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diff --git a/10090-0.txt b/10090-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e979c8b --- /dev/null +++ b/10090-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,8576 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10090 *** + +PEACELESS EUROPE + +By + +FRANCESCO S. NITTI + + +1922 + + + + +PREFACE + + +In this book are embodied the ideas which, as a parliamentarian, as +head of the Italian Government, and as a writer, I have upheld with +firm conviction during the last few years. + +I believe that Europe is threatened with decadence more owing to the +Peace Treaties than as a result of the War. She is in a state of daily +increasing decline, and the causes of dissatisfaction are growing +apace. + +Europe is still waiting for that peace which has not yet been +definitely concluded, and it is necessary that the public should be +made aware that the courses now being followed by the policy of the +great victorious States are perilous to the achievement of serious, +lasting and useful results. I believe that it is to the interest of +France herself if I speak the language of truth, as a sincere friend +of France and a confirmed enemy of German Imperialism. Not only did +that Imperialism plunge Germany into a sea of misery and suffering, +covering her with the opprobrium of having provoked the terrible War, +or at least of having been mainly responsible for it, but it has +ruined for many years the productive effort of the most cultured and +industrious country in Europe. + +Some time ago the ex-President of the French Republic, R. Poincaré, +after the San Remo Conference, _à propos_ of certain differences of +opinion which had arisen between Lloyd George and myself on the one +hand and Millerand on the other, wrote as follows: + + "Italy and England know what they owe to France, just as France + knows what she owes to them. They do not wish to part company with + us, nor do we with them. They recognize that they need us, as we + have need of them. Lloyd George and Nitti are statesmen too shrewd + and experienced not to understand that their greatest strength + will always lie in this fundamental axiom. On leaving San Remo + for Rome or London let them ask the opinion of the 'man in the + street.' His reply will be: '_Avant tout, restez unis avec la + France_.'" + +I believe that Lloyd George and I share the same cordial sentiments +toward France. We have gone through so much suffering and anxiety +together that it would be impossible to tear asunder links firmly +welded by common danger and pain. France will always remember with a +sympathetic glow that Italy was the first country which proclaimed her +neutrality, on August 2, 1914; without that proclamation the destinies +of the War might have taken a very different turn. + +But the work of reconstruction in Europe is in the interest of France +herself. She has hated too deeply to render a sudden cessation of her +hate-storm possible, and the treaties have been begotten in rancour +and applied with violence. Even as the life of men, the life of +peoples has days of joy and days of grief: sunshine follows the storm. +The whole history of European peoples is one of alternate victories +and defeats. It is the business of civilization to create such +conditions as will render victory less brutal and defeat more +bearable. + +The recent treaties which regulate, or are supposed to regulate, +the relations among peoples are, as a matter of fact, nothing but a +terrible regress, the denial of all those principles which had been +regarded as an unalienable conquest of public right. President Wilson, +by his League of Nations, has been the most responsible factor in +setting up barriers between nations. + +Christopher Columbus sailed from Europe hoping to land in India, +whereas he discovered America. President Wilson sailed from America +thinking that he was going to bring peace to Europe, but only +succeeded in bringing confusion and war. + +However, we should judge him with the greatest indulgence, for his +intentions were undoubtedly sincere and honest. + +France has more to gain than any other country in Europe by reverting +to those sound principles of democracy which formed her erstwhile +glory. We do not forget what we owe her, nor the noble spirit which +pervades some of her historic deeds. But _noblesse oblige_, and all +the more binding is her duty to respect tradition. + +When France shall have witnessed the gradual unfolding of approaching +events, she will be convinced that he who has spoken to her the +language of truth and has sought out a formula permitting the peoples +of Europe to rediscover their path in life, towards life, is not only +a friend, but a friend who has opportunely brought back to France's +mind and heart the deeds of her great ancestors at the time when fresh +deeds of greatness and glory await accomplishment. The task which we +must undertake with our inmost feeling, with all the ardour of our +faith, is to find once more the road to peace, to utter the word of +brotherly love toward oppressed peoples, and to reconstruct Europe, +which is gradually sinking to the condition of Quattrocento Italy, +without its effulgence of art and beauty: thirty States mutually +diffident of each other, in a sea of programmes and Balkan ideas. + +Towards the achievement of this work of civilization the great +democracies must march shoulder to shoulder. At the present moment I +hear nothing but hostile voices; but the time is not far distant when +my friends of France will be marching with us along the same road. +They already admit in private many things which they will presently be +obliged to recognize openly. Many truths are the fruit of persuasion; +others, again, are the result of former delusions. + +I place my greatest trust in the action of American democracy. + +By refusing to sanction the Treaty of Versailles and all the other +peace treaties, the American Senate has given proof of the soundest +political wisdom: the United States of America has negotiated its own +separate treaties, and resumes its pre-war relations with victors and +vanquished alike. + +It follows that all that has been done hitherto in the way of +treaties is rendered worthless, as the most important participant +has withdrawn. This is a further motive for reflecting that it is +impossible to continue living much longer in a Europe divided by two +contending fields and by a medley of rancour and hatred which tends to +widen the chasm. + +It is of the greatest interest to America that Europe should once more +be the wealthy, prosperous, civilized Europe which, before 1914, ruled +over the destinies of the world. Only by so great an effort can the +finest conquests of civilization come back to their own. + +We should only remember our dead in so far as their memory may prevent +future generations from being saddened by other war victims. The +voices of those whom we have lost should reach us as voices praying +for the return of that civilization which shall render massacres +impossible, or shall at least diminish the violence and ferocity of +war. + +Just as the growing dissolution of Europe is a common danger, so is +the renewal of the bonds of solidarity a common need. + +Let us all work toward this end, even if at first we may be +misunderstood and may find obstacles in our way. Truth is on the march +and will assert herself: we shall strike the main road after much of +dreary wandering in the dark lanes of prejudice and violence. + +Many of the leading men of Europe and America, who in the intoxication +of victory proclaimed ideas of violence and revenge, would now be very +glad to reverse their attitude, of which they see the unhappy results. +The truth is that what they privately recognize they will not yet +openly admit. But no matter. + +The confessions which many of them have made to me, both verbally and +in writing, induce me to believe that my ideas are also their ideas, +and that they only seek to express them in the form and on the +occasions less antagonistic to the currents of opinion which they +themselves set up in the days when the chief object to be achieved +seemed to be the vivisection of the enemy. + +Recent events, however, have entirely changed the situation. + +As I said before, the American Senate has not sanctioned the Treaty +of Versailles, nor is it likely to give it its approval. The United +States of America concludes separate treaties on its own account. + +Agreements of a military character had been arrived at in Paris: the +United States of America and Great Britain guaranteed France against +any future unjust attack by Germany. The American Senate did not +sanction the agreement; in fact, it did not even discuss it. The House +of Commons had approved it subordinate to the consent of the United +States. Italy has kept aloof from all alliances. As a result of this +situation, the four Entente Powers, "allied and associated" (as +formerly was the official term), have ceased to be either "allied" or +"associated" after the end of the War. + +On the other hand, Europe, after emerging from the War, is darkened +and overcast by intrigues, secret agreements and dissimulated plots: +fresh menaces of war and fresh explosions of dissatisfaction. + +Nothing can help the cause of peace more than giving a full knowledge +of the real situation to the various peoples. Errors thrive in +darkness while truth walks abroad in the full light of day. It has +been my intention to lay before the public those great controversies +which cannot merely form the object of diplomatic notes or of +posthumous books presented to Parliament in a more or less incomplete +condition after events have become irreparable. + +The sense of a common danger, threatening all alike, will prove the +most persuasive factor in swerving us from the perilous route which we +are now following. + +As a result of the War the bonds of economic solidarity have been +torn asunder: the losers in the War must not only make good their own +losses, but, according to the treaties, are expected to pay for all +the damage which the War has caused. Meanwhile all the countries of +Europe have only one prevailing fear: German competition. In order +to pay the indemnities imposed upon her (and she can only do it by +exporting goods), Germany is obliged to produce at the lowest possible +cost, which necessitates the maximum of technical progress. But +exports at low cost must in the long run prove detrimental, if not +destructive, to the commerce of neutral countries, and even to that of +the victors. Thus in all tariffs which have already been published or +which are in course of preparation there is one prevailing object in +view: that of reducing German competition, which practically amounts +to rendering it impossible for her to pay the War indemnity. + +If winners and losers were to abandon war-time ideas for a while, +and, rather, were to persuade themselves that the oppression of the +vanquished cannot be lasting, and that there is no other logical way +out of the difficulty but that of small indemnities payable in a +few years, debiting to the losers in tolerable proportion all debts +contracted towards Great Britain and the United States, the European +situation would immediately improve. + +Why is Europe still in such a state of economic disorder? Because the +confusion of moral ideas persists. In many countries nerves are still +as tense as a bowstring, and the language of hatred still prevails. +For some countries, as for some social groups, war has not yet +ceased to be. One hears now in the countries of the victors the same +arguments used as were current coin in Germany before the War and +during the first phases of the War; only now and then, more as a +question of habit than because they are truly felt, we hear the words +justice, peace, and democracy. + +Why is the present state of discomfort and dissatisfaction on the +increase? Because almost everywhere in Continental Europe, in the +countries which have emerged from the War, the rate of production is +below the rate of consumption, and many social groups, instead of +producing more, plan to possess themselves with violence of the wealth +produced by others. At home, the social classes, unable to resist, +are threatened; abroad, the vanquished, equally unable to resist, are +menaced, but in the very menace it is easy to discern the anxiety +of the winners. Confusion, discomfort and dissatisfaction thus grow +apace. + +The problem of Europe is above all a moral problem. A great step +toward its solution will have been accomplished when winners and +losers persuade themselves that only by a common effort can they be +saved, and that the best enemy indemnity consists in peace and joint +labour. Now that the enemy has lost all he possessed and threatens +to make us lose the fruits of victory, one thing is above all others +necessary: the resumption, not only of the language, but of the ideas +of peace; + +During one of the last international conferences at which I was +present, and over which I presided, at San Remo, after a long exchange +of views with the British and French Premiers, Lloyd George and +Millerand, the American journalists asked me to give them my ideas +on peace: "What is the most necessary thing for the maintenance of +peace?" they inquired. + +"One thing only," I replied, "is necessary. Europe must smile once +more." Smiles have vanished from every lip; nothing has remained but +hatred, menaces and nervous excitement. + +When Europe shall smile again she will "rediscover" her political +peace ideas and will drink once more at the spring of life. Class +struggles at home, in their acutest form, are like the competition of +nationalism abroad: explosions of cupidity, masked by the pretext of +the country's greatness. + +The deeply rooted economic crisis, which threatens and prepares new +wars, the deeply rooted social crisis, which threatens and prepares +fresh conflicts abroad, are nothing but the expression of a _status +animae_ or soul condition. Statesmen are the most directly responsible +for the continuation of a language of violence; they should be the +first to speak the language of peace. + +F.S. NITTI. + +ACQUAFREDDA IN BASILICATA. + +_September_ 30, 1921. + + +P.S.--"Peaceless Europe" is an entirely new book, which I have written +in my hermitage of Acquafredda, facing the blue Adriatic; it contains, +however, some remarks and notices which have already appeared in +articles written by me for the great American agency, the _United +Press_, and which have been reproduced by the American papers. + +I have repeatedly stated that I have not published any document which +was not meant for publication; I have availed myself of my knowledge +of the most important international Acts and of all diplomatic +documents merely as a guide, but it is on facts that I have solidly +based my considerations. + +J. Keynes and Robert Lansing have already published some very +important things, but no secret documents; recently, however, Tardieu +and Poincaré, in the interest of the French nationalist thesis which +they sustain, have published also documents of a very reserved nature. +Tardieu's book is a documentary proof of the French Government's +extremist attitude during the conference, amply showing that the +present form of peace has been desired almost exclusively by France, +and that the others have been unwilling parties to it. Besides his +articles in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Poincaré has recently +published in the _Temps_ (September 12, 1921) a whole secret +correspondence between Poincaré, President of the Republic, +Clemenceau, President of the Council of Ministers, the American +Delegation, and, above all, Lloyd George. + + + + +CONTENTS + + +1. EUROPE WITHOUT PEACE + +2. THE PEACE TREATIES AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR + +3. THE PEACE TREATIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND AIMS + +4. THE CONQUERORS AND THE CONQUERED + +5. THE INDEMNITY FROM THE DEFEATED ENEMY AND THE ANXIETIES OF THE +VICTORS + +6. EUROPE'S POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION AND PEACE POLICY + +INDEX + + + + +_The author includes in the book numerous secret official documents +that emanated from the Peace Conference and which came into his hands +in his position, at that time, as Italian Prime Minister. Among these +is a long and hitherto unpublished secret letter sent by Lloyd George +to Nitti, Wilson, Clemenceau, and the other members of the Peace +Conference_. + + + + +I + +EUROPE WITHOUT PEACE + + +Is there anyone who still remembers Europe in the first months of 1914 +or calls to mind the period which preceded the first year of the War? +It all seems terribly remote, something like a prehistoric era, not +only because the conditions of life have changed, but because our +viewpoint on life has swerved to a different angle. + +Something like thirty million dead have dug a chasm between two ages. +War killed many millions, disease accounted for many more, but the +hardiest reaper has been famine. The dead have built up a great cold +barrier between the Europe of yesterday and the Europe of to-day. + +We have lived through two historic epochs, not through two different +periods. Europe was happy and prosperous, while now, after the +terrible World War, she is threatened with a decline and a reversion +to brutality which suggest the fall of the Roman Empire. We ourselves +do not quite understand what is happening around us. More than +two-thirds of Europe is in a state of ferment, and everywhere there +prevails a vague sense of uneasiness, ill-calculated to encourage +important collective works. We live, as the saying is, "from hand to +mouth." + +Before 1914 Europe had enjoyed a prolonged period of peace, attaining +a degree of wealth and civilization unrivalled in the past. + +In Central Europe Germany had sprung up. After the Napoleonic +invasions, in the course of a century, Germany, which a hundred years +ago seemed of all European countries the least disposed to militarism, +had developed into a great military monarchy. From being the most +particularist country Germany had in reality become the most unified +state. But what constituted her strength was not so much her army and +navy as the prestige of her intellectual development. She had achieved +it laboriously, almost painfully, on a soil which was not fertile and +within a limited territory, but, thanks to the tenacity of her effort, +she succeeded in winning a prominent place in the world-race for +supremacy. Her universities, her institutes for technical instruction, +her schools, were a model to the whole world. In the course of a few +years she had built up a merchant fleet which seriously threatened +those of other countries. Having arrived too late to create a real +colonial empire of her own, such as those of France and England, she +nevertheless succeeded in exploiting her colonies most intelligently. + +In the field of industry she appeared to beat all competitors from a +technical point of view; and even in those industries which were not +hers by habit and tradition she developed so powerful an organization +as to appear almost uncanny. Germany held first place not only in the +production of iron, but in that of dyes and chemicals. Men went +there from all parts of the world not only to trade but to acquire +knowledge. An ominous threat weighed on the Empire, namely the +constitution of the State itself, essentially militaristic and +bureaucratic. Not even in Russia, perhaps, were the reins of power +held in the hands of so few men as in Germany and Austria-Hungary. + +A few years before the World War started one of the leading European +statesmen told me that there was everything to be feared for the +future of Europe where some three hundred millions, the inhabitants +of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary, about two-thirds of the whole +continent, were governed in an almost irresponsible manner by a man +without will or intelligence, the Tsar of Russia; a madman without a +spark of genius, the German Kaiser, and an obstinate old man hedged in +by his ambition, the Emperor of Austria-Hungary. Not more than +thirty persons, he added, act as a controlling force on these three +irresponsible sovereigns, who might assume, on their own initiative, +the most terrible responsibilities. + +The magnificent spiritual gifts of the Germans gave them an Emanuel +Kant, the greatest thinker of modern times, Beethoven, their greatest +exponent of music, and Goethe, their greatest poet. But the imperial +Germany which came after the victory of 1870 had limited the spirit of +independence even in the manifestations of literature and art. There +still existed in Germany the most widely known men of science, the +best universities, the most up-to-date schools; but the clumsy +mechanism tended to crush rather than to encourage all personal +initiative. Great manifestations of art or thought are not possible +without the most ample spiritual liberty. Germany was the most highly +organized country from a scientific point of view, but at the same +time the country in which there was the least liberty for individual +initiative. It went on like a huge machine: that explains why it +almost stopped after being damaged by the war, and the whole life of +the nation was paralysed while there were very few individual impulses +of reaction. Imperial Germany has always been lacking in political +ability, perhaps not only through a temperamental failing, but chiefly +owing to her militaristic education. + +Before the War Germany beat her neighbours in all the branches of +human labour: in science, industry, banking, commerce, etc. But in one +thing she did not succeed, and succeeded still less after the War, +namely, in politics. When the German people was blessed with a +political genius, such as Frederick the Great or Bismarck, it achieved +the height of greatness and glory. But when the same people, after +obtaining the maximum of power, found on its path William II with his +mediocre collaborators, it ruined, by war, a colossal work, not only +to the great detriment of the country, but also to that of the victors +themselves, of whom it cannot be said with any amount of certainty, +so far as those of the Continent are concerned, whether they are the +winners or the losers, so great is the ruin threatening them, and so +vast the material and moral losses sustained. + +I have always felt the deepest aversion for William II. So few as ten +years ago he was still treated with the greatest sympathy both in +Europe and America. Even democracies regarded with ill-dissimulated +admiration the work of the Kaiser, who brought everywhere his voice, +his enthusiasm, his activity, to the service of Germany. As a matter +of fact, his speeches were poor in phraseology, a mere conglomerate +of violence, prejudice and ignorance. As no one believed in the +possibility of a war, no one troubled about it. But after the War +nothing has been more harmful to Germany than the memory of those ugly +speeches, unrelieved by any noble idea, and full of a clumsy vulgarity +draped in a would-be solemn and majestic garb. Some of his threatening +utterances, such as the address to the troops sailing for China in +order to quell the Boxer rebellion, the constant association in +all his speeches of the great idea of God, with the ravings of a +megalomaniac, the frenzied oratory in which he indulged at the +beginning of the War, have harmed Germany more than anything else. It +is possible to lose nobly; but to have lost a great war after having +won so many battles would not have harmed the German people if it +had not been represented abroad by the presumptuous vulgarity of the +Kaiser and of all the members of his entourage, who were more or less +guilty of the same attitude. + +Before the War Germany had everywhere attained first place in all +forms of activity, excepting, perhaps, in certain spiritual and +artistic manifestations. She admired herself too much and too openly, +but succeeded in affirming her magnificent expansion in a greatness +and prosperity without rival. + +By common accord Germany held first place. Probably this consciousness +of power, together with the somewhat brutal forms of the struggle for +industrial supremacy, as in the case of the iron industry, threw a +mysterious and threatening shadow over the granitic edifice of the +Empire. + +When I was Minister of Commerce in 1913 I received a deputation of +German business men who wished to confer with me on the Italian +customs regime. They spoke openly of the necessity of possessing +themselves of the iron mines of French Lorraine; they looked upon war +as an industrial fact. Germany had enough coal but not enough iron, +and the Press of the iron industry trumpeted forth loud notes of war. +After the conclusion of peace, when France, through a series of wholly +unexpected events, saw Germany prostrate at her feet and without an +army, the same phenomenon took place. The iron industry tends to +affirm itself in France; she has the iron and now she wants coal. +Should she succeed in getting it, German production would be doomed. +To deprive Germany of Upper Silesia would mean killing production +after having disorganized it at the very roots of its development. + +Seven years ago, or thereabouts, Germany was flourishing in an +unprecedented manner and presented the most favourable conditions for +developing. Her powerful demographic structure was almost unique. +Placed in the centre of Europe after having withstood the push of so +many peoples, she had attained an unrivalled economic position. + +Close to Germany the Austro-Hungarian Empire united together eleven +different peoples, not without difficulty, and this union tended to +the common elevation of all. The vast monarchy, the result of a slow +aggregation of violence and of administrative wisdom, represented, +perhaps, the most interesting historic attempt on the part of +different peoples to achieve a common rule and discipline on the same +territory. Having successfully weathered the most terrible financial +crises, and having healed in half a century the wounds of two great +wars which she had lost, Austria-Hungary lived in the effort of +holding together Germans, Magyars, Slavs and Italians without their +flying at each others' throats. Time will show how the effort of +Austria-Hungary has not been lost for civilization. + +Russia represented the largest empire which has ever been in +existence, and in spite of its defective political regime was daily +progressing. Perhaps for the first time in history an immense empire +of twenty-one millions and a half of square kilometres, eighty-four +times the size of Italy, almost three times as large as the United +States of America, was ruled by a single man. From the Baltic to +the Yellow Sea, from Finland to the Caucasus, one law and one rule +governed the most different peoples scattered over an immense +territory. The methods by which, after Peter the Great, the old Duchy +of Muscovy had been transformed into an empire, still lived in the +administration; they survive to-day in the Bolshevist organization, +which represents less a revolution than a hieratic and brutal form of +violence placed at the service of a political organization. + +The war between Russia and Japan had revealed all the perils of +a political organization exclusively based on central authority +represented by a few irresponsible men under the apparent rule of a +sovereign not gifted with the slightest trace of will power. + +Those who exalt nationalist sentiments and pin their faith on +imperialistic systems fail to realize that while the greatest push +towards the War came from countries living under a less liberal +regime, those very countries gave proof of the least power of +resistance. Modern war means the full exploitation of all the human +and economic resources of each belligerent country. The greater a +nation's wealth the greater is the possibility to hold out, and the +perfection of arms and weapons is in direct ratio with the degree +of technical progress attained. Moreover, the combatants and the +possibility of using them are in relation with the number of persons +who possess sufficient skill and instruction to direct the war. +Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States of America, +were able without any appreciable effort to improvise an enormous +number of officers for the War, transforming professional men, +engineers and technicians into officers. Russia, who did not have a +real industrial bourgeoisie nor a sufficient development of the middle +classes, was only able to furnish an enormous number of combatants, +but an insufficient organization from a technical and military point +of view, and a very limited number of officers. While on a peace +footing her army was the most numerous in the world, over one million +three hundred thousand men; when her officers began to fail Russia was +unable to replace them so rapidly as the proportion of nine or ten +times more than normal required by the War. + +Russia has always had a latent force of development; there is within +her a _vis inertiae_ equivalent to a mysterious energy of expansion. +Her birth-rate is higher than that of any other European country; +she does not progress, she increases. Her weight acts as a menace +to neighbouring countries, and as, by a mysterious historic law the +primitive migrations of peoples and the ancient invasions mostly +originated from the territories now occupied by Russia, the latter has +succeeded in amalgamating widely different peoples and in creating +unity where no affinity appeared possible. + +At any rate, although suffering from an excessively centralized +government and a form of constitution which did not allow the +development of popular energies nor a sufficient education of the +people, Russia was perhaps, half a century before the War, the +European country which, considering the difficulties in her path, had +accomplished most progress. + +European Russia, with her yearly excess of from one million and a +half to two million births over deaths, with the development of +her industries and the formation of important commercial centres, +progressed very rapidly and was about to become the pivot of European +politics. + +When it will be possible to examine carefully the diplomatic documents +of the War, and time will allow us to judge them calmly, it will be +seen that Russia's attitude was the real and underlying cause of the +world-conflict. She alone promoted and kept alive the agitations +in Serbia and of the Slavs in Austria; she alone in Germany's eyes +represented the peril of the future. Germany has never believed in a +French danger. She knew very well that France, single handed, could +never have withstood Germany, numerically so much her superior. Russia +was the only danger that Germany saw, and the continual increase of +the Russian army was her gravest preoccupation. Before the War, when +Italy was Germany's ally, the leading German statesmen with whom I +had occasion to discuss the situation did nothing but allude to the +Russian peril. It was known (and subsequent facts have amply proved +it) that the Tsar was absolutely devoid of will power, that he was led +and carried away by conflicting currents, and that his advisers were +for the most part favourable to the War. After the Japanese defeat the +militarist party felt keenly the need for just such a great military +revival and a brilliant _revanche_ in Europe. + +Possessing an enormous wealth of raw materials and an immense +territory, Russia represented Europe's great resource, her support for +the future. + +If the three great empires had attained enviable prosperity and +development in 1914, when the War burst, the three great western +democracies, Great Britain, France and Italy, had likewise progressed +immensely. + +Great Britain, proud of her "splendid isolation," and ruler of the +seas, traded in every country of the world. Having the vastest empire, +she was also financially the greatest creditor country: creditor of +America and Asia, of the new African states and of Australia. Perhaps +all this wealth had somewhat diminished the spirit of enterprise +before the War, and popular culture also suffered from this +unprecedented prosperity. There was not the spasmodic effort +noticeable in Germany, but a continuous and secure expansion, an +undisputed supremacy. Although somewhat preoccupied at Germany's +progress and regarding it as a peril for the future, Great Britain +attached more importance to the problems of her Empire, namely to her +internal constitution: like ancient Rome, she was a truly imperial +country in the security of her supremacy, in her calm, in her +forbearance. + +France continued patiently to accumulate wealth. She did not increase +her population, but ably added to her territory and her savings. +Threatened with the phenomenon known to political economists under the +name of "oliganthropy," or lack of men, she had founded a colonial +empire which may be regarded as the largest on earth. It is true that +the British colonies, even before the War, covered an area of thirty +million square kilometres, while France's colonial empire was slightly +over twelve millions. But it must be remembered that the British +colonies are not colonies in the real sense of the word, but consist +chiefly in Dominions which enjoy an almost complete autonomy. Canada +alone represents about one-third of the territories of the British +Dominions; Australia and New Zealand more than one-fourth, and +Australasia, the South African Union and Canada put together represent +more than two-thirds of the Empire, while India accounts for about +fifty per cent. of the missing third. After England, France was the +most important creditor country. Her astonishing capacity for saving +increased in proportion with her wealth. Without having Germany's +force of development and Great Britain's power of expansion, France +enjoyed a wonderful prosperity and her wealth was scattered all over +the world. + +Italy had arisen under the greatest difficulties, but in less than +fifty years of unity she progressed steadily. Having a territory +too small and mountainous for a population already overflowing and +constantly on the increase, Italy had been unable to exploit the +limited resources of her subsoil and had been forced to build up her +industries in conditions far less favourable than those of other +countries. Italy is perhaps the only nation which has succeeded in +forming her industries without having any coal of her own and very +little iron. But the acquisition of wealth, extremely difficult at +first, had gradually been rendered more easy by the improvement in +technical instruction and methods, for the most part borrowed from +Germany. On the eve of the War, after a period of thirty-three years, +the Triple Alliance had rendered the greatest services to Italy, fully +confirming Crispi's political intuition. France, with whom we had had +serious differences of opinion, especially after the Tunis affair, did +not dare to threaten Italy because the latter belonged to the Triple +Alliance, and for the same reason all ideas of a conflict with +Austria-Hungary had been set aside because of her forming part of the +"Triplice." + +During the Triple Alliance Italy built up all her industries, +she consolidated her national unity and prepared her economic +transformation, which was fraught with considerable difficulties. +Suddenly her sons spread all over the world, stimulated by the +fecundity of their race and by the narrowness of their fields. + +The greater States were surrounded by minor nations which had achieved +considerable wealth and great prosperity. + +Europe throughout her history had never been so rich, so far advanced +on the road to progress, above all so united and living in her unity; +as regards production and exchanges she was really a living unity. The +vital lymph was not limited to this or that country, but flowed with +an even current through the veins and arteries of the various nations +through the great organizations of capital and labour, promoting a +continuous and increasing solidarity among all the parties concerned. + +In fact, the idea of solidarity had greatly progressed: economic, +moral and spiritual solidarity. + +Moreover, the idea of peace, although threatened by military +oligarchies and by industrial corners, was firmly based on the +sentiments of the great majority. The strain of barbaric blood which +still ferments in many populations of Central Europe constituted--it +is true--a standing menace; but no one dreamt that the threat was +about to be followed, lightning like, by facts, and that we were on +the eve of a catastrophe. + +Europe had forgotten what hunger meant. Never had Europe had at her +disposal such abundant economic resources or a greater increase in +wealth. + +Wealth is not our final object in life. But a minimum of means is an +indispensable condition of life and happiness. Excessive wealth may +lead both to moral elevation and to depression and ruin. + +Europe had not only increased her wealth but developed the solidarity +of her interests. Europe is a small continent, about as large as +Canada or the United States of America. But her economic ties and +interests had been steadily on the increase. + +Now the development of her wealth meant for Europe the development of +her moral ideas and of her social life and aspirations. We admire a +country not so much for its wealth as for the works of civilization +which that wealth enables it to accomplish. + +Although peace be the aspiration of all peoples, even as physical +health is the aspiration of all living beings, there are wars which +cannot be avoided, as there are diseases which help us to overcome +an organic crisis to which we might otherwise succumb. War and peace +cannot be regarded as absolutely bad or absolutely good and desirable; +war is often waged in order to secure peace. In certain cases war is +not only a necessary condition of life but may be an indispensable +condition towards progress. + +We must consider and analyse the sentiments and psychological causes +which bring about a war. A war waged to redeem its independence by a +nation downtrodden by another nation is perfectly legitimate, even +from the point of view of abstract morality. A war which has for +its object the conquest of political or religious liberty cannot be +condemned even by the most confirmed pacificist. + +Taken as a whole, the wars fought in the nineteenth century, wars of +nationality, of independence, of unity, even colonial wars, were of a +character far less odious than that of the great conflict which has +devastated Europe and upset the economic conditions of the world. It +has not only been the greatest war in history, but in its consequences +it threatens to prove the worst war which has ravaged Europe in modern +times. + +After nearly every nineteenth-century war there has been a marked +revival of human activity. But this unprecedented clash of peoples +has reduced the energy of all; it has darkened the minds of men, and +spread the spirit of violence. + +Europe will be able to make up for her losses in lives and wealth. +Time heals even the most painful wounds. But one thing she has lost +which, if she does not succeed in recovering it, must necessarily lead +to her decline and fall: the spirit of solidarity. + +After the victory of the Entente the microbes of hate have developed +and flourished in special cultures, consisting of national egotism, +imperialism, and a mania for conquest and expansion. + +The peace treaties imposed on the vanquished are nothing but arms of +oppression. What more could Germany herself have done had she won the +War? Perhaps her terms would have been more lenient, certainly not +harder, as she would have understood that conditions such as we have +imposed on the losers are simply inapplicable. + +Three years have elapsed since the end of the War, two since the +conclusion of peace, nevertheless Europe has still more men under +arms than in pre-war times. The sentiment of nationality, twisted and +transformed into nationalism, aims at the subjugation and depression +of other peoples. No civilized co-existence is possible where each +nation proposes to harm instead of helping its neighbour. + +The spread of hatred among peoples has everywhere rendered more +difficult the internal relations between social classes and the +economic life of each country. Fearing a repetition of armed +conflicts, and owing to that spirit of unrest and intolerance +engendered everywhere by the War, workers are becoming every day more +exacting. They, too, claim their share of the spoils; they, too, +clamour for enemy indemnities. The same manifestations of hate, the +same violence of language, spread from people to people and from class +to class. + +This tremendous War, which the peoples of Europe have fought and +suffered, has not only bled the losers almost to death, but it has +deeply perturbed the very life and existence of the victors. It +has not produced a single manifestation of art or a single moral +affirmation. For the last seven years the universities of Europe +appear to be stricken with paralysis: not one outstanding personality +has been revealed. + +In almost every country the War has brought a sense of internal +dissolution: everywhere this disquieting phenomenon is more or less +noticeable. With the exception, perhaps, of Great Britain, whose +privileged insular situation, enormous mercantile navy and flourishing +trade in coal have enabled her to resume her pre-war economic +existence almost entirely, no country has emerged scatheless from +the War. The rates of exchange soar daily to fantastic heights, and +insuperable barriers to the commerce of European nations are being +created. People work less than they did in pre-war times, but +everywhere a tendency is noticeable to consume more. Austria, +Germany, Italy, France are not different phenomena, but different +manifestations and phases of the same phenomenon. + +Before the War Europe, in spite of her great sub-divisions, +represented a living economic whole. To-day there are not only +victors and vanquished, but currents of hate, ferments of violence, a +hungering after conquests, an unscrupulous cornering of raw materials +carried out brutally and almost ostentatiously in the name of the +rights of victory: a situation which renders production, let alone its +development and increase, utterly impossible. + +The treaty system as applied after the War has divided Europe into +two distinct parts: the losers, held under the military and economic +control of the victors, are expected to produce not only enough +for their own needs, but to provide a super-production in order to +indemnify the winners for all the losses and damages sustained on +account of the War. The victors, bound together in what is supposed to +be a permanent alliance for the protection of their common interests, +are supposed to exercise a military action of oppression and control +over the losers until the full payment of the indemnity. Another part +of Europe is in a state of revolutionary ferment, and the Entente +Powers have, by their attitude, rather tended to aggravate than to +improve the situation. + +Europe can only recover her peace of mind by remembering that the +War is over and done with. Unfortunately, the treaty system not only +prevents us from remembering that the War is finished, but determines +a state of permanent war. + +Clemenceau bluntly declared to the French Chamber that treaties were a +means of continuing the War. He was perfectly right, for war is being +waged more bitterly than ever and peace is as remote as it ever was. + +The problem with which modern statesmen are confronted is very simple: +can Europe continue in her decline without involving the ruin of +civilization? And is it possible to stop this process of decay without +finding some form of civil symbiosis which will ensure for all men a +more human mode of living? In the affirmative case what course should +we take, and is it presumable that there should be an immediate change +for the better in the situation, given the national and economic +interests now openly and bitterly in conflict? + +We have before us a problem, or rather a series of problems, which +call for impartiality and calm if a satisfactory solution is to be +arrived at. Perhaps if some fundamental truths were brought home to +the people, or, to be more exact, to the peoples now at loggerheads +with each other, a notion of the peril equally impending upon all +concerned and the conviction that an indefinite prolongation of the +present state of things is impossible, would prove decisive factors in +restoring a spirit of peace and in reviving that spirit of solidarity +which now appears spent or slumbering. + +But in the first place it is necessary to review the situation, such +as it is at the present moment: + +Firstly, Europe, which was the creditor of all other continents, has +now become their debtor. + +Secondly, her working capacity has greatly decreased, chiefly owing to +the negative change in her demographic structure. In pre-war times the +ancient continent supplied new continents and new territories with a +hardy race of pioneers, and held the record as regards population, +both adult and infantile, the prevalence of women over men being +especially noted by statisticians. All this has changed considerably +for the worse! + +Thirdly, on the losing nations, including Germany, which is generally +understood to be the most cultured nation in the world, the victors +have forced a peace which practically amounts to a continuation of +the War. The vanquished have had to give up their colonies, their +shipping, their credits abroad, and their transferable resources, +besides agreeing to the military and economic control of the Allies; +moreover, despite their desperate conditions, they are expected to +pay an indemnity, the amount of which, although hitherto only vaguely +mentioned, surpasses by its very absurdity all possibility of an even +remote settlement. + +Fourthly, considerable groups of ex-enemy peoples, chiefly Germans +and Magyars, have been assigned to populations of an inferior +civilization. + +Fifthly, as a result of this state of things, while Germany, Austria +and Bulgaria have practically no army at all and have submitted +without the slightest resistance to the most stringent forms of +military control, the victorious States have increased their armies +and fleets to proportions, which they did not possess before the War. + +Sixthly, Europe, cut up into thirty States, daily sees her buying +capacity decreasing and the rate of exchange rising menacingly against +her. + +Seventhly, the peace treaties are the most barefaced denial of all the +principles which the Entente Powers declared and proclaimed during the +War; not only so, but they are a fundamental negation of President +Wilson's famous fourteen points which were supposed to constitute a +solemn pledge and covenant, not only with the enemy, but with the +democracies of the whole world. + +Eighthly, the moral unrest deriving from these conditions has divided +among themselves the various Entente Powers: United States of America, +Great Britain, Italy and France, not only in their aims and policy, +but in their sentiments. The United States is anxious to get rid, +as far as possible, of European complications and responsibilities; +France follows methods with which Great Britain and Italy are not +wholly in sympathy, and it cannot be said that the three Great Powers +of Western Europe are in perfect harmony. There is still a great deal +of talk about common ends and ideals, and the necessity of applying +the treaties in perfect accord and harmony, but everybody is convinced +that to enforce the treaties, without attenuating or modifying their +terms, would mean the ruin of Europe and the collapse of the victors +after that of the vanquished. + +Ninthly, a keen contest of nationalisms, land-grabbing and cornering +of raw materials renders friendly relations between the thirty States +of Europe extremely difficult. The most characteristic examples of +nationalist violence have arisen out of the War, as in the case of +Poland and other newborn States, which pursue vain dreams of empire +while on the verge of dissolution through sheer lack of vital strength +and energy, and becoming every day more deeply engulfed in misery and +ruin. + +Finally, Continental Europe is on the eve of a series of fresh and +more violent wars among peoples, threatening to submerge civilization +unless some means be found to replace the present treaties, which are +based on the principle that it is necessary to continue the War, by a +system of friendly agreements whereby winners and losers are placed +on a footing of liberty and equality, and which, while laying on the +vanquished a weight they are able to bear, will liberate Europe from +the present spectacle of a continent divided into two camps, where one +is armed to the teeth and threatening, while the other, unarmed and +inoffensive, is forced to labour in slavish conditions under the +menace of a servitude even more severe. + + + + +II + +THE PEACE TREATIES AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR + + +The various peace treaties regulating the present territorial +situation bear the names of the localities near Paris in which they +were signed: Versailles, Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Trianon and Sèvres. +The first deals with Germany, the second with Austria, the third +with Hungary, and the fourth with Turkey. The Treaty of Neuilly, +comparatively far less important, concerns Bulgaria alone. But the one +fundamental and decisive treaty is the Treaty of Versailles, inasmuch +as it not only establishes as a recognized fact the partition of +Europe, but lays down the rules according to which all future treaties +are to be concluded. + +History has not on record a more colossal diplomatic feat than this +treaty, by which Europe has been neatly divided into two sections: +victors and vanquished; the former being authorized to exercise on the +latter complete control until the fulfilment of terms which, even at +an optimistic point valuation, would require at least thirty years to +materialize. + +Although it is a matter of recent history, we may as well call to mind +that the Entente Powers have always maintained that the War was +wanted and was imposed by Germany; that she alone, with her Allies, +repeatedly violated the rights of peoples; that the World War could +well be regarded as the last war, inasmuch as the triumph of the +Entente meant the triumph of democracy and a more human regime of +life, a society of nations rich in effects conducive to a lasting +peace. It was imperative to restore the principles of international +justice. In France, in England, in Italy, and later, even more +solemnly, in the United States, the same principles have been +proclaimed by Heads of States, by Parliaments and Governments. + +There are two documents laying down and fixing the principles which +the Entente Powers, on the eve of that event of decisive importance, +the entry of the United States into the War, bound themselves to +sustain and to carry on to triumph. The first is a statement by Briand +to the United States Ambassador, in the name of all the other Allies, +dated December 30, 1916. Briand speaks in the name of all "_les +gouvernements alliés unis pour la défense et la liberté des peuples_." + +Briand's second declaration, dated January 10, 1917, is even more +fundamentally important. It is a collective note of reply to President +Wilson, delivered in the name of all the Allies to the United States +Ambassador. The principles therein established are very clearly +enunciated. According to that document the Entente has no idea of +conquest and proposes mainly to achieve the following objects: + +1st. Restoration of Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro, with the +indemnities due to them. + +2nd. Evacuation of invaded territories in France, Russia and Rumania +and payment of just reparations. + +3rd. Reorganization of Europe with a permanent regime based on the +respect of nationalities and on the right of all countries, both great +and small, to complete security and freedom of economic development, +besides territorial conventions and international regulations capable +of guaranteeing land and sea frontiers from unjustified attacks. + +4th. Restitution of the provinces and territories taken in the past +from the Allies by force and against the wish of the inhabitants. + +5th. Liberation of Italians, Slavs, Rumanians and Czeko-Slovaks from +foreign rule. + +6th. Liberation of the peoples subjected to the tyranny of the Turks +and expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire, as being decidedly +extraneous to western civilization. + +7th. The intentions of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia in regard +to Poland are clearly indicated in the proclamation addressed to his +armies. + +8th. The Allies have never harboured the design of exterminating +German peoples nor of bringing about their political disappearance. + +At that time the autocratic form of government still prevailed in +Russia, and the Allies still considered themselves bound to Russia's +aspirations; moreover there existed, in regard to Italy, the +obligations established by the Pact of London. That is why in the +statements of the Entente Powers of Europe the restoration of +Montenegro is regarded as an obligation; mention is made of the +necessity of driving the Turks out of Europe in order to enable Russia +to seize Constantinople; and as to Poland, there are only vague +allusions, namely, the reference made to the Tsar's intentions as +outlined in his proclamation. + +The Entente has won the War, but Russia has collapsed under the +strain. Had victory been achieved without the fall of Russia, the +latter would have installed herself as the predominating Power in the +Mediterranean. On the other hand, to unite Dalmatia to Italy, while +separating her from Italy, according to the pact of London, by +assigning the territory of Fiume to Croatia, would have meant setting +all the forces of Slav irredentism against Italy. + +These considerations are of no practical value inasmuch as events have +taken another course. Nobody can say what would have happened if the +Carthagenians had conquered the Romans or if victory had remained with +Mithridates. Hypotheses are of but slight interest when truth follows +another direction. Nevertheless we cannot but repeat that it was a +great fortune for Europe that victory was not decided by Russia, and +that the decisive factor proved the United States. + +It is beyond all possible doubt that without the intervention of +the United States of America the War could not have been won by the +Entente. Although the admission may prove humiliating to the European +point of view, it is a fact which cannot be attenuated or disguised. +The United States threw into the balance the weight of its enormous +economic and technical resources, besides its enormous resources in +men. Although its dead only amount to fifty thousand, the United +States built up such a formidable human reserve as to deprive Germany +of all hopes of victory. The announcement of America's entry in the +War immediately crushed all Germany's power of resistance. Germany +felt that the struggle was no longer limited to Europe, and that every +effort was vain. + +The United States, besides giving to the War enormous quantities of +arms and money, had practically inexhaustible reserves of men to place +in the field against an enemy already exhausted and famine-stricken. + +War and battles are two very different things. Battles constitute an +essentially military fact, while war is an essentially political fact. +That explains why great leaders in war have always been first and +foremost great political leaders, namely, men accustomed to manage +other men and able to utilize them for their purposes. Alexander, +Julius Caesar, Napoleon, the three greatest military leaders produced +by Aryan civilization, were essentially political men. War is not only +a clash of arms, it is above all the most convenient exploitation of +men, of economic resources and of political situations. A battle is a +fact of a purely military nature. The Romans almost constantly placed +at the head of their armies personages of consular rank, who regarded +and conducted the war as a political enterprise. The rules of tactics +and strategy are perfectly useless if those who conduct the war fail +to utilize to the utmost all the means at their disposal. + +It cannot be denied that in the War Germany and Austria-Hungary scored +the greatest number of victories. For a long period they succeeded in +invading large tracts of enemy territory and in recovering those +parts of their own territory which had been invaded, besides always +maintaining the offensive. They won great battles at the cost of +enormous sacrifices in men and lives, and for a long time victory +appeared to shine on their arms. But they failed to understand that +from the day in which the violation of Belgium's neutrality determined +Great Britain's entry in the field the War, from a general point of +view, could be regarded as lost. As I have said, Germany is especially +lacking in political sense: after Bismarck, her statesmen have never +risen to the height of the situation. Even von Bülow, who appeared +to be one of the cleverest, never had a single manifestation of real +intelligence. + +The "banal" statements made about Belgium and the United States of +America by the men who directed Germany's war policy were precisely +the sort of thing most calculated to harm the people from whom they +came. What is decidedly lacking in Germany, while it abounds in +France, is a political class. Now a political class, consisting of +men of ability and culture, cannot but be the result of a democratic +education in all modern States, especially in those which have +achieved a high standard of civilization and development. It seems +almost incredible that Germany, despite all her culture, should +have tolerated the political dictatorship of the Kaiser and of his +accomplices. + +At the Conferences of Paris and London, in 1919 and 1920, I did all +that was in my power to prevent the trial of the Kaiser, and I am +convinced that my firm attitude in the matter succeeded in avoiding +it. Sound common sense saved us from floundering in one of the most +formidable blunders of the Treaty of Versailles. To hold one man +responsible for the whole War and to bring him to trial, his enemies +acting as judge and jury, would have been such a monstrous travesty +of justice as to provoke a moral revolt throughout the world. On the +other hand it was also a moral monstrosity, which would have deprived +the Treaty of Versailles of every shred of dignity. If the one +responsible for the War is the Kaiser, why does the Entente demand of +the German people such enormous indemnities, unprecedented in history? + +One of the men who has exercised the greatest influence on European +events during the last ten years, one of the most intelligent of +living statesmen, once told me that it was his opinion that the Kaiser +did not want the War, but neither did he wish to prevent it. + +Germany, although under protest, has been forced to accept the +statement of the Versailles Treaty to the effect that she is +responsible for the War and that she provoked it. The same charge has +been levelled at her in all the Entente States throughout the War. + +When our countries were engaged in the struggle, and we were at grips +with a dangerous enemy, it was our duty to keep up the _morale_ of our +people and to paint our adversaries in the darkest colours, laying on +their shoulders all the blame and responsibility of the War. But after +the great world conflict, now that Imperial Germany has fallen, it +would be absurd to maintain that the responsibility of the War is +solely and wholly attributable to Germany and that earlier than 1914 +in Europe there had not developed a state of things fatally destined +to culminate in a war. If Germany has the greatest responsibility, +that responsibility is shared more or less by all the countries of the +Entente. But while the Entente countries, in spite of their mistakes, +had the political sense always to invoke principles of right and +justice, the statesmen of Germany gave utterance to nothing but brutal +and vulgar statements, culminating in the deplorable mental and moral +expressions contained in the speeches, messages and telegrams of +William II. He was a perfect type of the _miles gloriosus_, not a +harmless but an irritating and dangerous boaster, who succeeded in +piling up more loathing and hatred against his country than the most +active and intelligently managed enemy propaganda could possibly have +done. + +If the issue of the War could be regarded as seriously jeopardized +by England's intervention, it was practically lost for the Central +Empires when the United States stepped in. + +America's decision definitely crippled Germany's resistance--and +not only for military, but for moral reasons. In all his messages +President Wilson had repeatedly declared that he wanted a peace +based on justice and equity, of which he outlined the fundamental +conditions; moreover, he stated that he had no quarrel with the +Germans themselves, but with the men who were at their head, and that +he did not wish to impose on the vanquished peace terms such as might +savour of oppression. + +President Wilson's ideas on the subject have been embodied in a +bulky volume.[1] Turning over the pages of this book now we have the +impression that it is a collection of literary essays by a man who had +his eye on posterity and assumed a pose most likely to attract the +admiration of generations as yet unborn. But when these same words +were uttered in the intervals of mighty battles, they fell on +expectant and anxious ears: they were regarded as a ray of light in +the fearsome darkness of uncertainty, and everybody listened to them, +not only because the President was the authorized exponent of a +great nation, of a powerful people, but because he represented an +inexhaustible source of vitality in the midst of the ravages of +violence and death. President Wilson's messages have done as much as +famine and cruel losses in the field to break the stubborn resistance +of the German people. If it was possible to obtain a just peace, why +go to the bitter end when defeat was manifestly inevitable? Obstinacy +is the backbone of war, and nothing undermines a nation's power of +resistance so much as doubt and faint-heartedness on the part of the +governing classes. + +[Footnote 1: "President Wilson's State Speeches and Addresses," New +York, 1918.] + +President Wilson, who said on January 2, 1917, that a peace without +victory was to be preferred ("It must be a peace without victory"), +and that "Right is more precious than peace," had also repeatedly +affirmed that "We have no quarrel with the German people." + +He only desired, as the exponent of a great democracy, a peace which +should be the expression of right and justice, evolving from the War a +League of Nations, the first milestone in a new era of civilization, a +league destined to bind together ex-belligerents and neutrals in one. + +In Germany, where the inhabitants had to bear the most cruel +privations, President Wilson's words, pronounced as a solemn pledge +before the whole world, had a most powerful effect on all classes +and greatly contributed towards the final breakdown of collective +resistance. Democratic minds saw a promise for the future, while +reactionaries welcomed any way out of their disastrous adventure. + +After America's entry in the War, President Wilson, on January 8, +1918, formulated the fourteen points of his programme regarding the +finalities of the War and the peace to be realized. + +It is here necessary to reproduce the original text of President +Wilson's message containing the fourteen points which constitute a +formal pledge undertaken by the democracy of America, not only towards +enemy peoples but towards all peoples of the world. + +These important statements from President Wilson's message have, +strangely enough, been reproduced either incompletely or in an utterly +mistaken form even in official documents and in books published by +statesmen who took a leading part in the Paris Conference. + +It is therefore advisable to reproduce the original text in full: + + 1st. Honest peace treaties, following loyal and honest + negotiations, after which secret international agreements will be + abolished and diplomacy will always proceed frankly and openly. + + 2nd. Full liberty of navigation on the high seas outside + territorial waters, both in peace and war, except when the seas be + closed wholly or in part by an international decision sanctioned + by international treaties. + + 3rd. Removal, as far as possible, of all economic barriers and + establishment of terms of equality in commerce among all nations + adhering to peace and associated to maintain it. + + 4th. Appropriate guarantees to be given and received for the + reduction of national armaments to a minimum compatible with + internal safety. + + 5th. A clear, open and absolutely impartial settlement of all + colonial rights, based on a rigorous observance of the principle + that, in the determination of all questions of sovereignty, the + interests of the populations shall bear equal weight with those of + the Government whose claims are to be determined. + + 6th. The evacuation of all Russian territories and a settlement + of all Russian questions such as to ensure the best and most + untrammelled co-operation of other nations of the world in + order to afford Russia a clear and precise opportunity for the + independent settlement of her autonomous political development and + of her national policy, promising her a cordial welcome in the + League of Nations under institutions of her own choice, and + besides a cordial welcome, help and assistance in all that she may + need and require. The treatment meted out to Russia by the sister + nations in the months to come must be a decisive proof of their + goodwill, of their understanding of her needs as apart from + their own interests, and of their intelligent and disinterested + sympathy. + + 7th. Belgium, as the whole world will agree, must be evacuated + and reconstructed without the slightest attempt at curtailing the + sovereign rights which she enjoys in common with other free + nations. Nothing will be more conducive to the re-establishment + of confidence and respect among nations for those laws which they + themselves have made for the regulation and observance of their + reciprocal relations. Without this salutary measure the whole + structure and validity of international law would be permanently + undermined. + + 8th. All French territories will be liberated, the invaded regions + reconstructed, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871, + in the question of Alsace-Lorraine, and which has jeopardized the + peace of the world for nearly half a century, must be made good, + so as to ensure a lasting peace in the general interest. + + 9th. The Italian frontier must be rectified on the basis of the + clearly recognized lines of nationality. + + 10th. The people of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations + we wish to see safeguarded and maintained, should come to an + agreement as to the best way of attaining their autonomous + development. + + 11th. Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro are to be evacuated and + occupied territories restored: a free and secure access to the + sea for Serbia; mutual relations between the Balkan States to be + determined on a friendly basis by a Council, following the lines + of friendship and nationality traced by tradition and history; the + political and economic integrity of the various Balkan States to + be guaranteed. + + 12th. A certain degree of sovereignty must be assigned to that + part of the Ottoman Empire which is Turkish; but the other + nationalities now under the Turkish regime should have the + assurance of an independent existence and of an absolute and + undisturbed opportunity to develop their autonomy; moreover + the Dardanelles should be permanently open to the shipping and + commerce of all nations under international guarantees. + + 13th. An independent Polish State should be founded, comprising + all territories inhabited by peoples of undoubtedly Polish + nationality, with a free and secure access to the sea and its + political and economic independence and territorial integrity + guaranteed by international agreements. + + 14th. A League of Nations must be formed with special pacts and + for the sole scope of ensuring the reciprocal guarantees of + political independence and of territorial integrity, in equal + measure both for large and small States. + +The Peace Treaty as outlined by Wilson would really have brought about +a just peace; but we shall see how the actual result proved quite the +reverse of what constituted a solemn pledge of the American people and +of the Entente Powers. + +On February 11, 1918, President Wilson confirmed before Congress that +all territorial readjustments were to be made in the interest and for +the advantage of the populations concerned, not merely as a bargain +between rival States, and that there were not to be indemnities, +annexations or punitive exactions of any kind. + +On September 27, 1918, just on the eve of the armistice, when German +resistance was already shaken almost to breaking point, President +Wilson gave it the _coup de grâce_ by his message on the _post-bellum_ +economic settlement. No special or separate interest of any single +nation or group of nations was to be taken as the basis of any +settlement which did not concern the common interest of all; there +were not to be any leagues or alliances, or special pacts or ententes +within the great family of the society of nations; economic deals and +corners of an egotistical nature were to be forbidden, as also all +forms of boycotting, with the exception of those applied in punishment +to the countries transgressing the rules of good fellowship; all +international treaties and agreements of every kind were to be +published in their entirety to the whole world. + +It was a magnificent programme of world policy. Not only would it have +meant peace after war, but a peace calculated to heal the deep wounds +of Europe and to renovate the economic status of nations. + +On the basis of these principles, which constituted a solemn pledge, +Germany, worn out by famine and even more by increasing internal +unrest, demanded peace. + +According to President Wilson's clear statements, made not only in +the name of the United States but in that of the whole Entente, peace +should therefore have been based on justice, the relations between +winners and losers in a society of nations being exclusively inspired +by mutual trust. + +There were no longer to be huge standing armies, neither on the +part of the ex-Central Empires or on that of the victorious States; +adequate guarantees were to be _given and received_ for the reduction +of armies to the minimum necessary for internal defence; removal of +all economic barriers; absolute freedom of the seas; reorganization +of the colonies based on the development of the peoples directly +concerned; abolition of secret diplomacy, etc. + +As to the duties of the vanquished, besides evacuating the occupied +territories, they were to reconstruct Belgium, to restore to France +the territories taken in 1871; to restore all the territories +belonging to Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro, giving Serbia a free and +secure access to the sea; to constitute a free Poland with territories +_undoubtedly Polish_ to which _there might_ be granted a free and +secure access to the sea. Poland, founded on secure ethnical bases, +far from being a military State, was to be an element of peace, and +her political and economic independence and territorial integrity were +to have been guaranteed by an international agreement. + +After the rectification of the Italian frontier according to the +principles of nationality, the peoples of Austria-Hungary were to +agree on the free opportunity of their autonomous development. In +other terms, each people could freely choose autonomy or throw in its +lot with some other State. After giving a certain sovereignty to the +Turkish populations of the Ottoman Empire the other nationalities were +to be allowed to develop autonomously, and the free navigation of the +Dardanelles was to be internationally guaranteed. + +These principles announced by President Wilson, and already proclaimed +in part by the Entente Powers when they stoutly affirmed that they +were fighting for right, for democracy and for peace, did not +constitute a concession but a duty towards the enemy. In each of the +losing countries, in Germany as in Austria-Hungary, the democratic +groups contrary to the War, and those even more numerous which had +accepted the War as in a momentary intoxication, when they exerted +themselves for the triumph of peace, had counted on the statements, or +rather on the solemn promises which American democracy had made not +only in the name of the United States but in that of all the Entente +Powers. + +Let us now try to sum up the terms imposed on Germany and the other +losing countries by the treaty of June 28, 1919. The treaty, it is +true, was concluded between the allied and associated countries and +Germany, but it also concerns the very existence of other countries +such as Austria-Hungary, Russia, etc.: + + +I.--TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL CLAUSES + +Until the payment of an indemnity the amount of which is as yet not +definitely stated, Germany loses the fundamental characters of a +sovereign state. Not only part of her territory remains under the +occupation of the ex-enemy troops for a period of fifteen years but a +whole series of controls is established, military, administrative, on +transports, etc. The Commission for Reparations is empowered to effect +all the changes it thinks fit in the laws and regulations of the +German State, besides applying sanctions of a military and economic +nature in the event of violations of the clauses placed under its +control (Art. 240, 241). + +The allied and associated governments declare and Germany recognizes +that Germany and her allies are solely responsible, being the direct +cause thereof, for all the losses and damages suffered by the allied +and associated governments and their subjects as a result of the War, +which was thrust upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies +(Art. 231). Consequently the resources of Germany (and by the +other treaties those of her allies as well) are destined, even if +insufficient, to ensure full reparation for all losses and damages +(Art. 232). + +The allied and associated Powers place in a state of public accusation +William II of Hohenzollern, ex-German Emperor, charging him with +the gravest offences against international morality and the sacred +authority of treaties. A special tribunal composed of representatives +of the five great Entente Powers shall try him and will have the +right of determining his punishment (Art. 227). The German Government +likewise recognizes the right of the allied and associated Powers to +try in their courts of justice the persons (and more especially the +officers) accused of having committed acts contrary to the rules and +customs of war. + +Restitution of Alsace and Lorraine to France without any obligation +on the latter's part, not even the corresponding quota of public debt +(Art. 51 _et seq_.). + +The treaties of April 19, 1839, are abolished, so that Belgium, being +no longer neutral, may become allied to France (Art. 31); attribution +to Belgium of the territories of Eupen, Malmédy and Moresnet. + +Abolition of all the treaties which established political and economic +bonds between Germany and Luxemburg (Art. 40). + +Annulment of all the treaties concluded by Germany during the War. + +German-Austria, reduced to a little State of hardly more than +6,000,000 inhabitants, about one-third of whom live in the capital +(Art. 80), cannot become united to Germany without the consent of the +Society of Nations, and is not allowed to participate in the affairs +of another nation, namely of Germany, before being admitted to the +League of Nations (Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Art. 88). As the +consent of the League of Nations must be unanimous, a contrary vote on +the part of France would be sufficient to prevent German-Austria from +becoming united to Germany. + +Attribution of North Schleswig to Denmark (Art. 109). + +Creation of the Czeko-Slovak State (Art. 87), which comprises the +autonomous territory of the Ruthenians south of the Carpathians, +Germany abandoning in favour of the new State all her rights and +claims on that part of Silesia mentioned in Art. 83. + +Creation of the State of Poland (Art. 87), to whom Posnania and part +of Western Prussia are made over. Upper Silesia is to decide by a +plebiscite (Art. 88) whether it desires to be united to Germany or to +Poland. The latter, even without Upper Silesia, becomes a State of +31,000,000 inhabitants, with about fifty per cent. of the population +non-Polish, including very numerous groups of Germans. + +Creation of the Free State of Danzig within the limits of Art. 100, +under the protection of the League of Nations. The city is a Free +City, but enclosed within the Polish Customs House frontiers, and +Poland has full control of the river and of the railway system. +Poland, moreover, has charge of the foreign affairs of the Free City +of Danzig and undertakes to protect its subjects abroad. + +Surrender to the victors, or, to be more precise, almost exclusively +to Great Britain and France, of all the German colonies (Art. 119 and +127). The formula (Art. 119) is that Germany renounces in favour of +the leading allied and associated Powers all her territories beyond +the seas. Great Britain has secured an important share, but so has +France, receiving that part of Congo ceded in 1911, four-fifths of the +Cameroons and of Togoland. + +Abandonment of all rights and claims in China, Siam, Liberia, Morocco, +Egypt, Turkey, Bulgaria and Shantung (Art. 128 and 158). + +Creation of a League of Nations to the exclusion, practically, of +Germany and of the other losing countries, with the result that the +League is nothing but a juridical completion of the Commission of +Reparations. In all of the various treaties, the pact of the League of +Nations, the Covenant, left standing among the collapse of President +Wilson's other ideas and proposals, is given precedence over all other +clauses. + + +II.--MILITARY CLAUSES AND GUARANTEES + +Germany is obliged, and with her, by the subsequent treaties, all the +other losing countries, to surrender her arms and to reduce her troops +to the minimum necessary for internal defence (Art. 159 and 213). The +German army has no General Staff; its soldiers are mercenaries who +enlist for a period of ten years; it cannot be composed of more than +seven infantry and three cavalry divisions, not exceeding 100,000 +men including officers: no staff, no military aviation, no heavy +artillery. The number of gendarmes and of local police can only be +increased proportionately with the increase of the population. The +maximum of artillery allowed is limited to the requirements of +internal defence. Germany is strictly forbidden to import arms, +ammunition and war material of any kind or description. Conscription +is abolished, and officers must remain with the colours at least till +they have attained the age of forty-five. No institute of science or +culture is allowed to take an interest in military questions. All +fortifications included in a line traced fifty kilometres to the east +of the Rhine are to be destroyed, and on no account may German troops +cross the said line. + +Destruction of Heligoland and of the fortresses of the Kiel Canal. + +Destruction under the supervision of the allied commissions of control +of all tanks, flying apparatus, heavy and field artillery, namely +35,000 guns, 160,000 machine guns, 2,700,000 rifles, besides the tools +and machinery necessary for their manufacture. Destruction of all +arsenals. Destruction of the German fleet, which must be limited to +the proportions mentioned in Art. 181. + +Creation of inter-allied military commissions of control to supervise +and enforce the carrying out of the military and naval clauses, at the +expense of Germany and with the right to install themselves in the +seat of the central government. + +Occupation as a guarantee, for a period of fifteen years after the +application of the treaty, of the bridgeheads and of the territories +now occupied west of the Rhine (Art. 428 and 432). If, however, the +Commission of Reparations finds that Germany refuses wholly or in part +to fulfil her treaty obligations, the zones specified in Article +421 will be immediately occupied by the troops of the allied and +associated Powers. + + +III.--FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CLAUSES + +The principle being recognized that Germany alone is responsible for +the War which she willed and which she imposed on the rest of the +world, Germany is bound to give complete and full reparation within +the limits specified by Art. 232. The amount of the damages for which +reparation is due will be fixed by the Commission of Reparations, +consisting of the representatives of the winning countries. + +The coal fields of the Saar are to be handed over, in entire and +absolute ownership, free of all liens and obligations, to France, in +compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in the north of +France. Before the War, in 1913, the output of the Saar basin amounted +to 17,000,000 tons. The Saar is incorporated in the French douane +system and after fifteen years will be submitted to a plebiscite. + +Germany may not charge heavier duties on imports from allied countries +than on those from any other country. This treatment of the most +favoured nation to be extended to all allied and associated States +does not imply the obligation of reciprocity (Art. 264). A similar +limitation is placed on exports, on which no special duty may be +levied. + +Exports from Alsace and Lorraine into Germany to be exempt from duty, +without right of reciprocity (Art. 268). + +Germany delivers to the Allies all the steamers of her mercantile +fleet of over I,600 tons, half of those between 1,000 and I,600 tons, +and one-fourth of her fishing vessels. Moreover, she binds herself to +build at the request of the Allies every year, and for a period of +five years, 200,000 tons of shipping, as directed by the Allies, and +the value of the new constructions will be credited to her by the +Commission of Reparations (Part viii, 3). + +Besides giving up all her colonies, Germany surrenders all her rights +and claims on her possessions beyond the seas (Art. 119), and all +the contracts and conventions in favour of German subjects for the +construction and exploiting of public works, which will be considered +as part payment of the reparations due. The private property of +Germans in the colonies, as also the right of Germans to live and +work there, come under the free jurisdiction of the victorious States +occupying the colonies, and which reserve unto themselves the right to +confiscate and liquidate all property and claims belonging to Germans +(Art. 121 and 297). + +The private property of German citizens residing in Alsace-Lorraine is +subject to the same treatment as that of residents in the ex-German +colonies. The French Government may confiscate without granting any +compensation the private property of Germans and of German concerns in +Alsace-Lorraine, and the sums thus derived will be credited towards +the partial settlement of eventual French claims (Art. 53 and 74). +The property of the State and of local bodies is likewise surrendered +without any compensation whatever. The allies and associates reserve +the right to seize and liquidate all property, claims and interests +belonging, at the date of the ratification of the treaty, to +German citizens or to firms controlled by them, situated in their +territories, colonies, possessions and protectorates, including the +territories surrendered in accordance with the clauses of the treaty +(Art. 217). + +Germany loses everything with the exception of her territory: +colonies, possessions, rights, commercial investments, etc. + +After giving the Saar coal fields in perpetual ownership to France in +reparation of the temporary damages suffered by the French coal mines, +the treaty goes on to establish the best ways and means to deprive +Germany, in the largest measure possible, of her coal and her iron. +The Saar coal fields have been handed over to France absolutely, while +the war damages of the French mines have been repaired or can be +repaired in a few years. Upper Silesia being subject to the plebiscite +with the occupation of the allied troops, Germany must have lost +several of her most important coal fields had the plebiscite gone +against her. + +Germany is forced to deliver in part reparation to France 7,000,000 +tons of coal a year for ten years, besides a quantity of coal equal +to the yearly _ante-bellum_ output of the coal mines of the North of +France and of the Pas-de-Calais, which were entirely destroyed during +the War; the said quantity not to exceed 20,000,000 tons in the first +five years and 8,000,000 tons during the five succeeding years (Part +viii, 5). Moreover, Germany must give 8,000,000 tons to Belgium for a +period of ten years, and to Italy a quantity of coal which, commencing +at 4,500,000 tons for the year 1919-1920, reaches the figure of +8,500,000 tons in the five years after 1923-1924. To Luxemburg Germany +must provide coal in the same average quantity as in pre-war times. +Altogether Germany is compelled to hand over to the winners as part +reparation about 25,000,000 tons of coal a year. + +For three years Polish exports to Germany, and for five years exports +from Luxemburg into Germany, will be free of all duty, without right +of reciprocity (Art. 268). + +The Allies have the right to adopt, on the territories left of the +Rhine and occupied by their troops, a special customs regime both as +regards imports and exports (Art. 270). + +After having surrendered, as per Par. 7 of the armistice terms, +5,000 locomotives and 150,000 trucks and carriages with all their +accessories and fittings (Art. 250), Germany must hand over the +railway systems of the territories she has lost, with all the rolling +stock in a good state of preservation, and this measure applies even +to Prussian Poland occupied by Germany during the War (Art. 371). + +The German transport system is placed under control, and the +administration of the Elbe, the Rhine, the Oder, the Danube, owing to +the fact that they pass through more than one state and give access +to the sea, is entrusted to inter-allied commissions. In all these +commissions Germany is represented by a small minority. France +and Great Britain, who are not directly interested, have numerous +representatives on all the important river commissions, while on the +Rhine commission Germany has only four votes out of nineteen (Art. 382 +to 337). A privilege of first degree is established on all production +and resources of the German States to ensure the payment of +reparations and other charges specified by the treaty (Art. 248). + +The total cost of the allied and associated armies will be borne by +Germany, including the upkeep of men and beasts, pay and lodging, +heating, clothing, etc., and even veterinary services, motor lorries +and automobiles. All these expenses must be reimbursed in gold marks +(Art. 249). + +The privilege, as per Art. 248 of the treaty, is to be applied in the +following order: + +(a) Reimbursement of expenses for the armies of occupation during +the armistice and after the peace treaty. + +(b) Payment of the reparations as established by the treaty or +treaties or supplementary conventions. + +(c) Other expenses deriving from the armistice terms, from the peace +treaty and from other supplementary terms and conventions (Art. 251). +Restitution, on the basis of an estimate presented sixty days after +the application of the treaty by the Commission of Reparations, of the +live stock stolen or destroyed by the Germans and necessary for the +reconstruction of the invaded countries, with the right to exact from +Germany, as part reparations, the delivery of machinery, heating +apparatus, furniture, etc. + +Reimbursement to Belgium of all the sums loaned to her by the allied +and associated Powers during the War. + +Compensation for the losses and damages sustained by the civilian +population of the allied and associated Powers during the period in +which they were at war with Germany (Art. 232 and Part viii, I). + +Payment, during the first two years, of twenty milliard marks in +gold or by the delivery of goods, shipping, etc., on account of +compensation (Art. 235). + +The reparations owed by Germany concern chiefly: + +1st. Damages and loss of life and property sustained by the civilian +population. + +2nd. Damages sustained by civilian victims of cruelty, violence or +ill-treatment. + +3rd. Damages caused on occupied or invaded territories. + +4th. Damages through cruelty to and ill-treatment of prisoners of war. + +5th. Pensions and compensations of all kinds paid by the allied and +associated Powers to the military victims of the War and to their +families. + +6th. Subsidies paid by the allied and associated Powers to the +families and other dependents of men having served in the army, etc., +etc. (Part viii, I). These expenses, which have been calculated +at varying figures, commencing from 350 billions, have undergone +considerable fluctuations. + +I have given the general lines of the Treaty of Versailles. + +The other treaties, far less important, inasmuch as the situation +of all the losing countries was already well defined, especially as +regards territorial questions, by the Treaty of Versailles, are cast +in the same mould and contain no essential variation. + +Now these treaties constitute an absolutely new fact, and no one can +affirm that the Treaty of Versailles derives even remotely from the +declarations of the Entente and from Wilson's solemn pledges uttered +in the name of those who took part in the War. + +If the terms of the armistice were deeply in contrast with the pledges +to which the Entente Powers had bound themselves before the whole +world, the Treaty of Versailles and the other treaties deriving +therefrom are a deliberate negation of all that had been promised, +amounting to a debt of honour, and which had contributed much more +powerfully towards the defeat of the enemy than the entry in the field +of many fresh divisions. + +In the state of extreme exhaustion in which both conquerors and losers +found themselves in 1918, in the terrible suffering of the Germanic +group of belligerents, deprived for four years of sufficient +nourishment and of the most elementary necessaries of life, in the +moral collapse which had taken the place of boasting and temerity, the +words of Wilson, who pledged himself to a just peace and established +its terms, proclaiming them to the world, had completely broken down +whatever force of resistance there still remained. They were the most +powerful instruments of victory, and if not the essential cause, +certainly not the least important among the causes which brought about +the collapse of the Central Empires. + +Germany had been deeply hit by the armistice. Obliged to hand over +immediately 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 railway trucks and carriages +at the very time when she had to demobilize, during the first months +she found her traffic almost completely paralysed. + +Every war brings virulent germs of revolution in the vanquished +countries. The war of 1870 gave France the impulsive manifestations of +_La Commune_ in exactly the same manner as war gave rise in Germany +during the first months after the armistice to a violent revolutionary +crisis, overcome not without difficulty and still representing a grave +menace. + +Forced to surrender immediately a large quantity of live stock, to +demobilize when the best part of her railway material had gone, still +hampered by the blockade, Germany, against the interest of the Allies +themselves, has been obliged to sacrifice her exchange because, in the +absence of sufficient help, she has had to buy the most indispensable +foodstuffs in neutral countries. Her paper currency, which at the +end of 1918 amounted to twenty-two milliard marks, not excessive as +compared with that of other countries, immediately increased with a +growing crescendo till it reached, in a very short time, the figure of +eighty-eight milliards, thus rendering from the very first the payment +of indemnities in gold extremely difficult. + +The most skilled men have been thrust into an absolute impossibility +of producing. To have deprived Germany of her merchant fleet, built up +with so much care, means to have deprived the freight market of sixty +thousand of the most skilled, intelligent and hard-working seamen. + +But what Germany has lost as a result of the treaty surpasses all +imagination and can only be regarded as a sentence of ruin and decay +voluntarily passed over a whole people. + +Germany, without taking into account the countries subject to +plebiscite, has lost 7.5 per cent. of her population. Should the +plebiscites prove unfavourable to her, or, as the tendency seems to +be, should these plebiscites be disregarded, Germany would lose 13.5 +per cent. of her population. Purely German territories have been +forcibly wrenched from her. What has been done in the case of the +Saar has no precedents in modern history. It is a country of 650,000 +inhabitants of whom not even one hundred are French, a country which +has been German for a thousand years, and which was temporarily +occupied by France for purely military reasons. In spite of these +facts, however, not only have the coal fields of the Saar been +assigned in perpetuity to France as compensation for the damages +caused to the French mines in the North, but the territory of the Saar +forms part of the French customs regime and will be subjected after +fifteen years to a plebiscite, when such a necessity is absolutely +incomprehensible, as the population is purely German and has never +in any form or manner expressed the intention of changing its +nationality. + +The ebb and flow of peoples in Europe during the long war of +nationalities has often changed the situation of frontier countries. +Sometimes it may still be regarded as a necessity to include small +groups of alien race and language in different states in order to +ensure strategically safe frontiers. But, with the exception of the +necessity for self-defence, there is nothing to justify what has been +done to the detriment of Germany. + +Wilson had only said that France should receive compensation for +the wrong suffered in 1871 and that Belgium should be evacuated and +reconstructed. What had been destroyed was to have been built up +again; but no one had ever thought during the War of handing over to +Belgium a part, however small, of German territory or of surrendering +predominantly and purely German territories to Poland. + +The German colonies covered an area of nearly 3,000,000 square +kilometres; they had reached an admirable degree of development and +were managed with the greatest skill and ability. They represented an +enormous value; nevertheless they have been assigned to France, Great +Britain and in minor proportion to Japan, without figuring at all in +the reparations account. + +It is calculated that as a result of the treaty, owing to the loss +of a considerable percentage of her agricultural area, Germany is +twenty-five per cent. the poorer in regard to the production of +cereals and potatoes and ten to twelve per cent. in regard to the +breeding of live stock. + +The restitution of Alsace-Lorraine (the only formal claim advanced by +the Entente in its war programme) has deprived Germany of the bulk of +her iron-ore production. In 1913 Germany could count on 21,000,000 +tons of iron from Lorraine, 7,000,000 from Luxemburg, 138,000 from +Upper Silesia and 7,344 from the rest of her territory. This means +that Germany is reduced to only 20.41 per cent. of her pre-war wealth +in iron ore. + +In 1913 the Saar district represented 8.95 per cent. of the total +production of coal, and Upper Silesia 22.85 per cent. + +Having lost about eighty per cent. of her iron ore and large stocks +of coal, while her production is severely handicapped, Germany, +completely disorganized abroad after the suppression of all economic +equilibrium, is condemned to look on helplessly while the very sources +of her national wealth dry up and cease to flow. In order to form a +correct estimate of the facts we must hold in mind that one-fifth of +Germany's total exports before the War consisted of iron and of tools +and machinery mostly manufactured with German iron. + +If we now consider the fourteen points of President Wilson, accepted +by the Entente as a peace programme, comparing the actual results +obtained by the Treaty of Versailles, we are faced with the following +situation: + +1. "_After loyal peace negotiations and the conclusion and signing +of peace treaties, secret diplomatic agreements must be regarded as +abolished_," says Wilson. On the contrary, secret peace negotiations +have been protracted for more than six months, and no hearing was even +granted to the German delegates who wished to expose their views. By a +system of treaties France has created a military alliance with Belgium +and Poland, thus completely cornering Germany. + +2. _Absolute freedom of the sea beyond territorial waters_. Nothing, +as a matter of fact, has been changed from the pre-war state of +things; with the difference that the losers have had to surrender +their mercantile fleets and are therefore no longer directly +interested in the question. + +3. _Removal of all economic barriers and equality of trade +conditions_. The treaty imposes on Germany terms without reciprocity, +and almost all Entente countries have already adopted protectionist +and prohibitive tariffs. + +4. _Adequate guarantees to be given and received for the reduction of +armaments to a minimum compatible with home defence_. The treaties +have compelled the vanquished countries to destroy or to surrender +their navies, and have reduced the standing armies of Germany to +100,000 men, including officers, of Bulgaria to 23,000, of Austria to +30,000 (in reality only 21,000), of Hungary to 35,000. The conquering +states, on the other hand, maintain enormous armies numerically +superior to those which they had before the War. France, Belgium +and Poland have between them about 1,400,000 men with the colours. +Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria altogether have only 179,000 +men under arms, while Rumania alone has 206,000 and Poland more than +450,000 men. + +5. _Loyal and straightforward settlement of colonial rights and +claims, based chiefly on the advantage of the peoples directly +concerned_. All her colonies have been taken from Germany, who needed +them more than any other country of continental Europe, having a +density of population of 123 inhabitants per square kilometre (Italy +has a density of 133 per square kilometre) while France has 74, Spain +40, and European Russia before the War had only 24. + +6. _Evacuation of all Russian territories and cordial co-operation for +the reconstruction and development of Russia_. For a long time the +Entente has given its support to the military ventures of Koltchak, +Judenic, Denikin and Wrangel, all men of the old regime. + +7. _Evacuation and reconstruction of Belgium_. This has been done, but +to Belgium have been assigned territories which she never dreamt of +claiming before the War. + +8. _Liberation of French territories, reconstruction of invaded +regions and restitution of Alsace-Lorraine to France in respect of +the territories taken from her in 1871_. France occupies a dominating +position in the Saar which constitutes an absolute denial of the +principle of nationality. + +9. _Rectification of the Italian frontier, according to clearly +defined lines of nationality_. As these lines have never been clearly +defined or recognized, the solution arrived at has been distasteful +both to the Italians and to their neighbours. + +10. _The peoples of Austria-Hungary to be left free to unite together +or to form autonomous states in the manner best suited to their +development_. As a matter of fact the treaties have taken the greatest +possible number of Germans from Austria and of Magyars from Hungary in +order to hand them over to Poland, to Czeko-Slovakia, to Rumania and +to Jugo-Slavia, namely to populations for the most part inferior to +the Germans. + +11. _Evacuation of Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro_. This has been +effected, but whereas the Entente Powers have always proclaimed their +fundamental duty for the reconstruction of Montenegro, they all +contributed to its disappearance, chiefly at the instigation of +France. + +12. _A limited sovereignty to the Turkish parts of the Ottoman Empire, +liberation of other nationalities and freedom of navigation in the +Dardanelles placed under international guarantees_. What really +happened was that the Entente Powers immediately tried to possess +themselves of Asia Minor; but events rendered it necessary to adopt +a regime of mandates because direct sovereignty would have been too +perilous an experiment. A sense of deep perturbation and unrest +pervades the whole of Islam. + +13. _An independent Polish state with populations undoubtedly Polish +to be founded as a neutral State with a free and secure outlet to the +sea and whose integrity is to be guaranteed by international accords_. +In reality a Polish state has been formed with populations undoubtedly +non-Polish, having a markedly military character and aiming at further +expansion in Ukranian and German territory. It has a population of +31,000,000 inhabitants while it should not exceed 18,000,000, and +proposes to isolate Russia from Germany. Moreover the Free State of +Danzig, practically dependent from Poland, constitutes a standing +menace to Germany. + +14. _Foundation of the League of Nations for the sole purpose +of re-establishing order among nations, and laying the basis of +reciprocal guarantees of territorial integrity and political +independence for all states, both great and small_. After more than +two years have elapsed since the conclusion of peace and three since +the armistice the League of Nations is still nothing but a holy +alliance the object of which is to guarantee the privileges of the +conquerors. After the vote of the Senate, deserving of all praise +from every point of view, the United States does not form part of the +League nor do the losing countries, including Germany. + +It is therefore obvious that the most solemn pledges on which peace +was based have not been maintained; the noble declarations made by the +Entente during the War have been forgotten; forgotten all the solemn +collective pledges; forgotten and disregarded Wilson's proclamations +which, without being real contracts or treaties, were something far +more solemn and binding, a pledge taken before the whole world at its +most tragic hour to give the enemy a guarantee of justice. + +Without expressing any opinion on the treaties it cannot be denied +that the manner in which they have been applied has been even worse. +For the first time in civilized Europe, not during the War, when +everything was permissible in the supreme interests of defence, but +now that the War is over, the Entente Powers, though maintaining +armies more numerous than ever, for which the vanquished must pay, +have occupied German territories, inhabited by the most cultured, +progressive and technically advanced populations in the world, as an +insult and a slight, with coloured troops, men from darkest and most +barbarous Africa, to act as defenders of the rights of civilization +and to maintain the law and order of democracy. + + + + +III + +THE PEACE TREATIES--THEIR ORIGIN AND AIMS + + +How, after the solemn pledges undertaken during the War, a peace could +have been concluded which practically negatives all the principles +professed during the War and all the obligations entered into, is +easily explained when the progress of events is noted from the autumn +of 1918 to the end of the spring of 1919. I took no direct part in +those events, as I had no share in the government of Italy from +January to the end of June, 1919, the period during which the Treaties +of Versailles and Saint-Germain-en-Laye were being prepared. The +Orlando Ministry was resigning when the Treaty of Versailles was drawn +up for signature, and the situation which confronted the Ministry +of which I was head was clearly defined. Nevertheless I asked the +Minister of Foreign Affairs and the delegates of the preceding Cabinet +to put their signatures to it. Signing was a necessity, and it fell to +me later on to put my signature to the ratification. + +The Treaty of Versailles and those which have followed with Austria, +Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey have been validly signed, and they pledge +the good faith of the countries which have signed them. But in the +application of them there is need of great breadth of view; there is +need of dispassionate study to see if they can be maintained, if the +fulfilment of the impossible or unjust conditions demanded of the +conquered countries will not do more harm to the conquerors, will not, +in point of actual fact, pave the way to their ruin. + +If there is one thing, Lloyd George has said, which will never be +forgotten or forgiven, it is arrogance and injustice in the hour +of triumph. We have never tired of saying that Germany is the most +barbarous among civilized countries, that under her civilization +is hidden all the barbarism of mediaeval times, that she puts into +practice the doctrine of might over right. At the present moment it is +our duty to ask ourselves if something of the principles which we have +for so long been attributing to Germany has not passed over to the +other side, if in our own hearts there is not a bitterness of hatred +clouding our judgment and robbing our programme of all action that can +do real good. + +Prussia won the war against Austria-Hungary in 1866, and did not ask +for or impose any really onerous terms. It was contented with having +regained hegemony among the German people. Prussia conquered France +in 1870. It was an unjust war, and Prussia laid down two unjust +conditions: Alsace-Lorraine and the indemnity of five milliards. As +soon as the indemnity was paid--and it was an indemnity that could be +paid in one lump sum--Prussia evacuated the occupied territory. It did +not claim of France its colonies or its fleet, it did not impose the +reduction of its armaments or control of its transport after the +peace. The Treaty of Frankfort is a humanitarian act compared with the +Treaty of Versailles. + +If Germany had won the War--Germany to whom we have always attributed +the worst possible intentions--what could it have done that the +Entente has not done? It is possible that, as it is gifted with more +practical common sense, it might have laid down less impossible +conditions in order to gain a secure advantage without ruining the +conquered countries. + +There are about ninety millions of Germans in Europe, and perhaps +fifteen millions in different countries outside Europe. But in the +heart of Europe they represent a great ethnic unity; they are the +largest and most compact national group in that continent. With all +the good and bad points of their race, too methodical and at the same +time easily depressed by a severe setback, they are still the most +cultivated people on earth. It is impossible to imagine that they can +disappear, much less that they can reconcile themselves to live in a +condition of slavery. On the other hand, the Entente has built on a +foundation of shifting sand a Europe full of small States poisoned +with imperialism and in ruinous conditions of economy and finance, and +a too great Poland without a national basis and necessarily the enemy +of Russia and of Germany. + +No people has always been victorious; the peoples who have fought most +wars in modern Europe, English, French and Germans, have had +alternate victories and defeats. A defeat often carries in its train +reconsideration which is followed by renewed energy: the greatness of +England is largely due to its steadfast determination to destroy the +Napoleonic Empire. What elevates men is this steadfast and persevering +effort, and a series of such collective efforts carries a nation to a +high place. + +There is nothing lasting in the existing groupings. At the moment of +common danger eternal union and unbreakable solidarity are proclaimed; +but both are mere literary expressions. + +Great Britain, the country which has the least need to make war, has +been at war for centuries with nearly all the European countries. +There is one country only against which it has never made war, not +even when a commercial challenge from the mercantile Republics of +Italy seemed possible. That country is Italy. That shows that between +the action of Italy there is not, nor can there be, contrast, and +indeed that between the two nations there is complete agreement in +European continental policy. It is the common desire of the two +nations, though perhaps for different reasons, that no one State shall +have hegemony on the continent. But between the years 1688 and 1815 +Great Britain and France were at war for seventy years: for seventy +years, that is, out of a hundred and twenty-seven there was a state of +deadly hostility between the two countries. + +General progress, evinced in various ways, above all in respect for +and in the autonomy of other peoples, is a guarantee for all. No +peoples are always victorious, none always conquered. In the time of +Napoleon the First the French derided the lack of righting spirit +in the German peoples, producers of any number of philosophers +and writers. They would have laughed at anyone who suggested the +possibility of any early German military triumph. After 1815 the +countries of the Holy Alliance would never have believed in the +possibility of the revolutionary spirit recovering; they were sure of +lasting peace in Europe. In 1871 the Germans had no doubt at all that +they had surely smothered France; now the Entente thinks that it has +surely smothered Germany. + +But civilization has gained something: it has gained that collection +of rules, moral conditions, sentiments, international regulations, +which tend both to mitigate violence and to regulate in a form which +is tolerable, if not always just, relations between conquerors and +conquered, above all, a respect for the liberty and autonomy of the +latter. + +Now, the treaties which have been made are, from the moral point of +view, immeasurably worse than any consummated in former days, in that +they carry Europe back to a phase of civilization which was thought +to be over and done with centuries ago. They are a danger too. For +as everyone who takes vengeance does so in a degree greater than the +damage suffered, if one supposes for a moment that the conquered +of to-day may be the conquerors of to-morrow, to what lengths of +violence, degradation and barbarism may not Europe be dragged? + +Every effort, then, should now be made to follow the opposite road to +that traversed up to now, the more so in that the treaties cannot be +carried out; and if it is desired that the conquered countries shall +pay compensation to the conquerors, at least in part, for the most +serious damage, then the line to be followed must be based on +realities instead of on violence. + +But before trying to see how and why the treaties cannot be carried +out, it may be well to consider how the actual system of treaties +has been reached, in complete opposition to all that was said by the +Entente during the War and to President Wilson's fourteen points. At +the same time ought to be examined the causes which led in six months +from the declarations of the Entente and of President Wilson to the +Treaty of Versailles. + +The most important cause for what has happened was the choice of Paris +as the meeting-place of the Conference. After the War Paris was the +least fitted of any place for the holding of a Peace Conference, and +in the two French leaders, the President of the Republic, Poincaré, +and the President of the Council of Ministers, Clemenceau, even if the +latter was more adaptable in mind and more open to consideration of +arguments on the other side, were two temperaments driving inevitably +to extremes. Victory had come in a way that surpassed all expectation; +a people that, living through every day the War had lasted, had passed +through every sorrow, privation, agony, had now but one thought, to +destroy the enemy. The atmosphere of Paris was fiery. The decision of +the peace terms to be imposed on the enemy was to be taken in a city +which a few months before, one might really say a few weeks before, +had been under the fire of the long-range guns invented by the +Germans, in hourly dread of enemy aeroplanes. Even now it is +inexplicable that President Wilson did not realize the situation +which must inevitably come about. It is possible that the delirium of +enthusiasm with which he was received at Paris may have given him the +idea that it was in him alone that the people trusted, may have made +him take the welcome given to the representative of the deciding +factor of the War as the welcome to the principles which he had +proclaimed to the world. Months later, when he left France amid +general indifference if not distrust, President Wilson must have +realized that he had lost, not popularity, but prestige, the one sure +element of success for the head of a Government, much more so for the +head of a State. It was inevitable that a Peace Conference held +in Paris, only a few months after the War, with the direction and +preparation of the work almost entirely in French hands and with +Clemenceau at the head of everything, should conclude as it did +conclude; all the more so when Italy held apart right from the +beginning, and England, though convinced of the mistakes being made, +could not act freely and effectively. + +The first duty of the Peace Conference was to restore a state of +equilibrium and re-establish conditions of life. Taking Europe as an +economic unity, broken by the War, it was necessary first of all and +in the interests of all to re-establish conditions of life which would +make it possible for the crisis to be overcome with the least possible +damage. + +I do not propose to tell the story of the Conference, and it is as +well to say at once that I do not intend to make use of any document +placed in my hands for official purposes. But the story of the Paris +Conference can now be told with practical completeness after what +has been published by J.M. Keynes in his noble book on the Economic +Consequences of the War and by the American Secretary of State, Robert +Lansing, and after the statements made in the British and French +Parliaments by Lloyd George and Clemenceau. But from the political +point of view the most interesting document is still André Tardieu's +book _La Paix_, to which Clemenceau wrote a preface and which +expresses, from the point of view of the French Delegation at the +Conference, the programme which France laid before itself and what it +obtained. This book explains how the principal decisions were taken, +and indeed can be fairly considered to show in a more reliable way +than any other publication extant how the work of the Conference +proceeded. For not only was M. Tardieu one of the French Delegates to +the Conference, one of those who signed the Versailles Treaty, but +also he prepared the plan of work as well as the solutions of the most +important questions in his capacity of trusted agent of the Prime +Minister. + +The determination in the mind of President Wilson when he came to +Paris was to carry through his programme of the League of Nations. He +was fickle in his infallibility, but he had the firmest faith that he +was working for the peace of the world and above all for the glory of +the United States. Of European things he was supremely ignorant. We +are bound to recognize his good faith, but we are not in the least +bound on that account to admit his capacity to tackle the problems +which with his academic simplicity he set himself to solve. When he +arrived in Europe he had not even prepared in outline a scheme of what +the League of Nations was to be; the principal problems found him +unprepared, and the duty of the crowd of experts (sometimes not too +expert) who followed him seemed rather to be to demonstrate the +truth of his idea than to prepare material for seriously thought out +decisions. + +He could have made no greater mistake than he did in coming to Europe +to take part in the meetings of the Conference. His figure lost relief +at once, in a way it seemed to lose dignity. The head of a State was +taking part in meetings of heads of Governments, one of the latter +presiding. It was a giant compelled to live in a cellar and thereby +sacrificing his height. He was surrounded by formal respect and in +some decisions he exercised almost despotic authority, but his work +was none the less disordered; there was a semblance of giving in to +him while he was giving away his entire programme without being aware +of it. + +In his ignorance of European things he was brought, without +recognizing it, to accept a series of decisions not superficially in +opposition to his fourteen points but which did actually nullify them. + +Great Britain is part of Europe but is not on the Continent of Europe. +While Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Russia, Hungary, Holland, +Belgium, etc., live the same life, are one in thought, Great Britain +lives in her superb insularity. If she had any moment of supreme +anxiety during the War, it was in the spring and summer of 1917 during +the terrible threat of the destruction of her shipping by submarines +and the inability of construction to keep pace with it. But after +the defeat of Germany Great Britain found herself with a fleet far +superior to those of all the rest of Europe put together; once more +she broke away from Continental Europe. + +Lloyd George, with swiftly acting brain and clear insight, undoubtedly +the most remarkable man at the Paris Conference, found himself in a +difficult situation between President Wilson's pronouncements, some +of them, like that regarding the freedom of the seas, undefined and +dangerous, and the claims of France tending, after the brutal attack +it had had to meet, not towards a true peace and the reconstruction of +Europe, but towards the vivisection of Germany. In one of the first +moments, just before the General Elections, Lloyd George, too, +promised measures of the greatest severity, the trial of the Kaiser, +the punishment of all guilty of atrocities, compensation for all who +had suffered from the War, the widest and most complete indemnity. But +such pronouncements gave way before his clear realization of facts, +and later on he tried in vain to put the Conference on the plane of +such realization. + +Italy, as M. Tardieu says very plainly, carried no weight in the +Conference. In the meetings of the Prime Ministers and President +Wilson _le ton était celui de la conversation; nul apparat, nulle +pose. M. Orlando parlait peu; l'activité de l'Italie à la conference +a été, jusqu'à l'excès, absorbée par la question de Fiume, et sa part +dans les débats a été de ce fait trop réduite. Restait un dialogue à +trois: Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George_. The Italian Government came +into the War in May, 1915, on the basis of the London Agreement of the +preceding April, and it had never thought of claiming Fiume either +before the War when it was free to lay down conditions or during the +progress of the War. + +The Italian people had always been kept in ignorance of the principles +established in the London Agreement. One of the men chiefly +responsible for the American policy openly complained to me that when +the United States came into the War no notification was given them of +the London Agreement in which were defined the future conditions +of part of Europe. A far worse mistake was made in the failure to +communicate the London Agreement to Serbia, which would certainly have +accepted it without hesitation in the terrible position in which it +then was. + +But the most serious thing of all was that Italian Ministers were +unaware of its provisions till after its publication in London by the +organ of the Jugo-Slavs, which had evidently received the text from +Petrograd, where the Bolsheviks had published it. In Italy the London +Agreement was a mystery to everyone; its text was known only to the +Presidents of the Council and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the +War Cabinets. Thus only four or five people knew about it, secrecy was +strictly kept, and, moreover, it cannot possibly be said that it was +in accordance either with national ideals or the currents of public +opinion, much less with any intelligent conception of Italy's needs +and Italy's future. + +The framers of the London Agreement never thought of Fiume. Indeed +they specifically expressed their willingness that it should go to +Croatia, whether in the case of Austria-Hungary remaining united or of +the detachment of Croatia from it. It is not true that it was through +the opposition of Russia or of France that the Italian framers of the +London Agreement gave up all claim to Fiume. There was no opposition +because there was no claim. The representatives of Russia and France +have told me officially that no renunciation took place through any +action on the part of their Governments, because no claim was ever +made to them. On the other hand, after the armistice, and when it +became known through the newspapers that the London Agreement gave +Fiume to Croatia, a very strong movement for Fiume arose, fanned by +the Government itself, and an equally strong movement in Fiume also. + +If, in the London Agreement, instead of claiming large areas of +Dalmatia which are entirely or almost entirely Slav, provision had +been made for the constitution of a State of Fiume placed in a +condition to guarantee not only the people of Italian nationality but +the economic interests of all the peoples in it and surrounding it, +there is no doubt that such a claim on the part of Italy would have +gone through without opposition. + +During the Paris Conference the representatives of Italy showed hardly +any interest at all in the problems concerning the peace of Europe, +the situation of the conquered peoples, the distribution of raw +materials, the regulation of the new states and their relations with +the victor countries. They concentrated all their efforts on the +question of Fiume, that is to say on the one point in which Italian +action was fundamentally weak in that, when it was free to enter into +the War and lay down conditions of peace, at the moment when the +Entente was without America's invaluable assistance and was beginning +to doubt the capacity of Russia to carry on, it had never even asked +for Fiume in its War Treaty, that it had made the inexplicable mistake +of neglecting to communicate that treaty to the United States when +that country came into the War and to Serbia at the moment when +Italy's effort was most valuable for its help. At the conference Italy +had no directing policy. It had been a part of the system of +the German Alliance, but it had left its Allies, Germany and +Austria-Hungary, because it recognized that the War was unjust, and +had remained neutral for ten months. Then, entering into the War +freely and without obligation, there was one road for it to follow, +that of proclaiming solemnly and defending the principles of democracy +and justice. Indeed, that was a moral duty in that the break with the +two countries with which Italy had been in alliance for thirty-three +years became a matter not only of honesty but of duty solely through +the injustice of the cause for which they had proclaimed an offensive +war. It was not possible for Italy to go to war to realize the dream +of uniting the Italian lands to the nation, for she had entered the +system of Alliance of the Central Empires and had stayed there long +years while having all the time Italian territories unjustly subjected +to Austria-Hungary. The annexation of the Italian lands to the +Kingdom of Italy had to be the consequence of the affirmation of the +principles of nationality, not the reason for going to war. In any +case, for Italy, which had laid on itself in the London Agreement +the most absurd limitations, which had confined its war aims within +exceedingly modest limits, which had no share in the distribution +of the wealth of the conquered countries, which came out of the War +without raw materials and without any share in Germany's colonial +empire, it was a matter not only of high duty but of the greatest +utility to proclaim and uphold all those principles which the Entente +had so often and so publicly proclaimed as its war policy and its war +aims. But in the Paris Conference Italy hardly counted. Without any +definite idea of its own policy, it followed France and the United +States, sometimes it followed Great Britain. There was no affirmation +of principles at all. The country which, among all the European +warring Powers, had suffered most severely in proportion to its +resources and should have made the greatest effort to free itself +from the burdens imposed on it, took no part in the most important +decisions. It has to be added that these were arrived at between March +24 and May 7, while the Italian representatives were absent from Paris +or had returned there humbled without having been recalled. + +After interminable discussions which decided very little, especially +with regard to the League of Nations which arose before the nations +were constituted and could live, real vital questions were tackled, as +is seen from the report of the Conference, on March 24, and it is a +fact that between that date and May 7 the whole treaty was put in +shape: territorial questions, financial questions, economic questions, +colonial questions. Now, at that very moment, on account of the +question of Fiume and Fiume alone, for some inscrutable reason the +Italian delegates thought good to retire from the Conference, to which +they returned later without being invited, and during that time all +the demonstrations against President Wilson took place in Italy, not +without some grave responsibility on the part of the government. Italy +received least consideration in the peace treaties among all the +conquering countries. It was practically put on one side. + +It has to be noted that both in the armistice and in the peace treaty +the most serious decisions were arrived at almost incidentally; +moreover they were always vitiated by slight concessions apparently +of importance. On November 2, 1917, when the representatives of the +different nations met at Paris to fix the terms of armistice, M. +Tardieu relates, the question of reparation for damages was decided +quite incidentally. It is worth while reproducing what he says in his +book, taken from the official report: + +M. CLEMENCEAU: _Je voudrais venir maintenant sur la question des +réparations et des tonnages. On ne comprenderait pas chez nous, en +France, que nous n'inscrivions pas dans l'armistice une clause à +cet effet. Ce que je vous demande c'est l'addition de trois mots: +"Réparations des dommages" sans autre commentaire. + +Le dialogue suivant s'établit_: + +M. HYMANS: _Cela serait-il une condition d'armistice_? + +M. SONNINO: _C'est plutôt une condition de paix_. + +M. BONAR LAW: _Il est inutile d'insérer dans les conditions +d'armistice une clause qui ne pourrait être exécutée dans un bref +délai_. + +M. CLEMENCEAU: _Je ne veux que mentionner le principe. Vous ne devez +pas oublier que la population française est une de celles qui ont +le plus souffert. Elle ne comprendrait pas que nous ne fissions pas +allusion à cette clause_. + +M. LLOYD GEORGE: _Si vous envisages le principe des réparations sur +terre, il faut mentionner aussi celui des réparations pour les navires +coulés_. + +M. CLEMENCEAU: _Je comprends tout cela dans mes trois mots, +"Réparations des dommages." Je supplie le Conseil de se mettre dans +l'esprit de la population française...._ + +M. VESSITCH: _Et serbe_.... + +M. HYMANS: _Et belge_.... + +M. SONNINO: _Et italienne aussi_.... + +M. HOUSE: _Puisqu'est une question importante pour tous, je propose +l'addition de M. Clemenceau_. + +M. BONAR LAW: _C'est deja dit dans notre lettre au Président Wilson, +qui la comuniquera à l'Allemagne. Il est inutile de la dire deux +fois_. + +M. ORLANDO: _J'accepte en principe, quoiqu'il n'en ait pas été fait +mention dans les conditions de l'armistice avec l'Autriche_. + +_L'addition "Réparations des dommages" est alors adoptée. M. Klotz +propose de mettre en tête de cette addition les mots: "Sous réserve +de toutes revendications et restaurations ultérieures de la part des +Alliés et des Etats-Unis." Il est ainsi décidé_. + +If I were at liberty to publish the official report of the doings of +the Conference while the various peace treaties were being prepared, +as MM. Poincaré and Tardieu have published secret acts, it would be +seen that the proceedings were very much the same in every case. +Meanwhile we may confine ourselves to an examination of the report as +given by M. Tardieu. + +The question of reparation of damages was not a condition of the +armistice. It had not been accepted. Clemenceau brings the question up +again solely in homage to French public opinion. The suggestion is to +write in simply the three words: _Reparation of damages_. It is true +that these three words determine a policy, and that there is no +mention of it in the claims of the Entente, in the fourteen points +of President Wilson, or in the armistice between Italy and +Austria-Hungary. In his fourteen points Wilson confined himself, in +the matter of damages, to the following claims: (1) Reconstruction +of Belgium, (2) Reconstruction of French territory invaded, (3) +Reparation for territory invaded in Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania. +There is no other claim or statement in the fourteen points. On the +other hand the pronouncement, "_Réparation des dommages_," included, +as in fact was afterwards included, any claim for damage by land or +sea. + +The representatives of Belgium, Italy and Great Britain remark that it +is a condition of peace, not of armistice. But Clemenceau makes it +a question of regard and consideration for France. France would not +understand there being no mention of it; there was no desire to define +anything, only just to mention it, and in three simple words. "I ask +you," says Clemenceau, "to put yourselves into the spirit of the +people of France." At once the British representative notes the +necessity of a clear statement regarding reparations for losses at sea +through submarines and mines; and all, the Serbian, the Belgian and, +last of all, the Italian, at once call attention to their own damages. +Mr. House, not realizing the wide and serious nature of the claim, +says that it is an important question for all, while America had +already stated, in the words of the President of the Republic, that it +renounced all indemnity of any nature whatsoever. + +So was established, quite incidentally, the principle of indemnity for +damages which gave the treaty a complete turn away from the spirit +of the pronouncements by the Entente and the United States. Equally +incidentally were established all the declarations in the treaty, the +purpose of which is not easy to understand except in so far as it is +seen in the economic results which may accrue. + +Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles states that the allied and +associated governments affirm, and Germany accepts, the responsibility +of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which +the allied and associated governments and their peoples have been +subjected as a consequence of the War imposed on them by the +aggression of Germany and her allies. + +Article 177 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye states in the +same way that the allied and associated governments affirm, and +Austria-Hungary accepts, the responsibility of Austria and her allies, +etc. + +This article is common to all the treaties, and it would have no more +than historic and philosophic interest if it were not followed by +another article in which the allied and associated governments +recognize that the resources of Germany (and of Austria-Hungary, etc.) +are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions of +such resources which will result from other provisions of the present +treaty, to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage. +The allied and associated governments, however, require, and Germany +undertakes, that she will make compensation for all damage done to the +civilian population of the allied and associated powers and to their +property during the period of the belligerency of each as an allied or +associated power against Germany by such aggression by land, by sea +and from the air, and in general all damage as defined in the treaty, +comprising many of the burdens of war (war pensions and compensations +to soldiers and their families, cost of assistance to families of +those mobilized during the War, etc.). + +There is nothing more useless, indeed more stupid, than to take your +enemy by the throat after you have beaten him and force him to declare +that all the wrong was on his side. The declaration is of no use +whatever, either to the conqueror, because no importance can be +attributed to an admission extorted by force; or to the conquered, +because he knows that there is no moral significance in being forced +to state what one does not believe; or for third parties, because they +are well aware of the circumstances under which the declaration was +made. It is possible that President Wilson wanted to establish a moral +reason--I do not like to say a moral alibi--for accepting, as he was +constrained by necessity to accept, all those conditions which were +the negation of what he had solemnly laid down, the moral pledge of +his people, of the American democracy. + +Germany and the conquered countries have accepted the conditions +imposed on them with the reserve that they feel that they are not +bound by them, even morally, in the future. The future will pour +ridicule on this new form of treaty which endeavours to justify +excessive and absurd demands, which will have the effect of destroying +the enemy rather than of obtaining any sure benefit, by using a forced +declaration which has no value at all. + +I have always detested German imperialism, and also the phases of +exaggerated nationalism which have grown up in every country after the +War and have been eliminated one after the other through the simple +fact of their being common to all countries, but only after having +brought the greatest possible harm to all the peoples, and I cannot +say that Germany and her allies were solely responsible for the War +which devastated Europe and threw a dark shadow over the life of the +whole world. That statement, which we all made during the War, was a +weapon to be used at the time; now that the War is over, it cannot be +looked on as a serious argument. + +An honest and thorough examination of all the diplomatic documents, +all the agreements and relations of pre-war days, compels me to +declare solemnly that the responsibility for the War does not lie +solely on the defeated countries; that Germany may have desired +war and prepared for it under the influence of powerful industrial +interests, metallurgic, for instance, responsible for the extreme +views of newspapers and other publications, but still all the warring +countries have their share of responsibility in differing degree. It +cannot be said that there existed in Europe two groups with a moral +conception differing to the point of complete contrast; on one side, +Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, responsible for the +War, which they imposed by their aggression; on the other, all the +free and independent nations. By the side of England, France, Italy +and the United States there was Russia, which must bear, if not the +greatest, a very great responsibility for what happened. Nor is it +true that armament expenses in the ten years preceding the War were +greater in the Central Empires, or, to put it better, in the States +forming the Triple Alliance, than in the countries which later formed +the European Entente. + +It is not true that only in the case of Germany were the war aims +imperialist, and that the Entente countries came in without desire of +conquest. Putting aside for the moment what one sees in the treaties +which have followed the War, it is worth while considering what would +have happened if Russia had won the War instead of being torn to +pieces before victory came. Russia would have had all the Poland of +the eighteenth century (with the apparent autonomy promised by the +Tsar), nearly all Turkey in Europe, Constantinople, and a great part +of Asia Minor. Russia, with already the greatest existing land empire +and at least half the population not Russian, would have gained +fresh territories with fresh non-Russian populations, putting the +Mediterranean peoples, and above all Italy, in a very difficult +situation indeed. + +It cannot be said that in the ten years preceding the War Russia did +not do as much as Germany to bring unrest into Europe. It was on +account of Russia that the Serbian Government was a perpetual cause +of disturbance, a perpetual threat to Austria-Hungary. The unending +strife in the Balkans was caused by Russia in no less degree than +by Austria-Hungary, and all the great European nations shared, with +opposing views, in the policy of Eastern expansion. + +The judgment of peoples and of events, given the uncertainty of policy +as expressed in parliament and newspapers, is variable to the last +degree. It will be enough to recall the varying judgment upon Serbia +during the last ten years in the Press of Great Britain, France and +Italy: the people of Serbia have been described as criminals and +heroes, assassins and martyrs. No one would have anything to do with +Serbia; later Serbia was raised to the skies. + +The documents published by Kautsky in Germany and those revealed from +time to time by the Moscow Government prove that the preparation for +and conviction of war was not only on the part of the Central Empires, +but also, and in no less degree, on the part of the other States. One +point will always remain inexplicable: why Russia should have taken +the superlatively serious step of general mobilization, which could +not be and was not a simple measure of precaution. It is beyond doubt +that the Russian mobilization preceded even that of Austria. After +a close examination of events, after the bitter feeling of war had +passed, in his speech of December 23, 1920, Lloyd George said justly +that the War broke out without any Government having really desired +it; all, in one way or another, slithered into it, stumbling and +tripping. + +There were three Monarchies in Europe, the Russian, German, and +Austro-Hungarian Empires, and the fact that they were divided into +two groups necessarily led to war. It was inevitable sooner or later. +Russia was the greatest danger, the greatest threat to Europe; what +happened had to happen under one form or another. The crazy giant was +under the charge of one man without intelligence and a band of men, +the men of the old regime, largely without scruples. + +Each country of Europe has its share of responsibility, Italy not +excluded. It is difficult to explain why Italy went to Tripoli in the +way in which she did in 1911, bringing about the Italo-Turkish war, +which brought about the two Balkan wars and the policy of adventure of +Serbia, which was the incident though not the cause of the European +War. + +The Libyan adventure, considered now in the serene light of reason, +cannot be looked on as anything but an aberration. Libya is an immense +box of sand which never had any value, nor has it now. Tripolitania, +Cyrenaica and Fezzan cover more than one million one hundred +thousand square kilometres and have less than nine hundred thousand +inhabitants, of whom even now, after ten years, less than a third are +under the effective control of Italy. With the war and expenses of +occupation, Libya has cost Italy about seven milliard lire, and for a +long time yet it will be on the debit side in the life of the nation. +With the same number of milliards, most of which were spent before the +European War, Italy could have put in order and utilized her immense +patrimony of water-power and to-day would be free from anxiety about +the coal problem by which it is actually enslaved. The true policy +of the nation was to gain economic independence, not a barren waste. +Ignorant people spoke of Libya in Italy as a promised land; in one +official speech the King was even made to say that Libya could absorb +part of Italian emigration. That was just a phenomenon of madness, +for Libya has no value at all from the agricultural, commercial or +military point of view. It may pay its way one day, but only if all +expenses are cut down and the administrative system is completely +changed. It may be that, if only from a feeling of duty towards the +inhabitants, Italy cannot abandon Libya now that she has taken it, but +the question will always be asked why she did take it, why she took +it by violence when a series of concessions could have been obtained +without difficulty from the Turkish Government. + +The Libyan enterprise, undertaken on an impulse, against the opinion +of Italy's allies, Austria and Germany, against the wish of England +and France, is a very serious political responsibility for Italy. + +The European War was the consequence of a long series of movements, +aspirations, agitations. It cannot be denied, and it is recognized by +clear-thinking men like Lloyd George, that France and England too +have by their actions taken on themselves their part in the serious +responsibility. To say that in the past they had never thought of +war is to say a thing not true. And there is no doubt that all the +diplomatic documents published before and during the War show in +Russia, above all, a situation which inevitably would soon lead to +war. In the Balkans, especially in Serbia, Russia was pursuing a +cynical and shameless policy of corruption, nourishing and exciting +every ferment of revolt against Austria-Hungary. Russian policy in +Serbia was really criminal. Everyone in Germany was convinced that +Russia was preparing for war. The Tsar's pacificist ideas were of no +importance whatever. In absolute monarchies it is an illusion to think +that the sovereign, though apparently an autocrat, acts in accordance +with his own views. His views are almost invariably those of the +people round him; he does not even receive news in its true form, but +in the form given it by officials. Russia was an unwieldy giant who +had shown signs of madness long before the actual revolution. It +is impossible that a collective madness such as that which has had +possession of Russia for three years could be produced on the spur of +the moment; the regime of autocracy contained in itself the germs +of Bolshevism and violence. Bolshevism cannot properly be judged by +Western notions; it is not a revolutionary movement of the people; it +is, as I have said before, the religious fanaticism of the Eastern +Orthodox rising from the dead body of Tsarist despotism. Bolshevism, +centralizing and bureaucratic, follows the same lines as the imperial +policy of almost every Tsar. + +Undoubtedly the greatest responsibility for the War lies on Germany. +If it has not to bear all the responsibility, as the treaties claim, +it has to bear the largest share; and the responsibility lies, rather +than on the shoulders of the Emperor and the quite ordinary men +who surrounded him, on those of the military caste and some great +industrial groups. The crazy writings of General von Bernhardi and +other scandalous publications of the same sort expressed, more than +just theoretical views, the real hopes and tendencies of the whole +military caste. It is true enough that there existed in Germany a real +democratic society under the control of the civil government, but +there was the military caste too, with privileges in social life and a +special position in the life of the State. This caste was educated in +the conception of violence as the means of power and grandeur. When a +country has allowed the military and social theories of General von +Bernhardi and the senselessly criminal pronouncements of the Emperor +William II to prevail for so many years, it has put the most +formidable weapons possible into the hands of its enemies. The people +who governed Germany for so long have no right to complain now of the +conditions in which their country is placed. But the great German +people, hardworking and persevering, has full right to look on such +conditions as the negation of justice. The head of a European State, a +man of the clearest view and calmest judgment, speaking to me of the +Emperor William, of whose character and intellect he thought very +little, expressed the view that the Emperor did not want war, but that +he would not avoid it when he had the chance. + +The truth is that Germany troubled itself very little about France. +Kinderlen Wächter, the most intelligent of the German Foreign +Ministers, and perhaps the one most opposed to the War, when he +outlined to me the situation as it was ten years ago, showed no +anxiety at all except in regard to Russia. Russia might make war, and +it was necessary to be ready or to see that it came about at a moment +when victory was certain if conditions did not change. Germany had no +reason at all for making war on France from the time that it had got +well ahead of that country in industry, commerce and navigation. It +is true that there were a certain number of unbalanced people in the +metal industry who talked complacently of French iron and stirred up +the yellow press, just as in France to-day there are many industrials +with their eyes fixed on German coal which they want to seize as far +as possible. But the intellectuals, the politicians, even military +circles, had no anxiety at all except with regard to Russia. + +There were mistaken views in German policy, no doubt, but at the same +time there was real anxiety about her national existence. With a huge +population and limited resources, with few colonies, owing to her +late arrival in the competition for them, Germany looked on the +never-ceasing desire of Russia for Constantinople as the ruin of her +policy of expansion in the East. + +And in actual fact there was but one way by which the three great +Empires, which in population and extension of territory dominated +the greater part of Europe, could avoid war, and that was to join in +alliance among themselves or at least not to enter other alliances. +The three great Empires divided themselves into two allied groups. +From that moment, given the fact that in each of them the military +caste held power, that the principal decisions lay in the hands of a +few men not responsible to parliament; given the fact that Russia, +faithful to her traditional policy, aimed to draw into her political +orbit all the Slav peoples right down to the Adriatic and the Aegean +and Austria, was leaning toward the creation of a third Slav monarchy +in the dual kingdom, it was inevitable that sooner or later the +violence, intrigue and corruption with which we are familiar should +culminate in open conflict. Bismarck always saw that putting Russia +and Germany up against each other meant war. + +Peoples, like individuals, are far from representing with anything +approaching completeness such social conceptions as we call violence +and right, honesty and bad faith, justice and injustice; each people +has its different characteristics, but no one people represents good, +or another bad, no one represents brutality, or another civilization. +All these meaningless phrases were brought out during the War, +according to which, as was said by one of the Prime Ministers of the +Entente, the War was the decisive struggle between the forces of +autocracy and liberty, between the dark powers of evil and violence +and the radiant powers of good and right. To-day all this causes +nothing but a smile. Such things are just speechifying, and banal at +that. Perhaps they were a necessity of War-time which might well be +made use of; when you are fighting for your very life you use every +means you have; when you are in imminent danger you do not choose your +weapons, you use everything to hand. All the War propaganda against +the German Empires, recounting, sometimes exaggerating, all the crimes +of the enemy, claiming that all the guilt was on the side of Germany, +describing German atrocities as a habit, almost a characteristic of +the German people, deriding German culture as a species of liquid +in which were bred the microbes of moral madness--all this was +legitimate, perhaps necessary, during the War. The reply to the +asphyxiating gas of the enemy was not only the same gas, but a +propaganda calculated to do more damage, and which, in fact, did do as +much damage as tanks and blockade. + +But, when war is over, nothing should be put into a peace treaty +except such things as will lead to a lasting peace, or the most +lasting peace compatible with our degree of civilization. + +On January 22, 1917, President Wilson explained the reasons why he +made the proposal to put an end to the War; he said in the American +Senate that the greatest danger lay in a peace imposed by conquerors +after victory. At that time it was said that there must be neither +conquerors nor conquered. A peace imposed after victory would be the +cause of so much humiliation and such intolerable sacrifices for the +conquered side, it would be so severe, it would give rise to so much +bitter feeling that it would not be a lasting peace, but one founded +on shifting sand. + +In the spring of 1919, just before the most serious decisions were to +be taken, Lloyd George put before the conference a memorandum entitled +"_Some considerations for the Peace Conference before they finally +draft their terms_." + +With his marvellously quick insight, after having listened to the +speeches of which force was the leading motive (the tendency round him +was not to establish a lasting peace but to vivisect Germany), Lloyd +George saw that it was not a true peace that was being prepared. + +On March 25, 1919, Lloyd George presented the following memorandum to +the conference: + +I + +When nations are exhausted by wars in which they have put forth all +their strength and which leave them tired, bleeding and broken, it is +not difficult to patch up a peace that may last until the generation +which experienced the horrors of the war has passed away. Pictures +of heroism and triumph only tempt those who know nothing of the +sufferings and terrors of war. It is therefore comparatively easy to +patch up a peace which will last for thirty years. + +What is difficult, however, is to draw up a peace which will not +provoke a fresh struggle when those who have had practical experience +of what war means have passed away. History has proved that a +peace which has been hailed by a victorious nation as a triumph of +diplomatic skill and statesmanship, even of moderation, in the long +run has proved itself to be short-sighted and charged with danger to +the victor. The peace of 1871 was believed by Germany to ensure not +only her security but her permanent supremacy. The facts have shown +exactly the contrary. France itself has demonstrated that those who +say you can make Germany so feeble that she will never be able to hit +back are utterly wrong. Year by year France became numerically weaker +in comparison with her victorious neighbour, but in reality she became +ever more powerful. She kept watch on Europe; she made alliance with +those whom Germany had wronged or menaced; she never ceased to warn +the world of its danger, and ultimately she was able to secure the +overthrow of the far mightier power which had trampled so brutally +upon her. You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments +to a mere police force and her navy to that of a fifth-rate power; all +the same, in the end, if she feels that she has been unjustly treated +in the peace of 1919, she will find means of exacting retribution from +her conquerors. The impression, the deep impression, made upon the +human heart by four years of unexampled slaughter will disappear with +the hearts upon which it has been marked by the terrible sword of the +Great War. The maintenance of peace will then depend upon there +being no causes of exasperation constantly stirring up the spirit of +patriotism, of justice or of fair play to achieve redress. Our terms +may be severe, they may be stern and even ruthless, but at the same +time they can be so just that the country on which they are imposed +will feel in its heart that it has no right to complain. But +injustice, arrogance, displayed in the hour of triumph, will never be +forgotten nor forgiven. + +For these reasons I am, therefore, strongly averse to transferring +more Germans from German rule to the rule of some other nation than +can possibly be helped. I cannot conceive any greater cause of future +war than that the German people, who have certainly proved themselves +one of the most vigorous and powerful races in the world, should be +surrounded by a number of small states, many of them consisting of +people who have never previously set up a stable government for +themselves, but each of them containing large masses of Germans +clamouring for reunion with their native land. The proposal of the +Polish Commission that we should place 2,100,000 Germans under the +control of a people of a different religion and which has never proved +its capacity for stable self-government throughout its history, must, +in my judgment, lead sooner or later to a new war in the East of +Europe. What I have said about the Germans is equally true about the +Magyars. There will never be peace in South-Eastern Europe if every +little state now coming into being is to have a large Magyar Irredenta +within its borders. + +I would therefore take as a guiding principle of the peace that as +far as is humanly possible the different races should be allocated +to their motherlands, and that this human criterion should have +precedence over considerations of strategy or economics or +communications, which can usually be adjusted by other means. + +Secondly, I would say that the duration for the payments of reparation +ought to disappear if possible with the generation which made the war. + +But there is a consideration in favour of a long-sighted peace which +influences me even more than the desire to leave no causes justifying +a fresh outbreak thirty years hence. There is one element in the +present condition of nations which differentiates it from the +situation as it was in 1815. In the Napoleonic Wars the countries were +equally exhausted, but the revolutionary spirit had spent its force +in the country of its birth, and Germany had satisfied the legitimate +popular demands for the time being by a series of economic changes +which were inspired by courage, foresight and high statesmanship. Even +in Russia the Tsar had effected great reforms which were probably +at that time even too advanced for the half-savage population. The +situation is very different now. The revolution is still in its +infancy. The extreme figures of the Terror are still in command in +Russia. The whole of Europe is filled with the spirit of revolution. +There is a deep sense not only of discontent, but of anger and revolt +among the workmen against pre-war conditions. The whole existing +order, in its political, social and economic aspects is questioned by +the masses of the population from one end of Europe to the other. In +some countries, like Germany and Russia, the unrest takes the form of +open rebellion, in others, like France, Great Britain and Italy, it +takes the shape of strikes and of general disinclination to settle +down to work, symptoms which are just as much concerned with the +desire for political and social change as with wage demands. + +Much of this unrest is healthy. We shall never make a lasting peace by +attempting to restore the conditions of 1914. But there is a danger +that we may throw the masses of the population throughout Europe into +the arms of the extremists, whose only idea for regenerating mankind +is to destroy utterly the whole existing fabric of society. These +men have triumphed in Russia. They have done so at a terrible price. +Hundreds and thousands of the population have perished. The railways, +the roads, the towns, the whole structural organization of Russia has +been almost destroyed, but somehow or other they seem to have managed +to keep their hold upon the masses of the Russian people, and what is +much more significant, they have succeeded in creating a large army +which is apparently well directed and well disciplined, and is, as to +a great part of it, prepared to die for its ideals. In another year +Russia, inspired by a new enthusiasm, may have recovered from her +passion for peace and have at her command the only army eager to +fight, because it is the only army that believes that it has any cause +to fight for. + +The greatest danger that I see in the present situation is that +Germany may throw in her lot with Bolshevism and place her resources, +her brains, her vast organizing power at the disposal of the +revolutionary fanatics whose dream it is to conquer the world for +Bolshevism by force of arms. This danger is no mere chimera. The +present government in Germany is weak; its authority is challenged; it +lingers merely because there is no alternative but the Spartacists, +and Germany is not ready for Spartacism, as yet. But the argument +which the Spartacists are using with great effect at this very time is +that they alone can save Germany from the intolerable conditions which +have been bequeathed her by the War. They offer to free the German +people from indebtedness to the Allies and indebtedness to their own +richer classes. They offer them complete control of their own affairs +and the prospect of a new heaven and earth. It is true that the price +will be heavy. There will be two or three years of anarchy, perhaps +of bloodshed, but at the end the land will remain, the people will +remain, the greater part of the houses and the factories will remain, +and the railways and the roads will remain, and Germany, having thrown +off her burdens, will be able to make a fresh start. + +If Germany goes over to the Spartacists it is inevitable that she +should throw in her lot with the Russian Bolshevists. Once that +happens all Eastern Europe will be swept into the orbit of the +Bolshevik revolution, and within a year we may witness the spectacle +of nearly three hundred million people organized into a vast red army +under German instructors and German generals, equipped with German +cannon and German machine guns and prepared for a renewal of the +attack on Western Europe. This is a prospect which no one can face +with equanimity. Yet the news which came from Hungary yesterday shows +only too clearly that this danger is no fantasy. And what are the +reasons alleged for this decision? They are mainly the belief that +large numbers of Magyars are to be handed over to the control of +others. If we are wise, we shall offer to Germany a peace, which, +while just, will be preferable for all sensible men to the alternative +of Bolshevism. I would therefore put it in the forefront of the peace +that once she accepts our terms, especially reparation, we will open +to her the raw materials and markets of the world on equal terms with +ourselves, and will do everything possible to enable the German people +to get upon their legs again. We cannot both cripple her and expect +her to pay. + +Finally, we must offer terms which a responsible government in Germany +can expect to be able to carry out. If we present terms to Germany +which are unjust, or excessively onerous, no responsible government +will sign them; certainly the present weak administration will not. +If it did, I am told that it would be swept away within twenty-four +hours. Yet if we can find nobody in Germany who will put his hand to +a peace treaty, what will be the position? A large army of occupation +for an indefinite period is out of the question. Germany would not +mind it. A very large number of people in that country would welcome +it, as it would be the only hope of preserving the existing order of +things. The objection would not come from Germany, but from our own +countries. Neither the British Empire nor America would agree to +occupy Germany. France by itself could not bear the burden of +occupation. We should therefore be driven back on the policy of +blockading the country. That would inevitably mean Spartacism from the +Urals to the Rhine, with its inevitable consequence of a huge red army +attempting to cross the Rhine. As a matter of fact, I am doubtful +whether public opinion would allow us deliberately to starve Germany. +If the only difference between Germany and ourselves were between +onerous terms and moderate terms, I very much doubt if public opinion +would tolerate the deliberate condemnation of millions of women and +children to death by starvation. If so, the Allies would have incurred +the moral defeat of having attempted to impose terms on Germany which +Germany had successfully resisted. + +From every point of view, therefore, it seems to me that we ought +to endeavour to draw up a peace settlement as if we were impartial +arbiters, forgetful of the passions of the war. This settlement ought +to have three ends in view. + +First of all it must do justice to the Allies, by taking into account +Germany's responsibility for the origin of the War, and for the way in +which it was fought. + +Secondly, it must be a settlement which a responsible German +government can sign in the belief that it can fulfil the obligations +it incurs. + +Thirdly, it must be a settlement which will contain in itself no +provocations for future wars, and which will constitute an alternative +to Bolshevism, because it will commend itself to all reasonable +opinion as a fair settlement of the European problem. + + +II + +It is not, however, enough to draw up a just and far-sighted peace +with Germany. If we are to offer Europe an alternative to Bolshevism +we must make the League of Nations into something which will be both +a safeguard to those nations who are prepared for fair dealing with +their neighbours and a menace to those who would trespass on the +rights of their neighbours, whether they are imperialist empires or +imperialist Bolshevists. An essential element, therefore, in the +peace settlement is the constitution of the League of Nations as the +effective guardian of international right and international liberty +throughout the world. If this is to happen the first thing to do is +that the leading members of the League of Nations should arrive at an +understanding between themselves in regard to armaments. To my mind +it is idle to endeavour to impose a permanent limitation of armaments +upon Germany unless we are prepared similarly to impose a limitation +upon ourselves. I recognize that until Germany has settled down +and given practical proof that she has abandoned her imperialist +ambitions, and until Russia has also given proof that she does not +intend to embark upon a military crusade against her neighbours, it +is essential that the leading members of the League of Nations should +maintain considerable forces both by land and sea in order to preserve +liberty in the world. But if they are to present a united front to the +forces both of reaction and revolution, they must arrive at such an +agreement in regard to armaments among themselves as would make it +impossible for suspicion to arise between the members of the League +of Nations in regard to their intentions towards one another. If the +League is to do its work for the world it will only be because the +members of the League trust it themselves and because there are no +rivalries and jealousies in the matter of armaments between them. The +first condition of success for the League of Nations is, therefore, a +firm understanding between the British Empire and the United States +of America and France and Italy, that there will be no competitive +building up of fleets or armies between them. Unless this is arrived +at before the Covenant is signed the League of Nations will be a sham +and a mockery. It will be regarded, and rightly regarded, as a proof +that its principal promoters and patrons repose no confidence in its +efficacy. But once the leading members of the League have made it +clear that they have reached an understanding which will both secure +to the League of Nations the strength which is necessary to enable +it to protect its members and which at the same time will make +misunderstanding and suspicion with regard to competitive armaments +impossible between them its future and its authority will be assured. +It will then be able to ensure as an essential condition of peace that +not only Germany, but all the smaller States of Europe, undertake to +limit their armaments and abolish conscription. If the small nations +are permitted to organize and maintain conscript armies running each +to hundreds of thousands, boundary wars will be inevitable, and all +Europe will be drawn in. Unless we secure this universal limitation we +shall achieve neither lasting peace nor the permanent observance of +the limitation of German armaments which we now seek to impose. + +I should like to ask why Germany, if she accepts the terms we consider +just and fair, should not be admitted to the League of Nations, at +any rate as soon as she has established a stable and democratic +government? Would it not be an inducement to her both to sign the +terms and to resist Bolshevism? Might it not be safer that she should +be inside the League than that she should be outside it? + +Finally, I believe that until the authority and effectiveness of the +League of Nations has been demonstrated, the British Empire and the +United States ought to give France a guarantee against the possibility +of a new German aggression. France has special reason for asking for +such a guarantee. She has twice been attacked and twice invaded by +Germany in half a century. She has been so attacked because she has +been the principal guardian of liberal and democratic civilization +against Central European autocracy on the continent of Europe. It is +right that the other great Western democracies should enter into an +undertaking which will ensure that they stand by her side in time to +protect her against invasion should Germany ever threaten her again, +or until the League of Nations has proved its capacity to preserve the +peace and liberty of the world. + +III + +If, however, the Peace Conference is really to secure peace and prove +to the world a complete plan of settlement which all reasonable men +will recognize as an alternative preferable to anarchy, it must deal +with the Russian situation. Bolshevik imperialism does not merely +menace the States on Russia's borders. It threatens the whole of Asia, +and is as near to America as it is to France. It is idle to think that +the Peace Conference can separate, however sound a peace it may have +arranged with Germany, if it leaves Russia as it is to-day. I do not +propose, however, to complicate the question of the peace with Germany +by introducing a discussion of the Russian problem. I mention it +simply in order to remind ourselves of the importance of dealing with +it as soon as possible. + +The memorandum is followed by some proposals entitled "General Lines +of the Peace Conditions," which would tend to make the peace less +severe. It is hardly worth while reproducing them. As in many points +the decisions taken were in the opposite sense it is better not to go +beyond the general considerations. + +Mr. Lloyd George's memorandum is a secret document. But as the English +and American Press have already printed long passages from it, it +is practically possible to give it in its entirety without adding +anything to what has already been printed. + +M. Tardieu has published M. Clemenceau's reply, drawn up by M. Tardieu +himself and representing the French point of view: + +I + +The French Government is in complete agreement with the general +purpose of Mr. Lloyd George's Note: to make a lasting peace, and for +that reason a just peace. + +But, on the other hand, it does not think that this principle, which +is its own, really leads to the conclusions arrived at in the Note in +question. + +II + +The Note suggests that the territorial conditions laid down for +Germany in Europe shall be moderate in order that she may not feel +deeply embittered after peace. + +The method would be sound if the recent War had been nothing but a +European war for Germany; but that is not the case. + +Previous to the War Germany was a great world Power whose _future +was on the sea_. This was the power of which she was so inordinately +proud. For the loss of this world power she will never be consoled. + +The Allies have taken from her--or are going to take from her--without +being deterred by fear of her resentment, all her colonies, all her +ships of war, a great part of her commercial fleet (as reparations), +the foreign markets which she controlled. + +That is the worst blow that could be inflicted on her, and it is +suggested that she can be pacified by some improvements in territorial +conditions. That is a pure illusion. The remedy is not big enough for +the thing it is to cure. + +If there is any desire, for general reasons, to give Germany some +satisfaction, it must not be sought in Europe. Such help will be vain +as long as Germany has lost her world policy. + +To pacify her (if there is any interest in so doing) she must have +satisfaction given her in colonies, in ships, in commercial expansion. +The Note of March 26 thinks of nothing but satisfaction in European +territory. + +III + +Mr. Lloyd George fears that unduly severe territorial conditions +imposed on Germany will play into the hands of Bolshevism. Is there +not cause for fear, on the other hand, that the method he suggests +will have that very result? + +The Conference has decided to call into being a certain number of new +States. Is it possible without being unjust to them to impose on them +inacceptable frontiers towards Germany? If these people--Poland and +Bohemia above all--have resisted Bolshevism up to now it is through +national sentiment. If this sentiment is violated Bolshevism will find +an easy prey in them, and the only existing barrier between Russian +and German Bolshevism will be broken. + +The result will be either a Confederation of Eastern and Central +Europe under the direction of a Bolshevik Germany or the enslavery of +those countries to a Germany become reactionary again, thanks to the +general anarchy. In either case the Allies will have lost the War. + +The policy of the French Government, on the other hand, is to give +the fullest aid to those young peoples with the support of everything +liberal in Europe, and not to try to introduce at their expense +abatements--which in any case would be useless--of the colonial, naval +and commercial disaster which the peace imposes on Germany. + +If it is necessary, in giving these young peoples frontiers without +which they cannot live, to transfer under their sovereignty some +Germans, sons of the men who enslaved them, we may regret the +necessity, and we should do it with moderation, but it cannot be +avoided. + +Further, when all the German colonies are taken from her entirely and +definitely, because she ill-treated the natives, what right is there +to refuse normal frontiers to Poland and Bohemia because Germans +installed themselves in those countries as precursors of the tyrant +Pan-Germanism? + +IV + +The Note of March 26 insists on the necessity of a peace which will +appear to Germany as a just peace, and the French Government agrees. + +It may be observed, however, that, given the German mentality, their +conception of justice may not be the same as that of the Allies. + +And, also, surely the Allies as well as Germany, even before Germany, +should feel this impression of justice. The Allies who fought together +should conclude the War with a peace equal for all. + +Now, following the method suggested in the Note of March 26, what will +be the result? + +A certain number of total and definite guarantees will be given to +maritime nations whose countries were not invaded. + +Total and definite, the surrender of the German colonies. + +Total and definite, the surrender of the German war fleet. + +Total and definite, the surrender of a large part of the German +commercial fleet. + +Total and lasting, if not definite, the exclusion of Germany from +foreign markets. + +For the Continental countries, on the other hand--that is to say, for +the countries which have suffered most from the War--would be reserved +partial and transitory solutions: + +Partial solution, the modified frontiers suggested for Poland and +Bohemia. + +Transitory solution, the defensive pledge offered France for the +protection of her territory. + +Transitory solution, the regime proposed for the Saar coal. + +There is an evident inequality which might have a bad influence on +the after-war relations among the Allies, more important than the +after-war relations of Germany with them. + +It has been shown in Paragraph I that it would be an illusion to hope +that territorial satisfaction offered to Germany would compensate +her sufficiently for the world disaster she has suffered. And it may +surely be added that it would be an injustice to lay the burden of +such compensation on the shoulders of those countries among the Allies +which have had to bear the heaviest burden of the War. + +After the burdens of the War, these countries cannot bear the burdens +of the peace. It is essential that they should feel that the peace is +just and equal for all. + +And unless that be assured it is not only in Central Europe that there +will be fear of Bolshevism, for nowhere does it propagate so easily, +as has been seen, as amid national disillusionment. + +V + +The French Government desires to limit itself for the moment to these +observations of a general character. It pays full homage to the +intentions which inspired Mr. Lloyd George's memorandum. But it +considers that the inductions that can be drawn from the present Note +are in consonance with justice and the general interests. + +And those are the considerations by which the French Government will +be inspired in the coming exchange of ideas for the discussion of +conditions suggested by the Prime Minister of Great Britain. + +These two documents are of more than usual interest. + +The British Prime Minister, with his remarkable insight, at once notes +the seriousness of the situation. He sees the danger to the peace +of the world in German depression. Germany oppressed does not mean +Germany subjected. Every year France becomes numerically weaker, +Germany stronger. The horrors of war will be forgotten and the +maintenance of peace will depend on the creation of a situation which +makes life possible, does not cause exasperation to come into public +feeling or into the just claims of Germans desirous of independence. +Injustice in the hour of triumph will never be pardoned, can never be +atoned. + +So the idea of handing over to other States numbers of Germans is not +only an injustice, but a cause of future wars, and what can be said +of Germans is also true of Magyars. No cause of future wars must be +allowed to remain. Putting millions of Germans under Polish rule--that +is, under an inferior people which has never shown any capacity for +stable self-government--must lead to a new war sooner or later. If +Germany in exasperation became a country of revolution, what would +happen to Europe? You can impose severe conditions, but that does not +mean that you can enforce them; the conditions to be imposed must be +such that a responsible German Government can in good faith assume the +obligation of carrying them out. + +Neither Great Britain nor the United States of America can assume +the obligation of occupying Germany if it does not carry out the +excessively severe conditions which it is desired to impose. Can +France occupy Germany alone? + +From that moment Lloyd George saw the necessity of admitting Germany +into the League of Nations _at once_, and proposed a scheme of treaty +containing conditions which, while very severe, were in part tolerable +for the German people. + +Clemenceau's reply, issued a few days later, contains the French point +of view, and has an ironical note when it touches on the weak points +in Lloyd George's argument. The War, says the French note, was not a +European war; Germany's eyes were fixed on world power, and she +saw that her future was on the sea. There is no necessity to show +consideration regarding territorial conditions in Europe. By taking +away her commercial fleet, her colonies and her foreign markets more +harm is done to Germany than by taking European territory. To pacify +her (if there is any occasion for doing so) she must be offered +commercial satisfaction. At this point the note, in considering +questions of justice and of mere utility, becomes distinctly ironical. + +Having decided to bring to life new States, especially Poland and +Czeko-Slovakia, why not give them safe frontiers even if some Germans +or Magyars have to be sacrificed? + +One of Clemenceau's fixed ideas is that criterions of justice must not +be applied to Germans. The note says explicitly that, given the German +mentality, it is by no means sure that the conception of justice of +Germany will be the same as that of the Allies. + +On another occasion, after the signing of the treaty, when Lloyd +George pointed out the wisdom of not claiming from Germany the +absurdity of handing over thousands of officers accused of cruelty +for judgment by their late enemies, and recognized frankly the +impossibility of carrying out such a stipulation in England, +Clemenceau replied simply that the Germans are not like the English. + +The delicate point in Clemenceau's note is the contradiction in which +he tries to involve the British Prime Minister between the clauses of +the treaty concerning Germany outside Europe, in which no moderation +had been shown, and those regarding Germany in Europe, in which he +himself did not consider moderation either necessary or opportune. + +There was an evident divergence of views, clearing the way for a calm +review of the conditions to be imposed, and here two countries could +have exercised decisive action: the United States and Italy. + +But the United States was represented by Wilson, who was already in a +difficult situation. By successive concessions, the gravity of which +he had not realized, he found himself confronted by drafts of treaties +which in the end were contradictions of all his proposals, the +absolute antithesis of the pledges he had given. It is quite possible +that he had not seen where he was going, but his frequent irritation +was the sign of his distress. Still, in the ship-wreck of his whole +programme, he had succeeded in saving one thing, the Statute of the +League of Nations which was to be prefaced to all the treaties. +He wanted to go back to America and meet the Senate with at least +something to show as a record of the great undertaking, and he hoped +and believed in good faith that the Covenant of the League of Nations +would sooner or later have brought about agreement and modified the +worst of the mistakes made. His conception of things was academic, +and he had not realized that there was need to constitute the nations +before laying down rules for the League; he trusted that bringing them +together with mutual pledges would further most efficiently the cause +of peace among the peoples. On the other hand, there was diffidence, +shared by both, between Wilson and Lloyd George, and there was little +likelihood of the British Prime Minister's move checking the course +the Conference had taken. + +Italy might have done a great work if its representatives had had +a clear policy. But, as M. Tardieu says, they had no share in the +effective doings of the Conference, and their activity was almost +entirely absorbed in the question of Fiume. The Conference was a +three-sided conversation between Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George, +and the latter had hostility and diffidence on each side of him, with +Italy--as earlier stated--for the most part absent. Also, it was +just then that the divergence between Wilson and the Italian +representatives reached its acute stage. The essential parts of the +treaty were decided in April and the beginning of May, on April 22 +the question of the right bank of the Rhine, on the 23rd or 24th the +agreement about reparations. Italy was absent, and when the Italian +delegates returned to Paris without being asked on May 6, the text of +the treaty was complete, in print. In actual fact, only one person did +really effective work and directed the trend of the Conference, and +that person was Clemenceau. + +The fact that the Conference met in Paris, that everything that was +done by the various delegations was known, even foreseen so that +it could be opposed, discredited, even destroyed by the Press +beforehand--a thing which annoyed Lloyd George so much that at one +time he thought seriously of leaving the Conference--all this gave +an enormous advantage to the French delegation and especially to +Clemenceau who directed the Conference's work. + +All his life Clemenceau has been a tremendous destroyer. For years and +years he has done nothing but overthrow Governments with a sort of +obstinate ferocity. He was an old man when he was called to lead the +country, but he brought with him all his fighting spirit. No one +detests the Church and detests Socialism more than he; both of these +moral forces are equally repulsive to his individualistic spirit. I do +not think there is any man among the politicians I have known who is +more individualistic than Clemenceau, who remains to-day the man of +the old democracy. In time of war no one was better fitted than he to +lead a fighting Ministry, fighting at home, fighting abroad, with +the same feeling, the same passion. When there was one thing only +necessary in order to beat the enemy, never to falter in hatred, never +to doubt the sureness of victory, no one came near him, no one could +be more determined, no one more bitter. But when War was over, when it +was peace that had to be ensured, no one could be less fitted for the +work. He saw nothing beyond his hatred for Germany, the necessity +for destroying the enemy, sweeping away every bit of his activity, +bringing him into subjection. On account of his age he could not +visualize the problems of the future; he could only see one thing +necessary, and that was immediate, to destroy the enemy and either +destroy or confiscate all his means of development. He was not +nationalist or imperialist like his collaborators, but before all +and above all one idea lived in him, hatred for Germany; she must be +rendered barren, disembowelled, annihilated. + +He had said in the French Parliament that treaties of peace were +nothing more than a way of going on with war, and in September, 1920, +in his preface to M. Tardieu's book, he said that France must get +reparation for Waterloo and Sedan. Even Waterloo: _Waterloo et Sedan, +pour ne pas remonter plus haut, nous imposaient d'abord les douloureux +soucis d'une politique de réparation_. + +Tardieu noted, as we have seen, that there were only three people +in the Conference: Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George. Orlando, he +remarks, spoke little, and Italy had no importance. With subtle irony +he notes that Wilson talked like a University don criticizing an essay +with the didactic logic of the professor. The truth is that after +having made the mistake of staying in the Conference he did not +see that his whole edifice was tumbling down, and he let mistakes +accumulate one after the other, with the result that treaties were +framed which, as already pointed out, actually destroyed all the +principles he had declared to the world. + +Things being as they were in Paris, Clemenceau's temperament, the +pressure of French industry and of the newspapers, the real anxiety to +make the future safe, and the desire on that account to exterminate +the enemy, France naturally demanded, through its representatives, +the severest sanctions. England, given the realistic nature of its +representatives and the calm clear vision of Lloyd George, always +favoured in general the more moderate solutions as those which were +more likely to be carried out and would least disturb the equilibrium +of Europe. So it came about that the decisions seemed to be a +compromise, but were, on the other hand, actually so hard and so stern +that they were impossible of execution. + +Without committing any indiscretion it is possible to see now from +the publications of the French representatives at the Conference +themselves what France's claims were. + +Let us try to sum them up. + +As regards disarmament and control there could have been and there +ought to have been no difficulty about agreement. I am in favour +of the reduction of all armaments, but I regard it as a perfectly +legitimate claim that the country principally responsible for the War, +and in general the conquered countries, should be obliged to disarm. + +No one would regard it as unfair that Germany and the conquered +countries should be compelled to reduce their armaments to the measure +necessary to guarantee internal order only. + +But a distinction must be drawn between military sanctions meant to +guarantee peace and those which have the end of ruining the enemy. +In actual truth, in his solemn pronouncements after the entry of the +United States into the War, President Wilson had never spoken of a +separate disarmament of the conquered countries, but of adequate +guarantees _given and received_ that national armaments should +be reduced to the smallest point compatible with internal order. +Assurances given and received: that is to say an identical situation +as between conquerors and conquered. + +No one can deny the right of the conqueror to compel the conquered +enemy to give up his arms and reduce his military armaments, at any +rate for some time. But on this point too there was useless excess. + +I should never have thought of publishing France's claims. Bitterness +comes that way, responsibility is incurred, in future it may be an +argument in your adversary's hands. But M. Tardieu has taken this +office on himself and has told us all France did, recounting her +claims from the acts of the Conference itself. Reference is easy to +the story written by one of the representatives of France, possibly +the most efficient through having been in America a long time +and having fuller and more intimate knowledge of the American +representatives, particularly Colonel House. + +Generally speaking, in every claim the French representatives started +from an extreme position, and that was not only a state of mind, it +was a tactical measure. Later on, if they gave up any part of their +claim, they had the air of yielding, of accepting a compromise. When +their claims were of such an extreme nature that the anxiety they +caused, the opposition they raised, was evident, Clemenceau put on +an air of moderation and gave way at once. Sometimes, too, he showed +moderation himself, when it suited his purpose, but in reality he only +gave way when he saw that it was impossible to get what he wanted. + +In points where English and American interests were not involved, +given the difficult position in which Lloyd George was placed and +Wilson's utter ignorance of all European questions, with Italy keeping +almost entirely apart, the French point of view always came out on +top, if slightly modified. But the original claim was always so +extreme that the modification left standing the most radically severe +measure against the conquered countries. + +Many decisions affecting France were not sufficiently criticized on +account of the relations in which the English and Americans stood +to France; objections would have looked like ill-will, pleading the +enemy's cause. + +Previously, in nearly every case when peace was being made, the +representatives of the conquered countries had been called to state +their case, opportunity was given for discussion. The Russo-Japanese +peace is an example. Undoubtedly the aggression of Russia had been +unscrupulous and premeditated, but both parties participated in +drawing up the peace treaty. At Paris, possibly for the first time +in history, the destiny of the most cultured people in Europe was +decided--or rather it was thought that it was being decided--without +even listening to what they had to say and without hearing from their +representatives if the conditions imposed could or could not possibly +be carried out. Later on an exception, if only a purely formal one, +was made in the case of Hungary, whose delegates were heard; but it +will remain for ever a terrible precedent in modern history that, +against all pledges, all precedents and all traditions, the +representatives of Germany were never even heard; nothing was left to +them but to sign a treaty at a moment when famine and exhaustion and +threat of revolution made it impossible not to sign it. + +If Germany had not signed she would have suffered less loss. But at +that time conditions at home with latent revolution threatening the +whole Empire, made it imperative to accept any solution, and all the +more as the Germans considered that they were not bound by their +signature, the decisions having been imposed by violence without any +hearing being given to the conquered party, and the most serious +decisions being taken without any real examination of the facts. In +the old law of the Church it was laid down that everyone must have a +hearing, even the devil: _Etiam diabulus audiatur_ (Even the devil +has the right to be heard). But the new democracy, which proposed to +install the society of the nations, did not even obey the precepts +which the dark Middle Ages held sacred on behalf of the accused. + +Conditions in Germany were terribly difficult, and an army of two +hundred thousand men was considered by the military experts the +minimum necessary. The military commission presided over by Marshal +Foch left Germany an army of two hundred thousand men, recruited by +conscription, a Staff in proportion, service of one year, fifteen +divisions, 180 heavy guns, 600 field-guns. That is less than what +little States without any resources have now, three years after the +close of the War. But France at once imposed the reduction of the +German army to 100,000 men, no conscription but a twelve years' +service of paid soldiers, artillery reduced practically to nothing, no +heavy guns at all, very few field-guns. No opportunity was given for +discussion, nor was there any. Clemenceau put the problem in such a +way that discussion was out of the question: _C'est la France qui, +demain comme hier, sera face à l'Allemagne_. Lloyd George and Colonel +House confined themselves to saying that on this point France formally +expressed their views, Great Britain and the United States had no +right to oppose. Lloyd George was convinced that the measures were +too extreme and had tried on May 23, 1919, to modify them; but +France insisted on imposing on Germany this situation of tremendous +difficulty. + +I have referred to the military conditions imposed on Germany: +destruction of all war material, fortresses and armament factories; +prohibition of any trade in arms; destruction of the fleet; occupation +of the west bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads for fifteen years; +allied control, with wide powers, over the execution of the military +and naval clauses of the treaty, with consequent subjection of +all public administrations and private companies to the will of a +foreigner, or rather of an enemy kept at the expense of Germany itself +and at no small expense, etc. In some of the inter-allied conferences +I have had to take note of what these commissions of control really +are, and their absurd extravagance, based on the argument that the +enemy must pay for everything. + +The purport of France's action in the Conference was not to ensure +safe military guarantees against Germany but to destroy her, at any +rate to cut her up. And indeed, when she had got all she wanted and +Germany was helpless, she continued the same policy, even intensifying +it. Every bit of territory possible must be taken, German unity must +be broken, and not only military but industrial Germany must be +laid low under a series of controls and an impossible number of +obligations. + +All know how, in Article 428 of the treaty, it is laid down, as a +guarantee of the execution of the treaty terms on the part of Germany, +or rather as a more extended military guarantee for France, that +German territory on the west bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads +are to be occupied by allied and associated troops for fifteen years, +methods and regulations for such occupation following in Articles 429 +and 432. + +This occupation not only gives deep offence to Germany (France has +always looked back with implacable bitterness on the few months' +military occupation by her Prussian conquerors in the war of 1870), +but it paralyses all her activity and is generally judged to be +completely useless. + +All the Allies were ready to give France every military guarantee +against any unjust aggression by Germany, but France wanted in +addition the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine. It was a very +delicate matter, and the notes presented to the Conference by Great +Britain on March 26 and April 2, by the United States on March 28 and +April 12, show how embarrassed the two Governments were in considering +a question which France regarded as essential for her future. It has +to be added that the action of Marshal Foch in this matter was +not entirely constitutional. He claimed that, independently of +nationality, France and Belgium have the right to look on the Rhine as +the indispensable frontier for the nations of the west of Europe, _et +par là, de la civilisation_. Neither Lloyd George nor Wilson could +swallow the argument of the Rhine a frontier between the civilization +of France and Belgium, all civilization indeed, and Germany. + +In the treaty the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine and the +bridgeheads by the allied and associated powers for fifteen years +was introduced as a compromise. Such districts will be evacuated by +degrees every five years if Germany shall have faithfully carried out +the terms of the treaty. Now the conditions of the treaty are in large +measure impossible of execution, and in consequence no execution of +them can ever be described as faithful. Further, the occupying troops +are paid by Germany. It follows that the conception of the occupation +of the left bank of the Rhine was of a fact of unlimited duration. +The harm that would result from the occupation was pointed out at the +Conference by the American representatives and even more strongly by +the English. What was the use of it, they asked, if the German army +were reduced to 100,000 men? M. Tardieu himself tells the story of all +the efforts made, especially by Lloyd George and Bonar Law, to prevent +the blunder which later on was endorsed in the treaty as Article 428. +Lloyd George went so far as to complain of political intrigues for +creating disorder on the Rhine. But Clemenceau took care to put the +question in such a form that no discussion was possible. In the matter +of the occupation, he said to the English, you do not understand the +French point of view. You live in an island with the sea as defence, +we on the continent with a bad frontier. We do not look for an attack +by Germany but for systematic refusal to carry out the terms of +the treaty. Never was there a treaty with so many clauses, with, +consequently, so many opportunities for evasion. Against that risk the +material guarantee of occupation is necessary. There are two methods +in direct contrast: _En Angleterre on croit que le moyen d'y réussir +est de faire des concessions. En France nous croyons que c'est de +brusquer_. + +On March 14 Lloyd George and Wilson had offered France the fullest +military guarantee in place of the occupation of the left bank of the +Rhine. France wanted, and in fact got, the occupation as well as the +alliances. "_Notre but_?" says Tardieu. "_Sceller la garantie offerte, +mais y ajouter l'occupation_." Outside the Versailles Treaty the +United States and Great Britain had made several treaties of alliance +with France for the event of unprovoked aggression by Germany. Later +on the French-English Treaty was approved by the House of Commons, the +French-American underwent the same fate as the Versailles Treaty. But +the treaty with Great Britain fell through also on account of the +provision that it should come into force simultaneously with the +American Treaty. + +In a Paris newspaper Poincaré published in September, 1921, some +strictly reserved documents on the questions of the military +guarantees and the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine. He +wished to get the credit of having stood firm when Clemenceau himself +hesitated at the demand for an occupation of the left bank of the +Rhine for even a longer period than fifteen years. He has published +the letter he sent to Clemenceau to be shown to Wilson and Lloyd +George and the latter's reply. + +He said that there must be no thought of giving up the occupation and +renouncing a guarantee until every obligation in the treaty should +have been carried out; he went so far as to claim that in occupation +regarded as a guarantee of a credit representing an indemnity for +damages, there is nothing contrary to the principles proclaimed by +President Wilson and recognized by the Allies. Nor would it suffice +even to have the faculty of reoccupation, because "this faculty" could +never be a valid substitute for occupation. As regards the suggestion +that a long occupation or one for an indeterminate period would cause +bad feeling, M. Poincaré was convinced that this was an exaggeration. +A short occupation causes more irritation on account of its arbitrary +limit; everyone understands an occupation without other limit than the +complete carrying out of the treaty. The longer the time that passes +the better would become the relations between the German populations +and the armies of occupation. + +Clemenceau communicated Poincaré's letter to Lloyd George. The British +Prime Minister replied on May 6 in the clearest terms. In his eyes, +forcing Germany to submit to the occupation of the Rhine and the Rhine +Provinces for an unlimited period, was a provocation to renew the war +in Europe. + +During the Conference France put forward some proposals the aim of +which was nothing less than to split up Germany. A typical example +is the memorandum presented by the French delegation claiming the +annexation of the Saar territory. This is completely German; in the +six hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants before the War there were +not a hundred French. Not a word had ever been said about annexation +of the Saar either in Government pronouncements or in any vote in the +French Parliament, nor had it been discussed by any political party. +No one had ever suggested such annexation, which certainly was a far +more serious thing than the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany, +as there was considerable German population in Alsace-Lorraine. There +was no French population at all in the Saar, and the territory in +question could not even be claimed for military reasons but only for +its economic resources. Reasons of history could not count, for they +were all in Germany's favour. Nevertheless the request was put forward +as a matter of sentiment. Had not the Saar belonged in other days +entirely or in part to France? Politics and economics are not +everything, said Clemenceau; history also has great value. For the +United States a hundred and twenty years are a long time; for France +they count little. Material reparations are not enough, there must be +moral reparations too, and the conception of France cannot be the same +as that of her Allies. The desire for the Saar responded, according +to Clemenceau, to a need of moral reparation. On this point, too, +the extreme French claim was modified. The Saar mines were given to +France, not provisionally as a matter of reparations, but permanently +with full right of possession and full guarantees for their working. +For fifteen years from the date of the treaty the government of the +territory was put in the hands of the League of Nations as trustee; +after fifteen years the population, entirely German, should be called +to decide under what government they desired to live. In other words, +in a purely German country, which no one in France had ever claimed, +of which no one in France had ever spoken during the War, the most +important property was handed to a conquering State, the country was +put under the administration of the conquerors (which is what the +League of Nations actually is at present), and after fifteen years of +torment the population is to be put through a plebiscite. Meanwhile +the French douane rules in the Saar. + +It was open to the treaty to adopt or not to adopt the system of +plebiscites. When it was a case of handing over great masses of German +populations, a plebiscite was imperative--at any rate, where any doubt +existed, and the more so in concessions which formed no part of the +War aims and were not found in any pronouncement of the Allies. On the +other hand, in all cessions of German territory to Poland and Bohemia, +no mention is made of a plebiscite because it was a question of +military necessity or of lands which had been historically victims +of Germany. But only for Schleswig, Upper Silesia, Marienwerder, +Allenstein, Klagenfurth and the Saar were plebiscites laid down--and +with the exception that the plebiscite itself, when, as in the case of +Upper Silesia, it resulted in favour of Germany, was not regarded as +conclusive. + +But where the most extreme views clashed was in the matter of +reparations and the indemnity to be claimed from the enemy. + +We have already seen that the theory of reparation for damage found +its way incidentally, even before the treaty was considered, into the +armistice terms. No word had been said previously of claiming from the +conquered enemy anything beyond restoration of devastated territories, +but after the War another theory was produced. If Germany and her +allies are solely responsible for the War, they must pay the whole +cost of the War: damage to property, persons and war works. When +damage has been done, he who has done the wrong must make reparation +for it to the utmost limit of his resources. + +The American delegation struck a note of moderation: no claim +should be made beyond what was established in the peace conditions, +reparation for actions which were an evident violation of +international law, restoration of invaded country, and reparation for +damage caused to the civil population and to its property. + +During the War there were a number of exaggerated pronouncements on +the immense resources of Germany and her capacity for payment. + +Besides all the burdens with which Germany was loaded, there was a +discussion on the sum which the Allies should claim. The War had cost +700 milliard francs, and the claims for damage to persons and property +amounted to at least 350 milliards for all the Allies together. + +Whatever the sum might be, when it had been laid down in the treaty +what damage was to be indemnified, the French negotiators claimed +sixty-five per cent., leaving thirty-five per cent. for all the +others. + +What was necessary was to lay down proportions, not the actual amount +of the sum. It was impossible to say at once what amount the damages +would reach: that was the business of the Reparations Commission. + +Instead of inserting in the treaty the enormous figures spoken of, the +quality, not the quantity, of the damages to be indemnified was laid +down. But the standard of reckoning led to fantastic figures. + +An impossible amount had to be paid, and the delegations were +discussing then the very same things that are being discussed now. The +American experts saw the gross mistake of the other delegations, and +put down as the maximum payment 325 milliard marks up to 1951, the +first payment to be 25 milliard marks in 1921. So was invented the +Reparations Commission machine, a thing which has no precedent in any +treaty, being a commission with sovereign powers to control the life +of the whole of Germany. + +In actual truth no serious person has ever thought that Germany can +pay more than a certain number of milliards a year, no one believes +that a country can be subjected to a regime of control for thirty +years. + +But the directing line of work of the treaties has been to break down +Germany, to cut her up, to suffocate her. + +France had but one idea, and later on did not hesitate to admit it: +to dismember Germany, to destroy her unity. By creating intolerable +conditions of life, taking away territory on the frontier, putting +large districts under military occupation, delaying or not making any +diplomatic appointments and carrying on communications solely through +military commissions, a state of things was brought about which must +inevitably tend to weaken the constitutional unity of the German +Empire. Taking away from Germany 84 thousand kilometres of territory, +nearly eight million inhabitants and all the most important mineral +resources, preventing the unity of the German people and the six +million and five hundred thousand of German Austrians to which +Austria was then reduced, putting the whole German country under an +interminable series of controls--all this did more harm to German +unity than would have been done by taking the responsibility of a +forcible and immediate division to which the Germans could not have +consented and which the Allies could not have claimed to impose. + +What has been said about Germany and the Versailles Treaty can be said +about all the other conquered countries and all the other treaties, +with merely varying proportions in each case. + +The verdict that has to be passed on them will very soon be shown by +facts--if indeed facts have not shown already that, in great measure, +what had been laid down cannot be carried out. One thing is certain, +that the actual treaties threaten to ruin conquerors and conquered, +that they have not brought peace to Europe, but conditions of war and +violence. In Clemenceau's words, the treaties are a way of going on +with war. + +But, even if it were possible to dispute that, as men's minds cannot +yet frame an impartial judgment and the danger is not seen by all, +there is one thing that cannot be denied or disputed, and that is that +the treaties are the negation of the principles for which the United +States and Italy, without any obligation on them, entered the War; +they are a perversion of all the Entente had repeatedly proclaimed; +they break into pieces President Wilson's fourteen points which were a +solemn pledge for the American people, and to-morrow they will be the +greatest moral weapon with which the conquered of to-day will face the +conquerors of to-day. + + + + +IV + +THE CONQUERORS AND THE CONQUERED + + +How many are the States of Europe? Before the War the political +geography of Europe was almost tradition. To-day every part of +Europe is in a state of flux. The only absolute certainty is that in +Continental Europe conquerors and conquered are in a condition of +spiritual, as well as economic, unrest. It is difficult indeed to say +how many political unities there are and how many are lasting, and +what new wars are being prepared, if a way of salvation is not found +by some common endeavour to install peace, which the peace of Paris +has not done. How many thinking men can, without perplexity, remember +how many States there are and what they are: arbitrary creations of +the treaties, creations of the moment, territorial limitations imposed +by the necessities of international agreements. The situation of +Russia is so uncertain that no one knows whether new States will +arise as a result of her continuous disintegration, or if she will be +reconstructed in a solid, unified form, and other States amongst those +which have arisen will fall. + +Without taking into account those traditional little States which are +merely historical curiosities, as Monaco, San Marino, Andorra, Monte +Santo, not counting Iceland as a State apart, not including the +Saar, which as a result of one of the absurdities of the Treaty +of Versailles is an actual State outside Germany, but considering +Montenegro as an existing State, Europe probably comprises thirty +States. Some of them are, however, in such a condition that they do +not give promise of the slightest guarantee of life or security. + +Europe has rather Balkanized herself: not only the War came from the +Balkans, but also many ideas, which have been largely exploited in +parliamentary and newspaper circles. Listening to many speeches and +being present at many events to-day leaves the sensation of being in +Belgrade or at Sarajevo. + +Europe, including Russia and including also the Polar archipelagos, +covers an area of a little more than ten million square kilometres. +Canada is of almost the same size; the United States of America has +about the same territory. + +The historical procedure before the War was towards the formation of +large territorial unities; the _post-bellum_ procedure is entirely +towards a process of dissolution, and the fractionizing, resulting a +little from necessity and a little also from the desire to dismember +the old Empires and to weaken Germany, has assumed proportions almost +impossible to foresee. + +In the relations between the various States good and evil are not +abstract ideas: political actions can only be judged by their results. +If the treaties of peace which have been imposed on the conquered +would be capable of application, we could, from an ethnical point of +view, regret some or many of the decisions; but we should only have to +wait for the results of time for a definite judgment. + +The evil is that the treaties which have been signed are not +applicable or cannot be applied without the rapid dissolution of +Europe. + +So the balance-sheet of the peace, after three years from the +armistice--that is, three years from the War--shows on the whole a +worsening of the situation. The spirit of violence has not died out, +and perhaps in some countries not even diminished; on the other hand +the causes of material disagreement have increased, the inequality +has augmented, the division between the two groups has grown, and the +causes of hatred have been consolidated. An analysis of the foreign +exchanges indicated a process of undoing and not a tendency to +reconstruction. + +We have referred in a general manner to the conditions of Germany as a +result of the Treaty of Versailles; even worse is the situation of the +other conquered countries in so far that either they have not been +treated with due regard, or they have lost so much territory that they +have no possibility of reconstructing their national existence. Such +is the case with Austria, with Turkey and with Hungary. Bulgaria, +which has a tenacious and compact population composed of small +agriculturists, has less difficult conditions of reconstruction. + +Germany has fulfilled loyally all the conditions of the disarmament. +After she had handed over her fleet she destroyed her fortifications, +she destroyed all the material up to the extreme limit imposed by the +treaties, she disbanded her enormous armies. If in any one of the +works of destruction she had proceeded with a bad will, if she had +tried to delay them, it would be perfectly understandable. A different +step carries one to a dance or to a funeral. At the actual moment +Germany has no fleet, no army, no artillery, and is in a condition in +which she could not reply to any act of violence. This is why all the +violence of the Poles against Germany has found hardly any opposition. + +All this is so evident that no one can raise doubts on the question. + +Everyone remembers, said Hindenburg, the difficult task that the +United States had to put in the field an army of a million men. +Nevertheless they had the protection of the ocean during the period +when they were preparing their artillery and their aerial material. + +Germany for her aviation, for her heavy artillery, for her armaments, +is not even separated by the ocean from her Allies, and, on the +contrary, they are firmly established in German territory; it would +require many months to prepare a new war, during which France and her +Allies would not be resting quietly. + +General Ludendorff recently made certain declarations which have a +capital importance, since they fit the facts exactly. He declared +that a war of reconquest by Germany against the Allies and especially +against France is for an indefinite time completely impossible from +the technical and military point of view. France has an army largely +supplied with all the means of battle, ready to march at any time, +which could smash any German military organization hostile to France. +The more so since by the destruction of the German war industries +Germany has lost every possibility of arming herself afresh. It is +absurd to believe that a German army ready for modern warfare can be +organized and put on a war footing secretly. A German army which could +fight with the least possible hope of success against an enemy army +armed and equipped in the most modern manner would first of all have +to be based on a huge German war industry, which naturally could not +be improvised or built up in secret. Even if a third power wished +to arm Germany, it would not be possible to arm her so quickly and +mobilize her in sufficient time to prevent the enemy army from +obtaining an immediate and decisive victory. + +It would be necessary, as everyone realizes even in France, that +Germany should wish to commit suicide. In consequence of the treaty +there is the "maximum of obstacles which mind can conceive" to +guard against any German peril; and against Germany there have been +accumulated "_such guarantees that never before has history recorded +the like_" (Tardieu), and Germany cannot do anything for many years. +Mobilization requires years and years for preparation and the greatest +publicity for its execution. + +Wilson spoke of guarantees _given and received_ for the reduction of +armaments. Instead, after the treaties had been concluded, if the +conquered were completely disarmed, the conquering nations have +continued to arm. Almost all the conquering nations have not only high +expenses but more numerous armies. If the conditions of peace imposed +by the treaties were considered supportable, remembering the fact that +the late enemies were harmless, against whom are these continuous +increase of armaments? + +We have already seen the military conditions imposed on Germany--a +small mercenary army, no obligatory conscription, no military +instruction, no aviation, no artillery except a minimum and +insignificant quantity required by the necessities of interior order. +Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary can only have insignificant armies. +Austria may maintain under arms 30,000 men, but her ruined finances +only permit her, according to the latest reports, to keep 21,700; +Bulgaria has 20,000 men plus 3,082 gendarmes; Hungary, according to +the Treaty of Trianon, has 35,000. Turkey in Europe, which hardly +exists any more as a territorial State, except for the city of +Constantinople, where the sovereignty of the Sultan is more apparent +than real, has not an actual army. + +Taken all together the States which formed the powerful nucleus of war +of Germany as they are now reduced territorially have under arms fewer +than 180,000 men, not including, naturally, those new States risen on +the ruins of the old Central Empires, and which arm themselves by the +request and sometimes in the interest of some State of the Entente. + +The old enemies, therefore, are not in a condition to make war, and +are placed under all manner of controls. Sometimes the controls are +even of a very singular nature. All have been occupied in giving the +sea to the victors. Poland has obtained the absurd paradox of the +State of Danzig because it has the sea. The constant aim of the +Allies, even in opposition to Italy, has been to give free and safe +outlets on the sea coast to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. + +At the Conference of London and San Remo I repeatedly referred to +the expenses of these military missions of control and often their +outrageous imposition on the conquered who are suffering from hunger. +There are generals who are assigned as indemnity and expenses of all +sorts, salaries which are much superior to that of the President of +the United States of America. It is necessary to look at Vienna and +Budapest, where the people are dying of hunger, to see the carnival of +the Danube Commission. For the rest it is only necessary to look at +the expense accounts of the Reparations Commissions to be convinced +that this sad spectacle of greed and luxury humiliates the victors +more than the conquered. + +German-Austria has lost every access to the sea. She cannot live on +her resources with her enormous capital in ruins. She cannot unite +with Germany, though she is a purely German country, because the +treaty requires the unanimous consent of the League of Nations, and +France having refused, it is therefore impossible. She cannot unite +with Czeko-Slovakia, with Hungary and other countries which have +been formed from the Austrian Empire, because that is against the +aspirations of the German populations, and it would be the formation +anew of that Danube State which, with its numerous contrasts, was one +of the essential causes of the War. Austria has lost every access +to the sea, has consigned her fleet and her merchant marine, but in +return has had the advantage of numerous inter-allied commissions of +control to safeguard the military, naval and aeronautic clauses. But +there are clauses which can no longer be justified, as, for instance, +when Austria no longer has a sea coast. (Art. 140 of the Treaty of St. +Germain, which forbids the construction or acquisition of: any sort of +submersible vessel, even commercial.) It is impossible to understand +why (Art. 143) the wireless high-power station of Vienna is not +allowed to transmit other than commercial telegrams under the +surveillance of the Allied and Associated Powers, who take the trouble +to determine even the length of the wave to be used. + +Before the War, in 1914, France desired to bring her army to the +maximum of efficiency; opposite a great German army was to be found a +great French army. + +Germany had in 1913, according to the Budget presented to the +Reichstag, a standing army of 647,000 soldiers of all arms, of which +105,000 were non-commissioned officers and 30,000 officers. It was the +greatest army of Europe and of the world, taking into account its real +efficiency. + +Whilst Germany has no longer an army, France on July 1, 1921, had +under arms 810,000 men, of which 38,473 were officers, therefore many +more than Germany had before the War. Given its demographic character, +it is the greatest military force which has been seen in modern times, +and can only have two reasons--either military domination or ruin. The +military budget proposed for the present year in the ordinary section +is for 2,782 millions of francs, besides that portion paid by Germany +for the army of occupation; the extraordinary section of the same +budget is for 1,712 millions of francs, besides 635 millions for +expenses repayable for the maintenance of troops of occupation in +foreign countries. + +Austria-Hungary had in 1913 a total of 34,000 officers and 390,249 +men; the States which have arisen from her ruins have a good many +more. Whilst German-Austria has, as a matter of fact, only 21,700 men +and Hungary has only 35,000, Czeko-Slovakia has 150,000 men, of which +10,000 are officers; Jugo-Slavia has about 120,000, of which 8,000 to +10,000 are officers. + +But the two allies of France--Belgium and Poland, Belgium no longer +neutral, Poland always in disorder and in a state of continual +provocation abroad and of increasing anarchy at home--have in their +turn armies which previous to the War could have been maintained only +by a first-class power. Belgium has doubled her peace effectives, +which now amount to 113,500 men, an enormous army for a population +which is about equal to that of the city of New York or London. + +Poland, whose economic conditions are completely disastrous, and may +be described as having neither money nor credit any more, but which +maintains more employees than any other country on earth, has under +arms not fewer than 430,000 men, and often many more, and possibly has +to-day many more--about 600,000. Her treaty with France imposes on her +military obligations the extension of which cannot be compatible with +the policy of a country desiring peace. Poland has, besides, vast +dreams of greatness abroad, and growing ruin in the interior. She +enslaves herself in order to enslave others, and pretends in her +disorder to control and dominate much more intelligent and cultured +peoples. + +Rumania has under arms 160,000 men besides 80,000 carabineers and +16,000 frontier guards. Greece has, particularly on account of her +undertakings in Asia Minor, which only the lesser intelligence of her +national exaltations can explain, more than 400,000 men under arms. +She is suffocating under the weight of heavy armaments and can move +only with difficulty. + +The two pupils of the Entente, Greece and Poland, exactly like naughty +children, have a policy of greed and capriciousness. Poland was not +the outcome of her own strength, but of the strength of the Entente. +Greece never found the way to contribute heavily to the War with a +strong army, and after the War has the most numerous army which she +has ever had in her history. + +Great Britain and Italy are the only two countries which have largely +demobilized; Great Britain in the much greater measure. It is +calculated that Great Britain has under arms 201,000 men, of which +15,030 are officers. In this number, however, are not included 75,896 +men in India and the personnel of the Air Force. + +In Italy, on July 31, 1921, there were under arms 351,076 soldiers +and 18,138 officers, in all 369,214, of which, however, 56,529 were +carabineers carrying out duties almost exclusively of public order. + +Under the pressure and as a result of the example of the States which +have come through the War, those States which did not take part have +also largely augmented their armies. + +So, whilst the conquered have ceased every preoccupation, the neutrals +of the War have developed their armaments, and the conquerors have +developed theirs beyond measure. + +No one can say what may be the position of Bolshevik Russia; probably +she has not much less than a million of men under arms, also because +in a communist regime the vagabonds and the violent find the easiest +occupation in the army. + +The conquerors, having disarmed the conquered, have imposed their +economic conditions, their absurd moralities and territorial +humiliations, as those imposed on Bulgaria, Turkey and Hungary, +conditions which are sufficiently difficult to be maintained. And as +the ferment of hate develops, the conquerors do not disarm. Above +all, the little States do not disarm, who have wanted too much, have +obtained too much, and now do not know how to maintain what they +have. In many countries for certain social reasons war has become an +industry; they live by the state of war. What would they do without a +state of war? + +In general, then, Europe has considerably more men under arms than in +1913. Not only has it not disarmed, as the Entente always declared +would be the consequence of the victory of the principles of +democracy, but the victors are always leaning toward further armament. +The more difficult it becomes to maintain the conditions of the peace, +because of their severity and their absurdity, the more necessary it +is to maintain armies. The conquered have not armies; the conquerors +are, or, perhaps, up to a short time ago, were sure that the big +armies would serve to enforce the payment of the indemnities. Now, in +fact, they would not serve for anything else. + +At the Conference of London, after a long discussion in February, +1920, the economic manifesto was drawn up which warned Europe of the +perils of the economic situation. Lloyd George and myself were easily +agreed in denouncing it as the gravest danger, as the principal cause +of high prices and of economic disorder, both as to the maintenance of +large armies and in the continuation of the state of war. + +A Europe divided distinctly into two parts cannot be pacific even +after the conquered have yielded up their arms. The conquerors are +bound to arm themselves because of their own inquietude, from the +conviction that the only salvation is in force, which allows, if not +a true peace, at least an armed peace; if not the development of +production and exchange, at least the possibility of cutting off from +the markets the very fountains of riches. + +Violence begets new violence. If the conditions of the peace cannot +be fulfilled, other heavier conditions can be imposed. In France +irresponsible people are supporting already the necessity of occupying +permanently the Ruhr, that is to say, the greatest German centre for +the production of coal, and of not respecting the plebiscite of Upper +Silesia. + +What has been said about the armies is true also about the fleets. +There is a race towards the increase of naval armaments. If first that +was the preoccupation of the conquered, now it is the preoccupation of +the conquerors in the exchange of doubts into which they have fallen +after the War. + +The state of mind which has been created between Great Britain, the +United States of America and Japan deserves to be seriously examined. +The race for naval armaments into which these three countries entered +not many months ago, and the competition between the two great +Anglo-Saxon people, cannot be other than very damaging for +civilization. + +The Great War which has been fought was at bottom the fight between +the Germanic race and the Slav race; it was the doubts in regard to +the last and not in regard to France which pushed Germany to war and +precipitated events. The results of the Continental War, however, are +the suppression of Germany, which lost, as well as of Russia, which +had not resisted, and France alone has gathered the fruits of the +situation, if they can be called that, from amongst the thorns which +everywhere surround the victory. + +But the War was decided, above all, by the intervention of the +Anglo-Saxon people, Great Britain, her Dominions, and the United +States of America. Nothing but the small political intelligence of the +German statesmen could have united in the same group the peoples +who have the greatest contrast of interests among themselves--Great +Britain, Russia, the United States of America, Japan, France and +Italy. + +But now the situation of Europe and especially that of Asia is +creating fresh competitions, the expenses for the navies, according to +the figures of the various Budgets from 1914 to 1921, have risen in +the United States of America from 702 millions of lire to 2,166, in +Great Britain from 1,218 millions to 2,109, in Japan from 249 millions +to 1,250, in France from 495 millions to 1,083, in Italy from 250 +millions to 402. The sums proposed for new constructions in the year +1921-22 are 450 millions in the United States of America, 475 millions +for Great Britain, 281 millions for Japan, 185 millions for France, +and 61 millions for Italy. + +The United States of America and Great Britain are countries of great +resources: they can stand the effort. But can Japan, which has but +limited resources, support these for any length of time? or has she +some immediate intentions? + +A comparative table of the navies in 1914 and 1921 shows that the +fleets of the conquering countries are very much more powerful than +they were before the War. Nevertheless, Russia and Austria-Hungary and +the people arisen in their territories are not naval powers; Germany +has lost all her fleet. The race for naval armaments regards +especially the two Anglo-Saxon powers and Japan; the race for land +armaments regards all the conquerors of Europe and especially the +small States. + +This situation cannot but be the cause of great preoccupation; but +the greater preoccupation arises from the fact that the minor States, +especially those which took no part in the War, become every day more +exigent and display fresh aspirations. + +The whole system of the Treaty of Versailles has been erected on the +error of Poland. Poland was not created as the noble manifestation +of the rights of nationality, ethnical Poland was not created, but a +great State which, as she is, cannot live long, because there are not +great foreign minorities, but a whole mass of populations which cannot +co-exist, Poland, which has already the experience of a too numerous +Israelitic population, has not the capacity to assimilate the Germans, +the Russians and the Ukranians which the Treaty of Versailles has +unjustly given to her against the very declarations of Wilson. + +So that after, with the aid of the Entente, having had the strength +to resist the Bolshevik troops, Poland is now in a state of permanent +anarchy; consumes and does not produce; pays debts with a fantastic +bigness and does not know how to regulate the incomings. No country +in the world has ever more abused paper currency; her paper money is +probably the most greatly depreciated of any country on earth. She +has not succeeded in organizing her own production, and now tends to +dissolve the production of her neighbours. + +The whole Treaty of Versailles is based on a vigorous and vital +Poland. A harmless Germany, unable to unite with an equally harmless +German-Austria, should be under the military control of France and +Belgium on the west, and of Poland on the east. Poland, separating +Germany from Russia, besides imposing on Germany the territorial +outrage of the Danzig corridor, cuts her off from any possibility of +expansion and development in the east. Poland has been conceived as a +great State. A Polish nation was not constituted; a Polish military +State was constituted, whose principal duty is that of disorganizing +Germany. + +Poland, the result of a miracle of the War (no one could foretell the +simultaneous fall of the Central Empires and of the Russian Empire), +was formed not from a tenacious endeavour, but from an unforeseen +circumstance, which was the just reward for the long martyrdom of a +people. The borders of Poland will reach in time to the Baltic Sea in +the north, the Carpathians and the Dniester in the south, in the east +the country almost as far as Smolensk, in the west to the parts of +Germany, Brandenburg and Pomerania. The new patriots dream of an +immense Poland, the old Poland of tradition, and then to descend into +the countries of the Ukraine and dominate new territories. + +It is easy to see that, sooner or later, the Bolshevik degeneration +over, Russia will be recomposed; Germany, in spite of all the attempts +to break her up and crush her unity, within thirty or forty years will +be the most formidable ethnical nucleus of Continental Europe. What +will then happen to a Poland which pretends to divide two people who +represent numerically and will represent in other fields also the +greatest forces of Continental Europe of to-morrow? + +Amongst many in France there is the old conception of Napoleon I, who +considered the whole of European politics from an erroneous point of +view, that of a lasting French hegemony in Europe, when the lasting +hegemony of peoples is no longer possible. In the sad solitude of his +exile at Saint Helena, Napoleon I said that not to have created a +powerful Poland keystone of the roof of the European edifice, not to +have destroyed Prussia, and to have been mistaken in regard to Russia, +were the three great errors of his life. But all his work had as an +end to put the life of Europe under the control of France, and was +necessarily wrecked by reality, which does not permit the lasting +mistake of a single nation which places herself above all the others +in a free and progressive Europe. + +If the policy of the Entente towards Germany and towards the conquered +countries does not correspond either to collective declarations made +during the War, or to the promises solemnly made by Wilson, the policy +towards Russia has been a whole series of error. In fact, one cannot +talk of a policy of the Entente, in so far that with the exception of +a few errors committed in common, Great Britain, France and Italy have +each followed their own policy. + +In his sixth point, among the fourteen points, no longer pure, but +violated and outraged worse than the women of a conquered race by a +tribe of Kurds, Wilson said on January 8, 1918, that the treatment +meted out to Russia by the sister nations, and therefore their loyalty +in assisting her to settle herself, should be the stern proof of +their goodwill. They should show that they did not confound their +own interests, or rather their egoism, with what should be done for +Russia. The proof was most unfortunate. + +The attitude of the Entente towards Russia has had different phases. + +In the first phase, the prevailing idea, especially on the part of +one of the Allies, was to send military expeditions in conjunction +especially with Rumania and Poland. This idea was immediately +abandoned on account of its very absurdity. + +In the second phase, the greatest hopes were placed in the blockade; +of isolating Russia completely, cutting off from her (and for the rest +she no longer had it) every facility of trade exchange. At the same +time war on the part of Poland and Rumania was encouraged, to help the +attempt which the men of the old regime were making in the interior. +France alone reached the point of officially recognizing the Tsarist +undertaking of General Wrangel. + +Lloyd George, with the exception of some initial doubts, always had +the clearest ideas in regard to Russia, and I never found myself in +disagreement with him in valuing the men and the Russian situation. It +is easy for a broad and serene mind to judge the position of the rest. + +For my part I always tried to follow that policy which would best +bring about the most useful result with the least damage. After the +War the working masses in Europe had the greatest illusions about +Russian communism and the Bolshevik organization. Every military +expedition against Russia signified giving the people the conviction +that it was desired not to fight an enemy but to suffocate in blood an +attempt at a communist organization. I have always thought that the +dictatorship of the proletariat, that is the dictatorship of ignorance +and incapacity, would necessarily lead to disaster, and that hunger +and death would follow violence. There are for the peoples great +errors which must be carried out in the very effort to benefit +civilization. Our propaganda would have served nothing without the +reality of ruin. Only the death by hunger of millions of men in +communist Russia will convince the working masses in Europe and +America that the experiment of Russia is not to be followed; rather is +it to be avoided at any cost. To exterminate the communist attempt by +an unjust war, even if it were possible, would have meant ruin for +Western civilization. + +On repeated occasions I have counselled Rumania and Poland not to make +any attempt against Russia and to limit themselves to defence. Every +unjust aggression on the part of Bolshevik Russia would have found the +Entente disposed to further sacrifice to save two free nations, but +any provocation on their part could not create secure solidarity. + +When I assumed the direction of the Government in June, 1919, an +Italian military expedition was under orders for Georgia. The English +troops, who were in small numbers, were withdrawing; Italy had, with +the consent of the Allies, and partly by her own desire, prepared +a big military expedition. A considerable number of divisions were +ready, as also were the ships to commence the transport. Georgia is a +country of extraordinary natural resources, and it was thought +that she would be able to furnish Italy with a great number of raw +materials which she lacked. What surprised me was that not only men of +the Government, but intelligent financiers and men of very advanced +ideas, were convinced supporters of this expedition. + +However, confronted by much opposition, I immediately renounced this +undertaking, and renounced it in a definite form, limiting myself to +encouraging every commercial enterprise. + +Certainly the Allies could not suggest anything unfriendly to Italy; +but the effect of the expedition was to put Italy directly at variance +with the government of Moscow, to launch her upon an adventure of +which it was impossible to tell the consequences. + +In fact, not long afterwards Georgia fell into the hands of the +Bolsheviks, who sent there an army of 125,000 men, and since then +she has not been able to liberate herself. If Italy had made that +expedition she would have been engaged in a frightful military +adventure, with most difficult and costly transport in a theatre of +war of insuperable difficulty. To what end? + +Georgia before the War formed part of the Russian Empire, and no +country of the Entente had considered that unjust. Further, as though +the vast empire and the dominion of the Caucasus were not enough for +Russia, the Entente with monstrous condescension had given to Russia +Constantinople and the Straits and a huge zone in Asia Minor. How +could you take away from Russia a territory which was legitimately +hers? And _vice versa_, if Georgia and the other States of the +Caucasus had sufficient strength to live autonomously, how can +you dominate Aryan people who have risen to a notable state of +development? + +To go to Georgia inevitably meant war with Russia for Italy, and one, +moreover, fraught with extraordinary difficulties. In fact, later, the +government of Moscow, as we have said, succeeded in invading as well +as Georgia almost all the republics of the Caucasus. And at San Remo, +discussing the possibility of an expedition on the part of Great +Britain, France and Italy to defend at least the oil production, after +the report of a military committee presided over by Marshal Foch, the +conclusion was quickly and easily arrived at that it was better to +leave the matter alone. + +Italy had already made an expedition into Albania, the reason for +which beyond the military necessities for the period of the War has +never been understood, except that of spending a huge sum without +receiving the gratitude of the Albanians; an expedition in Georgia +would have done harm, the consequence of which cannot be readily +measured, it could, indeed, have meant ruin. + +Even those minds that are most blinded by prejudice and hate recognize +the complete failure of the Russian communist system. The so-called +dictatorship of the proletariat is reduced in practice to a military +dictatorship of a communist group which represents only a fraction of +the working classes and that not the best. The Bolshevik government +is in the hands of a small minority in which fanaticism has taken the +place of character. Everything which represented the work of the past +has been destroyed and they have not known how to construct anything. +The great industries have fallen and production is paralysed. Russia +has lived for a long time on the residues of her capitalistic +production rather than on new productions. The productivity of her +agricultural and industrial work has been killed by communism, and the +force of work has been reduced to a minimum. The Russian people are in +straits which have no comparison, and entire territories are dying of +hunger. The communist regime in a short time has precipitated such +damage and such misery as no system of oppression could achieve in +centuries. It is the proof, if any were necessary, that the form of +communist production is not only harmful but not even lasting. The +economists say that it is absurd, but, given the collective madness +which has attacked some people, nothing is absurd beyond hoping in the +rapid recovery of the most excited nations. + +If any country could be the scene of a communist experiment it was +Russia. Imperial Russia represented the most vast continuative +territory which a State ever occupied in all history's records of vast +empires. Under the Tsars a territory which was almost three times the +size of the United States of America was occupied by a people +who, with the exception of a few cases of individual revolt, were +accustomed to the most servile obedience. Under Nicholas II a few men +exercised rule in a most despotic form over more than 180,000,000 +individuals spread over an immense territory. All obeyed blindly. +Centralization was so great, and the obedience to the central power so +absolute, that no hostile demonstration was tolerated for long. The +communist regime therefore was able to count not only on the apathy +of the Russian people but also upon the blindest obedience. To this +fundamental condition of success, to a Government which must regulate +production despotically, was joined another even greater condition +of success. Russia is one of those countries which, like the United +States of America, China and Brazil (the four greatest countries +of the earth, not counting the English dominions with much thinner +populations), possess within their own territories everything +necessary for life. Imagine a country of self-contained economy, that +lives entirely upon her own resources and trades with no one (and that +is what happened in Russia as a result of the blockade), Russia has +the possibility of realizing within herself the most prosperous +conditions of existence. She has in her territories everything: grain, +textile fibres, combustibles of every sort; Russia is one of the +greatest reserves, if not the greatest reserve, in the world. +Well, the communist organization was sufficient, the bureaucratic +centralization, which communism must necessarily carry with it, to +arrest every form of production. Russia, which before could give grain +to all, is dying of hunger; Russia, which had sufficient quantities of +coal for herself and could give petroleum to all Europe, can no longer +move her railways; Russia, which had wool, flax, linen, and could have +easily increased her cotton cultivation in the Caucasus, cannot even +clothe the soldiers and functionaries of the Bolshevik State. Ceased +is the stimulus of individual interest; few work; the peasants work +only to produce what their families need; the workers in the city are +chiefly engaged in meetings and political reunions. All wish to +live upon the State, and production, organized autocratically and +bureaucratically, every day dries up and withers a bit more. + +To those who read the collection of laws issued by the Bolshevik +government many institutions appear not only reasonable, but also full +of interest and justice. Also many laws of the absolute governments +of past regimes appear intelligent and noble. But the law has not in +itself any power of creation; it regulates relations, does not create +them. It can even take away wealth from some and give it to others, +but cannot create the wealth. When the individual interest begins to +lack, work, which is sorrow and pain, lags and does not produce. To +begin with, it weakens in the short days when energy is avoided, and +then it stops through incapacity for energy. The old fundamental truth +is that in all the Aryan tongues the words which indicate work have +the same root as the words which denote pain. Among the great mass of +man work is only done by necessity or under the stimulus of individual +interest which excites the production of wealth. They work for wealth; +and therefore in the Aryan tongues wealth means dominion and power. + +Two years ago I wanted, in spite of the opinion of others, to consent +to the Italian Socialists visiting Russia. I was convinced that +nothing would have served better to break in Italy the sympathy +for Russia, or rather the illusions of the revolutionaries, as the +spectacle of famine and disorder would. Never did the Press of my +country, or the greater part of it, criticize with more violence a +proposal which I considered to be both wise and prudent. I am glad to +state that I was right, and that, maybe through the uncertainties +and the lessons of those who had spread the illusions, the Italian +Socialists returned from Russia were bound to recognize that the +communist experiment was the complete ruin of the Russian people. No +conservative propaganda could have been more efficacious than the +vision of the truth. + +I am convinced that the hostile attitude, and almost persecution, on +the part of the Entente rather helped the Bolshevik government, whose +claims to discredit were already so numerous that it was not necessary +to nullify it by an unjust and evident persecution. + +The Bolshevik government could not be recognized: it gave no +guarantees of loyalty, and too often its representatives had violated +the rights of hospitality and intrigued through fanatics and excited +people to extend the revolution. Revolution and government are two +terms which cannot co-exist. But not to recognize the government of +the Soviet does not mean that the conditions of such recognition must +include that the War debt shall be guaranteed, and, worse still, the +pre-War debt, or that the gold resources and the metals of Russia +shall be given as a guarantee of that debt. This morality, exclusively +financial and plutocratic, cannot be the base of international +relations in a period in which humanity, after the sorrows of the War, +has the annoyance of a peace which no one foresaw and of which very +few in the early days understood the dangers. + +Even when there was a tendency favourable to the recognition of the +republic of the Soviet, I was always decidedly against it. It is +impossible to recognize a State which bases all its relations on +violence, and which in its relations with foreign States seeks, or +has almost always sought, to carry out revolutionary propaganda. Even +when, yielding to an impulse which it was not possible to avoid--in +the new Italian Chamber, after the elections of 1919 not only the +Socialists, but above all the Catholic popular party and the party of +Rinnovamento, of which the ex-soldiers especially formed part, voted +unanimously an order of the day for the recognition of the actual +government of Russia--I did not think it right to give, and did not +give, effect to that vote, impulsively generous, which would have +invested Italy with the responsibility of recognizing, even if it were +_de facto_, the government of the Soviet. + +I have always, however, rebelled and would never give my consent to +any military undertakings against Russia, not even to a participation +in the undertakings of men of the old regime. It was easy to foresee +that the population would not have followed them and that the +undertakings were doomed to failure. However, all the attempts at +military revolts and counter-revolutions were encouraged with supplies +of arms and material. But in 1920 all the military undertakings, in +spite of the help given, failed one after another. In February the +attempt of Admiral Koltchak failed miserably, and in March that of +General Judenic. Failed has the attempt of Denikin. All the hopes of +the restoration were centred in General Wrangel. The only Grand Duke +with any claim to military authority also sent to tell me that this +was a serious attempt with probability of success. General Wrangel, in +fact, reunited the scattered forces of the old regime and occupied a +large territory in power. France not only recognized in the government +of Wrangel the legitimate representative of Russia, but nominated her +official representatives with him. In November, 1920, even the army +of Wrangel, which appeared to be of granite, was scattered. Poland, +through alternating vicissitudes, claimed the power of resistance, but +has shown that she has no offensive power against Russia. So all the +attempts at restoration have broken, one after another. + +One of the greatest errors of the Entente has been to treat Russia +on many occasions, not as a fallen friend, but as a conquered enemy. +Nothing has been more deplorable than to have considered as Russia the +men of the old regime, who have been treated for a long time as the +representatives of an existing State when the State no longer existed. + +Let us suppose that the Bolshevik government transforms itself and +gives guarantees to the civilized nations not to make revolutionary +agitations in foreign countries, to maintain the pledges she assumes, +and to respect the liberty of citizens; the United States of America, +Great Britain and Italy would recognize her at once. But France has an +entirely different point of view. She will not give any recognition +unless the creditors of the old regime are guaranteed. + +In June, 1920, the government of Moscow sent some gold to Sweden to +purchase indispensable goods. Millerand, President of the Council of +Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared to the Minister of +Sweden at Paris that if his Government consented to receive Russian +gold _ferait acte de receleur_. He then telegraphed to the Minister of +Finance at Stockholm regretting that the Government and public opinion +in Sweden were tending to consider the _revendications juridiques_ of +the French creditors of the ancient Russian regime to be such that +they did not stop the consignment of Swedish goods against Russian +gold. He added at the end that the syndicates of creditors could +utilize the news in telegram No. 355, in which the Swedish Government +gave notice of the trade and put a sequestration on Russian gold sent +to Sweden. + +This telegram, better than any speech, shows the diversity of +conception. + +The Bolshevik government may be so immoral that we cannot recognize +it until it gives serious guarantees. But if the government of Moscow +sends a little of the gold that remains, or has remained, to buy +goods, what right have we to sequestrate the gold in the interests of +the creditors of the old regime? + +The new regime, born after the revolution, can also not recognize the +debts of the old regime and annul them. It is not for that that we +have no relations with it. + +We have pushed Germany by absurd demands to ruin her circulation. It +is already at about 100 milliard of marks; if to-morrow it goes to 150 +or to 200, it will be necessary to annul it, nearly the same as is +done for bills of exchange. And for this should we not treat with +Germany? + +The new plutocratic conception, which marks the policy of a section +of the Entente, is not lasting, and the people have a justifiable +diffidence towards it. + +Bolshevism, as I have repeatedly stated, cannot be judged by our +western eyes: it is not a popular and revolutionary movement; it is a +religious fanaticism of the orthodox of the East hoisted on the throne +of Tsarist despotism. + +Italy is the country which suffers most from the lack of continuous +relations with Russia in so far that almost all Italian commerce, and +in consequence the prices of freight and goods, have been for almost +half a century regulated by the traffic with the Black Sea. + +Ships which leave England fully laden with goods for Italy generally +continue to the Black Sea, where they fill up with grain, petroleum, +etc., and then return to England, after having taken fresh cargoes in +Italy and especially iron in Spain. It was possible in Italy for long +periods of time to obtain most favourable freights and have coal at +almost the same price as in England. The voyages of the ships were +made, both coming and going, fully laden. + +The situation of Russia, therefore, hurts especially Italy. Great +Britain has Mediterranean interests; France is partly a Mediterranean +nation; Italy alone is a Mediterranean nation. + +Although Italy has a particular interest in reopening relations with +Russia, the Italian Government has understood that the best and +shortest way is not to recognize the government of Moscow. But Italy +will never subordinate her recognition to plutocratic considerations. +Whatever government there may be in Italy, it will never associate +itself with actions directed to compelling Russia, in order to be +recognized, to guarantee the payment of obligations assumed previous +to the War and the revolution. Civilization has already suppressed +corporal punishment for insolvent debtors, and slavery, from which +individuals are released, should not be imposed on nations by +democracies which say they are civilized. + +The fall of the communistic organization in Russia is inevitable. Very +probably from the immense revolutionary catastrophe which has hit +Russia there will spring up the diffusion of a regime of small landed +proprietors. Whatever is contrary to human nature is not lasting, and +communism can only accumulate misery, and on its ruins will arise new +forms of life which we cannot yet define. But Bolshevik Russia can +count still on two elements which we do not habitually take into +account: the apathy and indolence of the people on the one hand, and +the strength of the military organization on the other. No other +people would have resigned itself to the intense misery and to the +infinite sufferings which tens of millions of Russians endure without +complaint. But still in the midst of so much misery no other people +would have known how to maintain a powerful and disciplined army such +as is the army of revolutionary Russia. + +The Russian people have never had any sympathy for the military +undertakings which the Entente has aided. During some of the meetings +of Premiers at Paris and London I had occasion, in the sittings of +the conferences, to speak with the representatives of the new +States, especially those from the Caucasus. They were all agreed +in considering that the action of the men of the old regime, and +especially Denikin, was directed at the suppression of the independent +States and to the return of the old forms, and they attributed to this +the aversion of the Russian people to them. + +Certainly it is difficult to speak of Russia where there exists no +longer a free Press and the people have hardly any other preoccupation +than that of not dying of hunger. Although it is a disastrous +organization, the organization of the Soviet remains still the only +one, which it is not possible to substitute immediately with another. +Although the Russian people can re-enter slowly into international +life and take up again its thread, a long time is necessary, but also +it is necessary to change tactics. + +The peasants, who form the enormous mass of the Russian people, look +with terror on the old regime. They have occupied the land and will +maintain that occupation; they do not want the return of the great +Russian princes who possessed lands covering provinces and were even +ignorant of their possessions. One of the causes which has permitted +Bolshevism to last is, as I have said, the attitude of the Entente, +which on many occasions has shown the greatest sympathy for the men of +the old regime. The Tsar of Russia was an insignificant man, all the +Grand Dukes were persons without dignity and without credit, and the +Court and Government abounded with men without scruples--violent, +thieves, and drunkards. If Bolshevik government had been ruin, no one +can deny but that a great part of the blame belongs to the old regime, +the return of which no honest man desires. + +An error not less serious was to allow Poland to occupy large tracts +of purely Russian territory. + +There remain in Europe, therefore, so many states of unrest which do +not only concern the conditions of the conquered countries, but also +those of the conquering countries. We have already seen how Germany +and the States which form part of her group cannot now any longer +represent a danger of war for many years to come, and that none the +less the victorious countries and the new States continue to arm +themselves in a most formidable manner. We have seen what an element +of disorder Poland has become and how the policy of the Entente +towards Russia has constituted a permanent danger. + +But all Europe is still uncertain and the ground is so movable that +any new construction threatens ruin. Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, +Turkey, cannot live under the conditions imposed on them by the +treaties. But the new States for the most part are themselves in a +sufficiently serious position. + +With the exception of Finland all the other States which have arisen +on the ruins of the Russian Empire are in serious difficulty. If +Esthonia and Lithuania are in a fairly tolerable situation Lettonia is +in real ruin, and hunger and tuberculosis rule almost everywhere, as +in many districts of Poland and Russia. At Riga hunger and sickness +have caused enormous losses amongst the population. Recently 15,000 +children were in an extremely serious physical and mental condition. +In a single dispensary, of 663 children who were brought for treatment +151 were under-nourished, 229 were scrofulous, 66 anaemic, and 217 +suffering from rickets. The data published in England and the United +States and those of the Red Cross of Geneva are terrible. + +Even with the greatest imagination it is difficult to think how +Hungary and Austria can live and carry out, even in the smallest +degree, the obligations imposed by the treaties. By a moral paradox, +besides living they must indemnify the victors, according to the +Treaties of St. Germain and the Trianon, for all the damages which the +War has brought on themselves and which the victors have suffered. + +Hungary has undergone the greatest occupation of her territories and +her wealth. This poor great country, which saved both civilization and +Christianity, has been treated with a bitterness which nothing can +explain except the desire of greed of those surrounding her, and the +fact that the weaker people, seeing the stronger overcome, wish and +insist that she shall be reduced to impotence. Nothing, in fact, can +justify the measures of violence and the depredations committed in +Magyar territory. What was the Rumanian occupation of Hungary: a +systematic rapine and the systematic destruction for a long time +hidden, and the stern reproach which Lloyd George addressed in London +to the Premier of Rumania was perfectly justified. After the War +everyone wanted some sacrifice from Hungary, and no one dared to say a +word of peace or goodwill for her. When I tried it was too late. +The victors hated Hungary for her proud defence. The adherents of +Socialism do not love her because she had to resist, under more +than difficult conditions, internal and external Bolshevism. The +international financiers hate her because of the violences committed +against the Jews. So Hungary suffers all the injustices without +defence, all the miseries without help, and all the intrigues without +resistance. + +Before the War Hungary had an area almost equal to that of Italy, +282,870 square kilometres, with a population of 18,264,533 +inhabitants. The Treaty of Trianon reduced her territory to 91,114 +kilometres--that is, 32.3 per cent.--and the population to 7,481,954, +or 41 per cent. It was not sufficient to cut off from Hungary the +populations which were not ethnically Magyar. Without any reason +1,084,447 Magyars have been handed over to Czeko-Slovakia, 457,597 to +Jugo-Slavia, 1,704,851 to Rumania. Also other nuclei of population +have been detached without reason. + +Amongst all the belligerents Hungary perhaps is the country which in +comparison with the population has had the greatest number of dead; +the monarchy of the Habsburgs knew that they could count on the +bravery of the Magyars, and they sent them to massacre in all the most +bloody battles. So the little people gave over 500,000 dead and an +enormous number of injured and sick. + +The territories taken from Hungary represent two-thirds of her mineral +wealth; the production of three million quintali (300,000 tons) of +gold and silver is entirely lost; the great production of salt is +also lost to her (about 250,000 tons). The production of iron ore is +reduced by 19 per cent., of anthracite by 14 per cent., of lignite by +70 per cent.; of the 2,029 factories, hardly 1,241 have remained to +Hungary; more than three-quarters of the magnificent railway wealth +has been given away. + +Hungary at the same time has lost her greater resources in agriculture +and cattle breeding. + +The capital, henceforth, too large for a too small state, carries +on amidst the greatest difficulties, and there congregate the most +pitiable of the Transylvanian refugees and those from other lost +regions. + +The demographic structure of Hungary, which up to a few years ago was +excellent, is now threatening. The mortality among the children and +the mortality from tuberculosis have become alarming. At Budapest, +even after the War, the number of deaths surpasses the number of +births. The statistics published by Dr. Ferenczi prove that the +number of children afflicted with rickets and tuberculosis reaches in +Budapest the terrific figure of 250,000 in a population of about two +millions. It is said that practically all the new-born in recent +years, partly through the privations of the mothers and partly from +the lack of milk, are tuberculous. + +The conditions of life are so serious that there is no comparison; +some prices have only risen five to tenfold, but very many from thirty +to fifty and even higher. Grain, which before the War cost 31 crowns, +costs now 500 crowns; corn has passed from 17 to 220 and 250 crowns. +A kilogram of rice, which used to cost 70 centimes, can be found now +only at 80 crowns. Sugar, coffee and milk are at prices which are +absolutely prohibitive. + +Of the financial situation it is almost useless to speak. The +documents presented to the Conference of Brussels are sad evidence, +and a sure index is the course of the crown, now so reduced as to have +hardly any value in international relations. The effective income is +more than a fourth part of the effective expenses, and the rest is +covered especially by the circulation. + +Such is the situation of Hungary, which has lost everything, and which +suffers the most atrocious privations and the most cruel pangs of +hunger. In this condition she should, according to the Treaty of +Trianon, not only have sufficient for herself, but pay indemnities to +the enemy. + +The Hungarian deputies, at the sitting which approved the Treaty of +Trianon, were clad in mourning, and many were weeping. At the close +they all rose and sang the national hymn. + +A people which is in the condition of mind of the Magyar people can +accept the actual state of affairs as a temporary necessity, but have +we any faith that it will not seek all occasions to retake what it has +unjustly lost, and that in a certain number of years there will not be +new and more terrible wars? + +I cannot hide the profound emotion which I felt when Count Apponyi, +on January 16, 1920, before the Supreme Council at Paris, gave the +reasons of Hungary. + +You, gentlemen [he said], whom victory has permitted to place +yourselves in the position of judges, you have pronounced the +culpability of your late enemies and the point of view which directs +you in your resolutions is that of making the consequences of the War +fall on those who were responsible for it. + +Let us examine now with great serenity the conditions imposed on +Hungary, conditions which are inacceptable without the most serious +consequences. Taking away from Hungary the larger part of her +territory, the greater part of her population, the greater portion of +her economic resources, can this particular severity be justified by +the general principles which inspire the Entente? Hungary not having +been heard (and was not heard except to take note of the declaration +of the head of the delegation), cannot accept a verdict which destroys +her without explaining the reasons. + +The figures furnished by the Hungarian delegation left no doubt +behind: they treated of the dismemberment of Hungary and the sacrifice +of three millions and a half of Magyars and of the German population +of Hungary to people certainly more ignorant and less advanced. At the +end Apponyi and the Hungarian delegation did not ask for anything more +than a plebiscite for the territories in dispute. + +After he had explained in a marvellous manner the great function of +historic Hungary, that of having saved on various occasions Europe +from barbaric invasion, and of having known how to maintain its unity +for ten centuries in spite of the many differences amongst nations, +Count Apponyi showed how important it was for Europe to have a solid +Hungary against the spread of Bolshevism and violence. + +You can say [added Apponyi] that against all these reasons there is +only one--victory, the right of victory. We know it, gentlemen; we are +sufficient realists in politics to count on this factor. We know what +we owe to victory and we are ready to pay the price of our defeat. But +should this be the sole principle of construction: that force alone +should be the basis of what you would build, that force alone should +be the base of the new building, that material force alone should be +the power to hold up those constructions which fall whilst you are +trying to build them? The future of Europe would then be sad, and we +cannot believe it. We do not find all that in the mentality of the +victorious nations; we do not find it in the declarations in which you +have defined the principles for which you have fought, and the objects +of the War which you have proposed to yourselves. + +And after having referred to the traditions of the past, Count Apponyi +added: + +We have faith in the sincerity of the principles which you have +proclaimed: it would be doing you injustice to think otherwise. We +have faith in the moral forces with which you have wished to identify +your cause. And all that I wish to hope, gentlemen, is that the glory +of your arms may be surpassed by the glory of the peace which you will +give to the world. + +The Hungarian delegation was simply heard; but the treaty, which had +been previously prepared and was the natural consequence of the Treaty +of Versailles, was in no way modified. + +An examination of the Treaty of Trianon is superfluous. By a stroke +of irony the financial and economic clauses inflict the most serious +burdens on a country which had lost almost everything: which has lost +the greatest number of men proportionately in the War, which since +the War has had two revolutions, which for four months suffered the +sackings of Bolshevism--led by Bela Kun and the worst elements of +revolutionary political crime--and, finally, has suffered a Rumanian +occupation, which was worse almost than the revolutions or Bolshevism. + +It is impossible to say which of the peace treaties imposed on the +conquered is lasting and which is the least supportable: after the +Treaty of Versailles, all the treaties have had the same tendency and +the same conformation. + +The situation of German-Austria is now such that she can say with +Andromache: "Let it please God that I have still something more to +fear!" Austria has lost everything, and her great capital, which was +the most joyous in Europe, shelters now a population whose resources +are reduced to the minimum. The slump in her production, which is +carried on amidst all the difficulties, the fall in her credit, the +absolute lack of foreign exchanges, the difficulty of trading with the +hostile populations which surround her, put Austria in an extremely +difficult position and in progressive and continuous decadence. The +population, especially in the cities, is compelled to the hardest +privations; the increase of tuberculosis is continuous and +threatening. + +Bulgaria has had rather less loss, and although large tracts of +Bulgarian territory have been given without any justifiable motive to +Greece and Jugo-Slavia, and although all outlet on the Aegean has been +taken from her by assigning to Greece lands which she cannot maintain, +on the whole Bulgaria, after the Treaty of Neuilly, has less sharp +sufferings than the other conquered countries. Bulgaria had a +territorial extension of 113,809 square kilometres; she has now lost +about 9,000 square kilometres. She had a population of 4,800,000, and +has lost about 400,000. + +As for Turkey, if the treaties should continue to exist, she can be +considered as disappearing from Europe and on the road to disappear +from Asia. The Turkish population has been distributed haphazard, +especially to Greece, or divided up under the form of mandates to +countries of the Entente. According to the Treaty of Sèvres of August +10, 1920, Turkey abandons all her territory in Europe, withdrawing her +frontier to the Ciatalgia lines. + +Turkey in Europe is limited, therefore, to the surroundings of +Constantinople, with little more than 2,000 square kilometres, and a +population which is rather hard to estimate, but which is that only of +the city and the surroundings--perhaps a million and a half men. In +Asia Minor Turkey loses the territory of the Sanjak of Smyrna, +over which, however, she retains a purely nominal sovereignty; the +territory still undefined of the Armenian Republic: Syria, Cilicia, +Palestine and Mesopotamia, which become independent under mandatory +powers; in Arabia the territory of the Hedjaz, whilst the remainder +of the peninsula will enjoy almost complete independence. Besides, +Constantinople and the Straits are subject to international control, +and the three States now the most closely interested--Great Britain, +France and Italy--assume the control of the finances and other aspects +of the Ottoman administration. + +Every programme has ignored Turkey except when the Entente has had +opportunity to favour Greece. The Greece of Venezelos was the ward of +the Entente almost more than Poland itself. Having participated in the +War to a very small extent and with almost insignificant losses, she +has, after the War, almost trebled her territory and almost doubled +her population. Turkey was put entirely, or almost so, outside Europe; +Greece has taken almost everything. Rejected was the idea of fixing +the frontier on the Enos Medea line, and the frontier fixed at +Ciatalgia; Constantinople was under the fire of the Greek artillery, +and Constantinople was nominally the only city which remained to +Turkey. The Sanjak of Smyrna, in Asia Minor, was the true wealth of +Turkey; it represented forty-five per cent. of the imports of the +Turkish Empire. Although the population of the whole vilayet of Audin +and the majority of the Sanjak of Smyrna was Mussulman, Greece had the +possession. The whole of Thrace was assigned to Greece; Adrianople, +a city sacred to Islam, which contains the tombs of the Caliphs, has +passed to the Greeks. + +The Entente, despite the resistance of some of the heads of +governments, always yielded to the requests of Greece. There was a +sentiment of antipathy for the Turks and there was a sympathy for +the Greeks: there was the idea to put outside Europe all Mussulman +dominion, and the remembrance of the old propaganda of Gladstone, and +there were the threats of Wilson, who in one of his proposals desired +exactly to put Turkey outside Europe. But above all there was the +personal work of Venezelos. Every request, without being even examined +thoroughly, was immediately justified by history, statistics, +ethnography. In any discussion he took care to _solliciter doucement +les textes_ as often the learned with few scruples do. I have met few +men in my career who united to an exalted patriotism such a profound +ability as Venezelos. Every time that, in a friendly way, I gave him +counsels of moderation and showed him the necessity of limiting the +requests of Greece, I never found a hard or intemperate spirit. He +knew how to ask and obtain, to profit by all the circumstances, to +utilize all the resources better even than the professional diplomats. +In asking he always had the air of offering, and, obtaining, he +appeared to be conceding something. He had at the same time a supreme +ability to obtain the maximum force with the minimum of means and a +mobility of spirit almost surprising. + +He saw no difficulty, convinced as he was, of erecting a Greek Empire +on the remnants of Turkey. Every time that doubts were expressed to +him, or he was shown data which should have moderated the positions, +he denied the most evident things, he recognized no danger, and saw +no difficulty. He affirmed always with absolute calm the certainty of +success. It was his opinion that the Balkan peninsula should be, in +the north, under the action of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and of +Rumania, and in the south of Greece. But Greece, having almost all the +islands of the Aegean, a part of the territory of Turkey and all the +ports in the Aegean, and having the Sanjak of Smyrna, should form +a littoral Empire of the East and chase the Turks into the poorer +districts of Anatolia. + +In the facility with which the demands of Greece were accepted (and +in spite of everything they were accepted even after the fall of +Venezelos) there was not only a sympathy for Greece, but, above +all, the certainty that a large Greek army at Smyrna would serve +principally towards the security of those countries which have and +wished to consolidate great interests in Asia Minor, as long as the +Turks of Anatolia were thinking specially about Smyrna and could not +use her forces elsewhere. For the same motive, in the last few years, +all the blame is attributed to the Turks. If they have erred much, the +errors, even the minor ones, have been transformed into crimes. The +atrocities of the Turks have been described, illustrated, exaggerated; +all the other atrocities, often no less serious, have been forgotten +or ignored. + +The idea of a Hellenic Empire which dominates all the coast of the +Aegean in Europe and Asia encounters one fundamental difficulty. To +dominate the coast it is necessary to have the certainty of a large +hinterland. The Romans in order to dominate Dalmatia were obliged to +go as far as the Danube. Alexander the Great, to have a Greek Empire, +had, above all, to provide for land dominion. Commercial colonies or +penetration in isolation are certainly possible, but vast political +organizations are not possible. It is not sufficient to have +territory; it is necessary to organize it and regulate the life. +Mankind does not nourish itself on what it eats, and even less on what +it digests, but on what it assimilates. + +Historians of the future will be profoundly surprised to learn that in +the name of the principle of nationality the vilayet of Adrianople, +which contains the city dearest to the heart of Islam after Mecca, was +given to the Greeks. According to the very data supplied by Venezelos +there were 500,000 Turks, 365,000 Greeks, and 107,000 Bulgarians; in +truth the Turks are in much greater superiority. + +The Grand Vizier of Turkey, in April, 1920, presented a note to the +ambassadors of the Entente to revindicate the rights on certain +vilayets of the Turkish Empire. According to this note, in Western +Thrace there were 522,574 inhabitants, of which 362,445 were +Mussulmans. In the vilayet of Adrianople, out of 631,000 inhabitants, +360,417 were Mussulmans. The population of the vilayet of Smyrna is +1,819,616 inhabitants, of which 1,437,983 are Mussulmans. Perhaps +these statistics are biased, but the statistics presented by the +opposing party were even more fantastic. + +After having had so many territorial concessions, Greece--who during +the War had enriched herself by commerce--is obliged, even after the +return of Constantine, who did not know how to resist the pressure, +to undertake most risky undertakings in Asia Minor, and has no way of +saving herself except by an agreement with Turkey. In the illusion of +conquering the Turkish resistance, she is now obliged to maintain +an army twice as big as that of the British Empire! The dreams of +greatness increase: some little military success has given Greece the +idea also that the Treaty of Sèvres is only a foundation regulating +the relationship with the Allies and with the enemy, and constituting +for Greece a title of rights, the full possession of which cannot be +modified. The War determines new rights which cannot invalidate the +concessions already given, which, on the contrary, are reinforced and +become intangible, but renders necessary new concessions. + +What will happen? Whilst Greece dreams of Constantinople, and we have +disposed of Constantinople and the Straits, Turkey seems resigned to +Constantinople itself, to-day a very poor international city rather +than a Turkish city. The Treaty of Sèvres says that it is true that +the contracting States are in agreement in not offending any of the +rights of the Ottoman government on Constantinople, which remains +the capital of the Turkish Empire, always under the reserve of +the dispositions of the treaty. That is equivalent to saying of a +political regime that it is a controlled "liberty," just as in +the time of the Tsars it was said that there existed a _Monarchie +constitutionnelle sous un autocrate_. Constantinople under the Treaty +of Sèvres is the free capital of the Turkish Empire under the reserve +of the conditions which are contained in the treaty and limit exactly +that liberty. + +The force of Turkey has always been in her immense power of +resistance. Win by resisting, wear out with the aid of time, which the +Turks have considered not as an economic value, but as their friend. +To conquer the resistance of Turkey, both in the new territories of +Europe and in Asia Minor, Greece will have to exhaust the greater +part of her limited resources. The Turks have always brought to a +standstill those who would dominate her, by a stubborn resistance +which is fanaticism and national dignity. On the other hand, the +Treaty of Sèvres, which has systematized in part Eastern Europe, was +concluded in the absence of two personages not to be unconsidered, +Russia and Germany, the two States which have the greatest interest +there. Germany, the War won, as she could not give her explanations on +the conclusions of peace, was not able to intervene in the solutions +of the question of the Orient. Russia was absent. Worn out with the +force of a war superior to her energies, she fell into convulsions, +and is now struggling between the two misfortunes of communism and +misery, of which it is hard to say whether one, or which of the two, +is the consequence of the other. + +One of the most characteristic facts concerns Armenia. The Entente +never spoke of Armenia. In his fourteen points Wilson neither +considered nor mentioned it. It was an argument difficult for the +Entente in so far that Russia was straining in reality (under the +necessity of protecting the Christians) to take Turkish Armenia +without leaving Russian Armenia. + +But suddenly some religious societies and some philanthropic people +instituted a vast movement for the liberation of Armenia. Nothing +could be more just than to create a small Armenian State which would +have allowed the Armenians to group themselves around Lake Van and +to affirm their national unity in one free State. But here also +the hatred of the Turks, the agitation of the Greeks, the dimly +illuminated philanthropy, determined a large movement to form a great +State of Armenia which should have outlets on the sea and great +territories. + +So that no longer did people talk of a small State, a refuge and safe +asylum for the Armenians, but of a large State. President Wilson +himself, during the Conference of San Remo, sent a message in the form +of a recalling to mind, if not a reproof, to the European States of +the Entente because they did not proceed to the constitution of a +State of Armenia. It was suggested to bring it down to Trebizond, to +include Erzeroum in the new Armenia, a vast State of Armenia in which +the Armenians would have been in the minority. And all that in homage +to historical tradition and for dislike of the Turks! A great Armenia +creates also a series of difficulties amongst which is that of the +relations between Armenia, Georgia and Azerbajan, supposing that in +the future these States cut themselves off definitely from Russia. The +great Armenia would include the vilayet of Erzeroum, which is now +the centre of Turkish nationalism, and contains more Mussulmans than +Armenians. As a matter of fact the vilayet of Erzeroum has 673,000 +Mussulmans, 1,800 Greeks and 135,000 Armenians. + +When it was a question of giving Greece territories in which the +Greeks were in a minority it was said that the populations were so +badly governed by the Turks that they had the right to pass under +a better regime, whatever it might be. But for a large part of the +territory of the so-called Great Armenia it is possible to commit the +error of putting large majorities of Mussulman people under a hostile +Armenian minority. + +The Armenians would have to fight at the same time against the Kurds +and against Azerbajan; they are surrounded by enemies on all sides. + +But the whole of the discussion of giving the vilayet of Erzeroum to +Armenia or leaving it to Turkey is entirely superfluous, for it is +not a question of attributing territory but of determining actual +situations. If it is desired to give to the Armenians the city of +Erzeroum, it is first of all necessary that they shall be able to +enter and be able to remain there. Now since the Armenians have not +shown, with a few exceptions, a great power of resistance, and are +rather a race of merchants than warriors, it would be necessary for +others to undertake the charge of defending them. None of the European +States desired a mandate for Armenia, and no one wished to assume +the serious military burden of protecting the Armenians; the United +States, after having in the message of Wilson backed a great Armenia, +wished even less than the other States to interest themselves in it. + +Probably proposals of a more reasonable character and marked by less +aversion for the Turks would have permitted the Turks not only to +recognize, which is not difficult for them, but in fact to respect, +the new State of Armenia, without the dreams of a sea coast and the +madness of Erzeroum. + +If the condition of the conquered is sufficiently serious +the situation of the peoples most favoured by the Entente in +Europe--Poland and Greece, who have obtained the greatest and most +unjust increases in territory, having given for a diversity of reasons +extremely little during the War--is certainly not less so. Each of +these countries are suffocating under the weight of the concessions, +and seek in vain a way of salvation from the burdens which they are +not able to support, and from the mania of conquest which are the +fruits of exaltation and error. + +Having obtained much, having obtained far more than they thought or +hoped, they believe that their advantage lies in new expansion. Poland +violates treaties, offends the laws of international usage, and +is protected in everything she undertakes. But every one of her +undertakings can only throw her into greater discomfort and augment +the total of ruin. + +All the violences in Upper Silesia to prevent the plebiscite going in +favour of Germany were not only tolerated but prepared far ahead. + +When I was head of the Italian Government the representative of the +German Government in Rome, von Herf, gave documentary evidence on what +was being prepared, and on April 30, 1920, in an audience which I gave +him as head of the Council he furnished me with proofs of what was +the Polish organization, what were its objects and the source of its +funds. + +As everyone knows, the plebiscite of March 20, 1921, in spite of the +violence and notwithstanding the officially protected brigandage, +resulted favourably to Germany. Out of 1,200,636 voters 717,122 were +for Germany and 483,514 for Poland. The 664 richest, most prosperous +and most populous communes gave a majority for the Germans, 597 +communes gave a majority for Poland. The territory of Upper Silesia, +according to the treaty, according to the plebiscite, according to the +most elementary international honesty, should be immediately handed +over to Germany. But as they do not wish to give the coal of +Upper Silesia to Germany, and the big interests of the new great +metallurgical group press and trick, the Treaty of Versailles has here +also become a _chiffon de papier_. + +Instead of accepting, as was the first duty, the result of the +plebiscite, people have resorted to sophism of incomparable weakness: +Article 88 of the Treaty of Versailles says only that the inhabitants +of Upper Silesia shall be called to designate by means of a plebiscite +if they desire to be united to Germany or to Poland. + +It was necessary to find a sophism! + +The Addendum of Section 8 establishes how the work of scrutiny shall +be carried out and all the procedure of the elections. There are six +articles of procedure. Paragraph 4 says that each one shall vote in +the commune where he is domiciled or in that where he was born if he +has not a domicile in the territory. The result of the vote shall be +determined commune by commune, according to the majority of votes in +each commune. + +This means then that the results of the voting, as is done in +political questions in all countries, should, be controlled commune by +commune: it is the form of the scrutiny which the appendix defines. +Instead, in order to take the coal away from Germany, it was +attempted, and is being still attempted, not to apply the treaty, but +to violate the principle of the indivisibility of the territory and to +give the mining districts to Poland. + +The violation of the neutrality of Belgium was not an offence to a +treaty more serious than this attempt; the Treaty of 1839 cannot be +considered a _chiffon de papier_ more than the Treaty of Versailles. +Only the parties are inverted. + +It is not France, noble and democratic, which inspires these +movements, but a plutocratic situation which has taken the same +positions, but on worse grounds, as the German metallurgists before +the War. It is the same current against which Lloyd George has several +times bitterly protested and for which he has had very bitter words +which it is not necessary to recall. It is the same movement which has +created agitations in Italy by means of its organs, and which attempt +one thing only: to ruin the German industry and, having the control of +the coal, to monopolize in Europe the iron industries and those which +are derived from it. + +First of all, in order to indemnify France for the _temporary_ damages +done to the mines in the North, there was the cession _in perpetuo_ of +the mines of the Saar; then there were the repeated attempts to occupy +the territory of the Ruhr to control the coal; last of all there is +the wish not to apply the plebiscite and to violate the Treaty of +Versailles by not giving Upper Silesia to Germany, but giving it +abusively to Poland. + +Germany produced before the War about 190,000,000 tons of coal; in +1913 191,500,000. The consumption of these mines themselves was about +a tenth, 19,000,000 tons, whilst for exportation were 83,500,000 tons, +and for internal consumption were 139,000,000. + +Now Germany has lost, and justly, Alsace-Lorraine, 3,800,000 tons. She +has lost, and it was not just, the Saar, 13,200,000 tons. She is bound +by the obligations of the treaty to furnish France with 20,000,000 +tons, and to Belgium and Italy and France again another 25,000,000 +tons. If she loses the excellent coal of Upper Silesia, about +43,800,000 tons per year, she will be completely paralysed. + +It is needless to lose time in demonstrating for what geographic, +ethnographic and economist reason Upper Silesia should be united with +Germany. It is a useless procedure, and also, after the plebiscites, +an insult to the reasoning powers. If the violation of treaties is not +a right of the victor, after the plebiscite, in which, notwithstanding +all the violences, three-quarters of the population voted for Germany, +then there is no reason for discussion. + +The words used by Lloyd George on May 18, 1921, in the House of +Commons, are a courteous abbreviation of the truth. From the +historical point of view, he said, Poland has no rights over Silesia. +The only reason for which Poland could claim Upper Silesia is that it +possesses a numerous Polish population, arrived there in comparatively +recent times with the intention of finding work, and especially in the +mines. That is true and is more serious than would be an agitation of +the Italians in the State of San Paulo of Brazil, claiming that they +had a majority of the population. + +"The Polish insurrection," said Lloyd George justly, "is a challenge +to the Treaty of Versailles, which, at the same time, constitutes the +charter of Polish Liberty." Poland is the last country in Europe which +has the right to deplore the treaty, because Poland did not conquer +the treaty. Poland did not gain her liberty, and more than any other +country should respect every comma of the treaty. She owes her liberty +to Italy, Great Britain and France. + +In the future [said the English Prime Minister] force will lose its +efficiency in regard to the Treaty of Versailles, and the maintenance +of the undertakings on the part of Germany on the basis of her +signature placed to the treaty will count increasingly. We have the +right to everything which she gives us: but we have the right also to +leave everything which is left to her. It is our duty of impartiality +to act with rigorous justice, without taking into account the +advantages or the disadvantages which may accrue therefrom. Either the +Allies must demand that the treaty shall be respected, or they should +permit the Germans to make the Poles respect it. It is all very well +to disarm Germany, but to desire that even the troops which she does +possess should not participate in the re-establishment of order is a +pure injustice. + +Russia [added Lloyd George] to-day is a fallen Power, tired, a prey +to a despotism which leaves no hope, but is also a country of great +natural resources, inhabited by a people of courage, who at the +beginning of the War gave proof of its courage. Russia will not always +find herself in the position in which she is to-day. Who can say what +she will become? In a short time she may become a powerful country, +which can say its word about the future of Europe and the world. To +which part will she turn? With whom will she unite? + + +There is nothing more just or more true than this. + +But Poland wants to take away Upper Silesia from Germany +notwithstanding the plebiscite and against the treaty, and which has +in this action the aid of the metallurgical interests and the great +interests of a large portion of the Press of all Europe. Poland, which +has large nuclei of German populations, after having been enslaved, +claims the right to enslave populations, which are more cultured, +richer and more advanced. And besides the Germans it claims the right +to enslave even Russian peoples and further to occupy entire Russian +territories, and wishes to extend into Ukraine. There is then the +political paradox of Wilna. This city, which belongs according to the +regular treaty to Lithuania, has been occupied in an arbitrary manner +by the Poles, who also claim Kowno. + +In short, Poland, which obtained her unity by a miracle, is working in +the most feverish manner to create her own ruin. She has no finance, +she has no administration, she has no credit. She does not work, and +yet consumes; she occupies new territories, and ruins the old ones. Of +the 31,000,000 inhabitants, as we have seen, 7 millions are Ukranians, +2.2 Russians, 2.1 Germans, and nearly half a million of other +nationalities. But among the eighteen or nineteen million Poles there +are at least four million Jews--Polish Jews, without doubt, but +the greater portion do not love Poland, which has not known how to +assimilate them. The Treaty of Versailles has created the absurd +position that to go from one part to the other of Germany it is +necessary to traverse the Danzig corridor. In other terms, Germany is +cut in two parts, and to move in Prussia herself from Berlin to one of +the oldest German cities, the home of Emanuel Kant, Konigsberg, it is +necessary to traverse Polish territory. + +So Poland separates the two most numerous people of Europe: Russia and +Germany. The Biblical legend lets us suppose that the waters of +the Red Sea opened to let the Chosen People pass: but immediately +afterwards the waters closed up again. Is it possible to suppose that +such an arbitrary arrangement as this will last for long? + +If it has lasted as long as it has, it is because it was, at least +from the part of one section of the Entente, not the road to peace, +but because it was a method of crushing down Germany. + +If a people had conditions for developing rapidly it was +Czeko-Slovakia. But also with the intention of hurting Germany and the +German peoples, a Czeko-Slovak State was created which has also +its own tremendous crisis of nationality. A Czeko-Slovakia with a +population of eight to nine million people represented a compact +ethnical unity. Instead, they have added five and a half million +people of different nationalities, amongst whom about 4,000,000 +Germans, with cities which are the most German in the world, as +Pilsen, Karlsbad, Reichenberg, etc. What is even more serious is that +the 4,000,000 Germans are attached to Germany, and, having a superior +culture and civilization, will never resign themselves to being placed +under the Czeks. + +Czeko-Slovakia had mineral riches, industrial concerns and solid +agriculture, and a culture spread among the people--all the conditions +for rising rapidly. All these advantages risk being annulled by the +grave and useless insult to the Germans and Magyars. + +Not only is the situation of Europe in every way uncertain, but there +is a tendency in the groups of the victors on the Continent of Europe +to increase the military budgets. The relationships of trade are being +restored only slowly; commerce is spoken of as an aim. In Italy the +dangers and perils of reopening trade with Germany have been seriously +discussed; customs duties are raised every day; the industrial groups +find easy propaganda for protection. Any limitation of competition is +a duty, whether it be the enemy of yesterday or the enemy of to-day, +and so the greatest evils of protection are camouflaged under +patriotism. + +None of the countries which have come out of the War on the Continent +have a financial position which helps toward a solid situation. +All the financial documents of the various countries, which I have +collected and studied with great care, contain enormous masses +of expenses which are the consequences of the War; those of the +conquering countries also contain enormous aggregations of expenses +which are or can become the cause of new wars. + +The conquered countries have not actually any finance. Germany has an +increase of expenses which the fall of the mark renders more serious. +In 1920 she spent not less than ninety-two milliards, ruining her +circulation. How much has she spent in 1921? + +Austria and Hungary have budgets which are simply hypotheses. The last +Austrian budget, for 1921, assigned a sum of seventy-one milliards +of crowns for expenses, and this for a poor country with 7,000,000 +inhabitants. + +A detailed examination of the financial situation of Czeko-Slovakia, +of Rumania, and of the Serbo-Croat States gives results which are at +the least alarming. Even Greece, which until yesterday had a solid +structure, gallops now in a madness of expenditure which exceeds all +her resources, and if she does not find a means to make peace with +Turkey she will find her credit exhausted. The most ruinous of all +is the situation of Poland, whose finance is certainly not better +regulated than that of the Bolsheviks of Moscow, to judge from the +course of the Polish mark and the Russian rouble if anyone gets the +idea of buying them on an international market. + +The situation of the exchange since the War has not sensibly bettered +even for the great countries, and it is extraordinarily worse for the +other countries. + +In June, 1921, France had a circulation of about thirty-eight milliard +of francs, Belgium six milliard of francs, Italy of about eighteen +milliards; Great Britain, between State notes and Bank of England +notes, had hardly £434,000,000 sterling. Actually, among the +continental countries surviving the War, Italy is the country which +has made the greatest efforts not to augment the circulation but to +increase the duties; also because she had no illusions of rebuilding +her finance and her national economy on an enemy indemnity. + +But the conquered countries have so abused their circulation that +they almost live on the thought of it--as, in fact, not a few of the +conquering countries and those come out from the War do. Germany has +passed eighty-eight milliards, and is rapidly approaching one hundred +milliards. Now, when one thinks that the United States, after so many +loans and after all the expenses of the War, has only a circulation of +4,557,000,000 dollars, one understands what difficulty Germany has to +produce, to live, and to refurnish herself with raw materials. + +Only Great Britain of all the countries in Europe which have issued +from the War has had a courageous financial policy. Public opinion, +instead of pushing Parliament to financial dissipation, has insisted +on economy. If the situation created by the War has transformed also +the English circulation into unconvertible paper money, this is merely +a passing fact. If the sterling loses on the dollar--that is, on +gold--given the fact that the United States of America alone now have +a money at par, almost a quarter of its value, this is also merely a +transitory fact. + +Great Britain has the good sense to curtail expenses, and the sterling +tends always to improve. + +France and Italy are in an intermediate position. Their money can be +saved, but it will require energetic care and great economies, +stern finance, a greater development of production, limitation of +consumption, above all, of what is purchased from abroad. At the date +of which I am writing, expressed on a percentual basis, the French +franc is worth 47 centimes of the sterling and 36 of the dollar--that +is to say, of gold. The Italian lira is worth 28 centimes of the +sterling and 21 of the dollar. + +Here are still two countries in which tenacious energy can save and +with many sacrifices they can arrive at good money. France has a good +many more resources than Italy; she has a smaller need of importations +and a greater facility for exportations. But her public debt has +reached 265 milliards, the circulation has well passed thirty-eight +milliards, and they still fear to calculate amongst the extraordinary +income of the budget the fifteen milliards a year which should come +from Germany. + +Italy, with great difficulty of production and less concord inside the +country, has a more true vision, and does not reckon any income which +is not derived from her own resources. Her circulation does not pass +eighteen milliards, and her debt exceeds by a little one hundred +milliards. + +With prudence and firmness France and Italy will be able to balance +their accounts. + +But the financial situation and the exchanges of the conquered +countries, even that of Germany, may be called desperate. + +If expressed in percentages, the German mark is worth 5.11 per cent. +in comparison with the pound sterling and 3.98 per cent. of the +dollar. What possibility is there of systematizing the exchange? + +Germany was compelled this year to carry her expenses to 130 milliards +of marks. As her circulation has exceeded eighty-eight milliards, how +can she straighten out her money? + +As for the Austrian and Hungarian crowns, the Jugo-Slav crowns, the +Rumanian lei, and all the other depreciated moneys, their fate is not +doubtful. As their value is always descending, and the gold equivalent +becomes almost indeterminable, they will have a common fate. As for +the Polish mark, it can be said that before long it will not be worth +the paper on which it is printed. + +There is, then, the fantastic position of the public debts! They have +reached now such figures that no imagination could have forecasted. +France alone has a debt which of itself exceeds by a great deal +all the debts of all the European States previous to the War: 265 +milliards of francs. And Germany, the conquered country, has in her +turn a debt which exceeds 320 milliards of marks, and which is rapidly +approaching 400 milliards. The debts of many countries are only +recorded by feats of memory, because there is no practical interest in +knowing whether Austria, Hungary, and especially Poland, has one debt +or another, since the situation of the creditors is not a situation of +reality. + +The whole debt of the United States of America is, after so much war, +only 23,982,000,000 dollars; but the United States are creditors of +the Entente for 9,500,000,000 dollars. Also England, against a debt of +£9,240,000,000 sterling, has a credit of £1,778,000,000. + +These serious figures, whilst they increase the condition of +discomfort rendered even more serious by the scarcity of commercial +exchanges, indicate also what necessity may be superior to all in +every country to preserve internal peace: produce more, consume less, +put the finances in order, and reconquer the credits. + +Instead, the conquered countries are going downwards every day and the +conquering countries are maintaining very big armies, exhausting their +resources, whilst they are spreading the conviction that the indemnity +from the enemy will compensate sufficiently, or at least partially, +for the work of restoration. + +In fact, the causes of discontent and diffidence are augmenting. +Nothing is more significant than the lack of conscience with which +programmes of violence and of ruin are lightly accepted; nothing is +more deplorable than the thoughtlessness with which the germs of new +wars are cultivated. Germany has disarmed with a swiftness which has +even astonished the military circles of the Entente; but the bitter +results of the struggle are not only not finished against Germany, +not even to-day does she form part of the League of Nations (which is +rather a sign of a state of mind than an advantage), but the attitude +towards her is even more hostile. + +Two years after the end of the war R. Poincaré wrote that the League +of Nations would lose its best possibility of lasting if, _un jour_, +it did not reunite all the nations of Europe. But he added that of +all the conquered nations--Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey and +Germany--the last-mentioned, by her conduct during the War and +after the peace, justified least a near right of entry. It would be +_incontestablement plus naturel_ (of how many things does nature +occupy herself!) to let Austria enter first if she will disavow the +policy of reattachment--that is, being purely German, renounce +against the principle of nationality, in spite of the principle +of auto-decision, when she cannot live alone, to unite herself to +Germany; Bulgaria and Turkey as long as they had a loyal and courteous +attitude towards Greece, Rumania and Serbia. The turn of Germany +will come, but only after Turkey, when she will have given proof of +executing the treaty, which no reasonable and honest person considers +any more executable in its integrity. + +The most characteristic facts of this peace which continues the War +can be recapitulated as follows: + +1. Europe on the whole has more men under arms than before the War. +The conquered States are forced to disarm, but the conquering States +have increased the armaments; the new States and the countries which +have come through the War have increased their armaments. + +2. Production is very tardily being taken up again because there is +everywhere, if in a different degree, a lesser desire for work on +the part of the working classes joined with a need for higher +remuneration. + +3. The difficulties of trade, instead of decreasing in many countries +of Europe are increasing, and international commerce is very slowly +recovering. Between the States of Europe there is not a real commerce +which can compare with that under normal conditions. Considering +actual values with values before the War, the products which now form +the substance of trade between European countries do not represent +even the half of that before the War. + +As the desire for consumption, if not the capacity for consumption, +has greatly increased, and the production is greatly decreased, all +the States have increased their functions. So the discredit of the +paper money and the Treasury bills which permit these heavy expenses +is in all the countries of Europe, even if in different degrees, very +great. + +The conquering countries, from the moment that they had obtained in +the treaties of peace the acknowledgment of the conquered that the War +was caused by them, held it to be legitimate that they should lose all +their disposable goods, their colonies, their ships, their credits and +their commercial organization abroad, but that the conquered should +also pay all the damages of the War. The War, therefore, should be +paid for by the conquered, who recognized (even if against their will) +that they were alone responsible. That forms henceforth a certain +canon of foreign politics, the less a thing appears true the more it +is repeated. + +Although the treaties oblige Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey to +pay the damages of the War, it is, however, certain that they are not +able to pay anything and not even the expenses of the victors on their +territory. "_Cantabit vacuus coram latrone viator_," said Juvenal +("Who has nothing can give nothing"), and Austria, for her part, +instead of giving is imploring food succour. + +So the problem remains limited to Germany. Can she pay the indemnity +indicated in the treaty? Can she pay for the damages and indemnify the +victors? After having given up her colonies, her ships, her railway +material, all her disposable credits abroad, in what form can she pay? + +The fundamental controversy reduces itself henceforth only to this +point, which we shall try if possible to make clear, since we desire +that this matter shall be presented in the clearest and most evident +form. + +From now on it is not the chancelleries which must impose the +solutions of great problems; but it is the mass of the public in +Europe and America. + + + + +V + +THE ANXIETIES OF THE VICTORS + + +We have seen the process by which the idea of the indemnity for +damages, which was not contained either in the peace declaration of +the Entente, nor in the manifestations of the various parliaments, nor +in the first armistice proposals, nor in the armistice between Italy +and Austria, was introduced in the armistice with Germany, out of pure +regard for France, without taking heed of the consequences. Three +words, said Clemenceau, only three words need be added, words which +compromise nothing and are an act of deference to France. The entire +construction of the treaties, after all, is based on those three +words. + +And how fantastic the demands for compensation have become! + +An old Italian proverb says, "In time of war there are more lies than +earth." Ancient and modern pottery reproduce the motto, which is +widespread, and whose truth was not understood until some years +ago. So many foolish things were said about the almost mysterious +manoeuvres of Germany, about her vast expansion, her great resources +and accumulated capital, that the reality tended to become lost to +sight. + +These absurd legends, formed during the War, were not forgotten, and +there are even now many who believe in good faith that Germany can +pay, if not twenty or twenty-five milliards a year, at least eight or +nine without any difficulty. + +France's shrewdest politicians, however, well knew that the demand +for an enormous and unlimited indemnity was only a means of putting +Germany under control and depressing her to the point of exhaustion. +But the others maintained this proposal more out of rancour and hatred +than from any actual political concept. It may be said that the +problem of the indemnity has never been seriously studied and that the +calculations, the valuations, the procedures, have all formed a series +of impulsive acts co-ordinated by a single error, the error of the +French politicians who had the one aim of holding Germany down. + +The procedure was simple. + +In the first phase the indemnities came into being from three words +inserted almost by chance into the armistice treaty on November 2, +1918, _réparation des dommages_. It was merely a matter of a simple +expression to content public feeling: _Je supplie le conseil de se +mettre dans l'esprit de la population française_.... It was a moral +concession, a moral satisfaction. + +But afterwards, as things went on, all was altered when it came to +preparing the treaties. + +For a while the idea, not only of a reparation of damages, but of the +payment of the cost of the War was entertained. It was maintained that +the practice of making the vanquished reimburse the cost of the War +was permitted by international law. Since Germany had provoked the War +and lost it, she must not only furnish an indemnity for the losses, +but also pay the cost. + +The cost was calculated roughly at seven hundred milliards of francs +at par. Further, there was the damage to assess. In the aggregate, war +costs, damage to property, damage to persons, came to at least one +thousand milliards. But since it was impossible to demand immediate +payment and was necessary to spread the sum over fifty years, taking +into consideration sinking funds and interest the total came to three +thousand milliards. The amount was published by the illustrated papers +with the usual diagrams, drawings of golden globes, length of paper +money if stretched out, height of metal if all piled up together, etc. +etc. + +These figures were discussed for the first few months by a public +accustomed to be surprised at nothing. They merely helped to +demonstrate that an indemnity of 350 milliards was a real sacrifice +for the Allies. + +Thus a whole series of principles came to be established which were a +contradiction of reality. + +A great share in the responsibility in this matter lies with Great +Britain, who not only followed France's error, but in certain ways +made it worse by a number of intemperate requests. Italy had no +influence on the proceedings owing to her indecisive policy. Only the +United States, notwithstanding the banality of some of her experts +(_lucus a non lucendo_), spoke an occasional word of reason. + +When Lloyd George understood the mistake committed in the matter of +the indemnity it was too late. + +The English public found itself face to face with the elections almost +the day after the conclusion of the War. In the existing state of +exaltation and hatred the candidates found a convenient "plank" in +promising the extermination of Germany, the trial of the Kaiser, as +well as of thousands of German officers accused of cruelty, and last, +but not least, the end of German competition. + +The Prime Minister of Australia, William Morris Hughes, a +small-minded, insensitive, violent man, directed a furious campaign +in favour of a huge indemnity. Lord Northcliffe lent the aid of his +numerous papers to this campaign, which stirred up the electors. + +Lloyd George, with his admirable intelligence, perceived the situation +clearly. He did not believe in the usefulness or even in the +possibility of trying the Kaiser and the German officers. He did not +believe in the possibility of an enormous indemnity or even a very +large one. + +His first statements, like those of Bonar Law, a serious, honest, +well-balanced man, an idealist with the appearance of a practical +person, revealed nothing. On the eve of the dissolution of Parliament, +Lloyd George, speaking at Wolverhampton, November 24, 1918, did not +even hint at the question of the reparations or indemnity. He was +impelled along that track by the movement coming from France, by the +behaviour of the candidates, by Hughes's attitude, and by the Press +generally, especially that of Northcliffe. + +A most vulgar spectacle was offered by many of the English candidates, +among whom were several members of the War Cabinet, who used language +worthy of raving dervishes before crowds hypnotized by promises of the +most impossible things. + +To promise the electors that Germany should pay the cost of the War, +to announce to those who had lost their senses that the Kaiser was to +be hanged, to promise the arrest and punishment of the most guilty +German officers, to prophesy the reduction to slavery of a Germany +competing on sea and land, was certainly the easiest kind of +electoral programme. The numerous war-mutilated accepted it with much +enthusiasm, and the people listened, open-mouthed, to the endless +series of promises. + +Hughes, who was at bottom in good faith, developed the thesis which he +afterwards upheld at Paris with logical precision. It was Germany's +duty to reimburse, without any limitation, the entire cost of the +War: damage to property, damage to persons, and war-cost. He who has +committed the wrong must make reparation for it to the extreme limits +of his resources, and this principle, recognized by the jurists, +requires that the total of the whole cost of the War fall upon the +enemy nations. Later on, Hughes, who was a sincere man, recognized +that it was not possible to go beyond asking for reparation of the +damages. + +Lloyd George was dragged along by the necessity of not drawing away +the mass of the electors from the candidates of his party. Thus he was +obliged on December 11, in his final manifesto, to announce not only +the Kaiser's trial and that of all those responsible for atrocities, +but to promise the most extensive kind of indemnity from Germany and +the compensation of all who had suffered by the War. Speaking the +same evening at Bristol, he promised to uphold the principle of the +indemnity, and asserted the absolute right to demand from Germany +payment for the costs of the War. + +In England, where the illusion soon passed away, in France, where it +has not yet been dissipated, the public has been allowed to believe +that Germany can pay the greater part, if not the entire cost, of the +War, or at least make compensation for the damage. + +For many years I have studied the figures in relation to private +wealth and the wealth of nations, and I have written at length on +the subject. I know how difficult it is to obtain by means of even +approximate statistics results more or less near to the reality. +Nothing pained me more than to hear the facility with which +politicians of repute spoke of obtaining an indemnity of hundreds of +milliards. When Germany expressed her desire to pay an indemnity in +one agreed lump sum (_à forfait_) of one hundred milliards of gold +marks (an indemnity she could never pay, so enormous is it), I saw +statesmen, whom I imagined not deprived of intelligence, smile at +the paltriness of the offer. An indemnity of fifty milliards of +gold marks, such as that proposed by Keynes, appeared absurd in its +smallness. + +When the Peace Conference reassembled in Paris the situation +concerning the indemnity was as follows. The Entente had never during +the War spoken of indemnity as a condition of peace. Wilson, in his +proposals, had spoken only of reconstruction of invaded territories. +The request for _réparation des dommages_ had been included in the +terms of the armistice merely to afford a moral satisfaction to +France. But the campaign waged in France and during the elections +in England had exaggerated the demands so as to include not only +reparation for damage but reimbursement of the cost of the War. + +Only the United States maintained that the indemnity should be limited +to the reparation of the damages: a reparation which in later phases +included not only reconstruction of destroyed territories and damage +done to private property, but even pensions to the families of those +dead in the War and the sums in grant paid during it. + +When Prussia beat France in 1870 she asked for an indemnity of five +milliards. The Entente could have demanded from the vanquished an +indemnity and then have reassumed relations with them provided it were +an indemnity which they could pay in a brief period of time. + +Instead, it being impossible to demand an enormous sum of 300 or 400 +milliards, a difficult figure to fix definitely, recourse was had to +another expedient. + +From the moment that the phrase _réparation des dommages_ was included +in the armistice treaty as a claim that could be urged, it became +impossible to ask for a fixed sum. What was to be asked for was +neither more nor less than the amount of the damages. Hence a special +commission was required, and the Reparations Commission appears on +the scene to decide the sum to demand from Germany and to control +its payment. Also even after Germany was disarmed a portion of her +territory must remain in the Allies' hands as a guarantee for the +execution of the treaty. + +The reason why France has always been opposed to a rapid conclusion of +the indemnity question is that she may continue to have the right, in +view of the question remaining still open, to occupy the left bank of +the Rhine and to keep the bridgeheads indicated in the treaty. + +The thesis supported by Clemenceau at the Conference was a simple one: +Germany must recognize the total amount of her debt; it is not enough +to say that we recognize it. + +I demand in the name of the French Government, and after having +consulted my colleagues, that the Peace Treaty fixes Germany's debt +to us and indicates the nature of the damages for which reparation is +due. We will fix a period of thirty years if you so wish it, and we +will give to the Commission, after it has reduced the debt to figures, +the mandate to make Germany pay within these thirty years all she owes +us. If the whole debt cannot be paid in thirty years the Commission +will have the right to extend the time for payment. + +This scheme was agreed. And the thesis of the compensation of damages, +instead of that for the payment of the cost of the War, prevailed for +a very simple reason. If they proposed to demand for all integral +reparations, and therefore the reimbursement of the cost of the War, +the figures would have been enormous. It became necessary to reduce +all the credits proportionally, as in the case of a bankruptcy. Now, +since in the matter of the indemnities France occupied the first place +(to begin with, she asked sixty-five per cent. of all sums paid by +Germany), she took the greater part of the indemnities, while on the +sums paid for reimbursement of cost of war, she would only have got +less than twenty per cent. + +Germany has therefore been put under control for all the time she will +be paying the indemnities--that is, for an indefinite time. + +The valuation of the expenses for the reconstruction of the ruined +territories had to be carried out according to the regulations of +the treaty, and, the prices having increased, the French Government +presented in July, 1920, a first approximate valuation: damages, 152 +milliards; pensions, 58 milliards; in all, 210 milliards. In November, +1920, the damages had increased to 218 milliards. + +Even these figures represent something less absurd than the first +demands and figures. + +On September 5, 1919, the French Minister of Finance, speaking in the +French Chamber, calculated the total of the German indemnities arising +from the treaty at 375 milliards, whose interest would accumulate +until 1921, after which date Germany would begin to pay her debt +in thirty-four annual rates of about 25 milliards each, and 13,750 +milliards a year would go to France. + +Again, in November, 1920, Ogier, Minister of the liberated regions, +put before the Reparations Commission in the name of France a detailed +memorial which made the value of the territories to be reconstructed +only for the cases of private individuals come to 140 milliards, not +including the pensions, damage to railways and mercantile marine, +which totalled 218 milliards, of which 77 milliards were for pensions +and 141 milliards for damages. + +Of late the sense of reality has begun to diffuse itself. The Minister +Loucheur himself has laughed at the earlier figures, and has stated +that the damages do not exceed eighty milliards. + +But the French public has been accustomed for some time to take the +figures of Klotz seriously, and to discuss indemnities of 150, 200 +and 250 milliards. The public, however, is not yet aware of the real +position, and will not be able to arrive at a just realization of it +without passing through a serious moral crisis which will be the first +secure element of the real peace. + +Setting aside all questions of indemnities from Austria-Hungary, +Turkey and Bulgaria (they have nothing to give, can give nothing; on +the contrary, they ask and merit assistance), it is clear that all the +indemnities must be paid by Germany. + +The French totals of the material damage claims in the invaded +districts have been absolutely fantastic and more exaggerated than in +the case of Belgium, whose indemnity claims would lead one to suppose +the total destruction of at least the third part of her territory, +almost as if she had undergone the submersion of, say, ten thousand +square metres of her small territory. + +This problem of the indemnities, limited to the reparation of damages, +and in accordance with the costs contemplated in the Treaty of +Versailles, has never been seriously tackled. One may even say it has +not been seriously examined. And it is deplorable that there has been +created among the public, or among a large part of it, the conviction +that Germany will repair the damage of the War by her own effort. This +idea, however, finds no acceptance in England among serious persons, +and in Italy no one believes in it. But in France and Belgium the idea +is widely diffused, and the wish to spread the belief is lively in +several sections of opinion, not because intelligent people believe +in the possibility of effective payment, but with the idea of putting +Germany in the light of not maintaining the clauses of the peace, thus +extending the right to prolong the military occupation and even to +aggravate it. Germany, thereby, is kept out of the League of Nations +and her dissolution facilitated. + +John Maynard Keynes, ever since the end of 1919, has shown in his +admirable book the absurdity of asking for vast indemnities, Germany's +impossibility of paying them, and the risk for all Europe of following +a road leading to ruin, thus at the same time accentuating the work +of disintegration started by the treaty. That book had awakened a +wide-sounding echo, but it ought to have had a still wider one, and +would have done but for the fact that, unfortunately, the Press in +free countries is anything but free. + +The great industrial syndicates, especially in the steel-making +industry, which control so large a part of the Press among the +majority of the States of Europe, and even beyond Europe, find +easy allies in the inadequate preparation of the major part of +the journalists to discuss the most important problems, and the +indisposition on the part of the public to examine those questions +which present difficulties, and are so rendered less convenient for +discussion. + +I knew Keynes during the War, when he was attached to the British +Treasury and chief of the department charged to look after the foreign +exchanges and the financial relations between Great Britain and her +allies. A serious writer, a teacher of economics of considerable +value, he brought to his difficult task a scrupulousness and an +exactness that bordered on mistrust. Being at that time Chancellor of +the Exchequer in Italy, in the bitterest and most decisive period of +the War, I had frequent contact with Mr. Keynes, and I always admired +his exactness and his precision. I could not always find it in myself +to praise his friendly spirit. But he had an almost mystic force of +severity, and those enormous squanderings of wealth, that facile +assumption of liabilities that characterized this period of the War, +must have doubtless produced in him a sense of infinite disgust. This +state of mind often made him very exigent, and sometimes unjustifiably +suspicious. His word had a decisive effect on the actions of the +English Treasury. + +When the War was finished, he took part as first delegate of the +English Treasury at the Peace Conference of Paris, and was substituted +by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Supreme Economic Council. +He quitted his office when he had come to the conclusion that it was +hopeless to look for any fundamental change of the peace treaties. + +His book is not only a document of political uprightness but the first +appeal to a sense of reality which, after an orgy of mistakes, menaces +a succession of catastrophes. In my opinion it merits a serious +reconsideration as the expression of a new conscience, as well as an +expression of the truth, which is only disguised by the existing state +of exasperation and violence. + +After two years we must recognize that all the forecasts of Keynes +have been borne out by the facts: that the exchange question has grown +worse in all the countries who have been in the War, that the absurd +indemnities imposed on the enemies cannot be paid, that the depressed +condition of the vanquished is harmful to the victors almost in equal +measure with the vanquished themselves, that it menaces their very +existence, that, in fine, the sense of dissolution is more widespread +than ever. + +The moment has come to make an objective examination of the indemnity +question, and to discuss it without any hesitation. + +Let us lay aside all sentiment and forget the undertakings of the +peace treaties. Let us suppose that the Entente's declarations +and Wilson's proposals never happened. Let us imagine that we are +examining a simple commercial proposition stripped of all sentiment +and moral ideas. + +After a great war it is useless to invoke moral sentiments: men, while +they are blinded by hatred, recognize nothing save their passion. It +is the nature of war not only to kill or ruin a great number of men, +not only to cause considerable material damage, but also, necessarily, +to bring about states of mind full of hate which cannot be ended at +once and which are even refractory to the language of reason. + +For a long time I myself have looked upon the Germans with the +profoundest hatred. When I think of all the persons of my race dead in +the War, when I look back upon the fifteen months of anguish when my +first-born son was a prisoner of war in Germany, I am quite able to +understand the state of mind of those who made the peace and the +mental condition in which it was made. What determined the atmosphere +of the peace treaties was the fact that there was a conference +presided over by Clemenceau, who remembered the Prussians in the +streets of Paris after the war of 1870, who desired but one thing: the +extermination of the Germans. What created this atmosphere, or helped +to create it, was the action of Marshal Foch, who had lost in the War +the two persons dearest to him in life, the persons who attached him +to existence. + +But now we must examine the question not in the light of our +sentiments or even of our hatreds. We must see quite calmly if the +treaties are possible of application without causing the ruin of the +vanquished. Then we must ask ourselves if the ruin of the vanquished +does not bring in its train the ruin of the victors. Putting aside, +then, all moral considerations, let us examine and value the economic +facts. + +There is no question that the reparation problem exists solely in +the case of Germany, who has still a powerful statal framework which +allows her to maintain great efforts, capable not only of providing +her with the means of subsistence, but also of paying a large +indemnity to the victors. The other vanquished States are more in need +of succour than anything else. + +What are the reparations? + +Let us follow the _précis_ of them which a representative of France +made at the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. They are as follows: + +1. Germany is responsible for the total of the losses and damages +sustained by her victors inasmuch as she caused them. + +2. Germany, in consideration of the permanent diminution of her +resources, resulting from the Peace Treaty, is only obliged (but is +obliged without restitutions or reserves) to reimburse the direct +damages and the pensions as precised in Schedule I of Clause viii of +the treaty. + +3. Germany must pay before May 1, 1921, not less than twenty milliards +of gold marks or make equivalent payment in kind. + +4. On May 1 the Reparations Commission will fix the total amount of +the German debt. + +5. This debt must be liquidated by annual payments whose totals are to +be fixed by the Commission. + +6. The payments will continue for a period of thirty years, or longer +if by that time the debt is not extinguished. + +7. Germany will issue one hundred milliards of gold marks of bearer +bonds, and afterwards all such issues as the Reparations Commission +shall demand, until the amount of the debt be reached in order to +permit the stabilization of credit. + +8. The payments will be made in money and in kind. The payments in +kind will be made in coal, live stock, chemical products, ships, +machines, furniture, etc. The payments _in specie_ consist of metal +money, of Germany's credits, public and private, abroad, and of a +first charge on all the effects and resources of the Empire and the +German States. + +9. The Reparations Commission, charged with seeing to the execution of +this clause, shall have powers of control and decision. It will be +a commission for Germany's debt with wider powers. Called upon to +decide, according to equity, justice and good faith, without being +bound by any codex or special legislation, it has obtained from +Germany an irrevocable recognition of its authority. Its duty is to +supervise until the extinction of the debt Germany's situation, her +financial operations, her effects, her capacity for production, her +provisioning, her production. This commission must decide what Germany +can pay each year, and must see that her payments, added to the +budget, fall upon her taxpayers at least to the extent of the allied +country most heavily taxed. Its decisions shall be carried out +immediately and receive immediate application, without any other +formality. The commission can effect all the changes deemed necessary +in the German laws and regulations, as well as all the sanctions, +whether of a financial, economic or military nature arising from +established violations of the clauses put under its control. And +Germany is obliged not to consider these "sanctions" as hostile acts. + +In order to guarantee the payments an inter-allied army--in reality +a Franco-Belgian army--occupies the left bank of the Rhine, and is +stationed at the bridgeheads. Germany is completely helpless, and has +lost all the features of a sovereign State inasmuch as she is subject +to "controls" in a way that Turkey never was. In modern history we can +find no parallel for this state of things. These are conditions +which alter the very bases of civilization and the relations between +peoples. Such procedure has been unknown in Europe for centuries. +The public has become accustomed in certain countries to consider +responsible for the War not the government that wished it or the +German people, but the future generations. Thus the indemnities are +to be paid--were such conditions possible--in thirty years and for at +least twenty years afterwards by people still unborn at the time of +the War. This cursing of the guilty people has no parallel in modern +history. We must go back to the early ages of humanity to find +anything of the kind. + +But even the most inhuman policies, such as Germany has never adopted +in her victories, although she has been accused of every cruelty, can +find at least some justification if they had a useful effect on the +country which has wished and accepts responsibility for them. The +conqueror has his rights. Julius Caesar killed millions of Germans +and retarded perhaps for some centuries the invasion of Rome. But +the practices established by the Treaty of Versailles are in effect +equally harmful to victors and vanquished, though maybe in unequal +measure, and in any case prepare the dissolution of Europe. + +I had my share in arranging at San Remo the Spa Conference, in the +hope and with the desire of discussing frankly with the Germans what +sum they could pay by way of indemnity without upsetting their economy +and damaging severely that of the Allies. But the ministerial crisis +which took place in June, 1920, prevented me from participating at +the Spa Conference; and the profitable action which Great Britain had +agreed to initiate in the common interest, ours as well as France's, +could not be proceeded with. The old mistakes continued to be +repeated, though many attenuations have come about and the truth +begins to appear even for those most responsible for past errors. + +We shall have to examine with all fair-mindedness if Germany is in +a position to pay in whole or in part the indemnity established or +rather resulting from the treaty. France especially believes, or has +said on several occasions she believes, that Germany can pay without +difficulty 350 milliards. + +After many stupidities and many exaggerations which have helped +considerably to confuse the public, in face of the new difficulties +which have arisen, new arrangements for the payment of the indemnity +have been established. On May 11, in face of the situation which had +arisen, the Allies proposed and Germany accepted a fresh scheme for +the payment of the reparations. Germany is constrained to pay every +year in cash and in kind the equivalent of 500 million dollars, plus +26 per cent. of the total of her exports. + +The rest of the accord refers to the procedure for the issue of +bonds guaranteed on the indicated payments, to the constitution of a +guarantee committee, and to the date of payment. Probably Germany will +have been able to get through the year 1921 without insurmountable +difficulties. + +At Spa, on April 27, 1921, the proportionate sums assessed for each of +the conquering powers were established on a total indemnity notably +reduced in comparison with the earlier absurd demands. + +But leaving alone the idea of an indemnity of 250, 150, or even 100 +milliards of gold marks, it will be well to see in a concrete form +what Germany can be made to pay, and whether the useless and elaborate +structure of the Reparations Commission which, with its powers of +regulating the internal life of Germany for thirty years or more, +ought not to be substituted by a simpler formula more in sympathy with +civilized notions. + +Shortly before the War, according to successive statistics, the +private wealth of France did not amount to more than 250 milliards. + +The wealth of France, according to successive valuations, was +calculated at 208 milliards of francs in 1905 (de Foville), at 214 +milliards in 1908 (Turquan), at about 250 milliards according to other +authors. The wealth of Belgium, according to official statistics +published by the Belgian Ministry of Finance in 1913, amounted to +rather less than 30 milliards of francs. The estimate is perhaps a +trifle low. But this official figure must not be considered as being +a long way from the truth. At certain moments Belgium's demands have +surpassed even the total of her national wealth, while the damages +have not been more than some milliards. + +The value of the land in France was calculated before the War at +between 62 and 78 milliards; the value of the buildings, according +to _l'Annuaire Statistique de la France_, at 59-1/2 milliards. The +territory occupied by the Germans is not more than a tenth of the +national territory. Even taking into consideration the loss of +industrial buildings it is very difficult to arrive at the figure of +15 milliards. At the same time it is true that the Minister Loucheur +declared on February 17, 1919, in the French Chamber that the +reconstruction of the devastated regions in France required 75 +milliards--that is, very much more than double the private wealth of +all the inhabitants of all the occupied regions. + +In all the demands for compensation of the various States we have seen +not so much a real and precise estimate of the damages as a kind of +fixing of credit in the largest measure possible in order that in the +successive reductions each State should still have proportionally an +advantageous position. + +Making his calculation with a generosity which I assert to be +excessive (and I assert this as a result of an accurate study of +the question, which perhaps I may have occasion to publish), Keynes +maintains that the damages for which Germany should be made to pay +come to 53 milliards for all losses on land and sea and for the +effects of aerial bombardments--53 milliards of francs all told, +including the damages of France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, +Serbia, etc.! I do not believe that the damages reach 40 milliards of +gold marks, unless, of course, we calculate in them the pensions and +allowances. + +But these figures have but small interest, since the demands have been +almost entirely purely arbitrary. + +What we must see is if Germany can pay, and if, with a regime of +restrictions and violence, she can hand over, not the many milliards +which have been announced and which have been a deplorable speculation +on the ignorance of the public, but a considerable sum, such as is +that which many folk still delude themselves it is possible to have. + +Germany has already consigned all her transferable wealth; the gold in +her banks, her colonies, her commercial fleet, a large and even the +best part of her railway material, her submarine cables, her foreign +credits, the property of her private citizens in the victorious +countries, etc. Everything that could be handed over, even in +opposition to the rights of nations as such are known in modern +civilized States, Germany has given. She has also hypothecated all her +national goods. What can she give now? + +Germany can pay in three ways only: + +1. Merchandise and food products on account of the indemnity: coal, +machines, chemical products, etc. + +2. Credits abroad coming from the sale of merchandise. If Germany +exports, that is sells eight milliard marks' worth of goods abroad, +she pays two milliards to the Reparations Commission. + +3. Property of private citizens. Germany can enslave herself, ceding +the property of her private citizens to foreign States or citizens to +be disposed of as they wish. + +Excluding this last form, which would constitute slavery pure and +simple, as useless, as impossible, and calculated to parallel the +methods in use among barbarous peoples, there only remain the first +two methods of payment which we will examine briefly. + +It must be remembered that Germany, even before the War, was in +difficulties for insufficient avenues of development, given the +restricted nature of her territory and the exuberance of her +population. Her territory, smaller than that of France and much less +fertile, must now nourish a population which stands to that of France +as three to two. + +If we have had gigantic war losses, Germany, who fought on all the +fronts, has had losses certainly not inferior to ours. She too has +had, in larger or smaller proportion, her dead and her mutilated. +She has known the most atrocious sufferings from hunger. Thus her +productive power is much diminished, not only on account of the grave +difficulties in which her people find themselves (and the development +of tuberculosis is a terrible index), but also for the lowered +productive capacity of her working classes. + +The statistics published by the Office of Public Health of the Empire +(_Reichsgesundheitsamt_) and those given in England by Professor +Starling and laid before the British Parliament, leave no doubt in the +matter. + +Germany has had more than 1,800,000 dead and many more than 4,000,000 +of wounded. She has her mass of orphans, widows and invalids. Taken +altogether the structure of her people has become much worse. + +What constituted the great productive force of the German people was +not only its capacity to work, but the industrial organization which +she had created with fifty years of effort at home and abroad with +many sacrifices. Now Germany has not only lost 8 per cent. of her +population, but _25_ per cent. of her territory, from which cereals +and potatoes were produced, and 10 to 12 per cent. of her live stock, +etc. We have already seen the enormous losses sustained by Germany in +coal, iron and potash. + +The most intelligent and able working classes, created by the +most patient efforts, have been reduced to the state of becoming +revolutionary elements. By taking away from Germany at a stroke her +mercantile marine, about 60,000 sailors have been thrown on the +streets and their skill made useless. + +Germany, therefore, impoverished in her agricultural territory, +deprived of a good part of her raw materials, with a population +weakened in its productive qualities, has lost a good part of her +productive capacity because all her organization abroad has been +broken, and everything which served as a means of exchange of +products, such as her mercantile fleet, has been destroyed. Moreover, +Germany encounters everywhere obstacles and diffidence. Impeded from +developing herself on the seas, held up to ridicule by the absurd +corridor of Danzig, whereby there is a Polish State in German +territory, she cannot help seeking life and raw materials in Russia. + +In these conditions she must not only nourish her vast population, not +only produce sufficient to prevent her from falling into misery, +but must also pay an indemnity which fertile fantasies have made a +deceived Europe believe should amount even to 350 milliards of gold +marks, and which even now is supposed by seemingly reasonable people +to be able to surpass easily the sum of a hundred milliards. + +Could France or Italy, by any kind of sacrifice, have paid any +indemnities after ending the War? Germany has not only to live and +make reparation, but to maintain an inter-allied army of occupation +and the heavy machinery of the Reparations Commission, and must +prepare to pay an indemnity for thirty years. France and Italy have +preserved their colonies (Italy's do not amount to much), their +mercantile fleets (which have much increased), their foreign +organization. Germany, without any of these things, is to find herself +able to pay an indemnity which a brazen-faced and ignorant Press +deceived the public into believing could amount to twenty or +twenty-five milliards a year. + +Taking by chance Helferich's book, which valued the annual +capitalization at ten milliards, the difference between an annual +production of forty-three milliards and a consumption of thirty-three +milliards, inexpert persons have said that Germany can pay without +difficulty ten milliards, plus a premium on her exports, plus a +sufficient quantity of goods and products. + +One becomes humiliated when one sees newspapers of serious reputation +and politicians deemed not to be unimportant reasoning in language so +false. + +The estimates of private wealth, about which the economists make +experiments, and on which I myself have written much in the past, have +a relative value. It may be argued that before the War the total of +all private patrimony in Germany surpassed but by little three hundred +milliards of marks; and this is a valuation made upon generous +criteria. + +But when it is said that the annual capitalization of Germany was +ten milliards, that is not to say that ten milliards of capital is +deposited in the banks ready to be transferred at will. Capitalization +means the creation of instruments of production. The national capital +increases in proportion as these are increased. Therefore the best way +of examining the annual capitalization of a country is to see how many +new industries have arisen, to what extent the old ones have been +improved, what improvements have been introduced into agriculture, +what new investments have been made, etc. + +If the capitalization of Germany before the War was scarcely ten +milliards of marks, it was too small for an Empire of some 67,000,000 +persons. I believe that in reality it was larger. But even if it came +to fifteen milliards, it represented a very small figure. + +The population in the progressive countries augments every year. In +Germany, before the War, in the period 1908-1913, the population +increased on an average by 843,000 persons a year, the difference +between the people born alive and the dead. In other words, the annual +increase of the population per annum was at the rate of 13.0 per +thousand. + +As in certain districts of Italy the peasants plant a row of trees on +the birth of every son, so among nations it is necessary to increase +the national wealth at least in proportion to the newly arrived. +Supposing that the private wealth of the German citizens was from 300 +to 350 milliards of marks (an exaggeration, doubtless), it would mean +that the wealth increased each year by a thirteenth part or rather +more. The difference between the increase in population and the +increase in wealth constituted the effective increase in wealth, but +always in a form not capable of being immediately handled. To plant +trees, build workshops, utilize water-power: all this stands for the +output of so much force. One may undertake such works or not, but in +any case the result cannot immediately be given to the enemy. + +This is so obvious as to be banal. + +To seek to propagate the idea that Germany can give that which +constitutes her annual capitalization either wholly or in great part +is an example of extreme ignorance of economic facts. + +It is positively painful to listen to certain types of argument. + +A French Minister has said that the success of the war loans for 151 +milliards in Germany, and the increase of bank deposits for a sum of +28 milliards, coinciding with an increase of capital of 45 milliards +in limited companies, demonstrate that Germany has saved at least 180 +milliards in four years. Leaving aside the exactness of these figures, +it is really sad to observe reasoning of this type. How can the public +have an idea of the reality? + +Let us apply the same reasoning to France. We must say that inasmuch +as France before the War had a public debt of 32 milliards, and now +has a debt of 265 milliards, without calculating what she owes to +Great Britain and the United States, France, by reason of the War, has +immensely enriched herself, since, leaving aside the debt contracted +abroad and the previous debt, she has saved during the War 200 +milliards, quite apart from the increase in bank deposits and the +increase in capital of limited companies. The War has therefore +immensely enriched her. In reality we are face to face with one of the +phenomena of the intoxication brought about by paper money, by means +of which it has been possible at certain times for the public to +believe that the War had increased wealth. Other features of this +phenomenon we have in the wretched example of the capitalist classes, +after which it was not unnatural that the people should give way to +a great increase in consumption, should demand high wages and offer +little work in return at the very time when it was most necessary +to work more and consume less. There is small cause for wonder that +certain erroneous ideas are diffused among the public when they have +their being in those very sophisms according to which the indemnity to +be paid by the beaten enemy will pay all the debts and losses of the +conquering nations. + +We are told that Germany, being responsible for the War, must impose +on herself a regime of restrictions and organize herself as an +exporting nation for the payment of the reparation debts. + +Here again the question can be considered in two ways, according as +it is proposed to allow Germany a free commerce or to impose on her a +series of forced cessions of goods in payment of the reparations. Both +hypotheses can be entertained, but both, as we shall see, lead to +economic disorder in the conquering States, if these relations are to +be regulated by violence. + +It is useless to dilate on the other aphorisms, or rather sophisms, +which were seriously discussed at the Paris Conference, and which had +even the honour of being sustained by the technical experts: + +1. That it is not important to know what Germany can pay, but it is +sufficient to know what she ought to pay. + +2. That no one can foresee what immense resources Germany will develop +within thirty or forty years, and what Germany will not be able to pay +will be paid by the Allies. + +3. That Germany, under the stimulus of a military occupation, will +increase her production in an unheard-of manner. + +4. The obligation arising from the treaty is an absolute one; the +capacity to pay can only be taken into consideration to establish the +number and amount of the annual payments; the total must in any case +be paid within thirty years or more. + +5. _Elle ou nous_. Germany must pay; if she doesn't the Allies must +pay. It is not necessary that Germany free herself by a certain date; +it is only necessary that she pay all. + +6. Germany has not to discuss, only to pay. Let time illustrate what +is at present unforeseeable, etc. etc. + +If we exclude the third means of payment Germany has two ways open to +her. First of all she can give goods. What goods? When we speak of +goods we really mean coal. Now, as we have seen, according to the +treaty Germany must furnish for ten years to Belgium, Italy, and +France especially quantities of coal, which in the first five years +run from 39-1/2 to 42 millions of tons, and in the following five +years come to a maximum of about 32 millions. And all this when +she has lost the Saar coalfields and is faced with the threatening +situation in Upper Silesia. + +Germany's exports reached their maximum in 1913, when the figures +touched 10,097 millions of marks, excluding precious metals. Grouping +exports and imports in categories, the millions of marks were +distributed as follows: + + Imports. Exports. + + Foodstuffs 2,759 1,035 + Live animals 289 7.4 + Raw materials 5,003 1,518 + Semi-manufactured goods 5,003 1,139 + Manufactured goods 1,478 6,395 + +About one-fifth of the entire exports was in iron and machine products +(1,337 [mil.] articles in iron, 680 machines); 722 millions from +coal (as against imports of other qualities of 289), 658 millions +of chemical products and drugs, 446 from cotton, 298 paint, 290 +techno-electrical productions, etc. + +What goods can Germany give in payment of the indemnity? We have seen +how she has lost a very large part of her iron and a considerable +quantity of her coal. + +All the economic force of Germany was based upon: + +(a) The proper use of her reserves of coal and iron, which allowed +her to develop enormously those industries which are based on these +two elements. + +(b) On her transport and tariff system, which enabled her to fight any +competition. + +(c) On her potent overseas commercial organization. + +Now, by effect of the treaty, these three great forces have been +entirely or in part destroyed. + +What goods can Germany give in payment of the indemnity, and what +goods can she offer without ruining the internal production of the +Entente countries? Let us suppose that Germany gives machines, +colours, wagons, locomotives, etc. Then for this very fact the +countries of the Entente, already suffering by unemployment, would +soon see their factories obliged to shut down. Germany must therefore, +above all, give raw materials; but since she is herself a country that +imports raw materials, and has an enormous and dense population, she +is herself obliged to import raw materials for the fundamental needs +of her existence. + +If we examine Germany's commerce in the five years prior to the +War--that is, in the five years of her greatest boom--we shall find +that the imports always exceeded the exports. In the two years before +the War, 1912 and 1913, the imports were respectively 10,691 and +10,770 millions, and the exports 8,956 and 10,097 millions. In some +years the difference even exceeded two milliards, and was compensated +by credits abroad, with the payment of freights and with the +remittances (always considerable) of the German emigrants. All this is +lost. + +Exported goods can yield to the exporter a profit of, let us suppose, +ten, twelve, or twenty per cent. For the Allies to take an income from +the Custom returns means in practice reducing the exports. In fact, +in Germany production must be carried on at such low prices as to +compensate for the difference, or the exports must be reduced. + +In the first case (which is not likely, since Germany succeeds only +with difficulty, owing to her exchange, in obtaining raw materials, +and must encounter worse difficulties in this respect than other +countries), Germany would be preparing the ruin of the other countries +in organizing forms of production which are superior to those of +all her rivals. Germany would therefore damage all her creditors, +especially in the foreign markets. + +In the second case--the reduction of exports, one would have +the exactly opposite effect to that imagined in the programme +proposed--that is, the indemnities would become unpayable. + +In terms of francs or lire at par with the dollar, Germany's +exportations in 1920 have amounted to 7,250 millions. In 1921 an +increase may be foreseen. + +If Germany has to pay in cash and kind 2,500 millions of marks at +par, plus 26 per cent. of the total of her exports, then supposing an +export trade of eight milliards, she will have to give 1,840 millions, +or in all 4,540 millions of marks. Thus we arrive by stages at less +hyperbolical figures, coming down from the twenty-five milliards +a year to something less than a fifth. But to come to grips with +reality, Germany in all ways, it must be admitted, cannot give more +than two milliards a year, if, indeed, it is desired that an indemnity +be paid. + +Notwithstanding her great resources, France would not be in a +condition to pay abroad two milliards a year without ruining her +exchange, which would drop at once to the level of Germany's. Italy +with difficulty could pay one milliard. + +France and Italy are honest countries, yet they cannot pay their war +creditors, and have not been able, and are not able, to pay any share +of their debt either to the United States of America or to Great +Britain. As a matter of fact, up till now they have paid nothing, and +the interest continues to accumulate with the capital. + +Why have neither France nor Italy yet started to pay some of their +debt? Having won the War, France has had all she could have--fertile +territories, new colonies, an abundance of raw material, and above all +iron and potash. The simple explanation is that which I have given +above. + +Can, then, Germany, who is in a terrible condition, whose circulation +promises ruin, who has no longer credits nor organization abroad, who +has a great shortage in raw materials; can Germany pay four or five +milliards a year? + +We must also remember that Germany, in addition to the indemnity, must +pay the cost of the Army of Occupation, which up to now has amounted +to twenty-five milliards of paper marks a year, or more than 1,600 +millions of francs at par. That is, Germany has to bear for the +support of the Allied troops a charge equal to the cost of maintaining +the armies of France, Italy and Belgium before the War. + +No financier seriously believes that the issue of bonds authorized by +the treaty for the credit of the Reparations Commission has now any +probability of success. Germany's monetary circulation system is +falling to the stage of _assignats_, and the time is not distant +when, if intelligent provision is not made, Germany will not be in a +position to pay any indemnity. + +Obliged to pay only one milliard of gold marks, Germany has not been +able to find this modest sum (modest, that is, in comparison with all +the dreams about the indemnity) without contracting new foreign debts +and increasing her already enormous paper circulation. Each new +indemnity payment, each new debt incurred, will only place Germany in +the position of being unable to make payments abroad. + +Many capitalists, even in Italy, inspire their Press to state that +Germany derives an advantage from the depreciation of her mark, or, +in other words, is content with its low level. But the high exchanges +(and in the case of Germany it amounts to ruin) render almost +impossible the purchase of raw materials, of which Germany has need. +With what means must she carry out her payments if she is obliged to +cede a large part of her customs receipts, that is of her best form of +monetary value, and if she has no longer either credits or freights +abroad? + +If what is happening injured Germany only, it would be more possible +to explain it, if not to justify it. But, on the contrary, Germany's +fall, which is also the decadence of Europe, profoundly disturbs not +only the European continent, but many other producing countries. +Though the United States and Great Britain partially escape the +effect, they too feel the influence of it, not only in their political +serenity, but in the market of goods and values. Germany's position +is bound up with that of Europe; her conquerors cannot escape dire +consequences if the erstwhile enemy collapses. + +We must not forget that before the War, in the years 1912 and 1913, +the larger part of Germany's commerce was with the United States, +with Great Britain, with Russia and with Austria-Hungary. In 1913 her +commerce with the United States represented alone little less than +two milliards and a half of marks according to the statistics of the +German Empire, and 520 millions of dollars according to the figures +of America. If we except Canada, which we may consider a territorial +continuation, the two best customers of the United States were Great +Britain and Germany. They were, moreover, the two customers whose +imports largely exceeded the exports. The downfall of Germany will +bring about inevitably a formidable crisis in the Anglo-Saxon +countries and consequent ruin in other countries. + +Up to now Germany has given all she could; any further payment will +cause a downfall without changing the actual monetary position. +Germany, after a certain point, will not pay, but will drag down in +her fall the economic edifices of the victorious countries of the +Continent. + +All attempts at force are useless, all impositions are sterile. + +All this is true and cannot be denied, but at the same time it must +be recognized that in the first move for the indemnity there was a +reasonable cause for anxiety on the part of the Allies. + +If Germany had had to pay no indemnity this absurd situation would +have come about, that although exhausted, Germany would have issued +from the War without debts abroad and could easily have got into her +stride again, while France, Italy, and in much less degree Great +Britain, would have come out of the War with heavy debts. + +This anxiety was not only just and well founded, but it is easy to see +why it gave ground for a feeling of grave disquiet. + +France and Italy, the two big victor States of the Continent, were +only able to carry on the War through the assistance of Great Britain +and the United States. The War would not have lasted long without the +aid of the Anglo-Saxons, which had a decisive effect. + +France has obtained all she asked for, and, indeed, more than all her +previsions warranted. Italy has found herself in a difficult position. +She too has realized her territorial aspirations, though not +completely, and the assistance of her Allies has not always been +cordial. + +I have had, as head of the Government, to oppose all the agitations, +and especially the Adriatic adventures, which have caused an acute +party division in Italy. From a sense of duty I have also assumed all +responsibility. But the rigidness of Wilson in the Fiume and Adriatic +questions and the behaviour of some of the European Allies have been +perfectly unjustifiable. In certain messages to Wilson during my term +of government I did not fail to bring this fact forward. Certainly, +Jugo-Slavia's demands must be considered with a sense of justice, and +it would have been an error and an injustice to attribute to Italy +large tracts of territory in Dalmatia; but it would have been possible +to find a more reasonable settlement for a country which has had such +sufferings and known such losses during the War. In any case, when +by the absurd system followed in the treaties so many millions of +Germans, Magyars, Turks and Bulgarians have been handed over to States +like Serbia, whose intemperate behaviour precipitated the War, or to +States like Greece, which took only a small and obligatory part in it, +when States like Poland have won their unity and independence without +making war, when Germany has been dismembered in order to give Poland +an access to the sea and the ridiculous situation of Danzig has been +created, when the moral paradox of the Saar, which now becomes a +German Alsace-Lorraine, has been set up, when so many millions of men +have been parcelled out without any criteria, it was particularly +invidious to contest so bitterly Italy's claims. I can freely affirm +this inasmuch as, risking all popularity, I have always done my duty +as a statesman, pointing out that solution which time has proved to be +inevitable. + +No one can deny that Italy is passing through a period of crisis and +political ill-health. Such states of public psychology are for peoples +what neurasthenia is for individuals. On what does it depend? Often +enough on reasons which cannot be isolated or defined. It is a state +of mind which may come to an end at any minute, and is consequent upon +the after-effects of the War. Rather than coming from the economic +disorder, it derives from a malady of the temperament. + +I have never believed, in spite of the agitations which have been seen +at certain periods, in the possibility of a revolutionary movement in +Italy. Italy is the only country which has never had religious wars, +the only country which in twenty centuries has never had a real +revolution. Land of an ancient civilization, prone to sudden bursts of +enthusiasm, susceptible to rapid moods of discouragement, Italy, with +all the infinite resources of the Latin spirit, has always overcome +the most difficult crises by her wonderful adaptive power. In +human history she is, perhaps, the only country where three great +civilizations have risen up one after another in her limited soil. +If Italy can have the minimum of coal, cereals and raw materials +necessary to her existence and her economic revival, the traditional +good sense of the Italian people will easily overcome a crisis which +is grave, but which affects in various measure all the victors, and is +especially temperamental. + +It cannot be denied that if all Europe is sick, Italy has its own +special state of mind. Those who wished the War and those who were +against it are both dissatisfied: the former because, after the +War, Italy has not had the compensations she expected, and has had +sufferings far greater than could have been imagined; the latter +because they attribute to the War and the conduct of the War the great +trials which the nation has now to face. This sickness of the spirit +is the greatest cause of disorder, since malcontent is always the +worst kind of leaven. + +Four great countries decided the War: Great Britain, France, Italy, +and the United States of America. Russia fell to pieces soon, and +fell rather on account of her own internal conditions than from enemy +pressure. The action of the United States arrived late, but was +decisive. Each country, however, acted from a different state of mind. +France had of necessity to make war. Her territory was invaded, and +all hope of salvation lay in moral resistance alone. Great Britain +had to wage the War out of sense of duty. She had guaranteed the +neutrality of Belgium, and could not fail to keep her word of honour. +Two countries alone chose freely the sorrowful way of the War: Italy +and the United States. But their sacrifices, sufferings and losses +have been very different. During the War the United States have been +able to develop their immense resources, and, notwithstanding some +crises, they have come out of it much richer than before. From being +debtors to Europe they have become creditors. They had few losses +in men, and a great development in wealth. Italy, who after many +difficulties had developed in her famous but too narrow territory the +germs of a greater fortune, has had, together with very heavy losses +in men, heavy losses in her wealth. + +Italy saved the destinies of France for the first time by declaring +her neutrality on August 2, 1914, and letting the certainty of it be +known from July 30, as the diplomatic documents have shown. + +It was that sudden and unexpected declaration of neutrality which +rendered it possible for France to concentrate all her forces in the +north and to win the battle of the Marne. Italy for a second time +saved the destinies of the Entente by entering into the War (too +precipitately and unprepared), in May, 1915, thus preventing the +Austrian army, which was formidable for its technical organization and +for its valour, from obtaining the advantages it expected. + +Why did Italy go to war? + +The diplomatic documents, which are not all documents of political +wisdom, demonstrate the anxiety of the Italian Government to +realize its Adriatic programme and to gain secure frontiers against +Austria-Hungary and its successors. But this was not the _cause_ +of the War; it was rather a means of explaining to the people the +necessity for the War. Italy had been for nearly thirty-four years +ally of Austria-Hungary, and the aspirations of Italy's Adriatic +policy had never disturbed the relations between the two countries. +The real cause of Italy's war was a sentimental movement, a form of +extraordinary agitation of the spirits, brought about by the invasion +of Belgium and the danger of France. The intellectual movement +especially, the world of culture, partook largely in fomenting the +state of exaltation which determined the War. + +During the progress of the War, which was long and bitter, Italy +passed through some terrible hours. Her privations during the War, and +immediately after, surpassed all expectations. Italy found herself +face to face with an enemy who enjoyed a superior geographical +situation, a numerical superiority, as well as a superiority in +artillery. After the downfall of Russia she had to support a terrible +campaign. Even in 1917, after the military disaster, when allied +troops came to Italy, she sent abroad more men than there came allied +troops to her aid. According to some statistics which I had compiled, +and which I communicated to the Allies, Italy was shown, in relation +to her demographic structure, to have more men in the front line than +any other country. The economic sufferings were, and are, greater +than those endured by others. France is only in part a Mediterranean +country, while Italy is entirely so. During the War the action of the +submarines rendered the victualling of Italy a very difficult matter. +Many provinces, for months on end, had to content themselves with +the most wretched kind of food. Taking population and wealth into +proportion, if the United States had made the effort of Italy they +would have had to arm sixteen millions of men, to have lost a million +and a half to two million soldiers, and to have spent at least four +hundred milliards. In order to work up popular enthusiasm (and it was +perhaps necessary), the importance of the country's Adriatic claims +was exaggerated. Thus many Italians believe even to-day in good faith +that the War may be considered as lost if some of these aspirations +have not been realized or will not be realized. + +But, after the War, Italy's situation suddenly changed. The War had +aroused in the minds of all Europeans a certain sentiment of violence, +a longing for expansion and conquest. The proclamations of the +Entente, the declarations of Wilson's principles, or points, became so +contorted that no trace of them could be found in the treaties, save +for that ironic _covenant_ of the League of Nations, which is always +repeated on the front page, as Dante said of the rule of St. Benedict, +_at the expense of the paper_. + +For Italy a very curious situation came about. France had but one +enemy: Germany. She united all her forces against this enemy in +a coherent and single action which culminated in the Treaty of +Versailles. France had but one idea: to make the Entente abandon the +principles it had proclaimed, and try to suffocate Germany, dismember +her, humiliate her by means of a military occupation, by controlling +her transports, confiscating all her available wealth, by raising +to the dignity of elevated and highly civilized States inferior +populations without national dignity. + +Austria-Hungary was composed of eleven peoples. It was split up into +a series of States. Austria and Hungary were reduced to small +territories and shut up in narrow confines. All the other countries +were given to Rumania, to Serbia, or more exactly to the S.H.S. +State, to Poland, or else were formed into new States, such as +Czeko-Slovakia. These countries were considered by the Entente as +allies, and, to further good relations, the most important of the +Entente nations protected their aspirations even against the wishes of +Italy. The Italians had found themselves in their difficult theatre of +war against Galatians, Bosnians, Croats, Transylvanians, etc. But +by the simple fact of their having changed names, and having called +themselves Poles, Jugo-Slavs, Rumanians, they became friends. In order +to favour some of these new friends, it has happened that not only +have Italy's sentiments been offended, but even justice itself. +Montenegro was always mentioned in the declarations of the Entente. +On January 10, 1917, Briand, speaking in the name of all the Allies, +united at that time _pour la défense et la liberté des peuples_, put +forward as a fundamental programme the restoration of Belgium, Serbia +and Montenegro: Montenegro was in this on an equality with Belgium. +Just a year afterwards, January 8, 1918, Wilson, when formulating his +fourteen points, had included in the eleventh proposition the duty +of evacuating the territories of Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro, and +restoring them. The exact reason for which it was established that +Montenegro should be absorbed (even without plebiscite) by the S.H.S. +State, thus offending also Italy's sentiments, will remain one of the +most melancholy pages of the New Holy Alliance that the Entente has +become, along with that poor prestigeless organism, the League of +Nations. But let us hope this latter will find a means of renovating +itself. + +While France was ruining the German people's sources of life, the +peoples who had fought most ferociously against Italy became, through +the War, friendly nations, and every aspiration of Italy appeared +directed to lessen the prestige of the new friends and allies. + +The territories annexed to Italy have a small economic value. + +For more than thirty years Italy had sold a large part of her richest +agricultural produce to Germany and had imported a considerable share +of her raw materials from Russia. Since the War she has found herself +in a state of regular isolation. A large part of the Italian Press, +which repeats at haphazard the commonest themes of the French Press +instead of wishing for a more intense revival of commercial relations +with Germany, frightens the ignorant public with stories of German +penetration; and the very plutocracy in France and Italy--though not +to the same extent in Italy--abandons itself to the identical error. +So to-day we find spread throughout the peninsula a sense of +lively discontent which is conducive to a wider acceptance of the +exaggerations of the Socialists and the Fascists. But the phenomenon +is a transitory one. + +Italy had no feeling of rancour against the German people. She +entered the War against German Imperialism, and cannot now follow +any imperialistic policy. Indeed, in the face of the imperialistic +competitions which have followed the War, Italy finds herself in a +state of profound psychological uneasiness. + +France worries herself about one people only, since as a matter of +fact she has only one warlike race at her frontiers: Germany. Italy's +frontiers touch France, the German peoples, the Slav races. It is, +therefore, her interest to approve a democratic policy which allows no +one of the group of combatants to take up a position of superiority. +The true Italian nationalist policy consists in being against all +excessive nationalisms, and nothing is more harmful to Italy's policy +than the abandonment of those democratic principles in the name of +which she arose and by which she lives. If the policy of justice is +a moral duty for the other nations, for Italy it is a necessity of +existence. The Italian people has a clear vision of these facts, +notwithstanding a certain section of her Press and notwithstanding the +exaggerations of certain excited parties arisen from the ashes of the +War. And therefore her uneasiness is great. While other countries have +an economic crisis, Italy experiences, in addition, a mental crisis, +but one with which she will be able to cope. + +France, however, is in a much more difficult situation, and her policy +is still a result of her anxieties. All the violences against Germany +were, until the day before yesterday, an effect of hatred; to-day they +derive from dread. Moral ideas have for nations a still greater value +than wealth. France had until the other day the prestige of her +democratic institutions. All of us who detested the Hohenzollern +dynasty and the insolent fatuity of William II loved France, heir of +the bourgeois revolution and champion of democracy. So, when the War +came, all the democracies felt a lively pang: the crushing of France +meant the crushing of democracy and liberty. All the old bonds are +broken, all the organization which Germany had abroad is smashed up, +and France has been saved, not by arms alone, but by the potent life +of free peoples. + +Yet victory has taken away from France her greatest prestige, her +fascination as a democratic country. Now all the democratic races of +the world look at France with an eye of diffidence--some, indeed, with +rancour; others with hate. France has comported herself much more +crudely toward Germany than a victorious Germany would have comported +herself toward France. In the case of Russia, she has followed purely +plutocratic tendencies. She has on foot the largest army in the world +in front of a helpless Germany. She sends coloured troops to occupy +the most cultured and progressive cities of Germany, abusing the +fruits of victory. She shows no respect for the principle of +nationality or for the right of self-determination. + +Germany is in a helpless and broken condition to-day; she will not +make war; she cannot. But if to-morrow she should make war, how many +peoples would come to France's aid? + +The policy which has set the people of Italy against one another, the +diffusion of nationalist violence, the crude persecutions of enemies, +excluded even from the League of Nations, have created an atmosphere +of distrust of France. Admirable in her political perceptiveness, +France, by reason of an error of exaltation, has lost almost all the +benefit of her victorious action. + +A situation hedged with difficulties has been brought about. The +United States and Great Britain have no longer any treaty of alliance +of guarantee with France. The Anglo-Saxons, conquerors of the War and +the peace, have drawn themselves aside. Italy has no alliance and +cannot have any. No Italian politician could pledge his country, and +Parliament only desires that Italy follow a democratic, peaceful +policy, maintaining herself in Europe as a force for equilibrium and +life. + +France, apart from her military alliance with Belgium, has a whole +system of alliances based largely on the newly formed States: shifting +sands like Poland, Russia's and Germany's enemy, whose fate no one can +prophesy when Germany is reconstructed and Russia risen again, unless +she finds a way of remedying her present mistakes, which are much more +numerous than her past misfortunes. Thus the more France increases her +army, the more she corners raw materials and increases her measures +against Germany, the more unquiet she becomes. + +She has seen that Germany, mistress on land, and to a large extent on +the seas, after having carried everywhere her victorious flag, after +having organized her commerce and, by means of her bankers, merchants +and capitalists, made vast expansions and placed a regular network of +relations and intrigue round the earth, fell when she attempted her +act of imperialistic violence. France, when in difficulties, appealed +to the sentiment of the nations and found arms everywhere to help her. +What then is able organization worth to-day? + +The fluctuations of fortune in Europe show for all her peoples a +succession of victories and defeats. There are no peoples always +victorious. After having, under Napoleon I, humiliated Germany, France +saw the end of her imperialistic dream, and later witnessed the ruin +of Napoleon III. She has suffered two great defeats, and then, when +she stood diminished in stature before a Germany at the top of her +fortune, she, together with the Allies, has had a victory over an +enemy who seemed invincible. + +But no one can foresee the future. To have conveyed great nuclei of +German populations to the Slav States, and especially to Poland; to +have divided the Magyars, without any consideration for their fine +race, among the Rumanians, Czeko-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs; to have +used every kind of violence with the Bulgars; to have offended Turkey +on any and every pretext; to have done this is not to have guaranteed +the victory and the peace. + +Russia sooner or later will recover. It is an illusion to suppose that +Great Britain, France and Italy can form an agreement to regulate the +new State or new States that will arise in Russia. There are too many +tendencies and diverse interests. Germany, too, will reconstruct +herself after a series of sorrows and privations, and no one can say +how the Germans will behave. Unless a policy of peace and social +renovation be shaped and followed, our sons will witness scenes much +more terrible than those which have horrified our generation and upset +our minds even more than our interests. + +Meanwhile, in spite of the frightful increase of scrofula, rickets +and tuberculosis, from which the conquered peoples are principally +suffering, the march of the nations will proceed according to the laws +which have hitherto ruled them and on which our limited action can +only for brief periods cause small modifications or alterations. + +Demographic forecasts, like all forecasts of social events, have but +a comparative value. It is true that demographic movements are +especially biological manifestations, but it is also true that +economic and social factors exercise a profound influence in limiting +their regularity and can disturb them very considerably. It is better +therefore not to make long prophecies. + +What is certain is that the French population has increased almost +imperceptibly while the population of Germany augmented very rapidly. +The annual average of births in the five years before the War, +1908-13, was 762,000 in France and 176,000 in Belgium. In Germany it +was 1,916,000. The average of deaths was 729,000 in France, 117,000 in +Belgium, and 1,073,000 in Germany. Thus, per thousand, the excess of +births in France was 0.9, in Belgium 7.7, in Germany 13. The War +has terribly aggravated the situation in France, whose demographic +structure is far from being a healthy one. From statistics published +giving the first results of the French census of 1921--without the new +territory of Alsace-Lorraine--France, in the interval between the +two census periods, has decreased by 2,102,864; from 39,602,258 to +37,499,394 (1921). The deaths in the War do not represent a half of +this decrease, when is deducted the losses among the coloured troops +and those from French colonies who fought for France. The new +territories annexed to France do not compensate for the War-mortality +and the decrease in births. + +We may presume that if normal conditions of life return, the +population of Germany and German-Austria will be more than one hundred +millions, that the population of Belgium altogether little less than +fifty millions, that Italy will have a population much greater than +that of France, of at least forty-five million inhabitants, and that +Great Britain will have about sixty million inhabitants. In the case +of the Germans we have mentioned one hundred million persons, taking +into consideration Germany and German-Austria. But the Germans of +Poland, of Czeko-Slovakia and the Baltic States will amount to at +least twenty millions of inhabitants. No one can make forecasts, even +of an approximate nature, on Russia, whose fecundity is always the +highest in Europe, and whose losses are rapidly replaced by a high +birth-rate even after the greatest catastrophes. And then there are +the Germans spread about the world, great aggregations of populations +as in the United States of America and in a lesser degree in Brazil. +Up to now these people have been silent, not only because they were +surrounded by hostile populations, but because the accusation of being +sons of the Huns weighed down upon them more than any danger of the +War. But the Treaty of Versailles, and more still the manner in +which it has been applied, is to dissipate, and soon will entirely +dissipate, the atmosphere of antipathy that existed against the +Germans. In Great Britain the situation has changed profoundly in +three years. The United States have made their separate peace and want +no responsibility. In Italy there scarcely exists any hatred for the +Germans, and apart from certain capitalists who paint in lurid colours +the danger of German penetration in their papers because they want +higher tariff protection and to be able to speculate on government +orders, there is no one who does not desire peace with all peoples. +The great majority of the Italian people only desire to reconstruct +the economic and social life of the nation. + +Certain tendencies in France's policy depend perhaps on her great +anxiety for the future, an anxiety, in fact, not unjustified by the +lessons of the past. Germany, notwithstanding her fallen state, her +anguish and the torment she has to go through, is so strong and vital +that everybody is certain of seeing her once again potent, indeed more +potent and formidable than ever. + +Everyone in France is convinced that the Treaty of Versailles has lost +all foundation since the United States of America abandoned it, and +since Great Britain and Italy, persuaded of the impossibility of +putting certain clauses into effect, have shown by their attitude that +they are not disposed to entertain coercive measures which are as +useless as they are damaging. + +In France the very authors of the Treaty of Versailles recognize that +it is weakened by a series of successive attenuations. Tardieu has +asserted that the Treaty of Versailles tends to be abandoned on all +sides: "_Cette faillite a des causes allemandes, des causes alliés, +des causes françaises_" (p. 489). The United States has asked itself, +after the trouble that has followed the treaty, if wisdom did not lie +in the old time isolation, in Washington's testament, in the Monroe +doctrine: _Keep off_. But in America they have not understood, says +Tardieu, that to assist Europe the same solidarity was necessary that +existed during the War (p. 493). + +Great Britain, according to Tardieu, tends now also to stand aside. +The English are inclined to say, "_N'en parlons plus_" (p. 493). No +Frenchman will accept with calm the manner in which Lloyd George has +conceived the execution of the peace treaty. The campaign for the +revision of the treaties sprang up in lower spheres and from popular +associations and workmen's groups, has surprised and saddened the +French spirit (p. 495). In the new developments "_était-ce une autre +Angleterre, était-ce un autre Lloyd George_?" (p. 496). Even in France +herself Tardieu recognizes sadly the language has altered: "_les +gouvernements français, qui se sont succédé au pouvoir depuis le_ 10 +_janvier_, 1920," that is, after the fall of Clemenceau, accused in +turn by Poincaré of being weak and feeble in asserting his demands, +"_ont compromis les droits que leur prédecesseur avait fait +reconnaître à la France_" (p. 503). + +Taking into consideration Germany's financial downfall, which +threatens to upset not only all the indemnity schemes but the entire +economy of continental Europe, the state of mind which is prevalent is +not much different from that which Tardieu indicates. + +It is already more than a year ago since I left the direction of the +Italian Government, and the French Press no longer accused me of being +in perfect agreement with Lloyd George, yet Poincaré wrote on August +1, 1920: + +_L'autre jour M. Asquith déclarait au parlement britannique: "Quelque +forme de langage qu'on emploie, la conférence de Spa a bien été, en +fait, une conférence pour la révision des conditions du traité." +"Chut!" a répondu M. Lloyd George: "c'est là une déclaration très +grave par l'effet qu'elle peut produire en France. Je ne puis la +laisser passer sans la contredire." Contradiction de pure forme, faite +pour courtoisie vis-à-vis de nous, mais qui malheureusement ne change +rien au fond des choses. Chaque fois que le Conseil Suprême s'est +réuni, il a laissé sur la table des delibérations quelques morceaux +épars du traité_. + +No kind of high-handedness, no combined effort, will ever be able to +keep afloat absurdities like the dream of the vast indemnity, the +Polish programme, the hope of annexing the Saar, etc. As things go +there is almost more danger for the victors than for the vanquished. +He who has lost all has nothing to lose. It is rather the victorious +nations who risk all in this disorganized Europe of ours. The +conquerors arm themselves in the ratio by which the vanquished disarm, +and the worse the situation of our old enemies becomes, so much +the worse become the exchanges and the credits of the victorious +continental countries. + +Yet, in some of the exaggerated ideas of France and other countries of +the Entente, there is not only the rancour and anxiety for the future, +but a sentiment of well-founded diffidence. After the War the European +States belonging to the Entente have been embarrassed not only on +account of the enormous internal debts, but also for the huge debts +contracted abroad. + +If Germany had not had to pay any indemnity and had not lost her +colonies and mercantile marine we should have been confronted with the +absurd paradox that the victorious nations would have issued from +the War worn out, with their territories destroyed, and with a huge +foreign debt; Germany would have had her territory quite intact, her +industries ready to begin work again, herself anxious to start +again her productive force, and in addition with no foreign debt, +consequently ample credit abroad. In the mad struggle to break +up Germany there has had part not only hatred, but also a quite +reasonable anxiety which, after all, must be taken into consideration. + +Even to-day, three years after the War, Great Britain has not paid her +debt to America, and France and Italy have not paid their debts to +America and Great Britain. Great Britain could pay with a great +effort; France and Italy cannot pay anyhow. + +According to the accounts of the American Treasury the Allies' War +debt is 9,587 millions of dollars: 4,277 millions owing from Great +Britain, 2,977 millions from France, 1,648 millions from Italy, 349 +millions from Belgium, 187 millions from Russia, 61 millions from +Czeko-Slovakia, 26 millions from Serbia, 25 millions from Rumania, and +15 millions from Greece. Up to last July Great Britain had paid back +110 millions of dollars. Since the spring of 1919 the payment of +the interest on the amounts due to the American Treasury has been +suspended by some European States. Between October and November, 1919, +the amount of the capitalizing and unpaid interests of the European +States came to 236 million dollars. The figure has considerably +increased since then. + +According to the _Statist_ (August 6, 1921) the Allies' debt to the +United States on March 31, 1921, amounted to ten milliards and 959 +million dollars, including the interests, in which sum Great Britain +was interested to the sum of 4,775 million dollars and France for +3,351 million dollars. But the _Statist's_ figures, in variance to the +official figures, include other debts than strictly war debts. + +The debts of the various allied countries' to Great Britain on March +31, 1921, according to a schedule annexed to the financial +statement for 1921-22, published by the British Treasury, came to +£1,777,900,000, distributed as follows: France 557 millions, Italy +476 millions, Russia 561 millions, Belgium 94 millions, Serbia 22 +millions, Portugal, Rumania, Greece and other Allies 66 millions. This +sum represents War debts. But to it must be added the £9,900,000 given +by Great Britain for the reconstruction of Belgium and the loans +granted by her for relief to an amount of £16,000,000. So, altogether, +Great Britain's credit to the Allies on March 31, 1921, was +£1,803,600,000, and has since been increased by the interests. Great +Britain had also at the same date a credit of £144,000,000 to her +dominions. + +France has credit of little less than nine milliard francs, of which +875 millions is from Italy, four milliards from Russia, 2,250 millions +from Belgium, 500 millions from the Jugo-Slavs, and 1,250 millions +from other Allies. Italy has only small credits of no account. + +Now this situation, by reason of which the victorious countries of +Europe are heavy debtors (France has a foreign debt of nearly 30 +milliards, and Italy a debt of more than 20 milliards) in comparison +with Germany, which came out of the War without any debt, has created +a certain amount of bad feeling. Germany would have got on her feet +again quicker than the victors if she had no indemnity to pay and had +no foreign debts to settle. + +France's anxieties in this matter are perfectly legitimate and must be +most seriously considered without, however, producing the enormities +of the Treaty of Versailles. + +Assuming this, the situation may be stated in the following terms: + +1. All the illusions as to the capacity of Germany being able to pay +have fallen to pieces, and the indemnities, after the absurd demands +which tended to consider as inadequate the figure of 350 milliards +and an annual payment of from ten to fifteen milliards have become +an anxious unknown quantity, as troublesome to the victors as to the +vanquished. The German circulation has lost all control under the +force of internal needs, and Germany is threatened with failure. +The other debtors--Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria--have need +of succour, and can pay nothing. Austria has need of the most +indispensable objects of existence, and everything is lacking. + +2. The indemnity which Germany can pay annually in her present +condition cannot, calculating goods and cash payments altogether, +represent more than two or three milliards at the most. + +3. The victorious countries, such as France, have won immense +territories and great benefits, yet they have not been able to pay the +War debts contracted abroad, and not even the interests. France and +Italy, being countries of good faith, have demonstrated that, if they +cannot pay, it is absurd to demand the payment of much higher sums +from countries like Germany, which has lost almost all her best +resources: mercantile fleet, colonies and foreign organization, etc. + +4. The danger exists that with the aggravation of the situation in the +vanquished countries and the weakening of the economic structure of +Europe, the vanquished countries will drag the victors down with +them to ruin, while the Anglo-Saxon peoples, standing apart from +Continental Europe, will detach themselves more and more from its +policy. + +5. The situation which has come about is a reason for everyone to be +anxious, and threatens both the downfall of the vanquished and the +almost inevitable ruin of the victors, unless a way is found of +reconstructing the moral unity of Europe and the solidarity of +economic life. + + + + +VI + +EUROPE'S POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION AND PEACE POLICY + + +No right-thinking person has nowadays any doubt as to the profound +injustice of the Treaty of Versailles and of all the treaties which +derive from it. But this fact is of small importance, inasmuch as it +is not justice or injustice which regulates the relations between +nations, but their interests and sentiments. In the past we have seen +Christian peoples, transplanted in America, maintain the necessity of +slavery, and we have seen, and continue to see every day, methods of +reasoning which, when used by the defeated enemy were declared to be +fallacious and wrong, become in turn, when varied only in form, the +ideas and the customary life of the conquerors in the War--ideas which +then assume the quality of liberal expressions of democracy. + +If appeals to the noblest human sentiments are not made in vain (and +no effort of goodness or generosity is ever sterile), the conviction +which is gradually forming itself, even in the least receptive minds, +that the treaties of peace are inapplicable, as harmful to the +conquerors as to the conquered, gains in force. For the treaties are +at one and the same time a menace for the conquerors and a paralysis +of all activity on the part of the conquered, since once the economic +unity of Continental Europe is broken the resultant depression becomes +inevitable. + +If many errors have been committed, many errors were inevitable. What +we must try to do now is to limit the consequences of these mistakes +in a changed spirit. To reconstruct where we see only ruins is the +most evident necessity. We must also try to diffuse among the nations +which have won the War together and suffered together the least amount +of diffidence possible. As it is, the United States, Great Britain, +France, Italy, Japan, all go their own way. France has obtained her +maximum of concessions, including those of least use to her, but never +before has the world seen her so alone in her attitude as after the +treaties of Paris. + +What is most urgently required at the moment is to change the +prevalent war-mentality which still infects us and overcomes all +generous sentiments, all hopes of unity. The statement that war makes +men better or worse is, perhaps, an exaggerated one. War, which +creates a state of exaltation, hypertrophies all the qualities, all +the tendencies, be they for good or for evil. Ascetic souls, spirits +naturally noble, being disposed toward sacrifice, develop a state +of exaltation and true fervour. How many examples of nobility, of +abnegation, of voluntary martyrdom has not the War given us? But in +persons disposed to evil actions, in rude and violent spirits (and +these are always in the majority), the spirit of violence increases. +This spirit, which among the intellectuals takes the form of arrogance +and concupiscence, and in politics expresses itself in a policy of +conquest, assumes in the crowd the most violent forms of class war, +continuous assaults upon the power of the State, and an unbalanced +desire to gain as much as possible with the least possible work. + +Before the War the number of men ready to take the law into their own +hands was relatively small; now there are many such individuals. +The various nations, even those most advanced, cannot boast a moral +progress comparable with their intellectual development. The explosion +of sentiments of violence has created in the period after the War in +most countries an atmosphere which one may call unbreathable. Peoples +accustomed to be dominated and to serve have come to believe that, +having become dominators in their turn, they have the right to use +every kind of violence against their overlords of yesterday. Are not +the injustices of the Poles against the Germans, and those of the +Rumanians against the Magyars, a proof of this state of mind? Even in +the most civilized countries many rules of order and discipline have +gone by the board. + +After all the great wars a condition of torpor, of unwillingness to +work, together with a certain rudeness in social relations, has always +been noticed. + +The war of 1870 was a little war in comparison with the cataclysm let +loose by the European War. Yet then the conquered country had its +attempt at Bolshevism, which in those days was called the Commune, +and the fall of its political regime. In the conquering country we +witnessed, together with the rapid development of industrial groups, a +quick growth in Socialism and the constitution of great parties like +the Catholic Centre. _Mutatis mutandis_, the same situation has shown +itself after the European War. + +What is most urgently necessary, therefore, is to effect a return to +peace sentiments, and in the manifestations of government to abandon +those attitudes which in the peaces of Paris had their roots in hate. + +I have tried, as Premier of Italy, as writer, and as politician, to +regulate my actions by this principle. In the first months of 1920 I +gave instructions to Italy's ambassador in Vienna, the Marquis della +Torretta, to arrange a meeting between himself and Chancellor Renner, +head of the Government of Vienna. So the chief of the conquered +country came, together with his Ministers, to greet the head of the +conquering country, and there was no word that could record in any way +the past hatred and the ancient rancour. All the conversation was of +the necessity for reconstruction and for the development of fresh +currents of life and commercial activity. The Government of Italy +helped the Government of Austria in so far as was possible. And in so +acting, I felt I was working better for the greatness of my country +than I could possibly have done by any kind of stolid persecution. +I felt that over and beyond our competition there existed the human +sorrow of nations for whom we must avoid fresh shedding of blood and +fresh wars. Had I not left the Government, it was my intention not +only to continue in this path, but also to intensify my efforts in +this direction. + +The banal idea that there exist in Europe two groups of nations, one +of which stands for violence and barbarism--the Germans, the Magyars +and the Bulgarians--while the other group of Anglo-Saxons and Latins +represents civilization, must not continue to be repeated, because not +only is it an outrage on truth but an outrage on honesty. + +Always to repeat that the Germans are not adapted for a democratic +regime is neither just nor true. Nor is it true that Germany is an +essentially warlike country, and therefore different from all other +lands. In the last three centuries France and England have fought many +more wars than Germany. One must read the books of the Napoleonic +period to see with what disdain pacificist Germany is referred +to--that country of peasants, waiters and philosophers. It is +sufficient to read the works of German writers, including Treitschke +himself, to perceive for what a long period of time the German lands, +anxious for peace, have considered France as the country always eager +for war and conquest. + +Not only am I of the opinion that Germany is a land suited for +democratic institutions, but I believe that after the fall of the +Empire democratic principles have a wider prevalence there than in +any other country of Europe. The resistance offered to the peace of +Versailles--that is, to disorganization--may be claimed as a merit for +the democratic parties, which, if they are loyally assisted by the +States of the Entente, can not only develop themselves but establish a +great and noble democracy. + +Germany has accustomed us in history to the most remarkable surprises. +A century and a half ago she was considered as a pacificist nation +without national spirit. She has since then become a warlike country +with the most pronounced national spirit. Early in the seventeenth +century there were in Germany more than one hundred territories and +independent States. There was no true national conscience, and not +even the violence of the Napoleonic wars, a century after, sufficed +to awaken it. What was required was a regular effort of thought, a +sustained programme of action on the part of men like Wolff, Fichte +and Hegel to mould a national conscience. Fifty years earlier no one +would have believed in the possibility of a Germany united and +compact in her national sentiment. Germany passed from the widest +decentralization to the greatest concentration and the intensest +national life. Germany will also be a democratic country if the +violence of her ancient enemies does not drive her into a state of +exaltation which will tend to render minds and spirits favourable to a +return to the old regime. + +To arrive at peace we must first of all desire peace. We must no +longer carry on conversations by means of military missions, but by +means of ambassadors and diplomatic representatives. + + +1.--THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE PARTICIPATION OF THE VANQUISHED + +A great step towards peace may be made by admitting at once all +ex-enemy States into the League of Nations. Among the States of +European civilization millions of persons are unrepresented in the +League of Nations: the United States, who has not wished to adhere to +it after the Treaty of Versailles sanctioned violence; Russia, who +has not been able to join owing to her difficult position; Germany, +Hungary, Austria and Bulgaria, who have not been permitted to join; +the Turks, etc. The League of Nations was a magnificent conception in +which I have had faith, and which I have regarded with sympathy. But a +formidable mistake has deprived it of all prestige. Clauses 5 and 10 +of its originating constitution and the exclusion of the defeated +have given it at once the character of a kind of Holy Alliance of the +conquerors established to regulate the incredible relations which the +treaties have created between conquerors and conquered. Wilson had +already committed the mistake of founding the League of Nations +without first defining the nations and leaving to chance the resources +of the beaten peoples and their populations. The day, however, on +which all the peoples are represented in the League, the United +States, without approving the treaties of Versailles, St. Germain or +Trianon, etc., will feel the need of abandoning their isolation, which +is harmful for them and places them in a position of inferiority. And +the day when all the peoples of the world are represented, and accept +reciprocal pledges of international solidarity, a great step will have +been taken. + +As things stand, the organism of the Reparations Commission, +established by Schedule 2 of Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles, +is an absurd union of the conquerors (no longer allies, but reunited +solely in a kind of bankruptcy procedure), who interpret the treaty in +their own fashion, and can even modify the laws and regulations in +the conquered countries. The existence of such an institution among +civilized peoples ought to be an impossibility. Its powers must be +transferred to the League of Nations in such a manner as to provide +guarantees for the victors, but guarantees also for the conquered. +The suppression of the Reparations Commission becomes, therefore, a +fundamental necessity. + + +2.--THE REVISION OF THE TREATIES + +When the public, and especially in the United States and Great +Britain, become convinced that the spirit of peace can only prevail by +means of an honest revision of the treaties the difficulties will be +easily eliminated. But one cannot merely speak of a simple revision; +it would be a cure worse than the evil. During the tempest one cannot +abandon the storm-beaten ship and cross over to a safer vessel. It is +necessary to return into harbour and make the transhipment where calm, +or relative calm at any rate, reigns. + +Inasmuch as Europe is out of equilibrium, a settlement, even of a +bad kind, cannot be arrived at off-hand. To cast down the present +political scaffolding without having built anything would be an error. +Perhaps here the method that will prove most efficacious is to entrust +the League of Nations with the task of arriving at a revision. +When the League of Nations is charged with this work the various +governments will send their best politicians, and the discussion will +be able to assume a realizable character. + +According to its constitution, the League of Nations may, in case of +war or the menace of war (Clause 11), convoke its members, and take +all the measures required to safeguard the peace of the nations. All +the adhering States have recognized their obligation to submit all +controversies to arbitration, and that in any case they have no right +to resort to war before the expiration of a term of three months after +the verdict of the arbiters or the report of the Council (Clause 12). +Any member of the League of Nations resorting to war contrary to the +undertakings of the treaty which constitutes the League is, _ipso +facto_, considered as if he had committed an act of war against all +the other members of the League (Clause 19). + +But more important still is the fact that the Assembly of the League +of Nations may invite its members to proceed to a fresh examination +of treaties that become inapplicable as well as of international +situations whose prolongation might imperil the peace of the world +(Clause 19). + +We may therefore revise the present treaties without violence and +without destroying them. + +What requires to be modified there is no necessity to say, inasmuch as +all the matter of this book supplies the evidence and the proof. What +is certain is that in Europe and America, except for an intransigent +movement running strong in France, everyone is convinced of the +necessity of revision. + +It will be well that this revision should take place through the +operations of the League of Nations after the representatives of all +the States, conquerors, conquered and neutrals, have come to form part +of it. + +But in the constitution of the League of Nations there are two clauses +which form its fundamental weakness, sections desired by France, whose +gravity escaped Wilson. + +Clause 5 declares that, save and excepting contrary dispositions, the +decisions of the Assembly or of the Council are to be by the unanimous +consent of the members represented at the meetings. It is difficult +to imagine anything more absurd. If the modification of a territorial +situation is being discussed, all the nations must agree as to the +solution, including the interested nation. The League of Nations is +convinced that the Danzig corridor is an absurdity, but if France is +not of the same opinion no modification can be made. Without a change +of this clause, every honest attempt at revision must necessarily +break down. + +Clause 10, by which the members of the League of Nations pledge +themselves to respect and preserve from external attacks the +territorial integrity and the existing political independence of all +the members of the League, must also be altered. This clause, which +is profoundly immoral, consecrates and perpetuates the mistakes +and faults of the treaties. No honest country can guarantee the +territorial integrity of the States now existing after the monstrous +parcelling out of entire groups of Germans and Magyars to other +nations, arranged without scruples and without intelligence. No one +can honestly guarantee the territorial integrity of Poland as it +stands at present. If a new-risen Russia, a renewed Germany, and an +unextinguished Austria desire in the future a revision of the treaties +they will be making a most reasonable demand to which no civilized +country may make objection. It is indeed Clauses 5 and 10 which have +deprived the constitution of the League of Nations of all moral +credit, which have transformed it into an instrument of oppression for +the victors, which have caused the just and profound disapproval of +the most enlightened men of the American Senate. A League of Nations +with Clauses 5 and 10 and the prolonged exclusion of the vanquished +cannot but accentuate the diffidence of all the democracies and the +aversion of the masses. + +But the League of Nations can be altered and can become indeed a great +force for renovation if the problem of its functioning be clearly +confronted and promptly resolved. + +The League of Nations can become a great guarantee for peace on three +conditions: + +(a) That it include really and in the shortest space of time possible +all the peoples, conquerors, conquered and neutrals. + +(b) That clauses 5 and 10 be modified, and that after their +modification a revision of the treaties be undertaken. + +(c) That the Reparations Commission be abolished and its powers be +conferred upon the League of Nations itself. + +As it exists at present the League of Nations has neither prestige nor +dignity; it is an expression of the violence of the conquering group +of nations. But reconstituted and renovated it may become the greatest +of peace factors in the relations between the peoples. + +3.--THE SAFETY OF FRANCE AND THE MILITARY GUARANTEES + +In the state of mind in which France exists at present there is a +reasonable cause of worry for the future. Since the conclusion of +the War the United States of America have withdrawn. They concern +themselves with Europe no more, or only in a very limited form and +with diffidence. The Monroe doctrine has come into its own again. +Great Britain watches the decadence of the European continent, but, +girt by the sea, has nothing to fear. She is a country of Europe, but +she does not live the life of Europe; she stands apart from it. Italy, +when she has overcome the difficulties of her economic situation, can +be certain of her future. The very fact that she stands in direct +opposition to no State, that she may have competition with various +peoples but not long-nurtured hatreds, gives Italy a relative +security. But France, who has been in less than forty-four years twice +at war with Germany, has little security for her future. Germany +and the Germanic races increase rapidly in number. France does not +increase. France, notwithstanding the new territories, after her war +losses, has probably no more inhabitants than in 1914. In her almost +tormented anxiety to destroy Germany we see her dread for the +future--more indeed than mere hatred. To occupy with numerous troops +the left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads is an act of vengeance; +but in the vengeance there is also anxiety. There are many in France +who think that neither now nor after fifteen years must the territory +of the vanquished be abandoned. And so France maintains in effective +force too large an army and nourishes too great a rancour. And for +this reason she helps the Poles in their unjustifiable attempt in +Upper Silesia, will not allow the Germans of Austria to live, and +seeks to provoke and facilitate all movements and political actions +which can tend towards the dismemberment of Germany. The British and +the Italian viewpoints are essentially different. France, which knows +it can no longer count on the co-operation of Great Britain, of the +United States, or of Italy, keeps on foot her numerous army, has +allied herself with Belgium and Poland, and tries to suffocate Germany +in a ring of iron. The attempt is a vain one and destined to fail +within a few years, inasmuch as France's allies have no capacity for +resistance. Yet, all the same, her attempt derives from a feeling that +is not only justifiable but just. + +France had obtained at Paris, apart from the occupation of the left +bank of the Rhine and all the military controls, two guaranteeing +treaties from the United States and from Great Britain: in case of +unprovoked aggression on the part of Germany, Great Britain and +the United States pledged themselves to defend France. The British +Parliament, as we have seen, approved the treaty provisionally on the +similar approbation of the United States. But as the latter has not +approved the Treaty of Versailles, and has not even discussed the +guarantee treaty, France has now no guarantee treaty. + +If we are anxious to realize a peace politic two things are necessary: + +1. That France has security, and that for twenty years at least +Great Britain and Italy pledge themselves to defend her in case of +aggression. + +2. That the measures for the disarmament of the conquered States be +maintained, maybe with some tempering of their conditions, and that +their execution and control be entrusted with the amplest powers to +the League of Nations. + +No one can think it unjust that the parties who provoked the War or +those who have, if not the entire, at least the greatest share of +responsibility, should be rendered for a certain time incapable. +The fall of the military caste in Germany and the formation of a +democratic society will derive much help from the abolition, for a not +too brief period of time, of the permanent army, and this will render +possible, at no distant date, an effective reduction of the armaments +in the victorious countries. + +Great Britain has the moral duty to proffer a guarantee already +spontaneously given. Italy also must give such a guarantee if she +wishes truly to contribute towards the peace of Europe. + +As long as Germany has no fleet, and cannot put together an artillery +and an aviation corps, she cannot present a menace. + +Great Britain and Italy can, however, only give their guarantees on +the condition that they guarantee a proper state of things and not a +continued condition of violence. The withdrawal of all the troops from +the Rhine ought to coincide with a clear definition concerning the +fate of the Germans of Austria and the Germans detached from Germany +without motive. Such a retirement must coincide with the definition +of the territory of the Saar, and the assigning, pure and simple, of +Upper Silesia to Germany and the end of all the insupportable controls +and the indemnity regulations. + +Being myself contrary to any pledge binding Italy for too long a +period, I am of opinion that it is perfectly right that Great Britain +and Italy should make this sacrifice for the peace of Europe. + +But no guarantee is possible, either for Great Britain or Italy, until +the most essential problems be resolved in the justest manner by means +of straightforward and explicit understandings. + +Italy's tendency towards British policy on the continent of Europe +depends on the fact that Great Britain has never wished or tolerated +that any continental State should have a hegemony over others. And, +therefore, she has found herself at different epochs ranged against +France, Germany and Russia. + +England is in the Mediterranean solely to secure her passage through +it, not to dominate it. She continues to follow the grand policy by +which she has transformed her colonies into dominions, and, in spite +of errors, she has always shown the greatest respect for the liberty +of other peoples. + +But Europe will not have peace until the three progressive countries +of the Continent, Germany, France and Italy, find a way of agreement +which can reunite all their energies in one common force. + +Russia has conceived the idea of having the hegemony of Europe; +Germany has indeed had the illusion of such a hegemony. Now this +illusion penetrates certain French elements. Can a people of forty +million inhabitants, who are not increasing, who already find +difficulties in dominating and controlling their immense colonies, +aspire to hegemonic action, even taking count of their great political +prestige? Can France lastingly dominate and menace a country like +Germany, which at no distant date will have a population double that +of France? + +The future of European civilization requires that Germany, France and +Italy, after so much disaster, find a common road to travel. + +The first step to be taken is to give security of existence and of +reconstruction to Germany; the second is to guarantee France from the +perils of a not distant future; the third is to find at all costs a +means of accord between Germany, France and Italy. + +But only vast popular movements and great currents of thought and +of life can work effectively in those cases where the labours of +politicians have revealed themselves as characterized by uncertainty +and as being too traditional. Europe is still under the dominion of +old souls which often enough dwell in young bodies and, therefore, +unite old errors with violence. A great movement can only come from +the intellectuals of the countries most menaced and from fresh popular +energies. + + +4.--REGULATING INTER-ALLIED DEBTS, GERMANY'S INDEMNITY AND THAT OF THE +DEFEATED COUNTRIES + +These two problems are closely connected. + +The victorious countries demand an indemnity from the conquered +countries which, except Germany, who has a great productive force even +in her hour of difficulties, are in extreme depression and misery. + +Great Britain is in debt to the United States, and France, Italy and +minor nations are in their turn heavy debtors to the Americans and to +Great Britain. + +The experience of the last three years has shown that, even with the +best will, none of the countries owing money to the Entente has been +able to pay its debts or even the interest. With an effort Great +Britain could pay; France and Italy will never be able to, and have, +moreover, exchanges which constitute a real menace for the future of +each. + +The fact that France and Italy, although they came out of the war +victoriously, have not been able to pay their debts or even the +interest on them is the proof that Germany, whose best resources have +been taken away from her, can only pay an indemnity very different +from the fantastic figures put forward at the time of the Conference +of Paris, when even important political men spoke of monstrous and +ridiculous indemnities. + +The problem of the inter-allied debts, as well as that of the +indemnity, will be solved by a certain sacrifice on the part of all +who participated in the War. + +The credits of the United States amount to almost 48 milliards of lire +or francs at par, and the credits of Great Britain to 44 milliards. +Great Britain owes about 21 milliards to the United States and is in +turn creditor for some 44 milliards. She has a bad debt owing from +Russia for more than 14 milliards, but 13 milliards are owing from +France, about 12 milliards from Italy, and almost 2-1/2 milliards from +Belgium. That is to say, that Great Britain could well pay her debt +to the United States, ceding the greater part of her credits towards +France and Italy. + +But the truth is that, while on the subject of the German indemnities, +stolid illusions continue to be propagated (perhaps now with greater +discretion), neither France nor Italy is in a position to pay its +debts. + +The most honest solution, which, intelligently enough, J.M. Keynes has +seen from the first, is that each of the inter-allied countries should +renounce its state credits towards countries that were allies or +associates during the War. The United States of America are creditors +only; Great Britain has lent the double of what she has borrowed. +France has received on loan the triple of what she has lent to others. + +The credits of France are for almost two-thirds undemandable credits +of Great Britain; more than 14 milliards being with Russia, they are +for considerably more than one-third bad debts. + +France and Italy would be benefited chiefly by this provision. Great +Britain would scarcely either benefit or lose, or, rather, the benefit +accruing to her would be less in so much as her chief credits are to +Russia. + +The United States would doubtless have to bear the largest burden. But +when one thinks of the small sacrifice which the United States has +made in comparison with the efforts of France and Italy (and Italy was +not obliged to enter the War), the new sacrifice demanded does not +seem excessive. + +During the War the United States of America, who for three years +furnished food, provisions and arms to the countries of the Entente, +have absorbed the greater part of their available resources. Not only +are the States of Europe debtors, but so are especially the private +citizens who have contracted debts during or after the War. Great +Britain during the War had to sell at least 25 milliards of her +foreign values. The United States of America, on the contrary, have +immensely increased their reserves. + +But this very increase is harmful to them, inasmuch as the capacity +for exchange of the States of Europe has been much reduced. The United +States now risk seeing still further reduced, if not destroyed, +this purchasing capacity of their best clients; and this finally +constitutes for the U.S.A. infinitely greater damage than the +renouncing of all their credits. + +To reconstruct Germany, to intensify exchange of goods with the old +countries of Austria-Hungary and Russia, to settle the situation of +the exchange of goods with Italy and the Balkan countries is much more +important for the United States and the prosperity of its people than +to demand payment or not demand payment of those debts made for the +common cause. + +I will speak of the absurd situation which has come about. +Czeko-Slovakia and Poland unwillingly indeed fought against the +Entente, which has raised them to free and autonomous States; and +not only have they no debts to pay, being now in the position of +conquerors, or at least allies of the conquerors, but they have, in +fact, scarcely any foreign debts. + +The existence of enormous War debts is, then, everywhere a menace to +financial stability. No one is anxious to repudiate his debts in order +not to suffer in loss of dignity, but almost all know that they cannot +pay. The end of the War, as Keynes has justly written, has brought +about that all owe immense sums of money to one another. The holders +of loan stock in every country are creditors for vast sums towards +the State, and the State, in its turn, is creditor for enormous sums +towards the taxpayers. The whole situation is highly artificial and +irritating. We shall be unable to move unless we succeed in freeing +ourselves from this chain of paper. + +The work of reconstruction can begin by annulling the inter-allied +debts. + +If it is not thought desirable to proceed at once to annulment, there +remains only the solution of including them in the indemnity which +Germany must pay in the measure of 20 per cent., allocating a certain +proportion to each country which has made loans to allied and +associated governments on account of the War. In round figures the +inter-allied loans come to 100 milliards. They can be reduced to 20, +and then each creditor can renounce his respective credit towards +allies or associates and participate proportionately in the new credit +towards Germany. Such a credit, bearing no interest, could only be +demanded after the payment of all the other indemnities, and would be +considered in the complete total of the indemnities. + +All the illusions concerning the indemnities are now fated to +disappear. They have already vanished for the other countries; they +are about to vanish in the case of Germany. + +Nevertheless it is right that Germany should pay an indemnity. Yet, if +the conquerors cannot meet their foreign debts, how can the vanquished +clear the vast indemnity asked? Each passing day demonstrates more +clearly the misunderstanding of the indemnity. The non-experts have +not learned financial technics, but common sense tells them that the +golden nimbus which has been trailed before their eyes is only a thick +cloud of smoke that is slowly dissipating. + +I have already said that the real damages to repair do not exceed +40 milliards of gold marks and that all the other figures are pure +exaggerations. + +If it be agreed that Germany accept 20 per cent. of the inter-allied +debt, the indemnity may be raised to 60 milliards of francs at par, to +be paid in gold marks. + +But we must calculate for Germany's benefit all that she has already +given in immediate marketable wealth. Apart from her colonies, Germany +has given up all her mercantile marine fleet, her submarine cables, +much railway material and war material, government property in ceded +territory without any diminution of the amount of public debts, etc. +Without taking account, then, of the colonies and her magnificent +commercial organization abroad, Germany has parted with at least 20 +milliards. If we were to calculate what Germany has ceded with the +same criteria with which the conquering countries have calculated +their losses, we should arrive at figures much surpassing these. We +may agree in taxing Germany with an indemnity equivalent in gold marks +to 60 milliards of francs at par--an indemnity to be paid in the +following manner: + +(a) Twenty milliards of francs to be considered as already paid in +consideration of all that Germany has ceded in consequence of the +treaties. + +(b) Twenty milliards from the indemnity which Germany must pay to her +conquerors, especially in coal and other materials, according to the +proportions already established. + +(c) Twenty milliards--after the payment of the debts in the second +category to be taken over by Germany--as part of the reimbursement for +countries which have made credits to the belligerents of the Entente: +that is, the United States, Great Britain and France, in proportion to +the sums lent. + +In what material can Germany pay 20 milliards in a few years? +Especially in coal and in material for repairing the devastated +territories of France. Germany must pledge herself for ten years to +consign to France a quantity of coal at least equal in bulk to the +difference between the annual production before the War in the mines +of the north and in the Pas de Calais and the production of the mines +in the same area during the next ten years. She must also furnish +Italy--who, after the heavy losses sustained, has not the possibility +of effecting exchanges--a quantity of coal that will represent +three-quarters of the figures settled upon in the Treaty of +Versailles. We can compel Germany to give to the Allies for ten years, +in extinction of their credits, at least 500 millions a year in gold, +with privileges on the customs receipts. + +This systematization, which can only be imposed by the free agreement +of the United States and Great Britain, would have the effect of +creating excellent relations. The United States, cancelling their, in +great part, impossible debt, would derive the advantage of developing +their trade and industry, and thus be able to guarantee credits for +private individuals in Europe. It would also be of advantage to Great +Britain, who would lose nothing. Great Britain has about an equal +number of debits and credits, with this difference, that the debits +are secured, while the credits are, in part, unsecured. France's +credits are proportionately the worst and her debits largest, almost +27 milliards. France, liberated from her debt, and in a position to +calculate on a coal situation comparable with that of before the War +and with her new territories, would be in a position to re-establish +herself. The cancellation of 27 milliards of debt, a proportionate +share in 20 milliards, together with all that she has had, represent +on the whole a sum that perhaps exceeds 50 milliards. Italy would +have the advantage of possessing for ten years the minimum of coal +necessary to her existence, and would be liberated from her foreign +debt, which amounts to much more than she can possibly hope for from +the indemnity. + +Such an arrangement, or one like it, is the only way calculated to +allow Europe to set out again on the path of civilization and to +re-establish slowly that economic equilibrium which the War has +destroyed with enormous damage for the conquerors and the certain ruin +of the vanquished. + +But, before speaking of any indemnity, the Reparations Commission must +be abolished and its functions handed over to the League of Nations, +while all the useless controls and other hateful vexations must be put +an end to. + +While the Allied troops' occupation of the Rhine costs Germany +25 milliards of paper marks a year, it is foolish to speak of +reconstruction or indemnity. Either all occupation must cease or the +expenses ought not to exceed, according to the foregoing agreements, a +maximum of 80 millions at par, or even less. + +We shall, however, never arrive at such an arrangement until the +Continental countries become convinced of two things: first, that the +United States will grant no credits under any formula; secondly, that +Germany, under the present system, will be unable to pay anything and +will collapse, dragging down to ruin her conquerors. + +Among many uncertainties these two convictions become ever clearer. + +If in all countries the spirit of insubordination among the working +classes is increasing, the state of mind of the German operatives +is quite remarkable. The workmen almost everywhere, in face of the +enormous fortunes which the War has created and by reason of the +spirit of violence working in them, have worked with bad spirit after +the War because they have thought that a portion of their labour has +gone to form the profits of the industrials. It is useless to say that +we are dealing here with an absurd and dangerous conception, because +the profit of the capitalist is a necessary element of production, +and because production along communist lines, wherever it has been +attempted, has brought ruin and misery. But it is useless to deny that +such a situation exists, together with the state of mind which it +implies. We can well imagine, then, the conditions in which Germany +and the vanquished countries find themselves. The workmen, who in +France, England and Italy exhibit in various degree and measure a +state of intractability, in Germany have to face a situation still +graver. When they work they know that a portion of their labour is +destined to go to the victors, another part to the capitalist, and +finally there will remain something for them. Add to this that in +all the beaten countries hunger is widespread, with a consequent +diminution of energy and work. + +No reasonable person can explain how humanity can continue to believe +in the perpetuation of a similar state of things for another forty +years. + +In speaking of the indemnity which Germany can pay, it is necessary +to consider this special state of mind of the operatives and other +categories of producers. + +But the mere announcement of the settling of the indemnity, of the +immediate admission of the vanquished nations into the League of +Nations, of the settling the question of the occupation of the Rhine, +and of the firm intention to modify the constitution of the League +of Nations, according it the powers now held by the Reparations +Commission, will improve at once the market and signalize a definite +and assured revival. + +The United States made a great financial effort to assist their +associates, and in their own interests, as well as for those of +Europe, they would have done badly to have continued with such +assistance. When the means provided by America come to be employed to +keep going the anarchy of central Europe, Rumania's disorder, Greece's +adventures and Poland's violences, together with Denikin's and +Wrangel's restoration attempts, it is better that all help should +cease. In fact, Europe has begun to reason a little better than her +governments since the financial difficulties have increased. + +The fall of the mark and Germany's profound economic depression have +already destroyed a great part of the illusions on the subject of the +indemnity, and the figures with which for three years the public has +been humbugged no longer convince anyone. + + +5.--FORMING NEW CONNEXIONS WITH RUSSIA + +Among the States of the Entente there is always a fundamental discord +on the subject of Russia. Great Britain recognized at once that if it +were impossible to acknowledge the Soviet Government it was a mistake +to encourage attempts at restoration. After the first moments of +uncertainty Great Britain has insisted on temperate measures, and +notwithstanding that during the War she made the largest loans to the +Russian Government (more than 14 milliards of francs at par, while +France only lent about 4 milliards), she has never put forward the +idea that, as a condition precedent to the recognition of the Soviet +Government, a guarantee of the repayment of the debt was necessary. +Only France has had this mistaken idea, which she has forced to the +point of asking for the sequestration of all gold sent abroad by the +Soviet Government for the purchase of goods. + +Wilson had already stated in his fourteen points what the attitude of +the Entente towards Russia ought to be, but the attitudes actually +assumed have been of quite a different order. + +The barrier which Poland wants to construct between Germany and Russia +is an absurdity which must be swept away at once. Having taken away +Germany's colonies and her capacities for expansion abroad, we must +now direct her towards Russia where alone she can find the outlet +necessary for her enormous population and the debt she has to carry. +The blockade of Russia, the barbed wire placed round Russia, have +damaged Europe severely. This blockade has resolved itself into a +blockade against the Allies. Before the present state of economic +ruin Russia was the great reservoir of raw materials; she was the +unexplored treasure towards which one went with the confidence of +finding everything. Now, owing to her effort, she has fallen; but +how large a part of her fall is as much due to the Entente as to her +action during the War and since. For some time now even the most +hidebound intelligences have recognized the fact that it is useless +to talk of entering into trade relations with Russia without the +co-operation of Germany, the obvious ally in the vast task of +renovation. Similarly, it is useless to talk of reattempting military +manoeuvres. While Germany remains disassociated from the work +of reconstruction and feels herself menaced by a Poland that is +anarchical and disorderly and acts as an agent of the Entente, while +Germany has no security for her future and must work with doubt and +with rancour, all attempts to reconstruct Russia will be vain. The +simple and fundamental truth is just this: One can only get to Moscow +by passing through Berlin. + +If we do not wish conquerors and conquered to fall one after the +other, and a common fate to reunite those who for too long have hated +each other and continue to hate each other, a solemn word of peace +must be pronounced. + +Austria, Germany, Italy, France are not diverse phenomena; they are +different phases of the same phenomenon. All Europe will go to pieces +if new conditions of life are not found, and the economic equilibrium +profoundly shaken by the War re-established. + +I have sought in this book to point out in all sincerity the things +that are in store for Europe; what perils menace her and in what +way her regeneration lies. In my political career I have found many +bitternesses; but the campaign waged against me has not disturbed me +at all. I know that wisdom and life are indivisible, and I have no +need to modify anything of what I have done, neither in my propaganda +nor in my attempt at human regeneration, convinced as I am that I am +serving both the cause of my country and the cause of civilization. +Blame and praise do not disturb me, and the agitations promoted in the +heart of my country will not modify in any way my conviction. On the +contrary, they will only reinforce my will to follow in my own way. + +Truth, be it only slowly, makes its way. Though now the clouds are +blackest, they will shortly disappear. The crisis which menaces and +disturbs Europe so profoundly has inoculated with alarm the most +excited spirits; Europe is still in the phase of doubt, but after the +cries of hate and fury, doubt signifies a great advance. From doubt +the truth may come forth. + + + + +INDEX + + + ADRAIANOPLE, passes to the Greeks, + Adriatic programme, Italy's + Albania, an Italian expedition into + Alexander the Great as politician + Allenstein, a plebiscite for + Allies, the, war debts of + Alsace-Lorraine, annexation of + restitution of + America, and question of army of occupation + her attitude on reparations + result of her entry into the war + (_see also_ United States) + Apponyi, Count, on the Treaty of Trianon + Arabia, Turkey's losses in + Armaments, reduction of + the peace treaties and + Armenia, movement for liberation of + Armenian Republic, the + Armistice terms, summary of + three words change tenor of + Army of Occupation, the + Asia Minor, the Entente Powers and, + Turkey's losses in + Australasia, British possessions in + Australia as part of British dominions + Austria, financial position of, + loses access to the sea + Austria-Hungary, and the Versailles Treaty + civilizing influence of + pre-war army of + result of Treaty of St. Germain Germain-en-Laye + States of, before the war + victories of + Austrian army, the + Azerbajan + + BALKANS, the, Russia's policy in + Battles, a military fact + difference between war and + Beethoven + Belgium, acquires German territory + army of + financial position of + population of + violation of, and the consequences + Bernhardi, General von + Bismarck, foresight of + political genius of + Bolshevik Government, the fiasco of + result of + Bolshevism, and what it is + Boxer rebellion, the Kaiser's address to his troops + Briand, M., on the objects of the Entente + Bridgeheads, German, occupation of, + British colonies, before the war, + Brussels, Conference of, + Budapest, conditions in, + mortality in, + Bulgaria, army of, + the Treaty of Neuilly and, + Bülow, von + + CANADA as part of British dominions, + Cilicia, + Civilization, evolution of, + Clemenceau, M., and the military guarantees question, + and the Paris Conference, + and the reparations clause, + as destroyer, + communicates Poincaré's letter to Lloyd George, + fall of, + his hatred of the Germans, + on peace treaties, + replies to Lloyd George's note, + Coal fields, Germany's pre-war, + Colonial rights, and the Versailles Treaty, + Colonies, British, + German pre-war, + Germany loses her, + Commune, the French, + Communist system, Russian, failure of, + Constantine, King of Greece, return of, + Constantinople, retained by the Turks, + Russia's desire for, + subject to international control, + the Treaty of Sèvres and, + Croatia and Fiume, + Cyrenaica, + Czeko-Slovakia, State of, + added population of, + army of, + financial position of, + Magyars in + + DALMATIA, the London Agreement and, + Dante, a celebrated dictum of, + Danube Commission, the, + Danzig, allotted to Poland, + Dardanelles, the, freedom of: Versailles Treaty and, + De Foville's estimate of wealth of France, + Denikin, + Denmark acquires North Schleswig, + Disarmament conditions fulfilled by Germany, + Disease, and the aftermath of war + + ECONOMIC barriers, removal of, and the peace treaty, + England, and the Mediterranean, + war record of, + Entente, the, and Germany's responsibility for war, + and the Bolshevik Government, + author's opinion of peace terms of, + division among, as result of peace treaties, + Erzeroum, Mussulman population of, + Esthonia, + Eupen ceded to Belgium, + Europe, area of, + financial difficulties of, + increased armaments in + + Europe, monarchies in, before the war + pre-war conditions of + reconstruction of, and peace policy + results of world-war in + States of + European civilization, future of + European States, war debts of + (_cf of_ War Debts) + + FERENCZI, Dr., his statistics of sickness in Budapest + Fezzan + Fichte, and Germany + Financial and economic clauses of peace treaty + Finland + Fiume, Italy's position regarding + question of + the London Agreement and + Wilson and + Foch, Marshal, and the military commission + and the peace treaties + unconstitutional action of + France, acquires Saar mines + alliances with + and the indemnity + and the old regime in Russia + claims of, at Paris Conference, + expenses of her navy + financial position of + iron industry of + Italy and + population of + post-war army of + post-war condition of + presses for occupation of the Ruhr + pre-war status of + private wealth of, before the war + purport of her action in the Conference + recognizes government of Wrangel + safety of, and military guarantees + the political class in + treaties with U.S. and Great Britain + war record of + Franco-Prussian War, the + indemnity demanded by victors + unjust terms of Prussia + Frankfort, Treaty of, compared with Versailles Treaty + Frederick the Great, political genius of + Freedom of the seas, the peace treaties and + French-American Treaty, the + French-English Treaty, the + French territories, liberation + Frontiers, changed condition of + + GEORGE, Lloyd, a memorandum for Peace Conference + a truism of + and question of military guarantees + and reparations question + and Russia + and the Paris Conference + and the proposed trial of the Kaiser + denounces economic manifesto + difficult position of, at Paris Conference + on Poland's claim to Upper Silesia + proposes Germany's admission to League of Nations + Georgia, in Bolshevik hands + Italy prepares a military expedition to + German army reduced by peace terms + delegates and the Paris Conference + German-Austria, army of + loses access to the sea + plight of + Germany, a country of surprises + a war of reconquest by, impossible + accepts armistice terms + Allies' demands for indemnities + and America's entry into the war + and her indemnity + and reconstruction of Russia + and the political sense + annual capitalization of + commerce of, before the war + cost of army of occupation to + effect of peace treaty on + effect of President Wilson's messages on + financial position of + her indemnity increased + her pre-war colonies + her responsibility for the war + how she can pay indemnity + imports and exports of + is she able to pay indemnity asked? + loses her colonies + losses of, in Great War + militarist party in + military conditions imposed on + population of, in and outside Europe + pre-war army of + pre-war coal supply of + pre-war conditions of + result of Versailles Treaty to + revolutionary crisis in + Sèvres Treaty and + suited for democratic principles + territories and States in, before the war + victories of + war record of + Goethe + Great Britain, and the indemnity + and the Treaty of Versailles + army of + enters the war + expenses of her navy + financial position of + general election in + insularity of + population of + pre-war conditions of + war record of + why she entered the war + Great War, the, author's opinion of peace terms + estimated number of dead in + how it was decided + post-war results of + question of responsibility for + Greece, acquires Bulgarian territory + army of + financial position of + her gains by Sèvres Treaty + her illusion of conquering Turkish resistance + her policy of greed + the Entente and + + HEGEL, and Germany, + Helferich, and the capitalization of Germany, + Herf, von, and Polish organization, + Hindenburg, and the U.S. army, + House, Colonel, and the reduction of the German army, + and the reparations proposal, + Hughes, W.M., Premier of Australia, and the German indemnity, + Hungary, alarming mortality in, + army of, + conditions of life in, + delegates of, at Paris Conference, + harsh treatment of, + losses of, by peace treaty, + pre-war, + revolutions in, 166 + Hunger and disease, a legacy of war, + Hymans, M., at Paris Conference, + + INDEMNITIES, question of, + what Germany can pay, + (_see also_ Reparations) + Indemnity clause, how inserted, + _et seq_., + India, British, + Inter-Allied debts, problem of, + _et seq_. + (_see also_ Allies, war debts of) + Iron, Germany's lack of, + Iron-ore, Germany's pre-war wealth in, + Italian frontier, rectification of, + Italian Socialists visit Russia, + Italians, their difficult theatre of war, + Italo-Turkish war, the, + Italy, a period of crisis in, + an expedition into Albania, + and Georgia, + and Montenegro, + and the Balkans, + and the League of Nations, + and the London Agreement, + and the Paris Conference, + army of, + breaks with the Alliance, + custom of tree-planting in, + declares her neutrality, + economic sufferings of, + enters the war, + expenses of her navy, + financial position of, + Great Britain and, + her costly Libyan adventure, + her freedom from revolutions, + in the Triple Alliance, + ministerial crisis in, + population of, + pre-war status of, + stands apart from Conference, + suffers from situation in Russia + territories annexed to, + the Adriatic problem, + the question of Fiume, + votes for recognition of the Soviet, + why she entered the war, + + JAPAN, expenses of her navy, + Jews, Polish, + Judenic, General, + Jugo-Slavia, acquires Bulgarian territory, + army of, + financial position of, + Magyars in, + Julius Caesar as politician, + KANT, Emanuel + Kautsky, published documents of + Keynes, John Maynard, and inter-Allied debts + and the Paris Conference + author's admiration for + represents English Treasury at Paris Conference + the indemnity question and + true forecasts of + Klagenfurth, a plebiscite for + Klotz, and the indemnity + Koltchak, Admiral + Konigsberg, the home of Emanuel Kant + Kowno claimed by Poles + + LABOUR and the war + Lansing, Robert, and the Paris Conference + Law, Bonar, and question of military guarantees + and reparations + and the indemnity + League of Nations, the, a suggested revision of treaties by + and Danzig + and the participation of the vanquished + as trustee of Saar mines + covenant of + foundation of, and its objects + Germany debarred from + its capabilities and mistakes + modification of two clauses of + its constitution needed + powers of + Wilson in a difficult situation + Lettonia + Libyan adventure, the + Lithuania, Wilna ceded to, but occupied by Poles + London Agreement, the + secrecy of + London, Conference of + discusses economic manifesto + Lorraine, Germany's pre-war iron production from + iron mines of: German ambitions for + Loucheur, M., and the indemnity + Ludendorff, General, important declaration by + Luxemburg, iron industry of + + MAGYARS, in Rumania + Treaty of Trianon and, + Malmédy given to Belgium + Marienwerder, a plebiscite for + Marne, battle of the + Mesopotamia lost by Turkey + Military clauses and guarantees of peace treaty + Millerand, M., and Sweden + Monroe doctrine, the + Montenegro, absorbed by the S.H.S. State + restoration of + the Entente and + Moresnet becomes Belgian territory + Moscow Government sends gold to Sweden: French action + Mussulman population of pre-war Turkey + + NAPOLEON I + as politician + his three great errors + Napoleon III + Nationalism, and what it implies + Naval armaments, the race for + Neuilly, the Treaty of + New Zealand, Britain's share of + Nicholas II, his proclamation regarding Poland + weakness of + Nineteenth century, the, wars of + Nitti, Francesco S., and admission of ex-enemies into League of + Nations + and Germany's responsibility for the war + and Italian Socialists + and Russia + and the Italian military expedition to Georgia + and the proposed trial of the Kaiser + at Conferences of London and San Remo + denounces economic manifesto + his son a prisoner of war + ideals of + opposes Adriatic adventure + receives deputation of German business men + signs ratification of Treaty of Versailles + the indemnity question and + Northcliffe Press, the, and the indemnity + + OGIER, M., territorial reconstruction scheme of + Oliganthropy, + Orlando, M., and the reparations question + Orlando Ministry, the, resignation of + Ottoman Empire, the, a limited sovereignty to Turkish parts of + + PALESTINE, Treaty of Sèvres and + Paper currency, Germany's pre-and post-war + Paris, an unsuitable meeting place for Conference + Peace Conference in + Supreme Council at + welcomes President Wilson + Paris Conference, and the indemnity + Peace, necessary conditions for + Peace Conference, Lloyd George's memorandum for + Peace treaties, a negation of justice + and continuation of the war + and their application + effect on Germany of + origin and aims of + question of reparation and indemnity + revision of, a necessity + their opposition to Wilson's fourteen points + Peace treaty of June, 1919, summary of terms of + Peasants, Russian, and the old regime + Petrograd, text of London Agreement published in + Plebiscite, result of, in Upper Silesia + Plebiscites, system of + Poincaré, M., and Clemenceau + and Germany's right of entry into League of Nations + and the peace treaties + Lloyd George replies to + on military guarantees and occupation + Poland, aims at further expansion + anarchic condition of + and the plebiscite + and the Treaty of Versailles + Poland, army of + financial position of + gains by Treaty + her policy of greed + obtains State of Danzig + of to-day + the Tsar's proclamation regarding + treaty with France + working for ruin + Polish state, foundation of an independent + Politics, German, pre-war + Portugal, war debt of + Progress, war as condition towards + Public debts of warring nations + (_cf_. Allies, war debts of) + + RECONSTRUCTION of Europe, the, and annullment of inter-Allied debts + and the revision of peace treaties + Germany's indemnity and that of defeated countries + necessity of forming new connexions with Russia + the League of Nations and + the safety of France and the military guarantees + Renner, Chancellor of Vienna, confers with Marquis della Torretta + Reparations clause, origin of + Reparations Commission, the, expense accounts of + formation of + suppression of, a necessity + Reparations, the problem of + (_cf_. Indemnities) + Rhine, the, as frontier + occupation of + an act of vengeance + cost of, to Germany + Riga, hunger and sickness in, the aftermath of war + Ruhr, the, question of occupation of + Rumania, army of + evacuation of + financial position of + her gains by Treaty + Magyars in + Rumanian occupation of Hungary + Russia, and the League of Nations + as cause of world-conflict + birth-rate of + blockade of + Entente aids military undertakings in + financial position of + Germany's fear of + her policy of expansion + Lloyd George on + military revolts in + peace army of + policy of Entente towards + power of the Tsar in + present-day plight of + pre-war empire of + probable number of men under arms in + Sèvres Treaty and + the Versailles Treaty and + under the Tsars + Russian peasants and the old regime + Russians, remarkable fecundity of + Russo-Japanese peace, the and how drafted + Russo-Japanese War, the + + SAAR, the, a plebiscite for + annexation of: French proposals regarding + coalfields of, assigned to France + pre-war production of + Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Treaty of + San Remo, Conference of + Schleswig, a plebiscite for, + Secret diplomacy, peace treaties and + Serbia, evacuation of + her gains by Treaty + ignorant of London Agreement + responsibility for the war + Russian policy in + the Allied Press and + war debt of + Serbo-Croat States, financial position of + sea-coast outlets for + S.H.S. State absorbs Montenegro + Silesia (_see_ Upper Selesia) + Slav States, cosmopolitan population of + Smyrna, the Sanjak of + Sonnino, M., at Paris Conference + South Africa, British + Soviet, the, recognition of, refused + Spa Conference, the + Starling, Professor + States, European, pre- and post-war, _et seq_. + Submarine menace, the + Sweden, Russian gold sent to + Syria + + TARDIEU, André, and the guarantees against Germany + and the Paris Conference + and the question of military guarantees + draws up reply to Lloyd George + his report on Paris Conference + on President Wilson + on the Treaty of Versailles + Territorial and political clauses of peace treaty + Thrace assigned to Greece + Torretta, Marquis della, confers with Chancellor Renner + Trade conditions, equality of, and the peace treaty + Treaties, peace (_see Neuilly, Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Sèvres + Trianon, Versailles) + Treaties with France against German aggression + Treaty system, the, division of Europe by + Trianon, Treaty of + Triple Alliance, the + Italy and + "Triplice," the (_see_ Triple Alliance) + Tripoli, Italy + Tripolitania + Turkey, and the result of Treaty of Sèvres + army of + Grand Vizier of, and his note + Turks, their power of resistance + Turquan's estimate of wealth of France + + United States, the, a deciding factor of the war + abandons Treaty of Versailles + and Armenian question + and the indemnity + United States, the, and the League of Nations, + and the naval question, + expenses of her navy, + financial position of, + losses in the Great War, + (see also America) + Upper Silesia, a plebiscite for, + iron industry of, + result of plebiscite in, + + VENEZELOS, M., author's tribute to, + fall of, + Versailles, Treaty of, + abandoned by America, + and the future of Germany, + characteristic facts of, + conditions of Germany as result of, + injustice of, + Lloyd George on, + on what based, + ratification of, + summary of, + violation of, + why it has been weakened, + Vessitch, M., at Paris Conference, + Vienna, conditions in, + the wireless high-power station at, + + WÄCHTER, Kinderlen-, and Russia, + War, a political fact, + as a necessary condition of life, + difference between battles and, + legitimacy of, + the aftermath of, + the nature of, + War debts, a menace to financial stability, + War debts of the Allies, + (_cf_. Inter-Allied debts) + Warfare, modern, what it means, + Wars of the last three centuries, the, + Wealth, influence of, on life and happiness, + William II, and his responsibility for the war, + as _miles gioriosus_, + author's aversion to, + frenzied oratory of, + proposed trial of, + Wilna ceded to Lithuania, but occupied by Poles, + Wilson, President, and Armenia + and Fiume, + and military guarantees, + and the League of Nations, + demonstrations against, in Italy, + his fourteen points, + compared with Treaty of Versailles, + his ignorance of European affairs, and the result, + how he was received in Paris, + memorable speech in American Senate, + peace ideals of, 34, + _post-bellum_ economic settlement proposals of (_see_ League of + Nations) + Wolff, and Germany, + Wrangel, General, + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Peaceless Europe, by Francesco Saverio Nitti + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10090 *** |