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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Ethics [Part II], by Benedict de Spinoza
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Ethics [Part II]
+
+Author: Benedict de Spinoza
+
+Translator: R. H. M. Elwes
+
+Posting Date: April 15, 2013 [EBook #920]
+Release Date: May, 1997
+First Posted: May 28, 1997
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ETHICS [PART II] ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by an anonymous Project Gutenberg volunteer.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
+(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
+
+Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
+
+
+
+
+Part II:  ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND
+
+
+
+PREFACE I now pass on to explaining the results, which must
+necessarily follow from the essence of  God, or of the eternal
+and infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in
+Part i.,  Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an
+infinite number of ways), but only  those which are able to lead
+us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human  mind
+and its highest blessedness.
+
+DEFINITIONS I.  By 'body' I mean a mode which expresses in a
+certain determinate manner the essence  of God, in so far as he
+is considered as an extended thing.  (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv.
+Cor.)
+
+II.  I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that,
+which being given, the thing is  necessarily given also, and,
+which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also;  in
+other words, that without which the thing, and which itself
+without the thing, can neither  be nor be conceived.
+
+III. By 'idea,' I mean the mental conception which is formed by
+the mind as a thinking  thing.
+
+>>>>>Explanation--I say 'conception' rather than perception,
+because the word perception  seems to imply that the mind is
+passive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems  to
+express an activity of the mind.
+
+IV.  By 'an adequate idea,' I mean an idea which, in so far as
+it is considered in itself,  without relation to the object, has
+all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.
+
+>>>>>Explanation--I say 'intrinsic,' in order to exclude that
+mark which is extrinsic,  namely, the agreement between the idea
+and its object (ideatum).
+
+V.  'Duration' is the indefinite continuance of existing.
+
+>>>>>Explanation--I say 'indefinite,' because it cannot be
+determined through the  existence itself of the existing thing,
+or by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the  existence
+of the thing, but does not take it away.
+
+VI.  'Reality' and 'perfection' I use as synonymous terms.
+
+VII.  By 'particular things,' I mean things which are finite and
+have a conditioned  existence; but if several individual things
+concur in one action, so as to be all  simultaneously the effect
+of one cause, I consider them all, so far, as one particular
+thing.
+
+ AXIOMS  I.  The essence of man does not involve necessary
+existence, that is, it may, in the order of  nature, come to pass
+that this or that man does or does not exist.
+
+II.  Man thinks.
+
+III.  Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of
+the passions, do not take place,  unless there be in the same
+individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c.  But the idea
+can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.
+
+IV.  We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.
+
+V.  We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and
+modes of thought.
+
+N.B.  The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.
+xiii.
+
+ PROPOSITIONS  I.  Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a
+thinking thing.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are
+modes which, in a certain  conditioned manner, express the nature
+of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Cor.).  God therefore  possesses the
+attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved in
+all particular  thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby.
+Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite  attributes of God,
+which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def.
+vi.).  In  other words, God is a thinking thing.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--This proposition is also evident from the fact, that
+we are able to conceive  an infinite thinking being.  For, in
+proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking  more
+thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or
+perfection.  Therefore a  being, which can think an infinite
+number of things in an infinite number of ways, is,
+necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite.  As, therefore,
+from the consideration of  thought alone, we conceive an infinite
+being, thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.)  one of
+the infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.
+
+II.  Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended
+thing.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
+the last.
+
+III.  In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his
+essence, but also of all things which  necessarily follow from
+his essence.
+
+>>>>>Proof--God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an
+infinite number of things in  infinite ways, or (what is the same
+thing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his  essence,
+and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom.  Now all
+that is in the power  of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop.
+xxxv.).  Therefore, such an idea as we are considering
+necessarily is, and in God alone.  Q.E.D.  (Part i., Prop. xv.)
+
+*****Note--The multitude understand by the power of God the free
+will of God, and the  right over all things that exist, which
+latter are accordingly generally considered as  contingent.  For
+it is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to
+reduce them  to nothing.  Further, the power of God is very often
+likened to the power of kings.  But  this doctrine we have
+refuted (Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Cors. i. and ii.), and we have
+shown  (Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity,
+as that by which he understands  himself; in other words, as it
+follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit),
+that God understands himself, so also does it follow by the same
+necessity, that God  performs infinite acts in infinite ways.  We
+further showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that  God's power is
+identical with God's essence in action; therefore it is as
+impossible for us  to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive
+him as non-existent.  If we might pursue  the subject further, I
+could point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to
+God  is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the
+multitude as a man, or in the  likeness of a man), but involves a
+negation of power.  However, I am unwilling to go over  the same
+ground so often.  I would only beg the reader again and again, to
+turn over  frequently in his mind what I have said in Part i.
+from Prop. xvi. to the end.  No one will  be able to follow my
+meaning, unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the
+power  of God with the human power and right of kings.
+
+IV.  The idea of God, from which an infinite number of things
+follow in infinite ways, can  only be one.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the
+attributes of God and his  modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.).
+Now God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Cor.).  Therefore  the idea
+of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in infinite
+ways, can only  be one.  Q.E.D.
+
+V.  The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in so
+far as he is considered as a  thinking thing, not in so far as he
+is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas both  of
+the attributes of God and of particular things do not own as
+their efficient cause their  objects (ideata) or the things
+perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this
+Part.  We there drew the  conclusion, that God can form the idea
+of his essence, and of all things which follow  necessarily
+therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because
+he is the  object of his own idea.  Wherefore the actual being of
+ideas owns for cause God, in so far  as he is a thinking thing.
+It may be differently proved as follows:  the actual being of
+ideas  is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.
+xxv., Cor.) a mode which expresses  in a certain manner the
+nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore
+(Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute
+of God, and consequently  (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect
+of any attribute save thought.  Therefore the actual  being of
+ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a
+thinking thing, &c.   Q.E.D.
+
+VI.  The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in so
+far as he is considered  through the attribute of which they are
+modes, and not in so far as he is considered through  any other
+attribute.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Each attribute is conceived through itself, without
+any other part (Part i.,  Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each
+attribute involve the conception of that attribute,  but not of
+any other.  Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only
+in so far as he  is considered through the attribute whose modes
+they are, and not in so far as he is  considered through any
+other.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence the actual being of things, which are not
+modes of thought, does  not follow from the divine nature,
+because that nature has prior knowledge of the things.   Things
+represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their
+particular attribute, in the  same manner, and with the same
+necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have  shown) from
+the attribute of thought.
+
+VII.  The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order
+and connection of things.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv.
+For the idea of everything  that is caused depends on a
+knowledge of the cause, whereof it is an effect.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence God's power of thinking is equal to his
+realized power of action-- that is, whatsoever follows from the
+infinite nature of God in the world of extension  (formaliter),
+follows without exception in the same order and connection from
+the idea of  God in the world of thought (objective).
+
+*****Note--Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind
+what has been pointed out  above--namely, that whatsoever can be
+perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the  essence
+of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance:
+consequently, substance  thinking and substance extended are one
+and the same substance, comprehended now  through one attribute,
+now through the other.  So, also, a mode of extension and the
+idea  of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed
+in two ways.  This truth seems  to have been dimly recognized by
+those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect,  and the
+things understood by God are identical.  For instance, a circle
+existing in nature,  and the idea of a circle existing, which is
+also in God, are one and the same thing displayed  through
+different attributes.  Thus, whether we conceive nature under the
+attribute of  extension, or under the attribute of thought, or
+under any other attribute, we shall find the  same order, or one
+and the same chain of causes--that is, the same things following
+in  either case.
+
+I said that God is the cause of an idea--for instance, of the
+idea of a circle,--in so far as he  is a thinking thing; and of a
+circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the
+actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a
+proximate cause through  another mode of thinking, and that again
+through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so  long as we
+consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order
+of the whole of  nature, or the whole chain of causes, through
+the attribute of thought only.  And, in so far  as we consider
+things as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the
+whole of  nature through the attributes of extension only; and so
+on, in the case of the other  attributes.  Wherefore of things as
+they are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch  as he
+consists of infinite attributes.  I cannot for the present
+explain my meaning more  clearly.
+
+VIII.  The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not
+exist, must be comprehended  in the infinite idea of God, in the
+same way as the formal essences of particular things or  modes
+are contained in the attributes of God.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from the last; it is
+understood more clearly from  the preceding note.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence, so long as particular things do not
+exist, except in so far as they  are comprehended in the
+attributes of God, their representations in thought or ideas do
+not  exist, except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists;
+and when the particular things are  said to exist, not only in so
+far as they are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so
+ far as they are said to continue, their ideas will also involve
+existence, through which they  are said to continue.
+
+*****Note--If anyone desires an example to throw more light on
+this question, I shall, I  fear, not be able to give him any,
+which adequately explains the thing of which I here  speak,
+inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to
+illustrate it as far as possible.   The nature of a circle is
+such that if any number of straight lines intersect within it,
+the  rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one
+another; thus, infinite equal  rectangles are contained in a
+circle.  Yet none of these rectangles can be said to exist,
+except in so far as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of
+these rectangles be said to  exist, except in so far as they are
+comprehended in the idea of the circle.  Let us grant that,
+from this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist.  The
+ideas of these two not only  exist, in so far as they are
+contained in the idea of the circle, but also as they involve the
+ existence of those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished
+from the remaining ideas of  the remaining rectangles.
+
+IX.  The idea of an individual thing actually existing is caused
+by God, not in so far as he  is infinite, but in so far as he is
+considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually
+existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected
+by a third idea, and so on to  infinity.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
+an individual mode of  thinking, and is distinct from other modes
+(by the Cor. and Note to Prop. viii. of this part);  thus (by
+Prop. vi. of this part) it is caused by God, in so far only as he
+is a thinking thing.   But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.) in
+so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so  far as
+he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and he
+is the cause of this  latter, as being affected by a third, and
+so on to infinity.  Now, the order and connection  of ideas is
+(by Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection
+of causes.   Therefore of a given individual idea another
+individual idea, or God, in so far as he is  considered as
+modified by that idea, is the cause; and of this second idea God
+is the  cause, in so far as he is affected by another idea, and
+so on to infinity.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Whatsoever takes place in the individual object
+of any idea, the  knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as
+he has the idea of the object.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its
+idea is in God (by  Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he
+is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as  affected by
+another idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.); but (by
+Prop. vii. of  this part) the order and connection of ideas is
+the same as the order and connection of  things.  The knowledge,
+therefore, of that which takes place in any individual object
+will  be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that
+object.  Q.E.D.
+
+X.  The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of
+man--in other words,  substance does not constitute the actual
+being (forma) of man.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The being of substance involves necessary existence
+(Part i., Prop. vii.).   If, therefore, the being of substance
+appertains to the essence of man, substance being  granted, man
+would necessarily be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and,
+consequently, man would  necessarily exist, which is absurd (II.
+Ax. i.).  Therefore &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in
+which it is shown that there  cannot be two substances of the
+same nature; for as there may be many men, the being of
+substance is not that which constitutes the actual being of man.
+Again, the proposition is  evident from the other properties of
+substance--namely, that substance is in its nature  infinite,
+immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows, that the essence of man is
+constituted by certain  modifications of the attributes of God.
+For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does  not belong
+to the essence of man.  That essence therefore (by I. xv.) is
+something which is  in God, and which without God can neither be
+nor be conceived, whether it be a  modification (I. xxv. Cor.),
+or a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain  conditioned
+manner.
+
+*****Note--Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be
+conceived without  God.  All men agree that God is the one and
+only cause of all things, both of their essence  and of their
+existence; that is, God is not only the cause of things in
+respect to their being  made (secundum fieri), but also in
+respect to their being (secundum esse).
+
+At the same time many assert, that that, without which a thing
+cannot be nor be conceived,  belongs to the essence of that
+thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God
+appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created
+things can be or be  conceived without God; or else, as is more
+probably the case, they hold inconsistent  doctrines.  I think
+the cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to
+the  proper order of philosophic thinking.  The nature of God,
+which should be reflected on  first, inasmuch as it is prior both
+in the order of knowledge and the order of nature, they  have
+taken to be last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the
+first place what they  call the objects of sensation; hence,
+while they are considering natural phenomena, they  give no
+attention at all to the divine nature, and, when afterwards they
+apply their mind to  the study of the divine nature, they are
+quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses,  with which
+they have overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch
+as such  hypotheses are no help towards understanding the divine
+nature.  So that it is hardly to be  wondered at, that these
+persons contradict themselves freely.
+
+However, I pass over this point.  My intention her was only to
+give a reason for not saying,  that that, without which a thing
+cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that  thing:
+individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God
+does not  appertain to their essence.  I said that "I considered
+as belonging to the essence of a thing  that, which being given,
+the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the
+thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the
+thing, and which itself without  the thing can neither be nor be
+conceived."  (II. Def. ii.)
+
+XI.  The first element, which constitutes the actual being of the
+human mind, is the idea of  some particular thing actually
+existing.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The essence of man (by the Cor. of the last Prop.) is
+constituted by certain  modes of the attributes of God, namely
+(by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all  which (by II.
+Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is
+given, the other  modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior
+in nature) must be in the same individual  (by the same Axiom).
+Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human
+mind.   But not the idea of a non-existent thing, for then (II.
+viii. Cor.) the idea itself cannot be  said to exist; it must
+therefore be the idea of something actually existing.  But not of
+an  infinite thing.  For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.), must
+always necessarily exist; this would  (by II. Ax. i.) involve an
+absurdity.  Therefore the first element, which constitutes the
+actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually
+existing.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of
+the infinite intellect of  God; thus when we say, that the human
+mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion,  that God has
+this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far
+as he is displayed  through the nature of the human mind, or in
+so far as he constitutes the essence of the  human mind; and when
+we say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he
+constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as
+he, simultaneously with the  human mind, has the further idea of
+another thing, we assert that the human mind  perceives a thing
+in part or inadequately.
+
+*****Note--Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and
+will call to mind many  things which will cause them to hesitate;
+I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly,  step by step, and
+not to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the
+end.
+
+XII.  Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea, which
+constitutes the human  mind, must be perceived by the human mind,
+or there will necessarily be an idea in the  human mind of the
+said occurrence.  That is, if the object of the idea constituting
+the  human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that body
+without being perceived by  the mind.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea,
+the knowledge  thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Cor.), in
+so far as he is considered as affected by  the idea of the said
+object, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind
+of anything.   Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object
+constituting the idea of the human mind,  the knowledge thereof
+is necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of
+the  human mind; that is (by II. xi. Cor.) the knowledge of the
+said thing will necessarily be  in the mind, in other words the
+mind perceives it.
+
+*****Note--This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly
+to be understood from  II. vii., which see.
+
+XIII.  The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the
+body, in other words a  certain mode of extension which actually
+exists, and nothing else.
+
+>>>>>Proof--If indeed the body were not the object of the human
+mind, the ideas of the  modifications of the body would not be in
+God (II. ix. Cor.) in virtue of his constituting  our mind, but
+in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else; that is
+(II. xi. Cor.)  the ideas of the modifications of the body would
+not be in our mind:  now (by II. Ax. iv.)  we do possess the idea
+of the modifications of the body.  Therefore the object of the
+idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as it
+actually exists (II. xi.).   Further, if there were any other
+object of the idea constituting the mind besides body,  then, as
+nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I.
+xxxvi.) there would  necessarily have to be in our mind an idea,
+which would be the effect of that other object  (II. xi.); but
+(I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea.  Wherefore the object of our
+mind is the body  as it exists, and nothing else.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is
+united to the body,  but also the nature of the union between
+mind and body.  However, no one will be able  to grasp this
+adequately or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge
+of the nature  of our body.  The propositions we have advanced
+hitherto have been entirely general,  applying not more to men
+than to other individual things, all of which, though in
+different  degrees, are animated (animata).  For of everything
+there is necessarily an idea in God, of  which God is the cause,
+in the same way as there is an idea of the human body; thus
+whatever we have asserted of the idea of the human body must
+necessarily also be asserted  of the idea of everything else.
+Still, on the other hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like
+objects, differ one from the other, one being more excellent than
+another and containing  more reality, just as the object of one
+idea is more excellent than the object of another idea,  and
+contains more reality.
+
+Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind differs
+from other things, and  wherein it surpasses them, it is
+necessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is,  of
+the human body.  What this nature is, I am not able here to
+explain, nor is it necessary  for the proof of what I advance,
+that I should do so.  I will only say generally, that in
+proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing
+many actions or receiving  many impressions at once, so also is
+the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than  others for
+forming many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actions
+of the body  depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies
+concur with it in action, the more fitted  is the mind of which
+it is the object for distinct comprehension.  We may thus
+recognize  the superiority of one mind over others, and may
+further see the cause, why we have only a  very confused
+knowledge of our body, and also many kindred questions, which I
+will, in  the following propositions, deduce from what has been
+advanced.  Wherefore I have  thought it worth while to explain
+and prove more strictly my present statements.  In order  to do
+so, I must premise a few propositions concerning the nature of
+bodies.
+
+---Axiom I.  All bodies are either in motion or at rest.
+
+---Axiom II.  Every body is moved sometimes more slowly,
+sometimes more quickly.
+
+Lemma I.  Bodies are distinguished from one another in respect of
+motion and rest,  quickness and slowness, and not in respect of
+substance.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The first part of this proposition is, I take it,
+self-evident.  That bodies are  not distinguished in respect of
+substance, is plain both from I. v. and I. viii.  It is brought
+out still more clearly from I. xv., Note.
+
+Lemma II.  All bodies agree in certain respects.
+
+>>>>>Proof--All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the
+conception of one and the  same attribute (II., Def. i.).
+Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more
+quickly, and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.
+
+Lemma III.  A body in motion or at rest must be determined to
+motion or rest by another  body, which other body has been
+determined to motion or rest by a third body, and that  third
+again by a fourth, and so on to infinity.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Bodies are individual things (II., Def. i.), which
+(Lemma i.) are distinguished  one from the other in respect to
+motion and rest; thus (I. xxviii.) each must necessarily be
+determined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely
+(II. vi.) by another body,  which other body is also (Ax. i.) in
+motion or at rest.  And this body again can only have  been set
+in motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body
+to motion or rest.   This third body again by a fourth, and so on
+to infinity.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps in
+motion, until it is  determined to a state of rest by some other
+body; and a body at rest remains so, until it is  determined to a
+state of motion by some other body.  This is indeed self-evident.
+For  when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, A, is at
+rest, and do not take into  consideration other bodies in motion,
+I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A,  except that it
+is at rest.  If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion,
+this cannot have  resulted from its having been at rest, for no
+other consequence could have been involved  than its remaining at
+rest.  If, on the other hand, A be given in motion, we shall, so
+long as  we only consider A, be unable to affirm anything
+concerning it, except that it is in motion.   If A is
+subsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result
+of A's previous  motion, for such motion can only have led to
+continued motion; the state of rest therefore  must have resulted
+from something, which was not in A, namely, from an external
+cause  determining A to a state of rest.
+
+-----Axiom I--All modes, wherein one body is affected by another
+body, follow  simultaneously from the nature of the body
+affected and the body affecting; so that one  and the same body
+may be moved in different modes, according to the difference in
+the  nature of the bodies moving it; on the other hand, different
+bodies may be moved in  different modes by one and the same body.
+
+-----Axiom II--When a body in motion impinges on another body at
+rest, which it is  unable to move, it recoils, in order to
+continue its motion, and the angle made by the line  of motion in
+the recoil and the plane of the body at rest, whereon the moving
+body has  impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the line
+of motion of incidence and the  same plane.
+
+So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies,
+which are only distinguished  one from the other by motion and
+rest, quickness and slowness.  We now pass on to  compound
+bodies.
+
+Definition--When any given bodies of the same or different
+magnitude are compelled by  other bodies to remain in contact, or
+if they be moved at the same or different rates of  speed, so
+that their mutual movements should preserve among themselves a
+certain fixed  relation, we say that such bodies are 'in union,'
+and that together they compose one body  or individual, which is
+distinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union.
+
+-----Axiom III--In proportion as the parts of an individual, or
+a compound body, are in  contact over a greater or less
+superficies, they will with greater or less difficulty admit of
+being moved from their position; consequently the individual
+will, with greater or less  difficulty, be brought to assume
+another form.  Those bodies, whose parts are in contact  over
+large superficies, are called 'hard;' those, whose parts are in
+contact over small  superficies, are called 'soft;' those, whose
+parts are in motion among one another, are  called 'fluid.'
+
+Lemma IV.  If from a body or individual, compounded of several
+bodies, certain bodies be  separated, and if, at the same time,
+an equal number of other bodies of the same nature  take their
+place, the individual will preserve its nature as before, without
+any change in its  actuality (forma).
+
+>>>>>Proof--Bodies (Lemma i.) are not distinguished in respect of
+substance:  that which  constitutes the actuality (formam) of an
+individual consists (by the last Def.) in a union of  bodies; but
+this union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will
+(by our  hypothesis) be maintained; the individual, therefore,
+will retain its nature as before, both in  respect of substance
+and in respect of mode.  Q.E.D.
+
+Lemma V.  If the parts composing an individual become greater or
+less, but in such  proportion, that they all preserve the same
+mutual relations of motion and rest, the  individual will still
+preserve its original nature, and its actuality will not be
+changed.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The same as for the last Lemma.
+
+Lemma VI.  If certain bodies composing an individual be compelled
+to change the motion,  which they have in one direction, for
+motion in another direction, but in such a manner,  that they be
+able to continue their motions and their mutual communication in
+the same  relations as before, the individual will retain its own
+nature without any change of its  actuality.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident, for the individual
+is supposed to retain all  that, which, in its definition, we
+spoke of as its actual being.
+
+Lemma VII.  Furthermore, the individual thus composed preserves
+its nature, whether it  be, as a whole, in motion or at rest,
+whether it be moved in this or that direction; so long  as each
+part retains its motion, and preserves its communication with
+other parts as  before.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from the definition of an
+individual prefixed to  Lemma iv.
+
+*****Note--We thus see, how a composite individual may be
+affected in many different  ways, and preserve its nature
+notwithstanding.  Thus far we have conceived an individual  as
+composed of bodies only distinguished one from the other in
+respect of motion and  rest, speed and slowness; that is, of
+bodies of the most simple character.  If, however, we  now
+conceive another individual composed of several individuals of
+diverse natures, we  shall find that the number of ways in which
+it can be affected, without losing its nature, will  be greatly
+multiplied.  Each of its parts would consist of several bodies,
+and therefore (by  Lemma vi.) each part would admit, without
+change to its nature, of quicker or slower  motion, and would
+consequently be able to transmit its motions more quickly or more
+ slowly to the remaining parts.  If we further conceive a third
+kind of individuals composed  of individuals of this second kind,
+we shall find that they may be affected in a still greater
+number of ways without changing their actuality.  We may easily
+proceed thus to infinity,  and conceive the whole of nature as
+one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in
+infinite ways, without any change in the individual as a whole.
+I should feel bound to  explain and demonstrate this point at
+more length, if I were writing a special treatise on  body.  But
+I have already said that such is not my object; I have only
+touched on the  question, because it enables me to prove easily
+that which I have in view.
+
+POSTULATES I.  The human body is composed of a number of
+individual parts, of diverse nature, each  one of which is in
+itself extremely complex.
+
+II.  Of the individual parts composing the human body some are
+fluid, some soft, some  hard.
+
+III.  The individual parts composing the human body, and
+consequently the human body  itself, are affected in a variety of
+ways by external bodies.
+
+IV.  The human body stands in need for its preservation of a
+number of other bodies, by  which it is continually, so to speak,
+regenerated.
+
+V.  When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an
+external body to impinge  often on another soft part, it changes
+the surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves the
+impression thereupon of the external body which impels it.
+
+VI.  The human body can move external bodies, and arrange them in
+a variety of ways.
+
+PROPOSITIONS XIV.  The human mind is capable of perceiving a
+great number of things, and is so in   proportion as its body is
+capable of receiving a great number of impressions.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in
+very many ways by  external bodies, and is capable in very many
+ways of affecting external bodies.  But (II.xii.)  the human mind
+must perceive all that takes place in the human body; the human
+mind is,  therefore, capable of perceiving a great number of
+things, and is so in proportion, &c.   Q.E.D.
+
+XV.  The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human
+mind, is not simple, but  compounded of a great number of ideas.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The idea constituting the actual being of the human
+mind is the idea of the  body (II. xiii.), which (Post. i.) is
+composed of a great number of complex individual  parts.  But
+there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part
+whereof the body is  composed (II. viii. Cor.); therefore (II.
+vii.), the idea of the human body is composed of  each of these
+numerous ideas of its component parts.  Q.E.D.
+
+XVI.  The idea of every mode, in which the human body is
+affected by external bodies,  must involve the nature of the
+human body, and also the nature of the external body.
+
+>>>>>Proof--All the modes, in which any given body is affected,
+follow from the nature  of the body affected, and also from the
+nature of the affecting body (by Ax. i., after the  Cor. of Lemma
+iii.), wherefore their idea is also necessarily (by I, Ax. iv.)
+involves the  nature of both bodies; therefore, the idea of every
+mode, in which the human body is  affected by external bodies,
+involves the nature of the human body and of the external  body.
+Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary I.--Hence it follows, first, that the human mind
+perceives the nature of a  variety of bodies, together with the
+nature of its own.
+
+<<<<<Corollary II.--It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which
+we have of external bodies,  indicate rather the constitution of
+our own body than the nature of external bodies.  I have  amply
+illustrated this in the Appendix to Part I.
+
+XVII.  If the human body is affected in a manner which involves
+the nature of any external  body, the human mind will regard the
+said external body as actually existing, or as present  to
+itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to
+exclude the existence or the  presence of the said external body.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident, for so long as the
+human body continues to  be thus affected, so long will the human
+mind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the body  --that is
+(by the last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode as
+actually existing, and this  idea involves the nature of the
+external body; therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Cor. i.) will
+regard the external body as actually existing, until it is
+affected, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--The mind is able to regard as present external
+bodies, by which the  human body has once been affected, even
+though they be no longer in existence or present.
+
+>>>>>Proof--When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the
+human body, so that  they often impinge on the softer parts, they
+change the surface of the last named (Post. v);  hence (Ax. ii.,
+after the Cor. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in a
+different  manner from that which they followed before such
+change; and, further, when afterwards  they impinge on the new
+surfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be
+refracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled
+towards those surfaces by  external bodies; consequently, they
+will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the  human
+body in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again
+take cognizance  --that is (II. xvii.), the mind will again
+regard the external body as present, and will do so,  as often as
+the fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid
+surfaces by their  own spontaneous motion.  Wherefore, although
+the external bodies, by which the human  body has once been
+affected, be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless
+regard  them as present, as often as this action of the body is
+repeated.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case,
+that we regard as  present many things which are not.  It is
+possible that the same result may be brought about  by other
+causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated one
+possible  explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out the
+true cause.  Indeed, I do not think I  am very far from the
+truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which
+rest,  almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be
+controverted by those who have  shown, as we have, that the human
+body, as we feel it, exists (Cor. after II. xiii.).   Furthermore
+(II. vii. Cor., II. xvi. Cor. ii.), we clearly understand what is
+the difference  between the idea, say, of Peter, which
+constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the  idea of the
+said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul.  The former
+directly answers to  the essence of Peter's own body, and only
+implies existence so long as Peter exists; the  latter indicates
+rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter,
+and,  therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body lasts,
+Paul's mind will regard Peter as  present to itself, even though
+he no longer exists.  Further, to retain the usual phraseology,
+the modifications of the human body, of which the ideas represent
+external bodies as  present to us, we will call the images of
+things, though they do not recall the figure of  things.  When
+the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines.
+I will here  draw attention to the fact, in order to indicate
+where error lies, that the imaginations of the  mind, looked at
+in themselves, do not contain error.  The mind does not err in
+the mere act  of imagining, but only in so far as it is regarded
+as being without the idea, which excludes  the existence of such
+things as it imagines to be present to it.  If the mind, while
+imagining  non-existent things as present to it, is at the same
+time conscious that they do not really  exist, this power of
+imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature, and
+not to a  fault, especially if this faculty of imagination depend
+solely on its own nature--that is (I.  Def. vii.), if this
+faculty of imagination be free.
+
+XVIII.  If the human body has once been affected by two or more
+bodies at the same  time, when the mind afterwards imagines any
+of them, it will straightway remember the  others also.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The mind (II. xvii. Cor.) imagines any given body,
+because the human body  is affected and disposed by the
+impressions from an external body, in the same manner as  it is
+affected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said
+external body; but (by our  hypothesis) the body was then so
+disposed, that the mind imagined two bodies at once;  therefore,
+it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once, and
+the mind, when  it imagines one, will straightway remember the
+other.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--We now clearly see what 'Memory' is.  It is simply a
+certain association of  ideas involving the nature of things
+outside the human body, which association arises in the  mind
+according to the order and association of the modifications
+(affectiones) of the  human body.  I say, first, it is an
+association of those ideas only, which involve the nature  of
+things outside the human body:  not of ideas which answer to the
+nature of the said  things:  ideas of the modifications of the
+human body are, strictly speaking (II. xvi.), those  which
+involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies.
+I say, secondly,  that this association arises according to the
+order and association of the modifications of  the human body, in
+order to distinguish it from that association of ideas, which
+arises from  the order of the intellect, whereby the mind
+perceives things through their primary causes,  and which is in
+all men the same.  And hence we can further clearly understand,
+why the  mind from the thought of one thing, should straightway
+arrive at the thought of another  thing, which has no similarity
+with the first; for instance, from the thought of the word
+'pomum' (an apple), a Roman would straightway arrive at the
+thought of the fruit apple,  which has no similitude with the
+articulate sound in question, nor anything in common  with it,
+except that the body of the man has often been affected by these
+two things; that  is, that the man has often heard the word
+'pomum,' while he was looking at the fruit;  similarly every man
+will go on from one thought to another, according as his habit
+has  ordered the images of things in his body.  For a soldier,
+for instance, when he sees the  tracks of a horse in sand, will
+at once pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a
+horseman, and thence to the thought of war, &c.; while a
+countryman will proceed from  the thought of a horse to the
+thought of a plough, a field, &c.  Thus every man will follow
+this or that train of thought, according as he has been in the
+habit of conjoining and  associating the mental images of things
+in this or that manner.
+
+XIX.  The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does not
+know it to exist, save  through the ideas of the modifications
+whereby the body is affected.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the
+human body (II. xiii.),  which (II. ix.) is in God, in so far as
+he is regarded as affected by another idea of a  particular thing
+actually existing:  or, inasmuch as (Post. iv.) the human body
+stands in  need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were,
+continually regenerated; and the order  and connection of ideas
+is the same as the order and connection of causes (II. vii.);
+this  idea will therefore be in God, in so far as he is regarded
+as affected by the ideas of very  many particular things.  Thus
+God has the idea of the human body, or knows the human  body, in
+so far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in so
+far as he  constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by
+II. xi. Cor.), the human mind does not  know the human body.  But
+the ideas of the modifications of body are in God, in so far as
+he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human mind
+perceives those  modifications (II. xii.), and consequently (II.
+xvi.) the human body itself, and as actually  existing; therefore
+the mind perceives thus far only the human body.  Q.E.D.
+
+XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in God,
+following in God in the  same manner, and being referred to God
+in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of  the human body.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Thought is an attribute of God (II. i.); therefore
+(II. iii.) there must  necessarily be in God the idea both of
+thought itself and of all its modifications,  consequently also
+of the human mind (II. xi.).  Further, this idea or knowledge of
+the mind  does not follow from God, in so far as he is infinite,
+but in so far as he is affected by  another idea of an individual
+thing (II. ix.).  But (II. vii.) the order and connection of
+ideas  is the same as the order and connection of causes;
+therefore this idea or knowledge of the  mind is in God and is
+referred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of
+the  body.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way
+as the mind is united to  the body.
+
+>>>>>Proof--That the mind is united to the body we have shown
+from the fact, that the  body is the object of the mind (II. xii.
+and xiii.); and so for the same reason the idea of the  mind must
+be united with its object, that is, with the mind in the same
+manner as the mind  is united to the body.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--This proposition is comprehended much more clearly
+from what we have said  in the note to II. vii.  We there showed
+that the idea of body and body, that is, mind and  body (II.
+xiii.), are one and the same individual conceived now under the
+attribute of  thought, now under the attribute of extension;
+wherefore the idea of the mind and the mind  itself are one and
+the same thing, which is conceived under one and the same
+attribute,  namely, thought.  The idea of the mind, I repeat, and
+the mind itself are in God by the  same necessity and follow from
+him from the same power of thinking.  Strictly speaking,  the
+idea of the mind, that is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but
+the distinctive quality  (forma) of the idea in so far as it is
+conceived as a mode of thought without reference to  the object;
+if a man knows anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he
+knows it, and at  the same time knows that he knows that he knows
+it, and so on to infinity.  But I will treat  of this hereafter.
+
+XXII. The human mind perceives not only the modifications of the
+body, but also the ideas  of such modifications.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God
+in the same manner,  and are referred to God in the same manner,
+as the ideas of the said modifications.  This is  proved in the
+same way as II. xx.  But the ideas of the modifications of the
+body are in the  human mind (II. xii.), that is, in God, in so
+far as he constitutes the essence of the human  mind; therefore
+the ideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the
+knowledge  or idea of the human mind, that is (II. xxi.), they
+will be in the human mind itself, which  therefore perceives not
+only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such
+modifications.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it
+perceives the ideas of the  modifications of the body.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) follows
+in God in the same  manner, and is referred to God in the same
+manner, as the idea or knowledge of the  body.  But since (II.
+xix.) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is
+ (II. xi. Cor.), since the knowledge of the human body is not
+referred to God, in so far as  he constitutes the nature of the
+human mind; therefore, neither is the knowledge of the  mind
+referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the
+human mind; therefore  (by the same Cor. II. xi.), the human mind
+thus far has no knowledge of itself.  Further the  ideas of the
+modifications, whereby the body is affected, involve the nature
+of the human  body itself (II. xvi.), that is (II. xiii.), they
+agree with the nature of the mind; wherefore the  knowledge of
+these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind; but (by
+the last  Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human
+mind itself; wherefore the human mind  thus far only has
+knowledge of itself.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of
+the parts composing  the human body.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The parts composing the human body do not belong to
+the essence of that  body, except in so far as they communicate
+their motions to one another in a certain fixed  relation (Def.
+after Lemma iii.), not in so far as they can be regarded as
+individuals without  relation to the human body.  The parts of
+the human body are highly complex individuals  (Post. i.), whose
+parts (Lemma iv.) can be separated from the human body without in
+any  way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the
+latter, and they can communicate  their motions (Ax. i., after
+Lemma iii.) to other bodies in another relation; therefore (II.
+iii.)  the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God,
+inasmuch (II. ix.) as he is regarded as  affected by another idea
+of a particular thing, which particular thing is prior in the
+order of  nature to the aforesaid part (II. vii.).  We may affirm
+the same thing of each part of each  individual composing the
+human body; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing  the
+human body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many
+ideas of things, and not  in so far as he has the idea of the
+human body only, in other words, the idea which  constitutes the
+nature of the human mind (II. xiii.); therefore (II. xi. Cor.),
+the human mind  does not involve an adequate knowledge of the
+human body.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXV. The idea of each modification of the human body does not
+involve an adequate  knowledge of the external body.
+
+>>>>>Proof--We have shown that the idea of a modification of the
+human body involves  the nature of an external body, in so far as
+that external body conditions the human body in  a given manner.
+But, in so far as the external body is an individual, which has
+no reference  to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is
+in God (II. ix.), in so far as God is  regarded as affected by
+the idea of a further thing, which (II. vii.) is naturally prior
+to the  said external body.  Wherefore an adequate knowledge of
+the external body is not in God,  in so far as he has the idea of
+the modification of the human body; in other words, the idea  of
+the modification of the human body does not involve an adequate
+knowledge of the  external body.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external body as
+actually existing, except  through the ideas of the modifications
+of its own body.
+
+>>>>>Proof--If the human body is in no way affected by a given
+external body, then  (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human
+body, in other words, the human mind, affected in  any way by the
+idea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in
+any manner  perceive its existence.  But, in so far as the human
+body is affected in any way by a given  external body, thus far
+(II. xvi. and Cor.) it perceives that external body.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--In so far as the human mind imagines an external
+body, it has not an  adequate knowledge thereof.
+
+>>>>>Proof--When the human mind regards external bodies through
+the ideas of the  modifications of its own body, we say that it
+imagines (see II. xvii. note); now the mind  can only imagine
+external bodies as actually existing.  Therefore (by II. xxv.),
+in so far as  the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an
+adequate knowledge of them.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body does not
+involve an adequate  knowledge of the human body itself.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Every idea of a modification of the human body
+involves the nature of the  human body, in so far as the human
+body is regarded as affected in a given manner (II.  xvi.).  But
+inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected
+in many  other ways, the idea of the said modification, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+
+XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so
+far as they have  reference only to the human mind, are not clear
+and distinct, but confused.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The ideas of the modifications of the human body
+involve the nature both of  the human body and of external bodies
+(II. xvi.); they must involve the nature not only of  the human
+body but also of its parts; for the modifications are modes
+(Post. iii.), whereby  the parts of the human body, and,
+consequently, the human body as a whole are affected.   But (by
+II. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as
+also of the parts  composing the human body, is not in God, in
+so far as he is regarded as affected by the  human mind, but in
+so far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas.  These ideas
+of  modifications, in so far as they are referred to the human
+mind alone, are as consequences  without premisses, in other
+words, confused ideas.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--The idea which constitutes the nature of the human
+mind is, in the same  manner, proved not to be, when considered
+in itself and alone, clear and distinct; as also  is the case
+with the idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of
+the modifications  of the human body, in so far as they are
+referred to the mind only, as everyone may easily  see.
+
+XXIX.  The idea of the idea of each modification of the human
+body does not involve an  adequate knowledge of the human mind.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The idea of a modification of the human body (II.
+xxvii.) does not involve  an adequate knowledge of the said body,
+in other words, does not adequately express its  nature; that is
+(II. xiii.) it does not agree with the nature of the mind
+adequately; therefore  (I. Ax. vi.) the idea of this idea does
+not adequately express the nature of the human mind,  or does not
+involve an adequate knowledge thereof.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows that the human mind, when it
+perceives things after the  common order of nature, has not an
+adequate but only a confused and fragmentary  knowledge of
+itself, of its own body, and of external bodies.  For the mind
+does not know  itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas
+of the modifications of body (II. xxiii.).  It  only perceives
+its own body (II. xix.) through the ideas of the modifications of
+body (II.  xxiii.).  It only perceives its own body (II. xix.)
+through the ideas of the modifications, and  only perceives
+external bodies through the same means; thus, in so far as it has
+such ideas  of modification, it has not an adequate knowledge of
+itself (II. xxix.), nor of its own body  (II. xxvii.), nor of
+external bodies (II. xxv.), but only a fragmentary and confused
+knowledge thereof (II. xxviii. and note).  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but
+only a confused  knowledge of itself, its own body, and of
+external bodies, whenever it perceives things  after the common
+order of nature; that is, whenever it is determined from without,
+namely,  by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to regard this
+or that; not at such times as it is  determined from within, that
+is, by the fact of regarding several things at once, to
+understand their points of agreement, difference, and contrast.
+Whenever it is determined  in anywise from within, it regards
+things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below.
+
+XXX. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration
+of our body.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The duration of our body does not depend on its
+essence (II. Ax. i.), nor  on the absolute nature of God (I.
+xxi.).  But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operate
+by causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and
+operate in a fixed and definite  relation by other causes, these
+last again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity.
+The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of
+nature, or the  constitution of things.  Now, however a thing may
+be constituted, the adequate knowledge  of that thing is in God,
+in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as
+he has  the idea of the human body only (II. ix. Cor.).
+Wherefore the knowledge of the duration  of our body is in God
+very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting
+the  nature of the human mind; that is (II. xi. Cor.), this
+knowledge is very inadequate to our  mind.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
+duration of particular things  external to ourselves.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Every particular thing, like the human body, must be
+conditioned by another  particular thing to exist and operate in
+a fixed and definite relation; this other particular  thing must
+likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity (I.
+xxviii.).  As we have  shown in the foregoing proposition, from
+this common property of particular things, we  have only a very
+inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body; we must draw a
+similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular
+things, namely, that we can only  have a very inadequate
+knowledge of the duration thereof.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows that all particular things are
+contingent and perishable.   For we can have no adequate idea of
+their duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we  must
+understand by the contingency and perishableness of things (I.
+xxxiii., Note i.).  For  (I. xxix.), except in this sense,
+nothing is contingent.
+
+XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are
+true.
+
+>>>>>Proof--All ideas which are in God agree in every respect
+with their objects (II. ii.  Cor.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they
+are all true.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXXII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them to
+be called false.
+
+>>>>>Proof--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive
+mode of thinking, which  should constitute the distinctive
+quality of falsehood.  Such a mode of thinking cannot be  in God
+(II. xxxii.); external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I.
+xv.).  Therefore there  is nothing positive in ideas which causes
+them to be called false.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and
+perfect, is true.
+
+>>>>>Proof--When we say that an idea in us is adequate and
+perfect, we say, in other  words (II. xi. Cor.), that the idea is
+adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes  the
+essence of our mind; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that such
+an idea is true.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which
+inadequate, fragmentary, or  confused ideas involve.
+
+>>>>>Proof--There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them
+to be called false (II.  xxxiii.); but falsity cannot consist in
+simple privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err  and to
+be mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for
+ignorance and error  are not identical; wherefore it consists in
+the privation of knowledge, which inadequate,  fragmentary, or
+confused ideas involve.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--In the note to II. xvii. I explained how error
+consists in the privation of  knowledge, but in order to throw
+more light on the subject I will give an example.  For  instance,
+men are mistaken in thinking themselves free; their opinion is
+made up of  consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of
+the causes by which they are  conditioned.  Their idea of
+freedom, therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for
+their actions.  As for their saying that human actions depend on
+the will, this is a mere  phrase without any idea to correspond
+thereto.  What the will is, and how it moves the  body, they none
+of them know; those who boast of such knowledge, and feign
+dwellings  and habitations for the soul, are wont to provoke
+either laughter or disgust.  So, again,  when we look at the sun,
+we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet;
+this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact
+that, while we thus imagine, we  do not know the sun's true
+distance or the cause of the fancy.  For although we afterwards
+learn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of
+the earth's diameters, we  none the less shall fancy it to be
+near; for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because  we are
+ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of
+our body involves the  essence of the sun, in so far as our said
+body is affected thereby.
+
+XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same
+necessity, as adequate or  clear and distinct ideas.
+
+>>>>>Proof--All ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as they
+are referred to God are  true (II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Cor.)
+adequate; therefore there are no ideas confused or  inadequate,
+except in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv. and
+xxviii.); therefore all  ideas, whether adequate or inadequate,
+follow by the same necessity (II. vi.).  Q.E.D.
+
+XXXVII. That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II, above), and
+which is equally in a  part and in the whole, does not constitute
+the essence of any particular thing.
+
+>>>>>Proof--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it
+constitutes the essence of some  particular thing; for instance,
+the essence of B.  Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without B
+either exist or be conceived; but this is against our hypothesis.
+Therefore it does not  appertain to B's essence, nor does it
+constitute the essence of any particular thing.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and which are
+equally in a part and in  the whole, cannot be conceived except
+adequately.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Let A be something, which is common to all bodies,
+and which is equally  present in the part of any given body and
+in the whole.  I say A cannot be conceived except  adequately.
+For the idea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate (II.
+vii. Cor.), both in  so far as God has the idea of the human
+body, and also in so far as he has the idea of the  modifications
+of the human body, which (II. xvi., xxv., xxvii.) involve in part
+the nature of  the human body and the nature of external bodies;
+that is (II. xii., xiii.), the idea in God will  necessarily be
+adequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind, and in
+so far as  he has the ideas, which are in the human mind.
+Therefore the mind (II. xi. Cor.)  necessarily perceives A
+adequately, and has this adequate perception, both in so far as
+it  perceives itself, and in so far as it perceives its own or
+any external body, nor can A be  conceived in any other manner.
+Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or
+notions common to all  men; for (by Lemma ii.) all bodies agree
+in certain respects, which (by the foregoing Prop.)  must be
+adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.
+
+XXXIX. That, which is common to and a property of the human body
+and such other  bodies as are wont to affect the human body, and
+which is present equally in each part of  either, or in the
+whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.
+
+>>>>>Proof--If A be that, which is common to and a property of
+the human body and  external bodies, and equally present in the
+human body and in the said external bodies, in  each part of each
+external body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea of
+A in  God (II. vii. Cor.), both in so far as he has the idea of
+the human body, and in so far as he  has the ideas of the given
+external bodies.  Let it now be granted, that the human body is
+affected by an external body through that, which it has in common
+therewith, namely, A;  the idea of this modification will involve
+the property A (II. xvi.), and therefore (II. vii.  Cor.) the
+idea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property
+A, will be adequate  in God, in so far as God is affected by the
+idea of the human body; that is (II. xiii.), in so  far as he
+constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore (II. xi.
+Cor.) this idea is also  adequate in the human mind.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows that the mind is fitted to
+perceive adequately more  things, in proportion as its body has
+more in common with other bodies.
+
+XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which are
+therein adequate, are also  themselves adequate.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident.  For when we say
+that an idea in the human  mind follows from ideas which are
+therein adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Cor.),  that an
+idea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not in
+so far as he is  infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by the
+ideas of very many particular things, but only  in so far as he
+constitutes the essence of the human mind.
+
+*****Note I--I have thus set forth the cause of those notions,
+which are common to all  men, and which form the basis of our
+ratiocinations.  But there are other causes of certain  axioms or
+notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this
+method of ours; for  it would thus appear what notions are more
+useful than others, and what notions have  scarcely any use at
+all.  Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all
+men,  and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who
+are unshackled by prejudice, and  we should detect those which
+are ill-founded.  Again we should discern whence the notions
+called "secondary" derived their origin, and consequently the
+axioms on which they are  founded, and other points of interest
+connected with these questions.  But I have decided  to pass over
+the subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another
+treatise, partly  because I am afraid of wearying the reader by
+too great prolixity.  Nevertheless, in order  not to omit
+anything necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the
+causes, whence are  derived the terms styled "transcendental,"
+such as Being, Thing, Something.  These terms  arose from the
+fact, that the human body, being limited, is only capable of
+distinctly  forming a certain number of images (what an image is
+I explained in the II. xvii. note)  within itself at the same
+time; if this number be exceeded, the images will begin to be
+confused; if this number of images, of which the body is capable
+of forming distinctly  within itself, be largely exceeded, all
+will become entirely confused one with another.  This  being so,
+it is evident (from II. Prop. xvii. Cor., and xviii.) that the
+human mind can  distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously,
+as its body can form images  simultaneously.  When the images
+become quite confused in the body, the mind also  imagines all
+bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend
+them, as it  were, under one attribute, namely, under the
+attribute of Being, Thing, &c.  The same  conclusion can be drawn
+from the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from
+other analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here;
+for the purpose which we  have in view it is sufficient for us to
+consider one only.  All may be reduced to this, that  these terms
+represent ideas in the highest degree confused.  From similar
+causes arise those  notions, which we call "general," such as
+man, horse, dog, &c.  They arise, to wit, from  the fact that so
+many images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in
+the  human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not
+indeed utterly, but to the  extent of the mind losing count of
+small differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size,  &c.)
+and their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in
+which all the  individuals, in so far as the body is affected by
+them, agree; for that is the point, in which  each of the said
+individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses by
+the name  man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of
+particular individuals.  For, as we have  said, it is unable to
+imagine the definite number of individuals.  We must, however,
+bear in  mind, that these general notions are not formed by all
+men in the same way, but vary in  each individual according as
+the point varies, whereby the body has been most often  affected
+and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers.  For
+instance, those who  have most often regarded with admiration the
+stature of man, will by the name of man  understand an animal of
+erect stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some
+other attribute, will form a different general image of man, for
+instance, that man is a  laughing animal, a two-footed animal
+without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other  cases,
+everyone will form general images of things according to the
+habit of his body.
+
+It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, who
+seek to explain things in  nature merely by the images formed of
+them, so many controversies should have arisen.
+
+*****Note II--From all that has been said above it is clear, that
+we, in many cases,  perceive and form our general notions:--(1.)
+From particular things represented to our  intellect
+fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses
+(II. xxix. Cor.);  I have settled to call such perceptions by the
+name of knowledge from the mere  suggestions of experience.  (2.)
+From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard
+certain words we remember things and form certain ideas
+concerning them, similar to those  through which we imagine
+things (II. xviii. Note).  I shall call both these ways of
+regarding  things "knowledge of the first kind," "opinion," or
+"imagination."  (3.) From the fact that  we have notions common
+to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things (II.
+xxxviii. Cor., xxxix. and Cor., and xl.); this I call "reason"
+and "knowledge of the second  kind."  Besides these two kinds of
+knowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a third  kind of
+knowledge, which we will call intuition.  This kind of knowledge
+proceeds from an  adequate idea of the absolute essence of
+certain attributes of God to the adequate  knowledge of the
+essence of things.  I will illustrate all three kinds of
+knowledge by a  single example.  Three numbers are given for
+finding a fourth, which shall be to the third  as the second is
+to the first.  Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second
+by the third,  and divide the product by the first; either
+because they have not forgotten the rule which  they received
+from a master without any proof, or because they have often made
+trial of  it with simple numbers, or by virtue of the proof of
+the nineteenth proposition of the  seventh book of Euclid,
+namely, in virtue of the general property of proportionals.
+
+But with very simple numbers there is no need of this.  For
+instance, one, two, three being  given, everyone can see that the
+fourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because
+we infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the
+ratio, which the first bears to  the second.
+
+XLI.  Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity,
+knowledge of the second  and third kinds is necessarily true.
+
+>>>>>Proof--To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the
+foregoing note) assigned all  those ideas, which are inadequate
+and confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the  only
+source of falsity (II. xxxv.).  Furthermore, we assigned to the
+second and third kinds  of knowledge those ideas which are
+adequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (II.
+xxxiv.).  Q.E.D.
+
+XLII. Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not knowledge of
+the first kind, teaches us  to distinguish the true from the
+false.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident.  He, who knows how
+to distinguish between  true and false, must have an adequate
+idea of true and false.  That is (II. xl., note ii.), he  must
+know the true and the false by the second or third kind of
+knowledge.
+
+XLIII. He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has
+a true idea, and cannot  doubt of the truth of the thing
+perceived.
+
+>>>>>Proof--A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in
+God, in so far as he is  displayed through the nature of the
+human mind (II. xi. Cor.).  Let us suppose that there is  in God,
+in so far as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate
+idea, A.  The  idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God,
+and be referred to him in the same way as  the idea A (by II.
+xx., whereof the proof is of universal application).  But the
+idea A is  supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is
+displayed through the human mind;  therefore, the idea of the
+idea A must be referred to God in the same manner; that is (by
+II. xi. Cor.), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the
+mind, which has the adequate  idea A; therefore he, who has an
+adequate idea or knows a thing truly (II. xxxiv.), must at  the
+same time have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his
+knowledge; that is,  obviously, he must be assured.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by
+the idea of an idea; but we  may remark that the foregoing
+proposition is in itself sufficiently plain.  No one, who has a
+true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest
+certainty.  For to have a true idea  is only another expression
+for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible.  No one,
+indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is
+something lifeless, like a picture  on a panel, and not a mode of
+thinking--namely, the very act of understanding.  And who,  I
+ask, can know that he understands anything, unless he do first
+understand it?  In other  words, who can know that he is sure of
+a thing, unless he be first sure of that thing?   Further, what
+can there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a
+standard  of truth?  Even as light displays both itself and
+darkness, so is truth a standard both of  itself and of falsity.
+
+I think I have thus sufficiently answered these
+questions--namely, if a true idea is  distinguished from a false
+idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a
+true  idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea
+(since the two are only distinguished  by an extrinsic mark);
+consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any
+advantage over him who has only false ideas.  Further, how comes
+it that men have false  ideas?  Lastly, how can anyone be sure,
+that he has ideas which agree with their objects?   These
+questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently
+answered.  The difference  between a true idea and a false idea
+is plain:  from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is
+related to the latter as being is to not-being.  The causes of
+falsity I have set forth very  clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv.
+with the note.  From what is there stated, the difference
+between a man who has true ideas, and a man who has only false
+ideas, is made apparent.   As for the last question--as to how a
+man can be sure that he has ideas that agree with  their objects,
+I have just pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his
+knowledge arises  from the simple fact, that he has an idea which
+corresponds with its object--in other words,  that truth is its
+own standard.  We may add that our mind, in so far as it
+perceives things  truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God
+(II. xi. Cor.); therefore, the clear and distinct  ideas of the
+mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God.
+
+XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as
+contingent, but as necessary.
+
+>>>>>Proof--It is in the nature of reason to perceive things
+truly (II. xli.), namely (I. Ax.  vi.), as they are in
+themselves--that is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as
+necessary.   Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary I--Hence it follows, that it is only through our
+imagination that we  consider things, whether in respect to the
+future or the past, as contingent.
+
+*****Note--How this way of looking at things arises, I will
+briefly explain.  We have  shown above (II. xvii. and Cor.) that
+the mind always regards things as present to itself,  even though
+they be not in existence, until some causes arise which exclude
+their existence  and presence.  Further (II. xviii.), we showed
+that, if the human body has once been  affected by two external
+bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards imagines one
+of the said external bodies, will straightway remember the
+other--that is, it will regard both  as present to itself, unless
+there arise causes which exclude their existence and presence.
+Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from the fact that
+we imagine bodies to be  moved some more slowly than others, some
+more quickly, some at equal speed.  Thus,  let us suppose that a
+child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in the morning, Paul
+at  noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that today he again
+sees Peter in the morning.  It is  evident, from II. Prop.
+xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he will
+imagine that  the sun will traverse the same parts of the sky, as
+it did when he saw it on the preceding  day; in other words, he
+will imagine a complete day, and, together with his imagination
+of  the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he will
+imagine Paul; and with evening, he  will imagine Simon--that is,
+he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation to a
+future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the evening,
+he will refer Peter and Paul  to a past time, by imagining them
+simultaneously with the imagination of a past time.  If it
+should at any time happen, that on some other evening the child
+should see James instead  of Simon, he will, on the following
+morning, associate with his imagination of evening  sometimes
+Simon, sometimes James, not both together:  for the child is
+supposed to have  seen, at evening, one or other of them, not
+both together.  His imagination will therefore  waver; and, with
+the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first one,
+then the  other--that is, he will imagine them in the future,
+neither of them as certain, but both as  contingent.  This
+wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination
+be  concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in
+relation to time past or time  present:  consequently, we may
+imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to  time
+present, past, or future.
+
+<<<<<Corollary II--It is in the nature of reason to perceive
+things under a certain form of  eternity (sub quadam aeternitatis
+specie).
+
+>>>>>Proof--It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not
+as contingent, but as  necessary (II. xliv.).  Reason perceives
+this necessity of things (II. xli.) truly--that is (I. Ax.  vi.),
+as it is in itself.  But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is
+the very necessity of the eternal  nature of God; therefore, it
+is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of
+eternity.  We may add that the bases of reason are the notions
+(II. xxxviii.), which answer  to things common to all, and which
+(II. xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any  particular
+thing:  which must therefore be conceived without any relation to
+time, under a  certain form of eternity.
+
+XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particular thing
+actually existing, necessarily  involves the eternal and infinite
+essence of God.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The idea of a particular thing actually existing
+necessarily involves both the  existence and the essence of the
+said thing (II. viii.).  Now particular things cannot be
+conceived without God (I. xv.); but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) they
+have God for their cause,  in so far as he is regarded under the
+attribute of which the things in question are modes,  their ideas
+must necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the
+attributes of those  ideas--that is (I. vi.), the eternal and
+infinite essence of God.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--By existence I do not here mean duration--that is,
+existence in so far as it is  conceived abstractedly, and as a
+certain form of quantity.  I am speaking of the very nature  of
+existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they
+follow in infinite numbers  and in infinite ways from the eternal
+necessity of God's nature (I. xvi.).  I am speaking, I  repeat,
+of the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are
+in God.  For although  each particular thing be conditioned by
+another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet  the force
+whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from
+the eternal  necessity of God's nature (cf. I. xxiv. Cor.).
+
+XLVI.  The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God
+which every idea  involves is adequate and perfect.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The proof of the last proposition is universal; and
+whether a thing be  considered as a part or a whole, the idea
+thereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by  the last Prop.),
+will involve God's eternal and infinite essence.  Wherefore,
+that, which  gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence
+of God, is common to all, and is equally  in the part and in the
+whole; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate.
+ Q.E.D.
+
+XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal
+and infinite essence of  God.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II.
+xxiii.) it perceives  itself and its own body (II. xix.) and
+external bodies (II. xvi. Cor. i. and II. xvii.) as actually
+existing; therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate
+knowledge of the eternal and  infinite essence of God.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the
+eternity of God are known to  all.  Now as all things are in God,
+and are conceived through God, we can from this  knowledge infer
+many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that
+third  kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II.
+xl., and of the excellence and use of  which we shall have
+occasion to speak in Part V.  Men have not so clear a knowledge
+of  God as they have of general notions, because they are unable
+to imagine God as they do  bodies, and also because they have
+associated the name God with images of things that  they are in
+the habit of seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing,
+being, as they are,  men, and continually affected by external
+bodies.  Many errors, in truth, can be traced to  this head,
+namely, that we do not apply names to things rightly.  For
+instance, when a man  says that the lines drawn from the centre
+of a circle to its circumference are not equal, he  then, at all
+events, assuredly attaches a meaning to the word circle different
+from that  assigned by mathematicians.  So again, when men make
+mistakes in calculation, they have  one set of figures in their
+mind, and another on the paper.  If we could see into their
+minds,  they do not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because
+we think, that they have the same  numbers in their mind as they
+have on the paper.  If this were not so, we should not  believe
+them to be in error, any more than I thought that a man was in
+error, whom I lately  heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had
+flown into a neighbour's hen, for his meaning  seemed to me
+sufficiently clear.  Very many controversies have arisen from the
+fact, that  men do not rightly explain their meaning, or do not
+rightly interpret the meaning of others.   For, as a matter of
+fact, as they flatly contradict themselves, they assume now one
+side,  now another, of the argument, so as to oppose the
+opinions, which they consider mistaken  and absurd in their
+opponents.
+
+XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the
+mind is determined to wish  this or that by a cause, which has
+also been determined by another cause, and this last by  another
+cause, and so on to infinity.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II.
+xi.), therefore it cannot  be the free cause of its actions (I.
+xvii. Cor. ii.); in other words, it cannot have an absolute
+faculty of positive or negative volition; but (by I. xxviii.) it
+must be determined by a cause,  which has also been determined by
+another cause, and this last by another, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--In the same way it is proved, that there is in the
+mind no absolute faculty of  understanding, desiring, loving, &c.
+Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are  either
+entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms,
+such as we are  accustomed to put together from particular
+things.  Thus the intellect and the will stand in  the same
+relation to this or that idea, or this or that volition, as
+"lapidity" to this or that  stone, or as "man" to Peter and
+Paul.  The cause which leads men to consider themselves  free has
+been set forth in the Appendix to Part I.  But, before I proceed
+further, I would  here remark that, by the will to affirm and
+decide, I mean the faculty, not the desire.  I  mean, I repeat,
+the faculty, whereby the mind affirms or denies what is true or
+false, not  the desire, wherewith the mind wishes for or turns
+away from any given thing.  After we  have proved, that these
+faculties of ours are general notions, which cannot be
+distinguished  from the particular instances on which they are
+based, we must inquire whether volitions  themselves are anything
+besides the ideas of things.  We must inquire, I say, whether
+there  is in the mind any affirmation or negation beyond that,
+which the idea, in so far as it is an  idea, involves.  On which
+subject see the following proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest
+the  idea of pictures should suggest itself.  For by ideas I do
+not mean images such as are  formed at the back of the eye, or in
+the midst of the brain, but the conceptions of thought.
+
+XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and
+negation, save that which an  idea, inasmuch as it is an idea,
+involves.
+
+>>>>>Proof--There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive
+or negative volition, but  only particular volitions, namely,
+this or that affirmation, and this or that negation.  Now let  us
+conceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking
+whereby the mind affirms,  that the three interior angles of a
+triangle are equal to two right angles.  This affirmation
+involves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, without
+the idea of a triangle it cannot  be conceived.  It is the same
+thing to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B,  as
+it is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B.  Further,
+this affirmation cannot be  made (II. Ax. iii.) without the idea
+of a triangle.  Therefore, this affirmation can neither be  nor
+be conceived, without the idea of a triangle.  Again, this idea
+of a triangle must involve  this same affirmation, namely, that
+its three interior angles are equal to two right angles.
+Wherefore, and vice versa, this idea of a triangle can neither be
+nor be conceived without  this affirmation, therefore, this
+affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle,
+and is nothing besides.  What we have said of this volition
+(inasmuch as we have selected  it at random) may be said of any
+other volition, namely, that it is nothing but an idea.   Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Will and understanding are one and the same.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Will and understanding are nothing beyond the
+individual volitions and ideas  (II. xlviii. and note).  But a
+particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same
+(by the foregoing Prop.); therefore, will and understanding are
+one and the same.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--We have thus removed the cause which is commonly
+assigned for error.  For  we have shown above, that falsity
+consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in  ideas
+which are fragmentary and confused.  Wherefore, a false idea,
+inasmuch as it is false,  does not involve certainty.  When we
+say, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and  that he
+has no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain,
+but only that he does  not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what
+is false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which  should cause
+his imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note).  Thus, although
+the man be  assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never
+say that he is certain.  For by certainty  we mean something
+positive (II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt.
+
+However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully
+explained, I will draw  attention to a few additional points, and
+I will furthermore answer the objections which  may be advanced
+against our doctrine.  Lastly, in order to remove every scruple,
+I have  thought it worth while to point out some of the
+advantages, which follow therefrom.  I say  "some," for they will
+be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth
+part.
+
+I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to make
+an accurate distinction  between an idea, or conception of the
+mind, and the images of things which we imagine.   It is further
+necessary that they should distinguish between idea and words,
+whereby we  signify things.  These three--namely, images, words,
+and ideas--are by many persons either  entirely confused
+together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care,
+and hence  people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely
+necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine  of the will, both for
+philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life.  Those
+who  think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by
+contact with external bodies,  persuade themselves that the ideas
+of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture,  are not
+ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of
+our will; they thus  regard ideas as though they were inanimate
+pictures on a panel, and, filled with this  misconception, do not
+see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an
+affirmation or  negation.  Again, those who confuse words with
+ideas, or with the affirmation which an  idea involves, think
+that they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm,
+or  deny.  This misconception will easily be laid aside by one,
+who reflects on the nature of  knowledge, and seeing that it in
+no wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore
+clearly understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does
+not consist in the image of  anything, nor in words.  The essence
+of words and images is put together by bodily  motions, which in
+no wise involve the conception of thought.
+
+These few words on this subject will suffice:  I will therefore
+pass on to consider the  objections, which may be raised against
+our doctrine.  Of these, the first is advanced by  those, who
+think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, and
+that therefore  it is different therefrom.  The reason for their
+holding the belief, that the will has wider  scope than the
+understanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an
+increase in  their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or
+negation, in order to assent to an infinity of  things which we
+do not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their
+faculty of  understanding.  The will is thus distinguished from
+the intellect, the latter being finite and  the former infinite.
+Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us
+especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment
+before assenting to things  which we perceive; this is confirmed
+by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so  far as he
+perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or
+dissents.
+
+For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not therefore
+admit that a winged horse  exists; that is, he is not deceived,
+unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does  exist.
+Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by experience,
+than that the will  or faculty of assent is free and different
+from the faculty of understanding.  Thirdly, it may  be objected
+that one affirmation does not apparently contain more reality
+than another; in  other words, that we do not seem to need for
+affirming, that what is true is true, any  greater power than for
+affirming, that what is false is true.  We have, however, seen
+that  one idea has more reality or perfection than another, for
+as objects are some more  excellent than others, so also are the
+ideas of them some more excellent than others; this  also seems
+to point to a difference between the understanding and the will.
+Fourthly, it  may be objected, if man does not act from free
+will, what will happen if the incentives to  action are equally
+balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass?  Will he perish of
+hunger and  thirst?  If I say that he would not, he would then
+determine his own action, and would  consequently possess the
+faculty of going and doing whatever he liked.  Other objections
+might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence
+everything that anyone may  dream, I will only set myself to the
+task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as  briefly as
+possible.
+
+To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will has a
+wider scope than the  understanding, if by the understanding be
+meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny  that the will
+has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of
+forming  conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition
+should be called infinite, any more  than the faculty of feeling:
+for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an
+infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot
+affirm an infinite number  simultaneously), so also can we, by
+the same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in  succession) an
+infinite number of bodies.  If it be said that there is an
+infinite number of  things which we cannot perceive, I answer,
+that we cannot attain to such things by any  thinking, nor,
+consequently, by any faculty of volition.  But, it may still be
+urged, if God  wished to bring it about that we should perceive
+them, he would be obliged to endow us  with a greater faculty of
+perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have
+already.  This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring
+it about that we should  understand an infinite number of other
+entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a  greater
+understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that
+which we have  already, in order to grasp such infinite entities.
+We have shown that will is a universal  entity or idea, whereby
+we explain all particular volitions--in other words, that which
+is  common to all such volitions.
+
+As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or
+universal to all volitions, is a  faculty, it is little to be
+wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself
+into  the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding:  for
+what is universal is predicated alike  of one, of many, and of an
+infinite number of individuals.
+
+To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a free
+power of suspending  our judgment:  for, when we say that anyone
+suspends his judgment, we merely mean that  he sees, that he does
+not perceive the matter in question adequately.  Suspension of
+judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a perception, and not
+free will.  In order to  illustrate the point, let us suppose a
+boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing else.   Inasmuch as
+this imagination involves the existence of the horse (II. xvii.
+Cor.), and the boy  does not perceive anything which would
+exclude the existence of the horse, he will  necessarily regard
+the horse as present:  he will not be able to doubt of its
+existence,  although he be not certain thereof.  We have daily
+experience of such a state of things in  dreams; and I do not
+suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that, while he
+is  dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his judgment
+concerning the things in his  dream, and bringing it about that
+he should not dream those things, which he dreams that  he sees;
+yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we suspend
+our judgment,  namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.
+
+Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as actual
+perception extends--that is, I  grant that the mind's
+imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II.
+xvii.  note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of
+perception, make any affirmation.  For  what is the perception of
+a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings?  If the
+mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would
+regard the same as present  to itself:  it would have no reasons
+for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent,  unless
+the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which
+precludes the  existence of the said horse, or unless the mind
+perceives that the idea which it possess of a  winged horse is
+inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the
+existence of  such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on
+the subject.
+
+I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third objection,
+namely, that the will is  something universal which is predicated
+of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is  common to
+all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate essence must,
+therefore, in  so far as it is thus conceived in the abstract, be
+in every idea, and be, in this respect alone,  the same in all,
+not in so far as it is considered as constituting the idea's
+essence:  for, in  this respect, particular affirmations differ
+one from the other, as much as do ideas.  For  instance, the
+affirmation which involves the idea of a circle, differs from
+that which  involves the idea of a triangle, as much as the idea
+of a circle differs from the idea of a  triangle.
+
+Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal power
+of thinking, to affirm  that that which is true is true, and to
+affirm that that which is false is true.  These two
+affirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to
+one another as being and  not-being; for there is nothing
+positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of
+falsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).
+
+We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when we
+confuse universals with  singulars, and the entities of reason
+and abstractions with realities.  As for the fourth  objection, I
+am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium
+described  (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst,
+a certain food and a certain drink,  each equally distant from
+him) would die of hunger and thirst.  If I am asked, whether such
+ an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man; I
+answer, that I do not know,  neither do I know how a man should
+be considered, who hangs himself, or how we should  consider
+children, fools, madmen, &c.
+
+It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this
+doctrine as bearing on  conduct, and this may be easily gathered
+from what has been said.  The doctrine is good,
+
+1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the
+decree of God, and to be  partakers in the Divine nature, and so
+much the more, as we perform more perfect actions  and more and
+more understand God.  Such a doctrine not only completely
+tranquilizes our  spirit, but also shows us where our highest
+happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in  the knowledge of
+God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid
+us.  We  may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true
+estimate of virtue are those who  expect to be decorated by God
+with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions,  as
+for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the
+service of God were not in  itself happiness and perfect freedom.
+
+2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct ourselves
+with respect to the gifts  of fortune, or matters which are not
+in our power, and do not follow from our nature.  For  it shows
+us, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or frowns
+with an equal  mind, seeing that all things follow from the
+eternal decree of God by the same necessity,  as it follows from
+the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two
+right  angles.
+
+3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches us to
+hate no man, neither to  despise, to deride, to envy, or to be
+angry with any.  Further, as it tells us that each should  be
+content with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any
+womanish pity,  favour, or superstition, but solely by the
+guidance of reason, according as the time and  occasion demand,
+as I will show in Part III.
+
+4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the
+commonwealth; for it teaches  how citizens should be governed and
+led, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may  freely do
+whatsoever things are best.
+
+I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of this
+note, and I thus bring the  second part of my treatise to a
+close.  I think I have therein explained the nature and
+properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and,
+considering the difficulty of the  subject, with sufficient
+clearness.  I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many
+excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary
+to be known, as will, in  what follows, be partly made plain.
+
+
+
+
+
+END OF PART II
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's The Ethics [Part II], by Benedict de Spinoza
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+The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
+This is Part II
+#2 in our series by Spinoza
+
+Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
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+The Ethics [Part II]
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+(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
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+by Benedict de Spinoza
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+Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
+
+May, 1997  [Etext #920]
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+
+Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
+(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
+
+Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
+
+
+
+
+Part II:  ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND
+
+
+
+PREFACE I now pass on to explaining the results, which must
+necessarily follow from the essence of  God, or of the eternal
+and infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in
+Part i.,  Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an
+infinite number of ways), but only  those which are able to lead
+us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human  mind
+and its highest blessedness.
+
+DEFINITIONS I.  By 'body' I mean a mode which expresses in a
+certain determinate manner the essence  of God, in so far as he
+is considered as an extended thing.  (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv.
+Cor.)
+
+II.  I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that,
+which being given, the thing is  necessarily given also, and,
+which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also;  in
+other words, that without which the thing, and which itself
+without the thing, can neither  be nor be conceived.
+
+III. By 'idea,' I mean the mental conception which is formed by
+the mind as a thinking  thing.
+
+>>>>>Explanation--I say 'conception' rather than perception,
+because the word perception  seems to imply that the mind is
+passive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems  to
+express an activity of the mind.
+
+IV.  By 'an adequate idea,' I mean an idea which, in so far as
+it is considered in itself,  without relation to the object, has
+all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.
+
+>>>>>Explanation--I say 'intrinsic,' in order to exclude that
+mark which is extrinsic,  namely, the agreement between the idea
+and its object (ideatum).
+
+V.  'Duration' is the indefinite continuance of existing.
+
+>>>>>Explanation--I say 'indefinite,' because it cannot be
+determined through the  existence itself of the existing thing,
+or by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the  existence
+of the thing, but does not take it away.
+
+VI.  'Reality' and 'perfection' I use as synonymous terms.
+
+VII.  By 'particular things,' I mean things which are finite and
+have a conditioned  existence; but if several individual things
+concur in one action, so as to be all  simultaneously the effect
+of one cause, I consider them all, so far, as one particular 
+thing.
+
+ AXIOMS  I.  The essence of man does not involve necessary
+existence, that is, it may, in the order of  nature, come to pass
+that this or that man does or does not exist.
+
+II.  Man thinks.
+
+III.  Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of
+the passions, do not take place,  unless there be in the same
+individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c.  But the idea 
+can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.
+
+IV.  We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.
+
+V.  We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and
+modes of thought.
+
+N.B.  The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.
+xiii.
+
+ PROPOSITIONS  I.  Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a
+thinking thing.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are
+modes which, in a certain  conditioned manner, express the nature
+of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Cor.).  God therefore  possesses the
+attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved in
+all particular  thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby. 
+Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite  attributes of God,
+which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def.
+vi.).  In  other words, God is a thinking thing.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--This proposition is also evident from the fact, that
+we are able to conceive  an infinite thinking being.  For, in
+proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking  more
+thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or
+perfection.  Therefore a  being, which can think an infinite
+number of things in an infinite number of ways, is, 
+necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite.  As, therefore,
+from the consideration of  thought alone, we conceive an infinite
+being, thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.)  one of
+the infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.
+
+II.  Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended
+thing.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
+the last.
+
+III.  In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his
+essence, but also of all things which  necessarily follow from
+his essence.
+
+>>>>>Proof--God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an
+infinite number of things in  infinite ways, or (what is the same
+thing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his  essence,
+and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom.  Now all
+that is in the power  of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop.
+xxxv.).  Therefore, such an idea as we are considering 
+necessarily is, and in God alone.  Q.E.D.  (Part i., Prop. xv.)
+
+*****Note--The multitude understand by the power of God the free
+will of God, and the  right over all things that exist, which
+latter are accordingly generally considered as  contingent.  For
+it is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to
+reduce them  to nothing.  Further, the power of God is very often
+likened to the power of kings.  But  this doctrine we have
+refuted (Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Cors. i. and ii.), and we have
+shown  (Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity,
+as that by which he understands  himself; in other words, as it
+follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit), 
+that God understands himself, so also does it follow by the same
+necessity, that God  performs infinite acts in infinite ways.  We
+further showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that  God's power is
+identical with God's essence in action; therefore it is as
+impossible for us  to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive
+him as non-existent.  If we might pursue  the subject further, I
+could point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to
+God  is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the
+multitude as a man, or in the  likeness of a man), but involves a
+negation of power.  However, I am unwilling to go over  the same
+ground so often.  I would only beg the reader again and again, to
+turn over  frequently in his mind what I have said in Part i.
+from Prop. xvi. to the end.  No one will  be able to follow my
+meaning, unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the
+power  of God with the human power and right of kings.
+
+IV.  The idea of God, from which an infinite number of things
+follow in infinite ways, can  only be one.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the
+attributes of God and his  modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.). 
+Now God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Cor.).  Therefore  the idea
+of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in infinite
+ways, can only  be one.  Q.E.D.
+
+V.  The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in so
+far as he is considered as a  thinking thing, not in so far as he
+is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas both  of
+the attributes of God and of particular things do not own as
+their efficient cause their  objects (ideata) or the things
+perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this
+Part.  We there drew the  conclusion, that God can form the idea
+of his essence, and of all things which follow  necessarily
+therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because
+he is the  object of his own idea.  Wherefore the actual being of
+ideas owns for cause God, in so far  as he is a thinking thing. 
+It may be differently proved as follows:  the actual being of
+ideas  is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.
+xxv., Cor.) a mode which expresses  in a certain manner the
+nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore 
+(Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute
+of God, and consequently  (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect
+of any attribute save thought.  Therefore the actual  being of
+ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a
+thinking thing, &c.   Q.E.D.
+
+VI.  The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in so
+far as he is considered  through the attribute of which they are
+modes, and not in so far as he is considered through  any other
+attribute.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Each attribute is conceived through itself, without
+any other part (Part i.,  Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each
+attribute involve the conception of that attribute,  but not of
+any other.  Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only
+in so far as he  is considered through the attribute whose modes
+they are, and not in so far as he is  considered through any
+other.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence the actual being of things, which are not
+modes of thought, does  not follow from the divine nature,
+because that nature has prior knowledge of the things.   Things
+represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their
+particular attribute, in the  same manner, and with the same
+necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have  shown) from
+the attribute of thought.
+
+VII.  The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order
+and connection of things.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv. 
+For the idea of everything  that is caused depends on a
+knowledge of the cause, whereof it is an effect.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence God's power of thinking is equal to his
+realized power of action-- that is, whatsoever follows from the
+infinite nature of God in the world of extension  (formaliter),
+follows without exception in the same order and connection from
+the idea of  God in the world of thought (objective).
+
+*****Note--Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind
+what has been pointed out  above--namely, that whatsoever can be
+perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the  essence
+of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance: 
+consequently, substance  thinking and substance extended are one
+and the same substance, comprehended now  through one attribute,
+now through the other.  So, also, a mode of extension and the
+idea  of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed
+in two ways.  This truth seems  to have been dimly recognized by
+those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect,  and the
+things understood by God are identical.  For instance, a circle
+existing in nature,  and the idea of a circle existing, which is
+also in God, are one and the same thing displayed  through
+different attributes.  Thus, whether we conceive nature under the
+attribute of  extension, or under the attribute of thought, or
+under any other attribute, we shall find the  same order, or one
+and the same chain of causes--that is, the same things following
+in  either case.
+
+I said that God is the cause of an idea--for instance, of the
+idea of a circle,--in so far as he  is a thinking thing; and of a
+circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the 
+actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a
+proximate cause through  another mode of thinking, and that again
+through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so  long as we
+consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order
+of the whole of  nature, or the whole chain of causes, through
+the attribute of thought only.  And, in so far  as we consider
+things as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the
+whole of  nature through the attributes of extension only; and so
+on, in the case of the other  attributes.  Wherefore of things as
+they are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch  as he
+consists of infinite attributes.  I cannot for the present
+explain my meaning more  clearly.
+
+VIII.  The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not
+exist, must be comprehended  in the infinite idea of God, in the
+same way as the formal essences of particular things or  modes
+are contained in the attributes of God.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from the last; it is
+understood more clearly from  the preceding note.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence, so long as particular things do not
+exist, except in so far as they  are comprehended in the
+attributes of God, their representations in thought or ideas do
+not  exist, except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists;
+and when the particular things are  said to exist, not only in so
+far as they are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so
+ far as they are said to continue, their ideas will also involve
+existence, through which they  are said to continue.
+
+*****Note--If anyone desires an example to throw more light on
+this question, I shall, I  fear, not be able to give him any,
+which adequately explains the thing of which I here  speak,
+inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to
+illustrate it as far as possible.   The nature of a circle is
+such that if any number of straight lines intersect within it,
+the  rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one
+another; thus, infinite equal  rectangles are contained in a
+circle.  Yet none of these rectangles can be said to exist, 
+except in so far as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of
+these rectangles be said to  exist, except in so far as they are
+comprehended in the idea of the circle.  Let us grant that, 
+from this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist.  The
+ideas of these two not only  exist, in so far as they are
+contained in the idea of the circle, but also as they involve the
+ existence of those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished
+from the remaining ideas of  the remaining rectangles.
+
+IX.  The idea of an individual thing actually existing is caused
+by God, not in so far as he  is infinite, but in so far as he is
+considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually 
+existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected
+by a third idea, and so on to  infinity.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
+an individual mode of  thinking, and is distinct from other modes
+(by the Cor. and Note to Prop. viii. of this part);  thus (by
+Prop. vi. of this part) it is caused by God, in so far only as he
+is a thinking thing.   But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.) in
+so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so  far as
+he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and he
+is the cause of this  latter, as being affected by a third, and
+so on to infinity.  Now, the order and connection  of ideas is
+(by Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection
+of causes.   Therefore of a given individual idea another
+individual idea, or God, in so far as he is  considered as
+modified by that idea, is the cause; and of this second idea God
+is the  cause, in so far as he is affected by another idea, and
+so on to infinity.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Whatsoever takes place in the individual object
+of any idea, the  knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as
+he has the idea of the object.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its
+idea is in God (by  Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he
+is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as  affected by
+another idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.); but (by
+Prop. vii. of  this part) the order and connection of ideas is
+the same as the order and connection of  things.  The knowledge,
+therefore, of that which takes place in any individual object
+will  be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that
+object.  Q.E.D.
+
+X.  The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of
+man--in other words,  substance does not constitute the actual
+being (forma) of man.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The being of substance involves necessary existence
+(Part i., Prop. vii.).   If, therefore, the being of substance
+appertains to the essence of man, substance being  granted, man
+would necessarily be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and,
+consequently, man would  necessarily exist, which is absurd (II.
+Ax. i.).  Therefore &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in
+which it is shown that there  cannot be two substances of the
+same nature; for as there may be many men, the being of 
+substance is not that which constitutes the actual being of man. 
+Again, the proposition is  evident from the other properties of
+substance--namely, that substance is in its nature  infinite,
+immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows, that the essence of man is
+constituted by certain  modifications of the attributes of God. 
+For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does  not belong
+to the essence of man.  That essence therefore (by I. xv.) is
+something which is  in God, and which without God can neither be
+nor be conceived, whether it be a  modification (I. xxv. Cor.),
+or a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain  conditioned
+manner.
+
+*****Note--Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be
+conceived without  God.  All men agree that God is the one and
+only cause of all things, both of their essence  and of their
+existence; that is, God is not only the cause of things in
+respect to their being  made (secundum fieri), but also in
+respect to their being (secundum esse).
+
+At the same time many assert, that that, without which a thing
+cannot be nor be conceived,  belongs to the essence of that
+thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God 
+appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created
+things can be or be  conceived without God; or else, as is more
+probably the case, they hold inconsistent  doctrines.  I think
+the cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to
+the  proper order of philosophic thinking.  The nature of God,
+which should be reflected on  first, inasmuch as it is prior both
+in the order of knowledge and the order of nature, they  have
+taken to be last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the
+first place what they  call the objects of sensation; hence,
+while they are considering natural phenomena, they  give no
+attention at all to the divine nature, and, when afterwards they
+apply their mind to  the study of the divine nature, they are
+quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses,  with which
+they have overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch
+as such  hypotheses are no help towards understanding the divine
+nature.  So that it is hardly to be  wondered at, that these
+persons contradict themselves freely.
+
+However, I pass over this point.  My intention her was only to
+give a reason for not saying,  that that, without which a thing
+cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that  thing: 
+individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God
+does not  appertain to their essence.  I said that "I considered
+as belonging to the essence of a thing  that, which being given,
+the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the 
+thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the
+thing, and which itself without  the thing can neither be nor be
+conceived."  (II. Def. ii.)
+
+XI.  The first element, which constitutes the actual being of the
+human mind, is the idea of  some particular thing actually
+existing.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The essence of man (by the Cor. of the last Prop.) is
+constituted by certain  modes of the attributes of God, namely
+(by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all  which (by II.
+Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is
+given, the other  modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior
+in nature) must be in the same individual  (by the same Axiom). 
+Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human
+mind.   But not the idea of a non-existent thing, for then (II.
+viii. Cor.) the idea itself cannot be  said to exist; it must
+therefore be the idea of something actually existing.  But not of
+an  infinite thing.  For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.), must
+always necessarily exist; this would  (by II. Ax. i.) involve an
+absurdity.  Therefore the first element, which constitutes the 
+actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually
+existing.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of
+the infinite intellect of  God; thus when we say, that the human
+mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion,  that God has
+this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far
+as he is displayed  through the nature of the human mind, or in
+so far as he constitutes the essence of the  human mind; and when
+we say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he 
+constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as
+he, simultaneously with the  human mind, has the further idea of
+another thing, we assert that the human mind  perceives a thing
+in part or inadequately.
+
+*****Note--Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and
+will call to mind many  things which will cause them to hesitate;
+I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly,  step by step, and
+not to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the
+end.
+
+XII.  Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea, which
+constitutes the human  mind, must be perceived by the human mind,
+or there will necessarily be an idea in the  human mind of the
+said occurrence.  That is, if the object of the idea constituting
+the  human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that body
+without being perceived by  the mind.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea,
+the knowledge  thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Cor.), in
+so far as he is considered as affected by  the idea of the said
+object, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind
+of anything.   Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object
+constituting the idea of the human mind,  the knowledge thereof
+is necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of
+the  human mind; that is (by II. xi. Cor.) the knowledge of the
+said thing will necessarily be  in the mind, in other words the
+mind perceives it.
+
+*****Note--This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly
+to be understood from  II. vii., which see.
+
+XIII.  The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the
+body, in other words a  certain mode of extension which actually
+exists, and nothing else.
+
+>>>>>Proof--If indeed the body were not the object of the human
+mind, the ideas of the  modifications of the body would not be in
+God (II. ix. Cor.) in virtue of his constituting  our mind, but
+in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else; that is
+(II. xi. Cor.)  the ideas of the modifications of the body would
+not be in our mind:  now (by II. Ax. iv.)  we do possess the idea
+of the modifications of the body.  Therefore the object of the 
+idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as it
+actually exists (II. xi.).   Further, if there were any other
+object of the idea constituting the mind besides body,  then, as
+nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I.
+xxxvi.) there would  necessarily have to be in our mind an idea,
+which would be the effect of that other object  (II. xi.); but
+(I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea.  Wherefore the object of our
+mind is the body  as it exists, and nothing else.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is
+united to the body,  but also the nature of the union between
+mind and body.  However, no one will be able  to grasp this
+adequately or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge
+of the nature  of our body.  The propositions we have advanced
+hitherto have been entirely general,  applying not more to men
+than to other individual things, all of which, though in
+different  degrees, are animated (animata).  For of everything
+there is necessarily an idea in God, of  which God is the cause,
+in the same way as there is an idea of the human body; thus 
+whatever we have asserted of the idea of the human body must
+necessarily also be asserted  of the idea of everything else. 
+Still, on the other hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like 
+objects, differ one from the other, one being more excellent than
+another and containing  more reality, just as the object of one
+idea is more excellent than the object of another idea,  and
+contains more reality.
+
+Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind differs
+from other things, and  wherein it surpasses them, it is
+necessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is,  of
+the human body.  What this nature is, I am not able here to
+explain, nor is it necessary  for the proof of what I advance,
+that I should do so.  I will only say generally, that in 
+proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing
+many actions or receiving  many impressions at once, so also is
+the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than  others for
+forming many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actions
+of the body  depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies
+concur with it in action, the more fitted  is the mind of which
+it is the object for distinct comprehension.  We may thus
+recognize  the superiority of one mind over others, and may
+further see the cause, why we have only a  very confused
+knowledge of our body, and also many kindred questions, which I
+will, in  the following propositions, deduce from what has been
+advanced.  Wherefore I have  thought it worth while to explain
+and prove more strictly my present statements.  In order  to do
+so, I must premise a few propositions concerning the nature of
+bodies.
+
+---Axiom I.  All bodies are either in motion or at rest.
+
+---Axiom II.  Every body is moved sometimes more slowly,
+sometimes more quickly.
+
+Lemma I.  Bodies are distinguished from one another in respect of
+motion and rest,  quickness and slowness, and not in respect of
+substance.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The first part of this proposition is, I take it,
+self-evident.  That bodies are  not distinguished in respect of
+substance, is plain both from I. v. and I. viii.  It is brought 
+out still more clearly from I. xv., Note.
+
+Lemma II.  All bodies agree in certain respects.
+
+>>>>>Proof--All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the
+conception of one and the  same attribute (II., Def. i.). 
+Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more 
+quickly, and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.
+
+Lemma III.  A body in motion or at rest must be determined to
+motion or rest by another  body, which other body has been
+determined to motion or rest by a third body, and that  third
+again by a fourth, and so on to infinity.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Bodies are individual things (II., Def. i.), which
+(Lemma i.) are distinguished  one from the other in respect to
+motion and rest; thus (I. xxviii.) each must necessarily be 
+determined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely
+(II. vi.) by another body,  which other body is also (Ax. i.) in
+motion or at rest.  And this body again can only have  been set
+in motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body
+to motion or rest.   This third body again by a fourth, and so on
+to infinity.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps in
+motion, until it is  determined to a state of rest by some other
+body; and a body at rest remains so, until it is  determined to a
+state of motion by some other body.  This is indeed self-evident. 
+For  when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, A, is at
+rest, and do not take into  consideration other bodies in motion,
+I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A,  except that it
+is at rest.  If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion,
+this cannot have  resulted from its having been at rest, for no
+other consequence could have been involved  than its remaining at
+rest.  If, on the other hand, A be given in motion, we shall, so
+long as  we only consider A, be unable to affirm anything
+concerning it, except that it is in motion.   If A is
+subsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result
+of A's previous  motion, for such motion can only have led to
+continued motion; the state of rest therefore  must have resulted
+from something, which was not in A, namely, from an external
+cause  determining A to a state of rest.
+
+-----Axiom I--All modes, wherein one body is affected by another
+body, follow  simultaneously from the nature of the body
+affected and the body affecting; so that one  and the same body
+may be moved in different modes, according to the difference in
+the  nature of the bodies moving it; on the other hand, different
+bodies may be moved in  different modes by one and the same body.
+
+-----Axiom II--When a body in motion impinges on another body at
+rest, which it is  unable to move, it recoils, in order to
+continue its motion, and the angle made by the line  of motion in
+the recoil and the plane of the body at rest, whereon the moving
+body has  impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the line
+of motion of incidence and the  same plane.
+
+So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies,
+which are only distinguished  one from the other by motion and
+rest, quickness and slowness.  We now pass on to  compound
+bodies.
+
+Definition--When any given bodies of the same or different
+magnitude are compelled by  other bodies to remain in contact, or
+if they be moved at the same or different rates of  speed, so
+that their mutual movements should preserve among themselves a
+certain fixed  relation, we say that such bodies are 'in union,'
+and that together they compose one body  or individual, which is
+distinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union.
+
+-----Axiom III--In proportion as the parts of an individual, or
+a compound body, are in  contact over a greater or less
+superficies, they will with greater or less difficulty admit of 
+being moved from their position; consequently the individual
+will, with greater or less  difficulty, be brought to assume
+another form.  Those bodies, whose parts are in contact  over
+large superficies, are called 'hard;' those, whose parts are in
+contact over small  superficies, are called 'soft;' those, whose
+parts are in motion among one another, are  called 'fluid.'
+
+Lemma IV.  If from a body or individual, compounded of several
+bodies, certain bodies be  separated, and if, at the same time,
+an equal number of other bodies of the same nature  take their
+place, the individual will preserve its nature as before, without
+any change in its  actuality (forma).
+
+>>>>>Proof--Bodies (Lemma i.) are not distinguished in respect of
+substance:  that which  constitutes the actuality (formam) of an
+individual consists (by the last Def.) in a union of  bodies; but
+this union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will
+(by our  hypothesis) be maintained; the individual, therefore,
+will retain its nature as before, both in  respect of substance
+and in respect of mode.  Q.E.D.
+
+Lemma V.  If the parts composing an individual become greater or
+less, but in such  proportion, that they all preserve the same
+mutual relations of motion and rest, the  individual will still
+preserve its original nature, and its actuality will not be
+changed.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The same as for the last Lemma.
+
+Lemma VI.  If certain bodies composing an individual be compelled
+to change the motion,  which they have in one direction, for
+motion in another direction, but in such a manner,  that they be
+able to continue their motions and their mutual communication in
+the same  relations as before, the individual will retain its own
+nature without any change of its  actuality.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident, for the individual
+is supposed to retain all  that, which, in its definition, we
+spoke of as its actual being.
+
+Lemma VII.  Furthermore, the individual thus composed preserves
+its nature, whether it  be, as a whole, in motion or at rest,
+whether it be moved in this or that direction; so long  as each
+part retains its motion, and preserves its communication with
+other parts as  before.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from the definition of an
+individual prefixed to  Lemma iv.
+
+*****Note--We thus see, how a composite individual may be
+affected in many different  ways, and preserve its nature
+notwithstanding.  Thus far we have conceived an individual  as
+composed of bodies only distinguished one from the other in
+respect of motion and  rest, speed and slowness; that is, of
+bodies of the most simple character.  If, however, we  now
+conceive another individual composed of several individuals of
+diverse natures, we  shall find that the number of ways in which
+it can be affected, without losing its nature, will  be greatly
+multiplied.  Each of its parts would consist of several bodies,
+and therefore (by  Lemma vi.) each part would admit, without
+change to its nature, of quicker or slower  motion, and would
+consequently be able to transmit its motions more quickly or more
+ slowly to the remaining parts.  If we further conceive a third
+kind of individuals composed  of individuals of this second kind,
+we shall find that they may be affected in a still greater 
+number of ways without changing their actuality.  We may easily
+proceed thus to infinity,  and conceive the whole of nature as
+one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in 
+infinite ways, without any change in the individual as a whole. 
+I should feel bound to  explain and demonstrate this point at
+more length, if I were writing a special treatise on  body.  But
+I have already said that such is not my object; I have only
+touched on the  question, because it enables me to prove easily
+that which I have in view.
+
+POSTULATES I.  The human body is composed of a number of
+individual parts, of diverse nature, each  one of which is in
+itself extremely complex.
+
+II.  Of the individual parts composing the human body some are
+fluid, some soft, some  hard.
+
+III.  The individual parts composing the human body, and
+consequently the human body  itself, are affected in a variety of
+ways by external bodies.
+
+IV.  The human body stands in need for its preservation of a
+number of other bodies, by  which it is continually, so to speak,
+regenerated.
+
+V.  When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an
+external body to impinge  often on another soft part, it changes
+the surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves the 
+impression thereupon of the external body which impels it.
+
+VI.  The human body can move external bodies, and arrange them in
+a variety of ways.
+
+PROPOSITIONS XIV.  The human mind is capable of perceiving a
+great number of things, and is so in   proportion as its body is
+capable of receiving a great number of impressions.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in
+very many ways by  external bodies, and is capable in very many
+ways of affecting external bodies.  But (II.xii.)  the human mind
+must perceive all that takes place in the human body; the human
+mind is,  therefore, capable of perceiving a great number of
+things, and is so in proportion, &c.   Q.E.D.
+
+XV.  The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human
+mind, is not simple, but  compounded of a great number of ideas.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The idea constituting the actual being of the human
+mind is the idea of the  body (II. xiii.), which (Post. i.) is
+composed of a great number of complex individual  parts.  But
+there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part
+whereof the body is  composed (II. viii. Cor.); therefore (II.
+vii.), the idea of the human body is composed of  each of these
+numerous ideas of its component parts.  Q.E.D.
+
+XVI.  The idea of every mode, in which the human body is
+affected by external bodies,  must involve the nature of the
+human body, and also the nature of the external body.
+
+>>>>>Proof--All the modes, in which any given body is affected,
+follow from the nature  of the body affected, and also from the
+nature of the affecting body (by Ax. i., after the  Cor. of Lemma
+iii.), wherefore their idea is also necessarily (by I, Ax. iv.)
+involves the  nature of both bodies; therefore, the idea of every
+mode, in which the human body is  affected by external bodies,
+involves the nature of the human body and of the external  body. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary I.--Hence it follows, first, that the human mind
+perceives the nature of a  variety of bodies, together with the
+nature of its own.
+
+<<<<<Corollary II.--It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which
+we have of external bodies,  indicate rather the constitution of
+our own body than the nature of external bodies.  I have  amply
+illustrated this in the Appendix to Part I.
+
+XVII.  If the human body is affected in a manner which involves
+the nature of any external  body, the human mind will regard the
+said external body as actually existing, or as present  to
+itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to
+exclude the existence or the  presence of the said external body.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident, for so long as the
+human body continues to  be thus affected, so long will the human
+mind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the body  --that is
+(by the last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode as
+actually existing, and this  idea involves the nature of the
+external body; therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Cor. i.) will 
+regard the external body as actually existing, until it is
+affected, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--The mind is able to regard as present external
+bodies, by which the  human body has once been affected, even
+though they be no longer in existence or present.
+
+>>>>>Proof--When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the
+human body, so that  they often impinge on the softer parts, they
+change the surface of the last named (Post. v);  hence (Ax. ii.,
+after the Cor. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in a
+different  manner from that which they followed before such
+change; and, further, when afterwards  they impinge on the new
+surfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be 
+refracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled
+towards those surfaces by  external bodies; consequently, they
+will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the  human
+body in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again
+take cognizance  --that is (II. xvii.), the mind will again
+regard the external body as present, and will do so,  as often as
+the fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid
+surfaces by their  own spontaneous motion.  Wherefore, although
+the external bodies, by which the human  body has once been
+affected, be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless
+regard  them as present, as often as this action of the body is
+repeated.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case,
+that we regard as  present many things which are not.  It is
+possible that the same result may be brought about  by other
+causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated one
+possible  explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out the
+true cause.  Indeed, I do not think I  am very far from the
+truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which
+rest,  almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be
+controverted by those who have  shown, as we have, that the human
+body, as we feel it, exists (Cor. after II. xiii.).   Furthermore
+(II. vii. Cor., II. xvi. Cor. ii.), we clearly understand what is
+the difference  between the idea, say, of Peter, which
+constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the  idea of the
+said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul.  The former
+directly answers to  the essence of Peter's own body, and only 
+implies existence so long as Peter exists; the  latter indicates
+rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter,
+and,  therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body lasts,
+Paul's mind will regard Peter as  present to itself, even though
+he no longer exists.  Further, to retain the usual phraseology, 
+the modifications of the human body, of which the ideas represent
+external bodies as  present to us, we will call the images of
+things, though they do not recall the figure of  things.  When
+the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines. 
+I will here  draw attention to the fact, in order to indicate
+where error lies, that the imaginations of the  mind, looked at
+in themselves, do not contain error.  The mind does not err in
+the mere act  of imagining, but only in so far as it is regarded
+as being without the idea, which excludes  the existence of such
+things as it imagines to be present to it.  If the mind, while
+imagining  non-existent things as present to it, is at the same
+time conscious that they do not really  exist, this power of
+imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature, and
+not to a  fault, especially if this faculty of imagination depend
+solely on its own nature--that is (I.  Def. vii.), if this
+faculty of imagination be free.
+
+XVIII.  If the human body has once been affected by two or more
+bodies at the same  time, when the mind afterwards imagines any
+of them, it will straightway remember the  others also.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The mind (II. xvii. Cor.) imagines any given body,
+because the human body  is affected and disposed by the
+impressions from an external body, in the same manner as  it is
+affected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said
+external body; but (by our  hypothesis) the body was then so
+disposed, that the mind imagined two bodies at once;  therefore,
+it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once, and
+the mind, when  it imagines one, will straightway remember the
+other.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--We now clearly see what 'Memory' is.  It is simply a
+certain association of  ideas involving the nature of things
+outside the human body, which association arises in the  mind
+according to the order and association of the modifications
+(affectiones) of the  human body.  I say, first, it is an
+association of those ideas only, which involve the nature  of
+things outside the human body:  not of ideas which answer to the
+nature of the said  things:  ideas of the modifications of the
+human body are, strictly speaking (II. xvi.), those  which
+involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies. 
+I say, secondly,  that this association arises according to the
+order and association of the modifications of  the human body, in
+order to distinguish it from that association of ideas, which
+arises from  the order of the intellect, whereby the mind
+perceives things through their primary causes,  and which is in
+all men the same.  And hence we can further clearly understand,
+why the  mind from the thought of one thing, should straightway
+arrive at the thought of another  thing, which has no similarity
+with the first; for instance, from the thought of the word 
+'pomum' (an apple), a Roman would straightway arrive at the
+thought of the fruit apple,  which has no similitude with the
+articulate sound in question, nor anything in common  with it,
+except that the body of the man has often been affected by these
+two things; that  is, that the man has often heard the word
+'pomum,' while he was looking at the fruit;  similarly every man
+will go on from one thought to another, according as his habit
+has  ordered the images of things in his body.  For a soldier,
+for instance, when he sees the  tracks of a horse in sand, will
+at once pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a 
+horseman, and thence to the thought of war, &c.; while a
+countryman will proceed from  the thought of a horse to the
+thought of a plough, a field, &c.  Thus every man will follow 
+this or that train of thought, according as he has been in the
+habit of conjoining and  associating the mental images of things
+in this or that manner.
+
+XIX.  The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does not
+know it to exist, save  through the ideas of the modifications
+whereby the body is affected.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the
+human body (II. xiii.),  which (II. ix.) is in God, in so far as
+he is regarded as affected by another idea of a  particular thing
+actually existing:  or, inasmuch as (Post. iv.) the human body
+stands in  need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were,
+continually regenerated; and the order  and connection of ideas
+is the same as the order and connection of causes (II. vii.);
+this  idea will therefore be in God, in so far as he is regarded
+as affected by the ideas of very  many particular things.  Thus
+God has the idea of the human body, or knows the human  body, in
+so far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in so
+far as he  constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by
+II. xi. Cor.), the human mind does not  know the human body.  But
+the ideas of the modifications of body are in God, in so far as 
+he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human mind
+perceives those  modifications (II. xii.), and consequently (II.
+xvi.) the human body itself, and as actually  existing; therefore
+the mind perceives thus far only the human body.  Q.E.D.
+
+XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in God,
+following in God in the  same manner, and being referred to God
+in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of  the human body.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Thought is an attribute of God (II. i.); therefore
+(II. iii.) there must  necessarily be in God the idea both of
+thought itself and of all its modifications,  consequently also
+of the human mind (II. xi.).  Further, this idea or knowledge of
+the mind  does not follow from God, in so far as he is infinite,
+but in so far as he is affected by  another idea of an individual
+thing (II. ix.).  But (II. vii.) the order and connection of
+ideas  is the same as the order and connection of causes;
+therefore this idea or knowledge of the  mind is in God and is
+referred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of
+the  body.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way
+as the mind is united to  the body.
+
+>>>>>Proof--That the mind is united to the body we have shown
+from the fact, that the  body is the object of the mind (II. xii.
+and xiii.); and so for the same reason the idea of the  mind must
+be united with its object, that is, with the mind in the same
+manner as the mind  is united to the body.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--This proposition is comprehended much more clearly
+from what we have said  in the note to II. vii.  We there showed
+that the idea of body and body, that is, mind and  body (II.
+xiii.), are one and the same individual conceived now under the
+attribute of  thought, now under the attribute of extension;
+wherefore the idea of the mind and the mind  itself are one and
+the same thing, which is conceived under one and the same
+attribute,  namely, thought.  The idea of the mind, I repeat, and
+the mind itself are in God by the  same necessity and follow from
+him from the same power of thinking.  Strictly speaking,  the
+idea of the mind, that is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but
+the distinctive quality  (forma) of the idea in so far as it is
+conceived as a mode of thought without reference to  the object;
+if a man knows anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he
+knows it, and at  the same time knows that he knows that he knows
+it, and so on to infinity.  But I will treat  of this hereafter.
+
+XXII. The human mind perceives not only the modifications of the
+body, but also the ideas  of such modifications.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God
+in the same manner,  and are referred to God in the same manner,
+as the ideas of the said modifications.  This is  proved in the
+same way as II. xx.  But the ideas of the modifications of the
+body are in the  human mind (II. xii.), that is, in God, in so
+far as he constitutes the essence of the human  mind; therefore
+the ideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the
+knowledge  or idea of the human mind, that is (II. xxi.), they
+will be in the human mind itself, which  therefore perceives not
+only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such 
+modifications.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it
+perceives the ideas of the  modifications of the body.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) follows
+in God in the same  manner, and is referred to God in the same
+manner, as the idea or knowledge of the  body.  But since (II.
+xix.) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is
+ (II. xi. Cor.), since the knowledge of the human body is not
+referred to God, in so far as  he constitutes the nature of the
+human mind; therefore, neither is the knowledge of the  mind
+referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the
+human mind; therefore  (by the same Cor. II. xi.), the human mind
+thus far has no knowledge of itself.  Further the  ideas of the
+modifications, whereby the body is affected, involve the nature
+of the human  body itself (II. xvi.), that is (II. xiii.), they
+agree with the nature of the mind; wherefore the  knowledge of
+these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind; but (by
+the last  Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human
+mind itself; wherefore the human mind  thus far only has
+knowledge of itself.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of
+the parts composing  the human body.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The parts composing the human body do not belong to
+the essence of that  body, except in so far as they communicate
+their motions to one another in a certain fixed  relation (Def.
+after Lemma iii.), not in so far as they can be regarded as
+individuals without  relation to the human body.  The parts of
+the human body are highly complex individuals  (Post. i.), whose
+parts (Lemma iv.) can be separated from the human body without in
+any  way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the
+latter, and they can communicate  their motions (Ax. i., after
+Lemma iii.) to other bodies in another relation; therefore (II.
+iii.)  the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God,
+inasmuch (II. ix.) as he is regarded as  affected by another idea
+of a particular thing, which particular thing is prior in the
+order of  nature to the aforesaid part (II. vii.).  We may affirm
+the same thing of each part of each  individual composing the
+human body; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing  the
+human body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many
+ideas of things, and not  in so far as he has the idea of the
+human body only, in other words, the idea which  constitutes the
+nature of the human mind (II. xiii.); therefore (II. xi. Cor.),
+the human mind  does not involve an adequate knowledge of the
+human body.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXV. The idea of each modification of the human body does not
+involve an adequate  knowledge of the external body.
+
+>>>>>Proof--We have shown that the idea of a modification of the
+human body involves  the nature of an external body, in so far as
+that external body conditions the human body in  a given manner. 
+But, in so far as the external body is an individual, which has
+no reference  to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is
+in God (II. ix.), in so far as God is  regarded as affected by
+the idea of a further thing, which (II. vii.) is naturally prior
+to the  said external body.  Wherefore an adequate knowledge of
+the external body is not in God,  in so far as he has the idea of
+the modification of the human body; in other words, the idea  of
+the modification of the human body does not involve an adequate
+knowledge of the  external body.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external body as
+actually existing, except  through the ideas of the modifications
+of its own body.
+
+>>>>>Proof--If the human body is in no way affected by a given
+external body, then  (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human
+body, in other words, the human mind, affected in  any way by the
+idea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in
+any manner  perceive its existence.  But, in so far as the human
+body is affected in any way by a given  external body, thus far
+(II. xvi. and Cor.) it perceives that external body.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--In so far as the human mind imagines an external
+body, it has not an  adequate knowledge thereof.
+
+>>>>>Proof--When the human mind regards external bodies through
+the ideas of the  modifications of its own body, we say that it
+imagines (see II. xvii. note); now the mind  can only imagine
+external bodies as actually existing.  Therefore (by II. xxv.),
+in so far as  the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an
+adequate knowledge of them.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body does not
+involve an adequate  knowledge of the human body itself.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Every idea of a modification of the human body
+involves the nature of the  human body, in so far as the human
+body is regarded as affected in a given manner (II.  xvi.).  But
+inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected
+in many  other ways, the idea of the said modification, &c. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so
+far as they have  reference only to the human mind, are not clear
+and distinct, but confused.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The ideas of the modifications of the human body
+involve the nature both of  the human body and of external bodies
+(II. xvi.); they must involve the nature not only of  the human
+body but also of its parts; for the modifications are modes
+(Post. iii.), whereby  the parts of the human body, and,
+consequently, the human body as a whole are affected.   But (by
+II. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as
+also of the parts  composing the human body, is not in God, in
+so far as he is regarded as affected by the  human mind, but in
+so far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas.  These ideas
+of  modifications, in so far as they are referred to the human
+mind alone, are as consequences  without premisses, in other
+words, confused ideas.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--The idea which constitutes the nature of the human
+mind is, in the same  manner, proved not to be, when considered
+in itself and alone, clear and distinct; as also  is the case
+with the idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of
+the modifications  of the human body, in so far as they are
+referred to the mind only, as everyone may easily  see.
+
+XXIX.  The idea of the idea of each modification of the human
+body does not involve an  adequate knowledge of the human mind.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The idea of a modification of the human body (II.
+xxvii.) does not involve  an adequate knowledge of the said body,
+in other words, does not adequately express its  nature; that is
+(II. xiii.) it does not agree with the nature of the mind
+adequately; therefore  (I. Ax. vi.) the idea of this idea does
+not adequately express the nature of the human mind,  or does not
+involve an adequate knowledge thereof.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows that the human mind, when it
+perceives things after the  common order of nature, has not an
+adequate but only a confused and fragmentary  knowledge of
+itself, of its own body, and of external bodies.  For the mind
+does not know  itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas
+of the modifications of body (II. xxiii.).  It  only perceives
+its own body (II. xix.) through the ideas of the modifications of
+body (II.  xxiii.).  It only perceives its own body (II. xix.)
+through the ideas of the modifications, and  only perceives
+external bodies through the same means; thus, in so far as it has
+such ideas  of modification, it has not an adequate knowledge of
+itself (II. xxix.), nor of its own body  (II. xxvii.), nor of
+external bodies (II. xxv.), but only a fragmentary and confused 
+knowledge thereof (II. xxviii. and note).  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but
+only a confused  knowledge of itself, its own body, and of
+external bodies, whenever it perceives things  after the common
+order of nature; that is, whenever it is determined from without,
+namely,  by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to regard this
+or that; not at such times as it is  determined from within, that
+is, by the fact of regarding several things at once, to 
+understand their points of agreement, difference, and contrast. 
+Whenever it is determined  in anywise from within, it regards
+things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below.
+
+XXX. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration
+of our body.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The duration of our body does not depend on its
+essence (II. Ax. i.), nor  on the absolute nature of God (I.
+xxi.).  But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operate 
+by causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and
+operate in a fixed and definite  relation by other causes, these
+last again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity.  
+The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of
+nature, or the  constitution of things.  Now, however a thing may
+be constituted, the adequate knowledge  of that thing is in God,
+in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as
+he has  the idea of the human body only (II. ix. Cor.). 
+Wherefore the knowledge of the duration  of our body is in God
+very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting
+the  nature of the human mind; that is (II. xi. Cor.), this
+knowledge is very inadequate to our  mind.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
+duration of particular things  external to ourselves.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Every particular thing, like the human body, must be
+conditioned by another  particular thing to exist and operate in
+a fixed and definite relation; this other particular  thing must
+likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity (I.
+xxviii.).  As we have  shown in the foregoing proposition, from
+this common property of particular things, we  have only a very
+inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body; we must draw a 
+similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular
+things, namely, that we can only  have a very inadequate
+knowledge of the duration thereof.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows that all particular things are
+contingent and perishable.   For we can have no adequate idea of
+their duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we  must
+understand by the contingency and perishableness of things (I.
+xxxiii., Note i.).  For  (I. xxix.), except in this sense,
+nothing is contingent.
+
+XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are
+true.
+
+>>>>>Proof--All ideas which are in God agree in every respect
+with their objects (II. ii.  Cor.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they
+are all true.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXXII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them to
+be called false.
+
+>>>>>Proof--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive
+mode of thinking, which  should constitute the distinctive
+quality of falsehood.  Such a mode of thinking cannot be  in God
+(II. xxxii.); external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I.
+xv.).  Therefore there  is nothing positive in ideas which causes
+them to be called false.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and
+perfect, is true.
+
+>>>>>Proof--When we say that an idea in us is adequate and
+perfect, we say, in other  words (II. xi. Cor.), that the idea is
+adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes  the
+essence of our mind; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that such
+an idea is true.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which
+inadequate, fragmentary, or  confused ideas involve.
+
+>>>>>Proof--There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them
+to be called false (II.  xxxiii.); but falsity cannot consist in
+simple privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err  and to
+be mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for
+ignorance and error  are not identical; wherefore it consists in
+the privation of knowledge, which inadequate,  fragmentary, or
+confused ideas involve.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--In the note to II. xvii. I explained how error
+consists in the privation of  knowledge, but in order to throw
+more light on the subject I will give an example.  For  instance,
+men are mistaken in thinking themselves free; their opinion is
+made up of  consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of
+the causes by which they are  conditioned.  Their idea of
+freedom, therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for 
+their actions.  As for their saying that human actions depend on
+the will, this is a mere  phrase without any idea to correspond
+thereto.  What the will is, and how it moves the  body, they none
+of them know; those who boast of such knowledge, and feign
+dwellings  and habitations for the soul, are wont to provoke
+either laughter or disgust.  So, again,  when we look at the sun,
+we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet; 
+this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact
+that, while we thus imagine, we  do not know the sun's true
+distance or the cause of the fancy.  For although we afterwards 
+learn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of
+the earth's diameters, we  none the less shall fancy it to be
+near; for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because  we are
+ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of
+our body involves the  essence of the sun, in so far as our said
+body is affected thereby.
+
+XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same
+necessity, as adequate or  clear and distinct ideas.
+
+>>>>>Proof--All ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as they
+are referred to God are  true (II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Cor.)
+adequate; therefore there are no ideas confused or  inadequate,
+except in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv. and
+xxviii.); therefore all  ideas, whether adequate or inadequate,
+follow by the same necessity (II. vi.).  Q.E.D.
+
+XXXVII. That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II, above), and
+which is equally in a  part and in the whole, does not constitute
+the essence of any particular thing.
+
+>>>>>Proof--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it
+constitutes the essence of some  particular thing; for instance,
+the essence of B.  Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without B 
+either exist or be conceived; but this is against our hypothesis. 
+Therefore it does not  appertain to B's essence, nor does it
+constitute the essence of any particular thing.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and which are
+equally in a part and in  the whole, cannot be conceived except
+adequately.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Let A be something, which is common to all bodies,
+and which is equally  present in the part of any given body and
+in the whole.  I say A cannot be conceived except  adequately. 
+For the idea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate (II.
+vii. Cor.), both in  so far as God has the idea of the human
+body, and also in so far as he has the idea of the  modifications
+of the human body, which (II. xvi., xxv., xxvii.) involve in part
+the nature of  the human body and the nature of external bodies;
+that is (II. xii., xiii.), the idea in God will  necessarily be
+adequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind, and in
+so far as  he has the ideas, which are in the human mind. 
+Therefore the mind (II. xi. Cor.)  necessarily perceives A
+adequately, and has this adequate perception, both in so far as
+it  perceives itself, and in so far as it perceives its own or
+any external body, nor can A be  conceived in any other manner. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or
+notions common to all  men; for (by Lemma ii.) all bodies agree
+in certain respects, which (by the foregoing Prop.)  must be
+adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.
+
+XXXIX. That, which is common to and a property of the human body
+and such other  bodies as are wont to affect the human body, and
+which is present equally in each part of  either, or in the
+whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.
+
+>>>>>Proof--If A be that, which is common to and a property of
+the human body and  external bodies, and equally present in the
+human body and in the said external bodies, in  each part of each
+external body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea of
+A in  God (II. vii. Cor.), both in so far as he has the idea of
+the human body, and in so far as he  has the ideas of the given
+external bodies.  Let it now be granted, that the human body is 
+affected by an external body through that, which it has in common
+therewith, namely, A;  the idea of this modification will involve
+the property A (II. xvi.), and therefore (II. vii.  Cor.) the
+idea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property
+A, will be adequate  in God, in so far as God is affected by the
+idea of the human body; that is (II. xiii.), in so  far as he
+constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore (II. xi.
+Cor.) this idea is also  adequate in the human mind.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows that the mind is fitted to
+perceive adequately more  things, in proportion as its body has
+more in common with other bodies.
+
+XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which are
+therein adequate, are also  themselves adequate.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident.  For when we say
+that an idea in the human  mind follows from ideas which are
+therein adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Cor.),  that an
+idea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not in
+so far as he is  infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by the
+ideas of very many particular things, but only  in so far as he
+constitutes the essence of the human mind.
+
+*****Note I--I have thus set forth the cause of those notions,
+which are common to all  men, and which form the basis of our
+ratiocinations.  But there are other causes of certain  axioms or
+notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this
+method of ours; for  it would thus appear what notions are more
+useful than others, and what notions have  scarcely any use at
+all.  Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all
+men,  and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who
+are unshackled by prejudice, and  we should detect those which
+are ill-founded.  Again we should discern whence the notions 
+called "secondary" derived their origin, and consequently the
+axioms on which they are  founded, and other points of interest
+connected with these questions.  But I have decided  to pass over
+the subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another
+treatise, partly  because I am afraid of wearying the reader by
+too great prolixity.  Nevertheless, in order  not to omit
+anything necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the
+causes, whence are  derived the terms styled "transcendental,"
+such as Being, Thing, Something.  These terms  arose from the
+fact, that the human body, being limited, is only capable of
+distinctly  forming a certain number of images (what an image is
+I explained in the II. xvii. note)  within itself at the same
+time; if this number be exceeded, the images will begin to be 
+confused; if this number of images, of which the body is capable
+of forming distinctly  within itself, be largely exceeded, all
+will become entirely confused one with another.  This  being so,
+it is evident (from II. Prop. xvii. Cor., and xviii.) that the
+human mind can  distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously,
+as its body can form images  simultaneously.  When the images
+become quite confused in the body, the mind also  imagines all
+bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend
+them, as it  were, under one attribute, namely, under the
+attribute of Being, Thing, &c.  The same  conclusion can be drawn
+from the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from 
+other analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here;
+for the purpose which we  have in view it is sufficient for us to
+consider one only.  All may be reduced to this, that  these terms
+represent ideas in the highest degree confused.  From similar
+causes arise those  notions, which we call "general," such as
+man, horse, dog, &c.  They arise, to wit, from  the fact that so
+many images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in
+the  human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not
+indeed utterly, but to the  extent of the mind losing count of
+small differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size,  &c.)
+and their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in
+which all the  individuals, in so far as the body is affected by
+them, agree; for that is the point, in which  each of the said
+individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses by
+the name  man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of
+particular individuals.  For, as we have  said, it is unable to
+imagine the definite number of individuals.  We must, however,
+bear in  mind, that these general notions are not formed by all
+men in the same way, but vary in  each individual according as
+the point varies, whereby the body has been most often  affected
+and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers.  For
+instance, those who  have most often regarded with admiration the
+stature of man, will by the name of man  understand an animal of
+erect stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some 
+other attribute, will form a different general image of man, for
+instance, that man is a  laughing animal, a two-footed animal
+without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other  cases,
+everyone will form general images of things according to the
+habit of his body.
+
+It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, who
+seek to explain things in  nature merely by the images formed of
+them, so many controversies should have arisen.
+
+*****Note II--From all that has been said above it is clear, that
+we, in many cases,  perceive and form our general notions:--(1.)
+From particular things represented to our  intellect
+fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses
+(II. xxix. Cor.);  I have settled to call such perceptions by the
+name of knowledge from the mere  suggestions of experience.  (2.)
+From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard 
+certain words we remember things and form certain ideas
+concerning them, similar to those  through which we imagine
+things (II. xviii. Note).  I shall call both these ways of
+regarding  things "knowledge of the first kind," "opinion," or
+"imagination."  (3.) From the fact that  we have notions common
+to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things (II. 
+xxxviii. Cor., xxxix. and Cor., and xl.); this I call "reason"
+and "knowledge of the second  kind."  Besides these two kinds of
+knowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a third  kind of
+knowledge, which we will call intuition.  This kind of knowledge
+proceeds from an  adequate idea of the absolute essence of
+certain attributes of God to the adequate  knowledge of the
+essence of things.  I will illustrate all three kinds of
+knowledge by a  single example.  Three numbers are given for
+finding a fourth, which shall be to the third  as the second is
+to the first.  Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second
+by the third,  and divide the product by the first; either
+because they have not forgotten the rule which  they received
+from a master without any proof, or because they have often made
+trial of  it with simple numbers, or by virtue of the proof of
+the nineteenth proposition of the  seventh book of Euclid,
+namely, in virtue of the general property of proportionals.
+
+But with very simple numbers there is no need of this.  For
+instance, one, two, three being  given, everyone can see that the
+fourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because 
+we infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the
+ratio, which the first bears to  the second.
+
+XLI.  Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity,
+knowledge of the second  and third kinds is necessarily true.
+
+>>>>>Proof--To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the
+foregoing note) assigned all  those ideas, which are inadequate
+and confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the  only
+source of falsity (II. xxxv.).  Furthermore, we assigned to the
+second and third kinds  of knowledge those ideas which are
+adequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (II. 
+xxxiv.).  Q.E.D.
+
+XLII. Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not knowledge of
+the first kind, teaches us  to distinguish the true from the
+false.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident.  He, who knows how
+to distinguish between  true and false, must have an adequate
+idea of true and false.  That is (II. xl., note ii.), he  must
+know the true and the false by the second or third kind of
+knowledge.
+
+XLIII. He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has
+a true idea, and cannot  doubt of the truth of the thing
+perceived.
+
+>>>>>Proof--A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in
+God, in so far as he is  displayed through the nature of the
+human mind (II. xi. Cor.).  Let us suppose that there is  in God,
+in so far as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate
+idea, A.  The  idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God,
+and be referred to him in the same way as  the idea A (by II.
+xx., whereof the proof is of universal application).  But the
+idea A is  supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is
+displayed through the human mind;  therefore, the idea of the
+idea A must be referred to God in the same manner; that is (by 
+II. xi. Cor.), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the
+mind, which has the adequate  idea A; therefore he, who has an
+adequate idea or knows a thing truly (II. xxxiv.), must at  the
+same time have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his
+knowledge; that is,  obviously, he must be assured.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by
+the idea of an idea; but we  may remark that the foregoing
+proposition is in itself sufficiently plain.  No one, who has a 
+true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest
+certainty.  For to have a true idea  is only another expression
+for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible.  No one, 
+indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is
+something lifeless, like a picture  on a panel, and not a mode of
+thinking--namely, the very act of understanding.  And who,  I
+ask, can know that he understands anything, unless he do first
+understand it?  In other  words, who can know that he is sure of
+a thing, unless he be first sure of that thing?   Further, what
+can there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a
+standard  of truth?  Even as light displays both itself and
+darkness, so is truth a standard both of  itself and of falsity.
+
+I think I have thus sufficiently answered these
+questions--namely, if a true idea is  distinguished from a false
+idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a
+true  idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea
+(since the two are only distinguished  by an extrinsic mark);
+consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any 
+advantage over him who has only false ideas.  Further, how comes
+it that men have false  ideas?  Lastly, how can anyone be sure,
+that he has ideas which agree with their objects?   These
+questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently
+answered.  The difference  between a true idea and a false idea
+is plain:  from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is 
+related to the latter as being is to not-being.  The causes of
+falsity I have set forth very  clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv.
+with the note.  From what is there stated, the difference 
+between a man who has true ideas, and a man who has only false
+ideas, is made apparent.   As for the last question--as to how a
+man can be sure that he has ideas that agree with  their objects,
+I have just pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his
+knowledge arises  from the simple fact, that he has an idea which
+corresponds with its object--in other words,  that truth is its
+own standard.  We may add that our mind, in so far as it
+perceives things  truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God
+(II. xi. Cor.); therefore, the clear and distinct  ideas of the
+mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God.
+
+XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as
+contingent, but as necessary.
+
+>>>>>Proof--It is in the nature of reason to perceive things
+truly (II. xli.), namely (I. Ax.  vi.), as they are in
+themselves--that is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as
+necessary.   Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary I--Hence it follows, that it is only through our
+imagination that we  consider things, whether in respect to the
+future or the past, as contingent.
+
+*****Note--How this way of looking at things arises, I will
+briefly explain.  We have  shown above (II. xvii. and Cor.) that
+the mind always regards things as present to itself,  even though
+they be not in existence, until some causes arise which exclude
+their existence  and presence.  Further (II. xviii.), we showed
+that, if the human body has once been  affected by two external
+bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards imagines one 
+of the said external bodies, will straightway remember the
+other--that is, it will regard both  as present to itself, unless
+there arise causes which exclude their existence and presence.  
+Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from the fact that
+we imagine bodies to be  moved some more slowly than others, some
+more quickly, some at equal speed.  Thus,  let us suppose that a
+child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in the morning, Paul
+at  noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that today he again
+sees Peter in the morning.  It is  evident, from II. Prop.
+xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he will
+imagine that  the sun will traverse the same parts of the sky, as
+it did when he saw it on the preceding  day; in other words, he
+will imagine a complete day, and, together with his imagination
+of  the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he will
+imagine Paul; and with evening, he  will imagine Simon--that is,
+he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation to a 
+future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the evening,
+he will refer Peter and Paul  to a past time, by imagining them
+simultaneously with the imagination of a past time.  If it 
+should at any time happen, that on some other evening the child
+should see James instead  of Simon, he will, on the following
+morning, associate with his imagination of evening  sometimes
+Simon, sometimes James, not both together:  for the child is
+supposed to have  seen, at evening, one or other of them, not
+both together.  His imagination will therefore  waver; and, with
+the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first one,
+then the  other--that is, he will imagine them in the future,
+neither of them as certain, but both as  contingent.  This
+wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination
+be  concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in
+relation to time past or time  present:  consequently, we may
+imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to  time
+present, past, or future.
+
+<<<<<Corollary II--It is in the nature of reason to perceive
+things under a certain form of  eternity (sub quadam aeternitatis
+specie).
+
+>>>>>Proof--It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not
+as contingent, but as  necessary (II. xliv.).  Reason perceives
+this necessity of things (II. xli.) truly--that is (I. Ax.  vi.),
+as it is in itself.  But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is
+the very necessity of the eternal  nature of God; therefore, it
+is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of 
+eternity.  We may add that the bases of reason are the notions
+(II. xxxviii.), which answer  to things common to all, and which
+(II. xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any  particular
+thing:  which must therefore be conceived without any relation to
+time, under a  certain form of eternity.
+
+XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particular thing
+actually existing, necessarily  involves the eternal and infinite
+essence of God.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The idea of a particular thing actually existing
+necessarily involves both the  existence and the essence of the
+said thing (II. viii.).  Now particular things cannot be 
+conceived without God (I. xv.); but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) they
+have God for their cause,  in so far as he is regarded under the
+attribute of which the things in question are modes,  their ideas
+must necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the
+attributes of those  ideas--that is (I. vi.), the eternal and
+infinite essence of God.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--By existence I do not here mean duration--that is,
+existence in so far as it is  conceived abstractedly, and as a
+certain form of quantity.  I am speaking of the very nature  of
+existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they
+follow in infinite numbers  and in infinite ways from the eternal
+necessity of God's nature (I. xvi.).  I am speaking, I  repeat,
+of the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are
+in God.  For although  each particular thing be conditioned by
+another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet  the force
+whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from
+the eternal  necessity of God's nature (cf. I. xxiv. Cor.).
+
+XLVI.  The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God
+which every idea  involves is adequate and perfect.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The proof of the last proposition is universal; and
+whether a thing be  considered as a part or a whole, the idea
+thereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by  the last Prop.),
+will involve God's eternal and infinite essence.  Wherefore,
+that, which  gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence
+of God, is common to all, and is equally  in the part and in the
+whole; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate. 
+ Q.E.D.
+
+XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal
+and infinite essence of  God.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II.
+xxiii.) it perceives  itself and its own body (II. xix.) and
+external bodies (II. xvi. Cor. i. and II. xvii.) as actually 
+existing; therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate
+knowledge of the eternal and  infinite essence of God.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the
+eternity of God are known to  all.  Now as all things are in God,
+and are conceived through God, we can from this  knowledge infer
+many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that
+third  kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II.
+xl., and of the excellence and use of  which we shall have
+occasion to speak in Part V.  Men have not so clear a knowledge
+of  God as they have of general notions, because they are unable
+to imagine God as they do  bodies, and also because they have
+associated the name God with images of things that  they are in
+the habit of seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing,
+being, as they are,  men, and continually affected by external
+bodies.  Many errors, in truth, can be traced to  this head,
+namely, that we do not apply names to things rightly.  For
+instance, when a man  says that the lines drawn from the centre
+of a circle to its circumference are not equal, he  then, at all
+events, assuredly attaches a meaning to the word circle different
+from that  assigned by mathematicians.  So again, when men make
+mistakes in calculation, they have  one set of figures in their
+mind, and another on the paper.  If we could see into their
+minds,  they do not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because
+we think, that they have the same  numbers in their mind as they
+have on the paper.  If this were not so, we should not  believe
+them to be in error, any more than I thought that a man was in
+error, whom I lately  heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had
+flown into a neighbour's hen, for his meaning  seemed to me
+sufficiently clear.  Very many controversies have arisen from the
+fact, that  men do not rightly explain their meaning, or do not
+rightly interpret the meaning of others.   For, as a matter of
+fact, as they flatly contradict themselves, they assume now one
+side,  now another, of the argument, so as to oppose the
+opinions, which they consider mistaken  and absurd in their
+opponents.
+
+XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the
+mind is determined to wish  this or that by a cause, which has
+also been determined by another cause, and this last by  another
+cause, and so on to infinity.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II.
+xi.), therefore it cannot  be the free cause of its actions (I.
+xvii. Cor. ii.); in other words, it cannot have an absolute 
+faculty of positive or negative volition; but (by I. xxviii.) it
+must be determined by a cause,  which has also been determined by
+another cause, and this last by another, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--In the same way it is proved, that there is in the
+mind no absolute faculty of  understanding, desiring, loving, &c. 
+Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are  either
+entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms,
+such as we are  accustomed to put together from particular
+things.  Thus the intellect and the will stand in  the same
+relation to this or that idea, or this or that volition, as
+"lapidity" to this or that  stone, or as "man" to Peter and
+Paul.  The cause which leads men to consider themselves  free has
+been set forth in the Appendix to Part I.  But, before I proceed
+further, I would  here remark that, by the will to affirm and
+decide, I mean the faculty, not the desire.  I  mean, I repeat,
+the faculty, whereby the mind affirms or denies what is true or
+false, not  the desire, wherewith the mind wishes for or turns
+away from any given thing.  After we  have proved, that these
+faculties of ours are general notions, which cannot be
+distinguished  from the particular instances on which they are
+based, we must inquire whether volitions  themselves are anything
+besides the ideas of things.  We must inquire, I say, whether
+there  is in the mind any affirmation or negation beyond that,
+which the idea, in so far as it is an  idea, involves.  On which
+subject see the following proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest
+the  idea of pictures should suggest itself.  For by ideas I do
+not mean images such as are  formed at the back of the eye, or in
+the midst of the brain, but the conceptions of thought.
+
+XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and
+negation, save that which an  idea, inasmuch as it is an idea,
+involves.
+
+>>>>>Proof--There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive
+or negative volition, but  only particular volitions, namely,
+this or that affirmation, and this or that negation.  Now let  us
+conceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking
+whereby the mind affirms,  that the three interior angles of a
+triangle are equal to two right angles.  This affirmation 
+involves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, without
+the idea of a triangle it cannot  be conceived.  It is the same
+thing to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B,  as
+it is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B.  Further,
+this affirmation cannot be  made (II. Ax. iii.) without the idea
+of a triangle.  Therefore, this affirmation can neither be  nor
+be conceived, without the idea of a triangle.  Again, this idea
+of a triangle must involve  this same affirmation, namely, that
+its three interior angles are equal to two right angles.  
+Wherefore, and vice versa, this idea of a triangle can neither be
+nor be conceived without  this affirmation, therefore, this
+affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, 
+and is nothing besides.  What we have said of this volition
+(inasmuch as we have selected  it at random) may be said of any
+other volition, namely, that it is nothing but an idea.   Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Will and understanding are one and the same.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Will and understanding are nothing beyond the
+individual volitions and ideas  (II. xlviii. and note).  But a
+particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same 
+(by the foregoing Prop.); therefore, will and understanding are
+one and the same.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--We have thus removed the cause which is commonly
+assigned for error.  For  we have shown above, that falsity
+consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in  ideas
+which are fragmentary and confused.  Wherefore, a false idea,
+inasmuch as it is false,  does not involve certainty.  When we
+say, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and  that he
+has no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain,
+but only that he does  not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what
+is false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which  should cause
+his imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note).  Thus, although
+the man be  assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never
+say that he is certain.  For by certainty  we mean something
+positive (II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt.
+
+However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully
+explained, I will draw  attention to a few additional points, and
+I will furthermore answer the objections which  may be advanced
+against our doctrine.  Lastly, in order to remove every scruple,
+I have  thought it worth while to point out some of the
+advantages, which follow therefrom.  I say  "some," for they will
+be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth
+part.
+
+I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to make
+an accurate distinction  between an idea, or conception of the
+mind, and the images of things which we imagine.   It is further
+necessary that they should distinguish between idea and words,
+whereby we  signify things.  These three--namely, images, words,
+and ideas--are by many persons either  entirely confused
+together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care,
+and hence  people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely
+necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine  of the will, both for
+philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life.  Those
+who  think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by
+contact with external bodies,  persuade themselves that the ideas
+of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture,  are not
+ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of
+our will; they thus  regard ideas as though they were inanimate
+pictures on a panel, and, filled with this  misconception, do not
+see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an
+affirmation or  negation.  Again, those who confuse words with
+ideas, or with the affirmation which an  idea involves, think
+that they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm,
+or  deny.  This misconception will easily be laid aside by one,
+who reflects on the nature of  knowledge, and seeing that it in
+no wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore 
+clearly understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does
+not consist in the image of  anything, nor in words.  The essence
+of words and images is put together by bodily  motions, which in
+no wise involve the conception of thought.
+
+These few words on this subject will suffice:  I will therefore
+pass on to consider the  objections, which may be raised against
+our doctrine.  Of these, the first is advanced by  those, who
+think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, and
+that therefore  it is different therefrom.  The reason for their
+holding the belief, that the will has wider  scope than the
+understanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an
+increase in  their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or
+negation, in order to assent to an infinity of  things which we
+do not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their
+faculty of  understanding.  The will is thus distinguished from
+the intellect, the latter being finite and  the former infinite. 
+Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us 
+especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment
+before assenting to things  which we perceive; this is confirmed
+by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so  far as he
+perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or
+dissents.
+
+For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not therefore
+admit that a winged horse  exists; that is, he is not deceived,
+unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does  exist. 
+Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by experience,
+than that the will  or faculty of assent is free and different
+from the faculty of understanding.  Thirdly, it may  be objected
+that one affirmation does not apparently contain more reality
+than another; in  other words, that we do not seem to need for
+affirming, that what is true is true, any  greater power than for
+affirming, that what is false is true.  We have, however, seen
+that  one idea has more reality or perfection than another, for
+as objects are some more  excellent than others, so also are the
+ideas of them some more excellent than others; this  also seems
+to point to a difference between the understanding and the will. 
+Fourthly, it  may be objected, if man does not act from free
+will, what will happen if the incentives to  action are equally
+balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass?  Will he perish of
+hunger and  thirst?  If I say that he would not, he would then
+determine his own action, and would  consequently possess the
+faculty of going and doing whatever he liked.  Other objections 
+might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence
+everything that anyone may  dream, I will only set myself to the
+task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as  briefly as
+possible.
+
+To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will has a
+wider scope than the  understanding, if by the understanding be
+meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny  that the will
+has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of
+forming  conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition
+should be called infinite, any more  than the faculty of feeling: 
+for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an 
+infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot
+affirm an infinite number  simultaneously), so also can we, by
+the same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in  succession) an
+infinite number of bodies.  If it be said that there is an
+infinite number of  things which we cannot perceive, I answer,
+that we cannot attain to such things by any  thinking, nor,
+consequently, by any faculty of volition.  But, it may still be
+urged, if God  wished to bring it about that we should perceive
+them, he would be obliged to endow us  with a greater faculty of
+perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have 
+already.  This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring
+it about that we should  understand an infinite number of other
+entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a  greater
+understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that
+which we have  already, in order to grasp such infinite entities. 
+We have shown that will is a universal  entity or idea, whereby
+we explain all particular volitions--in other words, that which
+is  common to all such volitions.
+
+As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or
+universal to all volitions, is a  faculty, it is little to be
+wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself
+into  the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding:  for
+what is universal is predicated alike  of one, of many, and of an
+infinite number of individuals.
+
+To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a free
+power of suspending  our judgment:  for, when we say that anyone
+suspends his judgment, we merely mean that  he sees, that he does
+not perceive the matter in question adequately.  Suspension of 
+judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a perception, and not
+free will.  In order to  illustrate the point, let us suppose a
+boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing else.   Inasmuch as
+this imagination involves the existence of the horse (II. xvii.
+Cor.), and the boy  does not perceive anything which would
+exclude the existence of the horse, he will  necessarily regard
+the horse as present:  he will not be able to doubt of its
+existence,  although he be not certain thereof.  We have daily
+experience of such a state of things in  dreams; and I do not
+suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that, while he
+is  dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his judgment
+concerning the things in his  dream, and bringing it about that
+he should not dream those things, which he dreams that  he sees;
+yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we suspend
+our judgment,  namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.
+
+Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as actual
+perception extends--that is, I  grant that the mind's
+imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II.
+xvii.  note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of
+perception, make any affirmation.  For  what is the perception of
+a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings?  If the 
+mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would
+regard the same as present  to itself:  it would have no reasons
+for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent,  unless
+the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which
+precludes the  existence of the said horse, or unless the mind
+perceives that the idea which it possess of a  winged horse is
+inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the
+existence of  such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on
+the subject.
+
+I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third objection,
+namely, that the will is  something universal which is predicated
+of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is  common to
+all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate essence must,
+therefore, in  so far as it is thus conceived in the abstract, be
+in every idea, and be, in this respect alone,  the same in all,
+not in so far as it is considered as constituting the idea's
+essence:  for, in  this respect, particular affirmations differ
+one from the other, as much as do ideas.  For  instance, the
+affirmation which involves the idea of a circle, differs from
+that which  involves the idea of a triangle, as much as the idea
+of a circle differs from the idea of a  triangle.
+
+Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal power
+of thinking, to affirm  that that which is true is true, and to
+affirm that that which is false is true.  These two 
+affirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to
+one another as being and  not-being; for there is nothing
+positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of 
+falsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).
+
+We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when we
+confuse universals with  singulars, and the entities of reason
+and abstractions with realities.  As for the fourth  objection, I
+am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium
+described  (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst,
+a certain food and a certain drink,  each equally distant from
+him) would die of hunger and thirst.  If I am asked, whether such
+ an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man; I
+answer, that I do not know,  neither do I know how a man should
+be considered, who hangs himself, or how we should  consider
+children, fools, madmen, &c.
+
+It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this
+doctrine as bearing on  conduct, and this may be easily gathered
+from what has been said.  The doctrine is good,
+
+1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the
+decree of God, and to be  partakers in the Divine nature, and so
+much the more, as we perform more perfect actions  and more and
+more understand God.  Such a doctrine not only completely
+tranquilizes our  spirit, but also shows us where our highest
+happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in  the knowledge of
+God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid
+us.  We  may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true
+estimate of virtue are those who  expect to be decorated by God
+with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions,  as
+for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the
+service of God were not in  itself happiness and perfect freedom.
+
+2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct ourselves
+with respect to the gifts  of fortune, or matters which are not
+in our power, and do not follow from our nature.  For  it shows
+us, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or frowns
+with an equal  mind, seeing that all things follow from the
+eternal decree of God by the same necessity,  as it follows from
+the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two
+right  angles.
+
+3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches us to
+hate no man, neither to  despise, to deride, to envy, or to be
+angry with any.  Further, as it tells us that each should  be
+content with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any
+womanish pity,  favour, or superstition, but solely by the
+guidance of reason, according as the time and  occasion demand,
+as I will show in Part III.
+
+4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the
+commonwealth; for it teaches  how citizens should be governed and
+led, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may  freely do
+whatsoever things are best.
+
+I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of this
+note, and I thus bring the  second part of my treatise to a
+close.  I think I have therein explained the nature and 
+properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and,
+considering the difficulty of the  subject, with sufficient
+clearness.  I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many 
+excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary
+to be known, as will, in  what follows, be partly made plain.
+
+
+
+
+
+END OF PART II
+of The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
+
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