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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/77647-0.txt b/77647-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c4351c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/77647-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2805 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77647 *** + + + + +SOLDIERS UNMASKED + + + + + SOLDIERS UNMASKED + + _By_ + + WILLIAM ADDLEMAN GANOE + + COLONEL, U. S. ARMY + + [Illustration] + + Author of “The History of the + United States Army,” etc. + + + 1939 + + + + + FIRST EDITION, COPYRIGHT, 1935, BY + WILLIAM ADDLEMAN GANOE + + + SECOND EDITION, COPYRIGHT, 1939 + + FIRST PRINTING JANUARY, 1939 + + + Published by + THE MILITARY SERVICE PUBLISHING COMPANY + HARRISBURG, PA. + + PRINTED IN THE U. S. A. BY + THE TELEGRAPH PRESS + HARRISBURG, PA. + + + + + _To + George Washington + ever revered + seldom obeyed_ + + + + +_HOW IT STARTED_ + + +This booklet cropped out from a mixture of chance happenings. One day +last October, Captain R. B. Lovett, Adjutant General’s Department, +came into my office. I hadn’t seen him since he was a student at the +Infantry School in Georgia when I was an instructor. He said Colonel +Harvey W. Miller, Adjutant General, 1st Corps Area, thought it would +be a good thing for the recruiting service and the public in general +to be informed about the soldier. There were so many misunderstandings +about him. Would I do ten talks over the radio? They looked mountainous +with all my other work. But if you knew Lovett, you’d appreciate +how convincing he can be. He put in a plea of public service and I +succumbed. The next thing I heard was that the Yankee Network had +generously given time to the series Saturday nights. I began December +eighth. I felt the first talk was a beautiful flop. I got no fan mail +and my friends who phoned me were just pleasant. I suspected they were +letting me down easily. Anyway, I kept plugging along. After the third +talk, fan mail from strangers in Portland, Newburyport, Bridgeport +and little towns began to come in. After the fifth talk, there was a +flood of requests for copies. Then letters began to pile in from every +walk of life. The copies asked for couldn’t be furnished. There were +no means or money to get them out and mail them. My friends suggested +printing the whole series at as little cost as possible. Well, this is +the result. I hope you’ll get something out of it. + + W.A.G. + + + + +_I_ + +WHAT IS A SOLDIER + + +In a certain town in the United States a sign in front of a theater +boldly announced: “No dogs or soldiers admitted.” After some complaint +the sign was taken down. And after the people of the community got to +know the soldier, they were sorry the sign had been put up. + +Prejudice against the military man hasn’t ordinarily gone to that +length, but many citizens are at least disinterested. Not long ago I +was called upon to speak to a rather cultured group on the soldier’s +work. A few days later, an acquaintance, an intelligent, elderly woman, +met me on the street. “I liked the way you talked,” she said, “but +I’m not in sympathy with anything you spoke about. I don’t want to +hear about the soldier or anything military.” I thanked her for her +frankness, and dropped the matter, knowing it was useless to try to +give her the facts which are presented here, and which she probably +wouldn’t have believed anyway. + +Here are some of the questions which have been asked me by educated +people: “What do you fellows in the army do when there’s no war? Do you +just go out and drill the boys and then loaf around? What’s the need +of an army in a depression? Where’s the army now? How big is it? What’s +the use of an army when we have an air corps?” + +Whether or not such questions sound foolish, they do show ignorance +of what the soldier and the War Department are really doing. But the +citizen is not to blame for this lack of knowledge. A combination of +circumstances has deprived him of knowing what has happened and what +is happening with the military man. Certainly no true American wishes +to be unfair. First of all our school and college histories, our +literature, our entertainment have a habit of either misrepresenting or +omitting the actual deeds and purpose of the soldier. Second, anyone +associated with weapons usually has a bad name nowadays. Third, the +soldier, away off in our island possessions or in an army post, has +too little intimacy with the general run of people. Fourth, the name +War Department has a misleading sound. It makes us think of a great +mail-fisted demon, breathing fire and smiting with a red-hot sword. +Before we get through with the stories and facts given later, we’ll +see that it could much more faithfully be called the Peace Department. +Fifth, there’s the term “preparation for war,” which is about as far +from the truth about what the soldier is trying to do, as saying that +firemen are preparing to cause fires. + +The soldiers in this country have never prepared to have a war and they +are not doing so now. They have always prepared _against_ war. There +is no place in our history where they have been the remotest cause of +war. And would you believe it, they have actually been the outstanding +pacifists of American History? You know it seems peculiar that the +trained fighter has done more for peace in this country than any other +class. But it is so. In normal times he has repeatedly saved us from +war. In public works he has been one of the chief builders of the +nation, if not the chief one. In disaster he has been the first on the +spot to restore order, and feed and shelter the helpless. In war he has +aimed to bring back peace and return the people to restful firesides, +with the least loss of life and treasure. A multitude of facts enforce +these statements--facts which can be verified in the archives in +Washington--facts which we have ordinarily been denied in our formal +education. + +You know there’s a short paper about 150 years old that we Americans +are pretty keen about. In that document it says that Congress shall +provide for the common defense. And hand in hand with that provision +goes its twin brother--the general welfare. Our wise old forefathers, +who had plenty of time to reason, analyse, contemplate human nature +and be soundly practical, in contrast to us who must dash through this +complex civilization on high, used a sound bit of horse sense when +they coupled those two phrases. For it’s easy to see that you can’t +have general welfare without common defense any more than you can have +an undisturbed household without locks and policemen. Of course, we +need a little more than common defense to get general welfare in these +times, but that’s quite another subject. However, that business of +common defense brings the soldier onto the stage by our Constitution. +And one of the big tragedies of our country is that the stage failed +to produce him so many times until the play had actually begun. About +a million tombstones scattered in this country and in France can be +charged up to his absence when he was vitally needed. For it takes +time to train a soldier, and it’s pretty expensive and bloody to +train him when bullets begin to fly. Besides it makes the war drag +on. So you see the loss accumulates. I can make this idea clearer by +an illustration. Let us suppose you are a night watchman and have to +pace around a spooky industrial plant every night. And suppose your +employer armed you with a night stick, saying that firearms were +dangerous, expensive and might lead to trouble. You plead with him that +all you want is a decent break, that you’d like to have a pistol and +learn how to use it. He still contends that the night stick is good +enough. Sometime later a bandit scouts around the plant and sees you +wandering along with your club as your only defense. The next night +you see him entering a window. You chase him. He carefully aims, drops +you in your tracks, pilfers the cash box and makes a get away. Now +suppose thousands of watchmen are in the same fix. That in principle is +what has happened to our untrained men in all our wars. They haven’t +had a chance. And because they haven’t had a chance, they have come +home from the catastrophe with all sorts of ill-feeling against the +army, the soldier, the officer, when the fault has been not in the +military service, but in the neglect of proper training before the +enemy pounces upon us. Just how much waste and hardship to individuals +would result, if the country grocery store at Seven Corners had to +expand to a thousand chain-stores in thirty days? Can you imagine it? +And yet such an expansion is a drop in the bucket to what the Army +and the War Department have been compelled to produce in a twinkling, +when war caught us flat-footed. Of course, when we got into the World +War we were pretty lucky, for we had Allies who held off the enemy +for nearly a year before we had to go into real action. Just what +would have happened had we not had such a wall of strength in Europe +to stave off our enemies is not pretty to think about. As it was, many +an American went to the front untrained, unskilled, an easy prey to +disease and explosives. From this lack of preventive medicine, which +is what training in peace time amounts to, many men have come out of +our wars disgusted, and sayings have arisen which have put the army +in a mean light. There’s the word “soldiering” which oddly has come +to mean idleness. Yet if you were to go into any army post, any army +school, or any C.M.T.C. camp you’d see the soldier anything but idle. +Then there’s the term “passing the buck” which expresses an army habit +to some people. Just why it should, after your experiences and mine in +everyday life, is hard to explain. But the “old army game” is the one +we hear so often. It may mean anything from four-flushing to downright +crookedness. All these slanders seem to have arisen because men have +been rudely and unjustly snatched from the counter, the plough and the +mill to face a new desperate life, to live in mixed-up conditions under +hasty shelter, to find themselves square pegs in round holes, and to +be under officers as unskilled as they, officers not even a quarter +baked, whose leadership was too often faulty and cruel. How could it +be otherwise when we plunge fine young men who can’t swim into a raging +sea? These men come out of the conflict with heavy hatreds, justifiable +ones oftentimes, hatreds that go deep into their souls. And whom would +they hate? Naturally the professional soldier. He’s the one at hand. +But curiously enough it’s the trained soldier who has tried to prevent +the awful haste, waste and unnecessary mortality that have caused these +hatreds. + +The American soldier is the last man to want war or the unnecessary +loss of life and treasure in war. He shies at war’s hardships, and the +added horrors, resulting from unpreparedness against war. He knows too +much about them to want himself or anyone else to be in a war. But he +feels that it’s not quite practical in the present state of the world +to say that there will be no more armed conflicts. With Europe seething +with hatreds, Japan flying at Asia’s throat, Russia making its militant +inroads, with no practical progress in abolition of war to date, with +industrial strife breaking out here and there, and with an Army of +organized crime in this country greater than the Army and Navy of the +United States, he feels it’s inviting disaster not to prepare against +war and calamity. So he’s out to reduce the tragedy when it comes, or +to stop it from coming by a proper show of force. + +Do you know that one army officer, single-handed, without an army at +his back, saved or helped save this country from six big wars? And do +you know that another officer staved off another big war by being on +the spot with three trained corps? Do you know that many other officers +stubbornly opposed the powers in Washington when those powers wanted to +fight the Indian? Do you know who built all our first trails and roads +in the west and south? Do you know who constructed the first railroad +to span our United States from east to west? Do you know what the army +has done to help build this country in time of peace? Do you know that +one branch of the army alone has literally saved millions of lives in +peace time by its courageous discoveries and safeguards? Do you know +what another branch has done in the riddance of pests from industrial +plants? Do you know who laid the Alaskan Cable? Do you know that not a +single covered wagon ever reached the coast states in the west without +being accompanied by soldiers? We rarely hear the soldier mentioned +or see him shown in the movies in his protection of the wagon trains, +but there is no record of any of those trains ever reaching Oregon +or California over the wild prairie tracts unless soldiers went with +them. This is but one instance of the suppression of truth about the +soldier. We’re pretty well acquainted with what the soldier has done +in war. But do we know what he’s done for the up-building of men and +construction of public works in peace time? Do we know what he’s done +against war? + +Listen to what comes next. + + + + +_II_ + +WHAT HAS HE DONE + + +Two big pool operators of Wall Street one evening were standing in +front of a prominent theater watching the crowds surge into the +doorways. There was much display of ermines, sables, diamonds and +general wealth. One of the two asked the other: “Say, where do these +lambs get all the money we bears take away from them?” + +Today many people say, “Where do these soldiers get all this peace +stuff we extreme pacifists take away from them?” The answer lies in +cold facts--cold facts the historians don’t tell us--cover up almost +completely. Lewis and Clark, for instance. Why, yes, they were two +fellows who were the first to go across our Continent and back again. +But who ever told you that it was _Captain_ Meriwether Lewis and +_Lieutenant_ William Clark who took four sergeants and twenty-three +privates in that hazardous trek between the Atlantic and the Pacific +from 1803 to 1806--that it was the soldier who made surveys and maps +and created friendships with the Indians, many of whom were seeing a +white man for the first time? + +Pike’s Peak! O yes, that was discovered by a man by the name of +Pike. But where was it mentioned that it was _Lieutenant_ Z. M. +Pike? And what did he do? With three non-commissioned officers and +sixteen privates, he explored in 1806 and 1807 from the source of the +Mississippi to its mouth, doing from north to south what Lewis and +Clark had done from east to west. Turning west he discovered the peak +which bears his name. In what is now New Mexico, he even beguiled +the Spaniards into taking him prisoner so that he could learn their +intentions, customs and country. For his great deeds of exploration +and pacification he received the personal praise of the President +of the United States. Then there was Captain Long who in the same +way went through what is now Colorado, and for whom Long’s Peak is +named; Captain Bonneville who voluntarily lived with the Nez Perces +and Flatheads for five years, creating friendships and learning their +language; Lieutenant Litgreaves, who explored the Colorado River; and +Lieutenant Whipple and Lieutenant Ives, who separately went through +the southwest. And then John C. Fremont. O yes, the histories are +crazy about calling him the Pathfinder, but never told you that it was +Lieutenant John C. Fremont in 1838 when he started out, and Lieutenant +Colonel John C. Fremont in 1844--after he had explored 10,000 miles +of freezing mountain and sickly basin? In this brief space I can’t +even touch on many of these gigantic wedges of understanding. It was +the soldier who made the first trails, dug the first wells, built the +first roads, bridges and canals, made the first maps, surveyed most of +our boundaries, erected most of our lighthouses, dredged our harbors +and waterways, escorted the settlers, braved the Indian and suffered +in silence. The Hon. John W. Weeks, former Secretary of War and United +States Senator, wrote: “The Army was virtually the pioneer of pioneers. +As our citizens moved west over the prairies and through forests, they +traveled routes which were surveyed by army engineers, constructed by +the army and protected by military posts. The titles of their land were +valid only because of army surveys.... Up to 1855 there was scarcely a +railroad in this country that was not projected, built, and operated +in large part by the Army. Army engineers located, constructed, and +managed such well-known roads as the Baltimore and Ohio; the Northern +Central; the Erie; the Boston and Providence; the New York, New Haven +and Hartford; and the Boston and Albany. Practically all of the +transcontinental railroads were projected by the army. An army officer, +Lieutenant G. W. Whistler, built the best locomotive of his time, after +his own design.” The building of the Union Pacific Railroad, the first +to connect the two oceans, illustrates the soldiers’ contribution to +national welfare. The set-up for this mighty link was a military one. +The workmen were organized into companies and battalions. Soldiers +would dig and hammer and at the cry “Indians,” would rush to their +stacked arms and give battle. Nearly every man was a veteran of the +Civil War. The heads of the most of the engineering parties and all +chiefs of construction had been officers in the Civil War. The chief +of the track-laying force, General Casement, had been a distinguished +division commander. In a twinkling, General Dodge, the chief engineer, +could call into the field a thousand men, well-officered, ready to +meet any crisis. General Sherman also furnished troops. The builders +contended that this great bridge of progress could not have been +finished without soldiers and army training. During the enterprise +Oakes Ames said, “What makes me hang on is the faith of you soldiers.” + +The soldier went further than highways in his works. Let’s look at +buildings. How many know that the difficult Washington Monument, +the wings and dome of the National Capitol, the old Post Office +Building, the Municipal Building, the Washington Aqueduct, the +Agriculture Building, the Government Printing Office, the War College +and the beautiful Library of Congress were all built by the Army? +Army engineers supervised the building of the Lincoln Memorial, the +Arlington Bridge, the parks and even the playgrounds of the District +of Columbia. They even organized the Weather Bureau--and all this our +government got at the comparatively small pay of the soldier. + +But the soldier didn’t stop at exploring and building. He didn’t stop +at just contributing to development and peace. He went further. He even +tried his best to prevent war. So many were his attempts that they can +scarcely be hinted at tonight. Here is one conspicuous example. In +1832, South Carolina was verging on secession and civil war. President +Jackson called in General Winfield Scott and sent him to the scene of +the trouble. There Scott by skillful persuasion and conference helped +to quiet the difficulties and return the state to peace, without any +troops at his back. In 1838 there was a revolt against Great Britain +by Canadian patriots. Many in our border states were sympathizing with +the rebels. Blood had been shed. It looked horribly like a third war +with Great Britain. Scott was sent north to the place of the struggle. +After great effort and the most tactful arbitration he brought harmony +between the British officials and our own sympathizers. By his work, +war was averted. In the same year the great educated, peaceful tribe +of Cherokees in Georgia and the Carolinas, was enraged at the attempt +of the whites to force it away from its native home because gold had +been found there. 15,000 Indians refused to move. General Scott was +sent by the government to conduct them west to what is now Oklahoma. +Sensing the right on their side, but being compelled to carry out +the government’s unjust orders, he was left with nothing but his +personality and good sense to keep us out of a big fight. By his +masterful appeal to the Indians not to cause war, by his instructions +to his soldiers to be gentle and firm, by his square dealing and +carrying out of his promises to the letter, he was able to escort the +whole tribe west, without the slightest sign of trouble. So great was +his kindly power, that he even had these superstitious redmen submit +to vaccination. It is estimated that this prevention of war saved the +government two and one-half billion dollars and untold loss of life. +(Besides he very nearly washed clean the government’s dirty linen.) +But he had scarcely finished this delicate task when he was called to +Maine. There the boundary question was about to plunge us into that +third war with Great Britain. The government had already called out +eight thousand militia. Things were pretty bad. Scott hustled back and +forth holding conferences, calming this party and that, and finally +closed the issue to the satisfaction of all. In 1848 after he had +conducted the brilliant campaign which closed the Mexican War, Mexico +was in a state of unrest. It was there that he established a rule so +just and kindly that peace came more rapidly, and possibly composed +Mexico for many years. Never had the Mexicans been treated so decently. +Their representatives came to him and begged him to be their dictator. +Though he didn’t accept, it was probably the first time in history +where a conqueror of foreign territory had been so cordially urged. +Two years later after he had returned to the United States, trouble in +Vancouver Island in the northwest again threatened that ever-skulking +third war with Great Britain. The British Navy was already beating down +upon the little island of San Juan. Scott arrived on the scene. By the +cleverest tact he engineered a joint evacuation of the island. And no +war came. Six times had this man, who towered six feet five and weighed +two hundred forty pounds, showed us that his heart and character were +as great as his stature. Six times had he saved us. In keeping us out +of war who can compete with him? But he is not alone. Many another +soldier gave us peace and many another built for peace. + +In 1907, after long years of trial, President Theodore Roosevelt came +to the conclusion that high-salaried civilians could not complete the +Panama Canal. They would walk out on him and were inclined to the +spoils system of wasting money. He wanted someone who would stay on +the job, who would carry on the work for the work’s sake. He turned +to the Army. He appointed a commission of soldiers. Colonel George +Goethals with his able assistants, Colonels Gaillard and Sibert, Corps +of Engineers and Colonel W. C. Gorgas of the Medical Corps, were sent +south to construct the Canal. Gorgas purged the place of yellow fever +and malaria while the others forged ahead on the building. After bitter +trials and maddening set-backs, they finished the Panama Canal. This +vast public work, which others had failed to complete in almost half a +century, the soldier gave to his country in the surprising space of six +years. + +But this commercial short-cut could not have been so quickly finished, +had it not been for the work of another soldier. In 1900 Major Walter +Reed with a group of medical officers and men was sent to Cuba to study +yellow fever. For several years soldiers risked their lives repeatedly +in their attempt to find out what caused the disease. It came to the +point where a little banded-legged mosquito was suspected of carrying +the fever from the sick to the well. But the suspicion had to be +proved. Men had to let themselves be actually bitten by the deadly +insect in order to vouchsafe to the world that the mosquito was the +only carrier. Volunteers were called for. Officers and men responded +with such willingness that the ready victims were always in excess +of demand. One day Privates Kissinger and Moran came to Major Reed +as volunteers. He explained to them what their offer meant--extreme +suffering and probable death. They still insisted. They would gladly +run the risk, if it would save lives afterwards. He then told them that +they or their relatives would receive money. Both men showed their +disgust. Kissinger stepped forward and said, “I want it understood +that we are doing this in the interest of humanity and for science.” +Major Reed rose, touched his cap and said with tears in his eyes, +“Gentlemen I salute you.” The two privates were allowed to be bitten +by mosquitoes which had fed on persons stricken with the malignant +yellow fever. They took the disease, but God was with them. They pulled +through. Major Reed said of them: “This exhibition of moral courage +has never been surpassed in our history.” Reed finally proved that the +mosquito was the only carrier of the disease. Once the world found out +the cause, the rest was easy--riddance of the horrible insect that +had made so many countries places of horror and death. In the United +States alone yellow fever had taken a toll of more than half a million. +Commerce had been interrupted, states and cities had been turned into +turmoil and whole populations wiped out. Shortly after the proof of +the discovery General Leonard Wood purged Havana in a few months. And +today it is estimated that by the heroic service of Major Walter Reed +and his soldiers, thirty million lives have been saved in the Western +Hemisphere. + +Has the soldier done anything for peace? Has he done anything for +progress? Sentiment, theory, loud arguments don’t talk, but somehow +deeds, facts do. + + + + +_III_ + +WHAT MORE HAS HE DONE + + +A young farmer lad was once leading a calf by a rope down a road. He +came to a narrow bridge where the animal balked. An automobile moving +up behind the pair had to stop. The boy turned to the car and yelled: +“Toot!” The driver gave a great, loud blast from his deafening horn. +The calf, thoroughly frightened, galloped madly over the bridge and +down the road, pulling the poor boy at a break-neck run for half a +mile. When the automobile caught up to the pair, the lad, gasping +for breath, blazed out at the driver, “I--ugh--said ‘Toot!’--but +not--ugh--so loud!” + +One shouldn’t toot too loud about the soldier. It isn’t done. But since +his horn has been so seldom blown, I take the liberty to honk just a +trifle. Some of the noise may leave us breathless, but I hope it won’t +scare the calf. + +Yellow fever. We saw last time how Major Walter Reed stopped that +disease and saved to date some thirty million lives. Long before his +time another army surgeon by the name of William Beaumont had a patient +who had been accidentally wounded through the stomach. The case was +felt hopeless by other doctors. Beaumont not only cured the man, but +took advantage of the large hole to study for the first time the action +of digestion in a living body. His pioneer work paved the way for cures +later. Tropical anemia! When our country took over Porto Rico, the +island was helpless against the disease! Army doctors, after baffling +set-backs finally found the cause. Their work saved the Porto Ricans +from a scourge that would have stopped their development forever. +Dengue fever! Again army surgeons found the mosquito was the cause. +The remedy was simple. Empyema, tuberculosis, beriberi, surra and bone +deformities have been signally and notably helped by contributions of +army surgeons. Rinderpest--a disease that had been carrying off the +cattle by the thousands in the Philippines for half a century. The +plague was all the more hurtful since cattle are Philippines’ beasts +of burden and the key to their whole commercial life. Colonel R. A. +Kelser, who is now in Massachusetts, with other soldiers, went deeply +into the study of the disease. After patient efforts he developed a +vaccine, which prevents its occurrence. What that discovery has done +for those islands, cannot be measured. + +As with disease, so with disaster. Early one morning in 1906, San +Francisco was suddenly buried in flames. Transportation, telephone and +telegraph lines were broken down. Hospitals and fire departments were +out of commission. The police force was helpless. Riot and anarchy were +expected. No organized body of relief was possible but the Army. In +less than three hours after the first blow to the city, General Funston +with troops was on the scene. The soldier dealt out nearly a million +rations, set up bakeries and coffee kettles, gave havens of comfort, +controlled looters, opened stores, supervised hospitals and got the +fire under control. One private soldier assembled several hundred +refugees, organized them, got eating utensils and put up a field +bakery. Many a soldier did not sleep while the emergency lasted. + +In great catastrophes the soldier has been the first one to deliver +supplies, succor the helpless and keep order. The story of our floods, +tornadoes, cyclones, typhoons, bursting dams, ice-jams, coal mine +disasters, explosions, earthquakes and forest fires is the story of +relief by the soldier. In one Mississippi flood the army dealt out +over two and one-half million dollars worth of provisions for two +hundred forty-three thousand people. It _gave_ everything from stoves +to post-hole diggers. In Montana blizzards, Texas floods, Michigan +snow-storms, Florida disasters and Ohio overflows, the soldier was +there to help the helpless. In the last New England floods, army +trains were the first to reach the sufferers with food and relief, and +soldiers at great risk made temporary bridges and opened roads. In the +Porto Rico hurricane, army transports arrived first with supplies and +help for the needy, and brought the island to a state of recovery. We +hear much of Mr. Hoover’s magnificent relief in Europe, but whoever +told you that five army colonels were his principal assistants and that +three hundred twenty officers and four hundred sixty-four enlisted men +made up his agencies distributing American relief? The Russian relief +was wholly the work of our soldiers. + +The triumph of service by the army in our possessions of Alaska, Guam, +the Philippines, Hawaii, Porto Rico and the Canal Zone doesn’t often +come to the ear of the average citizen. In the great archipelago of the +Philippines, the soldier calmed strife between savage tribes, built +roads, railroads, schools, churches, gave spiritual aid and comfort, +and was at once, instructor, leader, governor, judge, jury, councilor, +constructor, almsgiver and peacemaker. He did more in 20 years to make +the Philippinos a united people than had been done in the previous +centuries. It was his labor largely that caused their great desire to +retain the supervision of the United States. Alaska, too, knows the +army as a friend in need. When the territory was bought, soldiers were +immediately sent there to keep order and open up the land. In the +pioneer days, under great hardship, the army made surveys and kept +watch over the frontiers. In the Klondike rush, it opened the harbors, +built the roads and trails leading to gold, and protected newcomers +against mob rule and lawlessness. In order to make the only link with +the mainland of the United States, the soldier laid four thousand, +five hundred eighty-eight miles of cable and built six hundred miles +of telegraph, all of which he operated. He largely administered the +government of the territory and at low cost furnished to business +millions of dollars worth of returns. The signal corps soldier gave +during the Civil War the greatest boost to our telegraph systems. As +late as 1877, he operated three thousand miles of telegraph in the +South. Today in Washington he operates the largest radio net in the +world, handling messages for forty-eight departments of the government. +In one year for this service the Army was able to turn over to the +United States Treasury, two hundred sixty-eight million dollars. It was +General G. O. Squier, Chief Signal Officer, who made the outstanding +invention of sending a number of telephone and telegraph messages over +the same line at the same time. His work improved and revolutionized +that industry. It was the soldier, too, who took the lead in +developing the short wave, high frequency transmission and opened up +vast channels through the air. It was the soldier who developed the +radio beacon, which guides the airman through fog, cloud and darkness +safely. It was the air soldier who perfected the parachute which has +already saved many fliers. Of course everyone knows how the soldier +helped the Wright Brothers in their great pioneer flying, and men like +Lieutenant Selfridge sacrificed their lives for the sake of progress. +Later others made the great good-will flight to South America, covering +twenty-two thousand sixty-five miles in two hundred sixty-three and +one-quarter hours of flying time. Lieutenants Maitland and Hegenberger +made this first non-stop flight from our west coast to Honolulu. Army +pilots have photographed thirty-five thousand square miles in eighteen +states for geological survey maps. Others have covered half a million +square miles of our forests and reported hundreds of beginnings of +fires. Others gave Colonel Lindbergh and many commercial pilots +advanced training in flying. + +In a different field, it was the soldier who started our steel +industry, developed the tractor and was the first to bring +interchangeable parts to machinery--making possible American mass +production. + +There is much false prejudice against our Chemical Warfare Service. +Did you know that since the war it has done much for life and progress? +It has aided industry by developing gas masks against the deadly carbon +monoxide in mines, the fumes from burst pipes of ammonia refrigeration +and from cyanide gas. It has aided the Public Health Service in the +successful fumigation of ships; the Bureau of Biological Survey in +ridding the commercial world of rats, gophers, locusts, grasshoppers, +the boll weevil, marine borers, vermin and moths. At a cost of $106 +in a western plant, it saved $75,000 worth of cloth goods by a +single fumigation. With the air service it developed a quick method +of spraying fruit trees, has aided police departments immeasurably +with chemicals against mobs and bank robbers, and led the way in the +foundation of the American dye industry. + +There is scarcely any path of our progress that the soldier has not +made or followed with helpfulness. His activities turn into so many +avenues that I’m unable to give more than a hint tonight. Here is a +late one. + +Within two weeks after President Roosevelt’s inauguration a bill to put +a quarter of a million jobless men in Reforestation work was passed by +Congress. The army didn’t want the task of taking over a mass of men +twice its size, of butting in on the Forest Service, and of robbing +the soldier of his peace time training. The army’s representative so +stated to the White House. The reply was: “You have given all the +reasons in the world why the Army should do this job. As a matter +of fact all the reasons you state show that nobody else can do it.” +The army got the job. The General Staff was wisely ready for that +possibility. A month later at the rate of one thousand five hundred +thirty a day, fifty-two thousand were enrolled, and forty-two camps had +been established. Fifty-one days after that three hundred ten thousand +had been enrolled. The rate of reception and caring for this vast +number was greater than for both the Army and Navy during the World +War. And this was peace time when the spirit, money and cooperation +of the people were not so great. And what did the soldiers have to do +for these men? Everything and more than a preparatory boarding school +must do for its students. It had to examine them physically, classify +them, clothe them, feed them, transport them, do all the work of paying +them, put up their camps in the wilderness, and supervise their moral, +mental and spiritual welfare and conduct. Army training stopped. The +soldier had to put every ounce of his energy into the task and spent +many sleepless, working nights, if it were to be a go. The little +available army not one-eighth the size of those finally enrolled had +to press these raw men from every walk of life through their new work +in a fair and orderly way. The entering C.C.C. boys were of equal rank. +There were no seniors, no foremen, no variations--just a crowd. They +were not being received into any organization. The whole structure +had to be built from the ground up. The situation was as strange to +the soldier as to the C.C.C. boy. The only recourse the Army Officer +had for keeping contentment, orderliness and efficiency were precept, +example and expulsion from camp. He could not use even minor forms of +correction. He wasn’t allowed to make the boy stand up, look one in the +eye, or say “Yes, sir” or “No, sir.” It was a fearful handicap, when +he was responsible for their safety, good order and reputation in a +strange community. But the records show surprisingly little discord for +the vast numbers taken in. The records also show how proper sanitation, +a balanced diet, daily medical attention and patient supervision +turned out. An inventory of one hundred ten camps reveals that the +boys gained from five to twenty-seven pounds. Only five per cent left +camp--a surprisingly small proportion when you realize that their +main qualification was lack of a job. Under skillful guidance they +developed rapidly. The white anemic faces and flabby arms of early +spring were changed into bronzed skins and bulging muscles in late +summer. Professor Nelson C. Brown, New York State College of Forestry, +says: “The usual army disciplinary methods were not permitted, but by +precept and example and by an exhibition of tolerance and patience, and +a friendly attitude of helpfulness, the camp commanders and forestry +officers have made a really notable contribution to the upbuilding of +character and good citizenship in this great army of young men.” But +let no one think for a moment that it is an army, or even the barest +beginning of one. These young men are no more soldiers than any other +rugged young men of our country. They have had no more military drill, +military teaching, military environment, military discipline, military +progress than high school lads at a fire drill. Why they’re not even +allowed to have military books in their libraries. To be soldiers, they +would have to start at the bottom in everything--forms of courtesy, +upright posture, neatness in dress, obedience, discipline, team work, +scouting and patrolling, guard duty, the use of weapons and all the +thousand and one things that the trained man must know. The fact that +C.C.C. boys wear parts of army uniform misleads many. That clothing, +salvaged from the war, was all the country had to give them. The army +dispensed it to keep the lad covered up. But a lion skin doesn’t make +a lion. No, anyone seeing an army post and then a camp of the C.C.C. +boys would notice the complete difference. The C.C.C. is wholly a +peacetime project for the interior development of our country, the +largest one ever undertaken in the United States. + +Today nearly a million C.C.C. boys have passed through the soldier’s +hands. Ninety-four per cent of the camps are now under Reserve Officers +from civilian life, who are carrying on with great efficiency and +success. This vast enterprise is just another by-product of the army’s +normal work of being fit and ready against an emergency. And all of +these services of the soldier come to the average taxpayer for less +than a penny a day. + +Do I toot too loudly--do I scare the calf? + + + + +_IV_ + +THE FIRST GAME + + +One day at West Point it was my duty to take a prominent visitor, an +Englishman, to a football game. We sat through three periods with +little conversation. Knowing that British Rugby corresponds in its +continuous motion to our basketball, I finally got up courage to ask +him what he thought of the game he was witnessing. “Well,” he said, “I +think it’s all very jolly, but I can’t understand why they get down and +pray so much.” + +That brings up the very first serious game we played with the British +in this country. It was a contest we had for freedom between 1775 and +1783. Incidentally we lost the game, but we gained our independence. If +the actual score could have been displayed in the headlines of a great +news sheet, it would have read something like this: “The British rout +the Colonials, 31-6.” + +In the first period of that game, after the kick-off at Lexington and +Concord, the English General Howe shoved the Colonial Team right out of +Long Island, and sent many of them to the sidelines. When he appeared +before Manhattan, they ran away at the first sight of the British +Team--ran pell-mell right through New York’s East Side, until our head +coach jumped in and actually had to beat them over the back to get them +onto the playing field again. But they melted away despite entreaties +and prodding. Of course, it wasn’t a team that George Washington had at +that time. It was a collection of fellows who hadn’t been taught the +rules and principles of the game, did not understand team-work, who had +few togs, were poorly conditioned and scarcely knew how to line up. +All this was very humiliating since our country was abundantly rich to +support a good coaching staff and to make an outlay for training and +equipment. Besides the game had been advertised for over ten years. +Yet nothing had been done to present even a good defensive line and +back field. In fact, most of the men who turned out had never even +tackled the dummy--let alone being assembled. It is not surprising then +that when the Colonists were chased by General Howe down through New +Jersey, that over half of Washington’s squad just picked up and went +home, refused to play any longer, said they’d played as long as they’d +agreed to, and left him with a few to carry on against a quantity of +well drilled and trained opponents. They were discontented not only at +the poor showing but because they didn’t have a chance. But Washington, +instead of quitting, showed how much determined stuff was in him. +When, with the handful remaining, the game looked hopelessly lost, he +called for two brilliant forward passes down on his one-foot line at +Trenton and Princeton, which were successful. It was a daring play, but +besides throwing a tiny scare into the British, the Colonists netted +only eight yards and were forced to kick. They did a lot of justified +kicking at this time in many other ways, but these desperate plays +put back a lot of spirit into the team, in spite of the discouraging +situation, and the desertion from Washington’s ranks of players. + +It was in the second period of the game that the Colonists made +their first real touchdown at Saratoga. Of course, they outweighed +the British about thirty pounds to the man, and that helped. Then, +too, they had a fine captain of the team by the name of Arnold, who +afterwards because of ill-treatment on his own squad at the hands of +some disgruntled alumni, went over and played on the British team. +But meanwhile General Howe added to his lead by scoring with wide end +sweeps and perfect interference two more touchdowns at the Brandywine +and Germantown--and there the half ended. During the intermission +both teams rested. The British went into luxurious training quarters +in Philadelphia, where they built themselves up with good food and +generally had a sprightly fine time, whereas the Colonists’ squad +sat out in the open and shivered and starved through a freezing +winter, and the hardships took a further toll of Washington’s line +and backfield men. But a great thing happened at Valley Forge for +Washington’s remnants of a squad. The pupil of the master strategist +abroad, Frederick the Great, arrived. It was Baron Von Steuben. At once +Washington made him principal assistant coach. There was no department +of the game in which he was not skilled. He was an untiring worker and +had a kind, attractive personality as an instructor. He picked out +the best material and made a sort of varsity squad. He emphasized the +fundamentals of blocking and tackling in which the colonists were sadly +lacking. As he drilled them in diversified plays and got them clicking +as a team, the rest of the players watched them and then attempted +to imitate them on separate fields. He did much as they do in those +schools where everyone has to take part in sports, where intra-mural +athletics are treated seriously. The effect of such coaching was +immediately felt at Monmouth in the beginning of the third period, +where the Colonists played the British to a standstill; and could have +made another touchdown, had not Charles Lee, a good half-back when he +wanted to play, run with the ball full-tilt toward the enemy’s goal. +He would actually have made a touchdown for the other side, if one of +his own team-mates had not tackled him a little past midfield. But +shortly afterward, this good showing of the Colonists was overcome +by two touchdowns made by the British at Newport and Camden, where +undrilled players faced veterans. Later Nathaniel Greene, a fine team +captain, played well with a green squad riddled with injuries. Although +he could not threaten the goal line, he stood the British on even terms +at Guilford Court House. His defensive work with his inferior line was +praiseworthy, but it didn’t thrill the spectators or advance the ball. +Then came Washington’s strategy as a great coach. He fooled the British +into the belief that he was playing a 6-2-2-1 defense and suddenly with +a fake kick attack, swooped down on Cornwallis at Yorktown. Even though +the team was penalized for holding, he hung on. But the touchdown he +was responsible for in his excellent head-work was offset by the fact +that there had been imported more men from France to block the British +than he had players from his own institution. The officials took the +view that players brought in from another institution were ringers, +and therefore the score as applying to the Colonists would have to be +thrown out. And besides this touchdown didn’t end the game, as so many +people think it did. It was just the end of the third period. In the +last and fourth quarter, the British quarter-back realized his lead +of 31 to 6, and just held on, since he had a squad of three times as +many hardy and well-drilled players as had been lost at Yorktown and +altogether a better and bigger one than the Colonists had. Of course, +the British were just content to stall around in midfield, occupying +our principal cities. The game ended just as the entire British squad +was called back to England, because the schedule makers in Europe had +more important games for them to play over there. And that left the +gridiron empty. If the game was not won by the Colonists, at least the +field was. So irrespective of score, the Americans surged all over the +gridiron and carried off both sets of goal-posts with a great hurrahing +over the victory. And we’ve been hurrahing ever since. + +Now the story of our Revolution as a game may appear to some to sound +flippant, to poke fun at our troops and belittle them. No one reveres +more the courage and fortitude of the men of ’76 than the soldier. But +so many of their sufferings and defeats were unnecessary, and so much +of their efforts wasted because of lack of timely coaching, that the +story as a game can briefly picture the play as the action took place. +In principle, that was exactly what happened in our fight for freedom. +We really never won the Revolution by either our power or our skill. +And what’s the use of fooling ourselves now? Are we not ready to look +at this contest frankly in the face and learn its lessons? Because of +our failure to coach or equip our squad properly, we dragged on eight +years of death by exposure, disease and the bullet. And this procedure +is all the sadder and more tragic when we recognize that the material +available in the colonies was as fine in raw ruggedness, character +and marksmanship as anywhere in the world. Men who joined the ranks +became discouraged by the wholesale when they saw themselves too often +officered by persons as unskilled and unlettered as they, when they +realized that they had little chance against soldiers well-trained and +equipped. They keenly felt the disgrace and uselessness of it all. It +was natural that they deserted in shoals or left at the expiration of +short-time enlistments. The Continental Line, which Steuben coached +and who stuck all through the war, were able and heroic, but were few +by comparison. The great majority stayed only as long a time as would +correspond to a few days on a football squad. Washington and Steuben +couldn’t count on what material they could coach or could have for any +one game. Green Americans against expert British, were the rule. If +you can picture a coach on any gridiron receiving from the farm or the +store a new set of men every two days, with most of the old set leaving +at the same time, and attempting to produce a team for a game each +Saturday, you have in a mild way Washington’s situation. We know that +when we put untrained and unconditioned men into a football game, we +reap more serious injuries than if the men are hardened and trained. +If those casualties exist where the human body is the only weapon, how +_much more_ unspeakable are the added injuries where bad weather, poor +shelter, loss of food and sleep, bullets and cannon balls were the +weapons. So in the Revolution we put men in a more terrible plight than +we’d think of allowing even in modern football. + +But a more surprising thing is what we did after the war was over. +We dismissed our entire coaching staff and all of the squad except +80 men, who just worked around the training quarters and received no +practice or instruction in the game. Our people had the idea that +there would never be another game. They contended that any attempt at +a continuous coaching system with a paid staff was getting back to +professionalism--to despotism and tyranny. Since armies in Europe were +playthings of Kings, then all armies would be that way. They took the +same line of reasoning as the man who says, “Since some church members +are hypocrites, then all churches are wrong.” Washington tried his +best with all his pleading and logic, to show how false was such a +view. He begged and advised in so many of his letters and testaments +that it seems nothing could be more important to him. He wrote of the +Revolution: “Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning--we should +not have been the greatest part of the war inferior to the enemy, +indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the +mortification of seeing opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for +the want of a force, which the country was completely able to afford; +and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants +plundered, abused, murdered with impunity from the same cause.” He also +wrote, “To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of +preserving peace.” Henry Lee, Governor of Virginia about the same time +went further. “Convinced as I am that a government is the murderer of +its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed and untaught, +where they are to meet men of the same age and strength, mechanized by +education and discipline for battle, I cannot withhold my denunciation +of its wickedness and folly.” + +Thus the people were warned against their slump--and we shall soon see +how they paid for it. + + + + +_V_ + +THE FIELD MEET + + +First of all, I’d better warn you to turn the dial, if you don’t want +to hear some shocking things about ourselves--things I daresay you +haven’t heard before. You remember what Hegel said--“We learn from +history that we learn nothing from history.” I think he meant that we +just won’t say, “Because Mark Anthony, Aaron Burr and Belgium did those +things, we won’t do them either.” O no, we must poke our nose right +into the fire and get our fair eyebrows burnt off, before we beware. +You and I often take singeings like that and charge them up to human +nature. But as a people after our Revolution we took red-hot scorchings +all over the face and down the body over and over again. Never did we +profit less by the bungling of any activity than we did in those years +following our escape into freedom. But I’d better tell you the facts +and let you judge for yourself. + +And yet--I hesitate to tell them--these black things that our histories +cover up with a sheet, a lily white sheet. As often as I have looked +at them I still get a quake in the stomach. But maybe it’s best that +we do look them in the face--in order to enter into the big charity of +preventive medicine. + +Well here goes! After the Revolution, in the face of Washington’s +pleading, Steuben’s example, and stout statesmen’s warnings, we cast +out discipline and training like life boats from a new ship and reduced +the army to eighty men. Then we put seven hundred on legal paper, +who couldn’t be raised or kept going. Three years after the war we +had for the common defense less than a thousand men poorly equipped +and trained and scattered in the lonely forts on our borders--the +equivalent of one hundred policemen on the outskirts of Boston today, +with none in the city. So when Daniel Shay organized his rebellion, +forced the court to adjourn and marched on Springfield, he had things +pretty much his own way. It was only after tumult and bloodshed that +peace was restored, whereas a small, well-trained force at hand would +doubtless have kept the uprising from even starting. But the people +refused to look at this picture--refused to take out preventives or +insurance against the dreadful happenings to follow. Even when the +United States became a nation and our Constitution was adopted, we had +an army of the magnificent size of five hundred ninety-five men. Can +you believe it? But listen to the consequence of this neglect. Seven +years after Revolution, one thousand souls in Kentucky alone perished +by tomahawk and arrow, with no one to protect them. Then a force of +hastily recruited men in Ohio were ambushed and wiped out. The next +year fourteen hundred quickly raised defenders were also annihilated. +And of course our weakness furnished the savage with a new courage for +depredations, so that the thousands of persons who perished cannot +now even be estimated. There was only one bright spot in this decade +of terror. Washington, despite the laxness of the country, selected +Anthony Wayne to lead troops against the Indians. Wayne, who had seen +Steuben’s careful coaching, trained his men for over a year before he +took them into action. At the Battle of Fallen Timber, eleven years +after the Revolution, he won our first well-executed victory over any +sort of disorder. The Indians were so completely spanked that they let +the settler live in peace for a long time--and thousands of lives were +thus saved. But this action was a live coal in a bed of ashes. For +soon the war scares crept steadily upon us--with France fifteen years +after the Revolution, with Spain twenty years after, with Great Britain +twenty-five years after. At each new scare, Congress voted huge sums +of money and called out thousands of men on paper, but at no time did +our actual forces even poorly trained, number four thousand men. The +soldier seemed to be the thermometer of the nation’s fear. His numbers +would rise and fall like the encased mercury to record the heat and +cold of the people. But he never rose in time before, or stayed long +enough afterward, to have any effect upon the temperature. He just +didn’t exist in time. William Duane in his writings of the period +complained, “There is no discipline; there is even no system; and there +are gross misconceptions on the subject. There appears to have been a +disposition to discourage the acquisition of military knowledge.” So we +arrived at our Second War with Great Britain, twenty-nine years after +the Revolution, weaker proportionally than when we faced that war. + +Now the land warfare of 1812 would be so funny, if it weren’t tragic; +so laughable, if it weren’t shameful, that our school histories just +must omit much of it, if they’re going to show that we are the perfect +people of the world. You could scarcely describe the affair in football +language, as I did with the Revolution, because the candidates for that +gridiron didn’t stay long enough to last much after the kick-off. It +had better be classified as an open tournament of all games and events, +under any rules which the particular coach wanted to make, and at any +time he wanted to play. It probably could be described somewhat as a +track-meet, if it were confined to running events. I tell you those +men who played against or rather opposite Great Britain the second +time, and who took no coaching for their particular stunts, could +outsprint anything you’ve seen in shorts. The first event was staged +at Detroit where our force of eighteen hundred had covered themselves +up with fortifications. On the appearance of only twelve hundred of +the enemy, the eighteen hundred gallantly surrendered without firing a +shot or putting up any sort of resistance. This display of talent was +soon followed by even a more disgraceful one at Queenstown. General +Van Rensselaer got together nearly three thousand hastily recruited +fellows at Lewiston to take the heights across the river. Two hundred +and twenty-five picked men succeeded in crossing and stormed the place. +This little courageous band withstood charge after charge of the +enemy, hoping for reenforcements. But the large force on the American +side refused to budge or even help their stricken comrades, who were +finally killed or captured. After seeing their gallant fellows perish, +they made their way to their homes quite quickly. A little later +General Harrison got together from four states ten thousand men with +no background or experience of warfare. After a short march and slight +flurry with the Indians their speed in getting back to their homes +and camp was far beyond the most sanguine expectations. You couldn’t +exactly say they ran. No, they evaporated and their work was over. Then +General Dearborn sent an expedition of fifteen hundred men against a +small post on the River LaColle. The British garrison consisted of only +two hundred men, seven and one-half times smaller force than ours. But +by unskilled leadership the American columns were separated and had an +exciting time firing into each other while the enemy escaped. After all +these escapades, along came General Smythe, who openly confessed how +wrong other leaders had been and how he was the one hope of the war. By +bombastic proclamations he induced over five thousand men to come to +him at Black Rock for an invasion of Canada. On the promised day for +the crossing, less than half the command embarked in the morning and +waited there for the order to push across. In the afternoon, Smythe +sensing the weakness of his troops, ordered them to disembark, and +stated that the expedition was temporarily postponed. The men were so +resentful that he promised he would invade Canada at a later date. +Three days afterward he got them into the boats--and then out of them +the very same way. The scene of riot and discontent was indescribable. +Men fired off their weapons in every direction, and threatened +Smythe’s life. Hunted and pursued, he finally made his way to his home +in Virginia, and his command dispersed in disorder. + +The next episode was that of General Winchester who sent Colonel +Lewis to take Frenchtown, which he captured with a superior force. +But after he had gained his victory, his soldiers were so lawless, +undisciplined and ignorant of the first essentials of precaution, that +the enemy returned and killed or captured the whole of the ten hundred +and fifty Americans. Then came two successful expeditions. General +Pike with seventeen hundred picked men took Toronto garrisoned by half +that number and General Harrison with a force three times as great +as the enemy, won a victory at Thames River. But these engagements +were isolated and did not have much effect upon the war. Then General +Hampton marched on Montreal with about five thousand untrained men, +who met eight hundred Canadian regulars, before whom they fled in +utter panic. After this General Wilkinson tried the same thing with a +similar force. When his advance guard of sixteen hundred men met eight +hundred British at Chrysler’s Field, they did the usual scampering and +Wilkinson gave up the idea of invading Canada. After all this weakness +there was nothing to stop the enemy from swooping down upon us. They +took Fort Niagara, occupied Lewiston, Youngstown and Manchester and +burned Buffalo. When six hundred and fifty British and Indians appeared +before Black Rock, nearly three thousand Americans going by the name of +soldiers ran away without even aiming--ran to cover so fast that the +enemy had no trouble pillaging and destroying everything in sight. + +But through these lowering clouds of neglect and ignorance there +came a rift of sunshine. Three young generals, Brown, Scott, Ripley, +in spite of the backward administration, decided on their own hook +in these dark ages to pull out of their shelves the old learning of +Washington and Steuben, to have a little renaissance of their own. +For a year they worked on preparing thirty-five hundred men for real +service in the field. And they were rewarded by the heroic battles +of Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane. Ah, yes, our histories record these +actions, but they don’t tell why they were successful. The men were +trained and disciplined. And these two contests put a wholesome stop to +depredations and invasions of American soil in the north. + +Yet much of that work was counteracted by Bladensburg, the prime +disgrace of American History. Little anxiety had been felt in +Washington, over three thousand British troops who had been hovering +about in the Chesapeake for a year. The Secretary of War, the +President and General Winder fell into a lengthy argument about how +many troops should be called out to oppose this force. Meanwhile, +the enemy was marching uninterruptedly toward our Capital. Finally +sixty-four hundred Americans were collected just before the battle to +oppose the invaders. The camp of men was wild with disorder and drink, +while our so-called leaders were stupid with perplexity. Just before +actual contact the three gentlemen mentioned above, fell to discussing +the situation as if it were something quite new. The troops were +posted on the heights--badly. At the firing of some harmless rockets, +our force which outnumbered the enemy two to one, fled right through +the nation’s Capitol, leaving it open to plunder and rapine. Why the +British chose to burn only the public buildings, was probably due to +their sportsmanship. + +Of course, General Jackson did excellent defensive work at New Orleans, +but that was after the war was over--after the whistle had blown. Of +course the Navy, too, did perfect work. The government had seen to it +that they had been well-trained for a long time before the war. There +were no novices in that organization. + +All these actions on land were really more disgraceful than I have +described them. Throughout the War of 1812, as you see, most any +unqualified man could be put in the saddle and every kind of unprepared +man could be put in the field to fight. We were helpless, hopeless, +impatient, disgraceful, because we had discarded training and foresight +in the years beforehand. In this war, over two decades after we had +become a nation, we committed all the errors of the Revolution to a +greater degree--and one more. We had no management or leadership--no +commander-in-chief or the commonest business organization. Fine +manhood, for want of previous training was held up to ridicule, +suffering, casualties, and disgrace. Now for the figures. We called +out over half a million men and could not drive a maximum of sixteen +thousand from our shores for over two years. We spent nearly two +hundred million dollars, not counting pensions, when two per cent +of that sum with a small well-trained force would have sufficed. +And above all we sacrificed six thousand lives in camp and on the +battlefield, when that figure should not have been over two hundred. +As far as might, efficiency, planning and management were concerned, +we muddled this war on land to the tune of death and shame. Again we +couldn’t defend our country against our enemies and had to thank God +for European weariness from Napoleon, which called off the British. +That’s the reason why, when our raw material is finer and greater +than anywhere else in the world, the soldier is so wrought up over +our people rushing into future extravagance, unnecessary slaughter +and possible defeat. For somehow war has a habit of sneaking up on us +craftily and quickly, like a thug. + + + + +_VI_ + +THE UPHILL GAME + + +How about giving our imaginations a little exercise for a minute before +we start in on the evening’s story. Are we set for the effort? Well, +here’s the picture. Just suppose a great plague of flu were to sweep +this country from end to end. And suppose there were not a single +doctor or nurse in the United States. Now suppose that Congress, all +excited, voted great numbers of doctors and nurses to stem the scourge. +Well, how many people would die, and how much neglect and horror would +visit our doorways, while the doctors and nurses were being trained +and educated? Just go over in your mind that little chaos and you have +almost a view of the War of 1812--almost--for then we went this fancied +epidemic one better. We didn’t provide training and education at all +for the doctors and nurses--the officers and men of that calamity. The +plague of war just went along from bad to worse--and then from worse +to awful. There was much excuse for our slips before and during the +Revolution, when we were a loose lot of colonies and were divided into +Whigs and Tories. But by 1812 we had been a nation for over twenty +years. Few realized then, and some don’t now, that the soldier needs +just as much preparation and education as the doctor and the nurse. +For preparedness against war and shortening a war amount to a vast +science and art which cannot be trusted to quacks without undue loss +of life to our sons. After our narrow escape from this plague of 1812, +when our enemy providentially was called back to Europe, we didn’t do +away with our preventive medicine, as we did after the Revolution. No +sir, we kept that training for three whole months. Then we reduced +it to ten thousand men on paper. Five years later, in the face of +protests by such men as John C. Calhoun, we cut it to six thousand +men. Then the Seminoles, Creeks and Black Hawk promptly entered into +the gentle art of taking scalps. Settlers were slain. Dade’s Command +of one hundred seven officers and men marching on a peaceful errand +were massacred. Other officers and civilians were mowed down. Cholera +attacked the troops against Black Hawk, and yellow fever took its toll +of those against the Seminoles. In the Florida, Georgia and Alabama +country a force of less than a thousand trained troops tried to keep +safe a vast unexplored country against three thousand Indians. By 1834, +for the whole of the United States, less than four thousand troops +attempted to guard over ten thousand miles of seacoast and frontier +for fifteen million people. Two years later, after these killings +had been going on for some time, our legislators with frenzied haste +voted our army to be raised back to ten thousand. But the troops could +not be had or trained in time. So the slaughter went on. Mr. Hearst +quotes Alfred Henry Lewis as saying that a Congressman is like a man +riding backwards in a train. He never sees anything till after it has +passed. Well, that may be a little unfair to our legislators, but it +surely applied to these enactments. For what happened afterwards? +The usual waste and ineffectiveness. General after general on the +frontier asked to be relieved of command because of the impossibility +of the task, the smallness of the force and the wholesale, needless +deaths. Of the trained men in this Seminole War over forty-one per +cent perished--nearly half of all the troops--and to little purpose. +One hundred seventeen of our best officers, in one year, seeing the +fruitlessness of their services resigned from the army rather than +to be a party to stagnation. Among them were such prominent men as +Horace Bliss, W. C. Young, R. R. Parrott, Alexander D. Bache, Albert +Sydney Johnston, N. B. Buford, Leonidas Polk, Jefferson Davis, Joseph +E. Johnston and George G. Meade. By 1842 the army in the face of the +want of a strong national police force was reduced to eighty-six +hundred and thirteen men. A Congressman on the floor of the house +stated in that year: “We have no prospects of war. We have more reason +to suppose that the world will grow wiser and that the humane and +oft-repeated wish of the wise and good, that the sword and bayonet may +be converted into the scythe and ploughshare, will be realized.” We +have no prospects of war! Four years after this statement, came the War +with Mexico like a bolt out of the red, white and blue. It found our +seventeen million people with an army of fifty-three hundred men all +told, or what would correspond for a university of seventeen hundred +students to a football squad of six men. Six whole men. Think of that. +A line, all but one man, no backs and no substitutes. Of course, you +couldn’t play the game at all, under those circumstances. Well, as +the Mexican War was in sight General Zachary Taylor had to. He had to +fight with less than that. He had just three thousand troops against a +possible fifty thousand Mexicans. Even so, his command was the largest +regular force we had assembled since the Revolution. Whatever the +rights and wrongs of this war were, Taylor was in a perilous position. +When hostilities came, he had to go forward with his little band of +trained soldiers. Against superior forces he won the battles of Palo +Alto and Resaca de la Palma. Then he was held up. Untrained volunteers +poured in upon him too late--right in the midst of campaign--just +as applicants for a medical school might rush in and clog up a busy +hospital. Imagine that situation, hundreds of novices running around +the corridors and into the wards of a big hospital. Would the doctors +be crazy? Taylor’s position was worse. The government had forced him +to keep these men in his institution and many of them hadn’t the +inclination to learn, many had come out for a lark, and all of them had +to be taught from the ground up obedience, punctiliousness, cleanliness +and the technique and character of the soldier if they weren’t going +to _run_ or be uselessly _killed in battle_. It took four months’ +waiting and preparing in a hostile country before Taylor could go into +his next engagement. Besides he couldn’t get enough transportation. +But he had one big advantage over leaders in 1812 and the Revolution. +West Point was beginning to account for itself--not because it was West +Point, nor because I would emphasize the United States Military Academy +unduly, but because it was the only place in the Western Hemisphere +_then_ where a man could get four years’ training and education toward +being a doctor for the plague of war. Five hundred West Pointers--the +Grants and Stonewall Jacksons as lieutenants and captains, made things +easier for Taylor, and other West Pointers, like Jefferson Davis, were +coming back to the colors with the volunteers. So Taylor, after his +green men had been taught something, won the battle of Monterey. But +these victories weren’t getting us anywhere. They were just scattered +first downs. Taylor was much like the hen that pecks, but has nothing +to cackle about. Over his advance into nowhere the administration was +beginning to be nervous. He could scarcely have been called an educated +soldier. On the contrary, Winfield Scott, the commanding general of +the army in Washington, was professionally trained and self-educated +to the point of brilliance. For a long time Scott had told Polk and +Marcy, just what would end the war quickly--a strike at the very heart +of Mexico--nothing less. But the powers wouldn’t listen to him, scoffed +at him, called him visionary. The quacks were ridiculing the doctors. +But when Taylor got nowhere more leisurely, the administration threw +up its hands and chucked the whole affair into Scott’s lap, because +the people were becoming restless for a solution. Yes, the President +gave permission to Scott, but he had called Scott’s plan visionary, +and therefore had to prove his point by taking a pot shot at Scott’s +efforts when he could safely do so from executive cover. In spite of +this double-crossing, Scott finally got enough troops at Vera Cruz +to start shoving through to the finish. Meanwhile Taylor, who could +scarcely have been accused of planning his battles with knowledge and +decision, won Buena Vista. A number of trained subordinates, such as +Wool and Jefferson Davis, together with seasoned troops were mainly +responsible for the victory. But beyond drawing a large part of the +Mexican Army away from Scott, it did not accomplish much toward ending +the war. Scott had given it out that he was going to conquer a peace +and he was determined to do so with all speed. By skill and energy +he took Vera Cruz with only twenty losses to his troops. But then he +was met with horrible obstacles. Polk had not kept his part of the +bargain--to send the rest of the troops, transportation and supplies. +Yellow fever would soon be attacking the forces in this low country. +Scott pushed on toward the highlands anyhow with what he had. At +Cerro Gordo he faced a natural stronghold in the mountains that was +terrifying. With excellent scouting and planning, with the aid of able +subordinates such as Robert E. Lee, he pushed through the scowling, +fortified barrier and sent the Mexicans flying, pursuing them as far as +he could. + +But then came the rub. Jalapa. Have you ever heard of Jalapa? Well, it +was another Valley Forge in our history, a Valley Forge in a hostile +country far from home. There, seven regiments and two companies of +Scott’s volunteers went home in a body because their enlistments +expired. Over thirty-six hundred men left him, and nothing could stir +their patriotism to remain. His force was reduced to less than seven +thousand in the face of twenty thousand Mexicans. Also James K. Polk +was continuing his undercutting work at home. Scott was being too +successful and would be too strong politically. So money and recruits +did not arrive. The troops were not only low in numbers, but in +spirits, too. Scott pleaded in vain with the government for the life of +his men and honor of our country to send him what he needed. Some of +his troops were beginning to feel it was no use trying to go forward. +It was all they could do to survive now in the center of Mexico. One of +his generals advised going back. Would they have to give up? It was a +desperate situation. But Scott meant to go forward. He began by winning +over the hostile inhabitants through his kindly, square treatment. They +grew to like him better than their own leader, Santa Anna. He kept +his troops in hand and generally well-behaved. So he was finally able +to barter with the inhabitants and get food for his men. He pushed on +toward Puebla without the money and recruits promised him. Finally, +after two months’ delay, fresh troops and money came. Even though he +had only ten thousand seven hundred eighty-one effectives, mixed with +green men, he went further onward immediately. Came the victories of +Contreras, Churubusco, Molino del Rey, Chapultepec and Mexico City. The +capital was taken and the war was over. In six months, trained troops, +trained subordinates and a trained commander had marched through the +heart of a hostile country, against vastly superior numbers of the +enemy, against a bloodsucking administration at its back, and had +conquered a peace, as Scott had said he would. Had his advice in the +first place been heeded, the war, the sufferings, the deaths, and the +expense could have been cut in less than a fourth. But again the value +of training and education for a plague had been flouted. Yet training +and training alone had won for us our first successful war on land. And +from it came a third of the present area of the United States, which we +weren’t loath to accept. + +And the cause of our success? Well, we must be frank and honest. We +must admit that the opposition wasn’t really first class. Had it been, +dear knows what beatings our paltry number of trained troops would have +taken. But the Mexicans were by no means as weak as we were in 1812. If +they had been, we could have walked into the Mexican capital without +much more than a loud booh. We mustn’t get the idea that the Mexicans +couldn’t fight. They disputed the way so hotly at Contreras and Molino +del Rey, that it looked for a time very doubtful for the United States. +It was no afternoon’s parade such as the British had had into our +capitol. + +But our quality was superior and we could force our way through the +opposition. Why? Well, Scott tells you, Scott, who was not a West +Pointer. He said that had it not been for the graduates of the Academy, +the war would have lasted four or five years, with more defeats than +victories in the first part. At any rate, these young men proved to be +a great foundation for efficient leadership. Specialized education and +training whether or not by West Point had saved money and life in this +war, despite untrained inpourings, despite a hampering administration, +and despite our pitiful numbers. + +But let us hark back to a piece of irony. In the previous years before +this war, _twice had Congress tried to abolish West Point_, and _once_ +it made no appropriations for it, so that the Superintendent at his +own risk had to borrow $65,000 from a private individual to keep it +going. What ugliness would have been added to our history, had the +abolitionists been successful? What shame and slaughter would have come +had the President _not_ been forced to let Scott carry out his plan? +Is it to laugh or weep at the sentimentalists who would do away with +the doctors and squander human life? Well, let’s see the Civil War +next. Not so pretty--what? + + + + +_VII_ + +THE SCRAMBLE + + +At a game of bridge, a player once tried to excuse himself to his +partner for trumping his ace, “But you see,” he said, “I’m just +learning.” Said the partner, “That’s the devil of it--you’re _not_.” +Just why our country didn’t learn after three wars, two of which we +actually lost through the _absence_ of training, and one of which +we won _because_ of training, is a mystery to more than good bridge +players. Well, we didn’t learn, for right after the Mexican War, +we reduced our trained force to the size it was shortly after our +miserable War of 1812, thirty-six years before. And we made this +astounding reduction, in the face of an increase in our population +of twelve millions, and in our territory, of nearly a million square +miles. The soldier was almost immediately put up against an impossible +task. He was sprinkled about so thinly beyond the Mississippi that +often he despaired of his own existence. A paltry seven thousand +struggled against hundreds of thousands of Indians for the sake of +the settler. Besides, the western land was familiar to the savage +and strange to the soldier. The odds against this meager force were +increased when gold was discovered in California, when the forty-niner +came along. The soldier had to build forts, roads and trails--and +escort the endless caravans of wagon trains over the prairie, if the +settler was to arrive safely in our coast states. Meanwhile uprisings +of Apaches, Yumas, Navajos, Cheyenne and the deadly Sioux had to be +repulsed. Tardy increases of the trained force by Congress came far +behind the heels of the unwarranted killings. By 1861 the entire +army, trained only in small actions, numbered a little over fifteen +thousand men. And eighty-four per cent of this force was scattered +so completely and remotely from Washington, that it would have taken +months to collect them. We sat through all this, like the man watching +for weeks the flood approaching his house, and making no attempt to +remove his furniture, or get a boat. We watched the skies grow darker +and crooned, “It ain’t goin’ to rain no more.” For thirty years the +North had been trying to black the South’s industrial eye, and the +South had as vigorously defied the threats. Violent abolitionists, +cartoonists, pamphleteers and novelists had been using hot words and +making insulting gestures at each other. Yet the Yankee, doubling one +fist and opening the other, kept saying, “O, no there won’t be a war. +Brother couldn’t fight brother. Even if there is one, it can’t last.” +When South Carolina seceded four months before the conflict, and six +states followed her example, we did not wake up to the protection of +our youth. When nearly one-fourth of the army, with its proportion +of government property in Texas, was surrendered to the South, we +did nothing to overcome the loss. When we saw the South call out one +hundred thousand men for a year’s service, we sat like spectators on +the bleachers. We let the Confederates seize the arsenals in their +states and all the government property they wanted. We let them boldly +inaugurate a rival republic within our borders, elect a president and +declare their independence. Even then we made no effort to school and +train our men so that they might have some chance. General Scott early +begged Buchanan and Secretary of War Floyd to raise a small, efficient, +trained force to stem possible trouble, but these men of state merely +shrugged. Since Scott was too old to mount a horse, he was too old +to give advice. After all he was only at the top of his profession, +practically and theoretically. Our attitude was _not_ to be ready for +possible emergencies, and particularly an emergency that had been +slapping us in the face for over thirty years, but to do as wretchedly +as we could when the emergency struck us. And we surely lived up to +expectations. When the gun at Fort Sumter waked the sleeping North +into action, we were destitute of anything like a proper tool to handle +the situation. Even our new President because there were no trained +troops in the East to protect him, had to make his way in disguise to +a threatened White House; whereas President Davis, a trained, tried +and educated soldier and statesman had collected thirty-five thousand +troops, who were being trained and equipped. So when President Lincoln, +unlettered and unskilled in the art and science of war arrived in +office, he found the South had a magnificent start on him. From then +on throughout the war he had to work against horrible handicaps, even +though we had three times the man-power and many times the resources of +the Confederates. In desperation he called out seventy-five thousand +men for three months--seventy-five thousand raw men to do the work of +veterans. In response to this call, a Massachusetts regiment was mobbed +while passing through Baltimore and a Pennsylvania regiment had to turn +back because it had no arms. Meanwhile nearly three hundred southern +officers of the small, far-scattered trained army went over to the +South. + +Washington and other cities were deluged with a bewildered, +undisciplined and poorly led and organized lot of fellows. Under +little restraint they wandered aimlessly about, often unfed for weeks, +quartered in muddy, filthy buildings, with ill-fitting and oftimes +insufficient clothing and with little idea of their duties, conduct or +responsibilities. The trained men were so few they couldn’t be found, +and the government, unlike the able management in the South, made no +effort to find them or use their services to the best advantage. Why, +when U. S. Grant wrote to Washington offering himself for duty, he +wasn’t even replied to. Naturally you can’t blame the rank and file, if +there was an unwarranted lot of brawls and disturbances. Idleness and +lack of discipline just means that. Public buildings were defaced. Even +the Capitol itself suffered damage and abuse from a regiment quartered +in its halls and on the very floors of the Senate and House. The farmer +colonel and the apothecary major stalked the streets in showy uniforms, +drew their pay, and didn’t go near their commands for weeks. Not all of +them. There were some very worthy ones, who strove under hindrances of +little opportunity, to bring order out of their units. But they were +the accidents in our country’s arrangements--or lack of them. In these +first few months of grand hubbub, misfit and waste, the country had +spent more money than would have supported an army of prevention during +the preceding ten years. And what needless hardship and suffering it +had brought to more than seventy-five thousand people. + +But something had to be done. These three-month men would be going home +soon and we’d have to begin all over. The people of the North, having +had such a long sleep, demanded action. What matter if we did throw +our poor men into a raging torrent before we taught them how to swim. +On to Richmond! Those who had said there couldn’t be any war, were the +loudest in screaming for a fight. On to Richmond! So McDowell became +the scape-goat. He had to go. They gave him only thirty thousand men, +but that was ten times more than any active officer in the regular +army had ever had a chance to handle. They also gave him eight days +in which to transform this excursion into an army. Eight days. It was +a compliment to his magical powers. But the administration and the +country were really serious about it. So he took them out to do battle. +Fatigue, waste, meandering, sore feet, green apples, overdrinking +and all those hundreds of vices, which the recruit learns to get +over, appeared on the march--a march that allowed him to go the great +distance of fifteen miles in two days. What else could have happened +at Bull Run but what _did_ happen? Of course they’d run. It wasn’t +their fault, nor had it anything to do with their bravery. It always +will happen when untrained men meet a sudden reversal. Training and +discipline are the equivalent of confidence, and these men hadn’t been +allowed by their people to have any confidence. Some of them never +stopped fleeing till they got to New York. Had it not been that there +were a few trained regulars to stop the onrush of the Confederates, +more men would have been uselessly slaughtered. This spectacle gave us +less than _nothing_. So we proceeded to call out one _million_ men with +more pandemonium, more ill-supplied concentrations, more sufferings and +more expense. + +Two weeks ago a listener to these talks, a total stranger to me, sent +me an extract from a diary of a gentleman now living, a survivor +of this war, one of those noblemen who at this period of the story +volunteered to be met with unnecessary cruelty by his country. Here is +some of the extract: + +“In due time we arrived in Washington on a drizzly, sloppy evening and +were marched to and housed in some large building already occupied by +larger numbers than should have been there. We had no food, the place +was dimly lighted with smoking torches. The floor was so muddy and foul +that we could not lie down and no place for so doing being provided. We +stood and shivered and said things and wondered if all heroes lived in +such style as this.” + +The diary goes on to show how this detachment wandered about +unassigned to any organization, for days without food, and living in +indescribable filth. That is a sample of what these hordes of fine +men suddenly called out, suffered. The author of this diary is now +ninety-one, one of the few left to tell the tale. Let me extend to him +the admiration and gratitude of our army for his needless and heroic +endurance and fortitude. + +To go on with the story, during this haphazard condition the South +was allowed to develop itself by its comparatively efficient methods, +undisturbed by us. McClellan had now the task of building up the great +part of these heterogeneous masses into something of an organization. +The war had stopped to let us train. But had it? The terrific expense +and useless deaths went on. In this first year thousands died of +disease under new conditions of exposure and hardships. Meanwhile +McClellan had to have time for his gigantic task. The people of the +North began to be irritated. Why didn’t he do something? Why didn’t +he go on to Richmond? He had plenty of men. The Yankee brain felt +that numbers were a solution for anything. It little realized that +the officers had to be taught the technique of the march, the camp, +the battlefield, security, supply, guard, unit management, drill and +staff work. The men had to be taught all sorts of movements, the use of +their weapons, sentry duty and above all discipline. All this would +have to be done now at this late date, if the North were going to have +any success at all. So for nearly a year against the ignorant clamor +of a nation, McClellan worked in schooling, and preparing a huge army +that would not have been necessary, had Scott’s advice been heeded. +And he turned out a well-knit machine ready for action--but just a +year too late to save the great carnage. When finally a year after +the war opened, the Peninsular Campaign was begun, the administration +of novices in Washington held out troops from McClellan, heckled and +hampered him and finally stopped him when he was beginning to get +somewhere. Meanwhile the South was making consummate use of Robert E. +Lee’s brains and leadership. Then came the empty victory of Antietam, +and the defeats of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. It wasn’t until +the middle of the third year of the war that we won our first decisive +battle at Gettysburg. But why shouldn’t we at that late date? It was +no glory to us. We had the man-power and money. It’s nothing to be +particularly happy about as far as efficiency is concerned. It’s far +better for us to grieve over the losses, the extravagant, ignorant, +idle, silly, moronic losses--losses that could scarcely be attributed +to men in their senses. I cannot make invectives too strong against my +fellow Yankee, who murderously treated his fellow man by his inhuman +dullness before the war. For in this conflict we fought the bloodiest +war, man for man, in all our history, when by wisdom and foresight of +ordinary business, we could have saved ninety to ninety-eight per cent +of the deaths. By our late start, our failure to apply preventives in +time, our unreasoning obtuseness in not listening to the experts, we +had to call out nearly three million men. Of these we lost by battle +over one hundred ten thousand men. But listen to this--by death from +disease we threw away nearly a quarter of a million, and the main part +of the awful sickness was in the first part of the war and among men +utterly unfit for campaign. Among the trained men sickness was so rare +that it wasn’t often reported. Besides this mortality, of the many fine +souls and bodies of volunteers who with high motives came into the +ranks, fought and escaped death, there were thousands who went back +home stricken by the effects of the bullet, dysentery and fever for the +rest of their lives. + + + + +_VIII_ + +MORE SCRAMBLE + + +Over my bed in college hung a drawing made by a member of the Class +of 1837. (Not a classmate of mine.) It showed a college youth of the +time, quite wabbly from too great association with John Barleycorn. He +was pointing his brace of pistols at a monkey perched on the foot of +his bed. Underneath the picture were the words: “If you’re a _monkey_, +you’re in a devilish fix. If you’re _not_ a monkey, _I’m_ in a devilish +fix.” Just whether or not it was a real monkey I never knew, but there +was no mistaking the fix. The more closely we study the Civil War, the +more we find that we were in a _terrible_ fix. And the more we get +away from it, the more we hate to look the fix in the face, especially +because the fix was our own fault. Today the World War is so close +to us that it screens the errors and calamities of our Civil War. We +forget too often that in the early sixties we endured the most awful +catastrophe this country has ever seen--a thing far more bloody man +for man than what we went through in the World War. But maybe it’s a +healthy thing to look at our Civil fix now, as the doctor studies past +epidemics in order to prevent future horrors to mankind. A picture +of the year before that war is full of so many fixes--so many pieces +of indulgence in artificial stimulation and neglect that they’d fill +a book. But here are two. In 1860 just before we were rushed into the +struggle, a bill was introduced into Congress to abolish the Navy, on +the ground that we’d never have any more war. Fortunately it failed +of passage. But the only legislation for the army that year was the +appointment of a committee to look into West Point and an authorization +to increase the sugar and coffee ration of the soldier. And all this, +while the tension between the North and South was about to snap. A +school and a drink, while blood and flame were in sight. And there +was no fire department to quench the raging blaze. A hose in Oregon, +a nozzle in Florida, horses in Arizona and an engine nowhere! And +suddenly Sumter’s guns cracked out and set the nation on fire. We +began to seethe and mill around. The President was caught in the furor +and had to exercise his war powers. Later when Congress met, it made +the entire set-up for the war in less than four weeks. Less than four +weeks! Why you couldn’t do that with a new factory, much less a police +department. And here we were with a massive business undertaking that +meant life and death to the whole country. Of course, the legislation +teemed with mistakes, which we paid for extravagantly and are still +paying for. The men called out weren’t soldiers any more than they +could be lawyers, managers and operators without practice and education. + +The thirty thousand collected for Bull Run were, in the mind of +the North, going to march right through to New Orleans. And people +came out from nearby towns to watch, from a very safe distance, the +battle--congressmen in carriages, women in barouches, sutlers in +wagons and reporters in tree-tops. They would behold this battle +that was going to bag these rebels and drive them into the Gulf of +Mexico. The spectators having comfortable and uncomfortable seats, +the engagement after some delay started. Tyler was slow in getting +into position and Hunter’s brigade rested for refreshments by the +waters of Bull Run a bit too long. After a time the Southern masked +batteries began to have their telling effect. Lines were formed slowly +and badly under fire. Many did not know the use of their muskets. +Those in the rear were almost as deadly to friend as foe. Too many +officers were killed or wounded in trying to get their men forward. +The green troops finally mistook a regiment of Confederates for their +own and received a murderous fire. Then the rout began. One regiment +fled and then another. The untrained men stampeded across the field +toward Washington. The eager observers scaled down the trees faster +than they had climbed them. Barouches, carriages and wagons wheeled +about and clattered away with much dust, turmoil and crowding. A +vehicle overturned and blocked the main road, adding to the panic. The +retreating recruits in their excitement fired mostly into the air, +fortunately for those about them. Some officers sought to rally their +men, here and there, but in vain. The majority rushed across fields, +over lanes and pushed through jammed roads in their hurry to get away. +And thus the first northern force evaporated. + +Haste, haste everywhere. Haste in forming a force--haste in +legislation--haste in getting away. Men who would otherwise have been +staunch and vigorous--men who were naturally brave--were hurried into a +life-and-death-position they had no chance to fill. The size of the two +forces had been about equal, but the South had had the advantage of six +months’ training, whereas the North had used mostly eight-day wonders. +And this decided jump of the Confederacy on us--their planning--their +foresight--their business arrangements had meant the turn of the tide +against the Union. + +And it was so all through 1861. We had five other battles in that +year, all of which we lost in the same way and for the same cause, +except one. Drainesville--have you ever heard of it? That was all +we had to show for the whole year’s effort--a tiny battle having no +influence on cutting the war shorter. And in that time we had killed +and wounded three thousand three hundred seventy-one men and spent four +hundred nineteen million dollars--all to no purpose--sheer waste. In +fact worse than waste, because the setbacks had paralyzed our efforts. +Then came the mismanagement of the second and part of the third year +of the war. While the Union was organizing as a loose Confederacy, the +Confederacy was organizing as a close Union. The southern government +keenly abandoned states’ rights for their army shortly after they had +begun to fight for states’ rights as a national policy. The northern +government inanely took up states’ rights for their army immediately +after they had begun to fight against states’ rights as a national +possibility. Both were inconsistent, but the South was inconsistent +wisely. It did away with voluntary enlistments and the power of +independent states to appoint officers and to offer whole units--and +vested the control in its President. It made a unified army. It then +enacted the first proper draft law in any English-speaking country--a +thing which was afterwards the greatest single stroke of efficiency +for America in the World War. On the other hand, the Union persisted in +lopsided volunteering and gave away to the governors absolute authority +to create organizations and appoint the officers over them. And Mr. +Lincoln had to receive these irregular lots and do the best he could +with them. He was powerless at the head of this great organization to +have control over the selection of his employees. And the way they were +selected didn’t help much either. Political favorites, farmers, clerks, +ward bosses and men about town, were given command of regiments and +battalions, when they knew nothing about the technique, tactics or art +of their undertaking--nothing about the real business of their jobs. +Professional qualifications had little to do with their selection. +Influence, popularity, deference, obligation and even pity put them in +their positions. Why, one officer was elected a captain of a company +because he had the most children and needed the money. Others were made +colonels or majors for just as sensible reasons, while three hundred +and eight trained officers were overlooked and kept in small positions +throughout the war. Would we put plumbers or carpenters over our sick +in the hospital? We did worse. We put them over well men, fine bodies, +whose lives depended upon knowledge and experience against the awful +things they had to face. For the camp and bivouac are even more deadly +than the battlefield under untrained leaders. In more ways than one our +hurried management caused the lengthening of the horror into four long +years of unnecessary slaughter. + +At the top, the North had a President and Secretary of War, +distinguished members of the bar, but utterly unfamiliar with the +technique and art of ending a war as quickly as possible. The country’s +policies had placed them in this unfair position. There was no active +general-in-chief of the armies. The Secretary of the Treasury was given +the task of making an organization plan. Other members of the cabinet +and bureau chiefs were given similar military problems. A group called +the Second Aulic Council debated, fussed and mostly collapsed into +grand meddling. It was the old story of a large cumbersome committee +getting nowhere--a committee that rarely understood the vital needs +of the occasion. So it was not surprising that the most ineffective +soldier with military education was finally chosen as General-in-Chief, +General Halleck. And he added to the confusion. Generals in the field +didn’t know where they stood. They were promised troops that never +arrived and shorn of troops they had with them. Their plans, by mail, +telegraph or personal travel had to be approved in Washington before +they could proceed. Often the opportunity passed before the veto or +approval arrived. During his campaigns, McClellan received hundreds of +telegrams, letters and courier packets a week, counseling one thing and +then another--and often contradictory. He could not change his base, +make a new plan, operate in a new place or go enthusiastically forward +without first having his proposals crunch through the slow grinding +mill of Washington. Commanders grew to be more fearful of the District +of Columbia than the enemy. For it’s hard to fight to your back and +front at the same time. And your back happens to give you more creeps. + +In a little over two years the main army of the East had in succession +as commanders McDowell, McClellan, Pope, McClellan, Burnside, Hooker +and Meade. In the whirlpool of mismanagement, heads fell fast. And +subordinate generals notoriously feared most being placed in command of +the Army of the Potomac. Certainly the whole fault couldn’t lie with +six different commanders. With the same system--or lack of it--sixteen +would probably have failed. Certainly _one_ could have been wisely +selected who could have gone on, if properly backed up. The answer lies +in the Confederacy. There, a single trained and experienced man picked +a trained commander and placed him over better trained and organized +troops than the North had. He was held on whether he won or lost and +became more capable as he proceeded. This sample of management and +organization, always a few steps ahead of the North is why the South +held off the Union against odds of three to one for four staggering +years. That is what was done while the Yankee was paying millions in +bounties for recruits, uselessly wasting his men, undergoing draft +riots and enduring one of the ablest _mis_managements our country has +seen. The lack of any action before the war--any wakefulness from +our deep sleep--any use of ordinary sense plunged us into the waste +of wastes and told the world ever since that we were the incompetent +of incompetents. And for all this the North paid nearly ten billion +dollars. And how we spent lives. Why, we were in such a rush at the +beginning that we sent in three hundred thousand men without even +examining them physically. Think of what that meant in mortality. We +fed our manhood like babes into the burning cauldron of Moloch, all +because we sat and waited with no idea of a preventive in those years +and months before the war. Experts, foreign and domestic, agree that if +we had had a trained force in the East in December 1860, of not more +than twenty-five thousand, the war could not have lasted over three +months, with a maximum of a thousand casualties. As it was in the North +alone we threw away three hundred sixty thousand lives. With the South +counted we filled prodigally way over a half million graves. No, we +don’t care to snuff things out at the source. We prefer to dam them at +the mouth. We do that with crime. Why not do it with war? + + + + +_IX_ + +FIDDLING + + +Do you remember the pillow shams of the gay nineties? For those of +you who don’t, I’ll tell you that they were clean, ruffled upright +coverings for pillows in the daytime. When they were laid aside +at night, they revealed too often a certain amount of real estate +underneath. What a cleanly view for the daily visitor and what an +unpleasant surprise for the nightly sleeper. I remember such a set of +shams. On the left one were embroidered in pink the words: “I slept and +dreamed that life was beauty.” On the right one in blue: “I woke and +found that life was duty.” + +Now that we’ve laid aside the shams of our school histories and looked +upon the tragically soiled linen of the Civil War, we find even cleaner +shams laid over the period _right after_ that war. You know as we +scratch our head and try to look wise when our young son attacks us +with a question about his history lesson, we see, among the cobwebs +those days of ’65, ’66 and ’67 as a time of sleeping beauty. The tired, +worn soldiers of the war, in our misty memory, are beating their swords +into pruning hooks and all that sort of thing. Are we wrong? Yes, we +are. Life was anything but beauty for our country then. They were +days of frightful, alarming duty. For we were even in a worse fix than +when Sumter’s guns tumbled us helter-skelter into catastrophe. On +all sides were threatenings of big wars and slaughter. On the north +the Fenians were trying to carry on strife against Great Britain from +within our borders, and the Alabama claims were adding to the fuel. The +South, smarting under revengeful reconstruction laws, was angered to a +pitch of frenzy. In Mexico, Napoleon the third had set up an empire, +placing the Archduke Maximilian of Austria on the throne in defiance +of the Monroe Doctrine. The thousands of irreconcilables of the former +Confederacy could there find a foothold to work against us. And in the +West, a half million Indians, unrestrained during the Civil War, were +overrunning half our territory, and sprinkling the soil with death +and massacre. In the midst of all this trouble, Abraham Lincoln was +shot down in cold blood. We had gone from a sizzling frying pan into a +surrounding fire. + +The situation in Mexico was so perilous that Sheridan was torn away +before the Grand Review in Washington, and sent immediately south. When +he arrived near the Rio Grande, the republican force in Mexico was +weak, worn and scattered. But it wasn’t hopeless long. For Sheridan +had something--we had something we’d never before had--a decent +sized, trained force. Even if it had been expensively trained under +the bullet, it was trained and well-trained. Sheridan just sat down in +Texas with almost three corps, and peered threateningly into Mexico. +Maximilian knew there wasn’t anything he had which could overcome such +a force. Little by little under the American display of strength, the +republicans gained power. In a year and a half the Empire fell, without +a single American gun being fired and with no bloodshed for us. We had +gained our ends by merely a show of force. Here is something for our +histories to brag about. Why do they cover it over with a sham? You +remember experts said that if we had had twenty-five thousand trained +men in 1860, the Civil War could not have lasted more than three +months. Well that statement, however careful, is at best theory, but +taken with the example of Sheridan’s force, it becomes a fact. And +there are other examples in our history where a sufficiently trained +force prevented bloodshed. The only reason we haven’t had more examples +is because we haven’t had more force. + +But we had a force this once, and one part of it had as difficult +a task as ever fell to the lot of soldiers. Nineteen thousand of +them were scattered in one hundred thirty-four places in the South +to enforce stringent, cruel laws for a conquered people. The ire +of the North had vented itself in insulting control. No one who had +given aid to the Confederacy was allowed to hold office. The northern +carpetbagger swaggered in to lord over poverty-stricken communities. +This exhibition of revenge leads one to believe the statement of the +clergymen that peace treaties, peace reactions and peace societies are +our most fruitful causes of war. + +But there was one saving grace--and that lay in the treatment of the +southern people by the soldier. You know it’s a funny thing about +fighters. After the fight is over, they seldom hold grudges. We can +all call up many instances where they were outstandingly friendly +with the former opponents. The Union soldier in the South was no +exception. He saw too clearly the injustice to these stricken people +and sympathized with them. He leagued up with the former Confederate +soldiers in efforts to help. He often got around the laws and sometimes +overrode them. His reports to Washington had much to do with rescinding +cruel legislation. So helpful was his attitude that a southern city +afterwards erected a monument to a Union general. The soldier’s +understanding sympathy was the big factor in overcoming riots, +disorders and slaughter. + +Similarly trained troops took their places along the northern border, +and beyond a little wire cutting, overcame the disturbances from the +Fenians. And as these fearful threats to the north, east and south of +us were slowly calmed, we began to be over-confident and stupid again. +We failed to see that our unusual strength had been the reason for +coming through these calamities unscathed. In our customary way we +descended into weakness. And how we were going to pay in human life for +this let-down! + +At first we pared the Army down to thirty-eight thousand. The day +before General Grant took the oath of office as President, we again +reduced it, against his urgent recommendation, by twenty regiments. By +1876 it was a scant twenty-five thousand soldiers, at which figure it +remained up until the time of the Spanish-American War--during almost +a quarter of a century. Thus we stagnated while our population was +increasing, savages were roaming over half our territory and we had +acquired Alaska. There was a war party who wanted to keep peace and a +peace party who let us fall into war. Naturally you’d know which party +would win in the United States. A paltry seventeen thousand soldiers +were strewn around the west in little groups. Their task was to control +hundreds of thousands of Indians in protection of the advancing +settlers. It was the dark age for the soldier. Impossible was his +struggle to be everywhere at once and to do the government’s bidding +against odds of twenty-four to one. In return the government often +armed the Indian with fine repeating rifles and always gave the soldier +a single-loader. + +Then came the tragedies that follow in the wake of helplessness. In +our history books, we have placed an embroidered, starched sham over +them, but underneath none the less lie very dirty pillows. Massacres +of our settlers and soldiers were too frequent. The Indian was one of +the shrewdest warriors of all time to sense the size and strength of +his opponents. Weakness to him meant a call for scalps. At Fort Phil +Kearney in Nebraska the officers and men were engaged in building their +own barracks and quarters (if they were going to have a roof to cover +them) and the work was going along quite smoothly, when one morning +two thousand Indians swooped down on the small garrison of two hundred +fifty and killed and mutilated one hundred seventy-four of them. In +Kansas when eighty-four settlers were slain or captured by a band of +Cheyennes, Major Forsyth with fifty scouts tried to trail the Indian +desperadoes. When he came upon them he was trapped, had to fight for +his life, lost half of his command, (among whom was the nephew of Henry +Ward Beecher,) and barely escaped with the remnants of his force. + +Later came the Custer affair. Probably no action in our history has +been more discussed and less understood. The story goes back a long +way and doesn’t show us up in any fine colors. The government had made +a treaty with the Great Sioux Nation in which it gave to these tribes +the Black Hills and all of South Dakota west of the Missouri River. +Gave them what was theirs in the first place. Kind of us. Another law +confirmed by our Senate, made it a crime for a white settler to go +into this region. Well, the whites as usual went in, because the land +appealed to them. And they went out of their way to trespass because +the Indians were six hundred miles from the nearest railroad and far +from white settlements. When the Indians complained and got no redress, +they went upon the warpath. Did so for the same reason that we took up +arms in the Revolution--from behind each “farmyard fence and wall.” +The Secretary of the Interior ordered the troops to put the Indians +on their reservations. He made a consistent sweep of things for he +not only violated the treaty, but did not uphold the law. So, little +companies of Infantry and Cavalry under General Terry, were ordered +to drive the victimized Indians to where neither the Indian nor the +soldier wanted to go. Fifteen hundred troops, half of whom were afoot, +were sent against six thousand hardy Sioux who were well-mounted. Why +such a small body of soldiers? Because other little groups were busy +with Assineboines, Piegans, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Pawnees, Commanches and +Flatheads. And there weren’t any more troops. The entire regular force +on the plains would scarcely have been a match then for the Great Sioux +Nation, but we were content to send this paltry number out against this +overwhelming force. Terry’s command accordingly advanced toward the +Indians. Custer, who was in command of the Cavalry, was sent ahead with +instructions to move toward the Tongue River, keep on the flank of the +Sioux, and not let them escape. It was an impossible task in the face +of so many Indians. But the soldier couldn’t know that such a big force +was there, for there were too few troops to scout the Sioux country +and find out. And if they could have found out, what was there to do +about it? They had to go against the Indians. No matter how perfectly +Terry’s force might act, it was in for a licking. So Custer split his +command into three parts in order to keep the Indians from escaping. +The irony!--from escaping. Well, it happened just as you would expect. +Custer’s little band was overwhelmed and annihilated. The other two +parts were backed against the wall and had to fight in desperation for +their lives. It was not a real massacre. It was a fight in which the +Indian used his normal methods of no quarter. We knew his methods. +And we unjustly and murderously sent a puny force against him to be +butchered to the extent of two hundred sixty-five killed and fifty-two +wounded. + +The Indians could have overwhelmed the rest of the force, but feeling +they had taught the white man a lesson in fair play, they drew off. But +the ones who bore the brunt of the punishment by paying the extreme +penalty, were innocent soldiers, who had had nothing to do with the +cause of the fight. The instigators were walking the eastern streets +crying for an investigation. And how the affair was investigated! After +reams of testimony had been taken down, and much money expended, it was +found that we had sent a pigmy out barehanded to fight a giant. The +result? True to form. + +Would we have been a little more decent, had we spent more on soldiers +beforehand and less on testimony afterward? If we had, it’s quite +possible we wouldn’t have needed the testimony. For it’s an accepted +fact that had we had ten thousand trained men for the Sioux alone, +placed in some conspicuous spot, the Custer fight would never have +been. The Indian would have been too wary. He always was. And many +another fight would not have taken place, as we’ll see. Going back +over the true events of these times, are we made to wonder whether we +really do care about human life? We talk a lot about it. Is it another +starched sham? + + + + +_X_ + +MORE FIDDLING + + +Abraham Lincoln one afternoon sat listening to the members of a +committee arguing. The next day he heard them arguing _more_ without +arriving anywhere. In a pause, he said, “I am reminded of old Zeke +Williams out in my home town. Zeke was the finest rifle shot with his +Brown Bess in those parts. One day he took his young son out hunting +with him. They approached a tree. Said Zeke, ‘Boy, shake that ’ar tree. +They’s a squirrel in it.’ The lad shook the tree, the father blazed +away, but nothing happened. Said Zeke, ‘Shake that ’ar tree agin.’ The +boy obeyed. The father blazed away and _still_ nothing happened. The +father brought his gun down from his shoulder and almost wept as he +said, ‘I must be gettin’ old. I can’t hit ’em no more.’ The son was +very sorry for his father. So he went and looked the tree all over. +Seeing no sign of a squirrel, he came over to his father and gazed +intently into the old man’s face. ‘Why pap,’ exclaimed the boy, ‘That +’ar ain’t no squirrel in the tree. That ’ar a _louse_ on your eyebrow’.” + +If Lincoln were alive today, I fear he’d discover many lice on our +eyebrows--many fancies about our past that are contrary to reality. And +nowhere would he find more than in our mistaken notions of the Indian +struggles in our West. Soldiers fighting Indians! That’s what the +school histories lead us to see. We get the feeling that the soldier +was a bloodthirsty fellow who loved to go out before breakfast and kill +a few redmen for pastime. The truth of the matter is that he was the +best and almost the only friend the Indian had. The reason for this +relationship is natural and simple. The soldier had no personal gain to +get from the West. He wanted nothing that belonged to the redman. If he +were out for greed, as the settlers, traders, trappers and adventurers +too often were, he wouldn’t have been a soldier at his paltry wage. +And as a hardy fellow, he appreciated the good points in other hardy +fellows like the Indians. So let us look at real scenery and not at +lice for a few minutes. Here is the tale of the Modocs. + +The Modocs had always been a peaceable tribe, often assisting the +whites in their undertakings, and even going so far as to help save a +California town from fire. The government had made a treaty with them. +As usual it violated it. All that these Indians asked was to be moved +to a small strip of land, no good to anybody. General Canby, known as +the Indian’s friend, tried to make the Indian Agents and Washington +see the point of view of these redmen and begged and entreated that +their simple request be granted. But the powers stubbornly refused. +The Indians, denied and double-crossed, went on the warpath. The +soldiers were ordered to fight them. In the ensuing engagements many +of them were killed. But that was not all. General Canby, Dr. Thomas +and other soldiers, in trying to carry out the government’s unjust +orders, were killed also. The very men who had tried to avert injustice +and bloodshed, were butchered. Dr. Thomas’ son has always claimed +that the government murdered his father. But the tragic irony of this +whole affair is that after all this debauch of human life and craze +of injustice, General Canby’s advice was finally heeded. Those that +were left of the Modocs, were transported to where they wanted to go +in the first place. But General Canby and many another good soldier +and Indian were dead. This story does not stand alone by any means. +That of the Nez Perce’s is even worse. This tribe was more peaceful, +high-minded and friendly than the Modocs. From the time that it had +helped the Lewis and Clark expedition, way back after our Revolution, +it had held uninterrupted good-will with the whites. But the government +defrauded these Indians of a little strip of poor land where they +wanted to go. They asked to be taken there. Chief Joseph, handsome, +intelligent, upright, patiently pleaded his cause. General Howard +naturally interceded and begged the government to let them go. But he +also like Canby was met with curt refusal, over and over again. After +long drawn-out insults by our government, the Nez Perce’s rebelled, and +Howard was ordered to fight them. An officer and thirty-three of our +soldiers were killed in the first action. Then began a chase through +three territories. In one instance, so few were the troops that a +general had to use a rifle himself and was severely wounded. The tribe +was finally captured after much loss of life to white and redman. The +government, contrary to General Miles’ recommendation, transported +what remained of the tribe to an unhealthful region where they quickly +perished. And that was our way of disposing of the Nez Perces. The Ute +uprising of 1879 was in principle a repetition of these events. Major +Thornburg and a large part of his command were killed because of the +stubbornness of an Indian Agent. + +Let’s look for a moment at another tribe. In 1870 the Apaches, the most +subtle redmen we’ve ever dealt with, broke from their reservations and +went upon the warpath. The cause as usual was our injustice. Colonel +George Crook with a small force was sent against them. He was the +kind of man who believed in a square word rather than a round bullet. +He was in every way (unlike his name) the kind of man you’d want your +boy to be like. But he faced a racking problem. The Apache country +in the rugged Sierras was one of the toughest spots anybody could +search, and when you added to it a wily Indian, ready to snare you at +every turn, you had something that looked hopeless. It meant that the +soldier had to master the country, know the valleys, streams, canyons, +water holes, and unexplored mountain ranges; and hang doggedly on the +trail, hour by hour, day by day through exhausting privation and bitter +disappointment. Crook trailed the Apaches, but not with menace or +threats. With a small escort he sought out the chiefs, ever imperilling +his life by exposing himself. After months of effort he succeeded in +getting a few of the chiefs to come in for a talk. Little by little his +strong personality and shining integrity led them to listen to him. +More chieftains came in. At length they talked to him freely, and he +in turn saw that they were well cared for. He offered them forgiveness +for any past misdeeds and urged a life of peace. Slowly they began +to believe in him. At the end of six years of utmost patience he +had calmed them, brought them into the reservations and made them +contented--without bloodshed. + +But then the Sioux uprising called him and his troops away to the +north, because of the smallness of the army. Crook, a general now, +tried to round up the Sioux with two thousand soldiers, whom he had +drained the west to get. Conditions there wouldn’t permit him to use +his Apache methods. Even under his able leadership he was nearly +trapped and reduced to starvation. All he could do was to make his +escape and let the Indians roam on. The Sioux were too strong for his +puny force. Meanwhile the Apaches were left to the control of Indian +Agents, who mishandled, defrauded and abused them. So awful did the +conditions become, that even in the east the President felt obliged to +send General Crook back to the Apaches in 1882. There Crook, after six +years’ absence, found his previous work had been worse than undone. The +Agents had ejected the Indians from their reservations because silver +had been found there, had thrown them into prison to languish for +months without trial, starved them, stolen their crops and in general +treated them like cattle. Crook set himself to win them back by his old +methods. But it was a monstrous task now, since the Indian had been +infuriated afresh and had lost faith in all whites. In his old, bold +way Crook set out through the trails to investigate complaints and find +out the causes. Fortunately the Indians recognized and remembered +him. They told him stories that would have wrung pity from a hardened +criminal. But the way they met him--a real friend and champion after +all these years of cruelty--was pathetic in its child-like appeal. +The faces of the old men brightened and the squaws wept when they saw +him again. The chieftain, Old Pedro, with dimmed eyes spoke to him +pitifully. His words were taken down at the time and here they are: + +“When you, General Crook, were here, whenever you said a thing, we +knew it was true, and we kept it in our minds. When Colonel Green was +here, our women and children were happy and our young people grew up +contented. And I remember Brown, Randall, and the other officers who +treated us kindly and were our friends. I used to be happy. Now I am +all the time thinking and crying, and I say, ‘Where is old Colonel John +Green, and Randall, and those other good officers, and what has become +of them? Where have they gone? Why don’t they come back? And the young +men all say the same thing’.” + +That was how the Indian in his simple faith, trusted and regarded the +soldier, who was too often unjustly sent out to fight him. And how do +you suppose the soldier felt when he had to? Certainly he could have +no relish for such dismal, perilous work. Anyway Crook and his small +command kept up their exhausting efforts to avoid bloodshed. But all +the while the Indian Agent Ring was sending out newspaper accounts +of murder and depredations by the Indians, in order to involve Crook +in a fight, which would drive the Indian away from the land on which +the agents wished to profiteer. These stories Crook investigated and +wherever he could, gave the lie to the rumor. Despite this knifing in +the back, he again restored peace and contentment to the Apache--after +two years. + +And so I could recount for many evenings true incidents like this. In +five years one regiment had sixty-seven battles and skirmishes and +another marched sixty-four hundred miles. In the first six years after +the Civil War, the army experienced two hundred three actions with the +redmen. And Indian troubles didn’t dwindle out until over 30 years +after the Civil War. But the uphill work with the redman was by no +means all that the soldier had to encounter. Between 1886 and 1895, he +was called upon to restore order in civil uprisings throughout every +state and territory in our country to the number of three hundred +twenty-eight. And he accomplished these tasks with almost no bloodshed. +The show of trained force was enough, small as it was. But during all +this time when the soldier was enduring the hardships of intense heat +and cold, and running untold risks for his nation, his work was little +understood or appreciated. Once Congress tried to reduce the army to +ten thousand, which would have brought on more slaughter, especially to +the whites, and prolonged the Indian troubles indefinitely. Fortunately +the reduction didn’t succeed. But something else did. No appropriation +for the pay of the army for the fiscal year 1877-78 was made by +Congress, and this right after the Custer fight. The soldier without +his meager wage had to borrow money at interest, in order to live--to +go on--go on enduring rude conditions and the hazards of life and +death. There was a faction back east which believed the Indian should +be exterminated. There was another which believed the Indian was right +and should be left alone. There were very few who realized that there +were good Indians and bad Indians just as there are good and bad white +men. When the soldier lost battles, he was investigated. When he won +some, he was branded as a butcher. Meanwhile the settlers were crowding +in and had to be protected, and the Indian Agent Ring was forcing +Crook, Canby, Howard, Miles and many others into fights they wished to +avoid. + +But the soldiers’ position was unfortunate mostly because his force was +not large enough to awe the Indian into peace without fighting. For +no one more than the Indian respected _size_. He was an expert scout +and had a keen eye for numbers. One hundred thousand soldiers would +doubtless have cut the losses in half. And had the government used the +Indian with common decency, they would have been cut to nothing. We +talk a lot about the violation of Belgium and we are justly enraged at +the Germans. But the Germans at least didn’t murder their soldiers in +addition to their enemies. Are there lice on our eyebrows? Are there +sins of our own? Greater sins? + + + + +_XI_ + +THE BLACK HOLE + + +One day in Texas after a long hike through broiling heat and alkali +dust, we came at last to our camping-place. Weary officers and men went +about their appointed tasks of setting up tentage, attending to the +water-supply and sanitation and generally making the place livable. +After a brief meal from rattling mess-kits, most of us lay down to +get the kinks out of our muscles. One company on a little hill in +plain view of the rest of the brigade, was resting quietly under its +pup-tents. Suddenly a Texas twister, one of those little mysterious +whirlwinds, came tearing along out of the silent, clear afternoon. +It pounced upon the most conspicuous tent, grabbed the canvas and +personal covering off the big First Sergeant, lifted them high in the +air, and left him lying in the open like a plucked chicken. A thousand +pairs of eyes fastened on him. He slowly awoke, rubbed his face, +squirmed a little and squinted at his coverings swishing about in the +heavens. “Well,” he said, “Who in the devil started that?”--and rushed +threateningly toward the nearest group of soldiers. + +The American people, after a sleep of a quarter of a century, woke up +one morning in 1898 to find that a twister out of the blue had pitched +the battleship Maine to the bottom of Havana Harbor, and tossed us into +war. Amazed, we asked, “Who started that?” Amazed, we said, “How could +war have come upon us?” Amazed and confused we rushed threateningly +this way and that. And why the surprise when for three years we’d been +shaking angry fists at the Spaniard--when we’d been lying in the path +of twisters from a land of twisters. And how completely we’d been lying. + +All the while we were provoking Spain to wrath, we were using sugared +cut-throat words to our own people. Well-meaning idealists, thinking +to calm our citizens, were really running them into misery. Two years +before the twister struck us, Mr. Livingstone in the Congress of our +nation, rose and stated: “I do not take much stock in an early war with +Spain or England.” The same day on the same floor Uncle Joe Cannon +said, “I want to say that I do not believe we will have war the coming +year, nor the year after. I doubt if there will be any during this +century or perhaps the early years of the next century.” At the same +time in Europe, Czar Nicholas II of Russia showed how arbitration would +settle everything; and books and articles were published proving that +modern mechanisms would make war result in suicide--in short that war +was impossible. Under this dangerous racket of propaganda the only +attention paid to our land forces, was to pick at them and tear off +little pieces. Any attempt to keep us from slaughtering and distressing +our youth needlessly as we’d done in the past, was laughed out of +court. When the twister struck us, the army was just the same size +it had been twenty-two years before. Little groups of soldiers were +scattered all over the west and on our borders. The overhead of these +little posts had become drab routine. The War Department was clogged +with thirty years’ mold. Its personnel was just sufficient to carry +on a peanut-stand administration and supply. There was no thought for +expansion or operating the army as a whole. There were no plans, no +staffs, no proper maps of Cuba, no set-up for any respectable force. +The army had not been brought together since the Civil War--a third of +a century before. No officer in the service had commanded more than +a regiment, about 700 men, and few had seen that many together. The +soldiers had had no chance to act as a unit, as an organization, as a +going concern. Supplies of all sorts were lacking--food, equipment, +guns and ammunition, everything. We had not learned a single lesson +from a hundred years of horrible disasters of our own making. We +showed to the world the greatest unreadiness we’d had since we’d been a +nation. + +We still persisted in the idea that an able bodied man was a soldier. +The President in this belief called out one hundred twenty-five +thousand volunteers when there wasn’t ammunition enough in the country +to let them fight one battle. The people seemed to feel we were +going out with brass bands playing to bag the Spaniard. One day in a +conference, the President turned to the Secretary of War and asked, +“How soon can you put an army into Cuba?” Said the Secretary, “I can +put 40,000 men there in ten days.” Later we found out we couldn’t put +half that number there in two months. + +General Miles, the head of the army, suggested the training of fifty +thousand soldiers rather than put in jeopardy a great quantity of +untrained men. But the President rejected that expert advice and called +out seventy-five thousand more volunteers to be exposed to death in +camp. The people were crying “On to Havana!” as they had yelled, On to +Richmond, Mexico and Canada. What matter utter extravagance and human +life? + +The government now had two hundred thousand men on its hands. Where +would they put them? O yes, the question of camps. Tampa, New Orleans +and Mobile were decided upon. It was found that all but Tampa were +unsuitable. After much investigation and delay. Camp Alger in Virginia, +and Camp Thomas in Tennessee were selected. They afterwards proved to +be far too small. Meanwhile the volunteers were flocking in much as +they had done in the Civil War--in a sad state of neglect. Unequipped, +untaught, unfed, uncared for, uneverything, they were all struggling +to the front. The little crippled War Department was beset with every +kind of request it could not fill. Congressmen who had taken delight in +blocking legislation for preparedness were the loudest in crying for +guns and vessels to protect their districts. Where were any implements +for the crises? Without having any, the President ordered General Miles +to take to Havana seventy thousand troops--(troops, mind you--real +troops)--when such an irregular mass could have fired little more than +one shot, if they had been troops. Then he ordered General Shafter +at Tampa to the north coast of Cuba, but it was found there were no +transports. Then he ordered twelve thousand troops to Key West, but the +place was found unsuitable. + +A month and a half passed. Why weren’t we getting on? General Miles +went to Tampa to see. There he found what you’d expect. Troops +were slowly assembling. Why not? One regular regiment had to come +clear from Alaska. Supplies were failing. Loading of transports was +helter-skelter. Miles reported that the principal part of the regular +army was there, but that of the fourteen regiments of volunteers nearly +forty per cent were undrilled and in one regiment over three hundred +men had never fired a gun. And these were the pick of the untrained men. + +Finally most of the regular army and a few volunteers set sail, after +a mad unmanaged scramble to get trains, and go abroad. Supplies were +hustled into holds helter-skelter. Most of the volunteers had to be +left behind because they were not equipped or trained. But the little +seventeen thousand were off. Were they? The Navy thought they had +sighted the Spanish fleet. The troops out at sea were turned back to +the mainland. The presence of the Spanish fleet proved to be a myth. +Again they set sail, crowded like galley-slaves into small vessels, +with little water, on pine cots, among neighing horses and foul odors. +The food made them sick. The embalmed beef by hurried contracts became +notorious. The boats moved seven miles an hour, then four miles, and +often not at all. After much suffering they arrived at Daiquiri near +Santiago harbor. There the civilian transports refused to land and kept +far out. Men were hurt and drowned in getting to shore. Fifty horses +swam out to sea and were lost. Fortunately the Spaniards fled inland. +If they hadn’t, their superior weapons would have torn our foolhardy +little force to pieces. One hundred ninety-six thousand, eight hundred +twenty Spanish troops were in Cuba, but we didn’t know it. Nor did we +know that they were as badly led and cared for as troops could be. By +the godsend of their complete lack of resistance, the little seventeen +thousand got ashore in five days. + +Then came the scrambling action of Las Gausimas through the brush. +The Army was used to this sort of bushwhacking against the Indians. +And the Rough Riders, though they’d just received their new Krags +the day before the fight, did good work. But the Spaniards fled--and +that helped. Then came a delay of a week. Supplies were hard to get +from the boats. Troops milled around with little food and ammunition. +The artillery wasn’t brought forward. What a chance for the Spaniard +then! A determined charge of a quarter of his force and the United +States troops would have been helpless. But since the Spaniard didn’t +do anything right, we were saved again. Half the regular army and +three volunteer regiments went on to San Juan and El Caney. Although +assaulting El Caney was a military blunder, the little force went +charging along with useless losses. One volunteer regiment funked +the fight. And another, though acting well, had to be sent out of it +because its ancient black powder weapons made it an easy target for +the smokeless Mauser rifle of the enemy. More useless casualties. The +artillery had nothing but black powder too. Every time it belched, +it threw up clouds of smoke that could be seen for miles. Still more +casualties. The Spaniards had put up barbed wire around their little +forts. And we had no wire-cutters. It was a long day’s work of slow +progress. The Spaniard, like all poor troops, could shoot well as long +as his vitals were covered up. But we finally took the two strongholds, +with over twelve per cent losses. We had won because the enemy was +grossly mismanaged and inefficient. We were badly managed, but we had +streaks of efficiency. Therein lay the difference--our salvation. When +the siege of Santiago was undertaken, General Shafter’s lines were so +thin that even poor troops with a little zeal could have punctured +them. But the Spaniards for some unknown reason seemed to be more +fearful than we were. + +Even so it would have been a stand-off, had it not been for the great +victory of our Navy in destroying Cervera’s fleet. And of course it +would destroy the Spanish ships. It had had seven years’ building +before the war. Under the supervision of Presidents Cleveland and +Arthur, we had developed the famous White Squadron. What would the +soldier have done without the Navy? What would he have done without the +complete sloppiness of the Spaniard? One authority shows that the war +would have lasted four or five years with more useless slaughter of our +own men than we had seen even in the Civil War. + +Even so, in only one hundred nine days of war, the volunteers alone +lost two hundred eighty-nine killed--but--listen to the _but_--three +thousand eight hundred forty-eight by sickness. Thirteen times as many +by disease as by battle. And most of these deaths occurred in our +country--before the poor volunteer had had a chance to lift a finger of +help. + +When the twister caught us, we had the great sum of one hundred +seventy-nine army medical officers for a mass of men that swelled to +two hundred sixteen thousand in four months. In our sleep there had +been no thought that the camp is more deadly than the bullet, that any +doctor can’t be a sanitary man in the field--that field sanitation +is a specialty like eye, ear, nose and throat or abdominal surgery. +Doctors can’t get that training in a few months. In over-crowded camps +in the United States many an otherwise fine medical man made a fizzle +of sanitation. Others who did know sanitation were not backed up by +the untrained volunteer officers. So our best youth died like flies +and by flies. And the suffering of those who did not die was appalling +torture. Filth was too often in the open. An untrained regiment would +be strewn with sickness, while a trained one right beside it would have +no sickness at all. + +By our sleep beforehand and our unjust haste after we were waked up +by the twister, we had done worse things. We had forced the little +seventeen thousand into Cuba at the height of the fever season. Right +after the surrender of Santiago, seventy-five per cent of Shafter’s +command, the majority of our entire trained forces were on the sick +list. Had the Spaniard held out a little longer, he’d have had only a +handful or none at all to fight. But he didn’t hold out. And we had +another miraculous escape. But the death toll went up. And over in the +Pacific it went up higher. In the Philippine Insurrection that followed +the Spanish-American War, we lost in two years over seven thousand men. + +Sleep is a very soothing thing, isn’t it? Quite necessary as a +part-time job. But when we sleep all the time, our friends know that +we are sick. When such a sickness overtakes a nation, how quickly it +spreads into death. How suddenly it kills innocent persons, when the +twister comes out of the blue and leaves us naked. + + + + +_XII_ + +BACKING AND FILLING + + +One day an old friend of mine, whom I had not seen for nearly twenty +years, burst into my office. After the gladsome handshakes and slaps of +affection, I asked him to tell me about himself. + +“Well,” he said, “I got married.” + +“Hm,” I said, “That’s good.” + +“No,” he said, “Not so good. My wife turned out to be a tartar.” + +“Well,” I said, “That’s bad.” + +“No,” he said, “Not so bad. She brought me twenty thousand dollars.” + +“O,” I said, “that’s good.” + +“No,” he said, “Not so good. I invested the money in sheep and they all +died.” + +“Hm,” I said, “that’s bad.” + +“No,” he said, “Not so bad. I sold the wool for more than the sheep +cost me.” + +“Well,” I said, “that’s good.” + +“No,” he said, “Not so good. I bought a fine home and a fire burned it +to the ground.” + +“Hm,” I said, “that’s bad.” + +“No,” he said, “Not so bad. My wife was in it.” + +Before and during our part of the World War we were not so good and +not so bad. Two years after that comedy of errors and tragedy of blood +called the Spanish-American War, we did the most unusual thing in our +life as a nation. For the first time after a war, we increased and +helped our land forces. Under the pressure of Philippine Wars and +onward-looking men like Elihu Root and Theodore Roosevelt, we raised +our army to one hundred thousand for a hundred million people. We set +up new service schools and broadened others for the higher military +education of our officers. We at last formed a general staff. And in +1911 we assembled during peace a regular division of troops for the +first time in our history. To be sure, it took months to do so, it +drained the country of nearly all its trained forces, and the division +couldn’t be entirely collected, but the move wasn’t so bad. For +several years it looked as though our army would be a going concern. +Then we lagged. The wolf in sheep’s clothing began to bleat. In 1913, +Congressman Dies, in the House of Representatives, stated: “God has +placed us on this great, rich continent, separate and secure from the +broils of Europe.” Dr. David Starr Jordan, President of Leland Stanford +University, flooded the country with his prophesies. Here is one. “It +is apparently not possible for another real war among the nations of +Europe to take place.” As for our getting into any war, he threw it +off as so much silliness. That was just the opium the country wanted +in 1913 and early ’14. The people ate up the idea. Anyone who spoke +preparedness was a jingoist and wanted war. Why, war was impossible. +It meant too much to Wall Street. European nations were too poor to +fight. Modern weapons would be too horrible to allow a war. What was +the use of paying out good money for scientific training--for modern +materials--for being ready at all? War couldn’t be. Not so good. + +For war suddenly _was_. Right in the midst of this dangerous +propaganda. Someone struck a match at Sarajevo and set all Europe +on fire. Despite those priceless brains that had so lately invented +no war, Russia, England, France, Belgium, Austria and Germany were +flaming. What a sight! Americans rushed for front seats and bought +concessions. Wasn’t it an awful fire! What a pity! As for us--poof! +We couldn’t get into it. It was Europe’s affair. We sensed no tidal +wave of emotions. We didn’t even send experts over there to see how +modern war was conducted. Not so good, for the rumblings grew plainer +and plainer. In 1915, Colonel House, the President’s confidential +adviser, wrote to Woodrow Wilson: “If war comes with Germany, it will +be because of our unpreparedness and her belief that we are more or +less impotent to do her harm.” He was on the ground and saw. But did +we take his word and see? Our mobile army _then_ was smaller than our +trained force before the Spanish-American War. Our general staff was +reduced and our equipment laughable. No so good. We entered 1916 still +unconcernedly watching the drama in Europe, while U-boats were sinking +our shipping, Germany was sticking out her tongue at us and we were +getting hotter and hotter. Were we doing anything for our safety? No, +no, that would be a violent gesture. Despite our watchful waiting and +utter helplessness, General Leonard Wood established the business men’s +training camp. And Congress, by some miracle, put over our first real +National Defense Act--a comprehensive thing built on sound lines. Not +so bad. + +But the legislation wouldn’t be fulfilled for five years--and here we +were ten months before we got into the war. Even if the act had been +immediately and wholly effective, we wouldn’t have had time to get the +men and train them. Not so good. + +Then out of the blue came Pancho Villa. He crossed our border March 9, +1916, raided the defenseless town of Columbus, New Mexico, and killed +eleven civilians and nine soldiers. It looked like a horror for us. +Not so good. But the tragedy was a blessing in disguise. It probably +kept France from being German today. It gave an excuse to the President +for rushing to the border a large part of the regular army and one +hundred and fifty thousand National Guardsmen. There they received fine +training in fundamentals. Their experience gave the foundation for the +1st, 2nd, 26th and 42nd Divisions--the first ones to be factors in +France later. Not so bad. But it took a brutal act to compel us to do +what we wouldn’t do under our own steam. Even so we were magnificently +unready. And we jumped into the European War, April 6, 1917, because we +were angry, inflamed, anxious to punish Germany at any cost. No catch +phrases, no plottings of a few could possibly have pitched us into the +struggle without that general hatred. And we had little with which +to carry out the wholesale desire for force. Immediately we needed +two hundred thousand officers. We hadn’t ten thousand trained ones +to instruct them and at the same time lead our forces. In equipment +we were worse off. We had a few out-of-date airplanes, only enough +artillery ammunition for a two-day battle, no automatic rifles and +comparatively few machine guns and ordinary rifles. Materially we +lacked almost everything. Although we had the best rifle in the world, +there was not anywhere near enough. We had to arm our men largely with +British Enfields--unfamiliar to Americans--at best poor makeshifts. +We couldn’t manufacture any of these things in time. In July 1917, +Congress voted six hundred forty million dollars for airplanes. Nearly +a year later we hadn’t any of our aircraft in Europe. Where had the +money gone? An investigation was ordered. After seventeen thousand +pages of testimony were taken down, it was found that aircraft couldn’t +be built and shipped abroad in that time. Not so good. + +In our equipment we were helpless without our Allies. But in our +manpower, we did surprisingly well. A little over a month after war was +declared, we did the astonishing thing of passing a Draft Act. We put +teeth in the law of 1792 promoted by George Washington, which had been +a dead statute for over one hundred and twenty-five years. Instead of +the horrors of volunteering, of utterly untrained men, of political +shilly-shallying, we turned to a just and equalizing system. We did +away with the woes of extra disease and death--and put our soldiers +into training. Not in _this_ war would absolutely green officers send +into eternity helpless volunteers. Our best men went to training camps, +where they at least had to qualify in leading others. Not so bad. But +of course these candidates couldn’t be fully trained in eighty days. +And the regular officers, who had been deprived of modern methods in +Europe, couldn’t give them all they needed. But they _did_ get many +essentials, which they could pass on to the drafted men. + +Today, many don’t realize what a vast amount of hardship, sickness and +death was saved by our moves of the draft and officers’ training camps. +It has been estimated that by the draft alone we saved five per cent +in money and possibly twenty per cent in human life. Not so bad. To be +sure we had unnecessary suffering and mortality. No system invented as +late as 1917 could have overcome our shiftlessness during the years +before. A month after we declared war, General Pershing was sent to +Europe with a handful. “Where are the Americans?” asked our Allies. +“Why,” he had to explain, “they are back in the United States getting +ready.” And for a year they had to keep getting ready before they were +of real physical help. + +Suppose you were attacked on the street by a strong bandit. I calmly +from my window watch you struggling against him for several hours. +Finally my wrath gets the best of me. I rush out to the curb. I see +blood and bruises on your face. I yell to you: “I’m for you, old man. +I’ll fight on your side, but chuck me a pair of brass knuckles. I’ll go +down town and have them made to fit me. I may get a few boxing lessons +too. I’ll be back in about an hour. Just keep on going. You’re doing +fine.” What would you think of me? Not so good. Well, we did that very +thing to our Allies. Sixteen months after we entered the war, General +Pershing pathetically stated: “This is the first time the American +Army has been recognized as a participant alongside of the Allies.” +What we did after war was declared was about as good as could humanly +be expected. What we didn’t do beforehand was about as dumb as could +humanly be expected. Most of the unnecessary woes of the war can justly +be laid to this stupidity. Out of nearly two million Americans who went +to Europe, over fifty thousand were killed by battle. Out of the three +and one-half millions in service, sixty-five thousand died of accident +or disease. Much of this waste could have been avoided. It is estimated +that there are fifteen thousand graves of our soldiers in France, which +should not be there. Men were sent overseas who didn’t know how to load +their rifles, use their gas masks, or take the simplest precautions of +taking cover or care of themselves. They hadn’t been given a chance to +learn. There was no time to teach them. The training camp products, +though better than untrained volunteers, were too often uncertain +in their movements and orders. There were times when they brought +unnecessary slaughter to themselves and their commands. The German +General Ludendorff after the war, paid great tribute to the gallantry +of the individual American soldier, but at the same time told of the +inferior quality of some American troops--as troops. General Pershing’s +complaints about the lack of training of men sent over, remind us of +George Washington’s pitiful pleas during our Revolution. We waited for +the calamity to get us, instead of getting the calamity beforehand. +The sad part is that our losses, our hardships, our waste of money and +material could all have been prevented, had we had strength in ’14, ’15 +and ’16. German records and statements brought to light since the war, +prove beyond doubt that we would never have been insulted by Germany, +had our people drowned at sea and been drawn into the war at all, had +we not been considered so senselessly weak. And we were weak--just +as weak as Germany estimated us. As it was we were barely able to +help. In the spring of 1918 all looked lost for our Allies. They were +making their last stand. A matter of hours and nothing could stem the +German onrush. By the greatest fortune and luck we had, by that time, +a few troops worthy of taking the places of French and British reserve +divisions and releasing them to the front. It was that plugging up +of the tiny hole in the dyke that let the Allies hold on. Had we not +shown an unbelievable efficiency over all of our other wars, after we +got into the fight, and had not Villa crossed our border in 1916, the +hole could not have been plugged--and America would have been on the +losing side. Our unreadiness before war--not so good. Our surprising +efficiency after we got into the war--not so bad. Our dependence upon a +Mexican bandit for partial preparation--not so good. + +But suppose we had been forced to fight our enemy alone. Suppose +we hadn’t had Allies to spend their lives in defense for a whole +year. Suppose in wandering off for brass knuckles and boxing lessons +we’d have been left alone with him. Can you picture the frightful, +extravagant, tremendous deaths we would have dealt out to our own young +men? + + + + +_XIII_ + +NOW + + +One very rainy day my regiment was marching through that gloomy red-mud +country of North Georgia. We were cold and tired, and our shoes were +heavy as suit-cases. Our camping-place was to be at a little town of +Jasper. We had trudged along for about ten miles when we came to a sign +which said: “Seven miles to Jasper.” That was encouragement. Only seven +more miles. The old Sergeant near me set his jaw. In a few minutes +we came to another sign which said: “Seven miles to Jasper.” The old +Sergeant glared at the words as if he could bite them. In about ten +minutes we came to a third sign which said: “Seven miles to Jasper.” +It was too much for the Sergeant. He plunked his foot down in the mud. +“Well,” he said, “thank God, we’re holding our own.” + +As we look over the history of our country, we can sincerely thank +God that we’ve held our own. For we didn’t do much of the holding +ourselves. In every one of our major wars, some outside influence, +some accident, some big defect of our enemies, some miracle pulled us +through to safety. In every big fracas we were caught napping--caught +saying there wouldn’t be a war--caught in the midst of brazen defiance +of simple protection. Our utter weakness didn’t keep us out of war. +In fact we chose our weakest times because our extreme anger wouldn’t +wait for anything. We’d have gone in with pitchforks, we were so +hot. That was courage all right, but it was stupid courage--and +slaughter--unnecessary slaughter of our finest young men by the +hundreds of thousands--young men we hadn’t given even a fighting +chance, young men whose dying voices call to us today to give our +manhood a little break--a little break against that sudden hurricane of +anger which dashes a whole people into war. + +Listening to these voices after the World War, we raised our army +to two hundred eighty thousand. We were going to be organized on +a business basis for defense. We were at last going to obey the +Constitution and give our manhood a chance. The soldier went to work to +build for safety. But his efforts were short-lived. In 1922 Congress +reduced the army to one hundred and seventy-five thousand men for one +hundred twenty million people. Over one thousand officers and one +hundred thousand enlisted men were cast out of the service. Then the +parings of the budgets began. Since that time the army has never been +greater than one hundred nineteen thousand and often less--about +forty-two per cent of what in 1920 we felt proper. Today the C.C.C. +outnumbers the army three to one--and organized crime many times. We +have but fifty-five thousand soldiers in the United States, subtracting +for foreign possessions and overhead. They would make a small crowd in +the Yale Bowl. It would be difficult to get two divisions of regular +troops together. The National Guard has been similarly cut down. In +1920 it was given a strength of four hundred twenty-five thousand. +Today it is about one hundred ninety thousand--a reduction of fifty-six +per cent. The Reserve Officers number but eighty-nine thousand and +their active duty training--their opportunity to keep abreast--has been +sliced to the bone. Since 1920 their efficiency has been slowed down +sixty per cent. Altogether our land defense in manpower is more than +fifty per cent lower than it was fifteen years ago. + +Our material deficiency is even greater. Our tanks are hopelessly out +of date. We have only twelve modern ones--and only one of them is the +most efficient type. We have aged field artillery, practically worn +out. Our rifles are older. We have only eighty new semi-automatics--the +normal weapon of the foot-soldier nowadays. Our ammunition is +tremendously short. We have the barest few modern anti-aircraft guns +and devices. Our motor vehicles are way behind in numbers. Our +airplanes are excellent in quality but slim in quantity. All these +supplies would take from a year to two years to manufacture. Does this +condition remind you of anything before our other wars? Does it give +you a little feeling of the days before the Spanish-American tragedy? +Our problem of National Defense has not been critically analysed since +1920. It is due the public to know where we stand. For it’s the public +only that can make or break national defense. + +The soldier doesn’t want a big army. He wants a safe army. He’s not +after a large military nation. That would be contrary to American +ideals and traditions. After all he’s simply an American citizen. He +wants only a well-knit skeleton upon which flesh and blood can be laid +in case of emergency. He wants the protection of a real defense man +to pull through a possible conflict without unwarranted killings. He +wants himself and every other man in his nation defended. He doesn’t +want to see the waste of money and life that has characterized all our +wars, because we were unskilled, unmanned, careless, neglectful. If he +were after a large force, he’d ask for a million men under arms. That +would be parallel to what other civilized countries are doing, but it +wouldn’t be decent for us. He doesn’t want that. He wants the barest +sufficiency to prevent habitual useless deaths. But he sees our woeful +weakness now and shudders at the thought of what might happen were our +country suddenly to become angry, as it has too often done in the past. +He asks now for one hundred sixty-five thousand regulars, two hundred +ten thousand National Guardsmen and one hundred twenty thousand reserve +officers. He asks that thirty thousand reservists receive active duty +training--every year. He asks that our supply of materials be brought +up to standard. Such a force is less than sixty per cent of what we +felt necessary in 1920. After General Staff study it is the bare +minimum for our protection--very bare. The change would make us the +sixteenth land power in the world instead of the seventeenth. But the +soldier doesn’t care whether we’d be the sixteenth, the seventeenth, +the second or the thirty-second. He wants enough to ensure our safety +and keep us from being swept into eternity as the British regular army +was in 1914. We have seen that an economy which cripples National +Defense is extravagance past the point of folly. On the other hand, we +see that too great a National Defense is also extravagance. + +If you ask the average citizen how many wars we’ve had he’ll answer +offhand, “O, about six.” That reply illustrates our knowledge of our +past. We’ve had actually one hundred and ten wars, great and small--an +average of one oftener than every year and a half. We’ve fought all +told eighty-six hundred battles. Compare this record with that of +Germany, who from 1870 to 1914--44 years--had continuous peace while +she was the most powerful military nation in the world. During that +time we were one of the weakest nations and were almost constantly at +war. A study of history proves that strength or weakness has nothing +to do with the motives of war in a republic. It’s the temper and urge +of the people as a whole when suddenly, unexpectedly they’re provoked. +So we must be thinking about a possible catastrophe as we live under a +volcano of human emotions. + +Is the soldier thinking about war? Of course--but only to stop it as +quickly as possible if it comes--only to prevent its coming to us by +being strong. He’s hired by this nation to study war as the doctor +studies disease, as the fireman studies fire, as the federal agent +studies crime. Does a fireman want fire? Does the federal agent want +crime? No more does the soldier want war, but he wouldn’t be a true +American, if he didn’t want to do a good job, if war comes. Does the +doctor know when an epidemic will break out? Does the fireman know when +a fire will start? Do federal agents and policemen know when a crime +will be committed? No more does the soldier know when war may start. +For it always has started with us suddenly--when people scoffed at our +getting into it. Does the surgeon scoff at the possible outbreak of an +epidemic, the fireman at the possible outbreak of a fire, the federal +agent at the possible outbreak of crime? He’d be silly to do so. Yet +fire, disease, crime are easier to lessen than war. For the cause of +war is not a thing. It’s a frenzy of emotions. Education and experiment +help prevent fire, crime and disease. But they value little with +emotions. The office manager is as likely to lose his temper as the +janitor. If you don’t believe it, try it out. But when a nation loses +its temper, it’s a boiling pot. Nothing can stop its mass hatred. It’s +like a plague of grasshoppers, Japanese beetles or white ants. We rush +to force whether we are weak or strong. And how we sacrifice our young +men when we are weak. + +We look at war as a horrible thing. It is. So are crime, fire and +disease. But we don’t do away with policemen, firemen and doctors +when we want to stop those ills. Yet that’s what we’ve done in this +country about war. We’ve trimmed down our soldiers after every one of +our conflicts. Trimmed them so that when we were hit by the next one, +we squandered life like confetti. In our short history we’ve had in +campaign over one million two hundred thousand casualties. At least a +million of these frightful deaths and sufferings need never have been, +had we been strong. Bereaved mothers all over this land have mourned +and cried out against war. It is only natural they should. We all hate +war--no one more than the soldier, for he knows what it is. But it +would have been a lot more practical to have faced the facts and cried +out against our unreadiness. That is the only real thing we can lay our +hands on which could have stopped or lessened the slaughter. To cry +out against war, much as we want to do away with it, is like crying +out against fire, crime or disease. We must work on the human soul to +keep from anger--on human souls to keep from mass anger. Therein lies +the great cause of war. But who can tell when a nation may lose its +temper? To be ready against that explosion is not contrary to trying +to abolish war. The two go hand in hand, as all history teaches. Each +may be a preventive, but readiness is also a safe-guard. The great harm +which some peace movements are doing lies in their attempt to make us +weak--in doing away with the safeguard, while they push along a royal +road to eternal peace. Let them push along that road. Let’s all help. +It’s a fine thing. But let us not at the same time open up an avenue to +the murder of our young men. + +False views--errors of fact--lead many to believe that mechanisms, +machines, devices will make war impossible. We’ve felt that way before +many wars. Far back in history people were sure that there’d be no +more war when the blunderbuss took the place of the bow and arrow. +We’ve found out for centuries that machines can’t do the trick. We’ve +found out scientifically that man is the big factor. Weapons change +but principles don’t. The only thing man runs from or ever has been +known to run from, is another man. He just won’t be stampeded by +engines, machines, mechanisms or missiles. He digs in. He protects +himself. There’s not a thing man invents that man can’t find a reply +to. Machines are for only one purpose--to help the man on the ground +get forward. Battles in the air may help the man on the ground, but +they wouldn’t settle anything. They couldn’t end the war. All this +hysteria about the machine being the answer is unscientific, untrue +and sensational. And bombing, gassing, strafing communities or cities +not in the fight, or not with the army, is just as absurd. It would +be the last thing a trained general would undertake. Nothing could be +worse for his own side and his own success. Only the untrained general +would indulge in such errors--and even he would soon learn his mistake. +And as for wiping out whole cities by air bombing or by gas it’s +mechanically impossible. Why, there’s not enough gas in the world to +destroy New York City alone. And if there were it would take fifteen +thousand airplanes, unhampered, to make any impression. And where would +fifteen thousand airplanes come from at a hundred thousand dollars a +throw? Don’t be fooled by these silly flights of fancy of unschooled, +untaught, unscientific blunderers. + +Then there’s the cry of militarism against decent readiness. +Militarism. Why there never has been such a thing in the United +States--and least of all with the soldier, and there’s no reason to +believe there ever will be. I defy anyone to show me a single instance +of it in any group at any time in this country. If more people knew +our true state, our true history, they’d see the rotten absurdity +of shouting against it. But theorists, revolutionary socialists, +peacebreakers are using this cunning false method of gulling our youth +into striking against any little strength the United States might have. + +It’s a day of questionnaires, of polls of votes. We’ve gone wild +with them. The college youth particularly is pursued by this plague. +Led on by a professor who either doesn’t know our true history or +doesn’t care about our country, the poor lad is gulled into blowing +pledge-bubbles. The questions in themselves are so degrading that +George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, all our presidents, would sicken +at the sight of them. “Would you bear arms in any war of your country?” +is the favorite. The poor lad, without background of our whole history +wavers. Under the glamorous, treacherous teachings of his professor, he +writes: “No.” And he believes what he says. He has no idea he’s giving +voice to a flimsy New Year’s resolution. Let me ask him now what he’d +do if a bandit attacked his home and tried to ruin his sister. Would he +bear arms? He’d bear everything he had to fight with or he wouldn’t be +worthy of the name of a man. Yet he said he’d never bear arms against +an enemy attacking another home. What of the golden rule? What of +selfishness? What of American sportsmanship? + +Our nation’s ability to protect itself is its highest insurance. For +our insurance companies would be nowhere, our commerce, our comfort, +our happiness would be nowhere, if our defense broke under attack. +There is no insurance to compete with National Defense. For it’s +our blanket insurance. It’s just plain business sense. The soldier +realizes that we have that sense in almost everything else but National +Defense. He realizes we’re living in a world--not heaven, Utopia or the +millennium. He’s got to face proven experience and facts as they are, +like the doctor, the fireman, the federal agent. He wonders whether +we can hold our own against the signs of the times. Or whether we must +have just faith without works. + + + + +_Other Books Recommended_ + + +_The History of the United States Army_--Colonel William Addleman +Ganoe--D. Appleton-Century Co., 35 West 32nd Street, New York City. + +★ + +_Chasing Villa_--Colonel Frank Tompkins--The Military Service +Publishing Co., 100 Telegraph Building, Harrisburg, Pa. + +★ + +_Inevitable War_--Lieut. Col. Richard Stockton--The Perth Co., +393 Seventh Ave., New York City. + + + + +TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES + + +Page 83: stray comma removed after “Napoleon the third”. + +Page 85: missing apostrophe added in “know it’s a funny thing”. + +Spelling errors corrected and missing quote marks added. + +Inconsistencies in hyphenation have been left unchanged. + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77647 *** diff --git a/77647-h/77647-h.htm b/77647-h/77647-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7a96fbb --- /dev/null +++ b/77647-h/77647-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,4020 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html> +<html lang="en"> +<head> + <meta charset="UTF-8"> + <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"> + <title> + Soldiers Unmasked | Project Gutenberg + </title> + <link rel="icon" href="images/cover.jpg" type="image/x-cover"> + <style> + +body { + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; +} + +h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + clear: both; +} + +p { + margin-top: .51em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .49em; +} + +.p2 {margin-top: 2em;} +.p6 {margin-top: 6em;} +.x-ebookmaker .ep4 {margin-top: 4em;} + +hr { + width: 33%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: 33.5%; + margin-right: 33.5%; + clear: both; +} + +hr.chap {width: 65%; margin-left: 17.5%; margin-right: 17.5%;} +@media print { hr.chap {display: none; visibility: hidden;} } + +hr.r5 {width: 5%; margin-top: 1em; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 47.5%; margin-right: 47.5%;} + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always;} +h2.nobreak {page-break-before: avoid;} + + +table { + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; +} +table.autotable { border-collapse: collapse; } +table.autotable td, +table.autotable th { padding: 0.25em; font-weight: normal; } + +.tdl {text-align: left;} +.tdr {text-align: right;} + +.pagenum { + position: absolute; + left: 92%; + font-size: small; + text-align: right; + font-style: normal; + font-weight: normal; + font-variant: normal; + text-indent: 0; +} /* page numbers */ + +blockquote { + margin-top: 0; + margin-bottom: 0; + margin-left: 5%; + margin-right: 10%; +} + + +.center {text-align: center;} + +.right {text-align: right;} + +.smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + +.allsmcap {font-variant: small-caps; text-transform: lowercase;} + + + +figcaption {font-weight: bold;} +figcaption p {margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: .2em; text-align: inherit;} + +/* Images */ + +img { + max-width: 100%; + height: auto; +} +img.w100 {width: 100%;} + + +.figcenter { + margin: auto; + text-align: center; + page-break-inside: avoid; + max-width: 100%; +} + +/* Transcriber's notes */ +.transnote {background-color: #E6E6FA; + color: black; + font-size:small; + padding:0.5em; + margin-bottom:5em; + font-family:sans-serif, serif; +} + +.ph1 { + text-align: center; + font-size: xx-large; + font-weight: bold; +} +.ph2 { + text-align: center; + font-size: x-large; + font-weight: bold; +} +.transnote { + margin-left:17.5%; + margin-right:17.5%; +} + +/* Illustration classes */ +.illowp100 {width: 100%;} + </style> +</head> +<body> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77647 ***</div> + + + +<h1> +SOLDIERS UNMASKED +</h1> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p class="ph1"> +SOLDIERS UNMASKED +</p> + +<p class="center"><i>By</i></p> + +<p class="center" style="font-size: x-large"><span class="smcap">William Addleman Ganoe</span></p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Colonel, U. S. Army</span></p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="colophon" style="max-width: 2em; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 2em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/colophon.png" alt="" data-role="presentation"> +</figure> + + +<p class="center">Author of “The History of the<br> +United States Army,” etc.</p> + + +<p class="center p6">1939</p> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p class="center ep4"><span class="smcap">First Edition, Copyright, 1935, by</span><br> +WILLIAM ADDLEMAN GANOE</p> + +<hr class="r5"> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Second Edition, Copyright, 1939</span></p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">First Printing January, 1939</span></p> + + +<p class="center p6">Published by<br> +<span class="smcap">The Military Service Publishing Company<br> +Harrisburg, Pa.</span></p> + + +<p class="center p2"><span class="allsmcap">PRINTED IN THE U. S. A. BY</span><br> +<span class="smcap">The Telegraph Press<br> +Harrisburg, Pa.</span></p> +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p class="center ep4" style="font-style: italic;"> + To<br> + George Washington<br> + ever revered<br> + seldom obeyed +</p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="TOC"><i>TABLE OF CONTENTS</i></h2> +<table class="autotable"> +<tr> +<th class="tdl"></th> +<th class="tdr">PAGE</th> +<tr> +<td class="tdl"><a href="#HOW_IT_STARTED"><i>HOW IT STARTED</i></a></td> +<td class="tdr">i</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl"><a href="#I"><i>I</i></a></td> +<td class="tdr">1</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl"><a href="#II"><i>II</i></a></td> +<td class="tdr">10</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl"><a href="#III"><i>III</i></a></td> +<td class="tdr">20</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl"><a href="#IV"><i>IV</i></a></td> +<td class="tdr">31</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl"><a href="#V"><i>V</i></a></td> +<td class="tdr">40</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl"><a href="#VI"><i>VI</i></a></td> +<td class="tdr">51</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl"><a href="#VII"><i>VII</i></a></td> +<td class="tdr">62</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl"><a href="#VIII"><i>VIII</i></a></td> +<td class="tdr">72</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl"><a href="#IX"><i>IX</i></a></td> +<td class="tdr">82</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl"><a href="#X"><i>X</i></a></td> +<td class="tdr">92</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl"><a href="#XI"><i>XI</i></a></td> +<td class="tdr">102</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl"><a href="#XII"><i>XII</i></a></td> +<td class="tdr">112</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="tdl"><a href="#XIII"><i>XIII</i></a></td> +<td class="tdr">122</td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_i">[Pg i]</span></p> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + <h2 class="nobreak" id="HOW_IT_STARTED"> + <i>HOW IT STARTED</i> + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>This booklet cropped out from a mixture of +chance happenings. One day last October, Captain +R. B. Lovett, Adjutant General’s Department, came +into my office. I hadn’t seen him since he was a +student at the Infantry School in Georgia when I +was an instructor. He said Colonel Harvey W. +Miller, Adjutant General, 1st Corps Area, thought +it would be a good thing for the recruiting service +and the public in general to be informed about the +soldier. There were so many misunderstandings +about him. Would I do ten talks over the radio? +They looked mountainous with all my other work. +But if you knew Lovett, you’d appreciate how convincing +he can be. He put in a plea of public service +and I succumbed. The next thing I heard was that +the Yankee Network had generously given time to +the series Saturday nights. I began December eighth. +I felt the first talk was a beautiful flop. I got no fan +mail and my friends who phoned me were just +pleasant. I suspected they were letting me down +easily. Anyway, I kept plugging along. After the +third talk, fan mail from strangers in Portland, Newburyport, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_ii">[Pg ii]</span>Bridgeport and little towns began to come +in. After the fifth talk, there was a flood of requests +for copies. Then letters began to pile in from every +walk of life. The copies asked for couldn’t be furnished. +There were no means or money to get them +out and mail them. My friends suggested printing +the whole series at as little cost as possible. Well, +this is the result. I hope you’ll get something out +of it.</p> + +<p class="right"> + W.A.G. +</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="I"> + <i>I</i><br>WHAT IS A SOLDIER + </h2> +</div> + +<p>In a certain town in the United States a sign in +front of a theater boldly announced: “No dogs or +soldiers admitted.” After some complaint the sign +was taken down. And after the people of the community +got to know the soldier, they were sorry +the sign had been put up.</p> + +<p>Prejudice against the military man hasn’t ordinarily +gone to that length, but many citizens are +at least disinterested. Not long ago I was called +upon to speak to a rather cultured group on the +soldier’s work. A few days later, an acquaintance, +an intelligent, elderly woman, met me on the street. +“I liked the way you talked,” she said, “but I’m +not in sympathy with anything you spoke about. +I don’t want to hear about the soldier or anything +military.” I thanked her for her frankness, and +dropped the matter, knowing it was useless to try +to give her the facts which are presented here, and +which she probably wouldn’t have believed anyway.</p> + +<p>Here are some of the questions which have been +asked me by educated people: “What do you fellows +in the army do when there’s no war? Do you +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</span>just go out and drill the boys and then loaf around? +What’s the need of an army in a depression? Where’s +the army now? How big is it? What’s the use of an +army when we have an air corps?”</p> + +<p>Whether or not such questions sound foolish, +they do show ignorance of what the soldier and +the War Department are really doing. But the +citizen is not to blame for this lack of knowledge. +A combination of circumstances has deprived +him of knowing what has happened and what is +happening with the military man. Certainly no true +American wishes to be unfair. First of all our school +and college histories, our literature, our entertainment +have a habit of either misrepresenting or omitting +the actual deeds and purpose of the soldier. +Second, anyone associated with weapons usually has +a bad name nowadays. Third, the soldier, away off +in our island possessions or in an army post, has too +little intimacy with the general run of people. +Fourth, the name War Department has a misleading +sound. It makes us think of a great mail-fisted demon, +breathing fire and smiting with a red-hot sword. +Before we get through with the stories and facts +given later, we’ll see that it could much more faithfully +be called the Peace Department. Fifth, there’s +the term “preparation for war,” which is about as +far from the truth about what the soldier is trying +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</span>to do, as saying that firemen are preparing to cause +fires.</p> + +<p>The soldiers in this country have never prepared +to have a war and they are not doing so now. They +have always prepared <i>against</i> war. There is no place +in our history where they have been the remotest +cause of war. And would you believe it, they have +actually been the outstanding pacifists of American +History? You know it seems peculiar that the +trained fighter has done more for peace in this country +than any other class. But it is so. In normal times +he has repeatedly saved us from war. In public works +he has been one of the chief builders of the nation, +if not the chief one. In disaster he has been the first +on the spot to restore order, and feed and shelter +the helpless. In war he has aimed to bring back peace +and return the people to restful firesides, with the +least loss of life and treasure. A multitude of facts +enforce these statements—facts which can be verified +in the archives in Washington—facts which we have +ordinarily been denied in our formal education.</p> + +<p>You know there’s a short paper about 150 years +old that we Americans are pretty keen about. In +that document it says that Congress shall provide +for the common defense. And hand in hand with +that provision goes its twin brother—the general +welfare. Our wise old forefathers, who had plenty +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</span>of time to reason, analyse, contemplate human nature +and be soundly practical, in contrast to us who +must dash through this complex civilization on high, +used a sound bit of horse sense when they coupled +those two phrases. For it’s easy to see that you can’t +have general welfare without common defense any +more than you can have an undisturbed household +without locks and policemen. Of course, we need +a little more than common defense to get general +welfare in these times, but that’s quite another subject. +However, that business of common defense +brings the soldier onto the stage by our Constitution. +And one of the big tragedies of our country +is that the stage failed to produce him so many times +until the play had actually begun. About a million +tombstones scattered in this country and in France +can be charged up to his absence when he was +vitally needed. For it takes time to train a soldier, +and it’s pretty expensive and bloody to train him +when bullets begin to fly. Besides it makes the war +drag on. So you see the loss accumulates. I can make +this idea clearer by an illustration. Let us suppose +you are a night watchman and have to pace around +a spooky industrial plant every night. And suppose +your employer armed you with a night stick, saying +that firearms were dangerous, expensive and might +lead to trouble. You plead with him that all you +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</span>want is a decent break, that you’d like to have a +pistol and learn how to use it. He still contends that +the night stick is good enough. Sometime later a +bandit scouts around the plant and sees you wandering +along with your club as your only defense. +The next night you see him entering a window. You +chase him. He carefully aims, drops you in your +tracks, pilfers the cash box and makes a get away. +Now suppose thousands of watchmen are in the +same fix. That in principle is what has happened to +our untrained men in all our wars. They haven’t +had a chance. And because they haven’t had a +chance, they have come home from the catastrophe +with all sorts of ill-feeling against the army, the +soldier, the officer, when the fault has been not in +the military service, but in the neglect of proper +training before the enemy pounces upon us. Just +how much waste and hardship to individuals would +result, if the country grocery store at Seven Corners +had to expand to a thousand chain-stores in thirty +days? Can you imagine it? And yet such an expansion +is a drop in the bucket to what the Army and +the War Department have been compelled to produce +in a twinkling, when war caught us flat-footed. +Of course, when we got into the World War we +were pretty lucky, for we had Allies who held off +the enemy for nearly a year before we had to go +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</span>into real action. Just what would have happened +had we not had such a wall of strength in Europe +to stave off our enemies is not pretty to think about. +As it was, many an American went to the front untrained, +unskilled, an easy prey to disease and explosives. +From this lack of preventive medicine, +which is what training in peace time amounts to, +many men have come out of our wars disgusted, +and sayings have arisen which have put the army +in a mean light. There’s the word “soldiering” +which oddly has come to mean idleness. Yet if you +were to go into any army post, any army school, +or any C.M.T.C. camp you’d see the soldier anything +but idle. Then there’s the term “passing the +buck” which expresses an army habit to some people. +Just why it should, after your experiences and mine +in everyday life, is hard to explain. But the “old +army game” is the one we hear so often. It may +mean anything from four-flushing to downright +crookedness. All these slanders seem to have arisen +because men have been rudely and unjustly snatched +from the counter, the plough and the mill to face +a new desperate life, to live in mixed-up conditions +under hasty shelter, to find themselves square pegs +in round holes, and to be under officers as unskilled +as they, officers not even a quarter baked, whose +leadership was too often faulty and cruel. How +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</span>could it be otherwise when we plunge fine young +men who can’t swim into a raging sea? These men +come out of the conflict with heavy hatreds, justifiable +ones oftentimes, hatreds that go deep into +their souls. And whom would they hate? Naturally +the professional soldier. He’s the one at hand. But +curiously enough it’s the trained soldier who has +tried to prevent the awful haste, waste and unnecessary +mortality that have caused these hatreds.</p> + +<p>The American soldier is the last man to want +war or the unnecessary loss of life and treasure in +war. He shies at war’s hardships, and the added +horrors, resulting from unpreparedness against war. +He knows too much about them to want himself +or anyone else to be in a war. But he feels that it’s +not quite practical in the present state of the world +to say that there will be no more armed conflicts. +With Europe seething with hatreds, Japan flying +at Asia’s throat, Russia making its militant inroads, +with no practical progress in abolition of war to +date, with industrial strife breaking out here and +there, and with an Army of organized crime in this +country greater than the Army and Navy of the +United States, he feels it’s inviting disaster not to +prepare against war and calamity. So he’s out to reduce +the tragedy when it comes, or to stop it from +coming by a proper show of force.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</span></p> + +<p>Do you know that one army officer, single-handed, +without an army at his back, saved or helped +save this country from six big wars? And do you +know that another officer staved off another big +war by being on the spot with three trained corps? +Do you know that many other officers stubbornly +opposed the powers in Washington when those +powers wanted to fight the Indian? Do you know +who built all our first trails and roads in the west +and south? Do you know who constructed the first +railroad to span our United States from east to west? +Do you know what the army has done to help build +this country in time of peace? Do you know that +one branch of the army alone has literally saved +millions of lives in peace time by its courageous discoveries +and safeguards? Do you know what another +branch has done in the riddance of pests from industrial +plants? Do you know who laid the Alaskan +Cable? Do you know that not a single covered wagon +ever reached the coast states in the west without +being accompanied by soldiers? We rarely hear the +soldier mentioned or see him shown in the movies +in his protection of the wagon trains, but there is +no record of any of those trains ever reaching Oregon +or California over the wild prairie tracts unless +soldiers went with them. This is but one instance +of the suppression of truth about the soldier. We’re +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</span>pretty well acquainted with what the soldier has +done in war. But do we know what he’s done for +the up-building of men and construction of public +works in peace time? Do we know what he’s done +against war?</p> + +<p>Listen to what comes next.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="II"> + <i>II</i><br>WHAT HAS HE DONE + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>Two big pool operators of Wall Street one evening +were standing in front of a prominent theater +watching the crowds surge into the doorways. +There was much display of ermines, sables, diamonds +and general wealth. One of the two asked the other: +“Say, where do these lambs get all the money we +bears take away from them?”</p> + +<p>Today many people say, “Where do these soldiers +get all this peace stuff we extreme pacifists take away +from them?” The answer lies in cold facts—cold +facts the historians don’t tell us—cover up almost +completely. Lewis and Clark, for instance. Why, +yes, they were two fellows who were the first to +go across our Continent and back again. But who +ever told you that it was <i>Captain</i> Meriwether Lewis +and <i>Lieutenant</i> William Clark who took four sergeants +and twenty-three privates in that hazardous +trek between the Atlantic and the Pacific from 1803 +to 1806—that it was the soldier who made surveys +and maps and created friendships with the Indians, +many of whom were seeing a white man for the first +time?</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</span></p> + +<p>Pike’s Peak! O yes, that was discovered by a man +by the name of Pike. But where was it mentioned +that it was <i>Lieutenant</i> Z. M. Pike? And what did he +do? With three non-commissioned officers and sixteen +privates, he explored in 1806 and 1807 from +the source of the Mississippi to its mouth, doing +from north to south what Lewis and Clark had done +from east to west. Turning west he discovered the +peak which bears his name. In what is now New +Mexico, he even beguiled the Spaniards into taking +him prisoner so that he could learn their intentions, +customs and country. For his great deeds of exploration +and pacification he received the personal praise +of the President of the United States. Then there +was Captain Long who in the same way went +through what is now Colorado, and for whom Long’s +Peak is named; Captain Bonneville who voluntarily +lived with the Nez Perces and Flatheads for five +years, creating friendships and learning their language; +Lieutenant Litgreaves, who explored the +Colorado River; and Lieutenant Whipple and Lieutenant +Ives, who separately went through the southwest. +And then John C. Fremont. O yes, the histories +are crazy about calling him the Pathfinder, but +never told you that it was Lieutenant John C. Fremont +in 1838 when he started out, and Lieutenant +Colonel John C. Fremont in 1844—after he had explored +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</span>10,000 miles of freezing mountain and sickly +basin? In this brief space I can’t even touch on many +of these gigantic wedges of understanding. It was +the soldier who made the first trails, dug the first +wells, built the first roads, bridges and canals, made +the first maps, surveyed most of our boundaries, +erected most of our lighthouses, dredged our harbors +and waterways, escorted the settlers, braved the +Indian and suffered in silence. The Hon. John W. +Weeks, former Secretary of War and United States +Senator, wrote: “The Army was virtually the +pioneer of pioneers. As our citizens moved west over +the prairies and through forests, they traveled +routes which were surveyed by army engineers, +constructed by the army and protected by military +posts. The titles of their land were valid only because +of army surveys.... Up to 1855 there was +scarcely a railroad in this country that was not projected, +built, and operated in large part by the Army. +Army engineers located, constructed, and managed +such well-known roads as the Baltimore and Ohio; +the Northern Central; the Erie; the Boston and +Providence; the New York, New Haven and Hartford; +and the Boston and Albany. Practically all +of the transcontinental railroads were projected by +the army. An army officer, Lieutenant G. W. +Whistler, built the best locomotive of his time, after +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</span>his own design.” The building of the Union Pacific +Railroad, the first to connect the two oceans, illustrates +the soldiers’ contribution to national welfare. +The set-up for this mighty link was a military one. +The workmen were organized into companies and +battalions. Soldiers would dig and hammer and at the +cry “Indians,” would rush to their stacked arms and +give battle. Nearly every man was a veteran of the +Civil War. The heads of the most of the engineering +parties and all chiefs of construction had been officers +in the Civil War. The chief of the track-laying +force, General Casement, had been a distinguished +division commander. In a twinkling, General Dodge, +the chief engineer, could call into the field a thousand +men, well-officered, ready to meet any crisis. +General Sherman also furnished troops. The builders +contended that this great bridge of progress could +not have been finished without soldiers and army +training. During the enterprise Oakes Ames said, +“What makes me hang on is the faith of you +soldiers.”</p> + +<p>The soldier went further than highways in his +works. Let’s look at buildings. How many know +that the difficult Washington Monument, the wings +and dome of the National Capitol, the old Post Office +Building, the Municipal Building, the Washington +Aqueduct, the Agriculture Building, the Government +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</span>Printing Office, the War College and the beautiful +Library of Congress were all built by the Army? +Army engineers supervised the building of the Lincoln +Memorial, the Arlington Bridge, the parks and +even the playgrounds of the District of Columbia. +They even organized the Weather Bureau—and all +this our government got at the comparatively small +pay of the soldier.</p> + +<p>But the soldier didn’t stop at exploring and building. +He didn’t stop at just contributing to development +and peace. He went further. He even tried his +best to prevent war. So many were his attempts that +they can scarcely be hinted at tonight. Here is one +conspicuous example. In 1832, South Carolina was +verging on secession and civil war. President Jackson +called in General Winfield Scott and sent him +to the scene of the trouble. There Scott by skillful +persuasion and conference helped to quiet the difficulties +and return the state to peace, without any +troops at his back. In 1838 there was a revolt against +Great Britain by Canadian patriots. Many in our +border states were sympathizing with the rebels. +Blood had been shed. It looked horribly like a third +war with Great Britain. Scott was sent north to the +place of the struggle. After great effort and the most +tactful arbitration he brought harmony between +the British officials and our own sympathizers. By +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</span>his work, war was averted. In the same year the +great educated, peaceful tribe of Cherokees in +Georgia and the Carolinas, was enraged at the attempt +of the whites to force it away from its native +home because gold had been found there. 15,000 +Indians refused to move. General Scott was sent +by the government to conduct them west to what +is now Oklahoma. Sensing the right on their side, +but being compelled to carry out the government’s +unjust orders, he was left with nothing but his personality +and good sense to keep us out of a big fight. +By his masterful appeal to the Indians not to cause +war, by his instructions to his soldiers to be gentle +and firm, by his square dealing and carrying out of +his promises to the letter, he was able to escort the +whole tribe west, without the slightest sign of +trouble. So great was his kindly power, that he even +had these superstitious redmen submit to vaccination. +It is estimated that this prevention of war saved +the government two and one-half billion dollars and +untold loss of life. (Besides he very nearly washed +clean the government’s dirty linen.) But he had +scarcely finished this delicate task when he was +called to Maine. There the boundary question was +about to plunge us into that third war with Great +Britain. The government had already called out +eight thousand militia. Things were pretty bad. Scott +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</span>hustled back and forth holding conferences, calming +this party and that, and finally closed the issue +to the satisfaction of all. In 1848 after he had conducted +the brilliant campaign which closed the Mexican +War, Mexico was in a state of unrest. It was there +that he established a rule so just and kindly that +peace came more rapidly, and possibly composed +Mexico for many years. Never had the Mexicans +been treated so decently. Their representatives came +to him and begged him to be their dictator. Though +he didn’t accept, it was probably the first time in +history where a conqueror of foreign territory had +been so cordially urged. Two years later after he +had returned to the United States, trouble in Vancouver +Island in the northwest again threatened +that ever-skulking third war with Great Britain. The +British Navy was already beating down upon the +little island of San Juan. Scott arrived on the scene. +By the cleverest tact he engineered a joint evacuation +of the island. And no war came. Six times had +this man, who towered six feet five and weighed +two hundred forty pounds, showed us that his heart +and character were as great as his stature. Six times +had he saved us. In keeping us out of war who can +compete with him? But he is not alone. Many +another soldier gave us peace and many another built +for peace.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</span></p> + +<p>In 1907, after long years of trial, President Theodore +Roosevelt came to the conclusion that high-salaried +civilians could not complete the Panama +Canal. They would walk out on him and were inclined +to the spoils system of wasting money. He +wanted someone who would stay on the job, who +would carry on the work for the work’s sake. He +turned to the Army. He appointed a commission of +soldiers. Colonel George Goethals with his able +assistants, Colonels Gaillard and Sibert, Corps of +Engineers and Colonel W. C. Gorgas of the Medical +Corps, were sent south to construct the Canal. Gorgas +purged the place of yellow fever and malaria +while the others forged ahead on the building. After +bitter trials and maddening set-backs, they finished +the Panama Canal. This vast public work, which +others had failed to complete in almost half a century, +the soldier gave to his country in the surprising +space of six years.</p> + +<p>But this commercial short-cut could not have +been so quickly finished, had it not been for the work +of another soldier. In 1900 Major Walter Reed with +a group of medical officers and men was sent to Cuba +to study yellow fever. For several years soldiers +risked their lives repeatedly in their attempt to find +out what caused the disease. It came to the point +where a little banded-legged mosquito was suspected +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</span>of carrying the fever from the sick to the well. But +the suspicion had to be proved. Men had to let themselves +be actually bitten by the deadly insect in +order to vouchsafe to the world that the mosquito +was the only carrier. Volunteers were called for. +Officers and men responded with such willingness +that the ready victims were always in excess of +demand. One day Privates Kissinger and Moran +came to Major Reed as volunteers. He explained +to them what their offer meant—extreme suffering +and probable death. They still insisted. They would +gladly run the risk, if it would save lives afterwards. +He then told them that they or their relatives would +receive money. Both men showed their disgust. +Kissinger stepped forward and said, “I want it understood +that we are doing this in the interest of humanity +and for science.” Major Reed rose, touched +his cap and said with tears in his eyes, “Gentlemen I +salute you.” The two privates were allowed to be +bitten by mosquitoes which had fed on persons +stricken with the malignant yellow fever. They +took the disease, but God was with them. They +pulled through. Major Reed said of them: “This +exhibition of moral courage has never been surpassed +in our history.” Reed finally proved that the mosquito +was the only carrier of the disease. Once the +world found out the cause, the rest was easy—riddance +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</span>of the horrible insect that had made so many +countries places of horror and death. In the United +States alone yellow fever had taken a toll of more +than half a million. Commerce had been interrupted, +states and cities had been turned into turmoil and +whole populations wiped out. Shortly after the proof +of the discovery General Leonard Wood purged +Havana in a few months. And today it is estimated +that by the heroic service of Major Walter Reed +and his soldiers, thirty million lives have been saved +in the Western Hemisphere.</p> + +<p>Has the soldier done anything for peace? Has +he done anything for progress? Sentiment, theory, +loud arguments don’t talk, but somehow deeds, +facts do.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="III"> + <i>III</i><br>WHAT MORE HAS HE DONE + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>A young farmer lad was once leading a calf by +a rope down a road. He came to a narrow bridge +where the animal balked. An automobile moving +up behind the pair had to stop. The boy turned to +the car and yelled: “Toot!” The driver gave a great, +loud blast from his deafening horn. The calf, +thoroughly frightened, galloped madly over the +bridge and down the road, pulling the poor boy at +a break-neck run for half a mile. When the automobile +caught up to the pair, the lad, gasping for +breath, blazed out at the driver, “I—ugh—said ‘Toot!’—but +not—ugh—so loud!”</p> + +<p>One shouldn’t toot too loud about the soldier. +It isn’t done. But since his horn has been so seldom +blown, I take the liberty to honk just a trifle. Some +of the noise may leave us breathless, but I hope it +won’t scare the calf.</p> + +<p>Yellow fever. We saw last time how Major Walter +Reed stopped that disease and saved to date some +thirty million lives. Long before his time another +army surgeon by the name of William Beaumont +had a patient who had been accidentally wounded +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</span>through the stomach. The case was felt hopeless by +other doctors. Beaumont not only cured the man, +but took advantage of the large hole to study for +the first time the action of digestion in a living body. +His pioneer work paved the way for cures later. +Tropical anemia! When our country took over +Porto Rico, the island was helpless against the disease! +Army doctors, after baffling set-backs finally +found the cause. Their work saved the Porto Ricans +from a scourge that would have stopped their development +forever. Dengue fever! Again army surgeons +found the mosquito was the cause. The remedy +was simple. Empyema, tuberculosis, beriberi, surra +and bone deformities have been signally and notably +helped by contributions of army surgeons. Rinderpest—a +disease that had been carrying off the cattle +by the thousands in the Philippines for half a century. +The plague was all the more hurtful since cattle +are Philippines’ beasts of burden and the key to their +whole commercial life. Colonel R. A. Kelser, who +is now in Massachusetts, with other soldiers, went +deeply into the study of the disease. After patient +efforts he developed a vaccine, which prevents its +occurrence. What that discovery has done for those +islands, cannot be measured.</p> + +<p>As with disease, so with disaster. Early one morning +in 1906, San Francisco was suddenly buried in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</span>flames. Transportation, telephone and telegraph lines +were broken down. Hospitals and fire departments +were out of commission. The police force was helpless. +Riot and anarchy were expected. No organized +body of relief was possible but the Army. In less +than three hours after the first blow to the city, +General Funston with troops was on the scene. The +soldier dealt out nearly a million rations, set up bakeries +and coffee kettles, gave havens of comfort, controlled +looters, opened stores, supervised hospitals +and got the fire under control. One private soldier +assembled several hundred refugees, organized them, +got eating utensils and put up a field bakery. Many +a soldier did not sleep while the emergency lasted.</p> + +<p>In great catastrophes the soldier has been the first +one to deliver supplies, succor the helpless and keep +order. The story of our floods, tornadoes, cyclones, +typhoons, bursting dams, ice-jams, coal mine disasters, +explosions, earthquakes and forest fires is the +story of relief by the soldier. In one Mississippi flood +the army dealt out over two and one-half million +dollars worth of provisions for two hundred forty-three +thousand people. It <i>gave</i> everything from +stoves to post-hole diggers. In Montana blizzards, +Texas floods, Michigan snow-storms, Florida disasters +and Ohio overflows, the soldier was there to +help the helpless. In the last New England floods, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</span>army trains were the first to reach the sufferers with +food and relief, and soldiers at great risk made temporary +bridges and opened roads. In the Porto Rico +hurricane, army transports arrived first with supplies +and help for the needy, and brought the island +to a state of recovery. We hear much of Mr. +Hoover’s magnificent relief in Europe, but whoever +told you that five army colonels were his principal +assistants and that three hundred twenty officers and +four hundred sixty-four enlisted men made up his +agencies distributing American relief? The Russian +relief was wholly the work of our soldiers.</p> + +<p>The triumph of service by the army in our possessions +of Alaska, Guam, the Philippines, Hawaii, +Porto Rico and the Canal Zone doesn’t often come +to the ear of the average citizen. In the great archipelago +of the Philippines, the soldier calmed strife +between savage tribes, built roads, railroads, schools, +churches, gave spiritual aid and comfort, and was +at once, instructor, leader, governor, judge, jury, +councilor, constructor, almsgiver and peacemaker. +He did more in 20 years to make the Philippinos a +united people than had been done in the previous +centuries. It was his labor largely that caused their +great desire to retain the supervision of the United +States. Alaska, too, knows the army as a friend in +need. When the territory was bought, soldiers were +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</span>immediately sent there to keep order and open up +the land. In the pioneer days, under great hardship, +the army made surveys and kept watch over the +frontiers. In the Klondike rush, it opened the harbors, +built the roads and trails leading to gold, and +protected newcomers against mob rule and lawlessness. +In order to make the only link with the mainland +of the United States, the soldier laid four +thousand, five hundred eighty-eight miles of cable +and built six hundred miles of telegraph, all of which +he operated. He largely administered the government +of the territory and at low cost furnished to +business millions of dollars worth of returns. The +signal corps soldier gave during the Civil War the +greatest boost to our telegraph systems. As late as +1877, he operated three thousand miles of telegraph +in the South. Today in Washington he operates the +largest radio net in the world, handling messages +for forty-eight departments of the government. In +one year for this service the Army was able to turn +over to the United States Treasury, two hundred +sixty-eight million dollars. It was General G. O. +Squier, Chief Signal Officer, who made the outstanding +invention of sending a number of telephone +and telegraph messages over the same line at the +same time. His work improved and revolutionized +that industry. It was the soldier, too, who took the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</span>lead in developing the short wave, high frequency +transmission and opened up vast channels through +the air. It was the soldier who developed the radio +beacon, which guides the airman through fog, cloud +and darkness safely. It was the air soldier who perfected +the parachute which has already saved many +fliers. Of course everyone knows how the soldier +helped the Wright Brothers in their great pioneer +flying, and men like Lieutenant Selfridge sacrificed +their lives for the sake of progress. Later others made +the great good-will flight to South America, covering +twenty-two thousand sixty-five miles in two +hundred sixty-three and one-quarter hours of flying +time. Lieutenants Maitland and Hegenberger made +this first non-stop flight from our west coast to +Honolulu. Army pilots have photographed thirty-five +thousand square miles in eighteen states for geological +survey maps. Others have covered half a +million square miles of our forests and reported +hundreds of beginnings of fires. Others gave Colonel +Lindbergh and many commercial pilots advanced +training in flying.</p> + +<p>In a different field, it was the soldier who started +our steel industry, developed the tractor and was +the first to bring interchangeable parts to machinery—making +possible American mass production.</p> + +<p>There is much false prejudice against our Chemical +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</span>Warfare Service. Did you know that since the +war it has done much for life and progress? It has +aided industry by developing gas masks against the +deadly carbon monoxide in mines, the fumes from +burst pipes of ammonia refrigeration and from +cyanide gas. It has aided the Public Health Service +in the successful fumigation of ships; the Bureau of +Biological Survey in ridding the commercial world +of rats, gophers, locusts, grasshoppers, the boll +weevil, marine borers, vermin and moths. At a cost +of $106 in a western plant, it saved $75,000 worth +of cloth goods by a single fumigation. With the air +service it developed a quick method of spraying +fruit trees, has aided police departments immeasurably +with chemicals against mobs and bank robbers, +and led the way in the foundation of the American +dye industry.</p> + +<p>There is scarcely any path of our progress that +the soldier has not made or followed with helpfulness. +His activities turn into so many avenues that +I’m unable to give more than a hint tonight. Here +is a late one.</p> + +<p>Within two weeks after President Roosevelt’s +inauguration a bill to put a quarter of a million jobless +men in Reforestation work was passed by Congress. +The army didn’t want the task of taking over +a mass of men twice its size, of butting in on the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</span>Forest Service, and of robbing the soldier of his +peace time training. The army’s representative so +stated to the White House. The reply was: “You +have given all the reasons in the world why the +Army should do this job. As a matter of fact all the +reasons you state show that nobody else can do it.” +The army got the job. The General Staff was wisely +ready for that possibility. A month later at the rate +of one thousand five hundred thirty a day, fifty-two +thousand were enrolled, and forty-two camps had +been established. Fifty-one days after that three +hundred ten thousand had been enrolled. The rate +of reception and caring for this vast number was +greater than for both the Army and Navy during +the World War. And this was peace time when the +spirit, money and cooperation of the people were +not so great. And what did the soldiers have to do +for these men? Everything and more than a preparatory +boarding school must do for its students. +It had to examine them physically, classify them, +clothe them, feed them, transport them, do all the +work of paying them, put up their camps in the +wilderness, and supervise their moral, mental and +spiritual welfare and conduct. Army training +stopped. The soldier had to put every ounce of his +energy into the task and spent many sleepless, working +nights, if it were to be a go. The little available +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</span>army not one-eighth the size of those finally enrolled +had to press these raw men from every walk +of life through their new work in a fair and orderly +way. The entering C.C.C. boys were of equal rank. +There were no seniors, no foremen, no variations—just +a crowd. They were not being received into any +organization. The whole structure had to be built +from the ground up. The situation was as strange to +the soldier as to the C.C.C. boy. The only recourse +the Army Officer had for keeping contentment, +orderliness and efficiency were precept, example and +expulsion from camp. He could not use even +minor forms of correction. He wasn’t allowed to +make the boy stand up, look one in the eye, or say +“Yes, sir” or “No, sir.” It was a fearful handicap, +when he was responsible for their safety, good order +and reputation in a strange community. But the records +show surprisingly little discord for the vast +numbers taken in. The records also show how proper +sanitation, a balanced diet, daily medical attention +and patient supervision turned out. An inventory of +one hundred ten camps reveals that the boys gained +from five to twenty-seven pounds. Only five per +cent left camp—a surprisingly small proportion when +you realize that their main qualification was lack +of a job. Under skillful guidance they developed +rapidly. The white anemic faces and flabby arms +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</span>of early spring were changed into bronzed skins +and bulging muscles in late summer. Professor Nelson +C. Brown, New York State College of Forestry, +says: “The usual army disciplinary methods were +not permitted, but by precept and example and by +an exhibition of tolerance and patience, and a +friendly attitude of helpfulness, the camp commanders +and forestry officers have made a really +notable contribution to the upbuilding of character +and good citizenship in this great army of young +men.” But let no one think for a moment that it +is an army, or even the barest beginning of one. These +young men are no more soldiers than any other +rugged young men of our country. They have had +no more military drill, military teaching, military +environment, military discipline, military progress +than high school lads at a fire drill. Why they’re not +even allowed to have military books in their libraries. +To be soldiers, they would have to start at the bottom +in everything—forms of courtesy, upright posture, +neatness in dress, obedience, discipline, team work, +scouting and patrolling, guard duty, the use of +weapons and all the thousand and one things that +the trained man must know. The fact that C.C.C. +boys wear parts of army uniform misleads many. +That clothing, salvaged from the war, was all the +country had to give them. The army dispensed it +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</span>to keep the lad covered up. But a lion skin doesn’t +make a lion. No, anyone seeing an army post and +then a camp of the C.C.C. boys would notice the +complete difference. The C.C.C. is wholly a peacetime +project for the interior development of our +country, the largest one ever undertaken in the +United States.</p> + +<p>Today nearly a million C.C.C. boys have passed +through the soldier’s hands. Ninety-four per cent +of the camps are now under Reserve Officers from +civilian life, who are carrying on with great efficiency +and success. This vast enterprise is just +another by-product of the army’s normal work of +being fit and ready against an emergency. And all +of these services of the soldier come to the average +taxpayer for less than a penny a day.</p> + +<p>Do I toot too loudly—do I scare the calf?</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="IV"> + <i>IV</i><br>THE FIRST GAME + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>One day at West Point it was my duty to take +a prominent visitor, an Englishman, to a football +game. We sat through three periods with little conversation. +Knowing that British Rugby corresponds +in its continuous motion to our basketball, I finally +got up courage to ask him what he thought of the +game he was witnessing. “Well,” he said, “I think +it’s all very jolly, but I can’t understand why they +get down and pray so much.”</p> + +<p>That brings up the very first serious game we +played with the British in this country. It was a contest +we had for freedom between 1775 and 1783. +Incidentally we lost the game, but we gained our +independence. If the actual score could have been +displayed in the headlines of a great news sheet, it +would have read something like this: “The British +rout the Colonials, 31-6.”</p> + +<p>In the first period of that game, after the kick-off +at Lexington and Concord, the English General +Howe shoved the Colonial Team right out of Long +Island, and sent many of them to the sidelines. When +he appeared before Manhattan, they ran away at +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</span>the first sight of the British Team—ran pell-mell right +through New York’s East Side, until our head coach +jumped in and actually had to beat them over the +back to get them onto the playing field again. But +they melted away despite entreaties and prodding. +Of course, it wasn’t a team that George Washington +had at that time. It was a collection of fellows who +hadn’t been taught the rules and principles of the +game, did not understand team-work, who had few +togs, were poorly conditioned and scarcely knew +how to line up. All this was very humiliating since +our country was abundantly rich to support a good +coaching staff and to make an outlay for training +and equipment. Besides the game had been advertised +for over ten years. Yet nothing had been done +to present even a good defensive line and back field. +In fact, most of the men who turned out had never +even tackled the dummy—let alone being assembled. +It is not surprising then that when the Colonists were +chased by General Howe down through New Jersey, +that over half of Washington’s squad just picked +up and went home, refused to play any longer, said +they’d played as long as they’d agreed to, and left +him with a few to carry on against a quantity of +well drilled and trained opponents. They were discontented +not only at the poor showing but because +they didn’t have a chance. But Washington, instead +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</span>of quitting, showed how much determined stuff was +in him. When, with the handful remaining, the game +looked hopelessly lost, he called for two brilliant +forward passes down on his one-foot line at Trenton +and Princeton, which were successful. It was a daring +play, but besides throwing a tiny scare into the +British, the Colonists netted only eight yards and +were forced to kick. They did a lot of justified +kicking at this time in many other ways, but these +desperate plays put back a lot of spirit into the team, +in spite of the discouraging situation, and the desertion +from Washington’s ranks of players.</p> + +<p>It was in the second period of the game that the +Colonists made their first real touchdown at Saratoga. +Of course, they outweighed the British about +thirty pounds to the man, and that helped. Then, +too, they had a fine captain of the team by the name +of Arnold, who afterwards because of ill-treatment +on his own squad at the hands of some disgruntled +alumni, went over and played on the British team. +But meanwhile General Howe added to his lead by +scoring with wide end sweeps and perfect interference +two more touchdowns at the Brandywine +and Germantown—and there the half ended. During +the intermission both teams rested. The British went +into luxurious training quarters in Philadelphia, +where they built themselves up with good food and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</span>generally had a sprightly fine time, whereas the +Colonists’ squad sat out in the open and shivered +and starved through a freezing winter, and the hardships +took a further toll of Washington’s line and +backfield men. But a great thing happened at Valley +Forge for Washington’s remnants of a squad. The +pupil of the master strategist abroad, Frederick the +Great, arrived. It was Baron Von Steuben. At once +Washington made him principal assistant coach. +There was no department of the game in which he +was not skilled. He was an untiring worker and had +a kind, attractive personality as an instructor. He +picked out the best material and made a sort of varsity +squad. He emphasized the fundamentals of +blocking and tackling in which the colonists were +sadly lacking. As he drilled them in diversified plays +and got them clicking as a team, the rest of the +players watched them and then attempted to imitate +them on separate fields. He did much as they do +in those schools where everyone has to take part +in sports, where intra-mural athletics are treated +seriously. The effect of such coaching was immediately +felt at Monmouth in the beginning of the +third period, where the Colonists played the British +to a standstill; and could have made another touchdown, +had not Charles Lee, a good half-back when +he wanted to play, run with the ball full-tilt toward +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</span>the enemy’s goal. He would actually have made a +touchdown for the other side, if one of his own +team-mates had not tackled him a little past midfield. +But shortly afterward, this good showing of the +Colonists was overcome by two touchdowns made +by the British at Newport and Camden, where undrilled +players faced veterans. Later Nathaniel +Greene, a fine team captain, played well with a green +squad riddled with injuries. Although he could not +threaten the goal line, he stood the British on even +terms at Guilford Court House. His defensive work +with his inferior line was praiseworthy, but it didn’t +thrill the spectators or advance the ball. Then came +Washington’s strategy as a great coach. He fooled +the British into the belief that he was playing a +6-2-2-1 defense and suddenly with a fake kick attack, +swooped down on Cornwallis at Yorktown. +Even though the team was penalized for holding, he +hung on. But the touchdown he was responsible for +in his excellent head-work was offset by the fact +that there had been imported more men from France +to block the British than he had players from his +own institution. The officials took the view that +players brought in from another institution were +ringers, and therefore the score as applying to the +Colonists would have to be thrown out. And besides +this touchdown didn’t end the game, as so many +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</span>people think it did. It was just the end of the third +period. In the last and fourth quarter, the British +quarter-back realized his lead of 31 to 6, and just +held on, since he had a squad of three times as many +hardy and well-drilled players as had been lost at +Yorktown and altogether a better and bigger one +than the Colonists had. Of course, the British were +just content to stall around in midfield, occupying +our principal cities. The game ended just as the +entire British squad was called back to England, +because the schedule makers in Europe had more +important games for them to play over there. And +that left the gridiron empty. If the game was not +won by the Colonists, at least the field was. So irrespective +of score, the Americans surged all over the +gridiron and carried off both sets of goal-posts with +a great hurrahing over the victory. And we’ve been +hurrahing ever since.</p> + +<p>Now the story of our Revolution as a game may +appear to some to sound flippant, to poke fun at +our troops and belittle them. No one reveres more +the courage and fortitude of the men of ’76 than +the soldier. But so many of their sufferings and defeats +were unnecessary, and so much of their efforts +wasted because of lack of timely coaching, that the +story as a game can briefly picture the play as the +action took place. In principle, that was exactly what +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</span>happened in our fight for freedom. We really never +won the Revolution by either our power or our +skill. And what’s the use of fooling ourselves now? +Are we not ready to look at this contest frankly +in the face and learn its lessons? Because of our +failure to coach or equip our squad properly, we +dragged on eight years of death by exposure, disease +and the bullet. And this procedure is all the +sadder and more tragic when we recognize that the +material available in the colonies was as fine in raw +ruggedness, character and marksmanship as anywhere +in the world. Men who joined the ranks became +discouraged by the wholesale when they saw +themselves too often officered by persons as unskilled +and unlettered as they, when they realized +that they had little chance against soldiers well-trained +and equipped. They keenly felt the disgrace +and uselessness of it all. It was natural that they +deserted in shoals or left at the expiration of short-time +enlistments. The Continental Line, which +Steuben coached and who stuck all through the +war, were able and heroic, but were few by comparison. +The great majority stayed only as long a +time as would correspond to a few days on a football +squad. Washington and Steuben couldn’t count +on what material they could coach or could have for +any one game. Green Americans against expert British, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</span>were the rule. If you can picture a coach on any +gridiron receiving from the farm or the store a new +set of men every two days, with most of the old +set leaving at the same time, and attempting to produce +a team for a game each Saturday, you have in +a mild way Washington’s situation. We know that +when we put untrained and unconditioned men into +a football game, we reap more serious injuries than +if the men are hardened and trained. If those casualties +exist where the human body is the only +weapon, how <i>much more</i> unspeakable are the added +injuries where bad weather, poor shelter, loss of +food and sleep, bullets and cannon balls were the +weapons. So in the Revolution we put men in a +more terrible plight than we’d think of allowing even +in modern football.</p> + +<p>But a more surprising thing is what we did after +the war was over. We dismissed our entire coaching +staff and all of the squad except 80 men, who just +worked around the training quarters and received +no practice or instruction in the game. Our people +had the idea that there would never be another +game. They contended that any attempt at a continuous +coaching system with a paid staff was getting +back to professionalism—to despotism and +tyranny. Since armies in Europe were playthings of +Kings, then all armies would be that way. They +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</span>took the same line of reasoning as the man who says, +“Since some church members are hypocrites, then +all churches are wrong.” Washington tried his best +with all his pleading and logic, to show how false +was such a view. He begged and advised in so many +of his letters and testaments that it seems nothing +could be more important to him. He wrote of the +Revolution: “Had we formed a permanent army in +the beginning—we should not have been the greatest +part of the war inferior to the enemy, indebted for +our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently +the mortification of seeing opportunities to ruin them +pass unimproved for the want of a force, which the +country was completely able to afford; and of seeing +the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants +plundered, abused, murdered with impunity +from the same cause.” He also wrote, “To +be prepared for war is one of the most effectual +means of preserving peace.” Henry Lee, Governor +of Virginia about the same time went further. “Convinced +as I am that a government is the murderer of +its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed +and untaught, where they are to meet men of the +same age and strength, mechanized by education and +discipline for battle, I cannot withhold my denunciation +of its wickedness and folly.”</p> + +<p>Thus the people were warned against their slump—and +we shall soon see how they paid for it.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="V"> + <i>V</i><br>THE FIELD MEET + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>First of all, I’d better warn you to turn the dial, +if you don’t want to hear some shocking things +about ourselves—things I daresay you haven’t heard +before. You remember what Hegel said—“We learn +from history that we learn nothing from history.” +I think he meant that we just won’t say, “Because +Mark Anthony, Aaron Burr and Belgium did those +things, we won’t do them either.” O no, we must +poke our nose right into the fire and get our fair +eyebrows burnt off, before we beware. You and I +often take singeings like that and charge them up +to human nature. But as a people after our Revolution +we took red-hot scorchings all over the face +and down the body over and over again. Never did +we profit less by the bungling of any activity than +we did in those years following our escape into freedom. +But I’d better tell you the facts and let you +judge for yourself.</p> + +<p>And yet—I hesitate to tell them—these black +things that our histories cover up with a sheet, a +lily white sheet. As often as I have looked at them +I still get a quake in the stomach. But maybe it’s +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</span>best that we do look them in the face—in order to +enter into the big charity of preventive medicine.</p> + +<p>Well here goes! After the Revolution, in the face +of Washington’s pleading, Steuben’s example, and +stout statesmen’s warnings, we cast out discipline +and training like life boats from a new ship and +reduced the army to eighty men. Then we put seven +hundred on legal paper, who couldn’t be raised or +kept going. Three years after the war we had for +the common defense less than a thousand men +poorly equipped and trained and scattered in the +lonely forts on our borders—the equivalent of one +hundred policemen on the outskirts of Boston today, +with none in the city. So when Daniel Shay +organized his rebellion, forced the court to adjourn +and marched on Springfield, he had things pretty +much his own way. It was only after tumult and +bloodshed that peace was restored, whereas a small, +well-trained force at hand would doubtless have kept +the uprising from even starting. But the people refused +to look at this picture—refused to take out preventives +or insurance against the dreadful happenings +to follow. Even when the United States became +a nation and our Constitution was adopted, we had +an army of the magnificent size of five hundred +ninety-five men. Can you believe it? But listen to +the consequence of this neglect. Seven years after +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</span>Revolution, one thousand souls in Kentucky alone +perished by tomahawk and arrow, with no one to +protect them. Then a force of hastily recruited men +in Ohio were ambushed and wiped out. The next +year fourteen hundred quickly raised defenders were +also annihilated. And of course our weakness furnished +the savage with a new courage for depredations, +so that the thousands of persons who perished +cannot now even be estimated. There was only one +bright spot in this decade of terror. Washington, +despite the laxness of the country, selected Anthony +Wayne to lead troops against the Indians. Wayne, +who had seen Steuben’s careful coaching, trained +his men for over a year before he took them into +action. At the Battle of Fallen Timber, eleven years +after the Revolution, he won our first well-executed +victory over any sort of disorder. The Indians were +so completely spanked that they let the settler live +in peace for a long time—and thousands of lives were +thus saved. But this action was a live coal in a bed +of ashes. For soon the war scares crept steadily upon +us—with France fifteen years after the Revolution, +with Spain twenty years after, with Great Britain +twenty-five years after. At each new scare, Congress +voted huge sums of money and called out +thousands of men on paper, but at no time did our +actual forces even poorly trained, number four +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</span>thousand men. The soldier seemed to be the thermometer +of the nation’s fear. His numbers would +rise and fall like the encased mercury to record the +heat and cold of the people. But he never rose in +time before, or stayed long enough afterward, to +have any effect upon the temperature. He just didn’t +exist in time. William Duane in his writings of the +period complained, “There is no discipline; there is +even no system; and there are gross misconceptions +on the subject. There appears to have been a disposition +to discourage the acquisition of military +knowledge.” So we arrived at our Second War with +Great Britain, twenty-nine years after the Revolution, +weaker proportionally than when we faced +that war.</p> + +<p>Now the land warfare of 1812 would be so +funny, if it weren’t tragic; so laughable, if it weren’t +shameful, that our school histories just must omit +much of it, if they’re going to show that we are the +perfect people of the world. You could scarcely +describe the affair in football language, as I did +with the Revolution, because the candidates for +that gridiron didn’t stay long enough to last much +after the kick-off. It had better be classified as an +open tournament of all games and events, under +any rules which the particular coach wanted to +make, and at any time he wanted to play. It probably +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</span>could be described somewhat as a track-meet, +if it were confined to running events. I tell you those +men who played against or rather opposite Great +Britain the second time, and who took no coaching +for their particular stunts, could outsprint anything +you’ve seen in shorts. The first event was staged at +Detroit where our force of eighteen hundred had +covered themselves up with fortifications. On the +appearance of only twelve hundred of the enemy, +the eighteen hundred gallantly surrendered without +firing a shot or putting up any sort of resistance. This +display of talent was soon followed by even a more +disgraceful one at Queenstown. General Van Rensselaer +got together nearly three thousand hastily +recruited fellows at Lewiston to take the heights +across the river. Two hundred and twenty-five +picked men succeeded in crossing and stormed the +place. This little courageous band withstood charge +after charge of the enemy, hoping for reenforcements. +But the large force on the American side refused +to budge or even help their stricken comrades, +who were finally killed or captured. After seeing +their gallant fellows perish, they made their way to +their homes quite quickly. A little later General +Harrison got together from four states ten thousand +men with no background or experience of warfare. +After a short march and slight flurry with the Indians +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</span>their speed in getting back to their homes and +camp was far beyond the most sanguine expectations. +You couldn’t exactly say they ran. No, they +evaporated and their work was over. Then General +Dearborn sent an expedition of fifteen hundred men +against a small post on the River LaColle. The British +garrison consisted of only two hundred men, seven +and one-half times smaller force than ours. But by +unskilled leadership the American columns were +separated and had an exciting time firing into each +other while the enemy escaped. After all these +escapades, along came General Smythe, who openly +confessed how wrong other leaders had been and +how he was the one hope of the war. By bombastic +proclamations he induced over five thousand men to +come to him at Black Rock for an invasion of +Canada. On the promised day for the crossing, less +than half the command embarked in the morning +and waited there for the order to push across. In the +afternoon, Smythe sensing the weakness of his +troops, ordered them to disembark, and stated that +the expedition was temporarily postponed. The men +were so resentful that he promised he would invade +Canada at a later date. Three days afterward he got +them into the boats—and then out of them the very +same way. The scene of riot and discontent was indescribable. +Men fired off their weapons in every +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</span>direction, and threatened Smythe’s life. Hunted and +pursued, he finally made his way to his home in +Virginia, and his command dispersed in disorder.</p> + +<p>The next episode was that of General Winchester +who sent Colonel Lewis to take Frenchtown, which +he captured with a superior force. But after he had +gained his victory, his soldiers were so lawless, undisciplined +and ignorant of the first essentials of +precaution, that the enemy returned and killed or +captured the whole of the ten hundred and fifty +Americans. Then came two successful expeditions. +General Pike with seventeen hundred picked men +took Toronto garrisoned by half that number and +General Harrison with a force three times as great +as the enemy, won a victory at Thames River. But +these engagements were isolated and did not have +much effect upon the war. Then General Hampton +marched on Montreal with about five thousand untrained +men, who met eight hundred Canadian regulars, +before whom they fled in utter panic. After this +General Wilkinson tried the same thing with a similar +force. When his advance guard of sixteen hundred +men met eight hundred British at Chrysler’s +Field, they did the usual scampering and Wilkinson +gave up the idea of invading Canada. After all this +weakness there was nothing to stop the enemy from +swooping down upon us. They took Fort Niagara, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</span>occupied Lewiston, Youngstown and Manchester +and burned Buffalo. When six hundred and fifty +British and Indians appeared before Black Rock, +nearly three thousand Americans going by the name +of soldiers ran away without even aiming—ran to +cover so fast that the enemy had no trouble pillaging +and destroying everything in sight.</p> + +<p>But through these lowering clouds of neglect +and ignorance there came a rift of sunshine. Three +young generals, Brown, Scott, Ripley, in spite of +the backward administration, decided on their own +hook in these dark ages to pull out of their shelves +the old learning of Washington and Steuben, to +have a little renaissance of their own. For a year they +worked on preparing thirty-five hundred men for +real service in the field. And they were rewarded +by the heroic battles of Chippewa and Lundy’s +Lane. Ah, yes, our histories record these actions, +but they don’t tell why they were successful. The +men were trained and disciplined. And these two +contests put a wholesome stop to depredations and +invasions of American soil in the north.</p> + +<p>Yet much of that work was counteracted by +Bladensburg, the prime disgrace of American History. +Little anxiety had been felt in Washington, +over three thousand British troops who had +been hovering about in the Chesapeake for a year. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</span>The Secretary of War, the President and General +Winder fell into a lengthy argument about how +many troops should be called out to oppose this +force. Meanwhile, the enemy was marching uninterruptedly +toward our Capital. Finally sixty-four +hundred Americans were collected just before the +battle to oppose the invaders. The camp of men was +wild with disorder and drink, while our so-called +leaders were stupid with perplexity. Just before +actual contact the three gentlemen mentioned above, +fell to discussing the situation as if it were something +quite new. The troops were posted on the +heights—badly. At the firing of some harmless +rockets, our force which outnumbered the enemy +two to one, fled right through the nation’s Capitol, +leaving it open to plunder and rapine. Why the +British chose to burn only the public buildings, was +probably due to their sportsmanship.</p> + +<p>Of course, General Jackson did excellent defensive +work at New Orleans, but that was after +the war was over—after the whistle had blown. Of +course the Navy, too, did perfect work. The government +had seen to it that they had been well-trained +for a long time before the war. There were +no novices in that organization.</p> + +<p>All these actions on land were really more disgraceful +than I have described them. Throughout +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</span>the War of 1812, as you see, most any unqualified +man could be put in the saddle and every kind of +unprepared man could be put in the field to fight. +We were helpless, hopeless, impatient, disgraceful, +because we had discarded training and foresight in +the years beforehand. In this war, over two decades +after we had become a nation, we committed all +the errors of the Revolution to a greater degree—and +one more. We had no management or leadership—no +commander-in-chief or the commonest business +organization. Fine manhood, for want of previous +training was held up to ridicule, suffering, casualties, +and disgrace. Now for the figures. We called out +over half a million men and could not drive a maximum +of sixteen thousand from our shores for over +two years. We spent nearly two hundred million +dollars, not counting pensions, when two per cent +of that sum with a small well-trained force would +have sufficed. And above all we sacrificed six thousand +lives in camp and on the battlefield, when that +figure should not have been over two hundred. As +far as might, efficiency, planning and management +were concerned, we muddled this war on land to +the tune of death and shame. Again we couldn’t +defend our country against our enemies and had to +thank God for European weariness from Napoleon, +which called off the British. That’s the reason why, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</span>when our raw material is finer and greater than anywhere +else in the world, the soldier is so wrought up +over our people rushing into future extravagance, +unnecessary slaughter and possible defeat. For somehow +war has a habit of sneaking up on us craftily +and quickly, like a thug.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="VI"> + <i>VI</i><br>THE UPHILL GAME + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>How about giving our imaginations a little exercise +for a minute before we start in on the evening’s +story. Are we set for the effort? Well, here’s the +picture. Just suppose a great plague of flu were +to sweep this country from end to end. And suppose +there were not a single doctor or nurse in the +United States. Now suppose that Congress, all excited, +voted great numbers of doctors and nurses to +stem the scourge. Well, how many people would +die, and how much neglect and horror would visit +our doorways, while the doctors and nurses were +being trained and educated? Just go over in your +mind that little chaos and you have almost a view +of the War of 1812—almost—for then we went this +fancied epidemic one better. We didn’t provide +training and education at all for the doctors and +nurses—the officers and men of that calamity. The +plague of war just went along from bad to worse—and +then from worse to awful. There was much +excuse for our slips before and during the Revolution, +when we were a loose lot of colonies and were +divided into Whigs and Tories. But by 1812 we had +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</span>been a nation for over twenty years. Few realized +then, and some don’t now, that the soldier needs +just as much preparation and education as the doctor +and the nurse. For preparedness against war and +shortening a war amount to a vast science and art +which cannot be trusted to quacks without undue +loss of life to our sons. After our narrow escape from +this plague of 1812, when our enemy providentially +was called back to Europe, we didn’t do away with +our preventive medicine, as we did after the Revolution. +No sir, we kept that training for three whole +months. Then we reduced it to ten thousand men +on paper. Five years later, in the face of protests by +such men as John C. Calhoun, we cut it to six thousand +men. Then the Seminoles, Creeks and Black +Hawk promptly entered into the gentle art of taking +scalps. Settlers were slain. Dade’s Command of one +hundred seven officers and men marching on a +peaceful errand were massacred. Other officers and +civilians were mowed down. Cholera attacked the +troops against Black Hawk, and yellow fever took +its toll of those against the Seminoles. In the Florida, +Georgia and Alabama country a force of less than +a thousand trained troops tried to keep safe a vast +unexplored country against three thousand Indians. +By 1834, for the whole of the United States, less +than four thousand troops attempted to guard over +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</span>ten thousand miles of seacoast and frontier for fifteen +million people. Two years later, after these +killings had been going on for some time, our legislators +with frenzied haste voted our army to be +raised back to ten thousand. But the troops could +not be had or trained in time. So the slaughter went +on. Mr. Hearst quotes Alfred Henry Lewis as saying +that a Congressman is like a man riding backwards +in a train. He never sees anything till after it has +passed. Well, that may be a little unfair to our +legislators, but it surely applied to these enactments. +For what happened afterwards? The usual waste +and ineffectiveness. General after general on the +frontier asked to be relieved of command because +of the impossibility of the task, the smallness of the +force and the wholesale, needless deaths. Of the +trained men in this Seminole War over forty-one +per cent perished—nearly half of all the troops—and +to little purpose. One hundred seventeen of our best +officers, in one year, seeing the fruitlessness of their +services resigned from the army rather than to be a +party to stagnation. Among them were such prominent +men as Horace Bliss, W. C. Young, R. R. +Parrott, Alexander D. Bache, Albert Sydney Johnston, +N. B. Buford, Leonidas Polk, Jefferson Davis, +Joseph E. Johnston and George G. Meade. By 1842 +the army in the face of the want of a strong national +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</span>police force was reduced to eighty-six hundred and +thirteen men. A Congressman on the floor of the +house stated in that year: “We have no prospects of +war. We have more reason to suppose that the world +will grow wiser and that the humane and oft-repeated +wish of the wise and good, that the sword +and bayonet may be converted into the scythe and +ploughshare, will be realized.” We have no prospects +of war! Four years after this statement, came +the War with Mexico like a bolt out of the red, +white and blue. It found our seventeen million people +with an army of fifty-three hundred men all +told, or what would correspond for a university of +seventeen hundred students to a football squad of +six men. Six whole men. Think of that. A line, all +but one man, no backs and no substitutes. Of course, +you couldn’t play the game at all, under those circumstances. +Well, as the Mexican War was in sight +General Zachary Taylor had to. He had to fight +with less than that. He had just three thousand +troops against a possible fifty thousand Mexicans. +Even so, his command was the largest regular force +we had assembled since the Revolution. Whatever +the rights and wrongs of this war were, Taylor was +in a perilous position. When hostilities came, he had +to go forward with his little band of trained soldiers. +Against superior forces he won the battles of Palo +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</span>Alto and Resaca de la Palma. Then he was held up. +Untrained volunteers poured in upon him too late—right +in the midst of campaign—just as applicants +for a medical school might rush in and clog up a +busy hospital. Imagine that situation, hundreds of +novices running around the corridors and into the +wards of a big hospital. Would the doctors be crazy? +Taylor’s position was worse. The government had +forced him to keep these men in his institution and +many of them hadn’t the inclination to learn, many +had come out for a lark, and all of them had to be +taught from the ground up obedience, punctiliousness, +cleanliness and the technique and character of +the soldier if they weren’t going to <i>run</i> or be uselessly +<i>killed in battle</i>. It took four months’ waiting +and preparing in a hostile country before Taylor +could go into his next engagement. Besides he +couldn’t get enough transportation. But he had one +big advantage over leaders in 1812 and the Revolution. +West Point was beginning to account for itself—not +because it was West Point, nor because I would +emphasize the United States Military Academy unduly, +but because it was the only place in the Western +Hemisphere <i>then</i> where a man could get four +years’ training and education toward being a doctor +for the plague of war. Five hundred West Pointers—the +Grants and Stonewall Jacksons as lieutenants +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</span>and captains, made things easier for Taylor, and +other West Pointers, like Jefferson Davis, were coming +back to the colors with the volunteers. So Taylor, +after his green men had been taught something, +won the battle of Monterey. But these victories +weren’t getting us anywhere. They were just scattered +first downs. Taylor was much like the hen +that pecks, but has nothing to cackle about. Over +his advance into nowhere the administration was +beginning to be nervous. He could scarcely have +been called an educated soldier. On the contrary, +Winfield Scott, the commanding general of the +army in Washington, was professionally trained and +self-educated to the point of brilliance. For a long +time Scott had told Polk and Marcy, just what +would end the war quickly—a strike at the very +heart of Mexico—nothing less. But the powers +wouldn’t listen to him, scoffed at him, called him +visionary. The quacks were ridiculing the doctors. +But when Taylor got nowhere more leisurely, the +administration threw up its hands and chucked the +whole affair into Scott’s lap, because the people were +becoming restless for a solution. Yes, the President +gave permission to Scott, but he had called Scott’s +plan visionary, and therefore had to prove his point +by taking a pot shot at Scott’s efforts when he could +safely do so from executive cover. In spite of this +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</span>double-crossing, Scott finally got enough troops at +Vera Cruz to start shoving through to the finish. +Meanwhile Taylor, who could scarcely have been +accused of planning his battles with knowledge and +decision, won Buena Vista. A number of trained +subordinates, such as Wool and Jefferson Davis, together +with seasoned troops were mainly responsible +for the victory. But beyond drawing a large part +of the Mexican Army away from Scott, it did not +accomplish much toward ending the war. Scott had +given it out that he was going to conquer a peace +and he was determined to do so with all speed. +By skill and energy he took Vera Cruz with only +twenty losses to his troops. But then he was met +with horrible obstacles. Polk had not kept his part +of the bargain—to send the rest of the troops, transportation +and supplies. Yellow fever would soon be +attacking the forces in this low country. Scott +pushed on toward the highlands anyhow with what +he had. At Cerro Gordo he faced a natural stronghold +in the mountains that was terrifying. With +excellent scouting and planning, with the aid of +able subordinates such as Robert E. Lee, he pushed +through the scowling, fortified barrier and sent the +Mexicans flying, pursuing them as far as he could.</p> + +<p>But then came the rub. Jalapa. Have you ever +heard of Jalapa? Well, it was another Valley Forge +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</span>in our history, a Valley Forge in a hostile country +far from home. There, seven regiments and two +companies of Scott’s volunteers went home in a +body because their enlistments expired. Over thirty-six +hundred men left him, and nothing could stir +their patriotism to remain. His force was reduced to +less than seven thousand in the face of twenty +thousand Mexicans. Also James K. Polk was continuing +his undercutting work at home. Scott was +being too successful and would be too strong politically. +So money and recruits did not arrive. The +troops were not only low in numbers, but in spirits, +too. Scott pleaded in vain with the government for +the life of his men and honor of our country to +send him what he needed. Some of his troops were +beginning to feel it was no use trying to go forward. +It was all they could do to survive now in the center +of Mexico. One of his generals advised going back. +Would they have to give up? It was a desperate +situation. But Scott meant to go forward. He began +by winning over the hostile inhabitants through his +kindly, square treatment. They grew to like him +better than their own leader, Santa Anna. He kept +his troops in hand and generally well-behaved. So +he was finally able to barter with the inhabitants and +get food for his men. He pushed on toward Puebla +without the money and recruits promised him. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</span>Finally, after two months’ delay, fresh troops and +money came. Even though he had only ten thousand +seven hundred eighty-one effectives, mixed with +green men, he went further onward immediately. +Came the victories of Contreras, Churubusco, Molino +del Rey, Chapultepec and Mexico City. The +capital was taken and the war was over. In six +months, trained troops, trained subordinates and a +trained commander had marched through the heart +of a hostile country, against vastly superior numbers +of the enemy, against a bloodsucking administration +at its back, and had conquered a peace, as Scott had +said he would. Had his advice in the first place been +heeded, the war, the sufferings, the deaths, and the +expense could have been cut in less than a fourth. +But again the value of training and education for a +plague had been flouted. Yet training and training +alone had won for us our first successful war on land. +And from it came a third of the present area of the +United States, which we weren’t loath to accept.</p> + +<p>And the cause of our success? Well, we must be +frank and honest. We must admit that the opposition +wasn’t really first class. Had it been, dear knows +what beatings our paltry number of trained troops +would have taken. But the Mexicans were by no +means as weak as we were in 1812. If they had been, +we could have walked into the Mexican capital +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</span>without much more than a loud booh. We mustn’t +get the idea that the Mexicans couldn’t fight. They +disputed the way so hotly at Contreras and Molino +del Rey, that it looked for a time very doubtful for +the United States. It was no afternoon’s parade such +as the British had had into our capitol.</p> + +<p>But our quality was superior and we could force +our way through the opposition. Why? Well, Scott +tells you, Scott, who was not a West Pointer. He +said that had it not been for the graduates of the +Academy, the war would have lasted four or five +years, with more defeats than victories in the first +part. At any rate, these young men proved to be a +great foundation for efficient leadership. Specialized +education and training whether or not by West +Point had saved money and life in this war, despite +untrained inpourings, despite a hampering administration, +and despite our pitiful numbers.</p> + +<p>But let us hark back to a piece of irony. In the +previous years before this war, <i>twice had Congress +tried to abolish West Point</i>, and <i>once</i> it made no +appropriations for it, so that the Superintendent at +his own risk had to borrow $65,000 from a private +individual to keep it going. What ugliness would +have been added to our history, had the abolitionists +been successful? What shame and slaughter would +have come had the President <i>not</i> been forced to let +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</span>Scott carry out his plan? Is it to laugh or weep at +the sentimentalists who would do away with the +doctors and squander human life? Well, let’s see the +Civil War next. Not so pretty—what?</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="VII"> + <i>VII</i><br>THE SCRAMBLE + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>At a game of bridge, a player once tried to excuse +himself to his partner for trumping his ace, “But you +see,” he said, “I’m just learning.” Said the partner, +“That’s the devil of it—you’re <i>not</i>.” Just why our +country didn’t learn after three wars, two of which +we actually lost through the <i>absence</i> of training, +and one of which we won <i>because</i> of training, is a +mystery to more than good bridge players. Well, +we didn’t learn, for right after the Mexican War, we +reduced our trained force to the size it was shortly +after our miserable War of 1812, thirty-six years +before. And we made this astounding reduction, in +the face of an increase in our population of twelve +millions, and in our territory, of nearly a million +square miles. The soldier was almost immediately +put up against an impossible task. He was sprinkled +about so thinly beyond the Mississippi that often he +despaired of his own existence. A paltry seven thousand +struggled against hundreds of thousands of +Indians for the sake of the settler. Besides, the western +land was familiar to the savage and strange to +the soldier. The odds against this meager force were +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</span>increased when gold was discovered in California, +when the forty-niner came along. The soldier had +to build forts, roads and trails—and escort the endless +caravans of wagon trains over the prairie, if the +settler was to arrive safely in our coast states. Meanwhile +uprisings of Apaches, Yumas, Navajos, Cheyenne +and the deadly Sioux had to be repulsed. Tardy +increases of the trained force by Congress came far +behind the heels of the unwarranted killings. By +1861 the entire army, trained only in small actions, +numbered a little over fifteen thousand men. And +eighty-four per cent of this force was scattered so +completely and remotely from Washington, that it +would have taken months to collect them. We sat +through all this, like the man watching for weeks the +flood approaching his house, and making no attempt +to remove his furniture, or get a boat. We watched +the skies grow darker and crooned, “It ain’t goin’ to +rain no more.” For thirty years the North had been +trying to black the South’s industrial eye, and the +South had as vigorously defied the threats. Violent +abolitionists, cartoonists, pamphleteers and novelists +had been using hot words and making insulting +gestures at each other. Yet the Yankee, doubling +one fist and opening the other, kept saying, “O, no +there won’t be a war. Brother couldn’t fight brother. +Even if there is one, it can’t last.” When South Carolina +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</span>seceded four months before the conflict, and +six states followed her example, we did not wake +up to the protection of our youth. When nearly one-fourth +of the army, with its proportion of government +property in Texas, was surrendered to the +South, we did nothing to overcome the loss. When +we saw the South call out one hundred thousand +men for a year’s service, we sat like spectators on +the bleachers. We let the Confederates seize the +arsenals in their states and all the government property +they wanted. We let them boldly inaugurate a +rival republic within our borders, elect a president +and declare their independence. Even then we made +no effort to school and train our men so that they +might have some chance. General Scott early begged +Buchanan and Secretary of War Floyd to raise a +small, efficient, trained force to stem possible trouble, +but these men of state merely shrugged. Since Scott +was too old to mount a horse, he was too old to give +advice. After all he was only at the top of his profession, +practically and theoretically. Our attitude +was <i>not</i> to be ready for possible emergencies, and +particularly an emergency that had been slapping +us in the face for over thirty years, but to do as +wretchedly as we could when the emergency +struck us. And we surely lived up to expectations. +When the gun at Fort Sumter waked the sleeping +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</span>North into action, we were destitute of anything +like a proper tool to handle the situation. Even our +new President because there were no trained troops +in the East to protect him, had to make his way in +disguise to a threatened White House; whereas +President Davis, a trained, tried and educated soldier +and statesman had collected thirty-five thousand +troops, who were being trained and equipped. So +when President Lincoln, unlettered and unskilled +in the art and science of war arrived in office, he +found the South had a magnificent start on him. +From then on throughout the war he had to work +against horrible handicaps, even though we had +three times the man-power and many times the resources +of the Confederates. In desperation he called +out seventy-five thousand men for three months—seventy-five +thousand raw men to do the work of +veterans. In response to this call, a Massachusetts +regiment was mobbed while passing through Baltimore +and a Pennsylvania regiment had to turn back +because it had no arms. Meanwhile nearly three +hundred southern officers of the small, far-scattered +trained army went over to the South.</p> + +<p>Washington and other cities were deluged with +a bewildered, undisciplined and poorly led and +organized lot of fellows. Under little restraint they +wandered aimlessly about, often unfed for weeks, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</span>quartered in muddy, filthy buildings, with ill-fitting +and oftimes insufficient clothing and with little +idea of their duties, conduct or responsibilities. The +trained men were so few they couldn’t be found, +and the government, unlike the able management in +the South, made no effort to find them or use their +services to the best advantage. Why, when U. S. +Grant wrote to Washington offering himself for +duty, he wasn’t even replied to. Naturally you can’t +blame the rank and file, if there was an unwarranted +lot of brawls and disturbances. Idleness and lack of +discipline just means that. Public buildings were defaced. +Even the Capitol itself suffered damage and +abuse from a regiment quartered in its halls and on +the very floors of the Senate and House. The farmer +colonel and the apothecary major stalked the streets +in showy uniforms, drew their pay, and didn’t go +near their commands for weeks. Not all of them. +There were some very worthy ones, who strove +under hindrances of little opportunity, to bring +order out of their units. But they were the accidents +in our country’s arrangements—or lack of them. In +these first few months of grand hubbub, misfit and +waste, the country had spent more money than +would have supported an army of prevention during +the preceding ten years. And what needless hardship +and suffering it had brought to more than +seventy-five thousand people.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</span></p> + +<p>But something had to be done. These three-month +men would be going home soon and we’d have to +begin all over. The people of the North, having had +such a long sleep, demanded action. What matter +if we did throw our poor men into a raging torrent +before we taught them how to swim. On to Richmond! +Those who had said there couldn’t be any +war, were the loudest in screaming for a fight. On +to Richmond! So McDowell became the scape-goat. +He had to go. They gave him only thirty thousand +men, but that was ten times more than any active +officer in the regular army had ever had a chance +to handle. They also gave him eight days in which to +transform this excursion into an army. Eight days. It +was a compliment to his magical powers. But the +administration and the country were really serious +about it. So he took them out to do battle. Fatigue, +waste, meandering, sore feet, green apples, overdrinking +and all those hundreds of vices, which the +recruit learns to get over, appeared on the march—a +march that allowed him to go the great distance +of fifteen miles in two days. What else could have +happened at Bull Run but what <i>did</i> happen? Of +course they’d run. It wasn’t their fault, nor had it +anything to do with their bravery. It always will +happen when untrained men meet a sudden reversal. +Training and discipline are the equivalent of confidence, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</span>and these men hadn’t been allowed by their +people to have any confidence. Some of them never +stopped fleeing till they got to New York. Had it not +been that there were a few trained regulars to stop +the onrush of the Confederates, more men would +have been uselessly slaughtered. This spectacle gave +us less than <i>nothing</i>. So we proceeded to call out +one <i>million</i> men with more pandemonium, more ill-supplied +concentrations, more sufferings and more +expense.</p> + +<p>Two weeks ago a listener to these talks, a total +stranger to me, sent me an extract from a diary of +a gentleman now living, a survivor of this war, one +of those noblemen who at this period of the story +volunteered to be met with unnecessary cruelty by +his country. Here is some of the extract:</p> + +<p>“In due time we arrived in Washington on a +drizzly, sloppy evening and were marched to and +housed in some large building already occupied by +larger numbers than should have been there. We had +no food, the place was dimly lighted with smoking +torches. The floor was so muddy and foul that we +could not lie down and no place for so doing being +provided. We stood and shivered and said things +and wondered if all heroes lived in such style as +this.”</p> + +<p>The diary goes on to show how this detachment +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</span>wandered about unassigned to any organization, for +days without food, and living in indescribable filth. +That is a sample of what these hordes of fine men +suddenly called out, suffered. The author of this +diary is now ninety-one, one of the few left to tell +the tale. Let me extend to him the admiration and +gratitude of our army for his needless and heroic +endurance and fortitude.</p> + +<p>To go on with the story, during this haphazard +condition the South was allowed to develop itself by +its comparatively efficient methods, undisturbed by +us. McClellan had now the task of building up the +great part of these heterogeneous masses into something +of an organization. The war had stopped to +let us train. But had it? The terrific expense and +useless deaths went on. In this first year thousands +died of disease under new conditions of exposure +and hardships. Meanwhile McClellan had to have +time for his gigantic task. The people of the North +began to be irritated. Why didn’t he do something? +Why didn’t he go on to Richmond? He had plenty +of men. The Yankee brain felt that numbers were a +solution for anything. It little realized that the +officers had to be taught the technique of the march, +the camp, the battlefield, security, supply, guard, +unit management, drill and staff work. The men had +to be taught all sorts of movements, the use of their +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</span>weapons, sentry duty and above all discipline. All +this would have to be done now at this late date, if +the North were going to have any success at all. So +for nearly a year against the ignorant clamor of a +nation, McClellan worked in schooling, and preparing +a huge army that would not have been necessary, +had Scott’s advice been heeded. And he turned out +a well-knit machine ready for action—but just a year +too late to save the great carnage. When finally a +year after the war opened, the Peninsular Campaign +was begun, the administration of novices in Washington +held out troops from McClellan, heckled and +hampered him and finally stopped him when he +was beginning to get somewhere. Meanwhile the +South was making consummate use of Robert E. +Lee’s brains and leadership. Then came the empty +victory of Antietam, and the defeats of Fredericksburg +and Chancellorsville. It wasn’t until the middle +of the third year of the war that we won our first +decisive battle at Gettysburg. But why shouldn’t we +at that late date? It was no glory to us. We had the +man-power and money. It’s nothing to be particularly +happy about as far as efficiency is concerned. +It’s far better for us to grieve over the losses, the +extravagant, ignorant, idle, silly, moronic losses—losses +that could scarcely be attributed to men in +their senses. I cannot make invectives too strong +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</span>against my fellow Yankee, who murderously treated +his fellow man by his inhuman dullness before the +war. For in this conflict we fought the bloodiest +war, man for man, in all our history, when by +wisdom and foresight of ordinary business, we could +have saved ninety to ninety-eight per cent of the +deaths. By our late start, our failure to apply preventives +in time, our unreasoning obtuseness in not +listening to the experts, we had to call out nearly +three million men. Of these we lost by battle over +one hundred ten thousand men. But listen to this—by +death from disease we threw away nearly a quarter +of a million, and the main part of the awful sickness +was in the first part of the war and among men +utterly unfit for campaign. Among the trained men +sickness was so rare that it wasn’t often reported. +Besides this mortality, of the many fine souls and +bodies of volunteers who with high motives came +into the ranks, fought and escaped death, there were +thousands who went back home stricken by the +effects of the bullet, dysentery and fever for the +rest of their lives.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="VIII"> + <i>VIII</i><br>MORE SCRAMBLE + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>Over my bed in college hung a drawing made by +a member of the Class of 1837. (Not a classmate of +mine.) It showed a college youth of the time, quite +wabbly from too great association with John Barleycorn. +He was pointing his brace of pistols at a +monkey perched on the foot of his bed. Underneath +the picture were the words: “If you’re a <i>monkey</i>, +you’re in a devilish fix. If you’re <i>not</i> a monkey, <i>I’m</i> +in a devilish fix.” Just whether or not it was a real +monkey I never knew, but there was no mistaking +the fix. The more closely we study the Civil War, +the more we find that we were in a <i>terrible</i> fix. And +the more we get away from it, the more we hate to +look the fix in the face, especially because the fix +was our own fault. Today the World War is so +close to us that it screens the errors and calamities +of our Civil War. We forget too often that in the +early sixties we endured the most awful catastrophe +this country has ever seen—a thing far more bloody +man for man than what we went through in the +World War. But maybe it’s a healthy thing to look +at our Civil fix now, as the doctor studies past epidemics +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</span>in order to prevent future horrors to mankind. +A picture of the year before that war is full +of so many fixes—so many pieces of indulgence in +artificial stimulation and neglect that they’d fill a +book. But here are two. In 1860 just before we were +rushed into the struggle, a bill was introduced into +Congress to abolish the Navy, on the ground that +we’d never have any more war. Fortunately it failed +of passage. But the only legislation for the army that +year was the appointment of a committee to look +into West Point and an authorization to increase the +sugar and coffee ration of the soldier. And all this, +while the tension between the North and South was +about to snap. A school and a drink, while blood +and flame were in sight. And there was no fire department +to quench the raging blaze. A hose in +Oregon, a nozzle in Florida, horses in Arizona and +an engine nowhere! And suddenly Sumter’s guns +cracked out and set the nation on fire. We began +to seethe and mill around. The President was caught +in the furor and had to exercise his war powers. +Later when Congress met, it made the entire set-up +for the war in less than four weeks. Less than four +weeks! Why you couldn’t do that with a new factory, +much less a police department. And here we +were with a massive business undertaking that meant +life and death to the whole country. Of course, the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</span>legislation teemed with mistakes, which we paid for +extravagantly and are still paying for. The men +called out weren’t soldiers any more than they could +be lawyers, managers and operators without practice +and education.</p> + +<p>The thirty thousand collected for Bull Run were, +in the mind of the North, going to march right +through to New Orleans. And people came out +from nearby towns to watch, from a very safe distance, +the battle—congressmen in carriages, women +in barouches, sutlers in wagons and reporters in +tree-tops. They would behold this battle that was +going to bag these rebels and drive them into the +Gulf of Mexico. The spectators having comfortable +and uncomfortable seats, the engagement after some +delay started. Tyler was slow in getting into position +and Hunter’s brigade rested for refreshments by the +waters of Bull Run a bit too long. After a time the +Southern masked batteries began to have their telling +effect. Lines were formed slowly and badly +under fire. Many did not know the use of their +muskets. Those in the rear were almost as deadly to +friend as foe. Too many officers were killed or +wounded in trying to get their men forward. The +green troops finally mistook a regiment of Confederates +for their own and received a murderous fire. +Then the rout began. One regiment fled and then +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</span>another. The untrained men stampeded across the +field toward Washington. The eager observers +scaled down the trees faster than they had climbed +them. Barouches, carriages and wagons wheeled +about and clattered away with much dust, turmoil +and crowding. A vehicle overturned and blocked +the main road, adding to the panic. The retreating +recruits in their excitement fired mostly into the air, +fortunately for those about them. Some officers +sought to rally their men, here and there, but in +vain. The majority rushed across fields, over lanes +and pushed through jammed roads in their hurry +to get away. And thus the first northern force +evaporated.</p> + +<p>Haste, haste everywhere. Haste in forming a force—haste +in legislation—haste in getting away. Men +who would otherwise have been staunch and vigorous—men +who were naturally brave—were hurried +into a life-and-death-position they had no chance to +fill. The size of the two forces had been about equal, +but the South had had the advantage of six months’ +training, whereas the North had used mostly eight-day +wonders. And this decided jump of the Confederacy +on us—their planning—their foresight—their +business arrangements had meant the turn of +the tide against the Union.</p> + +<p>And it was so all through 1861. We had five other +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</span>battles in that year, all of which we lost in the same +way and for the same cause, except one. Drainesville—have +you ever heard of it? That was all we had +to show for the whole year’s effort—a tiny battle +having no influence on cutting the war shorter. And +in that time we had killed and wounded three thousand +three hundred seventy-one men and spent four +hundred nineteen million dollars—all to no purpose—sheer +waste. In fact worse than waste, because the +setbacks had paralyzed our efforts. Then came the +mismanagement of the second and part of the third +year of the war. While the Union was organizing +as a loose Confederacy, the Confederacy was organizing +as a close Union. The southern government +keenly abandoned states’ rights for their army +shortly after they had begun to fight for states’ rights +as a national policy. The northern government +inanely took up states’ rights for their army immediately +after they had begun to fight against states’ +rights as a national possibility. Both were inconsistent, +but the South was inconsistent wisely. +It did away with voluntary enlistments and the +power of independent states to appoint officers +and to offer whole units—and vested the control +in its President. It made a unified army. It +then enacted the first proper draft law in any English-speaking +country—a thing which was afterwards +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</span>the greatest single stroke of efficiency for +America in the World War. On the other hand, +the Union persisted in lopsided volunteering and +gave away to the governors absolute authority to +create organizations and appoint the officers over +them. And Mr. Lincoln had to receive these irregular +lots and do the best he could with them. He was +powerless at the head of this great organization to +have control over the selection of his employees. +And the way they were selected didn’t help much +either. Political favorites, farmers, clerks, ward +bosses and men about town, were given command of +regiments and battalions, when they knew nothing +about the technique, tactics or art of their undertaking—nothing +about the real business of their jobs. +Professional qualifications had little to do with their +selection. Influence, popularity, deference, obligation +and even pity put them in their positions. Why, +one officer was elected a captain of a company +because he had the most children and needed the +money. Others were made colonels or majors for +just as sensible reasons, while three hundred and +eight trained officers were overlooked and kept in +small positions throughout the war. Would we put +plumbers or carpenters over our sick in the hospital? +We did worse. We put them over well men, fine +bodies, whose lives depended upon knowledge and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</span>experience against the awful things they had to +face. For the camp and bivouac are even more +deadly than the battlefield under untrained leaders. +In more ways than one our hurried management +caused the lengthening of the horror into four long +years of unnecessary slaughter.</p> + +<p>At the top, the North had a President and Secretary +of War, distinguished members of the bar, but +utterly unfamiliar with the technique and art of +ending a war as quickly as possible. The country’s +policies had placed them in this unfair position. +There was no active general-in-chief of the armies. +The Secretary of the Treasury was given the task +of making an organization plan. Other members of +the cabinet and bureau chiefs were given similar +military problems. A group called the Second Aulic +Council debated, fussed and mostly collapsed into +grand meddling. It was the old story of a large cumbersome +committee getting nowhere—a committee +that rarely understood the vital needs of the occasion. +So it was not surprising that the most ineffective +soldier with military education was finally +chosen as General-in-Chief, General Halleck. And +he added to the confusion. Generals in the field +didn’t know where they stood. They were promised +troops that never arrived and shorn of troops they +had with them. Their plans, by mail, telegraph or +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</span>personal travel had to be approved in Washington +before they could proceed. Often the opportunity +passed before the veto or approval arrived. During +his campaigns, McClellan received hundreds of +telegrams, letters and courier packets a week, counseling +one thing and then another—and often contradictory. +He could not change his base, make a new +plan, operate in a new place or go enthusiastically +forward without first having his proposals crunch +through the slow grinding mill of Washington. +Commanders grew to be more fearful of the District +of Columbia than the enemy. For it’s hard to fight +to your back and front at the same time. And your +back happens to give you more creeps.</p> + +<p>In a little over two years the main army of the +East had in succession as commanders McDowell, +McClellan, Pope, McClellan, Burnside, Hooker and +Meade. In the whirlpool of mismanagement, heads +fell fast. And subordinate generals notoriously +feared most being placed in command of the Army +of the Potomac. Certainly the whole fault couldn’t +lie with six different commanders. With the same +system—or lack of it—sixteen would probably have +failed. Certainly <i>one</i> could have been wisely selected +who could have gone on, if properly backed up. +The answer lies in the Confederacy. There, a single +trained and experienced man picked a trained commander +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</span>and placed him over better trained and +organized troops than the North had. He was held +on whether he won or lost and became more capable +as he proceeded. This sample of management and +organization, always a few steps ahead of the North +is why the South held off the Union against odds of +three to one for four staggering years. That is what +was done while the Yankee was paying millions in +bounties for recruits, uselessly wasting his men, undergoing +draft riots and enduring one of the ablest +<i>mis</i>managements our country has seen. The lack of +any action before the war—any wakefulness from +our deep sleep—any use of ordinary sense plunged +us into the waste of wastes and told the world ever +since that we were the incompetent of incompetents. +And for all this the North paid nearly ten billion +dollars. And how we spent lives. Why, we were in +such a rush at the beginning that we sent in three +hundred thousand men without even examining +them physically. Think of what that meant in mortality. +We fed our manhood like babes into the +burning cauldron of Moloch, all because we sat and +waited with no idea of a preventive in those years +and months before the war. Experts, foreign and +domestic, agree that if we had had a trained force +in the East in December 1860, of not more than +twenty-five thousand, the war could not have lasted +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</span>over three months, with a maximum of a thousand +casualties. As it was in the North alone we threw +away three hundred sixty thousand lives. With the +South counted we filled prodigally way over a half +million graves. No, we don’t care to snuff things +out at the source. We prefer to dam them at the +mouth. We do that with crime. Why not do it +with war?</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="IX"> + <i>IX</i><br>FIDDLING + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>Do you remember the pillow shams of the gay +nineties? For those of you who don’t, I’ll tell you +that they were clean, ruffled upright coverings for +pillows in the daytime. When they were laid aside +at night, they revealed too often a certain amount of +real estate underneath. What a cleanly view for the +daily visitor and what an unpleasant surprise for the +nightly sleeper. I remember such a set of shams. On +the left one were embroidered in pink the words: “I +slept and dreamed that life was beauty.” On the right +one in blue: “I woke and found that life was duty.”</p> + +<p>Now that we’ve laid aside the shams of our school +histories and looked upon the tragically soiled linen +of the Civil War, we find even cleaner shams laid +over the period <i>right after</i> that war. You know as +we scratch our head and try to look wise when our +young son attacks us with a question about his history +lesson, we see, among the cobwebs those days +of ’65, ’66 and ’67 as a time of sleeping beauty. The +tired, worn soldiers of the war, in our misty memory, +are beating their swords into pruning hooks and all +that sort of thing. Are we wrong? Yes, we are. Life +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</span>was anything but beauty for our country then. They +were days of frightful, alarming duty. For we were +even in a worse fix than when Sumter’s guns +tumbled us helter-skelter into catastrophe. On all +sides were threatenings of big wars and slaughter. +On the north the Fenians were trying to carry on +strife against Great Britain from within our borders, +and the Alabama claims were adding to the fuel. The +South, smarting under revengeful reconstruction +laws, was angered to a pitch of frenzy. In Mexico, +Napoleon the third had set up an empire, placing +the Archduke Maximilian of Austria on the throne +in defiance of the Monroe Doctrine. The thousands +of irreconcilables of the former Confederacy could +there find a foothold to work against us. And in the +West, a half million Indians, unrestrained during +the Civil War, were overrunning half our territory, +and sprinkling the soil with death and massacre. In +the midst of all this trouble, Abraham Lincoln was +shot down in cold blood. We had gone from a +sizzling frying pan into a surrounding fire.</p> + +<p>The situation in Mexico was so perilous that Sheridan +was torn away before the Grand Review in +Washington, and sent immediately south. When he +arrived near the Rio Grande, the republican force in +Mexico was weak, worn and scattered. But it wasn’t +hopeless long. For Sheridan had something—we had +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</span>something we’d never before had—a decent sized, +trained force. Even if it had been expensively trained +under the bullet, it was trained and well-trained. +Sheridan just sat down in Texas with almost three +corps, and peered threateningly into Mexico. Maximilian +knew there wasn’t anything he had which +could overcome such a force. Little by little under +the American display of strength, the republicans +gained power. In a year and a half the Empire fell, +without a single American gun being fired and with +no bloodshed for us. We had gained our ends by +merely a show of force. Here is something for our +histories to brag about. Why do they cover it over +with a sham? You remember experts said that if we +had had twenty-five thousand trained men in 1860, +the Civil War could not have lasted more than three +months. Well that statement, however careful, is at +best theory, but taken with the example of Sheridan’s +force, it becomes a fact. And there are other +examples in our history where a sufficiently trained +force prevented bloodshed. The only reason we +haven’t had more examples is because we haven’t +had more force.</p> + +<p>But we had a force this once, and one part of it +had as difficult a task as ever fell to the lot of soldiers. +Nineteen thousand of them were scattered in one +hundred thirty-four places in the South to enforce +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</span>stringent, cruel laws for a conquered people. The +ire of the North had vented itself in insulting control. +No one who had given aid to the Confederacy +was allowed to hold office. The northern carpetbagger +swaggered in to lord over poverty-stricken +communities. This exhibition of revenge leads one +to believe the statement of the clergymen that peace +treaties, peace reactions and peace societies are our +most fruitful causes of war.</p> + +<p>But there was one saving grace—and that lay in +the treatment of the southern people by the soldier. +You know it’s a funny thing about fighters. After +the fight is over, they seldom hold grudges. We can +all call up many instances where they were outstandingly +friendly with the former opponents. The +Union soldier in the South was no exception. He +saw too clearly the injustice to these stricken people +and sympathized with them. He leagued up with +the former Confederate soldiers in efforts to help. +He often got around the laws and sometimes overrode +them. His reports to Washington had much to +do with rescinding cruel legislation. So helpful was +his attitude that a southern city afterwards erected a +monument to a Union general. The soldier’s understanding +sympathy was the big factor in overcoming +riots, disorders and slaughter.</p> + +<p>Similarly trained troops took their places along +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</span>the northern border, and beyond a little wire cutting, +overcame the disturbances from the Fenians. +And as these fearful threats to the north, east and +south of us were slowly calmed, we began to be +over-confident and stupid again. We failed to see +that our unusual strength had been the reason for +coming through these calamities unscathed. In our +customary way we descended into weakness. And +how we were going to pay in human life for this +let-down!</p> + +<p>At first we pared the Army down to thirty-eight +thousand. The day before General Grant took the +oath of office as President, we again reduced it, +against his urgent recommendation, by twenty regiments. +By 1876 it was a scant twenty-five thousand +soldiers, at which figure it remained up until the +time of the Spanish-American War—during almost +a quarter of a century. Thus we stagnated while our +population was increasing, savages were roaming +over half our territory and we had acquired Alaska. +There was a war party who wanted to keep peace +and a peace party who let us fall into war. Naturally +you’d know which party would win in the United +States. A paltry seventeen thousand soldiers were +strewn around the west in little groups. Their task +was to control hundreds of thousands of Indians in +protection of the advancing settlers. It was the dark +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</span>age for the soldier. Impossible was his struggle to be +everywhere at once and to do the government’s bidding +against odds of twenty-four to one. In return +the government often armed the Indian with fine +repeating rifles and always gave the soldier a single-loader.</p> + +<p>Then came the tragedies that follow in the wake +of helplessness. In our history books, we have placed +an embroidered, starched sham over them, but underneath +none the less lie very dirty pillows. Massacres +of our settlers and soldiers were too frequent. +The Indian was one of the shrewdest warriors of all +time to sense the size and strength of his opponents. +Weakness to him meant a call for scalps. At Fort +Phil Kearney in Nebraska the officers and men were +engaged in building their own barracks and quarters +(if they were going to have a roof to cover them) +and the work was going along quite smoothly, when +one morning two thousand Indians swooped down +on the small garrison of two hundred fifty and killed +and mutilated one hundred seventy-four of them. +In Kansas when eighty-four settlers were slain or +captured by a band of Cheyennes, Major Forsyth +with fifty scouts tried to trail the Indian desperadoes. +When he came upon them he was trapped, had to +fight for his life, lost half of his command, (among +whom was the nephew of Henry Ward Beecher,) +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</span>and barely escaped with the remnants of his force.</p> + +<p>Later came the Custer affair. Probably no action +in our history has been more discussed and less +understood. The story goes back a long way and +doesn’t show us up in any fine colors. The government +had made a treaty with the Great Sioux Nation +in which it gave to these tribes the Black Hills and +all of South Dakota west of the Missouri River. +Gave them what was theirs in the first place. Kind +of us. Another law confirmed by our Senate, made +it a crime for a white settler to go into this region. +Well, the whites as usual went in, because the land +appealed to them. And they went out of their way +to trespass because the Indians were six hundred +miles from the nearest railroad and far from white +settlements. When the Indians complained and got +no redress, they went upon the warpath. Did so for +the same reason that we took up arms in the Revolution—from +behind each “farmyard fence and wall.” +The Secretary of the Interior ordered the troops to +put the Indians on their reservations. He made a +consistent sweep of things for he not only violated +the treaty, but did not uphold the law. So, little +companies of Infantry and Cavalry under General +Terry, were ordered to drive the victimized Indians +to where neither the Indian nor the soldier wanted +to go. Fifteen hundred troops, half of whom were +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</span>afoot, were sent against six thousand hardy Sioux +who were well-mounted. Why such a small body of +soldiers? Because other little groups were busy with +Assineboines, Piegans, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Pawnees, +Commanches and Flatheads. And there weren’t any +more troops. The entire regular force on the plains +would scarcely have been a match then for the Great +Sioux Nation, but we were content to send this +paltry number out against this overwhelming force. +Terry’s command accordingly advanced toward the +Indians. Custer, who was in command of the Cavalry, +was sent ahead with instructions to move +toward the Tongue River, keep on the flank of the +Sioux, and not let them escape. It was an impossible +task in the face of so many Indians. But the soldier +couldn’t know that such a big force was there, for +there were too few troops to scout the Sioux country +and find out. And if they could have found out, +what was there to do about it? They had to go +against the Indians. No matter how perfectly +Terry’s force might act, it was in for a licking. So +Custer split his command into three parts in order +to keep the Indians from escaping. The irony!—from +escaping. Well, it happened just as you would +expect. Custer’s little band was overwhelmed and +annihilated. The other two parts were backed against +the wall and had to fight in desperation for their +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</span>lives. It was not a real massacre. It was a fight in +which the Indian used his normal methods of no +quarter. We knew his methods. And we unjustly +and murderously sent a puny force against him to +be butchered to the extent of two hundred sixty-five +killed and fifty-two wounded.</p> + +<p>The Indians could have overwhelmed the rest of +the force, but feeling they had taught the white +man a lesson in fair play, they drew off. But the +ones who bore the brunt of the punishment by paying +the extreme penalty, were innocent soldiers, who +had had nothing to do with the cause of the fight. +The instigators were walking the eastern streets crying +for an investigation. And how the affair was +investigated! After reams of testimony had been +taken down, and much money expended, it was +found that we had sent a pigmy out barehanded to +fight a giant. The result? True to form.</p> + +<p>Would we have been a little more decent, had we +spent more on soldiers beforehand and less on testimony +afterward? If we had, it’s quite possible we +wouldn’t have needed the testimony. For it’s an accepted +fact that had we had ten thousand trained +men for the Sioux alone, placed in some conspicuous +spot, the Custer fight would never have been. The +Indian would have been too wary. He always was. +And many another fight would not have taken +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</span>place, as we’ll see. Going back over the true events +of these times, are we made to wonder whether we +really do care about human life? We talk a lot about +it. Is it another starched sham?</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="X"> + <i>X</i><br>MORE FIDDLING + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>Abraham Lincoln one afternoon sat listening to +the members of a committee arguing. The next day +he heard them arguing <i>more</i> without arriving anywhere. +In a pause, he said, “I am reminded of old +Zeke Williams out in my home town. Zeke was the +finest rifle shot with his Brown Bess in those parts. +One day he took his young son out hunting with +him. They approached a tree. Said Zeke, ‘Boy, shake +that ’ar tree. They’s a squirrel in it.’ The lad shook +the tree, the father blazed away, but nothing happened. +Said Zeke, ‘Shake that ’ar tree agin.’ The boy +obeyed. The father blazed away and <i>still</i> nothing +happened. The father brought his gun down from +his shoulder and almost wept as he said, ‘I must be +gettin’ old. I can’t hit ’em no more.’ The son was +very sorry for his father. So he went and looked the +tree all over. Seeing no sign of a squirrel, he came +over to his father and gazed intently into the old +man’s face. ‘Why pap,’ exclaimed the boy, ‘That +’ar ain’t no squirrel in the tree. That ’ar a <i>louse</i> on +your eyebrow’.”</p> + +<p>If Lincoln were alive today, I fear he’d discover +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</span>many lice on our eyebrows—many fancies about our +past that are contrary to reality. And nowhere would +he find more than in our mistaken notions of the +Indian struggles in our West. Soldiers fighting Indians! +That’s what the school histories lead us to see. +We get the feeling that the soldier was a bloodthirsty +fellow who loved to go out before breakfast +and kill a few redmen for pastime. The truth of the +matter is that he was the best and almost the only +friend the Indian had. The reason for this relationship +is natural and simple. The soldier had no personal +gain to get from the West. He wanted nothing +that belonged to the redman. If he were out for +greed, as the settlers, traders, trappers and adventurers +too often were, he wouldn’t have been a +soldier at his paltry wage. And as a hardy fellow, +he appreciated the good points in other hardy fellows +like the Indians. So let us look at real scenery +and not at lice for a few minutes. Here is the tale +of the Modocs.</p> + +<p>The Modocs had always been a peaceable tribe, +often assisting the whites in their undertakings, and +even going so far as to help save a California town +from fire. The government had made a treaty with +them. As usual it violated it. All that these Indians +asked was to be moved to a small strip of land, no +good to anybody. General Canby, known as the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</span>Indian’s friend, tried to make the Indian Agents and +Washington see the point of view of these redmen +and begged and entreated that their simple request +be granted. But the powers stubbornly refused. The +Indians, denied and double-crossed, went on the +warpath. The soldiers were ordered to fight them. +In the ensuing engagements many of them were +killed. But that was not all. General Canby, Dr. +Thomas and other soldiers, in trying to carry out the +government’s unjust orders, were killed also. The +very men who had tried to avert injustice and bloodshed, +were butchered. Dr. Thomas’ son has always +claimed that the government murdered his father. +But the tragic irony of this whole affair is that after +all this debauch of human life and craze of injustice, +General Canby’s advice was finally heeded. Those +that were left of the Modocs, were transported to +where they wanted to go in the first place. But General +Canby and many another good soldier and Indian +were dead. This story does not stand alone by +any means. That of the Nez Perce’s is even worse. +This tribe was more peaceful, high-minded and +friendly than the Modocs. From the time that it +had helped the Lewis and Clark expedition, way +back after our Revolution, it had held uninterrupted +good-will with the whites. But the government defrauded +these Indians of a little strip of poor land +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</span>where they wanted to go. They asked to be taken +there. Chief Joseph, handsome, intelligent, upright, +patiently pleaded his cause. General Howard naturally +interceded and begged the government to let +them go. But he also like Canby was met with curt +refusal, over and over again. After long drawn-out +insults by our government, the Nez Perce’s rebelled, +and Howard was ordered to fight them. An officer +and thirty-three of our soldiers were killed in the +first action. Then began a chase through three territories. +In one instance, so few were the troops that +a general had to use a rifle himself and was severely +wounded. The tribe was finally captured after much +loss of life to white and redman. The government, +contrary to General Miles’ recommendation, transported +what remained of the tribe to an unhealthful +region where they quickly perished. And that was +our way of disposing of the Nez Perces. The Ute +uprising of 1879 was in principle a repetition of these +events. Major Thornburg and a large part of his +command were killed because of the stubbornness +of an Indian Agent.</p> + +<p>Let’s look for a moment at another tribe. In 1870 +the Apaches, the most subtle redmen we’ve ever +dealt with, broke from their reservations and went +upon the warpath. The cause as usual was our injustice. +Colonel George Crook with a small force +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</span>was sent against them. He was the kind of man who +believed in a square word rather than a round bullet. +He was in every way (unlike his name) the kind of +man you’d want your boy to be like. But he faced +a racking problem. The Apache country in the +rugged Sierras was one of the toughest spots anybody +could search, and when you added to it a wily +Indian, ready to snare you at every turn, you had +something that looked hopeless. It meant that the +soldier had to master the country, know the valleys, +streams, canyons, water holes, and unexplored +mountain ranges; and hang doggedly on the trail, +hour by hour, day by day through exhausting +privation and bitter disappointment. Crook trailed +the Apaches, but not with menace or threats. With +a small escort he sought out the chiefs, ever imperilling +his life by exposing himself. After months +of effort he succeeded in getting a few of the chiefs +to come in for a talk. Little by little his strong personality +and shining integrity led them to listen to +him. More chieftains came in. At length they talked +to him freely, and he in turn saw that they were +well cared for. He offered them forgiveness for any +past misdeeds and urged a life of peace. Slowly they +began to believe in him. At the end of six years of +utmost patience he had calmed them, brought them +into the reservations and made them contented—without +bloodshed.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</span></p> + +<p>But then the Sioux uprising called him and his +troops away to the north, because of the smallness +of the army. Crook, a general now, tried to round +up the Sioux with two thousand soldiers, whom he +had drained the west to get. Conditions there +wouldn’t permit him to use his Apache methods. +Even under his able leadership he was nearly trapped +and reduced to starvation. All he could do was to +make his escape and let the Indians roam on. The +Sioux were too strong for his puny force. Meanwhile +the Apaches were left to the control of Indian +Agents, who mishandled, defrauded and abused +them. So awful did the conditions become, that even +in the east the President felt obliged to send General +Crook back to the Apaches in 1882. There Crook, +after six years’ absence, found his previous work had +been worse than undone. The Agents had ejected +the Indians from their reservations because silver had +been found there, had thrown them into prison to +languish for months without trial, starved them, +stolen their crops and in general treated them like +cattle. Crook set himself to win them back by his +old methods. But it was a monstrous task now, since +the Indian had been infuriated afresh and had lost +faith in all whites. In his old, bold way Crook set +out through the trails to investigate complaints and +find out the causes. Fortunately the Indians recognized +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</span>and remembered him. They told him stories +that would have wrung pity from a hardened criminal. +But the way they met him—a real friend and +champion after all these years of cruelty—was +pathetic in its child-like appeal. The faces of the old +men brightened and the squaws wept when they +saw him again. The chieftain, Old Pedro, with +dimmed eyes spoke to him pitifully. His words were +taken down at the time and here they are:</p> + +<p>“When you, General Crook, were here, whenever +you said a thing, we knew it was true, and we +kept it in our minds. When Colonel Green was here, +our women and children were happy and our young +people grew up contented. And I remember Brown, +Randall, and the other officers who treated us kindly +and were our friends. I used to be happy. Now I am +all the time thinking and crying, and I say, ‘Where +is old Colonel John Green, and Randall, and those +other good officers, and what has become of them? +Where have they gone? Why don’t they come +back? And the young men all say the same thing’.”</p> + +<p>That was how the Indian in his simple faith, +trusted and regarded the soldier, who was too often +unjustly sent out to fight him. And how do you +suppose the soldier felt when he had to? Certainly +he could have no relish for such dismal, perilous +work. Anyway Crook and his small command kept +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</span>up their exhausting efforts to avoid bloodshed. But +all the while the Indian Agent Ring was sending out +newspaper accounts of murder and depredations by +the Indians, in order to involve Crook in a fight, +which would drive the Indian away from the land +on which the agents wished to profiteer. These +stories Crook investigated and wherever he could, +gave the lie to the rumor. Despite this knifing in the +back, he again restored peace and contentment to +the Apache—after two years.</p> + +<p>And so I could recount for many evenings true incidents +like this. In five years one regiment had sixty-seven +battles and skirmishes and another marched +sixty-four hundred miles. In the first six years after +the Civil War, the army experienced two hundred +three actions with the redmen. And Indian troubles +didn’t dwindle out until over 30 years after the Civil +War. But the uphill work with the redman was by +no means all that the soldier had to encounter. +Between 1886 and 1895, he was called upon to +restore order in civil uprisings throughout every +state and territory in our country to the number of +three hundred twenty-eight. And he accomplished +these tasks with almost no bloodshed. The show of +trained force was enough, small as it was. But during +all this time when the soldier was enduring the hardships +of intense heat and cold, and running untold +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</span>risks for his nation, his work was little understood +or appreciated. Once Congress tried to reduce the +army to ten thousand, which would have brought +on more slaughter, especially to the whites, and +prolonged the Indian troubles indefinitely. Fortunately +the reduction didn’t succeed. But something +else did. No appropriation for the pay of +the army for the fiscal year 1877-78 was made by +Congress, and this right after the Custer fight. The +soldier without his meager wage had to borrow +money at interest, in order to live—to go on—go on +enduring rude conditions and the hazards of life +and death. There was a faction back east which +believed the Indian should be exterminated. There +was another which believed the Indian was right +and should be left alone. There were very few who +realized that there were good Indians and bad Indians +just as there are good and bad white men. +When the soldier lost battles, he was investigated. +When he won some, he was branded as a butcher. +Meanwhile the settlers were crowding in and had +to be protected, and the Indian Agent Ring was +forcing Crook, Canby, Howard, Miles and many +others into fights they wished to avoid.</p> + +<p>But the soldiers’ position was unfortunate mostly +because his force was not large enough to awe the +Indian into peace without fighting. For no one +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</span>more than the Indian respected <i>size</i>. He was an +expert scout and had a keen eye for numbers. One +hundred thousand soldiers would doubtless have cut +the losses in half. And had the government used the +Indian with common decency, they would have +been cut to nothing. We talk a lot about the violation +of Belgium and we are justly enraged at the +Germans. But the Germans at least didn’t murder +their soldiers in addition to their enemies. Are there +lice on our eyebrows? Are there sins of our own? +Greater sins?</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="XI"> + <i>XI</i><br>THE BLACK HOLE + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>One day in Texas after a long hike through +broiling heat and alkali dust, we came at last to our +camping-place. Weary officers and men went about +their appointed tasks of setting up tentage, attending +to the water-supply and sanitation and generally +making the place livable. After a brief meal from +rattling mess-kits, most of us lay down to get the +kinks out of our muscles. One company on a little +hill in plain view of the rest of the brigade, was resting +quietly under its pup-tents. Suddenly a Texas +twister, one of those little mysterious whirlwinds, +came tearing along out of the silent, clear afternoon. +It pounced upon the most conspicuous tent, grabbed +the canvas and personal covering off the big First +Sergeant, lifted them high in the air, and left him +lying in the open like a plucked chicken. A thousand +pairs of eyes fastened on him. He slowly awoke, +rubbed his face, squirmed a little and squinted at +his coverings swishing about in the heavens. “Well,” +he said, “Who in the devil started that?”—and +rushed threateningly toward the nearest group of +soldiers.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</span></p> + +<p>The American people, after a sleep of a quarter +of a century, woke up one morning in 1898 to find +that a twister out of the blue had pitched the battleship +Maine to the bottom of Havana Harbor, and +tossed us into war. Amazed, we asked, “Who started +that?” Amazed, we said, “How could war have +come upon us?” Amazed and confused we rushed +threateningly this way and that. And why the surprise +when for three years we’d been shaking angry +fists at the Spaniard—when we’d been lying in the +path of twisters from a land of twisters. And how +completely we’d been lying.</p> + +<p>All the while we were provoking Spain to wrath, +we were using sugared cut-throat words to our own +people. Well-meaning idealists, thinking to calm +our citizens, were really running them into misery. +Two years before the twister struck us, Mr. Livingstone +in the Congress of our nation, rose and stated: +“I do not take much stock in an early war with +Spain or England.” The same day on the same floor +Uncle Joe Cannon said, “I want to say that I do not +believe we will have war the coming year, nor the +year after. I doubt if there will be any during this +century or perhaps the early years of the next century.” +At the same time in Europe, Czar Nicholas II +of Russia showed how arbitration would settle +everything; and books and articles were published +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</span>proving that modern mechanisms would make war +result in suicide—in short that war was impossible. +Under this dangerous racket of propaganda the only +attention paid to our land forces, was to pick at +them and tear off little pieces. Any attempt to keep +us from slaughtering and distressing our youth +needlessly as we’d done in the past, was laughed out +of court. When the twister struck us, the army was +just the same size it had been twenty-two years +before. Little groups of soldiers were scattered all +over the west and on our borders. The overhead of +these little posts had become drab routine. The War +Department was clogged with thirty years’ mold. +Its personnel was just sufficient to carry on a peanut-stand +administration and supply. There was no +thought for expansion or operating the army as a +whole. There were no plans, no staffs, no proper +maps of Cuba, no set-up for any respectable force. +The army had not been brought together since the +Civil War—a third of a century before. No officer +in the service had commanded more than a regiment, +about 700 men, and few had seen that many together. +The soldiers had had no chance to act as a +unit, as an organization, as a going concern. Supplies +of all sorts were lacking—food, equipment, guns and +ammunition, everything. We had not learned a +single lesson from a hundred years of horrible +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</span>disasters of our own making. We showed to the +world the greatest unreadiness we’d had since we’d +been a nation.</p> + +<p>We still persisted in the idea that an able bodied +man was a soldier. The President in this belief called +out one hundred twenty-five thousand volunteers +when there wasn’t ammunition enough in the country +to let them fight one battle. The people seemed +to feel we were going out with brass bands playing +to bag the Spaniard. One day in a conference, the +President turned to the Secretary of War and asked, +“How soon can you put an army into Cuba?” Said +the Secretary, “I can put 40,000 men there in ten +days.” Later we found out we couldn’t put half that +number there in two months.</p> + +<p>General Miles, the head of the army, suggested +the training of fifty thousand soldiers rather than +put in jeopardy a great quantity of untrained men. +But the President rejected that expert advice and +called out seventy-five thousand more volunteers to +be exposed to death in camp. The people were crying +“On to Havana!” as they had yelled, On to Richmond, +Mexico and Canada. What matter utter extravagance +and human life?</p> + +<p>The government now had two hundred thousand +men on its hands. Where would they put them? +O yes, the question of camps. Tampa, New Orleans +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</span>and Mobile were decided upon. It was found that +all but Tampa were unsuitable. After much investigation +and delay. Camp Alger in Virginia, and +Camp Thomas in Tennessee were selected. They +afterwards proved to be far too small. Meanwhile +the volunteers were flocking in much as they had +done in the Civil War—in a sad state of neglect. +Unequipped, untaught, unfed, uncared for, uneverything, +they were all struggling to the front. +The little crippled War Department was beset with +every kind of request it could not fill. Congressmen +who had taken delight in blocking legislation for +preparedness were the loudest in crying for guns +and vessels to protect their districts. Where were +any implements for the crises? Without having any, +the President ordered General Miles to take to +Havana seventy thousand troops—(troops, mind +you—real troops)—when such an irregular mass +could have fired little more than one shot, if they +had been troops. Then he ordered General Shafter +at Tampa to the north coast of Cuba, but it was +found there were no transports. Then he ordered +twelve thousand troops to Key West, but the place +was found unsuitable.</p> + +<p>A month and a half passed. Why weren’t we getting +on? General Miles went to Tampa to see. There +he found what you’d expect. Troops were slowly +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</span>assembling. Why not? One regular regiment had +to come clear from Alaska. Supplies were failing. +Loading of transports was helter-skelter. Miles reported +that the principal part of the regular army +was there, but that of the fourteen regiments of +volunteers nearly forty per cent were undrilled and +in one regiment over three hundred men had never +fired a gun. And these were the pick of the untrained +men.</p> + +<p>Finally most of the regular army and a few volunteers +set sail, after a mad unmanaged scramble to +get trains, and go abroad. Supplies were hustled into +holds helter-skelter. Most of the volunteers had to +be left behind because they were not equipped or +trained. But the little seventeen thousand were off. +Were they? The Navy thought they had sighted +the Spanish fleet. The troops out at sea were turned +back to the mainland. The presence of the Spanish +fleet proved to be a myth. Again they set sail, +crowded like galley-slaves into small vessels, with +little water, on pine cots, among neighing horses +and foul odors. The food made them sick. The embalmed +beef by hurried contracts became notorious. +The boats moved seven miles an hour, then four +miles, and often not at all. After much suffering +they arrived at Daiquiri near Santiago harbor. There +the civilian transports refused to land and kept far +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</span>out. Men were hurt and drowned in getting to shore. +Fifty horses swam out to sea and were lost. Fortunately +the Spaniards fled inland. If they hadn’t, +their superior weapons would have torn our foolhardy +little force to pieces. One hundred ninety-six +thousand, eight hundred twenty Spanish troops +were in Cuba, but we didn’t know it. Nor did we +know that they were as badly led and cared for as +troops could be. By the godsend of their complete +lack of resistance, the little seventeen thousand got +ashore in five days.</p> + +<p>Then came the scrambling action of Las Gausimas +through the brush. The Army was used to this sort +of bushwhacking against the Indians. And the +Rough Riders, though they’d just received their +new Krags the day before the fight, did good work. +But the Spaniards fled—and that helped. Then came +a delay of a week. Supplies were hard to get from +the boats. Troops milled around with little food +and ammunition. The artillery wasn’t brought forward. +What a chance for the Spaniard then! A determined +charge of a quarter of his force and the +United States troops would have been helpless. But +since the Spaniard didn’t do anything right, we were +saved again. Half the regular army and three volunteer +regiments went on to San Juan and El Caney. +Although assaulting El Caney was a military blunder, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</span>the little force went charging along with useless +losses. One volunteer regiment funked the fight. +And another, though acting well, had to be sent out +of it because its ancient black powder weapons made +it an easy target for the smokeless Mauser rifle of +the enemy. More useless casualties. The artillery +had nothing but black powder too. Every time it +belched, it threw up clouds of smoke that could be +seen for miles. Still more casualties. The Spaniards +had put up barbed wire around their little forts. And +we had no wire-cutters. It was a long day’s work of +slow progress. The Spaniard, like all poor troops, +could shoot well as long as his vitals were covered +up. But we finally took the two strongholds, with +over twelve per cent losses. We had won because +the enemy was grossly mismanaged and inefficient. +We were badly managed, but we had streaks of +efficiency. Therein lay the difference—our salvation. +When the siege of Santiago was undertaken, General +Shafter’s lines were so thin that even poor troops +with a little zeal could have punctured them. But +the Spaniards for some unknown reason seemed to +be more fearful than we were.</p> + +<p>Even so it would have been a stand-off, had it not +been for the great victory of our Navy in destroying +Cervera’s fleet. And of course it would destroy the +Spanish ships. It had had seven years’ building before +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</span>the war. Under the supervision of Presidents +Cleveland and Arthur, we had developed the famous +White Squadron. What would the soldier have done +without the Navy? What would he have done without +the complete sloppiness of the Spaniard? One +authority shows that the war would have lasted four +or five years with more useless slaughter of our own +men than we had seen even in the Civil War.</p> + +<p>Even so, in only one hundred nine days of war, +the volunteers alone lost two hundred eighty-nine +killed—but—listen to the <i>but</i>—three thousand eight +hundred forty-eight by sickness. Thirteen times as +many by disease as by battle. And most of these +deaths occurred in our country—before the poor +volunteer had had a chance to lift a finger of help.</p> + +<p>When the twister caught us, we had the great sum +of one hundred seventy-nine army medical officers +for a mass of men that swelled to two hundred sixteen +thousand in four months. In our sleep there +had been no thought that the camp is more deadly +than the bullet, that any doctor can’t be a sanitary +man in the field—that field sanitation is a specialty +like eye, ear, nose and throat or abdominal surgery. +Doctors can’t get that training in a few months. In +over-crowded camps in the United States many an +otherwise fine medical man made a fizzle of sanitation. +Others who did know sanitation were not +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</span>backed up by the untrained volunteer officers. So +our best youth died like flies and by flies. And the +suffering of those who did not die was appalling +torture. Filth was too often in the open. An untrained +regiment would be strewn with sickness, +while a trained one right beside it would have no +sickness at all.</p> + +<p>By our sleep beforehand and our unjust haste after +we were waked up by the twister, we had done +worse things. We had forced the little seventeen +thousand into Cuba at the height of the fever season. +Right after the surrender of Santiago, seventy-five +per cent of Shafter’s command, the majority of our +entire trained forces were on the sick list. Had the +Spaniard held out a little longer, he’d have had only +a handful or none at all to fight. But he didn’t hold +out. And we had another miraculous escape. But +the death toll went up. And over in the Pacific it +went up higher. In the Philippine Insurrection that +followed the Spanish-American War, we lost in two +years over seven thousand men.</p> + +<p>Sleep is a very soothing thing, isn’t it? Quite +necessary as a part-time job. But when we sleep all +the time, our friends know that we are sick. When +such a sickness overtakes a nation, how quickly it +spreads into death. How suddenly it kills innocent +persons, when the twister comes out of the blue +and leaves us naked.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="XII"> + <i>XII</i><br>BACKING AND FILLING + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>One day an old friend of mine, whom I had not +seen for nearly twenty years, burst into my office. +After the gladsome handshakes and slaps of affection, +I asked him to tell me about himself.</p> + +<p>“Well,” he said, “I got married.”</p> + +<p>“Hm,” I said, “That’s good.”</p> + +<p>“No,” he said, “Not so good. My wife turned +out to be a tartar.”</p> + +<p>“Well,” I said, “That’s bad.”</p> + +<p>“No,” he said, “Not so bad. She brought me +twenty thousand dollars.”</p> + +<p>“O,” I said, “that’s good.”</p> + +<p>“No,” he said, “Not so good. I invested the money +in sheep and they all died.”</p> + +<p>“Hm,” I said, “that’s bad.”</p> + +<p>“No,” he said, “Not so bad. I sold the wool for +more than the sheep cost me.”</p> + +<p>“Well,” I said, “that’s good.”</p> + +<p>“No,” he said, “Not so good. I bought a fine home +and a fire burned it to the ground.”</p> + +<p>“Hm,” I said, “that’s bad.”</p> + +<p>“No,” he said, “Not so bad. My wife was in it.”</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</span></p> + +<p>Before and during our part of the World War +we were not so good and not so bad. Two years after +that comedy of errors and tragedy of blood called +the Spanish-American War, we did the most unusual +thing in our life as a nation. For the first time +after a war, we increased and helped our land forces. +Under the pressure of Philippine Wars and onward-looking +men like Elihu Root and Theodore Roosevelt, +we raised our army to one hundred thousand +for a hundred million people. We set up new service +schools and broadened others for the higher military +education of our officers. We at last formed a general +staff. And in 1911 we assembled during peace +a regular division of troops for the first time in our +history. To be sure, it took months to do so, it +drained the country of nearly all its trained forces, +and the division couldn’t be entirely collected, but +the move wasn’t so bad. For several years it looked +as though our army would be a going concern. +Then we lagged. The wolf in sheep’s clothing began +to bleat. In 1913, Congressman Dies, in the House +of Representatives, stated: “God has placed us on +this great, rich continent, separate and secure from +the broils of Europe.” Dr. David Starr Jordan, +President of Leland Stanford University, flooded the +country with his prophesies. Here is one. “It is +apparently not possible for another real war among +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</span>the nations of Europe to take place.” As for our +getting into any war, he threw it off as so much +silliness. That was just the opium the country +wanted in 1913 and early ’14. The people ate up +the idea. Anyone who spoke preparedness was a +jingoist and wanted war. Why, war was impossible. +It meant too much to Wall Street. European nations +were too poor to fight. Modern weapons would be +too horrible to allow a war. What was the use of +paying out good money for scientific training—for +modern materials—for being ready at all? War +couldn’t be. Not so good.</p> + +<p>For war suddenly <i>was</i>. Right in the midst of +this dangerous propaganda. Someone struck a match +at Sarajevo and set all Europe on fire. Despite those +priceless brains that had so lately invented no war, +Russia, England, France, Belgium, Austria and Germany +were flaming. What a sight! Americans rushed +for front seats and bought concessions. Wasn’t it an +awful fire! What a pity! As for us—poof! We +couldn’t get into it. It was Europe’s affair. We sensed +no tidal wave of emotions. We didn’t even send +experts over there to see how modern war was conducted. +Not so good, for the rumblings grew plainer +and plainer. In 1915, Colonel House, the President’s +confidential adviser, wrote to Woodrow Wilson: “If +war comes with Germany, it will be because of our +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</span>unpreparedness and her belief that we are more or +less impotent to do her harm.” He was on the ground +and saw. But did we take his word and see? Our +mobile army <i>then</i> was smaller than our trained force +before the Spanish-American War. Our general +staff was reduced and our equipment laughable. +No so good. We entered 1916 still unconcernedly +watching the drama in Europe, while U-boats were +sinking our shipping, Germany was sticking out her +tongue at us and we were getting hotter and hotter. +Were we doing anything for our safety? No, no, +that would be a violent gesture. Despite our watchful +waiting and utter helplessness, General Leonard +Wood established the business men’s training camp. +And Congress, by some miracle, put over our first +real National Defense Act—a comprehensive thing +built on sound lines. Not so bad.</p> + +<p>But the legislation wouldn’t be fulfilled for five +years—and here we were ten months before we got +into the war. Even if the act had been immediately +and wholly effective, we wouldn’t have had time +to get the men and train them. Not so good.</p> + +<p>Then out of the blue came Pancho Villa. He +crossed our border March 9, 1916, raided the defenseless +town of Columbus, New Mexico, and killed +eleven civilians and nine soldiers. It looked like a +horror for us. Not so good. But the tragedy was a +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</span>blessing in disguise. It probably kept France from +being German today. It gave an excuse to the President +for rushing to the border a large part of the +regular army and one hundred and fifty thousand +National Guardsmen. There they received fine +training in fundamentals. Their experience gave the +foundation for the 1st, 2nd, 26th and 42nd Divisions—the +first ones to be factors in France later. Not so +bad. But it took a brutal act to compel us to do what +we wouldn’t do under our own steam. Even so we +were magnificently unready. And we jumped into +the European War, April 6, 1917, because we were +angry, inflamed, anxious to punish Germany at any +cost. No catch phrases, no plottings of a few could +possibly have pitched us into the struggle without +that general hatred. And we had little with which +to carry out the wholesale desire for force. Immediately +we needed two hundred thousand officers. +We hadn’t ten thousand trained ones to instruct +them and at the same time lead our forces. In equipment +we were worse off. We had a few out-of-date +airplanes, only enough artillery ammunition for a +two-day battle, no automatic rifles and comparatively +few machine guns and ordinary rifles. Materially +we lacked almost everything. Although we +had the best rifle in the world, there was not anywhere +near enough. We had to arm our men largely +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</span>with British Enfields—unfamiliar to Americans—at +best poor makeshifts. We couldn’t manufacture any +of these things in time. In July 1917, Congress voted +six hundred forty million dollars for airplanes. +Nearly a year later we hadn’t any of our aircraft in +Europe. Where had the money gone? An investigation +was ordered. After seventeen thousand pages +of testimony were taken down, it was found that +aircraft couldn’t be built and shipped abroad in that +time. Not so good.</p> + +<p>In our equipment we were helpless without our +Allies. But in our manpower, we did surprisingly +well. A little over a month after war was declared, +we did the astonishing thing of passing a Draft Act. +We put teeth in the law of 1792 promoted by +George Washington, which had been a dead statute +for over one hundred and twenty-five years. Instead +of the horrors of volunteering, of utterly untrained +men, of political shilly-shallying, we turned to a just +and equalizing system. We did away with the woes +of extra disease and death—and put our soldiers into +training. Not in <i>this</i> war would absolutely green +officers send into eternity helpless volunteers. Our +best men went to training camps, where they at least +had to qualify in leading others. Not so bad. But of +course these candidates couldn’t be fully trained in +eighty days. And the regular officers, who had been +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</span>deprived of modern methods in Europe, couldn’t +give them all they needed. But they <i>did</i> get many +essentials, which they could pass on to the drafted +men.</p> + +<p>Today, many don’t realize what a vast amount of +hardship, sickness and death was saved by our moves +of the draft and officers’ training camps. It has been +estimated that by the draft alone we saved five per +cent in money and possibly twenty per cent in +human life. Not so bad. To be sure we had unnecessary +suffering and mortality. No system invented +as late as 1917 could have overcome our +shiftlessness during the years before. A month after +we declared war, General Pershing was sent to +Europe with a handful. “Where are the Americans?” +asked our Allies. “Why,” he had to explain, “they +are back in the United States getting ready.” And +for a year they had to keep getting ready before +they were of real physical help.</p> + +<p>Suppose you were attacked on the street by a +strong bandit. I calmly from my window watch you +struggling against him for several hours. Finally my +wrath gets the best of me. I rush out to the curb. I +see blood and bruises on your face. I yell to you: +“I’m for you, old man. I’ll fight on your side, but +chuck me a pair of brass knuckles. I’ll go down town +and have them made to fit me. I may get a few boxing +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</span>lessons too. I’ll be back in about an hour. Just +keep on going. You’re doing fine.” What would you +think of me? Not so good. Well, we did that very +thing to our Allies. Sixteen months after we entered +the war, General Pershing pathetically stated: “This +is the first time the American Army has been recognized +as a participant alongside of the Allies.” What +we did after war was declared was about as good as +could humanly be expected. What we didn’t do +beforehand was about as dumb as could humanly +be expected. Most of the unnecessary woes of the +war can justly be laid to this stupidity. Out of nearly +two million Americans who went to Europe, over +fifty thousand were killed by battle. Out of the three +and one-half millions in service, sixty-five thousand +died of accident or disease. Much of this waste could +have been avoided. It is estimated that there are +fifteen thousand graves of our soldiers in France, +which should not be there. Men were sent overseas +who didn’t know how to load their rifles, use their +gas masks, or take the simplest precautions of taking +cover or care of themselves. They hadn’t been given +a chance to learn. There was no time to teach them. +The training camp products, though better than untrained +volunteers, were too often uncertain in their +movements and orders. There were times when they +brought unnecessary slaughter to themselves and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</span>their commands. The German General Ludendorff +after the war, paid great tribute to the gallantry of +the individual American soldier, but at the same +time told of the inferior quality of some American +troops—as troops. General Pershing’s complaints +about the lack of training of men sent over, remind +us of George Washington’s pitiful pleas during our +Revolution. We waited for the calamity to get us, +instead of getting the calamity beforehand. The sad +part is that our losses, our hardships, our waste of +money and material could all have been prevented, +had we had strength in ’14, ’15 and ’16. German +records and statements brought to light since the +war, prove beyond doubt that we would never +have been insulted by Germany, had our people +drowned at sea and been drawn into the war at all, +had we not been considered so senselessly weak. +And we were weak—just as weak as Germany estimated +us. As it was we were barely able to help. In +the spring of 1918 all looked lost for our Allies. They +were making their last stand. A matter of hours and +nothing could stem the German onrush. By the +greatest fortune and luck we had, by that time, a +few troops worthy of taking the places of French +and British reserve divisions and releasing them to +the front. It was that plugging up of the tiny hole +in the dyke that let the Allies hold on. Had we not +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</span>shown an unbelievable efficiency over all of our +other wars, after we got into the fight, and had not +Villa crossed our border in 1916, the hole could not +have been plugged—and America would have been +on the losing side. Our unreadiness before war—not +so good. Our surprising efficiency after we got into +the war—not so bad. Our dependence upon a Mexican +bandit for partial preparation—not so good.</p> + +<p>But suppose we had been forced to fight our +enemy alone. Suppose we hadn’t had Allies to spend +their lives in defense for a whole year. Suppose in +wandering off for brass knuckles and boxing lessons +we’d have been left alone with him. Can you picture +the frightful, extravagant, tremendous deaths we +would have dealt out to our own young men?</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="XIII"> + <i>XIII</i><br>NOW + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>One very rainy day my regiment was marching +through that gloomy red-mud country of North +Georgia. We were cold and tired, and our shoes +were heavy as suit-cases. Our camping-place was to +be at a little town of Jasper. We had trudged along +for about ten miles when we came to a sign which +said: “Seven miles to Jasper.” That was encouragement. +Only seven more miles. The old Sergeant near +me set his jaw. In a few minutes we came to another +sign which said: “Seven miles to Jasper.” The old +Sergeant glared at the words as if he could bite +them. In about ten minutes we came to a third sign +which said: “Seven miles to Jasper.” It was too much +for the Sergeant. He plunked his foot down in the +mud. “Well,” he said, “thank God, we’re holding +our own.”</p> + +<p>As we look over the history of our country, we +can sincerely thank God that we’ve held our own. +For we didn’t do much of the holding ourselves. In +every one of our major wars, some outside influence, +some accident, some big defect of our enemies, some +miracle pulled us through to safety. In every big +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</span>fracas we were caught napping—caught saying there +wouldn’t be a war—caught in the midst of brazen +defiance of simple protection. Our utter weakness +didn’t keep us out of war. In fact we chose our +weakest times because our extreme anger wouldn’t +wait for anything. We’d have gone in with pitchforks, +we were so hot. That was courage all right, +but it was stupid courage—and slaughter—unnecessary +slaughter of our finest young men by the hundreds +of thousands—young men we hadn’t given +even a fighting chance, young men whose dying +voices call to us today to give our manhood a little +break—a little break against that sudden hurricane of +anger which dashes a whole people into war.</p> + +<p>Listening to these voices after the World War, +we raised our army to two hundred eighty thousand. +We were going to be organized on a business basis +for defense. We were at last going to obey the Constitution +and give our manhood a chance. The soldier +went to work to build for safety. But his efforts were +short-lived. In 1922 Congress reduced the army to +one hundred and seventy-five thousand men for one +hundred twenty million people. Over one thousand +officers and one hundred thousand enlisted men +were cast out of the service. Then the parings of the +budgets began. Since that time the army has never +been greater than one hundred nineteen thousand +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</span>and often less—about forty-two per cent of what in +1920 we felt proper. Today the C.C.C. outnumbers +the army three to one—and organized crime many +times. We have but fifty-five thousand soldiers in +the United States, subtracting for foreign possessions +and overhead. They would make a small crowd in +the Yale Bowl. It would be difficult to get two +divisions of regular troops together. The National +Guard has been similarly cut down. In 1920 it was +given a strength of four hundred twenty-five thousand. +Today it is about one hundred ninety thousand—a +reduction of fifty-six per cent. The Reserve +Officers number but eighty-nine thousand and their +active duty training—their opportunity to keep +abreast—has been sliced to the bone. Since 1920 their +efficiency has been slowed down sixty per cent. Altogether +our land defense in manpower is more than +fifty per cent lower than it was fifteen years ago.</p> + +<p>Our material deficiency is even greater. Our tanks +are hopelessly out of date. We have only twelve +modern ones—and only one of them is the most +efficient type. We have aged field artillery, practically +worn out. Our rifles are older. We have only +eighty new semi-automatics—the normal weapon of +the foot-soldier nowadays. Our ammunition is tremendously +short. We have the barest few modern +anti-aircraft guns and devices. Our motor vehicles +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</span>are way behind in numbers. Our airplanes are excellent +in quality but slim in quantity. All these +supplies would take from a year to two years to +manufacture. Does this condition remind you of +anything before our other wars? Does it give you a +little feeling of the days before the Spanish-American +tragedy? Our problem of National Defense has +not been critically analysed since 1920. It is due the +public to know where we stand. For it’s the public +only that can make or break national defense.</p> + +<p>The soldier doesn’t want a big army. He wants +a safe army. He’s not after a large military nation. +That would be contrary to American ideals and +traditions. After all he’s simply an American citizen. +He wants only a well-knit skeleton upon which flesh +and blood can be laid in case of emergency. He +wants the protection of a real defense man to pull +through a possible conflict without unwarranted +killings. He wants himself and every other man in +his nation defended. He doesn’t want to see the +waste of money and life that has characterized all +our wars, because we were unskilled, unmanned, +careless, neglectful. If he were after a large force, +he’d ask for a million men under arms. That would +be parallel to what other civilized countries are +doing, but it wouldn’t be decent for us. He doesn’t +want that. He wants the barest sufficiency to prevent +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</span>habitual useless deaths. But he sees our woeful +weakness now and shudders at the thought of what +might happen were our country suddenly to become +angry, as it has too often done in the past. He +asks now for one hundred sixty-five thousand regulars, +two hundred ten thousand National Guardsmen +and one hundred twenty thousand reserve +officers. He asks that thirty thousand reservists receive +active duty training—every year. He asks that +our supply of materials be brought up to standard. +Such a force is less than sixty per cent of what we +felt necessary in 1920. After General Staff study it +is the bare minimum for our protection—very bare. +The change would make us the sixteenth land power +in the world instead of the seventeenth. But the +soldier doesn’t care whether we’d be the sixteenth, +the seventeenth, the second or the thirty-second. He +wants enough to ensure our safety and keep us from +being swept into eternity as the British regular army +was in 1914. We have seen that an economy which +cripples National Defense is extravagance past the +point of folly. On the other hand, we see that too +great a National Defense is also extravagance.</p> + +<p>If you ask the average citizen how many wars +we’ve had he’ll answer offhand, “O, about six.” That +reply illustrates our knowledge of our past. We’ve +had actually one hundred and ten wars, great and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</span>small—an average of one oftener than every year +and a half. We’ve fought all told eighty-six hundred +battles. Compare this record with that of Germany, +who from 1870 to 1914—44 years—had continuous +peace while she was the most powerful military nation +in the world. During that time we were one of +the weakest nations and were almost constantly at +war. A study of history proves that strength or +weakness has nothing to do with the motives of war +in a republic. It’s the temper and urge of the people +as a whole when suddenly, unexpectedly they’re +provoked. So we must be thinking about a possible +catastrophe as we live under a volcano of human +emotions.</p> + +<p>Is the soldier thinking about war? Of course—but +only to stop it as quickly as possible if it comes—only +to prevent its coming to us by being strong. He’s +hired by this nation to study war as the doctor +studies disease, as the fireman studies fire, as the federal +agent studies crime. Does a fireman want fire? +Does the federal agent want crime? No more does +the soldier want war, but he wouldn’t be a true +American, if he didn’t want to do a good job, if war +comes. Does the doctor know when an epidemic +will break out? Does the fireman know when a fire +will start? Do federal agents and policemen know +when a crime will be committed? No more does the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</span>soldier know when war may start. For it always has +started with us suddenly—when people scoffed at +our getting into it. Does the surgeon scoff at the +possible outbreak of an epidemic, the fireman at the +possible outbreak of a fire, the federal agent at the +possible outbreak of crime? He’d be silly to do so. +Yet fire, disease, crime are easier to lessen than war. +For the cause of war is not a thing. It’s a frenzy of +emotions. Education and experiment help prevent +fire, crime and disease. But they value little with +emotions. The office manager is as likely to lose his +temper as the janitor. If you don’t believe it, try it +out. But when a nation loses its temper, it’s a boiling +pot. Nothing can stop its mass hatred. It’s like a +plague of grasshoppers, Japanese beetles or white +ants. We rush to force whether we are weak or +strong. And how we sacrifice our young men when +we are weak.</p> + +<p>We look at war as a horrible thing. It is. So are +crime, fire and disease. But we don’t do away with +policemen, firemen and doctors when we want to +stop those ills. Yet that’s what we’ve done in this +country about war. We’ve trimmed down our soldiers +after every one of our conflicts. Trimmed them +so that when we were hit by the next one, we squandered +life like confetti. In our short history we’ve +had in campaign over one million two hundred thousand +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</span>casualties. At least a million of these frightful +deaths and sufferings need never have been, had we +been strong. Bereaved mothers all over this land +have mourned and cried out against war. It is only +natural they should. We all hate war—no one more +than the soldier, for he knows what it is. But it +would have been a lot more practical to have faced +the facts and cried out against our unreadiness. That +is the only real thing we can lay our hands on which +could have stopped or lessened the slaughter. To cry +out against war, much as we want to do away with +it, is like crying out against fire, crime or disease. +We must work on the human soul to keep from +anger—on human souls to keep from mass anger. +Therein lies the great cause of war. But who can +tell when a nation may lose its temper? To be ready +against that explosion is not contrary to trying to +abolish war. The two go hand in hand, as all history +teaches. Each may be a preventive, but readiness is +also a safe-guard. The great harm which some peace +movements are doing lies in their attempt to make us +weak—in doing away with the safeguard, while they +push along a royal road to eternal peace. Let them +push along that road. Let’s all help. It’s a fine thing. +But let us not at the same time open up an avenue to +the murder of our young men.</p> + +<p>False views—errors of fact—lead many to believe +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</span>that mechanisms, machines, devices will make war +impossible. We’ve felt that way before many wars. +Far back in history people were sure that there’d be +no more war when the blunderbuss took the place +of the bow and arrow. We’ve found out for centuries +that machines can’t do the trick. We’ve found +out scientifically that man is the big factor. Weapons +change but principles don’t. The only thing man +runs from or ever has been known to run from, is +another man. He just won’t be stampeded by engines, +machines, mechanisms or missiles. He digs in. +He protects himself. There’s not a thing man invents +that man can’t find a reply to. Machines are for only +one purpose—to help the man on the ground get +forward. Battles in the air may help the man on the +ground, but they wouldn’t settle anything. They +couldn’t end the war. All this hysteria about the +machine being the answer is unscientific, untrue and +sensational. And bombing, gassing, strafing communities +or cities not in the fight, or not with the +army, is just as absurd. It would be the last thing a +trained general would undertake. Nothing could be +worse for his own side and his own success. Only +the untrained general would indulge in such errors—and +even he would soon learn his mistake. And as +for wiping out whole cities by air bombing or by +gas it’s mechanically impossible. Why, there’s not +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</span>enough gas in the world to destroy New York City +alone. And if there were it would take fifteen thousand +airplanes, unhampered, to make any impression. +And where would fifteen thousand airplanes +come from at a hundred thousand dollars a throw? +Don’t be fooled by these silly flights of fancy of unschooled, +untaught, unscientific blunderers.</p> + +<p>Then there’s the cry of militarism against decent +readiness. Militarism. Why there never has been +such a thing in the United States—and least of all +with the soldier, and there’s no reason to believe +there ever will be. I defy anyone to show me a single +instance of it in any group at any time in this country. +If more people knew our true state, our true history, +they’d see the rotten absurdity of shouting against +it. But theorists, revolutionary socialists, peacebreakers +are using this cunning false method of +gulling our youth into striking against any little +strength the United States might have.</p> + +<p>It’s a day of questionnaires, of polls of votes. +We’ve gone wild with them. The college youth +particularly is pursued by this plague. Led on by a +professor who either doesn’t know our true history +or doesn’t care about our country, the poor lad is +gulled into blowing pledge-bubbles. The questions +in themselves are so degrading that George Washington, +Abraham Lincoln, all our presidents, would +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</span>sicken at the sight of them. “Would you bear arms +in any war of your country?” is the favorite. The +poor lad, without background of our whole history +wavers. Under the glamorous, treacherous teachings +of his professor, he writes: “No.” And he believes +what he says. He has no idea he’s giving voice to a +flimsy New Year’s resolution. Let me ask him now +what he’d do if a bandit attacked his home and tried +to ruin his sister. Would he bear arms? He’d bear +everything he had to fight with or he wouldn’t be +worthy of the name of a man. Yet he said he’d never +bear arms against an enemy attacking another home. +What of the golden rule? What of selfishness? What +of American sportsmanship?</p> + +<p>Our nation’s ability to protect itself is its highest +insurance. For our insurance companies would be +nowhere, our commerce, our comfort, our happiness +would be nowhere, if our defense broke under +attack. There is no insurance to compete with National +Defense. For it’s our blanket insurance. It’s +just plain business sense. The soldier realizes that +we have that sense in almost everything else but +National Defense. He realizes we’re living in a +world—not heaven, Utopia or the millennium. He’s +got to face proven experience and facts as they are, +like the doctor, the fireman, the federal agent. He +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</span>wonders whether we can hold our own against the +signs of the times. Or whether we must have just +faith without works.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Other_Books_Recommended"> + <i>Other Books Recommended</i> + </h2> +</div> + + +<p class="center"><i>The History of the United States Army</i>—Colonel +William Addleman Ganoe—D. Appleton-Century +Co., 35 West 32nd Street, New +York City.</p> + +<p class="center">★</p> + +<p class="center"><i>Chasing Villa</i>—Colonel Frank Tompkins—The +Military Service Publishing Co., 100 +Telegraph Building, Harrisburg, Pa.</p> + +<p class="center">★</p> + +<p class="center"><i>Inevitable War</i>—Lieut. Col. Richard Stockton—The +Perth Co., 393 Seventh Ave., New +York City.</p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> +<div class="transnote"> +<p class="ph2">TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_83">83</a>: stray comma removed after “Napoleon the third”.</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_85">85</a>: missing apostrophe added in “know it’s a funny thing”.</p> + +<p>Spelling errors corrected and missing quote marks added.</p> + +<p>Inconsistencies in hyphenation have been left unchanged.</p> + +<p>A Table of Contents has been added by the transcriber to this edition for convenience.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77647 ***</div> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/77647-h/images/colophon.png b/77647-h/images/colophon.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..f70e89d --- /dev/null +++ b/77647-h/images/colophon.png diff --git a/77647-h/images/cover.jpg b/77647-h/images/cover.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..3230f18 --- /dev/null +++ b/77647-h/images/cover.jpg diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6c72794 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This book, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. 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