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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding,
+Volume II., by John Locke
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume II.
+       MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books III. and IV. (of 4)
+
+Author: John Locke
+
+Release Date: January 6, 2004 [EBook #10616]
+Last Updated: January 31, 2018
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HUMANE UNDERSTANDING, V2 ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Steve Harris and David Widger
+
+
+
+
+
+AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
+
+BY
+
+JOHN LOCKE
+
+[Based on the 2d Edition] CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME
+
+
+BOOK III. OF WORDS.
+
+CHAP.
+
+I.    OF WORDS OR LANGUAGE IN GENERAL
+II.   OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS
+III.  OF GENERAL TERMS
+IV.   OF THE NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS
+V.    OF THE NAMES OF MIXED MODES AND RELATIONS
+VI.   OF THE NAMES OF SUBSTANCES
+VII.  OF PARTICLES
+VIII. OF ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE TERMS
+IX.   OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS
+X.    OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS
+XI.   OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING IMPERFECTION AND ABUSES
+
+
+BOOK IV.  OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY.
+
+CHAP.
+
+I.    OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL
+II.   OF THE DEGREES OF OUR KNOWLEDGE
+III.  OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
+IV.   OF THE REALITY OF OUR KNOWLEDGE
+V.    OF TRUTH IN GENERAL
+VI.    OF UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS: THEIR TRUTH AND CERTAINTY
+VII.   OF MAXIMS
+VIII.  OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS
+IX.    OF OUR THREEFOLD KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE
+X.     OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD
+XI.    OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER THINGS
+XII.   OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE
+XIII.  SOME OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING OUR KNOWLEDGE
+XIV.   OF JUDGMENT
+XV.    OF PROBABILITY
+XVI.   OF THE DEGREES OF ASSENT
+XVII.  OF REASON [AND SYLLOGISM]
+XVIII. OF FAITH AND REASON, AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCES
+XIX.   [OF ENTHUSIASM]
+XX.    OF WRONG ASSENT, OR ERROR
+XXI.   OF THE DIVISION OF THE SCIENCES
+
+
+
+
+BOOK III
+
+OF WORDS
+
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+OF WORDS OR LANGUAGE IN GENERAL.
+
+
+1. Man fitted to form articulated Sounds.
+
+God, having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with
+an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of
+his own kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to be
+the great instrument and common tie of society. Man, therefore, had by
+nature his organs so fashioned, as to be fit to frame articulate sounds,
+which we call words. But this was not enough to produce language; for
+parrots, and several other birds, will be taught to make articulate
+sounds distinct enough, which yet by no means are capable of language.
+
+
+2. To use these sounds as Signs of Ideas.
+
+Besides articulate sounds, therefore, it was further necessary that he
+should be able to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions; and
+to make them stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind, whereby
+they might be made known to others, and the thoughts of men's minds be
+conveyed from one to another.
+
+
+3. To make them general Signs.
+
+But neither was this sufficient to make words so useful as they ought to
+be. It is not enough for the perfection of language, that sounds can
+be made signs of ideas, unless those signs can be so made use of as to
+comprehend several particular things: for the multiplication of words
+would have perplexed their use, had every particular thing need of
+a distinct name to be signified by. [To remedy this inconvenience,
+language had yet a further improvement in the use of GENERAL TERMS,
+whereby one word was made to mark a multitude of particular existences:
+which advantageous use of sounds was obtained only by the difference of
+the ideas they were made signs of: those names becoming general, which
+are made to stand for GENERAL IDEAS, and those remaining particular,
+where the IDEAS they are used for are PARTICULAR.]
+
+
+4. To make them signify the absence of positive Ideas.
+
+Besides these names which stand for ideas, there be other words which
+men make use of, not to signify any idea, but the want or absence of
+some ideas, simple or complex, or all ideas together; such as are NIHIL
+in Latin, and in English, IGNORANCE and BARRENNESS. All which negative
+or privative words cannot be said properly to belong to, or signify no
+ideas: for then they would be perfectly insignificant sounds; but they
+relate to positive ideas, and signify their absence.
+
+
+5. Words ultimately derived from such as signify sensible Ideas.
+
+It may also lead us a little towards the original of all our notions and
+knowledge, if we remark how great a dependence our words have on common
+sensible ideas; and how those which are made use of to stand for actions
+and notions quite removed from sense, have their rise from thence, and
+from obvious sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse
+significations, and made to stand for ideas that come not under the
+cognizance of our senses; v.g. to IMAGINE, APPREHEND, COMPREHEND,
+ADHERE, CONCEIVE, INSTIL, DISGUST, DISTURBANCE, TRANQUILLITY, &c., are
+all words taken from the operations of sensible things, and applied to
+certain modes of thinking. SPIRIT, in its primary signification, is
+breath; ANGEL, a messenger: and I doubt not but, if we could trace them
+to their sources, we should find, in all languages, the names which
+stand for things that fall not under our senses to have had their first
+rise from sensible ideas. By which we may give some kind of guess what
+kind of notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their minds
+who were the first beginners of languages, and how nature, even in the
+naming of things, unawares suggested to men the originals and principles
+of all their knowledge: whilst, to give names that might make known to
+others any operations they felt in themselves, or any other ideas that
+came not under their senses, they were fain to borrow words from
+ordinary known ideas of sensation, by that means to make others the more
+easily to conceive those operations they experimented in themselves,
+which made no outward sensible appearances; and then, when they had got
+known and agreed names to signify those internal operations of their own
+minds, they were sufficiently furnished to make known by words all their
+other ideas; since they could consist of nothing but either of outward
+sensible perceptions, or of the inward operations of their minds about
+them; we having, as has been proved, no ideas at all, but what
+originally come either from sensible objects without, or what we feel
+within ourselves, from the inward workings of our own spirits, of which
+we are conscious to ourselves within.
+
+
+6. Distribution of subjects to be treated of.
+
+But to understand better the use and force of Language, as subservient
+to instruction and knowledge, it will be convenient to consider:
+
+First, TO WHAT IT IS THAT NAMES, IN THE USE OF LANGUAGE, ARE IMMEDIATELY
+APPLIED.
+
+Secondly, Since all (except proper) names are general, and so stand not
+particularly for this or that single thing, but for sorts and ranks of
+things, it will be necessary to consider, in the next place, what the
+sorts and kinds, or, if you rather like the Latin names, WHAT THE
+SPECIES AND GENERA OF THINGS ARE, WHEREIN THEY CONSIST, AND HOW THEY
+COME TO BE MADE. These being (as they ought) well looked into, we shall
+the better come to find the right use of words; the natural advantages
+and defects of language; and the remedies that ought to be used,
+to avoid the inconveniences of obscurity or uncertainty in the
+signification of words: without which it is impossible to discourse with
+any clearness or order concerning knowledge: which, being conversant
+about propositions, and those most commonly universal ones, has greater
+connexion with words than perhaps is suspected. These considerations,
+therefore, shall be the matter of the following chapters.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS.
+
+
+1. Words are sensible Signs, necessary for Communication of Ideas.
+
+Man, though he have great variety of thoughts, and such from which
+others as well as himself might receive profit and delight; yet they are
+all within his own breast, invisible and hidden from others, nor can of
+themselves be made to appear. The comfort and advantage of society not
+being to be had without communication of thoughts, it was necessary
+that man should find out some external sensible signs, whereof those
+invisible ideas, which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known
+to others. For this purpose nothing was so fit, either for plenty or
+quickness, as those articulate sounds, which with so much ease and
+variety he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how WORDS,
+which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, came to be made
+use of by men as the signs of their ideas; not by any natural connexion
+that there is between particular articulate sounds and certain ideas,
+for then there would be but one language amongst all men; but by a
+voluntary imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark
+of such an idea. The use, then, of words, is to be sensible marks of
+ideas; and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate
+signification.
+
+
+2. Words, in their immediate Signification, are the sensible Signs of
+his Ideas who uses them.
+
+The use men have of these marks being either to record their own
+thoughts, for the assistance of their own memory; or, as it were, to
+bring out their ideas, and lay them before the view of others: words,
+in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but THE
+IDEAS IN THE MIND OF HIM THAT USES THEM, how imperfectly soever or
+carelessly those ideas are collected from the things which they are
+supposed to represent. When a man speaks to another, it is that he may
+be understood: and the end of speech is, that those sounds, as marks,
+may make known his ideas to the hearer. That then which words are the
+marks of are the ideas of the speaker: nor can any one apply them as
+marks, immediately, to anything else but the ideas that he himself hath:
+for this would be to make them signs of his own conceptions, and yet
+apply them to other ideas; which would be to make them signs and not
+signs of his ideas at the same time; and so in effect to have no
+signification at all. Words being voluntary signs, they cannot be
+voluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not. That would be to
+make them signs of nothing, sounds without signification. A man
+cannot make his words the signs either of qualities in things, or of
+conceptions in the mind of another, whereof he has none in his own. Till
+he has some ideas of his own, he cannot suppose them to correspond with
+the conceptions of another man; nor can he use any signs for them: for
+thus they would be the signs of he knows not what, which is in truth to
+be the signs of nothing. But when he represents to himself other men's
+ideas by some of his own, if he consent to give them the same names that
+other men do, it is still to his own ideas; to ideas that he has, and
+not to ideas that he has not.
+
+
+3. Examples of this.
+
+This is so necessary in the use of language, that in this respect the
+knowing and the ignorant, the learned and the unlearned, use the words
+they speak (with any meaning) all alike. They, in every man's mouth,
+stand for the ideas he has, and which he would express by them. A child
+having taken notice of nothing in the metal he hears called GOLD, but
+the bright shining yellow colour, he applies the word gold only to his
+own idea of that colour, and nothing else; and therefore calls the same
+colour in a peacock's tail gold. Another that hath better observed, adds
+to shining yellow great weight: and then the sound gold, when he uses
+it, stands for a complex idea of a shining yellow and a very weighty
+substance. Another adds to those qualities fusibility: and then the word
+gold signifies to him a body, bright, yellow, fusible, and very heavy.
+Another adds malleability. Each of these uses equally the word gold,
+when they have occasion to express the idea which they have applied it
+to: but it is evident that each can apply it only to his own idea; nor
+can he make it stand as a sign of such a complex idea as he has not.
+
+
+4. Words are often secretly referred, First to the Ideas supposed to be
+in other men's minds.
+
+But though words, as they are used by men, can properly and immediately
+signify nothing but the ideas that are in the mind of the speaker; yet
+they in their thoughts give them a secret reference to two other things.
+
+First, THEY SUPPOSE THEIR WORDS TO BE MARKS OF THE IDEAS IN THE MINDS
+ALSO OF OTHER MEN, WITH WHOM THEY COMMUNICATE; for else they should talk
+in vain, and could not be understood, if the sounds they applied to one
+idea were such as by the hearer were applied to another, which is to
+speak two languages. But in this men stand not usually to examine,
+whether the idea they, and those they discourse with have in their
+minds be the same: but think it enough that they use the word, as they
+imagine, in the common acceptation of that language; in which they
+suppose that the idea they make it a sign of is precisely the same to
+which the understanding men of that country apply that name.
+
+
+5. Secondly, to the Reality of Things.
+
+Secondly, Because men would not be thought to talk barely of their own
+imagination, but of things as really they are; therefore they often
+suppose the WORDS TO STAND ALSO FOR THE REALITY OF THINGS. But this
+relating more particularly to substances and their names, as perhaps
+the former does to simple ideas and modes, we shall speak of these two
+different ways of applying words more at large, when we come to treat of
+the names of mixed modes and substances in particular: though give me
+leave here to say, that it is a perverting the use of words, and brings
+unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their signification, whenever
+we make them stand for anything but those ideas we have in our own
+minds.
+
+
+6. Words by Use readily excite Ideas of their objects.
+
+Concerning words, also, it is further to be considered:
+
+First, that they being immediately the signs of men's ideas, and by that
+means the instruments whereby men communicate their conceptions, and
+express to one another those thoughts and imaginations they have within
+their own breasts; there comes, by constant use, to be such a connexion
+between certain sounds and the ideas they stand for, that the names
+heard, almost as readily excite certain ideas as if the objects
+themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the
+senses. Which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible qualities, and in
+all substances that frequently and familiarly occur to us.
+
+
+7. Words are often used without Signification, and Why.
+
+Secondly, That though the proper and immediate signification of words
+are ideas in the mind of the speaker, yet, because by familiar use from
+our cradles, we come to learn certain articulate sounds very perfectly,
+and have them readily on our tongues, and always at hand in our
+memories, but yet are not always careful to examine or settle their
+significations perfectly; it often happens that men, even when they
+would apply themselves to an attentive consideration, do set their
+thoughts more on words than things. Nay, because words are many of them
+learned before the ideas are known for which they stand: therefore some,
+not only children but men, speak several words no otherwise than parrots
+do, only because they have learned them, and have been accustomed to
+those sounds. But so far as words are of use and signification, so far
+is there a constant connexion between the sound and the idea, and a
+designation that the one stands for the other; without which application
+of them, they are nothing but so much insignificant noise.
+
+
+8. Their Signification perfectly arbitrary, not the consequence of a
+natural connexion.
+
+Words, by long and familiar use, as has been said, come to excite in men
+certain ideas so constantly and readily, that they are apt to suppose
+a natural connexion between them. But that they signify only men's
+peculiar ideas, and that BY A PERFECT ARBITRARY IMPOSITION, is evident,
+in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the same
+language) the same ideas we take them to be signs of: and every man has
+so inviolable a liberty to make words stand for what ideas he pleases,
+that no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in their
+minds that he has, when they use the same words that he does. And
+therefore the great Augustus himself, in the possession of that power
+which ruled the world, acknowledged he could not make a new Latin word:
+which was as much as to say, that he could not arbitrarily appoint what
+idea any sound should be a sign of, in the mouths and common language of
+his subjects. It is true, common use, by a tacit consent, appropriates
+certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages, which so far limits
+the signification of that sound, that unless a man applies it to the
+same idea, he does not speak properly: and let me add, that unless a
+man's words excite the same ideas in the hearer which he makes them
+stand for in speaking, he does not speak intelligibly. But whatever be
+the consequence of any man's using of words differently, either from
+their general meaning, or the particular sense of the person to whom
+he addresses them; this is certain, their signification, in his use of
+them, is limited to his ideas, and they can be signs of nothing else.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III.
+
+OF GENERAL TERMS.
+
+
+
+
+1. The greatest Part of Words are general terms.
+
+All things that exist being particulars, it may perhaps be thought
+reasonable that words, which ought to be conformed to things, should
+be so too,--I mean in their signification: but yet we find quite the
+contrary. The far greatest part of words that make all languages are
+general terms: which has not been the effect of neglect or chance, but
+of reason and necessity.
+
+
+2. That every particular Thing should have a Name for itself is
+impossible.
+
+First, It is impossible that every particular thing should have a
+distinct peculiar name. For, the signification and use of words
+depending on that connexion which the mind makes between its ideas and
+the sounds it uses as signs of them, it is necessary, in the application
+of names to things, that the mind should have distinct ideas of the
+things, and retain also the particular name that belongs to every one,
+with its peculiar appropriation to that idea. But it is beyond the
+power of human capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of all the
+particular things we meet with: every bird and beast men saw; every tree
+and plant that affected the senses, could not find a place in the
+most capacious understanding. If it be looked on as an instance of a
+prodigious memory, that some generals have been able to call every
+soldier in their army by his proper name, we may easily find a reason
+why men have never attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock,
+or crow that flies over their heads; much less to call every leaf of
+plants, or grain of sand that came in their way, by a peculiar name.
+
+
+3. And would be useless, if it were possible.
+
+Secondly, If it were possible, it would yet be useless; because it would
+not serve to the chief end of language. Men would in vain heap up names
+of particular things, that would not serve them to communicate their
+thoughts. Men learn names, and use them in talk with others, only that
+they may be understood: which is then only done when, by use or consent,
+the sound I make by the organs of speech, excites in another man's mind
+who hears it, the idea I apply it to in mine, when I speak it. This
+cannot be done by names applied to particular things; whereof I alone
+having the ideas in my mind, the names of them could not be significant
+or intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all those very
+particular things which had fallen under my notice.
+
+
+4. A distinct name for every particular thing not fitted for enlargement
+of knowledge.
+
+Thirdly, But yet, granting this also feasible, (which I think is not,)
+yet a distinct name for every particular thing would not be of any
+great use for the improvement of knowledge: which, though founded in
+particular things, enlarges itself by general views; to which things
+reduced into sorts, under general names, are properly subservient.
+These, with the names belonging to them, come within some compass, and
+do not multiply every moment, beyond what either the mind can contain,
+or use requires. And therefore, in these, men have for the most part
+stopped: but yet not so as to hinder themselves from distinguishing
+particular things by appropriated names, where convenience demands it.
+And therefore in their own species, which they have most to do with, and
+wherein they have often occasion to mention particular persons, they
+make use of proper names; and there distinct individuals have distinct
+denominations.
+
+
+5. What things have proper Names, and why.
+
+Besides persons, countries also, cities, rivers, mountains, and other
+the like distinctions of place have usually found peculiar names, and
+that for the same reason; they being such as men have often as occasion
+to mark particularly, and, as it were, set before others in their
+discourses with them. And I doubt not but, if we had reason to mention
+particular horses as often as as have reason to mention particular men,
+we should have proper names for the one, as familiar as for the other,
+and Bucephalus would be a word as much in use as Alexander. And
+therefore we see that, amongst jockeys, horses have their proper names
+to be known and distinguished by, as commonly as their servants:
+because, amongst them, there is often occasion to mention this or that
+particular horse when he is out of sight.
+
+
+6. How general Words are made.
+
+The next thing to be considered is,--How general words come to be made.
+For, since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by
+general terms; or where find we those general natures they are supposed
+to stand for? Words become general by being made the signs of
+general ideas: and ideas become general, by separating from them the
+circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may determine
+them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction
+they are made capable of representing more individuals than one; each of
+which having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call
+it) of that sort.
+
+
+7. Shown by the way we enlarge our complex ideas from infancy.
+
+But, to deduce this a little more distinctly, it will not perhaps be
+amiss to trace our notions and names from their beginning, and observe
+by what degrees we proceed, and by what steps we enlarge our ideas from
+our first infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the ideas of
+the persons children converse with (to instance in them alone) are, like
+the persons themselves, only particular. The ideas of the nurse and the
+mother are well framed in their minds; and, like pictures of them there,
+represent only those individuals. The names they first gave to them are
+confined to these individuals; and the names of NURSE and MAMMA, the
+child uses, determine themselves to those persons. Afterwards, when time
+and a larger acquaintance have made them observe that there are a great
+many other things in the world, that in some common agreements of shape,
+and several other qualities, resemble their father and mother, and those
+persons they have been used to, they frame an idea, which they find
+those many particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with
+others, the name MAN, for example. And thus they come to have a general
+name, and a general idea. Wherein they make nothing new; but only leave
+out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that
+which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.
+
+
+8. And further enlarge our complex ideas, by still leaving out
+properties contained in them.
+
+By the same way that they come by the general name and idea of MAN, they
+easily advance to more general names and notions. For, observing that
+several things that differ from their idea of man, and cannot therefore
+be comprehended out under that name, have yet certain qualities wherein
+they agree with man, by retaining only those qualities, and uniting them
+into one idea, they have again another and more general idea; to which
+having given a name they make a term of a more comprehensive extension:
+which new idea is made, not by any new addition, but only as before, by
+leaving out the shape, and some other properties signified by the name
+man, and retaining only a body, with life, sense, and spontaneous
+motion, comprehended under the name animal.
+
+
+9. General natures are nothing but abstract and partial ideas of more
+complex ones.
+
+That this is the way whereby men first formed general ideas, and general
+names to them, I think is so evident, that there needs no other proof
+of it but the considering of a man's self, or others, and the ordinary
+proceedings of their minds in knowledge. And he that thinks GENERAL
+NATURES or NOTIONS are anything else but such abstract and partial ideas
+of more complex ones, taken at first from particular existences, will, I
+fear, be at a loss where to find them. For let any one effect, and then
+tell me, wherein does his idea of MAN differ from that of PETER and
+PAUL, or his idea of HORSE from that of BUCEPHALUS, but in the leaving
+out something that is peculiar to each individual, and retaining so much
+of those particular complex ideas of several particular existences as
+they are found to agree in? Of the complex ideas signified by the names
+MAN and HORSE, leaving out but those particulars wherein they differ,
+and retaining only those wherein they agree, and of those making a new
+distinct complex idea, and giving the name ANIMAL to it, one has a more
+general term, that comprehends with man several other creatures. Leave
+out of the idea of ANIMAL, sense and spontaneous motion, and the
+remaining complex idea, made up of the remaining simple ones of body,
+life, and nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the more
+comprehensive term, VIVENS. And, not to dwell longer upon this
+particular, so evident in itself; by the same way the mind proceeds to
+BODY, SUBSTANCE, and at last to BEING, THING, and such universal terms,
+which stand for any of our ideas whatsoever. To conclude: this whole
+mystery of genera and species, which make such a noise in the schools,
+and are with justice so little regarded out of them, is nothing else but
+ABSTRACT IDEAS, more or less comprehensive, with names annexed to them.
+In all which this is constant and unvariable, That every more general
+term stands for such an idea, and is but a part of any of those
+contained under it.
+
+
+10. Why the Genus is ordinarily made Use of in Definitions.
+
+This may show us the reason why, in the defining of words, which is
+nothing but declaring their signification, we make use of the GENUS, or
+next general word that comprehends it. Which is not out of necessity,
+but only to save the labour of enumerating the several simple ideas
+which the next general word or GENUS stands for; or, perhaps, sometimes
+the shame of not being able to do it. But though defining by GENUS and
+DIFFERENTIA (I crave leave to use these terms of art, though originally
+Latin, since they most properly suit those notions they are applied to),
+I say, though defining by the GENUS be the shortest way, yet I think it
+may be doubted whether it be the best. This I am sure, it is not the
+only, and so not absolutely necessary. For, definition being nothing but
+making another understand by words what idea the term defined stands
+for, a definition is best made by enumerating those simple ideas that
+are combined in the signification of the term defined: and if, instead
+of such an enumeration, men have accustomed themselves to use the
+next general term, it has not been out of necessity, or for greater
+clearness, but for quickness and dispatch sake. For I think that, to one
+who desired to know what idea the word MAN stood for; if it should be
+said, that man was a solid extended substance, having life, sense,
+spontaneous motion, and the faculty of reasoning, I doubt not but the
+meaning of the term man would be as well understood, and the idea it
+stands for be at least as clearly made known, as when it is defined
+to be a rational animal: which, by the several definitions of ANIMAL,
+VIVENS, and CORPUS, resolves itself into those enumerated ideas. I have,
+in explaining the term MAN, followed here the ordinary definition of
+the schools; which, though perhaps not the most, exact, yet serves well
+enough to my present purpose. And one may, in this instance, see what
+gave occasion to the rule, that a definition must consist of GENUS and
+DIFFERENTIA; and it suffices to show us the little necessity there is
+of such a rule, or advantage in the strict observing of it. For,
+definitions, as has been said, being only the explaining of one word
+by several others, so that the meaning or idea it stands for may be
+certainly known; languages are not always so made according to the rules
+of logic, that every term can have its signification exactly and clearly
+expressed by two others. Experience sufficiently satisfies us to the
+contrary; or else those who have made this rule have done ill, that they
+have given us so few definitions conformable to it. But of definitions
+more in the next chapter.
+
+
+11. General and Universal are Creatures of the Understanding, and belong
+not to the Real Existence of things.
+
+To return to general words: it is plain, by what has been said, that
+GENERAL and UNIVERSAL belong not to the real existence of things; but
+are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for
+its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas. Words are
+general, as has been said, when used for signs of general ideas, and so
+are applicable indifferently to many particular things; and ideas are
+general when they are set up as the representatives of many particular
+things: but universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all
+of them particular in their existence, even those words and ideas which
+in their signification are general. When therefore we quit particulars,
+the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making; their
+general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into, by the
+understanding, of signifying or representing many particulars. For the
+signification they have is nothing but a relation that, by the mind of
+man, is added to them.
+
+
+12. Abstract Ideas are the Essences of Genera and Species.
+
+The next thing therefore to be considered is, What kind of signification
+it is that general words have. For, as it is evident that they do not
+signify barely one particular thing; for then they would not be general
+terms, but proper names, so, on the other side, it is as evident they do
+not signify a plurality; for MAN and MEN would then signify the same;
+and the distinction of numbers (as the grammarians call them) would be
+superfluous and useless. That then which general words signify is a SORT
+of things; and each of them does that, by being a sign of an abstract
+idea in the mind; to which idea, as things existing are found to agree,
+so they come to be ranked under that name, or, which is all one, be of
+that sort. Whereby it is evident that the ESSENCES of the sorts, or, if
+the Latin word pleases better, SPECIES of things, are nothing else but
+these abstract ideas. For the having the essence of any species, being
+that which makes anything to be of that species; and the conformity to
+the idea to which the name is annexed being that which gives a right to
+that name; the having the essence, and the having that conformity, must
+needs be the same thing: since to be of any species, and to have a right
+to the name of that species, is all one. As, for example, to be a MAN,
+or of the SPECIES man, and to have right to the NAME man, is the same
+thing. Again, to be a man, or of the species man, and have the ESSENCE
+of a man, is the same thing. Now, since nothing can be a man, or have a
+right to the name man, but what has a conformity to the abstract idea
+the name man stands for, nor anything be a man, or have a right to the
+species man, but what has the essence of that species; it follows, that
+the abstract idea for which the name stands, and the essence of the
+species, is one and the same. From whence it is easy to observe, that
+the essences of the sorts of things, and, consequently, the sorting of
+things, is the workmanship of the understanding that abstracts and makes
+those general ideas.
+
+
+13. They are the Workmanship of the Understanding, but have their
+Foundation in the Similitude of Things.
+
+I would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that Nature,
+in the production of things, makes several of them alike: there is
+nothing more obvious, especially in the races of animals, and all things
+propagated by seed. But yet I think we may say, THE SORTING OF THEM
+UNDER NAMES IS THE WORKMANSHIP OF THE UNDERSTANDING, TAKING OCCASION,
+FROM THE SIMILITUDE IT OBSERVES AMONGST THEM, TO MAKE ABSTRACT GENERAL
+IDEAS, and set them up in the mind, with names annexed to them, as
+patterns or forms, (for, in that sense, the word FORM has a very proper
+signification,) to which as particular things existing are found to
+agree, so they come to be of that species, have that denomination, or
+are put into that CLASSIS. For when we say this is a man, that a horse;
+this justice, that cruelty; this a watch, that a jack; what do we else
+but rank things under different specific names, as agreeing to those
+abstract ideas, of which we have made those names the signs? And what
+are the essences of those species set out and marked by names, but those
+abstract ideas in the mind; which are, as it were, the bonds between
+particular things that exist, and the names they are to be ranked under?
+And when general names have any connexion with particular beings, these
+abstract ideas are the medium that unites them: so that the essences of
+species, as distinguished and denominated by us, neither are nor can
+be anything but those precise abstract ideas we have in our minds. And
+therefore the supposed real essences of substances, if different from
+our abstract ideas, cannot be the essences of the species WE rank
+things into. For two species may be one, as rationally as two different
+essences be the essence of one species: and I demand what are the
+alterations [which] may, or may not be made in a HORSE or LEAD, without
+making either of them to be of another species? In determining the
+species of things by OUR abstract ideas, this is easy to resolve: but if
+any one will regulate himself herein by supposed REAL essences, he will
+I suppose, be at a loss: and he will never be able to know when anything
+precisely ceases to be of the species of a HORSE or LEAD.
+
+
+14. Each distinct abstract Idea is a distinct Essence.
+
+Nor will any one wonder that I say these essences, or abstract ideas
+(which are the measures of name, and the boundaries of species) are
+the workmanship of the understanding, who considers that at least the
+complex ones are often, in several men, different collections of simple
+ideas; and therefore that is COVETOUSNESS to one man, which is not so to
+another. Nay, even in substances, where their abstract ideas seem to be
+taken from the things themselves, they are not constantly the same; no,
+not in that species which is most familiar to us, and with which we have
+the most intimate acquaintance: it having been more than once doubted,
+whether the FOETUS born of a woman were a MAN, even so far as that it
+hath been debated, whether it were or were not to be nourished and
+baptized: which could not be, if the abstract idea or essence to
+which the name man belonged were of nature's making; and were not
+the uncertain and various collection of simple ideas, which the
+understanding put together, and then, abstracting it, affixed a name
+to it. So that, in truth, every distinct abstract idea is a distinct
+essence; and the names that stand for such distinct ideas are the
+names of things essentially different. Thus a circle is as essentially
+different from an oval as a sheep from a goat; and rain is as
+essentially different from snow as water from earth: that abstract idea
+which is the essence of one being impossible to be communicated to the
+other. And thus any two abstract ideas, that in any part vary one
+from another, with two distinct names annexed to them, constitute two
+distinct sorts, or, if you please, SPECIES, as essentially different as
+any two of the most remote or opposite in the world.
+
+
+15. Several significations of the word Essence.
+
+But since the essences of things are thought by some (and not without
+reason) to be wholly unknown, it may not be amiss to consider the
+several significations of the word ESSENCE.
+
+Real essences.
+
+First, Essence may be taken for the very being of anything, whereby it
+is what it is. And thus the real internal, but generally (in substances)
+unknown constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities
+depend, may be called their essence. This is the proper original
+signification of the word, as is evident from the formation of it;
+essential in its primary notation, signifying properly, being. And in
+this sense it is still used, when we speak of the essence of PARTICULAR
+things, without giving them any name.
+
+Nominal Essences.
+
+Secondly, The learning and disputes of the schools having been much
+busied about genus and species, the word essence has almost lost its
+primary signification: and, instead of the real constitution of things,
+has been almost wholly applied to the artificial constitution of
+genus and species. It is true, there is ordinarily supposed a real
+constitution of the sorts of things; and it is past doubt there must
+be some real constitution, on which any collection of simple ideas
+co-existing must depend. But, it being evident that things are ranked
+under names into sorts or species, only as they agree to certain
+abstract ideas, to which we have annexed those names, the essence of
+each GENUS, or sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract idea which
+the general, or sortal (if I may have leave so to call it from sort, as
+I do general from genus,) name stands for. And this we shall find to be
+that which the word essence imports in its most familiar use.
+
+These two sorts of essences, I suppose, may not unfitly be termed, the
+one the REAL, the other NOMINAL ESSENCE.
+
+
+16. Constant Connexion between the Name and nominal Essence.
+
+Between the NOMINAL ESSENCE and the NAME there is so near a connexion,
+that the name of any sort of things cannot be attributed to any
+particular being but what has this essence, whereby it answers that
+abstract idea whereof that name is the sign.
+
+
+17. Supposition, that Species are distinguished by their real Essences
+useless.
+
+Concerning the REAL ESSENCES of corporeal substances (to mention these
+only) there are, if I mistake not, two opinions. The one is of those
+who, using the word essence for they know not what, suppose a certain
+number of those essences, according to which all natural things are
+made, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and so
+become of this or that species. The other and more rational opinion is
+of those who look on all natural things to have a real, but unknown,
+constitution of their insensible parts; from which flow those sensible
+qualities which serve us to distinguish them one from another, according
+as we have occasion to rank them into sorts, under common denominations.
+The former of these opinions, which supposes these essences as a certain
+number of forms or moulds, wherein all natural things that exist are
+cast, and do equally partake, has, I imagine, very much perplexed the
+knowledge of natural things. The frequent productions of monsters, in
+all the species of animals, and of changelings, and other strange issues
+of human birth, carry with them difficulties, not possible to consist
+with this hypothesis; since it is as impossible that two things
+partaking exactly of the same real essence should have different
+properties, as that two figures partaking of the same real essence of a
+circle should have different properties. But were there no other reason
+against it, yet the supposition of essences that cannot be known; and
+the making of them, nevertheless, to be that which distinguishes the
+species of things, is so wholly useless and unserviceable to any part of
+our knowledge, that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by, and
+content ourselves with such essences of the sorts or species of things
+as come within the reach of our knowledge: which, when seriously
+considered, will be found, as I have said, to be nothing else but, those
+ABSTRACT complex ideas to which we have annexed distinct general names.
+
+
+18. Real and nominal Essence
+
+Essences being thus distinguished into nominal and real, we may further
+observe, that, in the species of simple ideas and modes, they are always
+the same; but in substances always quite different. Thus, a figure
+including a space between three lines, is the real as well as nominal
+essence of a triangle; it being not only the abstract idea to which the
+general name is annexed, but the very ESSENTIA or being of the thing
+itself; that foundation from which all its properties flow, and to which
+they are all inseparably annexed. But it is far otherwise concerning
+that parcel of matter which makes the ring on my finger; wherein these
+two essences are apparently different. For, it is the real constitution
+of its insensible parts, on which depend all those properties of colour,
+weight, fusibility, fixedness, &c., which are to be found in it; which
+constitution we know not, and so, having no particular idea of, having
+no name that is the sign of it. But yet it is its colour, weight,
+fusibility, fixedness, &c., which makes it to be gold, or gives it
+a right to that name, which is therefore its nominal essence. Since
+nothing can be called gold but what has a conformity of qualities to
+that abstract complex idea to which that name is annexed. But this
+distinction of essences, belonging particularly to substances, we shall,
+when we come to consider their names, have an occasion to treat of more
+fully.
+
+
+19. Essences ingenerable and incorruptible.
+
+That such abstract ideas, with names to them, as we have been speaking
+of are essences, may further appear by what we are told concerning
+essences, viz. that they are all ingenerable and incorruptible. Which
+cannot be true of the real constitutions of things, which begin and
+perish with them. All things that exist, besides their Author, are all
+liable to change; especially those things we are acquainted with, and
+have ranked into bands under distinct names or ensigns. Thus, that which
+was grass to-day is to-morrow the flesh of a sheep; and, within a few
+days after, becomes part of a man: in all which and the like changes,
+it is evident their real essence--i. e. that constitution whereon the
+properties of these several things depended--is destroyed, and perishes
+with them. But essences being taken for ideas established in the mind,
+with names annexed to them, they are supposed to remain steadily the
+same, whatever mutations the particular substances are liable to. For,
+whatever becomes of ALEXANDER and BUCEPHALUS, the ideas to which MAN and
+HORSE are annexed, are supposed nevertheless to remain the same; and
+so the essences of those species are preserved whole and undestroyed,
+whatever changes happen to any or all of the individuals of those
+species. By this means the essence of a species rests safe and entire,
+without the existence of so much as one individual of that kind. For,
+were there now no circle existing anywhere in the world, (as perhaps
+that figure exists not anywhere exactly marked out,) yet the idea
+annexed to that name would not cease to be what it is; nor cease to be
+as a pattern to determine which of the particular figures we meet with
+have or have not a right to the NAME circle, and so to show which of
+them, by having that essence, was of that species. And though there
+neither were nor had been in nature such a beast as an UNICORN, or such
+a fish as a MERMAID; yet, supposing those names to stand for complex
+abstract ideas that contained no inconsistency in them, the essence of a
+mermaid is as intelligible as that of a man; and the idea of an unicorn
+as certain, steady, and permanent as that of a horse. From what has been
+said, it is evident, that the doctrine of the immutability of essences
+proves them to be only abstract ideas; and is founded on the relation
+established between them and certain sounds as signs of them; and
+will always be true, as long as the same name can have the same
+signification.
+
+
+20. Recapitulation.
+
+To conclude. This is that which in short I would say, viz. that all the
+great business of GENERA and SPECIES, and their ESSENCES, amounts to no
+more but this:--That men making abstract ideas, and settling them in
+their minds with names annexed to them, do thereby enable themselves to
+consider things, and discourse of them, as it were in bundles, for the
+easier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge,
+which would advance but slowly were their words and thoughts confined
+only to particulars.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV.
+
+OF THE NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS.
+
+
+1. Names of simple Ideas, Modes, and Substances, have each something
+peculiar.
+
+Though all words, as I have shown, signify nothing immediately but the
+ideas in the mind of the speaker; yet, upon a nearer survey, we shall
+find the names of SIMPLE IDEAS, MIXED MODES (under which I comprise
+RELATIONS too), and NATURAL SUBSTANCES, have each of them something
+peculiar and different from the other. For example:--
+
+
+2. First, Names of simple Ideas, and of Substances intimate real
+Existence.
+
+First, the names of SIMPLE IDEAS and SUBSTANCES, with the abstract ideas
+in the mind which they immediately signify, intimate also some real
+existence, from which was derived their original pattern. But the names
+of MIXED MODES terminate in the idea that is in the mind, and lead not
+the thoughts any further; as we shall see more at large in the following
+chapter.
+
+
+3. Secondly, Names of simple Ideas and Modes signify always both real
+and nominal Essences.
+
+Secondly, The names of simple ideas and modes signify always the real
+as well as nominal essence of their species. But the names of natural
+substances signify rarely, if ever, anything but barely the nominal
+essences of those species; as we shall show in the chapter that treats
+of the names of substances in particular.
+
+
+4. Thirdly, Names of simple Ideas are undefinable.
+
+Thirdly, The names of simple ideas are not capable of any definition;
+the names of all complex ideas are. It has not, that I know, been yet
+observed by anybody what words are, and what are not, capable of being
+defined; the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not seldom the
+occasion of great wrangling and obscurity in men's discourses, whilst
+some demand definitions of terms that cannot be defined; and others
+think they ought not to rest satisfied in an explication made by a more
+general word, and its restriction, (or to speak in terms of art, by a
+genus and difference,) when, even after such definition, made according
+to rule, those who hear it have often no more a clear conception of the
+meaning of the word than they had before. This at least I think, that
+the showing what words are, and what are not, capable of definitions,
+and wherein consists a good definition, is not wholly besides our
+present purpose; and perhaps will afford so much light to the nature
+of these signs and our ideas, as to deserve a more particular
+consideration.
+
+
+5. If all names were definable, it would be a Process IN INFINITUM.
+
+I will not here trouble myself to prove that all terms are not
+definable, from that progress IN INFINITUM, which it will visibly lead
+us into, if we should allow that all names could be defined. For, if the
+terms of one definition were still to be defined by another, where at
+last should we stop? But I shall, from the nature of our ideas, and the
+signification of our words, show WHY SOME NAMES CAN, AND OTHERS CANNOT
+BE DEFINED; and WHICH THEY ARE.
+
+
+6. What a Definition is.
+
+I think it is agreed, that a DEFINITION is nothing else but THE SHOWING
+THE MEANING OF ONE WORD BY SEVERAL OTHER NOT SYNONYMOUS TERMS. The
+meaning of words being only the ideas they are made to stand for by him
+that uses them, the meaning of any term is then showed, or the word is
+defined, when, by other words, the idea it is made the sign of, and
+annexed to, in the mind of the speaker, is as it were represented, or
+set before the view of another; and thus its signification ascertained.
+This is the only use and end of definitions; and therefore the only
+measure of what is, or is not a good definition.
+
+
+7. Simple Ideas, why undefinable.
+
+This being premised, I say that the NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS, AND THOSE
+ONLY, ARE INCAPABLE OF BEING DEFINED. The reason whereof is this, That
+the several terms of a definition, signifying several ideas, they can
+all together by no means represent an idea which has no composition
+at all: and therefore a definition, which is properly nothing but the
+showing the meaning of one word by several others not signifying each
+the same thing, can in the names of simple ideas have no place.
+
+
+8. Instances: Scholastic definitions of Motion.
+
+The not observing this difference in our ideas, and their names, has
+produced that eminent trifling in the schools, which is so easy to be
+observed in the definitions they give us of some few of these simple
+ideas. For, as to the greatest part of them, even those masters
+of definitions were fain to leave them untouched, merely by the
+impossibility they found in it. What more exquisite jargon could the wit
+of man invent, than this definition:--'The act of a being in power, as
+far forth as in power;' which would puzzle any rational man, to whom it
+was not already known by its famous absurdity, to guess what word it
+could ever be supposed to be the explication of. If Tully, asking a
+Dutchman what BEWEEGINGE was, should have received this explication
+in his own language, that it was 'actus entis in potentia quatenus in
+potentia;' I ask whether any one can imagine he could thereby have
+understood what the word BEWEEGINGE signified, or have guessed what idea
+a Dutchman ordinarily had in his mind, and would signify to another,
+when he used that sound?
+
+
+9. Modern definition of Motion.
+
+Nor have the modern philosophers, who have endeavoured to throw off the
+jargon of the schools, and speak intelligibly, much better succeeded
+in defining simple ideas, whether by explaining their causes, or any
+otherwise. The atomists, who define motion to be 'a passage from one
+place to another,' what do they more than put one synonymous word for
+another? For what is PASSAGE other than MOTION? And if they were asked
+what passage was, how would they better define it than by motion? For is
+it not at least as proper and significant to say, Passage is a motion
+from one place to another, as to say, Motion is a passage, &c.? This is
+to translate, and not to define, when we change two words of the same
+signification one for another; which, when one is better understood than
+the other, may serve to discover what idea the unknown stands for; but
+is very far from a definition, unless we will say every English word in
+the dictionary is the definition of the Latin word it answers, and that
+motion is a definition of MOTUS. Nor will 'the successive application of
+the parts of the superficies of one body to those of another,' which the
+Cartesians give us, prove a much better definition of motion, when well
+examined.
+
+
+10. Definitions of Light.
+
+'The act of perspicuous, as far forth as perspicuous,' is another
+Peripatetic definition of a simple idea; which, though not more
+absurd than the former of motion, yet betrays its uselessness and
+insignificancy more plainly; because experience will easily convince any
+one that it cannot make the meaning of the word LIGHT (which it pretends
+to define) at all understood by a blind man, but the definition of
+motion appears not at first sight so useless, because it escapes this
+way of trial. For this simple idea, entering by the touch as well as
+sight, it is impossible to show an example of any one who has no other
+way to get the idea of motion, but barely by the definition of that
+name. Those who tell us that light is a great number of little globules,
+striking briskly on the bottom of the eye, speak more intelligibly than
+the Schools: but yet these words never so well understood would make the
+idea the word light stands for no more known to a man that understands
+it not before, than if one should tell him that light was nothing but a
+company of little tennis-balls, which fairies all day long struck with
+rackets against some men's foreheads, whilst they passed by others. For
+granting this explication of the thing to be true, yet the idea of the
+cause of light, if we had it never so exact, would no more give us the
+idea of light itself, as it is such a particular perception in us, than
+the idea of the figure and motion of a sharp piece of steel would give
+us the idea of that pain which it is able to cause in us. For the cause
+of any sensation, and the sensation itself, in all the simple ideas of
+one sense, are two ideas; and two ideas so different and distant one
+from another, that no two can be more so. And therefore, should Des
+Cartes's globules strike never so long on the retina of a man who was
+blind by a gutta serena, he would thereby never have any idea of light,
+or anything approaching it, though he understood never so well what
+little globules were, and what striking on another body was. And
+therefore the Cartesians very well distinguish between that light which
+is the cause of that sensation in us, and the idea which is produced in
+us by it, and is that which is properly light.
+
+
+11. Simple Ideas, why undefinable, further explained.
+
+Simple ideas, as has been shown, are only to be got by those impressions
+objects themselves make on our minds, by the proper inlets appointed
+to each sort. If they are not received this way, all the words in the
+world, made use of to explain or define any of their names, will never
+be able to produce in us the idea it stands for. For, words being
+sounds, can produce in us no other simple ideas than of those very
+sounds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary connexion which is
+known to be between them and those simple ideas which common use has
+made them the signs of. He that thinks otherwise, let him try if any
+words can give him the taste of a pine apple, and make him have the true
+idea of the relish of that celebrated delicious fruit. So far as he
+is told it has a resemblance with any tastes whereof he has the ideas
+already in his memory, imprinted there by sensible objects, not
+strangers to his palate, so far may he approach that resemblance in his
+mind. But this is not giving us that idea by a definition, but exciting
+in us other simple ideas by their known names; which will be still
+very different from the true taste of that fruit itself. In light and
+colours, and all other simple ideas, it is the same thing: for the
+signification of sounds is not natural, but only imposed and arbitrary.
+And no DEFINITION of light or redness is more fitted or able to produce
+either of those ideas in us, than the SOUND light or red, by itself.
+For, to hope to produce an idea of light or colour by a sound, however
+formed, is to expect that sounds should be visible, or colours audible;
+and to make the ears do the office of all the other senses. Which is all
+one as to say, that we might taste, smell, and see by the ears: a sort
+of philosophy worthy only of Sancho Panza, who had the faculty to see
+Dulcinea by hearsay. And therefore he that has not before received into
+his mind, by the proper inlet, the simple idea which any word stands
+for, can never come to know the signification of that word by any other
+words or sounds whatsoever, put together according to any rules of
+definition. The only way is, by applying to his senses the proper
+object; and so producing that idea in him, for which he has learned the
+name already. A studious blind man, who had mightily beat his head
+about visible objects, and made use of the explication of his books and
+friends, to understand those names of light and colours which often
+came in his way, bragged one day, That he now understood what SCARLET
+signified. Upon which, his friend demanding what scarlet was? The
+blind man answered, It was like the sound of a trumpet. Just such an
+understanding of the name of any other simple idea will he have, who
+hopes to get it only from a definition, or other words made use of to
+explain it.
+
+
+12. The contrary shown in complex ideas, by instances of a Statue and
+Rainbow.
+
+The case is quite otherwise in COMPLEX IDEAS; which, consisting of
+several simple ones, it is in the power of words, standing for the
+several ideas that make that composition, to imprint complex ideas in
+the mind which were never there before, and so make their names be
+understood. In such collections of ideas, passing under one name,
+definition, or the teaching the signification of one word by several
+others, has place, and may make us understand the names of things which
+never came within the reach of our senses; and frame ideas suitable to
+those in other men's minds, when they use those names: provided that
+none of the terms of the definition stand for any such simple ideas,
+which he to whom the explication is made has never yet had in his
+thought. Thus the word STATUE may be explained to a blind man by other
+words, when PICTURE cannot; his senses having given him the idea of
+figure, but not of colours, which therefore words cannot excite in him.
+This gained the prize to the painter against the statuary: each of which
+contending for the excellency of his art, and the statuary bragging that
+his was to be preferred, because it reached further, and even those who
+had lost their eyes could yet perceive the excellency of it. The painter
+agreed to refer himself to the judgment of a blind man; who being
+brought where there was a statue made by the one, and a picture drawn by
+the other; he was first led to the statue, in which he traced with his
+hands all the lineaments of the face and body, and with great admiration
+applauded the skill of the workman. But being led to the picture, and
+having his hands laid upon it, was told, that now he touched the head,
+and then the forehead, eyes, nose, &c., as his hand moved over the
+parts of the picture on the cloth, without finding any the least
+distinction: whereupon he cried out, that certainly that must needs be a
+very admirable and divine piece of workmanship, which could represent to
+them all those parts, where he could neither feel nor perceive anything.
+
+
+13. Colours indefinable to the born-blind.
+
+He that should use the word RAINBOW to one who knew all those colours,
+but yet had never seen that phenomenon, would, by enumerating the
+figure, largeness, position, and order of the colours, so well
+define that word that it might be perfectly understood. But yet that
+definition, how exact and perfect soever, would never make a blind
+man understand it; because several of the simple ideas that make
+that complex one, being such as he never received by sensation and
+experience, no words are able to excite them in his mind.
+
+
+14. Complex Ideas definable only when the simple ideas of which they
+consist have been got from experience.
+
+Simple ideas, as has been shown, can only be got by experience from
+those objects which are proper to produce in us those perceptions. When,
+by this means, we have our minds stored with them, and know the names
+for them, then we are in a condition to define, and by definition to
+understand, the names of complex ideas that are made up of them. But
+when any term stands for a simple idea that a man has never yet had in
+his mind, it is impossible by any words to make known its meaning to
+him. When any term stands for an idea a man is acquainted with, but is
+ignorant that that term is the sign of it, then another name of the
+same idea, which he has been accustomed to, may make him understand
+its meaning. But in no case whatsoever is any name of any simple idea
+capable of a definition.
+
+
+15. Fourthly, Names of simple Ideas of less doubtful meaning than those
+of mixed modes and substances.
+
+Fourthly, But though the names of simple ideas have not the help of
+definition to determine their signification, yet that hinders not but
+that they are generally less doubtful and uncertain than those of
+mixed modes and substances; because they, standing only for one simple
+perception, men for the most part easily and perfectly agree in their
+signification; and there is little room for mistake and wrangling about
+their meaning. He that knows once that whiteness is the name of that
+colour he has observed in snow or milk, will not be apt to misapply that
+word, as long as he retains that idea; which when he has quite lost, he
+is not apt to mistake the meaning of it, but perceives he understands it
+not. There is neither a multiplicity of simple ideas to be put together,
+which makes the doubtfulness in the names of mixed modes; nor a
+supposed, but an unknown, real essence, with properties depending
+thereon, the precise number whereof is also unknown, which makes the
+difficulty in the names of substances. But, on the contrary, in simple
+ideas the whole signification of the name is known at once, and consists
+not of parts, whereof more or less being put in, the idea may be varied,
+and so the signification of name be obscure, or uncertain.
+
+
+16. Simple Ideas have few Ascents in linea praedicamentali.
+
+Fifthly, This further may be observed concerning simple Simple ideas and
+their names, that they have but few ascents in linea praedicamentali,
+(as they call it,) from the lowest species to the summum genus. The
+reason whereof is, that the lowest species being but one simple idea,
+nothing can be left out of it, that so the difference being taken away,
+it may agree with some other thing in one idea common to them both;
+which, having one name, is the genus of the other two: v.g. there is
+nothing that can be left out of the idea of white and red to make
+them agree in one common appearance, and so have one general name; as
+RATIONALITY being left out of the complex idea of man, makes it agree
+with brute in the more general idea and name of animal. And therefore
+when, to avoid unpleasant enumerations, men would comprehend both white
+and red, and several other such simple ideas, under one general name,
+they have been fain to do it by a word which denotes only the way they
+get into the mind. For when white, red, and yellow are all comprehended
+under the genus or name colour, it signifies no more but such ideas
+as are produced in the mind only by the sight, and have entrance only
+through the eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general term to
+comprehend both colours and sounds, and the like simple ideas, they do
+it by a word that signifies all such as come into the mind only by one
+sense. And so the general term QUALITY, in its ordinary acceptation,
+comprehends colours, sounds, tastes, smells, and tangible qualities,
+with distinction from extension, number, motion, pleasure, and pain,
+which make impressions on the mind and introduce their ideas by more
+senses than one.
+
+
+17. Sixthly, Names of simple Ideas not arbitrary, but perfectly taken
+from the existence of things.
+
+Sixthly, The names of simple ideas, substances, and mixed modes have
+also this difference: that those of MIXED MODES stand for ideas
+perfectly arbitrary; those of SUBSTANCES are not perfectly so, but refer
+to a pattern, though with some latitude; and those of SIMPLE IDEAS are
+perfectly taken from the existence of things, and are not arbitrary at
+all. Which, what difference it makes in the significations of their
+names, we shall see in the following chapters.
+
+Simple modes.
+
+The names of SIMPLE MODES differ little from those of simple ideas.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V.
+
+OF THE NAMES OF MIXED MODES AND RELATIONS.
+
+
+
+1. Mixed modes stand for abstract Ideas, as other general Names.
+
+The names of MIXED MODES, being general, they stand, as has been shewed,
+for sorts or species of things, each of which has its peculiar essence.
+The essences of these species also, as has been shewed, are nothing but
+the abstract ideas in the mind, to which the name is annexed. Thus far
+the names and essences of mixed modes have nothing but what is common to
+them with other ideas: but if we take a little nearer survey of them, we
+shall find that they have something peculiar, which perhaps may deserve
+our attention.
+
+
+2. First, The abstract Ideas they stand for are made by the
+Understanding.
+
+The first particularity I shall observe in them, is, that the abstract
+ideas, or, if you please, the essences, of the several species of mixed
+modes, are MADE BY THE UNDERSTANDING, wherein they differ from those of
+simple ideas: in which sort the mind has no power to make any one, but
+only receives such as are presented to it by the real existence of
+things operating upon it.
+
+
+3. Secondly, Made arbitrarily, and without Patterns.
+
+In the next place, these essences of the species of mixed modes are not
+only made by the mind, but MADE VERY ARBITRARILY, MADE WITHOUT PATTERNS,
+OR REFERENCE TO ANY REAL EXISTENCE. Wherein they differ from those of
+substances, which carry with them the supposition of some real being,
+from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable. But, in
+its complex ideas of mixed modes, the mind takes a liberty not to
+follow the existence of things exactly. It unites and retains certain
+collections, as so many distinct specific ideas; whilst others, that as
+often occur in nature, and are as plainly suggested by outward things,
+pass neglected, without particular names or specifications. Nor does the
+mind, in these of mixed modes, as in the complex idea of substances,
+examine them by the real existence of things; or verify them by patterns
+containing such peculiar compositions in nature. To know whether his
+idea of ADULTERY or INCEST be right, will a man seek it anywhere amongst
+things existing? Or is it true because any one has been witness to such
+an action? No: but it suffices here, that men have put together such a
+collection into one complex idea, that makes the archetype and specific
+idea; whether ever any such action were committed in rerum natura or no.
+
+
+4. How this is done.
+
+To understand this right, we must consider wherein this making of these
+complex ideas consists; and that is not in the making any new idea, but
+putting together those which the mind had before. Wherein the mind does
+these three things: First, It chooses a certain number; Secondly, It
+gives them connexion, and makes them into one idea; Thirdly, It ties
+them together by a name. If we examine how the mind proceeds in these,
+and what liberty it takes in them, we shall easily observe how these
+essences of the species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the mind;
+and, consequently, that the species themselves are of men's making.
+
+
+5. Evidently arbitrary, in that the Idea is often before the Existence.
+
+Nobody can doubt but that these ideas of mixed modes are made by a
+voluntary collection of ideas, put together in the mind, independent
+from any original patterns in nature, who will but reflect that this
+sort of complex ideas may be made, abstracted, and have names given
+them, and so a species be constituted, before any one individual of
+that species ever existed. Who can doubt but the ideas of SACRILEGE or
+ADULTERY might be framed in the minds of men, and have names given them,
+and so these species of mixed modes be constituted, before either of
+them was ever committed; and might be as well discoursed of and reasoned
+about, and as certain truths discovered of them, whilst yet they had no
+being but in the understanding, as well as now, that they have but too
+frequently a real existence? Whereby it is plain how much the sorts of
+mixed modes are the creatures of the understanding, where they have a
+being as subservient to all the ends of real truth and knowledge, as
+when they really exist. And we cannot doubt but law-makers have often
+made laws about species of actions which were only the creatures of
+their own understandings; beings that had no other existence but in
+their own minds. And I think nobody can deny but that the RESURRECTION
+was a species of mixed modes in the mind, before it really existed.
+
+
+6. Instances: Murder, Incest, Stabbing.
+
+To see how arbitrarily these essences of mixed modes are made by the
+mind, we need but take a view of almost any of them. A little looking
+into them will satisfy us, that it is the mind that combines several
+scattered independent ideas into one complex one; and, by the common
+name it gives them, makes them the essence of a certain species, without
+regulating itself by any connexion they have in nature. For what greater
+connexion in nature has the idea of a man than the idea of a sheep with
+killing, that this is made a particular species of action, signified by
+the word MURDER, and the other not? Or what union is there in nature
+between the idea of the relation of a father with killing than that of
+a son or neighbour, that those are combined into one complex idea, and
+thereby made the essence of the distinct species PARRICIDE, whilst the
+other makes no distinct species at all? But, though they have made
+killing a man's father or mother a distinct species from killing his son
+or daughter, yet, in some other cases, son and daughter are taken in
+too, as well as father and mother: and they are all equally comprehended
+in the same species, as in that of INCEST. Thus the mind in mixed modes
+arbitrarily unites into complex ideas such as it finds convenient;
+whilst others that have altogether as much union in nature are left
+loose, and never combined into one idea, because they have no need of
+one name. It is evident then that the mind, by its free choice, gives
+a connexion to a certain number of ideas, which in nature have no more
+union with one another than others that it leaves out: why else is the
+part of the weapon the beginning of the wound is made with taken notice
+of, to make the distinct species called STABBING, and the figure and
+matter of the weapon left out? I do not say this is done without reason,
+as we shall see more by and by; but this I say, that it is done by the
+free choice of the mind, pursuing its own ends; and that, therefore,
+these species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the understanding.
+And there is nothing more evident than that, for the most part, in the
+framing these ideas, the mind searches not its patterns in nature, nor
+refers the ideas it makes to the real existence of things, but puts such
+together as may best serve its own purposes, without tying itself to a
+precise imitation of anything that really exists.
+
+
+7. But still subservient to the End of Language, and not made at random.
+
+But, though these complex ideas or essences of mixed modes depend on the
+mind, and are made by it with great liberty, yet they are not made at
+random, and jumbled together without any reason at all. Though these
+complex ideas be not always copied from nature, yet they are always
+suited to the end for which abstract ideas are made: and though they be
+combinations made of ideas that are loose enough, and have as little
+union in themselves as several other to which the mind never gives a
+connexion that combines them into one idea; yet they are always made for
+the convenience of communication, which is the chief end of language.
+The use of language is, by short sounds, to signify with ease and
+dispatch general conceptions; wherein not only abundance of particulars
+may be contained, but also a great variety of independent ideas
+collected into one complex one. In the making therefore of the species
+of mixed modes, men have had regard only to such combinations as they
+had occasion to mention one to another. Those they have combined into
+distinct complex ideas, and given names to; whilst others, that in
+nature have as near a union, are left loose and unregarded. For, to go
+no further than human actions themselves, if they would make distinct
+abstract ideas of all the varieties which might be observed in them, the
+number must be infinite, and the memory confounded with the plenty, as
+well as overcharged to little purpose. It suffices that men make and
+name so many complex ideas of these mixed modes as they find they have
+occasion to have names for, in the ordinary occurrence of their affairs.
+If they join to the idea of killing the idea of father or mother, and
+so make a distinct species from killing a man's son or neighbour, it
+is because of the different heinousness of the crime, and the distinct
+punishment is due to the murdering a man's father and mother, different
+to what ought to be inflicted on the murder of a son or neighbour; and
+therefore they find it necessary to mention it by a distinct name, which
+is the end of making that distinct combination. But though the ideas of
+mother and daughter are so differently treated, in reference to the idea
+of killing, that the one is joined with it to make a distinct abstract
+idea with a name, and so a distinct species, and the other not; yet, in
+respect of carnal knowledge, they are both taken in under INCEST: and
+that still for the same convenience of expressing under one name, and
+reckoning of one species, such unclean mixtures as have a peculiar
+turpitude beyond others; and this to avoid circumlocutions and tedious
+descriptions.
+
+
+8. Whereof the intranslatable Words of divers Languages are a Proof.
+
+A moderate skill in different languages will easily satisfy one of the
+truth of this, it being so obvious to observe great store of words in
+one language which have not any that answer them in another. Which
+plainly shows that those of one country, by their customs and manner of
+life, have found occasion to make several complex ideas, and given names
+to them, which others never collected into specific ideas. This could
+not have happened if these species were the steady workmanship of
+nature, and not collections made and abstracted by the mind, in order to
+naming, and for the convenience of communication. The terms of our law,
+which are not empty sounds, will hardly find words that answer them in
+the Spanish or Italian, no scanty languages; much less, I think, could
+any one translate them into the Caribbee or Westoe tongues: and the
+VERSURA of the Romans, or CORBAN of the Jews, have no words in other
+languages to answer them; the reason whereof is plain, from what has
+been said. Nay, if we look a little more nearly into this matter, and
+exactly compare different languages, we shall find that, though they
+have words which in translations and dictionaries are supposed to answer
+one another, yet there is scarce one often amongst the names of complex
+ideas, especially of mixed modes, that stands for the same precise idea
+which the word does that in dictionaries it is rendered by. There are
+no ideas more common and less compounded than the measures of time,
+extension, and weight; and the Latin names, HORA, PES, LIBRA, are
+without difficulty rendered by the English names, HOUR, FOOT, and POUND:
+but yet there is nothing more evident than that the ideas a Roman
+annexed to these Latin names, were very far different from those which
+an Englishman expresses by those English ones. And if either of these
+should make use of the measures that those of the other language
+designed by their names, he would be quite out in his account. These are
+too sensible proofs to be doubted; and we shall find this much more so
+in the names of more abstract and compounded ideas, such as are the
+greatest part of those which make up moral discourses: whose names, when
+men come curiously to compare with those they are translated into, in
+other languages, they will find very few of them exactly to correspond
+in the whole extent of their significations.
+
+
+9. This shows Species to be made for Communication.
+
+The reason why I take so particular notice of this is, that we may not
+be mistaken about GENERA and SPECIES, and their ESSENCES, as if they
+were things regularly and constantly made by nature, and had a real
+existence in things; when they appear, upon a more wary survey, to
+be nothing else but an artifice of the understanding, for the easier
+signifying such collections of ideas as it should often have occasion to
+communicate by one general term; under which divers particulars, as far
+forth as they agreed to that abstract idea, might be comprehended. And
+if the doubtful signification of the word SPECIES may make it sound
+harsh to some, that I say the species of mixed modes are 'made by the
+understanding'; yet, I think, it can by nobody be denied that it is the
+mind makes those abstract complex ideas to which specific names are
+given. And if it be true, as it is, that the mind makes the patterns for
+sorting and naming of things, I leave it to be considered who makes the
+boundaries of the sort or species; since with me SPECIES and SORT have
+no other difference than that of a Latin and English idiom.
+
+
+10. In mixed Modes it is the Name that ties the Combination of simple
+ideas together, and makes it a Species.
+
+The near relation that there is between SPECIES, ESSENCES, and their
+GENERAL NAME, at least in mixed modes, will further appear when we
+consider, that it is the name that seems to preserve those essences, and
+give them their lasting duration. For, the connexion between the loose
+parts of those complex ideas being made by the mind, this union, which
+has no particular foundation in nature, would cease again, were there
+not something that did, as it were, hold it together, and keep the parts
+from scattering. Though therefore it be the mind that makes the
+collection, it is the name which is as it were the knot that ties them
+fast together. What a vast variety of different ideas does the word
+TRIUMPHUS hold together, and deliver to us as one species! Had this name
+been never made, or quite lost, we might, no doubt, have had
+descriptions of what passed in that solemnity: but yet, I think, that
+which holds those different parts together, in the unity of one complex
+idea, is that very word annexed to it; without which the several parts
+of that would no more be thought to make one thing, than any other show,
+which having never been made but once, had never been united into one
+complex idea, under one denomination. How much, therefore, in mixed
+modes, the unity necessary to any essence depends on the mind; and how
+much the continuation and fixing of that unity depends on the name in
+common use annexed to it, I leave to be considered by those who look
+upon essences and species as real established things in nature.
+
+
+11.
+
+Suitable to this, we find that men speaking of mixed modes, seldom
+imagine or take any other for species of them, but such as are set out
+by name: because they, being of man's making only, in order to naming,
+no such species are taken notice of, or supposed to be, unless a name be
+joined to it, as the sign of man's having combined into one idea several
+loose ones; and by that name giving a lasting union to the parts which
+would otherwise cease to have any, as soon as the mind laid by that
+abstract idea, and ceased actually to think on it. But when a name
+is once annexed to it, wherein the parts of that complex idea have
+a settled and permanent union, then is the essence, as it were,
+established, and the species looked on as complete. For to what purpose
+should the memory charge itself with such compositions, unless it were
+by abstraction to make them general? And to what purpose make them
+general, unless it were that they might have general names for the
+convenience of discourse and communication? Thus we see, that killing a
+man with a sword or a hatchet are looked on as no distinct species of
+action; but if the point of the sword first enter the body, it passes
+for a distinct species, where it has a distinct name, as in England, in
+whose language it is called STABBING: but in another country, where it
+has not happened to be specified under a peculiar name, it passes not
+for a distinct species. But in the species of corporeal substances,
+though it be the mind that makes the nominal essence, yet, since those
+ideas which are combined in it are supposed to have an union in nature
+whether the mind joins them or not, therefore those are looked on as
+distinct species, without any operation of the mind, either abstracting,
+or giving a name to that complex idea.
+
+
+12. For the Originals of our mixed Modes, we look no further than the
+Mind; which also shows them to be the Workmanship of the Understanding.
+
+Conformable also to what has been said concerning the essences of the
+species of mixed modes, that they are the creatures of the understanding
+rather than the works of nature; conformable, I say, to this, we find
+that their names lead our thoughts to the mind, and no further. When we
+speak of JUSTICE, or GRATITUDE, we frame to ourselves no imagination of
+anything existing, which we would conceive; but our thoughts terminate
+in the abstract ideas of those virtues, and look not further; as they do
+when we speak of a HORSE, or IRON, whose specific ideas we consider not
+as barely in the mind, but as in things themselves, which afford the
+original patterns of those ideas. But in mixed modes, at least the most
+considerable parts of them, which are moral beings, we consider the
+original patterns as being in the mind, and to those we refer for the
+distinguishing of particular beings under names. And hence I think it
+is that these essences of the species of mixed modes are by a more
+particular name called NOTIONS; as, by a peculiar right, appertaining to
+the understanding.
+
+
+13. Their being made by the Understanding without Patterns, shows the
+Reason why they are so compounded.
+
+Hence, likewise, we may learn why the complex ideas of mixed modes
+are commonly more compounded and decompounded than those of natural
+substances. Because they being the workmanship of the understanding,
+pursuing only its own ends, and the conveniency of expressing in short
+those ideas it would make known to another, it does with great liberty
+unite often into one abstract idea things that, in their nature, have
+no coherence; and so under one term bundle together a great variety of
+compounded and decompounded ideas. Thus the name of PROCESSION: what a
+great mixture of independent ideas of persons, habits, tapers, orders,
+motions, sounds, does it contain in that complex one, which the mind of
+man has arbitrarily put together, to express by that one name? Whereas
+the complex ideas of the sorts of substances are usually made up of only
+a small number of simple ones; and in the species of animals, these two,
+viz. shape and voice, commonly make the whole nominal essence.
+
+
+14. Names of mixed Modes stand alway for their real Essences, which are
+the workmanship of our minds.
+
+Another thing we may observe from what has been said is, That the
+names of mixed modes always signify (when they have any determined
+signification) the REAL essences of their species. For, these abstract
+ideas being the workmanship of the mind, and not referred to the real
+existence of things, there is no supposition of anything more signified
+by that name, but barely that complex idea the mind itself has formed;
+which is all it would have expressed by it; and is that on which all the
+properties of the species depend, and from which alone they all flow:
+and so in these the real and nominal essence is the same; which, of what
+concernment it is to the certain knowledge of general truth, we shall
+see hereafter.
+
+
+15. Why their Names are usually got before their Ideas.
+
+This also may show us the reason why for the most part the names of
+mixed modes are got before the ideas they stand for are perfectly known.
+Because there being no species of these ordinarily taken notice of but
+what have names, and those species, or rather their essences, being
+abstract complex ideas, made arbitrarily by the mind, it is convenient,
+if not necessary, to know the names, before one endeavour to frame
+these complex ideas: unless a man will fill his head with a company
+of abstract complex ideas, which, others having no names for, he has
+nothing to do with, but to lay by and forget again. I confess that, in
+the beginning of languages, it was necessary to have the idea before one
+gave it the name: and so it is still, where, making a new complex idea,
+one also, by giving it a new name, makes a new word. But this concerns
+not languages made, which have generally pretty well provided for ideas
+which men have frequent occasion to have and communicate; and in such, I
+ask whether it be not the ordinary method, that children learn the names
+of mixed modes before they have their ideas? What one of a thousand ever
+frames the abstract ideas of GLORY and AMBITION, before he has heard the
+names of them? In simple ideas and substances I grant it is otherwise;
+which, being such ideas as have a real existence and union in nature,
+the ideas and names are got one before the other, as it happens.
+
+
+16. Reason of my being so large on this Subject.
+
+What has been said here of MIXED MODES is, with very little difference,
+applicable also to RELATIONS; which, since every man himself may
+observe, I may spare myself the pains to enlarge on: especially, since
+what I have here said concerning Words in this third Book, will possibly
+be thought by some to this be much more than what so slight a subject
+required. I allow it might be brought into a narrower compass; but I was
+willing to stay my reader on an argument that appears to me new and a
+little out of the way, (I am sure it is one I thought not of when I
+began to write,) that, by searching it to the bottom, and turning it on
+every side, some part or other might meet with every one's thoughts, and
+give occasion to the most averse or negligent to reflect on a general
+miscarriage, which, though of great consequence, is little taken notice
+of. When it is considered what a pudder is made about ESSENCES, and how
+much all sorts of knowledge, discourse, and conversation are pestered
+and disordered by the careless and confused use and application of
+words, it will perhaps be thought worth while thoroughly to lay it open.
+And I shall be pardoned if I have dwelt long on an argument which I
+think, therefore, needs to be inculcated, because the faults men are
+usually guilty of in this kind, are not only the greatest hindrances of
+true knowledge, but are so well thought of as to pass for it. Men would
+often see what a small pittance of reason and truth, or possibly none at
+all, is mixed with those huffing opinions they are swelled with; if they
+would but look beyond fashionable sounds, and observe what IDEAS are or
+are not comprehended under those words with which they are so armed at
+all points, and with which they so confidently lay about them. I shall
+imagine I have done some service to truth, peace, and learning, if, by
+any enlargement on this subject, I can make men reflect on their own use
+of language; and give them reason to suspect, that, since it is frequent
+for others, it may also be possible for them, to have sometimes very
+good and approved words in their mouths and writings, with very
+uncertain, little, or no signification. And therefore it is not
+unreasonable for them to be wary herein themselves, and not to be
+unwilling to have them examined by others. With this design, therefore,
+I shall go on with what I have further to say concerning this matter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI.
+
+OF THE NAMES OF SUBSTANCES.
+
+
+1. The common Names of Substances stand for Sorts.
+
+The common names of substances, as well as other general terms, stand
+for SORTS: which is nothing else but the being made signs of such
+complex ideas wherein several particular substances do or might agree,
+by virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common
+conception, and signified by one name. I say do or might agree: for
+though there be but one sun existing in the world, yet the idea of it
+being abstracted, so that more substances (if there were several) might
+each agree in it, it is as much a sort as if there were as many suns as
+there are stars. They want not their reasons who think there are, and
+that each fixed star would answer the idea the name sun stands for, to
+one who was placed in a due distance: which, by the way, may show us how
+much the sorts, or, if you please, GENERA and SPECIES of things (for
+those Latin terms signify to me no more than the English word sort)
+depend on such collections of ideas as men have made, and not on the
+real nature of things; since it is not impossible but that, in propriety
+of speech, that might be a sun to one which is a star to another.
+
+
+2. The Essence of each Sort of substance is our abstract Idea to which
+the name is annexed.
+
+The measure and boundary of each sort or species, whereby it is
+constituted that particular sort, and distinguished from others, is that
+we call its ESSENCE, which is nothing but that abstract idea to which
+the name is annexed; so that everything contained in that idea is
+essential to that sort. This, though it be all the essence of natural
+substances that WE know, or by which we distinguish them into sorts, yet
+I call it by a peculiar name, the NOMINAL ESSENCE, to distinguish it
+from the real constitution of substances, upon which depends this
+nominal essence, and all the properties of that sort; which, therefore,
+as has been said, may be called the REAL ESSENCE: v.g. the nominal
+essence of gold is that complex idea the word gold stands for, let
+it be, for instance, a body yellow, of a certain weight, malleable,
+fusible, and fixed. But the real essence is the constitution of the
+insensible parts of that body, on which those qualities and all the
+other properties of gold depend. How far these two are different, though
+they are both called essence, is obvious at first sight to discover.
+
+
+3. The nominal and real Essence different.
+
+For, though perhaps voluntary motion, with sense and reason, joined to a
+body of a certain shape, be the complex idea to which I and others annex
+the name MAN, and so be the nominal essence of the species so called:
+yet nobody will say that complex idea is the real essence and source of
+all those operations which are to be found in any individual of that
+sort. The foundation of all those qualities which are the ingredients
+of our complex idea, is something quite different: and had we such a
+knowledge of that constitution of man; from which his faculties of
+moving, sensation, and reasoning, and other powers flow, and on which
+his so regular shape depends, as it is possible angels have, and it is
+certain his Maker has, we should have a quite other idea of his essence
+than what now is contained in our definition of that species, be it what
+it will: and our idea of any individual man would be as far different
+from what it is now, as is his who knows all the springs and wheels and
+other contrivances within of the famous clock at Strasburg, from that
+which a gazing countryman has of it, who barely sees the motion of the
+hand, and hears the clock strike, and observes only some of the outward
+appearances.
+
+
+4. Nothing essential to Individuals.
+
+That ESSENCE, in the ordinary use of the word, relates to sorts, and
+that it is considered in particular beings no further than as they are
+ranked into sorts, appears from hence: that, take but away the abstract
+ideas by which we sort individuals, and rank them under common names,
+and then the thought of anything essential to any of them instantly
+vanishes: we have no notion of the one without the other, which plainly
+shows their relation. It is necessary for me to be as I am; God and
+nature has made me so: but there is nothing I have is essential to me.
+An accident or disease may very much alter my colour or shape; a fever
+or fall may take away my reason or memory, or both; and an apoplexy
+leave neither sense, nor understanding, no, nor life. Other creatures of
+my shape may be made with more and better, or fewer and worse faculties
+than I have; and others may have reason and sense in a shape and body
+very different from mine. None of these are essential to the one or the
+other, or to any individual whatever, till the mind refers it to some
+sort or species of things; and then presently, according to the abstract
+idea of that sort, something is found essential. Let any one examine his
+own thoughts, and he will find that as soon as he supposes or speaks
+of essential, the consideration of some species, or the complex idea
+signified by some general name, comes into his mind; and it is in
+reference to that that this or that quality is said to be essential.
+So that if it be asked, whether it be essential to me or any other
+particular corporeal being, to have reason? I say, no; no more than it
+is essential to this white thing I write on to have words in it. But if
+that particular being be to be counted of the sort MAN, and to have the
+name MAN given it, then reason is essential to it; supposing reason
+to be a part of the complex idea the name man stands for: as it is
+essential to this thing I write on to contain words, if I will give it
+the name TREATISE, and rank it under that species. So that essential and
+not essential relate only to our abstract ideas, and the names annexed
+to them; which amounts to no more than this, That whatever particular
+thing has not in it those qualities which are contained in the abstract
+idea which any general term stands for, cannot be ranked under that
+species, nor be called by that name; since that abstract idea is the
+very essence of that species.
+
+
+5. The only essences perceived by us in individual substances are those
+qualities which entitle them to receive their names.
+
+Thus, if the idea of BODY with some people be bare extension or space,
+then solidity is not essential to body: if others make the idea to which
+they give the name BODY to be solidity and extension, then solidity is
+essential to body. That therefore, and that alone, is considered as
+essential, which makes a part of the complex idea the name of a sort
+stands for; without which no particular thing can be reckoned of that
+sort, nor be entitled to that name. Should there be found a parcel of
+matter that had all the other qualities that are in iron, but wanted
+obedience to the loadstone, and would neither be drawn by it nor receive
+direction from it, would any one question whether it wanted anything
+essential? It would be absurd to ask, Whether a thing really existing
+wanted anything essential to it. Or could it be demanded, Whether this
+made an essential or specific difference or no, since WE have no other
+measure of essential or specific but our abstract ideas? And to talk of
+specific differences in NATURE, without reference to general ideas in
+names, is to talk unintelligibly. For I would ask any one, What is
+sufficient to make an essential difference in nature between any two
+particular beings, without any regard had to some abstract idea, which
+is looked upon as the essence and standard of a species? All such
+patterns and standards being quite laid aside, particular beings,
+considered barely in themselves, will be found to have all their
+qualities equally essential; and everything in each individual will be
+essential to it; or, which is more, nothing at all. For, though it may
+be reasonable to ask, Whether obeying the magnet be essential to iron?
+yet I think it is very improper and insignificant to ask, whether it be
+essential to the particular parcel of matter I cut my pen with; without
+considering it under the name IRON, or as being of a certain species.
+And if, as has been said, our abstract ideas, which have names annexed
+to them, are the boundaries of species, nothing can be essential but
+what is contained in those ideas.
+
+
+6. Even the real essences of individual substances imply potential
+sorts.
+
+It is true, I have often mentioned a REAL ESSENCE, distinct in
+substances from those abstract ideas of them, which I call their
+nominal essence. By this real essence I mean, that real constitution
+of anything, which is the foundation of all those properties that are
+combined in, and are constantly found to co-exist with the nominal
+essence; that particular constitution which everything has within
+itself, without any relation to anything without it. But essence, even
+in this sense, RELATES TO A SORT, AND SUPPOSES A SPECIES. For, being
+that real constitution on which the properties depend, it necessarily
+supposes a sort of things, properties belonging only to species, and not
+to individuals: v. g. supposing the nominal essence of gold to be a body
+of such a peculiar colour and weight, with malleability and fusibility,
+the real essence is that constitution of the parts of matter on which
+these qualities and their union depend; and is also the foundation of
+its solubility in aqua regia and other properties, accompanying that
+complex idea. Here are essences and properties, but all upon supposition
+of a sort or general abstract idea, which is considered as immutable;
+but there is no individual parcel of matter to which any of these
+qualities are so annexed as to be essential to it or inseparable from
+it. That which is essential belongs to it as a condition whereby it
+is of this or that sort: but take away the consideration of its being
+ranked under the name of some abstract idea, and then there is nothing
+necessary to it, nothing inseparable from it. Indeed, as to the real
+essences of substances, we only suppose their being, without precisely
+knowing what they are; but that which annexes them still to the species
+is the nominal essence, of which they are the supposed foundation and
+cause.
+
+
+7. The nominal Essence bounds the Species to us.
+
+The next thing to be considered is, by which of those essences it is
+that substances are determined into sorts or species; and that, it is
+evident, is by the nominal essence. For it is that alone that the name,
+which is the mark of the sort, signifies. It is impossible, therefore,
+that anything should determine the sorts of things, which WE rank under
+general names, but that idea which that name is designed as a mark for;
+which is that, as has been shown, which we call nominal essence. Why
+do we say this is a horse, and that a mule; this is an animal, that an
+herb? How comes any particular thing to be of this or that sort, but
+because it has that nominal essence; or, which is all one, agrees to
+that abstract idea, that name is annexed to? And I desire any one but
+to reflect on his own thoughts, when he hears or speaks any of those or
+other names of substances, to know what sort of essences they stand for.
+
+
+8. The nature of Species as formed by us.
+
+And that the species of things to us are nothing but the ranking them
+under distinct names, according to the complex ideas in US, and not
+according to precise, distinct, real essences in THEM, is plain from
+hence:--That we find many of the individuals that are ranked into
+one sort, called by one common name, and so received as being of one
+species, have yet qualities, depending on their real constitutions,
+as far different one from another as from others from which they are
+accounted to differ specifically. This, as it is easy to be observed
+by all who have to do with natural bodies, so chemists especially are
+often, by sad experience, convinced of it, when they, sometimes in vain,
+seek for the same qualities in one parcel of sulphur, antimony, or
+vitriol, which they have found in others. For, though they are bodies of
+the same species, having the same nominal essence, under the same name,
+yet do they often, upon severe ways of examination, betray qualities so
+different one from another, as to frustrate the expectation and labour
+of very wary chemists. But if things were distinguished into species,
+according to their real essences, it would be as impossible to find
+different properties in any two individual substances of the same
+species, as it is to find different properties in two circles, or
+two equilateral triangles. That is properly the essence to US, which
+determines every particular to this or that CLASSIS; or, which is the
+same thing, to this or that general name: and what can that be else, but
+that abstract idea to which that name is annexed; and so has, in truth,
+a reference, not so much to the being of particular things, as to their
+general denominations?
+
+
+9. Not the real Essence, or texture of parts, which we know not.
+
+Nor indeed can we rank and sort things, and consequently (which is the
+end of sorting) denominate them, by their real essences; because we know
+them not. Our faculties carry us no further towards the knowledge and
+distinction of substances, than a collection of THOSE SENSIBLE IDEAS
+WHICH WE OBSERVE IN THEM; which, however made with the greatest
+diligence and exactness we are capable of, yet is more remote from the
+true internal constitution from which those qualities flow, than, as I
+said, a countryman's idea is from the inward contrivance of that famous
+clock at Strasburg, whereof he only sees the outward figure and motions.
+There is not so contemptible a plant or animal, that does not confound
+the most enlarged understanding. Though the familiar use of things about
+us take off our wonder, yet it cures not our ignorance. When we come
+to examine the stones we tread on, or the iron we daily handle, we
+presently find we know not their make; and can give no reason of
+the different qualities we find in them. It is evident the internal
+constitution, whereon their properties depend, is unknown to us: for to
+go no further than the grossest and most obvious we can imagine amongst
+them, What is that texture of parts, that real essence, that makes lead
+and antimony fusible, wood and stones not? What makes lead and iron
+malleable, antimony and stones not? And yet how infinitely these come
+short of the fine contrivances and inconceivable real essences of
+plants or animals, every one knows. The workmanship of the all-wise
+and powerful God in the great fabric of the universe, and every part
+thereof, further exceeds the capacity and comprehension of the most
+inquisitive and intelligent man, than the best contrivance of the most
+ingenious man doth the conceptions of the most ignorant of rational
+creatures. Therefore we in vain pretend to range things into sorts, and
+dispose them into certain classes under names, by their real essences,
+that are so far from our discovery or comprehension. A blind man may as
+soon sort things by their colours, and he that has lost his smell as
+well distinguish a lily and a rose by their odours, as by those internal
+constitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he can distinguish
+sheep and goats by their real essences, that are unknown to him, may
+be pleased to try his skill in those species called CASSIOWARY and
+QUERECHINCHIO; and by their internal real essences determine the
+boundaries of those species, without knowing the complex idea of
+sensible qualities that each of those names stand for, in the countries
+where those animals are to be found.
+
+
+10. Not the substantial Form, which know Not.
+
+Those, therefore, who have been taught that the several species of
+substances had their distinct internal SUBSTANTIAL FORMS, and that it
+was those FORMS which made the distinction of substances into their true
+species and genera, were led yet further out of the way by having their
+minds set upon fruitless inquiries after 'substantial forms'; wholly
+unintelligible, and whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure or
+confused conception in general.
+
+
+11. That the Nominal Essence is that only whereby we distinguish Species
+of Substances, further evident, from our ideas of finite Spirits and of
+God.
+
+That our ranking and distinguishing natural substances into species
+consists in the nominal essences the mind makes, and not in the real
+essences to be found in the things themselves, is further evident from
+our ideas of spirits. For the mind getting, only by reflecting on its
+own operations, those simple ideas which it attributes to spirits, it
+hath or can have no other notion of spirit but by attributing all those
+operations it finds in itself to a sort of beings; without consideration
+of matter. And even the most advanced notion we have of GOD is but
+attributing the same simple ideas which we have got from reflection on
+what we find in ourselves, and which we conceive to have more perfection
+in them than would be in their absence; attributing, I say, those simple
+ideas to Him in an unlimited degree. Thus, having got from reflecting on
+ourselves the idea of existence, knowledge, power and pleasure--each of
+which we find it better to have than to want; and the more we have of
+each the better--joining all these together, with infinity to each of
+them, we have the complex idea of an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent,
+infinitely wise and happy being. And though we are told that there are
+different species of angels; yet we know not how to frame distinct
+specific ideas of them: not out of any conceit that the existence of
+more species than one of spirits is impossible; but because having no
+more simple ideas (nor being able to frame more) applicable to such
+beings, but only those few taken from ourselves, and from the actions of
+our own minds in thinking, and being delighted, and moving several parts
+of our bodies; we can no otherwise distinguish in our conceptions the
+several species of spirits, one from another, but by attributing those
+operations and powers we find in ourselves to them in a higher or lower
+degree; and so have no very distinct specific ideas of spirits, except
+only of GOD, to whom we attribute both duration and all those other
+ideas with infinity; to the other spirits, with limitation: nor, as
+I humbly conceive, do we, between GOD and them in our ideas, put any
+difference, by any number of simple ideas which we have of one and not
+of the other, but only that of infinity. All the particular ideas of
+existence, knowledge, will, power, and motion, &c., being ideas derived
+from the operations of our minds, we attribute all of them to all sorts
+of spirits, with the difference only of degrees; to the utmost we can
+imagine, even infinity, when we would frame as well as we can an idea of
+the First Being; who yet, it is certain, is infinitely more remote, in
+the real excellency of his nature, from the highest and perfectest of
+all created beings, than the greatest man, nay, purest seraph, is from
+the most contemptible part of matter; and consequently must infinitely
+exceed what our narrow understandings can conceive of Him.
+
+
+12. Of finite Spirits there are probably numberless Species in a
+continuous series of gradations.
+
+It is not impossible to conceive, nor repugnant to reason, that there
+may be many species of spirits, as much separated and diversified one
+from another by distinct properties whereof we have no ideas, as the
+species of sensible things are distinguished one from another by
+qualities which we know and observe in them. That there should be more
+species of intelligent creatures above us, than there are of sensible
+and material below us, is probable to me from hence: that in all the
+visible corporeal world, we see no chasms or gaps. All quite down from
+us the descent is by easy steps, and a continued series of things, that
+in each remove differ very little one from the other. There are fishes
+that have wings, and are not strangers to the airy region: and there are
+some birds that are inhabitants of the water, whose blood is cold as
+fishes, and their flesh so like in taste that the scrupulous are allowed
+them on fish-days. There are animals so near of kin both to birds and
+beasts that they are in the middle between both: amphibious animals link
+the terrestrial and aquatic together; seals live at land and sea, and
+porpoises have the warm blood and entrails of a hog; not to mention what
+is confidently reported of mermaids, or sea-men. There are some brutes
+that seem to have as much knowledge and reason as some that are called
+men: and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined, that,
+if you will take the lowest of one and the highest of the other, there
+will scarce be perceived any great difference between them: and so on,
+till we come to the lowest and the most inorganical parts of matter, we
+shall find everywhere that the several species are linked together,
+and differ but in almost insensible degrees. And when we consider the
+infinite power and wisdom of the Maker, we have reason to think that it
+is suitable to the magnificent harmony of the universe, and the great
+design and infinite goodness of the Architect, that the species of
+creatures should also, by gentle degrees, ascend upward from us toward
+his infinite perfection, as we see they gradually descend from us
+downwards: which if it be probable, we have reason then to be persuaded
+that there are far more species of creatures above us than there are
+beneath; we being, in degrees of perfection, much more remote from the
+infinite being of God than we are from the lowest state of being, and
+that which approaches nearest to nothing. And yet of all those distinct
+species, for the reasons abovesaid, we have no clear distinct ideas.
+
+
+13. The Nominal Essence that of the Species, as conceived by us, proved
+from Water and Ice.
+
+But to return to the species of corporeal substances. If I should ask
+any one whether ice and water were two distinct species of things, I
+doubt not but I should be answered in the affirmative: and it cannot be
+denied but he that says they are two distinct species is in the right.
+But if an Englishman bred in Jamaica, who perhaps had never seen nor
+heard of ice, coming into England in the winter, find the water he put
+in his basin at night in a great part frozen in the morning, and, not
+knowing any peculiar name it had, should call it hardened water; I ask
+whether this would be a new species to him, different from water? And I
+think it would be answered here, It would not be to him a new species,
+no more than congealed jelly, when it is cold, is a distinct species
+from the same jelly fluid and warm; or than liquid gold in the furnace
+is a distinct species from hard gold in the hands of a workman. And
+if this be so, it is plain that OUR DISTINCT SPECIES are NOTHING BUT
+DISTINCT COMPLEX IDEAS, WITH DISTINCT NAMES ANNEXED TO THEM. It is true
+every substance that exists has its peculiar constitution, whereon
+depend those sensible qualities and powers we observe in it; but the
+ranking of things into species (which is nothing but sorting them under
+several titles) is done by us according to the ideas that WE have of
+them: which, though sufficient to distinguish them by names, so that we
+may be able to discourse of them when we have them not present
+before us; yet if we suppose it to be done by their real internal
+constitutions, and that things existing are distinguished by nature into
+species, by real essences, according as we distinguish them into species
+by names, we shall be liable to great mistakes.
+
+
+14. Difficulties in the supposition of a certain number of real Essences
+
+To distinguish substantial beings into species, according to the usual
+supposition, that there are certain precise essences or forms of things,
+whereby all the individuals existing are, by nature distinguished into
+species, these things are necessary:--
+
+
+15. A crude supposition.
+
+First, To be assured that nature, in the production of things, always
+designs them to partake of certain regulated established essences, which
+are to be the models of all things to be produced. This, in that crude
+sense it is usually proposed, would need some better explication, before
+it can fully be assented to.
+
+
+16. Monstrous births.
+
+Secondly, It would be necessary to know whether nature always attains
+that essence it designs in the production of things. The irregular and
+monstrous births, that in divers sorts of animals have been observed,
+will always give us reason to doubt of one or both of these.
+
+
+17. Are monsters really a distinct species?
+
+Thirdly, It ought to be determined whether those we call monsters be
+really a distinct species, according to the scholastic notion of the
+word species; since it is certain that everything that exists has its
+particular constitution. And yet we find that some of these monstrous
+productions have few or none of those qualities which are supposed to
+result from, and accompany, the essence of that species from whence they
+derive their originals, and to which, by their descent, they seem to
+belong.
+
+
+18. Men can have no ideas of Real Essences.
+
+Fourthly, The real essences of those things which we distinguish into
+species, and as so distinguished we name, ought to be known; i.e. we
+ought to have ideas of them. But since we are ignorant in these four
+points, the supposed real essences of things stand US not in stead for
+the distinguishing substances into species.
+
+
+19. Our Nominal Essences of Substances not perfect collections of the
+properties that flow from the Real Essence.
+
+Fifthly, The only imaginable help in this case would be, that, having
+framed perfect complex ideas of the properties of things flowing from
+their different real essences, we should thereby distinguish them into
+species. But neither can this be done. For, being ignorant of the real
+essence itself, it is impossible to know all those properties that flow
+from it, and are so annexed to it, that any one of them being away, we
+may certainly conclude that that essence is not there, and so the thing
+is not of that species. We can never know what is the precise number of
+properties depending on the real essence of gold, any one of which
+failing, the real essence of gold, and consequently gold, would not be
+there, unless we knew the real essence of gold itself, and by that
+determined that species. By the word GOLD here, I must be understood to
+design a particular piece of matter; v. g. the last guinea that was
+coined. For, if it should stand here, in its ordinary signification, for
+that complex idea which I or any one else calls gold, i. e. for the
+nominal essence of gold, it would be jargon. So hard is it to show the
+various meaning and imperfection of words, when we have nothing else but
+words to do it by.
+
+
+20. Hence names independent of Real Essence.
+
+By all which it is clear, that our distinguishing substances into
+species by names, is not at all founded on their real essences; nor can
+we pretend to range and determine them exactly into species, according
+to internal essential differences.
+
+
+21. But stand for such collections of simple ideas as we have made the
+Name stand for.
+
+But since, as has been remarked, we have need of GENERAL words, though
+we know not the real essences of things; all we can do is, to collect
+such a number of simple ideas as, by examination, we find to be united
+together in things existing, and thereof to make one complex idea.
+Which, though it be not the real essence of any substance that exists,
+is yet the specific essence to which our name belongs, and is
+convertible with it; by which we may at least try the truth of these
+nominal essences. For example: there be that say that the essence of
+body is EXTENSION; if it be so, we can never mistake in putting the
+essence of anything for the thing itself. Let us then in discourse put
+extension for body, and when we would say that body moves, let us say
+that extension moves, and see how ill it will look. He that should say
+that one extension by impulse moves another extension, would, by the
+bare expression, sufficiently show the absurdity of such a notion. The
+essence of anything in respect of us, is the whole complex idea
+comprehended and marked by that name; and in substances, besides the
+several distinct simple ideas that make them up, the confused one of
+substance, or of an unknown support and cause of their union, is always
+a part: and therefore the essence of body is not bare extension, but an
+extended solid thing; and so to say, an extended solid thing moves, or
+impels another, is all one, and as intelligible, as to say, BODY moves
+or impels. Likewise, to say that a rational animal is capable of
+conversation, is all one as to say a man; but no one will say that
+rationality is capable of conversation, because it makes not the whole
+essence to which we give the name man.
+
+22. Our Abstract Ideas are to us the Measures of the Species we make in
+instance in that of Man.
+
+There are creatures in the world that have shapes like ours, but are
+hairy, and want language and reason. There are naturals amongst us that
+have perfectly our shape, but want reason, and some of them language
+too. There are creatures, as it is said, (sit fides penes authorem, but
+there appears no contradiction that there should be such,) that, with
+language and reason and a shape in other things agreeing with ours, have
+hairy tails; others where the males have no beards, and others where
+the females have. If it be asked whether these be all men or no, all
+of human species? it is plain, the question refers only to the nominal
+essence: for those of them to whom the definition of the word man, or
+the complex idea signified by that name, agrees, are men, and the other
+not. But if the inquiry be made concerning the supposed real essence;
+and whether the internal constitution and frame of these several
+creatures be specifically different, it is wholly impossible for us
+to answer, no part of that going into our specific idea: only we have
+reason to think, that where the faculties or outward frame so much
+differs, the internal constitution is not exactly the same. But what
+difference in the real internal constitution makes a specific difference
+it is in vain to inquire; whilst our measures of species be, as they
+are, only our abstract ideas, which we know; and not that internal
+constitution, which makes no part of them. Shall the difference of hair
+only on the skin be a mark of a different internal specific constitution
+between a changeling and a drill, when they agree in shape, and want of
+reason and speech? And shall not the want of reason and speech be a sign
+to us of different real constitutions and species between a changeling
+and a reasonable man? And so of the rest, if we pretend that distinction
+of species or sorts is fixedly established by the real frame and secret
+constitutions of things.
+
+
+23. Species in Animals not distinguished by Generation.
+
+Nor let any one say, that the power of propagation in animals by the
+mixture of male and female, and in plants by seeds, keeps the supposed
+real species distinct and entire, For, granting this to be true, it
+would help us in the distinction of the species of things no further
+than the tribes of animals and vegetables. What must we do for the rest?
+But in those too it is not sufficient: for if history lie not, women
+have conceived by drills; and what real species, by that measure, such a
+production will be in nature will be a new question: and we have reason
+to think this is not impossible, since mules and jumarts, the one from
+the mixture of an ass and a mare, the other from the mixture of a bull
+and a mare, are so frequent in the world. I once saw a creature that was
+the issue of a cat and a rat, and had the plain marks of both about it;
+wherein nature appeared to have followed the pattern of neither sort
+alone, but to have jumbled them both together. To which he that shall
+add the monstrous productions that are so frequently to be met with in
+nature, will find it hard, even in the race of animals, to determine by
+the pedigree of what species every animal's issue is; and be at a
+loss about the real essence, which he thinks certainly conveyed by
+generation, and has alone a right to the specific name. But further,
+if the species of animals and plants are to be distinguished only by
+propagation, must I go to the Indies to see the sire and dam of the one,
+and the plant from which the seed was gathered that produced the other,
+to know whether this be a tiger or that tea?
+
+
+24. Not by substantial Forms.
+
+Upon the whole matter, it is evident that it is their own collections of
+sensible qualities that men make the essences of THEIR several sorts of
+substances; and that their real internal structures are not considered
+by the greatest part of men in the sorting them. Much less were any
+SUBSTANTIAL FORMS ever thought on by any but those who have in this one
+part of the world learned the language of the schools: and yet those
+ignorant men, who pretend not any insight into the real essences, nor
+trouble themselves about substantial forms, but are content with knowing
+things one from another by their sensible qualities, are often better
+acquainted with their differences; can more nicely distinguish them
+from their uses; and better know what they expect from each, than those
+learned quick-sighted men, who look so deep into them, and talk so
+confidently of something more hidden and essential.
+
+
+25. The specific Essences that are common made by Men.
+
+But supposing that the REAL essences of substances were discoverable by
+those that would severely apply themselves to that inquiry, yet we could
+not reasonably think that the ranking of things under general names was
+regulated by those internal real constitutions, or anything else but
+their OBVIOUS appearances; since languages, in all countries, have
+been established long before sciences. So that they have not been
+philosophers or logicians, or such who have troubled themselves about
+forms and essences, that have made the general names that are in use
+amongst the several nations of men: but those more or less comprehensive
+terms have, for the most part, in all languages, received their birth
+and signification from ignorant and illiterate people, who sorted
+and denominated things by those sensible qualities they found in them;
+thereby to signify them, when absent, to others, whether they had an
+occasion to mention a sort or a particular thing.
+
+
+26. Therefore very various and uncertain in the ideas of different men.
+
+Since then it is evident that we sort and name substances by their
+nominal and not by their real essences, the next thing to be considered
+is how, and by whom these essences come to be made. As to the latter, it
+is evident they are made by the mind, and not by nature: for were they
+Nature's workmanship, they could not be so various and different in
+several men as experience tells us they are. For if we will examine it,
+we shall not find the nominal essence of any one species of substances
+in all men the same: no, not of that which of all others we are the most
+intimately acquainted with. It could not possibly be that the abstract
+idea to which the name MAN is given should be different in several men,
+if it were of Nature's making; and that to one it should be animal
+rationale, and to another, animal implume bipes latis unguibus. He that
+annexes the name man to a complex idea, made up of sense and spontaneous
+motion, joined to a body of such a shape, has thereby one essence of the
+species man; and he that, upon further examination, adds rationality,
+has another essence of the species he calls man: by which means the same
+individual will be a true man to the one which is not so to the other.
+I think there is scarce any one will allow this upright figure, so well
+known, to be the essential difference of the species man; and yet how
+far men determine of the sorts of animals rather by their shape than
+descent, is very visible; since it has been more than once debated,
+whether several human foetuses should be preserved or received to
+baptism or no, only because of the difference of their outward
+configuration from the ordinary make of children, without knowing
+whether they were not as capable of reason as infants cast in another
+mould: some whereof, though of an approved shape, are never capable of
+as much appearance of reason all their lives as is to be found in an
+ape, or an elephant, and never give any signs of being acted by a
+rational soul. Whereby it is evident, that the outward figure, which
+only was found wanting, and not the faculty of reason, which nobody
+could know would be wanting in its due season, was made essential to the
+human species. The learned divine and lawyer must, on such occasions,
+renounce his sacred definition of animal rationale, and substitute some
+other essence of the human species. [Monsieur Menage furnishes us with
+an example worth the taking notice of on this occasion: 'When the abbot
+of Saint Martin,' says he, 'was born, he had so little of the figure of
+a man, that it bespake him rather a monster. It was for some time under
+deliberation, whether he should be baptized or no. However, he was
+baptized, and declared a man provisionally [till time should show what
+he would prove]. Nature had moulded him so untowardly, that he was
+called all his life the Abbot Malotru; i.e. ill-shaped. He was of Caen.
+(Menagiana, 278, 430.) This child, we see, was very near being excluded
+out of the species of man, barely by his shape. He escaped very narrowly
+as he was; and it is certain, a figure a little more oddly turned had
+cast him, and he had been executed, as a thing not to be allowed to pass
+for a man. And yet there can be no reason given why, if the lineaments
+of his face had been a little altered, a rational soul could not have
+been lodged in him; why a visage somewhat longer, or a nose flatter, or
+a wider mouth, could not have consisted, as well as the rest of his ill
+figure, with such a soul, such parts, as made him, disfigured as he was,
+capable to be a dignitary in the church.]
+
+
+27. Nominal Essences of particular substances are undetermined by
+nature, and therefore various as men vary.
+
+Wherein, then, would I gladly know, consist the precise and unmovable
+boundaries of that species? It is plain, if we examine, there is no
+such thing made by Nature, and established by her amongst men. The real
+essence of that or any other sort of substances, it is evident, we know
+not; and therefore are so undetermined in our nominal essences, which we
+make ourselves, that, if several men were to be asked concerning some
+oddly-shaped foetus, as soon as born, whether it were a man or no, it
+is past doubt one should meet with different answers. Which could not
+happen, if the nominal essences, whereby we limit and distinguish the
+species of substances, were not made by man with some liberty; but
+were exactly copied from precise boundaries set by nature, whereby it
+distinguished all substances into certain species. Who would undertake
+to resolve what species that monster was of which is mentioned by
+Licetus (lib. i. c. 3), with a man's head and hog's body? Or those other
+which to the bodies of men had the heads of beasts, as dogs, horses, &c.
+If any of these creatures had lived, and could have spoke, it would have
+increased the difficulty. Had the upper part to the middle been of human
+shape, and all below swine, had it been murder to destroy it? Or must
+the bishop have been consulted, whether it were man enough to be
+admitted to the font or no? As I have been told it happened in France
+some years since, in somewhat a like case. So uncertain are the
+boundaries of species of animals to us, who have no other measures
+than the complex ideas of our own collecting: and so far are we from
+certainly knowing what a MAN is; though perhaps it will be judged great
+ignorance to make any doubt about it. And yet I think I may say, that
+the certain boundaries of that species are so far from being determined,
+and the precise number of simple ideas which make the nominal essence so
+far from being settles and perfectly known, that very material doubts
+may still arise about it. And I imagine none of the definitions of the
+word MAN which we yet have, nor descriptios of that sort of animal, are
+so perfect and exact as to satisfy a considerate inquisitive person;
+much less to obtain a general consent, and to be that which men would
+everywhere stick by, in the decision of cases, and determining of life
+and death, baptism or no baptism, in productions that mights happen.
+
+
+28. But not so arbitrary as Mixed Modes.
+
+But though these nominal essences of substances are made by the mind,
+they are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of mixed modes. To the
+making of any nominal essence, it is necessary, First, that the ideas
+whereof it consists have such a union as to make but one idea, how
+compounded soever. Secondly, that the particular ideas so united be
+exactly the same, neither more nor less. For if two abstract complex
+ideas differ either in number or sorts of their component parts, they
+make two different, and not one and the same essence. In the first of
+these, the mind, in making its complex ideas of substances, only follows
+nature; and puts none together which are not supposed to have a union in
+nature. Nobody joins the voice of a sheep with the shape of a horse;
+nor the colour of lead with the weight and fixedness of gold, to be the
+complex ideas of any real substances; unless he has a mind to fill his
+head with chimeras, and his discourse with unintelligible words. Men
+observing certain qualities always joined and existing together, therein
+copied nature; and of ideas so united made their complex ones of
+substances. For, though men may make what complex ideas they please, and
+give what names to them they will; yet, if they will be understood WHEN
+THEY SPEAK OF THINGS REALLY EXISTING, they must in some degree conform
+their ideas to the things they would speak of; or else men's language
+will be like that of Babel; and every man's words, being intelligible
+only to himself, would no longer serve to conversation and the ordinary
+affairs of life, if the ideas they stand for be not some way answering
+the common appearances and agreement of substances as they really exist.
+
+
+29. Our Nominal Essences of substances usually consist of a few obvious
+qualities observed in things.
+
+Secondly, Though the mind of man, in making its complex ideas of
+substances, never puts any together that do not really, or are not
+supposed to, co-exist; and so it truly borrows that union from nature:
+yet the number it combines depends upon the various care, industry, or
+fancy of him that makes it. Men generally content themselves with some
+few sensible obvious qualities; and often, if not always, leave out
+others as material and as firmly united as those that they take. Of
+sensible substances there are two sorts: one of organized bodies, which
+are propagated by seed; and in these the SHAPE is that which to us is
+the leading quality, and most characteristical part, that determines
+the species. And therefore in vegetables and animals, an extended solid
+substance of such a certain figure usually serves the turn. For however
+some men seem to prize their definition of animal rationale, yet should
+there a creature be found that had language and reason, but partaked not
+of the usual shape of a man, I believe it would hardly pass for a man,
+how much soever it were animal rationale. And if Balaam's ass had all
+his life discoursed as rationally as he did once with his master, I
+doubt yet whether any one would have thought him worthy the name man, or
+allowed him to be of the same species with himself. As in vegetables
+and animals it is the shape, so in most other bodies, not propagated by
+seed, it is the COLOUR we most fix on, and are most led by. Thus
+where we find the colour of gold, we are apt to imagine all the other
+qualities comprehended in our complex idea to be there also: and we
+commonly take these two obvious qualities, viz. shape and colour, for so
+presumptive ideas of several species, that in a good picture, we readily
+say, this is a lion, and that a rose; this is a gold, and that a silver
+goblet, only by the different figures and colours represented to the eye
+by the pencil.
+
+
+30. Yet, imperfect as they thus are, they serve for common converse.
+
+But though this serves well enough for gross and confused conceptions,
+and inaccurate ways of talking and thinking; yet MEN ARE FAR ENOUGH
+FROM HAVING AGREED ON THE PRECISE NUMBER OF SIMPLE IDEAS OR QUALITIES
+BELONGING TO ANY SORT OF THINGS, SIGNIFIED BY ITS NAME. Nor is it a
+wonder; since it requires much time, pains, and skill, strict inquiry,
+and long examination to find out what, and how many, those simple ideas
+are, which are constantly and inseparably united in nature, and are
+always to be found together in the same subject. Most men, wanting
+either time, inclination, or industry enough for this, even to some
+tolerable degree, content themselves with some few obvious and outward
+appearances of things, thereby readily to distinguish and sort them for
+the common affairs of life: and so, without further examination, give
+them names, or take up the names already in use. Which, though in common
+conversation they pass well enough for the signs of some few obvious
+qualities co-existing, are yet far enough from comprehending, in a
+settled signification, a precise number of simple ideas, much less all
+those which are united in nature. He that shall consider, after so
+much stir about genus and species, and such a deal of talk of specific
+differences, how few words we have yet settled definitions of, may with
+reason imagine, that those FORMS which there hath been so much noise
+made about are only chimeras, which give us no light into the specific
+natures of things. And he that shall consider how far the names of
+substances are from having significations wherein all who use them do
+agree, will have reason to conclude that, though the nominal essences of
+substances are all supposed to be copied from nature, yet they are all,
+or most of them, very imperfect. Since the composition of those complex
+ideas are, in several men, very different: and therefore that these
+boundaries of species are as men, and not as Nature, makes them, if at
+least there are in nature any such prefixed bounds. It is true that many
+particular substances are so made by Nature, that they have agreement
+and likeness one with another, and so afford a foundation of being
+ranked into sorts. But the sorting of things by us, or the making of
+determinate species, being in order to naming and comprehending them
+under general terms, I cannot see how it can be properly said, that
+Nature sets the boundaries of the species of things: or, if it be so,
+our boundaries of species are not exactly conformable to those in
+nature. For we, having need of general names for present use, stay not
+for a perfect discovery of all those qualities which would BEST show us
+their most material differences and agreements; but we ourselves divide
+them, by certain obvious appearances, into species, that we may the
+easier under general names communicate our thoughts about them. For,
+having no other knowledge of any substance but of the simple ideas that
+are united in it; and observing several particular things to agree with
+others in several of those simple ideas; we make that collection our
+specific idea, and give it a general name; that in recording our
+thoughts, and in our discourse with others, we may in one short word
+designate all the individuals that agree in that complex idea, without
+enumerating the simple ideas that make it up; and so not waste our time
+and breath in tedious descriptions: which we see they are fain to do who
+would discourse of any new sort of things they have not yet a name for.
+
+
+31. Essences of Species under the same Name very different in different
+minds.
+
+But however these species of substances pass well enough in ordinary
+conversation, it is plain that this complex idea wherein they observe
+several individuals to agree, is by different men made very differently;
+by some more, and others less accurately. In some, this complex idea
+contains a greater, and in others a smaller number of qualities; and so
+is apparently such as the mind makes it. The yellow shining colour makes
+gold to children; others add weight, malleableness, and fusibility; and
+others yet other qualities, which they find joined with that yellow
+colour, as constantly as its weight and fusibility. For in all these and
+the like qualities, one has as good a right to be put into the complex
+idea of that substance wherein they are all joined as another. And
+therefore different men, leaving out or putting in several simple ideas
+which others do not, according to their various examination, skill, or
+observation of that subject, have different essences of gold, which must
+therefore be of their own and not of nature's making.
+
+
+32. The more general our Ideas of Substances are, the more incomplete
+and partial they are.
+
+If the number of simple ideas that make the nominal essence of the
+lowest species, or first sorting, of individuals, depends on the mind of
+man, variously collecting them, it is much more evident that they do so
+in the more comprehensive classes, which, by the masters of logic, are
+called genera. These are complex ideas designedly imperfect: and it is
+visible at first sight, that several of those qualities that are to
+be found in the things themselves are purposely left out of generical
+ideas. For, as the mind, to make general ideas comprehending several
+particulars, leaves out those of time and place, and such other, that
+make them incommunicable to more than one individual; so to make other
+yet more general ideas, that may comprehend different sorts, it leaves
+out those qualities that distinguish them, and puts into its new
+collection only such ideas as are common to several sorts. The same
+convenience that made men express several parcels of yellow matter
+coming from Guinea and Peru under one name, sets them also upon making
+of one name that may comprehend both gold and silver, and some other
+bodies of different sorts. This is done by leaving out those qualities,
+which are peculiar to each sort, and retaining a complex idea made up
+of those that are common to them all. To which the name METAL being
+annexed, there is a genus constituted; the essence whereof being that
+abstract idea, containing only malleableness and fusibility, with
+certain degrees of weight and fixedness, wherein some bodies of several
+kinds agree, leaves out the colour and other qualities peculiar to gold
+and silver, and the other sorts comprehended under the name metal.
+Whereby it is plain that men follow not exactly the patterns set them by
+nature, when they make their general ideas of substances; since there is
+no body to be found which has barely malleableness and fusibility in
+it, without other qualities as inseparable as those. But men, in making
+their general ideas, seeking more the convenience of language, and quick
+dispatch by short and comprehensive signs, than the true and precise
+nature of things as they exist, have, in the framing their abstract
+ideas, chiefly pursued that end; which was to be furnished with store
+of general and variously comprehensive names. So that in this whole
+business of genera and species, the genus, or more comprehensive, is but
+a partial conception of what is in the species; and the species but a
+partial idea of what is to be found in each individual. If therefore any
+one will think that a man, and a horse, and an animal, and a plant, &c.,
+are distinguished by real essences made by nature, he must think nature
+to be very liberal of these real essences, making one for body, another
+for an animal, and another for a horse; and all these essences liberally
+bestowed upon Bucephalus. But if we would rightly consider what is done
+in all these genera and species, or sorts, we should find that there is
+no new thing made; but only more or less comprehensive signs, whereby we
+may be enabled to express in a few syllables great numbers of particular
+things, as they agree in more or less general conceptions, which we
+have framed to that purpose. In all which we may observe, that the more
+general term is always the name of a less complex idea; and that each
+genus is but a partial conception of; the species comprehended under it.
+So that if these abstract general ideas be thought to be complete, it
+can only be in respect of a certain established relation between them
+and certain names which are made use of to signify them; and not in
+respect of anything existing, as made by nature.
+
+
+33. This all accommodated to the end of the Speech.
+
+This is adjusted to the true end of speech, which is to be the easiest
+and shortest way of communicating our notions. For thus he that would
+discourse of things, as they agreed in the complex idea of extension and
+solidity, needed but use the word BODY to denote all such. He that
+to these would join others, signified by the words life, sense, and
+spontaneous motion, needed but use the word ANIMAL to signify all which
+partaked of those ideas, and he that had made a complex idea of a body,
+with life, sense, and motion, with the faculty of reasoning, and a
+certain shape joined to it, needed but use the short monosyllable MAN,
+to express all particulars that correspond to that complex idea. This is
+the proper business of genus and species: and this men do without any
+consideration of real essences, or substantial forms; which come not
+within the reach of our knowledge when we think of those things, nor
+within the signification of our words when we discourse with others.
+
+
+34. Instance in Cassowaries.
+
+Were I to talk with any one of a sort of birds I lately saw in St.
+James's Park, about three or four feet high, with a covering of
+something between feathers and hair, of a dark brown colour, without
+wings, but in the place thereof two or three little branches coming down
+like sprigs of Spanish broom, long great legs, with feet only of three
+claws, and without a tail; I must make this description of it, and so
+may make others understand me. But when I am told that the name of it
+is CASSUARIS, I may then use that word to stand in discourse for all my
+complex idea mentioned in that description; though by that word, which
+is now become a specific name, I know no more of the real essence
+or constitution of that sort of animals than I did before; and knew
+probably as much of the nature of that species of birds before I learned
+the name, as many Englishmen do of swans or herons, which are specific
+names, very well known, of sorts of birds common in England.
+
+
+35. Men determine the Sorts of Substances, which may be sorted
+variously.
+
+From what has been said, it is evident that MEN make sorts of things.
+For, it being different essences alone that make different species, it
+is plain that they who make those abstract ideas which are the nominal
+essences do thereby make the species, or sort. Should there be a body
+found, having all the other qualities of gold except malleableness, it
+would no doubt be made a question whether it were gold or not, i.e.
+whether it were of that species. This could be determined only by that
+abstract idea to which every one annexed the name gold: so that it
+would be true gold to him, and belong to that species, who included not
+malleableness in his nominal essence, signified by the sound gold; and
+on the other side it would not be true gold, or of that species, to him
+who included malleableness in his specific idea. And who, I pray, is it
+that makes these diverse species, even under one and the same name, but
+men that make two different abstract ideas, consisting not exactly
+of the same collection of qualities? Nor is it a mere supposition to
+imagine that a body may exist wherein the other obvious qualities of
+gold may be without malleableness; since it is certain that gold itself
+will be sometimes so eager, (as artists call it,) that it will as little
+endure the hammer as glass itself. What we have said of the putting in,
+or leaving out of malleableness, in the complex idea the name gold is by
+any one annexed to, may be said of its peculiar weight, fixedness, and
+several other the like qualities: for whatever is left out, or put in,
+it is still the complex idea to which that name is annexed that makes
+the species: and as any particular parcel of matter answers that idea,
+so the name of the sort belongs truly to it; and it is of that species.
+And thus anything is true gold, perfect metal. All which determination
+of the species, it is plain, depends on the understanding of man, making
+this or that complex idea.
+
+
+36. Nature makes the Similitudes of Substances.
+
+This, then, in short, is the case: Nature makes many PARTICULAR THINGS,
+which do agree one with another in many sensible qualities, and probably
+too in their internal frame and constitution: but it is not this real
+essence that distinguishes them into species; it is men who, taking
+occasion from the qualities they find united in them, and wherein they
+observe often several individuals to agree, range them into sorts, in
+order to their naming, for the convenience of comprehensive signs;
+under which individuals, according to their conformity to this or that
+abstract idea, come to be ranked as under ensigns: so that this is of
+the blue, that the red regiment; this is a man, that a drill: and in
+this, I think, consists the whole business of genus and species.
+
+
+37. The manner of sorting particular beings the work of fallible men,
+though nature makes things alike.
+
+I do not deny but nature, in the constant production of particular
+beings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alike
+and of kin one to another: but I think it nevertheless true, that the
+boundaries of the species, whereby men sort them, are made by men; since
+the essences of the species, distinguished by different names, are, as
+has been proved, of man's making, and seldom adequate to the internal
+nature of the things they are taken from. So that we may truly say, such
+a manner of sorting of things is the workmanship of men.
+
+
+38. Each abstract Idea, with a name to it, makes a nominal Essence.
+
+One thing I doubt not but will seem very strange in this doctrine, which
+is, that from what has been said it will follow, that each abstract
+idea, with a name to it, makes a distinct species. But who can help it,
+if truth will have it so? For so it must remain till somebody can show
+us the species of things limited and distinguished by something else;
+and let us see that general terms signify not our abstract ideas, but
+something different from them. I would fain know why a shock and a hound
+are not as distinct species as a spaniel and an elephant. We have no
+other idea of the different essence of an elephant and a spaniel,
+than we have of the different essence of a shock and a hound; all the
+essential difference, whereby we know and distinguish them one from
+another, consisting only in the different collection of simple ideas, to
+which we have given those different names.
+
+
+39. How Genera and Species are related to naming.
+
+How much the making of species and genera is in order to general names;
+and how much general names are necessary, if not to the being, yet at
+least to the completing of a species, and making it pass for such, will
+appear, besides what has been said above concerning ice and water, in
+a very familiar example. A silent and a striking watch are but one
+species, to those who have but one name for them: but he that has the
+name WATCH for one, and CLOCK for the other, and distinct complex ideas
+to which those names belong, to HIM they are different species. It
+will be said perhaps, that the inward contrivance and constitution is
+different between these two, which the watchmaker has a clear idea of.
+And yet it is plain they are but one species to him, when he has but one
+name for them. For what is sufficient in the inward contrivance to make
+a new species? There are some watches that are made with four wheels,
+others with five; is this a specific difference to the workman? Some
+have strings and physics, and others none; some have the balance loose,
+and others regulated by a spiral spring, and others by hogs' bristles.
+Are any or all of these enough to make a specific difference to
+the workman, that knows each of these and several other different
+contrivances in the internal constitutions of watches? It is certain
+each of these hath a real difference from the rest; but whether it be an
+essential, a specific difference or no, relates only to the complex idea
+to which the name watch is given: as long as they all agree in the idea
+which that name stands for, and that name does not as a generical name
+comprehend different species under it, they are not essentially nor
+specifically different. But if any one will make minuter divisions, from
+differences that he knows in the internal frame of watches, and to such
+precise complex ideas give names that shall prevail; they will then be
+new species, to them who have those ideas with names to them, and can by
+those differences distinguish watches into these several sorts; and
+then WATCH will be a generical name. But yet they would be no distinct
+species to men ignorant of clock-work, and the inward contrivances of
+watches, who had no other idea but the outward shape and bulk, with the
+marking of the hours by the hand. For to them all those other names
+would be but synonymous terms for the same idea, and signify no more,
+nor no other thing but a watch. Just thus I think it is in natural
+things. Nobody will doubt that the wheels or springs (if I may so say)
+within, are different in a RATIONAL MAN and a CHANGELING; no more
+than that there is a difference in the frame between a DRILL and a
+CHANGELING. But whether one or both these differences be essential or
+specifical, is only to be known to us by their agreement or disagreement
+with the complex idea that the name man stands for: for by that alone
+can it be determined whether one, or both, or neither of those be a man.
+
+
+40. Species of Artificial Things less confused than Natural.
+
+From what has been before said, we may see the reason why, in the
+species of artificial things, there is generally less confusion and
+uncertainty than in natural. Because an artificial thing being a
+production of man, which the artificer designed, and therefore well
+knows the idea of, the name of it is supposed to stand for no other
+idea, nor to import any other essence, than what is certainly to be
+known, and easy enough to be apprehended. For the idea or essence of
+the several sorts of artificial things, consisting for the most part
+in nothing but the determinate figure of sensible parts, and sometimes
+motion depending thereon, which the artificer fashions in matter, such
+as he finds for his turn; it is not beyond the reach of our faculties to
+attain a certain idea thereof; and so settle the signification of the
+names whereby the species of artificial things are distinguished, with
+less doubt, obscurity, and equivocation than we can in things natural,
+whose differences and operations depend upon contrivances beyond the
+reach of our discoveries.
+
+
+41. Artificial Things of distinct Species.
+
+I must be excused here if I think artificial things are of distinct
+species as well as natural: since I find they are as plainly and orderly
+ranked into sorts, by different abstract ideas, with general names
+annexed to them, as distinct one from another as those of natural
+substances. For why should we not think a watch and pistol as distinct
+species one from another, as a horse and a dog; they being expressed in
+our minds by distinct ideas, and to others by distinct appellations?
+
+
+42. Substances alone, of all our several sorts of ideas, have proper
+Names.
+
+This is further to be observed concerning substances, that they alone of
+all our several sorts of ideas have particular or proper names, whereby
+one only particular thing is signified. Because in simple ideas, modes,
+and relations, it seldom happens that men have occasion to mention often
+this or that particular when it is absent. Besides, the greatest part of
+mixed modes, being actions which perish in their birth, are not capable
+of a lasting duration, as substances which are the actors; and wherein
+the simple ideas that make up the complex ideas designed by the name
+have a lasting union.
+
+
+43. Difficult to lead another by words into the thoughts of things
+stripped of those abstract ideas we give them.
+
+I must beg pardon of my reader for having dwelt so long upon this
+subject, and perhaps with some obscurity. But I desire it may be
+considered, how difficult it is to lead another by words into the
+thoughts of things, stripped of those specifical differences we give
+them: which things, if I name not, I say nothing; and if I do name them,
+I thereby rank them into some sort or other, and suggest to the mind the
+usual abstract idea of that species; and so cross my purpose. For,
+to talk of a man, and to lay by, at the same time, the ordinary
+signification of the name man, which is our complex idea usually annexed
+to it; and bid the reader consider man, as he is in himself, and as he
+is really distinguished from others in his internal constitution, or
+real essence, that is, by something he knows not what, looks like
+trifling: and yet thus one must do who would speak of the supposed real
+essences and species of things, as thought to be made by nature, if it
+be but only to make it understood, that there is no such thing signified
+by the general names which substances are called by. But because it is
+difficult by known familiar names to do this, give me leave to endeavour
+by an example to make the different consideration the mind has of
+specific names and ideas a little more clear; and to show how the
+complex ideas of modes are referred sometimes to archetypes in the minds
+of other intelligent beings, or, which is the same, to the signification
+annexed by others to their received names; and sometimes to no
+archetypes at all. Give me leave also to show how the mind always refers
+its ideas of substances, either to the substances themselves, or to the
+signification of their names, as to the archetypes; and also to make
+plain the nature of species or sorting of things, as apprehended and
+made use of by us; and of the essences belonging to those species: which
+is perhaps of more moment to discover the extent and certainty of our
+knowledge than we at first imagine.
+
+
+44. Instances of mixed Modes names KINNEAH and NIOUPH.
+
+Let us suppose Adam, in the state of a grown man, with a good
+understanding, but in a strange country, with all things new and unknown
+about him; and no other faculties to attain the knowledge of them but
+what one of this age has now. He observes Lamech more melancholy than
+usual, and imagines it to be from a suspicion he has of his wife Adah,
+(whom he most ardently loved) that she had too much kindness for another
+man. Adam discourses these his thoughts to Eve, and desires her to take
+care that Adah commit not folly: and in these discourses with Eve he
+makes use of these two new words KINNEAH and NIOUPH. In time, Adam's
+mistake appears, for he finds Lamech's trouble proceeded from having
+killed a man: but yet the two names KINNEAH and NIOUPH, (the one
+standing for suspicion in a husband of his wife's disloyalty to him; and
+the other for the act of committing disloyalty,) lost not their distinct
+significations. It is plain then, that here were two distinct complex
+ideas of mixed modes, with names to them, two distinct species of
+actions essentially different; I ask wherein consisted the essences of
+these two distinct species of actions? And it is plain it consisted in a
+precise combination of simple ideas, different in one from the other. I
+ask, whether the complex idea in Adam's mind, which he called KINNEAH,
+were adequate or not? And it is plain it was; for it being a combination
+of simple ideas, which he, without any regard to any archetype, without
+respect to anything as a pattern, voluntarily put together, abstracted,
+and gave the name KINNEAH to, to express in short to others, by that one
+sound, all the simple ideas contained and united in that complex one;
+it must necessarily follow that it was an adequate idea. His own choice
+having made that combination, it had all in it he intended it should,
+and so could not but be perfect, could not but be adequate; it being
+referred to no other archetype which it was supposed to represent.
+
+
+45. These words, KINNEAH and NIOUPH, by degrees grew into common use,
+and then the case was somewhat altered. Adam's children had the same
+faculties, and thereby the same power that he had, to make what complex
+ideas of mixed modes they pleased in their own minds; to abstract them,
+and make what sounds they pleased the signs of them: but the use of
+names being to make our ideas within us known to others, that cannot be
+done, but when the same sign stands for the same idea in two who would
+communicate their thoughts and discourse together. Those, therefore,
+of Adam's children, that found these two words, KINNEAH and NIOUPH, in
+familiar use, could not take them for insignificant sounds, but must
+needs conclude they stood for something; for certain ideas, abstract
+ideas, they being general names; which abstract ideas were the essences
+of the species distinguished by those names. If therefore, they would
+use these words as names of species already established and agreed on,
+they were obliged to conform the ideas in their minds, signified by
+these names, to the ideas that they stood for in other men's minds, as
+to their patterns and archetypes; and then indeed their ideas of
+these complex modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt
+(especially those that consisted of combinations of many simple ideas)
+not to be exactly conformable to the ideas in other men's minds, using
+the same names; though for this there be usually a remedy at hand, which
+is to ask the meaning of any word we understand not of him that uses it:
+it being as impossible to know certainly what the words jealousy and
+adultery (which I think answer [Hebrew] and [Hebrew]) stand for in
+another man's mind, with whom I would discourse about them; as it was
+impossible, in the beginning of language, to know what KINNEAH and
+NIOUPH stood for in another man's mind, without explication; they being
+voluntary signs in every one.
+
+
+46. Instances of a species of Substance named ZAHAB.
+
+Let us now also consider, after the same manner, the names of substances
+in their first application. One of Adam's children, roving in the
+mountains, lights on a glittering substance which pleases his eye. Home
+he carries it to Adam, who, upon consideration of it, finds it to be
+hard, to have a bright yellow colour, and an exceeding great weight.
+These perhaps, at first, are all the qualities he takes notice of in it;
+and abstracting this complex idea, consisting of a substance having that
+peculiar bright yellowness, and a weight very great in proportion to its
+bulk, he gives the name ZAHAB, to denominate and mark all substances
+that have these sensible qualities in them. It is evident now, that,
+in this case, Adam acts quite differently from what he did before, in
+forming those ideas of mixed modes to which he gave the names KINNEAH
+and NIOUPH. For there he put ideas together only by his own imagination,
+not taken from the existence of anything; and to them he gave names to
+denominate all things that should happen to agree to those his abstract
+ideas, without considering whether any such thing did exist or not: the
+standard there was of his own making. But in the forming his idea of
+this new substance, he takes the quite contrary course; here he has
+a standard made by nature; and therefore, being to represent that to
+himself, by the idea he has of it, even when it is absent, he puts in no
+simple idea into his complex one, but what he has the perception of from
+the thing itself. He takes care that his idea be conformable to this
+archetype, and intends the name should stand for an idea so conformable.
+
+
+47.
+
+This piece of matter, thus denominated ZAHAB by Adam, being quite
+different from any he had seen before, nobody, I think, will deny to be
+a distinct species, and to have its peculiar essence; and that the name
+ZAHAB is the mark of the species, and a name belonging to all things
+partaking in that essence. But here it is plain the essence Adam made
+the name ZAHAB stand for was nothing but a body hard, shining, yellow,
+and very heavy. But the inquisitive mind of man, not content with the
+knowledge of these, as I may say, superficial qualities, puts Adam upon
+further examination of this matter. He therefore knocks, and beats it
+with flints, to see what was discoverable in the inside: he finds it
+yield to blows, but not easily separate into pieces: he finds it will
+bend without breaking. Is not now ductility to be added to his former
+idea, and made part of the essence of the species that name ZAHAB stands
+for? Further trials discover fusibility and fixedness. Are not they
+also, by the same reason that any of the others were, to be put into the
+complex idea signified by the name ZAHAB? If not, what reason will there
+be shown more for the one than the other? If these must, then all the
+other properties, which any further trials shall discover in this
+matter, ought by the same reason to make a part of the ingredients of
+the complex idea which the name ZAHAB stands for, and so be the essence
+of the species marked by that name. Which properties, because they are
+endless, it is plain that the idea made after this fashion, by this
+archetype, will be always inadequate.
+
+
+48. The Abstract Ideas of Substances always imperfect and therefore
+various.
+
+But this is not all. It would also follow that the names of substances
+would not only have, as in truth they have, but would also be supposed
+to have different significations, as used by different men, which would
+very much cumber the use of language. For if every distinct quality
+that were discovered in any matter by any one were supposed to make a
+necessary part of the complex idea signified by the common name given
+to it, it must follow, that men must suppose the same word to signify
+different things in different men: since they cannot doubt but different
+men may have discovered several qualities, in substances of the same
+denomination, which others know nothing of.
+
+
+49. Therefore to fix the Nominal Species Real Essence supposed.
+
+To avoid this therefore, they have supposed a real essence belonging to
+every species, from which these properties all flow, and would have
+their name of the species stand for that. But they, not having any idea
+of that real essence in substances, and their words signifying nothing
+but the ideas they have, that which is done by this attempt is only to
+put the name or sound in the place and stead of the thing having that
+real essence, without knowing what the real essence is, and this is that
+which men do when they speak of species of things, as supposing them
+made by nature, and distinguished by real essences.
+
+
+50. Which Supposition is of no Use.
+
+For, let us consider, when we affirm that 'all gold is fixed,' either
+it means that fixedness is a part of the definition, i. e., part of the
+nominal essence the word gold stands for; and so this affirmation, 'all
+gold is fixed,' contains nothing but the signification of the term gold.
+Or else it means, that fixedness, not being a part of the definition of
+the gold, is a property of that substance itself: in which case it is
+plain that the word gold stands in the place of a substance, having the
+real essence of a species of things made by nature. In which way of
+substitution it has so confused and uncertain a signification,
+that, though this proposition--'gold is fixed'--be in that sense an
+affirmation of something real; yet it is a truth will always fail us in
+its particular application, and so is of no real use or certainty. For
+let it be ever so true, that all gold, i. e. all that has the real
+essence of gold, is fixed, what serves this for, whilst we know not, in
+this sense, WHAT IS OR IS NOT GOLD? For if we know not the real essence
+of gold, it is impossible we should know what parcel of matter has that
+essence, and so whether IT be true gold or no.
+
+
+51. Conclusion.
+
+To conclude: what liberty Adam had at first to make any complex ideas of
+MIXED MODES by no other pattern but by his own thoughts, the same have
+all men ever since had. And the same necessity of conforming his ideas
+of SUBSTANCES to things without him, as to archetypes made by nature,
+that Adam was under, if he would not wilfully impose upon himself, the
+same are all men ever since under too. The same liberty also that Adam
+had of affixing any new name to any idea, the same has any one still,
+(especially the beginners of languages, if we can imagine any such;) but
+only with this difference, that, in places where men in society have
+already established a language amongst them, the significations of words
+are very warily and sparingly to be altered. Because men being furnished
+already with names for their ideas, and common use having appropriated
+known names to certain ideas, an affected misapplication of them cannot
+but be very ridiculous. He that hath new notions will perhaps venture
+sometimes on the coining of new terms to express them: but men think it
+a boldness, and it is uncertain whether common use will ever make them
+pass for current. But in communication with others, it is necessary that
+we conform the ideas we make the vulgar words of any language stand for
+to their known proper significations, (which I have explained at large
+already,) or else to make known that new signification we apply them to.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII.
+
+OF PARTICLES.
+
+
+1. Particles connect Parts, or whole Sentences together.
+
+Besides words which are names of ideas in the mind, there are a great
+many others that are made use of to signify the CONNEXION that the mind
+gives to ideas, or to propositions, one with another. The mind, in
+communicating its thoughts to others, does not only need signs of the
+ideas it has then before it, but others also, to show or intimate some
+particular action of its own, at that time, relating to those ideas.
+This it does several ways; as _I_S and _I_S NOT, are the general marks,
+of the mind, affirming or denying. But besides affirmation or negation,
+without which there is in words no truth or falsehood, the mind does,
+in declaring its sentiments to others, connect not only the parts of
+propositions, but whole sentences one to another, with their several
+relations and dependencies, to make a coherent discourse.
+
+
+2. In right use of Particles consists the Art of Well-speaking
+
+The words whereby it signifies what connexion it gives to the several
+affirmations and negations, that it unites in one continued reasoning or
+narration, are generally called PARTICLES: and it is in the right use of
+these that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good
+style. To think well, it is not enough that a man has ideas clear
+and distinct in his thoughts, nor that he observes the agreement or
+disagreement of some of them; but he must think in train, and observe
+the dependence of his thoughts and reasonings upon one another. And to
+express well such methodical and rational thoughts, he must have words
+to show what connexion, restriction, distinction, opposition, emphasis,
+&c., he gives to each respective part of his discourse. To mistake
+in any of these, is to puzzle instead of informing his hearer: and
+therefore it is, that those words which are not truly by themselves
+the names of any ideas are of such constant and indispensable use in
+language, and do much contribute to men's well expressing themselves.
+
+
+3. They say what Relation the Mind gives to its own Thoughts.
+
+This part of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected as some others
+over-diligently cultivated. It is easy for men to write, one after
+another, of cases and genders, moods and tenses, gerunds and supines: in
+these and the like there has been great diligence used; and particles
+themselves, in some languages, have been, with great show of exactness,
+ranked into their several orders. But though PREPOSITIONS and
+CONJUNCTIONS, &c., are names well known in grammar, and the particles
+contained under them carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions;
+yet he who would show the right use of particles, and what significancy
+and force they have, must take a little more pains, enter into his
+own thoughts, and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in
+discoursing.
+
+
+4. They are all marks of some action or intimation of the mind.
+
+Neither is it enough, for the explaining of these words, to render them,
+as is usual in dictionaries, by words of another tongue which come
+nearest to their signification: for what is meant by them is commonly as
+hard to be understood in one as another language. They are all marks of
+some action or intimation of the mind; and therefore to understand them
+rightly, the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations, and
+exceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind, for which we have
+either none or very deficient names, are diligently to be studied. Of
+these there is a great variety, much exceeding the number of particles
+that most languages have to express them by: and therefore it is not
+to be wondered that most of these particles have divers and sometimes
+almost opposite significations. In the Hebrew tongue there is a particle
+consisting of but one single letter, of which there are reckoned up, as
+I remember, seventy, I am sure above fifty, several significations.
+
+
+5. Instance in But.
+
+'But' is a particle, none more familiar in our language: and he that
+says it is a discretive conjunction, and that it answers to sed Latin,
+or mais in French, thinks he has sufficiently explained it. But yet it
+seems to me to intimate several relations the mind gives to the several
+propositions or parts of them which it joins by this monosyllable.
+
+First, 'But to say no more:' here it intimates a stop of the mind in the
+course it was going, before it came quite to the end of it.
+
+Secondly, 'I saw but two plants;' here it shows that the mind limits the
+sense to what is expressed, with a negation of all other.
+
+Thirdly,'You pray; but it is not that God would bring you to the true
+religion.'
+
+Fourthly, 'But that he would confirm you in your own.' The first of
+these BUTS intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise
+than it should be; the latter shows that the mind makes a direct
+opposition between that and what goes before it.
+
+Fifthly, 'All animals have sense, but a dog is an animal:' here it
+signifies little more but that the latter proposition is joined to the
+former, as the minor of a syllogism.
+
+
+6. This Matter of the use of Particles but lightly touched here.
+
+To these, I doubt not, might be added a great many other significations
+of this particle, if it were my business to examine it in its full
+latitude, and consider it in all the places it is to be found: which if
+one should do, I doubt whether in all those manners it is made use of,
+it would deserve the title of DISCRETIVE, which grammarians give to it.
+But I intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs. The
+instances I have given in this one may give occasion to reflect on their
+use and force in language, and lead us into the contemplation of several
+actions of our minds in discoursing, which it has found a way to
+intimate to others by these particles, some whereof constantly, and
+others in certain constructions, have the sense of a whole sentence
+contained in them.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII.
+
+OF ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE TERMS.
+
+
+
+1. Abstract Terms predicated one on another and why.
+
+The ordinary words of language, and our common use of them, would have
+given us light into the nature of our ideas, if they had been but
+considered with attention. The mind, as has been shown, has a power
+to abstract its ideas, and so they become essences, general essences,
+whereby the sorts of things are distinguished. Now each abstract idea
+being distinct, so that of any two the one can never be the other, the
+mind will, by its intuitive knowledge, perceive their difference, and
+therefore in propositions no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed one of
+another. This we see in the common use of language, which permits not
+any two abstract words, or names of abstract ideas, to be affirmed one
+of another. For how near of kin soever they may seem to be, and how
+certain soever it is that man is an animal, or rational, or white,
+yet every one at first hearing perceives the falsehood of these
+propositions: HUMANITY IS ANIMALITY, or RATIONALITY, or WHITENESS:
+and this is as evident as any of the most allowed maxims. All our
+affirmations then are only in concrete, which is the affirming, not
+one abstract idea to be another, but one abstract idea to be joined to
+another; which abstract ideas, in substances, may be of any sort; in all
+the rest are little else but of relations; and in substances the most
+frequent are of powers: v.g. 'a man is white,' signifies that the thing
+that has the essence of a man has also in it the essence of whiteness,
+which is nothing but a power to produce the idea of whiteness in one
+whose eyes can discover ordinary objects: or, 'a man is rational,'
+signifies that the same thing that hath the essence of a man hath also
+in it the essence of rationality, i.e. a power of reasoning.
+
+
+2. They show the Difference of our Ideas.
+
+This distinction of names shows us also the difference of our ideas:
+for if we observe them, we shall find that OUR SIMPLE IDEAS HAVE ALL
+ABSTRACT AS WELL AS CONCRETE NAMES: the one whereof is (to speak the
+language of grammarians) a substantive, the other an adjective; as
+whiteness, white; sweetness, sweet. The like also holds in our ideas of
+modes and relations; as justice, just; equality, equal: only with this
+difference, that some of the concrete names of relations amongst men
+chiefly are substantives; as, paternitas, pater; whereof it were easy to
+render a reason. But as to our ideas of substances, we have very few
+or no abstract names at all. For though the Schools have introduced
+animalitas, humanitas, corporietas, and some others; yet they hold no
+proportion with that infinite number of names of substances, to which
+they never were ridiculous enough to attempt the coining of abstract
+ones: and those few that the Schools forged, and put into the mouths
+of their scholars, could never yet get admittance into common use, or
+obtain the license of public approbation. Which seems to me at least to
+intimate the confession of all mankind, that they have no ideas of the
+real essences of substances, since they have not names for such ideas:
+which no doubt they would have had, had not their consciousness to
+themselves of their ignorance of them kept them from so idle an attempt.
+And therefore, though they had ideas enough to distinguish gold from a
+stone, and metal from wood; yet they but timorously ventured on such
+terms, as aurietas and saxietas, metallietas and lignietas, or the
+like names, which should pretend to signify the real essences of those
+substances whereof they knew they had no ideas. And indeed it was only
+the doctrine of SUBSTANTIAL FORMS, and the confidence of mistaken
+pretenders to a knowledge that they had not, which first coined and then
+introduced animalitas and humanitas, and the like; which yet went very
+little further than their own Schools, and could never get to be current
+amongst understanding men. Indeed, humanitas was a word in familiar use
+amongst the Romans; but in a far different sense, and stood not for the
+abstract essence of any substance; but was the abstracted name of a
+mode, and its concrete humanus, not homo.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX.
+
+OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS.
+
+
+1. Words are used for recording and communicating our Thoughts.
+
+From what has been said in the foregoing chapters, it is easy to
+perceive what imperfection there is in language, and how the very nature
+of words makes it almost unavoidable for many of them to be doubtful
+and uncertain in their significations. To examine the perfection or
+imperfection of words, it is necessary first to consider their use and
+end: for as they are more or less fitted to attain that, so they are
+more or less perfect. We have, in the former part of this discourse
+often, upon occasion, mentioned a double use of words.
+
+First, One for the recording of our own thoughts.
+
+Secondly, The other for the communicating of our thoughts to others.
+
+
+2. Any Words will serve for recording.
+
+As to the first of these, FOR THE RECORDING OUR OWN THOUGHTS FOR THE
+HELP OF OUR OWN MEMORIES, whereby, as it were, we talk to ourselves,
+any words will serve the turn. For since sounds are voluntary and
+indifferent signs of any ideas, a man may use what words he pleases to
+signify his own ideas to himself: and there will be no imperfection in
+them, if he constantly use the same sign for the same idea: for then he
+cannot fail of having his meaning understood, wherein consists the right
+use and perfection of language.
+
+
+3. Communication by Words either for civil or philosophical purposes.
+
+Secondly, As to COMMUNICATION BY WORDS, that too has a double use.
+
+I. Civil.
+
+II. Philosophical. First, By, their CIVIL use, I mean such a
+communication of thoughts and ideas by words, as may serve for the
+upholding common conversation and commerce, about the ordinary affairs
+and conveniences of civil life, in the societies of men, one amongst
+another.
+
+Secondly, By the PHILOSOPHICAL use of words, I mean such a use of them
+as may serve to convey the precise notions of things, and to express in
+general propositions certain and undoubted truths, which the mind may
+rest upon and be satisfied with in its search after true knowledge.
+These two uses are very distinct; and a great deal less exactness will
+serve in the one than in the other, as we shall see in what follows.
+
+
+4. The imperfection of Words is the Doubtfulness or ambiguity of their
+Signification, which is caused by the sort of ideas they stand for.
+
+The chief end of language in communication being to be understood,
+words serve not well for that end, neither in civil nor philosophical
+discourse, when any word does not excite in the hearer the same idea
+which it stands for in the mind of the speaker. Now, since sounds have
+no natural connexion with our ideas, but have all their signification
+from the arbitrary imposition of men, the doubtfulness and uncertainty
+of their signification, which is the imperfection we here are speaking
+of, has its cause more in the ideas they stand for than in any
+incapacity there is in one sound more than in another to signify any
+idea: for in that regard they are all equally perfect.
+
+That then which makes doubtfulness and uncertainty in the signification
+of some more than other words, is the difference of ideas they stand
+for.
+
+
+5. Natural Causes of their Imperfection, especially in those that stand
+for Mixed Modes, and for our ideas of Substances.
+
+Words having naturally no signification, the idea which each stands for
+must be learned and retained, by those who would exchange thoughts, and
+hold intelligible discourse with others, in any language. But this is
+the hardest to be done where,
+
+First, The ideas they stand for are very complex, and made up of a great
+number of ideas put together.
+
+Secondly, Where the ideas they stand for have no certain connexion in
+nature; and so no settled standard anywhere in nature existing, to
+rectify and adjust them by.
+
+Thirdly, When the signification of the word is referred to a standard,
+which standard is not easy to be known.
+
+Fourthly, Where the signification of the word and the real essence of
+the thing are not exactly the same.
+
+These are difficulties that attend the signification of several words
+that are intelligible. Those which are not intelligible at all, such
+as names standing for any simple ideas which another has not organs or
+faculties to attain; as the names of colours to a blind man, or sounds
+to a deaf man, need not here be mentioned.
+
+In all these cases we shall find an imperfection in words; which I shall
+more at large explain, in their particular application to our several
+sorts of ideas: for if we examine them, we shall find that the NAMES OF
+_M_IXED _M_ODES ARE MOST LIABLE TO DOUBTFULNESS AND IMPERFECTION, FOR
+THE TWO FIRST OF THESE REASONS; and the NAMES OF _S_UBSTANCES CHIEFLY
+FOR THE TWO LATTER.
+
+
+6. The Names of mixed Modes doubtful.
+
+First, The names of MIXED MODES are, many of them, liable to great
+uncertainty and obscurity in their signification.
+
+I. Because the Ideas they stand for are so complex.
+
+Because of that GREAT COMPOSITION these complex ideas are often made
+up of. To make words serviceable to the end of communication, it is
+necessary, as has been said, that they excite in the hearer exactly the
+same idea they stand for in the mind of the speaker. Without this, men
+fill one another's heads with noise and sounds; but convey not thereby
+their thoughts, and lay not before one another their ideas, which is the
+end of discourse and language. But when a word stands for a very complex
+idea that is compounded and decompounded, it is not easy for men to form
+and retain that idea so exactly, as to make the name in common use stand
+for the same precise idea, without any the least variation. Hence it
+comes to pass that men's names of very compound ideas, such as for the
+most part are moral words, have seldom in two different men the same
+precise signification; since one man's complex idea seldom agrees with
+another's, and often differs from his own--from that which he had
+yesterday, or will have tomorrow.
+
+
+7. Secondly because they have no Standards in Nature.
+
+Because the names of mixed modes for the most part WANT STANDARDS
+IN NATURE, whereby men may rectify and adjust their significations;
+therefore they are very various and doubtful. They are assemblages of
+ideas put together at the pleasure of the mind, pursuing its own ends of
+discourse, and suited to its own notions; whereby it designs not to copy
+anything really existing, but to denominate and rank things as they
+come to agree with those archetypes or forms it has made. He that first
+brought the word SHAM, or WHEEDLE, or BANTER, in use, put together as he
+thought fit those ideas he made it stand for; and as it is with any new
+names of modes that are now brought into any language, so it was with
+the old ones when they were first made use of. Names, therefore, that
+stand for collections of ideas which the mind makes at pleasure must
+needs be of doubtful signification, when such collections are nowhere
+to be found constantly united in nature, nor any patterns to be shown
+whereby men may adjust them. What the word MURDER, or SACRILEGE, &c.,
+signifies can never be known from things themselves: there be many of
+the parts of those complex ideas which are not visible in the action
+itself; the intention of the mind, or the relation of holy things, which
+make a part of murder or sacrilege, have no necessary connexion with the
+outward and visible action of him that commits either: and the pulling
+the trigger of the gun with which the murder is committed, and is all
+the action that perhaps is visible, has no natural connexion with those
+other ideas that make up the complex one named murder. They have their
+union and combination only from the understanding which unites them
+under one name: but, uniting them without any rule or pattern, it cannot
+be but that the signification of the name that stands for such voluntary
+collections should be often various in the minds of different men, who
+have scarce any standing rule to regulate themselves and their notions
+by, in such arbitrary ideas.
+
+
+8. Common use, or propriety not a sufficient Remedy.
+
+It is true, common use, that is, the rule of propriety may be supposed
+here to afford some aid, to settle the signification of language; and it
+cannot be denied but that in some measure it does. Common use regulates
+the meaning of words pretty well for common conversation; but nobody
+having an authority to establish the precise signification of words,
+nor determine to what ideas any one shall annex them, common use is
+not sufficient to adjust them to Philosophical Discourses; there being
+scarce any name of any very complex idea (to say nothing of others)
+which, in common use, has not a great latitude, and which, keeping
+within the bounds of propriety, may not be made the sign of far
+different ideas. Besides, the rule and measure of propriety itself being
+nowhere established, it is often matter of dispute, whether this or that
+way of using a word be propriety of speech or no. From all which it is
+evident, that the names of such kind of very complex ideas are
+naturally liable to this imperfection, to be of doubtful and uncertain
+signification; and even in men that have a mind to understand one
+another, do not always stand for the same idea in speaker and hearer.
+Though the names GLORY and GRATITUDE be the same in every man's mouth
+through a whole country, yet the complex collective idea which every one
+thinks on or intends by that name, is apparently very different in men
+using the same language.
+
+
+9. The way of learning these Names contributes also to their
+Doubtfulness.
+
+The way also wherein the names of mixed modes are ordinarily learned,
+does not a little contribute to the doubtfulness of their signification.
+For if we will observe how children learn languages, we shall find that,
+to make them understand what the names of simple ideas or substances
+stand for, people ordinarily show them the thing whereof they would have
+them have the idea; and then repeat to them the name that stands for
+it; as WHITE, SWEET, MILK, SUGAR, CAT, DOG. But as for mixed modes,
+especially the most material of them, MORAL WORDS, the sounds are
+usually learned first; and then, to know what complex ideas they stand
+for, they are either beholden to the explication of others, or (which
+happens for the most part) are left to their own observation and
+industry; which being little laid out in the search of the true and
+precise meaning of names, these moral words are in most men's mouths
+little more than bare sounds; or when they have any, it is for the most
+part but a very loose and undetermined, and, consequently, obscure and
+confused signification. And even those themselves who have with more
+attention settled their notions, do yet hardly avoid the inconvenience
+to have them stand for complex ideas different from those which other,
+even intelligent and studious men, make them the signs of. Where shall
+one find any, either controversial debate, or familiar discourse,
+concerning honour, faith, grace, religion, church, &c., wherein it is
+not easy to observe the different notions men have of them? Which is
+nothing but this, that they are not agreed in the signification of those
+words, nor have in their minds the same complex ideas which they make
+them stand for, and so all the contests that follow thereupon are
+only about the meaning of a sound. And hence we see that, in the
+interpretation of laws, whether divine or human, there is no end;
+comments beget comments, and explications make new matter for
+explications; and of limiting, distinguishing, varying the signification
+of these moral words there is no end. These ideas of men's making are,
+by men still having the same power, multiplied in infinitum. Many a man
+who was pretty well satisfied of the meaning of a text of Scripture, or
+clause in the code, at first reading, has, by consulting commentators,
+quite lost the sense of it, and by these elucidations given rise or
+increase to his doubts, and drawn obscurity upon the place. I say not
+this that I think commentaries needless; but to show how uncertain the
+names of mixed modes naturally are, even in the mouths of those who had
+both the intention and the faculty of speaking as clearly as language
+was capable to express their thoughts.
+
+
+10. Hence unavoidable Obscurity in ancient Authors.
+
+What obscurity this has unavoidably brought upon the writings of men who
+have lived in remote ages, and different countries, it will be needless
+to take notice. Since the numerous volumes of learned men, employing
+their thoughts that way, are proofs more than enough, to show what
+attention, study, sagacity, and reasoning are required to find out the
+true meaning of ancient authors. But, there being no writings we have
+any great concernment to be very solicitous about the meaning of, but
+those that contain either truths we are required to believe, or laws
+we are to obey, and draw inconveniences on us when we mistake or
+transgress, we may be less anxious about the sense of other authors;
+who, writing but their own opinions, we are under no greater necessity
+to know them, than they to know ours. Our good or evil depending not on
+their decrees, we may safely be ignorant of their notions: and therefore
+in the reading of them, if they do not use their words with a due
+clearness and perspicuity, we may lay them aside, and without any injury
+done them, resolve thus with ourselves,
+
+Si non vis intelligi, debes negligi.
+
+
+11. Names of Substances of doubtful Signification, because the ideas
+they stand for relate to the reality of things.
+
+If the signification of the names of mixed modes be uncertain, because
+there be no real standards existing in nature to which those ideas are
+referred, and by which they may be adjusted, the names of SUBSTANCES are
+of a doubtful signification, for a contrary reason, viz. because the
+ideas they stand for are supposed conformable to the reality of things,
+and are referred to as standards made by Nature. In our ideas of
+substances we have not the liberty, as in mixed modes, to frame what
+combinations we think fit, to be the characteristical notes to rank and
+denominate things by. In these we must follow Nature, suit our complex
+ideas to real existences, and regulate the signification of their names
+by the things themselves, if we will have our names to be signs of them,
+and stand for them. Here, it is true, we have patterns to follow; but
+patterns that will make the signification of their names very uncertain:
+for names must be of a very unsteady and various meaning, if the ideas
+they stand for be referred to standards without us, that either cannot
+be known at all, or can be known but imperfectly and uncertainly.
+
+
+12. Names of Substances referred, I. To real Essences that cannot be
+known.
+
+The names of substances have, as has been shown, a double reference in
+their ordinary use.
+
+First, Sometimes they are made to stand for, and so their signification
+is supposed to agree to, THE REAL CONSTITUTION OF THINGS, from which
+all their properties flow, and in which they all centre. But this real
+constitution, or (as it is apt to be called) essence, being utterly
+unknown to us, any sound that is put to stand for it must be very
+uncertain in its application; and it will be impossible to know what
+things are or ought to be called a HORSE, or ANTIMONY, when those words
+are put for real essences that we have no ideas of at all. And therefore
+in this supposition, the names of substances being referred to standards
+that cannot be known, their significations can never be adjusted and
+established by those standards.
+
+
+13. Secondly, To co-existing Qualities, which are known but imperfectly.
+
+Secondly, The simple ideas that are FOUND TO CO-EXIST IN SUBSTANCES
+being that which their names immediately signify, these, as united in
+the several sorts of things, are the proper standards to which their
+names are referred, and by which their significations may be best
+rectified. But neither will these archetypes so well serve to this
+purpose as to leave these names without very various and uncertain
+significations. Because these simple ideas that co-exist, and are united
+in the same subject, being very numerous, and having all an equal right
+to go into the complex specific idea which the specific name is to stand
+for, men, though they propose to themselves the very same subject to
+consider, yet frame very different ideas about it; and so the name they
+use for it unavoidably comes to have, in several men, very different
+significations. The simple qualities which make up the complex ideas,
+being most of them powers, in relation to changes which they are apt
+to make in, or receive from other bodies, are almost infinite. He that
+shall but observe what a great variety of alterations any one of the
+baser metals is apt to receive, from the different application only of
+fire; and how much a greater number of changes any of them will receive
+in the hands of a chymist, by the application of other bodies, will not
+think it strange that I count the properties of any sort of bodies not
+easy to be collected, and completely known, by the ways of inquiry which
+our faculties are capable of. They being therefore at least so many,
+that no man can know the precise and definite number, they are
+differently discovered by different men, according to their various
+skill, attention, and ways of handling; who therefore cannot choose
+but have different ideas of the same substance, and therefore make the
+signification of its common name very various and uncertain. For the
+complex ideas of substances, being made up of such simple ones as are
+supposed to co-exist in nature, every one has a right to put into his
+complex idea those qualities he has found to be united together. For,
+though in the substance of gold one satisfies himself with colour and
+weight, yet another thinks solubility in aqua regia as necessary to
+be joined with that colour in his idea of gold, as any one does its
+fusibility; solubility in aqua regia being a quality as constantly
+joined with its colour and weight as fusibility or any other; others
+put into it ductility or fixedness, &c., as they have been taught by
+tradition or experience. Who of all these has established the right
+signification of the word, gold? Or who shall be the judge to determine?
+Each has his standard in nature, which he appeals to, and with reason
+thinks he has the same right to put into his complex idea signified by
+the word gold, those qualities, which, upon trial, he has found united;
+as another who has not so well examined has to leave them out; or a
+third, who has made other trials, has to put in others. For the union in
+nature of these qualities being the true ground of their union in one
+complex idea, who can say one of them has more reason to be put in or
+left out than another? From hence it will unavoidably follow, that the
+complex ideas of substances in men using the same names for them,
+will be very various, and so the significations of those names very
+uncertain.
+
+
+14. Thirdly, To co-existing Qualities which are known but imperfectly.
+
+Besides, there is scarce any particular thing existing, which, in some
+of its simple ideas, does not communicate with a greater, and in others
+a less number of particular beings: who shall determine in this case
+which are those that are to make up the precise collection that is to
+be signified by the specific name? or can with any just authority
+prescribe, which obvious or common qualities are to be left out;
+or which more secret, or more particular, are to be put into the
+signification of the name of any substance? All which together, seldom
+or never fail to produce that various and doubtful signification in
+the names of substances, which causes such uncertainty, disputes, or
+mistakes, when we come to a philosophical use of them.
+
+
+15. With this imperfection, they may serve for civil, but not well for
+philosophical Use.
+
+It is true, as to civil and common conversation, the general names of
+substances, regulated in their ordinary signification by some obvious
+qualities, (as by the shape and figure in things of known seminal
+propagation, and in other substances, for the most part by colour,
+joined with some other sensible qualities,) do well enough to design the
+things men would be understood to speak of: and so they usually
+conceive well enough the substances meant by the word gold or apple, to
+distinguish the one from the other. But in PHILOSOPHICAL inquiries and
+debates, where general truths are to be established, and consequences
+drawn from positions laid down, there the precise signification of the
+names of substances will be found not only not to be well established
+but also very hard to be so. For example: he that shall make
+malleability, or a certain degree of fixedness, a part of his complex
+idea of gold, may make propositions concerning gold, and draw
+consequences from them, that will truly and clearly follow from gold,
+taken in such a signification: but yet such as another man can never
+be forced to admit, nor be convinced of their truth, who makes not
+malleableness, or the same degree of fixedness, part of that complex
+idea that the name gold, in his use of it, stands for.
+
+
+16. Instance, Liquor.
+
+This is a natural and almost unavoidable imperfection in almost all the
+names of substances, in all languages whatsoever, which men will easily
+find when, once passing from confused or loose notions, they come to
+more strict and close inquiries. For then they will be convinced how
+doubtful and obscure those words are in their signification, which in
+ordinary use appeared very clear and determined. I was once in a meeting
+of very learned and ingenious physicians, where by chance there arose a
+question, whether any liquor passed through the filaments of the nerves.
+The debate having been managed a good while, by variety of arguments on
+both sides, I (who had been used to suspect, that the greatest part
+of disputes were more about the signification of words than a real
+difference in the conception of things) desired, that, before they went
+any further on in this dispute, they would first examine and establish
+amongst them, what the word LIQUOR signified. They at first were a
+little surprised at the proposal; and had they been persons less
+ingenious, they might perhaps have taken it for a very frivolous or
+extravagant one: since there was no one there that thought not himself
+to understand very perfectly what the word liquor stood for; which I
+think, too, none of the most perplexed names of substances. However,
+they were pleased to comply with my motion; and upon examination found
+that the signification of that word was not so settled or certain
+as they had all imagined; but that each of them made it a sign of a
+different complex idea. This made them perceive that the main of their
+dispute was about the signification of that term; and that they differed
+very little in their opinions concerning SOME fluid and subtle matter,
+passing through the conduits of the nerves; though it was not so easy
+to agree whether it was to be called LIQUOR or no, a thing, which, when
+considered, they thought it not worth the contending about.
+
+
+17. Instance, Gold.
+
+How much this is the case in the greatest part of disputes that men are
+engaged so hotly in, I shall perhaps have an occasion in another place
+to take notice. Let us only here consider a little more exactly the
+fore-mentioned instance of the word GOLD, and we shall see how hard it
+is precisely to determine its signification. I think all agree to make
+it stand for a body of a certain yellow shining colour; which being the
+idea to which children have annexed that name, the shining yellow part
+of a peacock's tail is properly to them gold. Others finding fusibility
+joined with that yellow colour in certain parcels of matter, make of
+that combination a complex idea to which they give the name gold, to
+denote a sort of substances; and so exclude from being gold all such
+yellow shining bodies as by fire will be reduced to ashes; and admit to
+be of that species, or to be comprehended under that name gold, only
+such substances as having that shining yellow colour, will by fire be
+reduced to fusion, and not to ashes. Another, by the same reason, adds
+the weight, which, being a quality as straightly joined with that colour
+as its fusibility, he thinks has the same reason to be joined in its
+idea, and to be signified by its name: and therefore the other made up
+of body, of such a colour and fusibility, to be imperfect; and so on
+of all the rest: wherein no one can show a reason why some of the
+inseparable qualities, that are always united in nature, should be put
+into the nominal essence, and others left out, or why the word gold,
+signifying that sort of body the ring on his finger is made of, should
+determine that sort rather by its colour, weight, and fusibility,
+than by its colour, weight, and solubility in aqua regia: since the
+dissolving it by that liquor is as inseparable from it as the fusion
+by fire, and they are both of them nothing but the relation which
+that substance has to two other bodies, which have a power to operate
+differently upon it. For by what right is it that fusibility comes to be
+a part of the essence signified by the word gold, and solubility but
+a property of it? Or why is its colour part of the essence, and its
+malleableness but a property? That which I mean is this, That these
+being all but properties, depending on its real constitution, and
+nothing but powers, either active or passive, in reference to other
+bodies, no one has authority to determine the signification of the
+word gold (as referred to such a body existing in nature) more to one
+collection of ideas to be found in that body than to another: whereby
+the signification of that name must unavoidably be very uncertain.
+Since, as has been said, several people observe several properties in
+the same substance; and I think I may say nobody all. And therefore we
+have but very imperfect descriptions of things, and words have very
+uncertain significations.
+
+
+18. The Names of simple Ideas the least doubtful.
+
+From what has been said, it is easy to observe what has been before
+remarked, viz. that the NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS are, of all others, the
+least liable to mistakes, and that for these reasons. First, Because the
+ideas they stand for, being each but one single perception, are much
+easier got, and more clearly retained, than the more complex ones, and
+therefore are not liable to the uncertainty which usually attends those
+compounded ones of substances and mixed modes, in which the precise
+number of simple ideas that make them up are not easily agreed, so
+readily kept in mind. And, Secondly, Because they are never referred to
+any other essence, but barely that perception they immediately signify:
+which reference is that which renders the signification of the names
+of substances naturally so perplexed, and gives occasion to so many
+disputes. Men that do not perversely use their words, or on purpose set
+themselves to cavil, seldom mistake, in any language which they are
+acquainted with, the use and signification of the name of simple ideas.
+WHITE and SWEET, YELLOW and BITTER, carry a very obvious meaning with
+them, which every one precisely comprehends, or easily perceives he is
+ignorant of, and seeks to be informed. But what precise collection of
+simple ideas MODESTY or FRUGALITY stand for, in another's use, is not
+so certainly known. And however we are apt to think we well enough know
+what is meant by GOLD or IRON; yet the precise complex idea others make
+them the signs of is not so certain: and I believe it is very seldom
+that, in speaker and hearer, they stand for exactly the same collection.
+Which must needs produce mistakes and disputes, when they are made use
+of in discourses, wherein men have to do with universal propositions,
+and would settle in their minds universal truths, and consider the
+consequences that follow from them.
+
+
+19. And next to them, simple Modes.
+
+By the same rule, the names of SIMPLE MODES are, next to those of simple
+ideas, least liable to doubt and uncertainty; especially those of figure
+and number, of which men have so clear and distinct ideas. Who ever that
+had a mind to understand them mistook the ordinary meaning of SEVEN, or
+a TRIANGLE? And in general the least compounded ideas in every kind have
+the least dubious names.
+
+
+20. The most doubtful are the Names of very compounded mixed Modes and
+Substances.
+
+Mixed modes, therefore, that are made up but of a few and obvious simple
+ideas, have usually names of no very uncertain signification. But the
+names of mixed modes, which comprehend a great number of simple ideas,
+are commonly of a very doubtful and undetermined meaning, as has been
+shown. The names of substances, being annexed to ideas that are neither
+the real essences, nor exact representations of the patterns they are
+referred to, are liable to yet greater imperfection and uncertainty,
+especially when we come to a philosophical use of them.
+
+
+21. Why this Imperfection charged upon Words.
+
+The great disorder that happens in our names of substances, proceeding,
+for the most part, from our want of knowledge, and inability to
+penetrate into their real constitutions, it may probably be wondered
+why I charge this as an imperfection rather upon our words than
+understandings. This exception has so much appearance of justice, that I
+think myself obliged to give a reason why I have followed this method.
+I must confess, then, that, when I first began this Discourse of the
+Understanding, and a good while after, I had not the least thought that
+any consideration of words was at all necessary to it. But when, having
+passed over the original and composition of our ideas, I began to
+examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, I found it had so
+near a connexion with words, that, unless their force and manner of
+signification were first well observed, there could be very little said
+clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge: which being conversant
+about truth, had constantly to do with propositions. And though it
+terminated in things, yet it was for the most part so much by the
+intervention of words, that they seemed scarce separable from our
+general knowledge. At least they interpose themselves so much between
+our understandings, and the truth which it would contemplate and
+apprehend, that, like the medium through which visible objects pass, the
+obscurity and disorder do not seldom cast a mist before our eyes, and
+impose upon our understandings. If we consider, in the fallacies men put
+upon themselves, as well as others, and the mistakes in men's disputes
+and notions, how great a part is owing to words, and their uncertain or
+mistaken significations, we shall have reason to think this no small
+obstacle in the way to knowledge; which I conclude we are the more
+carefully to be warned of, because it has been so far from being taken
+notice of as an inconvenience, that the arts of improving it have
+been made the business of men's study, and obtained the reputation of
+learning and subtilty, as we shall see in the following chapter. But
+I am apt to imagine, that, were the imperfections of language, as the
+instrument of knowledge, more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the
+controversies that make such a noise in the world, would of themselves
+cease; and the way to knowledge, and perhaps peace too, lie a great deal
+opener than it does.
+
+
+22. This should teach us Moderation in imposing our own Sense of old
+Authors.
+
+Sure I am that the signification of words in all languages, depending
+very much on the thoughts, notions, and ideas of him that uses them,
+must unavoidably be of great uncertainty to men of the same language and
+country. This is so evident in the Greek authors, that he that shall
+peruse their writings will find in almost every one of them, a distinct
+language, though the same words. But when to this natural difficulty in
+every country, there shall be added different countries and remote ages,
+wherein the speakers and writers had very different notions, tempers,
+customs, ornaments, and figures of speech, &c., every one of which
+influenced the signification of their words then, though to us now they
+are lost and unknown; it would become us to be charitable one to another
+in our interpretations or misunderstandings of those ancient writings;
+which, though of great concernment to be understood, are liable to the
+unavoidable difficulties of speech, which (if we except the names of
+simple ideas, and some very obvious things) is not capable, without a
+constant defining the terms, of conveying the sense and intention of the
+speaker, without any manner of doubt and uncertainty to the hearer. And
+in discourses of religion, law, and morality, as they are matters of the
+highest concernment, so there will be the greatest difficulty.
+
+
+23. Especially of the Old and New Testament Scriptures.
+
+The volumes of interpreters and commentators on the Old and New
+Testament are but too manifest proofs of this. Though everything said in
+the text be infallibly true, yet the reader may be, nay, cannot choose
+but be, very fallible in the understanding of it. Nor is it to be
+wondered, that the will of God, when clothed in words, should be liable
+to that doubt and uncertainty which unavoidably attends that sort of
+conveyance, when even his Son, whilst clothed in flesh, was subject to
+all the frailties and inconveniences of human nature, sin excepted. And
+we ought to magnify his goodness, that he hath spread before all the
+world such legible characters of his works and providence, and given all
+mankind so sufficient a light of reason, that they to whom this written
+word never came, could not (whenever they set themselves to search)
+either doubt of the being of a God, or of the obedience due to him.
+Since then the precepts of Natural Religion are plain, and very
+intelligible to all mankind, and seldom come to be controverted; and
+other revealed truths, which are conveyed to us by books and languages,
+are liable to the common and natural obscurities and difficulties
+incident to words; methinks it would become us to be more careful and
+diligent in observing the former, and less magisterial, positive, and
+imperious, in imposing our own sense and interpretations of the latter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X.
+
+OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS.
+
+
+1. Woeful abuse of Words.
+
+Besides the imperfection that is naturally in language, and the
+obscurity and confusion that is so hard to be avoided in the use of
+words, there are several WILFUL faults and neglects which men are guilty
+of in this way of communication, whereby they render these signs less
+clear and distinct in their signification than naturally they need to
+be.
+
+
+2. First, Words are often employed without any, or without clear Ideas.
+
+FIRST, In this kind the first and most palpable abuse is, the using
+of words without clear and distinct ideas; or, which is worse, signs
+without anything signified. Of these there are two sorts:--
+
+I. Some words introduced without clear ideas annexed to them, even in
+their first original.
+
+One may observe, in all languages, certain words that, if they be
+examined, will be found in their first original, and their appropriated
+use, not to stand for any clear and distinct ideas. These, for the most
+part, the several sects of philosophy and religion have introduced. For
+their authors or promoters, either affecting something singular, and out
+of the way of common apprehensions, or to support some strange opinions,
+or cover some weakness of their hypothesis, seldom fail to coin new
+words, and such as, when they come to be examined, may justly be called
+INSIGNIFICANT TERMS. For, having either had no determinate collection of
+ideas annexed to them when they were first invented; or at least such
+as, if well examined, will be found inconsistent, it is no wonder, if,
+afterwards, in the vulgar use of the same party, they remain empty
+sounds, with little or no signification, amongst those who think it
+enough to have them often in their mouths, as the distinguishing
+characters of their Church or School, without much troubling their heads
+to examine what are the precise ideas they stand for. I shall not need
+here to heap up instances; every man's reading and conversation will
+sufficiently furnish him. Or if he wants to be better stored, the
+great mint-masters of this kind of terms, I mean the Schoolmen and
+Metaphysicians (under which I think the disputing natural and moral
+philosophers of these latter ages may be comprehended) have wherewithal
+abundantly to content him.
+
+
+3. II. Other Words, to which ideas were annexed at first, used
+afterwards without distinct meanings.
+
+Others there be who extend this abuse yet further, who take so little
+care to lay by words, which, in their primary notation have scarce
+any clear and distinct ideas which they are annexed to, that, by an
+unpardonable negligence, they familiarly use words which the propriety
+of language HAS affixed to very important ideas, without any distinct
+meaning at all. WISDOM, GLORY, GRACE, &c., are words frequent enough in
+every man's mouth; but if a great many of those who use them should be
+asked what they mean by them, they would be at a stand, and not know
+what to answer: a plain proof, that, though they have learned those
+sounds, and have them ready at their tongues ends, yet there are no
+determined ideas laid up in their minds, which are to be expressed to
+others by them.
+
+
+4. This occasioned by men learning Names before they have the Ideas the
+names belong to.
+
+Men having been accustomed from their cradles to learn words which are
+easily got and retained, before they knew or had framed the complex
+ideas to which they were annexed, or which were to be found in the
+things they were thought to stand for, they usually continue to do so
+all their lives; and without taking the pains necessary to settle in
+their minds determined ideas, they use their words for such unsteady and
+confused notions as they have, contenting themselves with the same words
+other people use; as if their very sound necessarily carried with it
+constantly the same meaning. This, though men make a shift with in
+the ordinary occurrences of life, where they find it necessary to be
+understood, and therefore they make signs till they are so; yet this
+insignificancy in their words, when they come to reason concerning
+either their tenets or interest, manifestly fills their discourse with
+abundance of empty unintelligible noise and jargon, especially in moral
+matters, where the words for the most part standing for arbitrary and
+numerous collections of ideas, not regularly and permanently united in
+nature, their bare sounds are often only thought on, or at least very
+obscure and uncertain notions annexed to them. Men take the words
+they find in use amongst their neighbours; and that they may not seem
+ignorant what they stand for, use them confidently, without much
+troubling their heads about a certain fixed meaning; whereby, besides
+the ease of it, they obtain this advantage, That, as in such discourses
+they seldom are in the right, so they are as seldom to be convinced that
+they are in the wrong; it being all one to go about to draw those men
+out of their mistakes who have no settled notions, as to dispossess a
+vagrant of his habitation who has no settled abode. This I guess to be
+so; and every one may observe in himself and others whether it be so or
+not.
+
+
+5. Secondly Unsteady Application of them.
+
+SECONDLY, Another great abuse of words is INCONSTANCY in the use of
+them. It is hard to find a discourse written on any subject, especially
+of controversy, wherein one shall not observe, if he read with
+attention, the same words (and those commonly the most material in the
+discourse, and upon which the argument turns) used sometimes for one
+collection of simple ideas, and sometimes for another; which is a
+perfect abuse of language. Words being intended for signs of my ideas,
+to make them known to others, not by any natural signification, but by
+a voluntary imposition, it is plain cheat and abuse, when I make them
+stand sometimes for one thing and sometimes for another; the wilful
+doing whereof can be imputed to nothing but great folly, or greater
+dishonesty. And a man, in his accounts with another may, with as much
+fairness make the characters of numbers stand sometimes for one and
+sometimes for another collection of units: v.g. this character 3, stand
+sometimes for three, sometimes for four, and sometimes for eight, as
+in his discourse or reasoning make the same words stand for different
+collections of simple ideas. If men should do so in their reckonings, I
+wonder who would have to do with them? One who would speak thus in the
+affairs and business of the world, and call 8 sometimes seven, and
+sometimes nine, as best served his advantage, would presently have
+clapped upon him, one of the two names men are commonly disgusted with.
+And yet in arguings and learned contests, the same sort of proceedings
+passes commonly for wit and learning; but to me it appears a greater
+dishonesty than the misplacing of counters in the casting up a debt; and
+the cheat the greater, by how much truth is of greater concernment and
+value than money.
+
+
+6. Thirdly, Affected Obscurity, as in the Peripatetic and other sects of
+Philosophy.
+
+THIRDLY. Another abuse of language is an AFFECTED OBSCURITY; by either
+applying old words to new and unusual significations; or introducing new
+and ambiguous terms, without defining either; or else putting them
+so together, as may confound their ordinary meaning. Though the
+Peripatetick philosophy has been most eminent in this way, yet other
+sects have not been wholly clear of it. There are scarce any of them
+that are not cumbered with some difficulties (such is the imperfection
+of human knowledge,) which they have been fain to cover with obscurity
+of terms, and to confound the signification of words, which, like a
+mist before people's eyes, might hinder their weak parts from being
+discovered. That BODY and EXTENSION in common use, stand for two
+distinct ideas, is plain to any one that will but reflect a little. For
+were their signification precisely the same, it would be as proper, and
+as intelligible to say, 'the body of an extension,' as the 'extension of
+a body;' and yet there are those who find it necessary to confound their
+signification. To this abuse, and the mischiefs of confounding the
+signification of words, logic, and the liberal sciences as they have
+been handled in the schools, have given reputation; and the admired Art
+of Disputing hath added much to the natural imperfection of languages,
+whilst it has been made use of and fitted to perplex the signification
+of words, more than to discover the knowledge and truth of things: and
+he that will look into that sort of learned writings, will find the
+words there much more obscure, uncertain, and undetermined in their
+meaning, than they are in ordinary conversation.
+
+
+7. Logic and Dispute have much contributed to this.
+
+This is unavoidably to be so, where men's parts and learning are
+estimated by their skill in disputing. And if reputation and reward
+shall attend these conquests, which depend mostly on the fineness and
+niceties of words, it is no wonder if the wit of man so employed, should
+perplex, involve, and subtilize the signification of sounds, so as never
+to want something to say in opposing or defending any question; the
+victory being adjudged not to him who had truth on his side, but the
+last word in the dispute.
+
+
+8. Calling it Subtlety.
+
+This, though a very useless skill, and that which I think the direct
+opposite to the ways of knowledge, hath yet passed hitherto under the
+laudable and esteemed names of SUBTLETY and ACUTENESS, and has had the
+applause of the schools, and encouragement of one part of the learned
+men of the world. And no wonder, since the philosophers of old, (the
+disputing and wrangling philosophers I mean, such as Lucian wittily and
+with reason taxes,) and the Schoolmen since, aiming at glory and esteem,
+for their great and universal knowledge, easier a great deal to be
+pretended to than really acquired, found this a good expedient to cover
+their ignorance, with a curious and inexplicable web of perplexed words,
+and procure to themselves the admiration of others, by unintelligible
+terms, the apter to produce wonder because they could not be understood;
+whilst it appears in all history, that these profound doctors were no
+wiser nor more useful than their neighbours, and brought but small
+advantage to human life or the societies wherein they lived; unless the
+coining of new words, where they produced no new things to apply them
+to, or the perplexing or obscuring the signification of old ones, and so
+bringing all things into question and dispute, were a thing profitable
+to the life of man, or worthy commendation and reward.
+
+
+9. This Learning very little benefits Society.
+
+For, notwithstanding these learned disputants, these all-knowing
+doctors, it was to the unscholastic statesman that the governments
+of the world owed their peace, defence, and liberties; and from the
+illiterate and contemned mechanic (a name of disgrace) that they
+received the improvements of useful arts. Nevertheless, this artificial
+ignorance, and learned gibberish, prevailed mightily in these last ages,
+by the interest and artifice of those who found no easier way to that
+pitch of authority and dominion they have attained, than by amusing
+the men of business, and ignorant, with hard words, or employing the
+ingenious and idle in intricate disputes about unintelligible terms, and
+holding them perpetually entangled in that endless labyrinth. Besides,
+there is no such way to gain admittance, or give defence to strange and
+absurd doctrines, as to guard them round about with legions of obscure,
+doubtful, and undefined words. Which yet make these retreats more like
+the dens of robbers, or holes of foxes, than the fortresses of fair
+warriors; which, if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the
+strength that is in them, but the briars and thorns, and the obscurity
+of the thickets they are beset with. For untruth being unacceptable
+to the mind of man, there is no other defence left for absurdity but
+obscurity.
+
+
+10. But destroys the instruments of Knowledge and communication.
+
+Thus learned ignorance, and this art of keeping even inquisitive men
+from true knowledge, hath been propagated in the world, and hath much
+perplexed, whilst it pretended to inform the understanding. For we see
+that other well-meaning and wise men, whose education and parts had not
+acquired that ACUTENESS, could intelligibly express themselves to one
+another; and in its plain use make a benefit of language. But though
+unlearned men well enough understood the words white and black; &c., and
+had constant notions of the ideas signified by those words; yet there
+were philosophers found who had learning and subtlety enough to prove
+that snow was black; i.e. to prove that white was black. Whereby they
+had the advantage to destroy the instruments and means of discourse,
+conversation, instruction, and society; whilst, with great art and
+subtlety, they did no more but perplex and confound the signification of
+words, and thereby render language less useful than the real defects of
+it had made it; a gift which the illiterate had not attained to.
+
+
+11. As useful as to confound the sound that the Letters of the Alphabet
+stand for.
+
+These learned men did equally instruct men's understandings, and
+profit their lives, as he who should alter the signification of known
+characters, and, by a subtle device of learning, far surpassing the
+capacity of the illiterate, dull, and vulgar, should in his writing show
+that he could put A for B, and D for E, &c., to the no small admiration
+and benefit of for his reader. It being as senseless to put BLACK,
+which is a word agreed on to stand for one sensible idea, to put it, I
+say, for another, or the contrary idea; i.e. to call SNOW BLACK, as
+to put this mark A, which is a character agreed on to stand for one
+modification of sound, made by a certain motion of the organs of speech,
+for B, which is agreed on to stand for another modification of sound,
+made by another certain mode of the organs of speech.
+
+
+12. This Art has perplexed Religion and Justice.
+
+Nor hath this mischief stopped in logical niceties, or curious empty
+speculations; it hath invaded the great concernments of human life and
+society; obscured and perplexed the material truths of law and divinity;
+brought confusion, disorder, and uncertainty into the affairs of
+mankind; and if not destroyed, yet in a great measure rendered useless,
+these two great rules, religion and justice. What have the greatest part
+of the comments and disputes upon the laws of God and man served for,
+but to make the meaning more doubtful, and perplex the sense? What have
+been the effect of those multiplied curious distinctions, and acute
+niceties, but obscurity and uncertainty, leaving the words more
+unintelligible, and the reader more at a loss? How else comes it to pass
+that princes, speaking or writing to their servants, in their ordinary
+commands are easily understood; speaking to their people, in their laws,
+are not so? And, as I remarked before, doth it not often happen that a
+man of an ordinary capacity very well understands a text, or a law, that
+he reads, till he consults an expositor, or goes to counsel; who, by
+that time he hath done explaining them, makes the words signify either
+nothing at all, or what he pleases.
+
+
+13. and ought not to pass for Learning.
+
+Whether any by-interests of these professions have occasioned this, I
+will not here examine; but I leave it to be considered, whether it would
+not be well for mankind, whose concernment it is to know things as they
+are, and to do what they ought, and not to spend their lives in talking
+about them, or tossing words to and fro;--whether it would not be well,
+I say, that the use of words were made plain and direct; and that
+language, which was given us for the improvement of knowledge and bond
+of society, should not be employed to darken truth and unsettle people's
+rights; to raise mists, and render unintelligible both morality and
+religion? Or that at least, if this will happen, it should not be
+thought learning or knowledge to do so?
+
+
+14. IV. Fourthly, by taking Words for Things.
+
+FOURTHLY, Another great abuse of words is, the TAKING THEM FOR THINGS.
+This, though it in some degree concerns all names in general, yet more
+particularly affects those of substances. To this abuse those men are
+most subject who most confine their thoughts to any one system, and
+give themselves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received
+hypothesis: whereby they come to be persuaded that the terms of that
+sect are so suited to the nature of things, that they perfectly
+correspond with their real existence. Who is there that has been bred up
+in the Peripatetick philosophy, who does not think the Ten Names, under
+which are ranked the Ten Predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the
+nature of things? Who is there of that school that is not persuaded that
+SUBSTANTIAL FORMS, VEGETATIVE SOULS, ABHORRENCE OF A VACUUM, INTENTIONAL
+SPECIES, &c., are something real? These words men have learned from
+their very entrance upon knowledge, and have found their masters and
+systems lay great stress upon them: and therefore they cannot quit
+the opinion, that they are conformable to nature, and are the
+representations of something that really exists. The Platonists have
+their SOUL OF THE WORLD, and the Epicureans their ENDEAVOR TOWARDS
+MOTION in their atoms when at rest. There is scarce any sect in
+philosophy has not a distinct set of terms that others understand not.
+But yet this gibberish, which, in the weakness of human understanding,
+serves so well to palliate men's ignorance, and cover their errors,
+comes, by familiar use amongst those of the same tribe, to seem the
+most important part of language, and of all other the terms the most
+significant: and should AERIAL and OETHERIAL VEHICLES come once, by the
+prevalency of that doctrine, to be generally received anywhere, no doubt
+those terms would make impressions on men's minds, so as to establish
+them in the persuasion of the reality of such things, as much as
+Peripatetick FORMS and INTENTIONAL SPECIES have heretofore done. 15.
+Instance, in Matter.
+
+How much names taken for things are apt to mislead the understanding,
+the attentive reading of philosophical writers would abundantly
+discover; and that perhaps in words little suspected of any such misuse.
+I shall instance in one only, and that a very familiar one. How many
+intricate disputes have there been about MATTER, as if there were some
+such thing really in nature, distinct from BODY; as it is evident the
+word matter stands for an idea distinct from the idea of body? For if
+the ideas these two terms stood for were precisely the same, they might
+indifferently in all places be put for one another. But we see that
+though it be proper to say, There is one matter of all bodies, one
+cannot say, There is one body of all matters: we familiarly say one body
+is bigger than another; but it sounds harsh (and I think is never used)
+to say one matter is bigger than another. Whence comes this, then? Viz.
+from hence: that, though matter and body be not really distinct, but
+wherever there is the one there is the other; yet matter and body stand
+for two different conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but
+a part of the other. For body stands for a solid extended figured
+substance, whereof matter is but a partial and more confused conception;
+it seeming to me to be used for the substance and solidity of body,
+without taking in its extension and figure: and therefore it is that,
+speaking of matter, we speak of it always as one, because in truth it
+expressly contains nothing but the idea of a solid substance, which is
+everywhere the same, everywhere uniform. This being our idea of matter,
+we no more conceive or speak of different MATTERS in the world than
+we do of different solidities; though we both conceive and speak of
+different bodies, because extension and figure are capable of variation.
+But, since solidity cannot exist without extension and figure, the
+taking matter to be the name of something really existing under that
+precision, has no doubt produced those obscure and unintelligible
+discourses and disputes, which have filled the heads and books of
+philosophers concerning materia prima; which imperfection or abuse,
+how far it may concern a great many other general terms I leave to be
+considered. This, I think, I may at least say, that we should have a
+great many fewer disputes in the world, if words were taken for what
+they are, the signs of our ideas only; and not for things themselves.
+For, when we argue about MATTER, or any the like term, we truly argue
+only about the idea we express by that sound, whether that precise idea
+agree to anything really existing in nature or no. And if men would tell
+what ideas they make their words stand for, there could not be half that
+obscurity or wrangling in the search or support of truth that there is.
+
+
+16. This makes Errors lasting.
+
+But whatever inconvenience follows from this mistake of words, this I am
+sure, that, by constant and familiar use, they charm men into notions
+far remote from the truth of things. It would be a hard matter to
+persuade any one that the words which his father, or schoolmaster, the
+parson of the parish, or such a reverend doctor used, signified nothing
+that really existed in nature: which perhaps is none of the least causes
+that men are so hardly drawn to quit their mistakes, even in opinions
+purely philosophical, and where they have no other interest but truth.
+For the words they have a long time been used to, remaining firm in
+their minds, it is no wonder that the wrong notions annexed to them
+should not be removed.
+
+
+17. Fifthly, by setting them in the place of what they cannot signify.
+
+V. FIFTHLY, Another abuse of words is, THE SETTING THEM IN THE PLACE OF
+THINGS WHICH THEY DO OR CAN BY NO MEANS SIGNIFY. We may observe that, in
+the general names of substances, whereof the NOMINAL essences are only
+known to us, when we put them into propositions, and affirm or deny
+anything about them, we do most commonly tacitly suppose or intend, they
+should stand for the REAL essence of a certain sort of substances.
+For, when a man says gold is malleable, he means and would insinuate
+something more than this, That what I call gold is malleable, (though
+truly it amounts to no more,) but would have this understood, viz.
+That gold, i.e. what has the real essence of gold, is malleable; which
+amounts to thus much, that malleableness depends on, and is inseparable
+from the real essence of gold. But a man, not knowing wherein that real
+essence consists, the connexion in his mind of malleableness is not
+truly with an essence he knows not, but only with the sound gold he puts
+for it. Thus, when we say that ANIMAL RATIONALE is, and animal imflume
+bipes latis unguibus is not a good definition of a man; it is plain we
+suppose the name man in this case to stand for the real essence of a
+species, and would signify that 'a rational animal' better described
+that real essence than 'a two-legged animal with broad nails, and
+without feathers.' For else, why might not Plato as properly make the
+word [word in Greek], or MAN, stand for his complex idea, made up of the
+idea of a body, distinguished from others by a certain shape and other
+outward appearances, as Aristotle make the complex idea to which he gave
+the name [word in Greek], or MAN, of body and the faculty of reasoning
+joined together; unless the name [word in Greek], or MAN, were supposed
+to stand for something else than what it signifies; and to be put in the
+place of some other thing than the idea a man professes he would express
+by it?
+
+
+18. VI. Putting them for the real Essences of Substances.
+
+It is true the names of substances would be much more useful, and
+propositions made in them much more certain, were the real essences of
+substances the ideas in our minds which those words signified. And it
+is for want of those real essences that our words convey so little
+knowledge or certainty in our discourses about them; and therefore the
+mind, to remove that imperfection as much as it can, makes them, by a
+secret supposition, to stand for a thing having that real essence, as if
+thereby it made some nearer approaches to it. For, though the word MAN
+or GOLD signify nothing truly but a complex idea of properties united
+together in one sort of substances; yet there is scarce anybody, in the
+use of these words, but often supposes each of those names to stand for
+a thing having the real essence on which these properties depend. Which
+is so far from diminishing the imperfection of our words, that by a
+plain abuse it adds to it, when we would make them stand for something,
+which, not being in our complex idea, the name we use can no ways be the
+sign of.
+
+
+19. Hence we think Change of our Complex Ideas of Substances not to
+change their Species.
+
+This shows us the reason why in MIXED MODES any of the ideas that make
+the composition of the complex one being left out or changed, it is
+allowed to be another thing, i.e. to be of another species, as is plain
+in CHANCE-MEDLEY, MANSLAUGHTER, MURDER, PARRICIDE, &c. The reason
+whereof is, because the complex idea signified by that name is the real
+as well as nominal essence; and there is no secret reference of that
+name to any other essence but that. But in SUBSTANCES, it is not so. For
+though in that called GOLD, one puts into his complex idea what another
+leaves out, and vice versa: yet men do not usually think that therefore
+the species is changed: because they secretly in their minds refer that
+name, and suppose it annexed to a real immutable essence of a thing
+existing, on which those properties depend. He that adds to his complex
+idea of gold that of fixedness and solubility in AQUA REGIA, which he
+put not in it before, is not thought to have changed the species; but
+only to have a more perfect idea, by adding another simple idea, which
+is always in fact joined with those other, of which his former complex
+idea consisted. But this reference of the name to a thing, whereof we
+have not the idea, is so far from helping at all, that it only serves
+the more to involve us in difficulties. For by this tacit reference to
+the real essence of that species of bodies, the word GOLD (which, by
+standing for a more or less perfect collection of simple ideas, serves
+to design that sort of body well enough in civil discourse) comes to
+have no signification at all, being put for somewhat whereof we have no
+idea at all, and so can signify nothing at all, when the body itself is
+away. For however it may be thought all one, yet, if well considered, it
+will be found a quite different thing, to argue about gold in name, and
+about a parcel in the body itself, v.g. a piece of leaf-gold laid before
+us; though in discourse we are fain to substitute the name for the
+thing.
+
+
+20. The Cause of this Abuse, a supposition of Nature's working always
+regularly, in setting boundaries to Species.
+
+That which I think very much disposes men to substitute their names for
+the real essences of species, is the supposition before mentioned,
+that nature works regularly in the production of things, and sets the
+boundaries to each of those species, by giving exactly the same real
+internal constitution to each individual which we rank under one general
+name. Whereas any one who observes their different qualities can hardly
+doubt, that many of the individuals, called by the same name, are, in
+their internal constitution, as different one from another as several of
+those which are ranked under different specific names. This supposition,
+however, that the same precise and internal constitution goes always
+with the same specific name, makes men forward to take those names for
+the representatives of those real essences; though indeed they signify
+nothing but the complex ideas they have in their minds when they use
+them. So that, if I may so say, signifying one thing, and being supposed
+for, or put in the place of another, they cannot but, in such a kind of
+use, cause a great deal of uncertainty in men's discourses; especially
+in those who have thoroughly imbibed the doctrine of SUBSTANTIAL
+FORMS, whereby they firmly imagine the several species of things to be
+determined and distinguished.
+
+
+21. This Abuse contains two false Suppositions.
+
+But however preposterous and absurd it be to make our names stand for
+ideas we have not, or (which is all one) essences that we know not,
+it being in effect to make our words the signs of nothing; yet it is
+evident to any one who ever so little reflects on the use men make
+of their words, that there is nothing more familiar. When a man asks
+whether this or that thing he sees, let it be a drill, or a monstrous
+foetus, be a MAN or no; it is evident the question is not, Whether that
+particular thing agree to his complex idea expressed by the name man:
+but whether it has in it the real essence of a species of things which
+he supposes his name man to stand for. In which way of using the names
+of substances, there are these false suppositions contained:--
+
+First, that there are certain precise essences according to which nature
+makes all particular things, and by which they are distinguished into
+species. That everything has a real constitution, whereby it is what it
+is, and on which its sensible qualities depend, is past doubt: but I
+think it has been proved that this makes not the distinction of species
+as WE rank them, nor the boundaries of their names.
+
+Secondly, this tacitly also insinuates, as if we had IDEAS of these
+proposed essences. For to what purpose else is it, to inquire whether
+this or that thing have the real essence of the species man, if we did
+not suppose that there were such a specifick essence known? Which yet
+is utterly false. And therefore such application of names as would make
+them stand for ideas which we have not, must needs cause great disorder
+in discourses and reasonings about them, and be a great inconvenience in
+our communication by words.
+
+
+22. VI. Sixthly, by proceeding upon the supposition that the words we
+use have a certain and evident Signification which other men cannot but
+understand.
+
+SIXTHLY, there remains yet another more general, though perhaps less
+observed, abuse of words; and that is, that men having by a long and
+familiar use annexed to them certain ideas, they are apt to imagine SO
+NEAR AND NECESSARY A CONNEXION BETWEEN THE NAMES AND SIGNIFICATION THEY
+USE THEM IN, that they forwardly suppose one cannot but understand what
+their meaning is; and therefore one ought to acquiesce in the words
+delivered, as if it were past doubt that, in the use of those common
+received sounds, the speaker and hearer had necessarily the same precise
+ideas. Whence presuming, that when they have in discourse used any term,
+they have thereby, as it were, set before others the very thing they
+talked of. And so likewise taking the words of others, as naturally
+standing for just what they themselves have been accustomed to apply
+them to, they never trouble themselves to explain their own, or
+understand clearly others' meaning. From whence commonly proceeds noise,
+and wrangling, without improvement or information; whilst men take words
+to be the constant regular marks of agreed notions, which in truth are
+no more but the voluntary and unsteady signs of their own ideas. And yet
+men think it strange, if in discourse, or (where it is often absolutely
+necessary) in dispute, one sometimes asks the meaning of their terms:
+though the arguings one may every day observe in conversation make it
+evident, that there are few names of complex ideas which any two men use
+for the same just precise collection. It is hard to name a word which
+will not be a clear instance of this. LIFE is a term, none more
+familiar. Any one almost would take it for an affront to be asked what
+he meant by it. And yet if it comes in question, whether a plant that
+lies ready formed in the seed have life; whether the embryo in an egg
+before incubation, or a man in a swoon without sense or motion, be alive
+or no; it is easy to perceive that a clear, distinct, settled idea does
+not always accompany the use of so known a word as that of life is. Some
+gross and confused conceptions men indeed ordinarily have, to which they
+apply the common words of their language; and such a loose use of their
+words serves them well enough in their ordinary discourses or affairs.
+But this is not sufficient for philosophical inquiries. Knowledge and
+reasoning require precise determinate ideas. And though men will not
+be so importunately dull as not to understand what others say, without
+demanding an explication of their terms; nor so troublesomely critical
+as to correct others in the use of the words they receive from them:
+yet, where truth and knowledge are concerned in the case, I know not
+what fault it can be, to desire the explication of words whose sense
+seems dubious; or why a man should be ashamed to own his ignorance in
+what sense another man uses his words; since he has no other way of
+certainly knowing it but by being informed. This abuse of taking words
+upon trust has nowhere spread so far, nor with so ill effects, as
+amongst men of letters. The multiplication and obstinacy of disputes,
+which have so laid waste the intellectual world, is owing to nothing
+more than to this ill use of words. For though it be generally believed
+that there is great diversity of opinions in the volumes and variety of
+controversies the world is distracted with; yet the most I can find that
+the contending learned men of different parties do, in their arguings
+one with another, is, that they speak different languages. For I am apt
+to imagine, that when any of them, quitting terms, think upon things,
+and know what they think, they think all the same: though perhaps what
+they would have be different.
+
+
+23. The Ends of Language: First, To convey our Ideas.
+
+To conclude this consideration of the imperfection and abuse of
+language. The ends of language in our discourse with others being
+chiefly these three: First, to make known one man's thoughts or ideas to
+another; Secondly, to do so with as much ease and quickness as possible;
+and, Thirdly, thereby to convey the knowledge of things: language is
+either abused or deficient, when it fails of any of these three.
+
+First, Words fail in the first of these ends, and lay not open one man's
+ideas to another's view: 1. When men have names in their mouths without
+any determinate ideas in their minds whereof they are the signs: or, 2.
+When they apply the common received names of any language to ideas, to
+which the common use of that language does not apply them: or 3. When
+they apply them very unsteadily, making them stand now for one, and by
+and by for another idea.
+
+
+24. Secondly, To do it with Quickness.
+
+Secondly, Men fail of conveying their thoughts with the quickness and
+ease that may be, when they have complex ideas without having any
+distinct names for them. This is sometimes the fault of the language
+itself, which has not in it a sound yet applied to such a signification;
+and sometimes the fault of the man, who has not yet learned the name for
+that idea he would show another.
+
+
+25. Thirdly, Therewith to convey the Knowledge of Things.
+
+Thirdly, there is no knowledge of things conveyed by men's words, when
+their ideas agree not to the reality of things. Though it be a defect
+that has its original in our ideas, which are not so conformable to the
+nature of things as attention, study and application might make them,
+yet it fails not to extend itself to our words too, when we use them as
+signs of real beings, which yet never had any reality or existence.
+
+
+26. How Men's Words fail in all these: First, when used without any
+ideas.
+
+First, He that hath words of any language, without distinct ideas in
+his mind to which he applies them, does, so far as he uses them in
+discourse, only make a noise without any sense or signification; and how
+learned soever he may seem, by the use of hard words or learned terms,
+is not much more advanced thereby in knowledge, than he would be in
+learning, who had nothing in his study but the bare titles of books,
+without possessing the contents of them. For all such words, however
+put into discourse, according to the right construction of grammatical
+rules, or the harmony of well-turned periods, do yet amount to nothing
+but bare sounds, and nothing else.
+
+
+27. Secondly, when complex ideas are without names annexed to them.
+
+Secondly, He that has complex ideas, without particular names for them,
+would be in no better case than a bookseller, who had in his warehouse
+volumes that lay there unbound, and without titles, which he could
+therefore make known to others only by showing the loose sheets, and
+communicate them only by tale. This man is hindered in his discourse,
+for want of words to communicate his complex ideas, which he is
+therefore forced to make known by an enumeration of the simple ones that
+compose them; and so is fain often to use twenty words, to express what
+another man signifies in one.
+
+
+28. Thirdly, when the same sign is not put for the same idea.
+
+Thirdly, He that puts not constantly the same sign for the same idea,
+but uses the same word sometimes in one and sometimes in another
+signification, ought to pass in the schools and conversation for as fair
+a man, as he does in the market and exchange, who sells several things
+under the same name.
+
+
+29. Fourthly, when words are diverted from their common use.
+
+Fourthly, He that applies the words of any language to ideas different
+from those to which the common use of that country applies them, however
+his own understanding may be filled with truth and light, will not by
+such words be able to convey much of it to others, without defining his
+terms. For however the sounds are such as are familiarly known, and
+easily enter the ears of those who are accustomed to them; yet standing
+for other ideas than those they usually are annexed to, and are wont to
+excite in the mind of the hearers, they cannot make known the thoughts
+of him who thus uses them.
+
+
+30. Fifthly, when they are names of fantastical imaginations.
+
+Fifthly, He that imagined to himself substances such as never have been,
+and filled his head with ideas which have not any correspondence with
+the real nature of things, to which yet he gives settled and defined
+names, may fill his discourse, and perhaps another man's head, with the
+fantastical imaginations of his own brain, but will be very far from
+advancing thereby one jot in real and true knowledge.
+
+
+31. Summary.
+
+He that hath names without ideas, wants meaning in his words, and speaks
+only empty sounds. He that hath complex ideas without names for them,
+wants liberty and dispatch in his expressions, and is necessitated to
+use periphrases. He that uses his words loosely and unsteadily will
+either be not minded or not understood. He that applies his names to
+ideas different from their common use, wants propriety in his language,
+and speaks gibberish. And he that hath the ideas of substances
+disagreeing with the real existence of things, so far wants the
+materials of true knowledge in his understanding, and hath instead
+thereof chimeras.
+
+
+32. How men's words fail when they stand for Substances.
+
+In our notions concerning Substances, we are liable to all the former
+inconveniences: v. g. he that uses the word TARANTULA, without having
+any imagination or idea of what it stands for, pronounces a good
+word; but so long means nothing at all by it. 2. He that, in a
+newly-discovered country, shall see several sorts of animals and
+vegetables, unknown to him before, may have as true ideas of them, as of
+a horse or a stag; but can speak of them only by a description, till he
+shall either take the names the natives call them by, or give them names
+himself. 3. He that uses the word BODY sometimes for pure extension,
+and sometimes for extension and solidity together, will talk very
+fallaciously. 4. He that gives the name HORSE to that idea which common
+usage calls MULE, talks improperly, and will not be understood. 5. He
+that thinks the name CENTAUR stands for some real being, imposes on
+himself, and mistakes words for things.
+
+
+33. How when they stand for Modes and Relations.
+
+In Modes and Relations generally, we are liable only to the four first
+of these inconveniences; viz. 1. I may have in my memory the names of
+modes, as GRATITUDE or CHARITY, and yet not have any precise ideas
+annexed in my thoughts to those names, 2. I may have ideas, and not know
+the names that belong to them: v. g. I may have the idea of a man's
+drinking till his colour and humour be altered, till his tongue trips,
+and his eyes look red, and his feet fail him; and yet not know that
+it is to be called DRUNKENNESS. 3. I may have the ideas of virtues or
+vices, and names also, but apply them amiss: v. g. when I apply the name
+FRUGALITY to that idea which others call and signify by this sound,
+COVETOUSNESS. 4. I may use any of those names with inconstancy. 5. But,
+in modes and relations, I cannot have ideas disagreeing to the existence
+of things: for modes being complex ideas, made by the mind at pleasure,
+and relation being but by way of considering or comparing two things
+together, and so also an idea of my own making, these ideas can scarce
+be found to disagree with anything existing; since they are not in the
+mind as the copies of things regularly made by nature, nor as properties
+inseparably flowing from the internal constitution or essence of any
+substance; but, as it were, patterns lodged in my memory, with names
+annexed to them, to denominate actions and relations by, as they come
+to exist. But the mistake is commonly in my giving a wrong name to my
+conceptions; and so using words in a different sense from other people:
+I am not understood, but am thought to have wrong ideas of them, when I
+give wrong names to them. Only if I put in my ideas of mixed modes or
+relations any inconsistent ideas together, I fill my head also with
+chimeras; since such ideas, if well examined, cannot so much as exist in
+the mind, much less any real being ever be denominated from them.
+
+
+34. Seventhly, Language is often abused by Figurative Speech.
+
+Since wit and fancy find easier entertainment in the world than dry
+truth and real knowledge, figurative speeches and allusion in language
+will hardly be admitted as an imperfection or abuse of it. I confess, in
+discourses where we seek rather pleasure and delight than information
+and improvement, such ornaments as are borrowed from them can scarce
+pass for faults. But yet if we would speak of things as they are, we
+must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness;
+all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath
+invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the
+passions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfect
+cheats: and therefore, however laudable or allowable oratory may render
+them in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all
+discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and
+where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great
+fault, either of the language or person that makes use of them. What and
+how various they are, will be superfluous here to take notice; the books
+of rhetoric which abound in the world, will instruct those who want to
+be informed: only I cannot but observe how little the preservation and
+improvement of truth and knowledge is the care and concern of mankind;
+since the arts of fallacy are endowed and preferred. It is evident how
+much men love to deceive and be deceived, since rhetoric, that powerful
+instrument of error and deceit, has its established professors, is
+publicly taught, and has always been had in great reputation: and I
+doubt not but it will be thought great boldness, if not brutality, in me
+to have said thus much against it. Eloquence, like the fair sex, has too
+prevailing beauties in it to suffer itself ever to be spoken against.
+And it is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving, wherein
+men find pleasure to be deceived.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI.
+
+OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING IMPERFECTIONS AND ABUSES OF WORDS.
+
+
+1. Remedies are worth seeking.
+
+The natural and improved imperfections of languages we have seen above
+at large: and speech being the great bond that holds society together,
+and the common conduit, whereby the improvements of knowledge are
+conveyed from one man and one generation to another, it would well
+deserve our most serious thoughts to consider, what remedies are to be
+found for the inconveniences above mentioned.
+
+
+2. Are not easy to find.
+
+I am not so vain as to think that any one can pretend to attempt the
+perfect reforming the languages of the world, no not so much as of his
+own country, without rendering himself ridiculous. To require that men
+should use their words constantly in the same sense, and for none but
+determined and uniform ideas, would be to think that all men should have
+the same notions, and should talk of nothing but what they have clear
+and distinct ideas of: which is not to be expected by any one who hath
+not vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with men to be very knowing
+or very silent. And he must be very little skilled in the world, who
+thinks that a voluble tongue shall accompany only a good understanding;
+or that men's talking much or little should hold proportion only to
+their knowledge.
+
+
+3. But yet necessary to those who search after Truth.
+
+But though the market and exchange must be left to their own ways of
+talking, and gossipings not be robbed of their ancient privilege: though
+the schools, and men of argument would perhaps take it amiss to have
+anything offered, to abate the length or lessen the number of their
+disputes; yet methinks those who pretend seriously to search after or
+maintain truth, should think themselves obliged to study how they might
+deliver themselves without obscurity, doubtfulness, or equivocation, to
+which men's words are naturally liable, if care be not taken.
+
+
+4. Misuse of Words the great Cause of Errors.
+
+For he that shall well consider the errors and obscurity, the mistakes
+and confusion, that are spread in the world by an ill use of words, will
+find some reason to doubt whether language, as it has been employed, has
+contributed more to the improvement or hindrance of knowledge amongst
+mankind. How many are there, that, when they would think on things, fix
+their thoughts only on words, especially when they would apply their
+minds to moral matters? And who then can wonder if the result of such
+contemplations and reasonings, about little more than sounds, whilst the
+ideas they annex to them are very confused and very unsteady, or perhaps
+none at all; who can wonder, I say, that such thoughts and reasonings
+end in nothing but obscurity and mistake, without any clear judgment or
+knowledge?
+
+
+5. Has made men more conceited and obstinate.
+
+This inconvenience, in an ill use of words, men suffer in their own
+private meditations: but much more manifest are the disorders which
+follow from it, in conversation, discourse, and arguings with others.
+For language being the great conduit, whereby men convey their
+discoveries, reasonings, and knowledge, from one to another, he that
+makes an ill use of it, though he does not corrupt the fountains of
+knowledge, which are in things themselves, yet he does, as much as in
+him lies, break or stop the pipes whereby it is distributed to the
+public use and advantage of mankind. He that uses words without any
+clear and steady meaning, what does he but lead himself and others into
+errors? And he that designedly does it, ought to be looked on as an
+enemy to truth and knowledge. And yet who can wonder that all the
+sciences and parts of knowledge have been so overcharged with obscure
+and equivocal terms, and insignificant and doubtful expressions, capable
+to make the most attentive or quick-sighted very little, or not at
+all, the more knowing or orthodox: since subtlety, in those who make
+profession to teach or defend truth, hath passed so much for a virtue: a
+virtue, indeed, which, consisting for the most part in nothing but the
+fallacious and illusory use of obscure or deceitful terms, is only fit
+to make men more conceited in their ignorance, and more obstinate in
+their errors.
+
+
+6. Addicted to Wrangling about sounds.
+
+Let us look into the books of controversy of any kind, there we shall
+see that the effect of obscure, unsteady, or equivocal terms is nothing
+but noise and wrangling about sounds, without convincing or bettering
+a man's understanding. For if the idea be not agreed on, betwixt the
+speaker and hearer, for which the words stand, the argument is not about
+things, but names. As often as such a word whose signification is not
+ascertained betwixt them, comes in use, their understandings have no
+other object wherein they agree, but barely the sound; the things that
+they think on at that time, as expressed by that word, being quite
+different.
+
+
+7. Instance, Bat and Bird.
+
+Whether a BAT be a BIRD or no, is not a question, Whether a bat be
+another thing than indeed it is, or have other qualities than indeed it
+has; for that would be extremely absurd to doubt of. But the question
+is, (i) Either between those that acknowledged themselves to have but
+imperfect ideas of one or both of this sort of things, for which these
+names are supposed to stand. And then it is a real inquiry concerning
+the NATURE of a bird or a bat, to make their yet imperfect ideas of
+it more complete; by examining whether all the simple ideas to which,
+combined together, they both give name bird, be all to be found in
+a bat: but this is a question only of inquirers (not disputers) who
+neither affirm nor deny, but examine: Or, (2) It is a question between
+disputants; whereof the one affirms, and the other denies that a bat is
+a bird. And then the question is barely about the signification of one
+or both these WORDS; in that they not having both the same complex ideas
+to which they give these two names, one holds and the other denies, that
+these two names may be affirmed one of another. Were they agreed in the
+signification of these two names, it were impossible they should dispute
+about them. For they would presently and clearly see (were that adjusted
+between them,) whether all the simple ideas of the more general name
+bird were found in the complex idea of a bat or no; and so there could
+be no doubt whether a bat were a bird or no. And here I desire it may
+be considered, and carefully examined, whether the greatest part of the
+disputes in the world are not merely verbal, and about the signification
+of words; and whether, if the terms they are made in were defined, and
+reduced in their signification (as they must be where they signify
+anything) to determined collections of the simple ideas they do or
+should stand for, those disputes would not end of themselves, and
+immediately vanish. I leave it then to be considered, what the learning
+of disputation is, and how well they are employed for the advantage of
+themselves or others, whose business is only the vain ostentation of
+sounds; i. e. those who spend their lives in disputes and controversies.
+When I shall see any of those combatants strip all his terms of
+ambiguity and obscurity, (which every one may do in the words he uses
+himself,) I shall think him a champion for knowledge, truth, and peace,
+and not the slave of vain-glory, ambition, or a party.
+
+
+8. Remedies.
+
+To remedy the defects of speech before mentioned to some degree, and
+to prevent the inconveniences that follow from them, I imagine the
+observation of these following rules may be of use, till somebody better
+able shall judge it worth his while to think more maturely on this
+matter, and oblige the world with his thoughts on it.
+
+
+First Remedy: To use no Word without an Idea annexed to it.
+
+First, A man shall take care to use no word without a signification, no
+name without an idea for which he makes it stand. This rule will
+not seem altogether needless to any one who shall take the pains to
+recollect how often he has met with such words as INSTINCT, SYMPATHY,
+and ANTIPATHY, &c., in the discourse of others, so made use of as he
+might easily conclude that those that used them had no ideas in their
+minds to which they applied them, but spoke them only as sounds, which
+usually served instead of reasons on the like occasions. Not but that
+these words, and the like, have very proper significations in which they
+may be used; but there being no natural connexion between any words and
+any ideas, these, and any other, may be learned by rote, and pronounced
+or writ by men who have no ideas in their minds to which they have
+annexed them, and for which they make them stand; which is necessary
+they should, if men would speak intelligibly even to themselves alone.
+
+
+9. Second Remedy: To have distinct, determinate Ideas annexed to Words,
+especially in mixed Modes.
+
+Secondly, It is not enough a man uses his words as signs of some ideas:
+those he annexes them to, if they be simple, must be clear and distinct;
+if complex, must be determinate, i.e. the precise collection of simple
+ideas settled in the mind, with that sound annexed to it, as the sign of
+that precise determined collection, and no other. This is very necessary
+in names of modes, and especially moral words; which, having no settled
+objects in nature, from whence their ideas are taken, as from their
+original, are apt to be very confused. JUSTICE is a word in every man's
+mouth, but most commonly with a very undetermined, loose signification;
+which will always be so, unless a man has in his mind a distinct
+comprehension of the component parts that complex idea consists of and
+if it be decompounded, must be able to resolve it still only till he at
+last comes to the simple ideas that make it up: and unless this be done,
+a man makes an ill use of the word, let it be justice, for example, or
+any other. I do not say, a man needs stand to recollect, and make this
+analysis at large, every time the word justice comes in his way: but
+this at least is necessary, that he have so examined the signification
+of that name, and settled the idea of all its parts in his mind, that
+he can do it when he pleases. If any one who makes his complex idea of
+justice to be, such a treatment of the person or goods of another as is
+according to law, hath not a clear and distinct idea what LAW is, which
+makes a part of his complex idea of justice, it is plain his idea of
+justice itself will be confused and imperfect. This exactness will,
+perhaps, be judged very troublesome; and therefore most men will think
+they may be excused from settling the complex ideas of mixed modes so
+precisely in their minds. But yet I must say, till this be done, it must
+not be wondered, that they have a great deal of obscurity and confusion
+in their own minds, and a great deal of wrangling in their discourse
+with others.
+
+
+10. And distinct and conformable ideas in Words that stand for
+Substances.
+
+In the names of substances, for a right use of them, something more is
+required than barely DETERMINED IDEAS. In these the names must also be
+CONFORMABLE TO THINGS AS THEY EXIST; but of this I shall have occasion
+to speak more at large by and by. This exactness is absolutely necessary
+in inquiries after philosophical knowledge, and in controversies about
+truth. And though it would be well, too, if it extended itself to common
+conversation and the ordinary affairs of life; yet I think that is
+scarce to be expected. Vulgar notions suit vulgar discourses: and both,
+though confused enough, yet serve pretty well the market and the wake.
+Merchants and lovers, cooks and tailors, have words wherewithal to
+dispatch their ordinary affairs: and so, I think, might philosophers
+and disputants too, if they had a mind to understand, and to clearly
+understood.
+
+
+11. Third Remedy: To apply Words to such ideas as common use has annexed
+them to.
+
+Thirdly, it is not enough that men have ideas, determined ideas, for
+which they make these signs stand; but they must also take care to apply
+their words as near as may be to such ideas as common use has annexed
+them to. For words, especially of languages already framed, being
+no man's private possession, but the common measure of commerce and
+communication, it is not for any one at pleasure to change the stamp
+they are current in, nor alter the ideas they are affixed to; or at
+least, when there is a necessity to do so, he is bound to give notice
+of it. Men's intentions in speaking are, or at least should be, to be
+understood; which cannot be without frequent explanations, demands,
+and other the like incommodious interruptions, where men do not follow
+common use. Propriety of speech is that which gives our thoughts
+entrance into other men's minds with the greatest ease and advantage:
+and therefore deserves some part of our care and study, especially in
+the names of moral words. The proper signification and use of terms
+is best to be learned from those who in their writings and discourses
+appear to have had the clearest notions, and applied to them their terms
+with the exactest choice and fitness. This way of using a man's words,
+according to the propriety of the language, though it have not always
+the good fortune to be understood; yet most commonly leaves the blame
+of it on him who is so unskilful in the language he speaks, as not to
+understand it when made use of as it ought to be.
+
+
+12. Fourth Remedy: To declare the meaning in which we use them.
+
+Fourthly, But, because common use has not so visibly annexed any
+signification to words, as to make men know always certainly what they
+precisely stand for: and because men, in the improvement of their
+knowledge, come to have ideas different from the vulgar and ordinary
+received ones, for which they must either make new words, (which men
+seldom venture to do, for fear of being thought guilty of affectation or
+novelty,) or else must use old ones in a new signification: therefore,
+after the observation of the foregoing rules, it is sometimes necessary,
+for the ascertaining the signification of words, to DECLARE THEIR
+MEANING; where either common use has left it uncertain and loose, (as it
+has in most names of very complex ideas;) or where the term, being very
+material in the discourse, and that upon which it chiefly turns, is
+liable to any doubtfulness or mistake.
+
+
+13. And that in three Ways.
+
+As the ideas men's words stand for are of different sorts, so the way of
+making known the ideas they stand for, when there is occasion, is also
+different. For though DEFINING be thought the proper way to make known
+the proper signification of words; yet there are some words that will
+not be defined, as there are others whose precise meaning cannot be made
+known but by definition: and perhaps a third, which partake somewhat of
+both the other, as we shall see in the names of simple ideas, modes, and
+substances.
+
+
+14. In Simple Ideas, either by synonymous terms, or by showing examples.
+
+I. First, when a man makes use of the name of any simple idea, which
+he perceives is not understood, or is in danger to be mistaken, he is
+obliged, by the laws of ingenuity and the end of speech, to declare his
+meaning, and make known what idea he makes it stand for. This, as
+has been shown, cannot be done by definition: and therefore, when a
+synonymous word fails to do it, there is but one of these ways left.
+First, Sometimes the NAMING the subject wherein that simple idea is
+to be found, will make its name to be understood by those who are
+acquainted with that subject, and know it by that name. So to make a
+countryman understand what FEUILLEMORTE colour signifies, it may suffice
+to tell him, it is the colour of withered leaves falling in autumn.
+Secondly, but the only sure way of making known the signification of the
+name of any simple idea, is BY PRESENTING TO HIS SENSES THAT SUBJECT
+WHICH MAY PRODUCE IT IN HIS MIND, and make him actually have the idea
+that word stands for.
+
+
+15. In mixed Modes, by Definition.
+
+II. Secondly, Mixed modes, especially those belonging to morality, being
+most of them such combinations of ideas as the mind puts together of its
+own choice, and whereof there are not always standing patterns to be
+found existing, the signification of their names cannot be made known,
+as those of simple ideas, by any showing: but, in recompense thereof,
+may be perfectly and exactly defined. For they being combinations of
+several ideas that the mind of man has arbitrarily put together, without
+reference to any archetypes, men may, if they please, exactly know the
+ideas that go to each composition, and so both use these words in a
+certain and undoubted signification, and perfectly declare, when there
+is occasion, what they stand for. This, if well considered, would lay
+great blame on those who make not their discourses about MORAL things
+very clear and distinct. For since the precise signification of the
+names of mixed modes, or, which is all one, the real essence of each
+species is to be known, they being not of nature's, but man's making, it
+is a great negligence and perverseness to discourse of moral things
+with uncertainty and obscurity; which is more pardonable in treating of
+natural substances, where doubtful terms are hardly to be avoided, for a
+quite contrary reason, as we shall see by and by.
+
+
+16. Morality capable of Demonstration.
+
+Upon this ground it is that I am bold to think that morality is capable
+of demonstration, as well as mathematics: since the precise real essence
+of the things moral words stand for may be perfectly known, and so
+the congruity and incongruity of the things themselves be certainly
+discovered; in which consists perfect knowledge. Nor let any one object,
+that the names of substances are often to be made use of in morality,
+as well as those of modes, from which will arise obscurity. For, as to
+substances, when concerned in moral discourses, their divers natures
+are not so much inquired into as supposed: v.g. when we say that man
+is subject to law, we mean nothing by man but a corporeal rational
+creature: what the real essence or other qualities of that creature are
+in this case is no way considered. And, therefore, whether a child or
+changeling be a man, in a physical sense, may amongst the naturalists be
+as disputable as it will, it concerns not at all the moral man, as I
+may call him, which is this immovable, unchangeable idea, a corporeal
+rational being. For, were there a monkey, or any other creature, to be
+found that had the use of reason to such a degree, as to be able to
+understand general signs, and to deduce consequences about general
+ideas, he would no doubt be subject to law, and in that sense be a MAN,
+how much soever he differed in shape from others of that name. The names
+of substances, if they be used in them as they should, can no more
+disturb moral than they do mathematical discourses; where, if the
+mathematician speaks of a cube or globe of gold, or of any other body,
+he has his clear, settled idea, which varies not, though it may by
+mistake be applied to a particular body to which it belongs not.
+
+
+17. Definitions can make moral Discourse clear.
+
+This I have here mentioned, by the by, to show of what consequence it is
+for men, in their names of mixed modes, and consequently in all their
+moral discourses, to define their words when there is occasion: since
+thereby moral knowledge may be brought to so great clearness and
+certainty. And it must be great want of ingenuousness (to say no worse
+of it) to refuse to do it: since a definition is the only way whereby
+the precise meaning of moral words can be known; and yet a way whereby
+their meaning may be known certainly, and without leaving any room for
+any contest about it. And therefore the negligence or perverseness of
+mankind cannot be excused, if their discourses in morality be not much
+more clear than those in natural philosophy: since they are about ideas
+in the mind, which are none of them false or disproportionate; they
+having no external beings for the archetypes which they are referred to
+and must correspond with. It is far easier for men to frame in their
+minds an idea, which shall be the standard to which they will give the
+name justice; with which pattern so made, all actions that agree shall
+pass under that denomination, than, having seen Aristides, to frame an
+idea that shall in all things be exactly like him; who is as he is, let
+men make what idea they please of him. For the one, they need but know
+the combination of ideas that are put together in their own minds; for
+the other, they must inquire into the whole nature, and abstruse hidden
+constitution, and various qualities of a thing existing without them.
+
+
+18. And is the only way in which the meaning of mixed Modes can be made
+known.
+
+Another reason that makes the defining of mixed modes so necessary,
+especially of moral words, is what I mentioned a little before, viz.
+that it is the only way whereby the signification of the most of them
+can be known with certainty. For the ideas they stand for, being for
+the most part such whose component parts nowhere exist together, but
+scattered and mingled with others, it is the mind alone that collects
+them, and gives them the union of one idea: and it is only by words
+enumerating the several simple ideas which the mind has united, that we
+can make known to others what their names stand for; the assistance of
+the senses in this case not helping us, by the proposal of sensible
+objects, to show the ideas which our names of this kind stand for, as
+it does often in the names of sensible simple ideas, and also to some
+degree in those of substances.
+
+
+19. In Substances, both by showing and by defining.
+
+III. Thirdly, for the explaining the signification of the names of
+substances, as they stand for the ideas we have of their distinct
+species, both the forementioned ways, viz. of showing and defining, are
+requisite, in many cases, to be made use of. For, there being ordinarily
+in each sort some leading qualities, to which we suppose the other ideas
+which make up our complex idea of that species annexed, we forwardly
+give the specific name to that thing wherein that characteristic mark is
+found, which we take to be the most distinguishing idea of that species.
+These leading or characteristical (as I may call them) ideas, in the
+sorts of animals and vegetables, are (as has been before remarked,
+ch vi. Section 29 and ch. ix. Section 15) mostly figure; and in inanimate
+bodies, colour; and in some, both together. Now,
+
+
+20. Ideas of the leading Qualities of Substances are best got by
+showing.
+
+These leading sensible qualities are those which make the chief
+ingredients of our specific ideas, and consequently the most observable
+and invariable part in the definitions of our specific names, as
+attributed to sorts of substances coming under our knowledge. For though
+the sound MAN, in its own nature, be as apt to signify a complex idea
+made up of animality and rationality, united in the same subject, as to
+signify any other combination; yet, used as a mark to stand for a sort
+of creatures we count of our own kind, perhaps the outward shape is as
+necessary to be taken into our complex idea, signified by the word man,
+as any other we find in it: and therefore, why Plato's ANIMAL IMPLUME
+BIPES LATIS UNGUIBUS should not be a good definition of the name man,
+standing for that sort of creatures, will not be easy to show: for it
+is the shape, as the leading quality, that seems more to determine that
+species, than a faculty of reasoning, which appears not at first, and in
+some never. And if this be not allowed to be so, I do not know how they
+can be excused from murder who kill monstrous births, (as we call them,)
+because of an unordinary shape, without knowing whether they have a
+rational soul or no; which can be no more discerned in a well-formed
+than ill-shaped infant, as soon as born. And who is it has informed us
+that a rational soul can inhabit no tenement, unless it has just such a
+sort of frontispiece; or can join itself to, and inform no sort of body,
+but one that is just of such an outward structure?
+
+
+21. And can hardly be made known otherwise.
+
+Now these leading qualities are best made known by showing, and can
+hardly be made known otherwise. For the shape of a horse or cassowary
+will be but rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the mind by words; the
+sight of the animals doth it a thousand times better. And the idea of
+the particular colour of gold is not to be got by any description of it,
+but only by the frequent exercise of the eyes about as is evident in
+those who are used to this metal, who frequently distinguish true from
+counterfeit, pure from adulterate, by the sight, where others (who have
+as good eyes, but yet by use have not got the precise nice idea of that
+peculiar yellow) shall not perceive any difference. The like may be said
+of those other simple ideas, peculiar in their kind to any substance;
+for which precise ideas there are no peculiar names. The particular
+ringing sound there is in gold, distinct from the sound of other bodies,
+has no particular name annexed to it, no more than the particular yellow
+that belongs to that metal.
+
+
+22. The Ideas of the Powers of Substances are best known by Definition.
+
+But because many of the simple ideas that make up our specific ideas of
+substances are powers which lie not obvious to our senses in the things
+as they ordinarily appear; therefore, in the signification of our names
+of substances, some part of the signification will be better made known
+by enumerating those simple ideas, than by showing the substance itself.
+For, he that to the yellow shining colour of gold, got by sight, shall,
+from my enumerating them, have the ideas of great ductility, fusibility,
+fixedness, and solubility, in aqua regia, will have a perfecter idea of
+gold than he can have by seeing a piece of gold, and thereby imprinting
+in his mind only its obvious qualities. But if the formal constitution
+of this shining, heavy, ductile thing, (from whence all these its
+properties flow,) lay open to our senses, as the formal constitution or
+essence of a triangle does, the signification of the word gold might as
+easily be ascertained as that of triangle.
+
+
+23. A Reflection on the Knowledge of corporeal things possessed by
+Spirits separate from bodies.
+
+Hence we may take notice, how much the foundation of all our knowledge
+of corporeal things lies in our senses. For how spirits, separate from
+bodies, (whose knowledge and ideas of these things are certainly much
+more perfect than ours,) know them, we have no notion, no idea at all.
+The whole extent of our knowledge or imagination reaches not beyond our
+own ideas limited to our ways of perception. Though yet it be not to be
+doubted that spirits of a higher rank than those immersed in flesh may
+have as clear ideas of the radical constitution of substances as we have
+of a triangle, and so perceive how all their properties and operations
+flow from thence: but the manner how they come by that knowledge exceeds
+our conceptions.
+
+
+24. Ideas of Substances must also be conformable to Things.
+
+Fourthly, But, though definitions will serve to explain the names of
+substances as they stand for our ideas, yet they leave them not without
+great imperfection as they stand for things. For our names of substances
+being not put barely for our ideas, but being made use of ultimately to
+represent things, and so are put in their place, their signification
+must agree with the truth of things as well as with men's ideas. And
+therefore, in substances, we are not always to rest in the ordinary
+complex idea commonly received as the signification of that word, but
+must go a little further, and inquire into the nature and properties of
+the things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our ideas
+of their distinct species; or else learn them from such as are used
+to that sort of things, and are experienced in them. For, since it is
+intended their names should stand for such collections of simple ideas
+as do really exist in things themselves, as well as for the complex idea
+in other men's minds, which in their ordinary acceptation they stand
+for, therefore, to define their names right, natural history is to be
+inquired into, and their properties are, with care and examination, to
+be found out. For it is not enough, for the avoiding inconveniences in
+discourse and arguings about natural bodies and substantial things,
+to have learned, from the propriety of the language, the common, but
+confused, or very imperfect, idea to which each word is applied, and to
+keep them to that idea in our use of them; but we must, by acquainting
+ourselves with the history of that sort of things, rectify and settle
+our complex idea belonging to each specific name; and in discourse with
+others, (if we find them mistake us,) we ought to tell what the complex
+idea is that we make such a name stand for. This is the more necessary
+to be done by all those who search after knowledge and philosophical
+verity, in that children, being taught words, whilst they have but
+imperfect notions of things, apply them at random, and without much
+thinking, and seldom frame determined ideas to be signified by them.
+Which custom (it being easy, and serving well enough for the ordinary
+affairs of life and conversation) they are apt to continue when they are
+men: and so begin at the wrong end, learning words first and perfectly,
+but make the notions to which they apply those words afterwards very
+overtly. By this means it comes to pass, that men speaking the language
+of their country, i.e. according to grammar rules of that language, do
+yet speak very improperly of things themselves; and, by their arguing
+one with another, make but small progress in the discoveries of useful
+truths, and the knowledge of things, as they are to be found in
+themselves, and not in our imaginations; and it matters not much for the
+improvement of our knowledge how they are called.
+
+
+25. Not easy to be made so.
+
+It were therefore to be wished, That men versed in physical inquiries,
+and acquainted with the several sorts of natural bodies, would set down
+those simple ideas wherein they observe the individuals of each sort
+constantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that confusion
+which comes from several persons applying the same name to a collection
+of a smaller or greater number of sensible qualities, proportionably as
+they have been more or less acquainted with, or accurate in examining,
+the qualities of any sort of things which come under one denomination.
+But a dictionary of this sort, containing, as it were, a natural
+history, requires too many hands as well as too much time, cost, pains,
+and sagacity ever to be hoped for; and till that be done, we must
+content ourselves with such definitions of the names of substances as
+explain the sense men use them in. And it would be well, where there is
+occasion, if they would afford us so much. This yet is not usually done;
+but men talk to one another, and dispute in words, whose meaning is not
+agreed between them, out of a mistake that the significations of common
+words are certainly established, and the precise ideas they stand for
+perfectly known; and that it is a shame to be ignorant of them. Both
+which suppositions are false, no names of complex ideas having so
+settled determined significations, that they are constantly used for
+the same precise ideas. Nor is it a shame for a man to have a certain
+knowledge of anything, but by the necessary ways of attaining it; and so
+it is no discredit not to know what precise idea any sound stands for in
+another man's mind, without he declare it to me by some other way than
+barely using that sound, there being no other way, without such a
+declaration, certainly to know it. Indeed the necessity of communication
+by language brings men to an agreement in the signification of common
+words, within some tolerable latitude, that may serve for ordinary
+conversation: and so a man cannot be supposed wholly ignorant of the
+ideas which are annexed to words by common use, in a language familiar
+to him. But common use being but a very uncertain rule, which reduces
+itself at last to the ideas of particular men, proves often but a
+very variable standard. But though such a Dictionary as I have above
+mentioned will require too much time, cost, and pains to be hoped for
+in this age; yet methinks it is not unreasonable to propose, that words
+standing for things which are known and distinguished by their outward
+shapes should be expressed by little draughts and prints made of them. A
+vocabulary made after this fashion would perhaps with more ease, and in
+less time, teach the true signification of many terms, especially in
+languages of remote countries or ages, and settle truer ideas in men's
+minds of several things, whereof we read the names in ancient authors,
+than all the large and laborious comments of learned critics.
+Naturalists, that treat of plants and animals, have found the benefit of
+this way: and he that has had occasion to consult them will have reason
+to confess that he has a clearer idea of APIUM or IBEX, from a little
+print of that herb or beast, than he could have from a long definition
+of the names of either of them. And so no doubt he would have of STRIGIL
+and SISTRUM, if, instead of CURRYCOMB and CYMBAL, (which are the English
+names dictionaries render them by,) he could see stamped in the margin
+small pictures of these instruments, as they were in use amongst the
+ancients. TOGA, TUNICA, PALLIUM, are words easily translated by GOWN,
+COAT, and CLOAK; but we have thereby no more true ideas of the fashion
+of those habits amongst the Romans, than we have of the faces of the
+tailors who made them. Such things as these, which the eye distinguishes
+by their shapes, would be best let into the mind by draughts made of
+them, and more determine the signification of such words, than any other
+words set for them, or made use of to define them. But this is only by
+the bye.
+
+
+26. V. Fifth Remedy: To use the same word constantly in the same sense.
+
+Fifthly, If men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their
+words, and definitions of their terms are not to be had, yet this is
+the least that can be expected, that, in all discourses wherein one man
+pretends to instruct or convince another, he should use the same word
+constantly in the same sense. If this were done, (which nobody can
+refuse without great disingenuity,) many of the books extant might be
+spared; many of the controversies in dispute would be at an end; several
+of those great volumes, swollen with ambiguous words, now used in
+one sense, and by and by in another, would shrink into a very narrow
+compass; and many of the philosophers (to mention no other) as well as
+poets works, might be contained in a nutshell.
+
+
+27. When not so used, the Variation is to be explained.
+
+But after all, the provision of words is so scanty in respect to that
+infinite variety of thoughts, that men, wanting terms to suit their
+precise notions, will, notwithstanding their utmost caution, be forced
+often to use the same word in somewhat different senses. And though in
+the continuation of a discourse, or the pursuit of an argument, there
+can be hardly room to digress into a particular definition, as often
+as a man varies the signification of any term; yet the import of the
+discourse will, for the most part, if there be no designed fallacy,
+sufficiently lead candid and intelligent readers into the true meaning
+of it; but where there is not sufficient to guide the reader, there it
+concerns the writer to explain his meaning, and show in what sense he
+there uses that term.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK IV
+
+OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY SYNOPSIS OF THE FOURTH BOOK.
+
+Locke's review of the different sorts of ideas, or appearances of what
+exists, that can be entertained in a human understanding, and of their
+relations to words, leads, in the Fourth Book, to an investigation of
+the extent and validity of the Knowledge that our ideas bring within our
+reach; and into the nature of faith in Probability, by which assent is
+extended beyond Knowledge, for the conduct of life. He finds (ch. i, ii)
+that Knowledge is either an intuitive, a demonstrative, or a sensuous
+perception of absolute certainty, in regard to one or other of four
+sorts of agreement or disagreement on the part of ideas:--(1) of each
+idea with itself, as identical, and different from every other; (2) in
+their abstract relations to one another; (3) in their necessary
+connexions, as qualities and powers coexisting in concrete substances;
+and (4) as revelations to us of the final realities of existence. The
+unconditional certainty that constitutes Knowledge is perceptible by man
+only in regard to the first, second, and fourth of these four sorts: in
+all general propositions only in regard to the first and second; that is
+to say, in identical propositions, and in those which express abstract
+relations of simple or mixed modes, in which nominal and real essences
+coincide, e. g. propositions in pure mathematics and abstract morality
+(chh. iii, v-viii). The fourth sort, which express certainty as to
+realities of existence, refer to any of three realities. For every man
+is able to perceive with absolute certainty that he himself exists, that
+God must exist, and that finite beings other than himself exist;--the
+first of these perceptions being awakened by all our ideas, the second
+as the consequence of perception of the first, and the last in the
+reception of our simple ideas of sense (chh. i. Section 7; ii. Section
+14; iii. Section 21; iv, ix-xi). Agreement of the third sort, of
+necessary coexistence of simple ideas as qualities and powers in
+particular substances, with which all physical inquiry is concerned,
+lies beyond human Knowledge; for here the nominal and real essences are
+not coincident: general propositions of this sort are determined by
+analogies of experience, in judgments that are more or less probable:
+intellectually necessary science of nature presupposes Omniscience;
+man's interpretations of nature have to turn upon presumptions of
+Probability (chh. iii. Sections 9-17; iv. SectionS 11-17; vi, xiv-xvi).
+In forming their stock of Certainties and Probabilities men employ the
+faculty of reason, faith in divine revelation, and enthusiasm (chh.
+xvii-xix); much misled by the last, as well as by other causes of 'wrong
+assent' (ch. xx), when they are at work in 'the three great provinces of
+the intellectual world' (ch. xxi), concerned respectively with (1)
+'things as knowable' (physica); (2) 'actions as they depend on us in
+order to happiness' (practica); and (3) methods for interpreting the
+signs of what is, and of what ought to be, that are presented in our
+ideas and words (logica).
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL.
+
+
+1. Our Knowledge conversant about our Ideas only.
+
+Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other
+immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can
+contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about
+them.
+
+
+2. Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of two
+Ideas.
+
+KNOWLEDGE then seems to me to be nothing but THE PERCEPTION OF THE
+CONNEXION OF AND AGREEMENT, OR DISAGREEMENT AND REPUGNANCY OF ANY OF OUR
+IDEAS. In this alone it consists.
+
+Where this perception is, there is knowledge, and where it is not,
+there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short
+of knowledge. For when we know that white is not black, what do we
+else but perceive, that these two ideas do not agree? When we possess
+ourselves with the utmost security of the demonstration, that the three
+angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but
+perceive, that equality to two right ones does necessarily agree to, and
+is inseparable from, the three angles of a triangle?
+
+
+3. This Agreement or Disagreement may be any of four sorts.
+
+But to understand a little more distinctly wherein this agreement or
+disagreement consists, I think we may reduce it all to these four sorts:
+
+I. IDENTITY, or DIVERSITY. II. RELATION. III. CO-EXISTENCE, or NECESSARY
+CONNEXION. IV. REAL EXISTENCE.
+
+
+4. First, Of Identity, or Diversity in ideas.
+
+FIRST, As to the first sort of agreement or disagreement, viz. IDENTITY
+or DIVERSITY. It is the first act of the mind, when it has any
+sentiments or ideas at all, to perceive its ideas; and so far as it
+perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive
+their difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutely
+necessary, that without it there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, no
+imagination, no distinct thoughts at all. By this the mind clearly and
+infallibly perceives each idea to agree with itself, and to be what it
+is; and all distinct ideas to disagree, i. e. the one not to be the
+other: and this it does without pains, labour, or deduction; but at
+first view, by its natural power of perception and distinction. And
+though men of art have reduced this into those general rules, WHAT IS,
+IS, and IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO BE, for
+ready application in all cases, wherein there may be occasion to reflect
+on it: yet it is certain that the first exercise of this faculty is
+about particular ideas. A man infallibly knows, as soon as ever he has
+them in his mind, that the ideas he calls WHITE and ROUND are the very
+ideas they are; and that they are not other ideas which he calls RED or
+SQUARE. Nor can any maxim or proposition in the world make him know it
+clearer or surer than he did before, and without any such general
+rule. This then is the first agreement or disagreement which the mind
+perceives in its ideas; which it always perceives at first sight: and
+if there ever happen any doubt about it, it will always be found to
+be about the names, and not the ideas themselves, whose identity and
+diversity will always be perceived, as soon and clearly as the ideas
+themselves are; nor can it possibly be otherwise.
+
+
+5. Secondly, Of abstract Relations between ideas.
+
+SECONDLY, the next sort of agreement or disagreement the mind perceives
+in any of its ideas may, I think, be called RELATIVE, and is nothing
+but the perception of the RELATION between any two ideas, of what kind
+soever, whether substances, modes, or any other. For, since all distinct
+ideas must eternally be known not to be the same, and so be universally
+and constantly denied one of another, there could be no room for any
+positive knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any relation between
+our ideas, and find out the agreement or disagreement they have one with
+another, in several ways the mind takes of comparing them.
+
+
+6. Thirdly, Of their necessary Co-existence in Substances.
+
+THIRDLY, The third sort of agreement or disagreement to be found in
+our ideas, which the perception of the mind is employed about, is
+CO-EXISTENCE or NON-CO-EXISTENCE in the SAME SUBJECT; and this belongs
+particularly to substances. Thus when we pronounce concerning gold, that
+it is fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more but this,
+that fixedness, or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed, is an idea
+that always accompanies and is joined with that particular sort of
+yellowness, weight, fusibility, malleableness, and solubility in AQUA
+REGIA, which make our complex idea signified by the word gold.
+
+
+7. Fourthly, Of real Existence agreeing to any idea.
+
+FOURTHLY, The fourth and last sort is that of ACTUAL REAL EXISTENCE
+agreeing to any idea.
+
+Within these four sorts of agreement or disagreement is, I suppose,
+contained all the knowledge we have, or are capable of. For all the
+inquiries we can make concerning any of our ideas, all that we know or
+can affirm concerning any of them, is, That it is, or is not, the same
+with some other; that it does or does not always co-exist with some
+other idea in the same subject; that it has this or that relation with
+some other idea; or that it has a real existence without the mind. Thus,
+'blue is not yellow,' is of identity. 'Two triangles upon equal bases
+between two parallels are equal,' is of relation. 'Iron is susceptible
+of magnetical impressions,' is of co-existence. 'God is,' is of real
+existence. Though identity and co-existence are truly nothing but
+relations, yet they are such peculiar ways of agreement or disagreement
+of our ideas, that they deserve well to be considered as distinct heads,
+and not under relation in general; since they are so different grounds
+of affirmation and negation, as will easily appear to any one, who will
+but reflect on what is said in several places of this ESSAY.
+
+I should now proceed to examine the several degrees of our knowledge,
+but that it is necessary first, to consider the different acceptations
+of the word KNOWLEDGE.
+
+
+8. Knowledge is either actual or habitual.
+
+There are several ways wherein the mind is possessed of truth; each of
+which is called knowledge.
+
+I. There is ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE, which is the present view the mind has of
+the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas, or of the relation
+they have one to another.
+
+II. A man is said to know any proposition, which having been once
+laid before his thoughts, he evidently perceived the agreement or
+disagreement of the ideas whereof it consists; and so lodged it in his
+memory, that whenever that proposition comes again to be reflected on,
+he, without doubt or hesitation, embraces the right side, assents to,
+and is certain of the truth of it. This, I think, one may call HABITUAL
+KNOWLEDGE. And thus a man may be said to know all those truths which are
+lodged in his memory, by a foregoing clear and full perception, whereof
+the mind is assured past doubt as often as it has occasion to reflect
+on them. For our finite understandings being able to think clearly and
+distinctly but on one thing at once, if men had no knowledge of any more
+than what they actually thought on, they would all be very ignorant: and
+he that knew most, would know but one truth, that being all he was able
+to think on at one time.
+
+
+9. Habitual Knowledge is of two degrees.
+
+Of habitual knowledge there are, also, vulgarly speaking, two degrees:
+
+First, The one is of such truths laid up in the memory as, whenever they
+occur to the mind, it ACTUALLY PERCEIVES THE RELATION is between those
+ideas. And this is in all those truths whereof we have an intuitive
+knowledge; where the ideas themselves, by an immediate view, discover
+their agreement or disagreement one with another.
+
+Secondly, The other is of such truths whereof the mind having been
+convinced, it RETAINS THE MEMORY OF THE CONVICTION, WITHOUT THE PROOFS.
+Thus, a man that remembers certainly that he once perceived the
+demonstration, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two
+right ones, is certain that he knows it, because he cannot doubt the
+truth of it. In his adherence to a truth, where the demonstration by
+which it was at first known is forgot, though a man may be thought
+rather to believe his memory than really to know, and this way of
+entertaining a truth seemed formerly to me like something between
+opinion and knowledge; a sort of assurance which exceeds bare belief,
+for that relies on the testimony of another;--yet upon a due examination
+I find it comes not short of perfect certainty, and is in effect true
+knowledge. That which is apt to mislead our first thoughts into a
+mistake in this matter is, that the agreement or disagreement of the
+ideas in this case is not perceived, as it was at first, by an actual
+view of all the intermediate ideas whereby the agreement or disagreement
+of those in the proposition was at first perceived; but by other
+intermediate ideas, that show the agreement or disagreement of the ideas
+contained in the proposition whose certainty we remember. For example:
+in this proposition, that 'the three angles of a triangle are equal
+to two right ones,' one who has seen and clearly perceived the
+demonstration of this truth knows it to be true, when that demonstration
+is gone out of his mind; so that at present it is not actually in view,
+and possibly cannot be recollected: but he knows it in a different way
+from what he did before. The agreement of the two ideas joined in that
+proposition is perceived; but it is by the intervention of other ideas
+than those which at first produced that perception. He remembers, i.e.
+he knows (for remembrance is but the reviving of some past knowledge)
+that he was once certain of the truth of this proposition, that the
+three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones. The immutability
+of the same relations between the same immutable things is now the idea
+that shows him, that if the three angles of a triangle were once equal
+to two right ones, they will always be equal to two right ones. And
+hence he comes to be certain, that what was once true in the case, is
+always true; what ideas once agreed will always agree; and consequently
+what he once knew to be true, he will always know to be true; as long
+as he can remember that he once knew it. Upon this ground it is, that
+particular demonstrations in mathematics afford general knowledge. If
+then the perception, that the same ideas will ETERNALLY have the same
+habitudes and relations, be not a sufficient ground of knowledge, there
+could be no knowledge of general propositions in mathematics; for no
+mathematical demonstration would be any other than particular: and
+when a man had demonstrated any proposition concerning one triangle or
+circle, his knowledge would not reach beyond that particular diagram. If
+he would extend it further, he must renew his demonstration in another
+instance, before he could know it to be true in another like triangle,
+and so on: by which means one could never come to the knowledge of
+any general propositions. Nobody, I think, can deny, that Mr. Newton
+certainly knows any proposition that he now at any time reads in his
+book to be true; though he has not in actual view that admirable chain
+of intermediate ideas whereby he at first discovered it to be true. Such
+a memory as that, able to retain such a train of particulars, may
+be well thought beyond the reach of human faculties, when the very
+discovery, perception, and laying together that wonderful connexion of
+ideas, is found to surpass most readers' comprehension. But yet it is
+evident the author himself knows the proposition to be true, remembering
+he once saw the connexion of those ideas; as certainly as he knows such
+a man wounded another, remembering that he saw him run him through. But
+because the memory is not always so clear as actual perception, and does
+in all men more or less decay in length of time, this, amongst other
+differences, is one which shows that DEMONSTRATIVE knowledge is much
+more imperfect than INTUITIVE, as we shall see in the following chapter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+OF THE DEGREES OF OUR KNOWLEDGE.
+
+
+1. Of the degrees, or differences in clearness, of our Knowledge:
+I. Intuitive
+
+All our knowledge consisting, as I have said, in the view the mind has
+of its own ideas, which is the utmost light and greatest certainty we,
+with our faculties, and in our way of knowledge, are capable of, it
+may not be amiss to consider a little the degrees of its evidence. The
+different clearness of our knowledge seems to me to lie in the different
+way of perception the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any
+of its ideas. For if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking,
+we will find, that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or
+disagreement of two ideas IMMEDIATELY BY THEMSELVES, without the
+intervention of any other: and this I think we may call INTUITIVE
+KNOWLEDGE. For in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining,
+but perceives the truth as the eye doth light, only by being directed
+towards it. Thus the mind perceives that WHITE is not BLACK, that a
+CIRCLE is not a TRIANGLE, that THREE are more than TWO and equal to ONE
+AND TWO. Such kinds of truths the mind perceives at the first sight of
+the ideas together, by bare intuition; without the intervention of any
+other idea: and this kind of knowledge is the clearest and most
+certain that human frailty is capable of. This part of knowledge is
+irresistible, and, like bright sunshine, forces itself immediately to be
+perceived, as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way; and leaves
+no room for hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the mind is presently
+filled with the clear light of it. IT IS ON THIS INTUITION THAT DEPENDS
+ALL THE CERTAINTY AND EVIDENCE OF ALL OUR KNOWLEDGE; which certainty
+every one finds to be so great, that he cannot imagine, and therefore
+not require a greater: for a man cannot conceive himself capable of a
+greater certainty than to know that any idea in his mind is such as
+he perceives it to be; and that two ideas, wherein he perceives a
+difference, are different and not precisely the same. He that demands a
+greater certainty than this, demands he knows not what, and shows
+only that he has a mind to be a sceptic, without being able to be so.
+Certainty depends so wholly on this intuition, that, in the next degree
+of knowledge which I call demonstrative, this intuition is necessary in
+all the connexions of the intermediate ideas, without which we cannot
+attain knowledge and certainty.
+
+
+2. II. Demonstrative.
+
+The next degree of knowledge is, where the mind perceives the agreement
+or disagreement of any ideas, but not immediately. Though wherever the
+mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas, there
+be certain knowledge; yet it does not always happen, that the mind sees
+that agreement or disagreement, which there is between them, even where
+it is discoverable; and in that case remains in ignorance, and at most
+gets no further than a probable conjecture. The reason why the mind
+cannot always perceive presently the agreement or disagreement of
+two ideas, is, because those ideas, concerning whose agreement or
+disagreement the inquiry is made, cannot by the mind be so put together
+as to show it. In this case then, when the mind cannot so bring its
+ideas together as by their immediate comparison, and as it were
+juxta-position or application one to another, to perceive their
+agreement or disagreement, it is fain, BY THE INTERVENTION OF OTHER
+IDEAS, (one or more, as it happens) to discover the agreement or
+disagreement which it searches; and this is that which we call
+REASONING. Thus, the mind being willing to know the agreement or
+disagreement in bigness between the three angles of a triangle and
+two right ones, cannot by an immediate view and comparing them do it:
+because the three angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once, and be
+compared with any other one, or two, angles; and so of this the mind has
+no immediate, no intuitive knowledge. In this case the mind is fain to
+find out some other angles, to which the three angles of a triangle have
+an equality; and, finding those equal to two right ones, comes to know
+their equality to two right ones.
+
+
+3. Demonstration depends on clearly perceived proofs.
+
+Those intervening ideas, which serve to show the agreement of any two
+others, are called PROOFS; and where the agreement and disagreement is
+by this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called DEMONSTRATION;
+it being SHOWN to the understanding, and the mind made to see that it is
+so. A quickness in the mind to find out these intermediate ideas, (that
+shall discover the agreement or disagreement of any other,) and to apply
+them right, is, I suppose, that which is called SAGACITY.
+
+
+4. As certain, but not so easy and ready as Intuitive Knowledge.
+
+This knowledge, by intervening proofs, though it be certain, yet the
+evidence of it is not altogether so clear and bright, nor the assent so
+ready, as in intuitive knowledge. For, though in demonstration the mind
+does at last perceive the agreement or disagreement of the ideas it
+considers; yet it is not without pains and attention: there must be more
+than one transient view to find it. A steady application and pursuit are
+required to this discovery: and there must be a progression by steps and
+degrees, before the mind can in this way arrive at certainty, and come
+to perceive the agreement or repugnancy between two ideas that need
+proofs and the use of reason to show it.
+
+
+5. The demonstrated conclusion not without Doubt, precedent to the
+demonstration.
+
+Another difference between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge
+is, that, though in the latter all doubt be removed when, by the
+intervention of the intermediate ideas, the agreement or disagreement
+is perceived, yet before the demonstration there was a doubt; which in
+intuitive knowledge cannot happen to the mind that has its faculty of
+perception left to a degree capable of distinct ideas; no more than it
+can be a doubt to the eye (that can distinctly see white and black),
+Whether this ink and this paper be all of a colour. If there be sight in
+the eyes, it will, at first glimpse, without hesitation, perceive the
+words printed on this paper different from the colour of the paper: and
+so if the mind have the faculty of distinct perception, it will perceive
+the agreement or disagreement of those ideas that produce intuitive
+knowledge. If the eyes have lost the faculty of seeing, or the mind of
+perceiving, we in vain inquire after the quickness of sight in one, or
+clearness of perception in the other.
+
+
+6. Not so clear as Intuitive Knowledge.
+
+It is true, the perception produced by demonstration is also very clear;
+yet it is often with a great abatement of that evident lustre and full
+assurance that always accompany that which I call intuitive: like a
+face reflected by several mirrors one to another, where, as long as it
+retains the similitude and agreement with the object, it produces a
+knowledge; but it is still, in every successive reflection, with a
+lessening of that perfect clearness and distinctness which is in the
+first; till at last, after many removes, it has a great mixture of
+dimness, and is not at first sight so knowable, especially to weak eyes.
+Thus it is with knowledge made out by a long train of proof.
+
+
+7. Each Step in Demonstrated Knowledge must have Intuitive Evidence.
+
+Now, in every step reason makes in demonstrative knowledge, there is an
+intuitive knowledge of that agreement or disagreement it seeks with the
+next intermediate idea which it uses as a proof: for if it were not
+so, that yet would need a proof; since without the perception of such
+agreement or disagreement, there is no knowledge produced: if it
+be perceived by itself, it is intuitive knowledge: if it cannot be
+perceived by itself, there is need of some intervening idea, as a common
+measure, to show their agreement or disagreement. By which it is plain,
+that every step in reasoning that produces knowledge, has intuitive
+certainty; which when the mind perceives, there is no more required
+but to remember it, to make the agreement or disagreement of the ideas
+concerning which we inquire visible and certain. So that to make
+anything a demonstration, it is necessary to perceive the immediate
+agreement of the intervening ideas, whereby the agreement or
+disagreement of the two ideas under examination (whereof the one is
+always the first, and the other the last in the account) is found.
+This intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement of the
+intermediate ideas, in each step and progression of the demonstration,
+must also be carried exactly in the mind, and a man must be sure that no
+part is left out: which, because in long deductions, and the use of
+many proofs, the memory does not always so readily and exactly retain;
+therefore it comes to pass, that this is more imperfect than intuitive
+knowledge, and men embrace often falsehood for demonstrations.
+
+
+8. Hence the Mistake, ex praecognitis, et praeconcessis.
+
+The necessity of this intuitive knowledge, in each step of scientifical
+or demonstrative reasoning, gave occasion, I imagine, to that mistaken
+axiom, That all reasoning was EX PRAECOGNITIS ET PRAECONCESSIS: which,
+how far it is a mistake, I shall have occasion to show more at
+large, when I come to consider propositions, and particularly those
+propositions which are called maxims, and to show that it is by a
+mistake that they are supposed to be the foundations of all our
+knowledge and reasonings.
+
+
+9. Demonstration not limited to ideas of mathematical Quantity.
+
+[It has been generally taken for granted, that mathematics alone are
+capable of demonstrative certainty: but to have such an agreement or
+disagreement as may intuitively be perceived, being, as I imagine, not
+the privilege of the ideas of number, extension, and figure alone, it
+may possibly be the want of due method and application in us, and not of
+sufficient evidence in things, that demonstration has been thought to
+have so little to do in other parts of knowledge, and been scarce so
+much as aimed at by any but mathematicians.] For whatever ideas we have
+wherein the mind can perceive the immediate agreement or disagreement
+that is between them, there the mind is capable of intuitive knowledge;
+and where it can perceive the agreement or disagreement of any two
+ideas, by an intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement
+they have with any intermediate ideas, there the mind is capable of
+demonstration: which is not limited to ideas of extension, figure,
+number, and their modes.
+
+
+10. Why it has been thought to be so limited.
+
+The reason why it has been generally sought for, and supposed to be only
+in those, I imagine has been, not only the general usefulness of those
+sciences; but because, in comparing their equality or excess, the modes
+of numbers have every the least difference very clear and perceivable:
+and though in extension every the least excess is not so perceptible,
+yet the mind has found out ways to examine, and discover
+demonstratively, the just equality of two angles, or extensions, or
+figures: and both these, i. e. numbers and figures, can be set down by
+visible and lasting marks, wherein the ideas under consideration are
+perfectly determined; which for the most part they are not, where they
+are marked only by names and words.
+
+
+11. Modes of Qualities not demonstrable like modes of Quantity.
+
+But in other simple ideas, whose modes and differences are made and
+counted by degrees, and not quantity, we have not so nice and accurate
+a distinction of their differences as to perceive, or find ways to
+measure, their just equality, or the least differences. For those other
+simple ideas, being appearances of sensations produced in us, by the
+size, figure, number, and motion of minute corpuscles singly insensible;
+their different degrees also depend upon the variation of some or of all
+those causes: which, since it cannot be observed by us, in particles of
+matter whereof each is too subtile to be perceived, it is impossible for
+us to have any exact measures of the different degrees of these simple
+ideas. For, supposing the sensation or idea we name whiteness be
+produced in us by a certain number of globules, which, having a
+verticity about their own centres, strike upon the retina of the eye,
+with a certain degree of rotation, as well as progressive swiftness; it
+will hence easily follow, that the more the superficial parts of any
+body are so ordered as to reflect the greater number of globules of
+light, and to give them the proper rotation, which is fit to produce
+this sensation of white in us, the more white will that body appear,
+that from an equal space sends to the retina the greater number of such
+corpuscles, with that peculiar sort of motion. I do not say that the
+nature of light consists in very small round globules; nor of whiteness
+in such a texture of parts as gives a certain rotation to these globules
+when it reflects them: for I am not now treating physically of light or
+colours. But this I think I may say, that I cannot (and I would be glad
+any one would make intelligible that he did) conceive how bodies without
+us can any ways affect our senses, but by the immediate contact of the
+sensible bodies themselves, as in tasting and feeling, or the impulse
+of some sensible particles coming from them, as in seeing, hearing,
+and smelling; by the different impulse of which parts, caused by their
+different size, figure, and motion, the variety of sensations is
+produced in us.
+
+
+12. Particles of light and simple ideas of colour.
+
+Whether then they be globules or no; or whether they have a verticity
+about their own centres that produces the idea of whiteness in us; this
+is certain, that the more particles of light are reflected from a body,
+fitted to give them that peculiar motion which produces the sensation
+of whiteness in us; and possibly too, the quicker that peculiar motion
+is,--the whiter does the body appear from which the greatest number are
+reflected, as is evident in the same piece of paper put in the sunbeams,
+in the shade, and in a dark hole; in each of which it will produce in us
+the idea of whiteness in far different degrees.
+
+
+13. The secondary Qualities of things not discovered by Demonstration.
+
+Not knowing, therefore, what number of particles, nor what motion of
+them, is fit to produce any precise degree of whiteness, we cannot
+DEMONSTRATE the certain equality of any two degrees of whiteness;
+because we have no certain standard to measure them by, nor means to
+distinguish every the least real difference, the only help we have being
+from our senses, which in this point fail us. But where the difference
+is so great as to produce in the mind clearly distinct ideas, whose
+differences can be perfectly retained, there these ideas or colours,
+as we see in different kinds, as blue and red, are as capable of
+demonstration as ideas of number and extension. What I have here said of
+whiteness and colours, I think holds true in all secondary qualities and
+their modes.
+
+
+14. III. Sensitive Knowledge of the particular Existence of finite
+beings without us.
+
+These two, viz. intuition and demonstration, are the degrees of our
+KNOWLEDGE; whatever comes short of one of these, with what assurance
+soever embraced, is but FAITH or OPINION, but not knowledge, at least in
+all general truths. There is, indeed, another perception of the mind,
+employed about THE PARTICULAR EXISTENCE OF FINITE BEINGS WITHOUT US,
+which, going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to
+either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes under the name
+of KNOWLEDGE. There can be nothing more certain than that the idea we
+receive from an external object is in our minds: this is intuitive
+knowledge. But whether there be anything more than barely that idea
+in our minds; whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of
+anything without us, which corresponds to that idea, is that whereof
+some men think there may be a question made; because men may have such
+ideas in their minds, when no such thing exists, no such object affects
+their senses. But yet here I think we are provided with an evidence that
+puts us past doubting. For I ask any one, Whether he be not invincibly
+conscious to himself of a different perception, when he looks on the sun
+by day, and thinks on it by night; when he actually tastes wormwood, or
+smells a rose, or only thinks on that savour or odour? We as plainly
+find the difference there is between any idea revived in our minds by
+our own memory, and actually coming into our minds by our senses, as we
+do between any two distinct ideas. If any one say, a dream may do the
+same thing, and all these ideas may be produced, in us without
+any external objects; he may please to dream that I make him this
+answer:--I. That it is no great matter, whether I remove his scruple or
+no: where all is but dream, reasoning and arguments are of no use, truth
+and knowledge nothing. 2. That I believe he will allow a very manifest
+difference between dreaming of being in the fire, and being actually in
+it. But yet if he be resolved to appear so sceptical as to maintain,
+that what I call being actually in the fire is nothing but a dream;
+and that we cannot thereby certainly know, that any such thing as fire
+actually exists without us: I answer, That we certainly finding that
+pleasure or pain follows upon the application of certain objects to us,
+whose existence we perceive, or dream that we perceive, by our senses;
+this certainty is as great as our happiness or misery, beyond which we
+have no concernment to know or to be. So that, I think, we may add
+to the two former sorts of knowledge this also, of the existence of
+particular external objects, by that perception and consciousness we
+have of the actual entrance of ideas from them, and allow these three
+degrees of knowledge, viz. INTUITIVE, DEMONSTRATIVE, and SENSITIVE;
+in each of which there are different degrees and ways of evidence and
+certainty.
+
+
+15. Knowledge not always clear, where the Ideas that enter into it are
+clear.
+
+But since our knowledge is founded on and employed about our ideas only,
+will it not follow from thence that it is conformable to our ideas; and
+that where our ideas are clear and distinct, or obscure and confused,
+our knowledge will be so too? To which I answer, No: for our knowledge
+consisting in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two
+ideas, its clearness or obscurity consists in the clearness or obscurity
+of that perception, and not in the clearness or obscurity of the ideas
+themselves: v. g. a man that has as clear ideas of the angles of a
+triangle, and of equality to two right ones, as any mathematician in the
+world, may yet have but a very obscure perception of their AGREEMENT,
+and so have but a very obscure knowledge of it. [But ideas which, by
+reason of their obscurity or otherwise, are confused, cannot produce any
+clear or distinct knowledge; because, as far as any ideas are confused,
+so far the mind cannot perceive clearly whether they agree or disagree.
+Or to express the same thing in a way less apt to be misunderstood:
+he that hath not determined ideas to the words he uses, cannot make
+propositions of them of whose truth he can be certain.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III.
+
+OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
+
+
+1. Extent of our Knowledge.
+
+Knowledge, as has been said, lying in the perception of the agreement or
+disagreement of any of our ideas, it follows from hence, That,
+
+
+First, it extends no further than we have Ideas.
+
+First, we can have knowledge no further than we have IDEAS.
+
+
+2. Secondly, It extends no further than we can perceive their Agreement
+or Disagreement.
+
+Secondly, That we can have no knowledge further than we can have
+PERCEPTION of that agreement or disagreement. Which perception being: 1.
+Either by INTUITION, or the immediate comparing any two ideas; or, 2.
+By REASON, examining the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, by
+the intervention of some others; or, 3. By SENSATION, perceiving the
+existence of particular things: hence it also follows:
+
+
+3. Thirdly, Intuitive Knowledge extends itself not to all the relation
+of all our Ideas.
+
+Thirdly, That we cannot have an INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE that shall extend
+itself to all our ideas, and all that we would know about them; because
+we cannot examine and perceive all the relations they have one to
+another, by juxta-position, or an immediate comparison one with another.
+Thus, having the ideas of an obtuse and an acute angled triangle, both
+drawn from equal bases, and between parallels, I can, by intuitive
+knowledge, perceive the one not to be the other, but cannot that
+way know whether they be equal or no; because their agreement or
+disagreement in equality can never be perceived by an immediate
+comparing them: the difference of figure makes their parts incapable
+of an exact immediate application; and therefore there is need of some
+intervening qualities to measure them by, which is demonstration, or
+rational knowledge.
+
+
+4. Fourthly, Nor does Demonstrative Knowledge.
+
+Fourthly, It follows, also, from what is above observed, that our
+RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE cannot reach to the whole extent of our ideas:
+because between two different ideas we would examine, we cannot always
+find such mediums as we can connect one to another with an intuitive
+knowledge in all the parts of the deduction; and wherever that fails, we
+come short of knowledge and demonstration.
+
+
+5. Fifthly, Sensitive Knowledge narrower than either.
+
+Fifthly, SENSITIVE KNOWLEDGE reaching no further than the existence of
+things actually present to our senses, is yet much narrower than either
+of the former.
+
+
+6. Sixthly, Our Knowledge, therefore narrower than our Ideas.
+
+Sixthly, From all which it is evident, that the EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE
+comes not only short of the reality of things, but even of the extent of
+our own ideas. Though our knowledge be limited to our ideas, and cannot
+exceed them either in extent or perfection; and though these be very
+narrow bounds, in respect of the extent of All-being, and far short
+of what we may justly imagine to be in some even created understandings,
+not tied down to the dull and narrow information that is to be received
+from some few, and not very acute, ways of perception, such as are our
+senses; yet it would be well with us if our knowledge were but as large
+as our ideas, and there were not many doubts and inquiries CONCERNING
+THE IDEAS WE HAVE, whereof we are not, nor I believe ever shall be in
+this world resolved. Nevertheless, I do not question but that
+human knowledge, under the present circumstances of our beings and
+constitutions, may be carried much further than it has hitherto been, if
+men would sincerely, and with freedom of mind, employ all that industry
+and labour of thought, in improving the means of discovering truth,
+which they do for the colouring or support of falsehood, to maintain a
+system, interest, or party they are once engaged in. But yet after all,
+I think I may, without injury to human perfection, be confident,
+that our knowledge would never reach to all we might desire to know
+concerning those ideas we have; nor be able to surmount all the
+difficulties, and resolve all the questions that might arise concerning
+any of them. We have the ideas of a SQUARE, a CIRCLE, and EQUALITY; and
+yet, perhaps, shall never be able to find a circle equal to a square,
+and certainly know that it is so. We have the ideas of MATTER and
+THINKING, but possibly shall never be able to know whether [any mere
+material being] thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the
+contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether
+Omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed,
+a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter, so
+disposed, a thinking immaterial substance: it being, in respect of our
+notions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that
+GOD can, if he pleases, superadd to matter A FACULTY OF THINKING, than
+that he should superadd to it ANOTHER SUBSTANCE WITH A FACULTY OF
+THINKING; since we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort
+of substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power, which
+cannot be in any created being, but merely by the good pleasure and
+bounty of the Creator. For I see no contradiction in it, that the first
+Eternal thinking Being, or Omnipotent Spirit, should, if he pleased,
+give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together as he
+thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought: though, as
+I think I have proved, lib. iv. ch. 10, Section 14, &c., it is no less
+than a contradiction to suppose matter (which is evidently in its own
+nature void of sense and thought) should be that Eternal first-thinking
+Being. What certainty of knowledge can any one have, that some
+perceptions, such as, v. g., pleasure and pain, should not be in some
+bodies themselves, after a certain manner modified and moved, as well as
+that they should be in an immaterial substance, upon the motion of the
+parts of body: Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only to
+strike and affect body, and motion, according to the utmost reach of our
+ideas, being able to produce nothing but motion; so that when we allow
+it to produce pleasure or pain, or the idea of a colour or sound, we are
+fain to quit our reason, go beyond our ideas, and attribute it wholly to
+the good pleasure of our Maker. For, since we must allow He has annexed
+effects to motion which we can no way conceive motion able to produce,
+what reason have we to conclude that He could not order them as well to
+be produced in a subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as
+in a subject we cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operate
+upon? I say not this, that I would any way lessen the belief of the
+soul's immateriality: I am not here speaking of probability, but
+knowledge, and I think not only that it becomes the modesty of
+philosophy not to pronounce magisterially, where we want that evidence
+that can produce knowledge; but also, that it is of use to us to discern
+how far our knowledge does reach; for the state we are at present in,
+not being that of vision, we must in many things content ourselves
+with faith and probability: and in the present question, about
+the Immateriality of the Soul, if our faculties cannot arrive at
+demonstrative certainty, we need not think it strange. All the great
+ends of morality and religion are well enough secured, without
+philosophical proofs of the soul's immateriality; since it is evident,
+that he who made us at the beginning to subsist here, sensible
+intelligent beings, and for several years continued us in such a state,
+can and will restore us to the like state of sensibility in another
+world, and make us capable there to receive the retribution he has
+designed to men, according to their doings in this life. [And therefore
+it is not of such mighty necessity to determine one way or the other, as
+some, over-zealous for or against the immateriality of the soul, have
+been forward to make the world believe. Who, either on the one side,
+indulging too much their thoughts immersed altogether in matter, can
+allow no existence to what is not material: or who, on the other side,
+finding not COGITATION within the natural powers of matter, examined
+over and over again by the utmost intention of mind, have the confidence
+to conclude--That Omnipotency itself cannot give perception and thought
+to a substance which has the modification of solidity. He that considers
+how hardly sensation is, in our thoughts, reconcilable to extended
+matter; or existence to anything that has no extension at all, will
+confess that he is very far from certainly knowing what his soul is.
+It is a point which seems to me to be put out of the reach of our
+knowledge: and he who will give himself leave to consider freely, and
+look into the dark and intricate part of each hypothesis, will scarce
+find his reason able to determine him fixedly for or against the soul's
+materiality. Since, on which side soever he views it, either as an
+UNEXTENDED SUBSTANCE, or as a THINKING EXTENDED MATTER, the difficulty
+to conceive either will, whilst either alone is in his thoughts, still
+drive him to the contrary side. An unfair way which some men take with
+themselves: who, because of the inconceivableness of something they find
+in one, throw themselves violently into the contrary hypothesis, though
+altogether as unintelligible to an unbiassed understanding. This serves
+not only to show the weakness and the scantiness of our knowledge, but
+the insignificant triumph of such sort of arguments; which, drawn from
+our own views, may satisfy us that we can find no certainty on one side
+of the question: but do not at all thereby help us to truth by running
+into the opposite opinion; which, on examination, will be found clogged
+with equal difficulties. For what safety, what advantage to any one is
+it, for the avoiding the seeming absurdities, and to him unsurmountable
+rubs, he meets with in one opinion, to take refuge in the contrary,
+which is built on something altogether as inexplicable, and as far
+remote from his comprehension? It is past controversy, that we have in
+us SOMETHING that thinks; our very doubts about what it is, confirm
+the certainty of its being, though we must content ourselves in the
+ignorance of what KIND of being it is: and it is in vain to go about to
+be sceptical in this, as it is unreasonable in most other cases to be
+positive against the being of anything, because we cannot comprehend
+its nature. For I would fain know what substance exists, that has not
+something in it which manifestly baffles our understandings. Other
+spirits, who see and know the nature and inward constitution of things,
+how much must they exceed us in knowledge? To which, if we add larger
+comprehension, which enables them at one glance to see the connexion
+and agreement of very many ideas, and readily supplies to them the
+intermediate proofs, which we by single and slow steps, and long poring
+in the dark, hardly at last find out, and are often ready to forget one
+before we have hunted out another; we may guess at some part of the
+happiness of superior ranks of spirits, who have a quicker and more
+penetrating sight, as well as a larger field of knowledge.]
+
+But to return to the argument in hand: our knowledge, I say, is not only
+limited to the paucity and imperfections of the ideas we have, and which
+we employ it about, but even comes short of that too: but how far it
+reaches, let us now inquire.
+
+
+7. How far our Knowledge reaches.
+
+The affirmations or negations we make concerning the ideas we have, may,
+as I have before intimated in general, be reduced to these four sorts,
+viz. identity, co-existence, relation, and real existence. I shall
+examine how far our knowledge extends in each of these:
+
+
+8. Firstly, Our Knowledge of Identity and Diversity in ideas extends as
+far as our Ideas themselves.
+
+FIRST, as to IDENTITY and DIVERSITY. In this way of agreement or
+disagreement of our ideas, our intuitive knowledge is as far extended
+as our ideas themselves: and there can be no idea in the mind, which it
+does not, presently, by an intuitive knowledge, perceive to be what it
+is, and to be different from any other.
+
+
+9. Secondly, Of their Co-existence, extends only a very little way.
+
+SECONDLY, as to the second sort, which is the agreement or disagreement
+of our ideas in CO-EXISTENCE, in this our knowledge is very short;
+though in this consists the greatest and most material part of our
+knowledge concerning substances. For our ideas of the species of
+substances being, as I have showed, nothing but certain collections of
+simple ideas united in one subject, and so co-existing together; v.g.
+our idea of flame is a body hot, luminous, and moving upward; of gold,
+a body heavy to a certain degree, yellow, malleable, and fusible: for
+these, or some such complex ideas as these, in men's minds, do these two
+names of the different substances, flame and gold, stand for. When we
+would know anything further concerning these, or any other sort of
+substances, what do we inquire, but what OTHER qualities or powers these
+substances have or have not? Which is nothing else but to know what
+OTHER simple ideas do, or do not co-exist with those that make up that
+complex idea?
+
+
+10. Because the Connexion between simple Ideas in substances is for the
+most part unknown.
+
+This, how weighty and considerable a part soever of human science, is
+yet very narrow, and scarce any at all. The reason whereof is, that the
+simple ideas whereof our complex ideas of substances are made up are,
+for the most part, such as carry with them, in their own nature, no
+VISIBLE NECESSARY connexion or inconsistency with any other simple
+ideas, whose co-existence with them we would inform ourselves about.
+
+
+11. Especially of the secondary Qualities of Bodies.
+
+The ideas that our complex ones of substances are made up of, and about
+which our knowledge concerning substances is most employed, are those of
+their secondary qualities; which depending all (as has been shown) upon
+the primary qualities of their minute and insensible parts; or, if not
+upon them, upon something yet more remote from our comprehension; it is
+impossible we should know which have a NECESSARY union or inconsistency
+one with another. For, not knowing the root they spring from, not
+knowing what size, figure, and texture of parts they are, on which
+depend, and from which result those qualities which make our complex
+idea of gold, it is impossible we should know what OTHER qualities
+result from, or are incompatible with, the same constitution of the
+insensible parts of gold; and so consequently must always co-exist with
+that complex idea we have of it, or else are inconsistent with it.
+
+
+12. Because necessary Connexion between any secondary and the primary
+Qualities is undiscoverable by us.
+
+Besides this ignorance of the primary qualities of the insensible parts
+of bodies, on which depend all their secondary qualities, there is yet
+another and more incurable part of ignorance, which sets us more remote
+from a certain knowledge of the co-existence or INCO-EXISTENCE (if I may
+so say) of different ideas in the same subject; and that is, that there
+is no discoverable connexion between any secondary quality and those
+primary qualities which it depends on.
+
+
+13. We have no perfect knowledge of their Primary Qualities.
+
+That the size, figure, and motion of one body should cause a change
+in the size, figure, and motion of another body, is not beyond our
+conception; the separation of the parts of one body upon the intrusion
+of another; and the change from rest to motion upon impulse; these and
+the like seem to have SOME CONNEXION one with another. And if we knew
+these primary qualities of bodies, we might have reason to hope we might
+be able to know a great deal more of these operations of them one upon
+another: but our minds not being able to discover any connexion betwixt
+these primary qualities of bodies and the sensations that are produced
+in us by them, we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted
+rules of the CONSEQUENCE or CO-EXISTENCE of any secondary qualities,
+though we could discover the size, figure, or motion of those invisible
+parts which immediately produce them. We are so far from knowing WHAT
+figure, size, or motion of parts produce a yellow colour, a sweet taste,
+or a sharp sound, that we can by no means conceive how ANY size, figure,
+or motion of any particles, can possibly produce in us the idea of any
+colour, taste, or sound whatsoever: there is no conceivable connexion
+between the one and the other.
+
+
+14. And seek in vain for certain and universal knowledge of unperceived
+qualities in substances.
+
+In vain, therefore, shall we endeavour to discover by our ideas (the
+only true way of certain and universal knowledge) what other ideas are
+to be found constantly joined with that of OUR complex idea of any
+substance: since we neither know the real constitution of the minute
+parts on which their qualities do depend; nor, did we know them,
+could we discover any necessary connexion between them and any of
+the secondary qualities: which is necessary to be done before we can
+certainly know their necessary co-existence. So, that, let our complex
+idea of any species of substances be what it will, we can hardly, from
+the simple ideas contained in it, certainly determine the necessary
+co-existence of any other quality whatsoever. Our knowledge in all these
+inquiries reaches very little further than our experience. Indeed some
+few of the primary qualities have a necessary dependence and visible
+connexion one with another, as figure necessarily supposes extension;
+receiving or communicating motion by impulse, supposes solidity. But
+though these, and perhaps some others of our ideas have: yet there are
+so few of them that have a visible connexion one with another, that we
+can by intuition or demonstration discover the co-existence of very few
+of the qualities that are to be found united in substances: and we are
+left only to the assistance of our senses to make known to us what
+qualities they contain. For of all the qualities that are co-existent
+in any subject, without this dependence and evident connexion of their
+ideas one with another, we cannot know certainly any two to co-exist,
+any further than experience, by our senses, informs us. Thus, though we
+see the yellow colour, and, upon trial, find the weight, malleableness,
+fusibility, and fixedness that are united in a piece of gold; yet,
+because no one of these ideas has any evident dependence or necessary
+connexion with the other, we cannot certainly know that where any four
+of these are, the fifth will be there also, how highly probable soever
+it may be; because the highest probability amounts not to certainty,
+without which there can be no true knowledge. For this co-existence can
+be no further known than it is perceived; and it cannot be perceived but
+either in particular subjects, by the observation of our senses, or, in
+general, by the necessary connexion of the ideas themselves.
+
+
+15. Of Repugnancy to co-exist, our knowledge is larger.
+
+As to the incompatibility or repugnancy to co-existence, we may know
+that any subject may have of each sort of primary qualities but one
+particular at once: v.g. each particular extension, figure, number of
+parts, motion, excludes all other of each kind. The like also is certain
+of all sensible ideas peculiar to each sense; for whatever of each kind
+is present in any subject, excludes all other of that sort: v.g. no one
+subject can have two smells or two colours at the same time. To this,
+perhaps will be said, Has not an opal, or the infusion of LIGNUM
+NEPHRITICUM, two colours at the same time? To which I answer, that
+these bodies, to eyes differently, placed, may at the same time afford
+different colours: but I take liberty also to say, that, to eyes
+differently placed, it is different parts of the object that reflect the
+particles of light: and therefore it is not the same part of the object,
+and so not the very same subject, which at the same time appears both
+yellow and azure. For, it is as impossible that the very same particle
+of any body should at the same time differently modify or reflect the
+rays of light, as that it should have two different figures and textures
+at the same time.
+
+
+16. Our Knowledge of the Co-existence of Power in Bodies extends but a
+very little Way.
+
+But as to the powers of substances to change the sensible qualities of
+other bodies, which make a great part of our inquiries about them, and
+is no inconsiderable branch of our knowledge; I doubt as to these,
+whether our knowledge reaches much further than our experience; or
+whether we can come to the discovery of most of these powers, and be
+certain that they are in any subject, by the connexion with any of those
+ideas which to us make its essence. Because the active and passive
+powers of bodies, and their ways of operating, consisting in a texture
+and motion of parts which we cannot by any means come to discover; it is
+but in very few cases we can be able to perceive their dependence on,
+or repugnance to, any of those ideas which make our complex one of that
+sort of things. I have here instanced in the corpuscularian hypothesis,
+as that which is thought to go furthest in an intelligible explication
+of those qualities of bodies; and I fear the weakness of human
+understanding is scarce able to substitute another, which will afford
+us a fuller and clearer discovery of the necessary connexion and
+co-existence of the powers which are to be observed united in several
+sorts of them. This at least is certain, that, whichever hypothesis be
+clearest and truest, (for of that it is not my business to determine,)
+our knowledge concerning corporeal substances will be very little
+advanced by any of them, till we are made to see what qualities and
+powers of bodies have a NECESSARY connexion or repugnancy one with
+another; which in the present state of philosophy I think we know but to
+a very small degree: and I doubt whether, with those faculties we
+have, we shall ever be able to carry our general knowledge (I say not
+particular experience) in this part much further. Experience is that
+which in this part we must depend on. And it were to be wished that it
+were more improved. We find the advantages some men's generous pains
+have this way brought to the stock of natural knowledge. And if others,
+especially the philosophers by fire, who pretend to it, had been so wary
+in their observations, and sincere in their reports as those who call
+themselves philosophers ought to have been, our acquaintance with the
+bodies here about us, and our insight into their powers and operations
+had been yet much greater.
+
+
+17. Of the Powers that co-exist in Spirits yet narrower.
+
+If we are at a loss in respect of the powers and operations of bodies, I
+think it is easy to conclude we are much more in the dark in reference
+to spirits; whereof we naturally have no ideas but what we draw from
+that of our own, by reflecting on the operations of our own souls
+within us, as far as they can come within our observation. But how
+inconsiderable a rank the spirits that inhabit our bodies hold amongst
+those various and possibly innumerable kinds of nobler beings; and how
+far short they come of the endowments and perfections of cherubim and
+seraphim, and infinite sorts of spirits above us, is what by a transient
+hint in another place I have offered to my reader's consideration.
+
+
+18. Thirdly, Of Relations between abstracted ideas it is not easy to say
+how far our knowledge extends.
+
+THIRDLY, As to the third sort of our knowledge, viz. the agreement or
+disagreement of any of our ideas in any other relation: this, as it is
+the largest field of our knowledge, so it is hard to determine how
+far it may extend: because the advances that are made in this part of
+knowledge, depending on our sagacity in finding intermediate ideas, that
+may show the relations and habitudes of ideas whose co-existence is not
+considered, it is a hard matter to tell when we are at an end of such
+discoveries; and when reason has all the helps it is capable of, for the
+finding of proofs, or examining the agreement or disagreement of remote
+ideas. They that are ignorant of Algebra cannot imagine the wonders in
+this kind are to be done by it: and what further improvements and helps
+advantageous to other parts of knowledge the sagacious mind of man may
+yet find out, it is not easy to determine. This at least I believe,
+that the IDEAS OF QUANTITY are not those alone that are capable of
+demonstration and knowledge; and that other, and perhaps more useful,
+parts of contemplation, would afford us certainty, if vices, passions,
+and domineering interest did not oppose or menace such endeavours.
+
+
+Morality capable of Demonstration
+
+The idea of a supreme Being, infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom,
+whose workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the idea of
+ourselves, as understanding, rational creatures, being such as are clear
+in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such
+foundations of our duty and rules of action as might place MORALITY
+amongst the SCIENCES CAPABLE OF DEMONSTRATION: wherein I doubt not
+but from self-evident propositions, by necessary consequences, as
+incontestible as those in mathematics, the measures of right and wrong
+might be made out, to any one that will apply himself with the same
+indifferency and attention to the one as he does to the other of these
+sciences. The RELATION of other MODES may certainly be perceived, as
+well as those of number and extension: and I cannot see why they should
+not also be capable of demonstration, if due methods were thought on to
+examine or pursue their agreement or disagreement. 'Where there is no
+property there is no injustice,' is a proposition as certain as any
+demonstration in Euclid: for the idea of property being a right to
+anything, and the idea of which the name 'injustice' is given being the
+invasion or violation of that right, it is evident that these ideas,
+being thus established, and these names annexed to them, I can as
+certainly know this proposition to be true, as that a triangle has three
+angles equal to two right ones. Again: 'No government allows absolute
+liberty.' The idea of government being the establishment of society upon
+certain rules or laws which require conformity to them; and the idea of
+absolute liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleases; I am as
+capable of being certain of the truth of this proposition as of any in
+the mathematics.
+
+
+19. Two things have made moral Ideas to be thought incapable of
+Demonstration: their unfitness for sensible representation, and their
+complexedness.
+
+That which in this respect has given the advantage to the ideas
+of quantity, and made them thought more capable of certainty and
+demonstration, is,
+
+First, That they can be set down and represented by sensible marks,
+which have a greater and nearer correspondence with them than any words
+or sounds whatsoever. Diagrams drawn on paper are copies of the ideas in
+the mind, and not liable to the uncertainty that words carry in their
+signification. An angle, circle, or square, drawn in lines, lies open to
+the view, and cannot be mistaken: it remains unchangeable, and may at
+leisure be considered and examined, and the demonstration be revised,
+and all the parts of it may be gone over more than once, without any
+danger of the least change in the ideas. This cannot be thus done in
+moral ideas: we have no sensible marks that resemble them, whereby we
+can set them down; we have nothing but words to express them by; which,
+though when written they remain the same, yet the ideas they stand for
+may change in the same man; and it is very seldom that they are not
+different in different persons.
+
+Secondly, Another thing that makes the greater difficulty in ethics is,
+That moral ideas are commonly more complex than those of the
+figures ordinarily considered in mathematics. From whence these two
+inconveniences follow:--First, that their names are of more uncertain
+signification, the precise collection of simple ideas they stand for
+not being so easily agreed on; and so the sign that is used for them in
+communication always, and in thinking often, does not steadily carry
+with it the same idea. Upon which the same disorder, confusion, and
+error follow, as would if a man, going to demonstrate something of an
+heptagon, should, in the diagram he took to do it, leave out one of the
+angles, or by oversight make the figure with one angle more than the
+name ordinarily imported, or he intended it should when at first
+he thought of his demonstration. This often happens, and is hardly
+avoidable in very complex moral ideas, where the same name being
+retained, one angle, i.e. one simple idea, is left out, or put in the
+complex one (still called by the same name) more at one time than
+another. Secondly, From the complexedness of these moral ideas there
+follows another inconvenience, viz. that the mind cannot easily retain
+those precise combinations so exactly and perfectly as is necessary in
+the examination of the habitudes and correspondences, agreements or
+disagreements, of several of them one with another; especially where it
+is to be judged of by long deductions, and the intervention of several
+other complex ideas to show the agreement or disagreement of two remote
+ones.
+
+The great help against this which mathematicians find in diagrams and
+figures, which remain unalterable in their draughts, is very apparent,
+and the memory would often have great difficulty otherwise to retain
+them so exactly, whilst the mind went over the parts of them step by
+step to examine their several correspondences. And though in casting up
+a long sum either in addition, multiplication, or division, every part
+be only a progression of the mind taking a view of its own ideas, and
+considering their agreement or disagreement, and the resolution of
+the question be nothing but the result of the whole, made up of such
+particulars, whereof the mind has a clear perception: yet, without
+setting down the several parts by marks, whose precise significations
+are known, and by marks that last, and remain in view when the memory
+had let them go, it would be almost impossible to carry so many
+different ideas in the mind, without confounding or letting slip some
+parts of the reckoning, and thereby making all our reasonings about it
+useless. In which case the cyphers or marks help not the mind at all to
+perceive the agreement of any two or more numbers, their equalities or
+proportions; that the mind has only by intuition of its own ideas of
+the numbers themselves. But the numerical characters are helps to
+the memory, to record and retain the several ideas about which the
+demonstration is made, whereby a man may know how far his intuitive
+knowledge in surveying several of the particulars has proceeded; that so
+he may without confusion go on to what is yet unknown; and at last have
+in one view before him the result of all his perceptions and reasonings.
+
+
+20. Remedies of our Difficulties in dealing demonstratively with moral
+ideas.
+
+One part of these disadvantages in moral ideas which has made them be
+thought not capable of demonstration, may in a good measure be remedied
+by definitions, setting down that collection of simple ideas, which
+every term shall stand for; and then using the terms steadily and
+constantly for that precise collection. And what methods algebra, or
+something of that kind, may hereafter suggest, to remove the other
+difficulties, it is not easy to foretell. Confident I am, that, if men
+would in the same method, and with the same indifferency, search after
+moral as they do mathematical truths, they would find them have a
+stronger connexion one with another, and a more necessary consequence
+from our clear and distinct ideas, and to come nearer perfect
+demonstration than is commonly imagined. But much of this is not to
+be expected, whilst the desire of esteem, riches, or power makes men
+espouse the well-endowed opinions in fashion, and then seek arguments
+either to make good their beauty, or varnish over and cover their
+deformity. Nothing being so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the
+mind; nothing so deformed and irreconcilable to the understanding as a
+lie. For though many a man can with satisfaction enough own a no very
+handsome wife in his bosom; yet who is bold enough openly to avow that
+he has espoused a falsehood, and received into his breast so ugly a
+thing as a lie? Whilst the parties of men cram their tenets down all
+men's throats whom they can get into their power, without permitting
+them to examine their truth or falsehood; and will not let truth have
+fair play in the world, nor men the liberty to search after it; what
+improvements can be expected of this kind? What greater light can be
+hoped for in the moral sciences? The subject part of mankind in most
+places might, instead thereof, with Egyptian bondage, expect Egyptian
+darkness, were not the candle of the Lord set up by himself in men's
+minds, which it is impossible for the breath or power of man wholly to
+extinguish.
+
+
+21. Fourthly, Of the three real Existences of which we have certain
+knowledge.
+
+FOURTHLY, As to the fourth sort of our knowledge, viz. of the REAL
+ACTUAL EXISTENCE OF THINGS, we have an intuitive knowledge of OUR OWN
+EXISTENCE, and a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of a GOD:
+of the existence of ANYTHING ELSE, we have no other but a sensitive
+knowledge; which extends not beyond the objects present to our senses.
+
+
+22. Our Ignorance great.
+
+Our knowledge being so narrow, as I have shown, it will perhaps give us
+some light into the present state of our minds if we look a little into
+the dark side, and take a view of OUR IGNORANCE; which, being infinitely
+larger than our knowledge, may serve much to the quieting of disputes,
+and improvement of useful knowledge; if, discovering how far we
+have clear and distinct ideas, we confine our thoughts within the
+contemplation of those things that are within the reach of our
+understandings, and launch not out into that abyss of darkness, (where
+we have not eyes to see, nor faculties to perceive anything), out of
+a presumption that nothing is beyond our comprehension. But to be
+satisfied of the folly of such a conceit, we need not go far. He that
+knows anything, knows this, in the first place, that he need not seek
+long for instances of his ignorance. The meanest and most obvious things
+that come in our way have dark sides, that the quickest sight cannot
+penetrate into. The clearest and most enlarged understandings of
+thinking men find themselves puzzled and at a loss in every particle of
+matter. We shall the less wonder to find it so, when we consider the
+CAUSES OF OUR IGNORANCE; which, from what has been said, I suppose will
+be found to be these three:--
+
+First, Want of ideas. Its causes.
+
+Secondly, Want of a discoverable connexion between the ideas we have.
+
+Thirdly, Want of tracing and examining our ideas.
+
+
+23. First, One Cause of our ignorance Want of Ideas.
+
+I. Want of simple ideas that other creatures in other parts of the
+universe may have.
+
+FIRST, There are some things, and those not a few, that we are ignorant
+of, for want of ideas.
+
+First, all the simple ideas we have are confined (as I have shown) to
+those we receive from corporeal objects by sensation, and from the
+operations of our own minds as the objects of reflection. But how much
+these few and narrow inlets are disproportionate to the vast whole
+extent of all beings, will not be hard to persuade those who are not so
+foolish as to think their span the measure of all things. What other
+simple ideas it is possible the creatures in other parts of the universe
+may have, by the assistance of senses and faculties more or perfecter
+than we have, or different from ours, it is not for us to determine. But
+to say or think there are no such, because we conceive nothing of them,
+is no better an argument than if a blind man should be positive in it,
+that there was no such thing as sight and colours, because he had no
+manner of idea of any such thing, nor could by any means frame to
+himself any notions about seeing. The ignorance and darkness that is in
+us no more hinders nor confines the knowledge that is in others, than
+the blindness of a mole is an argument against the quicksightedness of
+an eagle. He that will consider the infinite power, wisdom, and goodness
+of the Creator of all things will find reason to think it was not all
+laid out upon so inconsiderable, mean, and impotent a creature as he
+will find man to be; who in all probability is one of the lowest of
+all intellectual beings. What faculties, therefore, other species of
+creatures have to penetrate into the nature and inmost constitutions of
+things; what ideas they may receive of them far different from ours, we
+know not. This we know and certainly find, that we want several other
+views of them besides those we have, to make discoveries of them more
+perfect. And we may be convinced that the ideas we can attain to by
+our faculties are very disproportionate to things themselves, when
+a positive, clear, distinct one of substance itself, which is the
+foundation of all the rest, is concealed from us. But want of ideas of
+this kind, being a part as well as cause of our ignorance, cannot be
+described. Only this I think I may confidently say of it, That the
+intellectual and sensible world are in this perfectly alike: that that
+part which we see of either of them holds no proportion with what we see
+not; and whatsoever we can reach with our eyes or our thoughts of either
+of them is but a point, almost nothing in comparison of the the rest.
+
+
+24. Want of simple ideas that men are capable of having, but having
+not,(1) Because their remoteness, or,
+
+Secondly, Another great cause of ignorance is the want of ideas we are
+capable of. As the want of ideas which our faculties are not able
+to give us shuts us wholly from those views of things which it is
+reasonable to think other beings, perfecter than we, have, of which we
+know nothing; so the want of ideas I now speak of keeps us in ignorance
+of things we conceive capable of being known to us. Bulk, figure, and
+motion we have ideas of. But though we are not without ideas of these
+primary qualities of bodies in general, yet not knowing what is the
+particular bulk, figure, and motion, of the greatest part of the bodies
+of the universe, we are ignorant of the several powers, efficacies, and
+ways of operation, whereby the effects which we daily see are produced.
+These are hid from us, in some things by being too remote, and in others
+by being too minute. When we consider the vast distance of the known and
+visible parts of the world, and the reasons we have to think that what
+lies within our ken is but a small part of the universe, we shall then
+discover a huge abyss of ignorance. What are the particular fabrics of
+the great masses of matter which make up the whole stupendous frame of
+corporeal beings; how far they are extended; what is their motion, and
+how continued or communicated; and what influence they have one upon
+another, are contemplations that at first glimpse our thoughts lose
+themselves in. If we narrow our contemplations, and confine our thoughts
+to this little canton--I mean this system of our sun, and the grosser
+masses of matter that visibly move about it, What several sorts of
+vegetables, animals, and intellectual corporeal beings, infinitely
+different from those of our little spot of earth, may there probably be
+in the other planets, to the knowledge of which, even of their outward
+figures and parts, we can no way attain whilst we are confined to this
+earth; there being no natural means, either by sensation or reflection,
+to convey their certain ideas into our minds? They are out of the reach
+of those inlets of all our knowledge: and what sorts of furniture and
+inhabitants those mansions contain in them we cannot so much as guess,
+much less have clear and distinct ideas of them.
+
+
+25. (2) Because of their Minuteness.
+
+If a great, nay, far the greatest part of the several ranks of bodies
+in the universe escape our notice by their remoteness, there are others
+that are no less concealed from us by their minuteness. These INSENSIBLE
+CORPUSCLES, being the active parts of matter, and the great instruments
+of nature, on which depend not only all their secondary qualities, but
+also most of their natural operations, our want of precise distinct
+ideas of their primary qualities keeps us in an incurable ignorance of
+what we desire to know about them. I doubt not but if we could discover
+the figure, size, texture, and motion of the minute constituent parts of
+any two bodies, we should know without trial several of their operations
+one upon another; as we do now the properties of a square or a triangle.
+Did we know the mechanical affections of the particles of rhubarb,
+hemlock, opium, and a man, as a watchmaker does those of a watch,
+whereby it performs its operations; and of a file, which by rubbing on
+them will alter the figure of any of the wheels; we should be able to
+tell beforehand that rhubarb will purge, hemlock kill, and opium make
+a man sleep: as well as a watchmaker can, that a little piece of paper
+laid on the balance will keep the watch from going till it be removed;
+or that, some small part of it being rubbed by a file, the machine would
+quite lose its motion, and the watch go no more. The dissolving of
+silver in AQUA FORTIS, and gold in AQUA REGIA, and not VICE VERSA, would
+be then perhaps no more difficult to know than it is to a smith to
+understand why the turning of one key will open a lock, and not the
+turning of another. But whilst we are destitute of senses acute enough
+to discover the minute particles of bodies, and to give us ideas of
+their mechanical affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their
+properties and ways of operation; nor can we be assured about them any
+further than some few trials we make are able to reach. But whether they
+will succeed again another time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our
+certain knowledge of universal truths concerning natural bodies: and our
+reason carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of fact.
+
+
+26. Hence no Science of Bodies within our reach.
+
+And therefore I am apt to doubt that, how far soever human industry
+may advance useful and experimental philosophy in physical things,
+SCIENTIFICAL will still be out of our reach: because we want perfect and
+adequate ideas of those very bodies which are nearest to us, and most
+under our command. Those which we have ranked into classes under names,
+and we think ourselves best acquainted with, we have but very imperfect
+and incomplete ideas of. Distinct ideas of the several sorts of bodies
+that fall under the examination of our senses perhaps we may have: but
+adequate ideas, I suspect, we have not of any one amongst them. And
+though the former of these will serve us for common use and discourse,
+yet whilst we want the latter, we are not capable of scientifical
+knowledge; nor shall ever be able to discover general, instructive,
+unquestionable truths concerning them. CERTAINTY and DEMONSTRATION are
+things we must not, in these matters, pretend to. By the colour, figure,
+taste, and smell, and other sensible qualities, we have as clear and
+distinct ideas of sage and hemlock, as we have of a circle and a
+triangle: but having no ideas of the particular primary qualities of the
+minute parts of either of these plants, nor of other bodies which we
+would apply them to, we cannot tell what effects they will produce; nor
+when we see those effects can we so much as guess, much less know, their
+manner of production. Thus, having no ideas of the particular mechanical
+affections of the minute parts of bodies that are within our view and
+reach, we are ignorant of their constitutions, powers, and operations:
+and of bodies more remote we are yet more ignorant, not knowing so much
+as their very outward shapes, or the sensible and grosser parts of their
+constitutions.
+
+
+27. Much less a science of unembodied Spirits.
+
+This at first will show us how disproportionate our knowledge is to
+the whole extent even of material beings; to which if we add the
+consideration of that infinite number of spirits that may be, and
+probably are, which are yet more remote from our knowledge, whereof we
+have no cognizance, nor can frame to ourselves any distinct ideas of
+their several ranks and sorts, we shall find this cause of ignorance
+conceal from us, in an impenetrable obscurity, almost the whole
+intellectual world; a greater certainly, and more beautiful world than
+the material. For, bating some very few, and those, if I may so call
+them, superficial ideas of spirit, which by reflection we get of our
+own, and from thence the best we can collect of the Father of all
+spirits, the eternal independent Author of them, and us, and all things,
+we have no certain information, so much as of the existence of other
+spirits, but by revelation. Angels of all sorts are naturally beyond our
+discovery; and all those intelligences, whereof it is likely there are
+more orders than of corporeal substances, are things whereof our natural
+faculties give us no certain account at all. That there are minds and
+thinking beings in other men as well as himself, every man has a reason,
+from their words and actions, to be satisfied: and the knowledge of his
+own mind cannot suffer a man that considers, to be ignorant that there
+is a God. But that there are degrees of spiritual beings between us and
+the great God, who is there, that, by his own search and ability, can
+come to know? Much less have we distinct ideas of their different
+natures, conditions, states, powers, and several constitutions wherein
+they agree or differ from one another and from us. And, therefore, in
+what concerns their different species and properties we are in absolute
+ignorance.
+
+
+28. Secondly, Another cause, Want of a discoverable Connexion between
+Ideas we have.
+
+SECONDLY, What a small part of the substantial beings that are in the
+universe the want of ideas leaves open to our knowledge, we have seen.
+In the next place, another cause of ignorance, of no less moment, is
+a want of a discoverable connection between those ideas we have. For
+wherever we want that, we are utterly incapable of universal and certain
+knowledge; and are, in the former case, left only to observation and
+experiment: which, how narrow and confined it is, how far from general
+knowledge we need not be told. I shall give some few instances of this
+cause of our ignorance, and so leave it. It is evident that the bulk,
+figure, and motion of several bodies about us produce in us several
+sensations, as of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, pleasure, and pain,
+&c. These mechanical affections of bodies having no affinity at all with
+those ideas they produce in us, (there being no conceivable connexion
+between any impulse of any sort of body and any perception of a colour
+or smell which we find in our minds,) we can have no distinct knowledge
+of such operations beyond our experience; and can reason no otherwise
+about them, than as effects produced by the appointment of an infinitely
+Wise Agent, which perfectly surpass our comprehensions. As the ideas of
+sensible secondary qualities which we have in our minds, can by us be no
+way deduced from bodily causes, nor any correspondence or connexion be
+found between them and those primary qualities which (experience shows
+us) produce them in us; so, on the other side, the operation of our
+minds upon our bodies is as inconceivable. How any thought should
+produce a motion in body is as remote from the nature of our ideas, as
+how any body should produce any thought in the mind. That it is so,
+if experience did not convince us, the consideration of the things
+themselves would never be able in the least to discover to us. These,
+and the like, though they have a constant and regular connexion in the
+ordinary course of things; yet that connexion being not discoverable in
+the ideas themselves, which appearing to have no necessary dependence
+one on another, we can attribute their connexion to nothing else but the
+arbitrary determination of that All-wise Agent who has made them to be,
+and to operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak understandings
+to conceive.
+
+
+29. Instances
+
+In some of our ideas there are certain relations, habitudes, and
+connexions, so visibly included in the nature of the ideas themselves,
+that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any power
+whatsoever. And in these only we are capable of certain and universal
+knowledge. Thus the idea of a right-lined triangle necessarily carries
+with it an equality of its angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceive
+this relation, this connexion of these two ideas, to be possibly
+mutable, or to depend on any arbitrary power, which of choice made it
+thus, or could make it otherwise. But the coherence and continuity of
+the parts of matter; the production of sensation in us of colours
+and sounds, &c., by impulse and motion; nay, the original rules and
+communication of motion being such, wherein we can discover no natural
+connexion with any ideas we have, we cannot but ascribe them to the
+arbitrary will and good pleasure of the Wise Architect. I need not, I
+think, here mention the resurrection of the dead, the future state of
+this globe of earth, and such other things, which are by every one
+acknowledged to depend wholly on the determination of a free agent. The
+things that, as far as our observation reaches, we constantly find to
+proceed regularly, we may conclude do act by a law set them; but yet
+by a law that we know not: whereby, though causes work steadily, and
+effects constantly flow from them, yet their connexions and dependencies
+being not discoverable in our ideas, we can have but an experimental
+knowledge of them. From all which it is easy to perceive what a darkness
+we are involved in, how little it is of Being, and the things that are,
+that we are capable to know. And therefore we shall do no injury to our
+knowledge, when we modestly think with ourselves, that we are so far
+from being able to comprehend the whole nature of the universe, and all
+the things contained in it, that we are not capable of a philosophical
+knowledge of the bodies that are about us, and make a part of us:
+concerning their secondary qualities, powers, and operations, we can
+have no universal certainty. Several effects come every day within the
+notice of our senses, of which we have so far sensitive knowledge: but
+the causes, manner, and certainty of their production, for the two
+foregoing reasons, we must be content to be very ignorant of. In these
+we can go no further than particular experience informs us of matter of
+fact, and by analogy to guess what effects the like bodies are, upon
+other trials, like to produce. But as to a PERFECT SCIENCE of natural
+bodies, (not to mention spiritual beings,) we are, I think, so far from
+being capable of any such thing, that I conclude it lost labour to seek
+after it.
+
+
+30. Thirdly A third cause, Want of Tracing our ideas.
+
+THIRDLY, Where we have adequate ideas, and where there is a certain and
+discoverable connexion between them, yet we are often ignorant, for
+want of tracing those ideas which we have or may have; and for want of
+finding out those intermediate ideas, which may show us what habitude of
+agreement or disagreement they have one with another. And thus many are
+ignorant of mathematical truths, not out of any imperfection of their
+faculties, or uncertainty in the things themselves, but for want of
+application in acquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing those
+ideas. That which has most contributed to hinder the due tracing of our
+ideas, and finding out their relations, and agreements or disagreements,
+one with another, has been, I suppose, the ill use of words. It is
+impossible that men should ever truly seek or certainly discover the
+agreement or disagreement of ideas themselves, whilst their thoughts
+flutter about, or stick only in sounds of doubtful and uncertain
+significations. Mathematicians abstracting their thoughts from names,
+and accustoming themselves to set before their minds the ideas
+themselves that they would consider, and not sounds instead of them,
+have avoided thereby a great part of that perplexity, puddering, and
+confusion, which has so much hindered men's progress in other parts of
+knowledge. For whilst they stick in words of undetermined and uncertain
+signification, they are unable to distinguish true from false, certain
+from probable, consistent from inconsistent, in their own opinions. This
+having been the fate or misfortune of a great part of men of letters,
+the increase brought into the stock of real knowledge has been very
+little, in proportion to the schools disputes, and writings, the world
+has been filled with; whilst students, being lost in the great wood of
+words, knew not whereabouts they were, how far their discoveries were
+advanced, or what was wanting in their own, or the general stock of
+knowledge. Had men, in the discoveries of the material, done as they
+have in those of the intellectual world, involved all in the obscurity
+of uncertain and doubtful ways of talking, volumes writ of navigation
+and voyages, theories and stories of zones and tides, multiplied and
+disputed; nay, ships built, and fleets sent out, would never have taught
+us the way beyond the line; and the Antipodes would be still as much
+unknown, as when it was declared heresy to hold there were any. But
+having spoken sufficiently of words, and the ill or careless use that is
+commonly made of them, I shall not say anything more of it here.
+
+
+31. Extent of Human Knowledge in respect to its Universality.
+
+Hitherto we have examined the extent of our knowledge, in respect of
+the several sorts of beings that are. There is another extent of it, in
+respect of UNIVERSALITY, which will also deserve to be considered; and
+in this regard, our knowledge follows the nature of our ideas. If the
+ideas are abstract, whose agreement or disagreement we perceive, our
+knowledge is universal. For what is known of such general ideas, will be
+true of every particular thing in whom that essence, i.e. that abstract
+idea, is to be found: and what is once known of such ideas, will be
+perpetually and for ever true. So that as to all GENERAL KNOWLEDGE we
+must search and find it only in our minds; and it is only the examining
+of our own ideas that furnisheth us with that. Truths belonging to
+essences of things (that is, to abstract ideas) are eternal; and are
+to be found out by the contemplation only of those essences: as the
+existence of things is to be known only from experience. But having more
+to say of this in the chapters where I shall speak of general and real
+knowledge, this may here suffice as to the universality of our knowledge
+in general.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV. OF THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE.
+
+
+1. Objection. 'Knowledge placed in our Ideas may be all unreal or
+chimerical'
+
+I DOUBT not but my reader, by this time, may be apt to think that I have
+been all this while only building a castle in the air; and be ready to
+say to me:--
+
+'To what purpose all this stir? Knowledge, say you, is only the
+perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas: but who
+knows what those ideas may be? Is there anything so extravagant as the
+imaginations of men's brains? Where is the head that has no chimeras in
+it? Or if there be a sober and a wise man, what difference will
+there be, by your rules, between his knowledge and that of the most
+extravagant fancy in the world? They both have their ideas, and perceive
+their agreement and disagreement one with another. If there be any
+difference between them, the advantage will be on the warm-headed man's
+side, as having the more ideas, and the more lively. And so, by your
+rules, he will be the more knowing. If it be true, that all knowledge
+lies only in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own
+ideas, the visions of an enthusiast and the reasonings of a sober man
+will be equally certain. It is no matter how things are: so a man
+observe but the agreement of his own imaginations, and talk conformably,
+it is all truth, all certainty. Such castles in the air will be as
+strongholds of truth, as the demonstrations of Euclid. That an harpy is
+not a centaur is by this way as certain knowledge, and as much a truth,
+as that a square is not a circle.
+
+'But of what use is all this fine knowledge of MEN'S OWN IMAGINATIONS,
+to a man that inquires after the reality of things? It matters not what
+men's fancies are, it is the knowledge of things that is only to be
+prized: it is this alone gives a value to our reasonings, and preference
+to one man's knowledge over another's, that it is of things as they
+really are, and not of dreams and fancies.'
+
+
+2. Answer Not so, where Ideas agree with Things.
+
+To which I answer, That if our knowledge of our ideas terminate in them,
+and reach no further, where there is something further intended, our
+most serious thoughts will be of little more use than the reveries of
+a crazy brain; and the truths built thereon of no more weight than the
+discourses of a man who sees things clearly in a dream, and with great
+assurance utters them. But I hope, before I have done, to make it
+evident, that this way of certainty, by the knowledge of our own ideas,
+goes a little further than bare imagination: and I believe it will
+appear that all the certainty of general truths a man has lies in
+nothing else.
+
+
+3. But what shall be the criterion of this agreement?
+
+It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the
+intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is
+real only so far as there is a CONFORMITY between our ideas and the
+reality of things. But what shall be here the criterion? How shall the
+mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree
+with things themselves? This, though it seems not to want difficulty,
+yet, I think, there be two sorts of ideas that we may be assured agree
+with things.
+
+
+4. As, First All Simple Ideas are really conformed to Things.
+
+FIRST, The first are simple ideas, which since the mind, as has been
+showed, can by no means make to itself, must necessarily be the product
+of things operating on the mind, in a natural way, and producing therein
+those perceptions which by the Wisdom and Will of our Maker they are
+ordained and adapted to. From whence it follows, that simple ideas are
+not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of
+things without us, really operating upon us; and so carry with them all
+the conformity which is intended; or which our state requires: for they
+represent to us things under those appearances which they are fitted
+to produce in us: whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of
+particular substances, to discern the states they are in, and so to take
+them for our necessities, and apply them to our uses. Thus the idea of
+whiteness, or bitterness, as it is in the mind, exactly answering
+that power which is in any body to produce it there, has all the real
+conformity it can or ought to have, with things without us. And this
+conformity between our simple ideas and the existence of things, is
+sufficient for real knowledge.
+
+
+5. Secondly, All Complex Ideas, except ideas of Substances, are their
+own archetypes.
+
+Secondly, All our complex ideas, EXCEPT THOSE OF SUBSTANCES, being
+archetypes of the mind's own making, not intended to be the copies
+of anything, nor referred to the existence of anything, as to their
+originals, cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge. For
+that which is not designed to represent anything but itself, can never
+be capable of a wrong representation, nor mislead us from the true
+apprehension of anything, by its dislikeness to it: and such, excepting
+those of substances, are all our complex ideas. Which, as I have showed
+in another place, are combinations of ideas, which the mind, by its free
+choice, puts together, without considering any connexion they have in
+nature. And hence it is, that in all these sorts the ideas themselves
+are considered as the archetypes, and things no otherwise regarded, but
+as they are conformable to them. So that we cannot but be infallibly
+certain, that all the knowledge we attain concerning these ideas is
+real, and reaches things themselves. Because in all our thoughts,
+reasonings, and discourses of this kind, we intend things no further
+than as they are conformable to our ideas. So that in these we cannot
+miss of a certain and undoubted reality.
+
+
+6. Hence the reality of Mathematical Knowledge
+
+I doubt not but it will be easily granted, that the knowledge we have of
+mathematical truths is not only certain, but real knowledge; and not the
+bare empty vision of vain, insignificant chimeras of the brain: and yet,
+if we will consider, we shall find that it is only of our own ideas.
+The mathematician considers the truth and properties belonging to a
+rectangle or circle only as they are in idea in his own mind. For it is
+possible he never found either of them existing mathematically, i.e.
+precisely true, in his life. But yet the knowledge he has of any truths
+or properties belonging to a circle, or any other mathematical figure,
+are nevertheless true and certain, even of real things existing: because
+real things are no further concerned, nor intended to be meant by any
+such propositions, than as things really agree to those archetypes in
+his mind. Is it true of the IDEA of a triangle, that its three angles
+are equal to two right ones? It is true also of a triangle, wherever
+it REALLY EXISTS. Whatever other figure exists, that it is not exactly
+answerable to that idea of a triangle in his mind, is not at all
+concerned in that proposition. And therefore he is certain all his
+knowledge concerning such ideas is real knowledge: because, intending
+things no further than they agree with those his ideas, he is sure
+what he knows concerning those figures, when they have BARELY AN IDEAL
+EXISTENCE in his mind, will hold true of them also when they have A REAL
+EXISTANCE in matter: his consideration being barely of those figures,
+which are the same wherever or however they exist.
+
+
+7. And of Moral.
+
+And hence it follows that moral knowledge is as capable of real
+certainty as mathematics. For certainty being but the perception of the
+agreement or disagreement of our ideas, and demonstration nothing but
+the perception of such agreement, by the intervention of other ideas
+or mediums; our moral ideas, as well as mathematical, being archetypes
+themselves, and so adequate and complete ideas; all the agreement or
+disagreement which we shall find in them will produce real knowledge, as
+well as in mathematical figures.
+
+
+8. Existence not required to make Abstract Knowledge real.
+
+[For the attaining of knowledge and certainty, it is requisite that we
+have determined ideas:] and, to make our knowledge real, it is requisite
+that the ideas answer their archetypes. Nor let it be wondered, that I
+place the certainty of our knowledge in the consideration of our ideas,
+with so little care and regard (as it may seem) to the real existence of
+things: since most of those discourses which take up the thoughts and
+engage the disputes of those who pretend to make it their business to
+inquire after truth and certainty, will, I presume, upon examination, be
+found to be general propositions, and notions in which existence is not
+at all concerned. All the discourses of the mathematicians about the
+squaring of a circle, conic sections, or any other part of mathematics,
+concern not the existence of any of those figures: but their
+demonstrations, which depend on their ideas, are the same, whether there
+be any square or circle existing in the world or no. In the same manner,
+the truth and certainty of moral discourses abstracts from the lives of
+men, and the existence of those virtues in the world whereof they treat:
+nor are Tully's Offices less true, because there is nobody in the world
+that exactly practises his rules, and lives up to that pattern of a
+virtuous man which he has given us, and which existed nowhere when he
+writ but in idea. If it be true in speculation, i.e. in idea, that
+murder deserves death, it will also be true in reality of any action
+that exists conformable to that idea of murder. As for other
+actions, the truth of that proposition concerns them not. And thus it is
+of all other species of things, which have no other essences but those
+ideas which are in the minds of men.
+
+
+9. Nor will it be less true or certain, because Moral Ideas are of our
+own making and naming.
+
+But it will here be said, that if moral knowledge be placed in the
+contemplation of our own moral ideas, and those, as other modes, be
+of our own making, What strange notions will there be of justice and
+temperance? What confusion of virtues and vices, if every one may make
+what ideas of them he pleases? No confusion or disorder in the things
+themselves, nor the reasonings about them; no more than (in mathematics)
+there would be a disturbance in the demonstration, or a change in the
+properties of figures, and their relations one to another, if a man
+should make a triangle with four corners, or a trapezium with four right
+angles: that is, in plain English, change the names of the figures, and
+call that by one name, which mathematicians call ordinarily by another.
+For, let a man make to himself the idea of a figure with three angles,
+whereof one is a right one, and call it, if he please, EQUILATERUM or
+TRAPEZIUM, or anything else; the properties of, and demonstrations about
+that idea will be the same as if he called it a rectangular triangle. I
+confess the change of the name, by the impropriety of speech, will at
+first disturb him who knows not what idea it stands for: but as soon as
+the figure is drawn, the consequences and demonstrations are plain and
+clear. Just the same is it in moral knowledge: let a man have the idea
+of taking from others, without their consent, what their honest industry
+has possessed them of, and call this JUSTICE if he please. He that takes
+the name here without the idea put to it will be mistaken, by joining
+another idea of his own to that name: but strip the idea of that name,
+or take it such as it is in the speaker's mind, and the same things will
+agree to it, as if you called it INJUSTICE. Indeed, wrong names in moral
+discourses breed usually more disorder, because they are not so easily
+rectified as in mathematics, where the figure, once drawn and seen,
+makes the name useless and of no force. For what need of a sign, when
+the thing signified is present and in view? But in moral names, that
+cannot be so easily and shortly done, because of the many decompositions
+that go to the making up the complex ideas of those modes. But yet for
+all this, the miscalling of any of those ideas, contrary to the usual
+signification of the words of that language, hinders not but that we may
+have certain and demonstrative knowledge of their several agreements and
+disagreements, if we will carefully, as in mathematics, keep to the same
+precise ideas, and trace THEM in their several relations one to another,
+without being led away by their names. If we but separate the idea under
+consideration from the sign that stands for it, our knowledge goes
+equally on in the discovery of real truth and certainty, whatever sounds
+we make use of.
+
+
+10. Misnaming disturbs not the certainty of the Knowledge
+
+One thing more we are to take notice of, That where God or any other
+law-maker, hath defined any moral names, there they have made the
+essence of that species to which that name belongs; and there it is
+not safe to apply or use them otherwise: but in other cases it is bare
+impropriety of speech to apply them contrary to the common usage of
+the country. But yet even this too disturbs not the certainty of that
+knowledge, which is still to be had by a due contemplation and comparing
+of those even nick-named ideas.
+
+
+11. Thirdly, Our complex Ideas of Substances have their Archetypes
+without us; and here knowledge comes short.
+
+THIRDLY, There is another sort of complex ideas, which, being referred
+to archetypes without us, may differ from them, and so our knowledge
+about them may come short of being real. Such are our ideas of
+substances, which, consisting of a collection of simple ideas, supposed
+taken from the works of nature, may yet vary from them; by having more
+or different ideas united in them than are to be found united in the
+things themselves. From whence it comes to pass, that they may, and
+often do, fail of being exactly conformable to things themselves.
+
+
+12. So far as our complex ideas agree with those Archetypes without us,
+so far our Knowledge concerning Substances is real.
+
+I say, then, that to have ideas of SUBSTANCES which, by being
+conformable to things, may afford us real knowledge, it is not enough,
+as in MODES, to put together such ideas as have no inconsistence, though
+they did never before so exist: v.g. the ideas of sacrilege or perjury,
+&c., were as real and true ideas before, as after the existence of any
+such fact. But our ideas of substances, being supposed copies, and
+referred to archetypes without us, must still be taken from something
+that does or has existed: they must not consist of ideas put together at
+the pleasure of our thoughts, without any real pattern they were taken
+from, though we can perceive no inconsistence in such a combination. The
+reason whereof is because we, knowing not what real constitution it is
+of substances whereon our simple ideas depend, and which really is the
+cause of the strict union of some of them one with another, and the
+exclusion of others; there are very few of them that we can be sure
+are or are not inconsistent in nature: any further than experience and
+sensible observation reach Herein, therefore, is founded the reality of
+our knowledge concerning substances--That all our complex ideas of them
+must be such, and such only, as are made up of such simple ones as have
+been discovered to co-exist in nature. And our ideas being thus true,
+though not perhaps very exact copies, are yet the subjects of real (as
+far as we have any) knowledge of them. Which (as has been already shown)
+will not be found to reach very far: but so far as it does, it will
+still be real knowledge. Whatever ideas we have, the agreement we
+find they have with others will still be knowledge. If those ideas be
+abstract, it will be general knowledge. But to make it real concerning
+substances, the ideas must be taken from the real existence of things.
+Whatever simple ideas have been found to co-exist in any substance,
+these we may with confidence join together again, and so make abstract
+ideas of substances. For whatever have once had an union in nature, may
+be united again.
+
+
+13. In our inquiries about Substances, we must consider Ideas, and not
+confine our Thoughts to Names, or Species supposed set out by Names.
+
+This, if we rightly consider, and confine not our thoughts and abstract
+ideas to names, as if there were, or could be no other SORTS of things
+than what known names had already determined, and, as it were, set out,
+we should think of things with greater freedom and less confusion than
+perhaps we do. It would possibly be thought a bold paradox, if not a
+very dangerous falsehood, if I should say that some CHANGELINGS, who
+have lived forty years together, without any appearance of reason, are
+something between a man and a beast: which prejudice is founded upon
+nothing else but a false supposition, that these two names, man and
+beast, stand for distinct species so set out by real essences, that
+there can come no other species between them: whereas if we will
+abstract from those names, and the supposition of such specific essences
+made by nature, wherein all things of the same denominations did exactly
+and equally partake; if we would not fancy that there were a certain
+number of these essences, wherein all things, as in moulds, were cast
+and formed; we should find that the idea of the shape, motion, and life
+of a man without reason, is as much a distinct idea, and makes as much a
+distinct sort of things from man and beast, as the idea of the shape of
+an ass with reason would be different from either that of man or beast,
+and be a species of an animal between, or distinct from both.
+
+
+14. Objection against a Changeling being something between a Man and
+Beast, answered.
+
+Here everybody will be ready to ask, If changelings may be supposed
+something between man and beast, pray what are they? I answer,
+CHANGELINGS; which is as good a word to signify something different from
+the signification of MAN or BEAST, as the names man and beast are to
+have significations different one from the other. This, well considered,
+would resolve this matter, and show my meaning without any more ado. But
+I am not so unacquainted with the zeal of some men, which enables them
+to spin consequences, and to see religion threatened, whenever any one
+ventures to quit their forms of speaking, as not to foresee what names
+such a proposition as this is like to be charged with: and without doubt
+it will be asked, If changelings are something between man and beast,
+what will become of them in the other world? To which I answer, I. It
+concerns me not to know or inquire. To their own master they stand or
+fall. It will make their state neither better nor worse, whether we
+determine anything of it or no. They are in the hands of a faithful
+Creator and a bountiful Father, who disposes not of his creatures
+according to our narrow thoughts or opinions, nor distinguishes them
+according to names and species of our contrivance. And we that know so
+little of this present world we are in, may, I think, content ourselves
+without being peremptory in defining the different states which
+creatures shall come into when they go off this stage. It may suffice
+us, that He hath made known to all those who are capable of instruction,
+discoursing, and reasoning, that they shall come to an account, and
+receive according to what they have done in this body.
+
+
+15. What will become of Changelings in a future state?
+
+But, Secondly, I answer, The force of these men's question (viz. Will
+you deprive changelings of a future state?) is founded on one of these
+two suppositions, which are both false. The first is, That all things
+that have the outward shape and appearance of a man must necessarily be
+designed to an immortal future being after this life: or, secondly, That
+whatever is of human birth must be so. Take away these imaginations, and
+such questions will be groundless and ridiculous. I desire then those
+who think there is no more but an accidental difference between
+themselves and changelings, the essence in both being exactly the same,
+to consider, whether they can imagine immortality annexed to any outward
+shape of the body; the very proposing it is, I suppose, enough to make
+them disown it. No one yet, that ever I heard of, how much soever
+immersed in matter, allowed that excellency to any figure of the gross
+sensible outward consequence of it; or that any mass of matter
+should, after its dissolution here, be again restored hereafter to an
+everlasting state of sense, perception, and knowledge, only because it
+was moulded into this or that figure, and had such a particular frame
+of its visible parts. Such an opinion as this, placing immortality in a
+certain superficial figure, turns out of doors all consideration of soul
+or spirit; upon whose account alone some corporeal beings have hitherto
+been concluded immortal, and others not. This is to attribute more to
+the outside than inside of things; and to place the excellency of a man
+more in the external shape of his body, than internal perfections of his
+soul: which is but little better than to annex the great and inestimable
+advantage of immortality and life everlasting, which he has above other
+material beings, to annex it, I say, to the cut of his beard, or the
+fashion of his coat. For this or that outward mark of our bodies no more
+carries with it the hope of an eternal duration, than the fashion of a
+man's suit gives him reasonable grounds to imagine it will never wear
+out, or that it will make him immortal. It will perhaps be said, that
+nobody thinks that the shape makes anything immortal, but it is the
+shape that is the sign of a rational soul within, which is immortal. I
+wonder who made it the sign of any such thing: for barely saying it,
+will not make it so. It would require some proofs to persuade one of it.
+No figure that I know speaks any such language. For it may as rationally
+be concluded, that the dead body of a man, wherein there is to be found
+no more appearance or action of life than there is in a statue, has yet
+nevertheless a living soul in it, because of its shape; as that there
+is a rational soul in a changeling, because he has the outside of a
+rational creature, when his actions carry far less marks of reason with
+them, in the whole course of his life than what are to be found in many
+a beast.
+
+
+16. Monsters
+
+But it is the issue of rational parents, and must therefore be concluded
+to have a rational soul. I know not by what logic you must so conclude.
+I am sure this is a conclusion that men nowhere allow of. For if they
+did, they would not make bold, as everywhere they do to destroy
+ill-formed and mis-shaped productions. Ay, but these are MONSTERS.
+Let them be so: what will your drivelling, unintelligent, intractable
+changeling be? Shall a defect in the body make a monster; a defect in
+the mind (the far more noble, and, in the common phrase, the far more
+essential part) not? Shall the want of a nose, or a neck, make a
+monster, and put such issue out of the rank of men; the want of reason
+and understanding, not? This is to bring all back again to what was
+exploded just now: this is to place all in the shape, and to take the
+measure of a man only by his outside. To show that according to the
+ordinary way of reasoning in this matter, people do lay the whole stress
+on the figure, and resolve the whole essence of the species of man (as
+they make it) into the outward shape, how unreasonable soever it be, and
+how much soever they disown it, we need but trace their thoughts
+and practice a little further, and then it will plainly appear. The
+well-shaped changeling is a man, has a rational soul, though it appear
+not: this is past doubt, say you: make the ears a little longer, and
+more pointed, and the nose a little flatter than ordinary, and then you
+begin to boggle: make the face yet narrower, flatter, and longer, and
+then you are at a stand: add still more and more of the likeness of a
+brute to it, and let the head be perfectly that of some other animal,
+then presently it is a monster; and it is demonstration with you that it
+hath no rational soul, and must be destroyed. Where now (I ask) shall be
+the just measure; which the utmost bounds of that shape, that carries
+with it a rational soul? For, since there have been human foetuses
+produced, half beast and half man; and others three parts one, and one
+part the other; and so it is possible they may be in all the variety of
+approaches to the one or the other shape, and may have several degrees
+of mixture of the likeness of a man, or a brute;--I would gladly know
+what are those precise lineaments, which, according to this hypothesis,
+are or are not capable of a rational soul to be joined to them. What
+sort of outside is the certain sign that there is or is not such an
+inhabitant within? For till that be done, we talk at random of MAN: and
+shall always, I fear, do so, as long as we give ourselves up to certain
+sounds, and the imaginations of settled and fixed species in nature, we
+know not what. But, after all, I desire it may be considered, that those
+who think they have answered the difficulty, by telling us, that a
+mis-shaped foetus is a MONSTER, run into the same fault they are arguing
+against; by constituting a species between man and beast. For what else,
+I pray, is their monster in the case, (if the word monster signifies
+anything at all,) but something neither man nor beast, but partaking
+somewhat of either? And just so is the CHANGELING before mentioned. So
+necessary is it to quit the common notion of species and essences, if we
+will truly look into the nature of things, and examine them by what our
+faculties can discover in them as they exist, and not by groundless
+fancies that have been taken up about them.
+
+
+17. Words and Species.
+
+I have mentioned this here, because I think we cannot be too cautious
+that words and species, in the ordinary notions which we have been used
+to of them, impose not on us. For I am apt to think therein lies one
+great obstacle to our clear and distinct knowledge, especially in
+reference to substances: and from thence has rose a great part of the
+difficulties about truth and certainty. Would we accustom ourselves to
+separate our contemplations and reasonings from words, we might in a
+great measure remedy this inconvenience within our own thoughts: but yet
+it would still disturb us in our discourse with others, as long as we
+retained the opinion, that SPECIES and their ESSENCES were anything else
+but our abstract ideas (such as they are) with names annexed to them, to
+be the signs of them.
+
+
+18. Recapitulation.
+
+Wherever we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas,
+there is certain knowledge: and wherever we are sure those ideas agree
+with the reality of things, there is certain real knowledge. Of which
+agreement of our ideas with the reality of things, having here given
+the marks, I think, I have shown WHEREIN IT IS THAT CERTAINTY, REAL
+CERTAINTY, CONSISTS. Which, whatever it was to others, was, I confess,
+to me heretofore, one of those desiderata which I found great want of.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V. OF TRUTH IN GENERAL.
+
+
+1. What Truth is.
+
+WHAT is truth? was an inquiry many ages since; and it being that which
+all mankind either do, or pretend to search after, it cannot but be
+worth our while carefully to examine wherein it consists; and so
+acquaint ourselves with the nature of it, as to observe how the mind
+distinguishes it from falsehood.
+
+
+2. A right joining or separating of signs, i.e. either Ideas or Words.
+
+Truth, then, seems to me, in the proper import of the word, to signify
+nothing but THE JOINING OR SEPERATING OF SIGNS, AS THE THINGS SIGNIFIED
+BY THEM DO AGREE OR DISAGREE ONE WITH ANOTHER. The joining or separating
+of signs here meant, is what by another name we call PROPOSITION. So
+that truth properly belongs only to propositions: whereof there are two
+sorts, viz. mental and verbal; as there are two sorts of signs commonly
+made use of, viz. ideas and words.
+
+3. Which make mental or verbal Propositions.
+
+To form a clear notion of truth, it is very necessary to consider truth
+of thought, and truth of words, distinctly one from another: but yet it
+is very difficult to treat of them asunder. Because it is unavoidable,
+in treating of mental propositions, to make use of words: and then the
+instances given of mental propositions cease immediately to be barely
+mental, and become verbal. For a MENTAL PROPOSITION being nothing but a
+bare consideration of the ideas, as they are in our minds, stripped of
+names, they lose the nature of purely mental propositions as soon as
+they are put into words.
+
+
+4. Mental Propositions are very hard to be treated of.
+
+And that which makes it yet harder to treat of mental and verbal
+propositions separately is, that most men, if not all, in their thinking
+and reasonings within themselves, make use of words instead of ideas; at
+least when the subject of their meditation contains in it complex ideas.
+Which is a great evidence of the imperfection and uncertainty of our
+ideas of that kind, and may, if attentively made use of, serve for
+a mark to show us what are those things we have clear and perfect
+established ideas of, and what not. For if we will curiously observe the
+way our mind takes in thinking and reasoning, we shall find, I suppose,
+that when we make any propositions within our own thoughts about WHITE
+or BLACK, SWEET or BITTER, a TRIANGLE or a CIRCLE, we can and often
+do frame in our minds the ideas themselves, without reflecting on the
+names. But when we would consider, or make propositions about the more
+complex ideas, as of a MAN, VITRIOL, FORTITUDE, GLORY, we usually put
+the name for the idea: because the ideas these names stand for, being
+for the most part imperfect, confused, and undetermined, we reflect
+on the names themselves, because they are more clear, certain, and
+distinct, and readier occur to our thoughts than the pure ideas: and so
+we make use of these words instead of the ideas themselves, even when
+we would meditate and reason within ourselves, and make tacit mental
+propositions. In substances, as has been already noticed, this is
+occasioned by the imperfections of our ideas: we making the name stand
+for the real essence, of which we have no idea at all. In modes, it is
+occasioned by the great number of simple ideas that go to the making
+them up. For many of them being compounded, the name occurs much easier
+than the complex idea itself, which requires time and attention to be
+recollected, and exactly represented to the mind, even in those men who
+have formerly been at the pains to do it; and is utterly impossible
+to be done by those who, though they have ready in their memory the
+greatest part of the common words of that language, yet perhaps never
+troubled themselves in all their lives to consider what precise ideas
+the most of them stood for. Some confused or obscure notions have served
+their turns; and many who talk very much of RELIGION and CONSCIENCE,
+of CHURCH and FAITH, of POWER and RIGHT, of OBSTRUCTIONS and HUMOURS,
+MELANCHOLY and CHOLER, would perhaps have little left in their thoughts
+and meditations, if one should desire them to think only of the things
+themselves, and lay by those words with which they so often confound
+others, and not seldom themselves also.
+
+
+5. Mental and Verbal Propositions contrasted.
+
+But to return to the consideration of truth: we must, I say, observe two
+sorts of propositions that we are capable of making:--
+
+First, MENTAL, wherein the ideas in our understandings are without the
+use of words put together, or separated, by the mind perceiving or
+judging of their agreement or disagreement.
+
+Secondly, VERBAL propositions, which are words, the signs of our ideas,
+put together or separated in affirmative or negative sentences. By which
+way of affirming or denying, these signs, made by sounds, are, as it
+were, put together or separated from another. So that proposition
+consists in joining or separating signs; and truth consists in the
+putting together or separating those signs, according as the things
+which they stand for agree or disagree.
+
+
+6. When Mental Propositions contain real Truth, and when Verbal.
+
+Every one's experience will satisfy him, that the mind, either by
+perceiving, or supposing, the agreement or disagreement of any of its
+ideas, does tacitly within itself put them into a kind of proposition
+affirmative or negative; which I have endeavoured to express by the
+terms putting together and separating. But this action of the mind,
+which is so familiar to every thinking and reasoning man, is easier to
+be conceived by reflecting on what passes in us when we affirm or deny,
+than to be explained by words. When a man has in his head the idea of
+two lines, viz. the side and diagonal of a square, whereof the diagonal
+is an inch long, he may have the idea also of the division of that line
+into a certain number of equal parts; v.g. into five, ten, a hundred, a
+thousand, or any other number, and may have the idea of that inch line
+being divisible, or not divisible, into such equal parts, as a certain
+number of them will be equal to the sideline. Now, whenever he
+perceives, believes, or supposes such a kind of divisibility to agree or
+disagree to his idea of that line, he, as it were, joins or separates
+those two ideas, viz. the idea of that line, and the idea of that kind
+of divisibility; and so makes a mental proposition, which is true or
+false, according as such a kind of divisibility, a divisibility into
+such ALIQUOT parts, does really agree to that line or no. When ideas are
+so put together, or separated in the mind, as they or the things they
+stand for do agree or not, that is, as I may call it, MENTAL TRUTH. But
+TRUTH OF WORDS is something more; and that is the affirming or denying
+of words one of another, as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree:
+and this again is two-fold; either purely verbal and trifling, which I
+shall speak of, (chap. viii.,) or real and instructive; which is the
+object of that real knowledge which we have spoken of already.
+
+
+7. Objection against verbal Truth, that thus it may all be chimerical.
+
+But here again will be apt to occur the same doubt about truth, that did
+about knowledge: and it will be objected, that if truth be nothing but
+the joining and separating of words in propositions, as the ideas they
+stand for agree or disagree in men's minds, the knowledge of truth is
+not so valuable a thing as it is taken to be, nor worth the pains and
+time men employ in the search of it: since by this account it amounts to
+no more than the conformity of words to the chimeras of men's brains.
+Who knows not what odd notions many men's heads are filled with, and
+what strange ideas all men's brains are capable of? But if we rest here,
+we know the truth of nothing by this rule, but of the visionary words in
+our own imaginations; nor have other truth, but what as much concerns
+harpies and centaurs, as men and horses. For those, and the like, may be
+ideas in our heads, and have their agreement or disagreement there, as
+well as the ideas of real beings, and so have as true propositions made
+about them. And it will be altogether as true a proposition to say ALL
+CENTAURS ARE ANIMALS, as that ALL MEN ARE ANIMALS; and the certainty of
+one as great as the other. For in both the propositions, the words are
+put together according to the agreement of the ideas in our minds: and
+the agreement of the idea of animal with that of centaur is as clear and
+visable to the mind, as the agreement of the idea of animal with that of
+man; and so these two propositions are equally true, equally certain.
+But of what use is all such truth to us?
+
+
+8. Answered, Real Truth is about Ideas agreeing to things.
+
+Though what has been said in the foregoing chapter to distinguish real
+from imaginary knowledge might suffice here, in answer to this doubt,
+to distinguish real truth from chimerical, or (if you please) barely
+nominal, they depending both on the same foundation; yet it may not be
+amiss here again to consider, that though our words signify things, the
+truth they contain when put into propositions will be only verbal, when
+they stand for ideas in the mind that have not an agreement with the
+reality of things. And therefore truth as well as knowledge may well
+come under the distinction of verbal and real; that being only
+verbal truth, wherein terms are joined according to the agreement or
+disagreement of the ideas they stand for; without regarding whether our
+ideas are such as really have, or are capable of having, an existence
+in nature. But then it is they contain REAL TRUTH, when these signs are
+joined, as our ideas agree; and when our ideas are such as we know are
+capable of having an existence in nature: which in substances we cannot
+know, but by knowing that such have existed.
+
+
+9. Truth and Falsehood in general.
+
+Truth is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of
+ideas as it is. Falsehood is the marking down in words the agreement or
+disagreement of ideas otherwise than it is. And so far as these ideas,
+thus marked by sounds, agree to their archetypes, so far only is the
+truth real. The knowledge of this truth consists in knowing what ideas
+the words stand for, and the perception of the agreement or disagreement
+of those ideas, according as it is marked by those words.
+
+
+10. General Propositions to be treated of more at large.
+
+But because words are looked on as the great conduits of truth and
+knowledge, and that in conveying and receiving of truth, and commonly in
+reasoning about it, we make use of words and propositions, I shall more
+at large inquire wherein the certainty of real truths contained in
+propositions consists, and where it is to be had; and endeavour to show
+in what sort of universal propositions we are capable of being certain
+of their real truth or falsehood.
+
+I shall begin with GENERAL propositions, as those which most employ our
+thoughts, and exercise our contemplation. General truths are most looked
+after by the mind as those that most enlarge our knowledge; and by their
+comprehensiveness satisfying us at once of many particulars, enlarge our
+view, and shorten our way to knowledge.
+
+
+11. Moral and Metaphysical Truth.
+
+Besides truth taken in the strict sense before mentioned, there are
+other sorts of truths: As, 1. Moral truth, which is speaking of things
+according to the persuasion of our own minds, though the proposition we
+speak agree not to the reality of things; 2. Metaphysical truth, which
+is nothing but the real existence of things, conformable to the ideas to
+which we have annexed their names. This, though it seems to consist in
+the very beings of things, yet, when considered a little nearly, will
+appear to include a tacit proposition, whereby the mind joins that
+particular thing to the idea it had before settled with the name to
+it. But these considerations of truth, either having been before taken
+notice of, or not being much to our present purpose, it may suffice here
+only to have mentioned them.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI. OF UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS: THEIR TRUTH AND CERTAINTY.
+
+
+1. Treating of Words necessary to Knowledge.
+
+THOUGH the examining and judging of ideas by themselves, their names
+being quite laid aside, be the best and surest way to clear and distinct
+knowledge: yet, through the prevailing custom of using sounds for ideas,
+I think it is very seldom practised. Every one may observe how common it
+is for names to be made use of, instead of the ideas themselves, even
+when men think and reason within their own breasts; especially if the
+ideas be very complex, and made up of a great collection of simple ones.
+This makes the consideration of WORDS and PROPOSITIONS so necessary
+a part of the Treatise of Knowledge, that it is very hard to speak
+intelligibly of the one, without explaining the other.
+
+
+2. General Truths hardly to be understood, but in verbal Propositions.
+
+All the knowledge we have, being only of particular or general truths,
+it is evident that whatever may be done in the former of these, the
+latter, which is that which with reason is most sought after, can never
+be well made known, and is very seldom apprehended, but as conceived
+and expressed in words. It is not, therefore, out of our way, in the
+examination of our knowledge, to inquire into the truth and certainty of
+universal propositions.
+
+
+3. Certainty twofold--of Truth and of Knowledge.
+
+But that we may not be misled in this case by that which is the danger
+everywhere, I mean by the doubtfulness of terms, it is fit to observe
+that certainty is twofold: CERTAINTY OF TRUTH and CERTAINTY OF
+KNOWLEDGE. Certainty of truth is, when words are so put together in
+propositions as exactly to express the agreement or disagreement of the
+ideas they stand for, as really it is. Certainty of knowledge is to
+perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas, as expressed in any
+proposition. This we usually call knowing, or being certain of the truth
+of any proposition.
+
+
+4. No Proposition can be certainly known to be true, where the real
+Essence of each Species mentioned is not known.
+
+Now, because we cannot be certain of the truth of any general
+proposition, unless we know the precise bounds and extent of the species
+its terms stand for, it is necessary we should know the essence of each
+species, which is that which constitutes and bounds it.
+
+This, in all simple ideas and modes, is not hard to do. For in these
+the real and nominal essence being the same, or, which is all one, the
+abstract idea which the general term stands for being the sole essence
+and boundary that is or can be supposed of the species, there can be no
+doubt how far the species extends, or what things are comprehended under
+each term; which, it is evident, are all that have an exact conformity
+with the idea it stands for, and no other. But in substances, wherein
+a real essence, distinct from the nominal, is supposed to constitute,
+determine, and bound the species, the extent of the general word is very
+uncertain; because, not knowing this real essence, we cannot know what
+is, or what is not of that species; and, consequently, what may or may
+not with certainty be affirmed of it. And thus, speaking of a MAN,
+or GOLD, or any other species of natural substances, as supposed
+constituted by a precise and real essence which nature regularly imparts
+to every individual of that kind, whereby it is made to be of that
+species, we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation or
+negation made of it. For man or gold, taken in this sense, and used
+for species of things constituted by real essences, different from the
+complex idea in the mind of the speaker, stand for we know not what; and
+the extent of these species, with such boundaries, are so unknown and
+undetermined, that it is impossible with any certainty to affirm, that
+all men are rational, or that all gold is yellow. But where the nominal
+essence is kept to, as the boundary of each species, and men extend the
+application of any general term no further than to the particular things
+in which the complex idea it stands for is to be found, there they are
+in no danger to mistake the bounds of each species, nor can be in doubt,
+on this account, whether any proposition be true or not. I have chosen
+to explain this uncertainty of propositions in this scholastic way, and
+have made use of the terms of ESSENCES, and SPECIES, on purpose to show
+the absurdity and inconvenience there is to think of them as of any
+other sort of realities, than barely abstract ideas with names to them.
+To suppose that the species of things are anything but the sorting of
+them under general names, according as they agree to several abstract
+ideas of which we make those names signs, is to confound truth, and
+introduce uncertainty into all general propositions that can be made
+about them. Though therefore these things might, to people not possessed
+with scholastic learning, be treated of in a better and clearer way
+yet those wrong notions of essences or species having got root in most
+people's minds who have received any tincture from the learning which
+has prevailed in this part of the world, are to be discovered and
+removed, to make way for that use of words which should convey certainty
+with it.
+
+
+5. This more particularly concerns Substances.
+
+The names of substances, then, whenever made to stand for species which
+are supposed to be constituted by real essences which we know not, are
+not capable to convey certainty to the understanding. Of the truth
+general propositions made up of such terms we cannot be sure. [The
+reason whereof is plain: for how can we be sure that this or that
+quality is in gold, when we know not what is or is not gold? Since in
+this way of speaking, nothing is gold but what partakes of an essence,
+which we, not knowing, cannot know where it is or is not, and so cannot
+be sure that any parcel of matter in the world is or is not in this
+sense gold; being incurably ignorant whether IT has or has not that
+which makes anything to be called gold; i. e. that real essence of gold
+whereof we have no idea at all. This being as impossible for us to know
+as it is for a blind man to tell in what flower the colour of a pansy is
+or is not to be found, whilst he has no idea of the colour of a pansy at
+all. Or if we could (which is impossible) certainly know where a real
+essence, which we know not, is, v.g. in what parcels of matter the real
+essence of gold is, yet could we not be sure that this or that quality
+could with truth be affirmed of gold; since it is impossible for us to
+know that this or that quality or idea has a necessary connexion with
+a real essence of which we have no idea at all, whatever species that
+supposed real essence may be imagined to constitute.]
+
+
+6.
+
+On the other side, the names of substances, when made use of as they
+should be, for the ideas men have in their minds, though they carry a
+clear and determinate signification with them, will not yet serve us to
+make many universal propositions of whose truth we can be certain. Not
+because in this use of them we are uncertain what things are signified
+by them, but because the complex ideas they stand for are such
+combinations of simple ones as carry not with them any discoverable
+connexion or repugnancy, but with a very few other ideas.
+
+
+7.
+
+The complex ideas that our names of the species of substances properly
+stand for, are collections of such qualities as have been observed to
+co-exist in an unknown substratum, which we call substance; but what
+other qualities necessarily co-exist with such combinations, we cannot
+certainly know, unless we can discover their natural dependence; which,
+in their primary qualities, we can go but a very little way in; and in
+all their secondary qualities we can discover no connexion at all: for
+the reasons mentioned, chap. iii. Viz. 1. Because we know not the
+real constitutions of substances, on which each secondary quality
+particularly depends. 2. Did we know that, it would serve us only for
+experimental (not universal) knowledge; and reach with certainty no
+further than that bare instance: because our understandings can
+discover no conceivable connexion between any secondary quality and any
+modification whatsoever of any of the primary ones. And therefore there
+are very few general propositions to be made concerning substances,
+which can carry with them undoubted certainty.
+
+
+8. Instance in Gold.
+
+'All gold is fixed,' is a proposition whose truth we cannot be certain
+of, how universally soever it be believed. For if, according to the
+useless imagination of the Schools, any one supposes the term gold to
+stand for a species of things set out by nature, by a real essence
+belonging to it, it is evident he knows not what particular substances
+are of that species; and so cannot with certainty affirm anything
+universally of gold. But if he makes gold stand for a species determined
+by its nominal essence, let the nominal essence, for example, be the
+complex idea of a body of a certain yellow colour, malleable, fusible,
+and heavier than any other known;--in this proper use of the word gold,
+there is no difficulty to know what is or is not gold. But yet no other
+quality can with certainty be universally affirmed or denied of gold,
+but what hath a DISCOVERABLE connexion or inconsistency with that
+nominal essence. Fixedness, for example, having no necessary connexion
+that we can discover, with the colour, weight, or any other simple
+idea of our complex one, or with the whole combination together; it is
+impossible that we should certainly know the truth of this proposition,
+that all gold is fixed.
+
+
+9. No discoverable necessary connexion between nominal essence gold, and
+other simple ideas.
+
+As there is no discoverable connexion between fixedness and the colour,
+weight, and other simple ideas of that nominal essence of gold; so,
+if we make our complex idea of gold, a body yellow, fusable, ductile,
+weighty, and fixed, we shall be at the same uncertainty concerning
+solubility in AQUA REGIA, and for the same reason. Since we can never,
+from consideration of the ideas themselves, with certainty affirm or
+deny of a body whose complex idea is made up of yellow, very weighty,
+ductile, fusible, and fixed, that it is soluble in AQUA REGIA: and so
+on of the rest of its qualities. I would gladly meet with one general
+affirmation concerning any will, no doubt, be presently objected, Is not
+this an universal proposition, ALL GOLD IS MALLEABLE? To which I answer,
+It is a very complex idea the word gold stands for. But then here is
+nothing affirmed of gold, but that that sound stands for an idea in
+which malleableness is contained: and such a sort of truth and certainty
+as this it is, to say a centaur is four-footed. But if malleableness make
+not a part of the specific essence the name of gold stands for, it is
+plain, ALL GOLD IS MALLEABLE, is not a certain proposition. Because,
+let the complex idea of gold be made up of whichsoever of its other
+qualities you please, malleableness will not appear to depend on that
+complex idea, nor follow from any simple one contained in it: the
+connexion that malleableness has (if it has any) with those other
+qualities being only by the intervention of the real constitution of its
+insensible parts; which, since we know not, it is impossible we should
+perceive that connexion, unless we could discover that which ties them
+together.
+
+
+10. As far as any such Co-existence can be known, so far Universal
+Propositions maybe certain. But this will go but a little way.
+
+The more, indeed, of these co-existing qualities we unite into one
+complex idea, under one name, the more precise and determinate we make
+the signification of that word; but never yet make it thereby more
+capable of universal certainty, IN RESPECT OF OTHER QUALITIES NOT
+CONTAINED IN OUR COMPLEX IDEA: since we perceive not their connexion or
+dependence on one another; being ignorant both of that real constitution
+in which they are all founded, and also how they flow from it. For the
+chief part of our knowledge concerning substances is not, as in other
+things, barely of the relation of two ideas that may exist separately;
+but is of the necessary connexion and co-existence of several distinct
+ideas in the same subject, or of their repugnancy so to co-exist. Could
+we begin at the other end, and discover what it was wherein that colour
+consisted, what made a body lighter or heavier, what texture of parts
+made it malleable, fusible, and fixed, and fit to be dissolved in this
+sort of liquor, and not in another;--if, I say, we had such an idea
+as this of bodies, and could perceive wherein all sensible qualities
+originally consist, and how they are produced; we might frame such
+abstract ideas of them as would furnish us with matter of more general
+knowledge, and enable us to make universal propositions, that should
+carry general truth and certainty with them. But whilst our complex
+ideas of the sorts of substances are so remote from that internal real
+constitution on which their sensible qualities depend, and are made up
+of nothing but an imperfect collection of those apparent qualities our
+senses can discover, there can be few general propositions concerning
+substances of whose real truth we can be certainly assured; since there
+are but few simple ideas of whose connexion and necessary co-existence
+we can have certain and undoubted knowledge. I imagine, amongst all the
+secondary qualities of substances, and the powers relating to them,
+there cannot any two be named, whose necessary co-existence, or
+repugnance to co-exist, can certainly be known; unless in those of the
+same sense, which necessarily exclude one another, as I have elsewhere
+showed. No one, I think, by the colour that is in any body, can
+certainly know what smell, taste, sound, or tangible qualities it has,
+nor what alterations it is capable to make or receive on or from other
+bodies. The same may be said of the sound or taste, &c. Our specific
+names of substances standing for any collections of such ideas, it
+is not to be wondered that we can with them make very few general
+propositions of undoubted real certainty. But yet so far as any complex
+idea of any sort of substances contains in it any simple idea, whose
+NECESSARY co-existence with any other MAY be discovered, so far
+universal propositions may with certainty be made concerning it: v.g.
+could any one discover a necessary connexion between malleableness and
+the colour or weight of gold, or any other part of the complex idea
+signified by that name, he might make a certain universal proposition
+concerning gold in this respect; and the real truth of this proposition,
+that ALL GOLD IS MALLIABLE, would be as certain as of this, THE THREE
+ANGLES OF ALL RIGHT-LINED TRIANGLES ARE ALL EQUAL TO TWO RIGHT ONES.
+
+
+11. The Qualities which make our complex Ideas of Substances depend
+mostly on external, remote, and unperceived Causes.
+
+Had we such ideas of substances as to know what real constitutions
+produce those sensible qualities we find in them, and how those
+qualities flowed from thence, we could, by the specific ideas of
+their real essences in our own minds, more certainly find out their
+properties, and discover what qualities they had or had not, than we can
+now by our senses: and to know the properties of gold, it would be
+no more necessary that gold should exist, and that we should make
+experiments upon it, than it is necessary for the knowing the properties
+of a triangle, that a triangle should exist in any matter, the idea in
+our minds would serve for the one as well as the other. But we are so
+far from being admitted into the secrets of nature, that we scarce so
+much as ever approach the first entrance towards them. For we are wont
+to consider the substances we meet with, each of them, as an entire
+thing by itself, having all its qualities in itself, and independent of
+other things; overlooking, for the most part, the operations of those
+invisible fluids they are encompassed with, and upon whose motions and
+operations depend the greatest part of those qualities which are taken
+notice of in them, and are made by us the inherent marks of distinction
+whereby we know and denominate them. Put a piece of gold anywhere by
+itself, separate from the reach and influence of all other bodies,
+it will immediately lose all its colour and weight, and perhaps
+malleableness too; which, for aught I know, would be changed into a
+perfect friability. Water, in which to us fluidity is an essential
+quality, left to itself, would cease to be fluid. But if inanimate
+bodies owe so much of their present state to other bodies without them,
+that they would not be what they appear to us were those bodies that
+environ them removed; it is yet more so in vegetables, which are
+nourished, grow, and produce leaves, flowers, and seeds, in a constant
+succession. And if we look a little nearer into the state of animals,
+we shall find that their dependence, as to life, motion, and the
+most considerable qualities to be observed in them, is so wholly on
+extrinsical causes and qualities of other bodies that make no part of
+them, that they cannot subsist a moment without them: though yet those
+bodies on which they depend are little taken notice of, and make no part
+of the complex ideas we frame of those animals. Take the air but for a
+minute from the greatest part of living creatures, and they presently
+lose sense, life, and motion. This the necessity of breathing has forced
+into our knowledge. But how many other extrinsical and possibly very
+remote bodies do the springs of these admirable machines depend on,
+which are not vulgarly observed, or so much as thought on; and how many
+are there which the severest inquiry can never discover? The inhabitants
+of this spot of the universe, though removed so many millions of
+miles from the sun, yet depend so much on the duly tempered motion of
+particles coming from or agitated by it, that were this earth removed
+but a small part of the distance out of its present situation, and
+placed a little further or nearer that source of heat, it is more than
+probable that the greatest part of the animals in it would immediately
+perish: since we find them so often destroyed by an excess or defect of
+the sun's warmth, which an accidental position in some parts of this our
+little globe exposes them to. The qualities observed in a loadstone must
+needs have their source far beyond the confines of that body; and the
+ravage made often on several sorts of animals by invisible causes, the
+certain death (as we are told) of some of them, by barely passing
+the line, or, as it is certain of other, by being removed into a
+neighbouring country; evidently show that the concurrence and operations
+of several bodies, with which they are seldom thought to have anything
+to do, is absolutely necessary to make them be what they appear to us,
+and to preserve those qualities by which we know and distinguish them.
+We are then quite out of the way, when we think that things contain
+WITHIN THEMSELVES the qualities that appear to us in them; and we
+in vain search for that constitution within the body of a fly or an
+elephant, upon which depend those qualities and powers we observe in
+them. For which, perhaps, to understand them aright, we ought to look
+not only beyond this our earth and atmosphere, but even beyond the sun
+or remotest star our eyes have yet discovered. For how much the being
+and operation of particular substances in this our globe depends on
+causes utterly beyond our view, is impossible for us to determine. We
+see and perceive some of the motions and grosser operations of things
+here about us; but whence the streams come that keep all these curious
+machines in motion and repair, how conveyed and modified, is beyond our
+notice and apprehension: and the great parts and wheels, as I may so
+say, of this stupendous structure of the universe, may, for aught we
+know, have such a connexion and dependence in their influences and
+operations one upon another, that perhaps things in this our mansion
+would put on quite another face, and cease to be what they are, if some
+one of the stars or great bodies incomprehensibly remote from us,
+should cease to be or move as it does. This is certain: things, however
+absolute and entire they seem in themselves, are but retainers to other
+parts of nature, for that which they are most taken notice of by us.
+Their observable qualities, actions, and powers are owing to something
+without them; and there is not so complete and perfect a part that we
+know of nature, which does not owe the being it has, and the excellences
+of it, to its neighbours; and we must not confine our thoughts within
+the surface of any body, but look a great deal further, to comprehend
+perfectly those qualities that are in it.
+
+
+12. Our nominal essences of Substances furnish few universal
+propositions about them that are certain.
+
+If this be so, it is not to be wondered that we have very imperfect
+ideas of substances, and that the real essences, on which depend their
+properties and operations, are unknown to us. We cannot discover so much
+as that size, figure, and texture of their minute and active parts,
+which is really in much less the different motions and impulses made in
+and upon them by bodies from without, upon which depends, and by which
+is formed the greatest and most remarkable part of those qualities we
+observe in them, and of which our complex ideas of them are made up.
+This consideration alone is enough to put an end to all our hopes of
+ever having the ideas of their real essences; which whilst we want, the
+nominal essences we make use of instead of them will be able to
+furnish us but very sparingly with any general knowledge, or universal
+propositions capable of real certainty.
+
+
+13. Judgment of Probability concerning Substances may reach further: but
+that is not Knowledge.
+
+We are not therefore to wonder, if certainty be to be found in very few
+general propositions made concerning substances: our knowledge of their
+qualities and properties goes very seldom further than our senses reach
+and inform us. Possibly inquisitive and observing men may, by strength
+of judgment, penetrate further, and, on probabilities taken from wary
+observation, and hints well laid together, often guess right at what
+experience has not yet discovered to them. But this is but guessing
+still; it amounts only to opinion, and has not that certainty which is
+requisite to knowledge. For all general knowledge lies only in our own
+thoughts, and consists barely in the contemplation of our own abstract
+ideas. Wherever we perceive any agreement or disagreement amongst them,
+there we have general knowledge; and by putting the names of those ideas
+together accordingly in propositions, can with certainty pronounce
+general truths. But because the abstract ideas of substances, for
+which their specific names stand, whenever they have any distinct
+and determinate signification, have a discoverable connexion or
+inconsistency with but a very few other ideas, the certainty of
+universal propositions concerning substances is very narrow and scanty,
+in that part which is our principal inquiry concerning them; and there
+are scarce any of the names of substances, let the idea it is applied
+to be what it will, of which we can generally, and with certainty,
+pronounce, that it has or has not this or that other quality belonging
+to it, and constantly co-existing or inconsistent with that idea,
+wherever it is to be found.
+
+
+14. What is requisite for our Knowledge of Substances.
+
+Before we can have any tolerable knowledge of this kind, we must First
+know what changes the primary qualities of one body do regularly produce
+in the primary qualities of another, and how. Secondly, We must know
+what primary qualities of any body produce certain sensations or ideas
+in us. This is in truth no less than to know ALL the effects of matter,
+under its divers modifications of bulk, figure, cohesion of parts,
+motion and rest. Which, I think every body will allow, is utterly
+impossible to be known by us without revelation. Nor if it were revealed
+to us what sort of figure, bulk, and motion of corpuscles would produce
+in us the sensation of a yellow colour, and what sort of figure, bulk,
+and texture of parts in the superficies of any body were fit to give
+such corpuscles their due motion to produce that colour; would that be
+enough to make universal propositions with certainty, concerning the
+several sorts of them; unless we had faculties acute enough to perceive
+the precise bulk, figure, texture, and motion of bodies, in those minute
+parts, by which they operate on our senses, so that we might by those
+frame our abstract ideas of them. I have mentioned here only
+corporeal substances, whose operations seem to lie more level to our
+understandings. For as to the operations of spirits, both their thinking
+and moving of bodies, we at first sight find ourselves at a loss; though
+perhaps, when we have applied our thoughts a little nearer to the
+consideration of bodies and their operations, and examined how far our
+notions, even in these, reach with any clearness beyond sensible matter
+of fact, we shall be bound to confess that, even in these too, our
+discoveries amount to very little beyond perfect ignorance and
+incapacity.
+
+
+15. Whilst our complex Ideas of Substances contain not ideas of their
+real Constitutions, we can make but few general Propositions concerning
+them.
+
+This is evident, the abstract complex ideas of substances, for which
+their general names stand, not comprehending their real constitutions,
+can afford us very little universal certainty. Because our ideas of them
+are not made up of that on which those qualities we observe in them, and
+would inform ourselves about, do depend, or with which they have any
+certain connexion: v.g. let the ideas to which we give the name MAN be,
+as it commonly is, a body of the ordinary shape, with sense, voluntary
+motion, and reason joined to it. This being the abstract idea, and
+consequently the essence of OUR species, man, we can make but very few
+general certain propositions concerning man, standing for such an idea.
+Because, not knowing the real constitution on which sensation, power of
+motion, and reasoning, with that peculiar shape, depend, and whereby
+they are united together in the same subject, there are very few other
+qualities with which we can perceive them to have a necessary connexion:
+and therefore we cannot with certainty affirm: That all men sleep by
+intervals; That no man can be nourished by wood or stones; That all men
+will be poisoned by hemlock: because these ideas have no connexion nor
+repugnancy with this our nominal essence of man, with this abstract idea
+that name stands for. We must, in these and the like, appeal to trial in
+particular subjects, which can reach but a little way. We must content
+ourselves with probability in the rest: but can have no general
+certainty, whilst our specific idea of man contains not that real
+constitution which is the root wherein all his inseparable qualities are
+united, and from whence they flow. Whilst our idea the word MAN stands
+for is only an imperfect collection of some sensible qualities and
+powers in him, there is no discernible connexion or repugnance between
+our specific idea, and the operation of either the parts of hemlock or
+stones upon his constitution. There are animals that safely eat hemlock,
+and others that are nourished by wood and stones: but as long as we want
+ideas of those real constitutions of different sorts of animals whereon
+these and the like qualities and powers depend, we must not hope to
+reach certainty in universal propositions concerning them. Those few
+ideas only which have a discernible connexion with our nominal essence,
+or any part of it, can afford us such propositions. But these are so
+few, and of so little moment, that we may justly look on our certain
+general knowledge of substances as almost none at all.
+
+
+16. Wherein lies the general Certainty of Propositions.
+
+To conclude: general propositions, of what kind soever, are then only
+capable of certainty, when the terms used in them stand for such ideas,
+whose agreement or disagreement, as there expressed, is capable to be
+discovered by us. And we are then certain of their truth or falsehood,
+when we perceive the ideas the terms stand for to agree or not agree,
+according as they are affirmed or denied one of another. Whence we may
+take notice, that general certainty is never to be found but in
+our ideas. Whenever we go to seek it elsewhere, in experiment or
+observations without us, our knowledge goes not beyond particulars. It
+is the contemplation of our own abstract ideas that alone is able to
+afford us general knowledge.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII. OF MAXIMS
+
+
+1. Maxims or Axioms are Self-evident Propositions.
+
+THERE are a sort of propositions, which, under the name of MAXIMS and
+AXIOMS, have passed for principles of science: and because they are
+SELF-EVIDENT, have been supposed innate, without that anybody (that
+I know) ever went about to show the reason and foundation of their
+clearness or cogency. It may, however, be worth while to inquire into
+the reason of their evidence, and see whether it be peculiar to them
+alone; and also to examine how far they influence and govern our other
+knowledge.
+
+
+2. Where in that Self-evidence consists.
+
+Knowledge, as has been shown, consists in the perception of the
+agreement or disagreement of ideas. Now, where that agreement
+or disagreement is perceived immediately by itself, without the
+intervention or help of any other, there our knowledge is self-evident.
+This will appear to be so to any who will but consider any of those
+propositions which, without any proof, he assents to at first sight: for
+in all of them he will find that the reason of his assent is from that
+agreement or disagreement which the mind, by an immediate comparing
+them, finds in those ideas answering the affirmation or negation in the
+proposition.
+
+
+3. Self evidence not peculiar to received Axioms.
+
+This being so, in the next place, let us consider whether this
+self-evidence be peculiar only to those propositions which commonly pass
+under the name of maxims, and have the dignity of axioms allowed them.
+And here it is plain, that several other truths, not allowed to be
+axioms, partake equally with them in this self-evidence. This we shall
+see, if we go over these several sorts of agreement or disagreement
+of ideas which I have above mentioned, viz. identity, relation,
+co-existence, and real existence; which will discover to us, that not
+only those few propositions which have had the credit of maxims are
+self-evident, but a great many, even almost an infinite number of other
+propositions are such.
+
+
+4. As to Identity and Diversity all Propositions are equally
+self-evident.
+
+I. For, FIRST, The immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement
+of IDENTITY being founded in the mind's having distinct ideas, this
+affords us as many self-evident propositions as we have distinct ideas.
+Every one that has any knowledge at all, has, as the foundation of it,
+various and distinct ideas: and it is the first act of the mind (without
+which it can never be capable of any knowledge) to know every one of
+its ideas by itself, and distinguish it from others. Every one finds in
+himself, that he knows the ideas he has; that he knows also, when any
+one is in his understanding, and what it is; and that when more than one
+are there, he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another;
+which always being so, (it being impossible but that he should perceive
+what he perceives,) he can never be in doubt when any idea is in his
+mind, that it is there, and is that idea it is; and that two distinct
+ideas, when they are in his mind, are there, and are not one and the
+same idea. So that all such affirmations and negations are made
+without any possibility of doubt, uncertainty, or hesitation, and must
+necessarily be assented to as soon as understood; that is, as soon as we
+have in our minds [determined ideas,] which the terms in the proposition
+stand for. [And, therefore, whenever the mind with attention considers
+any proposition, so as to perceive the two ideas signified by the terms,
+and affirmed or denied one of the other to be the same or different; it
+is presently and infallibly certain of the truth of such a proposition;
+and this equally whether these propositions be in terms standing for
+more general ideas, or such as are less so: v.g. whether the general
+idea of Being be affirmed of itself, as in this proposition, 'whatsoever
+is, is'; or a more particular idea be affirmed of itself, as 'a man is a
+man'; or, 'whatsoever is white is white'; or whether the idea of being
+in general be denied of not-Being, which is the only (if I may so
+call it) idea different from it, as in this other proposition, 'it is
+impossible for the same thing to be and not to be': or any idea of any
+particular being be denied of another different from it, as 'a man is
+not a horse'; 'red is not blue.' The difference of the ideas, as soon as
+the terms are understood, makes the truth of the proposition presently
+visible, and that with an equal certainty and easiness in the less as
+well as the more general propositions; and all for the same reason, viz.
+because the mind perceives, in any ideas that it has, the same idea to
+be the same with itself; and two different ideas to be different, and
+not the same; and this it is equally certain of, whether these ideas
+be more or less general, abstract, and comprehensive.] It is not,
+therefore, alone to these two general propositions--'whatsoever is, is';
+and 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be'--that this
+sort of self-evidence belongs by any peculiar right. The perception of
+being, or not being, belongs no more to these vague ideas, signified by
+the terms WHATSOEVER, and THING, than it does to any other ideas. [These
+two general maxims, amounting to no more, in short, but this, that THE
+SAME IS THE SAME, and THE SAME IS NOT DIFFERENT, are truths known in
+more particular instances, as well as in those general maxims; and known
+also in particular instances, before these general maxims are ever
+thought on; and draw all their force from the discernment of the mind
+employed about particular ideas. There is nothing more visible than
+that] the mind, without the help of any proof, [or reflection on either
+of these general propositions,] perceives so clearly, and knows so
+certainly, that the idea of white is the idea of white, and not the idea
+of blue; and that the idea of white, when it is in the mind, is there,
+and is not absent; [that the consideration of these axioms can add
+nothing to the evidence or certainty of its knowledge.] [Just so it is
+(as every one may experiment in himself) in all the ideas a man has in
+his mind: he knows each to be itself, and not to be another; and to be
+in his mind, and not away when it is there, with a certainty that cannot
+be greater; and, therefore, the truth of no general proposition can be
+known with a greater certainty, nor add anything to this.] So that,
+in respect of identity, our intuitive knowledge reaches as far as our
+ideas. And we are capable of making as many self-evident propositions,
+as we have names for distinct ideas. And I appeal to every one's own
+mind, whether this proposition, 'a circle is a circle,' be not as
+self-evident a proposition as that consisting of more general terms,
+'whatsoever is, is'; and again, whether this proposition, 'blue is not
+red,' be not a proposition that the mind can no more doubt of, as
+soon as it understands the words, than it does of that axiom, 'it is
+impossible for the same thing to be and not to be?' And so of all the
+like.
+
+
+5. In Co-existance we have few self-evident Propositions.
+
+II. SECONDLY, as to CO-EXISTANCE, or such a necessary connexion between
+two ideas that, in the subject where one of them is supposed, there the
+other must necessarily be also: of such agreement or disagreement as
+this, the mind has an immediate perception but in very few of them. And
+therefore in this sort we have but very little intuitive knowledge: nor
+are there to be found very many propositions that are self-evident,
+though some there are: v.g. the idea of filling a place equal to the
+contents of its superficies, being annexed to our idea of body, I think
+it is a self-evident proposition, that two bodies cannot be in the same
+place.
+
+
+6. III. In other Relations we may have many.
+
+THIRDLY, As to the RELATIONS OF MODES, mathematicians have framed many
+axioms concerning that one relation of equality. As, 'equals taken from
+equals, the remainder will be equal'; which, with the rest of that kind,
+however they are received for maxims by the mathematicians, and are
+unquestionable truths, yet, I think, that any one who considers them
+will not find that they have a clearer self-evidence than these,--that
+'one and one are equal to two', that 'if you take from the five fingers
+of one hand two, and from the five fingers of the other hand two,
+the remaining numbers will be equal.' These and a thousand other such
+propositions may be found in numbers, which, at the very first hearing,
+force the assent, and carry with them an equal if not greater clearness,
+than those mathematical axioms.
+
+
+7. IV. Concerning real Existence, we have none.
+
+FOURTHLY, as to REAL EXISTANCE, since that has no connexion with any
+other of our ideas, but that of ourselves, and of a First Being, we have
+in that, concerning the real existence of all other beings, not so much
+as demonstrative, much less a self-evident knowledge: and, therefore,
+concerning those, there are no maxims.
+
+
+8. These Axioms do not much influence our other Knowledge.
+
+In the next place let us consider, what influence these received maxims
+have upon the other parts of our knowledge. The rules established in the
+schools, that all reasonings are EX PRAECOGNITIS ET PRAECONCESSIS, seem
+to lay the foundation of all other knowledge in these maxims, and to
+suppose them to be PRAECOGNITA. Whereby, I think, are meant these two
+things: first, that these axioms are those truths that are first known
+to the mind; and, secondly, that upon them the other parts of our
+knowledge depend.
+
+
+9. Because Maxims or Axioms are not the Truths we first knew.
+
+FIRST, That they are not the truths first known to the mind is evident
+to experience, as we have shown in another place. (Book I. chap, 1.) Who
+perceives not that a child certainly knows that a stranger is not its
+mother; that its sucking-bottle is not the rod, long before he knows
+that 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be?' And how
+many truths are there about numbers, which it is obvious to observe that
+the mind is perfectly acquainted with, and fully convinced of, before it
+ever thought on these general maxims, to which mathematicians, in their
+arguings, do sometimes refer them? Whereof the reason is very plain: for
+that which makes the mind assent to such propositions, being nothing
+else but the perception it has of the agreement or disagreement of its
+ideas, according as it finds them affirmed or denied one of another in
+words it understands; and every idea being known to be what it is,
+and every two distinct ideas being known not to be the same; it must
+necessarily follow that such self-evident truths must be first known
+which consist of ideas that are first in the mind. And the ideas first
+in the mind, it is evident, are those of particular things, from whence
+by slow degrees, the understanding proceeds to some few general ones;
+which being taken from the ordinary and familiar objects of sense, are
+settled in the mind, with general names to them. Thus PARTICULAR IDEAS
+are first received and distinguished, and so knowledge got about them;
+and next to them, the less general or specific, which are next to
+particular. For abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children,
+or the yet unexercised mind, as particular ones. If they seem so to
+grown men, it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made
+so. For, when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that GENERAL
+IDEAS are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty
+with them and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to
+imagine. For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form
+the general idea of a triangle,(which is yet none of the more abstract,
+comprehensive, and difficult,) for it must be neither oblique nor
+rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalinon; but all and
+none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot
+exist; an idea wherein some part of several different and inconsistant
+ideas are put together. It is true, the mind, in this imperfect state,
+has need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the
+conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge; to both which
+it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect
+such ideas are marks of our imperfection; at least, this is enough to
+show that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the
+mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest
+knowledge is conversant about.
+
+
+10. Because on perception of them the other Parts of our Knowledge do
+not depend.
+
+Secondly, from what has been said it plainly follows, that these
+magnified maxims are not the principles and foundations of all our other
+knowledge. For if there be a great many other truths, which have as much
+self-evidence as they, and a great many that we know before them, it is
+impossible they should be the principles from which we deduce all other
+truths. Is it impossible to know that one and two are equal to three,
+but by virtue of this, or some such axiom, viz. 'the whole is equal to
+all its parts taken together?' Many a one knows that one and two are
+equal to three, without having heard, or thought on, that or any other
+axiom by which it might be proved; and knows it as certainly as any
+other man knows, that 'the whole is equal to all its parts,' or any
+other maxim; and all from the same reason of self-evidence: the equality
+of those ideas being as visible and certain to him without that or any
+other axiom as with it, it needing no proof to make it perceived. Nor
+after the knowledge, that the whole is equal to all its parts, does he
+know that one and two are equal to three, better or more certainly than
+he did before. For if there be any odds in those ideas, the whole and
+parts are more obscure, or at least more difficult to be settled in the
+mind than those of one, two, and three. And indeed, I think, I may ask
+these men, who will needs have all knowledge, besides those general
+principles themselves, to depend on general, innate, and self-evident
+principles. What principle is requisite to prove that one and one are
+two, that two and two are four, that three times two are six? Which
+being known without any proof, do evince, That either all knowledge does
+not depend on certain PRAECOGNITA or general maxims, called principles;
+or else that these are principles: and if these are to be counted
+principles, a great part of numeration will be so. To which, if we
+add all the self-evident propositions which may be made about all
+our distinct ideas, principles will be almost infinite, at least
+innumerable, which men arrive to the knowledge of, at different ages;
+and a great many of these innate principles they never come to know all
+their lives. But whether they come in view of the mind earlier or later,
+this is true of them, that they are all known by their native evidence;
+are wholly independent; receive no light, nor are capable of any proof
+one from another; much less the more particular from the more general,
+or the more simple from the more compounded; the more simple and
+less abstract being the most familiar, and the easier and earlier
+apprehended. But whichever be the clearest ideas, the evidence and
+certainty of all such propositions is in this, That a man sees the same
+idea to be the same idea, and infallibly perceives two different ideas
+to be different ideas. For when a man has in his understanding the ideas
+of one and of two, the idea of yellow, and the idea of blue, he cannot
+but certainly know that the idea of one is the idea of one, and not the
+idea of two; and that the idea of yellow is the idea of yellow, and not
+the idea of blue. For a man cannot confound the ideas in his mind, which
+he has distinct: that would be to have them confused and distinct at the
+same time, which is a contradiction: and to have none distinct, is
+to have no use of our faculties, to have no knowledge at all. And,
+therefore, what idea soever is affirmed of itself, or whatsoever two
+entire distinct ideas are denied one of another, the mind cannot
+but assent to such a proposition as infallibly true, as soon as it
+understands the terms, without hesitation or need of proof, or regarding
+those made in more general terms and called maxims.
+
+
+11. What use these general Maxims or Axioms have.
+
+[What shall we then say? Are these general maxims of no use? By no
+means; though perhaps their use is not that which it is commonly taken
+to be. But, since doubting in the least of what hath been by some
+men ascribed to these maxims may be apt to be cried out against, as
+overturning the foundations of all the sciences; it may be worth while
+to consider them with respect to other parts of our knowledge, and
+examine more particularly to what purposes they serve, and to what not.
+
+{Of no use to prove less general propositions, nor as foundations on
+consideration of which any science has been built.}
+
+(1) It is evident from what has been already said, that they are of no
+use to prove or confirm less general self-evident propositions. (2) It
+is as plain that they are not, nor have been the foundations whereon
+any science hath been built. There is, I know, a great deal of talk,
+propagated from scholastic men, of sciences and the maxims on which
+they are built: but it has been my ill-luck never to meet with any such
+sciences; much less any one built upon these two maxims, WHAT IS, IS;
+and IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO BE. And I would
+be glad to be shown where any such science, erected upon these or any
+other general axioms is to be found: and should be obliged to any one
+who would lay before me the frame and system of any science so built on
+these or any such like maxims, that could not be shown to stand as firm
+without any consideration of them. I ask, Whether these general maxims
+have not the same use in the study of divinity, and in theological
+questions, that they have in other sciences? They serve here, too, to
+silence wranglers, and put an end to dispute. But I think that nobody
+will therefore say, that the Christian religion is built upon these
+maxims, or that the knowledge we have of it is derived from these
+principles. It is from revelation we have received it, and without
+revelation these maxims had never been able to help us to it. When we
+find out an idea by whose intervention we discover the connexion of two
+others, this is a revelation from God to us by the voice of reason:
+for we then come to know a truth that we did not know before. When God
+declares any truth to us, this is a revelation to us by the voice of his
+Spirit, and we are advanced in our knowledge. But in neither of these
+do we receive our light or knowledge from maxims. But in the one, the
+things themselves afford it: and we see the truth in them by perceiving
+their agreement or disagreement. In the other, God himself affords it
+immediately to us: and we see the truth of what he says in his unerring
+veracity.
+
+(3) Nor as helps in the discovery of yet unknown truths.
+
+They are not of use to help men forward in the advancement of sciences,
+or new discoveries of yet unknown truths. Mr. Newton, in his never
+enough to be admired book, has demonstrated several propositions, which
+are so many new truths, before unknown to the world, and are further
+advances in mathematical knowledge: but, for the discovery of these, it
+was not the general maxims, 'what is, is;' or, 'the whole is bigger than
+a part,' or the like, that helped him. These were not the clues that led
+him into the discovery of the truth and certainty of those propositions.
+Nor was it by them that he got the knowledge of those demonstrations,
+but by finding out intermediate ideas that showed the agreement
+or disagreement of the ideas, as expressed in the propositions he
+demonstrated. This is the greatest exercise and improvement of human
+understanding in the enlarging of knowledge, and advancing the
+sciences; wherein they are far enough from receiving any help from the
+contemplation of these or the like magnified maxims. Would those who
+have this traditional admiration of these propositions, that they think
+no step can be made in knowledge without the support of an axiom, no
+stone laid in the building of the sciences without a general maxim,
+but distinguish between the method of acquiring knowledge, and of
+communicating it; between the method of raising any science, and that
+of teaching it to others, as far as it is advanced--they would see
+that those general maxims were not the foundations on which the first
+discoverers raised their admirable structures, nor the keys that
+unlocked and opened those secrets of knowledge. Though afterwards, when
+schools were erected, and sciences had their professors to teach what
+others had found out, they often made use of maxims, i.e. laid down
+certain propositions which were self-evident, or to be received
+for true; which being settled in the minds of their scholars as
+unquestionable verities, they on occasion made use of, to convince them
+of truths in particular instances, that were not so familiar to their
+minds as those general axioms which had before been inculcated to them,
+and carefully settled in their minds. Though these particular instances,
+when well reflected on, are no less self-evident to the understanding
+than the general maxims brought to confirm them: and it was in those
+particular instances that the first discoverer found the truth, without
+the help of the general maxims: and so may any one else do, who with
+attention considers them.
+
+{Maxims of use in the exposition of what has been discovered, and in
+silencing obstinate wranglers.}
+
+To come, therefore, to the use that is made of maxims. (1) They are of
+use, as has been observed, in the ordinary methods of teaching sciences
+as far as they are advanced: but of little or none in advancing them
+further. (2) They are of use in disputes, for the silencing of obstinate
+wranglers, and bringing those contests to some conclusion. Whether a
+need of them to that end came not in the manner following, I crave leave
+to inquire. The Schools having made disputation the touchstone of men's
+abilities, and the criterion of knowledge, adjudged victory to him that
+kept the field: and he that had the last word was concluded to have the
+better of the argument, if not of the cause. But because by this means
+there was like to be no decision between skilful combatants, whilst one
+never failed of a MEDIUS TERMINUS to prove any proposition; and the
+other could as constantly, without or with a distinction, deny the major
+or minor; to prevent, as much as could be, running out of disputes into
+an endless train of syllogisms, certain general propositions--most of
+them, indeed, self-evident--were introduced into the Schools: which
+being such as all men allowed and agreed in, were looked on as general
+measures of truth, and served instead of principles (where the
+disputants had not lain down any other between them) beyond which there
+was no going, and which must not be receded from by either side. And
+thus these maxims, getting the name of principles, beyond which men in
+dispute could not retreat, were by mistake taken to be the originals and
+sources from whence all knowledge began, and the foundations whereon the
+sciences were built. Because when in their disputes they came to any
+of these, they stopped there, and went no further; the matter was
+determined. But how much this is a mistake, hath been already shown.
+
+
+{How Maxims came to be so much in vogue.}
+
+This method of the Schools, which have been thought the fountains of
+knowledge, introduced, as I suppose, the like use of these maxims into
+a great part of conversation out of the Schools, to stop the mouths of
+cavillers, whom any one is excused from arguing any longer with,
+when they deny these general self-evident principles received by all
+reasonable men who have once thought of them: but yet their use herein
+is but to put an end to wrangling. They in truth, when urged in such
+cases, teach nothing: that is already done by the intermediate ideas
+made use of in the debate, whose connexion may be seen without the help
+of those maxims, and so the truth known before the maxim is produced,
+and the argument brought to a first principle. Men would give off
+a wrong argument before it came to that, if in their disputes they
+proposed to themselves the finding and embracing of truth, and not a
+contest for victory. And thus maxims have their use to put a stop to
+their perverseness, whose ingenuity should have yielded sooner. But the
+method of the Schools having allowed and encouraged men to oppose and
+resist evident truth till they are baffled, i.e. till they are reduced
+to contradict themselves, or some established principles: it is no
+wonder that they should not in civil conversation be ashamed of that
+which in the Schools is counted a virtue and a glory, viz. obstinately
+to maintain that side of the question they have chosen, whether true or
+false, to the last extremity; even after conviction. A strange way to
+attain truth and knowledge: and that which I think the rational part of
+mankind, not corrupted by education, could scare believe should ever
+be admitted amongst the lovers of truth, and students of religion or
+nature, or introduced into the seminaries of those who are to propegate
+the truths of religion or philosophy amongst the ignorant and
+unconvinced. How much such a way of learning is like to turn young men's
+minds from the sincere search and love of truth; nay, and to make them
+doubt whether there is any such thing, or, at least, worth the adhering
+to, I shall not now inquire. This I think, that, bating those places,
+which brought the Peripatetic Philosophy into their schools, where it
+continued many ages, without teaching the world anything but the art of
+wrangling, these maxims were nowhere thought the foundations on which
+the sciences were built, nor the great helps to the advancement of
+knowledge.]
+
+
+{Of great use to stop wranglers in disputes, but of little use to the
+discovery of truths.}
+
+As to these general maxims, therefore, they are, as I have said, of
+great use in disputes, to stop the mouths of wranglers; but not of much
+use to the discovery of unknown truths, or to help the mind forwards in
+its search after knowledge. For who ever began to build his knowledge on
+this general proposition, WHAT IS, IS; or, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME
+THING TO BE AND NOT TO BE: and from either of these, as from a principle
+of science, deduced a system of useful knowledge? Wrong opinions often
+involving contradictions, one of these maxims, as a touchstone, may
+serve well to show whither they lead. But yet, however fit to lay open
+the absurdity or mistake of a man's reasoning or opinion, they are of
+very little use for enlightening the understanding: and it will not be
+found that the mind receives much help from them in its progress in
+knowledge; which would be neither less, nor less certain, were these two
+general propositions never thought on. It is true, as I have said, they
+sometimes serve in argumentation to stop a wrangler's mouth, by showing
+the absurdity of what he saith, [and by exposing him to the shame of
+contradicting what all the world knows, and he himself cannot but own to
+be true.] But it is one thing to show a man that he is in an error, and
+another to put him in possession of truth, and I would fain know what
+truths these two propositions are able to teach, and by their influence
+make us know which we did not know before, or could not know without
+them. Let us reason from them as well as we can, they are only about
+identical predications, and influence, if any at all, none but such.
+Each particular proposition concerning identity or diversity is as
+clearly and certainly known in itself, if attended to, as either of
+these general ones: [only these general ones, as serving in all cases,
+are therefore more inculcated and insisted on.] As to other less general
+maxims, many of them are no more than bare verbal propositions, and
+teach us nothing but the respect and import of names one to another.
+'The whole is equal to all its parts:' what real truth, I beseech you,
+does it teach us? What more is contained in that maxim, than what the
+signification of the word TOTUM, or the WHOLE, does of itself import?
+And he that knows that the WORD whole stands for what is made up of all
+its parts, knows very little less than that the whole is equal to all
+its parts. And, upon the same ground, I think that this proposition, 'A
+hill is higher than a valley', and several the like, may also pass for
+maxims. But yet [masters of mathematics, when they would, as teachers of
+what they know, initiate others in that science do not] without reason
+place this and some other such maxims [at the entrance of their
+systems]; that their scholars, having in the beginning perfectly
+acquainted their thoughts with these propositions, made in such general
+terms, may be used to make such reflections, and have these more general
+propositions, as formed rules and sayings, ready to apply to all
+particular cases. Not that if they be equally weighed, they are more
+clear and evident than the particular instances they are brought to
+confirm; but that, being more familiar to the mind, the very naming them
+is enough to satisfy the understanding. But this, I say, is more from
+our custom of using them, and the establishment they have got in our
+minds by our often thinking of them, than from the different evidence
+of the things. But before custom has settled methods of thinking and
+reasoning in our minds, I am apt to imagine it is quite otherwise; and
+that the child, when a part of his apple is taken away, knows it better
+in that particular instance, than by this general proposition, 'The
+whole is equal to all its parts;' and that, if one of these have need to
+be confirmed to him by the other, the general has more need to be let
+into his mind by the particular, than the particular by the general.
+For in _particulars_ our knowledge begins, and so spreads itself, by
+degrees, to _generals_ [Footnote: This is the order in time of the
+conscious acquistion of knowledge that is human. The _Essay_ might be
+regarded as a commentary on this one sentence. Our intellectual progress
+is from particulars and involuntary recipiency, through reactive doubt
+and criticism, into what is at last reasoned faith.]. Though afterwards
+the mind takes the quite contrary course, and having drawn its knowledge
+into as general propositions as it can, makes those familiar to its
+thoughts, and accustoms itself to have recourse to them, as to the
+standards of truth and falsehood. [Footnote: This is the philosophic
+attitude. Therein one consciously apprehends the intellectual
+necessities that were UNCONCIOUSLY PRESUPPOSED, its previous
+intellectual progress. In philosophy we 'draw our knowledge into as
+general propositions as it can' be made to assume, and thus either learn
+to see it as an organic while in a speculative unity, or learn that it
+cannot be so seen in a finite intelligence, and that even at the last
+it must remain 'broken' and mysterious in the human understanding. ]
+By which familiar use of them, as rules to measure the truth of other
+propositions, it comes in time to be thought, that more particular
+propositions have their truth and evidence from their conformity to
+these more general ones, which, in discourse and argumentation, are so
+frequently urged, and constantly admitted. And this I think to be the
+reason why, amongst so many self-evident propositions, the MOST
+GENERAL ONLY have had the title of MAXIMS.
+
+
+12. Maxims, if care be not taken in the Use of Words, may prove
+Contradictions.
+
+One thing further, I think, it may not be amiss to observe concerning
+these general maxims, That they are so far from improving or
+establishing our minds in true knowledge that if our notions be wrong,
+loose, or unsteady, and we resign up our thoughts to the sound of words,
+rather than [fix them on settled, determined] ideas of things; I say
+these general maxims will serve to confirm us in mistakes; and in such
+a way of use of words, which is most common, will serve to prove
+contradictions: v.g. he that with Descartes shall frame in his mind
+an idea of what he calls body to be nothing but extension, may easily
+demonstrate that there is no vacuum, i.e. no space void of body, by this
+maxim, WHAT IS, IS. For the idea to which he annexes the name body,
+being bare extension, his knowledge that space cannot be without
+body, is certain. For he knows his own idea of extension clearly and
+distinctly, and knows that it is what it is, and not another idea,
+though it be called by these three names,--extension, body, space. Which
+three words, standing for one and the same idea, may, no doubt, with
+the same evidence and certainty be affirmed one of another, as each of
+itself: and it is as certain, that, whilst I use them all to stand for
+one and the same idea, this predication is as true and identical in its
+signification, that 'space is body,' as this predication is true and
+identical, that 'body is body,' both in signification and sound.
+
+
+13. Instance in Vacuum.
+
+But if another should come and make to himself another idea, different
+from Descartes's, of the thing, which yet with Descartes he calls by the
+same name body, and make his idea, which he expresses by the word body,
+to be of a thing that hath both extension and solidity together; he will
+as easily demonstrate, that there may be a vacuum or space without a
+body, as Descartes demonstrated the contrary. Because the idea to which
+he gives the name space being barely the simple one of extension, and
+the idea to which he gives the name body being the complex idea of
+extension and resistibility or solidity, together in the same
+subject, these two ideas are not exactly one and the same, but in the
+understanding as distinct as the ideas of one and two, white and black,
+or as of CORPOREITY and HUMANITY, if I may use those barbarous terms:
+and therefore the predication of them in our minds, or in words standing
+for them, is not identical, but the negation of them one of another;
+[viz. this proposition: 'Extension or space is not body,' is] as true
+and evidently certain as this maxim, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING
+TO BE AND NOT TO BE, [can make any proposition.]
+
+
+14. But they prove not the Existance of things without us.
+
+But yet, though both these propositions (as you see) may be equally
+demonstrated, viz. that there may be a vacuum, and that there cannot be
+a vacuum, by these two certain principles, viz. WHAT IS, IS, and THE
+SAME THING CANNOT BE AND NOT BE: yet neither of these principles will
+serve to prove to us, that any, or what bodies do exist: for that we are
+left to our senses to discover to us as far as they can. Those universal
+and self-evident principles being only our constant, clear, and distinct
+knowledge of our own ideas, more general or comprehensive, can assure us
+of nothing that passes without the mind: their certainty is founded
+only upon the knowledge we have of each idea by itself, and of its
+distinction from others, about which we cannot be mistaken whilst they
+are in our minds; though we may be and often are mistaken when we retain
+the names without the ideas; or use them confusedly, sometimes for
+one and sometimes for another idea. In which cases the force of these
+axioms, reaching only to the sound, and not the signification of the
+words, serves only to lead us into confusion, mistake, and error. [It is
+to show men that these maxims, however cried up for the great guards of
+truth, will not secure them from error in a careless loose use of their
+words, that I have made this remark. In all that is here suggested
+concerning their little use for the improvement of knowledge, or
+dangerous use in undetermined ideas, I have been far enough from saying
+or intending they should be laid aside; as some have been too forward
+to charge me. I affirm them to be truths, self-evident truths; and so
+cannot be laid aside. As far as their influence will reach, it is in
+vain to endeavour, nor will I attempt, to abridge it. But yet, without
+any injury to truth or knowledge, I may have reason to think their use
+is not answerable to the great stress which seems to be laid on them;
+and I may warn men not to make an ill use of them, for the confirming
+themselves in errors.]
+
+
+15. They cannot add to our knowledge of Substances, and their
+Application to complex Ideas is dangerous.
+
+But let them be of what use they will in verbal propositions, they
+cannot discover or prove to us the least knowledge of the nature of
+substances, as they are found and exist without us, any further than
+grounded on experience. And though the consequence of these two
+propositions, called principles, be very clear, and their use not
+dangerous or hurtful, in the probation of such things wherein there is
+no need at all of them for proof, but such as are clear by themselves
+without them, viz. where our ideas are [determined] and known by the
+names that stand for them: yet when these principles, viz. WHAT IS, IS,
+and IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO BE, are made
+use of in the probation of propositions wherein are words standing for
+complex ideas, v.g. man, horse, gold, virtue; there they are of infinite
+danger, and most commonly make men receive and retain falsehood for
+manifest truth, and uncertainty for demonstration: upon which follow
+error, obstinacy, and all the mischiefs that can happen from wrong
+reasoning. The reason whereof is not, that these principles are less
+true [or of less force] in proving propositions made of terms standing
+for complex ideas, than where the propositions are about simple ideas.
+[But because men mistake generally,--thinking that where the same terms
+are preserved, the propositions are about the same things, though the
+ideas they stand for are in truth different, therefore these maxims
+are made use of to support those which in sound and appearance are
+contradictory propositions; and is clear in the demonstrations above
+mentioned about a vacuum. So that whilst men take words for things,
+as usually they do, these maxims may and do commonly serve to prove
+contradictory propositions; as shall yet be further made manifest]
+
+
+16. Instance in demonstrations about Man which can only be verbal.
+
+For instance: let MAN be that concerning which you would by these first
+principles demonstrate anything, and we shall see, that so far as
+demonstration is by these principles, it is only verbal, and gives us
+no certain, universal, true proposition, or knowledge, of any being
+existing without us. First, a child having framed the idea of a man, it
+is probable that his idea is just like that picture which the
+painter makes of the visible appearances joined together; and such a
+complication of ideas together in his understanding makes up the single
+complex idea which he calls man, whereof white or flesh-colour in
+England being one, the child can demonstrate to you that a negro is not
+a man, because white colour was one of the constant simple ideas of the
+complex idea he calls man; and therefore he can demonstrate, by the
+principle, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO BE, that
+a negro is NOT a man; the foundation of his certainty being not that
+universal proposition, which perhaps he never heard nor thought of, but
+the clear, distinct perception he hath of his own simple ideas of black
+and white, which he cannot be persuaded to take, nor can ever mistake
+one for another, whether he knows that maxim or no. And to this child,
+or any one who hath such an idea, which he calls man, can you never
+demonstrate that a man hath a soul, because his idea of man includes no
+such notion or idea in it. And therefore, to him, the principle of WHAT
+IS, IS, proves not this matter; but it depends upon collection and
+observation, by which he is to make his complex idea called man.
+
+
+17. Another instance.
+
+Secondly, Another that hath gone further in framing and collecting the
+idea he calls MAN, and to the outward shape adds laughter and rational
+discourse, may demonstrate that infants and changelings are no men, by
+this maxim, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO BE; and
+I have discoursed with very rational men, who have actually denied that
+they are men.
+
+
+18. A third instance.
+
+Thirdly, Perhaps another makes up the complex idea which he calls MAN,
+only out of the ideas of body in general, and the powers of language and
+reason, and leaves out the shape wholly: this man is able to demonstrate
+that a man may have no hands, but be QUADRUPES, neither of those being
+included in his idea of man: and in whatever body or shape he found
+speech and reason joined, that was a man; because, having a clear
+knowledge of such a complex idea, it is certain that WHAT IS, IS.
+
+
+19. Little use of these Maxims in Proofs where we have clear and
+distinct Ideas.
+
+So that, if rightly considered, I think we may say, That where our ideas
+are determined in our minds, and have annexed to them by us known and
+steady names under those settled determinations, there is little need,
+or no use at all of these maxims, to prove the agreement or disagreement
+of any of them. He that cannot discern the truth or falsehood of such
+propositions, without the help of these and the like maxims, will not be
+helped by these maxims to do it: since he cannot be supposed to know the
+truth of these maxims themselves without proof, if he cannot know the
+truth of others without proof, which are as self-evident as these. Upon
+this ground it is that intuitive knowledge neither requires nor admits
+any proof, one part of it more than another. He that will suppose it
+does, takes away the foundation of all knowledge and certainty; and he
+that needs any proof to make him certain, and give his assent to this
+proposition, that two are equal to two, will also have need of a proof
+to make him admit, that what is, is. He that needs a probation to
+convince him that two are not three, that white is not black, that a
+triangle is not a circle, &c., or any other two [determined] distinct
+ideas are not one and the same, will need also a demonstration to
+convince him that IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO
+BE.
+
+
+20. Their Use dangerous where our Ideas are not determined
+
+And as these maxims are of little use where we have determined ideas, so
+they are, as I have showed, of dangerous use where [our ideas are not
+determined; and where] we use words that are not annexed to determined
+ideas, but such as are of a loose and wandering signification, sometimes
+standing for one, and sometimes for another idea: from which follow
+mistake and error, which these maxims (brought as proofs to establish
+propositions, wherein the terms stand for undetermined ideas) do by
+their authority confirm and rivet.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII. OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS.
+
+
+1. Some Propositions bring no Increase to our Knowledge.
+
+WHETHER the maxims treated of in the foregoing chapter be of that use to
+real knowledge as is generally supposed, I leave to be considered.
+This, I think, may confidently be affirmed, That there ARE universal
+propositions, which, though they be certainly true, yet they add no
+light to our understanding; bring no increase to our knowledge. Such
+are--
+
+
+2. As, First, identical Propositions.
+
+First, All purely IDENTICAL PROPOSITIONS. These obviously and at first
+blush appear to contain no instruction in them; for when we affirm the
+said term of itself, whether it be barely verbal, or whether it contains
+any clear and real idea, it shows us nothing but what we must certainly
+know before, whether such a proposition be either made by, or proposed
+to us. Indeed, that most general one, WHAT IS, IS, may serve sometimes
+to show a man the absurdity he is guilty of, when, by circumlocution or
+equivocal terms, he would in particular instances deny the same thing of
+itself; because nobody will so openly bid defiance to common sense, as
+to affirm visible and direct contradictions in plain words; or, if he
+does, a man is excused if he breaks off any further discourse with him.
+But yet I think I may say, that neither that received maxim, nor any
+other identical proposition, teaches us anything; and though in such
+kind of propositions this great and magnified maxim, boasted to be the
+foundation of demonstration, may be and often is made use of to confirm
+them, yet all it proves amounts to no more than this, That the same word
+may with great certainty be affirmed of itself, without any doubt of the
+truth of any such proposition; and let me add, also, without any real
+knowledge.
+
+
+3. Examples.
+
+For, at this rate, any very ignorant person, who can but make a
+proposition, and knows what he means when he says ay or no, may make a
+million of propositions of whose truth he may be infallibly certain, and
+yet not know one thing in the world thereby; v.g. 'what is a soul, is a
+soul;' or, 'a soul is a soul;' 'a spirit is a spirit;' 'a fetiche is a
+fetiche,' &c. These all being equivalent to this proposition, viz. WHAT
+IS, IS; i.e. what hath existence, hath existence; or, who hath a soul,
+hath a soul. What is this more than trifling with words? It is but like
+a monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other: and had he but
+words, might no doubt have said, 'Oyster in right hand is subject, and
+oyster in left hand is predicate:' and so might have made a self-evident
+proposition of oyster, i.e. oyster is oyster; and yet, with all this,
+not have been one whit the wiser or more knowing: and that way of
+handling the matter would much at one have satisfied the monkey's
+hunger, or a man's understanding, and they would have improved in
+knowledge and bulk together.
+
+
+4. Secondly, Propositions in which a part of any complex Idea is
+predicated of the Whole.
+
+II. Another sort of trifling propositions is, WHEN A PART OF THE
+COMPLEX IDEA IS PREDICATED OF THE NAME OF THE WHOLE; a part of the
+definition of the word defined. Such are all propositions wherein the
+genus is predicated of the species, or more comprehensive of less
+comprehensive terms. For what information, what knowledge, carries this
+proposition in it, viz. 'Lead is a metal' to a man who knows the complex
+idea the name lead stands for? All the simple ideas that go to the
+complex one signified by the term metal, being nothing but what he
+before comprehended and signified by the name lead. Indeed, to a man
+that knows the signification of the word metal, and not of the word
+lead, it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word lead,
+by saying it is a metal, which at once expresses several of its simple
+ideas, than to enumerate them one by one, telling him it is a body very
+heavy, fusible, and malleable.
+
+
+5. As part of the Definition of the Term Defined.
+
+Alike trifling it is to predicate any other part of the definition of
+the term defined, or to affirm anyone of the simple ideas of a complex
+one of the name of the whole complex idea; as, 'All gold is fusible.'
+For fusibility being one of the simple ideas that goes to the making up
+the complex one the sound gold stands for, what can it be but playing
+with sounds, to affirm that of the name gold, which is comprehended
+in its received signification? It would be thought little better than
+ridiculous to affirm gravely, as a truth of moment, that gold is yellow;
+and I see not how it is any jot more material to say it is fusible,
+unless that quality be left out of the complex idea, of which the sound
+gold is the mark in ordinary speech. What instruction can it carry with
+it, to tell one that which he hath been told already, or he is supposed
+to know before? For I am supposed to know the signification of the word
+another uses to me, or else he is to tell me. And if I know that the
+name gold stands for this complex idea of body, yellow, heavy, fusible,
+malleable, it will not much instruct me to put it solemnly afterwards in
+a proposition, and gravely say, all gold is fusible. Such propositions
+can only serve to show the disingenuity of one who will go from the
+definition of his own terms, by reminding him sometimes of it; but carry
+no knowledge with them, but of the signification of words, however
+certain they be.
+
+
+6. Instance, Man and Palfrey.
+
+'Every man is an animal, or living body,' is as certain a proposition as
+can be; but no more conducing to the knowledge of things than to say, a
+palfrey is an ambling horse, or a neighing, ambling animal, both being
+only about the signification of words, and make me know but this--That
+body, sense, and motion, or power of sensation and moving, are three of
+those ideas that I always comprehend and signify by the word man: and
+where they are not to be found together, the NAME MAN belongs not to
+that thing: and so of the other--That body, sense, and a certain way of
+going, with a certain kind of voice, are some of those ideas which I
+always comprehend and signify by the WORD PALFREY; and when they are not
+to be found together, the name palfrey belongs not to that thing. It is
+just the same, and to the same purpose, when any term standing for any
+one or more of the simple ideas, that altogether make up that complex
+idea which is called man, is affirmed of the term man:--v.g. suppose a
+Roman signified by the word HOMO all these distinct ideas united in one
+subject, CORPORIETAS, SENSIBILITAS, POTENTIA SE MOVENDI, RATIONALITAS,
+RISIBILITAS; he might, no doubt, with great certainty, universally
+affirm one, more, or all of these together of the word HOMO, but did no
+more than say that the word HOMO, in his country, comprehended in its
+signification all these ideas. Much like a romance knight, who by
+the word PALFREY signified these ideas:--body of a certain figure,
+four-legged, with sense, motion, ambling, neighing, white, used to have
+a woman on his back--might with the same certainty universally affirm
+also any or all of these of the WORD palfrey: but did thereby teach no
+more, but that the word palfrey, in his or romance language, stood for
+all these, and was not to be applied to anything where any of these was
+wanting But he that shall tell me, that in whatever thing sense, motion,
+reason, and laughter, were united, that thing had actually a notion of
+God, or would be cast into a sleep by opium, made indeed an instructive
+proposition: because neither having the notion of God, nor being cast
+into sleep by opium, being contained in the idea signified by the word
+man, we are by such propositions taught something more than barely what
+the word MAN stands for: and therefore the knowledge contained in it is
+more than verbal.
+
+
+7. For this teaches but the Signification of Words.
+
+Before a man makes any proposition, he is supposed to understand the
+terms he uses in it, or else he talks like a parrot, only making a noise
+by imitation, and framing certain sounds, which he has learnt of others;
+but not as a rational creature, using them for signs of ideas which he
+has in his mind. The hearer also is supposed to understand the terms
+as the speaker uses them, or else he talks jargon, and makes an
+unintelligible noise. And therefore he trifles with words who makes such
+a proposition, which, when it is made, contains no more than one of the
+terms does, and which a man was supposed to know before: v.g. a triangle
+hath three sides, or saffron is yellow. And this is no further tolerable
+than where a man goes to explain his terms to one who is supposed or
+declares himself not to understand him; and then it teaches only the
+signification of that word, and the use of that sign.
+
+
+8. But adds no real Knowledge.
+
+We can know then the truth of two sorts of propositions with perfect
+certainty. The one is, of those trifling propositions which have
+a certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, but not
+instructive. And, secondly, we can know the truth, and so may be certain
+in propositions, which affirm something of another, which is a necessary
+consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it: as
+that, the external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the
+opposite internal angles. Which relation of the outward angle to either
+of the opposite internal angles, making no part of the complex idea
+signified by the name triangle, this is a real truth, and conveys with
+it instructive real knowledge.
+
+
+9. General Propositions concerning Substances are often trifling.
+
+We having little or no knowledge of what combinations there be of simple
+ideas existing together in substances, but by our senses, we cannot make
+any universal certain propositions concerning them, any further than our
+nominal essences lead us. Which being to a very few and inconsiderable
+truths, in respect of those which depend on their real constitutions,
+the general propositions that are made about substances, if they are
+certain, are for the most part but trifling; and if they are
+instructive, are uncertain, and such as we can have no knowledge of
+their real truth, how much soever constant observation and analogy may
+assist our judgment in guessing. Hence it comes to pass, that one may
+often meet with very clear and coherent discourses, that amount yet to
+nothing. For it is plain that names of substantial beings, as well as
+others, as far as they have relative significations affixed to them,
+may, with great truth, be joined negatively and affirmatively in
+propositions, as their relative definitions make them fit to be so
+joined; and propositions consisting of such terms, may, with the same
+clearness, be deduced one from another, as those that convey the most
+real truths: and all this without any knowledge of the nature or reality
+of things existing without us. By this method one may make
+demonstrations and undoubted propositions in words, and yet thereby
+advance not one jot in the knowledge of the truth of things: v. g. he
+that having learnt these following words, with their ordinary mutual
+relative acceptations annexed to them; v. g. SUBSTANCE, MAN, ANIMAL,
+FORM, SOUL, VEGETATIVE, SENSITIVE, RATIONAL, may make several undoubted
+propositions about the soul, without knowing at all what the soul really
+is: and of this sort, a man may find an infinite number of propositions,
+reasonings, and conclusions, in books of metaphysics, school-divinity,
+and some sort of natural philosophy; and, after all, know as little of
+God, spirits, or bodies, as he did before he set out.
+
+
+10. And why.
+
+He that hath liberty to define, i.e. to determine the signification of
+his names of substances (as certainly every one does in effect, who
+makes them stand for his own ideas), and makes their significations at a
+venture, taking them from his own or other men's fancies, and not from
+an examination or inquiry into the nature of things themselves; may with
+little trouble demonstrate them one of another, according to those
+several respects and mutual relations he has given them one to another;
+wherein, however things agree or disagree in their own nature, he needs
+mind nothing but his own notions, with the names he hath bestowed upon
+them: but thereby no more increases his own knowledge than he does his
+riches, who, taking a bag of counters, calls one in a certain place a
+pound, another in another place a shilling, and a third in a third place
+a penny; and so proceeding, may undoubtedly reckon right, and cast up a
+great sum, according to his counters so placed, and standing for more or
+less as he pleases, without being one jot the richer, or without even
+knowing how much a pound, shilling, or penny is, but only that one is
+contained in the other twenty times, and contains the other twelve:
+which a man may also do in the signification of words, by making them,
+in respect of one another, more or less, or equally comprehensive.
+
+
+11. Thirdly, using Words variously is trifling with them.
+
+Though yet concerning most words used in discourses, equally
+argumentative and controversial, there is this more to be complained of,
+which is the worst sort of trifling, and which sets us yet further from
+the certainty of knowledge we hope to attain by them, or find in them;
+viz. that most writers are so far from instructing us in the nature and
+knowledge of things, that they use their words loosely and uncertainly,
+and do not, by using them constantly and steadily in the same
+significations make plain and clear deductions of words one from
+another, and make their discourses coherent and clear, (how little
+soever they were instructive); which were not difficult to do, did they
+not find it convenient to shelter their ignorance or obstinacy under the
+obscurity and perplexedness of their terms: to which, perhaps,
+inadvertency and ill custom do in many men much contribute.
+
+
+12. Marks of verbal Propositions. First, Predication in Abstract.
+
+To conclude. Barely verbal propositions may be known by these following
+marks:
+
+First, All propositions wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one of
+another, are barely about the signification of sounds. For since no
+abstract idea can be the same with any other but itself, when its
+abstract name is affirmed of any other term, it can signify no more but
+this, that it may, or ought to be called by that name; or that these two
+names signify the same idea. Thus, should any one say that parsimony is
+frugality, that gratitude is justice, that this or that action is or is
+not temperate: however specious these and the like propositions may at
+first sight seem, yet when we come to press them, and examine nicely
+what they contain, we shall find that it all amounts to nothing but the
+signification of those terms.
+
+
+13. Secondly, A part of the Definition predicated of any Term.
+
+Secondly, All propositions wherein a part of the complex idea which any
+term stands for is predicated of that term, are only verbal: v.g. to say
+that gold is a metal, or heavy. And thus all propositions wherein more
+comprehensive words, called genera, are affirmed of subordinate or less
+comprehensive, called species, or individuals, are barely verbal.
+
+When by these two rules we have examined the propositions that make up
+the discourses we ordinarily meet with, both in and out of books, we
+shall perhaps find that a greater part of them than is usually suspected
+are purely about the signification of words, and contain nothing in them
+but the use and application of these signs.
+
+This I think I may lay down for an infallible rule, That, wherever the
+distinct idea any word stands for is not known and considered, and
+something not contained in the idea is not affirmed or denied of it,
+there our thoughts stick wholly in sounds, and are able to attain no
+real truth or falsehood. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might save us a
+great deal of useless amusement and dispute; and very much shorten our
+trouble and wandering in the search of real and true knowledge.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX. OF OUR THREEFOLD KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE.
+
+
+1. General Propositions that are certain concern not Existence.
+
+HITHERTO we have only considered the essences of things; which being
+only abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular
+existence, (that being the proper operation of the mind, in abstraction,
+to consider an idea under no other existence but what it has in the
+understandings,) gives us no knowledge of real existence at all. Where,
+by the way, we may take notice, that universal propositions of whose
+truth or falsehood we can have certain knowledge concern not existence:
+and further, that all particular affirmations or negations that would
+not be certain if they were made general, are only concerning existence;
+they declaring only the accidental union or separation of ideas in
+things existing, which, in their abstract natures, have no known
+necessary union or repugnancy.
+
+
+2. A threefold Knowledge of Existence.
+
+But, leaving the nature of propositions, and different ways of
+predication to be considered more at large in another place, let us
+proceed now to inquire concerning our knowledge of the EXISTANCE OF
+THINGS, and how we come by it. I say, then, that we have the knowledge
+of OUR OWN existence by intuition; of the existence of GOD by
+demonstration; and of OTHER THINGS by sensation.
+
+
+3. Our Knowledge of our own Existence is Intuitive.
+
+As for OUR OWN EXISTENCE, we perceive it so plainly and so certainly,
+that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof for nothing can be
+more evident to us than our own existence. I think, I reason, I feel
+pleasure and pain: can any of these be more evident to me than my own
+existence? If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me
+perceive my own existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. For
+if I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as certain perception of my
+own existence, as of the existence of the pain I feel: or if I know
+I doubt, I have as certain perception of the existence of the thing
+doubting, as of that thought which I CALL DOUBT. Experience then
+convinces us, that we have an INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE of our own existence,
+and an internal infallible perception that we are. In every act of
+sensation, reasoning, or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our
+own being; and, in this matter, come not short of the highest degree of
+certainty.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X. OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD.
+
+
+1. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a God.
+
+THOUGH God has given us no innate ideas of himself; though he has
+stamped no original characters on our minds, wherein we may read his
+being; yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are
+endowed with, he hath not left himself without witness: since we have
+sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as
+long as we carry OURSELVES about us. Nor can we justly complain of our
+ignorance in this great point; since he has so plentifully provided us
+with the means to discover and know him; so far as is necessary to the
+end of our being, and the great concernment of our happiness. But,
+though this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers, and though
+its evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical certainty: yet
+it requires thought and attention; and the mind must apply itself to a
+regular deduction of it from some part of our intuitive knowledge,
+or else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other
+propositions, which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration. To
+show, therefore, that we are capable of KNOWING, i.e. BEING CERTAIN that
+there is a God, and HOW WE MAY COME BY this certainty, I think we need
+go no further than OURSELVES, and that undoubted knowledge we have of
+our own existence.
+
+
+2. For Man knows that he himself exists.
+
+I think it is beyond question, that man has a clear idea of his own
+being; he knows certainly he exists, and that he is something. He that
+can doubt whether he be anything or no, I speak not to; no more than I
+would argue with pure nothing, or endeavour to convince nonentity that
+it were something. If any one pretends to be so sceptical as to deny his
+own existence, (for really to doubt of it is manifestly impossible,) let
+him for me enjoy his beloved happiness of being nothing, until hunger or
+some other pain convince him of the contrary. This, then, I think I may
+take for a truth, which every one's certain knowledge assures him of,
+beyond the liberty of doubting, viz. that he is SOMETHING THAT ACTUALLY
+EXISTS.
+
+
+3. He knows also that Nothing cannot produce a Being; therefore
+Something must have existed from Eternity.
+
+In the next place, man knows, by an intuitive certainty, that bare
+NOTHING CAN NO MORE PRODUCE ANY REAL BEING, THAN IT CAN BE EQUAL TO TWO
+RIGHT ANGLES. If a man knows not that nonentity, or the absence of all
+being, cannot be equal to two right angles, it is impossible he should
+know any demonstration in Euclid. If, therefore, we know there is some
+real being, and that nonentity cannot produce any real being, it is an
+evident demonstration, that FROM ETERNITY THERE HAS BEEN SOMETHING;
+since what was not from eternity had a beginning; and what had a
+beginning must be produced by something else.
+
+
+4. And that eternal Being must be most powerful.
+
+Next, it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from another,
+must also have all that which is in and belongs to its being from
+another too. All the powers it has must be owing to and received from
+the same source. This eternal source, then, of all being must also be
+the source and original of all power; and so THIS ETERNAL BEING MUST BE
+ALSO THE MOST POWERFUL.
+
+
+5. And most knowing.
+
+Again, a man finds in HIMSELF perception and knowledge. We have then got
+one step further; and we are certain now that there is not only some
+being, but some knowing, intelligent being in the world. There was a
+time, then, when there was no knowing being, and when knowledge began to
+be; or else there has been also A KNOWING BEING FROM ETERNITY. If it
+be said, there was a time when no being had any knowledge, when that
+eternal being was void of all understanding; I reply, that then it
+was impossible there should ever have been any knowledge: it being as
+impossible that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly,
+and without any perception, should produce a knowing being, as it is
+impossible that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than
+two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter,
+that it should put into itself sense, perception, and knowledge, as it
+is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put into itself
+greater angles than two right ones.
+
+
+6. And therefore God.
+
+Thus, from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find
+in our own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this
+certain and evident truth,--THAT THERE IS AN ETERNAL, MOST POWERFUL, AND
+MOST KNOWING BEING; which whether any one will please to call God, it
+matters not. The thing is evident; and from this idea duly considered,
+will easily be deduced all those other attributes, which we ought to
+ascribe to this eternal Being. [If, nevertheless, any one should be
+found so senselessly arrogant, as to suppose man alone knowing and wise,
+but yet the product of mere ignorance and chance; and that all the rest
+of the universe acted only by that blind haphazard; I shall leave with
+him that very rational and emphatical rebuke of Tully (1. ii. De Leg.),
+to be considered at his leisure: 'What can be more sillily arrogant
+and misbecoming, than for a man to think that he has a mind and
+understanding in him, but yet in all the universe beside there is no
+such thing? Or that those things, which with the utmost stretch of his
+reason he can scarce comprehend, should be moved and managed without any
+reason at all?' QUID EST ENIM VERIUS, QUAM NEMINEM ESSE OPORTERE TAM
+STULTE AROGANTEM, UT IN SE MENTEM ET RATIONEM PUTET INESSE IN COELO
+MUNDOQUE NON PUTET? AUT EA QUOE VIZ SUMMA INGENII RATIONE COMPREHENDAT,
+NULLA RATIONE MOVERI PUTET?]
+
+From what has been said, it is plain to me we have a more certain
+knowledge of the existence of a God, than of anything: our senses have
+not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we more
+certainly know that there is a God, than that there is anything else
+without us. When I say we KNOW, I mean there is such a knowledge within
+our reach which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our minds to that,
+as we do to several other inquiries.
+
+
+7. Our idea of a most perfect Being, not the sole Proof of a God.
+
+How far the IDEA of a most perfect being, which a man, may frame in his
+mind, does or does not prove the EXISTENCE of a God, I will not here
+examine. For in the different make of men's tempers and application of
+their thoughts, some arguments prevail more on one, and some on another,
+for the confirmation of the same truth. But yet, I think, this I may
+say, that it is an ill way of establishing this truth, and silencing
+atheists, to lay the whole stress of so important a point as this upon
+that sole foundation: and take some men's having that idea of God in
+their minds, (for it is evident some men have none, and some worse than
+none, and the most very different,) for the only proof of a Deity; and
+out of an over fondness of that darling invention, cashier, or at least
+endeavour to invalidate all other arguments; and forbid us to hearken to
+those proofs, as being weak or fallacious, which our own existence, and
+the sensible parts of the universe offer so clearly and cogently to our
+thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considering man to withstand
+them. For I judge it as certain and clear a truth as can anywhere be
+delivered, that 'the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the
+creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made,
+even his eternal power and Godhead.' Though our own being furnishes us,
+as I have shown, with an evident and incontestible proof of a Deity; and
+I believe nobody can avoid the cogency of it, who will but as carefully
+attend to it, as to any other demonstration of so many parts: yet this
+being so fundamental a truth, and of that consequence, that all religion
+and genuine morality depend thereon, I doubt not but I shall be forgiven
+by my reader if I go over some parts of this argument again, and enlarge
+a little more upon them.
+
+
+8. Recapitulation Something from Eternity.
+
+There is no truth more evident than that SOMETHING must be FROM
+ETERNITY. I never yet heard of any one so unreasonable, or that could
+suppose so manifest a contradiction, as a time wherein there was
+perfectly nothing. This being of all absurdities the greatest, to
+imagine that pure nothing, the perfect negation and absence of all
+beings, should ever produce any real existence.
+
+It being, then, unavoidable for all rational creatures to conclude, that
+SOMETHING has existed from eternity; let us next see WHAT KIND OF THING
+that must be.
+
+
+9. Two Sorts of Beings, cogitative and incogitative.
+
+There are but two sorts of beings in the world that man knows or
+conceives.
+
+First, such as are purely material, without sense, perception, or
+thought, as the clippings of our beards, and parings of our nails.
+
+Secondly, sensible, thinking, perceiving beings, such as we find
+ourselves to be. Which, if you please, we will hereafter call COGITATIVE
+and INCOGITATIVE beings; which to our present purpose, if for nothing
+else, are perhaps better terms than material and immaterial.
+
+
+10. Incogitative Being cannot produce a Cogitative Being.
+
+If, then, there must be something eternal, let us see what sort of being
+it must be. And to that it is very obvious to reason, that it must
+necessarily be a cogitative being. For it is as impossible to conceive
+that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent
+being, as that nothing should of itself produce matter. Let us suppose
+any parcel of matter eternal, great or small, we shall find it, in
+itself, able to produce nothing. For example: let us suppose the matter
+of the next pebble we meet with eternal, closely united, and the parts
+firmly at rest together; if there were no other being in the world, must
+it not eternally remain so, a dead inactive lump? Is it possible to
+conceive it can add motion to itself, being purely matter, or produce
+anything? Matter, then, by its own strength, cannot produce in itself so
+much as motion: the motion it has must also be from eternity, or else
+be produced, and added to matter by some other being more powerful than
+matter; matter, as is evident, having not power to produce motion in
+itself. But let us suppose motion eternal too: yet matter, INCOGITATIVE
+matter and motion, whatever changes it might produce of figure and bulk,
+could never produce thought: knowledge will still be as far beyond the
+power of motion and matter to produce, as matter is beyond the power
+of nothing or nonentity to produce. And I appeal to every one's own
+thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced by
+NOTHING, as thought to be produced by pure matter, when, before, there
+was no such thing as thought or an intelligent being existing? Divide
+matter into as many parts as you will, (which we are apt to imagine a
+sort of spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it,) vary the
+figure and motion of it as much as you please--a globe, cube, cone,
+prism, cylinder, &c., whose diameters are but 100,000th part of a GRY,
+will operate no otherwise upon other bodies of proportionable bulk, than
+those of an inch or foot diameter; and you may as rationally expect to
+produce sense, thought, and knowledge, by putting together, in a certain
+figure and motion, gross particles of matter, as by those that are the
+very minutest that do anywhere exist. They knock, impel, and resist one
+another, just as the greater do; and that is all they can do. So that,
+if we will suppose NOTHING first or eternal, matter can never begin to
+be: if we suppose bare matter without motion, eternal, motion can never
+begin to be: if we suppose only matter and motion first, or eternal,
+thought can never begin to be. [For it is impossible to conceive that
+matter, either with or without motion, could have, originally, in and
+from itself, sense, perception, and knowledge; as is evident from hence,
+that then sense, perception, and knowledge, must be a property eternally
+inseparable from matter and every particle of it. Not to add, that,
+though our general or specific conception of matter makes us speak of it
+as one thing, yet really all matter is not one individual thing, neither
+is there any such thing existing as ONE material being, or ONE single
+body that we know or can conceive. And therefore, if matter were
+the eternal first cogitative being, there would not be one eternal,
+infinite, cogitative being, but an infinite number of eternal, finite,
+cogitative beings, independent one of another, of limited force, and
+distinct thoughts, which could never produce that order, harmony, and
+beauty which are to be found in nature. Since, therefore, whatsoever is
+the first eternal being must necessarily be cogitative; and] whatsoever
+is first of all things must necessarily contain in it, and actually
+have, at least, all the perfections that can ever after exist; nor can
+it ever give to another any perfection that it hath not either actually
+in itself, or, at least, in a higher degree; [it necessarily follows,
+that the first eternal being cannot be matter.]
+
+
+11. Therefore, there has been an Eternal Wisdom.
+
+If, therefore, it be evident, that something necessarily must exist from
+eternity, it is also as evident, that that something must necessarily
+be a cogitative being: for it is as impossible that incogitative matter
+should produce a cogitative being, as that nothing, or the negation of
+all being, should produce a positive being or matter.
+
+
+12. The Attributes of the Eternal Cogitative Being.
+
+Though this discovery of the NECESSARY EXISTANCE OF A ETERNAL MIND does
+sufficiently lead us into the knowledge of God; since it will hence
+follow, that all other knowing beings that have a beginning must depend
+on him, and have in other ways of knowledge or extent of power than what
+He gives them; and therefore, if he made those, he made all the less
+excellent pieces of this universe,--all inanimate beings whereby his
+omniscience, power, and providence will be established, and all his
+other attributes necessarily follow yet, to clear up this a little
+further, we will see what doubt can be raised against it.
+
+
+13. Whether the Eternal Mind may be also material or no.
+
+FIRST, Perhaps it will be said, that, though it be as clear as
+demonstration can make it, that there must be an eternal Being, and that
+Being must also be knowing: yet it does not follow but that thinking
+Being may also be MATERIAL. Let it be so, it equally still follows that
+there is a God. For there be an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent Being,
+it is certain that there is a God, whether you imagine that Being to be
+material or no. But herein, I suppose, lies the danger and deceit of
+that supposition:--there being no way to avoid the demonstration,
+that there is an eternal knowing Being, men devoted to matter, would
+willingly have it granted, that that knowing Being is material;
+and then, letting slide out of their minds, or the discourse, the
+demonstration whereby an eternal KNOWING Being was proved necessarily
+to exist, would argue all to be matter, and so deny a God, that is, an
+eternal cogitative Being: whereby they are so far from establishing,
+that they destroy their own hypothesis. For, if there can be, in their
+opinion, eternal matter, without any eternal cogitative Being, they
+manifestly separate matter and thinking, and suppose no necessary
+connexion of the one with the other, and so establish the necessity of
+an eternal Spirit, but not of matter; since it has been proved already,
+that an eternal cogitative Being is unavoidably to be granted. Now, if
+thinking and matter may be separated, the eternal existence of matter
+will not follow from the eternal existence of a cogitative Being, and
+they suppose it to no purpose.
+
+
+14. Not material: First, because each Particle of Matter is not
+cogitative.
+
+But now let us see how they can satisfy themselves, or others, that this
+eternal thinking Being is material.
+
+I. I would ask them, whether they imagine that all matter, EVERY
+PARTICLE OF MATTER, thinks? This, I suppose, they will scarce say;
+since then there would be as many eternal thinking beings as there are
+particles of matter, and so an infinity of gods. And yet, if they will
+not allow matter as matter, that is, every particle of matter, to be as
+well cogitative as extended, they will have as hard a task to make out
+to their own reasons a cogitative being out of incogitative particles,
+as an extended being out of unextended parts, if I may so speak.
+
+
+15. II. Secondly, Because one Particle alone of Matter cannot be
+cogitative.
+
+If all matter does not think, I next ask, Whether it be ONLY ONE ATOM
+that does so? This has as many absurdities as the other; for then this
+atom of matter must be alone eternal or not. If this alone be eternal,
+then this alone, by its powerful thought or will, made all the rest of
+matter. And so we have the creation of matter by a powerful thought,
+which is that the materialists stick at; for if they suppose one single
+thinking atom to have produced all the rest of matter, they cannot
+ascribe that pre-eminency to it upon any other account than that of its
+thinking, the only supposed difference. But allow it to be by some other
+way which is above our conception, it must still be creation; and these
+men must give up their great maxim, EX NIHILO NIL FIT. If it be said,
+that all the rest of matter is equally eternal as that thinking atom,
+it will be to say anything at pleasure, though ever so absurd. For to
+suppose all matter eternal, and yet one small particle in knowledge and
+power infinitely above all the rest, is without any the least appearance
+of reason to frame an hypothesis. Every particle of matter, as matter,
+is capable of all the same figures and motions of any other; and I
+challenge any one, in his thoughts, to add anything else to one above
+another.
+
+
+16. III. Thirdly, Because a System of incogitative Matter cannot be
+cogitative.
+
+If then neither one peculiar atom alone can be this eternal thinking
+being; nor all matter, as matter, i. e. every particle of matter, can be
+it; it only remains, that it is some certain SYSTEM of matter, duly put
+together, that is this thinking eternal Being. This is that which, I
+imagine, is that notion which men are aptest to have of God; who would
+have him a material being, as most readily suggested to them by the
+ordinary conceit they have of themselves and other men, which they take
+to be material thinking beings. But this imagination, however more
+natural, is no less absurd than the other; for to suppose the eternal
+thinking Being to be nothing else but a composition of particles of
+matter, each whereof is incogitative, is to ascribe all the wisdom and
+knowledge of that eternal Being only to the juxta-position of parts;
+than which nothing can be more absurd. For unthinking particles of
+matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them,
+but a new relation of position, which it is impossible should give
+thought and knowledge to them.
+
+
+17. And whether this corporeal System is in Motion or at Rest.
+
+But further: this corporeal system either has all its parts at rest, or
+it is a certain motion of the parts wherein its thinking consists. If it
+be perfectly at rest, it is but one lump, and so can have no privileges
+above one atom.
+
+If it be the motion of its parts on which its thinking depends, all the
+thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental and limited; since all the
+particles that by motion cause thought, being each of them in itself
+without any thought, cannot regulate its own motions, much less be
+regulated by the thought of the whole; since that thought is not the
+cause of motion, (for then it must be antecedent to it, and so without
+it,) but the consequence of it; whereby freedom, power, choice, and all
+rational and wise thinking or acting, will be quite taken away: so
+that such a thinking being will be no better nor wiser than pure blind
+matter; since to resolve all into the accidental unguided motions of
+blind matter, or into thought depending on unguided motions of blind
+matter, is the same thing: not to mention the narrowness of such
+thoughts and knowledge that must depend on the motion of such parts. But
+there needs no enumeration of any more absurdities and impossibilities
+in this hypothesis (however full of them it be) than that before
+mentioned; since, let this thinking system be all or a part of the
+matter of the universe, it is impossible that any one particle should
+either know its own, or the motion of any other particle, or the whole
+know the motion of every particle; and so regulate its own thoughts or
+motions, or indeed have any thought resulting from such motion.
+
+
+18. Matter not co-eternal with an Eternal Mind.
+
+SECONDLY, Others would have Matter to be eternal, notwithstanding that
+they allow an eternal, cogitative, immaterial Being. This, though it
+take not away the being of a God, yet, since it denies one and the first
+great piece of his workmanship, the creation, let us consider it a
+little. Matter must be allowed eternal: Why? because you cannot conceive
+how it can be made out of nothing: why do you not also think yourself
+eternal? You will answer, perhaps, Because, about twenty or forty years
+since, you began to be. But if I ask you, what that YOU is, which began
+then to be, you can scarce tell me. The matter whereof you are made
+began not then to be: for if it did, then it is not eternal: but it
+began to be put together in such a fashion and frame as makes up your
+body; but yet that frame of particles is not you, it makes not that
+thinking thing you are; (for I have now to do with one who allows an
+eternal, immaterial, thinking Being, but would have unthinking Matter
+eternal too;) therefore, when did that thinking thing begin to be? If it
+did never begin to be, then have you always been a thinking thing from
+eternity; the absurdity whereof I need not confute, till I meet with one
+who is so void of understanding as to own it. If, therefore, you can
+allow a thinking thing to be made out of nothing, (as all things that
+are not eternal must be,) why also can you not allow it possible for a
+material being to be made out of nothing by an equal power, but that you
+have the experience of the one in view, and not of the other? Though,
+when well considered, creation [of a spirit will be found to require
+no less power than the creation of matter. Nay, possibly, if we would
+emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts, as far
+as they would reach, to a closer contemplation of things, we might be
+able to aim at some dim and seeming conception how MATTER might at first
+be made, and begin to exist, by the power of that eternal first Being:
+but to give beginning and being to a SPIRIT would be found a more
+inconceivable effect of omnipotent power. But this being what would
+perhaps lead us too far from the notions on which the philosophy now in
+the world is built, it would not be pardonable to deviate so far from
+them; or to inquire, so far as grammar itself would authorize, if the
+common settled opinion opposes it: especially in this place, where the
+received doctrine serves well enough to our present purpose, and leaves
+this past doubt, that] the creation or beginning of any one [SUBSTANCE]
+out of nothing being once admitted, the creation of all other but the
+Creator himself, may, with the same ease, be supposed.
+
+
+19. Objection: Creation out of nothing.
+
+But you will say, Is it not impossible to admit of the making anything
+out of nothing, SINCE WE CANNOT POSSIBLY CONCEIVE IT? I answer, No.
+Because it is not reasonable to deny the power of an infinite being,
+because we cannot comprehend its operations. We do not deny other
+effects upon this ground, because we cannot possibly conceive the manner
+of their production. We cannot conceive how anything but impulse of body
+can move body; and yet that is not a reason sufficient to make us deny
+it possible, against the constant experience we have of it in ourselves,
+in all our voluntary motions; which are produced in us only by the free
+action or thought of our own minds, and are not, nor can be, the effects
+of the impulse or determination of the motion of blind matter in or upon
+our own bodies; for then it could not be in our power or choice to alter
+it. For example: my right hand writes, whilst my left hand is still:
+What causes rest in one, and motion in the other? Nothing but my
+will,--a thought of my mind; my thought only changing, the right hand
+rests, and the left hand moves. This is matter of fact, which cannot be
+denied: explain this and make it intelligible, and then the next step
+will be to understand creation. [For the giving a new determination to
+the motion of the animal spirits (which some make use of to explain
+voluntary motion) clears not the difficulty one jot. To alter the
+determination of motion, being in this case no easier nor less, than
+to give motion itself: since the new determination given to the animal
+spirits must be either immediately by thought, or by some other body put
+in their way by thought which was not in their way before, and so must
+owe ITS motion to thought: either of which leaves VOLUNTARY motion as
+unintelligible as it was before.] In the meantime, it is an over-valuing
+ourselves to reduce all to the narrow measure of our capacities; and to
+conclude all things impossible to be done, whose manner of doing exceeds
+our comprehension. This is to make our comprehension infinite, or God
+finite, when what He can do is limited to what we can conceive of it.
+If you do not understand the operations of your own finite mind, that
+thinking thing within you, do not deem it strange that you cannot
+comprehend the operations of that eternal infinite Mind, who made and
+governs all things, and whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI.
+
+OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER THINGS.
+
+
+1. Knowledge of the existence of other Finite Beings is to be had only
+by actual Sensation.
+
+The knowledge of our own being we have by intuition. The existence of a
+God, reason clearly makes known to us, as has been shown.
+
+The knowledge of the existence of ANY OTHER THING we can have only by
+SENSATION: for there being no necessary connexion of real existence with
+any IDEA a man hath in his memory; nor of any other existence but that
+of God with the existence of any particular man: no particular man
+can know the existence of any other being, but only when, by actual
+operating upon him, it makes itself perceived by him. For, the having
+the idea of anything in our mind, no more proves the existence of that
+thing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or
+the visions of a dream make thereby a true history.
+
+
+2. Instance: Whiteness of this Paper.
+
+It is therefore the ACTUAL RECEIVING of ideas from without that gives
+us notice of the existence of other things, and makes us know, that
+something doth exist at that time without us, which causes that idea in
+us; though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it. For it
+takes not from the certainty of our senses, and the ideas we receive by
+them, that we know not the manner wherein they are produced: v.g. whilst
+I write this, I have, by the paper affecting my eyes, that idea produced
+in my mind, which, whatever object causes, I call WHITE; by which I know
+that that quality or accident (i.e. whose appearance before my eyes
+always causes that idea) doth really exist, and hath a being without me.
+And of this, the greatest assurance I can possibly have, and to which my
+faculties can attain, is the testimony of my eyes, which are the proper
+and sole judges of this thing; whose testimony I have reason to rely on
+as so certain, that I can no more doubt, whilst I write this, that I
+see white and black, and that something really exists that causes that
+sensation in me, than that I write or move my hand; which is a certainty
+as great as human nature is capable of, concerning the existence of
+anything, but a man's self alone, and of God.
+
+
+3. This notice by our Senses, though not so certain as Demonstration,
+yet may be called Knowledge, and proves the Existence of Things without
+us.
+
+The notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us,
+though it be not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge, or
+the deductions of our reason employed about the clear abstract ideas
+of our own minds; yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of
+KNOWLEDGE. If we persuade ourselves that our faculties act and inform
+us right concerning the existence of those objects that affect them, it
+cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence: for I think nobody can, in
+earnest, be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of those
+things which he sees and feels. At least, he that can doubt so far,
+(whatever he may have with his own thoughts,) will never have any
+controversy with me; since he can never be sure I say anything contrary
+to his own opinion. As to myself, I think God has given me assurance
+enough of the existence of things without me: since, by their different
+application, I can produce in myself both pleasure and pain, which
+is one great concernment of my present state. This is certain: the
+confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us, is the greatest
+assurance we are capable of concerning the existence of material beings.
+For we cannot act anything but by our faculties; nor talk of knowledge
+itself, but by the help of those faculties which are fitted to apprehend
+even what knowledge is.
+
+But besides the assurance we have from our senses themselves, that they
+do not err in the information they give us of the existence of things
+without us, when they are affected by them, we are further confirmed in
+this assurance by other concurrent reasons:--
+
+
+4. I. Confirmed by concurrent reasons:--First, Because we cannot have
+ideas of Sensation but by the Inlet of the Senses.
+
+It is plain those perceptions are produced in us by exterior causes
+affecting our senses: because those that want the ORGANS of any sense,
+never can have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their
+minds. This is too evident to be doubted: and therefore we cannot but be
+assured that they come in by the organs of that sense, and no other way.
+The organs themselves, it is plain, do not produce them: for then the
+eyes of a man in the dark would produce colours, and his nose smell
+roses in the winter: but we see nobody gets the relish of a pineapple,
+till he goes to the Indies, where it is, and tastes it.
+
+
+5. II. Secondly, Because we find that an Idea from actual Sensation, and
+another from memory, are very distinct Perceptions.
+
+Because sometimes I find that I CANNOT AVOID THE HAVING THOSE IDEAS
+PRODUCED IN MY MIND. For though, when my eyes are shut, or windows fast,
+I can at pleasure recal to my mind the ideas of light, or the sun, which
+former sensations had lodged in my memory; so I can at pleasure lay by
+THAT idea, and take into my view that of the smell of a rose, or taste
+of sugar. But, if I turn my eyes at noon towards the sun, I cannot avoid
+the ideas which the light or sun then produces in me. So that there is a
+manifest difference between the ideas laid up in my memory, (over which,
+if they were there only, I should have constantly the same power to
+dispose of them, and lay them by at pleasure,) and those which force
+themselves upon me, and I cannot avoid having. And therefore it must
+needs be some exterior cause, and the brisk acting of some objects
+without me, whose efficacy I cannot resist, that produces those ideas
+in my mind, whether I will or no. Besides, there is nobody who doth not
+perceive the difference in himself between contemplating the sun, as
+he hath the idea of it in his memory, and actually looking upon it: of
+which two, his perception is so distinct, that few of his ideas are
+more distinguishable one from another. And therefore he hath certain
+knowledge that they are not BOTH memory, or the actions of his mind, and
+fancies only within him; but that actual seeing hath a cause without.
+
+
+6. III. Thirdly, Because Pleasure or Pain, which accompanies actual
+Sensation, accompanies not the returning of those Ideas without the
+external Objects.
+
+Add to this, that many of those ideas are PRODUCED IN US WITH PAIN,
+which afterwards we remember without the least offence. Thus, the pain
+of heat or cold, when the idea of it is revived in our minds, gives us
+no disturbance; which, when felt, was very troublesome; and is again,
+when actually repeated: which is occasioned by the disorder the external
+object causes in our bodies when applied to them: and we remember the
+pains of hunger, thirst, or the headache, without any pain at all; which
+would either never disturb us, or else constantly do it, as often as we
+thought of it, were there nothing more but ideas floating in our minds,
+and appearances entertaining our fancies, without the real existence
+of things affecting us from abroad. The same may be said of PLEASURE,
+accompanying several actual sensations. And though mathematical
+demonstration depends not upon sense, yet the examining them by diagrams
+gives great credit to the evidence of our sight, and seems to give it a
+certainty approaching to that of demonstration itself. For, it would be
+very strange, that a man should allow it for an undeniable truth, that
+two angles of a figure, which he measures by lines and angles of a
+diagram, should be bigger one than the other, and yet doubt of the
+existence of those lines and angles, which by looking on he makes use of
+to measure that by.
+
+
+7. IV. Fourthly, Because our Senses assist one another's Testimony of
+the Existence of outward Things, and enable us to predict.
+
+Our SENSES in many cases BEAR WITNESS TO THE TRUTH OF EACH OTHER'S
+REPORT, concerning the existence of sensible things without us. He that
+SEES a fire, may, if he doubt whether it be anything more than a bare
+fancy, FEEL it too; and be convinced, by putting his hand in it. Which
+certainly could never be put into such exquisite pain by a bare idea or
+phantom, unless that the pain be a fancy too: which yet he cannot, when
+the burn is well, by raising the idea of it, bring upon himself again.
+
+Thus I see, whilst I write this, I can change the appearance of the
+paper; and by designing the letters, tell BEFOREHAND what new idea it
+shall exhibit the very next moment, by barely drawing my pen over it:
+which will neither appear (let me fancy as much as I will) if my hands
+stand still; or though I move my pen, if my eyes be shut: nor, when
+those characters are once made on the paper, can I choose afterwards but
+see them as they are; that is, have the ideas of such letters as I have
+made. Whence it is manifest, that they are not barely the sport and play
+of my own imagination, when I find that the characters that were made at
+the pleasure of my own thoughts, do not obey them; nor yet cease to be,
+whenever I shall fancy it, but continue to affect my senses constantly
+and regularly, according to the figures I made them. To which if we will
+add, that the sight of those shall from another man, draw such sounds as
+I beforehand design they shall stand for, there will be little reason
+left to doubt that those words I write do really exist without me, when
+they cause a long series of regular sounds to affect my ears, which
+could not be the effect of my imagination, nor could my memory retain
+them in that order.
+
+
+8. This Certainty is as great as our Condition needs.
+
+But yet, if after all this any one will be so sceptical as to distrust
+his senses, and to affirm that all we see and hear, feel and taste,
+think and do, during our whole being, is but the series and deluding
+appearances of a long dream, whereof there is no reality; and therefore
+will question the existence of all things, or our knowledge of anything:
+I must desire him to consider, that, if all be a dream, then he doth but
+dream that he makes the question, and so it is not much matter that a
+waking man should answer him. But yet, if he pleases, he may dream that
+I make him this answer, That the certainty of things existing in RERUM
+NATURA when we have the testimony of our senses for it is not only as
+great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs. For,
+our faculties being suited not to the full extent of being, nor to a
+perfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubt
+and scruple; but to the preservation of us, in whom they are; and
+accommodated to the use of life: they serve to our purpose well enough,
+if they will but give us certain notice of those things, which are
+convenient or inconvenient to us. For he that sees a candle burning, and
+hath experimented the force of its flame by putting his finger in it,
+will little doubt that this is something existing without him, which
+does him harm, and puts him to great pain: which is assurance enough,
+when no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by than
+what is as certain as his actions themselves. And if our dreamer pleases
+to try whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace be barely a wandering
+imagination in a drowsy man's fancy, by putting his hand into it, he may
+perhaps be wakened into a certainty greater than he could wish, that it
+is something more than bare imagination. So that this evidence is as
+great as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain,
+i.e. happiness or misery; beyond which we have no concernment, either of
+knowing or being. Such an assurance of the existence of things without
+us is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the good and avoiding the
+evil which is caused by them, which is the important concernment we have
+of being made acquainted with them.
+
+
+9. But reaches no further than actual Sensation.
+
+In fine, then, when our senses do actually convey into our
+understandings any idea, we cannot but be satisfied that there doth
+something AT THAT TIME really exist without us, which doth affect our
+senses, and by them give notice of itself to our apprehensive faculties,
+and actually produce that idea which we then perceive: and we cannot
+so far distrust their testimony, as to doubt that such COLLECTIONS of
+simple ideas as we have observed by our senses to be united together, do
+really exist together. But this knowledge extends as far as the present
+testimony of our senses, employed about particular objects that do then
+affect them, and no further. For if I saw such a collection of simple
+ideas as is wont to be called MAN, existing together one minute since,
+and am now alone, I cannot be certain that the same man exists now,
+since there is no NECESSARY CONNEXION of his existence a minute since
+with his existence now: by a thousand ways he may cease to be, since I
+had the testimony of my senses for his existence. And if I cannot be
+certain that the man I saw last to-day is now in being, I can less be
+certain that he is so who hath been longer removed from my senses, and I
+have not seen since yesterday, or since the last year: and much less can
+I be certain of the existence of men that I never saw. And, therefore,
+though it be highly probable that millions of men do now exist, yet,
+whilst I am alone, writing this, I have not that certainty of it which
+we strictly call knowledge; though the great likelihood of it puts me
+past doubt, and it be reasonable for me to do several things upon the
+confidence that there are men (and men also of my acquaintance, with
+whom I have to do) now in the world: but this is but probability, not
+knowledge.
+
+
+10. Folly to expect Demonstration in everything.
+
+Whereby yet we may observe how foolish and vain a thing it is for a
+man of a narrow knowledge, who having reason given him to judge of
+the different evidence and probability of things, and to be swayed
+accordingly; how vain, I say, it is to expect demonstration and
+certainty in things not capable of it; and refuse assent to very
+rational propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear truths,
+because they cannot be made out so evident, as to surmount every the
+least (I will not say reason, but) pretence of doubting. He that, in
+the ordinary affairs of life, would admit of nothing but direct plain
+demonstration, would be sure of nothing in this world, but of perishing
+quickly. The wholesomeness of his meat or drink would not give him
+reason to venture on it: and I would fain know what it is he could do
+upon such grounds as are capable of no doubt, no objection.
+
+
+11. Past Existence of other things is known by Memory.
+
+As WHEN OUR SENSES ARE ACTUALLY EMPLOYED ABOUT ANY OBJECT, we do know
+that it does exist; so BY OUR MEMORY we may be assured, that heretofore
+things that affected our senses have existed. And thus we have knowledge
+of the past existence of several things, whereof our senses having
+informed us, our memories still retain the ideas; and of this we are
+past all doubt, so long as we remember well. But this knowledge also
+reaches no further than our senses have formerly assured us. Thus,
+seeing water at this instant, it is an unquestionable truth to me that
+water doth exist: and remembering that I saw it yesterday, it will also
+be always true, and as long as my memory retains it always an undoubted
+proposition to me, that water did exist the 10th of July, 1688; as it
+will also be equally true that a certain number of very fine colours did
+exist, which at the same time I saw upon a bubble of that water: but,
+being now quite out of sight both of the water and bubbles too, it is no
+more certainly known to me that the water doth now exist, than that the
+bubbles or colours therein do so: it being no more necessary that water
+should exist to-day, because it existed yesterday, than that the colours
+or bubbles exist to-day, because they existed yesterday, though it be
+exceedingly much more probable; because water hath been observed to
+continue long in existence, but bubbles, and the colours on them,
+quickly cease to be.
+
+
+12. The Existence of other finite Spirits not knowable, and rests on
+Faith.
+
+What ideas we have of spirits, and how we come by them, I have already
+shown. But though we have those ideas in our minds, and know we have
+them there, the having the ideas of spirits does not make us know that
+any such things do exist without us, or that there are any finite
+spirits, or any other spiritual beings, but the Eternal God. We have
+ground from revelation, and several other reasons, to believe with
+assurance that there are such creatures: but our senses not being
+able to discover them, we want the means of knowing their particular
+existences. For we can no more know that there are finite spirits really
+existing, by the idea we have of such beings in our minds, than by the
+ideas any one has of fairies or centaurs, he can come to know that
+things answering those ideas do really exist.
+
+And therefore concerning the existence of finite spirits, as well as
+several other things, we must content ourselves with the evidence of
+faith; but universal, certain propositions concerning this matter
+are beyond our reach. For however true it may be, v.g., that all the
+intelligent spirits that God ever created do still exist, yet it
+can never make a part of our certain knowledge. These and the like
+propositions we may assent to, as highly probable, but are not, I fear,
+in this state capable of knowing. We are not, then, to put others upon
+demonstrating, nor ourselves upon search of universal certainty in all
+those matters; wherein we are not capable of any other knowledge, but
+what our senses give us in this or that particular.
+
+
+13. Only particular Propositions concerning concrete Existances are
+knowable.
+
+By which it appears that there are two sorts of propositions:--(1)
+There is one sort of propositions concerning the existence of anything
+answerable to such an idea: as having the idea of an elephant, phoenix,
+motion, or an angel, in my mind, the first and natural inquiry is,
+Whether such a thing does anywhere exist? And this knowledge is only of
+particulars. No existence of anything without us, but only of God, can
+certainly be known further than our senses inform us, (2) There is
+another sort of propositions, wherein is expressed the agreement or
+disagreement of OUR ABSTRACT IDEAS, and their dependence on one another.
+Such propositions may be universal and certain. So, having the idea of
+God and myself, of fear and obedience, I cannot but be sure that God is
+to be feared and obeyed by me: and this proposition will be certain,
+concerning man in general, if I have made an abstract idea of such a
+species, whereof I am one particular. But yet this proposition, how
+certain soever, that 'men ought to fear and obey God' proves not to
+me the EXISTENCE of MEN in the world; but will be true of all such
+creatures, whenever they do exist: which certainty of such general
+propositions depends on the agreement or disagreement to be discovered
+in those abstract ideas.
+
+
+14. And all general Propositions that are known to be true concern
+abstract Ideas.
+
+In the former case, our knowledge is the consequence of the existence
+of things, producing ideas in our minds by our senses: in the latter,
+knowledge is the consequence of the ideas (be they what they will) that
+are in our minds, producing there general certain propositions. Many of
+these are called AETERNAE VERITATES, and all of them indeed are so; not
+from being written, all or any of them, in the minds of all men; or that
+they were any of them propositions in any one's mind, till he, having
+got the abstract ideas, joined or separated them by affirmation or
+negation. But wheresoever we can suppose such a creature as man is,
+endowed with such faculties, and thereby furnished with such ideas as we
+have, we must conclude, he must needs, when he applies his thoughts to
+the consideration of his ideas, know the truth of certain propositions
+that will arise from the agreement or disagreement which he will
+perceive in his own ideas. Such propositions are therefore called
+ETERNAL TRUTHS, not because they are eternal propositions actually
+formed, and antecedent to the understanding that at any time makes them;
+nor because they are imprinted on the mind from any patterns that are
+anywhere out of the mind, and existed before: but because, being once
+made about abstract ideas, so as to be true, they will, whenever they
+can be supposed to be made again at any time, past or come, by a mind
+having those ideas, always actually be true. For names being supposed
+to stand perpetually for the same ideas, and the same ideas having
+immutably the same habitudes one to another, propositions concerning any
+abstract ideas that are once true must needs be ETERNAL VERITIES.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII. OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE
+
+
+1. Knowledge is not got from Maxims.
+
+IT having been the common received opinion amongst men of letters, that
+MAXIMS were the foundation of all knowledge; and that the sciences
+were each of them built upon certain PRAECOGNITA, from whence the
+understanding was to take its rise, and by which it was to conduct
+itself in its inquiries into the matters belonging to that science, the
+beaten road of the Schools has been, to lay down in the beginning one or
+more GENERAL PROPOSITIONS, as foundations whereon to build the knowledge
+that was to be had of that subject. These doctrines, thus laid down for
+foundations of any science, were called PRINCIPLES, as the beginnings
+from which we must set out, and look no further backwards in our
+inquiries, as we have already observed.
+
+
+2. (The Occasion of that Opinion.)
+
+One thing which might probably give an occasion to this way of
+proceeding in other sciences, was (as I suppose) the good success it
+seemed to have in MATHEMATICS, wherein men, being observed to attain a
+great certainty of knowledge, these sciences came by pre-eminence to
+be called [word in Greek], and [word in Greek], learning, or things
+learned, thoroughly learned, as having of all others the greatest
+certainty, clearness, and evidence in them.
+
+
+3. But from comparing clear and distinct Ideas.
+
+But if any one will consider, he will (I guess) find, that the great
+advancement and certainty of real knowledge which men arrived to in
+these sciences, was not owing to the influence of these principles, nor
+derived from any peculiar advantage they received from two or three
+general maxims, laid down in the beginning; but from the clear,
+distinct, complete ideas their thoughts were employed about, and the
+relation of equality and excess so clear between some of them, that they
+had an intuitive knowledge, and by THAT a way to discover it in others;
+and this without the help of those maxims. For I ask, Is it not possible
+for a young lad to know that his whole body is bigger than his little
+finger, but by virtue of this axiom, that THE WHOLE IS BIGGER THAN A
+PART; nor be assured of it, till he has learned that maxim? Or cannot a
+country wench know that, having received a shilling from one that owes
+her three, and a shilling also from another that owes her three, the
+remaining debts in each of their hands are equal? Cannot she know this,
+I say, unless she fetch the certainty of it from this maxim, that IF YOU
+TAKE EQUALS FROM EQUALS, THE REMAINDER WILL BE EQUALS, a maxim which
+possibly she never heard or thought of? I desire any one to consider,
+from what has been elsewhere said, which is known first and clearest by
+most people, the particular instance, or the general rule; and which it
+is that gives life and birth to the other. These general rules are
+but the comparing our more general and abstract ideas, which are the
+workmanship of the mind, made, and names given to them for the easier
+dispatch in its reasonings, and drawing into comprehensive terms and
+short rules its various and multiplied observations. But knowledge began
+in the mind, and was founded on particulars; though afterwards, perhaps,
+no notice was taken thereof: it being natural for the mind (forward
+still to enlarge its knowledge) most attentively to lay up those general
+notions, and make the proper use of them, which is to disburden the
+memory of the cumbersome load of particulars. For I desire it may be
+considered, what more certainty there is to a child, or any one, that
+his body, little finger, and all, is bigger than his little finger
+alone, after you have given to his body the name WHOLE, and to his
+little finger the name PART, than he could have had before; or what new
+knowledge concerning his body can these two relative terms give him,
+which he could not have without them? Could he not know that his body
+was bigger than his little finger, if his language were yet so imperfect
+that he had no such relative terms as whole and part? I ask, further,
+when he has got these names, how is he more certain that his body is a
+whole, and his little finger a part, than he was or might be certain
+before he learnt those terms, that his body was bigger than his little
+finger? Any one may as reasonably doubt or deny that his little finger
+is a part of his body, as that it is less than his body. And he that can
+doubt whether it be less, will as certainly doubt whether it be a part.
+So that the maxim, the whole is bigger than a part, can never be made
+use of to prove the little finger less than the body, but when it is
+useless, by being brought to convince one of a truth which he knows
+already. For he that does not certainly know that any parcel of matter,
+with another parcel of matter joined to it, is bigger than either of
+them alone, will never be able to know it by the help of these two
+relative terms, whole and part, make of them what maxim you please.
+
+
+4. Dangerous to build upon precarious Principles.
+
+But be it in the mathematics as it will, whether it be clearer, that,
+taking an inch from a black line of two inches, and an inch from a red
+line of two inches, the remaining parts of the two lines will be equal,
+or that IF YOU TAKE EQUALS FROM EQUALS, THE REMAINDER WILL BE EQUALS:
+which, I say, of these two is the clearer and first known, I leave to
+any one to determine, it not being material to my present occasion. That
+which I have here to do, is to inquire, whether, if it be the readiest
+way to knowledge to begin with general maxims, and build upon them, it
+be yet a safe way to take the PRINCIPLES which are laid down in any
+other science as unquestionable truths; and so receive them without
+examination, and adhere to them, without suffering them to be doubted
+of, because mathematicians have been so happy, or so fair, to use none
+but self-evident and undeniable. If this be so, I know not what may not
+pass for truth in morality, what may not be introduced and proved in
+natural philosophy.
+
+Let that principle of some of the old philosophers, That all is Matter,
+and that there is nothing else, be received for certain and indubitable,
+and it will be easy to be seen by the writings of some that have revived
+it again in our days, what consequences it will lead us into. Let any
+one, with Polemo, take the world; or with the Stoics, the aether, or
+the sun; or with Anaximenes, the air, to be God; and what a divinity,
+religion, and worship must we needs have! Nothing can be so dangerous as
+PRINCIPLES thus TAKEN UP WITHOUT QUESTIONING OR EXAMINATION; especially
+if they be such as concern morality, which influence men's lives, and
+give a bias to all their actions. Who might not justly expect another
+kind of life in Aristippus, who placed happiness in bodily pleasure; and
+in Antisthenes, who made virtue sufficient to felicity? And he who, with
+Plato, shall place beatitude in the knowledge of God, will have his
+thoughts raised to other contemplations than those who look not beyond
+this spot of earth, and those perishing things which are to be had in
+it. He that, with Archelaus, shall lay it down as a principle, that
+right and wrong, honest and dishonest, are defined only by laws, and not
+by nature, will have other measures of moral rectitude and gravity, than
+those who take it for granted that we are under obligations antecedent
+to all human constitutions.
+
+
+5. To do so is no certain Way to Truth.
+
+If, therefore, those that pass for PRINCIPLES are NOT CERTAIN, (which we
+must have some way to know, that we may be able to distinguish them
+from those that are doubtful,) but are only made so to us by our blind
+assent, we are liable to be misled by them; and instead of being guided
+into truth, we shall, by principles, be only confirmed in mistake and
+error.
+
+
+6. But to compare clear, complete Ideas, under steady Names.
+
+But since the knowledge of the certainty of principles, as well as
+of all other truths, depends only upon the perception we have of the
+agreement or disagreement of our ideas, the way to improve our knowledge
+is not, I am sure, blindly, and with an implicit faith, to receive and
+swallow principles; but is, I think, to get and fix in our minds clear,
+distinct, and complete ideas, as far as they are to be had, and annex
+to them proper and constant names. And thus, perhaps, without any other
+principles, but BARELY CONSIDERING THOSE PERFECT IDEAS, and by COMPARING
+THEM ONE WITH ANOTHER; finding their agreement and disagreement, and
+their several relations and habitudes; we shall get more true and clear
+knowledge by the conduct of this one rule, than by taking up principles,
+and thereby putting our minds into the disposal of others.
+
+
+7. The true Method of advancing Knowledge is by considering our abstract
+Ideas.
+
+We must, therefore, if we will proceed as reason advises, adapt our
+methods of inquiry to THE NATURE OF THE IDEAS WE EXAMINE, and the truth
+we search after. General and certain truths are only founded in the
+habitudes and relations of ABSTRACT IDEAS. A sagacious and methodical
+application of our thoughts, for the finding out these relations, is
+the only way to discover all that can be put with truth and certainty
+concerning them into general propositions. By what steps we are to
+proceed in these, is to be learned in the schools of the mathematicians,
+who, from very plain and easy beginnings, by gentle degrees, and
+a continued chain of reasonings, proceed to the discovery and
+demonstration of truths that appear at first sight beyond human
+capacity. The art of finding proofs, and the admirable methods they have
+invented for the singling out and laying in order those intermediate
+ideas that demonstratively show the equality or inequality of
+unapplicable quantities, is that which has carried them so far, and
+produced such wonderful and unexpected discoveries: but whether
+something like this, in respect of other ideas, as well as those of
+magnitude, may not in time be found out, I will not determine. This,
+I think, I may say, that if other ideas that are the real as well as
+nominal essences of their species, were pursued in the way familiar to
+mathematicians, they would carry our thoughts further, and with greater
+evidence and clearness than possibly we are apt to imagine.
+
+
+8. By which Morality also may be made clearer.
+
+This gave me the confidence to advance that conjecture, which I suggest,
+(chap. iii.) viz. that MORALITY is capable of demonstration as well as
+mathematics. For the ideas that ethics are conversant about, being all
+real essences, and such as I imagine have a discoverable connexion and
+agreement one with another; so far as we can find their habitudes and
+relations, so far we shall be possessed of certain, real, and general
+truths; and I doubt not but, if a right method were taken, a great part
+of morality might be made out with that clearness, that could leave, to
+a considering man, no more reason to doubt, than he could have to
+doubt of the truth of propositions in mathematics, which have been
+demonstrated to him.
+
+
+9. Our Knowledge of Substances is to be improved, not by contemplation
+of abstract ideas, but only by Experience.
+
+In our search after the knowledge of SUBSTANCES, our want of ideas that
+are suitable to such a way of proceeding obliges us to a quite different
+method. We advance not here, as in the other, (where our abstract ideas
+are real as well as nominal essences,) by contemplating our ideas, and
+considering their relations and correspondences; that helps us very
+little for the reasons, that in another place we have at large set down.
+By which I think it is evident, that substances afford matter of very
+little GENERAL knowledge; and the bare contemplation of their abstract
+ideas will carry us but a very little way in the search of truth and
+certainty. What, then, are we to do for the improvement of our knowledge
+in substantial beings? Here we are to take a quite contrary course: the
+want of ideas of their real essences sends us from our own thoughts to
+the things themselves as they exist. EXPERIENCE HERE MUST TEACH ME WHAT
+REASON CANNOT: and it is by TRYING alone, that I can CERTAINLY KNOW,
+what other qualities co-exist with those of my complex idea, v.g.
+whether that yellow heavy, fusible body I call gold, be malleable, or
+no; which experience (which way ever it prove in that particular body I
+examine) makes me not certain, that it is so in all, or any other
+yellow, heavy, fusible bodies, but that which I have tried. Because it
+is no consequence one way or the other from my complex idea: the
+necessity or inconsistence of malleability hath no visible connexion
+with the combination of that colour, weight, and fusibility in any body.
+What I have said here of the nominal essence of gold, supposed to
+consist of a body of such a determinate colour, weight, and fusibility,
+will hold true, if malleableness, fixedness, and solubility in aqua
+regia be added to it. Our reasonings from these ideas will carry us but
+a little way in the certain discovery of the other properties in those
+masses of matter wherein all these are to be found. Because the OTHER
+properties of such bodies, depending not on these, but on that unknown
+real essence on which these also depend, we cannot by them discover the
+rest; we can go no further than the simple ideas of our nominal essence
+will carry us, which is very little beyond themselves; and so afford us
+but very sparingly any certain, universal, and useful truths. For, upon
+trial, having found that particular piece (and all others of that
+colour, weight, and fusibility, that I ever tried) malleable, that also
+makes now, perhaps, a part of my complex idea, part of my nominal
+essence of gold: whereby though I make my complex idea to which I affix
+the name gold, to consist of more simple ideas than before; yet still,
+it not containing the real essence of any species of bodies, it helps me
+not certainly to know (I say to know, perhaps it may be to conjecture)
+the other remaining properties of that body, further than they have a
+visible connexion with some or all of the simple ideas that make up my
+nominal essence. For example, I cannot be certain, from this complex
+idea, whether gold be fixed or no; because, as before, there is no
+NECESSARY connexion or inconsistence to be discovered betwixt a COMPLEX
+IDEA OF A BODY YELLOW, HEAVY, FUSIBLE, MALLEABLE; betwixt these, I say,
+and FIXEDNESS; so that I may certainly know, that in whatsoever body
+these are found, there fixedness is sure to be. Here, again, for
+assurance, I must apply myself to experience; as far as that reaches,
+I may have certain knowledge, but no further.
+
+
+10. Experience may procure is Convenience, not Science.
+
+I deny not but a man, accustomed to rational and regular experiments,
+shall be able to see further into the nature of bodies, and guess
+righter at their yet unknown properties, than one that is a stranger to
+them: but yet, as I have said, this is but judgment and opinion, not
+knowledge and certainty. This way of GETTING AND IMPROVING OUR KNOWLEDGE
+IN SUBSTANCES ONLY BY EXPERIENCE AND HISTORY, which is all that the
+weakness of our faculties in this state of mediocrity which we are in
+this world can attain to, makes me suspect that NATURAL PHILOSOPHY IS
+NOT CAPABLE IS BEING MADE A SCIENCE. We are able, I imagine, to reach
+very little general knowledge concerning the species of bodies, and
+their several properties. Experiments and historical observations we may
+have, from which we may draw advantages of ease and health, and thereby
+increase our stock of conveniences for this life; but beyond this I fear
+our talents reach not, nor are our faculties, as I guess, able to
+advance.
+
+
+11. We are fitted for moral Science, but only for probable
+interpretations of external Nature.
+
+From whence is it obvious to conclude, that, since our faculties are
+not fitted to penetrate into the internal fabric and real essences of
+bodies; but yet plainly discover to us the being of a God, and the
+knowledge of ourselves, enough to lead us into a full and clear
+discovery of our duty and great concernment; it will become us, as
+rational creatures, to employ those faculties we have about what they
+are most adapted to, and follow the direction of nature, where it seems
+to point us out the way. For it is rational to conclude, that our proper
+employment lies in those inquiries, and in that sort of knowledge which
+is most suited to our natural capacities, and carries in it our greatest
+interest, i.e. the condition of our eternal estate. Hence I think I may
+conclude, that MORALITY IS THE PROPER SCIENCE AND BUSINESS OF MANKIND IN
+GENERAL, (who are both concerned and fitted to search out their SUMMUM
+BONUM;) as several arts, conversant about several parts of nature, are
+the lot and private talent of particular men, for the common use of
+human life, and their own particular subsistence in this world. Of what
+consequence the discovery of one natural body and its properties may
+be to human life, the whole great continent of America is a convincing
+instance: whose ignorance in useful arts, and want of the greatest part
+of the conveniences of life, in a country that abounded with all sorts
+of natural plenty, I think may be attributed to their ignorance of what
+was to be found in a very ordinary, despicable stone, I mean the mineral
+of IRON. And whatever we think of our parts or improvements in this part
+of the world, where knowledge and plenty seem to vie with each other;
+yet to any one that will seriously reflect on it, I suppose it will
+appear past doubt, that, were the use of iron lost among us, we should
+in a few ages be unavoidably reduced to the wants and ignorance of the
+ancient savage Americans, whose natural endowments and provisions come
+no way short of those of the most flourishing and polite nations. So
+that he who first made known the use of that contemptible mineral, may
+be truly styled the father of arts, and author of plenty.
+
+
+12. In the study of Nature we must beware of Hypotheses and wrong
+Principles.
+
+I would not, therefore, be thought to disesteem or dissuade the study of
+NATURE. I readily agree the contemplation of his works gives us occasion
+to admire, revere, and glorify their Author: and, if rightly directed,
+may be of greater benefit to mankind than the monuments of exemplary
+charity that have at so great charge been raised by the founders of
+hospitals and almshouses. He that first invented printing, discovered
+the use of the compass, or made public the virtue and right use of KIN
+KINA, did more for the propagation of knowledge, for the supply and
+increase of useful commodities, and saved more from the grave than those
+who built colleges, workhouses, and hospitals. All that I would say
+is, that we should not be too forwardly possessed with the opinion or
+expectation of knowledge, where it is not to be had, or by ways that
+will not attain to it: that we should not take doubtful systems
+for complete sciences; nor unintelligible notions for scientifical
+demonstrations. In the knowledge of bodies, we must be content to
+glean what we can from particular experiments: since we cannot, from a
+discovery of their real essences, grasp at a time whole sheaves, and in
+bundles comprehend the nature and properties of whole species together.
+Where our inquiry is concerning co-existence, or repugnancy to
+co-exist, which by contemplation of our ideas we cannot discover; there
+experience, observation, and natural history, must give us, by our
+senses and by retail, an insight into corporeal substances. The
+knowledge of BODIES we must get by our senses, warily employed in taking
+notice of their qualities and operations on one another: and what we
+hope to know of SEPARATE SPIRITS in this world, we must, I think, expect
+only from revelation. He that shall consider how little general maxims,
+precarious principles, and hypotheses laid down at pleasure, have
+promoted true knowledge, or helped to satisfy the inquiries of rational
+men after real improvements; how little, I say, the setting out at that
+end has, for many ages together, advanced men's progress, towards the
+knowledge of natural philosophy, Will think we have reason to thank
+those who in this latter age have taken another course, and have trod
+out to us, though not an easier way to learned ignorance, yet a surer
+way to profitable knowledge.
+
+
+13. The true Use of Hypotheses.
+
+Not that we may not, to explain any phenomena of nature, make use of any
+probable hypothesis whatsoever: hypotheses, if they are well made,
+are at least great helps to the memory, and often direct us to new
+discoveries. But my meaning is, that we should not take up any one too
+hastily (which the mind, that would always penetrate into the causes of
+things, and have principles to rest on, is very apt to do) till we have
+very well examined particulars, and made several experiments, in that
+thing which we would explain by our hypothesis, and see whether it will
+agree to them all; whether our principles will carry us quite through,
+and not be as inconsistent with one phenomenon of nature, as they seem
+to accommodate and explain another. And at least that we take care that
+the name of PRINCIPLES deceive us not, nor impose on us, by making us
+receive that for an unquestionable truth, which is really at best but a
+very doubtful conjecture; such as are most (I had almost said all) of
+the hypotheses in natural philosophy.
+
+
+14. Clear and distinct Ideas with settled Names, and the finding of
+those intermediate ideas which show their Agreement or Disagreement, are
+the Ways to enlarge our Knowledge.
+
+But whether natural philosophy be capable of certainty or no, the ways
+to enlarge our knowledge, as far as we are capable, seems to me, in
+short, to be these two:--
+
+First, The first is to get and settle in our minds [determined ideas of
+those things whereof we have general or specific names; at least, so
+many of them as we would consider and improve our knowledge in, or
+reason about.] [And if they be specific ideas of substances, we should
+endeavour also to make them as complete as we can, whereby I mean,
+that we should put together as many simple ideas as, being constantly
+observed to co-exist, may perfectly determine the species; and each of
+those simple ideas which are the ingredients of our complex ones, should
+be clear and distinct in our minds.] For it being evident that our
+knowledge cannot exceed our ideas; [as far as] they are either
+imperfect, confused, or obscure, we cannot expect to have certain,
+perfect, or clear knowledge. Secondly, The other is the art of finding
+out those intermediate ideas, which may show us the agreement or
+repugnancy of other ideas, which cannot be immediately compared.
+
+
+15. Mathematics an instance of this.
+
+That these two (and not the relying on maxims, and drawing consequences
+from some general propositions) are the right methods of improving our
+knowledge in the ideas of other modes besides those of quantity, the
+consideration of mathematical knowledge will easily inform us. Where
+first we shall find that he that has not a perfect and clear idea of
+those angles or figures of which he desires to know anything, is utterly
+thereby incapable of any knowledge about them. Suppose but a man not to
+have a perfect exact idea of a right angle, a scalenum, or trapezium,
+and there is nothing more certain than that he will in vain seek any
+demonstration about them. Further, it is evident, that it was not the
+influence of those maxims which are taken for principles in mathematics,
+that hath led the masters of that science into those wonderful
+discoveries they have made. Let a man of good parts know all the maxims
+generally made use of in mathematics ever so perfectly, and contemplate
+their extent and consequences as much as he pleases, he will, by their
+assistance, I suppose, scarce ever come to know that the square of the
+hypothenuse in a right-angled triangle is equal to the squares of the
+two other sides. The knowledge that 'the whole is equal to all its
+parts,' and 'if you take equals from equals, the remainder will be
+equal,' &c., helped him not, I presume, to this demonstration: and a man
+may, I think, pore long enough on those axioms, without ever seeing one
+jot the more of mathematical truths. They have been discovered by the
+thoughts otherwise applied: the mind had other objects, other views
+before it, far different from those maxims, when it first got the
+knowledge of such truths in mathematics, which men, well enough
+acquainted with those received axioms, but ignorant of their method who
+first made these demonstrations, can never sufficiently admire. And who
+knows what methods to enlarge our knowledge in other parts of science
+may hereafter be invented, answering that of algebra in mathematics,
+which so readily finds out the ideas of quantities to measure others
+by; whose equality or proportion we could otherwise very hardly, or,
+perhaps, never come to know?
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII.
+
+SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING OUR KNOWLEDGE.
+
+
+1. Our Knowledge partly necessary partly voluntary.
+
+Our knowledge, as in other things, so in this, has so great a conformity
+with our sight, that it is neither wholly necessary, nor wholly
+voluntary. If our knowledge were altogether necessary, all men's
+knowledge would not only be alike, but every man would know all that is
+knowable; and if it were wholly voluntary, some men so little regard or
+value it, that they would have extreme little, or none at all. Men that
+have senses cannot choose but receive some ideas by them; and if they
+have memory, they cannot but retain some of them; and if they have
+any distinguishing faculty, cannot but perceive the agreement or
+disagreement of some of them one with another; as he that has eyes, if
+he will open them by day, cannot but see some objects, and perceive a
+difference in them. But though a man with his eyes open in the light,
+cannot but see, yet there be certain objects which he may choose whether
+he will turn his eyes to; there may be in his reach a book containing
+pictures and discourses, capable to delight or instruct him, which yet
+he may never have the will to open, never take the pains to look into.
+
+
+2. The application of our Faculties voluntary; but they being employed,
+we know as things are, not as we please.
+
+There is also another thing in a man's power, and that is, though he
+turns his eyes sometimes towards an object, yet he may choose whether he
+will curiously survey it, and with an intent application endeavour to
+observe accurately all that is visible in it. But yet, what he does see,
+he cannot see otherwise than he does. It depends not on his will to see
+that black which appears yellow; nor to persuade himself, that what
+actually scalds him, feels cold. The earth will not appear painted with
+flowers, nor the fields covered with verdure, whenever he has a mind to
+it: in the cold winter, he cannot help seeing it white and hoary, if he
+will look abroad. Just thus is it with our understanding: all that is
+voluntary in our knowledge is, the employing or withholding any of our
+FACULTIES from this or that sort of objects, and a more or less accurate
+survey of them: but, THEY BEING EMPLOYED, OUR WILL HATH NO POWER TO
+DETERMINE THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MIND ONE WAY OR ANOTHER; that is done
+only by the objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered.
+And therefore, as far as men's senses are conversant about external
+objects, the mind cannot but receive those ideas which are presented by
+them, and be informed of the existence of things without: and so far as
+men's thoughts converse with their own determined ideas, they cannot
+but in some measure observe the agreement or disagreement that is to be
+found amongst some of them, which is so far knowledge: and if they have
+names for those ideas which they have thus considered, they must needs
+be assured of the truth of those propositions which express that
+agreement or disagreement they perceive in them, and be undoubtedly
+convinced of those truths. For what a man sees, he cannot but see; and
+what he perceives, he cannot but know that he perceives.
+
+
+3. Instance in Numbers.
+
+Thus he that has got the ideas of numbers, and hath taken the pains to
+compare one, two, and three, to six, cannot choose but know that they
+are equal: he that hath got the idea of a triangle, and found the ways
+to measure its angles and their magnitudes, is certain that its three
+angles are equal to two right ones; and can as little doubt of that, as
+of this truth, that, It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not
+to be.
+
+
+4. Instance in Natural Religion.
+
+He also that hath the idea of an intelligent, but frail and weak being,
+made by and depending on another, who is eternal, omnipotent, perfectly
+wise and good, will as certainly know that man is to honour, fear, and
+obey God, as that the sun shines when he sees it. For if he hath but the
+ideas of two such beings in his mind, and will turn his thoughts that
+way, and consider them, he will as certainly find that the inferior,
+finite, and dependent, is under an obligation to obey the supreme and
+infinite, as he is certain to find that three, four, and seven are less
+than fifteen; if he will consider and compute those numbers: nor can he
+be surer in a clear morning that the sun is risen; if he will but open
+his eyes, and turn them that way. But yet these truths, being ever so
+certain, ever so clear, he may be ignorant of either, or all of them,
+who will never take the pains to employ his faculties, as he should, to
+inform himself about them.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV. OF JUDGMENT.
+
+
+1. Our Knowledge being short, we want something else.
+
+The understanding faculties being given to man, not barely for
+speculation, but also for the conduct of his life, man would be at a
+great loss if he had nothing to direct him but what has the certainty of
+true knowledge. For that being very short and scanty, as we have seen,
+he would be often utterly in the dark, and in most of the actions of his
+life, perfectly at a stand, had he nothing to guide him in the absence
+of clear and certain knowledge. He that will not eat till he has
+demonstration that it will nourish him; he that will not stir till he
+infallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed, will have
+little else to do but to sit still and perish.
+
+
+2. What Use to be made of this twilight State.
+
+Therefore, as God has set some things in broad daylight; as he has given
+us some certain knowledge, though limited to a few things in comparison,
+probably as a taste of what intellectual creatures are capable of to
+excite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state: so, in the
+greatest part of our concernments, he has afforded us only the twilight,
+as I may so say, of probability; suitable, I presume, to that state of
+mediocrity and probationership he has been pleased to place us in here;
+wherein, to check our over-confidence and presumption, we might, by
+every day's experience, be made sensible of our short-sightedness and
+liableness to error; the sense whereof might be a constant admonition to
+us, to spend the days of this our pilgrimage with industry and care, in
+the search and following of that way which might lead us to a state
+of greater perfection. It being highly rational to think, even were
+revelation silent in the case, that, as men employ those talents God has
+given them here, they shall accordingly receive their rewards at the
+close of the day, when their sun shall set, and night shall put an end
+to their labours.
+
+
+3. Judgement or assent to Probability, supplies our want of Knowledge.
+
+The faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and
+certain knowledge, in cases where that cannot be had, is JUDGEMENT:
+whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree; or, which is
+the same, any proposition to be true or false, without perceiving a
+demonstrative evidence in the proofs. The mind sometimes exercises
+this judgment out of necessity, where demonstrative proofs and
+certain knowledge are not to be had; and sometimes out of laziness,
+unskilfulness, or haste, even where demonstrative and certain proofs
+are to be had. Men often stay not warily to examine the agreement or
+disagreement of two ideas, which they are desirous or concerned to know;
+but, either incapable of such attention as is requisite in a long train
+of gradations, or impatient of delay, lightly cast their eyes on, or
+wholly pass by the proofs; and so, without making out the demonstration,
+determine of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, as it were by a
+view of them as they are at a distance, and take it to be the one or
+the other, as seems most likely to them upon such a loose survey. This
+faculty of the mind, when it is exercised immediately about things, is
+called JUDGEMENT; when about truths delivered in words, is most commonly
+called ASSENT or DISSENT: which being the most usual way, wherein the
+mind has occasion to employ this faculty, I shall, under these terms,
+treat of it, as feast liable in our language to equivocation.
+
+
+4. Judgement is the presuming Things to be so, without perceiving it.
+
+Thus the mind has two faculties conversant (about truth and falsehood):--
+
+First, KNOWLEDGE, whereby it certainly PERCEIVES, and is undoubtedly
+satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas.
+
+Secondly, JUDGEMENT, which is the putting ideas together, or separating
+them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement or
+disagreement is not perceived, but PRESUMED to be so; which is, as the
+word imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears. And if it
+so unites or separates them as in reality things are, it is right
+judgement.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV. OF PROBABILITY.
+
+
+1. Probability is the appearance of Agreement upon fallible Proofs.
+
+As DEMONSTRATION is the showing the agreement or disagreement of two
+ideas, by the intervention of one or more proofs, which have a constant,
+immutable, and visible connexion one with another; so PROBABILITY is
+nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement, by the
+intervention of proofs, whose connexion is not constant and immutable,
+or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most
+part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition
+to be true or false, rather than the contrary. For example: in the
+demonstration of it a man perceives the certain, immutable connexion
+there is of equality between the three angles of a triangle, and those
+intermediate ones which are made use of to show their equality to two
+right ones; and so, by an intuitive knowledge of the agreement or
+disagreement of the intermediate ideas in each step of the progress,
+the whole series is continued with an evidence, which clearly shows the
+agreement or disagreement of those three angles in equality to two right
+ones: and thus he has certain knowledge that it is so. But another
+man, who never took the pains to observe the demonstration, hearing a
+mathematician, a man of credit, affirm the three angles of a triangle to
+be equal to two right ones, assents to it, i.e. receives it for true: in
+which case the foundation of his assent is the probability of the thing;
+the proof being such as for the most part carries truth with it: the man
+on whose testimony he receives it, not being wont to affirm anything
+contrary to or besides his knowledge, especially in matters of this
+kind: so that that which causes his assent to this proposition, that the
+three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, that which makes
+him take these ideas to agree, without knowings them to do so, is the
+wonted veracity of the speaker in other cases, or his supposed veracity
+in this.
+
+
+2. It is to supply our Want of Knowledge.
+
+Our knowledge, as has been shown, being very narrow, and we not happy
+enough to find certain truth in everything which we have occasion to
+consider; most of the propositions we think, reason, discourse--nay, act
+upon, are such as we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth:
+yet some of them border so near upon certainty, that we make no act,
+according to the assent, as resolutely as if they were infallibly
+demonstrated, and that our knowledge of them was perfect and certain.
+But there being degrees herein, from the very neighbourhood of certainty
+and demonstration, quite down to improbability and unlikeness, even to
+the confines of impossibility; and also degrees of assent from full
+assurance and confidence, quite down to conjecture, doubt, and distrust:
+I shall come now, (having, as I think, found out THE BOUNDS OF HUMAN
+KNOWLEDGE AND CERTAINTY,) in the next place, to consider THE SEVERAL
+DEGREES AND GROUNDS OF PROBABILITY, AND ASSENT OR FAITH.
+
+
+3. Being that which makes us presume Things to be true, before we know
+them to be so.
+
+Probability is likeliness to be true, the very notation of the word
+signifying such a proposition, for which there be arguments or proofs to
+make it pass, or be received for true. The entertainment the mind gives
+this sort of propositions is called BELIEF, ASSENT, or OPINION, which is
+the admitting or receiving any proposition for true, upon arguments or
+proofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, without
+certain knowledge that it is so. And herein lies the difference between
+PROBABILITY and CERTAINTY, FAITH, and KNOWLEDGE, that in all the parts
+of knowledge there is intuition; each immediate idea, each step has its
+visible and certain connexion: in belief, not so. That which makes me
+believe, is something extraneous to the thing I believe; something not
+evidently joined on both sides to, and so not manifestly showing the
+agreement or disagreement of those ideas that are under consideration.
+
+
+4. The Grounds of Probability are two: Conformity with our own
+Experience, or the Testimony of others.
+
+Probability then, being to supply the defect of our knowledge, and to
+guide us where that fails, is always conversant about propositions
+whereof we have no certainty, but only some inducements to receive them
+for true. The grounds of it are, in short, these two following:--
+
+First, The conformity of anything with our own knowledge, observation,
+and experience.
+
+Secondly, The testimony of others, vouching their observation and
+experience. In the testimony of others is to be considered: 1. The
+number. 2. The integrity. 3. The skill of the witnesses. 4. The design
+of the author, where it is a testimony out of a book cited. 5. The
+consistency of the parts, and circumstances of the relation. 6. Contrary
+testimonies.
+
+
+5. In this, all the Arguments pro and con ought to be examined, before
+we come to a Judgment.
+
+Probability wanting that intuitive evidence which, infallibly determines
+the understanding and produces certain knowledge, the mind, if it WILL
+PROCEED RATIONALLY, ought to examine all the grounds of probability, and
+see how they make more or less for or against any proposition, before
+it assents to or dissents from it; and, upon a due balancing the whole,
+reject or receive it, with a more or less firm assent, proportionably to
+the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on one side or
+the other. For example:--
+
+If I myself see a man walk on the ice, it is past probability; it is
+knowledge. But if another tells me he saw a man in England, in the midst
+of a sharp winter, walk upon water hardened with cold, this has so great
+conformity with what is usually observed to happen, that I am disposed
+by the natures of the thing itself to assent to it; unless some manifest
+suspicion attend the relation of that matter of fact. But if the same
+thing be told to one born between the tropics, who never saw nor
+heard of any such thing before, there the whole probability relies on
+testimony: and as the relators are more in number, and of more credit,
+and have no interest to speak contrary to the truth, so that matter
+of fact is like to find more or less belief. Though to a man whose
+experience has always been quite contrary, and who has never heard of
+anything like it, the most untainted credit of a witness will scarce
+be able to find belief. As it happened to a Dutch ambassador, who
+entertaining the king of Siam with the particularities of Holland, which
+he was inquisitive after, amongst other things told him, that the water
+in his country would sometimes, in cold weather, be so hard, that men
+walked upon it, and that it would bear an elephant, if he were there. To
+which the king replied, HITHERTO _I_ HAVE BELIEVED THE STRANGE THINGS
+YOU HAVE TOLD ME, BECAUSE _I_ LOOK UPON YOU AS A SOBER FAIR MAN, BUT NOW
+_I_ AM SURE YOU LIE.
+
+
+6. Probable arguments capable of great Variety.
+
+Upon these grounds depends the probability of any proposition: and as
+the conformity of our knowledge, as the certainty of observations,
+as the frequency and constancy of experience, and the number and
+credibility of testimonies do more or less agree or disagree with it, so
+is any proposition in itself more or less probable. There is another, I
+confess, which, though by itself it be no true ground of probability,
+yet is often made use of for one, by which men most commonly regulate
+their assent, and upon which they pin their faith more than anything
+else, and that is, THE OPINION OF OTHERS; though there cannot be a more
+dangerous thing to rely on, nor more likely to mislead one; since there
+is much more falsehood and error among men, than truth and knowledge.
+And if the opinions and persuasions of others, whom we know and think
+well of, be a ground of assent, men have reason to be Heathens in Japan,
+Mahometans in Turkey, Papists in Spain, Protestants in England, and
+Lutherans in Sweden. But of this wrong ground of assent I shall have
+occasion to speak more at large in another place.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI. OF THE DEGREES OF ASSENT.
+
+
+1. Our Assent ought to be regulated by the Grounds of Probability.
+
+The grounds of probability we have laid down in the foregoing chapter:
+as they are the foundations on which our ASSENT is built, so are they
+also the measure whereby its several degrees are, or ought to be
+regulated: only we are to take notice, that, whatever grounds of
+probability there may be, they yet operate no further on the mind which
+searches after truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear;
+at least, in the first judgment or search that the mind makes. I
+confess, in the opinions men have, and firmly stick to in the world,
+their assent is not always from an actual view of the reasons that at
+first prevailed with them: it being in many cases almost impossible, and
+in most, very hard, even for those who have very admirable memories, to
+retain all the proofs which, upon a due examination, made them embrace
+that side of the question. It suffices that they have once with care
+and fairness sifted the matter as far as they could; and that they have
+searched into all the particulars, that they could imagine to give any
+light to the question; and, with the best of their skill, cast up the
+account upon the whole evidence: and thus, having once found on which
+side the probability appeared to THEM, after as full and exact an
+inquiry as they can make, they lay up the conclusion in their memories,
+as a truth they have discovered; and for the future they remain
+satisfied with the testimony of their memories, that this is the opinion
+that, by the proofs they have once seen of it, deserves such a degree of
+their assent as they afford it.
+
+
+2. These can not always be actually in View; and then we must content
+ourselves with the remembrance that we once saw ground for such a Degree
+of Assent.
+
+This is all that the greatest part of men are capable of doing, in
+regulating their opinions and judgments; unless a man will exact of
+them, either to retain distinctly in their memories all the proofs
+concerning any probable truth, and that too, in the same order, and
+regular deduction of consequences in which they have formerly placed
+or seen them; which sometimes is enough to fill a large volume on one
+single question: or else they must require a man, for every opinion that
+he embraces, every day to examine the proofs: both which are impossible.
+It is unavoidable, therefore, that the memory be relied on in the case,
+and that men be persuaded of several opinions, whereof the proofs are
+not actually in their thoughts; nay, which perhaps they are not able
+actually to recall. Without this, the greatest part of men must be
+either very sceptics; or change every moment, and yield themselves up
+to whoever, having lately studied the question, offers them arguments,
+which, for want of memory, they are not able presently to answer.
+
+
+3. The ill consequence of this, if our former Judgments were not rightly
+made.
+
+I cannot but own, that men's sticking to their past judgment, and
+adhering firmly to conclusions formerly made, is often the cause of
+great obstinacy in error and mistake. But the fault is not that they
+rely on their memories for what they have before well judged, but
+because they judged before they had well examined. May we not find a
+great number (not to say the greatest part) of men that think they have
+formed right judgments of several matters; and that for no other reason,
+but because they never thought otherwise? that themselves to have judged
+right, only because they never questioned, never examined, their own
+opinions? Which is indeed to think they judged right, because they never
+judged at all. And yet these, of all men, hold their opinions with the
+greatest stiffness; those being generally the most fierce and firm in
+their tenets, who have least examined them. What we once KNOW, we are
+certain is so: and we may be secure, that there are no latent proofs
+undiscovered, which may overturn our knowledge, or bring it in doubt.
+But, in matters of PROBABILITY, it is not in every case we can be sure
+that we have all the particulars before us, that any way concern the
+question; and that there is no evidence behind, and yet unseen, which
+may cast the probability on the other side, and outweigh all that at
+present seems to preponderate with us. Who almost is there that hath
+the leisure, patience, and means to collect together all the proofs
+concerning most of the opinions he has, so as safely to conclude that he
+hath a clear and full view; and that there is no more to be alleged for
+his better information? And yet we are forced to determine ourselves on
+the one side or other. The conduct of our lives, and the management of
+our great concerns, will not bear delay: for those depend, for the most
+part, on the determination of our judgment in points wherein we are
+not capable of certain and demonstrative knowledge, and wherein it is
+necessary for us to embrace the one side or the other.
+
+
+4. The right Use of it, mutual Charity and Forbearance, in a necessary
+diversity of opinions.
+
+Since, therefore, it is unavoidable to the greatest part of men, if not
+all, to have several OPINIONS, without certain and indubitable proofs
+of their truth; and it carries too great an imputation of ignorance,
+lightness, or folly for men to quit and renounce their former tenets
+presently upon the offer of an argument which they cannot immediately
+answer, and show the insufficiency of: it would, methinks, become
+all men to maintain peace, and the common offices of humanity, and
+friendship, in the diversity of opinions; since we cannot reasonably
+expect that any one should readily and obsequiously quit his own
+opinion, and embrace ours, with a blind resignation to an authority
+which the understanding of man acknowledges not. For however it may
+often mistake, it can own no other guide but reason, nor blindly submit
+to the will and dictates of another. If he you would bring over to your
+sentiments be one that examines before he assents, you must give him
+leave at his leisure to go over the account again, and, recalling what
+is out of his mind, examine all the particulars, to see on which side
+the advantage lies: and if he will not think our arguments of weight
+enough to engage him anew in so much pains, it is but what we often do
+ourselves in the like case; and we should take it amiss if others should
+prescribe to us what points we should study. And if he be one who takes
+his opinions upon trust, how can we imagine that he should renounce
+those tenets which time and custom have so settled in his mind, that he
+thinks them self-evident, and of an unquestionably certainty; or which
+he takes to be impressions he has received from God himself, or from men
+sent by him? How can we expect, I say, that opinions thus settled should
+be given up to the arguments or authority of a stranger or adversary,
+especially if there be any suspicion of interest or design, as there
+never fails to be, where men find themselves ill-trusted? We should do
+well to commiserate our mutual ignorance, and endeavour to remove it in
+all the gentle and fair ways of information; and not instantly treat
+others ill, as obstinate and perverse, because they will not renounce
+their own, and receive our opinions, or at least those we would force
+upon them, when it is more than probable that we are no less obstinate
+in not embracing some of theirs. For where is the man that has
+incontestable evidence of the truth of all that he holds, or of the
+falsehood of all he condemns; or can say that he has examined to the
+bottom all his own, or other men's opinions? The necessity of believing
+without knowledge, nay often upon very slight grounds, in this fleeting
+state of action and blindness we are in, should make us more busy and
+careful to inform ourselves than constrain others. At least, those who
+have not thoroughly examined to the bottom all their own tenets, must
+confess they are unfit to prescribe to others; and are unreasonable in
+imposing that as truth on other men's belief, which they themselves have
+not searched into, nor weighed the arguments of probability, on which
+they should receive or reject it. Those who have fairly and truly
+examined, and are thereby got past doubt in all the doctrines they
+profess and govern themselves by, would have a juster pretence to
+require others to follow them: but these are so few in number, and find
+so little reason to be magisterial in their opinions, that nothing
+insolent and imperious is to be expected from them: and there is reason
+to think, that, if men were better instructed themselves, they would be
+less imposing on others.
+
+
+5. Probability is either of sensible Matter of Fact, capable of human
+testimony, or of what is beyond the evidence of our senses.
+
+But to return to the grounds of assent, and the several degrees of it,
+we are to take notice, that the propositions we receive upon inducements
+of PROBABILITY are of TWO SORTS: either concerning some particular
+existance, or, as it is usually termed, matter of fact, which, falling
+under observation, is capable of human testimony; or else concerning
+things, which being beyond the discovery of our senses, are not capable
+of any such testimony.
+
+
+6. Concerning the FIRST of these, viz. PARTICULAR MATTER OF FACT.
+
+I. The concurrent Experience of ALL other Men with ours, produces
+Assurance approaching to Knowledge.
+
+Where any particular thing, consonant to the constant observation of
+ourselves and others in the like case, comes attested by the concurrent
+reports of all that mention it, we receive it as easily, and build as
+firmly upon it, as if it were certain knowledge; and we reason and act
+thereupon with as little doubt as if it were perfect demonstration.
+Thus, if all Englishmen, who have occasion to mention it, should affirm
+that it froze in England the last winter, or that there were swallows
+seen there in the summer, I think a man could almost as little doubt of
+it as that seven and four are eleven. The first, therefore, and HIGHEST
+DEGREE OF PROBABILITY, is, when the general consent of all men, in all
+ages, as far as it can be known, concurs with a man's constant and
+never-failing experience in like cases, to confirm the truth of any
+particular matter of fact attested by fair witnesses: such are all
+the stated constitutions and properties of bodies, and the regular
+proceedings of causes and effects in the ordinary course of nature. This
+we call an argument from the nature of things themselves. For what our
+own and other men's CONSTANT OBSERVATION has found always to be after
+the same manner, that we with reason conclude to be the effect of
+steady and regular causes; though they come not within the reach of our
+knowledge. Thus, That fire warmed a man, made lead fluid, and changed
+the colour or consistency in wood or charcoal; that iron sunk in
+water, and swam in quicksilver: these and the like propositions about
+particular facts, being agreeable to our constant experience, as often
+as we have to do with these matters; and being generally spoke of (when
+mentioned by others) as things found constantly to be so, and therefore
+not so much as controverted by anybody--we are put past doubt that a
+relation affirming any such thing to have been, or any predication
+that it will happen again in the same manner, is very true. These
+PROBABILITIES rise so near to CERTAINTY, that they govern our thoughts
+as absolutely, and influence all our actions as fully, as the most
+evident demonstration; and in what concerns us we make little or
+no difference between them and certain knowledge. Our belief, thus
+grounded, rises to ASSURANCE.
+
+
+7. II. Unquestionable Testimony, and our own Experience that a thing is
+for the most part so, produce Confidence.
+
+The NEXT DEGREE OF PROBABILITY is, when I find by my own experience, and
+the agreement of all others that mention it, a thing to be for the most
+part so, and that the particular instance of it is attested by many and
+undoubted witnesses: v.g. history giving us such an account of men in
+all ages, and my own experience, as far as I had an opportunity to
+observe, confirming it, that most men prefer their private advantage to
+the public: if all historians that write of Tiberius, say that Tiberius
+did so, it is extremely probable. And in this case, our assent has a
+sufficient foundation to raise itself to a degree which we may call
+CONFIDENCE.
+
+
+8. III. Fair Testimony, and the Nature of the Thing indifferent, produce
+unavoidable Assent.
+
+In things that happen indifferently, as that a bird should fly this or
+that way; that it should thunder on a man's right or left hand, &c.,
+when any particular matter of fact is vouched by the concurrent
+testimony of unsuspected witnesses, there our assent is also
+UNAVOIDABLE. Thus: that there is such a city in Italy as Rome: that
+about one thousand seven hundred years ago, there lived in it a man,
+called Julius Caesar; that he was a general, and that he won a battle
+against another, called Pompey. This, though in the nature of the thing
+there be nothing for nor against it, yet being related by historians of
+credit, and contradicted by no one writer, a man cannot avoid believing
+it, and can as little doubt of it as he does of the being and actions of
+his own acquaintance, whereof he himself is a witness.
+
+
+9. Experience and Testimonies clashing, infinitely vary the Degrees of
+Probability.
+
+Thus far the matter goes easy enough. Probability upon such grounds
+carries so much evidence with it, that it naturally determines the
+judgment, and leaves us as little liberty to believe or disbelieve, as a
+demonstration does, whether we will know, or be ignorant. The difficulty
+is, when testimonies contradict common experience, and the reports of
+history and witnesses clash with the ordinary course of nature, or with
+one another; there it is, where diligence, attention, and exactness are
+required, to form a right judgment, and to proportion the assent to the
+different evidence and probability of the thing: which rises and
+falls, according as those two foundations of credibility, viz. COMMON
+OBSERVATION IN LIKE CASES, and PARTICULAR TESTIMONIES IN THAT PARTICULAR
+INSTANCE, favour or contradict it. These are liable to so great
+variety of contrary observations, circumstances, reports, different
+qualifications, tempers, designs, oversights, &c., of the reporters,
+that it is impossible to reduce to precise rules the various degrees
+wherein men give their assent. This only may be said in general, That
+as the arguments and proofs PRO and CON, upon due examination, nicely
+weighing every particular circumstance, shall to any one appear, upon
+the whole matter, in a greater or less degree to preponderate on
+either side; so they are fitted to produce in the mind such different
+entertainments, as we call BELIEF, CONJECTURE, GUESS, DOUBT, WAVERING,
+DISTRUST, DISBELIEF, &c.
+
+
+10. Traditional Testimonies, the further removed the less their Proof
+becomes.
+
+This is what concerns assent in matters wherein testimony is made use
+of: concerning which, I think, it may not be amiss to take notice of a
+rule observed in the law of England; which is, That though the attested
+copy of a record be good proof, yet the copy of a copy, ever so well
+attested, and by ever so credible witnesses, will not be admitted as a
+proof in judicature. This is so generally approved as reasonable,
+and suited to the wisdom and caution to be used in our inquiry after
+material truths, that I never yet heard of any one that blamed it.
+This practice, if it be allowable in the decisions of right and wrong,
+carries this observation along with it, viz. THAT ANY TESTIMONY, THE
+FURTHER OFF IT IS FROM THE ORIGINAL TRUTH, THE LESS FORCE AND PROOF IT
+HAS. The being and existence of the thing itself, is what I call the
+original truth. A credible man vouching his knowledge of it is a good
+proof; but if another equally credible do witness it from his report,
+the testimony is weaker: and a third that attests the hearsay of an
+hearsay is yet less considerable. So that in traditional truths, each
+remove weakens the force of the proof: and the more hands the tradition
+has successively passed through, the less strength and evidence does
+it receive from them. This I thought necessary to be taken notice of:
+because I find amongst some men the quite contrary commonly practised,
+who look on opinions to gain force by growing older; and what a thousand
+years since would not, to a rational man contemporary with the first
+voucher, have appeared at all probable, is now urged as certain beyond
+all question, only because several have since, from him, said it one
+after another. Upon this ground propositions, evidently false or
+doubtful enough in their first beginning, come, by an inverted rule of
+probability, to pass for authentic truths; and those which found or
+deserved little credit from the mouths of their first authors, are
+thought to grow venerable by age, are urged as undeniable.
+
+
+11. Yet History is of great Use.
+
+I would not be thought here to lessen the credit and use of HISTORY: it
+is all the light we have in many cases, and we receive from it a great
+part of the useful truths we have, with a convincing evidence. I think
+nothing more valuable than the records of antiquity: I wish we had more
+of them, and more uncorrupted. But this truth itself forces me to say,
+That no probability can rise higher than its first original. What has no
+other evidence than the single testimony of one only witness must stand
+or fall by his only testimony, whether good, bad, or indifferent; and
+though cited afterwards by hundreds of others, one after another, is so
+far from receiving any strength thereby, that it is only the weaker.
+Passion, interest, inadvertency, mistake of his meaning, and a thousand
+odd reasons, or capricios, men's minds are acted by, (impossible to
+be discovered,) may make one man quote another man's words or meaning
+wrong. He that has but ever so little examined the citations of writers,
+cannot doubt how little credit the quotations deserve, where the
+originals are wanting; and consequently how much less quotations of
+quotations can be relied on. This is certain, that what in one age was
+affirmed upon slight grounds, can never after come to be more valid in
+future ages by being often repeated. But the further still it is from
+the original, the less valid it is, and has always less force in the
+mouth or writing of him that last made use of it than in his from whom
+he received it.
+
+
+12. Secondly, In things which Sense cannot discover, Analogy is the
+great Rule of Probability.
+
+[SECONDLY], The probabilities we have hitherto mentioned are only such
+as concern matter of fact, and such things as are capable of observation
+and testimony. There remains that other sort, concerning which men
+entertain opinions with variety of assent, though THE THINGS BE SUCH,
+THAT FALLING NOT UNDER THE REACH OF OUR SENSES, THEY ARE NOT CAPABLE OF
+TESTIMONY. Such are, 1. The existence, nature and operations of finite
+immaterial beings without us; as spirits, angels, devils, &c. Or the
+existence of material beings which, either for their smallness in
+themselves or remoteness from us, our senses cannot take notice of--as,
+whether there be any plants, animals, and intelligent inhabitants in
+the planets, and other mansions of the vast universe. 2. Concerning
+the manner of operation in most parts of the works of nature: wherein,
+though we see the sensible effects, yet their causes are unknown, and we
+perceive not the ways and manner how they are produced. We see animals
+are generated, nourished, and move; the loadstone draws iron; and the
+parts of a candle, successively melting, turn into flame, and give us
+both light and heat. These and the like effects we see and know: but the
+causes that operate, and the manner they are produced in, we can only
+guess and probably conjecture. For these and the like, coming not within
+the scrutiny of human senses, cannot be examined by them, or be attested
+by anybody; and therefore can appear more or less probable, only as they
+more or less agree to truths that are established in our minds, and as
+they hold proportion to other parts of our knowledge and observation.
+ANALOGY in these matters is the only help we have, and it is from that
+alone we draw all our grounds of probability. Thus, observing that the
+bare rubbing of two bodies violently one upon another, produces heat,
+and very often fire itself, we have reason to think, that what we call
+HEAT and FIRE consists in a violent agitation of the imperceptible
+minute parts of the burning matter. Observing likewise that the
+different refractions of pellucid bodies produce in our eyes the
+different appearances of several colours; and also, that the different
+ranging and laying the superficial parts of several bodies, as of
+velvet, watered silk, &c., does the like, we think it probable that
+the COLOUR and shining of bodies is in them nothing but the different
+arrangement and refraction of their minute and insensible parts. Thus,
+finding in all parts of the creation, that fall under human observation,
+that there is A GRADUAL CONNEXION OF ONE WITH ANOTHER, WITHOUT ANY GREAT
+OR DISCERNIBLE GAPS BETWEEN, IN ALL THAT GREAT VARIETY OF THINGS WE SEE
+IN THE WORLD, which are so closely linked together, that, in the several
+ranks of beings, it is not easy to discover the bounds betwixt them; we
+have reason to be persuaded that, BY SUCH GENTLE STEPS, things ascend
+upwards in degrees of perfection. It is a hard matter to say where
+sensible and rational begin, and where insensible and irrational end:
+and who is there quick-sighted enough to determine precisely which is
+the lowest species of living things, and which the first of those which
+have no life? Things, as far as we can observe, lessen and augment, as
+the quantity does in a regular cone; where, though there be a manifest
+odds betwixt the bigness of the diameter at a remote distance, yet the
+difference between the upper and under, where they touch one another, is
+hardly discernible. The difference is exceeding great between some men
+and some animals: but if we will compare the understanding and abilities
+of some men and some brutes, we shall find so little difference, that it
+will be hard to say, that that of the man is either clearer or larger.
+Observing, I say, such gradual and gentle descents downwards in those
+parts of the creation that are beneath man, the rule of analogy may make
+it probable, that it is so also in things above us and our observation;
+and that there are several ranks of intelligent beings, excelling us in
+several degrees of perfection, ascending upwards towards the infinite
+perfection of the Creator, by gentle steps and differences, that are
+every one at no great distance from the next to it. This sort of
+probability, which is the best conduct of rational experiments, and the
+rise of hypothesis, has also its use and influence; and a wary reasoning
+from analogy leads us often into the discovery of truths and useful
+productions, which would otherwise lie concealed.
+
+
+13. One Case where contrary Experience lessens not the Testimony.
+
+Though the common experience and the ordinary course of things have
+justly a mighty influence on the minds of men, to make them give or
+refuse credit to anything proposed to their belief; yet there is one
+case, wherein the strangeness of the fact lessens not the assent to
+a fair testimony given of it. For where such supernatural events are
+suitable to ends aimed at by Him who has the power to change the course
+of nature, there, UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, that may be the fitter to
+procure belief, by how much the more they are beyond or contrary to
+ordinary observation. This is the proper case of MIRACLES, which, well
+attested, do not only find credit themselves, but give it also to other
+truths, which need such confirmation.
+
+
+14. The bare Testimony of Divine Revelation is the highest Certainty.
+
+Besides those we have hitherto mentioned, there is one sort of
+propositions that challenge the highest degree of our assent, upon bare
+testimony, whether the thing proposed agree or disagree with common
+experience, and the ordinary course of things, or no. The reason whereof
+is, because the testimony is of such an one as cannot deceive nor be
+deceived: and that is of God himself. This carries with it an assurance
+beyond doubt, evidence beyond exception. This is called by a peculiar
+name, REVELATION, and our assent to it, FAITH, which [as absolutely
+determines our minds, and as perfectly excludes all wavering,] as our
+knowledge itself; and we may as well doubt of our own being, as we can
+whether any revelation from God be true. So that faith is a settled and
+sure principle of assent and assurance, and leaves no manner of room
+for doubt or hesitation. ONLY WE MUST BE SURE THAT IT BE A DIVINE
+REVELATION, AND THAT WE UNDERSTAND IT RIGHT: else we shall expose
+ourselves to all the extravagancy of enthusiasm, and all the error of
+wrong principles, if we have faith and assurance in what is not DIVINE
+revelation. And therefore, in those cases, our assent can be rationally
+no higher than the evidence of its being a revelation, and that this is
+the meaning of the expressions it is delivered in. If the evidence of
+its being a revelation, or that this is its true sense, be only on
+probable proofs, our assent can reach no higher than an assurance or
+diffidence, arising from the more or less apparent probability of the
+proofs. But of FAITH, and the precedency it ought to have before other
+arguments of persuasion, I shall speak more hereafter; where I treat of
+it as it is ordinarily placed, in contradistinction to reason; though in
+truth it be nothing else but AN ASSENT FOUNDED ON THE HIGHEST REASON.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVII. OF REASON
+
+
+1. Various Significations of the word Reason.
+
+THE word REASON in the English language has different significations:
+sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles: sometimes for clear
+and fair deductions from those principles: and sometimes for the cause,
+and particularly the final cause. But the consideration I shall have of
+it here is in a signification different from all these; and that is, as
+it stands for a faculty in man, that faculty whereby man is supposed
+to be distinguished from beasts, and wherein it is evident he much
+surpasses them.
+
+
+2. Wherein Reasoning consists.
+
+If general knowledge, as has been shown, consists in a perception of the
+agreement or disagreement of our own ideas, and the knowledge of
+the existence of all things without us (except only of a God, whose
+existence every man may certainly know and demonstrate to himself from
+his own existence), be had only by our senses, what room is there
+for the exercise of any other faculty, but OUTWARD SENSE and INWARD
+PERCEPTION? What need is there of REASON? Very much: both for the
+enlargement of our knowledge, and regulating our assent. For it hath to
+do both in knowledge and opinion, and is necessary and assisting to all
+our other intellectual faculties, and indeed contains two of them, viz.
+SAGACITY and ILLATION. By the one, it finds out; and by the other, it so
+orders the intermediate ideas as to discover what connexion there is
+in each link of the chain, whereby the extremes are held together; and
+thereby, as it were, to draw into view the truth sought for, which is
+that which we call ILLATION or INFERENCE, and consists in nothing but
+the perception of the connexion there is between the ideas, in each step
+of the deduction; whereby the mind comes to see, either the certain
+agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, as in demonstration, in
+which it arrives at KNOWLEDGE; or their probable connexion, on which it
+gives or withholds its assent, as in OPINION. Sense and intuition reach
+but a very little way. The greatest part of our knowledge depends upon
+deductions and intermediate ideas: and in those cases where we are fain
+to substitute assent instead of knowledge, and take propositions for
+true, without being certain they are so, we have need to find out,
+examine, and compare the grounds of their probability. In both these
+cases, the faculty which finds out the means, and rightly applies them,
+to discover certainty in the one, and probability in the other, is
+that which we call REASON. For, as reason perceives the necessary and
+indubitable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to another, in
+each step of any demonstration that produces knowledge; so it likewise
+perceives the probable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to
+another, in every step of a discourse, to which it will think assent
+due. This is the lowest degree of that which can be truly called reason.
+For where the mind does not perceive this probable connexion, where it
+does not discern whether there be any such connexion or no; there men's
+opinions are not the product of judgment, or the consequence of reason,
+but the effects of chance and hazard, of a mind floating at all
+adventures, without choice and without direction.
+
+
+3. Reason in its four degrees.
+
+So that we may in REASON consider these FOUR DEGREES: the first and
+highest is the discovering and finding out of truths; the second, the
+regular and methodical disposition of them, and laying them in a clear
+and fit order, to make their connexion and force be plainly and easily
+perceived; the third is the perceiving their connexion; and the fourth,
+a making a right conclusion. These several degrees may be observed in
+any mathematical demonstration; it being one thing to perceive the
+connexion of each part, as the demonstration is made by another; another
+to perceive the dependence of the conclusion on all the parts; a third,
+to make out a demonstration clearly and neatly one's self; and something
+different from all these, to have first found out these intermediate
+ideas or proofs by which it is made.
+
+
+4. Whether Syllogism is the great Instrument of Reason.
+
+There is one thing more which I shall desire to be considered concerning
+reason; and that is, whether SYLLOGISM, as is generally thought, be
+the proper instrument of it, and the usefullest way of exercising this
+faculty. The causes I have to doubt are these:--
+
+
+First Cause to doubt this.
+
+FIRST, Because syllogism serves our reason but in one only of the
+forementioned parts of it; and that is, to show the CONNEXION OF THE
+PROOFS in any one instance, and no more; but in this it is of no great
+use, since the mind can perceive such connexion, where it really is, as
+easily, nay, perhaps better, without it.
+
+Men can reason well who cannot make a Syllogism.
+
+If we will observe the actings of our own minds, we shall find that we
+reason best and clearest, when we only observe the connexion of the
+proof, without reducing our thoughts to any rule of syllogism. And
+therefore we may take notice, that there are many men that reason
+exceeding clear and rightly, who know not how to make a syllogism. He
+that will look into many parts of Asia and America, will find men reason
+there perhaps as acutely as himself, who yet never heard of a syllogism,
+nor can reduce any one argument to those forms: [and I believe scarce
+any one makes syllogisms in reasoning within himself.] Indeed syllogism
+is made use of, on occasion, to discover a fallacy hid in a rhetorical
+flourish, or cunningly wrapt up in a smooth period; and, stripping an
+absurdity of the cover of wit and good language, show it in its naked
+deformity. But the mind is not taught to reason by these rules; it has a
+native faculty to perceive the coherence or incoherence of its ideas,
+and can range them right without any such perplexing repetitions. Tell
+a country gentlewoman that the wind is south-west, and the weather
+lowering, and like to rain, and she will easily understand it is not
+safe for her to go abroad thin clad in such a day, after a fever: she
+clearly sees the probable connexion of all these, viz. south-west wind,
+and clouds, rain, wetting, taking cold, relapse, and danger of death,
+without tying them together in those artificial and cumbersome fetters
+of several syllogisms, that clog and hinder the mind, which proceeds
+from one part to another quicker and clearer without them: and the
+probability which she easily perceives in things thus in their native
+state would be quite lost, if this argument were managed learnedly, and
+proposed in MODE and FIGURE. For it very often confounds the connexion;
+and, I think, every one will perceive in mathematical demonstrations,
+that the knowledge gained thereby comes shortest and clearest without
+syllogism.
+
+
+Secondly, Because though syllogism serves to show the force or fallacy
+of an argument, made use of in the usual way of discoursing, BY
+SUPPLYING THE ABSENT PROPOSITION, and so, setting it before the view
+in a clear light; yet it no less engages the mind in the perplexity of
+obscure, equivocal, and fallacious terms, wherewith this artificial way
+of reasoning always abounds: it being adapted more to the attaining of
+victory in dispute than the discovery and confirmation of truth in fair
+enquiries.
+
+
+5. Syllogism helps little in Demonstration, less in Probability.
+
+But however it be in knowledge, I think I may truly say, it is OF FAR
+LESS, OR NO USE AT ALL IN PROBABILITIES. For the assent there being
+to be determined by the preponderancy, after due weighing of all the
+proofs, with all circumstances on both sides, nothing is so unfit to
+assist the mind in that as syllogism; which running away with one
+assumed probability, or one topical argument, pursues that till it has
+led the mind quite out of sight of the thing under consideration; and,
+forcing it upon some remote difficulty, holds it fast there; entangled
+perhaps, and, as it were, manacled, in the chain of syllogisms, without
+allowing it the liberty, much less affording it the helps, requisite to
+show on which side, all things considered, is the greater probability.
+
+
+6. Serves not to increase our Knowledge, but to fence with the Knowledge
+we suppose we have.
+
+But let it help us (as perhaps may be said) in convincing men of their
+errors and mistakes: (and yet I would fain see the man that was forced
+out of his opinion by dint of syllogism,) yet still it fails our reason
+in that part, which, if not its highest perfection, is yet certainly its
+hardest task, and that which we most need its help in; and that is
+THE FINDING OUT OF PROOFS, AND MAKING NEW DISCOVERIES. The rules of
+syllogism serve not to furnish the mind with those intermediate ideas
+that may show the connexion of remote ones. This way of reasoning
+discovers no new proofs, but is the art of marshalling and ranging the
+old ones we have already. The forty-seventh proposition of the first
+book of Euclid is very true; but the discovery of it, I think, not owing
+to any rules of common logic. A man knows first and then he is able to
+prove syllogistically. So that syllogism comes after knowledge, and then
+a man has little or no need of it. But it is chiefly by the finding out
+those ideas that show the connexion of distant ones, that our stock of
+knowledge is increased, and that useful arts and sciences are advanced.
+Syllogism, at best, is but the art of fencing with the little knowledge
+we have, without making any addition to it. And if a man should employ
+his reason all this way, he will not do much otherwise than he who,
+having got some iron out of the bowels of the earth, should have it
+beaten up all into swords, and put it into his servants' hands to fence
+with and bang one another. Had the King of Spain employed the hands of
+his people, and his Spanish iron so, he had brought to light but little
+of that treasure that lay so long hid in the dark entrails of America.
+And I am apt to think that he who shall employ all the force of his
+reason only in brandishing of syllogisms, will discover very little of
+that mass of knowledge which lies yet concealed in the secret recesses
+of nature; and which, I am apt to think, native rustic reason (as it
+formerly has done) is likelier to open a way to, and add to the common
+stock of mankind, rather than any scholastic proceeding by the strict
+rules of MODE and FIGURE.
+
+
+7. Other Helps to reason than Syllogism should be sought.
+
+I doubt not, nevertheless, but there are ways to be found to assist
+our reason in this most useful part; and this the judicious Hooker
+encourages me to say, who in his Eccl. Pol. 1. i. Section 6, speaks
+thus: 'If there might be added the right helps of true art and learning,
+(which helps, I must plainly confess, this age of the world, carrying
+the name of a learned age, doth neither much know nor generally regard,)
+there would undoubtedly be almost as much difference in maturity of
+judgment between men therewith inured, and that which men now are, as
+between men that are now, and innocents.' I do not pretend to have found
+or discovered here any of those 'right helps of art,' this great man of
+deep thought mentions: but that is plain, that syllogism, and the logic
+now in use, which were as well known in his days, can be none of those
+he means. It is sufficient for me, if by a Discourse, perhaps something
+out of the way, I am sure, as to me, wholly new and unborrowed, I shall
+have given occasion to others to cast about for new discoveries, and
+to seek in their own thoughts for those right helps of art, which will
+scarce be found, I fear, by those who servilely confine themselves to
+the rules and dictates of others. For beaten tracks lead this sort of
+cattle, (as an observing Roman calls them,) whose thoughts reach only to
+imitation, NON QUO EUNDUM EST, SED QUO ITUR. But I can be bold to say,
+that this age is adorned with some men of that strength of judgment and
+largeness of comprehension, that, if they would employ their thoughts on
+this subject, could open new and undiscovered ways to the advancement of
+knowledge.
+
+
+8. We can reason about Particulars; and the immediate object of all our
+reasonings is nothing but particular ideas.
+
+Having here had occasion to speak of syllogism in general, and the use
+of it in reasoning, and the improvement of our knowledge, it is fit,
+before I leave this subject, to take notice of one manifest mistake in
+the rules of syllogism: viz. that no syllogistical reasoning can be
+right and conclusive, but what has at least one GENERAL proposition in
+it. As if we could not reason, and have knowledge about particulars:
+whereas, in truth, the matter rightly considered, the immediate object
+of all our reasoning and knowledge, is nothing but particulars. Every
+man's reasoning and knowledge is only about the ideas existing in his
+own mind; which are truly, every one of them, particular existences: and
+our knowledge and reason about other things, is only as they correspond
+with those our particular ideas. So that the perception of the agreement
+or disagreement of our particular ideas, is the whole and utmost of all
+our knowledge. Universality is but accidental to it, and consists only
+in this, that the particular ideas about which it is are such as more
+than one particular, thing can correspond with and be represented by.
+But the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our particular
+ideas, and consequently our knowledge, is equally clear and certain,
+whether either, or both, or neither of those ideas, be capable of
+representing more real beings than one, or no.
+
+
+9. Our Reason often fails us.
+
+REASON, though it penetrates into the depths of the sea and earth,
+elevates our thoughts as high as the stars, and leads us through the
+vast spaces and large rooms of this mighty fabric, yet it comes far
+short of the real extent of even corporeal being. And there are many
+instances wherein it fails us: as,
+
+
+First, In cases when we have no Ideas.
+
+I. It perfectly fails us, where our ideas fail. It neither does nor can
+extend itself further than they do. And therefore, wherever we have no
+ideas, our reasoning stops, and we are at an end of our reckoning: and
+if at any time we reason about words which do not stand for any ideas,
+it is only about those sounds, and nothing else.
+
+
+10. Secondly, Because our Ideas are often obscure or imperfect.
+
+II. Our reason is often puzzled and at a loss, because of the obscurity,
+confusion, or imperfection of the ideas it is employed about; and there
+we are involved in difficulties and contradictions. Thus, not having any
+perfect idea of the LEAST EXTENSION OF MATTER, nor of INFINITY, we are
+at a loss about the divisibility of matter; but having perfect, clear,
+and distinct ideas of NUMBER, our reason meets with none of those
+inextricable difficulties in numbers, nor finds itself involved in any
+contradictions about them. Thus, we having but imperfect ideas of the
+operations of our minds, and of the beginning of motion, or thought how
+the mind produces either of them in us, and much imperfecter yet of the
+operation of God, run into great difficulties about FREE CREATED AGENTS,
+which reason cannot well extricate itself out of.
+
+
+11. III. Thirdly, Because we perceive not intermediate Ideas to show
+conclusions.
+
+Our reason is often at a stand, because it perceives not those ideas,
+which could serve to show the certain or probable agreement or
+disagreement of any other two ideas: and in this some men's faculties
+far outgo others. Till algebra, that great instrument and instance of
+human sagacity, was discovered, men with amazement looked on several of
+the demonstrations of ancient mathematicians, and could scarce forbear
+to think the finding several of those proofs to be something more than
+human.
+
+
+12. IV. Fourthly, Because we often proceed upon wrong Principles.
+
+The mind, by proceeding upon false principles, is often engaged in
+absurdities and difficulties, brought into straits and contradictions,
+without knowing how to free itself: and in that case it is in vain to
+implore the help of reason, unless it be to discover the falsehood and
+reject the influence of those wrong principles. Reason is so far from
+clearing the difficulties which the building upon false foundations
+brings a man into, that if he will pursue it, it entangles him the more,
+and engages him deeper in perplexities.
+
+
+13. V. Fifthly, Because we often employ doubtful Terms.
+
+As obscure and imperfect ideas often involve our reason, so, upon the
+same ground, do dubious words and uncertain signs, often, in discourses
+and arguings, when not warily attended to, puzzle men's reason, and
+bring them to a nonplus. But these two latter are our fault, and not
+the fault of reason. But yet the consequences of them are nevertheless
+obvious; and the perplexities or errors they fill men's minds with are
+everywhere observable.
+
+
+14. Our highest Degree of Knowledge is intuitive, without Reasoning.
+
+Some of the ideas that are in the mind, are so there, that they can be
+by themselves immediately compared one with another: and in these the
+mind is able to perceive that they agree or disagree as clearly as that
+it has them. Thus the mind perceives, that an arch of a circle is less
+than the whole circle, as clearly as it does the idea of a circle: and
+this, therefore, as has been said, I call INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE; which is
+certain, beyond all doubt, and needs no probation, nor can have any;
+this being the highest of all human certainty. In this consists the
+evidence of all those MAXIMS which nobody has any doubt about, but every
+man (does not, as is said, only assent to, but) KNOWS to be true, as
+soon as ever they are proposed to his understanding. In the discovery of
+and assent to these truths, there is no use of the discursive faculty,
+NO NEED OF REASONING, but they are known by a superior and higher degree
+of evidence. And such, if I may guess at things unknown, I am apt to
+think that angels have now, and the spirits of just men made perfect
+shall have, in a future state, of thousands of things which now either
+wholly escape our apprehensions, or which our short-sighted reason
+having got some faint glimpse of, we, in the dark, grope after.
+
+
+15. The next is got by Reasoning.
+
+But though we have, here and there, a little of this clear light, some
+sparks of bright knowledge, yet the greatest part of our ideas are such,
+that we cannot discern their agreement or disagreement by an immediate
+comparing them. And in all these we have NEED OF REASONING, and must, by
+discourse and inference, make our discoveries. Now of these there are
+two sorts, which I shall take the liberty to mention here again:--
+
+
+First, through Reasonings that are Demonstrative.
+
+First, Those whose agreement or disagreement, though it cannot be seen
+by an immediate putting them together, yet may be examined by the
+intervention of other ideas which can be compared with them. In this
+case, when the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate idea, on
+both sides, with those which we would compare, is PLAINLY DISCERNED:
+there it amounts to DEMONSTRATION whereby knowledge is produced, which,
+though it be certain, yet it is not so easy, nor altogether so clear
+as intuitive knowledge. Because in that there is barely one simple
+intuition, wherein there is no room for any the least mistake or doubt:
+the truth is seen all perfectly at once. In demonstration, it is true,
+there is intuition too, but not altogether at once; for there must be
+a remembrance of the intuition of the agreement of the medium, or
+intermediate idea, with that we compared it with before, when we compare
+it with the other: and where there be many mediums, there the danger of
+the mistake is the greater. For each agreement or disagreement of the
+ideas must be observed and seen in each step of the whole train, and
+retained in the memory, just as it is; and the mind must be sure that
+no part of what is necessary to make up the demonstration is omitted or
+overlooked. This makes some demonstrations long and perplexed, and too
+hard for those who have not strength of parts distinctly to perceive,
+and exactly carry so many particulars orderly in their heads. And even
+those who are able to master such intricate speculations, are fain
+sometimes to go over them again, and there is need of more than one
+review before they can arrive at certainty. But yet where the mind
+clearly retains the intuition it had of the agreement of any idea with
+another, and that with a third, and that with a fourth, &c., there the
+agreement of the first and the fourth is a demonstration, and produces
+certain knowledge; which may be called RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE, as the other
+is intuitive.
+
+
+16. Secondly, to supply the narrowness of Demonstrative and Intuitive
+Knowledge we have nothing but Judgment upon probable reasoning.
+
+Secondly, There are other ideas, whose agreement or disagreement can no
+otherwise be judged of but by the intervention of others which have not
+a certain agreement with the extremes, but an USUAL or LIKELY one:
+and in these is that the JUDGMENT is properly exercised; which is the
+acquiescing of the mind, that any ideas do agree, by comparing them with
+such probable mediums. This, though it never amounts to knowledge,
+no, not to that which is the lowest degree of it; yet sometimes the
+intermediate ideas tie the extremes so firmly together, and the
+probability is so clear and strong, that ASSENT as necessarily follows
+it, as KNOWLEDGE does demonstration. The great excellency and use of the
+judgment is to observe right, and take a true estimate of the force and
+weight of each probability; and then casting them up all right together,
+choose that side which has the overbalance.
+
+
+17. Intuition, Demonstration, Judgment.
+
+INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE is the perception of the CERTAIN agreement or
+disagreement of two ideas immediately compared together.
+
+RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE is the perception of the CERTAIN agreement or
+disagreement of any two ideas, by the intervention of one or more other
+ideas.
+
+JUDGMENT is the thinking or taking two ideas to agree or disagree,
+by the intervention of one or more ideas, whose certain agreement or
+disagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath observed to be
+FREQUENT and USUAL.
+
+
+18. Consequences of Words, and Consequences of Ideas.
+
+Though the deducing one proposition from another, or making inferences
+in WORDS, be a great part of reason, and that which it is usually
+employed about; yet the principal act of ratiocination is THE FINDING
+THE AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT OF TWO IDEAS ONE WITH ANOTHER, BY THE
+INTERVENTION OF A THIRD. As a man, by a yard, finds two houses to be of
+the same length, which could not be brought together to measure their
+equality by juxta-position. Words have their consequences, as the signs
+of such ideas: and things agree or disagree, as really they are; but we
+observe it only by our ideas.
+
+
+19. Four sorts of Arguments.
+
+Before we quit this subject, it may be worth our while a little to
+reflect on FOUR SORTS OF ARGUMENTS, that men, in their reasonings with
+others, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent; or at
+least so to awe them as to silence their opposition.
+
+
+First, Argumentum ad verecundiam.
+
+I. The first is, to allege the opinions of men, whose parts, learning,
+eminency, power, or some other cause has gained a name, and settled
+their reputation in the common esteem with some kind of authority. When
+men are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach
+of modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question the
+authority of men who are in possession of it. This is apt to be
+censured, as carrying with it too much pride, when a man does not
+readily yield to the determination of approved authors, which is wont to
+be received with respect and submission by others: and it is looked upon
+as insolence, for a man to set up and adhere to his own opinion against
+the current stream of antiquity; or to put it in the balance against
+that of some learned doctor, or otherwise approved writer. Whoever backs
+his tenets with such authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the
+cause, and is ready to style it impudence in any one who shall stand out
+against them. This I think may be called ARGUMENTUM AD VERECUNDIAM.
+
+
+20. Secondly, Argumentum ad Ignorantiam.
+
+II. Secondly, Another way that men ordinarily use to drive others, and
+force them to submit their judgments, and receive the opinion in debate,
+is to require the adversary to admit what they allege as a proof, or to
+assign a better. And this I call ARGUMENTUM AD IGNORANTIAM.
+
+
+21. Thirdly, Argumentum ad hominem.
+
+III. Thirdly, A third way is to press a man with consequences drawn from
+his own principles or concessions. This is already known under the name
+of ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM.
+
+
+22. Fourthly, Argumentum ad justicium. The Fourth alone advances us in
+knowledge and judgment.
+
+IV. The fourth is the using of proofs drawn from any of the foundations
+of knowledge or probability. This I call ARGUMENTUM AD JUSTICIUM. This
+alone, of all the four, brings true instruction with it, and advances us
+in our way to knowledge. For, 1. It argues not another man's opinion to
+be right, because I, out of respect, or any other consideration but that
+of conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It proves not another man to
+be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same with him, because
+I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another man is in the
+right way, because he has shown me that I am in the wrong. I may be
+modest, and therefore not oppose another man's persuasion: I may be
+ignorant, and not be able to produce a better: I may be in an error, and
+another may show me that I am so. This may dispose me, perhaps, for the
+reception of truth, but helps me not to it: that must come from proofs
+and arguments, and light arising from the nature of things themselves,
+and not from my shamefacedness, ignorance, or error.
+
+
+23. Above, contrary, and according to Reason.
+
+By what has been before said of reason, we may be able to make some
+guess at the distinction of things, into those that are according
+to, above, and contrary to reason. 1. ACCORDING TO REASON are such
+propositions whose truth we can discover by examining and tracing those
+ideas we have from sensation and reflection; and by natural deduction
+find to be true or probable. 2. ABOVE REASON are such propositions whose
+truth or probability we cannot by reason derive from those principles.
+3. CONTRARY TO REASON are such propositions as are inconsistent with or
+irreconcilable to our clear and distinct ideas. Thus the existence of
+one God is according to reason; the existence of more than one God,
+contrary to reason; the resurrection of the dead, above reason. ABOVE
+REASON also may be taken in a double sense, viz. either as signifying
+above probability, or above certainty: and in that large sense also,
+CONTRARY TO REASON, is, I suppose, sometimes taken.
+
+
+24. Reason and Faith not opposite, for Faith must be regulated by
+Reason.
+
+There is another use of the word REASON, wherein it is OPPOSED TO FAITH:
+which, though it be in itself a very improper way of speaking, yet
+common use has so authorized it, that it would be folly either to oppose
+or hope to remedy it. Only I think it may not be amiss to take notice,
+that, however faith be opposed to reason, faith is nothing but a firm
+assent of the mind: which, if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be
+afforded to anything but upon good reason; and so cannot be opposite to
+it. He that believes without having any reason for believing, may be in
+love with his own fancies; but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor pays
+the obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning
+faculties he has given him, to keep him out of mistake and error. He
+that does not this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lights
+on truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether
+the luckiness of the accident will excuse the irregularity of his
+proceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be accountable for
+whatever mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes use of the light
+and faculties God has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover truth
+by those helps and abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in doing
+his duty as a rational creature, that, though he should miss truth, he
+will not miss the reward of it. For he governs his assent right, and
+places it as he should, who, in any case or matter whatsoever, believes
+or disbelieves according as reason directs him. He that doth otherwise,
+transgresses against his own light, and misuses those faculties which
+were given him to no other end, but to search and follow the clearer
+evidence and greater probability. But since reason and faith are by some
+men opposed, we will so consider them in the following chapter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVIII.
+
+OF FAITH AND REASON, AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCES.
+
+
+1. Necessary to know their boundaries.
+
+It has been above shown, 1. That we are of necessity ignorant, and want
+knowledge of all sorts, where we want ideas. 2. That we are ignorant,
+and want rational knowledge, where we want proofs. 3. That we want
+certain knowledge and certainty, as far as we want clear and determined
+specific ideas. 4. That we want probability to direct our assent in
+matters where we have neither knowledge of our own nor testimony of
+other men to bottom our reason upon. From these things thus premised, I
+think we may come to lay down THE MEASURES AND BOUNDARIES BETWEEN FAITH
+AND REASON: the want whereof may possibly have been the cause, if not of
+great disorders, yet at least of great disputes, and perhaps mistakes
+in the world. For till it be resolved how far we are to be guided by
+reason, and how far by faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavour to
+convince one another in matters of religion.
+
+
+2. Faith and Reason, what, as contradistingushed.
+
+I find every sect, as far as reason will help them, make use of it
+gladly: and where it fails them, they cry out, It is matter of faith,
+and above reason. And I do not see how they can argue with any one,
+or ever convince a gainsayer who makes use of the same plea, without
+setting down strict boundaries between faith and reason; which ought to
+be the first point established in all questions where faith has anything
+to do.
+
+REASON, therefore, here, as contradistinguished to FAITH, I take to be
+the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or
+truths, which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas,
+which it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz. by sensation
+or reflection.
+
+FAITH, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, not thus
+made out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit of
+the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of
+communication. This way of discovering truths to men, we call
+REVELATION.
+
+
+3. First, No new simple Idea can be conveyed by traditional Revelation.
+
+FIRST, Then I say, that NO MAN INSPIRED BY GOD CAN BY ANY REVELATION
+COMMUNICATE TO OTHERS ANY NEW SIMPLE IDEAS WHICH THEY HAD NOT BEFORE
+FROM SENSATION OR REFLECTION. For, whatsoever impressions he himself may
+have from the immediate hand of God, this revelation, if it be of new
+simple ideas, cannot be conveyed to another, either by words or any
+other signs. Because words, by their immediate operation on us, cause no
+other ideas but of their natural sounds: and it is by the custom of
+using them for signs, that they excite and revive in our minds latent
+ideas; but yet only such ideas as were there before. For words, seen or
+heard, recal to our thoughts those ideas only which to us they have been
+wont to be signs of, but cannot introduce any perfectly new, and
+formerly unknown simple ideas. The same holds in all other signs; which
+cannot signify to us things of which we have before never had any idea
+at all.
+
+Thus whatever things were discovered to St. Paul, when he was rapt up
+into the third heaven; whatever new ideas his mind there received, all
+the description he can make to others of that place, is only this, That
+there are such things, 'as eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath
+it entered into the heart of man to conceive.' And supposing God should
+discover to any one, supernaturally, a species of creatures inhabiting,
+for example, Jupiter or Saturn, (for that it is possible there may be
+such, nobody can deny,) which had six senses; and imprint on his mind
+the ideas conveyed to theirs by that sixth sense: he could no more, by
+words, produce in the minds of other men those ideas imprinted by that
+sixth sense, than one of us could convey the idea of any colour, by the
+sound of words, into a man who, having the other four senses perfect,
+had always totally wanted the fifth, of seeing. For our simple ideas,
+then, which are the foundation, and sole matter of all our notions and
+knowledge, we must depend wholly on our reason, I mean our natural
+faculties; and can by no means receive them, or any of them, from
+traditional revelation. I say, TRADITIONAL REVELATION, in distinction to
+ORIGINAL REVELATION. By the one, I mean that first impression which is
+made immediately by God on the mind of any man, to which we cannot set
+any bounds; and by the other, those impressions delivered over to others
+in words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions one to
+another.
+
+
+4. Secondly, Traditional Revelation may make us know Propositions
+knowable also by Reason, but not with the same Certainty that Reason
+doth.
+
+SECONDLY, I say that THE SAME TRUTHS MAY BE DISCOVERED, AND CONVEYED
+DOWN FROM REVELATION, WHICH ARE DISCERNABLE TO US BY REASON, AND BY
+THOSE IDEAS WE NATURALLY MAY HAVE. So God might, by revelation, discover
+the truth of any proposition in Euclid; as well as men, by the natural
+use of their faculties, come to make the discovery themselves. In all
+things of this kind there is little need or use of revelation, God
+having furnished us with natural and surer means to arrive at the
+knowledge of them. For whatsoever truth we come to the clear discovery
+of, from the knowledge and contemplation of our own ideas, will always
+be certainer to us than those which are conveyed to us by TRADITIONAL
+REVELATION. For the knowledge we have that this revelation came at first
+from God, can never be so sure as the knowledge we have from the clear
+and distinct perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own
+ideas: v.g. if it were revealed some ages since, that the three angles
+of a triangle were equal to two right ones, I might assent to the truth
+of that proposition, upon the credit of the tradition, that it was
+revealed: but that would never amount to so great a certainty as the
+knowledge of it, upon the comparing and measuring my own ideas of two
+right angles, and the three angles of a triangle. The like holds in
+matter of fact knowable by our senses; v.g. the history of the deluge is
+conveyed to us by writings which had their original from revelation: and
+yet nobody, I think, will say he has as certain and clear a knowledge of
+the flood as Noah, that saw it; or that he himself would have had, had
+he then been alive and seen it. For he has no greater an assurance than
+that of his senses, that it is writ in the book supposed writ by Moses
+inspired: but he has not so great an assurance that Moses wrote that
+book as if he had seen Moses write it. So that the assurance of its
+being a revelation is less still than the assurance of his senses.
+
+
+5. Even Original Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear Evidence
+of Reason.
+
+In propositions, then, whose certainty is built upon the clear
+perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, attained
+either by immediate intuition, as in self-evident propositions, or
+by evident deductions of reason in demonstrations we need not the
+assistance of revelation, as necessary to gain our assent, and introduce
+them into our minds. Because the natural ways of knowledge could settle
+them there, or had done it already; which is the greatest assurance we
+can possibly have of anything, unless where God immediately reveals it
+to us: and there too our assurance can be no greater than our knowledge
+is, that it IS a revelation from God. But yet nothing, I think, can,
+under that title, shake or overrule plain knowledge; or rationally
+prevail with any man to admit it for true, in a direct contradiction to
+the clear evidence of his own understanding. For, since no evidence of
+our faculties, by which we receive such revelations, can exceed, if
+equal, the certainty of our intuitive knowledge, we can never receive
+for a truth anything that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct
+knowledge; v.g. the ideas of one body and one place do so clearly agree,
+and the mind has so evident a perception of their agreement, that we can
+never assent to a proposition that affirms the same body to be in two
+distant places at once, however it should pretend to the authority of
+a divine revelation: since the evidence, first, that we deceive not
+ourselves, in ascribing it to God; secondly, that we understand it
+right; can never be so great as the evidence of our own intuitive
+knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible for the same body to be in
+two places at once. And therefore NO PROPOSITION CAN BE RECEIVED FOR
+DIVINE REVELATION, OR OBTAIN THE ASSENT DUE TO ALL SUCH, IF IT BE
+CONTRADICTORY TO OUR CLEAR INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. Because this would be to
+subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and
+assent whatsoever: and there would be left no difference between truth
+and falsehood, no measures of credible and incredible in the world, if
+doubtful propositions shall take place before self-evident; and what
+we certainly know give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in. In
+propositions therefore contrary to the clear perception of the agreement
+or disagreement of any of our ideas, it will be in vain to urge them as
+matters of faith. They cannot move our assent under that or any other
+title whatsoever. For faith can never convince us of anything that
+contradicts our knowledge. Because, though faith be founded on the
+testimony of God (who cannot lie) revealing any proposition to us:
+yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a divine
+revelation greater than our own knowledge. Since the whole strength of
+the certainty depends upon our knowledge that God revealed it; which,
+in this case, where the proposition supposed revealed contradicts our
+knowledge or reason, will always have this objection hanging to it, viz.
+that we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from God, the bountiful
+Author of our being, which, if received for true, must overturn all the
+principles and foundations of knowledge he has given us; render all
+our faculties useless; wholly destroy the most excellent part of his
+workmanship, our understandings; and put a man in a condition wherein he
+will have less light, less conduct than the beast that perisheth. For
+if the mind of man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not so clear)
+evidence of anything to be a divine revelation, as it has of the
+principles of its own reason, it can never have a ground to quit the
+clear evidence of its reason, to give a place to a proposition, whose
+revelation has not a greater evidence than those principles have.
+
+
+6. Traditional Revelation much less.
+
+Thus far a man has use of reason, and ought to hearken to it, even in
+immediate and original revelation, where it is supposed to be made to
+himself. But to all those who pretend not to immediate revelation, but
+are required to pay obedience, and to receive the truths revealed to
+others, which, by the tradition of writings, or word of mouth, are
+conveyed down to them, reason has a great deal more to do, and is that
+only which can induce us to receive them. For matter of faith being only
+divine revelation, and nothing else, faith, as we use the word, (called
+commonly DIVINE FAITH), has to do with no propositions, but those which
+are supposed to be divinely revealed. So that I do not see how those who
+make revelation alone the sole object of faith can say, That it is a
+matter of faith, and not of reason, to believe that such or such
+a proposition, to be found in such or such a book, is of divine
+inspiration; unless it be revealed that that proposition, or all in that
+book, was communicated by divine inspiration. Without such a revelation,
+the believing, or not believing, that proposition, or book, to be of
+divine authority, can never be matter of faith, but matter of reason;
+and such as I must come to an assent to only by the use of my reason,
+which can never require or enable me to believe that which is contrary
+to itself: it being impossible for reason ever to procure any assent to
+that which to itself appears unreasonable.
+
+In all things, therefore, where we have clear evidence from our ideas,
+and those principles of knowledge I have above mentioned, reason is the
+proper judge; and revelation, though it may, in consenting with it,
+confirm its dictates, yet cannot in such cases invalidate its decrees:
+nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident sentence of
+reason, to quit it for the contrary opinion, under a pretence that it is
+matter of faith: which can have no authority against the plain and clear
+dictates of reason.
+
+
+7. Thirdly, things above Reason are, when revealed, the proper matter of
+faith.
+
+But, THIRDLY, There being many things wherein we have very imperfect
+notions, or none at all; and other things, of whose past, present, or
+future existence, by the natural use of our faculties, we can have no
+knowledge at all; these, as being beyond the discovery of our natural
+faculties, and ABOVE REASON, are, when revealed, THE PROPER MATTER OF
+FAITH. Thus, that part of the angels rebelled against God, and thereby
+lost their first happy state: and that the dead shall rise, and live
+again: these and the like, being beyond the discovery of reason, are
+purely matters of faith, with which reason has directly nothing to do.
+
+
+8. Or not contrary to Reason, if revealed, are Matter of Faith; and must
+carry it against probable conjectures of Reason.
+
+But since God, in giving us the light of reason, has not thereby tied
+up his own hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the light of
+revelation in any of those matters wherein our natural faculties are
+able to give a probable determination; REVELATION, where God has been
+pleased to give it, MUST CARRY IT AGAINST THE PROBABLE CONJECTURES OF
+REASON. Because the mind not being certain of the truth of that it does
+not evidently know, but only yielding to the probability that appears
+in it, is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony which, it is
+satisfied, comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive. But
+yet, it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being
+a revelation, and of the signification of the words wherein it is
+delivered. Indeed, if anything shall be thought revelation which is
+contrary to the plain principles of reason, and the evident knowledge
+the mind has of its own clear and distinct ideas; there reason must be
+hearkened to, as to a matter within its province. Since a man can never
+have so certain a knowledge, that a proposition which contradicts
+the clear principles and evidence of his own knowledge was divinely
+revealed, or that he understands the words rightly wherein it is
+delivered, as he has that the contrary is true, and so is bound to
+consider and judge of it as a matter of reason, and not swallow it,
+without examination, as a matter of faith.
+
+
+9. Revelation in Matters where Reason cannot judge, or but probably,
+ought to be hearkened to.
+
+First, Whatever proposition is revealed, of whose truth our mind, by its
+natural faculties and notions, cannot judge, that is purely matter of
+faith, and above reason.
+
+Secondly, All propositions whereof the mind, by the use of its natural
+faculties, can come to determine and judge, from naturally acquired
+ideas, are matter of reason; with this difference still, that, in those
+concerning which it has but an uncertain evidence, and so is persuaded
+of their truth only upon probable grounds, which still admit a
+possibility of the contrary to be true, without doing violence to the
+certain evidence of its own knowledge, and overturning the principles of
+all reason; in such probable propositions, I say, an evident revelation
+ought to determine our assent, even against probability. For where the
+principles of reason have not evidenced a proposition to be certainly
+true or false, there clear revelation, as another principle of truth and
+ground of assent, may determine; and so it may be matter of faith, and
+be also above reason. Because reason, in that particular matter, being
+able to reach no higher than probability, faith gave the determination
+where reason came short; and revelation discovered on which side the
+truth lay.
+
+
+10. In Matters where Reason can afford certain Knowledge, that is to be
+hearkened to.
+
+Thus far the dominion of faith reaches, and that without any violence or
+hindrance to reason; which is not injured or disturbed, but assisted and
+improved by new discoveries of truth, coming from the eternal fountain
+of all knowledge. Whatever God hath revealed is certainly true: no doubt
+can be made of it. This is the proper object of faith: but whether it be
+a DIVINE revelation or no, reason must judge; which can never permit the
+mind to reject a greater evidence to embrace what is less evident,
+nor allow it to entertain probability in opposition to knowledge and
+certainty. There can be no evidence that any traditional revelation is
+of divine original, in the words we receive it, and in the sense we
+understand it, so clear and so certain as that of the principles of
+reason: and therefore NOTHING THAT IS CONTRARY TO, AND INCONSISTENT
+WITH, THE CLEAR AND SELF-EVIDENT DICTATES OF REASON, HAS A RIGHT TO BE
+URGED OR ASSENTED TO AS A MATTER OF FAITH, WHEREIN REASON HATH NOTHING
+TO DO. Whatsoever is divine revelation, ought to overrule all our
+opinions, prejudices, and interest, and hath a right to be received with
+full assent. Such a submission as this, of our reason to faith, takes
+not away the landmarks of knowledge: this shakes not the foundations
+of reason, but leaves us that use of our faculties for which they were
+given us.
+
+
+11. If the Boundaries be not set between Faith and Reason, no Enthusiasm
+or Extravagancy in Religion can be contradicted.
+
+If the provinces of faith and reason are not kept distinct by these
+boundaries, there will, in matters of religion, be no room for reason at
+all; and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies that are to be found
+in the several religions of the world will not deserve to be blamed.
+For, to this crying up of faith in OPPOSITION to reason, we may, I
+think, in good measure ascribe those absurdities that fill almost all
+the religions which possess and divide mankind. For men having been
+principled with an opinion, that they must not consult reason in the
+things of religion, however apparently contradictory to common sense and
+the very principles of all their knowledge, have let loose their fancies
+and natural superstition; and have been by them led into so strange
+opinions, and extravagant practices in religion, that a considerate man
+cannot but stand amazed, at their follies, and judge them so far from
+being acceptable to the great and wise God, that he cannot avoid
+thinking them ridiculous and offensive to a sober good man. So that,
+in effect, religion, which should most distinguish us from beasts,
+and ought most peculiarly to elevate us, as rational creatures, above
+brutes, is that wherein men often appear most irrational, and more
+senseless than beasts themselves. CREDO, QUIA IMPOSSIBILE EST: I
+believe, because it is impossible, might, in a good man, pass for a
+sally of zeal; but would prove a very ill rule for men to choose their
+opinions or religion by.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIX. [not in early editions]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XX.
+
+OF WRONG ASSENT, OR ERROR.
+
+
+1. Causes of Error, or how men come to give assent contrary to
+probability.
+
+KNOWLEDGE being to be had only of visible and certain truth, ERROR is
+not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment giving
+assent to that which is not true.
+
+But if assent be grounded on likelihood, if the proper object and motive
+of our assent be probability, and that probability consists in what is
+laid down in the foregoing chapters, it will be demanded HOW MEN COME TO
+GIVE THEIR ASSENTS CONTRARY TO PROBABILITY. For there is nothing more
+common than contrariety of opinions; nothing more obvious than that
+one man wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of, and a third
+steadfastly believes and firmly adheres to.
+
+The reasons whereof, though they may be very various, yet, I suppose may
+all be reduced to these four:
+
+I. WANT OF PROOFS.
+
+II. WANT OF ABILITY TO USE THEM.
+
+III. WANT OF WILL TO SEE THEM.
+
+IV. WRONG MEASURES OF PROBABILITY.
+
+
+2. First cause of Error, Want of Proofs.
+
+FIRST, By WANT OF PROOFS, I do not mean only the want of those proofs
+which are nowhere extant, and so are nowhere to be had; but the want
+even of those proofs which are in being, or might be procured. And thus
+men want proofs, who have not the convenience or opportunity to make
+experiments and observations themselves, tending to the proof of any
+proposition; nor likewise the convenience to inquire into and collect
+the testimonies of others: and in this state are the greatest part of
+mankind, who are given up to labour, and enslaved to the necessity of
+their mean condition, whose lives are worn out only in the provisions
+for living. These men's opportunities of knowledge and inquiry are
+commonly as narrow as their fortunes; and their understandings are but
+little instructed, when all their whole time and pains is laid out to
+still the croaking of their own bellies, or the cries of their children.
+It is not to be expected that a man who drudges on all his life in a
+laborious trade, should be more knowing in the variety of things done
+in the world than a packhorse, who is driven constantly forwards and
+backwards in a narrow lane and dirty road, only to market, should be
+skilled in the geography of the country. Nor is it at all more possible,
+that he who wants leisure, books, and languages, and the opportunity
+of conversing with variety of men, should be in a condition to collect
+those testimonies and observations which are in being, and are necessary
+to make out many, nay most, of the propositions that, in the societies
+of men, are judged of the greatest moment; or to find out grounds of
+assurance so great as the belief of the points he would build on them is
+thought necessary. So that a great part of mankind are, by the natural
+and unalterable state of things in this world, and the constitution of
+human affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible ignorance of those
+proofs on which others build, and which are necessary to establish those
+opinions: the greatest part of men, having much to do to get the means
+of living, are not in a condition to look after those of learned and
+laborious inquiries.
+
+
+3. Objection, What shall become of those who want Proofs? Answered.
+
+What shall we say, then? Are the greatest part of mankind, by the
+necessity of their condition, subjected to unavoidable ignorance, in
+those things which are of greatest importance to them? (for of those
+it is obvious to inquire.) Have the bulk of mankind no other guide but
+accident and blind chance to conduct them to their happiness or
+misery? Are the current opinions, and licensed guides of every country
+sufficient evidence and security to every man to venture his great
+concernments on; nay, his everlasting happiness or misery? Or can those
+be the certain and infallible oracles and standards of truth, which
+teach one thing in Christendom and another in Turkey? Or shall a poor
+countryman be eternally happy, for having the chance to be born in
+Italy; or a day-labourer be unavoidably lost, because he had the
+ill-luck to be born in England? How ready some men may be to say some of
+these things, I will not here examine: but this I am sure, that men must
+allow one or other of these to be true, (let them choose which they
+please,) or else grant that God has furnished men with faculties
+sufficient to direct them in the way they should take, if they will but
+seriously employ them that way, when their ordinary vocations allow them
+the leisure. No man is so wholly taken up with the attendance on the
+means of living, as to have no spare time at all to think of his soul,
+and inform himself in matters of religion. Were men as intent upon this
+as they are on things of lower concernment, there are none so enslaved
+to the necessities of life who might not find many vacancies that might
+be husbanded to this advantage of their knowledge.
+
+
+4. People hindered from Inquiry.
+
+Besides those whose improvements and informations are straitened by
+the narrowness of their fortunes, there are others whose largeness of
+fortune would plentifully enough supply books, and other requisites for
+clearing of doubts, and discovering of truth: but they are cooped in
+close, by the laws of their countries, and the strict guards of those
+whose interest it is to keep them ignorant, lest, knowing more, they
+should believe the less in them. These are as far, nay further, from
+the liberty and opportunities of a fair inquiry, than these poor and
+wretched labourers we before spoke of: and however they may seem high
+and great, are confined to narrowness of thought, and enslaved in that
+which should be the freest part of man, their understandings. This is
+generally the case of all those who live in places where care is taken
+to propagate truth without knowledge; where men are forced, at a
+venture, to be of the religion of the country; and must therefore
+swallow down opinions, as silly people do empiric's pills, without
+knowing what they are made of, or how they will work, and having nothing
+to do but believe that they will do the cure: but in this are much
+more miserable than they, in that they are not at liberty to refuse
+swallowing what perhaps they had rather let alone; or to choose the
+physician, to whose conduct they would trust themselves.
+
+
+5. Second Cause of Error, Want of skill to use Proofs.
+
+SECONDLY, Those who WANT SKILL TO USE THOSE EVIDENCES THEY HAVE OF
+PROBABILITIES; who cannot carry a train of consequences in their heads;
+nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary proofs and testimonies,
+making every circumstance its due allowance; may be easily misled to
+assent to positions that are not probable. There are some men of one,
+some but of two syllogisms, and no more; and others that can but advance
+one step further. These cannot always discern that side on which the
+strongest proofs lie; cannot constantly follow that which in itself is
+the more probable opinion. Now that there is such a difference between
+men, in respect of their understandings, I think nobody, who has had any
+conversation with his neighbours, will question: though he never was at
+Westminster-Hall or the Exchange on the one hand, nor at Alms-houses
+or Bedlam on the other. Which great difference in men's intellectuals,
+whether it rises from any defect in the organs of the body, particularly
+adapted to thinking; or in the dulness or untractableness of those
+faculties for want of use; or, as some think, in the natural differences
+of men's souls themselves; or some, or all of these together; it matters
+not here to examine: only this is evident, that there is a difference of
+degrees in men's understandings, apprehensions, and reasonings, to so
+great a latitude, that one may, without doing injury to mankind, affirm,
+that there is a greater distance between some men and others in this
+respect, than between some men and some beasts. But how this comes about
+is a speculation, though of great consequence, yet not necessary to our
+present purpose.
+
+
+6. Third cause of Error, Want of Will to use them.
+
+THIRDLY, There are another sort of people that want proofs, not because
+they are out of their reach, but BECAUSE THEY WILL NOT USE THEM: who,
+though they have riches and leisure enough, and want neither parts nor
+learning, may yet, through their hot pursuit of pleasure, or business,
+or else out of laziness or fear that the doctrines whose truth they
+would inquire into would not suit well with their opinions, lives or
+designs, may never come to the knowledge of, nor give their assent to,
+those possibilities which lie so much within their view, that, to be
+convinced of them, they need but turn their eyes that way. We know some
+men will not read a letter which is supposed to bring ill news; and many
+men forbear to cast up their accounts, or so much as think upon their
+estates, who have reason to fear their affairs are in no very good
+posture. How men, whose plentiful fortunes allow them leisure to improve
+their understandings, can satisfy themselves with a lazy ignorance, I
+cannot tell: but methinks they have a low opinion of their souls, who
+lay out all their incomes in provisions for the body, and employ none of
+it to procure the means and helps of knowledge; who take great care to
+appear always in a neat and splendid outside, and would think themselves
+miserable in coarse clothes, or a patched coat, and yet contentedly
+suffer their minds to appear abroad in a piebald livery of coarse
+patches and borrowed shreds, such as it has pleased chance, or their
+country tailor (I mean the common opinion of those they have conversed
+with) to clothe them in. I will not here mention how unreasonable this
+is for men that ever think of a future state, and their concernment in
+it, which no rational man can avoid to do sometimes: nor shall I take
+notice what a shame and confusion it is to the greatest contemners of
+knowledge, to be found ignorant in things they are concerned to
+know. But this at least is worth the consideration of those who call
+themselves gentlemen, That, however they may think credit, respect,
+power, and authority the concomitants of their birth and fortune, yet
+they will find all these still carried away from them by men of lower
+condition, who surpass them in knowledge. They who are blind will
+always be led by those that see, or else fall into the ditch: and he
+is certainly the most subjected, the most enslaved, who is so in his
+understanding. In the foregoing instances some of the causes have been
+shown of wrong assent, and how it comes to pass, that probable doctrines
+are not always received with an assent proportionable to the reasons
+which are to be had for their probability: but hitherto we have
+considered only such probabilities whose proofs do exist, but do not
+appear to him who embraces the error.
+
+
+7. Fourth cause of Error, Wrong Measures of Probability: which are--
+
+FOURTHLY, There remains yet the last sort, who, even where the real
+probabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do not admit
+of the conviction, nor yield unto manifest reasons, but do either
+suspend their assent, or give it to the less probable opinion. And
+to this danger are those exposed who have taken up WRONG MEASURES OF
+PROBABILITY, which are:
+
+I. PROPOSITIONS THAT ARE IN THEMSELVES CERTAIN AND EVIDENT, BUT DOUBTFUL
+AND FALSE, TAKEN UP FOR PRINCIPLES.
+
+II. RECEIVED HYPOTHESES.
+
+III. PREDOMINANT PASSIONS OR INCLINATIONS.
+
+IV. AUTHORITY.
+
+
+8. I. Doubtful Propositions taken for Principles.
+
+The first and firmest ground of probability is the conformity anything
+has to our own knowledge; especially that part of our knowledge which
+we have embraced, and continue to look on as PRINCIPLES. These have so
+great an influence upon our opinions, that it is usually by them we
+judge of truth, and measure probability; to that degree, that what is
+inconsistent with our principles, is so far from passing for probable
+with us, that it will not be allowed possible. The reverence borne to
+these principles is so great, and their authority so paramount to all
+other, that the testimony, not only of other men, but the evidence of
+our own senses are often rejected, when they offer to vouch anything
+contrary to these established rules. How much the doctrine of INNATE
+PRINCIPLES, and that principles are not to be proved or questioned, has
+contributed to this, I will not here examine. This I readily grant, that
+one truth cannot contradict another: but withal I take leave also to
+say, that every one ought very carefully to beware what he admits for a
+principle, to examine it strictly, and see whether he certainly knows it
+to be true of itself, by its own evidence, or whether he does only with
+assurance believe it to be so, upon the authority of others. For he
+hath a strong bias put into his understanding, which will unavoidably
+misguide his assent, who hath imbibed WRONG PRINCIPLES, and has blindly
+given himself up to the authority of any opinion in itself not evidently
+true.
+
+
+9. Instilled in childhood.
+
+There is nothing more ordinary than children's receiving into their
+minds propositions (especially about matters of religion) from their
+parents, nurses, or those about them: which being insinuated into their
+unwary as well as unbiassed understandings, and fastened by degrees, are
+at last (equally whether true or false) riveted there by long custom and
+education, beyond all possibility of being pulled out again. For men,
+when they are grown up, reflecting upon their opinions, and finding
+those of this sort to be as ancient in their minds as their very
+memories, not having observed their early insinuation, nor by what means
+they got them, they are apt to reverence them as sacred things, and not
+to suffer them to be profaned, touched, or questioned: they look on
+them as the Urim and Thummim set up in their minds immediately by God
+himself, to be the great and unerring deciders of truth and falsehood,
+and the judges to which they are to appeal in all manner of
+controversies.
+
+
+10. Of irresistible efficacy.
+
+This opinion of his principles (let them be what they will) being once
+established in any one's mind, it is easy to be imagined what reception
+any proposition shall find, how clearly soever proved, that shall
+invalidate their authority, or at all thwart with these internal
+oracles; whereas the grossest absurdities and improbabilities, being but
+agreeable to such principles, go down glibly, and are easily digested.
+The great obstinacy that is to be found in men firmly believing quite
+contrary opinions, though many times equally absurd, in the various
+religions of mankind, are as evident a proof as they are an unavoidable
+consequence of this way of reasoning from received traditional
+principles. So that men will disbelieve their own eyes, renounce the
+evidence of their senses, and give their own experience the lie, rather
+than admit of anything disagreeing with these sacred tenets. Take an
+intelligent Romanist that, from the first dawning of any notions in his
+understanding, hath had this principle constantly inculcated, viz. that
+he must believe as the church (i.e. those of his communion) believes,
+or that the pope is infallible, and this he never so much as heard
+questioned, till at forty or fifty years old he met with one of other
+principles: how is he prepared easily to swallow, not only against all
+probability, but even the clear evidence of his senses, the doctrine of
+TRANSUBSTANTIATION? This principle has such an influence on his mind,
+that he will believe that to be flesh which he sees to be bread. And
+what way will you take to convince a man of any improbable opinion he
+holds, who, with some philosophers, hath laid down this as a foundation
+of reasoning, That he must believe his reason (for so men improperly
+call arguments drawn from their principles) against his senses? Let an
+enthusiast be principled that he or his teacher is inspired, and acted
+by an immediate communication of the Divine Spirit, and you in vain
+bring the evidence of clear reasons against his doctrine. Whoever,
+therefore, have imbibed wrong principles, are not, in things
+inconsistent with these principles, to be moved by the most apparent
+and convincing probabilities, till they are so candid and ingenuous to
+themselves, as to be persuaded to examine even those very principles,
+which many never suffer themselves to do.
+
+
+11. Received Hypotheses.
+
+Next to these are men whose understandings are cast into a mould, and
+fashioned just to the size of a received HYPOTHESIS. The difference
+between these and the former, is, that they will admit of matter of
+fact, and agree with dissenters in that; but differ only in assigning of
+reasons and explaining the manner of operation. These are not at that
+open defiance with their senses, with the former: they can endure to
+hearken to their information a little more patiently; but will by no
+means admit of their reports in the explanation of things; nor be
+prevailed on by probabilities, which would convince them that things
+are not brought about just after the same manner that they have decreed
+within themselves that they are. Would it not be an insufferable thing
+for a learned professor, and that which his scarlet would blush at, to
+have his authority of forty years standing, wrought out of hard rock,
+Greek and Latin, with no small expense of time and candle, and confirmed
+by general tradition and a reverend beard, in an instant overturned
+by an upstart novelist? Can any one expect that he should be made to
+confess, that what he taught his scholars thirty years ago was all error
+and mistake; and that he sold them hard words and ignorance at a very
+dear rate. What probabilities, I say, are sufficient to prevail in such
+a case? And who ever, by the most cogent arguments, will be prevailed
+with to disrobe himself at once of all his old opinions, and pretences
+to knowledge and learning, which with hard study he hath all this time
+been labouring for; and turn himself out stark naked, in quest afresh of
+new notions? All the arguments that can be used will be as little able
+to prevail, as the wind did with the traveller to part with his cloak,
+which he held only the faster. To this of wrong hypothesis may be
+reduced the errors that may be occasioned by a true hypothesis, or right
+principles, but not rightly understood. There is nothing more familiar
+than this. The instances of men contending for different opinions, which
+they all derive from the infallible truth of the Scripture, are an
+undeniable proof of it. All that call themselves Christians, allow the
+text that says,[word in Greek], to carry in it the obligation to a very
+weighty duty. But yet how very erroneous will one of their practices
+be, who, understanding nothing but the French, take this rule with one
+translation to be, REPENTEZ-VOUS, repent; or with the other, FATIEZ
+PENITENCE, do penance.
+
+
+12. III. Predominant Passions.
+
+Probabilities which cross men's appetites and prevailing passions run
+the same fate. Let ever so much probability hang on one side of a
+covetous man's reasoning, and money on the other; it is easy to foresee
+which will outweigh. Earthly minds, like mud walls, resist the strongest
+batteries: and though, perhaps, sometimes the force of a clear argument
+may make some impression, yet they nevertheless stand firm, and keep
+out the enemy, truth, that would captivate or disturb them. Tell a man
+passionately in love, that he is jilted; bring a score of witnesses of
+the falsehood of his mistress, it is ten to one but three kind words
+of hers shall invalidate all their testimonies. QUOD VOLUMUS, FACILE
+CREDIMUS; what suits our wishes, is forwardly believed, is, I suppose,
+what every one hath more than once experimented: and though men cannot
+always openly gainsay or resist the force of manifest probabilities that
+make against them, yet yield they not to the argument. Not but that it
+is the nature of the understanding constantly to close with the more
+probable side; but yet a man hath a power to suspend and restrain its
+inquiries, and not permit a full and satisfactory examination, as far as
+the matter in question is capable, and will bear it to be made. Until
+that be done, there will be always these two ways left of evading the
+most apparent probabilities:
+
+
+13. Two Means of evading Probabilities: 1. Supposed Fallacy latent in
+the words employed.
+
+First, That the arguments being (as for the most part they are) brought
+in words, THERE MAY BE A FALLACY LATENT IN THEM: and the consequences
+being, perhaps, many in train, they may be some of them incoherent.
+There are very few discourses so short, clear, and consistent, to which
+most men may not, with satisfaction enough to themselves, raise this
+doubt; and from whose conviction they may not, without reproach of
+disingenuity or unreasonableness, set themselves free with the old
+reply, Non persuadebis, etiamsi persuaseris; though I cannot answer, I
+will not yield.
+
+
+14. Supposed unknown Arguments for the contrary.
+
+Secondly, Manifest probabilities maybe evaded, and the assent withheld,
+upon this suggestion, That I know not yet all that may be said on the
+contrary side. And therefore, though I be beaten, it is not necessary I
+should yield, not knowing what forces there are in reserve behind. This
+is a refuge against conviction so open and so wide, that it is hard to
+determine when a man is quite out of the verge of it.
+
+
+15. What Probabilities naturally determine the Assent.
+
+But yet there is some end of it; and a man having carefully inquired
+into all the grounds of probability and unlikeliness; done his utmost to
+inform himself in all particulars fairly, and cast up the sum total on
+both sides; may, in most cases, come to acknowledge, upon the whole
+matter, on which side the probability rests: wherein some proofs in
+matter of reason, being suppositions upon universal experience, are so
+cogent and clear, and some testimonies in matter of fact so universal,
+that he cannot refuse his assent. So that I think we may conclude, that,
+in propositions, where though the proofs in view are of most moment, yet
+there are sufficient grounds to suspect that there is either fallacy in
+words, or certain proofs as considerable to be produced on the contrary
+side; there assent, suspense, or dissent, are often voluntary actions.
+But where the proofs are such as make it highly probable, and there is
+not sufficient ground to suspect that there is either fallacy of words
+(which sober and serious consideration may discover) nor equally valid
+proofs yet undiscovered, latent on the other side (which also the nature
+of the thing may, in some cases, make plain to a considerate man;)
+there, I think, a man who has weighed them can scarce refuse his assent
+to the side on which the greater probability appears. Whether it be
+probable that a promiscuous jumble of printing letters should often
+fall into a method and order, which should stamp on paper a coherent
+discourse; or that a blind fortuitous concourse of atoms, not guided by
+an understanding agent, should frequently constitute the bodies of any
+species of animals: in these and the like cases, I think, nobody that
+considers them can be one jot at a stand which side to take, nor at all
+waver in his assent. Lastly, when there can be no supposition (the thing
+in its own nature indifferent, and wholly depending upon the testimony
+of witnesses) that there is as fair testimony against, as for the matter
+of fact attested; which by inquiry is to be learned, v.g. whether there
+was one thousand seven hundred years ago such a man at Rome as Julius
+Caesar: in all such cases, I say, I think it is not in any rational
+man's power to refuse his assent; but that it necessarily follows, and
+closes with such probabilities. In other less clear cases, I think it is
+in man's power to suspend his assent; and perhaps content himself with
+the proofs he has, if they favour the opinion that suits with his
+inclination or interest, and so stop from further search. But that a
+man should afford his assent to that side on which the less probability
+appears to him, seems to me utterly impracticable, and as impossible
+as it is to believe the same thing probable and improbable at the same
+time.
+
+
+16. Where it is in our Power to suspend our Judgment.
+
+As knowledge is no more arbitrary than perception; so, I think, assent
+is no more in our power than knowledge. When the agreement of any two
+ideas appears to our minds, whether immediately or by the assistance of
+reason, I can no more refuse to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than
+I can avoid seeing those objects which I turn my eyes to, and look on
+in daylight; and what upon full examination I find the most probable, I
+cannot deny my assent to. But, though we cannot hinder our knowledge,
+where the agreement is once perceived; nor our assent, where the
+probability manifestly appears upon due consideration of all the
+measures of it: yet we can hinder both KNOWLEDGE and ASSENT, BY STOPPING
+OUR INQUIRY, and not employing our faculties in the search of any truth.
+If it were not so, ignorance, error, or infidelity, could not in any
+case be a fault. Thus, in some cases we can prevent or suspend our
+assent: but can a man versed in modern or ancient history doubt whether
+there is such a place as Rome, or whether there was such a man as Julius
+Caesar? Indeed, there are millions of truths that a man is not, or may
+not think himself concerned to know; as whether our king Richard the
+Third was crooked or no; or whether Roger Bacon was a mathematician or
+a magician. In these and such like cases, where the assent one way or
+other is of no importance to the interest of any one; no action, no
+concernment of his following or depending thereon, there it is not
+strange that the mind should give itself up to the common opinion, or
+render itself to the first comer. These and the like opinions are of so
+little weight and moment, that, like motes in the sun, their tendencies
+are very rarely taken notice of. They are there, as it were, by chance,
+and the mind lets them float at liberty. But where the mind judges that
+the proposition has concernment in it: where the assent or not assenting
+is thought to draw consequences of moment after it, and good and evil to
+depend on choosing or refusing the right side, and the mind sets itself
+seriously to inquire and examine the probability: there I think it is
+not in our choice to take which side we please, if manifest odds appear
+on either. The greater probability, I think, in that case will determine
+the assent: and a man can no more avoid assenting, or taking it to be
+true, where he perceives the greater probability, than he can avoid
+knowing it to be true, where he perceives the agreement or disagreement
+of any two ideas.
+
+If this be so, the foundation of error will lie in wrong measures of
+probability; as the foundation of vice in wrong measures of good.
+
+
+17. IV. Authority
+
+The fourth and last wrong measure of probability I shall take notice of,
+and which keeps in ignorance or error more people than all the other
+together, is that which I have mentioned in the foregoing chapter: I
+mean the giving up our assent to the common received opinions, either
+of our friends or party, neighbourhood or country. How many men have no
+other ground for their tenets, than the supposed honesty, or learning,
+or number of those of the same profession? As if honest or bookish
+men could not err; or truth were to be established by the vote of the
+multitude: yet this with most men serves the turn. The tenet has had the
+attestation of reverend antiquity; it comes to me with the passport of
+former ages, and therefore I am secure in the reception I give it: other
+men have been and are of the same opinion, (for that is all is said,)
+and therefore it is reasonable for me to embrace it. A man may more
+justifiably throw up cross and pile for his opinions, than take them up
+by such measures. All men are liable to error, and most men are in many
+points, by passion or interest, under temptation to it. If we could but
+see the secret motives that influenced the men of name and learning in
+the world, and the leaders of parties, we should not always find that it
+was the embracing of truth for its own sake, that made them espouse the
+doctrines they owned and maintained. This at least is certain, there is
+not an opinion so absurd, which a man may not receive upon this ground.
+There is no error to be named, which has not had its professors: and a
+man shall never want crooked paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is
+in the right way, wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow. 18.
+Not so many men in Errors as is commonly supposed.
+
+But, notwithstanding the great noise is made in the world about errors
+and opinions, I must do mankind that right as to say, THERE ARE NOT SO
+MANY MEN IN ERRORS AND WRONG OPINIONS AS IS COMMONLY SUPPOSED. Not that
+I think they embrace the truth; but indeed, because concerning those
+doctrines they keep such a stir about, they have no thought, no opinion
+at all. For if any one should a little catechise the greatest part of
+the partizans of most of the sects in the world, he would not find,
+concerning those matters they are so zealous for, that they have any
+opinions of their own: much less would he have reason to think that
+they took them upon the examination of arguments and appearance of
+probability. They are resolved to stick to a party that education or
+interest has engaged them in; and there, like the common soldiers of an
+army, show their courage and warmth as their leaders direct, without
+ever examining, or so much as knowing, the cause they contend for. If a
+man's life shows that he has no serious regard for religion; for what
+reason should we think that he beats his head about the opinions of his
+church, and troubles himself to examine the grounds of this or that
+doctrine? It is enough for him to obey his leaders, to have his hand
+and his tongue ready for the support of the common cause, and thereby
+approve himself to those who can give him credit, preferment, or
+protection in that society. Thus men become professors of, and
+combatants for, those opinions they were never convinced of nor
+proselytes to; no, nor ever had so much as floating in their heads: and
+though one cannot say there are fewer improbable or erroneous opinions
+in the world than there are, yet this is certain; there are fewer that
+actually assent to them, and mistake them for truths, than is imagined.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXI.
+
+OF THE DIVISION OF THE SCIENCES.
+
+
+1. Science may be divided into three sorts.
+
+All that can fall within the compass of human understanding, being
+either, FIRST, the nature of things, as they are in themselves, their
+relations, and their manner of operation: or, SECONDLY, that which
+man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the
+attainment of any end, especially happiness: or, THIRDLY, the ways and
+means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these is
+attained and communicated; I think science may be divided properly into
+these three sorts:--
+
+
+2. First, Physica.
+
+FIRST, The knowledge of things, as they are in their own proper beings,
+then constitution, properties, and operations; whereby I mean not only
+matter and body, but spirits also, which have their proper natures,
+constitutions, and operations, as well as bodies. This, in a little more
+enlarged sense of the word, I call [word in Greek: physika], or NATURAL
+PHILOSOPHY. The end of this is bare speculative truth: and whatsoever
+can afford the mind of man any such, falls under this branch, whether it
+be God himself, angels, spirits, bodies; or any of their affections, as
+number, and figure, &c.
+
+
+3. Secondly, Practica.
+
+SECONDLY, [word in Greek: praktika], The skill of right applying our own
+powers and actions, for the attainment of things good and useful. The
+most considerable under this head is ETHICS, which is the seeking out
+those rules and measures of human actions, which lead to happiness, and
+the means to practise them. The end of this is not bare speculation and
+the knowledge of truth; but right, and a conduct suitable to it.
+
+
+4. Thirdly, [word in Greek: Semeiotika]
+
+THIRDLY, the third branch may be called [word in Greek: Semeiotika], or
+THE DOCTRINE OF SIGNS; the most usual whereof being words, it is aptly
+enough termed also [word in Greek: Logika], LOGIC: the business whereof
+is to consider the nature of signs, the mind makes use of for the
+understanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others. For,
+since the things the mind contemplates are none of them, besides itself,
+present to the understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a
+sign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to
+it: and these are IDEAS. And because the scene of ideas that makes one
+man's thoughts cannot be laid open to the immediate view of another, nor
+laid up anywhere but in the memory, a no very sure repository: therefore
+to communicate our thoughts to one another, as well as record them for
+our own use, signs of our ideas are also necessary: those which men
+have found most convenient, and therefore generally make use of, are
+ARTICULATE SOUNDS. The consideration, then, of IDEAS and WORDS as the
+great instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable part of their
+contemplation who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole
+extent of it. And perhaps if they were distinctly weighed, and duly
+considered, they would afford us another sort of logic and critic, than
+what we have been hitherto acquainted with.
+
+
+5. This is the first and most general Division of the Objects of our
+Understanding.
+
+This seems to me the first and most general, as well as natural division
+of the objects of our understanding. For a man can employ his thoughts
+about nothing, but either, the contemplation of THINGS themselves, for
+the discovery of truth; or about the things in his own power, which are
+his own ACTIONS, for the attainment of his own ends; or the SIGNS the
+mind makes use of both in the one and the other, and the right ordering
+of them, for its clearer information. All which three, viz. THINGS, as
+they are in themselves knowable; ACTIONS as they depend on us, in order
+to happiness; and the right use of SIGNS in order to knowledge, being
+TOTO COELO different, they seemed to me to be the three great provinces
+of the intellectual world, wholly separate and distinct one from
+another.
+
+
+The End
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of An Essay Concerning Humane
+Understanding, Volume II., by John Locke
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