diff options
Diffstat (limited to '10629-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | 10629-0.txt | 4409 |
1 files changed, 4409 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/10629-0.txt b/10629-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4741494 --- /dev/null +++ b/10629-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4409 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10629 *** + +BRITAIN AT BAY + +BY + +SPENSER WILKINSON + + + +New York + +1909 + + + +TO MY CHILDREN + +CONTENTS + + + + + +CHAPTER + +I. THE NATION AND THE PARTIES + +II. DEFEAT + +III. FORCE AND RIGHT + +IV. ARBITRATION AND DISARMAMENT + +V. THE NATIONALISATION OF WAR + +VI. THE BALANCE OF POWER + +VII. THE RISE OF GERMANY + +VIII. NATIONHOOD NEGLECTED + +IX. NEW CONDITIONS + +X. DYNAMICS--THE QUESTION OF MIGHT + +XI. POLICY--THE QUESTION OF RIGHT + +XII. THE NATION + +XIII. THE EFFECT OF THE NATIONALISATION OF WAR UPON LEADERSHIP + +XIV. THE NEEDS OF THE NAVY + +XV. ENGLAND'S MILITARY PROBLEM + +XVI. TWO SYSTEMS CONTRASTED + +XVII. A NATIONAL ARMY + +XVIII. THE COST + +XIX. ONE ARMY NOT TWO + +XX. THE TRANSITION + +XXI. THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH ARMIES ARE RAISED + +XXII. THE CHAIN OF DUTY + + + + +Chapters XIV. to XX. have appeared as articles in the _Morning Post_ +and are by kind permission reproduced without substantial change. + + + +I. + + +THE NATION AND THE PARTIES + +"I do not believe in the perfection of the British constitution as an +instrument of war ... it is evident that there is something in your +machinery that is wrong." These were the words of the late Marquis of +Salisbury, speaking as Prime Minister in his place in the House of Lords +on the 30th of January 1900. They amounted to a declaration by the +British Government that it could not govern, for the first business of a +Government is to be able to defend the State of which it has charge, +that is, to carry on war. Strange to say, the people of England were +undisturbed by so striking an admission of national failure. + +On the 16th of March 1909 came a new declaration from another Prime +Minister. Mr. Asquith, on the introduction of the Navy Estimates, +explained to the House of Commons that the Government had been surprised +at the rate at which the new German navy was being constructed, and at +the rapid growth of Germany's power to build battleships. But it is the +first duty of a Government to provide for national security and to +provide means to foresee. A Government that is surprised in a matter +relating to war is already half defeated. + +The creation of the German navy is the creation of means that could be +used to challenge Great Britain's sea power and all that depends upon +it. There has been no such challenge these hundred years, no challenge +so formidable as that represented by the new German fleet these three +hundred years. It brings with it a crisis in the national life of +England as great as has ever been known; yet this crisis finds the +British nation divided, unready and uncertain what leadership it is to +expect. + +The dominant fact, the fact that controls all others, is that from now +onwards Great Britain has to face the stern reality of war, immediately +by way of preparation and possibly at any moment by way of actual +collision. England is drifting into a quarrel with Germany which, if it +cannot be settled, involves a struggle for the mastery with the +strongest nation that the world has yet seen--a nation that, under the +pressure of necessity, has learnt to organise itself for war as for +peace; that sets its best minds to direct its preparations for war; +that has an army of four million citizens, and that is of one mind in +the determination to make a navy that shall fear no antagonist. A +conflict of this kind is the test of nations, not only of their strength +but also of their righteousness or right to be. It has two aspects. It +is first of all a quarrel and then a fight, and if we are to enter into +it without fear of destruction we must fulfil two conditions: in the +quarrel we must be in the right, in the fight we must win. The two +conditions are inseparable. If there is a doubt about the justice of our +cause we shall be divided among ourselves, and it will be impossible for +us to put forth the strength of a united nation. + +Have we really a quarrel with Germany? Is she doing us any wrong? Some +of our people seem to think so, though I find it hard to say in what the +wrong consists. Are we doing her any wrong? Some Germans seem to think +so, and it behoves us, if we can, to find out what the German grievance +is. + +Suppose that there is a cause for quarrel, hidden at present but sooner +or later to be revealed. What likelihood is there that we shall be able +to make good our case in arms, and to satisfy the world and posterity +that we deserved to win? + +Germany can build fleets as fast as we can, and although we have a start +the race will not be easy for us; she has the finest school of war that +ever existed, against which we have to set an Admiralty so much +mistrusted that at this moment a committee of the Cabinet is inquiring +into its efficiency. + +Is it not time for us to find the answer to the question raised by Lord +Salisbury nine years ago, to ascertain what it is that interferes with +the perfection of the British constitution as an instrument of war, and +to set right what is wrong with our machinery? + +The truth is that we have ceased to be a nation; we have forgotten +nationhood, and have become a conglomerate of classes, parties, +factions, and sects. That is the disease. The remedy consists in +reconstituting ourselves as a nation. + +What is a nation? The inhabitants of a country constituted as one body +to secure their corporate being and well-being. The nation is all of us, +and its government is trusteeship for us all in order to give us peace +and security, and in order that in peace and security we may make each +other's lives worth living by doing each the best work he can. The +nature of a nation may be seen by distinguishing it from the other +nations outside and from the parties within. The mark of a nation is +sovereignty, which means, as regards other nations, the right and the +power to make peace with them or to carry on war against them, and +which means, as regards those within, the right and the power to command +them. + +A nation is a people constituted as a State, maintaining and supporting +a Government which is at once the embodiment of right and the wielder of +force. If the right represented by the Government is challenged, either +without or within, the Government asserts it by force, and in either +case disposes, to any extent that may be required, of the property, the +persons, and the lives of its subjects. + +A party, according to the classical theory of the British constitution, +is a body of men within the State who are agreed in regarding some +measure or some principle as so vital to the State that, in order to +secure the adoption of the measure or the acceptance of the principle, +they are willing to sink all differences of opinion on other matters, +and to work together for the one purpose which they are agreed in +regarding as fundamental. + +The theory of party government is based on the assumption that there +must always be some measure or some principle in regard to which the +citizens of the same country will differ so strongly as to subordinate +their private convictions on other matters to their profound convictions +in regard to the one great question. It is a theory of permanent civil +war carried on through the forms of parliamentary debate and popular +election, and, indeed, the two traditional parties are the political +descendants of the two sides which in the seventeenth century were +actually engaged in civil war. For the ordinary purposes of the domestic +life of the country the system has its advantages, but they are coupled +with grave drawbacks. The party system destroys the sincerity of our +political life, and introduces a dangerous dilettantism into the +administration of public business. + +A deliberative assembly like the House of Commons can reach a decision +only by there being put from the chair a question to which the answer +must be either Yes or No. It is evidently necessary to the sincerity of +such decisions that the answer given by each member shall in every case +be the expression of his conviction regarding the right answer to the +question put. If every member in every division were to vote according +to his own judgment and conscience upon the question put, there would be +a perpetual circulation of members between the Ayes to the right and the +Noes to the left. The party system prevents this. It obliges each member +on every important occasion to vote with his leaders and to follow the +instruction of the whips. In this way the division of opinion produced +by some particular question or measure is, as far as possible, made +permanent and dominant, and the freedom of thought and of deliberation +is confined within narrow limits. + +Thus there creeps into the system an element of insincerity which has +been enormously increased since the extension of the franchise and the +consequent organisation of parties in the country. Thirty or forty years +ago the caucus was established in all the constituencies, in each of +which was formed a party club, association, or committee, for the +purpose of securing at parliamentary elections the success of the party +candidate. The association, club, or committee consists, as regards its +active or working portion, of a very small percentage of the voters even +of its own party, but it is affiliated to the central organisation and +in practice it controls the choice of candidates. + +What is the result? That the affairs of the nation are entirely given +over to be disputed between the two organised parties, whose leaders are +compelled, in shaping their policy and in thinking about public affairs, +to consider first and foremost the probable effect of what they will do +and of what they will say upon the active members of the caucus of their +own party in the constituencies. The frame of mind of the members of the +caucus is that of men who regard the opposite caucus as the adversary. +But the adversary of a nation can only be another nation. + +In this way the leaders of both parties, the men who fill the places +which, in a well-organised nation, would be assigned to statesmen, are +placed in it position in which statesmanship is almost impossible. A +statesman would be devoted solely to the nation. He would think first, +second, and third of the nation. Security would be his prime object, and +upon that basis he would aim at the elevation of the characters and of +the lives of the whole population. But our leaders cannot possibly think +first, second, and third of the nation. They have to think at least as +much of the next election and of the opinions of their supporters. In +this way their attention is diverted from that observation of other +nations which is essential for the maintenance of security. Moreover, +they are obliged to dwell on subjects directly intelligible to and +appreciable by the voters in the constituencies, and are thereby +hindered from giving either the time or the attention which they would +like to any of those problems of statesmanship which require close and +arduous study for their solution. The wonder is in these conditions that +they do their work so well, and maintain undiminished the reputation of +English public men for integrity and ability. + +Yet what at the present moment is the principle about which parties are +divided? Is there any measure or any principle at issue which is really +vital to Great Britain? Is there anything in dispute between the parties +which would not be abandoned and forgotten at the first shot fired in a +war between England and a great continental nation? I am convinced that +that first shot must cause the scales to fall from men's eyes; that it +must make every one realise that our divisions are comparative trifles +and that for years we have been wasting time over them. But if we wait +for the shock of war to arouse us to a sense of reality and to estimate +our party differences at their true value, it will be too late. We shall +wring our hands in vain over our past blindness and the insight we shall +then have obtained will avail us nothing. + +The party system has another consequence which will not stand scrutiny +in the light of reality; it is dilettantism in the conduct of the +nation's principal business. Some of the chief branches of the executive +work of government are the provinces of special arts and sciences, each +of which to master requires the work of a lifetime. Of such a kind are +the art of carrying on war, whether by sea or land, the art of +conducting foreign relations, which involves a knowledge of all the +other great States and their policies, and the direction of the +educational system, which cannot possibly be properly conducted except +by an experienced educator. But the system gives the direction of each +of these branches to one of the political leaders forming the Cabinet or +governing committee, and the practice is to consider as disqualified +from membership of that committee any man who has given his life either +to war, to foreign policy, or to education. Yet by its efficiency in +these matters the nation must stand or fall. By all means let us be +chary of lightly making changes in the constitution or in the +arrangements of government. But, if the security and continued existence +of the nation are in question, must we not scrutinise our methods of +government with a view to make sure that they accord with the necessary +conditions of success in a national struggle for existence? + +I am well aware that the train of thought to which I have tried to give +expression is unpopular, and that most people think that any +modification of the traditional party system is impracticable. But the +question is not whether the system is popular; it is whether it will +enable the country to stand in the hour of trial. If the system is +inefficient and fails to enable the nation to carry on with success the +functions necessary for its preservation and if at the same time it is +impracticable to change it, then nothing can avert ruin from this +country. Yet I believe that a very large number of my countrymen are in +fact thinking each for himself the thoughts which I am trying to +express. They are perhaps not the active members of the caucus of either +party, but they are men who, if they see the need, will not shrink from +exertions or from sacrifices which they believe to be useful or +necessary to the country. It is to them that the following pages are an +appeal. I appeal with some confidence because what I shall try to show +to be necessary is not so much a change of institutions as a change of +spirit; not a new constitution but a return to a true way of looking at +public and private life. My contention is that the future of England +depends entirely upon the restoration of duty, of which the nation is +the symbol, to its proper place in our lives. + + + + +II. + + +DEFEAT + +Great Britain is drifting unintentionally and half unconsciously into a +war with the German Empire, a State which has a population of sixty +millions and is better organised for war than any State has ever been in +modern times. For such a conflict, which may come about to-morrow, and +unless a great change takes place must come about in the near future, +Great Britain is not prepared. + +The food of our people and the raw material of their industries come to +this country by sea, and the articles here produced go by sea to their +purchasers abroad. Every transaction carries with it a certain profit +which makes it possible. If the exporter and the manufacturer who +supplies him can make no profit they cannot continue their operations, +and the men who work for them must lose their employment. + +Suppose Great Britain to be to-morrow at war with one or more of the +Great Powers of Europe. All the sailing vessels and slow steamers will +stop running lest they should be taken by hostile cruisers. The fast +steamers will have to pay war rates of insurance and to charge extra +freights. Steamers ready to leave foreign ports for this country will +wait for instructions and for news. On the outbreak of war, therefore, +this over-sea traffic must be greatly diminished in volume and carried +on with enormously increased difficulties. The supply of food would be +considerably reduced and the certainty of the arrival of any particular +cargo would have disappeared. The price of food must therefore rapidly +and greatly rise, and that alone would immediately impose very great +hardships on the whole of the working class, of which a considerable +part would be driven across the line which separates modern comfort from +the starvation margin. The diminution in the supply of the raw materials +of manufacture would be much greater and more immediate. Something like +half the manufacturers of Great Britain must close their works for want +of materials. But will the other half be able to carry on? Foreign +orders they cannot possibly execute, because there can be no certainty +of the delivery of the goods; and even if they could, the price at which +they could deliver them with a profit would be much higher than it is in +peace. For with a diminished supply the price of raw material must go +up, the cost of marine insurance must be added, together with the extra +wages necessary to enable the workmen to live with food at an enhanced +price. + +Thus the effect of the greater difficulty of sea communication must be +to destroy the margin of profit which enables the British capitalist to +carry on his works, while the effect of all these causes taken together +on the credit system upon which our whole domestic economy reposes will +perhaps be understood by business men. Even if this state of things +should last only a few months, it certainly involves the transfer to +neutrals of all trade that is by possibility transferable. Foreign +countries will give their orders for cotton, woollen, and iron goods to +the United States, France, Switzerland, and Austro-Hungary, and at the +conclusion of peace the British firms that before supplied them, if they +have not in the meantime become bankrupt, will find that their customers +have formed new connections. + +The shrinkage of credit would bring a multitude of commercial failures; +the diminution of trade and the cessation of manufactures a great many +more. The unemployed would be counted by the million, and would have to +be kept at the public expense or starve. + +If in the midst of these misfortunes, caused by the mere fact of war, +should come the news of defeat at sea, still more serious consequences +must follow. After defeat at sea all regular and secure communication +between Great Britain, her Colonies, and India comes to an end. With the +terrible blow to Britain's reputation which defeat at sea must bring, +what will be the position of the 100,000 British in India who for a +century have governed a population of nearly 300,000,000? What can the +Colonies do to help Great Britain under such conditions? For the command +of the sea nothing, and even if each of them had a first-rate army, what +would be the use of those armies to this country in her hour of need? +They cannot be brought to Europe unless the British navy commands the +sea. + +These are some of the material consequences of defeat. But what of its +spiritual consequences? We have brought up our children in the pride of +a great nation, and taught them of an Empire on which the sun never +sets. What shall we say to them in the hour of defeat and after the +treaty of peace imposed by the victor? They will say: "Find us work and +we will earn our bread and in due time win back the greatness that has +been lost." But how are they to earn their bread? In this country half +the employers will have been ruined by the war. The other half will have +lost heavily, and much of the wealth even of the very rich will have +gone to keep alive the innumerable multitude of starving unemployed. +These will be advised after the war to emigrate. To what country? +Englishmen, after defeat, will everywhere be at a discount. Words will +not describe, and the imagination cannot realise, the suffering of a +defeated nation living on an island which for fifty years has not +produced food enough for its population. + +The material and spiritual results of defeat can easily be recognised by +any one who takes the trouble to think about the question, though only +experience either at first hand or supplied by history can enable a man +fully to grasp its terrible nature. But a word must be said on the +social and political consequences inseparable from the wreck of a State +whose Government has been unable to fulfil its prime function, that of +providing security for the national life. All experience shows that in +such cases men do not take their troubles calmly. They are filled with +passion. Their feelings find vent in the actions to which their previous +currents of thought tended. The working class, long accustomed by its +leaders to regard the capitalists as a class with interests and aims +opposed to its own, will hardly be able in the stress of unemployment +and of famine to change its way of thinking. The mass of the workmen, +following leaders whose judgment may not perhaps be of the soundest but +who will undoubtedly sincerely believe that the doctrines with which +they have grown up are true, may assail the existing social order and +lay the blame of their misfortunes upon the class which has hitherto had +the government of the country in its hands and has supplied the leaders +of both political parties. The indignation which would inspire this +movement would not be altogether without justification, for it cannot be +denied that both political parties have for many years regarded +preparation for war and all that belongs to it as a minor matter, +subordinate to the really far less important questions relying upon +which each side has sought to win sufficient votes to secure a party +majority. + +Why do I discuss the hypothesis of British defeat rather than that of +British victory? Because it is the invariable practice of the masters of +war to consider first the disagreeable possibilities and to make +provision for them. But also because, according to every one of the +tests which can be applied, the probability of defeat for Great Britain +in the present state of Europe is exceedingly great. Rarely has a State +unready for conflict been able to stand against a nation organised for +war. The last of a long series of examples was the war between Russia +and Japan, in which the vast resources of a great Empire were exhausted +in the struggle with a State so small as to seem a pigmy in comparison +with her giant adversary. On the 10th of February 1904, the day when the +news reached England that the Russo-Japanese war had begun, I gave as +follows my reasons for thinking that Japan would win:-- + +"The hypothesis of a considerable Japanese success, at any rate at +first, is considered rather than its opposite, because Japan has at +present all the marks of a nation likely to do great things in war. It +is not merely that she has transformed her government and her education, +has introduced military institutions on the German model, especially +compulsory training and that vivifying institution, a general staff. The +present quarrel arises from the deliberate policy of Russia, pursuing +aims that are incompatible with every Japanese tradition and every +Japanese hope. The whole Japanese nation has for years been burning with +the sense of wrongs inflicted by Russia, and into this war, as into the +preparation for it, the whole people throws itself, mind, soul, and +body. This is the condition which produces great strategical plans and +extreme energy in their execution. The Japanese forces are well +organised, armed, and equipped. They are intelligently led and follow +with intelligence. + +"Of Russia there is hardly evidence to show that the cause for which she +is fighting has touched the imaginations or the feelings of more than a +small fraction of the population. It is the war of a bureaucracy, and +Russia may easily fail to develop either great leading, though her +officers are instructed, or intelligent following of the leaders by the +rank and file. But the Russian troops are brave and have always needed a +good deal of beating." + +Substitute Great Britain for Russia and Germany for Japan in this +forecast, which has been proved true, and every word holds good except +two. We now know that Russia's policy was not deliberate; that her +Government bungled into the war without knowing what it was doing. In +just the same way British Governments have drifted blindly into the +present difficult relations with Germany. Those in England who would +push the country into a war with Germany are indeed not a bureaucracy, +they are merely a fraction of one of the parties, and do not represent +the mass of our people, who have no desire for such a war, and are so +little aware of its possibility that they have never even taken the +trouble to find out why it may come. A larger section of the other party +is steeped in the belief that force, violence, and war are wicked in +themselves, and ought therefore not to be thought about. It is a +prejudice which, unless removed, may ruin this country, and there is no +way of dissipating it except that of patient argument based upon +observation of the world we live in. That way I shall attempt to follow +in the next chapter. + + + + +III. + + +FORCE AND RIGHT + +"Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and +a tooth for a tooth: but I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but +whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other +also. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy +coat, let him have thy cloke also. And whosoever shall compel thee +to go a mile, go with him twain. Give to him that asketh thee, and +from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away. Ye have +heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and +hate thine enemy: but I say unto you, Love your enemies." +(Matt. v. 38-44). + +If there are any among us who adopt these words as the governing rule of +their lives they will certainly cause no difficulty to the State in its +military policy whatever that may be, and will find their natural places +even in time of war to the public good. If the whole population were of +their way of thinking and acting there would be no need to discuss war. +An invader would not be resisted. His troops would be hospitably +entertained and treated with affection. No opposition would be made to +the change of Government which he would introduce, and the taxes which +he imposed would be cheerfully paid. But there would be no State, except +that created by the invader; and the problem of conduct for those +living the life described would arise when the State so set up issued +its ordinances requiring every able-bodied man to become a competent +soldier. + +There are those who believe, or fancy they believe, that the words I +have quoted involve the principle that the use of force or of violence +between man and man, or between nation and nation, is wicked. To the man +who thinks it right to submit to any violence or to be killed rather +than to use violence in resistance, I have no reply to make. The world +cannot conquer him and fear has no hold upon him. But even he can carry +out his doctrine only to the extent of allowing himself to be +ill-treated, as I will now convince him. Many years ago the people of +South Lancashire were horrified by the facts reported in a trial for +murder. In a village on the outskirts of Bolton lived a young woman, +much liked and respected as a teacher in one of the Board schools. On +her way home from school she was accustomed to follow a footpath through +a lonely wood, and here one evening her body was found. She had been +strangled by a ruffian who had thought in this lonely place to have his +wicked will of her. She had resisted successfully and he had killed her +in the struggle. Fortunately the murderer was caught and the facts +ascertained from circumstantial evidence were confirmed by his +confession. Now, the question I have to ask of the man who takes his +stand on the passage I have quoted from the Gospel is: "What would have +been your duty if you had been walking through that wood and come upon +the girl struggling with the man who killed her?" This is a crucial +instance which, I submit, utterly destroys the doctrine that the use of +violence is in itself wrong. The right or wrong is not in the employment +of force but simply in the purpose for which it is used. What the case +establishes, I think, is that to use violence in resistance to violent +wrong is not only right but necessary. + +The employment of force for the maintenance of right is the foundation +of all civilised human life, for it is the fundamental function of the +State, and apart from the State there is no civilisation, no life worth +living. The first business of the State is to protect the community +against violent interference from outside. This it does by requiring +from its subjects whatever personal service and whatever sacrifice of +property and of time may be necessary; and resistance to these demands, +as well as to any injunctions whatever laid by the State upon its +subjects, is unconditionally suppressed by force. The mark of the State +is sovereignty, or the identification of force and right, and the +measure of the perfection of the State is furnished by the completeness +of this identification. In the present condition of English political +thought it may be worth while to dwell for a few moments upon the +beneficent nature of this dual action of the State. + +Within its jurisdiction the State maintains order and law and in this +way makes life worth living for its subjects. Order and law are the +necessary conditions of men's normal activities, of their industry, of +their ownership of whatever the State allows them to possess--for +outside of the State there is no ownership--of their leisure and of +their freedom to enjoy it. The State is even the basis of men's +characters, for it sets up and establishes a minimum standard of +conduct. Certain acts are defined as unlawful and punished as crimes. +Other acts, though not criminal, are yet so far subject to the +disapproval of the courts that the man who does them may have to +compensate those who suffer injury or damage in consequence of them. +These standards have a dual origin, in legislation and precedent. +Legislation is a formal expression of the agreement of the community +upon the definition of crimes, and common law has been produced by the +decisions of the courts in actions between man and man. Every case tried +in a civil court is a conflict between two parties, a struggle for +justice, the judgment being justice applied to the particular case. The +growth of English law has been through an endless series of conflicts, +and the law of to-day may be described as a line passing through a +series of points representing an infinite number of judgments, each the +decision of a conflict in court. For seven hundred years, with hardly an +interruption, every judgment of a court has been sustained by the force +of the State. The law thus produced, expressed in legislation and +interpreted by the courts, is the foundation of all English conduct and +character. Upon the basis thus laid there takes place a perpetual +evolution of higher standards. In the intercourse of a settled and +undisturbed community and of the many societies which it contains, arise +a number of standards of behaviour which each man catches as it were by +infection from the persons with whom he habitually associates and to +which he is obliged to conform, because if his conduct falls below them +his companions will have nothing to do with him. Every class of society +has its notions of what constitutes proper conduct and constrains its +members to carry on their lives, so far as they are open to inspection, +according to these notions. The standards tend constantly to improve. +Men form an ideal of behaviour by observing the conduct of the best of +their class, and in proportion as this ideal gains acceptance, find +themselves driven to adopt it for fear of the social ostracism which is +the modern equivalent of excommunication. Little by little what was at +first a rarely attained ideal becomes a part of good manners. It +established itself as custom and finally becomes part of the law. + +Thus the State, in co-operation with the whole community, becomes the +educator of its people. Standards of conduct are formed slowly in the +best minds and exist at first merely in what Plato would have called +"the intellectual sphere," or in what would have been called at a later +date in Palestine the "kingdom of heaven." But the strongest impulse of +mankind is to realise its ideals. Its fervent prayer, which once uttered +can never cease, is "on earth as it is in heaven," and the ideals +developed in man's spiritual life gradually take shape in laws and +become prohibitions and injunctions backed by the forces of the State. + +The State, however, is not an abstraction. For English people it means +the United Kingdom; and if an Englishman wants to realise what he owes +to his country let him look back through its history and see how all +that he values in the character of the men he most admires and all that +is best in himself has gradually been created and realised through the +ceaseless effort of his forefathers, carried on continuously from the +time when the first Englishman crossed the North Sea until the present +day. Other nations have their types of conduct, perhaps as good as our +own, but Englishmen value, and rightly value, the ideals particularly +associated with the life of their own country. Perhaps two of the +commonest expressions convey peculiarly English views of character. We +talk of "fair play" as the essence of just dealing between man and man. +It is a conception we have developed from the national games. We +describe ideal conduct as that of a gentleman. It is a condensation of +the best part of English history, and a search for a definition of the +function of Great Britain in the moral economy of the world will hardly +find a better answer than that it is to stamp upon every subject of the +King the character implied in these two expressions. Suppose the British +State to be overthrown or to drop from its place among the great Powers +of the world, these ideals of character would be discredited and their +place would be taken by others. + +The justification of the constraint exercised by the State upon its own +citizens is the necessity for security, the obligation of self-defence, +which arises from the fact that outside the State there are other +States, each endowed like itself with sovereignty, each of them +maintaining by force its conception of right. The power of the State +over its own subjects is thus in the last resort a consequence of the +existence of other States. Upon the competition between them rests the +order of the world. It is a competition extending to every sphere of +life and in its acute form takes the shape of war, a struggle for +existence, for the mastery or for right. + + + + +IV. + + +ARBITRATION AND DISARMAMENT + +To some people the place of war in the economy of nations appears to be +unsatisfactory. They think war wicked and a world where it exists out of +joint. Accordingly they devote themselves to suggestions for the +abolition of war and for the discovery of some substitute for it. Two +theories are common; the first, that arbitration can in every case be a +substitute for war, the second that the hopes of peace would be +increased by some general agreement for disarmament. + +The idea of those who regard arbitration as a universal substitute for +war appears to be that the relations between States can be put upon a +basis resembling that of the relations between citizens in a settled and +civilised country like our own. In Great Britain we are accustomed to a +variety of means for settling disagreements between persons. There are +the law courts, there are the cases in which recourse is had, with the +sanction of the law courts, to the inquiry and decision of an +arbitrator, and in all our sports we are accustomed to the presence of +an umpire whose duty it is impartially to see that the rules of the +game are observed and immediately to decide all points that might +otherwise be doubtful. + +The work of an umpire who sees that the rules of the game are observed +is based upon the consent of the players of both sides. Without that +consent there could be no game, and the consent will be found to be +based upon the fact that all the players are brought up with similar +traditions and with like views of the nature of the game. Where this +unity does not exist, difficulties constantly arise, as is notoriously +the case in international sports. The attempt has been made, with +constantly increasing success, to mitigate the evils of war by the +creation of institutions in some way analogous to that of the umpire in +a game. The Declaration of London, recently published, is an agreement +between the principal Powers to accept a series of rules concerning +maritime war, to be administered by an International Prize Court. + +The function of an arbitrator, usually to decide questions of fact and +to assess compensation for inconvenience, most commonly the +inconvenience occasioned to a private person by some necessary act of +the State, also rests upon the consent of the parties, though in this +case the consent is usually imposed upon them by the State through some +legislative enactment or through the decision of a court. The action of +a court of law, on the other hand, does not rest upon the consent of the +parties. In a civil action the defendant may be and very often is +unwilling to take any part in the proceedings. But he has no choice, +and, whether he likes it or not, is bound by the decision of the court. +For the court is the State acting in its judicial capacity with a view +to insure that justice shall be done. The plaintiff alleges that the +defendant has done him some wrong either by breach of contract or +otherwise, and the verdict or judgment determines whether or not this is +the case, and, if it is, what compensation is due. The judgment once +given, the whole power of the State will be used to secure its +execution. + +The business of a criminal court is the punishment of offenders whom it +is the function of the State to discover, to bring to trial, and, when +convicted, to punish. The prisoner's consent is not asked, and the +judgment of the court is supported by the whole power of the State. + +In the international sphere there is no parallel to the action either of +a civil or of a criminal court. Civil and criminal jurisdiction are +attributes of sovereignty, and over two independent States there is no +sovereign power. If, therefore, it is desired to institute between two +States a situation analogous to that by which the subjects of a single +Government are amenable to judicial tribunals, the proper way is to +bring the two States under one sovereignty. This can be effected, and is +constantly effected, by one of two methods. Either the two States +federate and form a united State, or one of them conquers and annexes +the other. The former process has been seen in modern times in the +formation of the United States of America: the latter formed the +substance of the history of civilisation during the first three +centuries before Christ, when the Roman State successively conquered, +annexed, and absorbed all the other then existing States surrounding the +basin of the Mediterranean. + +The history of no State justifies the belief that order and justice can +successfully be maintained merely by the action of umpires and of +arbitrators. Every State worth the name has had to rely upon civil and +criminal courts and upon law enforced by its authority, that is, upon a +series of principles of right expressed in legislation and upon an +organisation of force for the purpose of carrying those principles into +practical effect. + +It appears, then, that so far from the experience of States justifying +the view that it is wrong to employ force, the truth is that right or +law, unless supported by force, is ineffective, that the objection in +principle to any use of force involves anarchy, or the cessation of the +State, and that the wish to substitute judicial tribunals for war as a +means of settling disputes between State and State is a wish to +amalgamate under a single Government all those States which are to +benefit by the substitution. + +The reasonable attitude with regard to arbitration is to accept it +whenever the other side will accept it. But if the adversary refuses +arbitration and insists upon using force, what course is open to any +State but that of resisting force by force? + +Arbitration has from the earliest times been preferred in most of those +cases to which it was applicable, that is, in cases in which there was a +basis of common view or common tradition sufficient to make agreement +practicable. But wherever there has been a marked divergence of ideals +or a different standard of right, there has been a tendency for each +side to feel that to submit its conscience or its convictions of right, +its sense of what is most sacred in life, to an outside judgment would +involve a kind of moral suicide. In such cases every nation repudiates +arbitration and prefers to be a martyr, in case of need, to its sense of +justice. It is at least an open question whether the disappearance of +this feeling would be a mark of progress or of degeneration. At any rate +it is practically certain that the period when it will have disappeared +cannot at present be foreseen. + +The abolition of war, therefore, involves the abolition of independent +States and their amalgamation into one. There are many who have hoped +for this ideal, expressed by Tennyson when he dreamed of + +"The Parliament of man, the Federation of the world." + +That it is the ultimate destiny of mankind to be united under a single +Government seems probable enough, but it is rash to assume that that +result will be reached either by a process of peaceful negotiation, or +by the spread of the imperfect methods of modern democratic government. +The German Empire, with its population of sixty millions, educated by +the State, disciplined by the State, relying on the State, and commanded +by the State, is as potent in comparison with the less disciplined and +less organised communities which surround it as was, in the third +century before Christ, the Roman State in comparison with the disunited +multitude of Greek cities, the commercial oligarchy of Carthage, and the +half-civilised tribes of Gaul and Spain. Unless the other States of +Europe can rouse themselves to a discipline as sound and to an +organisation as subtle as those of Prussia and to the perception of a +common purpose in the maintenance of their independence, the union of +Europe under a single Government is more likely to be brought about by +the conquering hand of Germany than by the extension of democratic +institutions and of sentimental good understandings. + +Proposals for disarmament stand on an entirely different footing from +proposals to agree to arbitration. The State that disarms renounces to +the extent of its disarmament the power to protect itself. Upon what +other power is it suggested that it should rely? In the last analysis +the suggestion amounts to a proposal for the abolition of the State, or +its abandonment of its claim to represent the right. Those who propose +agreements for disarmament imagine that the suggestion if adopted would +lead to the establishment of peace. Have they considered the natural +history of peace as one of the phenomena of the globe which we inhabit? +The only peace of any value is that between civilised nations. It rests +either upon the absence of dispute between them or upon an equilibrium +of forces. During the last few centuries there has usually been at the +end of a great European war a great European congress which has +regulated for the time being the matters which were in dispute, and the +treaty thus negotiated has remained for a long time the basis of the +relations between the Powers. It is always a compromise, but a +compromise more or less acceptable to all parties, in which they +acquiesce until some change either by growth or decay makes the +conditions irksome. Then comes a moment when one or more of the States +is dissatisfied and wishes for a change. When that has happened the +dissatisfied State attempts to bring about the change which it desires, +but if the forces with which its wish is likely to be opposed are very +great it may long acquiesce in a state of things most distasteful to it. +Let there be a change in the balance of forces and the discontented +State will seize the opportunity, will assert itself, and if resisted +will use its forces to overcome opposition. A proposal for disarmament +must necessarily be based upon the assumption that there is to be no +change in the system, that the _status quo_ is everywhere to be +preserved. This amounts to a guarantee of the decaying and inefficient +States against those which are growing and are more efficient. Such an +arrangement would not tend to promote the welfare of mankind and will +not be accepted by those nations that have confidence in their own +future. That such a proposal should have been announced by a British +Government is evidence not of the strength of Great Britain, not of a +healthy condition of national life, but of inability to appreciate the +changes which have been produced during the last century in the +conditions of Europe and the consequent alteration in Great Britain's +relative position among the great Powers. It was long ago remarked by +the German historian Bernhardi that Great Britain was the first country +in Europe to revive in the modern world the conception of the State. The +feudal conception identified the State with the monarch. The English +revolution of 1688 was an identification of the State with the Nation. +But the nationalisation of the State, of which the example was set in +1688 by Great Britain, was carried out much more thoroughly by France in +the period that followed the revolution of 1789; and in the great +conflict which ensued between France and the European States the +principal continental opponents of France were compelled to follow her +example, and, in a far greater degree than has ever happened in England, +to nationalise the State. It is to that struggle that we must turn if we +are to understand the present condition of Europe and the relations of +Great Britain to the European Powers. + + + + +V. + + +THE NATIONALISATION OF WAR + +The transformation of society of which the French Revolution was the +most striking symptom produced a corresponding change in the character +of war. + +By the Revolution the French people constituted itself the State, and +the process was accompanied by so much passion and so much violence that +it shortly involved the reconstituted nation in a quarrel with its +neighbours the Germanic Empire and Prussia, which rapidly developed into +a war between France and almost all the rest of Europe. The Revolution +weakened and demoralised the French army and disorganised the navy, +which it deprived of almost all its experienced officers. When the war +began the regular army was supplemented by a great levy of volunteers. +The mixed force thus formed, in spite of early successes, was unable to +stand against the well-disciplined armies of Austria and Prussia, and as +the war continued, while the French troops gained solidity and +experience, their numbers had to be increased by a levy _en masse_ or a +compulsory drafting of all the men of a certain age into the army. In +this way the army and the nation were identified as they had never been +in modern Europe before, and in the fifth year of the war a leader was +found in the person of General Bonaparte, who had imbued himself with +the principles of the art of war, as they had been expounded by the best +strategists of the old French army, and who had thus thought out with +unprecedented lucidity the method of conducting campaigns. His mastery +of the art of generalship was revealed by his success in 1796, and as +the conflict with Europe continued, he became the leader and eventually +the master of France. Under his impulse and guidance the French army, +superior to them in numbers, organisation, and tactical skill, crushed +one after another the more old-fashioned and smaller armies of the great +continental Powers, with the result that the defeated armies, under the +influence of national resentment after disaster, attempted to reorganise +themselves upon the French model. The new Austrian army undertook its +revenge too soon and was defeated in 1809; but the Prussian endeavour +continued and bore fruit, after the French disasters in Russia of 1812, +in the national rising in which Prussia, supported by Russia and Austria +and assisted by the British operations in the Peninsula, overthrew the +French Empire in 1814. + +After the definitive peace, deferred by the hundred days, but finally +forced upon France on the field of Waterloo, the Prussian Government +continued to foster the school of war which it had founded in the period +of humiliation. Prussian officers trained in that school tried to learn +the lessons of the long period of war which they had passed through. +What they discovered was that war between nations, as distinct from war +between dynasties or royal houses, was a struggle for existence in which +each adversary risked everything and in which success was to be expected +only from the complete prostration of the enemy. In the long run, they +said to themselves, the only defence consists in striking your adversary +to the ground. That being the case, a nation must go into war, if war +should become inevitable, with the maximum force which it can possibly +produce, represented by its whole manhood of military age, thoroughly +trained, organised, and equipped. The Prussian Government adhered to +these ideas, to which full effect was given in 1866, when the Prussian +army, reorganised in 1860, crushed in ten days the army of Austria, and +in 1870 when, in a month from the first shot fired, it defeated one half +of the French army at Gravelotte and captured the other half at Sedan. +These events proved to all continental nations the necessity of adopting +the system of the nation in arms and giving to their whole male +population, up to the limits of possibility, the training and the +organisation necessary for success in war. + +The principle that war is a struggle for existence, and that the only +effective defence consists in the destruction of the adversary's force, +received during the age of Napoleon an even more absolute demonstration +at sea than was possible on land. Great Britain, whether she would or +no, was drawn into the European conflict. The neglect of the army and of +the art of war into which, during the eighteenth century, her +Governments had for the most part fallen, made it impracticable for her +to take the decisive part which she had played in the days of William +III. and of Marlborough in the struggle against the French army; her +contributions to the land war were for the most part misdirected and +futile. Her expeditions to Dunkirk, to Holland, and to Hanover +embarrassed rather than materially assisted the cause of her allies. But +her navy, favourably handicapped by the breakdown, due to the +Revolution, of the French navy, eventually produced in the person of +Nelson a leader who, like Napoleon, had made it the business of his life +to understand the art of war. His victories, like Napoleon's, were +decisive, and when he fell at Trafalgar the navies of continental +Europe, which one after another had been pressed into the service of +France, had all been destroyed. + +Then were revealed the prodigious consequences of complete victory at +sea, which were more immediate, more decisive, more far-reaching, more +irrevocable than on land. The sea became during the continuance of the +war the territory of Great Britain, the open highway along which her +ships could pass, while it was closed to the ships of her adversaries. +Across that secure sea a small army was sent to Spain to assist the +national and heroic, though miserably organised, resistance made by the +Spanish people against the French attempt at conquest. The British +Government had at last found the right direction for such military force +as it possessed. Sir John Moore's army brought Napoleon with a great +force into the field, but it was able to retire to its own territory, +the sea. The army under Wellington, handled with splendid judgment, had +to wait long for its opportunity, which came when Napoleon with the +Grand Army had plunged into the vast expanse of Russia. Wellington, +marching from victory to victory, was then able to produce upon the +general course of the war an effect out of all proportion to the +strength of the force which he commanded or of that which directly +opposed him. + +While France was engaged in her great continental struggle England was +reaping, all over the world, the fruits of her naval victories. Of the +colonies of her enemies she took as many as she wanted, though at the +peace she returned most of them to their former owners. Of the world's +trade she obtained something like a monopoly. The nineteenth century saw +the British colonies grow up into so many nations and the British +administration of India become a great empire. These developments are +now seen to have been possible only through the security due to the fact +that Great Britain, during the first half of the nineteenth century, had +the only navy worth considering in the world, and that during the second +half its strength greatly preponderated over that of any of the new +navies which had been built or were building. No wonder that when in +1888 the American observer, Captain Mahan, published his volume "The +Influence of Sea Power upon History," other nations besides the British +read from that book the lesson that victory at sea carried with it a +prosperity, an influence, and a greatness obtainable by no other means. +It was natural for Englishmen to draw the moral which was slumbering in +the national consciousness that England's independence, her empire, and +her greatness depended upon her sea power. But it was equally natural +that other nations should draw a different moral and should ask +themselves why this tremendous prize, the primacy of nations and the +first place in the world, should for ever belong to the inhabitants of +a small island, a mere appendage to the continent of Europe. + +This question we must try to answer. But before entering upon that +inquiry I will ask the reader to note the great lesson of the age of +Napoleon and of Nelson. It produced a change in the character of war, +which enlarged itself from a mere dispute between Governments and became +a struggle between nations. The instrument used was no longer a small +standing army, but the able-bodied male population in arms. Great +Britain indeed still retained her standing army, but for the time she +threw her resources without stint into her navy and its success was +decisive. + + + + +VI. + + +THE BALANCE OF POWER + +We have seen what a splendid prize was the result of British victory at +sea, supplemented by British assistance to other Powers on land, a +century ago. We have now to ask ourselves first of all how it came about +that Great Britain was able to win it, and afterwards whether it was +awarded once for all or was merely a challenge cup to be held only so +long as there should be no competitor. + +The answer to the first question is a matter of history. England was +peculiarly favoured by fortune or by fate in the great struggles through +which, during a period of three hundred years, she asserted and +increased her superiority at sea until a century ago it became +supremacy. She rarely had to fight alone. Her first adversary was Spain. +In the conflict with Spain she had the assistance of the Dutch +Provinces. When the Dutch were strong enough to become her maritime +rivals she had for a time the co-operation of France. Then came a long +period during which France was her antagonist. At the beginning of this +epoch William III. accepted the British crown in order to be able to use +the strength of England to defend his native country, Holland. His work +was taken up by Marlborough, whose first great victory was won in +co-operation with the Imperial commander, Prince Eugene. From that time +on, each of the principal wars was a European war in which France was +fighting both by sea and land, her armies being engaged against +continental foes, while Great Britain could devote her energies almost +exclusively to her navy. In the Seven Years' War it was the Prussian +army which won the victories on land, while small British forces were +enabled by the help of the navy to win an Empire from France in Canada, +and to lay the foundations of the British Empire in India. In the war of +American Independence, Great Britain for once stood alone, but this was +the one conflict which contributed little or nothing towards +establishing the ascendency of the British navy. Great Britain failed of +her object because that ascendency was incomplete. Then came the wars of +the French Revolution and Empire in which the British navy was the +partner of the Austrian, Prussian, Russian, and Spanish armies. + +These are the facts which we have to explain. We have to find out how it +was that so many continental nations, whether they liked it or not, +found themselves, in fighting their own battles, helping to bring about +the British predominance at sea. It must be remembered that land warfare +involves much heavier sacrifices of life than warfare at sea, and that +though Great Britain no doubt spent great sums of money not merely in +maintaining her navy but also in subsidising her allies, she could well +afford to do so because the prosperity of her over-sea trade, due to her +naval success, made her the richest country in Europe. The other nations +that were her allies might not unnaturally feel that they had toiled and +that Great Britain had gathered the increase. What is the explanation of +a co-operation of which in the long run it might seem that one partner +has had the principal benefit? + +If two nations carry on a serious war on the same side, it may be +assumed that each of them is fighting for some cause which it holds to +be vital, and that some sort of common interest binds the allies +together. The most vital interest of any nation is its own independence, +and while that is in question it conceives of its struggle as one of +self-defence. The explanation of Great Britain's having had allies in +the past may therefore be that the independence of Great Britain was +threatened by the same danger which threatened the independence of other +Powers. This theory is made more probable by the fact that England's +great struggles--that of Queen Elizabeth against Spain, that of William +III. and Marlborough against Louis XIV., and of Pitt against +Napoleon--were, each one of them, against an adversary whose power was +so great as to overshadow the Continent and to threaten it with an +ascendency which, had it not been checked, might have developed into a +universal monarchy. It seems, therefore, that in the main England, in +defending her own interests, was consciously or unconsciously the +champion of the independence of nations against the predominance of any +one of their number. The effect of Great Britain's self-defence was to +facilitate the self-defence of other nations, and thus to preserve to +Europe its character of a community of independent States as opposed to +that which it might have acquired, if there had been no England, of a +single Empire, governed from a single capital. + +This is, however, only half of the answer we want. It explains to some +extent why England could find other nations co-operating with her, and +reveals the general nature of the cause which they maintained in common. +But let us remember the distinction between a quarrel in which the main +thing is to be in the right, and a fight in which the main thing is to +win. The explanation just sketched is a justification of England's +policy, an attempt to show that in the main she had right on her side. +That is only part of the reason why she had allies. The other part is +that she was strong and could help them. + +She had three modes of action. She used her navy to destroy the hostile +navy or navies and to obtain control of the seaways. Then she used that +control partly to destroy the seaborne trade of her enemies, and partly +to send armies across the sea to attack her enemies' armies. It was +because she could employ these three modes of warfare, and because two +of them were not available for other Powers, that her influence on the +course of events was so great. + +The question of moral justification is more or less speculative. I have +treated it here on a hypothesis which is not new, though since I +propounded it many years ago it has met with little adverse criticism. +But the question of force is one of hard fact; it is fundamental. If +England had not been able to win her battles at sea and to help her +allies by her war against trade and by her ubiquitous if small armies, +there would have been no need for hypotheses by which to justify or +explain her policy; she would have long ago lost all importance and all +interest except to antiquarians. Our object is to find out how she may +now justify her existence, and enough has been said to make it clear +that if she is to do that she must not only have a cause good enough to +gain the sympathy of other Powers, but force enough to give them +confidence in what she can do to help herself and them. + +We are now ready to examine the second question, whether or no Great +Britain's position, won a century ago, is liable to challenge. + + + + +VII. + + +THE RISE OF GERMANY + +The great event of the nineteenth century in the history of Europe is +the union of Germany into a Federal State. The secret of Prussia's +success in accomplishing that union and in leading the federation so +created, has been the organisation of the national energies by a +far-seeing Government, a process begun as a means of self-defence +against the French domination of the period between 1806 and 1812. The +Prussian statesmen of those days were not content merely to reorganise +the army on the basis of universal service. They organised the whole +nation. They swept away an ancient system of land tenure in order to +make the peasants free and prosperous. They established a system of +public education far in advance of anything possessed by any other +nation. They especially devoted themselves to fostering industry, +manufacture, and commerce. The result of this systematic direction of +the national energies by a Government of experts, continuously supported +by the patient and methodical diligence of the people, has been a +constant and remarkable advance of the national prosperity, a wonderful +development of the national resources, and an enormous addition to the +national strength. For the last forty years it has been the settled +policy of the German Government that her organised military forces +should be strong enough in case of need to confront two enemies at once, +one on either frontier. Feeling themselves thus stronger than any other +European state, the Germans have watched with admiration the growth of +the British Colonies and of British trade. It is natural that they +should think that Germany too might expect to have colonies and a great +maritime trade. But wherever in the world German travellers have gone, +wherever German traders have settled, wherever the German Government has +thought of working for a site for a colony, everywhere they have met +British influence, British trade, the British flag. + +In this way has been brought home to them as to no other people the +tremendous influence of sea-power. Their historians have recalled to +them the successive attempts which have been made in past times by +German States to create a navy and to obtain colonies, attempts which to +our own people are quite unknown, because they never, except in the case +of the Hanseatic League, attained to such importance as to figure in the +general history of Europe. In the period between 1815 and 1870, when +the desire for national unity was expressed by a host of German writers, +there were not wanting pleas for the creation of a German navy. Several +attempts were made in those days to construct either a Prussian or a +German fleet; but the time was not ripe and these attempts came to +nothing. The constitution of the Empire, promulgated in 1871, embodied +the principle that there should be a German navy, of which the Emperor +should be commander-in-chief, and to the creation of that navy the most +assiduous labour has been devoted. The plan pursued was in the first +instance to train a body of officers who should thoroughly understand +the sea and maritime warfare, and for this purpose the few ships which +were first built were sent on long voyages by way of training the crews +and of giving the officers that self-reliance and initiative which were +thought to be the characteristic mark of the officers of the British +navy. In due time was founded the naval college of Kiel, designed on a +large scale to be a great school of naval thought and of naval war. The +history of maritime wars was diligently studied, _especially_ of +course the history of the British navy. The professors and lecturers +made it their business to explore the workings of Nelson's mind just as +German military professors had made themselves pupils of Napoleon. And +not until a clear and consistent theory of naval war had been elaborated +and made the common property of all the officers of the navy was the +attempt made to expand the fleet to a scale thought to be proportionate +to the position of Germany among the nations. When it was at length +determined that that constructive effort should be made, the plan was +thought out and embodied in a law regulating the construction for a +number of years of a fleet of predetermined size and composition to be +used for a purpose defined in the law itself. The object was to have a +fleet of sufficient strength and of suitable formation to be able to +hold its own in case of need even against the greatest maritime Power. +In other words, Germany thought that if her prosperity continued and her +superiority in organisation over other continental nations continued to +increase, she might find England's policy backed by England's naval +power an obstacle in the way of her natural ambition. After all, no one +can be surprised if the Germans think Germany as well entitled as _any +other_ State to cherish the ambition of being the first nation in the +world. + +It has for a century been the rational practice of the German Government +that its chief strategist should at all times keep ready designs for +operations in case of war against any reasonably possible adversary. +Such a set of designs would naturally include a plan of operation for +the case of a conflict with Great Britain, and no doubt, every time +that plan of operations was re-examined and revised, light would be +thrown upon the difficulties of a struggle with a great maritime Power +and upon the means by which those difficulties might be overcome. The +British navy is so strong that, unless it were mismanaged, the German +navy ought to have no chance of overcoming it. Yet Germany cannot but be +anxious, in case of war, to protect herself against the consequences of +maritime blockade, and of the effort of a superior British navy to close +the sea to German merchantmen. Accordingly, the law which regulates the +naval shipbuilding of the German Empire lays down in its preamble +that--"Germany must possess a battle-fleet so strong that a war with her +would, even for the greatest naval Power, be accompanied with such +dangers as would render that Power's position doubtful." In other words, +a war with Great Britain must find the German navy too strong for the +British navy to be able to confine it to its harbours, and to maintain, +in spite of it, complete command of the seas which border the German +coast. As German strategists continuously accept the doctrine that the +first object of a fleet in war is the destruction of the enemy's fleet +with a view to the consequent command of the sea, the German Navy Act is +equivalent to the declaration of an intention in case of conflict to +challenge the British navy for the mastery. This is the answer to the +question asked at the beginning of the last chapter, whether the command +of the sea is a permanent prize or a challenge cup. Germany at any rate +regards it as a challenge cup, and has resolved to be qualified, if +occasion should arise, to make trial of her capacity to win it. + + + + +VIII. + + +NATIONHOOD NEGLECTED + +What has been the effect upon Great Britain of the rise of Germany? Is +there any cause of quarrel between the two peoples and the two States? +That Germany has given herself a strong military organisation is no +crime. On the contrary, she was obliged to do it, she could not have +existed without it. The foundations of her army were laid when she was +suffering all the agonies of conquest and oppression. Only by a +tremendous effort, at the cost of sacrifices to which England's +experience offers no analogy, was she able to free herself from the +over-lordship of Napoleon. King William I. expanded and reorganised his +army because he had passed through the bitter humiliation of seeing his +country impotent and humbled by a combination of Austria and Russia. +Whether Bismarck's diplomacy was less honourable than that of the +adversaries with whom he had to deal is a question to which different +answers may be given. But in a large view of history it is irrelevant, +for beyond all doubt the settlements effected through the war of 1866 +and 1870 were sound settlements and left the German nation and Europe +in a healthier condition than that which preceded them. The unity of +Germany was won by the blood of her people, who were and are rightly +resolved to remain strong enough and ready to defend it, come what may. +It is not for Englishmen, who have talked for twenty years of a +Two-Power standard for their navy, to reproach Germany for maintaining +her army at a similar standard. Had she not done so the peace of Europe +would not have been preserved, nor is it possible on any ground of right +or justice to cavil at Germany's purpose to be able in case of need to +defend herself at sea. The German Admiral Rosendahl, discussing the +British and German navies and the proposals for disarmament, wrote in +the _Deutsche Revue_ for June 1909:-- + +"If England claims and thinks permanently necessary for her an absolute +supremacy at sea that is her affair, and no sensible man will reproach +her for it; but it is quite a different thing for a Great Power like the +German Empire, by an international treaty supposed to be binding for all +time, expressly to recognise and accept this in principle. Assuredly we +do not wish to enter into a building competition with England on a +footing of equality.... But a political agreement on the basis of the +unconditional superiority of the British Fleet would be equivalent to +an abandonment of our national dignity, and though we do not, speaking +broadly, wish to dispute England's predominance at sea, yet we do mean +in case of war to be or to become the masters on our own coasts." + +There is not a word in this passage which can give just cause of offence +to England or to Englishmen. + +That there has been and still is a good deal of mutual ill-feeling both +in Germany and in England cannot be denied. Rivalry between nations is +always accompanied by feeling which is all the stronger when it is +instinctive and therefore, though not unintelligible, apt to be +irrational. But what in this case is really at the bottom of it? There +have no doubt been a number of matters that have been discussed between +the two Governments, and though they have for the most part been +settled, the manner in which they have been raised and pressed by German +Governments has caused them to be regarded by British Ministers, and to +a less extent by the British people, as sources of annoyance, as so many +diplomatic "pin-pricks." The manners of German diplomacy are not suave. +Suavity is no more part of the Bismarckian tradition than exactitude. +But after all, the manners of the diplomatists of any country are a +matter rather for the nation whose honour they concern than for the +nations to which they have given offence. They only partially account +for the deep feeling which has grown up between Great Britain and +Germany. + +The truth is that England is disturbed by the rise of Germany, which her +people, in spite of abundant warnings, did not foresee and have not +appreciated until the moment when they find themselves outstripped in +the race by a people whom they have been accustomed to regard with +something of the superiority with which the prosperous and polished +dweller in a capital looks upon his country cousin from the farm. + +Fifty years ago Germany in English estimation did not count. The name +was no more than a geographical expression. Great Britain was the one +great Power. She alone had colonies and India. She as good as +monopolised the world's shipping and the world's trade. As compared with +other countries she was immeasurably rich and prosperous. Her population +during the long peace, interrupted only by the Crimean War and the +Indian Mutiny, had multiplied beyond men's wildest dreams. Her +manufacturers were amassing fortunes, her industry had no rival. The +Victorian age was thought of as the beginning of a wonderful new era, in +which, among the nations, England was first and the rest nowhere. The +temporary effort of the French to create a modern navy disturbed the +sense of security which existed and gave rise to the Volunteer movement, +which was felt to be a marvellous display of patriotism. + +There were attempts to show that British self-complacency was not +altogether justified. The warnings of those who looked below the surface +were read and admired. Few writers were more popular than Carlyle, +Ruskin, and Matthew Arnold. But all three held aloof from the current of +public life which flowed in the traditional party channels. There was no +effort to revive the conception of the nation as the organised state to +which every citizen is bound, the source and centre of all men's duties. +Accordingly every man devoted himself to his own affairs, of which the +first was to make money and the second to enjoy life; those who were +rich enough finding their amusement in Parliament, which was regarded as +the most interesting club in London, and in its debates, of which the +charm, for those who take part in them, lies in the fact that for +success not knowledge of a subject, but fluency, readiness, and wit are +required. + +The great events taking place in the world, the wars in Bohemia, in +France, and in Turkey, added a certain, interest to English life because +they furnished to the newspapers matter more exciting than any novelist +could produce, and in this way gratified the taste for sensation which +had been acquired both by rich and poor. That these events meant +anything in particular to the British nation was not likely to be +realised while that nation was, in fact, non-existent, and had resolved +itself into forty million individuals, each of them living for his own +ends, slightly enlarged to include his family, his literary or +scientific society, perhaps his cricket club, and on Sunday morning his +church or chapel. There was also a widespread interest in "politics," by +which was meant the particular fads cherished by one's own caucus to the +exclusion of the nation's affairs, it being more or less understood that +the army, the navy, and foreign policy were not to be made political +questions. + +While forty million English people have thus been spending their lives +self-centred, content to make their living, to enjoy life, and to behave +kindly to their fellows, there has grown up in Germany a nation, a +people of sixty millions, who believe that they belong together, that +their country has the first call on them, whose children go to school +because the Government that represents the nation bids them, who go for +two years to the army or the navy to learn war, because they know that +if the nation has to fight it can do so only by their fighting for it. +Their Government thinks it is its business to be always improving the +organisation of its sixty millions for security, for knowledge, for +instruction, for agriculture, for industry, for navigation. Thus after +forty years of common effort for a common good Germany finds itself the +first nation in Europe, more than holding its own in every department of +life, and eagerly surveying the world in search of opportunities. + +The Englishman, while he has been living his own life and, as I think, +improving in many respects, has at the same time been admiring the +British Empire, and discovering with pride that a number of new nations +have grown up in distant places, formed of people whose fathers or +grandfathers emigrated from Great Britain. He remembers from his school +lessons or reads in the newspapers of the greatness of England in past +centuries, and naturally feels that with such a past and with so great +an Empire existing to-day, his country should be a very great Power. But +as he discovers what the actual performance of Germany is, and becomes +acquainted with the results of her efforts in science, education, trade, +and industry, and the way in which the influence of the German +Government predominates in the affairs of Europe, he is puzzled and +indignant, and feels that in some way Great Britain has been surpassed +and outdone. + +The state of the world which he thought existed, in which England was +the first nation and the rest nowhere, has completely changed while he +has been attending to his private business, his "politics," and his +cricket, and he finds the true state of the world to be that, while in +industry England has hard work to hold her own against her chief rival, +she has already been passed in education and in science, that her army, +good as it is, is so small as scarcely to count, and that even her navy +cannot keep its place without a great and unexpected effort. + +Yet fifty years ago England had on her side all the advantages but one. +She was forgetting nationhood while Germany was reviving it. The British +people, instead of organising themselves as one body, the nation, have +organised themselves into two bodies, the two "political" parties. +England's one chance lies in recovering the unity that has been lost, +which she must do by restoring the nation to its due place in men's +hearts and lives. To find out how that is to be done we must once more +look at Europe and at England's relations to Europe. + + + + +IX. + + +NEW CONDITIONS + +It has been seen how, as a result of the struggle with Napoleon, +England, from 1805 onwards, was the only sea power remaining in Europe, +and indeed, with the exception of the United States, the only sea power +in the world. One of the results was that she had for many years the +monopoly of the whole ocean, not merely for the purposes of war, but +also for the purposes of trade. The British mercantile marine continued +through the greater part of the nineteenth century to increase its +preponderance over all others, and this remarkable, and probably quite +exceptional, growth was greatly favoured by the Civil War in America, +during which the mercantile marine of the United States received from +the action of the Confederate cruisers a damage from which it has never +recovered. + +In the years immediately following 1805, Great Britain in self-defence, +or as a means of continuing the war against France, in regard to which +her resources for operations on land were limited, had recourse to the +operations of blockade, by which the sea was closed, as far as possible, +to enemy merchantmen while Great Britain prohibited neutral ships from +carrying enemy goods. Napoleon replied by the attempt to exclude British +goods from the Continent altogether, and indeed the pressure produced by +Great Britain's blockades compelled Napoleon further to extend his +domination on the Continent. Thus the other continental States found +themselves between the devil and the deep sea. They had to submit to the +domination of Napoleon on land and to the complete ascendency of Great +Britain on the waters which surrounded their coasts. The British claims +to supremacy at sea were unanimously resented by all the continental +States, which all suffered from them, but in all cases the national +resentment against French invasion or French occupation of territory was +greater than the resentment against the invisible pressure exercised by +the British navy. In the wars of liberation, though Great Britain was +the welcome ally of all the States that were fighting against France, +the pressure of British sea power was none the less disagreeable and, in +the years of peace which followed, the British monopoly of sea power, of +sea-carriage, of manufacturing industry, and of international trade were +equally disliked by almost all the nations of Europe. Protective duties +were regarded as the means of fostering national industries and of +sheltering them against the overpowering competition of British +manufactures. The British claim to the dominion of the sea was regarded +as unfounded in right, and was in principle as strongly denounced as had +been the territorial domination of France. The mistress of the seas was +regarded as a tyrant, whom it would be desirable, if it were possible, +to depose, and there were many who thought that as the result of a +conflict in which the final success had been gained by the co-operation +of a number of States acting together, the gains of Great Britain which, +as time went on, were seen to be growing into a world-wide empire, had +been out of proportion to the services she had rendered to the common +cause. + +Meantime during the century which has elapsed since the last great war, +there has been a complete change in the conditions of intercourse +between nations at sea and of maritime warfare. It has come about +gradually, almost imperceptibly, so that it could hardly be appreciated +before the close of the nineteenth century. But it is vital to Great +Britain that her people should understand the nature of the +transformation. + +The first thing to be observed is that the British monopoly of shipping +and of oversea trade has disappeared. Great Britain still has by far the +largest mercantile marine and by far the greatest share in the world's +sea traffic, but she no longer stands alone. Germany, the United States, +France, Norway, Italy, and Japan all have great fleets of merchant +ships and do an enormous, some of them a rapidly increasing, seaborne +trade. A large number of the principal States import the raw material of +manufacture and carry on import and export on a large scale. The railway +system connects all the great manufacturing centres, even those which +lie far inland, with the great ports to and from which the lines of +steamers ply. The industrial life of every nation is more than ever +dependent upon its communications with and by the sea, and every nation +has become more sensitive than ever to any disturbance of its maritime +trade. The preponderance of the British navy is therefore a subject of +anxiety in every State which regards as possible a conflict of its own +interests with those of Great Britain. This is one of the reasons why +continental States have during the last quarter of a century been +disposed to increase their fleets and their naval expenditure. + +In the Declaration of Paris, renewed and extended by the Declaration of +London, the maritime States have agreed that in any future war enemy +goods in a neutral ship are to be safe from capture unless the ship is +running a blockade, which must be effective. Whether Great Britain was +well or ill advised in accepting this rule is a question which it is now +useless to discuss, for the decision cannot be recalled, and the rule +must be regarded as established beyond controversy. Its effect is +greatly to diminish the pressure which a victorious navy can bring to +bear upon a hostile State. It deprives Great Britain of one of the most +potent weapons which she employed in the last great war. To-day it would +be impracticable even for a victorious navy to cut off a continental +State from seaborne traffic. The ports of that State might be blockaded +and its merchant ships would be liable to capture, but the victorious +navy could not interfere with the traffic carried by neutral ships to +neutral ports. Accordingly, Great Britain could not now, even in the +event of naval victory being hers, exercise upon an enemy the pressure +which she formerly exercised through the medium of the neutral States. +Any continental State, even if its coasts were effectively blockaded, +could still, with increased difficulty, obtain supplies both of raw +material and of food by the land routes through the territory of its +neutral neighbours. But Great Britain herself, as an insular State, +would not, in case of naval defeat, have this advantage. A decisive +defeat of the British navy might be followed by an attempt on the part +of the enemy to blockade the coasts of Great Britain, though that would +no doubt be difficult, for a very large force would be required to +maintain an effective blockade of the whole coast-line. + +It is conceivable that an enemy might attempt in spite of the +Declaration of London to treat as contraband food destined for the +civil population and this course ought to be anticipated, but in the +military weakness of Great Britain an enemy whose navy had gained the +upper hand would almost certainly prefer to undertake the speedier +process of bringing the war to an end by landing an army in Great +Britain. A landing on a coast so extensive as that of this island can +with difficulty be prevented by forces on land, because troops cannot be +moved as quickly as ships. + +The war in the Far East has shown how strong such an army might be, and +how great a military effort would be needed to crush it. The proper way +to render an island secure, is by a navy strong enough to obtain in war +the control of the surrounding sea, and a navy unable to perform that +function cannot be regarded as a guarantee of security. + +The immediate effects of naval victory can hardly ever again be so +far-reaching as they were a century ago in the epoch of masts and sails. +At that time there were no foreign navies, except in European waters, +and in the Atlantic waters of the United States. When, therefore, the +British navy had crushed its European adversaries, its ships could act +without serious opposition upon any sea and any coast in the world. +To-day, the radius of action of a victorious fleet is restricted by the +necessity of a supply of coal, and therefore by the secure possession +of coaling-stations at suitable intervals along any route by which the +fleet proposes to move, or by the goodwill of neutrals in permitting it +to coal at their depots. To-day, moreover, there are navies established +even in distant seas. In the Pacific, for example, are the fleets of +Japan and of the United States, and these, in their home waters, will +probably be too strong to be opposed by European navies acting at a vast +distance from their bases. + +It seems likely, therefore, that neither Great Britain nor any other +State will in future enjoy that monopoly of sea power which was granted +to Great Britain by the circumstances of her victories in the last great +war. What I have called the great prize has in fact ceased to exist, and +even if an adversary were to challenge the British navy, the reward of +his success would not be a naval supremacy of anything like the kind or +extent which peculiar conditions made it possible for Great Britain to +enjoy during the nineteenth century. It would be a supremacy limited and +reduced by the existence of the new navies that have sprung up. + +From these considerations a very important conclusion must be drawn. In +the first place, enough victory at sea is in case of war as +indispensable to Great Britain as ever, for it remains the fundamental +condition of her security, yet its results can hardly in future be as +great as they were in the past, and in particular it may perhaps not +again enable her to exert upon continental States the same effective +pressure which it formerly rendered possible. + +In order, therefore, to bring pressure upon a continental adversary, +Great Britain is more than ever in need of the co-operation of a +continental ally. A navy alone cannot produce the effect which it once +did upon the course of a land war, and its success will not suffice to +give confidence to the ally. Nothing but an army able to take its part +in a continental struggle will, in modern conditions, suffice to make +Great Britain the effective ally of a continental State, and in the +absence of such an army Great Britain will continue to be, as she is +to-day, without continental allies. + +A second conclusion is that our people, while straining every nerve in +peace to ensure to their navy the best chances of victory in war, must +carefully avoid the conception of a dominion of the sea, although, in +fact, such a dominion actually existed during a great part of the +nineteenth century. The new conditions which have grown up during the +past thirty years have made this ideal as much a thing of the past as +the mediæval conception of a Roman Empire in Europe to whose titular +head all kings were subordinate. + + + + +X. + + +DYNAMICS--THE QUESTION OF MIGHT + +If there is a chance of a conflict in which Great Britain is to be +engaged, her people must take thought in time how they may have on their +side both right and might. It is hard to see how otherwise they can +expect the contest to be decided in their favour. + +As I have said before, in the quarrel you must be in the right and in +the fight you must win. The quarrel is the domain of policy, the fight +that of strategy or dynamics. Policy and strategy are in reality +inextricably interwoven one with another, for right and might resemble, +more than is commonly supposed, two aspects of the same thing. But it is +convenient in the attempt to understand any complicated subject to +examine its aspects separately. + +I propose, therefore, in considering the present situation of Great +Britain and her relations to the rest of the world, to treat first of +the question of force, to assume that a quarrel may arise, and to +ascertain what are the conditions in which Great Britain can expect to +win, and then to enter into the question of right, in order to find out +what light can be thrown upon the necessary aims and methods of British +policy by the conclusions which will have been reached as to the use of +force. + +The nationalisation of States, which is the fundamental fact of modern +history, affects both policy and strategy. If the State is a nation, the +population associated as one body, then the force which it can use in +case of conflict represents the sum of the energies of the whole +population, and this force cannot and will not be used except as the +expression of the will of the whole population. The policy of such a +State means its collective will, the consciousness of its whole +population of a purpose, mission, or duty which it must fulfil, with +which it is identified, and which, therefore, it cannot abandon. Only in +case this national purpose meets with resistance will a people organised +as a State enter into a quarrel, and if such a quarrel has to be fought +out the nation's resources will be expended upon it without limitation. + +The chief fact in regard to the present condition of Europe appears to +be the very great excess in the military strength of Germany over that +of any other Power. It is due in part to the large population of the +German Empire, and in part to the splendid national organisation which +has been given to it. It cannot be asserted either that Germany was not +entitled to become united, or that she was not entitled to organise +herself as efficiently as possible both for peace and for war. But the +result is that Germany has a preponderance as great if not greater than +that of Spain in the time of Philip II., or of France either under Louis +XIV. or under Napoleon. Every nation, no doubt, has a right to make +itself as strong as it can, and to exercise as much influence as it can +on the affairs of the world. To do these things is the mission and +business of a nation. But the question arises, what are the limits to +the power of a single nation? The answer appears to be that the only +limits are those set by the power of other nations. This is the theory +of the balance of power of which the object is to preserve to Europe its +character of a community of independent States rather than that of a +single empire in which one State predominates. + +Without attributing to Germany any wrong purpose or any design of +injustice it must be evident that her very great strength must give her +in case of dispute, always possible between independent States, a +corresponding advantage against any other Power whose views or whose +intentions should not coincide with hers. It is the obvious possibility +of such dispute that makes it incumbent upon Great Britain to prepare +herself in case of disagreement to enter into a discussion with Germany +upon equal terms. + +Only upon such preparation can Great Britain base the hope either of +averting a quarrel with Germany, or in case a quarrel should arise and +cannot be made up by mutual agreement, of settling it by the arbitrament +of war upon terms accordant with the British conception of right. Great +Britain therefore must give herself a national organisation for war and +must make preparation for war the nation's first business until a +reasonable security has been attained. + +The question is, what weapons are now available for Great Britain in +case of a disagreement with Germany leading to conflict? In the old +wars, as we have seen, she had three modes of action. She used her navy +to obtain control of the sea-ways, and then she used that control partly +to destroy the sea-borne trade of her enemies, and partly to send armies +across the sea to attack her enemies' armies. By the combination of +these three modes of operation she was strong enough to give valuable +help to other Powers, and therefore she had allies whose assistance was +as useful to her as hers to them. To-day, as we have seen, the same +conditions no longer exist. The British navy may indeed hope to obtain +control of the sea-ways, but the law of maritime war, as it has been +settled by the Declarations of Paris and of London, makes it +impracticable for Great Britain to use a naval victory, even if she wins +it, in such a way as to be able commercially to throttle a hostile +Power, while the British military forces available for employment on the +Continent are so small as hardly to count in the balance. The result is +that Great Britain's power of action against a possible enemy is greatly +reduced, partly in consequence of changes in the laws of war, but +perhaps still more in consequence of the fact that while other Powers +are organised for war as nations, England in regard to war is still in +the condition of the eighteenth century, relying upon a small standing +army, a purely professional navy, and a large half-trained force, called +Territorial, neither ready for war nor available outside the United +Kingdom. + +There is a school of politicians who imagine that Great Britain's +weakness can be supplemented from other parts of the British Empire. +That is an idea which ought not to be received without the most careful +examination and in my judgment must, except within narrow limits, be +rejected. + +In a war between Great Britain and a continental State or combination +the assistance which Great Britain could possibly receive from the +King's dominions beyond the sea is necessarily limited. Such a war must +in the first place be a naval contest, towards which the most that the +colonies can contribute consists in such additions to Great Britain's +naval strength as they may have given during the preceding period of +peace. What taken together they may do in this way would no doubt make +an appreciable difference in the balance of forces between the two +contending navies; but in the actual struggle the colonies would be +little more than spectators, except in so far as their ports would offer +a certain number of secure bases for the cruisers upon which Great +Britain must rely for the protection of her sea-borne trade. Even if all +the colonies possessed first-rate armies, the help which those armies +could give would not be equal to that obtainable from a single European +ally. For a war against a European adversary Great Britain must rely +upon her own resources, and upon such assistance as she might obtain if +it were felt by other Powers on the Continent not only that the cause in +which she was fighting was vital to them and therefore called for their +co-operation, but also that in the struggle Great Britain's assistance +would be likely to turn the scale in their favour. + +Can we expect that history will repeat itself, and that once more in +case of conflict Great Britain will have the assistance of continental +allies? That depends chiefly on their faith in her power to help them. +One condition of such an alliance undoubtedly exists--the desire of +other nations for it. The predominance of Germany on the Continent +rests like a nightmare upon more than one of the other States. It is +increased by the alliance of Austria, another great military empire--an +empire, moreover, not without a fine naval tradition, and, as is proved +by the recent announcement of the intention of the Austrian Government +to build four "Dreadnoughts," resolved to revive that tradition. + +Against the combination of Germany and Austria, Russia, which has hardly +begun to recover from the prostration of her defeat by Japan, is +helpless; while France, with a population much smaller than that of +Germany, can hardly look forward to a renewal single-handed of the +struggle which ended for her so disastrously forty years ago. The +position of Italy is more doubtful, for the sympathies of her people are +not attracted by Austria; they look with anxiety upon the Austrian +policy of expansion towards the Aegean and along the shore of the +Adriatic. The estrangement from France which followed upon the French +occupation of Tunis appears to have passed away, and it seems possible +that if there were a chance of success Italy might be glad to emancipate +herself from German and Austrian influence. But even if Germany's policy +were such that Russia, France, and Italy were each and all of them +desirous to oppose it, and to assert a will and a policy of their own +distinct from that of the German Government, it is very doubtful whether +their strength is sufficient to justify them in an armed conflict, +especially as their hypothetical adversaries have a central position +with all its advantages. From a military point of view the strength of +the central position consists in the power which it gives to its holder +to keep one opponent in check with a part of his forces while he throws +the bulk of them into a decisive blow against another. + +This is the situation of to-day on the Continent of Europe. It cannot be +changed unless there is thrown into the scale of the possible opponents +of German policy a weight or a force that would restore the equality of +the two parties. The British navy, however perfect it may be assumed to +be, does not in itself constitute such a force. Nor could the British +army on its present footing restore the balance. A small standing army +able to give its allies assistance, officially estimated at a strength +of 160,000 men, will not suffice to turn the scale in a conflict in +which the troops available for each of the great Powers are counted no +longer by the hundred thousand but by the million. But if Great Britain +were so organised that she could utilise for the purpose of war the +whole of her national resources, if she had in addition to the navy +indispensable for her security an army equal in efficiency to the best +that can be found in Europe and in numbers to that maintained by Italy, +which though the fifth Power on the Continent is most nearly her equal +in territory and population, the equilibrium could be restored, and +either the peace of Europe would be maintained, or in case of fresh +conflict there would be a reasonable prospect of the recurrence of what +has happened in the past, the maintenance, against a threatened +domination, of the independence of the European States. + +The position here set forth is grave enough to demand the close +attention of the British nation, for it means that England might at any +time be called upon to enter into a contest, likely enough to take the +form of a struggle for existence, against the greatest military empire +in the world, supported by another military empire which is itself in +the front rank of great Powers, while the other European States would be +looking on comparatively helpless. + +But this is by no means a full statement of the case. The other Powers +might not find it possible to maintain an attitude of neutrality. It is +much more probable that they would have to choose between one side and +the other; and that if they do not consider Great Britain strong enough +to help them they may find it their interest, and indeed may be +compelled, to take the side of Great Britain's adversaries. In that case +Great Britain would have to carry on a struggle for existence against +the combined forces of the Continent. + +That even in this extreme form the contest would be hopeless, I for one +am unwilling to admit. If Great Britain were organised for war and able +to throw her whole energies into it, she might be so strong that her +overthrow even by united Europe would by no means be a foregone +conclusion. But the determined preparation which would make her ready +for the extreme contingency is the best and perhaps the only means of +preventing its occurrence. + + + + +XI. + + +POLICY--THE QUESTION OF RIGHT + +I have now given reasons for my belief that in case of conflict Great +Britain, owing to her lack of organisation for war, would be in a +position of some peril. She has not created for herself the means of +making good by force a cause with which she may be identified but which +may be disputed, and her weakness renders it improbable that she would +have allies. There remains the second question whether, in the absence +of might, she would at least have right on her side. That depends upon +the nature of the quarrel. A good cause ought to unite her own people, +and only in behalf of a good cause could she expect other nations to be +on her side. From this point of view must be considered the relations +between Great Britain and Germany, and in the first place the aims of +German policy. + +A nation of which the army consists of four million able-bodied citizens +does not go to war lightly. The German ideal, since the foundation of +the Empire, has been rather that held up for Great Britain by Lord +Rosebery in the words: + +"Peace secured, not by humiliation, but by preponderance." + +The first object after the defeat of France in 1870 was security, and +this was sought not merely by strengthening the army and improving its +training but also by obtaining the alliance of neighbouring Powers. In +the first period the attempt was made to keep on good terms, not only +with Austria, but with Russia. When in 1876 disturbances began in the +Balkan Peninsula, Germany, while giving Austria her support, exerted +herself to prevent a breach between Austria and Russia, and after the +Russo-Turkish war acted as mediator between Russia on one side and +Austria and Great Britain on the other, so that without a fresh war the +European treaty of Berlin was substituted for the Russo-Turkish Treaty +of San Stefano. + +After 1878 Russia became estranged from Germany, whereupon Germany, in +1879, made a defensive alliance with Austria, to which at a later date +Italy became a party. This triple alliance served for a quarter of a +century to maintain the peace against the danger of a Franco-Russian +combination until the defeat of Russia in Manchuria and consequent +collapse of Russia's military power removed that danger. + +Shortly before this event the British agreement with the French +Government had been negotiated by Lord Lansdowne. The French were very +anxious to bring Morocco into the sphere of French influence, and to +this the British Government saw no objection, but in the preamble to the +agreement, as well as in its text, by way of declaration that Great +Britain had no objection to this portion of the policy of France, words +were used which might seem to imply that Great Britain had some special +rights in regard to Morocco. + +The second article of the Declaration of April 8, 1904, contains the +following clause: + +"The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no +intention of altering the political status of Morocco. His Britannic +Majesty's Government, for their part, recognise that it appertains to +France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous +for a great distance with Morocco, to preserve order in that country, +and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, +economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require." + +This clause seems to be open to the interpretation that Great Britain +assumes a right to determine what nation of Europe is best entitled to +exercise a protectorate over Morocco. That would involve some British +superiority over other Powers, or at any rate that Great Britain had a +special right over Morocco, a sort of suzerainty of which she could +dispose at will. Germany disliked both this claim and the idea that +France was to obtain special influence in Morocco. She was herself +anxious for oversea possessions and spheres of influence, and appears to +have thought that if Morocco was to become a European protectorate she +ought to have a voice in any settlement. The terms in which the English +consent to the French design was expressed were construed by the +German's as involving, on the part of Great Britain, just that kind of +supremacy in regard to oversea affairs which they had for so many years +been learning to dislike. At any rate, when the moment convenient to her +came, Germany put her veto upon the arrangements which had been made and +required that they should be submitted to a European Conference. France +was not prepared to renew the struggle for existence over Morocco, while +Germany appeared not unwilling to assert her will even by force. +Accordingly Germany had her way. + +The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary again +afforded an opportunity for the exercise of Germany's preponderance. In +1878 the Treaty of Berlin had authorised Austria-Hungary to occupy and +administer the two provinces without limitation of time, and Bosnia and +Herzegovina have since then practically been Austrian provinces, for the +male population has been subject to compulsory service in the Austrian +army and the soldiers have taken the oath of allegiance to the Emperor. +It is not clear that any of the great Powers had other than a formal +objection to the annexation, the objection, namely, that it was not +consistent with the letter of the Treaty of Berlin. The British +Government pointed out that, by international agreement to which +Austria-Hungary is a party, a European Treaty is not to be modified +without the consent of all the signatory Powers, and that this consent +had not been asked by Austria-Hungary. The British view was endorsed +both by France and Russia, and these three Powers were in favour of a +European Conference for the purpose of revising the clause of the Treaty +of Berlin, and apparently also of giving some concessions to Servia and +Montenegro, the two small States which, for reasons altogether +disconnected with the formal aspect of the case, resented the +annexation. Neither of the Western Powers had any such interest in the +matter as to make it in the least probable that they would in any case +be prepared to support their view by force, while Austria, by mobilising +her army, showed that she was ready to do so, and there was no doubt +that she was assured, in case of need, of Germany's support. The Russian +Minister of Foreign Affairs publicly explained to his countrymen that +Russia was not in a condition to carry on a war. Accordingly in the +moment of crisis the Russian Government withdrew its opposition to +Austro-Hungarian policy, and thus once more was revealed the effect upon +a political decision of the military strength, readiness, and +determination of the two central Powers. + +A good deal of feeling was aroused, at any rate in Great Britain, by the +disclosure in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the +earlier case of Morocco, of Germany's policy, and in the later +negotiation of her determination to support Austria-Hungary by force. +Yet he would be a rash man who, on now looking back, would assert that +in either case a British Government would have been justified in armed +opposition to Germany's policy. + +The bearing of Germany and Austria-Hungary in these negotiations, ending +as they did at the time when the debate on the Navy Estimates disclosed +to the British public the serious nature of the competition in naval +shipbuilding between Germany and Great Britain, was to a large class in +this country a startling revelation of the too easily forgotten fact +that a nation does not get its way by asking for it, but by being able +and ready to assert its will by force of arms in case of need. There is +no reason to believe that the German Government has any intention to +enter into a war except for the maintenance of rights or interests held +to be vital for Germany, but it is always possible that Germany may hold +vital some right or interest which another nation may be not quite ready +to admit. In that case it behoves the other nation very carefully to +scrutinise the German claims and its own way of regarding them, and to +be quite sure, before entering into a dispute, that its own views are +right and Germany's views wrong, as well as that it has the means, in +case of conflict, of carrying on with success a war against the German +Empire. + +If then England is to enter into a quarrel with Germany or any other +State, let her people take care that it arises from no obscure issue +about which they may disagree among themselves, but from some palpable +wrong done by the other Power, some wrong which calls upon them to +resist it with all their might. + +The case alleged against Germany is that she is too strong, so strong in +herself that no Power in Europe can stand up against her, and so sure of +the assistance of her ally, Austria, to say nothing of the other ally, +Italy, that there is at this moment no combination that will venture to +oppose the Triple Alliance. In other words, Germany is thought to have +acquired an ascendency in Europe which she may at any moment attempt to +convert into supremacy. Great Britain is thought of, at any rate by her +own people, as the traditional opponent of any such supremacy on the +Continent, so that if she were strong enough it might be her function to +be the chief antagonist of a German ascendency or supremacy, though the +doubt whether she is strong enough prevents her from fulfilling this +role. + +But there is another side to the case. The opinion has long been +expressed by German writers and is very widespread in Germany that it is +Great Britain that claims an ascendency or supremacy, and that Germany +in opposing that supremacy is making herself the champion of the +European cause of the independence of States. This German idea was +plainly expressed twenty-five years ago by the German historian Wilhelm +Müller, who wrote in a review of the year 1884: "England was the +opponent of all the maritime Powers of Europe. She had for decades +assumed at sea the same dictatorial attitude as France had maintained +upon land under Louis XIV. and Napoleon I. The years 1870-1871 broke the +French spell; the year 1884 has shown England that the times of her +maritime imperialism also are over, and that if she does not renounce it +of her own free will, an 1870 will come for the English spell too. It is +true, England need not fear any single maritime Power, but only a +coalition of them all; and hitherto she has done all she can to call up +such a coalition." The language which Englishmen naturally use in +discussing their country's naval strength might seem to lend itself to +the German interpretation. For example, on the 10th March 1908, the +Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, expressing an opinion in which he thought +both parties concurred, said: "We must maintain the unassailable +supremacy of this country at sea." Here, at any rate, is the word +"supremacy" at which the Germans take umbrage, and which our own people +regard as objectionable if applied to the position of any Power on the +Continent. + +I will not repeat here the analysis which I published many years ago of +the dealings between the German and British Governments during the +period when German colonial enterprise was beginning; nor the +demonstration that in those negotiations the British Government acted +with perfect fairness, but was grossly misrepresented to the German +public. The important thing for the people of Great Britain to +understand to-day is not the inner diplomatic history of that and +subsequent periods, but the impression which is current in Germany with +regard to the whole of these transactions. + +The Germans think that Great Britain lays claim to a special position in +regard to the ocean, in the nature of a suzerainty over the waters of +the globe, and over those of its coasts which are not the possessions +of some strong civilised Power. What they have perceived in the last +quarter of a century has been that, somehow or other, they care not how, +whenever there has been a German attempt in the way of what is called +colonial expansion, it has led to friction with Great Britain. +Accordingly they have the impression that Great Britain is opposed to +any such German expansion, and in this way, as they are anxious for +dominions beyond the sea and for the spread of their trade into every +quarter of the globe, they have come to regard Great Britain as the +adversary. This German feeling found vent during the South African War, +and the expressions at that time freely used in the German newspapers, +as well as by German writers whose works were less ephemeral, could not +but deeply offend the national consciousness, to any nothing of the +pride of the people of this country. In this way the sympathy which used +to exist between the two peoples has been lost and they have come to +regard each other with suspicion, which has not been without its effect +on the relations between the two Governments and upon the course of +European diplomacy. This is the origin of the rivalry, and it is to the +resentment which has been diligently cultivated in Germany against the +supposed British claim to supremacy at sea that is attributable the +great popularity among the people of Germany of the movement in favour +of the expansion of the German navy. Since 1884 the people of Germany +have been taught to regard with suspicion every item of British policy, +and naturally enough this auspicious attitude has found its counterpart +among the people of this country. The result has been that the +agreements by which England has disposed of a number of disagreements +with France and with Russia have been regarded in Germany as inspired by +the wish to prepare a coalition against that country, and, in view of +the past history of Great Britain, this interpretation can hardly be +pronounced unnatural. + +Any cause for which Great Britain would fight ought to be intelligible +to other nations, first of all to those of Europe, but also to the +nations outside of Europe, at any rate to the United States and Japan, +for if we were fighting for something in regard to which there was no +sympathy with us, or which led other nations to sympathise with our +adversary, we should be hampered by grave misgivings and might find +ourselves alone in a hostile world. + +Accordingly it cannot be sound policy for Great Britain to assert for +herself a supremacy or ascendency of the kind which is resented, not +only by Germany, but by every other continental State, and indeed by +every maritime State in the world. It ought to be made clear to all the +world that in fact, whatever may have been the language used in English +discussions, Great Britain makes no claim to suzerainty over the sea, or +over territories bordering on the sea, not forming parts of the British +Empire; that, while she is determined to maintain a navy that can in +case of war secure the "command" of the sea against her enemies, she +regards the sea, in peace, and in war except for her enemies, as the +common property of all nations, the open road forming the great highway +of mankind. + +We have but to reflect on the past to perceive that the idea of a +dominion of the sea must necessarily unite other nations against us. +What in the sixteenth century was the nature of the dispute between +England and Spain? The British popular consciousness to-day remembers +two causes, of which one was religious antagonism, and the other the +claim set up by Spain and rejected by England to a monopoly of America, +carrying with it an exclusive right to navigation in the Western +Atlantic and to a monopoly of the trade of the Spanish dominions beyond +the sea. That is a chapter of history which at the present time deserves +a place in the meditations of Englishmen. + +I may now try to condense into a single view the general survey of the +conditions of Europe which I have attempted from the two points of view +of strategy and of policy, of force and of right. Germany has such a +preponderance of military force that no continental State can stand up +against her. There is, therefore, on the Continent no nation independent +of German influence or pressure. Great Britain, so long as she maintains +the superiority of her navy over that of Germany or over those of +Germany and her allies, is not amenable to constraint by Germany, but +her military weakness prevents her exerting any appreciable counter +pressure upon Germany. + +The moment the German navy has become strong enough to confront that of +Great Britain without risk of destruction, British influence in Europe +will be at an end, and the Continent will have to follow the direction +given by German policy. That is a consummation to be desired neither in +the interest of the development of the European nations nor in that of +Great Britain. It means the prevalence of one national ideal instead of +the growth side by side of a number of types. It means also the +exclusion of British ideals from European life. + +Great Britain has in the past been a powerful contributor to the free +development of the European nations, and therefore to the preservation +in Europe of variety of national growth. I believe that she is now +called upon to renew that service. The method open to her lies in such +action as may relieve the other European States from the overwhelming +pressure which, in case of the disappearance of England from the +European community, would be put upon them by Germany. It seems probable +that in default of right action she will be compelled to maintain her +national ideals against Europe united under German guidance. The action +required consists on the one hand in the perfecting of the British navy, +and on the other of the military organisation of the British people on +the principle, already explained, of the nationalisation of war. + + + + +XII. + + +THE NATION + +The conclusion to which a review of England's position and of the state +of Europe points, is that while there is no visible cause of quarrel +between Great Britain and Germany, yet there is between them a rivalry +such as is inevitable between a State that has long held something like +the first place in the world and a State that feels entitled in virtue +of the number of its people, their character and training, their work +and their corporate organisation, to aspire to the first place. The +German nation by the mere fact of its growth challenges England for the +primacy. It could not be otherwise. But the challenge is no wrong done +to England, and the idea that it ought to be resented is unworthy of +British traditions. It must be cheerfully accepted. If the Germans are +better men than we are they deserve to take our place. If we mean to +hold our own we must set about it in the right way--by proving ourselves +better than the Germans. + +There ought to be no question of quarrel or of war. Men can be rivals +without being enemies. It is the first lesson that an English boy +learns at school. Quarrels arise, as a rule, from misunderstandings or +from faults of temper, and England ought to avoid the frame of mind +which would render her liable to take offence at trifles, while her +policy ought to be simple enough to escape being misunderstood. + +In a competition between two nations the qualification for success is to +be the better nation. Germany's advantage is that her people have been +learning for a whole century to subordinate their individual wishes and +welfare to that of the nation, while the people of Great Britain have +been steeped in individualism until the consciousness of national +existence, of a common purpose and a common duty, has all but faded +away. What has to be done is to restore the nation to its right place in +men's minds, and so to organise it that, like a trained athlete, it will +be capable of hard and prolonged effort. + +By the nation I mean the United Kingdom, the commonwealth of Great +Britain and Ireland, and I distinguish it from the Empire which is a +federation of several nations. The nation thus defined has work to do, +duties to perform as one nation among many, and the way out of the +present difficulties will be found by attending to these duties. + +In the first place comes Britain's work in Europe, which to describe +has been the purpose of the preceding chapters. It cannot be right for +Britain, after the share she has taken in securing for Europe the +freedom that distinguishes a series of independent States existing side +by side from a single centralised Empire, to turn her back upon the +Continent and to suppose that she exists only for the sake of her own +colonies and India. On the contrary it is only by playing her part in +Europe that she can hope to carry through the organisation of her own +Empire which she has in view. Her function as a European State is to +make her voice heard in the council of the European nations, so that no +one State can dictate the decisions to be reached. In order to do that +she must be strong enough to be able to say Aye and No without fear, and +to give effective help in case of need to those other States which may +in a decision vote on the same side with her. + +In her attitude towards the Powers of Europe and in her dealings with +them Great Britain is the representative of the daughter nations and +dependencies that form her Empire, and her self-defence in Europe is the +defence of the whole Empire, at any rate against possible assaults from +any European Power. At the same time she is necessarily the centre and +the head of her own Empire. She must take the lead in its organisation +and in the direction of its policy. If she is to fulfil these duties, +on the one hand to Europe and on the other to the daughter nations and +India, she must herself be organised on the principle of duty. An +England divided against herself, absorbed in the disputes of factions +and unconscious of a purpose, can neither lead nor defend her Empire, +can play her proper part neither in Europe nor in the world. + +The great work to be done at home, corresponding to the ultimate purpose +of national life, is that she should bring up her people to a higher +standard of human excellence, to a finer type than others. There are +English types well recognised. Fifty years ago the standard of British +workmanship was the acknowledged mark of excellence in the industrial +world, while it has been pointed out in an earlier chapter that the +English standards, of character displayed in conduct, described in one +aspect by the word "gentleman," and in another by the expression +"fair-play," form the best part of the nation's inheritance. It is the +business of any British education worth thinking of to stamp these +hall-marks of character upon all her people. + +Nothing reveals in a more amazing light the extent to which in this +country the true meaning of our being a nation has been forgotten than +the use that has been made in recent years of the term "national +education." The leaders of both parties have discussed the subject as +though any system of schools maintained at the public expense formed a +system of national education. But the diffusion of instruction is not +education, and the fact that it is carried on at the public expense does +not make it national. Education is training the child for his life to +come, and his life's value consists in the work which he will do. +National education means bringing up every boy and girl to do his or her +part of the nation's work. A child who is going to do nothing will be of +no use to his country, and a bringing up that leaves him prepared to do +nothing is not an education but a perversion. A British national +education ought to make every man a good workman, every man a gentleman, +every man a servant of his country. + +My contention, then, is that this British nation has to perform certain +specific tasks, and that in order to be able to do her work she must +insist that her people--every man, woman, and child--exist not for +themselves but for her. This is the principle of duty. It gives a +standard of personal value, for evidently a man's use to his country +consists in what he does for it, not in what he gets or has for himself, +which, from the national point of view, is of no account except so far +as it either enables him to carry on the work for which he is best +suited or can be applied for the nation's benefit. + +How then in practice can the principle of duty be brought into our +national and our individual life? I think that the right way is that we +should join in doing those things which are evidently needed, and should +postpone other things about the necessity of which there may be +disagreement. I shall devote the rest of this volume to considering how +the nation is to prepare itself for the first duty laid upon it, that of +assuring its security and so making good its position as a member of the +European community. But before pursuing that inquiry I must reiterate +once more the principle which it is my main purpose to set before my +countrymen. + +The conception of the Nation is the clue to the solution of all the +problems with which the people of Great Britain are confronted. They are +those of foreign and imperial policy, of defence national and imperial, +of education and of social life. + +Foreign and imperial policy include all affairs external to Great +Britain, the relations of Great Britain to Europe, to India, to the +Colonies, and to the Powers of Asia and America. In all these external +affairs the question to be asked is, what is Britain's duty? + +It is by the test of duty that Great Britain's attitude towards Germany +should be tried. In what event would it be necessary and right to call +on every British citizen to turn out and fight, ready to shed his blood +and ready to shoot down enemies? Evidently only in case of some great +and manifest wrong undertaken by Germany. As I am aware of no such wrong +actually attempted, I think a conflict unnecessary. It is true I began +by pointing out the danger of drifting into a war with the German +Empire, but I wish to do what I can to prevent it, and to show that by +right action the risk will be diminished. + +The greatest risk is due to fear--fear in this country of what Germany +may do, fear in Germany of what Great Britain may do. Fear is a bad +adviser. There are Englishmen who seem to think that as Germany is +strengthening her navy it would be wise to attack her while the British +navy is superior in numerical force. This suggestion must be frankly +discussed and dealt with. + +A war is a trial of strength. To begin it does not add to your force. +Suppose for the sake of the argument that a war between England and +Germany were "inevitable"--which is equivalent to the supposition that +one of the two Governments is bound to wrong the other--one of the two +Governments must take the initiative. You take the initiative when you +are the Power that wants something, in which case you naturally exert +yourself to obtain it, while the adversary who merely says No to your +request, acts only in resistance. England wants nothing from Germany, so +that she is not called upon for an initiative. But the initiative, or +offensive, requires the stronger force, its object being to render the +other side powerless for resistance to its will. The defensive admits of +a smaller force. A conflict between England and Germany must be +primarily a naval war, and Germany's naval forces are considerably +weaker than those of England. England has no political reason for the +initiative; Germany is debarred from it by the inferiority of her navy. +If, therefore, Germany wants anything from England, she must wait to +take the initiative until she has forces strong enough for the +offensive. But her forces, though not strong enough for the offensive, +may be strong enough for the defensive. If, therefore, England should +take the initiative, she would in so doing give away the one advantage +she has. It may be Germany's interest to have a prompt decision. It can +hardly be her interest to attack before she is ready. But if she really +wanted to pick a quarrel and get some advantage, it would exactly serve +her purpose to be attacked at once, as that would give her the benefit +of the defensive. The English "Jingoes," then, are false guides, bad +strategists, and worse, statesmen. + +Not only in the affairs of Europe, but in those of India, Egypt, and +the Colonies, and in all dealings with Asia, Africa, and America the +line of British policy will be the line of the British nation's duty. + +If Britain is to follow this line two conditions must be fulfilled. She +must have a leader to show the way and her people must walk in it with +confidence. + +The mark of a leader is the single eye. But the traditional system gives +the lead of the nation to the leader of one party chosen for his success +in leading that party. He can never have a single eye; he serves two +masters. His party requires him to keep it in office, regarding the +Opposition as the enemy. But his country requires him to guide a united +nation in the fulfilment of its mission in Europe and a united Empire in +the fulfilment of its mission in the world. A statesman who is to lead +the nation and the Empire must keep his eyes on Europe and on the world. +A party leader who is to defeat the other party must keep his eyes on +the other party. No man can at the same time be looking out of the +window and watching an opponent inside the house, and the traditional +system puts the Prime Minister in a painful dilemma. Either he never +looks out of the window at all or he tries to look two ways at once. +Party men seem to believe that if a Prime Minister were to look across +the sea instead of across the floor of the House of Commons his +Government would be upset. That may be the case so long as men ignore +the nation and so long as they acquiesce in the treasonable doctrine +that it is the business of the Opposition to oppose. But a statesman who +would take courage to lead the nation might perhaps find the Opposition +powerless against him. + +The counterpart of leadership is following. A Government that shows the +line of Britain's duty must be able to utilise the whole energies of her +people for its performance. A duty laid upon the nation implies a duty +laid upon every man to do his share of the nation's work, to assist the +Government by obedient service, the best of which he is capable. It +means a people trained every man to his task. + +A nation should be like a team in which every man has his place, his +work to do, his mission or duty. There is no room in it either for the +idler who consumes but renders no service, or for the unskilled man who +bungles a task to which he has not been trained. A nation may be +compared to a living creature. Consider the way in which nature +organises all things that live and grow. In the structure of a living +thing every part has its function, its work to do. There are no +superfluous organs, and if any fails to do its work the creature +sickens and perhaps dies. + +Take the idea of the nation as I have tried to convey it and apply it as +a measure or test to our customary way of thinking both of public +affairs and of our own lives. Does it not reveal that we attach too much +importance to having and to possessions--our own and other people's--and +too little importance to doing, to service? When we ask what a man is +worth, we think of what he owns. But the words ought to make us think of +what he is fit for and of what service he renders to the nation. The +only value of what a man has springs from what he does with it. + +The idea of the nation leads to the right way of looking at these +matters, because it constrains every man to put himself and all that he +has at the service of the community. Thus it is the opposite of +socialism, which merely turns upside down the current worship of +ownership, and which thinks "having" so supremely important that it +would put "not having" in its place. The only cry I will adopt is +"England for ever," which means that we are here, every one of us, with +all that we have and all that we can do, as members of a nation that +must either serve the world or perish. + +But the idea of the nation carries us a long way further than I have yet +shown. It bids us all try at the peril of England's fall to get the +best Government we can to lead us. We need a man to preside over the +nation's counsels, to settle the line of Britain's duty in Europe and in +her own Empire, and of her duty to her own people, to the millions who +are growing up ill fed, ill housed and ill trained, and yet who are part +of the sovereign people. We need to give him as councillors men that are +masters of the tasks in which for the nation to fail means its ruin, the +tasks of which I have enumerated those that are vital. Do we give him a +master of the history of the other nations to guide the nation's +dealings with them? Do we give him a master of war to educate admirals +and generals? Do we give him a master of the sciences to direct the +pursuit of knowledge, and a master of character-building to supervise +the bringing up of boys and girls to be types of a noble life? It would +serve the nation's turn to have such men. They are among us, and to find +them we should only have to look for them. It would be no harder than to +pick apples off a tree. But we never dream of looking for them. We have +a wonderful plan of choosing our leaders, the plan which we call an +election. Five hundred men assemble in a hall and listen to a speech +from a partisan, while five hundred others in a hall in the next street +are cheering a second partisan who declaims against the first. There is +no test of either speaker, except that he must be rich enough to pay +the expenses of an "election." The voters do not even listen to both +partisans in order to judge between them. Thus we choose our members of +Parliament. Our Government is a committee of some twenty of them. Its +first business is to keep its authority against the other party, of +which in turn the chief function is to make out that everything the +Government does is wrong. This is the only recognised plan for leading +the nation. + +You may be shocked as you read this by the plainness of my words, but +you know them to be true, though you suppose that to insist on the facts +is "impracticable" because you fancy that there is no way out of the +marvellously absurd arrangements that exist. But there is a way out, +though it is no royal road. It is this. Get the meaning of the nation +into your own head and then make a present to England of your party +creed. Ask yourself what is the one thing most needed now, and the one +thing most needed for the future. You will answer, because you know it +to be true, that the one thing most needed now is to get the navy right. + +The one thing most needed for the future is to put the idea of the +nation and the will to help England into every man's soul. That cannot +be done by writing or by talking, but only by setting every man while +he is young to do something for his country. There is one way of +bringing that about. It is by making every citizen a soldier in a +national army. The man who has learned to serve his country has learned +to love it. He is the true citizen, and of such a nation is composed. +Great Britain needs a statesman to lead her and a policy at home and +abroad. But such a policy must not be sought and cannot be found upon +party lines. The statesman who is to expound it to his countrymen and +represent it to the world must be the leader not of one party but of +both. In short, a statesman must be a nation leader, and the first +condition of his existence is that there should be a nation for him to +lead. + + + + +XIII. + + +THE EFFECT OF THE NATIONALISATION OF WAR UPON LEADERSHIP + +The argument of the preceding chapters points to the conclusion that if +Great Britain is to maintain her position as a great Power, probably +even if she is to maintain her independence, and certainly if she is to +retain the administration of India and the leadership of the nations +that have grown out of her colonies, her statesmen and her people must +combine to do three things:-- + +1. To adopt a policy having due relation to the condition and needs of +the European Continent. + +2. To make the British navy the best possible instrument of naval +warfare. + +3. To make the British army strong enough to be able to turn the scales +in a continental war. + +What are for the navy and for the army the essentials of victory? If +there had never been any wars, no one would know what was essential to +victory. People would have their notions, no doubt, but these notions +would be guesses and could not be verified until the advent of a war, +which might bring with it a good deal of disappointment to the people +who had guessed wrong. But there have already been wars enough to afford +ample material for deductions as to the causes and conditions of +success. I propose to take the two best examples that can be found, one +for war at sea and the other for war on land, in order to show exactly +the way in which victory is attained. + +By victory, of course, I mean crushing the enemy. In a battle in which +neither side is crippled, and after which the fleets part to renew the +struggle after a short interval, one side or the other may consider that +it has had the honours of the day. It may have lost fewer ships than the +enemy, or have taken more. It may have been able and willing to continue +the fight, though the enemy drew off, and its commander may be promoted +or decorated for having maintained the credit of his country or of the +service to which he belongs. But such a battle is not victory either in +a political or a strategical sense. It does not lead to the +accomplishment of the purpose of the war, which is to dictate conditions +of peace. That result can be obtained only by crushing the enemy's force +and so making him powerless to renew the contest. + +A general view of the wars of the eighteenth century between Great +Britain and France shows that, broadly speaking, there was no decision +until the end of the period. The nearest approach to it was when Hawke +destroyed the French fleet in Quiberon Bay. But this was hardly a +stand-up fight. The French fleet was running away, and Hawke's +achievement was that, in spite of the difficulties of weather on an +extremely dangerous coast, he was able to consummate its destruction. +The real decision was the work of Nelson, and its principal cause was +Nelson himself. + +The British navy had discovered in its conflicts with the Dutch during +the seventeenth century that the object of naval warfare was the command +of the sea, which must be won by breaking the enemy's force in battle. +This was also perfectly understood by the Dutch admirals, and in those +wars was begun the development of the art of fighting battles with +sailing vessels. A formation, the line of battle, in which one ship +sails in the track of the ship before her, was found to be appropriate +to the weapon used, the broadside of artillery; and a type of ship +suitable to this formation, the line-of-battle ship, established itself. +These were the elements with which the British and French navies entered +into their long eighteenth century struggle. The French, however, had +not grasped the principle that the object of naval warfare was to obtain +the command of the sea. They did not consciously and primarily aim, as +did their British rivals, at the destruction of the enemy's fleet. They +were more concerned with the preservation of their own fleet than with +the destruction of the enemy's, and were ready rather to accept battle +than to bring it about. The British admirals were eager for battle, but +had a difficulty in finding out how a decisive blow could be struck. The +orthodox and accepted doctrine of the British navy was that the British +fleet should be brought alongside the enemy's fleet, the two lines of +battleships being parallel to one another, so that each ship in the +British fleet should engage a corresponding ship in the French fleet. It +was a manoeuvre difficult of execution, because, in order to approach +the French, the British must in the first place turn each of their ships +at right angles to the line or obliquely to it, and then, when they were +near enough to fire, must turn again to the left (or right) in order to +restore the line formation. And during this period of approach and +turning they must be exposed to the broadsides of the French without +being able to make full use of their own broadsides. Moreover, it was +next to impossible in this way to bring up the whole line together. +Besides being difficult, the manoeuvre had no promise of success. For if +two fleets of equal numbers are in this way matched ship against ship, +neither side has any advantage except what may be derived from the +superior skill of its gunners. So long as these conditions prevailed, +no great decisive victory of the kind for which we are seeking was +gained. It was during this period that Nelson received such training as +the navy could give him, and added to it the necessary finishing touch +by never-ceasing effort to find out for himself the way in which he +could strike a decisive blow. His daring was always deliberate, never +rash, and this is the right frame of mind for a commander. "You may be +assured," he writes to Lord Hood, March 11, 1794, "I shall undertake +nothing but what I have moral certainty of succeeding in." + +His fierce determination to get at the ultimate secrets of his trade led +him to use every means that would help him to think out his problem, and +among these means was reading. In 1780 appeared Clerk's "Essay on Naval +Tactics." Clerk pointed out the weakness of the method of fighting in +two parallel lines and suggested and discussed a number of plans by +which one fleet with the bulk of its force could attack and destroy a +portion of the other. This was the problem to which Nelson gave his +mind--how to attack a part with the whole. On the 19th of August 1796 he +writes to the Duke of Clarence:-- + +"We are now 22 sail of the line, the combined fleet will be above 35 +sail of the line.... I will venture my life Sir John Jervis defeats +them; I do not mean by a regular battle but by the skill of our +Admiral, and the activity and spirit of our officers and seamen. This +country is the most favourable possible for skill with an inferior +fleet; for the winds are so variable that some one time in the 24 hours +you must be able to attack a part of a large fleet, and the other will +be becalmed, or have a contrary wind." + +His opportunity came in 1798, when in the battle of the Nile he crushed +the French Mediterranean Fleet. In a letter to Lord Howe, written +January 8, 1799, he described his plan in a sentence:-- + +"By attacking the enemy's van and centre, the wind blowing directly +along their line, I was enabled to throw what force I pleased on a few +ships." + +We know that Nelson's method of fighting had for months before the +battle been his constant preoccupation, and that he had lost no +opportunity of explaining his ideas to his captains. Here are the words +of Captain Berry's narrative:-- + +"It had been his practice during the whole of the cruise, whenever the +weather and circumstances would permit, to have his captains on board +the Vanguard, where he would fully develop to them his own ideas of the +different and best modes of attack, and such plans as he proposed to +execute upon falling in with the enemy, whatever their position or +situation might be, by day or by night. There was no possible position +in which they might be found that he did not take into his calculation, +and for the most advantageous attack on which he had not digested and +arranged the best possible disposition of the force which he commanded." + +The great final victory of Trafalgar was prepared in the same way, and +the various memoranda written in the period before the battle have +revealed to recent investigation the unwearying care which Nelson +devoted to finding out how best to concentrate his force upon that +portion of the enemy's fleet which it would be most difficult for the +enemy to support with the remainder. + +Nelson's great merit, his personal contribution to his country's +influence, lay first and foremost in his having by intellectual effort +solved the tactical problem set to commanders by the conditions of the +naval weapon of his day, the fleet of line-of-battle ships; and +secondly, in his being possessed and inspired by the true strategical +doctrine that the prime object of naval warfare is the destruction of +the enemy's fleet, and therefore that the decisive point in the theatre +of war is the point where the enemy's fleet can be found. It was the +conviction with which he held this principle that enabled him in +circumstances of the greatest difficulty to divine where to go to find +the enemy's fleet; which in 1798 led him persistently up and down the +Mediterranean till he had discovered the French squadron anchored at +Aboukir; which in 1805 took him from the Mediterranean to the West +Indies, and from the West Indies back to the Channel. + +So much for Nelson's share of the work. But Nelson could neither have +educated himself nor made full use of his education if the navy of his +day had not been inspired with the will to fight and to conquer, with +the discipline that springs from that will, and had not obtained through +long experience of war the high degree of skill in seamanship and in +gunnery which made it the instrument its great commander required. These +conditions of the navy in turn were products of the national spirit and +of the will of the Government and people of Great Britain to devote to +the navy as much money, as many men, and as vigorous support as might be +necessary to realise the national purpose. + +The efforts of this nature made by the country were neither perfect nor +complete. The Governments made mistakes, the Admiralty left much to be +desired both in organisation and in personnel. But the will was there. +The best proof of the national determination is to be found in the best +hated of all the institutions of that time, the press-gang, a brutal and +narrow-minded form of asserting the principle that a citizen's duty is +to fight for his country. That the principle should take such a shape +is decisive evidence no doubt that society was badly organised, and that +education, intellectual and moral, was on a low level, but also, and +this is the vital matter, that the nation well understood the nature of +the struggle in which it was engaged and was firmly resolved not only to +fight but to conquer. + +The causes of the success of the French armies in the period between +1792 and 1809 were precisely analogous to those which have been analysed +in the case of the British navy. The basis was the national will, +expressed in the volunteers and the levy _en masse_. Upon this was +superimposed the skill acquired by the army in several years of +incessant war, and the formal cause of the victories was Napoleon's +insight into the art of command. The research of recent years has +revealed the origin of Napoleon's mastery of the method of directing an +army. He became an officer in 1785, at the age of sixteen. In 1793, as a +young captain of artillery, he directed with remarkable insight and +determination the operations by which the allied fleet was driven from +Toulon. In 1794 he inspired and conducted, though still a subordinate, a +series of successful operations in the Maritime Alps. In 1796, as +commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy, he astonished Europe by the +most brilliant campaign on record. For these achievements he had +prepared himself by assiduous study. As a young officer of artillery he +received the best professional training then to be had in Europe, while +at the same time, by wide and careful reading, he gave himself a general +education. At some period before 1796, probably before 1794, he had read +and thoroughly digested the remarkable treatise on the principles of +mountain war which had been left in manuscript by General Bourcet, an +officer who during the campaigns of half a century had assisted as +Quartermaster-General a number of the best Generals of France. +Napoleon's phenomenal power of concentration had enabled him to +assimilate Bourcet's doctrine, which in his clear and vigorous mind took +new and more perfect shape, so that from the beginning his operations +are conducted on a system which may be described as that of Bourcet +raised to a higher power. + +The "Nelson touch" was acquired by the Admiral through years of effort +to think out, to its last conclusion, a problem the nature of which had +never been adequately grasped by his professional predecessors and +comrades, though it seems probable that he owed to Clerk the hint which +led him to the solution which he found. Napoleon was more fortunate in +inheriting a strategical doctrine which he had but to appreciate to +expand and to apply. The success of both men is due to the habit of mind +which clings tenaciously to the subject under investigation until it is +completely cleared up. Each of them became, as a result of his thinking, +the embodiment of a theory or system of the employment of force, the one +on sea and the other on land; and such an embodiment is absolutely +necessary for a nation in pursuit of victory. + +It seems natural to say that if England wants victory on sea or land, +she must provide herself with a Nelson or a Napoleon. The statement is +quite true, but it requires to be rightly interpreted. If it means that +a nation must always choose a great man to command its navy or its army +it is an impossible maxim, because a great man cannot be recognised +until his power has been revealed in some kind of work. Moreover, to say +that Nelson and Napoleon won victories because they were great men is to +invert the order of nature and of truth. They are recognised as great +men because of the mastery of their business which they manifested in +action. That mastery was due primarily to knowledge. Wordsworth hit the +mark when, in answer to the question "Who is the Happy Warrior?" he +replied that it was he-- + +"Who with a natural instinct to discern +What knowledge can perform, is diligent to learn." + +The quality that made them both so valuable was that they knew the best +that was known and thought in regard to the art of war. This is the +quality which a nation must secure in those whom it entrusts with the +design and the conduct of the operations of its fleets and its armies. + +There is a method for securing this, not by any means a new one, and not +originally, as is commonly supposed, a German invention. It consists in +providing the army and the navy with a General Staff or Department for +the study, design, and direction of operations. In such a department +Bourcet, Napoleon's master, spent the best years of his life. In such a +department Moltke was trained; over such a department he presided. Its +characteristic is that it has one function, that of the study, design, +and direction of the movements in fighting of a fleet or an army, and +that it has nothing whatever to do with the maintenance of an army, or +with its recruiting, discipline, or peace administration. Its functions +in peace are intellectual and educational, and in war it becomes the +channel of executive power. Bourcet described the head of such a +department as "the soul of an army." The British navy is without such a +department. The army has borrowed the name, but has not maintained the +speciality of function which is essential. In armies other than the +British, the Chief of the General Staff is occupied solely with tactics +and strategy, with the work of intellectual research by which Nelson +and Napoleon prepared their great achievements. His business is to be +designing campaigns, to make up his mind at what point or points, in +case of war, he will assemble his fleets or his armies for the first +move, and what the nature of that move shall be. The second move it is +impossible for him to pre-arrange because it depends upon the result of +the first. He will determine the second move when the time comes. In +order that his work should be as well done as possible, care is taken +that the Chief of the Staff shall have nothing else to do. Not he but +another officer superintends the raising, organising, and disciplining +of the forces. Thus he becomes the embodiment of a theory or system of +operations, and with that theory or system he inspires as far as +possible all the admirals or generals and other officers who will have +to carry out his designs. + +In the British system the Chief of the General Staff is the principal +military member of the Board which administers the army. Accordingly, +only a fraction of his time can be given to thinking out the problems of +strategy and tactics. At the Admiralty the principal naval member of the +Board is made responsible not only for the distribution and movements of +ships--a definition which includes the whole domain of strategy and +tactics--but also for the fighting and sea-going efficiency of the +fleet, its organisation and mobilisation, a definition so wide that it +includes the greater part of the administration of the navy, especially +as the same officer is held responsible for advice on all large +questions of naval policy and maritime warfare, as well as for the +control of the naval ordnance department. Thus in each case the very +constitution of the office entrusted with the design of operations +prevents the officer at its head from concentrating himself upon that +vital duty. The result is that the intellectual life both of the army +and of the navy lags far behind that of their German rivals, and +therefore that there is every chance of both of them being beaten, not +for lack of courage or hard work, but by being opposed to an adversary +whose thinking has been better done by reason of the greater +concentration of energy devoted to it. + +The first reform needed, at any rate in the navy, is a definition of the +functions of the First Sea Lord which will confine his sphere to the +distribution and movement of ships and the strategical and tactical +training of officers, so as to compel him to become the embodiment or +personification of the best possible theory or system of naval warfare. +That definition adopted and enforced, there is no need to lay down +regulations giving the strategist control over his colleagues who +administer _matériel_ and _personnel_; they will of themselves always be +anxious to hear his views as to the methods of fighting, and will be +only too glad to build ships with a view to their being used in +accordance with his design of victory. But until there is at the +Admiralty department devoted to designing victory and to nothing else, +what possible guarantee can there be that ships will be built, or the +navy administered and organised in accordance with any design likely to +lead to victory? + + + + +XIV. + + +THE NEEDS OF THE NAVY + +The doubt which, since the Prime Minister's statement on the +introduction of the Navy Estimates, has disturbed the public mind, is +concerned almost exclusively with the number of modern battleships in +the Royal Navy. The one object which the nation ought to have in view is +victory in the next war, and the question never to be forgotten is, what +is essential to victory? While it is probably true that if the disparity +of numbers be too great a smaller fleet can hardly engage a larger one +with any prospect of success, it is possible to exaggerate the +importance both of numbers and of the size of ships. + +The most decisive victories at sea which are on record were those of +Tsusima, of Trafalgar, and of the Nile. At Tsusima the numbers and size +of the Japanese Fleet were not such as, before the battle, to give +foreign observers grounds for expecting a decisive victory by the +Japanese. It was on the superior intellectual and moral qualities of the +Japanese that those who expected them to win based their hopes, and this +view was justified by the event. At the battle of Trafalgar the British +Fleet numbered twenty-seven, the Franco-Spanish Fleet numbered +thirty-three; at the battle of the Nile the numbers were equal--thirteen +on each side. These figures seem to me sufficiently to prove that +superior numbers are not in battle the indispensable condition of +victory. They certainly prove that the numerically inferior fleet may +very well win. + +Writers on the art of war distinguish between tactics, the art of +winning a battle, and strategy, the art of designing and conducting the +whole of the operations which constitute a campaign, of bringing about +battles in conditions favourable to one's own side and of making the +best use of such victories as may be won for contributing to the general +purpose of the war, which is dictating peace on one's own terms. + +The decision of the questions, how many fleets to send out, what is to +be the strength and composition of each of them, and what the objectives +assigned to their several commanders is a strategical decision. It is a +function of the strategist at the Board of Admiralty, but the question +how to handle any one of these fleets in the presence of the enemy so as +either to avoid or to bring about an action and so as to win the battle, +if a battle be desirable, is a question for the admiral commanding the +particular fleet. + +Evidently the master art, because it dominates the whole war, is that +of strategy, and for that reason it must have a seat at the Admiralty +Board. + +As is well known, a large number of naval officers have for several +years past been troubled with doubts as to the strategical competence +displayed by the Board or Boards of Admiralty since 1904. The Board of +Admiralty has also been criticised for other reasons, into some of which +it is not necessary to enter, but it is desirable to state precisely the +considerations which tend to show that important decisions made by the +Admiralty have not been based upon sound strategical principles, and +are, indeed, incompatible with them. + +When four or five years ago it was decided to transfer the centre of +gravity of the navy, as represented by fleets in commission, from the +Mediterranean to the Atlantic coasts of Europe, that was a sound +decision. But when the principal fleet in commission in home waters was +reduced in order to facilitate the creation of a so-called Home Fleet, +made up of a number of ships stationed at different ports, and manned +for the most part by nucleus crews, the Admiralty announced this measure +in a very remarkable circular. The change clearly involved a reduction +of the number of men at sea, and also a reduction in the number of ships +which would be immediately available under war conditions. It was +further evident that the chief result of this measure would be a +reduction of expenditure, yet the circular boldly stated that the object +of the measure was to increase the power and readiness of the navy for +instant war. + +In any case, the decision announced revealed an ignorance of one of the +fundamental conditions of naval warfare, which differentiates it +completely from operations on land. A ship in commission carries on +board everything that is necessary for a fight. She can be made ready +for battle in a few minutes on the order to clear for action. No other +mobilisation is necessary for a fleet in commission, and if a war should +break out suddenly, as wars normally always do break out, whichever side +is able at once with its fleets already in commission to strike the +first blow has the incalculable advantage of the initiative. + +A fleet divided between several ports and not fully manned is not a +fleet in commission; it is not ready, and its assembly as a fleet +depends on a contingency, which there is no means of guaranteeing, that +the enemy shall not be able to prevent its assembly by moving a fleet +immediately to a point at sea from which it would be able to oppose by +force the union of the constituent parts of the divided and unready +fleet. + +Later official descriptions of the Home Fleet explained that it was part +of the Admiralty design that this fleet should offer the first +resistance to an enemy. The most careful examination of these +descriptions leaves no room for doubt that the idea of the Admiralty was +that one of its fleets should, in case of war, form a sort of +advance-guard to the rest of the navy. But it is a fundamental truth +that in naval war an advance-guard is absurd and impossible. In the +operations of armies, an advance-guard is both necessary and useful. Its +function is to delay the enemy's army until such time as the +commander-in-chief shall have assembled his own forces, which may be, to +some extent, scattered on the march. This delay is always possible on +land, because the troops can make use of the ground, that is, of the +positions which it affords favourable for defence, and because by means +of those positions a small force can for a long time hold in check the +advance of a very much larger one. But at sea there are no positions +except those formed by narrow straits, estuaries, and shoals, where land +and sea are more or less mixed up. The open sea is a uniform surface +offering no advantage whatever to either side. There is nothing in naval +warfare resembling the defence of a position on land, and the whole +difference between offence and defence at sea consists in the will of +one side to bring on an action and that of the other side to avoid or +postpone it. + +At sea a small force which endeavours by fighting to delay the movement +of a large force exposes itself to destruction without any corresponding +gain of time. Accordingly, at sea, there is no analogy to the action of +an advance-guard, and the mere fact that such an idea should find its +way into the official accounts of the Admiralty's views regarding the +opening move of a possible war must discredit the strategy of the +Admiralty in the judgment of all who have paid any attention to the +nature of naval war. + +The second requisite for victory, that is, for winning a battle against +a hostile fleet, is tactical superiority, or, as Nelson put it: "The +skill of our admirals and the activity and spirit of our officers and +seamen." The only way to obtain this is through the perpetual practice +of the admirals commanding fleets. An admiral, in order to make himself +a first-rate tactician, must not merely have deeply studied and pondered +the subject, but must spend as much time as possible in exercising, as a +whole, the fleet which he commands, in order not only by experimental +manoeuvres thoroughly to satisfy himself as to the formation and mode of +attack which will be best suited to any conceivable circumstance in +which he may find himself, but also to inculcate his ideas into his +subordinates; to inspire them with his own knowledge, and to give them +that training in working together which, in all those kinds of +activities which require large numbers of men to work together, whether +on the cricket field, at football, in an army, or in a navy, constitutes +the advantage of a practised over a scratch team. + +If the practice is to make the fleet ready for war, it must be carried +out with the fleet in its war composition. All the different elements, +battleships, cruisers, torpedo craft, and the rest, must be fully +represented, otherwise the admiral would be practising in peace with a +different instrument from that with which he would need to operate in +war. + +The importance of this perpetual training ought to be self-evident. It +may be well to remind the reader that it has also been historically +proved. The great advantage which the British possessed over the French +navy in the Wars of the Revolution and the Empire was that the British +fleets were always at sea, whereas the French fleets, for years +blockaded in their ports, were deficient in that practice which, in the +naval as in all other professions, makes perfect. One of the complaints +against the present Board of Admiralty is that it has not encouraged the +training and exercise of fleets as complete units. + +Another point, in regard to which the recent practice of the Admiralty +is regarded with very grave doubts, not only by many naval officers, +but also by many of those who, without being naval officers, take a +serious interest in the navy, is that of naval construction. For several +years the Admiralty neglected to build torpedo craft of the quality and +in the quantity necessary for the most probable contingencies of war, +while, at the same time, large sums of money were spent in building +armoured cruisers, vessels of a fighting power so great that an admiral +would hesitate to detach them from his fleet, lest he should be +needlessly weakened on the day of battle, yet not strong enough safely +to replace the battleships in the fighting line. The result has been +that the admirals in command of fleets have for some time been anxiously +asking to be better supplied with scouts or vessels of great speed, but +not of such fighting power that they could not be spared at a distance +from the fleet even on the eve of an action. These two defects in the +shipbuilding policy of the Admiralty make it probable that for some +years past the navy has not been constructed in accord with any fully +thought-out design of operations; in other words, that the great object +"victory" has been forgotten by the supreme authority. + +The doubt whether victory has been borne in mind is confirmed by what is +known of the design of the original _Dreadnought_. A battleship ought to +be constructed for battle, that is, for the purpose of destroying the +enemy's fleet, for which purpose it will never be used alone, but in +conjunction with a number of ships like itself forming the weapon of an +admiral in command. A battleship requires three qualities, in the +following order of importance:-- + +First, offensive power. A fleet exists in order to destroy the enemy, +but it has no prospect of performing that function if its power of +destruction is less than its enemy's. The chief weapon to-day, as in the +past, is artillery. Accordingly the first requisite of a fleet, as +regards its material qualities, those produced by the constructor, is +the capacity to pour on to the enemy's fleet a heavier rain of +projectiles than he can return. + +The second quality is the power of movement. The advantage of superior +speed in a fleet--for the superior speed of an individual ship is of +little importance--is that so long as it is preserved it enables the +admiral, within limits, to accept or decline battle according to his own +judgment. This is a great strategical advantage. It may in some +conditions enable an inferior fleet to postpone an action which might be +disastrous until it has effected a junction with another fleet belonging +to its own side. + +The third quality is that the ships of a fleet should be strong enough +to offer to the enemy's projectiles a sufficient resistance to make it +improbable that they can be sunk before having inflicted their fair +share of damage on the adversary. + +There is always a difficulty in combining these qualities in a given +ship, because as a ship weighs the quantity of water which she +displaces, a ship of any given size has its weight given, and the +designer cannot exceed that limit of weight. He must divide it between +guns with their ammunition, engines with their coal, and armour. Every +ton given to armour diminishes the tonnage possible for guns and +engines, and, given a minimum for armour, every extra ton given to +engines and coal reduces the possible weight of guns and ammunition. In +the _Dreadnought_ a very great effort was made to obtain a considerable +extra speed over that of all other battleships. This extra speed was +defended on the ground that it would enable a fleet of _Dreadnoughts_ to +fight a battle at long range, and with a view to such battle the +_Dreadnought_ was provided only with guns of the heaviest calibre and +deprived of those guns of medium calibre with which earlier battleships +were well provided. The theories thus embodied in the new class of ships +were both of them doubtful, and even dangerous. In the first place, it +is in the highest degree injurious to the spirit and courage of the crew +to have a ship which they know will be at a disadvantage if brought into +close proximity with the enemy. Their great object ought to be to get as +near to the enemy as possible. The hypothesis that more damage will be +done by an armament exclusively of the largest guns is in the opinion +of many of the best judges likely to be refuted. There is some reason to +believe that a given tonnage, if devoted to guns of medium calibre, +would yield a very much greater total damage to an enemy's ship than if +devoted to a smaller number of guns of heavy calibre and firing much +less rapidly. + +There is, moreover, a widespread belief among naval officers of the +highest repute, among whom may be named the author of the "Influence of +Sea Power upon History," than whom no one has thought more profoundly on +the subject of naval war, that it is bad economy to concentrate in a few +very large ships the power which might be more conveniently and +effectively employed if distributed in a great number of ships of more +moderate size. + +Surely, so long as naval opinion is divided about the tactical and +strategical wisdom of a new type of battleship, it is rash to continue +building battleships exclusively of that type, and it would be more +reasonable to make an attempt to have naval opinion sifted and +clarified, and thus to have a secure basis for a shipbuilding programme, +than to hurry on an enormous expenditure upon what may after all prove +to have been a series of doubtful experiments. + +All the questions above discussed seem to me to be more important than +that of mere numbers of ships. Numbers are, however, of great +importance in their proper place and for the proper reasons. The policy +adopted and carried out by the British navy, at any rate during the +latter half of the war against the French Empire, was based on a known +superiority of force. The British fleet set out by blockading all the +French fleets, that is, by taking stations near to the great French +harbours and there observing those harbours, so that no French fleet +should escape without being attacked. If this is to be the policy of the +British navy in future it will require a preponderance of force of every +kind over that of the enemy, and that preponderant force will have to be +fully employed from the very first day of the war. In other words, it +must be kept in commission during peace. But, in addition, it is always +desirable to have a reserve of strength to meet the possibility that the +opening of a war or one of its early subsequent stages may bring into +action some additional unexpected adversary. There are thus two reasons +that make for a fleet of great numerical strength. The first, that only +great superiority renders possible the strategy known as blockade, or, +as I have ventured to call it, of "shadowing" the whole of the enemy's +forces. The second, that only great numerical strength renders it +possible to provide a reserve against unexpected contingencies. + + + + +XV. + + +ENGLAND'S MILITARY PROBLEM + +After the close of the South African war, two Royal Commissions were +appointed. One of them, known as the War Commission, was in a general +way to inquire into and report upon the lessons of the war. This mission +it could fulfil only very imperfectly, because its members felt +precluded from discussing the policy in which the war had its origin and +incapable of reviewing the military conduct of the operations. This was +very like reviewing the play of "Hamlet" without reference to the +characters and actions either of Hamlet or of the King, for the +mainsprings which determine the course, character, and issue of any war +are the policy out of which it arises and the conduct of the military +operations. The main fact which impressed itself on the members of the +War Commission was that the forces employed on the British side had been +very much larger than had been expected at the beginning of the war, and +the moral which they drew was contained in the one sentence of their +report which has remained in the public mind, to the effect that the +Government ought to make provision for the expansion of the army beyond +the limit of the regular forces of the Crown. + +About the same time another Commission, under the chairmanship of the +Duke of Norfolk, was appointed to inquire and report whether any, and, +if any, what changes were required in order to secure that the Militia +and Volunteer forces should be maintained in a condition of military +efficiency and at an adequate strength. The Norfolk Commission +recommended certain changes which it thought would lead to a great +improvement in the efficiency of both forces, while permitting them to +maintain the requisite numerical strength. With regard to the Volunteer +force, the report said:-- + +"The governing condition is that the Volunteer, whether an officer, +non-commissioned officer, or private, earns his own living, and that if +demands are made upon him which are inconsistent with his doing so he +must cease to be a Volunteer. No regulations can be carried out which +are incompatible with the civil employment of the Volunteers, who are +for the most part in permanent situations. Moreover, whatever may be the +goodwill and patriotism of employers, they cannot allow the Volunteers +they may employ more than a certain period of absence. Their power to +permit their workmen to attend camp or other exercises is controlled by +the competition which exists in their trade. Those who permit Volunteers +in their service to take holidays longer than are customary in their +trade and district, are making in the public interest a sacrifice which +some of them think excessive." + +The report further laid stress on the cardinal principle that no +Volunteer, whatever his rank, should be put to expense on account of his +service. Subject to this governing condition and to this cardinal +principle, the Commission made recommendations from which it expected a +marked improvement and the gradual attainment of a standard much in +advance of anything which until then had been reached. + +Most of these recommendations have been adopted, with modifications, in +the arrangements which have since been made for the Volunteers under the +new name "The Territorial Force." + +The Norfolk Commission felt no great confidence in the instructions +given it by the Government on the subject of the standard of efficiency +and of numerical strength. Accordingly the Commission added to its +report the statement:-- + +"We cannot assert that, even if the measures +recommended were fully carried out, these forces +would be equal to the task of defeating a modern +continental army in the United Kingdom." + +The Commission's chief doubt was whether, under the conditions +inseparable at any rate from the volunteer system, any scheme of +training would give to forces officered largely by men who are not +professional soldiers the cohesion of armies that exact a progressive +two-years' course from their soldiers and rely, except for expanding the +subaltern ranks on mobilisation, upon professional leaders. The +Commission then considered "Measures which may provide a Home Defence +Army equal to the task of defeating an invader." They were unable to +recommend the adoption of the Swiss system, partly because the initial +training was not, in their judgment, sufficient for the purpose, and +partly because they held that the modern method of extending the +training to all classes, while shortening its duration, involves the +employment of instructors of the highest possible qualifications. The +Commission concluded by reporting that a Home Defence Army capable, in +the absence of the whole or the greater portion of the regular forces, +of protecting this country against invasion can be raised and maintained +only on the principle that it is the duty of every citizen of military +age and sound physique to be trained for the national defence and to +take part in it should emergency arise. + +The Norfolk Commission gave expression to two different views without +attempting to reconcile them. On the one hand it laid down the main +lines along which the improvement of the militia and volunteers was to +be sought, and on the other hand it pointed out the advantages of the +principle that it is the citizen's duty to be trained as a soldier and +to fight in case of need. To go beyond this and to attempt either to +reconcile the two currents of thought or to decide between them, was +impossible for a Commission appointed to deal with only a fraction of +the problem of national defence. The two sets of views, however, +continue to exist side by side, and the nation yet has to do what the +Norfolk Commission by its nature was debarred from doing. The +Government, represented in this matter by Mr. Haldane, is still in the +position of relying upon an improved militia and volunteer force. The +National Service League, on the other hand, advocates the principle of +the citizen's duty, though it couples with it a specific programme +borrowed from the Swiss system, the adoption of which was deprecated in +the Commission's Report. The public is somewhat puzzled by the +appearance of opposition between what are thought of as two schools, and +indeed Mr. Haldane in his speech introducing the Army Estimates on March +4, 1909, described the territorial force as a safeguard against +universal service. + +The time has perhaps come when the attempt should be made to find a +point of view from which the two schools of thought can be seen in due +perspective, and from which, therefore, a definite solution of the +military problem may be reached. + +By what principle must our choice between the two systems be determined? +By the purpose in hand. The sole ultimate use of an army is to win the +nation's battles, and if one system promises to fulfil that purpose +while the other system does not, we cannot hesitate. + +Great Britain requires an army as one of the instruments of success in a +modern British war, and we have therefore to ascertain, in general, the +nature of a modern war, and in particular the character of such wars as +Great Britain may have to wage. + +The distinguishing feature of the conflict between two modern great +States is that it is a struggle for existence, or, at any rate, a +wrestle to a fall. The mark of the modern State is that it is identified +with the population which it comprises, and to such a State the name +"nation" properly belongs. The French Revolution nationalised the State +and in consequence nationalised war, and every modern continental State +has so organized itself with a view to war that its army is equivalent +to the nation in arms. + +The peculiar character of a British war is due to the insular character +of the British State. A conflict with a great continental Power must +begin with a naval struggle, which will be carried on with the utmost +energy until one side or the other has established its predominance on +the sea. If in this struggle the British navy is successful, the effect +which can be produced on a continental State by the victorious navy will +not be sufficient to cause the enemy to accept peace upon British +conditions. For that purpose, it will be necessary to invade the enemy's +territory and to put upon him the constraint of military defeat, and +Great Britain therefore requires an army strong enough either to effect +this operation or to encourage continental allies to join with it in +making the attempt. + +In any British war, therefore, which is to be waged with prospect of +success, Great Britain's battles must be fought and won on the enemy's +territory and against an army raised and maintained on the modern +national principle. + +This is the decisive consideration affecting British military policy. + +In case of the defeat of the British navy a continental enemy would, +undoubtedly, attempt the invasion and at least the temporary conquest of +Great Britain. The army required to defeat him in the United Kingdom +would need to have the same strength and the same qualities as would be +required to defeat him in his own territory, though, if the invasion had +been preceded by naval defeat, it is very doubtful whether any military +success in the United Kingdom would enable Great Britain to continue +her resistance with much hope of ultimate success. + +For these reasons I cannot believe that Great Britain's needs are met by +the possession of any force the employment of which is, by the +conditions of its service, limited to fighting in the United Kingdom. A +British army, to be of any use, must be ready to go and win its +country's battles in the theatre of war in which its country requires +victories. That theatre of war will never be the United Kingdom unless +and until the navy has failed to perform its task, in which case it will +probably be too late to win battles in time to avert the national +overthrow which must be the enemy's aim. + +There are, however, certain subsidiary services for which any British +military system must make provision. + +These are:-- + +(1) Sufficient garrisons must be maintained during peace in India, in +Egypt, for some time to come in South Africa, and in certain naval +stations beyond the seas, viz., Gibraltar, Malta, Ceylon, Hong Kong, +Singapore, Mauritius, West Africa, Bermuda, and Jamaica. It is generally +agreed that the principle of compulsory service cannot be applied for +the maintenance of these garrisons, which must be composed of +professional paid soldiers. + +(2) Experience shows that a widespread Empire, like the British, +requires from time to time expeditions for the maintenance of order on +its borders against half civilised or savage tribes. This function was +described in an essay on "Imperial Defence," published by Sir Charles +Dilke and the present writer in 1892 as "Imperial Police." + +It would not be fair, for the purpose of one of these small expeditions, +arbitrarily to call upon a fraction of a force maintained on the +principle of compulsion. Accordingly any system must provide a special +paid reserve for the purpose of furnishing the men required for such an +expedition. + +An army able to strike a serious blow against a continental enemy in his +own territory would evidently be equally able to defeat an invading army +if the necessity should arise. Accordingly the military question for +Great Britain resolves itself into the provision of an army able to +carry on serious operations against a European enemy, together with the +maintenance of such professional forces as are indispensable for the +garrisons of India, Egypt, and the over-sea stations enumerated above +and for small wars. + + + + +XVI. + + +TWO SYSTEMS CONTRASTED + +I proceed to describe a typical army of the national kind, and to show +how the system of such an army could be applied in the case of Great +Britain. + +The system of universal service has been established longer in Germany +than in any other State, and can best be explained by an account of its +working in that country. In Germany every man becomes liable to military +service on his seventeenth birthday, and remains liable until he is +turned forty-five. The German army, therefore, theoretically includes +all German citizens between the ages of seventeen and forty-five, but +the liability is not enforced before the age of twenty nor after the age +of thirty-nine, except in case of some supreme emergency. Young men +under twenty, and men between thirty-nine and forty-five, belong to the +Landsturm. They are subjected to no training, and would not be called +upon to fight except in the last extremity. Every year all the young men +who have reached their twentieth birthday are mustered and classified. +Those who are not found strong enough for military service are divided +into three grades, of which one is dismissed as unfit; a second is +excused from training and enrolled in the Landsturm; while a third, +whose physical defects are minor and perhaps temporary, is told off to a +supplementary reserve, of which some members receive a short training. +Of those selected as fit for service a few thousand are told off to the +navy, the remainder pass into the army and join the colours. + +The soldiers thus obtained serve in the ranks of the army for two years +if assigned to the infantry, field artillery, or engineers, and for +three years if assigned to the cavalry or horse artillery. At the +expiration of the two or three years they pass into the reserve of the +standing army, in which they remain until the age of twenty-seven, that +is, for five years in the case of the infantry and engineers, and for +four years in the case of the cavalry and horse artillery. At +twenty-seven all alike cease to belong to the standing army, and pass +into the Landwehr, to which they continue to belong to the age of +thirty-nine. The necessity to serve for at least two years with the +colours is modified in the case of young men who have reached a certain +standard of education, and who engage to clothe, feed, equip, and in the +mounted arms to mount themselves. These men are called "one year +volunteers," and are allowed to pass into the reserve of the standing +army at the expiration of one year with the colours. + +In the year 1906, 511,000 young men were mustered, and of these 275,000 +were passed into the standing army, 55,000 of them being one year +volunteers. The men in any year so passed into the army form an annual +class, and the standing army at any time is made up, in the infantry, of +two annual classes, and in the cavalry and horse artillery of three +annual classes. In case of war, the army of first line would be made up +by adding to the two or three annual classes already with the colours +the four or five annual classes forming the reserve, that is, altogether +seven annual classes. Each of these classes would number, when it first +passed into the army, about 275,000; but as each class must lose every +year a certain number of men by death, by diseases which cause physical +incapacity from service, and by emigration, the total army of first line +must fall short of the total of seven times 275,000. It may probably be +taken at a million and a half. In the second line come the twelve annual +classes of Landwehr, which will together furnish about the same numbers +as the standing army. + +Behind the Landwehr comes the supplementary reserve, and behind that +again the Landsturm, comprising the men who have been trained and are +between the ages of thirty-nine and forty-five, the young men under +twenty, and all those who, from physical weakness, have been entirely +exempted from training. + +During their two or three years with the colours the men receive an +allowance or pay of twopence halfpenny a day. Their service is not a +contract but a public duty, and while performing it they are clothed, +lodged, and fed by the State. When passed into the reserve they resume +their normal civil occupation, except that for a year or two they are +called up for a few weeks' training and manoeuvres during the autumn. + +In this way all German citizens, so far as they are physically fit, with +a few exceptions, such as the only son and support of a widow, receive a +thorough training as soldiers, and Germany relies in case of war +entirely and only upon her citizens thus turned into soldiers. + +The training is carried out by officers and non-commissioned officers, +who together are the military schoolmasters of the nation, and, like +other proficient schoolmasters, are paid for their services by which +they live. Broadly speaking, there are in Germany no professional +soldiers except the officers and non-commissioned officers, from whom a +high standard of capacity as instructors and trainers during peace and +as leaders in war is demanded and obtained. + +The high degree of military proficiency which the German army has +acquired is due to the excellence of the training given by the officers +and to the thoroughness with which, during a course of two or three +years, that training can be imparted. The great numbers which can be put +into the field are due to the practice of passing the whole male +population, so far as it is physically qualified, through this training, +so that the army in war represents the whole of the best manhood of the +country between the ages of twenty and forty. + +The total of three millions which has been given above is that which was +mentioned by Prince Bismarck in a speech to the Reichstag in 1887. The +increase of population since that date has considerably augmented the +figures for the present time, and the corresponding total to-day +slightly exceeds four millions. + + * * * * * + +The results of the British system are shown in the following table, +which gives, from the Army Estimates, the numbers of the various +constituents of the British army on the 1st of January 1909. There were +at that date in the United Kingdom:--- + +Regular forces ........................ 123,250 +Army reserve .......................... 134,110 +Special reserves ...................... 67,780 +Militia ............................... 9,158 +Territorial force ..................... 209,977 +Officers' training corps .............. 416 + ________ + + Total in the United Kingdom ...... 544,691 + +In Egypt and the Colonies:-- + +Regular forces ........................ 45,002 + +The British troops in India are paid for by the Indian Government and do +not appear in the British Army Estimates. Of the force maintained in the +United Kingdom, it will be observed that it falls, roughly, into three +categories. + +In the first place come the first-rate troops which may be presumed to +have had a thorough training for war. This class embraces only the +regulars and the army reserve, which together slightly exceed a quarter +of a million. In the second class come the 68,000 of the special +reserve, which, in so far as they have enjoyed the six months' training +laid down in the recent reorganisation, could on a sanguine estimate be +classified as second-class troops, though in view of the fact that their +officers are not professional and are for the most part very slightly +trained, that classification would be exceedingly sanguine. Next comes +the territorial force with a maximum annual training of a fortnight in +camp, preceded by ten to twenty lessons and officered by men whose +professional training, though it far exceeds that of the rank and file, +falls yet very much short of that given to the professional officers of +a first-rate continental army. The territorial force, by its +constitution, is not available to fight England's battles except in the +United Kingdom, where they can never be fought except in the event of a +defeat of the navy. + +This heterogeneous tripartite army is exceedingly expensive, its cost +during the current year being, according to the Estimates, very little +less than 29 millions, the cost of the personnel being 23-1/2 millions, +that of _matériel_ being 4 millions, and that of administration 1/2 +millions. + +The British regular army cannot multiply soldiers as does the German +army. It receives about 37,000 recruits a year. But it sends away to +India and the Colonies about 23,000 each year and seldom receives them +back before their eight years' colour service are over, when they pass +into the first-class reserve. There pass into the reserve about 24,000 +men a year, and as the normal term of reserve service is four years, its +normal strength is about 96,000 men. + +As the regular army contains only professional soldiers, who look, at +any rate for a period of eight years, to soldiering as a living, and are +prepared for six or seven years abroad, there is a limit to the supply +of recruits, who are usually under nineteen years of age, and to whom +the pay of a shilling a day is an attraction. Older men with prospects +of regular work expect wages much higher than that, and therefore do not +enlist except when in difficulties. + + + + +XVII. + + +A NATIONAL ARMY + +I propose to show that a well-trained homogeneous army of great +numerical strength can be obtained on the principle of universal service +at no greater cost than the present mixed force. The essentials of a +scheme, based upon training the best manhood of the nation, are: first, +that to be trained is a matter of duty not of pay; secondly, that every +trained man is bound, as a matter of duty, to serve with the army in a +national war; thirdly, that the training must be long enough to be +thorough, but no longer; fourthly, that the instructors shall be the +best possible, which implies that they must be paid professional +officers and non-commissioned officers. + +I take the age at which the training should begin at the end of the +twentieth year, in order that, in case of war, the men in the ranks may +be the equals in strength and endurance of the men in the ranks of any +opposing army. The number of men who reach the age of twenty every year +in the United Kingdom exceeds 400,000. Continental experience shows that +less than half of these would be rejected as not strong enough. The +annual class would therefore be about 200,000. + +The principle of duty applies of course to the navy as well as to the +army, and any man going to the navy will be exempt from army training. +But it is doubtful whether the navy can be effectively manned on a +system of very short service such as is inevitable for a national army. +The present personnel of the navy is maintained by so small a yearly +contingent of recruits that it will be covered by the excess of the +annual class over the figure here assumed of 200,000. The actual number +of men reaching the age of twenty is more than 400,000, and the probable +number out of 400,000 who will be physically fit for service is at least +213,000. + +I assume that for the infantry and field artillery a year's training +would, with good instruction, be sufficient, and that even better and +more lasting results would be produced if the last two months of the +year were replaced by a fortnight of field manoeuvres in each of the +four summers following the first year. For the cavalry and horse +artillery I believe that the training should be prolonged for a second +year. + +The liability to rejoin the colours, in case of a national war, should +continue to the end of the 27th year, and be followed by a period of +liability in the second line, Landwehr or Territorial Army. + +The first thing to be observed is the numerical strength of the army +thus raised and trained. + +If we assume that any body of men loses each year, from death, +disablement, and emigration, five per cent. of its number, the annual +classes would be as follows:-- + +1st year, age 20-21 200,000 (At the end of the +2nd " " 21-22 170,000 first year 20,000 +3rd " " 23-24 161,300 are to go abroad +4th " " 24-25 153,425 as explained below) +5th " " 25-26 145,754 +6th " " 26-27 138,467 + -------- + Total on mobilisation 968,946 + ======== + +This gives an army of close upon a million men in first line in addition +to the British forces in India, Egypt, and the colonial stations. + +If from the age of 27 to that of 31 the men were in the Landwehr, that +force would be composed of four annual classes as follows:-- + + 7th year, age 27-28 131,544 + 8th " " 28-29 124,967 + 9th " " 29-30 118,719 +10th " " 30-31 112,784 + -------- + Total of Landwehr 488,014 + ======== + +There is no need to consider the further strength that would be +available if the liability were prolonged to the age of 39, as it is in +Germany. + +The liability thus enforced upon all men of sound physique is to fight +in a national war, a conflict involving for England a struggle for +existence. But that does not and ought not to involve serving in the +garrison of Egypt or of India during peace, nor being called upon to +take part in one of the small wars waged for the purpose of policing the +Empire or its borders. These functions must be performed by +professional, i.e. paid soldiers. + +The British army has 76,000 men in India and 45,000 in Egypt, South +Africa, and certain colonial stations. These forces are maintained by +drafts from the regular army at home, the drafts amounting in 1908 to +12,000 for India and 11,000 for the Colonies. + +Out of every annual class of 200,000 young men there will be a number +who, after a year's training, will find soldiering to their taste, and +will wish to continue it. These should be given the option of engaging +for a term of eight years in the British forces in India, Egypt, or the +Colonies. There they would receive pay and have prospects of promotion +to be non-commissioned officers, sergeants, warrant officers or +commissioned officers, and of renewing their engagement if they wished +either for service abroad or as instructors in the army at home. These +men would leave for India, Egypt, or a colony at the end of their first +year. I assume that 20,000 would be required, because eight annual +classes of that strength, diminishing at the rate of five per cent. per +annum, give a total of 122,545, and the eight annual classes would +therefore suffice to maintain the 121,000 now in India, Egypt, and the +Colonies. Provision is thus made for the maintenance of the forces in +India, Egypt, and the Colonies. + +There must also be provision for the small wars to which the Empire is +liable. This would be made by engaging every year 20,000 who had +finished their first year's training to serve for pay, say 1s. a day, +for a period say of six months, of the second year, and afterwards to +join for five years the present first-class reserve at 6d. a day, with +liability for small wars and expeditions. At the end of the five years +these men would merge in the general unpaid reserve of the army. They +might during their second year's training be formed into a special corps +devoting most of the time to field manoeuvres, in which supplementary or +reserve officers could receive special instruction. + +It would be necessary also to keep with the colours for some months +after the first year's training a number of garrison artillery and +engineers to provide for the security of fortresses during the period +between the time of sending home one annual class and the preliminary +lessons of the next. These men would be paid. I allow 10,000 men for +this purpose, and these, with the 20,000 prolonging their training for +the paid reserve, and with the mounted troops undergoing the second +year's training, would give during the winter months a garrison strength +at home of 50,000 men. + +The mobilised army of a million men would require a great number of +extra officers, who should be men of the type of volunteer officers +selected for good education and specially trained, after their first +year's service, in order to qualify them as officers. Similar provision +must be made for supplementary non-commissioned officers. + + + + +XVIII. + + +THE COST + +It will probably be admitted that an army raised and trained on the plan +here set forth would be far superior in war to the heterogeneous body +which figures in the Army Estimates at a total strength of 540,000 +regulars, militia, and volunteers. Its cost would in no case be more +than that of the existing forces, and would probably be considerably +less. This is the point which requires to be proved. + +The 17th Appendix to the Army Estimates is a statement of the cost of +the British army, arranged under the four headings of:-- + + +1. Cost of personnel of regular army and + army reserve £18,279,234 + +2. Cost of special reserves and territorial + forces 5,149,843 + +3. Cost of armaments, works, stores, &c. 3,949,463 + +4. Cost of staff and administration 1,414,360 + ___________ + Making a total of £28,792,900 + =========== + +In the above table nearly a million is set down for the cost of certain +labour establishments and of certain instructional establishments, +which may for the present purpose be neglected. Leaving them out, the +present cost of the personnel of the Regular Army, apart from staff, is, +£15,942,802. For this cost are maintained officers, non-commissioned +officers and men, numbering altogether 170,000. + +The lowest pay given is that of 1s. a day to infantry privates, the +privates of the other arms receiving somewhat higher and the +non-commissioned officers very much higher rates of pay. + +If compulsory service were introduced into Great Britain, pay would +become unnecessary for the private soldier; but he ought to be and would +be given a daily allowance of pocket-money, which probably ought not to +exceed fourpence. The mounted troops would be paid at the rate of 1s. a +day during their second year's service. + +Assuming then that the private soldier received fourpence a day instead +of 1s. a day, and that the officers and non-commissioned officers were +paid as at present, the cost of the army would be reduced by an amount +corresponding to 8d. a day for 148,980 privates. That amount is +£1,812,590, the deduction of which would reduce the total cost to +£14,137,212. At the same rate an army of 200,000 privates and + +20,000 non-commissioned officers and men would +cost . . . . . . . . £18,295,215 + + Second year of 20,000 mounted + troops at £60 a year each . . . 1,200,000 + + Add to this cost of first-class Reserve + of 96,000 at £10 7s. 6d. + each . . . . . . . 997,600 + + Cost of 30,000 men for six months' + extra training at the rate of + £60 a year each . . . . . 900,000 + + Cost of extra training for supplementary + officers and non-commissioned + officers . . . . . . 500,000 + ----------- + £21,892,815 + Add to this the cost of the troops + maintained in the Colonies and + Egypt so far as charged to + British Estimates . . . . £3,401,704 + ----------- + Total personnel . . . £25,294,519 + + Matériel (allowing for additional + outlay due to larger numbers) . . 4,500,000 + + Staff and administration . . . 1,500,000 + ------------ + Total Cost of Army at Home + and in the Colonies . . £31,294,519 + +This is slightly in excess of the present cost of the personnel of the +Army, but, whereas the present charge only provides for the +heterogeneous force already described of 589,000 men, the charges here +explained provide for a short-service homogeneous army of one million +and a half, as well as for the 45,000 troops permanently maintained in +Egypt and the Colonies. + +The estimate just given is, however, extravagant. The British system has +innumerable different rates of pay and extra allowances of all kinds, +and is so full of anomalies that it is bound to be costly. +Unfortunately, the Army Estimates are so put together that it is +difficult to draw from them any exact inferences as to the actual annual +cost of a private soldier beyond his pay. + +The average annual cost, effective and non-effective, of an officer in +the cavalry, artillery, engineers, and infantry is £473, this sum +covering all the arrangements for pensions and retiring allowances. + +I propose in the following calculations to assume the average cost of an +officer to be £500 a year, a sum which would make it possible for the +average combatant officer to be somewhat better paid than he is at +present. + +The normal pay of a sergeant in the infantry of the line is 2s. 4d. a +day, or £42, 11s. 8d. a year. The Army Estimates do not give the cost of +a private soldier, but the statement is made that the average annual +cost per head of 150,000 warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, +and men is £63, 6s. 7d. The warrant officers and non-commissioned +officers appear to be much more expensive than the private, and as the +minimum pay of a private is £18, 5s., the balance, £45, 1s. 7d., is +probably much more than the cost of housing, clothing, feeding, and +equipping the private, whose food, the most expensive item, certainly +does not cost a shilling a day or £18 a year. + +I assume that the cost of maintaining a private soldier is covered by +£36 a year, while his allowance of 4d. a day amounts to £6, 1s. 4d. In +order to cover the extra allowances which may be made to corporals, +buglers, and trumpeters, I assume the average cost of the rank and file +to be £45 a year. I also assume that the average cost of a sergeant does +not exceed £100 a year, which allows from £40 to £50 for his pay and the +balance for his housing, clothing, equipment, and food. I add provisions +for pensions for sergeants after twenty-five years' service. + +These figures lead to the following estimate:-- + +7000 officers at £500 £3,500,000 + +14,000 sergeants at £100 1,400,000 + +Pension after twenty-five years for sergeants, + £52 a year 396,864 + +(An annual class of 14,000, decreasing + annually by 2-1/2 per cent., would consist, + after twenty-five years, of 7632) + ------------ + Carry forward £5,296,864 + + Brought forward . . . £5,296,864 + +200,000 privates at £45 a year . . 9,000,000 + +2nd year of 20,000 mounted troops (cavalry + and horse artillery at £60 a year each) 1,200,000 + +Six months' extra training for 30,000 men + with pay (total rate per man £60 a year) + (20,000 for paid reserve and 10,000 + fortress troops) . . . . 900,000 + +First-class reserve . . . . 997,600 + +Training supplementary officers and sergeants 500,000 + ------------ + £17,894,464 + +Colonial troops . . . . . 3,500,000 + + Total personnel . . . . £21,394,464 + ------------ + +_Matériel_, allowing for additional cost due + to larger numbers . . . . 4,500,000 + +Staff and administration . . . 1,500,000 + ------------ + +Total cost of army at home and in the + Colonies . . . . . £27,394,464 + ============ + +The figures here given will, it is hoped, speak for themselves. They +are, if anything, too high rather than too low. The number of officers +is calculated on the basis of the present war establishments, which give +5625 officers for 160,500 of the other ranks. It does not include those +in Egypt and the Colonies. The cost of the officers is taken at a higher +average rate than that of British officers of the combatant arms under +the present system, and, both for sergeants and for privates, ample +allowance appears to me to be made even on the basis of their present +cost. + +When it is considered that Germany maintains with the colours a force of +600,000 men at a cost of £29,000,000, that France maintains 550,000 for +£27,000,000, and that Italy maintains 221,000 for £7,500,000, it cannot +be admitted that Great Britain would be unable to maintain 220,000 +officers and men at an annual cost of £17,500,000, and the probability +is that with effective administration this cost could be considerably +reduced. + +It may at first sight seem that the logical course would have been to +assume two years' service in the infantry and three years' service in +the mounted arms, in accord with the German practice, but there are +several reasons that appear to me to make such a proposal unnecessary. +In the first place, Great Britain's principal weapon must always be her +navy, while Germany's principal weapon will always be her army, which +guarantees the integrity of her three frontiers and also guards her +against invasion from oversea. Germany's navy comes only in the second +place in any scheme for a German war, while in any scheme for a British +war the navy must come in the first place and the army in the second. + +The German practice for many years was to retain the bulk of the men for +three years with the colours. It was believed by the older generation of +soldiers that any reduction of this period would compromise that +cohesion of the troops which is the characteristic mark of a +disciplined army. But the views of the younger men prevailed and the +period has been reduced by a third. The reduction of time has, however, +placed a heavier responsibility upon the body of professional +instructors. + +The actual practice of the British army proves that a recruit can be +fully trained and be made fit in every way to take his place in his +company by a six months' training, but in my opinion that is not +sufficient preparation for war. The recruit when thoroughly taught +requires a certain amount of experience in field operations or +manoeuvres. This he would obtain during the summer immediately following +upon the recruit training; for the three months of summer, or of summer +and autumn, ought to be devoted almost entirely to field exercises and +manoeuvres. If the soldier is then called out for manoeuvres for a +fortnight in each of four subsequent years, or for a month in each of +two subsequent years, I believe that the lessons he has learned of +operations in the field will thereby be refreshed, renewed, and +digested, so as to give him sufficient experience and sufficient +confidence in himself, in his officers, and in the system to qualify him +for war at any moment during the next five or six years. The additional +three months' manoeuvre training, beyond the mere recruit training, +appears to me indispensable for an army that is to be able to take the +field with effect. But that this period should suffice, and that the +whole training should be given in nine or ten months of one year, +followed by annual periods of manoeuvre, involves the employment of the +best methods by a body of officers steeped in the spirit of modern +tactics and inspired by a general staff of the first order. + +The question what is the shortest period that will suffice to produce +cohesion belongs to educational psychology. How long does it take to +form habits? How many repetitions of a lesson will bring a man into the +condition in which he responds automatically to certain calls upon him, +as does a swimmer dropped into the water, a reporter in forming his +shorthand words, or a cyclist guiding and balancing his machine? In each +case two processes are necessary. There is first the series of +progressive lessons in which the movements are learned and mastered +until the pupil can begin practice. Then follows a period of practice +more or less prolonged, without which the lessons learned do not become +part of the man's nature; he retains the uncertainty of a beginner. The +recruit course of the British army is of four months. A first practice +period of six months followed by fresh practice periods of a month each +in two subsequent years or by four practice periods of a fortnight each +in four successive years are in the proposals here sketched assumed to +be sufficient. If they were proved inadequate I believe the right plan +of supplementing them would be rather by adding to the number and +duration of the manoeuvre practices of the subsequent years than by +prolonging the first period of continuous training. + +The following table shows the cost of two years' service calculated on +the same bases as have been assumed above. Two years' service would mean +an army with the colours not of 200,000 but of 390,000 men. This would +require double the number of officers and sergeants, and the annual +estimates for personnel would be £34,000,000, and the total Army +Estimates £41,000,000. There would also be a very great extra +expenditure upon barracks. + + +Estimate of Annual Cost for Two Years' Service. + +13,650 officers at £500 a year £6,825,000 + +27,300 sergeants at £100 2,730,000 + +Pension for sergeants' annual class + of 27,300, decreasing by 2-1/2 per + cent., gives after twenty-five years + £12,403; at £52 a year pension + is 644,956 + +390,000 privates at £45 a year 17,550,000 + +Third year mounted troops, 20,000 + at £60 1,200,000 + +First-class reserve 997,000 + +Training supplementary officers and + sergeants 500,000 + ---------- + Carry forward £30,446,956 + + Brought forward £30,446,956 + +Colonial troops 3,500,000 + ---------- + Total personnel £33,946,956 + +_Matériel_, allowing for extra + numbers 5,000,000 + +Staff and administration, allowing + for extra numbers 2,000,000 + ----------- + £40,946,956 + =========== + + + + +XIX. + + +ONE ARMY NOT TWO + +The training provided in the scheme which I have outlined could be +facilitated at comparatively small cost by the adoption of certain +preparatory instruction to be given partly in the schools, and partly to +young men between the ages of seventeen and twenty. + +It has never appeared to me desirable to add to the school curriculum +any military subjects whatever, and I am convinced that no greater +mistake could be made, seeing that schoolmasters are universally agreed +that the curriculum is already overloaded and requires to be lightened, +and that the best preparation that the school can give for making a boy +likely to be a good soldier when grown up, is to develop his +intelligence and physique as far as the conditions of school life admit. +But if all school children were drilled in the evolutions of infantry in +close order, the evolutions being always precisely the same as those +practised in the army, the army would receive its men already drilled, +and would not need to spend much time in recapitulating these +practices, which make no appreciable demand upon the time of school +children. + +Again, there seems to be no doubt that boys between the ages of +seventeen and twenty can very well be taught to handle a rifle, and the +time required for such instruction and practice is so small that it +would in no way affect or interfere with the ordinary occupations of the +boys, whatever their class in life. + +Every school of every grade ought, as a part of its ordinary geography +lessons, to teach the pupils to understand, to read, and to use the +ordnance maps of Great Britain, and that this should be the case has +already been recognised by the Board of Education. A soldier who can +read such a map has thereby acquired a knowledge and a habit which are +of the greatest value to him, both in manoeuvres and in the field. + +The best physical preparation which the schools can give their pupils +for the military life, as well as for any other life, is a well-directed +course of gymnastics and the habits of activity, order, initiative, and +discipline derived from the practice of the national games. + +A national army is a school in which the young men of a nation are +educated by a body of specially trained teachers, the officers. The +education given for war consists in a special training of the will and +of the intelligence. In order that it should be effective, the teachers +or trainers must not merely be masters of the theory and practice of war +and of its operations, but also proficient in the art of education. This +conception of the officers' function fixes their true place in the +State. Their duties require for their proper performance the best heads +as well as the best-schooled wills that can be found, and impose upon +them a laborious life. There can be no good teacher who is not also a +student, and a national army requires from its officers a high standard +not only of character, but of intelligence and knowledge. It should +offer a career to the best talent. A national army must therefore +attract the picked men of the universities to become officers. The +attraction, to such men consists, chiefly, in their faith in the value +of the work to be done, and, to a less degree, in the prospect of an +assured living. Adequate, though not necessarily high, pay must be +given, and there must be a probability of advancement in the career +proportionate to the devotion and talents given to the work. But their +work must be relied upon by the nation, otherwise they cannot throw +their energies into it with full conviction. + +This is the reason why, if there is to be a national army, it must be +the only regular army and the nation must rely upon nothing else. To +keep a voluntary paid standing army side by side with a national army +raised upon the principle of universal duty is neither morally nor +economically sound. Either the nation will rely upon its school or it +will not. If the school is good enough to serve the nation's turn, a +second school on a different basis is needless; if a second school were +required, that would mean that the first could not be trusted. + +There can be no doubt that in a national school of war the professional +officers must be the instructors, otherwise the nation will not rely +upon the young men trained. The 200,000 passed through the school every +year will be the nation's best. Therefore, so soon as the system has +been at work long enough to produce a force as large as the present +total, that is, after the third year, there will be no need to keep up +the establishment of 138,000 paid privates, the special reserve, or the +now existing territorial force. There will be one homogeneous army, of +which a small annual contingent will, after each year's training, be +enlisted for paid service in India, Egypt, and the oversea stations, and +a second small contingent, with extra training, will pass into the paid +reserve for service in small oversea expeditions. + +The professional officers and sergeants will, of course, be +interchangeable between the national army at home and its professional +branches in India, Egypt, and the oversea stations, and the cadres of +the battalions, batteries, and squadrons stationed outside the United +Kingdom can from time to time be relieved by the cadres of the +battalions' from the training army at home. This relief of battalions is +made practicable by the national system. One of the first consequences +of the new mode of recruiting will be that all recruits will be taken on +the same given date, probably the 1st of January in each year, and, as +this will apply as well to the men who re-engage to serve abroad as to +all others, so soon as the system is in full working order, the men of +any battalion abroad will belong to annual classes, and the engagement +of each class will terminate on the same day. + + + + +XX. + + +THE TRANSITION + +I have now explained the nature and working of a national army, and +shown the kind of strength it will give and the probable maximum cost +which it will involve when adopted. + +The chief difficulty attendant upon its adoption lies in the period of +transition from the old order to the new. If Great Britain is to keep +her place and do her duty in the world the change must be made; but the +question arises, how is the gulf between one and the other to be +bridged? War comes like a thief in the night, and it must not catch this +country unready. + +The complete readiness which the new system, when in full swing, will +produce, cannot be obtained immediately. All that can be done in the +transition period is to see that the number and quality of men available +for mobilisation shall be at least as high as it is under the existing +system. It may be worth while to explain how this result can be secured. + +Let us assume that the Act authorising the new system is passed during a +year, which may be called '00, and that it is to come into force on the +1st January of the year '01. The Act would probably exempt from its +operations the men at the date of its passing already serving in any of +the existing forces, including the territorial army, and the discussion +on the Bill would, no doubt, have the effect of filling the territorial +army up to the limit of its establishment, 315,000 men. + +On the 31st December '00 the available troops would therefore be:-- + +Regulars in the United Kingdom (present + figure) 138,000 + +Special reserve 67,000 + +Army reserve (probably diminished from present + strength) 120,000 + +Territorial force 315,000 + -------- +Total 640,000 + ======== + +From the 1st January '01 recruiting on present conditions for all these +forces would cease. + +The regular army of 138,000 + would lose drafts to India and the + Colonies 23,000 + and would have lost during '00 + by waste at 5 per cent 6,900 + ------- + 29,000 +This would leave: ------- + regular army under old conditions 108,100 + + and leave room for recruits under new conditions 91,900 + ======= + +The total available for mobilisation during the year '01 would +therefore be:-- + +Regulars 200,000 + +Paid reserves (the present first-class reserve. + I assume an arbitrary figure below the + actual one) 120,000 + +Special reserve (I assume a large waste and + a loss from men whose time has expired) 50,000 + +Territorial force 315,000 + Less 5 per cent 15,700 + ------- + 299,250 + ------- + 669,250 + +On the 1st January '02 the regular army would be:-- + +Old engagement 108,000 + Less waste 5,400 +Indian and Colonial reliefs 23,000 + ------- 79,600 + +Recruits under new system 120,400 + +Mounted troops serving second year 20,000 + -------- +Total of regulars 220,000 + +New reserve 91,900 + Less 5 per cent. 4,580 + ------- + 87,320 87,000 + +Paid reserve 120,000 + +Special reserve, reduced by lapse of engagements 40,000 + -------- +Total liable for national war 467,000 + +Add--Territorial force, reduced by 5 per cent + waste (14,962), and lapse of (78,750) + engagements 205,538 + -------- + 672,538 + ======== + +In the year '03 there would be:-- + +Old regulars, 79,600; less 5 per cent. waste, + 3,950; less drafts for abroad, 23,000-- + leaves 52,050, say 50,000 + +Regulars, recruits under new conditions 150,000 + +Mounted troops serving second year 20,000 + +New reserve 197,331 + +Paid reserve 120,000 + +Special reserve 30,000 + --------- + Total liable for national war 567,334 + + Territorial force 116,512 + --------- + 683,846 + ========= + +In the year '04 there would be:-- + +Old regulars 50,000 + Less 5 per cent. 2,500 + ------- + 47,500 + + Less drafts 23,000 + ------- 24,500 + +New regulars 175,500 + +Mounted troops, second year 20,000 + --------- + 220,000 + +New reserve 329,000 + +Paid reserve 120,000 + +Special reserve may now be dropped --------- +Total liable for national war 669,000 + +Territorial force 116,512 + Less 5 per cent. 5,825 + -------- + 110,687 + Less 78,750 + -------- 31,937 + -------- + 700,937 + ======== + +At the end of '04 the territorial force would come to an end and in '05 +there would be:-- + +(Old regulars, 24,000, after waste just enough + for drafts.) + +New regulars 200,000 + +Mounted troops, second year 20,000 + +New reserve 478,000 + Less to paid reserve 20,000 + -------- 458,000 + +Paid reserve 120,000 + -------- +Total, all liable for national war 798,000 + ======== + +In these tables I have taken the drafts for India and the Colonies from +the old regulars. But they can just as well be taken from the new +regulars. If need be the old regulars could, before the fourth year, be +passed into the paid reserve, and the full contingent of 200,000 one +year's men taken. + +The men of the special reserve and territorial force would on the +termination of their engagements pass into the second line reserve or +Landwehr until the age of thirty-one or thirty-two. + +It will be seen that during the years of transition additional expense +must be incurred, as, until the change has been completed, some portion +of the existing forces must be maintained side by side with the new +national army. It is partly in order to facilitate the operations of the +transition period that I have assumed a large addition to the number of +officers. There will also be additional expense caused by the increase +of barrack accommodation needed when the establishment is raised from +138,000 privates to 200,000, but this additional accommodation will not +be so great as it might at first sight appear, because it is reasonable +to suppose that those young men who wish it, and whose parents wish it, +will be allowed to live at home instead of in barracks, provided they +regularly attend all drills, parades, and classes. + +It has been necessary, in discussing the British military system, to +consider the arrangements for providing the garrisons of India, Egypt, +and certain oversea stations during peace, and to make provision for +small wars or imperial police; but I may point out that the system by +which provision is made out of the resources of the United Kingdom alone +for these two military requirements of the Empire, is, in the present +conditions of the Empire, an anomaly. The new nations which have grown +up in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are anxious, above all things, +to give reality to the bond between them and the mother country. Their +desire is to render imperial service, and the proper way of giving them +the opportunity to do so is to call upon them to take their part in +maintaining the garrisons in India and Egypt and in the work of imperial +police. How they should do it, it is for them to decide and arrange, but +for Englishmen at home to doubt for a moment either their will or their +capacity to take their proper share of the burden is to show an unworthy +doubt of the sincerity of the daughter nations and of their attachment +to the mother country and the Empire. + +If Great Britain should be compelled to enter upon a struggle for +existence with one of the great European powers, the part which Canada, +Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa could play in that struggle is +limited and specific. For the conflict would, in the first instance, +take the form of a naval war. To this the King's dominions beyond the +seas can do little more than assist during peace by their contributions, +either of ships, men, or money, in strengthening the British navy. But +during the actual course of such a war, while it is doubtful whether +either Canada, Australia, or New Zealand could render much material help +in a European struggle, they could undoubtedly greatly contribute to the +security of India and Egypt by the despatch of contingents of their own +troops to reinforce the British garrisons maintained in those countries. +This appears to me to be the direction to which their attention should +turn, not only because it is the most effective way in which they can +promote the stability of the Empire, but also because it is the way +along which they will most speedily reach a full appreciation of the +nature of the Empire and its purpose in the world. + + + + +XXI. + + +THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH ARMIES ARE RAISED + +I have now sketched the outlines of a national military system +applicable to the case of Great Britain. It remains to show why such a +system is necessary. + +There are three main points in respect of each of which a choice has to +be made. They are the motive which induces men to become soldiers, the +time devoted to military education, and the nature of the liability to +serve in war. The distinction which strikes the popular imagination is +that between voluntary and compulsory service. But it covers another +distinction hardly less important--that between paid and unpaid +soldiers. The volunteers between 1860 and 1878, or 1880, when pay began +to be introduced for attendance in camps, gave their time and their +attention with no external inducement whatever. They had no pay of any +kind, and there was no constraint to induce them to join, or, having, +joined, to continue in their corps. The regular soldier, on the other +hand, makes a contract with the State. He agrees in return for his pay, +clothes, board and lodging to give his whole time for a specific number +of years to the soldier's life. + +The principle of a contract for pay is necessary in the case of a +professional force maintained abroad for purposes of imperial police; +but it is not possible on that principle to raise or maintain a national +army. + +The principle of voluntary unpaid service appears to have a deeper moral +foundation than that of service by a contract of hiring. But if the time +required is greater than is consistent with the men's giving a full +day's work to their industrial occupations the unpaid nature of the +service cannot be maintained, and the men must be paid for their time. +The merit of the man's free gift of himself is thereby obscured. + +Wherein does that merit consist? If there is no merit in a man's making +himself a soldier without other reward than that which consists in the +education he receives, then the voluntary system has no special value. +But if there is a merit, it must consist in the man's conferring a +benefit upon, or rendering a service to, his country. In other words, +the excellence of the unpaid voluntary system consists in its being an +acceptance by those who serve under it of a duty towards the State. The +performance of that duty raises their citizenship to a higher plane. If +that is the case it must be desirable, in the interest both of the State +and of its citizens, that every citizen capable of the duty should +perform it. But that is the principle upon which the national system is +based. The national system is therefore an extension of the spirit of +the volunteer or unpaid voluntary system. + +The terms compulsory service and universal service are neither of them +strictly accurate. There is no means of making every adult male, without +exception, a soldier, because not every boy that grows up has the +necessary physical qualification. Nor does the word compulsion give a +true picture. It suggests that, as a rule, men would not accept the duty +if they could evade it, which is not the case. The number of men who +have been volunteers since 1860 shows that the duty is widely accepted. +Indeed, in a country of which the government is democratic, a duty +cannot be imposed by law upon all citizens except with the concurrence +of the majority. But a duty recognised by the majority and prescribed by +law will commend itself as necessary and right to all but a very few. If +a popular vote were to be taken on the question whether or not it is +every citizen's duty to be trained as a soldier and to fight in case of +a national war, it is hardly conceivable that the principle would fail +to be affirmed by an overwhelming majority. + +The points as to which opinions are divided are the time and method of +training and the nature of the liability to serve in war. + +There are, roughly speaking, three schemes of training to be +considered--first, the old volunteer plan of weekly evening drills, with +an annual camp training; secondly, the militia plan of three months' +recruit training followed by a month's camp training in several +subsequent years; and, lastly, the continental plan of a continuous +training for one or more years followed by one or more periods of annual +manoeuvres. The choice between these three methods is the crucial point +of the whole discussion. It must be determined by the standard of +excellence rendered necessary by the needs of the State. The evidence +given to the Norfolk Commission convinced that body that neither the +first nor the second plan will produce troops fit to meet on equal terms +those of a good modern army. Professional officers are practically +unanimous in preferring the third method. + +The liability of the trained citizen to serve in war during his year in +the ranks and his years as a first-class reservist must be determined by +the military needs of the country. I have given the reasons why I +believe the need to be for an army that can strike a blow in a +continental war. + +I myself became a volunteer because I was convinced that it was a +citizen's duty to train himself to bear arms in his country's cause. I +have been for many years an ardent advocate of the volunteer system, +because I believed, as I still believe, that a national army must be an +army of citizen soldiers, and from the beginning I have looked for the +efficiency of such an army mainly to the tactical skill and the +educating power of its officers. But experience and observation have +convinced me that a national army, such as I have so long hoped for, +cannot be produced merely by the individual zeal of its members, nor +even by their devoted co-operation with one another. The spirit which +animates them must animate the whole nation, if the right result is to +be produced. For it is evident that the effort of the volunteers, +continued for half a century, to make themselves an army, has met with +insuperable obstacles in the social and industrial conditions of the +country. The Norfolk Commission's Report made it quite clear that the +conditions of civil employment render it impossible for the training of +volunteers to be extended beyond the present narrow limits of time, and +it is evident that those limits do not permit of a training sufficient +for the purpose, which is victory in war against the best troops that +another nation can produce. + +Yet the officers and men of the volunteer force have not carried on +their fifty years' work in vain. They have, little by little, educated +the whole nation to think of war as a reality of life, they have +diminished the prejudice which used to attach to the name of soldier, +and they have enabled their countrymen to realise that to fight for his +country's cause is a part of every citizen's duty, for which he must be +prepared by training. + +The adoption of this principle will have further results. So soon as +every able-bodied citizen is by law a soldier, the administration of +both army and navy will be watched, criticised, and supported with an +intelligence which will no longer tolerate dilettantism in authority. +The citizen's interest in the State will begin to take a new aspect. He +will discover the nature of the bond which unites him to his +fellow-citizens, and from this perception will spring that regeneration +of the national life from which alone is to be expected the uplifting of +England. + + + + +XXII. + + +THE CHAIN OF DUTY + +The reader who has accompanied me to this point will perhaps be willing +to give me a few minutes more in which we may trace the different +threads of the argument and see if we can twine them into a rope which +will be of some use to us. + +We began by agreeing that the people of this country have not made +entirely satisfactory arrangements for a competitive struggle, at any +rate in its extreme form of war with another country, although such +conflict is possible at any time; and we observed that British political +arrangements have been made rather with a view to the controversy +between parties at home than to united action in contest with a foreign +state. + +We then glanced at the probable consequences to the British people of +any serious war, and at the much more dreadful results of failure to +obtain victory. We discussed the theories which lead some of our +countrymen to be unwilling to consider the nature and conditions of war, +and which make many of them imagine that war can be avoided either by +trusting to international arbitration or by international agreements +for disarmament. We agreed that it was not safe to rely upon these +theories. + +Examining the conditions of war as they were revealed in the great +struggle which finished a hundred years ago, we saw that the only chance +of carrying on war with any prospect of success in modern times lies in +the nationalisation of the State, so that the Government can utilise in +conflict all the resources of its land and its people. In the last war +Great Britain's national weapon was her navy, which she has for +centuries used as a means of maintaining the balance of power in Europe. +The service she thus rendered to Europe had its reward in the monopoly +of sea power which lasted through the nineteenth century. The great +event of that century was the attainment by Germany of the unity that +makes a nation and her consequent remarkable growth in wealth and power, +resulting in a maritime ambition inconsistent with the position which +England held at sea during the nineteenth century and was disposed to +think eternal. + +Great Britain, in the security due to her victories at sea, was able to +develop her colonies into nations, and her East India Company into an +Empire. But that same security caused her to forget her nationalism, +with the result that now her security itself is imperilled. During this +period, when the conception of the nation was in abeyance, some of the +conditions of sea power have been modified, with the result that the +British monopoly is at an end, while the possibility of a similar +monopoly has probably disappeared, so that the British navy, even if +successful, could not now be used, as it was a hundred years ago, as a +means of entirely destroying the trade of an adversary. Accordingly, if +in a future war Britain is to find a continental ally, she must be able +to offer him the assistance, not merely of naval victory, but also of a +strong army. Moreover, during the epoch in which Great Britain has +turned her back upon Europe the balance of power has been upset, and +there is no power and no combination able to stand up against Germany as +the head of the Triple Alliance. This is a position of great danger for +England, because it is an open question whether in the absence of a +strong British army any group of Powers, even in alliance with England, +could afford to take up a quarrel against the combination of the central +States. It thus appears that Great Britain, by neglecting the conditions +of her existence as a nation, has lost the strength in virtue of which, +at previous crises in European history, she was the successful champion +of that independence of States which, in the present stage of human +development, is the substance of freedom. + +Our consideration of the question of might showed that if Great Britain +is to be strong enough to meet her responsibilities her people must +nationalise themselves, while our reflections on the question of right +showed that only from such nationalisation is a sound policy to be +expected. In short, only in so far as her people have the unity of +spirit and of will that mark a nation can Great Britain be either strong +or just. The idea of the nation implies a work to be done by the British +State, which has to be on the watch against challenge from a continental +rival to Great Britain's right to the headship of her empire, and which +at the same time has to give to that empire the direction without which +it cannot remain united. Great Britain cannot do the work thus imposed +upon her by her position and her history unless she has the co-operation +of all her people. Thus the conception of the nation reveals itself in +the twofold shape of duties laid upon England and of duties consequently +laid upon every Englishman. It means that England must either decline +and fall or do a certain work in the world which is impossible for her +unless she constrains all her people to devote themselves to her +service. It thus appears that England and her people can expect no +future worth having except on the principle of duty made the mainspring +both of public and of private life. + +We attempted to apply the principles involved in the word nation to the +obvious and urgent needs of the British State at the present time. + +Victory at sea being indispensable for Great Britain in case of +conflict, we inquired into the conditions of victory, and found in the +parallel instances of Nelson and Napoleon that both by sea and land the +result of the nationalisation of war is to produce a leader who is the +personification of a theory or system of operations. The history of the +rise of the German nation shows how the effort to make a nation produced +the necessary statesman, Bismarck. Nationalisation creates the right +leadership--that of the man who is master of his work. + +Reviewing the needs of the naval administration, we saw that what is +wanted at the present time is rather proper organisation at the +Admiralty than an increase in mere material strength; while turning to +the army, we discovered that the only system on which can be produced +the army that Great Britain requires is that which makes every +able-bodied citizen a soldier. + +To make the citizen a soldier is to give him that sense of duty to the +country and that consciousness of doing it, which, if spread through the +whole population, will convert it into what is required--a nation. +Therefore to reform the army according to some such plan as has been +here proposed is the first step in that national revival which is the +one thing needful for England, and if that step be taken the rest will +follow of itself. Nationalisation will bring leadership, which in the +political sphere becomes statesmanship, and the right kind of +education, to give which is the highest ultimate function of national +existence. + +I have tried in these pages to develop an idea which has haunted me for +many years. I think if the reader would extend to it even for a short +time the hospitality of his mind he might be willing to make it his +constant companion. For it seems to me to show the way towards the +solution of other problems than those which have here been directly +discussed. I cannot but believe that if we could all accustom ourselves +to make some sacrifices for the sake of England, if only by giving a few +minutes every day to thinking about her and by trying to convince +ourselves that those who are not of our party are yet perhaps animated +by the same love of their country as we ourselves, we might realise that +the question of duty is answered more easily by performance than by +speculation. I suspect that the relations between the political parties, +between capital and labour, between master and servant, between rich and +poor, between class and class would become simpler and better if +Englishmen were to come to see how natural it is that they should spend +their lives for England. + + +THE END + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Britain at Bay, by Spenser Wilkinson + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10629 *** |