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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text @@ -0,0 +1,1491 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Ethics [Part V], by Benedict de Spinoza + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Ethics [Part V] + +Author: Benedict de Spinoza + +Translator: R. H. M. Elwes + +Posting Date: April 15, 2013 [EBook #975] +Release Date: July, 1997 +First Posted: July 6, 1997 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ETHICS [PART V] *** + + + + +Produced by an anonymous Project Gutenberg volunteer. + + + + + + + + + +Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS +(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata) + +Translated by R. H. M. Elwes + + + + +PART V: Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom + + + +PREFACE +At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which is concerned +with the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore treat therein of the +power of the reason, showing how far the reason can control the emotions, +and what is the nature of Mental Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be +able to see, how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant. +It is no part of my design to point out the method and means whereby the +understanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the body may +be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of its functions. The +latter question lies in the province of Medicine, the former in the province +of Logic. Here, therefore, I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the +mind, or of reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its +dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation. That we do +not possess absolute dominion over them, I have already shown. Yet the +Stoics have thought, that the emotions depended absolutely on our will, and +that we could absolutely govern them. But these philosophers were compelled, +by the protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess, +that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them: +and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the example (if I remember +rightly) of two dogs, the one a house-dog and the other a hunting-dog. For +by long training it could be brought about, that the house-dog should become +accustomed to hunt, and the hunting-dog to cease from running after hares. +To this opinion Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained, that the +soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain, namely, +to that part called the pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is +enabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body, and also +external objects, and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in +motion in various ways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the +midst of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of the +animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the midst of the +brain in as many different manners, as the animal spirits can impinge +thereon; and, again, that as many different marks are impressed on the said +gland, as there are different external objects which impel the animal +spirits towards it; whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends +the gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once before +by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the gland in its turn +reacts on the said spirits, driving and determining them to the condition +wherein they were, when repulsed before by a similar position of the gland. +He further asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature +to a certain given motion of the gland. For instance, whenever anyone +desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition causes the pupil of +the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in question had only thought of +the dilatation of the pupil, the mere wish to dilate it would not have +brought about the result, inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves +to impel the animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would +dilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with the wish to +dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to look at remote or very +near objects. Lastly, he maintained that, although every motion of the +aforesaid gland seems to have been united by nature to one particular +thought out of the whole number of our thoughts from the very beginning of +our life, yet it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with +other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de l'ame, I. 50. +He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak, that it cannot, under +proper direction, acquire absolute power over its passions. For passions as +defined by him are "perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, +which are referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression) +are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement of the +spirits." (Passion del l'ame,I.27.) But, seeing that we can join any motion +of the gland, or consequently of the spirits, to any volition, the +determination of the will depends entirely on our own powers; if, therefore, +we determine our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to which +we wish our actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which +we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an absolute +dominion over our passions. Such is the doctrine of this illustrious +philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his own words); it is one +which, had it been less ingenious, I could hardly believe to have proceeded +from so great a man. Indeed, I am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who +had stoutly asserted, that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow +from self-evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did not +clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to task the +scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities, +could maintain a hypothesis, beside which occult qualities are commonplace. +What does he understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and the body? What +clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union +with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like him to +explain this union through its proximate cause. What clear and distinct +conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain +particle of extended matter? What clear and distinct conception has he got +of thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended +matter? But he had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from +body, that he could not assign any particular cause of the union between the +two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have recourse to the cause of +the whole universe, that is to God. Further, I should much like to know, +what degree of motion the mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with +what force can it hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this +gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the +animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we have +closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again disjoined therefrom by +physical causes; in which case it would follow that, although the mind +firmly intended to face a given danger, and had united to this decision the +motions of boldness, yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become +suspended in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything +except running away. In truth, as there is no common standard of volition +and motion, so is there no comparison possible between the powers of the +mind and the power or strength of the body; consequently the strength of one +cannot in any wise be determined by the strength of the other. We may also +add, that there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so +placed that it can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also +that all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain. +Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes concerning the will and its +freedom, inasmuch as I have abundantly proved that his premisses are false. +Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by +the understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of the +mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all have had +experience of, but do not accurately observe or distinctly see, and from the +same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions, which have regard to the +mind's blessedness. + + +AXIOMS. +I. If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a change must +necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of the two, and continue +until they cease to be contrary. + +II. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, in so far +as its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause. (This +axiom is evident from III.vii.) + + +PROPOSITIONS. + +Prop.I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged +and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or +the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and +associated in the body. + +Proof.- The order and connection of ideas is the same (II:vii.) as the order +and connection of things, and vice versa the order and connection of things +is the same (II:vi.Coroll. and II:vii.) as the order and connection of +ideas. Wherefore, even as the order and connection of ideas in the mind +takes place according to the order and association of modifications of the +body (II:xviii.), so vice versa (III:ii.) the order and connection of +modifications of the body takes place in accordance with the manner, in +which thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the +mind. Q.E.D. + + +PROP.II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion, +from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other +thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external cause, +and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these +emotions, be destroyed. + +Proof.- That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred, is pleasure +or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Def. of the +Emotions:vi.,&vii.); wherefore, when this cause is removed, the reality of +love or hatred is removed with it; therefore these emotions and those +which arise therefrom are destroyed. Q.E.D. + + +Prop.III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a +passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof. + +Proof.- An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by the general +Def. of the Emotions). If, therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of a +given emotion, that idea will only be distinguished from the emotion, in so +far as it is referred to the mind only, by reason (II:xxi.,&Note); therefore +(III:iii.), the emotion will cease to be a passion. Q.E.D. + +Corollary.- An emotion therefore becomes more under our control, and the +mind is less passive in respect to it, in proportion as it is more known to +us. + + +Prop.IV. There is no modification of the body, whereof we +cannot form some clear and distinct conception. + +Proof.- Properties which are common to all things can only be conceived +adequately (II:xxxviii.); therefore (II:xii.and Lemma. ii. after II:xiii.) +there is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and +distinct conception. Q.E.D. + +Corollary.- Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof we cannot +form some clear and distinct conception. For an emotion is the idea of a +modification of the body (by the general Def. of the Emotions), and must +therefore (by the preceding Prop.) involve some clear and distinct +conception. + +Note.- Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by an effect +(I:xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly understand whatever +follows from an idea, which in us is adequate (II:xl.), it follows that +everyone has the power of clearly and distinctly understanding himself and +his emotions, if not absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of +bringing it about, that he should become less subject to them. To attain +this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring, as +far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion, in order +that the mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to think of those +things which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully +acquiesces: and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from the +thought of an external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; +whence it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be +destroyed (V:ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which are wont to +arise from such emotion, will become incapable of being excessive (IV:lxi.). +For it must be especially remarked, that the appetite through which a man is +said to be active, and that through which he is said to be passive is one +and the same. For instance, we have shown that human nature is so +constituted, that everyone desires his fellow-men to live after his own +fashion (III:xxxi.Note); in a man, who is not guided by reason, this +appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and does not greatly differ +from pride; whereas in a man, who lives by the dictates of reason, it is an +activity or virtue which is called piety (IV:xxxvii.Note.i. and second +proof). In like manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far +as they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are accredited to +virtue, when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all +desires, whereby we are determined to any given action, may arise as much +from adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV:lix.). Than this remedy for the +emotions (to return to the point from which I started), which consists in a +true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within our power, can +be devised. For the mind has no other power save that of thinking and of +forming, adequate ideas, as we have shown above (III:iii.). + + +Prop.V. An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive +simply, and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, +other conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion. + +Proof.- An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, is greater +than one towards what we conceive to be necessary (III:xlix.), and, +consequently, still greater than one towards what we conceive as possible, +or contingent (IV:xi.). But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else +than to conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes whereby +it has been determined to action (II:xxxv.Note); therefore, an emotion +towards a thing which we conceive simply is, other conditions being equal, +greater than one, which we feel towards what is necessary, possible, or +contingent, and, consequently, it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D. + + +Prop.VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions and is +less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as +necessary. + +Proof.- The mind understands all things to be necessary (I:xxix.) and to be +determined to existence and operation by an infinite chain of causes; +therefore (by the foregoing Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that +it is less subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III:xlviii.) +feels less emotion towards the things themselves. Q.E.D. + +Note.- The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is applied to +particular things, which we conceive more distinctly and vividly, the +greater is the power of the mind over the emotions, as experience also +testifies. For we see, that the pain arising from the loss of any good is +mitigated, as soon as the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not +by any means have been preserved. So also we see that no one pities an +infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly, because it +passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness. Whereas, if most +people were born full-grown and only one here and there as an infant, +everyone would pity the infants; because infancy would not then be looked on +as a state natural and necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature; +and we may note several other instances of the same sort. + + +Prop.VII. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if +we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are +attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent. + +Proof.- We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the emotion +wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body, being affected by +another emotion excluding the existence of the said thing (II:xvii.). +Wherefore, the emotion, which is referred to the thing which we regard as +absent, is not of a nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and +power (IV:vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort +controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its external +cause (IV:ix.). But an emotion which springs from reason is necessarily +referred to the common properties of things (see the def. of reason in +II:xl.Note.ii.), which we always regard as present (for there can be nothing +to exclude their present existence), and which we always conceive in the +same manner (II:xxxviii.). Wherefore an emotion of this kind always remains +the same; and consequently (V:Ax.i.) emotions, which are contrary thereto +and are not kept going by their external causes, will be obliged to adapt +themselves to it more and more, until they are no longer contrary to it; to +this extent the emotion which springs from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D. + + +Prop.VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of +simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused. + +Proof.- Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few (III:vii.): +therefore (IV:v.), in proportion to the increased number of simultaneous +causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion becomes stronger. Q.E.D. + +Note.- This proposition is also evident from V:Ax.ii. + +Prop.IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse +causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion +itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less +affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different and +equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a +single cause. + +Proof-. An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it hinders the mind +from being able to think (IV:xxvi., IV:xxvii.); therefore, an emotion, +whereby the mind is determined to the contemplation of several things at +once, is less hurtful than another equally powerful emotion, which so +engrosses the mind in the single contemplation of a few objects or of one, +that it is unable to think of anything else; this was our first point. +Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power (III:vii.), consists +solely in thought (II:xi.), the mind is less passive in respect to an +emotion, which causes it to think of several things at once, than in regard +to an equally strong emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation +of a few or of a single object: this was our second point. Lastly, this +emotion (III:xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to several causes, is +less powerful in regard to each of them. Q.E.D. + + +Prop.X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to +our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the +modifications of our body according to the intellectual order. + +Proof.- The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that is (IV:xxx.), +which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede the mind from understanding +(IV:xxvii.). So long, therefore, as we are not assailed by emotions contrary +to our nature, the mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things +(IV:xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear and +distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II:xl.Note.ii. and +II:xlvii.Note); consequently we have in such cases the power of arranging +and associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual +order. Q.E.D. + +Note.- By this power of rightly arranging and associating the bodily +modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily affected by evil +emotions. For (V:vii.) a greater force is needed for controlling the +emotions, when they are arranged and associated according to the +intellectual order, than when they, are uncertain and unsettled. The best we +can do, therefore, so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our +emotions, is to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical +precepts, to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith to the +particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so that our +imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that it may be always +ready to our hand. For instance, we have laid down among the rules of life +(IV:xlvi., & Note), that hatred should be overcome with love or high- +mindedness, and not required with hatred in return. Now, that this precept +of reason may be always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often +think over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and in +what manner and way they may be best warded off by high-mindedness: we shall +thus associate the idea of wrong with the idea of this precept, which +accordingly will always be ready for use when a wrong is done to us +(II:xviii.). If we keep also in readiness the notion of our true +advantage, and of the good which follows from mutual friendships, and common +fellowships; further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the +result of the right way of life (IV:lii.), and that men, no less than +everything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such case I say +the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises therefrom, will engross a +very small part of our imagination and will be easily overcome; or, if the +anger which springs from a grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will +nevertheless be overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far +sooner than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. As is +indeed evident from V:vi.,V:vii.,V:viii. We should, in the same way, reflect +on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the ordinary dangers of life +should frequently be brought to mind and imagined, together with the means +whereby through readiness of resource and strength of mind we can avoid and +overcome them. But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and +conceptions we should always bear in mind that which is good in every +individual thing (IV:lxiii.Coroll. and III:lix.), in order that we may +always be determined to action by an emotion of pleasure. For instance, if +a man sees that he is too keen in the pursuit of honour, let him think over +its right use, the end for which it should be pursued, and the means whereby +he may attain it. Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and +the fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except +through a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do the +most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of gaining the +distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving vent to their anger would +fain appear wise. Wherefore it is certain that those, who cry out the +loudest against the misuse of honour and the vanity of the world, are those +who most greedily covet it. This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is +common to all who are ill-used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit. +For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the misuse of +wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely torments himself, and +shows the world that he is intolerant, not only of his own poverty, but also +of other people's riches. So, again, those who have been ill received by a +woman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other +stock faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion, +directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart. Thus he who +would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the love of freedom +strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of the virtues and their +causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy which arises from the true +knowledge of them: he will in no wise desire to dwell on men's faults, or to +carp at his fellows, or to revel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever will +diligently observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are not +difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for the most +part, to direct his actions according to the commandments of reason. + + +Prop.XI. In proportion as a mental image is referred to more +objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and occupies +the mind more. + +Proof.- In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is referred to more +objects, so are there more causes whereby it can be aroused and fostered, +all of which (by hypothesis) the mind contemplates simultaneously in +association with the given emotion; therefore the emotion is more frequent, +or is more often in full vigour, and (V:viii.) occupies the mind more. +Q.E.D. + + +Prop.XII. The mental images of things are more easily +associated with the images referred to things which we clearly +and distinctly understand, than with others. + +Proof.- Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand, are either the +common properties of things or deductions therefrom (see definition of +Reason, II:.xl.Note ii.), and are consequently (by the last Prop.) more +often aroused in us. Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should +contemplate other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with +something else, and consequently (II:xviii.) that the images of the said +things should be more often associated with the images of these than with +the images of something else. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XIII. A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion +as it is associated with a greater number of other images. + +Proof.- In proportion as an image is associated with a greater number of +other images, so (II:xviii.) are there more causes whereby it can be +aroused. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily +modifications or images of things may be referred to the +idea of God. + +Proof.- There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind may not form +some clear and distinct conception (V:iv.); wherefore it can bring it about, +that they should all be referred to the idea of God (I:xv.). Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself +and his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion +as he more understands himself and his emotions. + +Proof.- He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions +feels pleasure (III:liii.), and this pleasure is (by the last Prop.) +accompanied by the idea of God; therefore (Def. of the Emotions:vi.) such an +one loves God, and (for the same reason) so much the more in proportion as +he more understands himself and his emotions. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XVI. This love towards God must +hold the chief place in the mind. + +Proof.- For this love is associated with all the modifications of the body +(V:xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V:v.); therefore (V:xi.), it must hold +the chief place in the mind. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XVII. God is without passions, +neither is he affected by +any emotion of pleasure or pain. + +Proof.- All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true +(II:xxxii.), that is (II:Def.iv.) adequate; and therefore (by the general +Def. of the Emotions) God is without passions. Again, God cannot pass either +to a greater or to a lesser perfection (I:xx.Coroll.ii.); therefore +(by Def. of the Emotions:ii., &iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of +pleasure or pain. + +Corollary. Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate anyone. For God (by +the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain, +consequently (Def. of the Emotions:vi., &vii.) he does not love or hate +anyone. + + +Prop.XVIII. No one can hate God. + +Proof.- The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (II:xlvi., +II:xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God, we are active +(III:iii.) ; consequently (III:lix.) there can be no pain accompanied by the +idea of God, in other words (Def. of the Emotions:vii.), no one can hate +God. Q.E.D. + +Corollary.- Love towards God cannot be turned into hate. + +Note.- It may be objected that, as we understand God as the cause of all +things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause of pain. But I make +answer, that, in so far as we understand the causes of pain, it to that +extent (V:iii.) ceases to be a passion, that is, it ceases to be pain +(III:lix.); therefore, in so far as we understand God to be the cause of +pain, we to that extent feel pleasure. + + +Prop. XIX. He, who loves God, +cannot endeavour that God +should love him in return. + +Proof.- For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V:xvii.Coroll.) +that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and consequently he would desire +to feel pain (III:xix.); which is absurd (III:xxviii.). Therefore, he who +loves God, &c. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the +emotion of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, +in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be +joined to God by the same bond of love. + +Proof.- This love towards God is the highest good which we can seek for +under the guidance of reason (IV:xxviii.), it is common to all men +(IV:xxxvi),and we desire that all should rejoice therein (IV:xxxvii.); +therefore (Def. of the Emotions:xxiii), it cannot be stained by the +emotion envy nor by, the emotion of jealousy, (V:xviii. see definition of +Jealousy, (III:xxxv. Note); but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more +fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice +therein. Q.E.D. + +Note.- We can in the same way, show, that there is no emotion directly +contrary to this love, whereby this love can be destroyed; therefore we may +conclude, that this love towards God is the most constant of all the +emotions, and that, in so far as it is referred to the body, it cannot be +destroyed, unless the body be destroyed also. As to its nature, in so far as +it is referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire. + I have now gone through all the remedies against the emotions, or all +that the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them. Whence it +appears that the mind's power over the emotions consists:- + + I. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V:iv.Note). + + II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of an +external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V:ii. and V:iv.Note). + + III. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions referred to +things, which we distinctly understand, surpass those referred to what we +conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner (V:vii.). + + IV. In the number of causes whereby those modifications (Affectiones. +Camerer reads affectus - emotions), are fostered, which have regard to the +common properties of things or to God (V:ix., V:xi.). + + V. Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and associate, one +with another, its own emotions (V:x.Note and V:xii., V:xiii., V:xiv.). + +But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions may be better +understood, it should be specially observed that the emotions are called by +us strong, when we compare the emotion of one man with the emotion of +another, and see that one man is more troubled than another by the same +emotion; or when we are comparing the various emotions of the same man one +with another, and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion +than by another. For the strength of every emotion is defined by a +comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause. Now the +power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its infirmity or passion +is defined by the privation of knowledge only: it therefore follows, that +that mind is most passive, whose greatest part is made up of inadequate +ideas, so that it may be characterized more readily by its passive states +than by its activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active, whose +greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that, although it may contain +as many inadequate ideas as the former mind, it may yet be more easily +characterized by ideas attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which +tell of human infirmity. Again, it must be observed, that spiritual +unhealthiness; and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive love for +something which is subject to many variations, and which we can never become +masters of. For no one is solicitous or anxious about anything, unless he +loves it; neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, &c. arise, except in +regard to things whereof no one can be really master. + +We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and distinct knowledge, +and especially that third kind of knowledge (II:xlvii.Note), founded on the +actual knowledge of God, possesses over the emotions: if it does not +absolutely destroy them, in so far as they are passions (V:iii. and +V:iv.Note); at any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the +mind (V:xiv.). Further, it begets a love towards a thing immutable and +eternal (V:xv.), whereof we may really enter into possession (II:xlv.); +neither can it be defiled with those faults which are inherent in ordinary +love; but it may grow from strength to strength, and may engross the greater +part of the mind, and deeply penetrate it. And now I have finished with all +that concerns this present life: for, as I said in the beginning of this +note, I have briefly described all the remedies against the emotions. And +this everyone may readily have seen for himself, if he has attended to +what is advanced in the present note, and also to the definitions of the +mind and its emotions, and, lastly, to Propositions III:i. and III:iii. It +is now, therefore, time to pass on to those matters, which appertain to the +duration of the mind, without relation to the body. + + +Prop. XXI. The mind can only imagine anything, +or remember what is past, while the body endures. + +Proof.- The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, nor does +it imagine the modifications of the body as actual, except while the body +endures (II:viii.Coroll.); and, consequently (II:xxvi.), it does not imagine +any body as actually existing, except while its own body endures. Thus it +cannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II:xvii.Note), +or remember things past, except while the body endures (see definition of +Memory, II:xviii.Note). Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XXII. Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea, +which expresses the essence of this or that human body under +the form of eternity. + +Proof.- God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or that human +body, but also of its essence (I:xxv.). This essence, therefore, must +necessarily be conceived through the very essence of God (I:Ax.iv.), and be +thus conceived by a certain eternal necessity (I:xvi.); and this conception. +must necessarily exist in God (II:iii.). Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely +destroyed with the body, but there remains of it +something which is eternal. + +Proof.- There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which expresses the +essence of the human body (last Prop.), which, therefore, is necessarily +something appertaining to the essence of the human mind (II:xiii.). But we +have not assigned to the human mind any, duration, definable by time, except +in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is +explained through duration, and may be defined by time - that is +(II:viii.Coroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the body +endures. Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is conceived by +a certain eternal necessity through the very essence of God (last Prop.); +this something, which appertains to the essence of the mind, will +necessarily be eternal. Q.E.D. + +Note.- This idea, which expresses the essence of the body under the form of +eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode of thinking, which belongs to +the essence of the mind, and is necessarily eternal. Yet it is not possible +that we should remember that we existed before our body, for our body can +bear no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in terms of +time, or have any relation to time. But, notwithstanding, we feel and know +that we are eternal. For the mind feels those things that it conceives by +understanding, no less than those things that it remembers. For the eyes of +the mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than proofs. +Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before the body, yet we +feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the essence of the body, under +the form of eternity, is eternal, and that thus its existence cannot be +defined in terms of time, or explained through duration. Thus our mind can +only be said to endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed +time, in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body. Thus far +only has it the power of determining the existence of things by time, and +conceiving them under the category of duration. + + +Prop. XXIV. The more we understand particular +things, the more do we understand God. + +Proof.- This is evident from I:xxv.Coroll. + + +Prop. XXV. The highest endeavour of the mind, +and the highest virtue is to understand things +by the third kind of knowledge. + +Proof.- The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of +certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things +(see its definition III:xl.Note.ii.); and, in proportion as we understand +things more in this way, we better understand God (by the last Prop.); +therefore (IV:xxviii.) the highest virtue of the mind, that is IV:Def.viii.) +the power, or nature, or (III:vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is to +understand things by the third kind of knowledge. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XXVI. In proportion as the mind is +more capable of understanding things by +the third kind of knowledge, it desires +more to understand things by that kind. + +Proof.- This is evident. For, in so far as we conceive the mind to be +capable of conceiving things by this kind of knowledge, we, to that extent, +conceive it as determined thus to conceive things; and consequently (Def. of +the Emotions:i.), the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is more +capable thereof. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XXVII. From this third kind of +knowledge arises the highest possible +mental acquiescence. + +Proof.- The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV:xxviii.), or to +understand things by the third kind of knowledge (V:xxv.), and this virtue +is greater in proportion as the mind knows things more by the said kind of +knowledge (V:xxiv.): consequently, he who knows things by this kind of +knowledge passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore +(Def. of the Emotions:ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such pleasure +being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own virtue; thus (Def. of +the Emotions:xxv.), from this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible +acquiescence. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire to +know things by the third kind of knowledge +cannot arise from the first, but from the +second kind of knowledge. + +Proof.- This proposition is self-evident. For whatsoever we understand +clearly and distinct we understand either through itself, or through that +which is conceived through itself; that is, ideas which are clear and +distinct in us, or which are referred to the third kind of knowledge +(II:xl.Note.ii.) cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary, and +confused, and are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow +from adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of knowledge; +therefore (Def. of the Emotions:i.), the desire of knowing things by the +third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second +kind. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands +under the form of eternity, it does not +understand by virtue of conceiving the +present actual existence of the body, +but by virtue of conceiving the essence of +the body under the form of eternity. + +Proof.- In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body, +it to that extent conceives duration which can be determined by time, and to +that extent only, has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time +(V:xxi., II:xxvi.). But eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration +(I:Def.viii. and explanation). Therefore to this extent the mind has not the +power of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it possesses such +power, because it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under the +form of eternity (II:xliv.Coroll.ii.), and also because it is of the nature +of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity +(V:xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to the +essence of mind (II:xiii.). Therefore this power of conceiving things under +the form of eternity only belongs to the mind in virtue of the mind's +conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity. Q.E.D. + +Note.- Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as existing +in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in God and following +from the necessity of the divine nature. Whatsoever we conceive in this +second way as true or real, we conceive under the form of eternity, and +their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed +in II:xlv.&Note, which see. + + +Prop. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body +under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a +knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived +through God. + +Proof.- Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this involves +necessary existence (I:Def.viii.). Therefore to conceive things under the +form of eternity, is to conceive things in so far as they are conceived +through thp essence of God as real entities, or in so far as they involve +existence through the essence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it +conceives itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent +necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, &c. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge +depends on the mind, as its formal cause, +in so far as the mind itself is eternal. + +Proof.- The mind does not conceive anything under the form of eternity, +except in so far as it conceives its own body under the form of eternity +(V:xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is eternal (V:xxi., V:xxiii.); +therefore (by the last Prop.), in so far as it is eternal, it possesses the +knowledge of God, which knowledge is necessarily adequate +(II:xlvi.); hence the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is capable of +knowing everything which can follow from this given knowledge of God +(II:xl.), in other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge +(see Def. in II:xl.Note.ii.), whereof accordingly the mind (III:Def.i.), in +so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or formal cause of such knowledge. +Q.E.D. + +Note.- In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in this kind of +knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of himself and of God; in +other words, he will be more perfect and blessed, as will appear more +clearly in the sequel. But we must here observe that, although we are +already certain that the mind is eternal, in so far as it conceives things +under the form of eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be +more readily explained and better understood, we will consider the mind +itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to understand things under +the form of eternity, as indeed we have done hitherto; this we may do +without any danger of error, so long as we are careful not to draw any +conclusion, unless our premisses are plain. + + +Prop. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of +knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by +the idea of God as cause. + +Proof.- From this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental +acquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions:xxv.), pleasure, and this +acquiescence is accompanied by the idea of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and +consequently (V:xxx.) the idea also of God as cause. Q.E.D. + +Corollary.- From the third kind of knowledge necessarily arises the +intellectual love of God. From this kind of knowledge arises pleasure +accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is (Def. of the Emotions:vi.), +the love of God; not in so far as we imagine him as present (V:xxix.), but +in so far as we understand him to be eternal; this is what I call the +intellectual love of God. + + +Prop. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, +which arises from the third kind of knowledge, +is eternal. + +Proof.- The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V:xxxi., I:Ax.iii.); +therefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arises therefrom is also +necessarily eternal. Q.E.D. + +Note.- Although this love towards God has (by the foregoing Prop.) no +beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of love, just as though it +had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll. of the last Prop. Nor is there here +any difference, except that the mind possesses as eternal those same +perfections which we feigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by +the idea of God as eternal cause. If pleasure consists in the transition to +a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the mind being +endowed with perfection itself. + + +Prop. XXX.IV. The mind is, only while the body +endures, subject to those emotions which are +attributable to passions. + +Proof. Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind contemplates a thing as +present (II:xvii.Note); yet this idea indicates rather the present +disposition of the human body than the nature of the external thing +(II:xvi.Coroll.ii.). Therefore emotion (see general Def. of Emotions) +is imagination, in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the +body; therefore (V:xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures, subject +to emotions which are attributable to passions. Q.E.D. + +Corollary.- Hence it follows that no love save intellectual love is eternal. + +Note.- If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see that they are +indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that they confuse +eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the imagination or the memory +which they believe to remain after death. + + +Prop. XXXV. God loves himself with +an infinite intellectual love. + +Proof.- God is absolutely infinite (I:Def.vi.), that is (II:Def.vi.), the +nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection; and such rejoicing is +(II:iii.) accompanied by the idea of himself, that is (I:xi. and I:Def.i.), +the idea of his own cause: now this is what we have (in V:xxxii.Coroll.) +described as intellectual love. + + +Prop. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is +that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as +he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through +the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of +eternity; in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards +God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself. + +Proof.- (1) This love of the mind must be referred to the activities of the +mind (V:xxxii.Coroll. and III:iii.); it is itself, indeed, an activity +whereby the mind regards itself accompanied by the idea of God as cause +(V:xxxii.&Coroll.); that is (I:xxv.Coroll. and II:xi.Coroll.), an activity +whereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human mind, +regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself; therefore (by the last +Prop.), this love of the mind is part of the infinite love wherewith God +loves himself. Q.E.D. + +Corollary.- Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves himself, loves +man, and, consequently, that the love of God towards men, and the +intellectual love of the mind towards God are identical. + +Note.- From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein our salvation, +or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in the constant and eternal +love towards God, or in God's love towards men. This love or blessedness is, +in the Bible, called Glory and not undeservedly. For whether this love be +referred to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of +spirit, which (Def. of the Emotions:xxv., and xxx.) is not really +distinguished from glory. In so far as it is referred to God, it is +(V:xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still use that term, accompanied by the idea +of itself, and, in so far as it is referred to the mind, it is the same +(V:xxvii.). + +Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in knowledge, whereof +the beginning and the foundation is God (I:xv., &II:xlvii.Note), it becomes +clear to us, in what manner and way our mind, as to its essence and +existence, follows from the divine nature and constantly depends on God. I +have thought it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show +by this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I have called +intuitive or of the third kind (II:xl.Note.ii.), is potent, and more +powerful than the universal knowledge, which I have styled knowledge of the +second kind. For, although in Part I showed in general terms, that all +things (and consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence +and existence on God, yet that demonstration, though legitimate and placed +beyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind so much, as when the +same conclusion is derived from the actual essence of some particular thing, +which we say depends on God. + + +Prop. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature, +which is contrary to this intellectual love, +or which can take it away. + +Proof.- This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the +mind, in so far as the latter is regarded through the nature of God as an +eternal truth (V:xxxiii. and V:xxix.). If, therefore, there should be +anything which would be contrary to this love, that thing would be +contrary to that which is true; consequently, that, which should be able to +take away this love, would cause that which is true to be false; an obvious +absurdity. Therefore there is nothing in nature which, &c. Q.E.D. + +Note.- The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular things, in so far +as they are regarded in relation to a given time and place: of this, I +think, no one can doubt. + + +Prop. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more +things by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less +subject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in less +fear of death. + +Proof.- The mind's essence consists in knowledge (II:xi.); therefore, in +proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds +of knowledge, the greater will be the part of it that endures (V:xxix. and +V:xxiii.), and, consequently (by the last Prop.), the greater will be the +part that is not touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, +or in other words, evil (IV:xxx.). Thus, in proportion as the mind +understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the +greater will be the part of it, that remains unimpaired, and, consequently, +less subject to emotions, &c. Q.E.D. + +Note.- Hence we understand that point which I touched on in IV:xxxix.Note, +and which I promised to explain in this Part; namely, that death becomes +less hurtful, in proportion as the mind's clear and distinct knowledge is +greater, and, consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more. Again, +since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible +acquiescence (V:xxvii.), it follows that the human mind can attain to +being of such a nature, that the part thereof which we have shown to +perish with the body (V:xxi.) should be of little importance when compared +with the part which endures. But I will soon treat of the subject at greater +length. + + +Prop. XXXIX. He, who possesses a body capable +of the greatest number of activities, possesses +a mind whereof the greatest part is eternal. + +Proof.- He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of +activities, is least agitated by those emotions which are evil (IV:xxxviii.) +that is (IV:xxx.), by those emotions which are contrary to our nature; +therefore (V:x.), he possesses the power of arranging and associating the +modifications of the body according to the intellectual order, and, +consequently, of bringing it about, that all the modifications of the body +should be referred to the idea of God; whence it will come to pass that +(V:xv.) he will be affected with love towards God, which (V:xvi) must occupy +or constitute the chief part of the mind; therefore (V:xxxiii.), such a man +will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal. Q.E.D. + +Note.- Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number of activities, +there is no doubt but that they may be of such a nature, that they may be +referred to minds possessing a great knowledge of themselves and of God, and +whereof the greatest or chief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they +should scarcely fear death. But, in order that this may be understood more +clearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of perpetual +variation, and, according as we are changed for the better or the worse, we +are called happy or unhappy. + +For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a corpse, is called +unhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness, if we have been able to live +through the whole period of life with a sound mind in a sound body. And, in +reality, he, who, as in the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable +of very few activities, and depending, for the most part, on external +causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely conscious +of itself, or of God, or of things; whereas, he, who has a body capable of +very many activities, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is +highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things. In this life, therefore, +we primarily endeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so +far as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into something +else capable of very many activities, and referable to a mind which is +highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things; and we desire so to +change it, that what is referred to its imagination and memory may become +insignificant, in comparison with its intellect, as I have already said in +the note to the last Proposition. + + +Prop. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses +more of perfection, so is it more active, and +less passive; and, vice versa, in proportion as +it is more active, so is it more perfect. + +Proof.- In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it possesses more of +reality (II:Def.vi.), and, consequently (III:iii.and Note), it is to that +extent more active and less passive. This demonstration may be reversed, and +thus prove that, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it more +perfect. Q.E.D. + +Corollary.- Hence it follows that the part of the mind which endures, be it +great or small, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the +mind (V:xiii. and V:xxix.) the understanding, through which alone we are +said to act (III:iii.); the part which we have shown to perish is the +imagination (V:xxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III:iii. +and general Def. of the Emotions); therefore, the former, be it great or +small, is more perfect than the latter. Q.E.D. + +Note.- Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set forth concerning +the mind, in so far as it is regarded without relation to the body; whence, +as also from I:xxi. and other places, it is plain that our mind, in so far +as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by +another eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to +infinity; so that all taken together at once constitute the eternal and +infinite intellect of God. + + +Prop. XLI. Even if we did not know that +our mind is eternal, we should still +consider as of primary importance piety +and religion, and generally all things +which, in Part IV., we showed to be +attributable to courage and high-mindedness. + +Proof.- The first and only, foundation of virtue, or the rule of right +living is (IV:xxii.Coroll. and IV:xxiv.) seeking one's own true interest. +Now, while we determined what reason prescribes as useful, we took no +account of the mind's eternity, which has only become known to us in this +Fifth Part. Although we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal, +we nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage and high- +mindedness are of primary importance. Therefore, even if we were still +ignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put the aforesaid precepts of +reason in the first place. Q.E.D. + +Note.- The general belief of the multitude seems to be different. Most +people seem to believe that they are free, in so far as they may obey their +lusts, and that they cede their rights, in so far as they are bound to live +according to the commandments of the divine law. They therefore believe that +piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to firmness of +mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to lay aside, and to +receive the reward for their bondage, that is, for their piety, and +religion; it is not only by this hope, but also, and chiefly, by the fear of +being horribly punished after death, that they are induced to live according +to the divine commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will +carry them. + +If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the mind perishes +with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life remains for the wretches +who are broken down with the burden of piety, they would return to their own +inclinations, controlling everything in accordance with their lusts, and +desiring to obey fortune rather than themselves. Such a course appears to me +not less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he can by +wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to cram himself with +poisons and deadly fare; or if, because he sees that the mind is not eternal +or immortal, he should prefer to be out of his mind altogether, and to live +without the use of reason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth +refuting. + + +Prop. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue +itself ; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our +lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able +to control our lusts. + +Proof.- Blessedness consists in love towards God (V:xxxvi. and Note), which +love springs from the third kind of knowledge (V:xxxii.Coroll.); therefore +this love (III:iii. and III:lix.) must be referred to the mind, in so far as +the latter is active; therefore (IV:Def.viii.) it is virtue itself. +This was our first point. Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in +this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand (V:xxxii.); +that is (V:iii.Coroll.), so much the more power has it over the emotions, +and (V:xxxviii.) so much the less is it subject to those emotions +which are evil; therefore, in proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine +love or blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. And, since +human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in the +understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in blessedness, because he +has controlled his lusts, but, contrariwise, his power of controlling his +lusts arises from this blessedness itself. Q.E.D. + +Note.- I have thus completed all I wished to set forth touching the mind's +power over the emotions and the mind's freedom. Whence it appears, how +potent is the wise man, and how much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is +driven only by his lusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in +various ways by external causes without ever gaining, the true acquiescence +of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were unwitting of himself, and of +God, and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be. + +Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is scarcely at +all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of himself, and of God, and of +things, by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but always +possesses true acquiescence of his spirit. + +If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result seems +exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, +since it is so seldom found. How would it be possible, if salvation were +ready to our hand, and could without great labour be found, that it should +be by almost all men neglected? But all things excellent are as +difficult as they are rare. + + + + + +End of Part V. + + + + + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Ethics [Part V], by Benedict de Spinoza + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ETHICS [PART V] *** + +***** This file should be named 975.txt or 975.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/9/7/975/ + +Produced by an anonymous Project Gutenberg volunteer. + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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If you + don't derive profits, no royalty is due. Royalties are + payable to "Project Gutenberg Association/Carnegie-Mellon + University" within the 60 days following each + date you prepare (or were legally required to prepare) + your annual (or equivalent periodic) tax return. + +WHAT IF YOU *WANT* TO SEND MONEY EVEN IF YOU DON'T HAVE TO? +The Project gratefully accepts contributions in money, time, +scanning machines, OCR software, public domain etexts, royalty +free copyright licenses, and every other sort of contribution +you can think of. Money should be paid to "Project Gutenberg +Association / Carnegie-Mellon University". + +*END*THE SMALL PRINT! FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* + + + + + +Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS +(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata) + +Translated by R. H. M. Elwes + + + + +PART V: Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom + + + +PREFACE +At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which is concerned +with the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore treat therein of the +power of the reason, showing how far the reason can control the emotions, +and what is the nature of Mental Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be +able to see, how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant. +It is no part of my design to point out the method and means whereby the +understanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the body may +be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of its functions. The +latter question lies in the province of Medicine, the former in the province +of Logic. Here, therefore, I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the +mind, or of reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its +dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation. That we do +not possess absolute dominion over them, I have already shown. Yet the +Stoics have thought, that the emotions depended absolutely on our will, and +that we could absolutely govern them. But these philosophers were compelled, +by the protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess, +that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them: +and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the example (if I remember +rightly) of two dogs, the one a house-dog and the other a hunting-dog. For +by long training it could be brought about, that the house-dog should become +accustomed to hunt, and the hunting-dog to cease from running after hares. +To this opinion Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained, that the +soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain, namely, +to that part called the pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is +enabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body, and also +external objects, and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in +motion in various ways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the +midst of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of the +animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the midst of the +brain in as many different manners, as the animal spirits can impinge +thereon; and, again, that as many different marks are impressed on the said +gland, as there are different external objects which impel the animal +spirits towards it; whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends +the gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once before +by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the gland in its turn +reacts on the said spirits, driving and determining them to the condition +wherein they were, when repulsed before by a similar position of the gland. +He further asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature +to a certain given motion of the gland. For instance, whenever anyone +desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition causes the pupil of +the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in question had only thought of +the dilatation of the pupil, the mere wish to dilate it would not have +brought about the result, inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves +to impel the animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would +dilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with the wish to +dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to look at remote or very +near objects. Lastly, he maintained that, although every motion of the +aforesaid gland seems to have been united by nature to one particular +thought out of the whole number of our thoughts from the very beginning of +our life, yet it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with +other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de l'ame, I. 50. +He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak, that it cannot, under +proper direction, acquire absolute power over its passions. For passions as +defined by him are "perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, +which are referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression) +are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement of the +spirits." (Passion del l'ame,I.27.) But, seeing that we can join any motion +of the gland, or consequently of the spirits, to any volition, the +determination of the will depends entirely on our own powers; if, therefore, +we determine our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to which +we wish our actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which +we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an absolute +dominion over our passions. Such is the doctrine of this illustrious +philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his own words); it is one +which, had it been less ingenious, I could hardly believe to have proceeded +from so great a man. Indeed, I am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who +had stoutly asserted, that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow +from self-evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did not +clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to task the +scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities, +could maintain a hypothesis, beside which occult qualities are commonplace. +What does he understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and the body? What +clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union +with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like him to +explain this union through its proximate cause. What clear and distinct +conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain +particle of extended matter? What clear and distinct conception has he got +of thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended +matter? But he had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from +body, that he could not assign any particular cause of the union between the +two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have recourse to the cause of +the whole universe, that is to God. Further, I should much like to know, +what degree of motion the mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with +what force can it hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this +gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the +animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we have +closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again disjoined therefrom by +physical causes; in which case it would follow that, although the mind +firmly intended to face a given danger, and had united to this decision the +motions of boldness, yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become +suspended in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything +except running away. In truth, as there is no common standard of volition +and motion, so is there no comparison possible between the powers of the +mind and the power or strength of the body; consequently the strength of one +cannot in any wise be determined by the strength of the other. We may also +add, that there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so +placed that it can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also +that all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain. +Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes concerning the will and its +freedom, inasmuch as I have abundantly proved that his premisses are false. +Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by +the understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of the +mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all have had +experience of, but do not accurately observe or distinctly see, and from the +same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions, which have regard to the +mind's blessedness. + + +AXIOMS. +I. If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a change must +necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of the two, and continue +until they cease to be contrary. + +II. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, in so far +as its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause. (This +axiom is evident from III.vii.) + + +PROPOSITIONS. + +Prop.I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged +and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or +the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and +associated in the body. + +Proof.- The order and connection of ideas is the same (II:vii.) as the order +and connection of things, and vice versa the order and connection of things +is the same (II:vi.Coroll. and II:vii.) as the order and connection of +ideas. Wherefore, even as the order and connection of ideas in the mind +takes place according to the order and association of modifications of the +body (II:xviii.), so vice versa (III:ii.) the order and connection of +modifications of the body takes place in accordance with the manner, in +which thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the +mind. Q.E.D. + + +PROP.II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion, +from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other +thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external cause, +and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these +emotions, be destroyed. + +Proof.- That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred, is pleasure +or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Def. of the +Emotions:vi.,&vii.); wherefore, when this cause is removed, the reality of +love or hatred is removed with it; therefore these emotions and those +which arise therefrom are destroyed. Q.E.D. + + +Prop.III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a +passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof. + +Proof.- An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by the general +Def. of the Emotions). If, therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of a +given emotion, that idea will only be distinguished from the emotion, in so +far as it is referred to the mind only, by reason (II:xxi.,&Note); therefore +(III:iii.), the emotion will cease to be a passion. Q.E.D. + +Corollary.- An emotion therefore becomes more under our control, and the +mind is less passive in respect to it, in proportion as it is more known to +us. + + +Prop.IV. There is no modification of the body, whereof we +cannot form some clear and distinct conception. + +Proof.- Properties which are common to all things can only be conceived +adequately (II:xxxviii.); therefore (II:xii.and Lemma. ii. after II:xiii.) +there is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and +distinct conception. Q.E.D. + +Corollary.- Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof we cannot +form some clear and distinct conception. For an emotion is the idea of a +modification of the body (by the general Def. of the Emotions), and must +therefore (by the preceding Prop.) involve some clear and distinct +conception. + +Note.- Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by an effect +(I:xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly understand whatever +follows from an idea, which in us is adequate (II:xl.), it follows that +everyone has the power of clearly and distinctly understanding himself and +his emotions, if not absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of +bringing it about, that he should become less subject to them. To attain +this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring, as +far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion, in order +that the mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to think of those +things which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully +acquiesces: and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from the +thought of an external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; +whence it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be +destroyed (V:ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which are wont to +arise from such emotion, will become incapable of being excessive (IV:lxi.). +For it must be especially remarked, that the appetite through which a man is +said to be active, and that through which he is said to be passive is one +and the same. For instance, we have shown that human nature is so +constituted, that everyone desires his fellow-men to live after his own +fashion (III:xxxi.Note); in a man, who is not guided by reason, this +appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and does not greatly differ +from pride; whereas in a man, who lives by the dictates of reason, it is an +activity or virtue which is called piety (IV:xxxvii.Note.i. and second +proof). In like manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far +as they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are accredited to +virtue, when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all +desires, whereby we are determined to any given action, may arise as much +from adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV:lix.). Than this remedy for the +emotions (to return to the point from which I started), which consists in a +true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within our power, can +be devised. For the mind has no other power save that of thinking and of +forming, adequate ideas, as we have shown above (III:iii.). + + +Prop.V. An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive +simply, and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, +other conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion. + +Proof.- An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, is greater +than one towards what we conceive to be necessary (III:xlix.), and, +consequently, still greater than one towards what we conceive as possible, +or contingent (IV:xi.). But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else +than to conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes whereby +it has been determined to action (II:xxxv.Note); therefore, an emotion +towards a thing which we conceive simply is, other conditions being equal, +greater than one, which we feel towards what is necessary, possible, or +contingent, and, consequently, it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D. + + +Prop.VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions and is +less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as +necessary. + +Proof.- The mind understands all things to be necessary (I:xxix.) and to be +determined to existence and operation by an infinite chain of causes; +therefore (by the foregoing Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that +it is less subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III:xlviii.) +feels less emotion towards the things themselves. Q.E.D. + +Note.- The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is applied to +particular things, which we conceive more distinctly and vividly, the +greater is the power of the mind over the emotions, as experience also +testifies. For we see, that the pain arising from the loss of any good is +mitigated, as soon as the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not +by any means have been preserved. So also we see that no one pities an +infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly, because it +passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness. Whereas, if most +people were born full-grown and only one here and there as an infant, +everyone would pity the infants; because infancy would not then be looked on +as a state natural and necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature; +and we may note several other instances of the same sort. + + +Prop.VII. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if +we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are +attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent. + +Proof.- We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the emotion +wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body, being affected by +another emotion excluding the existence of the said thing (II:xvii.). +Wherefore, the emotion, which is referred to the thing which we regard as +absent, is not of a nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and +power (IV:vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort +controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its external +cause (IV:ix.). But an emotion which springs from reason is necessarily +referred to the common properties of things (see the def. of reason in +II:xl.Note.ii.), which we always regard as present (for there can be nothing +to exclude their present existence), and which we always conceive in the +same manner (II:xxxviii.). Wherefore an emotion of this kind always remains +the same; and consequently (V:Ax.i.) emotions, which are contrary thereto +and are not kept going by their external causes, will be obliged to adapt +themselves to it more and more, until they are no longer contrary to it; to +this extent the emotion which springs from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D. + + +Prop.VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of +simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused. + +Proof.- Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few (III:vii.): +therefore (IV:v.), in proportion to the increased number of simultaneous +causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion becomes stronger. Q.E.D. + +Note.- This proposition is also evident from V:Ax.ii. + +Prop.IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse +causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion +itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less +affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different and +equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a +single cause. + +Proof-. An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it hinders the mind +from being able to think (IV:xxvi., IV:xxvii.); therefore, an emotion, +whereby the mind is determined to the contemplation of several things at +once, is less hurtful than another equally powerful emotion, which so +engrosses the mind in the single contemplation of a few objects or of one, +that it is unable to think of anything else; this was our first point. +Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power (III:vii.), consists +solely in thought (II:xi.), the mind is less passive in respect to an +emotion, which causes it to think of several things at once, than in regard +to an equally strong emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation +of a few or of a single object: this was our second point. Lastly, this +emotion (III:xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to several causes, is +less powerful in regard to each of them. Q.E.D. + + +Prop.X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to +our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the +modifications of our body according to the intellectual order. + +Proof.- The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that is (IV:xxx.), +which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede the mind from understanding +(IV:xxvii.). So long, therefore, as we are not assailed by emotions contrary +to our nature, the mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things +(IV:xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear and +distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II:xl.Note.ii. and +II:xlvii.Note); consequently we have in such cases the power of arranging +and associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual +order. Q.E.D. + +Note.- By this power of rightly arranging and associating the bodily +modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily affected by evil +emotions. For (V:vii.) a greater force is needed for controlling the +emotions, when they are arranged and associated according to the +intellectual order, than when they, are uncertain and unsettled. The best we +can do, therefore, so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our +emotions, is to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical +precepts, to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith to the +particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so that our +imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that it may be always +ready to our hand. For instance, we have laid down among the rules of life +(IV:xlvi., & Note), that hatred should be overcome with love or high- +mindedness, and not required with hatred in return. Now, that this precept +of reason may be always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often +think over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and in +what manner and way they may be best warded off by high-mindedness: we shall +thus associate the idea of wrong with the idea of this precept, which +accordingly will always be ready for use when a wrong is done to us +(II:xviii.). If we keep also in readiness the notion of our true +advantage, and of the good which follows from mutual friendships, and common +fellowships; further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the +result of the right way of life (IV:lii.), and that men, no less than +everything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such case I say +the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises therefrom, will engross a +very small part of our imagination and will be easily overcome; or, if the +anger which springs from a grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will +nevertheless be overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far +sooner than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. As is +indeed evident from V:vi.,V:vii.,V:viii. We should, in the same way, reflect +on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the ordinary dangers of life +should frequently be brought to mind and imagined, together with the means +whereby through readiness of resource and strength of mind we can avoid and +overcome them. But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and +conceptions we should always bear in mind that which is good in every +individual thing (IV:lxiii.Coroll. and III:lix.), in order that we may +always be determined to action by an emotion of pleasure. For instance, if +a man sees that he is too keen in the pursuit of honour, let him think over +its right use, the end for which it should be pursued, and the means whereby +he may attain it. Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and +the fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except +through a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do the +most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of gaining the +distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving vent to their anger would +fain appear wise. Wherefore it is certain that those, who cry out the +loudest against the misuse of honour and the vanity of the world, are those +who most greedily covet it. This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is +common to all who are ill-used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit. +For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the misuse of +wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely torments himself, and +shows the world that he is intolerant, not only of his own poverty, but also +of other people's riches. So, again, those who have been ill received by a +woman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other +stock faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion, +directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart. Thus he who +would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the love of freedom +strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of the virtues and their +causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy which arises from the true +knowledge of them: he will in no wise desire to dwell on men's faults, or to +carp at his fellows, or to revel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever will +diligently observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are not +difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for the most +part, to direct his actions according to the commandments of reason. + + +Prop.XI. In proportion as a mental image is referred to more +objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and occupies +the mind more. + +Proof.- In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is referred to more +objects, so are there more causes whereby it can be aroused and fostered, +all of which (by hypothesis) the mind contemplates simultaneously in +association with the given emotion; therefore the emotion is more frequent, +or is more often in full vigour, and (V:viii.) occupies the mind more. +Q.E.D. + + +Prop.XII. The mental images of things are more easily +associated with the images referred to things which we clearly +and distinctly understand, than with others. + +Proof.- Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand, are either the +common properties of things or deductions therefrom (see definition of +Reason, II:.xl.Note ii.), and are consequently (by the last Prop.) more +often aroused in us. Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should +contemplate other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with +something else, and consequently (II:xviii.) that the images of the said +things should be more often associated with the images of these than with +the images of something else. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XIII. A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion +as it is associated with a greater number of other images. + +Proof.- In proportion as an image is associated with a greater number of +other images, so (II:xviii.) are there more causes whereby it can be +aroused. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily +modifications or images of things may be referred to the +idea of God. + +Proof.- There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind may not form +some clear and distinct conception (V:iv.); wherefore it can bring it about, +that they should all be referred to the idea of God (I:xv.). Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself +and his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion +as he more understands himself and his emotions. + +Proof.- He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions +feels pleasure (III:liii.), and this pleasure is (by the last Prop.) +accompanied by the idea of God; therefore (Def. of the Emotions:vi.) such an +one loves God, and (for the same reason) so much the more in proportion as +he more understands himself and his emotions. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XVI. This love towards God must +hold the chief place in the mind. + +Proof.- For this love is associated with all the modifications of the body +(V:xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V:v.); therefore (V:xi.), it must hold +the chief place in the mind. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XVII. God is without passions, +neither is he affected by +any emotion of pleasure or pain. + +Proof.- All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true +(II:xxxii.), that is (II:Def.iv.) adequate; and therefore (by the general +Def. of the Emotions) God is without passions. Again, God cannot pass either +to a greater or to a lesser perfection (I:xx.Coroll.ii.); therefore +(by Def. of the Emotions:ii., &iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of +pleasure or pain. + +Corollary. Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate anyone. For God (by +the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain, +consequently (Def. of the Emotions:vi., &vii.) he does not love or hate +anyone. + + +Prop.XVIII. No one can hate God. + +Proof.- The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (II:xlvi., +II:xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God, we are active +(III:iii.) ; consequently (III:lix.) there can be no pain accompanied by the +idea of God, in other words (Def. of the Emotions:vii.), no one can hate +God. Q.E.D. + +Corollary.- Love towards God cannot be turned into hate. + +Note.- It may be objected that, as we understand God as the cause of all +things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause of pain. But I make +answer, that, in so far as we understand the causes of pain, it to that +extent (V:iii.) ceases to be a passion, that is, it ceases to be pain +(III:lix.); therefore, in so far as we understand God to be the cause of +pain, we to that extent feel pleasure. + + +Prop. XIX. He, who loves God, +cannot endeavour that God +should love him in return. + +Proof.- For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V:xvii.Coroll.) +that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and consequently he would desire +to feel pain (III:xix.); which is absurd (III:xxviii.). Therefore, he who +loves God, &c. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the +emotion of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, +in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be +joined to God by the same bond of love. + +Proof.- This love towards God is the highest good which we can seek for +under the guidance of reason (IV:xxviii.), it is common to all men +(IV:xxxvi),and we desire that all should rejoice therein (IV:xxxvii.); +therefore (Def. of the Emotions:xxiii), it cannot be stained by the +emotion envy nor by, the emotion of jealousy, (V:xviii. see definition of +Jealousy, (III:xxxv. Note); but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more +fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice +therein. Q.E.D. + +Note.- We can in the same way, show, that there is no emotion directly +contrary to this love, whereby this love can be destroyed; therefore we may +conclude, that this love towards God is the most constant of all the +emotions, and that, in so far as it is referred to the body, it cannot be +destroyed, unless the body be destroyed also. As to its nature, in so far as +it is referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire. + I have now gone through all the remedies against the emotions, or all +that the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them. Whence it +appears that the mind's power over the emotions consists:- + + I. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V:iv.Note). + + II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of an +external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V:ii. and V:iv.Note). + + III. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions referred to +things, which we distinctly understand, surpass those referred to what we +conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner (V:vii.). + + IV. In the number of causes whereby those modifications (Affectiones. +Camerer reads affectus - emotions), are fostered, which have regard to the +common properties of things or to God (V:ix., V:xi.). + + V. Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and associate, one +with another, its own emotions (V:x.Note and V:xii., V:xiii., V:xiv.). + +But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions may be better +understood, it should be specially observed that the emotions are called by +us strong, when we compare the emotion of one man with the emotion of +another, and see that one man is more troubled than another by the same +emotion; or when we are comparing the various emotions of the same man one +with another, and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion +than by another. For the strength of every emotion is defined by a +comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause. Now the +power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its infirmity or passion +is defined by the privation of knowledge only: it therefore follows, that +that mind is most passive, whose greatest part is made up of inadequate +ideas, so that it may be characterized more readily by its passive states +than by its activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active, whose +greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that, although it may contain +as many inadequate ideas as the former mind, it may yet be more easily +characterized by ideas attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which +tell of human infirmity. Again, it must be observed, that spiritual +unhealthiness; and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive love for +something which is subject to many variations, and which we can never become +masters of. For no one is solicitous or anxious about anything, unless he +loves it; neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, &c. arise, except in +regard to things whereof no one can be really master. + +We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and distinct knowledge, +and especially that third kind of knowledge (II:xlvii.Note), founded on the +actual knowledge of God, possesses over the emotions: if it does not +absolutely destroy them, in so far as they are passions (V:iii. and +V:iv.Note); at any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the +mind (V:xiv.). Further, it begets a love towards a thing immutable and +eternal (V:xv.), whereof we may really enter into possession (II:xlv.); +neither can it be defiled with those faults which are inherent in ordinary +love; but it may grow from strength to strength, and may engross the greater +part of the mind, and deeply penetrate it. And now I have finished with all +that concerns this present life: for, as I said in the beginning of this +note, I have briefly described all the remedies against the emotions. And +this everyone may readily have seen for himself, if he has attended to +what is advanced in the present note, and also to the definitions of the +mind and its emotions, and, lastly, to Propositions III:i. and III:iii. It +is now, therefore, time to pass on to those matters, which appertain to the +duration of the mind, without relation to the body. + + +Prop. XXI. The mind can only imagine anything, +or remember what is past, while the body endures. + +Proof.- The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, nor does +it imagine the modifications of the body as actual, except while the body +endures (II:viii.Coroll.); and, consequently (II:xxvi.), it does not imagine +any body as actually existing, except while its own body endures. Thus it +cannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II:xvii.Note), +or remember things past, except while the body endures (see definition of +Memory, II:xviii.Note). Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XXII. Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea, +which expresses the essence of this or that human body under +the form of eternity. + +Proof.- God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or that human +body, but also of its essence (I:xxv.). This essence, therefore, must +necessarily be conceived through the very essence of God (I:Ax.iv.), and be +thus conceived by a certain eternal necessity (I:xvi.); and this conception. +must necessarily exist in God (II:iii.). Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely +destroyed with the body, but there remains of it +something which is eternal. + +Proof.- There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which expresses the +essence of the human body (last Prop.), which, therefore, is necessarily +something appertaining to the essence of the human mind (II:xiii.). But we +have not assigned to the human mind any, duration, definable by time, except +in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is +explained through duration, and may be defined by time - that is +(II:viii.Coroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the body +endures. Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is conceived by +a certain eternal necessity through the very essence of God (last Prop.); +this something, which appertains to the essence of the mind, will +necessarily be eternal. Q.E.D. + +Note.- This idea, which expresses the essence of the body under the form of +eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode of thinking, which belongs to +the essence of the mind, and is necessarily eternal. Yet it is not possible +that we should remember that we existed before our body, for our body can +bear no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in terms of +time, or have any relation to time. But, notwithstanding, we feel and know +that we are eternal. For the mind feels those things that it conceives by +understanding, no less than those things that it remembers. For the eyes of +the mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than proofs. +Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before the body, yet we +feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the essence of the body, under +the form of eternity, is eternal, and that thus its existence cannot be +defined in terms of time, or explained through duration. Thus our mind can +only be said to endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed +time, in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body. Thus far +only has it the power of determining the existence of things by time, and +conceiving them under the category of duration. + + +Prop. XXIV. The more we understand particular +things, the more do we understand God. + +Proof.- This is evident from I:xxv.Coroll. + + +Prop. XXV. The highest endeavour of the mind, +and the highest virtue is to understand things +by the third kind of knowledge. + +Proof.- The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of +certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things +(see its definition III:xl.Note.ii.); and, in proportion as we understand +things more in this way, we better understand God (by the last Prop.); +therefore (IV:xxviii.) the highest virtue of the mind, that is IV:Def.viii.) +the power, or nature, or (III:vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is to +understand things by the third kind of knowledge. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XXVI. In proportion as the mind is +more capable of understanding things by +the third kind of knowledge, it desires +more to understand things by that kind. + +Proof.- This is evident. For, in so far as we conceive the mind to be +capable of conceiving things by this kind of knowledge, we, to that extent, +conceive it as determined thus to conceive things; and consequently (Def. of +the Emotions:i.), the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is more +capable thereof. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XXVII. From this third kind of +knowledge arises the highest possible +mental acquiescence. + +Proof.- The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV:xxviii.), or to +understand things by the third kind of knowledge (V:xxv.), and this virtue +is greater in proportion as the mind knows things more by the said kind of +knowledge (V:xxiv.): consequently, he who knows things by this kind of +knowledge passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore +(Def. of the Emotions:ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such pleasure +being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own virtue; thus (Def. of +the Emotions:xxv.), from this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible +acquiescence. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire to +know things by the third kind of knowledge +cannot arise from the first, but from the +second kind of knowledge. + +Proof.- This proposition is self-evident. For whatsoever we understand +clearly and distinct we understand either through itself, or through that +which is conceived through itself; that is, ideas which are clear and +distinct in us, or which are referred to the third kind of knowledge +(II:xl.Note.ii.) cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary, and +confused, and are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow +from adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of knowledge; +therefore (Def. of the Emotions:i.), the desire of knowing things by the +third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second +kind. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands +under the form of eternity, it does not +understand by virtue of conceiving the +present actual existence of the body, +but by virtue of conceiving the essence of +the body under the form of eternity. + +Proof.- In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body, +it to that extent conceives duration which can be determined by time, and to +that extent only, has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time +(V:xxi., II:xxvi.). But eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration +(I:Def.viii. and explanation). Therefore to this extent the mind has not the +power of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it possesses such +power, because it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under the +form of eternity (II:xliv.Coroll.ii.), and also because it is of the nature +of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity +(V:xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to the +essence of mind (II:xiii.). Therefore this power of conceiving things under +the form of eternity only belongs to the mind in virtue of the mind's +conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity. Q.E.D. + +Note.- Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as existing +in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in God and following +from the necessity of the divine nature. Whatsoever we conceive in this +second way as true or real, we conceive under the form of eternity, and +their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed +in II:xlv.&Note, which see. + + +Prop. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body +under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a +knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived +through God. + +Proof.- Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this involves +necessary existence (I:Def.viii.). Therefore to conceive things under the +form of eternity, is to conceive things in so far as they are conceived +through thp essence of God as real entities, or in so far as they involve +existence through the essence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it +conceives itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent +necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, &c. Q.E.D. + + +Prop. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge +depends on the mind, as its formal cause, +in so far as the mind itself is eternal. + +Proof.- The mind does not conceive anything under the form of eternity, +except in so far as it conceives its own body under the form of eternity +(V:xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is eternal (V:xxi., V:xxiii.); +therefore (by the last Prop.), in so far as it is eternal, it possesses the +knowledge of God, which knowledge is necessarily adequate +(II:xlvi.); hence the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is capable of +knowing everything which can follow from this given knowledge of God +(II:xl.), in other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge +(see Def. in II:xl.Note.ii.), whereof accordingly the mind (III:Def.i.), in +so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or formal cause of such knowledge. +Q.E.D. + +Note.- In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in this kind of +knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of himself and of God; in +other words, he will be more perfect and blessed, as will appear more +clearly in the sequel. But we must here observe that, although we are +already certain that the mind is eternal, in so far as it conceives things +under the form of eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be +more readily explained and better understood, we will consider the mind +itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to understand things under +the form of eternity, as indeed we have done hitherto; this we may do +without any danger of error, so long as we are careful not to draw any +conclusion, unless our premisses are plain. + + +Prop. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of +knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by +the idea of God as cause. + +Proof.- From this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental +acquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions:xxv.), pleasure, and this +acquiescence is accompanied by the idea of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and +consequently (V:xxx.) the idea also of God as cause. Q.E.D. + +Corollary.- From the third kind of knowledge necessarily arises the +intellectual love of God. From this kind of knowledge arises pleasure +accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is (Def. of the Emotions:vi.), +the love of God; not in so far as we imagine him as present (V:xxix.), but +in so far as we understand him to be eternal; this is what I call the +intellectual love of God. + + +Prop. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, +which arises from the third kind of knowledge, +is eternal. + +Proof.- The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V:xxxi., I:Ax.iii.); +therefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arises therefrom is also +necessarily eternal. Q.E.D. + +Note.- Although this love towards God has (by the foregoing Prop.) no +beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of love, just as though it +had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll. of the last Prop. Nor is there here +any difference, except that the mind possesses as eternal those same +perfections which we feigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by +the idea of God as eternal cause. If pleasure consists in the transition to +a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the mind being +endowed with perfection itself. + + +Prop. XXX.IV. The mind is, only while the body +endures, subject to those emotions which are +attributable to passions. + +Proof. Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind contemplates a thing as +present (II:xvii.Note); yet this idea indicates rather the present +disposition of the human body than the nature of the external thing +(II:xvi.Coroll.ii.). Therefore emotion (see general Def. of Emotions) +is imagination, in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the +body; therefore (V:xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures, subject +to emotions which are attributable to passions. Q.E.D. + +Corollary.- Hence it follows that no love save intellectual love is eternal. + +Note.- If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see that they are +indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that they confuse +eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the imagination or the memory +which they believe to remain after death. + + +Prop. XXXV. God loves himself with +an infinite intellectual love. + +Proof.- God is absolutely infinite (I:Def.vi.), that is (II:Def.vi.), the +nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection; and such rejoicing is +(II:iii.) accompanied by the idea of himself, that is (I:xi. and I:Def.i.), +the idea of his own cause: now this is what we have (in V:xxxii.Coroll.) +described as intellectual love. + + +Prop. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is +that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as +he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through +the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of +eternity; in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards +God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself. + +Proof.- (1) This love of the mind must be referred to the activities of the +mind (V:xxxii.Coroll. and III:iii.); it is itself, indeed, an activity +whereby the mind regards itself accompanied by the idea of God as cause +(V:xxxii.&Coroll.); that is (I:xxv.Coroll. and II:xi.Coroll.), an activity +whereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human mind, +regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself; therefore (by the last +Prop.), this love of the mind is part of the infinite love wherewith God +loves himself. Q.E.D. + +Corollary.- Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves himself, loves +man, and, consequently, that the love of God towards men, and the +intellectual love of the mind towards God are identical. + +Note.- From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein our salvation, +or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in the constant and eternal +love towards God, or in God's love towards men. This love or blessedness is, +in the Bible, called Glory and not undeservedly. For whether this love be +referred to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of +spirit, which (Def. of the Emotions:xxv., and xxx.) is not really +distinguished from glory. In so far as it is referred to God, it is +(V:xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still use that term, accompanied by the idea +of itself, and, in so far as it is referred to the mind, it is the same +(V:xxvii.). + +Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in knowledge, whereof +the beginning and the foundation is God (I:xv., &II:xlvii.Note), it becomes +clear to us, in what manner and way our mind, as to its essence and +existence, follows from the divine nature and constantly depends on God. I +have thought it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show +by this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I have called +intuitive or of the third kind (II:xl.Note.ii.), is potent, and more +powerful than the universal knowledge, which I have styled knowledge of the +second kind. For, although in Part I showed in general terms, that all +things (and consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence +and existence on God, yet that demonstration, though legitimate and placed +beyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind so much, as when the +same conclusion is derived from the actual essence of some particular thing, +which we say depends on God. + + +Prop. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature, +which is contrary to this intellectual love, +or which can take it away. + +Proof.- This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the +mind, in so far as the latter is regarded through the nature of God as an +eternal truth (V:xxxiii. and V:xxix.). If, therefore, there should be +anything which would be contrary to this love, that thing would be +contrary to that which is true; consequently, that, which should be able to +take away this love, would cause that which is true to be false; an obvious +absurdity. Therefore there is nothing in nature which, &c. Q.E.D. + +Note.- The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular things, in so far +as they are regarded in relation to a given time and place: of this, I +think, no one can doubt. + + +Prop. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more +things by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less +subject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in less +fear of death. + +Proof.- The mind's essence consists in knowledge (II:xi.); therefore, in +proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds +of knowledge, the greater will be the part of it that endures (V:xxix. and +V:xxiii.), and, consequently (by the last Prop.), the greater will be the +part that is not touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, +or in other words, evil (IV:xxx.). Thus, in proportion as the mind +understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the +greater will be the part of it, that remains unimpaired, and, consequently, +less subject to emotions, &c. Q.E.D. + +Note.- Hence we understand that point which I touched on in IV:xxxix.Note, +and which I promised to explain in this Part; namely, that death becomes +less hurtful, in proportion as the mind's clear and distinct knowledge is +greater, and, consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more. Again, +since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible +acquiescence (V:xxvii.), it follows that the human mind can attain to +being of such a nature, that the part thereof which we have shown to +perish with the body (V:xxi.) should be of little importance when compared +with the part which endures. But I will soon treat of the subject at greater +length. + + +Prop. XXXIX. He, who possesses a body capable +of the greatest number of activities, possesses +a mind whereof the greatest part is eternal. + +Proof.- He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of +activities, is least agitated by those emotions which are evil (IV:xxxviii.) +that is (IV:xxx.), by those emotions which are contrary to our nature; +therefore (V:x.), he possesses the power of arranging and associating the +modifications of the body according to the intellectual order, and, +consequently, of bringing it about, that all the modifications of the body +should be referred to the idea of God; whence it will come to pass that +(V:xv.) he will be affected with love towards God, which (V:xvi) must occupy +or constitute the chief part of the mind; therefore (V:xxxiii.), such a man +will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal. Q.E.D. + +Note.- Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number of activities, +there is no doubt but that they may be of such a nature, that they may be +referred to minds possessing a great knowledge of themselves and of God, and +whereof the greatest or chief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they +should scarcely fear death. But, in order that this may be understood more +clearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of perpetual +variation, and, according as we are changed for the better or the worse, we +are called happy or unhappy. + +For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a corpse, is called +unhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness, if we have been able to live +through the whole period of life with a sound mind in a sound body. And, in +reality, he, who, as in the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable +of very few activities, and depending, for the most part, on external +causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely conscious +of itself, or of God, or of things; whereas, he, who has a body capable of +very many activities, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is +highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things. In this life, therefore, +we primarily endeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so +far as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into something +else capable of very many activities, and referable to a mind which is +highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things; and we desire so to +change it, that what is referred to its imagination and memory may become +insignificant, in comparison with its intellect, as I have already said in +the note to the last Proposition. + + +Prop. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses +more of perfection, so is it more active, and +less passive; and, vice versa, in proportion as +it is more active, so is it more perfect. + +Proof.- In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it possesses more of +reality (II:Def.vi.), and, consequently (III:iii.and Note), it is to that +extent more active and less passive. This demonstration may be reversed, and +thus prove that, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it more +perfect. Q.E.D. + +Corollary.- Hence it follows that the part of the mind which endures, be it +great or small, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the +mind (V:xiii. and V:xxix.) the understanding, through which alone we are +said to act (III:iii.); the part which we have shown to perish is the +imagination (V:xxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III:iii. +and general Def. of the Emotions); therefore, the former, be it great or +small, is more perfect than the latter. Q.E.D. + +Note.- Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set forth concerning +the mind, in so far as it is regarded without relation to the body; whence, +as also from I:xxi. and other places, it is plain that our mind, in so far +as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by +another eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to +infinity; so that all taken together at once constitute the eternal and +infinite intellect of God. + + +Prop. XLI. Even if we did not know that +our mind is eternal, we should still +consider as of primary importance piety +and religion, and generally all things +which, in Part IV., we showed to be +attributable to courage and high-mindedness. + +Proof.- The first and only, foundation of virtue, or the rule of right +living is (IV:xxii.Coroll. and IV:xxiv.) seeking one's own true interest. +Now, while we determined what reason prescribes as useful, we took no +account of the mind's eternity, which has only become known to us in this +Fifth Part. Although we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal, +we nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage and high- +mindedness are of primary importance. Therefore, even if we were still +ignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put the aforesaid precepts of +reason in the first place. Q.E.D. + +Note.- The general belief of the multitude seems to be different. Most +people seem to believe that they are free, in so far as they may obey their +lusts, and that they cede their rights, in so far as they are bound to live +according to the commandments of the divine law. They therefore believe that +piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to firmness of +mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to lay aside, and to +receive the reward for their bondage, that is, for their piety, and +religion; it is not only by this hope, but also, and chiefly, by the fear of +being horribly punished after death, that they are induced to live according +to the divine commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will +carry them. + +If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the mind perishes +with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life remains for the wretches +who are broken down with the burden of piety, they would return to their own +inclinations, controlling everything in accordance with their lusts, and +desiring to obey fortune rather than themselves. Such a course appears to me +not less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he can by +wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to cram himself with +poisons and deadly fare; or if, because he sees that the mind is not eternal +or immortal, he should prefer to be out of his mind altogether, and to live +without the use of reason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth +refuting. + + +Prop. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue +itself ; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our +lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able +to control our lusts. + +Proof.- Blessedness consists in love towards God (V:xxxvi. and Note), which +love springs from the third kind of knowledge (V:xxxii.Coroll.); therefore +this love (III:iii. and III:lix.) must be referred to the mind, in so far as +the latter is active; therefore (IV:Def.viii.) it is virtue itself. +This was our first point. Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in +this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand (V:xxxii.); +that is (V:iii.Coroll.), so much the more power has it over the emotions, +and (V:xxxviii.) so much the less is it subject to those emotions +which are evil; therefore, in proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine +love or blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. And, since +human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in the +understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in blessedness, because he +has controlled his lusts, but, contrariwise, his power of controlling his +lusts arises from this blessedness itself. Q.E.D. + +Note.- I have thus completed all I wished to set forth touching the mind's +power over the emotions and the mind's freedom. Whence it appears, how +potent is the wise man, and how much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is +driven only by his lusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in +various ways by external causes without ever gaining, the true acquiescence +of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were unwitting of himself, and of +God, and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be. + +Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is scarcely at +all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of himself, and of God, and of +things, by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but always +possesses true acquiescence of his spirit. + +If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result seems +exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, +since it is so seldom found. How would it be possible, if salvation were +ready to our hand, and could without great labour be found, that it should +be by almost all men neglected? But all things excellent are as +difficult as they are rare. + + + + + +End of Part V. +of The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza + diff --git a/old/5spne10.zip b/old/5spne10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf77592 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/5spne10.zip |