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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/8103-8.txt b/8103-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..55c9b3a --- /dev/null +++ b/8103-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11036 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Moral Philosophy, by Joseph Rickaby, S. J. + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world. Be sure to check the +copyright laws for your country before downloading or redistributing +this or any other Project Gutenberg eBook. + +This header should be the first thing seen when viewing this Project +Gutenberg file. Please do not remove it. Do not change or edit the +header without written permission. + +Please read the "legal small print," and other information about the +eBook and Project Gutenberg at the bottom of this file. Included is +important information about your specific rights and restrictions in +how the file may be used. You can also find out about how to make a +donation to Project Gutenberg, and how to get involved. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**eBooks Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*****These eBooks Were Prepared By Thousands of Volunteers!***** + + +Title: Moral Philosophy + +Author: Joseph Rickaby, S. J. + +Release Date: May, 2005 [EBook #8103] +[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule] +[This file was first posted on June 15, 2003] + +Edition: 10 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-Latin-1 + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MORAL PHILOSOPHY *** + + + + +Produced by Charles Aldarondo, Tiffany Vergon, David King, +Charles Franks and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team. + + + + +MORAL PHILOSOPHY: + +ETHICS, DEONTOLOGY AND NATURAL LAW. + +BY +JOSEPH RICKABY, S.J. + + +Nihil Obstat: +JOSEPHUS KEATING, S.J. +_Censor deputatus_ + +Imprimi potest: +JOANNES H. WRIGHT, S.J. +_Pręp. Prov. Anglię_ + +Nihil Obstat: +C. SCHUT, D.D. +_Censor deputatus_ + +Imprimatur: +EDM. CAN. SURMONT +_Vie. Gen._ + + + + +PREFACE (1905). + + +For fifteen years this Manual has enjoyed all the popularity that its +author could desire. With that popularity the author is the last +person to wish to interfere. Therefore, not to throw previous copies +out of use, this edition makes no alteration either in the pagination +or the text already printed. At the same time the author might well be +argued to have lapsed into strange supineness and indifference to +moral science, if in fifteen years he had learnt nothing new, and +found nothing in his work which he wished to improve. Whoever will be +at the expense of purchasing my _Political and Moral Essays_ +(Benziger, 1902, 6s.) will find in the first essay on the _Origin and +Extent of Civil Authority_ an advantageous substitute for the chapter +on the State in this work. The essay is a dissertation written for the +degree of B. Sc. in the University of Oxford; and represents, I hope, +tolerably well the best contemporary teaching on the subject. + +If the present work had to be rewritten, I should make a triple +division of Moral Philosophy, into Ethics, Deontology (the science of +[Greek: to deon], i.e., of what _ought_ to be done), and Natural Law. +For if "the principal business of Ethics is to determine what moral +obligation is" (p. 2), then the classical work on the subject, the +_Nicomachean Ethics_ of Aristotle, is as the play of Hamlet with the +character of Hamlet left out: for in that work there is no analysis of +moral obligation, no attempt to "fix the comprehension of the idea I +_ought_" (ib.). The system there exposed is a system of Eudaemonism, +not of Deontology. It is not a treatise on Duty, but on Happiness: it +tells us what Happiness, or rational well-being, is, and what conduct +is conducive to rational well-being. It may be found convenient to +follow Aristotle, and avow that the business of Ethics is not Duty, +not Obligation, not Law, not Sanction, but Happiness. That fiery +little word _ought_ goes unexplained in Ethics, except in an +hypothetical sense, that a man _ought_ to do this, and avoid that, +_if_ he means to be a happy man: cf. p. 115. Any man who declares that +he does not care about ethical or rational happiness, stands to Ethics +as that man stands to Music who "hath no ear for concord of sweet +sounds." + +All that Ethics or Music can do for such a Philistine is to "send him +away to another city, pouring ointment on his head, and crowning him +with wool," as Plato would dismiss the tragedian (_Republic_ III. +398). The author of the _Magna Moralia_ well says (I. i. 13): "No +science or faculty ever argues the goodness of the end which it +proposes to itself: it belongs to some other faculty to consider that. +Neither the physician says that health is a good thing, nor the +builder that a house is a good thing: but the one announces that he +produces health and how he produces it, and the builder in like manner +a house." The professor of Ethics indeed, from the very nature of his +subject-matter, says in pointing out happiness that it is the rational +sovereign good of man: but to any one unmoved by that demonstration +Ethics can have no more to say. Ethics will not threaten, nor talk of +duty, law, or punishment. + +Ethics, thus strictly considered on an Aristotelian basis, are +antecedent to Natural Theology. They belong rather to Natural +Anthropology: they are a study of human nature. But as human nature +points to God, so Ethics are not wholly irrespective of God, +considering Him as the object of human happiness and worship,--the +Supreme Being without whom all the aspirations of humanity are at +fault (pp. 13-26, 191-197). Ethics do not refer to the commandments of +God, for this simple reason, that they have nothing to say to +commandments, or laws, or obligation, or authority. They are simply a +system of moral hygiene, which a man may adopt or not: only, like any +other physician, the professor of Ethics utters a friendly warning +that misery must ensue upon the neglect of what makes for health. + +Deontology, not Ethics, expounds and vindicates the idea, _I ought_. +It is the science of Duty. It carries the mild suasions of Ethics into +laws, and out of moral prudence it creates conscience. And whereas +Ethics do not deal with sin, except under the aspect of what is called +"philosophical sin" (p. 119, § 6), Deontology defines sin in its +proper theological sense, as "an offence against God, or any thought, +word, or deed against the law of God." Deontology therefore +presupposes and is consequent upon Natural Theology. At the same time, +while Ethics indicate a valuable proof of the existence of God as the +requisite Object of Happiness, Deontology affords a proof of Him as +the requisite Lawgiver. Without God, man's rational desire is +frustrate, and man's conscience a misrepresentation of fact. [Footnote +1] + +[Footnote 1: This is Cardinal Newman's proof of the existence of God +from Conscience: see pp. 124, 125, and _Grammar of Assent_, pp. +104-111, ed. 1895. With Newman's, "Conscience has both a critical and +a judicial office," compare Plato, _Politicus_, 260 B, [Greek: +sumpasaes taes gnostikaes to men epitaktikon meros, to de kritikon]. +The "critical" office belongs to Ethics: the "judicial," or +"preceptive" office [Greek: to epitaktikon] to Deontology; and this +latter points to a Person who commands and judges, that is, to God.] + +In this volume, pp. 1-108 make up the treatise on Ethics: pp. 109-176 +that on Deontology. + +Aristotle writes: "He that acts by intelligence and cultivates +understanding, is likely to be best disposed and dearest to God. For +if, as is thought, there is any care of human things on the part of +the heavenly powers, we may reasonably expect them to delight in that +which is best and most akin to themselves, that is, in intelligence, +and to make a return of good to such as supremely love and honour +intelligence, as cultivating the thing dearest to Heaven, and so +behaving rightly and well. Such, plainly, is the behaviour of the +wise. The wise man therefore is the dearest to God" (Nic. Eth. X. ix. +13). But Aristotle does not work out the connexion between God and His +law on the one hand and human conscience and duty on the other. In +that direction the Stoics, and after them the Roman Jurists, went +further than Aristotle. By reason of this deficiency, Aristotle, +peerless as he is in Ethics, remains an imperfect Moral Philosopher. + + + +PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION (1918) + +1. I have altered the opening pages in accordance with the Preface to +the edition of 1905. + +2. I have added a paragraph on Syndicalism (pp. 291-2). + +3. Also a new Table of _Addenda et Corrigenda_, and a new Index. + +The quotations from St. Thomas may be read in English, nearly all of +them, in the Author's _Aquinas Ethicus_, 2 vols.; 12s. (Burns and +Oates.) + + + +CONTENTS. + +PART I.--ETHICS. + +CHAPTER I.--OF THE OBJECT-MATTER AND PARTITION OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. + +CHAPTER II.--OF HAPPINESS. +Section I.--Of Ends. +Section II.--Definition of Happiness. +Section III.--Happiness open to Man. +Section IV.--Of the Object of Perfect Happiness. +Section V.--Of the use of the present life. + +CHAPTER III.--OF HUMAN ACTS. +Section I.--What makes a human act less voluntary. +Section II.--Of the determinants of Morality in any given action. + +CHAPTER IV.--OF PASSIONS. +Section I.--Of Passions in general. +Section II.--Of Desire. +Section III.--Of Delight. +Section IV.--Of Anger. + +CHAPTER V.--OF HABITS AND VIRTUES. +Section I.--Of Habit. +Section II.--Of Virtues in general. +Section III.--Of the difference between Virtues, Intellectual +and Moral. +Section IV.--Of the Mean in Moral Virtue. +Section V.--Of Cardinal Virtues. +Section VI.--Of Prudence. +Section VII.--Of Temperance. +Section VIII.--Of Fortitude. +Section IX.--Of Justice. + +PART II.--DEONTOLOGY. + +CHAPTER I. (VI.)--OF THE ORIGIN OF MORAL OBLIGATION. +Section I.--Of the natural difference between Good and Evil. +Section II.--How Good becomes bounden Duty, and Evil is advanced to sin. + +CHAPTER II. (VII.)--OF THE ETERNAL LAW. + +CHAPTER III. (VIII.)--OF THE NATURAL LAW OF CONSCIENCE. +Section I.--Of the Origin of Primary Moral Judgments. +Section II.--Of the invariability of Primary Moral Judgments. +Section III.--Of the immutability of the Natural Law. +Section IV.--Of Probabilism. + +CHAPTER IV. (IX.)--OF THE SANCTION OF THE NATURAL LAW. +Section I.--Of a Twofold Sanction, Natural and Divine. +Section II.--Of the Finality of the aforesaid Sanction. +Section III.--Of Punishment, Retrospective and Retributive. + +CHAPTER V. (X.)--OF UTILITARIANISM. + + +PART III.--NATURAL LAW. + +CHAPTER I.--OF DUTIES TO GOD. +Section I.--Of the Worship of God. +Section II.--Of Superstitious Practices. +Section III.--Of the duty of knowing God. + +CHAPTER II.--OF THE DUTY OF PRESERVING LIFE. +Section I.--Of Killing, Direct and Indirect. +Section II.--Of Killing done Indirectly in Self-defence. +Section III.--Of Suicide. +Section IV.--Of Duelling. + +CHAPTER III.--OF SPEAKING THE TRUTH. +Section I.--Of the definition of a Lie. +Section II.--Of the Evil of Lying. +Section III.--Of the keeping of Secrets without Lying. + +CHAPTER IV.--OF CHARITY. + +CHAPTER V.--OF RIGHTS. +Section I.--Of the definition and division of Rights. +Section II.--Of the so-called Rights of Animals. +Section III.--Of the right to Honour and Reputation. +Section IV.--Of Contracts. +Section V.--Of Usury. + +CHAPTER VI.--OF MARRIAGE. +Section I.--Of the Institution of Marriage. +Section II.--Of the Unity of Marriage. +Section III.--Of the Indissolubility of Marriage. + +CHAPTER VII.--OF PROPERTY. +Section I.--Of Private Property. +Section II.--Of Private Capital. +Section III.--Of Landed Property. + +CHAPTER VIII.--OF THE STATE. +Section I.--Of the Monstrosities called Leviathan and Social Contract. +Section II.--Of the theory that Civil Power is an aggregate + formed by subscription of the powers of individuals. +Section III.--Of the true state of Nature, which is the + state of civil society, and consequently of the Divine origin of Power. +Section IV.--Of the variety of Polities. +Section V.--Of the Divine Right of Kings and the Inalienable +Sovereignty of the People. +Section VI.--Of the Elementary and Original Polity. +Section VII.--Of Resistance to Civil Power. +Section VIII.--Of the Right of the Sword. +Section IX.--Of War. +Section X.--Of the Scope and Aim of Civil Government. +Section XI.--Of Law and Liberty. +Section XII.--Of Liberty of Opinion. + + + +ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA + +p. 31. Aristotle calls the end [Greek: _to telos_]; the means, [Greek: +ta pros to telos] (St. Thomas, _ea quae sunt ad finem_); the +circumstances, [Greek: ta ein ois hae praxis]. + +Observe, both end and means are willed _directly_, but the +circumstances _indirectly_. + +The end is _intended_, [Greek: boulaeton]; the means are _chosen_, +[Greek: proaireton]; the circumstances are simply _permitted_, [Greek: +anekton], rightly or wrongly. The _intention_ of the end is called by +English philosophers the _motive_; while the choice of means they call +the _intention_, an unfortunate terminology. + +p. 42, §. 3. "As the wax takes all shapes, and yet is wax still at the +bottom; the [Greek: spokeimenon] still is wax; so the soul transported +in so many several passions of joy, fear, hope, sorrow, anger, and the +rest, has for its general groundwork of all this, Love." (Henry More, +quoted in Carey's Dante, _Purgatorio_, c. xviii.) Hence, says Carey, +Love does not figure in Collins's _Ode on the Passions_. + +p. 43. For _daring_ read _recklessness_. + +p. 44. Plato is a thorough Stoic when he says (_Phaedo_ 83) that every +pleasure and pain comes with a nail to pin down the soul to the body +and make it corporeal. His Stoicism appears in his denunciation of the +drama (_Republic_, x. 604). + +p. 47, §. 8. The first chapter of Mill's _Autobiography_, pp. 48-53, +133-149, supplies an instance. + +p. 49, §. I, 1. 2, for _physical_ read _psychical_. + +P. 52. §. 5. This _serving_, in [Greek: douleuein], St. Ignatius calls +"inordinate attachment," the modern form of idolatry. Cf. Romans vi. +16-22. + +p. 79. For _spoiled_ read _spoilt_. + +p. 84, foot. For _ways_ read _way_. + +p. 85, 1. 6 from foot. Substitute: ([Greek: b]) _to restrain the said +appetite in its irascible part from shrinking from danger_. + +p. 94, middle. For _others_ read _other_. + +p. 95. For _Daring_ read _Recklessness_. + +p. 103, middle. Substitute, _"neither evening star nor morning star is +so wonderful."_ + +p. 106, §. 6. Aristotle speaks of "corrective," not of "commutative" +justice. On the Aristotelian division of justice see Political and +Moral Essays (P. M. E.), pp. 285-6. + +p. 111, §. 4. The _static_ equivalent of the _dynamic_ idea, of +orderly development is that the eternal harmonies and fitnesses of +things, by observance or neglect whereof a man comes to be in or out +of harmony with himself, with his fellows, with God. + +p. 133. To the _Readings_ add Plato _Laws_, ix, 875, A, B, C, D. + +p. 151. Rewrite the Note thus: _The author has seen reason somewhat to +modify this view, as appears by the Appendix. See P.M.E._ pp. 185-9: +_Fowler's Progressive Morality, or Fowler and Wilson's Principles of +Morals_, pp. 227-248. + +p. 181, 1. ii from top. Add, _This is "the law of our nature, that +function is primary, and pleasure only attendant" (Stewart, Notes on +Nicomathean Ethics,_ II. 418). + +p. 218, lines 13-16 from top, cancel the sentence, _To this query_, +etc., and substitute: _The reply is, that God is never willing that +man should do an inordinate act; but suicide is an inordinate act, as +has been shown; capital punishment is not _(c. viii. s. viii. n. 7, p. +349). + +p. 237. For _The Month for March,_ 1883, read _P.M.E._, pp. 215-233. + +p. 251. To the _Reading_ add P.M.E., pp. 267-283. + +p. 297, l.6 from foot. After _simply evil_ add: _Hobbes allows that +human reason lays down certain good rules, "laws of nature" which +however it cannot get kept_. For Hobbes and Rousseau see further +_P.M.E_., pp. 81-90. + +p. 319, middle. Cancel the words: _but the sum total of civil power is +a constant quantity, the same for all States_. + +pp. 322-3. Cancel §. 7 for reasons alleged in _P.M.E_., pp. 50-72. +Substitute: _States are living organizations and grow, and their +powers vary with the stage of their development_. + +p. 323, § 8. For _This seems at variance with_, read _This brings us +to consider_. + +p. 338. To the _Readings_ add _P.M.E_., pp. 102-113. + +p. 347, middle. Cancel from _one of these prerogatives_ to the end of +the sentence. Substitute: _of every polity even in the most infantine +condition._ + + + * * * * * + + +MORAL PHILOSOPHY. + +PART I. ETHICS. + +CHAPTER I. + +OF THE OBJECT-MATTER AND PARTITION OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. + + +1. Moral Philosophy is the science of human acts in their bearing on +human happiness and human duty. + +2. Those acts alone are properly called _human_, which a man is master +of to do or not to do. A _human act_, then, is an act voluntary and +free. A man is what his human acts make him. + +3. A _voluntary_ act is an act that proceeds from the will with a +knowledge of the end to which the act tends. + +4. A free act is an act which so proceeds from the will that under the +same antecedent conditions it might have not proceeded. + +An act may be more or less voluntary, and more or less free. + +5. Moral Philosophy is divided into Ethics, Deontology, and Natural +Law. Ethics consider human acts in their bearing on human happiness; +or, what is the same thing, in their agreement or disagreement with +man's rational nature, and their making for or against his last end. +Deontology is the study of moral obligation, or the fixing of what +logicians call the comprehension of the idea _I ought_. Ethics deal +with [Greek: to prepon], "the becoming"; Deontology with [Greek: to +deon], "the obligatory". Deontology is the science of Duty, as such. +Natural Law (antecedent to Positive Law, whether divine or human, +civil or ecclesiastical, national or international) determines duties +in detail,--the _extension_ of the idea _I ought_,--and thus is the +foundation of Casuistry. + +6. In the order of sciences, Ethics are antecedent to Natural +Theology; Deontology, consequent upon it. + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., _in Eth_., I., lect. 1, init.; _ib_., 1a 2ę, +q. 1, art. 1, in corp.; _ib_., q. 58, art. 1, in corp. + + + +CHAPTER II. + +OF HAPPINESS. + +SECTION I.--_Of Ends_. + + +1. Every human act is done for some end or purpose. The end is always +regarded by the agent in the light of something good. If evil be done, +it is done as leading to good, or as bound up with good, or as itself +being good for the doer under the circumstances; no man ever does evil +for sheer evil's sake. Yet evil may be the object of the will, not by +itself, nor primarily, but in a secondary way, as bound up with the +good that is willed in the first place. + +2. Many things willed are neither good nor evil in themselves. There +is no motive for doing them except in so far as they lead to some good +beyond themselves, or to deliverance from some evil, which deliverance +counts as a good. A thing is willed, then, either as being good in +itself and an end by itself, or as leading to some good end. Once a +thing not good and desirable by itself has been taken up by the will +as leading to good, it may be taken up again and again without +reference to its tendency. But such a thing was not originally taken +up except in view of good to come of it. We may will one thing as +leading to another, and that to a third, and so on; thus one wills +study for learning, learning for examination purposes, examination for +a commission in the army, and the commission for glory. That end in +which the will rests, willing it for itself without reference to +anything beyond, is called the _last end_. + +3. An end is either _objective_ or _subjective_. The _objective end_ +is the thing wished for, as it exists distinct from the person who +wishes it. The _subjective end_ is the possession of the objective +end. That possession is a fact of the wisher's own being. Thus _money_ +may be an objective end: the corresponding subjective end is _being +wealthy_. + +4. Is there one subjective last end to all the human acts of a given +individual? Is there one supreme motive for all that this or that man +deliberately does? At first sight it seems that there is not. The same +individual will act now for glory, now for lucre, now for love. But +all these different ends are reducible to one, _that it may be well +with him and his_. And what is true of one man here, is true of all. +All the human acts of all men are done for the one (subjective) last +end just indicated. This end is called _happiness_. + +5. Men place their happiness in most different things; some in eating +and drinking, some in the heaping up of money, some in gambling, some +in political power, some in the gratification of affection, some in +reputation of one sort or another. But each one seeks his own +speciality because he thinks that he shall be happy, that it will be +well with him, when he has attained that. All men, then, do all things +for happiness, though not all place their happiness in the same thing. + +6. Just as when one goes on a journey, he need not think of his +destination at every step of his way, and yet all his steps are +directed towards his destination: so men do not think of happiness in +all they do, and yet all they do is referred to happiness. Tell a +traveller that this is the wrong way to his destination, he will avoid +it; convince a man that this act will not be well for him, will not +further his happiness, and, while he keeps that conviction principally +before his eyes, he will not do the act. But as a man who began to +travel on business, may come to make travelling itself a business, and +travel for the sake of going about; so in all cases there is a +tendency to elevate into an end that which was, to start with, only +valued as a means to an end. So the means of happiness, by being +habitually pursued, come to be a part of happiness. Habit is a second +nature, and we indulge a habit as we gratify nature. This tendency +works itself to an evil extreme in cases where men are become the +slaves of habit, and do a thing because they are got into the way of +doing it, though they allow that it is a sad and sorry way, and leads +them wide of true happiness. These instances show perversion of the +normal operation of the will. + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., 1a 2ę, q. 1, art. 4, in corp.; _ib_., q. 1, +art. 6, 7; _ib_., q. 5, art. 8; Ar., _Eth_., I., vii., 4, 5. + + +SECTION II.--_Definition of Happiness_. + + +1. Though all men do all things, in the last resort, that it may be +well with them and theirs, that is, for happiness vaguely apprehended, +yet when they come to specify what happiness is, answers so various +are given and acted upon, that we might be tempted to conclude that +each man is the measure of his own happiness, and that no standard of +happiness for all can be defined. But it is not so. Man is not the +measure of his own happiness, any more than of his own health. The +diet that he takes to be healthy, may prove his poison; and where he +looks for happiness, he may find the extreme of wretchedness and woe. +For man must live up to his nature, to his bodily constitution, to be +a healthy man; and to his whole nature, but especially to his mental +and moral constitution, if he is to be a happy man. And nature, though +it admits of individual peculiarities, is specifically the same for +all. There will, then, be one definition of happiness for all men, +specifically as such. + +2. _Happiness is an act, not a state_. That is to say, the happiness +of man does not lie in his having something done to him, nor in his +being habitually able to do something, but in his actually doing +something. "To be up and doing," that is happiness,--[Greek: en to zaen +kai energein]. (Ar., _Eth._, IX., ix., 5.) This is proved from the +consideration that happiness is the crown and perfection of human +nature; but the perfection of a thing lies in its ultimate act, or +"second act," that is, in its not merely being able to act, but +acting. But action is of two sorts. One proceeds from the agent to +some outward matter, as cutting and burning. This action cannot be +happiness, for it does not perfect the agent, but rather the patient. +There is another sort of act immanent in the agent himself, as +feeling, understanding, and willing: these perfect the agent. +Happiness will be found to be one of these immanent acts. Furthermore, +there is action full of movement and change, and there is an act done +in stillness and rest. The latter, as will presently appear, is +happiness; and partly for this reason, and partly to denote the +exclusion of care and trouble, happiness is often spoken of as _a +rest_. It is also called _a state_, because one of the elements of +happiness is permanence. How the act of happiness can be permanent, +will appear hereafter. + +3. _Happiness is an act in discharge of the function proper to man, as +man_. There is a function proper to the eye, to the ear, to the +various organs of the human body: there must be a function proper to +man as such. That can be none of the functions of the vegetative life, +nor of the mere animal life within him. Man is not happy by doing what +a rose-bush can do, digest and assimilate its food: nor by doing what +a horse does, having sensations pleasurable and painful, and muscular +feelings. Man is happy by doing what man alone can do in this world, +that is, acting by reason and understanding. Now the human will acting +by reason may do three things. It may regulate the passions, notably +desire and fear: the outcome will be the moral virtues of temperance +and fortitude. It may direct the understanding, and ultimately the +members of the body, in order to the production of some practical +result in the external world, as a bridge. Lastly, it may direct the +understanding to speculate and think, contemplate and consider, for +mere contemplation's sake. Happiness must take one or other of these +three lanes. + +4. First, then, _happiness is not the practice of the moral virtues of +temperance and fortitude_. Temperance makes a man strong against the +temptations to irrationality and swinishness that come of the bodily +appetites. But happiness lies, not in deliverance from what would +degrade man to the level of the brutes, but in something which shall +raise man to the highest level of human nature. Fortitude, again, is +not exercised except in the hour of danger; but happiness lies in an +environment of security, not of danger. And in general, the moral +virtues can be exercised only upon occasions, as they come and go; but +happiness is the light of the soul, that must burn with steady flame +and uninterrupted act, and not be dependent on chance occurrences. + +5. Secondly, _happiness is not the use of the practical understanding +with a view to production_. Happiness is an end in itself, a terminus +beyond which the act of the will can go no further; but this use of +the understanding is in view of an ulterior end, the thing to be +produced. That product is either useful or artistic; if useful, it +ministers to some further end still; if artistic, it ministers to +contemplation. Happiness, indeed, is no exercise of the practical +understanding whatever. The noblest exercises of practical +understanding are for military purposes and for statesmanship. But war +surely is not an end in itself to any right-minded man. Statecraft, +too, has an end before it, the happiness of the people. It is a labour +in view of happiness. We must follow down the third lane, and say: + +6. _Happiness is the act of the speculative understanding +contemplating for contemplation's sake_. This act has all the marks of +happiness. It is the highest act of man's highest power. It is the +most capable of continuance. It is fraught with pleasure, purest and +highest in quality. It is of all acts the most self-sufficient and +independent of environment, provided the object be to the mind's eye +visible. It is welcome for its own sake, not as leading to any further +good. It is a life of ease and leisure: man is busy that he may come +to ease. + +7. Aristotle says of this life of continued active contemplation: + +"Such a life will be too good for man; for not as he is man will he so +live, but inasmuch as there is a divine element in his composition. As +much as this element excels the compound into which it enters, so much +does the act of the said element excel any act in any other line of +virtue. If, then, the understanding is divine in comparison with man, +the life of the understanding is divine in comparison with human life. +We must not take the advice of those who tell us, that being man, one +should cherish the thoughts of a man, or being mortal, the thoughts of +a mortal, but so far as in us lies, we must play the immortal [Greek: +athanatizein], and do all in our power to live by the best element in +our nature: for though that element be slight in quantity, in power +and in value it far outweighs all the rest of our being. A man may +well be reckoned to be that which is the ruling power and the better +part in him. . . . What is proper to each creature by nature, is best +and sweetest for each: such, then, is for man the life of the +understanding, if the understanding preeminently is man." (Ar., +_Eth._, X., vii., 8, 9.) + +8. But if happiness is an act in discharge of the function proper to +man as man (n. 3), how can it be happiness to lead a life which +Aristotle says is too good for man? The solution of this paradox is +partly contained in the concluding words of Aristotle above quoted, +and will still further appear presently (s. iv., n. I, p. 21), where +we shall argue that human life is a state of transition in preparation +for a higher life of the soul, to be lived, according to the natural +order, when the compound of soul and body would no longer exist. + +9. _The act of contemplation, in which happiness consists, must rest +upon a habit of contemplation, which is intellectual virtue_. An act, +to be perfection and happiness, must be done easily, sweetly, and +constantly. But no act of the intellect can be so done, unless it +rests upon a corresponding habit. If the habit has not been acquired, +the act will be done fitfully, at random, and against the grain, like +the music of an untrained singer, or the composition of a schoolboy. +Painful study is not happiness, nor is any studied act. Happiness is +the play of a mind that is, if not master of, yet at home with its +subject. As the intellect is man's best and noblest power, so is +intellectual virtue, absolutely speaking, the best virtue of man. + +10. The use of the speculative understanding is discernible in many +things to which even the common crowd turn for happiness, as news of +that which is of little or no practical concern to self, sight-seeing, +theatre-going, novels, poetry, art, scenery, as well as speculative +science and high literature. A certain speculative interest is mixed +up with all practical work: the mind lingers on the speculation apart +from the end in view. + +11. _The act of contemplation cannot be steadily carried on, as is +necessary to happiness, except in the midst of easy surroundings_. +Human nature is not self-sufficient for the work of contemplation. +There is need of health and vigour, and the means of maintaining it, +food, warmth, interesting objects around you, leisure, absence of +distracting care or pain. None would call a man happy upon the rack, +except by way of maintaining a thesis. The happiness of a disembodied +spirit is of course independent of bodily conditions, but it would +appear that there are conditions of environment requisite for even a +spirit's contemplation. + +12. _Happiness must endure to length of days_. Happiness is the +perfect good of man. But no good is perfect that will not last. One +swallow does not make a summer, nor does one fine day: neither is man +made blessed and happy by one day, nor by a brief time. The human mind +lighting upon good soon asks the question, Will this last? If the +answer is negative, the good is not a complete good and there is no +complete happiness coming of it. If the answer is affirmative and +false, once more that is not a perfect happiness that rests on a +delusion. The supreme good of a rational being is not found in a +fool's paradise. We want an answer affirmative and true: _This +happiness shall last_. + +13. We now sum up and formulate the definition of happiness as +follows: _Happiness is a bringing of the soul to act according to the +habit of the best and most perfect virtue, that is, the virtue of the +speculative intellect, borne out by easy surroundings, and enduring to +length of days--[Greek: energeia psychaes kat aretaen taen aristaen +kai teleiotataen en biph teleio.] (Ar., _Eth._, I., vii., 15, 16.) + +14. Man is made for society. His happiness must be in society, a +social happiness, no lonely contemplation. He must be happy in the +consciousness of his own intellectual act, and happy in the +discernment of the good that is in those around him, whom he loves. +Friends and dear ones are no small part of those _easy surroundings_ +that are the condition of happiness. + +15. Happiness--final, perfect happiness--is not in fighting and +struggling, in so far as a struggle supposes evil present and +imminent; nor in benevolence, so far as that is founded upon misery +needing relief. We fight for the conquest and suppression of evil; we +are benevolent for the healing of misery. But it will be happiness, +_in the limit_, as mathematicians speak, to wish well to all in a +society where it is well with all, and to struggle with truth for its +own sake, ever grasping, never mastering, as Jacob wrestled with God. + +_Readings_.--Ar., _Eth._, I., vii. viii., 5 to end; I., x., 8 to end; +I., v., 6; VII., xiii., 3; IX., ix.; X., vii.; X., viii., 1-10; Ar., +_Pol._, IV. (al. VII.), i., 3-10; IV., iii., 7, 8; St. Thos., la 2ae, +q. 3, art. 2; _ib._, q. 3, art. 5. in corp., ad 3; _ib._, q. 2, art. +6. + + +SECTION III.--_Happiness open to man_. + + +"And now as he looked and saw the whole Hellespont covered with the +vessels of his fleet, and all the shore and every plain about Abydos +as full as possible of men, Xerxes congratulated himself on his good +fortune; but after a little while, he wept. Then Artabanus, the King's +uncle, when he heard that Xerxes was in tears, went to him, and said: +'How different, sire, is what thou art now doing from what thou didst +a little while ago! Then thou didst congratulate thyself; and now, +behold! thou weepest.' 'There came upon me,' replied he, 'a sudden +pity, when I thought of the shortness of man's life, and considered +that of all this host, so numerous as it is, not one will be alive +when a hundred years are gone by.' 'And yet there are sadder things in +life than that,' returned the other. 'Short as our time is, there is +no man, whether it be among this multitude or elsewhere, who is so +happy, as not to have felt the wish--I will not say once, but full +many a time--that he were dead rather than alive. Calamities fall upon +us, sicknesses vex and harass us, and make life, short though it be, +to appear long. So death, through the wretchedness of our life, is a +most sweet refuge to our race; and God, who gives us the tastes that +we enjoy of pleasant times, is seen, in his very gift, to be +envious.'" (Herodotus, vii., 45, 46.) + +1. It needs no argument to show that happiness, as defined in the last +section, can never be perfectly realized in this life. Aristotle took +his definition to represent an ideal to be approximated to, not +attained. He calls his sages "happy as men" (_Eth._, I., x., 16), that +is, imperfectly, as all things human are imperfect. Has Aristotle, +then, said the last word on happiness? Is perfect happiness out of the +reach of the person whom in this mortal life we call man? However that +may be, it is plain that _man desires perfect happiness_. Every man +desires that it may be perfectly well with him and his, although many +have mistaken notions of what their own well-being consists in, and +few can define it philosophically. Still they all desire it. The +higher a man stands in intellect, the loftier and vaster his +conception of happiness, and the stronger his yearning after it. This +argues that _the desire of happiness is natural to man_: not in the +sense in which eating and drinking are natural, as being requirements +of his animal nature, but in the same way that it is natural to him to +think and converse, his rational nature so requiring. It is a natural +desire, as springing from that which is the specific characteristic of +human nature, distinguishing it from mere animal nature, namely +reason. It is a natural desire in the best and highest sense of the +word. + +2. Contentment is not happiness. A man is content with little, but it +takes an immensity of good to satisfy all his desire, and render him +perfectly happy. When we say we are content, we signify that we should +naturally desire more, but acquiesce in our present portion, seeing +that more is not to be had. "Content," says Dr. Bain, "is not the +natural frame of any mind, but is the result of compromise." + +3. But is not this desire of unmixed happiness unreasonable? Are we +not taught to set bounds to our desire? Is not moderation a virtue, +and contentment wisdom? Yes, moderation is a virtue, but it concerns +only the use of means, not the apprehension of ends. The patient, not +to say the physician, desires medicines in moderation, so much as will +do him good and no more; but, so far as his end is health, he desires +all possible health, perfect health. The last end, then, is to be +desired as a thing to possess without end or measure, fully and +without defect. + +4. We have then these facts to philosophise on: that all men desire +perfect happiness: that this desire is natural, springing from the +rational soul which sets man above the brute: that on earth man may +attain to contentment, and to some happiness, but not to perfect +happiness: that consequently nature has planted in man a desire for +which on earth she has provided no adequate satisfaction. + +5. If the course of events were fitful and wayward, so that effects +started up without causes, and like causes under like conditions +produced unlike effects, and anything might come of anything, there +would be no such thing as that which we call _nature_. When we speak +of nature, we imply a regular and definite flow of tendencies, this +thing springing from that and leading to that other; nothing from +nothing, and nothing leading nowhere; no random, aimless proceedings; +but definite results led up to by a regular succession of steps, and +surely ensuing unless something occurs on the way to thwart the +process. How this is reconciled with Creation and Freewill, it is not +our province to enquire: suffice it to say that a _natural_ agent is +opposed to a _free_ one, and creation is the starting-point of nature. +But to return. Everywhere we say, "this is for that," wherever there +appears an end and consummation to which the process leads, provided +it go on unimpeded. Now every event that happens is a part of some +process or other. Every act is part of a tendency. There are no loose +facts in nature, no things that happen, or are, otherwise than in +consequence of something that has happened, or been, before, and in +view of something else that is to happen, or be, hereafter. The +tendencies of nature often run counter to one another, so that the +result to which this or that was tending is frustrated. But a tendency +is a tendency, although defeated; _this_ was for _that_, although that +for which it was has got perverted to something else. There is no +tendency which of itself fails and comes to naught, apart from +interference. Such a universal and absolute break-down is unknown to +nature. + +6. All this appears most clearly in organic beings, plants and +animals. Organisms, except the very lowest, are compounds of a number +of different parts, each fulfilling a special function for the good of +the whole. There is no idle constituent in an organic body, none +without its function. What are called _rudimentary_ organs, even if +they serve no purpose in the individual, have their use in the +species, or in some higher genus. In the animal there is no idle +natural craving, or appetite. True, in the individual, whether plant +or animal, there are many potentialities frustrate and made void. That +is neither here nor there in philosophy. Philosophy deals not with +individuals but with species, not with Bucephalus or Alexander, but +with _horse_, _man_. It is nothing to philosophy that of a thousand +seeds there germinate perhaps not ten. Enough that one seed ever +germinates, and that all normal specimens are apt to do the like, +meeting with proper environment. That alone shows that seed is not an +idle product in this or that class of living beings. + +7. But, it will be said, not everything contained in an organism +ministers to its good. There is refuse material, only good to get rid +of: there are morbid growths; there is that tendency to decay, by +which sooner or later the organism will perish. First, then, a word on +diseases. Diseases are the diseases of the individual; not of the +race. The race, as such, and that is what the philosopher studies, is +healthy: all that can be imputed to the race is liability to disease. +That liability, and the tendency to decay and die, are found in living +things, because their essence is of finite perfection; there cannot be +a plant or animal, that has not these drawbacks in itself, as such. +They represent, not the work of nature, but the failure of nature, and +the point beyond which nature can no further go. + +8. On the preceding observations Aristotle formulated the great +maxim--called by Dr. Thomas Browne, _Religio Medici_, p. i., sect. 15, +"the only indisputable axiom in philosophy,"--_Nature does nothing in +vain_. (Ar., _Pol._, I., viii., 12; _De Anima_, III., ix., 6; _De +part. animal._, I. i., p. 641, ed. Bekker.) + +9. _The desire of happiness, ample and complete, beyond what this +world can afford, is not planted in man by defect of his nature, but +by the perfection of his nature, and in view of his further +perfection_. This desire has not the character of a drawback, a thing +that cannot be helped, a weakness and decay of nature, and loss of +power, like that which sets in with advancing years. A locomotive +drawing a train warms the air about it: it is a pity that it should do +so, for that radiation of heat is a loss of power: but it cannot be +helped, as locomotives are and must be constructed. Not such is the +desire of perfect happiness in the human breast. It is not a disease, +for it is no peculiarity of individuals, but a property of the race. +It is not a decay, for it grows with the growing mind, being feeblest +in childhood, when desires are simplest and most easily satisfied, and +strongest where mental life is the most vigorous. It is an attribute +of great minds in proportion to their greatness. To be without it, +would be to live a minor in point of intellect, not much removed from +imbecility. It is not a waste of energy, rather it furnishes the +motive-power to all human volition. It comes of the natural working of +the understanding that discerns good, and other good above that, and +so still higher and higher good without limit; and of the natural +working of the will, following up and fastening upon what the +understanding discerns as good. The desire in question, then, is by no +means a necessary evil, or natural flaw, in the human constitution. + +10. It follows that the desire of perfect happiness is in man by the +normal growth of his nature, and for the better. But it would be a +vain desire, and objectless, if it were essentially incapable of +satisfaction: and man would be a made and abiding piece of +imperfection, if there were no good accessible to his intellectual +nature sufficient to meet its proper exigence of perfect happiness. +But no such perfect happiness is attainable in this world. Therefore +there must be a world to come, in which he who was man, now a +disembodied spirit, but still the same person, shall under due +conditions find a perfect good, the adequate object of his natural +desire. Else is the deepest craving of human nature in vain, and man +himself is vanity of vanities. + +11. It may be objected that there is no need to go beyond this world +to explain how the desire of perfect happiness is not in vain. It +works like the desire of the philosopher's stone among the old +alchemists. The thing they were in search of was a chimera, but in +looking for it they found a real good, modern chemistry. In like +manner, it is contended, though perfect happiness is not to be had +anywhere, yet the desire of it keeps men from sitting down on the path +of progress; and thus to that desire we owe all our modern +civilization, and all our hope and prospect of higher civilization to +come. Without questioning the alleged fact about the alchemists, we +may reply that modern chemistry has dissipated the desire of the +philosopher's stone, but modern civilization has not dissipated the +desire of perfect happiness: it has deepened it, and perhaps rather +obscured the prospect of its fulfilment. A desire that grows with +progress certainly cannot be satisfied by progressing. But if it is +never to be satisfied, what is it? A goad thrust into the side of man, +that shall keep him coursing along from century to century, like Io +under the gadfly, only to find himself in the last century as far from +the mark as in the first. Apart from the hope of the world to come, is +the Italy of to-day happier than the Italy of Antoninus Pius? Here is +a modern Italian's conclusion: "I have studied man, I have examined +nature, I have passed whole nights observing the starry heavens. And +what is the result of these long investigations? Simply this, that the +life of man is nothing; that man himself is nothing; that he will +never penetrate the mystery which surrounds the universe. With this +comfortless conviction I descend into the grave, and console myself +with the hope of speedy annihilation. The lamp goes out; and nothing, +nothing can rekindle it. So, Nature, I return to thee, to be united +with thee for ever. Never wilt thou have received into thy bosom a +more unhappy being." (_La Nullitą della Vita_. By G. P., 1882.) + +This is an extreme case, but much of modern progress tends this way. +Civilization is not happiness, nor is the desire for happiness other +than vain, if it merely leads to increased civilization. + +_Readings_.--St. Thomas, _C. G._, iii., 48; Newman's _Historical +Sketches--Conversion of Augustine_; Mill's _Autobiography_, pp. +133-149. + + +SECTION IV.--_Of the Object of Perfect Happiness_. + + +1. As happiness is an act of the speculative intellect contemplating +(s. ii., n. 6, p. 9), so the thing thus contemplated is the _object of +happiness_. As happiness is the _subjective last end_, so will this +object, inasmuch as the contemplation of it yields perfect happiness, +be the _objective last end_ of man. (s. i., nn. 3, 4, p. 4.) As +perfect happiness is possible, and intended by nature, so is this +objective last end attainable, and should be attained. But attained by +man? Aye, there's the rub. It cannot be attained in this life, and +after death man is no more: a soul out of the body is not man. About +the resurrection of the body philosophy knows nothing. Nature can make +out no title to resurrection. That is a gratuitous gift of God in +Christ. When it takes effect, _stupebit natura_. Philosophy deals only +with the natural order, with man as man, leaving the supernatural +order, or the privileges and _status_ of man as a child of God, to the +higher science of Scholastic Theology. Had God so willed it, there +might have been no supernatural at all. Philosophy shows the world as +it would have been on that hypothesis. In that case, then, man would +have been, as Aristotle represents him, a being incapable of perfect +happiness; but _he who is man_ could have become perfectly happy in a +state other than human, that is, as a disembodied spirit. Peter is +man: the soul of Peter, after separation, is man no longer; but Peter +is not one person, and Peter's soul out of the body another person; +there is but one person there, with one personal history and +liabilities. The soul of Peter is Peter still: therefore the person +Peter, or he _who is Peter_, attains to happiness, but not the man +Peter, as man, apart from the supernatural privilege of the +resurrection. Hence Aristotle well said, though he failed to see the +significance of his own saying, that man should aim at a life of +happiness too good for man. (s. ii., nn. 7, 8, p. 9.) + +2. The object of happiness,--the objective last end of man,--will be +that which the soul contemplating in the life to come will be +perfectly happy by so doing. The soul will contemplate all +intellectual beauty that she finds about her, all heights of truth, +all the expanse of goodness and mystery of love. She will see herself: +a vast and curious sight is one pure spirit: but that will not be +enough for her, her eye travels beyond. She must be in company, live +with myriads of pure spirits like herself,--see them, study them, and +admire them, and converse with them in closest intimacy. Together they +must explore the secrets of all creation even to the most distant +star: they must read the laws of the universe, which science +laboriously spells out here below: they must range from science to +art, and from facts to possibilities, till even their pure intellect +is baffled by the vast intricacy of things that might be and are not: +but yet they are not satisfied. A point of convergency is wanted for +all these vistas of being, whence they may go forth, and whither they +may return and meet: otherwise the soul is distracted and lost in a +maze of incoherent wandering, crying out, Whence all this? and what is +it for? and above all, whose is it? These are the questions that the +human mind asks in her present condition: much more will she ask them +then, when wonders are multiplied before her gaze: for it is the same +soul there and here. Here men are tormented in mind, if they find no +answer to these questions. Scientific men cannot leave theology alone. +They will not be happy there without an answer. Their contemplation +will still desiderate something beyond all finite being, actual or +possible. Is that God? It is nothing else. But God dwells in light +inaccessible, where no creature, as such, can come near Him nor see +Him. The beauties of creation, as so many streams of tendency, meet at +the foot of His Throne, and there are lost. Their course is towards +Him, and is, so far as it goes, an indication of Him: but He is +infinitely, unspeakably above them. No intelligence created, or +creatable, can arrive by its own natural perception to see Him as He +is: for mind can only discern what is proportionate to itself: and God +is out of proportion with all the being of all possible creatures. It +is only by analogy that the word _being_, or any other word whatever +can be applied to Him. As Plato says, "the First Good is not Being, +but over and beyond Being in dignity and power." (_Rep_. 509, B.) + +3. To see God face to face, which is called the beatific vision, is +not the natural destiny of man, nor of any possible creature. Such +happiness is not the happiness of man, nor of angel, but of God +Himself, and of any creature whom He may deign by an act of gratuitous +condescension to invite to sit as guest at His own royal table. That +God has so invited men and angels, revelation informs us. Scholastic +theology enlarges upon that revelation, but it is beyond philosophy. +Like the resurrection of the body, and much more even than that, the +Beatific Vision must be relegated to the realm of the Supernatural. + +4. But even in the natural order _the object of perfect happiness_ is +God. The natural and supernatural have the same object, but differ in +the mode of attainment. By supernatural grace, bearing perfect fruit, +man sees God with the eyes of his soul, as we see the faces of our +friends on earth. In perfect happiness of the natural order, creatures +alone are directly apprehended, or seen, and from the creature is +gathered the excellence of the unseen God. The process is an ascent, +as described by Plato, from the individual to the universal, and from +bodily to moral and intellectual beauty, till we reach a Beauty +eternal, immutable, absolute, substantial, and self-existent, on which +all other beauties depend for their being, while it is independent of +them. (Plato, _Symposium_, 210, 211.) Unless the ascent be prosecuted +thus far, the contemplation is inadequate, the happiness incomplete. +The mind needs to travel to the beginning and end of things, to the +Alpha and Omega of all. The mind needs to reach some perfect good: +some object, which though it is beyond the comprehension, is +nevertheless understood to be the very good of goods, unalloyed with +any admixture of defect or imperfection. The mind needs an infinite +object to rest upon, though it cannot grasp that object positively in +its infinity. If this is the case even with the human mind, still +wearing "this muddy vesture of decay," how much more ardent the +longing, as how much keener the gaze, of the pure spirit after Him who +is the centre and rest of all intellectual nature? + +5. Creatures to contemplate and see God in, are conditions and +secondary objects of natural happiness. They do not afford happiness +finally of themselves, but as manifesting God, even as a mirror would +be of little interest except for its power of reflection. + +6. In saying that God is the object of happiness, we must remember +that He is no cold, impersonal Beauty, but a living and loving God, +not indeed in the order of nature our Father and Friend, but still our +kind Master and very good Lord, who speaks to His servants from behind +the clouds that hide His face, and assures them of His abiding favour +and approving love. More than that, nature cannot look for: such +aspiration were unnatural, unreasonable, mere madness: it is enough +for the creature, as a creature, in its highest estate to stand before +God, hearing His voice, but seeing not His countenance, whom, without +His free grace, none can look upon and live. + +_Reading_.--St. Thos., 1a 2ę, q. 2, art. 8. + + +SECTION V.--_Of the use of the present life_. + + +1. Since perfect happiness is not to be had in this mortal life, and +is to be had hereafter; since moreover man has free will and the +control of his own acts; it is evidently most important for man in +this life so to control and rule himself here as to dispose himself +for happiness there. Happiness rests upon a habit of contemplation (s. +ii., n. 9, p. 10), rising to God. (s. iv., n. 4, p. 24.) But a habit, +as will be seen, is not formed except by frequent acts, and may be +marred and broken by contrary acts. It is, then, important for man in +this life so to act as to acquire a habit of lifting his mind to God. +There are two things here, to lift the mind, and to lift it to God. +The mind is not lifted, if the man lives not an intellectual life, but +the life of a swine wallowing in sensual indulgences; or a frivolous +life, taking the outside of things as they strike the senses, and +flitting from image to image thoughtlessly; or a quarrelsome life, +where reason is swallowed up in anger and hatred. Again, however +sublime the speculation and however active the intellect, if God is +not constantly referred to, the mind is lifted indeed, but not to God. +It is wisdom, then, in man during this life to look to God everywhere, +and ever to seek His face; to avoid idleness, anger, intemperance, and +pride of intellect. For the mind will not soar to God when the heart +is far from Him. + + + +CHAPTER III. + +OF HUMAN ACTS. + +SECTION I.--_What makes a human act less voluntary_. + + +1. See c. i., nn. 2, 3, 4. + +2. An act is more or less voluntary, as it is done with more or less +knowledge, and proceeds more or less fully and purely from the will +properly so called. Whatever diminishes knowledge, or partially +supplants the will, takes off from the voluntariness of the act. _An +act is rendered less voluntary by ignorance, by passionate desire, and +by fear_. + +3. If a man has done something in ignorance either of the law or of +the facts of the case, and would be sorry for it, were he to find out +what he has done, that act is _involuntary_, so far as it is traceable +to ignorance alone. Even if he would not be sorry, still the act must +be pronounced _not voluntary_, under the same reservation. Ignorance, +sheer ignorance, takes whatever is done under it out of the region of +volition. Nothing is willed but what is known. An ignorant man is as +excusable as a drunken one, as such,--no more and no less. The +difference is, that drunkenness generally is voluntary; ignorance +often is not. But ignorance may be voluntary, quite as voluntary as +drunkenness. It is a capital folly of our age to deny the possibility +of voluntary intellectual error. Error is often voluntary, and (where +the matter is one that the person officially or otherwise is required +to know) immoral too. A strange thing it is to say that "it is as +unmeaning to speak of the immorality of an intellectual mistake as it +would be to talk of the colour of a sound." (Lecky, _European Morals_, +ii., 202.) + +4. There is an ignorance that is sought on purpose, called _affected +ignorance_ (in the Shakspearian sense of the word _affect_), as when a +man will not read begging-letters, that he may not give anything away. +Such ignorance does not hinder voluntariness. It indicates a strong +will of doing or omitting, come what may. There is yet another +ignorance called _crass_, which is when a man, without absolutely +declining knowledge, yet takes no pains to acquire it in a matter +where he is aware that truth is important to him. Whatever election is +made in consequence of such ignorance, is less voluntary, indeed, than +if it were made in the full light, still it is to some extent +voluntary. It is _voluntary in its cause_, that is, in the voluntary +ignorance that led to it. Suppose a man sets up as a surgeon, having +made a very imperfect study of his art. He is aware, that for want of +knowledge and skill, he shall endanger many lives: still he neglects +opportunities of making himself competent, and goes audaciously to +work. If any harm comes of his bungling, he can plead intellectual +error, an error of judgment for the time being; he did his best as +well as he knew it. Doubtless he did, and in that he is unlike the +malicious maker of mischief: still he has chosen lightly and +recklessly to hazard a great evil. To that extent his will is bound to +the evil: he has chosen it, as it were, at one remove. + +5. Another instance. A man is a long way on to seeing, though he does +not quite see, the claims of the Church of Rome on his allegiance and +submission. He suspects that a little more prayer and search, and he +shall be a Roman Catholic. To escape this, he resolves to go +travelling and give up prayer. This is _affected ignorance_. Another +has no such perception of the claims of Catholicism. He has no +religion that satisfies him. He is aware speculatively of the +importance of the religious question; but his heart is not in religion +at all. With Demas, he loves the things of this world. Very attractive +and interesting does he find this life; and for the life to come he is +content to chance it. This is _crass ignorance_ of religious truth. +Such a man is not a formal heretic, for he is not altogether wilful +and contumacious in his error. Still neither is it wholly involuntary, +nor he wholly guiltless. + +6. _Passionate desire_ is not an affection of the will, but of the +sensitive appetite. The will may cooperate, but the passion is not in +the will. The will may neglect to check the passion, when it might: it +may abet and inflame it: in these ways an act done in passion is a +voluntary act. Still it becomes voluntary only by the influx of the +will, positively permitting or stimulating: it is not voluntary +precisely as it proceeds from passion: for voluntary is that which is +of the will. It belongs to passion to bring on a momentary darkness in +the understanding: where such darkness is, there is so much the less +of a human act. But passion in an adult of sane mind is hardly strong +enough, of itself and wholly without the will, to execute any +considerable outward action, involving the voluntary muscles. Things +are often said and done, and put down to passion: but that is not the +whole account of the matter. The will has been for a long time either +feeding the passions, or letting them range unchecked: that is the +reason of their present outburst, which is voluntary at least _in its +cause_. Once this evil preponderance has been brought about, it is to +be examined whether the will, in calm moods, is making any efforts to +redress the evil. Such efforts, if made, go towards making the effects +of passion, when they come, involuntary, and gradually preventing them +altogether. + +7. What a man does _from fear_, he is said to do _under compulsion_, +especially if the fear be applied to him by some other person in order +to gain a purpose. Such _compulsory action_ is distinguished in +ordinary parlance from voluntary action. And it is certainly less +voluntary, inasmuch as the will is hedged in to make its choice +between two evils, and chooses one or other only as being the less +evil of the two, not for any liking to the thing in itself. Still, all +things considered, the thing is chosen, and the action is so far +voluntary. We may call it _voluntary in the concrete_, and +_involuntary in the abstract_. The thing is willed as matters stand, +but in itself and apart from existing need it is not liked at all. But +as acts must be judged as they stand, by what the man wills now, not +by what he would will, an act done under fear is on the whole +voluntary. At the same time, fear sometimes excuses from the +observance of a law, or of a contract, which from the way in which it +was made was never meant to bind in so hard a case. Not all contracts, +however, are of this accommodating nature; and still less, all laws. +But even where the law binds, the penalty of the law is sometimes not +incurred, when the law was broken through fear. + +_Readings_.--Ar., _Eth_., III, i.; St. Thos., 1a 2ę, q. 6, art. 3; +_ib_., q. 6, art. 6, 8; _ib_., q. 77, art. 6. + + +SECTION II.--_Of the determinants of morality in any given action_. + + +1. _The morality of any given action is determined by three elements, +the end in view, the means taken, and the circumstances that accompany +the taking of the said means._ Whoever knows this principle, does not +thereby know the right and wrong of every action, but he knows how to +go about the enquiry. It is a rule of diagnosis. + +2. In order to know whether what a man does befits him as a man to do, +the first thing to examine is that which he mainly desires and wills +in his action. Now the end is more willed and desired than the means. +He who steals to commit adultery, says Aristotle, is more of an +adulterer than a thief. The end in view is what lies nearest to a +man's heart as he acts. On that his mind is chiefly bent; on that his +main purpose is fixed. Though the end is last in the order of +execution, it is first and foremost in the order of intention. +Therefore the end in view enters into morality more deeply than any +other element of the action. It is not, however, the most obvious +determinant, because it is the last point to be gained; and because, +while the means are taken openly, the end is often a secret locked up +in the heart of the doer, the same means leading to many ends, as the +road to a city leads to many homes and resting-places. Conversely, one +end may be prosecuted by many means, as there are many roads +converging upon one goal. + +3. If morality were determined by the end in view, and by that alone, +the doctrine would hold that the end justifies the means. That +doctrine is false, because the moral character of a human act depends +on the thing willed, or object of volition, according as it is or is +not a fit object. Now the object of volition is not only the end in +view, but likewise the means chosen. Besides the end, the means are +likewise willed. Indeed, the means are willed more immediately even +than the end, as they have to be taken first. + +4. A good action, like any other good thing, must possess a certain +requisite fulness of being, proper to itself. As it is not enough for +the physical excellence of a man to have the bare essentials, a body +with a soul animating it, but there is needed a certain grace of form, +colour, agility, and many accidental qualities besides; so for a good +act it is not enough that proper means be taken to a proper end, but +they must be taken by a proper person, at a proper place and time, in +a proper manner, and with manifold other circumstances of propriety. + +5. The end in view may be either _single_, as when you forgive an +injury solely for the love of Christ: or _multiple co-ordinate_, as +when you forgive both for the love of Christ and for the mediation of +a friend, and are disposed to forgive on either ground separately; or +_multiple subordinate_, as when you would not have forgiven on the +latter ground alone, but forgive the more easily for its addition, +having been ready, however, to forgive on the former alone; or +_cumulative_, as when you forgive on a number of grounds collectively, +on no one of which would you have forgiven apart from the rest. + +6. Where there is no outward action, but only an internal act, and the +object of that act is some good that is willed for its own sake, there +can be no question of means taken, as the end in view is immediately +attained. + +7. The means taken and the circumstances of those means enter into the +morality of the act, _formally_ as they are seen by the intellect, +_materially_ as they are in themselves. (See what is said of +ignorance, c. iii., s. i., nn. 3-5, p. 27.) This explains the +difference between _formal_ and _material_ sin. A _material_ sin would +be _formal_ also, did the agent know what he was doing. No sin is +culpable that is not _formal_. But, as has been said, there may be a +culpable perversion of the intellect, so that the man is the author of +his own obliquity or defect of vision. When Saul persecuted the +Christians, he probably sinned materially, not formally. When Caiphas +spoke the truth without knowing it, he said well materially, but ill +formally. + +8. In looking at the means taken and the circumstances that accompany +those means, it is important to have a ready rule for pronouncing what +particular belongs to the means and what to the circumstances. Thus +Clytemnestra deals her husband Agamemnon a deadly stroke with an axe, +partly for revenge, partly that she may take to herself another +consort; is the deadliness of the blow part of the means taken or only +an accompanying circumstance? It is part of the means taken. The means +taken include every particular that is willed and chosen as making for +the end in view. The fatal character of the blow does make to that +end; if Agamemnon does not die, the revenge will not be complete, and +life with Aegisthus will be impossible. On the other hand, the fact +that Clytemnestra is the wife of the man whom she murders, is not a +point that her will rests upon as furthering her purpose at all; it is +an accompanying circumstance. This method of distinguishing means from +circumstance is of great value in casuistry. + +9. It is clear that not every attendant circumstance affects the +morality of the means taken. Thus the blow under which Agamemnon sank +was neither more nor less guiltily struck because it was dealt with an +axe, because it was under pretence of giving him a bath, or because +his feet were entangled in a long robe. These circumstances are all +irrelevant. Those only are relevant which attach some special +reasonableness or unreasonableness to the thing done Thus the +provocation that Clytemnestra had from her husband's introduction of +Cassandra into her house made her act of vengeance less unreasonable: +on the other hand it was rendered more unreasonable by the +circumstance of the dear and holy tie that binds wife to husband. The +provocation and the relationship were two relevant circumstances in +that case. + +10. But it happens sometimes that a circumstance only affects the +reasonableness of an action on the supposition of some previous +circumstance so affecting it. Thus to carry off a thing in large or +small quantities does not affect the reasonableness of the carrying, +unless there be already some other circumstance attached that renders +the act good or evil; as for instance, if the goods that are being +removed are stolen property. Circumstances of this sort are called +_aggravating_--or, as the case may be, _extenuating_--circumstances. +Circumstances that of themselves, and apart from any previous +supposition, make the thing done peculiarly reasonable or +unreasonable, are called _specifying_ circumstances. They are so +called, because they place the action in some species of virtue or +vice; whereas _aggravating_ or _extenuating_ circumstances add to, or +take off from, the good or evil of the action in that species of +virtue or vice to which it already belongs. + +11. A variety of specifying circumstances may place one and the same +action in many various species of virtue or vice. Thus a religious +robbing his parents would sin at once against justice, piety, and +religion. A nun preferring death to dishonour practises three virtues, +chastity, fortitude, and religion. + +12. The means chosen may be of four several characters:-- + +(a) A thing _evil of itself_ and inexcusable under all conceivable +circumstances; for instance, blasphemy, idolatry, lying. + +(b) _Needing excuse_, as the killing of a man, the looking at an +indecent object. Such things are not to be done except under certain +circumstances and with a grave reason. Thus indecent sights may be met +in the discharge of professional duty. In that case indeed they cease +to be indecent. They are then only indecent when they are viewed +without cause. The absence of a good motive in a case like this +commonly implies the presence of a bad one. + +(c) _Indifferent_, as walking or sitting down. + +(d) _Good of itself_, but liable to be vitiated by circumstances, as +prayer and almsgiving; the good of such actions may be destroyed +wholly or in part by their being done out of a vain motive, or +unseasonably, or indiscreetly. + +13. It is said, "If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be +lightsome." (St. Matt., vi., 22.) The eye is the intention +contemplating the end in view. Whoever has placed a good end before +him, and regards it steadily with a well-ordered love, never swerving +in his affection from the way that reason would have him love, must +needs take towards his end those means, and those only, which are in +themselves reasonable and just: as it is written: "Thou shalt follow +justly after that which is just." (Deut. xvi., 20.) Thus I am building +a church to the glory of God; money runs short: I perceive that by +signing a certain contract that must mean grievous oppression of the +poor, I shall save considerable expense, whereas, if I refuse, the +works will have to be abandoned for want of funds. If I have purely +the glory of God before my eyes, I certainly shall not sign that +contract: for injustice I know can bear no fruit of Divine glory. But +if I am bent upon having the building up in any case, of course I +shall sign: but then my love for the end in view is no longer pure and +regulated by reason: it is not God but myself that I am seeking in the +work. Thus an end entirely just, holy, and pure, purifies and +sanctifies the means, not formally, by investing with a character of +justice means in themselves unjust, for that is impossible,--the +leopard cannot change his spots,--but by way of elimination, removing +unjust means as ineligible to my purpose, and leaving me only those +means to choose from which are in themselves just. + +14. With means in themselves indifferent, the case is otherwise. A +holy and pious end does formally sanctify those means, while a wicked +end vitiates them. I beg the reader to observe what sort of means are +here in question. There is no question of means in themselves or in +their circumstances unjust, as theft, lying, murder, but of such +indifferent things as reading, writing, painting, singing, travelling. +Whoever travels to commit sin at the end of his journey, his very +travelling, so far as it is referred to that end, is part of his sin: +it is a wicked journey that he takes. And he who travels to worship at +some shrine or place of pilgrimage, includes his journey in his +devotion. The end in view there sanctifies means in themselves +indifferent. + +15. As a great part of the things that we do are indifferent as well +in themselves as in the circumstances of the doing of them, the moral +character of our lives depends largely on the ends that we habitually +propose to ourselves. One man's great thought is how to make money; +what he reads, writes, says, where he goes, where he elects to reside, +his very eating, drinking and personal expenditure, all turns on what +he calls making his fortune. It is all to gain money--_quocunque modo +rem_. Another is active for bettering the condition of the labouring +classes: a third for the suppression of vice. These three men go some +way together in a common orbit of small actions, alike to the eye, but +morally unlike, because of the various guiding purposes for which they +are done. Hence, when we consider such pregnant final ends as the +service of God and the glory of a world to come, it appears how vast +is the alteration in the moral line and colouring of a man's life, +according to his practical taking up or setting aside of these great +ends. + +16. We must beware however of an exaggeration here. The final end of +action is often latent, not explicitly considered. A fervent +worshipper of God wishes to refer his whole self with all that he does +to the Divine glory and service. Yet such a one will eat, drink, and +be merry with his friends, not thinking of God at the time. Still, +supposing him to keep within the bounds of temperance, he is serving +God and doing good actions. But what of a man who has entirely broken +away from God, what of his eating, drinking, and other actions that +are of their kind indifferent? We cannot call them sins: there is +nothing wrong about them, neither in the thing done, nor in the +circumstances of the doing, nor in the intention. Pius V. condemned +the proposition: "All the works of infidels are sins." Neither must we +call such actions indifferent in the individual who does them, +supposing them to be true human acts, according to the definition, and +not done merely mechanically. They are not indifferent, because they +receive a certain measure of natural goodness from the good natural +purpose which they serve, namely, the conservation and well-being of +the agent. _Every human act is either good or evil in him who does +it._ I speak of natural goodness only. + +17. The _effect consequent_ upon an action is distinguishable from the +action itself, from which it is not unfrequently separated by a +considerable interval of time, as the death of a man from poison +administered a month before. The effect consequent enters into +morality only in so far as it is either chosen as a means or intended +as an end (nn. 2, 3, p. 31), or is annexed as a relevant circumstance +to the means chosen (n. 9, p. 34.). Once the act is done, it matters +nothing to morality whether the effect consequent actually ensues or +not, provided no new act be elicited thereupon, whether of commission +or of culpable omission to prevent. It matters not to morality, but it +does matter to the agent's claim to reward or liability to punishment +at the hands of human legislators civil and ecclesiastical. + +18. As soul and body make one man, so the inward and outward act--as +the will to strike and the actual blow struck--are one human act. The +outward act gives a certain physical completeness to the inward. +Moreover the inward act is no thorough-going thing, if it stops short +of outward action where the opportunity offers. Otherwise, the inward +act may be as good or as bad morally as inward and outward act +together. The mere wish to kill, where the deed is impossible, may be +as wicked as wish and deed conjoined. It may be, but commonly it will +not, for this reason, that the outward execution of the deed reacts +upon the will and calls it forth with greater intensity; the will as +it were expands where it finds outward vent. There is no one who has +not felt the relative mildness of inward feelings of impatience or +indignation, compared with those engendered by speaking out one's +mind. Often also the outward act entails a long course of preparation, +all during which the inward will is sustained and frequently renewed, +as in a carefully planned burglary. + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., 1a 2ae, q. 18, art. 1; _ib_., q. 18, art. 2, in +corp., ad 1; _ib_., q. 18, art. 3, in corp., ad 2; _ib_., q. 18, art. +4-6; _ib_., q. 18, art. 8, in corp., ad 2, 3; _ib_., q. 18, art. 9, in +corp., ad 3; _ib_., q. 18, art. 10, 3; _ib_., q. 18, art. 11, in +corp.; _ib_., q. 20, art. 4, in corp. + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +OF PASSIONS. + +SECTION I.--_Of Passions in General_. + + +1. A passion is defined to be: _A movement of the irrational part of +the soul, attended by a notable alteration of the body, on the +apprehension of good or evil._ The soul is made up of intellect, will, +and sensible appetite. The first two are rational, the third +irrational: the third is the seat of the passions. In a disembodied +spirit, or an angel, there are no senses, no sensible appetite, no +passions. The angel, or the departed soul, can love and hate, fear and +desire, rejoice and grieve, but these are not passions in the pure +spirit, they are acts of intellect and will alone. So man also often +loves and hates, and does other acts that are synonymous with +corresponding passions, and yet no passion is there. The man is +working with his calm reason: his irrational soul is not stirred. To +an author, when he is in the humour for it, it is a delight to be +writing, but not a passionate delight. The will finds satisfaction in +the act: the irrational soul is not affected by it. Or a penitent is +sorry for his sin: he sincerely regrets it before God: his will is +heartily turned away, and wishes that that sin had never been: at the +same time his eye is dry, his features unmoved, not a sigh does he +utter, and yet he is truly sorry. It is important to bear these facts +in mind: else we shall be continually mistaking for passions what are +pure acts of will, or _vice versa_, misled by the identity of name. + +2. The great mark of a passion is its sensible working of itself out +upon the body,--what Dr. Bain calls "the diffusive wave of emotion." +Without this mark there is no passion, but with it are other mental +states besides passions, as we define them. All strong emotion affects +the body sensibly, but not all emotions are passions. There are +emotions that arise from and appertain to the rational portion of the +soul. Such are Surprise, Laughter, Shame. + +There is no sense of humour in any but rational beings; and though +dogs look ashamed and horses betray curiosity, that is only inasmuch +as in these higher animals there is something analogous to what is +reason in man. Moreover passions are conversant with good and evil +affecting sense, but the objects of such emotions as those just +mentioned are not good and evil as such, common parlance +notwithstanding, whereby we are said to laugh at a _bon mot_, or "a +good thing." + +3. _Love_ is a generic passion, having for its species _desire_ and +_delight_, the contraries of which are _abhorrence_ and _pain_. Desire +is of absent good; abhorrence is of absent evil; delight is in present +good; pain is at present evil. The good and the evil which is the +object of any passion must be apprehended by sense, or by imagination +in a sensible way, whether itself be a thing of sense or not. + +4. Desire and abhorrence, delight and pain, are conversant with good +and evil simply. But good is often attainable only by an effort, and +evil avoidable by an effort. The effort that good costs to attain +casts a shade of evil or undesirableness over it: we may shrink from +the effort while coveting the good. Again, the fact of evil being at +all avoidable is a good thing about such evil. If we call evil black, +and good white, avoidable evil will be black just silvering into grey: +and arduous good will be white with a cloud on it. And if the white +attracts, and the black repels the appetite, it appears that arduous +good is somewhat distasteful, to wit, to the faint-hearted; and +avoidable, or vincible, evil has its attraction for the man of spirit. +About these two objects, good hard of getting and evil hard of +avoidance, arise four other passions, hope and despair about the +former, fear and daring about the latter. Hope goes out towards a +difficult good: despair flies from it, the difficulty here being more +repellent than the good is attractive. Fear flies from a threatening +evil: while daring goes up to the same, drawn by the likelihood of +vanquishing it. _Desire_ and _abhorrence_, _delight_ and _pain_, hope +and despair, fear and daring, with anger and hatred (of which +presently), complete our list of passions. + +5. Aristotle and his school of old, called Peripatetics, recommended +the moderation of the passions, not their extirpation. The Stoics on +the other hand contended that the model man, the sage, should be +totally devoid of passions. This celebrated dispute turned largely on +the two schools not understanding the same thing by the word +_passion_. Yet not entirely so. There was a residue of real +difference, and it came to this. If the sensitive appetite stirs at +all, it must stir in one or other of nine ways corresponding to the +nine passions which we have enumerated. Such an emotion as Laughter +affects the imagination and the sensitive part of man, and of course +the body visibly, but it does not stir the sensitive appetite, since +it does not prompt to action. To say then that a man has no passions, +means that the sensitive appetite never stirs within him, but is +wholly dead. But this is impossible, as the Stoic philosopher was fain +to confess when he got frightened in a storm at sea. Having no +passions cannot in any practical sense mean having no movements of the +sensitive appetite, for that will be afoot of its own proper motion +independent of reason: but it may mean cherishing no passions, +allowing none to arise unresisted, but suppressing their every +movement to the utmost that the will can. In that sense it is a very +intelligible and practical piece of advice, that the wise man should +labour to have no passions. It is the advice embodied in Horace's _Nil +admirari_, Talleyrand's "No zeal," Beaconsfield's "Beware of +enthusiasm." It would have man to work like a scientific instrument, +calm as a chronometer, regulated by reason alone. This was the Stoic +teaching, this the perfection that they inculcated, quite a possible +goal to make for, if not to attain. And it is worth a wise man's while +to consider, whether he should bend his efforts in this direction or +not. The determination here taken and acted upon will elaborate quite +a different character of man one way or the other. The effort made as +the Stoics direct, would mean no yielding to excitement, no poetry, no +high-strung devotion, no rapture, no ecstasy, no ardour of love, no +earnest rhetoric spoken or listened to, no mourning, no rejoicing +other than the most conventional, to the persistent smothering of +whatever is natural and really felt, no tear of pity freely let flow, +no touch of noble anger responded to, no scudding before the breeze of +indignation,--all this, that reason may keep on the even tenour of her +way undisturbed. + +6. The fault in this picture is that it is not the picture of a man, +but of a spirit. He who being man should try to realize it in himself, +would fall short of human perfection. For though the sensitive +appetite is distinguished from the will, and the two may clash and +come in conflict, yet they are not two wholly independent powers, but +the one man is both will and sensitive appetite, and he rarely +operates according to one power without the other being brought into +corresponding play. There is a similar concomitance of the operations +of intellect and imagination. What attracts the sensitive appetite, +commonly allures also the _affective_ will, though on advertence the +_elective_ will may reject it. On the other hand, a strong affection +and election of the will cannot be without the sensitive appetite +being stirred, and that so strongly that the motion is notable in the +body,--in other words, is a passion. Passion is the natural and in a +certain degree the inseparable adjunct of strong volition. To check +one is to check the other. Not only is the passion repressed by +repressing the volition, but the repression of the passion is also the +repression of the volition. A man then who did his best to repress all +movements of passion indiscriminately, would lay fetters on his will, +lamentable and cruel and impolitic fetters, where his will was bent on +any object good and honourable and well-judged. + +7. Again, man's will is reached by two channels, from above downwards +and from below upwards: it is reached through the reason and through +the imagination and senses. By the latter channel it often receives +evil impressions, undoubtedly, but not unfrequently by the former +also. Reason may be inconsiderate, vain, haughty, mutinous, unduly +sceptical. The abuse is no justification for closing either channel. +Now the channel of the senses and of the imagination is the wider, and +in many cases affords the better passage of the two. The will that is +hardly reached by reason, is approached and won by a pathetic sight, a +cry of enthusiasm, a threat that sends a tremor through the limbs. +Rather I should say the affective will is approached in this way: for +it remains with the elective will, on advertence and consultation with +reason, to decide whether or not it shall be won to consent. But were +it not for the channel of passion, this will could never have been +approached at all even by reasons the most cogent. Rhetoric often +succeeds, where mere dry logic would have been thrown away. God help +vast numbers of the human race, if their wills were approachable only +through their reasons! They would indeed be fixtures. + +8. Another fact to notice is the liability of reason's gaze to become +morbid and as it were inflamed by unremitting exercise. I do not here +allude to hard study, but to overcurious scanning of the realities of +this life, and the still greater realities and more momentous +possibilities of the world to come. There is a sense of the +surroundings being too much for us, an alarm and a giddiness, that +comes of sober matter-of-fact thought over-much prolonged. Then it +happens that one or more undeniable truths are laid hold of, and +considered in strong relief and in isolation from the rest: the result +is a distorted and partial view of truth as a whole, and therewith the +mind is troubled. Here the kindlier passions, judiciously allowed to +play, come in to soothe the wound and soreness of pure intellect, too +keen in its workings for one who is not yet a pure spirit. + +9. Moral good and evil are predicable only of _human acts_, in the +technical sense of the term. (c. i., nn. 2--4, p. 41.) As the passions +by definition (c. iv., s. i., n. 1, p. 41) are not human acts, they +can never be morally evil of themselves. But they are an occasion of +moral evil in this way. They often serve to wake up the slumbering +Reason. To that end it is necessary that they should start up of +themselves without the call of Reason. This would be no inconvenience, +if the instant Reason awoke, and adverted to the tumult and stir of +Passion, she could take command of it, and where she saw fit, quell +it. But Reason has no such command, except in cases where she has +acquired it by years of hard fighting. Passion once afoot holds on her +course against the dictate of Reason. True, so long as it remains mere +Passion, and Reason is not dragged away by it, no consent of the will +given, no voluntary act elicited, still less carried into outward +effect,--so long as things remain thus, however Passion may rage, +there is no moral evil done. But there is a great temptation, and in +great temptation many men fall. The evil is the act of free will, but +the pressure on the will is the pressure of Passion. But Passion +happily is a young colt amenable to discipline. Where the assaults of +Passion are resolutely and piously withstood, and the incentives +thereto avoided--unnatural and unnecessary incentives I mean--Passion +itself acquires a certain habit of obedience to Reason, which habit is +moral virtue. Of that presently. + +10. In a man of confirmed habits of moral virtue, Passion starts up +indeed independently of Reason, but then Reason ordinarily finds +little difficulty in regulating the Passion so aroused. In a certain +high and extraordinary condition of human nature, not only has Reason +entire mastery over Passion wherever she finds it astir, but Passion +cannot stir in the first instance, without Reason calling upon it to +do so. In this case the torpor of the will deprecated above (n. 7) is +not to be feared, because Reason is so vigorous and so masterful as to +be adequate to range everywhere and meet all emergencies without the +goad of Passion. This state is called by divines the _state of +integrity_. In it Adam was before he sinned. It was lost at the Fall, +and has not been restored by the Redemption. It is not a thing in any +way due to human nature: nothing truly natural to man was forfeited by +Adam's sin. It is no point of holiness, no guerdon of victory, this +state of integrity, but rather a being borne on angel's wings above +the battle. But one who has no battle in his own breast against +Passion, may yet suffer and bleed and die under exterior persecution: +nay, he may, if he wills, let in Passion upon himself, to fear and +grieve, when he need not. So did the Second Adam in the Garden of +Gethsemane. + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., 1a, q. 81, art. 2, in corp.; _id._, 1a 2ę, q. +23, art. 1, in corp.; _ib._, q. 23, art. 2, in corp.; Cicero, _Tusc. +Disp._, iv., cc. 17-26; St. Aug., _De Civitate Dei_, ix., cc. 4, 5; +Ar, _Eth._, III., v., 3, 4; _ib._, I., xiii., 15-17; St. Thos., 3a, q. +15, art. 4; _id._, 1a 2ę, q. 59, art. 5; Plato, _Timaeus_, 69, B, E: +70, A. + + +SECTION II.--_Of Desire_. + + +1. Desires are either _physical_ cravings, by moderns called +_appetites_; or _physical_ desires or _tastes_, called _desires_ +proper. The appetites have their beginning in bodily uneasiness. They +are felt needs of something required for the animal maintenance of the +individual or of the race. The objects of the several appetites are +Meat and Drink, Warmth or Coolness, Exercise and Repose, Sleep, Sex. +The object of mere appetite is marked by quantity only, not by +quality. That is to say, the thing is sought for in the vague, in a +certain amount sufficient to supply the want, but not this or that +variety of the thing. The cry of a hungry man is, "Give me to eat," if +very hungry, "Give me much:" but so far as he is under the mere +dominion of appetite he does not crave any particular article of food, +vegetable or animal: he wants quantity merely. So of thirst, so of all +the appetites, where there is nothing else but appetite present. + +2. But if a thirsty man cries for champagne, or a hungry man fancies a +venison pasty, there is another element beyond appetite in that +demand. On the matter of the physical craving there is stamped the +form of a psychical desire. The psychical element prescribes a quality +of the objects sought. The thirsty man thus prompted no longer wants +drink but wine: the man mewed up within doors no longer calls for +exercise, but for a horse or a bicycle. It is obvious that in man the +appetites generally pass into the further shape of psychical desire. +It is when the appetite is vehement, or the man is one who makes +slight study of his animal wants, that pure appetite, sheer physical +craving, is best shown. Darius flying before his conqueror is ready to +drink at any source, muddy or clear, a drink is all that he wants: it +is all that is wanted by St. Paul the first Hermit. But your modern +lounger at the clubs, what variety of liquors are excogitated to +please his palate! + +3. Not all psychical desires are on the matter of appetite; they may +be fixed on any good whatsoever of body or of mind. Many psychical +desires are not passions at all, but reside exclusively in the +superior part of the soul, in the will prompted by the understanding, +and do not affect the body in any sensible way. Such for instance is +the great desire of happiness. Those desires that are passions are +prompted, not by the understanding, but by the imagination or fancy, +imaging to itself some particular good, not good in general, for that +the understanding contemplates. Fancy paints the picture; or if sense +presents it, fancy appropriates and embellishes it: the sensitive +appetite fastens upon the representation: the bodily organs sensibly +respond; and there is the passion of psychical desire. + +4. _Physical cravings, or appetites, have limited objects: the objects +of psychical desires may be unlimited._ A thirsty man thirsts not for +an ocean, but for drink _quantum sufficit_: give him that and the +appetite is gone. But the miser covets all the money that he can get: +the voluptuary ranges land and sea in search of a new pleasure: the +philosopher ever longs for a higher knowledge: the saint is +indefatigable in doing good. Whatever a man takes to be an end in +itself, not simply a means, that he desires without end or measure. +What he desires as a means, he desires under a limitation, so far +forth as it makes for the end, so much and no more. As Aristotle says +of the processes of art, "the end in view is the limit," [Greek: peras +to telos] (cf. c. ii., s. iii., n. 3, p. 15) Whatever is desired as an +end in itself, is taken to be a part of happiness, or to represent +happiness. Happiness and the object that gives happiness is the one +thing that man desires for itself, and desires without end or measure. +Unfortunately he is often mistaken in the choice of this object. He +often takes for an end what is properly only a means. They "whose god +is their belly," have made this mistake in regard of the gratification +of appetite. It is not appetite proper that has led to this +perversion, but psychical desire, or appetite inflamed by the +artificial stimulus of imagination. For one who would be temperate, it +is more important to control his imagination than to trouble about his +appetite. Appetite exhausts itself, sometimes within the bounds of +what is good for the subject, sometimes beyond them, but still within +some bounds; but there is no limit to the cravings bred of +imagination. + +5. By this canon a man may try himself to discover whether or not a +favourite amusement is gaining too much upon him. An amusement is +properly a means to the end, that a man may come away from it better +fitted to do the serious work of his life. Pushed beyond a certain +point, the amusement ceases to minister to this end. The wise man +drops it at that point. But if one knows not where to stop: or if when +stopped in spite of himself, he is restless till he begin again, and +never willingly can forego any measure of the diversion that comes +within his reach, the means in that case has passed into an end: he is +enslaved to that amusement, inasmuch as he will do anything and +everything for the sake of it. Thus some men serve pleasure, and other +men money. + +6. Hence is apparent the folly of supposing that crimes against +property are preventible simply by placing it within the power of all +members of the community easily to earn an honest livelihood, and +therewith the satisfaction of all their natural needs. It is not +merely to escape cold and hunger that men turn to burglary or +fraudulent dealing: it is more for the gratification of a fancy, the +satisfaction of an inordinate desire. Great crimes are not committed +"to keep the wolf from the door," but because of the wolf in the +heart, the overgrown psychical desire, which is bred in many a +well-nourished, warmly clad, comfortably housed, highly educated +citizen. There is a sin born of "fulness of bread." + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., 1a 2ę, q. 30, art. 3, in corp.; _ib_., q. 30, +art. 4, in corp.; Ar., _Eth_., III., xi., 1-4: Ar., _Pol_., I., ix., +13; _ib_., II., vii., 11-13. + +N.B.--The division of desires into _physical_ and _psychical_ is first +suggested by Plato, who (_Rep._ 558 D to 559 C) divides them as +_necessary_ and _unnecessary_. Unnecessary desires he treats as evil. +What Plato calls a _necessary_, Aristotle calls a _physical_, and St. +Thomas a _natural_ desire. Unfortunately, Aristotle and St. Thomas had +but one word for our English two, _physical_ and _natural_. Desires +that are not physical, not natural nor necessary to man in his animal +capacity, may be highly natural and becoming to man as he is a +reasonable being, or they may be highly unbecoming. These psychical +desires, called by St. Thomas _not natural_, take in at once the +noblest and the basest aspirations of humanity. + + +SECTION III.--_Of Delight_. + + +1. Delight like desire may be either physical or psychical. All that +has been said above of desire under this division applies also to +delight, which is the realization of desire. This division does not +altogether fall in with that into _sensual_ delights and +_intellectual_ delights. A professional wine-taster could hardly be +said to find intellectual delight in a bottle of good Champagne, real +_Veuve-Clicquot_: yet certainly his is a psychical delight, no mere +unsophisticated gratification of appetite. Sensual delights then are +those delights which are founded on the gratification of appetite, +whether simple--in which case the delight is physical--or studied and +fancy-wrought appetite, the gratification of which is psychical +delight. Intellectual delights on the other hand are those that come +of the exercise of intellect, not unsupported by imagination, but +where appetite enters not at all, or only as a remote adjunct, albeit +the delight may turn upon some sight or sound, as of music, or of a +fine range of hills. Or the object may be a thing of intellect, pure +and removed from sense as far as an object of human contemplation can +be, for instance, the first elements of matter, freewill, the +immensity of God. The study of such objects yields a purer +intellectual delight than that of the preceding. But this is a high +ground and a keen upper air, where few can tread and breathe. + +2. A man has more complacency in himself upon attaining to some +intellectual delight than upon a sensual satisfaction: he is prouder +to have solved a problem than to have enjoyed his dinner. Also, he +would rather forego the capacity of sensual enjoyment than that of +intellectual pleasure; rather lose his sense of taste than his science +or his scholarship, if he has any notable amount of either. Again, put +sensual delight in one scale, and in the other the intellectual +delight of honour, no worthy specimen of a man will purchase the +pleasure at the price of honour. The disgrace attaching to certain +modes of enjoyment is sufficient to make men shun them, very pleasant +though they be to sense. Again, sensual delight is a passing thing, +waxing and waning: but intellectual delight is steady, grasped and +held firmly as a whole. But sensual delight comes more welcome of the +two in this that it removes a pre-existing uneasiness, as hunger, +weariness, nervous prostration, thus doing a medicinal office: whereas +no such office attaches in the essential nature of things to +intellectual delight, as that does not presuppose any uneasiness; and +though it may remove uneasiness, the removal is difficult, because the +uneasiness itself is an obstacle to the intellectual effort that must +be made to derive any intellectual delight. Sensual enjoyment is the +cheaper physician, and ailing mortals mostly resort to that door. + +3. "I will omit much usual declamation on the dignity and capacity of +our nature: the superiority of the soul to the body, of the rational +to the animal part of our constitution; upon the worthiness, +refinement, and delicacy of some satisfactions, or the meanness, +grossness, and sensuality of others: because I hold that pleasures +differ in nothing but in continuance and intensity." (Paley, _Moral +Philosophy_, bk. i., c. vi.) + +In opposition to the above it is here laid down that _delights do not +differ in continuance and intensity, that is, in quantity, alone, but +likewise in quality_, that is, some are nobler, better, and more +becoming a man than others, and therefore preferable on other grounds +than those of mere continuance and intensity. I wish to show that the +more pleasant pleasure is not always the better pleasure; that even +the pleasure which is more durable, and thereby more pleasant in the +long run, is not the better of the two simply as carrying the greater +_cumulus_ of pleasure. If this is shown, it will follow that pleasure +is not identical with good; or that pleasure is not happiness, not the +last end of man. + +4. Delight comes of activity, not necessarily of change, except so far +as activity itself involves change, as it always does in mortal man. +Delight sits upon activity, as the bloom upon youth. Bloom is the +natural sign of maturity; and the delight that we come to take in +doing a thing shows that we are at least beginning to do it well: our +activity is approaching perfection. In this sense it is said that +_delight perfects activity_. As the activity, so will be the delight. +But the activity will be as the power of which it is an exercise. +Powers like in kind will supply like activities, and these again will +yield delights alike in kind. There is no difference of quality in +such delights, they differ in quantity alone. Thus taste and smell are +two senses: the difference between them can hardly be called one of +kind: therefore the delights of smelling and of tasting fall under one +category. We may exchange so much smell for an equal amount of taste: +it is a mere matter of quantity. But between sight and hearing on the +one hand, and taste and smell and touch on the other, there is a wider +difference, due to the fact that intellect allies itself more readily +to the operation of the two former senses. + +5. Widest of all differences is that between sense and intellect. To +explain this difference in full belongs to Psychology. Enough to say +here that the object of sense is always particular, bound up in +circumstances of present time and place, as _this horse_: while the +object of intellect is universal, as _horse_ simply. The human +intellect never works without the concurrence either of sense or of +imagination, which is as it were sense at second hand. As pure +intellectual operation is never found in man, so neither is pure +intellectual delight, like that of an angel. Still, as even in man +sense and intellect are two powers differing in kind, so must their +operations differ in kind, and the delights consequent upon those +operations. Therefore, unless Paley would have been willing to allow +that the rational and animal parts of our nature differ only as _more_ +and _less_--which is tantamount to avowing that man is but a magnified +brute--he ought not to have penned his celebrated utterance, that +pleasures differ only in continuance and intensity: he should have +admitted that they differ likewise in kind; or in other words, that +pleasures differ in quality as well as in quantity. The goodness of a +pleasure, then, is not the mere amount of it. To repeat St. +Augustine's reflection on the drunken Milanese: "It makes a difference +what source a man draws his delight from." [Footnote 2] As in man +reason is nobler than sense, preferable, and a better good to its +possessor--for reason it is that makes him man and raises him above +the brute--so the use of the reason and the delight that comes thereof +is nobler, preferable, and a better good to him than the pleasure that +is of the mere operation of his animal nature. A little of the nobler +delight outweighs a vast volume of the baser: not that the nobler is +the pleasanter, but because it is the nobler. Nor can it be pretended +that the nobler prevails as being the more durable, and thereby likely +to prove the pleasanter in the long run. The nobler is better at the +time and in itself, because it is the more human delight and +characteristic of the higher species. I have but to add that what is +better in itself is not better under all circumstances. The best life +of man can only be lived at intervals. The lower operations and the +delights that go with them have a medicinal power to restore the +vigour that has become enfeebled by a lengthened exercise of the +higher faculties. At those "dead points" food and fiddling are better +than philosophy. + +[Footnote 2: Interest unde quis gaudeat. (S. Aug., Confess., vi., 6.)] + +6. This medicinal or restorative virtue of delight is a fact to bear +in mind in debating the question how far it is right to act for the +pleasure that the action gives. It is certainly wrong to act for mere +animal gratification. Such gratification is a stimulus to us to do +that which makes for the well-being of our nature: to fling away all +intention of any good other than the delight of the action, is to +mistake the incentive for the end proposed. But this is a doctrine +easily misunderstood. An example may save it from being construed too +rigidly. Suppose a man has a vinery, and being fond of fruit he goes +there occasionally, and eats, not for hunger, but as he says, because +he likes grapes. He seems to act for mere pleasure: yet who shall be +stern enough to condemn him, so that he exceed not in quantity? If he +returns from the vinery in a more amiable and charitable mood, more +satisfied with Providence, more apt to converse with men and do his +work in the commonwealth, who can deny that in acting in view of these +ends, at least implicitly, he has taken lawful means to a proper +purpose? He has not been fed, but recreated: he has not taken +nourishment, but medicine, preventive or remedial, to a mind diseased. +It is no doubt a sweet and agreeable medicine: this very agreeableness +makes its medical virtue. It is a sweet antidote to the bitterness of +life. But though a man may live by medicine, he does not live for it. +So no man by rights lives for pleasure. The pleasure that a man finds +in his work encourages him to go on with it. The pleasure that a man +finds by turning aside to what is not work, picks him up, rests and +renovates him, that he may go forth as from a wayside inn, or +_diverticulum_, refreshed to resume the road of labour. Hence we +gather the solution of the question as to the lawfulness of acting for +pleasure. If a man does a thing because it is pleasant, and takes the +pleasure as an incentive to carry on his labour, or as a remedy to +enable him to resume it, he acts for pleasure rightly. For this it is +not necessary that he should expressly think of the pleasure as being +helpful to labour: it is enough that he accepts the subordination of +pleasure to work as nature has ordained it; and this ordinance he does +accept, if he puts forth no positive volition the other way, whether +expressly, as none but a wrong-headed theologian is likely to do, or +virtually, by taking his pleasure with such greediness that the motion +of his will is all spent therein as in its last end and terminus, so +that the pleasure ceases to be referable to aught beyond itself, a +case of much easier occurrence. Or lastly, the natural subordination +of pleasure to work may be set aside, defeated, and rendered +impossible by the whole tenour of an individual's life, if he be one +of those giddy butterflies who flit from pleasure to pleasure and do +no work at all. Till late in the morning he sleeps, then breakfasts, +then he shoots, lunches, rides, bathes, dines, listens to music, +smokes, and reads fiction till late at night, then sleeps again; and +this, or the like of this is his day, some three hundred days at least +in the year. This is not mere acting for pleasure, it is living for +pleasure, or acting for pleasure so continuously as to leave no scope +for any further end of life. It may be hard to indicate the precise +hour in which this man's pleasure-seeking passes into sin: still this +is clear, his life is not innocent. Clear him of gluttony and lust, +there remains upon him the sin of sloth and of a wasted existence. + +7. Even the very highest of delights, the delight of contemplation, is +not the highest of goods, but a concomitant of the highest good. The +highest good is the final object of the will: but the object of the +will is not the will's own act: we do not will willing, as neither do +we understand understanding, not at least without a reflex effort. +What we will in contemplating is, not to be delighted, but to see. +This is the subjective end and happiness of man, to see, to +contemplate. Delight is not anything objective: neither is it the +subjective last end of humanity. In no sense then is delight, or +pleasure, the highest good. + +_Readings_.--Ar., _Eth_., X., iv., 8; _ib_., X., iii., 8-13, _ib_., +X., v., 1-5; Plato, _Gorgias_, pp. 494, 495; Mill, _Utilitarianism_, +2nd. edit., pp. 11-l6; St. Thos., la 2ę, q. 31, art. 5; _id_., _Contra +Gentiles_, iii., 26, nn. 8, 10, 11, 12. + + +SECTION IV.--_Of Anger_. + + +1. Anger is a compound passion, made up of displeasure, desire, and +hope: displeasure at a slight received, desire of revenge and +satisfaction, and hope of getting the same, the getting of it being a +matter of some difficulty and calling for some exertion, for we are +not angry with one who lies wholly in our power, or whom we despise. +Anger then is conversant at once with the good of vengeance and with +the evil of a slight received: the good being somewhat difficult to +compass, and the evil not altogether easy to wipe out. (Cf. s.i., n.4, +p. 43.) + +2. Anger is defined: _A desire of open vengeance for an open slight, +attended with displeasure at the same, the slight being put upon self, +or upon some dear one, unbefittingly._ The vengeance that the angry +man craves is a vengeance that all shall see. "No, ye unnatural hags," +cries Lear in his fury, "I will do such things,--what they shall be +yet I know not, but _they shall be the terror of the earth_." When we +are angry, we talk of "making an example" of the offender. The idea is +that, as all the world has seen us slighted and set at naught, so all +the world, witnessing the punishment of the offending party, may take +to heart the lesson which we are enforcing upon him, namely, that we +are men of might and importance whom none should despise. Whoever is +angry, is angry at being despised, flouted to his face and set at +naught, either in his own person, or in the person of one whom he +venerates and loves, or in some cause that lies near to his heart. +Anger is essentially a craving for vengeance on account of a wrong +done. If then we have suffered, but think we deserve to suffer, we are +not angry. If we have suffered wrong, but the wrong seems to have been +done in ignorance, or in the heat of passion, we are not angry, or we +are not so very angry. "If he had known what he was about," we say, +or, "if he had been in his right mind, he could not have brought +himself to treat me so." But when one has done us cool and deliberate +wrong, then we are angry, because the slight is most considerable. +There is an appearance of our claims to considerations having been +weighed, and found wanting. We call it, "a cool piece of +impertinence," "spiteful malevolence," and the like. Any other motive +to which the wrong is traceable on the part of the wrong-doer, lessens +our anger against him: but the motive of contempt, and that alone, if +we seem to discover it in him, invariably increases it. To this all +other points are reducible that move our anger, as forgetfulness, +rudely delivered tidings of misfortune, a face of mirth looking on at +our distress, or getting in the way and thwarting our purpose. + +3. Anger differs from hatred. Hatred is a chronic affection, anger an +acute one. Hatred wishes evil to a man as it is evil, anger as it is +just. Anger wishes evil to fall on its object in the sight of all men, +and with the full consciousness of the sufferer: hatred is satisfied +with even a secret mischief, and, so that the evil be a grievous one, +does not much mind whether the sufferer be conscious of it or no. Thus +an angry man may wish to see him who has offended brought to public +confession and shame: but a hater is well content to see his enemy +spending his fortune foolishly, or dead drunk in a ditch on a lonely +wayside. The man in anger feels grief and annoyance, not so the hater. +At a certain point of suffering anger stops, and is appeased when full +satisfaction seems to have been made: but an enemy is implacable and +insatiate in his desire of your harm. St. Augustine in his Rule to his +brethren says: "For quarrels, either have them not, or end them with +all speed, lest anger grow to hatred, and of a mote make a beam." + +4. Anger, like vengeance, is then only a safe course to enter on, when +it proceeds not upon personal but upon public grounds. And even by +this maxim many deceive themselves. + +_Readings_.--Ar., _Rhet_., ii., 2; _ib_., 4, ad fin.; St. Thos., 1a +2ę, q. 46, art. 2, in corp.; _ib_., q. 46, art. 3, in corp.; _ib_., q. +46, art. 6; _ib_., q. 47, art. 2. + + + +CHAPTER V. + +OF HABITS AND VIRTUES. + +SECTION I.--_Of Habit_. + + +1. _A habit is a quality difficult to change, whereby an agent whose +nature it was to work one way or another indeterminately, is disposed +easily and readily at will to follow this or that particular line of +action_. Habit differs from _disposition_, as disposition is a quality +easily changed. Thus one in a good humour is in a _disposition_ to be +kind. Habit is a part of character: disposition is a passing fit. +Again, habit differs from faculty, or power: as power enables one to +act; but habit, presupposing power, renders action easy and +expeditious, and reliable to come at call. We have a power to move our +limbs, but a habit to walk or ride or swim. Habit then is the +determinant of power. One and the same power works well or ill, but +not one and the same habit. + +2. A power that has only one way of working, set and fixed, is not +susceptible of habit. Such powers are the forces of inanimate nature, +as gravitation and electricity. A thing does not gravitate better for +gravitating often. The moon does not obey the earth more readily +to-day than she did in the days of Ptolemy, or of the Chaldean sages. +Some specious claim to habit might be set up on behalf of electricity +and magnetism. A glass rod rubbed at frequent intervals for six +months, is a different instrument from what it would have been, if +left all that time idle in a drawer. Then there are such cases as the +gradual magnetising of an iron bar. Still we cannot speak of +electrical habits, or magnetic habits, not at least in things without +life, because there is no will there to control the exercise of the +quality. As well might we speak of a "tumbledown" habit in a row of +houses, brought on by locomotives running underneath their +foundations. It is but a case of an accumulation of small effects, +inducing gradually a new molecular arrangement, so that the old powers +act under new material conditions. But habit is a thing of life, an +appurtenance of will, not of course independent of material conditions +and structural alterations, in so far forth as a living and volitional +is also a material agent, but essentially usable _at will_, and +brought into play and controlled in its operation by free choice. +Therefore a habit that works almost automatically has less of the +character of a true habit, and passes rather out of morality into the +region of physics. Again, bad habits, vices to which a man is become a +slave against his better judgment, are less properly called habits +than virtues are; for such evil habits do not so much attend on +volition (albeit volition has created them) as drag the will in their +wake. For the like reason, habit is less properly predicable of brute +animals than of men: for brutes have no intelligent will to govern +their habits. The highest brutes are most susceptible of habit. They +are most like men in being most educable. And, of human progeny, some +take up habits, in the best and completest sense of the term, more +readily than others. They are better subjects for education: education +being nothing else than the formation of habits. + +3. Knowledge consists of intellectual habits. But the habits of most +consequence to the moralist lie in the will, and in the sensitive +appetite as amenable to the control of the will. In this category come +the virtues, in the ordinary sense of that name, and secondarily the +vices. + +4. A habit is acquired by acts. Whereupon this difficulty has been +started:--If the habit, say of mental application, comes from acts of +study, and again the acts from the habit, how ever is the habit +originally acquired? We answer that there are two ways in which one +thing may come from another. It may come in point of its very +existence, as child from parent; or in point of some mode of +existence, as scholar from master. A habit has its very existence from +acts preceding: but those acts have their existence independent of the +habit. The acts which are elicited after the habit is formed, owe to +the habit, not their existence, but the mode of their existence: that +is to say, because of the habit the acts are now formed readily, +reliably, and artistically, or virtuously. The primitive acts which +gradually engendered the habit, were done with difficulty, fitfully, +and with many failures,--more by good luck than good management, if it +was a matter of skill, and by a special effort rather than as a thing +of course, where it was question of moral well-doing. (See c.ii., +s.ii., n.9, p. 10.) + +5. A habit is a living thing: it grows and must be fed. It grows on +acts, and acts are the food that sustain it. Unexercised, a habit +pines away: corruption sets in and disintegration. A man, we will say, +has a habit of thinking of God during his work. He gives over doing +so. That means that he either takes to thinking of everything and +nothing, or he takes up some definite line of thought to the exclusion +of God. Either way there is a new formation to the gradual ruin of the +old habit. + +6. _Habit_ and _custom_ may be distinguished in philosophical +language. We may say that custom makes the habit. Custom does not +imply any skill or special facility. A habit is a channel whereby the +energies flow, as otherwise they would not have flowed, freely and +readily in some particular direction. A habit, then, is a +determination of a faculty for good or for evil. It is something +intrinsic in a man, a real modification of his being, abiding in him +in the intervals between one occasion for its exercise and another: +whereas custom is a mere denomination, expressive of frequent action +and no more. Thus it would be more philosophical to speak of a +_custom_ of early rising, and of a _custom_ of smoking, rather than of +a _habit_ of smoking, except so far as, by the use of the word +_habit_, you may wish to point to a certain acquired skill of the +respiratory and facial muscles, and a certain acquired temper of the +stomach, enabling one to inhale tobacco fumes with impunity. + +7. Habits are acquired, but it is obvious that the rate of acquisition +varies in different persons. This comes from one person being more +predisposed by _nature_ than another to the acquiring of this or that +habit. By nature, that is by the native temper and conformation of his +body wherewith he was born, this child is more prone to literary +learning, that to mechanics, this one to obstinacy and +contentiousness, that to sensuality, and so of the rest. For though it +is by the soul that a man learns, and by the act of his will and +spiritual powers he becomes a glutton or a zealot, nevertheless the +bodily organs concur and act jointly towards these ends. The native +dispositions of the child's body for the acquisition of habits depend +to an unascertained extent upon the habits of his ancestors. This is +the fact of _heredity_. + +8. Man is said to be "a creature of habits." The formation of habits +in the will saves the necessity of continually making up the mind +anew. A man will act as he has become habituated, except under some +special motive from without, or some special effort from within. In +the case of evil habits, that effort is attended with immense +difficulty. The habit is indeed the man's own creation, the outcome of +his free acts. But he is become the bondslave of his creature, so much +so that when the occasion arrives, three-fourths of the act is already +done, by the force of the habit alone, before his will is awakened, or +drowsily moves in its sleep. The only way for the will to free itself +here is not to wait for the occasion to come, but be astir betimes, +keep the occasion at arm's length, and register many a determination +and firm protest and fervent prayer against the habit. He who neglects +to do this in the interval has himself to blame for being overcome +every time that he falls upon the occasion which brings into play the +evil habit. + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., 1a 2ę, q. 49, art. 4, ad 1, 2; _ib_., q. 50, +art. 3, in corp., ad. 1, 2; _ib_., q. 51, art. 1, in corp.; _ib_., q. +53, art. 3, in corp.; Ar., _Eth_., II., i.; _ib_., III., v., 10-14; +_ib_., II., iv., 1, 2, 4. + + +SECTION II.--_Of Virtues in General_. + + +1. Virtue in its most transcendental sense means the excellence of a +thing according to its kind. Thus it is the virtue of the eye to see, +and of a horse to be fleet of foot. Vice is a _flaw_ in the make of a +thing, going to render it useless for the purpose to which it was +ordained. From the ethical standpoint, virtue is a habit that a man +has got of doing moral good, or doing that which it befits his +rational nature to do: and vice is a habit of doing moral evil. (See +c. i., n. 5.) It is important to observe that virtue and vice are not +acts but habits. Vices do not make a man guilty, nor do virtues make +him innocent. A man is guilty or innocent according to his acts, not +according to his habits. A man may do a wicked thing and not be +vicious, or a good action and not be virtuous. But no man is vicious +who has not done one, two, aye, many wicked things: and to be +virtuous, a man must have performed many acts of virtue. Children do +right and wrong, but they have neither virtues nor vices except in a +nascent state: there has not yet been time in them for the habits to +be formed. When sin is taken away by God and pardoned, the vice, that +is, the evil habit, if any such existed before, still remains, and +constitutes a danger for the future. The habit can only be overcome by +watchfulness and a long continuance of contrary acts. But vice is not +sin, nor is sin vice, nor a good deed a virtue. + +2. The name of virtue is given to certain habits residing in the +intellect, as _intuition_ or _insight_ (into self-evident truths), +_wisdom_ (regarding conclusions of main application), _science_ (of +conclusions in special departments), and _art_. These are called +_intellectual virtues_. + +It was a peculiarity of Socrates' teaching, largely shared by Plato, +to make all virtue intellectual, a doctrine expressed in the formula, +_Virtue is knowledge_; which is tantamount to this other, _Vice is +ignorance_, or _an erroneous view_. From whence the conclusion is +inevitable: _No evil deed is wilfully done_; and therefore, _No man is +to blame for being wicked_. + +3. Undoubtedly there is a certain element of ignorance in all vice, +and a certain absence of will about every vicious act. There is +likewise an intellectual side to all virtue. These positions we +willingly concede to the Socratics. Every morally evil act is borne of +some voluntary inconsiderateness. The agent is looking the wrong way +in the instant at which he does wrong. Either he is regarding only the +solicitations of his inferior nature to the neglect of the superior, +or he is considering some rational good indeed, but a rational good +which, if he would look steadily upon it, he would perceive to be +unbefitting for him to choose. No man can do evil in the very instant +in which his understanding is considering, above all things else, that +which it behoves him specially to consider in the case. Again, in +every wrong act, it is not the sheer evil that is willed, but the good +through or with the evil. Good, real or supposed, is sought for: evil +is accepted as leading to good in the way of means, or annexed thereto +as a circumstance. Moreover, no act is virtuous that is elicited quite +mechanically, or at the blind instance of passion. To be virtuous, the +thing must be done _on principle_, that is, at the dictate of reason +and by the light of intellect. + +4. Still, virtue is not knowledge. There are other than intellectual +habits needed to complete the character of a virtuous man. "I see the +better course and approve it, and follow the worse," said the Roman +poet. [Footnote 3] "The evil which I will not, that I do," said the +Apostle. It is not enough to have an intellectual discernment of and +preference for what is right: but the will must be habituated to +embrace it, and the passions too must be habituated to submit and +square themselves to right being done. In other words, a virtuous man +is made up by the union of enlightened intellect with the moral +virtues. The addition is necessary for several reasons. + +[Footnote 3: Video meliora proboque,/Deteriora sequor. (Ovid, +_Metamorph_., vii., 21.)] + +(a) Ordinarily, the intellect does not necessitate the will. The will, +then, needs to be clamped and set by habit to choose the right thing +as the intellect proposes it. + +(b) Intellect, or Reason, is not absolute in the human constitution. +As Aristotle (_Pol_., I., v., 6) says: "The soul rules the body with a +despotic command: but reason rules appetite with a command +constitutional and kingly": that is to say, as Aristotle elsewhere +(_Eth_., I., xiii., 15, 16) explains, passion often "fights and +resists reason, opposes and contradicts": it has therefore to be bound +by ordinances and institutions to follow reason's lead: these +institutions are good habits, moral virtues, resident there where +passion itself is resident, in the inferior appetite. It is not enough +that the rider is competent, but the horse too must be broken in. + +(c) It is a saying, that "no mortal is always wise." There are times +when reason's utterance is faint from weariness and vexation. Then, +unless a man has acquired an almost mechanical habit of obeying reason +in the conduct of his will and passions, he will in such a conjuncture +act inconsiderately and do wrong. That habit is moral virtue. Moral +virtue is as the fly-wheel of an engine, a reservoir of force to carry +the machine past the "dead points" in its working. Or again, moral +virtue is as discipline to troops suddenly attacked, or hard pressed +in the fight. + +5. Therefore, besides the habits in the intellect that bear the name +of _intellectual virtues_, the virtuous man must possess other habits, +as well in the will, that this power may readily embrace what the +understanding points out to be good, as in the sensitive appetite in +both its parts, concupiscible and irascible, so far forth as appetite +is amenable to the control of the will, that it may be so controlled +and promptly obey the better guidance. These habits in the will and in +the sensitive appetite are called _moral virtues_, and to them the +name of _virtue_ is usually confined. + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., 1a 2ę, q. 71, art. 1, in corp.; _ib_., q. 58, +art. 2; _ib_., q. 58, art. 3, in corp., ad 3; _ib_., q. 56, art. 4, in +corp., ad 1-3. + + +SECTION III.--_Of the Difference between Virtues, Intellectual and +Moral_. + + +1. St. Thomas (1a 2ę, q. 56, art. 3, in corp.) [Footnote 4] draws this +difference, that an intellectual virtue gives one a facility in doing +a good act; but a moral virtue not only gives facility, but makes one +put the facility in use. Thus a habit of grammar he says, enables one +readily to speak correctly, but does not ensure that one always shall +speak correctly, for a grammarian may make solecisms on purpose: +whereas a habit of justice not only makes a man prompt and ready to do +just deeds, but makes him actually do them. Not that any habit +necessitates volition. Habits do not necessitate, but they facilitate +the act of the will. (s. i., nn. 1, 2, 8, pp. 64, 68.) + +[Footnote 4: By _doing good_ St. Thomas means the determination of the +appetite, rational or sensitive, to good. He says that intellectual +virtue does not prompt this determination of the appetite. Of course +it does not: it prompts only the act of the power wherein it resides: +now it resides in the intellect, not in the appetite; and it prompts +the act of the intellect, which however is cot always followed by an +act of appetite in accordance with it.] + +2. Another distinction may be gathered from St. Thomas (1a 2ę, q. 21, +art. 2, ad 2), that the special intellectual habit called _art_ +disposes a man to act correctly towards some particular end, but a +moral habit towards the common end, scope and purpose of all human +life. Thus medical skill ministers to the particular end of healing: +while the moral habit of temperance serves the general end, which is +final happiness and perfection. So to give a wrong prescription +through sheer antecedent ignorance, is to fail as a doctor: but to get +drunk wittingly and knowingly is to fail as a man. + +3. The grand distinction between intellectual and moral habits seems +to be this, that moral habits reside in powers which may act against +the dictate of the understanding,--the error of Socrates, noticed +above (c. v., s. ii., n. 2, p. 70), lay in supposing that they could +not so act: whereas the power which is the seat of the intellectual +habits, the understanding, cannot possibly act against itself. Habits +dispose the subject to elicit acts of the power wherein they reside. +Moral habits induce acts of will and sensitive appetite: intellectual +habits, acts of intellect. Will and appetite may act against what the +agent knows to be best: but intellect cannot contradict intellect. It +cannot judge that to be true and beautiful which it knows to be false +and foul. If a musician strikes discords on purpose, or a grammarian +makes solecisms wilfully, he is not therein contradicting the +intellectual habit within him, for it is the office of such a habit to +aid the intellect to judge correctly, and the intellect here does +correctly judge the effect produced. On the other hand, if the +musician or grammarian blunders, the intellect within him has not been +contradicted, seeing that he knew no better: the habit of grammar or +music has not been violated, but has failed to cover the case. +Therefore the intellectual habit is not a safeguard to keep a man from +going against his intelligent self. No such safeguard is needed: the +thing is impossible, in the region of pure intellect. In a region +where no temptation could enter, intellectual habits would suffice +alone of themselves to make a perfectly virtuous man. To avoid evil +and choose good, it would be enough to know the one and the other. But +in this world seductive reasonings sway the will, and fits of passion +the sensitive appetite, prompting the one and the other to rise up and +break away from what the intellect knows all along to be the true good +of man. Unless moral virtue be there to hold these powers to their +allegiance, they will frequently disobey the understanding. Such +disobedience is more irrational than any mere intellectual error. In +an error purely intellectual, where the will has no part, the +objective truth indeed is missed, but the intelligence that dwells +within the man is not flouted and gain-sayed. It takes two to make a +contradiction as to make a quarrel. But an intellectual error has only +one side. The intellect utters some false pronouncement, and there is +nothing within the man that says otherwise. In the moral error there +is a contradiction within, an intestine quarrel. The intellect +pronounces a thing not good, not to be taken, and the sensitive +appetite will throw a veil over the face of intellect, and seize upon +the thing. That amounts to a contradiction of a man's own intelligent +self. + +4. It appears that, absolutely speaking, intellectual virtue is the +greater perfection of a man: indeed in the act of that virtue, as we +have seen, his crowning perfection and happiness lies. But moral +virtue is the greater safeguard. The breach of moral virtue is the +direr evil. Sin is worse than ignorance, and more against reason, +because it is against the doer's own reason. Moral virtue then is more +necessary than intellectual in a world where evil is rife, as it is a +more vital thing to escape grievous disease than to attain the highest +development of strength and beauty. And as disease spoils strength and +beauty, not indeed always taking them away, but rendering them +valueless, so evil moral habits subvert intellectual virtue, and turn +it aside in a wrong direction. The vicious will keeps the intellect +from contemplating the objects which are the best good of man: so the +contemplation is thrown away on inferior things, often on base things, +and an overgrowth of folly ensues on those points whereupon it most +imports a man to be wise. + +To sum up all in a sentence, not exclusive but dealing with +characteristics: _the moral virtues are the virtues for this world, +intellectual virtue is the virtue of the life to come_. + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., 1a 2ę, q. 58, art. 2, in corp.; Ar., _Eth_., +I., xiii., 15-19; St. Thos., 1a 2ę, q. 66, art. 3. + + +SECTION IV.--_Of the Mean in Moral Virtue_. + + +1. Moral virtue is a habit of doing the right thing in the conduct of +the will and the government of the passions. Doing right is opposed to +overdoing the thing, and to underdoing it. Doing right is taking what +it suits a rational nature to desire, and eschewing what is unsuitable +under the circumstances. (c. i., n. 5.) + +But a thing may be unsuitable in two ways, by excess, and by defect: +the rational choice is in the mean between these two. The moral order +here is illustrated from the physical. Too much exercise and too +little alike impair the strength; so of meat and drink in regard to +health; but diet and exercise in moderation, and in proportion to the +subject, create, increase, and preserve both health and strength. So +it is with temperance, and fortitude, and all varieties of moral +virtue. He who fights shy of everything, and never stands his ground, +becomes a coward; while he who never fears at all, but walks boldly up +to all danger, turns out rash. The enjoyer of every pleasure, who +knows not what it is to deny himself aught, is a libertine and loose +liver; while to throw over all the graces and delicious things of +life, not as St. Paul did, who counted all things dross, that he might +gain Christ, but absolutely, as though such things were of themselves +devoid of attraction, is boorishness and insensibility. Thus the +virtues of temperance and fortitude perish in excess and defect, and +live in the mean. It is to be noticed in this illustration that the +mean of health is not necessarily the mean of virtue. What is too +little food, and too much exercise, for the animal well-being of a +man, may be the right amount of both for him in some higher relation, +inasmuch as he is more than a mere animal; as for a soldier in a hard +campaign, where a sufficiency of food and rest is incompatible with +his serving his country's need. + +2. The taking of means to an end implies the taking them in +moderation, not in excess, or we shall overshoot the mark, nor again +so feebly and inadequately as to fall short of it. No mere instrument +admits of an unlimited use; but the end to be gained fixes limits to +the use of the instrument, thus far, no more, and no less. Wherever +then reason requires an end to be gained, it requires a use of means +proportionate to the end, not coming short of it, nor going so far +beyond as to defeat the purpose in view. The variety of good that is +called the Useful lies within definite limits, between two +wildernesses, so to speak, stretching out undefined into the distance, +wilderness of Excess on the one side, and wilderness of Defect on the +other. + +3. A true work of art cannot be added to or taken from without +spoiling it. A perfect church would be spoiled by a lengthening of the +chancel or raising the tower, albeit there are buildings, secular and +ecclesiastical, that might be drawn out two miles long and not look +any worse. The colouring of a picture must not be too violent and +positive; but artistic colouring must be chaste, and artistic +utterance gentle, and artistic action calm and indicative of +self-command. Not that voice and action should not be impassioned for +a great emergency, but the very passion should bear the mark of +control: in the great master's phrase, you must not "tear a passion to +tatters." It is by moderation sitting upon power that works of art +truly masculine and mighty are produced; and by this sign they are +marked off from the lower host of things, gorgeous and redundant, and +still more from the order of "the loose, the lawless, the exaggerated, +the insolent, and the profane." + +4. On these considerations Aristotle framed his celebrated definition +of moral virtue: _the habit of fixing the choice in the golden mean in +relation to ourselves, defined by reason, as a prudent man would +define it_. All virtue is a _habit_, as we have seen--a habit of doing +that which is the proper act of the power wherein the habit resides. +One class of moral virtues is resident in the will, the act of which +power is properly called _choice_. The rest of the moral virtues +reside in the sensitive appetite, which also may be said to _choose_ +that object on which it fastens. Thus moral virtue is a habit of +_fixing the choice_. The _golden mean_ between two extremes of excess +and defect respectively has been already explained, and may be further +shown by a review of the virtues. Besides fortitude and temperance, +already described, _liberality_ is a mean between prodigality and +stinginess; _magnificence_ between vulgar display and pettiness: +_magnanimity_ between vainglory and pusillanimity; _truthfulness_ +between exaggeration and dissimulation; _friendship_ between +complaisance, or flattery, and frowardness,--and so of the rest. The +golden mean must be taken _in relation to ourselves_, because in many +matters of behaviour and the management of the passions the right +amount for one person would be excessive for another, according to +varieties of age, sex, station, and disposition. Thus anger that might +become a layman might be unbefitting in a churchman; and a man might +be thought loquacious if he talked as much as a discreet matron. +[Footnote 5] The golden mean, then, must be _defined by reason_ +according to the particular circumstances of each case. But as Reason +herself is to seek where she is not guided by Prudence, the mean of +virtue must be defined, not by the reason of the buffoon Pantolabus, +or of Nomentanus the spendthrift, but _as a prudent man_ would define +it, given an insight into the case. + +[Footnote 5: Ar., _Pol_., III., iv., 17, says just the converse, which +marks the altered position of woman in modern society.] + +5. The "golden mean," as Horace named it (_Od_., ii., 10), obtains +principally, if not solely, in living things, and in what appertains +to living things, and in objects of art. A lake, as such, has no +natural dimensions: it may be ten miles long, it may be a hundred; but +an elephant or an oak-tree cannot go beyond a certain growth. There is +a vast range between the temperature of a blast-furnace and the +temperature of the ice-pack on the Polar Sea, but very limited is the +range possible in the blood of a living man. Viewed artistically, a +hill may be too low, or a lake want width, for man's eye to rest upon +it with perfect satisfaction. The golden mean, then, is an artistic +conception, and what I may call an _anthropological_ conception: it +suits man, and is required by man, though Nature may spurn and +over-ride it. The earthquake, the hurricane, and the angry ocean are +not in the golden mean, not at least from a human point of view. If +man chooses to personify and body forth the powers of nature, he +creates some monstrous uncouth figure, like the Assyrian and Egyptian +idols; but if man makes a study of man, and brings genius and patient +elaboration to bear on his work, there emerges the symmetry and +perfect proportion of the Greek statue. No people ever made so much of +the beauty of the human form as the ancient Greeks: they made it the +object of a passion that marked their religion, their institutions, +their literature, and their art. Their virtues and their vices turned +upon it. Hence the golden mean is eminently a Greek conception, a +leading idea of the Hellenic race. The Greek hated a thing overdone, a +gaudy ornament, a proud title, a fulsome compliment, a high-flown +speech, a wordy peroration. _Nothing too much_ was the inscription +over the lintel of the national sanctuary at Delphi. It is the +surpassing grace of Greek art of the best period, that in it there +shines out the highest power, with _nothing too much_ of straining +after effect. The study of Greek literary models operates as a +corrective to redundancy, and to what ill-conditioned minds take to be +fine writing. The Greek artist knew just how far to go, and when to +stop. That point he called, in his own unsurpassed tongue, the [Greek: +kairos]. "The right measure (_kairos_) is at the head of all," says +Pindar. "Booby, not to have understood by how much the half is more +than the whole," is the quaint cry of Hesiod. Aeschylus puts these +verses in the mouth of his _Furies_; + + The golden mean is God's delight: + Extremes are hateful in His sight. + Hold by the mean, and glorify + Nor anarchy nor slavery. + +Characteristic of Socrates was his _irony_, or way of understating +himself, in protest against the extravagant professions of the +Sophists. In the reckoning of the Pythagoreans, the Infinite, the +Unlimited, or Unchecked, was marked as evil, in opposition to good, +which was the Limited. From thence, Plato, taking up his parable, +writes: "The goddess of the Limit, my fair Philebus, seeing insolence +and all manner of wickedness breaking loose from all limit in point of +gratification and gluttonous greed, established a law and order of +limited being; and you say this restraint was the death of pleasure; I +say it was the saving of it." Going upon the tradition of his +countrymen, upon their art and philosophy, their poetry, eloquence, +politics, and inmost sentiment, Aristotle formulated the law of moral +virtue, to hold by the _golden mean_, as discerned by the prudent in +view of the present circumstances, between the two extremes of excess +and defect. + +6. There is only one object on which man may throw himself without +reserve, his last end, the adequate object of his happiness, God. God +is approached by faith, hope, and charity; but it belongs not to +philosophy to speak of these supernatural virtues. There remains to +the philosopher the natural virtue of religion, which is a part of +justice. Religion has to do with the inward act of veneration and with +its outward expression. To the latter the rule of the mean at once +applies. Moderation in religion is necessary, so far as externals are +concerned. Not that any outward assiduity, pomp, splendour, or +costliness, can be too much in itself, or anything like enough, to +worship God with, but it may be too much for our limited means, which +in this world are drawn on by other calls. But our inward veneration +for God and desire to do Him honour, can never be too intense: +"Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can: for He is above all +praise." (Ecclus. xliii. 33.) + +7. The rule of the mean, then, is a human rule, for dealing with men, +and with human goods considered as means. It is a Greek rule: for the +Greeks were of all nations the fondest admirers of man and the things +of man. But when we ascend to God, we are out among the immensities +and eternities. The vastness of creation, the infinity of the +Creator,--there is no mode or measure there. In those heights the +Hebrew Psalmist loved to soar. Christianity, with its central dogma of +the Incarnation, is the meeting of Hebrew and Greek. That mystery +clothes the Lord God of hosts with the measured beauty, grace, and +truth, that man can enter into. But enough of this. Enough to show +that the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean is a highly suggestive and +wide-reaching doctrine beyond the sphere of Morals. It throws out one +great branch into Art, another into Theology. + +8. The vicious extremes, on this side and on that of a virtue, are not +always conterminous with the virtue itself, but sometimes another and +more excellent virtue intervenes; as in giving we may pass from +justice to liberality, and only through passing the bounds of +liberality, do we arrive at the vicious extreme of prodigality. So +penitential fasting intervenes between temperance in food and undue +neglect of sustenance. But it is to be noted that the _central +virtue_, so to speak, as justice, sobriety, chastity, is for all +persons on all occasions: the more excellent _side-virtue_, as +liberality, or total abstinence, is for special occasions and special +classes of persons. + +_Readings_.--Ar., _Eth_., II., ii., 6, 7; _ib_., II., cc. 6-9; Hor., +_Odes_, II., 10; Ruskin, _Modern Painters_, p. 3, s. i., c. x. + + +SECTION V.--_Of Cardinal Virtues_. + + +1. The enumeration of cardinal virtues is a piece of Greek philosophy +that has found its ways into the catechism. Prudence, justice, +fortitude, and temperance are mentioned by Plato as recognised heads +of virtue. They are recognised, though less clearly, by Xenophon, +reporting the conversations of Socrates. It does not look as though +Socrates invented the division: he seems to have received it from an +earlier source, possibly Pythagoras. They are mentioned in Holy +Scripture (Wisdom viii., 7, which is however a Greek book), and +Proverbs viii., 14. They make no figure in the philosophies of India +and China. + +2. The cardinal virtues are thus made out.--Virtue is a habit that +gives a man readiness in behaving according to the reason that is in +him. Such a habit may be fourfold. (a) It may reside in the reason, or +intellect itself, enabling it readily to discern the reasonable thing +to do, according to particular circumstances as they occur. That habit +is the virtue of _prudence_. (b) It may reside in the rational +appetite, otherwise called the will, disposing a man to act fairly and +reasonably in his dealings with other men. That is _justice_. (c) It +may reside in the irrational, or sensitive, appetite, and that to a +twofold purpose; (a) to restrain the said appetite in its +concupiscible part from a wanton and immoderate eagerness after +pleasure; that is _temperance_: (b) to incite the said appetite in its +irascible part not to shrink from danger, where there is reason for +going on in spite of danger; that is _fortitude_. + +3. Plato compares the rational soul in man to a charioteer, driving +two horses: one horse representing the concupiscible, the other the +irascible part of the sensitive appetite. He draws a vivid picture of +the resistance of the concupiscible part against reason, how madly it +rushes after lawless pleasure, and how it is only kept in restraint by +main force again and again applied, till gradually it grows +submissive. This submissiveness, gradually acquired, is the virtue of +temperance. Clearly the habit dwells in the appetite, not in reason: +in the horse, not in the charioteer. It is that habitual state, which +in a horse we call _being broken in_. + +The concupiscible appetite is _broken in_ to reason by temperance +residing within it. Plato lavishes all evil names on the steed that +represents the concupiscible part. But the irascible part, the other +steed, has its own fault, and that fault twofold, sometimes of +over-venturesomeness, sometimes of shying and turning tail. The habit +engendered, in the irascible part, of being neither over-venturesome +nor over-timorous, but going by reason, is termed fortitude. [Footnote +6] + +[Footnote 6: It will help an Englishman to understand Plato's +comparison, if instead of _concupiscible part_ and _irascible part_, +we call the one steed Passion and the other Pluck. Pluck fails, and +Passion runs to excess, till Pluck is formed to fortitude, and Passion +to temperance.] + +4. As the will is the rational appetite, the proper object of which is +rational good, it does not need to be prompted by any habit to embrace +rational good in what concerns only the inward administration of the +agent's own self. There is no difficulty in that department, provided +the sensitive appetite be kept in hand by fortitude and temperance. +But where there is question of external relations with other men, it +is not enough that the sensitive appetite be regulated, but a third +virtue is necessary, the habit of justice, to be planted in the will, +which would otherwise be too weak to attend steadily to points, not of +the agent's own good merely, but of the good of other men. + +5. Thus we have the four cardinal virtues: prudence, a habit of the +intellect; temperance, a habit of the concupiscible appetite; +fortitude, a habit of the irascible appetite; and justice, a habit of +the will. Temperance and Fortitude in the Home Department; Justice for +Foreign Affairs; with Prudence for Premier. Or, to use another +comparison, borrowed from Plato, prudence is the health of the soul, +temperance its beauty, fortitude its strength, and justice its wealth. + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., 1a 2ę, q. 61, art. 2, in corp.; _ib_., q. 56, +art. 4, in corp., ad 1-3; _ib_., q. 56, art. 6, in corp., ad 1, 3; +_ib_., q. 59, art. 4, in corp., ad 2; Plato, _Laws_, 631 B, C. + + +SECTION VI.--_Of Prudence_. + + +1. Prudence is _right reason applied to practice_, or more fully it +may be defined, the habit of intellectual discernment that enables one +to hit upon the golden mean of moral virtue and the way to secure that +mean. Thus prudence tells one what amount of punishment is proper for +a particular delinquent, and how to secure his getting it. It is to be +observed that prudence does not will the golden mean in question, but +simply indicates it. To will and desire the mean is the work of the +moral virtue concerned therewith: as in the case given it is the work +of vindictive justice. + +2. From the definition of moral virtue above given (c. v., s. iv., n. +4, p. 79), it is clear that no moral virtue can come into act without +prudence: for it is the judgment of the prudent man that must define +in each case the _golden mean_ in relation to ourselves, which every +moral virtue aims at. Thus, without prudence, fortitude passes into +rashness, vindictive justice into harshness, clemency into weakness, +religion into superstition. + +3. But may not one with no prudence to guide him hit upon the _golden +mean_ by some happy impulse, and thus do an act of virtue? We answer, +he may do a good act, and if you will, a virtuous act, but not an act +of virtue, not an act proceeding from a pre-existent habit in the +doer. The act is like a good stroke made by chance, not by skill; and +like such a stroke, it cannot be readily repeated at the agent's +pleasure. (See c. v., s. i., n. 4, p. 66; and Ar., _Eth_., II., iv., +2.) + +4. Prudence in its essence is an intellectual virtue, being a habit +resident in the understanding: but it deals with the subject-matter of +the moral virtues, pointing out the measure of temperance, the bounds +of fortitude, or the path of justice. It is the habit of intellectual +discernment that must enlighten every moral virtue in its action. +There is no virtue that goes blundering and stumbling in the dark. + +5. He is a prudent man, that can give counsel to others and to himself +in order to the attainment of ends that are worthy of human endeavour. +If unworthy ends are intended, however sagaciously they are pursued, +that is not prudence. We may call it _sagacity_, or _shrewdness_, +being a habit of ready discernment and application of means to ends. +Napoleon I. was conspicuous for this sagacity. It is the key to +success in this world. But prudence discovers worthy ends only, and to +them only does it provide means. The intellect is often blinded by +passion, by desire and by fear, so as not to discern the proper end +and term to make for in a particular instance and a practical case. +The general rules of conduct remain in the mind, as that, "In anger be +mindful of mercy:" but the propriety of mercy under the present +provocation drops out of sight. The intellect does not discern the +golden mean of justice and mercy in relation to the circumstances in +which the agent now finds himself. In other words, the habit of +prudence has failed; and it has failed because of the excess of +passion. Thus prudence is dependent on the presence of the virtues +that restrain passion, namely, fortitude and temperance. A like +argument would hold for the virtue of justice, that rectifies +inordinate action in dealing with another. The conclusion is, that as +the moral virtues cannot exist without prudence, so neither can +prudence exist without them: for vice corrupts the judgment of +prudence. + +6. Hence we arrive at a settlement of the question, whether the +virtues can be separated, or whether to possess one is to possess all. +We must distinguish between the rudimentary forms of virtue and the +perfect habit. The rudimentary forms certainly can exist separate: +they are a matter of temperament and inherited constitution: and the +man whom nature has kindly predisposed to benevolence, she has perhaps +very imperfectly prepared for prudence, fortitude, or sobriety. But +one perfect habit of any one of the four cardinal virtues, acquired by +repeated acts, and available at the call of reason, involves the +presence, in a matured state, of the other three habits also. A man +who acts irrationally upon one ground, will behave irrationally on +other grounds also: or if his conduct be rational there, it will not +be from regard for reason, but from impulse, temperament, or from some +other motive than the proper motive of the virtue which he seems to be +exercising. + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., 1a 2ę, q. 54, art. 4; _ib_., q. 58, art. 5, in +corp.; _ib_., 2a 2ę, q. 47, art. 7, 12, 13; Ar., _Eth_., VI., v.; +_ib_., VI., xii., 9, 10; _ib_., VI., xiii., 6; St. Francis of Sales, +_Of the Love of God_, bk. xi., c. vii. + + +SECTION VII.--_Of Temperance_. + + +1. Temperance is a virtue which regulates by the judgment of reason +those desires and delights which attend upon the operations whereby +human nature is preserved in the individual and propagated in the +species. Temperance is the virtue contrary to the two deadly sins of +Gluttony and Lust. As against the former, it represents Abstinence, or +moderation in solid food, and Sobriety, which is moderation in drink. +As against the latter, it is the great virtue of Chastity. The student +must bear in mind that, to a philosopher, Temperance does not mean +Total Abstinence, and Abstinence is quite independent of Fridays and +flesh-meat. Temperance then is made up of Abstinence, Sobriety, and +Chastity. + +Aristotle writes: "Cases of falling short in the taking of pleasure, +and of people enjoying themselves less than they ought, are not apt to +occur: for such insensibility is not human: but if there be any one to +whom nothing is pleasant, and all comes alike in the matter of taste, +he must be far from the state and condition of humanity: such a being +has no name, because he is nowhere met with." This is true, because +where there is question of a virtue, such as Temperance, resident in +the concupiscible appetite, we are not concerned with any sullenness +or moroseness of will, nor with any scrupulosity or imbecility of +judgment, refusing to gratify the reasonable cravings of appetite, but +with the habitual leaning and lie of the appetite itself. Now the +concupiscible appetite in every man, of its own nature, leans to its +proper object of delectable good. No virtue is requisite to secure it +from too little inclination that way: but to restrain the appetite +from going out excessively to delight is the function, and the sole +function, of Temperance. The measure of restraint is relative, as the +golden mean is relative, and varies with different persons and in view +of different ends. The training of the athlete is not the training of +the saint. + +3. Besides the primary virtue of Temperance, and its subordinate +species (enumerated above, n. 1), certain other virtues are brought +under Temperance in a secondary sense, as observing in easier matters +that moderation and self-restraint which the primary virtue keeps in +the matter that is most difficult of all. St. Thomas calls these +_potential parts_ of Temperance. There is question here of what is +most difficult to man as an animal, not of what is most difficult to +him as a rational being. To rational man, as such, ambition is harder +to restrain than sensuality: which is proved by the fact that fewer +men, who have any ambition in them, do restrain that passion than +those who restrain the animal propensities that are common to all. But +to man as an animal (and vast numbers of the human race rise little +above the animal state), it is hardest of all things to restrain those +appetites that go with the maintenance and propagation of flesh and +blood. These then are the proper matter of Temperance: other virtues, +potential parts of Temperance, restrain other cravings which are less +animal. Of these virtues the most noticeable are humility, meekness, +and modesty. [Footnote 7] + +[Footnote 7: This is St. Thomas's arrangement, placing Humility under +Temperance. The connection of Humility with Magnanimity, and thereby +with Fortitude, is indicated pp. 100, 101.] + +4. There is a thirst after honour and preeminence, arising from +self-esteem, and prevalent especially where there is little thought of +God, and scant reverence for the present majesty of heaven. A man who +thinks little of his Maker is great in his own eyes, as our green +English hills are mountains to one who has not seen the Alpine heights +and snows. Apart from the consideration of God there is no humility; +and this is why Aristotle, who treats of virtues as they minister to +the dealings of man with man, makes no mention of this virtue. There +are certain outward manifestations in words, acts, and gestures, the +demeanour of a humble man, which is largely identified with modesty +and with submission to others as representing God. + +5. Modesty is that outward comportment, style of dress, conversation, +and carriage, which indicates the presence of Temperance, "set up on +holy pedestal" (Plato, _Phaedr_., 254 B) in the heart within. + +6. Meekness is moderation in anger, and is or should be the virtue of +all men. Clemency is moderation in punishment, and is the virtue of +men in office, who bear the sword or the rod. + +7. As regards the vices opposite to Temperance, an important +distinction is to be drawn between him who sins by outburst of passion +and him whose very principles are corrupt. [Footnote 8] The former in +doing evil acknowledges it to be evil, and is prone to repent of it +afterwards: the latter has lost his belief in virtue, and his +admiration for it: he drinks in iniquity like water, with no +after-qualms; he glories in his shame. The former is reclaimable, the +latter is reprobate: his intellect as well as his heart is vitiated +and gone bad. If there were no miracles, he would be a lost man: but +God can work miracles in the moral as in the physical order: in that +there is hope for him. + +[Footnote 8: See the note in _Aquinas Ethicus_, Vol. I., pp. 170, +171.] + +8. A nation need not be virtuous in the great bulk of her citizens, to +be great in war and in dominion, in laws, in arts, and in literature: +but the bulk of the people must possess at least the sense and +appreciation of virtue in order to such national greatness. When that +sense is lost, the nation is undone and become impotent, for art no +less than for empire. Thus the Greece of Pericles and of Phidias fell, +to be "living Greece no more." + +9. As in other moral matters, no hard and fast line of division exists +between sinning from passion and sinning on principle, but cases of +the one shade into cases of the others, and by frequent indulgence of +passion principle is brought gradually to decay. + +_Readings_.--Ar., _Eth._, III., x.; St. Thos., 2a 2ę, q. 141, art. 2; +_ib._, q. 141, art. 3, in corp.; _ib._, q. 142, art. 1; _ib._, q. 143, +art. 1, in corp., ad 2, 3; _ib._, q. 161, art. 1, ad 5; _ib._, q. 161, +art. 2, in corp.; _ib._, q. 161, art. 6, in corp., ad 1; _ib._, q. +157, art. 1, in corp., ad 3; _ib_, q. 156, art. 3; Ar., _Eth._, VII., +viii. + + +SECTION VIII.--_Of Fortitude_. + + +1. As Temperance is a curb, restraining animal nature in the pursuit +of the good to which it goes out most eagerly, namely, life and the +means of its continuance, so Fortitude also is a curb, withholding +that nature from irrational flight from the evil which it most dreads. +Aristotle tells us what that evil is: "Most dreadful of all things is +death, for it is the limit, and for the dead man there appears to be +no further good nor evil left." (_Eth._, III, vi., b.) Death is truly +the limit to human existence: for, though the soul be immortal, the +being of flesh and blood, that we call man, is dissolved in death, +and, apart from supernatural hope of the resurrection, extinct for +ever. Death therefore is the direst of all evils in the animal +economy; and as such, is supremely abhorred by the sensitive appetite, +which is the animal part of man. Fortitude moderates this abhorrence +and fear by the dictate of reason. Reason shows that there are better +things than life, and things worse than death, for man in his +spiritual capacity as an intellectual and immortal being. + +2. Fortitude is a mean between Cowardice and Rashness, to which +opposite extremes we are carried by the contrary passions of Fear and +Daring respectively. Fortitude thus is a two-sided virtue, moderating +two opposite tendencies: while Temperance is one-sided, moderating +Desire alone. Life, rationally considered, bears undoubtedly a high +value, and is not to be lightly thrown away, or risked upon trivial or +ignoble objects. The brave man is circumspect in his ventures, and +moderate in his fears, which implies that he does fear somewhat. He +will fear superhuman visitations, as the judgments of God. He will +dread disgrace, and still more, sin. He will fear death in an unworthy +cause. And even in a good cause, it has well been said: "The truly +brave man is not he who fears no danger, but the man whose mind +subdues the fear, and braves the danger that nature shrinks from." The +Duke of Marlborough is said to have quaked in the saddle as he rode +into action, saying: "This poor body trembles at what the mind within +is about to do." Fortitude then is the virtue that restrains fear and +regulates venturesomeness by the judgment of reason, in danger +especially of a grand and glorious death. + +3. To the ancients, there was no grander object of devotion than the +State, their native city: no direr misfortune than its dissolution, or +the loss of its self-government: no nobler death than to die in arms +in its defence. As old Tyrtęus sang: + + A noble thing it is to lie dead, fallen in the front ranks, + A brave man in battle for his country. [Footnote 9] + +[Footnote 9: + [Greek: tethnamenai gar kalon, eni promachoisi pesonta, + andr' agathon peri hae patridi marnamenon.] +([Greek: Tyrtaeus apud Lycurg])] + +Such a death was taken to be the seal and stamp of the highest +fortitude. Nor has Christianity dimmed the glory that invests a +soldier's death. Only it points to a brighter glory, and a death in a +still nobler cause, the death of the martyr who dies for the faith, +and becomes valiant in battle for what is more to him than any earthly +city, the Church, the City of God. Nor must the martyr of charity, who +dies in succouring his neighbour, go without the praise of fortitude: +nor, in short, any one who braves death, or other heavy affliction, in +the discharge of duty, or when forwarding a good cause. + +4. A man may brave death in a good cause, and not be doing an act of +fortitude. So he may subscribe a large sum to a charitable purpose +without any exercise of the virtue of charity. A virtue is then only +exercised, when its outward act is performed from the proper motive of +the virtue, and not from any lower motive. Thus the proper motive of +Fortitude is the conviction that death is an evil, the risk of which +is to be left out of count as a circumstance relatively +inconsiderable, when there is question of the defence of certain +interests dearer to a good man than life. An improper motive would be +anger, which, however useful as an accessory, by itself is not an +intellectual motive at all, and therefore no motive of virtue. The +recklessness of an angry man is not Fortitude. It is not Fortitude to +be brave from ignorance or stupidity, not appreciating the danger: nor +again from experience, knowing that the apparent danger is not real, +at least to yourself. The brave man looks a real danger in the face, +and knows it, and goes on in spite of it, because so it is meet and +just, with the cause that he has, to go on. + +5. We may notice as _potential_ parts of Fortitude (s. vii., n. 3, p. +92), the three virtues of Magnificence, Magnanimity, and Patience. It +is the part of Patience, philosophically to endure all sufferings +short of death. It is the part of the former two, to dare wisely, not +in a matter of life and death, but in the matter of expense, for +Magnificence, and of honour, for Magnanimity. Magnificence, +technically understood, observes the right measure in the expenditure +of large sums of money. As being conversant with large sums, it +differs from Liberality. A poor man may be liberal out of his little +store, but never magnificent. It is a virtue in the rich, not to be +afraid of spending largely and lavishly on a great occasion, or a +grand purpose. The expense may be carried beyond what the occasion +warrants: that is one vicious extreme. The other extreme would be to +mar a costly work by sordid parsimony on a point of detail. It is not +easy to be magnificent: in the first place, because not many are rich; +and then because riches are seldom united with greatness of soul and +good judgment. Something analogous to the virtue of Magnificence is +shown in the generous use of great abilities, or, in the supernatural +order, of great graces. The destinies of the world lie with those men +who have it in their power to be magnificent. + +6. We are come to Magnanimity and the Magnanimous Man, the great +creation of Aristotle. As Magnanimity ranks under Fortitude, there +must be some fear to which the Magnanimous Man rises superior, as the +brave man rises superior to the fear of death. What Magnanimity +overcomes is the fear of undeserved dishonour. The Magnanimous Man is +he who rates himself as worthy of great honours, and is so worthy +indeed. When honour is paid to such a one, he makes no great account +of it, feeling that it is but his due, or even less than his due. If +he is dishonoured and insulted, he despises the insult as an +absurdity, offered to a man of his deserts. He is too conscious of his +real worth to be much affected by the expression of his neighbour's +view of him. For a man is most elated, when complimented on an +excellence which he was not very sure of possessing: and most sensibly +grieved at an insult, where he half suspects himself of really making +a poor figure, whereas he would like to make a good one. It is +doubtless the serene and settled conviction that Englishmen generally +entertain of the greatness of their country, that enables them to +listen with equanimity to abase of England, such as no other people in +Europe would endure levelled at themselves. + +7. _Proud_ is an epithet pretty freely applied to Englishmen abroad, +and it seems to fit the character of the Magnanimous Man. He seems a +Pharisee, and worse than a Pharisee. The Pharisee's pride was to some +extent mitigated by breaking out into that disease of children and +silly persons, vanity: he "did all his works to be seen of men." But +here the disease is all driven inwards, and therefore more malignant. +The Magnanimous Man is so much in conceit with himself as to have +become a scorner of his fellows. He is self-sufficient, a deity to +himself, the very type of Satanic pride. These are the charges brought +against him. + +8. To purify and rectify the character of the Magnanimous Man, we need +to take a leaf out of the book of Christianity. Not that there is +anything essentially Christian and supernatural in what we are about +to allege: otherwise it would not belong to philosophy: it is a truth +of reason, but a truth generally overlooked, till it found its +exponent in the Christian preacher, and its development in the +articles of the Christian faith. The truth is this. There is in every +human being what theologians have called _man and man_: man as he is +of himself, man again as he is by the gift and gracious mercy of God. +The reasonably Magnanimous Man is saved from pride by this +distinction. Of himself, he knows that he is nothing but nothingness, +meanness, sinfulness, and a walking sore of multitudinous actual sins. +"I know that there dwelleth not in me, that is, in my flesh, any +good." (Rom. vii. 18.) If he is insulted, he takes it as his due, not +any questionable due, for then he would resent the insult, but as +being undoubtedly what he deserves. If he is honoured, he smiles at +the absurdity of the compliments paid to him. It is as if an old +gentleman, a prey to gout and rheumatism, were lauded for his +fleetness of foot. He is then truly magnanimous on this side of his +character by a kind of obverse magnanimity, that bears insults +handsomely, as deserved, and honours modestly, as undeserved. + +9. But let us go round to the other side of the reasonably Magnanimous +Man. He was defined to be, "one that deems himself worthy of great +honours, and is so worthy indeed." Now, nothing is truly worthy of +honour but virtue. He must then be a good man, full of all virtues; +and all this goodness that he has, he recognises as being in him of +God. He has "received God's Spirit"--or something analogous in the +natural order to the gift of the Holy Ghost--"that he may know the +things that are given him of God." (2 Cor. ii. 12.) It is told of St. +Francis of Assisi, the humblest of men, that on one occasion when he +and his companions received from some persons extraordinary marks of +veneration, he, contrary to his usual wont, took it not at all amiss: +and said to his companions, who wondered at his behaviour, "Let them +alone: they cannot too much honour the work of God in us." This +magnanimity bears honours gracefully, and insult unflinchingly, from a +consciousness of internal worth, which internal worth and goodness +however it takes not for its own native excellence, but holds as +received from God, and unto God it refers all the glory. + +10. Thus the genuine Magnanimous Man is a paradox and a prodigy. He +despises an insult as undeserved, and he takes it as his due. He is +conscious of the vast good that is in him; and he knows that there is +no good in him. Highly honoured, he thinks that he gets but his due, +while he believes that vials of scorn and ignominy may justly be +poured upon him. He will bear the scorn, because he deserves it, and +again, because it is wholly undeserved. The Magnanimous Man is the +humble man. The secret of his marvellous virtue is his habit of +practical discernment between the abyss of misery that he has within +himself, as of himself, and the high gifts, also within him, which +come of the mercy of God. Aristotle well says, "Magnanimity is a sort +of robe of honour to the rest of the virtues: it both makes them +greater and stands not without them: therefore it is hard to be truly +magnanimous, for that cannot be without perfect virtue." We may add, +that in the present order of Providence none can be magnanimous +without supernatural aid, and supernatural considerations of the life +of Christ, which however are not in place here. + +_Readings_.--Ar., _Eth_., III., vii.; St. Thos., 2a 2ę, q. 123, art 3, +in corp.; Ar., _Eth_., III., viii.; St. Thos., 2a 2ę, q. 123, art. i, +ad 2; Ar., _Eth_., III., vi.; St. Thos., 2a 2ę, q. 123, art. 4, 5. For +the Magnificent and Magnanimous Man, Ar., _Eth_., IV., ii., iii.; St. +Thos., 2a 2ę, q. 129, art. 3, ad 4, 5. + + +SECTION IX.--_Of Justice_. + + +1. Justice is a habit residing in the will, prompting that power +constantly to render unto everyone his own. The fundamental notion of +Justice is some sort of equality. Equality supposes two terms, +physically distinct, or capable of existing separately, one from the +other. Between such terms alone can equality be properly predicated. +Any less distinction than this leaves room only for equality +improperly so called, and therefore no room for what is properly +termed Justice. When therefore Plato, going about to find a definition +of Justice, which is a main object in his _Republic_, acquiesces in +this position, that Justice consists in every part of the soul, +rational, irascible, and concupiscible, fulfilling its own proper +function, and not taking up the function of another, he fails for this +reason, that all Justice is relative to another, but the different +parts of one soul are not properly _other_ and _other_, since all go +to make up one man: therefore, however much Justice may be identical +with doing your own business, and leaving your neighbour free to do +his, yet this relation obtaining among the various parts of the soul +cannot properly be called Justice. What Plato defines is the beauty, +good order, and moral comeliness of the soul, but not Justice in any +sense, inasmuch as it is not referred to any being human or divine, +collective or individual, outside of the man himself. + +2. Going upon the principle that all Justice is of the nature of +_equality_, and is therefore relative to _another_, we arrive at the +definition of _general justice_, which is all virtue whatsoever, +inasmuch as it bears upon another person than him who practises it. +This Justice is perfect social virtue, the crown and perfection of all +virtue from a statesman's point of view; and in that aspect, as +Aristotle says, "neither morning star nor evening star is so +beautiful." Whoever has this virtue behaves well, not by himself +merely, but towards others--a great addition. Many a one who has done +well enough as an individual, has done badly in a public capacity: +whence the proverb, that office shows the man. This Justice may well +be called _another man's good_: though not in the sense of the +sophists of old, and the altruists of our time, that virtue is a very +good thing for everyone else than its possessor. Virtue, like health, +may be beneficial to neighbours, but the first benefit of it flows in +upon the soul to whom it belongs: for virtue is the health of the +soul. + +3. Another elementary notion of Justice connects it with Law, taking +Justice to be conformity to Law. This notion exhibits _legal justice_, +which is the same thing, under another aspect, as the _general +justice_ mentioned above, inasmuch as _general justice_ includes the +exercise of all virtues in so far as they bear upon the good of +others: and the law, to which _legal justice_ conforms a man, enjoins +acts of all virtues for the common good. It must be observed, however, +that though there is no natural virtue of which the law of man may not +prescribe some exercise, still no human law enjoins all acts of all +virtues, not even all obligatory acts. A man may fail in his duty +though he has kept all the laws of man. In order then that _legal +justice_ may include the whole duty of man, it must be referred to +that natural and eternal law of God, revealed or unrevealed, of which +we shall speak hereafter. By being conformed to this divine law a man +is a _just man_, a _righteous man_. It is this sense of Justice that +appears in the theological term, _justification_. In this sense, +Zachary and Elizabeth "were both just before God, walking in all the +commandments of the Lord without blame." (St. Luke i. 6.) + +4. _General_, or _legal, justice_ is not the cardinal virtue so +called, but is in one point of view identical with all virtue. +Distinguished from the other three cardinal virtues is _particular +justice_, which is divided into _distributive_ and _commutative +justice_. _Distributive justice_ is exercised by the community through +its head towards its individual members, so that there be a fair +distribution of the common goods, in varying amount and manner, +according to the various merits and deserts of the several recipients. +The matters distributed are public emoluments and honours, public +burdens, rewards, and also punishments. _Distributive justice_ is the +virtue of the king and of the statesman, of the commander-in-chief, of +the judge, and of the public functionary generally. It is violated by +favouritism, partiality, and jobbery. _Distributive justice_ is the +Justice that we adore in the great Governor of the Universe, saying +that He is "just in all His works," even though we understand them +not. When it takes the form of punishing, it is called _vindictive +justice_. This is what the multitudes clamoured for, that filled the +precincts of the Palace of Whitehall in the days of Charles I. with +cries of Justice, Justice, for the head of Strafford. + +5. Neither legal nor distributive justice fully answers to the +definition of that virtue. Justice disposes us to give _to another his +own_. The party towards whom Justice is practised must be wholly other +and different from him who practises it. But it is clear that the +member of a civil community is not wholly other and different from the +State: he is partially identified with the civil community to which he +belongs. Therefore neither the tribute of _legal justice_ paid by the +individual to the State, nor the grant of _distributive justice_ from +the State to the individual, is an exercise of Justice in the +strictest sense. Again, what the individual pays to the State because +he is legally bound to pay it, does not become the _State's own_ until +after payment. If he withhold it, though he do wrong, yet he is not +said to be keeping any portion of the public property in his private +hands: he only fails to make some of his private property public, +which the law bids him abdicate and make over. If this be true of +money and goods, it is still more evidently true of honour and +services. In like manner, in the matter of _distributive justice_, the +emoluments which a subject has a claim to, the rewards which he has +merited of the State, does not become _his_ till he actually gets them +into his hands. It may be unfair and immoral that they are withheld +from him, and in that case, so long as the circumstances remain the +same, the obligation rest with and presses upon the State, and those +who represent it, to satisfy his claim: still the State is not keeping +the individual from that which is as yet his own. In the language of +the Roman lawyers, he has at best a _jus ad rem_, a right that the +thing be made his, but not a _jus in re_; that is, the thing is not +properly his before he actually gets it. + +6. _Commutative justice_ alone is Justice strictly so called: for +therein alone the parties to the act are perfectly other and other, +and the matter that passes between them, if withheld by one of the +parties, would make a case of keeping the other out of that which he +could still properly call by right his own. _Commutative justice_ runs +between two individuals, or two independent States, or between the +State and an individual inasmuch as the latter is an independent +person, having rights of his own against the former. This justice is +called _commutative_, from being concerned with _exchanges_, or +contracts, _voluntary_ and _involuntary_. The idea of voluntary +contract, like that between buyer and seller, is familiar enough. But +the notion of an _involuntary contract_ is technical, and requires +explanation. Whoever, then, wrongfully takes that which belongs to +another, enters into an involuntary contract, or makes an involuntary +exchange, with the party. This he may do by taking away his property, +honour, reputation, liberty, or bodily ease and comfort. This is an +involuntary transaction, against the will of the party that suffers. +It is a contract, because the party that does the damage takes upon +himself, whether he will or no, by the very act of doing it, the +obligation of making the damage good, and of restoring what he has +taken away. This is the obligation of _restitution_, which attaches to +breaches of _commutative justice_, and, strictly speaking, to them +alone. Thus, if a minister has not promoted a deserving officer in +face of a clear obligation of _distributive justice_, the obligation +indeed remains as that of a duty unfulfilled, so long as he remains +minister with the patronage in his hands: but the promotion, if he +finally makes it, is not an act of restitution: it is giving to the +officer that which was not his before. And if the opportunity has +passed, he owes the officer nothing in compensation. But if he has +insulted the officer, he owes him an apology for all time to come: he +must give back that honour which belonged to the officer, and of which +he has robbed him. This is restitution. In a thousand practical cases +it is important, and often a very nice question to decide, whether a +particular offence, such as failure to pay taxes, be a sin against +_commutative justice_ or only against some more general form of the +virtue. If the former, restitution is due: if the latter, repentance +only and purpose of better things in future, but not reparation of the +past. + +7. The old notion, that Justice is minding your own business, and +leaving your neighbour to mind his, furnishes a good rough statement +of the obligations of _commutative justice_. They are mainly negative, +to leave your neighbour alone in his right of life and limb, of +liberty and property, of honour and reputation. But in two ways your +neighbour's business may become yours in justice. The first way is, if +you have any contract with him, whether a formal contract, as that +between a railway company and its passengers, or a virtual contract, +by reason of some office that you bear, as the office of a bishop and +pastor in relation to the souls of his flock. The second way in which +commutative justice binds you to positive action, is when undue damage +is likely to occur to another from some activity of yours. If, passing +by, I see my neighbour's house on fire, not having contracted to watch +it for him, and not having caused the fire myself, I am not bound in +strict justice to warn him of his danger. I am bound indeed by +charity, but that is not the point here. But if the fire has broken +out from my careless use of fire, _commutative justice_ binds me to +raise the alarm. + +8. The most notable potential parts of Justice--Religion, Obedience, +Truthfulness--enter into the treatise of Natural Law. + +_Readings_.--Ar., _Eth_., V., i.; Plato, _Rep_., 433 A; _ib_., 443 C, +D, E; St. Thos., 2a 2ę, q. 58, art. 2, in corp; _ib_., q. 58, art. 5; +_ib_., q. 58, art. 6, in corp; _ib_., q. 58, art. 7; _ib_., q. 58, art +9, in corp.; _ib_., q. 61, art. 1, in corp.; _ib_., q. 61, art. 3, in +corp.; Ar., _Eth_., V., ii., 12, 13; St. Thos., 2a 2ę, q. 62, art. 1, +in corp., ad 2. + + + * * * * * + + +PART II. DEONTOLOGY. + +CHAPTER VI. + +OF THE ORIGIN OF MORAL OBLIGATION. + +SECTION I.--_Of the natural difference between Good and Evil_. + + +1. A granite boulder lying on an upland moor stands indifferently the +August sun and the January frost, flood and drought. It neither blooms +in spring, nor fades in autumn. It is all one to the boulder whether +it remain in the picturesque solitude where the glacier dropped it, or +be laid in the gutter of a busy street. It has no growth nor +development: it is not a subject of evolution: there is no goal of +perfection to which it is tending by dint of inward germinal capacity +seconded by favourable environment. Therefore it does not matter what +you do with it: all things come alike to that lump of rock. + +2. But in a cranny or cleft of the same there is a little flower +growing. You cannot do what you will with that flower. It has its +exigencies and requirements. Had it a voice, it could say, what the +stone never could: "I must have this or that: I must have light, I +must have moisture, a certain heat, some soil to grow in." There is a +course to be run by this flower and the plant that bears it, a +development to be wrought out, a perfection to be achieved. For this +end certain conditions are necessary, or helpful: certain others +prejudicial, or altogether intolerable. In fact, that plant has a +_progressive nature_, and therewith is a subject of good and evil. +Good for that plant is what favours its natural progress, and evil is +all that impedes it. + +3. All organic natures are progressive: that is, each individual of +them is apt to make a certain progress, under certain conditions, from +birth to maturity. But man alone has his progress in any degree in his +own hands, to make or to mar. Man alone, in the graphic phrase of +Appius Claudius, is _faber fortunę suę_, "the shaper of his own +destiny." Any other plant or animal, other than man, however miserable +a specimen of its kind it finally prove to be, has always done the +best for itself under the circumstances: it has attained the limit +fixed for it by its primitive germinal capacity, as modified by the +events of its subsequent environment. The miserable animal that howls +under your window at night, is the finest dog that could possibly have +come of his blood and breeding, nurture and education. But there is no +man now on earth that has done all for himself that he might have +done. We all fall short in many things of the perfection that is +within our reach. Man therefore needs to stir himself, and to be +energetic with a free, self-determined energy to come up to the +standard of humanity. It is only his free acts that are considered by +the moralist. Such is the definition of Moral Science, that it deals +with _human acts_; acts, that is, whereof man is master to do or not +to do. (c. i., nn. 1, 2.) + +4. We have it, then, that a morally good act is an act that makes +towards the progress of human nature in him who does it, and which is +freely done. Similarly, a morally evil act is a bar to progress, or a +diversion of it from the right line, being also a free act. Now, that +act only can make for the progress of human nature, which befits and +suits human nature, and suits it in its best and most distinctive +characteristic. What is best in man, what characterises and makes man, +what the old schoolmen called the _form_ of man, is his reason. To be +up to reason is to be up to the standard of humanity. Human progress +is progress on the lines of reason. To make for that progress, and +thereby to be morally good, an act must be done, not blindly, +brutishly, sottishly, or on any impulse of passion, however beneficial +in its effects, but deliberately, and in conscious accordance with the +reasonable nature of the doer. + +5. Whatever be man's end and highest good, he must go about to compass +it reasonably. He must plan, and be systematic, and act on principle. +For instance, if the public health be the highest good, the laws which +govern it must be investigated, and their requirements carried out, +without regard to sentiment. If pleasure be the good, we must be +artists of pleasure. If, however, as has been seen (c. ii.) the +highest good of man is the highest play of reason herself in a life of +contemplation, to be prepared for, though it cannot be adequately and +worthily lived, in this world, then it is through following reason, +through subjecting appetite to reason by temperance, and the will to +reason by justice, and reason herself by a "reasonable service" to +God, that this end and consummation must be wrought out. Thus, in +Plato's phrase (_Rep._, 589 B), the moral man acts so that "the inner +man within him, the rational part of his nature, shall be strongest; +while he watches with a husbandman's care over the many-headed beast +of appetite, rearing and training the creature's tame heads, and not +letting the wild ones grow; for this purpose making an ally of the +lion, the irascible part of his nature, and caring for all the parts +in common, making them friends to one another and to himself." In this +way he will meet the true exigency of his nature _as a whole_, with +due regard to the proper order and subordination of the parts. He who +lives otherwise, acts in contradiction to his rational self. (c. v., +s. iii., n. 3, p. 74). + +6. The result of the above reasoning, if result it has, should be to +explain and justify the Stoic rule, _naturae convenienter vivere_, to +live according to nature. But some one will say: "That is the very +ideal of wickedness: all good in man comes of overcoming nature, and +doing violence to natural cravings: live according to nature, and you +will go straight to the devil." I answer: "Live _according to a part +of your nature_, and that the baser and lower, though also the more +impetuous and clamorous part, and you will certainly go where you say: +but live _up to the whole of your nature_, as explained in the last +paragraph, and you will be a man indeed, and will reach the goal of +human happiness." But again it may be objected, that our very reason, +to which the rest of our nature is naturally subordinate, frequently +prompts us to do amiss. The objection is a just one, in so far as it +goes upon a repudiation of the old Platonic position, that all moral +evil comes of the body, wherein the soul is imprisoned, and of the +desires which the body fastens upon the soul. Were that so, all sins +would be sins of sensuality. But there are spiritual sins, not +prompted by any lust or weakness of the body, as pride and mutiny, +self-opinionatedness, rejection of Divine revelation. The objection +turns on sins such as these. The answer is, that spiritual sins do not +arise from any exigency of reason, but from a deficiency of reason; +not from that faculty calling upon us, as we are reasonable men, to +take a certain course, in accordance with a just and full view of the +facts of the case, but from reason failing to look facts fully in the +face, and considering only some of them to the neglect of others, the +consideration of which would alter the decision. Thus a certain proud +creature mentioned in Scripture thought of the magnificence of the +throne above the stars of God, on the mountain of the covenant, on the +sides of the north: he did not think how such a pre-eminence would +become him as a creature. He had in view a rational good certainly, +but not a rational good for him. Partial reason, like a little +knowledge, is a dangerous thing. + +7. As it is not in the power of God to bring it about, that the angles +of a triangle taken together shall amount to anything else than two +right angles, so it is not within the compass of Divine omnipotence to +create a man for whom it shall be a good and proper thing, and +befitting his nature, to blaspheme, to perjure himself, to abandon +himself recklessly to lust, or anger, or any other passion. God need +not have created man at all, but He could not have created him with +other than human exigencies. The reason is, because God can only +create upon the pattern of His own essence, which is imitable, outside +of God, in certain definite lines of possibility. These possibilities, +founded upon the Divine essence and discerned by the Divine +intelligence, are the Archetype Ideas, among which the Divine will has +to choose, when it proceeds to create. The denial of this doctrine in +the Nominalist and Cartesian Schools, and their reference to the +arbitrary will of God of the eternal, immutable, and absolutely +necessary relations of possible things, is the subversion of all +science and philosophy. + +8. Still less are moral distinctions between good and evil to be set +down to the law of the State, or the fashion of society. Human +convention can no more constitute moral good than it can physical +good, or mathematical or logical truth. It is only in cases where two +or more courses are tolerable, and one of them needs to be chosen and +adhered to for the sake of social order, that human authority steps in +to elect and prescribe one of those ways of action, and brand the +others as illegitimate, which would otherwise be lawful. This is +called the making of a _positive law_. + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., 1a 2ę, q. 18, art. 5, in corp.; 1a 2ę, q. 71, +art. 2; Plato, _Rep_., 588 B to end of bk. ix.; Ar., _Eth_., IX., iv., +nn. 4-10; Suarez, _De Legibus_, II., vi., nn. 4, 11; Cicero, _De +Legibus_, i., cc. 15-17. + + +SECTION II.--_How Good becomes bounden Duty, and +Evil is advanced to Sin_. + + +1. The great problem of Moral Philosophy is the explanation of the +idea, _I ought_, (c. i., n. 6). We are now come close up to the +solution of that problem. The word _ought_ denotes the necessary +bearing of means upon end. To every _ought_ there is a pendent _if_. +The means _ought_ to be taken, _if_ the end is to be secured. Thus we +say: "You _ought_ to start betimes, _if_ you are to catch your train." +"You _ought_ to study harder, _if_ you are to pass your examination." +The person spoken to might reply: "But what if I do miss my train, and +fail in my examination?" He might be met with another _ought_: "You +_ought_ not to miss the one, _if_ you are to keep your appointment: or +to fail in the other, _if_ you are to get into a profession." Thus the +train of _oughts_ and _ifs_ extends, until we come finally to a +concatenation like the following: "You _ought_ not to break your word, +or to give needless pain to your parents, _if_ you don't want to do +violence to that nature which is yours as a reasonable being," or "to +thwart your own moral development,"--and so on in a variety of phrases +descriptive of the argument of the last section. Here it seems the +chain is made fast to a staple in the wall. If a person goes on to +ask, "Well, what if I do contradict my rational self?" we can only +tell him that he is a fool for his question. The _oughts_, such as +those wherewith our illustration commenced, Kant calls the +_hypothetical imperative_, the form being, "You must, unless:" but the +_ought_ wherein it terminated, he calls the _categorical imperative_, +the alternative being such as no rational man can accept, and +therefore no alternative at all. + +2. This doctrine of the Categorical Imperative is correct and valuable +so far as it goes. But then it does not go far enough. The full notion +of what a man _ought_, is what he _must do under pain of sin_. Sin is +more than folly, more than a breach of reason. It is mild reproach to +a great criminal to tell him that he is a very foolish person, a +walking unreasonableness. If he chooses to contradict his rational +self, is not that his own affair? Is he not his own master, and may he +not play the fool if he likes? The answer is, "No, he is not his own +master; he is under law, and his folly and self-abuse becomes criminal +and sinful, by being in contravention of the law that forbids him to +throw himself away thus wantonly." + +3. Kant readily takes up this idea, shaping it after his own fashion. +He contends,--and herein his doctrine is not merely deficient, but +positively in error,--that the Categorical Imperative, uttered by a +man's own reason, has the force of a law, made by that same reason; so +that the legislative authority is within the breast of the doer, who +owes it obedience. This he calls the _autonomy of reason_. It is also +called Independent Morality, inasmuch as it establishes right and +wrong without regard to external authority, or to the consequences of +actions, or to rewards and punishments. The doctrine is erroneous, +inasmuch as it undertakes to settle the matter of right and wrong +without reference to external authority; and inasmuch as it makes the +reason within a man, not the promulgator of the law to him, but his +own legislator. For a law is a precept, a command: now no one issues +precepts, or gives commands, to himself. To command is an act of +jurisdiction; and jurisdiction, like justice (see c. v., s. ix., n. 1, +p. 102) requires a distinction of persons, one ruler, and another +subject. But the reason in a man is not a distinct subject from the +will, appetites, or other faculties within him, to which reason +dictates: they are all one nature, one person, one man; consequently, +no one of them can strictly be said to command the rest; and the +dictate of reason, as emanating from within oneself, is not a law. But +without a law, there is no strict obligation. Therefore the whole +theory of obligation is not locked up in the Categorical Imperative, +as Kant formulated it. + +4. The above argumentation evinces that God is not under any law; for +there is no other God above Him to command Him. As for the ideas of +what is meet and just in the Divine intelligence, though the Divine +will, being a perfect will, is not liable to act against them, yet are +those ideas improperly called a law to the Divine will, because +intellect and will are identified in one God. Kant's doctrine makes us +all gods. It is a deification of the human intellect, and +identification of that intellect with the supreme and universal +Reason; and at the same time a release of the human will from all +authority extraneous to the individual. This amounts to a putting off +of all authority properly so called, and makes each man as sovereign +and unaccountable as his Maker. "Thy heart is lifted up, and thou hast +said: I am God, and sit in the chair of God: and hast set thy heart as +if it were the heart of God: whereas thou art a man and not God." +(Ezech. xxviii. 2.) Kant is thus the father of the pantheistic school +of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. + +5. But it has been contended that this phrase about a man who does +wrong _breaking a law_, is only a metaphor and figure of speech, +unless it be used with reference to the enactment of some civil +community. Thus John Austin says that a _natural law_ is a law which +is not, but which he who uses the expression thinks ought to be made. +At this rate _sin_ is not a transgression of any law, except so far as +it happens to be, in the lawyer's sense of the word, a _crime_, or +something punishable in a human court of justice. There will then be +no law but man's law. How then am I _obliged_ to obey man's law? Dr. +Bain answers: "Because, if you disobey, you will be _punished_." But +that punishment will be either just or unjust: if unjust, it +originates no obligation: if just, it presupposes an obligation, as it +presupposes a crime and sin, that is, an obligation violated. There +seems to be nothing left for John Austin but to fall back upon Kant +and his Categorical Imperative, and say that whoever rebels against +the duly constituted authority of the State in which he lives, is a +rebel against the reason that dwells within his own breast, and which +requires him to behave like a citizen. So that ultimately it is not +the State, but his own reason that he has offended; and the State has +no authority over him except what his own reason gives. + +6. If this were true, there would be no sin anywhere except what is +called _philosophical sin_, that is, a breach of the dignity of man's +rational nature; and the hardest thing that could be said in +reprobation of a wrongdoer, would be that he had gone against himself, +and against his fellow-men, by outraging reason, the common attribute +of the race. + +7. Far worse than that has the sinner done. He has offended against +his own reason, and thereby against a higher Reason, substantially +distinct from his, standing to it in the relation of Archetype to +type, a Living Reason, [Greek: hepsychos logos] (cf. Ar., _Eth_., V., +iv., 7), purely and supremely rational. The Archetype is outraged by +the violation of the type. Moreover, as the two are substantially +distinct, the one being God, the other a faculty of man, there is room +for a command, for law. A man may transgress and sin, in more than the +_philosophical_ sense of the word: he may be properly a _law-breaker_, +by offending against this supreme Reason, higher and other than his +own. + +8. Here we must pause and meditate a parable.--There was a certain +monastery where the monks lived in continual violation of monastic +observance. Their Abbot was a holy man, a model of what a monk ought +to be. But though perfectly cognisant of the delinquencies of his +community, he was content to display to his subjects the edifying +example of his own life, and to let it appear that he was aware of +their doings and pained at them. He would croon softly as he went +about the house old Hell's words: "Not so, my sons, not so: why do ye +these kind of things, very wicked things?" But the monks took no +notice of him. It happened in course of time that the Abbot went away +for about ten days. What he did in that time, never transpired: though +there was some whisper of certain "spiritual exercises," which he was +said to have been engaged in. Certain it is, that he returned to his +monastery, as he left it, a monk devout and regular: the monk was the +same, but the Abbot was mightily altered. The morning after his +arrival, a Chapter was held; the Abbot had the Rule read from cover to +cover, and announced his intention of enforcing the same. And he was +as good as his word. Transgressions of course abounded: but the monks +discovered that to transgress was quite a different thing now from +what it had been. Seeing the law proclaimed, and the Abbot in earnest +to enforce it, they too reformed themselves: the few who would not +reform had to leave. The subsequent holy lives of those monks do not +enter into this history. + +9. Now, we might fancy God our Lord like the Abbot of that monastery +in the early years of his rule. We might fancy the Supreme Reason, +displeased indeed, as Reason must be, at the excesses and follies of +mankind, but not otherwise commanding men to avoid those evil courses. +Were God to be thus quiescent, what we have called (n. 6) +_philosophical sin_, would indeed carry this additional malice, beyond +what was there set down, of being an offence against God, but it would +not be a grievous offence: for it would not be a sin in the proper +sense of the term, not being a transgression of the law of God, +inasmuch as God, by the supposition, would have given no law. But the +supposition itself is absurd. God could not so withhold His command. +He is free indeed not to command, but that only by not creating. If He +wills to have creatures, He must likewise will to bind them to certain +lines of action: which will to bind in God is a law to the creature. + +10. This assertion, that _God cannot but will to bind His creatures to +certain lines of action_, must be proved, though in the ascent we have +to mount to high regions, and breathe those subtle airs that are +wafted round the throne of the Eternal. As God is the one source of +all reality and of all power, not only can there be no being which He +has not created and does not still preserve, but no action either can +take place without His concurrence. God must go with His every +creature in its every act: otherwise, on the creature's part, nothing +could be done. Now, God cannot be indifferent what manner of act He +shall concur unto. A servant or a subject may be indifferent what +command he receives: he may will simply to obey,--to go here or there, +as he is bid, or to be left without orders where he is. That is +because he leaves the entire direction and management of the household +to his master. But for God to be thus indifferent what action He +should lend His concurrence to, would be to forego all design and +purpose of His own as to the use and destiny of the creatures which He +has made and continually preserves. This God cannot do, for He cannot +act aimlessly. It would be renouncing the direction of His own work, +and making the creature His superior. God is incapable of such +renunciation and subservience. He must, then, will the cooperation +which He lends, and the concurrent action of the creature, to take a +certain course, regulated and prescribed by Himself: which is our +proposition, that God cannot but will to bind His creatures to certain +lines of action. If His free creatures choose to stray from these +lines, God indeed still cooperates, and to His cooperation is to be +ascribed the _physical goodness_ of the action, not its _moral +inordinateness and inopportuneness_. Still, as the action is morally +inordinate, God may be said to cooperate, in a manner, where He would +not: whence we gather some conception of the enormity of sin. (See c. +vii., nn. 5, 6, pp. 130, 131.) + +11. The lines of action laid down and prescribed by God are not +arbitrary and irrespective of the subject of the command. They are +determined in each case by the nature of the subject. The Author of +Nature is not apt to subvert that order which proceeds from Himself. +He bids every creature act up to that nature wherein He has created +it. His commands follow the line of natural exigency. What this +natural exigency amounts to in man in regard to his human acts, we +have already seen, (c. vi., s. i., p. 109.) + +12. The difference between a necessary and a free agent is, that the +former is determined by its nature to act in a certain way, and cannot +act otherwise: the latter may act in more ways than one. Still, as we +have seen, the nature even of a free agent is not indifferent to all +manner of action. It requires, though it does not constrain, the agent +to act in certain definite ways, the ways of moral goodness. Acting +otherwise, as he may do, the free agent gainsays his own nature, taken +as a whole, a thing that a necessary agent can nowise do. God +therefore who, as we have shown, wills and commands all creatures +whatsoever to act on the lines of their nature, has especial reason to +give this command to His rational creatures, with whom alone rests the +momentous freedom to disobey. + +13. We are now abreast of the question, of such burning interest in +these days, as to the connection of Ethics with Theology, or of +Morality with Religion. I will not enquire whether the dogmatic +atheist is logically consistent in maintaining any distinction between +right and wrong: happily, dogmatic atheists do not abound. But there +are many who hold that, whether there be a God or no, the fact ought +not to be imported into Moral Science: that a Professor of Ethics, as +such, has no business with the name of the Almighty on his lips, any +more than a lecturer on Chemistry or Fortification. This statement +must be at once qualified by an important proviso. If we have any +duties of worship and praise towards our Maker: if there is such a +virtue as religion, and such a sin as blasphemy: surely a Professor of +Morals must point that out. He cannot in that case suppress all +reference to God, for the same reason that he cannot help going into +the duties of a man to his wife, or of an individual to the State, if +marriage and civil government are natural institutions. If there is a +God to be worshipped, any book on Moral Science is incomplete without +a chapter on Religion. But the question remains, whether the name of +God should enter into the other chapters, and His being and authority +into the very foundations of the science. I do not mean the +metaphysical foundations; for Metaphysics are like a two-edged sword, +that cleaves down to the very marrow of things, and must therefore +reveal and discover God. But Morality, like Mathematics, takes certain +metaphysical foundations for granted, without enquiring into them. On +these foundations we rear the walls, so to speak, of the science of +Ethics without reference to God, but we cannot put the roof and crown +upon the erection, unless we speak of Him and of His law. Moral +distinctions, as we saw (c. vi., s. i. n. 7, p. 113), are antecedent +to the Divine command to observe them: and though they rest ultimately +on the Divine nature, that ultimate ground belongs to Metaphysics, not +to Ethics. Ethics begins with human nature, pointing out that there +are certain human acts that do become a man, and others that do not. +(c. vi., s. i., p. 109.) To see this, it is not necessary to look up +above man. Thus we shall prove lying, suicide, and murder to be wrong, +and good fellowship a duty, without needing to mention the Divine +Being, though by considering Him the proof gains in cogency. Or +rather, apart from God we shall prove certain acts wrong, and other +acts obligatory as duties, _philosophically_ speaking, with an initial +and fundamental wrongness and obligation. In the present section we +have proved once for all, that what is wrong philosophically, or is +philosophically a duty, is the same also _theologically_. Thus the +initial and fundamental obligation is transformed into an obligation +formal and complete. Therefore, hereafter we shall be content to have +established the philosophical obligation, knowing that the theological +side is invariably conjoined therewith. As St. Thomas says (1a 2ę, q. +71, art. 6, ad 5): "By theologians sin is considered principally as it +is an offence against God: but by the moral philosopher, inasmuch as +it is contrary to reason." But what is contrary to reason offends God, +and is forbidden by Divine law, and thus becomes a _sin_. No God, no +sin. Away from God, there is _indecency_ and _impropriety, +unreasonableness, abomination_, and _brutality_, all this in view of +outraged humanity: there is likewise _crime_ against the State: but +the formal element of _sin_ is wanting. With sin, of course, +disappears also the punishment of sin as such. Thus to leave God +wholly out of Ethics and Natural Law, is to rob moral evil of half its +terrors, and of that very half which is more easily "understanded of +the people." A consideration for school-managers. + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., 1a, q. 22, art. 2, in corp. (against +Lucretius, ii. 646-651); Suarez, _De Legibus_, II., vi., nn. 3, 5-9, +13, 14, 17, 20-24. + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +OF THE ETERNAL LAW. + + +1. A law is defined to be: A precept just and abiding, given for +promulgation to a perfect community. A law is primarily a rule of +action. The first attribute of a law is that it be _just_: just to the +subject on whom it is imposed, as being no harmful abridgment of his +rights: just also to other men, as not moving him to injustice against +them. An unjust law is no law at all, for it is not a rule of action. +Still, we may sometimes be bound, when only our own rights are +infringed, to submit to such an imposition, not as a law, for it is +none, but on the score of prudence, to escape direr evils. A law is no +fleeting, occasional rule of conduct, suited to meet some passing +emergency or superficial disturbance. The reason of a law lies deep +down, lasting and widespread in the nature of the governed. A law, +then, has these two further attributes of permanence in duration and +amplitude in area. Every law is made for all time, and lives on with +the life of the community for whom it is enacted, for ever, unless it +be either expressly or implicitly repealed. A law in a community is +like a habit in an individual, an accretion to nature, which abides as +part of the natural being, and guides henceforth the course of natural +action. This analogy holds especially of those laws, which are not +enacted all of a sudden--and such are rarely the best laws--but grow +upon the people with gradual growth unmarked, like a habit by the +repetition of acts, in the way of immemorial custom. I have said that +a law is for a community, that it requires amplitude and large area. A +law is not laid down for an individual, except so far as his action is +of importance to the community. The private concerns of one man do not +afford scope and room enough for a law. Neither do the domestic +affairs of one family. A father is not a legislator. A law aims at a +deep, far-reaching, primary good. But the private good of an +individual, and the domestic good of a family, are not primary goods, +inasmuch as the individual and the family are not primary but +subordinate beings: not complete and independent, but dependent and +partial; not wholes but parts. The individual is part of the family, +and the family is part of a higher community. It is only when we are +come to some community which is not part of any higher, that we have +found the being, the good of which is primary good, the aim of law. +Such a community, not being part of any higher community in the same +order, is in its own order a perfect community. Thus, in the temporal +order, the individual is part of the State. The State is a perfect +community; and the good of the State is of more consequence than the +temporal well-being of any individual citizen. The temporal good of +the individual, then, is matter of law, in so far as it is subservient +to the good of the State. We have, then, to hold that a law is given +to the members of a perfect community for the good of the whole. Not +every precept, therefore, is a law: nor every superior a lawgiver: for +it is not every superior that has charge of the good of a perfect +community. Many a precept is given to an individual, either for his +private good, as when a father commands his child, or for the private +good of him that issues the precept, as when a master commands a +servant. But every law is a precept: for a law is an imperative rule +of action, in view of a good that is necessary, at least with the +necessity of convenience. To every law there are counsels attached. A +law may be said to be a _nucleus_ of precept, having an _envelope_ of +counsel. Every law has also a pendent called punishment for those who +break it: this is called the _sanction_ of the law. A law is also for +_promulgation_, as a birch rod for _application_. The promulgation, or +application, brings the law home to the subject, but is not part of +the law itself. So much for the definition of Law. + +2. We have to learn to look upon the whole created universe, and the +fulness thereof, angels, men, earth, sun, planets, fixed stars, all +things visible and invisible, as one great and perfect community, +whose King and Lawgiver is God. He is King, because He is Creator and +Lord. But lordship and kingship are different things, even in God. It +is one thing to be lord and master, owner and proprietor of a chattel, +property and domain: it is another thing to be king and governor, +lawgiver and judge of political subjects. The former is called _power +of dominion_, or right of ownership, the latter is _power of +jurisdiction_. Power of dominion is for the good of him who wields it: +but power of jurisdiction is for the good of the governed. As God is +Lord of the universe, He directs all its operations to His own glory. +As He is King, He governs as a king should govern, for the good of His +subjects. In intellectual creatures, whose will is not set in +opposition to God, the subject's good and the glory of the Lord +finally coincide. God's power of dominion is the concern of +theologians: the moralist is taken up with His power of jurisdiction, +from whence emanates the moral law. + +3. In the last chapter (s. ii., nn. 9, 10, pp. 120, 121), we stated +the moral law in these terms, that _God wills to bind His creatures to +certain lines of action_, not arbitrary lines, as we saw, but the +natural lines of each creature's being. The law thus stated takes in +manifestly a wider field than that of moral action. There is in fact +no action of created things that is not comprehended under this +statement. It comprises the laws of physical nature and the action of +physical causes, no less than the moral law and human acts. It is the +one primeval law of the universe, antecedent to all actual creation, +and co-eternal with God. And yet not necessary as God: for had God not +decreed from all eternity to create--and He need not have decreed +it--neither would He have passed in His own Divine Mind this second +decree, necessarily consequent as it is upon the decree of creation, +namely, that every creature should act in the mode of action proper of +its kind. This decree, supervening from eternity upon the creative +decree, is called the Eternal Law. + +4. This law does not govern the acts of God Himself. God ever does +what is wise and good, not because He binds Himself by the decree of +His own will so to act, but because of His all-perfect nature. His own +decrees have not for Him the force of a precept: that is impossible in +any case: yet He cannot act against them, as His nature allows not of +irresolution, change of mind, and inconsistency. + +5. Emanating from the will of God, and resting upon the nature of the +creature, it would seem that the Eternal Law must be irresistible. +"Who resisteth His will?" asks the Apostle. (Rom. ix. 19.) "The +streams of sacred rivers are flowing upwards, and justice and the +universal order is wrenched back." (Euripides, _Medea_, 499.) It is +only the perversion spoken of by the poet, that can anywise supply the +instance asked for by the Apostle. The thing is impossible in the +physical order. The rivers cannot flow upwards, under the conditions +under which rivers usually flow: but justice and purity, truth and +religion may be wrenched back, in violation of nature and of the law +eternal. The one thing that breaks this law is sin. Sin alone is +properly unnatural. The world is full of physical evils, pain, famine, +blindness, disease, decay and death. But herein is nothing against +nature: the several agents act up to their nature, so far as it goes: +it is the defect of nature that makes the evil. But sin is no mere +shortcoming: it is a turning round and going against nature, as though +the July sun should freeze a man, or the summer air suffocate him. +Physical evil comes by the defect of nature, and by permission of the +Eternal Law. But the moral evil of sin is a breach of that law. + +6. A great point with modern thinkers is the inviolability of the laws +of physical nature, _e.g_., of gravitation or of electrical induction. +If these laws are represented, as J. S. Mill said they should be, as +_tendencies_ only, they are truly inviolable. The law of gravitation +is equally fulfilled in a falling body, in a body suspended by a +string, and in a body borne up by the ministry of an angel. There is +no law of nature to the effect that a supernatural force shall never +intervene. Even if, as may be done perhaps in the greatest miracles, +God suspends His concurrence, so that the creature acts not at all, +even that would be no violation of the physical law of the creature's +action: for all that such a law provides is, that the creature, if it +acts at all, shall act in a certain way, not that God shall always +give the concurrence which is the necessary condition of its acting at +all. The laws of physical nature then are, strictly speaking, never +violated, although the _course_ of nature is occasionally altered by +supernatural interference, and continually by free human volition. But +the laws of physical nature, in the highest generality, are identified +with the moral law. The one Eternal Law embraces all the laws of +creation. It has a physical and a moral side. On the former it +_effects_, on the latter it _obliges_, but on both sides it is +imperative; and though in moral matters it be temporarily defeated by +sin, still the moral behest must in the end be fulfilled as surely as +the physical behest. The defeat of the law must be made good, the sin +must be punished. Of the Eternal Law working itself out in the form of +punishment, we shall speak presently. + +7. It is important to hold this conception of the Eternal Law as +embracing physical nature along with rational agents. To confine the +law, as modern writers do, to rational agents alone, is sadly to +abridge the view of its binding force. The rigid application of +physical laws is brought home to us daily by science and by +experience: it is a point gained, to come to understand that the moral +law, being ultimately one with those physical laws, is no less +absolute and indefeasible, though in a different manner, than they. + +It is hard for us to conceive of laws being given to senseless things. +We cannot ourselves prescribe to iron or to sulphur the manner of its +action. As Bacon says (_Novum Organum_, i., Aphorism 4): "Man can only +put natural bodies together or asunder: nature does the rest within." +That is, man cannot make the laws of nature: he can only arrange +collocations of materials so as to avail himself of those laws. But +God makes the law, issuing His command, the warrant without which no +creature could do anything, that every creature, rational and +irrational, shall act each according to its kind or nature. Such is +the Eternal Law. + +_Readings_.--Suarez, _De Legibus_, I., xii.; St. Thos., 1a 2ę, q. 90, +art. 2-4; _ib_., q. 91, art. 1, in corp., ad 1; _ib_., q. 93, art. 1, +in corp.; _ib_., q. 93, art. 4, in corp.; _ib_., q. 93, art. 5, in +corp.; _ib_., q. 93, art. 6, in corp.; Suarez, _De Legibus_, II., vi.; +Cicero, _De Legibus_, II., iv.; _id_., _De Republica_, iii. 22. + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +OF THE NATURAL LAW OF CONSCIENCE. + +SECTION I.--_Of the Origin of Primary Moral Judgments_. + + +1. It is an axiom of the schools, that whatever is received, is +received according to the manner of the recipient. We have spoken of +the law that governs the world, as that law has existed from eternity +in the mind of God. We have now to consider that law as it is received +in creatures, and becomes the inward determinant of their action. +Action is either necessary or free. The great multitude of creatures +are wholly necessary agents. Even in free agents, most of what is in +them, and much that proceeds from them, is of necessity, and beyond +the control of their will. Of necessary action, whether material or +mental, we shall have nothing further to say. It is governed by the +Eternal Law, but it is not matter of moral philosophy. Henceforth we +have to do with that law, only as it is received in free agents, as +such, to be the rule of their conduct. The agents being free, the law +must be received in a manner consonant with their freedom. It is +proper to a free and rational being to guide itself, not to be dragged +or pushed, but to go its own way, yet not arbitrarily, but according +to law. The law for such a creature must be, not a physical +determinant of its action, but a law operating in the manner of a +motive to the will, obliging and binding, yet not constraining it: a +law written in the intellect after the manner of knowledge: a law +within the mind and consciousness of the creature, whereby it shall +measure and regulate its own behaviour. This is the _natural law of +conscience_. It is the Eternal Law, as made known to the rational +creature, whereby to measure its own free acts. The Eternal Law is in +the Mind of God: the Natural Law in the minds of men and angels. The +Eternal Law adjusts all the operations of creatures: the Natural Law, +only the free acts of intellectual creatures. And yet, for binding +force, the Natural Law is one with the Eternal Law. On a summer +evening one observes the sunset on the west coast; the heavens are all +aglow with the sun shining there, and the waters are aglow too, +reflecting the sun's rays. The Eternal Law is as the sun there in the +heavens, the Natural Law is like the reflection in the sea. But it is +one light. + +2. It is called the _Natural Law_, first, because it is found, more or +less perfectly expressed, in all rational beings: now whatever is +found in all the individuals of a kind, is taken to belong to the +_specific nature_, or type of that kind. Again it is called the +_Natural Law_, because it is a thing which any rational nature must +necessarily compass and contain within itself in order to arrive at +its own proper perfection and maturity. Thus this inner law is +natural, in the sense in which walking, speech, civilization are +natural to man. A man who has it not, is below the standard of his +species. It will be seen that dancing, singing--at least to a pitch of +professional excellence--and a knowledge of Greek, are not, in this +sense, _natural_. The Natural Law is not _natural_, in the sense of +"coming natural," as provincial people say, or coming to be in man +quite irrespectively of training and education, as comes the power of +breathing. It was absurd of Paley (_Mor. Phil._, bk. i., c. v.) to +look to the wild boy of Hanover, who had grown up in the woods by +himself, to display in his person either the Natural Law or any other +attribute proper to a rational creature. + +3. We call this the _natural law of conscience_, because every +individual's conscience applies this law, as he understands it, to his +own particular human acts, and judges of their morality accordingly. +What then is conscience? It is not a faculty, not a habit, it is an +act. It is a practical judgment of the understanding. It is virtually +the conclusion of a syllogism, the major premiss of which would be +some general principle of command or counsel in moral matters; the +minor, a statement of fact bringing some particular case of your own +conduct under that law; and the conclusion, which is conscience, a +decision of the case for yourself according to that principle: _e.g._, +"There is no obligation of going to church on (what Catholics call) a +_day of devotion_: this day I am now living is only a day of devotion; +therefore I am not bound to go to church to-day." Such is the train of +thought, not always so explicitly and formally developed, that passes +through the mind, when conscience works. It is important to remember +that conscience is an act of intellect, a judgment, not on a matter of +general principle, not about other people's conduct, but about _my own +action_ in some particular case, and the amount of moral praise or +blame that I deserve, or should deserve, for it. As regards action +already done, or not done, conscience _testifies, accusing_ or +_excusing_. As regards action contemplated, conscience _restrains_ or +_prompts_, in the way of either obligation or counsel. + +4. Conscience is not infallible: it may err, like any other human +judgment. A man may be blind, if not exactly to his own action, at +least to the motives and circumstances of his action. He may have got +hold of a wrong general principle of conduct. He may be in error as to +the application of his principle to the actual facts. In all these +ways, what we may call the _conscientious syllogism_ may be at fault, +like any other syllogism. It may be a bad syllogism, either in logical +form, or in the matter of fact asserted in the premisses. This is an +_erroneous conscience_. But, for action contemplated, even an +erroneous conscience is an authoritative decision. If it points to an +obligation, however mistakenly, we are bound either to act upon the +judgment or get it reversed. We must not contradict our own reason: +such contradiction is moral evil, (c. v., s. iii., n. 3, p. 74.) If +conscience by mistake sets us free of what is objectively our bounden +duty, we are not there and then bound to that duty: but we may be +bound at once to get that verdict of conscience overhauled and +reconsidered. Conscience in this case has proceeded in ignorance, +which ignorance will be either _vincible_ or _invincible_, and must be +treated according to the rules provided in the matter of _ignorance_, +(c. iii., s. i., nn. 3-5, p. 27). An obligation, neglected in +invincible ignorance, makes a merely _material sin_. (c. iii., s. ii., +n. 7, p. 33.) + +5. There is another element of mind, often confounded under one name +with conscience, but distinct from it, as a habit from an act, and as +principles from their application. This element the schoolmen called +_synderesis_. [Footnote 10] + +[Footnote 10: On the derivation of this word, whether from [Greek: +synedaesis] or [Greek: syntaeresis], see _Athenęum_, 1877, vol. i., +pp. 738, 798, vol. iii. pp. 16, 48.] + +_Synderesis_ is an habitual hold upon primary moral judgments, as, +that we must do good, avoid evil, requite benefactors, honour +superiors, punish evil-doers. There is a hot controversy as to how +these primary moral judgments arise in the mind. The coals of dispute +are kindled by the assumption, that these moral judgments must needs +have a totally other origin and birth in the mind than speculative +first principles, as, that the whole is greater than the part, that +two and two are four, that things which are equal to the same thing +are equal to one another. The assumption is specious, but unfounded. +It looks plausible because of this difference, that moral judgments +have emotions to wait upon them, speculative judgments have not. +Speculative judgments pass like the philosophers that write them down, +unheeded in the quiet of their studies. But moral judgments are rulers +of the commonwealth: they are risen to as they go by, with majesty +preceding and cares coming after. Their presence awakens in us certain +emotions, conflicts of passion, as we think of the good that we should +do, but have not done, or of the evil that goes unremedied and +unatoned for. Commonly a man cannot contemplate his duty, a difficult +or an unfulfilled duty especially, without a certain emotion, very +otherwise than as he views the axioms of mathematics. There is a great +difference emotionally, but intellectually the two sets of principles, +speculative and moral, are held alike as necessary truths, truths that +not only are, but must be, and cannot be otherwise: truths in which +the _predicate_ of the proposition that states them is contained under +the _subject_. Such are called _self-evident propositions_; and the +truths that they express, _necessary truths_. The enquiry into the +origin of our primary moral judgments is thus merged in the question, +how we attain to necessary truth. + +6. The question belongs to Psychology, not to Ethics: but we will +treat it briefly for ethical purposes. And first for a clear notion of +the kind of judgments that we are investigating. + +"The primary precepts of the law of nature stand to the practical +reason as the first principles of scientific demonstration do to the +speculative reason: for both sets of principles are self-evident. A +thing is said to be self-evident in two ways, either _in itself_, or +_in reference to us. _In itself_ every proposition, the predicate of +which can be got from consideration of the subject is said to be +self-evident. But it happens that to one who is ignorant of the +definition of the subject, such a proposition will not be +self-evident: as this proposition, _Man is a rational being_, is +self-evident in its own nature, because to name man is to name +something rational; and yet, to one ignorant what man is, this +proposition is not self-evident. And hence it is that, as Boethius +says: "there are some axioms self-evident to all alike." Of this +nature are all those propositions whose terms are known to all, as, +_Every whole is greater than its part_; and, _Things which are equal +to the same thing are equal to one another_. Some propositions again +are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meaning of the +terms: as, to one who understands that an angel is not a body, it is +self-evident that an angel is not in a place by way of +circumscription; [Footnote 11] which is not manifest to others, who do +not understand the term." (St. Thos., 1a 2ę q. 94, art. 2, in corp.) + +[Footnote 11: _Circumscriptive_, which word is explained by St. Thos., +1a, q. 52. art. 1.] + +One more extract. "From the very nature of an intellectual soul it is +proper to man that, as soon as he knows what a whole is, and what a +part is, he knows that every whole is greater than its part; and so of +the rest. But what is a whole, and what a part, that he cannot know +except through sensory impressions. And therefore Aristotle shows that +the knowledge of principles comes to us through the senses." (St. +Thos., 1a 2ę, q. 51, art. 1, in corp.) + +7. Thus the propositions that _right is to be done, benefactors to be +requited_, are self-evident, necessary truths, to any child who has +learned by experience the meaning of _right_, of _kindness_, and of a +_return of kindness._ "Yes, but"--some one will say--"how ever does he +get to know what _right_ and _wrong_ are? Surely sensory experience +cannot teach him that." We answer, man's thoughts begin in sense, and +are perfected by reflection. Let us take the idea of _wrong_, the key +to all other elementary moral ideas. The steps by which a child comes +to the fulness of the idea of _wrong_ may be these. First, the thing +is _forbidden_: then one gets _punished_ for it. Punishment and +prohibition enter in by eye and ear and other senses besides. Then the +thing is _offensive_ to those we love and revere. Then it is _bad for +us_. Then it is _shameful, shabby, unfair, unkind, selfish, hateful to +God_. All these points of the idea of wrong are grasped by the +intellect, beginning with sensory presentations of what is seen and +felt and heard said. Again with the idea of _ought_. This idea is +sometimes said to defy analysis. But we have gone about (c. vi.) to +analyse it into two elements, _nature requiring, nature's King +commanding_. The idea of _wrong_ we analysed into a breach of this +natural requirement, and this Divine command or law. Primary moral +ideas, then, yield to intellectual analysis. They are of this style: +_to be done, as I wish to be rational and please God: not to be done, +unless I wish to spoil myself and disobey my Maker_. But primary moral +ideas, compared together, make primary moral judgments. Primary moral +judgments, therefore, arise in the intellect, by the same process as +other beliefs arise there in matters of necessary truth. + +8. Thus, applying the principle known as _Occham's razor_, that +"entities are not to be multiplied without reason," we refuse to +acknowledge any Moral Sense, distinct from Intellect. We know of no +peculiar faculty, specially made to receive "ideas, pleasures and +pains in the moral order." (Mackintosh, _Ethics_, p. 206.) Most of +all, we emphatically protest against any blind power being accredited +as the organ of morality. We cannot accept for our theory of morals, +that everything is right which warms the breast with a glow of +enthusiasm, and all those actions wrong, at which emotional people are +prone to cry out, _dreadful, shocking_. We cannot accept emotions for +arbitrators, where it most concerns reasonable beings to have what the +Apostle calls "enlightened eyes of the heart" (Ephes. i. 18), that we +may "know to refuse the evil and to choose the good." (Isaias vii. +15.) A judge may have his emotions, but his charge to the jury must be +dictated, not by his heart, but by his knowledge of the law. And the +voice of conscience, whatever feelings it may stir, must be an +intellectual utterance, and, to be worth anything in a case of +difficulty, a reasoned conclusion, based on observation of facts, and +application of principles, and consultation with moral theologians and +casuists. A subjective and emotional standard of right and wrong is as +treacherous and untrustworthy as the emotional justification of those +good people, who come of a sudden to "feel converted." + +9. It would be unnecessary, except for the wrong-headedness of +philosophers, to observe that conscience requires educating. As moral +virtue is a habit of appetite, rational or irrational, a formation +resulting from frequent acts; and as the child needs to be aided and +assisted from without towards the performance of such acts, in order +to overcome the frequent resistance of appetite to reason (c. v., s. +ii., n. 4, p. 71): so the springs of conscience are certain +intellectual habits, whereby the subject is cognisant of the +principles of natural law, and of their bearing on his own conduct, +habits which, like the habits of moral virtue, require to be formed by +acts from within and succour from without, since merely the rudiments +of the habit are supplied by nature. Even the first principles of +morality want formulating and pointing out to children, like the +axioms of geometry. The mother tells her little one: "Ernest, or +Frank, be a good boy:" while the schoolmaster explains to Master +Ernest that two straight lines cannot possibly enclose a space. There +is something in the boy's mind that goes along with and bears out both +the teaching of his master and his mother's exhortation: something +that says within him: "To be sure, those lines can't enclose a space:" +"Certainly, I ought to be good." It is not merely on authority that he +accepts these propositions. His own understanding welcomes and +approves them: so much so, that once he has understood them, he would +not believe the contrary for being told it. You would not persuade a +child that it was right to pull mother's hair; or that half an orange +was literally, as Hesiod says, "more than the whole." He would answer +that it could not be, that he knew better. + +10. On one ground there is greater need of education for the +conscience than for any other intellectual formation: that is because +of the power of evil to fascinate and blind on practical issues of +duty. Cicero well puts it: + +"We are amazed and perplexed by variety of opinions and strife of +authorities; and because there is not the same divergence upon matters +of sense, we fancy that the senses afford natural certainty, while, +for moral matters, because some men take one view, some another, and +the same men different views at different times, we consider that any +settlement that can be arrived at is merely conventional, which is a +huge mistake. The fact is, there is no parent, nor nurse, nor +schoolmaster, nor poet, nor stage play, to corrupt the judgments of +sense, nor consent of the multitude to wrench them away from the +truth. It is for minds and consciences that all the snares are set, as +well by the agency of those whom I have just mentioned, who take us in +our tender and inexperienced age, and ingrain and fashion us as they +will, as also by that counterfeit presentment of good, which lurks in +the folds of every sense, the mother of all evil, pleasure, under +whose seductive blandishments men fail to recognise the moral good +that nature offers, because it is unaccompanied by this itching desire +and satisfaction." (Cicero, _De Legibus_, i, 17.) + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., 1a, q. 79, art. 11-13; Plato, _Protagoras_, +325, 326; John Grote, _Examination of Utilitarian Philosophy,_ pp. +169, 207, 208; Cardinal Newman, _Grammar of Assent_, pp. l02-112. + + +SECTION II.--_Of the invariability of Primary Moral Judgments_. + + +1. The following narrative is taken from Grote's History of Greece, c. +81.: + +"It was a proud day for the Carthaginian general [Footnote 12] when he +stood as master on the ground of Himera; enabled to fulfil the duty, +and satisfy the exigencies, of revenge for his slain grandfather. +Tragical indeed was the consummation of this long-cherished +purpose.... All the male captives, 3,000 in number, were conveyed to +the precise spot where Hamilkar had been slain, and there put to death +with indignity, as an expiatory satisfaction to his lost honour. No +man can read the account of this wholesale massacre without horror and +repugnance. Yet we cannot doubt, that among all the acts of Hannibal's +life, this was the one in which he most gloried; that it realized in +the most complete and emphatic manner, his concurrent _aspirations of +filial sentiment, religious obligation, and honour as a patriot_; +[Footnote 13] that to show mercy would have been regarded as a mean +dereliction of these esteemed impulses.... Doubtless, the feelings of +Hannibal were cordially shared, and the plenitude of his revenge +envied, by the army around him. So different, sometimes so totally +contrary, is the tone and direction of the moral sentiments, among +different ages and nations." + +[Footnote 12: Hannibal, B.C. 409, therefore not the victor of Cannae.] +[Footnote 13: Italics mine.] + +We may supplement this story by another from Herodotus (iii., 38): + +"Darius, after he had got the kingdom, called into his presence +certain Greeks who were at hand, and asked, 'What he should pay them +to eat the bodies of their fathers when they died.' To which they +answered, that there was no sum that would tempt them to do such a +thing. He then sent for certain Indians, of the race called +Callatians, men who eat their fathers, and asked them, while the +Greeks were standing by, and knew by the aid of an interpreter all +that was said--'What he should give them to burn the bodies of their +fathers, at their decease?' The Indians exclaimed aloud, and bade him +forbear such language. Such is the way of men; and Pindar was right in +my judgment, when he said, 'Convention is king over all.'" + +2. If any one held that the natural law of conscience was natural in +the same way as the sense of temperature: if one held to the existence +of a Moral Sense in all men, settling questions of right and wrong, as +surely as all men know sweet things from bitter by tasting them: these +stories, and they could be multiplied by hundreds, abundantly suffice +to confute the error. There is no authentic copy of the moral law, +printed, framed, and hung up by the hand of Nature, in the inner +sanctuary of every human heart. Man has to learn his duties as he +learns the principles of health, the laws of mechanics, the +construction and navigation of vessels, the theorems of geometry, or +any other art or science. And he is just as likely to go wrong, and +has gone wrong as grievously, in his judgments on moral matters as on +any other subject of human knowledge. The knowledge of duties is +_natural_ (as explained in the previous section, n. 2), not because it +comes spontaneously, but because it is necessary to our nature for the +development and perfection of the same. Thus a man _ought_, so far as +he can, to learn his duties: but we cannot say of a man, as such, that +he _ought_ to learn geometry or navigation. If a man does not know his +duties, he is excused by ignorance, according to the rules under which +ignorance excuses (c. iii., s. i., nn. 3-5, p. 27). If a man does not +know navigation, there is no question of _excuse_ for what he was not +bound to learn, but he may suffer _loss_ by his want of knowledge. + +3. It was furthermore observed above (l.c.), that the _natural_ law +was so called as being found expressed more or less perfectly in the +minds of all men, and therefore being a proper element of human +nature. It remains to see how much this universal natural expression +amounts to. That is at once apparent from our previous explanation of +_synderesis_. (s. i., nn. 5, seq., p. 139.) Not a complete and +accurate knowledge of the natural law is found in all minds, far from +it; but _synderesis_ is found in all. This is apparent from Mr. +Grote's own phrases, "aspirations of filial sentiment," "religious +obligation," "honour as a patriot," _Parents are to be honoured, we +must do our duty to God and to our country_: there Hannibal was at one +with the most approved teachers of morality. Callatian and Greek +agreed in the recognition of the commandment, _Honour thy father and +thy mother_. That was the major premiss of them both, in the moral +syllogism (s. i., n. 3, p. 135), which ruled their respective +consciences. Their difference was upon the _applying minor_, as it is +called; the Greek regarding the dissolution of the body into its +elements by fire, and so saving it from corruption, as the best means +of honouring the dead: the Callatians preferring to raise their +parents as it were to life again, by making them the food of their +living children. Hannibal, again, had before his mind the grand +principle of retribution, that wrongdoing must be expiated by +suffering. But he had not heard the words "Vengeance is Mine;" and +mistakenly supposed it to rest with himself to appoint and carry out +his own measure of revenge. Whether he was quite so invincibly +ignorant on this point, as Grote represents, is open to doubt. At any +rate he was correct in the primary moral judgment on which he +proceeded. + +_Reading_.--St. Thos., 1a 2ę, q. 94, art. 6. + + +SECTION III.--_Of the immutability of the Natural Law_. + + +1. Besides printing, many methods are now in vogue for multiplying +copies of a document. Commonly the document is written out with +special ink on special paper: the copy thus used is called a +_stencil_; and from it other copies are struck off. We will suppose +the stencil to be that page of the Eternal Law written in the Mind of +God, which regulates _human acts_, technically so called. The copies +struck off from that stencil will be the Natural Law in the mind of +this man and of that. Now, as all who are familiar with copying +processes know too well, it happens at times that a copy comes out +very faint, and in parts not at all. These faint and partial copies +represent the Natural Law as it is imperfectly developed in the minds +of many men. In this sense, and as we may say _subjectively_, the +Natural Law is mutable, very mutable indeed. Still, as no one would +say that the document had been altered, because some copies of it were +bad, so it is not strictly correct to say that the Natural Law varies +with these subjective varieties. Appeal would be made to a full and +perfectly printed impression of the document, one that rendered the +stencil exactly. The Natural Law must be viewed in like manner, as it +would exist in a mind perfectly enlightened concerning the whole duty +of man, and exactly reproducing in itself that portion of the Eternal +Law which ordains such duty. Were such a mind to discern a natural +obligation to lie differently at two different times, all the relevant +circumstances being alike in both cases, and the moral solution +different, then only could the Natural Law be held to have changed. + +2. But this is clearly impossible. The conclusion of a geometrical +theorem is a truth for all time. There is no difference here between a +complicated theorem, having many conditions, and a simpler theorem +with fewer. It is indeed easier for a few than for many conditions to +be all present together: but the enunciation of the conclusion +supposes _all_ the conditions, whatever their number. The same in a +practical manner, as in the stability of a bridge. The bridge that +would stand in England, would stand in Ceylon. If it would not, there +must have occurred some change in the conditions, as the heat of the +tropical sun upon the girders. A point of casuistry also, however +knotty, once determined, is determined for ever and aye, for the +circumstances under which it was determined. The Natural Law in this +sense is absolutely immutable, no less in each particular application +than in the most general principles. We must uniformly pass the same +judgment on the same case. What is once right and reasonable, is +always right and reasonable, in the same matter. Where to-day there is +only one right course, there cannot to-morrow be two, unless +circumstances have altered. The Natural Law is thus far immutable, +every jot and tittle. + +3. No power in heaven above nor on earth beneath can dispense from any +portion of the Natural Law. For the matter of the negative precepts of +that law is, as we have seen, something bad in itself and repugnant to +human nature, and accordingly forbidden by God: while the matter of +the positive precepts is something good and necessary to man, +commanded by God. If God were to take off His command, or prohibition, +the intrinsic exigency, or intolerableness, of the thing to man would +still remain, being as inseparable from humanity as certain +mathematical properties from a triangle. Pride is not made for man, +nor fornication, nor lying, nor polygamy [Footnote 14]: human nature +would cry out against them, even were the Almighty in a particular +instance to withdraw His prohibition. What would be the use, then, of +any such withdrawal? It would not make the evil thing good. An evil +thing it would still remain, unnatural, irrational, and as such, +displeasing to God, the Supreme Reason. The man would not be free to +do the thing, even though God did not forbid it. It appears, +therefore, that the Divine prohibition, and similarly the Divine +command, which we have proved (c. vi., s. ii., nn. 10, 11, p. 121) to +be necessarily imposed in matters of natural evil and of naturally +imperative good, is imposed as a hard and fast line, so long as the +intrinsic good or evil remains the same. + +[Footnote 14: There is a theological difficulty about the polygamy of +the patriarchs, which will be touched on in _Natural Law_, c. vi., s. +ii., n. 4. p. 272.] + +4. There is, therefore, no room for Evolution in Ethics and Natural +Law any more than in Geometry. One variety of geometrical +construction, or of moral action, may succeed another; but the truths +of the science, by which those varieties are judged, change not. There +is indeed this peculiarity about morality, distinguishing it from art, +that if a man errs invincibly, the evil that he takes for good is not +_formally_ evil, or evil as he wills it, and the good that he takes +for evil is _formally_ evil to him. (c. iii., s. ii., n. 7, p. 33.) So +there is variation and possible Evolution in bare _formal_ good and +bare _formal_ evil, as ignorance gradually changes into knowledge; and +likewise Reversion, as knowledge declines into ignorance. Even this +Evolution and Reversion have their limits: they cannot occur in the +primary principles of morality, as we saw in the last section. But +morality _material_ and objective,--complete morality, where the +formal and material elements agree, where real wrong is seen to be +wrong, and real right is known for right--in this morality there is no +Evolution. If Hannibal offered human sacrifices to his grandfather +because he knew no better, and could not have known better, than to +think himself bound so to do, he is to be excused, and even praised +for his piety: still it was a mistaken piety; and the act, apart from +the light in which the doer viewed it, was a hideous crime. An +incorrupt teacher of morals would have taught the Carthaginian, not +that he was doing something perfectly right for his age and country, +which, however, would be wrong in Germany some centuries later, but +that he was doing an act there and then evil and forbidden of God, +from which he was bound, upon admonition, instantly to desist. +[Footnote 15] + +[Footnote 15: The author has seen reason somewhat to modify this view, +as appears by the Appendix. (Note to Third Edition.)] + +5. There are Evolution and Reversion in architecture, but not in the +laws of stability of structure, nor in the principles of beauty as +realized in building. A combination, ugly now, was not beautiful in +the days of Darius. Tastes differ, but not right tastes; and moral +notions, but not right moral notions. It is true that questions of +right and wrong occur in one state of society, that had no relevance +in an earlier state, the conditions of the case not having arisen. But +so it is in architecture; there are no arches in the Parthenon. The +principle of the arch, however, held in the age of Pericles, though +not applied. + +6. The progress of Moral Science is the more and more perfect +development of the Natural Law in the heart of man, a psychological, +not an ontological development. And Moral Science does progress. No +man can be a diligent student of morality for years, without coming to +the understanding of many things, for which one would look in vain in +Aristotle's _Ethics_ and _Politics_, or in Cicero, _De Officiis_, or +even in the _Summa_ of St. Thomas, or perhaps in any book ever +written. New moral questions come for discussion as civilization +advances. The commercial system of modern times would furnish a theme +for another De Lugo. And still on this path of ethical discovery, to +quote the text that Bacon loved, "Many shall pass over, and knowledge +shall be multiplied." (Daniel xii. 4.) + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., Supplement, q. 65, art. 1, in corp.; _ib_., q. +65, art. 2, in corp., and ad 1; Hughes, _Supernatural Morals_, pp. 67, +68, reviewed in _The Month_ for August, 1891, pp. 542, 543. + + +SECTION IV.--_Of Probabilism_. + + +1. Sometimes conscience returns a clear, positive answer as to the +morality of an act contemplated. True or false the answer may be, but +the ring of it has no uncertain sound. At other times conscience is +perplexed, and her answer is, _perhaps_, and _perhaps not_. When the +woman hid Achimaas and Jonathan in the well, and said to Absalom's +servants, "They passed on in haste" (2 Kings xvii. 17-21), did she do +right in speaking thus to save their lives? A point that has perplexed +consciences for centuries. A man's hesitation is sometimes subjective +and peculiar to himself. It turns on a matter of fact, which others +know full well, though he doubts; or on a point of law, dark to him, +but clearly ruled by the consent of the learned. In such cases it is +his duty to seek information from people about him, taking so much +trouble to procure it as the importance of the matter warrants, not +consulting ten doctors as to the ownership of one hen. But it may be +that all due enquiries fail. The fact remains obscure; or about the +law, doctors differ, and arguments conflict indecisively. What is the +man to do? Take the _safe_ course: suppose there is an obligation, and +act accordingly? This principle, put as a command, would make human +life intolerable. It is, moreover, false, when so put, as we shall +presently prove. Take the _easy_ course, and leave the obligation out +of count? This principle is more nearly correct than the other: but it +needs interpretation, else it may prove dangerously lax. + +2. To return to Achimaas and Jonathan and their hostess. Some such +reckoning as this may have passed through her mind: "Lying lips are an +abomination to the Lord: but is it a lie to put murderers off the +scent of blood?" To that question finding no answer, she may have made +up her mind in this way: "Well, I don't know, but I'll risk it." If +that were her procedure, she did not walk by the scientific lines of +Probabilism. The probabilist runs no risk, enters upon no uncertainty, +and yet he by no means always follows what is technically termed the +_safe_ course, that is, the course which supposes the obligation, +_e.g._, in the case in point, to have said simply where the men were. +How then does the probabilist contrive to extract certainty out of a +case of insoluble doubt? By aid of what is called a _reflex_ +principle. A _reflex_ is opposed to a _direct_ principle. A direct +principle lays down an obligation, as it would bind one who had a +perfect discernment of the law and of the facts of the case, and of +the application of the one to the other, and who was perfectly able to +keep the law. By a _reflex_ principle, a man judges of his own act, +taking account of the imperfection of his knowledge and the +limitations of his power. Probabilism steps in, only where a case is +practically insoluble to an agent upon direct principles. The +probabilist thereupon leaves the direct speculative doubt unsolved. He +relinquishes the attempt of determining what a man should do in the +case in question, who had a thorough insight into the lie of the law. +He leaves that aside, and considers what is his duty, or not his duty, +in the deficiency of his knowledge. Then he strikes upon the +principle, which is the root of Probabilism, _that a doubtful law has +no binding power_. It will be observed that this is a _reflex_ +principle. For objectively nothing is doubtful, but everything is or +is not in point of fact. To a mind that had a full grasp of the +objective order of things, there would be no doubtful law: such a mind +would discern the law in every case as holding or not holding. But no +human mind is so perfect. Every man has to take account of his own +limitations of vision in judging of his duty. The question for me is, +not the law absolutely, but the law as far as I can make it out. Our +proposition, then, states that when an individual, using such moral +diligence of enquiry as the gravity of the matter calls for, still +remains in a state of honest doubt as to whether the law binds, in +that mental condition it does not bind _him_. + +3. What the law does not forbid, it leaves open. Aristotle indeed +(_Eth_., V., xi., 1) says the contrary, that what the law does not +command (he instances suicide), it forbids. All that he seems to mean +is, that if there be an act which at times might appear advantageous, +and yet is never commanded, there is a presumption of the legislator +being averse to that act. Again, there are special occasions, in view +of which the legislator undertakes to regulate the whole outward +conduct of a man by positive enactment, as with a soldier on parade: +what is not there commanded, is forbidden. But these instances do not +derogate from our general proposition, which is proved in this way. +The office of law is not to loose, but to bind. It declares, not what +the subject may do, but what he must or must not. It does not bring +liberty, but restriction. Therefore, if any one wishes to assert a +restriction, he must go to a law to prove it. If he can find none, +liberty remains. The law is laid on liberty. Liberty is not the +outcome of law, but prior to it. Liberty is in possession. The burden +of proof rests with those who would abridge liberty and impose an +obligation. It is an axiom of law itself, a natural, not an arbitrary +axiom, that _better is the condition of the possessor_: which amounts +in this matter to another statement, also axiomatic, _that a law binds +not till it is promulgated_. But a law of which I have serious +outstanding doubts whether it exists at all, or, if existent, whether +it reaches my case, is for this occasion a law not duly promulgated to +me. Therefore it binds me not, and my liberty remains. + +4. It remains to consider what constitutes a _serious outstanding +doubt_. The word _outstanding_ has been already explained. It means +that we have sought for certain information, and cannot procure it. +Now what is a _serious_ doubt? It is a doubt founded on a _positive_ +opinion against the existence of the law, or its applicability to the +case in point, an opinion fraught with probability, _solid, +comparative, practical probability_. The doubt must not be mere +negative doubt, or ignorance that cannot tell why it doubts; not a +vague suspicion, or sentimental impression that defies all +intellectual analysis; not a mere subjective inability to make up +one's mind, but some counter-reason that admits of positive statement, +as we say, _in black and white_. It is true that many minds cannot +define their grounds of doubt, even when these are real. Such minds +are unfit to apply the doctrine of Probabilism to themselves, but must +seek its application from others. The opinion against the law, when +explicitly drawn out, must be found to possess a _solid_ probability. +It may be either an intrinsic argument from reason and the nature of +the case, or an extrinsic argument from the word of some authority: +but the reason or the authority must be grave. The opinion is thus +said to be _intrinsically_ or _extrinsically_ probable. The +probability must also be _comparative_. There is many an argument, in +itself a very good one, that perishes when we come to consider the +crushing weight of evidence on the other side. An opinion is +_comparatively_ probable, when after hearing all the reasons and all +the authorities on the other side, the said opinion still remains _not +unlikely_, which is all that we mean to say of an opinion here, when +we call it _probable_. In ordinary English, the word _probable_ means +_more likely than otherwise_, which is not the signification of the +Latin _opinio probabilis_. Lastly, the probability must be +_practical_: it must take account of all the circumstances of the +case. Practical probability is opposed to _speculative_, which leaves +out of count certain circumstances, which are pretty sure to be +present, and to make all the difference in the issue. Thus it is +speculatively probable that a Catholic might without sin remain years +without confession, never having any grievous sins to confess, +grievous sin alone being necessary matter for that sacrament. There is +no downright cogent reason why a man might not do so. And yet, if he +neglected such ordinary means of grace as confession of venial sin, +having it within reach, month after month, no one, considering "the +sin which surrounds us," would expect that man to go without grievous +scathe. In mechanics, there are many machines that work prettily +enough in speculation and on paper, where the inventors do not +consider the difficulties of imperfect material, careless handling, +climate, and other influences, that render the invention of no +practical avail. + +5. The safest use of Probabilism is in the field of property +transactions and of positive law. There is greatest risk of using it +amiss in remaining in a false religion. All turns upon the varying +amount of trouble involved in _moral diligence_ of enquiry, according +as the matter at issue is a point of mere observance or of vital +interest. + +6. The point on which the probability turns must be the lawfulness or +unlawfulness of the action, not any other issue, as that of the +physical consequences. Before rolling boulder-stones down a hill to +amuse myself, it is not enough to have formed a probable opinion that +there is no one coming up. That would be Probabilism misapplied. The +correct enquiry is: Does any intrinsic reason or extrinsic authority +make the opinion probable, that it is lawful for mere amusement to +roll down rocks with any belief short of certainty that no one will be +crushed thereby? The probability, thus turned on to the lawfulness of +the action, breaks down altogether. This explanation, borne in mind, +will save much misapprehension. + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +OF THE SANCTION OF THE NATURAL LAW. + +SECTION I.--_Of a Twofold Sanction, Natural and Divine_. + + +1. The sanction of a law is the punishment for breaking it. The +punishment for final, persistent breach of the natural law is failure +to attain the perfect state and last end of the human soul, which is +happiness. If existence be prolonged under this failure, it must be in +the contrary state of misery. This failure and misery is at once a +_natural result_ and a _divine infliction_. It is the natural result +of repeated flagrant acts of moral evil, whereby a man has made his +nature hideous, corrupted and overthrown it. (c. vi., s. i., nn. 4, 5, +p. 111.) For an end is gained by taking the means, and lost by neglect +of the means thereto. Now, as we have seen, happiness is an +intellectual act, the perfection of an intellectual or rational nature +(c. ii., s. ii., p. 6); and the means to it are living rationally: for +a reasonable being, to do well and fare well, must live by that +reason, which is the _form_ of his being. (c. vi., s. i., n. 4, p. +111.) Whoever therefore goes about contradicting the reason that is +within him (c. v., s. iii., n. 3, p. 74) is not in the way to attain +to happiness. Happiness the end of man, the creature of all others the +most complex, is not to be stumbled upon by chance. You may make two +stones lean upright one against the other by chance, but otherwise +than by a methodical application of means to the end you could not +support the spire of Salisbury Cathedral. + +2. Man's is a progressive nature (c. vi., s. i., nn. 2,3, p. 109), +himself being the director of his own progress. Other progressive +natures may be spoilt by their requirements being denied, and contrary +things done to them. Man has his requirements. It depends mainly on +himself whether he acts up to them or against them. If he acts against +them, he so far spoils himself; and once he is thoroughly spoilt by +his own doing, the final perfection of humanity is gone from him for +ever. It is the natural result. + +3. I have spoken (n. 1) of _repeated flagrant acts_: not that I would +ignore the evil _set_ of the will that results from one gross and +deliberate evil deed (see c. ix., s. ii., n. 6, p. 168): but because +the case is clearer where the acts have been multiplied. However we +must not omit to observe, that it is not any _vice_, or evil habit, +that formally unfits a man for his final happiness, but an actual evil +_set_ of the will, coming of actual sin unrepented of, which _set_ is +more decided, when that uncancelled sin is the last of many such, and +the outcome of a habit. But supposing an habitual sinner to have +repented, and his repentance to have been ratified by God, and that he +dies, not actually in sin, but before the habit of sin has been +eradicated (c. v., s. ii., n. 1, p. 69),--we may say of him, that his +"foot is set in the right way," that is, his will is actually right, +and the obstacle to happiness is removed. The evil habit in him is not +an actual adhesion of his will to evil, but a proneness to relapse +into that state. It is only remotely and potentially evil. It is a +seed of evil, which however will not germinate in the good and +blissful surroundings to which the soul has been transplanted, but +remain for ever sterile, or rather, will speedily decay. + +4. If we leave God out of morality, and take account only of the +_philosophical_ aspect of sin (c. vi., s. ii., n. 6, p. 119), we have +nothing further to say of the sanction than this, which has been said: +"Act against nature, and you will end by ruining your nature, and fail +of your final perfection and happiness." But now God comes in, the +giver of the law of nature; and the failure, already a natural result, +must henceforth be viewed also as a Divine chastisement. There is no +law without a sanction. There is no law, the giver of which can allow +it to be broken with impunity. A legislator who dispensed with all +sanction, would rightly be taken by young and old not to be in earnest +in his command. If then God must give a law to man whom He has created +(c. vi., s. ii., n. 9, p. 120), He must attach a sanction to that law; +and if the law is according to the exigency of human nature (c. vi., +s. ii., n. 11, p. 122), so will the sanction also be the natural +outcome of that exigency set at naught and that law broken. + +5. Our position gains by the consideration, that the object, in the +contemplation of which man's soul is to be finally and perfectly +blessed in the natural order, is the Creator seen through the veils of +His works. (c.ii., s.iv., p. 21.) This mediate vision of God, albeit it +is to be the work of a future existence, needs practice and +preparation in this life. God will not be discerned by the man who has +not been accustomed to look for Him. He will not be seen by the swine, +who with head to earth has eaten his fill of sensual pleasures, and +has cared for nothing better. He will not be seen by the covetous man +and the oppressor, who never identified His image hidden away under +the labour-stained dress of the poor. He will not be seen by the man, +who never looked up into His face in prayer here below. He will not be +seen by the earth-laden spirit, that cared nothing at all for God, +that hated the mention of His name, that proclaimed Him, or at least +wished Him, not to be at all. + +6. It will be said that this argumentation supposes the habits of +vice, contracted on earth, to remain in the soul after departure: but +there is no proof of that: nay of some vices--those that have more to +do with the body, as drunkenness--the habits cannot possibly remain, +seeing that the appetite wherein they were resident has perished with +the body. First, as regards the instance cited, I reply that we may +consider drunkenness in two ways, on the one hand as a turning to the +creature, on the other as a turning away from reason and the Creator. +The craving for liquor cannot remain in the soul after death exactly +as it was before, though it probably continues in some analogous form, +as a thirst for wild and irregular excitement: but the loathing and +horror of the ways of reason and of God, engendered by frequent +voluntary intoxication, still continues in the soul. And from this +observation we draw the general answer, that whereas in every sin, +whether sensual or spiritual, the most important part is played by the +will, and the will is a spiritual, not an organic faculty, a faculty +which is a main element of the soul whether in or out of the +body,--therefore the evil bent and inclination of the will, which sin +involves, must remain even in the departed spirit. Lastly, we may ask: +To what purpose is our free-will given us, if all souls, good and bad +alike, users and abusers of the liberty they had on earth, enter into +their long home all of one uniform and spotless hue? + +7. Thus then it comes to be, by order of nature and good consequence, +that the man who has abandoned God, goes without God; and he who has +shunned his last end and final good, arrives not unto it; and he who +would not go, when invited, to the feast, eats not of the same: and +whoso has withdrawn from God, from him God withdraws. "A curse he +loved, and it shall come upon him; and he would not have a blessing, +and it shall be far from him. He put on the curse like a garment, and +it has gone in like water into his entrails, and like oil into his +bones,--like a garment which covereth him, and like a girdle wherewith +he is girded continually." (Psalm cviii. 18, 19.) + +8. Conversely, we might argue the final happiness which attaches to +the observance of the law of nature. (c. ii., s. v., p. 26.) + +_Readings._--St. Thos., _Cont. Gent._, iii., cc. 140, 141, 143, 145. + + +SECTION II.--_Of the Finality of the aforesaid Sanction_. + + +1. By a _final_, as distinguished from an _eternal_ state, is here +meant the last state of existence in a creature, whether that state go +on for ever, in which case it is _final_ and _eternal_, or whether it +terminate in the cessation of that creature's being, which is a case +of a state _final_, but not _eternal_. Whether the unhappy souls of +men, who have incurred the last sentence of the natural law, shall +exist for eternity, is not a question for philosophy to decide with +certainty. The philosopher rules everything _a priori_, showing what +must be, if something else is. Of the action of God in the world, he +can only foretell that amount which is thus hypothetically necessary. +Some divine action there is, of which the _congruity_ only, not the +_necessity_, is apparent to human eyes: there the philosopher can tell +with _probability_, but not with _certainty_, what God will do. Other +actions of God are wholly beyond our estimate of the reasons of them: +we call them simply and entirely free. In that sphere philosophy has +no information to render of her own; she must wait to hear from +revelation what God has done, or means to do. Philosophers have given +_reasons of congruence_, as they call them, for the reprobate sinner +not being annihilated, and therefore for his _final_ punishment being +_eternal_. Those reasons go to evince the probability of eternal +punishment, a probability which is deepened into certainty by +revelation. We shall not enter into them here, but shall be content to +argue that a term is set to the career of the transgressor, arrived at +which he must leave hope behind of ever winning his way to happiness, +or ever leading any other existence than one of misery. + +2. The previous question has shown that some punishment must attend +upon violation of the natural law. Suppose a trangressor has suffered +accordingly for a certain time after death, what shall be done with +him in the end? If he does not continue to suffer as long as he +continues to be, then one of three things: he must either pass into +happiness, or into a new state of probation, or his very punishment +must be a probation, wherein if he behaves well, he shall be rewarded +with happiness at last, or if ill, he shall continue in misery until +he amend. All this speculation, be it understood, lies apart from +revelation. If then the sufferer passed out of this world, +substantially and in the main a good man, it is not unreasonable that, +after a period of expiatory suffering for minor delinquencies, he +should reach that happiness which is the just reward of his +substantial righteousness. But what of him who closed his career in +wickedness exceeding great? Mere suffering will never make of him a +good man, or a fit subject for happiness. But the suffering may be +probationary, and he may amend himself under the trial. Against that +hypothesis philosophers have brought _a priori_ arguments to show that +the period of probation must end with the separation of the soul from +the body. But waiving all such arguments, let us suppose that there +might be probation after probation even in the world to come. But some +human souls would continue obstinately and unrepentingly set in +wickedness, age after age, and probation after probation: for the +possible malice of the will is vastly great. What is to become of such +obstinate characters? It seems against the idea of probation, that +periods of trial should succeed one another in an endless series. It +would be a reasonable rule in a university, that an undergraduate who +had been plucked twenty-five times, should become ineligible for his +degree. Coming after so many failures, neither would the degree be any +ornament to him, nor he to the university. A soul cannot look for +seasons without end of possible grace and pardon to shine upon it. The +series of probations must end somewhere. And then? We are come round +to where we began. When all the probation is over, the soul is found +either in conformity with the natural law, which means ultimate +happiness, or at variance with the law, and becomes miserable with a +misery that shall never terminate, unless the soul itself ceases to +be. + +3. It may be asked, how much conformity to the natural law is +requisite and sufficient, to exempt a person at the end of his trial +from a final doom of misery, or to ensure his lasting happiness? The +question resolves itself into three:--how do sins differ in point of +gravity? is grave sin ever forgiven? is the final award to be given +upon the person's whole life, a balance being struck between his good +and evil deeds, or is it to be simply upon his moral state at the last +moment of his career of trial? + +4. It was a paradox of the Stoics, that all offences are equal, the +treading down of your neighbour's cabbage as heinous a crime as +sacrilege. (Horace, _Satires_, i., 3, 115-119.) But it is obvious that +there is a vast difference, as well _objectively_ in the matter of the +offence, _e.g_., in the instance just quoted from Horace, as also +_subjectively_ in the degree of knowledge, advertence, and will, +wherewith the offender threw himself into the sin. Thus offences come +to be distinguished as _grave_ and _light_: the latter being such as +with a human master would involve a reprimand, the former, instant +dismissal. Final misery is not incurred except by grave offending. + +5. The second question, whether grave sin is ever forgiven, cannot be +answered by philosophy. Of course the sinner may see by the light of +reason his folly and his error, and thereby conceive some sort of +sorrow for it, and retract, and to some extent withdraw his will from +it on natural grounds. This amendment of sin on its moral and +philosophical side may deserve and earn pardon at human hands. But the +offence against God remains to be reckoned for with God. Now God is +not bound to forgive without receiving satisfaction; and He never can +receive due satisfaction from man for the contempt that a deliberate, +grave, and flagrant violation of the moral law puts upon the Infinite +Majesty of the Lawgiver. The first thing that revelation has to teach +us is whether, and on what terms, God is ready to pardon grievous sin. + +6. The balance between deeds good and evil is not struck merely at the +instant of death. It is being struck continually; and man's final +destiny turns on how that balance stands at the close of his time of +probation. So long as he keeps the substance of the moral law, the +balance is in his favour. But one downright wilful and grievous +transgression outweighs with God all his former good deeds. It is a +defiance of the Deity, a greater insult than all his previous life was +a service and homage. It is as though a loyal regiment had mutinied, +or a hitherto decent and orderly citizen were taken red-handed in +murder. If however God deigns to draw the offender to repentance, and +to pardon him, the balance is restored. Thus everything finally +depends on man being free from guilt of grievous transgression at the +instant of death, or at the end of his period of probation, whenever +and wherever that end may come. + +_Reading_.--Lessius, _De perfectionibus divinis_, 1.xiii., c. xxvi., +nn. 183, seq. + + +SECTION III.--_Of Punishment Retrospective and Retributive_. + + +1. The doctrine of the last section might stand even in the mind of +one who held that all punishment is probational, and destined for the +amendment of him who undergoes it, to humble him, to awaken his sense +of guilt, and to make him fear to transgress again. On this theory of +punishment, the man who in his last probational suffering refuses to +amend, must be let drop out of existence as incorrigible, and so +clearly his final state is one of misery. The theory is not +inconsistent with _final_ punishment, but with _eternal_ punishment, +unless indeed we can suppose a creature for all eternity to refuse, +and that under stress of torment, a standing invitation to repentance. +It is however a peculiar theory, and opposite to the common tradition +of mankind, which has ever been to put gross offenders to death, not +as incorrigible, not simply as refuse to be got rid of, but that their +fate may be a _deterrent_ to others. Punishment, in this view, is +_medicinal_ to the individual, and _deterrent_ to the community. +Eternal punishment has been defended on the score of its _deterrent_ +force. Both these functions of punishment, the _medicinal_ and the +_deterrent_ function, are prospective. But there is asserted a third +function, which is retrospective: punishment is said to be +_retributive_. It is on this ground that the justification of eternal +punishment mainly rests. We are however here concerned, not with that +eternity, but in an endeavour to give a full and adequate view of +punishment in all its functions. + +2. If punishment is never _retributive_, the human race in all +countries and ages has been the sport of a strange illusion. Everyone +knows what _vengeance_ means. It is a desire to punish some one, or to +see him punished, not prospectively and with an eye to the future, for +his improvement, or as a warning to others, but retrospectively and +looking to the past, that he may suffer for what he has done. Is then +the idea of vengeance nothing but an unclean phantom? Is there no such +thing as vengeance to a right-minded man? Then is there an evil +element, an element _essentially_ and _positively_ evil, in human +nature. No one will deny that the idea, and to some extent the desire, +of vengeance, of retaliation, of retrospective infliction of suffering +in retribution for evil done, of what we learn to call in the nursery +_tit for tat_, is natural to mankind. It is found in all men. We all +respond to the sentiment: + + Mighty Fates, by Heaven's decree accomplish, + According as right passes from this side to that. + For hateful speech let speech of hate be paid back: + Justice exacting her due cries this aloud: + For murderous blow dealt let the murderer pay + By stroke of murder felt. + Do and it shall be done unto thee: + Old is this saying and old and old again. + +[Footnote 16: Ęschylus, _Choephori_, 316, seq. These lines embody the +idea on which the dramas of the Shakespeare of Greece are principally +founded. But when was a work of the highest art based upon an idea +unsound, irrational and vicious?] + +Nor must we be led away by Mill (_Utilitarianism_, c.v.) into +confounding retaliation, or vengeance, with self-defence. Self-defence +is a natural idea also, but not the same as retaliation. We defend +ourselves against a mad dog, we do not retaliate on him. Hence we must +not argue that, because self-defence is prospective, therefore so is +vengeance. + +3. A thing is _essentially_ evil, when there is no possible use of it +which is not an abuse. Not far different is the conception of a thing +_positively_ evil, evil, that is, not by reason of any deficiency, or +by what it is not, but evil by what it is in itself. Such an +essential, positive evil in human nature would vengeance be, a natural +thing for which there was no natural use, unless punishment may in +some measure be retributive. We cannot admit such a flaw in nature. +All healthy philosophy goes on the principle, that what is natural is +so far forth good. Otherwise we lapse into Manicheism, pessimism, +scepticism, abysses beyond the reach of argument. Vengeance +undoubtedly prompts to many crimes, but so does the passion of love. +Both are natural impulses. It would scarcely be an exaggeration to set +down one third of human transgressions to love, and another third to +revenge: yet it is the abuse in each case, not the use, that leads to +sin. If the matrimonial union were wicked and detestable, as the +Manicheans taught, then would the passion of love be an abomination +connatural to man. Such another enormity would be the affection of +vengeance, if punishment could never rightly be retributive. + +4. Aristotle, _Rhetoric_, I., x., 17, distinguishes two functions of +punishment thus: "Chastisement is for the benefit of him that suffers +it, but vengeance is for him that wreaks it, that he may have +satisfaction." Add to this the warning given to the commonwealth by +the example that is made of the offender, and we have the three +functions of punishment, _medicinal_, _deterrent_, and _retributive_. +As it is _medicinal_, it serves the _offender_: as it is _deterrent_, +it serves the _commonwealth_: as it is _retributive_, it serves the +_offended party_, being a reparation offered to him. Now, who is the +offended party in any evil deed? So far as it is a sin against +justice, an infringement of any man's right, he is the offended party. +He is offended, however, not simply and precisely by your violation of +the moral law, but by your having, in violation of that law, taken +away something that belonged to him. Consequently, when you make +restitution and give him back what you took away, with compensation +for the temporal deprival of it, he is satisfied, and the offence +against him is repaired. If you have maliciously burnt his house down, +you bring him the price of the house and furniture, together with +further payment for the fright and for the inconvenience of being, for +the present, houseless. You may do all that, and yet the moral guilt +of the conflagration may remain upon your soul. But that is no affair +of his: he is not the custodian of the moral law: he is not offended +by your sin, formally viewed as sin: nor has he any function of +punishing you, taking vengeance upon you, or exacting from you +retribution for that. But what if his wife and children have perished, +and you meant them so to perish, in the fire? Your debt of restitution +still lies in the matter which you took away. Of course it is a debt +that cannot be paid. You cannot give back his "pretty chickens and +their dam" whole and alive again. Still your inability to pay one debt +does not make you liable to that creditor for another debt, which is +part of a wholly different account. He is not offended by, nor are you +answerable to him for, your sin in this case any more than in the +former. + +5. We may do an _injury_ to an individual, commit a _crime_ against +the State, and _sin_ against God. The injury to the individual is +repaired by restitution, not by punishment, and therefore not by +vengeance, which is a function of punishment. There is no such thing +as vengeance for a private wrong, and therefore we have the precept to +forgive our enemies, and not to avenge ourselves, in which phrase the +emphasis falls on the word _ourselves_. The clear idea and strong +desire of vengeance, which nature affords, shows that there is such a +thing as vengeance to be taken by some one: it does not warrant every +form of vengeance, or allow it to be taken by each man for himself. It +consecrates the principle of retribution, not every application of the +principle. It is a point of _synderesis_, not of particular conduct. +The reader should recall what was said of the vengeance of Hannibal at +Himera. (c. viii., s. ii., p. 144.) + +6. It belongs to the State to punish _political sin_, or crime, and to +God to punish _theological sin_, which is sin properly so called, a +breach of the Eternal Law. The man who has burnt his neighbour's house +down, though he has compensated the individual owner, may yet be +punished by the State. The owner, acting in his capacity as citizen, +even when he has been compensated as an individual, may still hand him +over to the State for punishment. The arson was a violation, not only +of _commutative_, but of _legal_ justice (c. v., s. ix., nn. 3, 6, pp. +103, 106), a disturbance of the public peace and social order, an +outrage upon the majesty of the law. For this he may be punished by +the State, which is the guardian of all these things, and which has +jurisdiction over him to make laws for him, and to enforce their +sanction against him. Civil punishment, besides being deterrent, is +retributive for the breach of social order. It is the vengeance of the +commonwealth upon the disturber of the public peace. Whether the State +can punish on pure grounds of retribution, away from all hope or need +of deterring possible imitators of the crime, is a question irrelevant +to our present enquiry. Probably a negative answer should be returned. + +7. We come now to the punishment of sin by God, the Living +Reasonableness, the Head of the Commonwealth of Creation, the +Legislator of the Eternal Law, the Fountain of all Jurisdiction, Him +in whose hands rests the plenitude of the power to punish. An evil +deed may be no wrong to any individual man, no crime against the +State, but it must ever be an offence against God. It is a departure +from the order of man's progress as a reasonable being (c. v., s. +iii., n. 3, p. 74: c. vi., s. i., nn. 1-5, p. 109), which is founded +on the nature of God Himself (c. vi., s. i., n. 7, p. 113), of which +order God is the official guardian (c. vi., s. ii., nn. 8-10, p. 119), +and which is enjoined by God's Eternal Law. (c. vii., n. 3, p. 129.) +This law extends to all creation, rational and irrational, animate and +inanimate. It bids every creature work according to his or its own +nature and circumstances. Given to irrational beings, the law is +simply irresistible and unfailing: such are the physical laws of +nature, so many various emanations of the one Eternal Law. Given to +rational creatures, the law may be resisted and broken: sin is the one +thing in the universe that does break it. (c. vii., nn. 5-7, p. 130.) +A man may act in disregard of the Eternal Law on one or other of its +physical sides, and so much the worse for him, though he has not +broken the law, but merely ignored its operation, as when one eats +what is unwholesome. Much more shall he suffer for having broken the +law, in the only possible way that it can be broken, by sin. This +peculiar violation draws after it a peculiar consequence of suffering, +penal and retributive. If a man gets typhoid fever in his house, we +sometimes say it is a _punishment_ on him for neglecting his drains, +even when the neglect was a mere piece of ignorance or inadvertence. +It is an evil consequence certainly,--the law, which he thought not +of, working itself out in the form of disease. But it is not properly +punishment: no natural law has been really broken: there has been no +guilt, and the suffering is not retributive and compensatory. It does +not go to restore the balance of the neglect. It is a lamentable +consequence, not a repayment. As, when man wrongs his fellow-man, he +makes with him an _involuntary contract_ (c. v., s. ix., n. 6, p. +106), to restore what he takes away: so in sinning against God, man +makes another involuntary contract, to pay back in suffering against +his will what he unduly takes in doing his own will against the will +of the Legislator. As St. Augustine says of Judas (Serm. 125, n. 5): +"He did what he liked, but he suffered what he liked not. In his doing +what he liked, his sin is found: in his suffering what he liked not, +God's ordinance is praised." Thus it is impossible for the Eternal +Law, which bears down all so irresistibly in irrational nature, +finally to fail of its effect even upon the most headstrong and +contumacious of rational creatures; but, as St. Thomas says (1a 2ę, q. +93, art. 6, in corp.), "The defect of doing is made up by suffering, +inasmuch as they suffer what the Eternal Law prescribes for them to +the extent to which they fail to do what accords with the Eternal +Law." And St. Anselm (_Cur Deus homo_, nn. 14, 15): "God cannot +possibly lose His honour: for either the sinner spontaneously pays +what he owes, or God exacts it of him against his will. Thus if a man +chooses to fly from under the will of God commanding, he falls under +the same will punishing." Punishment is called by Hegel, "the other +half of sin." Lastly, they are God's own spoken words (Deut. xxxii. +35): "Vengeance is Mine, I will repay." + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., _Cont. Gent_., iii. 140, n. 5, Amplius; _ib_., +iii., 144, nn. 8, Per hoc, and 9, Est autem. + +For Plato's views on punishment see _Protag_. 324 A, B; _Gorgias_, +525; _Rep_. 380 B, 615; _Phaedo_, 113 E; _Laws_, 854 D; 862 D, E; 934 +A; 957 E. Plato recognizes only the _medicinal_ and the _deterrent_ +functions of punishment, and ignores the _retributive_. This is not to +be wondered at in one who wrote: "No one is wicked voluntarily; but it +is an evil habit of body and a faulty education that is the cause of +every case of wickedness" (_Timaeus_, 86 E; cf. _Laws_, 731 C, D), +which error receives a masterly confutation in Aristotle, _Ethics_, +III, v. + + + +CHAPTER X. + +OF UTILITARIANISM. + + +1. Though the name _utilitarian_ is an English growth of this century, +the philosophy so called probably takes its origin from the days when +man first began to speculate on moral matters. Bentham and the two +Mills, Austin, and George Grote, have repeated in England the +substance of what Protagoras and Epicurus taught in Greece, two +thousand years before. It is the system of Ethics to which all must +incline, who ignore the spiritual side of man's nature and his hopes +of a better world. It is a morality of the earth, earthy. + +2. Utilitarianism has not been formulated like the Athanasian Creed. +It is impossible to state it and combat it in a form to which all +Utilitarians will subscribe. Indeed, it is an amiable weakness of +theirs, when confronted with the grosser consequences that flow from +their theories, to run off to some explanation, true enough, but quite +out of keeping with the primary tenets of their school. We will take +what may be called a "mean reading" of the indications which various +Utilitarian thinkers afford of their mind and philosophy. These +authorities, then, teach two main heads of doctrine:-- + +(1) That the last end and final good of man lies in this world, and +consists in the greatest happiness of the greatest number of mankind, +happiness being taken to mean pleasure as well of the senses as of the +understanding, such pleasure as can be had in this world, along with +immunity from pain. (Mill's _Utilitarianism_, 2nd Ed., pp. 9, seq.) + +(2) That human acts are _right_ or _wrong_, according as they are +_useful_ or _hurtful_, that is, according as their consequences make +for or against the above-mentioned end of social happiness. + +3. Consequences, as Utilitarians very properly point out, are either +_general_ or _particular_. They add that, in pronouncing an action to +be good or evil according to its consequences, they mean the general +and not the particular consequences. In other words, they bid us +consider, not the immediate results of _this action_, but what would +be the result to society, if _this sort of action_ were generally +allowed. This point is well put by Paley (_Moral Philosophy_, bk. ii., +c. vii.: all three chapters, vi., vii., viii., should be read, as the +best explanation of the Principle of General Consequences): + +"You cannot permit one action and forbid another, without showing a +difference between them. Consequently the same sort of actions must be +generally permitted or generally forbidden. Where, therefore, the +general permission of them would be pernicious, it becomes necessary +to lay down and support the rule which generally forbids them.... The +assassin knocked the rich villain on the head, because he thought him +better out of the way than in it. If you allow this excuse in the +present instance, you must allow it to all who act in the same manner, +and from the same motive; that is, you must allow every man to kill +any one he meets, whom he thinks noxious or useless: ... a disposition +of affairs which would soon fill the world with misery and confusion, +and ere long put an end to human society." + +My contention is, not with the Principle of General Consequences, +which has a certain value in Ethics, and is used by many writers other +than Utilitarian, but with the two stated above, n. 2, which are +called the Greatest Happiness Principle and the Principle of Utility. + +4. Against the Greatest Happiness Principle I have these complaints: + +(1) Utilitarians from Paley to John Stuart Mill aver that their +teaching is no bar to any man hoping for and striving after the +happiness of the world to come. They say that such happiness cannot be +better attained than by making it your principal aim to improve all +temporal goods and dissipate all temporal evil. Their maxim in fact +is: "Take care of the things of earth, and the things of heaven will +take care of themselves." Whereas it was the very contrary teaching of +Him, whom moderns, who see in Him no higher character, still love to +call the greatest of moral teachers: "That which fell among thorns are +they who have heard, and going their way, are choked with the cares +and riches and pleasures of this life, and yield no fruit." (St. Luke +viii. 14.) + +(2) It will be said that these thorns grow of selfishness, and that +these cares are the cares of individual interest, whereas the +Utilitarian's delight and glory is to live, not for himself, but for +the commonwealth. But how can a man, who takes pleasure to be his +highest good and happiness, live otherwise than for himself? Here we +come upon the unobserved fault and flaw, which entirely vitiates the +Utilitarian structure. It is an union of two opposite and incompatible +elements. An old poet has said: + + Vinegar and oil in one same vessel pour, + They stand apart, unfriendly, all the more. + +(Aeschylus, _Agam_., 330, 331.) + +Utilitarianism consists of a still more unfriendly and unwholesome +mixture of two elements, both of them bad, and unable to stand +together, Hedonism and Altruism. Hedonism is the doctrine that the +main object and end of life is pleasure: which is the position laid +down in so many words by Mill (1. c.), that "actions are right in +proportion as they tend to promote happiness;" and "by happiness is +intended pleasure and the absence of pain." If Hedonism were sound +doctrine, the Pleasant and the Good would be identical, and the most +pleasant pleasure would ever be the best pleasure. That would take +away all distinction of _kind_ or _quality_ among pleasures, and +differentiate them only by intensity and duration. This was Paley's +doctrine, a fundamental point of Hedonism, and therefore also of the +Utilitarian philosophy. John Mill, very honourably to himself, but +very fatally to the system that he was writing to defend, parted +company with Paley. We have argued against Paley (c. iv., s. iii., nn. +3-5, p. 55), that there is a _better_ and a _worse_ in pleasures, +quite distinct from the _more_ or _less_ pleasurable, even if that +_more_ be taken _in the long run_ in this world. + +Again it may be considered that pleasure, even the best and highest, +is a sort of efflorescence from activity, and is for activity, not +activity for it; and better is the activity, whatever it be, than the +pleasure which comes thereof; wherefore no pleasure, as pleasure, can +be the highest good and happiness of man. + +Hedonism then is an error. But errors may be opposed to one another as +well as to the truth. Hedonism is opposed to Altruism in this way. A +man may take pleasure in seeing other people enjoy themselves. Nothing +is more common, except the pleasure taken in enjoying one's own self. +But if a man only feeds the hungry that he may have the satisfaction +of seeing them eat, is it the hungry or himself that he finally seeks +to gratify? Clearly, himself. That is the behaviour of the Hedonist, +he acts for his own pleasure even in his benevolence. The Altruist, on +the contrary, professes never to act for self, but for society. So +that society flourish, he is ready to be crushed and ruined, not in +the matter of his pleasure only, but even in that of his own good. +Selfishness, by which he means all manner of regard to self, is, upon +his conscience, the unforgiven sin. But Hedonism is selfishness in the +grossest form, being the mere pursuit in all things of pleasurable +feeling--feeling being always particular and limited to self, in +contradistinction to good, which is universal and diffuses itself all +round. The Hedonist seeks his own pleasure, where the Altruist forbids +him to take thought, let alone for his gratification, but even for his +good. Thus an Hedonist cannot be Altruist to boot; and, trying to +combine the two characters, the Utilitarian is committed to a +self-contradiction. + +If he relinquishes Hedonism, and holds to Altruism, pure and simple, +his position is not much improved. Altruism overlooks the fact, that +man, as compared with other men, is a _person_, the centre of his own +acts, not a _thing_, to be entirely referred to others. He is in +relation with others, as child, father, husband, master, citizen; but +these relations do not take up the whole man. There is a residue +within,--an inner being and life, which is not referable to any +creature outside himself, but only to the Creator. For this inner +being, man is responsible to God alone. The good of this, the "inner +man of the heart," is each individual's proper and primary care. +Altruism, and Utilitarianism with it, ignore the interior life of the +soul, and substitute human society, that is, ultimately, the +democratic State, in place of God. + +(3) Another confusion that the Greatest Happiness Principle involves, +is the mistaking the political for the ethical end of life. The +political end, which it is the statesman's business to aim at, and the +citizen's duty to subserve, is "the natural happiness of the +commonwealth, and of individuals as members of the commonwealth, that +they may live in it in peace and justice, and with a sufficiency of +goods for the preservation and comfort of bodily life, and with that +amount of moral rectitude which is necessary for this outward peace +and preservation of the commonwealth, and the perpetuity of the human +race." (Suarez, _De Legibus_, III., xi., 7.) This is all the good that +the Utilitarian contemplates. He is satisfied to make a good +_citizen_, a good _husband_, a good _father_, for the transactions of +this life. He has no concern to make a good _man_ up to the ethical +standard, which supposes the observance of the whole natural law, +duties to God, and duties within himself, as well as duties to human +society, and by this observance the compassing of the everlasting +happiness of the man's own individual soul. + +Against the Principle of Utility I find these charges: + +(1) It takes the sign and indication of moral evil for the evil +itself, as if the physician should take the symptom for the disease. +It places the wickedness of an act in the physical misery and +suffering that are its consequences. This is, I say, a taking of the +indication for the thing indicated. An act is bad in itself and by +itself, as being a violation of the rational nature of the doer (c. +vi., s. i.), and being bad, it breeds bad consequences. But the +badness of the act is moral; the badness of the consequences, +physical. There is an evident intrinsic irrationality, and thereby +moral evil, in such sins as intemperance, peevishness, and vanity. But +let us take an instance of an act, apparently harmless in itself, and +evil solely because of the consequences. Supposing one insists upon +playing the piano for his own amusement, to the disturbance of an +invalid who is lying in a critical state in the next room. Do the mere +consequences make this otherwise innocent amusement evil? Yes, if you +consider the amusement in the abstract: but if you take it as _this +human act_, the act is inordinate and evil in itself, or as it is +elicited in the mind of the agent. The volition amounts to this: "I +prefer my amusement to my neighbour's recovery," which is an act +unseemly and unreasonable in the mind of a social being. Utilitarians +fall into the capital error of ignoring the intrinsic value of an act, +and estimating it wholly by extrinsic results, because they commonly +follow the phenomenalist philosophy, which breaks away from all such +ideas as _substance_ and _nature_, and regards nothing but sequences +and coexistences of phenomena. To a phenomenalist the precept, _Live +up to thy nature_, can have no meaning. + +(2) Aristotle (_Ethics_, II., iv., 3) draws this distinction between +virtue and art, that "the products of art have their excellence in +themselves: it suffices therefore that they are of this or that +quality: but acts of virtue are not done virtuously according to the +quality of the thing done, but according to the state of mind of the +doer; first, according to his knowledge of what he was about; then, +according to his volition, as that was guided or not guided by the +proper motives of the virtue; thirdly, according to the steadiness and +fixedness of his will; whereas all these considerations are of no +account in a work of art, except the single one of the artist being +aware of what he was about." Elsewhere (_Ethics_, VI., iv., 2), he +says that virtue is distinguished from art as being _action_, not +_production_. The Principle of Utility confounds virtue with art, or +perhaps I should say, with manufactures. It judges conduct, as one +would shoemaking, by trial of the product, or net result. So far from +being solicitous, with Aristotle, that volition should be "guided by +the proper motives of the virtue" which there is question of +practising (c. v., s. viii., n. 4, p. 96: Ar. _Eth_., III., viii.), +Mill (_Utilitarianism_, p. 26) tells us that "utilitarian moralists +have gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has +nothing to do with the morality of the action." By _motive_ he +understands what we have called _the end in view_. (c. iii., s. ii., +n. 2, p. 31.) So that, if one man waits on the sick for the love of +God, and another in hope of a legacy, the morality of these two acts +is the same, just as it makes no difference to the usefulness of a +pair of boots, what motive it was that set the shoemaker to work. +True, Mill admits that the motive has "much to do with the worth of +the agent:" but that, he hastens to explain, is inasmuch as "it +indicates ... a bent of character from which useful, or from which +hurtful actions are likely to arise." Even so,--the shoemaker who +works to earn money for a carousal, is not likely to go on producing +useful articles so long as another, who labours to support his family. +Such is the moral difference that Mill places between the two men; one +instrument of production is longer available than the other. + +(3) Another well established distinction is that between _harm_ and +_injury_, injury being wilful and unjust harm. The housemaid, who in +arranging the room has burned your manuscript of "sugared sonnets," +has done you no injury, for she meant none, but how vast the _harm_ to +the author and to mankind! Harm is visible in the effects: but injury +only upon examination of the mind of the agent. Not so, however, the +Utilitarian thinks: harm being equal, he can make no difference +between a tyrant and a man-eating tiger. Thus George Grote says of a +certain murderous usurper of the kingdom of Macedon: "You discover +nothing while your eye is fixed on Archelaus himself.... But when you +turn to the persons whom he has killed, banished, or ruined--to the +mass of suffering that he has inflicted--and to the widespread +insecurity which such acts of iniquity spread through all societies +where they become known--there is no lack of argument which prompts a +reflecting spectator to brand him as [a most dangerous and destructive +animal, no] a disgraceful man." (Grote's _Plato_, ii., p. 108.) Why +Archelaus is described in terms of the tiger, and then branded as a +disgraceful man, we are at a loss to conceive, except in this way, +that the writer's philosophy forsook him at the end of the sentence, +and he reverted to the common sense of mankind. But he should have +either ended the sentence as suggested in the parenthesis, or have +been willing to call the man-eater of the Indian jungle, who has +"learned to make widows, and to lay waste their cities," _a +disgraceful tiger_; or lastly, he should have looked back, where he +declared it was vain to look, upon Archelaus himself, and discerned in +him that moral deformity, and contradiction of reason, whereof a brute +beast is incapable, but which is a disgrace and a stain upon humanity. + +A later writer, who presses Utilitarianism into the service of +Socialism, is plainer-spoken than Grote, and says bluntly: "To be +honestly mistaken avails nothing. Thus Herbert Spencer--who is under +the delusion that we have come into this world each for the sake of +himself, and who opposes, as far as he can, the evolution of +society--is verily an immoral man.... Right is every conduct which +tends to the welfare of society; wrong, what obstructs that welfare." +(Gronlund, _Co-operative Commonwealth_, pp. 226, 227.) Thus is +overlaid the difference between harm and injury, between physical and +moral evil: thus is the meaning of a _human act_ ignored: in this +abyss of chaos and confusion, which Utilitarianism has opened out, +Moral Philosophy finds her grave. + +(4) The Principle of Utility sees in virtue a habit of self-sacrifice, +useful to the community, but not naturally pleasant, and therefore not +naturally good and desirable, to him that practises it, but made +pleasurable and good and desirable to him by practice. (Mill, pp. +53-57.) In this way virtue becomes naturally a very good thing for +every one else but its possessor, but to him it is a natural evil, +inasmuch as it deprives him of pleasure, which natural evil by habit +is gradually converted into a factitious and artificial good, the man +becoming accustomed to it, as the proverb says, "like eels to +skinning." This theory is the resuscitation of one current among the +Sophists at Athens, and described by Plato thus.--The natural good of +man is to afford himself every indulgence, even at the expense of his +neighbours. He follows his natural good accordingly: so do his +neighbours follow theirs, and try to gratify themselves at his +expense. Fights ensue, till mankind, worried and wearied with +fighting, make a compact, each to give up so much of his natural good +as interferes with that of his neighbour. Human society, formed on +this understanding, enforces the compact in the interest of society. +Thus the interest of society is opposed to the interest of the +individual, in this that it keeps him out of his best natural good, +which is to do as his appetite of pleasure bids him in all things, +though it compensates him with a second-class good, by preventing his +neighbours from pleasure-hunting at his expense. If then his +neighbours could be restrained, and he left free to gratify himself, +that would be perfect bliss. But only a despot here or there has +attained to it. The ordinary man must pay his tax of virtue to the +community, a loss to him, but a gain to all the rest: while he is +compensated by the losses which their virtue entails upon them. + +Such was the old Athenian theory, which John Mill, the Principle of +Utility in his hand, completes by saying that by-and-bye, and little +by little (as the prisoner of Chillon came to love his dungeon), the +hampered individual comes to love, and to find an artificial happiness +in, those restrictions of his liberty, which are called Virtue. + +It was against this theory that Plato wrote his _Republic_, and, to +compare a little thing to a great, the whole account of moral good +being in consonance with nature, and of moral obligation rising out of +the nature of the individual man, as has been set forth in this brief +Text-book, may serve for a refutation of the perverse doctrine of +Utilitarianism. + +_Readings_.--Plato, _Republic_, pp. 338 E, 339 A, 343 C, D, E, 344 A, +B, C, 358 E, 359 A, B, 580 B, C. + + + * * * * * + + +PART III. NATURAL LAW. + + +We assume in Natural Law the preceding treatise on Ethics, and also +the principal truths of Natural Theology. + + + +CHAPTER I. + +OF DUTIES OF GOD. + +SECTION I.--_Of the Worship of God_. + + +1. _Worship_ is divided into _prayer_ and _praise_. To pray, and +present our petitions to the Most High, is a privilege; a privilege, +however, which we are bound to use at times, as the necessary means +for overcoming temptations and inclinations to evil. We praise and +adore God for His sovereign excellence, which excellence, +nevertheless, would found in us no positive duty if we stood free of +all dependence upon God. In such an hypothesis we should lie simply +under the negative duty of not thinking of God, speaking of Him, or +acting towards Him otherwise than with all reverence. So we should +behave to the Great Stranger, with civility, with admiration even and +awe, but not with cordiality, not with loyalty, not with homage, not +with love. Very different are our relations and our duties to God our +Lord, "in whom we live, move, and have our being." There is nothing in +us or about us, no positive perfection of ours whatsoever, that is not +His gift, and a gift that He is not giving continually, else it would +be lost to us. We are therefore bound in His regard, not merely to +abstention but to act. And first, for inward acts, we must habitually +feel, and at notable intervals we must actually elicit, sentiments of +adoration and praise, of thanksgiving, of submission, of loyalty and +love, as creatures to their Creator, and as vassals to their very good +Lord, for He is our Creator and Lord in the natural order, not to say +anything here of the supernatural filiation, by which, as the Church +says, "we dare" to call God "Our Father." + +2. We must also express these sentiments by outward act. All the signs +of reverence, which man pays to his human superior, must be paid to +God "with advantages": bowing passes into prostration, uncovering the +head into kneeling, kissing the hand into offering of incense: not +that these particular developments are necessary, but some such +development must take place. We shall not be content to think +reverential thoughts, but we shall say, or even sing, great things of +God's greatness and our indebtedness and duty: such a vocal exercise +is psalmody. We shall represent in symbolic action our dependence on +the Lord of life and death, and also our sinfulness, for which He +might justly strike us dead: such a representation is sacrifice. + +3. All this we must do, first, for the sake of our own souls, minds +and hearts, to quicken the inward sentiment of adoration and praise. +"Worship, mostly of the silent sort," worship, that finds no +expression in word or gesture,--worship away from pealing organs and +chants of praise, or the simpler music of the human voice, where no +hands are uplifted, nor tongues loosened, nor posture of reverence +assumed, becomes with most mortals a vague, aimless reverie, a course +of distraction, dreaminess, and vacancy of mind, no more worth than +the meditations of the Lancashire stone-breaker, who was asked what he +thought of during his work,--"Mostly nowt." + +4. Again, what the body is to the soul, that is exterior devotion to +interior. From the soul interior devotion springs, and through the +body it manifests itself. Exterior devotion, without the inward spirit +that quickens it, is worship unprofitable and dead: it tends at once +to corruption, like the body when the soul has left it. Interior +devotion, on the other hand, can exist, though not with its full +complement, without the exterior. So that it is only in the union of +the two together that perfect worship is given to God by men as men. +Upon which St. Thomas has this naļve remark, that "they who blame +bodily observances being paid to God, evidently fail to remember that +they themselves are men." + +Thus we pay tithe to God for soul and body, by acts of religion +interior and exterior. But man is, under God, the lord of this earth +and of the fulness thereof. He must pay tithe for that too by devoting +some portion of it to the direct service of God, to whom it all +primarily belongs. For "mine is the gold and mine the silver." (Aggeus +ii. 9.) Such are the words that God spoke through His prophet to +incite His people to restore his sanctuary. + +6. It is therefore not true to say that the sole reason of outward +worship is to move the worshipper to interior devotion. It is not true +that St. Peter's at Rome, and Cologne Cathedral, and the Duomo of +Milan, with all their wealth and elaborate ceremonial, exist and are +kept up solely because, things of earth as we are, we cannot be +depended upon to praise God lovingly within the white-washed walls of +a conventicle, or according to the simple ritual of the Society of +Friends. We would not, even if we could, pray habitually among such +surroundings, where we could afford to better them. We have before us +the principle of St. Thomas (1a 2ę, q. 24, art. 3, in corp.): + +"Since man's good consists in reason as in its root, the more actions +proper to man are performed under the direction of reason, the more +perfect will man's good be. Hence no one doubts that it belongs to the +perfection of moral good, that the actions of our bodily members +should be directed by the law of reason, ... as also that the passions +of the soul should be regulated by reason." + +This means, not merely that if the bodily members or the passions stir +at all, it is a good and desirable thing for them to be ruled by +reason; but further that it is a positive addition to human perfection +that they should stir and be active, provided reason guide them. +(_Ethics_, c. iv., s. i., n. 6, p. 45.) + +It certainly is an action proper to man to express in gesture, in +voice, in concert and company with his fellow-men, and by employment +of whatever is best and fairest and brightest under his command in the +material creation, his inward affections of loyalty, of homage and +devotion, of awe and reverence, of gratitude and love to his Creator. + +Good as these affections are in the heart of the worshipper, they +receive an external complement of goodness and perfection by being +blazoned forth in vocal utterance, singing, bending of knees,--by the +erection and embellishment of temples, and offerings of gold, silver, +precious stones, and incense,--and by men thronging those temples in +multitudes for social worship,--provided always that the inward +devotion of the heart be there, to put a soul into these outward +demonstrations and offerings. + +7. Concerning these religious observances interior and exterior, it is +as idle to pretend that they are _useful_ to Almighty God as it is +irrelevant to object that they are _useless_ to Him. Of course they +are useless to Him. All creation is useless to God. A Being who can +never receive any profit, increment, or gain, dwells not within the +region of utilities. Theologians indeed distinguish between intrinsic +and extrinsic glory, that is, between the glory which God gives +Himself by His own contemplation of His own essence, and the glory +which His creatures give Him. They say that God is thus capable of +extrinsic increment, to which increment the praise and worship of His +creatures is useful. But, after all, they are fain to avow that the +whole of this extrinsic increment and glory is no real gain to God, +giving Him nothing but what He had before in an infinitely more +excellent mode and manner from and of Himself. Thus it appears that +the extrinsic glory of God, to which the worship paid Him by man +contributes, is valued, not because it is properly _useful to Him_, +but because He is most properly and highly _worthy of it_. "Thou art +worthy, O Lord our God, to receive glory and honour and power: because +thou hast created all things, and for thy will they were, and have +been created." (Apoc. iv. II.) And being worthy of this glory, He +wills to have it, and does most strictly exact it, for which reason He +is called in the Scripture _a jealous God_. So those who reflect some +sparkle of God's Majesty, and under some aspect represent His person +upon the earth, as do princes, lay and ecclesiastical, have many +observances of honour and respect paid to them, which are not _useful_ +as supplying a _need_--for who needs a salute of twenty-one guns? +nevertheless their dignity is _worthy_ of them, and they require them +accordingly. + +8. What man feels strongly, he expresses in word and action. What all +men feel strongly, they express by meeting together for the purpose. +So that, if strong religious feeling is an element in every good and +reasonable man's character, it is bound to find expression, and that a +social expression. Men must worship together according to some +external form and ritual. God may reveal what He wills that ritual to +be. In fact He did give such a revelation and prescription to the +Jews. To Christians He has spoken in His Son, and still speaks in His +Church. Any other than the one sacrifice that He has instituted, or +any other public religious ritual than is approved by the religious +authority which He has established, is to Him of itself, and apart +from the invincibly erroneous devotion of them that pay it, an +abomination: for He has "not chosen it." Still we cannot say that, in +every possible state of things, God is bound to reveal the ritual that +He desires, or is bound Himself to designate the authority that shall +fix the ritual which alone He will accept and allow of. If the will of +God is not thus expressed, a ritual must still be drawn up. In a +matter that excites the mind, as religion does, and where a large +field is open for hallucination and eccentricity, it will not do to +have individuals parading methods of worship of their own invention. +Here the Greek maxim comes in, [Greek: tima tho daimonion katha tha +patria], "honour the Deity after the fashion of thy country." +Religious authorities must be set up, in the same way that the civil +power is set up. These authorities will determine, not the object, but +the outward manner of worship. Every great nation, or important member +of the human family, would come probably to have its own +characteristic rite; and within each rite there would be local +varieties. + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., _Contra Gentiles_, iii., 119; 2a 2ę, q. 81, +art. 4, in corp.; _ib_., q. 81, art. 7 _ib_., q. 84, art. 2: _ib_., q. +85, art. 1, in corp., ad 1, 3; _ib_., q. 91. + + +SECTION II.--_Of Superstitious Practices_. + + +1. Superstition is the abuse of religion. It is superstition, either +to worship false gods, or to worship the true God with unauthorized +rites, or to have dealings with wicked spirits, whether those spirits +have once animated human bodies or not. Of the first head, the only +avowed instance within our civilization is the Positivist worship of +the _Great Being_, that is, of the collective Worthies of Humanity, if +indeed it amounts to worship. The second head might have been +meditated by Archbishop Cranmer with advantage, when he was drawing up +the Edwardine Ordinal. Under the third head comes Spiritualism, which +we shall here not discuss in detail, but merely indicate certain +principles upon which it must be judged. + +2. "There is nothing superstitious or unlawful in simply applying +natural agencies to the production of certain effects, of which they +are supposed to be naturally capable.... We must consider whether +there is a fair appearance of the cause being able to produce the +effect naturally. If there is, the experiment will not be unlawful: +for it is lawful to use natural causes in order to their proper +effects." (2a 2ę, q. 96, art. 2, in corp., ad 1.) But this we must +understand under two provisos. First, that the "fair appearance" +spoken of be not opposed by a considerable force of evidence, whether +of authority or of reason, tending the other way: for in this matter, +which is not a mere matter of legality, it is not permissible to run +risks of becoming familiar with God's enemies. Secondly, that the +cause, though natural, be not morally prejudicial. Not even a natural +cause, brandy for instance, may be used to all its effects. Thus for +the mesmeric sleep, though that should be proved to be purely natural, +yet the weakening of the will thence ensuing, and the almost +irresistible dominion acquired by the operator over his patient, +render it imperative that such a remedy should not be applied without +grave necessity, and under an operator of assured moral character. + +3. St. Thomas continues in the place last quoted: "Wherefore, if there +is no fair appearance of the causes employed being able to produce +such effects, it needs must be that they are not employed to the +causation of these effects as causes, but only as signs, and thus they +come under the category of preconcerted signals arranged with evil +spirits." + +The modern Spiritualist is only too forward to avow his understanding +with the unseen powers; but he will have it that the spirits that he +deals with are good and harmless. We must prove the spirits by the +general effects of their communications--whether they be in accordance +with the known laws of morality, and the assured teachings of +religion, natural and revealed. Also we must consider, from what we +know from approved sources concerning God, and His holy angels, and +the spirits of the just, either already made perfect, or still +suffering for a time, whether they are likely to respond to such signs +as Spiritualists commonly employ. Also we must not ignore, what +revelation tells us, of an "enemy," a "father of lies," who "changes +himself into an angel of light," and who is ever ready, so far as it +is permitted him, to eke out curiosity, folly, and credulity, such as +he found in Eve. + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., 2a 2ę, q. 93; _ib_., q. 95, art. 4, in corp. + + +SECTION III.--_Of the duty of knowing God_. + + +1. Religious worship is bound to its object, and cannot possibly be +fixed in the hearts of men and the institutions of society, if the +object be doubtful and fluctuating. False religion has often been set +off with elaborate and gorgeous ceremonial, which has been kept up +even after the performers had come to see in all that light and lustre +a mere vain and unsubstantial show. Such were the rites of Roman +polytheism, as enacted by augurs and pontiffs, the colleagues of +Cicero and Cęsar. But though that worship was maintained, and even +augmented, for political purposes, without a creed, yet never could it +have arisen without some creed, however mistaken, earnestly held of +old. A firm interior conviction is the starting-point of all outward +worship. But if the modern living worshipper is without creed and +conviction; if he be a scoffer at heart, or at least a doubter; what a +hollow, horrid skeleton thing is his religion,--all the more horrid, +the grander its dress! That is not worship, but mummery. + +2. If then to worship God is a duty, as we have proved, it is a duty +likewise to know God. This supposes that God is knowable, a fact which +it does not lie within the province of this work to prove. To an +unknown God, all the worship we could render would be to build Him an +altar, without priest, prayer, or sacrifice, and so leave Him in His +solitude. God is knowable by the _manifestation_ of His works (Rom. i. +19); and where He is pleased to speak, by the _revelation_ of His +word. Apart from revelation--and, under a certain order of Providence, +God might have left us without revelation--we should study our Creator +as He is made manifest in the world around us, in the existence of +perishable things, in the order of the universe, in the region of +things eternally possible and knowable, in moral truths, in the mental +life and conscience of man. Philosophy would be our guide in the +search after God. Men with less leisure or ability for speculation +would acquiesce in the pronouncements of philosophers on things +divine; and, in the hypothesis which we are contemplating, Providence +would doubtless arrange for the better agreement and harmony of +philosophers among themselves. Their trumpet would not send forth so +uncertain a blast, were that the instrument, in the counsels of God, +whereby the whole duty of religion was to be regulated. As it is, we +know better than philosophy could teach us: for God hath spoken in His +Son. + +_Readings_.--_C. Gent_., i., 4; 1a 2ę, q. 91, art. 4, in corp. + + + +CHAPTER II. + +OF THE DUTY OF PRESERVING LIFE. + +SECTION I.--_Of Killing, Direct and Indirect_. + + +1. In a hilly country, two or three steps sometimes measure all the +interval between the basins of two rivers, whose mouths are miles +apart. In the crisis of an illness the merest trifle will turn the +scale between death and recovery. In a nice point of law and intricate +procedure, the lawyer is aware that scarcely more than the thickness +of the paper on which he writes lies between the case going for his +client or for the opposite party. To rail at these fine technicalities +argues a lay mind, unprofessional and undiscerning. _Hair-splitting_, +so far as it is a term of real reproach, means splitting the wrong +hairs. The expert in any profession knows what things to divide and +distinguish finely, and what things to take in the gross. Moral +Science in many respects gives its demonstrations, and can give them, +only "in the way of rough drawing," as Aristotle says. ([Greek: +pachulos kai tupo], _Ethics_, I., iii., 4.) But there are lines of +division exceeding fine and nice in natural morality no less than in +positive law. The student must not take scandal at the fine lines and +subtle distinctions that we shall be obliged to draw in marking off +lawful from unlawful action touching human life. + +2. _It is never lawful directly to kill an innocent man_. Understand +_innocent_ in the social and political sense, of a man who has not, by +any _human act_ (_Ethics_, c. i., n. 2, p. 1) of his own, done any +harm to society so grievous as to compare with loss of life. To kill, +or work any other effect, _directly_, is to bring about that death, or +other effect, willing the same, _either as an end desirable in +itself_, as when a man slays his enemy, whose death of its own sheer +sake is to him a satisfaction and a joy, or _as a means to an end_, as +Richard III. murdered his nephews to open his own way to the throne. +We must then in no case compass the death of the innocent, either +_intending_ it as an _end_, or _choosing_ it as a _means_. The +assertion is proved by these considerations. To kill a man is to +destroy the human nature within him: for, though the soul survives, he +is man no more when he is dead. Now to destroy a thing is to +subordinate that thing entirely to your self and your own purposes: +for that individual thing can never serve any other purpose, once it +is destroyed. The man that is killed is then subordinated to the +slayer, wholly given up, and as we say, _sacrificed_, to the aims and +purposes of him who slays him. But that ought not to be, for man is a +_person_. Body and soul in him make one person, one personal nature, +which _human personality_ is destroyed in death. Now it is the +property of a person to be what we may call _autocentric_, referring +its own operations to itself as to a centre. Every _person_--and every +intelligent nature is a person [Footnote 17]--exists and acts +primarily for himself. A _thing_ is marked off from a _person_ by the +aptitude of being another's and for another. We may venture to +designate it by the term _heterocentric_. A person therefore may +destroy a thing, entirely consume and use it up for his own benefit. +But he may not treat a person as a thing, and destroy that, either for +any end of pleasure that he finds in destroying it, or in view of any +gain or good, whereunto that destruction serves him as a means. + +[Footnote 17: The exception apparent in the Incarnation is not +relevant here.] + +3. In the above argumentation account has not been taken of God, to +whom for His sovereign dominion all created personalities stand in the +light of _things_, and may be destroyed at His pleasure. But account +has been taken of the State, to which the individual is subordinate as +a citizen, but not as a man and a person. It is permitted no more to +the State than to the individual ever to destroy the innocent +_directly_. + +4. An effect is brought about _indirectly_, when it is neither +_intended_ as an _end_ for its own sake, nor _chosen_ as a _means_ +making towards an end, but attaches as a circumstance concomitant +either to the end intended or to the means chosen. The case of a +circumstance so attaching to the means chosen is the only case that we +need consider here in speaking of _indirect_, _concomitant_, or +_incidental_ effects. The study of these incidents is of vast +importance to the moralist. Most cases of practical difficulty to +decide between right and wrong, arise out of them. They are best +illustrated in the manner of killing. That one matter, well worked +out, becomes a pattern for other matters in which they occur. +(_Ethics_, c. iii., s. ii., p. 31.) + +5. A man is killed _indirectly_, or _incidentally_, when he perishes +in consequence of certain means employed towards a certain end, +without his death being willed by the employer of those means, or in +any way serving that agent to the furtherance of the end that he has +in view. If a visitor to a quarry were standing on a piece of rock, +which a quarryman had occasion to blast, and the man fired the train +regardless of the visitor, the latter would be _incidentally_ killed. +Now incidental killing, even of the innocent, is not under all +circumstances unlawful. Where the end in view is in the highest degree +important, the means may be taken thereto, provided always that such +an issue as the shedding of innocent blood be not itself the means +discerned and elected as furthering the end: for no end however urgent +can justify the employment of any evil means. (_Ethics_, c. iii., s. +ii., nn. 3, 13, pp. 32, 36.) Suppose in the instance just given the +quarryman saw that, unless that piece of rock where the visitor stood +were blown up instantly, a catastrophe would happen elsewhere, which +would be the death of many men, and there were no time to warn the +visitor to clear off, who could blame him if he applied the explosive? +The means of averting the catastrophe would be, not that visitor's +death, but the blowing up of the rock. The presence or absence of the +visitor, his death or escape, is all one to the end intended: it has +no bearing thereon at all. + +6. We must then distinguish between _means_ and _circumstances_. The +means help to the end, the circumstances of the means do not. When the +end is of extreme urgency, circumstances may be disregarded: the means +become morally divested of them. So I have seen an island in a river, +a nucleus of rock with an environment of alluvial soil. While the +stream was flowing placidly in its usual course, the island remained +intact, both rock and earth. But when the water came rushing in a +flood, which was as though the island itself had gone speeding up the +river, the loose matter at its sides was carried away, and only the +central rock remained. The ordinary flow of the river past the island, +or the gentle motion of the island up-stream, keeping all its bulk, +represents a man acting for an end to which reason attaches no great +importance. He must then take a diligent review of all the +circumstances that have any close connection with his action, to see +if there is any that it would be wrong for him to will directly. And +if there is, he must abstain from willing it even indirectly: that is, +he must abstain from doing the action, which cannot be done without +that objectionable circumstance attending it. On the other hand, the +floating island being towed rapidly up-stream, with its loose sides +falling away, portrays the condition of one acting for a purpose of +imperative urgency: he considers the means to that end, and if they +are good, he concentrates his will upon them and uses them, +disregarding, or even deploring, but nowise willing or being +responsible for, the evil concomitants which go with those means, but +do not make for his end. Thus it is, that a circumstance which in +ordinary cases goes to make the adoption of certain means reasonable +or unreasonable, comes, in a case of great urgency, to weigh for +nothing in the balance of reason, owing to the extreme and crying +reasonableness of the end in view. Nor is this the end justifying the +means, for that unhappy circumstance is never a means to the end. +(_Ethics_, c. iii., s. ii., n. 8, p. 34.) + +7. To illustrate by a diagram: + +[Illustration: + + C + ( ) + U + | + | + A-----------------------------------E( )V +] + +A, the _agent_, a bead on a wire, can move only on the line AE, that +alone being the line of means to the end. + +EV, _reasonableness of end in view_, attracting A. + +UC, the amount of moral evil which the _untoward circumstance_ would +involve, if it were willed directly. This UC repels A, tending to jam +it on the line AE, which is absolutely rigid. + +AE, remoteness, difficulty, and uncertainty of the end in view. + +AU, remoteness of untoward circumstance from means chosen, which A is +just in the act of taking. Then, for lawful action, the reasonableness +required in the end in view is represented by the variation-- + +[Illustration: + UC . AE + EV *varies* ------- + AU +] + +We observe that when AU is zero, while UC . AE remains a finite +quantity (representing an appreciable evil), then EV becomes infinite: +that is to say, when the distance, difference, or distinction between +the evil circumstance and the means comes down to nothing at all, and +the evil thing actually is the very means taken, then an infinite +urgency of end in view would be requisite to justify the using of that +means: in other words, no end possible to man can ever justify an evil +means. + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., 2a 2ę, q.64, art. 6; Cardinal de Lugo, _De +Justitia et Jure_, disp. 10, n. 125. + + +SECTION II.--_Of Killing done Indirectly in Self-defence_. + + +1. On the question, whether it is lawful for one man to kill another +in self-defence, St. Thomas writes (2a 2ę, q. 64, art. 7): + +"There is nothing to hinder one act having two effects, of which one +only is within the intention [and election] of the doer, while the +other is beside his intention [and election, that is, is neither +intended as an end nor elected as a means].... From the act therefore +of one defending himself a twofold effect may follow, one the +preservation of his own life, the other the killing of the aggressor. +Now such an act, in so far as the preservation of the doer's own life +is intended, has no taint of evil about it, seeing that it is natural +to everything to preserve itself in being as much as it can. +Nevertheless, an act coming of a good intention may be rendered +unlawful, if it be not in proportion to the end in view. And +therefore, if any one uses greater violence than is necessary for the +defence of his life, it will be unlawful. But if he repels the +violence in a moderate way, it will be a lawful defence: for according +to the Civil and Canon Laws it is allowable _to repel force by force +with the moderation of a blameless defence_. Nor is it necessary to +salvation for a man to omit the act of moderate defence in order to +avoid the killing of another; because man is more bound to take +thought for his own life than for the life of his neighbour. But +because to kill a man is not allowable except by act of public +authority for the common good, it is unlawful for a man to intend +[that is, elect and choose as a means] to kill another man in order to +defend himself, unless he be one who has public authority, who +intending [electing] to kill a man in order to his own defence, refers +this to the public good." + +2. The right then of self-defence even to the shedding of blood +involves a mere exercise of indirect killing for a proportionably +grave cause. The cause in question is the defence of your own life, or +your friend's, or of some other good or possession that can weigh with +life, as the honour and inviolability of your person, or a large sum +of money. This must be in present danger of being taken away otherwise +than in due course of justice. The danger must be present, and even +imminent, not prospective. The right of self-defence even to the +grievous harming of the aggressor, endures only while the danger from +him is imminent, not when it is past, or the evil is already done. The +right supposes no moral obliquity, no formal injustice on the part of +the aggressor: he may be a madman making for you with a drawn sword. +Nay further, not even _material_ injustice--that is, the quality of an +act which would be _formally_ unjust, if only the agent knew what he +was about--is required. All that is requisite is that your life, or +something equivalent to life, be threatened, _not in due course of +law_. + +3. The essential idea of self-defence is that of stopping a +trespasser, one who, however innocently, is going about to trench on +that good which you have a right to maintain and reserve to yourself. +It is then no act of authority that you perform, but the dealing of +one private person with another. Indeed, the party stopped is hardly +regarded as a person: no account is taken of his demerits: he is +regarded simply as an abridger and diminisher of what you have a right +to preserve intact. You stop a man as you stop a horse, only with more +regard to _the moderation of a blameless self-defence_, not using more +violence than is necessary here and now to preserve what you have to +preserve. + +4. The stopping, unfortunately, has often to be done in a hurry: there +is no time to wait: for the next moment, unless you act promptly, it +will be all too late, or all to no purpose, to act at all. Being done +in a hurry, it has to be done in a rough-and-ready way, with such +instruments as are to hand: you cannot afford to be nice about the +means, carefully purifying them, and shaking off the dust of +objectionable circumstances. Now to stop a man in mid career all on a +sudden, to render him powerless where he was about to strike, +motionless in the direction whither he was about to go, and that in an +instant, is of common necessity a rude treatment, very dangerous to +him who experiences it, and under some conceivable circumstances +hopelessly fatal. Still the fatality--in plain words, the death of the +aggressor--is not _directly willed_. It is neither _intended_ as an +_end_, nor _chosen_ as a _means to an end_. It is not welcomed as an +end and desirable consummation: on the contrary, it is put up with +most reluctantly as coming from your act: for you, a private +individual, have no right to will and effect the death of any man, +however guilty, as will be proved hereafter. It is not chosen as a +means: for, formally as his death, it is no means to your end, which +was the averting of all present danger to your right. For that it was +enough to _stop_ the trespasser; and you chose the means as a +_stopping_ means, not as a _killing_ means. True, in stopping him you +killed him, but you did not kill him to stop him. You struck him to +stop him: that your blow was a mortal blow, was a circumstance which +you did not choose and could not help. All killing then in +self-defence is indirect. + +5. By this explanation, resting on St. Thomas--in opposition to +Cardinal de Lugo (_De Just. et Jure_. 10, 149) and others, who allow +killing in self-defence to be the actual means chosen, and therefore +directly willed--we save four grand positions in Moral Science: + +(a) The axiom, that _it is never lawful directly to take the life of +an innocent man_. For the person who perishes by occasion of your +defending yourself, may be innocent _formally_, and even _materially_ +also. + +(b) Likewise the axiom, that _it is never lawful for a private +individual to kill any one whatever_. We say, from a technical +standpoint, that he does not _kill_ but _arrests the onset of_ the +aggressor. + +(c) We are in hearty accord with the positive law of all civilized +countries, which views with extreme suspicion all deaths said to be +done in self-defence, the law being jealous of the blood of its +citizens, and reserving the shedding thereof to itself. We teach that +only by process of law can a man ever be directly slain, his death +made a means of, and the person, who strikes him, really willing and +seeking, exactly speaking, to kill him. + +(d) The initial error is revealed of a theory that we shall have to +combat at length hereafter, the theory of Hobbes and Locke, that the +power of the State is the mere agglomeration of the powers of the +individuals who compose it. It appears by our explanation that the +individual has no power strictly to take life in any case, or ever to +kill directly, as the State does when it executes a criminal. + +As a fifth point gained, we may mention the efficacious argument +afforded, as will presently be shown, against the acceptance of a duel +under any conceivable circumstances, a thesis otherwise not easy to +establish by reason. + +6. In view of the question of the origin of civil government, we must +carefully collect the differences between self-defence and punishment. +Death occasioned in self-defence is _indirect_: death inflicted as +punishment is _direct_. Punishment is an act of _authority_, of +_distributive justice_, which lies from ruler to subject (_Ethics_, c. +v., s. ix., n. 4, p. 104): self-defence is of equal against equal. +Punishment is _medicinal_ to him who suffers it, or _deterrent_ on +behalf of the community, or _retributive_ in the way of vengeance. +(_Ethics_, c. ix., s. iii., n. 4.) Self-defence is not on behalf of +the community, still less for the good of the aggressor, but for the +good of him who practises it and for the preservation of his right: +neither is it retributive and retrospective, as vengeance is, but +simply prospective and preventive of a harm immediately imminent. +Finally, the right to punish abides day and night: but the right of +self-defence holds only while instant aggression is threatened. + +7. These two diverse ideas of _self-defence_ and _vengeance_ were +confounded by the Greeks under the one verb [Greek: amunesthai]. They +are confounded by Mill, _On Utility_, in the fifth chapter where he +speaks (p. 77) of the "instinct of self-defence," which nine lines +below he converts into "the natural feeling of retaliation or +vengeance." It is a common but a grave mistake, and the parent of much +bad philosophy. + +_Reading_.--St. Thos., 2a 2ę, q. 64, art. 7. + + +SECTION III.--_Of Suicide_. + + +1. By suicide we shall here understand the _direct compassing of one's +own death_, which is an act never lawful. There is no difficulty in +seeing the unlawfulness of suicide for ordinary cases. The world could +not go on, if men were to kill themselves upon every slight +disappointment. But neither are they likely so to do. It is the hard +cases, where men are apt to lay violent hands on themselves, that put +the moralist on his mettle to restrain them by reasons. Why should not +the solitary invalid destroy himself, he whose life has become a +hopeless torture, and whose death none would mourn? Why should not a +voluntary death be sought as an escape from temptation and from +imminent sin? Why should not the first victims of a dire contagion +acquiesce in being slaughtered like cattle? Or if it be deemed +perilous to commit the departure from life to each one's private whim +and fancy, why not have the thing licensed under certificate of three +clergymen and four doctors, who could testify that it is done on good +grounds? + +2. To all these questions there is one good answer returned by Paley +on the principle of General Consequences. (_Ethics_, c. x., n. 3, p. +178.) + +"The true question of this argument is no other than this: May every +man who chooses to destroy his life, innocently do so? Limit and +distinguish the subject as you can, it will come at last to this +question. For, shall we say that we are then at liberty to commit +suicide, when we find our continuance in life becomes useless to +mankind? Any one who pleases, may make himself useless; and melancholy +minds are prone to think themselves useless when they really are not +so.... In like manner, whatever other rule you assign, it will +ultimately bring us to an indiscriminate toleration of suicide, in all +cases in which there is danger of its being committed. It remains, +therefore, to enquire what would be the effect of such a toleration: +evidently, the loss of many lives to the community, of which some +might be useful or important; the affliction of many families, and the +consternation of all: for mankind must live in continual alarm for the +fate of their friends, when every disgust which is powerful enough to +tempt men to suicide, shall be deemed sufficient to justify it." +(_Moral Philosophy_, bk. iv., c. iii.) + +A word in confirmation of Paley on the plan of the medico-clerical +certificate. There would be doctors, and I fear clergymen too, who +would get a name for giving these certificates easily: under their +hand many a patient might be smothered by his attendants with or +without his own consent. Many another wretch would consider, that if +the learned and reverend gentlemen empowered to license his departure +from life only felt what he had to endure, there would be no +difficulty about the certificate: so he would depart on presumed +leave. The whole effect would be to make men less tender of their own +lives, and by consequence of those of others, to the vast unsettling +of society. + +3. An argument from general consequences, however, does not go down +into the depths of things. There is always something morally crooked +and inordinate in an action itself, the general consequences whereof +are bad. It remains to point out the moral crookedness, inordination, +and unreasonableness, that is intrinsic to the act of suicide, apart +from its consequences. We find the inordination in this, that suicide +is an act falling upon undue matter, being an act destructive of that +which the agent has power over only to preserve. It is natural to +every being, animate and inanimate, to the full extent of its entity +and power, to maintain itself, and to resist destruction as long as it +can. This is the struggle for existence, one of the primary laws of +nature. Man has intelligence and power over himself, that he may +conduct his own struggle well and wisely. He may struggle more or +less, as he sees expedient, looking to higher goods even than +self-preservation in this mortal life: but he may not take that power +of managing himself, which nature invests him with for his +preservation, and use it to his own destruction. Should he do so, he +perverts the natural order of his own being, and thereby sins. +(_Ethics_, c. vi., s. i., nn. 1-5, p. 109.) + +4. It may be objected, that man is only bound to self-preservation so +long as life is a blessing; that, when the scale of death far +outweighs that of life in desirableness, it is cruelty to himself to +preserve his life any longer, and a kindness to himself to destroy it; +that in such a plight, accordingly, it is not unnatural for a man to +put himself, not so much out of life as out of misery. To this +argument it is sometimes answered that, whereas death is the greatest +of evils, it is foolish and wicked to resort to dying as a refuge +against any other calamity. But this answer proves too much. It would +show that it is never lawful even to wish for death: whereas under +many conditions, such as those now under consideration, death is a +consummation devoutly to be wished, and may be most piously desired, +as a gain and by comparison a good: as Ecclesiasticus says (xxx. 17): +"Better is death than a bitter life, and everlasting rest than +continual sickness." The truth seems to be, that there are many things +highly good and desirable in themselves, which become evil when +compassed in a particular way. The death of a great tyrant or +persecutor may be a blessing to the universe, but his death by the +hand of an assassin is an intolerable evil. So is death, as the +schoolmen say, _in facto esse_, and everlasting rest, better than a +bitter life, but not death _in fieri_, when that means dying by your +own hand. There the unnaturalness comes in and the irrationality. A +mother, watching the death agony of her son, may piously wish it over: +but it were an unmotherly act to lay her own hand on his mouth and +smother him. To lay violent hands on oneself is abidingly cruel and +unnatural, more so than if the suicide's own mother slew him. + +5. But though a man may not use actual violence against his own +person, may he not perhaps cease to preserve himself, abstain from +food, as the Roman noble did, in the tortures of the gout, and by +abstaining end them? I answer, a man's taking food periodically is as +much part of his life as the coursing of the blood in his veins. It is +doing himself no less violence to refuse food ready to hand, when he +is starving, on purpose that he may starve, than to open a vein on +purpose to bleed to death. This, when the food is readily accessible: +the case is otherwise when it is not procurable except by +extraordinary means. + +6. Another consideration. To destroy a thing is the exclusive right of +the owner and master of the same. If therefore man is his own master, +in the sense that no one else can claim dominion over him, may he not +accordingly destroy himself? The metaphysician will point out that +_master_ denotes a relation, that every relation has two terms, that +consequently a man cannot be his own master any more than he can be +his own father; and that, not owning himself, he may not destroy +himself. But, leaving this metaphysical argument for what it is worth, +we observe that man has a Master, Owner, Proprietor, and Sovereign +Lord, God Almighty. To take your own life is to usurp the dominion of +God. It is wronging the Lord of life and death. But none is wronged +against his will: God is willing that murderers should be hung, may He +not also be willing that men in misery should hang themselves? To this +query suffice it for the present to reply, that God governs us for our +good; and that capital punishment makes for the good of the community, +but never suicide. (c. viii., s. viii., n. 7, p. 349.) + +7. It was the doctrine of Aristotle and the Greeks, that the citizen +belongs to the State, and that therefore suicide was robbing the State +and doing it a formal injury. But no modern State takes this view of +its subjects. No modern mind would place suicide in the same category +of crime with robbing the Exchequer. + +8. The great deterrent against suicide, in cases where misery meets +with recklessness, is the thought, + + In that sleep of death what dreams may come!-- + +above all, the fear of being confronted with an angry God. Away from +belief in God's judgments and a future state, our arguments against +suicide may be good logic, but they make poor rhetoric for those who +need them most. Men are wonderfully imitative in killing themselves. +Once the practice is come in vogue, it becomes a rage, an epidemic. +Atheism and Materialism form the best _nidus_ for the contagion of +suicide. It is a shrewd remark of Madame de Stael: "Though there are +crimes of a darker hue than suicide, yet there is none other by which +man seems so entirely to renounce the protection of God." + +_Readings_.--Ar., _Eth_., III., vii., 13; _ib_., V., xi., nn. 1-3; St. +Thos., 2a 2ę, q. 64, art. 5; St. Aug., _De Civitate Dei_, i., cc. 26, +27; Paley, _Mor_. _Phil_., bk. iv., c. iii. + + +SECTION IV.--_Of Duelling_. + + +1. A duel may be defined: A meeting of two parties by private +agreement to fight with weapons in themselves deadly. The meeting must +be _by agreement_: a chance meeting of Montagues and Capulets, where +the parties improvise a fight on the spot is not a duel. The agreement +must be _private_; anything arranged by public authority, as the +encounter of David with Goliath, that in the legend of the Horatii and +Curiatii, or the _wager of battle_ in the Middle Ages is not a duel. +It is enough that the weapons be _in themselves deadly_, as swords or +pistols, though there be an express stipulation not to kill: but a +pre-arranged encounter with fists, with foils with buttons on, or even +perhaps with crab-sticks, is not a duel. + +2. The hard case in duelling is the case of him who receives the +challenge. Let us make the case as hard as possible. In a certain +army, every challenge sent to an officer is reported to a Court of +Honour. If the Court decide that it ought to be accepted, accept the +officer must, or lose his commission and all hope of military +distinction. In this army, say, there is an officer of high promise +who is believed to object to duels on conscientious grounds. An enemy +pretends to have been insulted, and challenges him, on purpose to see +him refuse and have to go down into the ranks, his career spoilt. The +Court of Honour rules that the duel must come off. Of this very case, +Reiffenstuel, a canonist of repute, about the year 1700, writes: + +"The answer is, ... that they who in such cases are so necessitated +and constrained to offer, or accept, a duel, as that unless they +offered, or accepted it, they would be held cowardly, craven, mean, +and unfit to bear office in the army, and consequently would be +deprived of the office that they actually enjoy, and support +themselves and their family by, or would for ever forfeit all hope of +promotion, otherwise their due and desert,--these I say in such a case +are free from all fault and penalty, whether they offer or accept a +duel." (In lib. v. decret., tit. 14, nn. 30, 31.) + +The author protests in his Preface that he wishes his opinions "all +and each to be subject to the judgment, censure, and correction of the +Holy Catholic Church." The opinion above quoted was condemned, word +for word as it was uttered, by Pope Benedict XIV. in 1752. + +Now for Reiffenstuel's reason. "The reason," he says, "is, because in +such a case as is supposed the acceptance and offering of a duel is an +absolutely necessary, and thereby a just and lawful, defence of your +reputation, or goods of fortune, and, by equivalence, even of your +life, against an unjust aggressor, who we suppose does you an injury, +and thereby gives you no choice but to call him out, or calls you out, +and accordingly assails you in words, &c. Hence, as for the needful +defence of reputation, or of goods of fortune of great consequence, it +is lawful, with the moderation of a blameless defence, to kill an +unjust aggressor, so it will be also lawful to offer and accept a +duel, and therein slay the other party." Reiffenstuel here evidently +supposes that killing done in self-defence is _direct_. Those who +agree with him on that point, proceed to draw differences between +self-defence and accepting a challenge. Of course the two are not the +same. The true difficulty for them lies in making out how the reasons +which justify self-defence in their view of it, do not also justify +the acceptance of a duel: how, if I may make another man's death a +means to the preservation of my vital right, I may not as well make +another man's risk of death and my own, which is all that a duel +amounts to, also a _means_, none other being at hand, to the +preserving of my no less vital right. This grave objection does not +touch us. We have denied that killing in self-defence is direct. On +the lines of that denial we meet Reiffenstuel's argument simply as +follows. + +3. In self-defence, the aggressor is slain _indirectly_. In a duel, +not indeed the death itself, or mutual slaughter of the combatants, is +_directly_ willed, but the risk of mutual slaughter is directly +willed. But we may not directly will the risk of that which we may not +directly do. And the combatants may not directly do themselves or one +another to death. Therefore they may not directly risk each his own +and his antagonist's life. But this risk is of the essence of a duel. +Therefore duelling is essentially unlawful. + +4. Such is the clenched fist, so to speak, of our argument. Now to +open it out, and prove in detail the several members. In self-defence, +neither the death of the aggressor nor the risk of his death is +directly willed, whereas the risk of death is directly willed in a +duel, which difference entirely bars the argument from self-defence to +duelling. For a duel is a means of recovering and preserving honour, +which is effected by a display of fortitude, which again consists in +exposing yourself to the risk of being killed, and, as part of the +bargain, of killing the other man. The risk to life is of the essence +of a duel: it only attains its end--of establishing a man's character +for courage--by being dangerous to life. Fortitude essentially +consists in braving death. (_Ethics_, c. v., s. viii., n. 1, p. 94.) +Deadly weapons, chosen because they are deadly and involve a risk of +life in fighting with such arms, are the apt and express means for +showing readiness to brave death. If the weapons were not deadly, +there would be no point in the duel. As a matter of fact, where our +definition of duel is verified, and weapons in themselves deadly are +used, the encounter cannot be other than dangerous, especially between +foes and where the blood is up. In the French army, where the +regimental fencing-master stands by, sword in hand, ready to parry any +too dangerous thrust, serious results still have occurred. If any man +will have it that short smooth-bore pistols at forty paces in a fog +are not to be counted dangerous weapons, all we can say is that MM. +Gambetta and De Fourton, the one being nearly blind, and the other +having lost an eye, did not fight a duel. In a duel then the danger of +being killed and of killing is _directly_ willed; it is the precise +_means chosen_ to the end in view. + +5. We have proved already that it is not lawful directly to procure +one's own death, nor the death of another innocent man. If any one +contends that his antagonist is not innocent, not even in a +_political_ sense (c. ii., s. i., n. 2, p. 203), we must here assume +against him, what we shall afterwards prove, that the guilty are not +to be _directly_ put to death except by public authority. But what we +may not directly bring about, we may not directly risk the occurrence +of. As I may not throw myself down a cliff, so neither may I walk +along the edge precisely for the chance of a fall. I may often walk +there _with_ the chance of falling, but not _because_ of the chance. +It will be said that the English love of fox-hunting and Alpine +climbing is largely owing to the element of danger present in those +amusements. But it is not the danger pure and simple, that is chosen +for amusement: it is the prospect of overcoming danger by skill. The +same may be said of Blondin on the tight-rope: it was his skill, not +his mere risk, that was admired. There are some risks that no skill +can obviate, as those of Alpine avalanches. We may face a mountain +slope where avalanches occur, but we must not hang about there because +of the avalanches, making our amusement or bravado of the chance of +being killed. That would be willing the risk of death _directly_, as +it is willed in duelling. + +_Readings_.--Paley, _Mor. Phil._, bk. iii., p. 2, c. ix.; St. Thos., +2a 2ę, q. 72, art. 3. + + + +CHAPTER III. + +OF SPEAKING THE TRUTH. + +SECTION I.--_Of the Definition of a Lie_. + + +1. "Let none doubt," says St. Augustine, "that he lies, who utters +what is false for the purpose of deceiving. Wherefore the utterance of +what is false with a will to deceive is unquestionably a lie." The +only question is, whether this definition does not contain more than +is necessary to the thing defined. The objective falseness of what is +said makes a _material_ falsehood: the will to utter what is false +makes a _formal_ falsehood (_Ethics_, c. iii., s. ii., n. 7, p. 33): +the will to create a false impression regards, not the falsehood +itself, but the effect to follow from it. If a person says what is not +true, but what he takes to be the truth, he tells indeed a material +lie, but at the same time he puts forth no _human act_ (_Ethics_, c. +i., n. 2, p. 1) of lying. If on the other hand he says what he +believes to be false, though it turns out true, he tells a formal lie, +though not a material one, and moreover, he does a _human act_ of +lying. But _human acts_ are the subject-matter of morality. The +moralist therefore is content to define the _formal lie_: the +_material_ aspect of the lie is irrelevant to his enquiry. A formal +lie is saying what one believes not to be true, or promising what one +intends not to perform: briefly, it is _speaking against one's mind_. + +2. We shall show presently that to speak against one's mind is +intrinsically, necessarily, and always evil. But when a thing is thus +evil in itself, there is no need to bring into the definition of the +act, from a moral point of view, the intention with which it is done. +There is no use in prying into ends, when the means taken is an +unlawful means for any end. If a person blasphemes, we do not ask why +he blasphemes: the intention is not part of the blasphemy: the +utterance is a sin by itself. But if a person strikes, we ask why he +strikes, to heal or to slay, in self-defence or in revenge. So, if +speaking against one's mind is a thing indifferent and colourless in +point of morality, and all depends on the intention with which we do +it, so that we may speak against our minds to put another off, but not +to deceive him, then certainly the intention to deceive must be +imported into the definition of lying. But if, as we shall prove +presently, the act of so speaking is by no means indifferent and +colourless, but is fraught with an inordinateness all its own, then +the intention may be left out of the question, the act is to be +characterised on its own merits, and _speech against one's mind_ is +the definition of a lie. + +3. Then, some one will say, it would be a lie for a prisoner in +solitary confinement to break the silence of his cell with the +exclamation, _Queen Anne is not dead_. The answer is simple: it takes +two to make a speech. A man does not properly speak to himself, nor +quarrel with himself, nor deal justly by himself. Not that it would be +a lie to deny the death of Queen Anne even in public: for speech is an +outward affirmation, the appearance of a serious will to apply +predicate to subject: but in this case there is no appearance of a +serious will: on the contrary, from the manifest absurdity of the +assertion, it is plain that you are joking and do not mean to affirm +anything. This perhaps is as far as we can go in permission of what +are called _lies in jest_. + +_Readings_.--St Thos., 2a 2ę, q. 110, art. 1. + + +SECTION II.--_Of the Evil of Lying_. + + +1. Human society cannot go on, if men are to be allowed +indiscriminately to lie to one another. Thucydides (iii., 83) gives as +the reason of the extravagant length to which faction ran in Greece in +his time: "For there was no power to reconcile the parties, no +plighted word reliable, no oath held in awe." Even in trifles no one +likes to be lied to, and we are not to do to our neighbour what we +would not have done to ourselves. The laws of good fellowship require +that we should "put away lying, and speak the truth every man with his +neighbour: for we are members one of another." (Ephesians iv. 25.) +This at least in ordinary circumstances. The same good fellowship +requires that in ordinary circumstances we should respect the lives +and property of our fellow-men. + +2. But it is lawful to take life in pursuance of the just judgment of +authority: it is lawful to seize upon property in self-preservation. +These exceptions stand very harmoniously with the well-being of +society, or rather are required by it, as we shall see later on. The +law against lying, so far as it is founded on the general prejudice +done to society by the shock of social confidence, and on the +particular annoyance of the party lied to, may seem to admit of +similar exceptions. Whoever has no reasonable objection to having life +and property taken from him in certain contingencies, can he +reasonably complain of any hurt or inconvenience that he may suffer +from a lie being told him at times? + +3. I put forward this difficulty, not as though it were without its +answer in the principle of General Consequences: still it is a +difficulty. Besides, if the whole harm of lying is in the unpleasant +effect wrought upon the deceived hearer, and the scandal and bad +consequences to society at large, it is a long way to go round to show +that lying is impossible to God. He in whose dominion are all the +rights and claims of man, is not to be restrained by the mere +reluctance of His creatures to be deceived, or by the general bad +effects of a lie upon the edifice of human credit. As Master He might +impose this annoyance upon the individual, these bad consequences upon +society: or by His Providence He might prevent their occurring, +whenever He willed in His utterances to swerve from the truth. The +only help for the argument for the Divine veracity on these grounds, +is to urge with Plato that none of the motives which lead men to lie +can ever find place in the mind of God: that a lie is a subterfuge, an +economy, a device resorted to under stress of circumstances, such as +can never serve the turn of the Supreme Being. But though God be +inaccessible to human reasons for departing from the truth, may He not +have higher reasons, mysterious, and unsearchable, for such a +deviation? It is long arguing out this point. Better bring the +discussion sharp round with the question: Is there not some element in +the Divine Nature itself, which makes it impossible for God to speak +false? + +4. Undoubtedly there is such an element, deep down, even at the root +of the sanctity of God. God is holy in that, being by essence the +fulness of all being and all goodness, He is ever true to Himself in +every act of His understanding, of His will, and of His power. By His +understanding He abidingly covers, grasps, and comprehends His whole +Being. With His will He loves Himself supremely. His power is +exercised entirely for His glory--entirely, but not exclusively, for +God's last and best external glory is in the consummated happiness of +His creatures. Whatever God makes, He makes in His own likeness, more +or less so according to the degree of being which He imparts to the +creature. And as whatever God does is like Him, and whatever God makes +is like Him, so whatever God says is like Him: His spoken word answers +to His inward word and thought. It holds of God as of every being who +has a thought to think and a word to utter: + + To thine own self be true, + And it must follow as the night the day, + Thou canst not then be false to any man. + +5. God's sanctity is in His being true to Himself. His veracity is +part of His sanctity. He cannot in His speech, or revelation of +Himself, contradict what He really has in His mind, without ceasing to +be holy and being no longer God. But the sanctity of intellectual +creatures must be, like their every other pure perfection, modelled on +the corresponding perfection of their Maker. Holiness must mean +truthfulness in man, for it means truthfulness in God. God's words +cannot be at variance with His thought, for God is essential holiness. +Nor can man speak otherwise than as he thinks without marring the +attribute of holiness in himself, that is, without doing wrong. + +6. To speak against one's mind is an act falling upon undue matter. +Words are naturally signs of thoughts. Not that the words of any given +language, as English or German, have any natural connection with the +thoughts that they express; but it is natural to men, natural to every +intellectual being, to have some mode of expressing his thoughts by +outward signs; and once a sign is recognized as the sign of a certain +thought, so long as the convention remains unrepealed, whoever uses +that sign, not having in his mind at the time the thought which that +sign signifies, but the contradictory to it, is doing violence to the +natural bond between sign and thing signified, by putting forward the +former where the latter is not behind it. And since the due and proper +matter for the sign to be put upon is the presence in the mind of the +thought signified, to make that sign where the opposite thought is +present, is, as St. Thomas says, an act falling upon undue matter. The +peculiar spiritual and moral inviolability of the connection between +word and thought, appears from the consideration which we have urged +of the archetype holiness of God. This then is the real, intrinsic, +primary, and inseparable reason, why lying, or speech in contradiction +with the thought of the speaker, is everywhere and always wrong. + +7. Grotius (_De Jure Belli et Pacis_, I. iii., c. i., nn. 11, seq.) +argues a lie to be wrong solely inasmuch as it is "in conflict with +the existing and abiding right of the person spoken to." If _right_ +here means something binding in _commutative justice_ (_Ethics_, c. +v., s. ix., n. 6, p. 106), we deny that any such right is violated by +what is called a _simple_ lie, that is, an untruth not in the matter +of religion, and not affecting the character, property, or personal +well-being of our neighbour. For if a simple lie is a violation of +commutative justice, it carries the obligation of restitution +(_Ethics_, c. v., s. ix., n. 6, p. 107); that is, we are bound to tell +the truth afterwards to the person that we have lied to, even in a +matter of no practical consequence,--quite a new burden on the +consciences of men. Again, if the bar to lying were the hearer's +right, whoever had dominion over another's right might lie to him; the +parent might lie to the child, the State to the citizen, and God to +man, a doctrine which, away from its application to God, Grotius +accepts. Lastly since _volenti non fit injuria_, the presumed +willingness of the listener would license all manner of officious and +jocose lies, as the authority of the speaker would sanction official +fabrications. Thus, what with official, and what with officious +speeches, it would be very hard to believe anybody. + +8. By our rejection of Grotius' theory we are enabled to answer +Milton's question: "If all killing be not murder, nor all taking from +another, stealing why must all untruths be lies?" Because, we say, +killing and taking away of goods deal with rights which are not +absolute and unlimited, but become in certain situations void; whereas +an untruth turns, not on another's right, but on the exigency of the +speaker's own rational nature calling for the concord of the word +signifying with the thought signified, and this exigency never varies. +_Untruth_ and _falsehood_ are but polite names for a _lie_. + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., 2a 2ę, q. 110, art. 3, in corp., ad. 4; _ib_., +q. 109, art. 2, 3, in corp.; Ar., _Eth_., IV., vii.; Plato, _Rep_., +382, 389 B, C. + + +SECTION III.--_Of the keeping of Secrets without Lying_. + + +1. There are _natural_ secrets, secrets of _promise_, and secrets of +_trust_. A _natural_ secret is all a man's own private history, which +he would not have made public, as also all that he discovers by his +own observation of the similar private history of his neighbours. If a +man finds out something about his neighbour, and, after he has found +it out for himself, the neighbour gets him to promise not to publish +it, that is a secret of _promise_. Lastly, if one man comes to +another, as to a lawyer, or a surgeon, for professional advice, or +simply to a friend for moral counsel, and in order thereto imparts to +him some of his natural secrets, those secrets, as they are received +and held by the person consulted, are called secrets of _trust_. This +latter kind of secret is privileged above the other two. A natural +secret, and also a secret of promise, must be delivered up on the +demand of an authority competent to inquire in the department where +the secret lies. But a secret of trust is to be given up to no +inquirer, but to be kept against all who endeavour to come by it, +except where the matter bodes mischief and wrong to a third party, or +to the community, and where at the same time the owner of the secret +cannot be persuaded to desist from the wrong. This proviso does not +hold for the _seal of confession_, which is absolutely inviolable. + +2. The main art of keeping a secret is, not to talk about it. If a man +is asked an awkward question, and sees no alternative but to let out +or lie, it is usually his own fault for having introduced the subject, +or encouraged the questioner up to that point. A wise man lets drop in +time topics which he is unwilling to have pressed. But there are +unconscionable people who will not be put off, and who, either out of +malice or out of stupidity, ply you with questions against all rules +of good breeding. This direct assault may sometimes be retaliated, and +a rude question met by a curt answer. But such a reply is not always +prudent or charitable, and would not unfrequently convey the very +information required. Silence would serve no better, for silence gives +consent, and is eloquent at times. There is nothing left for it in +such cases but to lock your secret up, as it were, in a separate +compartment of your breast, and answer according to the remainder of +your information, which is not secret, private, and confidential. This +looks very much like lying, but it is not lying, it is speaking the +truth under a _broad mental reservation_. + +3. _Mental reservation_ is an act of the mind, limiting the spoken +phrase so that it may not bear the full sense which at first hearing +it seems to bear. The reservation, or limitation of the spoken sense, +is said to be _broad_ or _pure_, according as it is, or is not, +indicated externally. A _pure mental reservation_, where the speaker +uses words in a limited meaning, without giving any outward clue to +the limitation, is in nothing different from a lie, and is wrong as a +lie is always wrong. A good instance is Archbishop Cranmer's oath of +fealty to the Pope, he having previously protested--of course out of +hearing of the Pope or the Pope's representative--that he meant that +oath in no way to preclude him from labouring at the reformation of +the Church in England, that is, doing all the evil work which Henry +VIII. had marked out for him in the teeth of the Roman Bishop. +[Footnote 18] Even _broad mental reservation_ is permissible only as a +last resource, when no other means are available for the preservation +of some secret which one has a duty to others, or grave reason of +one's own, to keep. + +[Footnote 18: Strype's _Cranmer_, i., pp 27, 28; _ib_., ii., +Appendices 5, 6; ed. Oxon., 1812.] + +4. The point to make out is that no lie is told. To speak under a +reservation is a lie, if it is speech against the mind of the speaker. +But how can it be aught else than speech against the mind, when the +heart thinks _yea_, and the tongue says _nay_? We answer that, in the +case contemplated, the thought of the heart is, _secrets apart, nay_; +and though the word on the lips is _nay_ simply, yet we must not take +that word as the whole locution, but as a mere text, to which the +situation of the speaker and the matter spoken of form a commentary, +legible to any observant eye. The word is an _annotated text; nay_ in +the body of the page, with _secrets apart_ inscribed in the margin. +The adequate utterance is the whole page, text and gloss together; +that speech answers to the thought in the speaker's mind; therefore it +is no lie. + +5. The essential requisite is that the gloss, _secrets apart_, be not +written in the speaker's private mind, but be outwardly and publicly +manifest in the matter spoken of, which must be one that clearly +admits of secrets, and in the circumstances of the speaker, who is +driven into a corner, and obliged to answer something, and yet cannot +by any prudent man be expected to answer out of the fulness of all the +knowledge that he may possibly possess. + +6. Nor let it be said that all confidence in the replies given to our +questions is hereby destroyed. For most questions are in matters that +do not admit of a secret. There the qualification, _secrets apart_, +which may be said to attach to all answers, has no value and meaning: +it is mathematically equal to zero; and we may take the answer in full +assurance just as it reaches our ear. Again, when a person volunteers +a statement unasked, he cannot be supposed to be reserving secrets. +But when delicate subjects are touched on, and inquiry is pushed to +extremity by an unauthorized questioner, _secrets apart_ is the +handwriting on the wall. + +7. But why is not this qualification spoken out with the tongue? +Sometimes it safely may be, and then it should be so added. But, as +the addition is unusual, our taking the trouble to express it would +often certify to the inquirer that his suspicions were correct, though +we ought not to tell him so. Our aim then must be to give such an oral +answer as we should return, were the suspicion quite unfounded. Our +questioner, if he is a prudent man, will piece out our phrase with the +addition, _secrets apart_; and he will understand that he can get +nothing out of us either way, which is exactly what we wish him to +understand. His unauthorized interrogatory has been met by speech that +amounts to silence, arguing indeed our prudence, but leaving him as +wise as before on the forbidden topic. If he is a thoughtless man, he +is deceived, not by any intention or election of ours, but indirectly +so far as we are concerned, an incidental deception which he has +brought on himself. + +8. This then is a convention that obtains, not of positive +institution, but dictated by nature herself, that on a matter which +admits of being secret, any answer elicited under stress of necessity +must be so construed, as that any grave secret that may be touched, +not being morally in the power of the respondent to reveal, shall be +taken to remain reserved. + +9. We may therefore sometimes avoid seeming to know what we know, or +to be what we are. But we may never of our own proper motion step +forward and court observation as being what we are not, or knowing +what is against or beyond our knowledge. We may dissemble +occasionally, but not simulate. The dissembler of a secret wishes for +obscurity and silence: he wants to have the eyes of men turned away +from him and their curiosity unroused. Whatever he says or does is to +divest the idea of there being anything particularly interesting about +him. But he who simulates--call him pretender, impostor, or quack--is +nothing, if not taken notice of. The public gaze is his sunshine: +obscurity gives him a deadly chill. His ambition is to appear out of +the ordinary, being really quite within common lines: the dissembler +is in some respect beyond the ordinary, but wishes not to show himself +otherwise than as an ordinary mortal with ordinary knowledge. The +pretender is on the offensive, challenging attention: the dissembler +is on his defence against notice. "Simulation," says Bolingbroke, "is +a stiletto, not only an offensive but an unlawful weapon, and the use +of it may be rarely, very rarely, excused, but never justified. +Dissimulation is a shield, as secrecy is armour: and it is no more +possible to preserve secrecy in the administration of public affairs +without dissimulation than it is to succeed in it without secrecy." +(_Idea of a Patriot King_.) + +_Readings_.--De Lugo, _De Just. et Jure_, 14, nn. 135, 141, 142; _The +Month_ for March, 1883; Lockhart's _Life of Scott_, v., 26. + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +OF CHARITY. + + +1. It is the difference between sensible apprehension and intellectual +knowledge, that the former seizes upon a particular object and it +only, as _this sweet_: the latter takes its object as the type of a +class of similars, _this and the like of this, this sweet as one of +the class of sweet things_. In like manner the love of passion, which +is the love of sense, regards one sole object. Titius is in love with +Bertha alone, not with woman in general. But an intellectual love is +the love of a type of beauty or goodness, of _this_ object and of +others as they approach in likeness to it. Whoever loves William from +an intellectual appreciation of his patriotism, in loving him loves +all patriots. Every animal loves itself with a brute, sensible love, +not a love to find fault with, nor yet a noble and exalted +sentiment--a love purely self-regarding, quite apart from the good +that is in self, but embracing self simply as self, and self alone. +This is the first love of self even in man. But over and above this +animal and sensible love, which no man lacks, there is in all men +worthy of the name a second self-regarding affection of an +intellectual cast, whereby a man loves himself as discerning with the +eye of his soul the excellence of his own nature--"how noble in +reason, how infinite in faculty, in form and moving how express and +admirable, in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a +god, the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals." Intellectual +self-complacence overflows from self to similars. It is not self-love, +it is love of the race, "the milk of human kindness," philanthropy. + +2. But man is a disappointing creature, after all a mere "quintessence +of dust," unless he can rise above himself by relation with some +superhuman being, and make his final fortune in some better region +than this world. Reason requires that we love ourselves, and love our +fellow-men, for and in order to the development of the highest gifts +and capacities that are in us. These are gifts and capacities divine, +preparing us to find our everlasting happiness in God. (_Ethics_, c. +ii., s. iv., n. 2, p. 22.) The love that we bear to ourselves and our +neighbour, in view of our coming from God and going to God, is called +the love of _charity_. Charity differs from philanthropy in looking +beyond the present life, and above creatures. A materialist and +atheist may possess philanthropy, but not charity. + +3. Beside the twofold love, animal and intellectual, which we bear +ourselves, we may also and should love ourselves with the love of +charity, seeing God's gifts in us, and desiring the perfection of +those gifts in a happy eternity occupied with God. The charity which +we should thus bear to ourselves is the model of that which we owe to +our neighbour, whom we are to love _as ourselves_, not with the same +intensity, but with the same quality of love, wishing him the good, +human and divine, temporal and eternal, which we wish for ourselves, +though not so earnestly as we wish it for ourselves. Our love for +ourselves is stronger than for our neighbour: for, if love comes of +likeness, much more does it come of identity. But by reason of the +vast preponderance of the good that is rational and eternal over that +which is material and temporal; and also by reason of the principle +laid down by St. Thomas, that "as to the sharing together of (eternal) +happiness, greater is the union of our neighbour's soul with our soul +than even of our own body with our soul" (2a 2ę, q. 26, art. 5, ad +2),--we are bound to love our neighbour's eternal good better than our +own temporal good, and in certain special conjunctures to sacrifice +the latter to the former. We have no duty and obligation of loving his +temporal good above our own temporal good. But it is often matter of +commendation and counsel to sacrifice our temporal interest to our +neighbour's. This sacrifice is no breach of the order of charity, +beginning at home: since what is resigned of material and perishable +profit is gained in moral perfection. Especially commendable is the +surrender of private good for the good of the community. Charity, or +philanthropy, taking this form, bears the name of patriotism and +public spirit. + +4. Charity, like material forces, acts in a certain inverse ratio to +the distance of the object. Other considerations being equal, the +nearer, the dearer. Nay, nearness and likeness to ourselves goes +further than goodness in winning our love. This is natural, and +charity presupposes nature, and follows its order. As we have more +charity for ourselves than for others whom we acknowledge to be better +men, so likewise for our kinsmen and intimate friends. We may put the +matter thus. Charity consists in wishing and seeking to procure for a +person the good that leads to God. One element is the intensity and +eagerness of this wish and search; another is the greatness of the +good wished. Now we wish those who are better than ourselves to be +rewarded according to their deserts with a greater good than +ourselves: but this wish is but lukewarm compared to the intensity of +our desire that we and our friends with us may attain to all the good +that we are capable of. + +5. The Christian precept to love our enemies is merely the enforcement +of a natural obligation. The obligation stands almost self-evident as +soon as it is cleared of misunderstanding. The love of enemies is not +based on the ground of their being hostile and annoying us. It would +be highly unnatural to love them on that score. Nor are we in duty +bound to show to one who hates us special offices of friendship, +except we find him in extreme need, _e.g._, dying in a ditch, as the +Good Samaritan found the Jew: otherwise it is enough that we be +animated towards him with that common charity, which we bear to other +men who are not further off from us than he is. If Lucius offend +Titius, there being no other tie between them than the tie of +friendship, Titius may, where the offence is very outrageous, +henceforth treat Lucius as a stranger. The question of scandal has +sometimes to be regarded, but that is an extrinsic circumstance to our +present subject. Nor are we concerned to say what is the better thing +for Titius to do, but to say all that he is bound to do. He is bound +to render himself as void of wilful malice, and as full of ordinary +courtesy and good feeling towards Lucius, as he is in the case of +Sempronius, a man whom he never heard of till this day. But if there +be some other antecedent tie between them besides the tie of +friendship,--for instance, if Titius and Lucius are two monks of the +same convent, two officers in the same regiment, two partners of one +firm,--Titius is no longer justified in treating Lucius as a stranger. +He must regard him with _ordinary_ charity; now ordinary charity +between two brother-officers, or two fellow-monks, is not the same as +between men who have no such tie one with another. This is why we laid +it down that we must be animated towards him who has offended us "with +that common charity, which we bear to other men _who are not further +off_ from us than he is." + +6. This then being the exact obligation, the same is easily +established. We must love our enemies, because the reasons given for +loving all mankind (nn. 1, 2) are not vitiated by this or that man +having treated us shamefully. The human nature in him still remains +good actually, and still more, potentially; and if good and hopeful, +to that extent also lovable. Nor is this lovableness a mere separable +accident. Rather, it is the offensive behaviour of the man that is the +separable accident. At that we may well be disgusted and abominate it. +But the underlying substance remains good, not incurably tainted with +that vicious accident. We must attend to the substance, which is, +rather than to the accident, which _happens_, and may be abolished. +Let us endeavour to abolish the accident, still so that we respect and +regard the substance. Let us seek for redress under the guidance of +prudence according to the circumstances of the case, but not for the +ruin of our enemy. Let us not render evil for evil, but even in +exacting a just satisfaction, make it of the nature of that +compensatory evil, which is by consequence good. Let us _be angry_ +with our enemy, but _sin not_ by hating him. (_Ethics_, c. iv., s. +iv., n. 3.) We may seek satisfaction for any _wrong_ we have suffered: +in grave cases we must have recourse to the State for that: but the +_sin_, if any, of our adversary is not our concern to punish or to +seek vengeance for. (_Ethics_, c. ix., s. iii., n. 4.) + +7. The same reasoning holds good even of _public enemies_, tyrants, +persecutors, anarchists, assassins. We must include them in our +prayers, wish for their conversion, and, though their case appear +hopeless, we must not damn them before their time. If we found one of +them dying by accident of cold or asphyxia, we should be bound by a +grave obligation to use all ordinary efforts to bring him round and +recover him. Still we may use our best efforts to bring them to +justice, even to capital punishment, according to the procedure of +public law established in the country, and not otherwise. We may also +with an _inefficacious_ desire, that is, a desire that finds no vent +in action, desire their death under an alternative thus, that either +living they may cease to do evil, or that God may call them away to +where the wicked cease from troubling. But we must not desire, nor be +glad of, their death by any unlawful means, for that were to +sympathise with crime. + +8. Real charity shows itself in action, succouring a neighbour in +need, which is sometimes a counsel, sometimes a duty. It is an axiom, +that _charity is not binding with grave inconvenience_. The gravity of +the inconvenience in prospect must be measured against the urgency of +the need to be relieved. A neighbour is technically said to be in +_extreme need_, when he is in imminent peril of deadly evil to soul or +body, and is unable to help himself. We are under severe obligation of +charity to succour any whom we find in this plight. + +9. By charity we give of our own to another: by justice we render to +another that which is his. Charity neglected calls for no restitution, +when the need that required it is past away: justice violated cries +for restitution, for what we have taken away from our neighbour +remains still his. The obligations of justice are negative, except for +the fulfilment of contracts: obligations in charity are largely +positive. (_Ethics_, c. v., s. ix., n. 7, p. 108.) + +_Readings_.--_C. Gent._, III., 117; 2a 2ę, q. 26, art. 4; _ib._, art. +7; _ib_., art. 8; 2a 2ę, q. 25, art. 8; _ib._, art. 9; _ib._, art. 6; +Ferrier, _Greek Philosophy_, Socrates, nn. 13, 26, 27, 29. (_Remains_, +vol. i., pp. 227, seq.) + + + +CHAPTER V. + +OF RIGHTS. + +SECTION I.--_Of the definition and division of Rights_. + + +1. A _right_ is that in virtue of which a person calls anything his +own. More elaborately, a right is a _moral power residing in a person, +in virtue whereof he refers to himself as well his own actions as also +other things, which stand referred to him in preference to other +persons_. A right is a _moral power_, as distinguished from physical +force or ability. It resides in a _person_, a being whom we call +_autocentric_, as distinguished from a _thing_, which is +_heterocentric_. (c. ii., s. i., n. 2, p. 203.) A person is his own, a +thing is another's. Every intellectual nature is a person except the +Humanity of Christ, an exception which does not concern us here. To +the Creator all created personalities are as things, but that again is +not our concern in this place, where we treat of the relations between +man and man. It will have to be noted hereafter with great emphasis, +that the _individual_ man is a _person_, not a thing and chattel, in +relation to the _State_, and consequently has rights against the +State. + +2. Every intellectual being has the attribute of _reflex +consciousness_. It may turn its regard in upon itself, and call itself +_me_, and its powers and activities _mine_. It certainly has the +physical ability of acting for self, and using its powers consciously +for its own ends. Does this physical ability represent also a _moral +power_? Is the agent justified in exercising it? and are his fellows +under a moral obligation of justice to leave him free to exercise it? +(_Ethics_, c. vi., s. i., nn. 5, 6, p. 111.) We have seen that +morality consists in acting up to one's own intellectual or rational +nature. Since then the calling oneself _me_, and one's power _mine_, +and the using those powers for purposes which one's reason approves, +is the distinguishing feature of an intellectual, or rational, and +personal being, that being is morally warranted so to act. He calls +himself his own, and his powers his own, and they are his own by the +very fact of his calling them so by a natural act. And, as justice is +to give to another his own, others are bound in justice to leave him +free to dispose of himself and his powers, at least within certain +limits. But this would be for man a barren freedom, were he not +empowered to lay hold of and make his own some things, nay many +things, outside of himself, for man is not self-sufficient, but has +many natural necessities, and many psychical cravings to boot. +Therefore man's right of preference extends, not only to his own +actions, but also to external things, which he may make his own to act +upon. + +3. Rights are either _connatural_ or _acquired_. Connatural rights +spring from the very being of a man, as he is a person. Such are the +rights to life, to honour, to personal liberty--that is, freedom to go +where you will--to civil liberty--that is, not being a slave--also the +rights to marry and to acquire property. Acquired rights spring from +some deed of man, annexing something to his personality. Such are the +rights to property, duly entered upon, to reputation, to the political +franchise, and all rights that come by contract. Acquired rights may +descend to heirs. + +4. Rights again are _alienable_ and _inalienable_, which division does +not coincide with the preceding. Those rights are inalienable, shorn +of which a man cannot work out his last end. Some rights are thus +permanently and universally inalienable, as the right to life: others +are so occasionally and for particular persons. + +5. The correlative of _right_ is _duty_: so that, wherever one man has +a right, his neighbours have a duty in justice to leave him free to +exercise the same. But the converse is not true, that wherever one man +has a duty towards another, that other has a right to its performance, +for there are duties of charity, which do not impart a corresponding +right, but only a _claim_. _Duties_ that correspond to _rights_ are +called by English moralists _perfect_ duties. _Duties_ answering to +_claims_ only they call _imperfect_. + +6. Of duties, some are _positive_, which bind _always, not for +always_, as the duty of adoring God. We are always bound to adore, we +are not bound to be always adoring. Other duties are negative, and +bind _always, for always_, as the duties of sobriety and chastity. The +former class of duties we may more easily be excused from, because +they can be deferred, and it is at times morally impossible to take +them up. But negative duty, as Mr. Gladstone has finely said, "rises +with us in the morning, and goes to rest with us at night: it is the +shadow that follows us wheresoever we go, and only leaves us when we +leave the light of life." + +7. Only a _person_ has rights, as appears by the definition of a +_right_. Again, only persons have duties, for they only have free +will. No one has duties without rights, and no man has rights without +duties. Infants and idiots, in whom the use of reason is impeded, +having notwithstanding rights, are said to have duties also +_radically_. Hence it is wrong to make an idiot commit what is in him +a _material_ breach of some negative duty, as of temperance. Positive +duties he is excused from. + +8. Some have taught that all human rights are consequences of duties; +a man having first a duty to perform, and then a right to the means +necessary to its performance. But this doctrine appears more pious +than probable. For, first, the type and example of sovereign right, +God, has no duties. (_Ethics_, c. vi., s. ii., n. 4, p. 130.) Then +again, a man may have a right conjoined with a duty--not of justice, +of course, but of some other virtue, as of religion--not to use that +right. But if rights were consequent upon duties, the right would +cease in such a case; and to pretend to exercise it would be a sin +against justice, which it is not. + + +SECTION II.--_Of the so-called Rights of Animals_. + + +1. Brute beasts, not having understanding and therefore not being +persons, cannot have any rights. The conclusion is clear. They are not +autocentric. They are of the number of _things_, which are another's: +they are chattels, or cattle. We have no duties to them,--not of +justice, as is shown; not of religion, unless we are to worship them, +like the Egyptians of old; not of fidelity, for they are incapable of +accepting a promise. The only question can be of charity. Have we +duties of charity to the lower animals? Charity is an extension of the +love of ourselves to beings like ourselves, in view of our common +nature and our common destiny to happiness in God. (c. iv., nn. 1, 2, +p. 239.) It is not for the present treatise to prove, but to assume, +that our nature is not common to brute beasts but immeasurably above +theirs, higher indeed above them than we are below the angels. Man +alone speaks, man alone hopes to contemplate for ever, if not--in the +natural order--the Face of his Father in Heaven, at least the +reflected brightness of that Divine Face. (_Ethics_, c. ii., s. iv., +nn. 3, 4.) We have then no duties of charity, nor duties of any kind, +to the lower animals, as neither to stocks and stones. + +2. Still we have duties _about_ stones, not to fling them through our +neighbour's windows; and we have duties _about_ brute beasts. We must +not harm them, when they are our neighbour's property. We must not +break out into paroxysms of rage and impatience in dealing with them. +It is a miserable way of showing off human pre-eminence, to torture +poor brutes in malevolent glee at their pain and helplessness. Such +wanton cruelty is especially deplorable, because it disposes the +perpetrators to be cruel also to men. As St. Thomas says (1a 2ę, q. +102, art. 6, ad 8): + +"Because the passion of pity arises from the afflictions of others, +and it happens even to brute animals to feel pain, the affection of +pity may arise in man even about the afflictions of animals. +Obviously, whoever is practised in the affection of pity towards +animals, is thereby more disposed to the affection of pity towards +men: whence it is said in Proverbs xii. 10: 'The just regardeth the +lives of his beasts, but the bowels of the wicked are cruel.' And +therefore the Lord, seeing the Jewish people to be cruel, that He +might reclaim them to pity, wished to train them to pity even towards +brute beasts, forbidding certain things to be done to animals which +seem to touch upon cruelty. And therefore He forbade them to seethe +the kid in the mother's milk (Deut. xiv. 21), or to muzzle the +treading ox (Deut. xxv. 4), or to kill the old bird with the young." +(Deut. xxii. 6, 7.) + +3. It is wanton cruelty to vex and annoy a brute beast _for sport_. +This is unworthy of man, and disposes him to inhumanity towards his +own species. Yet the converse is not to be relied on: there have been +cruel men who have made pets of the brute creation. But there is no +shadow of evil resting on the practice of causing pain to brutes _in +sport_, where the pain is not the sport itself, but an incidental +concomitant of it. Much more in all that conduces to the sustenance of +man may we give pain to brutes, as also in the pursuit of science. Nor +are we bound to any anxious care to make this pain as little as may +be. Brutes are as _things_ in our regard: so far as they are useful to +us, they exist for us, not for themselves; and we do right in using +them unsparingly for our need and convenience, though not for our +wantonness. If then any special case of pain to a brute creature be a +fact of considerable value for observation in biological science or +the medical art, no reasoned considerations of morality can stand in +the way of man making the experiment, yet so that even in the quest of +science he be mindful of mercy. + +4. Altogether it will be found that a sedulous observance of the +rights and claims of other men, a mastery over one's own passions, and +a reverence for the Creator, give the best assurance of a wise and +humane treatment of the lower animals. But to preach kindness to +brutes as a primary obligation, and capital point of amendment in the +conversion of a sinner, is to treat the symptom and leave unchecked +the inward malady. + +_Reading_.--St. Thos., 2a 2ę, q. 25, art. 3. + + +SECTION III.--_Of the right to Honour and Reputation_. + + +1. _Honour_ is the attestation of another's excellence. _Reputation_ +is the opinion of many touching another's life and conduct. Honour is +paid to a man to his face, whereas his reputation is bruited behind +his back. Honour is taken away by _insult_, reputation by +_detraction_. If the detraction involve a falsehood, it is called +_calumny_ or _slander_. The name _backbiting_, given to detraction, +points to the absence of the person spoken of. But no one meets with +an insult except where he is present, either in person or by his +representative. + +2. Both honour and reputation are goods that a man can call his own, +and has a right to, but on different titles. Honour, some honour at +least, appertains to a man simply for his being a man: reputation is +won by deeds. Honour is primarily a connatural right: reputation is +acquired. An entire stranger has no reputation, but a certain honour +is his due to start with. + +3. As there is a right to honour and a right to reputation, so insult +and detraction are sins, not against charity, but against commutative +justice, calling for restitution. (_Ethics_, c. v., s. ix., n. 6, p. +106.) We must tender an apology for an insult, and labour to restore +the good name that our detracting tongue has taken away. + +4. Calumny is a double sin, one sin against truth, and another sin, +the heavier of the two, against justice. If the blackening tale be +true, the first sin is absent, but the second is there. The truth of +the story is no justification for our publishing it. Though it is +wrong to lie, it is not always right to blurt out the truth, +especially when we are not asked for it. There are unprofitable +disclosures, unseasonable, harmful, and wrongful. But, it will be +said, does not a man forego his right to reputation by doing the evil +that belies his fair fame? No, his right remains, unless the evil that +he does, either of its own proper working or by the scandal that it +gives, be subversive of social order. If he has committed a crime +against society, he is to be denounced to the authorities who have +charge of society: they will judge him, and, finding him guilty, they +will punish him and brand him with infamy. If, again, he does evil, +though not immediately against society, yet in the face of society and +before the sun; he shocks the public conscience and rends his own +reputation. But the evil private and proper to himself that any man +works in secret, is not society's care, nor affects his social +standing, nor brings any rightful diminution to his good name. If all +our secret and personal offences are liable to be made public by any +observer, which of us shall abide it? Our character is our public +character; and that is not forfeit except for some manner of public +sin. + +5. Suppose a veteran, long retired, has made a name for military +prowess by boasting of battles wherein he never came into danger, is +the one old comrade who remembers him for a skulker and a runaway, +justified in showing him up? No, for that reputation, however +mendaciously got together, is still truly a good possession: it is not +a fruit of injustice, therefore it is no matter of restitution: nor is +it any instrument of injustice, which the holder is bound to drop: +thus, as he is not bound to forego it, now that he has got it, so his +neighbour may not rightfully take it from him. + +_Reading_.--St. Thos., 2a 2ę, q. 73, art. 1. + + +SECTION IV.--_Of Contracts_. + + +1. A _contract_ is a bargain productive of an obligation of +commutative justice in each of the contracting parties. A _bargain_ is +a consent of two wills to the same object. Thus a promise, before it +is accepted, is not a bargain. But even after acceptance a promise is +not a contract, for the promiser may not choose to bind himself in +justice, but only in good faith, while the promisee is under no +obligation whatever. + +2. There are such things as _implicit contracts_, attached to the +bearing of certain offices, whereby a man becomes his brother's +keeper. The liability contracted is limited by the nature of the +office: thus a physician is officially bound in justice as to his +patient's pulse, but not officially as to his purse. Where there is no +explicit contract, the duties which the subjects of a person's +official care have towards him are not duties of commutative justice. +Thus these _implicit contracts_ are not strictly contracts, as failing +to carry a full reciprocity. + +3. Contracts are either _consensual_ or _real_, according as they are +either complete by the mere consent of the parties, or further require +that something should change hands and pass from one to the other. +What contracts are consensual, and what real, depends chiefly on +positive law. No natural law can tell whether buying and selling, for +instance, be a consensual or a real contract. The interest of this +particular case is when the goods are lost in transmission: then +whichever of the two parties at the time be determined to be the +owner, apart from culpable negligence or contrary agreement of the +sender, he bears the loss, on the principle, _res perit domino_. + +4. Contracts are otherwise divided as _onerous_ and _gratuitous_. In +an onerous contract either party renders some advantage in return for +the advantage that he receives, as when Titius hires the horse of +Caius. In a gratuitous contract all the advantage is on one side, as +when Titius does not hire but borrows a horse. The Roman lawyers +further distinguish contracts, somewhat humorously, into _contracts +with names_ and _contracts without names_, or _nominate_ and +_innominate_, as anatomists name a certain bone the _innominate bone_, +and a certain artery the _innominate artery_. _Innominate contracts_ +are reckoned four: _I give on the terms of your giving_, otherwise +than as buying and selling,--to some forms of this there are English +names, as _exchange_ and _barter_: _I do on the terms of your doing: I +do on the terms of your giving: I give on the terms of your doing_. + +_Readings_.--De Lugo, _De Just. et Jure_, 22, nn. 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 16, +17. For buying and selling and the frauds incident thereto, Paley, +_Moral Philosophy_, bk. iii., p. 1, c. vii. + + +SECTION V.--_Of Usury_. + + +1. We must distinguish _use value_ and _market value_. The use value +of an article of property is the esteem which the owner has of it from +every other point of view except as a thing to sell. Thus a man values +his overcoat on a journey as a protection from cold and rain. A book +is valued that was held in the dying hand of a parent. This is use +value. The market value of an article is the estimate of society, +fixing the rate of exchange between that and other articles, so much +of one for so much of another, _e.g._, between mahogany and cedar +wood, considered as things to sell. + +2. Answering to this twofold value is a twofold exchange, _private +exchange_, which regards use value; and _commercial exchange_, which +is founded on market value. If I part with my watch to a sailor for +carrying me across an arm of the sea where there is no public ferry, +that is private exchange. If I pay the ordinary fare where there is a +public ferry, that is commercial exchange. + +3. Private exchange begins in the need of at least one of the +contracting parties. It is an act of charity in the other party to +accommodate him by offering the thing needed. If the offer is made +otherwise than as a gift, and is accepted, he who avails himself of it +is bound in justice to see that the afforder of the accommodation is +compensated for the loss that he suffers in affording it. Thus far the +recipient is bound in justice, and no further in that virtue. However +wholesome or profitable the thing be to him that gets it, the supplier +cannot charge for that but only for the loss that he himself suffers, +or the gain that he foregoes, in handing the thing over, or the pains +that he takes, or the hardship that he endures, or the risk that he +runs, in rendering the service desired. If all the labour to be +undergone, or damage incurred, or risk encountered, by the sailor who +goes about by private bargain to be my ferryman, is fairly met by the +remuneration of a thirty-shilling watch, he has no right to stipulate +for any more, not though the passage that he gives me sets me on the +way to a throne. The peculiar advantage that I have in prospect does +not come out of him, but out of myself. He must not pretend to sell +what is not his, what attaches, not to him, but to me. He can only +sell his own loss, risk, pains and labour. At the same time, if I have +any gentlemanly or generous feeling in me, I shall be forward to +bestow extra remuneration on one who has rendered me so timely a +service: but this is matter of my gratitude, not of his right and +claim in justice. Gratitude must not be put into the bill. And this +much of private exchange. + +4. Commercial exchange is conducted according to market value. Apart +from dire necessity--and one in dire necessity is not fit to enter +into commercial exchanges--the rule is, that a seller may always ask +the market value of his article, however much that may be above what +the thing cost him, or the use value which it bears to him. Thus, if +one finds in his garden a rare Roman coin--so far as his tastes go, a +paltry bit of metal--he may sell it for whatever price numismatists +will offer: whereas, if there were no market for coins, but only one +individual who doted on such things, the finder could make no profit +out of that individual, the coin having neither market value with the +community, nor use value in the eyes of the finder. + +5. As there is a twofold value, and a twofold exchange, so a twofold +character is impressed on the great instrument of exchange, money. +Money, in one character, is an instrument of private exchange: in its +other character, to mercantile men more familiar, it is an instrument +of commercial exchange. In the one, it represents use value to the +particular owner, more or less to him than it would be to some other +owner: in the other, it represents market value, the same to all at +the same time. + +6. Leo X. in the Fifth Council of Lateran, 1515, ruled that--"usury is +properly interpreted to be the attempt to draw profit and increment, +without labour, without cost, and without risk, out of the use of a +thing that does not fructify." In 1745 Benedict XIV. wrote in the same +sense to the Bishops of Italy: "That kind of sin which is called +usury, and which has its proper seat and place in the contract of +_mutuum_, consists in turning that contract, which of its own nature +requires the amount returned exactly to balance the amount received, +into a ground for demanding a return in excess of the amount +received." _Mutuum_, be it observed, is a loan for a definite period, +of some article, the use of which lies in its consumption, as matches, +fuel, food, and, in one respect, money. We shall prove this to be +properly a _gratuitous_ contract. (s. iv., n. 4, p. 254.) + +7. Usury then is no mere taking of exorbitant interest. There is no +question of more or less, but it is usury to take any interest at all +upon the loan of a piece of property, which + +(a) is of no use except to be used up, spent, consumed: + +(b) is not wanted for the lender's own consumption within the period +of the loan: + +(c) is lent upon security that obviates risk: + +(d) is so lent that the lender foregoes no occasion of lawful gain by +lending it. + +8. When all these four conditions are fulfilled, and yet interest is +exacted upon a loan, such interest is usurious and unjust. And why? +Simply by reason of the principle that we laid down before, speaking +of private exchange (n. 3), a principle that is thus stated by St. +Thomas: + +"If one party is much benefited by the commodity which he receives of +the other, while the other, the seller, is not a loser by going +without the article, no extra price must be put on. The reason is, +because the benefit that accrues to one party is not from the seller, +but from the condition of the buyer. Now no one ought to sell to +another that which is not his, though he may sell the loss that he +suffers. He, however, who is much benefited by the commodity he +receives of another, may spontaneously bestow some extra recompense on +the seller: that is the part of one who has the feelings of a +gentleman." (2a. 2ę, q. 77, art. 1, in corp.) + +9. St. Thomas speaks of sales, but the principle applies equally to +loans. It is upon loans of money that interest is commonly taken, and +of money-loans we speak. Clearly, according to the doctrine stated, +the lender can claim the compensation of interest, if he has to pinch +himself in order to lend, or lends at a notable risk. He is selling +his own loss,--or risk, which is loss once removed. But supposing he +has other monies in hand, and the security is good, and he has enough +still left for all domestic needs, and for all luxuries that he cares +to indulge in,--moreover he has nothing absolutely to do with his +money, in the event of his not lending it, but to hoard it up in his +strong box, and wait long months till he has occasion to use it: in +that case, if he lends it he will be no worse off on the day that he +gets it back, no worse off in the time while it is away, than if it +had never left his coffers. Such is the contract of _mutuum_, shorn of +all accidental attendant circumstances, a contract, which "of its own +nature," as Benedict XIV. says, that is, apart from circumstances, +"requires the amount returned exactly to balance the amount received." +Not though the borrower has profited of the loan to gain kingdoms, is +any further return in strict justice to be exacted of him on that +precise account. + +10. But now an altered case. Suppose land is purchaseable, and it is +proposed to stock a farm with cattle, and rear them, and convey them +to a large town where there is a brisk demand for meat--the +supposition is not always verified, nor any supposition like it, but +suppose it verified in some one case--then, though the lender has +other monies in hand for the needs of his household, and the security +is good, yet the money is not so lent as that he foregoes no occasion +of lawful gain by lending it. He foregoes the purchase of land and +farm stock, or at least delays it, and delay is loss where profit is +perennial. On that score of gain forfeited he may exact interest on +the money that he lends, which interest will be no usury. The title of +interest here given is recognized by divines as _lucrum cessans_, +"interruption of profit." The interest is taken, so far as it goes +upon a lawful title, not upon the fact of the borrower's profit--that +is irrelevant--but upon the profit that the lender might have made, +had he kept the money in hand. + +11. This latter case (n. 10) represents that putting of money out to +interest, which is an essential feature of modern commerce. The former +case (n. 9) is the aspect that money-lending commonly bore in the +Middle Ages. In those days land was hard to buy, agriculture backward, +roads bad, seas unnavigable, carrying-trade precarious, messages slow, +raids and marauders frequent, population sparse, commerce confined to +a few centres, mines unworked, manufactures mostly domestic, capital +yet unformed. Men kept their money in their cellars, or deposited it +for safety in religious houses: whence the stories of treasure-trove +belonging to those days. They took out the coin as they wanted it to +spend on housekeeping, or on war, or feasting. It was very hard, next +to impossible, to lay out money so as to make more money by it. Money +was in those days really barren--a resource for housekeeping, not for +trade--a medium of private, not of commercial exchange--a +representative of use value, not of market value. Apart from risk of +non-repayment, to take interest for money that you had no use for but +to hoard, was getting "a breed of barren metal:" it was taking up what +you laid not down: it was making profit out of your neighbour's need, +or your neighbour's gain, where there was no corresponding need +unsatisfied, or gain forfeited, on your part: it was that "attempt to +draw profit and increment, without labour, without cost, and without +risk, out of the use of a thing that does not fructify," which the +Fifth Lateran Council defines to be usury. + +12. In our time, thanks to steam and electricity, the increase of +population, and continued peace, the whole world has become one +trading community, representing now more, now less abundant +opportunities for the investment of money, and the conversion of it +into other lucrative commodities. Money consequently with us is not a +mere medium of private exchange for the purposes of housekeeping: it +is a medium of commercial exchange. It represents, not use value, but +market value. To be a thousand pounds out of pocket for a year means +an opportunity of gain irretrievably lost, gain that could have been +made otherwise than by money-lending. Where this is so, and so far as +it is so, the lender may without violation of justice point to _lucrum +cessans_, gain lost, and arrange beforehand with the borrower for +being reimbursed with interest. + +13. The transition from mediaeval housekeeping, with its use values +and private exchange, to the mercantile society of modern times, was +not made in a day, nor went on everywhere at the same rate. It was a +growth of ages. In great cities commerce rapidly ripened, and was well +on towards maturity five centuries ago. Then the conditions that +render interest lawful, and mark it off from usury, readily came to +obtain. But those centres were isolated. Like the centres of +ossification, which appear here and there in cartilage when it is +being converted into bone, they were separated one from another by +large tracts remaining in the primitive condition. Here you might have +a great city, Hamburg or Genoa, an early type of commercial +enterprise, and, fifty miles inland, society was in its infancy, and +the great city was as part of another world. Hence the same +transaction, as described by the letter of the law, might mean lawful +interest in the city, and usury out in the country--the two were so +disconnected. In such a situation the legislator has to choose between +forbidding interest here and allowing usury there; between restraining +speculation and licensing oppression. The mediaeval legislator chose +the former alternative. Church and State together enacted a number of +laws to restrain the taking of interest, laws that, like the clothes +of infancy, are not to be scorned as absurd restrictions, merely +because they are inapplicable now, and would not fit the modern growth +of nations. At this day the State has repealed those laws, and the +Church has officially signified that she no longer insists on them. +Still she maintains dogmatically that there is such a sin as usury, +and what it is, as defined in the Fifth Council of Lateran. + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., 2a 2ę, q. 77, art. 1; Ar., _Pol_., I., ix.; +St. Thos., 2a 2ę, q. 77, art. 4; _The Month_ for September, 1886; _The +Nineteenth Century _for September, 1877, pp. 181, seq. + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +OF MARRIAGE. + +SECTION I.--_Of the Institution of Marriage_. + + +1. Marriage is defined by the Canonists: _the union of male and +female, involving their living together in undivided intercourse_. In +the present order of Providence, the marriage contract between +baptized persons is a sacrament, under the superintendence of the +Church, the fertile theme of canonists and theologians. As +philosophers, we deal with marriage as it would be, were there no +sacraments, no Church, and no Incarnation, present or to come. This is +marriage in the order of pure nature. + +2. It is natural to all animals to propagate their kind, natural +therefore also to man; and being natural, it is so far forth also a +good thing, unless we are to say with the Manicheans, that the whole +of corporeal nature is an evil creation. Nay, so urgent is the natural +appetite here, that we must argue the existence, not of a mere +permission, but of an exigency of nature, and consequent command of +God (_Ethics_, c. vi., s. ii., nn. 11, 12, p. 122), for the +propagation of the human species. Besides, there is in the individual +the duty of self-preservation, therefore likewise in the race. Again, +the old cannot subsist at all without the support of the young, nor +lead a cheerful existence without their company. Imagine a world with +no youth in it, a winter without a spring! + +3. There is this difference between self-preservation and the +preservation of the race, that if a man will not eat, none can eat for +him; but if one man omit the propagation of his kind, another can take +it up. There are many things necessary for the good of mankind, which +are not to be done by every individual. Not all are to be soldiers, +nor all builders, though houses are needful, and sometimes war. Nor is +it desirable that the human race should be multiplied to its utmost +capacity. It is enough here to mention without discussing the teaching +of Malthus, how population presses on the means of subsistence, the +latter increasing in an arithmetical, the former in a geometrical +ratio. Without going the whole way with Malthus, modern economical +writers are commonly a little Malthusian, and shrink from giving to +all and each of their species the word to "increase and multiply." + +4. But, it will be said, sickly and consumptive subjects, and still +more those who have any tendency to madness, may well be excused from +having children; so too may they be excused whose poverty cannot keep +a family; excused too is the inveterate drunkard, and all habitual +criminals, by the principle of heredity, lest they transmit to +posterity an evil bodily predisposition; but the healthy and the +virtuous, men sound of mind and limb, of life unspotted, and in +circumstances easy, the flower of the race,--none of these surely +should omit to raise up others to wear his lineaments: we want such +men multiplied. I answer, on natural grounds alone: You may counsel, +but you cannot compel, either by positive law or ethical precept, any +man or woman to seek to have children. You surely will not breed men +by selection, like cattle, as Plato proposed. The union of the sexes, +especially the married union, is an act to be of all others the most +entirely free, spontaneous, uncommanded, and unconstrained. It should +be a union of intense mutual love. But a man may not meet with any +woman that he can love with passion; or, meeting such, he may not be +able to win her. Nor, considering the indeterminateness of points of +health, capacity, and character, could any certain list be drawn up of +persons bound to have issue. Thus the utmost that can be argued is a +counsel in this direction, a counsel that mankind ordinarily are ready +enough to comply with. But if any one of seeming aptitude excuses +himself on the score of finding no partner to his liking, or of a +desire to travel, or of study, or still more, of devotion--and why +should not a man, ever of natural piety, go out into solitude, like +St. Antony, to hold communion with his Maker?--all these excuses must +be taken. It is lawful then in the state of mere nature, upon any one +of many sufficient grounds, to stand aside and relinquish to your +neighbour the privilege and responsibility of giving increase to the +human family. + +5. But if it is no one individual's duty to propagate his kind, how is +it that we have laid down that there is such a duty? For the duty is +incumbent upon them that alone can do it, and it can only be done by +individuals. The answer rests on a distinction between _proximate_ and +_remote_ duty. The propagation of the race is the remote duty of every +individual, but at present the proximate, duty of none. A _remote_ +duty is a duty not now pressing but which would have to be performed +in a certain contingency, which contingency happening, the duty +becomes _proximate_. If there appeared a danger of our race dying out, +the survivors would be beholden, especially those in power, to take +steps for its continuance. Rewards might then be held out, like the +_jus trium liberorum_ instituted at Rome by Augustus; and if +necessary, penalties inflicted on celibacy. In this one extreme case +the matrimonial union might be made matter of legal constraint. But +when will such constraint become necessary? + +6. The continuance of the human race must be wrought out by man and +woman standing in that abiding and exclusive relation to one another, +which constitutes the state of marriage. Nature abhors promiscuity, or +free love. It is the delight of writers who use, perhaps abuse, +Darwin's name, to picture primitive mankind as all living in this +infrabestial state. But "the state supposed is suicidal, and instead +of allowing the expansion of the human race, would have produced +infertility, and probably disease, and at best only allowed the +existing numbers to maintain, under the most favourable circumstances, +a precarious existence. To suppose, therefore, that the whole human +race for any considerable time were without regular marriage, is +physiologically impossible. They could never have survived it." +(Devas, _Studies of Family Life_, § 101.) + +7. Even if the alleged promiscuity ever did prevail--and it may have +obtained to some extent in certain degraded portions of humanity--its +prevalence was not its justification. The practice cannot have been +befitting in any stage of the evolution of human society. As in all +things we suppose our readers to have understanding, we leave it to +them to think out this matter for themselves. Suffice it here to put +forward two grand advantages gained and ends achieved, which are +called by theologians "the goods of marriage." + +8. The first good of marriage is the _offspring_ that is born of it. +Nature wills, not only the being, but the well-being of this +offspring, and that both in the physical and in the moral order. Very +important for the physical health of the child it is, that it be born +of parents whose animal propensities are under some restraint; such +restraint the bond of marriage implies. Then, in the moral order, the +child requires to be educated with love, a love that shall be guided +by wisdom, and supported by firmness. Love, wisdom, and firmness, they +are the attributes of both parents; but love is especially looked for +from the mother, wisdom and firmness from the father. And, what is +important, both have an _interest_ in the child such as no other human +being can take. We are speaking of the normal father or mother, not of +many worthless parents that actually are; for, as Aristotle often lays +it down, we must not judge of a thing from its bad specimens. No +doubt, the State could establish public nurseries and infant schools, +and provide a staff of nurses and governesses, more scientific +educators than even the normal parent; but who, that has not been most +unhappy in his origin, would wish his own infancy to have been reared +in such a place? What certificated stranger can supply for a mother's +love? + +9. The second good of marriage is the _mutual faith_ of the partners. +Plato never made a greater mistake than when he wrote that "the female +sex differs from the male in mankind only in this, that the one bears +children, while the other begets them;" and consequently that "no +occupation of social life belongs to a woman because she is a woman, +or to a man because he is a man, but capacities are equally +distributed in both sexes, and woman naturally bears her share in all +occupations, and man his share, only that in all woman is weaker than +man." (_Republic_, 454 D; 455 D.) Over against this we must set +Aristotle's correction: "Cohabitation among human kind is not for the +mere raising of children, but also for the purposes of a partnership +in life: for from the first the offices of man and woman are distinct +and different: thus they mutually supply for one another, putting +their several advantages into the common stock." (Ar., _Eth_., VIII., +xii. 7.) Elsewhere he sets forth these several offices in detail: "The +nature of both partners, man and woman, has been prearranged by a +divine dispensation in view of their partnership: for they differ by +not having their faculties available all to the same effect, but some +even to opposite effects, though combining to a common end: for God +made the one sex stronger and the other weaker, that the one for fear +may be the more careful, and the other for courage the more capable of +self-defence; and that the one may forage abroad, while the other +keeps house: and for work the one is made competent for sedentary +employments, but too delicate for an out-door life, while the other +makes a poor figure at keeping still, but is vigorous and robust in +movement; and touching children, the generation is special, but the +improvement of the children is the joint labour of both parents, for +it belongs to the one to nurture, to the other to chastise." (Ar., +_Econ_., i. 3.) + +These passages are enough to suggest more than they actually contain, +of two orders of qualities arranged antithetically one over against +another in man and woman, so that the one existence becomes +complementary to the other, and the two conjoined form one perfect +human life. This life-communion, called by divines _fides_, or mutual +faith, is then the second good fruit of marriage. Indeed it is the +more characteristically human good, _offspring_ being rather related +to the animal side of our nature. But as animal and rational elements +make one human being, so do _offspring_ and _mutual faith_ constitute +the adequate good of that human union of the sexes, which we call +marriage. + +10. Whatever good there is in marriage, connections formed by either +party beyond the marriage-bed, are agents of confusion to the undoing +of all that good and the practical dissolution of the marriage. + +_Readings_.--_Contra Gentes_, iii., 122; _ib_., iii., 126; _ib_., +iii., 136; Devas, _Studies of Family Life_, §§ 90-101, where he +disposes of the proof of primitive promiscuity, drawn from the fact +that in early societies kinship is traced and property claimed only +through the mother. + + +SECTION II.--_Of the Unity of Marriage_. + + +1. _Both man and woman are by nature incapable of a second marriage, +while their former marriage endures_. No woman can have two husbands +at the same time, which is _polyandry_; and no man can have two wives +at the same time, which is _polygamy_. The second marriage attempted +is not only _illicit_, but _invalid_: it is no contract, no marriage +at all, and all cohabitation with the second partner is sheer +adultery. This is a great deal more than saying that polyandry and +polygamy are unlawful. + +2. That is by nature no marriage, which is inconsistent with the +natural ends of marriage, _offspring_ and _mutual faith_. But +polyandry is thus inconsistent with the good of offspring, and +polygamy with mutual faith. It is not meant that polyandry makes the +birth of children impossible. But nature is solicitous, not for the +mere birth, but for the rearing and good estate of the child born. Now +a child born fatherless is in an ill plight for its future education. +Posthumous children in lawful wedlock are born fatherless: that is a +calamity: but what shall we think of an institution which makes that +calamity to the child sure always to occur? Such an institution is +polyandry. For in it no man can ever know his own child, except by +likeness, and likeness in a baby face is largely as you choose to +fancy it. Again, is the polyandrous wife to be, or not to be, the head +of the family? If not, the family--for it ought to be one family, +where there is one mother--will have as many heads as she has +husbands, a pretty specimen of a house divided against itself. If she +is to be the head, that is a perversion of the natural order of +predominance between the sexes. In any case, polyandry is little +better than promiscuity: it is fatal to the family and, fatal to the +race; and children born of it are born out of marriage. + +3. Against polygamy the case in natural law is not quite so strong as +against polyandry. Still it is a strong case enough in the interest of +the wife. The words spoken by the bride to the bridegroom in the +marriage rite of ancient Rome, _Ubi tu Caius, ego Caia_, "Where you +are master, I am mistress," declare the relation of _mutual faith_ as +it should be, namely, a relation of equality, with some advantage, +preference, and pre-eminence allowed to the husband, yet not so great +advantage as to leave _him_ free where _she_ is straitly bound, and +reduce her to the servile level of one in a row of minions to his +passion and sharers of his divided affections. Polygamy in all ages +has meant the lowering of womankind: + + He will hold thee-- + Something better than his dog, a little dearer than his horse + +At its strongest, the love of man for woman, where polygamy obtains, +is a flame of passion, that quickly spends itself on one object, and +then passes to another; not a rational, enduring, human affection. It +is also a fact, that the increase of the race is not greater in +polygamy than in monogamy. Thus, as a practice that runs strongly +counter to one of the great purposes of marriage, and is, to say the +least, no help to the other, and carries with it the humiliation of +the female sex, polygamy is justly argued to be abhorrent to nature. + +4. It is beside the purpose of this work to enter into the questions +of morality that arise out of Holy Scripture, considered as an +inspired record of the actions of the Saints. But the polygamy of the +patriarchs of old so readily occurs to mind, that it is worth while to +mention four conceivable explanations, if only to indicate which is +and which is not reconcilable with our philosophy. The first +explanation would be, that polygamy is not against the natural law, +but only against the positive divine law, which was derogated from in +this instance. We have made it out to be against the natural law. The +second explanation would be that God gave the patriarchs a +dispensation, strictly so called, from this point of the natural law. +We have maintained that God cannot, strictly speaking, dispense from +one jot or tittle of natural law. (_Ethics_, c. viii., s. iii., nn. +1-3, p. 147.) [Footnote 19] A third explanation would be founded on +the words of St. Paul to the Athenians (Acts xvii. 30), about "God +overlooking the times of this ignorance." This would suppose that +mankind, beginning in monogamy, from passion and ignorance lapsed +quickly into polygamy: that the patriarchs in good faith conformed to +the practice of their time; and that God, in their case as with the +rest of mankind, awaited His own destined hour for the light of better +knowledge to break upon the earth. A fourth explanation would be this. +God by His supreme dominion can dissolve any marriage. By the same +dominative power He can infringe and partially make void any marriage +contract without entirely undoing it. The marriage contract, existing +in its fulness and integrity, is a bar to any second similar contract, +as we have proved. But what, on this theory, the Lord God did with the +marriages of the patriarchs was this: He partially unravelled and +undid the contract, so as to leave room for a second contract, and a +third, each having the bare essentials of a marriage, but none of them +the full integrity. + +[Footnote 19: _Dispensatio_ is the Latin for [Greek: oikonomia], and +in this case means an "economy" of law, in the sense that God did not +press the marriage law beyond the capacity of the subject (Matt. xix. +7,8). See my Newman Index, s.v. _Economy_. The schoolmen missed this +meaning, and took _dispensatio_ in the canonical sense.] + +But, for the author's final view, see Appendix. + +_Readings_.--_Contra Gent_., iii., 124; Suarez, _De Legibus_, II., +xv., 28. + + +SECTION III.--_Of the Indissolubility of Marriage_. + + +1. This section is pointed not so much against a _separation_--which +may take place by mutual consent, or without that, by grievous +infidelity or cruelty of one party--as against a divorce _a vinculo_, +which is a dissolution of a marriage in the lifetime of the parties, +enabling each of them validly and lawfully to contract with some +other. The unity of marriage is more essential than its +indissolubility. Nature is more against polygamy than against divorce. +Even Henry VIII. stuck at polygamy. In the present arrangement, a +divorce _a vinculo_ is obtainable in three cases. First, when of two +unbaptized persons, man and wife, the one is converted, and the +unconverted party refuses to live peaceably in wedlock, the convert +may marry again, and thereupon also the other party. So the Church +understands St. Paul, I Cor. vii. 13, 15. Again, the Pope can grant a +divorce _a vinculo_ in the marriage of baptized persons before +cohabitation. Such a marriage in that stage is also dissolved by the +profession of one of the parties in a religious order. Beyond these +three cases, the Catholic Church allows neither the lawfulness nor the +validity of any divorce _a vinculo_ by whomsoever given to whatsoever +parties. + +2. It is ours to investigate the lie of the law of nature, having due +regard to the points marked, antecedently to our search, by the +definition of infallible authority. Nothing can be done in the Church +against the law of nature: since therefore divorce _a vinculo_ is +sometimes recognized in the Church, it may be contended that marriage +is not by nature absolutely indissoluble. On the other hand, it is a +proposition censured by Pius IX. in the Syllabus, n. 67: "By the law +of nature the bond of marriage is not indissoluble." Thus it appears +we must teach that marriage is naturally indissoluble, still not +absolutely so, just as a safe is justly advertised as fire-proof, when +it will resist any conflagration that is likely to occur, though it +would be consumed in a blast-furnace or in a volcano. So marriage is +indissoluble, if it holds good for all ordinary contingencies, for all +difficulties that may be fairly reckoned with and regarded as not +quite improbable, for every posture of affairs that the contracting +parties before their union need at all consider. Or, if the three +cases of divorce actually allowed are to be traced to the dominative +power of God (_Ethics_, c. vii., n. 2, p. 129), we may teach that +marriage is by nature absolutely indissoluble, and that divorce is as +much against the law of nature as the killing of an innocent man, +excepting in the case of God's dominion being employed to quash the +contract or the right to life. But against this latter view is to be +set the consideration, that God is manifestly averse to using His +dominative power to overturn natural ordinances. He does not hand the +innocent over to death except in the due course of physical nature: +why then should He ever put forth His power against the marriage-tie, +unless it be that nature herself in certain cases postulates its +severance? But if such is ever nature's petition, the universal and +unconditional permanence of the marriage-tie cannot be a requisition +of nature, nor is divorce absolutely excluded by natural law. + +3. Thomas Sanchez, than whom there is no greater authority on this +subject, records his opinion that "a certain inseparability is of the +nature of marriage," but that "absolute indissolubility does not +attach to marriage by the law of nature." He adds: "if we consider +marriage as it is an office of nature for the propagation of the race, +it is hard to render a reason why for the wife's barrenness the +husband should not be allowed to put her away, or marry another." (_De +Matrimonio_, I. ii., d. 13, n. 7.) We proceed to prove that "a certain +inseparability is of the nature of marriage," so that marriage may +truly be said to be indissoluble by the law of nature. Whether this +natural indissolubility is absolute, and holds for every conceivable +contingency, the student must judge by the proofs. + +4. If a divorce _a vinculo_ were a visible object on the matrimonial +horizon, the parties would be strongly encouraged thereby to form +illicit connections, in the expectation of shortly having any one of +them they chose ratified and sanctified by marriage. Marriage would be +entered upon lightly, as a thing easily done and readily undone, a +state of things not very far in advance of promiscuity. Between +married persons little wounds would fester, trifling sores would be +angered into ulcers: any petty strife might lead to a fresh contract, +made in haste and repented of with speed: then fond, vain regrets for +the former partnership. Affinity would be a loose bond of friendship +between families; and after divorce it would turn to enmity. The fair +but weaker sex would suffer the more by this as by all other +matrimonial perversions: for the man has not so much difficulty in +lighting upon another love, but the woman--she illustrates the Greek +proverb of a fallen estate: + + Mighty was Miletus in the bygone days of yore. + +The divorced wife offers fewer attractions than the widow. + +5. It is well to bear in mind that, at least by the positive ordinance +of God in the present order of His Providence, the marriage of +baptized persons, after cohabitation, is absolutely indissoluble; and +no marriage can be dissolved except in the three cases specified. (n. +1.) + +_Readings_.--Leo XIII., Encyclical on Christian Marriage, _Arcanum +divina sapientia_; St. Thomas, _Contra Gent_., iii, 123. + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +OF PROPERTY. + +SECTION I.--_Of Private Property_. + + +1. Property was called by the Romans _res familiaris_, the stuff and +substance of the family. Property may be held by the individual for +himself alone: but any large accumulation of it is commonly held by +the head of a family, actual or potential, for the family; and he +cherishes it for the sake of his family as much as, or even more than, +for his own sake. This is to be borne in mind, for many errors in +theory and in practice spring from a large proprietor figuring as an +individual, and not as a sort of _corporation sole_ in his capacity of +paterfamilias. + +2. We have seen (c. v., s. i., n. 2, p. 245) how man acquires a right +over external goods, as it were setting the seal of his own +personality upon them. It appears upon further consideration, that +this right must extend beyond the mere making things your own for +immediate use and consumption; it must extend to the _storing_ of +things for future and perennial use. Otherwise we have Communism. +Communism allows men to hold property collectively in a common stock, +and allows each member of the community to take for his peculiar own +out of that stock whatever for the moment he needs; but it will not +permit him to appropriate private means of subsistence against any +notable time to come. Communism is very good in a family, which is an +imperfect community, part of a higher community, the State. It is very +good in a monastery, which is like a family: again, very good in the +primitive Church at Jerusalem, which existed for the time on +quasi-monastic lines: very good even in a perfect community, if such +there be, of tropical savages, for whom nature supplies all things, +bananas to eat and palm-leaves to wear, without any human labour of +production; but very bad and quite unworkable everywhere else. St. +Thomas, following Aristotle, puts it pithily and sufficiently: +"Private property is necessary to human life for three reasons: first, +because every one is more careful to look after what belongs to +himself alone than after what is common to all or to many, since all +men shun labour and leave to others what is matter of joint concern, +as happens where there are too many servants: on another ground, +because human affairs are more orderly handled, if on each individual +there rests his own care of managing something, whereas there would be +nothing but confusion, if every one without distinction were to have +the disposal of any thing he chose to take in hand: thirdly, because +by this means society is the rather kept at peace, every member being +content with his own possession, whence we see that among those who +hold any thing in common and undivided ownership strifes not +unfrequently arise." (2a 2ę, q. 66, art. 2, in corp.) + +3. If any revolutionist yet will have the hardihood to say with +Proudhon, "Property is theft," we shall ask him, "From whom?" He will +answer of course, "From the community." But that answer supposes the +community to have flourished, a wealthy corporation, before private +property began. Needless to say that history knows nothing of such a +corporation. The saying, that _in the beginning all things were in +common_, is not true in the sense that they were _positively_ in +common, like the goods of a corporation, which are collective +property: but simply that they were _negatively_ in common, that is, +not property at all, neither of corporation nor of individual, but +left in the middle open to all comers, for each to convert into +property by his occupation, and by his labour to enhance and multiply. +This must be modified by the observation, that the first occupants +were frequently heads of families, or of small clans, and occupied and +held for themselves and their people. + +4. The saying, that _all things are in common by the law of nature_, +must be received with still greater reserve. Really with as much truth +it might be said that all men are unmarried, or unclad, or uneducated, +by the law of nature. Nature unaided by human volition provides +neither property, nor clothing, nor marriage, nor education, for man. +But nature bids, urges and requires man to bestir his voluntary +energies for the securing of all these things. The law of nature does +not prescribe this or that particular distribution of goods, as +neither does it join this man with that woman in marriage, nor insist +on plaids rather than coats, nor set all boys to learn algebra, nor +fix a ritual for divine worship; but it insists in the vague upon some +worship, some education, some clothing, some marriage, and some +distribution of goods, leaving the determination in each case to +choice, custom, and positive law, human and divine. + +5. All property that can ever be immediately serviceable for saving +human life, is held under this burden, that a perishing +fellow-creature, who cannot otherwise help himself in a case of +_extreme need_ (c. iv., n. 8, p. 243), may make such use of the +property of another as shall suffice to rescue him from perishing +off-hand. If he draws largely on another for this purpose, he ought to +make compensation afterwards, if he has the means. This has been taken +for a piece of the primeval rock of Communism cropping up from +underneath subsequent human formations,--quite a mistaken notion. +There is no Communism whatever in the transaction. Up to the instant +when the needy man seizes the article that he requires to save him +from death, that article still belongs to the owner from whom he takes +it, who is bound in charity to give it to the needy party, but not in +justice. Extreme need does not confer ownership, nor dispossess any +previous owner: but it confers the right of taking what is another's +as though it belonged to no one; and in the taking, the thing passes +into the ownership of the new occupant, so that for the previous owner +forcibly to resume it would be a violation of justice. English law +does not recognise this right--properly enough, for with us it would +be made a plea for much stealing--but refers the destitute to the +parish. The law is considerately worked by the magistrates. A starving +man, who took a loaf off a baker's tray, has been known to be +sentenced to a few hours' imprisonment with two good meals. + +6. As St. Paul says (2 Cor. xii. 14), "parents ought to lay up for +their children," that they in whom their own existence is continued, +may not be left unprovided for at their decease. The amount laid up +necessary for this purpose, ought not to be diverted from it. Thus +much at least Natural Law can tell us of the right of inheritance. And +concerning testamentary right these natural considerations are +forthcoming, that it adds to the desirability of property, that it +secures deference to the wealthy in their old age, and that the +abolition of it might be frustrated by an apparatus of confidential +_donationes inter vivos_, that is to say, making the property over in +trust before death. Further enlargement of the natural basis of +testamentary right may be effected by the judicious reader. + +_Readings_.--Ar., _Pol_., II., v., nn. 1-16; De Lugo, _De just. et +jure_, vi., nn. 2-6; _ib_., xxi,, nn. 143, 144; Locke, _Of Civil +Government_, c.v.; _id_., _Of Government_, nn. 88, 89. + + +SECTION II.--_Of Private Capital_. + + +1. Reverting to a former section (c. v., s. v., nn. 1-5, p. 255) we +lay down this distinction: Goods held for their _use value_ are +_consumer's wealth_: goods held for their _market value_ are +_producer's wealth_, otherwise called _capital_. Capital then is that +wealth which a man holds for the purpose of gaining further wealth by +means of commercial exchange. It is represented by the razors that are +made, not to mow the manly beard, or youthful moustache, of the maker, +but, as the Yorkshire vendor put it, "to sell." + +2. Those economists who would allow no private ownership of capital, +but would have all capital to be State property, are called +Socialists. They stand distinctly apart from the Communists, whom we +have been labouring to refute in the last section. The Communist +forbids all private property: the Socialist allows private property, +but in the shape of _consumer's wealth_ alone. The Communist ignores +the necessity of labour: the Socialist schemes to make all men work. +The Communist contemplates a hand-to-mouth dispensation of all things: +the Socialist locks all things up, wages in private coffers, capital +in government stores. The Communist is a madman: the speculations of +the Socialist are sometimes deep. + +3. To what are we to attribute the rise of Socialism, and its growth +and propagation so fast and vigorous, that, its supporters say with +some colour of evidence, it is a theory destined within a measurable +space of time to pass into actual practice, whether men will or no? +The cause is not far to seek. There has lighted a plague upon all +civilized countries, an outbreak fearful and severe: only by the great +blessing of Providence, joined to drastic remedial measures on our +part, can we cope with the evil. The plague is a cancerous formation +of luxury growing out of a root of pauperism. It is a disease old as +the world, but the increase of commerce and intercommunication has +occasioned its bursting upon our generation in a peculiarly virulent +form. And what is more, ours being a talking age, the disease is made +the staple of speeches infinite, and the masses are clamouring for a +remedy. The remedy proposed is Socialism. + +4. Socialism in its essence is an attempt to transfer to the State, +governed by universal suffrage, the wealth, and with the wealth the +social duties, of what have hitherto been the wealthy and governing +classes. It is not enough for the multitude that they are getting the +political power out of the hands of the landlord and the capitalist: +they envy the one his broad acres, and the other his investments. All +must be theirs, sovereignty and wealth alike. If wealth has its +duties, the people collectively with cheerful acceptance will +undertake those duties. "It shall be ours, not only to be king, but to +be employer, patron, landlord, educator. We will assign to the workman +his wages, just and ample and perennial: we will adjust production to +demand: we will be the restorers of agriculture: we will monopolise +the carrying-trade: we alone will sell whatever shall be sold: we will +wash the workman in public baths: his taste shall be elevated by our +statues and pictures, our theatres, our music-halls, and our churches; +we will gratify his curiosity with our news-agencies, feed his thought +with our popular philosophy, educate his children as our own in our +primary and secondary schools. Furthermore, we will provide the long +desiderated career open to talents. The stupid boy, though his father +was our Prime Minister, shall be made a cabin-boy, or a scavenger's +assistant, an awful example to young gentlemen who fail to pass the +Government examinations: while we will pick up, not the gutter child, +for there shall be no more children in gutters, but the son of the +woman at the mill, and testing him and assigning his career, first by +school examinations, and then by his official performances, we will +make him in time Poet Laureate or President of the Board of Trade, +according to the bent of his genius." The astonished workman turns +round upon the exhibitors of this fairy vision: "And pray who are +You?" "Oh, you, we, the people, all of us together. Come put your +shoulder to the wheel, and up goes our enterprise. Or rather our first +motion is downwards: down with landlords and cotton-lords and lords of +parliament, down with contractors and stock-jobbers and all who live +on the interest of their money, and then our honourable multitude will +possess and administer and govern." + +5. If angels are to hold the collective ownership of capital and the +government of men in the Socialist Commonwealth; or if every citizen, +retaining in his private capacity all the follies and vices that human +flesh is heir to, shall still be vested in angelic attributes, +whenever he sits as legislator or judge, or acts on the executive of a +Socialist commission,--then this new Commonwealth is likely to prove a +blessed substitute for the rule of the higher classes, which in one +way or another has hitherto obtained in civilized society. But till +angelic attributes descend on earth, we shall not find a cure for the +evils of cities and countries in simply doubling the functions of +government, and placing all sovereign rights, and all the most +important of proprietory rights and duties, in the hands of a +numerical majority. + +6. Capital, as we have seen, is a collection of market or exchange +values in view of further exchange. If we call supply S and demand D, +market value is a social estimate of the fraction D/S. Another +definition has been given: Market value is a social estimate of the +amount of socially useful labour which a given article contains. This +second definition contains this much of truth in it, that directly as +the demand for an article, and inversely as the supply of the same, is +the amount of labour which men find it worth their while to spend upon +that article for commercial purposes. Otherwise the definition is +unsatisfactory and involved, and leads to endless discussion. Without +entering into these discussions, we will remark an ambiguity in the +term on which they all roll, the term _labour_, which ambiguity is at +the bottom of three fourths of the sophistries of popular Socialism. + +7. There were two pillars put at the entrance of Solomon's temple, one +on the right hand and the other on the left: that which was on the +right hand he called, according to the Septuagint, _Direction_, +[Greek: katorthosis], and that on the left hand, _Strength_, [Greek: +ischus]. (2 Par. iii. 17.) Further we are told that Solomon set +seventy thousand men to carry burdens on their shoulders, and eighty +thousand to hew stones in the mountains, and three thousand six +hundred to be overseers of the work of the people. (2 Par. ii. 18.) +The history is manifest. Strength and Direction build the Temple: +Strength, or Manual Labour, represented by the hodmen and quarrymen, +and the rest of the "hands:" Direction, or Mental Labour, represented +by the overseers. Yet not by them alone: surely we must count in as +doers of mental labour the designer of the Temple, or at least of its +decorations, that "most wise and skilful man, my father Hiram;" and +still more King Solomon himself and David, the two royal minds that +originated and perfected the idea; and David's generals, Joab and +Banaias, who secured the peace that was necessary as a condition of +the building; and innumerable other men of place and power in the +nation, but for whose thought and prudence the strength of the workman +would have been thrown away like a river poured out in the Libyan +desert. From this example, eked out with a little thought of his own, +the reader may estimate the wisdom and credit of those who tell +factory hands that it is their labour which produces all the wealth of +their employer, and that, in the day when every man shall receive his +due, the employer shall be made a workmen like themselves, and his +wealth shall go to the increase of their common wages. + +8. Certainly, it will be said, the employer should be paid for his +mental labour, but why at so enormously higher a rate than the manual +labourers? If we say, "because his labour is more valuable," some +Socialists would join issue on the score that labour is valuable +according to the time that it takes, and the employer works shorter +hours than his men. But this taking account of _quantity_ alone in +labour is an ignoring of the distinction which we have drawn of two +_qualities_ or _orders_ of labour, mental and manual; one more +valuable than the other as being scarcer and in greater demand, so +that a short time of one may be set against a long time of another, +like a little gold against a heap of brass. Any man accustomed to both +orders of labour must have observed, that while he can work with his +hands at almost any time when he is well, the highest labour of his +intellect can be done only at rare intervals, and that in one happy +hour he will sometimes accomplish more than in a day. As the same man +differs from himself at different times, so does one man from another +in the average value of his mental efforts: this value is not measured +by time. + +9. Abandoning this untenable position, Socialists still ask: "But is +the difference in the value of their labour quite so vast as is the +interval between the profits of the employer and the pay of his poor +drudges?" Honestly we cannot say that it is. We are fain to fall back +upon the consideration, that the employer contributes, not only his +brains to the work, but his capital. "Ah, that is just it," is the +Socialists' quick reply: "We propose to relieve him of his capital, +and remunerate his brainwork only: by that means we shall be able to +pay sufficiently handsome wages for management, according to the ratio +of mental and manual labour, and at the same time have a sufficiently +large surplus over to raise the wages of his needy comrades, those +seventy thousand hodmen and eighty thousand quarrymen." + +10. Two reasons may be given for turning away from this seductive +proposal, and leaving capital (not _consumer's wealth_ merely) in +private hands,--and that not only in the hands of what we may call +_mentally productive capitalists_, men who oversee their own +enterprises and manage their own workmen, but even of _unproductive +capitalists_, men who have shares in and reap profits out of a +business which they never meddle with. The first reason is, because +this position of the productive, and still more that of the +unproductive capitalist, is a prize for past industry expended upon +production. To understand this, we must recollect once more that men +work, not as individuals, but as heads of families. Every working man, +from the sailor to the shop-boy, covets for himself two things, pay +and leisure. The same two things do mentally productive labourers +covet. But they covet them, not for themselves alone, but for their +families, and more even for their families than for themselves. They +weary their brains, planning and managing, that in old age they may +retire on a competence, and hand down that same competence, +undiminished by their having lived on it, to their children. Thus the +young man works and produces, that the old man, and the child to come, +may have exemption from productive labour, an abiding exemption, which +cannot be unless he is allowed to live on the interest of accumulated +capital. These positions of affluence and rest--sinecures they are, so +far as production is concerned--are the prizes awarded to the best +productive labour. What they who do that labour aim at, is not wages +but exemption from toil: their wish is not so much to be wealthy and +have leisure themselves as to found a family in wealth and +leisure,--the one possible foundation of such a family being a store +of private capital. Socialists of course will offer nobler prizes for +the best productive labour,--honour, and the satisfaction of having +served the community, a satisfaction which they would have men trained +from childhood to relish above all other joys. Unfortunately, this +taste is yet unformed, and the stimulus of these nobler prizes is +still unproved by experience. Meanwhile men do work hard, to the +advantage of the community, for the ignobler prize of family affluence +and ease. Socialists are going to take away the good boy's cake and +give him a sunflower. + +11. The second reason for leaving capital in private, even +unproductive hands, begins from the consideration, that the highest +end of man on earth is not production, just as it is not consumption, +of the necessaries and luxuries of life. Aristotle bids us, as much as +possible in this life, "to play the immortal ([Greek: athanatizein]), +and do our utmost to live by the best element in our nature," that is, +the intellect. (_Ethics_, c. ii., s. ii., n. 7, p. 9.) There is the +intellectual life of the statesman in the practical order: and in the +speculative order, that of the poet, of the artist, of the scholar, of +the devout contemplative--the outcome of learned and pious leisure, +and freedom from vulgar cares. One man ascending into this higher and +better region helps his neighbour to follow. The neighbour can follow, +even though he be not free from productive cares, but the leader ought +to be free, if he is to soar a high, sustained and powerful flight, +and guide others aloft. These unproductive capitalist families then +form what we may call, by a figure which rhetoricians call _oxymoron_, +something which comes very near a bull,--we may call them an _endowed +lay-clergy_: they are told off from the rest of men to lead the way in +doing, and causing to be done, the highest work of humanity. The +absence of the First Class of Workers would render the Socialist +Utopia a very vulgar place. + +12. Nature's ideal is: _To all, plenty: to some, superabundance_. The +superabundance of some is not necessarily incompatible with all having +plenty: nay it is a positive furtherance of that and of still higher +ends, as has been shown. But it is a position of advantage that may be +abused, and is abused most wantonly: hence there comes to be question +of Socialism. + +13. The Socialism above described is of the old sort, called +Collectivism. A new variety has appeared, Syndicalism. Syndicalism is +opposed to nationalisation and centralisation of capital and power: it +would convert workers into owners in each separate department of +labour,--colliers to own the coal, railwaymen the lines and +rolling-stock, agricultural labourers the land, and so on. +Collectivism might conceivably be put in practice, given a +sufficiently high standard of social virtue, a quality which +Socialists are not in the way to get. As for Syndicalism in practice, +I leave that to the reader to imagine. Syndicalism stigmatises +Collectivism as a gross tyranny. Thus divided into two irreconcilable +factions, the Socialists are not a happy family. + +_Readings_.--_The Creed of Socialism_, by Joseph Rickaby +(Anti-socialist Union, Victoria Street, Westminster). + + +SECTION III.--_Of Landed Property_. + + +1. Land, like cotton, timber, or iron-ore, is a raw material wrought +up by man. Land, like any other thing, becomes an article of property +originally by occupation, and its value is enhanced by labour. There +is no more reason why all land, or the rents of all land, should +belong to the State, than why all house property, or all house rents, +should belong to the State. If the people need land to live on, so do +they need houses to live in, coals to burn, and shoes to wear. +Socialism, once admitted, cannot be confined to land alone. It will +exterminate "the lord manufacturer" as remorselessly as it +exterminates the landlord. + +2. Every man, it is contended, has a right to live on the fruits of +the soil. The proposition is needlessly long. It should be put simply: +Every man has a right to live. For as to living on the fruits of the +soil, there is absolutely nothing else that man can live on. All human +nutriment whatever is derived from what geologists call pulverised +rocks, that is, soil. But if it is meant that every man has a right to +live on the fruits of some soil or land of his own, where is the +proof? So long as the fruits of the earth do not fail to reach a man's +mouth, what matters it whose earth it is that grows them? Some of the +richest as well as the poorest members of the community are landless +men. Confiscate rent to take the place of taxation, and some of the +richest men in the community will go tax-free. + +3. The land on which a nation is settled, we are told, belongs to that +nation. Yes, it belongs to them as individuals, yet not so that a +foreigner is excluded by natural law from owning any portion of it. +But the government have over the land, and over all the property upon +it, what is called _altum dominium_, or _eminent domain_, which is a +power of commanding private proprietors to part with their property +for public purposes, with compensation, whenever compensation is +possible. Thus when a railway gets its Act of Parliament, the owners +through whose estates the projected line is to run are compelled by an +exercise of _eminent domain_ to sell to the company. By the same power +the government in a besieged city, when hard pressed, might seize upon +all the stores of food and fuel within the walls, even without +compensation. _Altum dominium_, which is not dominion properly so +called, is sufficient for all national emergencies, without making the +State the universal landlord. + +4. It seems impossible to imagine an emergency that would justify any +government in nationalizing all the land at once without compensation. +None but a wealthy government could afford the compensation requisite; +and the emergency would have to be severe indeed, to make it wise of +them to incur such an expense. We can imagine a government in a newly +settled country starting on the understanding that all land was State +land, and that all ground rents were to be paid into the State +exchequer. This would amount to taking rents for taxes; and instead of +a landlord in every district we should have a tax-gatherer. Probably +further taxation would be necessary: in England at any rate the annual +expenditure exceeds the rental by some twenty millions. Government, we +may suppose, would grant leases of land: when the lease fell in, the +rent would be raised for unearned increment, and lowered for +decrement, but not raised for improvements effected by the tenant +himself. In that case the tenant in two or three generations might be +a quasi-proprietor, his rent being ridiculously small in comparison +with the annual value of the holding. The improvements might be the +improvements of his grandfather, or even those of a complete stranger, +from whom he had bought the tenancy. Anyhow they might be the better +portion of the value of the land, and would not be government +property. Or would the government insist on purchasing the +improvements, and look out for a new tenant paying a higher rent? +Lastly, would the government themselves make such improvements as many +an English landlord makes now, for love of the country about him and +love of his own people? + +5. It would be most difficult to prevent private property arising in +land, even if it all did belong to the State to start with. "Suppose +£10 paid for a piece of land for a year, and suppose the occupier +said, Let me have it for ten years, and I will give you £20 a year, +ought not the State to accept the offer? Then suppose he said, Give it +me for ever and I will pay £30 a year? Again, ought not the State to +agree? He would then be that hateful creature a landowner, subject to +a rent-charge. Now suppose the State wanted to do work and had to +borrow money, and suppose he offered to give for the redemption of the +rent-charge a sum which could not be borrowed for less than £40 a +year. Again, ought not the State to accept his offer? Yet in that case +he would become a hopelessly unmitigated landlord." (Lord Bramwell.) + +6. When there is an alarm of fire in a theatre, any one who could +convince the audience that there was time enough for them all to file +out in slow succession by the door, would avert the greatest danger +that threatened them, that of being crushed and trampled on by one +another. Mankind in pursuit of wealth are like a crowd rushing +excitedly through a narrow place of exit. Whatever man, or body of +men, or institution, or doctrine, will moderate this "love of money" +([Greek: philargyria]), which St. Paul (1 Tim. vi. 10) declares to be +"the root of all evils," the same is a benefactor to the human race, +preventing that cruel oppression of the poor, which comes of +ruthlessly buying land, labour, everything, in the cheapest market and +selling it in the dearest. The landlord who always evicts, if he is +not paid the highest competition rent,--the employer who brings in +from afar the hands that will work at the lowest starvation +wage,--these vultures are worse enemies to society than Socialists, +for they occasion Socialism. + +7. Socialism, whether in land alone or in all capital, is an endeavour +to accomplish by State control the results that ought to be achieved +by private virtue. A landlord, or an employer, who remembers his +position as being what Homer calls "a king of men," [Greek: anax +andron],--remembers too, with Aristotle, that a prince exists for his +people,--and who, besides a quasi-royal care for the body of tenantry +or workmen over whom he presides, has something too of a fatherly +interest in every one of them, their persons and their families, +holding it to be a personal tie with himself, to be in his employment +or settled upon his land,--such a man and the multitude of such men +form the best bulwark a country can possess against Socialism. Such a +landlord or employer is a _praesens numen_ to his workpeople or +tenants. In the absence of this protective, personal influence of the +rich over the poor; in the disorganization of society consequent upon +the misconduct of its subordinate chiefs; in the stand-off attitude of +the higher classes, and the defiant independence of the lower; and in +the greed of material goods that is common to them both, there lurks a +danger of unknown magnitude to our modern civilization. + +_Reading_.--Leo XIII. on the Condition of Labour, Encyclical of 15th +May, 1891. [Footnote 20] + +[Footnote 20: "The right of property attaches to things produced by +labour, but cannot attach to things created by God." So Henry George, +_Condition of Labour_, pp. 3, 4. How then do we read in _Progress and +Poverty_, bk. 7. ch. 1: "The pen with which I am writing is justly +mine," and that, in the last resort, on account of "the rights of +those who dug the material from the ground and converted it into a +pen"? Was not that material, iron-ore, "created by God," equally with +any other portion of the earth's crust that we may please to call +_land_?] + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +OF THE STATE. + +SECTION I.--_Of the Monstrosities called Leviathan and Social +Contract_. + + +1. Thomas Hobbes, than whom never was greater genius for riding an +idea, right or wrong, to the full length that it will go, was born in +1588: and notwithstanding his twelve pipes of tobacco daily, his +vigorous constitution endured to his ninety-second year. The first +half of his life fell in with the age of the greatest predominance of +Calvinism. In religion he was scarcely a Calvinist, indeed he laboured +under a suspicion of atheism: but his philosophy is accurately cast in +the mould of the grim theology of Geneva. We may call it the +philosophy of Calvinism. It has for its central tenet, that human +nature either was from the first, or is become, bad, "desperately +wicked," depraved, corrupt, and utterly abominable, so that whatever +is natural to man, in so far forth as it is natural, is simply evil. +The remedy for our evil nature Hobbes finds in no imputed merits of a +Redeemer, no irresistible victorious grace, but in the masterful +coercion of a despotic civil power. But, lest any one should suspect +that there was at least this good in man, a propensity to civil +society and obedience to the rulers of cities, Hobbes insists that man +is by nature wholly averse to society with his kind: that the type of +the race is an Ishmael, "a wild man, his hand against all men, and all +men's hands against him:" in fact that the state of nature is a state +of war all round. He writes (_Leviathan_, c. xiii.): "Men have no +pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping +company where there is no power able to overawe them all. For every +man looketh that his companion should value him at the same rate he +sets on himself; and upon all signs of contempt or undervaluing +naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which among them that have +no common power to keep them quiet, is far enough to make them destroy +each other), to extort a greater value from his contemners by damage, +and from others by the example.... Hereby it is manifest, that during +the time that men live without a power to keep them all in awe, they +are in that condition which is called war, and such a war as is of +every man against every man.... In such condition there is no place +for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently +no culture of the earth: no navigation, nor use of the commodities +that may be imported by sea: no commodious building: no instruments of +moving and removing such things as require much force: no knowledge of +the face of the earth: no account of time: no arts, no letters, no +society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of +violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, +and short.... To this war of every man against every man this also is +consequent, that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and +wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no +common power there is no law: where no law, no injustice.... It is +consequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no +dominion, no _mine_ and _thine_ distinct, but only that to be every +man's that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it." + +2. Such is what Hobbes is pleased to call "the natural condition of +mankind," a condition which man would have every natural reason for +getting out of with all speed, were he ever so unhappy as to fall into +it. It is true that, apart from civil government, violence would reign +on earth. But it is not true that to live apart from civil government +is the natural condition of mankind. It is not true that the only +motive which draws men into civil society is the fear of violence, as +though there were no such facts and exigencies of human nature as +sympathy, friendship, intellectual curiosity, art, religion. It is not +true that the one reason for the existence of the civil power consists +in this, that without the restraining hand of the magistrate men would +bite and devour one another. Lastly, it is not true that all rights, +notably rights of property, are the creation of the State. A man is a +man first and a citizen afterwards. As a man, he has certain rights +actual and potential (c. v., s. i., p. 244): these the State exists, +not to create, for they are prior to it in the order of nature, but to +determine them, where indeterminate, to sanction and to safeguard +them. + +Natural rights go before legal rights, and are presupposed to them, as +the law of nature before that law which is civil and positive. It is +an "idol of the tribe" of lawyers to ignore all law but that upon +which their own professional action takes its stand. + +3. "In considering man as he must have come from the hands of nature," +writes Jean Jacques Rousseau, "I behold an animal less strong than +some, less active than others, but upon the whole in organism having +the advantage of them all. I behold him appeasing his hunger under an +oak, slaking his thirst in the first brook, finding a bed at the foot +of the same tree that furnished his repast, and there you have all his +cravings satisfied." (_Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité _.) This +noble savage--quite a contrast to Hobbes's ruffian primeval, "nasty, +brutish," and short-lived--observes and imitates the industry, and +gradually raises himself to the instinct, of the beasts among whom he +lives. His constitution is robust, and almost inaccessible to malady. +He attains to old age, free from gout and rheumatism. He surpasses the +fiercest wild beasts in address as much as they surpass him in +strength, and so arrives to dwell among them without fear. Yet withal +he is distinguished from brutes by freewill and perfectibility, +qualities which gradually draw him out of his primeval condition of +tranquil innocence, lead him through a long course of splendours and +errors, of vices and virtues, and end by making him a tyrant at once +over nature and over himself. + +4. Rousseau's life, 1715-1778, was a continual protest against the +formalism, affectation, pedantry and despotism of the age of the +Bourbons. His ideal of man was the unconventional, unconstrained, +solitary, but harmless and easy-going savage. Hobbes was the growth of +a sterner and more serious age. The only reality to him in heaven and +on earth was force: his one idea in philosophy was coercion. Human +nature to him was an embodiment of brute violence ever in need of +violent restraint. Rousseau, an optimist, saw nothing but good in +man's original nature: to the pessimist mind of Hobbes all was evil +there. Neither of them saw any natural adaptation to social life in +the human constitution. To live in society was, in both their views, +an artificial arrangement, an arbitrary convention. But Hobbes found +in the intolerable evils of a state of nature an excellent reason why +men should quit it for the unnatural condition of citizens. Rousseau +found no reason except, as he says, _quelque funeste hasard_. The +problem for Hobbes stood thus: how men, entering society, might be +"cribbed, cabined, and confined" to the utmost in order to keep down +their native badness. Rousseau's concern was, how one might so become +a citizen as yet to retain to the full the delightful liberty of a +tropical savage. Hobbes's solution is the _Leviathan_, Rousseau's the +_Social Contract_. The prize, we think, rests with the Englishman: but +the reader shall judge. + +5. And first of the Social Contract. Rousseau proposes "to find a form +of association which shall defend and protect with all the strength of +the community the person and the goods of each associate, and whereby +each one, uniting himself to all, may nevertheless obey none but +himself and remain as free as before." (_Contrat Social_, i. 6.) This +proposal is hopeless, it is a contradiction in terms. No man can +contract and remain as free as before, but he binds himself either +under a _wider_ obligation to do or abstain, where he was not bound +before, or under a _stronger_ obligation where he was bound already. +Nevertheless Rousseau finds a means of accomplishing the impossible +and the self-contradictory. "Each of us puts into a common stock his +person and all his power under the supreme direction of the general +will; and we receive in our turn the offering of the rest, each member +as an inseparable part of the whole. Instantly, instead of the private +person of each contracting party, this act of association produces a +moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly +has voices, which body receives by this same act its unity, its common +Ego, its life and its will." (_ib_.) This awful signing away of all +your rights, so that your very personality is merged in that of the +community--a self-renunciation going far beyond that of profession in +any religious order--ought certainly, as Rousseau says, to be "the +most voluntary act in the world;" and he adds the characteristic +reason: "every man being born free and master of himself, none can, +under any pretence whatsoever, subject him without his own consent." +(_Contrat Social_, iv. 2.) Then you ask: When have I made this large +contract by the most voluntary act in the world? Rousseau replies: +"When the State is instituted, consent is in residing." (_ib_.) But, +you reply, my residence is anything but the most voluntary act in the +world: it would be awkward for me to emigrate; and if I did emigrate, +it would only be to some other State: I cannot possibly camp out and +be independent in the woods, nor appease my hunger under an oak. To +this plea Rousseau quite gives in, remarking that "family, goods, the +want of an asylum, necessity, violence, may keep an inhabitant in the +country in spite of himself; and in that case his mere sojourn no +longer supposes his consent to the contract." (_ib_.) Then none of us +have made the contract, for we have never had the option of living +anywhere except in some State. + +6. Hobbes, after laying down the necessity of men combining for +protection against mutual injustice, observes that a mere promise or +agreement not to injure any one will not suffice: "for the agreement +of men is by covenant only, which is artificial; and therefore no +wonder if there be something else required besides covenant to make +their agreement constant and lasting, which is a common power to keep +them in awe and to direct their actions to the common benefit." He +continues: "The only way to erect such a common power ... is to confer +all their power and strength upon one man or upon one assembly of men, +that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices unto one will: +which is as much as to say, to appoint one man or assembly of men to +bear their person; and every one to own, and to acknowledge himself to +be the author of, whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act +or cause to be acted in those things which concern the common peace +and safety; and therein to submit their wills every one to his will, +and their judgments to his judgment. This is more than consent or +concord,--it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, +made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if +every man should say to every man: I authorise, and give up my right +of governing myself to this man or to this assembly of men, on this +condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorise all his +actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one +person is called a _commonwealth_, in Latin _civitas_. This is the +generation of that great Leviathan, or rather, to speak more +reverently, of that mortal god, to whom we owe under the immortal God +our peace and defence." (_Leviathan_, c. xvii.) This idea of all the +rights and personalities of the individuals who contract to live +socially being fused and welded together into the one resultant +personality and power of the State, has evidently been borrowed by +Rousseau from Hobbes. We shall deal with the idea presently. Meanwhile +several points claim our notice. + +7. The hideous piece of cynicism whereby Rousseau (_Contrat Social_, +iv. 2), after promising you that, if you join his commonwealth, you +shall obey none but yourself, then goes on to tell you that you obey +yourself in obeying the will of the majority, even when it puts you in +irons or leads you to death--because as a citizen you have once for +all renounced your own will, and can only wish what the majority +wishes,--has its root in the position of Hobbes, that "every subject +is author of every act the sovereign doth." (_Leviathan_, c. xxi.) + +8. A real and important difference between the _Leviathan_ and the +_Social Contract_, is that Hobbes (c. xix.) allows various +distributions of sovereign power, but prefers monarchy: Rousseau (l. +ii., c. i.) will have it that sovereignty is vested inalienably in the +people: of which doctrine more to follow. + +9. _Men are by nature equal_, say Rousseau and Hobbes and many more +respectable authors. Yes, in their specific nature, that is, they are +all equally men. Similarly you have it that all triangles are equal, +if that is a proposition of any value. But men as individuals are not +all equal. One is stronger in body, another more able in mind: one +predisposed to virtue, another to vice: one born in affluence and +honour, another in squalor. Not men in the abstract, but living men, +start at different points of vantage, and the distance between them +widens as they run the race of life. We may lay it down as an axiom, +in diametric opposition to Rousseau, that inequalities are natural, +equalities artificial. + +10. _Man is born free_: so opens the first chapter of the _Contrat +Social_. If free of all duties, then void of all rights (c. v., s. i., +nn. 5, 7, pp. 246, 247): let him then be promptly knocked on the head +as a sacrifice to Malthas; and with the misformed children born in +Plato's _Republic_, "they will bury him in a secret and unseen spot, +as is befitting." + +11. Hobbes and Rousseau go upon this maxim, which has overrun the +modern world, that no man can be bound to obedience to another without +his own consent. The maxim would be an excellent one, were men framed +like the categories of Aristotle--substance, quantity, quality, +relation, and the rest--each peering out of his own pigeon-hole, an +independent, self-sufficient entity. But men are dependent, naturally +dependent whether they will or no, every human being on certain +definite others,--the child on the parent, the citizen on the State +whose protection he enjoys, and all alike on God. These natural +dependences carry with them natural uncovenanted obediences,--to +parents, filial duty--to country, loyalty--to God, piety: all which +are embraced in the Latin term _pietas_. (See St. Thomas, 2a 2ę, q. +101, art. 1, in corp.) The fatal maxim before us is the annihilation +of _pietas_. In lieu of loyal submission we get a contract, a +transaction of reasoned commercial selfishness between equal and +equal. This perverse substitution has called forth Leo XIII.'s remark +on the men of our time, "Nothing comes so amiss to them as subjection +and obedience," _Nihil tam moleste ferunt quam subesse et parere_. +(Encyclical on Christian Marriage.) + +12. The common extravagance of the _Leviathan_ and the _Social +Contract_ is the suppression of the individual, with his rights and +his very personality, which is all blended in the State. (See +Rousseau's words above quoted, n. 5, and those of Hobbes, n. 6.) The +reservations in favour of the individual made by Hobbes, _Leviathan_, +c. xxi., and by Rousseau, _Contrat Social_, l. ii., c. iv., are either +trifles or self-contradictions. But it is not in man's power by any +contract thus to change his nature, so as to become from autocentric +heterocentric (c. ii., s. i., n. 2, p. 203; c. v., s. i., n. 1, p. +244), from a person a thing, from a man a chattel, void of rights and +consequently of duties, and bound to serve this Collective Monster, +this Aggregated Idol, with the absolute devotedness that is due to God +alone. The worship of the new Moloch goes well with the dark +misanthropism of Hobbes: but in Rousseau, the believer in the perfect +goodness of unrestrained humanity, it is about the most glaring of his +many inconsistencies. It is of course eagerly taken up by the +Socialists, as carrying all their conclusions. It is the political +aspect of Socialism. + +_Reading_.--Burke, _Warren Hastings_, Fourth Day, the passage +beginning, "He have arbitrary power!" + + +SECTION II.--_Of the theory that Civil Power is an aggregate formed by +subscription of the powers of individuals_. + + +1. The Greeks had a name [Greek: eranos], which meant a feast where +the viands were supplied by each guest contributing in kind. If, in a +party of four, one man brought a ham, another a rabbit, a third a dish +of truffles, and a fourth a salmon, no one would expect that, when the +cover was raised, there should appear a pigeon-pie. That would not be +in the nature of an [Greek: eranos]. Now not only Hobbes and Rousseau, +but Locke and a great multitude of modern Englishmen with him, hold +that the power of the State is an aggregate, the algebraic sum of the +powers whereof the component members would have stood possessed, had +they lived in what is called, by a misleading phrase, "the state of +nature," that is, the condition of men not subject to civil authority. +These powers,--either, as Hobbes and Rousseau virtually say, _all_ of +them, or, as Locke and the common opinion has it, only _some_ of them, +--men are supposed to resign as they enter into the State. If +therefore there appears in the City, Nation, State, or Commonwealth, a +certain new and peculiar power, which belongs to no individual in the +"state of nature," or, as I prefer to call it, the _extra-civil +state_, then what we may designate as the Aggregation Theory breaks +down, and another origin must be sought of civil principality. But +there is such a power in the State, new and peculiar, and not found in +any of the component individuals: it is the power and authority to +punish on civil grounds. It is the right of the rods and axes, that +were borne before the Roman magistrate. It is, in its most crucial +form, the right to punish with death. + +2. We are not here concerned with proving the existence of this right. +It is generally admitted: we assume it accordingly, and shall prove it +later on. Nor are we concerned with _domestic punishment_, inflicted +by the head of a family within his own household, for the good of that +household, stopping short of any _irreparable harm_ to the sufferer. +(St. Thos., 2a 2ę, q. 65, art. 2, ad. 2.) Leaving this aside, we say, +and have proved already, that one private individual has no right to +punish another, neither _medicinally_ for the amendment of the +delinquent, nor by way of _deterrent_ for the good of the community, +nor in the way of _retribution_ for his own satisfaction. He has the +right of self-defence, but not of punishment: the two things are quite +different. He may also exact restitution, where restitution is due: +but that again is not punishing. If he is in the extra-civil state, he +may use force, where prudence allows it, to recover what he has lost. +This _right of private war_ really is surrendered by the individual, +when the State is established: but war and punishment are two totally +different ideas. Subjects are punished: war is levied on independent +powers. (_Ethics_, c. ix., s. iii., nn. 4-6, pp. 171-174; _Natural +Law_, c. ii., s. ii., n. 6, p. 212.) + +3. Opposite is the opinion of Locke, who writes: + +"The execution of the law of nature is in that state [of nature] put +into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the +transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its +violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern +men in this world, be in vain, if there were nobody that in the state +of nature had a power to execute that law." We observe that the +punishment of offenders against the law of nature, as such, belongs to +the Legislator, who is God alone. Certainly it is well, nay necessary, +that there should be human law to bear out the law of nature: but +human law is the creation of human society in its perfection, which is +the State. Man is punished by man for breaking the laws of man, +not--except remotely--for breaking the laws of God. Nor would it be +any inconvenience, if the law of nature were in vain in a state +wherein nature never intended men to live, wherein no multitude of men +ever for any notable time have lived, a state which is neither actual +fact nor ideal perfection, but a mere property of the philosophic +stage, a broken article, an outworn speculation. Such is "the state of +nature," as identified with the extra-civil state by Hobbes, Locke, +and Rousseau. + + +SECTION III.--_Of the true state of Nature, which is the state of +civil society; and consequently of the Divine origin of Power_. + + +1. The State is deemed by Aristotle (_Politics_, III., ix., 14): "the +union of septs and villages in a complete and self-sufficient life." +The first and most elementary community is the _family_, [Greek: +oikia]. A knot of families associating together, claiming +blood-relationship and descent, real or fictitious, from a common +ancestor, whose name they bear, constitute a [Greek: genos], called in +Ireland a _sept_, in Scotland a _clan_, nameless in England. When the +sept come to cluster their habitations, or encampments, in one or more +spots, and to admit strangers in blood to dwell among them, these +hamlets, or camps, gradually reach the magnitude of a _village_. When +a number of these _villages_, belonging to different _septs_, come to +be contiguous to one another, this mere juxtaposition does not make of +them a State. Nor does interchange of commodities, nor intermarriage, +nor an offensive and defensive alliance: these are the mutual +relations of a _confederacy_, [Greek: xymmaxia], but all these and +more are needed for a State, [Greek: polis]. To be a State, it is +requisite that these septs and villages should agree to regulate the +conduct of their individual members by a _common standard of social +virtue_, sufficient for their well-being as one community. This common +standard is fixed by common consent, or by the decision of some power +competent to act for all and to punish delinquents. The name of this +common standard is _law_. (_Ethics_, c. vii., n. 1, p. 126.) The +community thus formed leads a life _complete and self-sufficient_, not +being a member of another, but a body by itself,--not part of any +ulterior community, but complete in the fulness of social good and +social authority. + +2. Among the ancient Greeks and Italians, and to some extent also in +medięval Italy and Germany, the city or municipality, with the small +country district attached, was the State. With us the nation is the +State; and accordingly we say _my country_ where the Greek said _my +city_. Bearing this difference in mind, as also the fact that the +_sept_ is not known amongst us except to antiquarians, and likewise +that the _village_ with us coincides with the _parish_, and that there +are town as well as country parishes,--upon these modern data we may +amend Aristotle's definition thus: _The State is the union of parishes +and municipalities in a perfect and self-sufficient community_. + +3. The City State is well illustrated in the following narrative of +Thucydides (ii., 15): + +"In the time of Cecrops and the early kings as far as Theseus, Attica +was always divided among several independent cities, with their own +town-halls and magistrates; and when there was no alarm of an enemy, +the inhabitants did not resort for common deliberation to the King, +but severally managed their own affairs and took their own counsel, +and some of them even went to war. But when Theseus came to the +throne, he abolished the council-chambers and magistracies of the +other cities, and centralised all the people in what is now the city +[of Athens], where he appointed their one council-chamber and +town-hall; and while they continued to occupy their own properties as +before, he forced them to recognise this as their one city and State." +Attica before Theseus was a _confederacy_, [Greek: xymmaxia], not a +State, [Greek: polis]. + +4. A _citizen_ is defined: "one who has access to a share in +deliberative and judicial functions." (Ar., _Pol_. III., i., 12.) It +is not necessary that he actually should share these functions, but +the way to them should lie open to him: he should be a person +qualified to share in them. There are various degrees of citizenship. +Under a parliamentary government, we distinguish the member of +parliament, the elector, and him who will be an elector as soon as he +gets a house of his own; and again, the judge, and him who is liable +to serve on juries. In an absolute monarchy there are no _citizens_, +only _subjects_. + +5. "The distribution of power in the State, and especially of the +sovereign power, is called the _polity_" ([Greek: politeia], Ar., +_Pol_., III., vi., 1),--a word immortalised by the judicious Hooker, +and happily recovered recently to the English language. The _polity_ +then is the distribution of the sovereignty. The person, singular or +collective, in whose hands the full sovereignty rests, is called the +_ruler_. Be it observed that what we call _the ruler_ is never one +man, except in absolute monarchy. By the theory of the British +Constitution, the _ruler_ is King, Lords, and Commons, together. + +6. _Nature requires that men generally live in society, domestic and +civil, so that the individual be of the family, and families form +associations, which again conspire to form one perfect community, +which is the State_. The requirement of nature may be gathered from +the universal practice of mankind. "If it (the word _savage_) means +people without a settled form of government, without laws and without +a religion, then, go where you like, you will not find such a race." +(Max Müller, in _Nineteenth Century_, Jan. 1885, p. 114.) The same may +be gathered from a consideration of what the State is, and of the ends +which it serves. The State, as we have seen (n. 2), is a union of +septs and villages, or of parishes and municipalities. The individual +is born and nurtured in the family, and ordinarily becomes in time the +parent of a new family. Families must combine to form septs by blood, +or villages (or parishes) by locality. Municipalities we may leave +aside, for a municipality is a potential State. But we must consider +the sept, village, or parish, which is the community intermediate +between family and State. Among the cogent reasons which require +families to enter into this association, we may mention friendship, +intermarriage, the interchange of services and commodities, the +cultivation of the arts, the preservation of traditions and +inventions. + +7. But it is further necessary that these septs, villages, or +parishes, should band together and combine to form a higher community, +self-sufficient and perfect,--for the determining of rights which +Natural Law leaves undetermined,--for the punishing of disturbers of +the peace, if need be, even with death,--for defence against a common +enemy,--for a union of counsels and resources to the execution of +magnificent works. This self-sufficient and perfect community, which +is not part of any higher community, is the State. + +8. We may observe that the whole reason for the being of the State is +not mutual need, nor the repression of violence. Main reasons these +are, no doubt, but not the whole main reason. Even if men had no need +of one another for the supply of their animal wants, they would still +desire to converse for the satisfaction of their intellectual +curiosity and their social affections. And even if we had all remained +as void of guile, and as full of light and love, as our first parents +were at their creation, we should still have needed the erection of +States. In a State there are not only criminal but civil courts, where +it is not wicked men alone who come to be litigants. From sundry +passages of Scripture it would appear that even angels may disagree as +to what is best and proper: angelic men certainly may and do. It is a +mistake to look upon civil government, with its apparatus of laws and +judgments, simply as a necessary evil, and remedy of the perverseness +of mankind. On the contrary, were all men virtuous, States would still +be formed, towering in magnificence above the States known to history, +as the cedars of Lebanon above the scanty growths of a fell-side in +our north country. + +9. _There can be no State without a power to guide and govern it_. It +has indeed become the fashion to repeat, as the latest discovery in +politics, that what a State needs is not government but +administration. This saying comes of a theory, to be examined +presently, that sovereign power abides permanently with the people at +large, and that the sole function of princes, cabinets, and +parliaments, is to provide means of giving effect to the popular will. +This however is not quite a repudiation of government, but a peculiar +view as to the seat and centre of government. Those who hold it, +vigorously maintain the right of the Many to govern, control, and +command the Few. The need of some governing authority in a State can +be denied by none but an Anarchist, a gentleman who lives two doors +beyond Rousseau on the side of unreason. + +10. _Every State is autonomous, self-governing, independent_. Either +the whole people taken collectively must rule the same whole taken +distributively, or a part must rule the rest. The ruler is either the +whole commonwealth, or more frequently a part of the commonwealth. An +autocrat is part of the State which he governs. Sovereignty whole and +entire is intrinsic to the State. A community that is to any extent +governed from without, like British India or London, is not a State, +but part of a State, for it is not a _perfect community_. + +11. We have it therefore that _man is a social animal_. Naturally he +is a member of a family. Nature requires that families should coalesce +into higher communities, which again naturally converge and culminate +in the State. Nature further requires that in every State there should +be an authority to govern. But authority to govern and duty to obey +are correlatives. Nature therefore requires submission to the +governing authority in the State. In other words, Nature abhors +anarchy as being the destruction of civil society, and as cutting the +ground from under the feet of civilised man. The genuine _state of +nature_, that state and condition, which nature allows and approves as +proper for the evolution of the human faculties, is the state of man +in civil society. That is lost where there is no judge in the land. + +12. There are men full of a sentimental deference to authority and +professions of obedience, who yet will not obey any of the authorities +that actually are over them. These are disobedient men. He is an +anarchist in practice, who meditates treason and rebellion against the +"powers that be" actually over him in the State wherein he lives. To +obey no actual power is to obey no power, as to wear no actual clothes +is to go naked. To keep up the comparison,--as a man may change his +clothes upon occasion, and thus go through a brief interval of +unclothedness without injury to health or violation of decency, +notwithstanding the requirement of nature to wear clothes: so it may +be or it may not be consonant with the exigency of our nature at times +to subvert by insurrection the existing government in order to the +substitution of a new authority; that does not concern us here. We are +stating the general rule under ordinary circumstances. The submission +to civil authority, which nature requires of us, must be paid in the +coin of obedience to the actual established "powers that be." + +13. Any one who understands how morality comes from God (_Ethics_, c. +vi., s. ii. nn. 6-9, 13, pp. 119-125), can have no difficulty in +seeing how civil power is of God also. The one point covers the other. +We need no mention of God to show that disobedience, lying, and the +seven deadly sins, are bad things for human nature, things to be +avoided even if they were not forbidden. All the things that God +forbids are against the good of man. Their being evil is +distinguishable from their being prohibited, and antecedent to it. Now +as drunkenness and unchastity are evil for man, so too is anarchy. The +one remedy for anarchy is civil government. Even if there were no God, +it would be still imperatively necessary, as we have seen, for mankind +to erect political institutions, and to abide by the laws and +ordinances of constitutional power. But there would be no _formal +obligation_ of submission to these laws and ordinances; and resistance +to this power would be no more than _philosophic sin_. (_Ethics_, c. +vi., s. ii., n. 6, p. 119.) What makes anarchy truly sinful and wrong +is the prohibition of it contained in the Eternal Law, that law +whereby God commands every creature, and particularly every man, to +act in accordance with his own proper being and nature taken as a +whole, and to avoid what is repugnant to the same. (_Ethics_, c. vi., +s. ii., n. 9, p. 120.) + +Therefore, as man is naturally social, and anarchy is the dissolution +of society, God forbids anarchy, and enjoins obedience to the civil +power, under pain of sin and damnation. "They that resist, purchase to +themselves damnation" (Rom. xiii. 2): where the theological student, +having the Greek text before him, will observe that the same phrase is +used as in 1 Cor. xi. 29 of the unworthy communicant, as though it +were the like sin to rend our Lord's mystical Body by civil discord as +to profane His natural Body by sacrilege. But to enjoin obedience and +to bestow authority are the obverse and reverse of one and the same +act. God therefore gives the civil ruler power and authority to +command. This is the meaning of St. Paul's teaching that there is no +power but from God, and that the powers that be are ordained of God. +(Rom. xiii. 1.) + +14. The argument is summed up in these seven consequent propositions: + +(a) Civil society is necessary to human nature. +(b) Civil power is necessary to civil society. +(c) Civil power is naught without civil obedience. +(d) Civil obedience is necessary to human nature. +(e) God commands whatever is necessary to human nature. +(f) God commands obedience to the civil power. +(g) God commissions the civil power to rule. + +15. If any one asks how the State and the civil power is of God any +otherwise than the railway company with its power, or even the fever +with its virulence, a moment's reflection will reveal the answer in +the facts, that railway communication, however convenient, is not an +essential feature of human life, as the State is: while diseases are +not requirements in order to good, but incidental defects and evils of +nature, permitted by God. Why God leaves man to cope with such evils, +is not the question here. + +_Readings_.--Ar., _Pol_., I., ii.; III., i.; III., ix.: nn. 5-15. + + +SECTION IV.--_Of the Variety of Polities_. + + +1. _One polity alone is against the natural law; that is every polity +which proves itself unworkable and inefficient: for the rest, various +States exhibit various polities workable and lawful, partly from the +circumstances, partly from the choice, of the citizens: but the sum +total of civil power is a constant quantity, the same for all States_. +We proceed to establish the clauses of this statement in succession. + +2. If a watch be necessary to a railway guard, and he is bound to have +one accordingly, it is also necessary, and he is bound to procure it, +that the watch shall go and keep time. A watch that will not keep time +is an unlawful article for him to depend upon, being tantamount to no +watch, whereas he is bound to have a watch. Otherwise, be his watch +large or small, gold, silver, or pinchbeck, all this is indifferent, +so long as it be a reliable timekeeper. In like manner, we must have a +State, we must have a government, and we must have a government that +can govern. Monarchy, aristocracy, parliaments, wide or narrow +franchise, centralisation, decentralisation, any one of these and +countless other forms--apart from the means whereby it is set up--is a +lawful government, where it is a workable one; unlawful, and forbidden +by God and nature, where it cannot work. A form of government that +from its own intrinsic defects could nowhere work, would be everywhere +and always unlawful. + +3. You cannot argue from the accomplished fact the lawfulness of the +means whereby it was accomplished. Nor do we say that every form of +government, which succeeds in governing, was originally set up in +justice; nor again that the success of its rule is necessarily due to +the use of just means. The Committee of Public Safety in Paris in 1794 +did manage to govern, but it was erected in blood, and it governed by +an unscrupulous disregard of everybody's rights. All that we say is, +that no distribution of civil power as a distribution, or no polity as +a polity (s. iii., n. 5, p. 312), is unlawful, if by it the government +can be carried on. And the reason is plain. For all that nature +requires is that there should be an efficient civil authority, not +that this man should have it, or that one man or other should have it +all, or that a certain class in council assembled should engross it, +or that all the inhabitants of the country should participate in it. +Any one of these arrangements that will work, satisfies the exigency +of nature for civil rule, and is therefore in itself a lawful polity. + +4. Working, and therefore, as explained, lawful polities are as +multitudinous as the species of animals. Besides those that actually +are, there is a variety without end, as of animals, so of polities, +that might be and are not. We can classify only the main types. We +ground our classification upon Ar., _Pol._, III., vii., modernising it +so as to take in forms of representative government, whereof Aristotle +had no conception. + +(1) _Monarchy_, or the rule of the Single Person, in whose hands the +whole power of the State is concentrated, e.g., Constantine the Great. + +(2) _Aristocracy_, or the rule of the Few, which will be either +_direct_ or _representative_, according as either they themselves by +their own votes at first hand, or representatives whom they elect, +make the laws. + +(3) _Democracy_, or the rule of the Many, that is, of the whole +community. Democracy, again, is either _direct_ (commonly called +_pure_) or _representative_. The most famous approach in history to +pure democracy is the government of Athens, B.C. 438-338. + +(4) _Limited Monarchy_. + +(a) _Monarchy with Aristocracy_, the government of England from 1688 +to 1830. + +(b) _Monarchy with Democracy_. + +5. All civil government is for the governed, that is, for the +community at large. The perversion of a polity is the losing sight of +this principle, and the conducting of the polity in the interest of +the governing body alone. By such perversion monarchy passes into +_tyranny_, aristocracy into _oligarchy_, and democracy into +_ochlocracy_ or _mob-rule_. It might appear strange that, where the +power rests with the whole people collectively, government should ever +be carried on otherwise than in the interest of the entire community, +did we not remember that the majority, with whom the power rests in a +democracy, may employ it to trample on and crush the minority. Thus +the Many may worry and harass the Few, the mean and poor the wealthy +and noble: though commonly perhaps the worrying has been the other way +about. Anyhow it is important to observe that there is no polity which +of itself, and apart from the spirit in which it is worked, is an +adequate safeguard and rock of defence against oppression. + +6. The wide range of polities that history presents is not drawn out +by the caprice of nations. The very fact of a certain nation choosing +a certain polity, where they are free to choose, is an indication of +the bent of the national character, and character is not a caprice. No +North American population are ever likely to elect an absolute monarch +to govern them. That polity which thrives on the shores of the +Caspian, can strike no root on the banks of the Potomac. The choice of +a polity is limited by the character of the electors and by the +circumstances in which the election is made. Not every generation in a +nation is free to choose its polity: but the choice and institution of +the fathers binds the children. Up to a certain point ancestral +settlements must be respected, or instability ensues, and anarchy is +not far off. Thus the spirit of freedom should always act as Burke +says, "as if in the presence of canonized forefathers." + +7. The smallest State in the world is the little republic of Andorra +in the Pyrenees. Though it be a paradox to say it, there is as much +political power in Andorra as in Russia,--one and the same measure of +it in every State. In every State there is power for civil good to the +full height of the emergencies that may arise. The same emergencies +may arise everywhere, and everywhere there is full power to see that +the commonwealth take no harm by them. What a great empire can do for +this purpose, _e.g_., proclaim martial law, search houses, lay an +embargo on the means of transport, impress soldiers, the same can the +tiniest commonwealth do in the like need. And the ordinary functions +of government are the same in both. + +8. This seems at variance with the theory of some constitutions, +according to which there are certain so-called _fundamental laws_, +which the legislature cannot call in question, nor deal with in any +way, but must take them in all its deliberations for positions +established and uncontrovertible. The British Constitution recognizes +no fundamental laws. There is no reform that may not legally be +broached in Parliament and enacted there. Parliament is said to be +"omnipotent," "able to do everything, except to make a man a woman." +But in many legislatures it is not so. At Athens of old there were +certain measures which no one could introduce for discussion in the +Sovereign Assembly without rendering himself liable to a prosecution +[Greek: graphae paranomon]. And there have been many monarchs termed +absolute, who yet were bound by their coronation-oath, or by some +other agreement with their people, to preserve inviolate certain +institutions and to maintain certain laws. It may be contended that +such a government as we have in England, which is theoretically +competent to pass any law within the limits of the natural law, has a +greater range of power than a government whose operation is limited by +a barrier of fundamental positive law. But this contention vanishes +when we observe that there must remain in the State, which has +fundamental laws, a power somewhere to reverse them. They can be +reversed at least by the consent of the whole people. Thus at Athens +the [Greek: graphae paranomon] could be suspended by a vote of the +Assembly. A people can release their monarch from his coronation-oath +in such portions of it as are not binding absolutely by divine law. +Where _fundamental law_ obtains, a portion of the civil power becomes +_latent_, and only a diminished remainder is left _free_ in the hands +of the person or persons who are there said to rule. Such person or +persons are not the _adequate ruler_ of the State, as they have not +the full power, but the people, with whom rests the latent authority +to cancel certain laws, are to that extent partakers in the +sovereignty. Where there is agreement of the whole people, great and +small, no part of the power remains _latent_, but all is set _free_. +With us, it may be observed, the omnipotence of parliament has become +a mere lawyer's theory. On every great issue, other than that on which +the sitting parliament has been elected, it is the practice of +ministers to "go to the country" by a new General Election. Thus only +a certain measure of available authority is _free_ at the disposal of +parliament: the rest remaining _latent_ in the general body of the +electorate. Such is our constitution in practice. + +9. If in any State the whole power were _free_ in the hands of one +man, there we might look to see made good the _dictum_ of the +judicious Hooker (_Ecclesiastical Polity_, bk. i., s. x., n. 5): "To +live by one man's will became the cause of all men's misery." In a +monarchy untrammelled by senate or popular assembly, it were well that +some of the sovereign power should remain _latent_, and that His +Majesty should rule in accordance with certain laws, not within his +royal pleasure to revoke. + +10. The State and the power of the State, apart from the polity, is of +God. (s. iii., n. 14, p. 318.) The State under this or that polity and +this or that ruler, is also of God. But, apart from the polity, the +State is of God _antecedently_ to any determination of any human will: +because, willy nilly, man must live in civil society and God commands +him so to do. But the State under _this_ polity and _this_ ruler is of +God _consequently_ to some determination of human volition. In this +consequent sense we write _Victoria Dei gratia_. + +11. There is little use in the enquiry, Which is the best polity? +There is no polity which excels all other polities as man does the +rest of animals. We judge of polities as of the various types of +locomotives, according to the nature of the country where they are to +run. Aristotle tells us that if we meet with a Pericles, we shall do +best to make him our king, and hand over all our affairs to him. (Ar., +_Pol_., III., xiii., 25: cf. Thucydides, ii., 65.) Otherwise, "for +most cities and for most men, apart from exceptional circumstances, or +a condition of ideal perfection, but having regard to what is +ordinarily possible," he recommends a moderate republic under +middle-class rule. (Ar., _Pol_., VI., xi., Ed. Congreve.) This he +calls _par excellence_ "a polity," [Greek: politeia]. _Democracy_, +[Greek: deimokratia] with Aristotle, always means that perversion of +democracy, which we call _mob-rule_. (Ar., _Pol._, III., vii., nn. 3, +5.) + +12. In the English monarchy the whole majesty of the State shines +forth in the Single Person who wears the Crown. The Crown is the +centre of loyalty and gives dignity to the government. The Crown is +above all parties in the State, knows their secrets, their purposes +when in office as well as their acts, and is able to mediate, when +party feeling threatens to bring government to a standstill. The +British Crown has more weight of influence than of prerogative. +[Footnote 21] + +[Footnote 21: Written in the month and year of jubilee, June, 1887.] + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., 1a 2ę, q. 105, art. 1, in corp., ad 2, 5; Ar., +_Pol_., III., xv.; _ib_., III., xvi., nn. 5-8; _ib_., VIII. (al. V.), +xi. nn. 1-3. + + +SECTION V.--_Of the Divine Right of Kings and the Inalienable +Sovereignty of the People._ + + +1. "Those old fanatics of arbitrary power dogmatized as if hereditary +monarchy were the only lawful government in the world, just as our new +fanatics of popular arbitrary power maintain that a popular election +is the only lawful source of authority." (Burke, _Reflections on +French Revolution_.) + +We here stand between two idols of the tribe of politicians. We may +call them Gog and Magog: Gog, the divine right of kings; Magog, the +inalienable sovereignty of the people. + +2. The position known in history as "the divine right of kings" may be +best described as a _political popedom_. It is the belief of Catholics +that our Divine Redeemer, instituting His Church by His own personal +act as a perfect society and spiritual commonwealth, instituted in +like manner the polity under which He willed it to be governed, +namely, the Papal monarchy, begun in St. Peter and carried to +completion according to our Lord's design under the line of Popes, +Peter's successors. The monarchy thus established is essential to the +Catholic Church. We speak not here of the temporal power which the +Pope once enjoyed in the Roman States, but of his spiritual +sovereignty over all Christendom. The Pope cannot validly resign and +put out of his own and his successors' hands, nor can the Cardinals +take away from him, nor the Episcopate, one jot or tittle of this +spiritual prerogative. He cannot, for instance, condition his +infallibility on the consent of a General Council, or surrender the +canonization of saints to the votes of the faithful at large. Such are +the inalienable, Christ-given prerogatives of the Papacy. Henry VIII. +feloniously set himself up for Pope within the realm of England. +Blending together temporal and spiritual jurisdiction, he made out his +rights and prerogatives as a monarch, even in the civil order, to be +inalienable as in the spiritual. Spiritual and civil attributes +together formed a jewelled circlet, one and indivisible, immoveably +fixed on the brow of the King's Most Sacred Majesty. Grown and swollen +by their union with the spirituality, the civil attributes of the +Crown were exaggerated to the utmost, and likewise declared +inalienable. They were exaggerated till they came to embrace all the +powers of government. The privileges of Parliament, and the +limitations to the royal authority, set forth in the Petition of Right +in 1628, were regarded as mere concessions tenable at the King's +pleasure: from which point of view we understand the readiness of so +conscientious a monarch as Charles I. to act against such privileges +after he had allowed them. But to vest all the powers of government +inalienably in the King, so that whoever else may seem to partake in +them, shall partake only by royal sufferance, is tantamount to +declaring monarchy the sole valid and lawful polity. This declaration +the ministers, lay and clerical, of our Charleses and Jameses do not +seem to have made in express terms. It is, however, contained by +implication in their celebrated phrase of "the inalienable +prerogatives of the Crown," as interpreted by the stretches of +prerogative which they advised. They virtually asserted of one +particular polity, or distribution of civil power (c. viii., s. iii., +n. 5, p. 312), that which is true only of civil power taken nakedly, +apart from the mode of its distribution--they said of _monarchy_ what +is true of _government_--that the sum of its power is a constant +quantity (c. viii., s. iv., n. 7, p. 322), and that it is of God +_antecedently_ to and irrespectively of any determination of popular +will. (c. viii., s. iv., n. 10, p. 325.) + +3. Such a position is easily refuted, _negatively_, by its being +wholly unproven, unless the English Reformation, and the servile +spirit in Church and State that promoted and was promoted by the +Reformation, can pass for a proof; and again the position is +_positively_ refuted, when we come to consider how all that nature +requires and God commands, is government under some polity, not +government everywhere under monarchy; there being many workable +polities besides monarchy. (s. iv., nn. 1-4, p. 319.) + +4. The same argument that demolishes Gog, also overturns Magog. The +two idols, opposed to one another, stand upon the same pedestal, the +identification of government in general with one particular polity, as +though _a_ polity were _the_ polity. The great assertor and worshipper +of the inalienable sovereignty of the people is Jean Jacques Rousseau. +He starts from postulates which we have already rejected--that all men +are equal (c. viii., s. i., n. 9, p. 305)--that man is born free +(_ib._, n. 10)--that none can be bound to obey another without his own +consent (_ib._, n. 11)--that civil society is formed by an arbitrary +convention (_ib._, n. 4)--which convention is the Social Contract. +(_ib._, n. 5.) From these unreasonable postulates Rousseau draws the +conclusion, logically enough, that the sovereign will in every State +is the will of the majority of the citizens: but the will of the +majority, he goes on, cannot be alienated from the majority: therefore +neither can the sovereignty be alienated, but must abide permanently +with the people ruling by a majority of votes. The argumentation is +excellent, but the premisses are all false. The conclusion is vastly +popular, few minds considering from what premisses it is drawn. + +5. If sovereignty rests inalienably with the people, the one valid +polity is pure democracy. This proposition, however, Rousseau was not +forward to formulate. The Stuarts had shrunk from formulating a +similar proposition about monarchy, though they virtually held and +acted upon it. They were willing enough to allow of a parliament, +whose privileges and functions should be at His Majesty's gracious +pleasure. Thus Rousseau will allow you to have your senate, king, +emperor, if you will: only remember that he is _the prince_, not _the +sovereign_. (_Contrat Social_, l. iii., c. i.) The people collectively +are the sovereign, always sovereign. The _prince_, that is, he or they +to whom the administration is entrusted--since all the citizens cannot +administer jointly--is the mere official and bailiff of the Sovereign +People, bound to carry out their mandate in all things, and removable +at their pleasure. The people must meet periodically, not at the +discretion of the prince. "These meetings must open with two +questions, never to be omitted, and to be voted on separately. The +first is: Whether it pleases the Sovereign (People) to continue the +present form of government. The second is: Whether it pleases the +People to leave the administration to the persons at present actually +charged with it." (_Contrat Social_, ,l. iv., c. xviii.) + +6. The claim of a pure democracy like this to supersede all other +polities cannot be established by abstract arguments. That we have +seen in examining the Social Contract. The alternative way of +establishing such an exclusive claim would be to prove that the +practical efficiency of pure democracy immeasurably transcends the +efficiency of every other possible polity. There is indeed yet a third +mode of proof resorted to. It is said that pure democracy everywhere +is coming and must come; and that what is thus on the line of human +progress must be right and best for the time that it obtains. A grand +invention this of Positivist genius, the theory, that whatever is is +right; and the practice, always to swim with the stream! But supposing +that pure democracy is coming, how long is it likely to last? The +answer may be gathered from a review of the working difficulties of +such a polity. + +7. It is made only for a small State. Railway and telegraph have +indeed diminished the difficulty; and have removed the need of all the +voters meeting in one place, as was done at Athens. Newspapers echo +and spread with addition the eloquence of popular orators, beyond the +ears that actually listen to them. Still, think what it would be to +have a general election, upon every bill that passes through +Parliament: for that is what pure democracy comes to. The plan would +scarcely work with a total electorate of thirty thousand. You say the +people would entrust a committee with the passing of ordinary +measures, reserving to themselves the supervision. I am not arguing +the physical impossibility, but the moral difficulties of such an +arrangement. For either the people throw the reins of government on +the neck of this committee, or they keep a tight hold upon the +committee and guide it. In the former case the popular sovereignty +becomes like that of a monarch who leans much on favourites, a +sovereignty largely participated in by others than the nominal holder +of the control. On the other hand, if the people do frequently +interfere, and take a lively interest in the doings of the subordinate +assembly, the people themselves must be a small body. An active +governing body of three hundred thousand members would be as great a +wonder as an active man weighing three hundred pounds. Only in a small +State is that intense political life possible, which a pure democracy +must live. There only, as Rousseau requires, can the public service be +the principal affair of the citizens. "All things considered," he +says, "I do not see how it is any longer possible for the Sovereign +(People) to preserve amongst us the exercise of his rights, if the +city is not very small." (_Contrat Social_, l. iii., c. xv.) And the +difficulty of size in a democracy is aggravated, if, as Socialists +propose, the democratic State is to be sole capitalist within its own +limits. The perfect sovereignty of the people means the disruption of +empires, and the pushing to extremity of what is variously described +as _local government, home rule, autonomy_, and _decentralisation_, +till every commune becomes an independent State. But for defence in +war and for commerce in peace, these little States must federate; and +federation means centralisation, external control over the majority at +home, restricted foreign relations, in fact the corruption of pure +democracy. + +8. Again, the perfect sovereignty of the people cannot subsist except +upon the supposition that one man is as much a born ruler as another, +which means a levelling down of the best talent of the community, for +that is the only way in which capacities can be equalised--a very +wasteful and ruinous expedient, and one that the born leaders of the +people will not long endure. Then there is the proverbial fickleness +of democracy, one day all aglow, and cooled down the next, never +pursuing any course steadily, in foreign policy least of all, though +there the dearest interests of the State are often at stake. As one +who lived under such a government once put it: "Sheer democracy is of +all institutions the most ill-balanced and ill put together, like a +wave at sea restlessly tossing before the fitful gusts of wind: +politicians come and go, and not one of them cares for the public +interest, or gives it a thought." (Quoted by Demosthenes, Speech on +the Embassy, p. 383 A.) What they do care for and think of sedulously, +is pleasing the people and clinging to office. In that respect they +are the counterparts of the favourites who cluster round the throne of +a despotic monarch, and suck up his power by flattering him. Peoples +have their favourites as well as kings. To these persons, the Cleon or +Gracchus of the hour, they blindly commit the management of their +concerns, as the _roi fainéant_ of old Frankish times left everything +to his Mayor of the Palace, till the Mayor came to reign in his +master's stead; and so has the popular favourite ere now developed +into the military despot. Strong-minded kings of course are not ruled +by favourites, nor are highly intelligent and capable peoples; but it +is as hard to find a people fit to wield the power of pure democracy +as to find an individual fit for an absolute monarch, especially where +the State is large. + +9. From all this we conclude that the new-fashioned Magog of pure +democracy, or the perfect sovereignty of the people, is not to be +worshipped to the overthrow and repudiation of all other polities, any +more than the old-fashioned Gog of pure monarchy, idolised by Stuart +courtiers under the name of "the divine right of kings." Neither of +these is _the polity_: each is _a polity_, but not one to be commonly +recommended. The study of polities admirably illustrates the +Aristotelian doctrine of the Golden Mean (_Ethics_, c. v., s. iv., p. +77), teaching us ordinarily to affect limited monarchy or limited +democracy. But as the mean must ever be chosen in _relation to +ourselves_, a Constantine or an Athenian Demos may represent the +proper polity in place under extraordinary circumstances. + +_Reading_.--_The Month_ for July, 1886, pp. 338, seqq. + + +SECTION VI.--_Of the Elementary and Original Polity_. + + +1. "All things are double, one against another." (Ecclus. xlii. 25.) +The son of Sirach may have had in view the human body as divisible by +a vertical median line into two symmetrical halves. But in each of the +halves thus made, the same organ or limb is never repeated twice in +exact likeness, nor do any two parts render exactly the same service. +This variety of organs in the bodies of the higher animals is called +_differentiation_. As we descend in the animal series we find less and +less of differentiation, till we reach the lowest types, which are +little more than a mere bag, whence their name of Ascidians. In that +State which has London for its capital city, we behold one of the +highest types of political existence. Sovereignty is there divided, as +usual in modern States, into three branches, Legislative, Judicial, +and Executive. Each of these branches is shared among many persons in +various modes and degrees, so that in practice it is not easy to +enumerate and specify the holders of sovereignty, nor to characterize +so complex a polity. At the other end of the scale we may represent to +ourselves 250 "squatters" forming an independent State in the far West +of America. They are a pure democracy, and the sovereignty belongs to +them all jointly. Is a man to be tried for his life? The remaining 249 +are his judges. Is a tax to be levied on ardent spirits? The 250 vote +it. Is there a call to arms? The 250 marshal themselves to war. That +clearly is the condition of minimum differentiation, where one citizen +is in all political points the exact counterpart of all the rest. Of +all polities it is the most _simple and elementary_ possible. And so +far forth as the natural order of evolution in polities, as in all +other things, is from simple to compound, this is also the _original_ +polity. It is also the _residuary_ polity, that, namely, which comes +to be, when all other government in the State vanishes. Thus, if the +Powder Plot had succeeded, and King James I., with the royal family, +Lords and Commons, with the judges and chief officers of the +Executive, had all perished together, the sovereign authority in +England would have devolved upon the nation as a whole. + +2. Certain monarchical writers shrink from the recognition of pure +democracy as either the first or the last term of the series of +polities. They do not recognize it as a polity at all. When there is +no governing body distinct from the mass of people at large, a +government must be formed, they say, by popular suffrage. Meanwhile, +according to them, the sovereign power rests not with the body of +electors: either it is not yet created, or it has lapsed: but as soon +as the election is made, they see sovereignty breaking forth like the +sun rising, in the person, single or composite, who is the object of +the people's choice. This would be the correct view of the matter, if +no choice were left to the electors, but they were obliged to +acquiesce in some prearranged polity, as a Monarchy, or a Council of +Ten, and could do nothing more than designate the Monarch or the +Council. Under such a restriction the Cardinals elect the Pope. But +our electors can institute any polity they see fit. They are a +Constituent Assembly. They may fix upon a monarchy or a republic, two +or one legislative chambers, a wide or a narrow franchise, home rule +or centralization: or they may erect a Provisional Government for five +years with another appeal to the people at the end of that term. More +than that. They could impose a protective duty upon corn, or endow the +Roman Catholic religion, making such protection or endowment a +fundamental law (s. iv., n. 8, p. 323), and withholding from the +government, which they proceed to set up, the power of meddling with +that law. They are then not only a Constituent but likewise a +Legislative Assembly. But this power of making laws and moulding the +future constitution of the State, what else is it but sovereign power, +and indeed the very highest manifestation of sovereignty? + +3. So far we follow Suarez in his controversy with James I. The +_natural_ order of evolution certainly is, that the State should be +conceived in pure democracy, and thence develop into other polities. +But in speaking as though the natural order had always been the +_actual_ order, Suarez seems to have been betrayed by the ardour of +controversy into the use of incorrect expressions. It is true in the +abstract, as he says, that "no natural reason can be alleged why +sovereignty should be fixed upon one person, or one set of persons, +rather than upon another, short of the whole community." This is true, +inasmuch as in the abstract we view men as men, in which specific +character they are all equal. But in the concrete and real life, the +primeval citizens who start a commonwealth are rarely alike and equal, +as the founders of the American Republic at the separation from Great +Britain pretty well were, but some men, or some order of men, will so +much excel the rest in ability, position, or possessions, that the +rest have really no choice but to acquiesce in those gifted hands +holding the sovereignty. + +_Readings_.--Suarez, _De Legibus_, III., iii., 6; _ib._, III., iv., +nn. 2, 3, 4; _Defensio Fidei_, III., ii., nn. 7, 8, 9; Ar., _Pol._, +III., xiv., 12; _ib._, VIII., x., nn. 7, 8; _The Month_ for July, +1886, pp. 342-345. + + +SECTION VII.--_Of Resistance to Civil Power_. + + +"When they say the King owes his crown to the choice of his people, +they tell us that they mean to say no more than that some of the +King's predecessors have been called to the throne by some sort of +choice. Thus they hope to render their proposition safe by rendering +it nugatory." (Burke, _Reflections on French Revolution_.) + +1. The great question about civil power is, not whence it first came +in remote antiquity, but whence it is now derived and flows +continually as from its source, whether from the free consent of +subjects so long as that lasts, or whether it obtains independently of +their consent. Can subjects overthrow the ruler, or alter the polity +itself, as often as they have a mind so to do? or has the ruler a +right to his position even against the will of his people? A parallel +question is, can a province annexed to an empire secede when it +chooses, as South Carolina and other Confederates once attempted +secession from the American Union? + +2. These questions raise two totally different issues, which must be +first carefully distinguished and then severally answered. The first +point at issue is whether subjects may dethrone their ruler, a people +alter their polity, or a province secede from an empire, _at +discretion_. The second point is, whether the same may be done _under +pressure of dire injustice_. One little matter of phraseology must be +rectified before an answer is returned to this first point. The +question whether _subjects_ may dethrone their _ruler_ at discretion, +from the terms in which it is drawn, can lead to none but a negative +answer. From the fact that they are subjects, and this man, or this +body of men, their ruler, their allegiance cannot be wholly +discretionary. That sovereign is a mere man of straw, there is no soul +and substance of sovereign power in him, who may be knocked down and +carted away for rubbish, any moment his so-called subjects please. +Rousseau is quite clear on this point. The true debateable form of the +question is, whether the people, being themselves sovereign, can +remove at will the official persons who actually administer the State; +whether they can change the polity, and whether the inhabitants of a +province can secede. The answer now is simple: all depends upon the +polity of the particular country where the case comes for discussion. +And if so it be that the constitution makes no provision one way or +another, any dispute that may occur must be settled by amicable +arrangement among the parties concerned: if they cannot amicably +agree, they must fight. To save this last eventuality, it were well +that any claim which the people in any country may have to remove +princes and statesmen from office, to alter the polity, or to divide +the empire, should be made matter of the clearest understanding and +most express and unambiguous stipulation. Even so, such a provision +must be generally viewed with disfavour by the political philosopher, +seeing how it tends to the weakening and undermining of government; +whereas the same considerations that make out government to be at all +a boon and a necessity to human nature, argue incapacity and +instability in the governing power to be a deplorable evil. We must +add, that where the people keep in their hands any power to alter the +polity, or transfer the administration to other hands, there they hold +part at least of the sovereignty; and the alteration or transference +is effected by them, not as subjects, but as partial ruler. + +3. The second point we raised was, whether a dethronement, or an +alteration of polity, or a secession, may be brought about, not indeed +at discretion for any cause, but under pressure of dire injustice. It +comes to this: May the civil power be resisted when it does grievous +wrong? Let us begin our reply with another question: May children +strike their parents? No. Not even in self-defence? when the parent is +going about to do the child some grievous bodily hurt? That is an +unpleasant question, but the answer is plain. We can make no +exceptions to the rule of self-defence. Self-defence in extreme cases +may raise the arm of a child against its parent: in a similar +extremity it may set a people in conflict with their civil ruler. +Still we regard with horror the idea of striking a parent, and speak +of it generally as a thing never to be done: so should we regard and +speak of rebellion. We should not parade it before men's eyes as a +deed to be contemplated, admired, and readily put in execution. "I +confess to you, Sir," writes Burke, "I never liked this continual talk +of resistance and revolution, or the practice of making the extreme +medicine of the constitution its daily bread." + +4. The conditions under which the civil authority may be withstood in +self-defence, are fairly stated in the _Dublin Review_ for April, +1865, p. 292. We must premise, that such a course of self-defence once +publicly entered upon is like a rock rolled over the brow of a steep +mountain: down it rolls and rebounds from point to point, gathering +momentum in the descent, till in the end the ruler, once defied, has +to be dethroned, the polity subverted, the empire rent, or they who +made the resistance must perish. + +"Resistance is lawful:--(1) When a government has become substantially +and habitually tyrannical, and that is when it has lost sight of the +common good, and pursues its own selfish objects to the manifest +detriment of its subjects, especially where their religious interests +are concerned. (2) When all legal and pacific means have been tried in +vain to recall the ruler to a sense of his duty. (3) When there is a +reasonable probability that resistance will be successful, and not +entail greater evils than it seeks to remove. (4) When the judgment +formed as to the badness of the government, and the prudence of +resistance thereto, is not the opinion only of private persons or of a +mere party: but is that of the larger and better portion of the +people, so that it may morally be considered as the judgment of the +community as a whole." + +5. Side by side with this we will set the teaching of Leo XIII., +Encyclical, _Quod Apostolici_. + +"If ever it happens that civil power is wielded by rulers recklessly +and beyond all bounds, the doctrine of the Catholic Church does not +allow of insurgents rising up against them _by independent action +(proprio marte)_, lest the tranquillity of order be more and more +disturbed, or society receive greater injury thereby: and when things +are come to such a pass that _there appears no other ray or hope of +preservation_, the same authority teaches that a remedy must be sought +in the merits of Christian patience and in earnest prayers to God." + +The words we have italicized seem to point to conditions (4) and (3) +respectively, as laid down by the writer in the _Dublin Review_. + +For an instance of a king dethroned, not _proprio marte_, but with +every appearance at least of an act of the whole nation, see the +dethronement of Edward II., as related by Walsingham, _Historia +Anglicana_, I., pp. 186, 187, Rolls Series. + +6. "We save ourselves the more virulent and destructive diseases of +revolution, sedition, and civil war, by submitting to the milder type +of a change of ministry." (_Times_, April 7, 1880.) + +7. It is not monarchical governments alone that can ever be resisted +lawfully: but what is sauce for the king's goose is sauce also for the +people's gander. There is no special sanctity attaching to democracy. + +It might seem that, since resistance requires to be justified by the +approval of "the larger and better portion of the people" (n. 4, +condition [4]) no just resistance can ever be offered to the will of +the democratic majority. But the said majority may be in divers ways +coerced and cajoled, a mere packed majority, while the malcontents may +be, if not "the larger," clearly "the better" portion of the +community. (s. iv., n. 5, p. 321.) + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., _De Regimine Principum_, i., 6; 2a 2ę, q. 42, +art. 2; 2a 2ę, q, 69, art. 4, in corp.; Locke, _Of Civil Government_, +nn. 200, 201, 203, 204, 208, 209, 223, 224, 225, 227, 229, 230, 232. + + +SECTION VIII.--_Of the Right of the sword_. + + +1. _By the right of the sword_ is technically meant the right of +inflicting capital punishment, according to the Apostle's words: "But +if thou do that which is evil, fear: for he beareth not the sword in +vain." (Rom. xiii. 4.) We commonly call it _the power of life and +death_. + +2. That a government may be a working government, as it should be (s. +iv., n. 2, p. 319), it must not only make laws, but bear out and +enforce its legislation by the sanction of punishment. "If talk and +argumentation were sufficient to make men well-behaved, manifold and +high should be the reward of talkers.... But in fact it appears that +talking does very well to incite and stimulate youths of fine mind; +and lighting upon a noble character and one of healthy tastes, it may +dispose such a person to take up the practice of virtue: but it is +wholly unable to move the multitude to goodness; for it is not their +nature to obey conscience, but fear, nor to abstain from evil because +it is wrong, but because of punishments. The multitude live by +feeling: they pursue the pleasures that they like and the means +thereto, and shun the opposite pains, but they have no idea, as they +have had no taste, of what is right and fair and truly sweet.... The +man who lives by feeling will not listen to the voice of reason, nor +can he appreciate its warning. How is it possible to divert such a one +from his course by argument? Speaking generally, we say that passion +yields not to argument but to constraint.... The multitude obey on +compulsion rather than on principle, and from fear of pains and +penalties rather than from a sense of right. These are grounds for +believing that legislators, while exhorting to virtue and putting +certain courses of conduct forward as right and honourable, in the +expectation that good men will obey the call, as their habits lead +them, should at the same time inflict chastisements and punishments +upon the crossgrained and disobedient; and as for the incurably +vicious, put them beyond the pale altogether. The result will be, that +the decent and conscientious citizen will listen to the voice of +reason, while the worthless votary of pleasure is chastened by pain +like a beast of burden.... Law has a coercive function, appealing to +force, notwithstanding that it is a reasoned conclusion of practical +wisdom and intelligence. The interference of persons is odious, when +it stands out against the tide of passion, even where it is right and +proper to interfere; but no odium attaches to statute law enjoining +the proper course." (Aristotle, _Ethics_, X., ix.) + +3. Aristotle seems hard upon the masses, likening them to brutes who +must be governed by the whip. He may be supposed to speak from +experience of the men of his time. If humanity has somewhat improved +in two and twenty centuries, yet it cannot be contended that the whip +is grown unnecessary and beyond the whip the sword. But we must +observe a certain _modus operandi_ of punishment which Aristotle has +not noted, a more human mode than the terror of slavish fear. Just +punishment, felt as such, stimulates the conscience to discern and +abhor the crime. Men would think little of outraging their own nature +by excess, did they not know that the laws of God and man forbid such +outrage. Again, they would think little even of those laws, were not +the law borne out by the sanction of punishment. A law that may be +broken with impunity is taken to be the toying of a legislator not in +earnest. Men here are as children. A child is cautioned against lying. +He reckons little of the caution: he tells a lie, and a flogging +ensues. Thereupon his mind reverts to what he was told: he sees that +the warning was meant in earnest. He reflects that it must have been a +wicked thing, that lie which his father, the object of his fond +reverence, chastises so sternly. If the thing had been let pass, he +would scarcely have regarded it as wicked. Next time he is more on his +guard, not merely because he fears a beating, but because he +understands better than before that lying is wrong. The awe in which +grown-up people stand of "a red judge," is not simple fear, like that +which keeps the wolf from the flock guarded by shepherds and their +dogs: but they are alarmed into reflection upon the evil which he is +God's minister to avenge, and they are moved to keep the law, "not +only for wrath, but for conscience sake." From this we see that for +punishment to be really salutary, its justice must be manifest to the +culprit, or to the lookers on, at least in their cooler moments. A +punishment the justice of which is not discernible, may quell for the +moment, but it does not moralise, nor abidingly deter. There must be +an apparent proportion between the offence and the punishment. A +Draconian code, visiting petty offences with the severity due to high +misdemeanours, is more of an irritant than a represser of crime, +because it goes beyond men's consciences. + +4. There is in every human breast a strong sense of what the learned +call _lex talionis_, and children _tit for tat_. "If a man has done to +him what he has done to others, that is the straight course of +justice;" so says the canon of Rhadamanthus, quoted by Aristotle. +(_Eth_., V., v., 3.) We have argued the fundamental correctness of +this rule. (_Ethics_, c. ix., s. iii., n. 2, p. 169.) It appears in +the divine direction given to Nod: "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, his +blood shall be shed." (Gen. ix. 6.) It appears in that popular +sentiment, which in some parts of America displays itself in the +lynching of murderers, who have unduly escaped the hands of the law; +and which, under a similar paralysis of law in Corsica, broke out in +blood-feuds, whereby the nearest relative of the deceased went about +to slay the murderer. Such taking of justice into private hands is +morally unlawful, as we have proved. (_Ethics_, c. ix., s. iii., n. 4, +p. 171; _Natural Law_, c. viii., s. ii., nn. 2, 3, pp. 308, 309.) It +is a violent outburst of a natural and reasonable sentiment deprived +of its legitimate vent. Unquestionably then there is an apparent and +commonly recognized fairness of retribution in the infliction of +capital punishment for murder. Thus the first condition of appropriate +punishment is satisfied, that it be _manifestly proportioned to the +crime_. + +5. Capital punishment is moreover expedient, nay, necessary to the +State. The right to inflict it is one of the essential prerogatives of +government, one of those prerogatives the sum of which, as we have +seen, is a constant quantity everywhere, (s. iv., n. 7, p. 322). No +Government can renounce it. The abolition of capital punishment by law +only makes the power of inflicting it _latent_ in the State (s. iv., +n. 8, p. 323); it does not and cannot wholly take the power away. You +ask: Is there not hope, that if humanity goes on improving as it has +done, capital punishment will become wholly unnecessary? I answer +that--waiving the question of the prospect of improvement--in a State +mainly consisting of God-fearing, conscientious men, the _infliction_ +of capital punishment would rarely be necessary, but the _power to +inflict it_ could never be dispensed with. If men ever become so +ideally virtuous, the right of the State to visit gross crime with +death cannot hurt them, and it will strengthen their virtue, as all +human social virtue will ever need strengthening. + +6. The abiding necessity of this _right of the sword_ is argued from +the strength and frequency of the provocations to deeds of bloodshed +and violence that must ever be encountered in human society. What +these provocations are, how many and how strong, may be left to the +reflection of the student who reads his newspaper, or even his novel. +Not the least appalling thing about crime, atrocious crime especially, +is the example that it gives and the imitators whom it begets. It is +not merely that it sets the perpetrator himself on the downward path, +so that, unless detected and punished, a man's first deed of blood is +rarely his last: it draws others after him by a fatal fascination. +Like the images which the Epicureans supposed all visible objects to +slough off and shed into the air around them, such phantoms and images +of guilt float about a great crime, enter into the mind of the +spectator and of the hearer, and there, upon slight occasion, turn to +actual repetitions of the original deed. The one preventive is to +append to that deed a punishment, the image of which shall also enter +into the mind, excite horror, and disenchant the recipient. This is +not to be done by mere banishment of the criminal, nor by his +perpetual incarceration. Exile and prison--particularly in view of the +humanity of a modern penitentiary--do not sufficiently strike the +imagination. One sweet hour of revenge will often appear cheap at the +price of ten years' penal servitude. There is nothing goes to the +heart like death. Death is the most striking of terrors; it is also +the penalty that most exactly counterpoises in the scales of justice +the commission of a murderous crime. All States need this dread figure +of the Sword-bearer standing at the elbow of the Sovereign. + +7. But is not every capital sentence a trespass upon the dominion of +God, Lord of life and death? No, for that same God it is who has +endowed man with a nature that needs to grow up in civil society, +which civil society again needs for its maintenance the power to make +laws, to sit in judgment on transgressors, and in extreme cases, as we +have proved, having tried them and found them guilty, to take away +even their lives, to the common terror and horror of the crime. God, +who wills human nature to be, wills it to be on the terms on which +alone it can be. To that end He has handed over to the civil ruler so +much of His own divine power of judgment, as shall enable His human +delegate to govern with assurance and effect. That means the right of +the sword. + +8. It may be objected that to kill any man is to treat him as a +_thing_, not a person, as an _heterocentric_, not an _autocentric_ +being, which is a proceeding essentially unnatural and wrong, (c. ii., +s. i., n. 2, p. 203.) St. Thomas's answer here is peculiarly valuable: + +"Man by sinning withdraws from the order of reason, and thereby falls +from human dignity, so far as that consists in man being naturally +free and existent for his own sake [autocentric]; and falls in a +manner into the state of servitude proper to beasts, according to that +of the Psalm (xlviii. 15): _Man when he was in honour did not +understand: he hath matched himself with senseless beasts and become +like unto them_; and Proverbs xi. 29: _The fool shall serve the wise_. +And therefore, though to kill a man, while he abides in his native +dignity, be a thing of itself evil, yet to kill a man who is a sinner +may be good, as to kill a beast. For worse is an evil man than a +beast, and more noxious, as the Philosopher says." (2a 2ę, q. 64, art. +2, ad 3.) + +Hence observe:--(1) That a Utilitarian who denies free will, as many +of that school do, stands at some loss whence to show cause why even +an innocent man may not be done to death for reasons of State, _e.g._, +as a sanitary precaution. + +(2) That the State must come to a conclusion about inward dispositions +by presumption from overt acts, arguing serious moral guilt before +proceeding to capital punishment. To this extent the State is remotely +a judge of sin. But it does not punish sin _retributively_ as sin, nor +even _medicinally_. It punishes the violation of its own laws, to +_deter_ future offenders. (_Ethics_, c. ix., s. iii., nn. 4-6, pp. +171-174.) + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., 2a 2ę, q. 64, art. 2, 3; 2a 2ę, q. 108, art. +3. + + +SECTION IX.--_Of War_. + + +1. War, a science by itself, has no interest for the philosopher +except as an instance on a grand scale of self-defence. When the +theory of self-defence has been mastered (c. ii. s. ii., p. 208), +little further remains to be said about war. In a State, the +self-defence of citizen against citizen is confined to the moment of +immediate physical aggression. But in a region where the State is +powerless and practically non-existent, self-defence assumes a far +greater amplitude. (S. ii., n, 2, p. 309.) When the Highland chief +lifted the cattle of the Lowland farmer, and the King of Scotland lay +unconcerned and unable to intervene, feasting at Holyrood, or fighting +on the English border, then, if there were a fair hope of recovering +the booty without a disproportionate effusion of blood, the farmer did +right to arm his people, march after the robber, and fight him for the +stolen oxen, as the gallant Baron of Bradwardine would fain have done. +(_Waverley_, c. xv.) Here is the right of self-defence in its full +development, including the right of private war. But in a private +individual this is an undesirable, rank, and luxuriant growth; and +when the individual comes to live, as it should be his aim to live, in +a well-organized State, the growth is pruned and cut down: he may then +defend himself for the instant when the State cannot defend him; but +after the wrong is done, he must hold his hand, and quietly apply to +the State to procure him restitution and redress. But there is no +State of States, no King of Kings, upon earth; therefore, when of two +independent States the one has wronged, or is about to wrong the +other, and will not desist nor make amends, nothing is left for it; +Nature has made no other provision, but they must fight. They must +fall back upon the steel and the shotted gun, the _ratio ultima +regum_. + +2. The Lowland farmer above mentioned might be spoken of as +_punishing_ the Highland robber, _chastising_ his insolence, and the +like. This is popular phraseology, but it is not accurate. Punishment, +an act of _vindictive justice_, is from superior to inferior. +(_Ethics_, c. v., s. ix., n. 4, p. 104.) War, like other self-defence, +is between equals. War is indeed an act of authority, of the authority +of each belligerent State over its own subjects, but not of one +belligerent over the other. We are not here considering the case of +putting down a rebellion: rebels are not properly belligerents, and +have no belligerent rights. + +3. The study of Civil and Canon Law flourished in the Middle Ages, +while moral science, which is the study of the Natural Law, was still +in its infancy. No wonder that the mediaeval jurists occasionally +formulated maxims, which can only be squared with the principles of +Natural Law by an exceeding amount of interpretation,--which are in +fact much better dropped, quoted though they sometimes be by moralists +of repute. One such maxim is this, that _a wrong-doer becomes the +subject of the injured party by reason of the offence_. Admit this, +and you can hardly keep clear of Locke's doctrine of the origin of +civil power, (s. ii., _per totum_, p. 307; cf. Suarez, _De Caritate_, +d. xiii., s. iv., nn. 5, 6). + +4. We have only to repeat about war what we said of self-defence, that +all the killing that takes place in it is _incidental_, or _indirect_. +The cannon that you see in Woolwich Arsenal, the powder and torpedoes, +have for their end what St. Thomas (_De Potentia_, q. 7, art. 2, ad +10) declares to be the end and object of the soldier, "to upset the +foe," to put him _hors de combat_. This is accomplished in such rough +and ready fashion, as the business admits of; by means attended with +incidental results of extremest horror. But no sooner has the bayonet +thrust or the bullet laid the soldier low, and converted him into a +non-combatant, than the ambulance men are forward to see that he shall +not die. If indeed even in the dust he continues to be aggressive, +like the wounded Arabs at Tel-el-Kebir, he must be quieted and +repressed a second time. Probably he will not escape with life from a +second repression: still, speaking with philosophic precision, we must +say that "to quiet, not to kill him," is, or should be, the precise +and formal object of the will of his slayer in war. St. Thomas indeed +(2a 2ę, q. 64, art. 7, in corp.) seems to allow the soldier fighting +against the enemy to mean to kill his man. But by _enemy_ in this +passage we should probably understand _rebel_. The soldier spoken of +is the instrument of the feudal lord bringing back to duty his +rebellious vassal. In the Middle Ages, till the end of the fifteenth +century, the notion of independent nations scarcely found place. + +In war, as all cases of self-defence, the killing is indirect. In +capital punishment, on the other hand, the killing is direct: it being +_chosen as a deterrent means_, that the offender be "hanged by the +neck" till he is "dead, dead, dead." This disposes of the error, that +capital punishment is an act of self-defence on the part of the State +against evildoers. We may observe finally that by the right of the +sword, and by that alone, not in self-defence, not in war, but by the +hand of public justice raised against a guilty subject, can human life +ever be taken _directly_. + +_Reading_.--St. Thos., 2a 2ę, q. 40, art. 1. + + +SECTION X.--_Of the Scope and Aim of Civil Government_. + + +1. I beseech the pious reader not to be shocked and scandalised by the +conclusions of this section. He will find them in the end a valuable +support to theology. The most religious mind can have no difficulty in +allowing that cookery, as such, is a business of this world only: that +you retain your cook, not to save your soul, but to prepare palatable +and wholesome nourishment for your body; that honesty, sobriety, and +good temper are officially requisite qualifications, simply inasmuch +as the contrary vices would be the plague of your kitchen and the +spoiling of your dinner. In a Catholic house the soup on a Friday is +made without meat. That restriction is observed, not as a point of +culinary art, but because, whereas eternal salvation is the main end +of life, and cookery a subordinate end, the latter must be so +prosecuted as not to interfere with the former. She who uses +ingredients forbidden by the Church, is the worse Christian, but she +may be the better cook. Now, to compare a great thing with a little, +the State equally with the kitchen is a creation of this world,--there +are no nationalities, nor kitchen-ranges either, beyond the grave. +Civil government is a secular concern. The scope and aim intrinsic to +it, and attainable by its own proper forces, is a certain temporal +good. Suarez (_De Legibus_, III., xi., 7) sets forth that good to +be,--"the natural happiness of the perfect human community, whereof +the civil legislature has the care, and the happiness of individuals +as they are members of such of a community, that they may live therein +peaceably and justly, and with a sufficiency of goods for the +preservation and comfort of their bodily life, and with so much moral +rectitude as is necessary for this external peace and happiness of the +commonwealth and the continued preservation of human nature." + +2. The intrinsic scope and aim of civil government is the good of the +citizens as citizens. That, we have to show, is not any good of the +world to come; nor again the full measure of good requisite for +individual well-being in this world. The good of the citizens as such +is that which they enjoy in common in their social and political +capacity: namely, security, wealth, liberty, commerce, the arts of +life, arms, glory, empire, sanitation, and the like, all which goods, +of their own nature, reach not beyond this world. True, a certain +measure of moral rectitude also is maintained in common, but only "so +much as is necessary for the external peace and happiness of the +commonwealth," not that rectitude of the whole man which is required +in view of the world to come. (Ethics, c. x., n. 4 [3], p. 182.) The +intrinsic aim of the State, then, falls short of the next life. +Neither does it cover the entire good of the individual even for this +life. The good of the State, and of each citizen as a citizen, which +it is the purpose of civil government to procure, is a mere grand +outline, within which every man has to fill in for himself the little +square of his own personal perfection and happiness. Happiness, as we +have seen, lies essentially in inward acts. The conditions of these +acts, outward tranquillity and order, are the statesman's care: the +acts themselves must be elicited by each individual from his own +heart. Happiness also depends greatly on domestic life, the details of +which, at least when they stop short of wife-beating, come not within +the cognisance of the civil power. It remains, as we have said, that +the scope and aim of the State, within its own sphere and the compass +of its own powers, is the temporal prosperity of the body politic, and +the prosperity of its members as they are its members and citizens, +but not absolutely as they are men. We cannot repeat too often the +saying of St. Thomas: "Man is not ordained to the political +commonwealth to the full extent of all that he is and has." (1a 2ę, q. +21, art. 4, ad 3.) + +3. From this view it appears that the end for which the State exists +is indeed an important and necessary good, but it is not all in all to +man, not his perfect and final happiness. To guide man to that is the +office of the Christian Church in the present order of Providence. +Cook and statesman must so go about the proper ends of their several +offices, as not to stand in the way of the Church, compassing as she +does that supreme end to which all other ends are subordinate. This +limitation they are bound to observe, not as cook and statesman, but +as men and Christians. A perfectly Christian State, as Christian, has +a twofold duty. First, it has a _positive_ duty, at the request of the +Church, to follow up ecclesiastical laws with corresponding civil +enactments, _e.g_., laws against criminous clerks and excommunicates. +On this spiritual ground, being beyond its jurisdiction, the State +must be careful not to forestall but to second the precept of +spiritual authority. It is no business of the State, as such, to +punish a purely religious offence. The second duty of a Christian +State, and a more urgent duty even than the former, is the _negative_ +one of making no civil enactment to the prejudice of the Church: +_e.g._, not to subject clerics to the law of conscription. Useful as +their arms might be for the defence of the country, the State must +forego that utility for the sake of a higher end. + +4. In the order of pure nature, which is the order of philosophy, +there is of course no Church. Still there would be, as we have seen +(c. i., s. i., n. 8, p. 197), erected on the same lines as the civil +power, and working side by side with it, a religious power competent +to prescribe and conduct divine worship. This power the State would be +bound to abet and support, both positively and negatively; something +in the same manner, but not to the same degree, as the Christian State +is bound to abet the Church. The supreme direction of the natural +religious power would conveniently be vested in the person of the +Civil Ruler. Thus the Roman Emperor was also Chief Pontiff. + +5. How in the mere natural, as distinguished from the Christian order, +the provinces of marriage and education should be divided between the +civil and the religious power, is perhaps not a very profitable +enquiry. The only use of it is a polemic use in arguing with men of no +Christianity. Among all men of any religion, marriage has ever been +regarded as one of those occasions of life that bring man into special +relation with God, and therefore into some dependence on God's +ministers. Education, again, has a religious element, to be +superintended by the religious power. Education has a secular element +also, the general superintendence of which cannot be denied to the +State. Though children are facts of the domestic order, and the care +and formation of them belongs primarily to their parents, yet if the +parents neglect their charge, the State can claim the right of +intervention _ab abusu_. It certainly is within the province of the +State to prevent any parent from launching upon the world a brood of +young barbarians, ready to disturb the peace of civil society. The +practical issue is, who are _barbarians_ and what is understood by +_peace_. The Emperor Decius probably considered every Christian child +an enemy of the _Pax Romana_. But the misapplication of a maxim does +not derogate from its truth. It also belongs to the State to see that +no parent behaves _like a Cyclops_ ([Greek: kyklopikos], Ar., _Eth_., +X., ix., 13) in his family, ordering his children, not to their good, +as a father is bound to do, but to his own tyrannical caprice. For +_instruction_, as distinguished from _education_, it is the parent's +duty to provide his child with so much of it as is necessary, in the +state of society wherein his lot is cast, to enable the child to make +his way in the world according to the condition of his father. In many +walks of life one might as well be short of a finger as not know how +to read and write. Where ignorance is such a disadvantage, the parent +is not allowed to let his child grow up ignorant. There, if he +neglects to have him taught, the State may step in with compulsory +schooling. Compulsory schooling for all indiscriminately, and that up +to a high standard, is quite another matter. + +_Readings_.--Suarez, _De Legibus_, III., xi.; _ib_., IV., ii., nn. 3, +4: St. Thos., 1a 2ę, q. 93, art. 3, ad 3; _ib_., q. 96, art. 2; _ib_., +q. 98, art. 1, in corp.;_ib._, q. 99, art. 3, in corp.; _ib_., q. 100, +art. 2, in corp. + + +SECTION XI.--_Of Law and Liberty_. + + +1. The student of Natural Law does not share the vulgar prejudice +against civil law and lawyers. He knows it for a precept of the +Natural Law, that there should be a State set up, and that this State +should proceed to positive legislation. This legislation partly +coincides with Natural Law in urging the practice of that limited +measure of morality, which is necessary for the State to do its office +and to be at all. (s. x., n. 2, p. 355.) This partial enforcement of +the Law of Nature is the main work of the criminal law of the State. +But State legislation goes beyond the Natural Law, and in the nature +of things must go beyond it. Natural Law leaves a thousand conflicting +rights undetermined, which in the interest of society, to save +quarrels, must be determined one way or another. + +2. An illustration. It is an axiom of Natural Law, that _res perit +domino_; that is, the owner bears the loss. If an article under sale +perishes before delivery, the loss falls, apart from contracts to the +contrary, upon whichever of the two parties is the owner at the time. +So far nature rules. But who is the owner at any given time, and at +what stage of the transaction does the dominion pass? That can only be +settled by custom and the law of the land. "If I order a pipe of port +from a wine-merchant abroad; at what period the property passes from +the merchant to me; whether upon delivery of the wine at the +merchant's warehouse; upon its being put on shipboard at Oporto; upon +the arrival of the ship in England at its destined port; or not till +the wine be committed to my servants, or deposited in my cellar; all +are questions which admit of no decision but what custom points out." +(Paley, _Mor. Phil_., bk. iii., p. i, c. vii.) + +This leads us to remark upon the much admired sentence of Tacitus, _in +corruptissima republica plurimae leges_, that not merely the multitude +of transgressions, but the very complexity of a highly developed +civilization, requires to be kept in order by a vast body of positive +law. + +3. Incidentally we may also remark, that the law of the State does not +create the right of property; otherwise, abolishing its own creation, +the State could bring in Communism, (c. vii., s. i., p. 278). But +finding this right of property unprotected and undetermined, the State +by its criminal law protects property against robbers, and by its +_civil_ as distinguished from _criminal_ law, it defines numerous open +questions between possessors as to manner of acquirement and +conditions of tenure. + +4. All civil laws bind the conscience: some by way of a categorical +imperative, _Do this_: others by way of a disjunctive, _Do this, or +being caught acting otherwise, submit to the penalty_. The latter are +called _purely penal laws_, an expression, by the way, which has no +reference to the days of religious persecution. Civil law binds the +conscience categorically whenever the civil ruler so intends. In the +absence of express declaration, it must be presumed that he so intends +whenever his law is an enforcement of the Natural Law, or a +determination of the same; as when the observance is necessary to the +preservation of the State, or when the ruler determines what lapse of +time shall be necessary for the acquisition of property by +prescription. Very frequently, the parties to a contract tacitly +accept the dispositions of the civil law as forming part of their +agreement; and in this indirect fashion the civil law becomes binding +on the conscience. In this way an Englishman who accepts a bill of +exchange tacitly binds himself to pay interest at five per cent., if +the bill is not met at maturity, for such is the disposition of the +English Law. It may be further observed that no prudent legislator +would attach a severe penalty to what was not already wrong. + +5. In Roman times it was part of the flattery of the imperial jurists +to their master, to tell him that he was above the laws, _legibus +solutus_. In the trial of Louis XVI., the Sovereign People, or they +who called themselves such, dispensed with certain legal formalities +on that same plea. Against the law at Athens, the generals who had +fought at Arginusae were condemned by one collective sentence, the +anger of the Sovereign People being too impatient to vote on them +separately, as the law required. Hereupon we must observe in the first +place, that the Supreme Ruler, whether one man or a multitude, can +never be brought to trial in his own court for any legal offence. As +all justice requires two terms: no power can do justice on itself. +(_Ethics_, c. v., s. ix., n. 1, p. 102.) This truth is embodied in the +English maxim, that _the king can do no wrong_. Again, the Sovereign +is either expressly or virtually exempted from the compass of many +laws, _e.g_. those which concern the flying of certain flags or +ensigns, and other petty matters. Thirdly, we have the principle, that +no being can give a law to himself. (_Ethics_, c. vi. s. ii., n. 3, p. +117.) Lastly, we must observe that there is no law so fundamental but +what the Supreme Power, taken in its entirety, can alter it, and by +consequence dispense from it. From these considerations it follows +that the Sovereign--the complete and absolute Sovereign, be he one man +or many--lies under no legal obligation to obey any law of his own +making as such. It does not follow that he is perfectly free to ignore +the laws. He is bound in conscience and before God to make his +government effectual; and effectual it cannot be, if the laws are +despised; and despised they will be, if the Sovereign gives scandal by +ignoring them in his own practice. Therefore the Sovereign, be he +King, Council, or Assembly, is bound in conscience and before God, +though not legally of his own jurisdiction, so far himself to stand to +the observance of the law as not to render it nugatory in the eyes and +practice of others. + +6. Law and liberty are like the strings and meshes of a net. In the +one limit of minimum of mesh, the net passes into sack-cloth, where +nothing could get through. In the other limit of maximum of mesh, the +net vanishes, and everything would get through. We cannot praise in +the abstract either a large mesh or a small one: the right size is +according to the purpose for which the net is to be used in each +particular case. So neither can law nor liberty be praised, as Burke +says, "on a simple view of the subject, as it stands stripped of every +relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical +abstraction." We can only praise either as it is "clothed in +circumstances." Commonly we are led to praise the one by getting too +much of the other. Confounded in a tangle of fussy, vexatious, perhaps +malicious restrictions, men cry loudly for liberty. When people all +about us are doing things by their own sweet will, we are converted to +praise of regulation and discipline and the wholesome restraint of +law. + +_Readings_.--St. Thos., 1a 2ę, q. 96, art. 5, ad 3; Suarez, _De +Legibus_, III., xxxv.; _ib_., V., iv.; Ruskin, _Seven Lamps of +Architecture_, c. vii., §§ I, 2. + + +SECTION XII.--_Of Liberty of Opinion_. + + +1. We are here dealing with liberty only so far as it means exemption +from State control. So far as the State is concerned, a man has the +fullest liberty to hold in his heart the most seditious opinions, and +to think the foulest thoughts, so long as they do not appear in his +public language and conduct. The heart is free from all mere human +law, resting in subjection to His law alone, and in responsibility to +His judgment, who is the Searcher of Hearts. + +2. We are dealing then not properly with opinion, but with the public +expression of opinion. We are dealing with that expression as +controllable by the State, not acting in deference to the invitation +of any religious power, but of its own initiative and proper +authority, in view of its own end, scope and aim, which is social +order and public prosperity for this life. (s. x., nn. 2, 3, p. 355.) + +3. That there are doctrines dangerous to social order, cannot be +denied, unless we are to cease to believe in any influence of thought +upon conduct. It is important to the State, that men should have the +greatest possible horror of crime. (s. viii., nn. 3, 6, pp. 345, 348.) +This horror is notably impaired when all idea of sin is taken away. +Now the idea of sin vanishes with that of God. (_Ethics_, c, vi., s. +ii., nn. 6, 7, 13, pp. 119, 123.) Therefore to pull down the idea of +God among a nation of theists, whether by the wiles of a courtly +Professor at a University, or by the tub-thumping blasphemy of an +itinerant lecturer, is to injure the State. The tub-thumper however is +the more easily reached by the civil authority, especially when his +discourses raise a tumult among the people. But where attacks upon +theism have become common, and unbelief is already rampant among the +masses, for the State to interfere with either "leader of thought," +high or low, would be a shutting of the stable-door after the steed +was stolen. Similarly we should speak of those who subvert the +received notions touching the sanctity of the marriage-tie and the law +of external purity generally, the obligation of civil allegiance, the +rights of property and of life. + +4. It will be objected: "The doctrines that you wish to express as +inimical to the peace of the commonwealth, possibly may be true. Did +not the first heralds of Christianity trouble the peace of the Roman +world?" We reply: Let the new teachers come to us as those apostolic +men came, "in weakness and in fear and in much trembling," and yet +withal "in the showing of the spirit and power," with an "exhortation +not of uncleanness," nor upon "an occasion of covetousness," "holily +and justly and without blame" (1 Cor. ii. 3, 4; 1 Thess. ii. 3, 5, +10); and we will receive them as angels of God, even to the plucking +out of our own eyes, if need be, and giving to them. (Gal. iv. 15.) +Any hostile reception that they may meet with at first from a +misapplication of our principle, will soon be made up for by welcome +and veneration. There is no principle that may not be momentarily +misapplied in all good faith. But the mistake in this case will +readily be rectified. + +5. But, writes J. S. Mill, _On Liberty_, "we can never be sure that +the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion." If we +cannot, then is there no such thing as certainty upon any point of +morals, politics, or religion. Assassination of tyrants, whether in +public or private life, may be wickedness, or it may be a laudable +outburst of public spirit, who knows? Which of us is sure that all +property is not theft? Plato's views on marriage and infanticide may +be correct: the Nihilist may be your true politician; and all our +religious knowledge dwindles down to the confession of Protagoras: +"Concerning Gods, I find no clear evidence whether they are or are +not, or what manner of beings they are." These are the sceptical +tremors which this denial induces. But even scepticism has its proof, +which Mill furnishes as follows: "All silencing of discussion is an +assumption of infallibility." The very name _infallibility_ has an +effect upon the modern Englishman like that of _Popery_ upon his +forefathers. It shakes his nerves, obscures his judgment, and scares +his seated reason to leap up from her throne. But after we have +recovered from our fright, we recollect that, whereas infallibility is +an all-round attribute, compassing an entire subject, certainty goes +out to one particular point on the circumference; we may then be +certain without being infallible. Extremely fallible as I am in +geography, I am nevertheless certain that Tunis is in Africa. +Silencing discussion is an assumption, not of infallibility, but of +certainty. The man who never dares assume that he is certain of +anything, so certain as to close his ears to all further discussion, +comes nothing short of a universal sceptic. + +6. We are told, free discussion promotes discovery. Yes, free +discussion in philosophical circles, free discussion among competent +persons. But free discussion of a subject among the incompetent and +the incapable, and the passionate and the prejudiced, is not good for +the cause of truth; and if the subject be practical and momentous, it +is not good for the disputants either, nor for the community. If we +allow that the science and practice of morality is not advanced by +free debate of ethical questions in nurseries and boarding-schools, we +must also bear in mind that a vast proportion of the human family +remain all their lives long, for the purpose of such discussions, as +incompetent as children. The multitude cannot be philosophers. They +have neither time, nor intelligence, nor love of hard thinking +sufficient to arrive at the final and adequate _why_ and _wherefore_ +of their every duty. Though capable of doing right, they are quite +incapable of doing so philosophically. They do it according as they +are led by custom and authority. Their inheritance is the traditionary +wisdom of mankind, which they live upon as an infant on his estate, +not understanding whence their support comes. It is dangerous to +batter them with objections against the received moral law. You will +overthrow them, not confirm them by the result of your reasonings: you +will perplex their intellect, you will confound their good purpose, +you will awaken their evil passions. Surely it is a more necessary +point to secure that right be done somehow, than that it be +philosophically done. The one is difficult enough, the other quite +impossible for the mass of mankind. Therefore, adapting to our purpose +the old Greek oracle: "let us not disturb the foundations of popular +morality: they are better undisturbed"-- + + [Greek: Mae kinei Kamarinan akinaetos gar ameinoon] + +7. But is it not immoral to interfere with conscience, and to attempt +to stifle sincere convictions? The State, we repeat, has nothing to do +with conscience as such, nor with the inward convictions of any man. +But if the State is sincerely convinced, that the convictions openly +professed and propagated by some of its subjects are subversive of +social order and public morality, whose sincere conviction is it that +must carry the day in practice? It is of the essence of government +that the convictions, sincere or otherwise, of the governed shall on +certain practical issues be waived in the external observance in +favour of the convictions of the ruling power. After all, this talk of +conscience and sincere convictions is but the canting phrase of the +day, according to which conscience means mere wild humour and +headstrong self-will. Such teachings as those which we would have the +State to suppress, _e.g.: An oath is a folly: There is no law of +purity: There is no harm in doing anything that does not annoy your +neighbour_: are not the teachings of men sincerely convinced: they +deserve no respect, consideration, or tenderness on that score. We do +not say, that the teachers of these monstrosities are not convinced, +but that they are not honestly and conscientiously convinced: they +have blinded themselves, and become the guilty authors of their own +delusion. Not all strong convictions are honestly come by or +virtuously entertained. + +8. Arraigned for their utterances, men protest their sincerity, as +parties indicted for murder do their innocence. We can set but small +store by such protestations. It is a question of evidence to come from +other sources than from the accused person's own mouth. A man indeed +must be held to be sincere until he is proved to be the contrary. That +is the general rule. But there are what Roman lawyers call +_pręsumptiones juris_; circumstances which, if proved, will induce the +court to take a certain view of a case, and give judgment accordingly, +unless by further evidence that view is proved to be a false one. Now +when a man proclaims some blatant and atrocious error in a matter +bearing directly upon public morals--and it is for the restraint of +these errors alone that we are arguing--there is a decided _pręsumptio +juris_, that the error in him, however doggedly he maintains it, is +not a sincere, candid, and innocently formed conviction. The light of +nature is not so feeble as that, among civilized men. Let the offender +be admonished and given time to think: but if, for all warning to the +contrary, the wilful man will have his way, and still propagate his +error to the confusion of society, he must be treated like any other +virtuous and well-meaning criminal: he must be restrained and coerced +to the extent that the interests of society require. + +9. At the same time it must be confessed that when an error, however +flagrant and pestilential, has ceased to shock and scandalize the +general body of the commonwealth; when the people listen to the +doctrine without indignation, and their worst sentence upon it +pronounces it merely "queer," there is little hope of legal restraints +there enduring long or effecting much. Penalties for the expression of +opinion are available only so far as they tally with the common +feeling of the country. When public opinion ceases to bear them out, +it is better not to enforce them: for that were but to provoke +resentment and make martyrs. No regulations can be maintained except +in a congenial atmosphere. Allowance too must be made for the danger +of driving the evil to burrow underground. + +10. The censorship of opinions even in a model State would vary in +method according to men and times. The censorship of the Press in +particular might be either by _Imprimatur_ required before printing, +or by liability to prosecution after. The _Imprimatur_ might be either +for all books, or only for a certain class. It might be either +obligatory, or merely matter of counsel, to obtain it. We are not to +adopt promiscuously all the praiseworthy institutions of our +forefathers. + +_Readings_.--Cardinal Newman, _Letter to Duke of Norfolk_, § 5; _The +Month_ for June, 1883, pp. 200, seqq. + + + * * * * * + + +APPENDIX + + +Of the precepts of Natural Law, some are more simple and of wider +extension; others are derivative, complex, and extend to fewer cases. +It is a question of more and less, and no hard and fast line of +demarcation can be drawn between them. The former however are called +_primary_, the latter _secondary_ precepts. Again, the nature of man +is the same in all men and at all periods of history for its essential +elements, but admits of wide, accidental variation and declension for +the worse. Thirdly, it is clear that Natural Law is a law good and +suitable for human nature to observe. Starting from these three +axioms, we apply the reasoning of St. Thomas, 1a 2ę, q. 96, art. 2, +not to human law alone, of which he is speaking, but to sundry +secondary precepts of Natural Law. These are his words: + +"A law is laid down as a rule or measure of human acts. Now a measure +ought to be homogeneous with the thing measured. Hence laws also must +be imposed upon men according to their condition. As Isidore says: 'A +law ought to be possible both according to nature and according to the +custom of the country.' Now the power or faculty of action proceeds +from interior habit or disposition. The same thing is not possible to +him who has no habit of virtue, that is possible to a virtuous man; as +the same thing is not possible to a boy and to a grown man, and +therefore the same rule is not laid down for children as for adults. +Many things are allowed to children, that in adults are visited with +legal punishment or with blame, and in like manner many things must be +allowed to men not perfect in virtue, which would be intolerable in +virtuous men." + +This reasoning leads us up to a conclusion, which St. Thomas states +thus (la 2ę, q. 94. art. 5): + +"A conceivable way in which the Natural Law might be changed is the +way of subtraction, that something should cease to be of the Natural +Law that was of it before. Understanding change in this sense, the +Natural Law is absolutely immutable in its first principles; but as to +secondary precepts, which are certain detailed conclusions closely +related to the first principles, the Natural Law is not so changed as +that its dictate is not right in most cases steadily to abide by; it +may however be changed in some particular case, and in rare instances, +through some special causes impeding the observance of these secondary +precepts." + +The reason for this conclusion, more pregnant, it may be, than St. +Thomas himself discerned, is given briefly as follows (2a 2ę, q. 57, +art. 2, ad 1): + +"Human nature is changeable; and therefore what is natural to man may +sometimes fail to hold good." + +The precepts of Natural Law that fail to be applicable when human +nature sinks below par, are only secondary precepts, and few even of +them. Christianity brings human nature up to par, and _fulfils_ the +Natural Law (St. Matt. v. 17), enjoining the observance of it in its +integrity. This is the meaning of St. John Chrysostom's saying: "Of +old not such an ample measure of virtue was proposed to us; ... but +since the coming of Christ the way has been made much narrower." (_De +Virginitate_, c. 44: cf. his 17th Homily on St. Matt. v. 37; indeed +the doctrine is familiar in his pages.) Thus the prohibition of +polygamy, being a secondary precept of the natural law, failed in its +application in that age of lapsed humanity, when a woman was better +one of many wives, protected by one husband, than exposed to +promiscuous violence and lust. (Isaias iv. i.) + + +NOTE ON ROUSSEAU. + + +The ruler is the servant of the _good_ of the people, not of the +_will_ of the people, except inasmuch as-- + +a. the _will_ of the people is an indication of their _good_, of which +they are probable judges; + +b. it is usually impossible to do _good_ to the people against their +steady _will_. + + + * * * * * + + +INDEX + + +Aggregation theory of civil power, + +Altruism, + +Altum dominium, + +Anger, + differs from hatred, + +Appetite in the modern sense, + in the scholastic sense, + appetite and desire, + +Archetype Ideas, + +Aristotle, imperfect as a moral philosopher, + on happiness, + on the passions, + on the mean of virtue, + on death, + his Magnanimous Man, + distinguishes chastisement from vengeance, + virtue from art, + on property, + defines a State, a citizen, a polity, + on the State's need to punish, + +Atheism, effects of social and political, + +Autocentric and heterocentric, + +Bain, Alexander, on content, + on punishability, + +Beatific vision, + +Capital Punishment, + not inconsistent with God's dominion over life, nor + with the personality (autocentric) of man, + power of (right of the sword), the distinguishing mark of sovereignty, + sole instance of rightful direct killing, + +Charity, + to enemies, + obligation of, how differing from justice, + +Church and State, elementary philosophy of, + +Circumstances of act, + distinguished from means, + +Civil authority, of God, + binds the conscience, + latent or free, + various distributions of, + not tied to any one polity, + when rightfully resisted, + +Comfort, no specific against crime, + +Communism, + +Conscience, natural law of, + defined, + erroneous conscience, + requires educating, + Conscience and the State, + +Contemplation, essence of happiness, + +Contracts, + +Delight, or pleasure, quality of, + said to perfect activity, + not happiness, + +Democracy, may be tyrannical, + not the sole valid polity, + sheer democracy difficult to work, + original and special sanctity attaching to democracy, + +Deontology, + +Desire, physical and psychical, + +Direct and indirect (or incidental) defined, + +Divorce, + +Duelling, essential wrong of, + +Dumb animals, our relations with, + +Duty, matter not of mere goodness, but of law; + duties of justice, correlative of a right; + duties negative and positive, + +Education, the State's part in, + +End in view; end does not justify means; + itself limitless, sets a limit to the means, + +English monarchy, + +Ethics, strict view of, + +Evil, none essential and positive in human nature, + +Fear, as an excuse, + +Food and fiddling, when better than philosophy, + +Fortitude, + +Francis of Assisi, St., + +General Consequences, principle of, + +God, transcends created being, + object of human happiness, + God and possibilities, + cannot but enforce morality, + how entering into Moral Philosophy, + does not dispense from the natural law, + punishes sin, + twofold worship of, + God beyond the sphere of utilities, + duty of knowing Him, + why He cannot lie, + no God, no sin, + +Greek taste, + +Grotius and Milton, on lying, + +Habit, defined, + acquired by acts, + a living thing, needs exercise, + habit and custom, + man a creature of habits, + habits remain in the departed soul, + +Happiness, defined, + open to man, + final in contemplation of God, + other than contentment, + desired without limit, + not pleasure, + +Hatred and anger, + +Hedonism, + +Hobbes, his _Leviathan_, + +Honour and reputation, + +Horace, his phrase, _aurea mediocritas_, + +Human act, + outward and inward, one, + +Humility, + +Hypnotism, + +Ignorance, as an excuse, + +Integrity, state of, + +Intellectual error, sometimes voluntary, + in that case not mere intellectual error, + +Jurisdiction, differs from dominion, + +Justice, always relative to another, + legal (or general),distributive, commutative (corrective), + justice and charity differ, + +Kant, his Categorical Imperative, + +Killing, direct and indirect, + indirect in self-defence, + and in war, + direct only in capital punishment, + +Knowledge of God, obligatory, + +Labour, qualitative as well as quantitative, + capital not simply an embodiment of labour, + +Land, a raw material, nationalisation of, + +Law, defined, + the Eternal Law, + irresistible and yet resisted, + extends to all agents, rational and irrational, + co-eternal with, yet not necessary as God, + laws of physical nature, + law of conscience, + fundamental laws of a state, + civil law, necessary complement of natural law, + civil law, how binding in conscience, + the King, _legibus solutus_, how far, + law and liberty, + +Lay mind, + +Liberty, the meshes of the net of law, + liberty of opinion and the press, + +Locke, on the state of nature, + +Lying, definition of, + intention to deceive, no part of the definition, + intrinsically and always wrong, + why God cannot lie, + not against commutative justice, + mental reservation not in every case a lie, + +Magnanimous man, + +Magnificence, + +Marriage, duty of the race, not of the individual, + two goods of marriage, + unity, + indissolubility, + +Material and formal, + +Marx, Karl, + +Means to end, truly willed, + four sorts of, + how far and how not sanctified by the end, + distinguished from circumstances, + limited by the end, + +Meekness and clemency, + +Mental reservation, not in every case a lie, + +Mill, John, confounds self-defence with vengeance, + his Utilitarianism, + on Liberty, + +Modesty, + +Morality, meaning of, + determinants of, + +Moral Philosophy, definition and division, + a progressive science, + subtlety of, + +Moral Sense, no peculiar faculty distinct from Intellect, + +Money, ancient and modern use of, + +Nature, does nothing in vain, + living according to nature, + laws of nature, inviolable as tendencies, + state of nature, + +Natural, in contrast with supernatural, + natural and physical confounded by ancients, + does not mean "coming natural", + +Natural law of conscience, + mutable subjectively, + immutable, situation remaining unchanged, + primary and secondary precepts, some of the latter fail to + hold even objectively, where human nature has sunk below par, + (notwithstanding), + not open to dispensation, + +Nominalism, subversion of philosophy, + +Obedience, not wholly of the nature of a contract, + +Ought, or Obligation, analysis of the idea, + +Passion, as an excuse, + definition of, + species of, + not to be extirpated, + never morally evil by itself, + passion and principle, two different sources of sin, + +People, the, all government for, + sovereignty of, + not philosophers, + +Person, autocentric, as distinguished from a thing (hetero-centric), + to have a right, you must be a person, + +Plato, on desires, + on the mean of virtue, + his similitude of the charioteer, + his phrase, "set up on holy pedestal", + fails to discover justice in his _Republic_, + his ignoring of spiritual sins, + ignores retributive punishment, + object of his _Republic_, + +Pleasure, or delight, quality of, + perfects activity, + how far wrong to act or live for pleasure, + not happiness, + +Polity, defined, + variety of polities, + no one polity best, universal and exclusive, + elementary and original polity, + the polity the standard of the politically allowable, + +Polygamy; patriarchal practice, + +Powers that be, ordained of God, + +Private war, right renounced by civilised man, + +Probable opinion, what, how a lawful ground of action, + +Property, _res familiaris_, + +Prudence, + +Punishment, naturally consequent upon sin, + also a divine infliction, + final, eternal, + medicinal, deterrent, retributive, + human punishment perhaps never purely retributive, + capital punishment, + punishment a stimulus to conscience, + war not punishment, + +Pyramid of capacities, + +Reiffenstuel, on duelling, + +Religion, how connected with morality, + duties of religion, + natural religious power, + the State and religion, + +Restitution, when due, + not retribution, + +Resurrection, + +Revolution, is it ever right? + +Right, a, defined, + connatural, acquired, alienable, inalienable, + one man's right imports another man's duty, but not conversely, + not all rights consequences of duties, + not wholly the creation of the State, + +Ritual, needs regulation, + +Rousseau, his Social Contract, + his inalienable sovereignty of the people, + +Secrets, + +Self-defence, differs from punishment and from vengeance, + a wrong maxim of the jurists, + duelling not self-defence, + +Simulation and dissimulation, + +Sin, material and formal, + differs from vice, + some by mere passion, other on principle, + spiritual sins, + philosophical sin, + sin alone properly unnatural, + entails punishment, + grave and light, + forgiveness of, an uncertainty in philosophy, + sin against God, crime against the State, + atheism the abolition of sin, + +Socialism, Collectivism and Syndicalism, + an endeavour to supersede private virtue, + +Soldier's death, + +Spiritualism, + +State, individual not all blended in, + definition of, + a natural requisite, more than a necessity of nature, + involves authority, to be obeyed, + a perfect community, + commanded and commissioned by God, + a secular concern with a secular end, + the State and virtue, + State and Church, + State and education, + doctrines dangerous to the State, + State and Conscience, + remotely a judge of sin, but does not punish it as such, + +Stoics, would extirpate passion, + their _naturae convenienter vivere_, + a paradox of theirs, + +Suarez, explains the natural rise of civil authority, + neglects the historical, + +Suicide, + +Supernatural, + +Superstitious practices, + +Synderesis, + +Temperance, + +Testamentary right, + +Usury, defined, + principle upon which it is wrong, + commercial loans not usurious, gradual opening for such, + +Utilitarianism, an ill-concerted blend of Hedonism and Altruism, + +Value, use value, market value, + +Vice and Virtue, habits, not acts, + not in children, + vice not sin, + +Virtue, a habit, + not reducible to knowledge, + intellectual and moral, + how moral and intellectual virtues differ, + need of moral virtue, + moral virtue (not theological) observes the mean, + cardinal virtues, + are the virtues separable?, + potential parts of a virtue, + sense of virtue necessary to national greatness, + virtue not "another man's good,", + how differing from art, + how far the care of the State, + +Virtuous man, acts on motives of virtue, + +War, the self-defence of nations, + not a punitive operation, + direct and proper object, not to kill but to put out of action, + +Wild boy of Hanover, + +Worship, interior and exterior, reasons for the latter, + not as useful to God, but because He is worthy of it, + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Moral Philosophy, by Joseph Rickaby, S. 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