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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 76774 ***
+
+
+
+
+
+ THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION
+
+
+ THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL LIBRARY
+
+ EDITED BY ERNEST JONES
+
+ No. 15
+
+
+
+
+ THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION
+
+
+ SIGMUND FREUD, M.D., LL.D.
+
+ TRANSLATED
+ BY
+ W. D. ROBSON-SCOTT
+
+ PUBLISHED BY HORACE LIVERIGHT
+ AND THE INSTITUTE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS
+ MCMXXVIII
+
+
+
+
+ _Printed in Great Britain by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_
+
+
+
+
+ TRANSLATOR’S NOTE
+
+
+I wish to express my thanks to the Editor and to Mr. James Strachey for
+reading through this translation and making many helpful suggestions.
+
+ W. D. R.-S.
+
+
+
+
+ CHAPTER I
+
+
+When one has lived for long within a particular culture[1] and has often
+striven to discover its origins and the path of its development, one
+feels for once the temptation to turn one’s attention in the other
+direction and to ask what further fate awaits this culture and what
+transformations it is destined to undergo. But one soon finds that the
+value of such an enquiry is diminished from the outset by several
+considerations. Above all, by the fact that there are only a few people
+who can survey human activity in all its ramifications. Most people have
+been compelled to restrict themselves to a single, or to a few, spheres
+of interest; but the less a man knows of the past and the present the
+more unreliable must his judgement of the future prove. And further it
+is precisely in the matter of this judgement that the subjective
+expectations of the individual play a part that is difficult to assess;
+for these prove to be dependent on purely personal factors in his own
+experience, on his more or less hopeful attitude to life, according as
+temperament, success or failure has prescribed for him. And finally one
+must take into account the remarkable fact that in general men
+experience the present naïvely, so to speak, without being able to
+estimate its content; they must first place it at a distance, _i.e._ the
+present must have become the past before one can win from it points of
+vantage from which to gauge the future.
+
+Footnote 1:
+
+ The German word _Kultur_ has been translated sometimes as ‘culture’
+ and sometimes as ‘civilization’, denoting as it does a concept
+ intermediate between these and at times inclusive of both.—ED.
+
+And so he who yields to the temptation to deliver an opinion on the
+probable future of our culture will do well to remind himself of the
+difficulties just indicated, and likewise of the uncertainty that
+attaches quite universally to every prophecy. It follows from this that
+in hasty flight from so great a task I shall seek out the small tract of
+territory to which my attention has hitherto been directed, as soon as I
+have defined its position in general.
+
+Human culture—I mean by that all those respects in which human life has
+raised itself above animal conditions and in which it differs from the
+life of the beasts, and I disdain to separate culture and
+civilization—presents, as is well known, two aspects to the observer. It
+includes on the one hand all the knowledge and power that men have
+acquired in order to master the forces of nature and win resources from
+her for the satisfaction of human needs; and on the other hand it
+includes all the necessary arrangements whereby men’s relations to each
+other, and in particular the distribution of the attainable riches, may
+be regulated. The two tendencies of culture are not independent of each
+other, first, because the mutual relations of men are profoundly
+influenced by the measure of instinctual satisfaction that the existing
+resources make possible; secondly, because the individual can himself
+take on the quality of a piece of property in his relation to another,
+in so far as this other makes use of his capacity for work or chooses
+him as sexual object; and thirdly, because every individual is virtually
+an enemy of culture, which is nevertheless ostensibly an object of
+universal human concern. It is remarkable that little as men are able to
+exist in isolation they should yet feel as a heavy burden the sacrifices
+that culture expects of them in order that a communal existence may be
+possible. Thus culture must be defended against the individual, and its
+organization, its institutions and its laws, are all directed to this
+end; they aim not only at establishing a certain distribution of
+property, but also at maintaining it; in fact, they must protect against
+the hostile impulses of mankind everything that contributes to the
+conquest of nature and the production of wealth. Human creations are
+easy to destroy, and science and technical skill, which have built them
+up, can also be turned to their destruction.
+
+So one gets the impression that culture is something which was imposed
+on a resisting majority by a minority that understood how to possess
+itself of the means of power and coercion. Of course it stands to reason
+that these difficulties are not inherent in the nature of culture
+itself, but are conditioned by the imperfections of the cultural forms
+that have so far been developed. Indeed it is not difficult to point out
+these defects. While mankind has made solid advances in the conquest of
+nature and may expect to make still greater ones, no certain claim can
+be established for a corresponding advance in the regulation of human
+affairs, and probably at every period, as again now, many men have asked
+themselves whether this fragment that has been acquired by culture is
+indeed worth defending at all. One might suppose that a reorganization
+of human relations should be possible, which, by abandoning coercion and
+the suppression of the instincts, would remove the sources of
+dissatisfaction with culture, so that undisturbed by inner conflict men
+might devote themselves to the acquisition of natural resources and to
+the enjoyment of the same. That would be the golden age, but it is
+questionable if such a state of affairs can ever be realized. It seems
+more probable that every culture must be built up on coercion and
+instinctual renunciation; it does not even appear certain that without
+coercion the majority of human individuals would be ready to submit to
+the labour necessary for acquiring new means of supporting life. One
+has, I think, to reckon with the fact that there are present in all men
+destructive, and therefore anti-social and anti-cultural, tendencies,
+and that with a great number of people these are strong enough to
+determine their behaviour in human society.
+
+This psychological fact acquires a decisive significance when one is
+forming an estimate of human culture. One thought at first that the
+essence of culture lay in the conquest of nature for the means of
+supporting life, and in eliminating the dangers that threaten culture by
+the suitable distribution of these among mankind, but now the emphasis
+seems to have shifted away from the material plane on to the psychical.
+The critical question is whether and to what extent one can succeed,
+first, in diminishing the burden of the instinctual sacrifices imposed
+on men; secondly, in reconciling them to those that must necessarily
+remain; and thirdly, in compensating them for these. It is just as
+impossible to do without government of the masses by a minority as it is
+to dispense with coercion in the work of civilization, for the masses
+are lazy and unintelligent, they have no love for instinctual
+renunciation, they are not to be convinced of its inevitability by
+argument, and the individuals support each other in giving full play to
+their unruliness. It is only by the influence of individuals who can set
+an example, whom the masses recognize as their leaders, that they can be
+induced to submit to the labours and renunciations on which the
+existence of culture depends. All is well if these leaders are people of
+superior insight into what constitute the necessities of life, people
+who have attained the height of mastering their own instinctual wishes.
+But the danger exists that in order not to lose their influence they
+will yield to the masses more than these will yield to them, and
+therefore it seems necessary that they should be independent of the
+masses by having at their disposal means of enforcing their authority.
+To put it briefly, there are two widely diffused human characteristics
+which are responsible for the fact that the organization of culture can
+be maintained only by a certain measure of coercion: that is to say, men
+are not naturally fond of work, and arguments are of no avail against
+their passions.
+
+I know what objections will be brought against these arguments. It will
+be said that the character of the masses, here delineated, which is
+supposed to prove that one cannot dispense with coercion in the work of
+civilization, is itself only the result of defective cultural
+organization, through which men have become embittered, revengeful and
+unapproachable. New generations, brought up kindly and taught to have a
+respect for reason, who have experienced the benefits of culture early
+in life, will have a different attitude towards it; they will feel it to
+be their very own possession, and they will be ready on its account to
+make the sacrifice in labour and in instinctual renunciation that is
+necessary for its preservation. They will be able to do without coercion
+and will differ little from their leaders. If no culture has so far
+produced human masses of such a quality, it is due to the fact that no
+culture has yet discovered the plan that will influence men in such a
+way, and that from childhood on.
+
+It may be doubted whether it is possible at all, or at any rate just
+now, in the present stage of our conquest of nature, to establish a
+cultural organization of this kind; it may be asked where the throng of
+superior, dependable and disinterested leaders, who are to act as
+educators of the future generations, are to come from; and one may be
+appalled at the stupendous amount of force that will be unavoidable if
+these intentions are to be carried out. But one cannot deny the grandeur
+of this project and its significance for the future of human culture. It
+is securely based on a piece of psychological insight, on the fact that
+man is equipped with the most varied instinctual predispositions, the
+ultimate course of which is determined by the experiences of early
+childhood. But the limitations of man’s capacity for education set
+bounds to the efficacy of such a cultural transformation. One may
+question whether and in what degree it would be possible for another
+cultural milieu to efface the two characteristics of human masses that
+make the guidance of men’s affairs so very difficult. The experiment has
+not yet been made. Probably a certain percentage of mankind—owing to
+morbid predisposition or too great instinctual vigour—will always remain
+asocial, but if only one can succeed in reducing to a minority the
+majority that is to-day hostile to culture, one will have accomplished a
+great deal, perhaps indeed everything that can be accomplished.
+
+I should not like to give the impression that I have wandered far away
+from the chosen path of my enquiry. I will therefore expressly assert
+that it is far from my intention to estimate the value of the great
+cultural experiment that is at present in progress in the vast country
+that stretches between Europe and Asia. I have neither the special
+knowledge nor the capacity to decide on its practicability, to test the
+expediency of the methods employed, or to measure the width of the
+inevitable gulf between intention and execution. What is there in course
+of preparation eludes investigation, for which it is not ready; for this
+our long consolidated culture presents the material.
+
+
+
+
+ CHAPTER II
+
+
+We have glided unawares out of the economic plane over into the
+psychological. At first we were tempted to seek the essence of culture
+in the existing material resources and in the arrangements for their
+distribution. But with the discovery that every culture is based on
+compulsory labour and instinctual renunciation, and that it therefore
+inevitably evokes opposition from those affected by these demands, it
+became clear that the resources themselves, the means of acquiring them,
+and the arrangements for their distribution could not be its essential
+or unique characteristic; for they are threatened by the rebelliousness
+and destructive passions of the members of the culture. Thus in addition
+to the resources there are the means of defending culture: the coercive
+measures, and others that are intended to reconcile men to it and to
+recompense them for their sacrifices. And these last may be described as
+the psychical sphere of culture.
+
+For the sake of a uniform terminology we will describe the fact that an
+instinct cannot be satisfied as ‘frustration’, the means by which this
+frustration is secured as ‘prohibition’, and the condition produced by
+the prohibition as ‘privation’. Then the next step is to distinguish
+between privations that do affect everybody and those that do not, those
+that merely affect groups, classes, or even individuals. The former are
+the oldest; with the prohibitions that cause them culture began, who
+knows how many thousands of years ago, to detach itself from the
+primordial animal condition of mankind. To our surprise we have found
+that they are still operative, that they still form the kernel of the
+hostility to culture. The instinctual wishes that suffer under them are
+born anew with every child; there is a class of men, the neurotics, who
+react already to this first group of frustrations by an asocial
+attitude. Such instinctual wishes are those of incest, of cannibalism,
+and of murder. It seems strange to classify these, in repudiating which
+all men seem to be at one, with those others, about whose permissibility
+or impermissibility in our culture there is so vigorous a dispute; but
+psychologically one is justified in doing this. Nor is the attitude of
+culture to these oldest instinctual wishes the same in each case;
+cannibalism alone seems to be proscribed by everyone, and—to other than
+analytic observation—completely overcome; the strength of the incest
+wishes can still be perceived behind the prohibition; and under certain
+conditions murder is still practised, indeed enjoined, by our culture.
+It is possible that cultural developments lie before us, in which yet
+other wish-gratifications, which are to-day entirely permissible, will
+appear just as disagreeable as those of cannibalism do now.
+
+Already in these earliest instinctual renunciations a psychological
+factor is involved, which remains of great importance for everything
+that follows. It is not true to say that the human mind has undergone no
+development since the earliest times and that in contrast to the
+advances of science and technical skill it is still the same to-day as
+at the beginning of history. We can point out one of these advances
+here. It is in accordance with the course of our development that
+external compulsion is gradually internalized, in that a special mental
+function, man’s super-ego, takes it under its jurisdiction. Every child
+presents to us the model of this transformation; it is only by that
+means that it becomes a moral and social being. This strengthening of
+the super-ego is a highly valuable psychological possession for culture.
+Those people in whom it has taken place, from being the foes of culture,
+become its supporters. The greater their number in a cultural community,
+the more secure it is and the more easily can it dispense with external
+coercion. Now the degree of this internalization differs widely in the
+case of each instinctual prohibition. As far as the earliest demands of
+culture, already mentioned, are concerned, the process of
+internalization seems to have been to a great extent accomplished, if we
+leave out of account the unwelcome exception of the neurotics. But the
+case is altered when we turn to the other instinctual claims. One notes
+with surprise and concern that a majority of men obey the cultural
+prohibitions in question only under the pressure of external force, in
+fact only where the latter can assert itself and for as long as it is an
+object of fear. This also holds good for those so-called moral cultural
+demands, which in the same way apply to everyone. The greater part of
+what one experiences of man’s moral untrustworthiness is to be explained
+in this connection. There are innumerable civilized people who would
+shrink from murder or incest, and who yet do not hesitate to gratify
+their avarice, their aggressiveness and their sexual lusts, and who have
+no compunction in hurting others by lying, fraud and calumny, so long as
+they remain unpunished for it; and no doubt this has been so for many
+cultural epochs.
+
+If we turn to those restrictions that only apply to certain classes of
+society, we encounter a state of things which is glaringly obvious and
+has always been recognized. It is to be expected that the neglected
+classes will grudge the favoured ones their privileges and that they
+will do everything in their power to rid themselves of their own surplus
+of privation. Where this is not possible a lasting measure of discontent
+will obtain within this culture, and this may lead to dangerous
+outbreaks. But if a culture has not got beyond the stage in which the
+satisfaction of one group of its members necessarily involves the
+suppression of another, perhaps the majority—and this is the case in all
+modern cultures,—it is intelligible that these suppressed classes should
+develop an intense hostility to the culture; a culture, whose existence
+they make possible by their labour, but in whose resources they have too
+small a share. In such conditions one must not expect to find an
+internalization of the cultural prohibitions among the suppressed
+classes; indeed they are not even prepared to acknowledge these
+prohibitions, intent, as they are, on the destruction of the culture
+itself and perhaps even of the assumptions on which it rests. These
+classes are so manifestly hostile to culture that on that account the
+more latent hostility of the better provided social strata has been
+overlooked. It need not be said that a culture which leaves unsatisfied
+and drives to rebelliousness so large a number of its members neither
+has a prospect of continued existence, nor deserves it.
+
+The extent to which cultural rules have been internalized—to express it
+popularly and unpsychologically: the moral level of the members—is not
+the only psychical asset to be considered if one is estimating the value
+of a culture. In addition there is its heritage of ideals and artistic
+creations, that is to say, of the satisfactions they both yield.
+
+One will be only too readily inclined to include among the psychical
+possessions of a culture its ideals, that is, its judgements of what are
+its loftiest and its most ambitious accomplishments. It seems at first
+as if these ideals would determine the achievements of the cultural
+group; but the actual process would seem to be that the ideals are
+modelled on the first achievements that the co-operation of internal
+ability and external circumstances made possible, and that now these
+first achievements are merely held fast by the ideal as examples to be
+followed. The satisfaction the ideal gives to the members of the culture
+is thus of a narcissistic nature, it is based on pride in what has
+already been successfully achieved. To make this satisfaction complete
+the culture compares itself with others which have applied themselves to
+other tasks and have developed other ideals. On the strength of these
+differences every culture claims the right to despise the rest. In this
+way cultural ideals become a source of discord and enmity between
+different cultural groups, as can be most clearly seen among nations.
+
+The narcissistic satisfaction provided by the cultural ideal is also one
+of the forces that effectively counteract the hostility to culture
+within the cultural group. It can be shared not only by the favoured
+classes, which enjoy the benefits of this culture, but also by the
+suppressed, since the right to despise those that are outside it
+compensates them for the wrongs they suffer in their own group. True,
+one is a miserable plebeian, tormented by obligations and military
+service, but withal one is a Roman citizen, one has one’s share in the
+task of ruling other nations and dictating their laws. This
+identification of the suppressed with the class that governs and
+exploits them is, however, only a part of a larger whole. Thus the
+former can be attached affectively to the latter; in spite of their
+animosity they can find their ideals in their masters. Unless such
+relations, fundamentally of a satisfying kind, were in existence, it
+would be impossible to understand how so many cultures have contrived to
+exist for so long in spite of the justified hostility of great masses of
+men.
+
+Different in kind is the satisfaction that art yields to the members of
+a cultural group. As a rule it remains inaccessible to the masses, who
+are engaged in exhausting labour and who have not enjoyed the benefits
+of individual education. As we have long known, art offers substitutive
+gratifications for the oldest cultural renunciations, still always most
+deeply felt, and for that reason serves like nothing else to reconcile
+men to the sacrifices they have made on culture’s behalf. On the other
+hand, works of art promote the feelings of identification, of which
+every cultural group has so much need, in the occasion they provide for
+the sharing of highly valued emotional experiences. And when they
+represent the achievements of a particular culture, thus in an
+impressive way recalling it to its ideals, they also subserve a
+narcissistic gratification.
+
+No mention has yet been made of what is perhaps the most important part
+of the psychical inventory of a culture: that is to say, its—in the
+broadest sense—religious ideas; in other words, the use of which will be
+justified later, its illusions.
+
+
+
+
+ CHAPTER III
+
+
+Wherein lies the peculiar value of religious ideas?
+
+We have spoken of the hostility to culture, produced by the pressure it
+exercises and the instinctual renunciations that it demands. If one
+imagined its prohibitions removed, then one could choose any woman who
+took one’s fancy as one’s sexual object, one could kill without
+hesitation one’s rival or whoever interfered with one in any other way,
+and one could seize what one wanted of another man’s goods without
+asking his leave: how splendid, what a succession of delights, life
+would be! True, one soon finds the first difficulty: everyone else has
+exactly the same wishes, and will treat one with no more consideration
+than one will treat him. And so in reality there is only one single
+person who can be made unrestrictedly happy by abolishing thus the
+restrictions imposed by culture, and that is a tyrant or dictator who
+has monopolized all the means of power; and even he has every reason to
+want the others to keep at least one cultural commandment: thou shalt
+not kill.
+
+But how ungrateful, how short-sighted after all, to strive for the
+abolition of culture! What would then remain would be the state of
+nature, and that is far harder to endure. It is true that nature does
+not ask us to restrain our instincts, she lets us do as we like; but she
+has her peculiarly effective mode of restricting us: she destroys us,
+coldly, cruelly, callously, as it seems to us, and possibly just through
+what has caused our satisfaction. It was because of these very dangers
+with which nature threatens us that we united together and created
+culture, which, amongst other things, is supposed to make our communal
+existence possible. Indeed, it is the principal task of culture, its
+real _raison d’être_, to defend us against nature.
+
+One must confess that in many ways it already does this tolerably well,
+and clearly as time goes on it will be much more successful. But no one
+is under the illusion that nature has so far been vanquished; few dare
+to hope that she will ever be completely under man’s subjection. There
+are the elements, which seem to mock at all human control: the earth,
+which quakes, is rent asunder, and buries man and all his works; the
+water, which in tumult floods and submerges all things; the storm, which
+drives all before it; there are the diseases, which we have only lately
+recognized as the attacks of other living creatures; and finally there
+is the painful riddle of death, for which no remedy at all has yet been
+found, nor probably ever will be. With these forces nature rises up
+before us, sublime, pitiless, inexorable; thus she brings again to mind
+our weakness and helplessness, of which we thought the work of
+civilization had rid us. It is one of the few noble and gratifying
+spectacles that men can offer, when in the face of an elemental
+catastrophe they awake from their muddle and confusion, forget all their
+internal difficulties and animosities, and remember the great common
+task, the preservation of mankind against the supremacy of nature.
+
+For the individual, as for mankind in general, life is hard to endure.
+The culture in which he shares imposes on him some measure of privation,
+and other men occasion him a certain degree of suffering, either in
+spite of the laws of this culture or because of its imperfections. Add
+to this the evils that unvanquished nature—he calls it Fate—inflicts on
+him. One would expect a permanent condition of anxious suspense and a
+severe injury to his innate narcissism to be the result of this state of
+affairs. We know already how the individual reacts to the injuries that
+culture and other men inflict on him: he develops a corresponding degree
+of resistance against the institutions of this culture, of hostility
+towards it. But how does he defend himself against the supremacy of
+nature, of fate, which threatens him, as it threatens all?
+
+Culture relieves him of this task: it performs it in the same way for
+everyone. (It is also noteworthy that pretty well all cultures are the
+same in this respect.) It does not cry a halt, as it were, in its task
+of defending man against nature; it merely pursues it by other methods.
+This is a complex business; man’s seriously menaced self-esteem craves
+for consolation, life and the universe must be rid of their terrors, and
+incidentally man’s curiosity, reinforced, it is true, by the strongest
+practical motives, demands an answer.
+
+With the first step, which is the humanization of nature, much is
+already won. Nothing can be made of impersonal forces and fates; they
+remain eternally remote. But if the elements have passions that rage
+like those in our own souls, if death itself is not something
+spontaneous, but the violent act of an evil Will, if everywhere in
+nature we have about us beings who resemble those of our own
+environment, then indeed we can breathe freely, we can feel at home in
+face of the supernatural, and we can deal psychically with our frantic
+anxiety. We are perhaps still defenceless, but no longer helplessly
+paralysed; we can at least react; perhaps indeed we are not even
+defenceless, we can have recourse to the same methods against these
+violent supermen of the beyond that we make use of in our own community;
+we can try to exorcise them, to appease them, to bribe them, and so rob
+them of part of their power by thus influencing them. Such a
+substitution of psychology for natural science provides not merely
+immediate relief, it also points the way to a further mastery of the
+situation.
+
+For there is nothing new in this situation. It has an infantile
+prototype, and is really only the continuation of this. For once before
+one has been in such a state of helplessness: as a little child in one’s
+relationship to one’s parents. For one had reason to fear them,
+especially the father, though at the same time one was sure of his
+protection against the dangers then known to one. And so it was natural
+to assimilate and combine the two situations. Here, too, as in
+dream-life, the wish came into its own. The sleeper is seized by a
+presentiment of death, which seeks to carry him to the grave. But the
+dream-work knows how to select a condition that will turn even this
+dreaded event into a wish-fulfilment: the dreamer sees himself in an
+ancient Etruscan grave, into which he has descended, happy in the
+satisfaction it has given to his archæological interests. Similarly man
+makes the forces of nature not simply in the image of men with whom he
+can associate as his equals—that would not do justice to the
+overpowering impression they make on him—but he gives them the
+characteristics of the father, makes them into gods, thereby following
+not only an infantile, but also, as I have tried to show, a phylogenetic
+prototype.
+
+In the course of time the first observations of law and order in natural
+phenomena are made, and therewith the forces of nature lose their human
+traits. But men’s helplessness remains, and with it their father-longing
+and the gods. The gods retain their threefold task: they must exorcise
+the terrors of nature, they must reconcile one to the cruelty of fate,
+particularly as shown in death, and they must make amends for the
+sufferings and privations that the communal life of culture has imposed
+on man.
+
+But within these there is a gradual shifting of the accent. It is
+observed that natural phenomena develop of themselves from inward
+necessity; without doubt the gods are the lords of nature: they have
+arranged it thus and now they can leave it to itself. Only occasionally,
+in the so-called miracles, do they intervene in its course, as if to
+protest that they have surrendered nothing of their original sphere of
+power. As far as the vicissitudes of fate are concerned, an unpleasant
+suspicion persists that the perplexity and helplessness of the human
+race cannot be remedied. This is where the gods are most apt to fail us;
+if they themselves make fate, then their ways must be deemed
+inscrutable. The most gifted people of the ancient world dimly surmised
+that above the gods stands Destiny and that the gods themselves have
+their destinies. And the more autonomous nature becomes and the more the
+gods withdraw from her, the more earnestly are all expectations
+concentrated on the third task assigned to them and the more does
+morality become their real domain. It now becomes the business of the
+gods to adjust the defects and evils of culture, to attend to the
+sufferings that men inflict on each other in their communal life, and to
+see that the laws of culture, which men obey so ill, are carried out.
+The laws of culture themselves are claimed to be of divine origin, they
+are elevated to a position above human society, and they are extended
+over nature and the universe.
+
+And so a rich store of ideas is formed, born of the need to make
+tolerable the helplessness of man, and built out of the material offered
+by memories of the helplessness of his own childhood and the childhood
+of the human race. It is easy to see that these ideas protect man in two
+directions; against the dangers of nature and fate, and against the
+evils of human society itself. What it amounts to is this: life in this
+world serves a higher purpose; true, it is not easy to guess the nature
+of this purpose, but certainly a perfecting of human existence is
+implied. Probably the spiritual part of man, the soul, which in the
+course of time has so slowly and unwillingly detached itself from the
+body, is to be regarded as the object of this elevation and exaltation.
+Everything that takes place in this world expresses the intentions of an
+Intelligence, superior to us, which in the end, though its devious ways
+may be difficult to follow, orders everything for good, that is, to our
+advantage. Over each one of us watches a benevolent, and only apparently
+severe, Providence, which will not suffer us to become the plaything of
+the stark and pitiless forces of nature; death itself is not
+annihilation, not a return to inorganic lifelessness, but the beginning
+of a new kind of existence, which lies on the road of development to
+something higher. And to turn to the other side of the question, the
+moral laws that have formed our culture govern also the whole universe,
+only they are upheld with incomparably more force and consistency by a
+supreme judicial court. In the end all good is rewarded, all evil
+punished, if not actually in this life, then in the further existences
+that begin after death. And thus all the terrors, the sufferings, and
+the hardships of life are destined to be obliterated; the life after
+death, which continues our earthly existence as the invisible part of
+the spectrum adjoins the visible, brings all the perfection that perhaps
+we have missed here. And the superior wisdom that directs this issue,
+the supreme goodness that expresses itself thus, the justice that thus
+achieves its aim—these are the qualities of the divine beings who have
+fashioned us and the world in general; or rather of the one divine being
+into which in our culture all the gods of antiquity have been condensed.
+The race that first succeeded in thus concentrating the divine qualities
+was not a little proud of this advance. It had revealed the father
+nucleus which had always lain hidden behind every divine figure;
+fundamentally it was a return to the historical beginnings of the idea
+of God. Now that God was a single person, man’s relations to him could
+recover the intimacy and intensity of the child’s relation to the
+father. If one had done so much for the father, then surely one would be
+rewarded—at least the only beloved child, the chosen people, would be.
+More recently, pious America has laid claim to be ‘God’s own country’,
+and for one of the forms under which men worship the deity the claim
+certainly holds good.
+
+The religious ideas that have just been summarized have of course gone
+through a long process of development, and have been held in various
+phases by various cultures. I have singled out one such phase of
+development, which more or less corresponds to the final form of our
+contemporary Christian culture in the west. It is easy to see that not
+all the parts of this whole tally equally well with each other, that not
+all the questions that press for an answer receive one, and that the
+contradiction of daily experience can only with difficulty be dismissed.
+But such as they are, these ideas—religious, in the broadest sense of
+the word—are prized as the most precious possession of culture, as the
+most valuable thing it has to offer its members; far more highly prized
+than all our devices for winning the treasures of the earth, for
+providing men with sustenance, or for preventing their diseases, and so
+forth; men suppose that life would be intolerable if they did not accord
+these ideas the value that is claimed for them. And now the question
+arises: what are these ideas in the light of psychology; whence do they
+derive the esteem in which they are held; and further, in all
+diffidence, what is their real worth?
+
+
+
+
+ CHAPTER IV
+
+
+An enquiry that proceeds uninterruptedly, like a monologue, is not
+altogether without its dangers. One is too easily tempted to push aside
+thoughts that would interrupt it, and in exchange one is left with a
+feeling of uncertainty which one will drown in the end by
+over-decisiveness. I shall therefore imagine an opponent who follows my
+arguments with mistrust, and I shall let him interject remarks here and
+there.
+
+I hear him saying: ‘You have repeatedly used the expressions “culture
+creates these religious ideas”, “culture places them at the disposal of
+its members”, which sounds strange to me somehow. I could not say why
+myself, but it does not sound so natural as to say that culture has made
+regulations about distributing the products of labour or about the
+rights over women and children.’
+
+I think, nevertheless, that one is justified in expressing oneself thus.
+I have tried to show that religious ideas have sprung from the same need
+as all the other achievements of culture: from the necessity for
+defending itself against the crushing supremacy of nature. And there was
+a second motive: the eager desire to correct the so painfully felt
+imperfections of culture. Moreover, there is something particularly
+apposite in saying that culture gives the individual these ideas, for he
+finds them at hand, they are presented to him ready-made; he would not
+be in a position to find them by himself. It is the heritage of many
+generations which he enters into and which he takes over as he does the
+multiplication table, geometry, etc. There is certainly a distinction in
+this, but it lies elsewhere, and I cannot examine it at this point. The
+feeling of strangeness that you mention may be partly accounted for by
+the fact that this stock of religious ideas is generally offered as a
+divine revelation. But that is in itself a part of the religious system,
+and entirely leaves out of account the known historical development of
+these ideas and their variations in different ages and cultures.
+
+‘Another point which seems to me more important. You would derive the
+humanization of nature from the desire to put an end to human perplexity
+and helplessness in the face of nature’s dreaded forces, and from the
+necessity for establishing relations with, and finally influencing,
+these forces. But this explanation seems to be superfluous. For
+primitive man has no choice, he has no other way of thinking. It is
+natural to him, as if innate, to project his existence outwards into the
+world, and to regard all events that come under his observation as the
+manifestations of beings who fundamentally resemble himself. It is his
+only method of comprehension. And it is by no means self-evident, on the
+contrary it is a remarkable coincidence, that he should succeed in
+satisfying one of his great wants by thus indulging his natural
+disposition.’
+
+I do not find that so striking. For do you suppose that men’s
+thought-processes have no practical motives, that they are simply the
+expression of a disinterested curiosity? That is surely very improbable.
+I believe, rather, that when he personifies the forces of nature man is
+once again following an infantile prototype. He has learnt from the
+persons of his earliest environment that the way to influence them is to
+establish a relationship with them, and so, later on, with the same end
+in view, he deals with everything that happens to him as he dealt with
+those persons. Thus I do not contradict your descriptive observation; it
+is, in point of fact, natural to man to personify everything that he
+wishes to comprehend, in order that later he may control it—the
+psychical subjugation as preparation for the physical—but I provide in
+addition a motive and genesis for this peculiarity of human thought.
+
+‘And now yet a third point. You have dealt with the origin of religion
+once before, in your book _Totem und Tabu_. But there it appears in a
+different light. Everything is the son-father relationship; God is the
+exalted father, and the longing for the father is the root of the need
+for religion. Since then, it seems, you have discovered the factor of
+human weakness and helplessness, to which indeed the chief part in the
+formation of religion is commonly assigned, and you now transfer to
+helplessness everything that was formerly father complex. May I ask you
+to enlighten me on this transformation?’
+
+With pleasure. I was only waiting for this invitation. But is it really
+a transformation? In _Totem und Tabu_ it was not my purpose to explain
+the origin of religions, but only of totemism. Can you from any
+standpoint known to you explain the fact that the first form in which
+the protecting deity revealed itself to men was that of an animal, that
+a prohibition existed against killing or eating this animal, and that
+yet it was the solemn custom to kill it and eat it communally once a
+year? It is just this that takes place in totemism. And it is hardly to
+the purpose to argue whether totemism should be called a religion. It
+has intimate connections with the later god-religions; the totem animals
+become the sacred animals of the gods; and the earliest, and the most
+profound, moral restrictions—the murder prohibition and the incest
+prohibition—originate in totemism. Whether or not you accept the
+conclusions of _Totem und Tabu_, I hope you will admit that in that book
+a number of very remarkable isolated facts are brought together into a
+consistent whole.
+
+Why in the long run the animal god did not suffice and why it was
+replaced by the human—that was hardly discussed in _Totem und Tabu_, and
+other problems of the formation of religion find no mention there at
+all. But do you regard such a limitation as identical with a denial? My
+work is a good example of the strict isolation of the share that
+psycho-analytic observation can contribute to the problem of religion.
+If I am now trying to add to it the other, less deeply hidden, part, you
+should not accuse me of inconsistency, just as before I was accused of
+being one-sided. It is of course my business to point out the connecting
+links between what I said before and what I now put forward, between the
+deeper and the manifest motivation, between the father complex and man’s
+helplessness and need for protection.
+
+These connections are not difficult to find. They consist in the
+relation of the child’s helplessness to the adult’s continuation of it,
+so that, as was to be expected, the psycho-analytic motivation of the
+forming of religion turns out to be the infantile contribution to its
+manifest motivation. Let us imagine to ourselves the mental life of the
+small child. You remember the object-choice after the anaclitic type,
+which psycho-analysis talks about? The libido follows the paths of
+narcissistic needs, and attaches itself to the objects that ensure their
+satisfaction. So the mother, who satisfies hunger, becomes the first
+love-object, and certainly also the first protection against all the
+undefined and threatening dangers of the outer world; becomes, if we may
+so express it, the first protection against anxiety.
+
+In this function the mother is soon replaced by the stronger father, and
+this situation persists from now on over the whole of childhood. But the
+relation to the father is affected by a peculiar ambivalence. He was
+himself a danger, perhaps just because of that earlier relation to the
+mother; so he is feared no less than he is longed for and admired. The
+indications of this ambivalence are deeply imprinted in all religions,
+as is brought out in _Totem und Tabu_. Now when the child grows up and
+finds that he is destined to remain a child for ever, and that he can
+never do without protection against unknown and mighty powers, he
+invests these with the traits of the father-figure; he creates for
+himself the gods, of whom he is afraid, whom he seeks to propitiate, and
+to whom he nevertheless entrusts the task of protecting him. Thus the
+longing-for-the-father explanation is identical with the other, the need
+for protection against the consequences of human weakness; the child’s
+defensive reaction to his helplessness gives the characteristic features
+to the adult’s reaction to his own sense of helplessness, _i.e_. the
+formation of religion. But it is not our intention to pursue further the
+development of the idea of God; we are concerned here with the matured
+stock of religious ideas as culture transmits them to the individual.
+
+
+
+
+ CHAPTER V
+
+
+Now to take up again the threads of our enquiry: what is the
+psychological significance of religious ideas and how can we classify
+them? The question is at first not at all easy to answer. Having
+rejected various formulas, I shall take my stand by this one: religion
+consists of certain dogmas, assertions about facts and conditions of
+external (or internal) reality, which tell one something that one has
+not oneself discovered and which claim that one should give them
+credence. As they give information about what are to us the most
+interesting and important things in life, they are particularly highly
+valued. He who knows nothing of them is ignorant indeed, and he who has
+assimilated them may consider himself enriched.
+
+There are of course many such dogmas about the most diverse things of
+this world. Every school hour is full of them. Let us choose geography.
+We hear there: Konstanz is on the Bodensee. A student song adds: If you
+don’t believe it go and see. I happen to have been there, and can
+confirm the fact that this beautiful town lies on the shore of a broad
+stretch of water, which all those dwelling around call the Bodensee. I
+am now completely convinced of the accuracy of this geographical
+statement. And in this connection I am reminded of another and very
+remarkable experience. I was already a man of mature years when I stood
+for the first time on the hill of the Athenian Acropolis, between the
+temple ruins, looking out on to the blue sea. A feeling of astonishment
+mingled with my pleasure, which prompted me to say: then it really is
+true, what we used to be taught at school! How shallow and weak at that
+age must have been my belief in the real truth of what I heard if I can
+be so astonished to-day! But I will not emphasize the significance of
+this experience too much; yet another explanation of my astonishment is
+possible, which did not strike me at the time, and which is of a wholly
+subjective nature and connected with the peculiar character of the
+place.
+
+All such dogmas as these, then, exact belief in their contents, but not
+without substantiating their title to this. They claim to be the
+condensed result of a long process of thought, which is founded on
+observation and also, certainly, on reasoning; they show how, if one so
+intends, one can go through this process oneself, instead of accepting
+the result of it; and the source of the knowledge imparted by the dogma
+is always added, where it is not, as with geographical statements,
+self-evident. For instance: the earth is shaped like a globe; the proofs
+adduced for this are Foucault’s pendulum experiment, the phenomena of
+the horizon and the possibility of circumnavigating the earth. Since it
+is impracticable, as all concerned realize, to send every school child
+on a voyage round the world, one is content that the school teaching
+shall be taken on trust, but one knows that the way to personal
+conviction is still open.
+
+Let us try to apply the same tests to the dogmas of religion. If we ask
+on what their claim to be believed is based, we receive three answers,
+which accord remarkably ill with one another. They deserve to be
+believed: firstly, because our primal ancestors already believed them;
+secondly, because we possess proofs, which have been handed down to us
+from this very period of antiquity; and thirdly, because it is forbidden
+to raise the question of their authenticity at all. Formerly this
+presumptuous act was visited with the very severest penalties, and even
+to-day society is unwilling to see anyone renew it.
+
+This third point cannot but rouse our strongest suspicions. Such a
+prohibition can surely have only one motive: that society knows very
+well the uncertain basis of the claim it makes for its religious
+doctrines. If it were otherwise, the relevant material would certainly
+be placed most readily at the disposal of anyone who wished to gain
+conviction for himself. And so we proceed to test the other two
+arguments with a feeling of mistrust not easily allayed. We ought to
+believe because our forefathers believed. But these ancestors of ours
+were far more ignorant than we; they believed in things we could not
+possibly accept to-day; so the possibility occurs that religious
+doctrines may also be in this category. The proofs they have bequeathed
+to us are deposited in writings that themselves bear every trace of
+being untrustworthy. They are full of contradictions, revisions, and
+interpolations; where they speak of actual authentic proofs they are
+themselves of doubtful authenticity. It does not help much if divine
+revelation is asserted to be the origin of their text or only of their
+content, for this assertion is itself already a part of those doctrines
+whose authenticity is to be examined, and no statement can bear its own
+proof.
+
+Thus we arrive at the singular conclusion that just what might be of the
+greatest significance for us in our cultural system, the information
+which should solve for us the riddles of the universe and reconcile us
+to the troubles of life, that just this has the weakest possible claim
+to authenticity. We should not be able to bring ourselves to accept
+anything of as little concern to us as the fact that whales bear young
+instead of laying eggs, if it were not capable of better proof than
+this.
+
+This state of things is in itself a very remarkable psychological
+problem. Let no one think that the foregoing remarks on the
+impossibility of proving religious doctrines contain anything new. It
+has been felt at all times, assuredly even by the ancestors who
+bequeathed this legacy. Probably many of them nursed the same doubts as
+we, but the pressure imposed on them was too strong for them to have
+dared to utter them. And since then countless people have been tortured
+by the same doubts, which they would fain have suppressed because they
+held themselves in duty bound to believe, and since then many brilliant
+intellects have been wrecked upon this conflict and many characters have
+come to grief through the compromises by which they sought a way out.
+
+If all the arguments that are put forward for the authenticity of
+religious doctrines originate in the past, it is natural to look round
+and see whether the present, better able to judge in these matters,
+cannot also furnish such evidence. The whole of the religious system
+would become infinitely more credible if one could succeed in this way
+in removing the element of doubt from a single part of it. It is at this
+point that the activity of the spiritualists comes in; they are
+convinced of the immortality of the individual soul, and they would
+demonstrate to us that this one article of religious teaching is free
+from doubt. Unfortunately they have not succeeded in disproving the fact
+that the appearances and utterances of their spirits are merely the
+productions of their own mental activity. They have called up the
+spirits of the greatest of men, of the most eminent thinkers, but all
+their utterances and all the information they have received from them
+have been so foolish and so desperately insignificant that one could
+find nothing else to believe in but the capacity of the spirits for
+adapting themselves to the circle of people that had evoked them.
+
+One must now mention two attempts to evade the problem, which both
+convey the impression of frantic effort. One of them, high-handed in its
+nature, is old; the other is subtle and modern. The first is the _Credo
+quia absurdum_ of the early Father. It would imply that religious
+doctrines are outside reason’s jurisdiction; they stand above reason.
+Their truth must be inwardly felt: one does not need to comprehend them.
+But this _Credo_ is only of interest as a voluntary confession; as a
+decree it has no binding force. Am I to be obliged to believe every
+absurdity? And if not, why just this one? There is no appeal beyond
+reason. And if the truth of religious doctrines is dependent on an inner
+experience which bears witness to that truth, what is one to make of the
+many people who do not have that rare experience? One may expect all men
+to use the gift of reason that they possess, but one cannot set up an
+obligation that shall apply to all on a basis that only exists for quite
+a few. Of what significance is it for other people that you have won
+from a state of ecstasy, which has deeply moved you, an imperturbable
+conviction of the real truth of the doctrines of religion?
+
+The second attempt is that of the philosophy of ‘As If’. It explains
+that in our mental activity we assume all manner of things, the
+groundlessness, indeed the absurdity, of which we fully realize. They
+are called ‘fictions’, but from a variety of practical motives we are
+led to behave ‘as if’ we believed in these fictions. This, it is argued,
+is the case with religious doctrines on account of their unequalled
+importance for the maintenance of human society.[2] This argument is not
+far removed from the _Credo quia absurdum_. But I think that the claim
+of the philosophy of ‘As If’ is such as only a philosopher could make.
+The man whose thinking is not influenced by the wiles of philosophy will
+never be able to accept it; with the confession of absurdity, of
+illogicality, there is no more to be said as far as he is concerned. He
+cannot be expected to forgo the guarantees he demands for all his usual
+activities just in the matter of his most important interests. I am
+reminded of one of my children who was distinguished at an early age by
+a peculiarly marked sense of reality. When the children were told a
+fairy tale, to which they listened with rapt attention, he would come
+forward and ask: Is that a true story? Having been told that it was not,
+he would turn away with an air of disdain. It is to be expected that men
+will soon behave in like manner towards the religious fairy tales,
+despite the advocacy of the philosophy of ‘As If’.
+
+Footnote 2:
+
+ I hope I am not doing an injustice if I make the author of the
+ philosophy of ‘As If’ represent a point of view that is familiar to
+ other thinkers also. Cp. H. Vaihinger, _Die Philosophie des Als ob_,
+ Siebente und achte Auflage, 1922, S. 68: ‘We include as fictions not
+ merely indifferent theoretical operations but ideational constructions
+ emanating from the noblest minds, to which the noblest part of mankind
+ cling and of which they will not allow themselves to be deprived. Nor
+ is it our object so to deprive them—for as _practical fictions_ we
+ leave them all intact; they perish only as _theoretical truths_’ (C.
+ K. Ogden’s translation).
+
+But at present they still behave quite differently, and in past ages, in
+spite of their incontrovertible lack of authenticity, religious ideas
+have exercised the very strongest influence on mankind. This is a fresh
+psychological problem. We must ask where the inherent strength of these
+doctrines lies and to what circumstance they owe their efficacy,
+independent, as it is, of the acknowledgement of the reason.
+
+
+
+
+ CHAPTER VI
+
+
+I think we have sufficiently paved the way for the answer to both these
+questions. It will be found if we fix our attention on the psychical
+origin of religious ideas. These, which profess to be dogmas, are not
+the residue of experience or the final result of reflection; they are
+illusions, fulfilments of the oldest, strongest and most insistent
+wishes of mankind; the secret of their strength is the strength of these
+wishes. We know already that the terrifying effect of infantile
+helplessness aroused the need for protection—protection through
+love—which the father relieved, and that the discovery that this
+helplessness would continue through the whole of life made it necessary
+to cling to the existence of a father—but this time a more powerful one.
+Thus the benevolent rule of divine providence allays our anxiety in face
+of life’s dangers, the establishment of a moral world order ensures the
+fulfilment of the demands of justice, which within human culture have so
+often remained unfulfilled, and the prolongation of earthly existence by
+a future life provides in addition the local and temporal setting for
+these wish-fulfilments. Answers to the questions that tempt human
+curiosity, such as the origin of the universe and the relation between
+the body and the soul, are developed in accordance with the underlying
+assumptions of this system; it betokens a tremendous relief for the
+individual psyche if it is released from the conflicts of childhood
+arising out of the father complex, which are never wholly overcome, and
+if these conflicts are afforded a universally accepted solution.
+
+When I say that they are illusions, I must define the meaning of the
+word. An illusion is not the same as an error, it is indeed not
+necessarily an error. Aristotle’s belief that vermin are evolved out of
+dung, to which ignorant people still cling, was an error; so was the
+belief of a former generation of doctors that _tabes dorsalis_ was the
+result of sexual excess. It would be improper to call these errors
+illusions. On the other hand, it was an illusion on the part of Columbus
+that he had discovered a new sea-route to India. The part played by his
+wish in this error is very clear. One may describe as an illusion the
+statement of certain nationalists that the Indo-Germanic race is the
+only one capable of culture, or the belief, which only psycho-analysis
+destroyed, that the child is a being without sexuality. It is
+characteristic of the illusion that it is derived from men’s wishes; in
+this respect it approaches the psychiatric delusion, but it is to be
+distinguished from this, quite apart from the more complicated structure
+of the latter. In the delusion we emphasize as essential the conflict
+with reality; the illusion need not be necessarily false, that is to
+say, unrealizable or incompatible with reality. For instance, a poor
+girl may have an illusion that a prince will come and fetch her home. It
+is possible; some such cases have occurred. That the Messiah will come
+and found a golden age is much less probable; according to one’s
+personal attitude one will classify this belief as an illusion or as
+analogous to a delusion. Examples of illusions that have come true are
+not easy to discover, but the illusion of the alchemists that all metals
+can be turned into gold may prove to be one. The desire to have lots of
+gold, as much gold as possible, has been considerably damped by our
+modern insight into the nature of wealth, yet chemistry no longer
+considers a transmutation of metals into gold as impossible. Thus we
+call a belief an illusion when wish-fulfilment is a prominent factor in
+its motivation, while disregarding its relations to reality, just as the
+illusion itself does.
+
+If after this survey we turn again to religious doctrines, we may
+reiterate that they are all illusions, they do not admit of proof, and
+no one can be compelled to consider them as true or to believe in them.
+Some of them are so improbable, so very incompatible with everything we
+have laboriously discovered about the reality of the world, that we may
+compare them—taking adequately into account the psychological
+differences—to delusions. Of the reality value of most of them we cannot
+judge; just as they cannot be proved, neither can they be refuted. We
+still know too little to approach them critically. The riddles of the
+universe only reveal themselves slowly to our enquiry, to many questions
+science can as yet give no answer; but scientific work is our only way
+to the knowledge of external reality. Again, it is merely illusion to
+expect anything from intuition or trance; they can give us nothing but
+particulars, which are difficult to interpret, about our own mental
+life, never information about the questions that are so lightly answered
+by the doctrines of religion. It would be wanton to let one’s own
+arbitrary action fill the gap, and according to one’s personal estimate
+declare this or that part of the religious system to be more or less
+acceptable. These questions are too momentous for that; too sacred, one
+might say.
+
+At this point it may be objected: well, then, if even the crabbed
+sceptics admit that the statements of religion cannot be confuted by
+reason, why should not I believe in them, since they have so much on
+their side—tradition, the concurrence of mankind, and all the
+consolation they yield? Yes, why not? Just as no one can be forced into
+belief, so no one can be forced into unbelief. But do not deceive
+yourself into thinking that with such arguments you are following the
+path of correct reasoning. If ever there was a case of facile argument,
+this is one. Ignorance is ignorance; no right to believe anything is
+derived from it. No reasonable man will behave so frivolously in other
+matters or rest content with such feeble grounds for his opinions or for
+the attitude he adopts; it is only in the highest and holiest things
+that he allows this. In reality these are only attempts to delude
+oneself or other people into the belief that one still holds fast to
+religion, when one has long cut oneself loose from it. Where questions
+of religion are concerned people are guilty of every possible kind of
+insincerity and intellectual misdemeanour. Philosophers stretch the
+meaning of words until they retain scarcely anything of their original
+sense; by calling ‘God’ some vague abstraction which they have created
+for themselves, they pose as deists, as believers, before the world;
+they may even pride themselves on having attained a higher and purer
+idea of God, although their God is nothing but an insubstantial shadow
+and no longer the mighty personality of religious doctrine. Critics
+persist in calling ‘deeply religious’ a person who confesses to a sense
+of man’s insignificance and impotence in face of the universe, although
+it is not this feeling that constitutes the essence of religious
+emotion, but rather the next step, the reaction to it, which seeks a
+remedy against this feeling. He who goes no further, he who humbly
+acquiesces in the insignificant part man plays in the universe, is, on
+the contrary, irreligious in the truest sense of the word.
+
+It does not lie within the scope of this enquiry to estimate the value
+of religious doctrines as truth. It suffices that we have recognized
+them, psychologically considered, as illusions. But we need not conceal
+the fact that this discovery strongly influences our attitude to what
+must appear to many the most important of questions. We know
+approximately at what periods and by what sort of men religious
+doctrines were formed. If we now learn from what motives this happened,
+our attitude to the problem of religion will suffer an appreciable
+change. We say to ourselves: it would indeed be very nice if there were
+a God, who was both creator of the world and a benevolent providence, if
+there were a moral world order and a future life, but at the same time
+it is very odd that this is all just as we should wish it ourselves. And
+it would be still odder if our poor, ignorant, enslaved ancestors had
+succeeded in solving all these difficult riddles of the universe.
+
+
+
+
+ CHAPTER VII
+
+
+Having recognized religious doctrines to be illusions, we are at once
+confronted with the further question: may not other cultural
+possessions, which we esteem highly and by which we let our life be
+ruled, be of a similar nature? Should not the assumptions that regulate
+our political institutions likewise be called illusions, and is it not
+the case that in our culture the relations between the sexes are
+disturbed by an erotic illusion, or by a series of erotic illusions?
+Once our suspicions have been roused, we shall not shrink from asking
+whether there is any better foundation for our conviction that it is
+possible to discover something about external reality through the
+applying of observation and reasoning in scientific work. Nothing need
+keep us from applying observation to our own natures or submitting the
+process of reasoning to its own criticism. Here a series of enquiries
+present themselves, which in their result should be of decisive
+importance for constructing a ‘Weltanschauung’. We surmise, too, that
+such an endeavour would not be wasted, and that it would at least
+partially justify our suspicions. But the author of these pages has not
+the means to undertake so comprehensive a task; forced by necessity, he
+confines his work to the pursuit of a single one of these illusions,
+that is, the religious.
+
+But now the loud voice of our opponent bids us to stop. We are called to
+account for our transgressions.
+
+‘Archæological interests are no doubt most praiseworthy, but one does
+not set about an excavation if one is thereby going to undermine
+occupied dwelling-places so that they collapse and bury the inhabitants
+under their ruins. The doctrines of religion are not a subject that one
+can be clever about, as one can about any other. Our culture is built up
+on them; the preservation of human society rests on the assumption that
+the majority of mankind believe in the truth of these doctrines. If they
+are taught that there is no almighty and all just God, no divine world
+order, and no future life, then they will feel exempt from all
+obligation to follow the rules of culture. Uninhibited and free from
+fear, everybody will follow his asocial, egoistic instincts, and will
+seek to prove his power. Chaos, which we have banished through thousands
+of years of the work of civilization, will begin again. Even if one
+knew, and could prove, that religion was not in possession of the truth,
+one should conceal the fact and behave as the philosophy of “As If”
+demands—and this in the interests of the preservation of everybody. And
+apart from the danger of the undertaking, it is also a purposeless
+cruelty. Countless people find their one consolation in the doctrines of
+religion, and only with their help can they endure life. You would rob
+them of what supports them, and yet you have nothing better to give them
+in exchange. It has been admitted that so far science has not achieved
+much, but even if it had advanced far further, it would not suffice for
+men. Man has yet other imperative needs, which can never be satisfied by
+cold science, and it is very strange—to be frank, it is the acme of
+inconsistency—that a psychologist who has always emphasized how much in
+men’s lives the intelligence retreats before the life of the instincts
+should now strive to rob men of a precious wish-satisfaction, and should
+want to give them in exchange a compensation of an intellectual nature.’
+
+What a number of accusations all at once! However, I am prepared to deny
+them all; and what is more, I am prepared to defend the statement that
+culture incurs a greater danger by maintaining its present attitude to
+religion than by relinquishing it. But I hardly know where to begin my
+reply.
+
+Perhaps with the assurance that I myself consider my undertaking to be
+completely harmless and free from danger. This time the overestimation
+of the intellect is not on my side. If men are such as my opponents
+describe them—and I have no wish to contradict it—then there is no
+danger of a devout believer, overwhelmed by my arguments, being deprived
+of his faith. Besides, I have said nothing that other and better men
+have not said before me in a much more complete, forcible and impressive
+way. The names of these men are well known. I shall not quote them. I
+should not like to give the impression that I would count myself of
+their number. I have merely—this is the only thing that is new in my
+statement—added a certain psychological foundation to the critique of my
+great predecessors. It is hardly to be expected that just this addition
+will produce the effect that was denied to the earlier attempts.
+Certainly I might be asked at this point why I write such things if I am
+convinced of their ineffectiveness. But we shall come back to that
+later.
+
+The one person this publication may harm is myself. I shall have to
+listen to the most unpleasant reproaches on the score of shallowness,
+narrow-mindedness, and lack of idealism and of understanding for the
+highest interests of mankind. But on the one hand these remonstrances
+are not new to me; and on the other hand, if a man has even in his early
+years learnt to face the displeasure of his contemporaries, what effect
+then can it have on him in his old age, when he is certain to be soon
+beyond the reach of all favour or disfavour? In former times it was
+different. Then utterances such as these brought with them a sure
+foreshortening of one’s earthly existence and a speedy approach of the
+opportunity to gain personal experience of the next life. But, I repeat,
+those times are over, and to-day such things can be written without
+endangering even the author; the most that can happen will be that in
+this or that country the translation and the circulation of his book
+will be forbidden—and naturally this will happen just in that country
+which feels certain of the high standard of its culture. But one must be
+able to put up with this also, if one makes any plea for
+wish-renunciation or for acquiescence in fate.
+
+And then it occurred to me to ask whether the publication of this work
+might not do some harm after all—not indeed to a person, but to a cause:
+the cause of psycho-analysis. For it cannot be denied that this is my
+creation, and that an abundance of distrust and ill-will has been shown
+to it. If I now come forward with such displeasing statements, people
+will be only too ready to displace their feelings from my person on to
+psycho-analysis. Now one can see, it will be said, where psycho-analysis
+leads to. The mask is fallen; it leads to the denial of God and of an
+ethical ideal, as indeed we have always supposed. To keep us from the
+discovery, we have been made to believe that psycho-analysis neither
+has, nor can have, a philosophical standpoint.
+
+This pother will be really disagreeable to me on account of my many
+fellow-workers, several of whom do not at all share my attitude to
+religious problems. However, psycho-analysis has already braved many
+storms, and it must face this new one also. In reality psycho-analysis
+is a method of investigation, an impartial instrument like, say, the
+infinitesimal calculus. Even if a physicist should discover with the
+help of the latter that after a certain period the earth will be
+destroyed, one would still hesitate to impute destructive tendencies to
+the calculus itself, and to proscribe it on that account. Nothing that I
+have said here against the truth-value of religion needed the support of
+psycho-analysis; it had been said by others long before psycho-analysis
+came into existence. If one can find a new argument against the truth of
+religion by applying the psycho-analytic method, so much the worse for
+religion, but the defenders of religion will with equal right avail
+themselves of psycho-analysis in order to appreciate to the full the
+affective significance of religious doctrines.
+
+And now to proceed with the defence: clearly religion has performed
+great services for human culture. It has contributed much toward
+restraining the asocial instincts, but still not enough. For many
+thousands of years it has ruled human society; it has had time to show
+what it can achieve. If it had succeeded in making happy the greater
+part of mankind, in consoling them, in reconciling them to life, and in
+making them into supporters of civilization, then no one would dream of
+striving to alter existing conditions. But instead of this what do we
+see? We see that an appallingly large number of men are discontented
+with civilization and unhappy in it, and feel it as a yoke that must be
+shaken off; that these men either do everything in their power to alter
+this civilization, or else go so far in their hostility to it that they
+will have nothing whatever to do either with civilization or with
+restraining their instincts. At this point it will be objected that this
+state of affairs is due to the very fact that religion has forfeited a
+part of its influence on the masses, just because of the deplorable
+effect of the advances in science. We shall note this admission and the
+reasons given for it, and shall make use of it later for our own
+purposes; but the objection itself has no force.
+
+It is doubtful whether men were in general happier at a time when
+religious doctrines held unlimited sway than they are now; more moral
+they certainly were not. They have always understood how to externalize
+religious precepts, thereby frustrating their intentions. And the
+priests, who had to enforce religious obedience, met them half-way.
+God’s kindness must lay a restraining hand upon his justice. One sinned,
+and then one made oblation or did penance, and then one was free to sin
+anew. Russian mysticism has come to the sublime conclusion that sin is
+indispensable for the full enjoyment of the blessings of divine grace,
+and therefore, fundamentally, it is pleasing to God. It is well known
+that the priests could only keep the masses submissive to religion by
+making these great concessions to human instincts. And so it was
+settled: God alone is strong and good, man is weak and sinful.
+Immorality, no less than morality, has at all times found support in
+religion. If the achievements of religion in promoting men’s happiness,
+in adapting them to civilization, and in controlling them morally, are
+no better, then the question arises whether we are right in considering
+it necessary for mankind, and whether we do wisely in basing the demands
+of our culture upon it.
+
+Let us consider the unmistakable character of the present situation. We
+have heard the admission that religion no longer has the same influence
+on men that it used to have (we are concerned here with European
+Christian culture). And this, not because its promises have become
+smaller, but because they appear less credible to people. Let us admit
+that the reason—perhaps not the only one—for this change is the increase
+of the scientific spirit in the higher strata of human society.
+Criticism has nibbled at the authenticity of religious documents,
+natural science has shown up the errors contained in them, and the
+comparative method of research has revealed the fatal resemblance
+between religious ideas revered by us and the mental productions of
+primitive ages and peoples.
+
+The scientific spirit engenders a particular attitude to the problems of
+this world; before the problems of religion it halts for a while, then
+wavers, and finally here too steps over the threshold. In this process
+there is no stopping. The more the fruits of knowledge become accessible
+to men, the more widespread is the decline of religious belief, at first
+only of the obsolete and objectionable expressions of the same, then of
+its fundamental assumptions, also. The Americans who instituted the
+monkey trial in Dayton have alone proved consistent. Elsewhere the
+inevitable transition is accomplished by way of half-measures and
+insincerities.
+
+Culture has little to fear from the educated or from the brain workers.
+In their case religious motives for civilized behaviour would be
+unobtrusively replaced by other and secular ones; besides, for the most
+part they are themselves supporters of culture. But it is another matter
+with the great mass of the uneducated and suppressed, who have every
+reason to be enemies of culture. So long as they do not discover that
+people no longer believe in God, all is well. But they discover it,
+infallibly, and would do so even if this work of mine were not
+published. They are ready to accept the results of scientific thought,
+without having effected in themselves the process of change which
+scientific thought induces in men. Is there not a danger that these
+masses, in their hostility to culture, will attack the weak point which
+they have discovered in their taskmaster? If you must not kill your
+neighbour, solely because God has forbidden it and will sorely avenge it
+in this or the other life, and you then discover that there is no God so
+that one need not fear his punishment, then you will certainly kill
+without hesitation, and you could only be prevented from this by mundane
+force. And so follows the necessity for either the most rigorous
+suppression of these dangerous masses and the most careful exclusion of
+all opportunities for mental awakening or a fundamental revision of the
+relation between culture and religion.
+
+
+
+
+ CHAPTER VIII
+
+
+One would suppose that this last proposal could be carried out without
+any special difficulty. It is true that it would involve some measure of
+renunciation, but one would gain, perhaps, more than one lost, and a
+great danger would be avoided. But people have a horror of it, as if
+civilization would thereby be exposed to an even greater danger. When
+Saint Boniface felled the tree which was venerated as sacred by the
+Saxons, those who stood round expected some fearful event to follow the
+outrage. It did not happen, and the Saxons were baptized.
+
+It is manifestly in the interest of man’s communal existence, which
+would not otherwise be practicable, that civilization has laid down the
+commandment that one shall not kill the neighbour whom one hates, who is
+in one’s way, or whose property one covets. For the murderer would draw
+on to himself the vengeance of the murdered man’s kinsmen and the secret
+envy of the others who feel as much inward inclination as he did to such
+an act of violence. Thus he would not enjoy his revenge or his spoil for
+long, but would have every prospect of being killed soon himself. Even
+if he could defend himself against single foes by his extraordinary
+strength and caution, he would be bound to succumb to a combination of
+these weaker foes. If a combination of this sort did not take place,
+then murder would continue ceaselessly, and the end of it would be that
+men would exterminate one another. It would be the same state of affairs
+among individuals that still prevails in Corsica among families, but
+otherwise survives only among nations. Insecurity of life, an equal
+danger for all, now unites men into one society, which forbids the
+individual to kill and reserves to itself the right to kill in the name
+of society the man who violates this prohibition. This, then, is justice
+and punishment.
+
+We do not, however, tell others of this rational basis for the murder
+prohibition; we declare, on the contrary, that God is its author. Thus,
+making bold to divine his intentions, we find that he has no wish,
+either, for men to exterminate each other. By acting thus we invest the
+cultural prohibition with a quite peculiar solemnity, but at the same
+time we risk making its observance dependent on belief in God. If we
+retract this step, no longer saddling God with our own wishes, and
+content ourselves with the social justification for the cultural
+prohibition, then we renounce, it is true, its hallowed nature, but we
+also avoid endangering its existence. And we gain something else as
+well. Through some kind of diffusion or infection the character of
+sanctity and inviolability, of other-worldliness, one might say, has
+been extended from some few important prohibitions to all other cultural
+institutions and laws and ordinances. And often the halo becomes these
+none too well; not only do they invalidate each other by making
+conflicting decisions according to the time and place of their origin;
+even apart from this they betray every sign of human inadequacy. One can
+easily recognize among them things which can only be the product of
+shortsightedness and apprehensiveness, the expression of narrow
+interests, or the result of inadequate hypotheses. The criticism to
+which one must subject them also diminishes to an unwelcome extent
+people’s respect for other and more justified cultural demands. As it is
+a delicate task to decide what God has himself ordained and what derives
+rather from the authority of an allpowerful parliament or a supreme
+judicial decision, it would be an indubitable advantage to leave God out
+of the question altogether, and to admit honestly the purely human
+origin of all cultural laws and institutions. Along with their
+pretensions to sanctity the rigid and immutable nature of these laws and
+regulations would also cease. Men would realize that these have been
+made, not so much to rule them, as, on the contrary, to serve their
+interests; they would acquire a more friendly attitude to them, and
+instead of aiming at their abolition they would aim only at improving
+them. This would be an important advance on the road which leads to
+reconciliation with the burden of culture.
+
+But here our plea for a purely rational basis for cultural laws, that is
+to say, for deriving them from social necessity, is interrupted by a
+sudden doubt. We have chosen as our example the origin of the murder
+prohibition. But does our account of it correspond to historical truth?
+We fear not; it appears to be merely a rationalistic construction. With
+the help of psycho-analysis we have studied this very point in the
+history of human culture, and supported by this study we are bound to
+say that in reality it did not happen like this. Even in men to-day
+purely reasonable motives are of little avail against passionate
+impulses. How much weaker, then, must they have been in the primordial
+animal man! Perhaps even now his descendants would still kill one
+another without inhibition, if there had not been among those acts of
+murder one—the slaughter of the primal father—which evoked an
+irresistible emotional reaction, momentous in its consequences. From it
+arose the commandment: thou shalt not kill, which in totemism was
+confined to the father-substitute, and was later extended to others, but
+which even to-day is not universally observed.
+
+But according to arguments which I need not repeat here, that primal
+father has been the prototype of God, the model after which later
+generations have formed their figure of God. Hence the religious
+explanation is right. God was actually concerned in the origin of that
+prohibition; his influence, not insight into what was necessary for
+society, brought it into being. And the process of attributing man’s
+will to God is fully justified; for men, knowing that they had brutally
+set aside the father, determined, in the reaction to their outrage, to
+respect his will in future. And so the religious doctrine does give us
+the historical truth, though of course in a somewhat remodelled and
+disguised form; our rational explanation belies it.
+
+We now observe that the stock of religious ideas contains not only
+wish-fulfilments, but also important historical memories. What
+matchless, what abundant power this combination of past and present must
+give to religion! But with the help of an analogy we may perhaps feel
+our way towards another view of the problem. It is not a good thing to
+transplant ideas far away from the soil in which they grew, but we
+cannot resist pointing out the resemblance which forms this analogy. We
+know that the human child cannot well complete its development towards
+culture without passing through a more or less distinct phase of
+neurosis. This is because the child is unable to suppress by rational
+mental effort so many of those instinctual impulsions which cannot later
+be turned to account, but has to check them by acts of repression,
+behind which there stands as a rule an anxiety motive. Most of these
+child neuroses are overcome spontaneously as one grows up, and
+especially is this the fate of the obsessional neuroses of childhood.
+The remainder can be cleared up still later by psycho-analytic
+treatment. In just the same way one might assume that in its development
+through the ages mankind as a whole experiences conditions that are
+analogous to the neuroses, and this for the same reasons, because in the
+ages of its ignorance and intellectual weakness it achieved by purely
+affective means the instinctual renunciations, indispensable for man’s
+communal existence. And the residue of these repression-like processes,
+which took place in antiquity, has long clung on to civilization. Thus
+religion would be the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity. It,
+like the child’s, originated in the Oedipus complex, the relation to the
+father. According to this conception one might prophesy that the
+abandoning of religion must take place with the fateful inexorability of
+a process of growth, and that we are just now in the middle of this
+phase of development.
+
+So we should form our behaviour after the model of a sensible teacher,
+who does not oppose the new development confronting him, but seeks to
+further it and to temper the force of its onset. To be sure this analogy
+does not exhaust the essence of religion. If on the one hand religion
+brings with it obsessional limitation, which can only be compared to an
+individual obsessional neurosis, it comprises on the other hand a system
+of wish-illusions, incompatible with reality, such as we find in an
+isolated form only in Meynert’s amentia, a state of blissful
+hallucinatory confusion. But these are only just comparisons, with whose
+help we can endeavour to understand social phenomena; individual
+psychology supplies us with no exact counterpart.
+
+It has been shown repeatedly (by myself, and particularly by Theodor
+Reik) into what details the analogy of religion and the obsessional
+neurosis may be pursued, how much of the vicissitudes and peculiarities
+of the formation of religion may be understood in this way. And it
+accords well with this that the true believer is in a high degree
+protected against the danger of certain neurotic afflictions; by
+accepting the universal neurosis he is spared the task of forming a
+personal neurosis.
+
+Our knowledge of the historical value of certain religious doctrines
+increases our respect for them, but it does not invalidate our proposal
+to exclude them from the motivation of cultural laws. On the contrary!
+This historical residue has given us the conception of religious dogmas
+as, so to speak, neurotic survivals, and now we may say that the time
+has probably come to replace the consequences of repression by the
+results of rational mental effort, as in the analytic treatment of
+neurotics. One may prophesy, but hardly regret, that this process of
+remodelling will not stop at dispelling the solemn air of sanctity
+surrounding the cultural laws, but that a general revision of these must
+involve the abolition of many of them. And this will go far to solve our
+appointed problem of reconciling men to civilization. We need not regret
+the loss of historical truth involved in accepting the rational
+motivation of cultural laws. The truths contained in religious doctrines
+are after all so distorted and systematically disguised that the mass of
+mankind cannot recognize them as truth. It is an instance of the same
+thing when we tell the child that new-born babies are brought by the
+stork. Here, too, we tell the truth in symbolic guise, for we know what
+that large bird signifies. But the child does not know it; he hears only
+the distortion, and feels that he has been deceived; and we know how
+often his refractoriness and his distrust of the grown-ups gets bound up
+with this impression. We have come to the conclusion that it is better
+to avoid such symbolic disguisings of the truth, and to allow the child
+knowledge of the real state of affairs in a way suitable for his stage
+of intellectual development.
+
+
+
+
+ CHAPTER IX
+
+
+‘You allow yourself contradictions which are hard to reconcile with one
+another. First you declare that a work like yours is quite harmless; no
+one will let himself be robbed of his religious faith through such
+discussions. But since, as became evident later, it is your aim to
+disturb this faith, one may ask: why in fact do you publish it? At
+another point, however, you admit that it might be dangerous, indeed
+very dangerous, for a man to discover that people no longer believe in
+God. Docile though he had been hitherto, now he would throw off all
+allegiance to the laws of culture. Your whole argument that the
+religious motivation of the cultural commandments signifies a danger for
+culture rests, in fact, on the assumption that the believer can be made
+into an unbeliever. But that is a complete contradiction.
+
+‘And here is another contradiction: you admit on the one hand that man
+will not be guided by intelligence; he is ruled by his passions and by
+the claims of his instincts; but on the other hand you propose to
+replace the affective basis of his allegiance to culture by a rational
+one. Let who can understand this. To me it seems a case of either the
+one or the other.
+
+‘Besides, have you learnt nothing from history? Once before such an
+attempt to substitute reason for religion was made, officially and in
+the grand manner. Surely you remember the French Revolution and
+Robespierre, and also how short-lived and how deplorably ineffectual the
+experiment? It is being repeated in Russia at present, and we need not
+be curious about the result. Do you not think we may assume that man
+cannot do without religion?
+
+‘You have said yourself that religion is more than an obsessional
+neurosis. But you have not dealt with this other aspect of it. You are
+content to work out the analogy with the neurosis. Men must be freed
+from a neurosis. What else is lost in the process does not trouble you.’
+
+Probably these apparent contradictions have arisen because I have been
+dealing too hastily with complicated matters, but we can make up for
+this to some extent. I still maintain that in one respect my work is
+quite harmless. No believer will let himself be led astray by these or
+by similar arguments. A believer has certain ties of affection binding
+him to the substance of religion. There are certainly a vast number of
+other people who are not religious in the same sense. They obey the laws
+of civilization because they are intimidated by the threats of religion,
+and they fear religion so long as they consider it as a part of the
+reality that restricts them. These are the people who break free as soon
+as they dare to give up their belief in its reality value; but arguments
+have no effect on them either. They cease to fear religion when they
+find that others do not fear it, and of these I have asserted that they
+would learn of the decline of religious influence even if I did not
+publish my work.
+
+But I suppose you yourself attach more value to the other contradiction
+with which you tax me. Since men are so slightly amenable to reasonable
+arguments, so completely are they ruled by their instinctual wishes, why
+should one want to take away from them a means of satisfying their
+instincts and replace it by reasonable arguments? Certainly men are like
+this, but have you asked yourself whether they need be so, whether their
+inmost nature necessitates it? Can an anthropologist give the cranial
+index of a people whose custom it is to deform their children’s heads by
+bandaging them from their earliest years? Think of the distressing
+contrast between the radiant intelligence of a healthy child and the
+feeble mentality of the average adult. Is it so utterly impossible that
+it is just religious up-bringing which is largely to blame for this
+relative degeneration? I think it would be a very long time before a
+child who was not influenced began to trouble himself about God and the
+things beyond this world. Perhaps his thoughts on these matters would
+then take the same course as they did with his ancestors; but we do not
+wait for this development; we introduce him to the doctrines of religion
+at a time when he is neither interested in them nor capable of grasping
+their import. Is it not true that the two main points in the modern
+educational programme are the retardation of sexual development and the
+early application of religious influence? So when the child’s mind
+awakens, the doctrines of religion are already unassailable. But do you
+suppose that it is particularly conducive to the strengthening of the
+mental function that so important a sphere should be closed to it by the
+menace of hell pains? We need not be greatly surprised at the feeble
+mentality of the man who has once brought himself to accept without
+criticism all the absurdities that religious doctrines repeat to him,
+and even to overlook the contradictions between them. Now we have no
+other means of controlling our instincts than our intelligence. And how
+can we expect people who are dominated by thought-prohibitions to attain
+the psychological ideal, the primacy of the intelligence? You know too
+that women in general are said to suffer from so-called ‘physiological
+weak-mindedness’, _i.e._ a poorer intelligence than the man’s. The fact
+itself is disputable, its interpretation doubtful; but it has been
+argued for the secondary nature of this intellectual degeneration that
+women labour under the harshness of the early prohibition, which
+prevented them from applying their mind to what would have interested
+them most, that is to say, to the problems of sexual life. So long as a
+man’s early years are influenced by the religious thought-inhibition and
+by the loyal one derived from it, as well as by the sexual one, we
+cannot really say what he is actually like.
+
+But I will curb my ardour and admit the possibility that I too am
+chasing after an illusion. Perhaps the effect of the religious
+thought-prohibition is not as bad as I assume, perhaps it will turn out
+that human nature remains the same even if education is not abused by
+being subjected to religion. I do not know, and you cannot know either.
+It is not only the great problems of this life that seem at present
+insoluble; there are many smaller questions also that are hard to
+decide. But you must admit that there is here the justification for a
+hope for the future, that perhaps we may dig up a treasure which can
+enrich culture, and that it is worth while to make the experiment of a
+non-religious education. Should it prove unsatisfactory, I am ready to
+give up the reform and to return to the earlier, purely descriptive
+judgement: man is a creature of weak intelligence who is governed by his
+instinctual wishes.
+
+There is another point in which I wholeheartedly agree with you. It is,
+to be sure, a senseless proceeding to try and do away with religion by
+force and at one blow—more especially as it is a hopeless one. The
+believer will not let his faith be taken from him, neither by arguments
+nor by prohibitions. And even if it did succeed with some, it would be a
+cruel thing to do. A man who has for decades taken a sleeping draught is
+naturally unable to sleep if he is deprived of it. That the effect of
+the consolations of religion may be compared to that of a narcotic is
+prettily illustrated by what is happening in America. There they are now
+trying—plainly under the influence of petticoat government—to deprive
+men of all stimulants, intoxicants and luxuries,[3] and to satiate them
+with piety by way of compensation. This is another experiment about the
+result of which we need not be curious.
+
+Footnote 3:
+
+ _I.e._ tea, alcohol, and tobacco.
+
+And so I disagree with you when you go on to argue that man cannot in
+general do without the consolation of the religious illusion, that
+without it he would not endure the troubles of life, the cruelty of
+reality. Certainly this is true of the man into whom you have instilled
+the sweet—or bitter-sweet—poison from childhood on. But what of the
+other, who has been brought up soberly? Perhaps he, not suffering from
+neurosis, will need no intoxicant to deaden it. True, man will then find
+himself in a difficult situation. He will have to confess his utter
+helplessness and his insignificant part in the working of the universe;
+he will have to confess that he is no longer the centre of creation, no
+longer the object of the tender care of a benevolent providence. He will
+be in the same position as the child who has left the home where he was
+so warm and comfortable. But, after all, is it not the destiny of
+childishness to be overcome? Man cannot remain a child for ever; he must
+venture at last into the hostile world. This may be called ‘_education
+to reality_’; need I tell you that it is the sole aim of my book to draw
+attention to the necessity for this advance?
+
+You fear, probably, that he will not stand the test? Well, anyhow, let
+us be hopeful. It is at least something to know that one is thrown on
+one’s own resources. One learns then to use them properly. And man is
+not entirely without means of assistance; since the time of the deluge
+science has taught him much, and it will still further increase his
+power. And as for the great necessities of fate, against which there is
+no remedy, these he will simply learn to endure with resignation. Of
+what use to him is the illusion of a kingdom on the moon, whose revenues
+have never yet been seen by anyone? As an honest crofter on this earth
+he will know how to cultivate his plot in a way that will support him.
+Thus by withdrawing his expectations from the other world and
+concentrating all his liberated energies on this earthly life he will
+probably attain to a state of things in which life will be tolerable for
+all and no one will be oppressed by culture any more. Then with one of
+our comrades in unbelief he will be able to say without regret:
+
+ Let us leave the heavens
+ To the angels and the sparrows.
+
+
+
+
+ CHAPTER X
+
+
+‘That does sound splendid. A race of men that has renounced all
+illusions and has thus become capable of making its existence on the
+earth a tolerable one! But I cannot share your expectations. And this,
+not because I am the pig-headed reactionary you perhaps take me for. No;
+it is because I am a sensible person. It seems to me that we have now
+exchanged rôles; you prove to be the enthusiast, who allows himself to
+be carried away by illusions, and I represent the claims of reason, the
+right to be sceptical. What you have just stated seems to me to be
+founded on errors, which after your precedent I may call illusions
+because they betray clearly enough the influence of your wishes. You
+indulge in the hope that generations which have not experienced the
+influence of religious teaching in early childhood will easily attain
+the wished-for primacy of the intelligence over the life of the
+instincts. That is surely an illusion; in this decisive point human
+nature is hardly likely to alter. If I am not mistaken—one knows so
+little of other civilizations—there are even to-day peoples who do not
+grow up under the pressure of a religious system, and they come no
+nearer your ideal than the others. If you wish to expel religion from
+our European civilization you can only do it through another system of
+doctrines, and from the outset this would take over all the
+psychological characteristics of religion, the same sanctity, rigidity
+and intolerance, the same prohibition of thought in self-defence.
+Something of this sort you must have in justice to the requirements of
+education. For you cannot do without education. The way from sucking
+child to civilized man is a long one; too many young people would go
+astray and fail to arrive at their life tasks in due time if they were
+left without guidance to their own development. The doctrines made use
+of in their education will always confine the thought of their riper
+years, exactly as you reproach religion with doing to-day. Do you not
+observe that it is the ineradicable natural defect of our, of every,
+culture that it imposes on the child, governed by his instincts and
+intellectually weak, the making of decisions to which only the matured
+intelligence of the grown-up can do justice? But owing to the fact that
+mankind’s development through the ages is concentrated into a few years
+of childhood culture cannot do otherwise, and it is only by affective
+influence that the child can be induced to accomplish the task assigned
+to it. And so this is the outlook for your “primacy of the intellect”.
+
+‘And now you should not be surprised if I intervene on behalf of
+retaining the religious system of teaching as the basis of education and
+of man’s communal life. It is a practical problem, not a question of
+reality value. Since we cannot, for the sake of the preservation of our
+culture, postpone influencing the individual until he has become ready
+for culture—many would never be so anyhow—and since we are obliged to
+press some system of teaching on the growing child which shall have the
+effect on him of a postulate that does not admit of criticism, it seems
+to me that the religious system is by far the most suitable for the
+purpose; of course just on account of that quality—its power for
+wish-fulfilment and consolation—by which you claim to have recognized it
+as an “illusion”. In face of the difficulty of discovering anything
+about reality, indeed the doubt whether this is possible for us at all,
+we must not overlook the fact that human needs are also a part, and
+indeed an important part, of reality, and one that concerns us
+particularly closely.
+
+‘I find another advantage of religious doctrine in one of its
+peculiarities, to which you seem to take particular exception. It admits
+of an ideational refinement and sublimation, by which it can be divested
+of most of those traces of a primitive and infantile way of thinking
+which it bears. What is then left is a body of ideas which science no
+longer contradicts and which it cannot disprove. These modifications of
+religious doctrine, which you have condemned as half-measures and
+compromises, make it possible to bridge the gap between the uneducated
+masses and the philosophical thinker, and to preserve that common bond
+between them which is so important for the protection of culture. With
+it you would have no need to fear that the poor man would discover that
+the upper strata of society “no longer believe in God”. I think I have
+shown by now that your endeavour reduces itself to the attempt to
+replace a proved and affectively valuable illusion by one that is
+improved and without affective value.’
+
+You shall not find me impervious to your criticism. I know how difficult
+it is to avoid illusions; perhaps even the hopes I have confessed to are
+of an illusory nature. But I hold fast to one distinction. My
+illusions—apart from the fact that no penalty is imposed for not sharing
+them—are not, like the religious ones, incapable of correction, they
+have no delusional character. If experience should show—not to me, but
+to others after me who think as I do—that we are mistaken, then we shall
+give up our expectations. Take my endeavour for what it is. A
+psychologist, who does not deceive himself about the difficulty of
+finding his bearings in this world, strives to review the development of
+mankind in accord with what insight he has won from studying the mental
+processes of the individual during his development from childhood to
+manhood. In this connection the idea forces itself upon him that
+religion is comparable to a childhood neurosis, and he is optimistic
+enough to assume that mankind will overcome this neurotic phase, just as
+so many children grow out of their similar neuroses. These pieces of
+knowledge from individual psychology may be inadequate, their
+application to the human race unjustified, the optimism without
+foundation; I grant you the uncertainty of all these things. But often
+we cannot refrain from saying what we think, excusing ourselves on the
+ground that it is given for no more than it is worth.
+
+And there are two points that I must dwell on a little longer. First,
+the weakness of my position does not betoken any strengthening of yours.
+I think you are defending a lost cause. We may insist as much as we like
+that the human intellect is weak in comparison with human instincts, and
+be right in doing so. But nevertheless there is something peculiar about
+this weakness. The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not
+rest until it has gained a hearing. Ultimately, after endlessly repeated
+rebuffs, it succeeds. This is one of the few points in which one may be
+optimistic about the future of mankind, but in itself it signifies not a
+little. And one can make it a starting-point for yet other hopes. The
+primacy of the intellect certainly lies in the far, far, but still
+probably not infinite, distance. And as it will presumably set itself
+the same aims that you expect to be realized by your God—of course
+within human limits, in so far as external reality, Ἀνάγκη, allows
+it—the brotherhood of man and the reduction of suffering, we may say
+that our antagonism is only a temporary and not an irreconcilable one.
+We desire the same things, but you are more impatient, more exacting,
+and—why should I not say it—more selfish than I and those like me. You
+would have the state of bliss to begin immediately after death; you ask
+of it the impossible, and you will not surrender the claim of the
+individual. Of these wishes our god Αόγος[4] will realize those which
+external nature permits, but he will do this very gradually, only in the
+incalculable future and for other children of men. Compensation for us,
+who suffer grievously from life, he does not promise. On the way to this
+distant goal your religious doctrines will have to be discarded, no
+matter whether the first attempts fail, or whether the first
+substitute-formations prove to be unstable. You know why; in the long
+run nothing can withstand reason and experience, and the contradiction
+religion offers to both is only too palpable. Not even the purified
+religious ideas can escape this fate, so long as they still try to
+preserve anything of the consolation of religion. Certainly if you
+confine yourself to the belief in a higher spiritual being, whose
+qualities are indefinable and whose intentions cannot be discerned, then
+you are proof against the interference of science, but then you will
+also relinquish the interest of men.
+
+Footnote 4:
+
+ The twin gods Αόγος-Ἀνάγκη of the Dutchman _Multatuli_.
+
+And secondly: note the difference between your attitude to illusions and
+mine. You have to defend the religious illusion with all your might; if
+it were discredited—and to be sure it is sufficiently menaced—then your
+world would collapse, there would be nothing left for you but to despair
+of everything, of culture and of the future of mankind. From this
+bondage I am, we are, free. Since we are prepared to renounce a good
+part of our infantile wishes, we can bear it if some of our expectations
+prove to be illusions.
+
+Education freed from the burden of religious doctrines will not perhaps
+effect much alteration in man’s psychological nature; our god Αόγος is
+not perhaps a very powerful one; he may only fulfil a small part of what
+his forerunners have promised. If we have to acknowledge this, we shall
+do so with resignation. We shall not thereby lose our interest in the
+world and in life, for we have in one respect a sure support which you
+lack. We believe that it is possible for scientific work to discover
+something about the reality of the world through which we can increase
+our power and according to which we can regulate our life. If this
+belief is an illusion, then we are in the same position as you, but
+science has shown us by numerous and significant successes that it is no
+illusion. Science has many open, and still more secret, enemies among
+those who cannot forgive it for having weakened religious belief and for
+threatening to overthrow it. People reproach it for the small amount it
+has taught us and the incomparably greater amount it has left in the
+dark. But then they forget how young it is, how difficult its
+beginnings, and how infinitesimally small the space of time since the
+human intellect has been strong enough for the tasks it sets it. Do we
+not all do wrong in that the periods of time which we make the basis of
+our judgements are of too short duration? We should take an example from
+the geologist. People complain of the unreliability of science, that she
+proclaims as a law to-day what the next generation will recognize to be
+an error and which it will replace by a new law of equally short
+currency. But that is unjust and in part untrue. The transformation of
+scientific ideas is a process of development and progress, not of
+revolution. A law that was at first held to be universally valid proves
+to be a special case of a more comprehensive law, or else its scope is
+limited by another law not discovered until later; a rough approximation
+to the truth is replaced by one more carefully adjusted, which in its
+turn awaits a further approach to perfection. In several spheres we have
+not yet surmounted a phase of investigation in which we test hypotheses
+that have soon to be rejected as inadequate; but in others we have
+already an assured and almost immutable core of knowledge. Finally an
+attempt has been made to discredit radically scientific endeavour on the
+ground that, bound as it is to the conditions of our own organization,
+it can yield nothing but subjective results, while the real nature of
+things outside us remains inaccessible to it. But this is to disregard
+several factors of decisive importance for the understanding of
+scientific work. Firstly, our organization, _i.e._ our mental apparatus,
+has been developed actually in the attempt to explore the outer world,
+and therefore it must have realized in its structure a certain measure
+of appropriateness; secondly, it itself is a constituent part of that
+world which we are to investigate, and readily admits of such
+investigation; thirdly, the task of science is fully circumscribed if we
+confine it to showing how the world must appear to us in consequence of
+the particular character of our organization; fourthly, the ultimate
+findings of science, just because of the way in which they are attained,
+are conditioned not only by our organization but also by that which has
+affected this organization; and, finally, the problem of the nature of
+the world irrespective of our perceptive mental apparatus is an empty
+abstraction without practical interest.
+
+No, science is no illusion. But it would be an illusion to suppose that
+we could get anywhere else what it cannot give us.
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+
+ TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES
+
+
+ ● Typos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained.
+ ● Used numbers for footnotes.
+ ● Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.
+
+
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 76774 ***
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+<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 76774 ***</div>
+
+<div class='tnotes covernote'>
+
+<p class='c000'><strong>Transcriber’s Note:</strong></p>
+
+<p class='c000'>New original cover art included with this eBook is granted to the public domain.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class='chapter ph1'>
+
+<div class='nf-center-c0'>
+<div class='nf-center c001'>
+ <div>THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION</div>
+ <div class='c002'><span class='xlarge'>THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL LIBRARY</span></div>
+ <div class='c003'><span class='large'>EDITED BY ERNEST JONES</span></div>
+ <div class='c003'><span class='small'>No. 15</span></div>
+ </div>
+</div>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class='titlepage'>
+
+<div>
+ <h1 class='c004'>THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION</h1>
+</div>
+
+<div class='nf-center-c0'>
+<div class='nf-center c002'>
+ <div><span class='xlarge'>SIGMUND FREUD, M.D., LL.D.</span></div>
+ <div class='c003'><span class='small'>TRANSLATED</span></div>
+ <div><span class='small'>BY</span></div>
+ <div><span class='small'>W. D. ROBSON-SCOTT</span></div>
+ <div class='c003'>PUBLISHED BY HORACE LIVERIGHT</div>
+ <div>AND THE INSTITUTE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS</div>
+ <div><span class='small'>MCMXXVIII</span></div>
+ </div>
+</div>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class='nf-center-c0'>
+<div class='nf-center c001'>
+ <div><span class='small'><em>Printed in Great Britain by</em> <span class='sc'>R. &#38; R. Clark, Limited</span>, <em>Edinburgh</em></span></div>
+ </div>
+</div>
+
+<div class='chapter'>
+ <span class='pageno' id='Page_v'>v</span>
+ <h2 class='c005'>TRANSLATOR’S NOTE</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class='drop-capa0_0_6 c006'>I wish to express my thanks to the Editor and
+to Mr. James Strachey for reading through
+this translation and making many helpful
+suggestions.</p>
+
+<div class='lg-container-r'>
+ <div class='linegroup'>
+ <div class='group'>
+ <div class='line'>W. D. R.-S.</div>
+ </div>
+ </div>
+</div>
+
+<div class='chapter'>
+ <span class='pageno' id='Page_7'>7</span>
+ <h2 class='c005'>CHAPTER I</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class='drop-capa0_0_6 c006'>When one has lived for long within a
+particular culture<a id='r1'></a><a href='#f1' class='c007'><sup>[1]</sup></a> and has often
+striven to discover its origins and the
+path of its development, one feels for once the
+temptation to turn one’s attention in the other
+direction and to ask what further fate awaits this
+culture and what transformations it is destined
+to undergo. But one soon finds that the value
+of such an enquiry is diminished from the outset
+by several considerations. Above all, by the fact
+that there are only a few people who can survey
+human activity in all its ramifications. Most
+people have been compelled to restrict themselves
+to a single, or to a few, spheres of interest; but the
+less a man knows of the past and the present the
+more unreliable must his judgement of the future
+prove. And further it is precisely in the matter
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_8'>8</span>of this judgement that the subjective expectations
+of the individual play a part that is difficult to
+assess; for these prove to be dependent on purely
+personal factors in his own experience, on his more
+or less hopeful attitude to life, according as
+temperament, success or failure has prescribed for
+him. And finally one must take into account the
+remarkable fact that in general men experience
+the present naïvely, so to speak, without being
+able to estimate its content; they must first place
+it at a distance, <em>i.e.</em> the present must have become
+the past before one can win from it points of
+vantage from which to gauge the future.</p>
+
+<div class='footnote' id='f1'>
+<p class='c008'><a href='#r1'>1</a>. The German word <em>Kultur</em> has been translated sometimes
+as ‘culture’ and sometimes as ‘civilization’, denoting as it does
+a concept intermediate between these and at times inclusive of
+both.—<span class='sc'>Ed.</span></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class='c008'>And so he who yields to the temptation to
+deliver an opinion on the probable future of our
+culture will do well to remind himself of the difficulties
+just indicated, and likewise of the uncertainty
+that attaches quite universally to every
+prophecy. It follows from this that in hasty flight
+from so great a task I shall seek out the small
+tract of territory to which my attention has hitherto
+been directed, as soon as I have defined its position
+in general.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>Human culture—I mean by that all those
+respects in which human life has raised itself above
+animal conditions and in which it differs from the
+life of the beasts, and I disdain to separate culture
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_9'>9</span>and civilization—presents, as is well known, two
+aspects to the observer. It includes on the one
+hand all the knowledge and power that men have
+acquired in order to master the forces of nature
+and win resources from her for the satisfaction of
+human needs; and on the other hand it includes
+all the necessary arrangements whereby men’s
+relations to each other, and in particular the
+distribution of the attainable riches, may be
+regulated. The two tendencies of culture are not
+independent of each other, first, because the mutual
+relations of men are profoundly influenced by the
+measure of instinctual satisfaction that the existing
+resources make possible; secondly, because the
+individual can himself take on the quality of a
+piece of property in his relation to another, in so
+far as this other makes use of his capacity for work
+or chooses him as sexual object; and thirdly,
+because every individual is virtually an enemy of
+culture, which is nevertheless ostensibly an object
+of universal human concern. It is remarkable
+that little as men are able to exist in isolation they
+should yet feel as a heavy burden the sacrifices
+that culture expects of them in order that a communal
+existence may be possible. Thus culture
+must be defended against the individual, and its
+organization, its institutions and its laws, are all
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_10'>10</span>directed to this end; they aim not only at establishing
+a certain distribution of property, but also
+at maintaining it; in fact, they must protect
+against the hostile impulses of mankind everything
+that contributes to the conquest of nature and
+the production of wealth. Human creations are
+easy to destroy, and science and technical skill,
+which have built them up, can also be turned to
+their destruction.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>So one gets the impression that culture is something
+which was imposed on a resisting majority
+by a minority that understood how to possess
+itself of the means of power and coercion. Of
+course it stands to reason that these difficulties
+are not inherent in the nature of culture itself,
+but are conditioned by the imperfections of the
+cultural forms that have so far been developed.
+Indeed it is not difficult to point out these defects.
+While mankind has made solid advances in the
+conquest of nature and may expect to make still
+greater ones, no certain claim can be established
+for a corresponding advance in the regulation
+of human affairs, and probably at every period,
+as again now, many men have asked themselves
+whether this fragment that has been acquired by
+culture is indeed worth defending at all. One
+might suppose that a reorganization of human
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_11'>11</span>relations should be possible, which, by abandoning
+coercion and the suppression of the instincts,
+would remove the sources of dissatisfaction with
+culture, so that undisturbed by inner conflict men
+might devote themselves to the acquisition of
+natural resources and to the enjoyment of the same.
+That would be the golden age, but it is questionable
+if such a state of affairs can ever be realized. It
+seems more probable that every culture must be
+built up on coercion and instinctual renunciation;
+it does not even appear certain that without
+coercion the majority of human individuals would
+be ready to submit to the labour necessary for
+acquiring new means of supporting life. One
+has, I think, to reckon with the fact that there
+are present in all men destructive, and therefore
+anti-social and anti-cultural, tendencies, and that
+with a great number of people these are strong
+enough to determine their behaviour in human
+society.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>This psychological fact acquires a decisive
+significance when one is forming an estimate of
+human culture. One thought at first that the
+essence of culture lay in the conquest of nature
+for the means of supporting life, and in eliminating
+the dangers that threaten culture by the suitable
+distribution of these among mankind, but now the
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_12'>12</span>emphasis seems to have shifted away from the
+material plane on to the psychical. The critical
+question is whether and to what extent one can
+succeed, first, in diminishing the burden of the
+instinctual sacrifices imposed on men; secondly,
+in reconciling them to those that must necessarily
+remain; and thirdly, in compensating them for
+these. It is just as impossible to do without
+government of the masses by a minority as it is to
+dispense with coercion in the work of civilization,
+for the masses are lazy and unintelligent, they have
+no love for instinctual renunciation, they are not
+to be convinced of its inevitability by argument,
+and the individuals support each other in giving
+full play to their unruliness. It is only by the
+influence of individuals who can set an example,
+whom the masses recognize as their leaders, that
+they can be induced to submit to the labours and
+renunciations on which the existence of culture
+depends. All is well if these leaders are people
+of superior insight into what constitute the
+necessities of life, people who have attained the
+height of mastering their own instinctual wishes.
+But the danger exists that in order not to lose
+their influence they will yield to the masses more
+than these will yield to them, and therefore it
+seems necessary that they should be independent
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_13'>13</span>of the masses by having at their disposal means
+of enforcing their authority. To put it briefly,
+there are two widely diffused human characteristics
+which are responsible for the fact that the organization
+of culture can be maintained only by a
+certain measure of coercion: that is to say, men
+are not naturally fond of work, and arguments are
+of no avail against their passions.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>I know what objections will be brought against
+these arguments. It will be said that the character
+of the masses, here delineated, which is
+supposed to prove that one cannot dispense with
+coercion in the work of civilization, is itself only
+the result of defective cultural organization, through
+which men have become embittered, revengeful
+and unapproachable. New generations, brought
+up kindly and taught to have a respect for reason,
+who have experienced the benefits of culture early
+in life, will have a different attitude towards it;
+they will feel it to be their very own possession,
+and they will be ready on its account to make the
+sacrifice in labour and in instinctual renunciation
+that is necessary for its preservation. They will
+be able to do without coercion and will differ little
+from their leaders. If no culture has so far produced
+human masses of such a quality, it is due
+to the fact that no culture has yet discovered the
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_14'>14</span>plan that will influence men in such a way, and
+that from childhood on.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>It may be doubted whether it is possible at all,
+or at any rate just now, in the present stage of our
+conquest of nature, to establish a cultural organization
+of this kind; it may be asked where the throng
+of superior, dependable and disinterested leaders,
+who are to act as educators of the future generations,
+are to come from; and one may be appalled
+at the stupendous amount of force that will be
+unavoidable if these intentions are to be carried
+out. But one cannot deny the grandeur of this
+project and its significance for the future of human
+culture. It is securely based on a piece of psychological
+insight, on the fact that man is equipped
+with the most varied instinctual predispositions,
+the ultimate course of which is determined by the
+experiences of early childhood. But the limitations
+of man’s capacity for education set bounds
+to the efficacy of such a cultural transformation.
+One may question whether and in what degree it
+would be possible for another cultural milieu to
+efface the two characteristics of human masses
+that make the guidance of men’s affairs so very
+difficult. The experiment has not yet been made.
+Probably a certain percentage of mankind—owing
+to morbid predisposition or too great instinctual
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_15'>15</span>vigour—will always remain asocial, but if only one
+can succeed in reducing to a minority the majority
+that is to-day hostile to culture, one will have
+accomplished a great deal, perhaps indeed everything
+that can be accomplished.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>I should not like to give the impression that I
+have wandered far away from the chosen path of
+my enquiry. I will therefore expressly assert that
+it is far from my intention to estimate the value
+of the great cultural experiment that is at present
+in progress in the vast country that stretches
+between Europe and Asia. I have neither the
+special knowledge nor the capacity to decide on
+its practicability, to test the expediency of the
+methods employed, or to measure the width of
+the inevitable gulf between intention and execution.
+What is there in course of preparation
+eludes investigation, for which it is not ready; for
+this our long consolidated culture presents the
+material.</p>
+
+<div class='chapter'>
+ <span class='pageno' id='Page_16'>16</span>
+ <h2 class='c005'>CHAPTER II</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class='drop-capa0_0_6 c006'>We have glided unawares out of the
+economic plane over into the psychological.
+At first we were tempted to
+seek the essence of culture in the existing material
+resources and in the arrangements for their distribution.
+But with the discovery that every
+culture is based on compulsory labour and instinctual
+renunciation, and that it therefore inevitably
+evokes opposition from those affected by
+these demands, it became clear that the resources
+themselves, the means of acquiring them, and the
+arrangements for their distribution could not be
+its essential or unique characteristic; for they are
+threatened by the rebelliousness and destructive
+passions of the members of the culture. Thus
+in addition to the resources there are the means
+of defending culture: the coercive measures, and
+others that are intended to reconcile men to it
+and to recompense them for their sacrifices. And
+these last may be described as the psychical sphere
+of culture.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_17'>17</span>For the sake of a uniform terminology we will
+describe the fact that an instinct cannot be satisfied
+as ‘frustration’, the means by which this frustration
+is secured as ‘prohibition’, and the condition
+produced by the prohibition as ‘privation’. Then
+the next step is to distinguish between privations
+that do affect everybody and those that do not,
+those that merely affect groups, classes, or even
+individuals. The former are the oldest; with
+the prohibitions that cause them culture began,
+who knows how many thousands of years ago, to
+detach itself from the primordial animal condition
+of mankind. To our surprise we have found that
+they are still operative, that they still form the
+kernel of the hostility to culture. The instinctual
+wishes that suffer under them are born anew with
+every child; there is a class of men, the neurotics,
+who react already to this first group of frustrations
+by an asocial attitude. Such instinctual
+wishes are those of incest, of cannibalism, and of
+murder. It seems strange to classify these, in
+repudiating which all men seem to be at one, with
+those others, about whose permissibility or impermissibility
+in our culture there is so vigorous
+a dispute; but psychologically one is justified in
+doing this. Nor is the attitude of culture to these
+oldest instinctual wishes the same in each case;
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_18'>18</span>cannibalism alone seems to be proscribed by everyone,
+and—to other than analytic observation—completely
+overcome; the strength of the incest
+wishes can still be perceived behind the prohibition;
+and under certain conditions murder is still
+practised, indeed enjoined, by our culture. It
+is possible that cultural developments lie before us,
+in which yet other wish-gratifications, which are
+to-day entirely permissible, will appear just as
+disagreeable as those of cannibalism do now.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>Already in these earliest instinctual renunciations
+a psychological factor is involved, which
+remains of great importance for everything that
+follows. It is not true to say that the human
+mind has undergone no development since the
+earliest times and that in contrast to the advances
+of science and technical skill it is still the same to-day
+as at the beginning of history. We can point
+out one of these advances here. It is in accordance
+with the course of our development that
+external compulsion is gradually internalized, in
+that a special mental function, man’s super-ego,
+takes it under its jurisdiction. Every child presents
+to us the model of this transformation; it is only
+by that means that it becomes a moral and social
+being. This strengthening of the super-ego is a
+highly valuable psychological possession for culture.
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_19'>19</span>Those people in whom it has taken place, from
+being the foes of culture, become its supporters.
+The greater their number in a cultural community,
+the more secure it is and the more easily can it
+dispense with external coercion. Now the degree
+of this internalization differs widely in the case of
+each instinctual prohibition. As far as the earliest
+demands of culture, already mentioned, are concerned,
+the process of internalization seems to
+have been to a great extent accomplished, if we
+leave out of account the unwelcome exception of
+the neurotics. But the case is altered when we
+turn to the other instinctual claims. One notes
+with surprise and concern that a majority of men
+obey the cultural prohibitions in question only
+under the pressure of external force, in fact only
+where the latter can assert itself and for as long
+as it is an object of fear. This also holds good
+for those so-called moral cultural demands, which
+in the same way apply to everyone. The greater
+part of what one experiences of man’s moral
+untrustworthiness is to be explained in this connection.
+There are innumerable civilized people
+who would shrink from murder or incest, and who
+yet do not hesitate to gratify their avarice, their
+aggressiveness and their sexual lusts, and who have
+no compunction in hurting others by lying, fraud
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_20'>20</span>and calumny, so long as they remain unpunished
+for it; and no doubt this has been so for many
+cultural epochs.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>If we turn to those restrictions that only apply
+to certain classes of society, we encounter a state
+of things which is glaringly obvious and has
+always been recognized. It is to be expected that
+the neglected classes will grudge the favoured
+ones their privileges and that they will do everything
+in their power to rid themselves of their
+own surplus of privation. Where this is not
+possible a lasting measure of discontent will obtain
+within this culture, and this may lead to dangerous
+outbreaks. But if a culture has not got beyond
+the stage in which the satisfaction of one group
+of its members necessarily involves the suppression
+of another, perhaps the majority—and this is the
+case in all modern cultures,—it is intelligible that
+these suppressed classes should develop an intense
+hostility to the culture; a culture, whose existence
+they make possible by their labour, but in whose
+resources they have too small a share. In such
+conditions one must not expect to find an internalization
+of the cultural prohibitions among
+the suppressed classes; indeed they are not even
+prepared to acknowledge these prohibitions, intent,
+as they are, on the destruction of the culture itself
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_21'>21</span>and perhaps even of the assumptions on which
+it rests. These classes are so manifestly hostile
+to culture that on that account the more latent
+hostility of the better provided social strata has
+been overlooked. It need not be said that a
+culture which leaves unsatisfied and drives to
+rebelliousness so large a number of its members
+neither has a prospect of continued existence, nor
+deserves it.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>The extent to which cultural rules have been
+internalized—to express it popularly and unpsychologically:
+the moral level of the members—is
+not the only psychical asset to be considered
+if one is estimating the value of a culture. In
+addition there is its heritage of ideals and artistic
+creations, that is to say, of the satisfactions they
+both yield.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>One will be only too readily inclined to include
+among the psychical possessions of a culture its
+ideals, that is, its judgements of what are its
+loftiest and its most ambitious accomplishments.
+It seems at first as if these ideals would determine
+the achievements of the cultural group; but
+the actual process would seem to be that the
+ideals are modelled on the first achievements that
+the co-operation of internal ability and external
+circumstances made possible, and that now these
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_22'>22</span>first achievements are merely held fast by the
+ideal as examples to be followed. The satisfaction
+the ideal gives to the members of the culture is
+thus of a narcissistic nature, it is based on pride
+in what has already been successfully achieved.
+To make this satisfaction complete the culture
+compares itself with others which have applied
+themselves to other tasks and have developed
+other ideals. On the strength of these differences
+every culture claims the right to despise the rest.
+In this way cultural ideals become a source of
+discord and enmity between different cultural
+groups, as can be most clearly seen among nations.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>The narcissistic satisfaction provided by the
+cultural ideal is also one of the forces that effectively
+counteract the hostility to culture within
+the cultural group. It can be shared not only
+by the favoured classes, which enjoy the benefits
+of this culture, but also by the suppressed, since
+the right to despise those that are outside it
+compensates them for the wrongs they suffer in
+their own group. True, one is a miserable plebeian,
+tormented by obligations and military service,
+but withal one is a Roman citizen, one has one’s
+share in the task of ruling other nations and
+dictating their laws. This identification of the
+suppressed with the class that governs and exploits
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_23'>23</span>them is, however, only a part of a larger whole.
+Thus the former can be attached affectively to
+the latter; in spite of their animosity they can
+find their ideals in their masters. Unless such
+relations, fundamentally of a satisfying kind, were
+in existence, it would be impossible to understand
+how so many cultures have contrived to exist for
+so long in spite of the justified hostility of great
+masses of men.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>Different in kind is the satisfaction that art
+yields to the members of a cultural group. As a
+rule it remains inaccessible to the masses, who are
+engaged in exhausting labour and who have not
+enjoyed the benefits of individual education. As
+we have long known, art offers substitutive
+gratifications for the oldest cultural renunciations,
+still always most deeply felt, and for that reason
+serves like nothing else to reconcile men to the
+sacrifices they have made on culture’s behalf.
+On the other hand, works of art promote the
+feelings of identification, of which every cultural
+group has so much need, in the occasion they
+provide for the sharing of highly valued emotional
+experiences. And when they represent the achievements
+of a particular culture, thus in an impressive
+way recalling it to its ideals, they also subserve
+a narcissistic gratification.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_24'>24</span>No mention has yet been made of what is
+perhaps the most important part of the psychical
+inventory of a culture: that is to say, its—in the
+broadest sense—religious ideas; in other words,
+the use of which will be justified later, its illusions.</p>
+
+<div class='chapter'>
+ <span class='pageno' id='Page_25'>25</span>
+ <h2 class='c005'>CHAPTER III</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class='drop-capa0_0_6 c006'>Wherein lies the peculiar value of
+religious ideas?</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>We have spoken of the hostility to
+culture, produced by the pressure it exercises and
+the instinctual renunciations that it demands.
+If one imagined its prohibitions removed, then
+one could choose any woman who took one’s fancy
+as one’s sexual object, one could kill without
+hesitation one’s rival or whoever interfered with
+one in any other way, and one could seize what
+one wanted of another man’s goods without asking
+his leave: how splendid, what a succession of
+delights, life would be! True, one soon finds the
+first difficulty: everyone else has exactly the
+same wishes, and will treat one with no more
+consideration than one will treat him. And so
+in reality there is only one single person who can
+be made unrestrictedly happy by abolishing thus
+the restrictions imposed by culture, and that is
+a tyrant or dictator who has monopolized all the
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_26'>26</span>means of power; and even he has every reason
+to want the others to keep at least one cultural
+commandment: thou shalt not kill.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>But how ungrateful, how short-sighted after all,
+to strive for the abolition of culture! What would
+then remain would be the state of nature, and that
+is far harder to endure. It is true that nature
+does not ask us to restrain our instincts, she lets
+us do as we like; but she has her peculiarly
+effective mode of restricting us: she destroys us,
+coldly, cruelly, callously, as it seems to us, and
+possibly just through what has caused our satisfaction.
+It was because of these very dangers
+with which nature threatens us that we united
+together and created culture, which, amongst
+other things, is supposed to make our communal
+existence possible. Indeed, it is the principal
+task of culture, its real <em>raison d’être</em>, to defend us
+against nature.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>One must confess that in many ways it already
+does this tolerably well, and clearly as time goes
+on it will be much more successful. But no one
+is under the illusion that nature has so far been
+vanquished; few dare to hope that she will ever
+be completely under man’s subjection. There
+are the elements, which seem to mock at all human
+control: the earth, which quakes, is rent asunder,
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_27'>27</span>and buries man and all his works; the water,
+which in tumult floods and submerges all things;
+the storm, which drives all before it; there are the
+diseases, which we have only lately recognized
+as the attacks of other living creatures; and
+finally there is the painful riddle of death, for
+which no remedy at all has yet been found, nor
+probably ever will be. With these forces nature
+rises up before us, sublime, pitiless, inexorable;
+thus she brings again to mind our weakness and
+helplessness, of which we thought the work of
+civilization had rid us. It is one of the few noble
+and gratifying spectacles that men can offer, when
+in the face of an elemental catastrophe they awake
+from their muddle and confusion, forget all their
+internal difficulties and animosities, and remember
+the great common task, the preservation of mankind
+against the supremacy of nature.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>For the individual, as for mankind in general,
+life is hard to endure. The culture in which he
+shares imposes on him some measure of privation,
+and other men occasion him a certain degree of
+suffering, either in spite of the laws of this culture
+or because of its imperfections. Add to this the
+evils that unvanquished nature—he calls it Fate—inflicts
+on him. One would expect a permanent
+condition of anxious suspense and a severe injury
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_28'>28</span>to his innate narcissism to be the result of this state
+of affairs. We know already how the individual
+reacts to the injuries that culture and other men
+inflict on him: he develops a corresponding degree
+of resistance against the institutions of this culture,
+of hostility towards it. But how does he defend
+himself against the supremacy of nature, of fate,
+which threatens him, as it threatens all?</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>Culture relieves him of this task: it performs
+it in the same way for everyone. (It is also
+noteworthy that pretty well all cultures are the
+same in this respect.) It does not cry a halt, as
+it were, in its task of defending man against
+nature; it merely pursues it by other methods.
+This is a complex business; man’s seriously
+menaced self-esteem craves for consolation, life
+and the universe must be rid of their terrors, and
+incidentally man’s curiosity, reinforced, it is true,
+by the strongest practical motives, demands an
+answer.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>With the first step, which is the humanization
+of nature, much is already won. Nothing can be
+made of impersonal forces and fates; they remain
+eternally remote. But if the elements have passions
+that rage like those in our own souls, if death
+itself is not something spontaneous, but the violent
+act of an evil Will, if everywhere in nature we
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_29'>29</span>have about us beings who resemble those of our
+own environment, then indeed we can breathe
+freely, we can feel at home in face of the supernatural,
+and we can deal psychically with our
+frantic anxiety. We are perhaps still defenceless,
+but no longer helplessly paralysed; we can at
+least react; perhaps indeed we are not even defenceless,
+we can have recourse to the same methods
+against these violent supermen of the beyond that
+we make use of in our own community; we can try
+to exorcise them, to appease them, to bribe them,
+and so rob them of part of their power by thus
+influencing them. Such a substitution of psychology
+for natural science provides not merely
+immediate relief, it also points the way to a
+further mastery of the situation.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>For there is nothing new in this situation. It
+has an infantile prototype, and is really only the
+continuation of this. For once before one has
+been in such a state of helplessness: as a little
+child in one’s relationship to one’s parents. For
+one had reason to fear them, especially the father,
+though at the same time one was sure of his
+protection against the dangers then known to one.
+And so it was natural to assimilate and combine
+the two situations. Here, too, as in dream-life,
+the wish came into its own. The sleeper is seized
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_30'>30</span>by a presentiment of death, which seeks to carry
+him to the grave. But the dream-work knows
+how to select a condition that will turn even this
+dreaded event into a wish-fulfilment: the dreamer
+sees himself in an ancient Etruscan grave, into
+which he has descended, happy in the satisfaction
+it has given to his archæological interests. Similarly
+man makes the forces of nature not simply
+in the image of men with whom he can associate
+as his equals—that would not do justice to the
+overpowering impression they make on him—but
+he gives them the characteristics of the father,
+makes them into gods, thereby following not only
+an infantile, but also, as I have tried to show, a
+phylogenetic prototype.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>In the course of time the first observations of
+law and order in natural phenomena are made,
+and therewith the forces of nature lose their
+human traits. But men’s helplessness remains,
+and with it their father-longing and the gods.
+The gods retain their threefold task: they must
+exorcise the terrors of nature, they must reconcile
+one to the cruelty of fate, particularly as shown
+in death, and they must make amends for the
+sufferings and privations that the communal life
+of culture has imposed on man.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>But within these there is a gradual shifting of
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_31'>31</span>the accent. It is observed that natural phenomena
+develop of themselves from inward necessity;
+without doubt the gods are the lords of nature:
+they have arranged it thus and now they can
+leave it to itself. Only occasionally, in the so-called
+miracles, do they intervene in its course, as
+if to protest that they have surrendered nothing
+of their original sphere of power. As far as the
+vicissitudes of fate are concerned, an unpleasant
+suspicion persists that the perplexity and helplessness
+of the human race cannot be remedied.
+This is where the gods are most apt to fail us; if
+they themselves make fate, then their ways must
+be deemed inscrutable. The most gifted people
+of the ancient world dimly surmised that above
+the gods stands Destiny and that the gods themselves
+have their destinies. And the more autonomous
+nature becomes and the more the gods
+withdraw from her, the more earnestly are all
+expectations concentrated on the third task assigned
+to them and the more does morality become
+their real domain. It now becomes the business of
+the gods to adjust the defects and evils of culture,
+to attend to the sufferings that men inflict on each
+other in their communal life, and to see that the
+laws of culture, which men obey so ill, are carried
+out. The laws of culture themselves are claimed
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_32'>32</span>to be of divine origin, they are elevated to a
+position above human society, and they are
+extended over nature and the universe.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>And so a rich store of ideas is formed, born of
+the need to make tolerable the helplessness of
+man, and built out of the material offered by
+memories of the helplessness of his own childhood
+and the childhood of the human race. It is easy to
+see that these ideas protect man in two directions;
+against the dangers of nature and fate, and against
+the evils of human society itself. What it amounts
+to is this: life in this world serves a higher purpose;
+true, it is not easy to guess the nature of
+this purpose, but certainly a perfecting of human
+existence is implied. Probably the spiritual part
+of man, the soul, which in the course of time has
+so slowly and unwillingly detached itself from the
+body, is to be regarded as the object of this
+elevation and exaltation. Everything that takes
+place in this world expresses the intentions of
+an Intelligence, superior to us, which in the
+end, though its devious ways may be difficult to
+follow, orders everything for good, that is, to
+our advantage. Over each one of us watches a
+benevolent, and only apparently severe, Providence,
+which will not suffer us to become the
+plaything of the stark and pitiless forces of nature;
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_33'>33</span>death itself is not annihilation, not a return to
+inorganic lifelessness, but the beginning of a new
+kind of existence, which lies on the road of
+development to something higher. And to turn
+to the other side of the question, the moral
+laws that have formed our culture govern also
+the whole universe, only they are upheld with
+incomparably more force and consistency by a
+supreme judicial court. In the end all good is
+rewarded, all evil punished, if not actually in this
+life, then in the further existences that begin after
+death. And thus all the terrors, the sufferings,
+and the hardships of life are destined to be
+obliterated; the life after death, which continues
+our earthly existence as the invisible part of the
+spectrum adjoins the visible, brings all the perfection
+that perhaps we have missed here. And
+the superior wisdom that directs this issue, the
+supreme goodness that expresses itself thus, the
+justice that thus achieves its aim—these are the
+qualities of the divine beings who have fashioned
+us and the world in general; or rather of the one
+divine being into which in our culture all the gods
+of antiquity have been condensed. The race that
+first succeeded in thus concentrating the divine
+qualities was not a little proud of this advance.
+It had revealed the father nucleus which had
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_34'>34</span>always lain hidden behind every divine figure;
+fundamentally it was a return to the historical
+beginnings of the idea of God. Now that God
+was a single person, man’s relations to him could
+recover the intimacy and intensity of the child’s
+relation to the father. If one had done so much
+for the father, then surely one would be rewarded—at
+least the only beloved child, the chosen people,
+would be. More recently, pious America has laid
+claim to be ‘God’s own country’, and for one of
+the forms under which men worship the deity the
+claim certainly holds good.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>The religious ideas that have just been summarized
+have of course gone through a long
+process of development, and have been held in
+various phases by various cultures. I have singled
+out one such phase of development, which more
+or less corresponds to the final form of our contemporary
+Christian culture in the west. It is
+easy to see that not all the parts of this whole
+tally equally well with each other, that not all
+the questions that press for an answer receive
+one, and that the contradiction of daily experience
+can only with difficulty be dismissed. But such as
+they are, these ideas—religious, in the broadest
+sense of the word—are prized as the most precious
+possession of culture, as the most valuable thing
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_35'>35</span>it has to offer its members; far more highly
+prized than all our devices for winning the treasures
+of the earth, for providing men with sustenance,
+or for preventing their diseases, and so forth;
+men suppose that life would be intolerable if they
+did not accord these ideas the value that is claimed
+for them. And now the question arises: what
+are these ideas in the light of psychology; whence
+do they derive the esteem in which they are held;
+and further, in all diffidence, what is their real
+worth?</p>
+
+<div class='chapter'>
+ <span class='pageno' id='Page_36'>36</span>
+ <h2 class='c005'>CHAPTER IV</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class='drop-capa0_0_6 c006'>An enquiry that proceeds uninterruptedly,
+like a monologue, is not altogether without
+its dangers. One is too easily tempted to
+push aside thoughts that would interrupt it, and
+in exchange one is left with a feeling of uncertainty
+which one will drown in the end by over-decisiveness.
+I shall therefore imagine an opponent who
+follows my arguments with mistrust, and I shall
+let him interject remarks here and there.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>I hear him saying: ‘You have repeatedly used
+the expressions “culture creates these religious
+ideas”, “culture places them at the disposal of
+its members”, which sounds strange to me somehow.
+I could not say why myself, but it does
+not sound so natural as to say that culture has
+made regulations about distributing the products of
+labour or about the rights over women and children.’</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>I think, nevertheless, that one is justified in
+expressing oneself thus. I have tried to show that
+religious ideas have sprung from the same need
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_37'>37</span>as all the other achievements of culture: from the
+necessity for defending itself against the crushing
+supremacy of nature. And there was a second
+motive: the eager desire to correct the so painfully
+felt imperfections of culture. Moreover,
+there is something particularly apposite in saying
+that culture gives the individual these ideas, for
+he finds them at hand, they are presented to him
+ready-made; he would not be in a position to
+find them by himself. It is the heritage of many
+generations which he enters into and which he
+takes over as he does the multiplication table,
+geometry, etc. There is certainly a distinction in
+this, but it lies elsewhere, and I cannot examine it
+at this point. The feeling of strangeness that you
+mention may be partly accounted for by the fact
+that this stock of religious ideas is generally offered
+as a divine revelation. But that is in itself a part
+of the religious system, and entirely leaves out of
+account the known historical development of these
+ideas and their variations in different ages and
+cultures.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>‘Another point which seems to me more
+important. You would derive the humanization
+of nature from the desire to put an end to human
+perplexity and helplessness in the face of nature’s
+dreaded forces, and from the necessity for establishing
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_38'>38</span>relations with, and finally influencing, these
+forces. But this explanation seems to be superfluous.
+For primitive man has no choice, he has
+no other way of thinking. It is natural to him,
+as if innate, to project his existence outwards into
+the world, and to regard all events that come under
+his observation as the manifestations of beings
+who fundamentally resemble himself. It is his
+only method of comprehension. And it is by no
+means self-evident, on the contrary it is a remarkable
+coincidence, that he should succeed in satisfying
+one of his great wants by thus indulging his
+natural disposition.’</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>I do not find that so striking. For do you
+suppose that men’s thought-processes have no
+practical motives, that they are simply the expression
+of a disinterested curiosity? That is surely
+very improbable. I believe, rather, that when he
+personifies the forces of nature man is once again
+following an infantile prototype. He has learnt
+from the persons of his earliest environment that
+the way to influence them is to establish a relationship
+with them, and so, later on, with the same
+end in view, he deals with everything that happens
+to him as he dealt with those persons. Thus I
+do not contradict your descriptive observation;
+it is, in point of fact, natural to man to personify
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_39'>39</span>everything that he wishes to comprehend, in order
+that later he may control it—the psychical subjugation
+as preparation for the physical—but I
+provide in addition a motive and genesis for this
+peculiarity of human thought.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>‘And now yet a third point. You have dealt
+with the origin of religion once before, in your book
+<cite>Totem und Tabu</cite>. But there it appears in a
+different light. Everything is the son-father relationship;
+God is the exalted father, and the
+longing for the father is the root of the need for
+religion. Since then, it seems, you have discovered
+the factor of human weakness and helplessness,
+to which indeed the chief part in the formation
+of religion is commonly assigned, and you now
+transfer to helplessness everything that was
+formerly father complex. May I ask you to
+enlighten me on this transformation?’</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>With pleasure. I was only waiting for this
+invitation. But is it really a transformation?
+In <cite>Totem und Tabu</cite> it was not my purpose to
+explain the origin of religions, but only of totemism.
+Can you from any standpoint known to you explain
+the fact that the first form in which the protecting
+deity revealed itself to men was that of an animal,
+that a prohibition existed against killing or eating
+this animal, and that yet it was the solemn custom
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_40'>40</span>to kill it and eat it communally once a year? It
+is just this that takes place in totemism. And
+it is hardly to the purpose to argue whether
+totemism should be called a religion. It has
+intimate connections with the later god-religions;
+the totem animals become the sacred animals of
+the gods; and the earliest, and the most profound,
+moral restrictions—the murder prohibition and
+the incest prohibition—originate in totemism.
+Whether or not you accept the conclusions of
+<cite>Totem und Tabu</cite>, I hope you will admit that in
+that book a number of very remarkable isolated
+facts are brought together into a consistent whole.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>Why in the long run the animal god did not
+suffice and why it was replaced by the human—that
+was hardly discussed in <cite>Totem und Tabu</cite>,
+and other problems of the formation of religion
+find no mention there at all. But do you regard
+such a limitation as identical with a denial? My
+work is a good example of the strict isolation of
+the share that psycho-analytic observation can
+contribute to the problem of religion. If I am
+now trying to add to it the other, less deeply
+hidden, part, you should not accuse me of inconsistency,
+just as before I was accused of being
+one-sided. It is of course my business to point
+out the connecting links between what I said
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_41'>41</span>before and what I now put forward, between the
+deeper and the manifest motivation, between the
+father complex and man’s helplessness and need
+for protection.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>These connections are not difficult to find.
+They consist in the relation of the child’s helplessness
+to the adult’s continuation of it, so that, as
+was to be expected, the psycho-analytic motivation
+of the forming of religion turns out to be the
+infantile contribution to its manifest motivation.
+Let us imagine to ourselves the mental life of
+the small child. You remember the object-choice
+after the anaclitic type, which psycho-analysis
+talks about? The libido follows the paths of
+narcissistic needs, and attaches itself to the objects
+that ensure their satisfaction. So the mother,
+who satisfies hunger, becomes the first love-object,
+and certainly also the first protection against all
+the undefined and threatening dangers of the outer
+world; becomes, if we may so express it, the first
+protection against anxiety.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>In this function the mother is soon replaced
+by the stronger father, and this situation persists
+from now on over the whole of childhood. But
+the relation to the father is affected by a peculiar
+ambivalence. He was himself a danger, perhaps
+just because of that earlier relation to the mother;
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_42'>42</span>so he is feared no less than he is longed for
+and admired. The indications of this ambivalence
+are deeply imprinted in all religions, as is
+brought out in <cite>Totem und Tabu</cite>. Now when the
+child grows up and finds that he is destined to
+remain a child for ever, and that he can never do
+without protection against unknown and mighty
+powers, he invests these with the traits of the
+father-figure; he creates for himself the gods,
+of whom he is afraid, whom he seeks to propitiate,
+and to whom he nevertheless entrusts the task of
+protecting him. Thus the longing-for-the-father
+explanation is identical with the other, the need
+for protection against the consequences of human
+weakness; the child’s defensive reaction to his
+helplessness gives the characteristic features to
+the adult’s reaction to his own sense of helplessness,
+<em>i.e</em>. the formation of religion. But it is not
+our intention to pursue further the development
+of the idea of God; we are concerned here with
+the matured stock of religious ideas as culture
+transmits them to the individual.</p>
+
+<div class='chapter'>
+ <span class='pageno' id='Page_43'>43</span>
+ <h2 class='c005'>CHAPTER V</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class='drop-capa0_0_6 c006'>Now to take up again the threads of our
+enquiry: what is the psychological significance
+of religious ideas and how can
+we classify them? The question is at first not at all
+easy to answer. Having rejected various formulas,
+I shall take my stand by this one: religion
+consists of certain dogmas, assertions about facts
+and conditions of external (or internal) reality,
+which tell one something that one has not oneself
+discovered and which claim that one should give
+them credence. As they give information about
+what are to us the most interesting and important
+things in life, they are particularly highly valued.
+He who knows nothing of them is ignorant indeed,
+and he who has assimilated them may consider
+himself enriched.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>There are of course many such dogmas about
+the most diverse things of this world. Every
+school hour is full of them. Let us choose geography.
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_44'>44</span>We hear there: Konstanz is on the
+Bodensee. A student song adds: If you don’t
+believe it go and see. I happen to have been
+there, and can confirm the fact that this beautiful
+town lies on the shore of a broad stretch of water,
+which all those dwelling around call the Bodensee.
+I am now completely convinced of the accuracy
+of this geographical statement. And in this
+connection I am reminded of another and very
+remarkable experience. I was already a man of
+mature years when I stood for the first time on
+the hill of the Athenian Acropolis, between the
+temple ruins, looking out on to the blue sea. A
+feeling of astonishment mingled with my pleasure,
+which prompted me to say: then it really is true,
+what we used to be taught at school! How
+shallow and weak at that age must have been my
+belief in the real truth of what I heard if I can be
+so astonished to-day! But I will not emphasize
+the significance of this experience too much; yet
+another explanation of my astonishment is possible,
+which did not strike me at the time, and which is
+of a wholly subjective nature and connected with
+the peculiar character of the place.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>All such dogmas as these, then, exact belief
+in their contents, but not without substantiating
+their title to this. They claim to be the condensed
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_45'>45</span>result of a long process of thought, which is
+founded on observation and also, certainly, on
+reasoning; they show how, if one so intends, one
+can go through this process oneself, instead of
+accepting the result of it; and the source of the
+knowledge imparted by the dogma is always
+added, where it is not, as with geographical statements,
+self-evident. For instance: the earth is
+shaped like a globe; the proofs adduced for this
+are Foucault’s pendulum experiment, the phenomena
+of the horizon and the possibility of circumnavigating
+the earth. Since it is impracticable,
+as all concerned realize, to send every school child
+on a voyage round the world, one is content that
+the school teaching shall be taken on trust, but
+one knows that the way to personal conviction is
+still open.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>Let us try to apply the same tests to the dogmas
+of religion. If we ask on what their claim to be
+believed is based, we receive three answers, which
+accord remarkably ill with one another. They
+deserve to be believed: firstly, because our primal
+ancestors already believed them; secondly, because
+we possess proofs, which have been handed down
+to us from this very period of antiquity; and
+thirdly, because it is forbidden to raise the question
+of their authenticity at all. Formerly this presumptuous
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_46'>46</span>act was visited with the very severest
+penalties, and even to-day society is unwilling
+to see anyone renew it.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>This third point cannot but rouse our strongest
+suspicions. Such a prohibition can surely have
+only one motive: that society knows very well
+the uncertain basis of the claim it makes for its
+religious doctrines. If it were otherwise, the
+relevant material would certainly be placed most
+readily at the disposal of anyone who wished to
+gain conviction for himself. And so we proceed
+to test the other two arguments with a feeling of
+mistrust not easily allayed. We ought to believe
+because our forefathers believed. But these
+ancestors of ours were far more ignorant than we;
+they believed in things we could not possibly
+accept to-day; so the possibility occurs that
+religious doctrines may also be in this category.
+The proofs they have bequeathed to us are deposited
+in writings that themselves bear every
+trace of being untrustworthy. They are full of
+contradictions, revisions, and interpolations; where
+they speak of actual authentic proofs they are
+themselves of doubtful authenticity. It does
+not help much if divine revelation is asserted
+to be the origin of their text or only of their
+content, for this assertion is itself already a part
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_47'>47</span>of those doctrines whose authenticity is to be
+examined, and no statement can bear its own
+proof.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>Thus we arrive at the singular conclusion that
+just what might be of the greatest significance for
+us in our cultural system, the information which
+should solve for us the riddles of the universe and
+reconcile us to the troubles of life, that just this
+has the weakest possible claim to authenticity.
+We should not be able to bring ourselves to accept
+anything of as little concern to us as the fact that
+whales bear young instead of laying eggs, if it were
+not capable of better proof than this.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>This state of things is in itself a very remarkable
+psychological problem. Let no one think that
+the foregoing remarks on the impossibility of
+proving religious doctrines contain anything new.
+It has been felt at all times, assuredly even by the
+ancestors who bequeathed this legacy. Probably
+many of them nursed the same doubts as we, but
+the pressure imposed on them was too strong for
+them to have dared to utter them. And since
+then countless people have been tortured by the
+same doubts, which they would fain have suppressed
+because they held themselves in duty
+bound to believe, and since then many brilliant
+intellects have been wrecked upon this conflict
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_48'>48</span>and many characters have come to grief through
+the compromises by which they sought a way
+out.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>If all the arguments that are put forward for
+the authenticity of religious doctrines originate in
+the past, it is natural to look round and see whether
+the present, better able to judge in these matters,
+cannot also furnish such evidence. The whole of
+the religious system would become infinitely more
+credible if one could succeed in this way in removing
+the element of doubt from a single part of it. It
+is at this point that the activity of the spiritualists
+comes in; they are convinced of the immortality
+of the individual soul, and they would demonstrate
+to us that this one article of religious teaching is
+free from doubt. Unfortunately they have not
+succeeded in disproving the fact that the appearances
+and utterances of their spirits are merely
+the productions of their own mental activity.
+They have called up the spirits of the greatest of
+men, of the most eminent thinkers, but all their
+utterances and all the information they have
+received from them have been so foolish and so
+desperately insignificant that one could find nothing
+else to believe in but the capacity of the spirits
+for adapting themselves to the circle of people
+that had evoked them.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_49'>49</span>One must now mention two attempts to evade
+the problem, which both convey the impression of
+frantic effort. One of them, high-handed in its
+nature, is old; the other is subtle and modern.
+The first is the <em>Credo quia absurdum</em> of the early
+Father. It would imply that religious doctrines
+are outside reason’s jurisdiction; they stand above
+reason. Their truth must be inwardly felt: one
+does not need to comprehend them. But this
+<em>Credo</em> is only of interest as a voluntary confession;
+as a decree it has no binding force. Am I to be
+obliged to believe every absurdity? And if not,
+why just this one? There is no appeal beyond
+reason. And if the truth of religious doctrines
+is dependent on an inner experience which bears
+witness to that truth, what is one to make of the
+many people who do not have that rare experience?
+One may expect all men to use the gift of reason
+that they possess, but one cannot set up an
+obligation that shall apply to all on a basis that
+only exists for quite a few. Of what significance
+is it for other people that you have won from a
+state of ecstasy, which has deeply moved you, an
+imperturbable conviction of the real truth of the
+doctrines of religion?</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>The second attempt is that of the philosophy
+of ‘As If’. It explains that in our mental activity
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_50'>50</span>we assume all manner of things, the groundlessness,
+indeed the absurdity, of which we fully
+realize. They are called ‘fictions’, but from a
+variety of practical motives we are led to behave
+‘as if’ we believed in these fictions. This, it is
+argued, is the case with religious doctrines on
+account of their unequalled importance for the
+maintenance of human society.<a id='r2'></a><a href='#f2' class='c007'><sup>[2]</sup></a> This argument is
+not far removed from the <em>Credo quia absurdum</em>.
+But I think that the claim of the philosophy of
+‘As If’ is such as only a philosopher could make.
+The man whose thinking is not influenced by the
+wiles of philosophy will never be able to accept
+it; with the confession of absurdity, of illogicality,
+there is no more to be said as far as he is concerned.
+He cannot be expected to forgo the
+guarantees he demands for all his usual activities
+just in the matter of his most important interests.
+I am reminded of one of my children who was
+distinguished at an early age by a peculiarly
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_51'>51</span>marked sense of reality. When the children were
+told a fairy tale, to which they listened with rapt
+attention, he would come forward and ask: Is
+that a true story? Having been told that it was
+not, he would turn away with an air of disdain.
+It is to be expected that men will soon behave
+in like manner towards the religious fairy tales,
+despite the advocacy of the philosophy of ‘As If’.</p>
+
+<div class='footnote' id='f2'>
+<p class='c008'><a href='#r2'>2</a>. I hope I am not doing an injustice if I make the author of
+the philosophy of ‘As If’ represent a point of view that is familiar
+to other thinkers also. Cp. H. Vaihinger, <cite>Die Philosophie des Als
+ob</cite>, Siebente und achte Auflage, 1922, S. 68: ‘We include as
+fictions not merely indifferent theoretical operations but ideational
+constructions emanating from the noblest minds, to which the
+noblest part of mankind cling and of which they will not allow
+themselves to be deprived. Nor is it our object so to deprive
+them—for as <em>practical fictions</em> we leave them all intact; they
+perish only as <em>theoretical truths</em>’ (C. K. Ogden’s translation).</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class='c008'>But at present they still behave quite differently,
+and in past ages, in spite of their incontrovertible
+lack of authenticity, religious ideas have exercised
+the very strongest influence on mankind. This
+is a fresh psychological problem. We must ask
+where the inherent strength of these doctrines lies
+and to what circumstance they owe their efficacy,
+independent, as it is, of the acknowledgement of
+the reason.</p>
+
+<div class='chapter'>
+ <span class='pageno' id='Page_52'>52</span>
+ <h2 class='c005'>CHAPTER VI</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class='drop-capa0_0_6 c006'>I think we have sufficiently paved the way for
+the answer to both these questions. It will
+be found if we fix our attention on the psychical
+origin of religious ideas. These, which profess to
+be dogmas, are not the residue of experience or
+the final result of reflection; they are illusions,
+fulfilments of the oldest, strongest and most
+insistent wishes of mankind; the secret of their
+strength is the strength of these wishes. We know
+already that the terrifying effect of infantile helplessness
+aroused the need for protection—protection
+through love—which the father relieved, and that
+the discovery that this helplessness would continue
+through the whole of life made it necessary to
+cling to the existence of a father—but this time a
+more powerful one. Thus the benevolent rule of
+divine providence allays our anxiety in face of
+life’s dangers, the establishment of a moral world
+order ensures the fulfilment of the demands of
+justice, which within human culture have so often
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_53'>53</span>remained unfulfilled, and the prolongation of
+earthly existence by a future life provides in
+addition the local and temporal setting for these
+wish-fulfilments. Answers to the questions that
+tempt human curiosity, such as the origin of the
+universe and the relation between the body and
+the soul, are developed in accordance with the
+underlying assumptions of this system; it betokens
+a tremendous relief for the individual psyche if it
+is released from the conflicts of childhood arising
+out of the father complex, which are never wholly
+overcome, and if these conflicts are afforded a
+universally accepted solution.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>When I say that they are illusions, I must
+define the meaning of the word. An illusion is
+not the same as an error, it is indeed not necessarily
+an error. Aristotle’s belief that vermin are
+evolved out of dung, to which ignorant people
+still cling, was an error; so was the belief of a
+former generation of doctors that <em>tabes dorsalis</em> was
+the result of sexual excess. It would be improper
+to call these errors illusions. On the other hand,
+it was an illusion on the part of Columbus that
+he had discovered a new sea-route to India. The
+part played by his wish in this error is very clear.
+One may describe as an illusion the statement of
+certain nationalists that the Indo-Germanic race
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_54'>54</span>is the only one capable of culture, or the belief,
+which only psycho-analysis destroyed, that the
+child is a being without sexuality. It is characteristic
+of the illusion that it is derived from
+men’s wishes; in this respect it approaches the
+psychiatric delusion, but it is to be distinguished
+from this, quite apart from the more complicated
+structure of the latter. In the delusion we emphasize
+as essential the conflict with reality; the
+illusion need not be necessarily false, that is to
+say, unrealizable or incompatible with reality.
+For instance, a poor girl may have an illusion
+that a prince will come and fetch her home. It
+is possible; some such cases have occurred. That
+the Messiah will come and found a golden age is
+much less probable; according to one’s personal
+attitude one will classify this belief as an illusion
+or as analogous to a delusion. Examples of illusions
+that have come true are not easy to discover,
+but the illusion of the alchemists that all metals
+can be turned into gold may prove to be one.
+The desire to have lots of gold, as much gold as
+possible, has been considerably damped by our
+modern insight into the nature of wealth, yet
+chemistry no longer considers a transmutation of
+metals into gold as impossible. Thus we call a
+belief an illusion when wish-fulfilment is a prominent
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_55'>55</span>factor in its motivation, while disregarding
+its relations to reality, just as the illusion itself
+does.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>If after this survey we turn again to religious
+doctrines, we may reiterate that they are all
+illusions, they do not admit of proof, and no one
+can be compelled to consider them as true or to
+believe in them. Some of them are so improbable,
+so very incompatible with everything we
+have laboriously discovered about the reality of
+the world, that we may compare them—taking
+adequately into account the psychological differences—to
+delusions. Of the reality value of
+most of them we cannot judge; just as they
+cannot be proved, neither can they be refuted.
+We still know too little to approach them critically.
+The riddles of the universe only reveal themselves
+slowly to our enquiry, to many questions science
+can as yet give no answer; but scientific work is
+our only way to the knowledge of external reality.
+Again, it is merely illusion to expect anything
+from intuition or trance; they can give us nothing
+but particulars, which are difficult to interpret,
+about our own mental life, never information
+about the questions that are so lightly answered
+by the doctrines of religion. It would be wanton
+to let one’s own arbitrary action fill the gap, and
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_56'>56</span>according to one’s personal estimate declare this
+or that part of the religious system to be more
+or less acceptable. These questions are too
+momentous for that; too sacred, one might say.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>At this point it may be objected: well, then,
+if even the crabbed sceptics admit that the statements
+of religion cannot be confuted by reason,
+why should not I believe in them, since they have
+so much on their side—tradition, the concurrence
+of mankind, and all the consolation they yield?
+Yes, why not? Just as no one can be forced into
+belief, so no one can be forced into unbelief. But
+do not deceive yourself into thinking that with
+such arguments you are following the path of
+correct reasoning. If ever there was a case of
+facile argument, this is one. Ignorance is ignorance;
+no right to believe anything is derived from
+it. No reasonable man will behave so frivolously
+in other matters or rest content with such feeble
+grounds for his opinions or for the attitude he
+adopts; it is only in the highest and holiest
+things that he allows this. In reality these are
+only attempts to delude oneself or other people
+into the belief that one still holds fast to religion,
+when one has long cut oneself loose from it.
+Where questions of religion are concerned people
+are guilty of every possible kind of insincerity and
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_57'>57</span>intellectual misdemeanour. Philosophers stretch
+the meaning of words until they retain scarcely
+anything of their original sense; by calling ‘God’
+some vague abstraction which they have created
+for themselves, they pose as deists, as believers,
+before the world; they may even pride themselves
+on having attained a higher and purer idea
+of God, although their God is nothing but an
+insubstantial shadow and no longer the mighty
+personality of religious doctrine. Critics persist in
+calling ‘deeply religious’ a person who confesses
+to a sense of man’s insignificance and impotence
+in face of the universe, although it is not this
+feeling that constitutes the essence of religious
+emotion, but rather the next step, the reaction to
+it, which seeks a remedy against this feeling. He
+who goes no further, he who humbly acquiesces in
+the insignificant part man plays in the universe,
+is, on the contrary, irreligious in the truest sense
+of the word.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>It does not lie within the scope of this enquiry
+to estimate the value of religious doctrines as
+truth. It suffices that we have recognized them,
+psychologically considered, as illusions. But we
+need not conceal the fact that this discovery
+strongly influences our attitude to what must
+appear to many the most important of questions.
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_58'>58</span>We know approximately at what periods and by
+what sort of men religious doctrines were formed.
+If we now learn from what motives this happened,
+our attitude to the problem of religion will suffer
+an appreciable change. We say to ourselves: it
+would indeed be very nice if there were a God,
+who was both creator of the world and a benevolent
+providence, if there were a moral world order
+and a future life, but at the same time it is very
+odd that this is all just as we should wish it
+ourselves. And it would be still odder if our
+poor, ignorant, enslaved ancestors had succeeded
+in solving all these difficult riddles of the universe.</p>
+
+<div class='chapter'>
+ <span class='pageno' id='Page_59'>59</span>
+ <h2 class='c005'>CHAPTER VII</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class='drop-capa0_0_6 c006'>Having recognized religious doctrines to
+be illusions, we are at once confronted
+with the further question: may not other
+cultural possessions, which we esteem highly and
+by which we let our life be ruled, be of a similar
+nature? Should not the assumptions that regulate
+our political institutions likewise be called illusions,
+and is it not the case that in our culture the
+relations between the sexes are disturbed by an
+erotic illusion, or by a series of erotic illusions?
+Once our suspicions have been roused, we shall not
+shrink from asking whether there is any better
+foundation for our conviction that it is possible to
+discover something about external reality through
+the applying of observation and reasoning in scientific
+work. Nothing need keep us from applying
+observation to our own natures or submitting the
+process of reasoning to its own criticism. Here a
+series of enquiries present themselves, which in their
+result should be of decisive importance for constructing
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_60'>60</span>a ‘Weltanschauung’. We surmise, too, that
+such an endeavour would not be wasted, and that
+it would at least partially justify our suspicions.
+But the author of these pages has not the means
+to undertake so comprehensive a task; forced by
+necessity, he confines his work to the pursuit of
+a single one of these illusions, that is, the religious.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>But now the loud voice of our opponent bids
+us to stop. We are called to account for our
+transgressions.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>‘Archæological interests are no doubt most
+praiseworthy, but one does not set about an
+excavation if one is thereby going to undermine
+occupied dwelling-places so that they collapse and
+bury the inhabitants under their ruins. The
+doctrines of religion are not a subject that one
+can be clever about, as one can about any other.
+Our culture is built up on them; the preservation
+of human society rests on the assumption that
+the majority of mankind believe in the truth of
+these doctrines. If they are taught that there
+is no almighty and all just God, no divine world
+order, and no future life, then they will feel exempt
+from all obligation to follow the rules of culture.
+Uninhibited and free from fear, everybody will
+follow his asocial, egoistic instincts, and will seek
+to prove his power. Chaos, which we have
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_61'>61</span>banished through thousands of years of the work
+of civilization, will begin again. Even if one
+knew, and could prove, that religion was not in
+possession of the truth, one should conceal the
+fact and behave as the philosophy of “As If”
+demands—and this in the interests of the preservation
+of everybody. And apart from the danger
+of the undertaking, it is also a purposeless cruelty.
+Countless people find their one consolation in the
+doctrines of religion, and only with their help can
+they endure life. You would rob them of what
+supports them, and yet you have nothing better
+to give them in exchange. It has been admitted
+that so far science has not achieved much, but
+even if it had advanced far further, it would not
+suffice for men. Man has yet other imperative
+needs, which can never be satisfied by cold science,
+and it is very strange—to be frank, it is the acme
+of inconsistency—that a psychologist who has
+always emphasized how much in men’s lives the
+intelligence retreats before the life of the instincts
+should now strive to rob men of a precious wish-satisfaction,
+and should want to give them in
+exchange a compensation of an intellectual nature.’</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>What a number of accusations all at once!
+However, I am prepared to deny them all; and
+what is more, I am prepared to defend the statement
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_62'>62</span>that culture incurs a greater danger by
+maintaining its present attitude to religion than
+by relinquishing it. But I hardly know where
+to begin my reply.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>Perhaps with the assurance that I myself
+consider my undertaking to be completely harmless
+and free from danger. This time the overestimation
+of the intellect is not on my side. If
+men are such as my opponents describe them—and
+I have no wish to contradict it—then there
+is no danger of a devout believer, overwhelmed
+by my arguments, being deprived of his faith.
+Besides, I have said nothing that other and better
+men have not said before me in a much more
+complete, forcible and impressive way. The
+names of these men are well known. I shall not
+quote them. I should not like to give the impression
+that I would count myself of their number.
+I have merely—this is the only thing that is new
+in my statement—added a certain psychological
+foundation to the critique of my great predecessors.
+It is hardly to be expected that just this addition
+will produce the effect that was denied to the earlier
+attempts. Certainly I might be asked at this
+point why I write such things if I am convinced
+of their ineffectiveness. But we shall come back
+to that later.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_63'>63</span>The one person this publication may harm is
+myself. I shall have to listen to the most unpleasant
+reproaches on the score of shallowness,
+narrow-mindedness, and lack of idealism and of
+understanding for the highest interests of mankind.
+But on the one hand these remonstrances are
+not new to me; and on the other hand, if a man
+has even in his early years learnt to face the displeasure
+of his contemporaries, what effect then
+can it have on him in his old age, when he is certain
+to be soon beyond the reach of all favour or disfavour?
+In former times it was different. Then
+utterances such as these brought with them a
+sure foreshortening of one’s earthly existence and
+a speedy approach of the opportunity to gain
+personal experience of the next life. But, I
+repeat, those times are over, and to-day such things
+can be written without endangering even the
+author; the most that can happen will be that
+in this or that country the translation and the
+circulation of his book will be forbidden—and
+naturally this will happen just in that country
+which feels certain of the high standard of its
+culture. But one must be able to put up with this
+also, if one makes any plea for wish-renunciation
+or for acquiescence in fate.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>And then it occurred to me to ask whether the
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_64'>64</span>publication of this work might not do some harm
+after all—not indeed to a person, but to a cause:
+the cause of psycho-analysis. For it cannot be
+denied that this is my creation, and that an
+abundance of distrust and ill-will has been shown
+to it. If I now come forward with such displeasing
+statements, people will be only too ready to displace
+their feelings from my person on to psycho-analysis.
+Now one can see, it will be said, where
+psycho-analysis leads to. The mask is fallen;
+it leads to the denial of God and of an ethical
+ideal, as indeed we have always supposed. To
+keep us from the discovery, we have been made to
+believe that psycho-analysis neither has, nor can
+have, a philosophical standpoint.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>This pother will be really disagreeable to me
+on account of my many fellow-workers, several
+of whom do not at all share my attitude to religious
+problems. However, psycho-analysis has already
+braved many storms, and it must face this new
+one also. In reality psycho-analysis is a method
+of investigation, an impartial instrument like,
+say, the infinitesimal calculus. Even if a physicist
+should discover with the help of the latter that
+after a certain period the earth will be destroyed,
+one would still hesitate to impute destructive
+tendencies to the calculus itself, and to proscribe
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_65'>65</span>it on that account. Nothing that I have said
+here against the truth-value of religion needed
+the support of psycho-analysis; it had been said
+by others long before psycho-analysis came into
+existence. If one can find a new argument against
+the truth of religion by applying the psycho-analytic
+method, so much the worse for religion,
+but the defenders of religion will with equal right
+avail themselves of psycho-analysis in order to
+appreciate to the full the affective significance of
+religious doctrines.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>And now to proceed with the defence: clearly
+religion has performed great services for human
+culture. It has contributed much toward restraining
+the asocial instincts, but still not enough.
+For many thousands of years it has ruled human
+society; it has had time to show what it can
+achieve. If it had succeeded in making happy
+the greater part of mankind, in consoling them,
+in reconciling them to life, and in making them
+into supporters of civilization, then no one would
+dream of striving to alter existing conditions.
+But instead of this what do we see? We see
+that an appallingly large number of men are discontented
+with civilization and unhappy in it, and
+feel it as a yoke that must be shaken off; that these
+men either do everything in their power to alter
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_66'>66</span>this civilization, or else go so far in their hostility
+to it that they will have nothing whatever to do
+either with civilization or with restraining their
+instincts. At this point it will be objected that
+this state of affairs is due to the very fact that
+religion has forfeited a part of its influence on
+the masses, just because of the deplorable effect
+of the advances in science. We shall note this
+admission and the reasons given for it, and shall
+make use of it later for our own purposes; but
+the objection itself has no force.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>It is doubtful whether men were in general
+happier at a time when religious doctrines held
+unlimited sway than they are now; more moral
+they certainly were not. They have always
+understood how to externalize religious precepts,
+thereby frustrating their intentions. And the
+priests, who had to enforce religious obedience,
+met them half-way. God’s kindness must lay a
+restraining hand upon his justice. One sinned,
+and then one made oblation or did penance, and
+then one was free to sin anew. Russian mysticism
+has come to the sublime conclusion that sin is
+indispensable for the full enjoyment of the blessings
+of divine grace, and therefore, fundamentally, it
+is pleasing to God. It is well known that the
+priests could only keep the masses submissive to
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_67'>67</span>religion by making these great concessions to
+human instincts. And so it was settled: God
+alone is strong and good, man is weak and sinful.
+Immorality, no less than morality, has at all times
+found support in religion. If the achievements
+of religion in promoting men’s happiness, in
+adapting them to civilization, and in controlling
+them morally, are no better, then the question
+arises whether we are right in considering it
+necessary for mankind, and whether we do
+wisely in basing the demands of our culture
+upon it.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>Let us consider the unmistakable character of
+the present situation. We have heard the admission
+that religion no longer has the same influence
+on men that it used to have (we are concerned
+here with European Christian culture). And this,
+not because its promises have become smaller,
+but because they appear less credible to people.
+Let us admit that the reason—perhaps not the
+only one—for this change is the increase of the
+scientific spirit in the higher strata of human
+society. Criticism has nibbled at the authenticity
+of religious documents, natural science has shown
+up the errors contained in them, and the comparative
+method of research has revealed the fatal
+resemblance between religious ideas revered by
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_68'>68</span>us and the mental productions of primitive ages
+and peoples.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>The scientific spirit engenders a particular
+attitude to the problems of this world; before
+the problems of religion it halts for a while, then
+wavers, and finally here too steps over the threshold.
+In this process there is no stopping. The
+more the fruits of knowledge become accessible
+to men, the more widespread is the decline of
+religious belief, at first only of the obsolete and
+objectionable expressions of the same, then of its
+fundamental assumptions, also. The Americans
+who instituted the monkey trial in Dayton have
+alone proved consistent. Elsewhere the inevitable
+transition is accomplished by way of half-measures
+and insincerities.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>Culture has little to fear from the educated or
+from the brain workers. In their case religious
+motives for civilized behaviour would be unobtrusively
+replaced by other and secular ones;
+besides, for the most part they are themselves
+supporters of culture. But it is another matter
+with the great mass of the uneducated and suppressed,
+who have every reason to be enemies of
+culture. So long as they do not discover that
+people no longer believe in God, all is well. But
+they discover it, infallibly, and would do so even
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_69'>69</span>if this work of mine were not published. They
+are ready to accept the results of scientific thought,
+without having effected in themselves the process
+of change which scientific thought induces in men.
+Is there not a danger that these masses, in their
+hostility to culture, will attack the weak point
+which they have discovered in their taskmaster?
+If you must not kill your neighbour, solely because
+God has forbidden it and will sorely avenge it in
+this or the other life, and you then discover that
+there is no God so that one need not fear his
+punishment, then you will certainly kill without
+hesitation, and you could only be prevented from
+this by mundane force. And so follows the
+necessity for either the most rigorous suppression
+of these dangerous masses and the most careful
+exclusion of all opportunities for mental awakening
+or a fundamental revision of the relation between
+culture and religion.</p>
+
+<div class='chapter'>
+ <span class='pageno' id='Page_70'>70</span>
+ <h2 class='c005'>CHAPTER VIII</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class='drop-capa0_0_6 c006'>One would suppose that this last proposal
+could be carried out without any
+special difficulty. It is true that it
+would involve some measure of renunciation, but
+one would gain, perhaps, more than one lost, and
+a great danger would be avoided. But people
+have a horror of it, as if civilization would thereby
+be exposed to an even greater danger. When
+Saint Boniface felled the tree which was venerated
+as sacred by the Saxons, those who stood round
+expected some fearful event to follow the outrage.
+It did not happen, and the Saxons were baptized.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>It is manifestly in the interest of man’s communal
+existence, which would not otherwise be
+practicable, that civilization has laid down the
+commandment that one shall not kill the neighbour
+whom one hates, who is in one’s way, or
+whose property one covets. For the murderer
+would draw on to himself the vengeance of the
+murdered man’s kinsmen and the secret envy of
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_71'>71</span>the others who feel as much inward inclination as
+he did to such an act of violence. Thus he would
+not enjoy his revenge or his spoil for long, but
+would have every prospect of being killed soon
+himself. Even if he could defend himself against
+single foes by his extraordinary strength and
+caution, he would be bound to succumb to a
+combination of these weaker foes. If a combination
+of this sort did not take place, then
+murder would continue ceaselessly, and the end
+of it would be that men would exterminate one
+another. It would be the same state of affairs
+among individuals that still prevails in Corsica
+among families, but otherwise survives only among
+nations. Insecurity of life, an equal danger for
+all, now unites men into one society, which forbids
+the individual to kill and reserves to itself the
+right to kill in the name of society the man who
+violates this prohibition. This, then, is justice and
+punishment.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>We do not, however, tell others of this rational
+basis for the murder prohibition; we declare, on
+the contrary, that God is its author. Thus,
+making bold to divine his intentions, we find that
+he has no wish, either, for men to exterminate
+each other. By acting thus we invest the cultural
+prohibition with a quite peculiar solemnity, but at
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_72'>72</span>the same time we risk making its observance
+dependent on belief in God. If we retract this
+step, no longer saddling God with our own wishes,
+and content ourselves with the social justification
+for the cultural prohibition, then we renounce, it
+is true, its hallowed nature, but we also avoid
+endangering its existence. And we gain something
+else as well. Through some kind of diffusion or
+infection the character of sanctity and inviolability,
+of other-worldliness, one might say, has been
+extended from some few important prohibitions
+to all other cultural institutions and laws and
+ordinances. And often the halo becomes these
+none too well; not only do they invalidate each
+other by making conflicting decisions according to
+the time and place of their origin; even apart
+from this they betray every sign of human inadequacy.
+One can easily recognize among them
+things which can only be the product of shortsightedness
+and apprehensiveness, the expression
+of narrow interests, or the result of inadequate
+hypotheses. The criticism to which one must
+subject them also diminishes to an unwelcome
+extent people’s respect for other and more
+justified cultural demands. As it is a delicate task
+to decide what God has himself ordained and what
+derives rather from the authority of an allpowerful
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_73'>73</span>parliament or a supreme judicial decision,
+it would be an indubitable advantage to leave
+God out of the question altogether, and to admit
+honestly the purely human origin of all cultural
+laws and institutions. Along with their pretensions
+to sanctity the rigid and immutable nature
+of these laws and regulations would also cease.
+Men would realize that these have been made,
+not so much to rule them, as, on the contrary, to
+serve their interests; they would acquire a more
+friendly attitude to them, and instead of aiming
+at their abolition they would aim only at improving
+them. This would be an important advance
+on the road which leads to reconciliation with the
+burden of culture.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>But here our plea for a purely rational basis
+for cultural laws, that is to say, for deriving them
+from social necessity, is interrupted by a sudden
+doubt. We have chosen as our example the origin
+of the murder prohibition. But does our account
+of it correspond to historical truth? We fear not;
+it appears to be merely a rationalistic construction.
+With the help of psycho-analysis we have studied
+this very point in the history of human culture,
+and supported by this study we are bound to say
+that in reality it did not happen like this. Even
+in men to-day purely reasonable motives are of
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_74'>74</span>little avail against passionate impulses. How
+much weaker, then, must they have been in the
+primordial animal man! Perhaps even now his
+descendants would still kill one another without
+inhibition, if there had not been among those acts
+of murder one—the slaughter of the primal father—which
+evoked an irresistible emotional reaction,
+momentous in its consequences. From it arose
+the commandment: thou shalt not kill, which in
+totemism was confined to the father-substitute,
+and was later extended to others, but which even
+to-day is not universally observed.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>But according to arguments which I need not
+repeat here, that primal father has been the prototype
+of God, the model after which later generations
+have formed their figure of God. Hence the
+religious explanation is right. God was actually
+concerned in the origin of that prohibition; his
+influence, not insight into what was necessary for
+society, brought it into being. And the process
+of attributing man’s will to God is fully justified;
+for men, knowing that they had brutally set aside
+the father, determined, in the reaction to their
+outrage, to respect his will in future. And so the
+religious doctrine does give us the historical truth,
+though of course in a somewhat remodelled and
+disguised form; our rational explanation belies it.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_75'>75</span>We now observe that the stock of religious
+ideas contains not only wish-fulfilments, but also
+important historical memories. What matchless,
+what abundant power this combination of past
+and present must give to religion! But with the
+help of an analogy we may perhaps feel our way
+towards another view of the problem. It is not a
+good thing to transplant ideas far away from the
+soil in which they grew, but we cannot resist
+pointing out the resemblance which forms this
+analogy. We know that the human child cannot
+well complete its development towards culture
+without passing through a more or less distinct
+phase of neurosis. This is because the child is
+unable to suppress by rational mental effort so
+many of those instinctual impulsions which cannot
+later be turned to account, but has to check
+them by acts of repression, behind which there
+stands as a rule an anxiety motive. Most of these
+child neuroses are overcome spontaneously as one
+grows up, and especially is this the fate of the
+obsessional neuroses of childhood. The remainder
+can be cleared up still later by psycho-analytic
+treatment. In just the same way one might
+assume that in its development through the ages
+mankind as a whole experiences conditions that
+are analogous to the neuroses, and this for the
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_76'>76</span>same reasons, because in the ages of its ignorance
+and intellectual weakness it achieved by purely
+affective means the instinctual renunciations, indispensable
+for man’s communal existence. And
+the residue of these repression-like processes,
+which took place in antiquity, has long clung on
+to civilization. Thus religion would be the universal
+obsessional neurosis of humanity. It, like
+the child’s, originated in the Oedipus complex, the
+relation to the father. According to this conception
+one might prophesy that the abandoning
+of religion must take place with the fateful
+inexorability of a process of growth, and that we
+are just now in the middle of this phase of
+development.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>So we should form our behaviour after the
+model of a sensible teacher, who does not oppose
+the new development confronting him, but seeks
+to further it and to temper the force of its onset.
+To be sure this analogy does not exhaust the
+essence of religion. If on the one hand religion
+brings with it obsessional limitation, which can
+only be compared to an individual obsessional
+neurosis, it comprises on the other hand a system
+of wish-illusions, incompatible with reality, such
+as we find in an isolated form only in Meynert’s
+amentia, a state of blissful hallucinatory confusion.
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_77'>77</span>But these are only just comparisons, with whose
+help we can endeavour to understand social phenomena;
+individual psychology supplies us with no
+exact counterpart.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>It has been shown repeatedly (by myself, and
+particularly by Theodor Reik) into what details
+the analogy of religion and the obsessional neurosis
+may be pursued, how much of the vicissitudes and
+peculiarities of the formation of religion may be
+understood in this way. And it accords well with
+this that the true believer is in a high degree
+protected against the danger of certain neurotic
+afflictions; by accepting the universal neurosis he
+is spared the task of forming a personal neurosis.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>Our knowledge of the historical value of certain
+religious doctrines increases our respect for them,
+but it does not invalidate our proposal to exclude
+them from the motivation of cultural laws. On
+the contrary! This historical residue has given
+us the conception of religious dogmas as, so to
+speak, neurotic survivals, and now we may say
+that the time has probably come to replace the
+consequences of repression by the results of
+rational mental effort, as in the analytic treatment
+of neurotics. One may prophesy, but hardly regret,
+that this process of remodelling will not stop at
+dispelling the solemn air of sanctity surrounding
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_78'>78</span>the cultural laws, but that a general revision of
+these must involve the abolition of many of them.
+And this will go far to solve our appointed problem
+of reconciling men to civilization. We need not
+regret the loss of historical truth involved in
+accepting the rational motivation of cultural laws.
+The truths contained in religious doctrines are
+after all so distorted and systematically disguised
+that the mass of mankind cannot recognize them
+as truth. It is an instance of the same thing when
+we tell the child that new-born babies are brought
+by the stork. Here, too, we tell the truth in
+symbolic guise, for we know what that large bird
+signifies. But the child does not know it; he hears
+only the distortion, and feels that he has been
+deceived; and we know how often his refractoriness
+and his distrust of the grown-ups gets bound
+up with this impression. We have come to the
+conclusion that it is better to avoid such symbolic
+disguisings of the truth, and to allow the child
+knowledge of the real state of affairs in a way
+suitable for his stage of intellectual development.</p>
+
+<div class='chapter'>
+ <span class='pageno' id='Page_79'>79</span>
+ <h2 class='c005'>CHAPTER IX</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class='drop-capa0_0_6 c006'>‘You allow yourself contradictions which
+are hard to reconcile with one another.
+First you declare that a work like yours
+is quite harmless; no one will let himself be robbed
+of his religious faith through such discussions.
+But since, as became evident later, it is your aim
+to disturb this faith, one may ask: why in fact
+do you publish it? At another point, however,
+you admit that it might be dangerous, indeed very
+dangerous, for a man to discover that people no
+longer believe in God. Docile though he had been
+hitherto, now he would throw off all allegiance
+to the laws of culture. Your whole argument
+that the religious motivation of the cultural
+commandments signifies a danger for culture rests,
+in fact, on the assumption that the believer can
+be made into an unbeliever. But that is a complete
+contradiction.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>‘And here is another contradiction: you admit
+on the one hand that man will not be guided by
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_80'>80</span>intelligence; he is ruled by his passions and by the
+claims of his instincts; but on the other hand
+you propose to replace the affective basis of his
+allegiance to culture by a rational one. Let
+who can understand this. To me it seems a case
+of either the one or the other.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>‘Besides, have you learnt nothing from history?
+Once before such an attempt to substitute reason
+for religion was made, officially and in the grand
+manner. Surely you remember the French Revolution
+and Robespierre, and also how short-lived
+and how deplorably ineffectual the experiment?
+It is being repeated in Russia at present, and we
+need not be curious about the result. Do you
+not think we may assume that man cannot do
+without religion?</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>‘You have said yourself that religion is more
+than an obsessional neurosis. But you have not
+dealt with this other aspect of it. You are content
+to work out the analogy with the neurosis. Men
+must be freed from a neurosis. What else is lost
+in the process does not trouble you.’</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>Probably these apparent contradictions have
+arisen because I have been dealing too hastily with
+complicated matters, but we can make up for this
+to some extent. I still maintain that in one
+respect my work is quite harmless. No believer
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_81'>81</span>will let himself be led astray by these or by similar
+arguments. A believer has certain ties of affection
+binding him to the substance of religion. There
+are certainly a vast number of other people who
+are not religious in the same sense. They obey
+the laws of civilization because they are intimidated
+by the threats of religion, and they fear religion so
+long as they consider it as a part of the reality
+that restricts them. These are the people who
+break free as soon as they dare to give up their
+belief in its reality value; but arguments have
+no effect on them either. They cease to fear
+religion when they find that others do not fear it,
+and of these I have asserted that they would learn
+of the decline of religious influence even if I did
+not publish my work.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>But I suppose you yourself attach more value
+to the other contradiction with which you tax me.
+Since men are so slightly amenable to reasonable
+arguments, so completely are they ruled by their
+instinctual wishes, why should one want to take
+away from them a means of satisfying their
+instincts and replace it by reasonable arguments?
+Certainly men are like this, but have you asked
+yourself whether they need be so, whether their
+inmost nature necessitates it? Can an anthropologist
+give the cranial index of a people whose
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_82'>82</span>custom it is to deform their children’s heads by
+bandaging them from their earliest years? Think
+of the distressing contrast between the radiant
+intelligence of a healthy child and the feeble
+mentality of the average adult. Is it so utterly
+impossible that it is just religious up-bringing
+which is largely to blame for this relative degeneration?
+I think it would be a very long time
+before a child who was not influenced began
+to trouble himself about God and the things
+beyond this world. Perhaps his thoughts on
+these matters would then take the same course
+as they did with his ancestors; but we do
+not wait for this development; we introduce
+him to the doctrines of religion at a time when
+he is neither interested in them nor capable of
+grasping their import. Is it not true that the
+two main points in the modern educational programme
+are the retardation of sexual development
+and the early application of religious influence? So
+when the child’s mind awakens, the doctrines of
+religion are already unassailable. But do you
+suppose that it is particularly conducive to the
+strengthening of the mental function that so
+important a sphere should be closed to it by the
+menace of hell pains? We need not be greatly
+surprised at the feeble mentality of the man who
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_83'>83</span>has once brought himself to accept without
+criticism all the absurdities that religious doctrines
+repeat to him, and even to overlook the contradictions
+between them. Now we have no other
+means of controlling our instincts than our intelligence.
+And how can we expect people who
+are dominated by thought-prohibitions to attain
+the psychological ideal, the primacy of the intelligence?
+You know too that women in general
+are said to suffer from so-called ‘physiological
+weak-mindedness’, <em>i.e.</em> a poorer intelligence than
+the man’s. The fact itself is disputable, its
+interpretation doubtful; but it has been argued
+for the secondary nature of this intellectual
+degeneration that women labour under the harshness
+of the early prohibition, which prevented
+them from applying their mind to what would
+have interested them most, that is to say, to the
+problems of sexual life. So long as a man’s early
+years are influenced by the religious thought-inhibition
+and by the loyal one derived from it,
+as well as by the sexual one, we cannot really say
+what he is actually like.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>But I will curb my ardour and admit the possibility
+that I too am chasing after an illusion.
+Perhaps the effect of the religious thought-prohibition
+is not as bad as I assume, perhaps it will
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_84'>84</span>turn out that human nature remains the same
+even if education is not abused by being subjected
+to religion. I do not know, and you cannot know
+either. It is not only the great problems of this
+life that seem at present insoluble; there are many
+smaller questions also that are hard to decide.
+But you must admit that there is here the justification
+for a hope for the future, that perhaps we
+may dig up a treasure which can enrich culture,
+and that it is worth while to make the experiment
+of a non-religious education. Should it
+prove unsatisfactory, I am ready to give up the
+reform and to return to the earlier, purely descriptive
+judgement: man is a creature of weak
+intelligence who is governed by his instinctual
+wishes.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>There is another point in which I wholeheartedly
+agree with you. It is, to be sure, a
+senseless proceeding to try and do away with
+religion by force and at one blow—more especially
+as it is a hopeless one. The believer will not let
+his faith be taken from him, neither by arguments
+nor by prohibitions. And even if it did succeed
+with some, it would be a cruel thing to do. A
+man who has for decades taken a sleeping
+draught is naturally unable to sleep if he is deprived
+of it. That the effect of the consolations
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_85'>85</span>of religion may be compared to that of a narcotic
+is prettily illustrated by what is happening in
+America. There they are now trying—plainly
+under the influence of petticoat government—to
+deprive men of all stimulants, intoxicants and
+luxuries,<a id='r3'></a><a href='#f3' class='c007'><sup>[3]</sup></a> and to satiate them with piety by
+way of compensation. This is another experiment
+about the result of which we need not be
+curious.</p>
+
+<div class='footnote' id='f3'>
+<p class='c008'><a href='#r3'>3</a>. <em>I.e.</em> tea, alcohol, and tobacco.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class='c008'>And so I disagree with you when you go on to
+argue that man cannot in general do without the
+consolation of the religious illusion, that without
+it he would not endure the troubles of life, the
+cruelty of reality. Certainly this is true of the
+man into whom you have instilled the sweet—or
+bitter-sweet—poison from childhood on. But what
+of the other, who has been brought up soberly?
+Perhaps he, not suffering from neurosis, will need
+no intoxicant to deaden it. True, man will then
+find himself in a difficult situation. He will have
+to confess his utter helplessness and his insignificant
+part in the working of the universe; he will have
+to confess that he is no longer the centre of creation,
+no longer the object of the tender care of a benevolent
+providence. He will be in the same
+position as the child who has left the home where
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_86'>86</span>he was so warm and comfortable. But, after all,
+is it not the destiny of childishness to be overcome?
+Man cannot remain a child for ever; he
+must venture at last into the hostile world.
+This may be called ‘<em>education to reality</em>’; need
+I tell you that it is the sole aim of my book
+to draw attention to the necessity for this
+advance?</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>You fear, probably, that he will not stand the
+test? Well, anyhow, let us be hopeful. It is
+at least something to know that one is thrown on
+one’s own resources. One learns then to use them
+properly. And man is not entirely without means
+of assistance; since the time of the deluge science
+has taught him much, and it will still further
+increase his power. And as for the great necessities
+of fate, against which there is no remedy, these
+he will simply learn to endure with resignation.
+Of what use to him is the illusion of a kingdom on
+the moon, whose revenues have never yet been
+seen by anyone? As an honest crofter on this
+earth he will know how to cultivate his plot in a
+way that will support him. Thus by withdrawing
+his expectations from the other world and concentrating
+all his liberated energies on this earthly
+life he will probably attain to a state of things in
+which life will be tolerable for all and no one will
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_87'>87</span>be oppressed by culture any more. Then with
+one of our comrades in unbelief he will be able to
+say without regret:</p>
+
+<div class='nf-center-c0'>
+ <div class='nf-center'>
+ <div>Let us leave the heavens</div>
+ <div>To the angels and the sparrows.</div>
+ </div>
+</div>
+
+<div class='chapter'>
+ <span class='pageno' id='Page_88'>88</span>
+ <h2 class='c005'>CHAPTER X</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class='drop-capa0_0_6 c006'>‘That does sound splendid. A race of men
+that has renounced all illusions and has
+thus become capable of making its existence
+on the earth a tolerable one! But I cannot
+share your expectations. And this, not because
+I am the pig-headed reactionary you perhaps take
+me for. No; it is because I am a sensible person.
+It seems to me that we have now exchanged rôles;
+you prove to be the enthusiast, who allows himself
+to be carried away by illusions, and I represent the
+claims of reason, the right to be sceptical. What
+you have just stated seems to me to be founded
+on errors, which after your precedent I may call
+illusions because they betray clearly enough the
+influence of your wishes. You indulge in the hope
+that generations which have not experienced the
+influence of religious teaching in early childhood
+will easily attain the wished-for primacy of the
+intelligence over the life of the instincts. That
+is surely an illusion; in this decisive point human
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_89'>89</span>nature is hardly likely to alter. If I am not
+mistaken—one knows so little of other civilizations—there
+are even to-day peoples who do not grow
+up under the pressure of a religious system, and
+they come no nearer your ideal than the others.
+If you wish to expel religion from our European
+civilization you can only do it through another
+system of doctrines, and from the outset this
+would take over all the psychological characteristics
+of religion, the same sanctity, rigidity and
+intolerance, the same prohibition of thought in
+self-defence. Something of this sort you must have
+in justice to the requirements of education. For
+you cannot do without education. The way from
+sucking child to civilized man is a long one; too
+many young people would go astray and fail to
+arrive at their life tasks in due time if they were
+left without guidance to their own development.
+The doctrines made use of in their education will
+always confine the thought of their riper years,
+exactly as you reproach religion with doing to-day.
+Do you not observe that it is the ineradicable
+natural defect of our, of every, culture that it
+imposes on the child, governed by his instincts
+and intellectually weak, the making of decisions
+to which only the matured intelligence of the
+grown-up can do justice? But owing to the fact
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_90'>90</span>that mankind’s development through the ages
+is concentrated into a few years of childhood
+culture cannot do otherwise, and it is only by
+affective influence that the child can be induced
+to accomplish the task assigned to it. And so
+this is the outlook for your “primacy of the
+intellect”.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>‘And now you should not be surprised if I
+intervene on behalf of retaining the religious
+system of teaching as the basis of education and
+of man’s communal life. It is a practical problem,
+not a question of reality value. Since we cannot,
+for the sake of the preservation of our culture,
+postpone influencing the individual until he has
+become ready for culture—many would never be
+so anyhow—and since we are obliged to press some
+system of teaching on the growing child which
+shall have the effect on him of a postulate that
+does not admit of criticism, it seems to me that
+the religious system is by far the most suitable
+for the purpose; of course just on account of that
+quality—its power for wish-fulfilment and consolation—by
+which you claim to have recognized
+it as an “illusion”. In face of the difficulty of
+discovering anything about reality, indeed the
+doubt whether this is possible for us at all, we
+must not overlook the fact that human needs
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_91'>91</span>are also a part, and indeed an important part,
+of reality, and one that concerns us particularly
+closely.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>‘I find another advantage of religious doctrine
+in one of its peculiarities, to which you seem to
+take particular exception. It admits of an ideational
+refinement and sublimation, by which it
+can be divested of most of those traces of a primitive
+and infantile way of thinking which it bears.
+What is then left is a body of ideas which science
+no longer contradicts and which it cannot disprove.
+These modifications of religious doctrine,
+which you have condemned as half-measures and
+compromises, make it possible to bridge the gap
+between the uneducated masses and the philosophical
+thinker, and to preserve that common
+bond between them which is so important for the
+protection of culture. With it you would have
+no need to fear that the poor man would discover
+that the upper strata of society “no longer believe
+in God”. I think I have shown by now that
+your endeavour reduces itself to the attempt to
+replace a proved and affectively valuable illusion
+by one that is improved and without affective
+value.’</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>You shall not find me impervious to your
+criticism. I know how difficult it is to avoid
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_92'>92</span>illusions; perhaps even the hopes I have confessed
+to are of an illusory nature. But I hold fast to
+one distinction. My illusions—apart from the
+fact that no penalty is imposed for not sharing
+them—are not, like the religious ones, incapable
+of correction, they have no delusional character.
+If experience should show—not to me, but to
+others after me who think as I do—that we are
+mistaken, then we shall give up our expectations.
+Take my endeavour for what it is. A psychologist,
+who does not deceive himself about the
+difficulty of finding his bearings in this world,
+strives to review the development of mankind in
+accord with what insight he has won from studying
+the mental processes of the individual during his
+development from childhood to manhood. In
+this connection the idea forces itself upon him
+that religion is comparable to a childhood neurosis,
+and he is optimistic enough to assume that mankind
+will overcome this neurotic phase, just as so
+many children grow out of their similar neuroses.
+These pieces of knowledge from individual psychology
+may be inadequate, their application to the
+human race unjustified, the optimism without
+foundation; I grant you the uncertainty of all
+these things. But often we cannot refrain from
+saying what we think, excusing ourselves on the
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_93'>93</span>ground that it is given for no more than it is
+worth.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>And there are two points that I must dwell on
+a little longer. First, the weakness of my position
+does not betoken any strengthening of yours. I
+think you are defending a lost cause. We may
+insist as much as we like that the human intellect
+is weak in comparison with human instincts, and
+be right in doing so. But nevertheless there is
+something peculiar about this weakness. The
+voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not
+rest until it has gained a hearing. Ultimately,
+after endlessly repeated rebuffs, it succeeds. This
+is one of the few points in which one may be
+optimistic about the future of mankind, but in
+itself it signifies not a little. And one can make
+it a starting-point for yet other hopes. The
+primacy of the intellect certainly lies in the far,
+far, but still probably not infinite, distance. And
+as it will presumably set itself the same aims that
+you expect to be realized by your God—of course
+within human limits, in so far as external reality,
+Ἀνάγκη, allows it—the brotherhood of man and
+the reduction of suffering, we may say that our
+antagonism is only a temporary and not an irreconcilable
+one. We desire the same things, but you
+are more impatient, more exacting, and—why
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_94'>94</span>should I not say it—more selfish than I and those
+like me. You would have the state of bliss to
+begin immediately after death; you ask of it the
+impossible, and you will not surrender the claim
+of the individual. Of these wishes our god Αόγος<a id='r4'></a><a href='#f4' class='c007'><sup>[4]</sup></a>
+will realize those which external nature permits,
+but he will do this very gradually, only in the
+incalculable future and for other children of men.
+Compensation for us, who suffer grievously from
+life, he does not promise. On the way to this
+distant goal your religious doctrines will have to
+be discarded, no matter whether the first attempts
+fail, or whether the first substitute-formations
+prove to be unstable. You know why; in the
+long run nothing can withstand reason and experience,
+and the contradiction religion offers to both
+is only too palpable. Not even the purified
+religious ideas can escape this fate, so long as they
+still try to preserve anything of the consolation
+of religion. Certainly if you confine yourself to
+the belief in a higher spiritual being, whose
+qualities are indefinable and whose intentions
+cannot be discerned, then you are proof against
+the interference of science, but then you will also
+relinquish the interest of men.</p>
+
+<div class='footnote' id='f4'>
+<p class='c008'><a href='#r4'>4</a>. The twin gods Αόγος-Ἀνάγκη of the Dutchman <em>Multatuli</em>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class='c008'>And secondly: note the difference between
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_95'>95</span>your attitude to illusions and mine. You have
+to defend the religious illusion with all your might;
+if it were discredited—and to be sure it is sufficiently
+menaced—then your world would collapse, there
+would be nothing left for you but to despair of
+everything, of culture and of the future of mankind.
+From this bondage I am, we are, free. Since we
+are prepared to renounce a good part of our
+infantile wishes, we can bear it if some of our
+expectations prove to be illusions.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>Education freed from the burden of religious
+doctrines will not perhaps effect much alteration
+in man’s psychological nature; our god Αόγος is
+not perhaps a very powerful one; he may only
+fulfil a small part of what his forerunners have
+promised. If we have to acknowledge this, we
+shall do so with resignation. We shall not thereby
+lose our interest in the world and in life, for we
+have in one respect a sure support which you lack.
+We believe that it is possible for scientific work
+to discover something about the reality of the
+world through which we can increase our power
+and according to which we can regulate our life.
+If this belief is an illusion, then we are in the
+same position as you, but science has shown us by
+numerous and significant successes that it is no
+illusion. Science has many open, and still more
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_96'>96</span>secret, enemies among those who cannot forgive
+it for having weakened religious belief and for
+threatening to overthrow it. People reproach it
+for the small amount it has taught us and the
+incomparably greater amount it has left in the
+dark. But then they forget how young it is,
+how difficult its beginnings, and how infinitesimally
+small the space of time since the human
+intellect has been strong enough for the tasks it
+sets it. Do we not all do wrong in that the
+periods of time which we make the basis of our
+judgements are of too short duration? We should
+take an example from the geologist. People complain
+of the unreliability of science, that she
+proclaims as a law to-day what the next generation
+will recognize to be an error and which it will
+replace by a new law of equally short currency.
+But that is unjust and in part untrue. The transformation
+of scientific ideas is a process of development
+and progress, not of revolution. A law that
+was at first held to be universally valid proves
+to be a special case of a more comprehensive law,
+or else its scope is limited by another law not
+discovered until later; a rough approximation
+to the truth is replaced by one more carefully
+adjusted, which in its turn awaits a further approach
+to perfection. In several spheres we have not
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_97'>97</span>yet surmounted a phase of investigation in which
+we test hypotheses that have soon to be rejected
+as inadequate; but in others we have already an
+assured and almost immutable core of knowledge.
+Finally an attempt has been made to discredit
+radically scientific endeavour on the ground that,
+bound as it is to the conditions of our own organization,
+it can yield nothing but subjective results,
+while the real nature of things outside us remains
+inaccessible to it. But this is to disregard several
+factors of decisive importance for the understanding
+of scientific work. Firstly, our organization, <em>i.e.</em>
+our mental apparatus, has been developed actually
+in the attempt to explore the outer world, and
+therefore it must have realized in its structure a
+certain measure of appropriateness; secondly,
+it itself is a constituent part of that world
+which we are to investigate, and readily admits
+of such investigation; thirdly, the task of science
+is fully circumscribed if we confine it to showing
+how the world must appear to us in consequence
+of the particular character of our organization;
+fourthly, the ultimate findings of science, just
+because of the way in which they are attained,
+are conditioned not only by our organization
+but also by that which has affected this organization;
+and, finally, the problem of the nature
+<span class='pageno' id='Page_98'>98</span>of the world irrespective of our perceptive
+mental apparatus is an empty abstraction without
+practical interest.</p>
+
+<p class='c008'>No, science is no illusion. But it would be an
+illusion to suppose that we could get anywhere
+else what it cannot give us.</p>
+
+<div class='pbb'>
+ <hr class='pb c003'>
+</div>
+<div class='tnotes x-ebookmaker'>
+
+<div class='chapter ph2'>
+
+<div class='nf-center-c0'>
+<div class='nf-center c001'>
+ <div>TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES</div>
+ </div>
+</div>
+
+</div>
+
+ <ul class='ul_1 c002'>
+ <li>Typos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained.
+
+ </li>
+ <li>Used numbers for footnotes.
+ </li>
+ </ul>
+
+</div>
+
+<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 76774 ***</div>
+ </body>
+ <!-- created with ppgen.py 3.57e (with regex) on 2025-07-30 16:59:59 GMT -->
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+
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+
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+
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+Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for eBook #76774
+(https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/76774)