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diff --git a/10274-h/10274-h.htm b/10274-h/10274-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..53c8a08 --- /dev/null +++ b/10274-h/10274-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,3907 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=US-ASCII" /> +<title>Sermons on Evil-Speaking</title> +</head> +<body> +<h2> +<a href="#startoftext">Sermons on Evil-Speaking, by Isaac Barrow</a> +</h2> +<pre> +The Project Gutenberg eBook, Sermons on Evil-Speaking, by Isaac Barrow, +Edited by Henry Morley + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: Sermons on Evil-Speaking + +Author: Isaac Barrow + +Release Date: November 25, 2003 [eBook #10274] + +Language: English + +Chatacter set encoding: US-ASCII + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SERMONS ON EVIL-SPEAKING*** +</pre> +<p><a name="startoftext"></a></p> +<p>This eBook was prepared by Les Bowler, St. Ives, Dorset.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines3"><br /><br /><br /></div> +<h1>SERMONS ON EVIL SPEAKING</h1> +<p>BY ISAAC BARROW, D.D.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines3"><br /><br /><br /></div> +<p>CONTENTS.</p> +<p>Introduction by Professor Henry Morley.</p> +<p>Against Foolish Talking and Jesting.</p> +<p>Against Rash and Vain Swearing.</p> +<p>Of Evil-speaking in General.</p> +<p>The Folly of Slander. Part 1.</p> +<p>The Folly of Slander. Part 2.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines3"><br /><br /><br /></div> +<h2>INTRODUCTION.</h2> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>Isaac Barrow was born in London in 1630. His father was draper +to the king. His mother died when he was four years old. +He was named Isaac after an uncle, who died in 1680, Bishop of St. Asaph. +Young Isaac Barrow was educated at the Charterhouse School, and at Felstead, +before he went, in 1643, to Cambridge. He entered first at Peterhouse, +where his uncle Isaac was a Fellow, but at that time his uncle was ejected +from his Fellowship for loyalty to the King’s cause, and removed +to Oxford; the nephew, who entered at Cambridge, therefore avoided Peterhouse, +and went to Trinity College. Young Barrow’s father also +was at Oxford, where he gave up all his worldly means in service of +the King.</p> +<p>The young student at Cambridge did not conceal his royalist feeling, +but obtained, nevertheless, a scholarship at Trinity, with some exemptions +from the Puritan requirements of subscription. He took his B.A. +degree in 1648, and in 1649 was elected to a fellowship of Trinity, +on the same day with his most intimate college friend John Ray, the +botanist. Ray held in the next year several college offices; was +made in 1651 lecturer in Greek, and in 1653 lecturer in Mathematics. +Barrow proceeded to his M.A. in 1652, and was admitted to the same degree +at Oxford in 1653. In 1654, Dr. Dupont, who had been tutor to +Barrow and Ray, and held the University Professorship of Greek, resigned, +and used his interest, without success, to get Barrow appointed in his +place. Isaac Barrow was then a young man of four-and-twenty, with +the courage of his opinions in politics and in church questions, which +were not the opinions of those in power.</p> +<p>In 1655 Barrow left Cambridge, having sold his books to raise money +for travel. He went to Paris, where his father was with other +royalists, and gave some help to his father. Then he went on to +Italy, made stay at Florence, and on a voyage from Leghorn to Smyrna +stood to a gun in fight with a pirate ship from Algiers that was beaten +off. At college and upon his travels Barrow was helped by the +liberality of public spirited men who thought him worth their aid. +He went on to Constantinople, where he studied the Greek Fathers of +the Church; and he spent more than a year in Turkey. He returned +through Germany and Holland, reached England in the year before the +Restoration, and then, at the age of twenty-nine, he entered holy orders, +for which in all his studies he had been preparing.</p> +<p>The Cambridge Greek Professorship, which had before been denied him, +was obtained by Barrow immediately after the Restoration. Soon +afterwards he was chosen to be Professor of Geometry at Gresham College. +In 1663 he preached the sermon in Westminster Abbey at the consecration +of his uncle, Isaac, as Bishop of St. Asaph. In that year also +he became, at Cambridge, the first Lucasian Professor of Mathematics, +for which office he resigned his post at Gresham College.</p> +<p>As Lucasian Professor of Mathematics, Isaac Barrow had among his +pupils Isaac Newton. Newton succeeded to the chair in 1669. +Barrow resigned because he feared that the duties of the mathematical +chair drew his thoughts too much from the duties of the pulpit, towards +the full performance of which he had desired all studies to be aids. +He was then intent upon the writing of an “Exposition of the Creed, +Decalogue, and Sacraments.” He held a prebend in Salisbury +Cathedral, and a living in Wales, that yielded little for his support +after the Professorship had been resigned. But he was one of the +King’s chaplains, was made D.D. by the King in 1670, and in 1672 +he was appointed Master of Trinity by Charles II., who said, when he +appointed Isaac Barrow, “that he gave the post to the best scholar +in England.” Barrow was Vice-Chancellor of the University +when he died in 1677, during a visit to London on the business of his +college.</p> +<p>The sermons here given were first published in 1678, in a volume +entitled “Several Sermons against Evil-speaking.” +That volume contained ten sermons, of which the publisher said that +“the two last, against pragmaticalness and meddling in the affairs +of others, do not so properly belong to this subject.” The +sermons here given follow continuously, beginning with the second in +the series. The text of the first sermon was “If any man +offend not in word, he is a perfect man.” The texts to the +last three were: “Speak not evil one of another, brethren;” +“Judge not;” and “That ye study to be quiet, and to +do your own business.”</p> +<p>There were also published in 1678, the year after Barrow’s +death, a sermon preached by him on the Good Friday before he died, a +volume of “Twelve Sermons preached upon several Occasions,” +and the second edition of a sermon on the “Duty and Reward of +Bounty to the Poor.” Barrow’s works were collected +by Archbishop Tillotson, and published, in four folio volumes, in the +years 1683-1687. There were other editions in three folios in +1716, in 1722, and in 1741. Dr. Dibdin said of Barrow that he +“had the clearest head with which mathematics ever endowed an +individual, and one of the purest and most unsophisticated hearts that +ever beat in the human breast.” In these sermons against +Evil Speaking he distinguishes as clearly as Shakespeare does between +the playfulness of kindly mirth that draws men nearer to each other +and the words that make division. No man was more free than Isaac +Barrow from the spirit of unkindness. The man speaks in these +sermons. Yet he could hold his own in wit with the light triflers +of the court of Charles the Second. It is of him that the familiar +story is told of a playful match at mock courtesy with the Earl of Rochester, +who meeting Dr. Barrow near the king’s chamber bowed low, saying, +“I am yours, doctor, to the knee strings.” <i>Barrow</i> +(bowing lower), “I am yours, my lord, to the shoe-tie.” +<i>Rochester</i>: “Yours, doctor, down to the ground.” +<i>Barrow</i>: “Yours, my lord, to the centre of the earth.” +<i>Rochester</i> (not to be out-done): “Yours, doctor, to the +lowest pit of hell.” <i>Barrow</i>: “There, my lord, +I must leave you.”</p> +<p>Barrow’s mathematical power gave clearness to his sermons, +which were full of sense and piety. They were very carefully written, +copied and recopied, and now rank with the most valued pieces of the +literature of the pulpit. He was deeply religious, although he +had, besides learning, a lively wit, and never lost the pluck that taught +him how to man a gun against a pirate. He was “low of stature, +lean, and of a pale complexion,” so untidy that on one occasion +his appearance in the pulpit is said to have caused half the congregation +to go out of church. He gave his whole mind and his whole soul +to his work for God. Mythical tales are told of the length of +some of his sermons, at a time when an hour’s sermon was not considered +long. Of one charity-sermon the story is that it lasted three +hours and a half, and that Barrow was requested to print it—“with +the other half which he had not had time to deliver.” But +we may take this tale as one of the quips at which Barrow himself would +have laughed very good-humouredly.<br /> H. +M.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines3"><br /><br /><br /></div> +<h2>SERMONS ON EVIL-SPEAKING.</h2> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines3"><br /><br /><br /></div> +<h3>AGAINST FOOLISH TALKING AND JESTING.</h3> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>“<i>Nor foolish talking, nor jesting, which are not convenient</i>.”—Ephes. +v.4.</p> +<p>Moral and political aphorisms are seldom couched in such terms that +they should be taken as they sound precisely, or according to the widest +extent of signification; but do commonly need exposition, and admit +exception: otherwise frequently they would not only clash with reason +and experience, but interfere, thwart, and supplant one another. +The best masters of such wisdom are wont to interdict things, apt by +unseasonable or excessive use to be perverted, in general forms of speech, +leaving the restrictions, which the case may require or bear, to be +made by the hearer’s or interpreter’s discretion; whence +many seemingly formal prohibitions are to be received only as sober +cautions. This observation may be particularly supposed applicable +to this precept of St. Paul, which seemeth universally to forbid a practice +commended (in some cases and degrees) by philosophers as virtuous, not +disallowed by reason, commonly affected by men, often used by wise and +good persons; from which consequently, if our religion did wholly debar +us, it would seem chargeable with somewhat too uncouth austerity and +sourness: from imputations of which kind as in its temper and frame +it is really most free (it never quenching natural light or cancelling +the dictates of sound reason, but confirming and improving them); so +it carefully declineth them, enjoining us that “if there be any +things” προσφιλη (“lovely,” +or grateful to men), “any things” ευφημα +(“of good report” and repute), “if there be any virtue +and any praise” (anything in the common apprehensions of men held +worthy and laudable), we should “mind those things,” that +is, should yield them a regard answerable to the esteem they carry among +rational and sober persons.</p> +<p>Whence it may seem requisite so to interpret and determine St. Paul’s +meaning here concerning <i>eutrapelia</i> (that is, facetious speech, +or raillery, by our translators rendered “jesting”), that +he may consist with himself, and be reconciled to Aristotle, who placeth +this practice in the rank of virtues; or that religion and reason may +well accord in the case: supposing that, if there be any kind of facetiousness +innocent and reasonable, conformable to good manners (regulated by common +sense, and consistent with the tenor of Christian duty, that is, not +transgressing the bounds of piety, charity, and sobriety), St. Paul +did not intend to discountenance or prohibit that kind.</p> +<p>For thus expounding and limiting his intent we have some warrant +from himself, some fair intimations in the words here. For first, +what sort of facetious speech he aimeth at, he doth imply by the fellow +he coupleth therewith; μωρολογια, +saith he, η ευτραπελια +(foolish talking, or facetiousness): such facetiousness therefore he +toucheth as doth include folly, in the matter or manner thereof. +Then he further determineth it, by adjoining a peculiar quality thereof, +unprofitableness, or impertinency; τα μη ανηκοντα +(which are not pertinent), or conducible to any good purpose: whence +may be collected that it is a frivolous and idle sort of facetiousness +which he condemneth.</p> +<p>But, however, manifest it is that some kind thereof he doth earnestly +forbid: whence, in order to the guidance of our practice, it is needful +to distinguish the kinds, severing that which is allowable from that +which is unlawful; that so we may be satisfied in the case, and not +on the one hand ignorantly transgress our duty, nor on the other trouble +ourselves with scruples, others with censures, upon the use of warrantable +liberty therein.</p> +<p>And such a resolution seemeth indeed especially needful in this our +age (this pleasant and jocular age) which is so infinitely addicted +to this sort of speaking, that it scarce doth affect or prize anything +near so much; all reputation appearing now to veil and stoop to that +of being a wit: to be learned, to be wise, to be good, are nothing in +comparison thereto; even to be noble and rich are inferior things, and +afford no such glory. Many at least (to purchase this glory, to +be deemed considerable in this faculty, and enrolled among the wits) +do not only make shipwreck of conscience, abandon virtue, and forfeit +all pretences to wisdom; but neglect their estates, and prostitute their +honour: so to the private damage of many particular persons, and with +no small prejudice to the public, are our times possessed and transported +with this humour. To repress the excess and extravagance whereof, +nothing in way of discourse can serve better than a plain declaration +when and how such a practice is allowable or tolerable; when it is wicked +and vain, unworthy of a man endued with reason, and pretending to honesty +or honour.</p> +<p>This I shall in some measure endeavour to perform.</p> +<p>But first it may be demanded what the thing we speak of is, or what +this facetiousness doth import? To which question I might reply +as Democritus did to him that asked the definition of a man, “’Tis +that which we all see and know”: any one better apprehends what +it is by acquaintance than I can inform him by description. It +is indeed a thing so versatile and multiform, appearing in so many shapes, +so many postures, so many garbs, so variously apprehended by several +eyes and judgments, that it seemeth no less hard to settle a clear and +certain notion thereof, than to make a portrait of Proteus, or to define +the figure of the fleeting air. Sometimes it lieth in pat allusion +to a known story, or in seasonable application of a trivial saying, +or in forging an apposite tale: sometimes it playeth in words and phrases, +taking advantage from the ambiguity of their sense, or the affinity +of their sound: sometimes it is wrapped in a dress of humorous expression; +sometimes it lurketh under an odd similitude; sometimes it is lodged +in a sly question, in a smart answer, in a quirkish reason, in a shrewd +intimation, in cunningly diverting, or cleverly retorting an objection: +sometimes it is couched in a bold scheme of speech, in a tart irony, +in a lusty hyperbole, in a startling metaphor, in a plausible reconciling +of contradictions, or in acute nonsense: sometimes a scenical representation +of persons or things, a counterfeit speech, a mimical look or gesture +passeth for it: sometimes an affected simplicity, sometimes a presumptuous +bluntness giveth it being; sometimes it riseth from a lucky hitting +upon what is strange, sometimes from a crafty wresting obvious matter +to the purpose: often it consisteth in one knows not what, and springeth +up one can hardly tell how. Its ways are unaccountable and inexplicable, +being answerable to the numberless rovings of fancy and windings of +language. It is in short, a manner of speaking out of the simple +and plain way (such as reason teacheth and proveth things by), which +by a pretty surprising uncouthness in conceit or expression doth affect +and amuse the fancy, stirring in it some wonder, and breeding some delight +thereto. It raiseth admiration, as signifying a nimble sagacity +of apprehension, a special felicity of invention, a vivacity of spirit, +and reach of wit more than vulgar: it seeming to argue a rare quickness +of parts, that one can fetch in remote conceits applicable; a notable +skill, that he can dexterously accommodate them to the purpose before +him; together with a lively briskness of humour, not apt to damp those +sportful flashes of imagination. (Whence in Aristotle such persons +are termed επιδεξιοι, +dexterous men; and ευτροποι, +men of facile or versatile manners, who can easily turn themselves to +all things, or turn all things to themselves.) It also procureth delight, +by gratifying curiosity with its rareness or semblance of difficulty +(as monsters, not for their beauty, but their rarety; as juggling tricks, +not for their use, but their abstruseness, are beheld with pleasure) +by diverting the mind from its road of serious thoughts; by instilling +gaiety and airiness of spirit; by provoking to such dispositions of +spirit in way of emulation or complaisance; and by seasoning matters, +otherwise distasteful or insipid, with an unusual, and thence grateful +tang.</p> +<p>But saying no more concerning what it is, and leaving it to your +imagination and experience to supply the defect of such explication, +I shall address myself to show, first, when and how such a manner of +speaking may be allowed; then, in what matters and ways it should be +condemned.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>1. Such facetiousness is not absolutely unreasonable or unlawful, +which ministereth harmless divertisement, and delight to conversation +(harmless, I say, that is, not entrenching upon piety, not infringing +charity or justice, not disturbing peace). For Christianity is +not so tetrical, so harsh, so envious, as to bar us continually from +innocent, much less from wholesome and useful pleasure, such as human +life doth need or require. And if jocular discourse may serve +to good purposes of this kind; if it may be apt to raise our drooping +spirits, to allay our irksome cares, to whet our blunted industry, to +recreate our minds being tired and cloyed with graver occupations; if +it may breed alacrity, or maintain good humour among us; if it may conduce +to sweeten conversation and endear society; then is it not inconvenient, +or unprofitable. If for those ends we may use other recreations, +employing on them our ears and eyes, our hands and feet, our other instruments +of sense and motion, why may we not as well to them accommodate our +organs of speech and interior sense? Why should those games which +excite our wits and fancies be less reasonable than those whereby our +grosser parts and faculties are exercised? Yea, why are not those +more reasonable, since they are performed in a manly way, and have in +them a smack of reason; feeling also they may be so managed, as not +only to divert and please, but to improve and profit the mind, rousing +and quickening it, yea sometimes enlightening and instructing it, by +good sense conveyed in jocular expression?</p> +<p>It would surely be hard that we should be tied ever to knit the brow, +and squeeze the brain (to be always sadly dumpish, or seriously pensive), +that all divertisement of mirth and pleasantness should be shut out +of conversation; and how can we better relieve our minds, or relax our +thoughts, how can we be more ingenuously cheerful, in what more kindly +way can we exhilarate ourselves and others, than by thus sacrificing +to the Graces, as the ancients called it? Are not some persons +always, and all persons sometimes, incapable otherwise to divert themselves, +than by such discourse? Shall we, I say, have no recreation? or +must our recreations be ever clownish, or childish, consisting merely +in rustical efforts, or in petty sleights of bodily strength and activity? +Were we, in fine, obliged ever to talk like philosophers, assigning +dry reasons for everything, and dropping grave sentences upon all occasions, +would it not much deaden human life, and make ordinary conversation +exceedingly to languish? Facetiousness therefore in such cases, +and to such purposes, may be allowable.</p> +<p>2. Facetiousness is allowable when it is the most proper instrument +of exposing things apparently base and vile to due contempt. It +is many times expedient, that things really ridiculous should appear +such, that they may be sufficiently loathed and shunned; and to render +them such is the part of a facetious wit, and usually can only be compassed +thereby. When to impugn them with down-right reason, or to check +them by serious discourse, would signify nothing, then representing +them in a shape strangely ugly to the fancy, and thereby raising derision +at them, may effectually discountenance them. Thus did the prophet +Elias expose the wicked superstition of those who worshipped Baal: “Elias +(saith the text) mocked them, and said, ‘Cry aloud; for he is +a god, either he is talking, or he is pursuing, or he is in a journey, +or peradventure he sleeps, and must be awaked.’“ By +which one pregnant instance it appeareth that reasoning pleasantly-abusive +in some cases may be useful. The Holy Scripture doth not indeed +use it frequently (it not suiting the Divine simplicity and stately +gravity thereof to do so); yet its condescension thereto at any time +sufficiently doth authorise a cautious use thereof. When sarcastic +twitches are needful to pierce the thick skins of men, to correct their +lethargic stupidity, to rouse them out of their drowsy negligence, then +may they well be applied when plain declarations will not enlighten +people to discern the truth and weight of things, and blunt arguments +will not penetrate to convince or persuade them to their duty, then +doth reason freely resign its place to wit, allowing it to undertake +its work of instruction and reproof.</p> +<p>3. Facetious discourse particularly may be commodious for reproving +some vices, and reclaiming some persons (as salt for cleansing and curing +some sores). It commonly procureth a more easy access to the ears +of men, and worketh a stronger impression on their hearts, than other +discourse could do. Many who will not stand a direct reproof, +and cannot abide to be plainly admonished of their fault, will yet endure +to be pleasantly rubbed, and will patiently bear a jocund wipe; though +they abominate all language purely bitter or sour, yet they can relish +discourse having in it a pleasant tartness. You must not chide +them as their master, but you may gibe with them as their companion. +If you do that, they will take you for pragmatical and haughty; this +they may interpret friendship and freedom. Most men are of that +temper; and particularly the genius of divers persons, whose opinions +and practices we should strive to correct, doth require not a grave +and severe, but a free and merry way of treating them. For what +can be more unsuitable and unpromising, than to seem serious with those +who are not so themselves, or demure with the scornful? If we +design either to please or vex them into better manners, we must be +as sportful in a manner, or as contemptuous as themselves. If +we mean to be heard by them, we must talk in their own fashion, with +humour and jollity; if we will instruct them, we must withal somewhat +divert them: we must seem to play with them if we think to convey any +sober thoughts into them. They scorn to be formally advised or +taught; but they may perhaps be slily laughed and lured into a better +mind. If by such complaisance we can inveigle those dottrels to +hearken to us, we may induce them to consider farther, and give reason +some competent scope, some fair play with them. Good reason may +be apparelled in the garb of wit, and therein will securely pass whither +in its native homeliness it could never arrive: and being come thither, +it with especial advantage may impress good advice, making an offender +more clearly to see, and more deeply to feel his miscarriage; being +represented to his fancy in a strain somewhat rare and remarkable, yet +not so fierce and frightful. The severity of reproof is tempered, +and the reprover’s anger disguised thereby. The guilty person +cannot but observe that he who thus reprehends him is not disturbed +or out of humour, and that he rather pitieth than hateth him; which +breedeth a veneration to him, and imparteth no small efficacy to his +wholesome suggestions. Such a reprehension, while it forceth a +smile without, doth work remorse within; while it seemeth to tickle +the ear, doth sting the heart. In fine, many whose foreheads are +brazed and hearts steeled against all blame, are yet not of proof against +derision; divers, who never will be reasoned, may be rallied in better +order: in which cases raillery, as an instrument of so important good, +as a servant of the best charity, may be allowed.</p> +<p>4. Some errors likewise in this way may be most properly and +most successfully confuted; such as deserve not, and hardly can bear +a serious and solid confutation. He that will contest things apparently +decided by sense and experience, or who disavows clear principles of +reason, approved by general consent and the common sense of men, what +other hopeful way is there of proceeding with him, than pleasantly to +explode his conceits? To dispute seriously with him were trifling; +to trifle with him is the proper course. Since he rejecteth the +grounds of reasoning, ’tis vain to be in earnest; what then remains +but to jest with him? To deal seriously were to yield too much +respect to such a baffler, and too much weight to his fancies; to raise +the man too high in his courage and conceit; to make his pretences seem +worthy the considering and canvassing. Briefly, perverse obstinacy +is more easily quelled, petulant impudence is sooner dashed, sophistical +captiousness is more safely eluded, sceptical wantonness is more surely +confounded in this than in the simple way of discourse.</p> +<p>5. This way is also commonly the best way of defence against +unjust reproach and obloquy. To yield to a slanderous reviler +a serious reply, or to make a formal plea against his charge, doth seem +to imply that we much consider or deeply resent it; whereas by pleasant +reflection on it we signify the matter only deserves contempt, and that +we take ourselves unconcerned therein. So easily without care +or trouble may the brunts of malice be declined or repelled.</p> +<p>6. This may be allowed in way of counterbalancing and in compliance +to the fashion of others. It would be a disadvantage unto truth +and virtue if their defenders were barred from the use of this weapon, +since it is that especially whereby the patrons of error and vice do +maintain and propagate them. They being destitute of good reason, +do usually recommend their absurd and pestilent notions by a pleasantness +of conceit and expression, bewitching the fancies of shallow hearers, +and inveigling heedless persons to a liking of them; and if, for reclaiming +such people, the folly of those seducers may in like manner be displayed +as ridiculous and odious, why should that advantage be refused? +It is wit that wageth the war against reason, against virtue, against +religion; wit alone it is that perverteth so many, and so greatly corrupteth +the world. It may, therefore, be needful, in our warfare for those +dearest concerns, to sort the manner of our fighting with that of our +adversaries, and with the same kind of arms to protect goodness, whereby +they do assail it. If wit may happily serve under the banner of +truth and virtue, we may impress it for that service; and good it were +to rescue so worthy a faculty from so vile abuse. It is the right +of reason and piety to command that and all other endowments; folly +and impiety do only usurp them. Just and fit therefore it is to +wrest them out of so bad hands, to revoke them to their right use and +duty.</p> +<p>It doth especially seem requisite to do it in this age, wherein plain +reason is deemed a dull and heavy thing. When the mental appetite +of men is become like the corporal, and cannot relish any food without +some piquant sauce, so that people will rather starve than live on solid +fare; when substantial and sound discourse findeth small attention or +acceptance; in such a time, he that can, may in complaisance, and for +fashion’s sake, vouchsafe to be facetious; an ingenious vein coupled +with an honest mind may be a good talent; he shall employ wit commendably +who by it can further the interests of goodness, alluring men first +to listen, then inducing them to consent unto its wholesome dictates +and precepts.</p> +<p>Since men are so irreclaimably disposed to mirth and laughter, it +may be well to set them in the right pin, to divert their humour into +the proper channel, that they may please themselves in deriding things +which deserve it, ceasing to laugh at that which requireth reverence +or horror.</p> +<p>It may also be expedient to put the world out of conceit that all +sober and good men are a sort of such lumpish or sour people that they +can utter nothing but flat and drowsy stuff, by showing them that such +persons, when they see cause, in condescension, can be as brisk and +smart as themselves; when they please, can speak pleasantly and wittily, +as well as gravely and judiciously. This way at least, in respect +to the various palates of men, may for variety sake be sometimes attempted, +when other means do fail; when many strict and subtle arguings, many +zealous declamations, many wholesome serious discourses have been spent, +without effecting the extirpation of bad principles, or conversion of +those who abet them; this course may be tried, and some perhaps may +be reclaimed thereby.</p> +<p>7. Furthermore, the warrantableness of this practice in some +cases may be inferred from a parity of reason, in this manner. +If it be lawful (as by the best authorities it plainly doth appear to +be), in using rhetorical schemes, poetical strains, involutions of sense +in allegories, fables, parables, and riddles, to discoast from the plain +and simple way of speech, why may not facetiousness, issuing from the +same principles, directed to the same ends, serving to like purposes, +be likewise used blamelessly? If those exorbitancies of speech +may be accommodated to instill good doctrine into the head, to excite +good passions in the heart, to illustrate and adorn the truth, in a +delightful and taking way, and facetious discourse be sometimes notoriously +conducible to the same ends, why, they being retained, should it be +rejected, especially considering how difficult often it may be to distinguish +those forms of discourse from this, or exactly to define the limits +which sever rhetoric and raillery. Some elegant figures and trophies +of rhetoric (biting sarcasms, sly ironies, strong metaphors, lofty hyperboles, +paronomasies, oxymorons, and the like, frequently used by the best speakers, +and not seldom even by sacred writers) do lie very near upon the confines +of jocularity, and are not easily differenced from those sallies of +wit wherein the lepid way doth consist: so that were this wholly culpable, +it would be matter of scruple whether one hath committed a fault or +no when he meant only to play the orator or the poet; and hard surely +it would be to find a judge who could precisely set out the difference +between a jest and a flourish.</p> +<p>8. I shall only add, that of old even the sagest and gravest +persons (persons of most rigid and severe virtue) did much affect this +kind of discourse, and did apply it to noble purposes. The great +introducer of moral wisdom among the pagans did practise it so much +(by it repressing the windy pride and fallacious vanity of sophisters +in his time), that he thereby got the name of ο ειρων, +the droll; and the rest of those who pursued his design do, by numberless +stories and apophthegms recorded of them, appear well skilled and much +delighted in this way. Many great princes (as Augustus Cæsar, +for one, many of whose jests are extant in Macrobius), many grave statesmen +(as Cicero particularly, who composed several books of jests), many +famous captains (as Fabius, M. Cato the Censor, Scipio Africanus, Epaminondas, +Themistocles, Phocion, and many others, whose witty sayings together +with their martial exploits are reported by historians), have pleased +themselves herein, and made it a condiment of their weighty businesses. +So that practising thus (within certain rule and compass), we cannot +err without great patterns, and mighty patrons.</p> +<p>9. In fine, since it cannot be shown that such a sportfulness +of wit and fancy doth contain an intrinsic and inseparable turpitude; +since it may be so cleanly, handsomely, and innocently used, as not +to defile or discompose the mind of the speaker, nor to wrong or harm +the hearer, nor to derogate from any worthy subject of discourse, nor +to infringe decency, to disturb peace, to violate any of the grand duties +incumbent on us (piety, charity, justice, sobriety), but rather sometimes +may yield advantage in those respects; it cannot well absolutely and +universally be condemned: and when not used upon improper matter, in +an unfit manner, with excessive measure, at undue season, to evil purpose, +it may be allowed. It is bad objects, or bad adjuncts, which do +spoil its indifference and innocence; it is the abuse thereof, to which +(as all pleasant things are dangerous, and apt to degenerate into baits +of intemperance and excess) it is very liable, that corrupteth it; and +seemeth to be the ground why in so general terms it is prohibited by +the Apostle. Which prohibition to what cases, or what sorts of +jesting it extendeth, we come now to declare.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>II. 1. All profane jesting, all speaking loosely and +wantonly about holy things (things nearly related to God and religion), +making such things the matters of sport and mockery, playing and trifling +with them, is certainly prohibited, as an intolerably vain and wicked +practice. It is an infallible sign of a vain and light spirit, +which considereth little, and cannot distinguish things, to talk slightly +concerning persons of high dignity, to whom especial respect is due; +or about matters of great importance, which deserve very serious consideration. +No man speaketh, or should speak, of his prince, that which he hath +not weighed whether it will consist with that veneration which should +be preserved inviolate to him. And is not the same, is not much +greater care to be used in regard to the incomparably great and glorious +Majesty of Heaven? Yes, surely, as we should not without great +awe think of Him; so we should not presume to mention His name, His +word, His institutions, anything immediately belonging to Him, without +profoundest reverence and dread. It is the most enormous sauciness +that can be imagined, to speak petulantly or pertly concerning Him; +especially considering that whatever we do say about Him, we do utter +it in His presence, and to His very face. “For there is +not,” as the holy psalmist considered, “a word in my tongue, +but lo, O Lord, thou knowest it altogether.” No man also +hath the heart to droll, or thinks raillery convenient, in cases nearly +touching his life, his health, his estate, or his fame: and are the +true life and health of our soul, are interests in God’s favour +and mercy, are everlasting glory and bliss affairs of less moment? are +the treasures and joys of paradise, or the damages and torments in hell, +more jesting matters? No, certainly no: in all reason therefore +it becometh us, and it infinitely concerneth us, whenever we think of +these things, to be in best earnest, always to speak of them in most +sober sadness.</p> +<p>The proper objects of common mirth and sportful divertisement are +mean and petty matters; anything at least is by playing therewith made +such: great things are thereby diminished and debased; especially sacred +things do grievously suffer thence, being with extreme indecency and +indignity depressed beneath themselves, when they become the subjects +of flashy wit, or the entertainments of frothy merriment: to sacrifice +their honour to our vain pleasure, being like the ridiculous fondness +of that people which, as Ælian reporteth, worshipping a fly, did +offer up an ox thereto. These things were by God instituted, and +proposed to us for purposes quite different; to compose our hearts, +and settle our fancies in a most serious frame; to breed inward satisfaction, +and joy purely spiritual; to exercise our most solemn thoughts, and +employ our gravest discourses: all our speech therefore about them should +be wholesome, apt to afford good instruction, or to excite good affections; +“good,” as St. Paul speaketh, “for the use of edifying, +that it may minister grace unto the hearers.”</p> +<p>If we must be facetious and merry, the field is wide and spacious; +there are matters enough in the world besides these most august and +dreadful things, to try our faculties and please our humour with; everywhere +light and ludicrous things occur; it therefore doth argue a marvellous +poverty of wit, and barrenness of invention (no less than a strange +defect of goodness, and want of discretion), in those who can devise +no other subjects to frolic upon besides these, of all most improper +and perilous; who cannot seem ingenious under the charge of so highly +trespassing upon decency, disclaiming wisdom, wounding the ears of others, +and their own consciences. Seem ingenious, I say; for seldom those +persons really are such, or are capable to discover any wit in a wise +and manly way. ’Tis not the excellency of their fancies, +which in themselves are usually sorry and insipid enough, but the uncouthness +of their presumption; not their extraordinary wit, but their prodigious +rashness, which is to be admired. They are gazed on, as the doers +of bold tricks, who dare perform that which no sober man will attempt: +they do indeed rather deserve themselves to be laughed at, than their +conceits. For what can be more ridiculous than we do make ourselves, +when we thus fiddle and fool with our own souls; when, to make vain +people merry, we incense God’s earnest displeasure; when, to raise +a fit of present laughter, we expose ourselves to endless wailing and +woe; when, to be reckoned wits, we prove ourselves stark wild? +Surely to this case we may accommodate that of a truly great wit, King +Solomon: “I said of laughter, It is mad; and of mirth, What doeth +it?”</p> +<p>2. All injurious, abusive, scurrilous jesting, which causelessly +or needlessly tendeth to the disgrace, damage, vexation, or prejudice +in any kind of our neighbour (provoking his displeasure, grating on +his modesty, stirring passion in him), is also prohibited. When +men, to raise an admiration of their wit, to please themselves, or gratify +the humours of other men, do expose their neighbour to scorn and contempt, +making ignominious reflections upon his person and his actions, taunting +his real imperfections, or fastening imaginary ones upon him, they transgress +their duty, and abuse their wits; ’tis not urbanity, or genuine +facetiousness, but uncivil rudeness or vile malignity. To do thus, +as it is the office of mean and base spirits (unfit for any worthy or +weighty employments), so it is full of inhumanity, of iniquity, of indecency +and folly. For the weaknesses of men, of what kind soever (natural +or moral, in quality or in act), considering whence they spring, and +how much we are all subject to them, and do need excuse for them, do +in equity challenge compassion to be had of them; not complacency to +be taken in them, or mirth drawn from them; they, in respect to common +humanity, should rather be studiously connived at, and concealed, or +mildly excused, than wilfully laid open, and wantonly descanted upon; +they rather are to be deplored secretly, than openly derided.</p> +<p>The reputation of men is too noble a sacrifice to be offered up to +vainglory, fond pleasure, or ill-humour; it is a good far more dear +and precious, than to be prostituted for idle sport and divertisement. +It becometh us not to trifle with that which in common estimation is +of so great moment—to play rudely with a thing so very brittle, +yet of so vast price; which being once broken or cracked, it is very +hard and scarce possible to repair. A small, transient pleasure, +a tickling the ears, wagging the lungs, forming the face into a smile, +a giggle, or a hum, are not to be purchased with the grievous distaste +and smart, perhaps with the real damage and mischief of our neighbour, +which attend upon contempt. This is not jesting, surely, but bad +earnest; ’tis wild mirth, which is the mother of grief to those +whom we should tenderly love; ’tis unnatural sport, which breedeth +displeasure in them whose delight it should promote, whose liking it +should procure: it crosseth the nature and design of this way of speaking, +which is to cement and ingratiate society, to render conversation pleasant +and sprightly, for mutual satisfaction and comfort.</p> +<p>True festivity is called salt, and such it should be, giving a smart +but savoury relish to discourse; exciting an appetite, not irritating +disgust; cleansing sometimes, but never creating a sore: and εαν +μωρανθη, (if it become thus insipid), +or unsavoury, it is therefore good for nothing, but to be cast out, +and trodden under foot of men. Such jesting which doth not season +wholesome or harmless discourse, but giveth a <i>haut goût</i> +to putrid and poisonous stuff, gratifying distempered palates and corrupt +stomachs, is indeed odious and despicable folly, to be cast out with +loathing, to be trodden under foot with contempt. If a man offends +in this sort, to please himself, ’tis scurvy malignity; if to +delight others, ’tis base servility and flattery: upon the first +score he is a buffoon to himself; upon the last, a fool to others. +And well in common speech are such practisers so termed, the grounds +of that practice being so vain, and the effect so unhappy. The +heart of fools, saith the wise man, is in the house of mirth; meaning, +it seems, especially such hurtfully wanton mirth: for it is (as he further +telleth us) the property of fools to delight in doing harm (“It +is as sport to a fool to do mischief”). Is it not in earnest +most palpable folly, for so mean ends to do so great harm; to disoblige +men in sport; to lose friends and get enemies for a conceit; out of +a light humour to provoke fierce wrath, and breed tough hatred; to engage +one’s self consequently very far in strife, danger, and trouble? +No way certainly is more apt to produce such effects than this; nothing +more speedily inflameth, or more thoroughly engageth men, or sticketh +longer in men’s hearts and memories, than bitter taunts and scoffs: +whence this honey soon turns into gall; these jolly comedies do commonly +terminate in woeful tragedies.</p> +<p>Especially this scurrilous and scoffing way is then most detestable +when it not only exposeth the blemishes and infirmities of men, but +abuseth piety and virtue themselves; flouting persons for their constancy +in devotion, or their strict adherence to a conscientious practice of +duty; aiming to effect that which Job complaineth of, “The just +upright man is laughed to scorn;” resembling those whom the psalmist +thus describeth, “Who whet their tongue like a sword, and bend +their arrows, even bitter words, that they may shoot in secret at the +perfect;” serving good men as Jeremy was served—“The +word of the Lord,” saith he, “was made a reproach unto me, +and a derision daily.”</p> +<p>This practice doth evidently in the highest degree tend to the disparagement +and discouragement of goodness; aiming to expose it, and to render men +ashamed thereof; and it manifestly proceedeth from a desperate corruption +of mind, from a mind hardened and emboldened, sold and enslaved to wickedness: +whence they who deal therein are in Holy Scripture represented as egregious +sinners, or persons superlatively wicked, under the name of scorners +(λοιμους, pests, or pestilent +men, the Greek translators call them, properly enough in regard to the +effects of their practice); concerning whom the wise man (signifying +how God will meet with them in their own way) saith, “Surely the +Lord scorneth the scorners.” ‘Εμπαικτας +(scoffers, or mockers), St. Peter termeth them, who walk according to +their own lusts; who not being willing to practise, are ready to deride +virtue; thereby striving to seduce others into their pernicious courses.</p> +<p>This offence also proportionably groweth more criminal as it presumeth +to reach persons eminent in dignity or worth, unto whom special veneration +is appropriate. This adjoineth sauciness to scurrility, and advanceth +the wrong thereof into a kind of sacrilege. ’Tis not only +injustice, but profaneness, to abuse the gods. Their station is +a sanctuary from all irreverence and reproach; they are seated on high, +that we may only look up to them with respect; their defects are not +to be seen, or not to be touched by malicious or wanton wits, by spiteful +or scornful tongues: the diminution of their credit is a public mischief, +and the State itself doth suffer in their becoming objects of scorn; +not only themselves are vilified and degraded, but the great affairs +they manage are obstructed, the justice they administer is disparaged +thereby.</p> +<p>In fine, no jesting is allowable which is not thoroughly innocent: +it is an unworthy perverting of wit to employ it in biting and scratching; +in working prejudice to any man’s reputation or interest; in needlessly +incensing any man’s anger or sorrow; in raising animosities, dissensions, +and feuds among any.</p> +<p>Whence it is somewhat strange that any men from so mean and silly +a practice should expect commendation, or that any should afford regard +thereto; the which it is so far from meriting, that indeed contempt +and abhorrence are due to it. Men do truly more render themselves +despicable than others when, without just ground, or reasonable occasion, +they do attack others in this way. That such a practice doth ever +find any encouragement or acceptance, whence can it proceed, but from +the bad nature and small judgment of some persons? For to any +man who is endowed with any sense of goodness, and hath a competence +of true wit, or a right knowledge of good manners (who knows. . . . +<i>inurbanum lepido seponere dicto</i>), it cannot but be unsavoury +and loathsome. The repute it obtaineth is in all respects unjust. +So would it appear, not only were the cause to be decided in a court +of morality, because it consists not with virtue and wisdom; but even +before any competent judges of wit itself. For he overthrows his +own pretence, and cannot reasonably claim any interest in wit, who doth +thus behave himself: he prejudgeth himself to want wit, who cannot descry +fit matter to divert himself or others: he discovereth a great straitness +and sterility of good invention, who cannot in all the wide field of +things find better subjects of discourse; who knows not how to be ingenious +within reasonable compass, but to pick up a sorry conceit is forced +to make excursions beyond the bounds of honesty and decency.</p> +<p>Neither is it any argument of considerable ability in him that haps +to please this way: a slender faculty will serve the turn. The +sharpness of his speech cometh not from wit so much as from choler, +which furnisheth the lowest inventions with a kind of pungent expression, +and giveth an edge to every spiteful word: so that any dull wretch doth +seem to scold eloquently and ingeniously. Commonly also satirical +taunts do owe their seeming piquancy, not to the speaker or his words, +but to the subject, and the hearers; the matter conspiring with the +bad nature or the vanity of men who love to laugh at any rate, and to +be pleased at the expense of other men’s repute; conceiting themselves +extolled by the depression of their neighbour, and hoping to gain by +his loss. Such customers they are that maintain the bitter wits, +who otherwise would want trade, and might go a-begging. For commonly +they who seem to excel this way are miserably flat in other discourse, +and most dully serious: they have a particular unaptness to describe +any good thing, or commend any worthy person; being destitute of right +ideas, and proper terms answerable to such purposes: their representations +of that kind are absurd and unhandsome; their eulogies (to use their +own way of speaking) are in effect satires, and they can hardly more +abuse a man than by attempting to commend him; like those in the prophet, +who were wise to do ill, but to do well had no knowledge.</p> +<p>3. I pass by that it is very culpable to be facetious in obscene +and smutty matters. Such things are not to be discoursed on either +in jest or in earnest; they must not, as St. Paul saith, be so much +as named among Christians. To meddle with them is not to disport, +but to defile one’s self and others. There is indeed no +more certain sign of a mind utterly debauched from piety and virtue +than by affecting such talk. But further—</p> +<p>4. All unseasonable jesting is blamable. As there are +some proper seasons of relaxation, when we may <i>desipere in loco</i>; +so there are some times, and circumstances of things, wherein it concerneth +and becometh men to be serious in mind, grave in demeanour, and plain +in discourse; when to sport in this way is to do indecently or uncivilly, +to be impertinent or troublesome.</p> +<p>It comporteth not well with the presence of superiors, before whom +it becometh us to be composed and modest, much less with the performance +of sacred offices, which require an earnest attention, and most serious +frame of mind.</p> +<p>In deliberations and debates about affairs of great importance, the +simple manner of speaking to the point is the proper, easy, clear, and +compendious way: facetious speech there serves only to obstruct and +entangle business, to lose time, and protract the result. The +shop and exchange will scarce endure jesting in their lower transactions: +the Senate, the Court of Justice, the Church do much more exclude it +from their more weighty consultations. Whenever it justleth out, +or hindereth the despatch of other serious business, taking up the room +or swallowing the time due to it, or indisposing the minds of the audience +to attend it, then it is unseasonable and pestilent. Παιζειν +ινα σπουδαζης +(to play, that we may be seriously busy), is the good rule (of Anacharsis), +implying the subordination of sport to business, as a condiment and +furtherance, not an impediment or clog thereto. He that for his +sport neglects his business, deserves indeed to be reckoned among children; +and children’s fortune will attend him, to be pleased with toys, +and to fail of substantial profit.</p> +<p>’Tis again improper (because indeed uncivil, and inhuman) to +jest with persons that are in a sad or afflicted condition; as arguing +want of due considering or due commiserating their case. It appears +a kind of insulting upon their misfortune, and is apt to foment their +grief. Even in our own case (upon any disastrous occurrence to +ourselves), it would not be seemly to frolic it thus; it would signify +want of due regard to the frowns of God, and the strokes of His hand; +it would cross the wise man’s advice, “In the day of prosperity +be joyful, but in the day of adversity consider.”</p> +<p>It is also not seasonable, or civil, to be jocund in this way with +those who desire to be serious, and like not the humour. Jocularity +should not be forcibly obtruded, but by a kindly conspiracy (or tacit +compact) slip into conversation; consent and complaisance give all the +life thereto. Its design is to sweeten and ease society; when +to the contrary it breedeth offence or encumbrance, it is worse than +vain and unprofitable. From these instances we may collect when +in other like cases it is unseasonable, and therefore culpable. +Further—</p> +<p>5. To affect, admire, or highly to value this way of speaking +(either absolutely in itself, or in comparison to the serious and plain +way of speech), and thence to be drawn into an immoderate use thereof, +is blamable. A man of ripe age and sound judgment, for refreshment +to himself, or in complaisance to others, may sometimes condescend to +play in this, or any other harmless way; but to be fond of it, to prosecute +it with a careful or painful eagerness, to dote and dwell upon it, to +reckon it a brave or a fine thing, a singular matter of commendation, +a transcendent accomplishment, anywise preferable to rational endowments, +or comparable to the moral excellencies of our mind (to solid knowledge, +or sound wisdom, or true virtue and goodness), this is extremely childish, +or brutish, and far below a man. What can be more absurd than +to make business of play, to be studious and laborious in toys, to make +a profession or drive a trade of impertinency? What more plain +nonsense can there be, than to be earnest in jest, to be continual in +divertisement, or constant in pastime; to make extravagance all our +way, and sauce all our diet? Is not this plainly the life of a +child that is ever busy, yet never hath anything to do? Or the +life of that mimical brute which is always active in playing uncouth +and unlucky tricks; which, could it speak, might surely pass well for +a professed wit?</p> +<p>The proper work of man, the grand drift of human life, is to follow +reason (that noble spark kindled from Heaven; that princely and powerful +faculty, which is able to reach so lofty objects, and achieve so mighty +works), not to soothe fancy, that brutish, shallow and giddy power, +able to perform nothing worthy much regard. We are not (even Cicero +could tell us) born for play and jesting, but for severity, and the +study of graver and greater affairs. Yes, we were purposely designed, +and fitly framed, to understand and contemplate, to affect and delight +in, to undertake and pursue most noble and worthy things; to be employed +in business considerably profitable to ourselves, and beneficial to +others. We do therefore strangely debase ourselves, when we do +strongly bend our minds to, or set our affections upon, such toys.</p> +<p>Especially to do so is unworthy of a Christian; that is, of a person +who is advanced to so high a rank, and so glorious relations; who hath +so excellent objects of his mind and affections presented before him, +and so excellent rewards for his care and pains proposed to him; who +is engaged in affairs of so worthy nature, and so immense consequence: +for him to be zealous about quibbles, for him to be ravished with puny +conceits and expressions, ’tis a wondrous oversight, and an enormous +indecency.</p> +<p>He indeed that prefers any faculty to reason, disclaims the privilege +of being a man, and understands not the worth of his own nature; he +that prizes any quality beyond virtue and goodness, renounces the title +of a Christian, and knows not how to value the dignity of his profession. +It is these two (reason and virtue) in conjunction which produce all +that is considerably good and great in the world. Fancy can do +little; doth never anything well, except as directed and wielded by +them. Do pretty conceits or humorous talk carry on any business, +or perform any work? No; they are ineffectual and fruitless: often +they disturb, but they never despatch anything with good success. +It is simple reason (as dull and dry as it seemeth) which expediteth +all the grand affairs, which accomplisheth all the mighty works that +we see done in the world. In truth, therefore, as one diamond +is worth numberless bits of glass; so one solid reason is worth innumerable +fancies: one grain of true science and sound wisdom in real worth and +use doth outweigh loads (if any loads can be) of freakish wit. +To rate things otherwise doth argue great weakness of judgment, and +fondness of mind. So to conceit of this way signifieth a weak +mind; and much to delight therein rendereth it so—nothing more +debaseth the spirit of a man, or more rendereth it light and trifling.</p> +<p>Hence if we must be venting pleasant conceits, we should do it as +if we did it not, carelessly and unconcernedly; not standing upon it, +or valuing ourselves for it: we should do it with measure and moderation; +not giving up ourselves thereto, so as to mind it or delight in it more +than in any other thing: we should not be so intent upon it as to become +remiss in affairs more proper or needful for us; so as to nauseate serious +business, or disrelish the more worthy entertainments of our minds. +This is the great danger of it, which we daily see men to incur; they +are so bewitched with a humour of being witty themselves, or of hearkening +to the fancies of others, that it is this only which they can like or +favour, which they can endure to think or talk of. ’Tis +a great pity that men who would seem to have so much wit, should so +little understand themselves. But further—</p> +<p>6. Vainglorious ostentation this way is very blamable. +All ambition, all vanity, all conceitedness, upon whatever ground they +are founded, are absolutely unreasonable and silly; but yet those being +grounded on some real ability, or some useful skill, are wise and manly +in comparison to this, which standeth on a foundation so manifestly +slight and weak. The old philosophers by a severe father were +called <i>animalia gloriæ</i> (animals of glory), and by a satirical +poet they were termed bladders of vanity; but they at least did catch +at praise from praiseworthy knowledge; they were puffed up with a wind +which blew some good to mankind; they sought glory from that which deserved +glory if they had not sought it; it was a substantial and solid credit +which they did affect, resulting from successful enterprises of strong +reason, and stout industry: but these <i>animalculæ gloriæ</i>, +these flies, these insects of glory, these, not bladders, but bubbles +of vanity, would be admired and praised for that which is nowise admirable +or laudable; for the casual hits and emergencies of roving fancy; for +stumbling on an odd conceit or phrase, which signifieth nothing, and +is as superficial as the smile, as hollow as the noise it causeth. +Nothing certainly in nature is more ridiculous than a self-conceited +wit, who deemeth himself somebody, and greatly pretendeth to commendation +from so pitiful and worthless a thing as a knack of trifling.</p> +<p>7. Lastly, it is our duty never so far to engage ourselves +in this way as thereby to lose or to impair that habitual seriousness, +modesty and sobriety of mind, that steady composedness, gravity and +constancy of demeanour, which become Christians. We should continually +keep our minds intent upon our high calling, and grand interests; ever +well tuned, and ready for the performance of holy devotions, and the +practice of most serious duties with earnest attention and fervent affection. +Wherefore we should never suffer them to be dissolved into levity, or +disordered into a wanton frame, indisposing us for religious thoughts +and actions. We ought always in our behaviour to maintain, not +only το πρεπον (a fitting decency), +but also το σεμνον (a stately +gravity), a kind of venerable majesty, suitable to that high rank which +we bear of God’s friends and children; adorning our holy profession, +and guarding us from all impressions of sinful vanity. Wherefore +we should not let ourselves be transported into any excessive pitch +of lightness, inconsistent with or prejudicial to our Christian state +and business. Gravity and modesty are the senses of piety, which +being once slighted, sin will easily attempt and encroach upon us. +So the old Spanish gentleman may be interpreted to have been wise who, +when his son upon a voyage to the Indies took his leave of him, gave +him this odd advice, “My son, in the first place keep thy gravity, +in the next place fear God;” intimating that a man must first +be serious, before he can be pious.</p> +<p>To conclude, as we need not be demure, so must we not be impudent; +as we should not be sour, so ought we not to be fond; as we may be free, +so we should not be vain; as we may well stoop to friendly complaisance, +so we should take heed of falling into contemptible levity. If +without wronging others, or derogating from ourselves, we can be facetious, +if we can use our wits in jesting innocently, and conveniently, we may +sometimes do it: but let us, in compliance with St. Paul’s direction, +beware of “foolish talking and jesting which are not convenient.”</p> +<p>“Now the God of grace and peace . . . . make us perfect in +every good work to do His will, working in us that which is well pleasing +in His sight, through Jesus Christ, to whom be glory for ever and ever. +Amen.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h3>AGAINST RASH AND VAIN SWEARING.</h3> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>“<i>But above all things, my brethren, swear not</i>.”<br /> St. +James v. 12.</p> +<p>Among other precepts of good life (directing the practice of virtue +and abstinence from sin) St. James doth insert this about swearing, +couched in expression denoting his great earnestness, and apt to excite +our special attention. Therein he doth not mean universally to +interdict the use of oaths, for that in some cases is not only lawful, +but very expedient, yea, needful, and required from us as a duty; but +that swearing which our Lord had expressly prohibited to His disciples, +and which thence, questionless, the brethren to whom St. James did write +did well understand themselves obliged to forbear, having learned so +in the first catechisms of Christian institution; that is, needless +and heedless swearing in ordinary conversation, a practice then frequent +in the world, both among Jews and Gentiles; the which also, to the shame +of our age, is now so much in fashion, and with some men in vogue; the +invoking God’s name, appealing to His testimony, and provoking +His judgment upon any slight occasion, in common talk, with vain incogitancy, +or profane boldness. From such practice the Holy Apostle exhorteth +in terms importing his great concernedness, and implying the matter +to be of highest importance; for, Προ παντων, +saith he, “(Before all things), my brethren, do not swear;” +as if he did apprehend this sin of all others to be one of the most +heinous and pernicious. Could he have said more? would he have +said so much, if he had not conceived the matter to be of exceeding +weight and consequence? And that it is so, I mean now, by God’s +help, to show you, by proposing some considerations, whereby the heinous +wickedness, together with the monstrous folly, of such rash and vain +swearing will appear; the which being laid to heart will, I hope, effectually +dissuade and deter from it.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>I. Let us consider the nature of an oath, and what we do when +we adventure to swear.</p> +<p>It is (as it is phrased in the Decalogue, and elsewhere in Holy Scripture) +an assuming the name of God, and applying it to our purpose; to countenance +and confirm what we say.</p> +<p>It is an invocation of God as a most faithful Witness, concerning +the truth of our words, or the sincerity of our meaning.</p> +<p>It is an appeal to God as a most upright Judge whether we do prevaricate +in asserting what we do not believe true, or in promising what we are +not firmly resolved to perform.</p> +<p>It is a formal engagement of God to be the Avenger of our trespassing +in violation of truth or faith.</p> +<p>It is a binding our souls with a most strict and solemn obligation, +to answer before God, and to undergo the issue of His judgment about +what we affirm or undertake.</p> +<p>Such an oath is represented to us in Holy Scripture.</p> +<p>Whence we may collect, that swearing doth require great modesty and +composedness of spirit, very serious consideration and solicitous care, +that we be not rude and saucy with God, in taking up His name, and prostituting +it to vile or mean uses; that we do not abuse or debase His authority, +by citing it to aver falsehoods or impertinences; that we do not slight +His venerable justice, by rashly provoking it against us; that we do +not precipitately throw our souls into most dangerous snares and intricacies.</p> +<p>For let us reflect and consider: What a presumption is it without +due regard and reverence to lay hold on God’s name; with unhallowed +breath to vent and toss that great and glorious, that most holy, that +reverend, that fearful and terrible name of the Lord our God, the great +Creator, the mighty Sovereign, the dreadful Judge of all the world; +that name which all heaven with profoundest submission doth adore, which +the angelical powers, the brightest and purest Seraphim, without hiding +their faces, and reverential horror, cannot utter or hear; the very +thought whereof should strike awe through our hearts, the mention whereof +would make any sober man to tremble? Πως γαρ +ουκ ατοπον, “For +how,” saith St. Chrysostom, “is it not absurd that a servant +should not dare to call his master by name, or bluntly and ordinarily +to mention him, yet that we slightly and contemptuously should in our +mouth toss about the Lord of angels?</p> +<p>“How is it not absurd, if we have a garment better than the +rest, that we forbear to use it continually, but in the most slight +and common way do wear the name of God?”</p> +<p>How grievous indecency is it, at every turn to summon our Maker, +and call down Almighty God from heaven, to attend our leisure, to vouch +our idle prattle, to second our giddy passions, to concern His truth, +His justice, His power in our trivial affairs!</p> +<p>What a wildness is it, to dally with that judgment upon which the +eternal doom of all creatures dependeth, at which the pillars of heaven +are astonished, which hurled down legions of angels from the top of +heaven and happiness into the bottomless dungeon: the which, as grievous +sinners, of all things we have most reason to dread; and about which +no sober man can otherwise think than did that great king, the holy +psalmist, who said, “My flesh trembleth for Thee, and I am afraid +of Thy judgments!”</p> +<p>How prodigious a madness is it, without any constraint or needful +cause, to incur so horrible a danger, to rush upon a curse; to defy +that vengeance, the least touch of breath whereof can dash us to nothing, +or thrust us down into extreme and endless woe?</p> +<p>Who can express the wretchedness of that folly, which so entangleth +us with inextricable knots, and enchaineth our souls so rashly with +desperate obligations?</p> +<p>Wherefore he that would but a little mind what he doeth when he dareth +to swear, what it is to meddle with the adorable name, the venerable +testimony, the formidable judgment, the terrible vengeance of the Divine +Majesty, into what a case he putteth himself, how extreme hazard he +runneth thereby, would assuredly have little heart to swear, without +greatest reason, and most urgent need; hardly without trembling would +he undertake the most necessary and solemn oath; much cause would he +see σεβεσθαι ορκον, +to adore, to fear an oath: which to do, the divine preacher maketh the +character of a good man. “As,” saith he, “is +the good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth, as he that feareth +an oath.”</p> +<p>In fine, even a heathen philosopher, considering the nature of an +oath, did conclude the unlawfulness thereof in such cases. For, +“seeing,” saith he, “an oath doth call God for witness, +and proposeth Him for umpire and voucher of the things it saith; therefore +to induce God so upon occasion of human affairs, or, which is all one, +upon small and slight accounts, doth imply contempt of Him: wherefore +we ought wholly to shun swearing, except upon occasions of highest necessity.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>II. We may consider that swearing, agreeably to its nature, +or natural aptitude and tendency, is represented in Holy Scripture as +a special part of religious worship, or devotion towards God; in the +due performance whereof we do avow Him for the true God and Governor +of the world; we piously do acknowledge His principal attributes and +special prerogatives; His omnipresence and omniscience, extending itself +to our most inward thoughts, our secretest purposes, our closest retirements; +His watchful providence over all our actions, affairs, and concerns; +His faithful goodness, in favouring truth and protecting right; His +exact justice, in patronising sincerity, and chastising perfidiousness; +His being Supreme Lord over all persons, and Judge paramount in all +causes; His readiness in our need, upon our humble imploration and reference, +to undertake the arbitration of matters controverted, and the care of +administering justice, for the maintenance of truth and right, of loyalty +and fidelity, of order and peace among men. Swearing does also +intimate a pious truth and confidence in God, as Aristotle observeth.</p> +<p>Such things a serious oath doth imply, to such purposes swearing +naturally serveth; and therefore to signify or effectuate them, Divine +institution hath devoted it.</p> +<p>God in goodness to such ends hath pleased to lend us His great name; +allowing us to cite Him for a witness, to have recourse to His bar, +to engage His justice and power, whenever the case deserveth and requireth +it, or when we cannot by other means well assure the sincerity of our +meaning, or secure the constancy of our resolutions.</p> +<p>Yea, in such exigencies He doth exact this practice from us, as an +instance of our religious confidence in Him, and as a service conducible +to His glory. For it is a precept in His law, of moral nature, +and eternal obligation, “Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God; Him +shalt thou serve, and to Him shalt thou cleave, and shalt swear by His +name.” It is the character of a religious man to swear with +due reverence and upright conscience. For, “The king,” +saith the psalmist, “shall rejoice in God; every one that sweareth +by Him shall glory: but the mouth of them that speak lies shall be stopped.” +It is a distinctive mark of God’s people, according to that of +the prophet Jeremy, “And it shall come to pass, if they will diligently +learn the ways of my people, to swear by my name . . . then shall they +be built in the midst of my people.” It is predicted concerning +the evangelical times, “Unto Me every knee shall bow, every tongue +shall swear:” and, “That he who blesseth himself in the +earth, shall bless himself by the God of Truth; and he that sweareth +in the earth, shall swear by the God of Truth.”</p> +<p>As therefore all other acts of devotion, wherein immediate application +is made to the Divine Majesty, should never be performed without most +hearty intention, most serious consideration, most lowly reverence; +so neither should this grand one, wherein God is so nearly touched, +and His chief attributes so much concerned: the which indeed doth involve +both prayer and praise, doth require the most devotional acts of faith +and fear.</p> +<p>We therefore should so perform it as not to incur that reproof: “This +people draweth nigh unto me with their mouth, and honoureth me with +their lips, but their heart is far from me.”</p> +<p>When we seem most formally to avow God, to confess His omniscience, +to confide in His justice, we should not really disregard Him, and in +effect signify that we do not think He doth know what we say, or what +we do.</p> +<p>If we do presume to offer this service, we should do it in the manner +appointed by himself, according to the conditions prescribed in the +prophet, “Thou shalt swear, the Lord liveth, in truth, in judgment, +and in righteousness:” in truth, taking heed that our meaning +be conformable to the sense of our words, and our words to the verity +of things; in judgment, having with careful deliberation examined and +weighed that which we assert or promise; in righteousness, being satisfied +in conscience that we do not therein infringe any rule of piety toward +God, of equity toward men, or sobriety and discretion in regard to ourselves.</p> +<p>The cause of our swearing must be needful, or very expedient; the +design of it must be honest and useful to considerable purposes (tending +to God’s honour, our neighbour’s benefit, our own welfare); +the matter of it should be not only just and lawful, but worthy and +weighty; the manner ought to be grave and solemn, our mind being framed +to earnest attention, and endued with pious affections suitable to the +occasion.</p> +<p>Otherwise, if we do venture to swear, without due advice and care, +without much respect and awe, upon any slight or vain (not to say bad +or unlawful) occasion, we then desecrate swearing, and are guilty of +profaning a most sacred ordinance: the doing so doth imply base hypocrisy, +or lewd mockery, or abominable wantonness and folly; in bodily invading +and vainly trifling with the most august duties of religion. Such +swearing therefore is very dishonourable and injurious to God, very +prejudicial to religion, very repugnant to piety.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>III. We may consider that the swearing prohibited is very noxious +to human society.</p> +<p>The great prop of society (which upholdeth the safety, peace, and +welfare thereof, in observing laws, dispensing justice, discharging +trusts, keeping contracts, and holding good correspondence mutually) +is conscience, or a sense of duty toward God, obliging to perform that +which is right and equal; quickened by hope of rewards and fear of punishments +from Him: secluding which principle, no worldly confederation is strong +enough to hold men fast, or can further dispose many to do right, or +observe faith, or hold peace, than appetite or interest, or humour (things +very slippery and uncertain) do sway them.</p> +<p>That men should live honestly, quietly, and comfortably together, +it is needful that they should live under a sense of God’s will, +and in awe of the divine power, hoping to please God, and fearing to +offend Him, by their behaviour respectively.</p> +<p>That justice should be administered between men, it is necessary +that testimonies of fact be alleged; and that witnesses should apprehend +themselves greatly obliged to discover the truth, according to their +conscience, in dark and doubtful cases.</p> +<p>That men should uprightly discharge offices serviceable to public +good, it doth behove that they be firmly engaged to perform the trusts +reposed in them.</p> +<p>That in affairs of very considerable importance men should deal with +one another with satisfaction of mind, and mutual confidence, they must +receive competent assurances concerning the integrity, fidelity, and +constancy each of other.</p> +<p>That the safety of governors may be preserved, and the obedience +due to them maintained secure from attempts to which they are liable +(by the treachery, levity, perverseness, timorousness, ambition, all +such lusts and ill humours of men), it is expedient that men should +be tied with the strictest bands of allegiance.</p> +<p>That controversies emergent about the interests of men should be +determined, and an end put to strife by peremptory and satisfactory +means, is plainly necessary for common quiet.</p> +<p>Wherefore for the public interest and benefit of human society it +is requisite that the highest obligations possible should be laid upon +the consciences of men.</p> +<p>And such are those of oaths, engaging them to fidelity and constancy +in all such cases, out of regard to Almighty God, as the infallible +patron of truth and right, the unavoidable chastiser of perfidiousness +and improbity.</p> +<p>To such purposes, therefore, oaths have ever been applied, as the +most effectual instruments of working them; not only among the followers +of true and perfect religion, but even among all those who had any glimmering +notions concerning a Divine Power and Providence; who have deemed an +oath the fastest tie of conscience, and held the violation of it for +the most detestable impiety and iniquity. So that what Cicero +saith of the Romans, that “their ancestors had no band to constrain +faith more strait than an oath,” is true of all other nations, +common reason not being able to devise any engagement more obliging +than it is; it being in the nature of things τελευταια +πιστις, and ουρωτατον +αληθειας ενευρον, +the utmost assurance, the last resort of human faith, the surest pledge +that any man can yield of his trustiness. Hence ever in transactions +of highest moment this hath been used to bind the faith of men.</p> +<p>Hereby nations have been wont to ratify leagues of peace and amity +between each other (which therefore the Greeks call οοκια).</p> +<p>Hereby princes have obliged their subjects to loyalty: and it hath +ever been the strongest argument to press that duty, which the Preacher +useth, “I counsel thee to keep the king’s commandment, and +that in regard of the oath of God.”</p> +<p>Hereby generals have engaged their soldiers to stick close to them +in bearing hardships and encountering dangers.</p> +<p>Hereby the nuptial league hath been confirmed; the solemnisation +whereof in temples before God is in effect a most sacred oath.</p> +<p>Hereon the decision of the greatest causes concerning the lives, +estates, and reputations of men have depended; so that, as the Apostle +saith, “an oath for confirmation is to them an end of all strife.”</p> +<p>Indeed, such hath the need hereof been ever apprehended, that we +may observe, in cases of great importance, no other obligation hath +been admitted for sufficient to bind the fidelity and constancy of the +most credible persons; so that even the best men hardly could trust +the best men without it. For instance,</p> +<p>When Abimelech would assure to himself the friendship of Abraham, +although he knew him to be a very pious and righteous person, whose +word might be as well taken as any man’s, yet, for entire satisfaction, +he thus spake to him: “God is with thee in all that thou doest: +Now therefore swear unto me here by God, that thou wilt not deal falsely +with me.”</p> +<p>Abraham, though he did much confide in the honesty of his servant +Eliezer, having entrusted him with all his estate, yet in the affair +concerning the marriage of his son he could not but thus oblige him: +“Put,” saith he, “I pray thee, thy hand under my thigh, +and I will make thee swear by the Lord, the God of heaven and the God +of the earth, that thou wilt not take a wife unto my son of the daughters +of the Canaanites.”</p> +<p>Laban had good experience of Jacob’s fidelity; yet that would +not satisfy, but, “The Lord,” said he, “watch between +me and thee, when we are absent one from another. If thou shalt afflict +my daughters, or if thou shalt take other wives beside my daughters, +no man is with us; see, God is witness between thee and me. The +God of Abraham, and the God of Nahor, the God of their father, judge +betwixt us.”</p> +<p>So did Jacob make Joseph swear that he would bury him in Canaan: +and Joseph caused the children of Israel to swear that they would translate +his bones. So did Jonathan cause his beloved friend David to swear +that he would show kindness to him and to his house for ever. +The prudence of which course the event showeth, the total excision of +Jonathan’s family being thereby prevented; for “the king,” +’tis said, “spared Mephibosheth the son of Jonathan, because +of the Lord’s oath that was between them.”</p> +<p>These instances declare that there is no security which men can yield +comparable to that of an oath; the obligation whereof no man wilfully +can infringe without renouncing the fear of God and any pretence to +His favour.</p> +<p>Wherefore human society will be extremely wronged and damnified by +the dissolving or slackening these most sacred bands of conscience; +and consequently by their common and careless use, which soon will breed +a contempt of them, and render them insignificant, either to bind the +swearers, or to ground a trust on their oaths.</p> +<p>As by the rare and reverent use of oaths their dignity is upheld +and their obligation kept fast, so by the frequent and negligent application +of them, by the prostituting them to every mean and toyish purpose, +their respect will be quite lost, their strength will be loosed, they +will prove unserviceable to public use.</p> +<p>If oaths generally become cheap and vile, what will that of allegiance +signify? If men are wont to play with swearing anywhere, can we +expect they should be serious and strict therein at the bar or in the +church. Will they regard God’s testimony, or dread His judgment, +in one place, or at one time, when everywhere upon any, upon no occasion +they dare to confront and contemn them? Who then will be the more +trusted for swearing? What satisfaction will any man have from +it? The rifeness of this practice, as it is the sign, so it will +be the cause of a general diffidence among man.</p> +<p>Incredible therefore is the mischief which this vain practice will +bring in to the public; depriving princes of their best security, exposing +the estates of private men to uncertainty, shaking all the confidence +men can have in the faith of one another.</p> +<p>For which detriments accruing from this abuse to the public every +vain swearer is responsible; and he would do well to consider that he +will never be able to make reparation for them. And the public +is much concerned that this enormity be retrenched.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>IV. Let us consider, that rash and vain swearing is very apt +often to bring the practiser of it into that most horrible sin of perjury. +For “false swearing,” as the Hebrew wise man saith, “naturally +springeth out of much swearing:” and, “he,” saith +St. Chrysostom, “that sweareth continually, both willingly and +unwillingly, both ignorantly and knowingly, both in earnest and in sport, +being often transported by anger and many other things, will frequently +forswear. It is confessed and manifest, that it is necessary for +him that sweareth much to be perjurious.” ’Αμηανον +γαρ, αμηανον, “For,” +saith he again, “it is impossible, it is impossible for a mouth +addicted to swearing not frequently to forswear.” He that +sweareth at random, as blind passion moveth, or wanton fancy prompteth, +or the temper suggesteth, often will hit upon asserting that which is +false, or promising that which is impossible: that want of conscience +and of consideration which do suffer him to violate God’s law +in swearing will betray him to the venting of lies, which backed with +oaths become perjuries. If sometime what he sweareth doth happen +to be true and performable, it doth not free him of guilt; it being +his fortune, rather than his care or conscience, which keepeth him from +perjury.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>V. Such swearing commonly will induce a man to bind himself +by oath to unlawful practices; and consequently will entangle him in +a woeful necessity either of breaking his oath, or of doing worse, and +committing wickedness: so that “swearing,” as St. Chrysostom +saith, “hath this misery attending it, that, both trangressed +and observed, it plagueth those who are guilty of it.”</p> +<p>Of this perplexity the Holy Scripture affordeth two notable instances: +the one of Saul, forced to break his rash oaths; the other of Herod, +being engaged thereby to commit a most horrid murder.</p> +<p>Had Saul observed his oaths, what injury had he done, what mischief +had he produced, in slaughtering his most worthy and most innocent son, +the prop and glory of his family, the bulwark of his country, and the +grand instrument of salvation to it; in forcing the people to violate +their cross oath, and for prevention of one, causing many perjuries? +He was therefore fain to desist, and lie under the guilt of breaking +his oaths.</p> +<p>And for Herod, the excellent father thus presseth the consideration +of his case: “Take,” saith he, “I beseech you, the +chopped off head of St. John, and his warm blood yet trickling down; +each of you bear it home with you, and conceive that before your eyes +you hear it uttering speech, and saying, Embrace the murderer of me, +an oath. That which reproof did not, this an oath did do; that +which the tyrant’s wrath could not, this the necessity of keeping +an oath did effect. For when the tyrant was reprehended publicly +in the audience of all men, he bravely did bear the rebuke; but when +he had cast himself into the necessity of oaths, then did he cut off +that blessed head.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>VI. Likewise the use of rash swearing will often engage a man +in undertakings very inconvenient and detrimental to himself. +A man is bound to perform his vows to the Lord, whatever they be, whatever +damage or trouble thence may accrue to him, if they be not unlawful. +It is the law, that which is gone out of thy lips, thou shalt keep and +perform. It is the property of a good man, that he sweareth to +his own hurt, and changeth not. Wherefore ’tis the part +of a sober man to be well advised what he doth swear or vow religiously, +that he do not put himself into the inextricable strait of committing +great sin, or undergoing great inconvenience; that he do not rush into +that snare of which the wise man speaketh, “It is a snare to a +man to devour that which is holy (or, to swallow a sacred obligation), +and after vows to make inquiry,” seeking how he may disengage +himself the doing which is a folly offensive to God, as the Preacher +telleth us. “When,” saith he, “thou vowest a +vow unto God, defer not to pay it; for He hath no pleasure in fools: +pay that which thou hast vowed.” God will not admit our +folly in vowing as a plea for non-performance; He will exact it from +us both as a due debt, and as a proper punishment of our impious folly.</p> +<p>For instance, into what loss and mischief, what sorrow, what regret +and repentance, did the unadvised vow of Jephthah throw him; the performance +whereof, as St. Chrysostom remarketh, God did permit, and order to be +commemorated with solemn lamentation, that all posterity might be admonished +thereby, and deterred from such precipitant swearing.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>VII. Let us consider that swearing is a sin of all others peculiarly +clamorous, and provocative of Divine judgment. God is hardly so +much concerned, or in a manner constrained, to punish any other sin +as this. He is bound in honour and interest to vindicate His name +from the abuse, His authority from the contempt, His holy ordinance +from the profanation, which it doth infer. He is concerned to +take care that His providence be not questioned, that the dread of His +majesty be not voided, that all religion be not overthrown by the outrageous +commission thereof with impunity.</p> +<p>It immediately toucheth His name, it expressly calleth upon Him to +mind it, to judge it, to show himself in avenging it. He may seem +deaf, or unconcerned, if, being so called and provoked, He doth not +declare Himself.</p> +<p>There is understood to be a kind of formal compact between Him and +mankind, obliging Him to interpose, to take the matter into His cognisance, +being specially addressed to Him.</p> +<p>The bold swearer doth importune Him to hear, doth rouse Him to mark, +doth brave Him to judge and punish his wickedness.</p> +<p>Hence no wonder that “the flying roll,” a quick and inevitable +curse, doth surprise the swearer, and cut him off, as it is in the prophet. +No wonder that so many remarkable instances do occur in history of signal +vengeance inflicted on persons notably guilty of this crime. No +wonder that a common practice thereof doth fetch down public judgments; +and that, as the prophets of old did proclaim, “because of swearing +the land mourneth.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>VIII. Further (passing over the special laws against it, the +mischievous consequences of it, the sore punishments appointed to it), +we may consider, that to common sense vain swearing is a very unreasonable +and ill-favoured practice, greatly misbecoming any sober, worthy, or +honest person; but especially most absurd and incongruous to a Christian.</p> +<p>For in ordinary conversation what needful or reasonable occasion +can intervene of violating this command? If there come under discourse +a matter of reason, which is evidently true and certain, then what need +can there be of an oath to affirm it, it sufficing to expose it to light, +or to propose the evidences for it? If an obscure or doubtful +point come to be debated, it will not bear an oath; it will be a strange +madness to dare, a great folly to hope the persuading it thereby. +What were more ridiculous than to swear the truth of a demonstrable +theorem? What more vain than so to assert a disputable problem: +oaths (like wagers) are in such cases no arguments, except silliness +in the users of them.</p> +<p>If a matter of history be started, then if a man be taken for honest, +his word will pass for attestation without further assurance; but if +his veracity or probity be doubted, his oath will not be relied on, +especially when he doth obtrude it. For it was no less truly than +acutely said by the old poet, Ουκ ανδρος +ορκοι πιστις, +αλλ’ ορκων ανηρ, +“The man doth not get credit from an oath, but an oath from the +man.” And a greater author, “An oath,” saith +St. Chrysostom, “doth not make a man credible; but the testimony +of his life, and the exactness of his conversation, and a good repute. +Many often have burst with swearing, and persuaded no man; others only +nodding have deserved more belief than those who swore so mightily.” +Wherefore oaths, as they are frivolous coming from a person of little +worth or conscience, so they are superfluous in the mouth of an honest +and worthy person; yea, as they do not increase the credit of the former, +so they may impair that of the latter.</p> +<p>“A good man,” as Socrates did say, “should apparently +so demean himself, that his word may be deemed more credible than an +oath;” the constant tenour of his practice vouching for it, and +giving it such weight, that no asseveration can further corroborate +it.</p> +<p>He should τοις εργοις +ευορκειν, “swear +by his good deeds,” and exhibit βιον αξιοπιστον, +“a life deserving belief,” as Clemens Alex. saith: so that +no man should desire more from him than his bare assertion; but willingly +should yield him the privilege which the Athenians granted to Xenocrates, +that he should testify without swearing.</p> +<p>He should be like the Essenes, of whom Josephus saith, that everything +spoken by them was more valid than an oath; whence they declined swearing.</p> +<p>He should so much confide in his own veracity and fidelity, and so +much stand upon them, that he should not deign to offer any pledge for +them, implying them to want confirmation.</p> +<p>“He should,” as St. Jerome saith, “so love truth, +that he should suppose himself to have sworn whatsoever he hath said;” +and therefore should not be apt to heap another oath on his words.</p> +<p>Upon such accounts common reason directed even pagan wise men wholly +to interdict swearing in ordinary conversation, or about petty matters, +as an irrational and immoral practice, unworthy of sober and discreet +persons. “Forbear swearing about any matter,” said +Plato, cited by Clem. Alex. “Avoid swearing, if you can, +wholly,” said Epictetus. “For money swear by no god, +though you swear truly,” said Socrates. And divers the like +precepts occur in other heathens; the mention whereof may well serve +to strike shame into many loose and vain people bearing the name of +Christians.</p> +<p>Indeed, for a true and real Christian, this practice doth especially +in a far higher degree misbecome him, upon considerations peculiar to +his high calling and holy profession.</p> +<p>Plutarch telleth us that among the Romans the flamen of Jupiter was +not permitted to swear, of which law among other reasons he assigned +this: “Because it is not handsome that he to whom divine and greatest +things are entrusted should be distrusted about small matters.” +The which reason may well be applied to excuse every Christian from +it, who is a priest to the most High God, and hath the most celestial +and important matters concredited to him; in comparison to which all +other matters are very mean and inconsiderable. The dignity of +his rank should render his word <i>verbum honoris</i>, passable without +any further engagement. He hath opinions of things, he hath undertaken +practices inconsistent with swearing. For he that firmly doth +believe that God is ever present with him, and auditor and witness of +all his discourse; he that is persuaded that a severe judgment shall +pass on him, wherein he must give an account for every idle word which +slippeth from him, and wherein, among other offenders, assuredly liars +will be condemned to the burning lake; he that in a great Sacrament +(once most solemnly taken, and frequently renewed) hath engaged and +sworn, together with all other divine commandments, to observe those +which most expressly do charge him to be exactly just, faithful, and +veracious in all his words and deeds; who therefore should be ready +to say with David, “I have sworn, and am steadfastly purposed +to keep thy righteous judgments,” to him every word hath the force +of an oath; every lie, every breach of promise, every violation of faith +doth involve perjury: for him to swear is false heraldry, an impertinent +accumulation of one oath upon another; he of all men should disdain +to allow that his words are not perfectly credible, that his promise +is not secure, without being assured by an oath.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>IX. Indeed, the practice of swearing greatly disparageth him +that useth it, and derogateth from his credit upon divers accounts.</p> +<p>It signifieth (if it signifieth anything) that he doth not confide +in his own reputation, and judgeth his own bare word not to deserve +credit: for why, if he taketh his word to be good, doth he back it with +asseverations? why, if he deemeth his own honesty to bear proof, doth +he cite Heaven to warrant it?</p> +<p>“It is,” saith St. Basil, “a very foul and silly +thing for a man to accuse himself as unworthy of belief, and to proffer +an oath for security.”</p> +<p>By so doing a man doth authorise others to distrust him; for it can +be no wrong to distrust him who doth not pretend to be a credible person, +or that his saying alone may safely be taken: who, by suspecting that +others are not satisfied with his simple assertion, implieth a reason +known to himself for it.</p> +<p>It rendereth whatever he saith to be in reason suspicious, as discovering +him void of conscience and discretion; for he that flatly against the +rules of duty and reason will swear vainly, what can engage him to speak +truly? He that is so loose in so clear and so considerable a point +of obedience to God, how can he be supposed staunch in regard to any +other? “It being,” as Aristotle hath it, “the +part of the same men to do ill things, and not to regard forswearing.” +It will at least constrain any man to suspect all his discourse of vanity +and unadvisedness, seeing he plainly hath no care to bridle his tongue +from so gross an offence.</p> +<p>It is strange, therefore, that any man of honour or honesty should +not scorn, by such a practice, to shake his own credit, or to detract +from the validity of his word; which should stand firm on itself, and +not want any attestation to support it. It is a privilege of honourable +persons that they are excused from swearing, and that their <i>verbum +honoris</i> passeth in lieu of an oath: is it not then strange, that +when others dispense with them, they should not dispense with themselves, +but voluntarily degrade themselves, and with sin forfeit so noble a +privilege?</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>X. To excuse these faults, the swearer will be forced to confess +that his oaths are no more than waste and insignificant words, deprecating +being taken for serious, or to be understood that he meaneth anything +by them, but only that he useth them as expletive phrases, προς +αναπληρωσιν λογου, +to plump his speech, and fill up sentences. But such pleas do +no more than suggest other faults of swearing, and good arguments against +it; its impertinence, its abuse of speech, its disgracing the practiser +of it in point of judgment and capacity. For so it is, oaths as +they commonly pass are mere excrescences of speech, which do nothing +but encumber and deform it; they so embellish discourse, as a wen or +a scab do beautify a face, as a patch or a spot do adorn a garment.</p> +<p>To what purpose, I pray, is God’s name hooked and haled into +our idle talk? why should we so often mention Him, when we do not mean +anything about Him? would it not, into every sentence to foist a dog +or a horse, to intrude Turkish, or any barbarous gibberish, be altogether +as proper and pertinent?</p> +<p>What do these superfluities signify, but that the venter of them +doth little skill the use of speech, or the rule of conversation, but +meaneth to sputter and prate anything without judgment or wit; that +his invention is very barren, his fancy beggarly, craving the aid of +any stuff to relieve it? One would think a man of sense should +grudge to lend his ear, or incline his attention to such motley ragged +discourse; that without nauseating he scarce should endure to observe +men lavishing time, and squandering their breath so frivolously. +’Tis an affront to good company to pester it with such talk.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>XI. But further, upon higher accounts this is a very uncivil +and unmannerly practice.</p> +<p>Some vain persons take it for a genteel and graceful thing; a special +accomplishment, a mark of fine breeding, a point of high gallantry; +for who, forsooth, is the brave spark, the complete gentleman, the man +of conversation and address, but he that hath the skill and confidence +(O heavens! how mean a skill! how mad a confidence!) to lard every sentence +with an oath or a curse, making bold at every turn to salute his Maker, +or to summon Him in attestation of his tattle; not to say calling and +challenging the Almighty to damn and destroy him? Such a conceit, +I say, too many have of swearing, because a custom thereof, together +with divers other fond and base qualities, hath prevailed among some +people, bearing the name and garb of gentlemen.</p> +<p>But in truth, there is no practice more crossing the genuine nature +of genteelness, or misbecoming persons well born and well bred; who +should excel the rude vulgar in goodness, in courtesy, in nobleness +of heart, in unwillingness to offend, and readiness to oblige those +with whom they converse, in steady composedness of mind and manners, +in disdaining to say or do any unworthy, any unhandsome things.</p> +<p>For this practice is not only a gross rudeness toward the main body +of men, who justly reverence the name of God, and detest such an abuse +thereof; not only further an insolent defiance of the common profession, +the religion, the law of our country, which disalloweth and condemneth +it, but it is very odious and offensive to any particular society or +company, at least, wherein there is any sober person, any who retaineth +a sense of goodness, or is anywise concerned for God’s honour: +for to any such person no language can be more disgustful; nothing can +more grate his ears, or fret his heart, than to hear the sovereign object +of his love and esteem so mocked and slighted; to see the law of his +Prince so disloyally infringed, so contemptuously trampled on; to find +his best Friend and Benefactor so outrageously abused. To give +him the lie were a compliment, to spit in his face were an obligation, +in comparison to this usage.</p> +<p>Wherefore ’tis a wonder that any person of rank, any that hath +in him a spark of ingenuity, or doth at all pretend to good manners, +should find in his heart or deign to comply with so scurvy a fashion: +a fashion much more befitting the scum of the people than the flower +of the gentry; yea, rather much below any man endued with a scrap of +reason or a grain of goodness. Would we bethink ourselves, modest, +sober, and pertinent discourse would appear far more generous and masculine +than such mad hectoring the Almighty, such boisterous insulting over +the received laws and general notions of mankind, such ruffianly swaggering +against sobriety and goodness. If gentlemen would regard the virtues +of their ancestors, the founders of their quality—that gallant +courage and solid wisdom, that noble courtesy, which advanced their +families and severed them from the vulgar—this degenerate wantonness +and forbidness of language would return to the dunghill, or rather, +which God grant, be quite banished from the world, the vulgar following +their example.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>XII. Further, the words of our Lord, when He forbade this practice, +do suggest another consideration against it, deducible from the causes +and sources of it; from whence it cometh, that men are so inclined or +addicted thereto. “Let,” saith He, “your communication +be Yea, yea, Nay, nay; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.” +The roots of it, He assureth us, are evil, and therefore the fruit cannot +be good: it is no grape which groweth from thorns, or fig from thistles. +Consult experience, and observe whence it doth proceed.</p> +<p>Sometimes it ariseth from exorbitant heats of spirit, or transports +of unbridled passion. When a man is keenly peevish, or fiercely +angry, or eagerly contentious, then he blustereth, and dischargeth his +choler in most tragical strains; then he would fright the objects of +his displeasure by the most violent expressions thereof. This +is sometime alleged in excuse of rash swearing: I was provoked, the +swearer will say, I was in passion; but it is strange that a bad cause +should justify a bad effect, that one crime should warrant another, +that what would spoil a good action should excuse a bad one.</p> +<p>Sometimes it proceedeth from arrogant conceit, and a tyrannical humour; +when a man fondly admireth his own opinion, and affecting to impose +it on others, is thence moved to thwack it on with lusty asseverations.</p> +<p>Sometimes it issueth from wantonness and levity of mind, disposing +a man to sport with anything, how serious, how grave, how sacred and +venerable soever.</p> +<p>Sometimes its rise is from stupid inadvertency, or heady precipitancy; +when the man doth not heed what he saith, or consider the nature and +consequence of his words, but snatcheth any expression which cometh +next, or which his roving fancy doth offer, for want of that caution +of the psalmist, “I said, I will take heed to my ways, that I +sin not with my tongue; I will keep my mouth with a bridle, while the +wicked is before me.”</p> +<p>Sometimes (alas! how often in this miserable age!) it doth spring +from profane boldness; when men design to put affronts on religion, +and to display their scorn and spite against conscience, affecting the +reputation of stout blades, of gallant hectors, of resolute giants, +who dare do anything, who are not afraid to defy Heaven, and brave God +Almighty Himself.</p> +<p>Sometimes it is derived from apish imitation, or a humour to comply +with a fashion current among vain and dissolute persons.</p> +<p>It always doth come from a great defect in conscience, of reverence +to God, of love to goodness, of discretion and sober regard to the welfare +of a man’s soul.</p> +<p>From such evidently vicious and unworthy sources it proceedeth, and +therefore must needs be very culpable. No good, no wise man can +like actions drawn from such principles. Further—</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>XIII. This offence may be particularly aggravated by considering +that it hath no strong temptation alluring to it, that it yieldeth no +sensible advantage, that it most easily may be avoided or corrected.</p> +<p>“Every sin,” saith St. Chrysostom, “hath not the +same punishment; but those things which may easily be reformed do bring +on us greater punishment:” and what can be more easy than to reform +this fault? “Tell me,” saith he, “what difficulty, +what sweat, what art, what hazard, what more doth it require beside +a little care” to abstain wholly from it? It is but willing, +or resolving on it, and it is instantly done; for there is not any natural +inclination disposing to it, any strong appetite to detain us under +its power.</p> +<p>It gratifieth no sense, it yieldeth no profit, it procureth no honour; +for the sound of it is not very melodious, and no man surely did ever +get an estate by it, or was preferred to dignity for it. It rather +to any good ear maketh a horrid and jarring noise; it rather with the +best part of the world produceth displeasure, damage, and disgrace. +What therefore, beside monstrous vanity and unaccountable perverseness, +should hold men so devoted thereto?</p> +<p>Surely of all dealers in sin the swearer is palpably the silliest, +and maketh the worst bargains for himself, for he sinneth gratis, and, +like those in the prophet, “selleth his soul for nothing.” +An epicure hath some reason to allege, an extortioner is a man of wisdom, +and acteth prudently in comparison to him; for they enjoy some pleasure, +or acquire some gain here, in lieu of their salvation hereafter, but +this fondling offendeth Heaven, and abandoneth happiness, he knoweth +not why or for what. He hath not so much as the common plea of +human infirmity to excuse him; he can hardly say that he was tempted +thereto by any bait.</p> +<p>A fantastic humour possesseth him of spurning at piety and soberness; +he inconsiderately followeth a herd of wild fops, he affecteth to play +the ape. What more than this can he say for himself?</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>XIV. Finally, let us consider that as we ourselves, with all +our members and powers, were chiefly designed and framed to glorify +our Maker, the which to do is indeed the greatest perfection and noblest +privilege of our nature, so our tongue and speaking faculty were given +to us to declare our admiration and reverence of Him, to exhibit our +due love and gratitude toward Him, to profess our trust and confidence +in Him, to celebrate His praises, to avow His benefits, to address our +supplications to Him, to maintain all kinds of devotional intercourse +with Him, to propagate our knowledge, fear, love, and obedience to Him, +in all such ways to promote His honour and service. This is the +most proper, worthy, and due use of our tongue, for which it was created, +to which it is dedicated, from whence it becometh, as it is so often +styled, our glory, and the best member that we have; that whereby we +excel all creatures here below, and whereby we are no less discriminated +from them, than by our reason; that whereby we consort with the blessed +angels above in the distinct utterance of praise and communication of +glory to our Creator. Wherefore, applying this to any impious +discourse with which to profane God’s blessed name, with this +to violate His holy commands, with this to unhallow His sacred ordinance, +with this to offer dishonour and indignity to Him, is a most unnatural +abuse, a horrid ingratitude toward Him.</p> +<p>It is that indeed whereby we render this noble organ incapable of +any good use. For how, as the excellent father doth often urge, +can we pray to God for mercies, or praise God for His benefits, or heartily +confess our sins, or cheerfully partake of the holy mysteries, with +a mouth defiled by impious oaths, with a heart guilty of so heinous +disobedience.</p> +<p>Likewise, whereas a secondary very worthy use of our speech is to +promote the good of our neighbour, and especially to edify him in piety, +according to that wholesome precept of the Apostle, “Let no corrupt +communication proceed out of your mouth, but that which is good to the +use of edifying, that it may administer grace unto the hearers.” +The practice of swearing is an abuse very contrary to that good purpose, +serving to corrupt our neighbour, and to instil into him a contempt +of religion; or however grievously to scandalise him.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>XV. I shall add but two words more. One is, that we would +seriously consider that our Blessed Saviour, who loved us so dearly, +who did and suffered so much for us, who redeemed us by His blood, who +said unto us, “If ye love Me, keep My commandments,” He +thus positively hath enjoined, “But I say unto you, Swear not +at all;” and how then can we find in our heart directly to thwart +His word.</p> +<p>The other is, that we would lay to heart the reason whereby St. James +doth enforce the point, and the sting in the close of our text, wherewith +I conclude: “But above all things, my brethren, swear not, neither +by heaven, neither by the earth, neither by any other oath; but let +your yea be yea, and your nay nay, lest ye fall into condemnation,” +or, “lest ye fall under damnation.” From the which +infinite mischief, and from all sin that may cause it, God in mercy +deliver us through our Blessed Redeemer Jesus, to whom for ever be all +glory and praise.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h3>OF EVIL-SPEAKING IN GENERAL.</h3> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>“<i>To speak evil of no man</i>.”—Titus iii. 2.</p> +<p>These words do imply a double duty; one incumbent on teachers, another +on the people who are to be instructed by them.</p> +<p>The teacher’s duty appeareth from reflecting on the words of +the context, which govern these, and make them up an entire sentence: +put them in mind, or, rub up their memory to do thus. It is St. +Paul’s injunction to Titus, a bishop and pastor of the Church, +that he should admonish the people committed to his care and instruction, +as of other great duties (of yielding obedience to magistrates, of behaving +themselves peaceably, of practising meekness and equity towards all +men, of being readily disposed to every good work), so particularly +of this, μηδενα βλασφημειν, +to revile or speak evil of no man.</p> +<p>Whence it is apparent that this is one of the principal duties that +preachers are obliged to mind people of, and to press upon them. +And if this were needful then, when charity, kindled by such instructions +and examples, was so lively; when Christians, by their sufferings, were +so inured to meekness and patience; even every one, for the honour of +his religion, and the safety of his person, was concerned in all respects +to demean himself innocently and inoffensively; then is it now especially +requisite, when (such engagements and restraints being taken off, love +being cooled, persecution being extinct, the tongue being set loose +from all extraordinary curbs) the transgression of this duty is grown +so prevalent and rife, that evil-speaking is almost as common as speaking, +ordinary conversation extremely abounding therewith, that ministers +should discharge their office in dehorting and dissuading from it.</p> +<p>Well indeed it were, if by their example of using mild and moderate +discourse, of abstaining from virulent invectives, tauntings, and scoffings, +good for little but to inflame anger, and infuse ill-will, they would +lead men to good practice of this sort: for no examples can be so wholesome, +or so mischievous to this purpose, as those which come down from the +pulpit, the place of edification, backed with special authority and +advantage.</p> +<p>However, it is to preachers a ground of assurance and matter of satisfaction, +that in pressing this duty they shall perform their duty: their text +being not so much of their own choosing, as given them by St. Paul; +they can surely scarce find a better to discourse upon: it cannot be +a matter of small moment or use, which this great master and guide so +expressly directeth us to insist upon. And to the observance of +his precept, so far as concerneth me, I shall immediately apply myself.</p> +<p>It is then the duty of all Christian people (to be taught and pressed +on them) not to reproach, or speak evil of any man. The which +duty, for your instruction, I shall first endeavour somewhat to explain, +declaring its import and extent; then, for your further edification, +I shall inculcate it, proposing several inducements persuasive to the +observance of it.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>I. For explication, we may first consider the object of it, +no man; then the act itself, which is prohibited, to blaspheme, that +is, to reproach, to revile, or (as we have it rendered) to speak evil.</p> +<p><i>No man</i>. St. Paul questionless did especially mean hereby +to hinder the Christians at that time from reproaching the Jews and +the pagans among whom they lived, men in their lives very wicked and +corrupt, men in opinion extremely dissenting from them, men who greatly +did hate, and cruelly did persecute them; of whom therefore they had +mighty provocations and temptations to speak ill; their judgment of +the persons, and their resentment of injuries, making it difficult to +abstain from doing so. Whence by a manifest analogy may be inferred +that the object of duty is very large, indeed universal and unlimited: +that we must forbear reproach not only against pious and virtuous persons, +against persons of our own judgment or party, against those who never +did harm or offend us, against our relations, our friends, our benefactors, +in respect of whom there is no ground or temptation of evil-speaking; +but even against the most unworthy and wicked persons, against those +who most differ in opinion and practice from us, against those who never +did oblige us, yea, those who have most disobliged us, even against +our most bitter and spiteful enemies. There is no exception or +excuse to be admitted from the quality, state, relation, or demeanour +of men; the duty (according to the proper sense, or due qualifications +and limits of the act) doth extend to all men: for, “Speak evil +of no man.”</p> +<p>As for the act, it may be inquired what the word βλασφημειν +(to blaspheme) doth import. I answer, that it is to vent words +concerning any person which do signify in us ill-opinion, or contempt, +anger, hatred, enmity conceived in our minds towards him; which are +apt in him to kindle wrath, and breed ill-blood towards us; which tend +to beget in others that hear ill-conceit or ill-will towards him; which +are much destructive of his reputation, prejudicial to his interests, +productive of damage or mischief to him. It is otherwise in Scripture +termed λοιδορειν, +to rail or revile, (to use bitter and ignominious language); υβριζειν, +to speak contumeliously; φερειν βλασφημον +κρισιν, to bring railing accusation (or +reproachful censure); καταλαλειν, +to use obloquy, or detraction; καταρασθαι, +to curse, that is, to speak words importing that we do wish ill to a +person.</p> +<p>Such is the language we are prohibited to use. To which purpose +we may observe that whereas, in our conversation and commerce with men, +there do frequently often occur occasions to speak of men and to men +words apparently disadvantageous to them, expressing our dissent in +opinion from them, or a dislike in us of their proceedings, we may do +this in different ways and terms; some of them gentle and moderate, +signifying no ill mind or disaffection towards them; others harsh and +sharp, arguing height of disdain, disgust, or despite, whereby we bid +them defiance, and show that we mean to exasperate them. Thus, +telling a man that we differ in judgment from him, or conceive him not +to be in the right, and calling him a liar, a deceiver, a fool, saying +that he doeth amiss, taketh a wrong course, transgresseth the rule, +and calling him dishonest, unjust, wicked, to omit more odious and provoking +names, unbecoming this place, and not deserving our notice, are several +ways of expressing the same things whereof the latter, in relating passages +concerning our neighbour, or in debating cases with him, is prohibited: +for thus the words reproaching, reviling, railing, cursing, and the +like do signify, and thus our Lord Himself doth explain them in His +divine sermon, wherein he doth enact this law: “Whosoever,” +saith He, “shall say to his brother, Raca” (that is, vain +man, or liar), “shall be in danger of the council; but whosoever +shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell-fire;” that is, +he rendereth himself liable to a strict account, and to severe condemnation +before God, who useth contemptuous and contumelious expressions towards +his neighbour, in proportion to the malignity of such expressions.</p> +<p>The reason of things also doth help to explain those words, and to +show why they are prohibited because those harsh terms are needless, +mild words serving as well to express the same things: because they +are commonly unjust, loading men with greater defect or blame than they +can be proved to deserve, or their actions do import; for every man +that speaketh falsehood is not therefore a liar, every man that erreth +is not thence a fool, every man that doeth amiss is not consequently +dishonest or wicked; the secret intentions and habitual dispositions +of men not being always to be collected from their outward actions; +because they are uncharitable, signifying that we entertain the worst +opinions of men, and make the worst construction of their doings, and +are disposed to show them no favour or kindness: because, also, they +produce mischievous effects, such as spring from the worst passions +raised by them.</p> +<p>This in gross is the meaning of the precept. But since there +are some other precepts seeming to clash with this; since there are +cases wherein we are allowed to use the harsher sort of terms, there +are great examples in appearance thwarting this rule; therefore it may +be requisite for determining the limits of our duty, and distinguishing +it from transgression, that such exceptions or restrictions should be +somewhat declared.</p> +<p>1. First, then, we may observe that it may be allowable to +persons in anywise concerned in the prosecution or administration of +justice, to speak words which in private intercourse would be reproachful. +A witness may impeach of crimes hurtful to justice, or public tranquillity; +a judge may challenge, may rebuke, may condemn an offender in proper +terms (or forms of speech prescribed by law), although most disgraceful +and distasteful to the guilty: for it belongeth to the majesty of public +justice to be bold, blunt, severe; little regarding the concerns or +passions of particular persons, in comparison to the public welfare.</p> +<p>A testimony, therefore, or sentence against a criminal, which materially +is a reproach, and morally would be such in a private mouth, is not +yet formally so according to the intent of this rule. For practices +of this kind, which serve the exigencies of justice, are not to be interpreted +as proceeding from anger, hatred, revenge, any bad passion or humour; +but in way of needful discipline for God’s service, and common +benefit of men. It is not, indeed, so much the minister of justice, +as God Himself, our absolute Lord; as the Sovereign, God’s representative, +acting in the public behalf; as the commonwealth itself, who by His +mouth do rebuke the obnoxious person.</p> +<p>2. God’s ministers in religious affairs, to whom the +care of men’s instruction and edification is committed, are enabled +to inveigh against sin and vice, whoever consequentially may be touched +thereby: yea, sometimes it is their duty with severity and sharpness +to reprove particular persons, not only privately, but publicly, for +their correction, and for the edification of others.</p> +<p>Thus St. Paul directeth Timothy: “Them that sin” (notoriously +and scandalously, he meaneth), “rebuke before all, that others +may fear:” that is, in a manner apt to make impression on the +minds of the hearers, so as to scare them from like offences. +And to Titus he writes, “Rebuke them sharply, that they may be +found in the faith.” And, “Cry aloud, spare not, lift +up thy voice like a trumpet, and show my people their transgressions, +and the house of Jacob their sins,” saith the Lord to the prophet. +Such are the charges and commissions laid on and granted to His messengers.</p> +<p>Thus we may observe that God’s prophets of old, St. John the +Baptist, our Lord Himself, the holy apostles did in terms most vehement +and biting reprove the age in which they lived, and some particular +persons in them. The prophets are full of declamations and invectives +against the general corruption of their times, and against the particular +manners of some persons in them. “Ah, sinful nation; people +laden with iniquity, a seed of evil-doers, children that are corrupters! +They are all adulterers, an assembly of treacherous men; and they bend +their tongues like their bow for lies. Thy princes are rebellious +and companions of thieves; every one loveth gifts, and followeth after +rewards: they judge not the fatherless, neither doth the cause of the +widow come before them. The prophets prophesy falsely, and the +priests rule by their means. As troops of robbers wait for a man, +so the company of priests murder in the way by consent, and commit lewdness.” +Such is their style commonly. St. John the Baptist calleth the +Scribes and Pharisees a “generation of vipers.” Our +Saviour speaketh of them in the same terms; calleth them an “evil +and adulterous generation, serpents, and children of vipers. Hypocrites, +painted sepulchres, obscure graves (μνημεια +αδηλα), blind guides; fools and blind, +children of the devil.” St. Paul likewise calleth the schismatical +heretical teachers “dogs, false apostles, evil and deceitful workers, +men of corrupt minds, reprobates and abominable.” With the +like colours do St. Peter, St. Jude, and other apostles paint them. +Which sort of speeches are to be supposed to proceed, not from private +passion or design, but out of holy zeal for God’s honour, and +from earnest charity towards men, for to work their amendment and common +edification. They were uttered also by special wisdom and peculiar +order; from God’s authority, and in His name; so that, as God +by them is said to preach, to entreat, to warn, and to exhort, so by +them also He may be said to reprehend and reproach.</p> +<p>3. Even private persons in due season, with discretion and +temper, may reprove others, whom they observe to commit sin, or follow +bad courses, out of charitable design, and with hope to reclaim them. +This was an office of charity imposed anciently even upon the Jews; +much more doth it lie upon Christians, who are obliged more earnestly +to tender the spiritual good of those who by the stricter and more holy +bands of brotherhood are allied to them. “Thou shalt not +hate thy brother; thou shalt in any wise rebuke thy neighbour, and not +suffer sin upon him,” was a precept of the old law: and, νουθετειν +ατακτους, to admonish +the disorderly, is an evangelical rule. Such persons we are enjoined +to shun and decline; but first we must endeavour by sober advice and +admonition to reclaim them; we must not thus reject them till they appear +contumacious and incorrigible, refusing to hear us, or becoming deaf +to reproof. This, although it necessarily doth include setting +out their faults, and charging blame on them (answerable to their offences), +is not the culpable reproach here meant, it being needful towards a +wholesome effect, and proceeding from charitable intention.</p> +<p>4. Some vehemency, some smartness and sharpness of speech may +sometimes be used in defence of truth, and impugning errors of bad consequence; +especially when it concerneth the interest of truth, that the reputation +and authority of its adversaries should somewhat be abased or abated. +If by partial opinion or reverence towards them, however begotten in +the minds of men, they strive to overbear or discountenance a good cause, +their faults (so far as truth permitteth and need requireth) may be +detected and displayed. For this cause particularly may we presume +our Lord (otherwise so meek in His temper, and mild in His carriage +towards all men) did characterise the Jewish scribes in such terms, +that their authority, being then so prevalent with the people, might +not prejudice the truth, and hinder the efficacy of His doctrine. +This is part of that επαγωνιζεσθαι +τη πιστει, that duty of contending +earnestly for the faith, which is incumbent on us.</p> +<p>5. It may be excusable upon particular emergent occasions, +with some heat of language to express dislike of notorious wickedness. +As our Lord doth against the perverse incredulity and stupidity in the +Pharisees, their profane misconstruction of His words and actions, their +malicious opposing truth, and obstructing His endeavours in God’s +service. As St. Peter did to Simon Magus, telling him that he +was in the gall of bitterness, and in the bond of iniquity. As +St. Paul to Elymas the sorcerer, when he withstood him, and desired +to turn away the Deputy Sergius from the faith; “O,” said +he, stirred with a holy zeal and indignation, “thou full of all +subtilty and all mischief, thou child of the devil, thou enemy of all +righteousness, wilt thou not cease to pervert the right ways of the +Lord?” The same spirit which enabled him to inflict a sore +punishment on that wicked wretch, did prompt him to use that sharp language +towards him; unquestionably deserved, and seasonably pronounced. +As also when the high priest commanded him illegally and unjustly to +be misused, that speech from a mind justly sensible of such outrage +broke forth, “God shall smite thee, thou whited wall.” +So when St. Peter presumptuously would have dissuaded our Lord from +compliance with God’s will, in undergoing those crosses which +were appointed to Him by God’s decree, our Lord calleth him Satan; +. . . . “Υπαγε Σατανα, +“Avaunt, Satan, thou art an offence unto Me; for thou savourest +not the things that be of God, but those that are of men.”</p> +<p>These sort of speeches, issuing from just and honest indignation, +are sometimes excusable, oftentimes commendable; especially when they +come from persons eminent in authority, of notable integrity, endued +with special measures of Divine grace, of wisdom, of goodness; such +as cannot be suspected of intemperate anger, of ill-nature, of ill-will, +or of ill-design.</p> +<p>In such cases as are above mentioned, a sort of evil-speaking about +our neighbour may be allowable or excusable. But, for fear of +overdoing, great caution and temper is to be used; and we should never +apply any such limitations as cloaks to palliate unjust or uncharitable +dealing. Generally it is more advisable to suppress such eruptions +of passion than to vent it; for seldom passion hath not inordinate motions +joined with it, or tendeth to good ends. And, however, it will +do well to reflect on those cases, and to remark some particulars about +them.</p> +<p>First, we may observe that in all these cases all possible moderation, +equity, and candour are to be used; so that no ill-speaking be practised +beyond what is needful or convenient. Even in prosecution of offences, +the bounds of truth, of equity, of humanity and clemency are not to +be transgressed. A judge must not lay on the most criminal person +more blame or contumely than the case will bear, or than serveth the +designs of justice. However our neighbour doth incur the calamities +of sin and of punishment, we must not be insolent or contemptuous towards +him. So we may learn by that law of Moses, backed with a notable +reason: “And it shall be, if the wicked man be worthy to be beaten, +that the judge cause him to lie down, and to be beaten before his face, +according to his fault by a certain number. Forty stripes he may +give him, and not exceed; lest if he should exceed, and beat him above +those stripes, then thy brother should seem vile unto thee.” +Whence appears that we should be careful of not vilifying an offender +beyond measure. And how mildly governors should proceed in the +administration of justice, the example of Joshua may teach us, who thus +examineth Achan, the cause of so great mischief to the public: “My +son, give, I pray thee, glory to the Lord God of Israel, and make confession +unto Him; and tell me now what thou hast done, and hide it not from +me.” “My son;” what compellation could be more +benign and kind? “I pray thee;” what language could be more +courteous and gentle? “give glory to God, and make confession;” +what words could be more inoffensively pertinent? And when he +sentenced that great malefactor, the cause of so much mischief, this +was all he said, “Why hast thou troubled us? the Lord will trouble +thee;” words void of contumely or insulting, containing only a +close intimation of the cause, and a simple declaration of the event +he was to undergo.</p> +<p>Secondly, likewise ministers, in the taxing sin and sinners, are +to proceed with great discretion and caution, with much gentleness and +meekness; signifying a tender pity of their infirmities, charitable +desires for their good, the best opinion of them, and the best hopes +for them, that may consist with any reason; according to those apostolical +rules: “Brethren, if a man be overtaken in a fault, ye which are +spiritual, restore such an one in the spirit of meekness; considering +thyself, lest thou also be tempted;” and, “We that are strong +ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please ourselves:” +and, more expressly, “A servant of the Lord must not fight, but +be gentle toward all, apt to teach, patient, in meekness instructing +those that oppose themselves.” Thus did St. Peter temper +his reproof of Simon Magus with this wholesome and comfortable advice: +“Repent, therefore, from this thy wickedness, and pray God if +perhaps the thought of thine heart may be forgiven thee.”</p> +<p>Thirdly, as for fraternal censure and reproof of faults (when it +is just and expedient to use it), ordinarily the calmest and mildest +way is the most proper, and most likely to obtain good success; it commonly +doth in a more kindly manner convey the sense thereof into the heart, +and therein more powerfully worketh remorse, than the fierce and harsh +way. Clearly to show a man his fault, with the reason proving +it such, so that he becometh thoroughly convinced of it, is sufficient +to breed in him regret, and to shame him before his own mind: to do +more (in way of aggravation, of insulting on him, of inveighing against +him), as it doth often not well consist with humanity, so it is seldom +consonant to discretion, if we do, as we ought, seek his health and +amendment. Humanity requireth that when we undertake to reform +our neighbour, we should take care not to deform him (not to discourage +or displease him more than is necessary); when we would correct his +manners, that we should also consider his modesty, and consult his reputation; +“<i>curam agentes</i>,” as Seneca speaketh, “<i>non +tantum salutis, sed et honestæ cicatricis</i>” (having care +not only to heal the wound, but to leave a comely scar behind). +“Be,” adviseth St. Austin, “so displeased with iniquity, +as to consider and consult humanity;” for, “Zeal void of +humanity is not,” saith St. Chrysostom, “zeal, but rather +animosity; and reproof not mixed with good-will appeareth a kind of +malignity.” We should so rebuke those who, by frailty or +folly incident to mankind, have fallen into misdemeanours, that they +may perceive we do sincerely pity their ill case, and tender their good; +that we mean not to upbraid their weakness or insult upon their misfortune; +that we delight not to inflict on them more grief than is plainly needful +and unavoidable; that we are conscious and sensible of our own obnoxiousness +to the like slips or falls, and do consider that we also may be tempted, +and being tempted, may be overborne. This they cannot perceive +or be persuaded of, except we temper our speech with benignity and mildness. +Such speech prudence also dictateth, as most useful and hopeful for +producing the good ends honest reprehension doth aim at; it mollifieth +and it melteth a stubborn heart, it subdueth and winneth a perverse +will, it healeth distempered affections. Whereas roughly handling +is apt to defeat or obstruct the cure: rubbing the sore doth tend to +exasperate and inflame it. Harsh speech rendereth advice odious +and unsavoury; driveth from it and depriveth it of efficacy; it turneth +regret for a fault into displeasure and disdain against the reprover; +it looks not like the dealing of a kind friend, but like the persecution +of a spiteful enemy; it seemeth rather an ebullition of gall, or a defluxion +from rancour, than an expression of good-will; the offender will take +it for a needless and pitiless tormenting, or for a proud and tyrannical +domineering over him. He that can bear a friendly touch, will +not endure to be lashed with angry and reproachful words. In fine, +all reproof ought to be seasoned with discretion, with candour, with +moderation, and meekness.</p> +<p>Fourthly, likewise in defence of truth, and maintenance of a good +cause, we may observe that commonly the fairest language is most proper +and advantageous, and that reproachful or foul terms are most improper +and prejudicial. A calm and meek way of discoursing doth much +advantage a good cause, as arguing the patron thereof to have confidence +in the cause itself, and to rely upon his strength: that he is in a +temper fit to apprehend it himself, and to maintain it; that he propoundeth +it as a friend, wishing the hearer for his own good to follow it, leaving +him the liberty to judge, and choose for himself. But rude speech, +and contemptuous reflections on persons, as they do signify nothing +to the question, so they commonly bring much disadvantage and damage +to the cause, creating mighty prejudices against it; they argue much +impotency in the advocate, and consequently little strength in what +he maintains; that he is little able to judge well, and altogether unapt +to teach others; they intimate a diffidence in himself concerning his +cause, and that, despairing to maintain it by reason, he seeks to uphold +it by passion; that not being able to convince by fair means, he would +bear down by noise and clamour: that not skilling to get his suit quietly, +he would extort it by force, obtruding his conceits violently as an +enemy, or imposing them arbitrarily as a tyrant. Thus doth he +really disparage and slur his cause, however good and defensible in +itself.</p> +<p>A modest and friendly style doth suit truth; it, like its author, +doth usually reside (not in the rumbling wind, nor in the shaking earthquake, +nor in the raging fire, but) in the small still voice; sounding in this, +it is most audible, most penetrant, and most effectual; thus propounded, +it is willingly hearkened to: for men have no aversion from hearing +those who seem to love them, and wish them well. It is easily +conceived, no prejudice or passion clouding the apprehensive faculties; +it is readily embraced, no animosity withstanding or obstructing it. +It is the sweetness of the lips, which, as the wise man telleth us, +increaseth learning; disposing a man to hear lessons of good doctrine, +rendering him capable to understand them, insinuating and impressing +them upon the mind; the affections being thereby unlocked, the passage +becomes open to the reason.</p> +<p>But it is plainly a preposterous method of instructing, of deciding +controversies, of begetting peace, to vex and anger those concerned +by ill language. Nothing surely doth more hinder the efficacy +of discourse, and prevent conviction, than doth this course, upon many +obvious accounts. It doth first put in a strong bar to attention: +for no man willingly doth afford an ear to him whom he conceiveth disaffected +towards him: which opinion harsh words infallibly will produce; no man +can expect to hear truth from him whom he apprehendeth disordered in +his own mind, whom he seeth rude in his proceedings, whom he taketh +to be unjust in his dealing; as men certainly will take those to be, +who presume to revile others for using their own judgment freely, and +dissenting from them in opinion. Again, this course doth blind +the hearer’s mind, so that he cannot discern what he that pretends +to instruct him doth mean, or how he doth assert his doctrine. +Truth will not be discerned through the smoke of wrathful expressions; +right being defaced by foul language will not appear, passion being +excited will not suffer a man to perceive the sense or the force of +an argument. The will also thereby is hardened and hindered from +submitting to truth. In such a case, <i>non persuadebis, etiamsi +persuaseris</i>; although you stop his mouth, you cannot subdue his +heart; although he can no longer fight, yet he never will yield: animosity +raised by such usage rendereth him invincibly obstinate in his conceits +and courses. Briefly, from this proceeding men become unwilling +to mark, unfit to apprehend, indisposed to embrace any good instruction +or advice; it maketh them indocile and intractable, averse from better +instruction, pertinacious in their opinions, and refractory in their +ways.</p> +<p>“Every man,” saith the wise man, “shall kiss his +lips that giveth a right answer;” but no man surely will be ready +to kiss those lips which are embittered with reproach, or defiled with +dirty language.</p> +<p>It is said of Pericles, that with thundering and lightning he put +Greece into confusion; such discourse may serve to confound things, +it seldom tendeth to compose them. If reason will not pierce, +rage will scarce avail to drive it in. Satirical virulency may +vex men sorely, but it hardly ever soundly converts them. “Few +become wiser or better by ill words.” Children may be frightened +into compliance by loud and severe reprimands; but men are to be allured +by rational persuasion backed with courteous usage; they may be sweetly +drawn, they cannot be violently driven to change their judgment and +practice. Whence that advice of the apostle, “With meekness +instruct those that oppose themselves,” doth no less savour of +wisdom than of goodness.</p> +<p>Fifthly, as for examples of extraordinary persons, which in some +cases do seem to authorise the practice of evil-speaking, we may consider +that, as they had especial commission enabling them to do some things +beyond ordinary standing rules, wherein they are not to be imitated: +as they had especial illumination and direction, which preserved them +from swerving in particular cases from truth and equity; so the tenor +of their life did evidence that it was the glory of God, the good of +men, the necessity of the case, which moved them to it. And of +them also we may observe, that on divers occasions (yea, generally, +whenever only their private credit or interest was concerned), although +grievously provoked, they did out of meekness, patience, and charity, +wholly forbear reproachful speech. Our Saviour, who sometimes +upon special reason in His discourses used such harsh words, yet when +He was most spitefully accused, reproached, and persecuted, did not +open His mouth, or return one angry word: “Being reviled, He did +not,” as St. Peter, proposing His example to us, telleth us, “revile +again; suffering, He did not threaten.” He used the softest +language to Judas, to the soldiers, to Pilate and Herod, to the priests, +etc. And the apostles, who sometimes inveigh so zealously against +the opposers and perverters of truth, did in their private conversation +and demeanour strictly observe their own rules, of abstinence from reproach: +“Being reviled, we bless; being persecuted, we suffer it;” +so doth St. Paul represent their practice. And in reason we should +rather follow them in this their ordinary course, than in their extraordinary +sallies of practice.</p> +<p>In fine, however in some cases and circumstances the matter may admit +such exceptions, so that all language disgraceful to our neighbour is +not ever culpable; yet the cases are so few and rare in comparison, +the practice commonly so dangerous and ticklish, that worthily forbearing +to reproach doth bear the style of a general rule; and particularly +(for clearer direction) we are in the following cases obliged carefully +to shun it; or in speaking about our neighbour we must observe these +cautions.</p> +<p>1. We should never in severe terms inveigh against any man +without reasonable warrant, or presuming upon a good call and commission +thereto. As every man should not assume to himself the power of +administering justice (of trying, sentencing, and punishing offenders), +so must not every man take upon him to speak against those who seem +to do ill; which is a sort of punishment, including the infliction of +smart and damage upon the persons concerned. Every man hath indeed +a commission, in due place and season, with discretion and moderation +to admonish his neighbour offending; but otherwise to speak ill of him, +no private man hath just right or authority, and therefore, in presuming +to do it, he is disorderly and irregular, trespassing beyond his bounds, +usurping an undue power to himself.</p> +<p>2. We should never speak ill of any man without apparent just +cause. It must be just; we must not reproach men for things innocent +or indifferent; for not concurring in disputable opinions with us, for +not complying with our humour, for not serving our interest, for not +doing anything to which they are not obliged, or for using their liberty +in any case: it must be at least some considerable fault, which we can +so much as tax. It must also be clear and certain, notorious and +palpable; for to speak ill upon slender conjectures, or doubtful suspicions, +is full of iniquity. “Οσα ουκ +οιδασι, βλασφημουσι, +“They rail at things which they know not,” is part of those +wicked men’s character, whom St. Jude doth so severely reprehend. +If, indeed, these conditions being wanting, we presume to reproach any +man, we do therein no less than slander him; which to do is unlawful +in any case, is in truth a most diabolical and detestable crime. +To impose odious names and characters on any person, which he deserveth +not, or without ground of truth, is to play the devil; and hell itself +scarce will own a fouler practice.</p> +<p>3. We should not cast reproach upon any man without some necessary +reason. In charity (that charity which “covereth all sins,” +which “covereth a multitude of sins”) we are bound to connive +at the defects, and to conceal the faults of our brethren; to extenuate +and excuse them, when apparent, so far as we may in truth and equity. +We must not therefore ever produce them to light, or prosecute them +with severity, except very needful occasion urgeth—such as is +the glory and service of God, the maintenance of truth, the vindication +of innocence, the preservation of public justice and peace; the amendment +of our neighbour himself, or securing others from contagion. Barring +such reasons (really being, not affectedly pretended), we are bound +not so much as to disclose, as to touch our neighbour’s faults; +much more, not to blaze them about, not to exaggerate them by vehement +invectives.</p> +<p>4. We should never speak ill of any man beyond measure; be +the cause never so just, the occasion never so necessary, we should +yet nowise be immoderate therein, exceeding the bounds prescribed by +truth, equity, and humanity. We should never speak worse of any +man whatever than he certainly deserveth, according to the most favourable +construction of his doings; never more than the cause absolutely requireth. +We should rather be careful to fall short of what in rigorous truth +might be said against him, than in the least to pass beyond it. +The best cause had better seem to suffer a little by our reservedness +in its defence, than any man be wronged by our aspersing him; for God, +the patron of truth and right, is ever able to secure them without the +succour of our unjust and uncharitable dealing. The contrary practice +hath indeed within it a spice of slander, that is, of the worst iniquity.</p> +<p>5. We must never speak ill of any man out of bad principles, +or for bad ends.</p> +<p>No sudden or rash anger should instigate us thereto. For, “Let +all bitterness, and wrath, and anger, and clamour, and evil-speaking +be put away from you, with all malice,” is the apostolical precept; +they are all associates and kindred, which are to be cast away together. +Such anger itself is culpable, as a work of the flesh, and therefore +to be suppressed; and all its brood therefore is also to be smothered; +the daughter of such a mother cannot be legitimate. “The +wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God.”</p> +<p>We must not speak ill out of inveterate hatred or ill-will. +For this murderous, this viperous disposition should itself be rooted +out of our hearts: whatever issueth from it cannot be otherwise than +very bad; it must be a poisonous breath that exhaleth from that foul +source.</p> +<p>We must not be provoked thereto by any revengeful disposition, or +rancorous spleen, in regard to any injuries or discourtesies received. +For, as we must not revenge ourselves, or render evil in any other way, +so particularly not in this, which is commonly the special instance +expressly prohibited. “Render not evil for evil,” +saith St. Peter, “nor railing for railing; but contrariwise bless,” +or speak well; and “Bless them,” saith the Lord, “which +curse you;” “Bless,” saith St. Paul, “and curse +not.”</p> +<p>We must not also do it out of contempt; for we are not to slight +our brethren in our hearts. No man really, considering what he +is, whence he came, how he is related, what he is capable of, can be +despicable. Extreme naughtiness is indeed contemptible; but the +unhappy person that is engaged therein is rather to be pitied than despised. +However, charity bindeth us to stifle contemptuous motions of heart, +and not to vent them in vilifying expression. Particularly, it +is a barbarous practice, out of contempt to reproach persons for natural +imperfections, for meanness of condition, for unlucky disasters, for +any involuntary defects; this being indeed to reproach mankind, unto +which such things are incident; to reproach Providence, from the disposal +whereof they do proceed. “Whoso mocketh the poor, despiseth +his Maker,” saith the wise man; and the same may be said of him +that reproachfully mocketh him that is dull in parts, deformed in body, +weak in health or strength, defective in any such way.</p> +<p>Likewise we must not speak ill out of envy; because others do excel +us in any good quality, or exceed us in fortune. To harbour this +base and ugly disposition in our minds is unworthy of a man (who should +delight in all good springing up anywhere, and befalling any man, naturally +allied unto him); it is most unworthy of a Christian, who should tender +his brother’s good as his own, and rejoice with those that rejoice. +From thence to be drawn to cast reproach upon any man, is horrible and +heinous wickedness.</p> +<p>Neither should we ever use reproach as a means of compassing any +design we do affect or aim at; ’tis an unwarrantable engine of +raising us to wealth, dignity, or repute. To grow by the diminution, +to rise by the depression, to shine by the eclipse of others, to build +a fortune upon the ruins of our neighbour’s reputation, is that +which no honourable mind can affect, no honest man will endeavour. +Our own wit, courage, and industry, managed with God’s assistance +and blessing, are sufficient, and only lawful instruments of prosecuting +honest enterprises; we need not, we must not instead of them employ +our neighbour’s disgrace; no worldly good is worth purchasing +at such a rate, no project worth achieving by such foul ways.</p> +<p>Neither should we out of malignity, to cherish or gratify ill humour, +use this practice. It is observable of some persons, that not +out of any formed displeasure, grudge, or particular disaffection, nor +out of any particular design, but merely out of a κακοηθεια, +an ill disposition, springing up from nature, or contracted by use, +they are apt to carp at any action, and with sharp reproach to bite +any man that comes in their way, thereby feeding and soothing that evil +inclination. But as this inhuman and currish humour should be +corrected, and extirpated from our hearts; so should the issues thereof +at our mouths be stopped; the bespattering our neighbour’s good +name should never afford any satisfaction or delight unto us.</p> +<p>Nor out of wantonness should we speak ill, for our divertisement +or sport. For our neighbour’s reputation is too great and +precious a thing to be played with, or offered up to sport; we are very +foolish in so disvaluing it, very naughty in so misusing it. Our +wits are very barren, our brains are ill furnished with store of knowledge, +if we can find no other matter of conversation.</p> +<p>Nor out of negligence and inadvertency should we sputter out reproachful +speech; shooting ill words at rovers, or not regarding who stands in +our way. Among all temerities this is one of the most noxious, +and therefore very culpable.</p> +<p>In fine, we should never speak concerning our neighbour from any +other principle than charity, or to any other intent but what is charitable; +such as tendeth to his good, or at least is consistent therewith. +“Let all your things,” saith St. Paul, “be done in +charity;” and words are most of the <i>things</i> we do concerning +our neighbour, wherein we may express charity. In all our speeches, +therefore, touching him, we should plainly show that we have a care +of his reputation, that we tender his interest, that we even desire +his content and repose. Even when reason and need do so require +that we should disclose and reprehend his faults, we may, we should +by the manner and scope of our speech signify thus much. Which +rule, were it observed, if we should never speak ill otherwise than +out of charity, surely most ill-speaking would be cut off; most, I fear, +of our tattling about others, much of our gossiping would be marred.</p> +<p>Indeed, so far from bitter or sour our language should be, that it +ought to be sweet and pleasant; so far from rough and harsh, that it +should be courteous and obliging; so far from signifying wrath, ill-will, +contempt, or animosity, that it should express tender affection, good +esteem, sincere respect towards our brethren; and be apt to produce +the like in them towards us. The sense of them should be grateful +to the heart; the very sound and accent of them should be delightful +to the ear. Every one should please his neighbour for his good +to edification. Our words should always be εν αριτι, +with grace, seasoned with salt; they should have the grace of courtesy, +they should be seasoned with the salt of discretion, so as to be sweet +and savoury to the hearers. Commonly ill language is a certain +sign of inward enmity and ill-will. Good-will is wont to show +itself in good terms; it clotheth even its grief handsomely, and its +displeasure carrieth favour in its face; its rigour is civil and gentle, +tempered with pity for the faults and errors which it disliketh, with +the desire of their amendment and recovery whom it reprehendeth. +It would inflict no more evil than is necessary; it would cure its neighbour’s +disease without exasperating his patience, troubling his modesty, or +impairing his credit. As it always judgeth candidly, so it never +condemneth extremely.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>II. But so much for the explication of this precept, and the +directive part of our discourse. I shall now briefly propound +some inducements to the observance thereof.</p> +<p>1. Let us consider that nothing more than railing and reviling +is opposite to the nature, and inconsistent with the tenor of our religion; +which (as even a heathen did observe of it) <i>nil nisi justum suadet</i>, +<i>et lene</i>, doth recommend nothing but what is very just and mild; +which propoundeth the practices of charity, meekness, patience, peaceableness, +moderation, equity, alacrity, or good humour, as its principal laws, +and declareth them the chief fruits of the Divine spirit and grace; +which chargeth us to curb and compose all our passions; more particularly +to restrain and repress anger, animosity, envy, malice, and such-like +dispositions, as the fruits of carnality and corrupt lust; which consequently +drieth up all the sources or dammeth up the sluices of bad language. +As it doth above all things oblige us to bear no ill-will in our hearts, +so it chargeth us to vent none with our mouths.</p> +<p>2. It is therefore often expressly condemned and prohibited +as evil. ’Tis the property of the wicked; a character of +those who work iniquity, to “whet their tongues like a sword, +and bend their bows to shoot their arrows, even bitter words.”</p> +<p>3. No practice hath more severe punishments denounced to it +than this. The railer (and it is indeed a very proper and fit +punishment for him, he being exceedingly bad company) is to be banished +out of all good society; thereto St. Paul adjudgeth him: “I have,” +saith he, “now written unto you, not to keep company, if any man +that is called a brother be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, +or a railer, or a drunkard, or an extortioner, with such an one not +to eat.” Ye see what company the railer hath in the text, +and with what a crew of people he is coupled; but no good company he +is allowed elsewhere; every good Christian should avoid him as a blot, +and a pest of conversation; and finally he is sure to be excluded from +the blessed society above in heaven; for “neither thieves, nor +covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners shall inherit +the kingdom of God;” and “without” (without the heavenly +city) “are dogs,” saith St. John in his Revelation; that +is, those chiefly who out of currish spite or malignity do frowardly +bark at their neighbours, or cruelly bite them with reproachful language.</p> +<p>4. If we look upon such language in its own nature, what is +it but a symptom of a foul, a weak, a disordered and a distempered mind? +’Tis the smoke of inward rage and malice: ’tis a stream +that cannot issue from a sweet spring; ’tis a storm that cannot +bluster out of a calm region. “The words of the pure are +pleasant words,” as the wise man saith.</p> +<p>5. This practice doth plainly signify low spirit, ill-breeding, +and bad manners; and thence misbecometh any wise, any honest, any honourable +person. It agreeth to children, who are unapt and unaccustomed +to deal in matters considerable, to squabble; to women of meanest rank +(apt, by nature, or custom, to be transported with passion) to scold. +In our modern languages it is termed villainy, as being proper for rustic +boors, or men of coarsest education and employment; who, having their +minds debased by being conversant in meanest affairs, do vent their +sorry passions, and bicker about their petty concernments, in such strains; +who also, being not capable of a fair reputation, or sensible of disgrace +to themselves, do little value the credit of others, or care for aspersing +it. But such language is unworthy of those persons, and cannot +easily be drawn from them, who are wont to exercise their thoughts about +nobler matters, who are versed in affairs manageable only by calm deliberation +and fair persuasion, not by impetuous and provocative rudeness; which +do never work otherwise upon masculine souls than so as to procure disdain +and resistance. Such persons, knowing the benefit of a good name, +being wont to possess a good repute, prizing their own credit as a considerable +good, will never be prone to bereave others of the like by opprobrious +speech. A noble enemy will never speak of his enemy in bad terms.</p> +<p>We may further consider that all wise, all honest, all ingenuous +persons have an aversion from ill-speaking, and cannot entertain it +with any acceptance or complacence; that only ill-natured, unworthy, +and naughty people are its willing auditors, or do abet it with applause. +The good man, in Psalm xv., <i>non accipit opprobrium</i>, doth not +take up, or accept, a reproach against his neighbour: “but a wicked +doer,” saith the wise man, “giveth heed to false lips, and +a liar giveth ear to a naughty tongue.” And what reasonable +man will do that which is disgustful to the wise and good, is grateful +only to the foolish and baser sort of men? I pretermit that using +this sort of language doth incapacitate a man for benefiting his neighbour, +and defeateth his endeavours for his edification, disparaging a good +cause, prejudicing the defence of truth, obstructing the effects of +good instruction and wholesome reproof; as we did before remark and +declare. Further—</p> +<p>6. He that useth this kind of speech doth, as harm and trouble +others, so create many great inconveniences and mischiefs to himself +thereby. Nothing so inflameth the wrath of men, so provoketh their +enmity, so breedeth lasting hatred and spite, as do contumelious words. +They are often called swords and arrows; and as such they pierce deeply, +and cause most grievous smart; which men feeling are enraged, and accordingly +will strive to requite them in the like manner and in all other obvious +ways of revenge. Hence strife, clamour, and tumult, care, suspicion, +and fear, danger and trouble, sorrow and regret, do seize on the reviler; +and he is sufficiently punished for this dealing. No man can otherwise +live than in perpetual fear of reciprocal like usage from him whom he +is conscious of having so abused. Whence, if not justice, or charity +towards others, yet love and pity of ourselves should persuade us to +forbear it as disquietful, incommodious, and mischievous to us.</p> +<p>We should indeed certainly enjoy much love, much concord, much quiet, +we should live in great safety and security, we should be exempted from +much care and fear, if we would restrain ourselves from abusing and +offending our neighbour in this kind: being conscious of so just and +innocent demeanour towards him, we should converse with him in a pleasant +freedom and confidence, not suspecting any bad language or ill usage +from him.</p> +<p>7. Hence with evidently good reason is he that useth such language +called a fool: and he that abstaineth from it is commended as wise. +“A fool’s lips enter into contention, and his mouth calleth +for strokes. A fool’s mouth is his destruction, and his +lips are the snare of his soul. He that refraineth his tongue +is wise. In the tongue of the wise is health. He that keepeth +his lips, keepeth his life: but he that openeth wide his mouth” +(that is, in evil-speaking, gaping with clamour and vehemency) “shall +have destruction. The words of a wise man’s mouth are gracious: +but the lips of a fool will swallow up himself. Death and life +are in the power of the tongue; and they that love it shall eat the +fruit thereof;” that is, of the one or the other, answerably to +the kind of speech they choose.</p> +<p>In fine, very remarkable is that advice, or resolution of the grand +point concerning the best way of living happily, in the psalmist: “What +man is he that desireth life, and loveth many days, that he may see +good? Keep thy tongue from evil, and thy lips from speaking guile.” +Abstinence from ill-speaking he seemeth to propose as the first step +towards the fruition of a durably happy life.</p> +<p>8. Lastly, we may consider that it is a grievous perverting +of the design of speech, that excellent faculty, which so much distinguisheth +us from, so highly advanceth us above other creatures, to use it to +the defaming and disquieting of our neighbour. It was given us +as an instrument of beneficial commerce and delectable conversation; +that with it we might assist and advise, might cheer and comfort one +another: we, therefore, in employing it to the disgrace, vexation, damage +or prejudice in any kind of our neighbour, do foully abuse it; and so +doing, render ourselves indeed worse than dumb beasts: for better far +it were that we could say nothing, than that we should speak ill.</p> +<p>“Now the God of grace and peace . . . make us perfect +in every good work to do His will, working in us that which is well-pleasing +in His sight, through Jesus Christ; to whom be glory for ever and ever. +Amen.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h3>THE FOLLY OF SLANDER.</h3> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>Part 1.</p> +<p>“<i>He that uttereth slander is a fool</i>.”—Prov. +x. 18.</p> +<p>General declamations against vice and sin are indeed excellently +useful, as rousing men to consider and look about them: but they do +often want effect, because they only raise confused apprehensions of +things, and indeterminate propensions to action; which usually, before +men thoroughly perceive or resolve what they should practise, do decay +and vanish. As he that cries out “Fire!” doth stir +up people, and inspireth them with a kind of hovering tendency every +way, yet no man thence to purpose moveth until he be distinctly informed +where the mischief is; then do they, who apprehend themselves concerned, +run hastily to oppose it: so, till we particularly discern where our +offences lie (till we distinctly know the heinous nature and the mischievous +consequences of them), we scarce will effectually apply ourselves to +correct them. Whence it is requisite that men should be particularly +acquainted with their sins, and by proper arguments be dissuaded from +them.</p> +<p>In order whereto I have now selected one sin to describe, and dissuade +from, being in nature as vile, and in practice as common, as any other +whatever that hath prevailed among men. It is slander, a sin which +in all times and places hath been epidemical and rife; but which especially +doth seem to reign and rage in our age and country.</p> +<p>There are principles innate to men, which ever have, and ever will +incline them to this offence. Eager appetites to secular and sensual +goods; violent passions, urging the prosecution of what men affect; +wrath and displeasure against those who stand in the way of compassing +their desires; emulation and envy towards those who happen to succeed +better, or to attain a greater share in such things; excessive self-love; +unaccountable malignity and vanity, are in some degrees connatural to +all men, and ever prompt them to this dealing, as appearing the most +efficacious, compendious, and easy way of satisfying such appetites, +of promoting such designs, of discharging such passions. Slander +thence hath always been a principal engine whereby covetous, ambitious, +envious, ill-natured, and vain persons have striven to supplant their +competitors, and advance themselves; meaning thereby to procure, what +they chiefly prize and like, wealth, or dignity, or reputation, favour +and power in the court, respect and interest with the people.</p> +<p>But from especial causes our age peculiarly doth abound in this practice; +for, besides the common dispositions inclining thereto, there are conceits +newly coined, and greedily entertained by many, which seem purposely +levelled at the disparagement of piety, charity, and justice, substituting +interest in the room of conscience, authorising and commending for good +and wise, all ways serving to private advantage. There are implacable +dissensions, fierce animosities, and bitter zeals sprung up; there is +an extreme curiosity, niceness, and delicacy of judgment: there is a +mighty affectation of seeming wise and witty by any means; there is +a great unsettlement of mind, and corruption of manners, generally diffused +over people: from which sources it is no wonder that this flood hath +so overflown, that no banks can restrain it, no fences are able to resist +it; so that ordinary conversation is full of it, and no demeanour can +be secure from it.</p> +<p>If we do mark what is done in many (might I not say, in most?) companies, +what is it but one telling malicious stories of, or fastening odious +characters upon another? What do men commonly please themselves +in so much, as in carping and harshly censuring, in defaming and abusing +their neighbours? Is it not the sport and divertisement of many, +to cast dirt in the faces of all they meet with; to bespatter any man +with foul imputations? Doth not in every corner a Momus lurk, +from the venom of whose spiteful or petulant tongue no eminency of rank, +dignity of place, or sacredness of office, no innocence or integrity +of life, no wisdom or circumspection in behaviour, no good-nature or +benignity in dealing and carriage, can protect any person? Do +not men assume to themselves a liberty of telling romances, and framing +characters concerning their neighbour, as freely as a poet doth about +Hector or Turnus, Thersites or Draucus? Do they not usurp a power +of playing with, or tossing about, of tearing in pieces their neighbour’s +good name, as if it were the veriest toy in the world? Do not +many having a form of godliness (some of them, demurely, others confidently, +both without any sense of, or remorse for what they do) backbite their +brethren? Is it not grown so common a thing to asperse causelessly +that no man wonders at it, that few dislike, that scarce any detest +it? that most notorious calumniators are heard, not only with patience, +but with pleasure; yea, are even held in vogue and reverence as men +of a notable talent, and very serviceable to their party? so that slander +seemeth to have lost its nature, and not to be now an odious sin, but +a fashionable humour, a way of pleasing entertainment, a fine knack, +or curious feat of policy; so that no man at least taketh himself or +others to be accountable for what is said in this way? Is not, +in fine, the case become such, that whoever hath in him any love of +truth, any sense of justice or honesty, any spark of charity towards +his brethren, shall hardly be able to satisfy himself in the conversations +he meeteth; but will be tempted, with the holy prophet, to wish himself +sequestered from society, and cast into solitude; repeating those words +of his, “Oh, that I had in the wilderness a lodging-place of wayfaring +men, that I might leave my people, and go from them: for they are . +. . . an assembly of treacherous men, and they bend their tongues like +their bow for lies”? This he wished in an age so resembling +ours, that I fear the description with equal patness may suit both: +“Take ye heed” (said he then, and may we not advise the +like now?) “every one of his neighbour, and trust ye not in any +brother: for every brother will utterly supplant, and every neighbour +will walk with slanders. They will deceive every one his neighbour, +and will not speak the truth; they have taught their tongue to speak +lies, and weary themselves to commit iniquity.”</p> +<p>Such being the state of things, obvious to experience, no discourse +may seem more needful, or more useful, than that which serveth to correct +or check this practice: which I shall endeavour to do (1) by describing +the nature, (2) by declaring the folly of it: or showing it to be very +true which the wise man here asserteth, “He that uttereth slander +is a fool.” Which particulars I hope so to prosecute, that +any man shall be able easily to discern, and ready heartily to detest +this practice.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>I. For explication of its nature, we may describe slander to +be the uttering false (or equivalent to false, morally false) speech +against our neighbour, in prejudice to his fame, his safety, his welfare, +or concernment in any kind, out of malignity, vanity, rashness, ill-nature, +or bad design. That which is in Holy Scripture forbidden and reproved +under several names and notions: of bearing false witness, false accusation, +railing censure, sycophantry, tale-bearing, whispering, backbiting, +supplanting, taking up reproach: which terms some of them do signify +the nature, others denote the special kinds, others imply the manners, +others suggest the ends of this practice. But it seemeth most +fully intelligible by observing the several kinds and degrees thereof; +as also by reflecting on the divers ways and manners of practising it.</p> +<p>The principal kinds thereof I observe to be these:</p> +<p>1. The grossest kind of slander is that which in the Decalogue +is called, bearing false testimony against our neighbour; that is, flatly +charging him with facts which he never committed, and is nowise guilty +of. As in the case of Naboth, when men were suborned to say, “Naboth +did blaspheme God and the king:” and as was David’s case, +when he thus complained, “False witnesses did rise up, they laid +to my charge things that I knew not of.” This kind in the +highest way (that is, in judicial proceedings) is more rare; and of +all men, they who are detected to practise it, are held most vile and +infamous; as being plainly the most pernicious and perilous instruments +of injustice, the most desperate enemies of all men’s right and +safety that can be. But also out of the court there are many knights-errant +of the post, whose business it is to run about scattering false reports; +sometimes loudly proclaiming them in open companies, sometimes closely +whispering them in dark corners; thus infecting conversation with their +poisonous breath: these no less notoriously are guilty of this kind, +as bearing always the same malice, and sometimes breeding as ill effects.</p> +<p>2. Another kind is, affixing scandalous names, injurious epithets, +and odious characters upon persons, which they deserve not. As +when Corah and his accomplices did accuse Moses of being ambitious, +unjust, and tyrannical: when the Pharisees called our Lord an impostor, +a blasphemer, a sorcerer, a glutton and wine-bibber, an incendiary and +perverter of the people, one that spake against Cæsar, and forbade +to give tribute: when the apostles were charged with being pestilent, +turbulent, factious and seditious fellows. This sort being very +common, and thence in ordinary repute not so bad, yet in just estimation +may be judged, even worse than the former; as doing to our neighbour +more heavy and more irreparable wrong. For it imposeth on him +really more blame, and that such which he can hardly shake off: because +the charge signifieth habit of evil, and includeth many acts; then, +being general and indefinite, can scarce be disproved. He, for +instance, that calleth a sober man drunkard, doth impute to him many +acts of such intemperance (some really past, others probably future), +and no particular time or place being specified, how can a man clear +himself of that imputation, especially with those who are not thoroughly +acquainted with his conversation? So he that calleth a man unjust, +proud, perverse, hypocritical, doth load him with most grievous faults, +which it is not possible that the most innocent person should discharge +himself from.</p> +<p>3. Like to that kind is this: aspersing a man’s actions +with harsh censures and foul terms, importing that they proceed from +ill principles, or tend to bad ends; so as it doth not or cannot appear. +Thus when we say of him that is generously hospitable, that he is profuse; +of him that is prudently frugal, that he is niggardly; of him that is +cheerful and free in his conversation, that he is vain or loose; of +him that is serious and resolute in a good way, that he is sullen or +morose; of him that is conspicuous and brisk in virtuous practice, that +it is ambition or ostentation which prompts him; of him that is close +and bashful in the like good way, that it is sneaking stupidity, or +want of spirit; of him that is reserved, that it is craft; of him that +is open, that it is simplicity in him; when we ascribe a man’s +liberality and charity to vainglory, or popularity; his strictness of +life, and constancy, in devotion, to superstition, or hypocrisy. +When, I say, we pass such censures, or impose such characters on the +laudable or innocent practice of our neighbours, we are indeed slanderers, +imitating therein the great calumniator, who thus did slander even God +Himself, imputing His prohibition of the fruit unto envy towards men; +“God,” said he, “doth know that in the day ye eat +thereof, your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing +good and evil;” who thus did ascribe the steady piety of Job, +not to a conscientious love and fear of God, but to policy and selfish +design: “Doth Job fear God for nought?”</p> +<p>Whoever, indeed, pronounceth concerning his neighbour’s intentions +otherwise than as they are evidently expressed by words, or signified +by overt actions, is a slanderer; because he pretendeth to know, and +dareth to aver, that which he nowise possibly can tell whether it be +true; because the heart is exempt from all jurisdiction here, is only +subject to the government and trial of another world; because no man +can judge concerning the truth of such accusations, because no man can +exempt or defend himself from them: so that apparently such practice +doth thwart all course of justice and equity.</p> +<p>4. Another kind is, perverting a man’s words or actions +disadvantageously by affected misconstruction. All words are ambiguous, +and capable of different senses, some fair, some more foul; all actions +have two handles, one that candour and charity will, another that disingenuity +and spite may lay hold on; and in such cases to misapprehend is a calumnious +procedure, arguing malignant disposition and mischievous design. +Thus when two men did witness that our Lord affirmed, He “could +demolish the temple, and rear it again in three days”—although +He did indeed speak words to that purpose, meaning them in a figurative +sense, discernible enough to those who would candidly have minded His +drift and way of speaking—yet they who crudely alleged them against +Him are called false witnesses. “At last,” saith the +Gospel, “came two false witnesses, and said, This fellow said, +I am able to destroy the temple,” etc. Thus also when some +certified of St. Stephen, as having said that “Jesus of Nazareth +should destroy that place, and change the customs that Moses delivered;” +although probably he did speak words near to that purpose, yet are those +men called false witnesses: “And,” saith St. Luke, “they +set up false witnesses, which said, This man ceaseth not to speak blasphemous +words,” etc. Which instances plainly do show, if we would +avoid the guilt of slander, how careful we should be to interpret fairly +and favourably the words and the actions of our neighbour.</p> +<p>5. Another sort of this practice is, partial and lame representation +of men’s discourse, or their practice; suppressing some part of +the truth in them, or concealing some circumstances about them which +might serve to explain, to excuse, or to extenuate them. In such +a manner easily, without uttering any logical untruth, one may yet grievously +calumniate. Thus suppose a man speaketh a thing upon supposition, +or with exception, or in way of objection, or merely for disputation +sake, in order to the discussion or clearing of truth; he that should +report him asserting it absolutely, unlimitedly, positively and peremptorily, +as his own settled judgment, would notoriously calumniate. If +one should be inveigled by fraud, or driven by violence, or slip by +chance into a bad place or bad company, he that should so represent +the gross of that accident, as to breed an opinion of that person, that +out of pure disposition and design he did put himself there, doth slanderously +abuse that innocent person. The reporter in such cases must not +think to defend himself by pretending that he spake nothing false; for +such propositions, however true in logic, may justly be deemed lies +in morality, being uttered with a malicious and deceitful (that is, +with a calumnious) mind, being apt to impress false conceits and to +produce hurtful effects concerning our neighbour. There are slanderous +truths as well as slanderous falsehoods: when truth is uttered with +a deceitful heart, and to a base end, it becomes a lie. “He +that speaketh truth,” saith the wise man, “showeth forth +righteousness: but a false witness deceit.” Deceiving is +the proper work of slander: and truth abused to that end putteth on +its nature, and will engage into like guilt.</p> +<p>6. Another kind of calumny is, by instilling sly suggestions; +which although they do not downrightly assert falsehoods, yet they breed +sinister opinions in the hearers; especially in those who, from weakness +or credulity, from jealousy or prejudice, from negligence or inadvertency, +are prone to entertain them. This is done many ways: by propounding +wily suppositions, shrewd insinuations, crafty questions, and specious +comparisons, intimating a possibility, or inferring some likelihood +of, and thence inducing to believe the fact. “Doth not,” +saith this kind of slanderer, “his temper incline him to do thus? +may not his interest have swayed him thereto? had he not fair opportunity +and strong temptation to it? hath he not acted so in like cases? +Judge you therefore whether he did it not.” Thus the close +slanderer argueth; and a weak or prejudiced person is thereby so caught, +that he presently is ready thence to conclude the thing done. +Again: “He doeth well,” saith the sycophant, “it is +true; but why, and to what end? Is it not, as most men do, out +of ill design? may he not dissemble now? may he not recoil hereafter? +have not others made as fair a show? yet we know what came of it.” +Thus do calumnious tongues pervert the judgments of men to think ill +of the most innocent, and meanly of the worthiest actions. Even +commendation itself is often used calumniously, with intent to breed +dislike and ill-will towards a person commended in envious or jealous +ears; or so as to give passage to dispraises, and render the accusations +following more credible. ’Tis an artifice commonly observed +to be much in use there, where the finest tricks of supplanting are +practised, with greatest effect; so that <i>pessimum inimicorum genus, +laudantes</i>; there is no more pestilent enemy than a malevolent praiser. +All these kinds of dealing, as they issue from the principles of slander, +and perform its work, so they deservedly bear the guilt thereof.</p> +<p>7. A like kind is that of oblique and covert reflections; when +a man doth not directly or expressly charge his neighbour with faults, +but yet so speaketh that he is understood, or reasonably presumed to +do it. This is a very cunning and very mischievous way of slandering; +for therein the skulking calumniator keepeth a reserve for himself, +and cutteth off from the person concerned the means of defence. +If he goeth to clear himself from the matter of such aspersions: “What +need,” saith this insidious speaker, “of that? must I needs +mean you? did I name you? why do you then assume it to yourself? do +you not prejudge yourself guilty? I did not, but your own conscience, +it seemeth, doth accuse you. You are so jealous and suspicious, +as persons overwise or guilty use to be.” So meaneth this +serpent out of the hedge securely and unavoidably to bite his neighbour, +and is in that respect more base and more hurtful than the most flat +and positive slanderer.</p> +<p>8. Another kind is that of magnifying and aggravating the faults +of others; raising any small miscarriage into a heinous crime, any slender +defect into an odious vice, and any common infirmity into a strange +enormity; turning a small “mote in the eye” of our neighbour +into a huge “beam,” a little dimple in his face into a monstrous +wen. This is plainly slander, at least in degree, and according +to the surplusage whereby the censure doth exceed the fault. As +he that, upon the score of a small debt, doth extort a great sum, is +no less a thief, in regard to what amounts beyond his due, than if without +any pretence he had violently or fraudulently seized on it: so he is +a slanderer that, by heightening faults or imperfections, doth charge +his neighbour with greater blame, or load him with more disgrace than +he deserves. ’Tis not only slander to pick a hole where +there is none, but to make that wider which is, so that it appeareth +more ugly, and cannot so easily be mended. For charity is wont +to extenuate faults, justice doth never exaggerate them. As no +man is exempt from some defects, or can live free from some misdemeanours, +so by this practice every man may be rendered very odious and infamous.</p> +<p>9. Another kind of slander is, imputing to our neighbour’s +practice, judgment, or profession, evil consequences (apt to render +him odious, or despicable) which have no dependence on them, or connection +with them. There do in every age occur disorders and mishaps, +springing from various complications of causes, working some of them +in a more open and discernible, others in a more secret and subtle way +(especially from Divine judgment and providence checking or chastising +sin): from such occurrences it is common to snatch occasion and matter +of calumny. Those who are disposed this way, are ready peremptorily +to charge them upon whomsoever they dislike or dissent from, although +without any apparent cause, or upon most frivolous and senseless pretences; +yea, often when reason showeth quite the contrary, and they who are +so charged are in just esteem of all men the least obnoxious to such +accusations. So usually the best friends of mankind, those who +most heartily wish the peace and prosperity of the world and most earnestly +to their power strive to promote them, have all the disturbances and +disasters happening charged on them by those fiery vixens, who (in pursuance +of their base designs, or gratification of their wild passions) really +do themselve embroil things, and raise miserable combustions in the +world. So it is that they who have the conscience to do mischief, +will have the confidence also to disavow the blame and the iniquity, +to lay the burden of it on those who are most innocent. Thus, +whereas nothing more disposeth men to live orderly and peaceably, nothing +more conduceth to the settlement and safety of the public, nothing so +much draweth blessings down from heaven upon the commonwealth, as true +religion; yet nothing hath been more ordinary than to attribute all +the miscarriages and mischiefs that happened unto it; even those are +laid at his door, which plainly do arise from the contempt or neglect +of it; being the natural fruits or the just punishments of irreligion. +King Ahab by forsaking God’s commandments, and following wicked +superstitions, had troubled Israel, drawing sore judgments and calamities +thereon; yet had he the heart and the face to charge those events on +the great assertor of piety, Elias: “Art thou he that troubleth +Israel?” The Jews by provocation of Divine justice had set +themselves in a fair way towards desolation and ruin; this event to +come they had the presumption to lay upon the faith of our Lord’s +doctrine: “If,” said they, “we let Him alone, all +men will believe on Him, and the Romans shall come, and take away our +place and nation:” whereas, in truth, a compliance with His directions +and admonitions had been the only means to prevent those presaged mischiefs. +And, <i>si Tibris ascenderit in mænia</i>, if any public calamity +did appear, then <i>Christianos ad leones</i>, Christians must be charged +and persecuted as the causes thereof. To them it was that Julian +and other pagans did impute all the concussions, confusions, and devastations +falling upon the Roman Empire. The sacking of Rome by the Goths +they cast upon Christianity; for the vindication of it from which reproach +St. Austin did write those renowned books <i>de Civitate Dei</i>. +So liable are the best and most innocent sort of men to be calumniously +accused in this manner.</p> +<p>Another practice (worthily bearing the guilt of slander) is, aiding +and being accessory thereto, by anywise furthering, cherishing, abetting +it. He that by crafty significations of ill-will doth prompt the +slanderer to vent his poison; he that by a willing audience and attention +doth readily suck it up, or who greedily swalloweth it down by credulous +approbation and assent; he that pleasingly relisheth and smacketh at +it, or expresseth a delightful complacence therein: as he is a partner +in the fact, so he is a sharer in the guilt. There are not only +slanderous throats, but slanderous ears also; not only wicked inventions, +which engender and brood lies, but wicked assents, which hatch and foster +them. Not only the spiteful mother that conceiveth such spurious +brats, but the midwife that helpeth to bring them forth, the nurse that +feedeth them, the guardian that traineth them up to maturity, and setteth +them forth to live in the world; as they do really contribute to their +subsistence, so deservedly they partake in the blame due to them, and +must be responsible for the mischief they do. For indeed were +it not for such free entertainers, such nourishers, such encouragers +of them, slanderers commonly would die in the womb, or prove still-born, +or presently entering into the cold air, would expire, or for want of +nourishment soon would starve. It is such friends and patrons +of them who are the causes that they are so rife; they it is who set +ill-natured, base, and designing people upon devising, searching after, +and picking up malicious and idle stories. Were it not for such +customers, the trade of calumniating would fall. Many pursue it +merely out of servility and flattery, to tickle the ears, to soothe +the humour, to gratify the malignant disposition or ill-will of others; +who upon the least discouragement would give over the practice. +If therefore we would exempt ourselves from all guilt of slander, we +must not only abstain from venting it, but forbear to regard or countenance +it: for “he is,” saith the wise man, “a wicked doer +who giveth heed to false lips, and a liar who giveth ear to a naughty +tongue.” Yea, if we thoroughly would be clear from it, we +must show an aversion from hearing it, an unwillingness to believe it, +an indignation against it; so either stifling it in the birth, or condemning +it to death, being uttered. This is the sure way to destroy it, +and to prevent its mischief. If we would stop our ears, we should +stop the slanderer’s mouth; if we would resist the calumniator, +he would fly from us; if we would reprove him, we should repel him. +For, “as the north wind driveth away rain, so,” the wise +man telleth us, “doth an angry countenance a backbiting tongue.”</p> +<p>These are the chief and most common kinds of slander; and there are +several ways of practising them worthy our observing, that we may avoid +them, namely these:—</p> +<p>1. The most notoriously heinous way is, forging and immediately +venting ill stories. As it is said of Doeg, “Thy tongue +deviseth mischief;” and of another like companion, “Thou +givest thy mouth to evil, and thy tongue frameth deceit;” and +as our Lord saith of the devil, “When he speaketh a lie, εκ +του ιδιων λαλει, +he speaketh of his own; for he is a liar, and the father of it.” +This palpably is the supreme pitch of calumny, incapable of any qualifications +or excuse: hell cannot go beyond this; the cursed fiend himself cannot +worse employ his wit than in minting wrongful falsehoods.</p> +<p>2. Another way is, receiving from others, and venting such +stories, which they who do it certainly know or may reasonably presume +to be false; the becoming hucksters of counterfeit wares, or factors +in this vile trade. There is no false coiner who hath not some +accomplices and emissaries ready to take from his hand and put off his +money; and such slanderers at second hand are scarce less guilty than +the first authors. He that breweth lies may have more wit and +skill, but the broacher showeth the like malice and wickedness. +In this there is no great difference between the great devil, that frameth +scandalous reports, and the little imps that run about and disperse +them.</p> +<p>3. Another way is, when one without competent examination, +due weighing, and just reason, doth admit and spread tales prejudicial +to his neighbour’s welfare; relying for his warrant, as to the +truth of them, upon any slight or slender authority. This is a +very common and current practice: men presume it lawful enough to say +over whatever they hear; to report anything, if they can quote an author +for it. “It is not,” say they, “my invention; +I tell it as I heard it: <i>sit fides penes authorem</i>; let him that +informed me undergo the blame if it prove false.” So do +they conceive themselves excusable for being the instruments of injurious +disgrace and damage to their neighbours. But they greatly mistake +therein; for as this practice commonly doth arise from the same wicked +principles, at least in some degree, and produceth altogether the like +mischievous effects, as the wilful devising and conveying slander: so +it no less thwarteth the rules of duty, the laws of equity; God hath +prohibited it, and reason doth condemn it. “Thou shalt not,” +saith God in the Law, “go up and down as a tale-bearer among thy +people:” as a talebearer (as Rachil, that is), as a merchant or +trader in ill reports and stories concerning our neighbour, to his prejudice. +Not only the framing of them, but the dealing in them beyond reason +or necessity, is interdicted. And it is part of a good man’s +character in Psalm xv., <i>Non accipit opprobrium</i>, “He taketh +not up a reproach against his neighbour;” that is, he doth not +easily entertain it, much less doth he effectually propagate it: and +in our text, “He,” it is said, “that uttereth slander” +(not only he that conceiveth it) “is a fool.”</p> +<p>And in reason, before exact trial and cognisance, to meddle with +the fame and interest of another, is evidently a practice full of iniquity, +such as no man can allow in his own case, or brook being used towards +himself without judging himself to be extremely abused by such reporters. +In all reason and equity, yea, in all discretion, before we yield credence +to any report concerning our neighbour, or venture to relate it, many +things are carefully to be weighed and scanned. We should, concerning +our author, consider whether he be not a particular enemy, or disaffected +to him: whether he be not ill-humoured, or a delighter in telling bad +stories; whether he be not dishonest, or unregardful of justice in his +dealings and discourse; whether he be not vain, or careless of what +he saith; whether he be not light or credulous, or apt to be imposed +upon by any small appearance; whether, at least in the present case, +he be not negligent, or too forward and rash in speaking. We should +also, concerning the matter reported, mind whether it be possible or +probable; whether suitable to the disposition of our neighbour, to his +principles, to the constant tenor of his practice; whether the action +imputed to him be not liable to misapprehension, or his words to misconstruction. +All reason and equity do, I say, exact from us, diligently to consider +such things, before we do either embrace ourselves or transmit unto +others any story concerning our neighbour; lest unadvisedly we do him +irreparable wrong and mischief. Briefly, we should take his case +for our own, and consider whether we ourselves should be content that +upon like grounds or testimonies any man should believe, or report, +disgraceful things concerning us. If we fail to do thus, we do, +vainly, or rashly, or maliciously, conspire with the slanderer to the +wrong of our innocent neighbour; and that in the psalmist, by a parity +of reason, may be transferred to us, “Thou hast consented unto +the liar, and hast partaken with the” author of calumny.</p> +<p>4. Of kin to this way is the assenting to popular rumours, +and thence affirming matters of obloquy to our neighbour. Every +one by experience knows how easily false news do rise, and how nimbly +they scatter themselves; how often they are raised from nothing, how +soon they from small sparks grow into a great blaze, how easily from +one thing they are transformed into another; especially news of this +kind, which do suit and feed the bad humour of the vulgar. ’Tis +obvious to any man how true that is of Tacitus, how void of consideration, +of judgment, of equity, the busy and talking part of mankind is. +Whoever therefore gives heed to flying tales, and thrusts himself into +the herd of those who spread them, is either strangely injudicious, +or very malignantly disposed. If he want not judgment, he cannot +but know that when he complieth with popular fame, it is mere chance +that he doth not slander, or rather it is odds that he shall do so; +he consequently showeth himself to be indifferent whether he doeth it +or no, or rather that he doth incline to do it; whence, not caring to +be otherwise, or loving to be a slanderer, he in effect and just esteem +is such; having at least a slanderous heart and inclination. He +that puts it to the venture whether he lieth or no, doth <i>eo ipso</i> +lie morally, as declaring no care or love of truth. “Thou +shalt not,” saith the Law, “follow a multitude to do evil;” +and with like reason we should not follow the multitude in speaking +evil of our neighbour.</p> +<p>5. Another slanderous course is, to build censures and reproaches +upon slender conjectures, or uncertain suspicions (those υπονοιαι +πονηραι, evil surmises, which St. Paul +condemneth). Of these occasion can never be wanting to them who +seek them, or are ready to embrace them; no innocence, no wisdom can +anywise prevent them; and if they may be admitted as grounds of defamation, +no man’s good name can be secure. But he that upon such +accounts dareth to asperse his neighbour is in moral computation no +less a slanderer than if he did the like out of pure invention, or without +any ground at all: for doubtful and false in this case differ little; +to devise, and to divine, in matters of this nature, do import near +the same. He that will judge or speak ill of others, ought to +be well assured of what he thinks or says; he that asserteth that which +he doth not know to be true, doth as well lie as he that affirmeth that +which he knoweth to be false; for he deceiveth the hearers, begetting +in them an opinion that he is assured of what he affirms; especially +in dealing with the concernments of others, whose right and repute justice +doth oblige us to beware of infringing, charity should dispose us to +regard and tender as our own. It is not every possibility, every +seeming, every faint show or glimmering appearance, which sufficeth +to ground bad opinion or reproachful discourse concerning our brother: +the matter should be clear, notorious and palpable, before we admit +a disadvantageous conceit into our head, a distasteful resentment into +our heart, a harsh word into our mouth about him. Men may fancy +themselves sagacious and shrewd, persons of deep judgment and fine wit +they may be taken for, when they can dive into others’ hearts, +and sound their intentions; when through thick mists or at remote distances +they can descry faults in them; when they collect ill of them by long +trains, and subtle fetches of discourse: but in truth they do thereby +rather betray in themselves small love of truth, care of justice, or +sense of charity, together with little wisdom and discretion: for truth +is only seen in a clear light; justice requireth strict proof. +Charity “thinketh no evil,” and “believeth all things” +for the best; wisdom is not forward to pronounce before full evidence. +(“He,” saith the wise man, “that answereth a matter +before he heareth it, it is folly and shame unto him.”) +In fine, they who proceed thus, as it is usual that they speak falsely, +as it is casual that they ever speak truly, as they affect to speak +ill, true or false; so worthily they are to be reckoned among slanderers.</p> +<p>6. Another like way of slandering is, impetuous or negligent +sputtering out of words, without minding what truth or consequence there +is in them, how they may touch or hurt our neighbour. To avoid +this sin, we must not only be free from intending mischief, but wary +of effecting it; not only careful of not wronging one distinct person, +but of harming any promiscuously; not only abstinent from aiming directly, +but provident not to hit casually any person with obloquy. For +as he that dischargeth shot into a crowd, or so as not to look about +regarding who may stand in the way, is no less guilty of doing mischief, +and bound to make satisfaction to them he woundeth, than if he had aimed +at some one person: so if we sling our bad words at random, which may +light unluckily, and defame somebody, we become slanderers unawares, +and before we think on it. This practice hath not ever all the +malice of the worst slander, but it worketh often the effects thereof; +and therefore doth incur its guilt, and its punishment; especially it +being commonly derived from ill-temper, or from bad habit, which we +are bound to watch over, to curb, and to correct. The tongue is +a sharp and perilous weapon, which we are bound to keep up in the sheath, +or never to draw forth but advisedly, and upon just occasion; it must +ever be wielded with caution and care: to brandish it wantonly, to lay +about with it blindly and furiously, to slash and smite therewith any +that happeneth to come in our way, doth argue malice or madness.</p> +<p>7. It is an ordinary way of proceeding to calumniate, for men, +reflecting upon some bad disposition in themselves (although resulting +from their own particular temper, from their bad principles, or from +their ill custom), to charge it presently upon others; presuming others +to be like themselves: like the wicked person in the psalm, “Thou +thoughtest that I was altogether such an one as thyself.” +This is to slander mankind first in the gross; then in retail, as occasion +serveth, to asperse any man; this is the way of half-witted Machiavellians, +and of desperate reprobates in wickedness, who having prostituted their +consciences to vice, for their own defence and solace, would shroud +themselves from blame under the shelter of common pravity and infirmity; +accusing all men of that whereof they know themselves guilty. +But surely there can be no greater iniquity than this, that one man +should undergo blame for the ill conscience of another.</p> +<p>These seem to be the chief kinds of slander, and most common ways +of practising it. In which description, the folly thereof doth, +I suppose, so clearly shine, that no man can look thereon without loathing +and despising it, as not only a very ugly, but a most foolish practice. +No man surely can be wise who will suffer himself to be defiled therewith. +But to render its folly more apparent, we shall display it; declaring +it to be extremely foolish upon several accounts. But the doing +of this, in regard to your patience, we shall forbear at present.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h3>THE FOLLY OF SLANDER.</h3> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>Part 2.</p> +<p>“<i>He that uttereth slander is a fool</i>.”—Prov. +x. 18.</p> +<p>I have formerly in this place, discoursing upon this text, explained +the nature of the sin here condemned, with its several kinds and ways +of practising.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>II. I shall now proceed to declare the folly of it; and to +make good by divers reasons the assertion of the wise man, that “He +who uttereth slander is a fool.”</p> +<p>1. Slandering is foolish, as sinful and wicked.</p> +<p>All sin is foolish upon many accounts; as proceeding from ignorance, +error, inconsiderateness, vanity; as implying weak judgment, and irrational +choice; as thwarting the dictates of reason, and best rules of wisdom; +as producing very mischievous effects to ourselves, bereaving us of +the chief goods, and exposing us to the worst evils. What can +be more egregiously absurd than to dissent in our opinion and discord +in our choice from infinite wisdom; to provoke by our actions sovereign +justice, and immutable severity: to oppose almighty power, and offend +immense goodness; to render ourselves unlike and contrary in our doings, +our disposition, our state, to absolute perfection and felicity? +What can be more desperately wild than to disoblige our best Friend, +to forfeit His love and favour, to render Him our enemy, who is our +Lord and our Judge, upon whose mere will and disposal all our subsistence, +all our welfare does absolutely depend? What greater madness can +be conceived than to deprive our minds of all true content here, and +to separate our souls from eternal bliss hereafter; to gall our consciences +now with sore remorse, and to engage ourselves for ever in remediless +miseries? Such folly doth all sin include: whence in Scripture +style worthily goodness and wisdom are terms equivalent; sin and folly +do signify the same thing.</p> +<p>If thence this practice be proved extremely sinful, it will thence +sufficiently be demonstrated no less foolish. And that it is extremely +sinful may easily be shown. It is the character of the superlatively +wicked man: “Thou givest thy mouth to evil, and thy tongue frameth +deceit. Thou sittest and speakest against thy brother; thou slanderest +thine own mother’s son.” It is, indeed, plainly the +blackest and most hellish sin that can be; that which giveth the grand +fiend his names, and most expresseth his nature. He is ο +διαβολος (the slanderer); +Satan, the spiteful adversary; the old snake or dragon, hissing out +lies, and spitting forth venom of calumnious accusation; the accuser +of the brethren, a murderous, envious, malicious calumniator; the father +of lies; the grand defamer of God to man, of man to God, of one man +to another. And highly wicked surely must that practice be, whereby +we grow namesakes to him, conspire in proceeding with him, resemble +his disposition and nature. It is a complication, a comprisal, +a collection and sum of all wickedness; opposite to all the principal +virtues (to veracity and sincerity, to charity and justice), transgressing +all the great commandments, violating immediately and directly all the +duties concerning our neighbour.</p> +<p>To lie simply is a great fault, being a deviation from that good +rule which prescribeth truth in all our words; rendering us unlike and +disagreeable to God, who is the God of truth (who loveth truth, and +practiseth it in all His doings, who abominateth all falsehood); including +a treacherous breach of faith towards mankind; we being all, in order +to the maintenance of society, by an implicit compact, obliged by speech +to declare our mind, to inform truly, and not to impose upon our neighbour; +arguing pusillanimous timorousness and impotency of mind, a distrust +in God’s help, and diffidence in all good means to compass our +designs; begetting deception and error, a foul and ill-favoured brood: +lying, I say, is upon such accounts a sinful and blamable thing; and +of all lies those certainly are the worst which proceed from malice +or from vanity, or from both, and which work mischief, such as slanders +are.</p> +<p>Again, to bear any hatred or ill-will, to exercise enmity towards +any man, to design or procure any mischief to our neighbour, whom even +Jews were commanded to love as themselves, whose good, by many laws, +and upon divers scores, we are obliged to tender as our own, is a heinous +fault; and of this apparently the slanderer is most guilty in the highest +degree. For evidently true it is which the wise man affirmeth, +“A lying tongue hateth those that are afflicted with it;” +there is no surer argument of extreme hatred; nothing but the height +of ill-will can suggest this practice. The slanderer is an enemy, +as the most fierce and outrageous, so the most base and unworthy that +can be; he fighteth with the most perilous and most unlawful weapon, +in the most furious and foul way that can be. His weapon is an +envenomed arrow, full of deadly poison, which he shooteth suddenly, +and feareth not: a weapon which by no force can be resisted, by no art +declined, whose impression is altogether inevitable and unsustainable. +It is a most insidious, most treacherous and cowardly way of fighting; +wherein manifestly the weakest and basest spirits have extreme advantage, +and may easily prevail against the bravest and worthiest; for no man +of honour or honesty can in way of resistance or requital deign to use +it, but must infallibly without repugnance be borne down thereby. +By it the vile practiser achieveth the greatest mischief that can be. +His words are, as the psalmist saith of Doeg, devouring words: “Thou +lovest all devouring words, O thou deceitful tongue:” and, “A +man,” saith the wise man, “that beareth false witness against +his neighbour is a maul, and a sword, and a sharp arrow;” that +is, he is a complicated instrument of all mischiefs; he smiteth and +bruiseth like a maul, he cutteth and pierceth like a sword, he thus +doth hurt near at hand; and at a distance he woundeth like a sharp arrow; +it is hard anywhere to evade him, or to get out of his reach. +“Many,” saith another wise man, the imitator of Solomon, +“have fallen by the edge of the sword, but not so many as have +fallen by the tongue. Well is he that is defended from it, and +hath not passed through the venom thereof; who hath not drawn the yoke +thereof, nor hath been bound in its bands. For the yoke thereof +is a yoke of iron, and the bands thereof are bands of brass. The +death thereof is an evil death, the grave were better than it.” +Incurable are the wounds which the slanderer inflicteth, irreparable +the damages which he causeth, indelible the marks which he leaveth. +“No balsam can heal the biting of a sycophant;” no thread +can stitch up a good name torn by calumnious defamation; no soap is +able to cleanse from the stains aspersed by a foul mouth. <i>Aliquid +adhærebit</i>; somewhat always of suspicion and ill opinion will +stick in the minds of those who have given ear to slander. So +extremely opposite is this practice unto the queen of virtues, Charity. +Its property indeed is to “believe all things,” that is, +all things for the best, and to the advantage of our neighbour; not +so much as to suspect any evil of him without unavoidably manifest cause; +how much more not to devise any falsehood against him! It “covereth” +all things, studiously conniving at real defects, and concealing assured +miscarriages: how much more not divulging imaginary or false scandals! +It disposeth to seek and further any the least good concerning him: +how much more will it hinder committing grievous outrage upon his dearest +good name!</p> +<p>Again, all injustice is abominable; to do any sort of wrong is a +heinous crime; that crime which of all most immediately tendeth to the +dissolution of society, and disturbance of human life; which God therefore +doth most loathe, and men have reason especially to detest. And +of this the slanderer is most deeply guilty. “A witness +of Belial scorneth judgment, and the mouth of the wicked devoureth iniquity,” +saith the wise man. He is indeed, according to just estimation, +guilty of all kinds whatever of injury, breaking all the second Table +of Commands respecting our neighbour. Most formally and directly +he “beareth false witness against his neighbour:” he doth +“covet his neighbour’s goods;” for ’tis constantly +out of such an irregular desire, for his own presumed advantage, to +dispossess his neighbour of some good, and transfer it on himself, that +the slanderer uttereth his tale: he is ever a thief and robber of his +good name, a deflowerer and defiler of his reputation, an assassin and +murderer of his honour. So doth he violate all the rules of justice, +and perpetrateth all sorts of wrong against his neighbour.</p> +<p>He may, indeed, perhaps conceive it no great matter that he committeth; +because he doth not act in so boisterous and bloody a way, but only +by words, which are subtle, slim, and transient things: upon his neighbour’s +credit only, which is no substantial or visible matter. He draweth +(thinks he), no blood, nor breaketh any bones, nor impresseth any remarkable +scar; ’tis only the soft air he breaketh with his tongue, ’tis +only a slight character that he stampeth on the fancy, ’tis only +an imaginary stain that he daubeth his neighbour with; therefore he +supposeth no great wrong done, and seemeth to himself innocent, or very +excusable. But these conceits arise from great inconsiderateness, +or mistake: nor can they excuse the slanderer from grievous injustice. +For in dealing with our neighbour, and meddling with his property, we +are not to value things according to our fancy, but according to the +price set on them by the owner; we must not reckon that a trifle, which +he prizeth as a jewel. Since, then, all men (especially men of +honour and honesty) do, from a necessary instinct of nature, estimate +their good name beyond any of their goods—yea, do commonly hold +it more dear and precious than their very lives—we, by violently +or fraudulently bereaving them of it, do them no less wrong than if +we should rob or cozen them of their substance; yea, than if we should +maim their body, or spill their blood, or even stop their breath. +If they as grievously feel it, and resent it as deeply, as they do any +other outrage, the injury is really as great, to them. Even the +slanderer’s own judgment and conscience might tell him so much; +for they who most slight another’s fame, are usually very tender +of their own, and can with no patience endure that others should touch +it; which demonstrates the inconsiderateness of their judgment, and +the iniquity of their practice. It is an injustice not to be corrected +or cured. Thefts may be restored, wounds may be cured; but there +is no restitution or cure of a lost good name: it is therefore an irreparable +injury.</p> +<p>Nor is the thing itself, in true judgment, contemptible; but in itself +really very considerable. “A good name,” saith Solomon +himself (no fool), “is rather to be chosen than great riches; +and loving favour rather than silver and gold.” In its consequences +it is much more so; the chief interests of a man, the success of his +affairs, his ability to do good (for himself, his friends, his neighbour), +his safety, the best comforts and conveniences of his life, sometimes +his life itself, depending thereon; so that whoever doth snatch or filch +it from him, doth not only according to his opinion, and in moral value, +but in real effect commonly rob, sometimes murder, ever exceedingly +wrong his neighbour. It is often the sole reward of a man’s +virtue and all the fruit of his industry; so that by depriving him of +that, he is robbed of all his estate, and left stark naked of all, excepting +a good conscience, which is beyond the reach of the world, and which +no malice or misfortune can divest him of. Full then of iniquity, +full of uncharitableness, full of all wickedness is this practice; and +consequently full it is of folly. No man, one would think, of +any tolerable sense, should dare or deign to incur the guilt of a practice +so vile and base, so indeed diabolical and detestable. But further +more particularly—</p> +<p>2. The slanderer is plainly a fool, because he maketh wrong +judgments and valuations of things, and accordingly driveth on silly +bargains for himself, in result whereof he proveth a great loser. +He means by his calumnious stories either to vent some passion boiling +in him, or to compass some design which he affects, or to please some +humour that he is possessed with: but is any of these things worth purchasing +at so dear a rate? can there be any valuable exchange for our honesty? +Is it not more advisable to suppress our passion, or to let it evaporate +otherwise, than to discharge it in so foul a way? Is it not better +to let go a petty interest, than to further it by committing so notorious +and heinous a sin; to let an ambitious project sink, than to buoy it +up by such base means? Is it not wisdom rather to smother or curb +our humour, than by satisfying it thus to forfeit our innocence? +Can anything in the world be so considerable, that for its sake we should +defile our souls by so foul a practice, making shipwreck of a good conscience, +abandoning honour and honesty, incurring all the guilt and all the punishment +due to so enormous a crime? Is it not far more wisdom, contentedly +to see our neighbour to enjoy credit and success, to flourish and thrive +in the world, than by such base courses to sully his reputation, to +rifle him of his goods, to supplant or cross him in his affairs? +We do really, when we think thus to depress him, and to climb up to +wealth or credit by the ruins of his honour, but debase ourselves. +Whatever comes of it, whether he succeeds or is disappointed therein, +assuredly he that useth such courses will himself be the greatest loser, +and deepest sufferer. ’Tis true which the wise man saith, +“The getting of treasures by a lying tongue, is a vanity tossed +to and fro of them that seek death.” And, “Woe unto +them,” saith the prophet, “that draw iniquity with cords +of vanity;” that is, who by falsehood endeavour to compass unjust +designs.</p> +<p>But it is not, perhaps he will pretend, to assuage a private passion, +or to promote his particular concernment, that he makes so bold with +his neighbour, or deals so harshly with him; but for the sake of orthodox +doctrine, for advantage of the true Church, for the advancement of public +good, he judgeth it expedient to asperse him. This indeed is the +covert of innumerable slanders: zeal for some opinion, or some party, +beareth out men of sectarian and factious spirits in such practices; +they may do, they may say anything for those fine ends. What is +a little truth, what is any man’s reputation in comparison to +the carrying on such brave designs? But (to omit that men do usually +prevaricate in these cases; that it is not commonly for love of truth, +but of themselves; not so much for the benefit of their sect, but for +their own interest, that they calumniate) this plea will nowise justify +such practice. For truth and sincerity, equity and candour, meekness +and charity are inviolably to be observed, not only towards dissenters +in opinion, but even towards declared enemies of truth itself; we are +to bless them (that is, to speak well of them, and to wish well to them), +not to curse them (that is, not to reproach them, or to wish them ill, +much less to belie them). Truth also, as it cannot ever need, +so doth it always loathe and scorn the patronage and the succour of +lies; it is able to support and protect itself by fair means; it will +not be killed upon a pretence of saving it, or thrive by its own ruin. +Nor indeed can any party be so much strengthened and underpropped, as +it will be weakened and undermined by such courses. No cause can +stand firm upon a bottom so loose and slippery as falsehood is. +All the good a slanderer can do is, to disparage what he would maintain. +In truth, no heresy can be worse than that would be which should allow +to play the devil in any case. He that can dispense with himself +to slander a Jew or a Turk, doth in so doing render himself worse than +either of them by profession is: for even they, and even pagans themselves, +disallow the practice of inhumanity and iniquity. All men by light +of nature avow truth to be honourable, and faith to be indispensably +observed. He doth not understand what it is to be Christian, or +careth not to practise according thereto, who can find in his heart +in any case, upon any pretence, to calumniate. In fine, to prostitute +our conscience, or sacrifice our honesty, for any cause, to any interest +whatever, can never be warrantable or wise. Further—</p> +<p>3. The slanderer is a fool, because he useth improper means +and preposterous methods of effecting his purposes. As there is +no design worth the carrying on by ways of falsehood and iniquity, so +is there scarce any, no good or lawful one at least, which may not more +surely, more safely, more cleverly be achieved by means of truth and +justice. Is not always the straight way more short than the oblique +and crooked? is not the plain way more easy than the rough and cragged? +is not the fair way more pleasant and passable than the foul? +Is it not better to walk in paths that are open and allowed, than in +those that are shut up and prohibited, than to clamber over walls, to +break through fences, to trespass upon enclosures? Surely yes: +“He that walketh uprightly, walketh surely.” Using +strict veracity and integrity, candour and equity, is the best method +of accomplishing good designs. Our own industry, good use of the +parts and faculties God hath given us, embracing fair opportunities, +God’s blessing and providence, are sufficient means to rely upon +for procuring, in an honest way, whatever is convenient for us. +These are ways approved, and amiable to all men; they procure the best +friends, and fewest enemies; they afford to the practises a cheerful +courage, and good hope; they meet with less disappointment, and have +no regret or shame attending them. He that hath recourse to the +other base means, and “maketh lies his refuge,” as he renounceth +all just and honest means, as he disclaimeth all hope in God’s +assistance, and forfeiteth all pretence to His blessing: so he cannot +reasonably expect good success, or be satisfied in any undertaking. +The supplanting way indeed seems the most curt and compendious way of +bringing about dishonest or dishonourable designs: but as good design +is certainly dishonoured thereby, so is it apt thence to be defeated; +it raises up enemies and obstacles, yielding advantages to whoever is +disposed to cross us. As in trade it is notorious that the best +course to thrive is by dealing squarely and truly; any fraud or cozenage +appearing there doth overthrow a man’s credit, and drive away +custom from him: so in all other transactions, as he that dealeth justly +and fairly will have his affairs proceed roundly, and shall find men +ready to comply with him, so he that is observed to practise falsehood +will be declined by some, opposed by others, disliked by all: no man +scarce willingly will have to do with him; he is commonly forced to +stand out in business, as one that plays foul play.</p> +<p>4. Lastly, the slanderer is a very fool, as bringing many great +inconveniences, troubles, and mischiefs on himself.</p> +<p>First, “A fool’s mouth,” saith the wise man, “is +his destruction, his lips are the snare of his soul:” and if any +kind of speech is destructive and dangerous, then is this certainly +most of all; for by no means can a man inflame so fierce anger, impress +so stiff hatred, raise so deadly enmity against himself, and consequently +so endanger his safety, ease and welfare, as by this practice. +Men can more easily endure, and sooner will forgive, any sort of abuse +than this; they will rather pardon a robber of their goods, than a defamer +of their good name.</p> +<p>Secondly, such an one indeed is not only odious to the person immediately +concerned, but generally to all men that observe his practice; every +man presently will be sensible how easily it may be his own case, how +liable he may be to be thus abused, in a way against which there is +no guard or defence. The slanderer therefore is apprehended a +common enemy, dangerous to all men; and thence rendereth all men averse +from him, and ready to cross him. Love and peace, tranquillity +and security can only be maintained by innocent and true dealing: so +the psalmist hath well taught us: “What man is he that desireth +life, and loveth many days, that he may see good? Keep thy tongue +from evil, and thy lips from speaking guile.”</p> +<p>Thirdly, all wise, all noble, all ingenuous and honest persons have +an aversion from this practice, and cannot entertain it with any acceptance +or complacence. “A righteous man hateth lying,” saith +the wise man. It is only ill-natured and ill-nurtured, unworthy +and naughty people that are willing auditors or encouragers thereof. +“A wicked doer,” saith the wise man again, “giveth +heed to false lips; and a liar giveth ear to a naughty tongue.” +All love of truth and regard to justice, and sense of humanity, all +generosity and ingenuity, all charity and good-will to men, must be +extinct in those who can with delight, or indeed with patience, lend +an ear or give any countenance to a slanderer: and is not he a very +fool who chooseth to displease the best, only soothing the worst of +men?</p> +<p>Fourthly, the slanderer indeed doth banish himself from all conversation +and company, or intruding into it becomes very disgustful thereto; for +he worthily is not only looked upon as an enemy to those whom he slandereth, +but to those also upon whom he obtrudeth his calumnious discourse. +He not only wrongeth the former by the injury, but he mocketh the latter +by the falsehood of his stories; implicitly charging his hearers with +weakness and credulity, or with injustice and pravity.</p> +<p>Fifthly, he also derogateth wholly from his own credit in all matters +of discourse. For he that dareth thus to injure his neighbour, +who can trust him in anything he speaks? what will not he say to please +his vile humour, or further his base interest? what, thinks any man, +will he scruple or boggle at, who hath the heart in thus doing wrong +and mischief to imitate the devil? Further—</p> +<p>Sixthly, this practice is perpetually haunted with most troublesome +companions, inward regret and self-condemnation, fear and disquiet: +the conscience of dealing so unworthily doth smite and rack him; he +is ever in danger, and thence in fear to be discovered, and requited +for it. Of these passions the manner of his behaviour is a manifest +indication: for men do seldom vent their slanderous reports openly and +loudly, to the face or in the ear of those who are concerned in them; +but do utter them in a low voice, in dark corners, out of sight and +hearing, where they conceit themselves at present safe from being called +to an account. “Swords,” saith the psalmist of such +persons, “are in their lips: Who (say they) doth hear?” +And, “Whoso privily slandereth his neighbour, him will I cut off,” +saith David again, intimating the common manner of this practice. +Calumny is like “the plague, that walketh in darkness.” +Hence appositely are the practisers thereof termed whisperers and backbiters: +their heart suffers them not openly to avow, their conscience tells +them they cannot fairly defend their practice. Again—</p> +<p>Seventhly, the consequence of this practice is commonly shameful +disgrace, with an obligation to retract and render satisfaction: for +seldom doth calumny pass long without being detected and confuted. +“He that walketh uprightly, walketh surely: but he that perverteth +his ways shall be known:” and, “The lip of truth shall be +established for ever; but a lying lip is but for a moment,” saith +the great observer of things. And when the slander is disclosed, +the slanderer is obliged to excuse (that is, to palliate one lie with +another, if he can do it), or forced to recant, with much disgrace and +extreme displeasure to himself: he is also many times constrained, with +his loss and pain, to repair the mischief he hath done.</p> +<p>Eighthly, to this in likelihood the concernments of men, and the +powers which guard justice, will forcibly bring him; and certainly his +conscience will bind him thereto; God will indispensably exact it from +him. He can never have any sound quiet in his mind, he can never +expect pardon from Heaven, without acknowledging his fault, repairing +the wrong he hath done, restoring that good name of which he dispossessed +his neighbour: for in this no less than in other cases conscience cannot +be satisfied, remission will not be granted, except due restitution +be performed; and of all restitutions this surely is the most difficult, +most laborious, and most troublesome. ’Tis nowise so hard +to restore goods stolen or extorted, as to recover a good opinion lost, +to wipe off aspersions cast on a man’s name, to cure a wounded +reputation: the most earnest and diligent endeavour can hardly ever +effect this, or spread the plaster so far as the sore hath reached. +The slanderer therefore doth engage himself into great straits, incurring +an obligation to repair an almost irreparable mischief.</p> +<p>Ninthly, this practice doth also certainly revenge itself, imposing +on its actor a perfect retaliation; “a tooth for a tooth;” +an irrecoverable infamy to himself, for the infamy he causeth to others. +Who will regard his fame, who will be concerned to excuse his faults, +who so outrageously abuseth the reputation of others? He suffereth +justly, he is paid in his own coin, will any man think, who doth hear +him reproached.</p> +<p>Tenthly, in fine, the slanderer, if he doth not, by serious and sore +repentance retract his practice, doth banish himself from heaven and +happiness, doth expose himself to endless miseries and sorrows. +For, if none that “maketh a lie shall enter into the heavenly +city;” if without those mansions of joy and bliss “every +one” must eternally abide “that loveth or maketh a lie;” +if πασι τοις ψευδεαι, +“to all liars their portion” is assigned “in the lake +which burneth with fire and brimstone;” then assuredly the capital +liar, the slanderer, who lieth most injuriously and mischievously, shall +be far excluded from felicity, and thrust down into the depth of that +miserable place. If, as St. Paul saith, no “railer,” +or evil-speaker, “shall inherit the kingdom of God,” how +far thence shall they be removed who without any truth or justice do +speak ill of and reproach their neighbour? If for every αργον +ρημα, “idle,” or vain, “word” +we must “render a” strict “account,” how much +more shall we be severely reckoned with for this sort of words, so empty +of truth and void of equity: words that are not only negatively vain, +or useless, but positively vain, as false and spoken to bad purpose? +If slander perhaps here may evade detection, or escape deserved punishment, +yet infallibly hereafter, at the dreadful day, it shall be disclosed, +irreversibly condemned, inevitably persecuted with condign reward of +utter shame and sorrow.</p> +<p>Is not he then, he who, out of malignity, or vanity, to serve any +design, or soothe any humour in himself or others, doth by committing +this sin involve himself in all these great evils, both here and hereafter, +a most desperate and deplorable fool?</p> +<p>Having thus described the nature of this sin, and declared the folly +thereof, we need, I suppose, to say no more for dissuading it; especially +to persons of a generous and honest mind, who cannot but scorn to debase +and defile themselves by so mean and vile a practice; or to those who +seriously do profess Christianity, that is, the religion which peculiarly +above all others prescribeth constant truth, strictest justice, and +highest charity.</p> +<p>I shall only add, that since our faculty of speech (wherein we do +excel all other creatures) was given us, as in the first place to praise +and glorify our Maker, so in the next to benefit and help our neighbour; +as an instrument of mutual succour and delectation, of friendly commerce +and pleasant converse together; for instructing and advising, comforting +and cheering one another: it is an unnatural perverting, and an irrational +abuse thereof, to employ it to the damage, disgrace, vexation, or wrong +in any kind of our brother. Better indeed had we been as brutes +without its use, than we are, if so worse than brutishly we abuse it.</p> +<p>Finally, all these things being considered, we may, I think, reasonably +conclude it most evidently true that “He which uttereth slander +is a fool.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines3"><br /><br /><br /></div> +<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SERMONS ON EVIL-SPEAKING***</p> +<pre> + + +***** This file should be named 10274-h.htm or 10274-h.zip ****** + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +https://www.gutenberg.org/1/0/2/7/10274 + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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