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| author | Roger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org> | 2025-10-15 04:34:27 -0700 |
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| committer | Roger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org> | 2025-10-15 04:34:27 -0700 |
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diff --git a/10409-h/10409-h.htm b/10409-h/10409-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..18b6284 --- /dev/null +++ b/10409-h/10409-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,8743 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html> +<head> +<meta name="generator" content= +"HTML Tidy for Solaris (vers 1st October 2003), see www.w3.org"> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content= +"text/html; charset=UTF-8"> +<title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Crisis of the Naval War, +by Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa.</title> + +<style type="text/css"> + <!-- + * { font-family: Times;} + P { text-indent: 1em; + margin-top: .75em; + font-size: 12pt; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; } + HR { width: 33%; } + PRE { font-family: Courier, monospaced; } + P.blockquote { font-size: 11pt; } + // --> +</style> +</head> +<body> +<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10409 ***</div> + +<h1>The Crisis of the Naval War</h1> +<center><b>By ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET</b></center> +<center><b>VISCOUNT JELLICOE OF SCAPA G.C.B., O.M., +G.C.V.O.</b></center> +<br> +<center><i>With 8 Plates and 6 Charts</i></center> +<br> +<center>1920</center> +<hr> +<a name="TOC"><!-- TOC --></a> +<h2>CONTENTS</h2> +<p><a href="#CH1">1. ADMIRALTY ORGANIZATION: THE CHANGES IN +1917</a></p> +<p><a href="#CH2">2. SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN IN THE EARLY PART OF +1917</a></p> +<p><a href="#CH3">3. ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS</a></p> +<p><a href="#CH4">4. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM</a></p> +<p><a href="#CH5">5. THE CONVOY SYSTEM AT WORK</a></p> +<p><a href="#CH6">6. THE ENTRY OF THE UNITED STATES: OUR NAVAL +POLICY EXPLAINED</a></p> +<p><a href="#CH7">7. PATROL CRAFT AND MINESWEEPING SERVICES</a></p> +<p><a href="#CH8">8. THE DOVER PATROL AND THE HARWICH +FORCES</a></p> +<p><a href="#CH9">9. THE SEQUEL</a></p> +<p><a href="#CH10">10. "PRODUCTION" AT THE ADMIRALTY DURING +1917</a></p> +<p><a href="#CH11">11. NAVAL WORK</a></p> +<p><a href="#CH12">12. THE FUTURE</a></p> +<p><a href="#IDX">INDEX</a></p> +<hr> +<a name="RULE4_1"><!-- RULE4 1 --></a> +<h2>LIST OF PLATES</h2> +<p>A Mine Exploding</p> +<p>A German Submarine of the U-C Type</p> +<p>A German Submarine of the later Cruiser Class</p> +<p>A Smoke Screen for a Convoy</p> +<p>The Dummy Deck-house of a Decoy Ship</p> +<p>A Convoy Zigzagging</p> +<p>A Convoy with an Airship</p> +<p>Drifters at Sea</p> +<p>A Paddle Minesweeper</p> +<p>A German Mine on the Surface</p> +<p>Two Depth Charges after Explosion</p> +<p>The Tell-tale Oil Patch</p> +<p>A Submarine Submerging</p> +<p>Periscope of Submerged Submarine Travelling at Slow Speed</p> +<p>A Submarine Submerged</p> +<hr> +<a name="RULE4_2"><!-- RULE4 2 --></a> +<h2>LIST OF CHARTS</h2> +<center>(CONTAINED IN THE POCKET AT THE END OF THE BOOK)</center> +<p>A. Approach Areas and Typical Routes.</p> +<p>B. Typical Approach Lines.</p> +<p>C. Barred Zones Proclaimed by the Germans.</p> +<p>D. Patrol Areas, British Isles.</p> +<p>E. Patrol and Minesweeping Zones in the Mediterranean.</p> +<p>F. Showing French and British Ports within Range of the German +Bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge.</p> +<hr> +<center>To<br> +<br> +The Officers and Men<br> +of our<br> +Convoy, Escort, Patrol and Minesweeping Vessels<br> +and their<br> +Comrades of the Mercantile Marine<br> +<br> +by whose splendid gallantry, heroic self-sacrifice, and<br> +unflinching endurance the submarine<br> +danger was defeated</center> +<hr> +<a name="INT"><!-- INT --></a> +<h2>INTRODUCTION</h2> +<p>Owing to the peculiar nature and demands of naval warfare, but +few dispatches, corresponding to those describing the work and +achievements of our great armies, were issued during the progress +of the war. In a former volume I attempted to supply this defect in +the historical records, which will be available for future +generations, so far as the Grand Fleet was concerned, during my +period as its Commander-in-Chief. The present volume, which was +commenced and nearly completed in 1918, was to have been published +at the same time. My departure on a Naval mission early in 1919 +prevented me, however, from putting the finishing touches to the +manuscript until my return this spring.</p> +<p>I hesitated as to the publication of this portion of what is in +effect one complete narrative, but eventually decided not to depart +from my original purpose. There is some reason to believe that the +account of the work of the Grand Fleet gave the nation a fuller +conception of the services which the officers and men of that force +rendered in circumstances which were necessarily not easily +appreciated by landsmen.</p> +<p>This second volume, dealing with the defeat of the enemy's +submarine campaign, the gravest peril which ever threatened the +population of this country, as well as of the whole Empire, may not +be unwelcome as a statement of facts. They have been set down in +order that the sequence and significance of events may be +understood, and that the nation may appreciate the debt which it +owes, in particular, to the seamen of the Royal Navy and the +Mercantile Marine, who kept the seas during the unforgettable days +of the intensive campaign.</p> +<p>This book, therefore, gives the outline of the work accomplished +by the Navy in combating the unrestricted submarine warfare +instituted by the Central Powers in February, 1917. It would have +been a labour of love to tell at greater length and in more detail +how the menace was gradually overcome by the gallantry, endurance +and strenuous work of those serving afloat in ships flying the +White or the Red Ensigns, but I had not the necessary materials at +my disposal for such an exhaustive record.</p> +<p>The volume is consequently largely concerned with the successive +steps taken at the Admiralty to deal with a situation which was +always serious, and which at times assumed a very grave aspect. The +ultimate result of all Naval warfare must naturally rest with those +who are serving afloat, but it is only just to the Naval officers +and others who did such fine work at the Admiralty in preparing for +the sea effort, that their share in the Navy's final triumph should +be known. The writing of this book appeared also to be the only way +in which I could show my keen appreciation of the loyalty and +devotion to duty of the Naval Staff, of the many clever, ingenious +and audacious schemes developed and carried through for the +destruction of submarines and the safeguarding of ocean-borne +trade, and of the skilful organization which brought into being, +and managed with such success, that great network of convoys by +which the sea communications of the Allies were kept open. The +volume shows how the officers who accompanied me to the Admiralty +from the Grand Fleet at the end of 1916, in association with those +already serving in Whitehall and others who joined in 1917, with +the necessary and valuable assistance of our comrades of the +Mercantile Marine, gradually produced the measures by which the Sea +Service conquered the gravest danger which has ever faced the +Empire.</p> +<p>There were at times inevitable set-backs as the enemy gained +experience of our methods, and new ones had then to be devised, and +we were always most seriously handicapped by the strain imposed +upon the Fleet by our numerous military and other commitments +overseas, and by the difficulty of obtaining supplies of material, +owing to the pre-occupation of our industries in meeting the needs +of our Armies in equipment and munitions; but, generally speaking, +it may be said that in April, 1917, the losses reached their +maximum, and that from the following month and onwards the battle +was being slowly but gradually won. By the end of the year it was +becoming apparent that success was assured.</p> +<p>The volume describes the changes carried out in the Admiralty +Staff organization; the position of affairs in regard to submarine +warfare in the early part of 1917; and the numerous anti-submarine +measures which were devised and brought into operation during the +year. The introduction and working of the convoy system is also +dealt with. The entry of the United States of America into the war +marked the opening of a new phase of the operations by sea, and it +has been a pleasure to give particulars of our cordial co-operation +with the United States Navy. The splendid work of the patrol craft +and minesweepers is described all too briefly, and I have had to be +content to give only a brief summary of the great services of the +Dover and Harwich forces.</p> +<p>Finally, an effort has been made to suggest the range and +character of the work of the Production Departments at the +Admiralty. It is impossible to tell this part of the story without +conveying some suggestion of criticism since the output never +satisfied our requirements. I have endeavoured also to indicate +where it seemed to me that changes in organization were not +justified by results, so that in future years we may benefit by the +experience gained. But I would not like it to be thought that I did +not, and do not, realize the difficulties which handicapped +production, or that I did not appreciate to the full the work done +by all concerned.</p> +<p>It is unfortunate that attempts to draw attention to the lessons +taught us by the war are regarded by many people either as +complaints of lack of devotion to the country's interests on the +part of some, or as criticisms of others who, in the years before +the war or during the war, were responsible for the administration +of the Navy. In anticipation of such an attitude, I wish to state +emphatically that, where mention is made of apparent shortcomings +or of action which, judged by results, did not seem, to meet a +particular situation, this is done solely in order that on any +future occasion of a similar character—and may the day be +long postponed—the nation may profit by experience.</p> +<p>Those who are inclined to indulge in criticism should ever bear +in mind that the Navy was faced with problems which were never +foreseen, and could not have been foreseen, by anyone in this +country. Who, for instance, would have ever had the temerity to +predict that the Navy, confronted by the second greatest Naval +Power in the world, would be called upon to maintain free +communications across the Channel for many months until the months +became years, in face of the naval forces of the enemy established +on the Belgian coast, passing millions of men across in safety, as +well as vast quantities of stores and munitions? Who would have +prophesied that the Navy would have to safeguard the passage of +hundreds of thousands of troops from the Dominions to Europe, as +well as the movement of tens of thousands of labourers from China +and elsewhere? Or who, moreover, would have been believed had he +stated that the Navy would be required to keep open the sea +communications of huge armies in Macedonia, Egypt, Palestine, +Mesopotamia and East Africa, against attack by surface vessels, +submarines and mines, whilst at the same time protecting the +merchant shipping of ourselves, our Allies, and neutral Powers +against similar perils, and assisting to ensure the safety of the +troops of the United States when they, in due course, were brought +across the Atlantic? Compare those varied tasks with the +comparatively modest duties which in pre-war days were generally +assigned to the Navy, and it will be seen how much there may be to +learn of the lessons of experience, and how sparing we should be of +criticism. Wisdom distilled from events which were unforeseeable +should find expression not in criticisms of those who did their +duty to the best of their ability, but in the taking of wise +precautions for the future.</p> +<p>Little mention is made in this volume of the work of the Grand +Fleet during the year 1917, but, although that Fleet had no +opportunity of showing its fighting power, it must never be +forgotten that without the Grand Fleet, under the distinguished +officer who succeeded me as Commander-in-Chief at the end of 1916, +all effort would have been of no avail, since every operation by +sea, as well as by land, was carried out under the sure protecting +shield of that Fleet, which the enemy could not face.</p> +<p>I am conscious of many shortcomings in the book, but it may +prove of interest to those who desire to know something of the +measures which gradually wore down the German submarine effort, +and, at any rate, it is the only record likely to be available in +the near future of the work of fighting the submarines in 1917.</p> +<p>June, 1920.</p> +<hr> +<a name="CH1"><!-- CH1 --></a> +<h2>CHAPTER I</h2> +<center>ADMIRALTY ORGANIZATION; THE CHANGES IN 1917</center> +<p>It is perhaps as well that the nation generally remained to a +great extent unconscious of the extreme gravity of the situation +which developed during the Great War, when the Germans were sinking +an increasing volume of merchant tonnage week by week. The people +of this country as a whole rose superior to many disheartening +events and never lost their sure belief in final victory, but full +knowledge of the supreme crisis in our history might have tended to +undermine in some quarters that confidence in victory which it was +essential should be maintained, and, in any event, the facts could +not be disclosed without benefiting the enemy. But the position at +times was undoubtedly extremely serious.</p> +<p>At the opening of the war we possessed approximately half the +merchant tonnage of the world, but experience during the early part +of the struggle revealed that we had not a single ship too many for +the great and increasing oversea military liabilities which we were +steadily incurring, over and above the responsibility of bringing +to these shores the greater part of the food for a population of +forty-five million people, as well as nearly all the raw materials +which were essential for the manufacture of munitions. The whole of +our war efforts, ashore as well as afloat, depended first and last +on an adequate volume of merchant shipping.</p> +<p>It is small wonder, therefore, that those who watched from day +to day the increasing toll which the enemy took of the country's +sea-carrying power, were sometimes filled with deep concern for the +future. Particularly was this the case during the early months of +unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917. For if the menace had not +been mastered to a considerable extent, and that speedily, not only +would the victory of the Allies have been imperilled, but this +country would have been brought face to face with conditions +approaching starvation. In pre-war days the possibility of these +islands being blockaded was frequently discussed; but during the +dark days of the unrestricted submarine campaign there was ample +excuse for those with imagination to picture the implication of +events which were happening from week to week. The memories of +those days are already becoming somewhat dim, and as a matter of +history and a guide to the future, it is perhaps well that some +account should be given, however inadequate, of the dangers which +confronted the country and of the means which were adopted to avert +the worst consequences of the enemy's campaign without ceasing to +exert the increasing pressure of our sea power upon his fighting +efficiency, and without diminishing our military efforts +overseas.</p> +<p>The latter points were of great importance. It was always +necessary to keep the Grand Fleet at a strength that would ensure +its instant readiness to move in waters which might be infested by +submarines in large numbers should the Germans decide upon some +operation by the High Sea Fleet. The possibility of action between +the fleets necessitated the maintenance of very strong destroyer +forces with the Grand Fleet.</p> +<p>Similarly our oversea military expeditions, with the consequent +large number of merchant ships in use as transports or supply +ships, required a considerable force of destroyers and other small +craft. These commitments greatly reduced the means at our disposal +for dealing with the hostile submarines that were attempting to +prevent the import of food and raw materials into the country.</p> +<p>Readers of books, and particularly books dealing with war, show +a natural avidity for what may be described as the human side of a +contest as well as for the dramatic events. But, whether it be +prosecuted by sea or by land, war is largely a matter of efficient +and adequate organization. It is a common saying that we muddle +through our wars, but we could not afford to muddle in face of the +threat which the enemy's unrestricted submarine campaign +represented. It is impossible, therefore, to approach the history +of the successful efforts made by sea to overcome this menace +without describing in some detail the work of organization which +was carried out at the Admiralty in order to enable the Fleet to +fulfil its new mission. In effect those responsible for the naval +policy of the country conducted two wars simultaneously, the one on +the surface, and the other under the surface. The strategy, tactics +and weapons which were appropriate to the former, were to a large +extent useless in the contest against mines and submarines which +the enemy employed with the utmost persistency and no little +ingenuity. Even in the Russo-Japanese war, where the mine was +little used, it exerted a marked influence on the course of the +war; the Germans based their hopes of victory in the early days of +the struggle entirely on a war of attrition, waged against +men-of-war, as well as merchant ships. The submarine, which was +thrown into the struggle in increasing numbers, represented an +entirely new development, for the submarine is a vessel which can +travel unseen beneath the water and, while still unseen, except for +a possible momentary glimpse of a few inches of periscope, can +launch a torpedo at long or short range and with deadly accuracy. +In these circumstances it became imperative to organize the +Admiralty administration to meet new needs, and to press into the +service of the central administration a large number of officers +charged with the sole duty of studying the new forms of warfare +which the enemy had adopted and of evolving with scientific +assistance novel methods of defeating his tactics.</p> +<p>Whilst the enemy's campaign against merchant shipping always +gave rise to anxiety, there were certain periods of greatly +increased activity. During the summer months of 1916 the losses +from submarine attack and from submarine-laid mines were +comparatively slight, and, in fact, less than during the latter +half of 1915, but in the autumn of 1916 they assumed very serious +proportions. This will be seen by reference to the following table, +which gives the monthly losses in British, neutral and Allied +mercantile gross tonnage from submarine and mine attack +<i>alone</i> for the months of May to November inclusive:</p> +<pre> + May 122,793 + June 111,719 + July 110,757 + August 160,077 + September 229,687 + October 352,902 + November 327,245 +</pre> +<p>Another disturbing feature was the knowledge that we were not +sinking enemy submarines at any appreciable rate, whilst we knew +that the Germans had under construction a very large number of +these vessels, and that they were thus rapidly adding to their +fleet. It was a matter also of common knowledge that our output of +new merchant ships was exceedingly small, and I, in common with +others, had urged a policy of greatly increased mercantile ship +construction. These facts, combined with the knowledge that our +reserves of food and essential raw materials for war purposes were +very low, led me, when commanding the Grand Fleet, to the +inevitable conclusion that it was essential to concentrate all our +naval efforts so far as possible on the submarine menace, and to +adopt the most energetic measures for the protection of our sea +communications and the destruction of the enemy's submarines. +Although it was not easy to see the exact means by which this could +be achieved, it appeared necessary as a first step to form an +organization having as its sole duty the study of the question, +comprising such officers as would be most likely to deal +effectively with the problem, supported by the necessary authority +to push forward their ideas. Another necessity was the rapid +production of such material as was found to be required for +anti-submarine measures.</p> +<p>With these ideas in my mind I had written letters to the +Admiralty on the subject, and was summoned to a conference in +London on November 1 by Mr. Balfour, the First Lord. The whole +question of the submarine warfare was fully discussed with Mr. +Balfour and Sir Henry Jackson (then First Sea Lord) during the two +days spent in London. I had at that time formed and expressed the +view that there was very little probability of the High Sea Fleet +putting to sea again to risk a Fleet action until the new submarine +campaign had been given a thorough trial. With the High Sea Fleet +"in being" we could not afford to deplete the Grand Fleet of +destroyers, which could under other conditions be employed in +anti-submarine work, and therefore the probable German strategy in +these circumstances was to keep the Fleet "in being." At the same +time the situation appeared so serious that I went so far as to +suggest that one Grand Fleet flotilla of destroyers might under +certain conditions be withdrawn for anti-submarine duties in +southern waters.</p> +<p>The misgivings which I entertained were, of course, shared by +all those in authority who were acquainted with the facts of the +case, including the Board of Admiralty.</p> +<p>On November 24 Mr. Balfour telegraphed offering me the post of +First Sea Lord, and in the event of acceptance requesting me to +meet him in Edinburgh to discuss matters. After consultation with +Sir Charles Madden, my Chief of Staff, I replied that I was +prepared to do what was considered best for the Service.</p> +<p>During the conference with Mr. Balfour in Edinburgh on November +27, 1916, and after I had agreed to go to the Admiralty, he +informed me of the consequent changes which he proposed to make in +flag officers' appointments in the Grand Fleet. Amongst the changes +he included Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, who would be relieved of his +post as second in command of the Grand Fleet and commander of the +1st Battle Squadron, as he had practically completed his term of +two years in command. I thereupon asked that he might be offered +the post of Second Sea Lord, and that Commodore Lionel Halsey, who +had been serving as Captain of the Fleet, might be offered that of +Fourth Sea Lord. In my view it was very desirable that an officer +with the great experience in command possessed by Sir Cecil Burney +should occupy the position of Second Sea Lord under the conditions +which existed, and that one who had served afloat during the war in +both an executive and administrative capacity should become Fourth +Sea Lord. I also informed Mr. Balfour of my desire to form an +Anti-Submarine Division of the War Staff at the Admiralty, and +asked that Rear-Admiral A.L. Duff, C.B., should be offered the post +of Director of the Division, with Captain F.C. Dreyer, C.B., my +Flag Captain in the <i>Iron Duke</i>, as his assistant.</p> +<p>All these appointments were made.</p> +<p>Although I arrived in London on November 29, I did not actually +take office as First Sea Lord until December 5, owing to an attack +of influenza. On that day I relieved Sir Henry Jackson, but only +held office under Mr. Balfour for two or three days, as the change +of Government took place just at this period, and Sir Edward Carson +came to the Admiralty in place of Mr. Balfour.</p> +<p>This book is intended to record facts, and not to touch upon +personal matters, but I cannot forbear to mention the extreme +cordiality of Sir Edward Carson's relations with the Board in +general and myself in particular. His devotion to the naval service +was obvious to all, and in him the Navy possessed indeed a true and +a powerful friend.</p> +<p>The earliest conversations between the First Lord and myself had +relation to the submarine menace, and Sir Edward Carson threw +himself wholeheartedly into the work. This was before the days of +the unrestricted submarine campaign, and although ships were +frequently torpedoed, very large numbers were still being sunk by +gun-fire. The torpedo did not come into general use until March, +1917.</p> +<p>One of the most pressing needs of this period of attack by +gun-fire was consequently a great increase in the number of guns +for use in defensively armed merchant vessels, and here Sir Edward +Carson's assistance was of great value. He fully realized the +urgent necessities of the case, and was constant in his efforts to +procure the necessary guns. The work carried out in this connection +is given in detail in <a href="#CH3">Chapter III (p. 68)</a>.</p> +<p>During Sir Edward's tenure of office the reorganization of the +Naval Staff was taken in hand. Changes from which great benefit +resulted were effected in the Staff organization. Sir Edward very +quickly saw the necessity for a considerable strengthening of the +Staff. In addition to the newly formed and rapidly expanding +Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff, he realized that the +Operations Division also needed increased strength, and that it was +essential to relieve the First Sea Lord of the mass of +administrative work falling upon his shoulders, which had +unfortunately been greatly magnified by the circumstances already +described.</p> +<p>It is as well at this point to describe the conditions in regard +to Staff organization that existed at the Admiralty at the end of +1916, and to show how those conditions had been arrived at.</p> +<p>Prior to 1909 there was no real Staff, although the organization +at the Admiralty included an Intelligence Department and a +Mobilization Division. The Director of Naval Intelligence at that +time acted in an advisory capacity as Chief of the Staff. Indeed +prior to 1904 there were but few naval officers at the Admiralty at +all beyond those in the technical departments of the Director of +Naval Ordnance and Torpedoes and the members of the Board itself. +The Sea Lords were even without Naval Assistants and depended +entirely on the help of a secretary provided by the civilian staff +at the Admiralty.</p> +<p>In 1910 a new branch was formed termed the Mobilization and +Movements Department under a Director. This branch was a first step +towards an Operations Division.</p> +<p>Under Mr. Churchill's regime at the Admiralty in 1911 a more +regular Staff organization was introduced and a Chief of the War +Staff, acting under the First Sea Lord, was appointed. The +organization introduced during his term of office is thus shown +graphically:</p> +<pre> + CHIEF OF STAFF + | + ------------------------------------------------------- + | | | + Director of Director of Director of + Operations Division. Intelligence Division. Mobilization Division. +</pre> +<p>In addition to other duties, the Mobilization Division was +charged with the responsibility for the supply of fuel to the +Fleet, from the Staff point of view.</p> +<p>In the organization introduced in 1911 the duties of the Chief +of the Staff were defined as being of an advisory nature. He +possessed no executive powers. Consequently all orders affecting +the movements of ships required the approval of the First Sea Lord +before issue, and the consequence of this over-centralization was +that additional work was thrown on the First Sea Lord. The +resultant inconvenience was not of much account during peace, but +became of importance in war, and as the war progressed the Chief of +the Staff gradually exercised executive functions, orders which +were not of the first importance being issued by the Staff in +accordance with the policy approved generally by the First Sea +Lord. The fault in the organization appeared to me to lie in +non-recognition of the fact that the First Sea Lord was in reality +the Chief of the Naval Staff, since he was charged with the +responsibility for the preparation and readiness of the Fleet for +war and for all movements. Another anomaly existing at the +Admiralty, which was not altered in the 1911 reorganization of the +War Staff, was that the orders to the Fleet were not drafted and +issued by the War Staff, but by the Military Branch of the +Secretary's Department.</p> +<p>The system was only workable because the very able civil +servants of the Military Branch were possessed of wide Admiralty +experience and worked in the closest co-operation with the naval +officers. Their work was of the most strenuous nature and was +carried out with the greatest devotion, but the system was +manifestly wrong in principle.</p> +<p>On the outbreak of war the necessity for placing the War +Registry (a part of the Military Branch) directly under the Chief +of the Staff became apparent, and this was done.</p> +<p>In December, 1916, when I took up the post of First Sea Lord, +the Admiralty War Staff was still being worked on the general lines +of the organization introduced by Mr. Churchill in 1911, but it +had, of course, expanded to a very considerable extent to meet war +conditions, and a most important Trade Division, which dealt with +all questions connected with the Mercantile Marine, had been formed +at the outbreak of war under the charge of Captain Richard Webb. +This Division, under that very able officer, had carried out work +of the greatest national importance with marked success.</p> +<p>The successive changes in the Staff organization carried out +during the year 1917 were as follows:</p> +<p>In December, 1916, an Anti-Submarine Division of the Staff was +formed. This Division did not, for some reason, appear in the Navy +List as part of the Staff organization until some months had +elapsed, although it started work in December, 1916. The officers +who composed the Division were shown as borne on the books of +H.M.S. <i>President</i>.</p> +<p>The Division relieved the Operations Division of the control of +all vessels, including aircraft, which were engaged in +anti-submarine offensive and defensive work, and took over also the +control of mine-sweeping operations. The Division was also charged +with the duty of examining and perfecting all experimental devices +for combating the submarine menace and of producing fresh schemes +for the destruction of enemy submarines. This organization is open +to the criticism that matters concerning operations and material +came under the same head, but they were so closely allied at this +stage that it was deemed advisable to accept this departure from +correct Staff organization. The personnel of the Division came with +me from the Grand Fleet, and at the outset consisted of one flag +officer—Rear-Admiral A.L. Duff, C.B.—two captains, four +commanders, three lieutenant-commanders, and two engineer officers, +in addition to the necessary clerical staff. The small staff of +four officers already at the Admiralty engaged in anti-submarine +experimental work, which had done much to develop this side of +warfare, was absorbed. The new Division worked directly under me, +but in close touch with the then Chief of the War Staff, +Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver.</p> +<p>In the early spring of 1917 the illogical nature of the War +Staff organization became apparent, in that it had no executive +functions, and as the result of discussions between Sir Edward +Carson and myself the decision was taken that the duties of the +Naval Staff (the term decided upon in place of that of War Staff) +should be made executive, and that the First Sea Lord should assume +his correct title as Chief of the Naval Staff, as he had, in fact, +already assumed the position.</p> +<p>At the same time the operational work of the Staff was grouped +under two heads, the first mainly concerned with operations against +the enemy's surface vessels, and the second with the protection of +trade and operations against the enemy's under-water warfare, +whether the means he employed were submarines or mines.</p> +<p>The officer, Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, K.C.B., charged with +the supervision of the first-named work was styled Deputy Chief of +the Naval Staff (D.C.N.S.), and the officer connected with the +second, Rear-Admiral A.L. Duff, C.B., was given the title of +Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (A.C.N.S.).</p> +<p>The duties of Director of the Anti-Submarine Division of the +Staff, hitherto carried out by Admiral Duff, were at this time +taken over by Captain W.W. Fisher, C.B., who was brought down from +the Grand Fleet for the purpose. Captain Dreyer, who had been +Admiral Duff's original assistant, had in the meantime been +appointed Director of Naval Ordnance, and had been succeeded by +Captain H. Walwyn, D.S.O.</p> +<p>The Mine-Sweeping Division of the Staff was also formed, and the +importance of the question of signal communications was recognized +by forming a Signal Section of the Staff.</p> +<p>The adoption of the title of Chief of the Naval Staff by the +First Sea Lord necessarily made the functions of the Staff +executive instead of advisory.</p> +<p>The Staff organization at this period is shown graphically +below.</p> +<pre> + C.N.S. + | + +-- D.C.N.S. + | . | + | . +-- Operations Division. + | . | | + | . | +-- Home + | . | +-- Foreign + | . +-- Mobilization Division. + | . +-- Signal Section. + | . +-- Intelligence Division. + | . + +-- A.C.N.S. + | + +-- Trade Division. + +-- Convoys Section. + +-- Anti-Submarine Division. + +-- Mine-Sweeping Division. +</pre> +<p>Stress was laid in a Staff memorandum issued by me on the fact +that the various divisions were on no account to work in watertight +compartments, but were to be in the closest touch with one another. +The dotted line connecting the D.C.N.S. and the A.C.N.S. in the +graph was defined as indicating that there should be the fullest +co-operation between the different portions of the Staff.</p> +<p>In the summer of 1917 the growth of the convoy system +necessitated further expansion of the Naval Staff, and a Mercantile +Movements Division was added. The duties of this division were to +organize and regulate the movements of convoys of merchant ships. A +staff of officers had been by this time sent abroad to the ports +from which convoys were directed to sail, and the Mercantile +Movements Division, acting in close touch with the Ministry of +Shipping, arranged the assembly and movements of the convoys and +their protection.</p> +<p>The organization of the portion of the Staff under the A.C.N.S. +at this stage is shown below.</p> +<pre> + A.C.N.S. + | + ------------------------------------------------ + | | | | + Director of Director of Director of Director of + Mercantile Trade Anti-Sub- Mine-Sweeping + Movements Division. marine Division. + Division. (Captain R.N.) Division. (Captain R.N.) + (Captain R.N.) | (Captain R.N.) | + | Staff. | Staff. + -------------- Staff. + | | +Convoy Movements +Section. Section. +</pre> +<p>The portion of the organization under the A.C.N.S. comprised the +following numbers in December, 1917:</p> +<p>Mercantile Movements Division, 36 Officers, with a clerical +staff.</p> +<p>Trade Division, 43 Officers, with a clerical staff of 10 +civilians.</p> +<p>Anti-Submarine Division, 26 Officers, with a clerical staff.</p> +<p>Mine-Sweeping Division, 8 Officers, with a clerical staff.</p> +<p>Of this number practically the whole of the Mercantile Movements +and Anti-Submarine Divisions were added during the year 1917, +whilst large additions were also made to the Trade Division, owing +to the great increase of work.</p> +<p>During the first half of the year 1917 the Operations Division +of the Naval Staff received a much needed increase of strength by +the appointment of additional officers, charged, under the Director +of the Operations Division, with the detailed preparation of plans +for operations. Further additions to this branch of the Staff were +made in the latter half of the year.</p> +<p>Matters were in this position with the reorganization of the +Naval Staff in hand and working towards a definite conclusion when, +to the intense regret of those who had been privileged to work with +him, Sir Edward Carson left the Admiralty to become a member of the +War Cabinet.</p> +<p>Before leaving the subject of work at the Admiralty during Sir +Edward Carson's administration, mention should be made of the +progress made in the difficult task of providing officers for the +rapidly expanding Fleet. The large programme of small craft started +in the early part of 1917 involved the eventual provision of a +great number of additional officers. Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, the +Second Sea Lord, took this matter in hand with conspicuous success, +and the measures which he introduced tided us over a period of much +difficulty and made provision for many months ahead. Sir Cecil +Burney, by reason of his intimate knowledge of the +personnel—the result of years of command afloat—was +able to settle also many problems relating to personnel which had +been the cause of dissatisfaction in the past.</p> +<p>Sir Edward Carson, on leaving the Admiralty, was succeeded by +Sir Eric Geddes as First Lord. Sir Eric had been brought into the +Admiralty in May, 1917, in circumstances which I will describe +later. (<a href="#CH10"><i>Vide</i> Chapter X.</a>) One of his +first steps as First Lord which affected Admiralty organization was +the appointment of a Deputy First Sea Lord. This appointment was +frankly made more as a matter of expediency than because any real +need had been shown for the creation of such an office. It is +unnecessary here to enter into the circumstances which led to the +appointment to which I saw objections, owing to the difficulty of +fitting into the organization an officer bearing the title of +Deputy First Sea Lord.</p> +<p>Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss—who had come to England +for the purpose of conferring with the Admiralty before taking up +the post of British Commander-in-Chief in the +Mediterranean—was selected by the First Lord as Deputy First +Sea Lord.</p> +<p>Shortly after assuming office as First Lord, Sir Eric Geddes +expressed a wish for a further consideration of the question of +Admiralty organization. To this end he appointed a joint War Office +and Admiralty Committee to compare the two organizations.</p> +<p>Having received the report of the Committee, the First Lord and +I both formulated ideas for further reorganization. My proposals, +so far as they concerned the Naval Staff, were conceived on the +general lines of an extension of the organization already adopted +since my arrival at the Admiralty, but I also stated that the time +had arrived when the whole Admiralty organization should be divided +more distinctly into two sides, viz., the Operational side and the +<i>Materiél</i> or Administrative side, and indicated that +the arrangement existing in the time of the old Navy Board might be +largely followed, in order that questions of Operations and +<i>Materiél</i> should be quite clearly separated. This, +indeed, was the principle of the Staff organization which I had +adopted in the Grand Fleet, and I was anxious to extend it to the +Admiralty.</p> +<p>This principle was accepted—although the term "Navy Board" +was not reinstituted—the Admiralty Board being divided into +two Committees, one for <i>Operations</i> and one for +<i>Materiél</i>, the whole Board meeting at least once a +week, as required, to discuss important questions affecting both +sides. Whilst it was necessary that the Maintenance Committee +should be kept acquainted with the requirements in the shape of +material needed for operations in which the Fleet was +engaged—and to the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff was assigned +this particular liaison duty—I was not in favour of +<i>discussing</i> questions affecting ordinary operations with the +whole Board, since, in addition to the delay thereby involved, +members of the Maintenance Committee could not keep in sufficiently +intimate touch with such matters, and opinions might be formed and +conclusions expressed on an incomplete knowledge of facts. +Questions of broad policy or of proposed major operations were, of +course, in a different category, and the above objections did not +apply.</p> +<p>The further alterations in Naval Staff organization were not +adopted without considerable discussion and some difference of +opinion as to detail, particularly on the subject of the +organization of the Operations Division of the Naval Staff, which I +considered should embrace the Plans Division as a sub-section in +order to avoid overlapping and delay. In my view it was undesirable +for a body of officers not working under the authority of those in +close touch with the daily operations of the Fleet to put forward +plans for operations which necessarily involved the use of the same +vessels and material, as such a procedure must inevitably lead to +impracticable suggestions and consequent waste of time; the system +which I favoured was that in use in the Army, where the Operations +Section of the Staff dealt also with the working out of plans.</p> +<p>The Admiralty Staff organization necessarily differed somewhat +from that at the War Office, because during the war the Admiralty +in a sense combined, so far as Naval operations were concerned, the +functions both of the War Office and of General Headquarters in +France. This was due primarily to the fact that intelligence was +necessarily centred at the Admiralty, and, secondly, because the +Admiralty acted in a sense as Commander-in-Chief of all the forces +working in the vicinity of the British Isles. It was not possible +for the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet to assume this +function, since he could not be provided with the necessary +knowledge without great delay being caused, and, further, when he +was at sea the other commands would be without a head. The +Admiralty therefore necessarily assumed the duty, whilst supplying +each command with all the information required for operations. The +general lines of the Staff organizations at the War Office and at +General Headquarters in France are here given for the sake of +comparison with the Naval Staff organization.</p> +<p>1.—<i>The British War Office.</i></p> +<p>The approximate organization is shown as concisely as possible +in the following diagram:</p> +<pre> + CHIEF OF IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF + + Director of Staff Duties. + Staff duties Organization and training. + War Organization of forces. + General questions of training. + Signals and communications. + + Director of Military Operations. + Operations on all fronts. + + Director of Military Intelligence. + Intelligence. + Espionage. + The Press. +</pre> +<p>The other important departments of the War Office on the +administration side are those of the Adjutant-General and the +Quartermaster-General, the former dealing with all questions +relating to the personnel of the Army under the various headings of +organization, mobilization, pay and discipline, and the latter with +all questions of supply and transport.</p> +<p>A Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff was attached to the +Chief of the Imperial General Staff. His main duty was to act as a +liaison between the General Staff and the administrative +departments of the War Office.</p> +<p>The whole organization of the British War Office is, of course, +under the direction and control of the Secretary of State for +War.</p> +<p>2.—<i>The Staff Organization at General Headquarters in +France.</i></p> +<pre> + FIELD MARSHAL + COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. + + Chief of the General Staff + G.S. (a) (Operations) Plans and Execution Intelligence. + G.S. (b) (Staff Duties) War Organizations and + Establishments Liason between G.S. (a) and + Administrative Services. + + Adjutant General (Personnel, Discipline, etc.) + + Quartermaster General (Transport and Supply, etc.) + + ATTACHED TO GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. + (BUT NOT STAFF OFFICERS.) + | + ---------------------------------------------------- + | | | + Artillery Adviser Engineer-in-Chief. Inspector of + (Advises Chief of Advises as in case of Training. + General Stall on Artillery. + Artillery matters + and operations). + | + Advises Administrative + Departments as + necessary. +</pre> +<p>N.B.—The Inspector of Training works in consultation with +the Chief of the General Staff.</p> +<p>It will be seen that whilst at the War Office the liaison +between the General Staff and the administrative side was +maintained by a Deputy Chief of the General Staff, in the +organization in the field the same function was performed by the +Staff Officer known as G.S. (b).</p> +<p>It will also be seen that neither at General Headquarters nor in +the case of an Army command does the Chief of the General Staff +exercise control over the administrative side.</p> +<p>After some discussion the Admiralty organizations shown in the +Tables A and B on page 20 (below) were adopted, and I guarded as +far as possible against the objection to keeping the Plans Division +separate from the Operations Division by the issue of detailed +orders as to the conduct of the business of the Staff, in which +directions were given that the Director of the Plans Division +should be in close touch with the Director of the Operations +Division before submitting any proposals to the Deputy Chief of +Naval Staff or myself.</p> +<p>During the remainder of my service at the Admiralty the +organization remained as shown in Tables A and B on p. 20 below. It +was not entirely satisfactory, for reasons already mentioned and +because I did not obtain all the relief from administrative work +which was so desirable.</p> +<a name="table-a"></a> +<pre> + TABLE A + + First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff. + + Deputy Chief of Naval Staff. + Director of Intelligence Division. + Director of Signals Division. + Director of Operations Division. + Deputy-Director of Operations + Operations at home. + Assistant Director Operations Division and Staff. + Operations abroad. + Director of Plans Division. + Preparation of Plans for operations at home and abroad. + Consideration of and proposals for use of new + weapons and material. Building programmes to + carry out approved policy. + + Deputy First Sea Lord. + Director of Training and Staff Duties. + + Assistant Chief of Naval Staff. + Director of Trade Division. + Director of Mercantile Movements. + Director of Mine-sweeping. + Director of Anti-Submarine Division. + + TABLE B + + Board of Admiralty. + Operations Committee. + Naval Staff. + Maintenance Committee. + Shipbuilding and Armaments. + Stores. + Air. + Finance. + Personnel and Discipline, etc. + Works. +</pre> +<p>Early in 1918, after my departure from the Admiralty, the +following announcement appeared in the Press:</p> +<p>The <i>Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following +announcement</i>:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">The Letters Patent for the new Board of +Admiralty having now been issued, it may be desirable to summarize +the changes in the personnel of the Board and to indicate briefly +the alterations in organization that have been decided upon.</p> +<p class="blockquote">Acting Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver now +brings to a close his long period of valuable service on the Naval +Staff and will take up a sea-going command, being succeeded as +D.C.N.S. by Rear-Admiral Sydney Fremantle. Rear-Admiral George P.W. +Hope has been selected for the appointment of Deputy First Sea +Lord, formerly held by Admiral Wemyss, but with changed functions. +Commodore Paine, Fifth Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Air Service, +leaves the Board of Admiralty in consequence of the recent creation +of the Air Council, of which he is now a member, and formal effect +is now given to the appointment of Mr. A.F. Pease as Second Civil +Lord, which was announced on Thursday last.</p> +<p class="blockquote">In view of the formal recognition now +accorded, as explained by the First Lord in his statement in the +House of Commons on the 1st November, to the principle of the +division of the work of the Board under the two heads of Operations +and Maintenance, the Members of the new Board (other than the First +Lord) may be grouped as follows:—</p> +<pre> + OPERATIONS. MAINTENANCE. + First Sea Lord Second Sea Lord. + and (Vice-Admiral Sir H.L. Heath.) + Chief of Naval Staff. + (Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss.) + + Deputy Chief of Naval Staff. Third Sea Lord. + (Rear-Admiral S.R. Fremantle.) (Rear-Admiral L. Halsey.) + Assistant Chief of Naval Staff. Fourth Sea Lord. + (Rear-Admiral A.L. Duff.) (Rear-Admiral H.H.D. + Tothill.) + + Deputy First Sea Lord. Civil Lord. + (Rear-Admiral G.P.W. Hope.) (Right Hon. E.G. Pretyman, + M.P.) + + Controller. + (Sir A.G. Anderson.) + + Second Civil Lord. + (Mr. A.F. Pease.) + + Financial Secretary. + (Right Hon. T.J. Macnamara, M.P.) + + Permanent Secretary. + (Sir O. Murray.) +</pre> +<p class="blockquote">The principle of isolating the work of +planning and directing naval war operations from all other work, in +order that it may receive the entire attention of the Officers +selected for its performance, is now being carried a stage further +and applied systematically to the organization of the Operations +side of the Board and that of the Naval Staff.</p> +<p class="blockquote">In future the general distribution of duties +between the Members of the Board belonging to the Naval Staff will +be as follows:—</p> +<pre> + FIRST SEA LORD AND CHIEF Naval policy and general direction + OF NAVAL STAFF of operations. + + DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL War operations in Home + STAFF Waters. + + ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL Trade Protection and + STAFF anti-submarine operations. + + DEPUTY FIRST SEA LORD General policy questions and + operations outside Home + Waters. +</pre> +<p class="blockquote">The detailed arrangements have been carefully +worked out so as to relieve the first three of these officers of +the necessity of dealing with any questions not directly connected +with the main operations of the war, and the great mass of +important paper work and administrative detail which is inseparably +and necessarily connected with Staff work, but which has hitherto +tended to compete for attention with Operations work generally will +under the new organization be diverted to the Deputy First Sea +Lord.</p> +<p class="blockquote">The grouping of the Directors of the Naval +Staff Divisions will be governed by the same principle.</p> +<p class="blockquote">The only two Directors that will work +immediately under the First Sea Lord will be the Director of +Intelligence Division (Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall) and the +Director of Training and Staff Duties (Rear-Admiral J. C. Ley), +whose functions obviously affect all the other Staff Divisions +alike.</p> +<p class="blockquote">Under the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff will be +grouped three Directors whose duties will relate entirely to the +planning and direction of operations in the main sphere of naval +activity, viz.:—</p> +<pre> + Director of Operations Division Captain A.D.P. Pound. + (Home) + + Director of Plans Division Captain C.T.M. Fuller, + C.M.G., D.S.O. + + Director of Air Division Wing Captain F.R. Scarlett, + D.S.O. +</pre> +<p class="blockquote">together with the Director of Signals +Division, Acting-Captain R.L. Nicholson, D.S.O., whose duties +relate to the system of Fleet communications.</p> +<p class="blockquote">Under the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff will +be grouped four Directors, whose duties relate to Trade Protection +and Anti-Submarine Operations, viz:—</p> +<pre> + Director of Anti-Submarine Captain W.W. Fisher, C.B. + Division + Director of Mine-sweeping Captain L.G. Preston, C.B. + Division + Director of Mercantile Movements Captain F.A. Whitehead. + Division + Director of Trade Division Captain A.G. Hotham. +</pre> +<p class="blockquote">Under the Deputy First Sea Lord there will be +one <i>Director of Operations Division (Foreign)</i>—Captain +C.P.R. Coode, D.S.O.</p> +<p class="blockquote">The chief change on the Maintenance side of +the Board relates to the distribution of duties amongst the Civil +Members. The continuance of the war has caused a steady increase in +the number of cases in which necessary developments of Admiralty +policy due to the war, or experience resulting from war conditions +give rise to administrative problems of great importance and +complexity, of which a solution will have to be forthcoming either +immediately upon or very soon after the conclusion of the war. The +difficulty of concentrating attention on these problems of the +future in the midst of current administrative work of great urgency +may easily be appreciated, and the Civil Lord has consented to take +charge of this important matter, with suitable naval and other +assistance. He will, therefore, be relieved by the Second Civil +Lord of the administration of the programme of Naval Works, +including the questions of priority of labour and material +requirements arising therefrom and the superintendence of the +Director of Works Department.</p> +<p class="blockquote">It has further been decided that the +exceptional labour and other difficulties now attending upon the +execution of the very large programme of urgent naval works in +progress have so greatly transformed the functions of the Director +of Works Department of the Admiralty that it is desirable, whilst +these abnormal conditions last, to place that Department under the +charge of an expert in the rapid execution of large engineering +works.</p> +<p class="blockquote">The Army Council have consented, at the +request of the First Lord of the Admiralty, to lend for this +purpose the services of Colonel Alexander Gibb, K.B.E., C.B., R.E., +Chief Engineer, Port Construction, British Armies in France. +Colonel Gibb (of the Firm of Easton, Gibb, Son and Company, which +built Rosyth Naval Base) will have the title of Civil +Engineer-in-Chief, and will be assisted by the Director of Works, +who retains his status as such, and the existing Staff of the +Department, which will be strengthened as necessary.</p> +<p class="blockquote">Another important change has reference to the +organization of the Admiralty Board of Invention and Research, and +has the object at once of securing greater concentration of effort +in connection with scientific research and experiment, and ensuring +that the distinguished scientists who are giving their assistance +to the Admiralty are more constantly in and amongst the problems +upon which they are advising.</p> +<p class="blockquote">Mr. Charles H. Merz, M.Inst.C.E., the +well-known Electrical Consulting Engineer, who has been associated +with the Board of Invention and Research (B.I.R.) since its +inception, has consented to serve as Director of Experiments and +Research (unpaid) at the Admiralty to direct and supervise all the +executive arrangements in connection with the organization of +scientific Research and Experiments. Mr. Merz will also be a member +of the Central Committee of the B.I.R. under the presidency of +Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher. The functions of the Central +Committee will, as hitherto, be to initiate, investigate, develop +and advise generally upon proposals in respect to the application +of Science and Engineering to Naval Warfare, but the distinguished +scientific experts at present giving their services will in future +work more much closely with the Technical Departments of the +Admiralty immediately concerned with the production and use of +apparatus required for specific purposes.</p> +<p class="blockquote">The general arrangements in regard to the +organization of scientific research and experiment will in future +come under the direct supervision of the First Lord.</p> +<br> +<p>Possibly by reason of the manner in which the announcement was +made, the Press appeared to assume that the whole of this Admiralty +organization was new. Such was not the case. Apart from the changes +in the personnel of the Board itself and a slight rearrangement of +their duties and those due to the establishment of an Air Ministry +(which had been arranged by the Cabinet before December, 1917), +there were but slight alterations in the organization shown in +Table A [above], as will be seen by comparing it with Table C on p. +27 [below], which indicates graphically the organization given in +the Admiralty communique.</p> +<pre> + TABLE C + + FIRST SEA LORD AND CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF. + + Deputy Chief of Naval Staff. + Director of Signals Division. + Director of Operations Division (Home). + Director of Plans Division. + Director of Air Division. + + Deputy First Sea Lord. + Director of Operations Division (Foreign) and + Administrative detail work. + + Director of Intelligence Division. + Director of Training and Staff Duties. + + Assistant Chief of Naval Staff. + Director of Trade Division. + Director of Mercantile Movements. + Director of Mine-sweeping. + Director of Anti-Submarine Division. +</pre> +<p>It will be seen that the alterations in Naval Staff organization +were as follows:</p> +<p>(a) The new Deputy First Sea Lord—Rear-Admiral +Hope—who since the spring of 1917 had been Director of the +Operations Division, was given the responsibility for operations in +foreign waters, with a Director of Operations (foreign) under him, +and was also definitely charged with the administrative detail +involving technical matters. The special gifts, experience and +aptitude of this particular officer for such work enabled him, no +doubt, to relieve the pressure on the First Sea Lord for +administrative detail very materially.</p> +<p>(b) The Operations Division was separated into two parts (home +and foreign), with a Director for each, instead of there being a +Deputy Director for home and an Assistant Director for foreign +work, both working under the Director. This was a change in name +only, as the same officer continued the foreign work under the new +arrangement.</p> +<p>(c) The Director of the Intelligence Division and the Director +of Training and Staff Duties were shown as working immediately +under the First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff.</p> +<p>(d) A Director of the Air Division was introduced as a result of +the Naval Air Service having been separated from the Admiralty and +placed under the Air Ministry. A larger Admiralty Staff +organization for aerial matters thus became necessary, since the +Staff could no longer refer to the Naval Air Service.</p> +<p>There were no other changes in the Staff organization. As +regards the general Admiralty organization, there was no change +except that caused by the disappearance of the separate Naval Air +Service, the addition of a Second Civil Lord, and some +reorganization of the Board of Invention and Research which had +been under discussion for some months previously.</p> +<p>It is probable that in 1918 the Chief of the Naval Staff had +more time at his disposal than was the case in 1917, owing to the +changes in organization initiated in the later year having reached +some finality and to the fact that the numerous anti-submarine +measures put in hand in 1917 had become effective in 1918.</p> +<p>The future Admiralty Naval Staff organization, which was in my +mind at the end of 1917, was a development of that shown in +<a href="#table-a">Table A, p. 20</a>, subject to the following +remarks:</p> +<p>In the organization then adopted the personality and experience +during the war of many of the officers in high positions were of +necessity considered, and the organization to that extent adapted +to circumstances. This resulted in somewhat overloading the staff +at the head, and the principle on which the Board of Admiralty +works, i.e., that its members are colleagues one of another, and +seniority in rank does not, theoretically, give greater weight in +council, was not altogether followed. Thus the Deputy Chief of the +Naval Staff, the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, and the Deputy +First Sea Lord were, by the nature of their duties, subordinate to +the Chief of the Naval Staff and yet were members of the Board. The +well-known loyalty of naval officers to one another tended to +minimize any difficulties that might have arisen from this anomaly, +but the arrangement might conceivably give rise to difficulty, and +is best avoided if the Board system is to remain.</p> +<p>The situation would be clearer if two of the three officers +concerned were removed altogether from the Board, viz., the Deputy +First Sea Lord and the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, leaving +only the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff as a member of the Board +to act in the absence of the Chief of the Naval Staff and to +relieve him of the administrative and technical work not +immediately connected with operations.</p> +<p>The work of the two officers thus removed should, under these +conditions, be undertaken by officers who should preferably be Flag +Officers, with experience in command at sea, having the titles of +Directors of Operations, whose emoluments should be commensurate +with their position and responsibilities.</p> +<p>I did not consider it advisable to carry out this alteration +during the war, and it was also difficult under the hour to hour +stress of war to rearrange all the duties of the Naval Staff in the +manner most convenient to the conduct of Staff business, although +its desirability was recognized during 1917.</p> +<p>It may be as well to close this chapter by a few remarks on +Staff work generally in the Navy. In the first place it is +necessary in the Navy to give much weight to the opinions of +specialist officers, and for this reason it is desirable that they +should be included in the Staff organization, and not "attached" to +it as was the case with our Army in pre-war days. The reason for +this is that in the Army there is, except in regard to artillery, +little "specialization." The training received by an officer of any +of the fighting branches of the Army at the Staff College may fit +him to assist in the planning and execution of operations, provided +due regard is paid to questions of supply, transport, housing, +etc.</p> +<p>This is not so in a navy. A ship and all that she contains is +the weapon, and very intimate knowledge of the different factors +that go to make a ship an efficient weapon is necessary if the ship +is to be used effectively and if operations in which the ship takes +so prominent a part are to be successfully planned and executed, or +if a sound opinion is to be expressed on the training necessary to +produce and maintain her as an efficient weapon.</p> +<p>The particular points in which this specially intimate knowledge +is required are:</p> +<p>(a) The science of navigation and of handling ships of all types +and classes.</p> +<p>(b) Gunnery.</p> +<p>(c) Torpedoes and mines.</p> +<p>It is the case at present (and the conditions are not likely to +alter) that each one of these subjects is a matter for specialist +training. Every executive officer has a general knowledge of each +subject, but it is not possible for any one officer to possess the +knowledge of all three which is gained by the specialist, and if +attempts are made to plan operations without the assistance of the +specialists grave errors may be made, and, indeed, such errors were +made during the late war, perhaps from this cause.</p> +<p>In my view, therefore, it is desirable that specialist officers +should be included in a Naval Staff organization and not be merely +"attached" to it. It may be said that a Staff can take the advice +of specialist officers who are <i>attached</i> to it for that +purpose. But there is a danger that the specialist advice may never +reach the heads of the Staff. Human nature being what it is, the +safest procedure is to place the specialist officer where his voice +must be heard, i.e. to give him a position on the Staff, for one +must legislate for the <i>average</i> individual and for normal +conditions of work.</p> +<p>The Chief of a Staff <i>might</i> have specialist knowledge +himself, or he <i>might</i> assure himself that due weight had been +given to the opinions of specialists attached to a Staff; but, on +the other hand, it is possible that he might not have that +knowledge and that he might ignore the opinions of the specialists. +The procedure suggested is at least as necessary when considering +the question of training as it is in the case of operations.</p> +<p>In passing from this point I may say that I have heard the +opinion expressed by military Staff officers that the war has shown +that artillery is so all important that it would be desirable to +place the Major-General of the Royal Artillery, now <i>attached</i> +to General Headquarters, on the Staff for operational matters.</p> +<p>Finally, great care should be exercised to prevent the Staff +becoming larger than is necessary, and there is some danger that +the ignorant may gauge the value of the Staff by its size.</p> +<p>Von Schellendorff says on this subject:</p> +<p>"The principle strictly followed throughout the German Service +of reducing all Staffs to the smallest possible dimensions is +moreover vindicated by restricting every Staff to what is +absolutely necessary, and by not attaching to every Army, Army +Corps and Divisional Staff representatives of all the various +branches and departments according to any fixed rule.</p> +<p>"There cannot be the slightest doubt that the addition of every +individual not absolutely required on a Staff is in itself an evil. +In the first place, it unnecessarily weakens the strength of the +regiment from which an officer is taken. Again it increases the +difficulty of providing the Staff with quarters, which affects the +troops that may happen to be quartered in the same place; and these +are quite ready enough, as it is, occasionally to look with a +certain amount of dislike—though in most cases it is entirely +uncalled for—on the personnel of the higher Staffs. Finally, +it should be remembered—and this is the most weighty argument +against the proceeding—that <i>idleness is at the root of all +mischief</i>. When there are too many officers on a Staff they +cannot always find the work and occupation essential for their +mental and physical welfare, and their superfluous energies soon +make themselves felt in all sorts of objectionable ways. Experience +shows that whenever a Staff is unnecessarily numerous the ambitious +before long take to intrigue, the litigious soon produce general +friction, and the vain are never satisfied. These failings, so +common to human nature, even if all present, are to a great extent +counteracted if those concerned have plenty of hard and constant +work. Besides, the numbers of a Staff being few, there is all the +greater choice in the selection of the men who are to fill posts on +it. In forming a Staff for war the qualifications required include +not only great professional knowledge and acquaintance with service +routine, but above all things character, self-denial, energy, tact +and discretion."</p> +<hr> +<a name="CH2"><!-- CH2 --></a> +<h2>CHAPTER II</h2> +<center>THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN IN THE EARLY PART OF 1917</center> +<p>The struggle against the depredations of the enemy submarines +during the year 1917 was two-fold; <i>offensive</i> in the +direction of anti-submarine measures (this was partly the business +of the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff and partly that +of the Operations Division); <i>defensive</i> in the direction of +protective measures for trade, whether carried in our own ships or +in ships belonging to our Allies or to neutrals, this being the +business of the Trade and Mercantile Movements Divisions.</p> +<p>Prior to the formation of the Mercantile Movements Division the +whole direction of trade was in the hands of the Trade Division of +the Staff.</p> +<p>The difficulty with which we were constantly faced in the early +part of 1917, when the effective means of fighting the submarine +were very largely confined to the employment of surface vessels, +was that of providing a sufficient number of such vessels for +<i>offensive</i> operations without incurring too heavy risks for +our trade by the withdrawal of vessels engaged in what might be +termed <i>defensive</i> work. There was always great doubt whether +any particular offensive operation undertaken by small craft would +produce any result, particularly as the numbers necessary for +success were not available, whilst there was the practical +<i>certainty</i> that withdrawal of defensive vessels would +increase our losses; the situation was so serious in the spring of +1917 that we could not carry out experiments involving grave risk +of considerably increased losses.</p> +<p>On the other hand, the sinking of one enemy submarine meant the +possible saving of a considerable number of merchant ships. It was +difficult to draw the line between the two classes of +operations.</p> +<p>The desire of the Anti-Submarine Division to obtain destroyers +for offensive use in hunting flotillas in the North Sea and English +Channel led to continual requests being made to me to provide +vessels for the purpose. I was, of course, anxious to institute +offensive operations, but in the early days of 1917 we could not +rely much on depth-charge attack, owing to our small stock of these +charges, and my experience in the Grand Fleet had convinced me that +for success in the alternative of hunting submarines for a period +which would exhaust their batteries and so force them to come to +the surface, a large number of destroyers was required, unless the +destroyers were provided with some apparatus which would, by sound +or otherwise, locate the submarine. This will be realized when the +fact is recalled that a German submarine could remain submerged at +slow speed for a period which would enable her to travel a distance +of some 80 miles. As this distance could be covered in any +direction in open waters such as the North Sea, it is obvious that +only a very numerous force of destroyers steaming at high speed +could cover the great area in which the submarine might come to the +surface. She would, naturally, select the dark hours for emergence, +as being the period of very limited range of vision for those +searching for her. In confined waters such as those in the eastern +portion of the English Channel the problem became simpler. Requests +for destroyers constantly came from every quarter, such as the +Commanders-in-Chief at Portsmouth and Devonport, the Senior Naval +Officer at Gibraltar, the Vice-Admiral, Dover, the Rear-Admiral +Commanding East Coast, and the Admiral at Queenstown. The vessels +they wanted did not, however, exist.</p> +<p>Eventually, with great difficulty, a force of six destroyers was +collected from various sources in the spring of 1917, and used in +the Channel solely for hunting submarines; this number was really +quite inadequate, and it was not long before they had to be taken +for convoy work.</p> +<p>Evidence of the difficulty of successfully hunting submarines +was often furnished by the experiences of our own vessels of this +type, sometimes when hunted by the enemy, sometimes when hunted in +error by our own craft. Many of our submarines went through some +decidedly unpleasant experiences at the hands of our own surface +vessels and occasionally at the hands of vessels belonging to our +Allies. On several such occasions the submarine was frequently +reported as having been sunk, whereas she had escaped.</p> +<p>As an example of a submarine that succeeded not only in evading +destruction, but in getting at least even with the enemy, the case +of one of our vessels of the "E" class, on patrol in the Heligoland +Bight, may be cited. This submarine ran into a heavy anti-submarine +net, and was dragged, nose first, to the bottom. After half an +hour's effort, during which bombs were exploding in her vicinity, +the submarine was brought to the surface by her own crew by the +discharge of a great deal of water from her forward ballast tanks. +It was found, however, that the net was still foul of her, and that +a Zeppelin was overhead, evidently attracted by the disturbance in +the water due to the discharge of air and water from the submarine. +She went to the bottom again, and after half an hour succeeded in +getting clear of the net. Meanwhile the Zeppelin had collected a +force of trawlers and destroyers, and the submarine was hunted for +fourteen hours by this force, assisted by the airship. During this +period she succeeded in sinking one of the German destroyers, and +was eventually left unmolested.</p> +<p>For a correct appreciation of submarine warfare it is necessary +to have a clear idea of the characteristics and qualities of the +submarine herself, of the numbers possessed by the enemy, and of +the rate at which they were being produced. It is also necessary, +in order to understand the difficulty of introducing the counter +measures adopted by the Royal Navy, to know the length of time +required to produce the vessels and the weapons which were employed +or which it was intended to employ in the anti-submarine war.</p> +<p>The German submarines may be divided into four classes, viz.: +Submarine cruisers, U-boats, U.B.-boats, U.C.-boats. There were +several variations of each class.</p> +<p>The earlier <i>submarine cruisers</i> of the "Deutschland" class +were double-hulled vessels, with a surface displacement of 1,850 +tons, and were about 215 feet long; they had a surface speed of +about 12 knots and a submerged speed of about 6 knots. They carried +two 5.9-inch guns, two 22 pounders, two torpedo tubes, and 12 +torpedoes. They could keep the sea for quite four months without +being dependent on a supply ship or base.</p> +<p>The later <i>submarine cruisers</i> were double-hulled, 275-320 +feet long, had a surface speed of 16-18 knots, and a submerged +speed of about 7 to 8 knots. They carried either one or two +5.9-inch guns, six torpedo tubes, and about 10 torpedoes. They had +a very large radius of action, viz., from 12,000 to 20,000 miles, +at a speed of 6 knots. A large number (some 30 to 40) of these +boats were under construction at the time of the Armistice, but +very few had been completed.</p> +<p>There were two or three types of <i>U-boats</i>. The earlier +vessels were 210 to 220 feet long, double-hulled, with a surface +displacement of about 750 tons, a surface speed of 15 to 16 knots, +and a submerged speed of about 8 knots. They carried one or two +4.1-inch guns, four to six torpedo tubes, and about 10 +torpedoes.</p> +<p>Later vessels of the class were 230 to 240 feet long, and of 800 +to 820 tons surface displacement, and carried six torpedo tubes and +16 torpedoes. Some of them, fitted as minelayers, carried 36 mines, +and two torpedo tubes, but only two torpedoes. A later and much +larger class of minelayers carried a 5.9-inch gun, four torpedo +tubes, 42 mines, and a larger number of torpedoes. The earlier +<i>U-boats</i> could keep the sea for about five weeks without +returning to a base or a supply ship; the later <i>U-boats</i> had +much greater sea endurance.</p> +<p>The smaller <i>U.B.-boats</i> were single-hulled, and about 100 +feet long, had a surface speed of 7 to 9 knots and a submerged +speed of about 5 knots, and carried one 22-pounder gun, two torpedo +tubes and four torpedoes. These boats could keep the sea for about +two weeks without returning to a base or supply ship. A later class +were double-hulled, 180 feet long, with greater endurance (8,000 +miles at 6 knots), a surface speed of 13 knots and a submerged +speed of 8 knots; they carried one 4.1-inch gun, five tubes and 10 +torpedoes.</p> +<p>The earliest <i>U.C.-boats</i> were 111 feet long, with a +surface displacement of 175 tons, a surface speed of 6-½ +knots, and a submerged speed of 5 knots. They carried 12 mines, but +no torpedo tubes, and as they had a fuel endurance of only 800 +miles at 5-½ knots, they could operate only in southern +waters.</p> +<p>The later <i>U.C.-boats</i> were 170 to 180 feet long, +double-hulled, had a surface speed of 11 to 12 knots and a +submerged speed of about 7 knots, carried 18 mines, three torpedo +tubes, five torpedoes, and one 22-pounder gun, and their fuel +endurance was 8,000 to 10,000 miles at a speed of 7 to 8 knots.</p> +<p>At the end of February, 1917, it was estimated that the enemy +had a total of about 130 submarines of all types available for use +in home waters, and about 20 in the Mediterranean. Of this total an +average of between one-half and one-third was usually at sea. +During the year about eight submarines, on the average, were added +monthly to this total. Of this number some 50 per cent, were +vessels of the mine-laying type.</p> +<p>All the German submarines were capable of prolonged endurance +submerged. The U-boats could travel under water at the slowest +speed for some 48 hours, at about 4 knots for 20 hours, at 5 knots +for about 12 hours, and at 8 knots for about 2 hours.</p> +<p>They were tested to depths of at least 180 feet, but many +submerged to depths exceeding 250 feet without injury. They did not +usually lie on the bottom at depths greatly exceeding 20 fathoms +(120 feet).</p> +<p>All German submarines, except possibly the <i>cruiser class</i>, +could dive from diving trim in from 30 seconds to one minute. The +<i>U.B. class</i> had particularly rapid diving qualities, and were +very popular boats with the German submarine officers. Perhaps the +most noticeable features of the German submarines as a whole were +their excellent engines and their great strength of +construction.</p> +<p>Prior to the month of February, 1917, it was the usual practice +of the enemy submarine in the warfare against merchant ships to +give some warning before delivering her attack. This was by no +means a universal rule, particularly in the case of British +merchant vessels, as is evidenced by the attacks on the +<i>Lusitania, Arabic</i>, and scores of other ships.</p> +<p>In the years 1915 and 1916, however, only 21 and 29 per cent. +respectively of the British merchant ships sunk by enemy submarines +were destroyed without warning, whilst during the first four months +of the unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917 the figure rose to 64 +per cent., and went higher and higher as the months progressed.</p> +<p>Prior to February, 1917, the more general method of attack on +ships was to "bring them to" by means of gun-fire; they were then +sunk by gun-fire, torpedo, or bomb. This practice necessitated the +submarine being on the surface, and so gave a merchant ship +defensively armed a chance of replying to the gun-fire and of +escaping, and it also gave armed decoy ships a good opportunity of +successful action if the submarine could be induced to close to +very short range.</p> +<p>The form of attack on commerce known as "unrestricted submarine +warfare" was commenced by Germany with the object of forcing Great +Britain to make peace by cutting off her supplies of food and raw +material. It has been acknowledged by Germans in high positions +that the German Admiralty considered that this form of warfare +would achieve its object in a comparatively short time, in fact in +a matter of some five or six months.</p> +<p>Experienced British naval officers, aware of the extent of the +German submarine building programme, and above all aware of the +shadowy nature of our existing means of defence against such a form +of warfare, had every reason to hold the view that the danger was +great and that the Allies were faced with a situation, fraught with +the very gravest possibilities.</p> +<p>The principal doubt was as to the ability of the enemy to train +submarine crews with sufficient rapidity to keep pace with his +building programme.</p> +<p>However, it was ascertained that the Germans had evidently +devoted a very great number of their submarines to training work +during the period September, 1915, to March, 1916, possibly in +anticipation of the unrestricted warfare, since none of their +larger boats was operating in our waters between these months; this +fact had a considerable bearing on the problem.</p> +<p>As events turned out it would appear either that the training +given was insufficient or that the German submarine officer was +lacking in enterprise.</p> +<p>There is no doubt whatever that had the German craft engaged in +the unrestricted submarine warfare been manned by British officers +and men, adopting German methods, there would have been but few +Allied or neutral merchant ships left afloat by the end of +1917.</p> +<p>So long as the majority of the German submarine attacks upon +shipping were made by gun-fire, the method of defence was +comparatively simple, in that it merely involved the supply to +merchant ships of guns of sufficient power to prevent the submarine +engaging at ranges at which the fire could not be returned. Whilst +the <i>method</i> of defence was apparent, the problem of +<i>supplying</i> suitable guns in sufficient numbers was a very +different matter. It involved arming all our merchant ships with +guns of 4-inch calibre and above. In January, 1917, only some 1,400 +British ships had been so armed since the outbreak of war.</p> +<p>It will be seen, therefore, that so long as ships sailed singly, +very extensive supplies of guns were required to meet gun attack, +and as there was most pressing need for the supply of guns for the +Army in France, as well as for the anti-aircraft defence of London, +the prospect of arming merchant ships adequately was not +promising.</p> +<p>When the enemy commenced unrestricted submarine warfare attack +by gun-fire was gradually replaced by attack by torpedo, and the +problem at once became infinitely more complicated.</p> +<p>Gun-fire was no longer a protection, since the submarine was +rarely seen. The first intimation of her presence would be given by +the track of a torpedo coming towards the ship, and no defence was +then possible beyond an endeavour to manoeuvre the ship clear of +the torpedo. Since, however, a torpedo is always some distance +ahead of the bubbles which mark its track (the speed of the torpedo +exceeding 30 knots an hour), the track is not, as a rule, seen +until the torpedo is fairly close to the ship unless the sea is +absolutely calm. The chance of a ship of low speed avoiding a hit +by a timely alteration of course after the torpedo has been fired +is but slight. Further, the only difficulty experienced by a +submarine in hitting a moving vessel by torpedo-fire, once she has +arrived in a position suitable for attack, lies in estimating +correctly the course and speed of the target. In the case of an +ordinary cargo ship there is little difficulty in guessing her +speed, since it is certain to be between 8 and 12 knots, and her +course can be judged with fair accuracy by the angle of her masts +and funnel, or by the angle presented by her bridge.</p> +<p>It will be seen, then, how easy was the problem before the +German submarine officers, and how very difficult was that set to +our Navy and our gallant Mercantile Marine.</p> +<p>It will not be out of place here to describe the methods which +were in force at the end of 1916 and during the first part of 1917 +for affording protection to merchant shipping approaching our +coasts from the direction of the Atlantic Ocean.</p> +<p>The general idea dating from the early months of the war was to +disperse trade on passage over wide tracts of ocean, in order to +prevent the successful attacks which could be so easily carried out +if shipping traversed one particular route. To carry out such a +system it was necessary to give each vessel a definite route which +she should follow from her port of departure to her port of +arrival; unless this course was adopted, successive ships would +certainly be found to be following identical, or practically +identical, routes, thereby greatly increasing the chance of attack. +In the early years of the war masters of ships were given +approximate tracks, but when the unrestricted submarine campaign +came into being it became necessary to give exact routes.</p> +<p>The necessary orders were issued by officers stationed at +various ports at home and abroad who were designated Shipping +Intelligence or Reporting Officers. It was, of course, essential to +preserve the secrecy of the general principles governing the issue +of route orders and of the route orders themselves. For this reason +each master was only informed of the orders affecting his own ship, +and was directed that such orders should on no account fall into +the hands of the enemy.</p> +<p>The route orders were compiled on certain principles, of which a +few may be mentioned:</p> +<p>(a) Certain definite positions of latitude and longitude were +given through which the ship was required to pass, and the orders +were discussed with the master of each vessel in order to ensure +that they were fully understood.</p> +<p>(b) Directions were given that certain localities in which +submarines were known to operate, such as the approaches to the +coast of the United Kingdom, were, if possible, to be crossed at +night. It was pointed out that when the speed of the ship did not +admit of traversing the whole danger area at night, the portion +involving the greatest danger (which was the inshore position) +should, as a rule, be crossed during dark hours.</p> +<p>(c) Similarly the orders stated that ships should, as a rule, +leave port so as to approach the dangerous area at dusk, and that +they should make the coast at about daylight, and should avoid, as +far as possible, the practice of making the land at points in +general use in peace time.</p> +<p>(d) Orders were definite that ships were to zigzag both by day +and at night in certain areas, and if kept waiting outside a +port.</p> +<p>(e) Masters were cautioned to hug the coast, as far as +navigational facilities admitted, when making coastal passages.</p> +<p>The orders (b), (c) and (d) were those in practice in the Grand +Fleet when circumstances permitted during my term in that +command.</p> +<p>A typical route order from New York to Liverpool might be as +follows:</p> +<p>"After passing Sandy Hook, hug the coast until dark, then make a +good offing before daylight and steer to pass through the following +positions, viz:</p> +<pre> + Lat. 38° N. Long. 68° W. + Lat. 41° N. Long. 48° W. + Lat. 46° N. Long. 28° W. + Lat. 51° 30' N. Long. 14° W. +</pre> +<p>"Thence make the coast near the Skelligs approximately at +daylight, hug the Irish coast to the Tuskar, up the Irish coast +(inside the banks if possible), and across the Irish Channel during +dark hours. Thence hug the coast to your port; zigzag by day and +night after passing, Long. 20° W."</p> +<p>Sometimes ships were directed to cross to the English coast from +the south of Ireland, and to hug the English coast on their way +north.</p> +<p>The traffic to the United Kingdom was so arranged in the early +part of 1917 as to approach the coast in four different areas, +which were known as Approach A, B, C, and D.</p> +<p>Approach A was used for traffic bound towards the western +approach to the English Channel.</p> +<p>Approach B for traffic making for the south of Ireland.</p> +<p>Approach C for traffic making for the north of Ireland.</p> +<p>Approach D for traffic making for the east coast of England via +the north of Scotland.</p> +<p>The approach areas in force during one particular period are +shown on Chart A (in pocket at the end of the book). They were +changed occasionally when suspicion was aroused that their limits +were known to the enemy, or as submarine attack in an area became +intense.</p> +<p>[Transcriber's note: Chart A is a navigational map of the waters +southwest of England, with approach routes marked.]</p> +<p>The approach areas were patrolled at the time, so far as numbers +admitted, by patrol craft (trawlers, torpedo-boat destroyers, and +sloops), and ships with specially valuable cargoes were given +directions to proceed to a certain rendezvous on the outskirts of +the area, there to be met by a destroyer or sloop, if one was +available for the purpose. The areas were necessarily of +considerable length, by reason of the distance from the coast at +which submarines operated, and of considerable width, owing to the +necessity for a fairly wide dispersion of traffic throughout the +area. Consequently, with the comparatively small number of patrol +craft available, the protection afforded was but slight, and losses +were correspondingly heavy. In the early spring of 1917, Captain +H.W. Grant, of the Operations Division at the Admiralty, whose work +in the Division was of great value, proposed a change in method by +which the traffic should be brought along certain definite "lines" +in each approach area. Typical lines are shown in Chart B.</p> +<p>[Transcriber's note: Chart B is a navigational map of the waters +southwest of Ireland, with approach routes marked.]</p> +<p>The idea was that the traffic in, say, Approach Route B, should, +commencing on a certain date, be ordered by the Routeing Officer to +pass along the line Alpha. Traffic would continue along the line +for a certain period, which was fixed at five days, when it would +be automatically diverted to another line, say Gamma, but the +traffic along Gamma would not commence until a period of 24 hours +had elapsed since discontinuance of the use of the line Alpha. This +was necessary in order to give time for the patrol craft to change +from one line to the other. During this period of 24 hours the +arrangement for routeing at the ports of departure ensured that no +traffic would reach the outer end of any of the approach lines, and +consequently that traffic would cease on line Alpha 24 hours before +it commenced on line Gamma. After a further period of five days the +line would again change automatically.</p> +<p>It was necessary that Shipping Intelligence Officers should have +in their possession the orders for directing traffic on to the +various lines for some considerable time ahead, and the masters of +ships which were likely to be for some time at sea were informed of +the dates between which the various lines were to be used, up to a +date sufficient to cover the end of their voyage. There was, +therefore, some danger of this information reaching the enemy if a +vessel were captured by a submarine and the master failed to +destroy his instructions in time. There was also some danger in +giving the information to neutrals.</p> +<p>However, the system, which was adopted, did result in a +reduction of losses during the comparatively short time that it was +in use, and the knowledge that patrol craft on the line would be +much closer together than they would be in an approach area +certainly gave confidence to the personnel of the merchant ships, +and those who had been forced to abandon their ship by taking to +the boats were afforded a better chance of being picked up.</p> +<p>Various arrangements were in existence for effecting rapidly a +diversion of shipping from one route to another in the event of +submarines being located in any particular position, and a +continual change of the signals for this purpose was necessary to +guard against the possibility of the code being compromised by +having fallen into enemy hands, an event which, unfortunately, was +not infrequent.</p> +<p>Elaborate orders were necessary to regulate coastal traffic, and +fresh directions were continually being issued as danger, +especially danger from mines, was located. Generally speaking, the +traffic in home waters was directed to hug the coast as closely as +safe navigation permitted. Two reasons existed for this, (a) in +water of a depth of less than about eight fathoms German submarines +did not care to operate, and (b) under the procedure indicated +danger from submarine attack was only likely on the side remote +from the coast.</p> +<p>Here is an example of the instructions for passing up +Channel:</p> +<p><i>From Falmouth to Portland Bill.</i>—Hug the coast, +following round the bays, except when passing Torbay. (Directions +followed as to the procedure here.)</p> +<p><i>From Portland Bill to St. Catherines.</i>—Pass close +south of the Shambles and steer for Anvil Point, thence hug the +coast, following round the bays.</p> +<p>And so on.</p> +<p>As it was not safe navigationally to follow round the bays +during darkness, the instructions directed that ships were to leave +the daylight route at dusk and to join the dark period route, +showing dimmed bow lights whilst doing so.</p> +<p>Two "dark period routes" were laid down, one for vessels bound +up Channel, and another for vessels bound down Channel, and these +routes were some five miles apart in order to minimize the danger +of collision, ships being directed not to use their navigation +lights except for certain portions of the route, during which they +crossed the route of transports and store ships bound between +certain southern British ports (Portsmouth, Southampton and +Devonport) and French ports.</p> +<p>Routes were similarly laid down for ships to follow when +navigating to or from the Bristol Channel, and for ships navigating +the Irish Sea.</p> +<p>Any system of convoy was at this time out of the question, as +neither the cruisers to marshal the convoy to the submarine area, +nor the destroyers to screen it when there, were available.</p> +<p>There was one very important factor in the situation, viz., the +comparative rate at which the Germans could produce submarines and +at which we could build vessels suitable for anti-submarine warfare +and for defence of commerce. The varying estimates gave cause for +grave anxiety. Our average output of <i>destroyers</i> was four to +five per month. Indeed, this is putting the figure high; and, of +course, we suffered losses. The French and Italians were not +producing any vessels of this type, whilst the Japanese were, in +the early part of 1917, not able to spare any for work in European +waters, although later in the year they lent twelve destroyers, +which gave valuable assistance in the Mediterranean. The United +States of America were not then in the war. Consequently measures +for the defence of the Allied trade against the new menace depended +on our own production.</p> +<p>Our <i>submarines</i> were being produced at an average rate of +about two per month only, and—apart from motor launches, +which were only of use in the finest weather and near the +coast—the only other vessels suitable for anti-submarine work +that were building at the time, besides some sloops and P-boats, +were trawlers, which, whilst useful for protection patrol, were too +slow for most of the escort work or for offensive duties. The +Germans' estimate of their own submarine production was about +twelve per month, although this figure was never realized, the +average being nearer eight. But each submarine was capable of +sinking many merchant ships, thus necessitating the employment of a +very large number of our destroyers; and therein lay the gravity of +the situation, as we realized at the Admiralty early in 1917 that +no effort of ours could increase the output of destroyers for at +least fifteen months, the shortest time then taken to build a +destroyer in this country.</p> +<p>And here it is interesting to compare the time occupied in the +production of small craft in Great Britain and in Germany during +the war.</p> +<p>In pre-war days we rarely built a destroyer in less than +twenty-four months, although shortly before the war efforts were +made to reduce the time to something like eighteen to twenty +months. Submarines occupied two years in construction.</p> +<p>In starting the great building programme of destroyers and +submarines at the end of 1914, Lord Fisher increased very largely +the number of firms engaged in constructing vessels of both types. +Hopes were held out of the construction both of destroyers and of +submarines in about twelve months; but labour and other +difficulties intervened, and although some firms did complete craft +of both classes during 1915 in less than twelve months, by 1916 and +1917 destroyers <i>averaged</i> about eighteen months and +submarines even longer for completion.</p> +<p>The Germans had always built their small craft rapidly, although +their heavy ships were longer in construction than our own. Their +destroyers were completed in a little over twelve months from the +official date of order in pre-war days. During the early years of +the war it would seem that they maintained this figure, and they +succeeded in building their smaller submarines of the U.B. and U.C. +types in some six to eight months, as U.B. and U.C. boats began to +be delivered as early as April, 1915, and it is certain that they +were not ordered before August, 1914.</p> +<p>The time taken by the Germans to build submarines of the U type +was estimated by us at twelve months, and that of submarine +cruisers at eighteen months. German submarine officers gave the +time as eight to ten months for a U-boat and eighteen months for a +submarine cruiser.</p> +<p>(It is to be observed that Captain Persius in a recent article +gives a much longer period for the construction of the German +submarines. It is not stated whether he had access to official +figures, and his statement is not in agreement with the figures +given by German submarine officers.)</p> +<p>It is of interest to note here the rate of ship production +attained by some firms in the United States of America during the +war.</p> +<p>As I mention later (<a href="#CH6"><i>Vide</i> Chapter vi, p. +157</a>), the Bethlehem Steel Company, under Mr. Schwab's guidance, +produced ten submarines for us in five months from the date of the +order. Mr. Schwab himself informed me that towards the end of the +war he was turning out large destroyers in six weeks. The Ford +Company, as is well known, produced submarine chasers of the +"Eagle" type in even a shorter period, but these vessels were of +special design and construction.</p> +<p>I have dealt so far with the question of anti-submarine measures +involving only the use of destroyers and other small surface craft. +There were, of course, other methods both in use and under +consideration early in 1917 when we took stock of the +situation.</p> +<p>For some time we had been using <i>Decoy vessels</i>, and with +some success; it was possible to increase the number of these ships +at the cost of taking merchant ships off the trade routes or by +building. A very considerable increase was arranged.</p> +<p>The use of our own <i>submarines</i> offensively against enemy +submarines had also been tried, and had met with occasional +success, but our numbers were very limited (the total in December, +1916, fit for oversea or anti-submarine work was about forty). They +were much needed for reconnaissance and offensive work against +surface men-of-war in enemy waters, and only a few were at the time +available for anti-submarine operations, and then only at the cost +of other important services.</p> +<p>The <i>hydrophone</i> had been in the experimental stage and +under trial for a considerable period, but it had not so far +developed into an effective instrument for locating submarines, and +although trials of the different patterns which had been devised +were pushed forward with energy, many months elapsed before it +became a practicable proposition.</p> +<p>One of the best offensive measures against the enemy submarines, +it was realized, was the <i>mine</i>, if laid in sufficiently large +numbers. Unfortunately, in January, 1917, we did not possess a mine +that was satisfactory against submarines.</p> +<p>Our deficiency in this respect was clearly shown in the course +of some trials which I ordered, when one of our own submarines was +run against a number of our mines, with the result that only about +33 per cent. of the mines (fitted, of course, only with small +charges) exploded. The Germans were well aware that our mines were +not very effective against submarines.</p> +<p>We possessed at the time mines of two patterns, and whilst +proving unsatisfactory against submarines, they were also found to +be somewhat unreliable when laid in minefields designed to catch +surface vessels, owing to a defect in the mooring apparatus. This +defect was remedied, but valuable time was lost whilst the +necessary alterations were being carried out, and although we +possessed in April, 1917, a stock of some 20,000 mines, only 1,500 +of them were then fit for laying. The position, therefore, was that +our mines were not a satisfactory anti-submarine weapon.</p> +<p>A <i>new pattern mine</i>, which had been designed on the model +of the German mine during Sir Henry Jackson's term of office as +First Sea Lord in 1916, was experimented with at the commencement +of 1917, and as soon as drawings could be prepared orders for +upwards of 100,000 were placed in anticipation of its success. +There were some initial difficulties before all the details were +satisfactory, and, in spite of the greatest pressure on +manufacturers, it was not until November, 1917, that mines of this +pattern were being delivered in large numbers. The earliest +minefields laid in the Heligoland Bight in September and October, +1917, with mines of the new pattern met with immediate success +against enemy submarines, as did the minefields composed of the +same type of mine, the laying of which commenced in November, 1917, +in the Straits of Dover.</p> +<p>When it became possible to adopt the system of bringing merchant +ships in convoys through the submarine zone under the escort of a +screen of destroyers, this system became in itself, to a certain +extent, an offensive operation, since it necessarily forced the +enemy submarines desirous of obtaining results into positions in +which they themselves were open to violent attack by depth charges +dropped by destroyers.</p> +<p>During the greater part of the year 1917, however, it was only +possible to supply destroyers with a small number of <i>depth +charges</i>, which was their principal anti-submarine weapon; as it +became feasible to increase largely the supply of these charges to +destroyers, so the violence of the attack on the submarines +increased, and their losses became heavier.</p> +<p>The position then, as it existed in the early days of the year +1917, is described in the foregoing remarks.</p> +<p>The <i>result</i> measured in loss of shipping (British, Allied, +and neutral) from submarine and mine attack in the first half of +the year was as follows in gross tonnage:</p> +<pre> + January - 324,016 + February - 500,573 + March - 555,991 + April - 870,359 + May - 589,754 + June - 675,154 +</pre> +<p>Because of the time required for production, it was a sheer +impossibility to <i>put into effect</i> any fresh devices that +might be adopted for dealing with submarine warfare for many +months, and all that could be done was to try new methods of +approach to the coast and, as the number of small craft suitable +for escort duty increased, to extend gradually the convoy system +already in force to a certain extent for the French coal trade and +the Scandinavian trade.</p> +<p>In the chapters which follow the further steps which were taken +to deal with the problem, and the degree of success which attended +them, will be described.</p> +<hr> +<a name="CH3"><!-- CH3 --></a> +<h2>CHAPTER III</h2> +<center>ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS</center> +<p>The previous chapters have dealt with the changes in +organization carried out at the Admiralty during the year 1917 +largely with the object of being able to deal more effectively with +the submarine warfare against merchant ships. Mention has also been +made of the submarine problem with which the Navy had to deal; +particulars of the anti-submarine and other work carried out will +now be examined.</p> +<p>A very large proportion of the successful anti-submarine devices +brought into use during 1917, and continued throughout the year +1918, were the outcome of the work of the Anti-Submarine Division +of the Naval Staff, and it is but just that the high value of this +work should be recognized when the history of the war comes to be +written by future historians. As has been stated in Chapter I, +Rear-Admiral A.C. Duff, C.B., was the original head of the +division, with Captain F.C. Dreyer, C.B., Commander Yeats Brown, +and Commander Reginald Henderson as his immediate assistants. +Captain H.T. Walwyn took the place of Captain Dreyer on March 1, +1917, when the latter officer became Director of Naval Ordnance. +When Admiral Duff was appointed Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, +with a seat on the Board, in May, 1917, Captain W.W. Fisher, C.B., +became head of the division, which still remained one of the +divisions of the Staff working immediately under the A.C.N.S. It is +to these officers, with their most zealous, clever and efficient +staff, that the institution of many of the successful +anti-submarine measures is largely due. They were indefatigable in +their search for new methods and in working out and perfecting +fresh schemes, and they kept their minds open to <i>new ideas</i>. +They received much valuable assistance from the great civilian +scientists who gave such ready help during the war, the function of +the naval officers working with the scientists being to see that +the effort was being directed along practical lines. They were also +greatly indebted to Captain Ryan, R.N., for the exceedingly +valuable work carried out by him at the experimental establishment +at Hawkcraig. Many brilliant ideas were due to Captain Ryan's +clever brain.</p> +<p>I doubt whether the debt due to Admiral Duff and Captain Fisher +and their staff for their great work can ever be thoroughly +appreciated, but it is certainly my duty to mention it here since I +am better able to speak of it than any other person. In saying this +I do not wish to detract in the least from the value of the part +performed by those to whose lot it fell to put the actual schemes +into operation. Without them, of course, nothing could have been +accomplished.</p> +<p>When the Anti-Submarine Division started in December, 1916, the +earlier devices to which attention was devoted were:</p> +<p>(1) The design and manufacture of howitzers firing shell fitted +to explode some 40 to 60 feet under water with which to attack +submarines when submerged.</p> +<p>(2) The introduction of a more suitable projectile for use +against submarines than that supplied at the time to the guns of +destroyers and patrol craft.</p> +<p>(3) The improvement of and great increase in the supply of smoke +apparatus for the screening of merchant ships from submarines +attacking by gunfire.</p> +<p>(4) A great increase in the number of depth charges supplied to +destroyers and other small craft.</p> +<p>(5) The development of the hydrophone for anti-submarine work, +both from ships and from shore stations.</p> +<p>(6) The introduction of the "Otter" for the protection of +merchant ships against mines.</p> +<p>(7) A very great improvement in the rapidity of arming merchant +ships defensively.</p> +<p>(8) The extended and organized use of air craft for +anti-submarine work.</p> +<p>(9) A great development of the special service or decoy +ship.</p> +<p>(10) The introduction of a form of net protection for merchant +ships against torpedo fire.</p> +<p>Other devices followed, many of which were the outcome of work +in other Admiralty Departments, particularly the Departments of the +Director of Naval Ordnance and the Director of Torpedoes and Mines, +working in conjunction with the Anti-Submarine or the Operations +Division of the Naval Staff. Some of the new features were the +development of depth-charge throwers, the manufacture and use of +fast coastal motor-boats for anti-submarine work, the production of +mines of an improved type for use especially against submarines, +very considerable developments in the use of minefields, especially +deep minefields, including persistent mining in the Heligoland +Bight and the laying of a complete minefield at varying depths in +the Straits of Dover; also, after the United States entered the +war, the laying of a very extensive minefield right across the +northern part of the North Sea. The provision of "flares" for +illuminating minefields at night, and a system of submarine +detection by the use of electrical apparatus were also matters +which were taken up and pressed forward during 1917. During the +year the system of dazzle painting for merchant ships was brought +into general use.</p> +<p>On the operational side of the Naval Staff the work of dealing +with enemy submarines before they passed out of the North Sea was +taken in hand by organized hunting operations by destroyers and +other patrol craft, and by the more extended use offensively of our +own submarines, as vessels became available.</p> +<p>Considerable developments were effected in the matter of the +control of mercantile traffic, and much was done to train the +personnel of the mercantile marine in matters relating to submarine +warfare.</p> +<p>Taking these subjects in detail, it will be of interest to +examine the progress made during the year.</p> +<center>HOWITZERS</center> +<p>The <i>howitzer</i> as a weapon for use against the submarine +when submerged was almost non-existent at the beginning of 1917, +only thirty bomb-throwers, on the lines of trench-mortars, being on +order. By April of that year designs for seven different kinds of +bomb-throwers and howitzers had been prepared and approved, and +orders placed for 1,006 weapons, of which number the first 41 were +due for delivery in May. By the end of May the number of +bomb-throwers and howitzers on order had been increased to 2,056, +of eight different patterns. Over 1,000 of these weapons fired a +bomb or shell carrying a burster exceeding 90 lbs. in weight, and +with a range varying between 1,200 and 2,600 yards. Later in the +war, as we gained experience of the value of this form of attack, +heavier bombs were introduced for use in the existing bomb-throwers +and howitzers. The howitzer as an anti-submarine weapon was +handicapped by the comparatively small weight of the bursting +charge of its shell. This applied more particularly to the earlier +patterns, and to inflict fatal injury it was necessary to burst the +shell in close proximity to the submerged submarine. This weapon, +although not very popular at first, soon, however, proved its +value, when employed both from patrol craft and from merchant +ships.</p> +<p>One curious instance occurred on March 28, 1918, of a merchant +ship being saved by a 7.5-inch howitzer. A torpedo was seen +approaching at a distance of some 600 yards, and it appeared +certain to hit the ship. A projectile fired from the howitzer +exploded under water close to the torpedo, deflected it from its +course, and caused it to come to the surface some 60 yards from the +ship; a second projectile caused it to stop, and apparently damaged +the torpedo, which when picked up by an escorting vessel was found +to be minus its head.</p> +<p>Delivery of howitzers commenced in June, 1917, and continued as +follows:</p> +<pre> + Total completed, + No. of Howitzers including those + Date. actually issued. under proof. + + July 24, 1917 35 48 + October 1, 1917 92 167 + December 10, 1917 377 422 +</pre> +<p>The slow rate of delivery, in spite of constant pressure, which +is shown by these figures gives some idea of the time required to +bring new devices into existence.</p> +<center>PROJECTILE FOR USE AGAINST SUBMARINES</center> +<p>In January, 1917, the Director of Naval Ordnance was requested +by the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff to carry out +trials against a target representing the hull of a German +submarine, so far as the details were known to us, to ascertain +<i>the most suitable type of projectile</i> amongst those then in +existence for the attack of submarines by guns of 4.7-inch calibre +and below.</p> +<p>The results were published to the Fleet in March, 1917. They +afforded some useful knowledge and demonstrated the ineffectiveness +of some of the shells and fuses commonly in use against submarines +from 12-pounder guns, the weapon with which so many of our patrol +craft were armed. The target at which the shell was fired did not, +however, fully represent a German submarine under the conditions of +service. The trials were therefore continued, and as a result, in +June, 1917, a further order was issued to the Fleet, giving +directions as to the type of projectile to be used against +submarines from all natures of guns, pending the introduction of +delay action fuses for the smaller guns; this was the temporary +solution of the difficulty until a new type of shell evolved from +the experience gained at the trials could be produced and issued. +The trials, which were exhaustive, were pressed forward vigorously +and continuously throughout the year 1917, and meanwhile more +accurate information as to the exact form of the hull and the +thickness of the plating of German submarines became available. +Early in 1918 the first supplies of the new fuses were ready for +issue.</p> +<center>SMOKE APPARATUS</center> +<p>The earlier <i>smoke apparatus</i> for supply to merchant ships +was designed towards the end of 1916.</p> +<p>One description of smoke apparatus consisted of an arrangement +for burning phosphorus at the stern of a ship; in other cases +firework composition and other chemicals were used. A dense smoke +cloud was thus formed, and, with the wind in a suitable direction, +a vessel could hide her movements from an enemy submarine or other +vessel, and thus screen herself from accurate shell fire.</p> +<p>In another form the apparatus was thrown overboard and formed a +smoke cloud on the water.</p> +<p>The rate of supply of sets of the smoke apparatus to ships is +shown by the following figures:</p> +<pre> + April 1, 1917 - 1,372 sets + July 3, 1917 - 2,563 sets + October 5, 1917 - 3,445 sets + November 26, 1917 - 3,976 sets +</pre> +<center>DEPTH CHARGES</center> +<p><i>Depth charges</i>, as supplied to ships in 1917, were of two +patterns: one, Type D, contained a charge of 300 lb. of T.N.T., and +the other, Type D*, carried 120 lb. of T.N.T. At the commencement +of 1917 the allowance to ships was two of Type D and two of Type +D*, and the supply was insufficient at that time to keep up the +stock required to maintain on board four per destroyer, the number +for which they were fitted, or to supply all trawlers and other +patrol craft with their allowance. The great value of the depth +charge as a weapon against submarines, and the large number that +were required for successful attack, became apparent early in 1917, +and the allowance was increased. Difficulty was experienced +throughout the year in maintaining adequate stocks owing to the +shortage of labour and the many demands on our industries made by +the war, but the improvement is shown by the fact that while the +average output <i>per week</i> of depth charges was only 140 in +July, it had become over 500 by October, and that by the end of +December it was raised to over 800, and was still increasing very +rapidly. As a consequence, early in 1918 it was found possible to +increase the supply very largely, as many as 30 to 40 per destroyer +being carried.</p> +<p>Improvements in the details of depth charges were effected +during 1917. One such improvement was the introduction of a pistol +capable of firing at much greater depths than had been in use +before. The result was that all vessels, whether fast or slow, +could safely use the 300-lb. depth charge if set to a sufficient +depth. This led to the abolition of the Type D* charges and the +universal supply of Type D.</p> +<p>In spite of the difficulties of dropping depth charges so close +to submarines as to damage them sufficiently to cause them to come +to the surface, very good results were obtained from their use when +destroyers carried enough to form, so to speak, a ring round the +assumed position at which the submarine had dived. In order to +encourage scientific attack on submarines, a system of depth charge +"Battle Practice" was introduced towards the end of 1917.</p> +<p>It is as well to correct a common misapprehension as to the +value of depth charges in destroying submarines.</p> +<p>Many people held very exaggerated ideas on this subject, even to +the extent of supposing that a depth charge would destroy a +submarine if dropped within several hundred yards of her. This is, +unfortunately, very far indeed from being the case; it is, on the +contrary, necessary to explode the charge near the submarine in +order to effect destruction. Taking the depth charge with 300 lb. +weight of explosive, ordinarily supplied to destroyers in 1917, it +was necessary to explode it within fourteen feet of a submarine to +ensure destruction; at distances up to about twenty-eight feet from +the hull the depth charge might be expected to disable a submarine +to the extent of forcing her to the surface, when she could be sunk +by gun-fire or rammed, and at distances up to sixty feet the moral +effect on the crew would be considerable and <i>might</i> force the +submarine to the surface.</p> +<p>A consideration of these figures will show that it was necessary +for a vessel attacking a submarine with depth charges to drop them +in very close proximity, and the first obvious difficulty was to +ascertain the position of a submarine that had dived and was out of +sight.</p> +<p>Unless, therefore, the attacking vessel was fairly close to the +submarine at the moment of the latter diving there was but little +chance of the attack being successful.</p> +<center>HYDROPHONES</center> +<p>The <i>Hydrophone</i>, for use in locating submerged submarines, +although first evolved in 1915, was in its infancy, so far as +supply to ships was concerned, at the commencement of 1917. +Experiments were being carried out by the Board of Invention and +Research at Harwich, and by Captain Ryan, R.N., at Hawkcraig, and +although very useful results had been obtained and a considerable +number of shore stations as well as some patrol vessels had been +fitted with hydrophones, which had a listening range of one or two +miles, all the devices for use afloat suffered from the +disadvantage that it was not possible to use them whilst the ship +carrying them was moving, since the noise of the vessel's own +machinery and of the water passing along the side prevented the +noise made by other vessels being located. What was required was a +listening instrument that could be used by a ship moving at least +at slow speed, otherwise the ship carrying the hydrophone was +herself, when stopped, an easy target for the submarine's torpedo. +It was also essential, before an attack could be delivered, to be +able to locate the <i>direction</i> of the enemy submarine, and +prior to 1917 all that these instruments showed was the presence of +a submarine somewhere in the vicinity.</p> +<p>Much research and experimental work was carried out during the +year 1917 under the encouragement and supervision of the +Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff. Two hydrophones were +invented in the early part of 1917, one by Captain Ryan, R.N., and +one by the Board of Invention and Research, which could be used +from ships at very slow speed and which gave some indication of the +<i>direction</i> of the sound; finally, in the summer of 1917, the +ability and patience of one inventor, Mr. Nash, were rewarded, and +an instrument was devised termed the "fish" hydrophone which to a +considerable extent fulfilled the required conditions. Mr. Nash, +whose invention had been considered but not adopted by the Board of +Invention and Research before he brought it to the Anti-Submarine +Division of the Naval Staff, laboured under many difficulties with +the greatest energy and perseverance; various modifications in the +design were effected until, in October, 1917, the instrument was +pronounced satisfactory and supplies were put in hand.</p> +<p>The next step was to fit the "fish" hydrophone in certain +auxiliary patrol vessels as well as some destroyers, "P" boats and +motor launches, to enter and train men to work it, and finally to +organize these vessels into "submarine hunting flotillas," drill +them, and then set them to their task.</p> +<p>This work, which occupied some time, was carried out at +Portland, where a regular establishment was set up for developing +the "fish" hydrophone and for organizing and training the "hunting +flotillas" in its use. A considerable amount of training in the use +of the hydrophone was required before men became efficient, and +only those with a very keen sense of hearing were suited to the +work. The chances of the success of the hunting flotillas had been +promising in the early experiments, and the fitting out of patrol +craft and organizing and drilling them, proceeded as rapidly as the +vessels could be obtained, but largely owing to the slow production +of trawlers it was not until November that the first hunting +flotilla fitted with the "fish" hydrophone was actually at work. +The progress made after this date is illustrated by the fact that +in December, 1917, a division of drifters, with a "P" boat, fitted +with this "fish" hydrophone hunted an enemy submarine for seven +hours during darkness, covering a distance of fifty miles, kept +touch with her by sound throughout this period, and finished by +dropping depth charges in apparently the correct position, since a +strong smell of oil fuel resulted and nothing further could be +heard of the submarine, although the drifters listened for several +hours. On another occasion in the same month a division of drifters +hunted a submarine for five hours. The number of hydrophones was +increased as rapidly as possible until by the end of the year the +system was in full operation within a limited area, and only +required expansion to work, as was intended, on a large scale in +the North Sea and the English Channel.</p> +<p>Meanwhile during 1917 <i>directional</i> hydrophones, which had +been successfully produced both by Captain Ryan and by the Board of +Invention and Research, had been fitted to patrol craft in large +numbers, and "hunting flotillas" were operating in many areas. A +good example of the working of one of these flotillas occurred off +Dartmouth in the summer of 1918, when a division of motor launches +fitted with the Mark II hydrophone, under the general guidance of a +destroyer, carried out a successful attack on a German submarine. +Early in the afternoon one of the motor launches dropped a depth +charge on an oil patch, and shortly afterwards one of the +hydrophones picked up the sound of an internal combustion engine; a +line of depth charges was run on the bearing indicated by the +hydrophone. The motor launches and the destroyer remained +listening, until at about 6.0 P.M. a submarine came to the surface +not far from Motor Launch No. 135, which fired two rounds at the +submarine before the latter submerged. Other motor launches closed +in, and depth charges were dropped by them in close proximity to +the wash of the submarine. Oil came to the surface, and more depth +charges were dropped in large numbers on the spot for the ensuing +forty-eight hours. Eventually objects came to the surface clearly +indicating the presence of a submarine. Further charges were +dropped, and an obstruction on the bottom was located by means of a +sweep. This engagement held peculiar interest for me, since during +my visit to Canada in the winter of 1919 the honour fell to me of +presenting to a Canadian—Lieutenant G.L. Cassady, +R.N.V.R.—at Vancouver the Distinguished Service Cross awarded +him by His Majesty for his work in Motor Launch No. 135 on this +occasion.</p> +<p><i>Motor Launches</i> were organized into submarine hunting +flotillas during the year 1917. These vessels were equipped with +the directional hydrophone as soon as its utility was established, +and were supplied with depth charges. In the summer of 1917 four +such hunting flotillas were busy in the Channel; the work of one of +these I have described already, and they certainly contributed +towards making the Channel an uneasy place for submarine +operations.</p> +<p>These results were, of course, greatly improved on in 1918, as +the numbers of ships fitted with the "fish" and other hydrophones +increased and further experience was gained.</p> +<p>The progress in supply of hydrophones is shown by the following +table:</p> +<pre> + Supply of Directional + Date General Service Mark I and Shark Fin Fish + 1917. Portable Type. Mark II. Type. Type. + + Jul 31 2,750 500 - - + Aug 31 2,750 700 - - + Sep 30 2,750 850 - - + Oct 31 3,500 1,000 - - + Dec 31 3,680 1,950 870 37 +</pre> +<center>HYDROPHONE STATIONS AND TRAINING SCHOOLS</center> +<p>At the beginning of 1917 four <i>shore hydrophone stations</i> +were in use. During the year eight additional stations were +completed and several more were nearing completion. The first step +necessary was a considerable increase in the instructional +facilities for training listeners both for the increased number of +shore stations and for the large number of vessels that were fitted +for hydrophone work during the year.</p> +<p>The greater part of this training took place at the +establishment at Hawkcraig, near Rosyth, at which Captain Ryan, +R.N., carried out so much exceedingly valuable work during the war. +I am not able to give exact figures of the number of officers and +men who were instructed in hydrophone work either at Hawkcraig or +at other stations by instructors sent from Hawkcraig, but the total +was certainly upwards of 1,000 officers and 2,000 men. In addition +to this extensive instructional work the development of the whole +system of detecting the presence of submarines by sound is very +largely due to the work originally carried out at Hawkcraig by +Captain Ryan.</p> +<p>The first hydrophone station which was established in the spring +of 1915 was from Oxcars Lighthouse in the Firth of Forth; it was +later in the year transferred to Inchcolm. Experimental work under +Captain Ryan continued at Hawkcraig during 1915, and in 1916 a +section of the Board of Invention and Research went to Hawkcraig to +work in conjunction with him. This station produced the Mark II +directional hydrophone of which large numbers were ordered in 1917 +for use in patrol craft. It was a great improvement on any +hydrophone instrument previously in use. Hawkcraig also produced +the directional plates fitted to our submarines, as well as many +other inventions used in detecting the presence of submarines.</p> +<p>In addition to the work at Hawkcraig an experimental station +under the Board of Invention and Research was established near +Harwich in January, 1917. The Mark I directional hydrophone was +designed at this establishment in 1917, and other exceedingly +valuable work was carried out there connected with the detection of +submarines.</p> +<p>At Malta an experimental station, with a hydrophone training +school, was started in the autumn of 1917, and good work was done +both there and at a hydrophone station established to the southward +of Otranto at about the same time, as well as at a hydrophone +training school started at Gallipoli at the end of the year.</p> +<center>"OTTERS" AND PARAVANES</center> +<p><i>The "Otter" system</i> of defence of merchant ships against +mines was devised by Lieutenant Dennis Burney, D.S.O., R.N. (a son +of Admiral Sir Cecil Burney), and was on similar lines to his +valuable invention for the protection of warships. The latter +system had been introduced into the Grand Fleet in 1916, although +for a long period considerable opposition existed against its +general adoption, partly on account of the difficulties experienced +in its early days of development, and partly owing to the extensive +outlay involved in fitting all ships. However, this opposition was +eventually overcome, and before the end of the war the system had +very amply justified itself by saving a large number of warships +from destruction by mines. It was computed that there were at least +fifty cases during the war in which paravanes fitted to warships +had cut the moorings of mines, thus possibly saving the ships. It +must also be borne in mind that the cutting of the moorings of a +mine and the bringing of it to the surface may disclose the +presence of an hitherto unknown minefield, and thus save other +ships.</p> +<p>Similarly, the "Otter" defence in its early stages was not +introduced without opposition, but again all difficulties were +overcome, and the rate of progress in its use is shown in the +following statement giving the number of British merchant ships +fitted with it at different periods of 1917:</p> +<pre> + By July 1, 95 ships had been fitted. + By September 1, 294 ships had been fitted. + By December 1, 900 ships had been fitted. +</pre> +<p>The system was also extended to foreign merchant ships, and +supplies of "Otters" were sent abroad for this purpose.</p> +<p>A considerable number of merchant ships were known to have been +saved from destruction by mine by the use of this system.</p> +<center>DEFENSIVE ARMING OF MERCHANT SHIPS</center> +<p>The <i>defensive arming</i> of merchant ships was a matter which +was pressed forward with great energy and rapidity during the year +1917. The matter was taken up with the Cabinet immediately on the +formation of the Board of Admiralty presided over by Sir Edward +Carson, and arrangements made for obtaining a considerable number +of guns from the War Office, from Japan, and from France, besides +surrendering some guns from the secondary and anti-torpedo boat +armament of our own men-of-war, principally those of the older +type, pending the manufacture of large numbers of guns for the +purpose. Orders for some 4,200 guns were placed by Captain Dreyer, +the Director of Naval Ordnance, with our own gun makers in March, +April and May, 1917, in addition to nearly 3,000 guns already on +order for this purpose; 400 90-m.m. guns were obtained from France, +the mountings being made in England. Special arrangements were also +made by Captain Dreyer for the rapid manufacture of all guns, +including the provision of the material and of extra manufacturing +plant.</p> +<p>These orders for 4,200 guns and the orders for 2,026 howitzers +placed at the same time brought the total number of guns and +howitzers under manufacture in England for naval and merchant +service purposes in May, 1917, up to the high figure of 10,761.</p> +<p>At the end of the year 1916 the total number of merchant ships +that had been armed since the commencement of the war (excluding +those which were working under the White Ensign and which had +received <i>offensive</i> armaments) was 1,420. Of this number, 83 +had been lost.</p> +<p>During the first six months of 1917 armaments were provided for +an additional 1,581 ships, and during the last six months of that +year a further total of 1,406 ships were provided with guns, an +aggregate number of 2,987 ships being thus furnished with armaments +during the year. This total was exclusive of howitzers.</p> +<p>The progress of the work is shown by the following figures:</p> +<pre> + Number or guns that had been + Date. provided for British Merchant + Ships excluding Howitzers. + + January 1, 1917 1,420 + April 1, 1917 2,181 + July 1, 1917 3,001 + October 1, 1917 3,763 + January 1, 1918 4,407 +</pre> +<p>The figures given include the guns mounted in ships that were +lost through enemy action or from marine risks.</p> +<p>It should be stated that the large majority of the guns +manufactured during 1917 were 12-pounders or larger guns, as +experience had shown that smaller weapons were usually outranged by +those carried in submarines, and the projectiles of even the +12-pounder were smaller than was desirable. Of the 2,987 new guns +mounted in merchant ships during the year 1917 only 190 were +smaller than 12-pounders.</p> +<center>AIRCRAFT FOR ANTI-SUBMARINE WORK</center> +<p><i>Anti-submarine work by aircraft</i> was already in operation +round our coasts by the beginning of 1917, and during the year the +increase in numbers and improvement in types of machines rendered +possible considerable expansion of the work. Closer co-operation +between surface vessels and aircraft was also secured, and as the +convoy system was extended aircraft were used both for escort and +observation work, as well as for attack on submarines. For actual +escort work airships were superior to heavier-than-air machines +owing to their greater radius of action, whilst for offensive work +against a submarine that had been sighted the high speed of the +seaplane or aeroplane was of great value.</p> +<p>In 1916 and the early part of 1917 we were but ill provided with +aircraft suitable for anti-submarine operations at any considerable +distance from the coast, and such aircraft as we possessed did not +carry sufficiently powerful bombs to be very effective in attacking +submarines, although they were of use in forcing these vessels to +submerge and occasionally in bringing our surface craft to the spot +to press home the attack.</p> +<p>The Royal Naval Air Service, under Commodore Godfrey Paine, +devoted much energy to the provision of suitable aircraft, and the +anti-submarine side of the Naval Staff co-operated in the matter of +their organization; with the advent of the large "America" type of +seaplane and the Handley-Page type of aeroplane, both of which +carried heavy bombs, successful attacks on enemy submarines became +more frequent. They were assisted by the airships, particularly +those of the larger type.</p> +<p>Improvements which were effected in signalling arrangements +between ships and aircraft were instrumental in adding greatly to +their efficiency, and by the early summer of 1917 aircraft had +commenced to play an important part in the war against submarines +and in the protection of trade.</p> +<p>Thereafter progress became rapid, as the following figures +show:</p> +<p>In June, 1917, aeroplanes and seaplanes patrolling for +anti-submarine operations covered 75,000 miles, sighted 17 +submarines, and were able to attack 7 of them.</p> +<p>In September, 1917, the distance covered by anti-submarine +patrols of aeroplanes and seaplanes was 91,000 miles, 25 submarines +were sighted, of which 18 were attacked.</p> +<p>In the four weeks ending December 8, 1917, in spite of the much +shorter days and the far less favourable flying weather +experienced, the mileage covered was again 91,000 miles; 17 +submarines were sighted, of which 11 were attacked during this +period.</p> +<p>As regards airships the figures again show the increased +anti-submarine work carried out:</p> +<p>In June, 1917, airships engaged in anti-submarine patrol covered +53,000 miles, sighted and attacked 1 submarine.</p> +<p>In September, 1917, they covered 83,000 miles, and sighted 8 +submarines, of which 5 were attacked.</p> +<p>In the four weeks ending December 8, 1917, they covered 50,000 +miles, sighted 6 submarines, and attacked 5 of them.</p> +<p>The airships were more affected by short days, and particularly +by bad weather, than the heavier than air craft, and the fact that +they covered practically the same mileage in the winter days of +December as in the summer days of June shows clearly the +development that took place in the interval.</p> +<p>During the whole of 1917 it was estimated that our heavier than +air craft sighted 135 submarines and attacked 85 of them, and our +lighter than air craft sighted 26 and attacked 15. The figures +given in Chapter IX of the number of submarines sunk during the war +<a href="#aircraft">by aircraft</a> (viz. 7 as a minimum), when +compared with the number of attacks during 1917 alone suggest the +difficulties of successful attack.</p> +<p>In September, 1917, as extensive a programme as was consistent +with manufacturing capabilities, in view of the enormous demands of +the Army, was drawn up by the Naval Staff for the development of +aircraft for anti-submarine operations during 1918.</p> +<p>The main developments were in machines of the large "America" +type and heavy bombing machines for attacking enemy bases, as well +as other anti-submarine machines and aircraft for use with the +Grand Fleet.</p> +<p>Included in the anti-submarine operations of aircraft during +1917 were the bombing attacks on Bruges, since the German +submarines and the shelters in which they took refuge were part of +the objective.</p> +<p>These attacks were carried out from the aerodrome established by +the Royal Naval Air Service at Dunkirk. During 1917 the Naval Air +Forces of the Dover Command, which included the squadrons at +Dunkirk, were under the command of Captain C.L. Lambe, R.N., and +the operations of this force were of a very strenuous character and +of the utmost value.</p> +<p>Bombing operations prior to the year of 1917 had been carried +out by various types of machines, but the introduction of the +Handley-Page aeroplanes in the spring of 1917 enabled a much +greater weight of bombs—viz. some 1,500 lbs.—to be +carried than had hitherto been possible. These machines were +generally used for night bombing, and the weight of bombs dropped +on the enemy bases in Belgium rose with great rapidity as machines +of the Handley-Page type were delivered, as did the number of +nights on which attacks were made. It was no uncommon occurrence +during the autumn of 1917 for six to eight tons of bombs to be +dropped in one night. I have not the figures for 1918, but feel no +doubt that with the great increase in aircraft that became possible +during that year this performance was constantly exceeded.</p> +<center>SPECIAL SERVICE OR DECOY SHIPS</center> +<p>The story of the work of these vessels constitutes a record of +gallantry, endurance and discipline which has never been surpassed +afloat or ashore. The earliest vessels were fitted out during the +year 1915 at Scapa, Rosyth, Queenstown and other ports, and from +the very first it was apparent that they would win for themselves a +place in history. The earliest success against an enemy submarine +by one of these vessels was achieved by the <i>Prince Charles</i>, +fitted out at Scapa, and commanded by Lieutenant Mark-Wardlaw, an +officer on the Staff of Admiral Sir Stanley Colville, then Admiral +Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands. In the early months of 1917 +it was decided to augment greatly the force of these special +service vessels, and steps were taken to organize a separate +Admiralty Department for the work. Special experience was needed, +both for the selection of suitable ships and for fitting them out, +and care was taken to select officers who had been personally +connected with the work during the war; the advice of successful +commanders of decoy ships was also utilized. At the head was +Captain Alexander Farrington, under whose directions several ships +had been fitted out at Scapa with great ingenuity and success. +Every class of ship was brought into the service: steam cargo +vessels, trawlers, drifters, sailing ships, ketches, and sloops +specially designed to have the appearance of cargo ships. These +latter vessels were known as "convoy sloops" to distinguish them +from the ordinary sloop. Their design, which was very clever, had +been prepared in 1916 by Sir Eustace T. D'Eyncourt, the Director of +Naval Construction. The enemy submarine commanders, however, became +so wary owing to the successes of decoy ships that they would not +come to the surface until they had inspected ships very closely in +the submerged condition, and the fine lines of the convoy sloops +gave them away under close inspection.</p> +<p>In the early spring of 1917 the Director of Naval Construction +was asked whether the "P" class of patrol boats then under +construction could be altered to work as decoy vessels, as owing to +their light draught they would be almost immune from torpedo +attack.</p> +<p>A very good design was produced, and some of the later patrol +boats were converted and called "P Q's." These vessels had the +appearance of small merchant ships at a cursory glance. They would +not, however, stand close examination owing, again, to their fine +lines, but being better sea boats than the "P's," by reason of +their greater freeboard, the design was continued, and they met +with considerable success against submarines (especially in the +Irish Sea) by ramming and depth charge tactics, the submarines when +submerged probably not realizing when observing the "P Q.'s" +through a periscope the speed of which they were capable.</p> +<p>During 1917, when the unrestricted submarine warfare was in +progress, many of the decoy vessels were fitted with torpedo tubes, +either above water or submerged, since, as the submarine commanders +became more wary, they showed great dislike to coming to the +surface sufficiently close to merchant ships to admit of the gun +armament being used with certainty of success. A torpedo, on the +other hand, could, of course, be used effectively against a +submarine whilst still submerged. The use also became general of +casks or cargoes of wood to give additional flotation to decoy +ships after being torpedoed, so as to prolong their life in case +the submarine should close near enough to allow of effective +gunfire.</p> +<p>Another ruse adopted was that of changing the disguise of a +decoy ship during the night, so that she could not be identified by +a submarine which had previously made an attack upon her. In all +cases of disguise or of changing disguise it was essential that the +decoy ship should assume the identity of some class of vessel +likely to be met with in the particular area in which she was +working, and obviously the courses steered were chosen with that +object in view.</p> +<p>Again, since for success it was essential to induce the +submarine to come within close range so that the decoy ship's +gunfire should be immediately effective, it was necessary that her +disguise should stand the closest possible examination through the +periscope of a submarine. German submarine commanders, after a +short experience of decoy ships, were most careful not to bring +their vessels to the surface in proximity to craft that were +apparently merchant ships until they had subjected them to the +sharpest scrutiny at short range through the periscope, and the +usual practice of an experienced submarine commander was to steer +round the ship, keeping submerged all the time.</p> +<p>Not only was it essential that there should be no sign of an +armament in the decoy ship, or a man-of-war-like appearance in any +respect, but when the "panic" signal was made to lead the submarine +commander to think that his attack had succeeded, precautions had +to be taken against the presence of more than the ordinary number +of men in the boats lowered and sent away with the supposed whole +ship's company; also the sight of any men left on board would at +once betray the real character of the decoy ship and result in the +disappearance of the submarine and the probable sinking of the +disguised craft by torpedo fire.</p> +<p>During the late summer of 1917 it became evident that the +submarine commanders had become so suspicious of decoy craft that +the chances of success by the larger cargo vessels were not +sufficient to justify any further addition to existing numbers in +view of the increasing shortage of shipping; a considerable fleet +of steamers building for this purpose was therefore diverted to +trade purposes. The number of smaller vessels, particularly sailing +craft, was, however, increased especially in Mediterranean waters +where they had not been previously operating on an extensive +scale.</p> +<p>It is impossible to close these remarks on this class of vessel +without testifying once more to the splendid gallantry, +self-sacrifice, skilful resource and magnificent discipline shown +by those on board. This is illustrated by descriptions of a few +typical actions fought during 1917.</p> +<p>The first which I relate took place on February 17, 1917, when a +decoy vessel, a steamship armed with five 12-pounder guns, +commanded by that most gallant officer, Captain Gordon Campbell, +R.N., was torpedoed by a submarine in a position Lat. 51.34 N., +Long. 11.23 W.</p> +<p>Captain Campbell saw the torpedo coming and manoeuvred to try +and avoid being hit in the engine-room, but as he purposely always +selected a very slow ship for decoy work his attempt was only +partially successful and the engine-room began to fill. No signal +for assistance was made, however, as Captain Campbell feared that +such a signal might bring another vessel on the scene and this +would naturally scare the submarine away. The usual procedure of +abandoning the ship in the boats with every appearance of haste was +carried out, only sufficient hands remaining hidden on board to +work the guns. The periscope of the submarine was next sighted on +the quarter within 200 or 300 yards, and she came slowly past the +ship still submerged and evidently examining the vessel closely +through the periscope. She passed within a few yards of the ship, +then crossed the bow and came to the surface about 200 yards off +and passed down the port side again close to. Captain Campbell +waited until every gun would bear before giving the signal for +"action." The decoy ship's true character was then revealed; +concealed gunports were thrown open; colours were hoisted, and a +hot fire opened from all guns. The submarine was hit at once and +continued to be hit so rapidly that it was evidently impossible for +her to submerge. She sank in a very short time. One officer and one +man were picked up. A signal was then made for assistance and help +arrived within a couple of hours. The decoy ship was rapidly +filling, but efforts were made to tow her into port, and with the +greatest difficulty, and entirely owing to the splendid manner in +which all hands stuck to the work, she was brought into Berehaven +with her stern under water thirty-six hours later and beached. The +great restraint shown by Captain Campbell, in withholding fire as +the submarine passed her in a submerged condition, and the truly +wonderful discipline and steadiness and ingenuity which baffled so +close an examination of the ship were the outstanding features of +this great exploit.</p> +<p>On April 22, 1917, a decoy ship known as "Q22," a small sailing +vessel with auxiliary power, armed with two 12-pounder guns, and +commanded by Lieutenant Irvine, R.N.R., while in a position about +fifty miles south of Kinsale Head, sighted a submarine on the +surface which opened fire immediately at a range of about 4,000 +yards. The fire was accurate and the decoy ship was hit frequently, +two men being killed and four wounded in a few minutes and the +vessel considerably damaged. As further concealment appeared +useless the guns were then unmasked and the fire returned with +apparently good results, several hits being claimed. The enemy's +fire then fell off in accuracy and she increased the range, and +after about one and a half hours' fighting the light became too bad +to continue the action. It was thought that the submarine was sunk, +but there was no positive evidence of sinking.</p> +<p>On April 30, 1917, a decoy ship—H.M.S. +<i>Prize</i>—a small schooner with auxiliary power, armed +with two 12-pounder guns and commanded by Lieutenant W.E. Sanders, +R.N.R., a New Zealand officer, sighted, when in position Lat. 49.44 +N., Long. 11.42 W., a submarine about two miles away on the port +beam at 8.30 P.M. At 8.45 P.M. the submarine opened fire on the +<i>Prize</i> and the "abandon ship" party left in a small boat. The +submarine gradually approached, continuing to pour in a heavy fire +and making two hits on the <i>Prize</i> which put the motor out of +action, wrecked the wireless office, and caused much internal +damage besides letting a great deal of water into the ship.</p> +<p>The crew of the <i>Prize</i> remained quietly hidden at their +concealed guns throughout this punishment, which continued for +forty minutes as the submarine closed, coming up from right astern, +a position no doubt which she considered one of safety. When close +to she sheered off and passed to the port beam at a distance of +about one hundred yards. At this moment Lieutenant Sanders gave the +order for "action." The guns were exposed and a devastating fire +opened at point blank range, but not before the submarine had fired +both her guns, obtaining two more hits, and wounding several of the +crew of the <i>Prize</i>. The first shell fired from the +<i>Prize</i> hit the foremost gun of the submarine and blew it +overboard, and a later shot knocked away the conning tower. The +submarine went ahead and the <i>Prize</i> tried to follow, but the +damage to her motor prevented much movement. The firing continued +as the submarine moved away, and after an interval she appeared to +be on fire and to sink. This occurred shortly after 9.0 P.M., when +it was nearly dark. The <i>Prize</i> sent her boats to pick up +survivors, three being taken out of the water, including the +commander and one other officer. The prisoners on coming on board +expressed their willingness to assist in taking the <i>Prize</i> +into port. It did not at this time seem likely that she would long +remain afloat, but by great exertion and good seamanship the leaks +were got under to a sufficient extent to allow of the ship being +kept afloat by pumping. The prisoners gave considerable help, +especially when the ship caught fire whilst starting the motor +again. On May 2 she met a motor launch off the coast of Ireland and +was towed into port. In spite of the undoubted great damage to the +submarine, damage confirmed by the survivors, who were apparently +blown overboard with the conning tower, and who had no thought +other than that she had been sunk, later intelligence showed that +she succeeded in reaching Germany in a very disabled condition. +This incident accentuated still further the recurrent difficulty of +making definite statements as to the fate of enemy submarines, for +the evidence in this case seemed absolutely conclusive. The +commander of the submarine was so impressed with the conduct of the +crew of the <i>Prize</i> that when examined subsequently in London +he stated that he did not consider it any disgrace to have been +beaten by her, as he could not have believed it possible for any +ship's company belonging to any nation in the world to have been +imbued with such discipline as to stand the shelling to which he +subjected the <i>Prize</i> without any sign being made which would +give away her true character.</p> +<p>Lieut.-Commander Sanders was awarded the Victoria Cross for his +action and many decorations were given to the officers and ship's +company for their conduct in the action. It was sad that so fine a +commander and so splendid a ship's company should have been lost a +little later in action with another submarine which she engaged +unsuccessfully during daylight, and which followed her in a +submerged condition until nightfall and then torpedoed her, all +hands being lost.</p> +<p>It was my privilege during my visit to New Zealand in 1919 to +unveil a memorial to the gallant Sanders which was placed in his +old school at Takapuna, near Auckland.</p> +<p>On June 7, 1917, a decoy ship, the S.S. <i>Pargust</i>, armed +with one 4-inch gun, four 12-pounder guns and two torpedo tubes, +commanded by Captain Gordon Campbell, R.N., who had meanwhile been +awarded the Victoria Cross, was in a position Lat. 51.50 N., Long. +11.50 W., when a torpedo hit the ship abreast the engine-room and +in detonating made a hole through which water poured, filling both +engine-room and boiler-room. The explosion of the torpedo also blew +one of the boats to pieces. The usual procedure of abandoning ship +was carried out, and shortly after the boats had left, the +periscope of a submarine was sighted steering for the port side. +The submarine passed close under the stern, steered to the +starboard side, then recrossed the stern to the port side, and when +she was some fifty yards off on the port beam her conning tower +appeared on the surface and she steered to pass round the stern +again and towards one of the ship's boats on the starboard beam. +She then came completely to the surface within one hundred yards, +and Captain Campbell disclosed his true character, opened fire with +all guns, hitting the submarine at once and continuing to hit her +until she sank. One officer and one man were saved. The decoy ship +lost one man killed, and one officer was wounded by the explosion +of the torpedo.</p> +<p>As in the case of the action on February 17 the distinguishing +feature of this exploit was the great restraint shown by Captain +Campbell in withholding his fire although his ship was so seriously +damaged. The gallantry and fine discipline of the ship's company, +their good shooting and splendid drill, contributed largely to the +success. The decoy ship, although seriously damaged, reached +harbour.</p> +<p>On July 10, 1917, a decoy ship, H.M.S. <i>Glen</i>, a small +schooner with auxiliary power and armed with one 12-pounder and one +6-pounder gun, commanded by Sub-Lieutenant K. Morris, R.N.R., was +in a position about forty miles south-west of Weymouth when a +submarine was sighted on the surface some three miles away. She +closed to within two miles and opened fire on the <i>Glen</i>. The +usual practice of abandoning ship was followed, the submarine +closing during this operation to within half a mile and remaining +at that distance examining the <i>Glen</i> for some time. After +about half an hour she went ahead and submerged, and then passed +round the ship at about 200 yards distance, examining her through +the periscope, finally coming to the surface about 50 yards off on +the port quarter. Almost immediately she again started to submerge, +and fire was at once opened. The submarine was hit three or four +times before she turned over on her side and disappeared. There was +every reason to believe that she had sunk, although no one was on +deck when she disappeared. No survivors were rescued.</p> +<p>The feature of this action was again the restraint shown by the +commanding officer of the <i>Glen</i> and the excellent discipline +of the crew.</p> +<p>On August 8, 1917, the decoy ship H.M.S. <i>Dunraven</i>, in +Lat. 48.0 N., Long. 7.37 W., armed with one 4-inch and four +12-pounder guns and two torpedo tubes, commanded by Captain Gordon +Campbell, V.C., R.N., sighted a submarine on the surface some +distance off. The submarine steered towards the ship and submerged, +and soon afterwards came to the surface some two miles off and +opened fire. The <i>Dunraven</i>, in her character of a merchant +ship, replied with an after gun, firing intentionally short, made a +smoke screen, and reduced speed slightly to allow the submarine to +close.</p> +<p>When the shells from the submarine began to fall close to the +ship the order to abandon her was given, and, as usual with the +splendidly trained ship's company working under Captain Campbell, +the operation was carried out with every appearance of disorder, +one of the boats being purposely left hanging vertical with only +one end lowered. Meanwhile the submarine closed. Several shells +from her gun hit the after part of the <i>Dunraven</i>, causing a +depth charge to explode and setting her on fire aft, blowing the +officer in charge of the after gun out of his control station, and +wounding severely the seaman stationed at the depth charges. The +situation now was that the submarine was passing from the port to +the starboard quarter, and at any moment the 4-inch magazine and +the remaining depth charges in the after part of the +<i>Dunraven</i> might be expected to explode. The 4-inch gun's crew +aft knew the imminence of this danger, but not a man moved although +the deck beneath them was rapidly becoming red hot; and Captain +Campbell was so certain of the magnificent discipline and gallantry +of his crew that he still held on so that the submarine might come +clearly into view on the starboard side clear of the smoke of the +fire aft. In a few minutes the anticipated explosion occurred. The +4-inch gun and gun's crew were blown into the air just too soon for +the submarine to be in the best position for being engaged. The +explosion itself caused the electrical apparatus to make the "open +fire" signal, whereupon the White Ensign was hoisted and the only +gun bearing commenced firing; but the submarine submerged at +once.</p> +<p>Fifteen minutes later a torpedo hit the ship, and Captain +Campbell again ordered "abandon ship" and sent away a second party +of men to give the impression that the ship had now been finally +abandoned although her true character had been revealed. Meanwhile +he had made a wireless signal to other ships to keep away as he +still hoped to get the submarine, which, now keeping submerged, +moved round the ship for three quarters of an hour, during which +period the fire gained on the <i>Dunraven</i> and frequent +explosions of ammunition took place.</p> +<p>The submarine then came to the surface right astern where no +guns could bear on her, and recommenced her shellfire on the ship, +hitting her frequently. During this period the officers and men +still remaining on board gave no sign of their presence, Captain +Campbell, by his example, imbuing this remnant of his splendid +ship's company with his own indomitable spirit of endurance. The +submarine submerged again soon afterwards, and as she passed the +ship Captain Campbell from his submerged tube fired a torpedo at +her, which just missed. Probably the range was too short to allow +the torpedo to gain its correct depth. She went right round the +ship, and a second torpedo was fired from the other tube, which +again missed. This torpedo was evidently seen from the submarine, +as she submerged at once. The ship was sinking, and it was +obviously of no use to continue the deception, which could only +lead to a useless sacrifice of life; wireless signals for +assistance were therefore made, and the arrival of some destroyers +brought the action to a conclusion. The wounded were transferred to +the destroyers and the ship taken in tow, but she sank whilst in +tow forty-eight hours later.</p> +<p>This action was perhaps the finest feat amongst the very many +gallant deeds performed by decoy ships during the war. It displayed +to the full the qualities of grim determination, gallantry, +patience and resource, the splendid training and high standard of +discipline, which were necessary to success in this form of +warfare. Lieutenant Charles G. Bonner, R.N.R., and Petty-Officer +Ernest Pitcher, R.N., were awarded the V.C. for their services in +this action, and many medals for conspicuous gallantry were also +given to the splendid ship's company.</p> +<p>Captain Campbell, as will be readily realized, met with great +success in his work, and he was the first to acknowledge how this +success was due to those who worked so magnificently under his +command, and he also realized the magnitude of the work performed +by other decoy ships in all areas, since he knew better than most +people the difficulties of enticing a submarine to her doom.</p> +<p>On September 17, 1917, in position Lat. 49.42 N., Long. 13.18 +W., the decoy ship <i>Stonecrop</i>, a small steamer commanded by +Commander M. Blackwood, R.N., armed with one 4-inch, one 6-pounder +gun and some stick-bomb throwers and carrying four torpedo tubes, +sighted a submarine, which opened fire on her at long range, the +fire being returned by the 6-pounder mounted aft. After the +shelling had continued for some time the usual order was given to +"abandon ship," and a little later the periscope of the submarine +was sighted some distance away. The submarine gradually closed, +keeping submerged, until within about a quarter of a mile, when she +passed slowly round the ship, and finally came to the surface at a +distance of about 500 yards on the starboard quarter. She did not +close nearer, so the order was given to open fire, and hitting +started after the third round had been fired and continued until +the submarine sank stern first. No survivors were picked up, but +all the indications pointed to the certainty of the destruction of +the submarine.</p> +<center>PATROL GUNBOATS</center> +<p>Mention may here be made of another vessel of a special class +designed in 1917. In the early summer, in consequence of the +shortage of destroyers, of the delays in the production of new +ones, and the great need for more small craft suitable for +escorting merchant ships through the submarine zone, arrangements +were made to build a larger and faster class of trawler which would +be suitable for convoy work under favourable conditions, and which +to a certain extent would take the place of destroyers. Trawlers +could be built with much greater rapidity than destroyers, and +trawler builders who could not build destroyers could be employed +for the work, thus supplementing the activities of the yards which +could turn out the bigger craft.</p> +<p>Accordingly a 13-knot trawler was designed, and a large number +ordered. Great delays occurred, however, in their construction, as +in that of all other classes of vessel owing to the pressure of +various kinds of war work and other causes, and only one was +delivered during 1917 instead of the twenty or so which had been +promised, whilst I believe that by July, 1918, not more than +fourteen had been completed instead of the anticipated number of +forty. I was informed that they proved to be a most useful type of +vessel for the slower convoys, were excellent sea boats, with a +large radius of action, were a great relief to the destroyers, and +even to light cruisers, for convoy work. It is understood that some +fifty were completed by the end of the war.</p> +<center>NET PROTECTION FOR MERCHANT SHIPS</center> +<p>This idea originated in 1915 or 1916 with Captain Edward C. +Villiers, of the <i>Actaeon</i> Torpedo School ship. Experiments +were carried out by a battleship at Rosyth, in the first instance, +and later at Scapa. They were at that time unsuccessful.</p> +<p>At the end of 1916 I gave directions for a reconsideration of +the matter, and fresh trials were made; but early in 1917 there +seemed to be no prospect of success, and the trials were again +abandoned. However, Captain Villiers displayed great confidence in +the idea, and he introduced modifications, with the result that +later in the year 1917 directions were given for fresh trials to be +undertaken. At the end of the year success was first obtained, and +this was confirmed early in 1918, and the device finally adopted. A +curious experience during the trials was that the vessel carrying +them out was actually fired at by a German submarine, with the +result that the net protection saved the ship from being torpedoed. +It is not often that an inventor receives such a good +advertisement.</p> +<center>DEPTH CHARGE THROWERS</center> +<p>The first proposal for this device came from Portsmouth, where +the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley Colville, was +indefatigable in his efforts to combat the submarine; throwers +manufactured by Messrs. Thornycroft, of Southampton, were tried and +gave good results. The arrangement was one by which depth charges +could be projected to a distance of 40 yards from a vessel, and the +throwers were usually fitted one on each quarter so that the +charges could be thrown out on the quarter whilst others were being +dropped over the stern, and the chances of damaging or sinking the +submarine attacked were thus greatly increased.</p> +<p>As soon as the earliest machines had been tried orders were +placed for large numbers and the supplies obtained were as +follows:</p> +<pre> + Deliveries commenced in July, 1917. + By September 1, 30 had been delivered. + By October 1, 97 had been delivered. + By December 1, 238 had been delivered. +</pre> +<center>COASTAL MOTOR BOATS</center> +<p>At the end of 1916 we possessed 13 fast coastal motor boats, +carrying torpedoes, and having a speed of some 36 knots. They had +been built to carry out certain operations in the Heligoland Bight, +working from Harwich, but the preliminary air reconnaissance which +it had been decided was necessary had not been effected by the end +of 1916 owing to bad weather and the lack of suitable machines.</p> +<p>When winter set in it became impossible, with the type of +aircraft then existing, to carry out the intended reconnaissance, +and early in 1917 I abandoned the idea of the operations for the +winter and sent the boats to the Dover Command for Sir R. Bacon to +use from Dunkirk in operations against enemy vessels operating from +Ostend and Zeebrugge. They quickly proved their value, and it +became evident that they would also be useful for anti-submarine +work. A large number were ordered, some for anti-submarine work and +some for certain contemplated operations in enemy waters, including +a night attack on the enemy's light cruisers known to lie +occasionally in the Ems River, an operation that it was intended to +carry out in the spring of 1918. A daylight operation in this +neighbourhood, which was carried out during 1918, did not, from the +published reports, meet with success, the coastal motor boats being +attacked by aircraft, vessels against which they were defenceless. +The new boats were of an improved and larger type than the original +40-feet boats. Delays occurred in construction owing principally to +the difficulty in obtaining engines by reason of the great demand +for engines for aircraft, and but few of the new boats were +delivered during the year 1917.</p> +<center>MINING OPERATIONS</center> +<p>The policy which was carried out during 1917 in this respect, so +far as the supply of mines admitted, aimed at preventing the exit +of submarines from enemy ports. Incidentally, the fact that we laid +large numbers of mines in the Heligoland Bight rendered necessary +such extensive sweeping operations before any portion of the High +Sea Fleet could put to sea as to be very useful in giving us some +indication of any movement that might be intended. In view of the +distance of the Grand Fleet from German bases and the short time +available in which to intercept the High Sea Fleet if it came out +for such a purpose as a raid on our coasts, or on convoys, the +information thus gathered would have proved of great value.</p> +<p>In planning mining operations in the Heligoland Bight, it was +necessary to take into consideration certain facts. The +<i>first</i> was the knowledge that the Germans themselves had laid +minefields in some portions of the Bight, and it was necessary for +our minelayers to give such suspected areas a wide berth. +<i>Secondly</i>, it was obvious that we could not lay minefields in +areas very near those which we ourselves had already mined, since +we should run the risk of blowing up our own ships with our own +mines.</p> +<p>Mining operations had necessarily to be carried out at night, +and as there were no navigational aids in the way of lights, etc., +in the Heligoland Bight, the position in which our mines were laid +was never known with <i>absolute</i> accuracy. Consequently an area +in which we had directed mines to be laid, and to which a minelayer +had been sent, could not safely be approached within a distance of +some five miles on a subsequent occasion.</p> +<p>The use in mining operations of the device known as "taut wire" +gear, introduced by Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, was of great +help in ensuring accuracy in laying minefields and consequently in +reducing the danger distance surrounding our own minefields.</p> +<p>As our mining operations increased in number we were driven +farther and farther out from the German ports for subsequent +operations. This naturally increased the area to be mined as the +Heligoland Bight is bell-mouthed in shape, but it had the advantage +of making the operations of German minesweepers and mine-bumpers +more difficult and hazardous as they had to work farther out, thus +giving our light forces better chances of catching them at work and +engaging them. Such actions as that on November 17, 1917, between +our light forces and the German light cruisers and minesweepers +were the result. We did not, of course, lay mines in either the +Danish or Dutch territorial waters, and these waters consequently +afforded an exit for German vessels as our minefields became most +distant from German bases.</p> +<p>Broadly speaking, the policy was to lay mines so thoroughly in +the Heligoland Bight as to force enemy submarines and other vessels +to make their exits along the Danish or Dutch coasts in territorial +waters.</p> +<p>At the end of the exit we stationed submarines to signal enemy +movements and to attack enemy vessels. We knew, of course, that the +enemy would sweep other channels for his ships, but as soon as we +discovered the position of these channels, which was not a very +difficult matter, more mines were laid at the end. In order to give +neutrals fair warning, certain areas which included the Heligoland +Bight were proclaimed dangerous. In this respect German and British +methods may be contrasted: We never laid a minefield which could +possibly have been dangerous to neutrals without issuing a warning +stating that a certain area (which included the minefield) was +dangerous. The Germans never issued such a warning unless the +proclamation stating that half the Atlantic Ocean, most of the +North Sea, and nine-tenths of the Mediterranean were dangerous +could be considered as such. It was also intended, as mines became +available, to lay more deep minefields in positions near our own +coast in which enemy submarines were known to work; these +minefields would be safe for the passage of surface vessels, but +our patrol craft would force the submarines to dive into them. This +system to a certain extent had already been in use during 1915 and +1916.</p> +<p>Schemes were also being devised by Admiral of the Fleet Sir +Arthur Wilson, who devoted much of his time to mining devices, by +which mines some distance below the surface would be exploded by an +enemy submarine even if navigating on the surface.</p> +<p>Such was the policy. Its execution was difficult.</p> +<p>The first difficulty lay in the fact that we did not possess a +thoroughly satisfactory mine. A percentage only of our mines +exploded when hit by a submarine, and they failed sometimes to take +up their intended depth when laid, betraying their presence by +appearing on the surface.</p> +<p>Energetic measures were adopted to overcome this latter defect, +but it took time and but few mines were available for laying in the +early months of 1917.</p> +<p>The result of our minelaying efforts is shown in the following +table:</p> +<pre> + Mines laid Deep mines laid + Year. in the Heligoland off our own coasts + Bight. to catch submarines. + + 1915 4,498 983 + 1916 1,679 2,573 + First quarter of 1917 4,865 ) + Second quarter of 1917 6,386 ) 3,843 + Third quarter of 1917 3,510 ) +</pre> +<p>In the Straits of Dover, Thames Estuary and off the Belgian +coast we laid 2,664 mines in 1914, 6,337 in 1915, 9,685 in 1916, +and 4,669 in the first three quarters of 1917.</p> +<p>These last mines were laid as fast as the alterations, made with +a view to increasing their efficiency, could be carried out.</p> +<p>During the early part of the year 1917 the new pattern of mine, +known as the "H" Type, evolved in 1916, had been tried, and +although not perfectly satisfactory at the first trials, the +success was sufficient to warrant the placing of orders for 100,000 +mines and in making arrangements for the quickest possible +manufacture. This was done by the Director of Torpedoes and Mines, +Rear-Admiral the Hon. Edward Fitzherbert, under the direction of +the then Fourth Sea Lord, Rear-Admiral Lionel Halsey.</p> +<p>Deliveries commenced in the summer of 1917, but by the end of +September only a little over 1,500 were ready for laying. Some 500 +of these were laid in September in the Heligoland Bight and were +immediately successful against enemy submarines. More were laid in +the Bight during October, November and December, and the remainder, +as they were produced, were prepared for laying in the new +minefield in the Straits of Dover. <i>In the fourth quarter of the +year a total of 10,389 mines was laid in the Heligoland Bight and +in the Straits of Dover.</i></p> +<p>During this last quarter delivery of "H" pattern mines was as +follows: In October 2,350, November 5,300, December 4,800; total +12,450. So that it will be seen that the mines were laid as fast as +delivery was made.</p> +<p>The great increase in projected minelaying operations during the +year 1917 made it necessary also to add considerably to the number +of minelaying vessels.</p> +<p>In January, 1917, the only vessels equipped for this service +were four merchant ships and the Flotilla Leader <i>Abdiel</i>, +with a total minelaying capacity of some 1,200 mines per trip. It +was not advisable to carry out minelaying operations in enemy +waters during the period near full moon owing to the liability of +the minelayers being seen by patrol craft. Under such conditions +the position of the minefield would be known to the enemy. As the +operation of placing the mines on board occupied several days, it +was not passible to depend on an average of more than three +operations per ship per month from the larger minelayers. +Consequently, with the intended policy in view, it was obvious that +more minelayers must be provided.</p> +<p>It was inadvisable to use merchant ships, since every vessel was +urgently required for trade or transport purposes, and the +alternative was to fit men-of-war for minelaying. The only old +vessels of this type suitable for mining in enemy waters were ships +of the "Ariadne" class, and although their machinery was not too +reliable, two of these vessels that were seaworthy were converted +to minelayers. In addition a number of the older light cruisers +were fitted with portable rails on which mines could be carried +when minelaying operations were contemplated, in place of a portion +of the armament which could be removed; a flotilla of destroyers, +with some further flotilla leaders, were also fitted out as +minelayers, and several additional submarines were fitted for this +purpose.</p> +<p>For a projected special scheme of minelaying in enemy waters a +number of lighters were ordered, and some of the motor launches and +coastal motor boats were fitted out and utilized for mining +operations on the Belgian coast towards the end of 1917.</p> +<p>By the end of that year 12 light cruisers, 12 destroyers and +flotilla leaders and 5 submarines had been fitted for minelaying. +Two old cruisers had been added to the minelaying fleet and several +other vessels were in hand for the same purpose. The detailed plans +of the arrangements were prepared and the work of fitting out +minelayers carried out under the supervision of Admiral R.N. +Ommanney, C.B., whose services in this matter were of great value. +The rapidity with which ships were added to the minelaying fleet +was largely due to his efforts.</p> +<p>On the entry of the United States of America into the war a +further development of mining policy became feasible. The immense +manufacturing resources of the United States rendered a large +production of mines an easy matter, with the result that as soon as +the United States Navy produced a reliable type of mine the idea of +placing a mine barrage across the northern part of the North Sea +which had been previously discussed became a matter of practical +politics. With this end in view a still further addition to the +minelaying fleet became necessary, and since the mining would be +carried out at leisure in this case and speed was no great +necessity for the minelayer owing to the distance of the minefields +from enemy waters, an old battleship was put in hand for +conversion.</p> +<p>With the enormous increase in the number of mines on order the +problem of storage became of importance, including as it did the +storage of the very large number, some 120,000, required for the +northern barrage. The Third Sea Lord, Admiral Lionel Halsey, took +this matter in hand with characteristic energy, and in conjunction +with United States naval officers made all the necessary +arrangements.</p> +<p>The United States mines were stored in the vicinity of +Invergordon, and the British mines intended for use in the northern +barrage were located at Grangemouth, near Leith, where Rear-Admiral +Clinton Baker was in charge, as well as in other places, whilst +those for use in the Heligoland Bight and Channel waters were +stored at Immingham and other southern depots.</p> +<p>The laying of the North Sea mine barrage was not accomplished +without very considerable delay, and many difficulties were +encountered. It was originally anticipated that the barrage would +be completed in the spring of 1918, but owing to various defects in +both British and United States mines which made themselves apparent +when the operations commenced, due partly to the great depth of +water as well as to other causes, a delay of several months took +place; and, even when near completion, the barrage was not so +effective as many had hoped in spite of the great expenditure of +labour and material involved. I have not the figures of the number +of submarines that the barrage is thought to have accounted for, +but it was known to be disappointing.</p> +<center>FLARES</center> +<p>In the late summer of 1917 <i>flares</i> were experimented with; +they were intended to be used from kite balloons with the object of +sighting submarines when on the surface at night. Previously +searchlights in destroyers had been used for this purpose. The +flares were not much used, however, from kite balloons owing to +lack of opportunity, but trials which were carried out with flares +from patrol craft, such as trawlers and drifters, demonstrated that +they would be of value from these vessels, and when the +Folkestone-Grisnez minefield was laid in November and December, +1917, it was apparent that the flares would be of use in forcing +submarines to dive at night into the minefield to escape detection +on the surface and attack by gunfire.</p> +<p>Manufacture on a large scale was therefore commenced, and during +1918 the flares were in constant use across the Straits of +Dover.</p> +<center>ELECTRICAL SUBMARINE DETECTOR</center> +<p>The existence of this very valuable device was due to the work +of certain distinguished scientists, and experiments were carried +out during 1917. It was brought to perfection in the late autumn, +and orders were given to fit it in certain localities. Some +difficulty was experienced in obtaining the necessary material, but +the work was well in hand by the end of the year, and quickly +proved its value.</p> +<center>SUBMARINE AGAINST SUBMARINE</center> +<p>Prior to the year 1917 the only areas in which our own +submarines operated against enemy vessels of the same type was in +the North Sea, or occasionally in the vicinity of the Hebrides. +Grand Fleet submarines were used in the northern areas during 1916, +and Harwich submarines operated farther south, but the number of +underwater craft available was insufficient for any extended method +of attack. Early in 1917, when our mercantile losses were very +heavy, some submarines were withdrawn from the Harwich and Humber +districts and formed into a flotilla off the coast of Ireland for +this form of operation. Some risk had to be accepted in thus +reducing our submarine strength in southern waters. At the same +time some Grand Fleet submarines were organized into a watching +patrol in the area off the Shetland Islands, through which enemy +submarines were expected to pass. The watch off the Horn Reef and +in the Heligoland Bight, which had previously been in force, was +also maintained.</p> +<p>A little later the submarine flotilla off the Irish coast was +strengthened, and a regular patrol instituted near the North +Channel between Ireland and Scotland. The next step was the +withdrawal of some "C" Class submarines from coastal work on our +east coast to work in the area between England and Holland near the +North Hinder Lightship, a locality much frequented by enemy +submarines on passage. Still later some submarines were attached to +the Portsmouth Command, where, working under Sir Stanley Colville, +they had some striking successes; others went to the Dover Command. +The latter were fitted with occulting lights on top of the +conning-tower, and were moored at night to buoys in the Dover Net +Barrage, in places where enemy submarines were likely to pass, in +order that they might have a chance of torpedoing them. A division +of submarines was also sent to Gibraltar, to operate against enemy +cruiser submarines working in that vicinity or near the Canaries. +Successes against enemy submarines were also obtained in the latter +locality.</p> +<p>Finally, the arrival of some United States submarines enabled +the areas in which this form of attack was in force to be still +further extended, after the American personnel had been trained to +this form of warfare. There was a great increase in the number of +enemy submarines sunk by this method of attack during 1917 as +compared with previous years; the number of vessels sunk does not, +however, convey a complete appreciation of the effect of this form +of anti-submarine warfare. The great value of it lay in the feeling +of insecurity that it bred in the minds of the enemy submarine +commanders. The moral effect of the constant apprehension that one +is being "stalked" is considerable. Indeed, the combination of our +aircraft and our submarine patrols led to our vessels reporting, +regretfully, that it was very seldom that German submarines were +found on the surface in daylight, and towards the end of 1917 quite +a large proportion of the attacks on merchant ships took place at +night.</p> +<p>The work for our own vessels was very arduous indeed. It was +only on rare occasions that it was possible to bring off a +successful attack on a submarine that had been sighted, the low +underwater speed of submarines making it difficult to get into +position when the enemy was only sighted at short range, which was +naturally usually the case.</p> +<p>In order to obviate this difficulty directions were given in +1917 to design a special type of submarine for this form of +warfare, and I believe that the first vessel was completed by the +autumn of 1918.</p> +<p>This account of the development of anti-submarine measures +during 1917 would not be complete without mention of the work of +the Trade Division of the Staff, of which Captain Richard Webb, +C.B., was the Director until September.</p> +<p>This Division was either partly or wholly responsible for:</p> +<p>(1) The great increase in the rapidity of placing the armaments +on board merchant ships.</p> +<p>(2) The establishment of schools of instruction for captains and +officers of the Mercantile Marine.</p> +<p>This training scheme was begun at Chatham Barracks in February, +1917, by Commander E.L.B. Lockyer, acting under Captain Webb, and +later was extended to Portsmouth, Cardiff and Greenock. Its success +was so marked, and its benefit in assisting officers to handle +their ships in the manner best calculated to save them from +submarine attack so great, that the Admiralty was continually being +pressed by shipowners and by the officers of the Mercantile Marine +to extend the instruction to more and more ports. This was done so +far as possible, our principal difficulty being to provide officers +capable of giving the instruction required.</p> +<p>(3) The provision of wireless plant and operators to the +Mercantile Marine. This was another matter taken up with energy +during 1917, and with excellent results.</p> +<p>(4) The drilling of guns crews for the merchant ships. Men were +invited to go through a course of drill, and large numbers +responded and were instructed at the Royal Naval Depot at the +Crystal Palace.</p> +<p>All these matters were additional to the important work upon +which the Trade Division was constantly employed, which included +all blockade questions, the routeing of merchant ships, examination +of ships, etc.</p> +<p>In addition to the instructional anti-submarine course for +masters and officers, gunnery courses for cadets and apprentices +were started at Portsmouth, Chatham and Devonport. A system of +visits to ships by officer instructors for the purpose of affording +instruction and for inspection, as well as for the purpose of +lecturing, was instituted, and arrangements were made for giving +instruction in signalling. Some idea of the work carried out will +be gathered from the following figures showing the instructional +work carried out during the year 1917:</p> +<pre> + Masters 1,929 + Officers 2,149 + Number of cadets and apprentices passed through + the gunnery course 543 + Number of merchant seamen trained in gunnery at + the Crystal Palace 3,964 + Number of ships visited by officer instructors 6,927 + Numbers attending these lectures: + Masters 1,361 + Officers 5,921 + Number of officers and men instructed in signalling 10,487 +</pre> +<p>The keenness shown by officers and men of the merchant service +contributed in a marked degree to the success of the courses +instituted; just one example may be given. I visited the Royal +Naval Depot at the Crystal Palace early in 1918, and amongst other +most interesting scenes witnessed a large number of men of the +merchant service at gun drill. I questioned several of them as to +their experiences, and many of the men had had their ships +torpedoed under them three, four or five times. Amongst the gun +crews was a steward who had been through this experience four +times. On my asking why he, as a steward, should be going through +the gunnery course, he replied that he hoped that by so doing he +might stand a chance of getting his own back by assisting to sink a +submarine.</p> +<p>The knowledge which I possessed of the measures introduced +during the year 1917 to combat the German submarine warfare, and +the continual increase in the efficiency of the anti-submarine work +which I knew would result from increased production of +anti-submarine vessels and weapons, led me in February, 1918, to +state that in my opinion the submarine menace would be "held" by +the autumn of the year 1918. The remark, which was made at what I +understood to be a private gathering, was given very wide +publicity, and was criticized at the time, but it was fulfilled, as +the figures will indicate.</p> +<hr> +<a name="CH4"><!-- CH4 --></a> +<h2>CHAPTER IV</h2> +<center>THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM</center> +<p>The question of the introduction of convoys for the protection +of merchant ships was under consideration at various times during +the war. The system had been employed during the old wars and had +proved its value in the case of attack by vessels on the surface, +and it was natural that thoughts should be directed towards its +reintroduction when the submarine campaign developed. There is one +inherent disadvantage in this system which cannot be overcome, +although it can be mitigated by careful organization, viz. the +delay involved. Delay means, of course, a loss of carrying-power, +and when tonnage is already short any proposal which must reduce +its efficiency has to be very carefully examined. The delay of the +convoy system is due to two causes, (a) because the speed of the +convoy must necessarily be fixed by the speed of the slowest ship, +and (b) the fact that the arrival of a large number of ships at one +time may cause congestion and consequent delay at the port of +unloading. However, if additional safety is given there is +compensation for this delay when the risk is great. One danger of a +convoy system under modern conditions should be mentioned, viz. the +increased risk from attack by mines. If ships are sailing singly a +minefield will in all probability sink only one vessel—the +first ship entering it. The fate of that ship reveals the presence +of the field, and with adequate organization it is improbable that +other vessels will be sunk in the same field. In the case of a +convoy encountering a minefield, as in the case of a fleet, several +ships may be sunk practically simultaneously.</p> +<p>During the year 1916, whilst I was still in command of the Grand +Fleet, suggestions as to convoys had been forwarded to the +Admiralty for the better protection of the ocean trade against +attack by surface vessels; but it was pointed out to me that the +number of cruisers available for escort work was entirely +insufficient, and that, consequently, the suggestions could not be +adopted. This objection was one that could only be overcome by +removing some of the faster merchant ships from the trade routes +and arming them. To this course there was the objection that we +were already—that is before the intensive campaign +began—very short of shipping.</p> +<p>Shortly after my taking up the post of First Sea Lord at the +Admiralty, at the end of 1916, the question was discussed once +more. At that time the danger of attack by enemy raiders on +shipping in the North Atlantic was small; the protection needed was +against attack by submarines, and the dangerous area commenced some +300-400 miles from the British Islands. It was known that +unrestricted submarine warfare was about to commence, and that this +would mean that shipping would usually be subjected to torpedo +attack from submarines when in a submerged condition. Against this +form of attack the gun armament of cruisers or armed merchant ships +was practically useless, and, however powerfully armed, ships of +this type were themselves in peril of being torpedoed. Small +vessels of shallow draught, possessing high speed, offered the only +practicable form of protection. Shallow draught was necessary in +order that the protecting vessels should themselves be +comparatively immune from successful torpedo fire, and speed was +essential for offensive operations against the submarines.</p> +<p>Convoy sailing was, as has been stated, the recognized method of +trade protection in the old wars, and this was a strong argument in +favour of its adoption in the late war. It should, however, be +clearly understood that the conditions had entirely changed. Convoy +sailing for the protection of merchant ships against torpedo attack +by submarines was quite a different matter from such a system as a +preventive against attack by surface vessels and involved far +greater difficulties. In the days of sailing ships especially, +accurate station keeping was not very necessary, and the ships +comprising the convoy sailed in loose order and covered a +considerable area of water. On a strange vessel, also a sailing +vessel, being sighted, the protecting frigate or frigates would +proceed to investigate her character, whilst the ships composing +the convoy closed in towards one another or steered a course that +would take them out of danger.</p> +<p>In the circumstances with which we were dealing in 1917 the +requirements were quite otherwise. It was essential for the +protection of the convoy that the ships should keep close and +accurate station and should be able to manoeuvre by signal. Close +station was enjoined by the necessity of reducing the area covered +by the convoy; accurate station was required to ensure safety from +collision and freedom of manoeuvre. It will be realized that a +convoy comprising twenty to thirty vessels occupies considerable +space, even when steaming in the usual formation of four, five or +six columns. Since the number of destroyers or sloops that could be +provided for screening the convoy from torpedo attack by submarines +was bound to be very limited under any conditions, it was essential +that the columns of ships should be as short as possible; in other +words, that the ships should follow one another at close intervals, +so that the destroyers on each side of the convoy should be able as +far as possible to guard it from attack by submarines working from +the flank, and that they should be able with great rapidity to +counter-attack a submarine with depth charges should a periscope be +sighted for a brief moment above the surface, or the track of a +torpedo be seen. In fact, it was necessary, if the protection of a +convoy was to be real protection, that the ships composing the +convoy should be handled in a manner that approached the handling +of battleships in a squadron. The diagram on p. 107 shows an ideal +convoy with six destroyers protecting it, disposed in the manner +ordered at the start of the convoy system.</p> +<p>[Illustration on Page 107, With Caption 'Diagram Illustrating a +Convoy of 25 Merchant Ships, With an Escort of 6 Destroyers +Zigzagging at High Speed for Protection. the Convoy Shown in Close +Order and on Its Normal Course.']</p> +<p>[Illustration on Page 108 Shows, According to Its Caption, +'Typical Convoy and Escort of 10 Trawlers in the Early Days of +Convoy.']</p> +<p>How far this ideal was attainable was a matter of doubt. Prior +to 1917 our experience of merchant ships sailing in company had +been confined to troop transports. These vessels were well +officered and well manned, carried experienced engine-room staffs, +were capable of attaining moderate speeds, and were generally not +comparable to ordinary cargo vessels, many of which were of very +slow speed, and possessed a large proportion of officers and men of +limited sea experience, owing to the very considerable personnel of +the Mercantile Marine which had joined the Royal Naval Reserve and +was serving in the Fleet or in patrol craft. Moreover, even the +troop transports had not crossed the submarine zone in company, but +had been escorted independently; and many naval officers who had +been in charge of convoys, when questioned, were not convinced that +sailing in convoy under the conditions mentioned above was a +feasible proposition, nor, moreover, were the masters of the +transports.</p> +<p>In February, 1917, in order to investigate this aspect of the +question, a conference took place between the Naval Staff and the +masters of cargo steamers which were lying in the London docks. The +masters were asked their opinion as to how far their ships could be +depended on to keep station in a convoy of 12 to 20 vessels. They +expressed a unanimous opinion that it was not practicable to keep +station under the conditions mentioned, the difficulty being due to +two causes: (1) the inexperience of their deck officers owing to so +many of them having been taken for the Royal Naval Reserve, and (2) +the inexperience of their engineers, combined with the +impossibility of obtaining delicate adjustments of speed by reason +of the absence of suitable engine-room telegraphs and the poor +quality of much of the coal used. When pressed as to the greatest +number of ships that could be expected to manoeuvre together in +safety, the masters of these cargo steamers, all experienced +seamen, gave it as their opinion that two or possibly three was the +maximum number. The opinions thus expressed were confirmed later by +other masters of merchant ships who were consulted on the subject. +It is to the eternal credit of the British Merchant Marine, which +rendered service of absolutely inestimable value to the Empire +throughout the war, that when put to the test by the adoption of +the convoy system, officers and men proved that they could achieve +far more than they themselves had considered possible. At the same +time it should be recognized how severe a strain was imposed on +officers, particularly the masters, of vessels sailing in +convoy.</p> +<p>The matter was kept constantly under review. In February, 1917, +the Germans commenced unrestricted submarine warfare against +merchant ships of all nationalities, and as a consequence our +shipping losses, as well as those of Allied and neutral countries, +began to mount steadily each succeeding month. The effect of this +new phase of submarine warfare is best illustrated by a few +figures.</p> +<p>During the last four months of 1916 the gross tonnage lost by +<i>submarine attack</i> alone gave the following monthly average: +British, 121,500; Allies, 59,500; neutrals, 87,500; total, +268,500.</p> +<p>In the first four months of 1917 the figures became, in round +numbers:</p> +<pre> + British. Allies. Neutrals. Total. + + January 104,000 62,000 116,000 282,000 + February 256,000 77,000 131,000 464,000 + March 283,000 74,000 149,000 506,000 + April 513,000 133,000 185,000 831,000 +</pre> +<p>(The United States entered the war on April 6, 1917.)</p> +<p>NOTE.—In neither case is the loss of fishing craft +included.</p> +<p>It will be realized that, since the losses towards the end of +1916 were such as to give just cause for considerable anxiety, the +later figures made it clear that some method of counteracting the +submarines must be found and found quickly if the Allied cause was +to be saved from disaster.</p> +<p>None of the anti-submarine measures that had been under +consideration or trial since the formation of the Anti-Submarine +Division of the Naval Staff in December, 1916, could <i>by any +possibility</i> mature for some months, since time was necessary +for the production of vessels and more or less complicated +matériel, and in these circumstances the only step that +could be taken was that of giving a trial to the convoy system for +the ocean trade, although the time was by no means yet ripe for +effective use of the system, by reason of the shortage of +destroyers, sloops and cruisers, which was still most acute, +although the situation was improving slowly month by month as new +vessels were completed.</p> +<p>Prior to this date we had already had some experience of convoys +as a protection against submarine attack. The coal trade of France +had been brought under convoy in March, 1917. The trade between +Scandinavia and North Sea ports was also organized in convoys in +April of the same year, this trade having since December, 1916, +been carried out on a system of "protected sailings." It is true +that these convoys were always very much scattered, particularly +the Scandinavian convoy, which was composed largely of neutral +vessels and therefore presented exceptional difficulties in the +matter of organization and handling. The number of destroyers which +could be spared for screening the convoys was also very small. The +protection afforded was therefore more apparent than real, but even +so the results had been very good in reducing the losses by +submarine attack. The protection of the vessels employed in the +French coal trade was entrusted very largely to trawlers, as the +ships composing the convoy were mostly slow, so that in this case +more screening vessels were available, although they were not so +efficient, being themselves of slow speed.</p> +<p>For the introduction of a system of convoy which would protect +merchant ships as far as their port of discharge in the United +Kingdom, there were two requirements: (a) A sufficient number of +convoying cruisers or armed merchant ships, whose role would be +that of bringing the ships comprising the convoy to some selected +rendezvous outside the zone of submarine activity, where it would +be met by the flotilla of small vessels which would protect the +convoy through the submarine area. It was essential that the ships +of the convoy should arrive at this rendezvous as an organized +unit, well practised in station-keeping by day, and at night, with +the ships darkened, and that the vessels should be capable also of +zigzagging together and of carrying out such necessary movements as +alterations of course, etc.; otherwise the convoy could not be +safely escorted through the danger area. (b) The other essential +was the presence of the escorting flotilla in sufficient +strength.</p> +<p>It has been mentioned that there was an insufficient number of +vessels available for use as convoying cruisers. It was estimated +that about fifty cruisers or armed merchant ships would be required +for this service if the homeward-bound trade to the British Isles +alone was considered. An additional twelve vessels would be +necessary to deal with the outward-bound trade. At the time only +eighteen vessels were available, and these could only be obtained +by denuding the North Atlantic entirely of cruisers.</p> +<p>The situation in regard to destroyers or other fast vessels +presented equal difficulties. Early in February, 1917, we had +available for general convoy or patrol work only fourteen +destroyers stationed at Devonport and twelve sloops at Queenstown, +and owing to repairs and the necessity of resting officers and men +periodically, only a proportion of these were available at any one +time. A number of these vessels were required to escort troop +transports through the submarine danger zone. During the month of +February six sloops were diverted from their proper work of +minesweeping in the North Sea and added to the patrol force at +Queenstown, and eight destroyers were taken from the Grand Fleet +and sent to southern waters for patrol and escort duty. There were +obvious objections to this weakening of the North Sea forces, but +it was necessary in the circumstances to ignore them.</p> +<p>This total of forty destroyers and sloops represented the whole +available force at the end of February. Simultaneously a careful +investigation showed that for the institution of a system of convoy +and escort for homeward-bound Atlantic trade alone to the United +Kingdom, our requirements would be eighty-one destroyers or sloops +and forty-eight trawlers (the latter vessels being only suitable +for escorting the slow 6-7-knot ships of the trade from Gibraltar +to the United Kingdom). For the outward Atlantic trade from the +United Kingdom our estimated requirements were forty-four +additional destroyers or sloops.</p> +<p>The deficiency in suitable vessels of this class is best shown +by the following table, which reveals the destroyer position at +different periods during the year 1917:</p> +<pre> +-------------------------------------------------------------------- +Mediterranean. +----------------------------------------------------------------+ +Pembroke. | +-------------------------------------------------------------+ | +Queenstown. | | +---------------------------------------------------------+ | | +Bunerana. | | | +------------------------------------------------------+ | | | +North Channel. | | | | +---------------------------------------------------+ | | | | +Scapa and Invergordon. | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+ | | | | | +The Tyne. | | | | | | +---------------------------------------------+ | | | | | | +The Humber. | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------+ | | | | | | | +Lowestoft. | | | | | | | | +---------------------------------------+ | | | | | | | | +The Nore. | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------+ | | | | | | | | | +Portsmouth. | | | | | | | | | | +---------------------------------+ | | | | | | | | | | +Devonport. | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------+ | | | | | | | | | | | +Dover. | | | | | | | | | | | | +---------------------------+ | | | | | | | | | | | | +Harwich Fleet. | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------+ | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Grand Fleet. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +--------------------+---+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+---+--+--- +January. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Flotilla Leaders | 10| 2| 3| | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Modern destroyers | 97|45|18|14|13| | | | | | | | | |29 + |[A]| | | | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Destroyers of River | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +class and earlier | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +construction | | |11| 6|16| 9| | 9|11|15| 4| | | | 8 + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +P boats | | 2| 5| | 4|10| 4| 1| | | | | | | +--------------------+---+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+---+--+--- +June. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Flotilla Leaders | 10| 3| 4| | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Modern destroyers | 95|23|29|38|15| | | 5| | | | 4| 32| |29 + |[A]| | | | | | | | | | | |[B]| | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Destroyers of River | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +class and earlier | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +construction | | |10| 5|16| 7| |29| 1|11| 4| | | | 8 + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +P boats | | 2| 6| | 8| 9| 4| 1| | | | | | 5| +--------------------+---+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+---+--+--- +November. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Flotilla Leaders | 11| 4| 6| | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Modern destroyers |101|24|26|37| 9| | | 4| | | |29| 35| |32 + |[A]| | | | | | | | | | | |[B]| | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Destroyers of River | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +class and earlier | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +construction | | |10| 4| 8|12| 2|30| |11| 4| | | | 8 + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +P boats | | 2| 6| |31| | | 1| | | | | |10| +--------------------+---+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+---+--+--- +</pre> +<p>[Footnote A: Includes destroyers detached for protection work in +other commands.]</p> +<p>[Footnote B: Includes United States destroyers.]</p> +<p>There was the possible alternative of bringing only a small +portion of the trade under convoy by taking all the available fast +small craft from patrol duty and utilizing them to escort this +portion of the trade, but it was felt that as this would leave the +<i>whole</i> of the remaining trade entirely without protection, +and no fast patrol craft would be on the trade routes to pick up +the crews of any merchant ships that might be sunk by submarines, +the step was not justified.</p> +<p>The next point for consideration was the possibility of +obtaining destroyers or sloops from other sources with which to +increase the forces for trade protection. The only commands on +which it was possible to draw further were the Grand Fleet, the +Harwich and Dover forces, the destroyers of old types working on +the East Coast, or the destroyers and "P" boats protecting our +cross-Channel communications west of the Dover Command.</p> +<p>It was out of the question to reduce the Harwich or Dover +flotillas materially, as we were already running the gravest risks +from the inadequacy of these forces to deal with enemy destroyers +and submarines operating in southern waters from Zeebrugge or from +German ports, and in addition the Harwich Force furnished the sole +protection for the weekly convoy running between the Thames and +Dutch ports, besides being much required for reconnaissance and +offensive operations in the Heligoland Bight so far as it could be +spared for this purpose. However, the emergency was such that +destroyers were taken from Harwich, as the force obtained new +vessels of a faster and more powerful type. The destroyers on the +East Coast and in the Portsmouth Command were already inadequate to +afford proper protection to the trade and the cross-Channel +communications, as evidenced by our losses. Here again, however, in +order to meet the very serious situation, some destroyers were +eventually transferred to Devonport from Portsmouth, but at the +expense of still less protection and fewer opportunities for +offensive action against submarines. There remained only the Grand +Fleet destroyers on which we could draw yet further. It had always +been held that the Grand Fleet required a total force of one +hundred destroyers and ten flotilla leaders for the double purpose +of screening the ships from submarine attack when at sea and of +countering the enemy's destroyers and attacking his heavy ships +with torpedo fire in a fleet action. We had gradually built the +destroyer force of the Grand Fleet up to this figure by the early +spring of 1917, although, of course, it fell far short of +requirements in earlier months. It was well known to us that the +High Sea Fleet would be accompanied by at least eight flotillas, or +eighty-eight destroyers, when proceeding to sea at its +<i>selected</i> moment, and it was quite probable that the number +might be much higher, as many more vessels were available. At our +<i>average</i> moment, even with a nominal force of one hundred +destroyers and ten flotilla leaders, we could not expect that more +than seventy destroyers and eight leaders would be present with the +Fleet, since, in addition to those absent refitting, a considerable +number were always engaged on trade protection or anti-submarine +work in northern waters which could not join up in time to +accompany the Fleet to sea. When the Scandinavian convoy was +started in April, 1917, one flotilla leader and six destroyers from +the Grand Fleet were used for its protection; other vessels in +northern waters also depended on Grand Fleet destroyers for +protection. Any further transference, therefore, of destroyers from +the Grand Fleet to southern waters for trade protection was a +highly dangerous expedient, involving increased risk from submarine +attack on the heavy ships in the event of the Fleet proceeding to +sea, as well as disadvantages in a Fleet action. The necessity, +however, was so great that the risk had to be faced, and for some +months of 1917 from eight to twelve Grand Fleet destroyers were +used for trade protection in the Atlantic, principally from Irish +ports, in addition to those protecting trade in the North Sea.</p> +<p>It is interesting to note the number of persons who claim to +have been the first to urge the Admiralty to adopt convoys as a +method of protecting merchant ships against submarine attack. The +claimants for this distinction are not confined to Great Britain; +the great majority of them are people without any knowledge of the +sea and naval matters, certainly none of them possessed any +knowledge of the number of vessels needed to afford protection to +the ships under convoy, nor of the vessels which we could produce +for the purpose at the time.</p> +<p>Possibly the facts related above may serve to show that convoys +were commenced by Admiralty direction, and that they were started +as soon as and extended as rapidly as the necessary protecting +vessels could be provided. Those who argued then, or who have +argued since, that we should have reduced the number of destroyers +with the Grand Fleet will not, I think, meet with any support from +those who served in that Fleet, especially from the officers upon +whom lay the responsibility for countering any move of the High Sea +Fleet.</p> +<p>The entry of the United States into the war early in April eased +the situation somewhat. First it was hoped that the United States +Navy would assist us with destroyers and other small craft, and +secondly it was a fact that the great majority of the material +imported into countries contiguous to Germany came from the United +States. There was reason to anticipate that steps would be taken by +the United States authorities in the direction of some form of +rationing of these countries, and in these circumstances it was +justifiable to reduce gradually the strength of our blockading +squadron of armed merchant vessels known as the 10th Cruiser +Squadron. By this means we could at once provide additional vessels +to act as convoying cruisers.</p> +<p>Vice-Admiral W.S. Sims had arrived in this country in March, +1917, after passing through an exciting experience, the ship in +which he crossed (the United States steamer <i>St. Louis</i>) being +mined outside Liverpool. He came to visit me at the Admiralty +immediately after his arrival in London, and from that day until I +left the Admiralty at the end of the year it was my privilege and +pleasure to work in the very closest co-operation with him. My +friendship with the Admiral was of very long standing. We had +during many years exchanged views on different naval subjects, but +principally on gunnery questions. I, in common with other British +naval officers who had the honour of his acquaintance, had always +been greatly struck by his wonderful success in the post of +Inspector of Target Practice in the United States Navy. That +success was due not only to his intimate knowledge of gunnery, but +also to his attractive personality, charm of manner, keen sense of +humour, and quick and accurate grasp of any problem with which he +was confronted. It was fortunate indeed for the Allied cause that +Admiral Sims should have been selected to command the United States +forces in European waters, for to the qualities mentioned above he +added a habit of speaking his mind with absolutely fearless +disregard of the consequences. This characteristic has led him on +more than one occasion into difficulty, but in the circumstances +with which we had to deal in 1917 it was just the quality that was +needed. It was a very difficult matter for those in authority in +the United States, separated as they were by 3,000 miles of sea +from the theatres of war, to realize the conditions in European +waters, for the Admiralty was not concerned only with the North Sea +and Atlantic, and the terse and straightforward reports of Admiral +Sims, and his convincing statements, went a long way towards +bringing home to the United States people at that time the extreme +gravity of the situation and the need for immediate action. He was +consistently backed up by that great ambassador, the late Mr. W.H. +Page, who also honoured me with his confidence, and to whom I spoke +perfectly freely on all occasions.</p> +<p>The assistance from the United States that it was hoped was now +in sight made the prospect of success following on the adoption of +the convoy system far more favourable, and preparations were put in +hand for the institution of an ocean convoy system on a large +scale. In order to gain some experience of the difficulties +attending the working of cargo ships, directions were given for an +experimental convoy to be collected at Gibraltar. The necessary +officers were sent out to Gibraltar with orders to assemble the +convoy, to instruct the masters in the work that lay before them, +and to explain to them the system of sailing, the manner in which +the convoy would be handled, and the protection that would be +afforded. This naturally took time, and the convoy did not arrive +in England until after the middle of May. The experience gained +showed, however, that the difficulties apprehended by the officers +of the Mercantile Marine were not insuperable, and that, given +adequate protection by cruisers and small fast craft, the system +was at least practicable. It was accordingly decided to put it into +operation at once, and to extend it as rapidly as the increase in +the numbers of our destroyers and sloops permitted.</p> +<p>The North Atlantic homeward-bound trade was brought under convoy +in May, 1917, and the Gibraltar homeward-bound trade in July, but +for some months it was impossible to provide for the institution of +a complete convoy system. At first some 40 per cent, of the +homeward-bound trade was convoyed. Then the system was gradually +extended to include first 60 per cent., then 80 per cent., and +finally 100 per cent, of the homeward Atlantic trade and the trade +from Gibraltar, trawlers being used as escorts for the Gibraltar +trade, as the majority of the ships therein engaged were slow. But +trawlers are unsatisfactory escort vessels.</p> +<p>In the early stages of the convoy system difficulties were +experienced from the fact that all the available destroyers and +most of the sloops were used as escorts, with the result that the +ships not under convoy were left with but little protection.</p> +<hr> +<a name="CH5"><!-- CH5 --></a> +<h2>CHAPTER V</h2> +<center>THE CONVOY SYSTEM AT WORK</center> +<p>As has been mentioned in Chapter II., the first ships to be +brought under a system of convoy were those engaged in the French +coal trade and in the trade between Scandinavia and the United +Kingdom.</p> +<p>In the case of the <i>French coal trade</i>, commencing in +March, 1917, the steamships engaged in the trade were sailed in +groups from four different assembly ports, viz.:</p> +<pre> + Southend to Boulogne and Calais. + St. Helens to Havre. + Portland to Cherbourg. + Penzance to Brest. +</pre> +<p>Between Southend and Boulogne and Calais the protection was +given by the vessels of the Dover Patrol in the course of their +ordinary duties, but for the other three routes special escort +forces were utilized, and daily convoys were the rule.</p> +<p>Owing to the great demand for coal in France, sailing vessels +were also used, and sailed under convoy from several of the +south-west ports.</p> +<p>A large organization was required to deal with the trade, and +this was built up under the supervision of Captain Reginald G.H. +Henderson, C.B., of the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff, +working under Vice-Admiral (then Rear-Admiral) Sir Alexander Duff, +head of the Division, in conference with the Commanders-in-Chief, +Portsmouth and Plymouth, under whose direction and protection the +convoys were run. The immunity of this trade, carried out in the +infested waters of the English Channel, from successful attack by +submarines was extraordinary. No doubt the small size of the +vessels concerned and their comparatively shallow draught were a +contributory cause to this immunity. The figures for the period +March to August, 1917, show that 8,825 vessels crossed the Channel +under convoy, and that only fourteen were lost.</p> +<p>The history of the <i>Scandinavian and East Coast convoys</i> +dates back to the autumn of 1916, when heavy losses were being +incurred amongst Scandinavian ships due to submarine attack. Thus +in October, 1916, the losses amongst Norwegian and Swedish ships by +submarine attack were more than three times as great as the +previous highest monthly losses. Some fear existed that the neutral +Scandinavian countries might refuse to run such risks and go to the +extreme of prohibiting sailings. Towards the end of 1916, before I +left the Fleet, a system of "protected" sailings was therefore +introduced. In this system the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, +fixed upon a number of alternative routes between Norway and the +Shetland Islands, which were used by all vessels trading between +Scandinavia and Allied countries. The particular route in use at +any given moment was patrolled by the local forces from the Orkneys +and Shetlands, assisted when possible by small craft from the Grand +Fleet. The Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands was placed +in charge of the arrangements, which were carried out by the Senior +Naval Officer at Lerwick, in the Shetland Islands. At this period +the intention was that the shipping from Norway should sail at +dusk, reach a certain rendezvous at dawn, and thence be escorted to +Lerwick. The shipping from Lerwick sailed at dawn under protection, +dispersed at dark, and reached the Norwegian coast at dawn. +Difficulties, of course, arose in the event of bad weather, or when +the slow speed of the ships prevented the passage of about 180 +miles being made in approximately twenty-four hours, and by April, +1917, it was evident that further steps were necessary to meet +these difficulties, which were again causing heavy losses. Early in +April, then, by direction from the Admiralty, a conference was held +at Longhope on the subject. Admiral Sir Frederick Brock, Commanding +the Orkneys and Shetlands, presided, and representatives from the +Admiralty and the Commands affected were present, and the adoption +of a complete convoy system to include the whole trade between the +East Coast and Norway was recommended. This proposal was approved +by the Admiralty and was put into force as soon as the necessary +organization had matured. Escorting vessels had with difficulty +been provided, although in inadequate numbers. The first convoys +sailed towards the end of April, 1917.</p> +<p>The system may be described briefly as follows. The convoys all +put into Lerwick, in the Shetland Islands, both on the eastward and +westward passages, so that Lerwick acted as a junction for the +whole system. From Lerwick, convoys to Scandinavia left in the +afternoon under the protection of two or three destroyers, and, +with some armed patrol vessels in company up to a certain stage, +made the Norwegian coast at varying points, and there dispersed, +and the destroyers then picked up the west-bound convoy at a +rendezvous off the Norwegian coast shortly before dark, and steered +for a rendezvous between Norway and the Shetland Islands, where an +escort of armed patrol vessels joined the convoy at daylight to +assist in its protection to Lerwick. From Lerwick convoys were +dispatched to various points on the coast of the United Kingdom; +those making for southern ports on the East Coast were escorted by +a force composed of some of the old "River" class or of 30-knot +class destroyers, and trawlers belonging to the East Coast Command +based on the Humber, and those making for more northerly ports or +ports on the West Coast were escorted merely by armed patrol +vessels, as the danger of submarine attack to these convoys was not +so great.</p> +<p>The main difficulty was the provision of the destroyers required +for the proper protection of the convoys, and to a lesser degree +the provision of armed patrol vessels of the trawler, whaler, or +drifter types.</p> +<p>The conference held early in April, 1917, had reported that +whilst stronger protection was naturally desirable, the very least +force that could give defence to the convoys between Lerwick and +the East Coast ports would be a total of twenty-three destroyers +and fifty trawlers, whilst for each convoy between Lerwick and +Norway at least two destroyers and four trawlers were needed. The +destroyers for the latter convoys were provided by the Grand Fleet, +although they could ill be spared. The total number so utilized was +six. It was only possible to provide a force of twenty old +destroyers and forty-five trawlers for the East Coast convoys +instead of the numbers recommended by the conference, and owing to +the age of a large majority of these destroyers and the inevitable +resultant occasional breakdown of machinery, the number available +frequently fell below twenty, although it was really marvellous how +those old destroyers stuck to the work to the eternal credit of +their crews, and particularly the engineering staffs. The adoption +of the system, however, resulted during the comparatively fine +summer weather in a considerable reduction in the number of +merchant ships lost, in spite of the fact that great difficulty was +experienced in keeping the ships of the convoys together, +particularly at night, dawn frequently finding the convoy very much +scattered.</p> +<p>It became obvious, however, that with the approach of winter the +old destroyers of the 30-knot class would have the greatest +difficulty in facing the heavy weather, and very urgent +representations were made by Sir Frederick Brock for their +replacement by more modern vessels before the winter set in. All +that could be effected in this direction was done, though at the +expense of some of the Channel escorts. Urgent requests for good +destroyers were being received at the Admiralty from every Command, +and it was impossible to comply with them since the vessels were +not in existence.</p> +<p>Certain other steps which may be enumerated were taken in +connection with the Scandinavian traffic.</p> +<p>The convoys received such additional protection as could be +given by the airships which were gradually being stationed on the +East Coast during the year 1917, and decoy ships occasionally +joined the convoys in order to invite submarine attack on +themselves. This procedure was indeed adopted on all convoy routes +as they were brought into being, the rule being for the decoy ship +to drop behind the convoy in the guise of a straggler.</p> +<p>Some of our submarines were also detailed to work in the +vicinity of convoy routes in order that they might take advantage +of any opportunity to attack enemy submarines if sighted; due +precautions for their safety were made.</p> +<p>Among the difficulties with which the very energetic and +resourceful Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands had to +contend in his working of the convoys was the persistent mining of +the approach to Lerwick Harbour by German submarines; a second +difficulty was the great congestion that took place in that harbour +as soon as bad weather set in during the autumn of 1917. The +weather during the latter part of 1917 was exceptionally bad, and +great congestion and consequent delay to shipping occurred both at +Lerwick and in the Norwegian ports. As the result of this +congestion it became necessary to increase largely the number of +ships in each convoy, thereby enhancing the difficulty of handling +the convoy.</p> +<p>At the commencement it had been decided to limit the size of a +Scandinavian convoy to six or eight vessels, but as the congestion +increased it became necessary to exceed this number considerably, +occasional convoys composed of as many as thirty to forty ships +being formed. A contributory cause to the increase in the size of +convoys was due to the fact that the trade between Lerwick and the +White Sea, which had been proceeding direct between those places +during the first half of 1917, became the target of persistent +submarine attack during the summer, and in order to afford them +protection it was necessary in the autumn to include these ships +also in the Scandinavian convoy for the passage across the North +Sea. Between the coast of Norway and the White Sea they proceeded +independently, hugging territorial waters as far as possible.</p> +<p>It will be realized that the institution of the convoy system of +sailing for the Scandinavian trade necessitated an extensive +organization on the Norwegian as well as on the British side of the +North Sea. For this reason Captain Arthur Halsey, R.N., was +appointed in March, 1917, as Naval Vice-Consul at Bergen, and the +whole of the arrangements in regard to the working of the convoys, +the issue of orders, etc., from the Norwegian side came under him +and his staff, to which additions were made from time to time. The +position was peculiar in that British naval officers were working +in this manner in a neutral country, and it says much for the +discretion and tact of Captain Halsey and his staff and the +courtesy of the Norwegian Government officials that no difficulties +occurred.</p> +<p>Steps were also taken to appoint officers at British ports for +the work of controlling the mercantile traffic, and as the +organization became perfected so the conditions gradually +improved.</p> +<p>By the end of September the bad weather prevalent in the North +Sea had caused great dislocation in the convoy system. Ships +composing convoys became much scattered and arrived so late off +Lerwick as to prevent them proceeding on their passage without +entering harbour. Owing to the overcrowding of Lerwick Harbour the +system of changing convoy escorts without entering harbour had been +introduced, and the delays due to bad weather were causing great +difficulties in this respect. The question of substituting the Tyne +for Lerwick as the collecting port was first discussed at this +period, but the objections to the Tyne as an assembly port were so +strong as to prevent the adoption of the proposal.</p> +<p>The system of convoy outlined above continued in force from +April to December, 1917, during which period some 6,000 vessels +were convoyed between Norway and the Humber with a total loss of +about seventy ships.</p> +<p>There was always the danger that Germany would attack the +convoys by means of surface vessels. The safeguard against such +attacks was the constant presence of forces from the Grand Fleet in +the North Sea. In view of the fact, however, that the distance of +the convoy routes from the Horn Reef was only between 300 and 350 +miles, and that on a winter night this distance could almost be +covered at a speed of 20 knots during the fourteen or fifteen hours +of darkness that prevailed, it will be seen that unless the convoys +were actually accompanied by a force sufficient to protect them +against operations by surface vessels, there was undoubted risk of +successful attack. It was not possible to forecast the class of +vessels by which such an attack might be carried out or the +strength of the attacking force. The German decision in this +respect would naturally be governed by the value of the objective +and by the risk to be run. Admiral Scheer in his book states that +on one occasion, in April, 1918, the German battle-cruisers, +supported by the battleships and the remainder of the High Sea +Fleet, attempted such an attack, but found no convoy. It was always +realized by us that an attack in great force might be made on the +convoy, but such risk had to be accepted.</p> +<p>The movements of the ships of the Grand Fleet were a matter for +the Commander-in-Chief, provided always that no definite orders +were issued by the Admiralty or no warning of expected attack was +given to the Commander-in-Chief, and, prior to the first attack on +the Scandinavian convoy, no special force of cruisers or light +cruisers accompanied the convoy to guard it against attack by +surface vessels, although a strong deterrent to attack lay in the +frequent presence of forces from the Grand Fleet to the southward +of the convoy routes, which forces would seriously threaten the +return of any raiding German vessels. As the enemy would naturally +make the northward passage by night we could hardly expect to sight +his ships on the outward trip.</p> +<p>The first attack took place at daylight on October 17. The +convoy on this occasion consisted of twelve ships, two British, one +Belgian, one Danish, five Norwegian and three Swedish, and was +under the anti-submarine escort of the destroyers <i>Mary Rose</i> +and <i>Strongbow</i>, and two trawlers, the <i>Elsie</i> and <i>P. +Fannon</i>. At dawn, shortly after 6.0 A.M., two strange vessels +were sighted to the southward, and were later recognized as German +light cruisers. They were challenged, but replied by opening fire +at about 6.15 A.M., disabling the <i>Strongbow</i> with the first +salvo fired. The <i>Mary Rose</i> steamed gallantly at the enemy +with the intention of attacking with torpedoes, but was sunk by +gunfire before she could achieve her object. The enemy vessels then +attacked the convoy, sinking all except the British and Belgian +vessels, which escaped undamaged. The <i>Strongbow</i>, shelled at +close range, returned the fire, using guns and torpedoes, but was +completely overwhelmed by the guns of the light cruisers and sank +at about 9.30 A.M. The trawler <i>Elsie</i> effected very fine +rescue work amongst the survivors both from the <i>Strongbow</i> +and ships of the convoy, whilst under fire, and both trawlers +reached Lerwick. The enemy sheered off soon after 8.0 A.M. Most +unfortunately neither the <i>Strongbow</i> nor the <i>Mary Rose</i> +succeeded in getting a wireless signal through to our own vessels +to report the presence of enemy ships, otherwise there can be +little doubt that they would have been intercepted and sunk. We had +in the North Sea, during the night before the attack and during the +day of the attack, a particularly strong force of light cruisers +comprising four or possibly five squadrons (a total of not less +than sixteen vessels), all to the southward of the convoy route, +and had the information of the attack come through from the +destroyers, these vessels would have been informed at once and +would have had an excellent chance of intercepting the enemy. The +extreme difficulty of preventing the egress of raiders from the +North Sea at night, even when so large a force is cruising, was +well illustrated by this incident, although a little reflection on +the wide area of water to be covered, together with a knowledge of +the distance that the eye can cover on a dark night (some 200 to +300 yards), would show how very great are the chances in favour of +evasion.</p> +<p>This disaster to the Scandinavian convoy was bound to bring into +prominence the question of affording to it protection against +future attacks by surface vessels, for necessarily the protection +against surface vessels differed from that against submarines, a +point which was sometimes overlooked by those who were unfamiliar +with the demands of the two wars which were being waged—the +one on the surface and the other under the surface. It was very +difficult to furnish efficient protection against the surface form +of attack from the resources of the Grand Fleet if the practice of +running a daily convoy was continued, because it was impossible to +forecast the strength or exact character—battle-cruisers, +cruisers or destroyers—of the attack; and the first step was +to reduce the number of convoys and to increase correspondingly the +number of ships in each convoy. A telegram was sent to the Admiral +Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands on October 26 asking whether +the convoys could be conveniently reduced to three per week. A +reply was received on the 29th to the effect that the convoy could +be run every third day under certain conditions; the important +conditions were the use of the Tyne instead of the Hurnber as a +collecting port, and the provision of eight extra trawlers and nine +modern destroyers. Sir Frederick Brock stated that he was assuming +cruiser protection to the convoys and that the details would need +to be worked out before the change could be made. He suggested a +conference. He was requested on October 31 to consult the +Vice-Admiral Commanding East Coast of England as to the +practicability of using the Tyne as a convoy collecting port. +Meanwhile Sir F. Brock had prepared a scheme for giving effect to +his proposals, and on November 5 he sent copies of this scheme to +the Vice-Admiral Commanding East Coast of England and other +officers concerned for their consideration.</p> +<p>In forwarding proposals to the Admiralty on November 22, the +Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet stated that the destroyers +asked for could not be provided from the Grand Fleet. Amongst other +reasons it was pointed out that the destroyers required for +screening the light cruisers protecting the convoys would have to +be supplied from that source, thus bringing an additional strain on +the Grand Fleet flotillas. He suggested the provision of these +vessels from other Commands, such as the Mediterranean, and pointed +out the manifest advantages that would result from providing a +force for this convoy work that would be additional to the Grand +Fleet flotillas. Consideration of the proposals at the Admiralty +showed once again the great difficulty of providing the destroyers. +It was impossible to spare any from the Mediterranean, where large +troop movements needing destroyer protection were in progress, and +other Commands were equally unable to furnish them. Indeed, the +demands for destroyers from all directions were as insistent as +ever. The unsuitability of the Tyne as a collecting port was +remarked upon by the Naval Staff, as well as other objections to +the scheme as put forward from Scapa. In order to decide upon a +workable scheme, directions were given that a conference was to +assemble at Scapa on December 10. An officer from the Naval Staff +was detailed to attend the conference, to point out the objections +which had been raised and, amongst other matters, to bring to +notice the advantage of the Firth of Forth as a collecting port +instead of the Tyne.</p> +<p>Meanwhile steps had been taken to furnish as much protection as +possible from Grand Fleet resources to the convoys against attack +by enemy surface vessels.</p> +<p>The conference of December 10 came to the conclusion that the +Firth of Forth was the best assembly place, and that the port of +Methil in that locality would offer great advantages. The +conference made recommendations as to the provision of destroyers +as soon as they were available, and, amongst other matters, +mentioned the necessity for an increase in the minesweeping force +at Rosyth to meet a possible extension of enemy minelaying when the +new system was in operation.</p> +<p>On December 12 a second attack on the convoy took place. In this +instance the attack was carried out by four German destroyers. Two +convoys were at sea, one east-bound and one west-bound, the +east-bound convoy being attacked. It was screened against submarine +attack by two destroyers—the <i>Pellew</i> and +<i>Partridge</i>—and four armed trawlers, and comprised six +vessels, one being British and the remainder neutrals. The attack +took place in approximately Lat. 59.50 N., Long. 3.50 E., and the +action resulted in the <i>Partridge</i>, the four trawlers, and the +whole of the convoy being sunk, and the <i>Pellew</i> was so +severely damaged as to be incapable of continuing the action. At +the time of this attack a west-bound convoy was at sea to the +westward of the other convoy, and two armoured cruisers—the +<i>Shannon</i> and <i>Minotaur</i>—with four destroyers were +acting as a covering force for the convoys against attack by +surface vessels. A wireless signal from the <i>Partridge</i> having +been intercepted, this force steamed at full speed for the scene of +the action, the destroyers arriving in time to pick up 100 +survivors from the convoy and trawlers, but not in time to save the +convoy. The 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, also at sea, was some 85 +miles to the southward and eastward of the convoy when attacked, +but neither this force nor the <i>Shannon's</i> force succeeded in +intercepting the enemy before he reached port. The short hours of +daylight greatly facilitated his escape.</p> +<p>On receipt of the report of the meeting of December 10, and in +view of the attack of December 12, the question of the interval +between convoys was specially considered in its relation to the +ability of the Grand Fleet to furnish protection against surface +attack. It was decided that for this reason it would only be +possible to sail convoys from Methil every third day so as to avoid +having two convoys at sea at a time, a situation with which the +Grand Fleet could not deal satisfactorily. The organization then +drawn up actually came into effect on January 20, 1918, after my +departure from the Admiralty, and was continued with certain +modifications to the end of the war. The principal modification was +an increase of the interval between convoys, first, to four, and +later to five days in order to relieve the strain on the Grand +Fleet arising from the provision of covering forces; the +disadvantage of the resultant increased size of the convoys had to +be accepted. Under the new system the Commander-in-Chief Coast of +Scotland at Rosyth—Admiral Sir Cecil Burney—became +responsible for the control of the Scandinavian convoys, the +Admiralty selecting the routes.</p> +<p>The introduction of the convoy system for the Atlantic trade +dates from the early days of May, 1917, when the prospect—for +it was only then a prospect—of increasing assistance from the +U.S. Navy in regard to destroyers and other small craft for escort +duty as well as convoy cruisers for ocean work, made the system +possible. Action taken with the U.S. authorities for the +introduction of a system by which the trade from that country in +neutral shipping was controlled enabled the ships of the 10th +Cruiser Squadron to be gradually withdrawn from blockade duties and +utilized as ocean convoy cruisers. Even with assistance from the +U.S. Navy in the shape of old battleships and cruisers, the use of +the 10th Cruiser Squadron, the withdrawal of the 2nd Cruiser +Squadron of five ships from the Grand Fleet, the use of the ships +of the North American and West Indies Squadron and of some of our +older battleships from the Mediterranean, there was still a +shortage of convoy cruisers; this deficiency was made up by arming +a number of the faster cargo vessels with 6-inch guns for duty as +convoy cruisers. These vessels usually carried cargo themselves, so +that no great loss of tonnage was involved.</p> +<p>On May 17 a committee was assembled at the Admiralty to draw up +a complete organization for a general convoy system. (The committee +was composed of the following officers: Captain H.W. Longden, R.N., +Fleet Paymaster H.W.E. Manisty, R.N., Commander J.S. Wilde, R.N., +Lieutenant G.E. Burton, R.N., and Mr. N.A. Leslie, of the Ministry +of Shipping.) This committee had before it the experience of an +experimental convoy which arrived from Gibraltar shortly after the +commencement of the committee's work, as well as the experience +already gained in the Scandinavian and French coal trade convoys, +and the evidence of officers such as Captain R.G. Henderson, R.N., +who had made a close study of the convoy question.</p> +<p>On June 6 the report was completed. This valuable report dealt +with the whole organization needed for the institution of a +complete system of convoy for homeward and outward trade in the +Atlantic. In anticipation of the report steps had already been +taken to commence the system, the first homeward bound Atlantic +convoy starting on May 24. A necessary preliminary for the +successful working of the convoys was a central organization at the +Admiralty. This organization—termed the Convoy Section of the +Trade Division of the Naval Staff—worked directly under +Rear-Admiral A.L. Duff, who had recently been placed on the Board +of Admiralty with the title of Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff +(A.C.N.S.), and who was in immediate control of the Anti-Submarine, +Trade and Minesweeping Divisions of the Staff. Fleet Paymaster +H.W.E. Manisty was appointed as Organizing Manager of Convoys, and +the Convoy Section, comprising at first some ten officers, soon +increased to a total of fifteen, and was in immediate touch with +the Ministry of Shipping through a representative, Mr. Leslie. His +function was to make such arrangements as would ensure co-operation +between the loading and discharging of cargoes and convoy +requirements, and generally to coordinate shipping needs with +convoy needs.</p> +<p>The organizing manager of the convoys and his staff controlled +the assembly, etc., of all convoys and vessels.</p> +<p>The routing of the convoys and their protection, both ocean and +anti-submarine, was arranged under the superintendence of the +A.C.N.S.</p> +<p>In addition to the central Admiralty organization, an officer +with the necessary staff was appointed to each convoy port of +assembly at home and abroad. This officer's duties comprised the +collection and organization of the convoy and the issue of sailing +orders and necessary printed instructions to the masters of the +vessels, seeing that they were properly equipped for sailing in +company, and forwarding information to the Admiralty of the +movements of the convoy.</p> +<p>An essential feature of the system was the appointment of a +convoy commodore. This officer was quite distinct from the +commanding officer of the vessel forming the ocean escort, but +acted under his orders when in company. The duty of the convoy +commodore, whose broad pennant was hoisted in one of the ships, +was, subject to instructions from the commanding officer of the +escorting vessel, to take general charge of the convoy.</p> +<p>The convoy commodores were either naval officers, admirals or +captains on the active or retired lists, or experienced merchant +captains. The duties were most arduous and responsible, but there +was no lack of volunteers for this work. Many of the convoy +commodores had their ships sunk under them. The country has every +reason for much gratitude to those who undertook this difficult and +very responsible task.</p> +<p>By July we had succeeded in increasing the strength of the +anti-submarine convoy escorting force to thirty-three destroyers +(eleven of which belonged to the United States Navy) and ten +sloops, with eleven more destroyers for the screening of troop +transports through the submarine zone and for the protection of the +convoys eastward from the Lizard, the position in which the other +screening force left them. We had remaining twelve sloops, which, +with trawlers, were engaged in protecting that considerable portion +of the trade making for the south of Ireland, which we could not +yet bring under convoy. It was intended to absorb these sloops for +convoy protection as soon as circumstances permitted.</p> +<p>At this stage it was considered that a total of thirty-three +more destroyers or sloops was needed to complete the homeward +convoy system. The Admiralty was pressed to weaken yet further the +Grand Fleet destroyer force in order to extend the convoy system, +but did not consider such a course justified in view of the general +naval situation.</p> +<p>In arranging the organization of the Atlantic convoy system it +was necessary to take into consideration certain other important +matters. Amongst these were the following:</p> +<p>1. The selection of ports of assembly and frequency of sailing. +During the latter half of 1917 the general arrangements were as +follows for the homeward trade:</p> +<pre> + Port of Assembly. Frequency of Sailing. Destination. + + Gibraltar Every 4 days. Alternately to + E. & W. c'ts. + Sierra Leone Every 8 days. Either coast. + Dakar Every 8 days. Either coast. + Hampton Roads (U.S.A.) Every 4 days. Alternately to + E. & W. c'ts. + New York Every 8 days. Alternately to + E. & W. c'ts. + Halifax, N.S. Every 8 days. West coast. + Sydney (Cape Breton) Every 8 days. Alternately to + E. & W. c'ts. +</pre> +<p>Each port served a certain area of trade, and vessels engaged in +that trade met at the port of assembly for convoy to the United +Kingdom or to France.</p> +<p>The total number of merchant ships sailing thus in convoy every +eight days in September, 1917, was about 150, in convoys comprising +from 12 to 30 ships, and the total escorting forces comprised:</p> +<pre> + 50 ocean escort vessels (old battleships, cruisers, armed + merchant ships and armed escort ships), + 90 sloops and destroyers, + 15 vessels of the "P" class (small destroyers), + 50 trawlers, +</pre> +<p>in addition to a considerable force for local escort near +Gibraltar, consisting of sloops, yachts, torpedo boats, U.S. +revenue cruisers, U.S. tugs, etc.</p> +<p>At this period (September, 1917) outward convoys were also in +operation, the arrangement being that the outward convoy was +escorted by destroyers or sloops to a position 300 to 400 miles +from the coast clear of the known submarine area, and there +dispersed to proceed independently, there being insufficient ocean +escort vessels to take the convoy on; about twelve more were needed +for this work. The escorting vessels used for the outward convoys +were destroyers or sloops which were due to proceed to sea to meet +a homeward convoy, the routine being that the outward convoy should +sail at such a time as would ensure the homeward convoy being met +by the escort without undue delay at the rendezvous, since any long +period of waiting about at a rendezvous was impossible for the +escorting vessels as they would have run short of fuel. It was also +undesirable, as it revealed to any submarine in the neighbourhood +the approach of a convoy.</p> +<p>It will be realized by seamen that this procedure (which was +forced upon us by the shortage of escorting vessels) led to many +difficulties. In the first place the homeward convoys were +frequently delayed by bad weather, etc., on passage across the +Atlantic, and, owing to the insufficient range of the wireless +installations, it was often not possible for the commodore to +acquaint the Admiralty of this delay in time to stop the sailing of +the outward convoys. Again, outward convoys were often delayed by +bad weather, resulting in the homeward convoy not being met before +entering the submarine zone. As the winter drew near this was a +source of constant anxiety, since so many of the vessels outward +bound were in ballast (empty), and their speed was consequently +quickly reduced in bad weather. The ships under these conditions +became in some cases almost unmanageable in a convoy, and the +responsibilities of the escorts were much intensified.</p> +<p>In September, 1917, the following was the position in respect to +outward bound convoys:</p> +<pre> + Port of Assembly. Frequency of Sailing. Destination. + + Lamlash Every 4 days. Atlantic ports. + Milford Haven Every 4 days. Gibraltar. + Queenstown Every 4 days. Atlantic ports. + Falmouth Every 8 days. Gibraltar. + Plymouth Every 4 days. Atlantic ports. +</pre> +<p>About 150 vessels sailed every eight days in convoys varying in +strength from 12 to 30 ships.</p> +<p>There was still a good deal of Atlantic trade that was not +sailing under convoy. This comprised trade between Gibraltar and +North and South America, between the Cape, South America and Dakar, +and the coastal trade between North and South America. It was +estimated that an additional twenty-five to thirty ocean escorts +and eleven destroyers would be needed to include the above trade in +convoy.</p> +<p>The Mediterranean trade is dealt with later.</p> +<p>The question of speed was naturally one of great importance in +the convoy system. As has been stated earlier, the speed of a +convoy like that of a squadron or fleet is necessarily that of the +slowest ship, and in order to prevent delay to shipping, which was +equivalent to serious loss of its carrying power, it was very +necessary that convoys should be composed of ships of approximately +the same speed. In order to achieve this careful organization was +needed, and the matter was not made easier by the uncertainty that +frequently prevailed as to the actual sea speed of particular +merchant ships. Some masters, no doubt from legitimate pride in +their vessels, credited them with speeds in excess of those +actually attained. Frequently coal of poor quality or the fact that +a ship had a dirty bottom reduced her speed to a very appreciable +extent, and convoy commodores had occasionally to direct ships +under such conditions to drop out of the convoy altogether and make +their passage alone. Obviously this action was not taken lightly +owing to the risk involved. Decision as to the sea speed of convoys +was taken by the convoy officer at the collecting port, and he +based this on the result of an examination of the records in the +different ships. As a rule convoys were classed as "slow" and +"fast." Slow convoys comprised vessels of a speed between 8 and +12-½ knots. Fast convoys included ships with a speed between +12-½ and 16 knots. Ships of higher speed than 16 knots did +not as a rule sail in convoys, but trusted to their speed and dark +hours for protection in the submarine area. The Gibraltar convoy +(an exception to the general rule) contained ships of only 7 knots +speed.</p> +<p>With the introduction of convoys the provision of efficient +signal arrangements became a matter of importance. The issue of +printed instructions to each master and the custom introduced of +assembling the masters to meet the captain of the escorting cruiser +before sailing, so that the conduct of the convoy might be +explained, had the effect of reducing signalling to a minimum, but +it was necessary that each ship should have a signalman on board, +and the provision of the number of signalmen required was no easy +matter. A good wireless installation was essential in the escorting +cruiser and in the Commodore's ship in order that the course of the +convoy could be diverted by the Admiralty if the known or suspected +presence of submarines rendered it necessary, and also for the +purpose of giving to the Admiralty early information of the +position of a convoy approaching the coast, so that the escorting +destroyers could be dispatched in time.</p> +<p>Fortunately for us, German submarines constantly used their +wireless installations when operating at sea, and as a consequence +our wireless directional stations were able to fix their positions +by cross bearings. This practice on the part of the enemy +undoubtedly went far to assist us both in anti-submarine measures +and in diverting trade to a safe course.</p> +<p>The introduction of the convoy system rendered the provision of +anti-submarine protection at ports of assembly a matter of great +importance, owing to the very large number of vessels that were +collected in them. Some of the ports were already in possession of +these defences, but amongst those for which net protection was +prepared and laid during 1917 were Halifax, Sydney (Cape Breton), +Falmouth, Lamlash, Rosslare (on the south-east coast of Ireland), +Milford Haven, Sierra Leone and Dakar. This involved extensive +work, and was undertaken and carried out with great rapidity by +Captain F.C. Learmonth and his staff, whose work in the production +of net defences during the war was of inestimable value, not only +to ourselves, but to our Allies, for whom large supplies of net +defences were also provided. The U.S.A. also adopted our system of +net defence for their harbours on entry into the war. Many anxious +months were passed at the Admiralty and at the ports named until +the anti-submarine defences were completed.</p> +<p>The escort of the convoys through the submarine zone imposed +very heavy work upon the destroyers, sloops and other screening +vessels. This was due partly to the fact that there were not +sufficient vessels to admit of adequate time being spent in harbour +to rest the crews and effect necessary repairs, and partly to the +nature of the work itself and the weather conditions under which so +much of it was carried out. It will be realized by those who have +been at sea in these small craft that little rest was obtainable in +the Atlantic between the west coast of Ireland and the mouth of the +Channel and positions 800 to 400 miles to the westward, except in +the finest weather. When to this is added the constant strain +imposed by watching for the momentary appearance of a periscope or +the track of a torpedo, and the vigilance needed, especially on +dark and stormy nights, to keep touch with a large convoy of +merchant ships showing no lights, with the inevitable whipping up +of occasional stragglers from the convoy, some idea may be gathered +of the arduous and unceasing work accomplished by the +anti-submarine escorts.</p> +<p>It had been my practice during 1917 to call for returns from all +commands of the number of hours that vessels of the destroyer and +light cruiser type were actually under way per month, and these +returns showed how heavy was the strain on the destroyers, +particularly those engaged in convoy work.</p> +<p>For several months, for instance, the destroyers in the +flotillas stationed at Devonport were under way on an average for +just under 50 per cent. of the month.</p> +<p>This meant that several destroyers in these flotillas averaged +quite 60 per cent. or even 70 per cent. of their time under way, as +other vessels of the flotilla were laid up during the periods under +review for long refits due to collision or other damage, in +addition to the necessary four-monthly refit.</p> +<p>Anyone familiar with the delicate nature of the machinery of +destroyers—which needs constant attention—and the +conditions of life at sea in them will appreciate the significance +of these figures and the strain which the conditions imposed on +those on board as well as on the machinery.</p> +<p>It was evident in November, 1917, that the personnel and the +machinery, whilst standing the strain in a wonderful manner, were +approaching the limit of endurance, and anxiety was felt as to the +situation during the winter.</p> +<p>Reports came in from the Grand Fleet indicating that the work of +the destroyers engaged in protecting the ships of the Scandinavian +convoy was telling heavily on the personnel, particularly on the +commanding officers, and one report stated that the convoy work +produced far greater strain than any other duty carried out by +destroyers. No mean proportion of the officers were suffering from +a breakdown in health, and since the <i>whole</i> of the work of +the Devonport, Queenstown and North of Ireland flotillas consisted +of convoy duty, whilst only a portion of the Grand Fleet destroyers +was engaged in this work, the opinions expressed were very +disquieting in their relation to the work of the southern +flotillas.</p> +<p>However, the destroyers held on here as elsewhere, but it is +only just to the splendid endurance of the young officers and the +men who manned them to emphasize as strongly as I can the +magnificent work they carried out in the face of every difficulty, +and without even the incentive of the prospect of a fight with a +foe that could be seen, this being the compensation given in their +work to the gallant personnel of the Dover, Harwich and Grand Fleet +flotillas. The convoy flotillas knew that their only chance of +action was with a submarine submerged, a form of warfare in which +the result was so very frequently unknown and therefore +unsatisfactory.</p> +<p>Under the new conditions the Admiralty took upon itself +responsibility for the control of the ships of the Mercantile +Marine in addition to its control of the movements of the Fleet. +Indeed the control of convoys was even more directly under the +Admiralty than was the control of the Fleet. In the latter case the +proper system is for the Admiralty to indicate to the +Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, or to other Commands the +objective, and to supply all the information possible regarding the +strength of the enemy, his intentions and movements and such other +information as can be of use to the Commander-in-Chief, but to +leave the handling of the force to the Commander-in-Chief +concerned. This is the course which was usually followed during the +late war. It was my invariable practice when at the Admiralty.</p> +<p>In the case of convoys, however, a different system was +necessary owing to the difficulty of transmitting information, the +great delay that would be caused were this attempted, and the +impossibility of control being exercised over all convoys at sea +except by the Admiralty. Consequently the actual movements of +convoys for the greater part of their passage were directed by the +Naval Staff. Owing to ships not showing lights at night, convoys +were diverted clear of one another by wireless signal if they were +getting into dangerous proximity; they were directed to alter +course as necessary to avoid areas in which submarines had been +located, and occasionally it became necessary to alter the +destination of some ships as they approached home waters. The +movements of all convoys were "plotted" from day to day, indeed +from hour to hour, on a large-scale chart at the Admiralty, and it +was easy to see at a glance the position of all the ships at any +given time.</p> +<p>As the convoy approached home waters the ships came within the +areas of the Commanders-in-Chief, Coast of Ireland, Devonport, and +Portsmouth, and the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Dover Patrol, and +were taken in charge by one or other of them. At each port a staff +existed which kept a constant record of the movements of ships +passing through or working in the Command, and enabled the +Commander-in-Chief to take instant action if occasion arose.</p> +<p>The success of the convoy system in protecting trade is best +shown by the figures relating to the year 1917 on the succeeding +page (p. 144). In considering these figures the loose +station-keeping of the ships in the Scandinavian convoy must be +borne in mind. A large proportion of the ships in this convoy were +neutrals, and it was naturally not possible to bring these vessels +under discipline as was the case with convoys composed of purely +British ships. Consequently there was much straggling, and the +losses were proportionately heavier than in most of the Atlantic +convoys. The comparatively heavy losses in the Gibraltar convoys +were probably due to these convoys traversing two dangerous +submarine zones. The extraordinary immunity of the French coal +trade convoy from serious losses is remarkable and is probably due +to the short passage which enabled most of the distance to be +traversed at night and to the ships being of light draught.</p> +<p>The table on the following page would not be complete were no +reference made to the heavy losses which were experienced during +the year amongst ships which were <i>unescorted</i> through the +danger zones, owing to the fact that no escorting vessels were +available for the work.</p> +<pre> +LOSSES IN HOMEWARD BOUND CONVOYS, 1917. + +PORTS OF DEPARTURE OF CONVOYS. + +|------------------------------------------------------------------ +| | No. of | No. lost | Percentage | +| Particulars | Ships | in | of | +| of Convoys. | convoyed | convoys | losses | +| | | | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| NEW YORK AND | of | 447 | 5 | 1 | +| HAMPTON ROADS | Aug. | | | | +| Started in May. |----------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| | of | 1,000 | 11 | 1 | +| | Oct. | | | | +| |----------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| | of | 1,280 | 11 | .93 | +| | Nov. | | | | +|------------------|----------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| GIBRALTAR | of | 122 | 2 | 1.6 | +| Started in July | Aug. | | | | +| |----------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| | of | 359 | 8 | 2.2 | +| | Oct. | | | | +| |----------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| | of | 484 | 12 | 2.5 | +| | Nov. | | | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| SCANDINAVIAN. | of | 3,372 | 42 | 1.2 | +| Started in April.| Aug. | | | | +| |----------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| | of | 4,800 | 6 | 1.3 | +| | Oct. | | | | +| |----------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| | of | 5,560 | 3.63 | 1.1 | +| | Nov. | | | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| FRENCH COAL | of | 8,871 | 16 | .18 | +| TRADE | Aug. | | | | +| |----------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| | of | 12,446 | 20 | .16 | +| | Oct. | | | | +| |----------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| | of | 14,416 | 24 | .16 | +| | Nov. | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------- +</pre> +<p>In the Dakar convoy at the end of November and in the Halifax +convoy 150 ships had been brought home without loss, whilst in the +Sierra Leone convoy 1 ship had been lost out of 90 convoyed.</p> +<pre> +LOSSES IN OUTWARD BOUND CONVOYS STARTED IN AUGUST + +PORTS OF COLLECTION OF CONVOYS. + +|------------------------------------------------------------------ +| | No. of | No. lost | Percentage | +| Particulars | Ships | in | of | +| of Convoys. | convoyed | convoys | losses | +| | | | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| MILFORD | of | 86 | Nil. | Nil. | +| HAVEN. | Aug. | | | | +| |----------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| | of | 360 | Nil. | Nil. | +| | Oct. | | | | +| |----------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| | of | 535 | 3 | .56 | +| | Nov. | | | | +|------------------|----------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| LAMLASH. | of | 35 | 1 | 2.8 | +| | Aug. | | | | +| |----------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| | of | 175 | 2 | 1.1 | +| | Oct. | | | | +| |----------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| | of | 284 | 2 | .7 | +| | Nov. | | | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| PLYMOUTH. | of | 42 | Nil. | Nil. | +| | Aug. | | | | +| |----------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| | of | 246 | Nil. | Nil. | +| | Oct. | | | | +| |----------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| | of | 414 | 1 | .23 | +| | Nov. | | | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| FALMOUTH. | of | 14 | Nil. | Nil. | +| | Aug. | | | | +| |----------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| | of | 146 | Nil. | Nil. | +| | Oct. | | | | +| |----------------------------------------------| +| | To end | | | | +| | of | 185 | Nil. | Nil. | +| | Nov. | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------- +</pre> +<p>In the convoys starting from Queenstown 180 ships had been sent +out up to the end of November without loss.</p> +<p>There were naturally loud complaints of these losses, but these +were inevitable in the absence of escorting vessels, and no one +realized the dangers run more than those responsible for finding +protection; every available vessel was not only working at highest +possible pressure, but, as has been mentioned, breakdowns from +overwork amongst escorting craft were causing very considerable +anxiety.</p> +<p>The following figures show the dangers which were run by +unescorted vessels:</p> +<pre> + Losses amongst British merchant + steamships in 1917 by submarine + attack, under separate escort, under + Period convoy or unescorted. + + Ships under Ships Ships + separate under unescorted. + escort. convoy. + +Quarter ending June 30 ... 17 26 158 + +Quarter ending September 30 ... 14 29 148 + +October and November ... 12 23 90 +</pre> +<p>In considering the above table it should be pointed out that a +large proportion of the losses shown under the heading "Ships +unescorted" took place amongst ships which had either dispersed +from a convoy or which were on their way to join up with a convoy +at the port of assembly. It was unfortunately quite impossible to +provide escorts for all ships either to their ports of discharge or +from their loading ports to the ports of assembly for the convoy, +as we had so few vessels available for this work. Thus, in the +month of November, 1917, out of 13 vessels engaged in the main +oversea trade that were lost, 6 were in convoy, 5 had left or had +not joined their convoy, and 2 were not joining a convoy and were +unescorted.</p> +<p>November was the month of smallest British losses during the +period of unrestricted warfare in 1917, and it is of interest to +examine the losses for that month. The total number of ships lost +was 51. As many as 1,197 vessels entered or left home waters in +<i>overseas trade</i> exclusive of the Mediterranean trade. Of this +aggregate 87.5 per cent, were in convoy, and the total number of +these vessels sunk (13) was divided amongst the following trades: +North America, 1; Gibraltar, 5; West Africa and South America, 1; +the Bay of Biscay, Portugal and Spanish ports west of Gibraltar, 5; +Scandinavian, 1. In the same month there were 2,159 +<i>cross-Channel sailings</i> and ten losses, nine of these vessels +being unescorted.</p> +<p>Particulars of the locality of the total British losses of 51 +ships for the month of November are as follows:</p> +<pre> + East Coast north of St. Abb's 1 + East Coast between St. Abb's and Yarmouth 4 + East Coast, Yarmouth to the Downs 4 (2 by mine) + English Channel 21 (7 by mine) + Bristol Channel 4 + Irish Sea 2 + Bay of Biscay 2 + South of Cape St. Vincent 1 + Mediterranean 11 + East of Suez 1 (by mine) +</pre> +<p>In order to give some idea of the great volume of traffic on the +East Coast and the consequent difficulty of affording proper +protection, it may be mentioned that in the month of October, 1917, +the number of vessels passing between Spurn Head (River Humber) and +St. Abb's Head (to the northward) was 740 going north and 920 going +south. Of this total only 223 of the northward—and 413 of the +southward-bound vessels were in convoy or under escort, the total +losses being eleven, all amongst the unaccompanied ships.</p> +<p>Mention should be made here of the very serious situation which +arose during the year 1917 owing to the success attending the +attacks by enemy submarines on oil tankers bringing oil fuel to the +United Kingdom for the use of the Fleet. A great many of these tank +vessels were of great length and slow speed and presented the +easiest of targets to the torpedo attack of a submerged submarine. +So many vessels were sunk that our reserve of oil fuel became +perilously low. Instead of a reserve of some five or six months we +were gradually reduced to one of about eight weeks, and in order to +economize expenditure of fuel it actually became necessary at one +time to issue directions that the speed of oil-burning warships was +to be limited except in cases of the greatest urgency. Such an +order in war was a matter of much gravity; the great majority of +our light cruisers and destroyers were fitted to burn oil fuel +only, as well as our latest and most powerful battleships. The +crisis was eventually overcome by drawing upon every source +(including the Grand Fleet) for destroyers to escort the tankers +through the submarine danger areas, and by the assistance given us +by the Ministry of Shipping in bringing supplies of oil fuel to +this country in the double bottoms of merchant ships. By the end of +1917 the situation had greatly improved.</p> +<p>The losses of shipping during 1917 were particularly heavy in +the Mediterranean. Apart from the fact that the narrow waters of +that sea render difficult a policy of evasion on the part of +merchant shipping and give great advantages to the submarine, it +was thought that the heavy losses in the early part of the year +were partly due to the method of routeing the ships then in force, +and in reply to representations made to the French Admiralty this +system was altered by the French Commander-in-Chief. It should be +noted that the Mediterranean outside the Adriatic was under French +naval control in accordance with the agreement entered into with +France and Italy. The cordial co-operation of the French Admiralty +with us, and the manner in which our proposals were met, form very +pleasant memories of my term of office at the Admiralty. During the +greater part of the year 1917 Admiral Lacaze was Minister of +Marine, whilst Admiral de Bon held office as Chief of the Naval +Staff during the whole year. Nothing could exceed the courtesy +extended to me by these distinguished officers, for whom I +conceived great admiration and respect.</p> +<p>The result of the altered arrangement was a decided but +temporary improvement, and the losses again became serious during +the summer months. I then deemed it desirable that the control of +the traffic should be placed in the hands of officers stationed at +Malta, this being a central position from which any necessary +change in the arrangements could be made more rapidly and with +greater facility than by the French Commander-in-Chief, who was +also controlling fleet movements and who, for this reason alone, +was not in a position to act quickly.</p> +<p>A unified command in the Mediterranean would undoubtedly have +been the most satisfactory and efficient system to adopt, but the +time was not ripe for proposing that solution in 1917, and the +alternative was adopted of British control of the traffic routes +throughout the whole Mediterranean Sea subject to the general +charge of the French Commander-in-Chief which was necessary in such +an eventuality arising as an attempted "break out" of the Austrian +Fleet.</p> +<p>Accordingly, with the consent of the French and Italian +Admiralties, Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Somerset Gough-Calthorpe, +K.C.B., was dispatched to the Mediterranean as British +Commander-in-Chief; he was in control generally of all British +Naval forces in the Mediterranean, and especially in charge of all +the arrangements for the protection of trade and for anti-submarine +operations, the patrol vessels of all the nationalities concerned +being placed under his immediate orders for the purpose, whilst the +whole of the Mediterranean remained under the general control of +Vice-Admiral Gauchet, the French Commander-in-Chief. Admiral +Calthorpe was assisted by French and Italian officers, and the +Japanese Government, which had previously dispatched twelve +destroyers to the Mediterranean to assist in the protection of +trade, also gave to Admiral Calthorpe the control of these +vessels.</p> +<p>In the requests which we addressed to the Japanese Admiralty I +always received great assistance from Admiral Funakoshi, the Naval +Attaché in London. His co-operation was of a close and most +cordial nature.</p> +<p>The services of the Japanese destroyers in the Mediterranean +were of considerable value to the Allied cause. A striking instance +of the seamanlike and gallant conduct of their officers and men was +furnished on the occasion of the torpedoing of a British transport +by an enemy submarine off the coast of Italy, when by the work of +the Japanese escorting destroyers the great majority of those on +board were saved.</p> +<p>Admiral Calthorpe on leaving England was charged with the duty +of organizing convoys in the Mediterranean on the lines of those +already in force in other waters as soon as the necessary vessels +were available, and a conference of Allied officers sat at Malta +soon after his arrival, when a definite scheme of convoy was +prepared. There had always, however, been a great scarcity of fast +patrol vessels in the Mediterranean for this work. Divided control +of the forces in that area was partly responsible for this. The +Austrian destroyers were considered by the Italian Admiralty to be +so serious a menace in the Adriatic as to render it necessary to +keep in that sea the great majority of the Italian destroyers as +well as several French vessels of this class. The situation at the +eastern end of the Mediterranean necessitated a force of some eight +British destroyers being kept in the Aegean Sea to deal with any +Turkish vessels that might attempt to force the blockade of the +Dardanelles, whilst operations on the Syrian coast engaged the +services of some French and British destroyers. Continual troop +movements in the Mediterranean also absorbed the sendees of a +considerable number of vessels of this type.</p> +<p>Consequently there was a great shortage of fast small craft for +escort and mercantile convoy work. It was estimated that the escort +force required for the protection of a complete system of convoy in +the Mediterranean was approximately 290 vessels, the total number +available being about 215.</p> +<p>In spite, then, of the success of Admiral Calthorpe's work, the +result was that convoys were not started in the Mediterranean until +October, and they were then but inadequately protected, and losses +were heavy, both from this cause and from the fact already +mentioned—that the Mediterranean is a sea which, by reason of +its confined nature, is particularly suited for operations by +submarines against trade. Its narrowness at various points, such as +the Straits of Gibraltar, the Malta Channel, the Straits of +Messina, and the passages to the Ægean cause such convergence +of trade as to make it a very simple matter for a submarine to +operate with success. Evasion by change of route is almost +impossible. Operations designed to prevent the exit of submarines +from the Adriatic were difficult, because the depth of water in the +Straits of Otranto militated against the adoption of effective +mining and the laying of an effective net barrage.</p> +<p>For the above reasons the Admiralty was always very averse to +the sending of a large volume of our Far Eastern trade through the +Mediterranean, and strongly urged the Cape route instead; but the +shortage of shipping, combined with the increased length of the +Cape route, influenced the Ministry of Shipping to press strongly +for the Mediterranean as opposed to the other route. A "through" +convoy from England to Port Said was started in October, and by the +end of November two ships had been sunk out of the thirty-five that +had been under convoy. The return convoy; Port Said to England, was +only started in December.</p> +<p>The losses of British merchant steamships per quarter in the +Mediterranean during 1917 is shown below:</p> +<pre> + Quarter ending June 30 69 + + September 30 29 + + October and November 28 +</pre> +<p>It is impossible to close this chapter describing the convoys +without mention being made of the fine work accomplished by those +upon whose shoulders fell the task of organizing and working the +whole system. I cannot hope that I have succeeded in conveying to +readers of this volume an adequate conception of the great and +marvellously successful performance that it was or a full +appreciation of what immense difficulties the staff had to contend +with. They were very completely realized by me, who saw them appear +day by day and disappear under treatment.</p> +<p>The head of the organization was, of course, Rear-Admiral A.L. +Duff, the member of the Board and Staff immediately responsible +also for the whole anti-submarine organization. Only those who +witnessed Admiral Duff's work at the Admiralty during 1917 can +realize the immense debt that the country owes to his untiring +ability, patience, energy and resource. Capt. H.G. Henderson, who +had been associated with the convoy system from its start, was an +invaluable assistant, as also was Commander I.W. Carrington. Capt. +Richard Webb, the Director of the Trade Division, and Capt. +Frederic A. Whitehead, the Director of the Mercantile Movements +Division, took an important share in the work of organization, +whilst the work of Convoy Manager was carried through with quite +exceptional skill by Paymaster-Commander H.W.E. Manisty. These +officers were assisted by most capable staffs, and the Ministry of +Shipping, without whose assistance the work could not possibly have +been successfully carried out, co-operated most cordially.</p> +<hr> +<a name="CH6"><!-- CH6 --></a> +<h2>CHAPTER VI</h2> +<center>THE ENTRY OF THE UNITED STATES; OUR NAVAL POLICY +EXPLAINED</center> +<p>The entry of the United States of America into the war in April, +1917, had an important although not an immediate effect upon our +Naval policy. That the effect was not immediate was due to the fact +that the United States Navy was at the time indifferently provided +with the particular classes of vessels which were so greatly needed +for submarine warfare, viz. destroyers and other small surface +craft, submarines and light cruisers; further, the United States +mercantile fleet did not include any considerable number of small +craft which could be usefully employed for patrol and escort duty. +The armed forces of the United States of America were also poorly +equipped with aircraft, and had none available for Naval work. +According to our knowledge at the time the United States Navy, in +April, 1917, possessed twenty-three large and about twenty-four +small destroyers, some of which were unfit to cross the Atlantic; +there were about twelve submarines capable of working overseas, but +not well suited for anti-submarine work, and only three light +cruisers of the "Chester" class. On the other hand about seven +armoured cruisers were available in Atlantic waters for convoy +duties, and the Navy included a fine force of battleships, of which +fourteen were in full commission in April.</p> +<p>At first, therefore, it was clear that the assistance which +could be given to the Allied Navies would be but slight even if all +available destroyers were sent to European waters. This was, +presumably, well known to the members of the German Naval Staff, +and possibly explains their view that the entry of the United +States of America would be of little help to the Allied cause. The +Germans did not, however, make sufficient allowance for the +productive power of the United States, and perhaps also it was +thought in Germany that public opinion in the United States would +not allow the Navy Department to send over to European waters such +destroyers and other vessels of value in anti-submarine warfare as +were available at once or would be available as time progressed. +The German Staff may have had in mind the situation during the +Spanish-American War when the fact of Admiral Cervera's weak and +inefficient squadron being at large was sufficient to affect +adversely the naval strategy of the United States to a considerable +extent and to paralyze the work of the United States Navy in an +offensive direction.</p> +<p>Very fortunately for the Allied cause a most distinguished +officer of the United States Navy, Vice-Admiral W.S. Sims, came to +this country to report on the situation and to command such forces +as were sent to European waters. Admiral Sims, in his earlier +career before reaching the flag list, was a gunnery officer of the +very first rank. He had assimilated the ideas of Sir Percy Scott of +our own Navy, who had revolutionized British naval gunnery, and he +had succeeded, in his position as Inspector of Target Practice in +the United States Navy, in producing a very marked increase in +gunnery efficiency. Later when in command, first of a battleship, +then of the destroyer flotillas, and finally as head of the United +States Naval War College, his close study of naval strategy and +tactics had peculiarly fitted him for the important post for which +he was selected, and he not only held the soundest views on such +subjects himself, but was able, by dint of the tact and persuasive +eloquence that had carried him successfully through his gunnery +difficulties, to impress his views on others.</p> +<p>Admiral Sims, from the first moment of his arrival in this +country, was in the closest touch with the Admiralty in general and +with myself in particular. His earliest question to me was as to +the direction in which the United States Navy could afford +assistance to the Allied cause. My reply was that the first +essential was the dispatch to European waters of every available +destroyer, trawler, yacht, tug and other small craft of sufficient +speed to deal with submarines, other vessels of these classes +following as fast as they could be produced; further that +submarines and light cruisers would also be of great value as they +became available. Admiral Sims responded wholeheartedly to my +requests. He urged the Navy Department with all his force to send +these vessels and send them quickly. He frequently telegraphed to +the United States figures showing the tonnage of merchant ships +being sunk week by week in order to impress on the Navy Department +and Government the great urgency of the situation. I furnished him +with figures which even we ourselves were not publishing, as I felt +that nothing but the knowledge given by these figures could impress +those who were removed by 3,000 miles of sea from the scene of a +Naval war unique in many of its features.</p> +<p>Meanwhile the British Naval Commander-in-Chief in North American +waters, Vice-Admiral Sir Montague Browning, had been directed to +confer with the United States Navy Department and to point out our +immediate requirements and explain the general situation.</p> +<p>On April 6 the United States declared war on Germany. On April +13 we received information from Washington that the Navy Department +was arranging to co-operate with our forces for the protection of +trade in the West Atlantic should any enemy raiders escape from the +North Sea, that six United States destroyers would be sent to +European waters in the immediate future, and that the United States +would undertake the protection of trade on the west coast of Canada +and North America as well as in the Gulf of Mexico. It was further +indicated that the number of United States destroyers for European +waters would be increased at an early date. The vital importance of +this latter step was being constantly urged by Admiral Sims.</p> +<p>When Mr. Balfour's mission left for the United States in April, +Rear-Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair, the naval representative on the +mission, was requested to do all in his power to impress on the +United States Navy Department the very urgent necessity that +existed for the immediate provision of small craft for +anti-submarine operations in European waters and for the protection +of trade.</p> +<p>He was informed that the position could not be considered +satisfactory until the number of trawlers and sloops available for +patrol and escort duty was greatly increased and that a total of at +least <i>another hundred destroyers was required</i>.</p> +<p>It was pointed out that difficulty might arise from the natural +desire of the United States Government to retain large numbers of +small craft for the protection of shipping in the vicinity of the +United States coast, but it was at the same time indicated that our +experience showed that the number of submarines that the Germans +could maintain on the western side of the Atlantic was very small, +and that the real danger therefore existed in European waters.</p> +<p>Admiral de Chair was asked amongst other matters to emphasize +the assistance which United States submarines could render on the +eastern side of the Atlantic, where they would be able to undertake +anti-submarine operations, and he was also directed to endeavour to +obtain assistance in the production of mines, and the provision of +ships for minelaying work. Great stress was, of course, laid upon +the very important question of a large output of merchant ships and +the necessity for repairing and putting into service the German +merchant ships interned in U.S. ports was urged; directions were +also given to Admiral de Chair to ascertain from Mr. Schwab, of the +Bethlehem Steel Company, and other firms, to what extent they could +build for the British Navy destroyers, sloops, trawlers and +submarines, and the rapidity of such production.</p> +<p>The need for sloops was so great that I sent a personal telegram +to Mr. Schwab, whose acquaintance I had made in October, 1914, on +the occasion of the loss of the <i>Audacious</i>, begging him to +build at once a hundred of these vessels to our order. I felt +certain from the experience we had gained of Mr. Schwab's wonderful +energy and power, as illustrated by the work accomplished by him in +providing us in 1915 with ten submarines built in the +extraordinarily short period of five months, that he would produce +sloops at a very rapid rate and that there would be no delay in +starting if he undertook the work. The drawings had already been +sent over. However he was not able to undertake the work as the +U.S. Government decided that his yards would all be required for +their own work. This was unfortunate, as I had hoped that these +vessels would have been built in from four to six months, seeing +that the drawings were actually ready; they would have been +invaluable in the latter part of 1917.</p> +<p>Whilst the mission was in the United States constant +communications passed on these subjects, the heavy losses taking +place in merchant ships were stated, and every effort was made to +impress upon the Navy Department the urgency of the situation.</p> +<p>The tenor of our communications will be gathered from these +quotations from a personal telegram sent by me to Admiral de Chair +on April 26, viz.:</p> +<p class="blockquote">"For Rear-Admiral de Chair from First Sea +Lord.</p> +<p class="blockquote">"You must emphasize most strongly to the +United States authorities the very serious nature of the shipping +position. We lost 55 British ships last week approximately 180,000 +tons and rate of loss is not diminishing.</p> +<hr> +<p class="blockquote">"Press most strongly that the number of +destroyers sent to Ireland should be increased to twenty-four at +once if this number is available.</p> +<p class="blockquote">"Battleships are not required but +concentration on the vital question of defeat of submarine menace +is essential.</p> +<p class="blockquote">"Urge on the authorities that everything +should give way to the submarine menace and that by far the most +important place on which to concentrate patrols is the S.W. of +Ireland.</p> +<hr> +<p class="blockquote">"You must keep constantly before the U.S. +authorities the great gravity of the situation and the need that +exists for immediate action.</p> +<p class="blockquote">"Our new methods will not be effective until +July and the critical period is April to July."</p> +<p>It was very necessary to bring home to the United States Navy +Department the need for early action. Admiral Sims informed +me—as soon as he became aware of the heavy losses to merchant +shipping that were taking place—that neither he nor anyone +else in the United States had realized that the situation was so +serious. This was, of course, largely due to the necessity which we +were under of not publishing facts which would encourage the enemy +or unduly depress our own people. Further, he informed me that an +idea was prevalent in the United States that the <i>morale</i> of +the German submarine crews had been completely broken by their +losses in submarines. This impression was the successful result of +certain action on our part taken with intent to discourage the +enemy. Whatever may have been the case later in the year, we had, +however, no evidence in the spring of 1917 of deterioration of +<i>morale</i> amongst German submarine crews, nor was there any +reason for such a result. It was therefore necessary to be quite +frank with Admiral Sims; we knew quite well that we could not +expect new measures to be effective for some few months, and we +knew also that we could not afford a continuance of the heavy rate +of loss experienced in April, without a serious effect being +produced upon our war effort. We were certainly not in the state of +panic which has been ascribed to us in certain quarters, but we did +want those who were engaged in the war on the side of the Allies to +understand the situation in order that they might realize the value +that early naval assistance would bring to the Allied cause. There +is no doubt that great difficulty must be experienced by those far +removed from the theatre of war in understanding the conditions in +the war zone. This was exemplified at a time when we had organized +the trade in convoys and the system was showing itself effective in +greatly reducing losses from submarine attack. We were pressing the +United States to strengthen our escorting forces as far as possible +in order to extend the convoy system, when a telegram arrived from +Washington to the effect that it was considered that ships which +were armed were safer when sailing singly than when in convoy. It +has also been stated that the Admiralty held the view at this time +that no solution of the problem created by the enemy's submarine +campaign was in sight. This is incorrect. We had confidence in the +measures—most of them dependent on the manufacture of +material—which were in course of preparation by the time the +United States entered the war, but our opinion was that there was +no <i>immediate</i> solution beyond the provision of additional +vessels for the protection of shipping, and the reason for this +view was that time was required before other measures could be put +into effective operation; this is evident from the final paragraph +of my telegram to Admiral de Chair, dated April 26, which I have +quoted.</p> +<p>The first division of six United States destroyers, under the +command of Lieut.-Commander T.K. Taussig, arrived in British waters +on May 2, and they were most welcome. It was interesting to me +personally that Lieut.-Commander Taussig should be in command, as +he, when a sub-lieutenant, had been wounded on the same day as +myself during the Boxer campaign in China, and we had been together +for some time subsequently.</p> +<p>At about this time our advice was sought by the United States +Navy Department as to the best type of anti-submarine craft for the +United States to build; on this subject a very short experience in +the war theatre caused Admiral Sims to hold precisely similar views +to myself. As a result of the advice tendered a great building +programme of destroyers, large submarine-hunting motor launches and +other small craft was embarked upon. Although the completion of +these vessels was delayed considerably beyond anticipated dates, +they did, in 1918, exercise an influence on the submarine war.</p> +<p>The Germans made one great mistake, for which we were thankful. +As already mentioned, it was anticipated that they would send +submarines to work off the United States coast immediately after +the declaration of war by that country. Indeed we were expecting to +hear of the presence of submarines in the West Atlantic throughout +the whole of 1917. They did not appear there until May, 1918. The +moral effect of such action in 1917 would have been very great and +might possibly have led to the retention in the United States of +some of the destroyers and other small craft which were of such +assistance in European waters in starting the convoy system. +Admiral Sims was himself, I think, anxious on this head. When the +Germans did move in this direction in 1918 it was too late; it was +by that time realized in the United States that the enemy could not +maintain submarines in sufficient numbers in their waters to +exercise any decisive effect, although the shipping losses might be +considerable for a time, and consequently no large change of policy +was made.</p> +<p>As is well known, Admiral Sims, with the consent of the United +States Navy Department, placed all vessels which were dispatched to +British waters under the British flag officers in whose Command +they were working. This step, which at once produced unity of +command, is typical of the manner in which the two navies, under +the guidance of their senior officers, worked together throughout +the war. The destroyers operating from Queenstown came under +Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly; Captain Pringle, the senior United States +officer on the spot, whose services were ever of the utmost value, +was appointed as Chief of the Staff to Sir Lewis Bayly, whilst on +the occasion of Sir Lewis Bayly, at my urgent suggestion, +consenting to take a few days' leave in the summer of 1917, Admiral +Sims, at our request, took his place at Queenstown, hoisting his +flag in command of the British and United States naval forces. The +relations between the officers and men of the two navies in this +Command were of the happiest possible nature, and form one of the +pleasantest episodes of the co-operation between the two nations. +The United States officers and men very quickly realized the strong +personality of the Commander-in-Chief at Queenstown, and became +imbued with the same feelings of great respect and admiration for +him as were held by British officers and men. Also he made the +officers feel that Admiralty House, Queenstown, was their home when +in port, and saw that everything possible was done for the comfort +of the men. The very high standard of duty set by Sir Lewis, and +very fully sustained by him, was cheerfully and willingly followed +by the United States force, the personnel of which earned his +warmest admiration. I think it will be agreed in years to come that +the comradeship between the two navies, first initiated in the +Queenstown Command, went very far towards cementing the bonds of +union between the two great English-speaking nations.</p> +<p>This was the first step in co-operation. The next was taken when +the United States Navy Department, as the result of a request made +by us to Admiral Sims, sent to Gibraltar a detachment of three +light cruisers and a number of revenue cutters as patrol and escort +vessels, placing the whole force under the British senior naval +officer at Gibraltar, Rear-Admiral Heathcote Grant. Here again the +relations between the two navies were of the happiest nature. +Finally, later in the year, I discussed with Admiral Sims the +desirability of a small force of United States battleships being +sent to reinforce the Grand Fleet.</p> +<p>When the project was first mentioned my object in asking for the +ships was that they might relieve some of our earlier +"Dreadnoughts," which at that time it was desired to use for +another purpose. I discussed the matter also with Admiral Mayo, the +Commander-in-Chief of the United States Atlantic Fleet, during his +visit to this country in August, 1917, and with Admiral Benson, the +Chief of Operations in the United States Navy Department, when he +came over later in the year. Admiral Benson gave directions that +four coal-burning battleships should be sent over. We were obliged +to ask for coal-burning battleships instead of the more modern +vessels with oil-fired boilers owing to the great shortage of oil +fuel in this country and the danger of our reserves being still +further depleted. These vessels, under Rear-Admiral Hugh Rodman, +arrived in British waters early in December, 1917, and formed a +division of the Grand Fleet. The co-operation afloat was now +complete, and all that was needed was further co-operation between +the British Admiralty and the United States Navy Department.</p> +<p>This had already formed the subject of discussions, first +between Admiral Sims and myself, and later with Admirals Mayo and +Benson.</p> +<p>During the summer of 1917 Admiral Sims had been invited to +attend the daily meetings of the naval members of the operations +side of the Board, an invitation which he accepted, and his +co-operation was of great value; but we both felt it desirable to +go a step farther, and I had suggested the extreme desirability of +the United States Navy Department sending officers of experience of +different ranks to work in the Admiralty, both on the operations +and material side, officers upon whom the Navy Department could +rely to place before us the views of the Department and to transmit +their view of the situation as the result of their work and +experience at the Admiralty. We had pressed strongly for the +adoption of this course. Admiral Benson, after discussions, +assented to it, and the officers on the material side commenced +work in the Admiralty towards the end of 1917, whilst those on the +operations side joined the War Staff early in 1918.</p> +<p>It was felt that this course would complete the co-operation +between the navies of the two countries and, further, that the +United States Navy Department would be kept in the closest possible +touch with the British Admiralty in all respects.</p> +<p>It is particularly to be remembered that even before we had +established this close liaison the whole of the United States naval +forces in British waters had been placed under the command of +British naval officers. This step, so conducive to good results +owing to the unity of command which was thus obtained, won our +highest admiration, showing as it did a fine spirit of +self-effacement on the part of the senior American naval +officers.</p> +<p>The visits of Admirals Mayo and Benson to this country were +productive of very good results. The exchange of information which +took place was most beneficial, as was the experience which the +admirals gained of modern naval warfare. Moreover, the utterly +baseless suggestion which had, unfortunately, found expression in +some organs of the Press of the United States that we were not +giving the fullest information to the Navy Department was +completely disproved.</p> +<p>When Admiral Mayo arrived in England he informed me that the +main objects of his visit as Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic +Fleet were:</p> +<p>(1) To ascertain our present policy and plans.</p> +<p>(2) To inquire as to the changes, if any, that were contemplated +in the immediate or more distant future.</p> +<p>(3) To ascertain what further assistance it was desired that the +United States should provide from resources then available or +likely to be soon available, and the measures that the United +States should take to provide future forces and material.</p> +<p>Papers were prepared under my direction for Admiral Mayo giving +full information of our immediate needs, of past procedure and of +future plans. As to our needs, the main requests were:</p> +<p>(1) An increase in the number of destroyers, in order to enlarge +the convoy system and to provide better protection for each convoy. +An additional 55 destroyers were stated to be required for this +service.</p> +<p>(2) An increase in the number of convoy cruisers for the same +reason. The total addition of cruisers or old battleships was given +as 41.</p> +<p>(3) An increase in the number of patrol craft, tugs, etc., for +anti-submarine work.</p> +<p>(4) The rapid building of merchant ships.</p> +<p>(5) The supply of a large number of mines for the proposed +barrage in the North Sea, and assistance towards laying them by the +provision of United States minelaying vessels.</p> +<p>(6) Aircraft assistance in the shape of three large seaplane +stations on the coast of Ireland, with some 36 machines at each +station.</p> +<p>(7) The provision of four coal-burning battleships of the +"Dreadnought" type to replace Grand Fleet "Dreadnought" battleships +which it was desired to use for other purposes.</p> +<p>Admiral Mayo was informed that some 100,000 mines would be +required from the Americans for forming and maintaining that +portion of the North Sea Barrage which it was suggested should be +laid by them, in addition to the large number that it was proposed +that we ourselves should lay in the barrage, and that as the +barrage would need patrolling by a large number of small craft, +great help would be afforded if the United States could provide +some of these vessels. It was estimated at that time that the +barrage would absorb the services of some 250 small vessels in +order that a sufficient number might be kept constantly on +patrol.</p> +<p>It may be of interest to give the history of the North Sea +Barrage so far as I can recollect it. Our views on such a scheme +were sought by the United States Navy Department in the spring of +1917. Owing to various military circumstances, even at that time we +had no prospect of obtaining mines in adequate numbers for such +work for at least nine to twelve months, nor could we provide the +necessary craft to patrol the barrage. Our view was that such mines +as became available during the last months of 1917 would be more +effective if laid nearer to the German North Sea naval bases, and +in the Straits of Dover, than at such a distance from these bases +as the suggestion involved. Apart from our desire to stop the +submarines near their bases, the pros and cons of the scheme were +as follows:</p> +<p>The advantages were:</p> +<p>(1) That, except for the difficulty of preventing the submarines +from using Norwegian territorial waters for egress, a North Sea +Barrage would be a menace to submarines using the Kattegat exit as +well as those coming from North Sea bases.</p> +<p>(2) That the enemy would be unable to sweep up the minefield, +owing to its distance (over 200 miles) from his bases.</p> +<p>The disadvantages were:</p> +<p>(1) The immense number of mines required—some 120,000, +excluding reserves—and the improbability of producing them in +Great Britain.</p> +<p>(2) The great depth of water in which many of them were to be +moored, a depth in which no mines had ever been successfully laid +before; time would be required to devise arrangements that would +enable the mines to be laid at such depths.</p> +<p>(3) The very large number of patrol craft that would be needed +to force submarines to dive into that portion of the minefield +which was safe for surface vessels and the difficulty of +maintaining them at sea in bad North Sea weather.</p> +<p>(4) The difficulty of preventing egress by the submarines in +Norwegian territorial waters, in which, even if mines were laid, +they would have to be moored at such a depth as not to constitute a +danger to vessels on the surface.</p> +<p>Shortly after the subject was broached to us we learned that the +United States Navy had devised a mine that it was expected would be +satisfactory for the purpose of the barrage. An experienced mining +officer was at once sent over by us to inspect the mine and to give +to the United States officers such assistance as was possible due +to his great knowledge of mining under war conditions.</p> +<p>When he arrived in the United States the mine was still in the +experimental stage, but later he reported that it promised to be +successful, and in view of the great manufacturing resources in +America, it appeared that a considerable proportion of the mines +for the barrage could be provided by the United States Navy. Our +own efforts to produce a mine suitable for very great depths were +also proving successful and anticipations as to manufacture were +optimistic. Accordingly plans were prepared for a barrage across +the North Sea, which were given to Admiral Mayo before he left +England on his return to the United States. Without seriously +relaxing our mining operations in the Heligoland Bight, and without +interfering with our mine barrage on the Folkestone-Grisnez line, +we anticipated at this time that we could provide mines for our +portion of the North Sea Barrage by the time that the United States +supply of mines was in readiness to be laid.</p> +<p>Admiral Mayo was also furnished with papers dealing at length +with our naval policy at the time and the intended future policy, +both in home waters and abroad. Papers were given him relating to +our air policy, to the attitude of neutral countries, to the +Belgian coast problem, to the blockade, to the defence of trade +(including one on the convoy system), to such subjects as the +defensive armament of merchant ships with guns, smoke apparatus and +mine defence gear, the instruction of the personnel in their use, +and the system of issuing route instruction to merchant ships. An +important statement was also supplied giving a detailed account of +our anti-submarine policy, both at the time and in the future.</p> +<p>These papers gave the fullest information on the naval problem, +and were intended to put the United States Naval Department in a +position to appreciate the whole position and its many +embarrassments, though we realized that these could be appreciated +only by those who, like Admiral Sims, were in daily contact with +the problems. It will possibly be of further interest if mention is +made of some of the points to which attention was drawn.</p> +<p>Admiral Mayo, for instance, was informed that British naval +policy was being directed in 1917, as during the remainder of the +war, to exerting constant economic pressure upon the enemy with a +view to forcing him to come to terms. We also endeavoured to +prevent the enemy from interfering with the conduct of the war by +ourselves and our Allies. In the effective pursuit of that policy +the duty of the Navy involved:</p> +<p>(1) The protection of the sea communications of the Allied +armies and the protection of British and Allied trade.</p> +<p>(2) The prevention of enemy trade in order to interfere with his +military operations and to exert economic pressure.</p> +<p>(3) Resistance to invasion and raids.</p> +<p>It was pointed out that the question at issue in each case was +the control of sea communications, and in order to attain that +control permanently and completely the enemy's naval forces both +above and below water had to be destroyed or effectually masked. As +the weaker German Fleet not unnaturally refused decisive action and +as its <i>destruction</i> had hitherto not been achieved, we had +adopted a policy of guarding an area between our vital +communications and the enemy's ports, and of guarding the areas +through which the trade and transports passed; these were the only +methods of frustrating attacks made either by surface vessels or by +submarines which succeeded in reaching open waters. It was pointed +out that a combination of these two methods had been in force +during the wars of the eighteenth century, blockades being combined +with the convoy system and the patrol of local areas by frigates, +etc. History, in fact, was repeating itself.</p> +<p>We mentioned that a close blockade of the German North Sea and +Baltic ports presented insuperable difficulties under the +conditions of modern warfare, and the alternative of controlling +the Dover and Norway-Scotland exits to the North Sea had been +adopted. The former protected the communications of the armies in +France, whilst the two combined covered the maritime communications +of the world outside the North Sea and Baltic, and if they could be +effectively guarded our first two objects would be attained.</p> +<p>So far as the Dover exit was concerned we stated that the +narrowness of the waters, with the consequent risk to the enemy +from our mines and torpedoes, had so far acted as a deterrent to +his capital ships; we had to depend on the light forces at Harwich +and Dover to deal with any enemy surface craft attacking the +southern area from German ports.</p> +<p>We pointed out that the control of the Norway-Scotland exit +depended upon the presence of the Grand Fleet at Rosyth or at +Scapa. This fleet ensured the safety of all the vessels engaged in +protecting trade and in hunting submarines outside the North +Sea.</p> +<p>Mention was made of the fact that the enemy could not open the +sea routes for his own war ships without risking a serious action, +and that so far he had shown no inclination to run that risk. The +Battle of Jutland having been fought in the previous year, any +future movement of the High Sea Fleet into the North Sea would +probably be merely with the object of drawing our capital ships +into prepared areas so as to bring about a process of attrition by +mines and torpedoes. Such a movement had been carried out on August +19, 1916. The reasons which had led to the adoption of the +Orkney-Faroe-Iceland blockade line were also explained.</p> +<p>It was pointed out that in the early stages of the war, the +foregoing general dispositions had sufficed to protect the Allies' +communications and to throttle those of the enemy outside the +Baltic. Although enemy cruisers in foreign waters and a few raiding +vessels which had evaded the blockade had inflicted losses on +trade, losses from such causes could not reach really serious +proportions so long as the enemy trusted to evasion and refused to +face the Grand Fleet. The danger of serious loss from attack by +raiding surface craft had also been greatly minimized by the +adoption of the convoy system. But as the enemy's submarines +increased in size, efficiency and numbers, the situation had been +modified, for evasion by submarines of the command exercised by the +Grand Fleet was easy, and our vital sea communications could be +attacked by them without the risk of a fleet action.</p> +<p>So far as the protection of trade was concerned, the effect +therefore of the submarine campaign had been to remove the barrier +established by the Grand Fleet and to transfer operations to the +focal areas and approach routes.</p> +<p>As the situation developed, a policy of dealing with the +submarines by armed patrol craft and decoy ships in these areas had +therefore been put into force. Merchant ships had been armed as +rapidly as possible, and in addition efforts had been made to +intercept the submarines <i>en route</i> to these areas both in the +vicinity of German waters and farther afield.</p> +<p>The great area covered by the approach routes and the increasing +radius of submarine operations had made the provision of a +sufficient number of patrol vessels a practical impossibility and +had led to a general adoption of the convoy system as rapidly as +the supply of fast small craft made this possible.</p> +<p>The methods of attacking German submarines before they could +reach open waters, by extensive mining in the Heligoland Bight, +with the exception of Dutch and Danish territorial waters, were +also mentioned.</p> +<p>As regards <i>future</i> naval policy it was pointed out that +the enemy submarine campaign was the dominating factor to such an +extent that any sustained increase in the then rate of sinking +merchant ships might eventually prove disastrous.</p> +<p>Mention was made of the fact that the enemy was still producing +submarines faster than the Allies were destroying them; the policy +of coping with submarines after they reached the open sea had not +as yet been sufficiently effective to balance construction against +losses, even in combination with the extensive minefields laid in +the Heligoland Bight.</p> +<p>The future policy was therefore being directed towards an +attempt at a still more concentrated and effective control in the +areas between the enemy's ports and our trade routes, and it was +proposed to form some description of block or barrage through which +the enemy submarines would not be able to pass without considerable +risk. Four forms had been considered:</p> +<p>(1) A method of blocking either mechanically or by mines all the +exits of the submarines from their North Sea or Baltic bases.</p> +<p>(2) A barrage of mines at different depths, from near the +surface of the sea to near the bottom.</p> +<p>(3) A combination of deep mines with a patrolling force of +surface craft and aircraft whose object would be to force the +submarines under the surface into the minefield.</p> +<p>(4) A force of surface craft and aircraft patrolling an area of +sufficient extent to prevent submarines coming to the surface to +recharge their batteries during the hours of darkness.</p> +<p>Admiral Mayo was informed that in our opinion the first scheme +as given above, viz. <i>that of absolutely sealing the exits, was +the only radical cure for the evil</i>, but that there were very +great difficulties to be overcome before such an operation could be +successfully carried out. He was shown the plan that had been +prepared for a mechanical block of all the enemy North Sea bases, +and he entirely concurred in the impracticability of carrying it +out. Such a plan had been advocated by some officers and by other +people; it was, of course, most attractive in theory and appealed +strongly to those who looked at the question superficially. When, +however, a definite operation came to be worked out in detail the +difficulties became very apparent, and even enthusiastic supporters +of the <i>idea</i> were forced to change their views. It was not a +matter for surprise to me that the idea of sealing the exits from +submarine bases was urged by so many people on both sides of the +Atlantic. It was, of course, the obvious counter to the submarine +campaign, and it appealed with force to that considerable section +which feels vaguely, and rightly, that <i>offensive</i> action is +needed, without being quite so clear as to the means by which it is +to be carried out.</p> +<p>In this particular case I informed the clever and able officers +to whom the planning of the operation was entrusted that they were +to proceed on the assumption that we intended to seal the enemy's +ports somehow, and that they were to devise the best possible +scheme, drawing up all the necessary orders for the operations. +This was done in the most complete detail and with great care and +ingenuity, but at the end there was no difference of opinion +whatever as to the inadvisability of proceeding with the +operations.</p> +<p>It is to be observed in connexion with this question that +sealing the North Sea bases would not have been a complete cure, +since submarines could still make their exit via the Kattegat, +where we could not block channels without violating the neutrality +of other nations.</p> +<p>The final conclusion arrived at <i>was to use a combination of +the last three alternatives</i> provided that <i>a satisfactory +type of mine</i> could be produced in sufficient numbers and a +sufficient supply of small craft provided by ourselves and the +United States.</p> +<p>Full details were given to Admiral Mayo of the proposed North +Sea Barrage on a line totalling 230 miles in length, which was +divided into three parts, Areas A, B and C, of which Area A only +would be dangerous to surface vessels.</p> +<p>It was estimated that Area A would require 36,300 mines, and it +was proposed that this area should be mined by the United States +forces with United States mines.</p> +<p>It was proposed that the British should mine Area B, the +requirements being 67,500 mines, and that the United States should +mine Area C, for which 18,000 United States mines would be +required.</p> +<p>The reasons governing the selection of the mine barrage area +were fully given, and the advantages arising from the use of the +United States pattern of mine instead of the British mine for Areas +A and C were stated.</p> +<p>Admiral Mayo was also informed of our intention to establish a +mine barrage in the Channel, on the Folkestone-Grisnez line, as +soon as mines were available, with a strong force of patrol vessels +stationed there, whose duty it would be to compel enemy submarines +to dive into the minefield. He was further made acquainted with our +intended policy of still closer minelaying in the Heligoland +Bight.</p> +<p>Although Admiral Mayo was not actually informed of the details +of the future policy which it was hoped to adopt in the Adriatic +for the improvement of the Otranto Barrage, various schemes were at +the time being worked out between the British, French and Italian +Admiralties, having as their object the prevention or obstruction +of the exit of enemy submarines from the Adriatic, in the same way +as it was hoped to obstruct German submarines from making their +exit from the North Sea without incurring heavy losses. The great +depth of water in the southern part of the Adriatic constituted the +main difficulty facing us in the solution of this problem. In +August, 1917, it was, however, definitely decided to establish a +barrage of nets and mines across the Straits of Otranto, and the +work was put in hand. This became effective during 1918.</p> +<p>The paper on Naval Air Policy showed the aim of the Admiralty to +be:</p> +<p>To provide in sufficient numbers a type of airship which would +be able to scout with the Grand Fleet, and, in this respect, to +perform the duty of light cruisers. Airship stations had been +established on the East Coast for this purpose.</p> +<p>To provide also a type of airship for coastal patrol work and +for the escort of merchant ships in convoy. For these airships +stations had been established on the East, South and West Coasts +and at Scapa.</p> +<p>To provide a sufficient supply of kite balloons for the work of +the Grand Fleet. Fleet kite balloon stations had already been +established at Rosyth and Scapa, and the resources of the latter +station were supplemented by a kite balloon ship. It was intended +also to provide kite balloons for flotillas or single vessels +engaged in submarine hunting or in convoy work. A large number of +kite balloon stations for anti-submarine work had been or were +being established round the coast for this work.</p> +<p>As to the future programme of rigid airships, Admiral Mayo was +told that it was under consideration to construct three new rigid +stations, also that three new stations for the use of non-rigids +for anti-submarine work were to be established, while it was also +proposed to provide sufficient resources to allow of a number of +kite balloons being worked in vessels between the North of Scotland +and Norway and to the eastward of the English Channel.</p> +<p>Admiral Mayo was also informed that it was proposed to provide +sufficient "heavier than air" craft of various types for the Fleet, +both to insure adequate air reconnaissance and to drive off hostile +aircraft. The Grand Fleet was at the time already provided with +three seaplane carriers, and the <i>Furious</i> and other special +vessels were being fitted to carry aircraft. Many of the armoured +vessels and light cruisers of the Fleet had also been fitted to +carry aircraft, whilst the Harwich light cruiser force possessed +one seaplane carrier; two carriers were devoted to anti-submarine +work, and three were employed in the Mediterranean.</p> +<p>It was further stated that machines for naval reconnaissance +were working from several East Coast stations, and that lighters to +carry seaplanes for more extended reconnaissance and offensive work +were under construction. The work carried out by our naval aircraft +off the Belgian coast, comprising the duty of keeping the coast +under constant observation, of spotting the gunfire of ships, of +fighting aircraft and bombing objectives of importance, were also +mentioned, as well as the work in the Mediterranean, where there +were four bases in the Aegean.</p> +<p>The extensive anti-submarine patrol work round the British Isles +and in the Mediterranean was touched upon, there being "heavier +than air" stations at the time at</p> +<pre> + Houton Bay. + Dundee. + South Shields. + Bembridge. + Calshot. + Portland. + Killingholme. + Yarmouth. + Felixstowe. + Westgate. + Dover. + Newhaven. + Cherbourg. + Plymouth. + Newlyn. + Scilly. + Fishguard. +</pre> +<p>Steps were being taken to extend the number of stations as soon +as possible, the new programme including stations at such places +as</p> +<pre> + Padstow. + Wexford. + Queenstown. + Berehaven. + Loch Foyle. + Loch Ryan (or in the Hebrides). + Shetlands. + Peterhead. +</pre> +<p>In the event of the United States being in a position to +co-operate in the work, it was recommended that the three main +seaplane stations in Ireland should be taken over by the Americans, +and equipped, manned and controlled entirely by United States +personnel.</p> +<p>In regard to the convoy system a full description of the whole +organization was given, with the results up to date, and details of +the vessels available and still needed for its protection.</p> +<p>Full information was afforded on the subject of the arming of +merchant ships and fitting other defensive measures to them, and +the routeing system in use for merchant ships was described in +detail.</p> +<p>In the remarks on our anti-submarine warfare it was pointed out +that anti-submarine measures were carried out both on the surface, +under water, and in the air.</p> +<p>The surface measures were described as follows:</p> +<p>In twelve of the twenty-two areas into which the waters round +the United Kingdom were divided, regular <i>hunting flotillas</i> +were at work, comprising trawlers and motor launches fitted with +hydrophones. Before the institution of the convoy system a few fast +vessels, such as destroyers or "P" boats, had been formed into +hunting flotillas, but the convoy work had necessitated the +withdrawal of all these vessels, and the work of the flotillas had +suffered in consequence, the speed of trawlers being too slow to +offer the same prospect of success in such anti-submarine measures. +The flotillas of motor launches which had been formed were of +considerable utility in fine weather, but they could only operate +in comparatively smooth water.</p> +<p>At the time of Admiral Mayo's visit a force of thirty-two +trawlers to work with about six sloops or destroyers was being +organized as vessels became available, to operate in the North Sea +with a view to engaging enemy submarines on passage in those +waters.</p> +<p>It was also pointed out to Admiral Mayo that the coast patrol +vessels which were not actually in the hunting flotillas were all +engaged in anti-submarine work and did frequently come into action +against the German submarines.</p> +<p>Finally Admiral Mayo was informed that the convoy system itself +was looked upon as an offensive measure since the German submarines +would, in order to attack vessels under convoy, be forced into +contact with the fast craft engaged in the work of escort and thus +place themselves in positions in which they could themselves be +successfully attacked.</p> +<p>Admiral Mayo, during his stay in European waters, inspected some +of our naval bases and paid a visit to the Grand Fleet.</p> +<p>He crossed to France in order that he might see the work being +carried out at French ports by vessels of the United States Navy, +and while returning from this visit he honoured the British Navy by +accompanying Sir Reginald Bacon and myself in H.M.S. <i>Broke</i> +to witness a bombardment of Ostend by the monitor <i>Terror</i>. On +this occasion Admiral Mayo's flag was hoisted in the <i>Broke</i> +and subsequently presented to him as a souvenir of the first +occasion of a United States Admiral having been under fire in a +British man-of-war. It is satisfactory to record that subsequent +aerial photographs showed that much damage to workshops, etc., had +been caused by this bombardment.</p> +<p>The Admiral and his Staff very quickly established themselves in +the high regard of British naval officers, and it was with much +regret that we witnessed their return to the United States. My own +associations with the Admiral had led to a feeling of great +friendship. He left behind him his Chief of Staff, Captain Jackson, +who to our great regret had been seriously injured in a motor +accident.</p> +<p>Admiral Benson's visit took place later in the year. I had +written to him urging him to come across so that he might have +first-hand knowledge of the state of affairs and of the policy +being followed. During his visit the same questions were discussed +as with Admiral Mayo, and important action was taken in the +direction of closer naval co-operation between the Allies by the +formation of an Allied Naval Council consisting of the Ministers of +Marine and the Chiefs of the Naval Staff of the Allied Nations and +of the United States. This proposal had been under discussion for +some little time, and, indeed, naval <i>conferences</i> had been +held on previous occasions. The first of these during my tenure of +office at the Admiralty was on January 23 and 24, 1917, and another +was held during the visit of Admiral Mayo and at the instigation of +the Government of the United States on September 4 and 5, 1917. On +this latter occasion important discussions had taken place, +principally on the subject of submarine warfare, the methods of +dealing with it in home waters and in the Mediterranean, and such +matters as the provision of mercantile shipping for the use of our +Allies.</p> +<p>There was, however, no regular council sitting at specified +intervals, and it was this council which came into being in the +early part of December. Its functions were to watch over the +general conduct of the naval war and to insure co-ordination of the +effort at sea as well as the development of all scientific +operations connected with the conduct of the war.</p> +<p>Special emphasis was laid upon the fact that the individual +responsibility of the respective Chiefs of the Naval Staff and of +the Commanders-in-Chief at sea towards their Governments as regards +operations in hand as well as the strategical and technical +disposition of the forces placed under their command remained +unchanged; this proviso was a necessity in naval warfare, and was +very strongly insisted upon by the Admiralty.</p> +<p>The attention of the Council was directed at the earliest +meetings to the situation in the Mediterranean, where naval forces +from the British Empire, France, Greece, Italy, Japan and the +United States were working, and where the need for close +co-operation was most urgent. The real need in the Mediterranean, +as was frequently pointed out, was the inclusion of the naval +forces of all the Allied nations under one single command. In 1918 +strong efforts were made to carry out this policy, and indeed the +actual Admiralissimo was selected, but the attempt failed in the +end.</p> +<p>Both these distinguished American officers were reminded, as +indeed they must have seen for themselves, that the successful +combating of the submarine danger depended largely on the +manufacture of material, and that the resources of this country, +with its great fleet and its large and increasing armies, were so +seriously taxed that the execution of the plans of the Admiralty +were being constantly and gravely delayed. The Admiralty was, +indeed, seriously embarrassed by difficulties in the adequate +supply of mines and other means of destroying submarines as well as +of fast craft of various descriptions. The Admiralty, as was +pointed out, were doing not what they would like to do, but what +they could do, both in the way of offensive and defensive action. +The supplies of raw material and labour controlled in large measure +the character and extent of the operations at sea.</p> +<hr> +<a name="CH7"><!-- CH7 --></a> +<h2>CHAPTER VII</h2> +<center>PATROL CRAFT AND MINESWEEPING SERVICES</center> +<p>It is difficult to give an idea of the truly magnificent work +achieved by the patrol and minesweeping services during the year +1917 without showing how these services expanded after the outbreak +of war in 1914.</p> +<p>When war was declared the only vessels immediately available for +the work consisted of seven torpedo gunboats manned by officers and +men of the Royal Navy, and fourteen trawlers manned by fishermen. +All these vessels were fitted for regular minesweeping work, and +the crews of the trawlers formed a part of what was known as the +"Trawler Reserve." Other trawlers, exceeding eighty in number, +became, however, almost immediately available at the outbreak of +war under the organized Trawler Reserve which had been set up a +year or two preceding the outbreak of war. Men belonging to this +reserve had been trained in the work of minesweeping and were paid +a small retaining fee.</p> +<p>As soon as the German methods of indiscriminate minelaying and +submarine attacks upon merchant ships commenced, a great expansion +of this force became necessary. The matter was handled +energetically by the Admiralty at the time, and by the end of 1914 +over 700 vessels (yachts, trawlers and drifters) were employed on +patrol and minesweeping duties, and the Admiralty had also +commenced to build vessels of the trawler type specially for this +work.</p> +<p>By the commencement of 1917 there were in use some 2,500 yachts, +trawlers and drifters, the great majority of them manned by +fishermen or men of the R.N.R. or R.N.V.R. and officered by trawler +or drifter skippers or officers of the R.N.R. or R.N.V.R., many of +them having temporary commissions in these services.</p> +<p>Early in the war the coast of the United Kingdom had been +divided into areas for purposes of patrol and minesweeping, and +each area was under the command of a naval officer on either the +active or retired list.</p> +<p>The Chart D shows the respective areas at one period. No very +important changes took place in the delimitation of the areas +during the war, and the chart may therefore be considered generally +representative of the organization. Chart E shows the zones into +which the Mediterranean was divided.</p> +<p>[Transcriber's note: Charts D and E are maps of the waters +around the United Kingdom, and the waters of the Mediterranean, +respectively, with patrol zones marked.]</p> +<p>In December, 1917, the number of vessels of different classes +actually appropriated to various areas is given on the next page in +Table D for the British Isles and Table E for the +Mediterranean.</p> +<pre> +TABLE D: AUXILIARY PATROLS IN HOME WATERS. + +------------------------------------------------------------+ + Boom Defence Drifters, etc. | +--------------------------------------------------------+ | + Boom Defence Trawlers. | | +----------------------------------------------------+ | | + Patrol Paddlers. | | | +-------------------------------------------------+ | | | + Paddle or Screw Minesweepers. | | | | +----------------------------------------------+ | | | | + Motor Boats. | | | | | +-------------------------------------------+ | | | | | + Motor Drifters. | | | | | | +----------------------------------------+ | | | | | | + Other Drifters. | | | | | | | +------------------------------------+ | | | | | | | + Net Drifters. | | | | | | | | +--------------------------------+ | | | | | | | | + Motor Launches. | | | | | | | | | +----------------------------+ | | | | | | | | | + Whalers. | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------+ | | | | | | | | | | + Trawlers. | | | | | | | | | | | +--------------------+ | | | | | | | | | | | + Yachts. | | | | | | | | | | | | +----------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+--+--+--+--+---+---+ +Area No. | | | | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | + I | 5| 44| 4| 6| 22| 2|11| | 3| | | 6| + II | 6|119| 7| 15| 72|112| 6| | 8| | 60| 83| + IV | 1| 27| | 12| 10| 3| | | | | 15| 10| + V | 1| 20| | 8| 12| 1| 7| | | | | | + VI | 6| 51| 1| 24| 9| 14|14| |13| | 20| 23| + VIII | 1| 51| | 16| 25| | 4| | 9| | | | + IX | 1| 93| 3| 6| 25| 1| 4| | 8| | 7| 25| + [ | 2| 16| | 6| 27| | | 2| | | | | + X -[ | | 53| | 6| | 19| | | | | | | + - | | 30| | 6| 28| | 2| | 7| | | 5| + - | 1| 29| | 33| 42| | | | 9| | 3| 13| + XI | 2| 70| | 31|101| | | |19| | | 2| + | 1| | | | | 30| | | | | | | + XII | 2| 35| | 26| 22| 10| | | 6| | | 10| + | | 18| | 5| 18| | | | | | | | + | | 14| | 2| 25| 2| | | | | | | + | | 6| | | | | | | | | | | + | | | | 4| 37| | | 1| | | | | + XIII | 1| 27| | 19| 15| | | | 5| | | | + XIIIA | | 54| | 21| 19| | | | | | | 1| + XIV | 2| 44| | 14| 41| | | | | | | 2| + | | 6| | 6| 6| | | | 5| | | | + XV | 3| 46| | 8| 59| 2| | | | | 3| | + XVI | 3| 19| | 12| 13| | | | | | | 1| + | | 9| | 6| 16| | 5| | 5| | | | + XVII | 3| 26| | 12| 68| 1| | | 4| | | 1| + | 1| 10| | 6| 31| | | | | | 4| 2| + XVIII | | 31| | | 11| 4| | | | | 4| | + XIX | | 7| | 8| | | | | | | | | + XX | | 8| | 6| 4| | | | | | | 1| + XXI | 1| 15| | 16| 11| | 6| | 7| | 2| 3| + XXII | 1| 10| | 6| 14| | | | | | | | +----------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+--+--+--+--+---+---+ + +TABLE E: AUXILIARY PATROLS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ZONES + +----------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+--+--+--+--+---+---+ + I | 7| 9| | 19| | | | | | | | | + VI | 1| 12| | 42|116| | | | | | | | + VIII | 2| 61| | 21| 25| | | | | | 2| 2| + V | 1| 51| | 18| | | | | | 5| | | + X | 1| 47| | 17| 6| | | | | 5| | | + | 2| | | 12| | | | | | | | | + | 2| 22| | | 4| | | | | | 2| | + | 1| 4| | 11| | | | 7| | | | | +----------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+--+--+--+--+---+---+ +</pre> +<p>It will be seen that the total number of British patrol and +minesweeping craft, exclusive of the stationary boom defence +vessels, was at this time 3,084. Of this number 473 were in the +Mediterranean, 824 were in the English Channel between The Nore and +Falmouth, 557 were in Irish waters or on the west coast of England, +and the remaining 1,230 were on the east coast of England and the +east and west coasts of Scotland and the Orkneys and Shetlands.</p> +<p>The work of these vessels was almost entirely of an +anti-submarine or minesweeping nature.</p> +<p>The trawlers were engaged in patrol duty, convoy escort service, +and minesweeping. The drifters worked drifting nets fitted with +mines as an anti-submarine weapon, and also in the case of the +Dover area they laid and kept efficient a barrage of mine nets off +the Belgian coast. Some were also fitted with hydrophones and +formed hunting flotillas, and some were engaged in minesweeping +duties, or in patrolling swept channels. At Fleet bases a small +number were required to attend on the ships of the Fleet, and to +assist in the work of the base. The whalers, being faster vessels +than the trawlers, were mostly engaged on escort duty or on patrol. +The motor launches were employed for anti-submarine work, fitted +with hydrophones, and worked in company with drifters and +torpedo-boat destroyers, or in minesweeping in areas in which their +light draught rendered it advantageous and safer to employ them +instead of heavier draught vessels to locate minefields, and in the +Dover area they were largely used to work smoke screens for +operations on the Belgian coast.</p> +<p>As the convoy system became more general, so the work of the +small craft in certain areas altered from patrol and escort work to +convoy duty. These areas were those on the East Coast and +north-west of Scotland through which the Scandinavian and East +Coast trade passed, and those in the Channel frequented by the +vessels employed in the French coal trade. The majority of these +ships were of comparatively slow speed, and trawlers possessed +sufficient speed to accompany them, but a few destroyers of the +older type formed a part of the escorting force, both for the +purpose of protection and also for offensive action against +submarines attacking the convoys, the slow speed of trawlers +handicapping them greatly in this respect.</p> +<p>The difficulty of dealing with submarines may be gauged by the +enormous number of small craft thus employed, but a consideration +of the characteristics of a submarine and of the great volume of +traffic passing up and down our coasts will assist in a realization +of the varied and difficult problems set to the British Navy.</p> +<p>For instance, the total number of vessels passing Lowestoft +during the month of April, 1917, was 1,837 British and Allied and +208 neutral, giving a <i>daily</i> average of 62 British and Allied +and 7 neutral ships; and as Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon has +mentioned in his book, "The Dover Patrol, 1915-17" (page 51), an +average of between 80 to 100 merchant vessels passed Dover daily +during 1917. A study of these figures gives some idea of the number +of targets offered daily to ordinary submarines and minelaying +submarines in two of the areas off our coasts. When it is borne in +mind that the Germans had similar chances of inflicting heavy +losses on our mercantile marine all round the coasts of the United +Kingdom, and that it was obviously impossible to tell where an +underwater attack would take place, it will be realized that once +submarines reached our coasts, nothing short of an immense number +of small craft could deal satisfactorily with the situation, and +afford any degree of protection to trade. Minelaying by submarines +was a particularly difficult problem with which to deal; the enemy +frequently changed his methods, and such changes when discovered +involved alterations in our own procedure. Thus for some time after +the commencement of minelaying by submarines, the whole of the +mines of one submarine would be laid in a comparatively small area. +It was fairly easy to deal with this method as a dangerous area was +proclaimed round the spot where a mine was discovered, and +experience soon showed the necessary extent of area to proclaim. +Later the submarines laid mines in groups of about six. This +necessitated the proclamation of more than one area, and was +naturally a more difficult problem. At a further stage the +submarines scattered their mines in even smaller numbers, and the +task of ensuring a safe channel was still further increased. The +most difficult artifice to deal with, however, was the introduction +by the Germans of a delay action device in their mines, which +caused them to remain at the bottom for varying periods after being +laid. The ordinary mine-sweep, the function of which was to catch +the mooring rope of the mine and drag the mine clear of the +channel, was, of course, ineffective against the mine on the +bottom, and there was no guarantee that mines might not be released +from the bottom and rise to a depth at which they were dangerous, +<i>after the channel had been swept and reported clear</i>. To deal +with this danger a chain-sweep to work on the bottom was +introduced, but its use presented many difficulties, especially +over a rocky bottom.</p> +<p>When a regular swept and buoyed channel was in use the enemy had +little difficulty in deciding on the positions in which to lay +mines by reason of the presence of the buoys. This fact constituted +the principal disadvantage in the use of a buoyed channel, but in +certain places where the traffic was heavy the procedure was +inevitable, and it greatly simplified the work of the patrol craft +and minesweepers; the only precautions possible lay in the use of +alternative marked channels, and in the laying of defensive deep +minefields outside the channel in which enemy submarines might +compass their own destruction. As rapidly as our supply of mines +admitted, this latter device was adopted in positions where the +minefields could not constitute a danger to our own submarines. +False buoyed channels with mined areas round them could also be +laid in which to catch the submarine. Another device was that of +altering the position of light vessels and buoys with the object of +putting a submarine on to a shoal.</p> +<p>The situation with which our patrol and minesweeping craft had +to deal having now been stated, it remains to speak of the +magnificent manner in which they accomplished their task.</p> +<p>I regret very deeply that, in spite of a strong desire to +undertake the task, I have neither the information nor the literary +ability to do justice to the many deeds of individual gallantry, +self-sacrifice and resource performed by the splendid officers and +men who manned the small craft. No words of mine can adequately +convey the intense admiration which I felt, and which I know was +shared by the whole Navy, for the manner in which their arduous and +perilous work was carried out. These fine seamen, though quite +strange to the hazardous work which they were called upon to +undertake, quickly accustomed themselves to their new duties, and +the nation should ever be full of gratitude that it bred such a +race of hardy, skilful and courageous men as those who took so +great a part in defeating the greatest menace with which the Empire +has ever been faced.</p> +<p>There are, however, just two cases in 1917, typical of many +others, which I cannot forbear from mentioning. The first occurred +off the East Coast of England.</p> +<p>On August 15 the armed fishing craft <i>Nelson</i> and <i>Ethel +and Millie</i> were attacked by gunfire by a German submarine on +the surface at a range of four to five miles.</p> +<p>The submarine first concentrated her fire on the <i>Nelson</i>, +which immediately slipped her trawl and went to action stations. +The third shot from the submarine pierced the trawler's bows, and, +having established the range, the submarine poured a well-directed +fire into the <i>Nelson</i>, under which she rapidly began to +settle down.</p> +<p>The seventh shot struck the skipper, Thomas Crisp, D.S.C., +R.N.R., taking off both his legs and partly disembowelling him.</p> +<p>In spite of the terrible nature of his injuries he retained +consciousness and gave instructions to the mate, who was his son, +to send a message by carrier pigeon to the senior officer of his +base reporting that he was engaged with the enemy; he then bade him +fight to the last.</p> +<p>The <i>Nelson</i>, armed with one small gun, replied to the +enemy's fire until the heavy heel which she had assumed made it +impossible to bring the gun to bear. As she was then on the point +of sinking the mate decided to abandon her and take to the boat, +and begged his father to give them leave to carry him. This, +however, the old man sternly refused to do, and ordered his son to +throw him overboard.</p> +<p>The nature of his wounds being such that he would have died if +he had been moved, they deemed it best, after consultation, to +leave him where he lay. Accordingly, yielding to his reiterated +order to abandon the ship, they left this most gallant seaman lying +in his blood, and embarked in the boat as the <i>Nelson</i> +sank.</p> +<p>The submarine in the meanwhile concentrated her fire on the +<i>Ethel and Millie</i>, and having eventually sunk her, made the +survivors of the crew prisoners, and steamed away.</p> +<p>The crew of the <i>Nelson</i> were rescued by a man-of-war after +being in their boat for forty-four hours.</p> +<p>The second case occurred in the Adriatic. On the night in +question our drifter patrol in the Straits of Otranto was attacked +by a force of Austrian light cruisers. The drifters were each armed +with a 3-pounder gun, and the light cruisers with 4-inch and 6-inch +guns. The drifters were, of course, quite unable to defend +themselves. Nevertheless the indomitable skipper, I. Watt, of the +drifter <i>Gowan Lea</i>, when summoned to surrender by an Austrian +light cruiser which was firing at his craft, shouted defiance, +waved his hat to his men, and ordered them to open fire with the +3-pounder gun. His orders were obeyed, and, surprising to relate, +the light cruiser sheered off, and this fine seaman with his +gallant ship's company brought the <i>Gowan Lea</i> into port in +safety.</p> +<p>Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, in his most interesting narrative of +the work of the Dover Patrol, has brought to light many individual +instances of work gallantly performed; it is much to be hoped that +before recollection fades, those who can speak of the actions of +individuals in other areas will tell their countrymen something of +the great deeds performed.</p> +<p>A feature of the patrol service of much interest was the manner +in which a large number of retired officers, including many of flag +rank—who had reached mature age—volunteered for service +in the yachts and other small craft engaged in the work. The late +Admiral Sir Alfred Paget was one of the first, if not the first, to +come forward, and in order to avoid any difficulty in the matter of +rank, this fine veteran proposed to sink his Naval status and to +accept a commission as captain of the Royal Naval Reserve. Sir +Alfred, in common with many other officers who took up this work, +was over sixty, but age did not deter these gallant seamen from +facing the hardship and discomfort of service in small craft in the +North Sea and elsewhere. To name all the officers who undertook +this duty, or who were in charge of patrol areas, would be +impossible, and it may seem invidious to mention names at all; but +I cannot forbear to speak of some of those with whom I came most +frequently into contact during 1917. Sir James Startin, K.C.B., who +was the life and soul of the patrols and minesweepers working from +Granton, was frequently at sea in decoy ships fitted out there, as +well as in minesweepers, etc., and together with his son won the +Albert Medal for saving life during the war; Admiral J.L. Marx, +C.B., D.S.O., served also in a decoy ship; Admiral John Denison, +D.S.O., was in charge first at Falmouth and later at Kingstown; +Admiral T.P. Walker, D.S.O., had his yacht sunk under him; Admiral +Sir Charles Dare, K.C.M.G., C.B., won great distinction in command +of the patrols, etc., working from Milford Haven; and Rear-Admiral +C.H. Simpson's Peterhead trawlers, splendidly manned, took a heavy +toll of enemy submarines. A large number of retired Naval officers +below the rank of admiral served in minesweepers and patrol craft, +and in command of various areas, and their work was of the greatest +possible value. A few of those with whom I came into personal +contact during the year 1917 were the late Captain F. Bird, C.M.G., +D.S.O., who was most conspicuous in command of the drifters of the +Dover Patrol; Captain W. Vansittart Howard, D.S.O., who commanded +the Dover Trawler Patrol with such ability; Commander Sir George +Armstrong, Bart., who so successfully inspired the minesweeping +force working from Havre; and Commander H.F. Cayley, D.S.O., whose +services in the Harwich minesweeping force, working under his +brother, Rear-Admiral C.G. Cayley, were invaluable.</p> +<p>So much for the patrol craft. The great work carried out by the +minesweepers can be best judged by quoting a few figures for 1917, +during which year the mine menace attained its maximum intensity, +owing to the large increase in the number of German submarine +minelayers.</p> +<p>During the year 1916 the average number of mines swept up per +month was 178.</p> +<p>Statistics for 1917 show the following numbers of mines swept up +per month:</p> +<pre> + January 250 + February 380 + March 473 + April 515 + May 360 + June 470 + July 404 + August 352 + September 418 + October 237 + November 184 + December 188 +</pre> +<p>making the average per month in 1917 355 mines.</p> +<p>It will be noticed how rapidly the figures rose in the early +part of the year, and how great was the diminution in the figures +for the later months. This decrease was due to the fact that the +extension of anti-submarine measures was beginning to take effect, +and the destruction of German submarines, and especially of +submarine minelayers of the U.C. type, was becoming +considerable.</p> +<p>The heavy work involved a great strain on the minesweeping +service, and the greatest possible credit is due to the personnel +of that service for the fine response made to the call for +additional exertions and heavier risks.</p> +<p>At the same time the organizing work achieved at Headquarters by +the minesweeping section of the Naval Staff should not be +forgotten. At the head of this section was Captain Lionel G. +Preston, C.B.; he had succeeded to the post of Head of the +Minesweeping Service early in 1917, after two and a half years of +strenuous and most successful minesweeping work in the Grand Fleet +flotillas, and he at once grappled with the task of dealing with +the large number of mines then being laid by German submarines.</p> +<p>Instructions were issued to fit all patrol craft round the coast +for minesweeping work in addition to their patrol duties, and they +were used for sweeping as required. Many drifters were also fitted +for minesweeping in addition to the trawlers hitherto employed; and +although there was some prejudice against these vessels on account +of their slower speed, they proved to be of great assistance. Every +available small craft that could be fitted for the work was pressed +into the service, including a considerable number of motor +launches.</p> +<p>There was unfortunately great delay in the building of the +"Hunt" class of minesweeper, which was the type ordered in 1916 and +repeated in 1917, and in spite of very large additional orders for +this class of vessel having been placed early in 1917 (a total of +100 extra vessels being ordered), the number completed during that +year was only sixteen, together with a single paddle sweeper. +Consequently we were dependent for the largely increased work on +improvised craft, and the very greatest credit is due to all who +were concerned in this arduous and dangerous duty that the waters +were kept comparatively clear of mines, and that our losses from +this cause were so small when the immense number of mines swept up +is considered.</p> +<p>Fortunately the enemy lost very heavily in submarines of the +U.C., or minelaying type, largely because they were working of +necessity in waters near our coast, so that our anti-submarine +measures had a better chance, since they were easier to locate and +destroy than submarines working farther afield. By the commencement +of 1918 the average number of mines swept up monthly showed a very +remarkable decrease, the average for the first two months of that +year being only 159 per month, eloquent testimony to the efficiency +of the anti-submarine measures in operation during 1917. I have no +information as to the figures for the remaining months of 1918.</p> +<p>The record of minesweeping work would not be complete without +figures showing the damage caused by mines to minesweeping +vessels.</p> +<p>During the last six months of 1916 the average number of these +craft sunk or damaged by mines <i>per month</i> was 5.7, while for +the first six months of 1917 the figures rose to ten per month. For +the second six months of 1917 the figures fell to four per month, a +reduction even on the losses towards the end of 1916, in spite of +the fact that more mines were being dealt with. This reduction may +have been due to improvements effected in organization as the +result of experience.</p> +<p>Similarly the total number of merchant ships sunk or damaged by +mines, which during the first six months of 1917 totalled 90, +dropped in the second six months to 49.</p> +<p>By far the greater proportion of mines swept up were laid in +Area 10—i.e. the Nore, Harwich and Lowestoft area. This part +of the coast was nearest to the German submarine base at Zeebrugge, +and as the greater part of the east coast traffic passed through +the area it naturally came in for a great deal of minelaying +attention. Out of some 2,400 mines swept up in the first half of +1917, over 800 came from Area 10 alone. The greatest number of +casualties to merchant ships from mines during this same period +also occurred in Area 10, which in this respect was, however, +rivalled by Area 8—the Tyne. Many ships also struck mines in +Areas 11 and 12 in the English Channel, and in both of these areas +a considerable number of mines were swept up.</p> +<p>In addition to the daily risks of being themselves blown up +which were run by the vessels engaged in this work, many very +gallant deeds were performed by individual officers and men of the +minesweeping force, who were one and all imbued with the idea that +their first duty was to keep a clear channel for traffic regardless +of the consequence to themselves. I must leave to abler pens than +mine the task of recording in fitting phrase some of the courageous +actions of our small craft which will be looked upon as amongst the +most glorious episodes of the Naval part of the Great War, and +content myself to mention only one case, that of the trawler +<i>Grand Duke</i>, working in the Milford area in May, 1917. In +this instance a flotilla of minesweepers was employed in sweeping +when two mines exploded in the sweep towed by the second pair of +minesweeping trawlers in the flotilla. The wire parted and one of +the two trawlers proceeded to heave in the "kite," the contrivance +employed to keep the sweep at the required depth. When hove short +up it was discovered that a mine was foul of the wire and that it +had been hauled up against the ship's side. Just beneath the +surface the circular outline of a second mine could also be +detected entangled in the wire and swirling round in the current +beneath the trawler's counter. In the circumstances, since any roll +of the ship might suffice to strike one of the horns of either mine +and detonate the charges, the officer in charge of the trawler +chose the best course open to him in view of his responsibility for +the lives of those under his command, and ordered the trawler to be +abandoned.</p> +<p>The senior officer of the division of minesweepers thereupon +called for a volunteer, and accompanied by the engineman, boarded +the abandoned trawler, and disregarding the imminent probability of +an explosion caused by the contact of the ship and the mine, cut +the sweep and kite wires. The mines fell clear without detonating, +and by means of a rope passed to another trawler they were towed +clear of the spot.</p> +<p>It is appropriate to close this chapter by giving a synopsis of +the losses amongst our patrol escort and minesweeping vessels +between the commencement of the war and the end of 1917 due (1) to +enemy action, and (2) to the increased navigational dangers +incidental to service afloat under war conditions.</p> +<p>Under the first heading—enemy action—the losses were +8 yachts, 6 motor launches, 3 motor boats, 150 trawlers, 59 +drifters, and 10 paddle minesweepers; and the losses due to +navigational risks were 5 yachts, 55 trawlers, 7 motor launches, 3 +motor boats, 30 drifters, and 1 paddle minesweeper, whilst the +total loss of life was 197 officers and 1,782 men.</p> +<hr> +<a name="CH8"><!-- CH8 --></a> +<h2>CHAPTER VIII</h2> +<center>THE DOVER PATROL AND THE HARWICH FORCES</center> +<p>Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon has given ("The Dover Patrol, +1915-1917," Hutchinson & Co., 1919.) a most valuable record of +the varied work carried out in the Straits of Dover and on the +Belgian coast during the period of his command. There is little to +be added to this great record, but it may be of interest to mention +the general Admiralty policy which governed the Naval operations in +southern waters during the year 1917, and the methods by which that +policy was carried out.</p> +<p>The policy which was adopted in southern waters, and especially +in the Straits of Dover, was that, so far as the means at our +disposal admitted, the Straits should be rendered impassable for +enemy ships of all kinds, from battleships to submarines, with a +view to protecting the cross-Channel communications of our Army in +France, of affording protection to trade in the Channel, and +preventing a military landing by the Germans either in the south of +England or on the left flank of the Allied Army in France. So long +as the Belgian coast ports remained in German possession, the Naval +force that could be based there constituted a very serious menace +to the cross-Channel traffic. This really applied more to +destroyers than to submarines, and for this reason: submarines have +an infinitely larger radius of action than destroyers, and if the +Belgian coast ports had not been in German occupation, the +additional 210 miles from the Ems would not have been a matter of +serious moment to them, and if sighted on the longer passage they +could submerge. The case was quite different with destroyers or +other surface vessels; in the first place they were open to attack +by our vessels during the passage to and from the Ems, and in the +second the additional distance to be traversed was a matter for +consideration, since they carried only limited supplies of +fuel.</p> +<p>A fact to which the Admiralty frequently directed attention was +that, although annoyance and even serious inconvenience might be +caused to the enemy by sea and air operations against Ostend and +Zeebrugge, no <i>permanent</i> result could be achieved by the Navy +alone unless backed up by an advance on land. The Admiralty was +heart and soul for an audacious policy, providing the form of +attack and the occasion offered a reasonable prospect of success. +Owing to the preoccupations of the Army, we had to be satisfied +with bombardments of the ports by unprotected monitors, which had +necessarily to be carried out at very long ranges, exceeding 25,000 +yards, and necessitating direction of the fire by aircraft.</p> +<p>Bruges, about eight miles from the sea, was the real base of +enemy submarines and destroyers, Zeebrugge and Ostend being merely +exits from Bruges, and the use of the latter could only be denied +to the enemy by land attack or by effective blocking operations at +Ostend and Zeebrugge, for, if only one port was closed, the other +could be used.</p> +<p>Neither Zeebrugge, Ostend, nor Bruges could be rendered +untenable to the enemy with the guns available during 1917, +although Ostend in particular, and Zeebrugge to a lesser extent, +could be, and were frequently, brought under fire when certain +conditions prevailed, and some temporary damage caused. Indeed, the +fire against Ostend was so effective that the harbour fell into +disuse as a base towards the end of 1917. We were arranging also in +1917 for mounting naval guns on shore that would bring Bruges under +fire, after the enemy had been driven from Ostend by the +contemplated operation which is mentioned later. When forced to +abandon this operation, in consequence of the military advance +being held up by the weather, these guns were mounted in +monitors.</p> +<p>In the matter of blocking the entrance to the ports of Zeebrugge +and Ostend, the fact had to be recognized that effective +<i>permanent</i> blocking operations against destroyers and +submarines were not practicable, mainly because of the great rise +and fall above low water at ordinary spring tides, which is 14 feet +at Ostend and 13 feet at Zeebrugge for about half the days in each +month. Low water at Ostend also lasts for one hour. Therefore, even +if block-ships were sunk in the most favourable position the +operation of making a passage by cutting away the upper works of +the block-ships was not a difficult matter, and the Germans are a +painstaking people. This passage could be used for some time on +each side of high water by vessels like destroyers drawing less +than 14 feet, or submarines drawing, say, 14 feet. The block would, +therefore, be of a temporary and not a permanent nature, although +it would undoubtedly be a source of considerable inconvenience. At +the same time it was realized that, although permanent blocking was +not practicable, a temporary block would be of use, and that <i>the +moral effect alone of such an operation would be of great +value</i>. These considerations, together with the abandonment of +the proposed landing on the Belgian coast, owing to unfavourable +military conditions, led to the decision late in 1917 to undertake +blocking operations concurrently with an attack on the vessels +alongside the Mole at Zeebrugge.</p> +<p>In order to carry out the general policy mentioned, the eastern +end of the Straits of Dover had been heavily mined at intervals +during the war, and these mines had proved to be a sufficient +deterrent against any attempt on the part of surface vessels larger +than destroyers to pass through. Owing to the rise of tide enemy +destroyers could pass over the minefields at high water without +risk of injury, and they frequently did so pass. Many attempts had +been made to prevent the passage of enemy submarines by means of +obstructions, but without much success; and at the end of 1916 a +"mine net barrage"—i.e. a series of wire nets of wide mesh +carrying mines—was in process of being placed by us right +across the Straits from the South Goodwin Buoy to the West Dyck +Bank, a length of 28 miles, it being arranged that the French would +continue the barrage from this position to the French coast. The +construction of the barrage was much delayed by the difficulty in +procuring mooring buoys, and it was not completed until the late +summer of 1917. Even then it was not an effective barrier owing to +the tidal effects, as submarines were able to pass over it during +strong tides, or to dive under the nets as an alternative; it was +not practicable to use nets more than 60 feet deep, whilst the +depth of water in places exceeded 120 feet.</p> +<p>Deep mines were laid to guard the water below the net, but +although these were moored at some considerable distance from the +barrage, trouble was experienced owing to the mines dragging their +moorings in the strong tide-way and fouling the nets. One series +had to be entirely swept up for this reason. Many devices were +tried with the object of improving this barrage, and many clever +brains were at work on it. <i>And all the time our drifters with +their crews of gallant fishermen, with Captain Bird at their head, +worked day after day at the task of keeping the nets +efficient</i>.</p> +<p>In spite of its deficiencies the barrage was believed to be +responsible for the destruction of a few submarines, and it did +certainly render the passage of the Straits more difficult, and +therefore its moral effect was appreciable. Towards the end of +1917, however, evidence came into our possession showing that more +submarines were actually passing the Straits of Dover than had been +believed to be the case, and it became a question whether a +proportion of the drifters, etc., required for the maintenance of +the nets of the barrage should be utilized instead for patrol work +in the vicinity of the mine barrage then being laid between +Folkestone and Cape Grisnez. This action was taken, drifters being +gradually moved to the new area.</p> +<p>In April, 1916, a net barrage, with lines of deep mines on the +Belgian side of the nets, had also been laid along the Belgian +coast covering the exits from the ports of Ostend and Zeebrugge as +well as the coast between those ports. These nets were laid at a +distance of some 24,000 yards from the shore. This plan had proved +most successful in preventing minelaying by submarines in the +Straits of Dover, and the barrage was maintained from May to +October, but the weather conditions had prevented its continuance +from that date.</p> +<p>The operation was repeated in 1917, the barrage being kept in +position until December, when the question of withdrawing the craft +required for its maintenance for patrol work in connection with the +minefield laid on the Folkestone-Grisnez line came under +discussion.</p> +<p>The Belgian coast barrage being in the nature of a surprise was +probably more useful as a deterrent to submarine activity in 1916 +than in 1917. In both years a strong patrol of monitors, +destroyers, minesweepers, drifters for net repairs, and other +vessels was maintained in position to the westward of the barrage +to prevent interference with the nets by enemy vessels and to keep +them effective.</p> +<p>These vessels were patrolling daily within 13 or 14 sea miles of +the two enemy destroyer and submarine bases, and although +occasionally attacked, were not driven off in spite of the superior +destroyer force which the enemy could always bring to bear. In 1917 +actions between our vessels and those of the enemy, and between our +own and enemy aircraft, were of very frequent occurrence. The +Germans also introduced a new weapon in the form of fast motor +boats controlled by a cable from the shore and guided by signals +from aircraft, these boats being heavily loaded in the fore part +with explosives which detonated on contact with any vessels +attacked. On only one occasion in four attacks were the boats +successful in hitting their mark, and the monitor <i>Terror</i>, +which was struck in this instance, although considerably damaged in +her bulge protection, was successfully brought back to port and +repaired.</p> +<p>Whilst our monitors were on patrol near the barrage, as well as +on other occasions, every favourable opportunity was taken of +bombarding the bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend. In the former case +the targets fired at were the lock gates, and in the latter the +workshops, to which considerable damage was frequently occasioned, +as well as to vessels lying in the basin.</p> +<p>These bombardments were carried out in 1917 at distances +exceeding 25,000 yards. The long range was necessary on account of +the net barrage, and also because of the rapidity with which the +"Knocke" and "Tirpitz" shore batteries obtained the range of +monitors attacking them, one hit on an unprotected monitor being +sufficient to sink her.</p> +<p>They were also invariably carried out under the protection of a +smoke screen; in the autumn of 1917 the enemy commenced to start a +smoke screen himself as soon as we opened fire, thus interfering +with our observation of fire even from aircraft, but in spite of +this much damage resulted from the bombardments. Our observation of +fire being necessarily carried out by aircraft, and the enemy +attempting similar measures in his return gunfire, resulted in +aerial combats over the monitors being a frequent occurrence.</p> +<p>The carefully organized arrangements made by Admiral Bacon for +these coastal bombardments excited my warm admiration. He left +nothing to chance, and everything that ingenuity could devise and +patient preparation could assist was done to ensure success. He +received assistance from a staff which, though small in number, was +imbued with his own spirit, and he brought to great perfection and +achieved wonderful success in methods of warfare of which the Navy +had had no previous experience.</p> +<p>During the year 1917 aerial bombing attacks were persistently +carried out on the German naval bases in Belgium by the Royal Naval +Air Force at Dunkirk, which came within the sphere of the Dover +Command. These attacks had as their main object the destruction of +enemy vessels lying in these bases, and of the means for their +maintenance and repair. The attacks, under the very skilful +direction of Captain Lambe, R.N., were as incessant as our +resources and the weather admitted, and our gallant and splendidly +efficient airmen of the R.N.A.S. were veritable thorns in the sides +of the Germans. Our bombing machines as well as our fighting +aircraft were often required to attack military instead of naval +objectives, and several squadrons of our fighting machines were +lent to the military for the operations carried out during the year +on the Western Front; they did most excellent work, and earned the +high commendation of Sir Douglas Haig (now Earl Haig). But we were +still able to work against naval objectives. Zeebrugge, for +instance, was bombed on seven nights during April and five nights +during May, and during September a total weight of 86 tons of bombs +was dropped on enemy objectives by the Dunkirk Naval aircraft, and +we had good reason to be satisfied with the results achieved. +During this same month 18 enemy aircraft were destroyed and 43 +driven down. Attacks upon enemy aerodromes were very frequent, and +this form of aerial offensive undoubtedly exercised a very +deterrent influence upon enemy aerial activity over England. Two +submarines also were attacked and were thought to be destroyed, all +by our machines from Dunkirk. To Commodore Godfrey Paine, the Fifth +Sea Lord at the Admiralty, who was in charge of the R.N.A.S., and +to the staff assisting him our thanks were due for the great work +they accomplished in developing new and efficient types of machines +and in overcoming so far as was possible the difficulties of +supply. The amount of bombing work carried out in 1917 cannot, of +course, compare with that accomplished during 1918, when production +had got into its stride and the number of machines available was +consequently so very much larger.</p> +<p>Whether it was due to our aerial attacks on Bruges that the +German destroyers in the autumn months frequently left that base +and lay at Zeebrugge cannot be known, but they did so, and as soon +as we discovered this fact by aerial photographs, plans were laid +by Sir Reginald Bacon for a combined naval and aerial night +operation. The idea was for the aircraft to bomb Zeebrugge heavily +in the vicinity of the Mole, as we ascertained by trial that on +such occasions the enemy's destroyers left the Mole and proceeded +outside the harbour. There we had our coastal motor boats lying off +waiting for the destroyers to come out, and on the first occasion +that the operation was carried out one German destroyer was sunk +and another believed to have been damaged, if not also sunk, by +torpedoes fired by the coastal motor boats, to which very great +credit is due for their work, not only on this, but on many other +occasions; these boats were manned by a very gallant and +enterprising personnel.</p> +<p>Numerous other operations against enemy destroyers, torpedo +boats and submarines were carried out during the year, as recounted +in Sir Reginald Bacon's book, and in the autumn, when supplies of +the new pattern mines were becoming available, some minelaying +destroyers were sent to Dover; these vessels, as well as coastal +motor boats and motor launches, were continually laying mines in +the vicinity of Zeebrugge and Ostend with excellent results, a +considerable number of German destroyers and torpedo boats working +from Zeebrugge being known to have been mined, and a fair +proportion of them sunk by these measures.</p> +<p>In addition to the operations carried out in the vicinity of the +Belgian coast, the Dover force constantly laid traps for the enemy +destroyers and submarines in waters through which they were known +to pass.</p> +<p>Lines of mined nets laid across the expected track of enemy +vessels was a device frequently employed; submarines, as has been +stated, were used on the cross-Channel barrage to watch for the +passage of enemy submarines and destroyers, and everything that +ingenuity could suggest was done to catch the German craft if they +came out.</p> +<p>Such measures were supplementary to the work of the destroyers +engaged on the regular Dover Patrol, the indomitable Sixth +Flotilla.</p> +<p>A great deal depended upon the work of these destroyers. They +formed the principal, indeed practically the only, protection for +the vast volume of trade passing the Straits of Dover as well as +for our cross-Channel communications. When the nearness of +Zeebrugge and Ostend to Dover is considered (a matter of only 72 +and 62 miles respectively), and the fact that one and sometimes two +German flotillas, each comprising eleven large and heavily armed +torpedo-boat destroyers, were usually based on Bruges, together +with a force of large modern torpedo boats and a very considerable +number of submarines, it will be realized that the position was +ever one of considerable anxiety. It was further always possible +for the enemy to send reinforcements of additional flotillas from +German ports, or to send heavier craft with minesweepers to sweep a +clear channel, timing their arrival to coincide with an intended +attack, and thus to place the German forces in a position of +overwhelming superiority.</p> +<p>Our own Dover force at the commencement of 1917 consisted of one +light cruiser, three flotilla leaders, eighteen modern destroyers, +including several of the old "Tribal" class, eleven old destroyers +of the 30-knot class (the latter being unfit to engage the German +destroyers), and five "P" boats. Of this total the average number +not available at any moment may be taken as at least one-third. +This may seem a high estimate, but in addition to the ordinary +refits and the time required for boiler cleaning, the vessels of +the Dover Patrol working in very dangerous, foggy and narrow waters +suffered heavy casualties from mines and collisions. The work of +the Dover force included the duty of escorting the heavy traffic +between Dover and Folkestone and the French ports, this being +mostly carried on during daylight hours owing to the prevalence of +submarine-laid mines and the necessity for sweeping the various +channels before the traffic—which included a very large troop +traffic—was allowed to cross. An average of more than twenty +transports and hospital ships crossed the Straits daily during +1917, irrespective of other vessels. The destroyers which were +engaged during daylight hours in this work, and those patrolling +the barrages across the Straits and off the Belgian coast, +obviously required some rest at night, and this fact reduced the +number available for duty in the dark hours, the only time during +which enemy destroyer attacks took place.</p> +<p>Up to the spring of 1917 the examination service of all vessels +passing the Straits of Dover had been carried out in the Downs. +This led to a very large number of merchant ships being at anchor +in the Downs at night, and these vessels were obviously open to +attack by enemy craft of every description. It was always a marvel +to me that the enemy showed such a lack of enterprise in failing to +take advantage of these conditions. In order to protect these +vessels to some extent, a light cruiser from Dover, and one usually +borrowed from Harwich, together with a division of destroyers +either from Dover, or borrowed also from Harwich, were anchored off +Ramsgate, and backed by a monitor if one was available, +necessitating a division of strength and a weakening of the force +available for work in the Straits of Dover proper.</p> +<p>The result of this conflict of interests in the early part of +the year was that for the patrol of the actual Straits in the +darkness of night on a line some 30 miles in length, the number of +vessels available rarely if ever exceeded six—viz. two +flotilla leaders and four destroyers, with the destroyers resting +in Dover (four to six in number) with steam ready at short notice +as a reserve.</p> +<p>An attack had been made on the Dover Patrol in October, 1916, +which had resulted in the loss by us of one destroyer and six +drifters, and serious damage to another destroyer. A consideration +of the circumstances of this attack after my arrival at the +Admiralty led me to discuss with Sir Reginald Bacon the question of +keeping such forces as we had in the Straits at night concentrated +as far as possible. This disposition naturally increased the risk +of enemy vessels passing unobserved, but ensured that they would be +encountered in greater, although not equal, force if sighted.</p> +<p>Steps were also taken to reduce the tempting bait represented by +the presence of so many merchant ships in the Downs at night. Sir +Reginald Bacon proposed that the portion of the examination service +which dealt with south-going ships should be moved to Southend, and +the transfer was effected as rapidly as possible and without +difficulty, thereby assisting to free us from a source of +anxiety.</p> +<p>During the early part of 1917 the enemy carried out a few +destroyer raids both on English coast towns in the vicinity of +Dover and the French ports of Dunkirk and Calais. As a result of +these raids, which, though regrettable, were of no military +importance, a good deal of ill-informed criticism was levelled at +the Admiralty and the Vice-Admiral commanding at Dover. To anyone +conversant with the conditions, the wonder was not that the raids +took place, but that the enemy showed so little enterprise in +carrying out—with the great advantages he +possessed—operations of real, if not vital, military +value.</p> +<p>The only explanation is that he foresaw the moral effect that +his tip-and-run raids would produce; and he considered that the +effect of the resulting agitation might be of no inconsiderable +value to himself; the actual damage done was almost negligible, +apart from the loss of some eight lives, which we all deplored. It +is perhaps natural that people who have never experienced war at +close quarters should be impatient if its consequences are brought +home to them. A visit to Dunkirk would have shown what war really +meant, and the bearing of the inhabitants of that town would have +taught a valuable lesson.</p> +<p>The conditions in the Straits have already been mentioned, but +too much emphasis cannot be laid on them. The enemy who possessed +the incalculable advantage of the initiative, had at his disposal, +whenever he took heart to plan an attack, a force of at least +twenty-two very good destroyers, all unfortunately of higher speed +than anything we could bring against them, and more heavily armed +than many of our destroyers. This force was based within seventy +miles of Dover, and as the Germans had no traffic of any sort to +defend, was always available for offensive operations against our +up and down or cross-Channel traffic. Our Dover force was inferior +even at full strength, but owing to the inevitable absence of +vessels under repair or refitting and the manifold duties imposed +upon it, was bound to be in a position of marked inferiority in any +night attack undertaken by the Germans against any objective in the +Straits.</p> +<p>The enemy had a great choice of objectives. These were: first, +the traffic in the Channel or the destroyers watching the Straits +(the most important military objective); second, the merchant ships +anchored in the Downs; third, the British monitors anchored off +Dunkirk; fourth, the French ports, Dunkirk, Boulogne and Calais, +and the British port of Dover; and fifth, the British undefended +towns of Ramsgate, Margate, Lowestoft, etc., which German mentality +did not hesitate to attack.</p> +<p>A glance at Chart F [Transcriber's note: Not preserved in book.] +will show how widely separated are these objectives and how +impossible it was for the small Dover force to defend them all +simultaneously, especially during the hours of darkness. Any such +attempt would have led to a dispersion of force which would have +been criminal. The distance from Dunkirk along the French coast to +Calais, thence to Dover and along the English coast to the North +Foreland is 60 miles. The distance at which an enemy destroyer can +be seen at night is about a quarter of a mile, and the enemy could +select any point of the 60 miles for attack, or could vary the +scene of operations by bombarding Lowestoft or towns in the +vicinity, which were only 80 miles from Zeebrugge and equally +vulnerable to attack, since the enemy's destroyers could leave +their base before dark, carry out their hurried bombardment, and +return before daylight. In whatever quarter he attacked he could be +certain of great local superiority of force, although, of course, +he knew full well that the first sign of an attack would be a +signal to our forces to try to cut him off from his bases. Therein +lay the reason for the tip-and-run nature of the raids, which +lasted for a few minutes only. The enemy realized that we should +endeavour to intercept his force as soon as it had disclosed its +presence. The Germans had naturally to take the risk of +encountering our vessels on the way to his objectives, but at night +this risk was but slight.</p> +<p>As it was obviously impossible to prevent bombardments by +stationing destroyers in adequate force for the protection of each +town, the only possible alternative, unless such bombardments were +ignored, was to give the most vulnerable points protection by +artillery mounted on shore. This was a War Office, not an +Admiralty, responsibility; but as the War Office had not the means +available, the Admiralty decided to take the matter in hand, and in +the spring of 1917 some 6-inch naval guns taken from our reserves +were mounted in the vicinity of the North Foreland. Further, an old +monitor, which was of no use for other work owing to her machinery +being unfit, was moored to the southward of Ramsgate, and her guns +commanded the Downs. Searchlights were also mounted on shore, but +more reliance was placed on the use of star shells, of which the +earliest supplies were sent to these guns. The result was +immediately apparent. German destroyers appeared one night later on +off the North Foreland and opened fire, which was returned by the +monitor and the shore guns. The enemy immediately withdrew, and +never appeared again in 1917 in this neighbourhood.</p> +<p>Meanwhile efforts had been made to increase the strength of the +Dover force, and by the end of June it stood at 4 flotilla leaders, +29 modern destroyers (including "Tribal" class), 10 old +30-knotters, and 6 "P" boats. The increase in strength was rendered +possible owing to the relief of destroyers of the "M" and "L" +classes at Harwich by new vessels recently completed and by the +weakening of that force numerically. The flotilla leaders were a +great asset to Dover, as, although they were coal-burning ships and +lacked the speed of the German destroyers, their powerful armament +made it possible for them to engage successfully a numerically +greatly superior force. This was clearly shown on the occasion of +the action between the <i>Broke</i> and <i>Swift</i> and a German +force of destroyers on the night of April 20-21, 1917.</p> +<p>The flotilla leaders on that occasion were, as was customary, +patrolling at the Dover end of the cross-Channel barrage. The +enemy's destroyers were in two detachments. One detachment, +consisting apparently of four boats, passed, it was thought, round +the western end of the barrage at high tide close to the South +Goodwin Buoy, and fired a few rounds at Dover. The other detachment +of two boats went towards Calais, and the whole force seems to have +met at a rendezvous prior to its return to its base.</p> +<p>The <i>Broke</i> and <i>Swift</i> intercepted them on their +return, and after a hot engagement succeeded in sinking two of the +enemy vessels, one being very neatly rammed by the <i>Broke</i> +(Captain E.R.G.R. Evans, C.B.), and the second sunk by torpedoes. +Some of the remaining four boats undoubtedly suffered serious +damage. Our flotilla leaders were handled with conspicuous skill, +and the enemy was taught a lesson which resulted in his displaying +even greater caution in laying his plans and evincing a greater +respect for the Dover force for many months.</p> +<p>The success of the <i>Broke</i> and <i>Swift</i> was received +with a chorus of praise, and this praise was undoubtedly most fully +deserved, but once again an example was furnished of the manner in +which public attention becomes riveted upon the dramatic moments of +naval warfare whilst the long and patient labour by which the +dramatic moments are brought about is ignored.</p> +<p>Thus in this case, but little attention was drawn to the years +of arduous work performed by the Sixth Flotilla in the Straits of +Dover by day and by night, in dense fogs, heavy gales and blinding +snowstorms, in waters which were constantly mined, and in the face +of an enemy who was bound to be in greatly superior force whenever +he chose to attack.</p> +<p>Little thought was given either to the wonderful and most +gallant work carried out by the drifters of the Patrol, manned +largely by fishermen, and practically defenceless against attack by +the German destroyers.</p> +<p>The careful organization which conduced to the successful action +was forgotten. Sir Reginald Bacon has told the story of all this +work in his book, and I need not repeat it. But let it be added +that victory depends less on such enheartening incidents, welcome +as they are, than on the patient and usually monotonous performance +of duty at sea by day and by night in all weathers, and on the +skill in organization of the staff ashore in foreseeing and +forestalling enemy activity on a hundred and one occasions of which +the public necessarily knows nothing.</p> +<p>It has been stated that reliable information reached us in the +autumn of 1917 that enemy submarines were passing the Straits of +Dover in much greater numbers than we had hitherto believed to be +the case, and the inefficiency of the net barrage in preventing the +passage was apparent.</p> +<p>Early in the year (in February) Sir Reginald Bacon had put +forward a proposal for a deep minefield on the line +Folkestone—Cape Grisnez, but confined only to the portion of +the line to the southward of the Varne Shoal.</p> +<p>It was known that enemy submarines as a rule made this portion +of their passage submerged, and the minefield was designed to catch +them.</p> +<p>The proposal was approved after personal discussion with Admiral +Bacon, and directions were given that the earliest supplies of the +new pattern mines were to be allocated for this service; these +mines commenced to become available early in the following +November, and were immediately laid.</p> +<p>Admiral Bacon suggested later the extension of the minefield to +the westward of the Varne Shoal, so as to make it a complete +barrier across the Channel. This was also approved and measures +were taken to provide the necessary mines.</p> +<p>The question of illuminating at night the area covered by the +deep minefield was also discussed at length with Sir Reginald +Bacon. Various proposals were considered, such as the use of +searchlights on Cape Grisnez and at Folkestone, together with the +provision of small light-ships fitted with searchlights and moored +at intervals across the Channel, and also the use of flares from +patrol craft. Flares had already been experimented with from kite +balloons by the Anti-Submarine Division of the War Staff, and they +were found on trial to be efficient when used from drifters, and of +great use in illuminating the patrol area so that the patrol craft +might have better opportunities for sighting submarines and the +latter be forced to dive into the minefields.</p> +<p>A committee had been meanwhile appointed by the First Lord to +consider the question of the Dover Barrage in the light of the +information we then possessed as to the passage of enemy submarines +through the Straits of Dover. This committee visited Dover on +several occasions, and its members, some of whom were naval +officers and some civilian engineers, were shown the existing +arrangements.</p> +<p>The committee, which considered at first the question of +providing an <i>obstruction</i>, ended by reporting that the +existing barrage was inefficient (a fact which had become +apparent), and made proposals for the establishment of the already +approved minefield on the Folkestone-Grisnez line. I do not +recollect that any definite new ideas were evolved as the outcome +of the labours of this committee; some ideas regarding the details +of the minefield, particularly as to the best form of obstruction +that would catch submarines or other vessels on the surface, were +put forward, as also some proposals for erecting towers in certain +positions in the Straits. I do not think that these latter ever +matured. The manner in which the minefield should be illuminated at +night was discussed by the committee, and arrangements were made +for the provision of the vessels proposed by Admiral Bacon.</p> +<p>Some disagreement arose on the subject of the provision of the +necessary number of vessels for patrolling the minefield with a +view to forcing the submarines to dive. In my view a question of +this nature was one to be left in the hands of the Vice-Admiral at +Dover, with experience on the spot, after I had emphasized to him +the extreme importance attached to the provision of an ample number +of patrol craft at the earliest possible moment. Interference by +the Admiralty in such a detail of a flag officer's command would in +my opinion have been dangerous and incorrect, for so long as a flag +officer retains the confidence of the Board he must be left to work +his command in the manner considered best by him after having been +informed of the approved general policy, since he is bound to be +acquainted with the local situation to a far greater extent than +any officer serving at the Admiralty or elsewhere. I discussed the +matter personally with Sir Reginald Bacon, and was satisfied that +he was aware of the views held by me and of the necessity for +providing the patrol craft even at the expense of other services, +as soon as he could make the requisite arrangements.</p> +<p>Sir Reginald Bacon's three years' experience at Dover was a +great asset in dealing with this matter, as with other questions +connected with the Command, more especially the difficult and +embarrassing operations on the Belgian coast. His ingenuity, +originality, patience, power of organization and his methodical +preparations for carrying out operations were always a great factor +in ensuring success. These qualities were never shown more clearly +than during the preparations made for landing a force of some +14,000 officers and men with tanks, artillery and transport on the +coast of Belgium under the very muzzles of the German heavy coast +artillery. It was estimated that the whole force would be put on +shore in a period of twenty minutes. The scheme is described in +full in Chapter IX. of the first volume of Sir Reginald Bacon's +book on the Dover Patrol. He had put the proposal before Admiral +Sir Henry Jackson, my predecessor, who had expressed his +concurrence so far as the naval portion of the scheme was +concerned, and provided that the army made the necessary advance in +Flanders. When the scheme was shown to me shortly after taking +office as First Sea Lord I confess that I had some doubts as to the +possibility of manoeuvring two monitors, with a pontoon 550 feet in +length secured ahead of and between the bows of the monitors, but +in view of the immense importance of driving the Germans from the +Belgian coast and the fact that this scheme, if practicable, +promised to facilitate greatly such an operation, approval was +given for the construction of a pontoon, and after witnessing the +first trials of the pontoon secured between two monitors which were +themselves lashed together, I became convinced that this part of +the operation was perfectly feasible. The remaining pontoons were +therefore constructed, and preparations commenced in the greatest +secrecy for the whole operation.</p> +<p>The next matter for trial was the arrangement devised by Sir R. +Bacon for making it possible for tanks to mount the sea wall. These +trials were carried out with great secrecy against a model of the +sea wall built at the Headquarters of the Tank Corps in France, and +were quite successful. It was necessary to see actual photographs +of the tanks mounting the coping at the top of the sea wall to be +convinced of the practicability of the scheme. A matter of great +importance was the necessity for obtaining accurate information of +the slope of the beach at the projected landing places in order +that the practicability of grounding the pontoon could be +ascertained. This information Sir R. Bacon, with his characteristic +patience and ingenuity, obtained by means of aerial photographs +taken at various states of tide.</p> +<p>Finally, to gain exact knowledge of the rise and fall of the +tide, Admiral Bacon employed a submarine which submerged in the +vicinity of Nieuport and registered the height of water above her +hull for a period of twenty-four hours under conditions of spring +and neap tides.</p> +<p>The preparations for the landing involved much collaboration +with the military authorities, and Sir Reginald Bacon was +frequently at G.H.Q. for the purpose. As soon as it was decided +that the 1st Division was to provide the landing party, conferences +took place between Admiral Bacon and General Sir Henry Rawlinson +(now Lord Rawlinson), and I took the opportunity of a visit paid by +Sir H. Rawlinson to London to confer with him myself. Subsequently +a conference took place at the War Office at which Sir Douglas Haig +was present.</p> +<p>There was entire unanimity between the Navy and Army over the +proposed operation, and we greatly admired the manner in which the +Sister Service took up the work of preparing for the landing. +Secrecy was absolutely vital to success, as the whole scheme was +dependent on the operation being a surprise, more particularly in +the selection of the landing place. Admiral Bacon describes in his +book the methods by which secrecy was preserved. As time passed, +and the atrocious weather in Flanders during the summer of 1917 +prevented the advance of our Army, it became more and more +difficult to preserve secrecy; but although the fact that some +operation of the kind was in preparation gradually became known to +an increasing number of people, it is safe to say that the enemy +never realized until long after the operation had been abandoned +its real nature or the locality selected for it.</p> +<p>Some officers with experience of the difficulties encountered +during the landings at Gallipoli expressed doubts of the +practicability of the operation in the face of the heavy fire from +large guns and from machine guns which might be expected, but the +circumstances were so different from those at Gallipoli that +neither Sir Reginald Bacon nor I shared these doubts. The heavy +bombardment of the coast batteries by our own shore guns, which had +been greatly strengthened for the purpose, the rapidity of the +landing, the use of a dense smoke screen, the fact of the landing +being a complete surprise, the use of tanks for dealing with +hostile machine guns, the interruption to the enemy's shore +communications by heavy artillery fire, and the bombardment by +monitors of the coast well to the eastward of the landing place as +a feint, were all new factors, and all promised to assist towards +success.</p> +<p>Of the supreme importance of the operation there could be no +question. Ever since 1914 the Navy had been pressing for the +recapture of the ports on the Belgian coast, and they could only be +taken by means of a combined operation. Sir John French (now +Field-Marshal Viscount French) himself had in the early days of the +war pointed, out the great importance of securing the coast, but +circumstances beyond his control were too powerful for him.</p> +<p>It was in these circumstances that the decision to undertake the +operation was made, and when it became necessary to abandon it +owing to the inability of the Army to co-operate the intense +disappointment felt by all those who had worked so hard to ensure +its success can be realized.</p> +<p>The Harwich force, consisting of the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron +and the flotilla of destroyers, was the only other British force +stationed in south-eastern waters if we except the local craft at +the Nore. The 5th Light Cruiser Squadron and the flotilla were +under the command of Commodore (now Rear-Admiral) Sir Reginald +Tyrwhitt, an officer whose vessels were, if we except the Dover +patrol, more frequently in contact with the enemy than any other +British force in Home waters. Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt had several +functions to perform:</p> +<p>(1) It was always hoped that he would be able to join forces +with the Grand Fleet should events foreshadow a meeting with the +High Sea Fleet.</p> +<p>(2) We depended very largely on him for reconnaissance work in +the southern part of the North Sea and into the German Bight.</p> +<p>(3) It fell to his lot as a rule to provide the covering force +for aerial operations carried out from seaplane carriers in +southern waters.</p> +<p>(4) His force was best placed to cut off any enemy light craft +that might be located in southern waters and to attack Zeppelins at +sea on their return from raids over England.</p> +<p>(5) He was called upon almost weekly to cover the passage of the +convoy of merchant ships between the Thames and Holland known as +the "Dutch Convoy."</p> +<p>(6) He was constantly called upon the provide reinforcements for +the Dover Patrol or to assist in operations carried out by the +latter force.</p> +<p>These miscellaneous duties involved a great deal of work for the +Harwich force and particularly for the destroyers.</p> +<p>The necessity for continually providing reinforcements from the +Harwich force for the Dover Patrol was a standing handicap to Sir +Reginald Tyrwhitt's operations; he took the matter philosophically, +although I always realized how difficult it made his work at times, +and whenever, as was frequent, combined operations were carried out +by the two forces, the greatest harmony prevailed between the +Commands.</p> +<p>At the commencement of 1917 the Harwich force comprised 8 light +cruisers, 2 flotilla leaders and 45 destroyers. During the year new +vessels were either added to it or replaced older craft which were +withdrawn for other services, and at the end of the year the force +included 9 light cruisers, 4 flotilla leaders and 24 +destroyers.</p> +<p>The force was constantly operating in the outer waters of the +Heligoland Bight to seaward of our minefields. The objects of the +presence of our ships in these waters, in addition to +reconnaissance work and aerial operations, were:</p> +<p>(a) To intercept any enemy light forces which might be intending +to operate off our coasts or which might be on passage between +German ports.</p> +<p>(b) To surprise and attack enemy minesweeping vessels.</p> +<p>(c) To destroy Zeppelins either on reconnaissance or raiding +work.</p> +<p>(d) To capture enemy merchant ships trading between Dutch and +German ports, or neutrals with contraband trading to Germany.</p> +<p>The opportunities that were given to the force under heading (a) +were exceedingly rare during the year 1917, when even the light +forces of the High Sea Fleet were content to remain almost +constantly in port except when engaged in the operations in the +Baltic, and excepting also on the two occasions on which attacks +were made on the Scandinavian convoy; but a portion of the Harwich +force succeeded on one occasion in intercepting a flotilla of +German destroyers <i>en route</i> to Zeebrugge from German ports +with the result that one destroyer was seriously damaged and forced +into the Dutch port of Ymuiden and another either sunk or badly +damaged.</p> +<p>Forces from Harwich also succeeded in capturing or sinking +twenty-four merchant ships trading between Antwerp and Dutch ports +and Germany during the year, but the main result of the operations +of this force was shown in the refusal of the enemy to risk his +vessels except under cover of darkness in the area in which the +Harwich force worked.</p> +<p>The duty of protecting the Dutch convoy imposed a heavy strain +upon the Harwich force. During the year 1917, 520 eastbound and 511 +westbound vessels were convoyed between Dutch and British ports +with the loss of only four ships by submarine attack, one by +destroyer attack, and one by mine. The price paid by the force for +this success was the loss of four destroyers by mines, and one by +collision, and the damage of three destroyers by mine or torpedo, +and of five destroyers and one light cruiser by collision. The +frequent collisions were due to the conditions under which the +traffic was carried out at night without lights, and to the +prevalence of fogs. The procedure adopted by the force was +frequently changed as it necessarily became known to the +Germans.</p> +<p>The extraordinarily small losses in the convoys were a very +great tribute to the handling of the protecting force and to the +organization in Holland for arranging sailings, when it is borne in +mind that it was almost impossible to prevent leakage of +information to German agents once the time of sailing was given +out, and that the convoys were open to attack from destroyers and +submarines operating either from Zeebrugge or from the Ems or other +German ports. The orders of course emanated from the Admiralty, and +of all the great work achieved by Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, +the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, during his service at the +Admiralty in the year 1917 and indeed in the two preceding years, +the success attending the work of this convoy was certainly not the +least.</p> +<p>It is difficult to put into words the great admiration which I +felt for Sir Henry Oliver's work throughout the war. Our +association commenced during my command of the Grand Fleet, but +became of course much closer at the Admiralty, and during my +service there his assistance was of immense help to me and of +incalculable value to the nation.</p> +<p>It was fortunate indeed for the Allied cause that he held such +important Staff appointments during the most critical periods of +the war.</p> +<hr> +<a name="CH9"><!-- CH9 --></a> +<h2>CHAPTER IX</h2> +<center>THE SEQUEL</center> +<p>The foregoing chapters have been devoted to describing the +measures that were devised or put into force or that were in course +of preparation during the year 1917 to deal with the unrestricted +submarine warfare against merchant shipping adopted by Germany and +Austria in February of that year. It now remains to state, so far +as my information admits, the effect of those measures.</p> +<p>British anti-submarine measures were almost non-existent at the +commencement of the war. Sir Arthur Wilson, when in command of the +Channel Fleet in the early days of the submarine, had experimented +with nets as an anti-submarine measure, and shortly before the war +submarines were exercised at stalking one another in a submerged +condition; also the question of employing a light gun for use +against the same type of enemy craft when on the surface had been +considered, and some of our submarines had actually been provided +with such a gun of small calibre. Two patterns of towed explosive +sweeps had also been tried and adopted, but it cannot be said that +we had succeeded in finding any satisfactory anti-submarine device, +although many brains were at work on the subject, and therefore the +earliest successes against enemy submarines were principally +achieved by ramming tactics. Gradually other devices were thought +out and adopted; these comprised drift and stationary nets fitted +with mines, the depth charge, decoy ships of various natures, +gunfire from patrol craft and gunfire from armed merchant ships, as +well as the numerous devices mentioned in <a href="#CH3">Chapter +III</a>.</p> +<p>Except at the very commencement of the war, when production of +craft in Germany was slow, presumably as a result of the +comparatively small number under construction when war broke out, +the British measures failed until towards the end of 1917 in +sinking submarines at a rate approaching in any degree that at +which the Germans were producing them.</p> +<p>Thus Germany started the war with 28 submarines; five were added +and five were lost during 1914, leaving the number still 28 at the +commencement of 1915.</p> +<p>During 1915, so far as our knowledge went, 54 were added and +only 19 were lost, the total at the commencement of 1916 being +therefore 63.</p> +<p>During 1916 it is believed that 87 submarines were added and 25 +lost, leaving the total at the commencement of 1917 at 125.</p> +<p>During 1917 our information was that 78 submarines were added +and 66 lost, leaving the total at the end of the year at 137.</p> +<p>The losses during 1917, given quarterly, indicate the increasing +effectiveness of our anti-submarine measures. These losses, so far +as we know them, were:</p> +<pre> + First quarter ... 10 Third quarter ... 20 + Second quarter ... 12 Fourth quarter ... 24 +</pre> +<p>During 1918, according to Admiral Scheer ("Germany's High Sea +Fleet In the World War," page 335), 74 submarines were added to the +fleet in the period January to October. The losses during this year +up to the date of the Armistice totalled 70, excluding those +destroyed by the Germans on the evacuation of Bruges and those +blown up by them at Pola and Cattaro. Taken quarterly the losses +were:</p> +<pre> + First quarter ... 18 Third quarter ... 21 + Second quarter ... 26 Fourth quarter (to + date of Armistice) ... 6 +</pre> +<p>It will be seen from the foregoing figures for 1917 and 1918 +that the full result of the anti-submarine measures inaugurated in +1917 and previous years was being felt in the last quarter of 1917, +the results for 1918 being very little in advance of those for the +previous half-year.</p> +<p>According to our information, as shown by the figures given +above, the Germans had completed by October, 1918, a total of 326 +submarines of all classes, exclusive of those destroyed by them in +November at Bruges, Pola and Cattaro.</p> +<p>Admiral von Capelle informed the Reichstag Committee that a +total of 810 was ordered before and during the war. It follows from +that statement that over 400 must have been under construction or +contemplated at the time of the Armistice.</p> +<p>It is understood that the number of submarines actually building +at the end of 1918 was, however, only about 200, which perhaps was +the total capacity of the German shipyards at one time.</p> +<p>At the risk of repetition it is as well to repeat here the +figures giving the quarterly losses of merchant ships during 1917 +and 1918, as they indicate in another and effective way the +influence of the anti-submarine measures.</p> +<p>These figures are:</p> +<pre> + 1917 + + British. Foreign. Total. +1st quarter 911,840 707,533 1,519,373 +2nd quarter 1,361,870 875,064 2,236,934 +3rd quarter 952,938 541,535 1,494,473 +4th quarter 782,887 489,954 1,272,843 +</pre> +<pre> + 1918 + + British. Foreign. Total. +1st quarter 697,668 445,668 1,143,336 +2nd quarter 630,862 331,145 962,007 +3rd quarter 512,030 403,483 915,513 +4th quarter 83,952 93,582 177,534 +</pre> +<pre> + Figures for 4th quarter are for Month of October only. +</pre> +<p>The decline of the losses of British shipping was progressive +from the second quarter of 1917; in the third quarter of 1918 the +reduction in the tonnage sunk became very marked, and suggested +definitely the approaching end of the submarine menace.</p> +<p>The fact that during the second quarter of 1918 the world's +output of tonnage overtook the world's losses was another +satisfactory feature. The output for 1917 and 1918 is shown in the +following table:</p> +<pre> + United Dominions, + Kingdom Allied and Total for + Output. Neutral World. + Countries. + 1917 +1st quarter 246,239 340,807 587,046 +2nd quarter 249,331 435,717 685,048 +3rd quarter 248,283 426,778 675,061 +4th quarter 419,621 571,010 990,631 +</pre> +<pre> + 1918 +1st quarter 320,280 550,037 870,317 +2nd quarter 442,966 800,308 1,243,274 +3rd quarter 411,395 972,735 1,384,130 +4th quarter, Oct. only 136,100 375,000 511,100 +</pre> +<p>It will be noticed that by the last quarter of 1918 the output +of shipping in the United Kingdom alone had overtaken the losses of +British shipping.</p> +<p>It is not possible to give exact information as to the +particular means by which the various German submarines were +disposed of, but it is believed that of the 186 vessels mentioned +as having been lost by the Germans at least thirty-five fell +victims to the depth charge, large orders for which had been placed +by the Admiralty in 1917, and it is probably safe to credit mines, +of which there was a large and rapidly increasing output throughout +1917, with the same number—thirty-five—a small +proportion of these losses being due to the mines in the North Sea +Barrage. Our own submarines accounted for some nineteen.</p> +<a name="aircraft"></a> +<p>Our destroyers and patrol craft of all natures sank at least +twenty by means of gunfire or the ram, and some four or five more +by the use of towed sweeps of various natures. Our decoy ships sank +about twelve; four German submarines are known to have been sunk by +being rammed by men-of-war other than destroyers, four by merchant +ships, and about ten by means of our nets. It is fairly certain +that at least seven were accounted for by aerial attack. Six were +interned, some as the result of injury after action with our +vessels.</p> +<p>The total thus accounted for is 156. It was always difficult to +obtain exact information of the fate of submarines, particularly in +such cases as mine attack, and the figures, therefore, do not cover +the whole of the German losses which we estimated at 185.</p> +<hr> +<a name="CH10"><!-- CH10 --></a> +<h2>CHAPTER X</h2> +<center>"PRODUCTION" AT THE ADMIRALTY DURING 1917</center> +<p>The anti-submarine measures initiated during the year 1917 and +continued throughout the year 1918, as well as those in force in +the earlier years of the war, depended very much for their success +on the work carried out by the Admiralty Departments responsible +for design and production, and apart from this these departments, +during the year 1917, carried out a great deal of most valuable +work in the direction of improving the efficiency of the material +with which the vessels of the Grand Fleet and other warships were +equipped.</p> +<p>Early in 1917 certain changes were made in the Naval Ordnance +Department. When Captain Dreyer took up the post of Director of +Naval Ordnance in succession to Rear-Admiral Morgan Singer on March +1, the opportunity was seized of removing the Torpedo Department, +which had hitherto been a branch of the Naval Ordnance Department, +from the control of the Director of Naval Ordnance, and +Rear-Admiral Fitzherbert was appointed as Director of Torpedoes and +Mines, with two assistant Directors under him, one for torpedoes +and the other for mines. It had for some time been apparent to me +that the torpedo and mining work of the Fleet required a larger and +more independent organization, and the intention to adopt a very +extensive mining policy accentuated the necessity of appointing a +larger staff and according it greater independence. The change also +relieved the D.N.O. of some work and gave him more liberty to +concentrate on purely ordnance matters.</p> +<p>Captain Dreyer, from his experience as Flag Captain in the +<i>Iron Duke</i>, was well aware of the directions in which +improvement in armament efficiency was necessary, and a variety of +questions were taken up by him with great energy.</p> +<p>Some of the more important items of the valuable work achieved +by the Naval Ordnance Department during the year 1917, in addition +to the provision of various anti-submarine measures mentioned in +<a href="#CH3">Chapter III</a>, were:</p> +<p>(1) The introduction of a new armour-piercing shell of far +greater efficiency than that previously in use; the initial designs +for these shells were produced in the drawing office of the +Department of the Director of Naval Ordnance.</p> +<p>(2) The introduction of star shell.</p> +<p>(3) The improvement of the arrangements made, after our +experience in the Jutland action, for preventing the flash of +exploding shell from being communicated to the magazines.</p> +<p>Taking these in order, the <i>New Armour-piercing Shell</i> +would have produced a very marked effect had a Fleet action been +fought in 1918. Twelve thousand of these new pattern shell had been +ordered by November, 1917, after a long series of experiments, and +a considerable number were in an advanced stage of construction by +the end of the year. With our older pattern of shell, as used by +the Fleet at Jutland and in earlier actions, there was no chance of +the burst of the shell, when fired at battle range, taking place +inboard, after penetrating the side armour of modern German capital +ships, in such a position that the fragments might be expected to +reach and explode the magazines. A large proportion of the shell +burst on the face of the armour, the remainder while passing +through it. In the case of the new shell, which was certainly twice +as efficient and which would penetrate the armour without breaking +up, the fragments would have a very good chance of reaching the +magazines of even the latest German ships.</p> +<p>The greatest credit was due to the Ordnance Department and to +our enterprising manufacturers for the feat which they achieved. We +had pressed for a shell of this nature as the result of our +experience during the Jutland action, and it was badly wanted.</p> +<p>We had experienced the need for an efficient <i>Star Shell</i> +both in the Grand Fleet and in southern waters, and after the +Jutland action the attention of the Admiralty had been drawn by me +to the efficiency of the German shell of this type. In the early +part of 1917, during one of the short night bombardments of the +south coast by German destroyers, some German star shell, +unexploded, reached the shore. Directions were at once given to +copy these shell and not to waste time by trying to improve upon +them, a procedure dear to technical minds but fatal when time is of +the first importance. Success was soon attained, and star shell +were issued during 1917 to all our ships, the vessels of the Dover +and Harwich patrol force and the shore battery at the North +Foreland being the first supplied.</p> +<p>Important experiments were carried out in 1917 on board H.M.S. +<i>Vengeance</i> to test the <i>Anti-flash</i> arrangements with +which the Fleet had been equipped as the result of certain of our +ships being blown up in the Jutland action. Valuable information +was obtained from these experiments and the arrangements were +improved accordingly.</p> +<p>The work of the Torpedo and Mining Department was also of great +value during 1917. The principal task lay in perfecting the new +pattern mine and arranging for its production in great numbers, in +overcoming the difficulties experienced with the older pattern +mines, and in arranging for a greatly increased production of +explosives for use in mines, depth charges, etc.</p> +<p>These projects were in hand when the new organization involving +the appointment of an Admiralty Controller was adopted.</p> +<p>The circumstances in which this great and far-reaching change in +organization was brought about were as follows. In the spring of +1917 proposals were made to the Admiralty by the then Prime +Minister that some of the work carried out at that time by the +Third Sea Lord should be transferred to a civilian. At first it was +understood by us that the idea was to re-institute the office of +additional Civil Lord, which office was at the time held by Sir +Francis Hopwood (now Lord Southborough), whose services, however, +were being utilized by the Foreign Office, and who had for this +reason but little time to devote to Admiralty work. To this +proposal no objection was raised.</p> +<p>At a later stage, however, it became evident that the proposal +was more far reaching and that the underlying idea was to place a +civilian in charge of naval material generally and of all +shipbuilding, both naval and mercantile. Up to the spring of 1916 +mercantile shipbuilding had been carried out under the supervision +of the Board of Trade, but when the office of Shipping Controller +was instituted this work had been placed under that Minister, who +was assisted by a committee of shipbuilders termed the +"Shipbuilding Advisory Committee." Statistics show that good +results as regards mercantile ship production were not obtained +under either the Board of Trade or the Shipping Controller, one +reason being that the supply of labour and material, which were +very important factors, was a matter of competition between the +claims of the Navy and those of the Mercantile Marine, and another +the fact that many men had been withdrawn from the shipyards for +service in the Army. There was especial difficulty in providing +labour for the manufacture of machinery, and at one time the +Admiralty went so far as to lend artificers to assist in the +production of engines. The idea of placing the production of ships +for both services under one head appealed to and was supported by +the Admiralty. The next step was a proposal to the Admiralty that +Sir Eric Geddes, at that time the head of the military railway +organization in France with the honorary rank of Major-General, +should become Admiralty Controller. This would place him in charge +of all shipbuilding for both services as well as that portion of +the work of the Third Sea Lord which related to armament +production. I was requested to see Sir Eric whilst attending a +conference in Paris with a view to his being asked to take up the +post of Admiralty Controller. This I did after discussing the +matter with some of the heads of the War Office Administration and +members of General Headquarters in France.</p> +<p>I learned from Sir Eric Geddes that he felt capable of +undertaking the work on the understanding that he was assured of my +personal support; he said that experience in his railway work in +France had shown the difficulty of taking over duties hitherto +performed by officers, and stated that it could not have been +carried through without the strong support of the +Commander-in-Chief; for this reason he considered he must be +assured of my support at the Admiralty. In view of the importance +attached to combining under one administration the work of both +naval and mercantile shipbuilding for the reasons already stated, +and influenced in some degree by the high opinion held of Sir Eric +Geddes by the Prime Minister, I came to the conclusion that his +appointment would be of benefit to Admiralty work, and therefore +gave him the assurance and said that I would do my best to smooth +over any difficulties with the existing Admiralty officials, +whether naval or technical.</p> +<p>In these circumstances Sir Eric Geddes was offered the post of +Admiralty Controller by Sir Edward Carson, then First Lord, and +accepted it. It was arranged that a naval officer should continue +to hold the post of Third Sea Lord and that he should be jointly +responsible, so far as the Navy was concerned, for all +<i>design</i> work on its technical side, whether for ships, +ordnance material, mines, torpedoes, etc., etc., whilst the +Controller became entirely responsible for <i>production</i>. It +was obvious that goodwill and tact would be required to start this +new organization, which was decidedly complicated, and that the +post of Third Sea Lord would be difficult to fill. At the request +of Sir Eric Geddes Rear-Admiral Lionel Halsey, C.B., who at that +time was Fourth Sea Lord, was asked if he would become Third Sea +Lord in the new organization. He consented and was appointed. When +the detailed organization, drawn up to meet the views of Sir E. +Geddes, was examined by the naval officers responsible for armament +work, strong objections were raised to that part of the +organization which affected their responsibility for the control +and approval of designs and of inspection.</p> +<p>Sir Eric held the view that inspection should come under the +officials in charge of production and that the designing staff +should also be under him, the designs being drawn up to meet the +views of the naval officers and finally approved by them. +Personally I saw no <i>danger</i> in the proposals regarding +design, because the responsibility of the naval officer for final +approval was recognized; but there was a certain possibility of +delay if the naval technical officer lost control over the +designing staff. I fully agreed with the criticisms on the subject +of inspection, the argument being that only naval officers +accustomed to <i>use</i> the ordnance material could know the +dangers that might arise from faulty inspection, and that the +producer had temptations in his path, especially under war +conditions, to make inspection subservient to rapidity of +production. Sir Eric Geddes finally waived his objections. He +informed me that he based his arguments largely on his experience +at the Ministry of Munitions, with which he had been associated +earlier in the war. The contention of the naval officers at the +Admiralty was that even if the organization proposed was found to +be workable for the Army, it would not be satisfactory for the +Navy, as in our case it was essential that the responsibility for +approval of design and for inspection should be independent of the +producer, whether the producer was a Government official or a +contractor. Apart from questions of general principle in this +matter, accidents to ordnance material in the Navy, or the +production of inferior ammunition, may involve, and have involved, +the most serious results, even the complete loss of battleships +with their crews, as the result of a magazine explosion or the +bursting of a heavy gun. I could not find that the organization at +the Ministry of Munitions had, even in its early days, placed +design, inspection and production under one head; inspection and +design had each its own head and were separate from production. In +any case in 1918 the Ministry of Munitions reverted to the +Admiralty system of placing the responsibility for design and +inspection under an artillery expert who was neither a manufacturer +nor responsible for production.</p> +<p>The matters referred to above may appear unimportant to the +civilian reader, but any question relating to the efficiency of its +material is of such paramount importance to the fighting efficiency +of the Navy that it is necessary to mention it with a view to the +avoidance of future mistakes.</p> +<p>The new organization resulted in the creation of a very large +administrative staff for the purpose of accelerating the production +of ships, ordnance material, mines, etc. Indeed, the increase in +numbers was so great that it became necessary to find additional +housing room, and the offices of the Board of Education were taken +over for the purpose. It was felt that the increase in staff, +though it involved, of course, very heavy expenditure, would be +justified if it resulted in increased rapidity of production. It +will be readily understood that such an immense change in +organization, one which I had promised to see through personally, +and which was naturally much disliked by all the Admiralty +departments, threw a vast volume of extra work on my shoulders, +work which had no connexion with the operations of war, and this +too at a period when the enemy's submarine campaign was at its +height. I should not have undertaken it but for the hope that the +change would result in greatly increased production, particularly +of warships and merchant ships.</p> +<p>The success of this new organization can only be measured by the +results obtained, and by this standard, if it were possible to +eliminate some of the varying and incalculable factors, we should +be able to judge the extent to which the change was justified. It +was a change for which, under pressure, I bore a large share of +responsibility, and it involved replacing, in the middle of a great +war, an organization built up by experts well acquainted with naval +needs by one in which a considerable proportion of the personnel +had no previous experience of the work. The change was, of course, +an experiment; the danger lay in the fact that, until technical and +Admiralty experience has been gained, even men of the greatest +ability in other walks of life may find it difficult to produce +satisfactory results even if there are no limits imposed on the +size of the Staff which assists them.</p> +<p>The question of production is best examined under various +headings and the results under the old Admiralty organization +compared with those under the new, although comparison is +admittedly difficult owing to changing conditions.</p> +<center>WARSHIP PRODUCTION</center> +<p>Under the Admiralty organization existing up to May, 1917, the +Third Sea Lord—as the Controller was termed when changes were +introduced by Mr. Churchill in 1912—was head of the +Departments of the Director of Naval Construction and Engineer in +Chief, and of that part of the work of the Director of Naval +Ordnance which dealt with the design and production of guns and gun +mountings. Under the new organization a civilian Controller became +responsible for production, the Third Sea Lord being associated +with him on technical matters of design.</p> +<p>A special department for warship production and repairs was set +up under a Deputy Controller, the Third Sea Lord having no +authority over this department except by his association with the +Controller.</p> +<p>Under the old organization it had been the custom during the war +for the Third Sea Lord to give to the Board and to the +Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet a personal forecast of the +anticipated dates of completion of all warships under construction. +My experience whilst in command of the Grand Fleet had been that +this personal forecast was generally fairly accurate for six months +ahead.</p> +<p>As an example it may be stated that in the first four months of +1917 the delivery of destroyers <i>was within one of the +forecast</i> made in October, 1916, four vessels of the class being +slightly behind and three ahead of the forecast. Of thirteen "E" +class submarines forecasted in October, 1916, for delivery by +March, 1917, all except two were delivered by April; of twelve "K" +class submarines forecasted for delivery in the same period, all +except three were delivered by April, 1917. It should be stated +that these "K" class submarines were vessels of a new type, +involving new problems of some difficulty.</p> +<p>On the other hand there was considerable delay in the completion +of a number of the thirty "P" boats forecasted in October, 1916, +for delivery during the first seven months of 1917, and the April +forecast showed that only twenty out of the thirty would be +delivered during that period. There was also some delay in the +delivery of twin screw minesweepers, twenty of which were shown in +the forecast of October, 1916, as due for delivery in the first six +months of 1917. The April, 1917, forecast showed that six had been +delivered or would complete in April, ten more would complete +within the estimated period, and the four remaining would be +overdue and would not be delivered until July or August.</p> +<p>These figures show the degree of reliance which could be placed +on the personal forecasts of the Third Sea Lord under the old +organization. It is, of course, a fact that accurate forecasts do +not <i>necessarily</i> mean that the rate of production is +satisfactory, but only that the forecast is to be depended on. We +were never at all satisfied with the rate of production, either +under the old or the new organization. Accuracy of forecast was, +however, of great use from the Staff point of view in allotting new +ships to the various commands and in planning operations.</p> +<p>To turn now to the figures given by the Admiralty Controller +under the new organization. The table below shows the forecasts +("F") given in June, 1917, and the deliveries ("D") of different +classes of warships month by month during the period of July to +November of that year:</p> +<pre> +-------------------------------------------------------------------- + Class of | July. | Aug. | Sept. | Oct. | Nov. | Deficit in +Vessel. | F | D | F | D | F | D | F | D | F | D | 5 months +-------------------------------------------------------------------- +Flotilla | | | | | | | | | | | + Leaders | | | | | | | | | | | + and T.B.D's.| 5 | 2 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 4 +Submarines | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 11 +Sloops | 3 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 5 +"P." Boats | 6 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 +------------------------------------------------------------------ +</pre> +<p>Amongst vessels which were classed as auxiliaries the figures +were:</p> +<pre> + Class of | July. | Aug. | Sept. | Oct. | Nov. | Deficit in +Vessel. | F | D | F | D | F | D | F | D | F | D | 5 months +-------------------------------------------------------------------- +Minesweepers | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 7 +Trawlers |25 |18 |23 |14 |30 |13 |27 |28 |33 |24 | 41 +-------------------------------------------------------------------- +</pre> +<p>It will be seen from these figures that the forecast of June was +inaccurate even for the three succeeding months and that the total +deficit in the five months was considerable, except in the case of +T.B.D.'s and "P" boats.</p> +<p>The most disappointing figures were those relating to +submarines, trawlers and minesweepers. The case of the submarines +may be put in another way, thus:</p> +<p>In the June forecast twenty-six submarines were forecasted for +delivery during the period July to the end of December, the dates +of three, however, being somewhat uncertain; of this total of +twenty-six, <i>only nine were actually delivered</i>. Of the +remainder, seven were shown in a November forecast as delayed for +four months, two for five months, and one for nine months.</p> +<p>The attention of the Production Departments was continually +directed to the very serious effect which the delay was producing +on our anti-submarine measures, and the First Lord, Sir Eric +Geddes, was informed of the difficult position which was arising. +In the early part of December I pointed out to the Third Sea Lord +and the Admiralty Controller, Sir Allan Anderson, that it was +obviously impossible for the Naval Staff to frame future policy +unless some dependence could be placed on the forecast of +deliveries. The Controller in reply stated that accurate forecasts +were most difficult, and proposed a discussion with the Third Sea +Lord and myself, but I had left the Admiralty before the discussion +took place.</p> +<p>The delays, as will be seen from the tables given, were most +serious in the case of vessels classed as auxiliaries. Sir Thomas +Bell, who possessed great experience of shipbuilding in a private +capacity, was at the head of the Department of the Deputy +Controller for Dockyards and Shipbuilding, and the Director of +Warship Production was a distinguished Naval constructor. The +Deputy Controller of Auxiliary Shipbuilding was an officer lent +from the War Office, whose previous experience had lain, I believe, +largely in the railway world; some of his assistants and staff +were, however, men with experience of shipbuilding.</p> +<p>When I became First Sea Lord at the end of 1916 the new building +programme, which had received the sanction of the Cabinet, was as +follows:</p> +<pre> + 8 Flotilla leaders. 500 Trawlers. + 65 T.B.D.'s. 60 Submarines. + 34 Sloops. 4 Seaplane carriers. + 48 Screw minesweepers. 60 Boom defence vessels. + 16 Paddle " +</pre> +<p>During the early part of 1917 it was decided to substitute 56 +screw minesweepers and 8 paddle sweepers for the approved programme +of this class of vessel and to add another 50 screw minesweepers to +meet the growing mine menace, as well as to substitute 115 drifters +for 50 of the trawlers, and to request the Canadian Government to +build 36 trawlers and 100 drifters mainly for use in Canadian +waters. It was also decided to lay down 36 mercantile decoy ships +and 12 tugs, and to build 56 motor skimmers on the lines of the +coastal motor boats, which were then showing their value off the +Belgian coast. The programme therefore, in May, 1917, was as +follows:</p> +<pre> + Flotilla leaders 8 + T.B.D.'s 65 + Patrol boats 6 + Sloops 34 + Minesweepers (screw) 56 + " (paddle) 8 + Additional twin-screw minesweepers 50 + Submarines 60 + Trawlers 450 + Drifters 115 + Canadian trawlers 36 + " drifters 100 + Boom defence vessels 60 + Mercantile decoy ships 36 + Seaplane carriers 4 + Tugs 12 + Motor skimmers 56 +</pre> +<p>Meanwhile intelligence had been received which indicated that +Germany was building such a considerable number of light cruisers +as to jeopardize our supremacy in this class of vessel, and it was +decided by the Board that we ought to build eight more light +cruisers even at the cost of appropriating the steel intended for +the construction of six merchant ships.</p> +<p>Further, the German submarine programme was developing with +great rapidity, and our own submarines of the "L" class were taking +a very long time to build. It was therefore proposed to substitute +eighteen additional "H" class submarines for four of the "L" class, +as the vessels of the "H" class were capable of more rapid +construction, thus making the total number of submarines on order +74. Approval was also sought for the addition of 24 destroyers and +four "P" boats to the programme, bringing the number of destroyers +on order up to a total of 89.</p> +<p>The programme was approved, a slight change being made in the +matter of the seaplane carriers by fitting out one of the "Raleigh" +class of cruisers as a seaplane vessel in order to obtain an +increased number of vessels of this type more rapidly than by +building. Later in the year the cruiser <i>Furious</i> was also +converted into a seaplane carrier, and she carried out much useful +work in 1918.</p> +<center>MERCANTILE SHIPBUILDING</center> +<p>A greatly increased output of merchant ships had been +anticipated under the new organization, which placed mercantile +construction under the Admiralty Controller instead of under the +Ministry of Shipping. It was expected that the difficulties due, +under the previous arrangement, to competing claims for steel and +labour would vanish with very beneficial results.</p> +<p>It was, as previously stated, mainly with this object that the +Admiralty had agreed to the change. The start was promising enough. +After a review of the situation hopes were held out that during the +second half of 1917 an addition of about 1,000,000 tons of shipping +from the shipyards within the United Kingdom would be effected. +This figure, indeed, was given to the House of Commons by the Prime +Minister on August 16, 1917.</p> +<p>On comparing this figure with that of the first half of the year +(a total of about 484,000 tons) there was distinct cause for +gratification; it is right to state that Admiralty officials who +had previously been watching mercantile shipbuilding regarded the +estimate as very optimistic. Further, it was anticipated by the +then Admiralty Controller, Sir Eric Geddes, that during the year +1918, with some addition to the labour strength, a total output of +nearly two million tons was possible, provided steel was +forthcoming, whilst with considerably greater additions to the +labour strength and to the supply of steel, and with the help of +the National Shipyards proposed by the Controller, the total output +might even reach three million tons.</p> +<p>The actual results fell very short of these forecasts, the total +output for the second half of the year was only 620,000 tons, the +monthly totals in gross tonnage for the whole year being:</p> +<pre> + January 46,929 July 81,188 + February 78,436 August 100,900 + March 115,654 September 60,685 + April 67,536 October 145,844 + May 68,083 November 158,826 + June 108,397 December 112,486 +</pre> +<p>In January, 1918, the total dropped to 58,568 tons, and in +February was only 100,038 tons. In March it was announced that Lord +Pirie would take the position of Controller General of Merchant +Shipbuilding. The subsequent results in the direction of output of +merchant ships do not properly come within the scope of this book, +which is intended to deal only with work during the year 1917, but +it may be of interest to give here the output month by month. It +was as follows:</p> +<pre> + January 58,568 July 141,948 + February 100,038 August 124,675 + March 161,674 September 144,772 + April 111,533 October 136,000 + May 197,274 November 105,093 + June 134,159 December 118,276 + + Total for the year 1,534,110 +</pre> +<p>It will be seen that the results for 1918 were an improvement on +those for 1917, the exact figure for that year being 1,163,474 +tons; these results, however, fell very short of the optimistic +estimates given in July, 1917.</p> +<center>MERCANTILE REPAIR WORK</center> +<p>The Controller's Department undoubtedly succeeded in the work of +improving the arrangements for the repair of merchant ships. This +is shown by an analysis of the total number of vessels that +<i>completed</i> repairs during various months.</p> +<p>In August, 1917, the number was 382, with a tonnage of +1,183,000. In November the figure became 542 ships, with a tonnage +of 1,509,000. There remained under repair at the end of August 326 +ships, and at the end of November 350 ships, these figures +indicating that the greater number of completions was not due to +the smaller number of vessels being damaged or the damages being +less in extent.</p> +<p>Considerable credit is due to the Department for this successful +acceleration of repair work which naturally had a great influence +on the shipping situation.</p> +<center>ARMAMENT PRODUCTION</center> +<p>It was not, I think, realized either by the Government or by the +civilians brought into the Admiralty during the year 1917 that +there was a very great difference between the Admiralty and the War +Office organizations in the matter of production of material, nor +was it recognized that naval officers are by their training and +experience better fitted to deal with such matters on a large scale +than are military officers, except perhaps officers in the +Artillery and Royal Engineers. Whatever may be the case in the +future, the Navy in pre-war days was so much more dependent on +material than the Army as to make questions relating to naval +material of far greater importance that was the case with military +material. This fact is apt to be forgotten by those writers on +naval affairs who think that an intimate knowledge of questions +relating to naval material <i>and its use</i> is of little +importance. I trust that this belief will never become general in +the service, for the naval officer who is not familiar with the +design and production of material is handicapped when he comes to +use it.</p> +<p>Ignorance of the great experience of the Admiralty in handling +problems of production and of the past success of Admiralty methods +in this respect gave rise to a good deal of misconception. The fact +that it had been necessary to form a separate Ministry (that of +Munitions) to deal with the production of war material for the Army +probably fostered the idea that matters at the Admiralty should be +altered in a similar direction.</p> +<p>The post of Deputy Controller of Armament Production was created +under the new organization, and all matters concerning the +production of guns, gun-mountings, projectiles, cordite, torpedoes, +mines, paravanes and all other war material was placed under him. I +have dealt earlier in this chapter with the questions of design and +inspection over which some disagreement arose.</p> +<p>I was not conscious that the new organization succeeded in +speeding up armament production during 1917, and during the latter +part of the year I was much concerned with the delays in ordnance +production as revealed during 1917 and as exposed by the forecasts +for 1918.</p> +<p>It is very possible, on the other hand, that in the case of +mines the results were good. The old Admiralty organization had not +been equipped to deal with such an immense number of mines as were +on order, and although a large organization for their production +was started by Sir Lionel Halsey, when Fourth Sea Lord, with the +assistance of Admiral Fitzherbert and Captain Litchfield-Speer, it +had not been sufficiently long at work for an opinion to be given +as to whether the results in production would have been as good as +under the D.C.A.P.</p> +<p>In considering the whole question of production during the year +1917 it should be borne in mind that very extensive orders were +placed in the early part of that year for guns, gun-mountings, +mines, warships of the smaller class and patrol craft, and that if +we compare only the actual output for 1917 with that of previous +years without taking the above fact into account, we might form an +incorrect impression as to the success of the organization for +production. For instance, in the last quarter of 1917, 1,515 guns +of all calibres were delivered, as against 1,101 in the first +quarter; in the month of November 1,335 mines of all natures and +2,078 depth charges were filled, as compared with 625 mines and 542 +depth charges in July. These figures were the result of the large +orders placed early in the year, and it was not until 1918 that the +full fruits of the orders placed in 1917 became apparent. The +figures for that year, however, are not at my disposal.</p> +<p>One great advantage which resulted from the new organization, +viz., the creation of a Directorate of Materials and Priority, must +be mentioned. This Directorate controlled the distribution of all +steel for all services and produced a very beneficial effect on the +issue of supplies of steel to shipbuilders. The immense increase in +staff which resulted from the institution of the office of +Admiralty Controller is exhibited in the lists of staff in 1918 as +compared with the staff in the early part of 1917.</p> +<hr> +<a name="CH11"><!-- CH11 --></a> +<h2>CHAPTER XI</h2> +<center>NAVAL WORK</center> +<p>The main effort of the Navy during the year 1917 was directed +towards the defeat of the enemy's submarines, since the Central +Powers confined their naval effort almost entirely to this form of +warfare, but many other problems occupied our attention at the +Admiralty, and some of these may be mentioned.</p> +<p>Considerable discussion took place in the early part of the year +on the subject of the policy to be pursued in the Eastern theatre +of war, and naval opinion on the possibility of effecting a landing +in force at different points was invited and given. It need only be +said here that the matter was brought forward more than once, and +that the situation from the naval point of view was always clear. +The feasible landing places so far as we were concerned were +unsuited to the military strategy at that period; the time required +to collect or build the great number of lighters, horse boats, +etc., for the strong force required was not available, and it was a +sheer impossibility to provide in a short period all the small +craft needed for an operation of magnitude, whilst the provision of +the necessary anti-submarine defences would have taxed our +resources to the utmost and have prevented essential work of this +nature in other theatres.</p> +<p>The work of the Navy, therefore, <i>off the coast of +Palestine</i> was confined to protecting the left flank of the +advancing army and assisting its operations, and to establishing, +as the troops advanced, bases on the coast at which stores, etc., +could be landed. This task was effectively carried out.</p> +<p>The anchorages on this coast are all entirely open to the sea, +and become untenable at very short notice, so that the work of the +Navy was always carried out under considerable difficulty. Nor +could the ships working on the flank be adequately guarded against +submarine attack, and some losses were experienced, the most +important being the sinking of Monitor M15 and the destroyer +<i>Staunch</i> by a submarine attack off Deir el Belah (nine miles +south of Gaza) in November.</p> +<p>The Navy continued its co-operation with the Army in the +<i>Salonika theatre of war</i>, assisted by the Royal Naval Air +Service, and bombardments were continually carried out on military +objectives. Similarly <i>in the Adriatic</i> our monitors and +machines of the R.N.A.S. assisted the military forces of the +Allies; particularly was this the case at the time of the Austrian +advance to the Piave, where our monitors did much useful work in +checking enemy attempts to cross that river.</p> +<p><i>Off the Gallipoli Peninsula</i> the Naval watch on the mouth +of the Dardanelles was continued; extensive new minefields were +laid during the year, and were effective in sinking the +<i>Breslau</i> and severely damaging the <i>Goeben</i> when those +vessels attempted a sortie on January 20, 1918. The R.N.A.S. during +the year carried out many long distance reconnaissance and bombing +operations over Constantinople and the vicinity.</p> +<p><i>In the Red Sea</i> Naval operations were carried out in +conjunction with friendly Arabs, and the Arabian coast cleared of +Turkish forces.</p> +<p><i>In the White Sea</i> during the latter part of 1917 the whole +of the Naval work fell upon British Naval forces when the Russian +ships, which had co-operated hitherto, had come under the influence +of the political situation. Our force in these waters consisted +largely of trawlers engaged in minesweeping and escort work. The +latter duty imposed a very heavy strain on officers and men, +involving as it did the safe conduct during the year of no fewer +than one thousand ships carrying stores and munitions for the +Russian military forces.</p> +<p><i>In the Baltic</i> the situation became very difficult owing +first to the Russian revolution and, finally, to the Russian +debacle. Our force in these waters consisted of seven submarines. +It became evident at the beginning of October, 1917, that the +Germans were intending to carry out some operations in the Baltic +against Russia, and the question of affording assistance was at +once considered by the Naval Staff. It was surmised that but little +dependence could be placed on the Russian Baltic Fleet (events +showed this surmise to be accurate), and in order to keep our +control over the North Sea and ensure the safety of our +communications with France it was obvious that for any action we +might decide to take we should be obliged to divide the Grand +Fleet, sending such portion of that Command into the Baltic as +could successfully engage the High Sea Fleet if encountered, as +well as to secure the return passage via the Great Belt, and +retaining a sufficient force to deal with such German vessels as +might attempt operations in the North Sea or Channel during our +raid into the Baltic.</p> +<p>There were many ways in which the Germans might seriously +hamper, if not entirely prevent, the return of our fleet from the +Baltic unless we secured the exits. The Great Belt could easily be +closed by block-ships at its narrowest points, and extensive +minefields could be laid. It was obvious, therefore, that to secure +the exit a strong force would be required, and that it would +necessarily occupy a position where it would be open to serious +attack.</p> +<p>The initial operation of gaining access to the Baltic via the +Great Belt, though not impossible, was difficult, involving as it +did sweeping passages through very extensive minefields, and even +when our ships were in the Baltic fairly constant sweeping would be +necessary.</p> +<p>Finally, the whole operation would be complicated by the +question of fuel supply, especially to the destroyers and other +small craft with a limited radius of action, since we could not +depend upon Russian sources of supply. These were amongst the +considerations which made it clear that the operation was not one +that I could recommend. The Russian naval view is given in the +following statement which appeared in the Russian Press in +October:</p> +<p>The Naval General Staff categorically denies the rumours +circulated in Petrograd on the 8th and 9th instant, to the effect +that the British or French Fleet had broken through to the Baltic +Sea.</p> +<p>At the same time it is pointed out that it would be a physical +impossibility for the Allies' Fleet to come in from the western +entrance, because it would be necessary to pass through the Sound +or through one of the two Belts.</p> +<p>Entry to the Sound through Danish or Swedish waters could not +also be affected owing to the fact that these waters in part are +only 18 feet deep, while large-sized vessels would require at least +30 feet of water.</p> +<p>As regards the entry to the Belts, this would be an extremely +hazardous undertaking as parts of the routes are under control of +the Germans who have constructed their own defences consisting of +mines and batteries.</p> +<p>In these circumstances, according to the opinion of our naval +experts, an entrance into the Baltic by the Allies' Fleets could +only be undertaken after gaining possession of these waters and the +adjacent coast; and then only with the co-operation of land +forces.</p> +<p>The Germans had an easy task in the Baltic, as the Russian +resistance was not of a serious nature; our submarines attacked on +every possible occasion, and scored some successes against German +vessels. Towards the end of the year it became necessary to +consider the action to be taken in regard to our submarines, as the +German control of the Baltic became effective, and the +demobilization of the Russian fleet became more and more +pronounced. Many schemes for securing their escape from these +waters were discussed, but the chances of success were so small, +and the submarines themselves possessed so little fighting value +owing to their age, that eventually instructions were sent to the +senior officer to destroy the submarines before they could fall +into German hands.</p> +<hr> +<a name="CH12"><!-- CH12 --></a> +<h2>CHAPTER XII</h2> +<center>THE FUTURE</center> +<p>It is natural that the task of recounting the facts in the +foregoing chapters should cause one's thoughts to turn to the +future. The Empire has passed through a period of great danger, +during which its every interest was threatened, and it has come +successfully out of the ordeal, but to those upon whom the +responsibility lay of initiating and directing the nation's policy +the serious nature of the perils which faced us were frequently +such as to justify the grave anxiety which sprang from full +knowledge of events and their significance.</p> +<p>An international organization is in process of being brought +into existence which, if it does not entirely prevent a recurrence +of the horrors of the four and a half years of war, will, it is +hoped, at least minimize the chances of the repetition of such an +experience as that through which the world has so recently passed. +But the League of Nations is still only a skeleton to be clothed +with authority and supported by the public opinion of the world if +it is to be a success. It is in its infancy, and so far the most +optimistic have not advanced beyond hopes in its efficiency; and if +the lessons of the past are correctly interpreted, as they were +interpreted by our forefathers in their day, those upon whom +responsibility lies in future years for the safety and prosperity +of the Empire will see to it that, so far as lies in their power, +whatever else may be left undone, the security of the sea +communications of the Empire is ensured. Not one of us but must +have realized during the war, if he did not realize it before, that +the all-important thing upon which we must set our minds is the +ability to use the sea communications of the far-flung Empire, +which is only united by the seas so long as we can use them. But +while governments may realize their duty in this matter, and set +out with good intentions, it is, after all, upon the people who +elect governments that the final responsibility lies, and therefore +it is to them that it is so necessary to bring home in season and +out of season the dangers that confront us if our sea +communications are imperilled.</p> +<p>The danger which confronted the British peoples was never so +great in any previous period as it was during the year 1917 when +the submarine menace was at its height, and it may be hoped that +the lessons to be learned from the history of those months will +never be forgotten. The British Empire differs from any other +nation or empire which has ever existed. Our sea communications are +our very life-blood, and it is not greatly exaggerating the case to +say that the safety of those communications is the one +consideration of first-class importance. Upon a solid sense of +their security depends not only our prosperity, but also the actual +lives of a large proportion of the inhabitants. There is no other +nation in the world which is situated as the people of these +islands are situated; therefore there is no other nation to whom +sea power is in the least degree as essential as it is to us. Four +out of five of our loaves and most of our raw materials for +manufacture must come to us by sea, and it is only by the sea that +we can hold any commercial intercourse with the Dominions, +Dependencies and Crown Colonies, which together make up what we +call the Empire, with a population of 400,000,000 people.</p> +<p>What, then, are we to do in the future to ensure the safety of +the communications between these islands and the rest of the +Empire? As a matter of course we should be in a position to +safeguard them against any possible form of attack from whatever +quarter it may come. So far as can be seen there is no present +likelihood of the transport of food or raw materials being effected +in anything but vessels which move upon the surface of the sea. It +is true that, as a result of the war, people's thoughts turn in the +direction of transport, both of human beings and of merchandise, by +air or under the water, but there is no possible chance, for at +least a generation to come, of either of these methods of transport +being able to compete commercially with transport in vessels +sailing on the sea. Therefore the problem of guarding our +communications resolves itself into one of securing the safety of +vessels which move upon the surface of the sea, whatever may be the +character of the attack.</p> +<p>I do not desire to enter into any discussion here as to the +method by which these vessels can be protected, except to say that +it is necessary for us to be in a position of superiority in all +the weapons by which their safety may be endangered. At the present +time there are two principal forms of attack: (1) by vessels which +move on the surface, and (2) by vessels which move under water. A +third danger—namely, one from the air—is also becoming +of increasing importance. The war has shown us how to ensure safety +against the first two forms of attack, and our duty as members of a +great maritime Empire is to take steps to maintain effective forces +for the purpose.</p> +<p>In order to carry out this duty it will be greatly to our +advantage if the matter can be dealt with by all the constituent +parts of the Empire. A recent tour of the greater part of the +British Empire has shown me that the importance of sea power is +very fully realized by the great majority of our kith and kin +overseas, and that there is a strong desire on their part to +co-operate in what is, after all, the concern of the whole Empire. +It seems to me of the greatest possible importance that this matter +of an Empire naval policy and an Empire naval organization should +be settled at the earliest possible moment, and that it should be +looked at from the broadest point of view.</p> +<p>I do not think that we in this country can claim to have taken +into sufficient account the very natural views and the very natural +ambitions which animate the peoples overseas. We have, in point of +fact, looked at the whole question too locally, whilst we have been +suggesting to the Dominions that they are inclined to make this +error, and unless we depart from that attitude there is a +possibility that we shall not reap the full benefit of the +resources of the Empire, which are very great and are increasing. +In war it is not only the material which counts, but the spirit of +a people, and we must enlist the support, spontaneous and +effective, of every section of the King's Dominions in the task of +sea defence which lies before us, consulting fully and unreservedly +the representatives of our kith and kin, and giving them the +benefit of whatever instructed advice we, with ancient traditions +and matured knowledge, may possess.</p> +<p>In framing our future naval policy it is obvious that we must be +guided by what is being done abroad. We are bound to keep an +absolutely safe margin of naval strength, and that margin must +exist in all arms and in all classes of vessels. At the moment, and +no doubt for some time to come, difficulties in regard to finance +will exist, but it would seem to be nothing more than common sense +to insist that the one service which is vital to our existence +should be absolutely the last to suffer for need of money. During a +period of the greatest financial pressure it may be necessary to +economize somewhat in the construction of new ships, and in the +upkeep of certain of our naval bases which the result of the war +and consequent considerations of future strategy may suggest to be +not of immediate importance, although even here it may well be +necessary to develop other naval bases to meet changed conditions; +but we cannot afford to fall behind in organization, in the testing +and development of new ideas, or in the strength of our personnel +or in its training. A well trained personnel and a carefully +thought out organization cannot by any possibility be quickly +extemporized.</p> +<p>It is the height of economic folly to stint experimental +research, for it is in times of stress that the value of past +experimental work is shown. In the matter of organization we must +be certain that adequate means are taken to ensure that the +different arms which must co-operate in war are trained to work +together under peace conditions. A modern fleet consists of many +units of different types—battleships, battle-cruisers, light +cruisers, destroyers and submarines. Before I relinquished the +command of the Grand Fleet, large sea-going submarines of high +speed, vessels of the "K" class, had been built to accompany the +surface vessels to sea. It is very essential that senior officers +should have every opportunity of studying tactical schemes in which +various classes of ships and kinds of weapons are employed. In +considering the future of the Navy it is impossible to ignore +aircraft. There are many important problems which the Navy and the +Air Service ought to work out together. A fleet without aircraft +will be a fleet without eyes, and aircraft will, moreover, be +necessary, not only for reconnaissance work, but for gun-spotting, +as well as, possibly, for submarine hunting. Air power is regarded +by many officers of wide practical experience as an essential +complement to sea power, whatever future the airship and aeroplane +may have for independent action. A captain who is going to fight +his ship successfully must have practised in time of peace with all +the weapons he will employ in action, and he must have absolute +control over all the elements constituting the fighting power of +his ship. In a larger sense, the same may be said of an admiral in +command of a fleet; divided control may mean disaster. The advent +of aircraft has introduced new and, at present, only partially +explored problems into naval warfare, and officers commanding naval +forces will require frequent opportunities of studying them. They +must be worked out with naval vessels and aircraft acting in close +association. With the Air Service under separate control, +financially as well as in an executive and administrative sense, is +it certain that the Admiralty will be able to obtain machines and +personnel in the necessary numbers to carry out all the +experimental and training work that is essential for efficiency in +action? Is it also beyond doubt that unity of command at sea, which +is essential to victory, will be preserved? In view of all the +possibilities which the future holds now that the airship and +aeroplane have arrived, it is well that there should be no doubt on +such matters, for inefficiency might in conceivable circumstances +spell defeat.</p> +<p>Then there is the question of the personnel of the fleet. It +would be most unwise to allow the strength of the trained personnel +of the Navy to fall below the limit of reasonable safety, because +it is upon that trained personnel that the success of the enormous +expansions needed in war so largely depends. This was found during +the late struggle, when the personnel was expanded from 150,000 to +upwards of 400,000, throwing upon the pre-war nucleus a heavy +responsibility in training, equipment and organizing. Without the +backbone of a highly trained personnel of sufficient strength, +developments in time of sudden emergency cannot possibly be +effected. In the late war we suffered in this respect, and we +should not forget the lesson.</p> +<p>In future wars, if any such should occur, trained personnel will +be of even greater importance than it was in the Great War, because +the advance of science increases constantly the importance of the +highly trained individual, and if nothing else is certain it can +surely be predicted that science will play an increasing part in +warfare in the future. Only those officers and men who served +afloat in the years immediately preceding the opening of +hostilities know how great the struggle was to gain that high pitch +of efficiency which the Navy had reached at the outbreak of war, +and it was the devotion to duty of our magnificent pre-war +personnel that went far to ensure our victory. It is essential that +the Navy of the future should not be given a yet harder task than +fell to the Navy of the past as a result of a policy of starving +the personnel.</p> +<p>There is, perhaps, just one other point upon which I might touch +in conclusion. I would venture to suggest to my countrymen that +there should be a full realization of the fact that the Naval +Service as a whole is a highly specialized profession. It is one in +which the senior officers have passed the whole of their lives, and +during their best years their thoughts are turned constantly in one +direction—namely, how they can best fit the Navy and +themselves for possible war. The country as a whole has probably +but little idea of the great amount of technical knowledge that is +demanded of the naval officer in these days. He must possess this +knowledge in addition to the lessons derived from his study of war, +and the naval officer is learning from the day that he enters the +Service until the day that he leaves it.</p> +<p>The Navy, then, is a profession which is at least as highly +specialized as that of a surgeon, an engineer, or a lawyer. +Consequently, it would seem a matter of common sense that those who +have not adopted the Navy as a profession should pay as much +respect to the professional judgment of the naval officer as they +would to that of the surgeon or the engineer or the lawyer, each in +his own sphere. Governments are, of course, bound to be responsible +for the policy of the country, and policy governs defence, but, +both in peace and in war, I think it will be agreed that the work +of governments in naval affairs should end at policy, and that the +remainder should be left to the expert. That is the basis of real +economy in association with efficiency, and victory in war goes to +the nation which, under stress and strain, develops the highest +efficiency in action.</p> +<hr> +<a name="IDX"><!-- IDX --></a> +<h2>INDEX</h2> +<pre> +<i>Abdiel</i> as minelayer, +Admiralty, the, American co-operation at, + and the control of convoys, + anomalies at, + lack of naval officers at, + naval air policy of, + official summary of changes in personnel of Board, + over-centralization at, + "production" at, in 1917, + reorganization at, + the Staff in October, 1916, + in April, 1917, + end of December, 1917, + end of November, 1918, +Admiralty Controller, appointment of an, +Admiralty Organization for Production, growth of the, +Adriatic, the, Austrian destroyers in, + R.N.A.S. assists military forces of Allies in, +Aegean Sea, the, British destroyers in, +Aeroplane, the Handley-Page type of, +Aeroplane stations, +Air Ministry, the, establishment of, +Air power as complement to sea power, +Aircraft, bombing attacks by, + for anti-submarine work, + the eyes of a fleet, +Airship stations, +Airships as protection for convoys, +Allied Naval Council, formation of, +America enters the war, + (see also United States) +American battleships and destroyers in British waters, +Anderson, Sir A.G., +Anti-flash arrangements, improvements of, +Anti-submarine convoy escorting force, the, strengthened, +Anti-submarine devices, +Anti-submarine Division of Naval Staff, Directors of, + formation of, +Anti-submarine instructional schools, +Anti-submarine operations, +Anti-submarine protection for ports of assembly, +Approach areas, and how protected, +Arabian coast cleared of Turkish forces, +Armament production, +Armed merchant ships, +Armour-piercing shell, an improved, +Armstrong, Commander Sir George, +Atlantic convoys, losses in, + organization of system of, +<i>Audacious</i>, loss of, +Auxiliary patrols, deficiency in deliveries of, + in home waters and in Mediterranean zones, + +Bacon, Sir Reginald, + a daring scheme of, abandoned, + author's tribute to, + his book on the "Dover Patrol," + his proposal for Folkestone-Cape Grisnez minefield, + organizes coastal bombardments, + witnesses bombardment of Ostend, +Baker, Rear-Admiral Clinton, +Balfour, Rt. Hon. A.J., a mission to the United States, + offers author post of First Sea Lord, +Baltic, the, a difficult situation in, +Barrage, Folkestone-Cape Grisnez, + four forms of, + off Belgian coast, + the Dover, + the North Sea, + the Otranio, +Bayly, Admiral Sir Lewis, in command at Queenstown, +Belgian coast, barrage off, + mining the, +Bell, Sir Thomas, +Benson, Admiral, and author, + visits England, +Bergen, Capt. Halsey's appointment to, +Bethlehem Steel Company, the, +Bird, Captain F., of the Dover patrol, +Blackwood, Commander M., +Blockade of German ports, difficulties of, +Board of Invention and Research, the (B.I.R.), +Bomb-throwers and howitzers, +Bonner, Lieutenant Charles G., awarded the V.C., +Boxer campaign in China, the, +<i>Breslau</i>, loss of, +British and German production of submarines, etc., compared, +British Empire, the, importance of security of sea communications of, +British merchant steamships, losses from submarines, + losses of unescorted, + submarine sinks enemy destroyer, +Brock, Admiral Sir Frederick, and the disaster to the Scandinavian + convoy, +<i>Broke</i>, action with German destroyers, + conveys author to witness bombardment of Ostend, +Brown, Commander Yeats, +Browning, Vice-Admiral Sir Montague, confers with U.S. Navy Department, +Bruges, aerial attacks on, as enemy base, + enemy evacuation of, +proposed long-range bombardment of, +Burney, Admiral Sir Cecil, at Rosyth, + Second Sea Lord, +Burney, Lieutenant Dennis, a clever device of, +Burton, Lieutenant G. E., + +Calais, enemy destroyer raids on, +Calthorpe, Admiral (see Gough-Calthorpe) +Campbell, Captain Gordon, + awarded the V.C., + fights with submarines, + sinks an enemy submarine, +Canadian Government asked to build vessels for use in Canadian waters, +Cape Grisnez-Folkestone mine barrage, +Capelle, Admiral von, and submarine construction, +Cardiff, instructional anti-submarine school at, +Carrington, Commander I.W., +Carson, Sir Edward, a tribute to, + and the defensive arming of merchant ships, + becomes First Lord, + leaves the Admiralty, + offers post of Admiralty Controller to Sir Eric Geddes, +Cassady, Lieut. G.L., awarded the D.S.C., +Cattaro, Germans destroy their submarines at, +Cayley, Rear-Admiral C.G., +Cayley, Commander H.F., +Cervera, Admiral, and the Spanish-American War, +Chain-sweep, a, introduction of, +Chatham, gunnery courses for cadets and apprentices at, + instructional anti-submarine school at, +Chief of the Staff, duties and responsibilities of, +Churchill, Right Hon. Winston, and Staff organization, +Coal-ships, French, convoy of, +Coastal motor boats, +Coastal traffic, regulation of: typical instructions, +Colville, Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley, +Constantinople, bombing operations in vicinity of, +Convoy commodores, appointment of, +Convoy Section of Trade Division of Naval Staff, the, +"Convoy sloops," +Convoy system, the, a committee on, at the Admiralty, + growth of, + introduction of, + successful organization and working of, + the system at work, +Convoys, as protection against submarine attack: success of, + enemy attacks on, + losses in homeward and outward bound, +Coode, Captain C.P.R., +Crisp, Thomas, of the <i>Nelson</i>, +Cross-Channel sailings and losses, +Crystal Palace, Royal Naval Depot at, + author's visit to, + +Dakar convoy, the, +Dare, Admiral Sir Charles, +Dartmouth, a successful attack on an enemy submarine off, +Dazzle painting for merchant ships, system of, +De Bon, Admiral, +De Chair, Rear-Admiral Sir Dudley, and the U.S. mission, +Decoy ships, + and the convoy of merchant shipping, + fitted with torpedo tubes, + number of enemy submarines sunk by, + typical actions fought by, +Delay action fuses, +Denison, Admiral John, +Depth charge throwers, +Depth charges, + enemy submarine victims to, +Deputy Controller of Armament Production, appointment of a, +Destroyers, American, in British waters, + and patrol craft, number of enemy submarines sunk by, + available force in February, 1917 + average output of British, + enemy flotilla of, intercepted, + essential to Grand Fleet, + fitted with "fish" hydrophones, + heavy strain on, + hunting flotillas of, +Destroyers, inadequate number of British, + of the Dover Patrol, + time taken in building, +Devonport, gunnery courses for cadets and apprentices at, +D'Eyncourt, Sir Eustace T., +Directional hydrophones, +Directorate of Materials and Priority, creation of, +Dover, daily average of mercantile marine passing, + enemy destroyer raids on, +Dover Patrol, the, + an enemy attack on, + Sir Reginald Bacon's book on, + the Sixth Flotilla and its arduous work, +Dover, Straits of, inefficiency of the barrage, + minelaying in, + passage of U-boats through, +Dreyer, Captain F.C., + and the defensive arming of merchant ships, + appointed Director of Naval Ordnance, + energy of, +Drift nets, mines fitted to, +Drifters, work of, +Duff, Rear-Admiral A.L., + a tribute to, + becomes A.C.N.S., +Dunkirk, enemy destroyer raids on, + Royal Naval Force at, and their work, + <i>Dunraven</i> (decoy ship), a gallant fight by, +Dutch convoy, the, + +East coast and Norway, trade between, convoyed, +East Coast, the, volume of trade on, and difficulty of proper +protection of, +Electrical submarine detector, the, +<i>Elsie</i>, +English coast towns, destroyer raids on, +Escorts for merchant shipping, +Ethel and Millie sunk by submarine, +Evans, Captain E.R.G.R., of the <i>Broke</i>, rams an enemy vessel, + +Falmouth convoy, the, + losses in 1917, +Farrington, Captain Alexander, and decoy ships, +"Fish" hydrophones, invention of, +Fisher, Lord, + destroyer programme of, +Fisher, Captain W.W., Director of Anti-Submarine Division, + tribute to, +Fitzherbert, Rear-Admiral the Hon. Edward, + appointed Director of Torpedoes and Mines, +"Flares," + for night illumination of minefields, +Folkestone-Cape Grisnez mine barrage, +Ford Company, the (U.S.A.), +France, the Staff organization at G.H.Q. in, +Fremantle, Rear-Admiral Sydney, +French, Sir John (Field-Marshal Viscount), +French Admiralty, the, cordial co-operation with Allies, +French coal trade, the, convoy of, + losses in 1917, +Fuller, Captain C.T.M., +Funakoshi, Admiral, Japanese Naval Attache in London, +<i>Furious</i> converted into a seaplane carrier, + +Gallipoli, hydrophone training school at, + naval work at, +Gauchet, Vice-Admiral, +Geddes, Sir Eric, becomes Admiralty Controller, + becomes First Lord, + disappointing forecasts of, +General Headquarters in France, Staff organization at, +German Army, von Schellendorft; on Staff work in, +German attacks on convoys, + campaign against merchant shipping, + operations in the Baltic against Russia, + prisoners assist a decoy ship to port, + star shells, efficiency of, + submarine commanders and decoy ships, + submarine fleet at commencement of war and subsequent additions, + view of entry of America into the war, +Germans, the, a new weapon of, + destroy their submarines, + their choice of objectives for night attacks, + their lack of enterprise, + tip-and-run raids by, +Germany, America declares war on, + estimated total of submarines in 1917, + her submarine production, + naval programme of, + submarine force of and her losses, +Gibb, Colonel Alexander, +Gibraltar, an American detachment at, + an experimental convoy collected at, +Gibraltar convoy, the, + a reason for heavy losses in, +Gibraltar convoy, the, losses in 1917, +<i>Glen</i> (decoy ship), +<i>Goeben</i> severely damaged, +Gough-Calthorpe, Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Somerset, his Mediterranean + command, +<i>Gowan Lea</i>, +<i>Grand Duke</i> trawler, +Grand Fleet, the, changes in command of, + destroyers and, + destroyers used for Atlantic trade, +Grant, Captain H.W., +Grant, Rear-Admiral Heathcote, his command at Gibraltar, +Greenock, instructional anti-submarine school at, +Gunnery courses for cadets and apprentices, + +Haig, Sir Douglas (Earl), commends work of air force, +Halifax convoy, the, +Hall, Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald, +Halsey, Captain Arthur, appointed Naval Vice-Consul at Bergen, +Halsey, Commodore (Rear-Admiral) Lionel, + becomes Third Sea Lord, +Hampton Roads and New York convoy, + losses in 1917, +Harwich, hydrophone station at, +Harwich force, the, and its commander, + duties of, + intercepts a flotilla of German destroyers, +Hawkcraig, hydrophone station at, +Heath, Vice-Admiral Sir H.L., +Heligoland Bight, mining of, + proclaimed a dangerous area, +Henderson, Captain Reginald G.H., + a tribute to, +Henderson, Captain Reginald G.H., and the convoy system, +Homeward-bound convoys, losses in, +Hope, Rear-Admiral George P.W., appointed Deputy First Sea Lord, +Hopwood, Sir Francis (Lord Southborough), +Hotham, Captain A.G., +Howard, Captain W. Vansittart, +Howitzers and bomb-throwers, +Hydrophone stations and training schools, +Hydrophones, + directional, + fitted to auxiliary patrols, + +Irvine, Lieutenant, fights a submarine, + +Jackson, Admiral Sir Heney, + First Sea Lord, +Jackson, Captain, injured in a motor accident, +Japanese destroyers in the Mediterranean, +Jellicoe, Admiral (Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa), a personal telegram to + Mr. Schwab, + a tour of the British Empire and its lessons, + amicable relations with U.S. Navy, + and merchant ship construction, + and the building programme of 1916, + and the Dover Patrol, + and the future naval policy, + and the reorganization at the Admiralty, + and the submarine menace, +Jellicoe, Admiral (Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa), becomes First Sea Lord + and Chief of Naval Staff, + confers with Mr. Balfour, + friendship with Admiral Mayo, + his admiration for the work of Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, + his proposals for Admiralty reorganization, + on the convoy system, + on the work of destroyers, + praises work and organization of convoys, + relations with Admiral Sims, + unveils a memorial to Lieut. Commander Sanders, + visits New Zealand, + witnesses bombardment of Ostend, + wounded in the Boxer campaign, +Jutland battle, and the shells used in, + +Kite balloons, + +Lacaze, Admiral, +Lambe, Captain C.L., and his command, +Lamlash convoy, the, + losses in 1917, +League of Nations, the, +Learmonth, Captain F.C., +Lerwick as junction for convoy system, + enemy mining of, +Leslie, N.A., +Ley, Rear-Admiral J.C., +Litchfield-Speer, Captain, +Lockyer, Commander E.L.B., +Longden, Captain H.W. +Lowestoft, average daily number of vessels passing, + bombardment of, +<i>Lusitania</i>, loss of, + +MacNamara, Right Hon. T.J., +Madden, Admiral Sir Charles, +Malta, hydrophone training school at, +Manisty, Fleet Paymaster H.W.E., + appointed Organizing Manager of Convoys, +Margate, bombardment of, +Mark-Wardlaw, Lieutenant, decoy ship of, +Marx, Admiral J.L., +Mary <i>Rose</i>, sinking of, +Mayo, Admiral, and author, + object of his visit to England, + visits Grand Fleet, + witnesses bombardment of Ostend, +Mediterranean, the, Japanese destroyers in, + narrow waters of, + need of a unified command in, + shipping losses in 1917 in, +Mercantile marine, daily average of, + passing Lowestoft and Dover, + schools of instruction for, + wireless for, + (See also Merchant ships) +Mercantile Movements Division, formation of, + its head, +Mercantile repair work, + shipbuilding, +Merchant ships, arming of, + convoying, + losses of, + route orders for, + submarines and, + (Cf. Mercantile marine) +Merz, Sir Charles H., +Milford Haven convoy, the, + losses in 1917, +Mine-cutters (see Paravanes) +Minelayers, fleet of, strengthened, +Minelaying, British and German methods of, contrasted, +Minelaying by submarines, + difficulty of dealing with problem of, +Mine net barrage, definition of, +Mines, American, + Britain, number laid in 1915-17, + number of submarines sunk by, +Mines and minefields, + as protection against enemy submarines, + "H" type of, + improved type of, + inadequate supply of, + influence of, in Great War, +Minesweepers, delay in deliveries of, +Minesweeping and patrol services, +Minesweeping craft, damage caused by mines to, + gallantry of officers and men of, +Minesweeping Division, formation of the, +Minesweeping, introduction of a chain-sweep, + statistics for 1916, 1917, +Ministry of Munitions, formation of, +<i>Minotaur</i>, +Mobilization and Movements Department, formation of, +Monitor M15, loss of, +Monitors, bombardment of enemy ports by, +Morris, Sub-Lieutenant K., +Motor boats, coastal, + launches as submarine hunters, + fitted with hydrophones, + in home waters and in the Mediterranean, +Murray, Sir O., + +Nash, Mr., invents the "fish" hydrophone, +Naval Ordnance Department, the, changes in, +Naval Staff and the movements of convoys, + confers with masters of cargo steamers, + minesweeping section of, + Operations Division of, strengthened, + reorganization of, +Navy, the, a specialized profession, + considerations on the future of, + personnel of: importance of, + Staff work in, + work of, during 1917, +<i>Nelson</i> attacked and sunk, +Net barrage at Dover, +Net protection against torpedo fire, + at ports of assembly, +Nets as an anti-submarine measure, +New York and Hampton Roads convoy, + losses in 1917, +Nicholson, Captain R.L., +North Foreland, the, naval guns mounted in vicinity of, + star shells supplied to, +North Sea barrage, the, + advantages and disadvantages of, +North Sea, the, convoy system at work in, +Norway convoy, the, + +Oil tankers, serious loss of, +Oliver, Vice-Admiral Sir Henry, + and mining operations, + becomes D.C.N.S., + his valuable work, +Ommanney, Admiral R.N., an appreciation of his services, +Operations Division of Naval Staff strengthened, +Ordnance production, delay in, +Ostend, bombardment of, +Otranto, hydrophone station at, +Otranto, Straits of, a drifter patrol attacked by Austrian light + cruisers, + mining the, +"Otter" mine destroyers, +Outward-bound convoys, losses in, +Overseas trade, vessels sunk in 1917, + +"P" Boats, fitted with "fish" hydrophones, + hunting flotillas of, +<i>P. Fannon</i>, +Page, Mr. W.H., relations with author, +Paget, Admiral Sir Alfred, +Paine, Commodore Godfrey, + joins the Air Council, +Palestine, work of the Navy off coast of, +Paravanes, and their use, +<i>Pargust</i> (decoy ship), +<i>Partridge</i>, sinking of, +Patrol craft and minesweeping services, + a tribute to officers and men of, + as decoy vessels, + hydrophones for, + lack of British, + retired officers volunteer for work in, + synopsis of losses among, +Patrol gunboats, +Pease, Mr. A.F., +<i>Pellew</i>, damaged in action, +Persius, Captain, and the construction of German submarines, +Personnel of the Navy, importance of, +Piave, the, Austrian advance to, +Pirie, Lord, becomes Controller-General of Merchant Shipbuilding, +Pitcher, Petty-Officer Ernest, awarded V.C., +Plymouth convoy, the, + losses in 1917, +Pola, Germans destroy their submarines at, +Portland, submarine-hunting flotillas at, +Ports of assembly for Atlantic convoy system, +Portsmouth, gunnery courses for cadets and apprentices at, + instructional anti-submarine school at, +Pound, Captain A.D.P., +Preston, Captain Lionel G., Head of Minesweeping Service, +Pretyman, Right Hon. E.G., +<i>Prince Charles</i>, success of, against an enemy submarine, +Pringle, Captain, appointed Chief of Staff to Sir Lewis Bayly, +<i>Prize</i> sinks a submarine, +Production of warships, etc., and forecasts of <i>et seq.</i>, +Projectiles, anti-submarine, +"Protected sailings," system of, + +Q-Boats (<i>see</i> Decoy ships), +Q22 in action with a submarine, +Queenstown, amicable relations between British and U.S. Navies at, +Queenstown convoy, the, + +Ramsgate, bombardment of, +Rawlinson, General Sir Henry (Lord), confers with Admiral Bacon, +Red Sea, naval operations in, +Rodman, Rear-Admiral Hugh, +Route orders, and principle on which compiled, +Royal Naval Air Service, the, activities of, + bombs enemy bases, +Royal Naval Air Service, the, in the Eastern theatre of war, +Russian Baltic Fleet, the, + demobilization of, +Russian Navy, the defection of, +Russo-Japanese war, the, +Ryan, Captain, experimental work of, + +<i>St. Louis</i> mined outside Liverpool, +Salonika, Navy co-operation with Army in, +Sanders, Lieutenant W. E., actions with submarines, + awarded the V.C., + memorial to, +Scandinavian convoy, the, + enemy attacks on a, + loose station-keeping of ships in, + losses in 1917, +Scapa, a conference at, +Scarlett, Wing-Captain F.R., +Scheer, Admiral, his work on the High Sea Fleet, + on the convoy system, +Schellendorff, von, on German Army Staffs, +Schwab, Mr., +Sea, the, considerations on future safeguarding of, +Seaplane, advent of "America" type of, +Seaplane carriers, +Seaplane stations, +Searchlights, +<i>Shannon</i>, +Shipbuilding Advisory Committee, +Shipbuilding programme of 1916, British, +Shipping (British, Allied and neutral), losses in 1917, +Shipping Controller, appointment of a, +Sierra Leone convoy, the, +Signalling arrangements for convoys, + instruction in, +Simpson, Rear-Admiral C.H., +Sims, Vice-Admiral W.S., arrives in London, + ensures unity of command, + his career, + hoists his flag at Queenstown, + in command of U.S. forces in European waters, +Singer, Admiral Morgan, +Smoke screens, +Spanish-American War, the, +Special service or decoy ships, +Specialist training in the Navy, +Speed, importance of, in convoy system, +Star shells, introduction of, +Startin, Admiral Sir James, the Albert Medal for, +<i>Staunch</i> sunk by submarine, +<i>Slonecrop</i> (decoy ship) sinks a submarine, +<i>Strongbow</i>, sinking of, +Submarine attacks on decoy ships, + campaign of 1917, the, + danger, the, difficulties of combating, + detector, an electrical, + -hunting flotillas, + warfare, offensive and defensive measures against, +Submarines, British, delay in deliveries of, + estimated number of enemy sinkings by, + fitted as minelayers, + length of time taken in construction of, + offensive use of, + operations against enemy submarines, + production of, + value of depth charges against, +Submarines, German, + aircraft attacks on, + Allied losses by, 1916-17, + as minelayers, + devices for circumventing, + losses of, +Submarines, German, rapid construction of, + success of, in the Mediterranean, +<i>Swift</i>, action with German destroyers, +Sydney (Cape Breton) convoy, the, +Syrian Coast, the, operations on, + +Taussig, Lieut-Commander T.K., +"Taut wire" gear, value of the device, +<i>Terror</i>, bombardment of Ostend by, + damaged, +Thames Estuary, mines laid in the, +Torpedo and Mining Department, the + valuable work of, +Torpedo, the, in general use, +Tothill, Rear-Admiral H.H.D., +Trade Division of the Naval Staff, the, +"Trawler Reserve," the, +Trawlers as minesweepers, + convoy work of, + delay in deliveries of, + hunting flotilla work of, +Troop transports, escorts for, +Tyrwhitt, Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald, and his command, + +U-Boats, various types of, (see also Submarines, German) +Unescorted ships, losses by submarine attack in 1917, +United Kingdom, the, approach areas for traffic to, + coast divided into areas for patrol and minesweeping, +United States Navy, a detachment dispatched to Gibraltar, + co-operation with British Navy, + In 1917, +United States, the, a new type of mine produced in, +United States, the, and the convoy system, + declares war on Germany, + rate of ship production in, + (See also America) +"Unrestricted submarine warfare," object of, + opening of, + +<i>Vengeance</i>, experimental tests in, +Villiers, Captain Edward C., net protection device of, + +Warship production in 1917, +Watt, I., skipper of <i>Gowan Lea</i>, +Webb, Captain Richard, in charge of Trade Division, +Wemyss, Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn, becomes Deputy First Sea Lord, + Chief of Naval Staff, +Whalers and their work, +White Sea, the, British naval work in, +Whitehead, Captain Frederic A., Director of Mercantile Movements + Division, +Wilde, Commander J.S., +Wilson, Admiral Sir Arthur, anti-submarine measures of, +Wireless, importance of, in convoys, + provided for the Mercantile Marine, + patrol work of, + +Zeebrugge, aerial bombing attacks on, + bombardment of, +Zeppelin assists in a hunt for a British submarine, + +</pre> + +<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10409 ***</div> +</body> +</html> |