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diff --git a/10629-h/10629-h.htm b/10629-h/10629-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..812e0d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/10629-h/10629-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,5169 @@ +<!-- saved from url=(0022)http://internet.e-mail --> +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html> +<head> +<meta HTTP-EQUIV="content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=UTF-8"> +<meta content="pg2html (binary version 0.12a)" + name="generator"> +<title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Britain at Bay, by Spenser Wilkinson. +</title> +<style type="text/css"> + <!-- + * { font-family: Times; + } + P { text-indent: 1em; + margin-top: .75em; + font-size: 12pt; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; } + HR { width: 33%; } + PRE { font-family: Courier, monospaced;} + .toc { margin-left: 15%; font-size: 10pt; margin-bottom: 0em;} + CENTER { padding: 10px;} + // --> +</style> +</head> +<body> +<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10629 ***</div> + +<h1> + BRITAIN AT BAY +</h1> +<center><b> + BY +</b></center> +<center><b> + SPENSER WILKINSON +</b></center> +<p><center>New York</center> + + +<center>1909</center> + <center> + TO MY CHILDREN +</center> +<a name="2HCH1"> +<!-- H2 anchor --> +</a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + CHAPTER +</h2> +<center> + I. THE NATION AND THE PARTIES +</center> +<center> + II. DEFEAT +</center> +<center> + III. FORCE AND RIGHT +</center> +<center> + IV. ARBITRATION AND DISARMAMENT +</center> +<center> + V. THE NATIONALISATION OF WAR +</center> +<center> + VI. THE BALANCE OF POWER +</center> +<center> + VII. THE RISE OF GERMANY +</center> +<center> + VIII. NATIONHOOD NEGLECTED +</center> +<center> + IX. NEW CONDITIONS +</center> +<center> + X. DYNAMICS—THE QUESTION OF MIGHT +</center> +<center> + XI. POLICY—THE QUESTION OF RIGHT +</center> +<center> + XII. THE NATION +</center> +<center> + XIII. THE EFFECT OF THE NATIONALISATION OF WAR UPON LEADERSHIP +</center> +<center> + XIV. THE NEEDS OF THE NAVY +</center> +<center> + XV. ENGLAND'S MILITARY PROBLEM +</center> +<center> + XVI. TWO SYSTEMS CONTRASTED +</center> +<center> + XVII. A NATIONAL ARMY +</center> +<center> + XVIII. THE COST +</center> +<center> + XIX. ONE ARMY NOT TWO +</center> +<center> + XX. THE TRANSITION +</center> +<center> + XXI. THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH ARMIES ARE RAISED +</center> +<center> + XXII. THE CHAIN OF DUTY +</center> +<a name="2HCH2"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> +<h4>Chapters XIV. to XX. have appeared as articles in the <i>Morning Post</i> and are by kind permission reproduced without substantial change. +</h4> +<center> + I +</center> +<center> + THE NATION AND THE PARTIES +</center> +<p> + "I do not believe in the perfection of the British constitution as an + instrument of war ... it is evident that there is something in your + machinery that is wrong." These were the words of the late Marquis of + Salisbury, speaking as Prime Minister in his place in the House of Lords + on the 30th of January 1900. They amounted to a declaration by the + British Government that it could not govern, for the first business of a + Government is to be able to defend the State of which it has charge, + that is, to carry on war. Strange to say, the people of England were + undisturbed by so striking an admission of national failure. +</p> +<p> + On the 16th of March 1909 came a new declaration from another Prime + Minister. Mr. Asquith, on the introduction of the Navy Estimates, + explained to the House of Commons that the Government had been surprised + at the rate at which the new German navy was being constructed, and at + the rapid growth of Germany's power to build battleships. But it is the + first duty of a Government to provide for national security and to + provide means to foresee. A Government that is surprised in a matter + relating to war is already half defeated. +</p> +<p> + The creation of the German navy is the creation of means that could be + used to challenge Great Britain's sea power and all that depends upon + it. There has been no such challenge these hundred years, no challenge + so formidable as that represented by the new German fleet these three + hundred years. It brings with it a crisis in the national life of + England as great as has ever been known; yet this crisis finds the + British nation divided, unready and uncertain what leadership it is to + expect. +</p> +<p> + The dominant fact, the fact that controls all others, is that from now + onwards Great Britain has to face the stern reality of war, immediately + by way of preparation and possibly at any moment by way of actual + collision. England is drifting into a quarrel with Germany which, if it + cannot be settled, involves a struggle for the mastery with the + strongest nation that the world has yet seen—a nation that, under the + pressure of necessity, has learnt to organise itself for war as for + peace; that sets its best minds to direct its preparations for war; + that has an army of four million citizens, and that is of one mind in + the determination to make a navy that shall fear no antagonist. A + conflict of this kind is the test of nations, not only of their strength + but also of their righteousness or right to be. It has two aspects. It + is first of all a quarrel and then a fight, and if we are to enter into + it without fear of destruction we must fulfil two conditions: in the + quarrel we must be in the right, in the fight we must win. The two + conditions are inseparable. If there is a doubt about the justice of our + cause we shall be divided among ourselves, and it will be impossible for + us to put forth the strength of a united nation. +</p> +<p> + Have we really a quarrel with Germany? Is she doing us any wrong? Some + of our people seem to think so, though I find it hard to say in what the + wrong consists. Are we doing her any wrong? Some Germans seem to think + so, and it behoves us, if we can, to find out what the German grievance + is. +</p> +<p> + Suppose that there is a cause for quarrel, hidden at present but sooner + or later to be revealed. What likelihood is there that we shall be able + to make good our case in arms, and to satisfy the world and posterity + that we deserved to win? +</p> +<p> + Germany can build fleets as fast as we can, and although we have a start + the race will not be easy for us; she has the finest school of war that + ever existed, against which we have to set an Admiralty so much + mistrusted that at this moment a committee of the Cabinet is inquiring + into its efficiency. +</p> +<p> + Is it not time for us to find the answer to the question raised by Lord + Salisbury nine years ago, to ascertain what it is that interferes with + the perfection of the British constitution as an instrument of war, and + to set right what is wrong with our machinery? +</p> +<p> + The truth is that we have ceased to be a nation; we have forgotten + nationhood, and have become a conglomerate of classes, parties, + factions, and sects. That is the disease. The remedy consists in + reconstituting ourselves as a nation. +</p> +<p> + What is a nation? The inhabitants of a country constituted as one body + to secure their corporate being and well-being. The nation is all of us, + and its government is trusteeship for us all in order to give us peace + and security, and in order that in peace and security we may make each + other's lives worth living by doing each the best work he can. The + nature of a nation may be seen by distinguishing it from the other + nations outside and from the parties within. The mark of a nation is + sovereignty, which means, as regards other nations, the right and the + power to make peace with them or to carry on war against them, and + which means, as regards those within, the right and the power to command + them. +</p> +<p> + A nation is a people constituted as a State, maintaining and supporting + a Government which is at once the embodiment of right and the wielder of + force. If the right represented by the Government is challenged, either + without or within, the Government asserts it by force, and in either + case disposes, to any extent that may be required, of the property, the + persons, and the lives of its subjects. +</p> +<p> + A party, according to the classical theory of the British constitution, + is a body of men within the State who are agreed in regarding some + measure or some principle as so vital to the State that, in order to + secure the adoption of the measure or the acceptance of the principle, + they are willing to sink all differences of opinion on other matters, + and to work together for the one purpose which they are agreed in + regarding as fundamental. +</p> +<p> + The theory of party government is based on the assumption that there + must always be some measure or some principle in regard to which the + citizens of the same country will differ so strongly as to subordinate + their private convictions on other matters to their profound convictions + in regard to the one great question. It is a theory of permanent civil + war carried on through the forms of parliamentary debate and popular + election, and, indeed, the two traditional parties are the political + descendants of the two sides which in the seventeenth century were + actually engaged in civil war. For the ordinary purposes of the domestic + life of the country the system has its advantages, but they are coupled + with grave drawbacks. The party system destroys the sincerity of our + political life, and introduces a dangerous dilettantism into the + administration of public business. +</p> +<p> + A deliberative assembly like the House of Commons can reach a decision + only by there being put from the chair a question to which the answer + must be either Yes or No. It is evidently necessary to the sincerity of + such decisions that the answer given by each member shall in every case + be the expression of his conviction regarding the right answer to the + question put. If every member in every division were to vote according + to his own judgment and conscience upon the question put, there would be + a perpetual circulation of members between the Ayes to the right and the + Noes to the left. The party system prevents this. It obliges each member + on every important occasion to vote with his leaders and to follow the + instruction of the whips. In this way the division of opinion produced + by some particular question or measure is, as far as possible, made + permanent and dominant, and the freedom of thought and of deliberation + is confined within narrow limits. +</p> +<p> + Thus there creeps into the system an element of insincerity which has + been enormously increased since the extension of the franchise and the + consequent organisation of parties in the country. Thirty or forty years + ago the caucus was established in all the constituencies, in each of + which was formed a party club, association, or committee, for the + purpose of securing at parliamentary elections the success of the party + candidate. The association, club, or committee consists, as regards its + active or working portion, of a very small percentage of the voters even + of its own party, but it is affiliated to the central organisation and + in practice it controls the choice of candidates. +</p> +<p> + What is the result? That the affairs of the nation are entirely given + over to be disputed between the two organised parties, whose leaders are + compelled, in shaping their policy and in thinking about public affairs, + to consider first and foremost the probable effect of what they will do + and of what they will say upon the active members of the caucus of their + own party in the constituencies. The frame of mind of the members of the + caucus is that of men who regard the opposite caucus as the adversary. + But the adversary of a nation can only be another nation. +</p> +<p> + In this way the leaders of both parties, the men who fill the places + which, in a well-organised nation, would be assigned to statesmen, are + placed in it position in which statesmanship is almost impossible. A + statesman would be devoted solely to the nation. He would think first, + second, and third of the nation. Security would be his prime object, and + upon that basis he would aim at the elevation of the characters and of + the lives of the whole population. But our leaders cannot possibly think + first, second, and third of the nation. They have to think at least as + much of the next election and of the opinions of their supporters. In + this way their attention is diverted from that observation of other + nations which is essential for the maintenance of security. Moreover, + they are obliged to dwell on subjects directly intelligible to and + appreciable by the voters in the constituencies, and are thereby + hindered from giving either the time or the attention which they would + like to any of those problems of statesmanship which require close and + arduous study for their solution. The wonder is in these conditions that + they do their work so well, and maintain undiminished the reputation of + English public men for integrity and ability. +</p> +<p> + Yet what at the present moment is the principle about which parties are + divided? Is there any measure or any principle at issue which is really + vital to Great Britain? Is there anything in dispute between the parties + which would not be abandoned and forgotten at the first shot fired in a + war between England and a great continental nation? I am convinced that + that first shot must cause the scales to fall from men's eyes; that it + must make every one realise that our divisions are comparative trifles + and that for years we have been wasting time over them. But if we wait + for the shock of war to arouse us to a sense of reality and to estimate + our party differences at their true value, it will be too late. We shall + wring our hands in vain over our past blindness and the insight we shall + then have obtained will avail us nothing. +</p> +<p> + The party system has another consequence which will not stand scrutiny + in the light of reality; it is dilettantism in the conduct of the + nation's principal business. Some of the chief branches of the executive + work of government are the provinces of special arts and sciences, each + of which to master requires the work of a lifetime. Of such a kind are + the art of carrying on war, whether by sea or land, the art of + conducting foreign relations, which involves a knowledge of all the + other great States and their policies, and the direction of the + educational system, which cannot possibly be properly conducted except + by an experienced educator. But the system gives the direction of each + of these branches to one of the political leaders forming the Cabinet or + governing committee, and the practice is to consider as disqualified + from membership of that committee any man who has given his life either + to war, to foreign policy, or to education. Yet by its efficiency in + these matters the nation must stand or fall. By all means let us be + chary of lightly making changes in the constitution or in the + arrangements of government. But, if the security and continued existence + of the nation are in question, must we not scrutinise our methods of + government with a view to make sure that they accord with the necessary + conditions of success in a national struggle for existence? +</p> +<p> + I am well aware that the train of thought to which I have tried to give + expression is unpopular, and that most people think that any + modification of the traditional party system is impracticable. But the + question is not whether the system is popular; it is whether it will + enable the country to stand in the hour of trial. If the system is + inefficient and fails to enable the nation to carry on with success the + functions necessary for its preservation and if at the same time it is + impracticable to change it, then nothing can avert ruin from this + country. Yet I believe that a very large number of my countrymen are in + fact thinking each for himself the thoughts which I am trying to + express. They are perhaps not the active members of the caucus of either + party, but they are men who, if they see the need, will not shrink from + exertions or from sacrifices which they believe to be useful or + necessary to the country. It is to them that the following pages are an + appeal. I appeal with some confidence because what I shall try to show + to be necessary is not so much a change of institutions as a change of + spirit; not a new constitution but a return to a true way of looking at + public and private life. My contention is that the future of England + depends entirely upon the restoration of duty, of which the nation is + the symbol, to its proper place in our lives. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_3"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + II +</h2> +<center> + DEFEAT +</center> +<p> + Great Britain is drifting unintentionally and half unconsciously into a + war with the German Empire, a State which has a population of sixty + millions and is better organised for war than any State has ever been in + modern times. For such a conflict, which may come about to-morrow, and + unless a great change takes place must come about in the near future, + Great Britain is not prepared. +</p> +<p> + The food of our people and the raw material of their industries come to + this country by sea, and the articles here produced go by sea to their + purchasers abroad. Every transaction carries with it a certain profit + which makes it possible. If the exporter and the manufacturer who + supplies him can make no profit they cannot continue their operations, + and the men who work for them must lose their employment. +</p> +<p> + Suppose Great Britain to be to-morrow at war with one or more of the + Great Powers of Europe. All the sailing vessels and slow steamers will + stop running lest they should be taken by hostile cruisers. The fast + steamers will have to pay war rates of insurance and to charge extra + freights. Steamers ready to leave foreign ports for this country will + wait for instructions and for news. On the outbreak of war, therefore, + this over-sea traffic must be greatly diminished in volume and carried + on with enormously increased difficulties. The supply of food would be + considerably reduced and the certainty of the arrival of any particular + cargo would have disappeared. The price of food must therefore rapidly + and greatly rise, and that alone would immediately impose very great + hardships on the whole of the working class, of which a considerable + part would be driven across the line which separates modern comfort from + the starvation margin. The diminution in the supply of the raw materials + of manufacture would be much greater and more immediate. Something like + half the manufacturers of Great Britain must close their works for want + of materials. But will the other half be able to carry on? Foreign + orders they cannot possibly execute, because there can be no certainty + of the delivery of the goods; and even if they could, the price at which + they could deliver them with a profit would be much higher than it is in + peace. For with a diminished supply the price of raw material must go + up, the cost of marine insurance must be added, together with the extra + wages necessary to enable the workmen to live with food at an enhanced + price. +</p> +<p> + Thus the effect of the greater difficulty of sea communication must be + to destroy the margin of profit which enables the British capitalist to + carry on his works, while the effect of all these causes taken together + on the credit system upon which our whole domestic economy reposes will + perhaps be understood by business men. Even if this state of things + should last only a few months, it certainly involves the transfer to + neutrals of all trade that is by possibility transferable. Foreign + countries will give their orders for cotton, woollen, and iron goods to + the United States, France, Switzerland, and Austro-Hungary, and at the + conclusion of peace the British firms that before supplied them, if they + have not in the meantime become bankrupt, will find that their customers + have formed new connections. +</p> +<p> + The shrinkage of credit would bring a multitude of commercial failures; + the diminution of trade and the cessation of manufactures a great many + more. The unemployed would be counted by the million, and would have to + be kept at the public expense or starve. +</p> +<p> + If in the midst of these misfortunes, caused by the mere fact of war, + should come the news of defeat at sea, still more serious consequences + must follow. After defeat at sea all regular and secure communication + between Great Britain, her Colonies, and India comes to an end. With the + terrible blow to Britain's reputation which defeat at sea must bring, + what will be the position of the 100,000 British in India who for a + century have governed a population of nearly 300,000,000? What can the + Colonies do to help Great Britain under such conditions? For the command + of the sea nothing, and even if each of them had a first-rate army, what + would be the use of those armies to this country in her hour of need? + They cannot be brought to Europe unless the British navy commands the + sea. +</p> +<p> + These are some of the material consequences of defeat. But what of its + spiritual consequences? We have brought up our children in the pride of + a great nation, and taught them of an Empire on which the sun never + sets. What shall we say to them in the hour of defeat and after the + treaty of peace imposed by the victor? They will say: "Find us work and + we will earn our bread and in due time win back the greatness that has + been lost." But how are they to earn their bread? In this country half + the employers will have been ruined by the war. The other half will have + lost heavily, and much of the wealth even of the very rich will have + gone to keep alive the innumerable multitude of starving unemployed. + These will be advised after the war to emigrate. To what country? + Englishmen, after defeat, will everywhere be at a discount. Words will + not describe, and the imagination cannot realise, the suffering of a + defeated nation living on an island which for fifty years has not + produced food enough for its population. +</p> +<p> + The material and spiritual results of defeat can easily be recognised by + any one who takes the trouble to think about the question, though only + experience either at first hand or supplied by history can enable a man + fully to grasp its terrible nature. But a word must be said on the + social and political consequences inseparable from the wreck of a State + whose Government has been unable to fulfil its prime function, that of + providing security for the national life. All experience shows that in + such cases men do not take their troubles calmly. They are filled with + passion. Their feelings find vent in the actions to which their previous + currents of thought tended. The working class, long accustomed by its + leaders to regard the capitalists as a class with interests and aims + opposed to its own, will hardly be able in the stress of unemployment + and of famine to change its way of thinking. The mass of the workmen, + following leaders whose judgment may not perhaps be of the soundest but + who will undoubtedly sincerely believe that the doctrines with which + they have grown up are true, may assail the existing social order and + lay the blame of their misfortunes upon the class which has hitherto had + the government of the country in its hands and has supplied the leaders + of both political parties. The indignation which would inspire this + movement would not be altogether without justification, for it cannot be + denied that both political parties have for many years regarded + preparation for war and all that belongs to it as a minor matter, + subordinate to the really far less important questions relying upon + which each side has sought to win sufficient votes to secure a party + majority. +</p> +<p> + Why do I discuss the hypothesis of British defeat rather than that of + British victory? Because it is the invariable practice of the masters of + war to consider first the disagreeable possibilities and to make + provision for them. But also because, according to every one of the + tests which can be applied, the probability of defeat for Great Britain + in the present state of Europe is exceedingly great. Rarely has a State + unready for conflict been able to stand against a nation organised for + war. The last of a long series of examples was the war between Russia + and Japan, in which the vast resources of a great Empire were exhausted + in the struggle with a State so small as to seem a pigmy in comparison + with her giant adversary. On the 10th of February 1904, the day when the + news reached England that the Russo-Japanese war had begun, I gave as + follows my reasons for thinking that Japan would win:— +</p> +<p> + "The hypothesis of a considerable Japanese success, at any rate at + first, is considered rather than its opposite, because Japan has at + present all the marks of a nation likely to do great things in war. It + is not merely that she has transformed her government and her education, + has introduced military institutions on the German model, especially + compulsory training and that vivifying institution, a general staff. The + present quarrel arises from the deliberate policy of Russia, pursuing + aims that are incompatible with every Japanese tradition and every + Japanese hope. The whole Japanese nation has for years been burning with + the sense of wrongs inflicted by Russia, and into this war, as into the + preparation for it, the whole people throws itself, mind, soul, and + body. This is the condition which produces great strategical plans and + extreme energy in their execution. The Japanese forces are well + organised, armed, and equipped. They are intelligently led and follow + with intelligence. +</p> +<p> + "Of Russia there is hardly evidence to show that the cause for which she + is fighting has touched the imaginations or the feelings of more than a + small fraction of the population. It is the war of a bureaucracy, and + Russia may easily fail to develop either great leading, though her + officers are instructed, or intelligent following of the leaders by the + rank and file. But the Russian troops are brave and have always needed a + good deal of beating." +</p> +<p> + Substitute Great Britain for Russia and Germany for Japan in this + forecast, which has been proved true, and every word holds good except + two. We now know that Russia's policy was not deliberate; that her + Government bungled into the war without knowing what it was doing. In + just the same way British Governments have drifted blindly into the + present difficult relations with Germany. Those in England who would + push the country into a war with Germany are indeed not a bureaucracy, + they are merely a fraction of one of the parties, and do not represent + the mass of our people, who have no desire for such a war, and are so + little aware of its possibility that they have never even taken the + trouble to find out why it may come. A larger section of the other party + is steeped in the belief that force, violence, and war are wicked in + themselves, and ought therefore not to be thought about. It is a + prejudice which, unless removed, may ruin this country, and there is no + way of dissipating it except that of patient argument based upon + observation of the world we live in. That way I shall attempt to follow + in the next chapter. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_4"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + III +</h2> +<center> + FORCE AND RIGHT +</center> +<center> +<pre> + "Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and + a tooth for a tooth: but I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but + whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other + also. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy + coat, let him have thy cloke also. And whosoever shall compel thee + to go a mile, go with him twain. Give to him that asketh thee, and + from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away. Ye have + heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and + hate thine enemy: but I say unto you, Love your enemies." + (Matt. v. 38-44). +</pre></center> +<center> +</center> +<p> + If there are any among us who adopt these words as the governing rule of + their lives they will certainly cause no difficulty to the State in its + military policy whatever that may be, and will find their natural places + even in time of war to the public good. If the whole population were of + their way of thinking and acting there would be no need to discuss war. + An invader would not be resisted. His troops would be hospitably + entertained and treated with affection. No opposition would be made to + the change of Government which he would introduce, and the taxes which + he imposed would be cheerfully paid. But there would be no State, except + that created by the invader; and the problem of conduct for those + living the life described would arise when the State so set up issued + its ordinances requiring every able-bodied man to become a competent + soldier. +</p> +<p> + There are those who believe, or fancy they believe, that the words I + have quoted involve the principle that the use of force or of violence + between man and man, or between nation and nation, is wicked. To the man + who thinks it right to submit to any violence or to be killed rather + than to use violence in resistance, I have no reply to make. The world + cannot conquer him and fear has no hold upon him. But even he can carry + out his doctrine only to the extent of allowing himself to be + ill-treated, as I will now convince him. Many years ago the people of + South Lancashire were horrified by the facts reported in a trial for + murder. In a village on the outskirts of Bolton lived a young woman, + much liked and respected as a teacher in one of the Board schools. On + her way home from school she was accustomed to follow a footpath through + a lonely wood, and here one evening her body was found. She had been + strangled by a ruffian who had thought in this lonely place to have his + wicked will of her. She had resisted successfully and he had killed her + in the struggle. Fortunately the murderer was caught and the facts + ascertained from circumstantial evidence were confirmed by his + confession. Now, the question I have to ask of the man who takes his + stand on the passage I have quoted from the Gospel is: "What would have + been your duty if you had been walking through that wood and come upon + the girl struggling with the man who killed her?" This is a crucial + instance which, I submit, utterly destroys the doctrine that the use of + violence is in itself wrong. The right or wrong is not in the employment + of force but simply in the purpose for which it is used. What the case + establishes, I think, is that to use violence in resistance to violent + wrong is not only right but necessary. +</p> +<p> + The employment of force for the maintenance of right is the foundation + of all civilised human life, for it is the fundamental function of the + State, and apart from the State there is no civilisation, no life worth + living. The first business of the State is to protect the community + against violent interference from outside. This it does by requiring + from its subjects whatever personal service and whatever sacrifice of + property and of time may be necessary; and resistance to these demands, + as well as to any injunctions whatever laid by the State upon its + subjects, is unconditionally suppressed by force. The mark of the State + is sovereignty, or the identification of force and right, and the + measure of the perfection of the State is furnished by the completeness + of this identification. In the present condition of English political + thought it may be worth while to dwell for a few moments upon the + beneficent nature of this dual action of the State. +</p> +<p> + Within its jurisdiction the State maintains order and law and in this + way makes life worth living for its subjects. Order and law are the + necessary conditions of men's normal activities, of their industry, of + their ownership of whatever the State allows them to possess—for + outside of the State there is no ownership—of their leisure and of + their freedom to enjoy it. The State is even the basis of men's + characters, for it sets up and establishes a minimum standard of + conduct. Certain acts are defined as unlawful and punished as crimes. + Other acts, though not criminal, are yet so far subject to the + disapproval of the courts that the man who does them may have to + compensate those who suffer injury or damage in consequence of them. + These standards have a dual origin, in legislation and precedent. + Legislation is a formal expression of the agreement of the community + upon the definition of crimes, and common law has been produced by the + decisions of the courts in actions between man and man. Every case tried + in a civil court is a conflict between two parties, a struggle for + justice, the judgment being justice applied to the particular case. The + growth of English law has been through an endless series of conflicts, + and the law of to-day may be described as a line passing through a + series of points representing an infinite number of judgments, each the + decision of a conflict in court. For seven hundred years, with hardly an + interruption, every judgment of a court has been sustained by the force + of the State. The law thus produced, expressed in legislation and + interpreted by the courts, is the foundation of all English conduct and + character. Upon the basis thus laid there takes place a perpetual + evolution of higher standards. In the intercourse of a settled and + undisturbed community and of the many societies which it contains, arise + a number of standards of behaviour which each man catches as it were by + infection from the persons with whom he habitually associates and to + which he is obliged to conform, because if his conduct falls below them + his companions will have nothing to do with him. Every class of society + has its notions of what constitutes proper conduct and constrains its + members to carry on their lives, so far as they are open to inspection, + according to these notions. The standards tend constantly to improve. + Men form an ideal of behaviour by observing the conduct of the best of + their class, and in proportion as this ideal gains acceptance, find + themselves driven to adopt it for fear of the social ostracism which is + the modern equivalent of excommunication. Little by little what was at + first a rarely attained ideal becomes a part of good manners. It + established itself as custom and finally becomes part of the law. +</p> +<p> + Thus the State, in co-operation with the whole community, becomes the + educator of its people. Standards of conduct are formed slowly in the + best minds and exist at first merely in what Plato would have called + "the intellectual sphere," or in what would have been called at a later + date in Palestine the "kingdom of heaven." But the strongest impulse of + mankind is to realise its ideals. Its fervent prayer, which once uttered + can never cease, is "on earth as it is in heaven," and the ideals + developed in man's spiritual life gradually take shape in laws and + become prohibitions and injunctions backed by the forces of the State. +</p> +<p> + The State, however, is not an abstraction. For English people it means + the United Kingdom; and if an Englishman wants to realise what he owes + to his country let him look back through its history and see how all + that he values in the character of the men he most admires and all that + is best in himself has gradually been created and realised through the + ceaseless effort of his forefathers, carried on continuously from the + time when the first Englishman crossed the North Sea until the present + day. Other nations have their types of conduct, perhaps as good as our + own, but Englishmen value, and rightly value, the ideals particularly + associated with the life of their own country. Perhaps two of the + commonest expressions convey peculiarly English views of character. We + talk of "fair play" as the essence of just dealing between man and man. + It is a conception we have developed from the national games. We + describe ideal conduct as that of a gentleman. It is a condensation of + the best part of English history, and a search for a definition of the + function of Great Britain in the moral economy of the world will hardly + find a better answer than that it is to stamp upon every subject of the + King the character implied in these two expressions. Suppose the British + State to be overthrown or to drop from its place among the great Powers + of the world, these ideals of character would be discredited and their + place would be taken by others. +</p> +<p> + The justification of the constraint exercised by the State upon its own + citizens is the necessity for security, the obligation of self-defence, + which arises from the fact that outside the State there are other + States, each endowed like itself with sovereignty, each of them + maintaining by force its conception of right. The power of the State + over its own subjects is thus in the last resort a consequence of the + existence of other States. Upon the competition between them rests the + order of the world. It is a competition extending to every sphere of + life and in its acute form takes the shape of war, a struggle for + existence, for the mastery or for right. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_5"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + IV +</h2> +<center> + ARBITRATION AND DISARMAMENT +</center> +<p> + To some people the place of war in the economy of nations appears to be + unsatisfactory. They think war wicked and a world where it exists out of + joint. Accordingly they devote themselves to suggestions for the + abolition of war and for the discovery of some substitute for it. Two + theories are common; the first, that arbitration can in every case be a + substitute for war, the second that the hopes of peace would be + increased by some general agreement for disarmament. +</p> +<p> + The idea of those who regard arbitration as a universal substitute for + war appears to be that the relations between States can be put upon a + basis resembling that of the relations between citizens in a settled and + civilised country like our own. In Great Britain we are accustomed to a + variety of means for settling disagreements between persons. There are + the law courts, there are the cases in which recourse is had, with the + sanction of the law courts, to the inquiry and decision of an + arbitrator, and in all our sports we are accustomed to the presence of + an umpire whose duty it is impartially to see that the rules of the + game are observed and immediately to decide all points that might + otherwise be doubtful. +</p> +<p> + The work of an umpire who sees that the rules of the game are observed + is based upon the consent of the players of both sides. Without that + consent there could be no game, and the consent will be found to be + based upon the fact that all the players are brought up with similar + traditions and with like views of the nature of the game. Where this + unity does not exist, difficulties constantly arise, as is notoriously + the case in international sports. The attempt has been made, with + constantly increasing success, to mitigate the evils of war by the + creation of institutions in some way analogous to that of the umpire in + a game. The Declaration of London, recently published, is an agreement + between the principal Powers to accept a series of rules concerning + maritime war, to be administered by an International Prize Court. +</p> +<p> + The function of an arbitrator, usually to decide questions of fact and + to assess compensation for inconvenience, most commonly the + inconvenience occasioned to a private person by some necessary act of + the State, also rests upon the consent of the parties, though in this + case the consent is usually imposed upon them by the State through some + legislative enactment or through the decision of a court. The action of + a court of law, on the other hand, does not rest upon the consent of the + parties. In a civil action the defendant may be and very often is + unwilling to take any part in the proceedings. But he has no choice, + and, whether he likes it or not, is bound by the decision of the court. + For the court is the State acting in its judicial capacity with a view + to insure that justice shall be done. The plaintiff alleges that the + defendant has done him some wrong either by breach of contract or + otherwise, and the verdict or judgment determines whether or not this is + the case, and, if it is, what compensation is due. The judgment once + given, the whole power of the State will be used to secure its + execution. +</p> +<p> + The business of a criminal court is the punishment of offenders whom it + is the function of the State to discover, to bring to trial, and, when + convicted, to punish. The prisoner's consent is not asked, and the + judgment of the court is supported by the whole power of the State. +</p> +<p> + In the international sphere there is no parallel to the action either of + a civil or of a criminal court. Civil and criminal jurisdiction are + attributes of sovereignty, and over two independent States there is no + sovereign power. If, therefore, it is desired to institute between two + States a situation analogous to that by which the subjects of a single + Government are amenable to judicial tribunals, the proper way is to + bring the two States under one sovereignty. This can be effected, and is + constantly effected, by one of two methods. Either the two States + federate and form a united State, or one of them conquers and annexes + the other. The former process has been seen in modern times in the + formation of the United States of America: the latter formed the + substance of the history of civilisation during the first three + centuries before Christ, when the Roman State successively conquered, + annexed, and absorbed all the other then existing States surrounding the + basin of the Mediterranean. +</p> +<p> + The history of no State justifies the belief that order and justice can + successfully be maintained merely by the action of umpires and of + arbitrators. Every State worth the name has had to rely upon civil and + criminal courts and upon law enforced by its authority, that is, upon a + series of principles of right expressed in legislation and upon an + organisation of force for the purpose of carrying those principles into + practical effect. +</p> +<p> + It appears, then, that so far from the experience of States justifying + the view that it is wrong to employ force, the truth is that right or + law, unless supported by force, is ineffective, that the objection in + principle to any use of force involves anarchy, or the cessation of the + State, and that the wish to substitute judicial tribunals for war as a + means of settling disputes between State and State is a wish to + amalgamate under a single Government all those States which are to + benefit by the substitution. +</p> +<p> + The reasonable attitude with regard to arbitration is to accept it + whenever the other side will accept it. But if the adversary refuses + arbitration and insists upon using force, what course is open to any + State but that of resisting force by force? +</p> +<p> + Arbitration has from the earliest times been preferred in most of those + cases to which it was applicable, that is, in cases in which there was a + basis of common view or common tradition sufficient to make agreement + practicable. But wherever there has been a marked divergence of ideals + or a different standard of right, there has been a tendency for each + side to feel that to submit its conscience or its convictions of right, + its sense of what is most sacred in life, to an outside judgment would + involve a kind of moral suicide. In such cases every nation repudiates + arbitration and prefers to be a martyr, in case of need, to its sense of + justice. It is at least an open question whether the disappearance of + this feeling would be a mark of progress or of degeneration. At any rate + it is practically certain that the period when it will have disappeared + cannot at present be foreseen. +</p> +<p> + The abolition of war, therefore, involves the abolition of independent + States and their amalgamation into one. There are many who have hoped + for this ideal, expressed by Tennyson when he dreamed of +</p> +<center><pre> + "The Parliament of man, the Federation of the world." +</pre></center> +<center> + That it is the ultimate destiny of mankind to be united under a single + Government seems probable enough, but it is rash to assume that that + result will be reached either by a process of peaceful negotiation, or + by the spread of the imperfect methods of modern democratic government. + The German Empire, with its population of sixty millions, educated by + the State, disciplined by the State, relying on the State, and commanded + by the State, is as potent in comparison with the less disciplined and + less organised communities which surround it as was, in the third + century before Christ, the Roman State in comparison with the disunited + multitude of Greek cities, the commercial oligarchy of Carthage, and the + half-civilised tribes of Gaul and Spain. Unless the other States of + Europe can rouse themselves to a discipline as sound and to an + organisation as subtle as those of Prussia and to the perception of a + common purpose in the maintenance of their independence, the union of + Europe under a single Government is more likely to be brought about by + the conquering hand of Germany than by the extension of democratic + institutions and of sentimental good understandings. +</center> +<p> + Proposals for disarmament stand on an entirely different footing from + proposals to agree to arbitration. The State that disarms renounces to + the extent of its disarmament the power to protect itself. Upon what + other power is it suggested that it should rely? In the last analysis + the suggestion amounts to a proposal for the abolition of the State, or + its abandonment of its claim to represent the right. Those who propose + agreements for disarmament imagine that the suggestion if adopted would + lead to the establishment of peace. Have they considered the natural + history of peace as one of the phenomena of the globe which we inhabit? + The only peace of any value is that between civilised nations. It rests + either upon the absence of dispute between them or upon an equilibrium + of forces. During the last few centuries there has usually been at the + end of a great European war a great European congress which has + regulated for the time being the matters which were in dispute, and the + treaty thus negotiated has remained for a long time the basis of the + relations between the Powers. It is always a compromise, but a + compromise more or less acceptable to all parties, in which they + acquiesce until some change either by growth or decay makes the + conditions irksome. Then comes a moment when one or more of the States + is dissatisfied and wishes for a change. When that has happened the + dissatisfied State attempts to bring about the change which it desires, + but if the forces with which its wish is likely to be opposed are very + great it may long acquiesce in a state of things most distasteful to it. + Let there be a change in the balance of forces and the discontented + State will seize the opportunity, will assert itself, and if resisted + will use its forces to overcome opposition. A proposal for disarmament + must necessarily be based upon the assumption that there is to be no + change in the system, that the <i>status quo</i> is everywhere to be + preserved. This amounts to a guarantee of the decaying and inefficient + States against those which are growing and are more efficient. Such an + arrangement would not tend to promote the welfare of mankind and will + not be accepted by those nations that have confidence in their own + future. That such a proposal should have been announced by a British + Government is evidence not of the strength of Great Britain, not of a + healthy condition of national life, but of inability to appreciate the + changes which have been produced during the last century in the + conditions of Europe and the consequent alteration in Great Britain's + relative position among the great Powers. It was long ago remarked by + the German historian Bernhardi that Great Britain was the first country + in Europe to revive in the modern world the conception of the State. The + feudal conception identified the State with the monarch. The English + revolution of 1688 was an identification of the State with the Nation. + But the nationalisation of the State, of which the example was set in + 1688 by Great Britain, was carried out much more thoroughly by France in + the period that followed the revolution of 1789; and in the great + conflict which ensued between France and the European States the + principal continental opponents of France were compelled to follow her + example, and, in a far greater degree than has ever happened in England, + to nationalise the State. It is to that struggle that we must turn if we + are to understand the present condition of Europe and the relations of + Great Britain to the European Powers. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_6"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + <b>V</b> +</h2> +<center> + THE NATIONALISATION OF WAR +</center> +<p> + The transformation of society of which the French Revolution was the + most striking symptom produced a corresponding change in the character + of war. +</p> +<p> + By the Revolution the French people constituted itself the State, and + the process was accompanied by so much passion and so much violence that + it shortly involved the reconstituted nation in a quarrel with its + neighbours the Germanic Empire and Prussia, which rapidly developed into + a war between France and almost all the rest of Europe. The Revolution + weakened and demoralised the French army and disorganised the navy, + which it deprived of almost all its experienced officers. When the war + began the regular army was supplemented by a great levy of volunteers. + The mixed force thus formed, in spite of early successes, was unable to + stand against the well-disciplined armies of Austria and Prussia, and as + the war continued, while the French troops gained solidity and + experience, their numbers had to be increased by a levy <i>en masse</i> or a + compulsory drafting of all the men of a certain age into the army. In + this way the army and the nation were identified as they had never been + in modern Europe before, and in the fifth year of the war a leader was + found in the person of General Bonaparte, who had imbued himself with + the principles of the art of war, as they had been expounded by the best + strategists of the old French army, and who had thus thought out with + unprecedented lucidity the method of conducting campaigns. His mastery + of the art of generalship was revealed by his success in 1796, and as + the conflict with Europe continued, he became the leader and eventually + the master of France. Under his impulse and guidance the French army, + superior to them in numbers, organisation, and tactical skill, crushed + one after another the more old-fashioned and smaller armies of the great + continental Powers, with the result that the defeated armies, under the + influence of national resentment after disaster, attempted to reorganise + themselves upon the French model. The new Austrian army undertook its + revenge too soon and was defeated in 1809; but the Prussian endeavour + continued and bore fruit, after the French disasters in Russia of 1812, + in the national rising in which Prussia, supported by Russia and Austria + and assisted by the British operations in the Peninsula, overthrew the + French Empire in 1814. +</p> +<p> + After the definitive peace, deferred by the hundred days, but finally + forced upon France on the field of Waterloo, the Prussian Government + continued to foster the school of war which it had founded in the period + of humiliation. Prussian officers trained in that school tried to learn + the lessons of the long period of war which they had passed through. + What they discovered was that war between nations, as distinct from war + between dynasties or royal houses, was a struggle for existence in which + each adversary risked everything and in which success was to be expected + only from the complete prostration of the enemy. In the long run, they + said to themselves, the only defence consists in striking your adversary + to the ground. That being the case, a nation must go into war, if war + should become inevitable, with the maximum force which it can possibly + produce, represented by its whole manhood of military age, thoroughly + trained, organised, and equipped. The Prussian Government adhered to + these ideas, to which full effect was given in 1866, when the Prussian + army, reorganised in 1860, crushed in ten days the army of Austria, and + in 1870 when, in a month from the first shot fired, it defeated one half + of the French army at Gravelotte and captured the other half at Sedan. + These events proved to all continental nations the necessity of adopting + the system of the nation in arms and giving to their whole male + population, up to the limits of possibility, the training and the + organisation necessary for success in war. +</p> +<p> + The principle that war is a struggle for existence, and that the only + effective defence consists in the destruction of the adversary's force, + received during the age of Napoleon an even more absolute demonstration + at sea than was possible on land. Great Britain, whether she would or + no, was drawn into the European conflict. The neglect of the army and of + the art of war into which, during the eighteenth century, her + Governments had for the most part fallen, made it impracticable for her + to take the decisive part which she had played in the days of William + III. and of Marlborough in the struggle against the French army; her + contributions to the land war were for the most part misdirected and + futile. Her expeditions to Dunkirk, to Holland, and to Hanover + embarrassed rather than materially assisted the cause of her allies. But + her navy, favourably handicapped by the breakdown, due to the + Revolution, of the French navy, eventually produced in the person of + Nelson a leader who, like Napoleon, had made it the business of his life + to understand the art of war. His victories, like Napoleon's, were + decisive, and when he fell at Trafalgar the navies of continental + Europe, which one after another had been pressed into the service of + France, had all been destroyed. +</p> +<p> + Then were revealed the prodigious consequences of complete victory at + sea, which were more immediate, more decisive, more far-reaching, more + irrevocable than on land. The sea became during the continuance of the + war the territory of Great Britain, the open highway along which her + ships could pass, while it was closed to the ships of her adversaries. + Across that secure sea a small army was sent to Spain to assist the + national and heroic, though miserably organised, resistance made by the + Spanish people against the French attempt at conquest. The British + Government had at last found the right direction for such military force + as it possessed. Sir John Moore's army brought Napoleon with a great + force into the field, but it was able to retire to its own territory, + the sea. The army under Wellington, handled with splendid judgment, had + to wait long for its opportunity, which came when Napoleon with the + Grand Army had plunged into the vast expanse of Russia. Wellington, + marching from victory to victory, was then able to produce upon the + general course of the war an effect out of all proportion to the + strength of the force which he commanded or of that which directly + opposed him. +</p> +<p> + While France was engaged in her great continental struggle England was + reaping, all over the world, the fruits of her naval victories. Of the + colonies of her enemies she took as many as she wanted, though at the + peace she returned most of them to their former owners. Of the world's + trade she obtained something like a monopoly. The nineteenth century saw + the British colonies grow up into so many nations and the British + administration of India become a great empire. These developments are + now seen to have been possible only through the security due to the fact + that Great Britain, during the first half of the nineteenth century, had + the only navy worth considering in the world, and that during the second + half its strength greatly preponderated over that of any of the new + navies which had been built or were building. No wonder that when in + 1888 the American observer, Captain Mahan, published his volume "The + Influence of Sea Power upon History," other nations besides the British + read from that book the lesson that victory at sea carried with it a + prosperity, an influence, and a greatness obtainable by no other means. + It was natural for Englishmen to draw the moral which was slumbering in + the national consciousness that England's independence, her empire, and + her greatness depended upon her sea power. But it was equally natural + that other nations should draw a different moral and should ask + themselves why this tremendous prize, the primacy of nations and the + first place in the world, should for ever belong to the inhabitants of + a small island, a mere appendage to the continent of Europe. +</p> +<p> + This question we must try to answer. But before entering upon that + inquiry I will ask the reader to note the great lesson of the age of + Napoleon and of Nelson. It produced a change in the character of war, + which enlarged itself from a mere dispute between Governments and became + a struggle between nations. The instrument used was no longer a small + standing army, but the able-bodied male population in arms. Great + Britain indeed still retained her standing army, but for the time she + threw her resources without stint into her navy and its success was + decisive. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_7"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + VI +</h2> +<center> + THE BALANCE OF POWER +</center> +<p> + We have seen what a splendid prize was the result of British victory at + sea, supplemented by British assistance to other Powers on land, a + century ago. We have now to ask ourselves first of all how it came about + that Great Britain was able to win it, and afterwards whether it was + awarded once for all or was merely a challenge cup to be held only so + long as there should be no competitor. +</p> +<p> + The answer to the first question is a matter of history. England was + peculiarly favoured by fortune or by fate in the great struggles through + which, during a period of three hundred years, she asserted and + increased her superiority at sea until a century ago it became + supremacy. She rarely had to fight alone. Her first adversary was Spain. + In the conflict with Spain she had the assistance of the Dutch + Provinces. When the Dutch were strong enough to become her maritime + rivals she had for a time the co-operation of France. Then came a long + period during which France was her antagonist. At the beginning of this + epoch William III. accepted the British crown in order to be able to use + the strength of England to defend his native country, Holland. His work + was taken up by Marlborough, whose first great victory was won in + co-operation with the Imperial commander, Prince Eugene. From that time + on, each of the principal wars was a European war in which France was + fighting both by sea and land, her armies being engaged against + continental foes, while Great Britain could devote her energies almost + exclusively to her navy. In the Seven Years' War it was the Prussian + army which won the victories on land, while small British forces were + enabled by the help of the navy to win an Empire from France in Canada, + and to lay the foundations of the British Empire in India. In the war of + American Independence, Great Britain for once stood alone, but this was + the one conflict which contributed little or nothing towards + establishing the ascendency of the British navy. Great Britain failed of + her object because that ascendency was incomplete. Then came the wars of + the French Revolution and Empire in which the British navy was the + partner of the Austrian, Prussian, Russian, and Spanish armies. +</p> +<p> + These are the facts which we have to explain. We have to find out how it + was that so many continental nations, whether they liked it or not, + found themselves, in fighting their own battles, helping to bring about + the British predominance at sea. It must be remembered that land warfare + involves much heavier sacrifices of life than warfare at sea, and that + though Great Britain no doubt spent great sums of money not merely in + maintaining her navy but also in subsidising her allies, she could well + afford to do so because the prosperity of her over-sea trade, due to her + naval success, made her the richest country in Europe. The other nations + that were her allies might not unnaturally feel that they had toiled and + that Great Britain had gathered the increase. What is the explanation of + a co-operation of which in the long run it might seem that one partner + has had the principal benefit? +</p> +<p> + If two nations carry on a serious war on the same side, it may be + assumed that each of them is fighting for some cause which it holds to + be vital, and that some sort of common interest binds the allies + together. The most vital interest of any nation is its own independence, + and while that is in question it conceives of its struggle as one of + self-defence. The explanation of Great Britain's having had allies in + the past may therefore be that the independence of Great Britain was + threatened by the same danger which threatened the independence of other + Powers. This theory is made more probable by the fact that England's + great struggles—that of Queen Elizabeth against Spain, that of William + III. and Marlborough against Louis XIV., and of Pitt against + Napoleon—were, each one of them, against an adversary whose power was + so great as to overshadow the Continent and to threaten it with an + ascendency which, had it not been checked, might have developed into a + universal monarchy. It seems, therefore, that in the main England, in + defending her own interests, was consciously or unconsciously the + champion of the independence of nations against the predominance of any + one of their number. The effect of Great Britain's self-defence was to + facilitate the self-defence of other nations, and thus to preserve to + Europe its character of a community of independent States as opposed to + that which it might have acquired, if there had been no England, of a + single Empire, governed from a single capital. +</p> +<p> + This is, however, only half of the answer we want. It explains to some + extent why England could find other nations co-operating with her, and + reveals the general nature of the cause which they maintained in common. + But let us remember the distinction between a quarrel in which the main + thing is to be in the right, and a fight in which the main thing is to + win. The explanation just sketched is a justification of England's + policy, an attempt to show that in the main she had right on her side. + That is only part of the reason why she had allies. The other part is + that she was strong and could help them. +</p> +<p> + She had three modes of action. She used her navy to destroy the hostile + navy or navies and to obtain control of the seaways. Then she used that + control partly to destroy the seaborne trade of her enemies, and partly + to send armies across the sea to attack her enemies' armies. It was + because she could employ these three modes of warfare, and because two + of them were not available for other Powers, that her influence on the + course of events was so great. +</p> +<p> + The question of moral justification is more or less speculative. I have + treated it here on a hypothesis which is not new, though since I + propounded it many years ago it has met with little adverse criticism. + But the question of force is one of hard fact; it is fundamental. If + England had not been able to win her battles at sea and to help her + allies by her war against trade and by her ubiquitous if small armies, + there would have been no need for hypotheses by which to justify or + explain her policy; she would have long ago lost all importance and all + interest except to antiquarians. Our object is to find out how she may + now justify her existence, and enough has been said to make it clear + that if she is to do that she must not only have a cause good enough to + gain the sympathy of other Powers, but force enough to give them + confidence in what she can do to help herself and them. +</p> +<p> + We are now ready to examine the second question, whether or no Great + Britain's position, won a century ago, is liable to challenge. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_8"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + VII +</h2> +<center> + THE RISE OF GERMANY +</center> +<p> + The great event of the nineteenth century in the history of Europe is + the union of Germany into a Federal State. The secret of Prussia's + success in accomplishing that union and in leading the federation so + created, has been the organisation of the national energies by a + far-seeing Government, a process begun as a means of self-defence + against the French domination of the period between 1806 and 1812. The + Prussian statesmen of those days were not content merely to reorganise + the army on the basis of universal service. They organised the whole + nation. They swept away an ancient system of land tenure in order to + make the peasants free and prosperous. They established a system of + public education far in advance of anything possessed by any other + nation. They especially devoted themselves to fostering industry, + manufacture, and commerce. The result of this systematic direction of + the national energies by a Government of experts, continuously supported + by the patient and methodical diligence of the people, has been a + constant and remarkable advance of the national prosperity, a wonderful + development of the national resources, and an enormous addition to the + national strength. For the last forty years it has been the settled + policy of the German Government that her organised military forces + should be strong enough in case of need to confront two enemies at once, + one on either frontier. Feeling themselves thus stronger than any other + European state, the Germans have watched with admiration the growth of + the British Colonies and of British trade. It is natural that they + should think that Germany too might expect to have colonies and a great + maritime trade. But wherever in the world German travellers have gone, + wherever German traders have settled, wherever the German Government has + thought of working for a site for a colony, everywhere they have met + British influence, British trade, the British flag. +</p> +<p> + In this way has been brought home to them as to no other people the + tremendous influence of sea-power. Their historians have recalled to + them the successive attempts which have been made in past times by + German States to create a navy and to obtain colonies, attempts which to + our own people are quite unknown, because they never, except in the case + of the Hanseatic League, attained to such importance as to figure in the + general history of Europe. In the period between 1815 and 1870, when + the desire for national unity was expressed by a host of German writers, + there were not wanting pleas for the creation of a German navy. Several + attempts were made in those days to construct either a Prussian or a + German fleet; but the time was not ripe and these attempts came to + nothing. The constitution of the Empire, promulgated in 1871, embodied + the principle that there should be a German navy, of which the Emperor + should be commander-in-chief, and to the creation of that navy the most + assiduous labour has been devoted. The plan pursued was in the first + instance to train a body of officers who should thoroughly understand + the sea and maritime warfare, and for this purpose the few ships which + were first built were sent on long voyages by way of training the crews + and of giving the officers that self-reliance and initiative which were + thought to be the characteristic mark of the officers of the British + navy. In due time was founded the naval college of Kiel, designed on a + large scale to be a great school of naval thought and of naval war. The + history of maritime wars was diligently studied, <em>especially</em> of + course the history of the British navy. The professors and lecturers + made it their business to explore the workings of Nelson's mind just as + German military professors had made themselves pupils of Napoleon. And + not until a clear and consistent theory of naval war had been elaborated + and made the common property of all the officers of the navy was the + attempt made to expand the fleet to a scale thought to be proportionate + to the position of Germany among the nations. When it was at length + determined that that constructive effort should be made, the plan was + thought out and embodied in a law regulating the construction for a + number of years of a fleet of predetermined size and composition to be + used for a purpose defined in the law itself. The object was to have a + fleet of sufficient strength and of suitable formation to be able to + hold its own in case of need even against the greatest maritime Power. + In other words, Germany thought that if her prosperity continued and her + superiority in organisation over other continental nations continued to + increase, she might find England's policy backed by England's naval + power an obstacle in the way of her natural ambition. After all, no one + can be surprised if the Germans think Germany as well entitled as <i>any + other</i> State to cherish the ambition of being the first nation in the + world. +</p> +<p> + It has for a century been the rational practice of the German Government + that its chief strategist should at all times keep ready designs for + operations in case of war against any reasonably possible adversary. + Such a set of designs would naturally include a plan of operation for + the case of a conflict with Great Britain, and no doubt, every time + that plan of operations was re-examined and revised, light would be + thrown upon the difficulties of a struggle with a great maritime Power + and upon the means by which those difficulties might be overcome. The + British navy is so strong that, unless it were mismanaged, the German + navy ought to have no chance of overcoming it. Yet Germany cannot but be + anxious, in case of war, to protect herself against the consequences of + maritime blockade, and of the effort of a superior British navy to close + the sea to German merchantmen. Accordingly, the law which regulates the + naval shipbuilding of the German Empire lays down in its preamble + that—"Germany must possess a battle-fleet so strong that a war with her + would, even for the greatest naval Power, be accompanied with such + dangers as would render that Power's position doubtful." In other words, + a war with Great Britain must find the German navy too strong for the + British navy to be able to confine it to its harbours, and to maintain, + in spite of it, complete command of the seas which border the German + coast. As German strategists continuously accept the doctrine that the + first object of a fleet in war is the destruction of the enemy's fleet + with a view to the consequent command of the sea, the German Navy Act is + equivalent to the declaration of an intention in case of conflict to + challenge the British navy for the mastery. This is the answer to the + question asked at the beginning of the last chapter, whether the command + of the sea is a permanent prize or a challenge cup. Germany at any rate + regards it as a challenge cup, and has resolved to be qualified, if + occasion should arise, to make trial of her capacity to win it. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_9"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + VIII +</h2> +<center> + NATIONHOOD NEGLECTED +</center> +<p> + What has been the effect upon Great Britain of the rise of Germany? Is + there any cause of quarrel between the two peoples and the two States? + That Germany has given herself a strong military organisation is no + crime. On the contrary, she was obliged to do it, she could not have + existed without it. The foundations of her army were laid when she was + suffering all the agonies of conquest and oppression. Only by a + tremendous effort, at the cost of sacrifices to which England's + experience offers no analogy, was she able to free herself from the + over-lordship of Napoleon. King William I. expanded and reorganised his + army because he had passed through the bitter humiliation of seeing his + country impotent and humbled by a combination of Austria and Russia. + Whether Bismarck's diplomacy was less honourable than that of the + adversaries with whom he had to deal is a question to which different + answers may be given. But in a large view of history it is irrelevant, + for beyond all doubt the settlements effected through the war of 1866 + and 1870 were sound settlements and left the German nation and Europe + in a healthier condition than that which preceded them. The unity of + Germany was won by the blood of her people, who were and are rightly + resolved to remain strong enough and ready to defend it, come what may. + It is not for Englishmen, who have talked for twenty years of a + Two-Power standard for their navy, to reproach Germany for maintaining + her army at a similar standard. Had she not done so the peace of Europe + would not have been preserved, nor is it possible on any ground of right + or justice to cavil at Germany's purpose to be able in case of need to + defend herself at sea. The German Admiral Rosendahl, discussing the + British and German navies and the proposals for disarmament, wrote in + the <i>Deutsche Revue</i> for June 1909:— +</p> +<p> + "If England claims and thinks permanently necessary for her an absolute + supremacy at sea that is her affair, and no sensible man will reproach + her for it; but it is quite a different thing for a Great Power like the + German Empire, by an international treaty supposed to be binding for all + time, expressly to recognise and accept this in principle. Assuredly we + do not wish to enter into a building competition with England on a + footing of equality.... But a political agreement on the basis of the + unconditional superiority of the British Fleet would be equivalent to + an abandonment of our national dignity, and though we do not, speaking + broadly, wish to dispute England's predominance at sea, yet we do mean + in case of war to be or to become the masters on our own coasts." +</p> +<p> + There is not a word in this passage which can give just cause of offence + to England or to Englishmen. +</p> +<p> + That there has been and still is a good deal of mutual ill-feeling both + in Germany and in England cannot be denied. Rivalry between nations is + always accompanied by feeling which is all the stronger when it is + instinctive and therefore, though not unintelligible, apt to be + irrational. But what in this case is really at the bottom of it? There + have no doubt been a number of matters that have been discussed between + the two Governments, and though they have for the most part been + settled, the manner in which they have been raised and pressed by German + Governments has caused them to be regarded by British Ministers, and to + a less extent by the British people, as sources of annoyance, as so many + diplomatic "pin-pricks." The manners of German diplomacy are not suave. + Suavity is no more part of the Bismarckian tradition than exactitude. + But after all, the manners of the diplomatists of any country are a + matter rather for the nation whose honour they concern than for the + nations to which they have given offence. They only partially account + for the deep feeling which has grown up between Great Britain and + Germany. +</p> +<p> + The truth is that England is disturbed by the rise of Germany, which her + people, in spite of abundant warnings, did not foresee and have not + appreciated until the moment when they find themselves outstripped in + the race by a people whom they have been accustomed to regard with + something of the superiority with which the prosperous and polished + dweller in a capital looks upon his country cousin from the farm. +</p> +<p> + Fifty years ago Germany in English estimation did not count. The name + was no more than a geographical expression. Great Britain was the one + great Power. She alone had colonies and India. She as good as + monopolised the world's shipping and the world's trade. As compared with + other countries she was immeasurably rich and prosperous. Her population + during the long peace, interrupted only by the Crimean War and the + Indian Mutiny, had multiplied beyond men's wildest dreams. Her + manufacturers were amassing fortunes, her industry had no rival. The + Victorian age was thought of as the beginning of a wonderful new era, in + which, among the nations, England was first and the rest nowhere. The + temporary effort of the French to create a modern navy disturbed the + sense of security which existed and gave rise to the Volunteer movement, + which was felt to be a marvellous display of patriotism. +</p> +<p> + There were attempts to show that British self-complacency was not + altogether justified. The warnings of those who looked below the surface + were read and admired. Few writers were more popular than Carlyle, + Ruskin, and Matthew Arnold. But all three held aloof from the current of + public life which flowed in the traditional party channels. There was no + effort to revive the conception of the nation as the organised state to + which every citizen is bound, the source and centre of all men's duties. + Accordingly every man devoted himself to his own affairs, of which the + first was to make money and the second to enjoy life; those who were + rich enough finding their amusement in Parliament, which was regarded as + the most interesting club in London, and in its debates, of which the + charm, for those who take part in them, lies in the fact that for + success not knowledge of a subject, but fluency, readiness, and wit are + required. +</p> +<p> + The great events taking place in the world, the wars in Bohemia, in + France, and in Turkey, added a certain, interest to English life because + they furnished to the newspapers matter more exciting than any novelist + could produce, and in this way gratified the taste for sensation which + had been acquired both by rich and poor. That these events meant + anything in particular to the British nation was not likely to be + realised while that nation was, in fact, non-existent, and had resolved + itself into forty million individuals, each of them living for his own + ends, slightly enlarged to include his family, his literary or + scientific society, perhaps his cricket club, and on Sunday morning his + church or chapel. There was also a widespread interest in "politics," by + which was meant the particular fads cherished by one's own caucus to the + exclusion of the nation's affairs, it being more or less understood that + the army, the navy, and foreign policy were not to be made political + questions. +</p> +<p> + While forty million English people have thus been spending their lives + self-centred, content to make their living, to enjoy life, and to behave + kindly to their fellows, there has grown up in Germany a nation, a + people of sixty millions, who believe that they belong together, that + their country has the first call on them, whose children go to school + because the Government that represents the nation bids them, who go for + two years to the army or the navy to learn war, because they know that + if the nation has to fight it can do so only by their fighting for it. + Their Government thinks it is its business to be always improving the + organisation of its sixty millions for security, for knowledge, for + instruction, for agriculture, for industry, for navigation. Thus after + forty years of common effort for a common good Germany finds itself the + first nation in Europe, more than holding its own in every department of + life, and eagerly surveying the world in search of opportunities. +</p> +<p> + The Englishman, while he has been living his own life and, as I think, + improving in many respects, has at the same time been admiring the + British Empire, and discovering with pride that a number of new nations + have grown up in distant places, formed of people whose fathers or + grandfathers emigrated from Great Britain. He remembers from his school + lessons or reads in the newspapers of the greatness of England in past + centuries, and naturally feels that with such a past and with so great + an Empire existing to-day, his country should be a very great Power. But + as he discovers what the actual performance of Germany is, and becomes + acquainted with the results of her efforts in science, education, trade, + and industry, and the way in which the influence of the German + Government predominates in the affairs of Europe, he is puzzled and + indignant, and feels that in some way Great Britain has been surpassed + and outdone. +</p> +<p> + The state of the world which he thought existed, in which England was + the first nation and the rest nowhere, has completely changed while he + has been attending to his private business, his "politics," and his + cricket, and he finds the true state of the world to be that, while in + industry England has hard work to hold her own against her chief rival, + she has already been passed in education and in science, that her army, + good as it is, is so small as scarcely to count, and that even her navy + cannot keep its place without a great and unexpected effort. +</p> +<p> + Yet fifty years ago England had on her side all the advantages but one. + She was forgetting nationhood while Germany was reviving it. The British + people, instead of organising themselves as one body, the nation, have + organised themselves into two bodies, the two "political" parties. + England's one chance lies in recovering the unity that has been lost, + which she must do by restoring the nation to its due place in men's + hearts and lives. To find out how that is to be done we must once more + look at Europe and at England's relations to Europe. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_10"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + IX +</h2> +<center> + NEW CONDITIONS +</center> +<p> + It has been seen how, as a result of the struggle with Napoleon, + England, from 1805 onwards, was the only sea power remaining in Europe, + and indeed, with the exception of the United States, the only sea power + in the world. One of the results was that she had for many years the + monopoly of the whole ocean, not merely for the purposes of war, but + also for the purposes of trade. The British mercantile marine continued + through the greater part of the nineteenth century to increase its + preponderance over all others, and this remarkable, and probably quite + exceptional, growth was greatly favoured by the Civil War in America, + during which the mercantile marine of the United States received from + the action of the Confederate cruisers a damage from which it has never + recovered. +</p> +<p> + In the years immediately following 1805, Great Britain in self-defence, + or as a means of continuing the war against France, in regard to which + her resources for operations on land were limited, had recourse to the + operations of blockade, by which the sea was closed, as far as possible, + to enemy merchantmen while Great Britain prohibited neutral ships from + carrying enemy goods. Napoleon replied by the attempt to exclude British + goods from the Continent altogether, and indeed the pressure produced by + Great Britain's blockades compelled Napoleon further to extend his + domination on the Continent. Thus the other continental States found + themselves between the devil and the deep sea. They had to submit to the + domination of Napoleon on land and to the complete ascendency of Great + Britain on the waters which surrounded their coasts. The British claims + to supremacy at sea were unanimously resented by all the continental + States, which all suffered from them, but in all cases the national + resentment against French invasion or French occupation of territory was + greater than the resentment against the invisible pressure exercised by + the British navy. In the wars of liberation, though Great Britain was + the welcome ally of all the States that were fighting against France, + the pressure of British sea power was none the less disagreeable and, in + the years of peace which followed, the British monopoly of sea power, of + sea-carriage, of manufacturing industry, and of international trade were + equally disliked by almost all the nations of Europe. Protective duties + were regarded as the means of fostering national industries and of + sheltering them against the overpowering competition of British + manufactures. The British claim to the dominion of the sea was regarded + as unfounded in right, and was in principle as strongly denounced as had + been the territorial domination of France. The mistress of the seas was + regarded as a tyrant, whom it would be desirable, if it were possible, + to depose, and there were many who thought that as the result of a + conflict in which the final success had been gained by the co-operation + of a number of States acting together, the gains of Great Britain which, + as time went on, were seen to be growing into a world-wide empire, had + been out of proportion to the services she had rendered to the common + cause. +</p> +<p> + Meantime during the century which has elapsed since the last great war, + there has been a complete change in the conditions of intercourse + between nations at sea and of maritime warfare. It has come about + gradually, almost imperceptibly, so that it could hardly be appreciated + before the close of the nineteenth century. But it is vital to Great + Britain that her people should understand the nature of the + transformation. +</p> +<p> + The first thing to be observed is that the British monopoly of shipping + and of oversea trade has disappeared. Great Britain still has by far the + largest mercantile marine and by far the greatest share in the world's + sea traffic, but she no longer stands alone. Germany, the United States, + France, Norway, Italy, and Japan all have great fleets of merchant + ships and do an enormous, some of them a rapidly increasing, seaborne + trade. A large number of the principal States import the raw material of + manufacture and carry on import and export on a large scale. The railway + system connects all the great manufacturing centres, even those which + lie far inland, with the great ports to and from which the lines of + steamers ply. The industrial life of every nation is more than ever + dependent upon its communications with and by the sea, and every nation + has become more sensitive than ever to any disturbance of its maritime + trade. The preponderance of the British navy is therefore a subject of + anxiety in every State which regards as possible a conflict of its own + interests with those of Great Britain. This is one of the reasons why + continental States have during the last quarter of a century been + disposed to increase their fleets and their naval expenditure. +</p> +<p> + In the Declaration of Paris, renewed and extended by the Declaration of + London, the maritime States have agreed that in any future war enemy + goods in a neutral ship are to be safe from capture unless the ship is + running a blockade, which must be effective. Whether Great Britain was + well or ill advised in accepting this rule is a question which it is now + useless to discuss, for the decision cannot be recalled, and the rule + must be regarded as established beyond controversy. Its effect is + greatly to diminish the pressure which a victorious navy can bring to + bear upon a hostile State. It deprives Great Britain of one of the most + potent weapons which she employed in the last great war. To-day it would + be impracticable even for a victorious navy to cut off a continental + State from seaborne traffic. The ports of that State might be blockaded + and its merchant ships would be liable to capture, but the victorious + navy could not interfere with the traffic carried by neutral ships to + neutral ports. Accordingly, Great Britain could not now, even in the + event of naval victory being hers, exercise upon an enemy the pressure + which she formerly exercised through the medium of the neutral States. + Any continental State, even if its coasts were effectively blockaded, + could still, with increased difficulty, obtain supplies both of raw + material and of food by the land routes through the territory of its + neutral neighbours. But Great Britain herself, as an insular State, + would not, in case of naval defeat, have this advantage. A decisive + defeat of the British navy might be followed by an attempt on the part + of the enemy to blockade the coasts of Great Britain, though that would + no doubt be difficult, for a very large force would be required to + maintain an effective blockade of the whole coast-line. +</p> +<p> + It is conceivable that an enemy might attempt in spite of the + Declaration of London to treat as contraband food destined for the + civil population and this course ought to be anticipated, but in the + military weakness of Great Britain an enemy whose navy had gained the + upper hand would almost certainly prefer to undertake the speedier + process of bringing the war to an end by landing an army in Great + Britain. A landing on a coast so extensive as that of this island can + with difficulty be prevented by forces on land, because troops cannot be + moved as quickly as ships. +</p> +<p> + The war in the Far East has shown how strong such an army might be, and + how great a military effort would be needed to crush it. The proper way + to render an island secure, is by a navy strong enough to obtain in war + the control of the surrounding sea, and a navy unable to perform that + function cannot be regarded as a guarantee of security. +</p> +<p> + The immediate effects of naval victory can hardly ever again be so + far-reaching as they were a century ago in the epoch of masts and sails. + At that time there were no foreign navies, except in European waters, + and in the Atlantic waters of the United States. When, therefore, the + British navy had crushed its European adversaries, its ships could act + without serious opposition upon any sea and any coast in the world. + To-day, the radius of action of a victorious fleet is restricted by the + necessity of a supply of coal, and therefore by the secure possession + of coaling-stations at suitable intervals along any route by which the + fleet proposes to move, or by the goodwill of neutrals in permitting it + to coal at their depots. To-day, moreover, there are navies established + even in distant seas. In the Pacific, for example, are the fleets of + Japan and of the United States, and these, in their home waters, will + probably be too strong to be opposed by European navies acting at a vast + distance from their bases. +</p> +<p> + It seems likely, therefore, that neither Great Britain nor any other + State will in future enjoy that monopoly of sea power which was granted + to Great Britain by the circumstances of her victories in the last great + war. What I have called the great prize has in fact ceased to exist, and + even if an adversary were to challenge the British navy, the reward of + his success would not be a naval supremacy of anything like the kind or + extent which peculiar conditions made it possible for Great Britain to + enjoy during the nineteenth century. It would be a supremacy limited and + reduced by the existence of the new navies that have sprung up. +</p> +<p> + From these considerations a very important conclusion must be drawn. In + the first place, enough victory at sea is in case of war as + indispensable to Great Britain as ever, for it remains the fundamental + condition of her security, yet its results can hardly in future be as + great as they were in the past, and in particular it may perhaps not + again enable her to exert upon continental States the same effective + pressure which it formerly rendered possible. +</p> +<p> + In order, therefore, to bring pressure upon a continental adversary, + Great Britain is more than ever in need of the co-operation of a + continental ally. A navy alone cannot produce the effect which it once + did upon the course of a land war, and its success will not suffice to + give confidence to the ally. Nothing but an army able to take its part + in a continental struggle will, in modern conditions, suffice to make + Great Britain the effective ally of a continental State, and in the + absence of such an army Great Britain will continue to be, as she is + to-day, without continental allies. +</p> +<p> + A second conclusion is that our people, while straining every nerve in + peace to ensure to their navy the best chances of victory in war, must + carefully avoid the conception of a dominion of the sea, although, in + fact, such a dominion actually existed during a great part of the + nineteenth century. The new conditions which have grown up during the + past thirty years have made this ideal as much a thing of the past as + the medifval conception of a Roman Empire in Europe to whose titular + head all kings were subordinate. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_11"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + X +</h2> +<center> + DYNAMICS—THE QUESTION OF MIGHT +</center> +<p> + If there is a chance of a conflict in which Great Britain is to be + engaged, her people must take thought in time how they may have on their + side both right and might. It is hard to see how otherwise they can + expect the contest to be decided in their favour. +</p> +<p> + As I have said before, in the quarrel you must be in the right and in + the fight you must win. The quarrel is the domain of policy, the fight + that of strategy or dynamics. Policy and strategy are in reality + inextricably interwoven one with another, for right and might resemble, + more than is commonly supposed, two aspects of the same thing. But it is + convenient in the attempt to understand any complicated subject to + examine its aspects separately. +</p> +<p> + I propose, therefore, in considering the present situation of Great + Britain and her relations to the rest of the world, to treat first of + the question of force, to assume that a quarrel may arise, and to + ascertain what are the conditions in which Great Britain can expect to + win, and then to enter into the question of right, in order to find out + what light can be thrown upon the necessary aims and methods of British + policy by the conclusions which will have been reached as to the use of + force. +</p> +<p> + The nationalisation of States, which is the fundamental fact of modern + history, affects both policy and strategy. If the State is a nation, the + population associated as one body, then the force which it can use in + case of conflict represents the sum of the energies of the whole + population, and this force cannot and will not be used except as the + expression of the will of the whole population. The policy of such a + State means its collective will, the consciousness of its whole + population of a purpose, mission, or duty which it must fulfil, with + which it is identified, and which, therefore, it cannot abandon. Only in + case this national purpose meets with resistance will a people organised + as a State enter into a quarrel, and if such a quarrel has to be fought + out the nation's resources will be expended upon it without limitation. +</p> +<p> + The chief fact in regard to the present condition of Europe appears to + be the very great excess in the military strength of Germany over that + of any other Power. It is due in part to the large population of the + German Empire, and in part to the splendid national organisation which + has been given to it. It cannot be asserted either that Germany was not + entitled to become united, or that she was not entitled to organise + herself as efficiently as possible both for peace and for war. But the + result is that Germany has a preponderance as great if not greater than + that of Spain in the time of Philip II., or of France either under Louis + XIV. or under Napoleon. Every nation, no doubt, has a right to make + itself as strong as it can, and to exercise as much influence as it can + on the affairs of the world. To do these things is the mission and + business of a nation. But the question arises, what are the limits to + the power of a single nation? The answer appears to be that the only + limits are those set by the power of other nations. This is the theory + of the balance of power of which the object is to preserve to Europe its + character of a community of independent States rather than that of a + single empire in which one State predominates. +</p> +<p> + Without attributing to Germany any wrong purpose or any design of + injustice it must be evident that her very great strength must give her + in case of dispute, always possible between independent States, a + corresponding advantage against any other Power whose views or whose + intentions should not coincide with hers. It is the obvious possibility + of such dispute that makes it incumbent upon Great Britain to prepare + herself in case of disagreement to enter into a discussion with Germany + upon equal terms. +</p> +<p> + Only upon such preparation can Great Britain base the hope either of + averting a quarrel with Germany, or in case a quarrel should arise and + cannot be made up by mutual agreement, of settling it by the arbitrament + of war upon terms accordant with the British conception of right. Great + Britain therefore must give herself a national organisation for war and + must make preparation for war the nation's first business until a + reasonable security has been attained. +</p> +<p> + The question is, what weapons are now available for Great Britain in + case of a disagreement with Germany leading to conflict? In the old + wars, as we have seen, she had three modes of action. She used her navy + to obtain control of the sea-ways, and then she used that control partly + to destroy the sea-borne trade of her enemies, and partly to send armies + across the sea to attack her enemies' armies. By the combination of + these three modes of operation she was strong enough to give valuable + help to other Powers, and therefore she had allies whose assistance was + as useful to her as hers to them. To-day, as we have seen, the same + conditions no longer exist. The British navy may indeed hope to obtain + control of the sea-ways, but the law of maritime war, as it has been + settled by the Declarations of Paris and of London, makes it + impracticable for Great Britain to use a naval victory, even if she wins + it, in such a way as to be able commercially to throttle a hostile + Power, while the British military forces available for employment on the + Continent are so small as hardly to count in the balance. The result is + that Great Britain's power of action against a possible enemy is greatly + reduced, partly in consequence of changes in the laws of war, but + perhaps still more in consequence of the fact that while other Powers + are organised for war as nations, England in regard to war is still in + the condition of the eighteenth century, relying upon a small standing + army, a purely professional navy, and a large half-trained force, called + Territorial, neither ready for war nor available outside the United + Kingdom. +</p> +<p> + There is a school of politicians who imagine that Great Britain's + weakness can be supplemented from other parts of the British Empire. + That is an idea which ought not to be received without the most careful + examination and in my judgment must, except within narrow limits, be + rejected. +</p> +<p> + In a war between Great Britain and a continental State or combination + the assistance which Great Britain could possibly receive from the + King's dominions beyond the sea is necessarily limited. Such a war must + in the first place be a naval contest, towards which the most that the + colonies can contribute consists in such additions to Great Britain's + naval strength as they may have given during the preceding period of + peace. What taken together they may do in this way would no doubt make + an appreciable difference in the balance of forces between the two + contending navies; but in the actual struggle the colonies would be + little more than spectators, except in so far as their ports would offer + a certain number of secure bases for the cruisers upon which Great + Britain must rely for the protection of her sea-borne trade. Even if all + the colonies possessed first-rate armies, the help which those armies + could give would not be equal to that obtainable from a single European + ally. For a war against a European adversary Great Britain must rely + upon her own resources, and upon such assistance as she might obtain if + it were felt by other Powers on the Continent not only that the cause in + which she was fighting was vital to them and therefore called for their + co-operation, but also that in the struggle Great Britain's assistance + would be likely to turn the scale in their favour. +</p> +<p> + Can we expect that history will repeat itself, and that once more in + case of conflict Great Britain will have the assistance of continental + allies? That depends chiefly on their faith in her power to help them. + One condition of such an alliance undoubtedly exists—the desire of + other nations for it. The predominance of Germany on the Continent + rests like a nightmare upon more than one of the other States. It is + increased by the alliance of Austria, another great military empire—an + empire, moreover, not without a fine naval tradition, and, as is proved + by the recent announcement of the intention of the Austrian Government + to build four "Dreadnoughts," resolved to revive that tradition. +</p> +<p> + Against the combination of Germany and Austria, Russia, which has hardly + begun to recover from the prostration of her defeat by Japan, is + helpless; while France, with a population much smaller than that of + Germany, can hardly look forward to a renewal single-handed of the + struggle which ended for her so disastrously forty years ago. The + position of Italy is more doubtful, for the sympathies of her people are + not attracted by Austria; they look with anxiety upon the Austrian + policy of expansion towards the Aegean and along the shore of the + Adriatic. The estrangement from France which followed upon the French + occupation of Tunis appears to have passed away, and it seems possible + that if there were a chance of success Italy might be glad to emancipate + herself from German and Austrian influence. But even if Germany's policy + were such that Russia, France, and Italy were each and all of them + desirous to oppose it, and to assert a will and a policy of their own + distinct from that of the German Government, it is very doubtful whether + their strength is sufficient to justify them in an armed conflict, + especially as their hypothetical adversaries have a central position + with all its advantages. From a military point of view the strength of + the central position consists in the power which it gives to its holder + to keep one opponent in check with a part of his forces while he throws + the bulk of them into a decisive blow against another. +</p> +<p> + This is the situation of to-day on the Continent of Europe. It cannot be + changed unless there is thrown into the scale of the possible opponents + of German policy a weight or a force that would restore the equality of + the two parties. The British navy, however perfect it may be assumed to + be, does not in itself constitute such a force. Nor could the British + army on its present footing restore the balance. A small standing army + able to give its allies assistance, officially estimated at a strength + of 160,000 men, will not suffice to turn the scale in a conflict in + which the troops available for each of the great Powers are counted no + longer by the hundred thousand but by the million. But if Great Britain + were so organised that she could utilise for the purpose of war the + whole of her national resources, if she had in addition to the navy + indispensable for her security an army equal in efficiency to the best + that can be found in Europe and in numbers to that maintained by Italy, + which though the fifth Power on the Continent is most nearly her equal + in territory and population, the equilibrium could be restored, and + either the peace of Europe would be maintained, or in case of fresh + conflict there would be a reasonable prospect of the recurrence of what + has happened in the past, the maintenance, against a threatened + domination, of the independence of the European States. +</p> +<p> + The position here set forth is grave enough to demand the close + attention of the British nation, for it means that England might at any + time be called upon to enter into a contest, likely enough to take the + form of a struggle for existence, against the greatest military empire + in the world, supported by another military empire which is itself in + the front rank of great Powers, while the other European States would be + looking on comparatively helpless. +</p> +<p> + But this is by no means a full statement of the case. The other Powers + might not find it possible to maintain an attitude of neutrality. It is + much more probable that they would have to choose between one side and + the other; and that if they do not consider Great Britain strong enough + to help them they may find it their interest, and indeed may be + compelled, to take the side of Great Britain's adversaries. In that case + Great Britain would have to carry on a struggle for existence against + the combined forces of the Continent. +</p> +<p> + That even in this extreme form the contest would be hopeless, I for one + am unwilling to admit. If Great Britain were organised for war and able + to throw her whole energies into it, she might be so strong that her + overthrow even by united Europe would by no means be a foregone + conclusion. But the determined preparation which would make her ready + for the extreme contingency is the best and perhaps the only means of + preventing its occurrence. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_12"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + XI +</h2> +<center> + POLICY—THE QUESTION OF RIGHT +</center> +<p> + I have now given reasons for my belief that in case of conflict Great + Britain, owing to her lack of organisation for war, would be in a + position of some peril. She has not created for herself the means of + making good by force a cause with which she may be identified but which + may be disputed, and her weakness renders it improbable that she would + have allies. There remains the second question whether, in the absence + of might, she would at least have right on her side. That depends upon + the nature of the quarrel. A good cause ought to unite her own people, + and only in behalf of a good cause could she expect other nations to be + on her side. From this point of view must be considered the relations + between Great Britain and Germany, and in the first place the aims of + German policy. +</p> +<p> + A nation of which the army consists of four million able-bodied citizens + does not go to war lightly. The German ideal, since the foundation of + the Empire, has been rather that held up for Great Britain by Lord + Rosebery in the words: +</p> +<p> + "Peace secured, not by humiliation, but by preponderance." +</p> +<p> + The first object after the defeat of France in 1870 was security, and + this was sought not merely by strengthening the army and improving its + training but also by obtaining the alliance of neighbouring Powers. In + the first period the attempt was made to keep on good terms, not only + with Austria, but with Russia. When in 1876 disturbances began in the + Balkan Peninsula, Germany, while giving Austria her support, exerted + herself to prevent a breach between Austria and Russia, and after the + Russo-Turkish war acted as mediator between Russia on one side and + Austria and Great Britain on the other, so that without a fresh war the + European treaty of Berlin was substituted for the Russo-Turkish Treaty + of San Stefano. +</p> +<p> + After 1878 Russia became estranged from Germany, whereupon Germany, in + 1879, made a defensive alliance with Austria, to which at a later date + Italy became a party. This triple alliance served for a quarter of a + century to maintain the peace against the danger of a Franco-Russian + combination until the defeat of Russia in Manchuria and consequent + collapse of Russia's military power removed that danger. +</p> +<p> + Shortly before this event the British agreement with the French + Government had been negotiated by Lord Lansdowne. The French were very + anxious to bring Morocco into the sphere of French influence, and to + this the British Government saw no objection, but in the preamble to the + agreement, as well as in its text, by way of declaration that Great + Britain had no objection to this portion of the policy of France, words + were used which might seem to imply that Great Britain had some special + rights in regard to Morocco. +</p> +<p> + The second article of the Declaration of April 8, 1904, contains the + following clause: +</p> +<p> + "The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no + intention of altering the political status of Morocco. His Britannic + Majesty's Government, for their part, recognise that it appertains to + France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous + for a great distance with Morocco, to preserve order in that country, + and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, + economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require." +</p> +<p> + This clause seems to be open to the interpretation that Great Britain + assumes a right to determine what nation of Europe is best entitled to + exercise a protectorate over Morocco. That would involve some British + superiority over other Powers, or at any rate that Great Britain had a + special right over Morocco, a sort of suzerainty of which she could + dispose at will. Germany disliked both this claim and the idea that + France was to obtain special influence in Morocco. She was herself + anxious for oversea possessions and spheres of influence, and appears to + have thought that if Morocco was to become a European protectorate she + ought to have a voice in any settlement. The terms in which the English + consent to the French design was expressed were construed by the + German's as involving, on the part of Great Britain, just that kind of + supremacy in regard to oversea affairs which they had for so many years + been learning to dislike. At any rate, when the moment convenient to her + came, Germany put her veto upon the arrangements which had been made and + required that they should be submitted to a European Conference. France + was not prepared to renew the struggle for existence over Morocco, while + Germany appeared not unwilling to assert her will even by force. + Accordingly Germany had her way. +</p> +<p> + The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary again + afforded an opportunity for the exercise of Germany's preponderance. In + 1878 the Treaty of Berlin had authorised Austria-Hungary to occupy and + administer the two provinces without limitation of time, and Bosnia and + Herzegovina have since then practically been Austrian provinces, for the + male population has been subject to compulsory service in the Austrian + army and the soldiers have taken the oath of allegiance to the Emperor. + It is not clear that any of the great Powers had other than a formal + objection to the annexation, the objection, namely, that it was not + consistent with the letter of the Treaty of Berlin. The British + Government pointed out that, by international agreement to which + Austria-Hungary is a party, a European Treaty is not to be modified + without the consent of all the signatory Powers, and that this consent + had not been asked by Austria-Hungary. The British view was endorsed + both by France and Russia, and these three Powers were in favour of a + European Conference for the purpose of revising the clause of the Treaty + of Berlin, and apparently also of giving some concessions to Servia and + Montenegro, the two small States which, for reasons altogether + disconnected with the formal aspect of the case, resented the + annexation. Neither of the Western Powers had any such interest in the + matter as to make it in the least probable that they would in any case + be prepared to support their view by force, while Austria, by mobilising + her army, showed that she was ready to do so, and there was no doubt + that she was assured, in case of need, of Germany's support. The Russian + Minister of Foreign Affairs publicly explained to his countrymen that + Russia was not in a condition to carry on a war. Accordingly in the + moment of crisis the Russian Government withdrew its opposition to + Austro-Hungarian policy, and thus once more was revealed the effect upon + a political decision of the military strength, readiness, and + determination of the two central Powers. +</p> +<p> + A good deal of feeling was aroused, at any rate in Great Britain, by the + disclosure in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the + earlier case of Morocco, of Germany's policy, and in the later + negotiation of her determination to support Austria-Hungary by force. + Yet he would be a rash man who, on now looking back, would assert that + in either case a British Government would have been justified in armed + opposition to Germany's policy. +</p> +<p> + The bearing of Germany and Austria-Hungary in these negotiations, ending + as they did at the time when the debate on the Navy Estimates disclosed + to the British public the serious nature of the competition in naval + shipbuilding between Germany and Great Britain, was to a large class in + this country a startling revelation of the too easily forgotten fact + that a nation does not get its way by asking for it, but by being able + and ready to assert its will by force of arms in case of need. There is + no reason to believe that the German Government has any intention to + enter into a war except for the maintenance of rights or interests held + to be vital for Germany, but it is always possible that Germany may hold + vital some right or interest which another nation may be not quite ready + to admit. In that case it behoves the other nation very carefully to + scrutinise the German claims and its own way of regarding them, and to + be quite sure, before entering into a dispute, that its own views are + right and Germany's views wrong, as well as that it has the means, in + case of conflict, of carrying on with success a war against the German + Empire. +</p> +<p> + If then England is to enter into a quarrel with Germany or any other + State, let her people take care that it arises from no obscure issue + about which they may disagree among themselves, but from some palpable + wrong done by the other Power, some wrong which calls upon them to + resist it with all their might. +</p> +<p> + The case alleged against Germany is that she is too strong, so strong in + herself that no Power in Europe can stand up against her, and so sure of + the assistance of her ally, Austria, to say nothing of the other ally, + Italy, that there is at this moment no combination that will venture to + oppose the Triple Alliance. In other words, Germany is thought to have + acquired an ascendency in Europe which she may at any moment attempt to + convert into supremacy. Great Britain is thought of, at any rate by her + own people, as the traditional opponent of any such supremacy on the + Continent, so that if she were strong enough it might be her function to + be the chief antagonist of a German ascendency or supremacy, though the + doubt whether she is strong enough prevents her from fulfilling this + role. +</p> +<p> + But there is another side to the case. The opinion has long been + expressed by German writers and is very widespread in Germany that it is + Great Britain that claims an ascendency or supremacy, and that Germany + in opposing that supremacy is making herself the champion of the + European cause of the independence of States. This German idea was + plainly expressed twenty-five years ago by the German historian Wilhelm + M|ller, who wrote in a review of the year 1884: "England was the + opponent of all the maritime Powers of Europe. She had for decades + assumed at sea the same dictatorial attitude as France had maintained + upon land under Louis XIV. and Napoleon I. The years 1870-1871 broke the + French spell; the year 1884 has shown England that the times of her + maritime imperialism also are over, and that if she does not renounce it + of her own free will, an 1870 will come for the English spell too. It is + true, England need not fear any single maritime Power, but only a + coalition of them all; and hitherto she has done all she can to call up + such a coalition." The language which Englishmen naturally use in + discussing their country's naval strength might seem to lend itself to + the German interpretation. For example, on the 10th March 1908, the + Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, expressing an opinion in which he thought + both parties concurred, said: "We must maintain the unassailable + supremacy of this country at sea." Here, at any rate, is the word + "supremacy " at which the Germans take umbrage, and which our own people + regard as objectionable if applied to the position of any Power on the + Continent. +</p> +<p> + I will not repeat here the analysis which I published many years ago of + the dealings between the German and British Governments during the + period when German colonial enterprise was beginning; nor the + demonstration that in those negotiations the British Government acted + with perfect fairness, but was grossly misrepresented to the German + public. The important thing for the people of Great Britain to + understand to-day is not the inner diplomatic history of that and + subsequent periods, but the impression which is current in Germany with + regard to the whole of these transactions. +</p> +<p> + The Germans think that Great Britain lays claim to a special position in + regard to the ocean, in the nature of a suzerainty over the waters of + the globe, and over those of its coasts which are not the possessions + of some strong civilised Power. What they have perceived in the last + quarter of a century has been that, somehow or other, they care not how, + whenever there has been a German attempt in the way of what is called + colonial expansion, it has led to friction with Great Britain. + Accordingly they have the impression that Great Britain is opposed to + any such German expansion, and in this way, as they are anxious for + dominions beyond the sea and for the spread of their trade into every + quarter of the globe, they have come to regard Great Britain as the + adversary. This German feeling found vent during the South African War, + and the expressions at that time freely used in the German newspapers, + as well as by German writers whose works were less ephemeral, could not + but deeply offend the national consciousness, to any nothing of the + pride of the people of this country. In this way the sympathy which used + to exist between the two peoples has been lost and they have come to + regard each other with suspicion, which has not been without its effect + on the relations between the two Governments and upon the course of + European diplomacy. This is the origin of the rivalry, and it is to the + resentment which has been diligently cultivated in Germany against the + supposed British claim to supremacy at sea that is attributable the + great popularity among the people of Germany of the movement in favour + of the expansion of the German navy. Since 1884 the people of Germany + have been taught to regard with suspicion every item of British policy, + and naturally enough this auspicious attitude has found its counterpart + among the people of this country. The result has been that the + agreements by which England has disposed of a number of disagreements + with France and with Russia have been regarded in Germany as inspired by + the wish to prepare a coalition against that country, and, in view of + the past history of Great Britain, this interpretation can hardly be + pronounced unnatural. +</p> +<p> + Any cause for which Great Britain would fight ought to be intelligible + to other nations, first of all to those of Europe, but also to the + nations outside of Europe, at any rate to the United States and Japan, + for if we were fighting for something in regard to which there was no + sympathy with us, or which led other nations to sympathise with our + adversary, we should be hampered by grave misgivings and might find + ourselves alone in a hostile world. +</p> +<p> + Accordingly it cannot be sound policy for Great Britain to assert for + herself a supremacy or ascendency of the kind which is resented, not + only by Germany, but by every other continental State, and indeed by + every maritime State in the world. It ought to be made clear to all the + world that in fact, whatever may have been the language used in English + discussions, Great Britain makes no claim to suzerainty over the sea, or + over territories bordering on the sea, not forming parts of the British + Empire; that, while she is determined to maintain a navy that can in + case of war secure the "command" of the sea against her enemies, she + regards the sea, in peace, and in war except for her enemies, as the + common property of all nations, the open road forming the great highway + of mankind. +</p> +<p> + We have but to reflect on the past to perceive that the idea of a + dominion of the sea must necessarily unite other nations against us. + What in the sixteenth century was the nature of the dispute between + England and Spain? The British popular consciousness to-day remembers + two causes, of which one was religious antagonism, and the other the + claim set up by Spain and rejected by England to a monopoly of America, + carrying with it an exclusive right to navigation in the Western + Atlantic and to a monopoly of the trade of the Spanish dominions beyond + the sea. That is a chapter of history which at the present time deserves + a place in the meditations of Englishmen. +</p> +<p> + I may now try to condense into a single view the general survey of the + conditions of Europe which I have attempted from the two points of view + of strategy and of policy, of force and of right. Germany has such a + preponderance of military force that no continental State can stand up + against her. There is, therefore, on the Continent no nation independent + of German influence or pressure. Great Britain, so long as she maintains + the superiority of her navy over that of Germany or over those of + Germany and her allies, is not amenable to constraint by Germany, but + her military weakness prevents her exerting any appreciable counter + pressure upon Germany. +</p> +<p> + The moment the German navy has become strong enough to confront that of + Great Britain without risk of destruction, British influence in Europe + will be at an end, and the Continent will have to follow the direction + given by German policy. That is a consummation to be desired neither in + the interest of the development of the European nations nor in that of + Great Britain. It means the prevalence of one national ideal instead of + the growth side by side of a number of types. It means also the + exclusion of British ideals from European life. +</p> +<p> + Great Britain has in the past been a powerful contributor to the free + development of the European nations, and therefore to the preservation + in Europe of variety of national growth. I believe that she is now + called upon to renew that service. The method open to her lies in such + action as may relieve the other European States from the overwhelming + pressure which, in case of the disappearance of England from the + European community, would be put upon them by Germany. It seems probable + that in default of right action she will be compelled to maintain her + national ideals against Europe united under German guidance. The action + required consists on the one hand in the perfecting of the British navy, + and on the other of the military organisation of the British people on + the principle, already explained, of the nationalisation of war. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_13"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + XII +</h2> +<center> + THE NATION +</center> +<p> + The conclusion to which a review of England's position and of the state + of Europe points, is that while there is no visible cause of quarrel + between Great Britain and Germany, yet there is between them a rivalry + such as is inevitable between a State that has long held something like + the first place in the world and a State that feels entitled in virtue + of the number of its people, their character and training, their work + and their corporate organisation, to aspire to the first place. The + German nation by the mere fact of its growth challenges England for the + primacy. It could not be otherwise. But the challenge is no wrong done + to England, and the idea that it ought to be resented is unworthy of + British traditions. It must be cheerfully accepted. If the Germans are + better men than we are they deserve to take our place. If we mean to + hold our own we must set about it in the right way—by proving ourselves + better than the Germans. +</p> +<p> + There ought to be no question of quarrel or of war. Men can be rivals + without being enemies. It is the first lesson that an English boy + learns at school. Quarrels arise, as a rule, from misunderstandings or + from faults of temper, and England ought to avoid the frame of mind + which would render her liable to take offence at trifles, while her + policy ought to be simple enough to escape being misunderstood. +</p> +<p> + In a competition between two nations the qualification for success is to + be the better nation. Germany's advantage is that her people have been + learning for a whole century to subordinate their individual wishes and + welfare to that of the nation, while the people of Great Britain have + been steeped in individualism until the consciousness of national + existence, of a common purpose and a common duty, has all but faded + away. What has to be done is to restore the nation to its right place in + men's minds, and so to organise it that, like a trained athlete, it will + be capable of hard and prolonged effort. +</p> +<p> + By the nation I mean the United Kingdom, the commonwealth of Great + Britain and Ireland, and I distinguish it from the Empire which is a + federation of several nations. The nation thus defined has work to do, + duties to perform as one nation among many, and the way out of the + present difficulties will be found by attending to these duties. +</p> +<p> + In the first place comes Britain's work in Europe, which to describe + has been the purpose of the preceding chapters. It cannot be right for + Britain, after the share she has taken in securing for Europe the + freedom that distinguishes a series of independent States existing side + by side from a single centralised Empire, to turn her back upon the + Continent and to suppose that she exists only for the sake of her own + colonies and India. On the contrary it is only by playing her part in + Europe that she can hope to carry through the organisation of her own + Empire which she has in view. Her function as a European State is to + make her voice heard in the council of the European nations, so that no + one State can dictate the decisions to be reached. In order to do that + she must be strong enough to be able to say Aye and No without fear, and + to give effective help in case of need to those other States which may + in a decision vote on the same side with her. +</p> +<p> + In her attitude towards the Powers of Europe and in her dealings with + them Great Britain is the representative of the daughter nations and + dependencies that form her Empire, and her self-defence in Europe is the + defence of the whole Empire, at any rate against possible assaults from + any European Power. At the same time she is necessarily the centre and + the head of her own Empire. She must take the lead in its organisation + and in the direction of its policy. If she is to fulfil these duties, + on the one hand to Europe and on the other to the daughter nations and + India, she must herself be organised on the principle of duty. An + England divided against herself, absorbed in the disputes of factions + and unconscious of a purpose, can neither lead nor defend her Empire, + can play her proper part neither in Europe nor in the world. +</p> +<p> + The great work to be done at home, corresponding to the ultimate purpose + of national life, is that she should bring up her people to a higher + standard of human excellence, to a finer type than others. There are + English types well recognised. Fifty years ago the standard of British + workmanship was the acknowledged mark of excellence in the industrial + world, while it has been pointed out in an earlier chapter that the + English standards, of character displayed in conduct, described in one + aspect by the word "gentleman," and in another by the expression + "fair-play," form the best part of the nation's inheritance. It is the + business of any British education worth thinking of to stamp these + hall-marks of character upon all her people. +</p> +<p> + Nothing reveals in a more amazing light the extent to which in this + country the true meaning of our being a nation has been forgotten than + the use that has been made in recent years of the term "national + education." The leaders of both parties have discussed the subject as + though any system of schools maintained at the public expense formed a + system of national education. But the diffusion of instruction is not + education, and the fact that it is carried on at the public expense does + not make it national. Education is training the child for his life to + come, and his life's value consists in the work which he will do. + National education means bringing up every boy and girl to do his or her + part of the nation's work. A child who is going to do nothing will be of + no use to his country, and a bringing up that leaves him prepared to do + nothing is not an education but a perversion. A British national + education ought to make every man a good workman, every man a gentleman, + every man a servant of his country. +</p> +<p> + My contention, then, is that this British nation has to perform certain + specific tasks, and that in order to be able to do her work she must + insist that her people—every man, woman, and child—exist not for + themselves but for her. This is the principle of duty. It gives a + standard of personal value, for evidently a man's use to his country + consists in what he does for it, not in what he gets or has for himself, + which, from the national point of view, is of no account except so far + as it either enables him to carry on the work for which he is best + suited or can be applied for the nation's benefit. +</p> +<p> + How then in practice can the principle of duty be brought into our + national and our individual life? I think that the right way is that we + should join in doing those things which are evidently needed, and should + postpone other things about the necessity of which there may be + disagreement. I shall devote the rest of this volume to considering how + the nation is to prepare itself for the first duty laid upon it, that of + assuring its security and so making good its position as a member of the + European community. But before pursuing that inquiry I must reiterate + once more the principle which it is my main purpose to set before my + countrymen. +</p> +<p> + The conception of the Nation is the clue to the solution of all the + problems with which the people of Great Britain are confronted. They are + those of foreign and imperial policy, of defence national and imperial, + of education and of social life. +</p> +<p> + Foreign and imperial policy include all affairs external to Great + Britain, the relations of Great Britain to Europe, to India, to the + Colonies, and to the Powers of Asia and America. In all these external + affairs the question to be asked is, what is Britain's duty? +</p> +<p> + It is by the test of duty that Great Britain's attitude towards Germany + should be tried. In what event would it be necessary and right to call + on every British citizen to turn out and fight, ready to shed his blood + and ready to shoot down enemies? Evidently only in case of some great + and manifest wrong undertaken by Germany. As I am aware of no such wrong + actually attempted, I think a conflict unnecessary. It is true I began + by pointing out the danger of drifting into a war with the German + Empire, but I wish to do what I can to prevent it, and to show that by + right action the risk will be diminished. +</p> +<p> + The greatest risk is due to fear—fear in this country of what Germany + may do, fear in Germany of what Great Britain may do. Fear is a bad + adviser. There are Englishmen who seem to think that as Germany is + strengthening her navy it would be wise to attack her while the British + navy is superior in numerical force. This suggestion must be frankly + discussed and dealt with. +</p> +<p> + A war is a trial of strength. To begin it does not add to your force. + Suppose for the sake of the argument that a war between England and + Germany were "inevitable"—which is equivalent to the supposition that + one of the two Governments is bound to wrong the other—one of the two + Governments must take the initiative. You take the initiative when you + are the Power that wants something, in which case you naturally exert + yourself to obtain it, while the adversary who merely says No to your + request, acts only in resistance. England wants nothing from Germany, so + that she is not called upon for an initiative. But the initiative, or + offensive, requires the stronger force, its object being to render the + other side powerless for resistance to its will. The defensive admits of + a smaller force. A conflict between England and Germany must be + primarily a naval war, and Germany's naval forces are considerably + weaker than those of England. England has no political reason for the + initiative; Germany is debarred from it by the inferiority of her navy. + If, therefore, Germany wants anything from England, she must wait to + take the initiative until she has forces strong enough for the + offensive. But her forces, though not strong enough for the offensive, + may be strong enough for the defensive. If, therefore, England should + take the initiative., she would in so doing give away the one advantage + she has. It may be Germany's interest to have a prompt decision. It can + hardly be her interest to attack before she is ready. But if she really + wanted to pick a quarrel and get some advantage, it would exactly serve + her purpose to be attacked at once, as that would give her the benefit + of the defensive. The English "Jingoes," then, are false guides, bad + strategists, and worse, statesmen. +</p> +<p> + Not only in the affairs of Europe, but in those of India, Egypt, and + the Colonies, and in all dealings with Asia, Africa, and America the + line of British policy will be the line of the British nation's duty. +</p> +<p> + If Britain is to follow this line two conditions must be fulfilled. She + must have a leader to show the way and her people must walk in it with + confidence. +</p> +<p> + The mark of a leader is the single eye. But the traditional system gives + the lead of the nation to the leader of one party chosen for his success + in leading that party. He can never have a single eye; he serves two + masters. His party requires him to keep it in office, regarding the + Opposition as the enemy. But his country requires him to guide a united + nation in the fulfilment of its mission in Europe and a united Empire in + the fulfilment of its mission in the world. A statesman who is to lead + the nation and the Empire must keep his eyes on Europe and on the world. + A party leader who is to defeat the other party must keep his eyes on + the other party. No man can at the same time be looking out of the + window and watching an opponent inside the house, and the traditional + system puts the Prime Minister in a painful dilemma. Either he never + looks out of the window at all or he tries to look two ways at once. + Party men seem to believe that if a Prime Minister were to look across + the sea instead of across the floor of the House of Commons his + Government would be upset. That may be the case so long as men ignore + the nation and so long as they acquiesce in the treasonable doctrine + that it is the business of the Opposition to oppose. But a statesman who + would take courage to lead the nation might perhaps find the Opposition + powerless against him. +</p> +<p> + The counterpart of leadership is following. A Government that shows the + line of Britain's duty must be able to utilise the whole energies of her + people for its performance. A duty laid upon the nation implies a duty + laid upon every man to do his share of the nation's work, to assist the + Government by obedient service, the best of which he is capable. It + means a people trained every man to his task. +</p> +<p> + A nation should be like a team in which every man has his place, his + work to do, his mission or duty. There is no room in it either for the + idler who consumes but renders no service, or for the unskilled man who + bungles a task to which he has not been trained. A nation may be + compared to a living creature. Consider the way in which nature + organises all things that live and grow. In the structure of a living + thing every part has its function, its work to do. There are no + superfluous organs, and if any fails to do its work the creature + sickens and perhaps dies. +</p> +<p> + Take the idea of the nation as I have tried to convey it and apply it as + a measure or test to our customary way of thinking both of public + affairs and of our own lives. Does it not reveal that we attach too much + importance to having and to possessions—our own and other people's—and + too little importance to doing, to service? When we ask what a man is + worth, we think of what he owns. But the words ought to make us think of + what he is fit for and of what service he renders to the nation. The + only value of what a man has springs from what he does with it. +</p> +<p> + The idea of the nation leads to the right way of looking at these + matters, because it constrains every man to put himself and all that he + has at the service of the community. Thus it is the opposite of + socialism, which merely turns upside down the current worship of + ownership, and which thinks "having" so supremely important that it + would put "not having" in its place. The only cry I will adopt is + "England for ever," which means that we are here, every one of us, with + all that we have and all that we can do, as members of a nation that + must either serve the world or perish. +</p> +<p> + But the idea of the nation carries us a long way further than I have yet + shown. It bids us all try at the peril of England's fall to get the + best Government we can to lead us. We need a man to preside over the + nation's counsels, to settle the line of Britain's duty in Europe and in + her own Empire, and of her duty to her own people, to the millions who + are growing up ill fed, ill housed and ill trained, and yet who are part + of the sovereign people. We need to give him as councillors men that are + masters of the tasks in which for the nation to fail means its ruin, the + tasks of which I have enumerated those that are vital. Do we give him a + master of the history of the other nations to guide the nation's + dealings with them? Do we give him a master of war to educate admirals + and generals? Do we give him a master of the sciences to direct the + pursuit of knowledge, and a master of character-building to supervise + the bringing up of boys and girls to be types of a noble life? It would + serve the nation's turn to have such men. They are among us, and to find + them we should only have to look for them. It would be no harder than to + pick apples off a tree. But we never dream of looking for them. We have + a wonderful plan of choosing our leaders, the plan which we call an + election. Five hundred men assemble in a hall and listen to a speech + from a partisan, while five hundred others in a hall in the next street + are cheering a second partisan who declaims against the first. There is + no test of either speaker, except that he must be rich enough to pay + the expenses of an "election." The voters do not even listen to both + partisans in order to judge between them. Thus we choose our members of + Parliament. Our Government is a committee of some twenty of them. Its + first business is to keep its authority against the other party, of + which in turn the chief function is to make out that everything the + Government does is wrong. This is the only recognised plan for leading + the nation. +</p> +<p> + You may be shocked as you read this by the plainness of my words, but + you know them to be true, though you suppose that to insist on the facts + is "impracticable" because you fancy that there is no way out of the + marvellously absurd arrangements that exist. But there is a way out, + though it is no royal road. It is this. Get the meaning of the nation + into your own head and then make a present to England of your party + creed. Ask yourself what is the one thing most needed now, and the one + thing most needed for the future. You will answer, because you know it + to be true, that the one thing most needed now is to get the navy right. +</p> +<p> + The one thing most needed for the future is to put the idea of the + nation and the will to help England into every man's soul. That cannot + be done by writing or by talking, but only by setting every man while + he is young to do something for his country. There is one way of + bringing that about. It is by making every citizen a soldier in a + national army. The man who has learned to serve his country has learned + to love it. He is the true citizen, and of such a nation is composed. + Great Britain needs a statesman to lead her and a policy at home and + abroad. But such a policy must not be sought and cannot be found upon + party lines. The statesman who is to expound it to his countrymen and + represent it to the world must be the leader not of one party but of + both. In short, a statesman must be a nation leader, and the first + condition of his existence is that there should be a nation for him to + lead. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_14"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + XIII +</h2> +<center> + THE EFFECT OF THE NATIONALISATION OF WAR UPON LEADERSHIP +</center> +<p> + The argument of the preceding chapters points to the conclusion that if + Great Britain is to maintain her position as a great Power, probably + even if she is to maintain her independence, and certainly if she is to + retain the administration of India and the leadership of the nations + that have grown out of her colonies, her statesmen and her people must + combine to do three things:— +</p> +<p> + 1. To adopt a policy having due relation to the condition and needs of + the European Continent. +</p> +<p> + 2. To make the British navy the best possible instrument of naval + warfare. +</p> +<p> + 3. To make the British army strong enough to be able to turn the scales + in a continental war. +</p> +<p> + What are for the navy and for the army the essentials of victory? If + there had never been any wars, no one would know what was essential to + victory. People would have their notions, no doubt, but these notions + would be guesses and could not be verified until the advent of a war, + which might bring with it a good deal of disappointment to the people + who had guessed wrong. But there have already been wars enough to afford + ample material for deductions as to the causes and conditions of + success. I propose to take the two best examples that can be found, one + for war at sea and the other for war on land, in order to show exactly + the way in which victory is attained. +</p> +<p> + By victory, of course, I mean crushing the enemy. In a battle in which + neither side is crippled, and after which the fleets part to renew the + struggle after a short interval, one side or the other may consider that + it has had the honours of the day. It may have lost fewer ships than the + enemy, or have taken more. It may have been able and willing to continue + the fight, though the enemy drew off, and its commander may be promoted + or decorated for having maintained the credit of his country or of the + service to which he belongs. But such a battle is not victory either in + a political or a strategical sense. It does not lead to the + accomplishment of the purpose of the war, which is to dictate conditions + of peace. That result can be obtained only by crushing the enemy's force + and so making him powerless to renew the contest. +</p> +<p> + A general view of the wars of the eighteenth century between Great + Britain and France shows that, broadly speaking, there was no decision + until the end of the period. The nearest approach to it was when Hawke + destroyed the French fleet in Quiberon Bay. But this was hardly a + stand-up fight. The French fleet was running away, and Hawke's + achievement was that, in spite of the difficulties of weather on an + extremely dangerous coast, he was able to consummate its destruction. + The real decision was the work of Nelson, and its principal cause was + Nelson himself. +</p> +<p> + The British navy had discovered in its conflicts with the Dutch during + the seventeenth century that the object of naval warfare was the command + of the sea, which must be won by breaking the enemy's force in battle. + This was also perfectly understood by the Dutch admirals, and in those + wars was begun the development of the art of fighting battles with + sailing vessels. A formation, the line of battle, in which one ship + sails in the track of the ship before her, was found to be appropriate + to the weapon used, the broadside of artillery; and a type of ship + suitable to this formation, the line-of-battle ship, established itself. + These were the elements with which the British and French navies entered + into their long eighteenth century struggle. The French, however, had + not grasped the principle that the object of naval warfare was to obtain + the command of the sea. They did not consciously and primarily aim, as + did their British rivals, at the destruction of the enemy's fleet. They + were more concerned with the preservation of their own fleet than with + the destruction of the enemy's, and were ready rather to accept battle + than to bring it about. The British admirals were eager for battle, but + had a difficulty in finding out how a decisive blow could be struck. The + orthodox and accepted doctrine of the British navy was that the British + fleet should be brought alongside the enemy's fleet, the two lines of + battleships being parallel to one another, so that each ship in the + British fleet should engage a corresponding ship in the French fleet. It + was a manoeuvre difficult of execution, because, in order to approach + the French, the British must in the first place turn each of their ships + at right angles to the line or obliquely to it, and then, when they were + near enough to fire, must turn again to the left (or right) in order to + restore the line formation. And during this period of approach and + turning they must be exposed to the broadsides of the French without + being able to make full use of their own broadsides. Moreover, it was + next to impossible in this way to bring up the whole line together. + Besides being difficult, the manoeuvre had no promise of success. For if + two fleets of equal numbers are in this way matched ship against ship, + neither side has any advantage except what may be derived from the + superior skill of its gunners. So long as these conditions prevailed, + no great decisive victory of the kind for which we are seeking was + gained. It was during this period that Nelson received such training as + the navy could give him, and added to it the necessary finishing touch + by never-ceasing effort to find out for himself the way in which he + could strike a decisive blow. His daring was always deliberate, never + rash, and this is the right frame of mind for a commander. "You may be + assured," he writes to Lord Hood, March 11, 1794, "I shall undertake + nothing but what I have moral certainty of succeeding in." +</p> +<p> + His fierce determination to get at the ultimate secrets of his trade led + him to use every means that would help him to think out his problem, and + among these means was reading. In 1780 appeared Clerk's "Essay on Naval + Tactics." Clerk pointed out the weakness of the method of fighting in + two parallel lines and suggested and discussed a number of plans by + which one fleet with the bulk of its force could attack and destroy a + portion of the other. This was the problem to which Nelson gave his + mind—how to attack a part with the whole. On the 19th of August 1796 he + writes to the Duke of Clarence:— +</p> +<p> + "We are now 22 sail of the line, the combined fleet will be above 35 + sail of the line.... I will venture my life Sir John Jervis defeats + them; I do not mean by a regular battle but by the skill of our + Admiral, and the activity and spirit of our officers and seamen. This + country is the most favourable possible for skill with an inferior + fleet; for the winds are so variable that some one time in the 24 hours + you must be able to attack a part of a large fleet, and the other will + be becalmed, or have a contrary wind." +</p> +<p> + His opportunity came in 1798, when in the battle of the Nile he crushed + the French Mediterranean Fleet. In a letter to Lord Howe, written + January 8, 1799, he described his plan in a sentence:— +</p> +<p> + "By attacking the enemy's van and centre, the wind blowing directly + along their line, I was enabled to throw what force I pleased on a few + ships." +</p> +<p> + We know that Nelson's method of fighting had for months before the + battle been his constant preoccupation, and that he had lost no + opportunity of explaining his ideas to his captains. Here are the words + of Captain Berry's narrative:— +</p> +<p> + "It had been his practice during the whole of the cruise, whenever the + weather and circumstances would permit, to have his captains on board + the Vanguard, where he would fully develop to them his own ideas of the + different and best modes of attack, and such plans as he proposed to + execute upon falling in with the enemy, whatever their position or + situation might be, by day or by night. There was no possible position + in which they might be found that he did not take into his calculation, + and for the most advantageous attack on which he had not digested and + arranged the best possible disposition of the force which he commanded." +</p> +<p> + The great final victory of Trafalgar was prepared in the same way, and + the various memoranda written in the period before the battle have + revealed to recent investigation the unwearying care which Nelson + devoted to finding out how best to concentrate his force upon that + portion of the enemy's fleet which it would be most difficult for the + enemy to support with the remainder. +</p> +<p> + Nelson's great merit, his personal contribution to his country's + influence, lay first and foremost in his having by intellectual effort + solved the tactical problem set to commanders by the conditions of the + naval weapon of his day, the fleet of line-of-battle ships; and + secondly, in his being possessed and inspired by the true strategical + doctrine that the prime object of naval warfare is the destruction of + the enemy's fleet, and therefore that the decisive point in the theatre + of war is the point where the enemy's fleet can be found. It was the + conviction with which he held this principle that enabled him in + circumstances of the greatest difficulty to divine where to go to find + the enemy's fleet; which in 1798 led him persistently up and down the + Mediterranean till he had discovered the French squadron anchored at + Aboukir; which in 1805 took him from the Mediterranean to the West + Indies, and from the West Indies back to the Channel. +</p> +<p> + So much for Nelson's share of the work. But Nelson could neither have + educated himself nor made full use of his education if the navy of his + day had not been inspired with the will to fight and to conquer, with + the discipline that springs from that will, and had not obtained through + long experience of war the high degree of skill in seamanship and in + gunnery which made it the instrument its great commander required. These + conditions of the navy in turn were products of the national spirit and + of the will of the Government and people of Great Britain to devote to + the navy as much money, as many men, and as vigorous support as might be + necessary to realise the national purpose. +</p> +<p> + The efforts of this nature made by the country were neither perfect nor + complete. The Governments made mistakes, the Admiralty left much to be + desired both in organisation and in personnel. But the will was there. + The best proof of the national determination is to be found in the best + hated of all the institutions of that time, the press-gang, a brutal and + narrow-minded form of asserting the principle that a citizen's duty is + to fight for his country. That the principle should take such a shape + is decisive evidence no doubt that society was badly organised, and that + education, intellectual and moral, was on a low level, but also, and + this is the vital matter, that the nation well understood the nature of + the struggle in which it was engaged and was firmly resolved not only to + fight but to conquer. +</p> +<p> + The causes of the success of the French armies in the period between + 1792 and 1809 were precisely analogous to those which have been analysed + in the case of the British navy. The basis was the national will, + expressed in the volunteers and the levy <i>en masse</i>. Upon this was + superimposed the skill acquired by the army in several years of + incessant war, and the formal cause of the victories was Napoleon's + insight into the art of command. The research of recent years has + revealed the origin of Napoleon's mastery of the method of directing an + army. He became an officer in 1785, at the age of sixteen. In 1793, as a + young captain of artillery, he directed with remarkable insight and + determination the operations by which the allied fleet was driven from + Toulon. In 1794 he inspired and conducted, though still a subordinate, a + series of successful operations in the Maritime Alps. In 1796, as + commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy, he astonished Europe by the + most brilliant campaign on record. For these achievements he had + prepared himself by assiduous study. As a young officer of artillery he + received the best professional training then to be had in Europe, while + at the same time, by wide and careful reading, he gave himself a general + education. At some period before 1796, probably before 1794, he had read + and thoroughly digested the remarkable treatise on the principles of + mountain war which had been left in manuscript by General Bourcet, an + officer who during the campaigns of half a century had assisted as + Quartermaster-General a number of the best Generals of France. + Napoleon's phenomenal power of concentration had enabled him to + assimilate Bourcet's doctrine, which in his clear and vigorous mind took + new and more perfect shape, so that from the beginning his operations + are conducted on a system which may be described as that of Bourcet + raised to a higher power. +</p> +<p> + The "Nelson touch" was acquired by the Admiral through years of effort + to think out, to its last conclusion, a problem the nature of which had + never been adequately grasped by his professional predecessors and + comrades, though it seems probable that he owed to Clerk the hint which + led him to the solution which he found. Napoleon was more fortunate in + inheriting a strategical doctrine which he had but to appreciate to + expand and to apply. The success of both men is due to the habit of mind + which clings tenaciously to the subject under investigation until it is + completely cleared up. Each of them became, as a result of his thinking, + the embodiment of a theory or system of the employment of force, the one + on sea and the other on land; and such an embodiment is absolutely + necessary for a nation in pursuit of victory. +</p> +<p> + It seems natural to say that if England wants victory on sea or land, + she must provide herself with a Nelson or a Napoleon. The statement is + quite true, but it requires to be rightly interpreted. If it means that + a nation must always choose a great man to command its navy or its army + it is an impossible maxim, because a great man cannot be recognised + until his power has been revealed in some kind of work. Moreover, to say + that Nelson and Napoleon won victories because they were great men is to + invert the order of nature and of truth. They are recognised as great + men because of the mastery of their business which they manifested in + action. That mastery was due primarily to knowledge. Wordsworth hit the + mark when, in answer to the question "Who is the Happy Warrior?" he + replied that it was he— +</p> +<center><pre> + "Who with a natural instinct to discern + What knowledge can perform, is diligent to learn." +</pre></center> +<p> + The quality that made them both so valuable was that they knew the best + that was known and thought in regard to the art of war. This is the + quality which a nation must secure in those whom it entrusts with the + design and the conduct of the operations of its fleets and its armies. +</p> +<p> + There is a method for securing this, not by any means a new one, and not + originally, as is commonly supposed, a German invention. It consists in + providing the army and the navy with a General Staff or Department for + the study, design, and direction of operations. In such a department + Bourcet, Napoleon's master, spent the best years of his life. In such a + department Moltke was trained; over such a department he presided. Its + characteristic is that it has one function, that of the study, design, + and direction of the movements in fighting of a fleet or an army, and + that it has nothing whatever to do with the maintenance of an army, or + with its recruiting, discipline, or peace administration. Its functions + in peace are intellectual and educational, and in war it becomes the + channel of executive power. Bourcet described the head of such a + department as "the soul of an army." The British navy is without such a + department. The army has borrowed the name, but has not maintained the + speciality of function which is essential. In armies other than the + British, the Chief of the General Staff is occupied solely with tactics + and strategy, with the work of intellectual research by which Nelson + and Napoleon prepared their great achievements. His business is to be + designing campaigns, to make up his mind at what point or points, in + case of war, he will assemble his fleets or his armies for the first + move, and what the nature of that move shall be. The second move it is + impossible for him to pre-arrange because it depends upon the result of + the first. He will determine the second move when the time comes. In + order that his work should be as well done as possible, care is taken + that the Chief of the Staff shall have nothing else to do. Not he but + another officer superintends the raising, organising, and disciplining + of the forces. Thus he becomes the embodiment of a theory or system of + operations, and with that theory or system he inspires as far as + possible all the admirals or generals and other officers who will have + to carry out his designs. +</p> +<p> + In the British system the Chief of the General Staff is the principal + military member of the Board which administers the army. Accordingly, + only a fraction of his time can be given to thinking out the problems of + strategy and tactics. At the Admiralty the principal naval member of the + Board is made responsible not only for the distribution and movements of + ships—a definition which includes the whole domain of strategy and + tactics —but also for the fighting and sea-going efficiency of the + fleet, its organisation and mobilisation, a definition so wide that it + includes the greater part of the administration of the navy, especially + as the same officer is held responsible for advice on all large + questions of naval policy and maritime warfare, as well as for the + control of the naval ordnance department. Thus in each case the very + constitution of the office entrusted with the design of operations + prevents the officer at its head from concentrating himself upon that + vital duty. The result is that the intellectual life both of the army + and of the navy lags far behind that of their German rivals, and + therefore that there is every chance of both of them being beaten, not + for lack of courage or hard work, but by being opposed to an adversary + whose thinking has been better done by reason of the greater + concentration of energy devoted to it. +</p> +<p> + The first reform needed, at any rate in the navy, is a definition of the + functions of the First Sea Lord which will confine his sphere to the + distribution and movement of ships and the strategical and tactical + training of officers, so as to compel him to become the embodiment or + personification of the best possible theory or system of naval warfare. + That definition adopted and enforced, there is no need to lay down + regulations giving the strategist control over his colleagues who + administer <i>matiriel</i> and <i>personnel</i>; they will of themselves always be + anxious to hear his views as to the methods of fighting, and will be + only too glad to build ships with a view to their being used in + accordance with his design of victory. But until there is at the + Admiralty department devoted to designing victory and to nothing else, + what possible guarantee can there be that ships will be built, or the + navy administered and organised in accordance with any design likely to + lead to victory? +</p> +<a name="2H_4_15"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + XIV +</h2> +<center> + THE NEEDS OF THE NAVY +</center> +<p> + The doubt which, since the Prime Minister's statement on the + introduction of the Navy Estimates, has disturbed the public mind, is + concerned almost exclusively with the number of modern battleships in + the Royal Navy. The one object which the nation ought to have in view is + victory in the next war, and the question never to be forgotten is, what + is essential to victory? While it is probably true that if the disparity + of numbers be too great a smaller fleet can hardly engage a larger one + with any prospect of success, it is possible to exaggerate the + importance both of numbers and of the size of ships. +</p> +<p> + The most decisive victories at sea which are on record were those of + Tsusima, of Trafalgar, and of the Nile. At Tsusima the numbers and size + of the Japanese Fleet were not such as, before the battle, to give + foreign observers grounds for expecting a decisive victory by the + Japanese. It was on the superior intellectual and moral qualities of the + Japanese that those who expected them to win based their hopes, and this + view was justified by the event. At the battle of Trafalgar the British + Fleet numbered twenty-seven, the Franco-Spanish Fleet numbered + thirty-three; at the battle of the Nile the numbers were equal—thirteen + on each side. These figures seem to me sufficiently to prove that + superior numbers are not in battle the indispensable condition of + victory. They certainly prove that the numerically inferior fleet may + very well win. +</p> +<p> + Writers on the art of war distinguish between tactics, the art of + winning a battle, and strategy, the art of designing and conducting the + whole of the operations which constitute a campaign, of bringing about + battles in conditions favourable to one's own side and of making the + best use of such victories as may be won for contributing to the general + purpose of the war, which is dictating peace on one's own terms. +</p> +<p> + The decision of the questions, how many fleets to send out, what is to + be the strength and composition of each of them, and what the objectives + assigned to their several commanders is a strategical decision. It is a + function of the strategist at the Board of Admiralty, but the question + how to handle any one of these fleets in the presence of the enemy so as + either to avoid or to bring about an action and so as to win the battle, + if a battle be desirable, is a question for the admiral commanding the + particular fleet. +</p> +<p> + Evidently the master art, because it dominates the whole war, is that + of strategy, and for that reason it must have a seat at the Admiralty + Board. +</p> +<p> + As is well known, a large number of naval officers have for several + years past been troubled with doubts as to the strategical competence + displayed by the Board or Boards of Admiralty since 1904. The Board of + Admiralty has also been criticised for other reasons, into some of which + it is not necessary to enter, but it is desirable to state precisely the + considerations which tend to show that important decisions made by the + Admiralty have not been based upon sound strategical principles, and + are, indeed, incompatible with them. +</p> +<p> + When four or five years ago it was decided to transfer the centre of + gravity of the navy, as represented by fleets in commission, from the + Mediterranean to the Atlantic coasts of Europe, that was a sound + decision. But when the principal fleet in commission in home waters was + reduced in order to facilitate the creation of a so-called Home Fleet, + made up of a number of ships stationed at different ports, and manned + for the most part by nucleus crews, the Admiralty announced this measure + in a very remarkable circular. The change clearly involved a reduction + of the number of men at sea, and also a reduction in the number of ships + which would be immediately available under war conditions. It was + further evident that the chief result of this measure would be a + reduction of expenditure, yet the circular boldly stated that the object + of the measure was to increase the power and readiness of the navy for + instant war. +</p> +<p> + In any case, the decision announced revealed an ignorance of one of the + fundamental conditions of naval warfare, which differentiates it + completely from operations on land. A ship in commission carries on + board everything that is necessary for a fight. She can be made ready + for battle in a few minutes on the order to clear for action. No other + mobilisation is necessary for a fleet in commission, and if a war should + break out suddenly, as wars normally always do break out, whichever side + is able at once with its fleets already in commission to strike the + first blow has the incalculable advantage of the initiative. +</p> +<p> + A fleet divided between several ports and not fully manned is not a + fleet in commission; it is not ready, and its assembly as a fleet + depends on a contingency, which there is no means of guaranteeing, that + the enemy shall not be able to prevent its assembly by moving a fleet + immediately to a point at sea from which it would be able to oppose by + force the union of the constituent parts of the divided and unready + fleet. +</p> +<p> + Later official descriptions of the Home Fleet explained that it was part + of the Admiralty design that this fleet should offer the first + resistance to an enemy. The most careful examination of these + descriptions leaves no room for doubt that the idea of the Admiralty was + that one of its fleets should, in case of war, form a sort of + advance-guard to the rest of the navy. But it is a fundamental truth + that in naval war an advance-guard is absurd and impossible. In the + operations of armies, an advance-guard is both necessary and useful. Its + function is to delay the enemy's army until such time as the + commander-in-chief shall have assembled his own forces, which may be, to + some extent, scattered on the march. This delay is always possible on + land, because the troops can make use of the ground, that is, of the + positions which it affords favourable for defence, and because by means + of those positions a small force can for a long time hold in check the + advance of a very much larger one. But at sea there are no positions + except those formed by narrow straits, estuaries, and shoals, where land + and sea are more or less mixed up. The open sea is a uniform surface + offering no advantage whatever to either side. There is nothing in naval + warfare resembling the defence of a position on land, and the whole + difference between offence and defence at sea consists in the will of + one side to bring on an action and that of the other side to avoid or + postpone it. +</p> +<p> + At sea a small force which endeavours by fighting to delay the movement + of a large force exposes itself to destruction without any corresponding + gain of time. Accordingly, at sea, there is no analogy to the action of + an advance-guard, and the mere fact that such an idea should find its + way into the official accounts of the Admiralty's views regarding the + opening move of a possible war must discredit the strategy of the + Admiralty in the judgment of all who have paid any attention to the + nature of naval war. +</p> +<p> + The second requisite for victory, that is, for winning a battle against + a hostile fleet, is tactical superiority, or, as Nelson put it: "The + skill of our admirals and the activity and spirit of our officers and + seamen." The only way to obtain this is through the perpetual practice + of the admirals commanding fleets. An admiral, in order to make himself + a first-rate tactician, must not merely have deeply studied and pondered + the subject, but must spend as much time as possible in exercising, as a + whole, the fleet which he commands, in order not only by experimental + manoeuvres thoroughly to satisfy himself as to the formation and mode of + attack which will be best suited to any conceivable circumstance in + which he may find himself, but also to inculcate his ideas into his + subordinates; to inspire them with his own knowledge, and to give them + that training in working together which, in all those kinds of + activities which require large numbers of men to work together, whether + on the cricket field, at football, in an army, or in a navy, constitutes + the advantage of a practised over a scratch team. +</p> +<p> + If the practice is to make the fleet ready for war, it must be carried + out with the fleet in its war composition. All the different elements, + battleships, cruisers, torpedo craft, and the rest, must be fully + represented, otherwise the admiral would be practising in peace with a + different instrument from that with which he would need to operate in + war. +</p> +<p> + The importance of this perpetual training ought to be self-evident. It + may be well to remind the reader that it has also been historically + proved. The great advantage which the British possessed over the French + navy in the Wars of the Revolution and the Empire was that the British + fleets were always at sea, whereas the French fleets, for years + blockaded in their ports, were deficient in that practice which, in the + naval as in all other professions, makes perfect. One of the complaints + against the present Board of Admiralty is that it has not encouraged the + training and exercise of fleets as complete units. +</p> +<p> + Another point, in regard to which the recent practice of the Admiralty + is regarded with very grave doubts, not only by many naval officers, + but also by many of those who, without being naval officers, take a + serious interest in the navy, is that of naval construction. For several + years the Admiralty neglected to build torpedo craft of the quality and + in the quantity necessary for the most probable contingencies of war, + while, at the same time, large sums of money were spent in building + armoured cruisers, vessels of a fighting power so great that an admiral + would hesitate to detach them from his fleet, lest he should be + needlessly weakened on the day of battle, yet not strong enough safely + to replace the battleships in the fighting line. The result has been + that the admirals in command of fleets have for some time been anxiously + asking to be better supplied with scouts or vessels of great speed, but + not of such fighting power that they could not be spared at a distance + from the fleet even on the eve of an action. These two defects in the + shipbuilding policy of the Admiralty make it probable that for some + years past the navy has not been constructed in accord with any fully + thought-out design of operations; in other words, that the great object + "victory" has been forgotten by the supreme authority. +</p> +<p> + The doubt whether victory has been borne in mind is confirmed by what is + known of the design of the original <i>Dreadnought</i>. A battleship ought to + be constructed for battle, that is, for the purpose of destroying the + enemy's fleet, for which purpose it will never be used alone, but in + conjunction with a number of ships like itself forming the weapon of an + admiral in command. A battleship requires three qualities, in the + following order of importance:— +</p> +<p> + First, offensive power. A fleet exists in order to destroy the enemy, + but it has no prospect of performing that function if its power of + destruction is less than its enemy's. The chief weapon to-day, as in the + past, is artillery. Accordingly the first requisite of a fleet, as + regards its material qualities, those produced by the constructor, is + the capacity to pour on to the enemy's fleet a heavier rain of + projectiles than he can return. +</p> +<p> + The second quality is the power of movement. The advantage of superior + speed in a fleet—for the superior speed of an individual ship is of + little importance—is that so long as it is preserved it enables the + admiral, within limits, to accept or decline battle according to his own + judgment. This is a great strategical advantage. It may in some + conditions enable an inferior fleet to postpone an action which might be + disastrous until it has effected a junction with another fleet belonging + to its own side. +</p> +<p> + The third quality is that the ships of a fleet should be strong enough + to offer to the enemy's projectiles a sufficient resistance to make it + improbable that they can be sunk before having inflicted their fair + share of damage on the adversary. +</p> +<p> + There is always a difficulty in combining these qualities in a given + ship, because as a ship weighs the quantity of water which she + displaces, a ship of any given size has its weight given, and the + designer cannot exceed that limit of weight. He must divide it between + guns with their ammunition, engines with their coal, and armour. Every + ton given to armour diminishes the tonnage possible for guns and + engines, and, given a minimum for armour, every extra ton given to + engines and coal reduces the possible weight of guns and ammunition. In + the <i>Dreadnought</i> a very great effort was made to obtain a considerable + extra speed over that of all other battleships. This extra speed was + defended on the ground that it would enable a fleet of <i>Dreadnoughts</i> to + fight a battle at long range, and with a view to such battle the + <i>Dreadnought</i> was provided only with guns of the heaviest calibre and + deprived of those guns of medium calibre with which earlier battleships + were well provided. The theories thus embodied in the new class of ships + were both of them doubtful, and even dangerous. In the first place, it + is in the highest degree injurious to the spirit and courage of the crew + to have a ship which they know will be at a disadvantage if brought into + close proximity with the enemy. Their great object ought to be to get as + near to the enemy as possible. The hypothesis that more damage will be + done by an armament exclusively of the largest guns is in the opinion + of many of the best judges likely to be refuted. There is some reason to + believe that a given tonnage, if devoted to guns of medium calibre, + would yield a very much greater total damage to an enemy's ship than if + devoted to a smaller number of guns of heavy calibre and firing much + less rapidly. +</p> +<p> + There is, moreover, a widespread belief among naval officers of the + highest repute, among whom may be named the author of the "Influence of + Sea Power upon History," than whom no one has thought more profoundly on + the subject of naval war, that it is bad economy to concentrate in a few + very large ships the power which might be more conveniently and + effectively employed if distributed in a great number of ships of more + moderate size. +</p> +<p> + Surely, so long as naval opinion is divided about the tactical and + strategical wisdom of a new type of battleship, it is rash to continue + building battleships exclusively of that type, and it would be more + reasonable to make an attempt to have naval opinion sifted and + clarified, and thus to have a secure basis for a shipbuilding programme, + than to hurry on an enormous expenditure upon what may after all prove + to have been a series of doubtful experiments. +</p> +<p> + All the questions above discussed seem to me to be more important than + that of mere numbers of ships. Numbers are, however, of great + importance in their proper place and for the proper reasons. The policy + adopted and carried out by the British navy, at any rate during the + latter half of the war against the French Empire, was based on a known + superiority of force. The British fleet set out by blockading all the + French fleets, that is, by taking stations near to the great French + harbours and there observing those harbours, so that no French fleet + should escape without being attacked. If this is to be the policy of the + British navy in future it will require a preponderance of force of every + kind over that of the enemy, and that preponderant force will have to be + fully employed from the very first day of the war. In other words, it + must be kept in commission during peace. But, in addition, it is always + desirable to have a reserve of strength to meet the possibility that the + opening of a war or one of its early subsequent stages may bring into + action some additional unexpected adversary. There are thus two reasons + that make for a fleet of great numerical strength. The first, that only + great superiority renders possible the strategy known as blockade, or, + as I have ventured to call it, of "shadowing" the whole of the enemy's + forces. The second, that only great numerical strength renders it + possible to provide a reserve against unexpected contingencies. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_16"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + XV +</h2> +<center> + ENGLAND'S MILITARY PROBLEM +</center> +<p> + After the close of the South African war, two Royal Commissions were + appointed. One of them, known as the War Commission, was in a general + way to inquire into and report upon the lessons of the war. This mission + it could fulfil only very imperfectly, because its members felt + precluded from discussing the policy in which the war had its origin and + incapable of reviewing the military conduct of the operations. This was + very like reviewing the play of "Hamlet" without reference to the + characters and actions either of Hamlet or of the King, for the + mainsprings which determine the course, character, and issue of any war + are the policy out of which it arises and the conduct of the military + operations. The main fact which impressed itself on the members of the + War Commission was that the forces employed on the British side had been + very much larger than had been expected at the beginning of the war, and + the moral which they drew was contained in the one sentence of their + report which has remained in the public mind, to the effect that the + Government ought to make provision for the expansion of the army beyond + the limit of the regular forces of the Crown. +</p> +<p> + About the same time another Commission, under the chairmanship of the + Duke of Norfolk, was appointed to inquire and report whether any, and, + if any, what changes were required in order to secure that the Militia + and Volunteer forces should be maintained in a condition of military + efficiency and at an adequate strength. The Norfolk Commission + recommended certain changes which it thought would lead to a great + improvement in the efficiency of both forces, while permitting them to + maintain the requisite numerical strength. With regard to the Volunteer + force, the report said:— +</p> +<p> + "The governing condition is that the Volunteer, whether an officer, + non-commissioned officer, or private, earns his own living, and that if + demands are made upon him which are inconsistent with his doing so he + must cease to be a Volunteer. No regulations can be carried out which + are incompatible with the civil employment of the Volunteers, who are + for the most part in permanent situations. Moreover, whatever may be the + goodwill and patriotism of employers, they cannot allow the Volunteers + they may employ more than a certain period of absence. Their power to + permit their workmen to attend camp or other exercises is controlled by + the competition which exists in their trade. Those who permit Volunteers + in their service to take holidays longer than are customary in their + trade and district, are making in the public interest a sacrifice which + some of them think excessive." +</p> +<p> + The report further laid stress on the cardinal principle that no + Volunteer, whatever his rank, should be put to expense on account of his + service. Subject to this governing condition and to this cardinal + principle, the Commission made recommendations from which it expected a + marked improvement and the gradual attainment of a standard much in + advance of anything which until then had been reached. +</p> +<p> + Most of these recommendations have been adopted, with modifications, in + the arrangements which have since been made for the Volunteers under the + new name "The Territorial Force." +</p> +<p> + The Norfolk Commission felt no great confidence in the instructions + given it by the Government on the subject of the standard of efficiency + and of numerical strength. Accordingly the Commission added to its + report the statement:— +</p> +<center> +<pre> + "We cannot assert that, even if the measures + recommended were fully carried out, these forces + would be equal to the task of defeating a modern + continental army in the United Kingdom." +</pre> +</center> +<p> + The Commission's chief doubt was whether, under the conditions + inseparable at any rate from the volunteer system, any scheme of + training would give to forces officered largely by men who are not + professional soldiers the cohesion of armies that exact a progressive + two-years' course from their soldiers and rely, except for expanding the + subaltern ranks on mobilisation, upon professional leaders. The + Commission then considered "Measures which may provide a Home Defence + Army equal to the task of defeating an invader." They were unable to + recommend the adoption of the Swiss system, partly because the initial + training was not, in their judgment, sufficient for the purpose, and + partly because they held that the modern method of extending the + training to all classes, while shortening its duration, involves the + employment of instructors of the highest possible qualifications. The + Commission concluded by reporting that a Home Defence Army capable, in + the absence of the whole or the greater portion of the regular forces, + of protecting this country against invasion can be raised and maintained + only on the principle that it is the duty of every citizen of military + age and sound physique to be trained for the national defence and to + take part in it should emergency arise. +</p> +<p> + The Norfolk Commission gave expression to two different views without + attempting to reconcile them. On the one hand it laid down the main + lines along which the improvement of the militia and volunteers was to + be sought, and on the other hand it pointed out the advantages of the + principle that it is the citizen's duty to be trained as a soldier and + to fight in case of need. To go beyond this and to attempt either to + reconcile the two currents of thought or to decide between them, was + impossible for a Commission appointed to deal with only a fraction of + the problem of national defence. The two sets of views, however, + continue to exist side by side, and the nation yet has to do what the + Norfolk Commission by its nature was debarred from doing. The + Government, represented in this matter by Mr. Haldane, is still in the + position of relying upon an improved militia and volunteer force. The + National Service League, on the other hand, advocates the principle of + the citizen's duty, though it couples with it a specific programme + borrowed from the Swiss system, the adoption of which was deprecated in + the Commission's Report. The public is somewhat puzzled by the + appearance of opposition between what are thought of as two schools, and + indeed Mr. Haldane in his speech introducing the Army Estimates on March + 4, 1909, described the territorial force as a safeguard against + universal service. +</p> +<p> + The time has perhaps come when the attempt should be made to find a + point of view from which the two schools of thought can be seen in due + perspective, and from which, therefore, a definite solution of the + military problem may be reached. +</p> +<p> + By what principle must our choice between the two systems be determined? + By the purpose in hand. The sole ultimate use of an army is to win the + nation's battles, and if one system promises to fulfil that purpose + while the other system does not, we cannot hesitate. +</p> +<p> + Great Britain requires an army as one of the instruments of success in a + modern British war, and we have therefore to ascertain, in general, the + nature of a modern war, and in particular the character of such wars as + Great Britain may have to wage. +</p> +<p> + The distinguishing feature of the conflict between two modern great + States is that it is a struggle for existence, or, at any rate, a + wrestle to a fall. The mark of the modern State is that it is identified + with the population which it comprises, and to such a State the name + "nation" properly belongs. The French Revolution nationalised the State + and in consequence nationalised war, and every modern continental State + has so organized itself with a view to war that its army is equivalent + to the nation in arms. +</p> +<p> + The peculiar character of a British war is due to the insular character + of the British State. A conflict with a great continental Power must + begin with a naval struggle, which will be carried on with the utmost + energy until one side or the other has established its predominance on + the sea. If in this struggle the British navy is successful, the effect + which can be produced on a continental State by the victorious navy will + not be sufficient to cause the enemy to accept peace upon British + conditions. For that purpose, it will be necessary to invade the enemy's + territory and to put upon him the constraint of military defeat, and + Great Britain therefore requires an army strong enough either to effect + this operation or to encourage continental allies to join with it in + making the attempt. +</p> +<p> + In any British war, therefore, which is to be waged with prospect of + success, Great Britain's battles must be fought and won on the enemy's + territory and against an army raised and maintained on the modern + national principle. +</p> +<p> + This is the decisive consideration affecting British military policy. +</p> +<p> + In case of the defeat of the British navy a continental enemy would, + undoubtedly, attempt the invasion and at least the temporary conquest of + Great Britain. The army required to defeat him in the United Kingdom + would need to have the same strength and the same qualities as would be + required to defeat him in his own territory, though, if the invasion had + been preceded by naval defeat, it is very doubtful whether any military + success in the United Kingdom would enable Great Britain to continue + her resistance with much hope of ultimate success. +</p> +<p> + For these reasons I cannot believe that Great Britain's needs are met by + the possession of any force the employment of which is, by the + conditions of its service, limited to fighting in the United Kingdom. A + British army, to be of any use, must be ready to go and win its + country's battles in the theatre of war in which its country requires + victories. That theatre of war will never be the United Kingdom unless + and until the navy has failed to perform its task, in which case it will + probably be too late to win battles in time to avert the national + overthrow which must be the enemy's aim. +</p> +<p> + There are, however, certain subsidiary services for which any British + military system must make provision. +</p> +<p> + These are:— +</p> +<p> + (1) Sufficient garrisons must be maintained during peace in India, in + Egypt, for some time to come in South Africa, and in certain naval + stations beyond the seas, viz., Gibraltar, Malta, Ceylon, Hong Kong, + Singapore, Mauritius, West Africa, Bermuda, and Jamaica. It is generally + agreed that the principle of compulsory service cannot be applied for + the maintenance of these garrisons, which must be composed of + professional paid soldiers. +</p> +<p> + (2) Experience shows that a widespread Empire, like the British, + requires from time to time expeditions for the maintenance of order on + its borders against half civilised or savage tribes. This function was + described in an essay on "Imperial Defence," published by Sir Charles + Dilke and the present writer in 1892 as "Imperial Police." +</p> +<p> + It would not be fair, for the purpose of one of these small expeditions, + arbitrarily to call upon a fraction of a force maintained on the + principle of compulsion. Accordingly any system must provide a special + paid reserve for the purpose of furnishing the men required for such an + expedition. +</p> +<p> + An army able to strike a serious blow against a continental enemy in his + own territory would evidently be equally able to defeat an invading army + if the necessity should arise. Accordingly the military question for + Great Britain resolves itself into the provision of an army able to + carry on serious operations against a European enemy, together with the + maintenance of such professional forces as are indispensable for the + garrisons of India, Egypt, and the over-sea stations enumerated above + and for small wars. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_17"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + XVI +</h2> +<center> + TWO SYSTEMS CONTRASTED +</center> +<p> + I proceed to describe a typical army of the national kind, and to show + how the system of such an army could be applied in the case of Great + Britain. +</p> +<p> + The system of universal service has been established longer in Germany + than in any other State, and can best be explained by an account of its + working in that country. In Germany every man becomes liable to military + service on his seventeenth birthday, and remains liable until he is + turned forty-five. The German army, therefore, theoretically includes + all German citizens between the ages of seventeen and forty-five, but + the liability is not enforced before the age of twenty nor after the age + of thirty-nine, except in case of some supreme emergency. Young men + under twenty, and men between thirty-nine and forty-five, belong to the + Landsturm. They are subjected to no training, and would not be called + upon to fight except in the last extremity. Every year all the young men + who have reached their twentieth birthday are mustered and classified. + Those who are not found strong enough for military service are divided + into three grades, of which one is dismissed as unfit; a second is + excused from training and enrolled in the Landsturm; while a third, + whose physical defects are minor and perhaps temporary, is told off to a + supplementary reserve, of which some members receive a short training. + Of those selected as fit for service a few thousand are told off to the + navy, the remainder pass into the army and join the colours. +</p> +<p> + The soldiers thus obtained serve in the ranks of the army for two years + if assigned to the infantry, field artillery, or engineers, and for + three years if assigned to the cavalry or horse artillery. At the + expiration of the two or three years they pass into the reserve of the + standing army, in which they remain until the age of twenty-seven, that + is, for five years in the case of the infantry and engineers, and for + four years in the case of the cavalry and horse artillery. At + twenty-seven all alike cease to belong to the standing army, and pass + into the Landwehr, to which they continue to belong to the age of + thirty-nine. The necessity to serve for at least two years with the + colours is modified in the case of young men who have reached a certain + standard of education, and who engage to clothe, feed, equip, and in the + mounted arms to mount themselves. These men are called "one year + volunteers," and are allowed to pass into the reserve of the standing + army at the expiration of one year with the colours. +</p> +<p> + In the year 1906, 511,000 young men were mustered, and of these 275,000 + were passed into the standing army, 55,000 of them being one year + volunteers. The men in any year so passed into the army form an annual + class, and the standing army at any time is made up, in the infantry, of + two annual classes, and in the cavalry and horse artillery of three + annual classes. In case of war, the army of first line would be made up + by adding to the two or three annual classes already with the colours + the four or five annual classes forming the reserve, that is, altogether + seven annual classes. Each of these classes would number, when it first + passed into the army, about 275,000; but as each class must lose every + year a certain number of men by death, by diseases which cause physical + incapacity from service, and by emigration, the total army of first line + must fall short of the total of seven times 275,000. It may probably be + taken at a million and a half. In the second line come the twelve annual + classes of Landwehr, which will together furnish about the same numbers + as the standing army. +</p> +<p> + Behind the Landwehr comes the supplementary reserve, and behind that + again the Landsturm, comprising the men who have been trained and are + between the ages of thirty-nine and forty-five, the young men under + twenty, and all those who, from physical weakness, have been entirely + exempted from training. +</p> +<p> + During their two or three years with the colours the men receive an + allowance or pay of twopence halfpenny a day. Their service is not a + contract but a public duty, and while performing it they are clothed, + lodged, and fed by the State. When passed into the reserve they resume + their normal civil occupation, except that for a year or two they are + called up for a few weeks' training and manoeuvres during the autumn. +</p> +<p> + In this way all German citizens, so far as they are physically fit, with + a few exceptions, such as the only son and support of a widow, receive a + thorough training as soldiers, and Germany relies in case of war + entirely and only upon her citizens thus turned into soldiers. +</p> +<p> + The training is carried out by officers and non-commissioned officers, + who together are the military schoolmasters of the nation, and, like + other proficient schoolmasters, are paid for their services by which + they live. Broadly speaking, there are in Germany no professional + soldiers except the officers and non-commissioned officers, from whom a + high standard of capacity as instructors and trainers during peace and + as leaders in war is demanded and obtained. +</p> +<p> + The high degree of military proficiency which the German army has + acquired is due to the excellence of the training given by the officers + and to the thoroughness with which, during a course of two or three + years, that training can be imparted. The great numbers which can be put + into the field are due to the practice of passing the whole male + population, so far as it is physically qualified, through this training, + so that the army in war represents the whole of the best manhood of the + country between the ages of twenty and forty. +</p> +<p> + The total of three millions which has been given above is that which was + mentioned by Prince Bismarck in a speech to the Reichstag in 1887. The + increase of population since that date has considerably augmented the + figures for the present time, and the corresponding total to-day + slightly exceeds four millions. +</p> +<p> + The results of the British system are shown in the following table, + which gives, from the Army Estimates, the numbers of the various + constituents of the British army on the 1st of January 1909. There were + at that date in the United Kingdom:—</p> +<p> </p> +<table width="324" border="0"> + <tr> + <td width="181">Regular forces </td> + <td width="133"><div align="right">123,250</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Army reserve </td> + <td><div align="right">134,110</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Special reserves </td> + <td><div align="right">67,780</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Militia</td> + <td><div align="right">9,158</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Territorial force </td> + <td><div align="right">209,977</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Officers' training corps </td> + <td><div align="right">416</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><strong>Total in the United Kingdom </strong></td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>544,691</strong></div></td> + </tr> +</table> +<p> </p> +<p>In Egypt and the Colonies:—</p> +<p> </p> +<table width="324" border="0"> + <tr> + <td width="181">Regular Forces </td> + <td width="133"><div align="right">45,002</div></td> + </tr> +</table> +<p> </p> +<p>he British troops in India are paid for by the Indian Government and do + not appear in the British Army Estimates. Of the force maintained in the + United Kingdom, it will be observed that it falls, roughly, into three + categories.</p> +<p> + In the first place come the first-rate troops which may be presumed to + have had a thorough training for war. This class embraces only the + regulars and the army reserve, which together slightly exceed a quarter + of a million. In the second class come the 68,000 of the special + reserve, which, in so far as they have enjoyed the six months' training + laid down in the recent reorganisation, could on a sanguine estimate be + classified as second-class troops, though in view of the fact that their + officers are not professional and are for the most part very slightly + trained, that classification would be exceedingly sanguine. Next comes + the territorial force with a maximum annual training of a fortnight in + camp, preceded by ten to twenty lessons and officered by men whose + professional training, though it far exceeds that of the rank and file, + falls yet very much short of that given to the professional officers of + a first-rate continental army. The territorial force, by its + constitution, is not available to fight England's battles except in the + United Kingdom, where they can never be fought except in the event of a + defeat of the navy. +</p> +<p> + This heterogeneous tripartite army is exceedingly expensive, its cost + during the current year being, according to the Estimates, very little + less than 29 millions, the cost of the personnel being 23-1/2 millions, + that of <i>materièl</i> being 4 millions, and that of administration 1-1/2 + millions. +</p> +<p> + The British regular army cannot multiply soldiers as does the German + army. It receives about 37,000 recruits a year. But it sends away to + India and the Colonies about 23,000 each year and seldom receives them + back before their eight years' colour service are over, when they pass + into the first-class reserve. There pass into the reserve about 24,000 + men a year, and as the normal term of reserve service is four years, its + normal strength is about 96,000 men. +</p> +<p> + As the regular army contains only professional soldiers, who look, at + any rate for a period of eight years, to soldiering as a living, and are + prepared for six or seven years abroad, there is a limit to the supply + of recruits, who are usually under nineteen years of age, and to whom + the pay of a shilling a day is an attraction. Older men with prospects + of regular work expect wages much higher than that, and therefore do not + enlist except when in difficulties. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_18"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + XVII +</h2> +<center> + A NATIONAL ARMY +</center> +<p> + I propose to show that a well-trained homogeneous army of great + numerical strength can be obtained on the principle of universal service + at no greater cost than the present mixed force. The essentials of a + scheme, based upon training the best manhood of the nation, are: first, + that to be trained is a matter of duty not of pay; secondly, that every + trained man is bound, as a matter of duty, to serve with the army in a + national war; thirdly, that the training must be long enough to be + thorough, but no longer; fourthly, that the instructors shall be the + best possible, which implies that they must be paid professional + officers and non-commissioned officers. +</p> +<p> + I take the age at which the training should begin at the end of the + twentieth year, in order that, in case of war, the men in the ranks may + be the equals in strength and endurance of the men in the ranks of any + opposing army. The number of men who reach the age of twenty every year + in the United Kingdom exceeds 400,000. Continental experience shows that + less than half of these would be rejected as not strong enough. The + annual class would therefore be about 200,000. +</p> +<p> + The principle of duty applies of course to the navy as well as to the + army, and any man going to the navy will be exempt from army training. + But it is doubtful whether the navy can be effectively manned on a + system of very short service such as is inevitable for a national army. + The present personnel of the navy is maintained by so small a yearly + contingent of recruits that it will be covered by the excess of the + annual class over the figure here assumed of 200,000. The actual number + of men reaching the age of twenty is more than 400,000, and the probable + number out of 400,000 who will be physically fit for service is at least 213,000. +</p> +<p> + I assume that for the infantry and field artillery a year's training + would, with good instruction, be sufficient, and that even better and + more lasting results would be produced if the last two months of the + year were replaced by a fortnight of field manoeuvres in each of the + four summers following the first year. For the cavalry and horse + artillery I believe that the training should be prolonged for a second + year. +</p> +<p> + The liability to rejoin the colours, in case of a national war, should + continue to the end of the 27th year, and be followed by a period of + liability in the second line, Landwehr or Territorial Army. +</p> +<p> + The first thing to be observed is the numerical strength of the army + thus raised and trained. +</p> +<p> + If we assume that any body of men loses each year, from death, + disablement, and emigration, five per cent. of its number, the annual + classes would be as follows:— +</p> +<p> </p> +<table width="400" border="0"> + <caption> + At the end of the first year 20,000 are to go abroad as explained below.) + </caption> + <tr> + <td>1st year, age 20-21 </td> + <td><div align="right">200,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>2nd year, age 20-22 </td> + <td><div align="right">170,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>3rd year, age 23-24</td> + <td><div align="right">161,300</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>4th year, age 24-25</td> + <td><div align="right">153,425</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>5th year, age 25-26 </td> + <td><div align="right">145,754</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>6th year, age 26-27 </td> + <td><div align="right">138,467</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><div align="left"><strong>Total on mobilisation </strong></div></td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>968,946</strong></div></td> + </tr> +</table> +<p> +</p> +<p>This gives an army of close upon a million men in first line in addition + to the British forces in India, Egypt, and the colonial stations. +</p> +<p> + If from the age of 27 to that of 31 the men were in the Landwehr, that + force would be composed of four annual classes as follows:— +</p> +<p> </p> +<table width="400" border="0"> + <tr> + <td width="286">7th year, age 27-28 </td> + <td width="104"><div align="right">131,544</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>8th year, age 28-29 </td> + <td><div align="right">124,967</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>9th year, age 29-30 </td> + <td><div align="right">118,719</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>10th year, age 30-31 </td> + <td><div align="right">112,784</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><strong>Total of Landwehr </strong></td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>488,014</strong></div></td> + </tr> +</table> +<p> +</p> +<p>There is no need to consider the further strength that would be + available if the liability were prolonged to the age of 39, as it is in + Germany. +</p> +<p> + The liability thus enforced upon all men of sound physique is to fight + in a national war, a conflict involving for England a struggle for + existence. But that does not and ought not to involve serving in the + garrison of Egypt or of India during peace, nor being called upon to + take part in one of the small wars waged for the purpose of policing the + Empire or its borders. These functions must be performed by + professional, i.e. paid soldiers. +</p> +<p> + The British army has 76,000 men in India and 45,000 in Egypt, South + Africa, and certain colonial stations. These forces are maintained by + drafts from the regular army at home, the drafts amounting in 1908 to + 12,000 for India and 11,000 for the Colonies. +</p> +<p> + Out of every annual class of 200,000 young men there will be a number + who, after a year's training, will find soldiering to their taste, and + will wish to continue it. These should be given the option of engaging + for a term of eight years in the British forces in India, Egypt, or the + Colonies. There they would receive pay and have prospects of promotion + to be non-commissioned officers, sergeants, warrant officers or + commissioned officers, and of renewing their engagement if they wished + either for service abroad or as instructors in the army at home. These + men would leave for India, Egypt, or a colony at the end of their first + year. I assume that 20,000 would be required, because eight annual + classes of that strength, diminishing at the rate of five per cent. per + annum, give a total of 122,545, and the eight annual classes would + therefore suffice to maintain the 121,000 now in India, Egypt, and the + Colonies. Provision is thus made for the maintenance of the forces in + India, Egypt, and the Colonies. +</p> +<p> + There must also be provision for the small wars to which the Empire is + liable. This would be made by engaging every year 20,000 who had + finished their first year's training to serve for pay, say 1s. a day, + for a period say of six months, of the second year, and afterwards to + join for five years the present first-class reserve at 6d. a day, with + liability for small wars and expeditions. At the end of the five years + these men would merge in the general unpaid reserve of the army. They + might during their second year's training be formed into a special corps + devoting most of the time to field manoeuvres, in which supplementary or + reserve officers could receive special instruction. +</p> +<p> + It would be necessary also to keep with the colours for some months + after the first year's training a number of garrison artillery and + engineers to provide for the security of fortresses during the period + between the time of sending home one annual class and the preliminary + lessons of the next. These men would be paid. I allow 10,000 men for + this purpose, and these, with the 20,000 prolonging their training for + the paid reserve, and with the mounted troops undergoing the second + year's training, would give during the winter months a garrison strength + at home of 50,000 men. +</p> +<p> + The mobilised army of a million men would require a great number of + extra officers, who should be men of the type of volunteer officers + selected for good education and specially trained, after their first + year's service, in order to qualify them as officers. Similar provision + must be made for supplementary non-commissioned officers. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_19"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + XVIII +</h2> +<center> + THE COST +</center> +<p> + It will probably be admitted that an army raised and trained on the plan + here set forth would be far superior in war to the heterogeneous body + which figures in the Army Estimates at a total strength of 540,000 + regulars, militia, and volunteers. Its cost would in no case be more + than that of the existing forces, and would probably be considerably + less. This is the point which requires to be proved. +</p> +<p> + The 17th Appendix to the Army Estimates is a statement of the cost of + the British army, arranged under the four headings of:— +</p> + + + +<p> </p> +<table width="531" border="0"> + <tr> + <td width="382">1. Cost of personnel of regular army and army reserve </td> + <td width="139"> <div align="right">£ 18,279,234</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>2. Cost of special reserves and territorial forces </td> + <td> <div align="right">£ 5,149,843</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>3. Cost of armaments, works, stores, &c. </td> + <td> <div align="right">£ 3,949,463 </div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>4. Cost of staff and administration </td> + <td> <div align="right">£ 1,414,360 </div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><strong>Making a total of</strong></td> + <td> <div align="right">£ 28,792,900 </div></td> + </tr> +</table> + +<p> +</p> +<p>In the above table nearly a million is set down for the cost of certain + labour establishments and of certain instructional establishments, + which may for the present purpose be neglected. Leaving them out, the + present cost of the personnel of the Regular Army, apart from staff, is, + £15,942,802. For this cost are maintained officers, non-commissioned + officers and men, numbering altogether 170,000. +</p> +<p> + The lowest pay given is that of 1s. a day to infantry privates, the + privates of the other arms receiving somewhat higher and the + non-commissioned officers very much higher rates of pay. +</p> +<p> + If compulsory service were introduced into Great Britain, pay would + become unnecessary for the private soldier; but he ought to be and would + be given a daily allowance of pocket-money, which probably ought not to + exceed fourpence. The mounted troops would be paid at the rate of 1s. a +day during their second year's service.</p> +<p>Assuming then that the private soldier received fourpence a day instead of 1s. a day, and that the officers and non-commissioned officers were paid as at present, the cost of the army would be reduced by an amount corresponding to 8d. a day for 148,980 privates. That amount is £1,812,590, the deduction of which would reduce the total cost to £14,137,212. At the same rate...</p> +<p> </p> +<table width="548" border="0"> + <tr> + <td width="443">An army of 200,000 privates and 20,000 non-commissioned officers and men would cost... </td> + <td width="95"> + <div align="right">£ 18,295,215</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Second year of 20,000 mounted troops at £ 60 a year each </td> + <td><div align="right"> £ 1,200,000 </div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Cost of 30,000 men for six months' extra training at the rate of £ 60 a year each </td> + <td><div align="right"> £ 900,000 </div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Cost of extra training for supplementary officers and non-commissioned officers </td> + <td><div align="right"> £ 500,000 </div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> </td> + <td><div align="right"><strong> £ 21,892,815</strong></div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Add to this the cost of the troops maintained in the Colonies and Egypt so far as charged to British Estimages </td> + <td><div align="right"> £ 3,401,704 </div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><strong>Total Personnel </strong></td> + <td><div align="right"><strong> £ 25,294,519 </strong></div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Matiriel (allowing for aditional outlay due to larger numbers) </td> + <td><div align="right"> £ 4,500,000 </div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Staff and administration </td> + <td><div align="right"> £ 1,500,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><strong>Total Cost of Army at Home and in the Colonies </strong></td> + <td><div align="right"><strong> £ 31,294,519 </strong></div></td> + </tr> +</table> +<p> +</p> + + +<p>This is slightly in excess of the present cost of the personnel of the + Army, but, whereas the present charge only provides for the + heterogeneous force already described of 589,000 men, the charges here + explained provide for a short-service homogeneous army of one million + and a half, as well as for the 45,000 troops permanently maintained in + Egypt and the Colonies.</p> +<p> + The estimate just given is, however, extravagant. The British system has + innumerable different rates of pay and extra allowances of all kinds, + and is so full of anomalies that it is bound to be costly. + Unfortunately, the Army Estimates are so put together that it is + difficult to draw from them any exact inferences as to the actual annual + cost of a private soldier beyond his pay. +</p> +<p> + The average annual cost, effective and non-effective, of an officer in + the cavalry, artillery, engineers, and infantry is £473, this sum + covering all the arrangements for pensions and retiring allowances. +</p> +<p> + I propose in the following calculations to assume the average cost of an + officer to be £500 a year, a sum which would make it possible for the + average combatant officer to be somewhat better paid than he is at + present. +</p> +<p> + The normal pay of a sergeant in the infantry of the line is 2s. 4d. a + day, or £42, 11s. 8d. a year. The Army Estimates do not give the cost of + a private soldier, but the statement is made that the average annual + cost per head of 150,000 warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, + and men is £63, 6s. 7d. The warrant officers and non-commissioned + officers appear to be much more expensive than the private, and as the + minimum pay of a private is £18, 5s., the balance, £45, 1s. 7d., is + probably much more than the cost of housing, clothing, feeding, and + equipping the private, whose food, the most expensive item, certainly + does not cost a shilling a day or £18 a year. +</p> +<p> + I assume that the cost of maintaining a private soldier is covered by + £36 a year, while his allowance of 4d. a day amounts to £6, 1s. 4d. In + order to cover the extra allowances which may be made to corporals, + buglers, and trumpeters, I assume the average cost of the rank and file + to be £45 a year. I also assume that the average cost of a sergeant does + not exceed £100 a year, which allows from £40 to £50 for his pay and the + balance for his housing, clothing, equipment, and food. I add provisions + for pensions for sergeants after twenty-five years' service. +</p> +<p> + These figures lead to the following estimate:— +</p> +<table width="527" border="0"> + <tr> + <td width="408">7,000 officers at £500</td> + <td width="109"><div align="right">£3,500,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>14,000 officers at £100</td> + <td><div align="right">£1,400,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Pension after twenty-five years for seargenats, £52 a year </td> + <td><div align="right">£396,864</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>(An annual class of 14,000, decreasing annually by 2-1/2 per cent., would consist, after twenty-five years, of 7632) </td> + <td><div align="right"></div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>200,000 privates at £45 a year </td> + <td><div align="right">£9,000,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>2nd year of 20,000 mounted troops (cavalry and horse artillery at £60 a year each) </td> + <td><div align="right">£1,200,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Six months' extra training for 30,000 men with pay (total rate per man £60 a year) (20,000 for paid reserve and 10,000 fortress troops) </td> + <td><div align="right">£900,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>First-class reserve </td> + <td><div align="right">£997,600</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Training supplementary officers and sergeants </td> + <td><div align="right">£500,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> </td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>£ 17,894,464 </strong></div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Colonial troops </td> + <td><div align="right">£3,500,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><strong>Total Personnel </strong></td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>£21,394,464</strong></div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Matiriel allowing for additional cost due to larger numbers </td> + <td><div align="right">£4,500,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Staff and administration</td> + <td><div align="right">£1,500,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><strong>Total cost of army at home and in the Colonies </strong></td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>£27,394,464</strong></div></td> + </tr> +</table> +<p> </p> + + + + +<p> + The figures here given will, it is hoped, speak for themselves. They + are, if anything, too high rather than too low. The number of officers + is calculated on the basis of the present war establishments, which give + 5625 officers for 160,500 of the other ranks. It does not include those + in Egypt and the Colonies. The cost of the officers is taken at a higher + average rate than that of British officers of the combatant arms under + the present system, and, both for sergeants and for privates, ample + allowance appears to me to be made even on the basis of their present + cost. +</p> +<p> + When it is considered that Germany maintains with the colours a force of + 600,000 men at a cost of £29,000,000, that France maintains 550,000 for + £27,000,000, and that Italy maintains 221,000 for £7,500,000, it cannot + be admitted that Great Britain would be unable to maintain 220,000 + officers and men at an annual cost of £17,500,000, and the probability + is that with effective administration this cost could be considerably + reduced. +</p> +<p> + It may at first sight seem that the logical course would have been to + assume two years' service in the infantry and three years' service in + the mounted arms, in accord with the German practice, but there are + several reasons that appear to me to make such a proposal unnecessary. + In the first place, Great Britain's principal weapon must always be her + navy, while Germany's principal weapon will always be her army, which + guarantees the integrity of her three frontiers and also guards her + against invasion from oversea. Germany's navy comes only in the second + place in any scheme for a German war, while in any scheme for a British + war the navy must come in the first place and the army in the second. +</p> +<p> + The German practice for many years was to retain the bulk of the men for + three years with the colours. It was believed by the older generation of + soldiers that any reduction of this period would compromise that + cohesion of the troops which is the characteristic mark of a + disciplined army. But the views of the younger men prevailed and the + period has been reduced by a third. The reduction of time has, however, + placed a heavier responsibility upon the body of professional + instructors. +</p> +<p> + The actual practice of the British army proves that a recruit can be + fully trained and be made fit in every way to take his place in his + company by a six months' training, but in my opinion that is not + sufficient preparation for war. The recruit when thoroughly taught + requires a certain amount of experience in field operations or + manoeuvres. This he would obtain during the summer immediately following + upon the recruit training; for the three months of summer, or of summer + and autumn, ought to be devoted almost entirely to field exercises and + manoeuvres. If the soldier is then called out for manoeuvres for a + fortnight in each of four subsequent years, or for a month in each of + two subsequent years, I believe that the lessons he has learned of + operations in the field will thereby be refreshed, renewed, and + digested, so as to give him sufficient experience and sufficient + confidence in himself, in his officers, and in the system to qualify him + for war at any moment during the next five or six years. The additional + three months' manoeuvre training, beyond the mere recruit training, + appears to me indispensable for an army that is to be able to take the + field with effect. But that this period should suffice, and that the + whole training should be given in nine or ten months of one year, + followed by annual periods of manoeuvre, involves the employment of the + best methods by a body of officers steeped in the spirit of modern + tactics and inspired by a general staff of the first order. +</p> +<p> + The question what is the shortest period that will suffice to produce + cohesion belongs to educational psychology. How long does it take to + form habits? How many repetitions of a lesson will bring a man into the + condition in which he responds automatically to certain calls upon him, + as does a swimmer dropped into the water, a reporter in forming his + shorthand words, or a cyclist guiding and balancing his machine? In each + case two processes are necessary. There is first the series of + progressive lessons in which the movements are learned and mastered + until the pupil can begin practice. Then follows a period of practice + more or less prolonged, without which the lessons learned do not become + part of the man's nature; he retains the uncertainty of a beginner. The + recruit course of the British army is of four months. A first practice + period of six months followed by fresh practice periods of a month each + in two subsequent years or by four practice periods of a fortnight each + in four successive years are in the proposals here sketched assumed to + be sufficient. If they were proved inadequate I believe the right plan + of supplementing them would be rather by adding to the number and + duration of the manoeuvre practices of the subsequent years than by + prolonging the first period of continuous training. +</p> +<p> + The following table shows the cost of two years' service calculated on + the same bases as have been assumed above. Two years' service would mean + an army with the colours not of 200,000 but of 390,000 men. This would + require double the number of officers and sergeants, and the annual + estimates for personnel would be £34,000,000, and the total Army + Estimates £41,000,000. There would also be a very great extra + expenditure upon barracks. +</p> +<p> </p> +<table width="517" border="0"> + <caption><strong> + Estimate of Annual Cost for Two Years' Service + </strong></caption> + <tr> + <td width="403">13,650 officers at £500 a year </td> + <td width="104"><div align="right">£6,825,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>27,300 sergeants at £100</td> + <td><div align="right">£2,730,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Pension for sergeants' annual class of £27,300, decreasing by 2-1/2 per cent., gives after twenty-five years £12,403; at £52 a year pension is </td> + <td><div align="right">£644,956</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>390,000 privates at £45 a year </td> + <td><div align="right">£17,550,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Third year mounted troops, 20,000 at £60</td> + <td><div align="right">£1,200,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>First-class reserve</td> + <td><div align="right">£997,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Training supplementary officers and sergeants </td> + <td><div align="right">£500,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Colonial troops </td> + <td><div align="right">£3,500,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><strong>Total personnel</strong></td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>£ 33,946,956 </strong></div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Matiriel allowing for extra numbers </td> + <td><div align="right">£ 5,000,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Staff and administration, allowing for extra numbers</td> + <td><div align="right">£ 2,000,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> </td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>£ 40,946,956</strong></div></td> + </tr> +</table> +<p><a name="2H_4_20"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> +</a></p> + +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + XIX +</h2> +<center> + ONE ARMY NOT TWO +</center> +<p> + The training provided in the scheme which I have outlined could be + facilitated at comparatively small cost by the adoption of certain + preparatory instruction to be given partly in the schools, and partly to + young men between the ages of seventeen and twenty. +</p> +<p> + It has never appeared to me desirable to add to the school curriculum + any military subjects whatever, and I am convinced that no greater + mistake could be made, seeing that schoolmasters are universally agreed + that the curriculum is already overloaded and requires to be lightened, + and that the best preparation that the school can give for making a boy + likely to be a good soldier when grown up, is to develop his + intelligence and physique as far as the conditions of school life admit. + But if all school children were drilled in the evolutions of infantry in + close order, the evolutions being always precisely the same as those + practised in the army, the army would receive its men already drilled, + and would not need to spend much time in recapitulating these + practices, which make no appreciable demand upon the time of school + children. +</p> +<p> + Again, there seems to be no doubt that boys between the ages of + seventeen and twenty can very well be taught to handle a rifle, and the + time required for such instruction and practice is so small that it + would in no way affect or interfere with the ordinary occupations of the + boys, whatever their class in life. +</p> +<p> + Every school of every grade ought, as a part of its ordinary geography + lessons, to teach the pupils to understand, to read, and to use the + ordnance maps of Great Britain, and that this should be the case has + already been recognised by the Board of Education. A soldier who can + read such a map has thereby acquired a knowledge and a habit which are + of the greatest value to him, both in manoeuvres and in the field. +</p> +<p> + The best physical preparation which the schools can give their pupils + for the military life, as well as for any other life, is a well-directed + course of gymnastics and the habits of activity, order, initiative, and + discipline derived from the practice of the national games. +</p> +<p> + A national army is a school in which the young men of a nation are + educated by a body of specially trained teachers, the officers. The + education given for war consists in a special training of the will and + of the intelligence. In order that it should be effective, the teachers + or trainers must not merely be masters of the theory and practice of war + and of its operations, but also proficient in the art of education. This + conception of the officers' function fixes their true place in the + State. Their duties require for their proper performance the best heads + as well as the best-schooled wills that can be found, and impose upon + them a laborious life. There can be no good teacher who is not also a + student, and a national army requires from its officers a high standard + not only of character, but of intelligence and knowledge. It should + offer a career to the best talent. A national army must therefore + attract the picked men of the universities to become officers. The + attraction, to such men consists, chiefly, in their faith in the value + of the work to be done, and, to a less degree, in the prospect of an + assured living. Adequate, though not necessarily high, pay must be + given, and there must be a probability of advancement in the career + proportionate to the devotion and talents given to the work. But their + work must be relied upon by the nation, otherwise they cannot throw + their energies into it with full conviction. +</p> +<p> + This is the reason why, if there is to be a national army, it must be + the only regular army and the nation must rely upon nothing else. To + keep a voluntary paid standing army side by side with a national army + raised upon the principle of universal duty is neither morally nor + economically sound. Either the nation will rely upon its school or it + will not. If the school is good enough to serve the nation's turn, a + second school on a different basis is needless; if a second school were + required, that would mean that the first could not be trusted. +</p> +<p> + There can be no doubt that in a national school of war the professional + officers must be the instructors, otherwise the nation will not rely + upon the young men trained. The 200,000 passed through the school every + year will be the nation's best. Therefore, so soon as the system has + been at work long enough to produce a force as large as the present + total, that is, after the third year, there will be no need to keep up + the establishment of 138,000 paid privates, the special reserve, or the + now existing territorial force. There will be one homogeneous army, of + which a small annual contingent will, after each year's training, be + enlisted for paid service in India, Egypt, and the oversea stations, and + a second small contingent, with extra training, will pass into the paid + reserve for service in small oversea expeditions. +</p> +<p> + The professional officers and sergeants will, of course, be + interchangeable between the national army at home and its professional + branches in India, Egypt, and the oversea stations, and the cadres of + the battalions, batteries, and squadrons stationed outside the United + Kingdom can from time to time be relieved by the cadres of the + battalions' from the training army at home. This relief of battalions is + made practicable by the national system. One of the first consequences + of the new mode of recruiting will be that all recruits will be taken on + the same given date, probably the 1st of January in each year, and, as + this will apply as well to the men who re-engage to serve abroad as to + all others, so soon as the system is in full working order, the men of + any battalion abroad will belong to annual classes, and the engagement + of each class will terminate on the same day. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_21"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + XX +</h2> +<center> + THE TRANSITION +</center> +<p> + I have now explained the nature and working of a national army, and + shown the kind of strength it will give and the probable maximum cost + which it will involve when adopted. +</p> +<p> + The chief difficulty attendant upon its adoption lies in the period of + transition from the old order to the new. If Great Britain is to keep + her place and do her duty in the world the change must be made; but the + question arises, how is the gulf between one and the other to be + bridged? War comes like a thief in the night, and it must not catch this + country unready. +</p> +<p> + The complete readiness which the new system, when in full swing, will + produce, cannot be obtained immediately. All that can be done in the + transition period is to see that the number and quality of men available + for mobilisation shall be at least as high as it is under the existing + system. It may be worth while to explain how this result can be secured. +</p> +<p> + Let us assume that the Act authorising the new system is passed during a + year, which may be called '00, and that it is to come into force on the + 1st January of the year '01. The Act would probably exempt from its + operations the men at the date of its passing already serving in any of + the existing forces, including the territorial army, and the discussion + on the Bill would, no doubt, have the effect of filling the territorial + army up to the limit of its establishment, 315,000 men. +</p> +<p> + On the 31st December '00 the available troops would therefore be:— +</p> +<table width="464" border="0"> + <tr> + <td width="353">Regulars in the United Kingdom (present figure) </td> + <td width="101"><div align="right">£138,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Special reserve </td> + <td><div align="right">£67,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Army reserve (probably diminished from present strength)</td> + <td><div align="right">£120,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Territorial force </td> + <td><div align="right">£315,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><strong>Total</strong></td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>£640,000</strong></div></td> + </tr> +</table> +<p> </p> + +<p> + From the 1st January '01 recruiting on present conditions for all these + forces would cease. +</p> +<pre> +</pre> +<table width="500" border="0"> + <tr> + <td width="396">The regular army of </td> + <td width="94"><div align="right">138,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>would lose drafts to Indian and the colonies </td> + <td>23,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>and would have lost during '00 by waste of 5 per cent </td> + <td>6,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> </td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>29,000</strong></div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>This would leave: </td> + <td><div align="right"></div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><div align="right">regular army under old conditions</div></td> + <td><div align="right">108,100</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><div align="right">and leave room for recruits and new conditions </div></td> + <td><div align="right">91,900</div></td> + </tr> +</table> +<p> +</p> +<p>The total available for mobilisation during the year '01 would + therefore be:— +</p> + +<table width="535" border="0"> + <tr> + <td width="415">Regulars</td> + <td width="110"><div align="right">200,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Paid reserves (the present first-class reserve. I assume an arbitrary figure below the actual one) </td> + <td><div align="right">120,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Special reserve (I assume a large waste and a loss form men whose time has expired) </td> + <td><div align="right">50,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Territorial force </td> + <td>315,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Less 5 per cent </td> + <td> 15,700</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> </td> + <td><strong>299,250</strong></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> </td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>669,250</strong></div></td> + </tr> +</table> +<p> </p> +<p> + On the 1st January '02 the regular army would be:— +</p> +<table width="543" border="0"> + <tr> + <td width="438">Old engagement </td> + <td width="95">108,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Less waste </td> + <td>5,400</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Indian and Colonial reliefs </td> + <td>23,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> </td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>79,600</strong></div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Recruits under new system </td> + <td><div align="right">120,400</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Mounted troops serving second year </td> + <td><div align="right">20,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><strong>Total of regulars</strong></td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>220,000</strong></div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>New reserve </td> + <td>91,900</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Less 5 per cent</td> + <td>4,580</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> </td> + <td><strong>87,320</strong></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> </td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>87,000</strong></div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Paid reserve </td> + <td><div align="right">120,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Special reserve, reduced by lapse of engagements </td> + <td><div align="right">40,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><strong>Total liable for national war</strong></td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>467,000</strong></div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Add Territorial force, reduced by 5 per cent waste (14,962), and lapse of (78,750) engagements </td> + <td><div align="right">205,538</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><strong>Total liable for national war</strong></td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>672,538</strong></div></td> + </tr> +</table> +<p> </p> +<p> + In the year '03 there would be:— +</p> +<pre> +</pre> +<table width="517" border="0"> + <tr> + <td width="438">Old regulars, 79,600; less 5 per cent. waste, 3,950; les drafts for abroad, 23,000, leaves 52,050, say </td> + <td width="69"><div align="right">50,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Regulars, recruits under new conditions </td> + <td><div align="right">150,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Mounted troops serving second year </td> + <td><div align="right">20,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>New reserve </td> + <td><div align="right">197,331</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Paid reserve </td> + <td><div align="right">120,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Special reserve</td> + <td><div align="right">30,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><strong>Total liable for national war </strong></td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>567,334</strong></div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Territorial force </td> + <td><div align="right">116,512</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> </td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>683,846</strong></div></td> + </tr> +</table> + + + +<p> + In the year '04 there would be:— +</p> +<table width="500" border="0"> + <tr> + <td>Old Regulars </td> + <td>50,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Less 5 per cent </td> + <td>2,500</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> </td> + <td>47,500</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Less drafts </td> + <td>23,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> </td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>24,500</strong></div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>New regulars </td> + <td><div align="right">175,500</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Mounted troops, second year </td> + <td><div align="right">20,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> </td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>220,000</strong></div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>New reserve </td> + <td><div align="right">329,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Paid reserve </td> + <td><div align="right">120,000</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><p>Special reserve may be dropped</p> + <p><strong>Total liable for national war </strong></p></td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>669,000</strong></div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Territorial force </td> + <td><div align="right">116,512</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Less 5 per cent. </td> + <td><div align="right">5,825</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> </td> + <td><div align="right">110,687</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Less</td> + <td><div align="right">78,750</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> </td> + <td><div align="right">31,937</div></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><strong>Total</strong></td> + <td><div align="right"><strong>700,937</strong></div></td> + </tr> +</table> +<p> </p> + + +<p> + At the end of '04 the territorial force would come to an end and in '05 + there would be:— +</p> +<table width="500" border="0"> + <tr> + <td>(Old regulars, 24,000, after waste just enough for drafts.) </td> + <td> </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>New regulars </td> + <td>200,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Mounted troops, second year </td> + <td>20,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>New reserve </td> + <td>478,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Less to paid deserve </td> + <td>20,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> </td> + <td><strong>458,000</strong></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Paid reserve </td> + <td>120,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><strong>Total, all liable for national war </strong></td> + <td><strong>798,000</strong></td> + </tr> +</table> +<p> </p> + +<p> + In these tables I have taken the drafts for India and the Colonies from + the old regulars. But they can just as well be taken from the new + regulars. If need be the old regulars could, before the fourth year, be + passed into the paid reserve, and the full contingent of 200,000 one + year's men taken. +</p> +<p> + The men of the special reserve and territorial force would on the + termination of their engagements pass into the second line reserve or + Landwehr until the age of thirty-one or thirty-two. +</p> +<p> + It will be seen that during the years of transition additional expense + must be incurred, as, until the change has been completed, some portion + of the existing forces must be maintained side by side with the new + national army. It is partly in order to facilitate the operations of the + transition period that I have assumed a large addition to the number of + officers. There will also be additional expense caused by the increase + of barrack accommodation needed when the establishment is raised from + 138,000 privates to 200,000, but this additional accommodation will not + be so great as it might at first sight appear, because it is reasonable + to suppose that those young men who wish it, and whose parents wish it, + will be allowed to live at home instead of in barracks, provided they + regularly attend all drills, parades, and classes. +</p> +<p> + It has been necessary, in discussing the British military system, to + consider the arrangements for providing the garrisons of India, Egypt, + and certain oversea stations during peace, and to make provision for + small wars or imperial police; but I may point out that the system by + which provision is made out of the resources of the United Kingdom alone + for these two military requirements of the Empire, is, in the present + conditions of the Empire, an anomaly. The new nations which have grown + up in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are anxious, above all things, + to give reality to the bond between them and the mother country. Their + desire is to render imperial service, and the proper way of giving them + the opportunity to do so is to call upon them to take their part in + maintaining the garrisons in India and Egypt and in the work of imperial + police. How they should do it, it is for them to decide and arrange, but + for Englishmen at home to doubt for a moment either their will or their + capacity to take their proper share of the burden is to show an unworthy + doubt of the sincerity of the daughter nations and of their attachment + to the mother country and the Empire. +</p> +<p> + If Great Britain should be compelled to enter upon a struggle for + existence with one of the great European powers, the part which Canada, + Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa could play in that struggle is + limited and specific. For the conflict would, in the first instance, + take the form of a naval war. To this the King's dominions beyond the + seas can do little more than assist during peace by their contributions, + either of ships, men, or money, in strengthening the British navy. But + during the actual course of such a war, while it is doubtful whether + either Canada, Australia, or New Zealand could render much material help + in a European struggle, they could undoubtedly greatly contribute to the + security of India and Egypt by the despatch of contingents of their own + troops to reinforce the British garrisons maintained in those countries. + This appears to me to be the direction to which their attention should + turn, not only because it is the most effective way in which they can + promote the stability of the Empire, but also because it is the way + along which they will most speedily reach a full appreciation of the + nature of the Empire and its purpose in the world. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_22"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + XXI +</h2> +<center> + THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH ARMIES ARE RAISED +</center> +<p> + I have now sketched the outlines of a national military system + applicable to the case of Great Britain. It remains to show why such a + system is necessary. +</p> +<p> + There are three main points in respect of each of which a choice has to + be made. They are the motive which induces men to become soldiers, the + time devoted to military education, and the nature of the liability to + serve in war. The distinction which strikes the popular imagination is + that between voluntary and compulsory service. But it covers another + distinction hardly less important—that between paid and unpaid + soldiers. The volunteers between 1860 and 1878, or 1880, when pay began + to be introduced for attendance in camps, gave their time and their + attention with no external inducement whatever. They had no pay of any + kind, and there was no constraint to induce them to join, or, having, + joined, to continue in their corps. The regular soldier, on the other + hand, makes a contract with the State. He agrees in return for his pay, + clothes, board and lodging to give his whole time for a specific number + of years to the soldier's life. +</p> +<p> + The principle of a contract for pay is necessary in the case of a + professional force maintained abroad for purposes of imperial police; + but it is not possible on that principle to raise or maintain a national + army. +</p> +<p> + The principle of voluntary unpaid service appears to have a deeper moral + foundation than that of service by a contract of hiring. But if the time + required is greater than is consistent with the men's giving a full + day's work to their industrial occupations the unpaid nature of the + service cannot be maintained, and the men must be paid for their time. + The merit of the man's free gift of himself is thereby obscured. +</p> +<p> + Wherein does that merit consist? If there is no merit in a man's making + himself a soldier without other reward than that which consists in the + education he receives, then the voluntary system has no special value. + But if there is a merit, it must consist in the man's conferring a + benefit upon, or rendering a service to, his country. In other words, + the excellence of the unpaid voluntary system consists in its being an + acceptance by those who serve under it of a duty towards the State. The + performance of that duty raises their citizenship to a higher plane. If + that is the case it must be desirable, in the interest both of the State + and of its citizens, that every citizen capable of the duty should + perform it. But that is the principle upon which the national system is + based. The national system is therefore an extension of the spirit of + the volunteer or unpaid voluntary system. +</p> +<p> + The terms compulsory service and universal service are neither of them + strictly accurate. There is no means of making every adult male, without + exception, a soldier, because not every boy that grows up has the + necessary physical qualification. Nor does the word compulsion give a + true picture. It suggests that, as a rule, men would not accept the duty + if they could evade it, which is not the case. The number of men who + have been volunteers since 1860 shows that the duty is widely accepted. + Indeed, in a country of which the government is democratic, a duty + cannot be imposed by law upon all citizens except with the concurrence + of the majority. But a duty recognised by the majority and prescribed by + law will commend itself as necessary and right to all but a very few. If + a popular vote were to be taken on the question whether or not it is + every citizen's duty to be trained as a soldier and to fight in case of + a national war, it is hardly conceivable that the principle would fail + to be affirmed by an overwhelming majority. +</p> +<p> + The points as to which opinions are divided are the time and method of + training and the nature of the liability to serve in war. +</p> +<p> + There are, roughly speaking, three schemes of training to be + considered—first, the old volunteer plan of weekly evening drills, with + an annual camp training; secondly, the militia plan of three months' + recruit training followed by a month's camp training in several + subsequent years; and, lastly, the continental plan of a continuous + training for one or more years followed by one or more periods of annual + manoeuvres. The choice between these three methods is the crucial point + of the whole discussion. It must be determined by the standard of + excellence rendered necessary by the needs of the State. The evidence + given to the Norfolk Commission convinced that body that neither the + first nor the second plan will produce troops fit to meet on equal terms + those of a good modern army. Professional officers are practically + unanimous in preferring the third method. +</p> +<p> + The liability of the trained citizen to serve in war during his year in + the ranks and his years as a first-class reservist must be determined by + the military needs of the country. I have given the reasons why I + believe the need to be for an army that can strike a blow in a + continental war. +</p> +<p> + I myself became a volunteer because I was convinced that it was a + citizen's duty to train himself to bear arms in his country's cause. I + have been for many years an ardent advocate of the volunteer system, + because I believed, as I still believe, that a national army must be an + army of citizen soldiers, and from the beginning I have looked for the + efficiency of such an army mainly to the tactical skill and the + educating power of its officers. But experience and observation have + convinced me that a national army, such as I have so long hoped for, + cannot be produced merely by the individual zeal of its members, nor + even by their devoted co-operation with one another. The spirit which + animates them must animate the whole nation, if the right result is to + be produced. For it is evident that the effort of the volunteers, + continued for half a century, to make themselves an army, has met with + insuperable obstacles in the social and industrial conditions of the + country. The Norfolk Commission's Report made it quite clear that the + conditions of civil employment render it impossible for the training of + volunteers to be extended beyond the present narrow limits of time, and + it is evident that those limits do not permit of a training sufficient + for the purpose, which is victory in war against the best troops that + another nation can produce. +</p> +<p> + Yet the officers and men of the volunteer force have not carried on + their fifty years' work in vain. They have, little by little, educated + the whole nation to think of war as a reality of life, they have + diminished the prejudice which used to attach to the name of soldier, + and they have enabled their countrymen to realise that to fight for his + country's cause is a part of every citizen's duty, for which he must be + prepared by training. +</p> +<p> + The adoption of this principle will have further results. So soon as + every able-bodied citizen is by law a soldier, the administration of + both army and navy will be watched, criticised, and supported with an + intelligence which will no longer tolerate dilettantism in authority. + The citizen's interest in the State will begin to take a new aspect. He + will discover the nature of the bond which unites him to his + fellow-citizens, and from this perception will spring that regeneration + of the national life from which alone is to be expected the uplifting of + England. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_23"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + XXII +</h2> +<center> + THE CHAIN OF DUTY +</center> +<p> + The reader who has accompanied me to this point will perhaps be willing + to give me a few minutes more in which we may trace the different + threads of the argument and see if we can twine them into a rope which + will be of some use to us. +</p> +<p> + We began by agreeing that the people of this country have not made + entirely satisfactory arrangements for a competitive struggle, at any + rate in its extreme form of war with another country, although such + conflict is possible at any time; and we observed that British political + arrangements have been made rather with a view to the controversy + between parties at home than to united action in contest with a foreign + state. +</p> +<p> + We then glanced at the probable consequences to the British people of + any serious war, and at the much more dreadful results of failure to + obtain victory. We discussed the theories which lead some of our + countrymen to be unwilling to consider the nature and conditions of war, + and which make many of them imagine that war can be avoided either by + trusting to international arbitration or by international agreements + for disarmament. We agreed that it was not safe to rely upon these + theories. +</p> +<p> + Examining the conditions of war as they were revealed in the great + struggle which finished a hundred years ago, we saw that the only chance + of carrying on war with any prospect of success in modern times lies in + the nationalisation of the State, so that the Government can utilise in + conflict all the resources of its land and its people. In the last war + Great Britain's national weapon was her navy, which she has for + centuries used as a means of maintaining the balance of power in Europe. + The service she thus rendered to Europe had its reward in the monopoly + of sea power which lasted through the nineteenth century. The great + event of that century was the attainment by Germany of the unity that + makes a nation and her consequent remarkable growth in wealth and power, + resulting in a maritime ambition inconsistent with the position which + England held at sea during the nineteenth century and was disposed to + think eternal. +</p> +<p> + Great Britain, in the security due to her victories at sea, was able to + develop her colonies into nations, and her East India Company into an + Empire. But that same security caused her to forget her nationalism, + with the result that now her security itself is imperilled. During this + period, when the conception of the nation was in abeyance, some of the + conditions of sea power have been modified, with the result that the + British monopoly is at an end, while the possibility of a similar + monopoly has probably disappeared, so that the British navy, even if + successful, could not now be used, as it was a hundred years ago, as a + means of entirely destroying the trade of an adversary. Accordingly, if + in a future war Britain is to find a continental ally, she must be able + to offer him the assistance, not merely of naval victory, but also of a + strong army. Moreover, during the epoch in which Great Britain has + turned her back upon Europe the balance of power has been upset, and + there is no power and no combination able to stand up against Germany as + the head of the Triple Alliance. This is a position of great danger for + England, because it is an open question whether in the absence of a + strong British army any group of Powers, even in alliance with England, + could afford to take up a quarrel against the combination of the central + States. It thus appears that Great Britain, by neglecting the conditions + of her existence as a nation, has lost the strength in virtue of which, + at previous crises in European history, she was the successful champion + of that independence of States which, in the present stage of human + development, is the substance of freedom. +</p> +<p> + Our consideration of the question of might showed that if Great Britain + is to be strong enough to meet her responsibilities her people must + nationalise themselves, while our reflections on the question of right + showed that only from such nationalisation is a sound policy to be + expected. In short, only in so far as her people have the unity of + spirit and of will that mark a nation can Great Britain be either strong + or just. The idea of the nation implies a work to be done by the British + State, which has to be on the watch against challenge from a continental + rival to Great Britain's right to the headship of her empire, and which + at the same time has to give to that empire the direction without which + it cannot remain united. Great Britain cannot do the work thus imposed + upon her by her position and her history unless she has the co-operation + of all her people. Thus the conception of the nation reveals itself in + the twofold shape of duties laid upon England and of duties consequently + laid upon every Englishman. It means that England must either decline + and fall or do a certain work in the world which is impossible for her + unless she constrains all her people to devote themselves to her + service. It thus appears that England and her people can expect no + future worth having except on the principle of duty made the mainspring + both of public and of private life. +</p> +<p> + We attempted to apply the principles involved in the word nation to the + obvious and urgent needs of the British State at the present time. +</p> +<p> + Victory at sea being indispensable for Great Britain in case of + conflict, we inquired into the conditions of victory, and found in the + parallel instances of Nelson and Napoleon that both by sea and land the + result of the nationalisation of war is to produce a leader who is the + personification of a theory or system of operations. The history of the + rise of the German nation shows how the effort to make a nation produced + the necessary statesman, Bismarck. Nationalisation creates the right + leadership—that of the man who is master of his work. +</p> +<p> + Reviewing the needs of the naval administration, we saw that what is + wanted at the present time is rather proper organisation at the + Admiralty than an increase in mere material strength; while turning to + the army, we discovered that the only system on which can be produced + the army that Great Britain requires is that which makes every + able-bodied citizen a soldier. +</p> +<p> + To make the citizen a soldier is to give him that sense of duty to the + country and that consciousness of doing it, which, if spread through the + whole population, will convert it into what is required—a nation. + Therefore to reform the army according to some such plan as has been + here proposed is the first step in that national revival which is the + one thing needful for England, and if that step be taken the rest will + follow of itself. Nationalisation will bring leadership, which in the + political sphere becomes statesmanship, and the right kind of + education, to give which is the highest ultimate function of national + existence. +</p> +<p> + I have tried in these pages to develop an idea which has haunted me for + many years. I think if the reader would extend to it even for a short + time the hospitality of his mind he might be willing to make it his + constant companion. For it seems to me to show the way towards the + solution of other problems than those which have here been directly + discussed. I cannot but believe that if we could +all accustom ourselves to make some sacrifices for +the sake of England, if only by giving a few +minutes every day to thinking about her and by +trying to convince ourselves that those who are +not of our party are yet perhaps animated by the +same love of their country as we ourselves, we +might realise that the question of duty is answered +more easily by performance than by speculation. +I suspect that the relations between the political +parties, between capital and labour, between master +and servant, between rich and poor, between class +and class would become simpler and better if +Englishmen were to come to see how natural it is +that they should spend their lives for England. +</p> +<a name="2H_4_24"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2> + THE END +</h2> +<p> + Printed by BALLANTYNE, HANSON & Co. +</p> +<p> + Edinburgh & London +</p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> + +<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10629 ***</div> +</body> +</html> + |