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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10732 ***
+
+THE ESSAYS OF ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER: STUDIES IN PESSIMISM
+
+TRANSLATED BY
+
+T. BAILEY SAUNDERS, M.A.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+
+ ON THE SUFFERINGS OF THE WORLD
+ ON THE VANITY OF EXISTENCE
+ ON SUICIDE
+ IMMORTALITY: A DIALOGUE
+ PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS
+ ON EDUCATION
+ OF WOMEN
+ ON NOISE
+ A FEW PARABLES
+
+
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The Essays here presented form a further selection from Schopenhauer's
+_Parerga_, brought together under a title which is not to be found
+in the original, and does not claim to apply to every chapter in
+the volume. The first essay is, in the main, a rendering of the
+philosopher's remarks under the heading of _Nachträge zur Lehre vom
+Leiden der Welt_, together with certain parts of another section
+entitled _Nachträge zur Lehre von der Bejahung und Verneinung des
+Willens zum Leben_. Such omissions as I have made are directed chiefly
+by the desire to avoid repeating arguments already familiar to readers
+of the other volumes in this series. The _Dialogue on Immortality_
+sums up views expressed at length in the philosopher's chief work, and
+treated again in the _Parerga_. The _Psychological Observations_ in
+this and the previous volume practically exhaust the chapter of the
+original which bears this title.
+
+The essay on _Women_ must not be taken in jest. It expresses
+Schopenhauer's serious convictions; and, as a penetrating observer
+of the faults of humanity, he may be allowed a hearing on a question
+which is just now receiving a good deal of attention among us.
+
+T.B.S.
+
+
+
+
+ON THE SUFFERINGS OF THE WORLD.
+
+
+Unless _suffering_ is the direct and immediate object of life, our
+existence must entirely fail of its aim. It is absurd to look upon
+the enormous amount of pain that abounds everywhere in the world, and
+originates in needs and necessities inseparable from life itself, as
+serving no purpose at all and the result of mere chance. Each separate
+misfortune, as it comes, seems, no doubt, to be something exceptional;
+but misfortune in general is the rule.
+
+I know of no greater absurdity than that propounded by most systems of
+philosophy in declaring evil to be negative in its character. Evil is
+just what is positive; it makes its own existence felt. Leibnitz is
+particularly concerned to defend this absurdity; and he seeks to
+strengthen his position by using a palpable and paltry sophism.[1]
+It is the good which is negative; in other words, happiness and
+satisfaction always imply some desire fulfilled, some state of pain
+brought to an end.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_, cf. _Thèod_, §153.--Leibnitz argued
+that evil is a negative quality--_i.e_., the absence of good; and that
+its active and seemingly positive character is an incidental and not
+an essential part of its nature. Cold, he said, is only the absence of
+the power of heat, and the active power of expansion in freezing water
+is an incidental and not an essential part of the nature of cold. The
+fact is, that the power of expansion in freezing water is really an
+increase of repulsion amongst its molecules; and Schopenhauer is quite
+right in calling the whole argument a sophism.]
+
+This explains the fact that we generally find pleasure to be not
+nearly so pleasant as we expected, and pain very much more painful.
+
+The pleasure in this world, it has been said, outweighs the pain; or,
+at any rate, there is an even balance between the two. If the reader
+wishes to see shortly whether this statement is true, let him compare
+the respective feelings of two animals, one of which is engaged in
+eating the other.
+
+The best consolation in misfortune or affliction of any kind will
+be the thought of other people who are in a still worse plight than
+yourself; and this is a form of consolation open to every one. But
+what an awful fate this means for mankind as a whole!
+
+We are like lambs in a field, disporting themselves under the eye of
+the butcher, who chooses out first one and then another for his prey.
+So it is that in our good days we are all unconscious of the evil Fate
+may have presently in store for us--sickness, poverty, mutilation,
+loss of sight or reason.
+
+No little part of the torment of existence lies in this, that Time is
+continually pressing upon us, never letting us take breath, but always
+coming after us, like a taskmaster with a whip. If at any moment Time
+stays his hand, it is only when we are delivered over to the misery of
+boredom.
+
+But misfortune has its uses; for, as our bodily frame would burst
+asunder if the pressure of the atmosphere was removed, so, if the
+lives of men were relieved of all need, hardship and adversity; if
+everything they took in hand were successful, they would be so swollen
+with arrogance that, though they might not burst, they would present
+the spectacle of unbridled folly--nay, they would go mad. And I may
+say, further, that a certain amount of care or pain or trouble is
+necessary for every man at all times. A ship without ballast is
+unstable and will not go straight.
+
+Certain it is that _work, worry, labor_ and _trouble_, form the lot of
+almost all men their whole life long. But if all wishes were fulfilled
+as soon as they arose, how would men occupy their lives? what would
+they do with their time? If the world were a paradise of luxury and
+ease, a land flowing with milk and honey, where every Jack obtained
+his Jill at once and without any difficulty, men would either die of
+boredom or hang themselves; or there would be wars, massacres, and
+murders; so that in the end mankind would inflict more suffering on
+itself than it has now to accept at the hands of Nature.
+
+In early youth, as we contemplate our coming life, we are like
+children in a theatre before the curtain is raised, sitting there
+in high spirits and eagerly waiting for the play to begin. It is a
+blessing that we do not know what is really going to happen. Could we
+foresee it, there are times when children might seem like innocent
+prisoners, condemned, not to death, but to life, and as yet all
+unconscious of what their sentence means. Nevertheless, every man
+desires to reach old age; in other words, a state of life of which it
+may be said: "It is bad to-day, and it will be worse to-morrow; and so
+on till the worst of all."
+
+If you try to imagine, as nearly as you can, what an amount of misery,
+pain and suffering of every kind the sun shines upon in its course,
+you will admit that it would be much better if, on the earth as little
+as on the moon, the sun were able to call forth the phenomena of life;
+and if, here as there, the surface were still in a crystalline state.
+
+Again, you may look upon life as an unprofitable episode, disturbing
+the blessed calm of non-existence. And, in any case, even though
+things have gone with you tolerably well, the longer you live the more
+clearly you will feel that, on the whole, life is _a disappointment,
+nay, a cheat_.
+
+If two men who were friends in their youth meet again when they are
+old, after being separated for a life-time, the chief feeling
+they will have at the sight of each other will be one of complete
+disappointment at life as a whole; because their thoughts will be
+carried back to that earlier time when life seemed so fair as it
+lay spread out before them in the rosy light of dawn, promised so
+much--and then performed so little. This feeling will so completely
+predominate over every other that they will not even consider it
+necessary to give it words; but on either side it will be silently
+assumed, and form the ground-work of all they have to talk about.
+
+He who lives to see two or three generations is like a man who sits
+some time in the conjurer's booth at a fair, and witnesses the
+performance twice or thrice in succession. The tricks were meant to
+be seen only once; and when they are no longer a novelty and cease to
+deceive, their effect is gone.
+
+While no man is much to be envied for his lot, there are countless
+numbers whose fate is to be deplored.
+
+Life is a task to be done. It is a fine thing to say _defunctus est_;
+it means that the man has done his task.
+
+If children were brought into the world by an act of pure reason
+alone, would the human race continue to exist? Would not a man rather
+have so much sympathy with the coming generation as to spare it the
+burden of existence? or at any rate not take it upon himself to impose
+that burden upon it in cold blood.
+
+I shall be told, I suppose, that my philosophy is comfortless--because
+I speak the truth; and people prefer to be assured that everything the
+Lord has made is good. Go to the priests, then, and leave philosophers
+in peace! At any rate, do not ask us to accommodate our doctrines to
+the lessons you have been taught. That is what those rascals of sham
+philosophers will do for you. Ask them for any doctrine you please,
+and you will get it. Your University professors are bound to preach
+optimism; and it is an easy and agreeable task to upset their
+theories.
+
+I have reminded the reader that every state of welfare, every feeling
+of satisfaction, is negative in its character; that is to say, it
+consists in freedom from pain, which is the positive element of
+existence. It follows, therefore, that the happiness of any given life
+is to be measured, not by its joys and pleasures, but by the extent to
+which it has been free from suffering--from positive evil. If this
+is the true standpoint, the lower animals appear to enjoy a happier
+destiny than man. Let us examine the matter a little more closely.
+
+However varied the forms that human happiness and misery may take,
+leading a man to seek the one and shun the other, the material basis
+of it all is bodily pleasure or bodily pain. This basis is very
+restricted: it is simply health, food, protection from wet and cold,
+the satisfaction of the sexual instinct; or else the absence of these
+things. Consequently, as far as real physical pleasure is concerned,
+the man is not better off than the brute, except in so far as the
+higher possibilities of his nervous system make him more sensitive to
+every kind of pleasure, but also, it must be remembered, to every kind
+of pain. But then compared with the brute, how much stronger are the
+passions aroused in him! what an immeasurable difference there is in
+the depth and vehemence of his emotions!--and yet, in the one case,
+as in the other, all to produce the same result in the end: namely,
+health, food, clothing, and so on.
+
+The chief source of all this passion is that thought for what is
+absent and future, which, with man, exercises such a powerful
+influence upon all he does. It is this that is the real origin of
+his cares, his hopes, his fears--emotions which affect him much
+more deeply than could ever be the case with those present joys
+and sufferings to which the brute is confined. In his powers of
+reflection, memory and foresight, man possesses, as it were, a machine
+for condensing and storing up his pleasures and his sorrows. But the
+brute has nothing of the kind; whenever it is in pain, it is as though
+it were suffering for the first time, even though the same thing
+should have previously happened to it times out of number. It has
+no power of summing up its feelings. Hence its careless and placid
+temper: how much it is to be envied! But in man reflection comes in,
+with all the emotions to which it gives rise; and taking up the same
+elements of pleasure and pain which are common to him and the brute,
+it develops his susceptibility to happiness and misery to such a
+degree that, at one moment the man is brought in an instant to a state
+of delight that may even prove fatal, at another to the depths of
+despair and suicide.
+
+If we carry our analysis a step farther, we shall find that, in order
+to increase his pleasures, man has intentionally added to the number
+and pressure of his needs, which in their original state were not much
+more difficult to satisfy than those of the brute. Hence luxury in all
+its forms; delicate food, the use of tobacco and opium, spirituous
+liquors, fine clothes, and the thousand and one things than he
+considers necessary to his existence.
+
+And above and beyond all this, there is a separate and peculiar source
+of pleasure, and consequently of pain, which man has established for
+himself, also as the result of using his powers of reflection; and
+this occupies him out of all proportion to its value, nay, almost more
+than all his other interests put together--I mean ambition and the
+feeling of honor and shame; in plain words, what he thinks about the
+opinion other people have of him. Taking a thousand forms, often very
+strange ones, this becomes the goal of almost all the efforts he makes
+that are not rooted in physical pleasure or pain. It is true that
+besides the sources of pleasure which he has in common with the
+brute, man has the pleasures of the mind as well. These admit of many
+gradations, from the most innocent trifling or the merest talk up to
+the highest intellectual achievements; but there is the accompanying
+boredom to be set against them on the side of suffering. Boredom is
+a form of suffering unknown to brutes, at any rate in their natural
+state; it is only the very cleverest of them who show faint traces
+of it when they are domesticated; whereas in the case of man it has
+become a downright scourge. The crowd of miserable wretches whose one
+aim in life is to fill their purses but never to put anything into
+their heads, offers a singular instance of this torment of boredom.
+Their wealth becomes a punishment by delivering them up to misery of
+having nothing to do; for, to escape it, they will rush about in all
+directions, traveling here, there and everywhere. No sooner do they
+arrive in a place than they are anxious to know what amusements it
+affords; just as though they were beggars asking where they could
+receive a dole! Of a truth, need and boredom are the two poles
+of human life. Finally, I may mention that as regards the sexual
+relation, a man is committed to a peculiar arrangement which drives
+him obstinately to choose one person. This feeling grows, now and
+then, into a more or less passionate love,[1] which is the source of
+little pleasure and much suffering.
+
+[Footnote 1: I have treated this subject at length in a special
+chapter of the second volume of my chief work.]
+
+It is, however, a wonderful thing that the mere addition of thought
+should serve to raise such a vast and lofty structure of human
+happiness and misery; resting, too, on the same narrow basis of joy
+and sorrow as man holds in common with the brute, and exposing him
+to such violent emotions, to so many storms of passion, so much
+convulsion of feeling, that what he has suffered stands written and
+may be read in the lines on his face. And yet, when all is told, he
+has been struggling ultimately for the very same things as the brute
+has attained, and with an incomparably smaller expenditure of passion
+and pain.
+
+But all this contributes to increase the measures of suffering in
+human life out of all proportion to its pleasures; and the pains of
+life are made much worse for man by the fact that death is something
+very real to him. The brute flies from death instinctively without
+really knowing what it is, and therefore without ever contemplating it
+in the way natural to a man, who has this prospect always before his
+eyes. So that even if only a few brutes die a natural death, and most
+of them live only just long enough to transmit their species, and
+then, if not earlier, become the prey of some other animal,--whilst
+man, on the other hand, manages to make so-called natural death the
+rule, to which, however, there are a good many exceptions,--the
+advantage is on the side of the brute, for the reason stated above.
+But the fact is that man attains the natural term of years just as
+seldom as the brute; because the unnatural way in which he lives, and
+the strain of work and emotion, lead to a degeneration of the race;
+and so his goal is not often reached.
+
+The brute is much more content with mere existence than man; the plant
+is wholly so; and man finds satisfaction in it just in proportion as
+he is dull and obtuse. Accordingly, the life of the brute carries less
+of sorrow with it, but also less of joy, when compared with the life
+of man; and while this may be traced, on the one side, to freedom from
+the torment of _care_ and _anxiety_, it is also due to the fact
+that _hope_, in any real sense, is unknown to the brute. It is thus
+deprived of any share in that which gives us the most and best of our
+joys and pleasures, the mental anticipation of a happy future, and the
+inspiriting play of phantasy, both of which we owe to our power of
+imagination. If the brute is free from care, it is also, in this
+sense, without hope; in either case, because its consciousness is
+limited to the present moment, to what it can actually see before
+it. The brute is an embodiment of present impulses, and hence what
+elements of fear and hope exist in its nature--and they do not go very
+far--arise only in relation to objects that lie before it and within
+reach of those impulses: whereas a man's range of vision embraces the
+whole of his life, and extends far into the past and future.
+
+Following upon this, there is one respect in which brutes show real
+wisdom when compared with us--I mean, their quiet, placid enjoyment of
+the present moment. The tranquillity of mind which this seems to give
+them often puts us to shame for the many times we allow our thoughts
+and our cares to make us restless and discontented. And, in fact,
+those pleasures of hope and anticipation which I have been mentioning
+are not to be had for nothing. The delight which a man has in hoping
+for and looking forward to some special satisfaction is a part of the
+real pleasure attaching to it enjoyed in advance. This is afterwards
+deducted; for the more we look forward to anything, the less
+satisfaction we find in it when it comes. But the brute's enjoyment
+is not anticipated, and therefore, suffers no deduction; so that the
+actual pleasure of the moment comes to it whole and unimpaired. In the
+same way, too, evil presses upon the brute only with its own intrinsic
+weight; whereas with us the fear of its coming often makes its burden
+ten times more grievous.
+
+It is just this characteristic way in which the brute gives itself up
+entirely to the present moment that contributes so much to the delight
+we take in our domestic pets. They are the present moment personified,
+and in some respects they make us feel the value of every hour that
+is free from trouble and annoyance, which we, with our thoughts and
+preoccupations, mostly disregard. But man, that selfish and heartless
+creature, misuses this quality of the brute to be more content than we
+are with mere existence, and often works it to such an extent that he
+allows the brute absolutely nothing more than mere, bare life. The
+bird which was made so that it might rove over half of the world, he
+shuts up into the space of a cubic foot, there to die a slow death in
+longing and crying for freedom; for in a cage it does not sing for
+the pleasure of it. And when I see how man misuses the dog, his best
+friend; how he ties up this intelligent animal with a chain, I feel
+the deepest sympathy with the brute and burning indignation against
+its master.
+
+We shall see later that by taking a very high standpoint it is
+possible to justify the sufferings of mankind. But this justification
+cannot apply to animals, whose sufferings, while in a great measure
+brought about by men, are often considerable even apart from their
+agency.[1] And so we are forced to ask, Why and for what purpose does
+all this torment and agony exist? There is nothing here to give the
+will pause; it is not free to deny itself and so obtain redemption.
+There is only one consideration that may serve to explain the
+sufferings of animals. It is this: that the will to live, which
+underlies the whole world of phenomena, must, in their case satisfy
+its cravings by feeding upon itself. This it does by forming a
+gradation of phenomena, every one of which exists at the expense of
+another. I have shown, however, that the capacity for suffering is
+less in animals than in man. Any further explanation that may be given
+of their fate will be in the nature of hypothesis, if not actually
+mythical in its character; and I may leave the reader to speculate
+upon the matter for himself.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. _Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, vol. ii. p. 404.]
+
+_Brahma_ is said to have produced the world by a kind of fall or
+mistake; and in order to atone for his folly, he is bound to remain
+in it himself until he works out his redemption. As an account of the
+origin of things, that is admirable! According to the doctrines
+of _Buddhism_, the world came into being as the result of some
+inexplicable disturbance in the heavenly calm of Nirvana, that blessed
+state obtained by expiation, which had endured so long a time--the
+change taking place by a kind of fatality. This explanation must be
+understood as having at bottom some moral bearing; although it is
+illustrated by an exactly parallel theory in the domain of physical
+science, which places the origin of the sun in a primitive streak of
+mist, formed one knows not how. Subsequently, by a series of moral
+errors, the world became gradually worse and worse--true of the
+physical orders as well--until it assumed the dismal aspect it wears
+to-day. Excellent! The _Greeks_ looked upon the world and the gods as
+the work of an inscrutable necessity. A passable explanation: we may
+be content with it until we can get a better. Again, _Ormuzd_ and
+_Ahriman_ are rival powers, continually at war. That is not bad. But
+that a God like Jehovah should have created this world of misery and
+woe, out of pure caprice, and because he enjoyed doing it, and should
+then have clapped his hands in praise of his own work, and declared
+everything to be very good--that will not do at all! In its
+explanation of the origin of the world, Judaism is inferior to any
+other form of religious doctrine professed by a civilized nation;
+and it is quite in keeping with this that it is the only one which
+presents no trace whatever of any belief in the immortality of the
+soul.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: See _Parerga_, vol. i. pp. 139 _et seq_.]
+
+Even though Leibnitz' contention, that this is the best of all
+possible worlds, were correct, that would not justify God in having
+created it. For he is the Creator not of the world only, but of
+possibility itself; and, therefore, he ought to have so ordered
+possibility as that it would admit of something better.
+
+There are two things which make it impossible to believe that this
+world is the successful work of an all-wise, all-good, and, at the
+same time, all-powerful Being; firstly, the misery which abounds in
+it everywhere; and secondly, the obvious imperfection of its highest
+product, man, who is a burlesque of what he should be. These things
+cannot be reconciled with any such belief. On the contrary, they are
+just the facts which support what I have been saying; they are our
+authority for viewing the world as the outcome of our own misdeeds,
+and therefore, as something that had better not have been. Whilst,
+under the former hypothesis, they amount to a bitter accusation
+against the Creator, and supply material for sarcasm; under the latter
+they form an indictment against our own nature, our own will, and
+teach us a lesson of humility. They lead us to see that, like the
+children of a libertine, we come into the world with the burden of sin
+upon us; and that it is only through having continually to atone for
+this sin that our existence is so miserable, and that its end is
+death.
+
+There is nothing more certain than the general truth that it is the
+grievous _sin of the world_ which has produced the grievous _suffering
+of the world_. I am not referring here to the physical connection
+between these two things lying in the realm of experience; my meaning
+is metaphysical. Accordingly, the sole thing that reconciles me to the
+Old Testament is the story of the Fall. In my eyes, it is the only
+metaphysical truth in that book, even though it appears in the form of
+an allegory. There seems to me no better explanation of our existence
+than that it is the result of some false step, some sin of which
+we are paying the penalty. I cannot refrain from recommending the
+thoughtful reader a popular, but at the same time, profound treatise
+on this subject by Claudius[1] which exhibits the essentially
+pessimistic spirit of Christianity. It is entitled: _Cursed is the
+ground for thy sake_.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--Matthias Claudius (1740-1815), a
+popular poet, and friend of Klopstock, Herder and Leasing. He edited
+the _Wandsbecker Bote_, in the fourth part of which appeared the
+treatise mentioned above. He generally wrote under the pseudonym of
+_Asmus_, and Schopenhauer often refers to him by this name.]
+
+Between the ethics of the Greeks and the ethics of the Hindoos, there
+is a glaring contrast. In the one case (with the exception, it must be
+confessed, of Plato), the object of ethics is to enable a man to lead
+a happy life; in the other, it is to free and redeem him from life
+altogether--as is directly stated in the very first words of the
+_Sankhya Karika_.
+
+Allied with this is the contrast between the Greek and the Christian
+idea of death. It is strikingly presented in a visible form on a fine
+antique sarcophagus in the gallery of Florence, which exhibits, in
+relief, the whole series of ceremonies attending a wedding in ancient
+times, from the formal offer to the evening when Hymen's torch lights
+the happy couple home. Compare with that the Christian coffin,
+draped in mournful black and surmounted with a crucifix! How much
+significance there is in these two ways of finding comfort in death.
+They are opposed to each other, but each is right. The one points to
+the _affirmation_ of the will to live, which remains sure of life for
+all time, however rapidly its forms may change. The other, in the
+symbol of suffering and death, points to the _denial_ of the will to
+live, to redemption from this world, the domain of death and devil.
+And in the question between the affirmation and the denial of the will
+to live, Christianity is in the last resort right.
+
+The contrast which the New Testament presents when compared with the
+Old, according to the ecclesiastical view of the matter, is just that
+existing between my ethical system and the moral philosophy of Europe.
+The Old Testament represents man as under the dominion of Law, in
+which, however, there is no redemption. The New Testament declares
+Law to have failed, frees man from its dominion,[1] and in its stead
+preaches the kingdom of grace, to be won by faith, love of neighbor
+and entire sacrifice of self. This is the path of redemption from the
+evil of the world. The spirit of the New Testament is undoubtedly
+asceticism, however your protestants and rationalists may twist it to
+suit their purpose. Asceticism is the denial of the will to live; and
+the transition from the Old Testament to the New, from the dominion
+of Law to that of Faith, from justification by works to redemption
+through the Mediator, from the domain of sin and death to eternal life
+in Christ, means, when taken in its real sense, the transition from
+the merely moral virtues to the denial of the will to live. My
+philosophy shows the metaphysical foundation of justice and the love
+of mankind, and points to the goal to which these virtues necessarily
+lead, if they are practised in perfection. At the same time it is
+candid in confessing that a man must turn his back upon the world, and
+that the denial of the will to live is the way of redemption. It is
+therefore really at one with the spirit of the New Testament, whilst
+all other systems are couched in the spirit of the Old; that is
+to say, theoretically as well as practically, their result is
+Judaism--mere despotic theism. In this sense, then, my doctrine might
+be called the only true Christian philosophy--however paradoxical a
+statement this may seem to people who take superficial views instead
+of penetrating to the heart of the matter.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Romans vii; Galatians ii, iii.]
+
+If you want a safe compass to guide you through life, and to banish
+all doubt as to the right way of looking at it, you cannot do better
+than accustom yourself to regard this world as a penitentiary, a
+sort of a penal colony, or [Greek: ergastaerion] as the earliest
+philosopher called it.[1] Amongst the Christian Fathers, Origen, with
+praiseworthy courage, took this view,[2] which is further justified by
+certain objective theories of life. I refer, not to my own philosophy
+alone, but to the wisdom of all ages, as expressed in Brahmanism and
+Buddhism, and in the sayings of Greek philosophers like Empedocles and
+Pythagoras; as also by Cicero, in his remark that the wise men of old
+used to teach that we come into this world to pay the penalty of crime
+committed in another state of existence--a doctrine which formed
+part of the initiation into the mysteries.[3] And Vanini--whom his
+contemporaries burned, finding that an easier task than to confute
+him--puts the same thing in a very forcible way. _Man_, he says, _is
+so full of every kind of misery that, were it not repugnant to the
+Christian religion, I should venture to affirm that if evil spirits
+exist at all, they have posed into human form and are now atoning for
+their crimes_.[4] And true Christianity--using the word in its right
+sense--also regards our existence as the consequence of sin and error.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Clem. Alex. Strom. L. iii, c, 3, p. 399.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Augustine _de cìvitate Dei_., L. xi. c. 23.]
+
+[Footnote 3: Cf. _Fragmenta de philosophia_.]
+
+[Footnote: 4: _De admirandis naturae arcanis_; dial L. p. 35.]
+
+If you accustom yourself to this view of life you will regulate your
+expectations accordingly, and cease to look upon all its disagreeable
+incidents, great and small, its sufferings, its worries, its misery,
+as anything unusual or irregular; nay, you will find that everything
+is as it should be, in a world where each of us pays the penalty of
+existence in his own peculiar way. Amongst the evils of a penal colony
+is the society of those who form it; and if the reader is worthy of
+better company, he will need no words from me to remind him of what he
+has to put up with at present. If he has a soul above the common, or
+if he is a man of genius, he will occasionally feel like some noble
+prisoner of state, condemned to work in the galleys with common
+criminals; and he will follow his example and try to isolate himself.
+
+In general, however, it should be said that this view of life will
+enable us to contemplate the so-called imperfections of the great
+majority of men, their moral and intellectual deficiencies and the
+resulting base type of countenance, without any surprise, to say
+nothing of indignation; for we shall never cease to reflect where we
+are, and that the men about us are beings conceived and born in
+sin, and living to atone for it. That is what Christianity means in
+speaking of the sinful nature of man.
+
+_Pardon's the word to all_! [1] Whatever folly men commit, be
+their shortcomings or their vices what they may, let us exercise
+forbearance; remembering that when these faults appear in others, it
+is our follies and vices that we behold. They are the shortcomings of
+humanity, to which we belong; whose faults, one and all, we share;
+yes, even those very faults at which we now wax so indignant, merely
+because they have not yet appeared in ourselves. They are faults that
+do not lie on the surface. But they exist down there in the depths of
+our nature; and should anything call them forth, they will come and
+show themselves, just as we now see them in others. One man, it
+is true, may have faults that are absent in his fellow; and it is
+undeniable that the sum total of bad qualities is in some cases very
+large; for the difference of individuality between man and man passes
+all measure.
+
+[Footnote 1: "Cymbeline," Act v. Sc. 5.]
+
+In fact, the conviction that the world and man is something that had
+better not have been, is of a kind to fill us with indulgence towards
+one another. Nay, from this point of view, we might well consider the
+proper form of address to be, not _Monsieur, Sir, mein Herr_, but _my
+fellow-sufferer, Socî malorum, compagnon de miseres_! This may perhaps
+sound strange, but it is in keeping with the facts; it puts others in
+a right light; and it reminds us of that which is after all the most
+necessary thing in life--the tolerance, patience, regard, and love
+of neighbor, of which everyone stands in need, and which, therefore,
+every man owes to his fellow.
+
+
+
+
+THE VANITY OF EXISTENCE.
+
+
+This vanity finds expression in the whole way in which things exist;
+in the infinite nature of Time and Space, as opposed to the finite
+nature of the individual in both; in the ever-passing present moment
+as the only mode of actual existence; in the interdependence and
+relativity of all things; in continual Becoming without ever Being; in
+constant wishing and never being satisfied; in the long battle
+which forms the history of life, where every effort is checked by
+difficulties, and stopped until they are overcome. Time is that in
+which all things pass away; it is merely the form under which the will
+to live--the thing-in-itself and therefore imperishable--has revealed
+to it that its efforts are in vain; it is that agent by which at every
+moment all things in our hands become as nothing, and lose any real
+value they possess.
+
+That which _has been_ exists no more; it exists as little as that
+which has _never_ been. But of everything that exists you must say, in
+the next moment, that it has been. Hence something of great importance
+now past is inferior to something of little importance now present, in
+that the latter is a _reality_, and related to the former as something
+to nothing.
+
+A man finds himself, to his great astonishment, suddenly existing,
+after thousands and thousands of years of non-existence: he lives for
+a little while; and then, again, comes an equally long period when he
+must exist no more. The heart rebels against this, and feels that
+it cannot be true. The crudest intellect cannot speculate on such a
+subject without having a presentiment that Time is something ideal in
+its nature. This ideality of Time and Space is the key to every true
+system of metaphysics; because it provides for quite another order of
+things than is to be met with in the domain of nature. This is why
+Kant is so great.
+
+Of every event in our life we can say only for one moment that it
+_is_; for ever after, that it _was_. Every evening we are poorer by a
+day. It might, perhaps, make us mad to see how rapidly our short span
+of time ebbs away; if it were not that in the furthest depths of our
+being we are secretly conscious of our share in the exhaustible spring
+of eternity, so that we can always hope to find life in it again.
+
+Consideration of the kind, touched on above, might, indeed, lead us to
+embrace the belief that the greatest _wisdom_ is to make the enjoyment
+of the present the supreme object of life; because that is the only
+reality, all else being merely the play of thought. On the other hand,
+such a course might just as well be called the greatest _folly_: for
+that which in the next moment exists no more, and vanishes utterly,
+like a dream, can never be worth a serious effort.
+
+The whole foundation on which our existence rests is the present--the
+ever-fleeting present. It lies, then, in the very nature of our
+existence to take the form of constant motion, and to offer no
+possibility of our ever attaining the rest for which we are always
+striving. We are like a man running downhill, who cannot keep on his
+legs unless he runs on, and will inevitably fall if he stops; or,
+again, like a pole balanced on the tip of one's finger; or like a
+planet, which would fall into its sun the moment it ceased to hurry
+forward on its way. Unrest is the mark of existence.
+
+In a world where all is unstable, and nought can endure, but is swept
+onwards at once in the hurrying whirlpool of change; where a man, if
+he is to keep erect at all, must always be advancing and moving, like
+an acrobat on a rope--in such a world, happiness in inconceivable.
+How can it dwell where, as Plato says, _continual Becoming and never
+Being_ is the sole form of existence? In the first place, a man never
+is happy, but spends his whole life in striving after something which
+he thinks will make him so; he seldom attains his goal, and when he
+does, it is only to be disappointed; he is mostly shipwrecked in the
+end, and comes into harbor with masts and rigging gone. And then, it
+is all one whether he has been happy or miserable; for his life was
+never anything more than a present moment always vanishing; and now it
+is over.
+
+At the same time it is a wonderful thing that, in the world of human
+beings as in that of animals in general, this manifold restless motion
+is produced and kept up by the agency of two simple impulses--hunger
+and the sexual instinct; aided a little, perhaps, by the influence of
+boredom, but by nothing else; and that, in the theatre of life, these
+suffice to form the _primum mobile_ of how complicated a machinery,
+setting in motion how strange and varied a scene!
+
+On looking a little closer, we find that inorganic matter presents
+a constant conflict between chemical forces, which eventually works
+dissolution; and on the other hand, that organic life is impossible
+without continual change of matter, and cannot exist if it does not
+receive perpetual help from without. This is the realm of _finality_;
+and its opposite would be _an infinite existence_, exposed to no
+attack from without, and needing nothing to support it; [Greek: haei
+hosautos dn], the realm of eternal peace; [Greek: oute giguomenon oute
+apollumenon], some timeless, changeless state, one and undiversified;
+the negative knowledge of which forms the dominant note of the
+Platonic philosophy. It is to some such state as this that the denial
+of the will to live opens up the way.
+
+The scenes of our life are like pictures done in rough mosaic. Looked
+at close, they produce no effect. There is nothing beautiful to
+be found in them, unless you stand some distance off. So, to gain
+anything we have longed for is only to discover how vain and empty
+it is; and even though we are always living in expectation of better
+things, at the same time we often repent and long to have the past
+back again. We look upon the present as something to be put up with
+while it lasts, and serving only as the way towards our goal. Hence
+most people, if they glance back when they come to the end of life,
+will find that all along they have been living _ad interim_: they will
+be surprised to find that the very thing they disregarded and let
+slip by unenjoyed, was just the life in the expectation of which they
+passed all their time. Of how many a man may it not be said that hope
+made a fool of him until he danced into the arms of death!
+
+Then again, how insatiable a creature is man! Every satisfaction he
+attains lays the seeds of some new desire, so that there is no end to
+the wishes of each individual will. And why is this? The real reason
+is simply that, taken in itself, Will is the lord of all worlds:
+everything belongs to it, and therefore no one single thing can ever
+give it satisfaction, but only the whole, which is endless. For all
+that, it must rouse our sympathy to think how very little the Will,
+this lord of the world, really gets when it takes the form of an
+individual; usually only just enough to keep the body together. This
+is why man is so very miserable.
+
+Life presents itself chiefly as a task--the task, I mean, of
+subsisting at all, _gagner sa vie_. If this is accomplished, life is a
+burden, and then there comes the second task of doing something with
+that which has been won--of warding off boredom, which, like a bird
+of prey, hovers over us, ready to fall wherever it sees a life secure
+from need. The first task is to win something; the second, to banish
+the feeling that it has been won; otherwise it is a burden.
+
+Human life must be some kind of mistake. The truth of this will be
+sufficiently obvious if we only remember that man is a compound of
+needs and necessities hard to satisfy; and that even when they are
+satisfied, all he obtains is a state of painlessness, where nothing
+remains to him but abandonment to boredom. This is direct proof that
+existence has no real value in itself; for what is boredom but the
+feeling of the emptiness of life? If life--the craving for which
+is the very essence of our being--were possessed of any positive
+intrinsic value, there would be no such thing as boredom at all: mere
+existence would satisfy us in itself, and we should want for nothing.
+But as it is, we take no delight in existence except when we are
+struggling for something; and then distance and difficulties to be
+overcome make our goal look as though it would satisfy us--an illusion
+which vanishes when we reach it; or else when we are occupied with
+some purely intellectual interest--when in reality we have stepped
+forth from life to look upon it from the outside, much after the
+manner of spectators at a play. And even sensual pleasure itself means
+nothing but a struggle and aspiration, ceasing the moment its aim is
+attained. Whenever we are not occupied in one of these ways, but cast
+upon existence itself, its vain and worthless nature is brought home
+to us; and this is what we mean by boredom. The hankering after what
+is strange and uncommon--an innate and ineradicable tendency of human
+nature--shows how glad we are at any interruption of that natural
+course of affairs which is so very tedious.
+
+That this most perfect manifestation of the will to live, the human
+organism, with the cunning and complex working of its machinery,
+must fall to dust and yield up itself and all its strivings to
+extinction--this is the naïve way in which Nature, who is always so
+true and sincere in what she says, proclaims the whole struggle of
+this will as in its very essence barren and unprofitable. Were it of
+any value in itself, anything unconditioned and absolute, it could not
+thus end in mere nothing.
+
+If we turn from contemplating the world as a whole, and, in
+particular, the generations of men as they live their little hour of
+mock-existence and then are swept away in rapid succession; if we turn
+from this, and look at life in its small details, as presented, say,
+in a comedy, how ridiculous it all seems! It is like a drop of water
+seen through a microscope, a single drop teeming with _infusoria_; or
+a speck of cheese full of mites invisible to the naked eye. How we
+laugh as they bustle about so eagerly, and struggle with one another
+in so tiny a space! And whether here, or in the little span of human
+life, this terrible activity produces a comic effect.
+
+It is only in the microscope that our life looks so big. It is an
+indivisible point, drawn out and magnified by the powerful lenses of
+Time and Space.
+
+
+
+
+ON SUICIDE.
+
+
+As far as I know, none but the votaries of monotheistic, that is to
+say, Jewish religions, look upon suicide as a crime. This is all the
+more striking, inasmuch as neither in the Old nor in the New Testament
+is there to be found any prohibition or positive disapproval of it;
+so that religious teachers are forced to base their condemnation of
+suicide on philosophical grounds of their own invention. These are
+so very bad that writers of this kind endeavor to make up for the
+weakness of their arguments by the strong terms in which they express
+their abhorrence of the practice; in other words, they declaim against
+it. They tell us that suicide is the greatest piece of cowardice; that
+only a madman could be guilty of it; and other insipidities of the
+same kind; or else they make the nonsensical remark that suicide is
+_wrong_; when it is quite obvious that there is nothing in the world
+to which every man has a more unassailable title than to his own life
+and person.
+
+Suicide, as I have said, is actually accounted a crime; and a crime
+which, especially under the vulgar bigotry that prevails in England,
+is followed by an ignominious burial and the seizure of the man's
+property; and for that reason, in a case of suicide, the jury almost
+always brings in a verdict of insanity. Now let the reader's own moral
+feelings decide as to whether or not suicide is a criminal act. Think
+of the impression that would be made upon you by the news that some
+one you know had committed the crime, say, of murder or theft, or been
+guilty of some act of cruelty or deception; and compare it with your
+feelings when you hear that he has met a voluntary death. While in the
+one case a lively sense of indignation and extreme resentment will be
+aroused, and you will call loudly for punishment or revenge, in the
+other you will be moved to grief and sympathy; and mingled with your
+thoughts will be admiration for his courage, rather than the moral
+disapproval which follows upon a wicked action. Who has not had
+acquaintances, friends, relations, who of their own free will have
+left this world; and are these to be thought of with horror as
+criminals? Most emphatically, No! I am rather of opinion that the
+clergy should be challenged to explain what right they have to go into
+the pulpit, or take up their pens, and stamp as a crime an action
+which many men whom we hold in affection and honor have committed;
+and to refuse an honorable burial to those who relinquish this
+world voluntarily. They have no Biblical authority to boast of,
+as justifying their condemnation of suicide; nay, not even any
+philosophical arguments that will hold water; and it must be
+understood that it is arguments we want, and that we will not be put
+off with mere phrases or words of abuse. If the criminal law forbids
+suicide, that is not an argument valid in the Church; and besides, the
+prohibition is ridiculous; for what penalty can frighten a man who is
+not afraid of death itself? If the law punishes people for trying
+to commit suicide, it is punishing the want of skill that makes the
+attempt a failure.
+
+The ancients, moreover, were very far from regarding the matter in
+that light. Pliny says: _Life is not so desirable a thing as to be
+protracted at any cost. Whoever you are, you are sure to die, even
+though your life has been full of abomination and crime. The chief
+of all remedies for a troubled mind is the feeling that among the
+blessings which Nature gives to man, there is none greater than an
+opportune death; and the best of it is that every one can avail
+himself of it.[1]_ And elsewhere the same writer declares: _Not even
+to God are all things possible; for he could not compass his own
+death, if he willed to die, and yet in all the miseries of our earthly
+life, this is the best of his gifts to man.[2]_ Nay, in Massilia
+and on the isle of Ceos, the man who could give valid reasons
+for relinquishing his life, was handed the cup of hemlock by the
+magistrate; and that, too, in public.[3] And in ancient times, how
+many heroes and wise men died a voluntary death. Aristotle,[4] it is
+true, declared suicide to be an offence against the State, although
+not against the person; but in Stobaeus' exposition of the Peripatetic
+philosophy there is the following remark: _The good man should flee
+life when his misfortunes become too great; the bad man, also, when
+he is too prosperous_. And similarly: _So he will marry and beget
+children and take part in the affairs of the State, and, generally,
+practice virtue and continue to live; and then, again, if need be,
+and at any time necessity compels him, he will depart to his place of
+refuge in the tomb.[5]_ And we find that the Stoics actually praised
+suicide as a noble and heroic action, as hundreds of passages show;
+above all in the works of Seneca, who expresses the strongest approval
+of it. As is well known, the Hindoos look upon suicide as a religious
+act, especially when it takes the form of self-immolation by widows;
+but also when it consists in casting oneself under the wheels of the
+chariot of the god at Juggernaut, or being eaten by crocodiles in the
+Ganges, or being drowned in the holy tanks in the temples, and so on.
+The same thing occurs on the stage--that mirror of life. For example,
+in _L'Orphelin de la Chine_[6] a celebrated Chinese play, almost
+all the noble characters end by suicide; without the slightest hint
+anywhere, or any impression being produced on the spectator, that
+they are committing a crime. And in our own theatre it is much the
+same--Palmira, for instance, in _Mahomet_, or Mortimer in _Maria
+Stuart_, Othello, Countess Terzky.[7] Is Hamlet's monologue the
+meditation of a criminal? He merely declares that if we had any
+certainty of being annihilated by it, death would be infinitely
+preferable to the world as it is. But _there lies the rub_!
+
+[Footnote 1: Hist. Nat. Lib. xxviii., 1.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Loc. cit. Lib. ii. c. 7.]
+
+[Footnote 3: 3 Valerius Maximus; hist. Lib. ii., c. 6, § 7 et 8.
+Heraclides Ponticus; fragmenta de rebus publicis, ix. Aeliani variae
+historiae, iii., 37. Strabo; Lib. x., c. 5, 6.]
+
+[Footnote 4: _Eth. Nichom_., v. 15.]
+
+[Footnote 5: Stobaeus. _Ecl. Eth_.. ii., c. 7, pp. 286, 312]
+
+[Footnote 6: Traduit par St. Julien, 1834.]
+
+[Footnote 7: _Translator's Note_.--Palmira: a female slave in Goethe's
+play of _Mahomet_. Mortimer: a would-be lover and rescuer of Mary in
+Schiller's _Maria Stuart_. Countess Terzky: a leading character in
+Schiller's _Wallenstein's Tod_.]
+
+The reasons advanced against suicide by the clergy of monotheistic,
+that is to say, Jewish religions, and by those philosophers who adapt
+themselves thereto, are weak sophisms which can easily be refuted.[1]
+The most thorough-going refutation of them is given by Hume in his
+_Essay on Suicide_. This did not appear until after his death, when
+it was immediately suppressed, owing to the scandalous bigotry and
+outrageous ecclesiastical tyranny that prevailed in England; and hence
+only a very few copies of it were sold under cover of secrecy and at a
+high price. This and another treatise by that great man have come to
+us from Basle, and we may be thankful for the reprint.[2] It is a
+great disgrace to the English nation that a purely philosophical
+treatise, which, proceeding from one of the first thinkers and writers
+in England, aimed at refuting the current arguments against suicide
+by the light of cold reason, should be forced to sneak about in that
+country, as though it were some rascally production, until at last it
+found refuge on the Continent. At the same time it shows what a good
+conscience the Church has in such matters.
+
+[Footnote 1: See my treatise on the _Foundation of Morals_, § 5.]
+
+[Footnote 2: _Essays on Suicide_ and the _Immortality of the Soul_, by
+the late David Hume, Basle, 1799, sold by James Decker.]
+
+In my chief work I have explained the only valid reason existing
+against suicide on the score of mortality. It is this: that suicide
+thwarts the attainment of the highest moral aim by the fact that, for
+a real release from this world of misery, it substitutes one that is
+merely apparent. But from a _mistake_ to a _crime_ is a far cry; and
+it is as a crime that the clergy of Christendom wish us to regard
+suicide.
+
+The inmost kernel of Christianity is the truth that suffering--_the
+Cross_--is the real end and object of life. Hence Christianity
+condemns suicide as thwarting this end; whilst the ancient world,
+taking a lower point of view, held it in approval, nay, in honor.[1]
+But if that is to be accounted a valid reason against suicide, it
+involves the recognition of asceticism; that is to say, it is valid
+only from a much higher ethical standpoint than has ever been adopted
+by moral philosophers in Europe. If we abandon that high standpoint,
+there is no tenable reason left, on the score of morality, for
+condemning suicide. The extraordinary energy and zeal with which the
+clergy of monotheistic religions attack suicide is not supported
+either by any passages in the Bible or by any considerations of
+weight; so that it looks as though they must have some secret reason
+for their contention. May it not be this--that the voluntary surrender
+of life is a bad compliment for him who said that _all things were
+very good_? If this is so, it offers another instance of the crass
+optimism of these religions,--denouncing suicide to escape being
+denounced by it.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--Schopenhauer refers to _Die Welt
+als Wille und Vorstellung_, vol. i., § 69, where the reader may find
+the same argument stated at somewhat greater length. According to
+Schopenhauer, moral freedom--the highest ethical aim--is to be
+obtained only by a denial of the will to live. Far from being a
+denial, suicide is an emphatic assertion of this will. For it is in
+fleeing from the pleasures, not from the sufferings of life, that this
+denial consists. When a man destroys his existence as an individual,
+he is not by any means destroying his will to live. On the contrary,
+he would like to live if he could do so with satisfaction to himself;
+if he could assert his will against the power of circumstance; but
+circumstance is too strong for him.]
+
+It will generally be found that, as soon as the terrors of life reach
+the point at which they outweigh the terrors of death, a man will
+put an end to his life. But the terrors of death offer considerable
+resistance; they stand like a sentinel at the gate leading out of this
+world. Perhaps there is no man alive who would not have already put an
+end to his life, if this end had been of a purely negative character,
+a sudden stoppage of existence. There is something positive about
+it; it is the destruction of the body; and a man shrinks from that,
+because his body is the manifestation of the will to live.
+
+However, the struggle with that sentinel is, as a rule, not so hard
+as it may seem from a long way off, mainly in consequence of the
+antagonism between the ills of the body and the ills of the mind. If
+we are in great bodily pain, or the pain lasts a long time, we become
+indifferent to other troubles; all we think about is to get well. In
+the same way great mental suffering makes us insensible to bodily
+pain; we despise it; nay, if it should outweigh the other, it
+distracts our thoughts, and we welcome it as a pause in mental
+suffering. It is this feeling that makes suicide easy; for the bodily
+pain that accompanies it loses all significance in the eyes of one
+who is tortured by an excess of mental suffering. This is especially
+evident in the case of those who are driven to suicide by some purely
+morbid and exaggerated ill-humor. No special effort to overcome their
+feelings is necessary, nor do such people require to be worked up in
+order to take the step; but as soon as the keeper into whose charge
+they are given leaves them for a couple of minutes, they quickly bring
+their life to an end.
+
+When, in some dreadful and ghastly dream, we reach the moment of
+greatest horror, it awakes us; thereby banishing all the hideous
+shapes that were born of the night. And life is a dream: when the
+moment of greatest horror compels us to break it off, the same thing
+happens.
+
+Suicide may also be regarded as an experiment--a question which man
+puts to Nature, trying to force her to an answer. The question is
+this: What change will death produce in a man's existence and in his
+insight into the nature of things? It is a clumsy experiment to make;
+for it involves the destruction of the very consciousness which puts
+the question and awaits the answer.
+
+
+
+
+IMMORTALITY:[1] A DIALOGUE.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--The word
+immortality--_Unsterblichkeit_--does not occur in the original; nor
+would it, in its usual application, find a place in Schopenhauer's
+vocabulary. The word he uses is _Unzerstörbarkeit--indestructibility_.
+But I have preferred _immortality_, because that word is commonly
+associated with the subject touched upon in this little debate. If any
+critic doubts the wisdom of this preference, let me ask him to try
+his hand at a short, concise, and, at the same time, popularly
+intelligible rendering of the German original, which runs thus: _Zur
+Lehre von der Unzerstörbarkeit unseres wahren Wesens durch den Tod:
+Meine dialogische Schlussbelustigung_.]
+
+
+THRASYMACHOS--PHILALETHES.
+
+_Thrasymachos_. Tell me now, in one word, what shall I be after my
+death? And mind you be clear and precise.
+
+_Philalethes_. All and nothing!
+
+_Thrasymachos_. I thought so! I gave you a problem, and you solve it
+by a contradiction. That's a very stale trick.
+
+_Philalethes_. Yes, but you raise transcendental questions, and you
+expect me to answer them in language that is only made for immanent
+knowledge. It's no wonder that a contradiction ensues.
+
+_Thrasymachos_. What do you mean by transcendental questions and
+immanent knowledge? I've heard these expressions before, of course;
+they are not new to me. The Professor was fond of using them, but only
+as predicates of the Deity, and he never talked of anything else;
+which was all quite right and proper. He argued thus: if the Deity was
+in the world itself, he was immanent; if he was somewhere outside it,
+he was transcendent. Nothing could be clearer and more obvious! You
+knew where you were. But this Kantian rigmarole won't do any more:
+it's antiquated and no longer applicable to modern ideas. Why, we've
+had a whole row of eminent men in the metropolis of German learning--
+
+_Philalethes_. (Aside.) German humbug, he means.
+
+_Thrasymachos_. The mighty Schleiermacher, for instance, and that
+gigantic intellect, Hegel; and at this time of day we've abandoned
+that nonsense. I should rather say we're so far beyond it that we
+can't put up with it any more. What's the use of it then? What does it
+all mean?
+
+_Philalethes_. Transcendental knowledge is knowledge which passes
+beyond the bounds of possible experience, and strives to determine the
+nature of things as they are in themselves. Immanent knowledge, on the
+other hand, is knowledge which confines itself entirely with those
+bounds; so that it cannot apply to anything but actual phenomena. As
+far as you are an individual, death will be the end of you. But your
+individuality is not your true and inmost being: it is only the
+outward manifestation of it. It is not the _thing-in-itself_, but only
+the phenomenon presented in the form of time; and therefore with a
+beginning and an end. But your real being knows neither time, nor
+beginning, nor end, nor yet the limits of any given individual. It is
+everywhere present in every individual; and no individual can
+exist apart from it. So when death comes, on the one hand you are
+annihilated as an individual; on the other, you are and remain
+everything. That is what I meant when I said that after your death
+you would be all and nothing. It is difficult to find a more precise
+answer to your question and at the same time be brief. The answer is
+contradictory, I admit; but it is so simply because your life is in
+time, and the immortal part of you in eternity. You may put the matter
+thus: Your immortal part is something that does not last in time and
+yet is indestructible; but there you have another contradiction! You
+see what happens by trying to bring the transcendental within the
+limits of immanent knowledge. It is in some sort doing violence to the
+latter by misusing it for ends it was never meant to serve.
+
+_Thrasymachos_. Look here, I shan't give twopence for your immortality
+unless I'm to remain an individual.
+
+_Philalethes_. Well, perhaps I may be able to satisfy you on this
+point. Suppose I guarantee that after death you shall remain an
+individual, but only on condition that you first spend three months of
+complete unconsciousness.
+
+_Thrasymachos_. I shall have no objection to that.
+
+_Philalethes_. But remember, if people are completely unconscious,
+they take no account of time. So, when you are dead, it's all the same
+to you whether three months pass in the world of consciousness, or ten
+thousand years. In the one case as in the other, it is simply a matter
+of believing what is told you when you awake. So far, then, you can
+afford to be indifferent whether it is three months or ten thousand
+years that pass before you recover your individuality.
+
+_Thrasymachos_. Yes, if it comes to that, I suppose you're right.
+
+_Philalethes_. And if by chance, after those ten thousand years have
+gone by, no one ever thinks of awakening you, I fancy it would be
+no great misfortune. You would have become quite accustomed to
+non-existence after so long a spell of it--following upon such a very
+few years of life. At any rate you may be sure you would be perfectly
+ignorant of the whole thing. Further, if you knew that the mysterious
+power which keeps you in your present state of life had never once
+ceased in those ten thousand years to bring forth other phenomena like
+yourself, and to endow them with life, it would fully console you.
+
+_Thrasymachos_. Indeed! So you think you're quietly going to do me
+out of my individuality with all this fine talk. But I'm up to your
+tricks. I tell you I won't exist unless I can have my individuality.
+I'm not going to be put off with 'mysterious powers,' and what you
+call 'phenomena.' I can't do without my individuality, and I won't
+give it up.
+
+_Philalethes_. You mean, I suppose, that your individuality is such a
+delightful thing, so splendid, so perfect, and beyond compare--that
+you can't imagine anything better. Aren't you ready to exchange your
+present state for one which, if we can judge by what is told us, may
+possibly be superior and more endurable?
+
+_Thrasymachos_. Don't you see that my individuality, be it what it
+may, is my very self? To me it is the most important thing in the
+world.
+
+ _For God is God and I am I_.
+
+_I_ want to exist, _I, I_. That's the main thing. I don't care about
+an existence which has to be proved to be mine, before I can believe
+it.
+
+_Philalethes_. Think what you're doing! When you say _I, I, I_ want
+to exist, it is not you alone that says this. Everything says it,
+absolutely everything that has the faintest trace of consciousness. It
+follows, then, that this desire of yours is just the part of you that
+is _not individual_--the part that is common to all things without
+distinction. It is the cry, not of the individual, but of existence
+itself; it is the intrinsic element in everything that exists, nay, it
+is the cause of anything existing at all. This desire craves for, and
+so is satisfied with, nothing less than existence in general--not any
+definite individual existence. No! that is not its aim. It seems to be
+so only because this desire--this _Will_--attains consciousness only
+in the individual, and therefore looks as though it were concerned
+with nothing but the individual. There lies the illusion--an illusion,
+it is true, in which the individual is held fast: but, if he reflects,
+he can break the fetters and set himself free. It is only indirectly,
+I say, that the individual has this violent craving for existence. It
+is _the Will to Live_ which is the real and direct aspirant--alike and
+identical in all things. Since, then, existence is the free work, nay,
+the mere reflection of the will, where existence is, there, too,
+must be will; and for the moment the will finds its satisfaction in
+existence itself; so far, I mean, as that which never rests, but
+presses forward eternally, can ever find any satisfaction at all.
+The will is careless of the individual: the individual is not its
+business; although, as I have said, this seems to be the case, because
+the individual has no direct consciousness of will except in himself.
+The effect of this is to make the individual careful to maintain his
+own existence; and if this were not so, there would be no surety
+for the preservation of the species. From all this it is clear that
+individuality is not a form of perfection, but rather of limitation;
+and so to be freed from it is not loss but gain. Trouble yourself no
+more about the matter. Once thoroughly recognize what you are, what
+your existence really is, namely, the universal will to live, and the
+whole question will seem to you childish, and most ridiculous!
+
+_Thrasymachos_. You're childish yourself and most ridiculous, like
+all philosophers! and if a man of my age lets himself in for a
+quarter-of-an-hour's talk with such fools, it is only because it
+amuses me and passes the time. I've more important business to attend
+to, so Good-bye.
+
+
+
+
+FURTHER PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS.
+
+
+There is an unconscious propriety in the way in which, in all European
+languages, the word _person_ is commonly used to denote a human
+being. The real meaning of _persona_ is _a mask_, such as actors were
+accustomed to wear on the ancient stage; and it is quite true that no
+one shows himself as he is, but wears his mask and plays his part.
+Indeed, the whole of our social arrangements may be likened to a
+perpetual comedy; and this is why a man who is worth anything finds
+society so insipid, while a blockhead is quite at home in it.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Reason deserves to be called a prophet; for in showing us the
+consequence and effect of our actions in the present, does it not tell
+us what the future will be? This is precisely why reason is such an
+excellent power of restraint in moments when we are possessed by some
+base passion, some fit of anger, some covetous desire, that will lead
+us to do things whereof we must presently repent.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+_Hatred_ comes from the heart; _contempt_ from the head; and neither
+feeling is quite within our control. For we cannot alter our heart;
+its basis is determined by motives; and our head deals with objective
+facts, and applies to them rules which are immutable. Any given
+individual is the union of a particular heart with a particular head.
+
+Hatred and contempt are diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive.
+There are even not a few cases where hatred of a person is rooted in
+nothing but forced esteem for his qualities. And besides, if a man
+sets out to hate all the miserable creatures he meets, he will not
+have much energy left for anything else; whereas he can despise them,
+one and all, with the greatest ease. True, genuine contempt is just
+the reverse of true, genuine pride; it keeps quite quiet and gives no
+sign of its existence. For if a man shows that he despises you, he
+signifies at least this much regard for you, that he wants to let
+you know how little he appreciates you; and his wish is dictated by
+hatred, which cannot exist with real contempt. On the contrary, if it
+is genuine, it is simply the conviction that the object of it is a man
+of no value at all. Contempt is not incompatible with indulgent and
+kindly treatment, and for the sake of one's own peace and safety, this
+should not be omitted; it will prevent irritation; and there is no
+one who cannot do harm if he is roused to it. But if this pure, cold,
+sincere contempt ever shows itself, it will be met with the most
+truculent hatred; for the despised person is not in a position to
+fight contempt with its own weapons.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Melancholy is a very different thing from bad humor, and of the two,
+it is not nearly so far removed from a gay and happy temperament.
+Melancholy attracts, while bad humor repels.
+
+Hypochondria is a species of torment which not only makes us
+unreasonably cross with the things of the present; not only fills us
+with groundless anxiety on the score of future misfortunes entirely
+of our own manufacture; but also leads to unmerited self-reproach for
+what we have done in the past.
+
+Hypochondria shows itself in a perpetual hunting after things that vex
+and annoy, and then brooding over them. The cause of it is an inward
+morbid discontent, often co-existing with a naturally restless
+temperament. In their extreme form, this discontent and this unrest
+lead to suicide.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Any incident, however trivial, that rouses disagreeable emotion,
+leaves an after-effect in our mind, which for the time it lasts,
+prevents our taking a clear objective view of the things about us, and
+tinges all our thoughts: just as a small object held close to the eye
+limits and distorts our field of vision.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+What makes people _hard-hearted_ is this, that each man has, or
+fancies he has, as much as he can bear in his own troubles. Hence, if
+a man suddenly finds himself in an unusually happy position, it will
+in most cases result in his being sympathetic and kind. But if he has
+never been in any other than a happy position, or this becomes his
+permanent state, the effect of it is often just the contrary: it so
+far removes him from suffering that he is incapable of feeling any
+more sympathy with it. So it is that the poor often show themselves
+more ready to help than the rich.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+At times it seems as though we both wanted and did not want the same
+thing, and felt at once glad and sorry about it. For instance, if
+on some fixed date we are going to be put to a decisive test about
+anything in which it would be a great advantage to us to come off
+victorious, we shall be anxious for it to take place at once, and at
+the same time we shall tremble at the thought of its approach. And if,
+in the meantime, we hear that, for once in a way, the date has been
+postponed, we shall experience a feeling both of pleasure and of
+annoyance; for the news is disappointing, but nevertheless it affords
+us momentary relief. It is just the same thing if we are expecting
+some important letter carrying a definite decision, and it fails to
+arrive.
+
+In such cases there are really two different motives at work in us;
+the stronger but more distant of the two being the desire to stand
+the test and to have the decision given in our favor; and the weaker,
+which touches us more nearly, the wish to be left for the present in
+peace and quiet, and accordingly in further enjoyment of the advantage
+which at any rate attaches to a state of hopeful uncertainty, compared
+with the possibility that the issue may be unfavorable.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+In my head there is a permanent opposition-party; and whenever I take
+any step or come to any decision--though I may have given the matter
+mature consideration--it afterwards attacks what I have done, without,
+however, being each time necessarily in the right. This is, I suppose,
+only a form of rectification on the part of the spirit of scrutiny;
+but it often reproaches me when I do not deserve it. The same thing,
+no doubt, happens to many others as well; for where is the man who
+can help thinking that, after all, it were better not to have done
+something that he did with great deliberation:
+
+ _Quid tam dextro pede concipis ut te
+ Conatus non poeniteat votique peracti_?
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Why is it that _common_ is an expression of contempt? and that
+_uncommon, extraordinary, distinguished_, denote approbation? Why is
+everything that is common contemptible?
+
+_Common_ in its original meaning denotes that which is peculiar to all
+men, _i.e_., shared equally by the whole species, and therefore an
+inherent part of its nature. Accordingly, if an individual possesses
+no qualities beyond those which attach to mankind in general, he is
+a _common man. Ordinary_ is a much milder word, and refers rather
+to intellectual character; whereas _common_ has more of a moral
+application.
+
+What value can a creature have that is not a whit different from
+millions of its kind? Millions, do I say? nay, an infiniture of
+creatures which, century after century, in never-ending flow, Nature
+sends bubbling up from her inexhaustible springs; as generous with
+them as the smith with the useless sparks that fly around his anvil.
+
+It is obviously quite right that a creature which has no qualities
+except those of the species, should have to confine its claim to an
+existence entirely within the limits of the species, and live a life
+conditioned by those limits.
+
+In various passages of my works,[1] I have argued that whilst a lower
+animal possesses nothing more than the generic character of its
+species, man is the only being which can lay claim to possess an
+individual character. But in most men this individual character comes
+to very little in reality; and they may be almost all ranged under
+certain classes: _ce sont des espèces_. Their thoughts and desires,
+like their faces, are those of the species, or, at any rate, those
+of the class to which they belong; and accordingly, they are of a
+trivial, every-day, common character, and exist by the thousand. You
+can usually tell beforehand what they are likely to do and say. They
+have no special stamp or mark to distinguish them; they are like
+manufactured goods, all of a piece.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Grundprobleme der Ethik_, p. 48; _Welt als Wille und
+Vorstellung_, vol. i. p. 338.]
+
+If, then, their nature is merged in that of the species, how shall
+their existence go beyond it? The curse of vulgarity puts men on a par
+with the lower animals, by allowing them none but a generic nature, a
+generic form of existence. Anything that is high or great or noble,
+must then, as a mater of course, and by its very nature, stand alone
+in a world where no better expression can be found to denote what is
+base and contemptible than that which I have mentioned as in general
+use, namely, _common_.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Will, as the _thing-in-itself_, is the foundation of all being; it
+is part and parcel of every creature, and the permanent element in
+everything. Will, then, is that which we possess in common with all
+men, nay, with all animals, and even with lower forms of existence;
+and in so far we are akin to everything--so far, that is, as
+everything is filled to overflowing with will. On the other hand, that
+which places one being over another, and sets differences between man
+and man, is intellect and knowledge; therefore in every manifestation
+of self we should, as far as possible, give play to the intellect
+alone; for, as we have seen, the will is the _common_ part of us.
+Every violent exhibition of will is common and vulgar; in other words,
+it reduces us to the level of the species, and makes us a mere type
+and example of it; in that it is just the character of the
+species that we are showing. So every fit of anger is something
+_common_--every unrestrained display of joy, or of hate, or fear--in
+short, every form of emotion; in other words, every movement of the
+will, if it's so strong as decidedly to outweigh the intellectual
+element in consciousness, and to make the man appear as a being that
+_wills_ rather than _knows_.
+
+In giving way to emotion of this violent kind, the greatest genius
+puts himself on a level with the commonest son of earth. Contrarily,
+if a man desires to be absolutely uncommon, in other words, great, he
+should never allow his consciousness to be taken possession of
+and dominated by the movement of his will, however much he may be
+solicited thereto. For example, he must be able to observe that other
+people are badly disposed towards him, without feeling any hatred
+towards them himself; nay, there is no surer sign of a great mind than
+that it refuses to notice annoying and insulting expressions, but
+straightway ascribes them, as it ascribes countless other mistakes, to
+the defective knowledge of the speaker, and so merely observes without
+feeling them. This is the meaning of that remark of Gracian, that
+nothing is more unworthy of a man than to let it be seen that he is
+one--_el mayor desdoro de un hombre es dar muestras de que es hombre_.
+
+And even in the drama, which is the peculiar province of the passions
+and emotions, it is easy for them to appear common and vulgar. And
+this is specially observable in the works of the French tragic
+writers, who set no other aim before themselves but the delineation
+of the passions; and by indulging at one moment in a vaporous kind
+of pathos which makes them ridiculous, at another in epigrammatic
+witticisms, endeavor to conceal the vulgarity of their subject. I
+remember seeing the celebrated Mademoiselle Rachel as Maria Stuart:
+and when she burst out in fury against Elizabeth--though she did it
+very well--I could not help thinking of a washerwoman. She played
+the final parting in such a way as to deprive it of all true tragic
+feeling, of which, indeed, the French have no notion at all. The same
+part was incomparably better played by the Italian Ristori; and, in
+fact, the Italian nature, though in many respects very different from
+the German, shares its appreciation for what is deep, serious, and
+true in Art; herein opposed to the French, which everywhere betrays
+that it possesses none of this feeling whatever.
+
+The noble, in other words, the uncommon, element in the drama--nay,
+what is sublime in it--is not reached until the intellect is set to
+work, as opposed to the will; until it takes a free flight over all
+those passionate movements of the will, and makes them subject of its
+contemplation. Shakespeare, in particular, shows that this is his
+general method, more especially in Hamlet. And only when intellect
+rises to the point where the vanity of all effort is manifest, and the
+will proceeds to an act of self-annulment, is the drama tragic in the
+true sense of the word; it is then that it reaches its highest aim in
+becoming really sublime.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Every man takes the limits of his own field of vision for the limits
+of the world. This is an error of the intellect as inevitable as that
+error of the eye which lets us fancy that on the horizon heaven and
+earth meet. This explains many things, and among them the fact that
+everyone measures us with his own standard--generally about as long as
+a tailor's tape, and we have to put up with it: as also that no one
+will allow us to be taller than himself--a supposition which is once
+for all taken for granted.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+There is no doubt that many a man owes his good fortune in life solely
+to the circumstance that he has a pleasant way of smiling, and so wins
+the heart in his favor.
+
+However, the heart would do better to be careful, and to remember what
+Hamlet put down in his tablets--_that one may smile, and smile, and be
+a villain_.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Everything that is really fundamental in a man, and therefore genuine
+works, as such, unconsciously; in this respect like the power of
+nature. That which has passed through the domain of consciousness is
+thereby transformed into an idea or picture; and so if it comes to be
+uttered, it is only an idea or picture which passes from one person to
+another.
+
+Accordingly, any quality of mind or character that is genuine and
+lasting, is originally unconscious; and it is only when unconsciously
+brought into play that it makes a profound impression. If any like
+quality is consciously exercised, it means that it has been worked up;
+it becomes intentional, and therefore matter of affectation, in other
+words, of deception.
+
+If a man does a thing unconsciously, it costs him no trouble; but if
+he tries to do it by taking trouble, he fails. This applies to the
+origin of those fundamental ideas which form the pith and marrow of
+all genuine work. Only that which is innate is genuine and will hold
+water; and every man who wants to achieve something, whether in
+practical life, in literature, or in art, must _follow the rules
+without knowing them_.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Men of very great capacity, will as a rule, find the company of very
+stupid people preferable to that of the common run; for the same
+reason that the tyrant and the mob, the grandfather and the
+grandchildren, are natural allies.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+That line of Ovid's,
+
+ _Pronaque cum spectent animalia cetera terram_,
+
+can be applied in its true physical sense to the lower animals alone;
+but in a metaphorical and spiritual sense it is, alas! true of nearly
+all men as well. All their plans and projects are merged in the desire
+of physical enjoyment, physical well-being. They may, indeed, have
+personal interests, often embracing a very varied sphere; but still
+these latter receive their importance entirely from the relation in
+which they stand to the former. This is not only proved by their
+manner of life and the things they say, but it even shows itself in
+the way they look, the expression of their physiognomy, their gait and
+gesticulations. Everything about them cries out; _in terram prona_!
+
+It is not to them, it is only to the nobler and more highly endowed
+natures--men who really think and look about them in the world, and
+form exceptional specimens of humanity--that the next lines are
+applicable;
+
+ _Os homini sublime dedit coelumque tueri
+ Jussit et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus_.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+No one knows what capacities for doing and suffering he has in
+himself, until something comes to rouse them to activity: just as in
+a pond of still water, lying there like a mirror, there is no sign of
+the roar and thunder with which it can leap from the precipice, and
+yet remain what it is; or again, rise high in the air as a fountain.
+When water is as cold as ice, you can have no idea of the latent
+warmth contained in it.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Why is it that, in spite of all the mirrors in the world, no one
+really knows what he looks like?
+
+A man may call to mind the face of his friend, but not his own. Here,
+then, is an initial difficulty in the way of applying the maxim, _Know
+thyself_.
+
+This is partly, no doubt, to be explained by the fact that it is
+physically impossible for a man to see himself in the glass except
+with face turned straight towards it and perfectly motionless; where
+the expression of the eye, which counts for so much, and really gives
+its whole character to the face, is to a great extent lost. But
+co-existing with this physical impossibility, there seems to me to be
+an ethical impossibility of an analogous nature, and producing the
+same effect. A man cannot look upon his own reflection as though the
+person presented there were _a stranger_ to him; and yet this is
+necessary if he is to take _an objective view_. In the last resort,
+an objective view means a deep-rooted feeling on the part of the
+individual, as a moral being, that that which he is contemplating is
+_not himself_[1]; and unless he can take this point of view, he will
+not see things in a really true light, which is possible only if he is
+alive to their actual defects, exactly as they are. Instead of that,
+when a man sees himself in the glass, something out of his own
+egotistic nature whispers to him to take care to remember that _it is
+no stranger, but himself, that he is looking at_; and this operates as
+a _noli me tang ere_, and prevents him taking an objective view. It
+seems, indeed, as if, without the leaven of a grain of malice, such a
+view were impossible.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. _Grundprobleme der Ethik_, p. 275.]
+
+ * * * * *
+
+According as a man's mental energy is exerted or relaxed, will life
+appear to him either so short, and petty, and fleeting, that nothing
+can possibly happen over which it is worth his while to spend emotion;
+that nothing really matters, whether it is pleasure or riches, or even
+fame, and that in whatever way a man may have failed, he cannot
+have lost much--or, on the other hand, life will seem so long, so
+important, so all in all, so momentous and so full of difficulty that
+we have to plunge into it with our whole soul if we are to obtain a
+share of its goods, make sure of its prizes, and carry out our plans.
+This latter is the immanent and common view of life; it is what
+Gracian means when he speaks of the serious way of looking
+at things--_tomar muy de veras el vivir_. The former is the
+transcendental view, which is well expressed in Ovid's _non est
+tanti_--it is not worth so much trouble; still better, however, by
+Plato's remark that nothing in human affairs is worth any great
+anxiety--[Greek: oute ti ton anthropinon axion esti megalaes
+spoudaes.] This condition of mind is due to the intellect having got
+the upper hand in the domain of consciousness, where, freed from
+the mere service of the will, it looks upon the phenomena of life
+objectively, and so cannot fail to gain a clear insight into its
+vain and futile character. But in the other condition of mind, will
+predominates; and the intellect exists only to light it on its way to
+the attainment of its desires.
+
+A man is great or small according as he leans to the one or the other
+of these views of life.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+People of very brilliant ability think little of admitting their
+errors and weaknesses, or of letting others see them. They look upon
+them as something for which they have duly paid; and instead of
+fancying that these weaknesses are a disgrace to them, they consider
+they are doing them an honor. This is especially the case when
+the errors are of the kind that hang together with their
+qualities--_conditiones sine quibus non_--or, as George Sand said,
+_les défauts de ses vertus_.
+
+Contrarily, there are people of good character and irreproachable
+intellectual capacity, who, far from admitting the few little
+weaknesses they have, conceal them with care, and show themselves very
+sensitive to any suggestion of their existence; and this, just because
+their whole merit consists in being free from error and infirmity. If
+these people are found to have done anything wrong, their reputation
+immediately suffers.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+With people of only moderate ability, modesty is mere honesty; but
+with those who possess great talent, it is hypocrisy. Hence, it is
+just as becoming in the latter to make no secret of the respect they
+bear themselves and no disguise of the fact that they are conscious of
+unusual power, as it is in the former to be modest. Valerius
+Maximus gives some very neat examples of this in his chapter on
+self-confidence, _de fiducia sui_.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Not to go to the theatre is like making one's toilet without a mirror.
+But it is still worse to take a decision without consulting a friend.
+For a man may have the most excellent judgment in all other matters,
+and yet go wrong in those which concern himself; because here the will
+comes in and deranges the intellect at once. Therefore let a man take
+counsel of a friend. A doctor can cure everyone but himself; if he
+falls ill, he sends for a colleague.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+In all that we do, we wish, more or less, to come to the end; we are
+impatient to finish and glad to be done. But the last scene of all,
+the general end, is something that, as a rule, we wish as far off as
+may be.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Every parting gives a foretaste of death; every coming together again
+a foretaste of the resurrection. This is why even people who were
+indifferent to each other, rejoice so much if they come together again
+after twenty or thirty years' separation.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Intellects differ from one another in a very real and fundamental way:
+but no comparison can well be made by merely general observations. It
+is necessary to come close, and to go into details; for the difference
+that exists cannot be seen from afar; and it is not easy to judge by
+outward appearances, as in the several cases of education, leisure and
+occupation. But even judging by these alone, it must be admitted that
+many a man has _a degree of existence_ at least ten times as high as
+another--in other words, exists ten times as much.
+
+I am not speaking here of savages whose life is often only one degree
+above that of the apes in their woods. Consider, for instance, a
+porter in Naples or Venice (in the north of Europe solicitude for the
+winter months makes people more thoughtful and therefore reflective);
+look at the life he leads, from its beginning to its end:--driven by
+poverty; living on his physical strength; meeting the needs of every
+day, nay, of every hour, by hard work, great effort, constant tumult,
+want in all its forms, no care for the morrow; his only comfort
+rest after exhaustion; continuous quarreling; not a moment free for
+reflection; such sensual delights as a mild climate and only just
+sufficient food will permit of; and then, finally, as the metaphysical
+element, the crass superstition of his church; the whole forming a
+manner of life with only a low degree of consciousness, where a man
+hustles, or rather is hustled, through his existence. This restless
+and confused dream forms the life of how many millions!
+
+Such men _think_ only just so much as is necessary to carry out their
+will for the moment. They never reflect upon their life as a connected
+whole, let alone, then, upon existence in general; to a certain extent
+they may be said to exist without really knowing it. The existence of
+the mobsman or the slave who lives on in this unthinking way, stands
+very much nearer than ours to that of the brute, which is confined
+entirely to the present moment; but, for that very reason, it has also
+less of pain in it than ours. Nay, since all pleasure is in its nature
+negative, that is to say, consists in freedom from some form of misery
+or need, the constant and rapid interchange between setting about
+something and getting it done, which is the permanent accompaniment of
+the work they do, and then again the augmented form which this
+takes when they go from work to rest and the satisfaction of their
+needs--all this gives them a constant source of enjoyment; and the
+fact that it is much commoner to see happy faces amongst the poor than
+amongst the rich, is a sure proof that it is used to good advantage.
+
+Passing from this kind of man, consider, next, the sober, sensible
+merchant, who leads a life of speculation, thinks long over his plans
+and carries them out with great care, founds a house, and provides for
+his wife, his children and descendants; takes his share, too, in the
+life of a community. It is obvious that a man like this has a much
+higher degree of consciousness than the former, and so his existence
+has a higher degree of reality.
+
+Then look at the man of learning, who investigates, it may be, the
+history of the past. He will have reached the point at which a man
+becomes conscious of existence as a whole, sees beyond the period of
+his own life, beyond his own personal interests, thinking over the
+whole course of the world's history.
+
+Then, finally, look at the poet or the philosopher, in whom reflection
+has reached such a height, that, instead of being drawn on to
+investigate any one particular phenomenon of existence, he stands in
+amazement _before existence itself_, this great sphinx, and makes it
+his problem. In him consciousness has reached the degree of clearness
+at which it embraces the world itself: his intellect has completely
+abandoned its function as the servant of his will, and now holds the
+world before him; and the world calls upon him much more to examine
+and consider it, than to play a part in it himself. If, then, the
+degree of consciousness is the degree of reality, such a man will be
+said to exist most of all, and there will be sense and significance in
+so describing him.
+
+Between the two extremes here sketched, and the intervening stages,
+everyone will be able to find the place at which he himself stands.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+We know that man is in general superior to all other animals, and this
+is also the case in his capacity for being trained. Mohammedans are
+trained to pray with their faces turned towards Mecca, five times a
+day; and they never fail to do it. Christians are trained to cross
+themselves on certain occasions, to bow, and so on. Indeed, it may
+be said that religion is the _chef d'oeuvre_ of the art of training,
+because it trains people in the way they shall think: and, as is well
+known, you cannot begin the process too early. There is no absurdity
+so palpable but that it may be firmly planted in the human head if
+you only begin to inculcate it before the age of five, by constantly
+repeating it with an air of great solemnity. For as in the case of
+animals, so in that of men, training is successful only when you begin
+in early youth.
+
+Noblemen and gentlemen are trained to hold nothing sacred but their
+word of honor--to maintain a zealous, rigid, and unshaken belief in
+the ridiculous code of chivalry; and if they are called upon to do so,
+to seal their belief by dying for it, and seriously to regard a king
+as a being of a higher order.
+
+Again, our expressions of politeness, the compliments we make, in
+particular, the respectful attentions we pay to ladies, are a matter
+of training; as also our esteem for good birth, rank, titles, and so
+on. Of the same character is the resentment we feel at any insult
+directed against us; and the measure of this resentment may be exactly
+determined by the nature of the insult. An Englishman, for instance,
+thinks it a deadly insult to be told that he is no gentleman, or,
+still worse, that he is a liar; a Frenchman has the same feeling if
+you call him a coward, and a German if you say he is stupid.
+
+There are many persons who are trained to be strictly honorable in
+regard to one particular matter, while they have little honor to boast
+of in anything else. Many a man, for instance, will not steal your
+money; but he will lay hands on everything of yours that he can enjoy
+without having to pay for it. A man of business will often deceive you
+without the slightest scruple, but he will absolutely refuse to commit
+a theft.
+
+Imagination is strong in a man when that particular function of the
+brain which enables him to observe is roused to activity without
+any necessary excitement of the senses. Accordingly, we find that
+imagination is active just in proportion as our senses are not excited
+by external objects. A long period of solitude, whether in prison or
+in a sick room; quiet, twilight, darkness--these are the things that
+promote its activity; and under their influence it comes into play of
+itself. On the other hand, when a great deal of material is presented
+to our faculties of observation, as happens on a journey, or in
+the hurly-burly of the world, or, again, in broad daylight, the
+imagination is idle, and, even though call may be made upon it,
+refuses to become active, as though it understood that that was not
+its proper time.
+
+However, if the imagination is to yield any real product, it must have
+received a great deal of material from the external world. This is
+the only way in which its storehouse can be filled. The phantasy is
+nourished much in the same way as the body, which is least capable
+of any work and enjoys doing nothing just in the very moment when it
+receives its food which it has to digest. And yet it is to this very
+food that it owes the power which it afterwards puts forth at the
+right time.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Opinion is like a pendulum and obeys the same law. If it goes past
+the centre of gravity on one side, it must go a like distance on the
+other; and it is only after a certain time that it finds the true
+point at which it can remain at rest.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+By a process of contradiction, distance in space makes things look
+small, and therefore free from defect. This is why a landscape looks
+so much better in a contracting mirror or in a _camera obscura_, than
+it is in reality. The same effect is produced by distance in time. The
+scenes and events of long ago, and the persons who took part in them,
+wear a charming aspect to the eye of memory, which sees only the
+outlines and takes no note of disagreeable details. The present enjoys
+no such advantage, and so it always seems defective.
+
+And again, as regards space, small objects close to us look big, and
+if they are very close, we may be able to see nothing else, but when
+we go a little way off, they become minute and invisible. It is the
+same again as regards time. The little incidents and accidents of
+every day fill us with emotion, anxiety, annoyance, passion, as long
+as they are close to us, when they appear so big, so important, so
+serious; but as soon as they are borne down the restless stream of
+time, they lose what significance they had; we think no more of them
+and soon forget them altogether. They were big only because they were
+near.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+_Joy_ and _sorrow_ are not ideas of the mind, but affections of the
+will, and so they do not lie in the domain of memory. We cannot recall
+our joys and sorrows; by which I mean that we cannot renew them. We
+can recall only the _ideas_ that accompanied them; and, in particular,
+the things we were led to say; and these form a gauge of our feelings
+at the time. Hence our memory of joys and sorrows is always imperfect,
+and they become a matter of indifference to us as soon as they are
+over. This explains the vanity of the attempt, which we sometimes
+make, to revive the pleasures and the pains of the past. Pleasure and
+pain are essentially an affair of the will; and the will, as such, is
+not possessed of memory, which is a function of the intellect; and
+this in its turn gives out and takes in nothing but thoughts and
+ideas, which are not here in question.
+
+It is a curious fact that in bad days we can very vividly recall the
+good time that is now no more; but that in good days, we have only a
+very cold and imperfect memory of the bad.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+We have a much better memory of actual objects or pictures than
+for mere ideas. Hence a good imagination makes it easier to learn
+languages; for by its aid, the new word is at once united with the
+actual object to which it refers; whereas, if there is no imagination,
+it is simply put on a parallel with the equivalent word in the mother
+tongue.
+
+Mnemonics should not only mean the art of keeping something indirectly
+in the memory by the use of some direct pun or witticism; it should,
+rather, be applied to a systematic theory of memory, and explain its
+several attributes by reference both to its real nature, and to the
+relation in which these attributes stand to one another.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+There are moments in life when our senses obtain a higher and rarer
+degree of clearness, apart from any particular occasion for it in the
+nature of our surroundings; and explicable, rather, on physiological
+grounds alone, as the result of some enhanced state of susceptibility,
+working from within outwards. Such moments remain indelibly impressed
+upon the memory, and preserve themselves in their individuality
+entire. We can assign no reason for it, nor explain why this among so
+many thousand moments like it should be specially remembered. It seems
+as much a matter of chance as when single specimens of a whole race of
+animals now extinct are discovered in the layers of a rock; or when,
+on opening a book, we light upon an insect accidentally crushed within
+the leaves. Memories of this kind are always sweet and pleasant.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+It occasionally happens that, for no particular reason, long-forgotten
+scenes suddenly start up in the memory. This may in many cases be due
+to the action of some hardly perceptible odor, which accompanied those
+scenes and now recurs exactly same as before. For it is well known
+that the sense of smell is specially effective in awakening memories,
+and that in general it does not require much to rouse a train of
+ideas. And I may say, in passing, that the sense of sight is connected
+with the understanding,[1] the sense of hearing with the reason,[2]
+and, as we see in the present case, the sense of smell with the
+memory. Touch and Taste are more material and dependent upon contact.
+They have no ideal side.
+
+[Footnote 1:_Wierfache Wurzel_ § 21.]
+
+[Footnote 2: _Parerga_ vol. ii, § 311.]
+
+ * * * * *
+
+It must also be reckoned among the peculiar attributes of memory
+that a slight state of intoxication often so greatly enhances the
+recollection of past times and scenes, that all the circumstances
+connected with them come back much more clearly than would be possible
+in a state of sobriety; but that, on the other hand, the recollection
+of what one said or did while the intoxication lasted, is more than
+usually imperfect; nay, that if one has been absolutely tipsy, it is
+gone altogether. We may say, then, that whilst intoxication enhances
+the memory for what is past, it allows it to remember little of the
+present.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Men need some kind of external activity, because they are inactive
+within. Contrarily, if they are active within, they do not care to be
+dragged out of themselves; it disturbs and impedes their thoughts in a
+way that is often most ruinous to them.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+I am not surprised that some people are bored when they find
+themselves alone; for they cannot laugh if they are quite by
+themselves. The very idea of it seems folly to them.
+
+Are we, then, to look upon laughter as merely O signal for others--a
+mere sign, like a word? What makes it impossible for people to laugh
+when they are alone is nothing but want of imagination, dullness of
+mind generally--[Greek: anaisthaesia kai bradutaes psuchaes], as
+Theophrastus has it.[1] The lower animals never laugh, either alone
+or in company. Myson, the misanthropist, was once surprised by one of
+these people as he was laughing to himself. _Why do you laugh_? he
+asked; _there is no one with you. That is just why I am laughing_,
+said Myson.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Characters_, c. 27.]
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Natural _gesticulation_, such as commonly accompanies any lively talk,
+is a language of its own, more widespread, even, than the language of
+words--so far, I mean, as it is independent of words and alike in all
+nations. It is true that nations make use of it in proportion as they
+are vivacious, and that in particular cases, amongst the Italians, for
+instance, it is supplemented by certain peculiar gestures which are
+merely conventional, and therefore possessed of nothing more than a
+local value.
+
+In the universal use made of it, gesticulation has some analogy with
+logic and grammar, in that it has to do with the form, rather
+than with the matter of conversation; but on the other hand it is
+distinguishable from them by the fact that it has more of a moral than
+of an intellectual bearing; in other words, it reflects the movements
+of the will. As an accompaniment of conversation it is like the bass
+of a melody; and if, as in music, it keeps true to the progress of the
+treble, it serves to heighten the effect.
+
+In a conversation, the gesture depends upon the form in which the
+subject-matter is conveyed; and it is interesting to observe that,
+whatever that subject-matter may be, with a recurrence of the form,
+the very same gesture is repeated. So if I happen to see--from my
+window, say--two persons carrying on a lively conversation, without
+my being able to catch a word, I can, nevertheless, understand the
+general nature of it perfectly well; I mean, the kind of thing that is
+being said and the form it takes. There is no mistake about it. The
+speaker is arguing about something, advancing his reasons, then
+limiting their application, then driving them home and drawing the
+conclusion in triumph; or he is recounting his experiences, proving,
+perhaps, beyond the shadow of a doubt, how much he has been injured,
+but bringing the clearest and most damning evidence to show that
+his opponents were foolish and obstinate people who would not be
+convinced; or else he is telling of the splendid plan he laid, and how
+he carried it to a successful issue, or perhaps failed because
+the luck was against him; or, it may be, he is saying that he was
+completely at a loss to know what to do, or that he was quick in
+seeing some traps set for him, and that by insisting on his rights or
+by applying a little force, he succeeded in frustrating and punishing
+his enemies; and so on in hundreds of cases of a similar kind.
+
+Strictly speaking, however, what I get from gesticulation alone is
+an abstract notion of the essential drift of what is being said, and
+that, too, whether I judge from a moral or an intellectual point of
+view. It is the quintessence, the true substance of the conversation,
+and this remains identical, no matter what may have given rise to the
+conversation, or what it may be about; the relation between the two
+being that of a general idea or class-name to the individuals which it
+covers.
+
+As I have said, the most interesting and amusing part of the matter is
+the complete identity and solidarity of the gestures used to denote
+the same set of circumstances, even though by people of very different
+temperament; so that the gestures become exactly like words of
+a language, alike for every one, and subject only to such small
+modifications as depend upon variety of accent and education. And yet
+there can be no doubt but that these standing gestures, which every
+one uses, are the result of no convention or collusion. They are
+original and innate--a true language of nature; consolidated, it may
+be, by imitation and the influence of custom.
+
+It is well known that it is part of an actor's duty to make a careful
+study of gesture; and the same thing is true, to a somewhat smaller
+degree, of a public speaker. This study must consist chiefly in
+watching others and imitating their movements, for there are no
+abstract rules fairly applicable to the matter, with the exception
+of some very general leading principles, such as--to take an
+example--that the gesture must not follow the word, but rather
+come immediately before it, by way of announcing its approach and
+attracting the hearer's attention.
+
+Englishmen entertain a peculiar contempt for gesticulation, and look
+upon it as something vulgar and undignified. This seems to me a silly
+prejudice on their part, and the outcome of their general prudery. For
+here we have a language which nature has given to every one, and which
+every one understands; and to do away with and forbid it for no better
+reason than that it is opposed to that much-lauded thing, gentlemanly
+feeling, is a very questionable proceeding.
+
+
+
+
+ON EDUCATION.
+
+
+The human intellect is said to be so constituted that _general ideas_
+arise by abstraction from _particular observations_, and therefore
+come after them in point of time. If this is what actually occurs, as
+happens in the case of a man who has to depend solely upon his own
+experience for what he learns--who has no teacher and no book,--such
+a man knows quite well which of his particular observations belong to
+and are represented by each of his general ideas. He has a perfect
+acquaintance with both sides of his experience, and accordingly, he
+treats everything that comes in his way from a right standpoint. This
+might be called the _natural_ method of education.
+
+Contrarily, the _artificial_ method is to hear what other people say,
+to learn and to read, and so to get your head crammed full of general
+ideas before you have any sort of extended acquaintance with the world
+as it is, and as you may see it for yourself. You will be told that
+the particular observations which go to make these general ideas will
+come to you later on in the course of experience; but until that time
+arrives, you apply your general ideas wrongly, you judge men and
+things from a wrong standpoint, you see them in a wrong light, and
+treat them in a wrong way. So it is that education perverts the mind.
+
+This explains why it so frequently happens that, after a long course
+of learning and reading, we enter upon the world in our youth, partly
+with an artless ignorance of things, partly with wrong notions about
+them; so that our demeanor savors at one moment of a nervous anxiety,
+at another of a mistaken confidence. The reason of this is simply that
+our head is full of general ideas which we are now trying to turn to
+some use, but which we hardly ever apply rightly. This is the result
+of acting in direct opposition to the natural development of the mind
+by obtaining general ideas first, and particular observations last:
+it is putting the cart before the horse. Instead of developing the
+child's own faculties of discernment, and teaching it to judge and
+think for itself, the teacher uses all his energies to stuff its head
+full of the ready-made thoughts of other people. The mistaken views
+of life, which spring from a false application of general ideas, have
+afterwards to be corrected by long years of experience; and it is
+seldom that they are wholly corrected. This is why so few men of
+learning are possessed of common-sense, such as is often to be met
+with in people who have had no instruction at all.
+
+_To acquire a knowledge of the world_ might be defined as the aim
+of all education; and it follows from what I have said that special
+stress should be laid upon beginning to acquire this knowledge _at
+the right end_. As I have shown, this means, in the main, that the
+particular observation of a thing shall precede the general idea of
+it; further, that narrow and circumscribed ideas shall come before
+ideas of a wide range. It means, therefore, that the whole system of
+education shall follow in the steps that must have been taken by the
+ideas themselves in the course of their formation. But whenever any of
+these steps are skipped or left out, the instruction is defective, and
+the ideas obtained are false; and finally, a distorted view of the
+world arises, peculiar to the individual himself--a view such as
+almost everyone entertains for some time, and most men for as long as
+they live. No one can look into his own mind without seeing that it
+was only after reaching a very mature age, and in some cases when he
+least expected it, that he came to a right understanding or a clear
+view of many matters in his life, that, after all, were not very
+difficult or complicated. Up till then, they were points in his
+knowledge of the world which were still obscure, due to his having
+skipped some particular lesson in those early days of his education,
+whatever it may have been like--whether artificial and conventional,
+or of that natural kind which is based upon individual experience.
+
+It follows that an attempt should be made to find out the strictly
+natural course of knowledge, so that education may proceed
+methodically by keeping to it; and that children may become acquainted
+with the ways of the world, without getting wrong ideas into their
+heads, which very often cannot be got out again. If this plan were
+adopted, special care would have to be taken to prevent children
+from using words without clearly understanding their meaning and
+application. The fatal tendency to be satisfied with words instead of
+trying to understand things--to learn phrases by heart, so that
+they may prove a refuge in time of need, exists, as a rule, even in
+children; and the tendency lasts on into manhood, making the knowledge
+of many learned persons to consist in mere verbiage.
+
+However, the main endeavor must always be to let particular
+observations precede general ideas, and not _vice versa_, as is
+usually and unfortunately the case; as though a child should come
+feet foremost into the world, or a verse be begun by writing down the
+rhyme! The ordinary method is to imprint ideas and opinions, in the
+strict sense of the word, _prejudices_, on the mind of the child,
+before it has had any but a very few particular observations. It is
+thus that he afterwards comes to view the world and gather experience
+through the medium of those ready-made ideas, rather than to let his
+ideas be formed for him out of his own experience of life, as they
+ought to be.
+
+A man sees a great many things when he looks at the world for himself,
+and he sees them from many sides; but this method of learning is not
+nearly so short or so quick as the method which employs abstract
+ideas and makes hasty generalizations about everything. Experience,
+therefore, will be a long time in correcting preconceived ideas, or
+perhaps never bring its task to an end; for wherever a man finds that
+the aspect of things seems to contradict the general ideas he has
+formed, he will begin by rejecting the evidence it offers as partial
+and one-sided; nay, he will shut his eyes to it altogether and deny
+that it stands in any contradiction at all with his preconceived
+notions, in order that he may thus preserve them uninjured. So it is
+that many a man carries about a burden of wrong notions all his life
+long--crotchets, whims, fancies, prejudices, which at last become
+fixed ideas. The fact is that he has never tried to form his
+fundamental ideas for himself out of his own experience of life, his
+own way of looking at the world, because he has taken over his ideas
+ready-made from other people; and this it is that makes him--as it
+makes how many others!--so shallow and superficial.
+
+Instead of that method of instruction, care should be taken to educate
+children on the natural lines. No idea should ever be established in a
+child's mind otherwise than by what the child can see for itself, or
+at any rate it should be verified by the same means; and the result of
+this would be that the child's ideas, if few, would be well-grounded
+and accurate. It would learn how to measure things by its own standard
+rather than by another's; and so it would escape a thousand strange
+fancies and prejudices, and not need to have them eradicated by the
+lessons it will subsequently be taught in the school of life. The
+child would, in this way, have its mind once for all habituated
+to clear views and thorough-going knowledge; it would use its own
+judgment and take an unbiased estimate of things.
+
+And, in general, children should not form their notions of what life
+is like from the copy before they have learned it from the original,
+to whatever aspect of it their attention may be directed. Instead,
+therefore, of hastening to place _books_, and books alone, in their
+hands, let them be made acquainted, step by step, with _things_--with
+the actual circumstances of human life. And above all let care be
+taken to bring them to a clear and objective view of the world as it
+is, to educate them always to derive their ideas directly from real
+life, and to shape them in conformity with it--not to fetch them from
+other sources, such as books, fairy tales, or what people say--then
+to apply them ready-made to real life. For this will mean that their
+heads are full of wrong notions, and that they will either see things
+in a false light or try in vain to _remodel the world_ to suit their
+views, and so enter upon false paths; and that, too, whether they are
+only constructing theories of life or engaged in the actual business
+of it. It is incredible how much harm is done when the seeds of wrong
+notions are laid in the mind in those early years, later on to bear a
+crop of prejudice; for the subsequent lessons, which are learned from
+real life in the world have to be devoted mainly to their extirpation.
+_To unlearn the evil_ was the answer, according to Diogenes
+Laertius,[1] Antisthenes gave, when he was asked what branch of
+knowledge was most necessary; and we can see what he meant.
+
+[Footnote 1: vi. 7.]
+
+No child under the age of fifteen should receive instruction in
+subjects which may possibly be the vehicle of serious error, such as
+philosophy, religion, or any other branch of knowledge where it is
+necessary to take large views; because wrong notions imbibed early can
+seldom be rooted out, and of all the intellectual faculties, judgment
+is the last to arrive at maturity. The child should give its attention
+either to subjects where no error is possible at all, such as
+mathematics, or to those in which there is no particular danger in
+making a mistake, such as languages, natural science, history and so
+on. And in general, the branches of knowledge which are to be studied
+at any period of life should be such as the mind is equal to at that
+period and can perfectly understand. Childhood and youth form the time
+for collecting materials, for getting a special and thorough knowledge
+of the individual and particular things. In those years it is too
+early to form views on a large scale; and ultimate explanations must
+be put off to a later date. The faculty of judgment, which cannot come
+into play without mature experience, should be left to itself; and
+care should be taken not to anticipate its action by inculcating
+prejudice, which will paralyze it for ever.
+
+On the other hand, the memory should be specially taxed in youth,
+since it is then that it is strongest and most tenacious. But in
+choosing the things that should be committed to memory the utmost care
+and forethought must be exercised; as lessons well learnt in youth are
+never forgotten. This precious soil must therefore be cultivated so as
+to bear as much fruit as possible. If you think how deeply rooted in
+your memory are those persons whom you knew in the first twelve years
+of your life, how indelible the impression made upon you by the events
+of those years, how clear your recollection of most of the things that
+happened to you then, most of what was told or taught you, it will
+seem a natural thing to take the susceptibility and tenacity of the
+mind at that period as the ground-work of education. This may be done
+by a strict observance of method, and a systematic regulation of the
+impressions which the mind is to receive.
+
+But the years of youth allotted to a man are short, and memory is, in
+general, bound within narrow limits; still more so, the memory of any
+one individual. Since this is the case, it is all-important to fill
+the memory with what is essential and material in any branch of
+knowledge, to the exclusion of everything else. The decision as to
+what is essential and material should rest with the masterminds in
+every department of thought; their choice should be made after the
+most mature deliberation, and the outcome of it fixed and determined.
+Such a choice would have to proceed by sifting the things which it
+is necessary and important for a man to know in general, and then,
+necessary and important for him to know in any particular business
+or calling. Knowledge of the first kind would have to be classified,
+after an encyclopaedic fashion, in graduated courses, adapted to the
+degree of general culture which a man may be expected to have in the
+circumstances in which he is placed; beginning with a course limited
+to the necessary requirements of primary education, and extending
+upwards to the subjects treated of in all the branches of
+philosophical thought. The regulation of the second kind of knowledge
+would be left to those who had shown genuine mastery in the several
+departments into which it is divided; and the whole system would
+provide an elaborate rule or canon for intellectual education, which
+would, of course, have to be revised every ten years. Some such
+arrangement as this would employ the youthful power of the memory to
+best advantage, and supply excellent working material to the faculty
+of judgment, when it made its appearance later on.
+
+A man's knowledge may be said to be mature, in other words, it has
+reached the most complete state of perfection to which he, as an
+individual, is capable of bringing it, when an exact correspondence is
+established between the whole of his abstract ideas and the things he
+has actually perceived for himself. This will mean that each of
+his abstract ideas rests, directly or indirectly, upon a basis of
+observation, which alone endows it with any real value; and also
+that he is able to place every observation he makes under the right
+abstract idea which belongs to it. Maturity is the work of experience
+alone; and therefore it requires time. The knowledge we derive from
+our own observation is usually distinct from that which we acquire
+through the medium of abstract ideas; the one coming to us in the
+natural way, the other by what people tell us, and the course of
+instruction we receive, whether it is good or bad. The result is, that
+in youth there is generally very little agreement or correspondence
+between our abstract ideas, which are merely phrases in the mind, and
+that real knowledge which we have obtained by our own observation. It
+is only later on that a gradual approach takes place between these two
+kinds of knowledge, accompanied by a mutual correction of error; and
+knowledge is not mature until this coalition is accomplished. This
+maturity or perfection of knowledge is something quite independent of
+another kind of perfection, which may be of a high or a low order--the
+perfection, I mean, to which a man may bring his own individual
+faculties; which is measured, not by any correspondence between the
+two kinds of knowledge, but by the degree of intensity which each kind
+attains.
+
+For the practical man the most needful thing is to acquire an accurate
+and profound knowledge of _the ways of the world_. But this, though
+the most needful, is also the most wearisome of all studies, as a man
+may reach a great age without coming to the end of his task; whereas,
+in the domain of the sciences, he masters the more important facts
+when he is still young. In acquiring that knowledge of the world, it
+is while he is a novice, namely, in boyhood and in youth, that the
+first and hardest lessons are put before him; but it often happens
+that even in later years there is still a great deal to be learned.
+
+The study is difficult enough in itself; but the difficulty is doubled
+by _novels_, which represent a state of things in life and the world,
+such as, in fact, does not exist. Youth is credulous, and accepts
+these views of life, which then become part and parcel of the mind; so
+that, instead of a merely negative condition of ignorance, you have
+positive error--a whole tissue of false notions to start with; and at
+a later date these actually spoil the schooling of experience, and put
+a wrong construction on the lessons it teaches. If, before this,
+the youth had no light at all to guide him, he is now misled by a
+will-o'-the-wisp; still more often is this the case with a girl.
+They have both had a false view of things foisted on them by reading
+novels; and expectations have been aroused which can never be
+fulfilled. This generally exercises a baneful influence on their whole
+life. In this respect those whose youth has allowed them no time or
+opportunity for reading novels--those who work with their hands and
+the like--are in a position of decided advantage. There are a few
+novels to which this reproach cannot be addressed--nay, which have an
+effect the contrary of bad. First and foremost, to give an example,
+_Gil Blas_, and the other works of Le Sage (or rather their Spanish
+originals); further, _The Vicar of Wakefield_, and, to some extent Sir
+Walter Scott's novels. _Don Quixote_ may be regarded as a satirical
+exhibition of the error to which I am referring.
+
+
+
+
+OF WOMEN.
+
+
+Schiller's poem in honor of women, _Würde der Frauen_, is the
+result of much careful thought, and it appeals to the reader by its
+antithetic style and its use of contrast; but as an expression of the
+true praise which should be accorded to them, it is, I think, inferior
+to these few words of Jouy's: _Without women, the beginning of our
+life would be helpless; the middle, devoid of pleasure; and the end,
+of consolation_. The same thing is more feelingly expressed by Byron
+in _Sardanapalus_:
+
+ _The very first
+ Of human life must spring from woman's breast,
+ Your first small words are taught you from her lips,
+ Your first tears quench'd by her, and your last sighs
+ Too often breathed out in a woman's hearing,
+ When men have shrunk from the ignoble care
+ Of watching the last hour of him who led them_.
+
+ (Act I Scene 2.)
+
+These two passages indicate the right standpoint for the appreciation
+of women.
+
+You need only look at the way in which she is formed, to see that
+woman is not meant to undergo great labor, whether of the mind or of
+the body. She pays the debt of life not by what she does, but by what
+she suffers; by the pains of child-bearing and care for the child,
+and by submission to her husband, to whom she should be a patient and
+cheering companion. The keenest sorrows and joys are not for her, nor
+is she called upon to display a great deal of strength. The current
+of her life should be more gentle, peaceful and trivial than man's,
+without being essentially happier or unhappier.
+
+Women are directly fitted for acting as the nurses and teachers of
+our early childhood by the fact that they are themselves childish,
+frivolous and short-sighted; in a word, they are big children all
+their life long--a kind of intermediate stage between the child and
+the full-grown man, who is man in the strict sense of the word. See
+how a girl will fondle a child for days together, dance with it and
+sing to it; and then think what a man, with the best will in the
+world, could do if he were put in her place.
+
+With young girls Nature seems to have had in view what, in the
+language of the drama, is called _a striking effect_; as for a few
+years she dowers them with a wealth of beauty and is lavish in her
+gift of charm, at the expense of all the rest of their life; so that
+during those years they may capture the fantasy of some man to such a
+degree that he is hurried away into undertaking the honorable care of
+them, in some form or other, as long as they live--a step for which
+there would not appear to be any sufficient warranty if reason only
+directed his thoughts. Accordingly, Nature has equipped woman, as she
+does all her creatures, with the weapons and implements requisite
+for the safeguarding of her existence, and for just as long as it is
+necessary for her to have them. Here, as elsewhere, Nature proceeds
+with her usual economy; for just as the female ant, after fecundation,
+loses her wings, which are then superfluous, nay, actually a danger
+to the business of breeding; so, after giving birth to one or two
+children, a woman generally loses her beauty; probably, indeed, for
+similar reasons.
+
+And so we find that young girls, in their hearts, look upon domestic
+affairs or work of any kind as of secondary importance, if not
+actually as a mere jest. The only business that really claims their
+earnest attention is love, making conquests, and everything connected
+with this--dress, dancing, and so on.
+
+The nobler and more perfect a thing is, the later and slower it is
+in arriving at maturity. A man reaches the maturity of his reasoning
+powers and mental faculties hardly before the age of twenty-eight; a
+woman at eighteen. And then, too, in the case of woman, it is only
+reason of a sort--very niggard in its dimensions. That is why women
+remain children their whole life long; never seeing anything but
+what is quite close to them, cleaving to the present moment, taking
+appearance for reality, and preferring trifles to matters of the first
+importance. For it is by virtue of his reasoning faculty that man does
+not live in the present only, like the brute, but looks about him and
+considers the past and the future; and this is the origin of prudence,
+as well as of that care and anxiety which so many people exhibit. Both
+the advantages and the disadvantages which this involves, are shared
+in by the woman to a smaller extent because of her weaker power
+of reasoning. She may, in fact, be described as intellectually
+short-sighted, because, while she has an intuitive understanding of
+what lies quite close to her, her field of vision is narrow and does
+not reach to what is remote; so that things which are absent, or past,
+or to come, have much less effect upon women than upon men. This is
+the reason why women are more often inclined to be extravagant, and
+sometimes carry their inclination to a length that borders upon
+madness. In their hearts, women think that it is men's business
+to earn money and theirs to spend it--- if possible during their
+husband's life, but, at any rate, after his death. The very fact
+that their husband hands them over his earnings for purposes of
+housekeeping, strengthens them in this belief.
+
+However many disadvantages all this may involve, there is at least
+this to be said in its favor; that the woman lives more in the present
+than the man, and that, if the present is at all tolerable, she enjoys
+it more eagerly. This is the source of that cheerfulness which
+is peculiar to women, fitting her to amuse man in his hours of
+recreation, and, in case of need, to console him when he is borne down
+by the weight of his cares.
+
+It is by no means a bad plan to consult women in matters of
+difficulty, as the Germans used to do in ancient times; for their way
+of looking at things is quite different from ours, chiefly in the
+fact that they like to take the shortest way to their goal, and, in
+general, manage to fix their eyes upon what lies before them; while
+we, as a rule, see far beyond it, just because it is in front of our
+noses. In cases like this, we need to be brought back to the right
+standpoint, so as to recover the near and simple view.
+
+Then, again, women are decidedly more sober in their judgment than
+we are, so that they do not see more in things than is really there;
+whilst, if our passions are aroused, we are apt to see things in an
+exaggerated way, or imagine what does not exist.
+
+The weakness of their reasoning faculty also explains why it is that
+women show more sympathy for the unfortunate than men do, and so treat
+them with more kindness and interest; and why it is that, on the
+contrary, they are inferior to men in point of justice, and less
+honorable and conscientious. For it is just because their reasoning
+power is weak that present circumstances have such a hold over them,
+and those concrete things, which lie directly before their eyes,
+exercise a power which is seldom counteracted to any extent by
+abstract principles of thought, by fixed rules of conduct, firm
+resolutions, or, in general, by consideration for the past and the
+future, or regard for what is absent and remote. Accordingly, they
+possess the first and main elements that go to make a virtuous
+character, but they are deficient in those secondary qualities which
+are often a necessary instrument in the formation of it.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: In this respect they may be compared to an animal
+organism which contains a liver but no gall-bladder. Here let me refer
+to what I have said in my treatise on _The Foundation of Morals_, §
+17.]
+
+Hence, it will be found that the fundamental fault of the female
+character is that it has _no sense of justice_. This is mainly due to
+the fact, already mentioned, that women are defective in the powers of
+reasoning and deliberation; but it is also traceable to the position
+which Nature has assigned to them as the weaker sex. They are
+dependent, not upon strength, but upon craft; and hence their
+instinctive capacity for cunning, and their ineradicable tendency to
+say what is not true. For as lions are provided with claws and teeth,
+and elephants and boars with tusks, bulls with horns, and cuttle fish
+with its clouds of inky fluid, so Nature has equipped woman, for her
+defence and protection, with the arts of dissimulation; and all the
+power which Nature has conferred upon man in the shape of physical
+strength and reason, has been bestowed upon women in this form. Hence,
+dissimulation is innate in woman, and almost as much a quality of the
+stupid as of the clever. It is as natural for them to make use of it
+on every occasion as it is for those animals to employ their means of
+defence when they are attacked; they have a feeling that in doing so
+they are only within their rights. Therefore a woman who is perfectly
+truthful and not given to dissimulation is perhaps an impossibility,
+and for this very reason they are so quick at seeing through
+dissimulation in others that it is not a wise thing to attempt it with
+them. But this fundamental defect which I have stated, with all
+that it entails, gives rise to falsity, faithlessness, treachery,
+ingratitude, and so on. Perjury in a court of justice is more
+often committed by women than by men. It may, indeed, be generally
+questioned whether women ought to be sworn in at all. From time to
+time one finds repeated cases everywhere of ladies, who want for
+nothing, taking things from shop-counters when no one is looking, and
+making off with them.
+
+Nature has appointed that the propagation of the species shall be the
+business of men who are young, strong and handsome; so that the race
+may not degenerate. This is the firm will and purpose of Nature in
+regard to the species, and it finds its expression in the passions of
+women. There is no law that is older or more powerful than this. Woe,
+then, to the man who sets up claims and interests that will conflict
+with it; whatever he may say and do, they will be unmercifully crushed
+at the first serious encounter. For the innate rule that governs
+women's conduct, though it is secret and unformulated, nay,
+unconscious in its working, is this: _We are justified in deceiving
+those who think they have acquired rights over the species by paying
+little attention to the individual, that is, to us. The constitution
+and, therefore, the welfare of the species have been placed in our
+hands and committed to our care, through the control we obtain over
+the next generation, which proceeds from us; let us discharge our
+duties conscientiously_. But women have no abstract knowledge of this
+leading principle; they are conscious of it only as a concrete fact;
+and they have no other method of giving expression to it than the
+way in which they act when the opportunity arrives. And then their
+conscience does not trouble them so much as we fancy; for in the
+darkest recesses of their heart, they are aware that in committing a
+breach of their duty towards the individual, they have all the
+better fulfilled their duty towards the species, which is infinitely
+greater.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: A more detailed discussion of the matter in question may
+be found in my chief work, _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, vol.
+ii, ch. 44.]
+
+And since women exist in the main solely for the propagation of the
+species, and are not destined for anything else, they live, as a rule,
+more for the species than for the individual, and in their hearts
+take the affairs of the species more seriously than those of the
+individual. This gives their whole life and being a certain levity;
+the general bent of their character is in a direction fundamentally
+different from that of man; and it is this to which produces that
+discord in married life which is so frequent, and almost the normal
+state.
+
+The natural feeling between men is mere indifference, but
+between women it is actual enmity. The reason of this is that
+trade-jealousy--_odium figulinum_--which, in the case of men does not
+go beyond the confines of their own particular pursuit; but, with
+women, embraces the whole sex; since they have only one kind of
+business. Even when they meet in the street, women look at one another
+like Guelphs and Ghibellines. And it is a patent fact that when two
+women make first acquaintance with each other, they behave with more
+constraint and dissimulation than two men would show in a like case;
+and hence it is that an exchange of compliments between two women is a
+much more ridiculous proceeding than between two men. Further, whilst
+a man will, as a general rule, always preserve a certain amount of
+consideration and humanity in speaking to others, even to those who
+are in a very inferior position, it is intolerable to see how proudly
+and disdainfully a fine lady will generally behave towards one who is
+in a lower social rank (I do not mean a woman who is in her service),
+whenever she speaks to her. The reason of this may be that, with
+women, differences of rank are much more precarious than with us;
+because, while a hundred considerations carry weight in our case,
+in theirs there is only one, namely, with which man they have found
+favor; as also that they stand in much nearer relations with one
+another than men do, in consequence of the one-sided nature of their
+calling. This makes them endeavor to lay stress upon differences of
+rank.
+
+It is only the man whose intellect is clouded by his sexual impulses
+that could give the name of _the fair sex_ to that under-sized,
+narrow-shouldered, broad-hipped, and short-legged race; for the whole
+beauty of the sex is bound up with this impulse. Instead of calling
+them beautiful, there would be more warrant for describing women as
+the un-aesthetic sex. Neither for music, nor for poetry, nor for fine
+art, have they really and truly any sense or susceptibility; it is a
+mere mockery if they make a pretence of it in order to assist their
+endeavor to please. Hence, as a result of this, they are incapable of
+taking a _purely objective interest_ in anything; and the reason of it
+seems to me to be as follows. A man tries to acquire _direct_ mastery
+over things, either by understanding them, or by forcing them to do
+his will. But a woman is always and everywhere reduced to obtaining
+this mastery _indirectly_, namely, through a man; and whatever direct
+mastery she may have is entirely confined to him. And so it lies in
+woman's nature to look upon everything only as a means for conquering
+man; and if she takes an interest in anything else, it is simulated--a
+mere roundabout way of gaining her ends by coquetry, and feigning what
+she does not feel. Hence, even Rousseau declared: _Women have, in
+general, no love for any art; they have no proper knowledge of any;
+and they have no genius_.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Lettre à d'Alembert, Note xx.]
+
+No one who sees at all below the surface can have failed to remark the
+same thing. You need only observe the kind of attention women bestow
+upon a concert, an opera, or a play--the childish simplicity, for
+example, with which they keep on chattering during the finest passages
+in the greatest masterpieces. If it is true that the Greeks excluded
+women from their theatres they were quite right in what they did;
+at any rate you would have been able to hear what was said upon the
+stage. In our day, besides, or in lieu of saying, _Let a woman keep
+silence in the church_, it would be much to the point to say _Let a
+woman keep silence in the theatre_. This might, perhaps, be put up in
+big letters on the curtain.
+
+And you cannot expect anything else of women if you consider that the
+most distinguished intellects among the whole sex have never managed
+to produce a single achievement in the fine arts that is really great,
+genuine, and original; or given to the world any work of permanent
+value in any sphere. This is most strikingly shown in regard to
+painting, where mastery of technique is at least as much within their
+power as within ours--and hence they are diligent in cultivating it;
+but still, they have not a single great painting to boast of, just
+because they are deficient in that objectivity of mind which is so
+directly indispensable in painting. They never get beyond a subjective
+point of view. It is quite in keeping with this that ordinary women
+have no real susceptibility for art at all; for Nature proceeds in
+strict sequence--_non facit saltum_. And Huarte[1] in his _Examen de
+ingenios para las scienzias_--a book which has been famous for
+three hundred years--denies women the possession of all the higher
+faculties. The case is not altered by particular and partial
+exceptions; taken as a whole, women are, and remain, thorough-going
+Philistines, and quite incurable. Hence, with that absurd arrangement
+which allows them to share the rank and title of their husbands they
+are a constant stimulus to his ignoble ambitions. And, further, it is
+just because they are Philistines that modern society, where they
+take the lead and set the tone, is in such a bad way. Napoleon's
+saying--that _women have no rank_--should be adopted as the right
+standpoint in determining their position in society; and as regards
+their other qualities Chamfort[2] makes the very true remark: _They
+are made to trade with our own weaknesses and our follies, but not
+with our reason. The sympathies that exist between them and men are
+skin-deep only, and do not touch the mind or the feelings or the
+character_. They form the _sexus sequior_--the second sex, inferior in
+every respect to the first; their infirmities should be treated
+with consideration; but to show them great reverence is extremely
+ridiculous, and lowers us in their eyes. When Nature made two
+divisions of the human race, she did not draw the line exactly through
+the middle. These divisions are polar and opposed to each other, it is
+true; but the difference between them is not qualitative merely, it is
+also quantitative.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--- Juan Huarte (1520?-1590)
+practised as a physician at Madrid. The work cited by Schopenhauer is
+known, and has been translated into many languages.]
+
+[Footnote 2: _Translator's Note_.--See _Counsels and Maxims_, p. 12,
+Note.]
+
+This is just the view which the ancients took of woman, and the view
+which people in the East take now; and their judgment as to her proper
+position is much more correct than ours, with our old French notions
+of gallantry and our preposterous system of reverence--that highest
+product of Teutonico-Christian stupidity. These notions have served
+only to make women more arrogant and overbearing; so that one is
+occasionally reminded of the holy apes in Benares, who in the
+consciousness of their sanctity and inviolable position, think they
+can do exactly as they please.
+
+But in the West, the woman, and especially the _lady_, finds herself
+in a false position; for woman, rightly called by the ancients,
+_sexus sequior_, is by no means fit to be the object of our honor and
+veneration, or to hold her head higher than man and be on equal terms
+with him. The consequences of this false position are sufficiently
+obvious. Accordingly, it would be a very desirable thing if this
+Number-Two of the human race were in Europe also relegated to her
+natural place, and an end put to that lady nuisance, which not only
+moves all Asia to laughter, but would have been ridiculed by Greece
+and Rome as well. It is impossible to calculate the good effects which
+such a change would bring about in our social, civil and political
+arrangements. There would be no necessity for the Salic law: it would
+be a superfluous truism. In Europe the _lady_, strictly so-called, is
+a being who should not exist at all; she should be either a housewife
+or a girl who hopes to become one; and she should be brought up, not
+to be arrogant, but to be thrifty and submissive. It is just because
+there are such people as _ladies_ in Europe that the women of the
+lower classes, that is to say, the great majority of the sex, are much
+more unhappy than they are in the East. And even Lord Byron says:
+_Thought of the state of women under the ancient Greeks--convenient
+enough. Present state, a remnant of the barbarism of the chivalric
+and the feudal ages--artificial and unnatural. They ought to mind
+home--and be well fed and clothed--but not mixed in society. Well
+educated, too, in religion--but to read neither poetry nor politics--
+nothing but books of piety and cookery. Music--drawing--dancing--also
+a little gardening and ploughing now and then. I have seen them
+mending the roads in Epirus with good success. Why not, as well as
+hay-making and milking_?
+
+The laws of marriage prevailing in Europe consider the woman as the
+equivalent of the man--start, that is to say, from a wrong position.
+In our part of the world where monogamy is the rule, to marry means to
+halve one's rights and double one's duties. Now, when the laws gave
+women equal rights with man, they ought to have also endowed her with
+a masculine intellect. But the fact is, that just in proportion as
+the honors and privileges which the laws accord to women, exceed the
+amount which nature gives, is there a diminution in the number
+of women who really participate in these privileges; and all the
+remainder are deprived of their natural rights by just so much as is
+given to the others over and above their share. For the institution of
+monogamy, and the laws of marriage which it entails, bestow upon
+the woman an unnatural position of privilege, by considering her
+throughout as the full equivalent of the man, which is by no means
+the case; and seeing this, men who are shrewd and prudent very often
+scruple to make so great a sacrifice and to acquiesce in so unfair an
+arrangement.
+
+Consequently, whilst among polygamous nations every woman is provided
+for, where monogamy prevails the number of married women is limited;
+and there remains over a large number of women without stay or
+support, who, in the upper classes, vegetate as useless old maids, and
+in the lower succumb to hard work for which they are not suited; or
+else become _filles de joie_, whose life is as destitute of joy as it
+is of honor. But under the circumstances they become a necessity; and
+their position is openly recognized as serving the special end of
+warding off temptation from those women favored by fate, who have
+found, or may hope to find, husbands. In London alone there are 80,000
+prostitutes. What are they but the women, who, under the institution
+of monogamy have come off worse? Theirs is a dreadful fate: they are
+human sacrifices offered up on the altar of monogamy. The women whose
+wretched position is here described are the inevitable set-off to the
+European lady with her arrogance and pretension. Polygamy is therefore
+a real benefit to the female sex if it is taken as a whole. And, from
+another point of view, there is no true reason why a man whose wife
+suffers from chronic illness, or remains barren, or has gradually
+become too old for him, should not take a second. The motives which
+induce so many people to become converts to Mormonism[1] appear to
+be just those which militate against the unnatural institution of
+monogamy.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--The Mormons have recently given up
+polygamy, and received the American franchise in its stead.]
+
+Moreover, the bestowal of unnatural rights upon women has imposed upon
+them unnatural duties, and, nevertheless, a breach of these duties
+makes them unhappy. Let me explain. A man may often think that his
+social or financial position will suffer if he marries, unless he
+makes some brilliant alliance. His desire will then be to win a woman
+of his own choice under conditions other than those of marriage, such
+as will secure her position and that of the children. However fair,
+reasonable, fit and proper these conditions may be, and the woman
+consents by foregoing that undue amount of privilege which marriage
+alone can bestow, she to some extent loses her honor, because marriage
+is the basis of civic society; and she will lead an unhappy life,
+since human nature is so constituted that we pay an attention to the
+opinion of other people which is out of all proportion to its value.
+On the other hand, if she does not consent, she runs the risk either
+of having to be given in marriage to a man whom she does not like, or
+of being landed high and dry as an old maid; for the period during
+which she has a chance of being settled for life is very short. And
+in view of this aspect of the institution of monogamy, Thomasius'
+profoundly learned treatise, _de Concubinatu_, is well worth reading;
+for it shows that, amongst all nations and in all ages, down to the
+Lutheran Reformation, concubinage was permitted; nay, that it was an
+institution which was to a certain extent actually recognized by law,
+and attended with no dishonor. It was only the Lutheran Reformation
+that degraded it from this position. It was seen to be a further
+justification for the marriage of the clergy; and then, after that,
+the Catholic Church did not dare to remain behind-hand in the matter.
+
+There is no use arguing about polygamy; it must be taken as _de facto_
+existing everywhere, and the only question is as to how it shall be
+regulated. Where are there, then, any real monogamists? We all live,
+at any rate, for a time, and most of us, always, in polygamy. And so,
+since every man needs many women, there is nothing fairer than to
+allow him, nay, to make it incumbent upon him, to provide for many
+women. This will reduce woman to her true and natural position as
+a subordinate being; and the _lady_--that monster of European
+civilization and Teutonico-Christian stupidity--will disappear from
+the world, leaving only _women_, but no more _unhappy women_, of whom
+Europe is now full.
+
+In India, no woman is ever independent, but in accordance with the law
+of Mamu,[1] she stands under the control of her father, her husband,
+her brother or her son. It is, to be sure, a revolting thing that a
+widow should immolate herself upon her husband's funeral pyre; but it
+is also revolting that she should spend her husband's money with her
+paramours--the money for which he toiled his whole life long, in the
+consoling belief that he was providing for his children. Happy are
+those who have kept the middle course--_medium tenuere beati_.
+
+[Footnote 1: Ch. V., v. 148.]
+
+The first love of a mother for her child is, with the lower animals as
+with men, of a purely _instinctive_ character, and so it ceases when
+the child is no longer in a physically helpless condition. After that,
+the first love should give way to one that is based on habit and
+reason; but this often fails to make its appearance, especially where
+the mother did not love the father. The love of a father for his child
+is of a different order, and more likely to last; because it has its
+foundation in the fact that in the child he recognizes his own inner
+self; that is to say, his love for it is metaphysical in its origin.
+
+In almost all nations, whether of the ancient or the modern world,
+even amongst the Hottentots,[1] property is inherited by the male
+descendants alone; it is only in Europe that a departure has taken
+place; but not amongst the nobility, however. That the property which
+has cost men long years of toil and effort, and been won with so much
+difficulty, should afterwards come into the hands of women, who then,
+in their lack of reason, squander it in a short time, or otherwise
+fool it away, is a grievance and a wrong as serious as it is common,
+which should be prevented by limiting the right of women to inherit.
+In my opinion, the best arrangement would be that by which women,
+whether widows or daughters, should never receive anything beyond the
+interest for life on property secured by mortgage, and in no case the
+property itself, or the capital, except where all male descendants
+fail. The people who make money are men, not women; and it follows
+from this that women are neither justified in having unconditional
+possession of it, nor fit persons to be entrusted with its
+administration. When wealth, in any true sense of the word, that is to
+say, funds, houses or land, is to go to them as an inheritance they
+should never be allowed the free disposition of it. In their case a
+guardian should always be appointed; and hence they should never be
+given the free control of their own children, wherever it can be
+avoided. The vanity of women, even though it should not prove to be
+greater than that of men, has this much danger in it, that it takes an
+entirely material direction. They are vain, I mean, of their personal
+beauty, and then of finery, show and magnificence. That is just why
+they are so much in their element in society. It is this, too, which
+makes them so inclined to be extravagant, all the more as their
+reasoning power is low. Accordingly we find an ancient writer
+describing woman as in general of an extravagant nature--[Greek: Gynae
+to synolon esti dapanaeron Physei][2] But with men vanity often takes
+the direction of non-material advantages, such as intellect, learning,
+courage.
+
+[Footnote 1: Leroy, _Lettres philosophiques sur l'intelligence et la
+perfectibilité des animaux, avec quelques lettres sur l'homme_, p.
+298, Paris, 1802.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Brunck's _Gnomici poetae graeci_, v. 115.]
+
+In the _Politics_[1] Aristotle explains the great disadvantage which
+accrued to the Spartans from the fact that they conceded too much to
+their women, by giving them the right of inheritance and dower, and a
+great amount of independence; and he shows how much this contributed
+to Sparta's fall. May it not be the case in France that the influence
+of women, which went on increasing steadily from the time of Louis
+XIII., was to blame for that gradual corruption of the Court and the
+Government, which brought about the Revolution of 1789, of which all
+subsequent disturbances have been the fruit? However that may be, the
+false position which women occupy, demonstrated as it is, in the most
+glaring way, by the institution of the _lady_, is a fundamental defect
+in our social scheme, and this defect, proceeding from the very heart
+of it, must spread its baneful influence in all directions.
+
+[Footnote 1: Bk. I, ch. 9.]
+
+ * * * * *
+
+That woman is by nature meant to obey may be seen by the fact that
+every woman who is placed in the unnatural position of complete
+independence, immediately attaches herself to some man, by whom she
+allows herself to be guided and ruled. It is because she needs a lord
+and master. If she is young, it will be a lover; if she is old, a
+priest.
+
+
+
+
+ON NOISE.
+
+
+Kant wrote a treatise on _The Vital Powers_. I should prefer to write
+a dirge for them. The superabundant display of vitality, which takes
+the form of knocking, hammering, and tumbling things about, has proved
+a daily torment to me all my life long. There are people, it is
+true--nay, a great many people--who smile at such things, because they
+are not sensitive to noise; but they are just the very people who are
+also not sensitive to argument, or thought, or poetry, or art, in a
+word, to any kind of intellectual influence. The reason of it is that
+the tissue of their brains is of a very rough and coarse quality. On
+the other hand, noise is a torture to intellectual people. In the
+biographies of almost all great writers, or wherever else their
+personal utterances are recorded, I find complaints about it; in the
+case of Kant, for instance, Goethe, Lichtenberg, Jean Paul; and if it
+should happen that any writer has omitted to express himself on the
+matter, it is only for want of an opportunity.
+
+This aversion to noise I should explain as follows: If you cut up a
+large diamond into little bits, it will entirely lose the value it
+had as a whole; and an army divided up into small bodies of soldiers,
+loses all its strength. So a great intellect sinks to the level of
+an ordinary one, as soon as it is interrupted and disturbed, its
+attention distracted and drawn off from the matter in hand; for its
+superiority depends upon its power of concentration--of bringing all
+its strength to bear upon one theme, in the same way as a concave
+mirror collects into one point all the rays of light that strike upon
+it. Noisy interruption is a hindrance to this concentration. That is
+why distinguished minds have always shown such an extreme dislike
+to disturbance in any form, as something that breaks in upon and
+distracts their thoughts. Above all have they been averse to that
+violent interruption that comes from noise. Ordinary people are
+not much put out by anything of the sort. The most sensible and
+intelligent of all nations in Europe lays down the rule, _Never
+Interrupt_! as the eleventh commandment. Noise is the most impertinent
+of all forms of interruption. It is not only an interruption, but
+also a disruption of thought. Of course, where there is nothing to
+interrupt, noise will not be so particularly painful. Occasionally it
+happens that some slight but constant noise continues to bother and
+distract me for a time before I become distinctly conscious of it. All
+I feel is a steady increase in the labor of thinking--just as though I
+were trying to walk with a weight on my foot. At last I find out what
+it is. Let me now, however, pass from genus to species. The most
+inexcusable and disgraceful of all noises is the cracking of whips--a
+truly infernal thing when it is done in the narrow resounding streets
+of a town. I denounce it as making a peaceful life impossible; it puts
+an end to all quiet thought. That this cracking of whips should be
+allowed at all seems to me to show in the clearest way how senseless
+and thoughtless is the nature of mankind. No one with anything like an
+idea in his head can avoid a feeling of actual pain at this sudden,
+sharp crack, which paralyzes the brain, rends the thread of
+reflection, and murders thought. Every time this noise is made, it
+must disturb a hundred people who are applying their minds to business
+of some sort, no matter how trivial it may be; while on the thinker
+its effect is woeful and disastrous, cutting his thoughts asunder,
+much as the executioner's axe severs the head from the body. No sound,
+be it ever so shrill, cuts so sharply into the brain as this cursed
+cracking of whips; you feel the sting of the lash right inside your
+head; and it affects the brain in the same way as touch affects a
+sensitive plant, and for the same length of time.
+
+With all due respect for the most holy doctrine of utility, I really
+cannot see why a fellow who is taking away a wagon-load of gravel or
+dung should thereby obtain the right to kill in the bud the thoughts
+which may happen to be springing up in ten thousand heads--the number
+he will disturb one after another in half an hour's drive through the
+town. Hammering, the barking of dogs, and the crying of children are
+horrible to hear; but your only genuine assassin of thought is the
+crack of a whip; it exists for the purpose of destroying every
+pleasant moment of quiet thought that any one may now and then enjoy.
+If the driver had no other way of urging on his horse than by making
+this most abominable of all noises, it would be excusable; but quite
+the contrary is the case. This cursed cracking of whips is not only
+unnecessary, but even useless. Its aim is to produce an effect upon
+the intelligence of the horse; but through the constant abuse of it,
+the animal becomes habituated to the sound, which falls upon blunted
+feelings and produces no effect at all. The horse does not go any
+faster for it. You have a remarkable example of this in the ceaseless
+cracking of his whip on the part of a cab-driver, while he is
+proceeding at a slow pace on the lookout for a fare. If he were to
+give his horse the slightest touch with the whip, it would have much
+more effect. Supposing, however, that it were absolutely necessary to
+crack the whip in order to keep the horse constantly in mind of its
+presence, it would be enough to make the hundredth part of the noise.
+For it is a well-known fact that, in regard to sight and hearing,
+animals are sensitive to even the faintest indications; they are alive
+to things that we can scarcely perceive. The most surprising instances
+of this are furnished by trained dogs and canary birds.
+
+It is obvious, therefore, that here we have to do with an act of pure
+wantonness; nay, with an impudent defiance offered to those members of
+the community who work with their heads by those who work with their
+hands. That such infamy should be tolerated in a town is a piece of
+barbarity and iniquity, all the more as it could easily be remedied by
+a police-notice to the effect that every lash shall have a knot at the
+end of it. There can be no harm in drawing the attention of the mob to
+the fact that the classes above them work with their heads, for any
+kind of headwork is mortal anguish to the man in the street. A fellow
+who rides through the narrow alleys of a populous town with unemployed
+post-horses or cart-horses, and keeps on cracking a whip several yards
+long with all his might, deserves there and then to stand down and
+receive five really good blows with a stick.
+
+All the philanthropists in the world, and all the legislators, meeting
+to advocate and decree the total abolition of corporal punishment,
+will never persuade me to the contrary! There is something even more
+disgraceful than what I have just mentioned. Often enough you may see
+a carter walking along the street, quite alone, without any horses,
+and still cracking away incessantly; so accustomed has the wretch
+become to it in consequence of the unwarrantable toleration of this
+practice. A man's body and the needs of his body are now everywhere
+treated with a tender indulgence. Is the thinking mind then, to be
+the only thing that is never to obtain the slightest measure of
+consideration or protection, to say nothing of respect? Carters,
+porters, messengers--these are the beasts of burden amongst mankind;
+by all means let them be treated justly, fairly, indulgently, and with
+forethought; but they must not be permitted to stand in the way of
+the higher endeavors of humanity by wantonly making a noise. How many
+great and splendid thoughts, I should like to know, have been lost to
+the world by the crack of a whip? If I had the upper hand, I should
+soon produce in the heads of these people an indissoluble association
+of ideas between cracking a whip and getting a whipping.
+
+Let us hope that the more intelligent and refined among the nations
+will make a beginning in this matter, and then that the Germans may
+take example by it and follow suit.[1] Meanwhile, I may quote what
+Thomas Hood says of them[2]: _For a musical nation, they are the most
+noisy I ever met with_. That they are so is due to the fact, not that
+they are more fond of making a noise than other people--they would
+deny it if you asked them--but that their senses are obtuse;
+consequently, when they hear a noise, it does not affect them much. It
+does not disturb them in reading or thinking, simply because they do
+not think; they only smoke, which is their substitute for thought. The
+general toleration of unnecessary noise--the slamming of doors, for
+instance, a very unmannerly and ill-bred thing--is direct evidence
+that the prevailing habit of mind is dullness and lack of thought. In
+Germany it seems as though care were taken that no one should ever
+think for mere noise--to mention one form of it, the way in which
+drumming goes on for no purpose at all.
+
+[Footnote 1: According to a notice issued by the Society for the
+Protection of Animals in Munich, the superfluous whipping and the
+cracking of whips were, in December, 1858, positively forbidden in
+Nuremberg.]
+
+[Footnote 2: In _Up the Rhine_.]
+
+Finally, as regards the literature of the subject treated of in this
+chapter, I have only one work to recommend, but it is a good one. I
+refer to a poetical epistle in _terzo rimo_ by the famous painter
+Bronzino, entitled _De' Romori: a Messer Luca Martini_. It gives a
+detailed description of the torture to which people are put by the
+various noises of a small Italian town. Written in a tragicomic style,
+it is very amusing. The epistle may be found in _Opere burlesche del
+Berni, Aretino ed altri_, Vol. II., p. 258; apparently published in
+Utrecht in 1771.
+
+
+
+
+A FEW PARABLES.
+
+
+In a field of ripening corn I came to a place which had been trampled
+down by some ruthless foot; and as I glanced amongst the countless
+stalks, every one of them alike, standing there so erect and bearing
+the full weight of the ear, I saw a multitude of different flowers,
+red and blue and violet. How pretty they looked as they grew there so
+naturally with their little foliage! But, thought I, they are quite
+useless; they bear no fruit; they are mere weeds, suffered to remain
+only because there is no getting rid of them. And yet, but for these
+flowers, there would be nothing to charm the eye in that wilderness
+of stalks. They are emblematic of poetry and art, which, in civic
+life--so severe, but still useful and not without its fruit--play the
+same part as flowers in the corn.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+There are some really beautifully landscapes in the world, but the
+human figures in them are poor, and you had not better look at them.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+The fly should be used as the symbol of impertinence and audacity; for
+whilst all other animals shun man more than anything else, and run
+away even before he comes near them, the fly lights upon his very
+nose.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Two Chinamen traveling in Europe went to the theatre for the first
+time. One of them did nothing but study the machinery, and he
+succeeded in finding out how it was worked. The other tried to get at
+the meaning of the piece in spite of his ignorance of the language.
+Here you have the Astronomer and the Philosopher.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Wisdom which is only theoretical and never put into practice, is like
+a double rose; its color and perfume are delightful, but it withers
+away and leaves no seed.
+
+No rose without a thorn. Yes, but many a thorn without a rose.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+A wide-spreading apple-tree stood in full bloom, and behind it a
+straight fir raised its dark and tapering head. _Look at the thousands
+of gay blossoms which cover me everywhere_, said the apple-tree; _what
+have you to show in comparison? Dark-green needles! That is true_,
+replied the fir, _but when winter comes, you will be bared of your
+glory; and I shall be as I am now_.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Once, as I was botanizing under an oak, I found amongst a number
+of other plants of similar height one that was dark in color, with
+tightly closed leaves and a stalk that was very straight and stiff.
+When I touched it, it said to me in firm tones: _Let me alone; I am
+not for your collection, like these plants to which Nature has given
+only a single year of life. I am a little oak_.
+
+So it is with a man whose influence is to last for hundreds of years.
+As a child, as a youth, often even as a full-grown man, nay, his whole
+life long, he goes about among his fellows, looking like them and
+seemingly as unimportant. But let him alone; he will not die. Time
+will come and bring those who know how to value him.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+The man who goes up in a balloon does not feel as though he were
+ascending; he only sees the earth sinking deeper under him.
+
+There is a mystery which only those will understand who feel the truth
+of it.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Your estimation of a man's size will be affected by the distance at
+which you stand from him, but in two entirely opposite ways according
+as it is his physical or his mental stature that you are considering.
+The one will seem smaller, the farther off you move; the other,
+greater.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Nature covers all her works with a varnish of beauty, like the tender
+bloom that is breathed, as it were, on the surface of a peach or a
+plum. Painters and poets lay themselves out to take off this varnish,
+to store it up, and give it us to be enjoyed at our leisure. We drink
+deep of this beauty long before we enter upon life itself; and when
+afterwards we come to see the works of Nature for ourselves, the
+varnish is gone: the artists have used it up and we have enjoyed it in
+advance. Thus it is that the world so often appears harsh and devoid
+of charm, nay, actually repulsive. It were better to leave us to
+discover the varnish for ourselves. This would mean that we should
+not enjoy it all at once and in large quantities; we should have no
+finished pictures, no perfect poems; but we should look at all things
+in that genial and pleasing light in which even now a child of Nature
+sometimes sees them--some one who has not anticipated his aesthetic
+pleasures by the help of art, or taken the charms of life too early.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+The Cathedral in Mayence is so shut in by the houses that are built
+round about it, that there is no one spot from which you can see it
+as a whole. This is symbolic of everything great or beautiful in the
+world. It ought to exist for its own sake alone, but before very long
+it is misused to serve alien ends. People come from all directions
+wanting to find in it support and maintenance for themselves; they
+stand in the way and spoil its effect. To be sure, there is nothing
+surprising in this, for in a world of need and imperfection everything
+is seized upon which can be used to satisfy want. Nothing is exempt
+from this service, no, not even those very things which arise only
+when need and want are for a moment lost sight of--the beautiful and
+the true, sought for their own sakes.
+
+This is especially illustrated and corroborated in the case of
+institutions--whether great or small, wealthy or poor, founded, no
+matter in what century or in what land, to maintain and advance human
+knowledge, and generally to afford help to those intellectual efforts
+which ennoble the race. Wherever these institutions may be, it is not
+long before people sneak up to them under the pretence of wishing to
+further those special ends, while they are really led on by the desire
+to secure the emoluments which have been left for their furtherance,
+and thus to satisfy certain coarse and brutal instincts of their own.
+Thus it is that we come to have so many charlatans in every branch
+of knowledge. The charlatan takes very different shapes according
+to circumstances; but at bottom he is a man who cares nothing about
+knowledge for its own sake, and only strives to gain the semblance
+of it that he may use it for his own personal ends, which are always
+selfish and material.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+Every hero is a Samson. The strong man succumbs to the intrigues of
+the weak and the many; and if in the end he loses all patience he
+crushes both them and himself. Or he is like Gulliver at Lilliput,
+overwhelmed by an enormous number of little men.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+A mother gave her children Aesop's fables to read, in the hope of
+educating and improving their minds; but they very soon brought the
+book back, and the eldest, wise beyond his years, delivered himself as
+follows: _This is no book for us; it's much too childish and stupid.
+You can't make us believe that foxes and wolves and ravens are able to
+talk; we've got beyond stories of that kind_!
+
+In these young hopefuls you have the enlightened Rationalists of the
+future.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+A number of porcupines huddled together for warmth on a cold day in
+winter; but, as they began to prick one another with their quills,
+they were obliged to disperse. However the cold drove them together
+again, when just the same thing happened. At last, after many turns of
+huddling and dispersing, they discovered that they would be best off
+by remaining at a little distance from one another. In the same way
+the need of society drives the human porcupines together, only to be
+mutually repelled by the many prickly and disagreeable qualities of
+their nature. The moderate distance which they at last discover to be
+the only tolerable condition of intercourse, is the code of politeness
+and fine manners; and those who transgress it are roughly told--in
+the English phrase--_to keep their distance_. By this arrangement the
+mutual need of warmth is only very moderately satisfied; but then
+people do not get pricked. A man who has some heat in himself prefers
+to remain outside, where he will neither prick other people nor get
+pricked himself.
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10732 ***