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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10739 ***
+
+THE ESSAYS
+
+OF
+
+ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER
+
+TRANSLATED BY
+
+T. BAILEY SAUNDERS, M.A.
+
+
+
+
+ON HUMAN NATURE.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+  HUMAN NATURE
+  GOVERNMENT
+  FREE-WILL AND FATALISM
+  CHARACTER
+  MORAL INSTINCT
+  ETHICAL REFLECTIONS
+
+
+
+
+TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
+
+The following essays are drawn from the chapters entitled _Zur Ethik_
+and _Zur Rechtslehre und Politik_ which are to be found both in
+Schopenhauer's _Parerga_ and in his posthumous writings. As in my
+previous volumes, so also in this, I have omitted a few passages which
+appeared to me to be either antiquated or no longer of any general
+interest. For convenience' sake I have divided the original chapters
+into sections, which I have had to name; and I have also had to invent
+a title which should express their real scope. The reader will find
+that it is not so much _Ethics_ and _Politics_ that are here treated,
+as human nature itself in various aspects.
+
+T.B.S.
+
+
+
+
+HUMAN NATURE.
+
+
+Truths of the physical order may possess much external significance,
+but internal significance they have none. The latter is the privilege
+of intellectual and moral truths, which are concerned with the
+objectivation of the will in its highest stages, whereas physical
+truths are concerned with it in its lowest.
+
+For example, if we could establish the truth of what up till now is
+only a conjecture, namely, that it is the action of the sun which
+produces thermoelectricity at the equator; that this produces
+terrestrial magnetism; and that this magnetism, again, is the cause of
+the _aurora borealis_, these would be truths externally of great, but
+internally of little, significance. On the other hand, examples
+of internal significance are furnished by all great and true
+philosophical systems; by the catastrophe of every good tragedy; nay,
+even by the observation of human conduct in the extreme manifestations
+of its morality and immorality, of its good and its evil character.
+For all these are expressions of that reality which takes outward
+shape as the world, and which, in the highest stages of its
+objectivation, proclaims its innermost nature.
+
+To say that the world has only a physical and not a moral significance
+is the greatest and most pernicious of all errors, the fundamental
+blunder, the real perversity of mind and temper; and, at bottom, it
+is doubtless the tendency which faith personifies as Anti-Christ.
+Nevertheless, in spite of all religions--and they are systems which
+one and all maintain the opposite, and seek to establish it in their
+mythical way--this fundamental error never becomes quite extinct, but
+raises its head from time to time afresh, until universal indignation
+compels it to hide itself once more.
+
+Yet, however certain we may feel of the moral significance of life
+and the world, to explain and illustrate it, and to resolve the
+contradiction between this significance and the world as it is, form
+a task of great difficulty; so great, indeed, as to make it possible
+that it has remained for me to exhibit the true and only genuine
+and sound basis of morality everywhere and at all times effective,
+together with the results to which it leads. The actual facts of
+morality are too much on my side for me to fear that my theory can
+ever be replaced or upset by any other.
+
+However, so long as even my ethical system continues to be ignored by
+the professorial world, it is Kant's moral principle that prevails in
+the universities. Among its various forms the one which is most in
+favour at present is "the dignity of man." I have already exposed
+the absurdity of this doctrine in my treatise on the _Foundation of
+Morality_.[1] Therefore I will only say here that if the question were
+asked on what the alleged dignity of man rests, it would not be long
+before the answer was made that it rests upon his morality. In other
+words, his morality rests upon his dignity, and his dignity rests upon
+his morality.
+
+[Footnote 1: § 8.]
+
+But apart from this circular argument it seems to me that the idea of
+dignity can be applied only in an ironical sense to a being whose will
+is so sinful, whose intellect is so limited, whose body is so weak and
+perishable as man's. How shall a man be proud, when his conception
+is a crime, his birth a penalty, his life a labour, and death a
+necessity!--
+
+  _Quid superbit homo? cujus conceptio culpa,
+  Nasci poena, labor vita, necesse mori_!
+
+Therefore, in opposition to the above-mentioned form of the Kantian
+principle, I should be inclined to lay down the following rule: When
+you come into contact with a man, no matter whom, do not attempt an
+objective appreciation of him according to his worth and dignity. Do
+not consider his bad will, or his narrow understanding and perverse
+ideas; as the former may easily lead you to hate and the latter to
+despise him; but fix your attention only upon his sufferings, his
+needs, his anxieties, his pains. Then you will always feel your
+kinship with him; you will sympathise with him; and instead of hatred
+or contempt you will experience the commiseration that alone is the
+peace to which the Gospel calls us. The way to keep down hatred and
+contempt is certainly not to look for a man's alleged "dignity," but,
+on the contrary, to regard him as an object of pity.
+
+The Buddhists, as the result of the more profound views which they
+entertain on ethical and metaphysical subjects, start from the
+cardinal vices and not the cardinal virtues; since the virtues make
+their appearance only as the contraries or negations of the vices.
+According to Schmidt's _History of the Eastern Mongolians_ the
+cardinal vices in the Buddhist scheme are four: Lust, Indolence,
+Anger, and Avarice. But probably instead of Indolence, we should read
+Pride; for so it stands in the _Lettres édifiantes et curieuses_,[1]
+where Envy, or Hatred, is added as a fifth. I am confirmed in
+correcting the statement of the excellent Schmidt by the fact that my
+rendering agrees with the doctrine of the Sufis, who are certainly
+under the influence of the Brahmins and Buddhists. The Sufis also
+maintain that there are four cardinal vices, and they arrange them in
+very striking pairs, so that Lust appears in connection with Avarice,
+and Anger with Pride. The four cardinal virtues opposed to them would
+be Chastity and Generosity, together with Gentleness and Humility.
+
+[Footnote 1: Edit, of 1819, vol. vi., p. 372.]
+
+When we compare these profound ideas of morality, as they are
+entertained by oriental nations, with the celebrated cardinal virtues
+of Plato, which have been recapitulated again and again--Justice,
+Valour, Temperance, and Wisdom--it is plain that the latter are not
+based on any clear, leading idea, but are chosen on grounds that are
+superficial and, in part, obviously false. Virtues must be qualities
+of the will, but Wisdom is chiefly an attribute of the Intellect.
+[Greek: Sophrosynae], which Cicero translates _Temperantia_, is a very
+indefinite and ambiguous word, and it admits, therefore, of a variety
+of applications: it may mean discretion, or abstinence, or keeping a
+level head. Courage is not a virtue at all; although sometimes it is a
+servant or instrument of virtue; but it is just as ready to become
+the servant of the greatest villainy. It is really a quality of
+temperament. Even Geulinx (in the preface to this _Ethics_) condemned
+the Platonic virtues and put the following in their place: Diligence,
+Obedience, Justice and Humility; which are obviously bad. The Chinese
+distinguish five cardinal virtues: Sympathy, Justice, Propriety,
+Wisdom, and Sincerity. The virtues of Christianity are theological,
+not cardinal: Faith, Love, and Hope.
+
+Fundamental disposition towards others, assuming the character either
+of Envy or of Sympathy, is the point at which the moral virtues and
+vices of mankind first diverge. These two diametrically opposite
+qualities exist in every man; for they spring from the inevitable
+comparison which he draws between his own lot and that of others.
+According as the result of this comparison affects his individual
+character does the one or the other of these qualities become the
+source and principle of all his action. Envy builds the wall between
+_Thee_ and _Me_ thicker and stronger; Sympathy makes it slight and
+transparent; nay, sometimes it pulls down the wall altogether; and
+then the distinction between self and not-self vanishes.
+
+Valour, which has been mentioned as a virtue, or rather the Courage
+on which it is based (for valour is only courage in war), deserves a
+closer examination. The ancients reckoned Courage among the virtues,
+and cowardice among the vices; but there is no corresponding idea in
+the Christian scheme, which makes for charity and patience, and in its
+teaching forbids all enmity or even resistance. The result is that
+with the moderns Courage is no longer a virtue. Nevertheless it must
+be admitted that cowardice does not seem to be very compatible with
+any nobility of character--if only for the reason that it betrays an
+overgreat apprehension about one's own person.
+
+Courage, however, may also be explained as a readiness to meet ills
+that threaten at the moment, in order to avoid greater ills that
+lie in the future; whereas cowardice does the contrary. But this
+readiness is of the same quality as _patience_, for patience consists
+in the clear consciousness that greater evils than those which are
+present, and that any violent attempt to flee from or guard against
+the ills we have may bring the others upon us. Courage, then, would
+be a kind of patience; and since it is patience that enables us to
+practise forbearance and self control, Courage is, through the medium
+of patience, at least akin to virtue.
+
+But perhaps Courage admits of being considered from a higher point of
+view. The fear of death may in every case be traced to a deficiency
+in that natural philosophy--natural, and therefore resting on mere
+feeling--which gives a man the assurance that he exists in everything
+outside him just as much as in his own person; so that the death of
+his person can do him little harm. But it is just this very assurance
+that would give a man heroic Courage; and therefore, as the reader
+will recollect from my _Ethics_, Courage comes from the same source as
+the virtues of Justice and Humanity. This is, I admit, to take a very
+high view of the matter; but apart from it I cannot well explain why
+cowardice seems contemptible, and personal courage a noble and sublime
+thing; for no lower point of view enables me to see why a finite
+individual who is everything to himself--nay, who is himself even
+the very fundamental condition of the existence of the rest of the
+world--should not put his own preservation above every other aim. It
+is, then, an insufficient explanation of Courage to make it rest
+only on utility, to give it an empirical and not a transcendental
+character. It may have been for some such reason that Calderon once
+uttered a sceptical but remarkable opinion in regard to Courage, nay,
+actually denied its reality; and put his denial into the mouth of a
+wise old minister, addressing his young sovereign. "Although," he
+observed, "natural fear is operative in all alike, a man may be brave
+in not letting it be seen; and it is this that constitutes Courage":
+
+  _Que aunque el natural temor
+  En todos obra igualmente,
+  No mostrarle es ser valiente
+  Y esto es lo que hace el valor_.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: _La Hija del Aire_, ii., 2.]
+
+In regard to the difference which I have mentioned between the
+ancients and the moderns in their estimate of Courage as a virtue,
+it must be remembered that by Virtue, _virtus_, [Greek: aretae], the
+ancients understood every excellence or quality that was praiseworthy
+in itself, it might be moral or intellectual, or possibly only
+physical. But when Christianity demonstrated that the fundamental
+tendency of life was moral, it was moral superiority alone than
+henceforth attached to the notion of Virtue. Meanwhile the earlier
+usage still survived in the elder Latinists, and also in Italian
+writers, as is proved by the well-known meaning of the word
+_virtuoso_. The special attention of students should be drawn to this
+wider range of the idea of Virtue amongst the ancients, as otherwise
+it might easily be a source of secret perplexity. I may recommend two
+passages preserved for us by Stobaeus, which will serve this purpose.
+One of them is apparently from the Pythagorean philosopher Metopos, in
+which the fitness of every bodily member is declared to be a virtue.
+The other pronounces that the virtue of a shoemaker is to make good
+shoes. This may also serve to explain why it is that in the ancient
+scheme of ethics virtues and vices are mentioned which find no place
+in ours.
+
+As the place of Courage amongst the virtues is a matter of doubt,
+so is that of Avarice amongst the vices. It must not, however, be
+confounded with greed, which is the most immediate meaning of the
+Latin word _avaritia_. Let us then draw up and examine the arguments
+_pro et contra_ in regard to Avarice, and leave the final judgment to
+be formed by every man for himself.
+
+On the one hand it is argued that it is not Avarice which is a vice,
+but extravagance, its opposite. Extravagance springs from a brutish
+limitation to the present moment, in comparison with which the future,
+existing as it does only in thought, is as nothing. It rests upon the
+illusion that sensual pleasures possess a positive or real value.
+Accordingly, future need and misery is the price at which the
+spendthrift purchases pleasures that are empty, fleeting, and often no
+more than imaginary; or else feeds his vain, stupid self-conceit on
+the bows and scrapes of parasites who laugh at him in secret, or on
+the gaze of the mob and those who envy his magnificence. We should,
+therefore, shun the spendthrift as though he had the plague, and on
+discovering his vice break with him betimes, in order that later on,
+when the consequences of his extravagance ensue, we may neither have
+to help to bear them, nor, on the other hand, have to play the part of
+the friends of Timon of Athens.
+
+At the same time it is not to be expected that he who foolishly
+squanders his own fortune will leave another man's intact, if it
+should chance to be committed to his keeping; nay, _sui profusus_ and
+_alieni appetens_ are by Sallust very rightly conjoined. Hence it is
+that extravagance leads not only to impoverishment but also to crime;
+and crime amongst the moneyed classes is almost always the result of
+extravagance. It is accordingly with justice that the _Koran_ declares
+all spendthrifts to be "brothers of Satan."
+
+But it is superfluity that Avarice brings in its train, and when was
+superfluity ever unwelcome? That must be a good vice which has good
+consequences. Avarice proceeds upon the principle that all pleasure is
+only negative in its operation and that the happiness which consists
+of a series of pleasures is a chimaera; that, on the contrary, it
+is pains which are positive and extremely real. Accordingly, the
+avaricious man foregoes the former in order that he may be the
+better preserved from the latter, and thus it is that _bear and
+forbear_--_sustine et abstine_--is his maxim. And because he knows,
+further, how inexhaustible are the possibilities of misfortune,
+and how innumerable the paths of danger, he increases the means of
+avoiding them, in order, if possible, to surround himself with a
+triple wall of protection. Who, then, can say where precaution against
+disaster begins to be exaggerated? He alone who knows where the
+malignity of fate reaches its limit. And even if precaution were
+exaggerated it is an error which at the most would hurt the man who
+took it, and not others. If he will never need the treasures which he
+lays up for himself, they will one day benefit others whom nature
+has made less careful. That until then he withdraws the money
+from circulation is no misfortune; for money is not an article of
+consumption: it only represents the good things which a man may
+actually possess, and is not one itself. Coins are only counters;
+their value is what they represent; and what they represent cannot be
+withdrawn from circulation. Moreover, by holding back the money,
+the value of the remainder which is in circulation is enhanced by
+precisely the same amount. Even though it be the case, as is said,
+that many a miser comes in the end to love money itself for its own
+sake, it is equally certain that many a spendthrift, on the other
+hand, loves spending and squandering for no better reason. Friendship
+with a miser is not only without danger, but it is profitable, because
+of the great advantages it can bring. For it is doubtless those who
+are nearest and dearest to the miser who on his death will reap
+the fruits of the self-control which he exercised; but even in his
+lifetime, too, something may be expected of him in cases of great
+need. At any rate one can always hope for more from him than from the
+spendthrift, who has lost his all and is himself helpless and in debt.
+_Mas da el duro que el desnudo_, says a Spanish proverb; the man who
+has a hard heart will give more than the man who has an empty purse.
+The upshot of all this is that Avarice is not a vice.
+
+On the other side, it may be said that Avarice is the quintessence of
+all vices. When physical pleasures seduce a man from the right path,
+it is his sensual nature--the animal part of him--which is at fault.
+He is carried away by its attractions, and, overcome by the impression
+of the moment, he acts without thinking of the consequences. When,
+on the other hand, he is brought by age or bodily weakness to the
+condition in which the vices that he could never abandon end by
+abandoning him, and his capacity for physical pleasure dies--if he
+turns to Avarice, the intellectual desire survives the sensual. Money,
+which represents all the good things of this world, and is these good
+things in the abstract, now becomes the dry trunk overgrown with all
+the dead lusts of the flesh, which are egoism in the abstract. They
+come to life again in the love of the Mammon. The transient pleasure
+of the senses has become a deliberate and calculated lust of money,
+which, like that to which it is directed, is symbolical in its nature,
+and, like it, indestructible.
+
+This obstinate love of the pleasures of the world--a love which, as it
+were, outlives itself; this utterly incorrigible sin, this refined
+and sublimated desire of the flesh, is the abstract form in which all
+lusts are concentrated, and to which it stands like a general idea to
+individual particulars. Accordingly, Avarice is the vice of age, just
+as extravagance is the vice of youth.
+
+This _disputatio in utramque partem_--this debate for and against--is
+certainly calculated to drive us into accepting the _juste milieu_
+morality of Aristotle; a conclusion that is also supported by the
+following consideration.
+
+Every human perfection is allied to a defect into which it threatens
+to pass; but it is also true that every defect is allied to a
+perfection. Hence it is that if, as often happens, we make a mistake
+about a man, it is because at the beginning of our acquaintance with
+him we confound his defects with the kinds of perfection to which they
+are allied. The cautious man seems to us a coward; the economical man,
+a miser; the spendthrift seems liberal; the rude fellow, downright and
+sincere; the foolhardy person looks as if he were going to work with a
+noble self-confidence; and so on in many other cases.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+No one can live among men without feeling drawn again and again to the
+tempting supposition that moral baseness and intellectual incapacity
+are closely connected, as though they both sprang direct from one
+source. That that, however, is not so, I have shown in detail.[1] That
+it seems to be so is merely due to the fact that both are so often
+found together; and the circumstance is to be explained by the very
+frequent occurrence of each of them, so that it may easily happen for
+both to be compelled to live under one roof. At the same time it is
+not to be denied that they play into each other's hands to their
+mutual benefit; and it is this that produces the very unedifying
+spectacle which only too many men exhibit, and that makes the world to
+go as it goes. A man who is unintelligent is very likely to show his
+perfidy, villainy and malice; whereas a clever man understands how
+to conceal these qualities. And how often, on the other hand, does
+a perversity of heart prevent a man from seeing truths which his
+intelligence is quite capable of grasping!
+
+[Footnote 1: In my chief work, vol. ii., ch. xix,]
+
+Nevertheless, let no one boast. Just as every man, though he be the
+greatest genius, has very definite limitations in some one sphere of
+knowledge, and thus attests his common origin with the essentially
+perverse and stupid mass of mankind, so also has every man something
+in his nature which is positively evil. Even the best, nay the
+noblest, character will sometimes surprise us by isolated traits of
+depravity; as though it were to acknowledge his kinship with the human
+race, in which villainy--nay, cruelty--is to be found in that degree.
+For it was just in virtue of this evil in him, this bad principle,
+that of necessity he became a man. And for the same reason the world
+in general is what my clear mirror of it has shown it to be.
+
+But in spite of all this the difference even between one man and
+another is incalculably great, and many a one would be horrified to
+see another as he really is. Oh, for some Asmodeus of morality, to
+make not only roofs and walls transparent to his favourites, but
+also to lift the veil of dissimulation, fraud, hypocrisy, pretence,
+falsehood and deception, which is spread over all things! to show how
+little true honesty there is in the world, and how often, even where
+it is least to be expected, behind all the exterior outwork of virtue,
+secretly and in the innermost recesses, unrighteousness sits at the
+helm! It is just on this account that so many men of the better kind
+have four-footed friends: for, to be sure, how is a man to get relief
+from the endless dissimulation, falsity and malice of mankind, if
+there were no dogs into whose honest faces he can look without
+distrust?
+
+For what is our civilised world but a big masquerade? where you meet
+knights, priests, soldiers, men of learning, barristers, clergymen,
+philosophers, and I don't know what all! But they are not what they
+pretend to be; they are only masks, and, as a rule, behind the masks
+you will find moneymakers. One man, I suppose, puts on the mask of
+law, which he has borrowed for the purpose from a barrister, only in
+order to be able to give another man a sound drubbing; a second has
+chosen the mask of patriotism and the public welfare with a similar
+intent; a third takes religion or purity of doctrine. For all sorts
+of purposes men have often put on the mask of philosophy, and even
+of philanthropy, and I know not what besides. Women have a smaller
+choice. As a rule they avail themselves of the mask of morality,
+modesty, domesticity, and humility. Then there are general masks,
+without any particular character attaching to them like dominoes. They
+may be met with everywhere; and of this sort is the strict rectitude,
+the courtesy, the sincere sympathy, the smiling friendship, that
+people profess. The whole of these masks as a rule are merely, as I
+have said, a disguise for some industry, commerce, or speculation. It
+is merchants alone who in this respect constitute any honest class.
+They are the only people who give themselves out to be what they are;
+and therefore they go about without any mask at all, and consequently
+take a humble rank.
+
+It is very necessary that a man should be apprised early in life that
+it is a masquerade in which he finds himself. For otherwise there are
+many things which he will fail to understand and put up with, nay, at
+which he will be completely puzzled, and that man longest of all whose
+heart is made of better clay--
+
+  _Et meliore luto finxit praecordia Titan.[1]_
+
+[Footnote 1: Juvenal, _Sat_. 14, 34]
+
+Such for instance is the favour that villainy finds; the neglect that
+merit, even the rarest and the greatest, suffers at the hands of those
+of the same profession; the hatred of truth and great capacity; the
+ignorance of scholars in their own province; and the fact that true
+wares are almost always despised and the merely specious ones in
+request. Therefore let even the young be instructed betimes that in
+this masquerade the apples are of wax, the flowers of silk, the fish
+of pasteboard, and that all things--yes, all things--are toys and
+trifles; and that of two men whom he may see earnestly engaged in
+business, one is supplying spurious goods and the other paying for
+them in false coin.
+
+But there are more serious reflections to be made, and worse things to
+be recorded. Man is at bottom a savage, horrible beast. We know it,
+if only in the business of taming and restraining him which we call
+civilisation. Hence it is that we are terrified if now and then his
+nature breaks out. Wherever and whenever the locks and chains of law
+and order fall off and give place to anarchy, he shows himself for
+what he is. But it is unnecessary to wait for anarchy in order to gain
+enlightenment on this subject. A hundred records, old and new, produce
+the conviction that in his unrelenting cruelty man is in no way
+inferior to the tiger and the hyaena. A forcible example is supplied
+by a publication of the year 1841 entitled _Slavery and the Internal
+Slave Trade in the United States of North America: being replies to
+questions transmitted by the British Anti-slavery Society to the
+American Anti-slavery Society_.[1] This book constitutes one of the
+heaviest indictments against the human race. No one can put it down
+with a feeling of horror, and few without tears. For whatever the
+reader may have ever heard, or imagined, or dreamt, of the unhappy
+condition of slavery, or indeed of human cruelty in general, it will
+seem small to him when he reads of the way in which those devils
+in human form, those bigoted, church-going, strictly Sabbatarian
+rascals--and in particular the Anglican priests among them--treated
+their innocent black brothers, who by wrong and violence had got into
+their diabolical clutches.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's 'Note_.--If Schopenhauer were writing
+to-day, he would with equal truth point to the miseries of the African
+trade. I have slightly abridged this passage, as some of the evils
+against which he protested no longer exist.]
+
+Other examples are furnished by Tshudi's _Travels in Peru_, in the
+description which he gives of the treatment of the Peruvian soldiers
+at the hands of their officers; and by Macleod's _Travels in Eastern
+Africa_, where the author tells of the cold-blooded and truly devilish
+cruelty with which the Portuguese in Mozambique treat their slaves.
+But we need not go for examples to the New World, that obverse side of
+our planet. In the year 1848 it was brought to life that in England,
+not in one, but apparently in a hundred cases within a brief period, a
+husband had poisoned his wife or _vice versâ_, or both had joined in
+poisoning their children, or in torturing them slowly to death by
+starving and ill-treating them, with no other object than to get the
+money for burying them which they had insured in the Burial Clubs
+against their death. For this purpose a child was often insured in
+several, even in as many as twenty clubs at once.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. _The Times_, 20th, 22nd and 23rd Sept., 1848, and
+also 12th Dec., 1853.]
+
+Details of this character belong, indeed, to the blackest pages in the
+criminal records of humanity. But, when all is said, it is the
+inward and innate character of man, this god _par excellence_ of the
+Pantheists, from which they and everything like them proceed. In every
+man there dwells, first and foremost, a colossal egoism, which breaks
+the bounds of right and justice with the greatest freedom, as everyday
+life shows on a small scale, and as history on every page of it on a
+large. Does not the recognised need of a balance of power in Europe,
+with the anxious way in which it is preserved, demonstrate that man
+is a beast of prey, who no sooner sees a weaker man near him than he
+falls upon him without fail? and does not the same hold good of the
+affairs of ordinary life?
+
+But to the boundless egoism of our nature there is joined more or
+less in every human breast a fund of hatred, anger, envy, rancour and
+malice, accumulated like the venom in a serpent's tooth, and waiting
+only for an opportunity of venting itself, and then, like a demon
+unchained, of storming and raging. If a man has no great occasion for
+breaking out, he will end by taking advantage of the smallest, and by
+working it up into something great by the aid of his imagination; for,
+however small it may be, it is enough to rouse his anger--
+
+  _Quantulacunque adeo est occasio, sufficit irae[1]_--
+
+[Footnote 1: Juvenal, _Sat_. 13, 183.]
+
+and then he will carry it as far as he can and may. We see this in
+daily life, where such outbursts are well known under the name of
+"venting one's gall on something." It will also have been observed
+that if such outbursts meet with no opposition the subject of them
+feels decidedly the better for them afterwards. That anger is
+not without its pleasure is a truth that was recorded even by
+Aristotle;[1] and he quotes a passage from Homer, who declares anger
+to be sweeter than honey. But not in anger alone--in hatred too, which
+stands to anger like a chronic to an acute disease, a man may indulge
+with the greatest delight:
+
+[Footnote 1: _Rhet_., i., 11; ii., 2.]
+
+  _Now hatred is by far the longest pleasure,
+  Men love in haste, but they detest at leisure_[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Byron _Don Juan_, c. xiii, 6.]
+
+Gobineau in his work _Les Races Humaines_ has called man _l'animal
+méchant par excellence_. People take this very ill, because they feel
+that it hits them; but he is quite right, for man is the only animal
+which causes pain to others without any further purpose than just to
+cause it. Other animals never do it except to satisfy their hunger, or
+in the rage of combat. If it is said against the tiger that he kills
+more than eats, he strangles his prey only for the purpose of eating
+it; and if he cannot eat it, the only explanation is, as the French
+phrase has it, that _ses yeux sont plus grands que son estomac_. No
+animal ever torments another for the mere purpose of tormenting, but
+man does it, and it is this that constitutes the diabolical feature in
+his character which is so much worse than the merely animal. I have
+already spoken of the matter in its broad aspect; but it is manifest
+even in small things, and every reader has a daily opportunity
+of observing it. For instance, if two little dogs are playing
+together--and what a genial and charming sight it is--and a child of
+three or four years joins them, it is almost inevitable for it to
+begin hitting them with a whip or stick, and thereby show itself, even
+at that age, _l'animal méchant par excellence_. The love of teasing
+and playing tricks, which is common enough, may be traced to the same
+source. For instance, if a man has expressed his annoyance at any
+interruption or other petty inconvenience, there will be no lack of
+people who for that very reason will bring it about: _animal méchant
+par excellence_! This is so certain that a man should be careful not
+to express any annoyance at small evils. On the other hand he should
+also be careful not to express his pleasure at any trifle, for, if
+he does so, men will act like the jailer who, when he found that his
+prisoner had performed the laborious task of taming a spider, and took
+a pleasure in watching it, immediately crushed it under his foot:
+_l'animal méchant par excellence_! This is why all animals are
+instinctively afraid of the sight, or even of the track of a man, that
+_animal méchant par excellence_! nor does their instinct them false;
+for it is man alone who hunts game for which he has no use and which
+does him no harm.
+
+It is a fact, then, that in the heart of every man there lies a wild
+beast which only waits for an opportunity to storm and rage, in its
+desire to inflict pain on others, or, if they stand in his way, to
+kill them. It is this which is the source of all the lust of war and
+battle. In trying to tame and to some extent hold it in check, the
+intelligence, its appointed keeper, has always enough to do. People
+may, if they please, call it the radical evil of human nature--a
+name which will at least serve those with whom a word stands for an
+explanation. I say, however, that it is the will to live, which, more
+and more embittered by the constant sufferings of existence, seeks to
+alleviate its own torment by causing torment in others. But in this
+way a man gradually develops in himself real cruelty and malice. The
+observation may also be added that as, according to Kant, matter
+subsists only through the antagonism of the powers of expansion and
+contraction, so human society subsists only by the antagonism of
+hatred, or anger, and fear. For there is a moment in the life of
+all of us when the malignity of our nature might perhaps make us
+murderers, if it were not accompanied by a due admixture of fear to
+keep it within bounds; and this fear, again, would make a man the
+sport and laughing stock of every boy, if anger were not lying ready
+in him, and keeping watch.
+
+But it is _Schadenfreude_, a mischievous delight in the misfortunes of
+others, which remains the worst trait in human nature. It is a feeling
+which is closely akin to cruelty, and differs from it, to say the
+truth, only as theory from practice. In general, it may be said of it
+that it takes the place which pity ought to take--pity which is its
+opposite, and the true source of all real justice and charity.
+
+_Envy_ is also opposed to pity, but in another sense; envy, that is
+to say, is produced by a cause directly antagonistic to that which
+produces the delight in mischief. The opposition between pity and envy
+on the one hand, and pity and the delight in mischief on the other,
+rests, in the main, on the occasions which call them forth. In the
+case of envy it is only as a direct effect of the cause which excites
+it that we feel it at all. That is just the reason why envy, although
+it is a reprehensible feeling, still admits of some excuse, and is,
+in general, a very human quality; whereas the delight in mischief is
+diabolical, and its taunts are the laughter of hell.
+
+The delight in mischief, as I have said, takes the place which pity
+ought to take. Envy, on the contrary, finds a place only where there
+is no inducement to pity, or rather an inducement to its opposite; and
+it is just as this opposite that envy arises in the human breast; and
+so far, therefore, it may still be reckoned a human sentiment. Nay, I
+am afraid that no one will be found to be entirely free from it. For
+that a man should feel his own lack of things more bitterly at the
+sight of another's delight in the enjoyment of them, is natural; nay,
+it is inevitable; but this should not rouse his hatred of the man who
+is happier than himself. It is just this hatred, however, in which
+true envy consists. Least of all should a man be envious, when it is a
+question, not of the gifts of fortune, or chance, or another's favour,
+but of the gifts of nature; because everything that is innate in a man
+rests on a metaphysical basis, and possesses justification of a higher
+kind; it is, so to speak, given him by Divine grace. But, unhappily,
+it is just in the case of personal advantages that envy is most
+irreconcilable. Thus it is that intelligence, or even genius, cannot
+get on in the world without begging pardon for its existence, wherever
+it is not in a position to be able, proudly and boldly, to despise the
+world.
+
+In other words, if envy is aroused only by wealth, rank, or power,
+it is often kept down by egoism, which perceives that, on occasion,
+assistance, enjoyment, support, protection, advancement, and so
+on, may be hoped for from the object of envy or that at least by
+intercourse with him a man may himself win honour from the reflected
+light of his superiority; and here, too, there is the hope of one day
+attaining all those advantages himself. On the other hand, in the envy
+that is directed to natural gifts and personal advantages, like beauty
+in women, or intelligence in men, there is no consolation or hope of
+one kind or the other; so that nothing remains but to indulge a
+bitter and irreconcilable hatred of the person who possesses these
+privileges; and hence the only remaining desire is to take vengeance
+on him.
+
+But here the envious man finds himself in an unfortunate position; for
+all his blows fall powerless as soon as it is known that they come
+from him. Accordingly he hides his feelings as carefully as if they
+were secret sins, and so becomes an inexhaustible inventor of tricks
+and artifices and devices for concealing and masking his procedure,
+in order that, unperceived, he may wound the object of his envy. For
+instance, with an air of the utmost unconcern he will ignore the
+advantages which are eating his heart out; he will neither see them,
+nor know them, nor have observed or even heard of them, and thus make
+himself a master in the art of dissimulation. With great cunning he
+will completely overlook the man whose brilliant qualities are gnawing
+at his heart, and act as though he were quite an unimportant person;
+he will take no notice of him, and, on occasion, will have even quite
+forgotten his existence. But at the same time he will before all
+things endeavour by secret machination carefully to deprive those
+advantages of any opportunity of showing themselves and becoming
+known. Then out of his dark corner he will attack these qualities with
+censure, mockery, ridicule and calumny, like the toad which spurts
+its poison from a hole. No less will he enthusiastically praise
+unimportant people, or even indifferent or bad performances in the
+same sphere. In short, he will becomes a Proteas in stratagem, in
+order to wound others without showing himself. But what is the use
+of it? The trained eye recognises him in spite of it all. He betrays
+himself, if by nothing else, by the way in which he timidly avoids
+and flies from the object of his envy, who stands the more completely
+alone, the more brilliant he is; and this is the reason why pretty
+girls have no friends of their own sex. He betrays himself, too, by
+the causeless hatred which he shows--a hatred which finds vent in a
+violent explosion at any circumstance however trivial, though it is
+often only the product of his imagination. How many such men there are
+in the world may be recognised by the universal praise of modesty,
+that is, of a virtue invented on behalf of dull and commonplace
+people. Nevertheless, it is a virtue which, by exhibiting the
+necessity for dealing considerately with the wretched plight of these
+people, is just what calls attention to it.
+
+For our self-consciousness and our pride there can be nothing more
+flattering than the sight of envy lurking in its retreat and plotting
+its schemes; but never let a man forget that where there is envy there
+is hatred, and let him be careful not to make a false friend out of
+any envious person. Therefore it is important to our safety to lay
+envy bare; and a man should study to discover its tricks, as it is
+everywhere to be found and always goes about _incognito_; or as I
+have said, like a venomous toad it lurks in dark corners. It deserves
+neither quarter nor sympathy; but as we can never reconcile it let our
+rule of conduct be to scorn it with a good heart, and as our happiness
+and glory is torture to it we may rejoice in its sufferings:
+
+  _Den Neid wirst nimmer du versöhnen;
+  So magst du ihn getrost verhöhnen.
+  Dein Glück, dein Ruhm ist ihm ein Leiden:
+  Magst drum an seiner Quaal dich weiden_.
+
+We have been taking a look at the _depravity_ of man, and it is a
+sight which may well fill us with horror. But now we must cast our
+eyes on the _misery_ of his existence; and when we have done so, and
+are horrified by that too, we must look back again at his depravity.
+We shall then find that they hold the balance to each other. We shall
+perceive the eternal justice of things; for we shall recognise that
+the world is itself the Last Judgment on it, and we shall begin to
+understand why it is that everything that lives must pay the penalty
+of its existence, first in living and then in dying. Thus the evil
+of the penalty accords with the evil of the sin--_malum poenae_ with
+_malum culpae_. From the same point of view we lose our indignation at
+that intellectual incapacity of the great majority of mankind which in
+life so often disgusts us. In this _Sansara_, as the Buddhists call
+it, human misery, human depravity and human folly correspond with one
+another perfectly, and they are of like magnitude. But if, on some
+special inducement, we direct our gaze to one of them, and survey it
+in particular, it seems to exceed the other two. This, however, is an
+illusion, and merely the effect of their colossal range.
+
+All things proclaim this _Sansara_; more than all else, the world of
+mankind; in which, from a moral point of view, villainy and baseness,
+and from an intellectual point of view, incapacity and stupidity,
+prevail to a horrifying extent. Nevertheless, there appear in
+it, although very spasmodically, and always as a fresh surprise,
+manifestations of honesty, of goodness, nay, even of nobility; and
+also of great intelligence, of the thinking mind of genius. They never
+quite vanish, but like single points of light gleam upon us out of the
+great dark mass. We must accept them as a pledge that this _Sansara_
+contains a good and redeeming principle, which is capable of breaking
+through and of filling and freeing the whole of it.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The readers of my _Ethics_ know that with me the ultimate foundation
+of morality is the truth which in the _Vedas_ and the _Vedanta_
+receives its expression in the established, mystical formula, _Tat
+twam asi (This is thyself_), which is spoken with reference to every
+living thing, be it man or beast, and is called the _Mahavakya_, the
+great word.
+
+Actions which proceed in accordance with this principle, such as those
+of the philanthropist, may indeed be regarded as the beginning of
+mysticism. Every benefit rendered with a pure intention proclaims that
+the man who exercises it acts in direct conflict with the world of
+appearance; for he recognises himself as identical with another
+individual, who exists in complete separation from him. Accordingly,
+all disinterested kindness is inexplicable; it is a mystery; and hence
+in order to explain it a man has to resort to all sorts of fictions.
+When Kant had demolished all other arguments for theism, he admitted
+one only, that it gave the best interpretation and solution of such
+mysterious actions, and of all others like them. He therefore allowed
+it to stand as a presumption unsusceptible indeed of theoretical
+proof, but valid from a practical point of view. I may, however,
+express my doubts whether he was quite serious about it. For to make
+morality rest on theism is really to reduce morality to egoism;
+although the English, it is true, as also the lowest classes of
+society with us, do not perceive the possibility of any other
+foundation for it.
+
+The above-mentioned recognition of a man's own true being in
+another individual objectively presented to him, is exhibited in a
+particularly beautiful and clear way in the cases in which a man,
+already destined to death beyond any hope of rescue, gives himself up
+to the welfare of others with great solicitude and zeal, and tries to
+save them. Of this kind is the well-known story of a servant who was
+bitten in a courtyard at night by a mad dog. In the belief that she
+was beyond hope, she seized the dog and dragged it into a stable,
+which she then locked, so that no one else might be bitten. Then again
+there is the incident in Naples, which Tischbein has immortalised in
+one of his _aquarelles_. A son, fleeing from the lava which is rapidly
+streaming toward the sea, is carrying his aged father on his back.
+When there is only a narrow strip of land left between the devouring
+elements, the father bids the son put him down, so that the son may
+save himself by flight, as otherwise both will be lost. The son obeys,
+and as he goes casts a glance of farewell on his father. This is the
+moment depicted. The historical circumstance which Scott represents
+in his masterly way in _The Heart of Midlothian_, chap, ii., is of a
+precisely similar kind; where, of two delinquents condemned to death,
+the one who by his awkwardness caused the capture of the other happily
+sets him free in the chapel by overpowering the guard after the
+execution-sermon, without at the same time making any attempt on his
+own behalf. Nay, in the same category must also be placed the scene
+which is represented in a common engraving, which may perhaps be
+objectionable to western readers--I mean the one in which a soldier,
+kneeling to be shot, is trying by waving a cloth to frighten away his
+dog who wants to come to him.
+
+In all these cases we see an individual in the face of his own
+immediate and certain destruction no longer thinking of saving
+himself, so that he may direct the whole of his efforts to saving some
+one else. How could there be a clearer expression of the consciousness
+that what is being destroyed is only a phenomenon, and that the
+destruction itself is only a phenomenon; that, on the other hand, the
+real being of the man who meets his death is untouched by that event,
+and lives on in the other man, in whom even now, as his action
+betrays, he so clearly perceives it to exist? For if this were not so,
+and it was his real being which was about to be annihilated, how could
+that being spend its last efforts in showing such an ardent sympathy
+in the welfare and continued existence of another?
+
+There are two different ways in which a man may become conscious
+of his own existence. On the one hand, he may have an empirical
+perception of it, as it manifests itself externally--something so
+small that it approaches vanishing point; set in a world which, as
+regards time and space, is infinite; one only of the thousand millions
+of human creatures who run about on this planet for a very brief
+period and are renewed every thirty years. On the other hand, by going
+down into the depths of his own nature, a man may become conscious
+that he is all in all; that, in fact, he is the only real being; and
+that, in addition, this real being perceives itself again in others,
+who present themselves from without, as though they formed a mirror of
+himself.
+
+Of these two ways in which a man may come to know what he is, the
+first grasps the phenomenon alone, the mere product of _the principle
+of individuation_; whereas the second makes a man immediately
+conscious that he is _the thing-in-itself_. This is a doctrine in
+which, as regards the first way, I have Kant, and as regards both, I
+have the _Vedas_, to support me.
+
+There is, it is true, a simple objection to the second method. It may
+be said to assume that one and the same being can exist in different
+places at the same time, and yet be complete in each of them.
+Although, from an empirical point of view, this is the most palpable
+impossibility--nay, absurdity--it is nevertheless perfectly true
+of the thing-in-itself. The impossibility and the absurdity of it,
+empirically, are only due to the forms which phenomena assume,
+in accordance with the principle of individuation. For the
+thing-in-itself, the will to live, exists whole and undivided in every
+being, even in the smallest, as completely as in the sum-total of all
+things that ever were or are or will be. This is why every being, even
+the smallest, says to itself, So long as I am safe, let the world
+perish--_dum ego salvus sim, pereat mundus_. And, in truth, even if
+only one individual were left in the world, and all the rest were to
+perish, the one that remained would still possess the whole self-being
+of the world, uninjured and undiminished, and would laugh at the
+destruction of the world as an illusion. This conclusion _per
+impossible_ may be balanced by the counter-conclusion, which is on all
+fours with it, that if that last individual were to be annihilated in
+and with him the whole world would be destroyed. It was in this sense
+that the mystic Angelas Silesius[1] declared that God could not live
+for a moment without him, and that if he were to be annihilated God
+must of necessity give up the ghost:
+
+  _Ich weiss dass ohne mich Gott nicht ein Nu kann leben;
+  Werd' ich zunicht, er muss von Noth den Geist aufgeben_.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--Angelus Silesius, see _Counsels and
+Maxims_, p. 39, note.]
+
+But the empirical point of view also to some extent enables us to
+perceive that it is true, or at least possible, that our self can
+exist in other beings whose consciousness is separated and different
+from our own. That this is so is shown by the experience of
+somnambulists. Although the identity of their ego is preserved
+throughout, they know nothing, when they awake, of all that a moment
+before they themselves said, did or suffered. So entirely is the
+individual consciousness a phenomenon that even in the same ego two
+consciousnesses can arise of which the one knows nothing of the other.
+
+
+
+
+GOVERNMENT.
+
+
+It is a characteristic failing of the Germans to look in the clouds
+for what lies at their feet. An excellent example of this is furnished
+by the treatment which the idea of _Natural Right_ has received at
+the hands of professors of philosophy. When they are called upon
+to explain those simple relations of human life which make up the
+substance of this right, such as Right and Wrong, Property, State,
+Punishment and so on, they have recourse to the most extravagant,
+abstract, remote and meaningless conceptions, and out of them build a
+Tower of Babel reaching to the clouds, and taking this or that form
+according to the special whim of the professor for the time being. The
+clearest and simplest relations of life, such as affect us directly,
+are thus made quite unintelligible, to the great detriment of the
+young people who are educated in such a school. These relations
+themselves are perfectly simple and easily understood--as the reader
+may convince himself if he will turn to the account which I have given
+of them in the _Foundation of Morality_, § 17, and in my chief work,
+bk. i., § 62. But at the sound of certain words, like Right, Freedom,
+the Good, Being--this nugatory infinitive of the cupola--and many
+others of the same sort, the German's head begins to swim, and falling
+straightway into a kind of delirium he launches forth into high-flown
+phrases which have no meaning whatever. He takes the most remote and
+empty conceptions, and strings them together artificially, instead of
+fixing his eyes on the facts, and looking at things and relations as
+they really are. It is these things and relations which supply the
+ideas of Right and Freedom, and give them the only true meaning that
+they possess.
+
+The man who starts from the preconceived opinion that the conception
+of Right must be a positive one, and then attempts to define it, will
+fail; for he is trying to grasp a shadow, to pursue a spectre, to
+search for what does not exist. The conception of Right is a negative
+one, like the conception of Freedom; its content is mere negation.
+It is the conception of Wrong which is positive; Wrong has the same
+significance as _injury_--_laesio_--in the widest sense of the term.
+An injury may be done either to a man's person or to his property or
+to his honour; and accordingly a man's rights are easy to define:
+every one has a right to do anything that injures no one else.
+
+To have a right to do or claim a thing means nothing more than to be
+able to do or take or vise it without thereby injuring any one else.
+_Simplex sigillum veri_. This definition shows how senseless many
+questions are; for instance, the question whether we have the right to
+take our own life, As far as concerns the personal claims which others
+may possibly have upon us, they are subject to the condition that we
+are alive, and fall to the ground when we die. To demand of a man, who
+does not care to live any longer for himself, that he should live
+on as a mere machine for the advantage of others is an extravagant
+pretension.
+
+Although men's powers differ, their rights are alike. Their rights do
+not rest upon their powers, because Right is of a moral complexion;
+they rest on the fact that the same will to live shows itself in
+every man at the same stage of its manifestation. This, however, only
+applies to that original and abstract Right, which a man possesses as
+a man. The property, and also the honour, which a man acquires for
+himself by the exercise of his powers, depend on the measure and kind
+of power which he possesses, and so lend his Right a wider sphere of
+application. Here, then, equality comes to an end. The man who is
+better equipped, or more active, increases by adding to his gains, not
+his Right, but the number of the things to which it extends.
+
+In my chief work[1] I have proved that the State in its essence is
+merely an institution existing for the purpose of protecting its
+members against outward attack or inward dissension. It follows from
+this that the ultimate ground on which the State is necessary is the
+acknowledged lack of Right in the human race. If Right were there, no
+one would think of a State; for no one would have any fear that his
+rights would be impaired; and a mere union against the attacks of wild
+beasts or the elements would have very little analogy with what we
+mean by a State. From this point of view it is easy to see how dull
+and stupid are the philosophasters who in pompous phrases represent
+that the State is the supreme end and flower of human existence. Such
+a view is the apotheosis of Philistinism.
+
+[Footnote 1: 1 Bk. ii., ch. xlvii.]
+
+If it were Right that ruled in the world, a man would have done enough
+in building his house, and would need no other protection than the
+right of possessing it, which would be obvious. But since Wrong is the
+order of the day, it is requisite that the man who has built his house
+should also be able to protect it. Otherwise his Right is _de
+facto_ incomplete; the aggressor, that is to say, has the right of
+might--_Faustrecht_; and this is just the conception of Right
+which Spinoza entertains. He recognises no other. His words are:
+_unusquisque tantum juris habet quantum potentia valet_;[1] each man
+has as much right as he has power. And again: _uniuscujusque jus
+potentia ejus definitur_; each man's right is determined by his
+power.[2] Hobbes seems to have started this conception of Right,[3]
+and he adds the strange comment that the Right of the good Lord to all
+things rests on nothing but His omnipotence.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Tract. Theol. Pol_., ch. ii., § 8.]
+
+[Footnote 2: _Ethics_, IV., xxxvii., 1.]
+
+[Footnote 3: Particularly in a passage in the _De Cive_, I, § 14.]
+
+Now this is a conception of Right which, both in theory and in
+practice, no longer prevails in the civic world; but in the world
+in general, though abolished in theory, it continues to apply in
+practice. The consequences of neglecting it may be seen in the case
+of China. Threatened by rebellion within and foes without, this great
+empire is in a defenceless state, and has to pay the penalty of having
+cultivated only the arts of peace and ignored the arts of war.
+
+There is a certain analogy between the operations of nature and those
+of man which is a peculiar but not fortuitous character, and is based
+on the identity of the will in both. When the herbivorous animals had
+taken their place in the organic world, beasts of prey made their
+appearance--necessarily a late appearance--in each species, and
+proceeded to live upon them. Just in the same way, as soon as by
+honest toil and in the sweat of their faces men have won from the
+ground what is needed for the support of their societies, a number of
+individuals are sure to arise in some of these societies, who, instead
+of cultivating the earth and living on its produce, prefer to take
+their lives in their hands and risk health and freedom by falling upon
+those who are in possession of what they have honestly earned, and by
+appropriating the fruits of their labour. These are the beasts of
+prey in the human race; they are the conquering peoples whom we find
+everywhere in history, from the most ancient to the most recent times.
+Their varying fortunes, as at one moment they succeed and at another
+fail, make up the general elements of the history of the world. Hence
+Voltaire was perfectly right when he said that the aim of all war is
+robbery. That those who engage in it are ashamed of their doings is
+clear by the fact that governments loudly protest their reluctance to
+appeal to arms except for purposes of self-defence. Instead of trying
+to excuse themselves by telling public and official lies, which are
+almost more revolting than war itself, they should take their stand,
+as bold as brass, on Macchiavelli's doctrine. The gist of it may be
+stated to be this: that whereas between one individual and another,
+and so far as concerns the law and morality of their relations,
+the principle, _Don't do to others what you wouldn't like done to
+yourself_, certainly applies, it is the converse of this principle
+which is appropriate in the case of nations and in politics: _What you
+wouldn't like done to yourself do to others_. If you do not want to
+be put under a foreign yoke, take time by the forelock, and put your
+neighbour under it himself; whenever, that is to say, his weakness
+offers you the opportunity. For if you let the opportunity pass, it
+will desert one day to the enemy's camp and offer itself there. Then
+your enemy will put you under his yoke; and your failure to grasp the
+opportunity may be paid for, not by the generation which was guilty of
+it, but by the next. This Macchiavellian principle is always a much
+more decent cloak for the lust of robbery than the rags of very
+obvious lies in a speech from the head of the State; lies, too, of a
+description which recalls the well-known story of the rabbit attacking
+the dog. Every State looks upon its neighbours as at bottom a horde of
+robbers, who will fall upon it as soon as they have the opportunity.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Between the serf, the farmer, the tenant, and the mortgagee, the
+difference is rather one of form than of substance. Whether the
+peasant belongs to me, or the land on which he has to get a living;
+whether the bird is mine, or its food, the tree or its fruit, is a
+matter of little moment; for, as Shakespeare makes Shylock say:
+
+                              _You take my life
+  When you do take the means whereby I live_.
+
+The free peasant has, indeed, the advantage that he can go off and
+seek his fortune in the wide world; whereas the serf who is attached
+to the soil, _glebae adscriptus_, has an advantage which is perhaps
+still greater, that when failure of crops or illness, old age or
+incapacity, render him helpless, his master must look after him, and
+so he sleeps well at night; whereas, if the crops fail, his master
+tosses about on his bed trying to think how he is to procure bread for
+his men. As long ago as Menander it was said that it is better to
+be the slave of a good master than to live miserably as a freeman.
+Another advantage possessed by the free is that if they have any
+talents they can improve their position; but the same advantage is not
+wholly withheld from the slave. If he proves himself useful to his
+master by the exercise of any skill, he is treated accordingly; just
+as in ancient Rome mechanics, foremen of workshops, architects, nay,
+even doctors, were generally slaves.
+
+Slavery and poverty, then, are only two forms, I might almost say only
+two names, of the same thing, the essence of which is that a man's
+physical powers are employed, in the main, not for himself but for
+others; and this leads partly to his being over-loaded with work, and
+partly to his getting a scanty satisfaction for his needs. For Nature
+has given a man only as much physical power as will suffice, if he
+exerts it in moderation, to gain a sustenance from the earth. No great
+superfluity of power is his. If, then, a not inconsiderable number of
+men are relieved from the common burden of sustaining the existence
+of the human race, the burden of the remainder is augmented, and they
+suffer. This is the chief source of the evil which under the name of
+slavery, or under the name of the proletariat, has always oppressed
+the great majority of the human race.
+
+But the more remote cause of it is luxury. In order, it may be said,
+that some few persons may have what is unnecessary, superfluous,
+and the product of refinement--nay, in order that they may satisfy
+artificial needs--a great part of the existing powers of mankind
+has to be devoted to this object, and therefore withdrawn from the
+production of what is necessary and indispensable. Instead of building
+cottages for themselves, thousands of men build mansions for a few.
+Instead of weaving coarse materials for themselves and their families,
+they make fine cloths, silk, or even lace, for the rich, and in
+general manufacture a thousand objects of luxury for their pleasure. A
+great part of the urban population consists of workmen who make these
+articles of luxury; and for them and those who give them work the
+peasants have to plough and sow and look after the flocks as well
+as for themselves, and thus have more labour than Nature originally
+imposed upon them. Moreover, the urban population devotes a great deal
+of physical strength, and a great deal of land, to such things as
+wine, silk, tobacco, hops, asparagus and so on, instead of to corn,
+potatoes and cattle-breeding. Further, a number of men are withdrawn
+from agriculture and employed in ship-building and seafaring, in order
+that sugar, coffee, tea and other goods may be imported. In short,
+a large part of the powers of the human race is taken away from the
+production of what is necessary, in order to bring what is superfluous
+and unnecessary within the reach of a few. As long therefore as luxury
+exists, there must be a corresponding amount of over-work and misery,
+whether it takes the name of poverty or of slavery. The fundamental
+difference between the two is that slavery originates in violence,
+and poverty in craft. The whole unnatural condition of society--the
+universal struggle to escape from misery, the sea-trade attended with
+so much loss of life, the complicated interests of commerce, and
+finally the wars to which it all gives rise--is due, only and alone,
+to luxury, which gives no happiness even to those who enjoy it, nay,
+makes them ill and bad-tempered. Accordingly it looks as if the most
+effective way of alleviating human misery would be to diminish luxury,
+or even abolish it altogether.
+
+There is unquestionably much truth in this train of thought. But the
+conclusion at which it arrives is refuted by an argument possessing
+this advantage over it--that it is confirmed by the testimony of
+experience. A certain amount of work is devoted to purposes of luxury.
+What the human race loses in this way in the _muscular power_ which
+would otherwise be available for the necessities of existence is
+gradually made up to it a thousandfold by the _nervous power_, which,
+in a chemical sense, is thereby released. And since the intelligence
+and sensibility which are thus promoted are on a higher level than the
+muscular irritability which they supplant, so the achievements of mind
+exceed those of the body a thousandfold. One wise counsel is worth the
+work of many hands:
+
+  [Greek: Hos en sophon bouleuma tas pollon cheiras nika.]
+
+A nation of nothing but peasants would do little in the way of
+discovery and invention; but idle hands make active heads. Science and
+the Arts are themselves the children of luxury, and they discharge
+their debt to it. The work which they do is to perfect technology in
+all its branches, mechanical, chemical and physical; an art which in
+our days has brought machinery to a pitch never dreamt of before, and
+in particular has, by steam and electricity, accomplished things the
+like of which would, in earlier ages, have been ascribed to the agency
+of the devil. In manufactures of all kinds, and to some extent in
+agriculture, machines now do a thousand times more than could ever
+have been done by the hands of all the well-to-do, educated, and
+professional classes, and could ever have been attained if all luxury
+had been abolished and every one had returned to the life of a
+peasant. It is by no means the rich alone, but all classes, who derive
+benefit from these industries. Things which in former days hardly
+any one could afford are now cheap and abundant, and even the lowest
+classes are much better off in point of comfort. In the Middle Ages a
+King of England once borrowed a pair of silk stockings from one of his
+lords, so that he might wear them in giving an audience to the French
+ambassador. Even Queen Elizabeth was greatly pleased and astonished to
+receive a pair as a New Year's present; to-day every shopman has them.
+Fifty years ago ladies wore the kind of calico gowns which servants
+wear now. If mechanical science continues to progress at the same
+rate for any length of time, it may end by saving human labour almost
+entirely, just as horses are even now being largely superseded by
+machines. For it is possible to conceive that intellectual culture
+might in some degree become general in the human race; and this would
+be impossible as long as bodily labour was incumbent on any great part
+of it. Muscular irritability and nervous sensibility are always and
+everywhere, both generally and particularly, in antagonism; for the
+simple reason that it is one and the same vital power which underlies
+both. Further, since the arts have a softening effect on character, it
+is possible that quarrels great and small, wars and duels, will vanish
+from the world; just as both have become much rarer occurrences.
+However, it is not my object here to write a _Utopia_.
+
+But apart from all this the arguments used above in favour of the
+abolition of luxury and the uniform distribution of all bodily labour
+are open to the objection that the great mass of mankind, always and
+everywhere, cannot do without leaders, guides and counsellors, in
+one shape or another, according to the matter in question; judges,
+governors, generals, officials, priests, doctors, men of learning,
+philosophers, and so on, are all a necessity. Their common task is to
+lead the race for the greater part so incapable and perverse, through
+the labyrinth of life, of which each of them according to his position
+and capacity has obtained a general view, be his range wide or narrow.
+That these guides of the race should be permanently relieved of all
+bodily labour as well as of all vulgar need and discomfort; nay,
+that in proportion to their much greater achievements they should
+necessarily own and enjoy more than the common man, is natural and
+reasonable. Great merchants should also be included in the same
+privileged class, whenever they make far-sighted preparations for
+national needs.
+
+The question of the sovereignty of the people is at bottom the same
+as the question whether any man can have an original right to rule
+a people against its will. How that proposition can be reasonably
+maintained I do not see. The people, it must be admitted, is
+sovereign; but it is a sovereign who is always a minor. It must have
+permanent guardians, and it can never exercise its rights itself,
+without creating dangers of which no one can foresee the end;
+especially as like all minors, it is very apt to become the sport of
+designing sharpers, in the shape of what are called demagogues.
+
+Voltaire remarks that the first man to become a king was a successful
+soldier. It is certainly the case that all princes were originally
+victorious leaders of armies, and for a long time it was as such that
+they bore sway. On the rise of standing armies princes began to regard
+their people as a means of sustaining themselves and their soldiers,
+and treated them, accordingly, as though they were a herd of cattle,
+which had to be tended in order that it might provide wool, milk, and
+meat. The why and wherefore of all this, as I shall presently show in
+detail, is the fact that originally it was not right, but might, that
+ruled in the world. Might has the advantage of having been the first
+in the field. That is why it is impossible to do away with it and
+abolish it altogether; it must always have its place; and all that a
+man can wish or ask is that it should be found on the side of right
+and associated with it. Accordingly says the prince to his subjects:
+"I rule you in virtue of the power which I possess. But, on the other
+hand, it excludes that of any one else, and I shall suffer none but
+my own, whether it comes from without, or arises within by one of you
+trying to oppress another. In this way, then, you are protected." The
+arrangement was carried out; and just because it was carried out the
+old idea of kingship developed with time and progress into quite a
+different idea, and put the other one in the background, where it may
+still be seen, now and then, flitting about like a spectre. Its place
+has been taken by the idea of the king as father of his people, as
+the firm and unshakable pillar which alone supports and maintains the
+whole organisation of law and order, and consequently the rights
+of every man.[1] But a king can accomplish this only by inborn
+prerogative which reserves authority to him and to him alone--an
+authority which is supreme, indubitable, and beyond all attack, nay,
+to which every one renders instinctive obedience. Hence the king is
+rightly said to rule "by the grace of God." He is always the most
+useful person in the State, and his services are never too dearly
+repaid by any Civil List, however heavy.
+
+[Footnote 1: We read in Stobaeus, _Florilegium_, ch. xliv., 41, of a
+Persian custom, by which, whenever a king died, there was a five days'
+anarchy, in order that people might perceive the advantage of having
+kings and laws.]
+
+But even as late a writer as Macchiavelli was so decidedly imbued with
+the earlier or mediaeval conception of the position of a prince that
+he treats it as a matter which is self-evident: he never discusses it,
+but tacitly takes it as the presupposition and basis of his advice.
+It may be said generally that his book is merely the theoretical
+statement and consistent and systematic exposition of the practice
+prevailing in his time. It is the novel statement of it in a complete
+theoretical form that lends it such a poignant interest. The same
+thing, I may remark in passing, applies to the immortal little work of
+La Rochefaucauld, who, however, takes private and not public life for
+his theme, and offers, not advice, but observations. The title of this
+fine little book is open, perhaps, to some objection: the contents are
+not, as a rule, either _maxims_ or _reflections_, but _aperçus_;
+and that is what they should be called. There is much, too, in
+Macchiavelli that will be found also to apply to private life.
+
+Right in itself is powerless; in nature it is Might that rules. To
+enlist might on the side of right, so that by means of it right
+may rule, is the problem of statesmanship. And it is indeed a hard
+problem, as will be obvious if we remember that almost every human
+breast is the seat of an egoism which has no limits, and is usually
+associated with an accumulated store of hatred and malice; so that
+at the very start feelings of enmity largely prevail over those of
+friendship. We have also to bear in mind that it is many millions of
+individuals so constituted who have to be kept in the bonds of law
+and order, peace and tranquillity; whereas originally every one had
+a right to say to every one else: _I am just as good as you are_! A
+consideration of all this must fill us with surprise that on the whole
+the world pursues its way so peacefully and quietly, and with so much
+law and order as we see to exist. It is the machinery of State which
+alone accomplishes it. For it is physical power alone which has any
+direct action on men; constituted as they generally are, it is for
+physical power alone that they have any feeling or respect.
+
+If a man would convince himself by experience that this is the case,
+he need do nothing but remove all compulsion from his fellows, and try
+to govern them by clearly and forcibly representing to them what
+is reasonable, right, and fair, though at the same time it may be
+contrary to their interests. He would be laughed to scorn; and as
+things go that is the only answer he would get. It would soon be
+obvious to him that moral force alone is powerless. It is, then,
+physical force alone which is capable of securing respect. Now this
+force ultimately resides in the masses, where it is associated with
+ignorance, stupidity and injustice. Accordingly the main aim of
+statesmanship in these difficult circumstances is to put physical
+force in subjection to mental force--to intellectual superiority, and
+thus to make it serviceable. But if this aim is not itself accompanied
+by justice and good intentions the result of the business, if it
+succeeds, is that the State so erected consists of knaves and fools,
+the deceivers and the deceived. That this is the case is made
+gradually evident by the progress of intelligence amongst the masses,
+however much it may be repressed; and it leads to revolution. But
+if, contrarily, intelligence is accompanied by justice and good
+intentions, there arises a State as perfect as the character of human
+affairs will allow. It is very much to the purpose if justice and
+good intentions not only exist, but are also demonstrable and openly
+exhibited, and can be called to account publicly, and be subject to
+control. Care must be taken, however, lest the resulting participation
+of many persons in the work of government should affect the unity of
+the State, and inflict a loss of strength and concentration on the
+power by which its home and foreign affairs have to be administered.
+This is what almost always happens in republics. To produce a
+constitution which should satisfy all these demands would accordingly
+be the highest aim of statesmanship. But, as a matter of fact,
+statesmanship has to consider other things as well. It has to reckon
+with the people as they exist, and their national peculiarities. This
+is the raw material on which it has to work, and the ingredients of
+that material will always exercise a great effect on the completed
+scheme.
+
+Statesmanship will have achieved a good deal if it so far attains its
+object as to reduce wrong and injustice in the community to a minimum.
+To banish them altogether, and to leave no trace of them, is merely
+the ideal to be aimed at; and it is only approximately that it can be
+reached. If they disappear in one direction, they creep in again in
+another; for wrong and injustice lie deeply rooted in human nature.
+Attempts have been made to attain the desired aim by artificial
+constitutions and systematic codes of law; but they are not in
+complete touch with the facts--they remain an asymptote, for the
+simple reason that hard and fast conceptions never embrace all
+possible cases, and cannot be made to meet individual instances. Such
+conceptions resemble the stones of a mosaic rather than the delicate
+shading in a picture. Nay, more: all experiments in this matter are
+attended with danger; because the material in question, namely, the
+human race, is the most difficult of all material to handle. It is
+almost as dangerous as an explosive.
+
+No doubt it is true that in the machinery of the State the freedom
+of the press performs the same function as a safety-valve in other
+machinery; for it enables all discontent to find a voice; nay, in
+doing so, the discontent exhausts itself if it has not much substance;
+and if it has, there is an advantage in recognising it betimes
+and applying the remedy. This is much better than to repress the
+discontent, and let it simmer and ferment, and go on increasing until
+it ends in an explosion. On the other hand, the freedom of the press
+may be regarded as a permission to sell poison--poison for the heart
+and the mind. There is no idea so foolish but that it cannot be put
+into the heads of the ignorant and incapable multitude, especially if
+the idea holds out some prospect of any gain or advantage. And when a
+man has got hold of any such idea what is there that he will not do?
+I am, therefore, very much afraid that the danger of a free press
+outweighs its utility, particularly where the law offers a way of
+redressing wrongs. In any case, however, the freedom of the press
+should be governed by a very strict prohibition of all and every
+anonymity.
+
+Generally, indeed, it may be maintained that right is of a nature
+analogous to that of certain chemical substances, which cannot be
+exhibited in a pure and isolated condition, but at the most only with
+a small admixture of some other substance, which serves as a vehicle
+for them, or gives them the necessary consistency; such as fluorine,
+or even alcohol, or prussic acid. Pursuing the analogy we may say that
+right, if it is to gain a footing in the world and really prevail,
+must of necessity be supplemented by a small amount of arbitrary
+force, in order that, notwithstanding its merely ideal and therefore
+ethereal nature, it may be able to work and subsist in the real and
+material world, and not evaporate and vanish into the clouds, as
+it does in Hesoid. Birth-right of every description, all heritable
+privileges, every form of national religion, and so on, may be
+regarded as the necessary chemical base or alloy; inasmuch as it is
+only when right has some such firm and actual foundation that it can
+be enforced and consistently vindicated. They form for right a sort of
+[Greek: os moi pou sto]--a fulcrum for supporting its lever.
+
+Linnaeus adopted a vegetable system of an artificial and arbitrary
+character. It cannot be replaced by a natural one, no matter how
+reasonable the change might be, or how often it has been attempted to
+make it, because no other system could ever yield the same certainty
+and stability of definition. Just in the same way the artificial and
+arbitrary basis on which, as has been shown, the constitution of
+a State rests, can never be replaced by a purely natural basis. A
+natural basis would aim at doing away with the conditions that have
+been mentioned: in the place of the privileges of birth it would put
+those of personal merit; in the place of the national religion, the
+results of rationalistic inquiry, and so on. However agreeable to
+reason this might all prove, the change could not be made; because a
+natural basis would lack that certainty and fixity of definition which
+alone secures the stability of the commonwealth. A constitution which
+embodied abstract right alone would be an excellent thing for natures
+other than human, but since the great majority of men are extremely
+egoistic, unjust, inconsiderate, deceitful, and sometimes even
+malicious; since in addition they are endowed with very scanty
+intelligence there arises the necessity for a power that shall be
+concentrated in one man, a power that shall be above all law and
+right, and be completely irresponsible, nay, to which everything shall
+yield as to something that is regarded as a creature of a higher
+kind, a ruler by the grace of God. It is only thus that men can be
+permanently held in check and governed.
+
+The United States of North America exhibit the attempt to proceed
+without any such arbitrary basis; that is to say, to allow abstract
+right to prevail pure and unalloyed. But the result is not attractive.
+For with all the material prosperity of the country what do we find?
+The prevailing sentiment is a base Utilitarianism with its inevitable
+companion, ignorance; and it is this that has paved the way for a
+union of stupid Anglican bigotry, foolish prejudice, coarse brutality,
+and a childish veneration of women. Even worse things are the order of
+the day: most iniquitous oppression of the black freemen, lynch law,
+frequent assassination often committed with entire impunity, duels of
+a savagery elsewhere unknown, now and then open scorn of all law and
+justice, repudiation of public debts, abominable political rascality
+towards a neighbouring State, followed by a mercenary raid on its rich
+territory,--afterwards sought to be excused, on the part of the chief
+authority of the State, by lies which every one in the country knew to
+be such and laughed at--an ever-increasing ochlocracy, and finally
+all the disastrous influence which this abnegation of justice in high
+quarters must have exercised on private morals. This specimen of a
+pure constitution on the obverse side of the planet says very little
+for republics in general, but still less for the imitations of it in
+Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia and Peru.
+
+A peculiar disadvantage attaching to republics--and one that might
+not be looked for--is that in this form of government it must be more
+difficult for men of ability to attain high position and exercise
+direct political influence than in the case of monarchies. For always
+and everywhere and under all circumstances there is a conspiracy, or
+instinctive alliance, against such men on the part of all the stupid,
+the weak, and the commonplace; they look upon such men as their
+natural enemies, and they are firmly held together by a common fear of
+them. There is always a numerous host of the stupid and the weak,
+and in a republican constitution it is easy for them to suppress and
+exclude the men of ability, so that they may not be outflanked by
+them. They are fifty to one; and here all have equal rights at the
+start.
+
+In a monarchy, on the other hand, this natural and universal league of
+the stupid against those who are possessed of intellectual advantages
+is a one-sided affair; it exists only from below, for in a monarchy
+talent and intelligence receive a natural advocacy and support from
+above. In the first place, the position of the monarch himself is
+much too high and too firm for him to stand in fear of any sort of
+competition. In the next place, he serves the State more by his will
+than by his intelligence; for no intelligence could ever be equal
+to all the demands that would in his case be made upon it. He is
+therefore compelled to be always availing himself of other men's
+intelligence. Seeing that his own interests are securely bound up with
+those of his country; that they are inseparable from them and one with
+them, he will naturally give the preference to the best men, because
+they are his most serviceable instruments, and he will bestow his
+favour upon them--as soon, that is, as he can find them; which is not
+so difficult, if only an honest search be made. Just in the same
+way even ministers of State have too much advantage over rising
+politicians to need to regard them with jealousy; and accordingly for
+analogous reasons they are glad to single out distinguished men and
+set them to work, in order to make use of their powers for themselves.
+It is in this way that intelligence has always under a monarchical
+government a much better chance against its irreconcilable and
+ever-present foe, stupidity; and the advantage which it gains is very
+great.
+
+In general, the monarchical form of government is that which is
+natural to man; just as it is natural to bees and ants, to a flight of
+cranes, a herd of wandering elephants, a pack of wolves seeking prey
+in common, and many other animals, all of which place one of their
+number at the head of the business in hand. Every business in which
+men engage, if it is attended with danger--every campaign, every
+ship at sea--must also be subject to the authority of one commander;
+everywhere it is one will that must lead. Even the animal organism is
+constructed on a monarchical principle: it is the brain alone which
+guides and governs, and exercises the hegemony. Although heart, lungs,
+and stomach contribute much more to the continued existence of the
+whole body, these philistines cannot on that account be allowed to
+guide and lead. That is a business which belongs solely to the brain;
+government must proceed from one central point. Even the solar system
+is monarchical. On the other hand, a republic is as unnatural as it
+is unfavourable to the higher intellectual life and the arts and
+sciences. Accordingly we find that everywhere in the world, and at all
+times, nations, whether civilised or savage, or occupying a position
+between the two, are always under monarchical government. The rule of
+many as Homer said, is not a good thing: let there be one ruler, one
+king;
+
+  [Greek: Ouk agathon polykoiraniae-eis koiranos esto
+  Eis basoleus.] [1]
+
+[Footnote 1: _Iliad_, ii., 204.]
+
+How would it be possible that, everywhere and at all times, we should
+see many millions of people, nay, even hundreds of millions, become
+the willing and obedient subjects of one man, sometimes even one
+woman, and provisionally, even, of a child, unless there were a
+monarchical instinct in men which drove them to it as the form of
+government best suited to them? This arrangement is not the product
+of reflection. Everywhere one man is king, and for the most part his
+dignity is hereditary. He is, as it were, the personification, the
+monogram, of the whole people, which attains an individuality in him.
+In this sense he can rightly say: _l'etat c'est moi_. It is precisely
+for this reason that in Shakespeare's historical plays the kings
+of England and France mutually address each other as _France_ and
+_England_, and the Duke of Austria goes by the name of his country. It
+is as though the kings regarded themselves as the incarnation of their
+nationalities. It is all in accordance with human nature; and for this
+very reason the hereditary monarch cannot separate his own welfare and
+that of his family from the welfare of his country; as, on the other
+hand, mostly happens when the monarch is elected, as, for instance, in
+the States of the Church.[1] The Chinese can conceive of a monarchical
+government only; what a republic is they utterly fail to understand.
+When a Dutch legation was in China in the year 1658, it was obliged to
+represent that the Prince of Orange was their king, as otherwise the
+Chinese would have been inclined to take Holland for a nest of pirates
+living without any lord or master.[2] Stobaeus, in a chapter in his
+_Florilegium_, at the head of which he wrote _That monarchy is best_,
+collected the best of the passages in which the ancients explained
+the advantages of that form of government. In a word, republics are
+unnatural and artificial; they are the product of reflection. Hence it
+is that they occur only as rare exceptions in the whole history of
+the world. There were the small Greek republics, the Roman and the
+Carthaginian; but they were all rendered possible by the fact that
+five-sixths, perhaps even seven-eighths, of the population consisted
+of slaves. In the year 1840, even in the United States, there were
+three million slaves to a population of sixteen millions. Then, again,
+the duration of the republics of antiquity, compared with that of
+monarchies, was very short. Republics are very easy to found, and
+very difficult to maintain, while with monarchies it is exactly the
+reverse. If it is Utopian schemes that are wanted, I say this: the
+only solution of the problem would be a despotism of the wise and the
+noble, of the true aristocracy and the genuine nobility, brought about
+by the method of generation--that is, by the marriage of the noblest
+men with the cleverest and most intellectual women. This is my Utopia,
+my Republic of Plato.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--The reader will recollect that
+Schopenhauer was writing long before the Papal territories were
+absorbed into the kingdom of Italy.]
+
+[Footnote 2: See Jean Nieuhoff, _L'Ambassade de la Compagnie Orientale
+des Provinces Unies vers L'Empereur de la Chine_, traduit par Jean le
+Charpentier à Leyde, 1665; ch. 45.]
+
+Constitutional kings are undoubtedly in much the same position as
+the gods of Epicurus, who sit upon high in undisturbed bliss and
+tranquillity, and do not meddle with human affairs. Just now they are
+the fashion. In every German duodecimo-principality a parody of the
+English constitution is set up, quite complete, from Upper and
+Lower Houses down to the Habeas Corpus Act and trial by jury. These
+institutions, which proceed from English character and English
+circumstances, and presuppose both, are natural and suitable to the
+English people. It is just as natural to the German people to be split
+up into a number of different stocks, under a similar number of ruling
+Princes, with an Emperor over them all, who maintains peace at home,
+and represents the unity of the State board. It is an arrangement
+which has proceeded from German character and German circumstances.
+I am of opinion that if Germany is not to meet with the same fate as
+Italy, it must restore the imperial crown, which was done away with
+by its arch-enemy, the first Napoleon; and it must restore it as
+effectively as possible. [1] For German unity depends on it, and
+without the imperial crown it will always be merely nominal, or
+precarious. But as we no longer live in the days of Günther of
+Schwarzburg, when the choice of Emperor was a serious business, the
+imperial crown ought to go alternately to Prussia and to Austria, for
+the life of the wearer. In any case, the absolute sovereignty of the
+small States is illusory. Napoleon I. did for Germany what Otto the
+Great did for Italy: he divided it into small, independent States, on
+the principle, _divide et impera_.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--Here, again, it is hardly necessary
+to say that Schopenhauer, who died in 1860, and wrote this passage at
+least some years previously, cannot be referring to any of the
+events which culminated in 1870. The whole passage forms a striking
+illustration of his political sagacity.]
+
+The English show their great intelligence, amongst other ways, by
+clinging to their ancient institutions, customs and usages, and by
+holding them sacred, even at the risk of carrying this tenacity too
+far, and making it ridiculous. They hold them sacred for the simple
+reason that those institutions and customs are not the invention of an
+idle head, but have grown up gradually by the force of circumstance
+and the wisdom of life itself, and are therefore suited to them as a
+nation. On the other hand, the German Michel[1] allows himself to be
+persuaded by his schoolmaster that he must go about in an English
+dress-coat, and that nothing else will do. Accordingly he has bullied
+his father into giving it to him; and with his awkward manners this
+ungainly creature presents in it a sufficiently ridiculous figure. But
+the dress-coat will some day be too tight for him and incommode him.
+It will not be very long before he feels it in trial by jury. This
+institution arose in the most barbarous period of the Middle Ages--the
+times of Alfred the Great, when the ability to read and write exempted
+a man from the penalty of death. It is the worst of all criminal
+procedures. Instead of judges, well versed in law and of great
+experience, who have grown grey in daily unravelling the tricks and
+wiles of thieves, murderers and rascals of all sorts, and so are well
+able to get at the bottom of things, it is gossiping tailors and
+tanners who sit in judgment; it is their coarse, crude, unpractised,
+and awkward intelligence, incapable of any sustained attention, that
+is called upon to find out the truth from a tissue of lies and deceit.
+All the time, moreover, they are thinking of their cloth and their
+leather, and longing to be at home; and they have absolutely no clear
+notion at all of the distinction between probability and certainty. It
+is with this sort of a calculus of probabilities in their stupid heads
+that they confidently undertake to seal a man's doom.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--It may be well to explain that
+"Michel" is sometimes used by the Germans as a nickname of their
+nation, corresponding to "John Bull" as a nickname of the English.
+Flügel in his German-English Dictionary declares that _der deutsche
+Michel_ represents the German nation as an honest, blunt, unsuspicious
+fellow, who easily allows himself to be imposed upon, even, he adds,
+with a touch of patriotism, "by those who are greatly his inferiors in
+point of strength and real worth."]
+
+The same remark is applicable to them which Dr. Johnson made of a
+court-martial in which he had little confidence, summoned to decide a
+very important case. He said that perhaps there was not a member of
+it who, in the whole course of his life, had ever spent an hour by
+himself in balancing probabilities.[1] Can any one imagine that the
+tailor and the tanner would be impartial judges? What! the vicious
+multitude impartial! as if partiality were not ten times more to be
+feared from men of the same class as the accused than from judges who
+knew nothing of him personally, lived in another sphere altogether,
+were irremovable, and conscious of the dignity of their office. But
+to let a jury decide on crimes against the State and its head, or on
+misdemeanours of the press, is in a very real sense to set the fox to
+keep the geese.
+
+[Footnote 1: Boswell's _Johnson_, 1780, set. 71.]
+
+Everywhere and at all times there has been much discontent with
+governments, laws and public regulations; for the most part, however,
+because men are always ready to make institutions responsible for the
+misery inseparable from human existence itself; which is, to speak
+mythically, the curse that was laid on Adam, and through him on the
+whole race. But never has that delusion been proclaimed in a more
+mendacious and impudent manner than by the demagogues of the
+_Jetstzeit_--of the day we live in. As enemies of Christianity, they
+are, of course, optimists: to them the world is its own end and
+object, and accordingly in itself, that is to say, in its own natural
+constitution, it is arranged on the most excellent principles, and
+forms a regular habitation of bliss. The enormous and glaring evils of
+the world they attribute wholly to governments: if governments, they
+think, were to do their duty, there would be a heaven upon earth; in
+other words, all men could eat, drink, propagate and die, free from
+trouble and want. This is what they mean when they talk of the world
+being "its own end and object"; this is the goal of that "perpetual
+progress of the human race," and the other fine things which they are
+never tired of proclaiming.
+
+Formerly it was _faith_ which was the chief support of the throne;
+nowadays it is _credit_. The Pope himself is scarcely more concerned
+to retain the confidence of the faithful than to make his creditors
+believe in his own good faith. If in times past it was the guilty debt
+of the world which was lamented, now it is the financial debts of the
+world which arouse dismay. Formerly it was the Last Day which was
+prophesied; now it is the [Greek: seisachtheia] the great repudiation,
+the universal bankruptcy of the nations, which will one day happen;
+although the prophet, in this as in the other case, entertains a firm
+hope that he will not live to see it himself.
+
+From an ethical and a rational point of view, the _right of
+possession_ rests upon an incomparably better foundation than the
+_right of birth_; nevertheless, the right of possession is allied with
+the right of birth and has come to be part and parcel of it, so that
+it would hardly be possible to abolish the right of birth without
+endangering the right of possession. The reason of this is that most
+of what a man possesses he inherited, and therefore holds by a kind of
+right of birth; just as the old nobility bear the names only of their
+hereditary estates, and by the use of those names do no more than give
+expression to the fact that they own the estates. Accordingly all
+owners of property, if instead of being envious they were wise, ought
+also to support the maintenance of the rights of birth.
+
+The existence of a nobility has, then, a double advantage: it helps to
+maintain on the one hand the rights of possession, and on the other
+the right of birth belonging to the king. For the king is the first
+nobleman in the country, and, as a general rule, he treats the
+nobility as his humble relations, and regards them quite otherwise
+than the commoners, however trusty and well-beloved. It is quite
+natural, too, that he should have more confidence in those whose
+ancestors were mostly the first ministers, and always the immediate
+associates, of his own. A nobleman, therefore, appeals with reason
+to the name he bears, when on the occurrence of anything to rouse
+distrust he repeats his assurance of fidelity and service to the king.
+A man's character, as my readers are aware, assuredly comes to him
+from his father. It is a narrow-minded and ridiculous thing not to
+consider whose son a man is.
+
+
+
+
+FREE-WILL AND FATALISM.
+
+
+No thoughtful man can have any doubt, after the conclusions reached in
+my prize-essay on _Moral Freedom_, that such freedom is to be sought,
+not anywhere in nature, but outside of it. The only freedom that
+exists is of a metaphysical character. In the physical world freedom
+is an impossibility. Accordingly, while our several actions are in no
+wise free, every man's individual character is to be regarded as a
+free act. He is such and such a man, because once for all it is his
+will to be that man. For the will itself, and in itself, and also in
+so far as it is manifest in an individual, and accordingly constitutes
+the original and fundamental desires of that individual, is
+independent of all knowledge, because it is antecedent to such
+knowledge. All that it receives from knowledge is the series of
+motives by which it successively develops its nature and makes itself
+cognisable or visible; but the will itself, as something that lies
+beyond time, and so long as it exists at all, never changes. Therefore
+every man, being what he is and placed in the circumstances which
+for the moment obtain, but which on their part also arise by strict
+necessity, can absolutely never do anything else than just what at
+that moment he does do. Accordingly, the whole course of a man's life,
+in all its incidents great and small, is as necessarily predetermined
+as the course of a clock.
+
+The main reason of this is that the kind of metaphysical free act
+which I have described tends to become a knowing consciousness--a
+perceptive intuition, which is subject to the forms of space and time.
+By means of those forms the unity and indivisibility of the act are
+represented as drawn asunder into a series of states and events,
+which are subject to the Principle of Sufficient Reason in its four
+forms--and it is this that is meant by _necessity_. But the result of
+it all assumes a moral complexion. It amounts to this, that by what we
+do we know what we are, and by what we suffer we know what we deserve.
+
+Further, it follows from this that a man's _individuality_ does not
+rest upon the principle of individuation alone, and therefore is not
+altogether phenomenal in its nature. On the contrary, it has its roots
+in the thing-in-itself, in the will which is the essence of each
+individual. The character of this individual is itself individual. But
+how deep the roots of individuality extend is one of the questions
+which I do not undertake to answer.
+
+In this connection it deserves to be mentioned that even Plato, in his
+own way, represented the individuality of a man as a free act.[1] He
+represented him as coming into the world with a given tendency, which
+was the result of the feelings and character already attaching to
+him in accordance with the doctrine of metempsychosis. The Brahmin
+philosophers also express the unalterable fixity of innate character
+in a mystical fashion. They say that Brahma, when a man is produced,
+engraves his doings and sufferings in written characters on his skull,
+and that his life must take shape in accordance therewith. They point
+to the jagged edges in the sutures of the skull-bones as evidence of
+this writing; and the purport of it, they say, depends on his previous
+life and actions. The same view appears to underlie the Christian, or
+rather, the Pauline, dogma of Predestination.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Phaedrus_ and _Laws, bk_. x.]
+
+But this truth, which is universally confirmed by experience, is
+attended with another result. All genuine merit, moral as well as
+intellectual, is not merely physical or empirical in its origin,
+but metaphysical; that is to say, it is given _a priori_ and not _a
+posteriori_; in other words, it lies innate and is not acquired,
+and therefore its source is not a mere phenomenon, but the
+thing-in-itself. Hence it is that every man achieves only that which
+is irrevocably established in his nature, or is born with him.
+Intellectual capacity needs, it is true, to be developed just as many
+natural products need to be cultivated in order that we may enjoy or
+use them; but just as in the case of a natural product no cultivation
+can take the place of original material, neither can it do so in the
+case of intellect. That is the reason why qualities which are merely
+acquired, or learned, or enforced--that is, qualities _a posteriori_,
+whether moral or intellectual--are not real or genuine, but
+superficial only, and possessed of no value. This is a conclusion of
+true metaphysics, and experience teaches the same lesson to all who
+can look below the surface. Nay, it is proved by the great importance
+which we all attach to such innate characteristics as physiognomy and
+external appearance, in the case of a man who is at all distinguished;
+and that is why we are so curious to see him. Superficial people, to
+be sure,--and, for very good reasons, commonplace people too,--will be
+of the opposite opinion; for if anything fails them they will thus be
+enabled to console themselves by thinking that it is still to come.
+
+The world, then, is not merely a battlefield where victory and defeat
+receive their due recompense in a future state. No! the world is
+itself the Last Judgment on it. Every man carries with him the reward
+and the disgrace that he deserves; and this is no other than the
+doctrine of the Brahmins and Buddhists as it is taught in the theory
+of metempsychosis.
+
+The question has been raised, What two men would do, who lived a
+solitary life in the wilds and met each other for the first time.
+Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Rousseau have given different answers.
+Pufendorf believed that they would approach each other as friends;
+Hobbes, on the contrary, as enemies; Rousseau, that they would pass
+each other by In silence. All three are both right and wrong. This
+is just a case in which the incalculable difference that there is in
+innate moral disposition between one individual and another would make
+its appearance. The difference is so strong that the question here
+raised might be regarded as the standard and measure of it. For there
+are men in whom the sight of another man at once rouses a feeling of
+enmity, since their inmost nature exclaims at once: That is not me!
+There are, others in whom the sight awakens immediate sympathy; their
+inmost nature says: _That is me over again_! Between the two there
+are countless degrees. That in this most important matter we are so
+totally different is a great problem, nay, a mystery.
+
+In regard to this _a priori_ nature of moral character there is matter
+for varied reflection in a work by Bastholm, a Danish writer, entitled
+_Historical Contributions to the Knowledge of Man in the Savage
+State_. He is struck by the fact that intellectual culture and moral
+excellence are shown to be entirely independent of each other,
+inasmuch as one is often found without the other. The reason of this,
+as we shall find, is simply that moral excellence in no wise springs
+from reflection, which is developed by intellectual culture, but
+from the will itself, the constitution of which is innate and not
+susceptible in itself of any improvement by means of education.
+Bastholm represents most nations as very vicious and immoral; and on
+the other hand he reports that excellent traits of character are found
+amongst some savage peoples; as, for instance, amongst the Orotchyses,
+the inhabitants of the island Savu, the Tunguses, and the Pelew
+islanders. He thus attempts to solve the problem, How it is that some
+tribes are so remarkably good, when their neighbours are all bad,
+
+It seems to me that the difficulty may be explained as follows: Moral
+qualities, as we know, are heritable, and an isolated tribe, such as
+is described, might take its rise in some one family, and ultimately
+in a single ancestor who happened to be a good man, and then maintain
+its purity. Is it not the case, for instance, that on many unpleasant
+occasions, such as repudiation of public debts, filibustering raids
+and so on, the English have often reminded the North Americans of
+their descent from English penal colonists? It is a reproach, however,
+which can apply only to a small part of the population.
+
+It is marvellous how _every man's individuality_ (that is to say, the
+union of a definite character with a definite intellect) accurately
+determines all his actions and thoughts down to the most unimportant
+details, as though it were a dye which pervaded them; and how, in
+consequence, one man's whole course of life, in other words, his inner
+and outer history, turns out so absolutely different from another's.
+As a botanist knows a plant in its entirety from a single leaf; as
+Cuvier from a single bone constructed the whole animal, so an accurate
+knowledge of a man's whole character may be attained from a single
+characteristic act; that is to say, he himself may to some extent
+be constructed from it, even though the act in question is of very
+trifling consequence. Nay, that is the most perfect test of all, for
+in a matter of importance people are on their guard; in trifles
+they follow their natural bent without much reflection. That is
+why Seneca's remark, that even the smallest things may be taken as
+evidence of character, is so true: _argumenta morum ex minimis quoque
+licet capere_.[1] If a man shows by his absolutely unscrupulous and
+selfish behaviour in small things that a sentiment of justice is
+foreign to his disposition, he should not be trusted with a penny
+unless on due security. For who will believe that the man who every
+day shows that he is unjust in all matters other than those which
+concern property, and whose boundless selfishness everywhere protrudes
+through the small affairs of ordinary life which are subject to
+no scrutiny, like a dirty shirt through the holes of a ragged
+jacket--who, I ask, will believe that such a man will act honourably
+in matters of _meum_ and _tuum_ without any other incentive but that
+of justice? The man who has no conscience in small things will be a
+scoundrel in big things. If we neglect small traits of character,
+we have only ourselves to blame if we afterwards learn to our
+disadvantage what this character is in the great affairs of life. On
+the same principle, we ought to break with so-called friends even in
+matters of trifling moment, if they show a character that is malicious
+or bad or vulgar, so that we may avoid the bad turn which only waits
+for an opportunity of being done us. The same thing applies to
+servants. Let it always be our maxim: Better alone than amongst
+traitors.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Ep_., 52.]
+
+Of a truth the first and foremost step in all knowledge of mankind is
+the conviction that a man's conduct, taken as a whole, and in all its
+essential particulars, is not governed by his reason or by any of the
+resolutions which he may make in virtue of it. No man becomes this or
+that by wishing to be it, however earnestly. His acts proceed from his
+innate and unalterable character, and they are more immediately and
+particularly determined by motives. A man's conduct, therefore, is the
+necessary product of both character and motive. It may be illustrated
+by the course of a planet, which is the result of the combined effect
+of the tangential energy with which it is endowed, and the centripetal
+energy which operates from the sun. In this simile the former energy
+represents character, and the latter the influence of motive. It is
+almost more than a mere simile. The tangential energy which properly
+speaking is the source of the planet's motion, whilst on the
+other hand the motion is kept in check by gravitation, is, from a
+metaphysical point of view, the will manifesting itself in that body.
+
+To grasp this fact is to see that we really never form anything more
+than a conjecture of what we shall do under circumstances which are
+still to happen; although we often take our conjecture for a resolve.
+When, for instance, in pursuance of a proposal, a man with the
+greatest sincerity, and even eagerness, accepts an engagement to do
+this or that on the occurrence of a certain future event, it is by
+no means certain that he will fulfil the engagement; unless he is so
+constituted that the promise which he gives, in itself and as such, is
+always and everywhere a motive sufficient for him, by acting upon him,
+through considerations of honour, like some external compulsion. But
+above and beyond this, what he will do on the occurrence of that event
+may be foretold from true and accurate knowledge of his character and
+the external circumstances under the influence of which he will fall;
+and it may with complete certainty be foretold from this alone. Nay,
+it is a very easy prophecy if he has been already seen in a like
+position; for he will inevitably do the same thing a second time,
+provided that on the first occasion he had a true and complete
+knowledge of the facts of the case. For, as I have often remarked, a
+final cause does not impel a man by being real, but by being known;
+_causa finalis non movet secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum esse
+cognitum_.[1] Whatever he failed to recognise or understand the first
+time could have no influence upon his will; just as an electric
+current stops when some isolating body hinders the action of the
+conductor. This unalterable nature of character, and the consequent
+necessity of our actions, are made very clear to a man who has not,
+on any given occasion, behaved as he ought to have done, by showing
+a lack either of resolution or endurance or courage, or some other
+quality demanded at the moment. Afterwards he recognises what it is
+that he ought to have done; and, sincerely repenting of his incorrect
+behaviour, he thinks to himself, _If the opportunity were offered to
+me again, I should act differently_. It is offered once more; the same
+occasion recurs; and to his great astonishment he does precisely the
+same thing over again.[2]
+
+[Footnote 1: Suarez, _Disp. Metaph_., xxiii.; §§7 and 8.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Cf. _World as Will_, ii., pp. 251 ff. _sqq_. (third
+edition).]
+
+The best examples of the truth in question are in every way furnished
+by Shakespeare's plays. It is a truth with which he was thoroughly
+imbued, and his intuitive wisdom expressed it in a concrete shape on
+every page. I shall here, however, give an instance of it in a case in
+which he makes it remarkably clear, without exhibiting any design or
+affectation in the matter; for he was a real artist and never set
+out from general ideas. His method was obviously to work up to the
+psychological truth which he grasped directly and intuitively,
+regardless of the fact that few would notice or understand it, and
+without the smallest idea that some dull and shallow fellows in
+Germany would one day proclaim far and wide that he wrote his works to
+illustrate moral commonplaces. I allude to the character of the Earl
+of Northumberland, whom we find in three plays in succession, although
+he does not take a leading part in any one of them; nay, he appears
+only in a few scenes distributed over fifteen acts. Consequently, if
+the reader is not very attentive, a character exhibited at such great
+intervals, and its moral identity, may easily escape his notice, even
+though it has by no means escaped the poet's. He makes the earl appear
+everywhere with a noble and knightly grace, and talk in language
+suitable to it; nay, he sometimes puts very beautiful and even
+elevated passages, into his mouth. At the same time he is very far
+from writing after the manner of Schiller, who was fond of painting
+the devil black, and whose moral approval or disapproval of the
+characters which he presented could be heard in their own words. With
+Shakespeare, and also with Goethe, every character, as long as he is
+on the stage and speaking, seems to be absolutely in the right, even
+though it were the devil himself. In this respect let the reader
+compare Duke Alba as he appears in Goethe with the same character in
+Schiller.
+
+We make the acquaintance of the Earl of Northumberland in the play of
+_Richard II_., where he is the first to hatch a plot against the King
+in favour of Bolingbroke, afterwards Henry IV., to whom he even offers
+some personal flattery (Act II., Sc. 3). In the following act he
+suffers a reprimand because, in speaking of the King he talks of him
+as "Richard," without more ado, but protests that he did it only for
+brevity's sake. A little later his insidious words induce the King to
+surrender. In the following act, when the King renounces the crown,
+Northumberland treats him with such harshness and contempt that the
+unlucky monarch is quite broken, and losing all patience once more
+exclaims to him: _Fiend, thou torment'st me ere I come to hell_! At
+the close, Northumberland announces to the new King that he has sent
+the heads of the former King's adherents to London.
+
+In the following tragedy, _Henry IV_., he hatches a plot against the
+new King in just the same way. In the fourth act we see the rebels
+united, making preparations for the decisive battle on the morrow, and
+only waiting impatiently for Northumberland and his division. At last
+there arrives a letter from him, saying that he is ill, and that he
+cannot entrust his force to any one else; but that nevertheless the
+others should go forward with courage and make a brave fight. They
+do so, but, greatly weakened by his absence, they are completely
+defeated; most of their leaders are captured, and his own son, the
+valorous Hotspur, falls by the hand of the Prince of Wales.
+
+Again, in the following play, the _Second Part of Henry IV_., we see
+him reduced to a state of the fiercest wrath by the death of his son,
+and maddened by the thirst for revenge. Accordingly he kindles another
+rebellion, and the heads of it assemble once more. In the fourth act,
+just as they are about to give battle, and are only waiting for him to
+join them, there comes a letter saying that he cannot collect a proper
+force, and will therefore seek safety for the present in Scotland;
+that, nevertheless, he heartily wishes their heroic undertaking the
+best success. Thereupon they surrender to the King under a treaty
+which is not kept, and so perish.
+
+So far is character from being the work of reasoned choice and
+consideration that in any action the intellect has nothing to do but
+to present motives to the will. Thereafter it looks on as a mere
+spectator and witness at the course which life takes, in accordance
+with the influence of motive on the given character. All the incidents
+of life occur, strictly speaking, with the same necessity as the
+movement of a clock. On this point let me refer to my prize-essay on
+_The Freedom of the Will_. I have there explained the true meaning and
+origin of the persistent illusion that the will is entirely free in
+every single action; and I have indicated the cause to which it is
+due. I will only add here the following teleological explanation of
+this natural illusion.
+
+Since every single action of a man's life seems to possess the freedom
+and originality which in truth only belong to his character as he
+apprehends it, and the mere apprehension of it by his intellect is
+what constitutes his career; and since what is original in every
+single action seems to the empirical consciousness to be always being
+performed anew, a man thus receives in the course of his career the
+strongest possible moral lesson. Then, and not before, he becomes
+thoroughly conscious of all the bad sides of his character. Conscience
+accompanies every act with the comment: _You should act differently_,
+although its true sense is: _You could be other than you are_. As the
+result of this immutability of character on the one hand, and, on the
+other, of the strict necessity which attends all the circumstances in
+which character is successively placed, every man's course of life
+is precisely determined from Alpha right through to Omega. But,
+nevertheless, one man's course of life turns out immeasurably happier,
+nobler and more worthy than another's, whether it be regarded from a
+subjective or an objective point of view, and unless we are to exclude
+all ideas of justice, we are led to the doctrine which is well
+accepted in Brahmanism and Buddhism, that the subjective conditions in
+which, as well as the objective conditions under which, every man is
+born, are the moral consequences of a previous existence.
+
+Macchiavelli, who seems to have taken no interest whatever in
+philosophical speculations, is drawn by the keen subtlety of his very
+unique understanding into the following observation, which possesses
+a really deep meaning. It shows that he had an intuitive knowledge of
+the entire necessity with which, characters and motives being given,
+all actions take place. He makes it at the beginning of the prologue
+to his comedy _Clitia_. _If_, he says, _the same men were to recur
+in the world in the way that the same circumstances recur, a hundred
+years would never elapse without our finding ourselves together once
+more, and doing the same things as we are doing now--Se nel mondo
+tornassino i medesimi uomini, como tornano i medesimi casi, non
+passarebbono mai cento anni che noi non ci trovassimo un altra volta
+insieme, a fare le medesime cose che hora_. He seems however to have
+been drawn into the remark by a reminiscence of what Augustine says in
+his _De Civitate Dei_, bk. xii., ch. xiii.
+
+Again, Fate, or the [Greek: eimarmenae] of the ancients, is nothing
+but the conscious certainty that all that happens is fast bound by a
+chain of causes, and therefore takes place with a strict necessity;
+that the future is already ordained with absolute certainty and can
+undergo as little alteration as the past. In the fatalistic myths of
+the ancients all that can be regarded as fabulous is the prediction
+of the future; that is, if we refuse to consider the possibility of
+magnetic clairvoyance and second sight. Instead of trying to explain
+away the fundamental truth of Fatalism by superficial twaddle and
+foolish evasion, a man should attempt to get a clear knowledge and
+comprehension of it; for it is demonstrably true, and it helps us in a
+very important way to an understanding of the mysterious riddle of
+our life. Predestination and Fatalism do not differ in the main. They
+differ only in this, that with Predestination the given character and
+external determination of human action proceed from a rational Being,
+and with Fatalism from an irrational one. But in either case the
+result is the same: that happens which must happen.
+
+On the other hand the conception of _Moral Freedom_ is inseparable
+from that of _Originality_. A man may be said, but he cannot be
+conceived, to be the work of another, and at the same time be free in
+respect of his desires and acts. He who called him into existence out
+of nothing in the same process created and determined his nature--in
+other words, the whole of his qualities. For no one can create without
+creating a something, that is to say, a being determined throughout
+and in all its qualities. But all that a man says and does necessarily
+proceeds from the qualities so determined; for it is only the
+qualities themselves set in motion. It is only some external impulse
+that they require to make their appearance. As a man is, so must he
+act; and praise or blame attaches, not to his separate acts, but to
+his nature and being.
+
+That is the reason why Theism and the moral responsibility of man are
+incompatible; because responsibility always reverts to the creator of
+man and it is there that it has its centre. Vain attempts have been
+made to make a bridge from one of these incompatibles to the other by
+means of the conception of moral freedom; but it always breaks down
+again. What is _free_ must also be _original_. If our will is _free_,
+our will is also _the original element_, and conversely. Pre-Kantian
+dogmatism tried to separate these two predicaments. It was thereby
+compelled to assume two kinds of freedom, one cosmological, of the
+first cause, and the other moral and theological, of human will. These
+are represented in Kant by the third as well as the fourth antimony of
+freedom.
+
+On the other hand, in my philosophy the plain recognition of the
+strictly necessary character of all action is in accordance with the
+doctrine that what manifests itself even in the organic and irrational
+world is _will_. If this were not so, the necessity under which
+irrational beings obviously act would place their action in conflict
+with will; if, I mean, there were really such a thing as the freedom
+of individual action, and this were not as strictly necessitated as
+every other kind of action. But, as I have just shown, it is this same
+doctrine of the necessary character of all acts of will which makes it
+needful to regard a man's existence and being as itself the work of
+his freedom, and consequently of his will. The will, therefore, must
+be self-existent; it must possess so-called _a-se-ity_. Under the
+opposite supposition all responsibility, as I have shown, would be at
+an end, and the moral like the physical world would be a mere machine,
+set in motion for the amusement of its manufacturer placed somewhere
+outside of it. So it is that truths hang together, and mutually
+advance and complete one another; whereas error gets jostled at every
+corner.
+
+What kind of influence it is that _moral instruction_ may exercise
+on conduct, and what are the limits of that influence, are questions
+which I have sufficiently examined in the twentieth section of my
+treatise on the _Foundation of Morality_. In all essential particulars
+an analogous influence is exercised by _example_, which, however, has
+a more powerful effect than doctrine, and therefore it deserves a
+brief analysis.
+
+In the main, example works either by restraining a man or by
+encouraging him. It has the former effect when it determines him to
+leave undone what he wanted to do. He sees, I mean, that other people
+do not do it; and from this he judges, in general, that it is not
+expedient; that it may endanger his person, or his property, or his
+honour.
+
+He rests content, and gladly finds himself relieved from examining
+into the matter for himself. Or he may see that another man, who has
+not refrained, has incurred evil consequences from doing it; this is
+example of the deterrent kind. The example which encourages a man
+works in a twofold manner. It either induces him to do what he would
+be glad to leave undone, if he were not afraid lest the omission might
+in some way endanger him, or injure him in others' opinion; or else it
+encourages him to do what he is glad to do, but has hitherto refrained
+from doing from fear of danger or shame; this is example of the
+seductive kind. Finally, example may bring a man to do what he would
+have otherwise never thought of doing. It is obvious that in this last
+case example works in the main only on the intellect; its effect on
+the will is secondary, and if it has any such effect, it is by the
+interposition of the man's own judgment, or by reliance on the person
+who presented the example.
+
+The whole influence of example--and it is very strong--rests on the
+fact that a man has, as a rule, too little judgment of his own, and
+often too little knowledge, o explore his own way for himself, and
+that he is glad, therefore, to tread in the footsteps of some one
+else. Accordingly, the more deficient he is in either of these
+qualities, the more is he open to the influence of example; and we
+find, in fact, that most men's guiding star is the example of others;
+that their whole course of life, in great things and in small, comes
+in the end to be mere imitation; and that not even in the pettiest
+matters do they act according to their own judgment. Imitation and
+custom are the spring of almost all human action. The cause of it
+is that men fight shy of all and any sort of reflection, and very
+properly mistrust their own discernment. At the same time this
+remarkably strong imitative instinct in man is a proof of his kinship
+with apes.
+
+But the kind of effect which example exercises depends upon a man's
+character, and thus it is that the same example may possibly seduce
+one man and deter another. An easy opportunity of observing this is
+afforded in the case of certain social impertinences which come into
+vogue and gradually spread. The first time that a man notices anything
+of the kind, he may say to himself: _For shame! how can he do it! how
+selfish and inconsiderate of him! really, I shall take care never to
+do anything like that_. But twenty others will think: _Aha! if he does
+that, I may do it too_.
+
+As regards morality, example, like doctrine, may, it is true, promote
+civil or legal amelioration, but not that inward amendment which is,
+strictly speaking, the only kind of moral amelioration. For example
+always works as a personal motive alone, and assumes, therefore,
+that a man is susceptible to this sort of motive. But it is just the
+predominating sensitiveness of a character to this or that sort of
+motive that determines whether its morality is true and real; though,
+of whatever kind it is, it is always innate. In general it may be said
+that example operates as a means of promoting the good and the bad
+qualities of a character, but it does not create them; and so it
+is that Seneca's maxim, _velle non discitur_--_will cannot be
+learned_--also holds good here. But the innateness of all truly moral
+qualities, of the good as of the bad, is a doctrine that consorts
+better with the metempsychosis of the Brahmins and Buddhists,
+according to which a man's good and bad deeds follow him from one
+existence to another like his shadow, than with Judaism. For Judaism
+requires a man to come into the world as a moral blank, so that, in
+virtue of an inconceivable free will, directed to objects which
+are neither to be sought nor avoided--_liberum arbitrium
+indifferentiae_--and consequently as the result of reasoned
+consideration, he may choose whether he is to be an angel or a devil,
+or anything else that may lie between the two. Though I am well aware
+what the Jewish scheme is, I pay no attention to it; for my standard
+is truth. I am no professor of philosophy, and therefore I do not find
+my vocation in establishing the fundamental ideas of Judaism at any
+cost, even though they for ever bar the way to all and every kind of
+philosophical knowledge. _Liberum arbitrium indifferentiae_ under
+the name of _moral freedom_ is a charming doll for professors of
+philosophy to dandle; and we must leave it to those intelligent,
+honourable and upright gentlemen.
+
+
+
+
+CHARACTER.
+
+
+Men who aspire to a happy, a brilliant and a long life, instead of to
+a virtuous one, are like foolish actors who want to be always having
+the great parts,--the parts that are marked by splendour and triumph.
+They fail to see that the important thing is not _what_ or _how much_,
+but _how_ they act.
+
+Since _a man does not alter_, and his _moral character_ remains
+absolutely the same all through his life; since he must play out the
+part which he has received, without the least deviation from the
+character; since neither experience, nor philosophy, nor religion
+can effect any improvement in him, the question arises, What is the
+meaning of life at all? To what purpose is it played, this farce
+in which everything that is essential is irrevocably fixed and
+determined?
+
+It is played that a man may come to understand himself, that he may
+see what it is that he seeks and has sought to be; what he wants, and
+what, therefore, he is. _This is a knowledge which must be imparted
+to him from without_. Life is to man, in other words, to will, what
+chemical re-agents are to the body: it is only by life that a man
+reveals what he is, and it is only in so far as he reveals himself
+that he exists at all. Life is the manifestation of character, of the
+something that we understand by that word; and it is not in life, but
+outside of it, and outside time, that character undergoes alteration,
+as a result of the self-knowledge which life gives. Life is only
+the mirror into which a man gazes not in order that he may get a
+reflection of himself, but that he may come to understand himself by
+that reflection; that he may see _what_ it is that the mirror shows.
+Life is the proof sheet, in which the compositors' errors are brought
+to light. How they become visible, and whether the type is large or
+small, are matters of no consequence. Neither in the externals of life
+nor in the course of history is there any significance; for as it is
+all one whether an error occurs in the large type or in the small, so
+it is all one, as regards the essence of the matter, whether an evil
+disposition is mirrored as a conqueror of the world or a common
+swindler or ill-natured egoist. In one case he is seen of all men; in
+the other, perhaps only of himself; but that he should see himself is
+what signifies.
+
+Therefore if egoism has a firm hold of a man and masters him, whether
+it be in the form of joy, or triumph, or lust, or hope, or frantic
+grief, or annoyance, or anger, or fear, or suspicion, or passion of
+any kind--he is in the devil's clutches and how he got into them does
+not matter. What is needful is that he should make haste to get out of
+them; and here, again, it does not matter how.
+
+I have described _character_ as _theoretically_ an act of will lying
+beyond time, of which life in time, or _character in action_, is the
+development. For matters of practical life we all possess the one as
+well as the other; for we are constituted of them both. Character
+modifies our life more than we think, and it is to a certain extent
+true that every man is the architect of his own fortune. No doubt it
+seems as if our lot were assigned to us almost entirely from without,
+and imparted to us in something of the same way in which a melody
+outside us reaches the ear. But on looking back over our past, we see
+at once that our life consists of mere variations on one and the same
+theme, namely, our character, and that the same fundamental bass
+sounds through it all. This is an experience which a man can and must
+make in and by himself.
+
+Not only a man's life, but his intellect too, may be possessed of a
+clear and definite character, so far as his intellect is applied to
+matters of theory. It is not every man, however, who has an intellect
+of this kind; for any such definite individuality as I mean is
+genius--an original view of the world, which presupposes an absolutely
+exceptional individuality, which is the essence of genius. A man's
+intellectual character is the theme on which all his works are
+variations. In an essay which I wrote in Weimar I called it the knack
+by which every genius produces his works, however various. This
+intellectual character determines the physiognomy of men of
+genius--what I might call _the theoretical physiognomy_--and gives it
+that distinguished expression which is chiefly seen in the eyes and
+the forehead. In the case of ordinary men the physiognomy presents no
+more than a weak analogy with the physiognomy of genius. On the other
+hand, all men possess _the practical physiognomy_, the stamp of will,
+of practical character, of moral disposition; and it shows itself
+chiefly in the mouth.
+
+Since character, so far as we understand its nature, is above and
+beyond time, it cannot undergo any change under the influence of life.
+But although it must necessarily remain the same always, it requires
+time to unfold itself and show the very diverse aspects which it may
+possess. For character consists of two factors: one, the will-to-live
+itself, blind impulse, so-called impetuosity; the other, the restraint
+which the will acquires when it comes to understand the world; and the
+world, again, is itself will. A man may begin by following the craving
+of desire, until he comes to see how hollow and unreal a thing is
+life, how deceitful are its pleasures, what horrible aspects it
+possesses; and this it is that makes people hermits, penitents,
+Magdalenes. Nevertheless it is to be observed that no such change
+from a life of great indulgence in pleasure to one of resignation is
+possible, except to the man who of his own accord renounces pleasure.
+A really bad life cannot be changed into a virtuous one. The most
+beautiful soul, before it comes to know life from its horrible side,
+may eagerly drink the sweets of life and remain innocent. But it
+cannot commit a bad action; it cannot cause others suffering to do
+a pleasure to itself, for in that case it would see clearly what
+it would be doing; and whatever be its youth and inexperience it
+perceives the sufferings of others as clearly as its own pleasures.
+That is why one bad action is a guarantee that numberless others will
+be committed as soon as circumstances give occasion for them. Somebody
+once remarked to me, with entire justice, that every man had something
+very good and humane in his disposition, and also something very bad
+and malignant; and that according as he was moved one or the other of
+them made its appearance. The sight of others' suffering arouses, not
+only in different men, but in one and the same man, at one moment an
+inexhaustible sympathy, at another a certain satisfaction; and this
+satisfaction may increase until it becomes the cruellest delight in
+pain. I observe in myself that at one moment I regard all mankind with
+heartfelt pity, at another with the greatest indifference, on occasion
+with hatred, nay, with a positive enjoyment of their pain.
+
+All this shows very clearly that we are possessed of two different,
+nay, absolutely contradictory, ways of regarding the world: one
+according to the principle of individuation, which exhibits all
+creatures as entire strangers to us, as definitely not ourselves. We
+can have no feelings for them but those of indifference, envy, hatred,
+and delight that they suffer. The other way of regarding the world
+is in accordance with what I may call the
+_Tat-twam-asi_--_this-is-thyself_ principle. All creatures are
+exhibited as identical with ourselves; and so it is pity and love
+which the sight of them arouses.
+
+The one method separates individuals by impassable barriers; the other
+removes the barrier and brings the individuals together. The one makes
+us feel, in regard to every man, _that is what I am_; the other,
+_that is not what I am_. But it is remarkable that while the sight of
+another's suffering makes us feel our identity with him, and arouses
+our pity, this is not so with the sight of another's happiness. Then
+we almost always feel some envy; and even though we may have no such
+feeling in certain cases,--as, for instance, when our friends are
+happy,--yet the interest which we take in their happiness is of a weak
+description, and cannot compare with the sympathy which we feel with
+their suffering. Is this because we recognise all happiness to be a
+delusion, or an impediment to true welfare? No! I am inclined to think
+that it is because the sight of the pleasure, or the possessions,
+which are denied to us, arouses envy; that is to say, the wish that
+we, and not the other, had that pleasure or those possessions.
+
+It is only the first way of looking at the world which is founded on
+any demonstrable reason. The other is, as it were, the gate out of
+this world; it has no attestation beyond itself, unless it be the very
+abstract and difficult proof which my doctrine supplies. Why the first
+way predominates in one man, and the second in another--though perhaps
+it does not exclusively predominate in any man; why the one or the
+other emerges according as the will is moved--these are deep problems.
+The paths of night and day are close together:
+
+  [Greek: Engus gar nuktos de kai aematos eisi keleuthoi.]
+
+It is a fact that there is a great and original difference between
+one empirical character and another; and it is a difference which,
+at bottom, rests upon the relation of the individual's will to his
+intellectual faculty. This relation is finally determined by the
+degree of will in his father and of intellect in his mother; and the
+union of father and mother is for the most part an affair of chance.
+This would all mean a revolting injustice in the nature of the
+world, if it were not that the difference between parents and son is
+phenomenal only and all chance is, at bottom, necessity.
+
+As regards the freedom of the will, if it were the case that the will
+manifested itself in a single act alone, it would be a free act. But
+the will manifests itself in a course of life, that is to say, in a
+series of acts. Every one of these acts, therefore, is determined as
+a part of a complete whole, and cannot happen otherwise than it does
+happen. On the other hand, the whole series is free; it is simply the
+manifestation of an individualised will.
+
+If a man feels inclined to commit a bad action and refrains, he is
+kept back either (1) by fear of punishment or vengeance; or (2) by
+superstition in other words, fear of punishment in a future life; or
+(3) by the feeling of sympathy, including general charity; or (4) by
+the feeling of honour, in other words, the fear of shame; or (5) by
+the feeling of justice, that is, an objective attachment to fidelity
+and good-faith, coupled with a resolve to hold them sacred, because
+they are the foundation of all free intercourse between man and
+man, and therefore often of advantage to himself as well. This last
+thought, not indeed as a thought, but as a mere feeling, influences
+people very frequently. It is this that often compels a man of honour,
+when some great but unjust advantage is offered him, to reject it with
+contempt and proudly exclaim: _I am an honourable man_! For otherwise
+how should a poor man, confronted with the property which chance or
+even some worse agency has bestowed on the rich, whose very existence
+it is that makes him poor, feel so much sincere respect for this
+property, that he refuses to touch it even in his need; and although
+he has a prospect of escaping punishment, what other thought is it
+that can be at the bottom of such a man's honesty? He is resolved not
+to separate himself from the great community of honourable people
+who have the earth in possession, and whose laws are recognised
+everywhere. He knows that a single dishonest act will ostracise and
+proscribe him from that society for ever. No! a man will spend money
+on any soil that yields him good fruit, and he will make sacrifices
+for it.
+
+With a good action,--that, every action in which a man's own advantage
+is ostensibly subordinated to another's,--the motive is either (1)
+self-interest, kept in the background; or (2) superstition, in other
+words, self-interest in the form of reward in another life; or (3)
+sympathy; or (4) the desire to lend a helping hand, in other words,
+attachment to the maxim that we should assist one another in need, and
+the wish to maintain this maxim, in view of the presumption that some
+day we ourselves may find it serve our turn. For what Kant calls a
+good action done from motives of duty and for the sake of duty, there
+is, as will be seen, no room at all. Kant himself declares it to be
+doubtful whether an action was ever determined by pure motives of duty
+alone. I affirm most certainly that no action was ever so done; it is
+mere babble; there is nothing in it that could really act as a motive
+to any man. When he shelters himself behind verbiage of that sort, he
+is always actuated by one of the four motives which I have described.
+Among these it is obviously sympathy alone which is quite genuine and
+sincere.
+
+_Good_ and _bad_ apply to character only _à potiori_; that is to say,
+we prefer the good to the bad; but, absolutely, there is no such
+distinction. The difference arises at the point which lies between
+subordinating one's own advantage to that of another, and not
+subordinating it. If a man keeps to the exact middle, he is _just_.
+But most men go an inch in their regard for others' welfare to twenty
+yards in regard for their own.
+
+The source of _good_ and of _bad character_, so far as we have any
+real knowledge of it, lies in this, that with the bad character the
+thought of the external world, and especially of the living creatures
+in it, is accompanied--all the more, the greater the resemblance
+between them and the individual self--by a constant feeling of _not I,
+not I, not I_.
+
+Contrarily, with the good character (both being assumed to exist in
+a high degree) the same thought has for its accompaniment, like a
+fundamental bass, a constant feeling of _I, I, I_. From this spring
+benevolence and a disposition to help all men, and at the same time a
+cheerful, confident and tranquil frame of mind, the opposite of that
+which accompanies the bad character.
+
+The difference, however, is only phenomenal, although it is a
+difference which is radical. But now we come to _the hardest of all
+problems_: How is it that, while the will, as the thing-in-itself, is
+identical, and from a metaphysical point of view one and the same
+in all its manifestations, there is nevertheless such an enormous
+difference between one character and another?--the malicious,
+diabolical wickedness of the one, and set off against it, the goodness
+of the other, showing all the more conspicuously. How is it that we
+get a Tiberius, a Caligula, a Carcalla, a Domitian, a Nero; and on the
+other hand, the Antonines, Titus, Hadrian, Nerva? How is it that among
+the animals, nay, in a higher species, in individual animals, there is
+a like difference?--the malignity of the cat most strongly developed
+in the tiger; the spite of the monkey; on the other hand, goodness,
+fidelity and love in the dog and the elephant. It is obvious that the
+principle of wickedness in the brute is the same as in man.
+
+We may to some extent modify the difficulty of the problem by
+observing that the whole difference is in the end only one of degree.
+In every living creature, the fundamental propensities and instincts
+all exist, but they exist in very different degrees and proportions.
+This, however, is not enough to explain the facts.
+
+We must fall back upon the intellect and its relation to the will; it
+is the only explanation that remains. A man's intellect, however, by
+no means stands in any direct and obvious relation with the goodness
+of his character. We may, it is true, discriminate between two kinds
+of intellect: between understanding, as the apprehension of relation
+in accordance with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and cognition,
+a faculty akin to genius, which acts more directly, is independent of
+this law, and passes beyond the Principle of Individuation. The latter
+is the faculty which apprehends Ideas, and it is the faculty which
+has to do with morality. But even this explanation leaves much to
+be desired. _Fine minds are seldom fine souls_ was the correct
+observation of Jean Paul; although they are never the contrary. Lord
+Bacon, who, to be sure, was less a fine soul than a fine mind, was a
+scoundrel.
+
+I have declared space and time to be part of the Principle of
+Individuation, as it is only space and time that make the multiplicity
+of similar objects a possibility. But multiplicity itself also admits
+of variety; multiplicity and diversity are not only quantitative, but
+also qualitative. How is it that there is such a thing as qualitative
+diversity, especially in ethical matters? Or have I fallen into an
+error the opposite of that in which Leibnitz fell with his _identitas
+indiscernibilium_?
+
+The chief cause of intellectual diversity is to be found in the
+brain and nervous system. This is a fact which somewhat lessens the
+obscurity of the subject. With the brutes the intellect and the brain
+are strictly adapted to their aims and needs. With man alone there
+is now and then, by way of exception, a superfluity, which, if it is
+abundant, may yield genius. But ethical diversity, it seems, proceeds
+immediately from the will. Otherwise ethical character would not be
+above and beyond time, as it is only in the individual that intellect
+and will are united. The will is above and beyond time, and eternal;
+and character is innate; that is to say, it is sprung from the same
+eternity, and therefore it does not admit of any but a transcendental
+explanation.
+
+Perhaps some one will come after me who will throw light into this
+dark abyss.
+
+
+
+
+MORAL INSTINCT.
+
+
+An act done by instinct differs from every other kind of act in that
+an understanding of its object does not precede it but follows upon
+it. Instinct is therefore a rule of action given _à priori_. We may be
+unaware of the object to which it is directed, as no understanding of
+it is necessary to its attainment. On the other hand, if an act is
+done by an exercise of reason or intelligence, it proceeds according
+to a rule which the understanding has itself devised for the purpose
+of carrying out a preconceived aim. Hence it is that action according
+to rule may miss its aim, while instinct is infallible.
+
+On the _à priori_ character of instinct we may compare what Plato says
+in the _Philebus_. With Plato instinct is a reminiscence of something
+which a man has never actually experienced in his lifetime; in the
+same way as, in the _Phaedo_ and elsewhere, everything that a man
+learns is regarded as a reminiscence. He has no other word to express
+the _à priori_ element in all experience.
+
+There are, then, three things that are _à priori_:
+
+(1) Theoretical Reason, in other words, the conditions which make all
+experience possible.
+
+(2) Instinct, or the rule by which an object promoting the life of the
+senses may, though unknown, be attained.
+
+(3) The Moral Law, or the rule by which an action takes place without
+any object.
+
+Accordingly rational or intelligent action proceeds by a rule laid
+down in accordance with the object as it is understood. Instinctive
+action proceeds by a rule without an understanding of the object of
+it. Moral action proceeds by a rule without any object at all.
+
+_Theoretical Reason_ is the aggregate of rules in accordance
+with which all my knowledge--that is to say, the whole world of
+experience--necessarily proceeds. In the same manner _Instinct_ is the
+aggregate of rules in accordance with which all my action necessarily
+proceeds if it meets with no obstruction. Hence it seems to me that
+Instinct may most appropriately be called _practical reason_, for like
+theoretical reason it determines the _must_ of all experience.
+
+The so-called moral law, on the other hand, is only one aspect of _the
+better consciousness_, the aspect which it presents from the point of
+view of instinct. This better consciousness is something lying beyond
+all experience, that is, beyond all reason, whether of the theoretical
+or the practical kind, and has nothing to do with it; whilst it is in
+virtue of the mysterious union of it and reason in the same individual
+that the better consciousness comes into conflict with reason, leaving
+the individual to choose between the two.
+
+In any conflict between the better consciousness and reason, if the
+individual decides for reason, should it be theoretical reason, he
+becomes a narrow, pedantic philistine; should it be practical, a
+rascal.
+
+If he decides for the better consciousness, we can make no further
+positive affirmation about him, for if we were to do so, we should
+find ourselves in the realm of reason; and as it is only what takes
+place within this realm that we can speak of at all it follows that we
+cannot speak of the better consciousness except in negative terms.
+
+This shows us how it is that reason is hindered and obstructed;
+that _theoretical reason_ is suppressed in favour of _genius_, and
+_practical reason_ in favour of _virtue_. Now the better consciousness
+is neither theoretical nor practical; for these are distinctions that
+only apply to reason. But if the individual is in the act of choosing,
+the better consciousness appears to him in the aspect which it assumes
+in vanquishing and overcoming the practical reason (or instinct, to
+use the common word). It appears to him as an imperative command, an
+_ought_. It so appears to him, I say; in other words, that is the
+shape which it takes for the theoretical reason which renders
+all things into objects and ideas. But in so far as the better
+consciousness desires to vanquish and overcome the theoretical reason,
+it takes no shape at all; on the simple ground that, as it comes
+into play, the theoretical reason is suppressed and becomes the mere
+servant of the better consciousness. That is why genius can never give
+any account of its own works.
+
+In the morality of action, the legal principle that both sides are to
+be heard must not be allowed to apply; in other words, the claims of
+self and the senses must not be urged. Nay, on the contrary, as soon
+as the pure will has found expression, the case is closed; _nec
+audienda altera pars_.
+
+The lower animals are not endowed with moral freedom. Probably this is
+not because they show no trace of the better consciousness which in us
+is manifested as morality, or nothing analogous to it; for, if that
+were so, the lower animals, which are in so many respects like
+ourselves in outward appearance that we regard man as a species of
+animal, would possess some _raison d'être_ entirely different from our
+own, and actually be, in their essential and inmost nature, something
+quite other than ourselves. This is a contention which is obviously
+refuted by the thoroughly malignant and inherently vicious character
+of certain animals, such as the crocodile, the hyaena, the scorpion,
+the snake, and the gentle, affectionate and contented character of
+others, such as the dog. Here, as in the case of men, the character,
+as it is manifested, must rest upon something that is above and beyond
+time. For, as Jacob Böhme says,[1] _there is a power in every animal
+which is indestructible, and the spirit of the world draws it into
+itself, against the final separation at the Last Judgment_. Therefore
+we cannot call the lower animals free, and the reason why we cannot
+do so is that they are wanting in a faculty which is profoundly
+subordinate to the better consciousness in its highest phase, I mean
+reason. Reason is the faculty of supreme comprehension, the idea of
+totality. How reason manifests itself in the theoretical sphere Kant
+has shown, and it does the same in the practical: it makes us capable
+of observing and surveying the whole of our life, thought, and action,
+in continual connection, and therefore of acting according to general
+maxims, whether those maxims originate in the understanding as
+prudential rules, or in the better consciousness as moral laws.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Epistles_, 56.]
+
+If any desire or passion is aroused in us, we, and in the same way the
+lower animals, are for the moment filled with this desire; we are all
+anger, all lust, all fear; and in such moments neither the better
+consciousness can speak, nor the understanding consider the
+consequences. But in our case reason allows us even at that moment
+to see our actions and our life as an unbroken chain,--a chain
+which connects our earlier resolutions, or, it may be, the future
+consequences of our action, with the moment of passion which now fills
+our whole consciousness. It shows us the identity of our person, even
+when that person is exposed to influences of the most varied kind, and
+thereby we are enabled to act according to maxims. The lower animal
+is wanting in this faculty; the passion which seizes it completely
+dominates it, and can be checked only by another passion--anger, for
+instance, or lust, by fear; even though the vision that terrifies does
+not appeal to the senses, but is present in the animal only as a dim
+memory and imagination. Men, therefore, may be called irrational, if,
+like the lower animals, they allow themselves to be determined by the
+moment.
+
+So far, however, is reason from being the source of morality that it
+is reason alone which makes us capable of being rascals, which the
+lower animals cannot be. It is reason which enables us to form an evil
+resolution and to keep it when the provocation to evil is removed; it
+enables us, for example, to nurse vengeance. Although at the moment
+that we have an opportunity of fulfilling our resolution the better
+consciousness may manifest itself as love or charity, it is by force
+of reason, in pursuance of some evil maxim, that we act against it.
+Thus Goethe says that a man may use his reason only for the purpose of
+being more bestial than any beast:
+
+  _Er hat Vernunft, doch braucht er sie allein
+  Um theirischer als jedes Thier zu sein_.
+
+For not only do we, like the beasts, satisfy the desires of the
+moment, but we refine upon them and stimulate them in order to prepare
+the desire for the satisfaction.
+
+Whenever we think that we perceive a trace of reason in the lower
+animals, it fills us with surprise. Now our surprise is not excited by
+the good and affectionate disposition which some of them exhibit--we
+recognise that as something other than reason--but by some action in
+them which seems to be determined not by the impression of the moment,
+but by a resolution previously made and kept. Elephants, for instance,
+are reported to have taken premeditated revenge for insults long after
+they were suffered; lions, to have requited benefits on an opportunity
+tardily offered. The truth of such stories has, however, no bearing at
+all on the question, What do we mean by reason? But they enable us to
+decide whether in the lower animals there is any trace of anything
+that we can call reason.
+
+Kant not only declares that all our moral sentiments originate in
+reason, but he lays down that reason, _in my sense of the word_, is
+a condition of moral action; as he holds that for an action to be
+virtuous and meritorious it must be done in accordance with maxims,
+and not spring from a resolve taken under some momentary impression.
+But in both contentions he is wrong. If I resolve to take vengeance on
+some one, and when an opportunity offers, the better consciousness in
+the form of love and humanity speaks its word, and I am influenced by
+it rather than by my evil resolution, this is a virtuous act, for it
+is a manifestation of the better consciousness. It is possible to
+conceive of a very virtuous man in whom the better consciousness is
+so continuously active that it is never silent, and never allows his
+passions to get a complete hold of him. By such consciousness he is
+subject to a direct control, instead of being guided indirectly,
+through the medium of reason, by means of maxims and moral principles.
+That is why a man may have weak reasoning powers and a weak
+understanding and yet have a high sense of morality and be eminently
+good; for the most important element in a man depends as little on
+intellectual as it does on physical strength. Jesus says, _Blessed
+are the poor in spirit_. And Jacob Böhme has the excellent and noble
+observation: _Whoso lies quietly in his own will, like a child in the
+womb, and lets himself be led and guided by that inner principle from
+which he is sprung, is the noblest and richest on earth_.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: _Epistles_, 37.]
+
+
+
+
+ETHICAL REFLECTIONS.
+
+
+The philosophers of the ancient world united in a single conception
+a great many things that had no connection with one another. Of this
+every dialogue of Plato's furnishes abundant examples. The greatest
+and worst confusion of this kind is that between ethics and politics.
+The State and the Kingdom of God, or the Moral Law, are so entirely
+different in their character that the former is a parody of the
+latter, a bitter mockery at the absence of it. Compared with the Moral
+Law the State is a crutch instead of a limb, an automaton instead of a
+man.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The _principle of honour_ stands in close connection with human
+freedom. It is, as it were, an abuse of that freedom. Instead of
+using his freedom to fulfil the moral law, a man employs his power
+of voluntarily undergoing any feeling of pain, of overcoming any
+momentary impression, in order that he may assert his self-will,
+whatever be the object to which he directs it. As he thereby shows
+that, unlike the lower animals, he has thoughts which go beyond the
+welfare of his body and whatever makes for that welfare, it has come
+about that the principle of honour is often confused with virtue. They
+are regarded as if they were twins. But wrongly; for although the
+principle of honour is something which distinguishes man from the
+lower animals, it is not, in itself, anything that raises him above
+them. Taken as an end and aim, it is as dark a delusion as any other
+aim that springs from self. Used as a means, or casually, it may be
+productive of good; but even that is good which is vain and frivolous.
+It is the misuse of freedom, the employment of it as a weapon for
+overcoming the world of feeling, that makes man so infinitely more
+terrible than the lower animals; for they do only what momentary
+instinct bids them; while man acts by ideas, and his ideas may entail
+universal ruin before they are satisfied.
+
+There is another circumstance which helps to promote the notion that
+honour and virtue are connected. A man who can do what he wants to do
+shows that he can also do it if what he wants to do is a virtuous act.
+But that those of our actions which we are ourselves obliged to regard
+with contempt are also regarded with contempt by other people serves
+more than anything that I have here mentioned to establish the
+connection. Thus it often happens that a man who is not afraid of the
+one kind of contempt is unwilling to undergo the other. But when we
+are called upon to choose between our own approval and the world's
+censure, as may occur in complicated and mistaken circumstances, what
+becomes of the principle of honour then?
+
+Two characteristic examples of the principle of honour are to be found
+in Shakespeare's _Henry VI_., Part II., Act IV., Sc. 1. A pirate is
+anxious to murder his captive instead of accepting, like others, a
+ransom for him; because in taking his captive he lost an eye, and
+his own honour and that of his forefathers would in his opinion be
+stained, if he were to allow his revenge to be bought off as though he
+were a mere trader. The prisoner, on the other hand, who is the Duke
+of Suffolk, prefers to have his head grace a pole than to uncover it
+to such a low fellow as a pirate, by approaching him to ask for mercy.
+
+Just as civic honour--in other words, the opinion that we deserve to
+be trusted--is the palladium of those whose endeavour it is to make
+their way in the world on the path of honourable business, so knightly
+honour--in other words, the opinion that we are men to be feared--is
+the palladium of those who aim at going through life on the path
+of violence; and so it was that knightly honour arose among the
+robber-knights and other knights of the Middle Ages.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+A theoretical philosopher is one who can supply in the shape of ideas
+for the reason, a copy of the presentations of experience; just as
+what the painter sees he can reproduce on canvas; the sculptor, in
+marble; the poet, in pictures for the imagination, though they are
+pictures which he supplies only in sowing the ideas from which they
+sprang.
+
+A so-called practical philosopher, on the other hand, is one who,
+contrarily, deduces his action from ideas. The theoretical philosopher
+transforms life into ideas. The practical philosopher transforms ideas
+into life; he acts, therefore, in a thoroughly reasonable manner; he
+is consistent, regular, deliberate; he is never hasty or passionate;
+he never allows himself to be influenced by the impression of the
+moment.
+
+And indeed, when we find ourselves among those full presentations of
+experience, or real objects, to which the body belongs--since the body
+is only an objectified will, the shape which the will assumes in the
+material world--it is difficult to let our bodies be guided, not by
+those presentations, but by a mere image of them, by cold, colourless
+ideas, which are related to experience as the shadow of Orcus to life;
+and yet this is the only way in which we can avoid doing things of
+which we may have to repent.
+
+The theoretical philosopher enriches the domain of reason by adding to
+it; the practical philosopher draws upon it, and makes it serve him.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+According to Kant the truth of experience is only a hypothetical
+truth. If the suppositions which underlie all the intimations of
+experience--subject, object, time, space and causality--were removed,
+none of those intimations would contain a word of truth. In other
+words, experience is only a phenomenon; it is not knowledge of the
+thing-in-itself.
+
+If we find something in our own conduct at which we are secretly
+pleased, although we cannot reconcile it with experience, seeing that
+if we were to follow the guidance of experience we should have to
+do precisely the opposite, we must not allow this to put us out;
+otherwise we should be ascribing an authority to experience which
+it does not deserve, for all that it teaches rests upon a mere
+supposition. This is the general tendency of the Kantian Ethics.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Innocence is in its very nature stupid. It is stupid because the aim
+of life (I use the expression only figuratively, and I could just
+as well speak of the essence of life, or of the world) is to gain a
+knowledge of our own bad will, so that our will may become an object
+for us, and that we may undergo an inward conversion. Our body is
+itself our will objectified; it is one of the first and foremost of
+objects, and the deeds that we accomplish for the sake of the body
+show us the evil inherent in our will. In the state of innocence,
+where there is no evil because there is no experience, man is, as
+it were, only an apparatus for living, and the object for which the
+apparatus exists is not yet disclosed. An empty form of life like
+this, a stage untenanted, is in itself, like the so-called real world,
+null and void; and as it can attain a meaning only by action, by
+error, by knowledge, by the convulsions of the will, it wears a
+character of insipid stupidity. A golden age of innocence, a fools'
+paradise, is a notion that is stupid and unmeaning, and for that
+very reason in no way worthy of any respect. The first criminal and
+murderer, Cain, who acquired a knowledge of guilt, and through
+guilt acquired a knowledge of virtue by repentance, and so came to
+understand the meaning of life, is a tragical figure more significant,
+and almost more respectable, than all the innocent fools in the world
+put together.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+If I had to write about _modesty_ I should say: I know the esteemed
+public for which I have the honour to write far too well to dare to
+give utterance to my opinion about this virtue. Personally I am quite
+content to be modest and to apply myself to this virtue with
+the utmost possible circumspection. But one thing I shall never
+admit--that I have ever required modesty of any man, and any statement
+to that effect I repel as a slander.
+
+The paltry character of most men compels the few who have any merit
+or genius to behave as though they did not know their own value, and
+consequently did not know other people's want of value; for it is
+only on this condition that the mob acquiesces in tolerating merit. A
+virtue has been made out of this necessity, and it is called modesty.
+It is a piece of hypocrisy, to be excused only because other people
+are so paltry that they must be treated with indulgence.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Human misery may affect us in two ways, and we may be in one of two
+opposite moods in regard to it.
+
+In one of them, this misery is immediately present to us. We feel it
+in our own person, in our own will which, imbued with violent desires,
+is everywhere broken, and this is the process which constitutes
+suffering. The result is that the will increases in violence, as
+is shown in all cases of passion and emotion; and this increasing
+violence comes to a stop only when the will turns and gives way to
+complete resignation, in other words, is redeemed. The man who is
+entirely dominated by this mood will regard any prosperity which he
+may see in others with envy, and any suffering with no sympathy.
+
+In the opposite mood human misery is present to us only as a fact
+of knowledge, that is to say, indirectly. We are mainly engaged in
+looking at the sufferings of others, and our attention is withdrawn
+from our own. It is in their person that we become aware of human
+misery; we are filled with sympathy; and the result of this mood is
+general benevolence, philanthropy. All envy vanishes, and instead
+of feeling it, we are rejoiced when we see one of our tormented
+fellow-creatures experience any pleasure or relief.
+
+After the same fashion we may be in one of two opposite moods in
+regard to human baseness and depravity. In the one we perceive this
+baseness indirectly, in others. Out of this mood arise indignation,
+hatred, and contempt of mankind. In the other we perceive it directly,
+in ourselves. Out of it there arises humiliation, nay, contrition.
+
+In order to judge the moral value of a man, it is very important to
+observe which of these four moods predominate in him. They go in
+pairs, one out of each division. In very excellent characters the
+second mood of each division will predominate.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The categorical imperative, or absolute command, is a contradiction.
+Every command is conditional. What is unconditional and necessary is a
+_must_, such as is presented by the laws of nature.
+
+It is quite true that the moral law is entirely conditional. There
+is a world and a view of life in which it has neither validity nor
+significance. That world is, properly speaking, the real world in
+which, as individuals, we live; for every regard paid to morality is a
+denial of that world and of our individual life in it. It is a view
+of the world, however, which does not go beyond the principle of
+sufficient reason; and the opposite view proceeds by the intuition of
+Ideas.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+If a man is under the influence of two opposite but very strong
+motives, A and B, and I am greatly concerned that he should choose A,
+but still more that he should never be untrue to his choice, and by
+changing his mind betray me, or the like, it will not do for me to say
+anything that might hinder the motive B from having its full effect
+upon him, and only emphasise A; for then I should never be able to
+reckon on his decision. What I have to do is, rather, to put both
+motives before him at the same time, in as vivid and clear a way as
+possible, so that they may work upon him with their whole force. The
+choice that he then makes is the decision of his inmost nature, and
+stands firm to all eternity. In saying _I will do this_, he has said
+_I must do this_. I have got at his will, and I can rely upon its
+working as steadily as one of the forces of nature. It is as certain
+as fire kindles and water wets that he will act according to the
+motive which has proved to be stronger for him. Insight and knowledge
+may be attained and lost again; they may be changed, or improved, or
+destroyed; but will cannot be changed. That is why _I apprehend, I
+perceive, I see_, is subject to alteration and uncertainty; _I will_,
+pronounced on a right apprehension of motive, is as firm as nature
+itself. The difficulty, however, lies in getting at a right
+apprehension. A man's apprehension of motive may change, or be
+corrected or perverted; and on the other hand, his circumstances may
+undergo an alteration.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+A man should exercise an almost boundless toleration and placability,
+because if he is capricious enough to refuse to forgive a single
+individual for the meanness or evil that lies at his door, it is doing
+the rest of the world a quite unmerited honour.
+
+But at the same time the man who is every one's friend is no one's
+friend. It is quite obvious what sort of friendship it is which we
+hold out to the human race, and to which it is open to almost every
+man to return, no matter what he may have done.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+With the ancients _friendship_ was one of the chief elements in
+morality. But friendship is only limitation and partiality; it is
+the restriction to one individual of what is the due of all mankind,
+namely, the recognition that a man's own nature and that of mankind
+are identical. At most it is a compromise between this recognition and
+selfishness.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+A lie always has its origin in the desire to extend the dominion of
+one's own will over other individuals, and to deny their will in order
+the better to affirm one's own. Consequently a lie is in its very
+nature the product of injustice, malevolence and villainy. That is why
+truth, sincerity, candour and rectitude are at once recognised and
+valued as praiseworthy and noble qualities; because we presume that
+the man who exhibits them entertains no sentiments of injustice or
+malice, and therefore stands in no need of concealing such sentiments.
+He who is open cherishes nothing that is bad.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+There is a certain kind of courage which springs from the same source
+as good-nature. What I mean is that the good-natured man is almost as
+clearly conscious that he exists in other individuals as in himself. I
+have often shown how this feeling gives rise to good-nature. It
+also gives rise to courage, for the simple reason that the man who
+possesses this feeling cares less for his own individual existence,
+as he lives almost as much in the general existence of all creatures.
+Accordingly he is little concerned for his own life and its
+belongings. This is by no means the sole source of courage for it is
+a phenomenon due to various causes. But it is the noblest kind of
+courage, as is shown by the fact that in its origin it is associated
+with great gentleness and patience. Men of this kind are usually
+irresistible to women.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+All general rules and precepts fail, because they proceed from the
+false assumption that men are constituted wholly, or almost wholly,
+alike; an assumption which the philosophy of Helvetius expressly
+makes. Whereas the truth is that the original difference between
+individuals in intellect and morality is immeasurable.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The question as to whether morality is something real is the question
+whether a well-grounded counter-principle to egoism actually exists.
+
+As egoism restricts concern for welfare to a single individual,
+_viz_., the man's own self, the counter-principle would have to extend
+it to all other individuals.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+It is only because the will is above and beyond time that the stings
+of conscience are ineradicable, and do not, like other pains,
+gradually wear away. No! an evil deed weighs on the conscience years
+afterwards as heavily as if it had been freshly committed.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Character is innate, and conduct is merely its manifestation; the
+occasion for great misdeeds comes seldom; strong counter-motives keep
+us back; our disposition is revealed to ourselves by our desires,
+thoughts, emotions, when it remains unknown to others. Reflecting on
+all this, we might suppose it possible for a man to possess, in some
+sort, an innate evil conscience, without ever having done anything
+very bad.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+_Don't do to others what you wouldn't like done to yourself_. This is,
+perhaps, one of those arguments that prove, or rather ask, too much.
+For a prisoner might address it to a judge.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Stupid people are generally malicious, for the very same reason as the
+ugly and the deformed.
+
+Similarly, genius and sanctity are akin. However simple-minded a saint
+may be, he will nevertheless have a dash of genius in him; and however
+many errors of temperament, or of actual character, a genius may
+possess, he will still exhibit a certain nobility of disposition by
+which he shows his kinship with the saint.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The great difference between Law without and Law within, between
+the State and the Kingdom of God, is very clear. It is the State's
+business to see that _every one should have justice done to him_;
+it regards men as passive beings, and therefore takes no account of
+anything but their actions. The Moral Law, on the other hand, is
+concerned that _every one should do justice_; it regards men as
+active, and looks to the will rather than the deed. To prove that this
+is the true distinction let the reader consider what would happen if
+he were to say, conversely, that it is the State's business that every
+one should do justice, and the business of the Moral Law that every
+one should have justice done to him. The absurdity is obvious.
+
+As an example of the distinction, let me take the case of a debtor and
+a creditor disputing about a debt which the former denies. A lawyer
+and a moralist are present, and show a lively interest in the matter.
+Both desire that the dispute should end in the same way, although what
+they want is by no means the same. The lawyer says, _I want this man
+to get back what belongs to him_; and the moralist, _I want that man
+to do his duty_.
+
+It is with the will alone that morality is concerned. Whether external
+force hinders or fails to hinder the will from working does not in the
+least matter. For morality the external world is real only in so far
+as it is able or unable to lead and influence the will. As soon as
+the will is determined, that is, as soon as a resolve is taken, the
+external world and its events are of no further moment and
+practical do not exist. For if the events of the world had any
+such reality--that is to say, if they possessed a significance in
+themselves, or any other than that derived from the will which is
+affected by them--what a grievance it would be that all these events
+lie in the realm of chance and error! It is, however, just this which
+proves that the important thing is not what happens, but what is
+willed. Accordingly, let the incidents of life be left to the play of
+chance and error, to demonstrate to man that he is as chaff before the
+wind.
+
+The State concerns itself only with the incidents--with what happens;
+nothing else has any reality for it. I may dwell upon thoughts of
+murder and poison as much as I please: the State does not forbid me,
+so long as the axe and rope control my will, and prevent it from
+becoming action.
+
+Ethics asks: What are the duties towards others which justice imposes
+upon us? in other words, What must I render? The Law of Nature asks:
+What need I not submit to from others? that is, What must I suffer?
+The question is put, not that I may do no injustice, but that I
+may not do more than every man must do if he is to safeguard his
+existence, and than every man will approve being done, in order that
+he may be treated in the same way himself; and, further, that I may
+not do more than society will permit me to do. The same answer will
+serve for both questions, just as the same straight line can be drawn
+from either of two opposite directions, namely, by opposing forces;
+or, again, as the angle can give the sine, or the sine the angle.
+
+It has been said that the historian is an inverted prophet. In the
+same way it may be said that a teacher of law is an inverted moralist
+(_viz_., a teacher of the duties of justice), or that politics are
+inverted ethics, if we exclude the thought that ethics also teaches
+the duty of benevolence, magnanimity, love, and so on. The State is
+the Gordian knot that is cut instead of being untied; it is Columbus'
+egg which is made to stand by being broken instead of balanced, as
+though the business in question were to make it stand rather than to
+balance it. In this respect the State is like the man who thinks that
+he can produce fine weather by making the barometer go up.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The pseudo-philosophers of our age tell us that it is the object of
+the State to promote the moral aims of mankind. This is not true;
+it is rather the contrary which is true. The aim for which mankind
+exists--the expression is parabolic--is not that a man should act in
+such and such a manner; for all _opera operata_, things that have
+actually been done, are in themselves matters of indifference. No! the
+aim is that the Will, of which every man is a complete specimen--nay,
+is the very Will itself--should turn whither it needs to turn; that
+the man himself (the union of Thought and Will) should perceive what
+this will is, and what horrors it contains; that he should show the
+reflection of himself in his own deeds, in the abomination of them.
+The State, which is wholly concerned with the general welfare, checks
+the manifestation of the bad will, but in no wise checks the will
+itself; the attempt would be impossible. It is because the State
+checks the manifestation of his will that a man very seldom sees the
+whole abomination of his nature in the mirror of his deeds. Or does
+the reader actually suppose there are no people in the world as bad as
+Robespierre, Napoleon, or other murderers? Does he fail to see that
+there are many who would act like them if only they could?
+
+Many a criminal dies more quietly on the scaffold than many a
+non-criminal in the arms of his family. The one has perceived what his
+will is and has discarded it. The other has not been able to discard
+it, because he has never been able to perceive what it is. The aim
+of the State is to produce a fool's paradise, and this is in direct
+conflict with the true aim of life, namely, to attain a knowledge of
+what the will, in its horrible nature, really is.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Napoleon was not really worse than many, not to say most, men. He was
+possessed of the very ordinary egoism that seeks its welfare at the
+expense of others. What distinguished him was merely the greater power
+he had of satisfying his will, and greater intelligence, reason and
+courage; added to which, chance gave him a favourable scope for his
+operations. By means of all this he did for his egoism what a thousand
+other men would like to do for theirs, but cannot. Every feeble lad
+who by little acts of villainy gains a small advantage for himself by
+putting others to some disadvantage, although it may be equally small,
+is just as bad as Napoleon.
+
+Those who fancy that retribution comes after death would demand that
+Napoleon should by unutterable torments pay the penalty for all the
+numberless calamities that he caused. But he is no more culpable than
+all those who possess the same will, unaccompanied by the same power.
+
+The circumstance that in his case this extraordinary power was added
+allowed him to reveal the whole wickedness of the human will; and the
+sufferings of his age, as the necessary obverse of the medal, reveal
+the misery which is inextricably bound up with this bad will. It is
+the general manipulation of this will that constitutes the world. But
+it is precisely that it should be understood how inextricably the will
+to live is bound up with, and is really one and the same as, this
+unspeakable misery, that is the world's aim and purpose; and it is an
+aim and purpose which the appearance of Napoleon did much to assist.
+Not to be an unmeaning fools' paradise but a tragedy, in which the
+will to live understands itself and yields--that is the object for
+which the world exists. Napoleon is only an enormous mirror of the
+will to live.
+
+The difference between the man who causes suffering and the man who
+suffers it, is only phenomenal. It is all a will to live, identical
+with great suffering; and it is only by understanding this that the
+will can mend and end.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+What chiefly distinguishes ancient from modern times is that in
+ancient times, to use Napoleon's expression, it was affairs that
+reigned: _les paroles aux choses_. In modern times this is not so.
+What I mean is that in ancient times the character of public life,
+of the State, and of Religion, as well as of private life, was a
+strenuous affirmation of the will to live. In modern times it is a
+denial of this will, for such is the character of Christianity. But
+now while on the one hand that denial has suffered some abatement even
+in public opinion, because it is too repugnant to human character, on
+the other what is publicly denied is secretly affirmed. Hence it is
+that we see half measures and falsehood everywhere; and that is why
+modern times look so small beside antiquity.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The structure of human society is like a pendulum swinging between two
+impulses, two evils in polar opposition, _despotism_ and _anarchy_.
+The further it gets from the one, the nearer it approaches the other.
+From this the reader might hit on the thought that if it were exactly
+midway between the two, it would be right. Far from it. For these
+two evils are by no means equally bad and dangerous. The former is
+incomparably less to be feared; its ills exist in the main only as
+possibilities, and if they come at all it is only one among millions
+that they touch. But, with anarchy, possibility and actuality are
+inseparable; its blows fall on every man every day. Therefore every
+constitution should be a nearer approach to a despotism than to
+anarchy; nay, it must contain a small possibility of despotism.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Essays Of Arthur Schopenhauer
+by Arthur Schopenhauer
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10739 ***
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+    <title>
+      The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer: on Human Nature., by Arthur
+      Schopenhauer
+    </title>
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+<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10739 ***</div>
+    <div style="height: 8em;">
+      <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />
+    </div>
+    <h1>
+      THE ESSAYS OF<br /> ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER:<br /><br /> ON HUMAN NATURE.
+    </h1>
+    <h2>
+      By Arthur Schopenhauer
+    </h2>
+    <h3>
+      Translated By T. Bailey Saunders
+    </h3>
+    <p>
+      <br />
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      <br />
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <b>CONTENTS</b>
+    </p>
+    <p class="toc">
+      <a href="#link2H_4_0001"> TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. </a>
+    </p>
+    <p class="toc">
+      <a href="#link2H_4_0002"> HUMAN NATURE. </a>
+    </p>
+    <p class="toc">
+      <a href="#link2H_4_0003"> GOVERNMENT. </a>
+    </p>
+    <p class="toc">
+      <a href="#link2H_4_0004"> FREE-WILL AND FATALISM. </a>
+    </p>
+    <p class="toc">
+      <a href="#link2H_4_0005"> CHARACTER. </a>
+    </p>
+    <p class="toc">
+      <a href="#link2H_4_0006"> MORAL INSTINCT. </a>
+    </p>
+    <p class="toc">
+      <a href="#link2H_4_0007"> ETHICAL REFLECTIONS. </a>
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <br /><br />
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      <a name="link2H_4_0001" id="link2H_4_0001"> </a>
+    </p>
+    <div style="height: 4em;">
+      <br /><br /><br /><br />
+    </div>
+    <h2>
+      TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
+    </h2>
+    <p>
+      The following essays are drawn from the chapters entitled <i>Zur Ethik</i>
+      and <i>Zur Rechtslehre und Politik</i> which are to be found both in
+      Schopenhauer's <i>Parerga</i> and in his posthumous writings. As in my
+      previous volumes, so also in this, I have omitted a few passages which
+      appeared to me to be either antiquated or no longer of any general
+      interest. For convenience' sake I have divided the original chapters into
+      sections, which I have had to name; and I have also had to invent a title
+      which should express their real scope. The reader will find that it is not
+      so much <i>Ethics</i> and <i>Politics</i> that are here treated, as human
+      nature itself in various aspects.
+    </p>
+    <h3>
+      T.B.S.
+    </h3>
+    <p>
+      <br /><br />
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      <a name="link2H_4_0002" id="link2H_4_0002"> </a>
+    </p>
+    <div style="height: 4em;">
+      <br /><br /><br /><br />
+    </div>
+    <h1>
+      HUMAN NATURE.
+    </h1>
+    <p>
+      Truths of the physical order may possess much external significance, but
+      internal significance they have none. The latter is the privilege of
+      intellectual and moral truths, which are concerned with the objectivation
+      of the will in its highest stages, whereas physical truths are concerned
+      with it in its lowest.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      For example, if we could establish the truth of what up till now is only a
+      conjecture, namely, that it is the action of the sun which produces
+      thermoelectricity at the equator; that this produces terrestrial
+      magnetism; and that this magnetism, again, is the cause of the <i>aurora
+      borealis</i>, these would be truths externally of great, but internally of
+      little, significance. On the other hand, examples of internal significance
+      are furnished by all great and true philosophical systems; by the
+      catastrophe of every good tragedy; nay, even by the observation of human
+      conduct in the extreme manifestations of its morality and immorality, of
+      its good and its evil character. For all these are expressions of that
+      reality which takes outward shape as the world, and which, in the highest
+      stages of its objectivation, proclaims its innermost nature.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      To say that the world has only a physical and not a moral significance is
+      the greatest and most pernicious of all errors, the fundamental blunder,
+      the real perversity of mind and temper; and, at bottom, it is doubtless
+      the tendency which faith personifies as Anti-Christ. Nevertheless, in
+      spite of all religions&mdash;and they are systems which one and all
+      maintain the opposite, and seek to establish it in their mythical way&mdash;this
+      fundamental error never becomes quite extinct, but raises its head from
+      time to time afresh, until universal indignation compels it to hide itself
+      once more.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Yet, however certain we may feel of the moral significance of life and the
+      world, to explain and illustrate it, and to resolve the contradiction
+      between this significance and the world as it is, form a task of great
+      difficulty; so great, indeed, as to make it possible that it has remained
+      for me to exhibit the true and only genuine and sound basis of morality
+      everywhere and at all times effective, together with the results to which
+      it leads. The actual facts of morality are too much on my side for me to
+      fear that my theory can ever be replaced or upset by any other.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      However, so long as even my ethical system continues to be ignored by the
+      professorial world, it is Kant's moral principle that prevails in the
+      universities. Among its various forms the one which is most in favour at
+      present is "the dignity of man." I have already exposed the absurdity of
+      this doctrine in my treatise on the <i>Foundation of Morality</i>.{1}
+      Therefore I will only say here that if the question were asked on what the
+      alleged dignity of man rests, it would not be long before the answer was
+      made that it rests upon his morality. In other words, his morality rests
+      upon his dignity, and his dignity rests upon his morality.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: § 8.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But apart from this circular argument it seems to me that the idea of
+      dignity can be applied only in an ironical sense to a being whose will is
+      so sinful, whose intellect is so limited, whose body is so weak and
+      perishable as man's. How shall a man be proud, when his conception is a
+      crime, his birth a penalty, his life a labour, and death a necessity!&mdash;
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  <i>Quid superbit homo? cujus conceptio culpa,
+  Nasci poena, labor vita, necesse mori</i>!
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      Therefore, in opposition to the above-mentioned form of the Kantian
+      principle, I should be inclined to lay down the following rule: When you
+      come into contact with a man, no matter whom, do not attempt an objective
+      appreciation of him according to his worth and dignity. Do not consider
+      his bad will, or his narrow understanding and perverse ideas; as the
+      former may easily lead you to hate and the latter to despise him; but fix
+      your attention only upon his sufferings, his needs, his anxieties, his
+      pains. Then you will always feel your kinship with him; you will
+      sympathise with him; and instead of hatred or contempt you will experience
+      the commiseration that alone is the peace to which the Gospel calls us.
+      The way to keep down hatred and contempt is certainly not to look for a
+      man's alleged "dignity," but, on the contrary, to regard him as an object
+      of pity.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The Buddhists, as the result of the more profound views which they
+      entertain on ethical and metaphysical subjects, start from the cardinal
+      vices and not the cardinal virtues; since the virtues make their
+      appearance only as the contraries or negations of the vices. According to
+      Schmidt's <i>History of the Eastern Mongolians</i> the cardinal vices in
+      the Buddhist scheme are four: Lust, Indolence, Anger, and Avarice. But
+      probably instead of Indolence, we should read Pride; for so it stands in
+      the <i>Lettres édifiantes et curieuses</i>,{1} where Envy, or Hatred, is
+      added as a fifth. I am confirmed in correcting the statement of the
+      excellent Schmidt by the fact that my rendering agrees with the doctrine
+      of the Sufis, who are certainly under the influence of the Brahmins and
+      Buddhists. The Sufis also maintain that there are four cardinal vices, and
+      they arrange them in very striking pairs, so that Lust appears in
+      connection with Avarice, and Anger with Pride. The four cardinal virtues
+      opposed to them would be Chastity and Generosity, together with Gentleness
+      and Humility.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: Edit, of 1819, vol. vi., p. 372.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      When we compare these profound ideas of morality, as they are entertained
+      by oriental nations, with the celebrated cardinal virtues of Plato, which
+      have been recapitulated again and again&mdash;Justice, Valour, Temperance,
+      and Wisdom&mdash;it is plain that the latter are not based on any clear,
+      leading idea, but are chosen on grounds that are superficial and, in part,
+      obviously false. Virtues must be qualities of the will, but Wisdom is
+      chiefly an attribute of the Intellect. {Greek: Sophrosynae}, which Cicero
+      translates <i>Temperantia</i>, is a very indefinite and ambiguous word,
+      and it admits, therefore, of a variety of applications: it may mean
+      discretion, or abstinence, or keeping a level head. Courage is not a
+      virtue at all; although sometimes it is a servant or instrument of virtue;
+      but it is just as ready to become the servant of the greatest villainy. It
+      is really a quality of temperament. Even Geulinx (in the preface to this
+      <i>Ethics</i>) condemned the Platonic virtues and put the following in
+      their place: Diligence, Obedience, Justice and Humility; which are
+      obviously bad. The Chinese distinguish five cardinal virtues: Sympathy,
+      Justice, Propriety, Wisdom, and Sincerity. The virtues of Christianity are
+      theological, not cardinal: Faith, Love, and Hope.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Fundamental disposition towards others, assuming the character either of
+      Envy or of Sympathy, is the point at which the moral virtues and vices of
+      mankind first diverge. These two diametrically opposite qualities exist in
+      every man; for they spring from the inevitable comparison which he draws
+      between his own lot and that of others. According as the result of this
+      comparison affects his individual character does the one or the other of
+      these qualities become the source and principle of all his action. Envy
+      builds the wall between <i>Thee</i> and <i>Me</i> thicker and stronger;
+      Sympathy makes it slight and transparent; nay, sometimes it pulls down the
+      wall altogether; and then the distinction between self and not-self
+      vanishes.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Valour, which has been mentioned as a virtue, or rather the Courage on
+      which it is based (for valour is only courage in war), deserves a closer
+      examination. The ancients reckoned Courage among the virtues, and
+      cowardice among the vices; but there is no corresponding idea in the
+      Christian scheme, which makes for charity and patience, and in its
+      teaching forbids all enmity or even resistance. The result is that with
+      the moderns Courage is no longer a virtue. Nevertheless it must be
+      admitted that cowardice does not seem to be very compatible with any
+      nobility of character&mdash;if only for the reason that it betrays an
+      overgreat apprehension about one's own person.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Courage, however, may also be explained as a readiness to meet ills that
+      threaten at the moment, in order to avoid greater ills that lie in the
+      future; whereas cowardice does the contrary. But this readiness is of the
+      same quality as <i>patience</i>, for patience consists in the clear
+      consciousness that greater evils than those which are present, and that
+      any violent attempt to flee from or guard against the ills we have may
+      bring the others upon us. Courage, then, would be a kind of patience; and
+      since it is patience that enables us to practise forbearance and self
+      control, Courage is, through the medium of patience, at least akin to
+      virtue.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But perhaps Courage admits of being considered from a higher point of
+      view. The fear of death may in every case be traced to a deficiency in
+      that natural philosophy&mdash;natural, and therefore resting on mere
+      feeling&mdash;which gives a man the assurance that he exists in everything
+      outside him just as much as in his own person; so that the death of his
+      person can do him little harm. But it is just this very assurance that
+      would give a man heroic Courage; and therefore, as the reader will
+      recollect from my <i>Ethics</i>, Courage comes from the same source as the
+      virtues of Justice and Humanity. This is, I admit, to take a very high
+      view of the matter; but apart from it I cannot well explain why cowardice
+      seems contemptible, and personal courage a noble and sublime thing; for no
+      lower point of view enables me to see why a finite individual who is
+      everything to himself&mdash;nay, who is himself even the very fundamental
+      condition of the existence of the rest of the world&mdash;should not put
+      his own preservation above every other aim. It is, then, an insufficient
+      explanation of Courage to make it rest only on utility, to give it an
+      empirical and not a transcendental character. It may have been for some
+      such reason that Calderon once uttered a sceptical but remarkable opinion
+      in regard to Courage, nay, actually denied its reality; and put his denial
+      into the mouth of a wise old minister, addressing his young sovereign.
+      "Although," he observed, "natural fear is operative in all alike, a man
+      may be brave in not letting it be seen; and it is this that constitutes
+      Courage":
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  <i>Que aunque el natural temor
+  En todos obra igualmente,
+  No mostrarle es ser valiente
+  Y esto es lo que hace el valor</i>.{1}
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>La Hija del Aire</i>, ii., 2.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In regard to the difference which I have mentioned between the ancients
+      and the moderns in their estimate of Courage as a virtue, it must be
+      remembered that by Virtue, <i>virtus</i>, {Greek: aretae}, the ancients
+      understood every excellence or quality that was praiseworthy in itself, it
+      might be moral or intellectual, or possibly only physical. But when
+      Christianity demonstrated that the fundamental tendency of life was moral,
+      it was moral superiority alone than henceforth attached to the notion of
+      Virtue. Meanwhile the earlier usage still survived in the elder Latinists,
+      and also in Italian writers, as is proved by the well-known meaning of the
+      word <i>virtuoso</i>. The special attention of students should be drawn to
+      this wider range of the idea of Virtue amongst the ancients, as otherwise
+      it might easily be a source of secret perplexity. I may recommend two
+      passages preserved for us by Stobaeus, which will serve this purpose. One
+      of them is apparently from the Pythagorean philosopher Metopos, in which
+      the fitness of every bodily member is declared to be a virtue. The other
+      pronounces that the virtue of a shoemaker is to make good shoes. This may
+      also serve to explain why it is that in the ancient scheme of ethics
+      virtues and vices are mentioned which find no place in ours.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      As the place of Courage amongst the virtues is a matter of doubt, so is
+      that of Avarice amongst the vices. It must not, however, be confounded
+      with greed, which is the most immediate meaning of the Latin word <i>avaritia</i>.
+      Let us then draw up and examine the arguments <i>pro et contra</i> in
+      regard to Avarice, and leave the final judgment to be formed by every man
+      for himself.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      On the one hand it is argued that it is not Avarice which is a vice, but
+      extravagance, its opposite. Extravagance springs from a brutish limitation
+      to the present moment, in comparison with which the future, existing as it
+      does only in thought, is as nothing. It rests upon the illusion that
+      sensual pleasures possess a positive or real value. Accordingly, future
+      need and misery is the price at which the spendthrift purchases pleasures
+      that are empty, fleeting, and often no more than imaginary; or else feeds
+      his vain, stupid self-conceit on the bows and scrapes of parasites who
+      laugh at him in secret, or on the gaze of the mob and those who envy his
+      magnificence. We should, therefore, shun the spendthrift as though he had
+      the plague, and on discovering his vice break with him betimes, in order
+      that later on, when the consequences of his extravagance ensue, we may
+      neither have to help to bear them, nor, on the other hand, have to play
+      the part of the friends of Timon of Athens.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      At the same time it is not to be expected that he who foolishly squanders
+      his own fortune will leave another man's intact, if it should chance to be
+      committed to his keeping; nay, <i>sui profusus</i> and <i>alieni appetens</i>
+      are by Sallust very rightly conjoined. Hence it is that extravagance leads
+      not only to impoverishment but also to crime; and crime amongst the
+      moneyed classes is almost always the result of extravagance. It is
+      accordingly with justice that the <i>Koran</i> declares all spendthrifts
+      to be "brothers of Satan."
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But it is superfluity that Avarice brings in its train, and when was
+      superfluity ever unwelcome? That must be a good vice which has good
+      consequences. Avarice proceeds upon the principle that all pleasure is
+      only negative in its operation and that the happiness which consists of a
+      series of pleasures is a chimaera; that, on the contrary, it is pains
+      which are positive and extremely real. Accordingly, the avaricious man
+      foregoes the former in order that he may be the better preserved from the
+      latter, and thus it is that <i>bear and forbear</i>&mdash;<i>sustine et
+      abstine</i>&mdash;is his maxim. And because he knows, further, how
+      inexhaustible are the possibilities of misfortune, and how innumerable the
+      paths of danger, he increases the means of avoiding them, in order, if
+      possible, to surround himself with a triple wall of protection. Who, then,
+      can say where precaution against disaster begins to be exaggerated? He
+      alone who knows where the malignity of fate reaches its limit. And even if
+      precaution were exaggerated it is an error which at the most would hurt
+      the man who took it, and not others. If he will never need the treasures
+      which he lays up for himself, they will one day benefit others whom nature
+      has made less careful. That until then he withdraws the money from
+      circulation is no misfortune; for money is not an article of consumption:
+      it only represents the good things which a man may actually possess, and
+      is not one itself. Coins are only counters; their value is what they
+      represent; and what they represent cannot be withdrawn from circulation.
+      Moreover, by holding back the money, the value of the remainder which is
+      in circulation is enhanced by precisely the same amount. Even though it be
+      the case, as is said, that many a miser comes in the end to love money
+      itself for its own sake, it is equally certain that many a spendthrift, on
+      the other hand, loves spending and squandering for no better reason.
+      Friendship with a miser is not only without danger, but it is profitable,
+      because of the great advantages it can bring. For it is doubtless those
+      who are nearest and dearest to the miser who on his death will reap the
+      fruits of the self-control which he exercised; but even in his lifetime,
+      too, something may be expected of him in cases of great need. At any rate
+      one can always hope for more from him than from the spendthrift, who has
+      lost his all and is himself helpless and in debt. <i>Mas da el duro que el
+      desnudo</i>, says a Spanish proverb; the man who has a hard heart will
+      give more than the man who has an empty purse. The upshot of all this is
+      that Avarice is not a vice.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      On the other side, it may be said that Avarice is the quintessence of all
+      vices. When physical pleasures seduce a man from the right path, it is his
+      sensual nature&mdash;the animal part of him&mdash;which is at fault. He is
+      carried away by its attractions, and, overcome by the impression of the
+      moment, he acts without thinking of the consequences. When, on the other
+      hand, he is brought by age or bodily weakness to the condition in which
+      the vices that he could never abandon end by abandoning him, and his
+      capacity for physical pleasure dies&mdash;if he turns to Avarice, the
+      intellectual desire survives the sensual. Money, which represents all the
+      good things of this world, and is these good things in the abstract, now
+      becomes the dry trunk overgrown with all the dead lusts of the flesh,
+      which are egoism in the abstract. They come to life again in the love of
+      the Mammon. The transient pleasure of the senses has become a deliberate
+      and calculated lust of money, which, like that to which it is directed, is
+      symbolical in its nature, and, like it, indestructible.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      This obstinate love of the pleasures of the world&mdash;a love which, as
+      it were, outlives itself; this utterly incorrigible sin, this refined and
+      sublimated desire of the flesh, is the abstract form in which all lusts
+      are concentrated, and to which it stands like a general idea to individual
+      particulars. Accordingly, Avarice is the vice of age, just as extravagance
+      is the vice of youth.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      This <i>disputatio in utramque partem</i>&mdash;this debate for and
+      against&mdash;is certainly calculated to drive us into accepting the <i>juste
+      milieu</i> morality of Aristotle; a conclusion that is also supported by
+      the following consideration.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Every human perfection is allied to a defect into which it threatens to
+      pass; but it is also true that every defect is allied to a perfection.
+      Hence it is that if, as often happens, we make a mistake about a man, it
+      is because at the beginning of our acquaintance with him we confound his
+      defects with the kinds of perfection to which they are allied. The
+      cautious man seems to us a coward; the economical man, a miser; the
+      spendthrift seems liberal; the rude fellow, downright and sincere; the
+      foolhardy person looks as if he were going to work with a noble
+      self-confidence; and so on in many other cases.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      No one can live among men without feeling drawn again and again to the
+      tempting supposition that moral baseness and intellectual incapacity are
+      closely connected, as though they both sprang direct from one source. That
+      that, however, is not so, I have shown in detail.{1} That it seems to be
+      so is merely due to the fact that both are so often found together; and
+      the circumstance is to be explained by the very frequent occurrence of
+      each of them, so that it may easily happen for both to be compelled to
+      live under one roof. At the same time it is not to be denied that they
+      play into each other's hands to their mutual benefit; and it is this that
+      produces the very unedifying spectacle which only too many men exhibit,
+      and that makes the world to go as it goes. A man who is unintelligent is
+      very likely to show his perfidy, villainy and malice; whereas a clever man
+      understands how to conceal these qualities. And how often, on the other
+      hand, does a perversity of heart prevent a man from seeing truths which
+      his intelligence is quite capable of grasping!
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: In my chief work, vol. ii., ch. xix,}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Nevertheless, let no one boast. Just as every man, though he be the
+      greatest genius, has very definite limitations in some one sphere of
+      knowledge, and thus attests his common origin with the essentially
+      perverse and stupid mass of mankind, so also has every man something in
+      his nature which is positively evil. Even the best, nay the noblest,
+      character will sometimes surprise us by isolated traits of depravity; as
+      though it were to acknowledge his kinship with the human race, in which
+      villainy&mdash;nay, cruelty&mdash;is to be found in that degree. For it
+      was just in virtue of this evil in him, this bad principle, that of
+      necessity he became a man. And for the same reason the world in general is
+      what my clear mirror of it has shown it to be.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But in spite of all this the difference even between one man and another
+      is incalculably great, and many a one would be horrified to see another as
+      he really is. Oh, for some Asmodeus of morality, to make not only roofs
+      and walls transparent to his favourites, but also to lift the veil of
+      dissimulation, fraud, hypocrisy, pretence, falsehood and deception, which
+      is spread over all things! to show how little true honesty there is in the
+      world, and how often, even where it is least to be expected, behind all
+      the exterior outwork of virtue, secretly and in the innermost recesses,
+      unrighteousness sits at the helm! It is just on this account that so many
+      men of the better kind have four-footed friends: for, to be sure, how is a
+      man to get relief from the endless dissimulation, falsity and malice of
+      mankind, if there were no dogs into whose honest faces he can look without
+      distrust?
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      For what is our civilised world but a big masquerade? where you meet
+      knights, priests, soldiers, men of learning, barristers, clergymen,
+      philosophers, and I don't know what all! But they are not what they
+      pretend to be; they are only masks, and, as a rule, behind the masks you
+      will find moneymakers. One man, I suppose, puts on the mask of law, which
+      he has borrowed for the purpose from a barrister, only in order to be able
+      to give another man a sound drubbing; a second has chosen the mask of
+      patriotism and the public welfare with a similar intent; a third takes
+      religion or purity of doctrine. For all sorts of purposes men have often
+      put on the mask of philosophy, and even of philanthropy, and I know not
+      what besides. Women have a smaller choice. As a rule they avail themselves
+      of the mask of morality, modesty, domesticity, and humility. Then there
+      are general masks, without any particular character attaching to them like
+      dominoes. They may be met with everywhere; and of this sort is the strict
+      rectitude, the courtesy, the sincere sympathy, the smiling friendship,
+      that people profess. The whole of these masks as a rule are merely, as I
+      have said, a disguise for some industry, commerce, or speculation. It is
+      merchants alone who in this respect constitute any honest class. They are
+      the only people who give themselves out to be what they are; and therefore
+      they go about without any mask at all, and consequently take a humble
+      rank.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      It is very necessary that a man should be apprised early in life that it
+      is a masquerade in which he finds himself. For otherwise there are many
+      things which he will fail to understand and put up with, nay, at which he
+      will be completely puzzled, and that man longest of all whose heart is
+      made of better clay&mdash;
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  <i>Et meliore luto finxit praecordia Titan.{1}</i>
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: Juvenal, <i>Sat</i>. 14, 34}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Such for instance is the favour that villainy finds; the neglect that
+      merit, even the rarest and the greatest, suffers at the hands of those of
+      the same profession; the hatred of truth and great capacity; the ignorance
+      of scholars in their own province; and the fact that true wares are almost
+      always despised and the merely specious ones in request. Therefore let
+      even the young be instructed betimes that in this masquerade the apples
+      are of wax, the flowers of silk, the fish of pasteboard, and that all
+      things&mdash;yes, all things&mdash;are toys and trifles; and that of two
+      men whom he may see earnestly engaged in business, one is supplying
+      spurious goods and the other paying for them in false coin.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But there are more serious reflections to be made, and worse things to be
+      recorded. Man is at bottom a savage, horrible beast. We know it, if only
+      in the business of taming and restraining him which we call civilisation.
+      Hence it is that we are terrified if now and then his nature breaks out.
+      Wherever and whenever the locks and chains of law and order fall off and
+      give place to anarchy, he shows himself for what he is. But it is
+      unnecessary to wait for anarchy in order to gain enlightenment on this
+      subject. A hundred records, old and new, produce the conviction that in
+      his unrelenting cruelty man is in no way inferior to the tiger and the
+      hyaena. A forcible example is supplied by a publication of the year 1841
+      entitled <i>Slavery and the Internal Slave Trade in the United States of
+      North America: being replies to questions transmitted by the British
+      Anti-slavery Society to the American Anti-slavery Society</i>.{1} This
+      book constitutes one of the heaviest indictments against the human race.
+      No one can put it down with a feeling of horror, and few without tears.
+      For whatever the reader may have ever heard, or imagined, or dreamt, of
+      the unhappy condition of slavery, or indeed of human cruelty in general,
+      it will seem small to him when he reads of the way in which those devils
+      in human form, those bigoted, church-going, strictly Sabbatarian rascals&mdash;and
+      in particular the Anglican priests among them&mdash;treated their innocent
+      black brothers, who by wrong and violence had got into their diabolical
+      clutches.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Translator's 'Note</i>.&mdash;If Schopenhauer were writing
+      to-day, he would with equal truth point to the miseries of the African
+      trade. I have slightly abridged this passage, as some of the evils against
+      which he protested no longer exist.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Other examples are furnished by Tshudi's <i>Travels in Peru</i>, in the
+      description which he gives of the treatment of the Peruvian soldiers at
+      the hands of their officers; and by Macleod's <i>Travels in Eastern Africa</i>,
+      where the author tells of the cold-blooded and truly devilish cruelty with
+      which the Portuguese in Mozambique treat their slaves. But we need not go
+      for examples to the New World, that obverse side of our planet. In the
+      year 1848 it was brought to life that in England, not in one, but
+      apparently in a hundred cases within a brief period, a husband had
+      poisoned his wife or <i>vice versâ</i>, or both had joined in poisoning
+      their children, or in torturing them slowly to death by starving and
+      ill-treating them, with no other object than to get the money for burying
+      them which they had insured in the Burial Clubs against their death. For
+      this purpose a child was often insured in several, even in as many as
+      twenty clubs at once.{1}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: Cf. <i>The Times</i>, 20th, 22nd and 23rd Sept., 1848, and
+      also 12th Dec., 1853.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Details of this character belong, indeed, to the blackest pages in the
+      criminal records of humanity. But, when all is said, it is the inward and
+      innate character of man, this god <i>par excellence</i> of the Pantheists,
+      from which they and everything like them proceed. In every man there
+      dwells, first and foremost, a colossal egoism, which breaks the bounds of
+      right and justice with the greatest freedom, as everyday life shows on a
+      small scale, and as history on every page of it on a large. Does not the
+      recognised need of a balance of power in Europe, with the anxious way in
+      which it is preserved, demonstrate that man is a beast of prey, who no
+      sooner sees a weaker man near him than he falls upon him without fail? and
+      does not the same hold good of the affairs of ordinary life?
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But to the boundless egoism of our nature there is joined more or less in
+      every human breast a fund of hatred, anger, envy, rancour and malice,
+      accumulated like the venom in a serpent's tooth, and waiting only for an
+      opportunity of venting itself, and then, like a demon unchained, of
+      storming and raging. If a man has no great occasion for breaking out, he
+      will end by taking advantage of the smallest, and by working it up into
+      something great by the aid of his imagination; for, however small it may
+      be, it is enough to rouse his anger&mdash;
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  <i>Quantulacunque adeo est occasio, sufficit irae{1}</i>&mdash;
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: Juvenal, <i>Sat</i>. 13, 183.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      and then he will carry it as far as he can and may. We see this in daily
+      life, where such outbursts are well known under the name of "venting one's
+      gall on something." It will also have been observed that if such outbursts
+      meet with no opposition the subject of them feels decidedly the better for
+      them afterwards. That anger is not without its pleasure is a truth that
+      was recorded even by Aristotle;{1} and he quotes a passage from Homer, who
+      declares anger to be sweeter than honey. But not in anger alone&mdash;in
+      hatred too, which stands to anger like a chronic to an acute disease, a
+      man may indulge with the greatest delight:
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Rhet</i>., i., 11; ii., 2.}
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  <i>Now hatred is by far the longest pleasure,
+  Men love in haste, but they detest at leisure</i>{1}
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: Byron <i>Don Juan</i>, c. xiii, 6.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Gobineau in his work <i>Les Races Humaines</i> has called man <i>l'animal
+      méchant par excellence</i>. People take this very ill, because they feel
+      that it hits them; but he is quite right, for man is the only animal which
+      causes pain to others without any further purpose than just to cause it.
+      Other animals never do it except to satisfy their hunger, or in the rage
+      of combat. If it is said against the tiger that he kills more than eats,
+      he strangles his prey only for the purpose of eating it; and if he cannot
+      eat it, the only explanation is, as the French phrase has it, that <i>ses
+      yeux sont plus grands que son estomac</i>. No animal ever torments another
+      for the mere purpose of tormenting, but man does it, and it is this that
+      constitutes the diabolical feature in his character which is so much worse
+      than the merely animal. I have already spoken of the matter in its broad
+      aspect; but it is manifest even in small things, and every reader has a
+      daily opportunity of observing it. For instance, if two little dogs are
+      playing together&mdash;and what a genial and charming sight it is&mdash;and
+      a child of three or four years joins them, it is almost inevitable for it
+      to begin hitting them with a whip or stick, and thereby show itself, even
+      at that age, <i>l'animal méchant par excellence</i>. The love of teasing
+      and playing tricks, which is common enough, may be traced to the same
+      source. For instance, if a man has expressed his annoyance at any
+      interruption or other petty inconvenience, there will be no lack of people
+      who for that very reason will bring it about: <i>animal méchant par
+      excellence</i>! This is so certain that a man should be careful not to
+      express any annoyance at small evils. On the other hand he should also be
+      careful not to express his pleasure at any trifle, for, if he does so, men
+      will act like the jailer who, when he found that his prisoner had
+      performed the laborious task of taming a spider, and took a pleasure in
+      watching it, immediately crushed it under his foot: <i>l'animal méchant
+      par excellence</i>! This is why all animals are instinctively afraid of
+      the sight, or even of the track of a man, that <i>animal méchant par
+      excellence</i>! nor does their instinct them false; for it is man alone
+      who hunts game for which he has no use and which does him no harm.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      It is a fact, then, that in the heart of every man there lies a wild beast
+      which only waits for an opportunity to storm and rage, in its desire to
+      inflict pain on others, or, if they stand in his way, to kill them. It is
+      this which is the source of all the lust of war and battle. In trying to
+      tame and to some extent hold it in check, the intelligence, its appointed
+      keeper, has always enough to do. People may, if they please, call it the
+      radical evil of human nature&mdash;a name which will at least serve those
+      with whom a word stands for an explanation. I say, however, that it is the
+      will to live, which, more and more embittered by the constant sufferings
+      of existence, seeks to alleviate its own torment by causing torment in
+      others. But in this way a man gradually develops in himself real cruelty
+      and malice. The observation may also be added that as, according to Kant,
+      matter subsists only through the antagonism of the powers of expansion and
+      contraction, so human society subsists only by the antagonism of hatred,
+      or anger, and fear. For there is a moment in the life of all of us when
+      the malignity of our nature might perhaps make us murderers, if it were
+      not accompanied by a due admixture of fear to keep it within bounds; and
+      this fear, again, would make a man the sport and laughing stock of every
+      boy, if anger were not lying ready in him, and keeping watch.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But it is <i>Schadenfreude</i>, a mischievous delight in the misfortunes
+      of others, which remains the worst trait in human nature. It is a feeling
+      which is closely akin to cruelty, and differs from it, to say the truth,
+      only as theory from practice. In general, it may be said of it that it
+      takes the place which pity ought to take&mdash;pity which is its opposite,
+      and the true source of all real justice and charity.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <i>Envy</i> is also opposed to pity, but in another sense; envy, that is
+      to say, is produced by a cause directly antagonistic to that which
+      produces the delight in mischief. The opposition between pity and envy on
+      the one hand, and pity and the delight in mischief on the other, rests, in
+      the main, on the occasions which call them forth. In the case of envy it
+      is only as a direct effect of the cause which excites it that we feel it
+      at all. That is just the reason why envy, although it is a reprehensible
+      feeling, still admits of some excuse, and is, in general, a very human
+      quality; whereas the delight in mischief is diabolical, and its taunts are
+      the laughter of hell.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The delight in mischief, as I have said, takes the place which pity ought
+      to take. Envy, on the contrary, finds a place only where there is no
+      inducement to pity, or rather an inducement to its opposite; and it is
+      just as this opposite that envy arises in the human breast; and so far,
+      therefore, it may still be reckoned a human sentiment. Nay, I am afraid
+      that no one will be found to be entirely free from it. For that a man
+      should feel his own lack of things more bitterly at the sight of another's
+      delight in the enjoyment of them, is natural; nay, it is inevitable; but
+      this should not rouse his hatred of the man who is happier than himself.
+      It is just this hatred, however, in which true envy consists. Least of all
+      should a man be envious, when it is a question, not of the gifts of
+      fortune, or chance, or another's favour, but of the gifts of nature;
+      because everything that is innate in a man rests on a metaphysical basis,
+      and possesses justification of a higher kind; it is, so to speak, given
+      him by Divine grace. But, unhappily, it is just in the case of personal
+      advantages that envy is most irreconcilable. Thus it is that intelligence,
+      or even genius, cannot get on in the world without begging pardon for its
+      existence, wherever it is not in a position to be able, proudly and
+      boldly, to despise the world.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In other words, if envy is aroused only by wealth, rank, or power, it is
+      often kept down by egoism, which perceives that, on occasion, assistance,
+      enjoyment, support, protection, advancement, and so on, may be hoped for
+      from the object of envy or that at least by intercourse with him a man may
+      himself win honour from the reflected light of his superiority; and here,
+      too, there is the hope of one day attaining all those advantages himself.
+      On the other hand, in the envy that is directed to natural gifts and
+      personal advantages, like beauty in women, or intelligence in men, there
+      is no consolation or hope of one kind or the other; so that nothing
+      remains but to indulge a bitter and irreconcilable hatred of the person
+      who possesses these privileges; and hence the only remaining desire is to
+      take vengeance on him.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But here the envious man finds himself in an unfortunate position; for all
+      his blows fall powerless as soon as it is known that they come from him.
+      Accordingly he hides his feelings as carefully as if they were secret
+      sins, and so becomes an inexhaustible inventor of tricks and artifices and
+      devices for concealing and masking his procedure, in order that,
+      unperceived, he may wound the object of his envy. For instance, with an
+      air of the utmost unconcern he will ignore the advantages which are eating
+      his heart out; he will neither see them, nor know them, nor have observed
+      or even heard of them, and thus make himself a master in the art of
+      dissimulation. With great cunning he will completely overlook the man
+      whose brilliant qualities are gnawing at his heart, and act as though he
+      were quite an unimportant person; he will take no notice of him, and, on
+      occasion, will have even quite forgotten his existence. But at the same
+      time he will before all things endeavour by secret machination carefully
+      to deprive those advantages of any opportunity of showing themselves and
+      becoming known. Then out of his dark corner he will attack these qualities
+      with censure, mockery, ridicule and calumny, like the toad which spurts
+      its poison from a hole. No less will he enthusiastically praise
+      unimportant people, or even indifferent or bad performances in the same
+      sphere. In short, he will becomes a Proteas in stratagem, in order to
+      wound others without showing himself. But what is the use of it? The
+      trained eye recognises him in spite of it all. He betrays himself, if by
+      nothing else, by the way in which he timidly avoids and flies from the
+      object of his envy, who stands the more completely alone, the more
+      brilliant he is; and this is the reason why pretty girls have no friends
+      of their own sex. He betrays himself, too, by the causeless hatred which
+      he shows&mdash;a hatred which finds vent in a violent explosion at any
+      circumstance however trivial, though it is often only the product of his
+      imagination. How many such men there are in the world may be recognised by
+      the universal praise of modesty, that is, of a virtue invented on behalf
+      of dull and commonplace people. Nevertheless, it is a virtue which, by
+      exhibiting the necessity for dealing considerately with the wretched
+      plight of these people, is just what calls attention to it.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      For our self-consciousness and our pride there can be nothing more
+      flattering than the sight of envy lurking in its retreat and plotting its
+      schemes; but never let a man forget that where there is envy there is
+      hatred, and let him be careful not to make a false friend out of any
+      envious person. Therefore it is important to our safety to lay envy bare;
+      and a man should study to discover its tricks, as it is everywhere to be
+      found and always goes about <i>incognito</i>; or as I have said, like a
+      venomous toad it lurks in dark corners. It deserves neither quarter nor
+      sympathy; but as we can never reconcile it let our rule of conduct be to
+      scorn it with a good heart, and as our happiness and glory is torture to
+      it we may rejoice in its sufferings:
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  <i>Den Neid wirst nimmer du versöhnen;
+  So magst du ihn getrost verhöhnen.
+  Dein Glück, dein Ruhm ist ihm ein Leiden:
+  Magst drum an seiner Quaal dich weiden</i>.
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      We have been taking a look at the <i>depravity</i> of man, and it is a
+      sight which may well fill us with horror. But now we must cast our eyes on
+      the <i>misery</i> of his existence; and when we have done so, and are
+      horrified by that too, we must look back again at his depravity. We shall
+      then find that they hold the balance to each other. We shall perceive the
+      eternal justice of things; for we shall recognise that the world is itself
+      the Last Judgment on it, and we shall begin to understand why it is that
+      everything that lives must pay the penalty of its existence, first in
+      living and then in dying. Thus the evil of the penalty accords with the
+      evil of the sin&mdash;<i>malum poenae</i> with <i>malum culpae</i>. From
+      the same point of view we lose our indignation at that intellectual
+      incapacity of the great majority of mankind which in life so often
+      disgusts us. In this <i>Sansara</i>, as the Buddhists call it, human
+      misery, human depravity and human folly correspond with one another
+      perfectly, and they are of like magnitude. But if, on some special
+      inducement, we direct our gaze to one of them, and survey it in
+      particular, it seems to exceed the other two. This, however, is an
+      illusion, and merely the effect of their colossal range.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      All things proclaim this <i>Sansara</i>; more than all else, the world of
+      mankind; in which, from a moral point of view, villainy and baseness, and
+      from an intellectual point of view, incapacity and stupidity, prevail to a
+      horrifying extent. Nevertheless, there appear in it, although very
+      spasmodically, and always as a fresh surprise, manifestations of honesty,
+      of goodness, nay, even of nobility; and also of great intelligence, of the
+      thinking mind of genius. They never quite vanish, but like single points
+      of light gleam upon us out of the great dark mass. We must accept them as
+      a pledge that this <i>Sansara</i> contains a good and redeeming principle,
+      which is capable of breaking through and of filling and freeing the whole
+      of it.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      The readers of my <i>Ethics</i> know that with me the ultimate foundation
+      of morality is the truth which in the <i>Vedas</i> and the <i>Vedanta</i>
+      receives its expression in the established, mystical formula, <i>Tat twam
+      asi (This is thyself</i>), which is spoken with reference to every living
+      thing, be it man or beast, and is called the <i>Mahavakya</i>, the great
+      word.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Actions which proceed in accordance with this principle, such as those of
+      the philanthropist, may indeed be regarded as the beginning of mysticism.
+      Every benefit rendered with a pure intention proclaims that the man who
+      exercises it acts in direct conflict with the world of appearance; for he
+      recognises himself as identical with another individual, who exists in
+      complete separation from him. Accordingly, all disinterested kindness is
+      inexplicable; it is a mystery; and hence in order to explain it a man has
+      to resort to all sorts of fictions. When Kant had demolished all other
+      arguments for theism, he admitted one only, that it gave the best
+      interpretation and solution of such mysterious actions, and of all others
+      like them. He therefore allowed it to stand as a presumption unsusceptible
+      indeed of theoretical proof, but valid from a practical point of view. I
+      may, however, express my doubts whether he was quite serious about it. For
+      to make morality rest on theism is really to reduce morality to egoism;
+      although the English, it is true, as also the lowest classes of society
+      with us, do not perceive the possibility of any other foundation for it.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The above-mentioned recognition of a man's own true being in another
+      individual objectively presented to him, is exhibited in a particularly
+      beautiful and clear way in the cases in which a man, already destined to
+      death beyond any hope of rescue, gives himself up to the welfare of others
+      with great solicitude and zeal, and tries to save them. Of this kind is
+      the well-known story of a servant who was bitten in a courtyard at night
+      by a mad dog. In the belief that she was beyond hope, she seized the dog
+      and dragged it into a stable, which she then locked, so that no one else
+      might be bitten. Then again there is the incident in Naples, which
+      Tischbein has immortalised in one of his <i>aquarelles</i>. A son, fleeing
+      from the lava which is rapidly streaming toward the sea, is carrying his
+      aged father on his back. When there is only a narrow strip of land left
+      between the devouring elements, the father bids the son put him down, so
+      that the son may save himself by flight, as otherwise both will be lost.
+      The son obeys, and as he goes casts a glance of farewell on his father.
+      This is the moment depicted. The historical circumstance which Scott
+      represents in his masterly way in <i>The Heart of Midlothian</i>, chap,
+      ii., is of a precisely similar kind; where, of two delinquents condemned
+      to death, the one who by his awkwardness caused the capture of the other
+      happily sets him free in the chapel by overpowering the guard after the
+      execution-sermon, without at the same time making any attempt on his own
+      behalf. Nay, in the same category must also be placed the scene which is
+      represented in a common engraving, which may perhaps be objectionable to
+      western readers&mdash;I mean the one in which a soldier, kneeling to be
+      shot, is trying by waving a cloth to frighten away his dog who wants to
+      come to him.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In all these cases we see an individual in the face of his own immediate
+      and certain destruction no longer thinking of saving himself, so that he
+      may direct the whole of his efforts to saving some one else. How could
+      there be a clearer expression of the consciousness that what is being
+      destroyed is only a phenomenon, and that the destruction itself is only a
+      phenomenon; that, on the other hand, the real being of the man who meets
+      his death is untouched by that event, and lives on in the other man, in
+      whom even now, as his action betrays, he so clearly perceives it to exist?
+      For if this were not so, and it was his real being which was about to be
+      annihilated, how could that being spend its last efforts in showing such
+      an ardent sympathy in the welfare and continued existence of another?
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      There are two different ways in which a man may become conscious of his
+      own existence. On the one hand, he may have an empirical perception of it,
+      as it manifests itself externally&mdash;something so small that it
+      approaches vanishing point; set in a world which, as regards time and
+      space, is infinite; one only of the thousand millions of human creatures
+      who run about on this planet for a very brief period and are renewed every
+      thirty years. On the other hand, by going down into the depths of his own
+      nature, a man may become conscious that he is all in all; that, in fact,
+      he is the only real being; and that, in addition, this real being
+      perceives itself again in others, who present themselves from without, as
+      though they formed a mirror of himself.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Of these two ways in which a man may come to know what he is, the first
+      grasps the phenomenon alone, the mere product of <i>the principle of
+      individuation</i>; whereas the second makes a man immediately conscious
+      that he is <i>the thing-in-itself</i>. This is a doctrine in which, as
+      regards the first way, I have Kant, and as regards both, I have the <i>Vedas</i>,
+      to support me.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      There is, it is true, a simple objection to the second method. It may be
+      said to assume that one and the same being can exist in different places
+      at the same time, and yet be complete in each of them. Although, from an
+      empirical point of view, this is the most palpable impossibility&mdash;nay,
+      absurdity&mdash;it is nevertheless perfectly true of the thing-in-itself.
+      The impossibility and the absurdity of it, empirically, are only due to
+      the forms which phenomena assume, in accordance with the principle of
+      individuation. For the thing-in-itself, the will to live, exists whole and
+      undivided in every being, even in the smallest, as completely as in the
+      sum-total of all things that ever were or are or will be. This is why
+      every being, even the smallest, says to itself, So long as I am safe, let
+      the world perish&mdash;<i>dum ego salvus sim, pereat mundus</i>. And, in
+      truth, even if only one individual were left in the world, and all the
+      rest were to perish, the one that remained would still possess the whole
+      self-being of the world, uninjured and undiminished, and would laugh at
+      the destruction of the world as an illusion. This conclusion <i>per
+      impossible</i> may be balanced by the counter-conclusion, which is on all
+      fours with it, that if that last individual were to be annihilated in and
+      with him the whole world would be destroyed. It was in this sense that the
+      mystic Angelas Silesius{1} declared that God could not live for a moment
+      without him, and that if he were to be annihilated God must of necessity
+      give up the ghost:
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  <i>Ich weiss dass ohne mich Gott nicht ein Nu kann leben;
+  Werd' ich zunicht, er muss von Noth den Geist aufgeben</i>.
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Translator's Note</i>.&mdash;Angelus Silesius, see <i>Counsels
+      and Maxims</i>, p. 39, note.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But the empirical point of view also to some extent enables us to perceive
+      that it is true, or at least possible, that our self can exist in other
+      beings whose consciousness is separated and different from our own. That
+      this is so is shown by the experience of somnambulists. Although the
+      identity of their ego is preserved throughout, they know nothing, when
+      they awake, of all that a moment before they themselves said, did or
+      suffered. So entirely is the individual consciousness a phenomenon that
+      even in the same ego two consciousnesses can arise of which the one knows
+      nothing of the other.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <br /><br />
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      <a name="link2H_4_0003" id="link2H_4_0003"> </a>
+    </p>
+    <div style="height: 4em;">
+      <br /><br /><br /><br />
+    </div>
+    <h2>
+      GOVERNMENT.
+    </h2>
+    <p>
+      It is a characteristic failing of the Germans to look in the clouds for
+      what lies at their feet. An excellent example of this is furnished by the
+      treatment which the idea of <i>Natural Right</i> has received at the hands
+      of professors of philosophy. When they are called upon to explain those
+      simple relations of human life which make up the substance of this right,
+      such as Right and Wrong, Property, State, Punishment and so on, they have
+      recourse to the most extravagant, abstract, remote and meaningless
+      conceptions, and out of them build a Tower of Babel reaching to the
+      clouds, and taking this or that form according to the special whim of the
+      professor for the time being. The clearest and simplest relations of life,
+      such as affect us directly, are thus made quite unintelligible, to the
+      great detriment of the young people who are educated in such a school.
+      These relations themselves are perfectly simple and easily understood&mdash;as
+      the reader may convince himself if he will turn to the account which I
+      have given of them in the <i>Foundation of Morality</i>, § 17, and in my
+      chief work, bk. i., § 62. But at the sound of certain words, like Right,
+      Freedom, the Good, Being&mdash;this nugatory infinitive of the cupola&mdash;and
+      many others of the same sort, the German's head begins to swim, and
+      falling straightway into a kind of delirium he launches forth into
+      high-flown phrases which have no meaning whatever. He takes the most
+      remote and empty conceptions, and strings them together artificially,
+      instead of fixing his eyes on the facts, and looking at things and
+      relations as they really are. It is these things and relations which
+      supply the ideas of Right and Freedom, and give them the only true meaning
+      that they possess.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The man who starts from the preconceived opinion that the conception of
+      Right must be a positive one, and then attempts to define it, will fail;
+      for he is trying to grasp a shadow, to pursue a spectre, to search for
+      what does not exist. The conception of Right is a negative one, like the
+      conception of Freedom; its content is mere negation. It is the conception
+      of Wrong which is positive; Wrong has the same significance as <i>injury</i>&mdash;<i>laesio</i>&mdash;in
+      the widest sense of the term. An injury may be done either to a man's
+      person or to his property or to his honour; and accordingly a man's rights
+      are easy to define: every one has a right to do anything that injures no
+      one else.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      To have a right to do or claim a thing means nothing more than to be able
+      to do or take or vise it without thereby injuring any one else. <i>Simplex
+      sigillum veri</i>. This definition shows how senseless many questions are;
+      for instance, the question whether we have the right to take our own life,
+      As far as concerns the personal claims which others may possibly have upon
+      us, they are subject to the condition that we are alive, and fall to the
+      ground when we die. To demand of a man, who does not care to live any
+      longer for himself, that he should live on as a mere machine for the
+      advantage of others is an extravagant pretension.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Although men's powers differ, their rights are alike. Their rights do not
+      rest upon their powers, because Right is of a moral complexion; they rest
+      on the fact that the same will to live shows itself in every man at the
+      same stage of its manifestation. This, however, only applies to that
+      original and abstract Right, which a man possesses as a man. The property,
+      and also the honour, which a man acquires for himself by the exercise of
+      his powers, depend on the measure and kind of power which he possesses,
+      and so lend his Right a wider sphere of application. Here, then, equality
+      comes to an end. The man who is better equipped, or more active, increases
+      by adding to his gains, not his Right, but the number of the things to
+      which it extends.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In my chief work{1} I have proved that the State in its essence is merely
+      an institution existing for the purpose of protecting its members against
+      outward attack or inward dissension. It follows from this that the
+      ultimate ground on which the State is necessary is the acknowledged lack
+      of Right in the human race. If Right were there, no one would think of a
+      State; for no one would have any fear that his rights would be impaired;
+      and a mere union against the attacks of wild beasts or the elements would
+      have very little analogy with what we mean by a State. From this point of
+      view it is easy to see how dull and stupid are the philosophasters who in
+      pompous phrases represent that the State is the supreme end and flower of
+      human existence. Such a view is the apotheosis of Philistinism.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: 1 Bk. ii., ch. xlvii.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      If it were Right that ruled in the world, a man would have done enough in
+      building his house, and would need no other protection than the right of
+      possessing it, which would be obvious. But since Wrong is the order of the
+      day, it is requisite that the man who has built his house should also be
+      able to protect it. Otherwise his Right is <i>de facto</i> incomplete; the
+      aggressor, that is to say, has the right of might&mdash;<i>Faustrecht</i>;
+      and this is just the conception of Right which Spinoza entertains. He
+      recognises no other. His words are: <i>unusquisque tantum juris habet
+      quantum potentia valet</i>;{1} each man has as much right as he has power.
+      And again: <i>uniuscujusque jus potentia ejus definitur</i>; each man's
+      right is determined by his power.{2} Hobbes seems to have started this
+      conception of Right,{3} and he adds the strange comment that the Right of
+      the good Lord to all things rests on nothing but His omnipotence.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Tract. Theol. Pol</i>., ch. ii., § 8.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 2: <i>Ethics</i>, IV., xxxvii., 1.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 3: Particularly in a passage in the <i>De Cive</i>, I, § 14.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Now this is a conception of Right which, both in theory and in practice,
+      no longer prevails in the civic world; but in the world in general, though
+      abolished in theory, it continues to apply in practice. The consequences
+      of neglecting it may be seen in the case of China. Threatened by rebellion
+      within and foes without, this great empire is in a defenceless state, and
+      has to pay the penalty of having cultivated only the arts of peace and
+      ignored the arts of war.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      There is a certain analogy between the operations of nature and those of
+      man which is a peculiar but not fortuitous character, and is based on the
+      identity of the will in both. When the herbivorous animals had taken their
+      place in the organic world, beasts of prey made their appearance&mdash;necessarily
+      a late appearance&mdash;in each species, and proceeded to live upon them.
+      Just in the same way, as soon as by honest toil and in the sweat of their
+      faces men have won from the ground what is needed for the support of their
+      societies, a number of individuals are sure to arise in some of these
+      societies, who, instead of cultivating the earth and living on its
+      produce, prefer to take their lives in their hands and risk health and
+      freedom by falling upon those who are in possession of what they have
+      honestly earned, and by appropriating the fruits of their labour. These
+      are the beasts of prey in the human race; they are the conquering peoples
+      whom we find everywhere in history, from the most ancient to the most
+      recent times. Their varying fortunes, as at one moment they succeed and at
+      another fail, make up the general elements of the history of the world.
+      Hence Voltaire was perfectly right when he said that the aim of all war is
+      robbery. That those who engage in it are ashamed of their doings is clear
+      by the fact that governments loudly protest their reluctance to appeal to
+      arms except for purposes of self-defence. Instead of trying to excuse
+      themselves by telling public and official lies, which are almost more
+      revolting than war itself, they should take their stand, as bold as brass,
+      on Macchiavelli's doctrine. The gist of it may be stated to be this: that
+      whereas between one individual and another, and so far as concerns the law
+      and morality of their relations, the principle, <i>Don't do to others what
+      you wouldn't like done to yourself</i>, certainly applies, it is the
+      converse of this principle which is appropriate in the case of nations and
+      in politics: <i>What you wouldn't like done to yourself do to others</i>.
+      If you do not want to be put under a foreign yoke, take time by the
+      forelock, and put your neighbour under it himself; whenever, that is to
+      say, his weakness offers you the opportunity. For if you let the
+      opportunity pass, it will desert one day to the enemy's camp and offer
+      itself there. Then your enemy will put you under his yoke; and your
+      failure to grasp the opportunity may be paid for, not by the generation
+      which was guilty of it, but by the next. This Macchiavellian principle is
+      always a much more decent cloak for the lust of robbery than the rags of
+      very obvious lies in a speech from the head of the State; lies, too, of a
+      description which recalls the well-known story of the rabbit attacking the
+      dog. Every State looks upon its neighbours as at bottom a horde of
+      robbers, who will fall upon it as soon as they have the opportunity.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      Between the serf, the farmer, the tenant, and the mortgagee, the
+      difference is rather one of form than of substance. Whether the peasant
+      belongs to me, or the land on which he has to get a living; whether the
+      bird is mine, or its food, the tree or its fruit, is a matter of little
+      moment; for, as Shakespeare makes Shylock say:
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+                              <i>You take my life
+  When you do take the means whereby I live</i>.
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      The free peasant has, indeed, the advantage that he can go off and seek
+      his fortune in the wide world; whereas the serf who is attached to the
+      soil, <i>glebae adscriptus</i>, has an advantage which is perhaps still
+      greater, that when failure of crops or illness, old age or incapacity,
+      render him helpless, his master must look after him, and so he sleeps well
+      at night; whereas, if the crops fail, his master tosses about on his bed
+      trying to think how he is to procure bread for his men. As long ago as
+      Menander it was said that it is better to be the slave of a good master
+      than to live miserably as a freeman. Another advantage possessed by the
+      free is that if they have any talents they can improve their position; but
+      the same advantage is not wholly withheld from the slave. If he proves
+      himself useful to his master by the exercise of any skill, he is treated
+      accordingly; just as in ancient Rome mechanics, foremen of workshops,
+      architects, nay, even doctors, were generally slaves.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Slavery and poverty, then, are only two forms, I might almost say only two
+      names, of the same thing, the essence of which is that a man's physical
+      powers are employed, in the main, not for himself but for others; and this
+      leads partly to his being over-loaded with work, and partly to his getting
+      a scanty satisfaction for his needs. For Nature has given a man only as
+      much physical power as will suffice, if he exerts it in moderation, to
+      gain a sustenance from the earth. No great superfluity of power is his.
+      If, then, a not inconsiderable number of men are relieved from the common
+      burden of sustaining the existence of the human race, the burden of the
+      remainder is augmented, and they suffer. This is the chief source of the
+      evil which under the name of slavery, or under the name of the
+      proletariat, has always oppressed the great majority of the human race.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But the more remote cause of it is luxury. In order, it may be said, that
+      some few persons may have what is unnecessary, superfluous, and the
+      product of refinement&mdash;nay, in order that they may satisfy artificial
+      needs&mdash;a great part of the existing powers of mankind has to be
+      devoted to this object, and therefore withdrawn from the production of
+      what is necessary and indispensable. Instead of building cottages for
+      themselves, thousands of men build mansions for a few. Instead of weaving
+      coarse materials for themselves and their families, they make fine cloths,
+      silk, or even lace, for the rich, and in general manufacture a thousand
+      objects of luxury for their pleasure. A great part of the urban population
+      consists of workmen who make these articles of luxury; and for them and
+      those who give them work the peasants have to plough and sow and look
+      after the flocks as well as for themselves, and thus have more labour than
+      Nature originally imposed upon them. Moreover, the urban population
+      devotes a great deal of physical strength, and a great deal of land, to
+      such things as wine, silk, tobacco, hops, asparagus and so on, instead of
+      to corn, potatoes and cattle-breeding. Further, a number of men are
+      withdrawn from agriculture and employed in ship-building and seafaring, in
+      order that sugar, coffee, tea and other goods may be imported. In short, a
+      large part of the powers of the human race is taken away from the
+      production of what is necessary, in order to bring what is superfluous and
+      unnecessary within the reach of a few. As long therefore as luxury exists,
+      there must be a corresponding amount of over-work and misery, whether it
+      takes the name of poverty or of slavery. The fundamental difference
+      between the two is that slavery originates in violence, and poverty in
+      craft. The whole unnatural condition of society&mdash;the universal
+      struggle to escape from misery, the sea-trade attended with so much loss
+      of life, the complicated interests of commerce, and finally the wars to
+      which it all gives rise&mdash;is due, only and alone, to luxury, which
+      gives no happiness even to those who enjoy it, nay, makes them ill and
+      bad-tempered. Accordingly it looks as if the most effective way of
+      alleviating human misery would be to diminish luxury, or even abolish it
+      altogether.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      There is unquestionably much truth in this train of thought. But the
+      conclusion at which it arrives is refuted by an argument possessing this
+      advantage over it&mdash;that it is confirmed by the testimony of
+      experience. A certain amount of work is devoted to purposes of luxury.
+      What the human race loses in this way in the <i>muscular power</i> which
+      would otherwise be available for the necessities of existence is gradually
+      made up to it a thousandfold by the <i>nervous power</i>, which, in a
+      chemical sense, is thereby released. And since the intelligence and
+      sensibility which are thus promoted are on a higher level than the
+      muscular irritability which they supplant, so the achievements of mind
+      exceed those of the body a thousandfold. One wise counsel is worth the
+      work of many hands:
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  {Greek: Hos en sophon bouleuma tas pollon cheiras nika.}
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      A nation of nothing but peasants would do little in the way of discovery
+      and invention; but idle hands make active heads. Science and the Arts are
+      themselves the children of luxury, and they discharge their debt to it.
+      The work which they do is to perfect technology in all its branches,
+      mechanical, chemical and physical; an art which in our days has brought
+      machinery to a pitch never dreamt of before, and in particular has, by
+      steam and electricity, accomplished things the like of which would, in
+      earlier ages, have been ascribed to the agency of the devil. In
+      manufactures of all kinds, and to some extent in agriculture, machines now
+      do a thousand times more than could ever have been done by the hands of
+      all the well-to-do, educated, and professional classes, and could ever
+      have been attained if all luxury had been abolished and every one had
+      returned to the life of a peasant. It is by no means the rich alone, but
+      all classes, who derive benefit from these industries. Things which in
+      former days hardly any one could afford are now cheap and abundant, and
+      even the lowest classes are much better off in point of comfort. In the
+      Middle Ages a King of England once borrowed a pair of silk stockings from
+      one of his lords, so that he might wear them in giving an audience to the
+      French ambassador. Even Queen Elizabeth was greatly pleased and astonished
+      to receive a pair as a New Year's present; to-day every shopman has them.
+      Fifty years ago ladies wore the kind of calico gowns which servants wear
+      now. If mechanical science continues to progress at the same rate for any
+      length of time, it may end by saving human labour almost entirely, just as
+      horses are even now being largely superseded by machines. For it is
+      possible to conceive that intellectual culture might in some degree become
+      general in the human race; and this would be impossible as long as bodily
+      labour was incumbent on any great part of it. Muscular irritability and
+      nervous sensibility are always and everywhere, both generally and
+      particularly, in antagonism; for the simple reason that it is one and the
+      same vital power which underlies both. Further, since the arts have a
+      softening effect on character, it is possible that quarrels great and
+      small, wars and duels, will vanish from the world; just as both have
+      become much rarer occurrences. However, it is not my object here to write
+      a <i>Utopia</i>.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But apart from all this the arguments used above in favour of the
+      abolition of luxury and the uniform distribution of all bodily labour are
+      open to the objection that the great mass of mankind, always and
+      everywhere, cannot do without leaders, guides and counsellors, in one
+      shape or another, according to the matter in question; judges, governors,
+      generals, officials, priests, doctors, men of learning, philosophers, and
+      so on, are all a necessity. Their common task is to lead the race for the
+      greater part so incapable and perverse, through the labyrinth of life, of
+      which each of them according to his position and capacity has obtained a
+      general view, be his range wide or narrow. That these guides of the race
+      should be permanently relieved of all bodily labour as well as of all
+      vulgar need and discomfort; nay, that in proportion to their much greater
+      achievements they should necessarily own and enjoy more than the common
+      man, is natural and reasonable. Great merchants should also be included in
+      the same privileged class, whenever they make far-sighted preparations for
+      national needs.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The question of the sovereignty of the people is at bottom the same as the
+      question whether any man can have an original right to rule a people
+      against its will. How that proposition can be reasonably maintained I do
+      not see. The people, it must be admitted, is sovereign; but it is a
+      sovereign who is always a minor. It must have permanent guardians, and it
+      can never exercise its rights itself, without creating dangers of which no
+      one can foresee the end; especially as like all minors, it is very apt to
+      become the sport of designing sharpers, in the shape of what are called
+      demagogues.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Voltaire remarks that the first man to become a king was a successful
+      soldier. It is certainly the case that all princes were originally
+      victorious leaders of armies, and for a long time it was as such that they
+      bore sway. On the rise of standing armies princes began to regard their
+      people as a means of sustaining themselves and their soldiers, and treated
+      them, accordingly, as though they were a herd of cattle, which had to be
+      tended in order that it might provide wool, milk, and meat. The why and
+      wherefore of all this, as I shall presently show in detail, is the fact
+      that originally it was not right, but might, that ruled in the world.
+      Might has the advantage of having been the first in the field. That is why
+      it is impossible to do away with it and abolish it altogether; it must
+      always have its place; and all that a man can wish or ask is that it
+      should be found on the side of right and associated with it. Accordingly
+      says the prince to his subjects: "I rule you in virtue of the power which
+      I possess. But, on the other hand, it excludes that of any one else, and I
+      shall suffer none but my own, whether it comes from without, or arises
+      within by one of you trying to oppress another. In this way, then, you are
+      protected." The arrangement was carried out; and just because it was
+      carried out the old idea of kingship developed with time and progress into
+      quite a different idea, and put the other one in the background, where it
+      may still be seen, now and then, flitting about like a spectre. Its place
+      has been taken by the idea of the king as father of his people, as the
+      firm and unshakable pillar which alone supports and maintains the whole
+      organisation of law and order, and consequently the rights of every
+      man.{1} But a king can accomplish this only by inborn prerogative which
+      reserves authority to him and to him alone&mdash;an authority which is
+      supreme, indubitable, and beyond all attack, nay, to which every one
+      renders instinctive obedience. Hence the king is rightly said to rule "by
+      the grace of God." He is always the most useful person in the State, and
+      his services are never too dearly repaid by any Civil List, however heavy.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: We read in Stobaeus, <i>Florilegium</i>, ch. xliv., 41, of a
+      Persian custom, by which, whenever a king died, there was a five days'
+      anarchy, in order that people might perceive the advantage of having kings
+      and laws.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But even as late a writer as Macchiavelli was so decidedly imbued with the
+      earlier or mediaeval conception of the position of a prince that he treats
+      it as a matter which is self-evident: he never discusses it, but tacitly
+      takes it as the presupposition and basis of his advice. It may be said
+      generally that his book is merely the theoretical statement and consistent
+      and systematic exposition of the practice prevailing in his time. It is
+      the novel statement of it in a complete theoretical form that lends it
+      such a poignant interest. The same thing, I may remark in passing, applies
+      to the immortal little work of La Rochefaucauld, who, however, takes
+      private and not public life for his theme, and offers, not advice, but
+      observations. The title of this fine little book is open, perhaps, to some
+      objection: the contents are not, as a rule, either <i>maxims</i> or <i>reflections</i>,
+      but <i>aperçus</i>; and that is what they should be called. There is much,
+      too, in Macchiavelli that will be found also to apply to private life.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Right in itself is powerless; in nature it is Might that rules. To enlist
+      might on the side of right, so that by means of it right may rule, is the
+      problem of statesmanship. And it is indeed a hard problem, as will be
+      obvious if we remember that almost every human breast is the seat of an
+      egoism which has no limits, and is usually associated with an accumulated
+      store of hatred and malice; so that at the very start feelings of enmity
+      largely prevail over those of friendship. We have also to bear in mind
+      that it is many millions of individuals so constituted who have to be kept
+      in the bonds of law and order, peace and tranquillity; whereas originally
+      every one had a right to say to every one else: <i>I am just as good as
+      you are</i>! A consideration of all this must fill us with surprise that
+      on the whole the world pursues its way so peacefully and quietly, and with
+      so much law and order as we see to exist. It is the machinery of State
+      which alone accomplishes it. For it is physical power alone which has any
+      direct action on men; constituted as they generally are, it is for
+      physical power alone that they have any feeling or respect.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      If a man would convince himself by experience that this is the case, he
+      need do nothing but remove all compulsion from his fellows, and try to
+      govern them by clearly and forcibly representing to them what is
+      reasonable, right, and fair, though at the same time it may be contrary to
+      their interests. He would be laughed to scorn; and as things go that is
+      the only answer he would get. It would soon be obvious to him that moral
+      force alone is powerless. It is, then, physical force alone which is
+      capable of securing respect. Now this force ultimately resides in the
+      masses, where it is associated with ignorance, stupidity and injustice.
+      Accordingly the main aim of statesmanship in these difficult circumstances
+      is to put physical force in subjection to mental force&mdash;to
+      intellectual superiority, and thus to make it serviceable. But if this aim
+      is not itself accompanied by justice and good intentions the result of the
+      business, if it succeeds, is that the State so erected consists of knaves
+      and fools, the deceivers and the deceived. That this is the case is made
+      gradually evident by the progress of intelligence amongst the masses,
+      however much it may be repressed; and it leads to revolution. But if,
+      contrarily, intelligence is accompanied by justice and good intentions,
+      there arises a State as perfect as the character of human affairs will
+      allow. It is very much to the purpose if justice and good intentions not
+      only exist, but are also demonstrable and openly exhibited, and can be
+      called to account publicly, and be subject to control. Care must be taken,
+      however, lest the resulting participation of many persons in the work of
+      government should affect the unity of the State, and inflict a loss of
+      strength and concentration on the power by which its home and foreign
+      affairs have to be administered. This is what almost always happens in
+      republics. To produce a constitution which should satisfy all these
+      demands would accordingly be the highest aim of statesmanship. But, as a
+      matter of fact, statesmanship has to consider other things as well. It has
+      to reckon with the people as they exist, and their national peculiarities.
+      This is the raw material on which it has to work, and the ingredients of
+      that material will always exercise a great effect on the completed scheme.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Statesmanship will have achieved a good deal if it so far attains its
+      object as to reduce wrong and injustice in the community to a minimum. To
+      banish them altogether, and to leave no trace of them, is merely the ideal
+      to be aimed at; and it is only approximately that it can be reached. If
+      they disappear in one direction, they creep in again in another; for wrong
+      and injustice lie deeply rooted in human nature. Attempts have been made
+      to attain the desired aim by artificial constitutions and systematic codes
+      of law; but they are not in complete touch with the facts&mdash;they
+      remain an asymptote, for the simple reason that hard and fast conceptions
+      never embrace all possible cases, and cannot be made to meet individual
+      instances. Such conceptions resemble the stones of a mosaic rather than
+      the delicate shading in a picture. Nay, more: all experiments in this
+      matter are attended with danger; because the material in question, namely,
+      the human race, is the most difficult of all material to handle. It is
+      almost as dangerous as an explosive.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      No doubt it is true that in the machinery of the State the freedom of the
+      press performs the same function as a safety-valve in other machinery; for
+      it enables all discontent to find a voice; nay, in doing so, the
+      discontent exhausts itself if it has not much substance; and if it has,
+      there is an advantage in recognising it betimes and applying the remedy.
+      This is much better than to repress the discontent, and let it simmer and
+      ferment, and go on increasing until it ends in an explosion. On the other
+      hand, the freedom of the press may be regarded as a permission to sell
+      poison&mdash;poison for the heart and the mind. There is no idea so
+      foolish but that it cannot be put into the heads of the ignorant and
+      incapable multitude, especially if the idea holds out some prospect of any
+      gain or advantage. And when a man has got hold of any such idea what is
+      there that he will not do? I am, therefore, very much afraid that the
+      danger of a free press outweighs its utility, particularly where the law
+      offers a way of redressing wrongs. In any case, however, the freedom of
+      the press should be governed by a very strict prohibition of all and every
+      anonymity.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Generally, indeed, it may be maintained that right is of a nature
+      analogous to that of certain chemical substances, which cannot be
+      exhibited in a pure and isolated condition, but at the most only with a
+      small admixture of some other substance, which serves as a vehicle for
+      them, or gives them the necessary consistency; such as fluorine, or even
+      alcohol, or prussic acid. Pursuing the analogy we may say that right, if
+      it is to gain a footing in the world and really prevail, must of necessity
+      be supplemented by a small amount of arbitrary force, in order that,
+      notwithstanding its merely ideal and therefore ethereal nature, it may be
+      able to work and subsist in the real and material world, and not evaporate
+      and vanish into the clouds, as it does in Hesoid. Birth-right of every
+      description, all heritable privileges, every form of national religion,
+      and so on, may be regarded as the necessary chemical base or alloy;
+      inasmuch as it is only when right has some such firm and actual foundation
+      that it can be enforced and consistently vindicated. They form for right a
+      sort of {Greek: os moi pou sto}&mdash;a fulcrum for supporting its lever.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Linnaeus adopted a vegetable system of an artificial and arbitrary
+      character. It cannot be replaced by a natural one, no matter how
+      reasonable the change might be, or how often it has been attempted to make
+      it, because no other system could ever yield the same certainty and
+      stability of definition. Just in the same way the artificial and arbitrary
+      basis on which, as has been shown, the constitution of a State rests, can
+      never be replaced by a purely natural basis. A natural basis would aim at
+      doing away with the conditions that have been mentioned: in the place of
+      the privileges of birth it would put those of personal merit; in the place
+      of the national religion, the results of rationalistic inquiry, and so on.
+      However agreeable to reason this might all prove, the change could not be
+      made; because a natural basis would lack that certainty and fixity of
+      definition which alone secures the stability of the commonwealth. A
+      constitution which embodied abstract right alone would be an excellent
+      thing for natures other than human, but since the great majority of men
+      are extremely egoistic, unjust, inconsiderate, deceitful, and sometimes
+      even malicious; since in addition they are endowed with very scanty
+      intelligence there arises the necessity for a power that shall be
+      concentrated in one man, a power that shall be above all law and right,
+      and be completely irresponsible, nay, to which everything shall yield as
+      to something that is regarded as a creature of a higher kind, a ruler by
+      the grace of God. It is only thus that men can be permanently held in
+      check and governed.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The United States of North America exhibit the attempt to proceed without
+      any such arbitrary basis; that is to say, to allow abstract right to
+      prevail pure and unalloyed. But the result is not attractive. For with all
+      the material prosperity of the country what do we find? The prevailing
+      sentiment is a base Utilitarianism with its inevitable companion,
+      ignorance; and it is this that has paved the way for a union of stupid
+      Anglican bigotry, foolish prejudice, coarse brutality, and a childish
+      veneration of women. Even worse things are the order of the day: most
+      iniquitous oppression of the black freemen, lynch law, frequent
+      assassination often committed with entire impunity, duels of a savagery
+      elsewhere unknown, now and then open scorn of all law and justice,
+      repudiation of public debts, abominable political rascality towards a
+      neighbouring State, followed by a mercenary raid on its rich territory,&mdash;afterwards
+      sought to be excused, on the part of the chief authority of the State, by
+      lies which every one in the country knew to be such and laughed at&mdash;an
+      ever-increasing ochlocracy, and finally all the disastrous influence which
+      this abnegation of justice in high quarters must have exercised on private
+      morals. This specimen of a pure constitution on the obverse side of the
+      planet says very little for republics in general, but still less for the
+      imitations of it in Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia and Peru.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      A peculiar disadvantage attaching to republics&mdash;and one that might
+      not be looked for&mdash;is that in this form of government it must be more
+      difficult for men of ability to attain high position and exercise direct
+      political influence than in the case of monarchies. For always and
+      everywhere and under all circumstances there is a conspiracy, or
+      instinctive alliance, against such men on the part of all the stupid, the
+      weak, and the commonplace; they look upon such men as their natural
+      enemies, and they are firmly held together by a common fear of them. There
+      is always a numerous host of the stupid and the weak, and in a republican
+      constitution it is easy for them to suppress and exclude the men of
+      ability, so that they may not be outflanked by them. They are fifty to
+      one; and here all have equal rights at the start.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In a monarchy, on the other hand, this natural and universal league of the
+      stupid against those who are possessed of intellectual advantages is a
+      one-sided affair; it exists only from below, for in a monarchy talent and
+      intelligence receive a natural advocacy and support from above. In the
+      first place, the position of the monarch himself is much too high and too
+      firm for him to stand in fear of any sort of competition. In the next
+      place, he serves the State more by his will than by his intelligence; for
+      no intelligence could ever be equal to all the demands that would in his
+      case be made upon it. He is therefore compelled to be always availing
+      himself of other men's intelligence. Seeing that his own interests are
+      securely bound up with those of his country; that they are inseparable
+      from them and one with them, he will naturally give the preference to the
+      best men, because they are his most serviceable instruments, and he will
+      bestow his favour upon them&mdash;as soon, that is, as he can find them;
+      which is not so difficult, if only an honest search be made. Just in the
+      same way even ministers of State have too much advantage over rising
+      politicians to need to regard them with jealousy; and accordingly for
+      analogous reasons they are glad to single out distinguished men and set
+      them to work, in order to make use of their powers for themselves. It is
+      in this way that intelligence has always under a monarchical government a
+      much better chance against its irreconcilable and ever-present foe,
+      stupidity; and the advantage which it gains is very great.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In general, the monarchical form of government is that which is natural to
+      man; just as it is natural to bees and ants, to a flight of cranes, a herd
+      of wandering elephants, a pack of wolves seeking prey in common, and many
+      other animals, all of which place one of their number at the head of the
+      business in hand. Every business in which men engage, if it is attended
+      with danger&mdash;every campaign, every ship at sea&mdash;must also be
+      subject to the authority of one commander; everywhere it is one will that
+      must lead. Even the animal organism is constructed on a monarchical
+      principle: it is the brain alone which guides and governs, and exercises
+      the hegemony. Although heart, lungs, and stomach contribute much more to
+      the continued existence of the whole body, these philistines cannot on
+      that account be allowed to guide and lead. That is a business which
+      belongs solely to the brain; government must proceed from one central
+      point. Even the solar system is monarchical. On the other hand, a republic
+      is as unnatural as it is unfavourable to the higher intellectual life and
+      the arts and sciences. Accordingly we find that everywhere in the world,
+      and at all times, nations, whether civilised or savage, or occupying a
+      position between the two, are always under monarchical government. The
+      rule of many as Homer said, is not a good thing: let there be one ruler,
+      one king;
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  {Greek: Ouk agathon polykoiraniae-eis koiranos esto
+  Eis basoleus.} {1}
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Iliad</i>, ii., 204.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      How would it be possible that, everywhere and at all times, we should see
+      many millions of people, nay, even hundreds of millions, become the
+      willing and obedient subjects of one man, sometimes even one woman, and
+      provisionally, even, of a child, unless there were a monarchical instinct
+      in men which drove them to it as the form of government best suited to
+      them? This arrangement is not the product of reflection. Everywhere one
+      man is king, and for the most part his dignity is hereditary. He is, as it
+      were, the personification, the monogram, of the whole people, which
+      attains an individuality in him. In this sense he can rightly say: <i>l'etat
+      c'est moi</i>. It is precisely for this reason that in Shakespeare's
+      historical plays the kings of England and France mutually address each
+      other as <i>France</i> and <i>England</i>, and the Duke of Austria goes by
+      the name of his country. It is as though the kings regarded themselves as
+      the incarnation of their nationalities. It is all in accordance with human
+      nature; and for this very reason the hereditary monarch cannot separate
+      his own welfare and that of his family from the welfare of his country;
+      as, on the other hand, mostly happens when the monarch is elected, as, for
+      instance, in the States of the Church.{1} The Chinese can conceive of a
+      monarchical government only; what a republic is they utterly fail to
+      understand. When a Dutch legation was in China in the year 1658, it was
+      obliged to represent that the Prince of Orange was their king, as
+      otherwise the Chinese would have been inclined to take Holland for a nest
+      of pirates living without any lord or master.{2} Stobaeus, in a chapter in
+      his <i>Florilegium</i>, at the head of which he wrote <i>That monarchy is
+      best</i>, collected the best of the passages in which the ancients
+      explained the advantages of that form of government. In a word, republics
+      are unnatural and artificial; they are the product of reflection. Hence it
+      is that they occur only as rare exceptions in the whole history of the
+      world. There were the small Greek republics, the Roman and the
+      Carthaginian; but they were all rendered possible by the fact that
+      five-sixths, perhaps even seven-eighths, of the population consisted of
+      slaves. In the year 1840, even in the United States, there were three
+      million slaves to a population of sixteen millions. Then, again, the
+      duration of the republics of antiquity, compared with that of monarchies,
+      was very short. Republics are very easy to found, and very difficult to
+      maintain, while with monarchies it is exactly the reverse. If it is
+      Utopian schemes that are wanted, I say this: the only solution of the
+      problem would be a despotism of the wise and the noble, of the true
+      aristocracy and the genuine nobility, brought about by the method of
+      generation&mdash;that is, by the marriage of the noblest men with the
+      cleverest and most intellectual women. This is my Utopia, my Republic of
+      Plato.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Translator's Note</i>.&mdash;The reader will recollect
+      that Schopenhauer was writing long before the Papal territories were
+      absorbed into the kingdom of Italy.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 2: See Jean Nieuhoff, <i>L'Ambassade de la Compagnie Orientale
+      des Provinces Unies vers L'Empereur de la Chine</i>, traduit par Jean le
+      Charpentier à Leyde, 1665; ch. 45.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Constitutional kings are undoubtedly in much the same position as the gods
+      of Epicurus, who sit upon high in undisturbed bliss and tranquillity, and
+      do not meddle with human affairs. Just now they are the fashion. In every
+      German duodecimo-principality a parody of the English constitution is set
+      up, quite complete, from Upper and Lower Houses down to the Habeas Corpus
+      Act and trial by jury. These institutions, which proceed from English
+      character and English circumstances, and presuppose both, are natural and
+      suitable to the English people. It is just as natural to the German people
+      to be split up into a number of different stocks, under a similar number
+      of ruling Princes, with an Emperor over them all, who maintains peace at
+      home, and represents the unity of the State board. It is an arrangement
+      which has proceeded from German character and German circumstances. I am
+      of opinion that if Germany is not to meet with the same fate as Italy, it
+      must restore the imperial crown, which was done away with by its
+      arch-enemy, the first Napoleon; and it must restore it as effectively as
+      possible. {1} For German unity depends on it, and without the imperial
+      crown it will always be merely nominal, or precarious. But as we no longer
+      live in the days of Günther of Schwarzburg, when the choice of Emperor was
+      a serious business, the imperial crown ought to go alternately to Prussia
+      and to Austria, for the life of the wearer. In any case, the absolute
+      sovereignty of the small States is illusory. Napoleon I. did for Germany
+      what Otto the Great did for Italy: he divided it into small, independent
+      States, on the principle, <i>divide et impera</i>.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Translator's Note</i>.&mdash;Here, again, it is hardly
+      necessary to say that Schopenhauer, who died in 1860, and wrote this
+      passage at least some years previously, cannot be referring to any of the
+      events which culminated in 1870. The whole passage forms a striking
+      illustration of his political sagacity.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The English show their great intelligence, amongst other ways, by clinging
+      to their ancient institutions, customs and usages, and by holding them
+      sacred, even at the risk of carrying this tenacity too far, and making it
+      ridiculous. They hold them sacred for the simple reason that those
+      institutions and customs are not the invention of an idle head, but have
+      grown up gradually by the force of circumstance and the wisdom of life
+      itself, and are therefore suited to them as a nation. On the other hand,
+      the German Michel{1} allows himself to be persuaded by his schoolmaster
+      that he must go about in an English dress-coat, and that nothing else will
+      do. Accordingly he has bullied his father into giving it to him; and with
+      his awkward manners this ungainly creature presents in it a sufficiently
+      ridiculous figure. But the dress-coat will some day be too tight for him
+      and incommode him. It will not be very long before he feels it in trial by
+      jury. This institution arose in the most barbarous period of the Middle
+      Ages&mdash;the times of Alfred the Great, when the ability to read and
+      write exempted a man from the penalty of death. It is the worst of all
+      criminal procedures. Instead of judges, well versed in law and of great
+      experience, who have grown grey in daily unravelling the tricks and wiles
+      of thieves, murderers and rascals of all sorts, and so are well able to
+      get at the bottom of things, it is gossiping tailors and tanners who sit
+      in judgment; it is their coarse, crude, unpractised, and awkward
+      intelligence, incapable of any sustained attention, that is called upon to
+      find out the truth from a tissue of lies and deceit. All the time,
+      moreover, they are thinking of their cloth and their leather, and longing
+      to be at home; and they have absolutely no clear notion at all of the
+      distinction between probability and certainty. It is with this sort of a
+      calculus of probabilities in their stupid heads that they confidently
+      undertake to seal a man's doom.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Translator's Note</i>.&mdash;It may be well to explain
+      that "Michel" is sometimes used by the Germans as a nickname of their
+      nation, corresponding to "John Bull" as a nickname of the English. Flügel
+      in his German-English Dictionary declares that <i>der deutsche Michel</i>
+      represents the German nation as an honest, blunt, unsuspicious fellow, who
+      easily allows himself to be imposed upon, even, he adds, with a touch of
+      patriotism, "by those who are greatly his inferiors in point of strength
+      and real worth."}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The same remark is applicable to them which Dr. Johnson made of a
+      court-martial in which he had little confidence, summoned to decide a very
+      important case. He said that perhaps there was not a member of it who, in
+      the whole course of his life, had ever spent an hour by himself in
+      balancing probabilities.{1} Can any one imagine that the tailor and the
+      tanner would be impartial judges? What! the vicious multitude impartial!
+      as if partiality were not ten times more to be feared from men of the same
+      class as the accused than from judges who knew nothing of him personally,
+      lived in another sphere altogether, were irremovable, and conscious of the
+      dignity of their office. But to let a jury decide on crimes against the
+      State and its head, or on misdemeanours of the press, is in a very real
+      sense to set the fox to keep the geese.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: Boswell's <i>Johnson</i>, 1780, set. 71.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Everywhere and at all times there has been much discontent with
+      governments, laws and public regulations; for the most part, however,
+      because men are always ready to make institutions responsible for the
+      misery inseparable from human existence itself; which is, to speak
+      mythically, the curse that was laid on Adam, and through him on the whole
+      race. But never has that delusion been proclaimed in a more mendacious and
+      impudent manner than by the demagogues of the <i>Jetstzeit</i>&mdash;of
+      the day we live in. As enemies of Christianity, they are, of course,
+      optimists: to them the world is its own end and object, and accordingly in
+      itself, that is to say, in its own natural constitution, it is arranged on
+      the most excellent principles, and forms a regular habitation of bliss.
+      The enormous and glaring evils of the world they attribute wholly to
+      governments: if governments, they think, were to do their duty, there
+      would be a heaven upon earth; in other words, all men could eat, drink,
+      propagate and die, free from trouble and want. This is what they mean when
+      they talk of the world being "its own end and object"; this is the goal of
+      that "perpetual progress of the human race," and the other fine things
+      which they are never tired of proclaiming.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Formerly it was <i>faith</i> which was the chief support of the throne;
+      nowadays it is <i>credit</i>. The Pope himself is scarcely more concerned
+      to retain the confidence of the faithful than to make his creditors
+      believe in his own good faith. If in times past it was the guilty debt of
+      the world which was lamented, now it is the financial debts of the world
+      which arouse dismay. Formerly it was the Last Day which was prophesied;
+      now it is the {Greek: seisachtheia} the great repudiation, the universal
+      bankruptcy of the nations, which will one day happen; although the
+      prophet, in this as in the other case, entertains a firm hope that he will
+      not live to see it himself.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      From an ethical and a rational point of view, the <i>right of possession</i>
+      rests upon an incomparably better foundation than the <i>right of birth</i>;
+      nevertheless, the right of possession is allied with the right of birth
+      and has come to be part and parcel of it, so that it would hardly be
+      possible to abolish the right of birth without endangering the right of
+      possession. The reason of this is that most of what a man possesses he
+      inherited, and therefore holds by a kind of right of birth; just as the
+      old nobility bear the names only of their hereditary estates, and by the
+      use of those names do no more than give expression to the fact that they
+      own the estates. Accordingly all owners of property, if instead of being
+      envious they were wise, ought also to support the maintenance of the
+      rights of birth.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The existence of a nobility has, then, a double advantage: it helps to
+      maintain on the one hand the rights of possession, and on the other the
+      right of birth belonging to the king. For the king is the first nobleman
+      in the country, and, as a general rule, he treats the nobility as his
+      humble relations, and regards them quite otherwise than the commoners,
+      however trusty and well-beloved. It is quite natural, too, that he should
+      have more confidence in those whose ancestors were mostly the first
+      ministers, and always the immediate associates, of his own. A nobleman,
+      therefore, appeals with reason to the name he bears, when on the
+      occurrence of anything to rouse distrust he repeats his assurance of
+      fidelity and service to the king. A man's character, as my readers are
+      aware, assuredly comes to him from his father. It is a narrow-minded and
+      ridiculous thing not to consider whose son a man is.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <br /><br />
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      <a name="link2H_4_0004" id="link2H_4_0004"> </a>
+    </p>
+    <div style="height: 4em;">
+      <br /><br /><br /><br />
+    </div>
+    <h2>
+      FREE-WILL AND FATALISM.
+    </h2>
+    <p>
+      No thoughtful man can have any doubt, after the conclusions reached in my
+      prize-essay on <i>Moral Freedom</i>, that such freedom is to be sought,
+      not anywhere in nature, but outside of it. The only freedom that exists is
+      of a metaphysical character. In the physical world freedom is an
+      impossibility. Accordingly, while our several actions are in no wise free,
+      every man's individual character is to be regarded as a free act. He is
+      such and such a man, because once for all it is his will to be that man.
+      For the will itself, and in itself, and also in so far as it is manifest
+      in an individual, and accordingly constitutes the original and fundamental
+      desires of that individual, is independent of all knowledge, because it is
+      antecedent to such knowledge. All that it receives from knowledge is the
+      series of motives by which it successively develops its nature and makes
+      itself cognisable or visible; but the will itself, as something that lies
+      beyond time, and so long as it exists at all, never changes. Therefore
+      every man, being what he is and placed in the circumstances which for the
+      moment obtain, but which on their part also arise by strict necessity, can
+      absolutely never do anything else than just what at that moment he does
+      do. Accordingly, the whole course of a man's life, in all its incidents
+      great and small, is as necessarily predetermined as the course of a clock.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The main reason of this is that the kind of metaphysical free act which I
+      have described tends to become a knowing consciousness&mdash;a perceptive
+      intuition, which is subject to the forms of space and time. By means of
+      those forms the unity and indivisibility of the act are represented as
+      drawn asunder into a series of states and events, which are subject to the
+      Principle of Sufficient Reason in its four forms&mdash;and it is this that
+      is meant by <i>necessity</i>. But the result of it all assumes a moral
+      complexion. It amounts to this, that by what we do we know what we are,
+      and by what we suffer we know what we deserve.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Further, it follows from this that a man's <i>individuality</i> does not
+      rest upon the principle of individuation alone, and therefore is not
+      altogether phenomenal in its nature. On the contrary, it has its roots in
+      the thing-in-itself, in the will which is the essence of each individual.
+      The character of this individual is itself individual. But how deep the
+      roots of individuality extend is one of the questions which I do not
+      undertake to answer.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In this connection it deserves to be mentioned that even Plato, in his own
+      way, represented the individuality of a man as a free act.{1} He
+      represented him as coming into the world with a given tendency, which was
+      the result of the feelings and character already attaching to him in
+      accordance with the doctrine of metempsychosis. The Brahmin philosophers
+      also express the unalterable fixity of innate character in a mystical
+      fashion. They say that Brahma, when a man is produced, engraves his doings
+      and sufferings in written characters on his skull, and that his life must
+      take shape in accordance therewith. They point to the jagged edges in the
+      sutures of the skull-bones as evidence of this writing; and the purport of
+      it, they say, depends on his previous life and actions. The same view
+      appears to underlie the Christian, or rather, the Pauline, dogma of
+      Predestination.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Phaedrus</i> and <i>Laws, bk</i>. x.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But this truth, which is universally confirmed by experience, is attended
+      with another result. All genuine merit, moral as well as intellectual, is
+      not merely physical or empirical in its origin, but metaphysical; that is
+      to say, it is given <i>a priori</i> and not <i>a posteriori</i>; in other
+      words, it lies innate and is not acquired, and therefore its source is not
+      a mere phenomenon, but the thing-in-itself. Hence it is that every man
+      achieves only that which is irrevocably established in his nature, or is
+      born with him. Intellectual capacity needs, it is true, to be developed
+      just as many natural products need to be cultivated in order that we may
+      enjoy or use them; but just as in the case of a natural product no
+      cultivation can take the place of original material, neither can it do so
+      in the case of intellect. That is the reason why qualities which are
+      merely acquired, or learned, or enforced&mdash;that is, qualities <i>a
+      posteriori</i>, whether moral or intellectual&mdash;are not real or
+      genuine, but superficial only, and possessed of no value. This is a
+      conclusion of true metaphysics, and experience teaches the same lesson to
+      all who can look below the surface. Nay, it is proved by the great
+      importance which we all attach to such innate characteristics as
+      physiognomy and external appearance, in the case of a man who is at all
+      distinguished; and that is why we are so curious to see him. Superficial
+      people, to be sure,&mdash;and, for very good reasons, commonplace people
+      too,&mdash;will be of the opposite opinion; for if anything fails them
+      they will thus be enabled to console themselves by thinking that it is
+      still to come.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The world, then, is not merely a battlefield where victory and defeat
+      receive their due recompense in a future state. No! the world is itself
+      the Last Judgment on it. Every man carries with him the reward and the
+      disgrace that he deserves; and this is no other than the doctrine of the
+      Brahmins and Buddhists as it is taught in the theory of metempsychosis.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The question has been raised, What two men would do, who lived a solitary
+      life in the wilds and met each other for the first time. Hobbes,
+      Pufendorf, and Rousseau have given different answers. Pufendorf believed
+      that they would approach each other as friends; Hobbes, on the contrary,
+      as enemies; Rousseau, that they would pass each other by In silence. All
+      three are both right and wrong. This is just a case in which the
+      incalculable difference that there is in innate moral disposition between
+      one individual and another would make its appearance. The difference is so
+      strong that the question here raised might be regarded as the standard and
+      measure of it. For there are men in whom the sight of another man at once
+      rouses a feeling of enmity, since their inmost nature exclaims at once:
+      That is not me! There are, others in whom the sight awakens immediate
+      sympathy; their inmost nature says: <i>That is me over again</i>! Between
+      the two there are countless degrees. That in this most important matter we
+      are so totally different is a great problem, nay, a mystery.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In regard to this <i>a priori</i> nature of moral character there is
+      matter for varied reflection in a work by Bastholm, a Danish writer,
+      entitled <i>Historical Contributions to the Knowledge of Man in the Savage
+      State</i>. He is struck by the fact that intellectual culture and moral
+      excellence are shown to be entirely independent of each other, inasmuch as
+      one is often found without the other. The reason of this, as we shall
+      find, is simply that moral excellence in no wise springs from reflection,
+      which is developed by intellectual culture, but from the will itself, the
+      constitution of which is innate and not susceptible in itself of any
+      improvement by means of education. Bastholm represents most nations as
+      very vicious and immoral; and on the other hand he reports that excellent
+      traits of character are found amongst some savage peoples; as, for
+      instance, amongst the Orotchyses, the inhabitants of the island Savu, the
+      Tunguses, and the Pelew islanders. He thus attempts to solve the problem,
+      How it is that some tribes are so remarkably good, when their neighbours
+      are all bad,
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      It seems to me that the difficulty may be explained as follows: Moral
+      qualities, as we know, are heritable, and an isolated tribe, such as is
+      described, might take its rise in some one family, and ultimately in a
+      single ancestor who happened to be a good man, and then maintain its
+      purity. Is it not the case, for instance, that on many unpleasant
+      occasions, such as repudiation of public debts, filibustering raids and so
+      on, the English have often reminded the North Americans of their descent
+      from English penal colonists? It is a reproach, however, which can apply
+      only to a small part of the population.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      It is marvellous how <i>every man's individuality</i> (that is to say, the
+      union of a definite character with a definite intellect) accurately
+      determines all his actions and thoughts down to the most unimportant
+      details, as though it were a dye which pervaded them; and how, in
+      consequence, one man's whole course of life, in other words, his inner and
+      outer history, turns out so absolutely different from another's. As a
+      botanist knows a plant in its entirety from a single leaf; as Cuvier from
+      a single bone constructed the whole animal, so an accurate knowledge of a
+      man's whole character may be attained from a single characteristic act;
+      that is to say, he himself may to some extent be constructed from it, even
+      though the act in question is of very trifling consequence. Nay, that is
+      the most perfect test of all, for in a matter of importance people are on
+      their guard; in trifles they follow their natural bent without much
+      reflection. That is why Seneca's remark, that even the smallest things may
+      be taken as evidence of character, is so true: <i>argumenta morum ex
+      minimis quoque licet capere</i>.{1} If a man shows by his absolutely
+      unscrupulous and selfish behaviour in small things that a sentiment of
+      justice is foreign to his disposition, he should not be trusted with a
+      penny unless on due security. For who will believe that the man who every
+      day shows that he is unjust in all matters other than those which concern
+      property, and whose boundless selfishness everywhere protrudes through the
+      small affairs of ordinary life which are subject to no scrutiny, like a
+      dirty shirt through the holes of a ragged jacket&mdash;who, I ask, will
+      believe that such a man will act honourably in matters of <i>meum</i> and
+      <i>tuum</i> without any other incentive but that of justice? The man who
+      has no conscience in small things will be a scoundrel in big things. If we
+      neglect small traits of character, we have only ourselves to blame if we
+      afterwards learn to our disadvantage what this character is in the great
+      affairs of life. On the same principle, we ought to break with so-called
+      friends even in matters of trifling moment, if they show a character that
+      is malicious or bad or vulgar, so that we may avoid the bad turn which
+      only waits for an opportunity of being done us. The same thing applies to
+      servants. Let it always be our maxim: Better alone than amongst traitors.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Ep</i>., 52.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Of a truth the first and foremost step in all knowledge of mankind is the
+      conviction that a man's conduct, taken as a whole, and in all its
+      essential particulars, is not governed by his reason or by any of the
+      resolutions which he may make in virtue of it. No man becomes this or that
+      by wishing to be it, however earnestly. His acts proceed from his innate
+      and unalterable character, and they are more immediately and particularly
+      determined by motives. A man's conduct, therefore, is the necessary
+      product of both character and motive. It may be illustrated by the course
+      of a planet, which is the result of the combined effect of the tangential
+      energy with which it is endowed, and the centripetal energy which operates
+      from the sun. In this simile the former energy represents character, and
+      the latter the influence of motive. It is almost more than a mere simile.
+      The tangential energy which properly speaking is the source of the
+      planet's motion, whilst on the other hand the motion is kept in check by
+      gravitation, is, from a metaphysical point of view, the will manifesting
+      itself in that body.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      To grasp this fact is to see that we really never form anything more than
+      a conjecture of what we shall do under circumstances which are still to
+      happen; although we often take our conjecture for a resolve. When, for
+      instance, in pursuance of a proposal, a man with the greatest sincerity,
+      and even eagerness, accepts an engagement to do this or that on the
+      occurrence of a certain future event, it is by no means certain that he
+      will fulfil the engagement; unless he is so constituted that the promise
+      which he gives, in itself and as such, is always and everywhere a motive
+      sufficient for him, by acting upon him, through considerations of honour,
+      like some external compulsion. But above and beyond this, what he will do
+      on the occurrence of that event may be foretold from true and accurate
+      knowledge of his character and the external circumstances under the
+      influence of which he will fall; and it may with complete certainty be
+      foretold from this alone. Nay, it is a very easy prophecy if he has been
+      already seen in a like position; for he will inevitably do the same thing
+      a second time, provided that on the first occasion he had a true and
+      complete knowledge of the facts of the case. For, as I have often
+      remarked, a final cause does not impel a man by being real, but by being
+      known; <i>causa finalis non movet secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum
+      esse cognitum</i>.{1} Whatever he failed to recognise or understand the
+      first time could have no influence upon his will; just as an electric
+      current stops when some isolating body hinders the action of the
+      conductor. This unalterable nature of character, and the consequent
+      necessity of our actions, are made very clear to a man who has not, on any
+      given occasion, behaved as he ought to have done, by showing a lack either
+      of resolution or endurance or courage, or some other quality demanded at
+      the moment. Afterwards he recognises what it is that he ought to have
+      done; and, sincerely repenting of his incorrect behaviour, he thinks to
+      himself, <i>If the opportunity were offered to me again, I should act
+      differently</i>. It is offered once more; the same occasion recurs; and to
+      his great astonishment he does precisely the same thing over again.{2}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: Suarez, <i>Disp. Metaph</i>., xxiii.; §§7 and 8.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 2: Cf. <i>World as Will</i>, ii., pp. 251 ff. <i>sqq</i>. (third
+      edition).}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The best examples of the truth in question are in every way furnished by
+      Shakespeare's plays. It is a truth with which he was thoroughly imbued,
+      and his intuitive wisdom expressed it in a concrete shape on every page. I
+      shall here, however, give an instance of it in a case in which he makes it
+      remarkably clear, without exhibiting any design or affectation in the
+      matter; for he was a real artist and never set out from general ideas. His
+      method was obviously to work up to the psychological truth which he
+      grasped directly and intuitively, regardless of the fact that few would
+      notice or understand it, and without the smallest idea that some dull and
+      shallow fellows in Germany would one day proclaim far and wide that he
+      wrote his works to illustrate moral commonplaces. I allude to the
+      character of the Earl of Northumberland, whom we find in three plays in
+      succession, although he does not take a leading part in any one of them;
+      nay, he appears only in a few scenes distributed over fifteen acts.
+      Consequently, if the reader is not very attentive, a character exhibited
+      at such great intervals, and its moral identity, may easily escape his
+      notice, even though it has by no means escaped the poet's. He makes the
+      earl appear everywhere with a noble and knightly grace, and talk in
+      language suitable to it; nay, he sometimes puts very beautiful and even
+      elevated passages, into his mouth. At the same time he is very far from
+      writing after the manner of Schiller, who was fond of painting the devil
+      black, and whose moral approval or disapproval of the characters which he
+      presented could be heard in their own words. With Shakespeare, and also
+      with Goethe, every character, as long as he is on the stage and speaking,
+      seems to be absolutely in the right, even though it were the devil
+      himself. In this respect let the reader compare Duke Alba as he appears in
+      Goethe with the same character in Schiller.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      We make the acquaintance of the Earl of Northumberland in the play of <i>Richard
+      II</i>., where he is the first to hatch a plot against the King in favour
+      of Bolingbroke, afterwards Henry IV., to whom he even offers some personal
+      flattery (Act II., Sc. 3). In the following act he suffers a reprimand
+      because, in speaking of the King he talks of him as "Richard," without
+      more ado, but protests that he did it only for brevity's sake. A little
+      later his insidious words induce the King to surrender. In the following
+      act, when the King renounces the crown, Northumberland treats him with
+      such harshness and contempt that the unlucky monarch is quite broken, and
+      losing all patience once more exclaims to him: <i>Fiend, thou torment'st
+      me ere I come to hell</i>! At the close, Northumberland announces to the
+      new King that he has sent the heads of the former King's adherents to
+      London.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In the following tragedy, <i>Henry IV</i>., he hatches a plot against the
+      new King in just the same way. In the fourth act we see the rebels united,
+      making preparations for the decisive battle on the morrow, and only
+      waiting impatiently for Northumberland and his division. At last there
+      arrives a letter from him, saying that he is ill, and that he cannot
+      entrust his force to any one else; but that nevertheless the others should
+      go forward with courage and make a brave fight. They do so, but, greatly
+      weakened by his absence, they are completely defeated; most of their
+      leaders are captured, and his own son, the valorous Hotspur, falls by the
+      hand of the Prince of Wales.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Again, in the following play, the <i>Second Part of Henry IV</i>., we see
+      him reduced to a state of the fiercest wrath by the death of his son, and
+      maddened by the thirst for revenge. Accordingly he kindles another
+      rebellion, and the heads of it assemble once more. In the fourth act, just
+      as they are about to give battle, and are only waiting for him to join
+      them, there comes a letter saying that he cannot collect a proper force,
+      and will therefore seek safety for the present in Scotland; that,
+      nevertheless, he heartily wishes their heroic undertaking the best
+      success. Thereupon they surrender to the King under a treaty which is not
+      kept, and so perish.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      So far is character from being the work of reasoned choice and
+      consideration that in any action the intellect has nothing to do but to
+      present motives to the will. Thereafter it looks on as a mere spectator
+      and witness at the course which life takes, in accordance with the
+      influence of motive on the given character. All the incidents of life
+      occur, strictly speaking, with the same necessity as the movement of a
+      clock. On this point let me refer to my prize-essay on <i>The Freedom of
+      the Will</i>. I have there explained the true meaning and origin of the
+      persistent illusion that the will is entirely free in every single action;
+      and I have indicated the cause to which it is due. I will only add here
+      the following teleological explanation of this natural illusion.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Since every single action of a man's life seems to possess the freedom and
+      originality which in truth only belong to his character as he apprehends
+      it, and the mere apprehension of it by his intellect is what constitutes
+      his career; and since what is original in every single action seems to the
+      empirical consciousness to be always being performed anew, a man thus
+      receives in the course of his career the strongest possible moral lesson.
+      Then, and not before, he becomes thoroughly conscious of all the bad sides
+      of his character. Conscience accompanies every act with the comment: <i>You
+      should act differently</i>, although its true sense is: <i>You could be
+      other than you are</i>. As the result of this immutability of character on
+      the one hand, and, on the other, of the strict necessity which attends all
+      the circumstances in which character is successively placed, every man's
+      course of life is precisely determined from Alpha right through to Omega.
+      But, nevertheless, one man's course of life turns out immeasurably
+      happier, nobler and more worthy than another's, whether it be regarded
+      from a subjective or an objective point of view, and unless we are to
+      exclude all ideas of justice, we are led to the doctrine which is well
+      accepted in Brahmanism and Buddhism, that the subjective conditions in
+      which, as well as the objective conditions under which, every man is born,
+      are the moral consequences of a previous existence.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Macchiavelli, who seems to have taken no interest whatever in
+      philosophical speculations, is drawn by the keen subtlety of his very
+      unique understanding into the following observation, which possesses a
+      really deep meaning. It shows that he had an intuitive knowledge of the
+      entire necessity with which, characters and motives being given, all
+      actions take place. He makes it at the beginning of the prologue to his
+      comedy <i>Clitia</i>. <i>If</i>, he says, <i>the same men were to recur in
+      the world in the way that the same circumstances recur, a hundred years
+      would never elapse without our finding ourselves together once more, and
+      doing the same things as we are doing now&mdash;Se nel mondo tornassino i
+      medesimi uomini, como tornano i medesimi casi, non passarebbono mai cento
+      anni che noi non ci trovassimo un altra volta insieme, a fare le medesime
+      cose che hora</i>. He seems however to have been drawn into the remark by
+      a reminiscence of what Augustine says in his <i>De Civitate Dei</i>, bk.
+      xii., ch. xiii.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Again, Fate, or the {Greek: eimarmenae} of the ancients, is nothing but
+      the conscious certainty that all that happens is fast bound by a chain of
+      causes, and therefore takes place with a strict necessity; that the future
+      is already ordained with absolute certainty and can undergo as little
+      alteration as the past. In the fatalistic myths of the ancients all that
+      can be regarded as fabulous is the prediction of the future; that is, if
+      we refuse to consider the possibility of magnetic clairvoyance and second
+      sight. Instead of trying to explain away the fundamental truth of Fatalism
+      by superficial twaddle and foolish evasion, a man should attempt to get a
+      clear knowledge and comprehension of it; for it is demonstrably true, and
+      it helps us in a very important way to an understanding of the mysterious
+      riddle of our life. Predestination and Fatalism do not differ in the main.
+      They differ only in this, that with Predestination the given character and
+      external determination of human action proceed from a rational Being, and
+      with Fatalism from an irrational one. But in either case the result is the
+      same: that happens which must happen.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      On the other hand the conception of <i>Moral Freedom</i> is inseparable
+      from that of <i>Originality</i>. A man may be said, but he cannot be
+      conceived, to be the work of another, and at the same time be free in
+      respect of his desires and acts. He who called him into existence out of
+      nothing in the same process created and determined his nature&mdash;in
+      other words, the whole of his qualities. For no one can create without
+      creating a something, that is to say, a being determined throughout and in
+      all its qualities. But all that a man says and does necessarily proceeds
+      from the qualities so determined; for it is only the qualities themselves
+      set in motion. It is only some external impulse that they require to make
+      their appearance. As a man is, so must he act; and praise or blame
+      attaches, not to his separate acts, but to his nature and being.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      That is the reason why Theism and the moral responsibility of man are
+      incompatible; because responsibility always reverts to the creator of man
+      and it is there that it has its centre. Vain attempts have been made to
+      make a bridge from one of these incompatibles to the other by means of the
+      conception of moral freedom; but it always breaks down again. What is <i>free</i>
+      must also be <i>original</i>. If our will is <i>free</i>, our will is also
+      <i>the original element</i>, and conversely. Pre-Kantian dogmatism tried
+      to separate these two predicaments. It was thereby compelled to assume two
+      kinds of freedom, one cosmological, of the first cause, and the other
+      moral and theological, of human will. These are represented in Kant by the
+      third as well as the fourth antimony of freedom.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      On the other hand, in my philosophy the plain recognition of the strictly
+      necessary character of all action is in accordance with the doctrine that
+      what manifests itself even in the organic and irrational world is <i>will</i>.
+      If this were not so, the necessity under which irrational beings obviously
+      act would place their action in conflict with will; if, I mean, there were
+      really such a thing as the freedom of individual action, and this were not
+      as strictly necessitated as every other kind of action. But, as I have
+      just shown, it is this same doctrine of the necessary character of all
+      acts of will which makes it needful to regard a man's existence and being
+      as itself the work of his freedom, and consequently of his will. The will,
+      therefore, must be self-existent; it must possess so-called <i>a-se-ity</i>.
+      Under the opposite supposition all responsibility, as I have shown, would
+      be at an end, and the moral like the physical world would be a mere
+      machine, set in motion for the amusement of its manufacturer placed
+      somewhere outside of it. So it is that truths hang together, and mutually
+      advance and complete one another; whereas error gets jostled at every
+      corner.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      What kind of influence it is that <i>moral instruction</i> may exercise on
+      conduct, and what are the limits of that influence, are questions which I
+      have sufficiently examined in the twentieth section of my treatise on the
+      <i>Foundation of Morality</i>. In all essential particulars an analogous
+      influence is exercised by <i>example</i>, which, however, has a more
+      powerful effect than doctrine, and therefore it deserves a brief analysis.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In the main, example works either by restraining a man or by encouraging
+      him. It has the former effect when it determines him to leave undone what
+      he wanted to do. He sees, I mean, that other people do not do it; and from
+      this he judges, in general, that it is not expedient; that it may endanger
+      his person, or his property, or his honour.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      He rests content, and gladly finds himself relieved from examining into
+      the matter for himself. Or he may see that another man, who has not
+      refrained, has incurred evil consequences from doing it; this is example
+      of the deterrent kind. The example which encourages a man works in a
+      twofold manner. It either induces him to do what he would be glad to leave
+      undone, if he were not afraid lest the omission might in some way endanger
+      him, or injure him in others' opinion; or else it encourages him to do
+      what he is glad to do, but has hitherto refrained from doing from fear of
+      danger or shame; this is example of the seductive kind. Finally, example
+      may bring a man to do what he would have otherwise never thought of doing.
+      It is obvious that in this last case example works in the main only on the
+      intellect; its effect on the will is secondary, and if it has any such
+      effect, it is by the interposition of the man's own judgment, or by
+      reliance on the person who presented the example.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The whole influence of example&mdash;and it is very strong&mdash;rests on
+      the fact that a man has, as a rule, too little judgment of his own, and
+      often too little knowledge, o explore his own way for himself, and that he
+      is glad, therefore, to tread in the footsteps of some one else.
+      Accordingly, the more deficient he is in either of these qualities, the
+      more is he open to the influence of example; and we find, in fact, that
+      most men's guiding star is the example of others; that their whole course
+      of life, in great things and in small, comes in the end to be mere
+      imitation; and that not even in the pettiest matters do they act according
+      to their own judgment. Imitation and custom are the spring of almost all
+      human action. The cause of it is that men fight shy of all and any sort of
+      reflection, and very properly mistrust their own discernment. At the same
+      time this remarkably strong imitative instinct in man is a proof of his
+      kinship with apes.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But the kind of effect which example exercises depends upon a man's
+      character, and thus it is that the same example may possibly seduce one
+      man and deter another. An easy opportunity of observing this is afforded
+      in the case of certain social impertinences which come into vogue and
+      gradually spread. The first time that a man notices anything of the kind,
+      he may say to himself: <i>For shame! how can he do it! how selfish and
+      inconsiderate of him! really, I shall take care never to do anything like
+      that</i>. But twenty others will think: <i>Aha! if he does that, I may do
+      it too</i>.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      As regards morality, example, like doctrine, may, it is true, promote
+      civil or legal amelioration, but not that inward amendment which is,
+      strictly speaking, the only kind of moral amelioration. For example always
+      works as a personal motive alone, and assumes, therefore, that a man is
+      susceptible to this sort of motive. But it is just the predominating
+      sensitiveness of a character to this or that sort of motive that
+      determines whether its morality is true and real; though, of whatever kind
+      it is, it is always innate. In general it may be said that example
+      operates as a means of promoting the good and the bad qualities of a
+      character, but it does not create them; and so it is that Seneca's maxim,
+      <i>velle non discitur</i>&mdash;<i>will cannot be learned</i>&mdash;also
+      holds good here. But the innateness of all truly moral qualities, of the
+      good as of the bad, is a doctrine that consorts better with the
+      metempsychosis of the Brahmins and Buddhists, according to which a man's
+      good and bad deeds follow him from one existence to another like his
+      shadow, than with Judaism. For Judaism requires a man to come into the
+      world as a moral blank, so that, in virtue of an inconceivable free will,
+      directed to objects which are neither to be sought nor avoided&mdash;<i>liberum
+      arbitrium indifferentiae</i>&mdash;and consequently as the result of
+      reasoned consideration, he may choose whether he is to be an angel or a
+      devil, or anything else that may lie between the two. Though I am well
+      aware what the Jewish scheme is, I pay no attention to it; for my standard
+      is truth. I am no professor of philosophy, and therefore I do not find my
+      vocation in establishing the fundamental ideas of Judaism at any cost,
+      even though they for ever bar the way to all and every kind of
+      philosophical knowledge. <i>Liberum arbitrium indifferentiae</i> under the
+      name of <i>moral freedom</i> is a charming doll for professors of
+      philosophy to dandle; and we must leave it to those intelligent,
+      honourable and upright gentlemen.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <br /><br />
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      <a name="link2H_4_0005" id="link2H_4_0005"> </a>
+    </p>
+    <div style="height: 4em;">
+      <br /><br /><br /><br />
+    </div>
+    <h2>
+      CHARACTER.
+    </h2>
+    <p>
+      Men who aspire to a happy, a brilliant and a long life, instead of to a
+      virtuous one, are like foolish actors who want to be always having the
+      great parts,&mdash;the parts that are marked by splendour and triumph.
+      They fail to see that the important thing is not <i>what</i> or <i>how
+      much</i>, but <i>how</i> they act.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Since <i>a man does not alter</i>, and his <i>moral character</i> remains
+      absolutely the same all through his life; since he must play out the part
+      which he has received, without the least deviation from the character;
+      since neither experience, nor philosophy, nor religion can effect any
+      improvement in him, the question arises, What is the meaning of life at
+      all? To what purpose is it played, this farce in which everything that is
+      essential is irrevocably fixed and determined?
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      It is played that a man may come to understand himself, that he may see
+      what it is that he seeks and has sought to be; what he wants, and what,
+      therefore, he is. <i>This is a knowledge which must be imparted to him
+      from without</i>. Life is to man, in other words, to will, what chemical
+      re-agents are to the body: it is only by life that a man reveals what he
+      is, and it is only in so far as he reveals himself that he exists at all.
+      Life is the manifestation of character, of the something that we
+      understand by that word; and it is not in life, but outside of it, and
+      outside time, that character undergoes alteration, as a result of the
+      self-knowledge which life gives. Life is only the mirror into which a man
+      gazes not in order that he may get a reflection of himself, but that he
+      may come to understand himself by that reflection; that he may see <i>what</i>
+      it is that the mirror shows. Life is the proof sheet, in which the
+      compositors' errors are brought to light. How they become visible, and
+      whether the type is large or small, are matters of no consequence. Neither
+      in the externals of life nor in the course of history is there any
+      significance; for as it is all one whether an error occurs in the large
+      type or in the small, so it is all one, as regards the essence of the
+      matter, whether an evil disposition is mirrored as a conqueror of the
+      world or a common swindler or ill-natured egoist. In one case he is seen
+      of all men; in the other, perhaps only of himself; but that he should see
+      himself is what signifies.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Therefore if egoism has a firm hold of a man and masters him, whether it
+      be in the form of joy, or triumph, or lust, or hope, or frantic grief, or
+      annoyance, or anger, or fear, or suspicion, or passion of any kind&mdash;he
+      is in the devil's clutches and how he got into them does not matter. What
+      is needful is that he should make haste to get out of them; and here,
+      again, it does not matter how.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      I have described <i>character</i> as <i>theoretically</i> an act of will
+      lying beyond time, of which life in time, or <i>character in action</i>,
+      is the development. For matters of practical life we all possess the one
+      as well as the other; for we are constituted of them both. Character
+      modifies our life more than we think, and it is to a certain extent true
+      that every man is the architect of his own fortune. No doubt it seems as
+      if our lot were assigned to us almost entirely from without, and imparted
+      to us in something of the same way in which a melody outside us reaches
+      the ear. But on looking back over our past, we see at once that our life
+      consists of mere variations on one and the same theme, namely, our
+      character, and that the same fundamental bass sounds through it all. This
+      is an experience which a man can and must make in and by himself.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Not only a man's life, but his intellect too, may be possessed of a clear
+      and definite character, so far as his intellect is applied to matters of
+      theory. It is not every man, however, who has an intellect of this kind;
+      for any such definite individuality as I mean is genius&mdash;an original
+      view of the world, which presupposes an absolutely exceptional
+      individuality, which is the essence of genius. A man's intellectual
+      character is the theme on which all his works are variations. In an essay
+      which I wrote in Weimar I called it the knack by which every genius
+      produces his works, however various. This intellectual character
+      determines the physiognomy of men of genius&mdash;what I might call <i>the
+      theoretical physiognomy</i>&mdash;and gives it that distinguished
+      expression which is chiefly seen in the eyes and the forehead. In the case
+      of ordinary men the physiognomy presents no more than a weak analogy with
+      the physiognomy of genius. On the other hand, all men possess <i>the
+      practical physiognomy</i>, the stamp of will, of practical character, of
+      moral disposition; and it shows itself chiefly in the mouth.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Since character, so far as we understand its nature, is above and beyond
+      time, it cannot undergo any change under the influence of life. But
+      although it must necessarily remain the same always, it requires time to
+      unfold itself and show the very diverse aspects which it may possess. For
+      character consists of two factors: one, the will-to-live itself, blind
+      impulse, so-called impetuosity; the other, the restraint which the will
+      acquires when it comes to understand the world; and the world, again, is
+      itself will. A man may begin by following the craving of desire, until he
+      comes to see how hollow and unreal a thing is life, how deceitful are its
+      pleasures, what horrible aspects it possesses; and this it is that makes
+      people hermits, penitents, Magdalenes. Nevertheless it is to be observed
+      that no such change from a life of great indulgence in pleasure to one of
+      resignation is possible, except to the man who of his own accord renounces
+      pleasure. A really bad life cannot be changed into a virtuous one. The
+      most beautiful soul, before it comes to know life from its horrible side,
+      may eagerly drink the sweets of life and remain innocent. But it cannot
+      commit a bad action; it cannot cause others suffering to do a pleasure to
+      itself, for in that case it would see clearly what it would be doing; and
+      whatever be its youth and inexperience it perceives the sufferings of
+      others as clearly as its own pleasures. That is why one bad action is a
+      guarantee that numberless others will be committed as soon as
+      circumstances give occasion for them. Somebody once remarked to me, with
+      entire justice, that every man had something very good and humane in his
+      disposition, and also something very bad and malignant; and that according
+      as he was moved one or the other of them made its appearance. The sight of
+      others' suffering arouses, not only in different men, but in one and the
+      same man, at one moment an inexhaustible sympathy, at another a certain
+      satisfaction; and this satisfaction may increase until it becomes the
+      cruellest delight in pain. I observe in myself that at one moment I regard
+      all mankind with heartfelt pity, at another with the greatest
+      indifference, on occasion with hatred, nay, with a positive enjoyment of
+      their pain.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      All this shows very clearly that we are possessed of two different, nay,
+      absolutely contradictory, ways of regarding the world: one according to
+      the principle of individuation, which exhibits all creatures as entire
+      strangers to us, as definitely not ourselves. We can have no feelings for
+      them but those of indifference, envy, hatred, and delight that they
+      suffer. The other way of regarding the world is in accordance with what I
+      may call the <i>Tat-twam-asi</i>&mdash;<i>this-is-thyself</i> principle.
+      All creatures are exhibited as identical with ourselves; and so it is pity
+      and love which the sight of them arouses.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The one method separates individuals by impassable barriers; the other
+      removes the barrier and brings the individuals together. The one makes us
+      feel, in regard to every man, <i>that is what I am</i>; the other, <i>that
+      is not what I am</i>. But it is remarkable that while the sight of
+      another's suffering makes us feel our identity with him, and arouses our
+      pity, this is not so with the sight of another's happiness. Then we almost
+      always feel some envy; and even though we may have no such feeling in
+      certain cases,&mdash;as, for instance, when our friends are happy,&mdash;yet
+      the interest which we take in their happiness is of a weak description,
+      and cannot compare with the sympathy which we feel with their suffering.
+      Is this because we recognise all happiness to be a delusion, or an
+      impediment to true welfare? No! I am inclined to think that it is because
+      the sight of the pleasure, or the possessions, which are denied to us,
+      arouses envy; that is to say, the wish that we, and not the other, had
+      that pleasure or those possessions.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      It is only the first way of looking at the world which is founded on any
+      demonstrable reason. The other is, as it were, the gate out of this world;
+      it has no attestation beyond itself, unless it be the very abstract and
+      difficult proof which my doctrine supplies. Why the first way predominates
+      in one man, and the second in another&mdash;though perhaps it does not
+      exclusively predominate in any man; why the one or the other emerges
+      according as the will is moved&mdash;these are deep problems. The paths of
+      night and day are close together:
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  {Greek: Engus gar nuktos de kai aematos eisi keleuthoi.}
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      It is a fact that there is a great and original difference between one
+      empirical character and another; and it is a difference which, at bottom,
+      rests upon the relation of the individual's will to his intellectual
+      faculty. This relation is finally determined by the degree of will in his
+      father and of intellect in his mother; and the union of father and mother
+      is for the most part an affair of chance. This would all mean a revolting
+      injustice in the nature of the world, if it were not that the difference
+      between parents and son is phenomenal only and all chance is, at bottom,
+      necessity.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      As regards the freedom of the will, if it were the case that the will
+      manifested itself in a single act alone, it would be a free act. But the
+      will manifests itself in a course of life, that is to say, in a series of
+      acts. Every one of these acts, therefore, is determined as a part of a
+      complete whole, and cannot happen otherwise than it does happen. On the
+      other hand, the whole series is free; it is simply the manifestation of an
+      individualised will.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      If a man feels inclined to commit a bad action and refrains, he is kept
+      back either (1) by fear of punishment or vengeance; or (2) by superstition
+      in other words, fear of punishment in a future life; or (3) by the feeling
+      of sympathy, including general charity; or (4) by the feeling of honour,
+      in other words, the fear of shame; or (5) by the feeling of justice, that
+      is, an objective attachment to fidelity and good-faith, coupled with a
+      resolve to hold them sacred, because they are the foundation of all free
+      intercourse between man and man, and therefore often of advantage to
+      himself as well. This last thought, not indeed as a thought, but as a mere
+      feeling, influences people very frequently. It is this that often compels
+      a man of honour, when some great but unjust advantage is offered him, to
+      reject it with contempt and proudly exclaim: <i>I am an honourable man</i>!
+      For otherwise how should a poor man, confronted with the property which
+      chance or even some worse agency has bestowed on the rich, whose very
+      existence it is that makes him poor, feel so much sincere respect for this
+      property, that he refuses to touch it even in his need; and although he
+      has a prospect of escaping punishment, what other thought is it that can
+      be at the bottom of such a man's honesty? He is resolved not to separate
+      himself from the great community of honourable people who have the earth
+      in possession, and whose laws are recognised everywhere. He knows that a
+      single dishonest act will ostracise and proscribe him from that society
+      for ever. No! a man will spend money on any soil that yields him good
+      fruit, and he will make sacrifices for it.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      With a good action,&mdash;that, every action in which a man's own
+      advantage is ostensibly subordinated to another's,&mdash;the motive is
+      either (1) self-interest, kept in the background; or (2) superstition, in
+      other words, self-interest in the form of reward in another life; or (3)
+      sympathy; or (4) the desire to lend a helping hand, in other words,
+      attachment to the maxim that we should assist one another in need, and the
+      wish to maintain this maxim, in view of the presumption that some day we
+      ourselves may find it serve our turn. For what Kant calls a good action
+      done from motives of duty and for the sake of duty, there is, as will be
+      seen, no room at all. Kant himself declares it to be doubtful whether an
+      action was ever determined by pure motives of duty alone. I affirm most
+      certainly that no action was ever so done; it is mere babble; there is
+      nothing in it that could really act as a motive to any man. When he
+      shelters himself behind verbiage of that sort, he is always actuated by
+      one of the four motives which I have described. Among these it is
+      obviously sympathy alone which is quite genuine and sincere.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <i>Good</i> and <i>bad</i> apply to character only <i>à potiori</i>; that
+      is to say, we prefer the good to the bad; but, absolutely, there is no
+      such distinction. The difference arises at the point which lies between
+      subordinating one's own advantage to that of another, and not
+      subordinating it. If a man keeps to the exact middle, he is <i>just</i>.
+      But most men go an inch in their regard for others' welfare to twenty
+      yards in regard for their own.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The source of <i>good</i> and of <i>bad character</i>, so far as we have
+      any real knowledge of it, lies in this, that with the bad character the
+      thought of the external world, and especially of the living creatures in
+      it, is accompanied&mdash;all the more, the greater the resemblance between
+      them and the individual self&mdash;by a constant feeling of <i>not I, not
+      I, not I</i>.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Contrarily, with the good character (both being assumed to exist in a high
+      degree) the same thought has for its accompaniment, like a fundamental
+      bass, a constant feeling of <i>I, I, I</i>. From this spring benevolence
+      and a disposition to help all men, and at the same time a cheerful,
+      confident and tranquil frame of mind, the opposite of that which
+      accompanies the bad character.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The difference, however, is only phenomenal, although it is a difference
+      which is radical. But now we come to <i>the hardest of all problems</i>:
+      How is it that, while the will, as the thing-in-itself, is identical, and
+      from a metaphysical point of view one and the same in all its
+      manifestations, there is nevertheless such an enormous difference between
+      one character and another?&mdash;the malicious, diabolical wickedness of
+      the one, and set off against it, the goodness of the other, showing all
+      the more conspicuously. How is it that we get a Tiberius, a Caligula, a
+      Carcalla, a Domitian, a Nero; and on the other hand, the Antonines, Titus,
+      Hadrian, Nerva? How is it that among the animals, nay, in a higher
+      species, in individual animals, there is a like difference?&mdash;the
+      malignity of the cat most strongly developed in the tiger; the spite of
+      the monkey; on the other hand, goodness, fidelity and love in the dog and
+      the elephant. It is obvious that the principle of wickedness in the brute
+      is the same as in man.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      We may to some extent modify the difficulty of the problem by observing
+      that the whole difference is in the end only one of degree. In every
+      living creature, the fundamental propensities and instincts all exist, but
+      they exist in very different degrees and proportions. This, however, is
+      not enough to explain the facts.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      We must fall back upon the intellect and its relation to the will; it is
+      the only explanation that remains. A man's intellect, however, by no means
+      stands in any direct and obvious relation with the goodness of his
+      character. We may, it is true, discriminate between two kinds of
+      intellect: between understanding, as the apprehension of relation in
+      accordance with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and cognition, a
+      faculty akin to genius, which acts more directly, is independent of this
+      law, and passes beyond the Principle of Individuation. The latter is the
+      faculty which apprehends Ideas, and it is the faculty which has to do with
+      morality. But even this explanation leaves much to be desired. <i>Fine
+      minds are seldom fine souls</i> was the correct observation of Jean Paul;
+      although they are never the contrary. Lord Bacon, who, to be sure, was
+      less a fine soul than a fine mind, was a scoundrel.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      I have declared space and time to be part of the Principle of
+      Individuation, as it is only space and time that make the multiplicity of
+      similar objects a possibility. But multiplicity itself also admits of
+      variety; multiplicity and diversity are not only quantitative, but also
+      qualitative. How is it that there is such a thing as qualitative
+      diversity, especially in ethical matters? Or have I fallen into an error
+      the opposite of that in which Leibnitz fell with his <i>identitas
+      indiscernibilium</i>?
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The chief cause of intellectual diversity is to be found in the brain and
+      nervous system. This is a fact which somewhat lessens the obscurity of the
+      subject. With the brutes the intellect and the brain are strictly adapted
+      to their aims and needs. With man alone there is now and then, by way of
+      exception, a superfluity, which, if it is abundant, may yield genius. But
+      ethical diversity, it seems, proceeds immediately from the will. Otherwise
+      ethical character would not be above and beyond time, as it is only in the
+      individual that intellect and will are united. The will is above and
+      beyond time, and eternal; and character is innate; that is to say, it is
+      sprung from the same eternity, and therefore it does not admit of any but
+      a transcendental explanation.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Perhaps some one will come after me who will throw light into this dark
+      abyss.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <br /><br />
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      <a name="link2H_4_0006" id="link2H_4_0006"> </a>
+    </p>
+    <div style="height: 4em;">
+      <br /><br /><br /><br />
+    </div>
+    <h2>
+      MORAL INSTINCT.
+    </h2>
+    <p>
+      An act done by instinct differs from every other kind of act in that an
+      understanding of its object does not precede it but follows upon it.
+      Instinct is therefore a rule of action given <i>à priori</i>. We may be
+      unaware of the object to which it is directed, as no understanding of it
+      is necessary to its attainment. On the other hand, if an act is done by an
+      exercise of reason or intelligence, it proceeds according to a rule which
+      the understanding has itself devised for the purpose of carrying out a
+      preconceived aim. Hence it is that action according to rule may miss its
+      aim, while instinct is infallible.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      On the <i>à priori</i> character of instinct we may compare what Plato
+      says in the <i>Philebus</i>. With Plato instinct is a reminiscence of
+      something which a man has never actually experienced in his lifetime; in
+      the same way as, in the <i>Phaedo</i> and elsewhere, everything that a man
+      learns is regarded as a reminiscence. He has no other word to express the
+      <i>à priori</i> element in all experience.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      There are, then, three things that are <i>à priori</i>:
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      (1) Theoretical Reason, in other words, the conditions which make all
+      experience possible.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      (2) Instinct, or the rule by which an object promoting the life of the
+      senses may, though unknown, be attained.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      (3) The Moral Law, or the rule by which an action takes place without any
+      object.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Accordingly rational or intelligent action proceeds by a rule laid down in
+      accordance with the object as it is understood. Instinctive action
+      proceeds by a rule without an understanding of the object of it. Moral
+      action proceeds by a rule without any object at all.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <i>Theoretical Reason</i> is the aggregate of rules in accordance with
+      which all my knowledge&mdash;that is to say, the whole world of experience&mdash;necessarily
+      proceeds. In the same manner <i>Instinct</i> is the aggregate of rules in
+      accordance with which all my action necessarily proceeds if it meets with
+      no obstruction. Hence it seems to me that Instinct may most appropriately
+      be called <i>practical reason</i>, for like theoretical reason it
+      determines the <i>must</i> of all experience.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The so-called moral law, on the other hand, is only one aspect of <i>the
+      better consciousness</i>, the aspect which it presents from the point of
+      view of instinct. This better consciousness is something lying beyond all
+      experience, that is, beyond all reason, whether of the theoretical or the
+      practical kind, and has nothing to do with it; whilst it is in virtue of
+      the mysterious union of it and reason in the same individual that the
+      better consciousness comes into conflict with reason, leaving the
+      individual to choose between the two.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In any conflict between the better consciousness and reason, if the
+      individual decides for reason, should it be theoretical reason, he becomes
+      a narrow, pedantic philistine; should it be practical, a rascal.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      If he decides for the better consciousness, we can make no further
+      positive affirmation about him, for if we were to do so, we should find
+      ourselves in the realm of reason; and as it is only what takes place
+      within this realm that we can speak of at all it follows that we cannot
+      speak of the better consciousness except in negative terms.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      This shows us how it is that reason is hindered and obstructed; that <i>theoretical
+      reason</i> is suppressed in favour of <i>genius</i>, and <i>practical
+      reason</i> in favour of <i>virtue</i>. Now the better consciousness is
+      neither theoretical nor practical; for these are distinctions that only
+      apply to reason. But if the individual is in the act of choosing, the
+      better consciousness appears to him in the aspect which it assumes in
+      vanquishing and overcoming the practical reason (or instinct, to use the
+      common word). It appears to him as an imperative command, an <i>ought</i>.
+      It so appears to him, I say; in other words, that is the shape which it
+      takes for the theoretical reason which renders all things into objects and
+      ideas. But in so far as the better consciousness desires to vanquish and
+      overcome the theoretical reason, it takes no shape at all; on the simple
+      ground that, as it comes into play, the theoretical reason is suppressed
+      and becomes the mere servant of the better consciousness. That is why
+      genius can never give any account of its own works.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In the morality of action, the legal principle that both sides are to be
+      heard must not be allowed to apply; in other words, the claims of self and
+      the senses must not be urged. Nay, on the contrary, as soon as the pure
+      will has found expression, the case is closed; <i>nec audienda altera pars</i>.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The lower animals are not endowed with moral freedom. Probably this is not
+      because they show no trace of the better consciousness which in us is
+      manifested as morality, or nothing analogous to it; for, if that were so,
+      the lower animals, which are in so many respects like ourselves in outward
+      appearance that we regard man as a species of animal, would possess some
+      <i>raison d'être</i> entirely different from our own, and actually be, in
+      their essential and inmost nature, something quite other than ourselves.
+      This is a contention which is obviously refuted by the thoroughly
+      malignant and inherently vicious character of certain animals, such as the
+      crocodile, the hyaena, the scorpion, the snake, and the gentle,
+      affectionate and contented character of others, such as the dog. Here, as
+      in the case of men, the character, as it is manifested, must rest upon
+      something that is above and beyond time. For, as Jacob Böhme says,{1} <i>there
+      is a power in every animal which is indestructible, and the spirit of the
+      world draws it into itself, against the final separation at the Last
+      Judgment</i>. Therefore we cannot call the lower animals free, and the
+      reason why we cannot do so is that they are wanting in a faculty which is
+      profoundly subordinate to the better consciousness in its highest phase, I
+      mean reason. Reason is the faculty of supreme comprehension, the idea of
+      totality. How reason manifests itself in the theoretical sphere Kant has
+      shown, and it does the same in the practical: it makes us capable of
+      observing and surveying the whole of our life, thought, and action, in
+      continual connection, and therefore of acting according to general maxims,
+      whether those maxims originate in the understanding as prudential rules,
+      or in the better consciousness as moral laws.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Epistles</i>, 56.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      If any desire or passion is aroused in us, we, and in the same way the
+      lower animals, are for the moment filled with this desire; we are all
+      anger, all lust, all fear; and in such moments neither the better
+      consciousness can speak, nor the understanding consider the consequences.
+      But in our case reason allows us even at that moment to see our actions
+      and our life as an unbroken chain,&mdash;a chain which connects our
+      earlier resolutions, or, it may be, the future consequences of our action,
+      with the moment of passion which now fills our whole consciousness. It
+      shows us the identity of our person, even when that person is exposed to
+      influences of the most varied kind, and thereby we are enabled to act
+      according to maxims. The lower animal is wanting in this faculty; the
+      passion which seizes it completely dominates it, and can be checked only
+      by another passion&mdash;anger, for instance, or lust, by fear; even
+      though the vision that terrifies does not appeal to the senses, but is
+      present in the animal only as a dim memory and imagination. Men,
+      therefore, may be called irrational, if, like the lower animals, they
+      allow themselves to be determined by the moment.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      So far, however, is reason from being the source of morality that it is
+      reason alone which makes us capable of being rascals, which the lower
+      animals cannot be. It is reason which enables us to form an evil
+      resolution and to keep it when the provocation to evil is removed; it
+      enables us, for example, to nurse vengeance. Although at the moment that
+      we have an opportunity of fulfilling our resolution the better
+      consciousness may manifest itself as love or charity, it is by force of
+      reason, in pursuance of some evil maxim, that we act against it. Thus
+      Goethe says that a man may use his reason only for the purpose of being
+      more bestial than any beast:
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  <i>Er hat Vernunft, doch braucht er sie allein
+  Um theirischer als jedes Thier zu sein</i>.
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      For not only do we, like the beasts, satisfy the desires of the moment,
+      but we refine upon them and stimulate them in order to prepare the desire
+      for the satisfaction.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Whenever we think that we perceive a trace of reason in the lower animals,
+      it fills us with surprise. Now our surprise is not excited by the good and
+      affectionate disposition which some of them exhibit&mdash;we recognise
+      that as something other than reason&mdash;but by some action in them which
+      seems to be determined not by the impression of the moment, but by a
+      resolution previously made and kept. Elephants, for instance, are reported
+      to have taken premeditated revenge for insults long after they were
+      suffered; lions, to have requited benefits on an opportunity tardily
+      offered. The truth of such stories has, however, no bearing at all on the
+      question, What do we mean by reason? But they enable us to decide whether
+      in the lower animals there is any trace of anything that we can call
+      reason.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Kant not only declares that all our moral sentiments originate in reason,
+      but he lays down that reason, <i>in my sense of the word</i>, is a
+      condition of moral action; as he holds that for an action to be virtuous
+      and meritorious it must be done in accordance with maxims, and not spring
+      from a resolve taken under some momentary impression. But in both
+      contentions he is wrong. If I resolve to take vengeance on some one, and
+      when an opportunity offers, the better consciousness in the form of love
+      and humanity speaks its word, and I am influenced by it rather than by my
+      evil resolution, this is a virtuous act, for it is a manifestation of the
+      better consciousness. It is possible to conceive of a very virtuous man in
+      whom the better consciousness is so continuously active that it is never
+      silent, and never allows his passions to get a complete hold of him. By
+      such consciousness he is subject to a direct control, instead of being
+      guided indirectly, through the medium of reason, by means of maxims and
+      moral principles. That is why a man may have weak reasoning powers and a
+      weak understanding and yet have a high sense of morality and be eminently
+      good; for the most important element in a man depends as little on
+      intellectual as it does on physical strength. Jesus says, <i>Blessed are
+      the poor in spirit</i>. And Jacob Böhme has the excellent and noble
+      observation: <i>Whoso lies quietly in his own will, like a child in the
+      womb, and lets himself be led and guided by that inner principle from
+      which he is sprung, is the noblest and richest on earth</i>.{1}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Epistles</i>, 37.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <br /><br />
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      <a name="link2H_4_0007" id="link2H_4_0007"> </a>
+    </p>
+    <div style="height: 4em;">
+      <br /><br /><br /><br />
+    </div>
+    <h2>
+      ETHICAL REFLECTIONS.
+    </h2>
+    <p>
+      The philosophers of the ancient world united in a single conception a
+      great many things that had no connection with one another. Of this every
+      dialogue of Plato's furnishes abundant examples. The greatest and worst
+      confusion of this kind is that between ethics and politics. The State and
+      the Kingdom of God, or the Moral Law, are so entirely different in their
+      character that the former is a parody of the latter, a bitter mockery at
+      the absence of it. Compared with the Moral Law the State is a crutch
+      instead of a limb, an automaton instead of a man.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      The <i>principle of honour</i> stands in close connection with human
+      freedom. It is, as it were, an abuse of that freedom. Instead of using his
+      freedom to fulfil the moral law, a man employs his power of voluntarily
+      undergoing any feeling of pain, of overcoming any momentary impression, in
+      order that he may assert his self-will, whatever be the object to which he
+      directs it. As he thereby shows that, unlike the lower animals, he has
+      thoughts which go beyond the welfare of his body and whatever makes for
+      that welfare, it has come about that the principle of honour is often
+      confused with virtue. They are regarded as if they were twins. But
+      wrongly; for although the principle of honour is something which
+      distinguishes man from the lower animals, it is not, in itself, anything
+      that raises him above them. Taken as an end and aim, it is as dark a
+      delusion as any other aim that springs from self. Used as a means, or
+      casually, it may be productive of good; but even that is good which is
+      vain and frivolous. It is the misuse of freedom, the employment of it as a
+      weapon for overcoming the world of feeling, that makes man so infinitely
+      more terrible than the lower animals; for they do only what momentary
+      instinct bids them; while man acts by ideas, and his ideas may entail
+      universal ruin before they are satisfied.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      There is another circumstance which helps to promote the notion that
+      honour and virtue are connected. A man who can do what he wants to do
+      shows that he can also do it if what he wants to do is a virtuous act. But
+      that those of our actions which we are ourselves obliged to regard with
+      contempt are also regarded with contempt by other people serves more than
+      anything that I have here mentioned to establish the connection. Thus it
+      often happens that a man who is not afraid of the one kind of contempt is
+      unwilling to undergo the other. But when we are called upon to choose
+      between our own approval and the world's censure, as may occur in
+      complicated and mistaken circumstances, what becomes of the principle of
+      honour then?
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Two characteristic examples of the principle of honour are to be found in
+      Shakespeare's <i>Henry VI</i>., Part II., Act IV., Sc. 1. A pirate is
+      anxious to murder his captive instead of accepting, like others, a ransom
+      for him; because in taking his captive he lost an eye, and his own honour
+      and that of his forefathers would in his opinion be stained, if he were to
+      allow his revenge to be bought off as though he were a mere trader. The
+      prisoner, on the other hand, who is the Duke of Suffolk, prefers to have
+      his head grace a pole than to uncover it to such a low fellow as a pirate,
+      by approaching him to ask for mercy.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Just as civic honour&mdash;in other words, the opinion that we deserve to
+      be trusted&mdash;is the palladium of those whose endeavour it is to make
+      their way in the world on the path of honourable business, so knightly
+      honour&mdash;in other words, the opinion that we are men to be feared&mdash;is
+      the palladium of those who aim at going through life on the path of
+      violence; and so it was that knightly honour arose among the
+      robber-knights and other knights of the Middle Ages.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      A theoretical philosopher is one who can supply in the shape of ideas for
+      the reason, a copy of the presentations of experience; just as what the
+      painter sees he can reproduce on canvas; the sculptor, in marble; the
+      poet, in pictures for the imagination, though they are pictures which he
+      supplies only in sowing the ideas from which they sprang.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      A so-called practical philosopher, on the other hand, is one who,
+      contrarily, deduces his action from ideas. The theoretical philosopher
+      transforms life into ideas. The practical philosopher transforms ideas
+      into life; he acts, therefore, in a thoroughly reasonable manner; he is
+      consistent, regular, deliberate; he is never hasty or passionate; he never
+      allows himself to be influenced by the impression of the moment.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      And indeed, when we find ourselves among those full presentations of
+      experience, or real objects, to which the body belongs&mdash;since the
+      body is only an objectified will, the shape which the will assumes in the
+      material world&mdash;it is difficult to let our bodies be guided, not by
+      those presentations, but by a mere image of them, by cold, colourless
+      ideas, which are related to experience as the shadow of Orcus to life; and
+      yet this is the only way in which we can avoid doing things of which we
+      may have to repent.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The theoretical philosopher enriches the domain of reason by adding to it;
+      the practical philosopher draws upon it, and makes it serve him.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      According to Kant the truth of experience is only a hypothetical truth. If
+      the suppositions which underlie all the intimations of experience&mdash;subject,
+      object, time, space and causality&mdash;were removed, none of those
+      intimations would contain a word of truth. In other words, experience is
+      only a phenomenon; it is not knowledge of the thing-in-itself.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      If we find something in our own conduct at which we are secretly pleased,
+      although we cannot reconcile it with experience, seeing that if we were to
+      follow the guidance of experience we should have to do precisely the
+      opposite, we must not allow this to put us out; otherwise we should be
+      ascribing an authority to experience which it does not deserve, for all
+      that it teaches rests upon a mere supposition. This is the general
+      tendency of the Kantian Ethics.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      Innocence is in its very nature stupid. It is stupid because the aim of
+      life (I use the expression only figuratively, and I could just as well
+      speak of the essence of life, or of the world) is to gain a knowledge of
+      our own bad will, so that our will may become an object for us, and that
+      we may undergo an inward conversion. Our body is itself our will
+      objectified; it is one of the first and foremost of objects, and the deeds
+      that we accomplish for the sake of the body show us the evil inherent in
+      our will. In the state of innocence, where there is no evil because there
+      is no experience, man is, as it were, only an apparatus for living, and
+      the object for which the apparatus exists is not yet disclosed. An empty
+      form of life like this, a stage untenanted, is in itself, like the
+      so-called real world, null and void; and as it can attain a meaning only
+      by action, by error, by knowledge, by the convulsions of the will, it
+      wears a character of insipid stupidity. A golden age of innocence, a
+      fools' paradise, is a notion that is stupid and unmeaning, and for that
+      very reason in no way worthy of any respect. The first criminal and
+      murderer, Cain, who acquired a knowledge of guilt, and through guilt
+      acquired a knowledge of virtue by repentance, and so came to understand
+      the meaning of life, is a tragical figure more significant, and almost
+      more respectable, than all the innocent fools in the world put together.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      If I had to write about <i>modesty</i> I should say: I know the esteemed
+      public for which I have the honour to write far too well to dare to give
+      utterance to my opinion about this virtue. Personally I am quite content
+      to be modest and to apply myself to this virtue with the utmost possible
+      circumspection. But one thing I shall never admit&mdash;that I have ever
+      required modesty of any man, and any statement to that effect I repel as a
+      slander.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The paltry character of most men compels the few who have any merit or
+      genius to behave as though they did not know their own value, and
+      consequently did not know other people's want of value; for it is only on
+      this condition that the mob acquiesces in tolerating merit. A virtue has
+      been made out of this necessity, and it is called modesty. It is a piece
+      of hypocrisy, to be excused only because other people are so paltry that
+      they must be treated with indulgence.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      Human misery may affect us in two ways, and we may be in one of two
+      opposite moods in regard to it.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In one of them, this misery is immediately present to us. We feel it in
+      our own person, in our own will which, imbued with violent desires, is
+      everywhere broken, and this is the process which constitutes suffering.
+      The result is that the will increases in violence, as is shown in all
+      cases of passion and emotion; and this increasing violence comes to a stop
+      only when the will turns and gives way to complete resignation, in other
+      words, is redeemed. The man who is entirely dominated by this mood will
+      regard any prosperity which he may see in others with envy, and any
+      suffering with no sympathy.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In the opposite mood human misery is present to us only as a fact of
+      knowledge, that is to say, indirectly. We are mainly engaged in looking at
+      the sufferings of others, and our attention is withdrawn from our own. It
+      is in their person that we become aware of human misery; we are filled
+      with sympathy; and the result of this mood is general benevolence,
+      philanthropy. All envy vanishes, and instead of feeling it, we are
+      rejoiced when we see one of our tormented fellow-creatures experience any
+      pleasure or relief.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      After the same fashion we may be in one of two opposite moods in regard to
+      human baseness and depravity. In the one we perceive this baseness
+      indirectly, in others. Out of this mood arise indignation, hatred, and
+      contempt of mankind. In the other we perceive it directly, in ourselves.
+      Out of it there arises humiliation, nay, contrition.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In order to judge the moral value of a man, it is very important to
+      observe which of these four moods predominate in him. They go in pairs,
+      one out of each division. In very excellent characters the second mood of
+      each division will predominate.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      The categorical imperative, or absolute command, is a contradiction. Every
+      command is conditional. What is unconditional and necessary is a <i>must</i>,
+      such as is presented by the laws of nature.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      It is quite true that the moral law is entirely conditional. There is a
+      world and a view of life in which it has neither validity nor
+      significance. That world is, properly speaking, the real world in which,
+      as individuals, we live; for every regard paid to morality is a denial of
+      that world and of our individual life in it. It is a view of the world,
+      however, which does not go beyond the principle of sufficient reason; and
+      the opposite view proceeds by the intuition of Ideas.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      If a man is under the influence of two opposite but very strong motives, A
+      and B, and I am greatly concerned that he should choose A, but still more
+      that he should never be untrue to his choice, and by changing his mind
+      betray me, or the like, it will not do for me to say anything that might
+      hinder the motive B from having its full effect upon him, and only
+      emphasise A; for then I should never be able to reckon on his decision.
+      What I have to do is, rather, to put both motives before him at the same
+      time, in as vivid and clear a way as possible, so that they may work upon
+      him with their whole force. The choice that he then makes is the decision
+      of his inmost nature, and stands firm to all eternity. In saying <i>I will
+      do this</i>, he has said <i>I must do this</i>. I have got at his will,
+      and I can rely upon its working as steadily as one of the forces of
+      nature. It is as certain as fire kindles and water wets that he will act
+      according to the motive which has proved to be stronger for him. Insight
+      and knowledge may be attained and lost again; they may be changed, or
+      improved, or destroyed; but will cannot be changed. That is why <i>I
+      apprehend, I perceive, I see</i>, is subject to alteration and
+      uncertainty; <i>I will</i>, pronounced on a right apprehension of motive,
+      is as firm as nature itself. The difficulty, however, lies in getting at a
+      right apprehension. A man's apprehension of motive may change, or be
+      corrected or perverted; and on the other hand, his circumstances may
+      undergo an alteration.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      A man should exercise an almost boundless toleration and placability,
+      because if he is capricious enough to refuse to forgive a single
+      individual for the meanness or evil that lies at his door, it is doing the
+      rest of the world a quite unmerited honour.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But at the same time the man who is every one's friend is no one's friend.
+      It is quite obvious what sort of friendship it is which we hold out to the
+      human race, and to which it is open to almost every man to return, no
+      matter what he may have done.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      With the ancients <i>friendship</i> was one of the chief elements in
+      morality. But friendship is only limitation and partiality; it is the
+      restriction to one individual of what is the due of all mankind, namely,
+      the recognition that a man's own nature and that of mankind are identical.
+      At most it is a compromise between this recognition and selfishness.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      A lie always has its origin in the desire to extend the dominion of one's
+      own will over other individuals, and to deny their will in order the
+      better to affirm one's own. Consequently a lie is in its very nature the
+      product of injustice, malevolence and villainy. That is why truth,
+      sincerity, candour and rectitude are at once recognised and valued as
+      praiseworthy and noble qualities; because we presume that the man who
+      exhibits them entertains no sentiments of injustice or malice, and
+      therefore stands in no need of concealing such sentiments. He who is open
+      cherishes nothing that is bad.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      There is a certain kind of courage which springs from the same source as
+      good-nature. What I mean is that the good-natured man is almost as clearly
+      conscious that he exists in other individuals as in himself. I have often
+      shown how this feeling gives rise to good-nature. It also gives rise to
+      courage, for the simple reason that the man who possesses this feeling
+      cares less for his own individual existence, as he lives almost as much in
+      the general existence of all creatures. Accordingly he is little concerned
+      for his own life and its belongings. This is by no means the sole source
+      of courage for it is a phenomenon due to various causes. But it is the
+      noblest kind of courage, as is shown by the fact that in its origin it is
+      associated with great gentleness and patience. Men of this kind are
+      usually irresistible to women.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      All general rules and precepts fail, because they proceed from the false
+      assumption that men are constituted wholly, or almost wholly, alike; an
+      assumption which the philosophy of Helvetius expressly makes. Whereas the
+      truth is that the original difference between individuals in intellect and
+      morality is immeasurable.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      The question as to whether morality is something real is the question
+      whether a well-grounded counter-principle to egoism actually exists.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      As egoism restricts concern for welfare to a single individual, <i>viz</i>.,
+      the man's own self, the counter-principle would have to extend it to all
+      other individuals.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      It is only because the will is above and beyond time that the stings of
+      conscience are ineradicable, and do not, like other pains, gradually wear
+      away. No! an evil deed weighs on the conscience years afterwards as
+      heavily as if it had been freshly committed.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      Character is innate, and conduct is merely its manifestation; the occasion
+      for great misdeeds comes seldom; strong counter-motives keep us back; our
+      disposition is revealed to ourselves by our desires, thoughts, emotions,
+      when it remains unknown to others. Reflecting on all this, we might
+      suppose it possible for a man to possess, in some sort, an innate evil
+      conscience, without ever having done anything very bad.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      <i>Don't do to others what you wouldn't like done to yourself</i>. This
+      is, perhaps, one of those arguments that prove, or rather ask, too much.
+      For a prisoner might address it to a judge.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      Stupid people are generally malicious, for the very same reason as the
+      ugly and the deformed.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Similarly, genius and sanctity are akin. However simple-minded a saint may
+      be, he will nevertheless have a dash of genius in him; and however many
+      errors of temperament, or of actual character, a genius may possess, he
+      will still exhibit a certain nobility of disposition by which he shows his
+      kinship with the saint.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      The great difference between Law without and Law within, between the State
+      and the Kingdom of God, is very clear. It is the State's business to see
+      that <i>every one should have justice done to him</i>; it regards men as
+      passive beings, and therefore takes no account of anything but their
+      actions. The Moral Law, on the other hand, is concerned that <i>every one
+      should do justice</i>; it regards men as active, and looks to the will
+      rather than the deed. To prove that this is the true distinction let the
+      reader consider what would happen if he were to say, conversely, that it
+      is the State's business that every one should do justice, and the business
+      of the Moral Law that every one should have justice done to him. The
+      absurdity is obvious.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      As an example of the distinction, let me take the case of a debtor and a
+      creditor disputing about a debt which the former denies. A lawyer and a
+      moralist are present, and show a lively interest in the matter. Both
+      desire that the dispute should end in the same way, although what they
+      want is by no means the same. The lawyer says, <i>I want this man to get
+      back what belongs to him</i>; and the moralist, <i>I want that man to do
+      his duty</i>.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      It is with the will alone that morality is concerned. Whether external
+      force hinders or fails to hinder the will from working does not in the
+      least matter. For morality the external world is real only in so far as it
+      is able or unable to lead and influence the will. As soon as the will is
+      determined, that is, as soon as a resolve is taken, the external world and
+      its events are of no further moment and practical do not exist. For if the
+      events of the world had any such reality&mdash;that is to say, if they
+      possessed a significance in themselves, or any other than that derived
+      from the will which is affected by them&mdash;what a grievance it would be
+      that all these events lie in the realm of chance and error! It is,
+      however, just this which proves that the important thing is not what
+      happens, but what is willed. Accordingly, let the incidents of life be
+      left to the play of chance and error, to demonstrate to man that he is as
+      chaff before the wind.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The State concerns itself only with the incidents&mdash;with what happens;
+      nothing else has any reality for it. I may dwell upon thoughts of murder
+      and poison as much as I please: the State does not forbid me, so long as
+      the axe and rope control my will, and prevent it from becoming action.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Ethics asks: What are the duties towards others which justice imposes upon
+      us? in other words, What must I render? The Law of Nature asks: What need
+      I not submit to from others? that is, What must I suffer? The question is
+      put, not that I may do no injustice, but that I may not do more than every
+      man must do if he is to safeguard his existence, and than every man will
+      approve being done, in order that he may be treated in the same way
+      himself; and, further, that I may not do more than society will permit me
+      to do. The same answer will serve for both questions, just as the same
+      straight line can be drawn from either of two opposite directions, namely,
+      by opposing forces; or, again, as the angle can give the sine, or the sine
+      the angle.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      It has been said that the historian is an inverted prophet. In the same
+      way it may be said that a teacher of law is an inverted moralist (<i>viz</i>.,
+      a teacher of the duties of justice), or that politics are inverted ethics,
+      if we exclude the thought that ethics also teaches the duty of
+      benevolence, magnanimity, love, and so on. The State is the Gordian knot
+      that is cut instead of being untied; it is Columbus' egg which is made to
+      stand by being broken instead of balanced, as though the business in
+      question were to make it stand rather than to balance it. In this respect
+      the State is like the man who thinks that he can produce fine weather by
+      making the barometer go up.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      The pseudo-philosophers of our age tell us that it is the object of the
+      State to promote the moral aims of mankind. This is not true; it is rather
+      the contrary which is true. The aim for which mankind exists&mdash;the
+      expression is parabolic&mdash;is not that a man should act in such and
+      such a manner; for all <i>opera operata</i>, things that have actually
+      been done, are in themselves matters of indifference. No! the aim is that
+      the Will, of which every man is a complete specimen&mdash;nay, is the very
+      Will itself&mdash;should turn whither it needs to turn; that the man
+      himself (the union of Thought and Will) should perceive what this will is,
+      and what horrors it contains; that he should show the reflection of
+      himself in his own deeds, in the abomination of them. The State, which is
+      wholly concerned with the general welfare, checks the manifestation of the
+      bad will, but in no wise checks the will itself; the attempt would be
+      impossible. It is because the State checks the manifestation of his will
+      that a man very seldom sees the whole abomination of his nature in the
+      mirror of his deeds. Or does the reader actually suppose there are no
+      people in the world as bad as Robespierre, Napoleon, or other murderers?
+      Does he fail to see that there are many who would act like them if only
+      they could?
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Many a criminal dies more quietly on the scaffold than many a non-criminal
+      in the arms of his family. The one has perceived what his will is and has
+      discarded it. The other has not been able to discard it, because he has
+      never been able to perceive what it is. The aim of the State is to produce
+      a fool's paradise, and this is in direct conflict with the true aim of
+      life, namely, to attain a knowledge of what the will, in its horrible
+      nature, really is.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      Napoleon was not really worse than many, not to say most, men. He was
+      possessed of the very ordinary egoism that seeks its welfare at the
+      expense of others. What distinguished him was merely the greater power he
+      had of satisfying his will, and greater intelligence, reason and courage;
+      added to which, chance gave him a favourable scope for his operations. By
+      means of all this he did for his egoism what a thousand other men would
+      like to do for theirs, but cannot. Every feeble lad who by little acts of
+      villainy gains a small advantage for himself by putting others to some
+      disadvantage, although it may be equally small, is just as bad as
+      Napoleon.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Those who fancy that retribution comes after death would demand that
+      Napoleon should by unutterable torments pay the penalty for all the
+      numberless calamities that he caused. But he is no more culpable than all
+      those who possess the same will, unaccompanied by the same power.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The circumstance that in his case this extraordinary power was added
+      allowed him to reveal the whole wickedness of the human will; and the
+      sufferings of his age, as the necessary obverse of the medal, reveal the
+      misery which is inextricably bound up with this bad will. It is the
+      general manipulation of this will that constitutes the world. But it is
+      precisely that it should be understood how inextricably the will to live
+      is bound up with, and is really one and the same as, this unspeakable
+      misery, that is the world's aim and purpose; and it is an aim and purpose
+      which the appearance of Napoleon did much to assist. Not to be an
+      unmeaning fools' paradise but a tragedy, in which the will to live
+      understands itself and yields&mdash;that is the object for which the world
+      exists. Napoleon is only an enormous mirror of the will to live.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The difference between the man who causes suffering and the man who
+      suffers it, is only phenomenal. It is all a will to live, identical with
+      great suffering; and it is only by understanding this that the will can
+      mend and end.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      What chiefly distinguishes ancient from modern times is that in ancient
+      times, to use Napoleon's expression, it was affairs that reigned: <i>les
+      paroles aux choses</i>. In modern times this is not so. What I mean is
+      that in ancient times the character of public life, of the State, and of
+      Religion, as well as of private life, was a strenuous affirmation of the
+      will to live. In modern times it is a denial of this will, for such is the
+      character of Christianity. But now while on the one hand that denial has
+      suffered some abatement even in public opinion, because it is too
+      repugnant to human character, on the other what is publicly denied is
+      secretly affirmed. Hence it is that we see half measures and falsehood
+      everywhere; and that is why modern times look so small beside antiquity.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      The structure of human society is like a pendulum swinging between two
+      impulses, two evils in polar opposition, <i>despotism</i> and <i>anarchy</i>.
+      The further it gets from the one, the nearer it approaches the other. From
+      this the reader might hit on the thought that if it were exactly midway
+      between the two, it would be right. Far from it. For these two evils are
+      by no means equally bad and dangerous. The former is incomparably less to
+      be feared; its ills exist in the main only as possibilities, and if they
+      come at all it is only one among millions that they touch. But, with
+      anarchy, possibility and actuality are inseparable; its blows fall on
+      every man every day. Therefore every constitution should be a nearer
+      approach to a despotism than to anarchy; nay, it must contain a small
+      possibility of despotism.
+    </p>
+    <div style="height: 6em;">
+      <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />
+    </div>
+  <div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10739 ***</div>
+</body>
+</html>
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+Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for
+eBook #10739 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/10739)
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+Project Gutenberg's The Essays Of Arthur Schopenhauer, by Arthur Schopenhauer
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Essays Of Arthur Schopenhauer
+
+Author: Arthur Schopenhauer
+
+Release Date: January 18, 2004 [EBook #10739]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ESSAYS OF ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Juliet Sutherland, Josephine Paolucci and the Online
+Distributed Proofreading Team.
+
+
+
+
+
+THE ESSAYS
+
+OF
+
+ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER
+
+TRANSLATED BY
+
+T. BAILEY SAUNDERS, M.A.
+
+
+
+
+ON HUMAN NATURE.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+  HUMAN NATURE
+  GOVERNMENT
+  FREE-WILL AND FATALISM
+  CHARACTER
+  MORAL INSTINCT
+  ETHICAL REFLECTIONS
+
+
+
+
+TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
+
+The following essays are drawn from the chapters entitled _Zur Ethik_
+and _Zur Rechtslehre und Politik_ which are to be found both in
+Schopenhauer's _Parerga_ and in his posthumous writings. As in my
+previous volumes, so also in this, I have omitted a few passages which
+appeared to me to be either antiquated or no longer of any general
+interest. For convenience' sake I have divided the original chapters
+into sections, which I have had to name; and I have also had to invent
+a title which should express their real scope. The reader will find
+that it is not so much _Ethics_ and _Politics_ that are here treated,
+as human nature itself in various aspects.
+
+T.B.S.
+
+
+
+
+HUMAN NATURE.
+
+
+Truths of the physical order may possess much external significance,
+but internal significance they have none. The latter is the privilege
+of intellectual and moral truths, which are concerned with the
+objectivation of the will in its highest stages, whereas physical
+truths are concerned with it in its lowest.
+
+For example, if we could establish the truth of what up till now is
+only a conjecture, namely, that it is the action of the sun which
+produces thermoelectricity at the equator; that this produces
+terrestrial magnetism; and that this magnetism, again, is the cause of
+the _aurora borealis_, these would be truths externally of great, but
+internally of little, significance. On the other hand, examples
+of internal significance are furnished by all great and true
+philosophical systems; by the catastrophe of every good tragedy; nay,
+even by the observation of human conduct in the extreme manifestations
+of its morality and immorality, of its good and its evil character.
+For all these are expressions of that reality which takes outward
+shape as the world, and which, in the highest stages of its
+objectivation, proclaims its innermost nature.
+
+To say that the world has only a physical and not a moral significance
+is the greatest and most pernicious of all errors, the fundamental
+blunder, the real perversity of mind and temper; and, at bottom, it
+is doubtless the tendency which faith personifies as Anti-Christ.
+Nevertheless, in spite of all religions--and they are systems which
+one and all maintain the opposite, and seek to establish it in their
+mythical way--this fundamental error never becomes quite extinct, but
+raises its head from time to time afresh, until universal indignation
+compels it to hide itself once more.
+
+Yet, however certain we may feel of the moral significance of life
+and the world, to explain and illustrate it, and to resolve the
+contradiction between this significance and the world as it is, form
+a task of great difficulty; so great, indeed, as to make it possible
+that it has remained for me to exhibit the true and only genuine
+and sound basis of morality everywhere and at all times effective,
+together with the results to which it leads. The actual facts of
+morality are too much on my side for me to fear that my theory can
+ever be replaced or upset by any other.
+
+However, so long as even my ethical system continues to be ignored by
+the professorial world, it is Kant's moral principle that prevails in
+the universities. Among its various forms the one which is most in
+favour at present is "the dignity of man." I have already exposed
+the absurdity of this doctrine in my treatise on the _Foundation of
+Morality_.[1] Therefore I will only say here that if the question were
+asked on what the alleged dignity of man rests, it would not be long
+before the answer was made that it rests upon his morality. In other
+words, his morality rests upon his dignity, and his dignity rests upon
+his morality.
+
+[Footnote 1: § 8.]
+
+But apart from this circular argument it seems to me that the idea of
+dignity can be applied only in an ironical sense to a being whose will
+is so sinful, whose intellect is so limited, whose body is so weak and
+perishable as man's. How shall a man be proud, when his conception
+is a crime, his birth a penalty, his life a labour, and death a
+necessity!--
+
+  _Quid superbit homo? cujus conceptio culpa,
+  Nasci poena, labor vita, necesse mori_!
+
+Therefore, in opposition to the above-mentioned form of the Kantian
+principle, I should be inclined to lay down the following rule: When
+you come into contact with a man, no matter whom, do not attempt an
+objective appreciation of him according to his worth and dignity. Do
+not consider his bad will, or his narrow understanding and perverse
+ideas; as the former may easily lead you to hate and the latter to
+despise him; but fix your attention only upon his sufferings, his
+needs, his anxieties, his pains. Then you will always feel your
+kinship with him; you will sympathise with him; and instead of hatred
+or contempt you will experience the commiseration that alone is the
+peace to which the Gospel calls us. The way to keep down hatred and
+contempt is certainly not to look for a man's alleged "dignity," but,
+on the contrary, to regard him as an object of pity.
+
+The Buddhists, as the result of the more profound views which they
+entertain on ethical and metaphysical subjects, start from the
+cardinal vices and not the cardinal virtues; since the virtues make
+their appearance only as the contraries or negations of the vices.
+According to Schmidt's _History of the Eastern Mongolians_ the
+cardinal vices in the Buddhist scheme are four: Lust, Indolence,
+Anger, and Avarice. But probably instead of Indolence, we should read
+Pride; for so it stands in the _Lettres édifiantes et curieuses_,[1]
+where Envy, or Hatred, is added as a fifth. I am confirmed in
+correcting the statement of the excellent Schmidt by the fact that my
+rendering agrees with the doctrine of the Sufis, who are certainly
+under the influence of the Brahmins and Buddhists. The Sufis also
+maintain that there are four cardinal vices, and they arrange them in
+very striking pairs, so that Lust appears in connection with Avarice,
+and Anger with Pride. The four cardinal virtues opposed to them would
+be Chastity and Generosity, together with Gentleness and Humility.
+
+[Footnote 1: Edit, of 1819, vol. vi., p. 372.]
+
+When we compare these profound ideas of morality, as they are
+entertained by oriental nations, with the celebrated cardinal virtues
+of Plato, which have been recapitulated again and again--Justice,
+Valour, Temperance, and Wisdom--it is plain that the latter are not
+based on any clear, leading idea, but are chosen on grounds that are
+superficial and, in part, obviously false. Virtues must be qualities
+of the will, but Wisdom is chiefly an attribute of the Intellect.
+[Greek: Sophrosynae], which Cicero translates _Temperantia_, is a very
+indefinite and ambiguous word, and it admits, therefore, of a variety
+of applications: it may mean discretion, or abstinence, or keeping a
+level head. Courage is not a virtue at all; although sometimes it is a
+servant or instrument of virtue; but it is just as ready to become
+the servant of the greatest villainy. It is really a quality of
+temperament. Even Geulinx (in the preface to this _Ethics_) condemned
+the Platonic virtues and put the following in their place: Diligence,
+Obedience, Justice and Humility; which are obviously bad. The Chinese
+distinguish five cardinal virtues: Sympathy, Justice, Propriety,
+Wisdom, and Sincerity. The virtues of Christianity are theological,
+not cardinal: Faith, Love, and Hope.
+
+Fundamental disposition towards others, assuming the character either
+of Envy or of Sympathy, is the point at which the moral virtues and
+vices of mankind first diverge. These two diametrically opposite
+qualities exist in every man; for they spring from the inevitable
+comparison which he draws between his own lot and that of others.
+According as the result of this comparison affects his individual
+character does the one or the other of these qualities become the
+source and principle of all his action. Envy builds the wall between
+_Thee_ and _Me_ thicker and stronger; Sympathy makes it slight and
+transparent; nay, sometimes it pulls down the wall altogether; and
+then the distinction between self and not-self vanishes.
+
+Valour, which has been mentioned as a virtue, or rather the Courage
+on which it is based (for valour is only courage in war), deserves a
+closer examination. The ancients reckoned Courage among the virtues,
+and cowardice among the vices; but there is no corresponding idea in
+the Christian scheme, which makes for charity and patience, and in its
+teaching forbids all enmity or even resistance. The result is that
+with the moderns Courage is no longer a virtue. Nevertheless it must
+be admitted that cowardice does not seem to be very compatible with
+any nobility of character--if only for the reason that it betrays an
+overgreat apprehension about one's own person.
+
+Courage, however, may also be explained as a readiness to meet ills
+that threaten at the moment, in order to avoid greater ills that
+lie in the future; whereas cowardice does the contrary. But this
+readiness is of the same quality as _patience_, for patience consists
+in the clear consciousness that greater evils than those which are
+present, and that any violent attempt to flee from or guard against
+the ills we have may bring the others upon us. Courage, then, would
+be a kind of patience; and since it is patience that enables us to
+practise forbearance and self control, Courage is, through the medium
+of patience, at least akin to virtue.
+
+But perhaps Courage admits of being considered from a higher point of
+view. The fear of death may in every case be traced to a deficiency
+in that natural philosophy--natural, and therefore resting on mere
+feeling--which gives a man the assurance that he exists in everything
+outside him just as much as in his own person; so that the death of
+his person can do him little harm. But it is just this very assurance
+that would give a man heroic Courage; and therefore, as the reader
+will recollect from my _Ethics_, Courage comes from the same source as
+the virtues of Justice and Humanity. This is, I admit, to take a very
+high view of the matter; but apart from it I cannot well explain why
+cowardice seems contemptible, and personal courage a noble and sublime
+thing; for no lower point of view enables me to see why a finite
+individual who is everything to himself--nay, who is himself even
+the very fundamental condition of the existence of the rest of the
+world--should not put his own preservation above every other aim. It
+is, then, an insufficient explanation of Courage to make it rest
+only on utility, to give it an empirical and not a transcendental
+character. It may have been for some such reason that Calderon once
+uttered a sceptical but remarkable opinion in regard to Courage, nay,
+actually denied its reality; and put his denial into the mouth of a
+wise old minister, addressing his young sovereign. "Although," he
+observed, "natural fear is operative in all alike, a man may be brave
+in not letting it be seen; and it is this that constitutes Courage":
+
+  _Que aunque el natural temor
+  En todos obra igualmente,
+  No mostrarle es ser valiente
+  Y esto es lo que hace el valor_.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: _La Hija del Aire_, ii., 2.]
+
+In regard to the difference which I have mentioned between the
+ancients and the moderns in their estimate of Courage as a virtue,
+it must be remembered that by Virtue, _virtus_, [Greek: aretae], the
+ancients understood every excellence or quality that was praiseworthy
+in itself, it might be moral or intellectual, or possibly only
+physical. But when Christianity demonstrated that the fundamental
+tendency of life was moral, it was moral superiority alone than
+henceforth attached to the notion of Virtue. Meanwhile the earlier
+usage still survived in the elder Latinists, and also in Italian
+writers, as is proved by the well-known meaning of the word
+_virtuoso_. The special attention of students should be drawn to this
+wider range of the idea of Virtue amongst the ancients, as otherwise
+it might easily be a source of secret perplexity. I may recommend two
+passages preserved for us by Stobaeus, which will serve this purpose.
+One of them is apparently from the Pythagorean philosopher Metopos, in
+which the fitness of every bodily member is declared to be a virtue.
+The other pronounces that the virtue of a shoemaker is to make good
+shoes. This may also serve to explain why it is that in the ancient
+scheme of ethics virtues and vices are mentioned which find no place
+in ours.
+
+As the place of Courage amongst the virtues is a matter of doubt,
+so is that of Avarice amongst the vices. It must not, however, be
+confounded with greed, which is the most immediate meaning of the
+Latin word _avaritia_. Let us then draw up and examine the arguments
+_pro et contra_ in regard to Avarice, and leave the final judgment to
+be formed by every man for himself.
+
+On the one hand it is argued that it is not Avarice which is a vice,
+but extravagance, its opposite. Extravagance springs from a brutish
+limitation to the present moment, in comparison with which the future,
+existing as it does only in thought, is as nothing. It rests upon the
+illusion that sensual pleasures possess a positive or real value.
+Accordingly, future need and misery is the price at which the
+spendthrift purchases pleasures that are empty, fleeting, and often no
+more than imaginary; or else feeds his vain, stupid self-conceit on
+the bows and scrapes of parasites who laugh at him in secret, or on
+the gaze of the mob and those who envy his magnificence. We should,
+therefore, shun the spendthrift as though he had the plague, and on
+discovering his vice break with him betimes, in order that later on,
+when the consequences of his extravagance ensue, we may neither have
+to help to bear them, nor, on the other hand, have to play the part of
+the friends of Timon of Athens.
+
+At the same time it is not to be expected that he who foolishly
+squanders his own fortune will leave another man's intact, if it
+should chance to be committed to his keeping; nay, _sui profusus_ and
+_alieni appetens_ are by Sallust very rightly conjoined. Hence it is
+that extravagance leads not only to impoverishment but also to crime;
+and crime amongst the moneyed classes is almost always the result of
+extravagance. It is accordingly with justice that the _Koran_ declares
+all spendthrifts to be "brothers of Satan."
+
+But it is superfluity that Avarice brings in its train, and when was
+superfluity ever unwelcome? That must be a good vice which has good
+consequences. Avarice proceeds upon the principle that all pleasure is
+only negative in its operation and that the happiness which consists
+of a series of pleasures is a chimaera; that, on the contrary, it
+is pains which are positive and extremely real. Accordingly, the
+avaricious man foregoes the former in order that he may be the
+better preserved from the latter, and thus it is that _bear and
+forbear_--_sustine et abstine_--is his maxim. And because he knows,
+further, how inexhaustible are the possibilities of misfortune,
+and how innumerable the paths of danger, he increases the means of
+avoiding them, in order, if possible, to surround himself with a
+triple wall of protection. Who, then, can say where precaution against
+disaster begins to be exaggerated? He alone who knows where the
+malignity of fate reaches its limit. And even if precaution were
+exaggerated it is an error which at the most would hurt the man who
+took it, and not others. If he will never need the treasures which he
+lays up for himself, they will one day benefit others whom nature
+has made less careful. That until then he withdraws the money
+from circulation is no misfortune; for money is not an article of
+consumption: it only represents the good things which a man may
+actually possess, and is not one itself. Coins are only counters;
+their value is what they represent; and what they represent cannot be
+withdrawn from circulation. Moreover, by holding back the money,
+the value of the remainder which is in circulation is enhanced by
+precisely the same amount. Even though it be the case, as is said,
+that many a miser comes in the end to love money itself for its own
+sake, it is equally certain that many a spendthrift, on the other
+hand, loves spending and squandering for no better reason. Friendship
+with a miser is not only without danger, but it is profitable, because
+of the great advantages it can bring. For it is doubtless those who
+are nearest and dearest to the miser who on his death will reap
+the fruits of the self-control which he exercised; but even in his
+lifetime, too, something may be expected of him in cases of great
+need. At any rate one can always hope for more from him than from the
+spendthrift, who has lost his all and is himself helpless and in debt.
+_Mas da el duro que el desnudo_, says a Spanish proverb; the man who
+has a hard heart will give more than the man who has an empty purse.
+The upshot of all this is that Avarice is not a vice.
+
+On the other side, it may be said that Avarice is the quintessence of
+all vices. When physical pleasures seduce a man from the right path,
+it is his sensual nature--the animal part of him--which is at fault.
+He is carried away by its attractions, and, overcome by the impression
+of the moment, he acts without thinking of the consequences. When,
+on the other hand, he is brought by age or bodily weakness to the
+condition in which the vices that he could never abandon end by
+abandoning him, and his capacity for physical pleasure dies--if he
+turns to Avarice, the intellectual desire survives the sensual. Money,
+which represents all the good things of this world, and is these good
+things in the abstract, now becomes the dry trunk overgrown with all
+the dead lusts of the flesh, which are egoism in the abstract. They
+come to life again in the love of the Mammon. The transient pleasure
+of the senses has become a deliberate and calculated lust of money,
+which, like that to which it is directed, is symbolical in its nature,
+and, like it, indestructible.
+
+This obstinate love of the pleasures of the world--a love which, as it
+were, outlives itself; this utterly incorrigible sin, this refined
+and sublimated desire of the flesh, is the abstract form in which all
+lusts are concentrated, and to which it stands like a general idea to
+individual particulars. Accordingly, Avarice is the vice of age, just
+as extravagance is the vice of youth.
+
+This _disputatio in utramque partem_--this debate for and against--is
+certainly calculated to drive us into accepting the _juste milieu_
+morality of Aristotle; a conclusion that is also supported by the
+following consideration.
+
+Every human perfection is allied to a defect into which it threatens
+to pass; but it is also true that every defect is allied to a
+perfection. Hence it is that if, as often happens, we make a mistake
+about a man, it is because at the beginning of our acquaintance with
+him we confound his defects with the kinds of perfection to which they
+are allied. The cautious man seems to us a coward; the economical man,
+a miser; the spendthrift seems liberal; the rude fellow, downright and
+sincere; the foolhardy person looks as if he were going to work with a
+noble self-confidence; and so on in many other cases.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+No one can live among men without feeling drawn again and again to the
+tempting supposition that moral baseness and intellectual incapacity
+are closely connected, as though they both sprang direct from one
+source. That that, however, is not so, I have shown in detail.[1] That
+it seems to be so is merely due to the fact that both are so often
+found together; and the circumstance is to be explained by the very
+frequent occurrence of each of them, so that it may easily happen for
+both to be compelled to live under one roof. At the same time it is
+not to be denied that they play into each other's hands to their
+mutual benefit; and it is this that produces the very unedifying
+spectacle which only too many men exhibit, and that makes the world to
+go as it goes. A man who is unintelligent is very likely to show his
+perfidy, villainy and malice; whereas a clever man understands how
+to conceal these qualities. And how often, on the other hand, does
+a perversity of heart prevent a man from seeing truths which his
+intelligence is quite capable of grasping!
+
+[Footnote 1: In my chief work, vol. ii., ch. xix,]
+
+Nevertheless, let no one boast. Just as every man, though he be the
+greatest genius, has very definite limitations in some one sphere of
+knowledge, and thus attests his common origin with the essentially
+perverse and stupid mass of mankind, so also has every man something
+in his nature which is positively evil. Even the best, nay the
+noblest, character will sometimes surprise us by isolated traits of
+depravity; as though it were to acknowledge his kinship with the human
+race, in which villainy--nay, cruelty--is to be found in that degree.
+For it was just in virtue of this evil in him, this bad principle,
+that of necessity he became a man. And for the same reason the world
+in general is what my clear mirror of it has shown it to be.
+
+But in spite of all this the difference even between one man and
+another is incalculably great, and many a one would be horrified to
+see another as he really is. Oh, for some Asmodeus of morality, to
+make not only roofs and walls transparent to his favourites, but
+also to lift the veil of dissimulation, fraud, hypocrisy, pretence,
+falsehood and deception, which is spread over all things! to show how
+little true honesty there is in the world, and how often, even where
+it is least to be expected, behind all the exterior outwork of virtue,
+secretly and in the innermost recesses, unrighteousness sits at the
+helm! It is just on this account that so many men of the better kind
+have four-footed friends: for, to be sure, how is a man to get relief
+from the endless dissimulation, falsity and malice of mankind, if
+there were no dogs into whose honest faces he can look without
+distrust?
+
+For what is our civilised world but a big masquerade? where you meet
+knights, priests, soldiers, men of learning, barristers, clergymen,
+philosophers, and I don't know what all! But they are not what they
+pretend to be; they are only masks, and, as a rule, behind the masks
+you will find moneymakers. One man, I suppose, puts on the mask of
+law, which he has borrowed for the purpose from a barrister, only in
+order to be able to give another man a sound drubbing; a second has
+chosen the mask of patriotism and the public welfare with a similar
+intent; a third takes religion or purity of doctrine. For all sorts
+of purposes men have often put on the mask of philosophy, and even
+of philanthropy, and I know not what besides. Women have a smaller
+choice. As a rule they avail themselves of the mask of morality,
+modesty, domesticity, and humility. Then there are general masks,
+without any particular character attaching to them like dominoes. They
+may be met with everywhere; and of this sort is the strict rectitude,
+the courtesy, the sincere sympathy, the smiling friendship, that
+people profess. The whole of these masks as a rule are merely, as I
+have said, a disguise for some industry, commerce, or speculation. It
+is merchants alone who in this respect constitute any honest class.
+They are the only people who give themselves out to be what they are;
+and therefore they go about without any mask at all, and consequently
+take a humble rank.
+
+It is very necessary that a man should be apprised early in life that
+it is a masquerade in which he finds himself. For otherwise there are
+many things which he will fail to understand and put up with, nay, at
+which he will be completely puzzled, and that man longest of all whose
+heart is made of better clay--
+
+  _Et meliore luto finxit praecordia Titan.[1]_
+
+[Footnote 1: Juvenal, _Sat_. 14, 34]
+
+Such for instance is the favour that villainy finds; the neglect that
+merit, even the rarest and the greatest, suffers at the hands of those
+of the same profession; the hatred of truth and great capacity; the
+ignorance of scholars in their own province; and the fact that true
+wares are almost always despised and the merely specious ones in
+request. Therefore let even the young be instructed betimes that in
+this masquerade the apples are of wax, the flowers of silk, the fish
+of pasteboard, and that all things--yes, all things--are toys and
+trifles; and that of two men whom he may see earnestly engaged in
+business, one is supplying spurious goods and the other paying for
+them in false coin.
+
+But there are more serious reflections to be made, and worse things to
+be recorded. Man is at bottom a savage, horrible beast. We know it,
+if only in the business of taming and restraining him which we call
+civilisation. Hence it is that we are terrified if now and then his
+nature breaks out. Wherever and whenever the locks and chains of law
+and order fall off and give place to anarchy, he shows himself for
+what he is. But it is unnecessary to wait for anarchy in order to gain
+enlightenment on this subject. A hundred records, old and new, produce
+the conviction that in his unrelenting cruelty man is in no way
+inferior to the tiger and the hyaena. A forcible example is supplied
+by a publication of the year 1841 entitled _Slavery and the Internal
+Slave Trade in the United States of North America: being replies to
+questions transmitted by the British Anti-slavery Society to the
+American Anti-slavery Society_.[1] This book constitutes one of the
+heaviest indictments against the human race. No one can put it down
+with a feeling of horror, and few without tears. For whatever the
+reader may have ever heard, or imagined, or dreamt, of the unhappy
+condition of slavery, or indeed of human cruelty in general, it will
+seem small to him when he reads of the way in which those devils
+in human form, those bigoted, church-going, strictly Sabbatarian
+rascals--and in particular the Anglican priests among them--treated
+their innocent black brothers, who by wrong and violence had got into
+their diabolical clutches.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's 'Note_.--If Schopenhauer were writing
+to-day, he would with equal truth point to the miseries of the African
+trade. I have slightly abridged this passage, as some of the evils
+against which he protested no longer exist.]
+
+Other examples are furnished by Tshudi's _Travels in Peru_, in the
+description which he gives of the treatment of the Peruvian soldiers
+at the hands of their officers; and by Macleod's _Travels in Eastern
+Africa_, where the author tells of the cold-blooded and truly devilish
+cruelty with which the Portuguese in Mozambique treat their slaves.
+But we need not go for examples to the New World, that obverse side of
+our planet. In the year 1848 it was brought to life that in England,
+not in one, but apparently in a hundred cases within a brief period, a
+husband had poisoned his wife or _vice versâ_, or both had joined in
+poisoning their children, or in torturing them slowly to death by
+starving and ill-treating them, with no other object than to get the
+money for burying them which they had insured in the Burial Clubs
+against their death. For this purpose a child was often insured in
+several, even in as many as twenty clubs at once.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. _The Times_, 20th, 22nd and 23rd Sept., 1848, and
+also 12th Dec., 1853.]
+
+Details of this character belong, indeed, to the blackest pages in the
+criminal records of humanity. But, when all is said, it is the
+inward and innate character of man, this god _par excellence_ of the
+Pantheists, from which they and everything like them proceed. In every
+man there dwells, first and foremost, a colossal egoism, which breaks
+the bounds of right and justice with the greatest freedom, as everyday
+life shows on a small scale, and as history on every page of it on a
+large. Does not the recognised need of a balance of power in Europe,
+with the anxious way in which it is preserved, demonstrate that man
+is a beast of prey, who no sooner sees a weaker man near him than he
+falls upon him without fail? and does not the same hold good of the
+affairs of ordinary life?
+
+But to the boundless egoism of our nature there is joined more or
+less in every human breast a fund of hatred, anger, envy, rancour and
+malice, accumulated like the venom in a serpent's tooth, and waiting
+only for an opportunity of venting itself, and then, like a demon
+unchained, of storming and raging. If a man has no great occasion for
+breaking out, he will end by taking advantage of the smallest, and by
+working it up into something great by the aid of his imagination; for,
+however small it may be, it is enough to rouse his anger--
+
+  _Quantulacunque adeo est occasio, sufficit irae[1]_--
+
+[Footnote 1: Juvenal, _Sat_. 13, 183.]
+
+and then he will carry it as far as he can and may. We see this in
+daily life, where such outbursts are well known under the name of
+"venting one's gall on something." It will also have been observed
+that if such outbursts meet with no opposition the subject of them
+feels decidedly the better for them afterwards. That anger is
+not without its pleasure is a truth that was recorded even by
+Aristotle;[1] and he quotes a passage from Homer, who declares anger
+to be sweeter than honey. But not in anger alone--in hatred too, which
+stands to anger like a chronic to an acute disease, a man may indulge
+with the greatest delight:
+
+[Footnote 1: _Rhet_., i., 11; ii., 2.]
+
+  _Now hatred is by far the longest pleasure,
+  Men love in haste, but they detest at leisure_[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Byron _Don Juan_, c. xiii, 6.]
+
+Gobineau in his work _Les Races Humaines_ has called man _l'animal
+méchant par excellence_. People take this very ill, because they feel
+that it hits them; but he is quite right, for man is the only animal
+which causes pain to others without any further purpose than just to
+cause it. Other animals never do it except to satisfy their hunger, or
+in the rage of combat. If it is said against the tiger that he kills
+more than eats, he strangles his prey only for the purpose of eating
+it; and if he cannot eat it, the only explanation is, as the French
+phrase has it, that _ses yeux sont plus grands que son estomac_. No
+animal ever torments another for the mere purpose of tormenting, but
+man does it, and it is this that constitutes the diabolical feature in
+his character which is so much worse than the merely animal. I have
+already spoken of the matter in its broad aspect; but it is manifest
+even in small things, and every reader has a daily opportunity
+of observing it. For instance, if two little dogs are playing
+together--and what a genial and charming sight it is--and a child of
+three or four years joins them, it is almost inevitable for it to
+begin hitting them with a whip or stick, and thereby show itself, even
+at that age, _l'animal méchant par excellence_. The love of teasing
+and playing tricks, which is common enough, may be traced to the same
+source. For instance, if a man has expressed his annoyance at any
+interruption or other petty inconvenience, there will be no lack of
+people who for that very reason will bring it about: _animal méchant
+par excellence_! This is so certain that a man should be careful not
+to express any annoyance at small evils. On the other hand he should
+also be careful not to express his pleasure at any trifle, for, if
+he does so, men will act like the jailer who, when he found that his
+prisoner had performed the laborious task of taming a spider, and took
+a pleasure in watching it, immediately crushed it under his foot:
+_l'animal méchant par excellence_! This is why all animals are
+instinctively afraid of the sight, or even of the track of a man, that
+_animal méchant par excellence_! nor does their instinct them false;
+for it is man alone who hunts game for which he has no use and which
+does him no harm.
+
+It is a fact, then, that in the heart of every man there lies a wild
+beast which only waits for an opportunity to storm and rage, in its
+desire to inflict pain on others, or, if they stand in his way, to
+kill them. It is this which is the source of all the lust of war and
+battle. In trying to tame and to some extent hold it in check, the
+intelligence, its appointed keeper, has always enough to do. People
+may, if they please, call it the radical evil of human nature--a
+name which will at least serve those with whom a word stands for an
+explanation. I say, however, that it is the will to live, which, more
+and more embittered by the constant sufferings of existence, seeks to
+alleviate its own torment by causing torment in others. But in this
+way a man gradually develops in himself real cruelty and malice. The
+observation may also be added that as, according to Kant, matter
+subsists only through the antagonism of the powers of expansion and
+contraction, so human society subsists only by the antagonism of
+hatred, or anger, and fear. For there is a moment in the life of
+all of us when the malignity of our nature might perhaps make us
+murderers, if it were not accompanied by a due admixture of fear to
+keep it within bounds; and this fear, again, would make a man the
+sport and laughing stock of every boy, if anger were not lying ready
+in him, and keeping watch.
+
+But it is _Schadenfreude_, a mischievous delight in the misfortunes of
+others, which remains the worst trait in human nature. It is a feeling
+which is closely akin to cruelty, and differs from it, to say the
+truth, only as theory from practice. In general, it may be said of it
+that it takes the place which pity ought to take--pity which is its
+opposite, and the true source of all real justice and charity.
+
+_Envy_ is also opposed to pity, but in another sense; envy, that is
+to say, is produced by a cause directly antagonistic to that which
+produces the delight in mischief. The opposition between pity and envy
+on the one hand, and pity and the delight in mischief on the other,
+rests, in the main, on the occasions which call them forth. In the
+case of envy it is only as a direct effect of the cause which excites
+it that we feel it at all. That is just the reason why envy, although
+it is a reprehensible feeling, still admits of some excuse, and is,
+in general, a very human quality; whereas the delight in mischief is
+diabolical, and its taunts are the laughter of hell.
+
+The delight in mischief, as I have said, takes the place which pity
+ought to take. Envy, on the contrary, finds a place only where there
+is no inducement to pity, or rather an inducement to its opposite; and
+it is just as this opposite that envy arises in the human breast; and
+so far, therefore, it may still be reckoned a human sentiment. Nay, I
+am afraid that no one will be found to be entirely free from it. For
+that a man should feel his own lack of things more bitterly at the
+sight of another's delight in the enjoyment of them, is natural; nay,
+it is inevitable; but this should not rouse his hatred of the man who
+is happier than himself. It is just this hatred, however, in which
+true envy consists. Least of all should a man be envious, when it is a
+question, not of the gifts of fortune, or chance, or another's favour,
+but of the gifts of nature; because everything that is innate in a man
+rests on a metaphysical basis, and possesses justification of a higher
+kind; it is, so to speak, given him by Divine grace. But, unhappily,
+it is just in the case of personal advantages that envy is most
+irreconcilable. Thus it is that intelligence, or even genius, cannot
+get on in the world without begging pardon for its existence, wherever
+it is not in a position to be able, proudly and boldly, to despise the
+world.
+
+In other words, if envy is aroused only by wealth, rank, or power,
+it is often kept down by egoism, which perceives that, on occasion,
+assistance, enjoyment, support, protection, advancement, and so
+on, may be hoped for from the object of envy or that at least by
+intercourse with him a man may himself win honour from the reflected
+light of his superiority; and here, too, there is the hope of one day
+attaining all those advantages himself. On the other hand, in the envy
+that is directed to natural gifts and personal advantages, like beauty
+in women, or intelligence in men, there is no consolation or hope of
+one kind or the other; so that nothing remains but to indulge a
+bitter and irreconcilable hatred of the person who possesses these
+privileges; and hence the only remaining desire is to take vengeance
+on him.
+
+But here the envious man finds himself in an unfortunate position; for
+all his blows fall powerless as soon as it is known that they come
+from him. Accordingly he hides his feelings as carefully as if they
+were secret sins, and so becomes an inexhaustible inventor of tricks
+and artifices and devices for concealing and masking his procedure,
+in order that, unperceived, he may wound the object of his envy. For
+instance, with an air of the utmost unconcern he will ignore the
+advantages which are eating his heart out; he will neither see them,
+nor know them, nor have observed or even heard of them, and thus make
+himself a master in the art of dissimulation. With great cunning he
+will completely overlook the man whose brilliant qualities are gnawing
+at his heart, and act as though he were quite an unimportant person;
+he will take no notice of him, and, on occasion, will have even quite
+forgotten his existence. But at the same time he will before all
+things endeavour by secret machination carefully to deprive those
+advantages of any opportunity of showing themselves and becoming
+known. Then out of his dark corner he will attack these qualities with
+censure, mockery, ridicule and calumny, like the toad which spurts
+its poison from a hole. No less will he enthusiastically praise
+unimportant people, or even indifferent or bad performances in the
+same sphere. In short, he will becomes a Proteas in stratagem, in
+order to wound others without showing himself. But what is the use
+of it? The trained eye recognises him in spite of it all. He betrays
+himself, if by nothing else, by the way in which he timidly avoids
+and flies from the object of his envy, who stands the more completely
+alone, the more brilliant he is; and this is the reason why pretty
+girls have no friends of their own sex. He betrays himself, too, by
+the causeless hatred which he shows--a hatred which finds vent in a
+violent explosion at any circumstance however trivial, though it is
+often only the product of his imagination. How many such men there are
+in the world may be recognised by the universal praise of modesty,
+that is, of a virtue invented on behalf of dull and commonplace
+people. Nevertheless, it is a virtue which, by exhibiting the
+necessity for dealing considerately with the wretched plight of these
+people, is just what calls attention to it.
+
+For our self-consciousness and our pride there can be nothing more
+flattering than the sight of envy lurking in its retreat and plotting
+its schemes; but never let a man forget that where there is envy there
+is hatred, and let him be careful not to make a false friend out of
+any envious person. Therefore it is important to our safety to lay
+envy bare; and a man should study to discover its tricks, as it is
+everywhere to be found and always goes about _incognito_; or as I
+have said, like a venomous toad it lurks in dark corners. It deserves
+neither quarter nor sympathy; but as we can never reconcile it let our
+rule of conduct be to scorn it with a good heart, and as our happiness
+and glory is torture to it we may rejoice in its sufferings:
+
+  _Den Neid wirst nimmer du versöhnen;
+  So magst du ihn getrost verhöhnen.
+  Dein Glück, dein Ruhm ist ihm ein Leiden:
+  Magst drum an seiner Quaal dich weiden_.
+
+We have been taking a look at the _depravity_ of man, and it is a
+sight which may well fill us with horror. But now we must cast our
+eyes on the _misery_ of his existence; and when we have done so, and
+are horrified by that too, we must look back again at his depravity.
+We shall then find that they hold the balance to each other. We shall
+perceive the eternal justice of things; for we shall recognise that
+the world is itself the Last Judgment on it, and we shall begin to
+understand why it is that everything that lives must pay the penalty
+of its existence, first in living and then in dying. Thus the evil
+of the penalty accords with the evil of the sin--_malum poenae_ with
+_malum culpae_. From the same point of view we lose our indignation at
+that intellectual incapacity of the great majority of mankind which in
+life so often disgusts us. In this _Sansara_, as the Buddhists call
+it, human misery, human depravity and human folly correspond with one
+another perfectly, and they are of like magnitude. But if, on some
+special inducement, we direct our gaze to one of them, and survey it
+in particular, it seems to exceed the other two. This, however, is an
+illusion, and merely the effect of their colossal range.
+
+All things proclaim this _Sansara_; more than all else, the world of
+mankind; in which, from a moral point of view, villainy and baseness,
+and from an intellectual point of view, incapacity and stupidity,
+prevail to a horrifying extent. Nevertheless, there appear in
+it, although very spasmodically, and always as a fresh surprise,
+manifestations of honesty, of goodness, nay, even of nobility; and
+also of great intelligence, of the thinking mind of genius. They never
+quite vanish, but like single points of light gleam upon us out of the
+great dark mass. We must accept them as a pledge that this _Sansara_
+contains a good and redeeming principle, which is capable of breaking
+through and of filling and freeing the whole of it.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The readers of my _Ethics_ know that with me the ultimate foundation
+of morality is the truth which in the _Vedas_ and the _Vedanta_
+receives its expression in the established, mystical formula, _Tat
+twam asi (This is thyself_), which is spoken with reference to every
+living thing, be it man or beast, and is called the _Mahavakya_, the
+great word.
+
+Actions which proceed in accordance with this principle, such as those
+of the philanthropist, may indeed be regarded as the beginning of
+mysticism. Every benefit rendered with a pure intention proclaims that
+the man who exercises it acts in direct conflict with the world of
+appearance; for he recognises himself as identical with another
+individual, who exists in complete separation from him. Accordingly,
+all disinterested kindness is inexplicable; it is a mystery; and hence
+in order to explain it a man has to resort to all sorts of fictions.
+When Kant had demolished all other arguments for theism, he admitted
+one only, that it gave the best interpretation and solution of such
+mysterious actions, and of all others like them. He therefore allowed
+it to stand as a presumption unsusceptible indeed of theoretical
+proof, but valid from a practical point of view. I may, however,
+express my doubts whether he was quite serious about it. For to make
+morality rest on theism is really to reduce morality to egoism;
+although the English, it is true, as also the lowest classes of
+society with us, do not perceive the possibility of any other
+foundation for it.
+
+The above-mentioned recognition of a man's own true being in
+another individual objectively presented to him, is exhibited in a
+particularly beautiful and clear way in the cases in which a man,
+already destined to death beyond any hope of rescue, gives himself up
+to the welfare of others with great solicitude and zeal, and tries to
+save them. Of this kind is the well-known story of a servant who was
+bitten in a courtyard at night by a mad dog. In the belief that she
+was beyond hope, she seized the dog and dragged it into a stable,
+which she then locked, so that no one else might be bitten. Then again
+there is the incident in Naples, which Tischbein has immortalised in
+one of his _aquarelles_. A son, fleeing from the lava which is rapidly
+streaming toward the sea, is carrying his aged father on his back.
+When there is only a narrow strip of land left between the devouring
+elements, the father bids the son put him down, so that the son may
+save himself by flight, as otherwise both will be lost. The son obeys,
+and as he goes casts a glance of farewell on his father. This is the
+moment depicted. The historical circumstance which Scott represents
+in his masterly way in _The Heart of Midlothian_, chap, ii., is of a
+precisely similar kind; where, of two delinquents condemned to death,
+the one who by his awkwardness caused the capture of the other happily
+sets him free in the chapel by overpowering the guard after the
+execution-sermon, without at the same time making any attempt on his
+own behalf. Nay, in the same category must also be placed the scene
+which is represented in a common engraving, which may perhaps be
+objectionable to western readers--I mean the one in which a soldier,
+kneeling to be shot, is trying by waving a cloth to frighten away his
+dog who wants to come to him.
+
+In all these cases we see an individual in the face of his own
+immediate and certain destruction no longer thinking of saving
+himself, so that he may direct the whole of his efforts to saving some
+one else. How could there be a clearer expression of the consciousness
+that what is being destroyed is only a phenomenon, and that the
+destruction itself is only a phenomenon; that, on the other hand, the
+real being of the man who meets his death is untouched by that event,
+and lives on in the other man, in whom even now, as his action
+betrays, he so clearly perceives it to exist? For if this were not so,
+and it was his real being which was about to be annihilated, how could
+that being spend its last efforts in showing such an ardent sympathy
+in the welfare and continued existence of another?
+
+There are two different ways in which a man may become conscious
+of his own existence. On the one hand, he may have an empirical
+perception of it, as it manifests itself externally--something so
+small that it approaches vanishing point; set in a world which, as
+regards time and space, is infinite; one only of the thousand millions
+of human creatures who run about on this planet for a very brief
+period and are renewed every thirty years. On the other hand, by going
+down into the depths of his own nature, a man may become conscious
+that he is all in all; that, in fact, he is the only real being; and
+that, in addition, this real being perceives itself again in others,
+who present themselves from without, as though they formed a mirror of
+himself.
+
+Of these two ways in which a man may come to know what he is, the
+first grasps the phenomenon alone, the mere product of _the principle
+of individuation_; whereas the second makes a man immediately
+conscious that he is _the thing-in-itself_. This is a doctrine in
+which, as regards the first way, I have Kant, and as regards both, I
+have the _Vedas_, to support me.
+
+There is, it is true, a simple objection to the second method. It may
+be said to assume that one and the same being can exist in different
+places at the same time, and yet be complete in each of them.
+Although, from an empirical point of view, this is the most palpable
+impossibility--nay, absurdity--it is nevertheless perfectly true
+of the thing-in-itself. The impossibility and the absurdity of it,
+empirically, are only due to the forms which phenomena assume,
+in accordance with the principle of individuation. For the
+thing-in-itself, the will to live, exists whole and undivided in every
+being, even in the smallest, as completely as in the sum-total of all
+things that ever were or are or will be. This is why every being, even
+the smallest, says to itself, So long as I am safe, let the world
+perish--_dum ego salvus sim, pereat mundus_. And, in truth, even if
+only one individual were left in the world, and all the rest were to
+perish, the one that remained would still possess the whole self-being
+of the world, uninjured and undiminished, and would laugh at the
+destruction of the world as an illusion. This conclusion _per
+impossible_ may be balanced by the counter-conclusion, which is on all
+fours with it, that if that last individual were to be annihilated in
+and with him the whole world would be destroyed. It was in this sense
+that the mystic Angelas Silesius[1] declared that God could not live
+for a moment without him, and that if he were to be annihilated God
+must of necessity give up the ghost:
+
+  _Ich weiss dass ohne mich Gott nicht ein Nu kann leben;
+  Werd' ich zunicht, er muss von Noth den Geist aufgeben_.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--Angelus Silesius, see _Counsels and
+Maxims_, p. 39, note.]
+
+But the empirical point of view also to some extent enables us to
+perceive that it is true, or at least possible, that our self can
+exist in other beings whose consciousness is separated and different
+from our own. That this is so is shown by the experience of
+somnambulists. Although the identity of their ego is preserved
+throughout, they know nothing, when they awake, of all that a moment
+before they themselves said, did or suffered. So entirely is the
+individual consciousness a phenomenon that even in the same ego two
+consciousnesses can arise of which the one knows nothing of the other.
+
+
+
+
+GOVERNMENT.
+
+
+It is a characteristic failing of the Germans to look in the clouds
+for what lies at their feet. An excellent example of this is furnished
+by the treatment which the idea of _Natural Right_ has received at
+the hands of professors of philosophy. When they are called upon
+to explain those simple relations of human life which make up the
+substance of this right, such as Right and Wrong, Property, State,
+Punishment and so on, they have recourse to the most extravagant,
+abstract, remote and meaningless conceptions, and out of them build a
+Tower of Babel reaching to the clouds, and taking this or that form
+according to the special whim of the professor for the time being. The
+clearest and simplest relations of life, such as affect us directly,
+are thus made quite unintelligible, to the great detriment of the
+young people who are educated in such a school. These relations
+themselves are perfectly simple and easily understood--as the reader
+may convince himself if he will turn to the account which I have given
+of them in the _Foundation of Morality_, § 17, and in my chief work,
+bk. i., § 62. But at the sound of certain words, like Right, Freedom,
+the Good, Being--this nugatory infinitive of the cupola--and many
+others of the same sort, the German's head begins to swim, and falling
+straightway into a kind of delirium he launches forth into high-flown
+phrases which have no meaning whatever. He takes the most remote and
+empty conceptions, and strings them together artificially, instead of
+fixing his eyes on the facts, and looking at things and relations as
+they really are. It is these things and relations which supply the
+ideas of Right and Freedom, and give them the only true meaning that
+they possess.
+
+The man who starts from the preconceived opinion that the conception
+of Right must be a positive one, and then attempts to define it, will
+fail; for he is trying to grasp a shadow, to pursue a spectre, to
+search for what does not exist. The conception of Right is a negative
+one, like the conception of Freedom; its content is mere negation.
+It is the conception of Wrong which is positive; Wrong has the same
+significance as _injury_--_laesio_--in the widest sense of the term.
+An injury may be done either to a man's person or to his property or
+to his honour; and accordingly a man's rights are easy to define:
+every one has a right to do anything that injures no one else.
+
+To have a right to do or claim a thing means nothing more than to be
+able to do or take or vise it without thereby injuring any one else.
+_Simplex sigillum veri_. This definition shows how senseless many
+questions are; for instance, the question whether we have the right to
+take our own life, As far as concerns the personal claims which others
+may possibly have upon us, they are subject to the condition that we
+are alive, and fall to the ground when we die. To demand of a man, who
+does not care to live any longer for himself, that he should live
+on as a mere machine for the advantage of others is an extravagant
+pretension.
+
+Although men's powers differ, their rights are alike. Their rights do
+not rest upon their powers, because Right is of a moral complexion;
+they rest on the fact that the same will to live shows itself in
+every man at the same stage of its manifestation. This, however, only
+applies to that original and abstract Right, which a man possesses as
+a man. The property, and also the honour, which a man acquires for
+himself by the exercise of his powers, depend on the measure and kind
+of power which he possesses, and so lend his Right a wider sphere of
+application. Here, then, equality comes to an end. The man who is
+better equipped, or more active, increases by adding to his gains, not
+his Right, but the number of the things to which it extends.
+
+In my chief work[1] I have proved that the State in its essence is
+merely an institution existing for the purpose of protecting its
+members against outward attack or inward dissension. It follows from
+this that the ultimate ground on which the State is necessary is the
+acknowledged lack of Right in the human race. If Right were there, no
+one would think of a State; for no one would have any fear that his
+rights would be impaired; and a mere union against the attacks of wild
+beasts or the elements would have very little analogy with what we
+mean by a State. From this point of view it is easy to see how dull
+and stupid are the philosophasters who in pompous phrases represent
+that the State is the supreme end and flower of human existence. Such
+a view is the apotheosis of Philistinism.
+
+[Footnote 1: 1 Bk. ii., ch. xlvii.]
+
+If it were Right that ruled in the world, a man would have done enough
+in building his house, and would need no other protection than the
+right of possessing it, which would be obvious. But since Wrong is the
+order of the day, it is requisite that the man who has built his house
+should also be able to protect it. Otherwise his Right is _de
+facto_ incomplete; the aggressor, that is to say, has the right of
+might--_Faustrecht_; and this is just the conception of Right
+which Spinoza entertains. He recognises no other. His words are:
+_unusquisque tantum juris habet quantum potentia valet_;[1] each man
+has as much right as he has power. And again: _uniuscujusque jus
+potentia ejus definitur_; each man's right is determined by his
+power.[2] Hobbes seems to have started this conception of Right,[3]
+and he adds the strange comment that the Right of the good Lord to all
+things rests on nothing but His omnipotence.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Tract. Theol. Pol_., ch. ii., § 8.]
+
+[Footnote 2: _Ethics_, IV., xxxvii., 1.]
+
+[Footnote 3: Particularly in a passage in the _De Cive_, I, § 14.]
+
+Now this is a conception of Right which, both in theory and in
+practice, no longer prevails in the civic world; but in the world
+in general, though abolished in theory, it continues to apply in
+practice. The consequences of neglecting it may be seen in the case
+of China. Threatened by rebellion within and foes without, this great
+empire is in a defenceless state, and has to pay the penalty of having
+cultivated only the arts of peace and ignored the arts of war.
+
+There is a certain analogy between the operations of nature and those
+of man which is a peculiar but not fortuitous character, and is based
+on the identity of the will in both. When the herbivorous animals had
+taken their place in the organic world, beasts of prey made their
+appearance--necessarily a late appearance--in each species, and
+proceeded to live upon them. Just in the same way, as soon as by
+honest toil and in the sweat of their faces men have won from the
+ground what is needed for the support of their societies, a number of
+individuals are sure to arise in some of these societies, who, instead
+of cultivating the earth and living on its produce, prefer to take
+their lives in their hands and risk health and freedom by falling upon
+those who are in possession of what they have honestly earned, and by
+appropriating the fruits of their labour. These are the beasts of
+prey in the human race; they are the conquering peoples whom we find
+everywhere in history, from the most ancient to the most recent times.
+Their varying fortunes, as at one moment they succeed and at another
+fail, make up the general elements of the history of the world. Hence
+Voltaire was perfectly right when he said that the aim of all war is
+robbery. That those who engage in it are ashamed of their doings is
+clear by the fact that governments loudly protest their reluctance to
+appeal to arms except for purposes of self-defence. Instead of trying
+to excuse themselves by telling public and official lies, which are
+almost more revolting than war itself, they should take their stand,
+as bold as brass, on Macchiavelli's doctrine. The gist of it may be
+stated to be this: that whereas between one individual and another,
+and so far as concerns the law and morality of their relations,
+the principle, _Don't do to others what you wouldn't like done to
+yourself_, certainly applies, it is the converse of this principle
+which is appropriate in the case of nations and in politics: _What you
+wouldn't like done to yourself do to others_. If you do not want to
+be put under a foreign yoke, take time by the forelock, and put your
+neighbour under it himself; whenever, that is to say, his weakness
+offers you the opportunity. For if you let the opportunity pass, it
+will desert one day to the enemy's camp and offer itself there. Then
+your enemy will put you under his yoke; and your failure to grasp the
+opportunity may be paid for, not by the generation which was guilty of
+it, but by the next. This Macchiavellian principle is always a much
+more decent cloak for the lust of robbery than the rags of very
+obvious lies in a speech from the head of the State; lies, too, of a
+description which recalls the well-known story of the rabbit attacking
+the dog. Every State looks upon its neighbours as at bottom a horde of
+robbers, who will fall upon it as soon as they have the opportunity.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Between the serf, the farmer, the tenant, and the mortgagee, the
+difference is rather one of form than of substance. Whether the
+peasant belongs to me, or the land on which he has to get a living;
+whether the bird is mine, or its food, the tree or its fruit, is a
+matter of little moment; for, as Shakespeare makes Shylock say:
+
+                              _You take my life
+  When you do take the means whereby I live_.
+
+The free peasant has, indeed, the advantage that he can go off and
+seek his fortune in the wide world; whereas the serf who is attached
+to the soil, _glebae adscriptus_, has an advantage which is perhaps
+still greater, that when failure of crops or illness, old age or
+incapacity, render him helpless, his master must look after him, and
+so he sleeps well at night; whereas, if the crops fail, his master
+tosses about on his bed trying to think how he is to procure bread for
+his men. As long ago as Menander it was said that it is better to
+be the slave of a good master than to live miserably as a freeman.
+Another advantage possessed by the free is that if they have any
+talents they can improve their position; but the same advantage is not
+wholly withheld from the slave. If he proves himself useful to his
+master by the exercise of any skill, he is treated accordingly; just
+as in ancient Rome mechanics, foremen of workshops, architects, nay,
+even doctors, were generally slaves.
+
+Slavery and poverty, then, are only two forms, I might almost say only
+two names, of the same thing, the essence of which is that a man's
+physical powers are employed, in the main, not for himself but for
+others; and this leads partly to his being over-loaded with work, and
+partly to his getting a scanty satisfaction for his needs. For Nature
+has given a man only as much physical power as will suffice, if he
+exerts it in moderation, to gain a sustenance from the earth. No great
+superfluity of power is his. If, then, a not inconsiderable number of
+men are relieved from the common burden of sustaining the existence
+of the human race, the burden of the remainder is augmented, and they
+suffer. This is the chief source of the evil which under the name of
+slavery, or under the name of the proletariat, has always oppressed
+the great majority of the human race.
+
+But the more remote cause of it is luxury. In order, it may be said,
+that some few persons may have what is unnecessary, superfluous,
+and the product of refinement--nay, in order that they may satisfy
+artificial needs--a great part of the existing powers of mankind
+has to be devoted to this object, and therefore withdrawn from the
+production of what is necessary and indispensable. Instead of building
+cottages for themselves, thousands of men build mansions for a few.
+Instead of weaving coarse materials for themselves and their families,
+they make fine cloths, silk, or even lace, for the rich, and in
+general manufacture a thousand objects of luxury for their pleasure. A
+great part of the urban population consists of workmen who make these
+articles of luxury; and for them and those who give them work the
+peasants have to plough and sow and look after the flocks as well
+as for themselves, and thus have more labour than Nature originally
+imposed upon them. Moreover, the urban population devotes a great deal
+of physical strength, and a great deal of land, to such things as
+wine, silk, tobacco, hops, asparagus and so on, instead of to corn,
+potatoes and cattle-breeding. Further, a number of men are withdrawn
+from agriculture and employed in ship-building and seafaring, in order
+that sugar, coffee, tea and other goods may be imported. In short,
+a large part of the powers of the human race is taken away from the
+production of what is necessary, in order to bring what is superfluous
+and unnecessary within the reach of a few. As long therefore as luxury
+exists, there must be a corresponding amount of over-work and misery,
+whether it takes the name of poverty or of slavery. The fundamental
+difference between the two is that slavery originates in violence,
+and poverty in craft. The whole unnatural condition of society--the
+universal struggle to escape from misery, the sea-trade attended with
+so much loss of life, the complicated interests of commerce, and
+finally the wars to which it all gives rise--is due, only and alone,
+to luxury, which gives no happiness even to those who enjoy it, nay,
+makes them ill and bad-tempered. Accordingly it looks as if the most
+effective way of alleviating human misery would be to diminish luxury,
+or even abolish it altogether.
+
+There is unquestionably much truth in this train of thought. But the
+conclusion at which it arrives is refuted by an argument possessing
+this advantage over it--that it is confirmed by the testimony of
+experience. A certain amount of work is devoted to purposes of luxury.
+What the human race loses in this way in the _muscular power_ which
+would otherwise be available for the necessities of existence is
+gradually made up to it a thousandfold by the _nervous power_, which,
+in a chemical sense, is thereby released. And since the intelligence
+and sensibility which are thus promoted are on a higher level than the
+muscular irritability which they supplant, so the achievements of mind
+exceed those of the body a thousandfold. One wise counsel is worth the
+work of many hands:
+
+  [Greek: Hos en sophon bouleuma tas pollon cheiras nika.]
+
+A nation of nothing but peasants would do little in the way of
+discovery and invention; but idle hands make active heads. Science and
+the Arts are themselves the children of luxury, and they discharge
+their debt to it. The work which they do is to perfect technology in
+all its branches, mechanical, chemical and physical; an art which in
+our days has brought machinery to a pitch never dreamt of before, and
+in particular has, by steam and electricity, accomplished things the
+like of which would, in earlier ages, have been ascribed to the agency
+of the devil. In manufactures of all kinds, and to some extent in
+agriculture, machines now do a thousand times more than could ever
+have been done by the hands of all the well-to-do, educated, and
+professional classes, and could ever have been attained if all luxury
+had been abolished and every one had returned to the life of a
+peasant. It is by no means the rich alone, but all classes, who derive
+benefit from these industries. Things which in former days hardly
+any one could afford are now cheap and abundant, and even the lowest
+classes are much better off in point of comfort. In the Middle Ages a
+King of England once borrowed a pair of silk stockings from one of his
+lords, so that he might wear them in giving an audience to the French
+ambassador. Even Queen Elizabeth was greatly pleased and astonished to
+receive a pair as a New Year's present; to-day every shopman has them.
+Fifty years ago ladies wore the kind of calico gowns which servants
+wear now. If mechanical science continues to progress at the same
+rate for any length of time, it may end by saving human labour almost
+entirely, just as horses are even now being largely superseded by
+machines. For it is possible to conceive that intellectual culture
+might in some degree become general in the human race; and this would
+be impossible as long as bodily labour was incumbent on any great part
+of it. Muscular irritability and nervous sensibility are always and
+everywhere, both generally and particularly, in antagonism; for the
+simple reason that it is one and the same vital power which underlies
+both. Further, since the arts have a softening effect on character, it
+is possible that quarrels great and small, wars and duels, will vanish
+from the world; just as both have become much rarer occurrences.
+However, it is not my object here to write a _Utopia_.
+
+But apart from all this the arguments used above in favour of the
+abolition of luxury and the uniform distribution of all bodily labour
+are open to the objection that the great mass of mankind, always and
+everywhere, cannot do without leaders, guides and counsellors, in
+one shape or another, according to the matter in question; judges,
+governors, generals, officials, priests, doctors, men of learning,
+philosophers, and so on, are all a necessity. Their common task is to
+lead the race for the greater part so incapable and perverse, through
+the labyrinth of life, of which each of them according to his position
+and capacity has obtained a general view, be his range wide or narrow.
+That these guides of the race should be permanently relieved of all
+bodily labour as well as of all vulgar need and discomfort; nay,
+that in proportion to their much greater achievements they should
+necessarily own and enjoy more than the common man, is natural and
+reasonable. Great merchants should also be included in the same
+privileged class, whenever they make far-sighted preparations for
+national needs.
+
+The question of the sovereignty of the people is at bottom the same
+as the question whether any man can have an original right to rule
+a people against its will. How that proposition can be reasonably
+maintained I do not see. The people, it must be admitted, is
+sovereign; but it is a sovereign who is always a minor. It must have
+permanent guardians, and it can never exercise its rights itself,
+without creating dangers of which no one can foresee the end;
+especially as like all minors, it is very apt to become the sport of
+designing sharpers, in the shape of what are called demagogues.
+
+Voltaire remarks that the first man to become a king was a successful
+soldier. It is certainly the case that all princes were originally
+victorious leaders of armies, and for a long time it was as such that
+they bore sway. On the rise of standing armies princes began to regard
+their people as a means of sustaining themselves and their soldiers,
+and treated them, accordingly, as though they were a herd of cattle,
+which had to be tended in order that it might provide wool, milk, and
+meat. The why and wherefore of all this, as I shall presently show in
+detail, is the fact that originally it was not right, but might, that
+ruled in the world. Might has the advantage of having been the first
+in the field. That is why it is impossible to do away with it and
+abolish it altogether; it must always have its place; and all that a
+man can wish or ask is that it should be found on the side of right
+and associated with it. Accordingly says the prince to his subjects:
+"I rule you in virtue of the power which I possess. But, on the other
+hand, it excludes that of any one else, and I shall suffer none but
+my own, whether it comes from without, or arises within by one of you
+trying to oppress another. In this way, then, you are protected." The
+arrangement was carried out; and just because it was carried out the
+old idea of kingship developed with time and progress into quite a
+different idea, and put the other one in the background, where it may
+still be seen, now and then, flitting about like a spectre. Its place
+has been taken by the idea of the king as father of his people, as
+the firm and unshakable pillar which alone supports and maintains the
+whole organisation of law and order, and consequently the rights
+of every man.[1] But a king can accomplish this only by inborn
+prerogative which reserves authority to him and to him alone--an
+authority which is supreme, indubitable, and beyond all attack, nay,
+to which every one renders instinctive obedience. Hence the king is
+rightly said to rule "by the grace of God." He is always the most
+useful person in the State, and his services are never too dearly
+repaid by any Civil List, however heavy.
+
+[Footnote 1: We read in Stobaeus, _Florilegium_, ch. xliv., 41, of a
+Persian custom, by which, whenever a king died, there was a five days'
+anarchy, in order that people might perceive the advantage of having
+kings and laws.]
+
+But even as late a writer as Macchiavelli was so decidedly imbued with
+the earlier or mediaeval conception of the position of a prince that
+he treats it as a matter which is self-evident: he never discusses it,
+but tacitly takes it as the presupposition and basis of his advice.
+It may be said generally that his book is merely the theoretical
+statement and consistent and systematic exposition of the practice
+prevailing in his time. It is the novel statement of it in a complete
+theoretical form that lends it such a poignant interest. The same
+thing, I may remark in passing, applies to the immortal little work of
+La Rochefaucauld, who, however, takes private and not public life for
+his theme, and offers, not advice, but observations. The title of this
+fine little book is open, perhaps, to some objection: the contents are
+not, as a rule, either _maxims_ or _reflections_, but _aperçus_;
+and that is what they should be called. There is much, too, in
+Macchiavelli that will be found also to apply to private life.
+
+Right in itself is powerless; in nature it is Might that rules. To
+enlist might on the side of right, so that by means of it right
+may rule, is the problem of statesmanship. And it is indeed a hard
+problem, as will be obvious if we remember that almost every human
+breast is the seat of an egoism which has no limits, and is usually
+associated with an accumulated store of hatred and malice; so that
+at the very start feelings of enmity largely prevail over those of
+friendship. We have also to bear in mind that it is many millions of
+individuals so constituted who have to be kept in the bonds of law
+and order, peace and tranquillity; whereas originally every one had
+a right to say to every one else: _I am just as good as you are_! A
+consideration of all this must fill us with surprise that on the whole
+the world pursues its way so peacefully and quietly, and with so much
+law and order as we see to exist. It is the machinery of State which
+alone accomplishes it. For it is physical power alone which has any
+direct action on men; constituted as they generally are, it is for
+physical power alone that they have any feeling or respect.
+
+If a man would convince himself by experience that this is the case,
+he need do nothing but remove all compulsion from his fellows, and try
+to govern them by clearly and forcibly representing to them what
+is reasonable, right, and fair, though at the same time it may be
+contrary to their interests. He would be laughed to scorn; and as
+things go that is the only answer he would get. It would soon be
+obvious to him that moral force alone is powerless. It is, then,
+physical force alone which is capable of securing respect. Now this
+force ultimately resides in the masses, where it is associated with
+ignorance, stupidity and injustice. Accordingly the main aim of
+statesmanship in these difficult circumstances is to put physical
+force in subjection to mental force--to intellectual superiority, and
+thus to make it serviceable. But if this aim is not itself accompanied
+by justice and good intentions the result of the business, if it
+succeeds, is that the State so erected consists of knaves and fools,
+the deceivers and the deceived. That this is the case is made
+gradually evident by the progress of intelligence amongst the masses,
+however much it may be repressed; and it leads to revolution. But
+if, contrarily, intelligence is accompanied by justice and good
+intentions, there arises a State as perfect as the character of human
+affairs will allow. It is very much to the purpose if justice and
+good intentions not only exist, but are also demonstrable and openly
+exhibited, and can be called to account publicly, and be subject to
+control. Care must be taken, however, lest the resulting participation
+of many persons in the work of government should affect the unity of
+the State, and inflict a loss of strength and concentration on the
+power by which its home and foreign affairs have to be administered.
+This is what almost always happens in republics. To produce a
+constitution which should satisfy all these demands would accordingly
+be the highest aim of statesmanship. But, as a matter of fact,
+statesmanship has to consider other things as well. It has to reckon
+with the people as they exist, and their national peculiarities. This
+is the raw material on which it has to work, and the ingredients of
+that material will always exercise a great effect on the completed
+scheme.
+
+Statesmanship will have achieved a good deal if it so far attains its
+object as to reduce wrong and injustice in the community to a minimum.
+To banish them altogether, and to leave no trace of them, is merely
+the ideal to be aimed at; and it is only approximately that it can be
+reached. If they disappear in one direction, they creep in again in
+another; for wrong and injustice lie deeply rooted in human nature.
+Attempts have been made to attain the desired aim by artificial
+constitutions and systematic codes of law; but they are not in
+complete touch with the facts--they remain an asymptote, for the
+simple reason that hard and fast conceptions never embrace all
+possible cases, and cannot be made to meet individual instances. Such
+conceptions resemble the stones of a mosaic rather than the delicate
+shading in a picture. Nay, more: all experiments in this matter are
+attended with danger; because the material in question, namely, the
+human race, is the most difficult of all material to handle. It is
+almost as dangerous as an explosive.
+
+No doubt it is true that in the machinery of the State the freedom
+of the press performs the same function as a safety-valve in other
+machinery; for it enables all discontent to find a voice; nay, in
+doing so, the discontent exhausts itself if it has not much substance;
+and if it has, there is an advantage in recognising it betimes
+and applying the remedy. This is much better than to repress the
+discontent, and let it simmer and ferment, and go on increasing until
+it ends in an explosion. On the other hand, the freedom of the press
+may be regarded as a permission to sell poison--poison for the heart
+and the mind. There is no idea so foolish but that it cannot be put
+into the heads of the ignorant and incapable multitude, especially if
+the idea holds out some prospect of any gain or advantage. And when a
+man has got hold of any such idea what is there that he will not do?
+I am, therefore, very much afraid that the danger of a free press
+outweighs its utility, particularly where the law offers a way of
+redressing wrongs. In any case, however, the freedom of the press
+should be governed by a very strict prohibition of all and every
+anonymity.
+
+Generally, indeed, it may be maintained that right is of a nature
+analogous to that of certain chemical substances, which cannot be
+exhibited in a pure and isolated condition, but at the most only with
+a small admixture of some other substance, which serves as a vehicle
+for them, or gives them the necessary consistency; such as fluorine,
+or even alcohol, or prussic acid. Pursuing the analogy we may say that
+right, if it is to gain a footing in the world and really prevail,
+must of necessity be supplemented by a small amount of arbitrary
+force, in order that, notwithstanding its merely ideal and therefore
+ethereal nature, it may be able to work and subsist in the real and
+material world, and not evaporate and vanish into the clouds, as
+it does in Hesoid. Birth-right of every description, all heritable
+privileges, every form of national religion, and so on, may be
+regarded as the necessary chemical base or alloy; inasmuch as it is
+only when right has some such firm and actual foundation that it can
+be enforced and consistently vindicated. They form for right a sort of
+[Greek: os moi pou sto]--a fulcrum for supporting its lever.
+
+Linnaeus adopted a vegetable system of an artificial and arbitrary
+character. It cannot be replaced by a natural one, no matter how
+reasonable the change might be, or how often it has been attempted to
+make it, because no other system could ever yield the same certainty
+and stability of definition. Just in the same way the artificial and
+arbitrary basis on which, as has been shown, the constitution of
+a State rests, can never be replaced by a purely natural basis. A
+natural basis would aim at doing away with the conditions that have
+been mentioned: in the place of the privileges of birth it would put
+those of personal merit; in the place of the national religion, the
+results of rationalistic inquiry, and so on. However agreeable to
+reason this might all prove, the change could not be made; because a
+natural basis would lack that certainty and fixity of definition which
+alone secures the stability of the commonwealth. A constitution which
+embodied abstract right alone would be an excellent thing for natures
+other than human, but since the great majority of men are extremely
+egoistic, unjust, inconsiderate, deceitful, and sometimes even
+malicious; since in addition they are endowed with very scanty
+intelligence there arises the necessity for a power that shall be
+concentrated in one man, a power that shall be above all law and
+right, and be completely irresponsible, nay, to which everything shall
+yield as to something that is regarded as a creature of a higher
+kind, a ruler by the grace of God. It is only thus that men can be
+permanently held in check and governed.
+
+The United States of North America exhibit the attempt to proceed
+without any such arbitrary basis; that is to say, to allow abstract
+right to prevail pure and unalloyed. But the result is not attractive.
+For with all the material prosperity of the country what do we find?
+The prevailing sentiment is a base Utilitarianism with its inevitable
+companion, ignorance; and it is this that has paved the way for a
+union of stupid Anglican bigotry, foolish prejudice, coarse brutality,
+and a childish veneration of women. Even worse things are the order of
+the day: most iniquitous oppression of the black freemen, lynch law,
+frequent assassination often committed with entire impunity, duels of
+a savagery elsewhere unknown, now and then open scorn of all law and
+justice, repudiation of public debts, abominable political rascality
+towards a neighbouring State, followed by a mercenary raid on its rich
+territory,--afterwards sought to be excused, on the part of the chief
+authority of the State, by lies which every one in the country knew to
+be such and laughed at--an ever-increasing ochlocracy, and finally
+all the disastrous influence which this abnegation of justice in high
+quarters must have exercised on private morals. This specimen of a
+pure constitution on the obverse side of the planet says very little
+for republics in general, but still less for the imitations of it in
+Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia and Peru.
+
+A peculiar disadvantage attaching to republics--and one that might
+not be looked for--is that in this form of government it must be more
+difficult for men of ability to attain high position and exercise
+direct political influence than in the case of monarchies. For always
+and everywhere and under all circumstances there is a conspiracy, or
+instinctive alliance, against such men on the part of all the stupid,
+the weak, and the commonplace; they look upon such men as their
+natural enemies, and they are firmly held together by a common fear of
+them. There is always a numerous host of the stupid and the weak,
+and in a republican constitution it is easy for them to suppress and
+exclude the men of ability, so that they may not be outflanked by
+them. They are fifty to one; and here all have equal rights at the
+start.
+
+In a monarchy, on the other hand, this natural and universal league of
+the stupid against those who are possessed of intellectual advantages
+is a one-sided affair; it exists only from below, for in a monarchy
+talent and intelligence receive a natural advocacy and support from
+above. In the first place, the position of the monarch himself is
+much too high and too firm for him to stand in fear of any sort of
+competition. In the next place, he serves the State more by his will
+than by his intelligence; for no intelligence could ever be equal
+to all the demands that would in his case be made upon it. He is
+therefore compelled to be always availing himself of other men's
+intelligence. Seeing that his own interests are securely bound up with
+those of his country; that they are inseparable from them and one with
+them, he will naturally give the preference to the best men, because
+they are his most serviceable instruments, and he will bestow his
+favour upon them--as soon, that is, as he can find them; which is not
+so difficult, if only an honest search be made. Just in the same
+way even ministers of State have too much advantage over rising
+politicians to need to regard them with jealousy; and accordingly for
+analogous reasons they are glad to single out distinguished men and
+set them to work, in order to make use of their powers for themselves.
+It is in this way that intelligence has always under a monarchical
+government a much better chance against its irreconcilable and
+ever-present foe, stupidity; and the advantage which it gains is very
+great.
+
+In general, the monarchical form of government is that which is
+natural to man; just as it is natural to bees and ants, to a flight of
+cranes, a herd of wandering elephants, a pack of wolves seeking prey
+in common, and many other animals, all of which place one of their
+number at the head of the business in hand. Every business in which
+men engage, if it is attended with danger--every campaign, every
+ship at sea--must also be subject to the authority of one commander;
+everywhere it is one will that must lead. Even the animal organism is
+constructed on a monarchical principle: it is the brain alone which
+guides and governs, and exercises the hegemony. Although heart, lungs,
+and stomach contribute much more to the continued existence of the
+whole body, these philistines cannot on that account be allowed to
+guide and lead. That is a business which belongs solely to the brain;
+government must proceed from one central point. Even the solar system
+is monarchical. On the other hand, a republic is as unnatural as it
+is unfavourable to the higher intellectual life and the arts and
+sciences. Accordingly we find that everywhere in the world, and at all
+times, nations, whether civilised or savage, or occupying a position
+between the two, are always under monarchical government. The rule of
+many as Homer said, is not a good thing: let there be one ruler, one
+king;
+
+  [Greek: Ouk agathon polykoiraniae-eis koiranos esto
+  Eis basoleus.] [1]
+
+[Footnote 1: _Iliad_, ii., 204.]
+
+How would it be possible that, everywhere and at all times, we should
+see many millions of people, nay, even hundreds of millions, become
+the willing and obedient subjects of one man, sometimes even one
+woman, and provisionally, even, of a child, unless there were a
+monarchical instinct in men which drove them to it as the form of
+government best suited to them? This arrangement is not the product
+of reflection. Everywhere one man is king, and for the most part his
+dignity is hereditary. He is, as it were, the personification, the
+monogram, of the whole people, which attains an individuality in him.
+In this sense he can rightly say: _l'etat c'est moi_. It is precisely
+for this reason that in Shakespeare's historical plays the kings
+of England and France mutually address each other as _France_ and
+_England_, and the Duke of Austria goes by the name of his country. It
+is as though the kings regarded themselves as the incarnation of their
+nationalities. It is all in accordance with human nature; and for this
+very reason the hereditary monarch cannot separate his own welfare and
+that of his family from the welfare of his country; as, on the other
+hand, mostly happens when the monarch is elected, as, for instance, in
+the States of the Church.[1] The Chinese can conceive of a monarchical
+government only; what a republic is they utterly fail to understand.
+When a Dutch legation was in China in the year 1658, it was obliged to
+represent that the Prince of Orange was their king, as otherwise the
+Chinese would have been inclined to take Holland for a nest of pirates
+living without any lord or master.[2] Stobaeus, in a chapter in his
+_Florilegium_, at the head of which he wrote _That monarchy is best_,
+collected the best of the passages in which the ancients explained
+the advantages of that form of government. In a word, republics are
+unnatural and artificial; they are the product of reflection. Hence it
+is that they occur only as rare exceptions in the whole history of
+the world. There were the small Greek republics, the Roman and the
+Carthaginian; but they were all rendered possible by the fact that
+five-sixths, perhaps even seven-eighths, of the population consisted
+of slaves. In the year 1840, even in the United States, there were
+three million slaves to a population of sixteen millions. Then, again,
+the duration of the republics of antiquity, compared with that of
+monarchies, was very short. Republics are very easy to found, and
+very difficult to maintain, while with monarchies it is exactly the
+reverse. If it is Utopian schemes that are wanted, I say this: the
+only solution of the problem would be a despotism of the wise and the
+noble, of the true aristocracy and the genuine nobility, brought about
+by the method of generation--that is, by the marriage of the noblest
+men with the cleverest and most intellectual women. This is my Utopia,
+my Republic of Plato.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--The reader will recollect that
+Schopenhauer was writing long before the Papal territories were
+absorbed into the kingdom of Italy.]
+
+[Footnote 2: See Jean Nieuhoff, _L'Ambassade de la Compagnie Orientale
+des Provinces Unies vers L'Empereur de la Chine_, traduit par Jean le
+Charpentier à Leyde, 1665; ch. 45.]
+
+Constitutional kings are undoubtedly in much the same position as
+the gods of Epicurus, who sit upon high in undisturbed bliss and
+tranquillity, and do not meddle with human affairs. Just now they are
+the fashion. In every German duodecimo-principality a parody of the
+English constitution is set up, quite complete, from Upper and
+Lower Houses down to the Habeas Corpus Act and trial by jury. These
+institutions, which proceed from English character and English
+circumstances, and presuppose both, are natural and suitable to the
+English people. It is just as natural to the German people to be split
+up into a number of different stocks, under a similar number of ruling
+Princes, with an Emperor over them all, who maintains peace at home,
+and represents the unity of the State board. It is an arrangement
+which has proceeded from German character and German circumstances.
+I am of opinion that if Germany is not to meet with the same fate as
+Italy, it must restore the imperial crown, which was done away with
+by its arch-enemy, the first Napoleon; and it must restore it as
+effectively as possible. [1] For German unity depends on it, and
+without the imperial crown it will always be merely nominal, or
+precarious. But as we no longer live in the days of Günther of
+Schwarzburg, when the choice of Emperor was a serious business, the
+imperial crown ought to go alternately to Prussia and to Austria, for
+the life of the wearer. In any case, the absolute sovereignty of the
+small States is illusory. Napoleon I. did for Germany what Otto the
+Great did for Italy: he divided it into small, independent States, on
+the principle, _divide et impera_.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--Here, again, it is hardly necessary
+to say that Schopenhauer, who died in 1860, and wrote this passage at
+least some years previously, cannot be referring to any of the
+events which culminated in 1870. The whole passage forms a striking
+illustration of his political sagacity.]
+
+The English show their great intelligence, amongst other ways, by
+clinging to their ancient institutions, customs and usages, and by
+holding them sacred, even at the risk of carrying this tenacity too
+far, and making it ridiculous. They hold them sacred for the simple
+reason that those institutions and customs are not the invention of an
+idle head, but have grown up gradually by the force of circumstance
+and the wisdom of life itself, and are therefore suited to them as a
+nation. On the other hand, the German Michel[1] allows himself to be
+persuaded by his schoolmaster that he must go about in an English
+dress-coat, and that nothing else will do. Accordingly he has bullied
+his father into giving it to him; and with his awkward manners this
+ungainly creature presents in it a sufficiently ridiculous figure. But
+the dress-coat will some day be too tight for him and incommode him.
+It will not be very long before he feels it in trial by jury. This
+institution arose in the most barbarous period of the Middle Ages--the
+times of Alfred the Great, when the ability to read and write exempted
+a man from the penalty of death. It is the worst of all criminal
+procedures. Instead of judges, well versed in law and of great
+experience, who have grown grey in daily unravelling the tricks and
+wiles of thieves, murderers and rascals of all sorts, and so are well
+able to get at the bottom of things, it is gossiping tailors and
+tanners who sit in judgment; it is their coarse, crude, unpractised,
+and awkward intelligence, incapable of any sustained attention, that
+is called upon to find out the truth from a tissue of lies and deceit.
+All the time, moreover, they are thinking of their cloth and their
+leather, and longing to be at home; and they have absolutely no clear
+notion at all of the distinction between probability and certainty. It
+is with this sort of a calculus of probabilities in their stupid heads
+that they confidently undertake to seal a man's doom.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--It may be well to explain that
+"Michel" is sometimes used by the Germans as a nickname of their
+nation, corresponding to "John Bull" as a nickname of the English.
+Flügel in his German-English Dictionary declares that _der deutsche
+Michel_ represents the German nation as an honest, blunt, unsuspicious
+fellow, who easily allows himself to be imposed upon, even, he adds,
+with a touch of patriotism, "by those who are greatly his inferiors in
+point of strength and real worth."]
+
+The same remark is applicable to them which Dr. Johnson made of a
+court-martial in which he had little confidence, summoned to decide a
+very important case. He said that perhaps there was not a member of
+it who, in the whole course of his life, had ever spent an hour by
+himself in balancing probabilities.[1] Can any one imagine that the
+tailor and the tanner would be impartial judges? What! the vicious
+multitude impartial! as if partiality were not ten times more to be
+feared from men of the same class as the accused than from judges who
+knew nothing of him personally, lived in another sphere altogether,
+were irremovable, and conscious of the dignity of their office. But
+to let a jury decide on crimes against the State and its head, or on
+misdemeanours of the press, is in a very real sense to set the fox to
+keep the geese.
+
+[Footnote 1: Boswell's _Johnson_, 1780, set. 71.]
+
+Everywhere and at all times there has been much discontent with
+governments, laws and public regulations; for the most part, however,
+because men are always ready to make institutions responsible for the
+misery inseparable from human existence itself; which is, to speak
+mythically, the curse that was laid on Adam, and through him on the
+whole race. But never has that delusion been proclaimed in a more
+mendacious and impudent manner than by the demagogues of the
+_Jetstzeit_--of the day we live in. As enemies of Christianity, they
+are, of course, optimists: to them the world is its own end and
+object, and accordingly in itself, that is to say, in its own natural
+constitution, it is arranged on the most excellent principles, and
+forms a regular habitation of bliss. The enormous and glaring evils of
+the world they attribute wholly to governments: if governments, they
+think, were to do their duty, there would be a heaven upon earth; in
+other words, all men could eat, drink, propagate and die, free from
+trouble and want. This is what they mean when they talk of the world
+being "its own end and object"; this is the goal of that "perpetual
+progress of the human race," and the other fine things which they are
+never tired of proclaiming.
+
+Formerly it was _faith_ which was the chief support of the throne;
+nowadays it is _credit_. The Pope himself is scarcely more concerned
+to retain the confidence of the faithful than to make his creditors
+believe in his own good faith. If in times past it was the guilty debt
+of the world which was lamented, now it is the financial debts of the
+world which arouse dismay. Formerly it was the Last Day which was
+prophesied; now it is the [Greek: seisachtheia] the great repudiation,
+the universal bankruptcy of the nations, which will one day happen;
+although the prophet, in this as in the other case, entertains a firm
+hope that he will not live to see it himself.
+
+From an ethical and a rational point of view, the _right of
+possession_ rests upon an incomparably better foundation than the
+_right of birth_; nevertheless, the right of possession is allied with
+the right of birth and has come to be part and parcel of it, so that
+it would hardly be possible to abolish the right of birth without
+endangering the right of possession. The reason of this is that most
+of what a man possesses he inherited, and therefore holds by a kind of
+right of birth; just as the old nobility bear the names only of their
+hereditary estates, and by the use of those names do no more than give
+expression to the fact that they own the estates. Accordingly all
+owners of property, if instead of being envious they were wise, ought
+also to support the maintenance of the rights of birth.
+
+The existence of a nobility has, then, a double advantage: it helps to
+maintain on the one hand the rights of possession, and on the other
+the right of birth belonging to the king. For the king is the first
+nobleman in the country, and, as a general rule, he treats the
+nobility as his humble relations, and regards them quite otherwise
+than the commoners, however trusty and well-beloved. It is quite
+natural, too, that he should have more confidence in those whose
+ancestors were mostly the first ministers, and always the immediate
+associates, of his own. A nobleman, therefore, appeals with reason
+to the name he bears, when on the occurrence of anything to rouse
+distrust he repeats his assurance of fidelity and service to the king.
+A man's character, as my readers are aware, assuredly comes to him
+from his father. It is a narrow-minded and ridiculous thing not to
+consider whose son a man is.
+
+
+
+
+FREE-WILL AND FATALISM.
+
+
+No thoughtful man can have any doubt, after the conclusions reached in
+my prize-essay on _Moral Freedom_, that such freedom is to be sought,
+not anywhere in nature, but outside of it. The only freedom that
+exists is of a metaphysical character. In the physical world freedom
+is an impossibility. Accordingly, while our several actions are in no
+wise free, every man's individual character is to be regarded as a
+free act. He is such and such a man, because once for all it is his
+will to be that man. For the will itself, and in itself, and also in
+so far as it is manifest in an individual, and accordingly constitutes
+the original and fundamental desires of that individual, is
+independent of all knowledge, because it is antecedent to such
+knowledge. All that it receives from knowledge is the series of
+motives by which it successively develops its nature and makes itself
+cognisable or visible; but the will itself, as something that lies
+beyond time, and so long as it exists at all, never changes. Therefore
+every man, being what he is and placed in the circumstances which
+for the moment obtain, but which on their part also arise by strict
+necessity, can absolutely never do anything else than just what at
+that moment he does do. Accordingly, the whole course of a man's life,
+in all its incidents great and small, is as necessarily predetermined
+as the course of a clock.
+
+The main reason of this is that the kind of metaphysical free act
+which I have described tends to become a knowing consciousness--a
+perceptive intuition, which is subject to the forms of space and time.
+By means of those forms the unity and indivisibility of the act are
+represented as drawn asunder into a series of states and events,
+which are subject to the Principle of Sufficient Reason in its four
+forms--and it is this that is meant by _necessity_. But the result of
+it all assumes a moral complexion. It amounts to this, that by what we
+do we know what we are, and by what we suffer we know what we deserve.
+
+Further, it follows from this that a man's _individuality_ does not
+rest upon the principle of individuation alone, and therefore is not
+altogether phenomenal in its nature. On the contrary, it has its roots
+in the thing-in-itself, in the will which is the essence of each
+individual. The character of this individual is itself individual. But
+how deep the roots of individuality extend is one of the questions
+which I do not undertake to answer.
+
+In this connection it deserves to be mentioned that even Plato, in his
+own way, represented the individuality of a man as a free act.[1] He
+represented him as coming into the world with a given tendency, which
+was the result of the feelings and character already attaching to
+him in accordance with the doctrine of metempsychosis. The Brahmin
+philosophers also express the unalterable fixity of innate character
+in a mystical fashion. They say that Brahma, when a man is produced,
+engraves his doings and sufferings in written characters on his skull,
+and that his life must take shape in accordance therewith. They point
+to the jagged edges in the sutures of the skull-bones as evidence of
+this writing; and the purport of it, they say, depends on his previous
+life and actions. The same view appears to underlie the Christian, or
+rather, the Pauline, dogma of Predestination.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Phaedrus_ and _Laws, bk_. x.]
+
+But this truth, which is universally confirmed by experience, is
+attended with another result. All genuine merit, moral as well as
+intellectual, is not merely physical or empirical in its origin,
+but metaphysical; that is to say, it is given _a priori_ and not _a
+posteriori_; in other words, it lies innate and is not acquired,
+and therefore its source is not a mere phenomenon, but the
+thing-in-itself. Hence it is that every man achieves only that which
+is irrevocably established in his nature, or is born with him.
+Intellectual capacity needs, it is true, to be developed just as many
+natural products need to be cultivated in order that we may enjoy or
+use them; but just as in the case of a natural product no cultivation
+can take the place of original material, neither can it do so in the
+case of intellect. That is the reason why qualities which are merely
+acquired, or learned, or enforced--that is, qualities _a posteriori_,
+whether moral or intellectual--are not real or genuine, but
+superficial only, and possessed of no value. This is a conclusion of
+true metaphysics, and experience teaches the same lesson to all who
+can look below the surface. Nay, it is proved by the great importance
+which we all attach to such innate characteristics as physiognomy and
+external appearance, in the case of a man who is at all distinguished;
+and that is why we are so curious to see him. Superficial people, to
+be sure,--and, for very good reasons, commonplace people too,--will be
+of the opposite opinion; for if anything fails them they will thus be
+enabled to console themselves by thinking that it is still to come.
+
+The world, then, is not merely a battlefield where victory and defeat
+receive their due recompense in a future state. No! the world is
+itself the Last Judgment on it. Every man carries with him the reward
+and the disgrace that he deserves; and this is no other than the
+doctrine of the Brahmins and Buddhists as it is taught in the theory
+of metempsychosis.
+
+The question has been raised, What two men would do, who lived a
+solitary life in the wilds and met each other for the first time.
+Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Rousseau have given different answers.
+Pufendorf believed that they would approach each other as friends;
+Hobbes, on the contrary, as enemies; Rousseau, that they would pass
+each other by In silence. All three are both right and wrong. This
+is just a case in which the incalculable difference that there is in
+innate moral disposition between one individual and another would make
+its appearance. The difference is so strong that the question here
+raised might be regarded as the standard and measure of it. For there
+are men in whom the sight of another man at once rouses a feeling of
+enmity, since their inmost nature exclaims at once: That is not me!
+There are, others in whom the sight awakens immediate sympathy; their
+inmost nature says: _That is me over again_! Between the two there
+are countless degrees. That in this most important matter we are so
+totally different is a great problem, nay, a mystery.
+
+In regard to this _a priori_ nature of moral character there is matter
+for varied reflection in a work by Bastholm, a Danish writer, entitled
+_Historical Contributions to the Knowledge of Man in the Savage
+State_. He is struck by the fact that intellectual culture and moral
+excellence are shown to be entirely independent of each other,
+inasmuch as one is often found without the other. The reason of this,
+as we shall find, is simply that moral excellence in no wise springs
+from reflection, which is developed by intellectual culture, but
+from the will itself, the constitution of which is innate and not
+susceptible in itself of any improvement by means of education.
+Bastholm represents most nations as very vicious and immoral; and on
+the other hand he reports that excellent traits of character are found
+amongst some savage peoples; as, for instance, amongst the Orotchyses,
+the inhabitants of the island Savu, the Tunguses, and the Pelew
+islanders. He thus attempts to solve the problem, How it is that some
+tribes are so remarkably good, when their neighbours are all bad,
+
+It seems to me that the difficulty may be explained as follows: Moral
+qualities, as we know, are heritable, and an isolated tribe, such as
+is described, might take its rise in some one family, and ultimately
+in a single ancestor who happened to be a good man, and then maintain
+its purity. Is it not the case, for instance, that on many unpleasant
+occasions, such as repudiation of public debts, filibustering raids
+and so on, the English have often reminded the North Americans of
+their descent from English penal colonists? It is a reproach, however,
+which can apply only to a small part of the population.
+
+It is marvellous how _every man's individuality_ (that is to say, the
+union of a definite character with a definite intellect) accurately
+determines all his actions and thoughts down to the most unimportant
+details, as though it were a dye which pervaded them; and how, in
+consequence, one man's whole course of life, in other words, his inner
+and outer history, turns out so absolutely different from another's.
+As a botanist knows a plant in its entirety from a single leaf; as
+Cuvier from a single bone constructed the whole animal, so an accurate
+knowledge of a man's whole character may be attained from a single
+characteristic act; that is to say, he himself may to some extent
+be constructed from it, even though the act in question is of very
+trifling consequence. Nay, that is the most perfect test of all, for
+in a matter of importance people are on their guard; in trifles
+they follow their natural bent without much reflection. That is
+why Seneca's remark, that even the smallest things may be taken as
+evidence of character, is so true: _argumenta morum ex minimis quoque
+licet capere_.[1] If a man shows by his absolutely unscrupulous and
+selfish behaviour in small things that a sentiment of justice is
+foreign to his disposition, he should not be trusted with a penny
+unless on due security. For who will believe that the man who every
+day shows that he is unjust in all matters other than those which
+concern property, and whose boundless selfishness everywhere protrudes
+through the small affairs of ordinary life which are subject to
+no scrutiny, like a dirty shirt through the holes of a ragged
+jacket--who, I ask, will believe that such a man will act honourably
+in matters of _meum_ and _tuum_ without any other incentive but that
+of justice? The man who has no conscience in small things will be a
+scoundrel in big things. If we neglect small traits of character,
+we have only ourselves to blame if we afterwards learn to our
+disadvantage what this character is in the great affairs of life. On
+the same principle, we ought to break with so-called friends even in
+matters of trifling moment, if they show a character that is malicious
+or bad or vulgar, so that we may avoid the bad turn which only waits
+for an opportunity of being done us. The same thing applies to
+servants. Let it always be our maxim: Better alone than amongst
+traitors.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Ep_., 52.]
+
+Of a truth the first and foremost step in all knowledge of mankind is
+the conviction that a man's conduct, taken as a whole, and in all its
+essential particulars, is not governed by his reason or by any of the
+resolutions which he may make in virtue of it. No man becomes this or
+that by wishing to be it, however earnestly. His acts proceed from his
+innate and unalterable character, and they are more immediately and
+particularly determined by motives. A man's conduct, therefore, is the
+necessary product of both character and motive. It may be illustrated
+by the course of a planet, which is the result of the combined effect
+of the tangential energy with which it is endowed, and the centripetal
+energy which operates from the sun. In this simile the former energy
+represents character, and the latter the influence of motive. It is
+almost more than a mere simile. The tangential energy which properly
+speaking is the source of the planet's motion, whilst on the
+other hand the motion is kept in check by gravitation, is, from a
+metaphysical point of view, the will manifesting itself in that body.
+
+To grasp this fact is to see that we really never form anything more
+than a conjecture of what we shall do under circumstances which are
+still to happen; although we often take our conjecture for a resolve.
+When, for instance, in pursuance of a proposal, a man with the
+greatest sincerity, and even eagerness, accepts an engagement to do
+this or that on the occurrence of a certain future event, it is by
+no means certain that he will fulfil the engagement; unless he is so
+constituted that the promise which he gives, in itself and as such, is
+always and everywhere a motive sufficient for him, by acting upon him,
+through considerations of honour, like some external compulsion. But
+above and beyond this, what he will do on the occurrence of that event
+may be foretold from true and accurate knowledge of his character and
+the external circumstances under the influence of which he will fall;
+and it may with complete certainty be foretold from this alone. Nay,
+it is a very easy prophecy if he has been already seen in a like
+position; for he will inevitably do the same thing a second time,
+provided that on the first occasion he had a true and complete
+knowledge of the facts of the case. For, as I have often remarked, a
+final cause does not impel a man by being real, but by being known;
+_causa finalis non movet secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum esse
+cognitum_.[1] Whatever he failed to recognise or understand the first
+time could have no influence upon his will; just as an electric
+current stops when some isolating body hinders the action of the
+conductor. This unalterable nature of character, and the consequent
+necessity of our actions, are made very clear to a man who has not,
+on any given occasion, behaved as he ought to have done, by showing
+a lack either of resolution or endurance or courage, or some other
+quality demanded at the moment. Afterwards he recognises what it is
+that he ought to have done; and, sincerely repenting of his incorrect
+behaviour, he thinks to himself, _If the opportunity were offered to
+me again, I should act differently_. It is offered once more; the same
+occasion recurs; and to his great astonishment he does precisely the
+same thing over again.[2]
+
+[Footnote 1: Suarez, _Disp. Metaph_., xxiii.; §§7 and 8.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Cf. _World as Will_, ii., pp. 251 ff. _sqq_. (third
+edition).]
+
+The best examples of the truth in question are in every way furnished
+by Shakespeare's plays. It is a truth with which he was thoroughly
+imbued, and his intuitive wisdom expressed it in a concrete shape on
+every page. I shall here, however, give an instance of it in a case in
+which he makes it remarkably clear, without exhibiting any design or
+affectation in the matter; for he was a real artist and never set
+out from general ideas. His method was obviously to work up to the
+psychological truth which he grasped directly and intuitively,
+regardless of the fact that few would notice or understand it, and
+without the smallest idea that some dull and shallow fellows in
+Germany would one day proclaim far and wide that he wrote his works to
+illustrate moral commonplaces. I allude to the character of the Earl
+of Northumberland, whom we find in three plays in succession, although
+he does not take a leading part in any one of them; nay, he appears
+only in a few scenes distributed over fifteen acts. Consequently, if
+the reader is not very attentive, a character exhibited at such great
+intervals, and its moral identity, may easily escape his notice, even
+though it has by no means escaped the poet's. He makes the earl appear
+everywhere with a noble and knightly grace, and talk in language
+suitable to it; nay, he sometimes puts very beautiful and even
+elevated passages, into his mouth. At the same time he is very far
+from writing after the manner of Schiller, who was fond of painting
+the devil black, and whose moral approval or disapproval of the
+characters which he presented could be heard in their own words. With
+Shakespeare, and also with Goethe, every character, as long as he is
+on the stage and speaking, seems to be absolutely in the right, even
+though it were the devil himself. In this respect let the reader
+compare Duke Alba as he appears in Goethe with the same character in
+Schiller.
+
+We make the acquaintance of the Earl of Northumberland in the play of
+_Richard II_., where he is the first to hatch a plot against the King
+in favour of Bolingbroke, afterwards Henry IV., to whom he even offers
+some personal flattery (Act II., Sc. 3). In the following act he
+suffers a reprimand because, in speaking of the King he talks of him
+as "Richard," without more ado, but protests that he did it only for
+brevity's sake. A little later his insidious words induce the King to
+surrender. In the following act, when the King renounces the crown,
+Northumberland treats him with such harshness and contempt that the
+unlucky monarch is quite broken, and losing all patience once more
+exclaims to him: _Fiend, thou torment'st me ere I come to hell_! At
+the close, Northumberland announces to the new King that he has sent
+the heads of the former King's adherents to London.
+
+In the following tragedy, _Henry IV_., he hatches a plot against the
+new King in just the same way. In the fourth act we see the rebels
+united, making preparations for the decisive battle on the morrow, and
+only waiting impatiently for Northumberland and his division. At last
+there arrives a letter from him, saying that he is ill, and that he
+cannot entrust his force to any one else; but that nevertheless the
+others should go forward with courage and make a brave fight. They
+do so, but, greatly weakened by his absence, they are completely
+defeated; most of their leaders are captured, and his own son, the
+valorous Hotspur, falls by the hand of the Prince of Wales.
+
+Again, in the following play, the _Second Part of Henry IV_., we see
+him reduced to a state of the fiercest wrath by the death of his son,
+and maddened by the thirst for revenge. Accordingly he kindles another
+rebellion, and the heads of it assemble once more. In the fourth act,
+just as they are about to give battle, and are only waiting for him to
+join them, there comes a letter saying that he cannot collect a proper
+force, and will therefore seek safety for the present in Scotland;
+that, nevertheless, he heartily wishes their heroic undertaking the
+best success. Thereupon they surrender to the King under a treaty
+which is not kept, and so perish.
+
+So far is character from being the work of reasoned choice and
+consideration that in any action the intellect has nothing to do but
+to present motives to the will. Thereafter it looks on as a mere
+spectator and witness at the course which life takes, in accordance
+with the influence of motive on the given character. All the incidents
+of life occur, strictly speaking, with the same necessity as the
+movement of a clock. On this point let me refer to my prize-essay on
+_The Freedom of the Will_. I have there explained the true meaning and
+origin of the persistent illusion that the will is entirely free in
+every single action; and I have indicated the cause to which it is
+due. I will only add here the following teleological explanation of
+this natural illusion.
+
+Since every single action of a man's life seems to possess the freedom
+and originality which in truth only belong to his character as he
+apprehends it, and the mere apprehension of it by his intellect is
+what constitutes his career; and since what is original in every
+single action seems to the empirical consciousness to be always being
+performed anew, a man thus receives in the course of his career the
+strongest possible moral lesson. Then, and not before, he becomes
+thoroughly conscious of all the bad sides of his character. Conscience
+accompanies every act with the comment: _You should act differently_,
+although its true sense is: _You could be other than you are_. As the
+result of this immutability of character on the one hand, and, on the
+other, of the strict necessity which attends all the circumstances in
+which character is successively placed, every man's course of life
+is precisely determined from Alpha right through to Omega. But,
+nevertheless, one man's course of life turns out immeasurably happier,
+nobler and more worthy than another's, whether it be regarded from a
+subjective or an objective point of view, and unless we are to exclude
+all ideas of justice, we are led to the doctrine which is well
+accepted in Brahmanism and Buddhism, that the subjective conditions in
+which, as well as the objective conditions under which, every man is
+born, are the moral consequences of a previous existence.
+
+Macchiavelli, who seems to have taken no interest whatever in
+philosophical speculations, is drawn by the keen subtlety of his very
+unique understanding into the following observation, which possesses
+a really deep meaning. It shows that he had an intuitive knowledge of
+the entire necessity with which, characters and motives being given,
+all actions take place. He makes it at the beginning of the prologue
+to his comedy _Clitia_. _If_, he says, _the same men were to recur
+in the world in the way that the same circumstances recur, a hundred
+years would never elapse without our finding ourselves together once
+more, and doing the same things as we are doing now--Se nel mondo
+tornassino i medesimi uomini, como tornano i medesimi casi, non
+passarebbono mai cento anni che noi non ci trovassimo un altra volta
+insieme, a fare le medesime cose che hora_. He seems however to have
+been drawn into the remark by a reminiscence of what Augustine says in
+his _De Civitate Dei_, bk. xii., ch. xiii.
+
+Again, Fate, or the [Greek: eimarmenae] of the ancients, is nothing
+but the conscious certainty that all that happens is fast bound by a
+chain of causes, and therefore takes place with a strict necessity;
+that the future is already ordained with absolute certainty and can
+undergo as little alteration as the past. In the fatalistic myths of
+the ancients all that can be regarded as fabulous is the prediction
+of the future; that is, if we refuse to consider the possibility of
+magnetic clairvoyance and second sight. Instead of trying to explain
+away the fundamental truth of Fatalism by superficial twaddle and
+foolish evasion, a man should attempt to get a clear knowledge and
+comprehension of it; for it is demonstrably true, and it helps us in a
+very important way to an understanding of the mysterious riddle of
+our life. Predestination and Fatalism do not differ in the main. They
+differ only in this, that with Predestination the given character and
+external determination of human action proceed from a rational Being,
+and with Fatalism from an irrational one. But in either case the
+result is the same: that happens which must happen.
+
+On the other hand the conception of _Moral Freedom_ is inseparable
+from that of _Originality_. A man may be said, but he cannot be
+conceived, to be the work of another, and at the same time be free in
+respect of his desires and acts. He who called him into existence out
+of nothing in the same process created and determined his nature--in
+other words, the whole of his qualities. For no one can create without
+creating a something, that is to say, a being determined throughout
+and in all its qualities. But all that a man says and does necessarily
+proceeds from the qualities so determined; for it is only the
+qualities themselves set in motion. It is only some external impulse
+that they require to make their appearance. As a man is, so must he
+act; and praise or blame attaches, not to his separate acts, but to
+his nature and being.
+
+That is the reason why Theism and the moral responsibility of man are
+incompatible; because responsibility always reverts to the creator of
+man and it is there that it has its centre. Vain attempts have been
+made to make a bridge from one of these incompatibles to the other by
+means of the conception of moral freedom; but it always breaks down
+again. What is _free_ must also be _original_. If our will is _free_,
+our will is also _the original element_, and conversely. Pre-Kantian
+dogmatism tried to separate these two predicaments. It was thereby
+compelled to assume two kinds of freedom, one cosmological, of the
+first cause, and the other moral and theological, of human will. These
+are represented in Kant by the third as well as the fourth antimony of
+freedom.
+
+On the other hand, in my philosophy the plain recognition of the
+strictly necessary character of all action is in accordance with the
+doctrine that what manifests itself even in the organic and irrational
+world is _will_. If this were not so, the necessity under which
+irrational beings obviously act would place their action in conflict
+with will; if, I mean, there were really such a thing as the freedom
+of individual action, and this were not as strictly necessitated as
+every other kind of action. But, as I have just shown, it is this same
+doctrine of the necessary character of all acts of will which makes it
+needful to regard a man's existence and being as itself the work of
+his freedom, and consequently of his will. The will, therefore, must
+be self-existent; it must possess so-called _a-se-ity_. Under the
+opposite supposition all responsibility, as I have shown, would be at
+an end, and the moral like the physical world would be a mere machine,
+set in motion for the amusement of its manufacturer placed somewhere
+outside of it. So it is that truths hang together, and mutually
+advance and complete one another; whereas error gets jostled at every
+corner.
+
+What kind of influence it is that _moral instruction_ may exercise
+on conduct, and what are the limits of that influence, are questions
+which I have sufficiently examined in the twentieth section of my
+treatise on the _Foundation of Morality_. In all essential particulars
+an analogous influence is exercised by _example_, which, however, has
+a more powerful effect than doctrine, and therefore it deserves a
+brief analysis.
+
+In the main, example works either by restraining a man or by
+encouraging him. It has the former effect when it determines him to
+leave undone what he wanted to do. He sees, I mean, that other people
+do not do it; and from this he judges, in general, that it is not
+expedient; that it may endanger his person, or his property, or his
+honour.
+
+He rests content, and gladly finds himself relieved from examining
+into the matter for himself. Or he may see that another man, who has
+not refrained, has incurred evil consequences from doing it; this is
+example of the deterrent kind. The example which encourages a man
+works in a twofold manner. It either induces him to do what he would
+be glad to leave undone, if he were not afraid lest the omission might
+in some way endanger him, or injure him in others' opinion; or else it
+encourages him to do what he is glad to do, but has hitherto refrained
+from doing from fear of danger or shame; this is example of the
+seductive kind. Finally, example may bring a man to do what he would
+have otherwise never thought of doing. It is obvious that in this last
+case example works in the main only on the intellect; its effect on
+the will is secondary, and if it has any such effect, it is by the
+interposition of the man's own judgment, or by reliance on the person
+who presented the example.
+
+The whole influence of example--and it is very strong--rests on the
+fact that a man has, as a rule, too little judgment of his own, and
+often too little knowledge, o explore his own way for himself, and
+that he is glad, therefore, to tread in the footsteps of some one
+else. Accordingly, the more deficient he is in either of these
+qualities, the more is he open to the influence of example; and we
+find, in fact, that most men's guiding star is the example of others;
+that their whole course of life, in great things and in small, comes
+in the end to be mere imitation; and that not even in the pettiest
+matters do they act according to their own judgment. Imitation and
+custom are the spring of almost all human action. The cause of it
+is that men fight shy of all and any sort of reflection, and very
+properly mistrust their own discernment. At the same time this
+remarkably strong imitative instinct in man is a proof of his kinship
+with apes.
+
+But the kind of effect which example exercises depends upon a man's
+character, and thus it is that the same example may possibly seduce
+one man and deter another. An easy opportunity of observing this is
+afforded in the case of certain social impertinences which come into
+vogue and gradually spread. The first time that a man notices anything
+of the kind, he may say to himself: _For shame! how can he do it! how
+selfish and inconsiderate of him! really, I shall take care never to
+do anything like that_. But twenty others will think: _Aha! if he does
+that, I may do it too_.
+
+As regards morality, example, like doctrine, may, it is true, promote
+civil or legal amelioration, but not that inward amendment which is,
+strictly speaking, the only kind of moral amelioration. For example
+always works as a personal motive alone, and assumes, therefore,
+that a man is susceptible to this sort of motive. But it is just the
+predominating sensitiveness of a character to this or that sort of
+motive that determines whether its morality is true and real; though,
+of whatever kind it is, it is always innate. In general it may be said
+that example operates as a means of promoting the good and the bad
+qualities of a character, but it does not create them; and so it
+is that Seneca's maxim, _velle non discitur_--_will cannot be
+learned_--also holds good here. But the innateness of all truly moral
+qualities, of the good as of the bad, is a doctrine that consorts
+better with the metempsychosis of the Brahmins and Buddhists,
+according to which a man's good and bad deeds follow him from one
+existence to another like his shadow, than with Judaism. For Judaism
+requires a man to come into the world as a moral blank, so that, in
+virtue of an inconceivable free will, directed to objects which
+are neither to be sought nor avoided--_liberum arbitrium
+indifferentiae_--and consequently as the result of reasoned
+consideration, he may choose whether he is to be an angel or a devil,
+or anything else that may lie between the two. Though I am well aware
+what the Jewish scheme is, I pay no attention to it; for my standard
+is truth. I am no professor of philosophy, and therefore I do not find
+my vocation in establishing the fundamental ideas of Judaism at any
+cost, even though they for ever bar the way to all and every kind of
+philosophical knowledge. _Liberum arbitrium indifferentiae_ under
+the name of _moral freedom_ is a charming doll for professors of
+philosophy to dandle; and we must leave it to those intelligent,
+honourable and upright gentlemen.
+
+
+
+
+CHARACTER.
+
+
+Men who aspire to a happy, a brilliant and a long life, instead of to
+a virtuous one, are like foolish actors who want to be always having
+the great parts,--the parts that are marked by splendour and triumph.
+They fail to see that the important thing is not _what_ or _how much_,
+but _how_ they act.
+
+Since _a man does not alter_, and his _moral character_ remains
+absolutely the same all through his life; since he must play out the
+part which he has received, without the least deviation from the
+character; since neither experience, nor philosophy, nor religion
+can effect any improvement in him, the question arises, What is the
+meaning of life at all? To what purpose is it played, this farce
+in which everything that is essential is irrevocably fixed and
+determined?
+
+It is played that a man may come to understand himself, that he may
+see what it is that he seeks and has sought to be; what he wants, and
+what, therefore, he is. _This is a knowledge which must be imparted
+to him from without_. Life is to man, in other words, to will, what
+chemical re-agents are to the body: it is only by life that a man
+reveals what he is, and it is only in so far as he reveals himself
+that he exists at all. Life is the manifestation of character, of the
+something that we understand by that word; and it is not in life, but
+outside of it, and outside time, that character undergoes alteration,
+as a result of the self-knowledge which life gives. Life is only
+the mirror into which a man gazes not in order that he may get a
+reflection of himself, but that he may come to understand himself by
+that reflection; that he may see _what_ it is that the mirror shows.
+Life is the proof sheet, in which the compositors' errors are brought
+to light. How they become visible, and whether the type is large or
+small, are matters of no consequence. Neither in the externals of life
+nor in the course of history is there any significance; for as it is
+all one whether an error occurs in the large type or in the small, so
+it is all one, as regards the essence of the matter, whether an evil
+disposition is mirrored as a conqueror of the world or a common
+swindler or ill-natured egoist. In one case he is seen of all men; in
+the other, perhaps only of himself; but that he should see himself is
+what signifies.
+
+Therefore if egoism has a firm hold of a man and masters him, whether
+it be in the form of joy, or triumph, or lust, or hope, or frantic
+grief, or annoyance, or anger, or fear, or suspicion, or passion of
+any kind--he is in the devil's clutches and how he got into them does
+not matter. What is needful is that he should make haste to get out of
+them; and here, again, it does not matter how.
+
+I have described _character_ as _theoretically_ an act of will lying
+beyond time, of which life in time, or _character in action_, is the
+development. For matters of practical life we all possess the one as
+well as the other; for we are constituted of them both. Character
+modifies our life more than we think, and it is to a certain extent
+true that every man is the architect of his own fortune. No doubt it
+seems as if our lot were assigned to us almost entirely from without,
+and imparted to us in something of the same way in which a melody
+outside us reaches the ear. But on looking back over our past, we see
+at once that our life consists of mere variations on one and the same
+theme, namely, our character, and that the same fundamental bass
+sounds through it all. This is an experience which a man can and must
+make in and by himself.
+
+Not only a man's life, but his intellect too, may be possessed of a
+clear and definite character, so far as his intellect is applied to
+matters of theory. It is not every man, however, who has an intellect
+of this kind; for any such definite individuality as I mean is
+genius--an original view of the world, which presupposes an absolutely
+exceptional individuality, which is the essence of genius. A man's
+intellectual character is the theme on which all his works are
+variations. In an essay which I wrote in Weimar I called it the knack
+by which every genius produces his works, however various. This
+intellectual character determines the physiognomy of men of
+genius--what I might call _the theoretical physiognomy_--and gives it
+that distinguished expression which is chiefly seen in the eyes and
+the forehead. In the case of ordinary men the physiognomy presents no
+more than a weak analogy with the physiognomy of genius. On the other
+hand, all men possess _the practical physiognomy_, the stamp of will,
+of practical character, of moral disposition; and it shows itself
+chiefly in the mouth.
+
+Since character, so far as we understand its nature, is above and
+beyond time, it cannot undergo any change under the influence of life.
+But although it must necessarily remain the same always, it requires
+time to unfold itself and show the very diverse aspects which it may
+possess. For character consists of two factors: one, the will-to-live
+itself, blind impulse, so-called impetuosity; the other, the restraint
+which the will acquires when it comes to understand the world; and the
+world, again, is itself will. A man may begin by following the craving
+of desire, until he comes to see how hollow and unreal a thing is
+life, how deceitful are its pleasures, what horrible aspects it
+possesses; and this it is that makes people hermits, penitents,
+Magdalenes. Nevertheless it is to be observed that no such change
+from a life of great indulgence in pleasure to one of resignation is
+possible, except to the man who of his own accord renounces pleasure.
+A really bad life cannot be changed into a virtuous one. The most
+beautiful soul, before it comes to know life from its horrible side,
+may eagerly drink the sweets of life and remain innocent. But it
+cannot commit a bad action; it cannot cause others suffering to do
+a pleasure to itself, for in that case it would see clearly what
+it would be doing; and whatever be its youth and inexperience it
+perceives the sufferings of others as clearly as its own pleasures.
+That is why one bad action is a guarantee that numberless others will
+be committed as soon as circumstances give occasion for them. Somebody
+once remarked to me, with entire justice, that every man had something
+very good and humane in his disposition, and also something very bad
+and malignant; and that according as he was moved one or the other of
+them made its appearance. The sight of others' suffering arouses, not
+only in different men, but in one and the same man, at one moment an
+inexhaustible sympathy, at another a certain satisfaction; and this
+satisfaction may increase until it becomes the cruellest delight in
+pain. I observe in myself that at one moment I regard all mankind with
+heartfelt pity, at another with the greatest indifference, on occasion
+with hatred, nay, with a positive enjoyment of their pain.
+
+All this shows very clearly that we are possessed of two different,
+nay, absolutely contradictory, ways of regarding the world: one
+according to the principle of individuation, which exhibits all
+creatures as entire strangers to us, as definitely not ourselves. We
+can have no feelings for them but those of indifference, envy, hatred,
+and delight that they suffer. The other way of regarding the world
+is in accordance with what I may call the
+_Tat-twam-asi_--_this-is-thyself_ principle. All creatures are
+exhibited as identical with ourselves; and so it is pity and love
+which the sight of them arouses.
+
+The one method separates individuals by impassable barriers; the other
+removes the barrier and brings the individuals together. The one makes
+us feel, in regard to every man, _that is what I am_; the other,
+_that is not what I am_. But it is remarkable that while the sight of
+another's suffering makes us feel our identity with him, and arouses
+our pity, this is not so with the sight of another's happiness. Then
+we almost always feel some envy; and even though we may have no such
+feeling in certain cases,--as, for instance, when our friends are
+happy,--yet the interest which we take in their happiness is of a weak
+description, and cannot compare with the sympathy which we feel with
+their suffering. Is this because we recognise all happiness to be a
+delusion, or an impediment to true welfare? No! I am inclined to think
+that it is because the sight of the pleasure, or the possessions,
+which are denied to us, arouses envy; that is to say, the wish that
+we, and not the other, had that pleasure or those possessions.
+
+It is only the first way of looking at the world which is founded on
+any demonstrable reason. The other is, as it were, the gate out of
+this world; it has no attestation beyond itself, unless it be the very
+abstract and difficult proof which my doctrine supplies. Why the first
+way predominates in one man, and the second in another--though perhaps
+it does not exclusively predominate in any man; why the one or the
+other emerges according as the will is moved--these are deep problems.
+The paths of night and day are close together:
+
+  [Greek: Engus gar nuktos de kai aematos eisi keleuthoi.]
+
+It is a fact that there is a great and original difference between
+one empirical character and another; and it is a difference which,
+at bottom, rests upon the relation of the individual's will to his
+intellectual faculty. This relation is finally determined by the
+degree of will in his father and of intellect in his mother; and the
+union of father and mother is for the most part an affair of chance.
+This would all mean a revolting injustice in the nature of the
+world, if it were not that the difference between parents and son is
+phenomenal only and all chance is, at bottom, necessity.
+
+As regards the freedom of the will, if it were the case that the will
+manifested itself in a single act alone, it would be a free act. But
+the will manifests itself in a course of life, that is to say, in a
+series of acts. Every one of these acts, therefore, is determined as
+a part of a complete whole, and cannot happen otherwise than it does
+happen. On the other hand, the whole series is free; it is simply the
+manifestation of an individualised will.
+
+If a man feels inclined to commit a bad action and refrains, he is
+kept back either (1) by fear of punishment or vengeance; or (2) by
+superstition in other words, fear of punishment in a future life; or
+(3) by the feeling of sympathy, including general charity; or (4) by
+the feeling of honour, in other words, the fear of shame; or (5) by
+the feeling of justice, that is, an objective attachment to fidelity
+and good-faith, coupled with a resolve to hold them sacred, because
+they are the foundation of all free intercourse between man and
+man, and therefore often of advantage to himself as well. This last
+thought, not indeed as a thought, but as a mere feeling, influences
+people very frequently. It is this that often compels a man of honour,
+when some great but unjust advantage is offered him, to reject it with
+contempt and proudly exclaim: _I am an honourable man_! For otherwise
+how should a poor man, confronted with the property which chance or
+even some worse agency has bestowed on the rich, whose very existence
+it is that makes him poor, feel so much sincere respect for this
+property, that he refuses to touch it even in his need; and although
+he has a prospect of escaping punishment, what other thought is it
+that can be at the bottom of such a man's honesty? He is resolved not
+to separate himself from the great community of honourable people
+who have the earth in possession, and whose laws are recognised
+everywhere. He knows that a single dishonest act will ostracise and
+proscribe him from that society for ever. No! a man will spend money
+on any soil that yields him good fruit, and he will make sacrifices
+for it.
+
+With a good action,--that, every action in which a man's own advantage
+is ostensibly subordinated to another's,--the motive is either (1)
+self-interest, kept in the background; or (2) superstition, in other
+words, self-interest in the form of reward in another life; or (3)
+sympathy; or (4) the desire to lend a helping hand, in other words,
+attachment to the maxim that we should assist one another in need, and
+the wish to maintain this maxim, in view of the presumption that some
+day we ourselves may find it serve our turn. For what Kant calls a
+good action done from motives of duty and for the sake of duty, there
+is, as will be seen, no room at all. Kant himself declares it to be
+doubtful whether an action was ever determined by pure motives of duty
+alone. I affirm most certainly that no action was ever so done; it is
+mere babble; there is nothing in it that could really act as a motive
+to any man. When he shelters himself behind verbiage of that sort, he
+is always actuated by one of the four motives which I have described.
+Among these it is obviously sympathy alone which is quite genuine and
+sincere.
+
+_Good_ and _bad_ apply to character only _à potiori_; that is to say,
+we prefer the good to the bad; but, absolutely, there is no such
+distinction. The difference arises at the point which lies between
+subordinating one's own advantage to that of another, and not
+subordinating it. If a man keeps to the exact middle, he is _just_.
+But most men go an inch in their regard for others' welfare to twenty
+yards in regard for their own.
+
+The source of _good_ and of _bad character_, so far as we have any
+real knowledge of it, lies in this, that with the bad character the
+thought of the external world, and especially of the living creatures
+in it, is accompanied--all the more, the greater the resemblance
+between them and the individual self--by a constant feeling of _not I,
+not I, not I_.
+
+Contrarily, with the good character (both being assumed to exist in
+a high degree) the same thought has for its accompaniment, like a
+fundamental bass, a constant feeling of _I, I, I_. From this spring
+benevolence and a disposition to help all men, and at the same time a
+cheerful, confident and tranquil frame of mind, the opposite of that
+which accompanies the bad character.
+
+The difference, however, is only phenomenal, although it is a
+difference which is radical. But now we come to _the hardest of all
+problems_: How is it that, while the will, as the thing-in-itself, is
+identical, and from a metaphysical point of view one and the same
+in all its manifestations, there is nevertheless such an enormous
+difference between one character and another?--the malicious,
+diabolical wickedness of the one, and set off against it, the goodness
+of the other, showing all the more conspicuously. How is it that we
+get a Tiberius, a Caligula, a Carcalla, a Domitian, a Nero; and on the
+other hand, the Antonines, Titus, Hadrian, Nerva? How is it that among
+the animals, nay, in a higher species, in individual animals, there is
+a like difference?--the malignity of the cat most strongly developed
+in the tiger; the spite of the monkey; on the other hand, goodness,
+fidelity and love in the dog and the elephant. It is obvious that the
+principle of wickedness in the brute is the same as in man.
+
+We may to some extent modify the difficulty of the problem by
+observing that the whole difference is in the end only one of degree.
+In every living creature, the fundamental propensities and instincts
+all exist, but they exist in very different degrees and proportions.
+This, however, is not enough to explain the facts.
+
+We must fall back upon the intellect and its relation to the will; it
+is the only explanation that remains. A man's intellect, however, by
+no means stands in any direct and obvious relation with the goodness
+of his character. We may, it is true, discriminate between two kinds
+of intellect: between understanding, as the apprehension of relation
+in accordance with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and cognition,
+a faculty akin to genius, which acts more directly, is independent of
+this law, and passes beyond the Principle of Individuation. The latter
+is the faculty which apprehends Ideas, and it is the faculty which
+has to do with morality. But even this explanation leaves much to
+be desired. _Fine minds are seldom fine souls_ was the correct
+observation of Jean Paul; although they are never the contrary. Lord
+Bacon, who, to be sure, was less a fine soul than a fine mind, was a
+scoundrel.
+
+I have declared space and time to be part of the Principle of
+Individuation, as it is only space and time that make the multiplicity
+of similar objects a possibility. But multiplicity itself also admits
+of variety; multiplicity and diversity are not only quantitative, but
+also qualitative. How is it that there is such a thing as qualitative
+diversity, especially in ethical matters? Or have I fallen into an
+error the opposite of that in which Leibnitz fell with his _identitas
+indiscernibilium_?
+
+The chief cause of intellectual diversity is to be found in the
+brain and nervous system. This is a fact which somewhat lessens the
+obscurity of the subject. With the brutes the intellect and the brain
+are strictly adapted to their aims and needs. With man alone there
+is now and then, by way of exception, a superfluity, which, if it is
+abundant, may yield genius. But ethical diversity, it seems, proceeds
+immediately from the will. Otherwise ethical character would not be
+above and beyond time, as it is only in the individual that intellect
+and will are united. The will is above and beyond time, and eternal;
+and character is innate; that is to say, it is sprung from the same
+eternity, and therefore it does not admit of any but a transcendental
+explanation.
+
+Perhaps some one will come after me who will throw light into this
+dark abyss.
+
+
+
+
+MORAL INSTINCT.
+
+
+An act done by instinct differs from every other kind of act in that
+an understanding of its object does not precede it but follows upon
+it. Instinct is therefore a rule of action given _à priori_. We may be
+unaware of the object to which it is directed, as no understanding of
+it is necessary to its attainment. On the other hand, if an act is
+done by an exercise of reason or intelligence, it proceeds according
+to a rule which the understanding has itself devised for the purpose
+of carrying out a preconceived aim. Hence it is that action according
+to rule may miss its aim, while instinct is infallible.
+
+On the _à priori_ character of instinct we may compare what Plato says
+in the _Philebus_. With Plato instinct is a reminiscence of something
+which a man has never actually experienced in his lifetime; in the
+same way as, in the _Phaedo_ and elsewhere, everything that a man
+learns is regarded as a reminiscence. He has no other word to express
+the _à priori_ element in all experience.
+
+There are, then, three things that are _à priori_:
+
+(1) Theoretical Reason, in other words, the conditions which make all
+experience possible.
+
+(2) Instinct, or the rule by which an object promoting the life of the
+senses may, though unknown, be attained.
+
+(3) The Moral Law, or the rule by which an action takes place without
+any object.
+
+Accordingly rational or intelligent action proceeds by a rule laid
+down in accordance with the object as it is understood. Instinctive
+action proceeds by a rule without an understanding of the object of
+it. Moral action proceeds by a rule without any object at all.
+
+_Theoretical Reason_ is the aggregate of rules in accordance
+with which all my knowledge--that is to say, the whole world of
+experience--necessarily proceeds. In the same manner _Instinct_ is the
+aggregate of rules in accordance with which all my action necessarily
+proceeds if it meets with no obstruction. Hence it seems to me that
+Instinct may most appropriately be called _practical reason_, for like
+theoretical reason it determines the _must_ of all experience.
+
+The so-called moral law, on the other hand, is only one aspect of _the
+better consciousness_, the aspect which it presents from the point of
+view of instinct. This better consciousness is something lying beyond
+all experience, that is, beyond all reason, whether of the theoretical
+or the practical kind, and has nothing to do with it; whilst it is in
+virtue of the mysterious union of it and reason in the same individual
+that the better consciousness comes into conflict with reason, leaving
+the individual to choose between the two.
+
+In any conflict between the better consciousness and reason, if the
+individual decides for reason, should it be theoretical reason, he
+becomes a narrow, pedantic philistine; should it be practical, a
+rascal.
+
+If he decides for the better consciousness, we can make no further
+positive affirmation about him, for if we were to do so, we should
+find ourselves in the realm of reason; and as it is only what takes
+place within this realm that we can speak of at all it follows that we
+cannot speak of the better consciousness except in negative terms.
+
+This shows us how it is that reason is hindered and obstructed;
+that _theoretical reason_ is suppressed in favour of _genius_, and
+_practical reason_ in favour of _virtue_. Now the better consciousness
+is neither theoretical nor practical; for these are distinctions that
+only apply to reason. But if the individual is in the act of choosing,
+the better consciousness appears to him in the aspect which it assumes
+in vanquishing and overcoming the practical reason (or instinct, to
+use the common word). It appears to him as an imperative command, an
+_ought_. It so appears to him, I say; in other words, that is the
+shape which it takes for the theoretical reason which renders
+all things into objects and ideas. But in so far as the better
+consciousness desires to vanquish and overcome the theoretical reason,
+it takes no shape at all; on the simple ground that, as it comes
+into play, the theoretical reason is suppressed and becomes the mere
+servant of the better consciousness. That is why genius can never give
+any account of its own works.
+
+In the morality of action, the legal principle that both sides are to
+be heard must not be allowed to apply; in other words, the claims of
+self and the senses must not be urged. Nay, on the contrary, as soon
+as the pure will has found expression, the case is closed; _nec
+audienda altera pars_.
+
+The lower animals are not endowed with moral freedom. Probably this is
+not because they show no trace of the better consciousness which in us
+is manifested as morality, or nothing analogous to it; for, if that
+were so, the lower animals, which are in so many respects like
+ourselves in outward appearance that we regard man as a species of
+animal, would possess some _raison d'être_ entirely different from our
+own, and actually be, in their essential and inmost nature, something
+quite other than ourselves. This is a contention which is obviously
+refuted by the thoroughly malignant and inherently vicious character
+of certain animals, such as the crocodile, the hyaena, the scorpion,
+the snake, and the gentle, affectionate and contented character of
+others, such as the dog. Here, as in the case of men, the character,
+as it is manifested, must rest upon something that is above and beyond
+time. For, as Jacob Böhme says,[1] _there is a power in every animal
+which is indestructible, and the spirit of the world draws it into
+itself, against the final separation at the Last Judgment_. Therefore
+we cannot call the lower animals free, and the reason why we cannot
+do so is that they are wanting in a faculty which is profoundly
+subordinate to the better consciousness in its highest phase, I mean
+reason. Reason is the faculty of supreme comprehension, the idea of
+totality. How reason manifests itself in the theoretical sphere Kant
+has shown, and it does the same in the practical: it makes us capable
+of observing and surveying the whole of our life, thought, and action,
+in continual connection, and therefore of acting according to general
+maxims, whether those maxims originate in the understanding as
+prudential rules, or in the better consciousness as moral laws.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Epistles_, 56.]
+
+If any desire or passion is aroused in us, we, and in the same way the
+lower animals, are for the moment filled with this desire; we are all
+anger, all lust, all fear; and in such moments neither the better
+consciousness can speak, nor the understanding consider the
+consequences. But in our case reason allows us even at that moment
+to see our actions and our life as an unbroken chain,--a chain
+which connects our earlier resolutions, or, it may be, the future
+consequences of our action, with the moment of passion which now fills
+our whole consciousness. It shows us the identity of our person, even
+when that person is exposed to influences of the most varied kind, and
+thereby we are enabled to act according to maxims. The lower animal
+is wanting in this faculty; the passion which seizes it completely
+dominates it, and can be checked only by another passion--anger, for
+instance, or lust, by fear; even though the vision that terrifies does
+not appeal to the senses, but is present in the animal only as a dim
+memory and imagination. Men, therefore, may be called irrational, if,
+like the lower animals, they allow themselves to be determined by the
+moment.
+
+So far, however, is reason from being the source of morality that it
+is reason alone which makes us capable of being rascals, which the
+lower animals cannot be. It is reason which enables us to form an evil
+resolution and to keep it when the provocation to evil is removed; it
+enables us, for example, to nurse vengeance. Although at the moment
+that we have an opportunity of fulfilling our resolution the better
+consciousness may manifest itself as love or charity, it is by force
+of reason, in pursuance of some evil maxim, that we act against it.
+Thus Goethe says that a man may use his reason only for the purpose of
+being more bestial than any beast:
+
+  _Er hat Vernunft, doch braucht er sie allein
+  Um theirischer als jedes Thier zu sein_.
+
+For not only do we, like the beasts, satisfy the desires of the
+moment, but we refine upon them and stimulate them in order to prepare
+the desire for the satisfaction.
+
+Whenever we think that we perceive a trace of reason in the lower
+animals, it fills us with surprise. Now our surprise is not excited by
+the good and affectionate disposition which some of them exhibit--we
+recognise that as something other than reason--but by some action in
+them which seems to be determined not by the impression of the moment,
+but by a resolution previously made and kept. Elephants, for instance,
+are reported to have taken premeditated revenge for insults long after
+they were suffered; lions, to have requited benefits on an opportunity
+tardily offered. The truth of such stories has, however, no bearing at
+all on the question, What do we mean by reason? But they enable us to
+decide whether in the lower animals there is any trace of anything
+that we can call reason.
+
+Kant not only declares that all our moral sentiments originate in
+reason, but he lays down that reason, _in my sense of the word_, is
+a condition of moral action; as he holds that for an action to be
+virtuous and meritorious it must be done in accordance with maxims,
+and not spring from a resolve taken under some momentary impression.
+But in both contentions he is wrong. If I resolve to take vengeance on
+some one, and when an opportunity offers, the better consciousness in
+the form of love and humanity speaks its word, and I am influenced by
+it rather than by my evil resolution, this is a virtuous act, for it
+is a manifestation of the better consciousness. It is possible to
+conceive of a very virtuous man in whom the better consciousness is
+so continuously active that it is never silent, and never allows his
+passions to get a complete hold of him. By such consciousness he is
+subject to a direct control, instead of being guided indirectly,
+through the medium of reason, by means of maxims and moral principles.
+That is why a man may have weak reasoning powers and a weak
+understanding and yet have a high sense of morality and be eminently
+good; for the most important element in a man depends as little on
+intellectual as it does on physical strength. Jesus says, _Blessed
+are the poor in spirit_. And Jacob Böhme has the excellent and noble
+observation: _Whoso lies quietly in his own will, like a child in the
+womb, and lets himself be led and guided by that inner principle from
+which he is sprung, is the noblest and richest on earth_.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: _Epistles_, 37.]
+
+
+
+
+ETHICAL REFLECTIONS.
+
+
+The philosophers of the ancient world united in a single conception
+a great many things that had no connection with one another. Of this
+every dialogue of Plato's furnishes abundant examples. The greatest
+and worst confusion of this kind is that between ethics and politics.
+The State and the Kingdom of God, or the Moral Law, are so entirely
+different in their character that the former is a parody of the
+latter, a bitter mockery at the absence of it. Compared with the Moral
+Law the State is a crutch instead of a limb, an automaton instead of a
+man.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The _principle of honour_ stands in close connection with human
+freedom. It is, as it were, an abuse of that freedom. Instead of
+using his freedom to fulfil the moral law, a man employs his power
+of voluntarily undergoing any feeling of pain, of overcoming any
+momentary impression, in order that he may assert his self-will,
+whatever be the object to which he directs it. As he thereby shows
+that, unlike the lower animals, he has thoughts which go beyond the
+welfare of his body and whatever makes for that welfare, it has come
+about that the principle of honour is often confused with virtue. They
+are regarded as if they were twins. But wrongly; for although the
+principle of honour is something which distinguishes man from the
+lower animals, it is not, in itself, anything that raises him above
+them. Taken as an end and aim, it is as dark a delusion as any other
+aim that springs from self. Used as a means, or casually, it may be
+productive of good; but even that is good which is vain and frivolous.
+It is the misuse of freedom, the employment of it as a weapon for
+overcoming the world of feeling, that makes man so infinitely more
+terrible than the lower animals; for they do only what momentary
+instinct bids them; while man acts by ideas, and his ideas may entail
+universal ruin before they are satisfied.
+
+There is another circumstance which helps to promote the notion that
+honour and virtue are connected. A man who can do what he wants to do
+shows that he can also do it if what he wants to do is a virtuous act.
+But that those of our actions which we are ourselves obliged to regard
+with contempt are also regarded with contempt by other people serves
+more than anything that I have here mentioned to establish the
+connection. Thus it often happens that a man who is not afraid of the
+one kind of contempt is unwilling to undergo the other. But when we
+are called upon to choose between our own approval and the world's
+censure, as may occur in complicated and mistaken circumstances, what
+becomes of the principle of honour then?
+
+Two characteristic examples of the principle of honour are to be found
+in Shakespeare's _Henry VI_., Part II., Act IV., Sc. 1. A pirate is
+anxious to murder his captive instead of accepting, like others, a
+ransom for him; because in taking his captive he lost an eye, and
+his own honour and that of his forefathers would in his opinion be
+stained, if he were to allow his revenge to be bought off as though he
+were a mere trader. The prisoner, on the other hand, who is the Duke
+of Suffolk, prefers to have his head grace a pole than to uncover it
+to such a low fellow as a pirate, by approaching him to ask for mercy.
+
+Just as civic honour--in other words, the opinion that we deserve to
+be trusted--is the palladium of those whose endeavour it is to make
+their way in the world on the path of honourable business, so knightly
+honour--in other words, the opinion that we are men to be feared--is
+the palladium of those who aim at going through life on the path
+of violence; and so it was that knightly honour arose among the
+robber-knights and other knights of the Middle Ages.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+A theoretical philosopher is one who can supply in the shape of ideas
+for the reason, a copy of the presentations of experience; just as
+what the painter sees he can reproduce on canvas; the sculptor, in
+marble; the poet, in pictures for the imagination, though they are
+pictures which he supplies only in sowing the ideas from which they
+sprang.
+
+A so-called practical philosopher, on the other hand, is one who,
+contrarily, deduces his action from ideas. The theoretical philosopher
+transforms life into ideas. The practical philosopher transforms ideas
+into life; he acts, therefore, in a thoroughly reasonable manner; he
+is consistent, regular, deliberate; he is never hasty or passionate;
+he never allows himself to be influenced by the impression of the
+moment.
+
+And indeed, when we find ourselves among those full presentations of
+experience, or real objects, to which the body belongs--since the body
+is only an objectified will, the shape which the will assumes in the
+material world--it is difficult to let our bodies be guided, not by
+those presentations, but by a mere image of them, by cold, colourless
+ideas, which are related to experience as the shadow of Orcus to life;
+and yet this is the only way in which we can avoid doing things of
+which we may have to repent.
+
+The theoretical philosopher enriches the domain of reason by adding to
+it; the practical philosopher draws upon it, and makes it serve him.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+According to Kant the truth of experience is only a hypothetical
+truth. If the suppositions which underlie all the intimations of
+experience--subject, object, time, space and causality--were removed,
+none of those intimations would contain a word of truth. In other
+words, experience is only a phenomenon; it is not knowledge of the
+thing-in-itself.
+
+If we find something in our own conduct at which we are secretly
+pleased, although we cannot reconcile it with experience, seeing that
+if we were to follow the guidance of experience we should have to
+do precisely the opposite, we must not allow this to put us out;
+otherwise we should be ascribing an authority to experience which
+it does not deserve, for all that it teaches rests upon a mere
+supposition. This is the general tendency of the Kantian Ethics.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Innocence is in its very nature stupid. It is stupid because the aim
+of life (I use the expression only figuratively, and I could just
+as well speak of the essence of life, or of the world) is to gain a
+knowledge of our own bad will, so that our will may become an object
+for us, and that we may undergo an inward conversion. Our body is
+itself our will objectified; it is one of the first and foremost of
+objects, and the deeds that we accomplish for the sake of the body
+show us the evil inherent in our will. In the state of innocence,
+where there is no evil because there is no experience, man is, as
+it were, only an apparatus for living, and the object for which the
+apparatus exists is not yet disclosed. An empty form of life like
+this, a stage untenanted, is in itself, like the so-called real world,
+null and void; and as it can attain a meaning only by action, by
+error, by knowledge, by the convulsions of the will, it wears a
+character of insipid stupidity. A golden age of innocence, a fools'
+paradise, is a notion that is stupid and unmeaning, and for that
+very reason in no way worthy of any respect. The first criminal and
+murderer, Cain, who acquired a knowledge of guilt, and through
+guilt acquired a knowledge of virtue by repentance, and so came to
+understand the meaning of life, is a tragical figure more significant,
+and almost more respectable, than all the innocent fools in the world
+put together.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+If I had to write about _modesty_ I should say: I know the esteemed
+public for which I have the honour to write far too well to dare to
+give utterance to my opinion about this virtue. Personally I am quite
+content to be modest and to apply myself to this virtue with
+the utmost possible circumspection. But one thing I shall never
+admit--that I have ever required modesty of any man, and any statement
+to that effect I repel as a slander.
+
+The paltry character of most men compels the few who have any merit
+or genius to behave as though they did not know their own value, and
+consequently did not know other people's want of value; for it is
+only on this condition that the mob acquiesces in tolerating merit. A
+virtue has been made out of this necessity, and it is called modesty.
+It is a piece of hypocrisy, to be excused only because other people
+are so paltry that they must be treated with indulgence.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Human misery may affect us in two ways, and we may be in one of two
+opposite moods in regard to it.
+
+In one of them, this misery is immediately present to us. We feel it
+in our own person, in our own will which, imbued with violent desires,
+is everywhere broken, and this is the process which constitutes
+suffering. The result is that the will increases in violence, as
+is shown in all cases of passion and emotion; and this increasing
+violence comes to a stop only when the will turns and gives way to
+complete resignation, in other words, is redeemed. The man who is
+entirely dominated by this mood will regard any prosperity which he
+may see in others with envy, and any suffering with no sympathy.
+
+In the opposite mood human misery is present to us only as a fact
+of knowledge, that is to say, indirectly. We are mainly engaged in
+looking at the sufferings of others, and our attention is withdrawn
+from our own. It is in their person that we become aware of human
+misery; we are filled with sympathy; and the result of this mood is
+general benevolence, philanthropy. All envy vanishes, and instead
+of feeling it, we are rejoiced when we see one of our tormented
+fellow-creatures experience any pleasure or relief.
+
+After the same fashion we may be in one of two opposite moods in
+regard to human baseness and depravity. In the one we perceive this
+baseness indirectly, in others. Out of this mood arise indignation,
+hatred, and contempt of mankind. In the other we perceive it directly,
+in ourselves. Out of it there arises humiliation, nay, contrition.
+
+In order to judge the moral value of a man, it is very important to
+observe which of these four moods predominate in him. They go in
+pairs, one out of each division. In very excellent characters the
+second mood of each division will predominate.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The categorical imperative, or absolute command, is a contradiction.
+Every command is conditional. What is unconditional and necessary is a
+_must_, such as is presented by the laws of nature.
+
+It is quite true that the moral law is entirely conditional. There
+is a world and a view of life in which it has neither validity nor
+significance. That world is, properly speaking, the real world in
+which, as individuals, we live; for every regard paid to morality is a
+denial of that world and of our individual life in it. It is a view
+of the world, however, which does not go beyond the principle of
+sufficient reason; and the opposite view proceeds by the intuition of
+Ideas.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+If a man is under the influence of two opposite but very strong
+motives, A and B, and I am greatly concerned that he should choose A,
+but still more that he should never be untrue to his choice, and by
+changing his mind betray me, or the like, it will not do for me to say
+anything that might hinder the motive B from having its full effect
+upon him, and only emphasise A; for then I should never be able to
+reckon on his decision. What I have to do is, rather, to put both
+motives before him at the same time, in as vivid and clear a way as
+possible, so that they may work upon him with their whole force. The
+choice that he then makes is the decision of his inmost nature, and
+stands firm to all eternity. In saying _I will do this_, he has said
+_I must do this_. I have got at his will, and I can rely upon its
+working as steadily as one of the forces of nature. It is as certain
+as fire kindles and water wets that he will act according to the
+motive which has proved to be stronger for him. Insight and knowledge
+may be attained and lost again; they may be changed, or improved, or
+destroyed; but will cannot be changed. That is why _I apprehend, I
+perceive, I see_, is subject to alteration and uncertainty; _I will_,
+pronounced on a right apprehension of motive, is as firm as nature
+itself. The difficulty, however, lies in getting at a right
+apprehension. A man's apprehension of motive may change, or be
+corrected or perverted; and on the other hand, his circumstances may
+undergo an alteration.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+A man should exercise an almost boundless toleration and placability,
+because if he is capricious enough to refuse to forgive a single
+individual for the meanness or evil that lies at his door, it is doing
+the rest of the world a quite unmerited honour.
+
+But at the same time the man who is every one's friend is no one's
+friend. It is quite obvious what sort of friendship it is which we
+hold out to the human race, and to which it is open to almost every
+man to return, no matter what he may have done.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+With the ancients _friendship_ was one of the chief elements in
+morality. But friendship is only limitation and partiality; it is
+the restriction to one individual of what is the due of all mankind,
+namely, the recognition that a man's own nature and that of mankind
+are identical. At most it is a compromise between this recognition and
+selfishness.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+A lie always has its origin in the desire to extend the dominion of
+one's own will over other individuals, and to deny their will in order
+the better to affirm one's own. Consequently a lie is in its very
+nature the product of injustice, malevolence and villainy. That is why
+truth, sincerity, candour and rectitude are at once recognised and
+valued as praiseworthy and noble qualities; because we presume that
+the man who exhibits them entertains no sentiments of injustice or
+malice, and therefore stands in no need of concealing such sentiments.
+He who is open cherishes nothing that is bad.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+There is a certain kind of courage which springs from the same source
+as good-nature. What I mean is that the good-natured man is almost as
+clearly conscious that he exists in other individuals as in himself. I
+have often shown how this feeling gives rise to good-nature. It
+also gives rise to courage, for the simple reason that the man who
+possesses this feeling cares less for his own individual existence,
+as he lives almost as much in the general existence of all creatures.
+Accordingly he is little concerned for his own life and its
+belongings. This is by no means the sole source of courage for it is
+a phenomenon due to various causes. But it is the noblest kind of
+courage, as is shown by the fact that in its origin it is associated
+with great gentleness and patience. Men of this kind are usually
+irresistible to women.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+All general rules and precepts fail, because they proceed from the
+false assumption that men are constituted wholly, or almost wholly,
+alike; an assumption which the philosophy of Helvetius expressly
+makes. Whereas the truth is that the original difference between
+individuals in intellect and morality is immeasurable.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The question as to whether morality is something real is the question
+whether a well-grounded counter-principle to egoism actually exists.
+
+As egoism restricts concern for welfare to a single individual,
+_viz_., the man's own self, the counter-principle would have to extend
+it to all other individuals.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+It is only because the will is above and beyond time that the stings
+of conscience are ineradicable, and do not, like other pains,
+gradually wear away. No! an evil deed weighs on the conscience years
+afterwards as heavily as if it had been freshly committed.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Character is innate, and conduct is merely its manifestation; the
+occasion for great misdeeds comes seldom; strong counter-motives keep
+us back; our disposition is revealed to ourselves by our desires,
+thoughts, emotions, when it remains unknown to others. Reflecting on
+all this, we might suppose it possible for a man to possess, in some
+sort, an innate evil conscience, without ever having done anything
+very bad.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+_Don't do to others what you wouldn't like done to yourself_. This is,
+perhaps, one of those arguments that prove, or rather ask, too much.
+For a prisoner might address it to a judge.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Stupid people are generally malicious, for the very same reason as the
+ugly and the deformed.
+
+Similarly, genius and sanctity are akin. However simple-minded a saint
+may be, he will nevertheless have a dash of genius in him; and however
+many errors of temperament, or of actual character, a genius may
+possess, he will still exhibit a certain nobility of disposition by
+which he shows his kinship with the saint.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The great difference between Law without and Law within, between
+the State and the Kingdom of God, is very clear. It is the State's
+business to see that _every one should have justice done to him_;
+it regards men as passive beings, and therefore takes no account of
+anything but their actions. The Moral Law, on the other hand, is
+concerned that _every one should do justice_; it regards men as
+active, and looks to the will rather than the deed. To prove that this
+is the true distinction let the reader consider what would happen if
+he were to say, conversely, that it is the State's business that every
+one should do justice, and the business of the Moral Law that every
+one should have justice done to him. The absurdity is obvious.
+
+As an example of the distinction, let me take the case of a debtor and
+a creditor disputing about a debt which the former denies. A lawyer
+and a moralist are present, and show a lively interest in the matter.
+Both desire that the dispute should end in the same way, although what
+they want is by no means the same. The lawyer says, _I want this man
+to get back what belongs to him_; and the moralist, _I want that man
+to do his duty_.
+
+It is with the will alone that morality is concerned. Whether external
+force hinders or fails to hinder the will from working does not in the
+least matter. For morality the external world is real only in so far
+as it is able or unable to lead and influence the will. As soon as
+the will is determined, that is, as soon as a resolve is taken, the
+external world and its events are of no further moment and
+practical do not exist. For if the events of the world had any
+such reality--that is to say, if they possessed a significance in
+themselves, or any other than that derived from the will which is
+affected by them--what a grievance it would be that all these events
+lie in the realm of chance and error! It is, however, just this which
+proves that the important thing is not what happens, but what is
+willed. Accordingly, let the incidents of life be left to the play of
+chance and error, to demonstrate to man that he is as chaff before the
+wind.
+
+The State concerns itself only with the incidents--with what happens;
+nothing else has any reality for it. I may dwell upon thoughts of
+murder and poison as much as I please: the State does not forbid me,
+so long as the axe and rope control my will, and prevent it from
+becoming action.
+
+Ethics asks: What are the duties towards others which justice imposes
+upon us? in other words, What must I render? The Law of Nature asks:
+What need I not submit to from others? that is, What must I suffer?
+The question is put, not that I may do no injustice, but that I
+may not do more than every man must do if he is to safeguard his
+existence, and than every man will approve being done, in order that
+he may be treated in the same way himself; and, further, that I may
+not do more than society will permit me to do. The same answer will
+serve for both questions, just as the same straight line can be drawn
+from either of two opposite directions, namely, by opposing forces;
+or, again, as the angle can give the sine, or the sine the angle.
+
+It has been said that the historian is an inverted prophet. In the
+same way it may be said that a teacher of law is an inverted moralist
+(_viz_., a teacher of the duties of justice), or that politics are
+inverted ethics, if we exclude the thought that ethics also teaches
+the duty of benevolence, magnanimity, love, and so on. The State is
+the Gordian knot that is cut instead of being untied; it is Columbus'
+egg which is made to stand by being broken instead of balanced, as
+though the business in question were to make it stand rather than to
+balance it. In this respect the State is like the man who thinks that
+he can produce fine weather by making the barometer go up.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The pseudo-philosophers of our age tell us that it is the object of
+the State to promote the moral aims of mankind. This is not true;
+it is rather the contrary which is true. The aim for which mankind
+exists--the expression is parabolic--is not that a man should act in
+such and such a manner; for all _opera operata_, things that have
+actually been done, are in themselves matters of indifference. No! the
+aim is that the Will, of which every man is a complete specimen--nay,
+is the very Will itself--should turn whither it needs to turn; that
+the man himself (the union of Thought and Will) should perceive what
+this will is, and what horrors it contains; that he should show the
+reflection of himself in his own deeds, in the abomination of them.
+The State, which is wholly concerned with the general welfare, checks
+the manifestation of the bad will, but in no wise checks the will
+itself; the attempt would be impossible. It is because the State
+checks the manifestation of his will that a man very seldom sees the
+whole abomination of his nature in the mirror of his deeds. Or does
+the reader actually suppose there are no people in the world as bad as
+Robespierre, Napoleon, or other murderers? Does he fail to see that
+there are many who would act like them if only they could?
+
+Many a criminal dies more quietly on the scaffold than many a
+non-criminal in the arms of his family. The one has perceived what his
+will is and has discarded it. The other has not been able to discard
+it, because he has never been able to perceive what it is. The aim
+of the State is to produce a fool's paradise, and this is in direct
+conflict with the true aim of life, namely, to attain a knowledge of
+what the will, in its horrible nature, really is.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Napoleon was not really worse than many, not to say most, men. He was
+possessed of the very ordinary egoism that seeks its welfare at the
+expense of others. What distinguished him was merely the greater power
+he had of satisfying his will, and greater intelligence, reason and
+courage; added to which, chance gave him a favourable scope for his
+operations. By means of all this he did for his egoism what a thousand
+other men would like to do for theirs, but cannot. Every feeble lad
+who by little acts of villainy gains a small advantage for himself by
+putting others to some disadvantage, although it may be equally small,
+is just as bad as Napoleon.
+
+Those who fancy that retribution comes after death would demand that
+Napoleon should by unutterable torments pay the penalty for all the
+numberless calamities that he caused. But he is no more culpable than
+all those who possess the same will, unaccompanied by the same power.
+
+The circumstance that in his case this extraordinary power was added
+allowed him to reveal the whole wickedness of the human will; and the
+sufferings of his age, as the necessary obverse of the medal, reveal
+the misery which is inextricably bound up with this bad will. It is
+the general manipulation of this will that constitutes the world. But
+it is precisely that it should be understood how inextricably the will
+to live is bound up with, and is really one and the same as, this
+unspeakable misery, that is the world's aim and purpose; and it is an
+aim and purpose which the appearance of Napoleon did much to assist.
+Not to be an unmeaning fools' paradise but a tragedy, in which the
+will to live understands itself and yields--that is the object for
+which the world exists. Napoleon is only an enormous mirror of the
+will to live.
+
+The difference between the man who causes suffering and the man who
+suffers it, is only phenomenal. It is all a will to live, identical
+with great suffering; and it is only by understanding this that the
+will can mend and end.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+What chiefly distinguishes ancient from modern times is that in
+ancient times, to use Napoleon's expression, it was affairs that
+reigned: _les paroles aux choses_. In modern times this is not so.
+What I mean is that in ancient times the character of public life,
+of the State, and of Religion, as well as of private life, was a
+strenuous affirmation of the will to live. In modern times it is a
+denial of this will, for such is the character of Christianity. But
+now while on the one hand that denial has suffered some abatement even
+in public opinion, because it is too repugnant to human character, on
+the other what is publicly denied is secretly affirmed. Hence it is
+that we see half measures and falsehood everywhere; and that is why
+modern times look so small beside antiquity.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The structure of human society is like a pendulum swinging between two
+impulses, two evils in polar opposition, _despotism_ and _anarchy_.
+The further it gets from the one, the nearer it approaches the other.
+From this the reader might hit on the thought that if it were exactly
+midway between the two, it would be right. Far from it. For these
+two evils are by no means equally bad and dangerous. The former is
+incomparably less to be feared; its ills exist in the main only as
+possibilities, and if they come at all it is only one among millions
+that they touch. But, with anarchy, possibility and actuality are
+inseparable; its blows fall on every man every day. Therefore every
+constitution should be a nearer approach to a despotism than to
+anarchy; nay, it must contain a small possibility of despotism.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Essays Of Arthur Schopenhauer
+by Arthur Schopenhauer
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+  <head>
+    <meta content="pg2html (binary v0.17)" name="linkgenerator" />
+    <title>
+      The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer: on Human Nature., by Arthur
+      Schopenhauer
+    </title>
+    <style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve">
+    body { margin:5%; background:#faebd0; text-align:justify}
+    P { text-indent: 1em; margin-top: .75em; margin-bottom: .75em; }
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+    .mynote    {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;}
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+    .toc2      { margin-left: 20%;}
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+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+
+Project Gutenberg's The Essays Of Arthur Schopenhauer, by Arthur Schopenhauer
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Essays Of Arthur Schopenhauer: on Human Nature
+
+Author: Arthur Schopenhauer
+
+Release Date: January 18, 2004 [EBook #10739]
+Last Updated: December 9, 2018
+
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ESSAYS OF ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER ***
+
+
+
+
+Etext produced by Juliet Sutherland, Josephine Paolucci and the Online
+Distributed Proofreading Team.
+
+HTML file produced by David Widger
+
+
+
+</pre>
+    <div style="height: 8em;">
+      <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />
+    </div>
+    <h1>
+      THE ESSAYS OF<br /> ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER:<br /><br /> ON HUMAN NATURE.
+    </h1>
+    <h2>
+      By Arthur Schopenhauer
+    </h2>
+    <h3>
+      Translated By T. Bailey Saunders
+    </h3>
+    <p>
+      <br />
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      <br />
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <b>CONTENTS</b>
+    </p>
+    <p class="toc">
+      <a href="#link2H_4_0001"> TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. </a>
+    </p>
+    <p class="toc">
+      <a href="#link2H_4_0002"> HUMAN NATURE. </a>
+    </p>
+    <p class="toc">
+      <a href="#link2H_4_0003"> GOVERNMENT. </a>
+    </p>
+    <p class="toc">
+      <a href="#link2H_4_0004"> FREE-WILL AND FATALISM. </a>
+    </p>
+    <p class="toc">
+      <a href="#link2H_4_0005"> CHARACTER. </a>
+    </p>
+    <p class="toc">
+      <a href="#link2H_4_0006"> MORAL INSTINCT. </a>
+    </p>
+    <p class="toc">
+      <a href="#link2H_4_0007"> ETHICAL REFLECTIONS. </a>
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <br /><br />
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      <a name="link2H_4_0001" id="link2H_4_0001"> </a>
+    </p>
+    <div style="height: 4em;">
+      <br /><br /><br /><br />
+    </div>
+    <h2>
+      TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
+    </h2>
+    <p>
+      The following essays are drawn from the chapters entitled <i>Zur Ethik</i>
+      and <i>Zur Rechtslehre und Politik</i> which are to be found both in
+      Schopenhauer's <i>Parerga</i> and in his posthumous writings. As in my
+      previous volumes, so also in this, I have omitted a few passages which
+      appeared to me to be either antiquated or no longer of any general
+      interest. For convenience' sake I have divided the original chapters into
+      sections, which I have had to name; and I have also had to invent a title
+      which should express their real scope. The reader will find that it is not
+      so much <i>Ethics</i> and <i>Politics</i> that are here treated, as human
+      nature itself in various aspects.
+    </p>
+    <h3>
+      T.B.S.
+    </h3>
+    <p>
+      <br /><br />
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      <a name="link2H_4_0002" id="link2H_4_0002"> </a>
+    </p>
+    <div style="height: 4em;">
+      <br /><br /><br /><br />
+    </div>
+    <h1>
+      HUMAN NATURE.
+    </h1>
+    <p>
+      Truths of the physical order may possess much external significance, but
+      internal significance they have none. The latter is the privilege of
+      intellectual and moral truths, which are concerned with the objectivation
+      of the will in its highest stages, whereas physical truths are concerned
+      with it in its lowest.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      For example, if we could establish the truth of what up till now is only a
+      conjecture, namely, that it is the action of the sun which produces
+      thermoelectricity at the equator; that this produces terrestrial
+      magnetism; and that this magnetism, again, is the cause of the <i>aurora
+      borealis</i>, these would be truths externally of great, but internally of
+      little, significance. On the other hand, examples of internal significance
+      are furnished by all great and true philosophical systems; by the
+      catastrophe of every good tragedy; nay, even by the observation of human
+      conduct in the extreme manifestations of its morality and immorality, of
+      its good and its evil character. For all these are expressions of that
+      reality which takes outward shape as the world, and which, in the highest
+      stages of its objectivation, proclaims its innermost nature.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      To say that the world has only a physical and not a moral significance is
+      the greatest and most pernicious of all errors, the fundamental blunder,
+      the real perversity of mind and temper; and, at bottom, it is doubtless
+      the tendency which faith personifies as Anti-Christ. Nevertheless, in
+      spite of all religions&mdash;and they are systems which one and all
+      maintain the opposite, and seek to establish it in their mythical way&mdash;this
+      fundamental error never becomes quite extinct, but raises its head from
+      time to time afresh, until universal indignation compels it to hide itself
+      once more.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Yet, however certain we may feel of the moral significance of life and the
+      world, to explain and illustrate it, and to resolve the contradiction
+      between this significance and the world as it is, form a task of great
+      difficulty; so great, indeed, as to make it possible that it has remained
+      for me to exhibit the true and only genuine and sound basis of morality
+      everywhere and at all times effective, together with the results to which
+      it leads. The actual facts of morality are too much on my side for me to
+      fear that my theory can ever be replaced or upset by any other.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      However, so long as even my ethical system continues to be ignored by the
+      professorial world, it is Kant's moral principle that prevails in the
+      universities. Among its various forms the one which is most in favour at
+      present is "the dignity of man." I have already exposed the absurdity of
+      this doctrine in my treatise on the <i>Foundation of Morality</i>.{1}
+      Therefore I will only say here that if the question were asked on what the
+      alleged dignity of man rests, it would not be long before the answer was
+      made that it rests upon his morality. In other words, his morality rests
+      upon his dignity, and his dignity rests upon his morality.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: § 8.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But apart from this circular argument it seems to me that the idea of
+      dignity can be applied only in an ironical sense to a being whose will is
+      so sinful, whose intellect is so limited, whose body is so weak and
+      perishable as man's. How shall a man be proud, when his conception is a
+      crime, his birth a penalty, his life a labour, and death a necessity!&mdash;
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  <i>Quid superbit homo? cujus conceptio culpa,
+  Nasci poena, labor vita, necesse mori</i>!
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      Therefore, in opposition to the above-mentioned form of the Kantian
+      principle, I should be inclined to lay down the following rule: When you
+      come into contact with a man, no matter whom, do not attempt an objective
+      appreciation of him according to his worth and dignity. Do not consider
+      his bad will, or his narrow understanding and perverse ideas; as the
+      former may easily lead you to hate and the latter to despise him; but fix
+      your attention only upon his sufferings, his needs, his anxieties, his
+      pains. Then you will always feel your kinship with him; you will
+      sympathise with him; and instead of hatred or contempt you will experience
+      the commiseration that alone is the peace to which the Gospel calls us.
+      The way to keep down hatred and contempt is certainly not to look for a
+      man's alleged "dignity," but, on the contrary, to regard him as an object
+      of pity.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The Buddhists, as the result of the more profound views which they
+      entertain on ethical and metaphysical subjects, start from the cardinal
+      vices and not the cardinal virtues; since the virtues make their
+      appearance only as the contraries or negations of the vices. According to
+      Schmidt's <i>History of the Eastern Mongolians</i> the cardinal vices in
+      the Buddhist scheme are four: Lust, Indolence, Anger, and Avarice. But
+      probably instead of Indolence, we should read Pride; for so it stands in
+      the <i>Lettres édifiantes et curieuses</i>,{1} where Envy, or Hatred, is
+      added as a fifth. I am confirmed in correcting the statement of the
+      excellent Schmidt by the fact that my rendering agrees with the doctrine
+      of the Sufis, who are certainly under the influence of the Brahmins and
+      Buddhists. The Sufis also maintain that there are four cardinal vices, and
+      they arrange them in very striking pairs, so that Lust appears in
+      connection with Avarice, and Anger with Pride. The four cardinal virtues
+      opposed to them would be Chastity and Generosity, together with Gentleness
+      and Humility.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: Edit, of 1819, vol. vi., p. 372.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      When we compare these profound ideas of morality, as they are entertained
+      by oriental nations, with the celebrated cardinal virtues of Plato, which
+      have been recapitulated again and again&mdash;Justice, Valour, Temperance,
+      and Wisdom&mdash;it is plain that the latter are not based on any clear,
+      leading idea, but are chosen on grounds that are superficial and, in part,
+      obviously false. Virtues must be qualities of the will, but Wisdom is
+      chiefly an attribute of the Intellect. {Greek: Sophrosynae}, which Cicero
+      translates <i>Temperantia</i>, is a very indefinite and ambiguous word,
+      and it admits, therefore, of a variety of applications: it may mean
+      discretion, or abstinence, or keeping a level head. Courage is not a
+      virtue at all; although sometimes it is a servant or instrument of virtue;
+      but it is just as ready to become the servant of the greatest villainy. It
+      is really a quality of temperament. Even Geulinx (in the preface to this
+      <i>Ethics</i>) condemned the Platonic virtues and put the following in
+      their place: Diligence, Obedience, Justice and Humility; which are
+      obviously bad. The Chinese distinguish five cardinal virtues: Sympathy,
+      Justice, Propriety, Wisdom, and Sincerity. The virtues of Christianity are
+      theological, not cardinal: Faith, Love, and Hope.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Fundamental disposition towards others, assuming the character either of
+      Envy or of Sympathy, is the point at which the moral virtues and vices of
+      mankind first diverge. These two diametrically opposite qualities exist in
+      every man; for they spring from the inevitable comparison which he draws
+      between his own lot and that of others. According as the result of this
+      comparison affects his individual character does the one or the other of
+      these qualities become the source and principle of all his action. Envy
+      builds the wall between <i>Thee</i> and <i>Me</i> thicker and stronger;
+      Sympathy makes it slight and transparent; nay, sometimes it pulls down the
+      wall altogether; and then the distinction between self and not-self
+      vanishes.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Valour, which has been mentioned as a virtue, or rather the Courage on
+      which it is based (for valour is only courage in war), deserves a closer
+      examination. The ancients reckoned Courage among the virtues, and
+      cowardice among the vices; but there is no corresponding idea in the
+      Christian scheme, which makes for charity and patience, and in its
+      teaching forbids all enmity or even resistance. The result is that with
+      the moderns Courage is no longer a virtue. Nevertheless it must be
+      admitted that cowardice does not seem to be very compatible with any
+      nobility of character&mdash;if only for the reason that it betrays an
+      overgreat apprehension about one's own person.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Courage, however, may also be explained as a readiness to meet ills that
+      threaten at the moment, in order to avoid greater ills that lie in the
+      future; whereas cowardice does the contrary. But this readiness is of the
+      same quality as <i>patience</i>, for patience consists in the clear
+      consciousness that greater evils than those which are present, and that
+      any violent attempt to flee from or guard against the ills we have may
+      bring the others upon us. Courage, then, would be a kind of patience; and
+      since it is patience that enables us to practise forbearance and self
+      control, Courage is, through the medium of patience, at least akin to
+      virtue.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But perhaps Courage admits of being considered from a higher point of
+      view. The fear of death may in every case be traced to a deficiency in
+      that natural philosophy&mdash;natural, and therefore resting on mere
+      feeling&mdash;which gives a man the assurance that he exists in everything
+      outside him just as much as in his own person; so that the death of his
+      person can do him little harm. But it is just this very assurance that
+      would give a man heroic Courage; and therefore, as the reader will
+      recollect from my <i>Ethics</i>, Courage comes from the same source as the
+      virtues of Justice and Humanity. This is, I admit, to take a very high
+      view of the matter; but apart from it I cannot well explain why cowardice
+      seems contemptible, and personal courage a noble and sublime thing; for no
+      lower point of view enables me to see why a finite individual who is
+      everything to himself&mdash;nay, who is himself even the very fundamental
+      condition of the existence of the rest of the world&mdash;should not put
+      his own preservation above every other aim. It is, then, an insufficient
+      explanation of Courage to make it rest only on utility, to give it an
+      empirical and not a transcendental character. It may have been for some
+      such reason that Calderon once uttered a sceptical but remarkable opinion
+      in regard to Courage, nay, actually denied its reality; and put his denial
+      into the mouth of a wise old minister, addressing his young sovereign.
+      "Although," he observed, "natural fear is operative in all alike, a man
+      may be brave in not letting it be seen; and it is this that constitutes
+      Courage":
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  <i>Que aunque el natural temor
+  En todos obra igualmente,
+  No mostrarle es ser valiente
+  Y esto es lo que hace el valor</i>.{1}
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>La Hija del Aire</i>, ii., 2.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In regard to the difference which I have mentioned between the ancients
+      and the moderns in their estimate of Courage as a virtue, it must be
+      remembered that by Virtue, <i>virtus</i>, {Greek: aretae}, the ancients
+      understood every excellence or quality that was praiseworthy in itself, it
+      might be moral or intellectual, or possibly only physical. But when
+      Christianity demonstrated that the fundamental tendency of life was moral,
+      it was moral superiority alone than henceforth attached to the notion of
+      Virtue. Meanwhile the earlier usage still survived in the elder Latinists,
+      and also in Italian writers, as is proved by the well-known meaning of the
+      word <i>virtuoso</i>. The special attention of students should be drawn to
+      this wider range of the idea of Virtue amongst the ancients, as otherwise
+      it might easily be a source of secret perplexity. I may recommend two
+      passages preserved for us by Stobaeus, which will serve this purpose. One
+      of them is apparently from the Pythagorean philosopher Metopos, in which
+      the fitness of every bodily member is declared to be a virtue. The other
+      pronounces that the virtue of a shoemaker is to make good shoes. This may
+      also serve to explain why it is that in the ancient scheme of ethics
+      virtues and vices are mentioned which find no place in ours.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      As the place of Courage amongst the virtues is a matter of doubt, so is
+      that of Avarice amongst the vices. It must not, however, be confounded
+      with greed, which is the most immediate meaning of the Latin word <i>avaritia</i>.
+      Let us then draw up and examine the arguments <i>pro et contra</i> in
+      regard to Avarice, and leave the final judgment to be formed by every man
+      for himself.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      On the one hand it is argued that it is not Avarice which is a vice, but
+      extravagance, its opposite. Extravagance springs from a brutish limitation
+      to the present moment, in comparison with which the future, existing as it
+      does only in thought, is as nothing. It rests upon the illusion that
+      sensual pleasures possess a positive or real value. Accordingly, future
+      need and misery is the price at which the spendthrift purchases pleasures
+      that are empty, fleeting, and often no more than imaginary; or else feeds
+      his vain, stupid self-conceit on the bows and scrapes of parasites who
+      laugh at him in secret, or on the gaze of the mob and those who envy his
+      magnificence. We should, therefore, shun the spendthrift as though he had
+      the plague, and on discovering his vice break with him betimes, in order
+      that later on, when the consequences of his extravagance ensue, we may
+      neither have to help to bear them, nor, on the other hand, have to play
+      the part of the friends of Timon of Athens.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      At the same time it is not to be expected that he who foolishly squanders
+      his own fortune will leave another man's intact, if it should chance to be
+      committed to his keeping; nay, <i>sui profusus</i> and <i>alieni appetens</i>
+      are by Sallust very rightly conjoined. Hence it is that extravagance leads
+      not only to impoverishment but also to crime; and crime amongst the
+      moneyed classes is almost always the result of extravagance. It is
+      accordingly with justice that the <i>Koran</i> declares all spendthrifts
+      to be "brothers of Satan."
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But it is superfluity that Avarice brings in its train, and when was
+      superfluity ever unwelcome? That must be a good vice which has good
+      consequences. Avarice proceeds upon the principle that all pleasure is
+      only negative in its operation and that the happiness which consists of a
+      series of pleasures is a chimaera; that, on the contrary, it is pains
+      which are positive and extremely real. Accordingly, the avaricious man
+      foregoes the former in order that he may be the better preserved from the
+      latter, and thus it is that <i>bear and forbear</i>&mdash;<i>sustine et
+      abstine</i>&mdash;is his maxim. And because he knows, further, how
+      inexhaustible are the possibilities of misfortune, and how innumerable the
+      paths of danger, he increases the means of avoiding them, in order, if
+      possible, to surround himself with a triple wall of protection. Who, then,
+      can say where precaution against disaster begins to be exaggerated? He
+      alone who knows where the malignity of fate reaches its limit. And even if
+      precaution were exaggerated it is an error which at the most would hurt
+      the man who took it, and not others. If he will never need the treasures
+      which he lays up for himself, they will one day benefit others whom nature
+      has made less careful. That until then he withdraws the money from
+      circulation is no misfortune; for money is not an article of consumption:
+      it only represents the good things which a man may actually possess, and
+      is not one itself. Coins are only counters; their value is what they
+      represent; and what they represent cannot be withdrawn from circulation.
+      Moreover, by holding back the money, the value of the remainder which is
+      in circulation is enhanced by precisely the same amount. Even though it be
+      the case, as is said, that many a miser comes in the end to love money
+      itself for its own sake, it is equally certain that many a spendthrift, on
+      the other hand, loves spending and squandering for no better reason.
+      Friendship with a miser is not only without danger, but it is profitable,
+      because of the great advantages it can bring. For it is doubtless those
+      who are nearest and dearest to the miser who on his death will reap the
+      fruits of the self-control which he exercised; but even in his lifetime,
+      too, something may be expected of him in cases of great need. At any rate
+      one can always hope for more from him than from the spendthrift, who has
+      lost his all and is himself helpless and in debt. <i>Mas da el duro que el
+      desnudo</i>, says a Spanish proverb; the man who has a hard heart will
+      give more than the man who has an empty purse. The upshot of all this is
+      that Avarice is not a vice.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      On the other side, it may be said that Avarice is the quintessence of all
+      vices. When physical pleasures seduce a man from the right path, it is his
+      sensual nature&mdash;the animal part of him&mdash;which is at fault. He is
+      carried away by its attractions, and, overcome by the impression of the
+      moment, he acts without thinking of the consequences. When, on the other
+      hand, he is brought by age or bodily weakness to the condition in which
+      the vices that he could never abandon end by abandoning him, and his
+      capacity for physical pleasure dies&mdash;if he turns to Avarice, the
+      intellectual desire survives the sensual. Money, which represents all the
+      good things of this world, and is these good things in the abstract, now
+      becomes the dry trunk overgrown with all the dead lusts of the flesh,
+      which are egoism in the abstract. They come to life again in the love of
+      the Mammon. The transient pleasure of the senses has become a deliberate
+      and calculated lust of money, which, like that to which it is directed, is
+      symbolical in its nature, and, like it, indestructible.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      This obstinate love of the pleasures of the world&mdash;a love which, as
+      it were, outlives itself; this utterly incorrigible sin, this refined and
+      sublimated desire of the flesh, is the abstract form in which all lusts
+      are concentrated, and to which it stands like a general idea to individual
+      particulars. Accordingly, Avarice is the vice of age, just as extravagance
+      is the vice of youth.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      This <i>disputatio in utramque partem</i>&mdash;this debate for and
+      against&mdash;is certainly calculated to drive us into accepting the <i>juste
+      milieu</i> morality of Aristotle; a conclusion that is also supported by
+      the following consideration.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Every human perfection is allied to a defect into which it threatens to
+      pass; but it is also true that every defect is allied to a perfection.
+      Hence it is that if, as often happens, we make a mistake about a man, it
+      is because at the beginning of our acquaintance with him we confound his
+      defects with the kinds of perfection to which they are allied. The
+      cautious man seems to us a coward; the economical man, a miser; the
+      spendthrift seems liberal; the rude fellow, downright and sincere; the
+      foolhardy person looks as if he were going to work with a noble
+      self-confidence; and so on in many other cases.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      No one can live among men without feeling drawn again and again to the
+      tempting supposition that moral baseness and intellectual incapacity are
+      closely connected, as though they both sprang direct from one source. That
+      that, however, is not so, I have shown in detail.{1} That it seems to be
+      so is merely due to the fact that both are so often found together; and
+      the circumstance is to be explained by the very frequent occurrence of
+      each of them, so that it may easily happen for both to be compelled to
+      live under one roof. At the same time it is not to be denied that they
+      play into each other's hands to their mutual benefit; and it is this that
+      produces the very unedifying spectacle which only too many men exhibit,
+      and that makes the world to go as it goes. A man who is unintelligent is
+      very likely to show his perfidy, villainy and malice; whereas a clever man
+      understands how to conceal these qualities. And how often, on the other
+      hand, does a perversity of heart prevent a man from seeing truths which
+      his intelligence is quite capable of grasping!
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: In my chief work, vol. ii., ch. xix,}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Nevertheless, let no one boast. Just as every man, though he be the
+      greatest genius, has very definite limitations in some one sphere of
+      knowledge, and thus attests his common origin with the essentially
+      perverse and stupid mass of mankind, so also has every man something in
+      his nature which is positively evil. Even the best, nay the noblest,
+      character will sometimes surprise us by isolated traits of depravity; as
+      though it were to acknowledge his kinship with the human race, in which
+      villainy&mdash;nay, cruelty&mdash;is to be found in that degree. For it
+      was just in virtue of this evil in him, this bad principle, that of
+      necessity he became a man. And for the same reason the world in general is
+      what my clear mirror of it has shown it to be.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But in spite of all this the difference even between one man and another
+      is incalculably great, and many a one would be horrified to see another as
+      he really is. Oh, for some Asmodeus of morality, to make not only roofs
+      and walls transparent to his favourites, but also to lift the veil of
+      dissimulation, fraud, hypocrisy, pretence, falsehood and deception, which
+      is spread over all things! to show how little true honesty there is in the
+      world, and how often, even where it is least to be expected, behind all
+      the exterior outwork of virtue, secretly and in the innermost recesses,
+      unrighteousness sits at the helm! It is just on this account that so many
+      men of the better kind have four-footed friends: for, to be sure, how is a
+      man to get relief from the endless dissimulation, falsity and malice of
+      mankind, if there were no dogs into whose honest faces he can look without
+      distrust?
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      For what is our civilised world but a big masquerade? where you meet
+      knights, priests, soldiers, men of learning, barristers, clergymen,
+      philosophers, and I don't know what all! But they are not what they
+      pretend to be; they are only masks, and, as a rule, behind the masks you
+      will find moneymakers. One man, I suppose, puts on the mask of law, which
+      he has borrowed for the purpose from a barrister, only in order to be able
+      to give another man a sound drubbing; a second has chosen the mask of
+      patriotism and the public welfare with a similar intent; a third takes
+      religion or purity of doctrine. For all sorts of purposes men have often
+      put on the mask of philosophy, and even of philanthropy, and I know not
+      what besides. Women have a smaller choice. As a rule they avail themselves
+      of the mask of morality, modesty, domesticity, and humility. Then there
+      are general masks, without any particular character attaching to them like
+      dominoes. They may be met with everywhere; and of this sort is the strict
+      rectitude, the courtesy, the sincere sympathy, the smiling friendship,
+      that people profess. The whole of these masks as a rule are merely, as I
+      have said, a disguise for some industry, commerce, or speculation. It is
+      merchants alone who in this respect constitute any honest class. They are
+      the only people who give themselves out to be what they are; and therefore
+      they go about without any mask at all, and consequently take a humble
+      rank.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      It is very necessary that a man should be apprised early in life that it
+      is a masquerade in which he finds himself. For otherwise there are many
+      things which he will fail to understand and put up with, nay, at which he
+      will be completely puzzled, and that man longest of all whose heart is
+      made of better clay&mdash;
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  <i>Et meliore luto finxit praecordia Titan.{1}</i>
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: Juvenal, <i>Sat</i>. 14, 34}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Such for instance is the favour that villainy finds; the neglect that
+      merit, even the rarest and the greatest, suffers at the hands of those of
+      the same profession; the hatred of truth and great capacity; the ignorance
+      of scholars in their own province; and the fact that true wares are almost
+      always despised and the merely specious ones in request. Therefore let
+      even the young be instructed betimes that in this masquerade the apples
+      are of wax, the flowers of silk, the fish of pasteboard, and that all
+      things&mdash;yes, all things&mdash;are toys and trifles; and that of two
+      men whom he may see earnestly engaged in business, one is supplying
+      spurious goods and the other paying for them in false coin.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But there are more serious reflections to be made, and worse things to be
+      recorded. Man is at bottom a savage, horrible beast. We know it, if only
+      in the business of taming and restraining him which we call civilisation.
+      Hence it is that we are terrified if now and then his nature breaks out.
+      Wherever and whenever the locks and chains of law and order fall off and
+      give place to anarchy, he shows himself for what he is. But it is
+      unnecessary to wait for anarchy in order to gain enlightenment on this
+      subject. A hundred records, old and new, produce the conviction that in
+      his unrelenting cruelty man is in no way inferior to the tiger and the
+      hyaena. A forcible example is supplied by a publication of the year 1841
+      entitled <i>Slavery and the Internal Slave Trade in the United States of
+      North America: being replies to questions transmitted by the British
+      Anti-slavery Society to the American Anti-slavery Society</i>.{1} This
+      book constitutes one of the heaviest indictments against the human race.
+      No one can put it down with a feeling of horror, and few without tears.
+      For whatever the reader may have ever heard, or imagined, or dreamt, of
+      the unhappy condition of slavery, or indeed of human cruelty in general,
+      it will seem small to him when he reads of the way in which those devils
+      in human form, those bigoted, church-going, strictly Sabbatarian rascals&mdash;and
+      in particular the Anglican priests among them&mdash;treated their innocent
+      black brothers, who by wrong and violence had got into their diabolical
+      clutches.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Translator's 'Note</i>.&mdash;If Schopenhauer were writing
+      to-day, he would with equal truth point to the miseries of the African
+      trade. I have slightly abridged this passage, as some of the evils against
+      which he protested no longer exist.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Other examples are furnished by Tshudi's <i>Travels in Peru</i>, in the
+      description which he gives of the treatment of the Peruvian soldiers at
+      the hands of their officers; and by Macleod's <i>Travels in Eastern Africa</i>,
+      where the author tells of the cold-blooded and truly devilish cruelty with
+      which the Portuguese in Mozambique treat their slaves. But we need not go
+      for examples to the New World, that obverse side of our planet. In the
+      year 1848 it was brought to life that in England, not in one, but
+      apparently in a hundred cases within a brief period, a husband had
+      poisoned his wife or <i>vice versâ</i>, or both had joined in poisoning
+      their children, or in torturing them slowly to death by starving and
+      ill-treating them, with no other object than to get the money for burying
+      them which they had insured in the Burial Clubs against their death. For
+      this purpose a child was often insured in several, even in as many as
+      twenty clubs at once.{1}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: Cf. <i>The Times</i>, 20th, 22nd and 23rd Sept., 1848, and
+      also 12th Dec., 1853.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Details of this character belong, indeed, to the blackest pages in the
+      criminal records of humanity. But, when all is said, it is the inward and
+      innate character of man, this god <i>par excellence</i> of the Pantheists,
+      from which they and everything like them proceed. In every man there
+      dwells, first and foremost, a colossal egoism, which breaks the bounds of
+      right and justice with the greatest freedom, as everyday life shows on a
+      small scale, and as history on every page of it on a large. Does not the
+      recognised need of a balance of power in Europe, with the anxious way in
+      which it is preserved, demonstrate that man is a beast of prey, who no
+      sooner sees a weaker man near him than he falls upon him without fail? and
+      does not the same hold good of the affairs of ordinary life?
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But to the boundless egoism of our nature there is joined more or less in
+      every human breast a fund of hatred, anger, envy, rancour and malice,
+      accumulated like the venom in a serpent's tooth, and waiting only for an
+      opportunity of venting itself, and then, like a demon unchained, of
+      storming and raging. If a man has no great occasion for breaking out, he
+      will end by taking advantage of the smallest, and by working it up into
+      something great by the aid of his imagination; for, however small it may
+      be, it is enough to rouse his anger&mdash;
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  <i>Quantulacunque adeo est occasio, sufficit irae{1}</i>&mdash;
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: Juvenal, <i>Sat</i>. 13, 183.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      and then he will carry it as far as he can and may. We see this in daily
+      life, where such outbursts are well known under the name of "venting one's
+      gall on something." It will also have been observed that if such outbursts
+      meet with no opposition the subject of them feels decidedly the better for
+      them afterwards. That anger is not without its pleasure is a truth that
+      was recorded even by Aristotle;{1} and he quotes a passage from Homer, who
+      declares anger to be sweeter than honey. But not in anger alone&mdash;in
+      hatred too, which stands to anger like a chronic to an acute disease, a
+      man may indulge with the greatest delight:
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Rhet</i>., i., 11; ii., 2.}
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  <i>Now hatred is by far the longest pleasure,
+  Men love in haste, but they detest at leisure</i>{1}
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: Byron <i>Don Juan</i>, c. xiii, 6.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Gobineau in his work <i>Les Races Humaines</i> has called man <i>l'animal
+      méchant par excellence</i>. People take this very ill, because they feel
+      that it hits them; but he is quite right, for man is the only animal which
+      causes pain to others without any further purpose than just to cause it.
+      Other animals never do it except to satisfy their hunger, or in the rage
+      of combat. If it is said against the tiger that he kills more than eats,
+      he strangles his prey only for the purpose of eating it; and if he cannot
+      eat it, the only explanation is, as the French phrase has it, that <i>ses
+      yeux sont plus grands que son estomac</i>. No animal ever torments another
+      for the mere purpose of tormenting, but man does it, and it is this that
+      constitutes the diabolical feature in his character which is so much worse
+      than the merely animal. I have already spoken of the matter in its broad
+      aspect; but it is manifest even in small things, and every reader has a
+      daily opportunity of observing it. For instance, if two little dogs are
+      playing together&mdash;and what a genial and charming sight it is&mdash;and
+      a child of three or four years joins them, it is almost inevitable for it
+      to begin hitting them with a whip or stick, and thereby show itself, even
+      at that age, <i>l'animal méchant par excellence</i>. The love of teasing
+      and playing tricks, which is common enough, may be traced to the same
+      source. For instance, if a man has expressed his annoyance at any
+      interruption or other petty inconvenience, there will be no lack of people
+      who for that very reason will bring it about: <i>animal méchant par
+      excellence</i>! This is so certain that a man should be careful not to
+      express any annoyance at small evils. On the other hand he should also be
+      careful not to express his pleasure at any trifle, for, if he does so, men
+      will act like the jailer who, when he found that his prisoner had
+      performed the laborious task of taming a spider, and took a pleasure in
+      watching it, immediately crushed it under his foot: <i>l'animal méchant
+      par excellence</i>! This is why all animals are instinctively afraid of
+      the sight, or even of the track of a man, that <i>animal méchant par
+      excellence</i>! nor does their instinct them false; for it is man alone
+      who hunts game for which he has no use and which does him no harm.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      It is a fact, then, that in the heart of every man there lies a wild beast
+      which only waits for an opportunity to storm and rage, in its desire to
+      inflict pain on others, or, if they stand in his way, to kill them. It is
+      this which is the source of all the lust of war and battle. In trying to
+      tame and to some extent hold it in check, the intelligence, its appointed
+      keeper, has always enough to do. People may, if they please, call it the
+      radical evil of human nature&mdash;a name which will at least serve those
+      with whom a word stands for an explanation. I say, however, that it is the
+      will to live, which, more and more embittered by the constant sufferings
+      of existence, seeks to alleviate its own torment by causing torment in
+      others. But in this way a man gradually develops in himself real cruelty
+      and malice. The observation may also be added that as, according to Kant,
+      matter subsists only through the antagonism of the powers of expansion and
+      contraction, so human society subsists only by the antagonism of hatred,
+      or anger, and fear. For there is a moment in the life of all of us when
+      the malignity of our nature might perhaps make us murderers, if it were
+      not accompanied by a due admixture of fear to keep it within bounds; and
+      this fear, again, would make a man the sport and laughing stock of every
+      boy, if anger were not lying ready in him, and keeping watch.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But it is <i>Schadenfreude</i>, a mischievous delight in the misfortunes
+      of others, which remains the worst trait in human nature. It is a feeling
+      which is closely akin to cruelty, and differs from it, to say the truth,
+      only as theory from practice. In general, it may be said of it that it
+      takes the place which pity ought to take&mdash;pity which is its opposite,
+      and the true source of all real justice and charity.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <i>Envy</i> is also opposed to pity, but in another sense; envy, that is
+      to say, is produced by a cause directly antagonistic to that which
+      produces the delight in mischief. The opposition between pity and envy on
+      the one hand, and pity and the delight in mischief on the other, rests, in
+      the main, on the occasions which call them forth. In the case of envy it
+      is only as a direct effect of the cause which excites it that we feel it
+      at all. That is just the reason why envy, although it is a reprehensible
+      feeling, still admits of some excuse, and is, in general, a very human
+      quality; whereas the delight in mischief is diabolical, and its taunts are
+      the laughter of hell.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The delight in mischief, as I have said, takes the place which pity ought
+      to take. Envy, on the contrary, finds a place only where there is no
+      inducement to pity, or rather an inducement to its opposite; and it is
+      just as this opposite that envy arises in the human breast; and so far,
+      therefore, it may still be reckoned a human sentiment. Nay, I am afraid
+      that no one will be found to be entirely free from it. For that a man
+      should feel his own lack of things more bitterly at the sight of another's
+      delight in the enjoyment of them, is natural; nay, it is inevitable; but
+      this should not rouse his hatred of the man who is happier than himself.
+      It is just this hatred, however, in which true envy consists. Least of all
+      should a man be envious, when it is a question, not of the gifts of
+      fortune, or chance, or another's favour, but of the gifts of nature;
+      because everything that is innate in a man rests on a metaphysical basis,
+      and possesses justification of a higher kind; it is, so to speak, given
+      him by Divine grace. But, unhappily, it is just in the case of personal
+      advantages that envy is most irreconcilable. Thus it is that intelligence,
+      or even genius, cannot get on in the world without begging pardon for its
+      existence, wherever it is not in a position to be able, proudly and
+      boldly, to despise the world.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In other words, if envy is aroused only by wealth, rank, or power, it is
+      often kept down by egoism, which perceives that, on occasion, assistance,
+      enjoyment, support, protection, advancement, and so on, may be hoped for
+      from the object of envy or that at least by intercourse with him a man may
+      himself win honour from the reflected light of his superiority; and here,
+      too, there is the hope of one day attaining all those advantages himself.
+      On the other hand, in the envy that is directed to natural gifts and
+      personal advantages, like beauty in women, or intelligence in men, there
+      is no consolation or hope of one kind or the other; so that nothing
+      remains but to indulge a bitter and irreconcilable hatred of the person
+      who possesses these privileges; and hence the only remaining desire is to
+      take vengeance on him.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But here the envious man finds himself in an unfortunate position; for all
+      his blows fall powerless as soon as it is known that they come from him.
+      Accordingly he hides his feelings as carefully as if they were secret
+      sins, and so becomes an inexhaustible inventor of tricks and artifices and
+      devices for concealing and masking his procedure, in order that,
+      unperceived, he may wound the object of his envy. For instance, with an
+      air of the utmost unconcern he will ignore the advantages which are eating
+      his heart out; he will neither see them, nor know them, nor have observed
+      or even heard of them, and thus make himself a master in the art of
+      dissimulation. With great cunning he will completely overlook the man
+      whose brilliant qualities are gnawing at his heart, and act as though he
+      were quite an unimportant person; he will take no notice of him, and, on
+      occasion, will have even quite forgotten his existence. But at the same
+      time he will before all things endeavour by secret machination carefully
+      to deprive those advantages of any opportunity of showing themselves and
+      becoming known. Then out of his dark corner he will attack these qualities
+      with censure, mockery, ridicule and calumny, like the toad which spurts
+      its poison from a hole. No less will he enthusiastically praise
+      unimportant people, or even indifferent or bad performances in the same
+      sphere. In short, he will becomes a Proteas in stratagem, in order to
+      wound others without showing himself. But what is the use of it? The
+      trained eye recognises him in spite of it all. He betrays himself, if by
+      nothing else, by the way in which he timidly avoids and flies from the
+      object of his envy, who stands the more completely alone, the more
+      brilliant he is; and this is the reason why pretty girls have no friends
+      of their own sex. He betrays himself, too, by the causeless hatred which
+      he shows&mdash;a hatred which finds vent in a violent explosion at any
+      circumstance however trivial, though it is often only the product of his
+      imagination. How many such men there are in the world may be recognised by
+      the universal praise of modesty, that is, of a virtue invented on behalf
+      of dull and commonplace people. Nevertheless, it is a virtue which, by
+      exhibiting the necessity for dealing considerately with the wretched
+      plight of these people, is just what calls attention to it.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      For our self-consciousness and our pride there can be nothing more
+      flattering than the sight of envy lurking in its retreat and plotting its
+      schemes; but never let a man forget that where there is envy there is
+      hatred, and let him be careful not to make a false friend out of any
+      envious person. Therefore it is important to our safety to lay envy bare;
+      and a man should study to discover its tricks, as it is everywhere to be
+      found and always goes about <i>incognito</i>; or as I have said, like a
+      venomous toad it lurks in dark corners. It deserves neither quarter nor
+      sympathy; but as we can never reconcile it let our rule of conduct be to
+      scorn it with a good heart, and as our happiness and glory is torture to
+      it we may rejoice in its sufferings:
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  <i>Den Neid wirst nimmer du versöhnen;
+  So magst du ihn getrost verhöhnen.
+  Dein Glück, dein Ruhm ist ihm ein Leiden:
+  Magst drum an seiner Quaal dich weiden</i>.
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      We have been taking a look at the <i>depravity</i> of man, and it is a
+      sight which may well fill us with horror. But now we must cast our eyes on
+      the <i>misery</i> of his existence; and when we have done so, and are
+      horrified by that too, we must look back again at his depravity. We shall
+      then find that they hold the balance to each other. We shall perceive the
+      eternal justice of things; for we shall recognise that the world is itself
+      the Last Judgment on it, and we shall begin to understand why it is that
+      everything that lives must pay the penalty of its existence, first in
+      living and then in dying. Thus the evil of the penalty accords with the
+      evil of the sin&mdash;<i>malum poenae</i> with <i>malum culpae</i>. From
+      the same point of view we lose our indignation at that intellectual
+      incapacity of the great majority of mankind which in life so often
+      disgusts us. In this <i>Sansara</i>, as the Buddhists call it, human
+      misery, human depravity and human folly correspond with one another
+      perfectly, and they are of like magnitude. But if, on some special
+      inducement, we direct our gaze to one of them, and survey it in
+      particular, it seems to exceed the other two. This, however, is an
+      illusion, and merely the effect of their colossal range.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      All things proclaim this <i>Sansara</i>; more than all else, the world of
+      mankind; in which, from a moral point of view, villainy and baseness, and
+      from an intellectual point of view, incapacity and stupidity, prevail to a
+      horrifying extent. Nevertheless, there appear in it, although very
+      spasmodically, and always as a fresh surprise, manifestations of honesty,
+      of goodness, nay, even of nobility; and also of great intelligence, of the
+      thinking mind of genius. They never quite vanish, but like single points
+      of light gleam upon us out of the great dark mass. We must accept them as
+      a pledge that this <i>Sansara</i> contains a good and redeeming principle,
+      which is capable of breaking through and of filling and freeing the whole
+      of it.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      The readers of my <i>Ethics</i> know that with me the ultimate foundation
+      of morality is the truth which in the <i>Vedas</i> and the <i>Vedanta</i>
+      receives its expression in the established, mystical formula, <i>Tat twam
+      asi (This is thyself</i>), which is spoken with reference to every living
+      thing, be it man or beast, and is called the <i>Mahavakya</i>, the great
+      word.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Actions which proceed in accordance with this principle, such as those of
+      the philanthropist, may indeed be regarded as the beginning of mysticism.
+      Every benefit rendered with a pure intention proclaims that the man who
+      exercises it acts in direct conflict with the world of appearance; for he
+      recognises himself as identical with another individual, who exists in
+      complete separation from him. Accordingly, all disinterested kindness is
+      inexplicable; it is a mystery; and hence in order to explain it a man has
+      to resort to all sorts of fictions. When Kant had demolished all other
+      arguments for theism, he admitted one only, that it gave the best
+      interpretation and solution of such mysterious actions, and of all others
+      like them. He therefore allowed it to stand as a presumption unsusceptible
+      indeed of theoretical proof, but valid from a practical point of view. I
+      may, however, express my doubts whether he was quite serious about it. For
+      to make morality rest on theism is really to reduce morality to egoism;
+      although the English, it is true, as also the lowest classes of society
+      with us, do not perceive the possibility of any other foundation for it.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The above-mentioned recognition of a man's own true being in another
+      individual objectively presented to him, is exhibited in a particularly
+      beautiful and clear way in the cases in which a man, already destined to
+      death beyond any hope of rescue, gives himself up to the welfare of others
+      with great solicitude and zeal, and tries to save them. Of this kind is
+      the well-known story of a servant who was bitten in a courtyard at night
+      by a mad dog. In the belief that she was beyond hope, she seized the dog
+      and dragged it into a stable, which she then locked, so that no one else
+      might be bitten. Then again there is the incident in Naples, which
+      Tischbein has immortalised in one of his <i>aquarelles</i>. A son, fleeing
+      from the lava which is rapidly streaming toward the sea, is carrying his
+      aged father on his back. When there is only a narrow strip of land left
+      between the devouring elements, the father bids the son put him down, so
+      that the son may save himself by flight, as otherwise both will be lost.
+      The son obeys, and as he goes casts a glance of farewell on his father.
+      This is the moment depicted. The historical circumstance which Scott
+      represents in his masterly way in <i>The Heart of Midlothian</i>, chap,
+      ii., is of a precisely similar kind; where, of two delinquents condemned
+      to death, the one who by his awkwardness caused the capture of the other
+      happily sets him free in the chapel by overpowering the guard after the
+      execution-sermon, without at the same time making any attempt on his own
+      behalf. Nay, in the same category must also be placed the scene which is
+      represented in a common engraving, which may perhaps be objectionable to
+      western readers&mdash;I mean the one in which a soldier, kneeling to be
+      shot, is trying by waving a cloth to frighten away his dog who wants to
+      come to him.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In all these cases we see an individual in the face of his own immediate
+      and certain destruction no longer thinking of saving himself, so that he
+      may direct the whole of his efforts to saving some one else. How could
+      there be a clearer expression of the consciousness that what is being
+      destroyed is only a phenomenon, and that the destruction itself is only a
+      phenomenon; that, on the other hand, the real being of the man who meets
+      his death is untouched by that event, and lives on in the other man, in
+      whom even now, as his action betrays, he so clearly perceives it to exist?
+      For if this were not so, and it was his real being which was about to be
+      annihilated, how could that being spend its last efforts in showing such
+      an ardent sympathy in the welfare and continued existence of another?
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      There are two different ways in which a man may become conscious of his
+      own existence. On the one hand, he may have an empirical perception of it,
+      as it manifests itself externally&mdash;something so small that it
+      approaches vanishing point; set in a world which, as regards time and
+      space, is infinite; one only of the thousand millions of human creatures
+      who run about on this planet for a very brief period and are renewed every
+      thirty years. On the other hand, by going down into the depths of his own
+      nature, a man may become conscious that he is all in all; that, in fact,
+      he is the only real being; and that, in addition, this real being
+      perceives itself again in others, who present themselves from without, as
+      though they formed a mirror of himself.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Of these two ways in which a man may come to know what he is, the first
+      grasps the phenomenon alone, the mere product of <i>the principle of
+      individuation</i>; whereas the second makes a man immediately conscious
+      that he is <i>the thing-in-itself</i>. This is a doctrine in which, as
+      regards the first way, I have Kant, and as regards both, I have the <i>Vedas</i>,
+      to support me.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      There is, it is true, a simple objection to the second method. It may be
+      said to assume that one and the same being can exist in different places
+      at the same time, and yet be complete in each of them. Although, from an
+      empirical point of view, this is the most palpable impossibility&mdash;nay,
+      absurdity&mdash;it is nevertheless perfectly true of the thing-in-itself.
+      The impossibility and the absurdity of it, empirically, are only due to
+      the forms which phenomena assume, in accordance with the principle of
+      individuation. For the thing-in-itself, the will to live, exists whole and
+      undivided in every being, even in the smallest, as completely as in the
+      sum-total of all things that ever were or are or will be. This is why
+      every being, even the smallest, says to itself, So long as I am safe, let
+      the world perish&mdash;<i>dum ego salvus sim, pereat mundus</i>. And, in
+      truth, even if only one individual were left in the world, and all the
+      rest were to perish, the one that remained would still possess the whole
+      self-being of the world, uninjured and undiminished, and would laugh at
+      the destruction of the world as an illusion. This conclusion <i>per
+      impossible</i> may be balanced by the counter-conclusion, which is on all
+      fours with it, that if that last individual were to be annihilated in and
+      with him the whole world would be destroyed. It was in this sense that the
+      mystic Angelas Silesius{1} declared that God could not live for a moment
+      without him, and that if he were to be annihilated God must of necessity
+      give up the ghost:
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  <i>Ich weiss dass ohne mich Gott nicht ein Nu kann leben;
+  Werd' ich zunicht, er muss von Noth den Geist aufgeben</i>.
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Translator's Note</i>.&mdash;Angelus Silesius, see <i>Counsels
+      and Maxims</i>, p. 39, note.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But the empirical point of view also to some extent enables us to perceive
+      that it is true, or at least possible, that our self can exist in other
+      beings whose consciousness is separated and different from our own. That
+      this is so is shown by the experience of somnambulists. Although the
+      identity of their ego is preserved throughout, they know nothing, when
+      they awake, of all that a moment before they themselves said, did or
+      suffered. So entirely is the individual consciousness a phenomenon that
+      even in the same ego two consciousnesses can arise of which the one knows
+      nothing of the other.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <br /><br />
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      <a name="link2H_4_0003" id="link2H_4_0003"> </a>
+    </p>
+    <div style="height: 4em;">
+      <br /><br /><br /><br />
+    </div>
+    <h2>
+      GOVERNMENT.
+    </h2>
+    <p>
+      It is a characteristic failing of the Germans to look in the clouds for
+      what lies at their feet. An excellent example of this is furnished by the
+      treatment which the idea of <i>Natural Right</i> has received at the hands
+      of professors of philosophy. When they are called upon to explain those
+      simple relations of human life which make up the substance of this right,
+      such as Right and Wrong, Property, State, Punishment and so on, they have
+      recourse to the most extravagant, abstract, remote and meaningless
+      conceptions, and out of them build a Tower of Babel reaching to the
+      clouds, and taking this or that form according to the special whim of the
+      professor for the time being. The clearest and simplest relations of life,
+      such as affect us directly, are thus made quite unintelligible, to the
+      great detriment of the young people who are educated in such a school.
+      These relations themselves are perfectly simple and easily understood&mdash;as
+      the reader may convince himself if he will turn to the account which I
+      have given of them in the <i>Foundation of Morality</i>, § 17, and in my
+      chief work, bk. i., § 62. But at the sound of certain words, like Right,
+      Freedom, the Good, Being&mdash;this nugatory infinitive of the cupola&mdash;and
+      many others of the same sort, the German's head begins to swim, and
+      falling straightway into a kind of delirium he launches forth into
+      high-flown phrases which have no meaning whatever. He takes the most
+      remote and empty conceptions, and strings them together artificially,
+      instead of fixing his eyes on the facts, and looking at things and
+      relations as they really are. It is these things and relations which
+      supply the ideas of Right and Freedom, and give them the only true meaning
+      that they possess.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The man who starts from the preconceived opinion that the conception of
+      Right must be a positive one, and then attempts to define it, will fail;
+      for he is trying to grasp a shadow, to pursue a spectre, to search for
+      what does not exist. The conception of Right is a negative one, like the
+      conception of Freedom; its content is mere negation. It is the conception
+      of Wrong which is positive; Wrong has the same significance as <i>injury</i>&mdash;<i>laesio</i>&mdash;in
+      the widest sense of the term. An injury may be done either to a man's
+      person or to his property or to his honour; and accordingly a man's rights
+      are easy to define: every one has a right to do anything that injures no
+      one else.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      To have a right to do or claim a thing means nothing more than to be able
+      to do or take or vise it without thereby injuring any one else. <i>Simplex
+      sigillum veri</i>. This definition shows how senseless many questions are;
+      for instance, the question whether we have the right to take our own life,
+      As far as concerns the personal claims which others may possibly have upon
+      us, they are subject to the condition that we are alive, and fall to the
+      ground when we die. To demand of a man, who does not care to live any
+      longer for himself, that he should live on as a mere machine for the
+      advantage of others is an extravagant pretension.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Although men's powers differ, their rights are alike. Their rights do not
+      rest upon their powers, because Right is of a moral complexion; they rest
+      on the fact that the same will to live shows itself in every man at the
+      same stage of its manifestation. This, however, only applies to that
+      original and abstract Right, which a man possesses as a man. The property,
+      and also the honour, which a man acquires for himself by the exercise of
+      his powers, depend on the measure and kind of power which he possesses,
+      and so lend his Right a wider sphere of application. Here, then, equality
+      comes to an end. The man who is better equipped, or more active, increases
+      by adding to his gains, not his Right, but the number of the things to
+      which it extends.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In my chief work{1} I have proved that the State in its essence is merely
+      an institution existing for the purpose of protecting its members against
+      outward attack or inward dissension. It follows from this that the
+      ultimate ground on which the State is necessary is the acknowledged lack
+      of Right in the human race. If Right were there, no one would think of a
+      State; for no one would have any fear that his rights would be impaired;
+      and a mere union against the attacks of wild beasts or the elements would
+      have very little analogy with what we mean by a State. From this point of
+      view it is easy to see how dull and stupid are the philosophasters who in
+      pompous phrases represent that the State is the supreme end and flower of
+      human existence. Such a view is the apotheosis of Philistinism.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: 1 Bk. ii., ch. xlvii.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      If it were Right that ruled in the world, a man would have done enough in
+      building his house, and would need no other protection than the right of
+      possessing it, which would be obvious. But since Wrong is the order of the
+      day, it is requisite that the man who has built his house should also be
+      able to protect it. Otherwise his Right is <i>de facto</i> incomplete; the
+      aggressor, that is to say, has the right of might&mdash;<i>Faustrecht</i>;
+      and this is just the conception of Right which Spinoza entertains. He
+      recognises no other. His words are: <i>unusquisque tantum juris habet
+      quantum potentia valet</i>;{1} each man has as much right as he has power.
+      And again: <i>uniuscujusque jus potentia ejus definitur</i>; each man's
+      right is determined by his power.{2} Hobbes seems to have started this
+      conception of Right,{3} and he adds the strange comment that the Right of
+      the good Lord to all things rests on nothing but His omnipotence.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Tract. Theol. Pol</i>., ch. ii., § 8.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 2: <i>Ethics</i>, IV., xxxvii., 1.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 3: Particularly in a passage in the <i>De Cive</i>, I, § 14.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Now this is a conception of Right which, both in theory and in practice,
+      no longer prevails in the civic world; but in the world in general, though
+      abolished in theory, it continues to apply in practice. The consequences
+      of neglecting it may be seen in the case of China. Threatened by rebellion
+      within and foes without, this great empire is in a defenceless state, and
+      has to pay the penalty of having cultivated only the arts of peace and
+      ignored the arts of war.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      There is a certain analogy between the operations of nature and those of
+      man which is a peculiar but not fortuitous character, and is based on the
+      identity of the will in both. When the herbivorous animals had taken their
+      place in the organic world, beasts of prey made their appearance&mdash;necessarily
+      a late appearance&mdash;in each species, and proceeded to live upon them.
+      Just in the same way, as soon as by honest toil and in the sweat of their
+      faces men have won from the ground what is needed for the support of their
+      societies, a number of individuals are sure to arise in some of these
+      societies, who, instead of cultivating the earth and living on its
+      produce, prefer to take their lives in their hands and risk health and
+      freedom by falling upon those who are in possession of what they have
+      honestly earned, and by appropriating the fruits of their labour. These
+      are the beasts of prey in the human race; they are the conquering peoples
+      whom we find everywhere in history, from the most ancient to the most
+      recent times. Their varying fortunes, as at one moment they succeed and at
+      another fail, make up the general elements of the history of the world.
+      Hence Voltaire was perfectly right when he said that the aim of all war is
+      robbery. That those who engage in it are ashamed of their doings is clear
+      by the fact that governments loudly protest their reluctance to appeal to
+      arms except for purposes of self-defence. Instead of trying to excuse
+      themselves by telling public and official lies, which are almost more
+      revolting than war itself, they should take their stand, as bold as brass,
+      on Macchiavelli's doctrine. The gist of it may be stated to be this: that
+      whereas between one individual and another, and so far as concerns the law
+      and morality of their relations, the principle, <i>Don't do to others what
+      you wouldn't like done to yourself</i>, certainly applies, it is the
+      converse of this principle which is appropriate in the case of nations and
+      in politics: <i>What you wouldn't like done to yourself do to others</i>.
+      If you do not want to be put under a foreign yoke, take time by the
+      forelock, and put your neighbour under it himself; whenever, that is to
+      say, his weakness offers you the opportunity. For if you let the
+      opportunity pass, it will desert one day to the enemy's camp and offer
+      itself there. Then your enemy will put you under his yoke; and your
+      failure to grasp the opportunity may be paid for, not by the generation
+      which was guilty of it, but by the next. This Macchiavellian principle is
+      always a much more decent cloak for the lust of robbery than the rags of
+      very obvious lies in a speech from the head of the State; lies, too, of a
+      description which recalls the well-known story of the rabbit attacking the
+      dog. Every State looks upon its neighbours as at bottom a horde of
+      robbers, who will fall upon it as soon as they have the opportunity.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      Between the serf, the farmer, the tenant, and the mortgagee, the
+      difference is rather one of form than of substance. Whether the peasant
+      belongs to me, or the land on which he has to get a living; whether the
+      bird is mine, or its food, the tree or its fruit, is a matter of little
+      moment; for, as Shakespeare makes Shylock say:
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+                              <i>You take my life
+  When you do take the means whereby I live</i>.
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      The free peasant has, indeed, the advantage that he can go off and seek
+      his fortune in the wide world; whereas the serf who is attached to the
+      soil, <i>glebae adscriptus</i>, has an advantage which is perhaps still
+      greater, that when failure of crops or illness, old age or incapacity,
+      render him helpless, his master must look after him, and so he sleeps well
+      at night; whereas, if the crops fail, his master tosses about on his bed
+      trying to think how he is to procure bread for his men. As long ago as
+      Menander it was said that it is better to be the slave of a good master
+      than to live miserably as a freeman. Another advantage possessed by the
+      free is that if they have any talents they can improve their position; but
+      the same advantage is not wholly withheld from the slave. If he proves
+      himself useful to his master by the exercise of any skill, he is treated
+      accordingly; just as in ancient Rome mechanics, foremen of workshops,
+      architects, nay, even doctors, were generally slaves.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Slavery and poverty, then, are only two forms, I might almost say only two
+      names, of the same thing, the essence of which is that a man's physical
+      powers are employed, in the main, not for himself but for others; and this
+      leads partly to his being over-loaded with work, and partly to his getting
+      a scanty satisfaction for his needs. For Nature has given a man only as
+      much physical power as will suffice, if he exerts it in moderation, to
+      gain a sustenance from the earth. No great superfluity of power is his.
+      If, then, a not inconsiderable number of men are relieved from the common
+      burden of sustaining the existence of the human race, the burden of the
+      remainder is augmented, and they suffer. This is the chief source of the
+      evil which under the name of slavery, or under the name of the
+      proletariat, has always oppressed the great majority of the human race.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But the more remote cause of it is luxury. In order, it may be said, that
+      some few persons may have what is unnecessary, superfluous, and the
+      product of refinement&mdash;nay, in order that they may satisfy artificial
+      needs&mdash;a great part of the existing powers of mankind has to be
+      devoted to this object, and therefore withdrawn from the production of
+      what is necessary and indispensable. Instead of building cottages for
+      themselves, thousands of men build mansions for a few. Instead of weaving
+      coarse materials for themselves and their families, they make fine cloths,
+      silk, or even lace, for the rich, and in general manufacture a thousand
+      objects of luxury for their pleasure. A great part of the urban population
+      consists of workmen who make these articles of luxury; and for them and
+      those who give them work the peasants have to plough and sow and look
+      after the flocks as well as for themselves, and thus have more labour than
+      Nature originally imposed upon them. Moreover, the urban population
+      devotes a great deal of physical strength, and a great deal of land, to
+      such things as wine, silk, tobacco, hops, asparagus and so on, instead of
+      to corn, potatoes and cattle-breeding. Further, a number of men are
+      withdrawn from agriculture and employed in ship-building and seafaring, in
+      order that sugar, coffee, tea and other goods may be imported. In short, a
+      large part of the powers of the human race is taken away from the
+      production of what is necessary, in order to bring what is superfluous and
+      unnecessary within the reach of a few. As long therefore as luxury exists,
+      there must be a corresponding amount of over-work and misery, whether it
+      takes the name of poverty or of slavery. The fundamental difference
+      between the two is that slavery originates in violence, and poverty in
+      craft. The whole unnatural condition of society&mdash;the universal
+      struggle to escape from misery, the sea-trade attended with so much loss
+      of life, the complicated interests of commerce, and finally the wars to
+      which it all gives rise&mdash;is due, only and alone, to luxury, which
+      gives no happiness even to those who enjoy it, nay, makes them ill and
+      bad-tempered. Accordingly it looks as if the most effective way of
+      alleviating human misery would be to diminish luxury, or even abolish it
+      altogether.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      There is unquestionably much truth in this train of thought. But the
+      conclusion at which it arrives is refuted by an argument possessing this
+      advantage over it&mdash;that it is confirmed by the testimony of
+      experience. A certain amount of work is devoted to purposes of luxury.
+      What the human race loses in this way in the <i>muscular power</i> which
+      would otherwise be available for the necessities of existence is gradually
+      made up to it a thousandfold by the <i>nervous power</i>, which, in a
+      chemical sense, is thereby released. And since the intelligence and
+      sensibility which are thus promoted are on a higher level than the
+      muscular irritability which they supplant, so the achievements of mind
+      exceed those of the body a thousandfold. One wise counsel is worth the
+      work of many hands:
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  {Greek: Hos en sophon bouleuma tas pollon cheiras nika.}
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      A nation of nothing but peasants would do little in the way of discovery
+      and invention; but idle hands make active heads. Science and the Arts are
+      themselves the children of luxury, and they discharge their debt to it.
+      The work which they do is to perfect technology in all its branches,
+      mechanical, chemical and physical; an art which in our days has brought
+      machinery to a pitch never dreamt of before, and in particular has, by
+      steam and electricity, accomplished things the like of which would, in
+      earlier ages, have been ascribed to the agency of the devil. In
+      manufactures of all kinds, and to some extent in agriculture, machines now
+      do a thousand times more than could ever have been done by the hands of
+      all the well-to-do, educated, and professional classes, and could ever
+      have been attained if all luxury had been abolished and every one had
+      returned to the life of a peasant. It is by no means the rich alone, but
+      all classes, who derive benefit from these industries. Things which in
+      former days hardly any one could afford are now cheap and abundant, and
+      even the lowest classes are much better off in point of comfort. In the
+      Middle Ages a King of England once borrowed a pair of silk stockings from
+      one of his lords, so that he might wear them in giving an audience to the
+      French ambassador. Even Queen Elizabeth was greatly pleased and astonished
+      to receive a pair as a New Year's present; to-day every shopman has them.
+      Fifty years ago ladies wore the kind of calico gowns which servants wear
+      now. If mechanical science continues to progress at the same rate for any
+      length of time, it may end by saving human labour almost entirely, just as
+      horses are even now being largely superseded by machines. For it is
+      possible to conceive that intellectual culture might in some degree become
+      general in the human race; and this would be impossible as long as bodily
+      labour was incumbent on any great part of it. Muscular irritability and
+      nervous sensibility are always and everywhere, both generally and
+      particularly, in antagonism; for the simple reason that it is one and the
+      same vital power which underlies both. Further, since the arts have a
+      softening effect on character, it is possible that quarrels great and
+      small, wars and duels, will vanish from the world; just as both have
+      become much rarer occurrences. However, it is not my object here to write
+      a <i>Utopia</i>.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But apart from all this the arguments used above in favour of the
+      abolition of luxury and the uniform distribution of all bodily labour are
+      open to the objection that the great mass of mankind, always and
+      everywhere, cannot do without leaders, guides and counsellors, in one
+      shape or another, according to the matter in question; judges, governors,
+      generals, officials, priests, doctors, men of learning, philosophers, and
+      so on, are all a necessity. Their common task is to lead the race for the
+      greater part so incapable and perverse, through the labyrinth of life, of
+      which each of them according to his position and capacity has obtained a
+      general view, be his range wide or narrow. That these guides of the race
+      should be permanently relieved of all bodily labour as well as of all
+      vulgar need and discomfort; nay, that in proportion to their much greater
+      achievements they should necessarily own and enjoy more than the common
+      man, is natural and reasonable. Great merchants should also be included in
+      the same privileged class, whenever they make far-sighted preparations for
+      national needs.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The question of the sovereignty of the people is at bottom the same as the
+      question whether any man can have an original right to rule a people
+      against its will. How that proposition can be reasonably maintained I do
+      not see. The people, it must be admitted, is sovereign; but it is a
+      sovereign who is always a minor. It must have permanent guardians, and it
+      can never exercise its rights itself, without creating dangers of which no
+      one can foresee the end; especially as like all minors, it is very apt to
+      become the sport of designing sharpers, in the shape of what are called
+      demagogues.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Voltaire remarks that the first man to become a king was a successful
+      soldier. It is certainly the case that all princes were originally
+      victorious leaders of armies, and for a long time it was as such that they
+      bore sway. On the rise of standing armies princes began to regard their
+      people as a means of sustaining themselves and their soldiers, and treated
+      them, accordingly, as though they were a herd of cattle, which had to be
+      tended in order that it might provide wool, milk, and meat. The why and
+      wherefore of all this, as I shall presently show in detail, is the fact
+      that originally it was not right, but might, that ruled in the world.
+      Might has the advantage of having been the first in the field. That is why
+      it is impossible to do away with it and abolish it altogether; it must
+      always have its place; and all that a man can wish or ask is that it
+      should be found on the side of right and associated with it. Accordingly
+      says the prince to his subjects: "I rule you in virtue of the power which
+      I possess. But, on the other hand, it excludes that of any one else, and I
+      shall suffer none but my own, whether it comes from without, or arises
+      within by one of you trying to oppress another. In this way, then, you are
+      protected." The arrangement was carried out; and just because it was
+      carried out the old idea of kingship developed with time and progress into
+      quite a different idea, and put the other one in the background, where it
+      may still be seen, now and then, flitting about like a spectre. Its place
+      has been taken by the idea of the king as father of his people, as the
+      firm and unshakable pillar which alone supports and maintains the whole
+      organisation of law and order, and consequently the rights of every
+      man.{1} But a king can accomplish this only by inborn prerogative which
+      reserves authority to him and to him alone&mdash;an authority which is
+      supreme, indubitable, and beyond all attack, nay, to which every one
+      renders instinctive obedience. Hence the king is rightly said to rule "by
+      the grace of God." He is always the most useful person in the State, and
+      his services are never too dearly repaid by any Civil List, however heavy.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: We read in Stobaeus, <i>Florilegium</i>, ch. xliv., 41, of a
+      Persian custom, by which, whenever a king died, there was a five days'
+      anarchy, in order that people might perceive the advantage of having kings
+      and laws.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But even as late a writer as Macchiavelli was so decidedly imbued with the
+      earlier or mediaeval conception of the position of a prince that he treats
+      it as a matter which is self-evident: he never discusses it, but tacitly
+      takes it as the presupposition and basis of his advice. It may be said
+      generally that his book is merely the theoretical statement and consistent
+      and systematic exposition of the practice prevailing in his time. It is
+      the novel statement of it in a complete theoretical form that lends it
+      such a poignant interest. The same thing, I may remark in passing, applies
+      to the immortal little work of La Rochefaucauld, who, however, takes
+      private and not public life for his theme, and offers, not advice, but
+      observations. The title of this fine little book is open, perhaps, to some
+      objection: the contents are not, as a rule, either <i>maxims</i> or <i>reflections</i>,
+      but <i>aperçus</i>; and that is what they should be called. There is much,
+      too, in Macchiavelli that will be found also to apply to private life.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Right in itself is powerless; in nature it is Might that rules. To enlist
+      might on the side of right, so that by means of it right may rule, is the
+      problem of statesmanship. And it is indeed a hard problem, as will be
+      obvious if we remember that almost every human breast is the seat of an
+      egoism which has no limits, and is usually associated with an accumulated
+      store of hatred and malice; so that at the very start feelings of enmity
+      largely prevail over those of friendship. We have also to bear in mind
+      that it is many millions of individuals so constituted who have to be kept
+      in the bonds of law and order, peace and tranquillity; whereas originally
+      every one had a right to say to every one else: <i>I am just as good as
+      you are</i>! A consideration of all this must fill us with surprise that
+      on the whole the world pursues its way so peacefully and quietly, and with
+      so much law and order as we see to exist. It is the machinery of State
+      which alone accomplishes it. For it is physical power alone which has any
+      direct action on men; constituted as they generally are, it is for
+      physical power alone that they have any feeling or respect.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      If a man would convince himself by experience that this is the case, he
+      need do nothing but remove all compulsion from his fellows, and try to
+      govern them by clearly and forcibly representing to them what is
+      reasonable, right, and fair, though at the same time it may be contrary to
+      their interests. He would be laughed to scorn; and as things go that is
+      the only answer he would get. It would soon be obvious to him that moral
+      force alone is powerless. It is, then, physical force alone which is
+      capable of securing respect. Now this force ultimately resides in the
+      masses, where it is associated with ignorance, stupidity and injustice.
+      Accordingly the main aim of statesmanship in these difficult circumstances
+      is to put physical force in subjection to mental force&mdash;to
+      intellectual superiority, and thus to make it serviceable. But if this aim
+      is not itself accompanied by justice and good intentions the result of the
+      business, if it succeeds, is that the State so erected consists of knaves
+      and fools, the deceivers and the deceived. That this is the case is made
+      gradually evident by the progress of intelligence amongst the masses,
+      however much it may be repressed; and it leads to revolution. But if,
+      contrarily, intelligence is accompanied by justice and good intentions,
+      there arises a State as perfect as the character of human affairs will
+      allow. It is very much to the purpose if justice and good intentions not
+      only exist, but are also demonstrable and openly exhibited, and can be
+      called to account publicly, and be subject to control. Care must be taken,
+      however, lest the resulting participation of many persons in the work of
+      government should affect the unity of the State, and inflict a loss of
+      strength and concentration on the power by which its home and foreign
+      affairs have to be administered. This is what almost always happens in
+      republics. To produce a constitution which should satisfy all these
+      demands would accordingly be the highest aim of statesmanship. But, as a
+      matter of fact, statesmanship has to consider other things as well. It has
+      to reckon with the people as they exist, and their national peculiarities.
+      This is the raw material on which it has to work, and the ingredients of
+      that material will always exercise a great effect on the completed scheme.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Statesmanship will have achieved a good deal if it so far attains its
+      object as to reduce wrong and injustice in the community to a minimum. To
+      banish them altogether, and to leave no trace of them, is merely the ideal
+      to be aimed at; and it is only approximately that it can be reached. If
+      they disappear in one direction, they creep in again in another; for wrong
+      and injustice lie deeply rooted in human nature. Attempts have been made
+      to attain the desired aim by artificial constitutions and systematic codes
+      of law; but they are not in complete touch with the facts&mdash;they
+      remain an asymptote, for the simple reason that hard and fast conceptions
+      never embrace all possible cases, and cannot be made to meet individual
+      instances. Such conceptions resemble the stones of a mosaic rather than
+      the delicate shading in a picture. Nay, more: all experiments in this
+      matter are attended with danger; because the material in question, namely,
+      the human race, is the most difficult of all material to handle. It is
+      almost as dangerous as an explosive.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      No doubt it is true that in the machinery of the State the freedom of the
+      press performs the same function as a safety-valve in other machinery; for
+      it enables all discontent to find a voice; nay, in doing so, the
+      discontent exhausts itself if it has not much substance; and if it has,
+      there is an advantage in recognising it betimes and applying the remedy.
+      This is much better than to repress the discontent, and let it simmer and
+      ferment, and go on increasing until it ends in an explosion. On the other
+      hand, the freedom of the press may be regarded as a permission to sell
+      poison&mdash;poison for the heart and the mind. There is no idea so
+      foolish but that it cannot be put into the heads of the ignorant and
+      incapable multitude, especially if the idea holds out some prospect of any
+      gain or advantage. And when a man has got hold of any such idea what is
+      there that he will not do? I am, therefore, very much afraid that the
+      danger of a free press outweighs its utility, particularly where the law
+      offers a way of redressing wrongs. In any case, however, the freedom of
+      the press should be governed by a very strict prohibition of all and every
+      anonymity.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Generally, indeed, it may be maintained that right is of a nature
+      analogous to that of certain chemical substances, which cannot be
+      exhibited in a pure and isolated condition, but at the most only with a
+      small admixture of some other substance, which serves as a vehicle for
+      them, or gives them the necessary consistency; such as fluorine, or even
+      alcohol, or prussic acid. Pursuing the analogy we may say that right, if
+      it is to gain a footing in the world and really prevail, must of necessity
+      be supplemented by a small amount of arbitrary force, in order that,
+      notwithstanding its merely ideal and therefore ethereal nature, it may be
+      able to work and subsist in the real and material world, and not evaporate
+      and vanish into the clouds, as it does in Hesoid. Birth-right of every
+      description, all heritable privileges, every form of national religion,
+      and so on, may be regarded as the necessary chemical base or alloy;
+      inasmuch as it is only when right has some such firm and actual foundation
+      that it can be enforced and consistently vindicated. They form for right a
+      sort of {Greek: os moi pou sto}&mdash;a fulcrum for supporting its lever.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Linnaeus adopted a vegetable system of an artificial and arbitrary
+      character. It cannot be replaced by a natural one, no matter how
+      reasonable the change might be, or how often it has been attempted to make
+      it, because no other system could ever yield the same certainty and
+      stability of definition. Just in the same way the artificial and arbitrary
+      basis on which, as has been shown, the constitution of a State rests, can
+      never be replaced by a purely natural basis. A natural basis would aim at
+      doing away with the conditions that have been mentioned: in the place of
+      the privileges of birth it would put those of personal merit; in the place
+      of the national religion, the results of rationalistic inquiry, and so on.
+      However agreeable to reason this might all prove, the change could not be
+      made; because a natural basis would lack that certainty and fixity of
+      definition which alone secures the stability of the commonwealth. A
+      constitution which embodied abstract right alone would be an excellent
+      thing for natures other than human, but since the great majority of men
+      are extremely egoistic, unjust, inconsiderate, deceitful, and sometimes
+      even malicious; since in addition they are endowed with very scanty
+      intelligence there arises the necessity for a power that shall be
+      concentrated in one man, a power that shall be above all law and right,
+      and be completely irresponsible, nay, to which everything shall yield as
+      to something that is regarded as a creature of a higher kind, a ruler by
+      the grace of God. It is only thus that men can be permanently held in
+      check and governed.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The United States of North America exhibit the attempt to proceed without
+      any such arbitrary basis; that is to say, to allow abstract right to
+      prevail pure and unalloyed. But the result is not attractive. For with all
+      the material prosperity of the country what do we find? The prevailing
+      sentiment is a base Utilitarianism with its inevitable companion,
+      ignorance; and it is this that has paved the way for a union of stupid
+      Anglican bigotry, foolish prejudice, coarse brutality, and a childish
+      veneration of women. Even worse things are the order of the day: most
+      iniquitous oppression of the black freemen, lynch law, frequent
+      assassination often committed with entire impunity, duels of a savagery
+      elsewhere unknown, now and then open scorn of all law and justice,
+      repudiation of public debts, abominable political rascality towards a
+      neighbouring State, followed by a mercenary raid on its rich territory,&mdash;afterwards
+      sought to be excused, on the part of the chief authority of the State, by
+      lies which every one in the country knew to be such and laughed at&mdash;an
+      ever-increasing ochlocracy, and finally all the disastrous influence which
+      this abnegation of justice in high quarters must have exercised on private
+      morals. This specimen of a pure constitution on the obverse side of the
+      planet says very little for republics in general, but still less for the
+      imitations of it in Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia and Peru.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      A peculiar disadvantage attaching to republics&mdash;and one that might
+      not be looked for&mdash;is that in this form of government it must be more
+      difficult for men of ability to attain high position and exercise direct
+      political influence than in the case of monarchies. For always and
+      everywhere and under all circumstances there is a conspiracy, or
+      instinctive alliance, against such men on the part of all the stupid, the
+      weak, and the commonplace; they look upon such men as their natural
+      enemies, and they are firmly held together by a common fear of them. There
+      is always a numerous host of the stupid and the weak, and in a republican
+      constitution it is easy for them to suppress and exclude the men of
+      ability, so that they may not be outflanked by them. They are fifty to
+      one; and here all have equal rights at the start.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In a monarchy, on the other hand, this natural and universal league of the
+      stupid against those who are possessed of intellectual advantages is a
+      one-sided affair; it exists only from below, for in a monarchy talent and
+      intelligence receive a natural advocacy and support from above. In the
+      first place, the position of the monarch himself is much too high and too
+      firm for him to stand in fear of any sort of competition. In the next
+      place, he serves the State more by his will than by his intelligence; for
+      no intelligence could ever be equal to all the demands that would in his
+      case be made upon it. He is therefore compelled to be always availing
+      himself of other men's intelligence. Seeing that his own interests are
+      securely bound up with those of his country; that they are inseparable
+      from them and one with them, he will naturally give the preference to the
+      best men, because they are his most serviceable instruments, and he will
+      bestow his favour upon them&mdash;as soon, that is, as he can find them;
+      which is not so difficult, if only an honest search be made. Just in the
+      same way even ministers of State have too much advantage over rising
+      politicians to need to regard them with jealousy; and accordingly for
+      analogous reasons they are glad to single out distinguished men and set
+      them to work, in order to make use of their powers for themselves. It is
+      in this way that intelligence has always under a monarchical government a
+      much better chance against its irreconcilable and ever-present foe,
+      stupidity; and the advantage which it gains is very great.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In general, the monarchical form of government is that which is natural to
+      man; just as it is natural to bees and ants, to a flight of cranes, a herd
+      of wandering elephants, a pack of wolves seeking prey in common, and many
+      other animals, all of which place one of their number at the head of the
+      business in hand. Every business in which men engage, if it is attended
+      with danger&mdash;every campaign, every ship at sea&mdash;must also be
+      subject to the authority of one commander; everywhere it is one will that
+      must lead. Even the animal organism is constructed on a monarchical
+      principle: it is the brain alone which guides and governs, and exercises
+      the hegemony. Although heart, lungs, and stomach contribute much more to
+      the continued existence of the whole body, these philistines cannot on
+      that account be allowed to guide and lead. That is a business which
+      belongs solely to the brain; government must proceed from one central
+      point. Even the solar system is monarchical. On the other hand, a republic
+      is as unnatural as it is unfavourable to the higher intellectual life and
+      the arts and sciences. Accordingly we find that everywhere in the world,
+      and at all times, nations, whether civilised or savage, or occupying a
+      position between the two, are always under monarchical government. The
+      rule of many as Homer said, is not a good thing: let there be one ruler,
+      one king;
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  {Greek: Ouk agathon polykoiraniae-eis koiranos esto
+  Eis basoleus.} {1}
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Iliad</i>, ii., 204.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      How would it be possible that, everywhere and at all times, we should see
+      many millions of people, nay, even hundreds of millions, become the
+      willing and obedient subjects of one man, sometimes even one woman, and
+      provisionally, even, of a child, unless there were a monarchical instinct
+      in men which drove them to it as the form of government best suited to
+      them? This arrangement is not the product of reflection. Everywhere one
+      man is king, and for the most part his dignity is hereditary. He is, as it
+      were, the personification, the monogram, of the whole people, which
+      attains an individuality in him. In this sense he can rightly say: <i>l'etat
+      c'est moi</i>. It is precisely for this reason that in Shakespeare's
+      historical plays the kings of England and France mutually address each
+      other as <i>France</i> and <i>England</i>, and the Duke of Austria goes by
+      the name of his country. It is as though the kings regarded themselves as
+      the incarnation of their nationalities. It is all in accordance with human
+      nature; and for this very reason the hereditary monarch cannot separate
+      his own welfare and that of his family from the welfare of his country;
+      as, on the other hand, mostly happens when the monarch is elected, as, for
+      instance, in the States of the Church.{1} The Chinese can conceive of a
+      monarchical government only; what a republic is they utterly fail to
+      understand. When a Dutch legation was in China in the year 1658, it was
+      obliged to represent that the Prince of Orange was their king, as
+      otherwise the Chinese would have been inclined to take Holland for a nest
+      of pirates living without any lord or master.{2} Stobaeus, in a chapter in
+      his <i>Florilegium</i>, at the head of which he wrote <i>That monarchy is
+      best</i>, collected the best of the passages in which the ancients
+      explained the advantages of that form of government. In a word, republics
+      are unnatural and artificial; they are the product of reflection. Hence it
+      is that they occur only as rare exceptions in the whole history of the
+      world. There were the small Greek republics, the Roman and the
+      Carthaginian; but they were all rendered possible by the fact that
+      five-sixths, perhaps even seven-eighths, of the population consisted of
+      slaves. In the year 1840, even in the United States, there were three
+      million slaves to a population of sixteen millions. Then, again, the
+      duration of the republics of antiquity, compared with that of monarchies,
+      was very short. Republics are very easy to found, and very difficult to
+      maintain, while with monarchies it is exactly the reverse. If it is
+      Utopian schemes that are wanted, I say this: the only solution of the
+      problem would be a despotism of the wise and the noble, of the true
+      aristocracy and the genuine nobility, brought about by the method of
+      generation&mdash;that is, by the marriage of the noblest men with the
+      cleverest and most intellectual women. This is my Utopia, my Republic of
+      Plato.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Translator's Note</i>.&mdash;The reader will recollect
+      that Schopenhauer was writing long before the Papal territories were
+      absorbed into the kingdom of Italy.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 2: See Jean Nieuhoff, <i>L'Ambassade de la Compagnie Orientale
+      des Provinces Unies vers L'Empereur de la Chine</i>, traduit par Jean le
+      Charpentier à Leyde, 1665; ch. 45.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Constitutional kings are undoubtedly in much the same position as the gods
+      of Epicurus, who sit upon high in undisturbed bliss and tranquillity, and
+      do not meddle with human affairs. Just now they are the fashion. In every
+      German duodecimo-principality a parody of the English constitution is set
+      up, quite complete, from Upper and Lower Houses down to the Habeas Corpus
+      Act and trial by jury. These institutions, which proceed from English
+      character and English circumstances, and presuppose both, are natural and
+      suitable to the English people. It is just as natural to the German people
+      to be split up into a number of different stocks, under a similar number
+      of ruling Princes, with an Emperor over them all, who maintains peace at
+      home, and represents the unity of the State board. It is an arrangement
+      which has proceeded from German character and German circumstances. I am
+      of opinion that if Germany is not to meet with the same fate as Italy, it
+      must restore the imperial crown, which was done away with by its
+      arch-enemy, the first Napoleon; and it must restore it as effectively as
+      possible. {1} For German unity depends on it, and without the imperial
+      crown it will always be merely nominal, or precarious. But as we no longer
+      live in the days of Günther of Schwarzburg, when the choice of Emperor was
+      a serious business, the imperial crown ought to go alternately to Prussia
+      and to Austria, for the life of the wearer. In any case, the absolute
+      sovereignty of the small States is illusory. Napoleon I. did for Germany
+      what Otto the Great did for Italy: he divided it into small, independent
+      States, on the principle, <i>divide et impera</i>.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Translator's Note</i>.&mdash;Here, again, it is hardly
+      necessary to say that Schopenhauer, who died in 1860, and wrote this
+      passage at least some years previously, cannot be referring to any of the
+      events which culminated in 1870. The whole passage forms a striking
+      illustration of his political sagacity.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The English show their great intelligence, amongst other ways, by clinging
+      to their ancient institutions, customs and usages, and by holding them
+      sacred, even at the risk of carrying this tenacity too far, and making it
+      ridiculous. They hold them sacred for the simple reason that those
+      institutions and customs are not the invention of an idle head, but have
+      grown up gradually by the force of circumstance and the wisdom of life
+      itself, and are therefore suited to them as a nation. On the other hand,
+      the German Michel{1} allows himself to be persuaded by his schoolmaster
+      that he must go about in an English dress-coat, and that nothing else will
+      do. Accordingly he has bullied his father into giving it to him; and with
+      his awkward manners this ungainly creature presents in it a sufficiently
+      ridiculous figure. But the dress-coat will some day be too tight for him
+      and incommode him. It will not be very long before he feels it in trial by
+      jury. This institution arose in the most barbarous period of the Middle
+      Ages&mdash;the times of Alfred the Great, when the ability to read and
+      write exempted a man from the penalty of death. It is the worst of all
+      criminal procedures. Instead of judges, well versed in law and of great
+      experience, who have grown grey in daily unravelling the tricks and wiles
+      of thieves, murderers and rascals of all sorts, and so are well able to
+      get at the bottom of things, it is gossiping tailors and tanners who sit
+      in judgment; it is their coarse, crude, unpractised, and awkward
+      intelligence, incapable of any sustained attention, that is called upon to
+      find out the truth from a tissue of lies and deceit. All the time,
+      moreover, they are thinking of their cloth and their leather, and longing
+      to be at home; and they have absolutely no clear notion at all of the
+      distinction between probability and certainty. It is with this sort of a
+      calculus of probabilities in their stupid heads that they confidently
+      undertake to seal a man's doom.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Translator's Note</i>.&mdash;It may be well to explain
+      that "Michel" is sometimes used by the Germans as a nickname of their
+      nation, corresponding to "John Bull" as a nickname of the English. Flügel
+      in his German-English Dictionary declares that <i>der deutsche Michel</i>
+      represents the German nation as an honest, blunt, unsuspicious fellow, who
+      easily allows himself to be imposed upon, even, he adds, with a touch of
+      patriotism, "by those who are greatly his inferiors in point of strength
+      and real worth."}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The same remark is applicable to them which Dr. Johnson made of a
+      court-martial in which he had little confidence, summoned to decide a very
+      important case. He said that perhaps there was not a member of it who, in
+      the whole course of his life, had ever spent an hour by himself in
+      balancing probabilities.{1} Can any one imagine that the tailor and the
+      tanner would be impartial judges? What! the vicious multitude impartial!
+      as if partiality were not ten times more to be feared from men of the same
+      class as the accused than from judges who knew nothing of him personally,
+      lived in another sphere altogether, were irremovable, and conscious of the
+      dignity of their office. But to let a jury decide on crimes against the
+      State and its head, or on misdemeanours of the press, is in a very real
+      sense to set the fox to keep the geese.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: Boswell's <i>Johnson</i>, 1780, set. 71.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Everywhere and at all times there has been much discontent with
+      governments, laws and public regulations; for the most part, however,
+      because men are always ready to make institutions responsible for the
+      misery inseparable from human existence itself; which is, to speak
+      mythically, the curse that was laid on Adam, and through him on the whole
+      race. But never has that delusion been proclaimed in a more mendacious and
+      impudent manner than by the demagogues of the <i>Jetstzeit</i>&mdash;of
+      the day we live in. As enemies of Christianity, they are, of course,
+      optimists: to them the world is its own end and object, and accordingly in
+      itself, that is to say, in its own natural constitution, it is arranged on
+      the most excellent principles, and forms a regular habitation of bliss.
+      The enormous and glaring evils of the world they attribute wholly to
+      governments: if governments, they think, were to do their duty, there
+      would be a heaven upon earth; in other words, all men could eat, drink,
+      propagate and die, free from trouble and want. This is what they mean when
+      they talk of the world being "its own end and object"; this is the goal of
+      that "perpetual progress of the human race," and the other fine things
+      which they are never tired of proclaiming.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Formerly it was <i>faith</i> which was the chief support of the throne;
+      nowadays it is <i>credit</i>. The Pope himself is scarcely more concerned
+      to retain the confidence of the faithful than to make his creditors
+      believe in his own good faith. If in times past it was the guilty debt of
+      the world which was lamented, now it is the financial debts of the world
+      which arouse dismay. Formerly it was the Last Day which was prophesied;
+      now it is the {Greek: seisachtheia} the great repudiation, the universal
+      bankruptcy of the nations, which will one day happen; although the
+      prophet, in this as in the other case, entertains a firm hope that he will
+      not live to see it himself.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      From an ethical and a rational point of view, the <i>right of possession</i>
+      rests upon an incomparably better foundation than the <i>right of birth</i>;
+      nevertheless, the right of possession is allied with the right of birth
+      and has come to be part and parcel of it, so that it would hardly be
+      possible to abolish the right of birth without endangering the right of
+      possession. The reason of this is that most of what a man possesses he
+      inherited, and therefore holds by a kind of right of birth; just as the
+      old nobility bear the names only of their hereditary estates, and by the
+      use of those names do no more than give expression to the fact that they
+      own the estates. Accordingly all owners of property, if instead of being
+      envious they were wise, ought also to support the maintenance of the
+      rights of birth.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The existence of a nobility has, then, a double advantage: it helps to
+      maintain on the one hand the rights of possession, and on the other the
+      right of birth belonging to the king. For the king is the first nobleman
+      in the country, and, as a general rule, he treats the nobility as his
+      humble relations, and regards them quite otherwise than the commoners,
+      however trusty and well-beloved. It is quite natural, too, that he should
+      have more confidence in those whose ancestors were mostly the first
+      ministers, and always the immediate associates, of his own. A nobleman,
+      therefore, appeals with reason to the name he bears, when on the
+      occurrence of anything to rouse distrust he repeats his assurance of
+      fidelity and service to the king. A man's character, as my readers are
+      aware, assuredly comes to him from his father. It is a narrow-minded and
+      ridiculous thing not to consider whose son a man is.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <br /><br />
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      <a name="link2H_4_0004" id="link2H_4_0004"> </a>
+    </p>
+    <div style="height: 4em;">
+      <br /><br /><br /><br />
+    </div>
+    <h2>
+      FREE-WILL AND FATALISM.
+    </h2>
+    <p>
+      No thoughtful man can have any doubt, after the conclusions reached in my
+      prize-essay on <i>Moral Freedom</i>, that such freedom is to be sought,
+      not anywhere in nature, but outside of it. The only freedom that exists is
+      of a metaphysical character. In the physical world freedom is an
+      impossibility. Accordingly, while our several actions are in no wise free,
+      every man's individual character is to be regarded as a free act. He is
+      such and such a man, because once for all it is his will to be that man.
+      For the will itself, and in itself, and also in so far as it is manifest
+      in an individual, and accordingly constitutes the original and fundamental
+      desires of that individual, is independent of all knowledge, because it is
+      antecedent to such knowledge. All that it receives from knowledge is the
+      series of motives by which it successively develops its nature and makes
+      itself cognisable or visible; but the will itself, as something that lies
+      beyond time, and so long as it exists at all, never changes. Therefore
+      every man, being what he is and placed in the circumstances which for the
+      moment obtain, but which on their part also arise by strict necessity, can
+      absolutely never do anything else than just what at that moment he does
+      do. Accordingly, the whole course of a man's life, in all its incidents
+      great and small, is as necessarily predetermined as the course of a clock.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The main reason of this is that the kind of metaphysical free act which I
+      have described tends to become a knowing consciousness&mdash;a perceptive
+      intuition, which is subject to the forms of space and time. By means of
+      those forms the unity and indivisibility of the act are represented as
+      drawn asunder into a series of states and events, which are subject to the
+      Principle of Sufficient Reason in its four forms&mdash;and it is this that
+      is meant by <i>necessity</i>. But the result of it all assumes a moral
+      complexion. It amounts to this, that by what we do we know what we are,
+      and by what we suffer we know what we deserve.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Further, it follows from this that a man's <i>individuality</i> does not
+      rest upon the principle of individuation alone, and therefore is not
+      altogether phenomenal in its nature. On the contrary, it has its roots in
+      the thing-in-itself, in the will which is the essence of each individual.
+      The character of this individual is itself individual. But how deep the
+      roots of individuality extend is one of the questions which I do not
+      undertake to answer.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In this connection it deserves to be mentioned that even Plato, in his own
+      way, represented the individuality of a man as a free act.{1} He
+      represented him as coming into the world with a given tendency, which was
+      the result of the feelings and character already attaching to him in
+      accordance with the doctrine of metempsychosis. The Brahmin philosophers
+      also express the unalterable fixity of innate character in a mystical
+      fashion. They say that Brahma, when a man is produced, engraves his doings
+      and sufferings in written characters on his skull, and that his life must
+      take shape in accordance therewith. They point to the jagged edges in the
+      sutures of the skull-bones as evidence of this writing; and the purport of
+      it, they say, depends on his previous life and actions. The same view
+      appears to underlie the Christian, or rather, the Pauline, dogma of
+      Predestination.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Phaedrus</i> and <i>Laws, bk</i>. x.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But this truth, which is universally confirmed by experience, is attended
+      with another result. All genuine merit, moral as well as intellectual, is
+      not merely physical or empirical in its origin, but metaphysical; that is
+      to say, it is given <i>a priori</i> and not <i>a posteriori</i>; in other
+      words, it lies innate and is not acquired, and therefore its source is not
+      a mere phenomenon, but the thing-in-itself. Hence it is that every man
+      achieves only that which is irrevocably established in his nature, or is
+      born with him. Intellectual capacity needs, it is true, to be developed
+      just as many natural products need to be cultivated in order that we may
+      enjoy or use them; but just as in the case of a natural product no
+      cultivation can take the place of original material, neither can it do so
+      in the case of intellect. That is the reason why qualities which are
+      merely acquired, or learned, or enforced&mdash;that is, qualities <i>a
+      posteriori</i>, whether moral or intellectual&mdash;are not real or
+      genuine, but superficial only, and possessed of no value. This is a
+      conclusion of true metaphysics, and experience teaches the same lesson to
+      all who can look below the surface. Nay, it is proved by the great
+      importance which we all attach to such innate characteristics as
+      physiognomy and external appearance, in the case of a man who is at all
+      distinguished; and that is why we are so curious to see him. Superficial
+      people, to be sure,&mdash;and, for very good reasons, commonplace people
+      too,&mdash;will be of the opposite opinion; for if anything fails them
+      they will thus be enabled to console themselves by thinking that it is
+      still to come.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The world, then, is not merely a battlefield where victory and defeat
+      receive their due recompense in a future state. No! the world is itself
+      the Last Judgment on it. Every man carries with him the reward and the
+      disgrace that he deserves; and this is no other than the doctrine of the
+      Brahmins and Buddhists as it is taught in the theory of metempsychosis.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The question has been raised, What two men would do, who lived a solitary
+      life in the wilds and met each other for the first time. Hobbes,
+      Pufendorf, and Rousseau have given different answers. Pufendorf believed
+      that they would approach each other as friends; Hobbes, on the contrary,
+      as enemies; Rousseau, that they would pass each other by In silence. All
+      three are both right and wrong. This is just a case in which the
+      incalculable difference that there is in innate moral disposition between
+      one individual and another would make its appearance. The difference is so
+      strong that the question here raised might be regarded as the standard and
+      measure of it. For there are men in whom the sight of another man at once
+      rouses a feeling of enmity, since their inmost nature exclaims at once:
+      That is not me! There are, others in whom the sight awakens immediate
+      sympathy; their inmost nature says: <i>That is me over again</i>! Between
+      the two there are countless degrees. That in this most important matter we
+      are so totally different is a great problem, nay, a mystery.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In regard to this <i>a priori</i> nature of moral character there is
+      matter for varied reflection in a work by Bastholm, a Danish writer,
+      entitled <i>Historical Contributions to the Knowledge of Man in the Savage
+      State</i>. He is struck by the fact that intellectual culture and moral
+      excellence are shown to be entirely independent of each other, inasmuch as
+      one is often found without the other. The reason of this, as we shall
+      find, is simply that moral excellence in no wise springs from reflection,
+      which is developed by intellectual culture, but from the will itself, the
+      constitution of which is innate and not susceptible in itself of any
+      improvement by means of education. Bastholm represents most nations as
+      very vicious and immoral; and on the other hand he reports that excellent
+      traits of character are found amongst some savage peoples; as, for
+      instance, amongst the Orotchyses, the inhabitants of the island Savu, the
+      Tunguses, and the Pelew islanders. He thus attempts to solve the problem,
+      How it is that some tribes are so remarkably good, when their neighbours
+      are all bad,
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      It seems to me that the difficulty may be explained as follows: Moral
+      qualities, as we know, are heritable, and an isolated tribe, such as is
+      described, might take its rise in some one family, and ultimately in a
+      single ancestor who happened to be a good man, and then maintain its
+      purity. Is it not the case, for instance, that on many unpleasant
+      occasions, such as repudiation of public debts, filibustering raids and so
+      on, the English have often reminded the North Americans of their descent
+      from English penal colonists? It is a reproach, however, which can apply
+      only to a small part of the population.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      It is marvellous how <i>every man's individuality</i> (that is to say, the
+      union of a definite character with a definite intellect) accurately
+      determines all his actions and thoughts down to the most unimportant
+      details, as though it were a dye which pervaded them; and how, in
+      consequence, one man's whole course of life, in other words, his inner and
+      outer history, turns out so absolutely different from another's. As a
+      botanist knows a plant in its entirety from a single leaf; as Cuvier from
+      a single bone constructed the whole animal, so an accurate knowledge of a
+      man's whole character may be attained from a single characteristic act;
+      that is to say, he himself may to some extent be constructed from it, even
+      though the act in question is of very trifling consequence. Nay, that is
+      the most perfect test of all, for in a matter of importance people are on
+      their guard; in trifles they follow their natural bent without much
+      reflection. That is why Seneca's remark, that even the smallest things may
+      be taken as evidence of character, is so true: <i>argumenta morum ex
+      minimis quoque licet capere</i>.{1} If a man shows by his absolutely
+      unscrupulous and selfish behaviour in small things that a sentiment of
+      justice is foreign to his disposition, he should not be trusted with a
+      penny unless on due security. For who will believe that the man who every
+      day shows that he is unjust in all matters other than those which concern
+      property, and whose boundless selfishness everywhere protrudes through the
+      small affairs of ordinary life which are subject to no scrutiny, like a
+      dirty shirt through the holes of a ragged jacket&mdash;who, I ask, will
+      believe that such a man will act honourably in matters of <i>meum</i> and
+      <i>tuum</i> without any other incentive but that of justice? The man who
+      has no conscience in small things will be a scoundrel in big things. If we
+      neglect small traits of character, we have only ourselves to blame if we
+      afterwards learn to our disadvantage what this character is in the great
+      affairs of life. On the same principle, we ought to break with so-called
+      friends even in matters of trifling moment, if they show a character that
+      is malicious or bad or vulgar, so that we may avoid the bad turn which
+      only waits for an opportunity of being done us. The same thing applies to
+      servants. Let it always be our maxim: Better alone than amongst traitors.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Ep</i>., 52.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Of a truth the first and foremost step in all knowledge of mankind is the
+      conviction that a man's conduct, taken as a whole, and in all its
+      essential particulars, is not governed by his reason or by any of the
+      resolutions which he may make in virtue of it. No man becomes this or that
+      by wishing to be it, however earnestly. His acts proceed from his innate
+      and unalterable character, and they are more immediately and particularly
+      determined by motives. A man's conduct, therefore, is the necessary
+      product of both character and motive. It may be illustrated by the course
+      of a planet, which is the result of the combined effect of the tangential
+      energy with which it is endowed, and the centripetal energy which operates
+      from the sun. In this simile the former energy represents character, and
+      the latter the influence of motive. It is almost more than a mere simile.
+      The tangential energy which properly speaking is the source of the
+      planet's motion, whilst on the other hand the motion is kept in check by
+      gravitation, is, from a metaphysical point of view, the will manifesting
+      itself in that body.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      To grasp this fact is to see that we really never form anything more than
+      a conjecture of what we shall do under circumstances which are still to
+      happen; although we often take our conjecture for a resolve. When, for
+      instance, in pursuance of a proposal, a man with the greatest sincerity,
+      and even eagerness, accepts an engagement to do this or that on the
+      occurrence of a certain future event, it is by no means certain that he
+      will fulfil the engagement; unless he is so constituted that the promise
+      which he gives, in itself and as such, is always and everywhere a motive
+      sufficient for him, by acting upon him, through considerations of honour,
+      like some external compulsion. But above and beyond this, what he will do
+      on the occurrence of that event may be foretold from true and accurate
+      knowledge of his character and the external circumstances under the
+      influence of which he will fall; and it may with complete certainty be
+      foretold from this alone. Nay, it is a very easy prophecy if he has been
+      already seen in a like position; for he will inevitably do the same thing
+      a second time, provided that on the first occasion he had a true and
+      complete knowledge of the facts of the case. For, as I have often
+      remarked, a final cause does not impel a man by being real, but by being
+      known; <i>causa finalis non movet secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum
+      esse cognitum</i>.{1} Whatever he failed to recognise or understand the
+      first time could have no influence upon his will; just as an electric
+      current stops when some isolating body hinders the action of the
+      conductor. This unalterable nature of character, and the consequent
+      necessity of our actions, are made very clear to a man who has not, on any
+      given occasion, behaved as he ought to have done, by showing a lack either
+      of resolution or endurance or courage, or some other quality demanded at
+      the moment. Afterwards he recognises what it is that he ought to have
+      done; and, sincerely repenting of his incorrect behaviour, he thinks to
+      himself, <i>If the opportunity were offered to me again, I should act
+      differently</i>. It is offered once more; the same occasion recurs; and to
+      his great astonishment he does precisely the same thing over again.{2}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: Suarez, <i>Disp. Metaph</i>., xxiii.; §§7 and 8.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 2: Cf. <i>World as Will</i>, ii., pp. 251 ff. <i>sqq</i>. (third
+      edition).}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The best examples of the truth in question are in every way furnished by
+      Shakespeare's plays. It is a truth with which he was thoroughly imbued,
+      and his intuitive wisdom expressed it in a concrete shape on every page. I
+      shall here, however, give an instance of it in a case in which he makes it
+      remarkably clear, without exhibiting any design or affectation in the
+      matter; for he was a real artist and never set out from general ideas. His
+      method was obviously to work up to the psychological truth which he
+      grasped directly and intuitively, regardless of the fact that few would
+      notice or understand it, and without the smallest idea that some dull and
+      shallow fellows in Germany would one day proclaim far and wide that he
+      wrote his works to illustrate moral commonplaces. I allude to the
+      character of the Earl of Northumberland, whom we find in three plays in
+      succession, although he does not take a leading part in any one of them;
+      nay, he appears only in a few scenes distributed over fifteen acts.
+      Consequently, if the reader is not very attentive, a character exhibited
+      at such great intervals, and its moral identity, may easily escape his
+      notice, even though it has by no means escaped the poet's. He makes the
+      earl appear everywhere with a noble and knightly grace, and talk in
+      language suitable to it; nay, he sometimes puts very beautiful and even
+      elevated passages, into his mouth. At the same time he is very far from
+      writing after the manner of Schiller, who was fond of painting the devil
+      black, and whose moral approval or disapproval of the characters which he
+      presented could be heard in their own words. With Shakespeare, and also
+      with Goethe, every character, as long as he is on the stage and speaking,
+      seems to be absolutely in the right, even though it were the devil
+      himself. In this respect let the reader compare Duke Alba as he appears in
+      Goethe with the same character in Schiller.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      We make the acquaintance of the Earl of Northumberland in the play of <i>Richard
+      II</i>., where he is the first to hatch a plot against the King in favour
+      of Bolingbroke, afterwards Henry IV., to whom he even offers some personal
+      flattery (Act II., Sc. 3). In the following act he suffers a reprimand
+      because, in speaking of the King he talks of him as "Richard," without
+      more ado, but protests that he did it only for brevity's sake. A little
+      later his insidious words induce the King to surrender. In the following
+      act, when the King renounces the crown, Northumberland treats him with
+      such harshness and contempt that the unlucky monarch is quite broken, and
+      losing all patience once more exclaims to him: <i>Fiend, thou torment'st
+      me ere I come to hell</i>! At the close, Northumberland announces to the
+      new King that he has sent the heads of the former King's adherents to
+      London.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In the following tragedy, <i>Henry IV</i>., he hatches a plot against the
+      new King in just the same way. In the fourth act we see the rebels united,
+      making preparations for the decisive battle on the morrow, and only
+      waiting impatiently for Northumberland and his division. At last there
+      arrives a letter from him, saying that he is ill, and that he cannot
+      entrust his force to any one else; but that nevertheless the others should
+      go forward with courage and make a brave fight. They do so, but, greatly
+      weakened by his absence, they are completely defeated; most of their
+      leaders are captured, and his own son, the valorous Hotspur, falls by the
+      hand of the Prince of Wales.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Again, in the following play, the <i>Second Part of Henry IV</i>., we see
+      him reduced to a state of the fiercest wrath by the death of his son, and
+      maddened by the thirst for revenge. Accordingly he kindles another
+      rebellion, and the heads of it assemble once more. In the fourth act, just
+      as they are about to give battle, and are only waiting for him to join
+      them, there comes a letter saying that he cannot collect a proper force,
+      and will therefore seek safety for the present in Scotland; that,
+      nevertheless, he heartily wishes their heroic undertaking the best
+      success. Thereupon they surrender to the King under a treaty which is not
+      kept, and so perish.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      So far is character from being the work of reasoned choice and
+      consideration that in any action the intellect has nothing to do but to
+      present motives to the will. Thereafter it looks on as a mere spectator
+      and witness at the course which life takes, in accordance with the
+      influence of motive on the given character. All the incidents of life
+      occur, strictly speaking, with the same necessity as the movement of a
+      clock. On this point let me refer to my prize-essay on <i>The Freedom of
+      the Will</i>. I have there explained the true meaning and origin of the
+      persistent illusion that the will is entirely free in every single action;
+      and I have indicated the cause to which it is due. I will only add here
+      the following teleological explanation of this natural illusion.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Since every single action of a man's life seems to possess the freedom and
+      originality which in truth only belong to his character as he apprehends
+      it, and the mere apprehension of it by his intellect is what constitutes
+      his career; and since what is original in every single action seems to the
+      empirical consciousness to be always being performed anew, a man thus
+      receives in the course of his career the strongest possible moral lesson.
+      Then, and not before, he becomes thoroughly conscious of all the bad sides
+      of his character. Conscience accompanies every act with the comment: <i>You
+      should act differently</i>, although its true sense is: <i>You could be
+      other than you are</i>. As the result of this immutability of character on
+      the one hand, and, on the other, of the strict necessity which attends all
+      the circumstances in which character is successively placed, every man's
+      course of life is precisely determined from Alpha right through to Omega.
+      But, nevertheless, one man's course of life turns out immeasurably
+      happier, nobler and more worthy than another's, whether it be regarded
+      from a subjective or an objective point of view, and unless we are to
+      exclude all ideas of justice, we are led to the doctrine which is well
+      accepted in Brahmanism and Buddhism, that the subjective conditions in
+      which, as well as the objective conditions under which, every man is born,
+      are the moral consequences of a previous existence.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Macchiavelli, who seems to have taken no interest whatever in
+      philosophical speculations, is drawn by the keen subtlety of his very
+      unique understanding into the following observation, which possesses a
+      really deep meaning. It shows that he had an intuitive knowledge of the
+      entire necessity with which, characters and motives being given, all
+      actions take place. He makes it at the beginning of the prologue to his
+      comedy <i>Clitia</i>. <i>If</i>, he says, <i>the same men were to recur in
+      the world in the way that the same circumstances recur, a hundred years
+      would never elapse without our finding ourselves together once more, and
+      doing the same things as we are doing now&mdash;Se nel mondo tornassino i
+      medesimi uomini, como tornano i medesimi casi, non passarebbono mai cento
+      anni che noi non ci trovassimo un altra volta insieme, a fare le medesime
+      cose che hora</i>. He seems however to have been drawn into the remark by
+      a reminiscence of what Augustine says in his <i>De Civitate Dei</i>, bk.
+      xii., ch. xiii.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Again, Fate, or the {Greek: eimarmenae} of the ancients, is nothing but
+      the conscious certainty that all that happens is fast bound by a chain of
+      causes, and therefore takes place with a strict necessity; that the future
+      is already ordained with absolute certainty and can undergo as little
+      alteration as the past. In the fatalistic myths of the ancients all that
+      can be regarded as fabulous is the prediction of the future; that is, if
+      we refuse to consider the possibility of magnetic clairvoyance and second
+      sight. Instead of trying to explain away the fundamental truth of Fatalism
+      by superficial twaddle and foolish evasion, a man should attempt to get a
+      clear knowledge and comprehension of it; for it is demonstrably true, and
+      it helps us in a very important way to an understanding of the mysterious
+      riddle of our life. Predestination and Fatalism do not differ in the main.
+      They differ only in this, that with Predestination the given character and
+      external determination of human action proceed from a rational Being, and
+      with Fatalism from an irrational one. But in either case the result is the
+      same: that happens which must happen.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      On the other hand the conception of <i>Moral Freedom</i> is inseparable
+      from that of <i>Originality</i>. A man may be said, but he cannot be
+      conceived, to be the work of another, and at the same time be free in
+      respect of his desires and acts. He who called him into existence out of
+      nothing in the same process created and determined his nature&mdash;in
+      other words, the whole of his qualities. For no one can create without
+      creating a something, that is to say, a being determined throughout and in
+      all its qualities. But all that a man says and does necessarily proceeds
+      from the qualities so determined; for it is only the qualities themselves
+      set in motion. It is only some external impulse that they require to make
+      their appearance. As a man is, so must he act; and praise or blame
+      attaches, not to his separate acts, but to his nature and being.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      That is the reason why Theism and the moral responsibility of man are
+      incompatible; because responsibility always reverts to the creator of man
+      and it is there that it has its centre. Vain attempts have been made to
+      make a bridge from one of these incompatibles to the other by means of the
+      conception of moral freedom; but it always breaks down again. What is <i>free</i>
+      must also be <i>original</i>. If our will is <i>free</i>, our will is also
+      <i>the original element</i>, and conversely. Pre-Kantian dogmatism tried
+      to separate these two predicaments. It was thereby compelled to assume two
+      kinds of freedom, one cosmological, of the first cause, and the other
+      moral and theological, of human will. These are represented in Kant by the
+      third as well as the fourth antimony of freedom.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      On the other hand, in my philosophy the plain recognition of the strictly
+      necessary character of all action is in accordance with the doctrine that
+      what manifests itself even in the organic and irrational world is <i>will</i>.
+      If this were not so, the necessity under which irrational beings obviously
+      act would place their action in conflict with will; if, I mean, there were
+      really such a thing as the freedom of individual action, and this were not
+      as strictly necessitated as every other kind of action. But, as I have
+      just shown, it is this same doctrine of the necessary character of all
+      acts of will which makes it needful to regard a man's existence and being
+      as itself the work of his freedom, and consequently of his will. The will,
+      therefore, must be self-existent; it must possess so-called <i>a-se-ity</i>.
+      Under the opposite supposition all responsibility, as I have shown, would
+      be at an end, and the moral like the physical world would be a mere
+      machine, set in motion for the amusement of its manufacturer placed
+      somewhere outside of it. So it is that truths hang together, and mutually
+      advance and complete one another; whereas error gets jostled at every
+      corner.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      What kind of influence it is that <i>moral instruction</i> may exercise on
+      conduct, and what are the limits of that influence, are questions which I
+      have sufficiently examined in the twentieth section of my treatise on the
+      <i>Foundation of Morality</i>. In all essential particulars an analogous
+      influence is exercised by <i>example</i>, which, however, has a more
+      powerful effect than doctrine, and therefore it deserves a brief analysis.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In the main, example works either by restraining a man or by encouraging
+      him. It has the former effect when it determines him to leave undone what
+      he wanted to do. He sees, I mean, that other people do not do it; and from
+      this he judges, in general, that it is not expedient; that it may endanger
+      his person, or his property, or his honour.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      He rests content, and gladly finds himself relieved from examining into
+      the matter for himself. Or he may see that another man, who has not
+      refrained, has incurred evil consequences from doing it; this is example
+      of the deterrent kind. The example which encourages a man works in a
+      twofold manner. It either induces him to do what he would be glad to leave
+      undone, if he were not afraid lest the omission might in some way endanger
+      him, or injure him in others' opinion; or else it encourages him to do
+      what he is glad to do, but has hitherto refrained from doing from fear of
+      danger or shame; this is example of the seductive kind. Finally, example
+      may bring a man to do what he would have otherwise never thought of doing.
+      It is obvious that in this last case example works in the main only on the
+      intellect; its effect on the will is secondary, and if it has any such
+      effect, it is by the interposition of the man's own judgment, or by
+      reliance on the person who presented the example.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The whole influence of example&mdash;and it is very strong&mdash;rests on
+      the fact that a man has, as a rule, too little judgment of his own, and
+      often too little knowledge, o explore his own way for himself, and that he
+      is glad, therefore, to tread in the footsteps of some one else.
+      Accordingly, the more deficient he is in either of these qualities, the
+      more is he open to the influence of example; and we find, in fact, that
+      most men's guiding star is the example of others; that their whole course
+      of life, in great things and in small, comes in the end to be mere
+      imitation; and that not even in the pettiest matters do they act according
+      to their own judgment. Imitation and custom are the spring of almost all
+      human action. The cause of it is that men fight shy of all and any sort of
+      reflection, and very properly mistrust their own discernment. At the same
+      time this remarkably strong imitative instinct in man is a proof of his
+      kinship with apes.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But the kind of effect which example exercises depends upon a man's
+      character, and thus it is that the same example may possibly seduce one
+      man and deter another. An easy opportunity of observing this is afforded
+      in the case of certain social impertinences which come into vogue and
+      gradually spread. The first time that a man notices anything of the kind,
+      he may say to himself: <i>For shame! how can he do it! how selfish and
+      inconsiderate of him! really, I shall take care never to do anything like
+      that</i>. But twenty others will think: <i>Aha! if he does that, I may do
+      it too</i>.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      As regards morality, example, like doctrine, may, it is true, promote
+      civil or legal amelioration, but not that inward amendment which is,
+      strictly speaking, the only kind of moral amelioration. For example always
+      works as a personal motive alone, and assumes, therefore, that a man is
+      susceptible to this sort of motive. But it is just the predominating
+      sensitiveness of a character to this or that sort of motive that
+      determines whether its morality is true and real; though, of whatever kind
+      it is, it is always innate. In general it may be said that example
+      operates as a means of promoting the good and the bad qualities of a
+      character, but it does not create them; and so it is that Seneca's maxim,
+      <i>velle non discitur</i>&mdash;<i>will cannot be learned</i>&mdash;also
+      holds good here. But the innateness of all truly moral qualities, of the
+      good as of the bad, is a doctrine that consorts better with the
+      metempsychosis of the Brahmins and Buddhists, according to which a man's
+      good and bad deeds follow him from one existence to another like his
+      shadow, than with Judaism. For Judaism requires a man to come into the
+      world as a moral blank, so that, in virtue of an inconceivable free will,
+      directed to objects which are neither to be sought nor avoided&mdash;<i>liberum
+      arbitrium indifferentiae</i>&mdash;and consequently as the result of
+      reasoned consideration, he may choose whether he is to be an angel or a
+      devil, or anything else that may lie between the two. Though I am well
+      aware what the Jewish scheme is, I pay no attention to it; for my standard
+      is truth. I am no professor of philosophy, and therefore I do not find my
+      vocation in establishing the fundamental ideas of Judaism at any cost,
+      even though they for ever bar the way to all and every kind of
+      philosophical knowledge. <i>Liberum arbitrium indifferentiae</i> under the
+      name of <i>moral freedom</i> is a charming doll for professors of
+      philosophy to dandle; and we must leave it to those intelligent,
+      honourable and upright gentlemen.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <br /><br />
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      <a name="link2H_4_0005" id="link2H_4_0005"> </a>
+    </p>
+    <div style="height: 4em;">
+      <br /><br /><br /><br />
+    </div>
+    <h2>
+      CHARACTER.
+    </h2>
+    <p>
+      Men who aspire to a happy, a brilliant and a long life, instead of to a
+      virtuous one, are like foolish actors who want to be always having the
+      great parts,&mdash;the parts that are marked by splendour and triumph.
+      They fail to see that the important thing is not <i>what</i> or <i>how
+      much</i>, but <i>how</i> they act.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Since <i>a man does not alter</i>, and his <i>moral character</i> remains
+      absolutely the same all through his life; since he must play out the part
+      which he has received, without the least deviation from the character;
+      since neither experience, nor philosophy, nor religion can effect any
+      improvement in him, the question arises, What is the meaning of life at
+      all? To what purpose is it played, this farce in which everything that is
+      essential is irrevocably fixed and determined?
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      It is played that a man may come to understand himself, that he may see
+      what it is that he seeks and has sought to be; what he wants, and what,
+      therefore, he is. <i>This is a knowledge which must be imparted to him
+      from without</i>. Life is to man, in other words, to will, what chemical
+      re-agents are to the body: it is only by life that a man reveals what he
+      is, and it is only in so far as he reveals himself that he exists at all.
+      Life is the manifestation of character, of the something that we
+      understand by that word; and it is not in life, but outside of it, and
+      outside time, that character undergoes alteration, as a result of the
+      self-knowledge which life gives. Life is only the mirror into which a man
+      gazes not in order that he may get a reflection of himself, but that he
+      may come to understand himself by that reflection; that he may see <i>what</i>
+      it is that the mirror shows. Life is the proof sheet, in which the
+      compositors' errors are brought to light. How they become visible, and
+      whether the type is large or small, are matters of no consequence. Neither
+      in the externals of life nor in the course of history is there any
+      significance; for as it is all one whether an error occurs in the large
+      type or in the small, so it is all one, as regards the essence of the
+      matter, whether an evil disposition is mirrored as a conqueror of the
+      world or a common swindler or ill-natured egoist. In one case he is seen
+      of all men; in the other, perhaps only of himself; but that he should see
+      himself is what signifies.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Therefore if egoism has a firm hold of a man and masters him, whether it
+      be in the form of joy, or triumph, or lust, or hope, or frantic grief, or
+      annoyance, or anger, or fear, or suspicion, or passion of any kind&mdash;he
+      is in the devil's clutches and how he got into them does not matter. What
+      is needful is that he should make haste to get out of them; and here,
+      again, it does not matter how.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      I have described <i>character</i> as <i>theoretically</i> an act of will
+      lying beyond time, of which life in time, or <i>character in action</i>,
+      is the development. For matters of practical life we all possess the one
+      as well as the other; for we are constituted of them both. Character
+      modifies our life more than we think, and it is to a certain extent true
+      that every man is the architect of his own fortune. No doubt it seems as
+      if our lot were assigned to us almost entirely from without, and imparted
+      to us in something of the same way in which a melody outside us reaches
+      the ear. But on looking back over our past, we see at once that our life
+      consists of mere variations on one and the same theme, namely, our
+      character, and that the same fundamental bass sounds through it all. This
+      is an experience which a man can and must make in and by himself.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Not only a man's life, but his intellect too, may be possessed of a clear
+      and definite character, so far as his intellect is applied to matters of
+      theory. It is not every man, however, who has an intellect of this kind;
+      for any such definite individuality as I mean is genius&mdash;an original
+      view of the world, which presupposes an absolutely exceptional
+      individuality, which is the essence of genius. A man's intellectual
+      character is the theme on which all his works are variations. In an essay
+      which I wrote in Weimar I called it the knack by which every genius
+      produces his works, however various. This intellectual character
+      determines the physiognomy of men of genius&mdash;what I might call <i>the
+      theoretical physiognomy</i>&mdash;and gives it that distinguished
+      expression which is chiefly seen in the eyes and the forehead. In the case
+      of ordinary men the physiognomy presents no more than a weak analogy with
+      the physiognomy of genius. On the other hand, all men possess <i>the
+      practical physiognomy</i>, the stamp of will, of practical character, of
+      moral disposition; and it shows itself chiefly in the mouth.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Since character, so far as we understand its nature, is above and beyond
+      time, it cannot undergo any change under the influence of life. But
+      although it must necessarily remain the same always, it requires time to
+      unfold itself and show the very diverse aspects which it may possess. For
+      character consists of two factors: one, the will-to-live itself, blind
+      impulse, so-called impetuosity; the other, the restraint which the will
+      acquires when it comes to understand the world; and the world, again, is
+      itself will. A man may begin by following the craving of desire, until he
+      comes to see how hollow and unreal a thing is life, how deceitful are its
+      pleasures, what horrible aspects it possesses; and this it is that makes
+      people hermits, penitents, Magdalenes. Nevertheless it is to be observed
+      that no such change from a life of great indulgence in pleasure to one of
+      resignation is possible, except to the man who of his own accord renounces
+      pleasure. A really bad life cannot be changed into a virtuous one. The
+      most beautiful soul, before it comes to know life from its horrible side,
+      may eagerly drink the sweets of life and remain innocent. But it cannot
+      commit a bad action; it cannot cause others suffering to do a pleasure to
+      itself, for in that case it would see clearly what it would be doing; and
+      whatever be its youth and inexperience it perceives the sufferings of
+      others as clearly as its own pleasures. That is why one bad action is a
+      guarantee that numberless others will be committed as soon as
+      circumstances give occasion for them. Somebody once remarked to me, with
+      entire justice, that every man had something very good and humane in his
+      disposition, and also something very bad and malignant; and that according
+      as he was moved one or the other of them made its appearance. The sight of
+      others' suffering arouses, not only in different men, but in one and the
+      same man, at one moment an inexhaustible sympathy, at another a certain
+      satisfaction; and this satisfaction may increase until it becomes the
+      cruellest delight in pain. I observe in myself that at one moment I regard
+      all mankind with heartfelt pity, at another with the greatest
+      indifference, on occasion with hatred, nay, with a positive enjoyment of
+      their pain.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      All this shows very clearly that we are possessed of two different, nay,
+      absolutely contradictory, ways of regarding the world: one according to
+      the principle of individuation, which exhibits all creatures as entire
+      strangers to us, as definitely not ourselves. We can have no feelings for
+      them but those of indifference, envy, hatred, and delight that they
+      suffer. The other way of regarding the world is in accordance with what I
+      may call the <i>Tat-twam-asi</i>&mdash;<i>this-is-thyself</i> principle.
+      All creatures are exhibited as identical with ourselves; and so it is pity
+      and love which the sight of them arouses.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The one method separates individuals by impassable barriers; the other
+      removes the barrier and brings the individuals together. The one makes us
+      feel, in regard to every man, <i>that is what I am</i>; the other, <i>that
+      is not what I am</i>. But it is remarkable that while the sight of
+      another's suffering makes us feel our identity with him, and arouses our
+      pity, this is not so with the sight of another's happiness. Then we almost
+      always feel some envy; and even though we may have no such feeling in
+      certain cases,&mdash;as, for instance, when our friends are happy,&mdash;yet
+      the interest which we take in their happiness is of a weak description,
+      and cannot compare with the sympathy which we feel with their suffering.
+      Is this because we recognise all happiness to be a delusion, or an
+      impediment to true welfare? No! I am inclined to think that it is because
+      the sight of the pleasure, or the possessions, which are denied to us,
+      arouses envy; that is to say, the wish that we, and not the other, had
+      that pleasure or those possessions.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      It is only the first way of looking at the world which is founded on any
+      demonstrable reason. The other is, as it were, the gate out of this world;
+      it has no attestation beyond itself, unless it be the very abstract and
+      difficult proof which my doctrine supplies. Why the first way predominates
+      in one man, and the second in another&mdash;though perhaps it does not
+      exclusively predominate in any man; why the one or the other emerges
+      according as the will is moved&mdash;these are deep problems. The paths of
+      night and day are close together:
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  {Greek: Engus gar nuktos de kai aematos eisi keleuthoi.}
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      It is a fact that there is a great and original difference between one
+      empirical character and another; and it is a difference which, at bottom,
+      rests upon the relation of the individual's will to his intellectual
+      faculty. This relation is finally determined by the degree of will in his
+      father and of intellect in his mother; and the union of father and mother
+      is for the most part an affair of chance. This would all mean a revolting
+      injustice in the nature of the world, if it were not that the difference
+      between parents and son is phenomenal only and all chance is, at bottom,
+      necessity.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      As regards the freedom of the will, if it were the case that the will
+      manifested itself in a single act alone, it would be a free act. But the
+      will manifests itself in a course of life, that is to say, in a series of
+      acts. Every one of these acts, therefore, is determined as a part of a
+      complete whole, and cannot happen otherwise than it does happen. On the
+      other hand, the whole series is free; it is simply the manifestation of an
+      individualised will.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      If a man feels inclined to commit a bad action and refrains, he is kept
+      back either (1) by fear of punishment or vengeance; or (2) by superstition
+      in other words, fear of punishment in a future life; or (3) by the feeling
+      of sympathy, including general charity; or (4) by the feeling of honour,
+      in other words, the fear of shame; or (5) by the feeling of justice, that
+      is, an objective attachment to fidelity and good-faith, coupled with a
+      resolve to hold them sacred, because they are the foundation of all free
+      intercourse between man and man, and therefore often of advantage to
+      himself as well. This last thought, not indeed as a thought, but as a mere
+      feeling, influences people very frequently. It is this that often compels
+      a man of honour, when some great but unjust advantage is offered him, to
+      reject it with contempt and proudly exclaim: <i>I am an honourable man</i>!
+      For otherwise how should a poor man, confronted with the property which
+      chance or even some worse agency has bestowed on the rich, whose very
+      existence it is that makes him poor, feel so much sincere respect for this
+      property, that he refuses to touch it even in his need; and although he
+      has a prospect of escaping punishment, what other thought is it that can
+      be at the bottom of such a man's honesty? He is resolved not to separate
+      himself from the great community of honourable people who have the earth
+      in possession, and whose laws are recognised everywhere. He knows that a
+      single dishonest act will ostracise and proscribe him from that society
+      for ever. No! a man will spend money on any soil that yields him good
+      fruit, and he will make sacrifices for it.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      With a good action,&mdash;that, every action in which a man's own
+      advantage is ostensibly subordinated to another's,&mdash;the motive is
+      either (1) self-interest, kept in the background; or (2) superstition, in
+      other words, self-interest in the form of reward in another life; or (3)
+      sympathy; or (4) the desire to lend a helping hand, in other words,
+      attachment to the maxim that we should assist one another in need, and the
+      wish to maintain this maxim, in view of the presumption that some day we
+      ourselves may find it serve our turn. For what Kant calls a good action
+      done from motives of duty and for the sake of duty, there is, as will be
+      seen, no room at all. Kant himself declares it to be doubtful whether an
+      action was ever determined by pure motives of duty alone. I affirm most
+      certainly that no action was ever so done; it is mere babble; there is
+      nothing in it that could really act as a motive to any man. When he
+      shelters himself behind verbiage of that sort, he is always actuated by
+      one of the four motives which I have described. Among these it is
+      obviously sympathy alone which is quite genuine and sincere.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <i>Good</i> and <i>bad</i> apply to character only <i>à potiori</i>; that
+      is to say, we prefer the good to the bad; but, absolutely, there is no
+      such distinction. The difference arises at the point which lies between
+      subordinating one's own advantage to that of another, and not
+      subordinating it. If a man keeps to the exact middle, he is <i>just</i>.
+      But most men go an inch in their regard for others' welfare to twenty
+      yards in regard for their own.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The source of <i>good</i> and of <i>bad character</i>, so far as we have
+      any real knowledge of it, lies in this, that with the bad character the
+      thought of the external world, and especially of the living creatures in
+      it, is accompanied&mdash;all the more, the greater the resemblance between
+      them and the individual self&mdash;by a constant feeling of <i>not I, not
+      I, not I</i>.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Contrarily, with the good character (both being assumed to exist in a high
+      degree) the same thought has for its accompaniment, like a fundamental
+      bass, a constant feeling of <i>I, I, I</i>. From this spring benevolence
+      and a disposition to help all men, and at the same time a cheerful,
+      confident and tranquil frame of mind, the opposite of that which
+      accompanies the bad character.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The difference, however, is only phenomenal, although it is a difference
+      which is radical. But now we come to <i>the hardest of all problems</i>:
+      How is it that, while the will, as the thing-in-itself, is identical, and
+      from a metaphysical point of view one and the same in all its
+      manifestations, there is nevertheless such an enormous difference between
+      one character and another?&mdash;the malicious, diabolical wickedness of
+      the one, and set off against it, the goodness of the other, showing all
+      the more conspicuously. How is it that we get a Tiberius, a Caligula, a
+      Carcalla, a Domitian, a Nero; and on the other hand, the Antonines, Titus,
+      Hadrian, Nerva? How is it that among the animals, nay, in a higher
+      species, in individual animals, there is a like difference?&mdash;the
+      malignity of the cat most strongly developed in the tiger; the spite of
+      the monkey; on the other hand, goodness, fidelity and love in the dog and
+      the elephant. It is obvious that the principle of wickedness in the brute
+      is the same as in man.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      We may to some extent modify the difficulty of the problem by observing
+      that the whole difference is in the end only one of degree. In every
+      living creature, the fundamental propensities and instincts all exist, but
+      they exist in very different degrees and proportions. This, however, is
+      not enough to explain the facts.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      We must fall back upon the intellect and its relation to the will; it is
+      the only explanation that remains. A man's intellect, however, by no means
+      stands in any direct and obvious relation with the goodness of his
+      character. We may, it is true, discriminate between two kinds of
+      intellect: between understanding, as the apprehension of relation in
+      accordance with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and cognition, a
+      faculty akin to genius, which acts more directly, is independent of this
+      law, and passes beyond the Principle of Individuation. The latter is the
+      faculty which apprehends Ideas, and it is the faculty which has to do with
+      morality. But even this explanation leaves much to be desired. <i>Fine
+      minds are seldom fine souls</i> was the correct observation of Jean Paul;
+      although they are never the contrary. Lord Bacon, who, to be sure, was
+      less a fine soul than a fine mind, was a scoundrel.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      I have declared space and time to be part of the Principle of
+      Individuation, as it is only space and time that make the multiplicity of
+      similar objects a possibility. But multiplicity itself also admits of
+      variety; multiplicity and diversity are not only quantitative, but also
+      qualitative. How is it that there is such a thing as qualitative
+      diversity, especially in ethical matters? Or have I fallen into an error
+      the opposite of that in which Leibnitz fell with his <i>identitas
+      indiscernibilium</i>?
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The chief cause of intellectual diversity is to be found in the brain and
+      nervous system. This is a fact which somewhat lessens the obscurity of the
+      subject. With the brutes the intellect and the brain are strictly adapted
+      to their aims and needs. With man alone there is now and then, by way of
+      exception, a superfluity, which, if it is abundant, may yield genius. But
+      ethical diversity, it seems, proceeds immediately from the will. Otherwise
+      ethical character would not be above and beyond time, as it is only in the
+      individual that intellect and will are united. The will is above and
+      beyond time, and eternal; and character is innate; that is to say, it is
+      sprung from the same eternity, and therefore it does not admit of any but
+      a transcendental explanation.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Perhaps some one will come after me who will throw light into this dark
+      abyss.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <br /><br />
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      <a name="link2H_4_0006" id="link2H_4_0006"> </a>
+    </p>
+    <div style="height: 4em;">
+      <br /><br /><br /><br />
+    </div>
+    <h2>
+      MORAL INSTINCT.
+    </h2>
+    <p>
+      An act done by instinct differs from every other kind of act in that an
+      understanding of its object does not precede it but follows upon it.
+      Instinct is therefore a rule of action given <i>à priori</i>. We may be
+      unaware of the object to which it is directed, as no understanding of it
+      is necessary to its attainment. On the other hand, if an act is done by an
+      exercise of reason or intelligence, it proceeds according to a rule which
+      the understanding has itself devised for the purpose of carrying out a
+      preconceived aim. Hence it is that action according to rule may miss its
+      aim, while instinct is infallible.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      On the <i>à priori</i> character of instinct we may compare what Plato
+      says in the <i>Philebus</i>. With Plato instinct is a reminiscence of
+      something which a man has never actually experienced in his lifetime; in
+      the same way as, in the <i>Phaedo</i> and elsewhere, everything that a man
+      learns is regarded as a reminiscence. He has no other word to express the
+      <i>à priori</i> element in all experience.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      There are, then, three things that are <i>à priori</i>:
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      (1) Theoretical Reason, in other words, the conditions which make all
+      experience possible.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      (2) Instinct, or the rule by which an object promoting the life of the
+      senses may, though unknown, be attained.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      (3) The Moral Law, or the rule by which an action takes place without any
+      object.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Accordingly rational or intelligent action proceeds by a rule laid down in
+      accordance with the object as it is understood. Instinctive action
+      proceeds by a rule without an understanding of the object of it. Moral
+      action proceeds by a rule without any object at all.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <i>Theoretical Reason</i> is the aggregate of rules in accordance with
+      which all my knowledge&mdash;that is to say, the whole world of experience&mdash;necessarily
+      proceeds. In the same manner <i>Instinct</i> is the aggregate of rules in
+      accordance with which all my action necessarily proceeds if it meets with
+      no obstruction. Hence it seems to me that Instinct may most appropriately
+      be called <i>practical reason</i>, for like theoretical reason it
+      determines the <i>must</i> of all experience.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The so-called moral law, on the other hand, is only one aspect of <i>the
+      better consciousness</i>, the aspect which it presents from the point of
+      view of instinct. This better consciousness is something lying beyond all
+      experience, that is, beyond all reason, whether of the theoretical or the
+      practical kind, and has nothing to do with it; whilst it is in virtue of
+      the mysterious union of it and reason in the same individual that the
+      better consciousness comes into conflict with reason, leaving the
+      individual to choose between the two.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In any conflict between the better consciousness and reason, if the
+      individual decides for reason, should it be theoretical reason, he becomes
+      a narrow, pedantic philistine; should it be practical, a rascal.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      If he decides for the better consciousness, we can make no further
+      positive affirmation about him, for if we were to do so, we should find
+      ourselves in the realm of reason; and as it is only what takes place
+      within this realm that we can speak of at all it follows that we cannot
+      speak of the better consciousness except in negative terms.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      This shows us how it is that reason is hindered and obstructed; that <i>theoretical
+      reason</i> is suppressed in favour of <i>genius</i>, and <i>practical
+      reason</i> in favour of <i>virtue</i>. Now the better consciousness is
+      neither theoretical nor practical; for these are distinctions that only
+      apply to reason. But if the individual is in the act of choosing, the
+      better consciousness appears to him in the aspect which it assumes in
+      vanquishing and overcoming the practical reason (or instinct, to use the
+      common word). It appears to him as an imperative command, an <i>ought</i>.
+      It so appears to him, I say; in other words, that is the shape which it
+      takes for the theoretical reason which renders all things into objects and
+      ideas. But in so far as the better consciousness desires to vanquish and
+      overcome the theoretical reason, it takes no shape at all; on the simple
+      ground that, as it comes into play, the theoretical reason is suppressed
+      and becomes the mere servant of the better consciousness. That is why
+      genius can never give any account of its own works.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In the morality of action, the legal principle that both sides are to be
+      heard must not be allowed to apply; in other words, the claims of self and
+      the senses must not be urged. Nay, on the contrary, as soon as the pure
+      will has found expression, the case is closed; <i>nec audienda altera pars</i>.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The lower animals are not endowed with moral freedom. Probably this is not
+      because they show no trace of the better consciousness which in us is
+      manifested as morality, or nothing analogous to it; for, if that were so,
+      the lower animals, which are in so many respects like ourselves in outward
+      appearance that we regard man as a species of animal, would possess some
+      <i>raison d'être</i> entirely different from our own, and actually be, in
+      their essential and inmost nature, something quite other than ourselves.
+      This is a contention which is obviously refuted by the thoroughly
+      malignant and inherently vicious character of certain animals, such as the
+      crocodile, the hyaena, the scorpion, the snake, and the gentle,
+      affectionate and contented character of others, such as the dog. Here, as
+      in the case of men, the character, as it is manifested, must rest upon
+      something that is above and beyond time. For, as Jacob Böhme says,{1} <i>there
+      is a power in every animal which is indestructible, and the spirit of the
+      world draws it into itself, against the final separation at the Last
+      Judgment</i>. Therefore we cannot call the lower animals free, and the
+      reason why we cannot do so is that they are wanting in a faculty which is
+      profoundly subordinate to the better consciousness in its highest phase, I
+      mean reason. Reason is the faculty of supreme comprehension, the idea of
+      totality. How reason manifests itself in the theoretical sphere Kant has
+      shown, and it does the same in the practical: it makes us capable of
+      observing and surveying the whole of our life, thought, and action, in
+      continual connection, and therefore of acting according to general maxims,
+      whether those maxims originate in the understanding as prudential rules,
+      or in the better consciousness as moral laws.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Epistles</i>, 56.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      If any desire or passion is aroused in us, we, and in the same way the
+      lower animals, are for the moment filled with this desire; we are all
+      anger, all lust, all fear; and in such moments neither the better
+      consciousness can speak, nor the understanding consider the consequences.
+      But in our case reason allows us even at that moment to see our actions
+      and our life as an unbroken chain,&mdash;a chain which connects our
+      earlier resolutions, or, it may be, the future consequences of our action,
+      with the moment of passion which now fills our whole consciousness. It
+      shows us the identity of our person, even when that person is exposed to
+      influences of the most varied kind, and thereby we are enabled to act
+      according to maxims. The lower animal is wanting in this faculty; the
+      passion which seizes it completely dominates it, and can be checked only
+      by another passion&mdash;anger, for instance, or lust, by fear; even
+      though the vision that terrifies does not appeal to the senses, but is
+      present in the animal only as a dim memory and imagination. Men,
+      therefore, may be called irrational, if, like the lower animals, they
+      allow themselves to be determined by the moment.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      So far, however, is reason from being the source of morality that it is
+      reason alone which makes us capable of being rascals, which the lower
+      animals cannot be. It is reason which enables us to form an evil
+      resolution and to keep it when the provocation to evil is removed; it
+      enables us, for example, to nurse vengeance. Although at the moment that
+      we have an opportunity of fulfilling our resolution the better
+      consciousness may manifest itself as love or charity, it is by force of
+      reason, in pursuance of some evil maxim, that we act against it. Thus
+      Goethe says that a man may use his reason only for the purpose of being
+      more bestial than any beast:
+    </p>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+  <i>Er hat Vernunft, doch braucht er sie allein
+  Um theirischer als jedes Thier zu sein</i>.
+</pre>
+    <p>
+      For not only do we, like the beasts, satisfy the desires of the moment,
+      but we refine upon them and stimulate them in order to prepare the desire
+      for the satisfaction.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Whenever we think that we perceive a trace of reason in the lower animals,
+      it fills us with surprise. Now our surprise is not excited by the good and
+      affectionate disposition which some of them exhibit&mdash;we recognise
+      that as something other than reason&mdash;but by some action in them which
+      seems to be determined not by the impression of the moment, but by a
+      resolution previously made and kept. Elephants, for instance, are reported
+      to have taken premeditated revenge for insults long after they were
+      suffered; lions, to have requited benefits on an opportunity tardily
+      offered. The truth of such stories has, however, no bearing at all on the
+      question, What do we mean by reason? But they enable us to decide whether
+      in the lower animals there is any trace of anything that we can call
+      reason.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Kant not only declares that all our moral sentiments originate in reason,
+      but he lays down that reason, <i>in my sense of the word</i>, is a
+      condition of moral action; as he holds that for an action to be virtuous
+      and meritorious it must be done in accordance with maxims, and not spring
+      from a resolve taken under some momentary impression. But in both
+      contentions he is wrong. If I resolve to take vengeance on some one, and
+      when an opportunity offers, the better consciousness in the form of love
+      and humanity speaks its word, and I am influenced by it rather than by my
+      evil resolution, this is a virtuous act, for it is a manifestation of the
+      better consciousness. It is possible to conceive of a very virtuous man in
+      whom the better consciousness is so continuously active that it is never
+      silent, and never allows his passions to get a complete hold of him. By
+      such consciousness he is subject to a direct control, instead of being
+      guided indirectly, through the medium of reason, by means of maxims and
+      moral principles. That is why a man may have weak reasoning powers and a
+      weak understanding and yet have a high sense of morality and be eminently
+      good; for the most important element in a man depends as little on
+      intellectual as it does on physical strength. Jesus says, <i>Blessed are
+      the poor in spirit</i>. And Jacob Böhme has the excellent and noble
+      observation: <i>Whoso lies quietly in his own will, like a child in the
+      womb, and lets himself be led and guided by that inner principle from
+      which he is sprung, is the noblest and richest on earth</i>.{1}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      {Footnote 1: <i>Epistles</i>, 37.}
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      <br /><br />
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      <a name="link2H_4_0007" id="link2H_4_0007"> </a>
+    </p>
+    <div style="height: 4em;">
+      <br /><br /><br /><br />
+    </div>
+    <h2>
+      ETHICAL REFLECTIONS.
+    </h2>
+    <p>
+      The philosophers of the ancient world united in a single conception a
+      great many things that had no connection with one another. Of this every
+      dialogue of Plato's furnishes abundant examples. The greatest and worst
+      confusion of this kind is that between ethics and politics. The State and
+      the Kingdom of God, or the Moral Law, are so entirely different in their
+      character that the former is a parody of the latter, a bitter mockery at
+      the absence of it. Compared with the Moral Law the State is a crutch
+      instead of a limb, an automaton instead of a man.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      The <i>principle of honour</i> stands in close connection with human
+      freedom. It is, as it were, an abuse of that freedom. Instead of using his
+      freedom to fulfil the moral law, a man employs his power of voluntarily
+      undergoing any feeling of pain, of overcoming any momentary impression, in
+      order that he may assert his self-will, whatever be the object to which he
+      directs it. As he thereby shows that, unlike the lower animals, he has
+      thoughts which go beyond the welfare of his body and whatever makes for
+      that welfare, it has come about that the principle of honour is often
+      confused with virtue. They are regarded as if they were twins. But
+      wrongly; for although the principle of honour is something which
+      distinguishes man from the lower animals, it is not, in itself, anything
+      that raises him above them. Taken as an end and aim, it is as dark a
+      delusion as any other aim that springs from self. Used as a means, or
+      casually, it may be productive of good; but even that is good which is
+      vain and frivolous. It is the misuse of freedom, the employment of it as a
+      weapon for overcoming the world of feeling, that makes man so infinitely
+      more terrible than the lower animals; for they do only what momentary
+      instinct bids them; while man acts by ideas, and his ideas may entail
+      universal ruin before they are satisfied.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      There is another circumstance which helps to promote the notion that
+      honour and virtue are connected. A man who can do what he wants to do
+      shows that he can also do it if what he wants to do is a virtuous act. But
+      that those of our actions which we are ourselves obliged to regard with
+      contempt are also regarded with contempt by other people serves more than
+      anything that I have here mentioned to establish the connection. Thus it
+      often happens that a man who is not afraid of the one kind of contempt is
+      unwilling to undergo the other. But when we are called upon to choose
+      between our own approval and the world's censure, as may occur in
+      complicated and mistaken circumstances, what becomes of the principle of
+      honour then?
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Two characteristic examples of the principle of honour are to be found in
+      Shakespeare's <i>Henry VI</i>., Part II., Act IV., Sc. 1. A pirate is
+      anxious to murder his captive instead of accepting, like others, a ransom
+      for him; because in taking his captive he lost an eye, and his own honour
+      and that of his forefathers would in his opinion be stained, if he were to
+      allow his revenge to be bought off as though he were a mere trader. The
+      prisoner, on the other hand, who is the Duke of Suffolk, prefers to have
+      his head grace a pole than to uncover it to such a low fellow as a pirate,
+      by approaching him to ask for mercy.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Just as civic honour&mdash;in other words, the opinion that we deserve to
+      be trusted&mdash;is the palladium of those whose endeavour it is to make
+      their way in the world on the path of honourable business, so knightly
+      honour&mdash;in other words, the opinion that we are men to be feared&mdash;is
+      the palladium of those who aim at going through life on the path of
+      violence; and so it was that knightly honour arose among the
+      robber-knights and other knights of the Middle Ages.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      A theoretical philosopher is one who can supply in the shape of ideas for
+      the reason, a copy of the presentations of experience; just as what the
+      painter sees he can reproduce on canvas; the sculptor, in marble; the
+      poet, in pictures for the imagination, though they are pictures which he
+      supplies only in sowing the ideas from which they sprang.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      A so-called practical philosopher, on the other hand, is one who,
+      contrarily, deduces his action from ideas. The theoretical philosopher
+      transforms life into ideas. The practical philosopher transforms ideas
+      into life; he acts, therefore, in a thoroughly reasonable manner; he is
+      consistent, regular, deliberate; he is never hasty or passionate; he never
+      allows himself to be influenced by the impression of the moment.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      And indeed, when we find ourselves among those full presentations of
+      experience, or real objects, to which the body belongs&mdash;since the
+      body is only an objectified will, the shape which the will assumes in the
+      material world&mdash;it is difficult to let our bodies be guided, not by
+      those presentations, but by a mere image of them, by cold, colourless
+      ideas, which are related to experience as the shadow of Orcus to life; and
+      yet this is the only way in which we can avoid doing things of which we
+      may have to repent.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The theoretical philosopher enriches the domain of reason by adding to it;
+      the practical philosopher draws upon it, and makes it serve him.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      According to Kant the truth of experience is only a hypothetical truth. If
+      the suppositions which underlie all the intimations of experience&mdash;subject,
+      object, time, space and causality&mdash;were removed, none of those
+      intimations would contain a word of truth. In other words, experience is
+      only a phenomenon; it is not knowledge of the thing-in-itself.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      If we find something in our own conduct at which we are secretly pleased,
+      although we cannot reconcile it with experience, seeing that if we were to
+      follow the guidance of experience we should have to do precisely the
+      opposite, we must not allow this to put us out; otherwise we should be
+      ascribing an authority to experience which it does not deserve, for all
+      that it teaches rests upon a mere supposition. This is the general
+      tendency of the Kantian Ethics.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      Innocence is in its very nature stupid. It is stupid because the aim of
+      life (I use the expression only figuratively, and I could just as well
+      speak of the essence of life, or of the world) is to gain a knowledge of
+      our own bad will, so that our will may become an object for us, and that
+      we may undergo an inward conversion. Our body is itself our will
+      objectified; it is one of the first and foremost of objects, and the deeds
+      that we accomplish for the sake of the body show us the evil inherent in
+      our will. In the state of innocence, where there is no evil because there
+      is no experience, man is, as it were, only an apparatus for living, and
+      the object for which the apparatus exists is not yet disclosed. An empty
+      form of life like this, a stage untenanted, is in itself, like the
+      so-called real world, null and void; and as it can attain a meaning only
+      by action, by error, by knowledge, by the convulsions of the will, it
+      wears a character of insipid stupidity. A golden age of innocence, a
+      fools' paradise, is a notion that is stupid and unmeaning, and for that
+      very reason in no way worthy of any respect. The first criminal and
+      murderer, Cain, who acquired a knowledge of guilt, and through guilt
+      acquired a knowledge of virtue by repentance, and so came to understand
+      the meaning of life, is a tragical figure more significant, and almost
+      more respectable, than all the innocent fools in the world put together.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      If I had to write about <i>modesty</i> I should say: I know the esteemed
+      public for which I have the honour to write far too well to dare to give
+      utterance to my opinion about this virtue. Personally I am quite content
+      to be modest and to apply myself to this virtue with the utmost possible
+      circumspection. But one thing I shall never admit&mdash;that I have ever
+      required modesty of any man, and any statement to that effect I repel as a
+      slander.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The paltry character of most men compels the few who have any merit or
+      genius to behave as though they did not know their own value, and
+      consequently did not know other people's want of value; for it is only on
+      this condition that the mob acquiesces in tolerating merit. A virtue has
+      been made out of this necessity, and it is called modesty. It is a piece
+      of hypocrisy, to be excused only because other people are so paltry that
+      they must be treated with indulgence.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      Human misery may affect us in two ways, and we may be in one of two
+      opposite moods in regard to it.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In one of them, this misery is immediately present to us. We feel it in
+      our own person, in our own will which, imbued with violent desires, is
+      everywhere broken, and this is the process which constitutes suffering.
+      The result is that the will increases in violence, as is shown in all
+      cases of passion and emotion; and this increasing violence comes to a stop
+      only when the will turns and gives way to complete resignation, in other
+      words, is redeemed. The man who is entirely dominated by this mood will
+      regard any prosperity which he may see in others with envy, and any
+      suffering with no sympathy.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In the opposite mood human misery is present to us only as a fact of
+      knowledge, that is to say, indirectly. We are mainly engaged in looking at
+      the sufferings of others, and our attention is withdrawn from our own. It
+      is in their person that we become aware of human misery; we are filled
+      with sympathy; and the result of this mood is general benevolence,
+      philanthropy. All envy vanishes, and instead of feeling it, we are
+      rejoiced when we see one of our tormented fellow-creatures experience any
+      pleasure or relief.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      After the same fashion we may be in one of two opposite moods in regard to
+      human baseness and depravity. In the one we perceive this baseness
+      indirectly, in others. Out of this mood arise indignation, hatred, and
+      contempt of mankind. In the other we perceive it directly, in ourselves.
+      Out of it there arises humiliation, nay, contrition.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      In order to judge the moral value of a man, it is very important to
+      observe which of these four moods predominate in him. They go in pairs,
+      one out of each division. In very excellent characters the second mood of
+      each division will predominate.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      The categorical imperative, or absolute command, is a contradiction. Every
+      command is conditional. What is unconditional and necessary is a <i>must</i>,
+      such as is presented by the laws of nature.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      It is quite true that the moral law is entirely conditional. There is a
+      world and a view of life in which it has neither validity nor
+      significance. That world is, properly speaking, the real world in which,
+      as individuals, we live; for every regard paid to morality is a denial of
+      that world and of our individual life in it. It is a view of the world,
+      however, which does not go beyond the principle of sufficient reason; and
+      the opposite view proceeds by the intuition of Ideas.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      If a man is under the influence of two opposite but very strong motives, A
+      and B, and I am greatly concerned that he should choose A, but still more
+      that he should never be untrue to his choice, and by changing his mind
+      betray me, or the like, it will not do for me to say anything that might
+      hinder the motive B from having its full effect upon him, and only
+      emphasise A; for then I should never be able to reckon on his decision.
+      What I have to do is, rather, to put both motives before him at the same
+      time, in as vivid and clear a way as possible, so that they may work upon
+      him with their whole force. The choice that he then makes is the decision
+      of his inmost nature, and stands firm to all eternity. In saying <i>I will
+      do this</i>, he has said <i>I must do this</i>. I have got at his will,
+      and I can rely upon its working as steadily as one of the forces of
+      nature. It is as certain as fire kindles and water wets that he will act
+      according to the motive which has proved to be stronger for him. Insight
+      and knowledge may be attained and lost again; they may be changed, or
+      improved, or destroyed; but will cannot be changed. That is why <i>I
+      apprehend, I perceive, I see</i>, is subject to alteration and
+      uncertainty; <i>I will</i>, pronounced on a right apprehension of motive,
+      is as firm as nature itself. The difficulty, however, lies in getting at a
+      right apprehension. A man's apprehension of motive may change, or be
+      corrected or perverted; and on the other hand, his circumstances may
+      undergo an alteration.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      A man should exercise an almost boundless toleration and placability,
+      because if he is capricious enough to refuse to forgive a single
+      individual for the meanness or evil that lies at his door, it is doing the
+      rest of the world a quite unmerited honour.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      But at the same time the man who is every one's friend is no one's friend.
+      It is quite obvious what sort of friendship it is which we hold out to the
+      human race, and to which it is open to almost every man to return, no
+      matter what he may have done.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      With the ancients <i>friendship</i> was one of the chief elements in
+      morality. But friendship is only limitation and partiality; it is the
+      restriction to one individual of what is the due of all mankind, namely,
+      the recognition that a man's own nature and that of mankind are identical.
+      At most it is a compromise between this recognition and selfishness.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      A lie always has its origin in the desire to extend the dominion of one's
+      own will over other individuals, and to deny their will in order the
+      better to affirm one's own. Consequently a lie is in its very nature the
+      product of injustice, malevolence and villainy. That is why truth,
+      sincerity, candour and rectitude are at once recognised and valued as
+      praiseworthy and noble qualities; because we presume that the man who
+      exhibits them entertains no sentiments of injustice or malice, and
+      therefore stands in no need of concealing such sentiments. He who is open
+      cherishes nothing that is bad.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      There is a certain kind of courage which springs from the same source as
+      good-nature. What I mean is that the good-natured man is almost as clearly
+      conscious that he exists in other individuals as in himself. I have often
+      shown how this feeling gives rise to good-nature. It also gives rise to
+      courage, for the simple reason that the man who possesses this feeling
+      cares less for his own individual existence, as he lives almost as much in
+      the general existence of all creatures. Accordingly he is little concerned
+      for his own life and its belongings. This is by no means the sole source
+      of courage for it is a phenomenon due to various causes. But it is the
+      noblest kind of courage, as is shown by the fact that in its origin it is
+      associated with great gentleness and patience. Men of this kind are
+      usually irresistible to women.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      All general rules and precepts fail, because they proceed from the false
+      assumption that men are constituted wholly, or almost wholly, alike; an
+      assumption which the philosophy of Helvetius expressly makes. Whereas the
+      truth is that the original difference between individuals in intellect and
+      morality is immeasurable.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      The question as to whether morality is something real is the question
+      whether a well-grounded counter-principle to egoism actually exists.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      As egoism restricts concern for welfare to a single individual, <i>viz</i>.,
+      the man's own self, the counter-principle would have to extend it to all
+      other individuals.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      It is only because the will is above and beyond time that the stings of
+      conscience are ineradicable, and do not, like other pains, gradually wear
+      away. No! an evil deed weighs on the conscience years afterwards as
+      heavily as if it had been freshly committed.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      Character is innate, and conduct is merely its manifestation; the occasion
+      for great misdeeds comes seldom; strong counter-motives keep us back; our
+      disposition is revealed to ourselves by our desires, thoughts, emotions,
+      when it remains unknown to others. Reflecting on all this, we might
+      suppose it possible for a man to possess, in some sort, an innate evil
+      conscience, without ever having done anything very bad.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      <i>Don't do to others what you wouldn't like done to yourself</i>. This
+      is, perhaps, one of those arguments that prove, or rather ask, too much.
+      For a prisoner might address it to a judge.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      Stupid people are generally malicious, for the very same reason as the
+      ugly and the deformed.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Similarly, genius and sanctity are akin. However simple-minded a saint may
+      be, he will nevertheless have a dash of genius in him; and however many
+      errors of temperament, or of actual character, a genius may possess, he
+      will still exhibit a certain nobility of disposition by which he shows his
+      kinship with the saint.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      The great difference between Law without and Law within, between the State
+      and the Kingdom of God, is very clear. It is the State's business to see
+      that <i>every one should have justice done to him</i>; it regards men as
+      passive beings, and therefore takes no account of anything but their
+      actions. The Moral Law, on the other hand, is concerned that <i>every one
+      should do justice</i>; it regards men as active, and looks to the will
+      rather than the deed. To prove that this is the true distinction let the
+      reader consider what would happen if he were to say, conversely, that it
+      is the State's business that every one should do justice, and the business
+      of the Moral Law that every one should have justice done to him. The
+      absurdity is obvious.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      As an example of the distinction, let me take the case of a debtor and a
+      creditor disputing about a debt which the former denies. A lawyer and a
+      moralist are present, and show a lively interest in the matter. Both
+      desire that the dispute should end in the same way, although what they
+      want is by no means the same. The lawyer says, <i>I want this man to get
+      back what belongs to him</i>; and the moralist, <i>I want that man to do
+      his duty</i>.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      It is with the will alone that morality is concerned. Whether external
+      force hinders or fails to hinder the will from working does not in the
+      least matter. For morality the external world is real only in so far as it
+      is able or unable to lead and influence the will. As soon as the will is
+      determined, that is, as soon as a resolve is taken, the external world and
+      its events are of no further moment and practical do not exist. For if the
+      events of the world had any such reality&mdash;that is to say, if they
+      possessed a significance in themselves, or any other than that derived
+      from the will which is affected by them&mdash;what a grievance it would be
+      that all these events lie in the realm of chance and error! It is,
+      however, just this which proves that the important thing is not what
+      happens, but what is willed. Accordingly, let the incidents of life be
+      left to the play of chance and error, to demonstrate to man that he is as
+      chaff before the wind.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The State concerns itself only with the incidents&mdash;with what happens;
+      nothing else has any reality for it. I may dwell upon thoughts of murder
+      and poison as much as I please: the State does not forbid me, so long as
+      the axe and rope control my will, and prevent it from becoming action.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Ethics asks: What are the duties towards others which justice imposes upon
+      us? in other words, What must I render? The Law of Nature asks: What need
+      I not submit to from others? that is, What must I suffer? The question is
+      put, not that I may do no injustice, but that I may not do more than every
+      man must do if he is to safeguard his existence, and than every man will
+      approve being done, in order that he may be treated in the same way
+      himself; and, further, that I may not do more than society will permit me
+      to do. The same answer will serve for both questions, just as the same
+      straight line can be drawn from either of two opposite directions, namely,
+      by opposing forces; or, again, as the angle can give the sine, or the sine
+      the angle.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      It has been said that the historian is an inverted prophet. In the same
+      way it may be said that a teacher of law is an inverted moralist (<i>viz</i>.,
+      a teacher of the duties of justice), or that politics are inverted ethics,
+      if we exclude the thought that ethics also teaches the duty of
+      benevolence, magnanimity, love, and so on. The State is the Gordian knot
+      that is cut instead of being untied; it is Columbus' egg which is made to
+      stand by being broken instead of balanced, as though the business in
+      question were to make it stand rather than to balance it. In this respect
+      the State is like the man who thinks that he can produce fine weather by
+      making the barometer go up.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      The pseudo-philosophers of our age tell us that it is the object of the
+      State to promote the moral aims of mankind. This is not true; it is rather
+      the contrary which is true. The aim for which mankind exists&mdash;the
+      expression is parabolic&mdash;is not that a man should act in such and
+      such a manner; for all <i>opera operata</i>, things that have actually
+      been done, are in themselves matters of indifference. No! the aim is that
+      the Will, of which every man is a complete specimen&mdash;nay, is the very
+      Will itself&mdash;should turn whither it needs to turn; that the man
+      himself (the union of Thought and Will) should perceive what this will is,
+      and what horrors it contains; that he should show the reflection of
+      himself in his own deeds, in the abomination of them. The State, which is
+      wholly concerned with the general welfare, checks the manifestation of the
+      bad will, but in no wise checks the will itself; the attempt would be
+      impossible. It is because the State checks the manifestation of his will
+      that a man very seldom sees the whole abomination of his nature in the
+      mirror of his deeds. Or does the reader actually suppose there are no
+      people in the world as bad as Robespierre, Napoleon, or other murderers?
+      Does he fail to see that there are many who would act like them if only
+      they could?
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Many a criminal dies more quietly on the scaffold than many a non-criminal
+      in the arms of his family. The one has perceived what his will is and has
+      discarded it. The other has not been able to discard it, because he has
+      never been able to perceive what it is. The aim of the State is to produce
+      a fool's paradise, and this is in direct conflict with the true aim of
+      life, namely, to attain a knowledge of what the will, in its horrible
+      nature, really is.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      Napoleon was not really worse than many, not to say most, men. He was
+      possessed of the very ordinary egoism that seeks its welfare at the
+      expense of others. What distinguished him was merely the greater power he
+      had of satisfying his will, and greater intelligence, reason and courage;
+      added to which, chance gave him a favourable scope for his operations. By
+      means of all this he did for his egoism what a thousand other men would
+      like to do for theirs, but cannot. Every feeble lad who by little acts of
+      villainy gains a small advantage for himself by putting others to some
+      disadvantage, although it may be equally small, is just as bad as
+      Napoleon.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Those who fancy that retribution comes after death would demand that
+      Napoleon should by unutterable torments pay the penalty for all the
+      numberless calamities that he caused. But he is no more culpable than all
+      those who possess the same will, unaccompanied by the same power.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The circumstance that in his case this extraordinary power was added
+      allowed him to reveal the whole wickedness of the human will; and the
+      sufferings of his age, as the necessary obverse of the medal, reveal the
+      misery which is inextricably bound up with this bad will. It is the
+      general manipulation of this will that constitutes the world. But it is
+      precisely that it should be understood how inextricably the will to live
+      is bound up with, and is really one and the same as, this unspeakable
+      misery, that is the world's aim and purpose; and it is an aim and purpose
+      which the appearance of Napoleon did much to assist. Not to be an
+      unmeaning fools' paradise but a tragedy, in which the will to live
+      understands itself and yields&mdash;that is the object for which the world
+      exists. Napoleon is only an enormous mirror of the will to live.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The difference between the man who causes suffering and the man who
+      suffers it, is only phenomenal. It is all a will to live, identical with
+      great suffering; and it is only by understanding this that the will can
+      mend and end.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      What chiefly distinguishes ancient from modern times is that in ancient
+      times, to use Napoleon's expression, it was affairs that reigned: <i>les
+      paroles aux choses</i>. In modern times this is not so. What I mean is
+      that in ancient times the character of public life, of the State, and of
+      Religion, as well as of private life, was a strenuous affirmation of the
+      will to live. In modern times it is a denial of this will, for such is the
+      character of Christianity. But now while on the one hand that denial has
+      suffered some abatement even in public opinion, because it is too
+      repugnant to human character, on the other what is publicly denied is
+      secretly affirmed. Hence it is that we see half measures and falsehood
+      everywhere; and that is why modern times look so small beside antiquity.
+    </p>
+    <hr />
+    <p>
+      The structure of human society is like a pendulum swinging between two
+      impulses, two evils in polar opposition, <i>despotism</i> and <i>anarchy</i>.
+      The further it gets from the one, the nearer it approaches the other. From
+      this the reader might hit on the thought that if it were exactly midway
+      between the two, it would be right. Far from it. For these two evils are
+      by no means equally bad and dangerous. The former is incomparably less to
+      be feared; its ills exist in the main only as possibilities, and if they
+      come at all it is only one among millions that they touch. But, with
+      anarchy, possibility and actuality are inseparable; its blows fall on
+      every man every day. Therefore every constitution should be a nearer
+      approach to a despotism than to anarchy; nay, it must contain a small
+      possibility of despotism.
+    </p>
+    <div style="height: 6em;">
+      <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />
+    </div>
+<pre xml:space="preserve">
+
+
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+Project Gutenberg's The Essays Of Arthur Schopenhauer, by Arthur Schopenhauer
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Essays Of Arthur Schopenhauer
+
+Author: Arthur Schopenhauer
+
+Release Date: January 18, 2004 [EBook #10739]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ESSAYS OF ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Juliet Sutherland, Josephine Paolucci and the Online
+Distributed Proofreading Team.
+
+
+
+
+
+THE ESSAYS
+
+OF
+
+ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER
+
+TRANSLATED BY
+
+T. BAILEY SAUNDERS, M.A.
+
+
+
+
+ON HUMAN NATURE.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+  HUMAN NATURE
+  GOVERNMENT
+  FREE-WILL AND FATALISM
+  CHARACTER
+  MORAL INSTINCT
+  ETHICAL REFLECTIONS
+
+
+
+
+TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
+
+The following essays are drawn from the chapters entitled _Zur Ethik_
+and _Zur Rechtslehre und Politik_ which are to be found both in
+Schopenhauer's _Parerga_ and in his posthumous writings. As in my
+previous volumes, so also in this, I have omitted a few passages which
+appeared to me to be either antiquated or no longer of any general
+interest. For convenience' sake I have divided the original chapters
+into sections, which I have had to name; and I have also had to invent
+a title which should express their real scope. The reader will find
+that it is not so much _Ethics_ and _Politics_ that are here treated,
+as human nature itself in various aspects.
+
+T.B.S.
+
+
+
+
+HUMAN NATURE.
+
+
+Truths of the physical order may possess much external significance,
+but internal significance they have none. The latter is the privilege
+of intellectual and moral truths, which are concerned with the
+objectivation of the will in its highest stages, whereas physical
+truths are concerned with it in its lowest.
+
+For example, if we could establish the truth of what up till now is
+only a conjecture, namely, that it is the action of the sun which
+produces thermoelectricity at the equator; that this produces
+terrestrial magnetism; and that this magnetism, again, is the cause of
+the _aurora borealis_, these would be truths externally of great, but
+internally of little, significance. On the other hand, examples
+of internal significance are furnished by all great and true
+philosophical systems; by the catastrophe of every good tragedy; nay,
+even by the observation of human conduct in the extreme manifestations
+of its morality and immorality, of its good and its evil character.
+For all these are expressions of that reality which takes outward
+shape as the world, and which, in the highest stages of its
+objectivation, proclaims its innermost nature.
+
+To say that the world has only a physical and not a moral significance
+is the greatest and most pernicious of all errors, the fundamental
+blunder, the real perversity of mind and temper; and, at bottom, it
+is doubtless the tendency which faith personifies as Anti-Christ.
+Nevertheless, in spite of all religions--and they are systems which
+one and all maintain the opposite, and seek to establish it in their
+mythical way--this fundamental error never becomes quite extinct, but
+raises its head from time to time afresh, until universal indignation
+compels it to hide itself once more.
+
+Yet, however certain we may feel of the moral significance of life
+and the world, to explain and illustrate it, and to resolve the
+contradiction between this significance and the world as it is, form
+a task of great difficulty; so great, indeed, as to make it possible
+that it has remained for me to exhibit the true and only genuine
+and sound basis of morality everywhere and at all times effective,
+together with the results to which it leads. The actual facts of
+morality are too much on my side for me to fear that my theory can
+ever be replaced or upset by any other.
+
+However, so long as even my ethical system continues to be ignored by
+the professorial world, it is Kant's moral principle that prevails in
+the universities. Among its various forms the one which is most in
+favour at present is "the dignity of man." I have already exposed
+the absurdity of this doctrine in my treatise on the _Foundation of
+Morality_.[1] Therefore I will only say here that if the question were
+asked on what the alleged dignity of man rests, it would not be long
+before the answer was made that it rests upon his morality. In other
+words, his morality rests upon his dignity, and his dignity rests upon
+his morality.
+
+[Footnote 1: Sec. 8.]
+
+But apart from this circular argument it seems to me that the idea of
+dignity can be applied only in an ironical sense to a being whose will
+is so sinful, whose intellect is so limited, whose body is so weak and
+perishable as man's. How shall a man be proud, when his conception
+is a crime, his birth a penalty, his life a labour, and death a
+necessity!--
+
+  _Quid superbit homo? cujus conceptio culpa,
+  Nasci poena, labor vita, necesse mori_!
+
+Therefore, in opposition to the above-mentioned form of the Kantian
+principle, I should be inclined to lay down the following rule: When
+you come into contact with a man, no matter whom, do not attempt an
+objective appreciation of him according to his worth and dignity. Do
+not consider his bad will, or his narrow understanding and perverse
+ideas; as the former may easily lead you to hate and the latter to
+despise him; but fix your attention only upon his sufferings, his
+needs, his anxieties, his pains. Then you will always feel your
+kinship with him; you will sympathise with him; and instead of hatred
+or contempt you will experience the commiseration that alone is the
+peace to which the Gospel calls us. The way to keep down hatred and
+contempt is certainly not to look for a man's alleged "dignity," but,
+on the contrary, to regard him as an object of pity.
+
+The Buddhists, as the result of the more profound views which they
+entertain on ethical and metaphysical subjects, start from the
+cardinal vices and not the cardinal virtues; since the virtues make
+their appearance only as the contraries or negations of the vices.
+According to Schmidt's _History of the Eastern Mongolians_ the
+cardinal vices in the Buddhist scheme are four: Lust, Indolence,
+Anger, and Avarice. But probably instead of Indolence, we should read
+Pride; for so it stands in the _Lettres edifiantes et curieuses_,[1]
+where Envy, or Hatred, is added as a fifth. I am confirmed in
+correcting the statement of the excellent Schmidt by the fact that my
+rendering agrees with the doctrine of the Sufis, who are certainly
+under the influence of the Brahmins and Buddhists. The Sufis also
+maintain that there are four cardinal vices, and they arrange them in
+very striking pairs, so that Lust appears in connection with Avarice,
+and Anger with Pride. The four cardinal virtues opposed to them would
+be Chastity and Generosity, together with Gentleness and Humility.
+
+[Footnote 1: Edit, of 1819, vol. vi., p. 372.]
+
+When we compare these profound ideas of morality, as they are
+entertained by oriental nations, with the celebrated cardinal virtues
+of Plato, which have been recapitulated again and again--Justice,
+Valour, Temperance, and Wisdom--it is plain that the latter are not
+based on any clear, leading idea, but are chosen on grounds that are
+superficial and, in part, obviously false. Virtues must be qualities
+of the will, but Wisdom is chiefly an attribute of the Intellect.
+[Greek: Sophrosynae], which Cicero translates _Temperantia_, is a very
+indefinite and ambiguous word, and it admits, therefore, of a variety
+of applications: it may mean discretion, or abstinence, or keeping a
+level head. Courage is not a virtue at all; although sometimes it is a
+servant or instrument of virtue; but it is just as ready to become
+the servant of the greatest villainy. It is really a quality of
+temperament. Even Geulinx (in the preface to this _Ethics_) condemned
+the Platonic virtues and put the following in their place: Diligence,
+Obedience, Justice and Humility; which are obviously bad. The Chinese
+distinguish five cardinal virtues: Sympathy, Justice, Propriety,
+Wisdom, and Sincerity. The virtues of Christianity are theological,
+not cardinal: Faith, Love, and Hope.
+
+Fundamental disposition towards others, assuming the character either
+of Envy or of Sympathy, is the point at which the moral virtues and
+vices of mankind first diverge. These two diametrically opposite
+qualities exist in every man; for they spring from the inevitable
+comparison which he draws between his own lot and that of others.
+According as the result of this comparison affects his individual
+character does the one or the other of these qualities become the
+source and principle of all his action. Envy builds the wall between
+_Thee_ and _Me_ thicker and stronger; Sympathy makes it slight and
+transparent; nay, sometimes it pulls down the wall altogether; and
+then the distinction between self and not-self vanishes.
+
+Valour, which has been mentioned as a virtue, or rather the Courage
+on which it is based (for valour is only courage in war), deserves a
+closer examination. The ancients reckoned Courage among the virtues,
+and cowardice among the vices; but there is no corresponding idea in
+the Christian scheme, which makes for charity and patience, and in its
+teaching forbids all enmity or even resistance. The result is that
+with the moderns Courage is no longer a virtue. Nevertheless it must
+be admitted that cowardice does not seem to be very compatible with
+any nobility of character--if only for the reason that it betrays an
+overgreat apprehension about one's own person.
+
+Courage, however, may also be explained as a readiness to meet ills
+that threaten at the moment, in order to avoid greater ills that
+lie in the future; whereas cowardice does the contrary. But this
+readiness is of the same quality as _patience_, for patience consists
+in the clear consciousness that greater evils than those which are
+present, and that any violent attempt to flee from or guard against
+the ills we have may bring the others upon us. Courage, then, would
+be a kind of patience; and since it is patience that enables us to
+practise forbearance and self control, Courage is, through the medium
+of patience, at least akin to virtue.
+
+But perhaps Courage admits of being considered from a higher point of
+view. The fear of death may in every case be traced to a deficiency
+in that natural philosophy--natural, and therefore resting on mere
+feeling--which gives a man the assurance that he exists in everything
+outside him just as much as in his own person; so that the death of
+his person can do him little harm. But it is just this very assurance
+that would give a man heroic Courage; and therefore, as the reader
+will recollect from my _Ethics_, Courage comes from the same source as
+the virtues of Justice and Humanity. This is, I admit, to take a very
+high view of the matter; but apart from it I cannot well explain why
+cowardice seems contemptible, and personal courage a noble and sublime
+thing; for no lower point of view enables me to see why a finite
+individual who is everything to himself--nay, who is himself even
+the very fundamental condition of the existence of the rest of the
+world--should not put his own preservation above every other aim. It
+is, then, an insufficient explanation of Courage to make it rest
+only on utility, to give it an empirical and not a transcendental
+character. It may have been for some such reason that Calderon once
+uttered a sceptical but remarkable opinion in regard to Courage, nay,
+actually denied its reality; and put his denial into the mouth of a
+wise old minister, addressing his young sovereign. "Although," he
+observed, "natural fear is operative in all alike, a man may be brave
+in not letting it be seen; and it is this that constitutes Courage":
+
+  _Que aunque el natural temor
+  En todos obra igualmente,
+  No mostrarle es ser valiente
+  Y esto es lo que hace el valor_.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: _La Hija del Aire_, ii., 2.]
+
+In regard to the difference which I have mentioned between the
+ancients and the moderns in their estimate of Courage as a virtue,
+it must be remembered that by Virtue, _virtus_, [Greek: aretae], the
+ancients understood every excellence or quality that was praiseworthy
+in itself, it might be moral or intellectual, or possibly only
+physical. But when Christianity demonstrated that the fundamental
+tendency of life was moral, it was moral superiority alone than
+henceforth attached to the notion of Virtue. Meanwhile the earlier
+usage still survived in the elder Latinists, and also in Italian
+writers, as is proved by the well-known meaning of the word
+_virtuoso_. The special attention of students should be drawn to this
+wider range of the idea of Virtue amongst the ancients, as otherwise
+it might easily be a source of secret perplexity. I may recommend two
+passages preserved for us by Stobaeus, which will serve this purpose.
+One of them is apparently from the Pythagorean philosopher Metopos, in
+which the fitness of every bodily member is declared to be a virtue.
+The other pronounces that the virtue of a shoemaker is to make good
+shoes. This may also serve to explain why it is that in the ancient
+scheme of ethics virtues and vices are mentioned which find no place
+in ours.
+
+As the place of Courage amongst the virtues is a matter of doubt,
+so is that of Avarice amongst the vices. It must not, however, be
+confounded with greed, which is the most immediate meaning of the
+Latin word _avaritia_. Let us then draw up and examine the arguments
+_pro et contra_ in regard to Avarice, and leave the final judgment to
+be formed by every man for himself.
+
+On the one hand it is argued that it is not Avarice which is a vice,
+but extravagance, its opposite. Extravagance springs from a brutish
+limitation to the present moment, in comparison with which the future,
+existing as it does only in thought, is as nothing. It rests upon the
+illusion that sensual pleasures possess a positive or real value.
+Accordingly, future need and misery is the price at which the
+spendthrift purchases pleasures that are empty, fleeting, and often no
+more than imaginary; or else feeds his vain, stupid self-conceit on
+the bows and scrapes of parasites who laugh at him in secret, or on
+the gaze of the mob and those who envy his magnificence. We should,
+therefore, shun the spendthrift as though he had the plague, and on
+discovering his vice break with him betimes, in order that later on,
+when the consequences of his extravagance ensue, we may neither have
+to help to bear them, nor, on the other hand, have to play the part of
+the friends of Timon of Athens.
+
+At the same time it is not to be expected that he who foolishly
+squanders his own fortune will leave another man's intact, if it
+should chance to be committed to his keeping; nay, _sui profusus_ and
+_alieni appetens_ are by Sallust very rightly conjoined. Hence it is
+that extravagance leads not only to impoverishment but also to crime;
+and crime amongst the moneyed classes is almost always the result of
+extravagance. It is accordingly with justice that the _Koran_ declares
+all spendthrifts to be "brothers of Satan."
+
+But it is superfluity that Avarice brings in its train, and when was
+superfluity ever unwelcome? That must be a good vice which has good
+consequences. Avarice proceeds upon the principle that all pleasure is
+only negative in its operation and that the happiness which consists
+of a series of pleasures is a chimaera; that, on the contrary, it
+is pains which are positive and extremely real. Accordingly, the
+avaricious man foregoes the former in order that he may be the
+better preserved from the latter, and thus it is that _bear and
+forbear_--_sustine et abstine_--is his maxim. And because he knows,
+further, how inexhaustible are the possibilities of misfortune,
+and how innumerable the paths of danger, he increases the means of
+avoiding them, in order, if possible, to surround himself with a
+triple wall of protection. Who, then, can say where precaution against
+disaster begins to be exaggerated? He alone who knows where the
+malignity of fate reaches its limit. And even if precaution were
+exaggerated it is an error which at the most would hurt the man who
+took it, and not others. If he will never need the treasures which he
+lays up for himself, they will one day benefit others whom nature
+has made less careful. That until then he withdraws the money
+from circulation is no misfortune; for money is not an article of
+consumption: it only represents the good things which a man may
+actually possess, and is not one itself. Coins are only counters;
+their value is what they represent; and what they represent cannot be
+withdrawn from circulation. Moreover, by holding back the money,
+the value of the remainder which is in circulation is enhanced by
+precisely the same amount. Even though it be the case, as is said,
+that many a miser comes in the end to love money itself for its own
+sake, it is equally certain that many a spendthrift, on the other
+hand, loves spending and squandering for no better reason. Friendship
+with a miser is not only without danger, but it is profitable, because
+of the great advantages it can bring. For it is doubtless those who
+are nearest and dearest to the miser who on his death will reap
+the fruits of the self-control which he exercised; but even in his
+lifetime, too, something may be expected of him in cases of great
+need. At any rate one can always hope for more from him than from the
+spendthrift, who has lost his all and is himself helpless and in debt.
+_Mas da el duro que el desnudo_, says a Spanish proverb; the man who
+has a hard heart will give more than the man who has an empty purse.
+The upshot of all this is that Avarice is not a vice.
+
+On the other side, it may be said that Avarice is the quintessence of
+all vices. When physical pleasures seduce a man from the right path,
+it is his sensual nature--the animal part of him--which is at fault.
+He is carried away by its attractions, and, overcome by the impression
+of the moment, he acts without thinking of the consequences. When,
+on the other hand, he is brought by age or bodily weakness to the
+condition in which the vices that he could never abandon end by
+abandoning him, and his capacity for physical pleasure dies--if he
+turns to Avarice, the intellectual desire survives the sensual. Money,
+which represents all the good things of this world, and is these good
+things in the abstract, now becomes the dry trunk overgrown with all
+the dead lusts of the flesh, which are egoism in the abstract. They
+come to life again in the love of the Mammon. The transient pleasure
+of the senses has become a deliberate and calculated lust of money,
+which, like that to which it is directed, is symbolical in its nature,
+and, like it, indestructible.
+
+This obstinate love of the pleasures of the world--a love which, as it
+were, outlives itself; this utterly incorrigible sin, this refined
+and sublimated desire of the flesh, is the abstract form in which all
+lusts are concentrated, and to which it stands like a general idea to
+individual particulars. Accordingly, Avarice is the vice of age, just
+as extravagance is the vice of youth.
+
+This _disputatio in utramque partem_--this debate for and against--is
+certainly calculated to drive us into accepting the _juste milieu_
+morality of Aristotle; a conclusion that is also supported by the
+following consideration.
+
+Every human perfection is allied to a defect into which it threatens
+to pass; but it is also true that every defect is allied to a
+perfection. Hence it is that if, as often happens, we make a mistake
+about a man, it is because at the beginning of our acquaintance with
+him we confound his defects with the kinds of perfection to which they
+are allied. The cautious man seems to us a coward; the economical man,
+a miser; the spendthrift seems liberal; the rude fellow, downright and
+sincere; the foolhardy person looks as if he were going to work with a
+noble self-confidence; and so on in many other cases.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+No one can live among men without feeling drawn again and again to the
+tempting supposition that moral baseness and intellectual incapacity
+are closely connected, as though they both sprang direct from one
+source. That that, however, is not so, I have shown in detail.[1] That
+it seems to be so is merely due to the fact that both are so often
+found together; and the circumstance is to be explained by the very
+frequent occurrence of each of them, so that it may easily happen for
+both to be compelled to live under one roof. At the same time it is
+not to be denied that they play into each other's hands to their
+mutual benefit; and it is this that produces the very unedifying
+spectacle which only too many men exhibit, and that makes the world to
+go as it goes. A man who is unintelligent is very likely to show his
+perfidy, villainy and malice; whereas a clever man understands how
+to conceal these qualities. And how often, on the other hand, does
+a perversity of heart prevent a man from seeing truths which his
+intelligence is quite capable of grasping!
+
+[Footnote 1: In my chief work, vol. ii., ch. xix,]
+
+Nevertheless, let no one boast. Just as every man, though he be the
+greatest genius, has very definite limitations in some one sphere of
+knowledge, and thus attests his common origin with the essentially
+perverse and stupid mass of mankind, so also has every man something
+in his nature which is positively evil. Even the best, nay the
+noblest, character will sometimes surprise us by isolated traits of
+depravity; as though it were to acknowledge his kinship with the human
+race, in which villainy--nay, cruelty--is to be found in that degree.
+For it was just in virtue of this evil in him, this bad principle,
+that of necessity he became a man. And for the same reason the world
+in general is what my clear mirror of it has shown it to be.
+
+But in spite of all this the difference even between one man and
+another is incalculably great, and many a one would be horrified to
+see another as he really is. Oh, for some Asmodeus of morality, to
+make not only roofs and walls transparent to his favourites, but
+also to lift the veil of dissimulation, fraud, hypocrisy, pretence,
+falsehood and deception, which is spread over all things! to show how
+little true honesty there is in the world, and how often, even where
+it is least to be expected, behind all the exterior outwork of virtue,
+secretly and in the innermost recesses, unrighteousness sits at the
+helm! It is just on this account that so many men of the better kind
+have four-footed friends: for, to be sure, how is a man to get relief
+from the endless dissimulation, falsity and malice of mankind, if
+there were no dogs into whose honest faces he can look without
+distrust?
+
+For what is our civilised world but a big masquerade? where you meet
+knights, priests, soldiers, men of learning, barristers, clergymen,
+philosophers, and I don't know what all! But they are not what they
+pretend to be; they are only masks, and, as a rule, behind the masks
+you will find moneymakers. One man, I suppose, puts on the mask of
+law, which he has borrowed for the purpose from a barrister, only in
+order to be able to give another man a sound drubbing; a second has
+chosen the mask of patriotism and the public welfare with a similar
+intent; a third takes religion or purity of doctrine. For all sorts
+of purposes men have often put on the mask of philosophy, and even
+of philanthropy, and I know not what besides. Women have a smaller
+choice. As a rule they avail themselves of the mask of morality,
+modesty, domesticity, and humility. Then there are general masks,
+without any particular character attaching to them like dominoes. They
+may be met with everywhere; and of this sort is the strict rectitude,
+the courtesy, the sincere sympathy, the smiling friendship, that
+people profess. The whole of these masks as a rule are merely, as I
+have said, a disguise for some industry, commerce, or speculation. It
+is merchants alone who in this respect constitute any honest class.
+They are the only people who give themselves out to be what they are;
+and therefore they go about without any mask at all, and consequently
+take a humble rank.
+
+It is very necessary that a man should be apprised early in life that
+it is a masquerade in which he finds himself. For otherwise there are
+many things which he will fail to understand and put up with, nay, at
+which he will be completely puzzled, and that man longest of all whose
+heart is made of better clay--
+
+  _Et meliore luto finxit praecordia Titan.[1]_
+
+[Footnote 1: Juvenal, _Sat_. 14, 34]
+
+Such for instance is the favour that villainy finds; the neglect that
+merit, even the rarest and the greatest, suffers at the hands of those
+of the same profession; the hatred of truth and great capacity; the
+ignorance of scholars in their own province; and the fact that true
+wares are almost always despised and the merely specious ones in
+request. Therefore let even the young be instructed betimes that in
+this masquerade the apples are of wax, the flowers of silk, the fish
+of pasteboard, and that all things--yes, all things--are toys and
+trifles; and that of two men whom he may see earnestly engaged in
+business, one is supplying spurious goods and the other paying for
+them in false coin.
+
+But there are more serious reflections to be made, and worse things to
+be recorded. Man is at bottom a savage, horrible beast. We know it,
+if only in the business of taming and restraining him which we call
+civilisation. Hence it is that we are terrified if now and then his
+nature breaks out. Wherever and whenever the locks and chains of law
+and order fall off and give place to anarchy, he shows himself for
+what he is. But it is unnecessary to wait for anarchy in order to gain
+enlightenment on this subject. A hundred records, old and new, produce
+the conviction that in his unrelenting cruelty man is in no way
+inferior to the tiger and the hyaena. A forcible example is supplied
+by a publication of the year 1841 entitled _Slavery and the Internal
+Slave Trade in the United States of North America: being replies to
+questions transmitted by the British Anti-slavery Society to the
+American Anti-slavery Society_.[1] This book constitutes one of the
+heaviest indictments against the human race. No one can put it down
+with a feeling of horror, and few without tears. For whatever the
+reader may have ever heard, or imagined, or dreamt, of the unhappy
+condition of slavery, or indeed of human cruelty in general, it will
+seem small to him when he reads of the way in which those devils
+in human form, those bigoted, church-going, strictly Sabbatarian
+rascals--and in particular the Anglican priests among them--treated
+their innocent black brothers, who by wrong and violence had got into
+their diabolical clutches.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's 'Note_.--If Schopenhauer were writing
+to-day, he would with equal truth point to the miseries of the African
+trade. I have slightly abridged this passage, as some of the evils
+against which he protested no longer exist.]
+
+Other examples are furnished by Tshudi's _Travels in Peru_, in the
+description which he gives of the treatment of the Peruvian soldiers
+at the hands of their officers; and by Macleod's _Travels in Eastern
+Africa_, where the author tells of the cold-blooded and truly devilish
+cruelty with which the Portuguese in Mozambique treat their slaves.
+But we need not go for examples to the New World, that obverse side of
+our planet. In the year 1848 it was brought to life that in England,
+not in one, but apparently in a hundred cases within a brief period, a
+husband had poisoned his wife or _vice versa_, or both had joined in
+poisoning their children, or in torturing them slowly to death by
+starving and ill-treating them, with no other object than to get the
+money for burying them which they had insured in the Burial Clubs
+against their death. For this purpose a child was often insured in
+several, even in as many as twenty clubs at once.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. _The Times_, 20th, 22nd and 23rd Sept., 1848, and
+also 12th Dec., 1853.]
+
+Details of this character belong, indeed, to the blackest pages in the
+criminal records of humanity. But, when all is said, it is the
+inward and innate character of man, this god _par excellence_ of the
+Pantheists, from which they and everything like them proceed. In every
+man there dwells, first and foremost, a colossal egoism, which breaks
+the bounds of right and justice with the greatest freedom, as everyday
+life shows on a small scale, and as history on every page of it on a
+large. Does not the recognised need of a balance of power in Europe,
+with the anxious way in which it is preserved, demonstrate that man
+is a beast of prey, who no sooner sees a weaker man near him than he
+falls upon him without fail? and does not the same hold good of the
+affairs of ordinary life?
+
+But to the boundless egoism of our nature there is joined more or
+less in every human breast a fund of hatred, anger, envy, rancour and
+malice, accumulated like the venom in a serpent's tooth, and waiting
+only for an opportunity of venting itself, and then, like a demon
+unchained, of storming and raging. If a man has no great occasion for
+breaking out, he will end by taking advantage of the smallest, and by
+working it up into something great by the aid of his imagination; for,
+however small it may be, it is enough to rouse his anger--
+
+  _Quantulacunque adeo est occasio, sufficit irae[1]_--
+
+[Footnote 1: Juvenal, _Sat_. 13, 183.]
+
+and then he will carry it as far as he can and may. We see this in
+daily life, where such outbursts are well known under the name of
+"venting one's gall on something." It will also have been observed
+that if such outbursts meet with no opposition the subject of them
+feels decidedly the better for them afterwards. That anger is
+not without its pleasure is a truth that was recorded even by
+Aristotle;[1] and he quotes a passage from Homer, who declares anger
+to be sweeter than honey. But not in anger alone--in hatred too, which
+stands to anger like a chronic to an acute disease, a man may indulge
+with the greatest delight:
+
+[Footnote 1: _Rhet_., i., 11; ii., 2.]
+
+  _Now hatred is by far the longest pleasure,
+  Men love in haste, but they detest at leisure_[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Byron _Don Juan_, c. xiii, 6.]
+
+Gobineau in his work _Les Races Humaines_ has called man _l'animal
+mechant par excellence_. People take this very ill, because they feel
+that it hits them; but he is quite right, for man is the only animal
+which causes pain to others without any further purpose than just to
+cause it. Other animals never do it except to satisfy their hunger, or
+in the rage of combat. If it is said against the tiger that he kills
+more than eats, he strangles his prey only for the purpose of eating
+it; and if he cannot eat it, the only explanation is, as the French
+phrase has it, that _ses yeux sont plus grands que son estomac_. No
+animal ever torments another for the mere purpose of tormenting, but
+man does it, and it is this that constitutes the diabolical feature in
+his character which is so much worse than the merely animal. I have
+already spoken of the matter in its broad aspect; but it is manifest
+even in small things, and every reader has a daily opportunity
+of observing it. For instance, if two little dogs are playing
+together--and what a genial and charming sight it is--and a child of
+three or four years joins them, it is almost inevitable for it to
+begin hitting them with a whip or stick, and thereby show itself, even
+at that age, _l'animal mechant par excellence_. The love of teasing
+and playing tricks, which is common enough, may be traced to the same
+source. For instance, if a man has expressed his annoyance at any
+interruption or other petty inconvenience, there will be no lack of
+people who for that very reason will bring it about: _animal mechant
+par excellence_! This is so certain that a man should be careful not
+to express any annoyance at small evils. On the other hand he should
+also be careful not to express his pleasure at any trifle, for, if
+he does so, men will act like the jailer who, when he found that his
+prisoner had performed the laborious task of taming a spider, and took
+a pleasure in watching it, immediately crushed it under his foot:
+_l'animal mechant par excellence_! This is why all animals are
+instinctively afraid of the sight, or even of the track of a man, that
+_animal mechant par excellence_! nor does their instinct them false;
+for it is man alone who hunts game for which he has no use and which
+does him no harm.
+
+It is a fact, then, that in the heart of every man there lies a wild
+beast which only waits for an opportunity to storm and rage, in its
+desire to inflict pain on others, or, if they stand in his way, to
+kill them. It is this which is the source of all the lust of war and
+battle. In trying to tame and to some extent hold it in check, the
+intelligence, its appointed keeper, has always enough to do. People
+may, if they please, call it the radical evil of human nature--a
+name which will at least serve those with whom a word stands for an
+explanation. I say, however, that it is the will to live, which, more
+and more embittered by the constant sufferings of existence, seeks to
+alleviate its own torment by causing torment in others. But in this
+way a man gradually develops in himself real cruelty and malice. The
+observation may also be added that as, according to Kant, matter
+subsists only through the antagonism of the powers of expansion and
+contraction, so human society subsists only by the antagonism of
+hatred, or anger, and fear. For there is a moment in the life of
+all of us when the malignity of our nature might perhaps make us
+murderers, if it were not accompanied by a due admixture of fear to
+keep it within bounds; and this fear, again, would make a man the
+sport and laughing stock of every boy, if anger were not lying ready
+in him, and keeping watch.
+
+But it is _Schadenfreude_, a mischievous delight in the misfortunes of
+others, which remains the worst trait in human nature. It is a feeling
+which is closely akin to cruelty, and differs from it, to say the
+truth, only as theory from practice. In general, it may be said of it
+that it takes the place which pity ought to take--pity which is its
+opposite, and the true source of all real justice and charity.
+
+_Envy_ is also opposed to pity, but in another sense; envy, that is
+to say, is produced by a cause directly antagonistic to that which
+produces the delight in mischief. The opposition between pity and envy
+on the one hand, and pity and the delight in mischief on the other,
+rests, in the main, on the occasions which call them forth. In the
+case of envy it is only as a direct effect of the cause which excites
+it that we feel it at all. That is just the reason why envy, although
+it is a reprehensible feeling, still admits of some excuse, and is,
+in general, a very human quality; whereas the delight in mischief is
+diabolical, and its taunts are the laughter of hell.
+
+The delight in mischief, as I have said, takes the place which pity
+ought to take. Envy, on the contrary, finds a place only where there
+is no inducement to pity, or rather an inducement to its opposite; and
+it is just as this opposite that envy arises in the human breast; and
+so far, therefore, it may still be reckoned a human sentiment. Nay, I
+am afraid that no one will be found to be entirely free from it. For
+that a man should feel his own lack of things more bitterly at the
+sight of another's delight in the enjoyment of them, is natural; nay,
+it is inevitable; but this should not rouse his hatred of the man who
+is happier than himself. It is just this hatred, however, in which
+true envy consists. Least of all should a man be envious, when it is a
+question, not of the gifts of fortune, or chance, or another's favour,
+but of the gifts of nature; because everything that is innate in a man
+rests on a metaphysical basis, and possesses justification of a higher
+kind; it is, so to speak, given him by Divine grace. But, unhappily,
+it is just in the case of personal advantages that envy is most
+irreconcilable. Thus it is that intelligence, or even genius, cannot
+get on in the world without begging pardon for its existence, wherever
+it is not in a position to be able, proudly and boldly, to despise the
+world.
+
+In other words, if envy is aroused only by wealth, rank, or power,
+it is often kept down by egoism, which perceives that, on occasion,
+assistance, enjoyment, support, protection, advancement, and so
+on, may be hoped for from the object of envy or that at least by
+intercourse with him a man may himself win honour from the reflected
+light of his superiority; and here, too, there is the hope of one day
+attaining all those advantages himself. On the other hand, in the envy
+that is directed to natural gifts and personal advantages, like beauty
+in women, or intelligence in men, there is no consolation or hope of
+one kind or the other; so that nothing remains but to indulge a
+bitter and irreconcilable hatred of the person who possesses these
+privileges; and hence the only remaining desire is to take vengeance
+on him.
+
+But here the envious man finds himself in an unfortunate position; for
+all his blows fall powerless as soon as it is known that they come
+from him. Accordingly he hides his feelings as carefully as if they
+were secret sins, and so becomes an inexhaustible inventor of tricks
+and artifices and devices for concealing and masking his procedure,
+in order that, unperceived, he may wound the object of his envy. For
+instance, with an air of the utmost unconcern he will ignore the
+advantages which are eating his heart out; he will neither see them,
+nor know them, nor have observed or even heard of them, and thus make
+himself a master in the art of dissimulation. With great cunning he
+will completely overlook the man whose brilliant qualities are gnawing
+at his heart, and act as though he were quite an unimportant person;
+he will take no notice of him, and, on occasion, will have even quite
+forgotten his existence. But at the same time he will before all
+things endeavour by secret machination carefully to deprive those
+advantages of any opportunity of showing themselves and becoming
+known. Then out of his dark corner he will attack these qualities with
+censure, mockery, ridicule and calumny, like the toad which spurts
+its poison from a hole. No less will he enthusiastically praise
+unimportant people, or even indifferent or bad performances in the
+same sphere. In short, he will becomes a Proteas in stratagem, in
+order to wound others without showing himself. But what is the use
+of it? The trained eye recognises him in spite of it all. He betrays
+himself, if by nothing else, by the way in which he timidly avoids
+and flies from the object of his envy, who stands the more completely
+alone, the more brilliant he is; and this is the reason why pretty
+girls have no friends of their own sex. He betrays himself, too, by
+the causeless hatred which he shows--a hatred which finds vent in a
+violent explosion at any circumstance however trivial, though it is
+often only the product of his imagination. How many such men there are
+in the world may be recognised by the universal praise of modesty,
+that is, of a virtue invented on behalf of dull and commonplace
+people. Nevertheless, it is a virtue which, by exhibiting the
+necessity for dealing considerately with the wretched plight of these
+people, is just what calls attention to it.
+
+For our self-consciousness and our pride there can be nothing more
+flattering than the sight of envy lurking in its retreat and plotting
+its schemes; but never let a man forget that where there is envy there
+is hatred, and let him be careful not to make a false friend out of
+any envious person. Therefore it is important to our safety to lay
+envy bare; and a man should study to discover its tricks, as it is
+everywhere to be found and always goes about _incognito_; or as I
+have said, like a venomous toad it lurks in dark corners. It deserves
+neither quarter nor sympathy; but as we can never reconcile it let our
+rule of conduct be to scorn it with a good heart, and as our happiness
+and glory is torture to it we may rejoice in its sufferings:
+
+  _Den Neid wirst nimmer du versoehnen;
+  So magst du ihn getrost verhoehnen.
+  Dein Glueck, dein Ruhm ist ihm ein Leiden:
+  Magst drum an seiner Quaal dich weiden_.
+
+We have been taking a look at the _depravity_ of man, and it is a
+sight which may well fill us with horror. But now we must cast our
+eyes on the _misery_ of his existence; and when we have done so, and
+are horrified by that too, we must look back again at his depravity.
+We shall then find that they hold the balance to each other. We shall
+perceive the eternal justice of things; for we shall recognise that
+the world is itself the Last Judgment on it, and we shall begin to
+understand why it is that everything that lives must pay the penalty
+of its existence, first in living and then in dying. Thus the evil
+of the penalty accords with the evil of the sin--_malum poenae_ with
+_malum culpae_. From the same point of view we lose our indignation at
+that intellectual incapacity of the great majority of mankind which in
+life so often disgusts us. In this _Sansara_, as the Buddhists call
+it, human misery, human depravity and human folly correspond with one
+another perfectly, and they are of like magnitude. But if, on some
+special inducement, we direct our gaze to one of them, and survey it
+in particular, it seems to exceed the other two. This, however, is an
+illusion, and merely the effect of their colossal range.
+
+All things proclaim this _Sansara_; more than all else, the world of
+mankind; in which, from a moral point of view, villainy and baseness,
+and from an intellectual point of view, incapacity and stupidity,
+prevail to a horrifying extent. Nevertheless, there appear in
+it, although very spasmodically, and always as a fresh surprise,
+manifestations of honesty, of goodness, nay, even of nobility; and
+also of great intelligence, of the thinking mind of genius. They never
+quite vanish, but like single points of light gleam upon us out of the
+great dark mass. We must accept them as a pledge that this _Sansara_
+contains a good and redeeming principle, which is capable of breaking
+through and of filling and freeing the whole of it.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The readers of my _Ethics_ know that with me the ultimate foundation
+of morality is the truth which in the _Vedas_ and the _Vedanta_
+receives its expression in the established, mystical formula, _Tat
+twam asi (This is thyself_), which is spoken with reference to every
+living thing, be it man or beast, and is called the _Mahavakya_, the
+great word.
+
+Actions which proceed in accordance with this principle, such as those
+of the philanthropist, may indeed be regarded as the beginning of
+mysticism. Every benefit rendered with a pure intention proclaims that
+the man who exercises it acts in direct conflict with the world of
+appearance; for he recognises himself as identical with another
+individual, who exists in complete separation from him. Accordingly,
+all disinterested kindness is inexplicable; it is a mystery; and hence
+in order to explain it a man has to resort to all sorts of fictions.
+When Kant had demolished all other arguments for theism, he admitted
+one only, that it gave the best interpretation and solution of such
+mysterious actions, and of all others like them. He therefore allowed
+it to stand as a presumption unsusceptible indeed of theoretical
+proof, but valid from a practical point of view. I may, however,
+express my doubts whether he was quite serious about it. For to make
+morality rest on theism is really to reduce morality to egoism;
+although the English, it is true, as also the lowest classes of
+society with us, do not perceive the possibility of any other
+foundation for it.
+
+The above-mentioned recognition of a man's own true being in
+another individual objectively presented to him, is exhibited in a
+particularly beautiful and clear way in the cases in which a man,
+already destined to death beyond any hope of rescue, gives himself up
+to the welfare of others with great solicitude and zeal, and tries to
+save them. Of this kind is the well-known story of a servant who was
+bitten in a courtyard at night by a mad dog. In the belief that she
+was beyond hope, she seized the dog and dragged it into a stable,
+which she then locked, so that no one else might be bitten. Then again
+there is the incident in Naples, which Tischbein has immortalised in
+one of his _aquarelles_. A son, fleeing from the lava which is rapidly
+streaming toward the sea, is carrying his aged father on his back.
+When there is only a narrow strip of land left between the devouring
+elements, the father bids the son put him down, so that the son may
+save himself by flight, as otherwise both will be lost. The son obeys,
+and as he goes casts a glance of farewell on his father. This is the
+moment depicted. The historical circumstance which Scott represents
+in his masterly way in _The Heart of Midlothian_, chap, ii., is of a
+precisely similar kind; where, of two delinquents condemned to death,
+the one who by his awkwardness caused the capture of the other happily
+sets him free in the chapel by overpowering the guard after the
+execution-sermon, without at the same time making any attempt on his
+own behalf. Nay, in the same category must also be placed the scene
+which is represented in a common engraving, which may perhaps be
+objectionable to western readers--I mean the one in which a soldier,
+kneeling to be shot, is trying by waving a cloth to frighten away his
+dog who wants to come to him.
+
+In all these cases we see an individual in the face of his own
+immediate and certain destruction no longer thinking of saving
+himself, so that he may direct the whole of his efforts to saving some
+one else. How could there be a clearer expression of the consciousness
+that what is being destroyed is only a phenomenon, and that the
+destruction itself is only a phenomenon; that, on the other hand, the
+real being of the man who meets his death is untouched by that event,
+and lives on in the other man, in whom even now, as his action
+betrays, he so clearly perceives it to exist? For if this were not so,
+and it was his real being which was about to be annihilated, how could
+that being spend its last efforts in showing such an ardent sympathy
+in the welfare and continued existence of another?
+
+There are two different ways in which a man may become conscious
+of his own existence. On the one hand, he may have an empirical
+perception of it, as it manifests itself externally--something so
+small that it approaches vanishing point; set in a world which, as
+regards time and space, is infinite; one only of the thousand millions
+of human creatures who run about on this planet for a very brief
+period and are renewed every thirty years. On the other hand, by going
+down into the depths of his own nature, a man may become conscious
+that he is all in all; that, in fact, he is the only real being; and
+that, in addition, this real being perceives itself again in others,
+who present themselves from without, as though they formed a mirror of
+himself.
+
+Of these two ways in which a man may come to know what he is, the
+first grasps the phenomenon alone, the mere product of _the principle
+of individuation_; whereas the second makes a man immediately
+conscious that he is _the thing-in-itself_. This is a doctrine in
+which, as regards the first way, I have Kant, and as regards both, I
+have the _Vedas_, to support me.
+
+There is, it is true, a simple objection to the second method. It may
+be said to assume that one and the same being can exist in different
+places at the same time, and yet be complete in each of them.
+Although, from an empirical point of view, this is the most palpable
+impossibility--nay, absurdity--it is nevertheless perfectly true
+of the thing-in-itself. The impossibility and the absurdity of it,
+empirically, are only due to the forms which phenomena assume,
+in accordance with the principle of individuation. For the
+thing-in-itself, the will to live, exists whole and undivided in every
+being, even in the smallest, as completely as in the sum-total of all
+things that ever were or are or will be. This is why every being, even
+the smallest, says to itself, So long as I am safe, let the world
+perish--_dum ego salvus sim, pereat mundus_. And, in truth, even if
+only one individual were left in the world, and all the rest were to
+perish, the one that remained would still possess the whole self-being
+of the world, uninjured and undiminished, and would laugh at the
+destruction of the world as an illusion. This conclusion _per
+impossible_ may be balanced by the counter-conclusion, which is on all
+fours with it, that if that last individual were to be annihilated in
+and with him the whole world would be destroyed. It was in this sense
+that the mystic Angelas Silesius[1] declared that God could not live
+for a moment without him, and that if he were to be annihilated God
+must of necessity give up the ghost:
+
+  _Ich weiss dass ohne mich Gott nicht ein Nu kann leben;
+  Werd' ich zunicht, er muss von Noth den Geist aufgeben_.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--Angelus Silesius, see _Counsels and
+Maxims_, p. 39, note.]
+
+But the empirical point of view also to some extent enables us to
+perceive that it is true, or at least possible, that our self can
+exist in other beings whose consciousness is separated and different
+from our own. That this is so is shown by the experience of
+somnambulists. Although the identity of their ego is preserved
+throughout, they know nothing, when they awake, of all that a moment
+before they themselves said, did or suffered. So entirely is the
+individual consciousness a phenomenon that even in the same ego two
+consciousnesses can arise of which the one knows nothing of the other.
+
+
+
+
+GOVERNMENT.
+
+
+It is a characteristic failing of the Germans to look in the clouds
+for what lies at their feet. An excellent example of this is furnished
+by the treatment which the idea of _Natural Right_ has received at
+the hands of professors of philosophy. When they are called upon
+to explain those simple relations of human life which make up the
+substance of this right, such as Right and Wrong, Property, State,
+Punishment and so on, they have recourse to the most extravagant,
+abstract, remote and meaningless conceptions, and out of them build a
+Tower of Babel reaching to the clouds, and taking this or that form
+according to the special whim of the professor for the time being. The
+clearest and simplest relations of life, such as affect us directly,
+are thus made quite unintelligible, to the great detriment of the
+young people who are educated in such a school. These relations
+themselves are perfectly simple and easily understood--as the reader
+may convince himself if he will turn to the account which I have given
+of them in the _Foundation of Morality_, Sec. 17, and in my chief work,
+bk. i., Sec. 62. But at the sound of certain words, like Right, Freedom,
+the Good, Being--this nugatory infinitive of the cupola--and many
+others of the same sort, the German's head begins to swim, and falling
+straightway into a kind of delirium he launches forth into high-flown
+phrases which have no meaning whatever. He takes the most remote and
+empty conceptions, and strings them together artificially, instead of
+fixing his eyes on the facts, and looking at things and relations as
+they really are. It is these things and relations which supply the
+ideas of Right and Freedom, and give them the only true meaning that
+they possess.
+
+The man who starts from the preconceived opinion that the conception
+of Right must be a positive one, and then attempts to define it, will
+fail; for he is trying to grasp a shadow, to pursue a spectre, to
+search for what does not exist. The conception of Right is a negative
+one, like the conception of Freedom; its content is mere negation.
+It is the conception of Wrong which is positive; Wrong has the same
+significance as _injury_--_laesio_--in the widest sense of the term.
+An injury may be done either to a man's person or to his property or
+to his honour; and accordingly a man's rights are easy to define:
+every one has a right to do anything that injures no one else.
+
+To have a right to do or claim a thing means nothing more than to be
+able to do or take or vise it without thereby injuring any one else.
+_Simplex sigillum veri_. This definition shows how senseless many
+questions are; for instance, the question whether we have the right to
+take our own life, As far as concerns the personal claims which others
+may possibly have upon us, they are subject to the condition that we
+are alive, and fall to the ground when we die. To demand of a man, who
+does not care to live any longer for himself, that he should live
+on as a mere machine for the advantage of others is an extravagant
+pretension.
+
+Although men's powers differ, their rights are alike. Their rights do
+not rest upon their powers, because Right is of a moral complexion;
+they rest on the fact that the same will to live shows itself in
+every man at the same stage of its manifestation. This, however, only
+applies to that original and abstract Right, which a man possesses as
+a man. The property, and also the honour, which a man acquires for
+himself by the exercise of his powers, depend on the measure and kind
+of power which he possesses, and so lend his Right a wider sphere of
+application. Here, then, equality comes to an end. The man who is
+better equipped, or more active, increases by adding to his gains, not
+his Right, but the number of the things to which it extends.
+
+In my chief work[1] I have proved that the State in its essence is
+merely an institution existing for the purpose of protecting its
+members against outward attack or inward dissension. It follows from
+this that the ultimate ground on which the State is necessary is the
+acknowledged lack of Right in the human race. If Right were there, no
+one would think of a State; for no one would have any fear that his
+rights would be impaired; and a mere union against the attacks of wild
+beasts or the elements would have very little analogy with what we
+mean by a State. From this point of view it is easy to see how dull
+and stupid are the philosophasters who in pompous phrases represent
+that the State is the supreme end and flower of human existence. Such
+a view is the apotheosis of Philistinism.
+
+[Footnote 1: 1 Bk. ii., ch. xlvii.]
+
+If it were Right that ruled in the world, a man would have done enough
+in building his house, and would need no other protection than the
+right of possessing it, which would be obvious. But since Wrong is the
+order of the day, it is requisite that the man who has built his house
+should also be able to protect it. Otherwise his Right is _de
+facto_ incomplete; the aggressor, that is to say, has the right of
+might--_Faustrecht_; and this is just the conception of Right
+which Spinoza entertains. He recognises no other. His words are:
+_unusquisque tantum juris habet quantum potentia valet_;[1] each man
+has as much right as he has power. And again: _uniuscujusque jus
+potentia ejus definitur_; each man's right is determined by his
+power.[2] Hobbes seems to have started this conception of Right,[3]
+and he adds the strange comment that the Right of the good Lord to all
+things rests on nothing but His omnipotence.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Tract. Theol. Pol_., ch. ii., Sec. 8.]
+
+[Footnote 2: _Ethics_, IV., xxxvii., 1.]
+
+[Footnote 3: Particularly in a passage in the _De Cive_, I, Sec. 14.]
+
+Now this is a conception of Right which, both in theory and in
+practice, no longer prevails in the civic world; but in the world
+in general, though abolished in theory, it continues to apply in
+practice. The consequences of neglecting it may be seen in the case
+of China. Threatened by rebellion within and foes without, this great
+empire is in a defenceless state, and has to pay the penalty of having
+cultivated only the arts of peace and ignored the arts of war.
+
+There is a certain analogy between the operations of nature and those
+of man which is a peculiar but not fortuitous character, and is based
+on the identity of the will in both. When the herbivorous animals had
+taken their place in the organic world, beasts of prey made their
+appearance--necessarily a late appearance--in each species, and
+proceeded to live upon them. Just in the same way, as soon as by
+honest toil and in the sweat of their faces men have won from the
+ground what is needed for the support of their societies, a number of
+individuals are sure to arise in some of these societies, who, instead
+of cultivating the earth and living on its produce, prefer to take
+their lives in their hands and risk health and freedom by falling upon
+those who are in possession of what they have honestly earned, and by
+appropriating the fruits of their labour. These are the beasts of
+prey in the human race; they are the conquering peoples whom we find
+everywhere in history, from the most ancient to the most recent times.
+Their varying fortunes, as at one moment they succeed and at another
+fail, make up the general elements of the history of the world. Hence
+Voltaire was perfectly right when he said that the aim of all war is
+robbery. That those who engage in it are ashamed of their doings is
+clear by the fact that governments loudly protest their reluctance to
+appeal to arms except for purposes of self-defence. Instead of trying
+to excuse themselves by telling public and official lies, which are
+almost more revolting than war itself, they should take their stand,
+as bold as brass, on Macchiavelli's doctrine. The gist of it may be
+stated to be this: that whereas between one individual and another,
+and so far as concerns the law and morality of their relations,
+the principle, _Don't do to others what you wouldn't like done to
+yourself_, certainly applies, it is the converse of this principle
+which is appropriate in the case of nations and in politics: _What you
+wouldn't like done to yourself do to others_. If you do not want to
+be put under a foreign yoke, take time by the forelock, and put your
+neighbour under it himself; whenever, that is to say, his weakness
+offers you the opportunity. For if you let the opportunity pass, it
+will desert one day to the enemy's camp and offer itself there. Then
+your enemy will put you under his yoke; and your failure to grasp the
+opportunity may be paid for, not by the generation which was guilty of
+it, but by the next. This Macchiavellian principle is always a much
+more decent cloak for the lust of robbery than the rags of very
+obvious lies in a speech from the head of the State; lies, too, of a
+description which recalls the well-known story of the rabbit attacking
+the dog. Every State looks upon its neighbours as at bottom a horde of
+robbers, who will fall upon it as soon as they have the opportunity.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Between the serf, the farmer, the tenant, and the mortgagee, the
+difference is rather one of form than of substance. Whether the
+peasant belongs to me, or the land on which he has to get a living;
+whether the bird is mine, or its food, the tree or its fruit, is a
+matter of little moment; for, as Shakespeare makes Shylock say:
+
+                              _You take my life
+  When you do take the means whereby I live_.
+
+The free peasant has, indeed, the advantage that he can go off and
+seek his fortune in the wide world; whereas the serf who is attached
+to the soil, _glebae adscriptus_, has an advantage which is perhaps
+still greater, that when failure of crops or illness, old age or
+incapacity, render him helpless, his master must look after him, and
+so he sleeps well at night; whereas, if the crops fail, his master
+tosses about on his bed trying to think how he is to procure bread for
+his men. As long ago as Menander it was said that it is better to
+be the slave of a good master than to live miserably as a freeman.
+Another advantage possessed by the free is that if they have any
+talents they can improve their position; but the same advantage is not
+wholly withheld from the slave. If he proves himself useful to his
+master by the exercise of any skill, he is treated accordingly; just
+as in ancient Rome mechanics, foremen of workshops, architects, nay,
+even doctors, were generally slaves.
+
+Slavery and poverty, then, are only two forms, I might almost say only
+two names, of the same thing, the essence of which is that a man's
+physical powers are employed, in the main, not for himself but for
+others; and this leads partly to his being over-loaded with work, and
+partly to his getting a scanty satisfaction for his needs. For Nature
+has given a man only as much physical power as will suffice, if he
+exerts it in moderation, to gain a sustenance from the earth. No great
+superfluity of power is his. If, then, a not inconsiderable number of
+men are relieved from the common burden of sustaining the existence
+of the human race, the burden of the remainder is augmented, and they
+suffer. This is the chief source of the evil which under the name of
+slavery, or under the name of the proletariat, has always oppressed
+the great majority of the human race.
+
+But the more remote cause of it is luxury. In order, it may be said,
+that some few persons may have what is unnecessary, superfluous,
+and the product of refinement--nay, in order that they may satisfy
+artificial needs--a great part of the existing powers of mankind
+has to be devoted to this object, and therefore withdrawn from the
+production of what is necessary and indispensable. Instead of building
+cottages for themselves, thousands of men build mansions for a few.
+Instead of weaving coarse materials for themselves and their families,
+they make fine cloths, silk, or even lace, for the rich, and in
+general manufacture a thousand objects of luxury for their pleasure. A
+great part of the urban population consists of workmen who make these
+articles of luxury; and for them and those who give them work the
+peasants have to plough and sow and look after the flocks as well
+as for themselves, and thus have more labour than Nature originally
+imposed upon them. Moreover, the urban population devotes a great deal
+of physical strength, and a great deal of land, to such things as
+wine, silk, tobacco, hops, asparagus and so on, instead of to corn,
+potatoes and cattle-breeding. Further, a number of men are withdrawn
+from agriculture and employed in ship-building and seafaring, in order
+that sugar, coffee, tea and other goods may be imported. In short,
+a large part of the powers of the human race is taken away from the
+production of what is necessary, in order to bring what is superfluous
+and unnecessary within the reach of a few. As long therefore as luxury
+exists, there must be a corresponding amount of over-work and misery,
+whether it takes the name of poverty or of slavery. The fundamental
+difference between the two is that slavery originates in violence,
+and poverty in craft. The whole unnatural condition of society--the
+universal struggle to escape from misery, the sea-trade attended with
+so much loss of life, the complicated interests of commerce, and
+finally the wars to which it all gives rise--is due, only and alone,
+to luxury, which gives no happiness even to those who enjoy it, nay,
+makes them ill and bad-tempered. Accordingly it looks as if the most
+effective way of alleviating human misery would be to diminish luxury,
+or even abolish it altogether.
+
+There is unquestionably much truth in this train of thought. But the
+conclusion at which it arrives is refuted by an argument possessing
+this advantage over it--that it is confirmed by the testimony of
+experience. A certain amount of work is devoted to purposes of luxury.
+What the human race loses in this way in the _muscular power_ which
+would otherwise be available for the necessities of existence is
+gradually made up to it a thousandfold by the _nervous power_, which,
+in a chemical sense, is thereby released. And since the intelligence
+and sensibility which are thus promoted are on a higher level than the
+muscular irritability which they supplant, so the achievements of mind
+exceed those of the body a thousandfold. One wise counsel is worth the
+work of many hands:
+
+  [Greek: Hos en sophon bouleuma tas pollon cheiras nika.]
+
+A nation of nothing but peasants would do little in the way of
+discovery and invention; but idle hands make active heads. Science and
+the Arts are themselves the children of luxury, and they discharge
+their debt to it. The work which they do is to perfect technology in
+all its branches, mechanical, chemical and physical; an art which in
+our days has brought machinery to a pitch never dreamt of before, and
+in particular has, by steam and electricity, accomplished things the
+like of which would, in earlier ages, have been ascribed to the agency
+of the devil. In manufactures of all kinds, and to some extent in
+agriculture, machines now do a thousand times more than could ever
+have been done by the hands of all the well-to-do, educated, and
+professional classes, and could ever have been attained if all luxury
+had been abolished and every one had returned to the life of a
+peasant. It is by no means the rich alone, but all classes, who derive
+benefit from these industries. Things which in former days hardly
+any one could afford are now cheap and abundant, and even the lowest
+classes are much better off in point of comfort. In the Middle Ages a
+King of England once borrowed a pair of silk stockings from one of his
+lords, so that he might wear them in giving an audience to the French
+ambassador. Even Queen Elizabeth was greatly pleased and astonished to
+receive a pair as a New Year's present; to-day every shopman has them.
+Fifty years ago ladies wore the kind of calico gowns which servants
+wear now. If mechanical science continues to progress at the same
+rate for any length of time, it may end by saving human labour almost
+entirely, just as horses are even now being largely superseded by
+machines. For it is possible to conceive that intellectual culture
+might in some degree become general in the human race; and this would
+be impossible as long as bodily labour was incumbent on any great part
+of it. Muscular irritability and nervous sensibility are always and
+everywhere, both generally and particularly, in antagonism; for the
+simple reason that it is one and the same vital power which underlies
+both. Further, since the arts have a softening effect on character, it
+is possible that quarrels great and small, wars and duels, will vanish
+from the world; just as both have become much rarer occurrences.
+However, it is not my object here to write a _Utopia_.
+
+But apart from all this the arguments used above in favour of the
+abolition of luxury and the uniform distribution of all bodily labour
+are open to the objection that the great mass of mankind, always and
+everywhere, cannot do without leaders, guides and counsellors, in
+one shape or another, according to the matter in question; judges,
+governors, generals, officials, priests, doctors, men of learning,
+philosophers, and so on, are all a necessity. Their common task is to
+lead the race for the greater part so incapable and perverse, through
+the labyrinth of life, of which each of them according to his position
+and capacity has obtained a general view, be his range wide or narrow.
+That these guides of the race should be permanently relieved of all
+bodily labour as well as of all vulgar need and discomfort; nay,
+that in proportion to their much greater achievements they should
+necessarily own and enjoy more than the common man, is natural and
+reasonable. Great merchants should also be included in the same
+privileged class, whenever they make far-sighted preparations for
+national needs.
+
+The question of the sovereignty of the people is at bottom the same
+as the question whether any man can have an original right to rule
+a people against its will. How that proposition can be reasonably
+maintained I do not see. The people, it must be admitted, is
+sovereign; but it is a sovereign who is always a minor. It must have
+permanent guardians, and it can never exercise its rights itself,
+without creating dangers of which no one can foresee the end;
+especially as like all minors, it is very apt to become the sport of
+designing sharpers, in the shape of what are called demagogues.
+
+Voltaire remarks that the first man to become a king was a successful
+soldier. It is certainly the case that all princes were originally
+victorious leaders of armies, and for a long time it was as such that
+they bore sway. On the rise of standing armies princes began to regard
+their people as a means of sustaining themselves and their soldiers,
+and treated them, accordingly, as though they were a herd of cattle,
+which had to be tended in order that it might provide wool, milk, and
+meat. The why and wherefore of all this, as I shall presently show in
+detail, is the fact that originally it was not right, but might, that
+ruled in the world. Might has the advantage of having been the first
+in the field. That is why it is impossible to do away with it and
+abolish it altogether; it must always have its place; and all that a
+man can wish or ask is that it should be found on the side of right
+and associated with it. Accordingly says the prince to his subjects:
+"I rule you in virtue of the power which I possess. But, on the other
+hand, it excludes that of any one else, and I shall suffer none but
+my own, whether it comes from without, or arises within by one of you
+trying to oppress another. In this way, then, you are protected." The
+arrangement was carried out; and just because it was carried out the
+old idea of kingship developed with time and progress into quite a
+different idea, and put the other one in the background, where it may
+still be seen, now and then, flitting about like a spectre. Its place
+has been taken by the idea of the king as father of his people, as
+the firm and unshakable pillar which alone supports and maintains the
+whole organisation of law and order, and consequently the rights
+of every man.[1] But a king can accomplish this only by inborn
+prerogative which reserves authority to him and to him alone--an
+authority which is supreme, indubitable, and beyond all attack, nay,
+to which every one renders instinctive obedience. Hence the king is
+rightly said to rule "by the grace of God." He is always the most
+useful person in the State, and his services are never too dearly
+repaid by any Civil List, however heavy.
+
+[Footnote 1: We read in Stobaeus, _Florilegium_, ch. xliv., 41, of a
+Persian custom, by which, whenever a king died, there was a five days'
+anarchy, in order that people might perceive the advantage of having
+kings and laws.]
+
+But even as late a writer as Macchiavelli was so decidedly imbued with
+the earlier or mediaeval conception of the position of a prince that
+he treats it as a matter which is self-evident: he never discusses it,
+but tacitly takes it as the presupposition and basis of his advice.
+It may be said generally that his book is merely the theoretical
+statement and consistent and systematic exposition of the practice
+prevailing in his time. It is the novel statement of it in a complete
+theoretical form that lends it such a poignant interest. The same
+thing, I may remark in passing, applies to the immortal little work of
+La Rochefaucauld, who, however, takes private and not public life for
+his theme, and offers, not advice, but observations. The title of this
+fine little book is open, perhaps, to some objection: the contents are
+not, as a rule, either _maxims_ or _reflections_, but _apercus_;
+and that is what they should be called. There is much, too, in
+Macchiavelli that will be found also to apply to private life.
+
+Right in itself is powerless; in nature it is Might that rules. To
+enlist might on the side of right, so that by means of it right
+may rule, is the problem of statesmanship. And it is indeed a hard
+problem, as will be obvious if we remember that almost every human
+breast is the seat of an egoism which has no limits, and is usually
+associated with an accumulated store of hatred and malice; so that
+at the very start feelings of enmity largely prevail over those of
+friendship. We have also to bear in mind that it is many millions of
+individuals so constituted who have to be kept in the bonds of law
+and order, peace and tranquillity; whereas originally every one had
+a right to say to every one else: _I am just as good as you are_! A
+consideration of all this must fill us with surprise that on the whole
+the world pursues its way so peacefully and quietly, and with so much
+law and order as we see to exist. It is the machinery of State which
+alone accomplishes it. For it is physical power alone which has any
+direct action on men; constituted as they generally are, it is for
+physical power alone that they have any feeling or respect.
+
+If a man would convince himself by experience that this is the case,
+he need do nothing but remove all compulsion from his fellows, and try
+to govern them by clearly and forcibly representing to them what
+is reasonable, right, and fair, though at the same time it may be
+contrary to their interests. He would be laughed to scorn; and as
+things go that is the only answer he would get. It would soon be
+obvious to him that moral force alone is powerless. It is, then,
+physical force alone which is capable of securing respect. Now this
+force ultimately resides in the masses, where it is associated with
+ignorance, stupidity and injustice. Accordingly the main aim of
+statesmanship in these difficult circumstances is to put physical
+force in subjection to mental force--to intellectual superiority, and
+thus to make it serviceable. But if this aim is not itself accompanied
+by justice and good intentions the result of the business, if it
+succeeds, is that the State so erected consists of knaves and fools,
+the deceivers and the deceived. That this is the case is made
+gradually evident by the progress of intelligence amongst the masses,
+however much it may be repressed; and it leads to revolution. But
+if, contrarily, intelligence is accompanied by justice and good
+intentions, there arises a State as perfect as the character of human
+affairs will allow. It is very much to the purpose if justice and
+good intentions not only exist, but are also demonstrable and openly
+exhibited, and can be called to account publicly, and be subject to
+control. Care must be taken, however, lest the resulting participation
+of many persons in the work of government should affect the unity of
+the State, and inflict a loss of strength and concentration on the
+power by which its home and foreign affairs have to be administered.
+This is what almost always happens in republics. To produce a
+constitution which should satisfy all these demands would accordingly
+be the highest aim of statesmanship. But, as a matter of fact,
+statesmanship has to consider other things as well. It has to reckon
+with the people as they exist, and their national peculiarities. This
+is the raw material on which it has to work, and the ingredients of
+that material will always exercise a great effect on the completed
+scheme.
+
+Statesmanship will have achieved a good deal if it so far attains its
+object as to reduce wrong and injustice in the community to a minimum.
+To banish them altogether, and to leave no trace of them, is merely
+the ideal to be aimed at; and it is only approximately that it can be
+reached. If they disappear in one direction, they creep in again in
+another; for wrong and injustice lie deeply rooted in human nature.
+Attempts have been made to attain the desired aim by artificial
+constitutions and systematic codes of law; but they are not in
+complete touch with the facts--they remain an asymptote, for the
+simple reason that hard and fast conceptions never embrace all
+possible cases, and cannot be made to meet individual instances. Such
+conceptions resemble the stones of a mosaic rather than the delicate
+shading in a picture. Nay, more: all experiments in this matter are
+attended with danger; because the material in question, namely, the
+human race, is the most difficult of all material to handle. It is
+almost as dangerous as an explosive.
+
+No doubt it is true that in the machinery of the State the freedom
+of the press performs the same function as a safety-valve in other
+machinery; for it enables all discontent to find a voice; nay, in
+doing so, the discontent exhausts itself if it has not much substance;
+and if it has, there is an advantage in recognising it betimes
+and applying the remedy. This is much better than to repress the
+discontent, and let it simmer and ferment, and go on increasing until
+it ends in an explosion. On the other hand, the freedom of the press
+may be regarded as a permission to sell poison--poison for the heart
+and the mind. There is no idea so foolish but that it cannot be put
+into the heads of the ignorant and incapable multitude, especially if
+the idea holds out some prospect of any gain or advantage. And when a
+man has got hold of any such idea what is there that he will not do?
+I am, therefore, very much afraid that the danger of a free press
+outweighs its utility, particularly where the law offers a way of
+redressing wrongs. In any case, however, the freedom of the press
+should be governed by a very strict prohibition of all and every
+anonymity.
+
+Generally, indeed, it may be maintained that right is of a nature
+analogous to that of certain chemical substances, which cannot be
+exhibited in a pure and isolated condition, but at the most only with
+a small admixture of some other substance, which serves as a vehicle
+for them, or gives them the necessary consistency; such as fluorine,
+or even alcohol, or prussic acid. Pursuing the analogy we may say that
+right, if it is to gain a footing in the world and really prevail,
+must of necessity be supplemented by a small amount of arbitrary
+force, in order that, notwithstanding its merely ideal and therefore
+ethereal nature, it may be able to work and subsist in the real and
+material world, and not evaporate and vanish into the clouds, as
+it does in Hesoid. Birth-right of every description, all heritable
+privileges, every form of national religion, and so on, may be
+regarded as the necessary chemical base or alloy; inasmuch as it is
+only when right has some such firm and actual foundation that it can
+be enforced and consistently vindicated. They form for right a sort of
+[Greek: os moi pou sto]--a fulcrum for supporting its lever.
+
+Linnaeus adopted a vegetable system of an artificial and arbitrary
+character. It cannot be replaced by a natural one, no matter how
+reasonable the change might be, or how often it has been attempted to
+make it, because no other system could ever yield the same certainty
+and stability of definition. Just in the same way the artificial and
+arbitrary basis on which, as has been shown, the constitution of
+a State rests, can never be replaced by a purely natural basis. A
+natural basis would aim at doing away with the conditions that have
+been mentioned: in the place of the privileges of birth it would put
+those of personal merit; in the place of the national religion, the
+results of rationalistic inquiry, and so on. However agreeable to
+reason this might all prove, the change could not be made; because a
+natural basis would lack that certainty and fixity of definition which
+alone secures the stability of the commonwealth. A constitution which
+embodied abstract right alone would be an excellent thing for natures
+other than human, but since the great majority of men are extremely
+egoistic, unjust, inconsiderate, deceitful, and sometimes even
+malicious; since in addition they are endowed with very scanty
+intelligence there arises the necessity for a power that shall be
+concentrated in one man, a power that shall be above all law and
+right, and be completely irresponsible, nay, to which everything shall
+yield as to something that is regarded as a creature of a higher
+kind, a ruler by the grace of God. It is only thus that men can be
+permanently held in check and governed.
+
+The United States of North America exhibit the attempt to proceed
+without any such arbitrary basis; that is to say, to allow abstract
+right to prevail pure and unalloyed. But the result is not attractive.
+For with all the material prosperity of the country what do we find?
+The prevailing sentiment is a base Utilitarianism with its inevitable
+companion, ignorance; and it is this that has paved the way for a
+union of stupid Anglican bigotry, foolish prejudice, coarse brutality,
+and a childish veneration of women. Even worse things are the order of
+the day: most iniquitous oppression of the black freemen, lynch law,
+frequent assassination often committed with entire impunity, duels of
+a savagery elsewhere unknown, now and then open scorn of all law and
+justice, repudiation of public debts, abominable political rascality
+towards a neighbouring State, followed by a mercenary raid on its rich
+territory,--afterwards sought to be excused, on the part of the chief
+authority of the State, by lies which every one in the country knew to
+be such and laughed at--an ever-increasing ochlocracy, and finally
+all the disastrous influence which this abnegation of justice in high
+quarters must have exercised on private morals. This specimen of a
+pure constitution on the obverse side of the planet says very little
+for republics in general, but still less for the imitations of it in
+Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia and Peru.
+
+A peculiar disadvantage attaching to republics--and one that might
+not be looked for--is that in this form of government it must be more
+difficult for men of ability to attain high position and exercise
+direct political influence than in the case of monarchies. For always
+and everywhere and under all circumstances there is a conspiracy, or
+instinctive alliance, against such men on the part of all the stupid,
+the weak, and the commonplace; they look upon such men as their
+natural enemies, and they are firmly held together by a common fear of
+them. There is always a numerous host of the stupid and the weak,
+and in a republican constitution it is easy for them to suppress and
+exclude the men of ability, so that they may not be outflanked by
+them. They are fifty to one; and here all have equal rights at the
+start.
+
+In a monarchy, on the other hand, this natural and universal league of
+the stupid against those who are possessed of intellectual advantages
+is a one-sided affair; it exists only from below, for in a monarchy
+talent and intelligence receive a natural advocacy and support from
+above. In the first place, the position of the monarch himself is
+much too high and too firm for him to stand in fear of any sort of
+competition. In the next place, he serves the State more by his will
+than by his intelligence; for no intelligence could ever be equal
+to all the demands that would in his case be made upon it. He is
+therefore compelled to be always availing himself of other men's
+intelligence. Seeing that his own interests are securely bound up with
+those of his country; that they are inseparable from them and one with
+them, he will naturally give the preference to the best men, because
+they are his most serviceable instruments, and he will bestow his
+favour upon them--as soon, that is, as he can find them; which is not
+so difficult, if only an honest search be made. Just in the same
+way even ministers of State have too much advantage over rising
+politicians to need to regard them with jealousy; and accordingly for
+analogous reasons they are glad to single out distinguished men and
+set them to work, in order to make use of their powers for themselves.
+It is in this way that intelligence has always under a monarchical
+government a much better chance against its irreconcilable and
+ever-present foe, stupidity; and the advantage which it gains is very
+great.
+
+In general, the monarchical form of government is that which is
+natural to man; just as it is natural to bees and ants, to a flight of
+cranes, a herd of wandering elephants, a pack of wolves seeking prey
+in common, and many other animals, all of which place one of their
+number at the head of the business in hand. Every business in which
+men engage, if it is attended with danger--every campaign, every
+ship at sea--must also be subject to the authority of one commander;
+everywhere it is one will that must lead. Even the animal organism is
+constructed on a monarchical principle: it is the brain alone which
+guides and governs, and exercises the hegemony. Although heart, lungs,
+and stomach contribute much more to the continued existence of the
+whole body, these philistines cannot on that account be allowed to
+guide and lead. That is a business which belongs solely to the brain;
+government must proceed from one central point. Even the solar system
+is monarchical. On the other hand, a republic is as unnatural as it
+is unfavourable to the higher intellectual life and the arts and
+sciences. Accordingly we find that everywhere in the world, and at all
+times, nations, whether civilised or savage, or occupying a position
+between the two, are always under monarchical government. The rule of
+many as Homer said, is not a good thing: let there be one ruler, one
+king;
+
+  [Greek: Ouk agathon polykoiraniae-eis koiranos esto
+  Eis basoleus.] [1]
+
+[Footnote 1: _Iliad_, ii., 204.]
+
+How would it be possible that, everywhere and at all times, we should
+see many millions of people, nay, even hundreds of millions, become
+the willing and obedient subjects of one man, sometimes even one
+woman, and provisionally, even, of a child, unless there were a
+monarchical instinct in men which drove them to it as the form of
+government best suited to them? This arrangement is not the product
+of reflection. Everywhere one man is king, and for the most part his
+dignity is hereditary. He is, as it were, the personification, the
+monogram, of the whole people, which attains an individuality in him.
+In this sense he can rightly say: _l'etat c'est moi_. It is precisely
+for this reason that in Shakespeare's historical plays the kings
+of England and France mutually address each other as _France_ and
+_England_, and the Duke of Austria goes by the name of his country. It
+is as though the kings regarded themselves as the incarnation of their
+nationalities. It is all in accordance with human nature; and for this
+very reason the hereditary monarch cannot separate his own welfare and
+that of his family from the welfare of his country; as, on the other
+hand, mostly happens when the monarch is elected, as, for instance, in
+the States of the Church.[1] The Chinese can conceive of a monarchical
+government only; what a republic is they utterly fail to understand.
+When a Dutch legation was in China in the year 1658, it was obliged to
+represent that the Prince of Orange was their king, as otherwise the
+Chinese would have been inclined to take Holland for a nest of pirates
+living without any lord or master.[2] Stobaeus, in a chapter in his
+_Florilegium_, at the head of which he wrote _That monarchy is best_,
+collected the best of the passages in which the ancients explained
+the advantages of that form of government. In a word, republics are
+unnatural and artificial; they are the product of reflection. Hence it
+is that they occur only as rare exceptions in the whole history of
+the world. There were the small Greek republics, the Roman and the
+Carthaginian; but they were all rendered possible by the fact that
+five-sixths, perhaps even seven-eighths, of the population consisted
+of slaves. In the year 1840, even in the United States, there were
+three million slaves to a population of sixteen millions. Then, again,
+the duration of the republics of antiquity, compared with that of
+monarchies, was very short. Republics are very easy to found, and
+very difficult to maintain, while with monarchies it is exactly the
+reverse. If it is Utopian schemes that are wanted, I say this: the
+only solution of the problem would be a despotism of the wise and the
+noble, of the true aristocracy and the genuine nobility, brought about
+by the method of generation--that is, by the marriage of the noblest
+men with the cleverest and most intellectual women. This is my Utopia,
+my Republic of Plato.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--The reader will recollect that
+Schopenhauer was writing long before the Papal territories were
+absorbed into the kingdom of Italy.]
+
+[Footnote 2: See Jean Nieuhoff, _L'Ambassade de la Compagnie Orientale
+des Provinces Unies vers L'Empereur de la Chine_, traduit par Jean le
+Charpentier a Leyde, 1665; ch. 45.]
+
+Constitutional kings are undoubtedly in much the same position as
+the gods of Epicurus, who sit upon high in undisturbed bliss and
+tranquillity, and do not meddle with human affairs. Just now they are
+the fashion. In every German duodecimo-principality a parody of the
+English constitution is set up, quite complete, from Upper and
+Lower Houses down to the Habeas Corpus Act and trial by jury. These
+institutions, which proceed from English character and English
+circumstances, and presuppose both, are natural and suitable to the
+English people. It is just as natural to the German people to be split
+up into a number of different stocks, under a similar number of ruling
+Princes, with an Emperor over them all, who maintains peace at home,
+and represents the unity of the State board. It is an arrangement
+which has proceeded from German character and German circumstances.
+I am of opinion that if Germany is not to meet with the same fate as
+Italy, it must restore the imperial crown, which was done away with
+by its arch-enemy, the first Napoleon; and it must restore it as
+effectively as possible. [1] For German unity depends on it, and
+without the imperial crown it will always be merely nominal, or
+precarious. But as we no longer live in the days of Guenther of
+Schwarzburg, when the choice of Emperor was a serious business, the
+imperial crown ought to go alternately to Prussia and to Austria, for
+the life of the wearer. In any case, the absolute sovereignty of the
+small States is illusory. Napoleon I. did for Germany what Otto the
+Great did for Italy: he divided it into small, independent States, on
+the principle, _divide et impera_.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--Here, again, it is hardly necessary
+to say that Schopenhauer, who died in 1860, and wrote this passage at
+least some years previously, cannot be referring to any of the
+events which culminated in 1870. The whole passage forms a striking
+illustration of his political sagacity.]
+
+The English show their great intelligence, amongst other ways, by
+clinging to their ancient institutions, customs and usages, and by
+holding them sacred, even at the risk of carrying this tenacity too
+far, and making it ridiculous. They hold them sacred for the simple
+reason that those institutions and customs are not the invention of an
+idle head, but have grown up gradually by the force of circumstance
+and the wisdom of life itself, and are therefore suited to them as a
+nation. On the other hand, the German Michel[1] allows himself to be
+persuaded by his schoolmaster that he must go about in an English
+dress-coat, and that nothing else will do. Accordingly he has bullied
+his father into giving it to him; and with his awkward manners this
+ungainly creature presents in it a sufficiently ridiculous figure. But
+the dress-coat will some day be too tight for him and incommode him.
+It will not be very long before he feels it in trial by jury. This
+institution arose in the most barbarous period of the Middle Ages--the
+times of Alfred the Great, when the ability to read and write exempted
+a man from the penalty of death. It is the worst of all criminal
+procedures. Instead of judges, well versed in law and of great
+experience, who have grown grey in daily unravelling the tricks and
+wiles of thieves, murderers and rascals of all sorts, and so are well
+able to get at the bottom of things, it is gossiping tailors and
+tanners who sit in judgment; it is their coarse, crude, unpractised,
+and awkward intelligence, incapable of any sustained attention, that
+is called upon to find out the truth from a tissue of lies and deceit.
+All the time, moreover, they are thinking of their cloth and their
+leather, and longing to be at home; and they have absolutely no clear
+notion at all of the distinction between probability and certainty. It
+is with this sort of a calculus of probabilities in their stupid heads
+that they confidently undertake to seal a man's doom.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--It may be well to explain that
+"Michel" is sometimes used by the Germans as a nickname of their
+nation, corresponding to "John Bull" as a nickname of the English.
+Fluegel in his German-English Dictionary declares that _der deutsche
+Michel_ represents the German nation as an honest, blunt, unsuspicious
+fellow, who easily allows himself to be imposed upon, even, he adds,
+with a touch of patriotism, "by those who are greatly his inferiors in
+point of strength and real worth."]
+
+The same remark is applicable to them which Dr. Johnson made of a
+court-martial in which he had little confidence, summoned to decide a
+very important case. He said that perhaps there was not a member of
+it who, in the whole course of his life, had ever spent an hour by
+himself in balancing probabilities.[1] Can any one imagine that the
+tailor and the tanner would be impartial judges? What! the vicious
+multitude impartial! as if partiality were not ten times more to be
+feared from men of the same class as the accused than from judges who
+knew nothing of him personally, lived in another sphere altogether,
+were irremovable, and conscious of the dignity of their office. But
+to let a jury decide on crimes against the State and its head, or on
+misdemeanours of the press, is in a very real sense to set the fox to
+keep the geese.
+
+[Footnote 1: Boswell's _Johnson_, 1780, set. 71.]
+
+Everywhere and at all times there has been much discontent with
+governments, laws and public regulations; for the most part, however,
+because men are always ready to make institutions responsible for the
+misery inseparable from human existence itself; which is, to speak
+mythically, the curse that was laid on Adam, and through him on the
+whole race. But never has that delusion been proclaimed in a more
+mendacious and impudent manner than by the demagogues of the
+_Jetstzeit_--of the day we live in. As enemies of Christianity, they
+are, of course, optimists: to them the world is its own end and
+object, and accordingly in itself, that is to say, in its own natural
+constitution, it is arranged on the most excellent principles, and
+forms a regular habitation of bliss. The enormous and glaring evils of
+the world they attribute wholly to governments: if governments, they
+think, were to do their duty, there would be a heaven upon earth; in
+other words, all men could eat, drink, propagate and die, free from
+trouble and want. This is what they mean when they talk of the world
+being "its own end and object"; this is the goal of that "perpetual
+progress of the human race," and the other fine things which they are
+never tired of proclaiming.
+
+Formerly it was _faith_ which was the chief support of the throne;
+nowadays it is _credit_. The Pope himself is scarcely more concerned
+to retain the confidence of the faithful than to make his creditors
+believe in his own good faith. If in times past it was the guilty debt
+of the world which was lamented, now it is the financial debts of the
+world which arouse dismay. Formerly it was the Last Day which was
+prophesied; now it is the [Greek: seisachtheia] the great repudiation,
+the universal bankruptcy of the nations, which will one day happen;
+although the prophet, in this as in the other case, entertains a firm
+hope that he will not live to see it himself.
+
+From an ethical and a rational point of view, the _right of
+possession_ rests upon an incomparably better foundation than the
+_right of birth_; nevertheless, the right of possession is allied with
+the right of birth and has come to be part and parcel of it, so that
+it would hardly be possible to abolish the right of birth without
+endangering the right of possession. The reason of this is that most
+of what a man possesses he inherited, and therefore holds by a kind of
+right of birth; just as the old nobility bear the names only of their
+hereditary estates, and by the use of those names do no more than give
+expression to the fact that they own the estates. Accordingly all
+owners of property, if instead of being envious they were wise, ought
+also to support the maintenance of the rights of birth.
+
+The existence of a nobility has, then, a double advantage: it helps to
+maintain on the one hand the rights of possession, and on the other
+the right of birth belonging to the king. For the king is the first
+nobleman in the country, and, as a general rule, he treats the
+nobility as his humble relations, and regards them quite otherwise
+than the commoners, however trusty and well-beloved. It is quite
+natural, too, that he should have more confidence in those whose
+ancestors were mostly the first ministers, and always the immediate
+associates, of his own. A nobleman, therefore, appeals with reason
+to the name he bears, when on the occurrence of anything to rouse
+distrust he repeats his assurance of fidelity and service to the king.
+A man's character, as my readers are aware, assuredly comes to him
+from his father. It is a narrow-minded and ridiculous thing not to
+consider whose son a man is.
+
+
+
+
+FREE-WILL AND FATALISM.
+
+
+No thoughtful man can have any doubt, after the conclusions reached in
+my prize-essay on _Moral Freedom_, that such freedom is to be sought,
+not anywhere in nature, but outside of it. The only freedom that
+exists is of a metaphysical character. In the physical world freedom
+is an impossibility. Accordingly, while our several actions are in no
+wise free, every man's individual character is to be regarded as a
+free act. He is such and such a man, because once for all it is his
+will to be that man. For the will itself, and in itself, and also in
+so far as it is manifest in an individual, and accordingly constitutes
+the original and fundamental desires of that individual, is
+independent of all knowledge, because it is antecedent to such
+knowledge. All that it receives from knowledge is the series of
+motives by which it successively develops its nature and makes itself
+cognisable or visible; but the will itself, as something that lies
+beyond time, and so long as it exists at all, never changes. Therefore
+every man, being what he is and placed in the circumstances which
+for the moment obtain, but which on their part also arise by strict
+necessity, can absolutely never do anything else than just what at
+that moment he does do. Accordingly, the whole course of a man's life,
+in all its incidents great and small, is as necessarily predetermined
+as the course of a clock.
+
+The main reason of this is that the kind of metaphysical free act
+which I have described tends to become a knowing consciousness--a
+perceptive intuition, which is subject to the forms of space and time.
+By means of those forms the unity and indivisibility of the act are
+represented as drawn asunder into a series of states and events,
+which are subject to the Principle of Sufficient Reason in its four
+forms--and it is this that is meant by _necessity_. But the result of
+it all assumes a moral complexion. It amounts to this, that by what we
+do we know what we are, and by what we suffer we know what we deserve.
+
+Further, it follows from this that a man's _individuality_ does not
+rest upon the principle of individuation alone, and therefore is not
+altogether phenomenal in its nature. On the contrary, it has its roots
+in the thing-in-itself, in the will which is the essence of each
+individual. The character of this individual is itself individual. But
+how deep the roots of individuality extend is one of the questions
+which I do not undertake to answer.
+
+In this connection it deserves to be mentioned that even Plato, in his
+own way, represented the individuality of a man as a free act.[1] He
+represented him as coming into the world with a given tendency, which
+was the result of the feelings and character already attaching to
+him in accordance with the doctrine of metempsychosis. The Brahmin
+philosophers also express the unalterable fixity of innate character
+in a mystical fashion. They say that Brahma, when a man is produced,
+engraves his doings and sufferings in written characters on his skull,
+and that his life must take shape in accordance therewith. They point
+to the jagged edges in the sutures of the skull-bones as evidence of
+this writing; and the purport of it, they say, depends on his previous
+life and actions. The same view appears to underlie the Christian, or
+rather, the Pauline, dogma of Predestination.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Phaedrus_ and _Laws, bk_. x.]
+
+But this truth, which is universally confirmed by experience, is
+attended with another result. All genuine merit, moral as well as
+intellectual, is not merely physical or empirical in its origin,
+but metaphysical; that is to say, it is given _a priori_ and not _a
+posteriori_; in other words, it lies innate and is not acquired,
+and therefore its source is not a mere phenomenon, but the
+thing-in-itself. Hence it is that every man achieves only that which
+is irrevocably established in his nature, or is born with him.
+Intellectual capacity needs, it is true, to be developed just as many
+natural products need to be cultivated in order that we may enjoy or
+use them; but just as in the case of a natural product no cultivation
+can take the place of original material, neither can it do so in the
+case of intellect. That is the reason why qualities which are merely
+acquired, or learned, or enforced--that is, qualities _a posteriori_,
+whether moral or intellectual--are not real or genuine, but
+superficial only, and possessed of no value. This is a conclusion of
+true metaphysics, and experience teaches the same lesson to all who
+can look below the surface. Nay, it is proved by the great importance
+which we all attach to such innate characteristics as physiognomy and
+external appearance, in the case of a man who is at all distinguished;
+and that is why we are so curious to see him. Superficial people, to
+be sure,--and, for very good reasons, commonplace people too,--will be
+of the opposite opinion; for if anything fails them they will thus be
+enabled to console themselves by thinking that it is still to come.
+
+The world, then, is not merely a battlefield where victory and defeat
+receive their due recompense in a future state. No! the world is
+itself the Last Judgment on it. Every man carries with him the reward
+and the disgrace that he deserves; and this is no other than the
+doctrine of the Brahmins and Buddhists as it is taught in the theory
+of metempsychosis.
+
+The question has been raised, What two men would do, who lived a
+solitary life in the wilds and met each other for the first time.
+Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Rousseau have given different answers.
+Pufendorf believed that they would approach each other as friends;
+Hobbes, on the contrary, as enemies; Rousseau, that they would pass
+each other by In silence. All three are both right and wrong. This
+is just a case in which the incalculable difference that there is in
+innate moral disposition between one individual and another would make
+its appearance. The difference is so strong that the question here
+raised might be regarded as the standard and measure of it. For there
+are men in whom the sight of another man at once rouses a feeling of
+enmity, since their inmost nature exclaims at once: That is not me!
+There are, others in whom the sight awakens immediate sympathy; their
+inmost nature says: _That is me over again_! Between the two there
+are countless degrees. That in this most important matter we are so
+totally different is a great problem, nay, a mystery.
+
+In regard to this _a priori_ nature of moral character there is matter
+for varied reflection in a work by Bastholm, a Danish writer, entitled
+_Historical Contributions to the Knowledge of Man in the Savage
+State_. He is struck by the fact that intellectual culture and moral
+excellence are shown to be entirely independent of each other,
+inasmuch as one is often found without the other. The reason of this,
+as we shall find, is simply that moral excellence in no wise springs
+from reflection, which is developed by intellectual culture, but
+from the will itself, the constitution of which is innate and not
+susceptible in itself of any improvement by means of education.
+Bastholm represents most nations as very vicious and immoral; and on
+the other hand he reports that excellent traits of character are found
+amongst some savage peoples; as, for instance, amongst the Orotchyses,
+the inhabitants of the island Savu, the Tunguses, and the Pelew
+islanders. He thus attempts to solve the problem, How it is that some
+tribes are so remarkably good, when their neighbours are all bad,
+
+It seems to me that the difficulty may be explained as follows: Moral
+qualities, as we know, are heritable, and an isolated tribe, such as
+is described, might take its rise in some one family, and ultimately
+in a single ancestor who happened to be a good man, and then maintain
+its purity. Is it not the case, for instance, that on many unpleasant
+occasions, such as repudiation of public debts, filibustering raids
+and so on, the English have often reminded the North Americans of
+their descent from English penal colonists? It is a reproach, however,
+which can apply only to a small part of the population.
+
+It is marvellous how _every man's individuality_ (that is to say, the
+union of a definite character with a definite intellect) accurately
+determines all his actions and thoughts down to the most unimportant
+details, as though it were a dye which pervaded them; and how, in
+consequence, one man's whole course of life, in other words, his inner
+and outer history, turns out so absolutely different from another's.
+As a botanist knows a plant in its entirety from a single leaf; as
+Cuvier from a single bone constructed the whole animal, so an accurate
+knowledge of a man's whole character may be attained from a single
+characteristic act; that is to say, he himself may to some extent
+be constructed from it, even though the act in question is of very
+trifling consequence. Nay, that is the most perfect test of all, for
+in a matter of importance people are on their guard; in trifles
+they follow their natural bent without much reflection. That is
+why Seneca's remark, that even the smallest things may be taken as
+evidence of character, is so true: _argumenta morum ex minimis quoque
+licet capere_.[1] If a man shows by his absolutely unscrupulous and
+selfish behaviour in small things that a sentiment of justice is
+foreign to his disposition, he should not be trusted with a penny
+unless on due security. For who will believe that the man who every
+day shows that he is unjust in all matters other than those which
+concern property, and whose boundless selfishness everywhere protrudes
+through the small affairs of ordinary life which are subject to
+no scrutiny, like a dirty shirt through the holes of a ragged
+jacket--who, I ask, will believe that such a man will act honourably
+in matters of _meum_ and _tuum_ without any other incentive but that
+of justice? The man who has no conscience in small things will be a
+scoundrel in big things. If we neglect small traits of character,
+we have only ourselves to blame if we afterwards learn to our
+disadvantage what this character is in the great affairs of life. On
+the same principle, we ought to break with so-called friends even in
+matters of trifling moment, if they show a character that is malicious
+or bad or vulgar, so that we may avoid the bad turn which only waits
+for an opportunity of being done us. The same thing applies to
+servants. Let it always be our maxim: Better alone than amongst
+traitors.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Ep_., 52.]
+
+Of a truth the first and foremost step in all knowledge of mankind is
+the conviction that a man's conduct, taken as a whole, and in all its
+essential particulars, is not governed by his reason or by any of the
+resolutions which he may make in virtue of it. No man becomes this or
+that by wishing to be it, however earnestly. His acts proceed from his
+innate and unalterable character, and they are more immediately and
+particularly determined by motives. A man's conduct, therefore, is the
+necessary product of both character and motive. It may be illustrated
+by the course of a planet, which is the result of the combined effect
+of the tangential energy with which it is endowed, and the centripetal
+energy which operates from the sun. In this simile the former energy
+represents character, and the latter the influence of motive. It is
+almost more than a mere simile. The tangential energy which properly
+speaking is the source of the planet's motion, whilst on the
+other hand the motion is kept in check by gravitation, is, from a
+metaphysical point of view, the will manifesting itself in that body.
+
+To grasp this fact is to see that we really never form anything more
+than a conjecture of what we shall do under circumstances which are
+still to happen; although we often take our conjecture for a resolve.
+When, for instance, in pursuance of a proposal, a man with the
+greatest sincerity, and even eagerness, accepts an engagement to do
+this or that on the occurrence of a certain future event, it is by
+no means certain that he will fulfil the engagement; unless he is so
+constituted that the promise which he gives, in itself and as such, is
+always and everywhere a motive sufficient for him, by acting upon him,
+through considerations of honour, like some external compulsion. But
+above and beyond this, what he will do on the occurrence of that event
+may be foretold from true and accurate knowledge of his character and
+the external circumstances under the influence of which he will fall;
+and it may with complete certainty be foretold from this alone. Nay,
+it is a very easy prophecy if he has been already seen in a like
+position; for he will inevitably do the same thing a second time,
+provided that on the first occasion he had a true and complete
+knowledge of the facts of the case. For, as I have often remarked, a
+final cause does not impel a man by being real, but by being known;
+_causa finalis non movet secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum esse
+cognitum_.[1] Whatever he failed to recognise or understand the first
+time could have no influence upon his will; just as an electric
+current stops when some isolating body hinders the action of the
+conductor. This unalterable nature of character, and the consequent
+necessity of our actions, are made very clear to a man who has not,
+on any given occasion, behaved as he ought to have done, by showing
+a lack either of resolution or endurance or courage, or some other
+quality demanded at the moment. Afterwards he recognises what it is
+that he ought to have done; and, sincerely repenting of his incorrect
+behaviour, he thinks to himself, _If the opportunity were offered to
+me again, I should act differently_. It is offered once more; the same
+occasion recurs; and to his great astonishment he does precisely the
+same thing over again.[2]
+
+[Footnote 1: Suarez, _Disp. Metaph_., xxiii.; Sec.Sec.7 and 8.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Cf. _World as Will_, ii., pp. 251 ff. _sqq_. (third
+edition).]
+
+The best examples of the truth in question are in every way furnished
+by Shakespeare's plays. It is a truth with which he was thoroughly
+imbued, and his intuitive wisdom expressed it in a concrete shape on
+every page. I shall here, however, give an instance of it in a case in
+which he makes it remarkably clear, without exhibiting any design or
+affectation in the matter; for he was a real artist and never set
+out from general ideas. His method was obviously to work up to the
+psychological truth which he grasped directly and intuitively,
+regardless of the fact that few would notice or understand it, and
+without the smallest idea that some dull and shallow fellows in
+Germany would one day proclaim far and wide that he wrote his works to
+illustrate moral commonplaces. I allude to the character of the Earl
+of Northumberland, whom we find in three plays in succession, although
+he does not take a leading part in any one of them; nay, he appears
+only in a few scenes distributed over fifteen acts. Consequently, if
+the reader is not very attentive, a character exhibited at such great
+intervals, and its moral identity, may easily escape his notice, even
+though it has by no means escaped the poet's. He makes the earl appear
+everywhere with a noble and knightly grace, and talk in language
+suitable to it; nay, he sometimes puts very beautiful and even
+elevated passages, into his mouth. At the same time he is very far
+from writing after the manner of Schiller, who was fond of painting
+the devil black, and whose moral approval or disapproval of the
+characters which he presented could be heard in their own words. With
+Shakespeare, and also with Goethe, every character, as long as he is
+on the stage and speaking, seems to be absolutely in the right, even
+though it were the devil himself. In this respect let the reader
+compare Duke Alba as he appears in Goethe with the same character in
+Schiller.
+
+We make the acquaintance of the Earl of Northumberland in the play of
+_Richard II_., where he is the first to hatch a plot against the King
+in favour of Bolingbroke, afterwards Henry IV., to whom he even offers
+some personal flattery (Act II., Sc. 3). In the following act he
+suffers a reprimand because, in speaking of the King he talks of him
+as "Richard," without more ado, but protests that he did it only for
+brevity's sake. A little later his insidious words induce the King to
+surrender. In the following act, when the King renounces the crown,
+Northumberland treats him with such harshness and contempt that the
+unlucky monarch is quite broken, and losing all patience once more
+exclaims to him: _Fiend, thou torment'st me ere I come to hell_! At
+the close, Northumberland announces to the new King that he has sent
+the heads of the former King's adherents to London.
+
+In the following tragedy, _Henry IV_., he hatches a plot against the
+new King in just the same way. In the fourth act we see the rebels
+united, making preparations for the decisive battle on the morrow, and
+only waiting impatiently for Northumberland and his division. At last
+there arrives a letter from him, saying that he is ill, and that he
+cannot entrust his force to any one else; but that nevertheless the
+others should go forward with courage and make a brave fight. They
+do so, but, greatly weakened by his absence, they are completely
+defeated; most of their leaders are captured, and his own son, the
+valorous Hotspur, falls by the hand of the Prince of Wales.
+
+Again, in the following play, the _Second Part of Henry IV_., we see
+him reduced to a state of the fiercest wrath by the death of his son,
+and maddened by the thirst for revenge. Accordingly he kindles another
+rebellion, and the heads of it assemble once more. In the fourth act,
+just as they are about to give battle, and are only waiting for him to
+join them, there comes a letter saying that he cannot collect a proper
+force, and will therefore seek safety for the present in Scotland;
+that, nevertheless, he heartily wishes their heroic undertaking the
+best success. Thereupon they surrender to the King under a treaty
+which is not kept, and so perish.
+
+So far is character from being the work of reasoned choice and
+consideration that in any action the intellect has nothing to do but
+to present motives to the will. Thereafter it looks on as a mere
+spectator and witness at the course which life takes, in accordance
+with the influence of motive on the given character. All the incidents
+of life occur, strictly speaking, with the same necessity as the
+movement of a clock. On this point let me refer to my prize-essay on
+_The Freedom of the Will_. I have there explained the true meaning and
+origin of the persistent illusion that the will is entirely free in
+every single action; and I have indicated the cause to which it is
+due. I will only add here the following teleological explanation of
+this natural illusion.
+
+Since every single action of a man's life seems to possess the freedom
+and originality which in truth only belong to his character as he
+apprehends it, and the mere apprehension of it by his intellect is
+what constitutes his career; and since what is original in every
+single action seems to the empirical consciousness to be always being
+performed anew, a man thus receives in the course of his career the
+strongest possible moral lesson. Then, and not before, he becomes
+thoroughly conscious of all the bad sides of his character. Conscience
+accompanies every act with the comment: _You should act differently_,
+although its true sense is: _You could be other than you are_. As the
+result of this immutability of character on the one hand, and, on the
+other, of the strict necessity which attends all the circumstances in
+which character is successively placed, every man's course of life
+is precisely determined from Alpha right through to Omega. But,
+nevertheless, one man's course of life turns out immeasurably happier,
+nobler and more worthy than another's, whether it be regarded from a
+subjective or an objective point of view, and unless we are to exclude
+all ideas of justice, we are led to the doctrine which is well
+accepted in Brahmanism and Buddhism, that the subjective conditions in
+which, as well as the objective conditions under which, every man is
+born, are the moral consequences of a previous existence.
+
+Macchiavelli, who seems to have taken no interest whatever in
+philosophical speculations, is drawn by the keen subtlety of his very
+unique understanding into the following observation, which possesses
+a really deep meaning. It shows that he had an intuitive knowledge of
+the entire necessity with which, characters and motives being given,
+all actions take place. He makes it at the beginning of the prologue
+to his comedy _Clitia_. _If_, he says, _the same men were to recur
+in the world in the way that the same circumstances recur, a hundred
+years would never elapse without our finding ourselves together once
+more, and doing the same things as we are doing now--Se nel mondo
+tornassino i medesimi uomini, como tornano i medesimi casi, non
+passarebbono mai cento anni che noi non ci trovassimo un altra volta
+insieme, a fare le medesime cose che hora_. He seems however to have
+been drawn into the remark by a reminiscence of what Augustine says in
+his _De Civitate Dei_, bk. xii., ch. xiii.
+
+Again, Fate, or the [Greek: eimarmenae] of the ancients, is nothing
+but the conscious certainty that all that happens is fast bound by a
+chain of causes, and therefore takes place with a strict necessity;
+that the future is already ordained with absolute certainty and can
+undergo as little alteration as the past. In the fatalistic myths of
+the ancients all that can be regarded as fabulous is the prediction
+of the future; that is, if we refuse to consider the possibility of
+magnetic clairvoyance and second sight. Instead of trying to explain
+away the fundamental truth of Fatalism by superficial twaddle and
+foolish evasion, a man should attempt to get a clear knowledge and
+comprehension of it; for it is demonstrably true, and it helps us in a
+very important way to an understanding of the mysterious riddle of
+our life. Predestination and Fatalism do not differ in the main. They
+differ only in this, that with Predestination the given character and
+external determination of human action proceed from a rational Being,
+and with Fatalism from an irrational one. But in either case the
+result is the same: that happens which must happen.
+
+On the other hand the conception of _Moral Freedom_ is inseparable
+from that of _Originality_. A man may be said, but he cannot be
+conceived, to be the work of another, and at the same time be free in
+respect of his desires and acts. He who called him into existence out
+of nothing in the same process created and determined his nature--in
+other words, the whole of his qualities. For no one can create without
+creating a something, that is to say, a being determined throughout
+and in all its qualities. But all that a man says and does necessarily
+proceeds from the qualities so determined; for it is only the
+qualities themselves set in motion. It is only some external impulse
+that they require to make their appearance. As a man is, so must he
+act; and praise or blame attaches, not to his separate acts, but to
+his nature and being.
+
+That is the reason why Theism and the moral responsibility of man are
+incompatible; because responsibility always reverts to the creator of
+man and it is there that it has its centre. Vain attempts have been
+made to make a bridge from one of these incompatibles to the other by
+means of the conception of moral freedom; but it always breaks down
+again. What is _free_ must also be _original_. If our will is _free_,
+our will is also _the original element_, and conversely. Pre-Kantian
+dogmatism tried to separate these two predicaments. It was thereby
+compelled to assume two kinds of freedom, one cosmological, of the
+first cause, and the other moral and theological, of human will. These
+are represented in Kant by the third as well as the fourth antimony of
+freedom.
+
+On the other hand, in my philosophy the plain recognition of the
+strictly necessary character of all action is in accordance with the
+doctrine that what manifests itself even in the organic and irrational
+world is _will_. If this were not so, the necessity under which
+irrational beings obviously act would place their action in conflict
+with will; if, I mean, there were really such a thing as the freedom
+of individual action, and this were not as strictly necessitated as
+every other kind of action. But, as I have just shown, it is this same
+doctrine of the necessary character of all acts of will which makes it
+needful to regard a man's existence and being as itself the work of
+his freedom, and consequently of his will. The will, therefore, must
+be self-existent; it must possess so-called _a-se-ity_. Under the
+opposite supposition all responsibility, as I have shown, would be at
+an end, and the moral like the physical world would be a mere machine,
+set in motion for the amusement of its manufacturer placed somewhere
+outside of it. So it is that truths hang together, and mutually
+advance and complete one another; whereas error gets jostled at every
+corner.
+
+What kind of influence it is that _moral instruction_ may exercise
+on conduct, and what are the limits of that influence, are questions
+which I have sufficiently examined in the twentieth section of my
+treatise on the _Foundation of Morality_. In all essential particulars
+an analogous influence is exercised by _example_, which, however, has
+a more powerful effect than doctrine, and therefore it deserves a
+brief analysis.
+
+In the main, example works either by restraining a man or by
+encouraging him. It has the former effect when it determines him to
+leave undone what he wanted to do. He sees, I mean, that other people
+do not do it; and from this he judges, in general, that it is not
+expedient; that it may endanger his person, or his property, or his
+honour.
+
+He rests content, and gladly finds himself relieved from examining
+into the matter for himself. Or he may see that another man, who has
+not refrained, has incurred evil consequences from doing it; this is
+example of the deterrent kind. The example which encourages a man
+works in a twofold manner. It either induces him to do what he would
+be glad to leave undone, if he were not afraid lest the omission might
+in some way endanger him, or injure him in others' opinion; or else it
+encourages him to do what he is glad to do, but has hitherto refrained
+from doing from fear of danger or shame; this is example of the
+seductive kind. Finally, example may bring a man to do what he would
+have otherwise never thought of doing. It is obvious that in this last
+case example works in the main only on the intellect; its effect on
+the will is secondary, and if it has any such effect, it is by the
+interposition of the man's own judgment, or by reliance on the person
+who presented the example.
+
+The whole influence of example--and it is very strong--rests on the
+fact that a man has, as a rule, too little judgment of his own, and
+often too little knowledge, o explore his own way for himself, and
+that he is glad, therefore, to tread in the footsteps of some one
+else. Accordingly, the more deficient he is in either of these
+qualities, the more is he open to the influence of example; and we
+find, in fact, that most men's guiding star is the example of others;
+that their whole course of life, in great things and in small, comes
+in the end to be mere imitation; and that not even in the pettiest
+matters do they act according to their own judgment. Imitation and
+custom are the spring of almost all human action. The cause of it
+is that men fight shy of all and any sort of reflection, and very
+properly mistrust their own discernment. At the same time this
+remarkably strong imitative instinct in man is a proof of his kinship
+with apes.
+
+But the kind of effect which example exercises depends upon a man's
+character, and thus it is that the same example may possibly seduce
+one man and deter another. An easy opportunity of observing this is
+afforded in the case of certain social impertinences which come into
+vogue and gradually spread. The first time that a man notices anything
+of the kind, he may say to himself: _For shame! how can he do it! how
+selfish and inconsiderate of him! really, I shall take care never to
+do anything like that_. But twenty others will think: _Aha! if he does
+that, I may do it too_.
+
+As regards morality, example, like doctrine, may, it is true, promote
+civil or legal amelioration, but not that inward amendment which is,
+strictly speaking, the only kind of moral amelioration. For example
+always works as a personal motive alone, and assumes, therefore,
+that a man is susceptible to this sort of motive. But it is just the
+predominating sensitiveness of a character to this or that sort of
+motive that determines whether its morality is true and real; though,
+of whatever kind it is, it is always innate. In general it may be said
+that example operates as a means of promoting the good and the bad
+qualities of a character, but it does not create them; and so it
+is that Seneca's maxim, _velle non discitur_--_will cannot be
+learned_--also holds good here. But the innateness of all truly moral
+qualities, of the good as of the bad, is a doctrine that consorts
+better with the metempsychosis of the Brahmins and Buddhists,
+according to which a man's good and bad deeds follow him from one
+existence to another like his shadow, than with Judaism. For Judaism
+requires a man to come into the world as a moral blank, so that, in
+virtue of an inconceivable free will, directed to objects which
+are neither to be sought nor avoided--_liberum arbitrium
+indifferentiae_--and consequently as the result of reasoned
+consideration, he may choose whether he is to be an angel or a devil,
+or anything else that may lie between the two. Though I am well aware
+what the Jewish scheme is, I pay no attention to it; for my standard
+is truth. I am no professor of philosophy, and therefore I do not find
+my vocation in establishing the fundamental ideas of Judaism at any
+cost, even though they for ever bar the way to all and every kind of
+philosophical knowledge. _Liberum arbitrium indifferentiae_ under
+the name of _moral freedom_ is a charming doll for professors of
+philosophy to dandle; and we must leave it to those intelligent,
+honourable and upright gentlemen.
+
+
+
+
+CHARACTER.
+
+
+Men who aspire to a happy, a brilliant and a long life, instead of to
+a virtuous one, are like foolish actors who want to be always having
+the great parts,--the parts that are marked by splendour and triumph.
+They fail to see that the important thing is not _what_ or _how much_,
+but _how_ they act.
+
+Since _a man does not alter_, and his _moral character_ remains
+absolutely the same all through his life; since he must play out the
+part which he has received, without the least deviation from the
+character; since neither experience, nor philosophy, nor religion
+can effect any improvement in him, the question arises, What is the
+meaning of life at all? To what purpose is it played, this farce
+in which everything that is essential is irrevocably fixed and
+determined?
+
+It is played that a man may come to understand himself, that he may
+see what it is that he seeks and has sought to be; what he wants, and
+what, therefore, he is. _This is a knowledge which must be imparted
+to him from without_. Life is to man, in other words, to will, what
+chemical re-agents are to the body: it is only by life that a man
+reveals what he is, and it is only in so far as he reveals himself
+that he exists at all. Life is the manifestation of character, of the
+something that we understand by that word; and it is not in life, but
+outside of it, and outside time, that character undergoes alteration,
+as a result of the self-knowledge which life gives. Life is only
+the mirror into which a man gazes not in order that he may get a
+reflection of himself, but that he may come to understand himself by
+that reflection; that he may see _what_ it is that the mirror shows.
+Life is the proof sheet, in which the compositors' errors are brought
+to light. How they become visible, and whether the type is large or
+small, are matters of no consequence. Neither in the externals of life
+nor in the course of history is there any significance; for as it is
+all one whether an error occurs in the large type or in the small, so
+it is all one, as regards the essence of the matter, whether an evil
+disposition is mirrored as a conqueror of the world or a common
+swindler or ill-natured egoist. In one case he is seen of all men; in
+the other, perhaps only of himself; but that he should see himself is
+what signifies.
+
+Therefore if egoism has a firm hold of a man and masters him, whether
+it be in the form of joy, or triumph, or lust, or hope, or frantic
+grief, or annoyance, or anger, or fear, or suspicion, or passion of
+any kind--he is in the devil's clutches and how he got into them does
+not matter. What is needful is that he should make haste to get out of
+them; and here, again, it does not matter how.
+
+I have described _character_ as _theoretically_ an act of will lying
+beyond time, of which life in time, or _character in action_, is the
+development. For matters of practical life we all possess the one as
+well as the other; for we are constituted of them both. Character
+modifies our life more than we think, and it is to a certain extent
+true that every man is the architect of his own fortune. No doubt it
+seems as if our lot were assigned to us almost entirely from without,
+and imparted to us in something of the same way in which a melody
+outside us reaches the ear. But on looking back over our past, we see
+at once that our life consists of mere variations on one and the same
+theme, namely, our character, and that the same fundamental bass
+sounds through it all. This is an experience which a man can and must
+make in and by himself.
+
+Not only a man's life, but his intellect too, may be possessed of a
+clear and definite character, so far as his intellect is applied to
+matters of theory. It is not every man, however, who has an intellect
+of this kind; for any such definite individuality as I mean is
+genius--an original view of the world, which presupposes an absolutely
+exceptional individuality, which is the essence of genius. A man's
+intellectual character is the theme on which all his works are
+variations. In an essay which I wrote in Weimar I called it the knack
+by which every genius produces his works, however various. This
+intellectual character determines the physiognomy of men of
+genius--what I might call _the theoretical physiognomy_--and gives it
+that distinguished expression which is chiefly seen in the eyes and
+the forehead. In the case of ordinary men the physiognomy presents no
+more than a weak analogy with the physiognomy of genius. On the other
+hand, all men possess _the practical physiognomy_, the stamp of will,
+of practical character, of moral disposition; and it shows itself
+chiefly in the mouth.
+
+Since character, so far as we understand its nature, is above and
+beyond time, it cannot undergo any change under the influence of life.
+But although it must necessarily remain the same always, it requires
+time to unfold itself and show the very diverse aspects which it may
+possess. For character consists of two factors: one, the will-to-live
+itself, blind impulse, so-called impetuosity; the other, the restraint
+which the will acquires when it comes to understand the world; and the
+world, again, is itself will. A man may begin by following the craving
+of desire, until he comes to see how hollow and unreal a thing is
+life, how deceitful are its pleasures, what horrible aspects it
+possesses; and this it is that makes people hermits, penitents,
+Magdalenes. Nevertheless it is to be observed that no such change
+from a life of great indulgence in pleasure to one of resignation is
+possible, except to the man who of his own accord renounces pleasure.
+A really bad life cannot be changed into a virtuous one. The most
+beautiful soul, before it comes to know life from its horrible side,
+may eagerly drink the sweets of life and remain innocent. But it
+cannot commit a bad action; it cannot cause others suffering to do
+a pleasure to itself, for in that case it would see clearly what
+it would be doing; and whatever be its youth and inexperience it
+perceives the sufferings of others as clearly as its own pleasures.
+That is why one bad action is a guarantee that numberless others will
+be committed as soon as circumstances give occasion for them. Somebody
+once remarked to me, with entire justice, that every man had something
+very good and humane in his disposition, and also something very bad
+and malignant; and that according as he was moved one or the other of
+them made its appearance. The sight of others' suffering arouses, not
+only in different men, but in one and the same man, at one moment an
+inexhaustible sympathy, at another a certain satisfaction; and this
+satisfaction may increase until it becomes the cruellest delight in
+pain. I observe in myself that at one moment I regard all mankind with
+heartfelt pity, at another with the greatest indifference, on occasion
+with hatred, nay, with a positive enjoyment of their pain.
+
+All this shows very clearly that we are possessed of two different,
+nay, absolutely contradictory, ways of regarding the world: one
+according to the principle of individuation, which exhibits all
+creatures as entire strangers to us, as definitely not ourselves. We
+can have no feelings for them but those of indifference, envy, hatred,
+and delight that they suffer. The other way of regarding the world
+is in accordance with what I may call the
+_Tat-twam-asi_--_this-is-thyself_ principle. All creatures are
+exhibited as identical with ourselves; and so it is pity and love
+which the sight of them arouses.
+
+The one method separates individuals by impassable barriers; the other
+removes the barrier and brings the individuals together. The one makes
+us feel, in regard to every man, _that is what I am_; the other,
+_that is not what I am_. But it is remarkable that while the sight of
+another's suffering makes us feel our identity with him, and arouses
+our pity, this is not so with the sight of another's happiness. Then
+we almost always feel some envy; and even though we may have no such
+feeling in certain cases,--as, for instance, when our friends are
+happy,--yet the interest which we take in their happiness is of a weak
+description, and cannot compare with the sympathy which we feel with
+their suffering. Is this because we recognise all happiness to be a
+delusion, or an impediment to true welfare? No! I am inclined to think
+that it is because the sight of the pleasure, or the possessions,
+which are denied to us, arouses envy; that is to say, the wish that
+we, and not the other, had that pleasure or those possessions.
+
+It is only the first way of looking at the world which is founded on
+any demonstrable reason. The other is, as it were, the gate out of
+this world; it has no attestation beyond itself, unless it be the very
+abstract and difficult proof which my doctrine supplies. Why the first
+way predominates in one man, and the second in another--though perhaps
+it does not exclusively predominate in any man; why the one or the
+other emerges according as the will is moved--these are deep problems.
+The paths of night and day are close together:
+
+  [Greek: Engus gar nuktos de kai aematos eisi keleuthoi.]
+
+It is a fact that there is a great and original difference between
+one empirical character and another; and it is a difference which,
+at bottom, rests upon the relation of the individual's will to his
+intellectual faculty. This relation is finally determined by the
+degree of will in his father and of intellect in his mother; and the
+union of father and mother is for the most part an affair of chance.
+This would all mean a revolting injustice in the nature of the
+world, if it were not that the difference between parents and son is
+phenomenal only and all chance is, at bottom, necessity.
+
+As regards the freedom of the will, if it were the case that the will
+manifested itself in a single act alone, it would be a free act. But
+the will manifests itself in a course of life, that is to say, in a
+series of acts. Every one of these acts, therefore, is determined as
+a part of a complete whole, and cannot happen otherwise than it does
+happen. On the other hand, the whole series is free; it is simply the
+manifestation of an individualised will.
+
+If a man feels inclined to commit a bad action and refrains, he is
+kept back either (1) by fear of punishment or vengeance; or (2) by
+superstition in other words, fear of punishment in a future life; or
+(3) by the feeling of sympathy, including general charity; or (4) by
+the feeling of honour, in other words, the fear of shame; or (5) by
+the feeling of justice, that is, an objective attachment to fidelity
+and good-faith, coupled with a resolve to hold them sacred, because
+they are the foundation of all free intercourse between man and
+man, and therefore often of advantage to himself as well. This last
+thought, not indeed as a thought, but as a mere feeling, influences
+people very frequently. It is this that often compels a man of honour,
+when some great but unjust advantage is offered him, to reject it with
+contempt and proudly exclaim: _I am an honourable man_! For otherwise
+how should a poor man, confronted with the property which chance or
+even some worse agency has bestowed on the rich, whose very existence
+it is that makes him poor, feel so much sincere respect for this
+property, that he refuses to touch it even in his need; and although
+he has a prospect of escaping punishment, what other thought is it
+that can be at the bottom of such a man's honesty? He is resolved not
+to separate himself from the great community of honourable people
+who have the earth in possession, and whose laws are recognised
+everywhere. He knows that a single dishonest act will ostracise and
+proscribe him from that society for ever. No! a man will spend money
+on any soil that yields him good fruit, and he will make sacrifices
+for it.
+
+With a good action,--that, every action in which a man's own advantage
+is ostensibly subordinated to another's,--the motive is either (1)
+self-interest, kept in the background; or (2) superstition, in other
+words, self-interest in the form of reward in another life; or (3)
+sympathy; or (4) the desire to lend a helping hand, in other words,
+attachment to the maxim that we should assist one another in need, and
+the wish to maintain this maxim, in view of the presumption that some
+day we ourselves may find it serve our turn. For what Kant calls a
+good action done from motives of duty and for the sake of duty, there
+is, as will be seen, no room at all. Kant himself declares it to be
+doubtful whether an action was ever determined by pure motives of duty
+alone. I affirm most certainly that no action was ever so done; it is
+mere babble; there is nothing in it that could really act as a motive
+to any man. When he shelters himself behind verbiage of that sort, he
+is always actuated by one of the four motives which I have described.
+Among these it is obviously sympathy alone which is quite genuine and
+sincere.
+
+_Good_ and _bad_ apply to character only _a potiori_; that is to say,
+we prefer the good to the bad; but, absolutely, there is no such
+distinction. The difference arises at the point which lies between
+subordinating one's own advantage to that of another, and not
+subordinating it. If a man keeps to the exact middle, he is _just_.
+But most men go an inch in their regard for others' welfare to twenty
+yards in regard for their own.
+
+The source of _good_ and of _bad character_, so far as we have any
+real knowledge of it, lies in this, that with the bad character the
+thought of the external world, and especially of the living creatures
+in it, is accompanied--all the more, the greater the resemblance
+between them and the individual self--by a constant feeling of _not I,
+not I, not I_.
+
+Contrarily, with the good character (both being assumed to exist in
+a high degree) the same thought has for its accompaniment, like a
+fundamental bass, a constant feeling of _I, I, I_. From this spring
+benevolence and a disposition to help all men, and at the same time a
+cheerful, confident and tranquil frame of mind, the opposite of that
+which accompanies the bad character.
+
+The difference, however, is only phenomenal, although it is a
+difference which is radical. But now we come to _the hardest of all
+problems_: How is it that, while the will, as the thing-in-itself, is
+identical, and from a metaphysical point of view one and the same
+in all its manifestations, there is nevertheless such an enormous
+difference between one character and another?--the malicious,
+diabolical wickedness of the one, and set off against it, the goodness
+of the other, showing all the more conspicuously. How is it that we
+get a Tiberius, a Caligula, a Carcalla, a Domitian, a Nero; and on the
+other hand, the Antonines, Titus, Hadrian, Nerva? How is it that among
+the animals, nay, in a higher species, in individual animals, there is
+a like difference?--the malignity of the cat most strongly developed
+in the tiger; the spite of the monkey; on the other hand, goodness,
+fidelity and love in the dog and the elephant. It is obvious that the
+principle of wickedness in the brute is the same as in man.
+
+We may to some extent modify the difficulty of the problem by
+observing that the whole difference is in the end only one of degree.
+In every living creature, the fundamental propensities and instincts
+all exist, but they exist in very different degrees and proportions.
+This, however, is not enough to explain the facts.
+
+We must fall back upon the intellect and its relation to the will; it
+is the only explanation that remains. A man's intellect, however, by
+no means stands in any direct and obvious relation with the goodness
+of his character. We may, it is true, discriminate between two kinds
+of intellect: between understanding, as the apprehension of relation
+in accordance with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and cognition,
+a faculty akin to genius, which acts more directly, is independent of
+this law, and passes beyond the Principle of Individuation. The latter
+is the faculty which apprehends Ideas, and it is the faculty which
+has to do with morality. But even this explanation leaves much to
+be desired. _Fine minds are seldom fine souls_ was the correct
+observation of Jean Paul; although they are never the contrary. Lord
+Bacon, who, to be sure, was less a fine soul than a fine mind, was a
+scoundrel.
+
+I have declared space and time to be part of the Principle of
+Individuation, as it is only space and time that make the multiplicity
+of similar objects a possibility. But multiplicity itself also admits
+of variety; multiplicity and diversity are not only quantitative, but
+also qualitative. How is it that there is such a thing as qualitative
+diversity, especially in ethical matters? Or have I fallen into an
+error the opposite of that in which Leibnitz fell with his _identitas
+indiscernibilium_?
+
+The chief cause of intellectual diversity is to be found in the
+brain and nervous system. This is a fact which somewhat lessens the
+obscurity of the subject. With the brutes the intellect and the brain
+are strictly adapted to their aims and needs. With man alone there
+is now and then, by way of exception, a superfluity, which, if it is
+abundant, may yield genius. But ethical diversity, it seems, proceeds
+immediately from the will. Otherwise ethical character would not be
+above and beyond time, as it is only in the individual that intellect
+and will are united. The will is above and beyond time, and eternal;
+and character is innate; that is to say, it is sprung from the same
+eternity, and therefore it does not admit of any but a transcendental
+explanation.
+
+Perhaps some one will come after me who will throw light into this
+dark abyss.
+
+
+
+
+MORAL INSTINCT.
+
+
+An act done by instinct differs from every other kind of act in that
+an understanding of its object does not precede it but follows upon
+it. Instinct is therefore a rule of action given _a priori_. We may be
+unaware of the object to which it is directed, as no understanding of
+it is necessary to its attainment. On the other hand, if an act is
+done by an exercise of reason or intelligence, it proceeds according
+to a rule which the understanding has itself devised for the purpose
+of carrying out a preconceived aim. Hence it is that action according
+to rule may miss its aim, while instinct is infallible.
+
+On the _a priori_ character of instinct we may compare what Plato says
+in the _Philebus_. With Plato instinct is a reminiscence of something
+which a man has never actually experienced in his lifetime; in the
+same way as, in the _Phaedo_ and elsewhere, everything that a man
+learns is regarded as a reminiscence. He has no other word to express
+the _a priori_ element in all experience.
+
+There are, then, three things that are _a priori_:
+
+(1) Theoretical Reason, in other words, the conditions which make all
+experience possible.
+
+(2) Instinct, or the rule by which an object promoting the life of the
+senses may, though unknown, be attained.
+
+(3) The Moral Law, or the rule by which an action takes place without
+any object.
+
+Accordingly rational or intelligent action proceeds by a rule laid
+down in accordance with the object as it is understood. Instinctive
+action proceeds by a rule without an understanding of the object of
+it. Moral action proceeds by a rule without any object at all.
+
+_Theoretical Reason_ is the aggregate of rules in accordance
+with which all my knowledge--that is to say, the whole world of
+experience--necessarily proceeds. In the same manner _Instinct_ is the
+aggregate of rules in accordance with which all my action necessarily
+proceeds if it meets with no obstruction. Hence it seems to me that
+Instinct may most appropriately be called _practical reason_, for like
+theoretical reason it determines the _must_ of all experience.
+
+The so-called moral law, on the other hand, is only one aspect of _the
+better consciousness_, the aspect which it presents from the point of
+view of instinct. This better consciousness is something lying beyond
+all experience, that is, beyond all reason, whether of the theoretical
+or the practical kind, and has nothing to do with it; whilst it is in
+virtue of the mysterious union of it and reason in the same individual
+that the better consciousness comes into conflict with reason, leaving
+the individual to choose between the two.
+
+In any conflict between the better consciousness and reason, if the
+individual decides for reason, should it be theoretical reason, he
+becomes a narrow, pedantic philistine; should it be practical, a
+rascal.
+
+If he decides for the better consciousness, we can make no further
+positive affirmation about him, for if we were to do so, we should
+find ourselves in the realm of reason; and as it is only what takes
+place within this realm that we can speak of at all it follows that we
+cannot speak of the better consciousness except in negative terms.
+
+This shows us how it is that reason is hindered and obstructed;
+that _theoretical reason_ is suppressed in favour of _genius_, and
+_practical reason_ in favour of _virtue_. Now the better consciousness
+is neither theoretical nor practical; for these are distinctions that
+only apply to reason. But if the individual is in the act of choosing,
+the better consciousness appears to him in the aspect which it assumes
+in vanquishing and overcoming the practical reason (or instinct, to
+use the common word). It appears to him as an imperative command, an
+_ought_. It so appears to him, I say; in other words, that is the
+shape which it takes for the theoretical reason which renders
+all things into objects and ideas. But in so far as the better
+consciousness desires to vanquish and overcome the theoretical reason,
+it takes no shape at all; on the simple ground that, as it comes
+into play, the theoretical reason is suppressed and becomes the mere
+servant of the better consciousness. That is why genius can never give
+any account of its own works.
+
+In the morality of action, the legal principle that both sides are to
+be heard must not be allowed to apply; in other words, the claims of
+self and the senses must not be urged. Nay, on the contrary, as soon
+as the pure will has found expression, the case is closed; _nec
+audienda altera pars_.
+
+The lower animals are not endowed with moral freedom. Probably this is
+not because they show no trace of the better consciousness which in us
+is manifested as morality, or nothing analogous to it; for, if that
+were so, the lower animals, which are in so many respects like
+ourselves in outward appearance that we regard man as a species of
+animal, would possess some _raison d'etre_ entirely different from our
+own, and actually be, in their essential and inmost nature, something
+quite other than ourselves. This is a contention which is obviously
+refuted by the thoroughly malignant and inherently vicious character
+of certain animals, such as the crocodile, the hyaena, the scorpion,
+the snake, and the gentle, affectionate and contented character of
+others, such as the dog. Here, as in the case of men, the character,
+as it is manifested, must rest upon something that is above and beyond
+time. For, as Jacob Boehme says,[1] _there is a power in every animal
+which is indestructible, and the spirit of the world draws it into
+itself, against the final separation at the Last Judgment_. Therefore
+we cannot call the lower animals free, and the reason why we cannot
+do so is that they are wanting in a faculty which is profoundly
+subordinate to the better consciousness in its highest phase, I mean
+reason. Reason is the faculty of supreme comprehension, the idea of
+totality. How reason manifests itself in the theoretical sphere Kant
+has shown, and it does the same in the practical: it makes us capable
+of observing and surveying the whole of our life, thought, and action,
+in continual connection, and therefore of acting according to general
+maxims, whether those maxims originate in the understanding as
+prudential rules, or in the better consciousness as moral laws.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Epistles_, 56.]
+
+If any desire or passion is aroused in us, we, and in the same way the
+lower animals, are for the moment filled with this desire; we are all
+anger, all lust, all fear; and in such moments neither the better
+consciousness can speak, nor the understanding consider the
+consequences. But in our case reason allows us even at that moment
+to see our actions and our life as an unbroken chain,--a chain
+which connects our earlier resolutions, or, it may be, the future
+consequences of our action, with the moment of passion which now fills
+our whole consciousness. It shows us the identity of our person, even
+when that person is exposed to influences of the most varied kind, and
+thereby we are enabled to act according to maxims. The lower animal
+is wanting in this faculty; the passion which seizes it completely
+dominates it, and can be checked only by another passion--anger, for
+instance, or lust, by fear; even though the vision that terrifies does
+not appeal to the senses, but is present in the animal only as a dim
+memory and imagination. Men, therefore, may be called irrational, if,
+like the lower animals, they allow themselves to be determined by the
+moment.
+
+So far, however, is reason from being the source of morality that it
+is reason alone which makes us capable of being rascals, which the
+lower animals cannot be. It is reason which enables us to form an evil
+resolution and to keep it when the provocation to evil is removed; it
+enables us, for example, to nurse vengeance. Although at the moment
+that we have an opportunity of fulfilling our resolution the better
+consciousness may manifest itself as love or charity, it is by force
+of reason, in pursuance of some evil maxim, that we act against it.
+Thus Goethe says that a man may use his reason only for the purpose of
+being more bestial than any beast:
+
+  _Er hat Vernunft, doch braucht er sie allein
+  Um theirischer als jedes Thier zu sein_.
+
+For not only do we, like the beasts, satisfy the desires of the
+moment, but we refine upon them and stimulate them in order to prepare
+the desire for the satisfaction.
+
+Whenever we think that we perceive a trace of reason in the lower
+animals, it fills us with surprise. Now our surprise is not excited by
+the good and affectionate disposition which some of them exhibit--we
+recognise that as something other than reason--but by some action in
+them which seems to be determined not by the impression of the moment,
+but by a resolution previously made and kept. Elephants, for instance,
+are reported to have taken premeditated revenge for insults long after
+they were suffered; lions, to have requited benefits on an opportunity
+tardily offered. The truth of such stories has, however, no bearing at
+all on the question, What do we mean by reason? But they enable us to
+decide whether in the lower animals there is any trace of anything
+that we can call reason.
+
+Kant not only declares that all our moral sentiments originate in
+reason, but he lays down that reason, _in my sense of the word_, is
+a condition of moral action; as he holds that for an action to be
+virtuous and meritorious it must be done in accordance with maxims,
+and not spring from a resolve taken under some momentary impression.
+But in both contentions he is wrong. If I resolve to take vengeance on
+some one, and when an opportunity offers, the better consciousness in
+the form of love and humanity speaks its word, and I am influenced by
+it rather than by my evil resolution, this is a virtuous act, for it
+is a manifestation of the better consciousness. It is possible to
+conceive of a very virtuous man in whom the better consciousness is
+so continuously active that it is never silent, and never allows his
+passions to get a complete hold of him. By such consciousness he is
+subject to a direct control, instead of being guided indirectly,
+through the medium of reason, by means of maxims and moral principles.
+That is why a man may have weak reasoning powers and a weak
+understanding and yet have a high sense of morality and be eminently
+good; for the most important element in a man depends as little on
+intellectual as it does on physical strength. Jesus says, _Blessed
+are the poor in spirit_. And Jacob Boehme has the excellent and noble
+observation: _Whoso lies quietly in his own will, like a child in the
+womb, and lets himself be led and guided by that inner principle from
+which he is sprung, is the noblest and richest on earth_.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: _Epistles_, 37.]
+
+
+
+
+ETHICAL REFLECTIONS.
+
+
+The philosophers of the ancient world united in a single conception
+a great many things that had no connection with one another. Of this
+every dialogue of Plato's furnishes abundant examples. The greatest
+and worst confusion of this kind is that between ethics and politics.
+The State and the Kingdom of God, or the Moral Law, are so entirely
+different in their character that the former is a parody of the
+latter, a bitter mockery at the absence of it. Compared with the Moral
+Law the State is a crutch instead of a limb, an automaton instead of a
+man.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The _principle of honour_ stands in close connection with human
+freedom. It is, as it were, an abuse of that freedom. Instead of
+using his freedom to fulfil the moral law, a man employs his power
+of voluntarily undergoing any feeling of pain, of overcoming any
+momentary impression, in order that he may assert his self-will,
+whatever be the object to which he directs it. As he thereby shows
+that, unlike the lower animals, he has thoughts which go beyond the
+welfare of his body and whatever makes for that welfare, it has come
+about that the principle of honour is often confused with virtue. They
+are regarded as if they were twins. But wrongly; for although the
+principle of honour is something which distinguishes man from the
+lower animals, it is not, in itself, anything that raises him above
+them. Taken as an end and aim, it is as dark a delusion as any other
+aim that springs from self. Used as a means, or casually, it may be
+productive of good; but even that is good which is vain and frivolous.
+It is the misuse of freedom, the employment of it as a weapon for
+overcoming the world of feeling, that makes man so infinitely more
+terrible than the lower animals; for they do only what momentary
+instinct bids them; while man acts by ideas, and his ideas may entail
+universal ruin before they are satisfied.
+
+There is another circumstance which helps to promote the notion that
+honour and virtue are connected. A man who can do what he wants to do
+shows that he can also do it if what he wants to do is a virtuous act.
+But that those of our actions which we are ourselves obliged to regard
+with contempt are also regarded with contempt by other people serves
+more than anything that I have here mentioned to establish the
+connection. Thus it often happens that a man who is not afraid of the
+one kind of contempt is unwilling to undergo the other. But when we
+are called upon to choose between our own approval and the world's
+censure, as may occur in complicated and mistaken circumstances, what
+becomes of the principle of honour then?
+
+Two characteristic examples of the principle of honour are to be found
+in Shakespeare's _Henry VI_., Part II., Act IV., Sc. 1. A pirate is
+anxious to murder his captive instead of accepting, like others, a
+ransom for him; because in taking his captive he lost an eye, and
+his own honour and that of his forefathers would in his opinion be
+stained, if he were to allow his revenge to be bought off as though he
+were a mere trader. The prisoner, on the other hand, who is the Duke
+of Suffolk, prefers to have his head grace a pole than to uncover it
+to such a low fellow as a pirate, by approaching him to ask for mercy.
+
+Just as civic honour--in other words, the opinion that we deserve to
+be trusted--is the palladium of those whose endeavour it is to make
+their way in the world on the path of honourable business, so knightly
+honour--in other words, the opinion that we are men to be feared--is
+the palladium of those who aim at going through life on the path
+of violence; and so it was that knightly honour arose among the
+robber-knights and other knights of the Middle Ages.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+A theoretical philosopher is one who can supply in the shape of ideas
+for the reason, a copy of the presentations of experience; just as
+what the painter sees he can reproduce on canvas; the sculptor, in
+marble; the poet, in pictures for the imagination, though they are
+pictures which he supplies only in sowing the ideas from which they
+sprang.
+
+A so-called practical philosopher, on the other hand, is one who,
+contrarily, deduces his action from ideas. The theoretical philosopher
+transforms life into ideas. The practical philosopher transforms ideas
+into life; he acts, therefore, in a thoroughly reasonable manner; he
+is consistent, regular, deliberate; he is never hasty or passionate;
+he never allows himself to be influenced by the impression of the
+moment.
+
+And indeed, when we find ourselves among those full presentations of
+experience, or real objects, to which the body belongs--since the body
+is only an objectified will, the shape which the will assumes in the
+material world--it is difficult to let our bodies be guided, not by
+those presentations, but by a mere image of them, by cold, colourless
+ideas, which are related to experience as the shadow of Orcus to life;
+and yet this is the only way in which we can avoid doing things of
+which we may have to repent.
+
+The theoretical philosopher enriches the domain of reason by adding to
+it; the practical philosopher draws upon it, and makes it serve him.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+According to Kant the truth of experience is only a hypothetical
+truth. If the suppositions which underlie all the intimations of
+experience--subject, object, time, space and causality--were removed,
+none of those intimations would contain a word of truth. In other
+words, experience is only a phenomenon; it is not knowledge of the
+thing-in-itself.
+
+If we find something in our own conduct at which we are secretly
+pleased, although we cannot reconcile it with experience, seeing that
+if we were to follow the guidance of experience we should have to
+do precisely the opposite, we must not allow this to put us out;
+otherwise we should be ascribing an authority to experience which
+it does not deserve, for all that it teaches rests upon a mere
+supposition. This is the general tendency of the Kantian Ethics.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Innocence is in its very nature stupid. It is stupid because the aim
+of life (I use the expression only figuratively, and I could just
+as well speak of the essence of life, or of the world) is to gain a
+knowledge of our own bad will, so that our will may become an object
+for us, and that we may undergo an inward conversion. Our body is
+itself our will objectified; it is one of the first and foremost of
+objects, and the deeds that we accomplish for the sake of the body
+show us the evil inherent in our will. In the state of innocence,
+where there is no evil because there is no experience, man is, as
+it were, only an apparatus for living, and the object for which the
+apparatus exists is not yet disclosed. An empty form of life like
+this, a stage untenanted, is in itself, like the so-called real world,
+null and void; and as it can attain a meaning only by action, by
+error, by knowledge, by the convulsions of the will, it wears a
+character of insipid stupidity. A golden age of innocence, a fools'
+paradise, is a notion that is stupid and unmeaning, and for that
+very reason in no way worthy of any respect. The first criminal and
+murderer, Cain, who acquired a knowledge of guilt, and through
+guilt acquired a knowledge of virtue by repentance, and so came to
+understand the meaning of life, is a tragical figure more significant,
+and almost more respectable, than all the innocent fools in the world
+put together.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+If I had to write about _modesty_ I should say: I know the esteemed
+public for which I have the honour to write far too well to dare to
+give utterance to my opinion about this virtue. Personally I am quite
+content to be modest and to apply myself to this virtue with
+the utmost possible circumspection. But one thing I shall never
+admit--that I have ever required modesty of any man, and any statement
+to that effect I repel as a slander.
+
+The paltry character of most men compels the few who have any merit
+or genius to behave as though they did not know their own value, and
+consequently did not know other people's want of value; for it is
+only on this condition that the mob acquiesces in tolerating merit. A
+virtue has been made out of this necessity, and it is called modesty.
+It is a piece of hypocrisy, to be excused only because other people
+are so paltry that they must be treated with indulgence.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Human misery may affect us in two ways, and we may be in one of two
+opposite moods in regard to it.
+
+In one of them, this misery is immediately present to us. We feel it
+in our own person, in our own will which, imbued with violent desires,
+is everywhere broken, and this is the process which constitutes
+suffering. The result is that the will increases in violence, as
+is shown in all cases of passion and emotion; and this increasing
+violence comes to a stop only when the will turns and gives way to
+complete resignation, in other words, is redeemed. The man who is
+entirely dominated by this mood will regard any prosperity which he
+may see in others with envy, and any suffering with no sympathy.
+
+In the opposite mood human misery is present to us only as a fact
+of knowledge, that is to say, indirectly. We are mainly engaged in
+looking at the sufferings of others, and our attention is withdrawn
+from our own. It is in their person that we become aware of human
+misery; we are filled with sympathy; and the result of this mood is
+general benevolence, philanthropy. All envy vanishes, and instead
+of feeling it, we are rejoiced when we see one of our tormented
+fellow-creatures experience any pleasure or relief.
+
+After the same fashion we may be in one of two opposite moods in
+regard to human baseness and depravity. In the one we perceive this
+baseness indirectly, in others. Out of this mood arise indignation,
+hatred, and contempt of mankind. In the other we perceive it directly,
+in ourselves. Out of it there arises humiliation, nay, contrition.
+
+In order to judge the moral value of a man, it is very important to
+observe which of these four moods predominate in him. They go in
+pairs, one out of each division. In very excellent characters the
+second mood of each division will predominate.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The categorical imperative, or absolute command, is a contradiction.
+Every command is conditional. What is unconditional and necessary is a
+_must_, such as is presented by the laws of nature.
+
+It is quite true that the moral law is entirely conditional. There
+is a world and a view of life in which it has neither validity nor
+significance. That world is, properly speaking, the real world in
+which, as individuals, we live; for every regard paid to morality is a
+denial of that world and of our individual life in it. It is a view
+of the world, however, which does not go beyond the principle of
+sufficient reason; and the opposite view proceeds by the intuition of
+Ideas.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+If a man is under the influence of two opposite but very strong
+motives, A and B, and I am greatly concerned that he should choose A,
+but still more that he should never be untrue to his choice, and by
+changing his mind betray me, or the like, it will not do for me to say
+anything that might hinder the motive B from having its full effect
+upon him, and only emphasise A; for then I should never be able to
+reckon on his decision. What I have to do is, rather, to put both
+motives before him at the same time, in as vivid and clear a way as
+possible, so that they may work upon him with their whole force. The
+choice that he then makes is the decision of his inmost nature, and
+stands firm to all eternity. In saying _I will do this_, he has said
+_I must do this_. I have got at his will, and I can rely upon its
+working as steadily as one of the forces of nature. It is as certain
+as fire kindles and water wets that he will act according to the
+motive which has proved to be stronger for him. Insight and knowledge
+may be attained and lost again; they may be changed, or improved, or
+destroyed; but will cannot be changed. That is why _I apprehend, I
+perceive, I see_, is subject to alteration and uncertainty; _I will_,
+pronounced on a right apprehension of motive, is as firm as nature
+itself. The difficulty, however, lies in getting at a right
+apprehension. A man's apprehension of motive may change, or be
+corrected or perverted; and on the other hand, his circumstances may
+undergo an alteration.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+A man should exercise an almost boundless toleration and placability,
+because if he is capricious enough to refuse to forgive a single
+individual for the meanness or evil that lies at his door, it is doing
+the rest of the world a quite unmerited honour.
+
+But at the same time the man who is every one's friend is no one's
+friend. It is quite obvious what sort of friendship it is which we
+hold out to the human race, and to which it is open to almost every
+man to return, no matter what he may have done.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+With the ancients _friendship_ was one of the chief elements in
+morality. But friendship is only limitation and partiality; it is
+the restriction to one individual of what is the due of all mankind,
+namely, the recognition that a man's own nature and that of mankind
+are identical. At most it is a compromise between this recognition and
+selfishness.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+A lie always has its origin in the desire to extend the dominion of
+one's own will over other individuals, and to deny their will in order
+the better to affirm one's own. Consequently a lie is in its very
+nature the product of injustice, malevolence and villainy. That is why
+truth, sincerity, candour and rectitude are at once recognised and
+valued as praiseworthy and noble qualities; because we presume that
+the man who exhibits them entertains no sentiments of injustice or
+malice, and therefore stands in no need of concealing such sentiments.
+He who is open cherishes nothing that is bad.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+There is a certain kind of courage which springs from the same source
+as good-nature. What I mean is that the good-natured man is almost as
+clearly conscious that he exists in other individuals as in himself. I
+have often shown how this feeling gives rise to good-nature. It
+also gives rise to courage, for the simple reason that the man who
+possesses this feeling cares less for his own individual existence,
+as he lives almost as much in the general existence of all creatures.
+Accordingly he is little concerned for his own life and its
+belongings. This is by no means the sole source of courage for it is
+a phenomenon due to various causes. But it is the noblest kind of
+courage, as is shown by the fact that in its origin it is associated
+with great gentleness and patience. Men of this kind are usually
+irresistible to women.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+All general rules and precepts fail, because they proceed from the
+false assumption that men are constituted wholly, or almost wholly,
+alike; an assumption which the philosophy of Helvetius expressly
+makes. Whereas the truth is that the original difference between
+individuals in intellect and morality is immeasurable.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The question as to whether morality is something real is the question
+whether a well-grounded counter-principle to egoism actually exists.
+
+As egoism restricts concern for welfare to a single individual,
+_viz_., the man's own self, the counter-principle would have to extend
+it to all other individuals.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+It is only because the will is above and beyond time that the stings
+of conscience are ineradicable, and do not, like other pains,
+gradually wear away. No! an evil deed weighs on the conscience years
+afterwards as heavily as if it had been freshly committed.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Character is innate, and conduct is merely its manifestation; the
+occasion for great misdeeds comes seldom; strong counter-motives keep
+us back; our disposition is revealed to ourselves by our desires,
+thoughts, emotions, when it remains unknown to others. Reflecting on
+all this, we might suppose it possible for a man to possess, in some
+sort, an innate evil conscience, without ever having done anything
+very bad.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+_Don't do to others what you wouldn't like done to yourself_. This is,
+perhaps, one of those arguments that prove, or rather ask, too much.
+For a prisoner might address it to a judge.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Stupid people are generally malicious, for the very same reason as the
+ugly and the deformed.
+
+Similarly, genius and sanctity are akin. However simple-minded a saint
+may be, he will nevertheless have a dash of genius in him; and however
+many errors of temperament, or of actual character, a genius may
+possess, he will still exhibit a certain nobility of disposition by
+which he shows his kinship with the saint.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The great difference between Law without and Law within, between
+the State and the Kingdom of God, is very clear. It is the State's
+business to see that _every one should have justice done to him_;
+it regards men as passive beings, and therefore takes no account of
+anything but their actions. The Moral Law, on the other hand, is
+concerned that _every one should do justice_; it regards men as
+active, and looks to the will rather than the deed. To prove that this
+is the true distinction let the reader consider what would happen if
+he were to say, conversely, that it is the State's business that every
+one should do justice, and the business of the Moral Law that every
+one should have justice done to him. The absurdity is obvious.
+
+As an example of the distinction, let me take the case of a debtor and
+a creditor disputing about a debt which the former denies. A lawyer
+and a moralist are present, and show a lively interest in the matter.
+Both desire that the dispute should end in the same way, although what
+they want is by no means the same. The lawyer says, _I want this man
+to get back what belongs to him_; and the moralist, _I want that man
+to do his duty_.
+
+It is with the will alone that morality is concerned. Whether external
+force hinders or fails to hinder the will from working does not in the
+least matter. For morality the external world is real only in so far
+as it is able or unable to lead and influence the will. As soon as
+the will is determined, that is, as soon as a resolve is taken, the
+external world and its events are of no further moment and
+practical do not exist. For if the events of the world had any
+such reality--that is to say, if they possessed a significance in
+themselves, or any other than that derived from the will which is
+affected by them--what a grievance it would be that all these events
+lie in the realm of chance and error! It is, however, just this which
+proves that the important thing is not what happens, but what is
+willed. Accordingly, let the incidents of life be left to the play of
+chance and error, to demonstrate to man that he is as chaff before the
+wind.
+
+The State concerns itself only with the incidents--with what happens;
+nothing else has any reality for it. I may dwell upon thoughts of
+murder and poison as much as I please: the State does not forbid me,
+so long as the axe and rope control my will, and prevent it from
+becoming action.
+
+Ethics asks: What are the duties towards others which justice imposes
+upon us? in other words, What must I render? The Law of Nature asks:
+What need I not submit to from others? that is, What must I suffer?
+The question is put, not that I may do no injustice, but that I
+may not do more than every man must do if he is to safeguard his
+existence, and than every man will approve being done, in order that
+he may be treated in the same way himself; and, further, that I may
+not do more than society will permit me to do. The same answer will
+serve for both questions, just as the same straight line can be drawn
+from either of two opposite directions, namely, by opposing forces;
+or, again, as the angle can give the sine, or the sine the angle.
+
+It has been said that the historian is an inverted prophet. In the
+same way it may be said that a teacher of law is an inverted moralist
+(_viz_., a teacher of the duties of justice), or that politics are
+inverted ethics, if we exclude the thought that ethics also teaches
+the duty of benevolence, magnanimity, love, and so on. The State is
+the Gordian knot that is cut instead of being untied; it is Columbus'
+egg which is made to stand by being broken instead of balanced, as
+though the business in question were to make it stand rather than to
+balance it. In this respect the State is like the man who thinks that
+he can produce fine weather by making the barometer go up.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The pseudo-philosophers of our age tell us that it is the object of
+the State to promote the moral aims of mankind. This is not true;
+it is rather the contrary which is true. The aim for which mankind
+exists--the expression is parabolic--is not that a man should act in
+such and such a manner; for all _opera operata_, things that have
+actually been done, are in themselves matters of indifference. No! the
+aim is that the Will, of which every man is a complete specimen--nay,
+is the very Will itself--should turn whither it needs to turn; that
+the man himself (the union of Thought and Will) should perceive what
+this will is, and what horrors it contains; that he should show the
+reflection of himself in his own deeds, in the abomination of them.
+The State, which is wholly concerned with the general welfare, checks
+the manifestation of the bad will, but in no wise checks the will
+itself; the attempt would be impossible. It is because the State
+checks the manifestation of his will that a man very seldom sees the
+whole abomination of his nature in the mirror of his deeds. Or does
+the reader actually suppose there are no people in the world as bad as
+Robespierre, Napoleon, or other murderers? Does he fail to see that
+there are many who would act like them if only they could?
+
+Many a criminal dies more quietly on the scaffold than many a
+non-criminal in the arms of his family. The one has perceived what his
+will is and has discarded it. The other has not been able to discard
+it, because he has never been able to perceive what it is. The aim
+of the State is to produce a fool's paradise, and this is in direct
+conflict with the true aim of life, namely, to attain a knowledge of
+what the will, in its horrible nature, really is.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Napoleon was not really worse than many, not to say most, men. He was
+possessed of the very ordinary egoism that seeks its welfare at the
+expense of others. What distinguished him was merely the greater power
+he had of satisfying his will, and greater intelligence, reason and
+courage; added to which, chance gave him a favourable scope for his
+operations. By means of all this he did for his egoism what a thousand
+other men would like to do for theirs, but cannot. Every feeble lad
+who by little acts of villainy gains a small advantage for himself by
+putting others to some disadvantage, although it may be equally small,
+is just as bad as Napoleon.
+
+Those who fancy that retribution comes after death would demand that
+Napoleon should by unutterable torments pay the penalty for all the
+numberless calamities that he caused. But he is no more culpable than
+all those who possess the same will, unaccompanied by the same power.
+
+The circumstance that in his case this extraordinary power was added
+allowed him to reveal the whole wickedness of the human will; and the
+sufferings of his age, as the necessary obverse of the medal, reveal
+the misery which is inextricably bound up with this bad will. It is
+the general manipulation of this will that constitutes the world. But
+it is precisely that it should be understood how inextricably the will
+to live is bound up with, and is really one and the same as, this
+unspeakable misery, that is the world's aim and purpose; and it is an
+aim and purpose which the appearance of Napoleon did much to assist.
+Not to be an unmeaning fools' paradise but a tragedy, in which the
+will to live understands itself and yields--that is the object for
+which the world exists. Napoleon is only an enormous mirror of the
+will to live.
+
+The difference between the man who causes suffering and the man who
+suffers it, is only phenomenal. It is all a will to live, identical
+with great suffering; and it is only by understanding this that the
+will can mend and end.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+What chiefly distinguishes ancient from modern times is that in
+ancient times, to use Napoleon's expression, it was affairs that
+reigned: _les paroles aux choses_. In modern times this is not so.
+What I mean is that in ancient times the character of public life,
+of the State, and of Religion, as well as of private life, was a
+strenuous affirmation of the will to live. In modern times it is a
+denial of this will, for such is the character of Christianity. But
+now while on the one hand that denial has suffered some abatement even
+in public opinion, because it is too repugnant to human character, on
+the other what is publicly denied is secretly affirmed. Hence it is
+that we see half measures and falsehood everywhere; and that is why
+modern times look so small beside antiquity.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The structure of human society is like a pendulum swinging between two
+impulses, two evils in polar opposition, _despotism_ and _anarchy_.
+The further it gets from the one, the nearer it approaches the other.
+From this the reader might hit on the thought that if it were exactly
+midway between the two, it would be right. Far from it. For these
+two evils are by no means equally bad and dangerous. The former is
+incomparably less to be feared; its ills exist in the main only as
+possibilities, and if they come at all it is only one among millions
+that they touch. But, with anarchy, possibility and actuality are
+inseparable; its blows fall on every man every day. Therefore every
+constitution should be a nearer approach to a despotism than to
+anarchy; nay, it must contain a small possibility of despotism.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Essays Of Arthur Schopenhauer
+by Arthur Schopenhauer
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