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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by
+Ramanuja, by Trans. George Thibaut
+
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+Title: The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja
+       Sacred Books of the East, Volume 48
+
+Author: Trans. George Thibaut
+
+Release Date: January, 2005 [EBook #7297]
+[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule]
+[This file was first posted on April 9, 2003]
+
+Edition: 10
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-Latin-1
+
+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE VEDANTA-SUTRAS ***
+
+
+
+
+
+THE
+
+VEDĀNTĀ-SŪTRAS
+
+WITH THE COMMENTARY BY
+
+RĀMĀNUJA
+
+TRANSLATED BY
+
+GEORGE THIBAUT
+
+PART III
+
+Sacred Books of the East, Volume 48
+
+[1904]
+
+
+
+[Scanned in by Srinivasan Sriram (as part of the sripedia.org initiative).
+OCRed and proofed at Distributed Proofing by other volunteers; Juliet
+Sutherland, project manager. Formatting and additional proofreading at
+Sacred-texts.com by J.B. Hare. This text is in the public domain worldwide.
+This file may be used for any non-commercial purpose provided this notice
+is left intact.]
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+VEDĀNTA-SŪTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY OF RĀMĀNUJA.
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+
+ADHYĀYA I
+
+Pāda I
+
+Pāda II
+
+Pāda III
+
+Pāda IV
+
+
+ADHYĀYA II
+
+Pāda I
+
+Pāda II
+
+Pāda III
+
+Pāda IV
+
+
+ADHYĀYA III
+
+Pāda I
+
+Pāda II
+
+Pāda III
+
+Pāda IV
+
+
+ADHYĀYA IV
+
+Pāda I
+
+Pāda II
+
+Pāda III
+
+Pāda IV
+
+
+INDEXES BY DR. M. WINTERNITZ:--
+
+Index of Quotations
+
+Index of Sanskrit Words
+
+Index of Names and Subjects
+
+Corrigenda
+
+Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations of the
+Sacred Books of the East
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+In the Introduction to the first volume of the translation of the
+'Vedānta-Sūtras with Sankara's Commentary' (vol. xxxiv of this Series) I
+have dwelt at some length on the interest which Rāmānuja's Commentary
+may claim--as being, on the one hand, the fullest exposition of what may
+be called the Theistic Vedānta, and as supplying us, on the other, with
+means of penetrating to the true meaning of Bādarāyana's Aphorisms. I do
+not wish to enter here into a fuller discussion of Rāmānuja's work in
+either of these aspects; an adequate treatment of them would, moreover,
+require considerably more space than is at my disposal. Some very useful
+material for the right understanding of Rāmānuju's work is to be found
+in the 'Analytical Outline of Contents' which Messrs. M. Rangākārya and
+M. B. Varadarāja Aiyangār have prefixed to the first volume of their
+scholarly translation of the Srībhāshya (Madras, 1899).
+
+The question as to what the Stūras really teach is a critical, not a
+philosophical one. This distinction seems to have been imperfectly
+realised by several of those critics, writing in India, who have
+examined the views expressed in my Introduction to the translation of
+Sankara's Commentary. A writer should not be taxed with 'philosophic
+incompetency,' 'hopeless theistic bias due to early training,' and the
+like, simply because he, on the basis of a purely critical investigation,
+considers himself entitled to maintain that a certain ancient document
+sets forth one philosophical view rather than another. I have nowhere
+expressed an opinion as to the comparative philosophical value of the
+systems of Sankara and Rāmānuja; not because I have no definite opinions
+on this point, but because to introduce them into a critical enquiry
+would be purposeless if not objectionable.
+
+The question as to the true meaning of the Sūtras is no doubt of some
+interest; although the interest of problems of this kind may easily be
+over-estimated. Among the remarks of critics on my treatment of this
+problem I have found little of solid value. The main arguments which I
+have set forth, not so much in favour of the adequacy of Rāmānuja's
+interpretation, as against the validity of Sankarākārya's understanding
+of the Sūtras, appear to me not to have been touched. I do not by any
+means consider the problem a hopeless one; but its solution will not be
+advanced, in any direction, but by those who will be at the trouble of
+submitting the entire body of the Sūtras to a new and detailed
+investigation, availing themselves to the full of the help that is to be
+derived from the study of all the existing Commentaries.
+
+The present translation of the Srībhāshya claims to be faithful on the
+whole, although I must acknowledge that I have aimed rather at making it
+intelligible and, in a certain sense, readable than scrupulously
+accurate. If I had to rewrite it, I should feel inclined to go even
+further in the same direction. Indian Philosophy would, in my opinion,
+be more readily and widely appreciated than it is at present, if the
+translators of philosophical works had been somewhat more concerned to
+throw their versions into a form less strange and repellent to the
+western reader than literal renderings from technical Sanskrit must
+needs be in many passages. I am not unaware of the peculiar dangers of
+the plan now advocated--among which the most obvious is the temptation
+it offers to the translator of deviating from the text more widely than
+regard for clearness would absolutely require. And I am conscious of
+having failed in this respect in more than one instance. In other cases
+I have no doubt gone astray through an imperfect understanding of the
+author's meaning. The fact is, that as yet the time has hardly come for
+fully adequate translations of comprehensive works of the type of the
+Srībhāshya, the authors of which wrote with reference--in many cases
+tacit--to an immense and highly technical philosophical literature which
+is only just beginning to be studied, and comprehended in part, by
+European scholars.
+
+It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the help which I have received
+from various quarters in preparing this translation. Pandit Gangādhara
+Sāstrin, C. I. E., of the Benares Sanskrit College, has, with unwearying
+kindness and patience, supplied me throughout with comments of his own
+on difficult sections of the text. Pandit Svāmin Rāma Misra Sāstrin has
+rendered me frequent assistance in the earlier portion of my task. And
+to Mr. A. Venis, the learned Principal of the Benares Sanskrit College,
+I am indebted for most instructive notes on some passages of a
+peculiarly technical and abstruse character. Nor can I conclude without
+expressing my sense of obligation to Colonel G. A. Jacob, whose
+invaluable 'Concordance to the Principal Upanishads' lightens to an
+incalculable degree the task of any scholar who is engaged in work
+bearing on the Vedānta.
+
+
+
+
+VEDĀNTA-SŪTRAS
+
+WITH
+
+RĀMĀNUJA'S SRĪBHĀSHYA
+
+FIRST ADHYĀYA.
+
+FIRST PĀDA.
+
+MAY my mind be filled with devotion towards the highest Brahman, the
+abode of Lakshmi who is luminously revealed in the Upanishads; who in
+sport produces, sustains, and reabsorbs the entire Universe; whose only
+aim is to foster the manifold classes of beings that humbly worship him.
+
+The nectar of the teaching of Parāsara's son (Vyāsa),--which was brought
+up from the middle of the milk-ocean of the Upanishads--which restores
+to life the souls whose vital strength had departed owing to the heat of
+the fire of transmigratory existence--which was well guarded by the
+teachers of old--which was obscured by the mutual conflict of manifold
+opinions,--may intelligent men daily enjoy that as it is now presented
+to them in my words.
+
+The lengthy explanation (vritti) of the Brahma-sūtras which was composed
+by the Reverend Bodhāyana has been abridged by former teachers;
+according to their views the words of the Sūtras will be explained in
+this present work.
+
+
+
+
+1. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.
+
+In this Sūtra the word 'then' expresses immediate sequence; the word
+'therefore' intimates that what has taken place (viz. the study of the
+karmakānda of the Veda) constitutes the reason (of the enquiry into
+Brahman). For the fact is that the enquiry into (lit.'the desire to
+know') Brahman--the fruit of which enquiry is infinite in nature and
+permanent--follows immediately in the case of him who, having read the
+Veda together with its auxiliary disciplines, has reached the knowledge
+that the fruit of mere works is limited and non-permanent, and hence has
+conceived the desire of final release.
+
+The compound 'brahmajijńāsā' is to be explained as 'the enquiry of
+Brahman,' the genitive case 'of Brahman' being understood to denote the
+object; in agreement with the special rule as to the meaning of the
+genitive case, Pānini II, 3, 65. It might be said that even if we
+accepted the general meaning of the genitive case--which is that of
+connexion in general--Brahman's position (in the above compound) as an
+object would be established by the circumstance that the 'enquiry'
+demands an object; but in agreement with the principle that the direct
+denotation of a word is to be preferred to a meaning inferred we take
+the genitive case 'of Brahman' as denoting the object.
+
+The word 'Brahman' denotes the hightest Person (purushottama), who is
+essentially free from all imperfections and possesses numberless classes
+of auspicious qualities of unsurpassable excellence. The term 'Brahman'
+is applied to any things which possess the quality of greatness
+(brihattva, from the root 'brih'); but primarily denotes that which
+possesses greatness, of essential nature as well as of qualities, in
+unlimited fulness; and such is only the Lord of all. Hence the word
+'Brahman' primarily denotes him alone, and in a secondary derivative
+sense only those things which possess some small part of the Lord's
+qualities; for it would be improper to assume several meanings for the
+word (so that it would denote primarily or directly more than one thing).
+The case is analogous to that of the term 'bhagavat [FOOTNOTE 4:1].' The
+Lord only is enquired into, for the sake of immortality, by all those
+who are afflicted with the triad of pain. Hence the Lord of all is that
+Brahman which, according to the Sūtra, constitutes the object of enquiry.
+The word 'jijńāsā' is a desiderative formation meaning 'desire to know.'
+And as in the case of any desire the desired object is the chief thing,
+the Sūtra means to enjoin knowledge--which is the object of the desire
+of knowledge. The purport of the entire Sūtra then is as follows: 'Since
+the fruit of works known through the earlier part of the Mīmāmsā is
+limited and non-permanent, and since the fruit of the knowledge of
+Brahman--which knowledge is to be reached through the latter part of the
+Mīmāmsā--is unlimited and permanent; for this reason Brahman is to be
+known, after the knowledge of works has previously taken place.'--The
+same meaning is expressed by the Vrittikāra when saying 'after the
+comprehension of works has taken place there follows the enquiry into
+Brahman.' And that the enquiry into works and that into Brahman
+constitute one body of doctrine, he (the Vrittikāra) will declare later
+on 'this Sārīraka-doctrine is connected with Jaimini's doctrine as
+contained in sixteen adhyāyas; this proves the two to constitute one
+body of doctrine.' Hence the earlier and the later Mīmāmsā are separate
+only in so far as there is a difference of matter to be taught by each;
+in the same way as the two halves of the Pūrva Mīmāmsā-sūtras,
+consisting of six adhyāyas each, are separate [FOOTNOTE 5:1]; and as each
+adhyāya is separate. The entire Mīmāmsā-sātra--which begins with the
+Sūtra 'Now therefore the enquiry into religious duty' and concludes with
+the Sūtra '(From there is) no return on account of scriptural statement'--
+has, owing to the special character of the contents, a definite order of
+internal succession. This is as follows. At first the precept 'one is to
+learn one's own text (svādhyāya)' enjoins the apprehension of that
+aggregate of syllables which is called 'Veda,' and is here referred to
+as 'svādhyāya.' Next there arises the desire to know of what nature the
+'Learning' enjoined is to be, and how it is to be done. Here there come
+in certain injunctions such as 'Let a Brahnmana be initiated in his
+eighth year' and 'The teacher is to make him recite the Veda'; and
+certain rules about special observances and restrictions--such as
+'having performed the upākarman on the full moon of Sravana or
+Praushthapada according to prescription, he is to study the sacred
+verses for four months and a half--which enjoin all the required details.
+
+From all these it is understood that the study enjoined has for its
+result the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables called Veda, on
+the part of a pupil who has been initiated by a teacher sprung from a
+good family, leading a virtuous life, and possessing purity of soul; who
+practises certain special observances and restrictions; and who learns
+by repeating what is recited by the teacher.
+
+And this study of the Veda is of the nature of a samskāra of the text,
+since the form of the injunction 'the Veda is to be studied' shows that
+the Veda is the object (of the action of studying). By a samskāra is
+understood an action whereby something is fitted to produce some other
+effect; and that the Veda should be the object of such a samskaāra is
+quite appropriate, since it gives rise to the knowledge of the four
+chief ends of human action--viz. religious duty, wealth, pleasure, and
+final release--and of the means to effect them; and since it helps to
+effect those ends by itself also, viz. by mere mechanical repetition
+(apart from any knowledge to which it may give rise).
+
+The injunction as to the study of the Veda thus aims only at the
+apprehension of the aggregate of syllables (constituting the Veda)
+according to certain rules; it is in this way analogous to the recital
+of mantras.
+
+It is further observed that the Veda thus apprehended through reading
+spontaneously gives rise to the ideas of certain things subserving
+certain purposes. A person, therefore, who has formed notions of those
+things immediately, i.e. on the mere apprehension of the text of the
+Veda through reading, thereupon naturally applies himself to the study
+of the Mimāmsa, which consists in a methodical discussion of the
+sentences constituting the text of the Veda, and has for its result the
+accurate determination of the nature of those things and their different
+modes. Through this study the student ascertains the character of the
+injunctions of work which form part of the Veda, and observes that all
+work leads only to non-permanent results; and as, on the other hand, he
+immediately becomes aware that the Upanishad sections--which form part
+of the Veda which he has apprehended through reading--refer to an
+infinite and permanent result, viz. immortality, he applies himself to
+the study of the Sārīraka-Mīmāmsā, which consists in a systematic
+discussion of the Vedānta-texts, and has for its result the accurate
+determination of their sense. That the fruit of mere works is transitory,
+while the result of the knowledge of Brahman is something permanent, the
+Vedanta-texts declare in many places--'And as here the world acquired by
+work perishes, so there the world acquired by merit perishes' (Ch. Up.
+VIII, 1,6); 'That work of his has an end' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 10); 'By
+non-permanent works the Permanent is not obtained' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 10);
+'Frail indeed are those boats, the sacrifices' (Mu. Up. I, 2, 7); 'Let a
+Brāhmana, after he has examined all these worlds that are gained by
+works, acquire freedom from all desires. What is not made cannot be
+gained by what is made. To understand this, let the pupil, with fuel in
+his hand, go to a teacher who is learned and dwells entirely in Brahman.
+To that pupil who has approached him respectfully, whose mind is
+altogether calm, the wise teacher truly told that knowledge of Brahman
+through which he knows the imperishable true Person' (Mu. Up. I, 2, 12,
+13). 'Told' here means 'he is to tell.'--On the other hand, 'He who
+knows Brahman attains the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He who sees
+this does not see death' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2); 'He becomes a self-ruler'
+(Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'Knowing him he becomes immortal here' (Taitt. Ār.
+III, 12, 7); 'Having known him he passes over death; there is no other
+path to go' (Svet. Up. VI, 15); 'Having known as separate his Self and
+the Mover, pleased thereby he goes to immortality' (Svet. Up. I, 6).
+
+But--an objection here is raised--the mere learning of the Veda with its
+auxiliary disciplines gives rise to the knowledge that the heavenly
+world and the like are the results of works, and that all such results
+are transitory, while immortality is the fruit of meditation on Brahman.
+Possessing such knowledge, a person desirous of final release may at
+once proceed to the enquiry into Brahman; and what need is there of a
+systematic consideration of religious duty (i.e. of the study of the
+Purva Mimāmsā)?--If this reasoning were valid, we reply, the person
+desirous of release need not even apply himself to the study of the
+Sārīraka Mīmāmsā, since Brahman is known from the mere reading of the
+Veda with its auxiliary disciplines.--True. Such knowledge arises indeed
+immediately (without deeper enquiry). But a matter apprehended in this
+immediate way is not raised above doubt and mistake. Hence a systematic
+discussion of the Vedānta-texts must he undertaken in order that their
+sense may be fully ascertained--We agree. But you will have to admit
+that for the very same reason we must undertake a systematic enquiry
+into religious duty!
+
+[FOOTNOTE 4:1. 'Bhagavat' denotes primarily the Lord, the divinity;
+secondarily any holy person.]
+
+[FOOTNOTE 5:1. The first six books of the Pūrva Mīmāmsā-sūtras give
+rules for the fundamental forms of the sacrifice; while the last six
+books teach how these rules are to be applied to the so-called modified
+forms.]
+
+
+
+
+THE SMALL PŪRVAPAKSHA.
+
+But--a further objection is urged--as that which has to precede the
+systematic enquiry into Brahman we should assign something which that
+enquiry necessarily presupposes. The enquiry into the nature of duty,
+however, does not form such a prerequisite, since a consideration of the
+Vedanta-texts may be undertaken by any one who has read those texts,
+even if he is not acquainted with works.--But in the Vedanta-texts there
+are enjoined meditations on the Udgītha and the like which are matters
+auxiliary to works; and such meditations are not possible for him who is
+not acquainted with those works!--You who raise this objection clearly
+are ignorant of what kind of knowledge the Sārīraka Mīmāmsā is concerned
+with! What that sāstra aims at is to destroy completely that wrong
+knowledge which is the root of all pain, for man, liable to birth, old
+age, and death, and all the numberless other evils connected with
+transmigratory existence--evils that spring from the view, due to
+beginningless Nescience, that there is plurality of existence; and to
+that end the sāstra endeavours to establish the knowledge of the unity
+of the Self. Now to this knowledge, the knowledge of works--which is
+based on the assumption of plurality of existence--is not only useless
+but even opposed. The consideration of the Udgītha and the like, which
+is supplementary to works only, finds a place in the Vedānta-texts, only
+because like them it is of the nature of knowledge; but it has no direct
+connexion with the true topic of those texts. Hence some prerequisite
+must be indicated which has reference to the principal topic of the
+sāstra.--Quite so; and this prerequisite is just the knowledge of works;
+for scripture declares that final release results from knowledge with
+works added. The Sūtra-writer himself says further on 'And there is need
+of all works, on account of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and
+the like' (Ve. Sū. III, 4, 26). And if the required works were not known,
+one could not determine which works have to be combined with knowledge
+and which not. Hence the knowledge of works is just the necessary
+prerequisite.--Not so, we reply. That which puts an end to Nescience is
+exclusively the knowledge of Brahman, which is pure intelligence and
+antagonistic to all plurality. For final release consists just in the
+cessation of Nescience; how then can works--to which there attach
+endless differences connected with caste, āsrama, object to be
+accomplished, means and mode of accomplishment, &c.--ever supply a means
+for the cessation of ignorance, which is essentially the cessation of
+the view that difference exists? That works, the results of which are
+transitory, are contrary to final release, and that such release can be
+effected through knowledge only, scripture declares in many places;
+compare all the passages quoted above (p. 7).
+
+As to the assertion that knowledge requires sacrifices and other works,
+we remark that--as follows from the essential contrariety of knowledge
+and works, and as further appears from an accurate consideration of the
+words of scripture--pious works can contribute only towards the rise of
+the desire of knowledge, in so far namely as they clear the internal
+organ (of knowledge), but can have no influence on the production of the
+fruit, i.e. knowledge itself. For the scriptural passage concerned runs
+as follows Brāhmanas desire to know him by the study of the Veda, by
+sacrifice, by gifts,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22).
+
+According to this passage, the desire only of knowledge springs up
+through works; while another text teaches that calmness, self-restraint,
+and so on, are the direct means for the origination of knowledge itself.
+(Having become tranquil, calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and
+collected, he is to see the Self within the Self (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23).)
+
+The process thus is as follows. After the mind of a man has been cleaned
+of all impurities through works performed in many preceding states of
+existence, without a view to special forms of reward, there arises in
+him the desire of knowledge, and thereupon--through knowledge itself
+originated by certain scriptural texts--'Being only, this was in the
+beginning, one only without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, I, 2); 'Truth,
+Knowledge, the Infinite, is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'Without parts,
+without actions, calm, without fault, without taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19);
+'This Self is Brahman' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19); 'Thou art that' (Ch. Up. VI,
+9, 7), Nescience comes to an end. Now, 'Hearing,' 'reflection,' and
+'meditation,' are helpful towards cognising the sense of these Vedic
+texts. 'Hearing' (sravana) means the apprehension of the sense of
+scripture, together with collateral arguments, from a teacher who
+possesses the true insight, viz. that the Vedānta-texts establish the
+doctrine of the unity of the Self. 'Reflection' (mananam) means the
+confirmation within oneself of the sense taught by the teacher, by means
+of arguments showing it alone to be suitable. 'Meditation'
+(nididhyāsanam) finally means the constant holding of thai sense before
+one's mind, so as to dispel thereby the antagonistic beginningless
+imagination of plurality. In the case of him who through 'hearing,'
+'reflection,' and meditation,' has dis-dispelled the entire imagination
+of plurality, the knowledge of the sense of Vedānta-texts puts an end to
+Nescience; and what we therefore require is a statement of the
+indispensable prerequisites of such 'hearing,' 'reflection,' and so on.
+Now of such prerequisites there are four, viz. discrimination of what is
+permanent and what is non-permanent; the full possession of calmness of
+mind, self-restraint and similar means; the renunciation of all
+enjoyment of fruits here below as well as in the next world; and the
+desire of final release.
+
+Without these the desire of knowledge cannot arise; and they are
+therefore known, from the very nature of the matter, to be necessary
+prerequisites. To sum up: The root of bondage is the unreal view of
+plurality which itself has its root in Nescience that conceals the true
+being of Brahman. Bondage itself thus is unreal, and is on that account
+cut short, together with its root, by mere knowledge. Such knowledge is
+originated by texts such as 'That art thou'; and work is of no help
+either towards its nature, or its origination, or its fruit (i.e.
+release). It is on the other hand helpful towards the desire of
+knowledge, which arises owing to an increase of the element of goodness
+(sattva) in the soul, due to the destruction of the elements of passion
+(rajas) and darkness (tamas) which are the root of all moral evil. This
+use is referred to in the text quoted above, 'Brāhmanas wish to know him,'
+&c. As, therefore, the knowledge of works is of no use towards the
+knowledge of Brahman, we must acknowledge as the prerequisite of the
+latter knowledge the four means mentioned above.
+
+
+
+
+THE SMALL SIDDHĀNTA.
+
+To this argumentation we make the following reply. We admit that release
+consists only in the cessation of Nescience, and that this cessation
+results entirely from the knowledge of Brahman. But a distinction has
+here to be made regarding the nature of this knowledge which the
+Vedānta-texts aim at enjoining for the purpose of putting an end to
+Nescience. Is it merely the knowledge of the sense of sentences which
+originates from the sentences? or is it knowledge in the form of
+meditation (upāsana) which has the knowledge just referred to as its
+antecedent? It cannot be knowledge of the former kind: for such
+knowledge springs from the mere apprehension of the sentence, apart from
+any special injunction, and moreover we do not observe that the
+cessation of Nescience is effected by such knowledge merely. Our
+adversary will perhaps attempt to explain things in the following way.
+The Vedānta-texts do not, he will say, produce that knowledge which
+makes an end of Nescience, so long as the imagination of plurality is
+not dispelled. And the fact that such knowledge, even when produced,
+does not at once and for every one put a stop to the view of plurality
+by no means subverts my opinion; for, to mention an analogous instance,
+the double appearance of the moon--presenting itself to a person
+affected with a certain weakness of vision--does not come to an end as
+soon as the oneness of the moon has been apprehended by reason.
+Moreover, even without having come to an end, the view of plurality is
+powerless to effect further bondage, as soon as the root, i.e.
+Nescience, has once been cut But this defence we are unable to admit. It
+is impossible that knowledge should not arise when its means, i.e. the
+texts conveying knowledge, are once present. And we observe that even
+when there exists an antagonistic imagination (interfering with the rise
+of knowledge), information given by competent persons, the presence of
+characteristic marks (on which a correct inference may be based), and
+the like give rise to knowledge which sublates the erroneous
+imagination. Nor can we admit that even after the sense of texts has
+been apprehended, the view of plurality may continue owing to some small
+remainder of beginningless imagination. For as this imagination which
+constitutes the means for the view of plurality is itself false, it is
+necessarily put an end to by the rise of true knowledge. If this did not
+take place, that imagination would never come to an end, since there is
+no other means but knowledge to effect its cessation. To say that the
+view of plurality, which is the effect of that imagination, continues
+even after its root has been cut, is mere nonsense. The instance of some
+one seeing the moon double is not analogous. For in his case the
+non-cessation of wrong knowledge explains itself from the circumstance
+that the cause of wrong knowledge, viz. the real defect of the eye which
+does not admit of being sublated by knowledge, is not removed, although
+that which would sublate wrong knowledge is near. On the other hand,
+effects, such as fear and the like, may come to an end because they can
+be sublated by means of knowledge of superior force. Moreover, if it
+were true that knowledge arises through the dispelling of the
+imagination of plurality, the rise of knowledge would really never be
+brought about. For the imagination of plurality has through gradual
+growth in the course of beginningless time acquired an infinite
+strength, and does not therefore admit of being dispelled by the
+comparatively weak conception of non-duality. Hence we conclude that the
+knowledge which the Vedānta-texts aim at inculcating is a knowledge
+other than the mere knowledge of the sense of sentences, and denoted by
+'dhyāna,' 'upāsanā' (i. e. meditation), and similar terms.
+
+With this agree scriptural texts such as 'Having known it, let him
+practise meditation' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 21); 'He who, having searched out
+the Self, knows it' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Meditate on the Self as Om'
+(Mu. Up. II, 2, 6); 'Having known that, he is freed from the jaws of
+death' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 15); 'Let a man meditate on the Self only as his
+world' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 15); 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to her
+reflected on, to be meditated on' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6); 'That we must
+search out, that we must try to understand' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1).
+
+(According to the principle of the oneness of purport of the different
+sākhās) all these texts must be viewed as agreeing in meaning with the
+injunction of meditation contained in the passage quoted from the Bri.
+Up.; and what they enjoin is therefore meditation. In the first and
+second passages quoted, the words 'having known' and 'having searched
+out' (vijńāya; anuvidya) contain a mere reference to (not injunction of)
+the apprehension of the meaning of texts, such apprehension subserving
+meditation; while the injunction of meditation (which is the true
+purport of the passages) is conveyed by the clauses 'let him practise
+meditation' (prajńām kurvīta) and 'he knows it.' In the same way the
+clause 'the Self is to be heard' is a mere anuvāda, i.e. a mere
+reference to what is already established by other means; for a person
+who has read the Veda observes that it contains instruction about
+matters connected with certain definite purposes, and then on his own
+account applies himself to methodical 'hearing,' in order definitely to
+ascertain these matters; 'hearing' thus is established already. In the
+same way the clause 'the Self is to be reflected upon' is a mere anuvāda
+of reflection which is known as a means of confirming what one has
+'heard.' It is therefore meditation only which all those texts enjoin.
+In agreement with this a later Sūtra also says, 'Repetition more than
+once, on account of instruction' (Ve. Sū. IV, I, I). That the knowledge
+intended to be enjoined as the means of final release is of the nature
+of meditation, we conclude from the circumstance that the terms
+'knowing' and'meditating' are seen to be used in place of each other in
+the earlier and later parts of Vedic texts. Compare the following
+passages: 'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman,' and 'he who knows
+this shines and warms through his celebrity, fame, and glory of
+countenance' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1; 6). And 'He does not know him, for he
+is not complete,' and 'Let men meditate on him as the Self (Bri. Up. I,
+4, 7). And 'He who knows what he knows,' and 'Teach me the deity on
+which you meditate' (Ch. Up. IV, 1, 6; 2, 2).
+
+'Meditation' means steady remembrance, i.e. a continuity of steady
+remembrance, uninterrupted like the flow of oil; in agreement with the
+scriptural passage which declares steady remembrance to be the means of
+release, 'on the attainment of remembrance all the ties are loosened'
+(Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2). Such remembrance is of the same character (form)
+as seeing (intuition); for the passage quoted has the same purport as
+the following one, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are
+solved, and all the works of that man perish when he has been seen who
+is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). And this being so, we conclude that
+the passage 'the Self is to be seen' teaches that 'Meditation' has the
+character of 'seeing' or 'intuition.' And that remembrance has the
+character of 'seeing' is due to the element of imagination
+(representation) which prevails in it. All this has been set forth at
+length by the Vākyakāra. 'Knowledge (vedana) means meditation (upāsana),
+scripture using the word in that sense'; i.e. in all Upanishads that
+knowledge which is enjoined as the means of final release is Meditation.
+The Vākyakāra then propounds a pūrvapaksha (primā facie view), 'Once he
+is to make the meditation, the matter enjoined by scripture being
+accomplished thereby, as in the case of the prayājas and the like'; and
+then sums up against this in the words 'but (meditation) is established
+on account of the term meditation'; that means--knowledge repeated more
+than once (i.e. meditation) is determined to be the means of Release.--
+The Vākyakāra then goes on 'Meditation is steady remembrance, on the
+ground of observation and statement.' That means--this knowledge, of the
+form of meditation, and repeated more than once, is of the nature of
+steady remembrance.
+
+Such remembrance has been declared to be of the character of 'seeing,'
+and this character of seeing consists in its possessing the character of
+immediate presentation (pratyakshatā). With reference to remembrance,
+which thus acquires the character of immediate presentation and is the
+means of final release, scripture makes a further determination, viz. in
+the passage Ka. Up. I, 2, 23, 'That Self cannot be gained by the study
+of the Veda ("reflection"), nor by thought ("meditation"), nor by much
+hearing. Whom the Self chooses, by him it may be gained; to him the Self
+reveals its being.' This text says at first that mere hearing,
+reflection, and meditation do not suffice to gain the Self, and then
+declares, 'Whom the Self chooses, by him it may be gained.' Now a
+'chosen' one means a most beloved person; the relation being that he by
+whom that Self is held most dear is most dear to the Self. That the Lord
+(bhagavān) himself endeavours that this most beloved person should gain
+the Self, he himself declares in the following words, 'To those who are
+constantly devoted and worship with love I give that knowledge by which
+they reach me' (Bha. Gī. X, 10), and 'To him who has knowledge I am dear
+above all things, and he is dear to me' (VII, 17). Hence, he who
+possesses remembrance, marked by the character of immediate presentation
+(sākshātkāra), and which itself is dear above all things since the
+object remembered is such; he, we say, is chosen by the highest Self,
+and by him the highest Self is gained. Steady remembrance of this kind
+is designated by the word 'devotion' (bhakti); for this term has the
+same meaning as upāsanā (meditation). For this reason scripture and
+smriti agree in making the following declarations, 'A man knowing him
+passes over death' (Svet. Up. III, 8); 'Knowing him thus he here becomes
+immortal' (Taitt. Ār. III, 12,7); 'Neither by the Vedas, nor by
+austerities, nor by gifts, nor by sacrifice can I be so seen as thou
+hast seen me. But by devotion exclusive I may in this form be known and
+seen in truth, O Arjuna, and also be entered into' (Bha. Gī. XI, 53, 54);
+'That highest Person, O Pārtha, may be obtained by exclusive devotion'
+(VIII, 22).
+
+That of such steady remembrance sacrifices and so on are means will be
+declared later on (Ve. Sū. III, 4, 26). Although sacrifices and the like
+are enjoined with a view to the origination of knowledge (in accordance
+with the passage 'They desire to know,' Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22), it is only
+knowledge in the form of meditation which--being daily practised,
+constantly improved by repetition, and continued up to death--is the
+means of reaching Brahman, and hence all the works connected with the
+different conditions of life are to be performed throughout life only
+for the purpose of originating such knowledge. This the Sūtrakāra
+declares in Ve. Sū. IV, 1, 12; 16; III, 4, 33, and other places. The
+Vākyakāra also declares that steady remembrance results only from
+abstention, and so on; his words being 'This (viz. steady remembrance =
+meditation) is obtained through abstention (viveka), freeness of mind
+(vimoka), repetition (abhyāsa), works (kriyā), virtuous conduct
+(kalyāna), freedom from dejection (anavasāda), absence of exultation
+(anuddharsha); according to feasibility and scriptural statement.' The
+Vākyakāra also gives definitions of all these terms. Abstention (viveka)
+means keeping the body clean from all food, impure either owing to
+species (such as the flesh of certain animals), or abode (such as food
+belonging to a Kāndāla or the like), or accidental cause (such as food
+into which a hair or the like has fallen). The scriptural passage
+authorising this point is Ch. Up. VII, 26, 'The food being pure, the
+mind becomes pure; the mind being pure, there results steady remembrance.'
+Freeness of mind (vimoka) means absence of attachment to desires. The
+authoritative passage here is 'Let him meditate with a calm mind' (Ch.
+Up. III, 14, 1). Repetition means continued practice. For this point the
+Bhāshya-kāra quotes an authoritative text from Smriti, viz.: 'Having
+constantly been absorbed in the thought of that being' (sadā
+tadbhāvabhāvitah; Bha. Gī. VIII, 6).--By 'works' (kriyā) is understood
+the performance, according to one's ability, of the five great
+sacrifices. The authoritative passages here are 'This person who
+performs works is the best of those who know Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 1,
+4); and 'Him Brāhmanas seek to know by recitation of the Veda, by
+sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22).--By
+virtuous conduct (kalyānāni) are meant truthfulness, honesty, kindness,
+liberality, gentleness, absence of covetousness. Confirmatory texts are
+'By truth he is to be obtained' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 5) and 'to them belongs
+that pure Brahman-world' (Pr. Up. I, 16).--That lowness of spirit or
+want of cheerfulness which results from unfavourable conditions of place
+or time and the remembrance of causes of sorrow, is denoted by the term
+'dejection'; the contrary of this is 'freedom from dejection.' The
+relevant scriptural passage is 'This Self cannot be obtained by one
+lacking in strength' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 4).--'Exultation' is that
+satisfaction of mind which springs from circumstances opposite to those
+just mentioned; the contrary is 'absence of exultation.' Overgreat
+satisfaction also stands in the way (of meditation). The scriptural
+passage for this is 'Calm, subdued,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23).--What the
+Vākyakāra means to say is therefore that knowledge is realised only
+through the performance of the duly prescribed works, on the part of a
+person fulfilling all the enumerated conditions.
+
+Analogously another scriptural passage says 'He who knows both knowledge
+and non-knowledge together, overcoming death by non-knowledge reaches
+the Immortal through knowledge' (Īs. Up. II). Here the term
+'non-knowledge' denotes the works enjoined on the different castes and
+āsramas; and the meaning of the text is that, having discarded by such
+works death, i.e. the previous works antagonistic to the origination of
+knowledge, a man reaches the Immortal, i.e. Brahman, through knowledge.
+The non-knowledge of which this passage speaks as being the means of
+overcoming death can only mean that which is other than knowledge, viz.
+prescribed works. The word has the same sense in the following passage:
+'Firm in traditional knowledge he offered many sacrifices, leaning on
+the knowledge of Brahman, so as to pass beyond death by non-knowledge'
+(Vi. Pu. VI, 6, 12).--Antagonistic to knowledge (as said above) are all
+good and evil actions, and hence--as equally giving rise to an
+undesirable result--they may both be designated as evil. They stand in
+the way of the origination of knowledge in so far as they strengthen the
+elements of passion and darkness which are antagonistic to the element
+of goodness which is the cause of the rise of knowledge. That evil works
+stand in the way of such origination, the following scriptural text
+declares: 'He makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do
+an evil deed' (Ka. Up. III, 8). That passion and darkness veil the
+knowledge of truth while goodness on the other hand gives rise to it,
+the Divine one has declared himself, in the passage 'From goodness
+springs knowledge' (Bha. Gī. XIV, 17). Hence, in order that knowledge
+may arise, evil works have to be got rid of, and this is effected by the
+performance of acts of religious duty not aiming at some immediate
+result (such as the heavenly world and the like); according to the text
+'by works of religious duty he discards all evil.' Knowledge which is
+the means of reaching Brahman, thus requires the works prescribed for
+the different āsramas; and hence the systematic enquiry into works (i.
+e. the Pūrva Mīmāmsā)--from which we ascertain the nature of the works
+required and also the transitoriness and limitation of the fruits of
+mere works--forms a necessary antecedent to the systematic enquiry into
+Brahman. Moreover the discrimination of permanent and non-permanent
+things, &c. (i.e. the tetrad of 'means' mentioned above, p. 11) cannot
+be accomplished without the study of the Mīmāmsā; for unless we
+ascertain all the distinctions of fruits of works, means, modes of
+procedure and qualification (on the part of the agent) we can hardly
+understand the true nature of works, their fruits, the transitoriness or
+non-transitoriness of the latter, the permanence of the Self, and
+similar matters. That those conditions (viz. nityānityavastuviveka,
+sama, dama, &c.) are 'means' must be determined on the basis of viniyoga
+('application' which determines the relation of principal and
+subordinate matters--angin and anga); and this viniyoga which depends on
+direct scriptural statement (sruti), inferential signs (linga), and so
+on, is treated of in the third book of the Pūrva Mīmāmsā-sūtras. And
+further we must, in this connexion, consider also the meditations on the
+Udgītha and similar things--which, although aiming at the success of
+works, are of the nature of reflections on Brahman (which is viewed in
+them under various forms)--and as such have reference to knowledge of
+Brahman. Those works also (with which these meditations are connected)
+aim at no special results of their own, and produce and help to perfect
+the knowledge of Brahman: they are therefore particularly connected with
+the enquiry into Brahman. And that these meditations presuppose an
+understanding of the nature of works is admitted by every one.
+
+
+
+
+THE GREAT PŪRVAPAKSHA.
+
+THE ONLY REALITY IS BRAHMAN.
+
+Brahman, which is pure intelligence and opposed to all difference,
+constitutes the only reality; and everything else, i.e. the plurality of
+manifold knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, and acts of knowledge
+depending on those two, is only imagined on (or 'in') that Brahman, and
+is essentially false.
+
+'In the beginning, my dear, there was that only which is, one only
+without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'The higher knowledge is that by
+which the Indestructible is apprehended' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5); 'That which
+cannot be seen nor seized, which has no eyes nor ears, no hands nor feet,
+the permanent, the all-pervading, the most subtle, the imperishable
+which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6);
+'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'He
+who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without
+taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'By whom it is not thought, by him it is
+thought; he by whom it is thought knows it not. It is not known by those
+who know it, known by those who do not know it' (Ke. Up. II, 3); 'Thou
+mayest not see the seer of sight; thou mayest not think the thinker of
+thought' (Bri. Up. III, 4, 2); 'Bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1);
+'All this is that Self' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 7); 'There is here no diversity
+whatever' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'From death to death goes he who sees
+any difference here' (Ka. Up. II, 4, 10); 'For where there is duality as
+it were, there one sees the other'; 'but where the Self has become all
+of him, by what means, and whom, should he see? by what means, and whom,
+should he know?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'the effect is a name merely
+which has its origin in speech; the truth is that (the thing made of
+clay) is clay merely' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4); 'for if he makes but the
+smallest distinction in it there is fear for him' (Taitt. Up. II, 7);--
+the two following Vedānta-sūtras: III, 2, 11; III, 2, 3--the following
+passages from the Vishnu-purāna: 'In which all difference vanishes,
+which is pure Being, which is not the object of words, which is known by
+the Self only--that knowledge is called Brahman' (VI, 7, 53); 'Him whose
+essential nature is knowledge, who is stainless in reality'; 'Him who,
+owing to erroneous view, abides in the form of things' (I, 2, 6); 'the
+Reality thou art alone, there is no other, O Lord of the world!--
+whatever matter is seen belongs to thee whose being is knowledge; but
+owing to their erroneous opinion the non-devout look on it as the form
+of the world. This whole world has knowledge for its essential nature,
+but the Unwise viewing it as being of the nature of material things are
+driven round on the ocean of delusion. Those however who possess true
+knowledge and pure minds see this whole world as having knowledge for
+its Self, as thy form, O highest Lord!' (Vi. Pu. I, 4, 38 ff.).--'Of
+that Self, although it exists in one's own and in other bodies, the
+knowledge is of one kind, and that is Reality; those who maintain
+duality hold a false view' (II, 14, 31); 'If there is some other one,
+different from me, then it can be said, "I am this and that one is
+another"' (II, 13, 86); 'As owing to the difference of the holes of the
+flute the air equally passing through them all is called by the names of
+the different notes of the musical scale; so it is with the universal
+Self' (II, 14, 32); 'He is I; he is thou; he is all: this Universe is
+his form. Abandon the error of difference. The king being thus
+instructed, abandoned the view of difference, having gained an intuition
+of Reality' (II, 16, 24). 'When that view which gives rise to difference
+is absolutely destroyed, who then will make the untrue distinction
+between the individual Self and Brahman?' (VI, 7, 94).--The following
+passages from the Bhagavad-Gītā: 'I am the Self dwelling within all
+beings' (X, 20); 'Know me to be the soul within all bodies' (XIII, 2);
+'Being there is none, movable or immovable, which is without me' (X, 39).--
+All these and other texts, the purport of which clearly is instruction
+as to the essential nature of things, declare that Brahman only, i.e.
+non-differenced pure intelligence is real, while everything else is
+false.
+
+The appearance of plurality is due to avidyā.
+
+'Falsehood' (mithyātva) belongs to what admits of being terminated by
+the cognition of the real thing--such cognition being preceded by
+conscious activity (not by mere absence of consciousness or knowledge).
+The snake, e.g. which has for its substrate a rope or the like is false;
+for it is due to an imperfection (dosha) that the snake is imagined in
+(or 'on') the rope. In the same way this entire world, with its
+distinctions of gods, men, animals, inanimate matter, and so on, is,
+owing to an imperfection, wrongly imagined in the highest Brahman whose
+substance is mere intelligence, and therefore is false in so far as it
+may be sublated by the cognition of the nature of the real Brahman. What
+constitutes that imperfection is beginningless Nescience (avidyā), which,
+hiding the truth of things, gives rise to manifold illusions, and cannot
+be defined either as something that is or as something that is not.--'By
+the Untrue they are hidden; of them which are true the Untrue is the
+covering' (Ch, Up. VIII, 3, 1); 'Know Māya to be Prakriti, and the great
+Lord him who is associated with Māya' (Svet. Up. IV, 10); 'Indra appears
+manifold through the Māyās' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19); 'My Māya is hard to
+overcome' (Bha. Gī. VII, 14); 'When the soul slumbering in beginningless
+Māyā awakes' (Gau. Kā. I, 16).--These and similar texts teach that it is
+through beginningless Māyā that to Brahman which truly is pure
+non-differenced intelligence its own nature hides itself, and that it
+sees diversity within itself. As has been said, 'Because the Holy One is
+essentially of the nature of intelligence, the form of all, but not
+material; therefore know that all particular things like rocks, oceans,
+hills and so on, have proceeded from intelligence [FOOTNOTE 22:1] But
+when, on the cessation of all work, everything is only pure intelligence
+in its own proper form, without any imperfections; then no differences--
+the fruit of the tree of wishes--any longer exist between things.
+Therefore nothing whatever, at any place or any time, exists apart from
+intelligence: intelligence, which is one only, is viewed as manifold by
+those whose minds are distracted by the effects of their own works.
+Intelligence pure, free from stain, free from grief, free from all
+contact with desire and other affections, everlastingly one is the
+highest Lord--Vāsudeva apart from whom nothing exists. I have thus
+declared to you the lasting truth of things--that intelligence only is
+true and everything else untrue. And that also which is the cause of
+ordinary worldly existence has been declared to you' (Vi. Pu. II, 12,
+39, 40, 43-45).
+
+Avidyā is put an end to by true Knowledge.
+
+Other texts declare that this Nescience comes to an end through the
+cognition of the essential unity of the Self with Brahman which is
+nothing but non-differenced intelligence. 'He does not again go to death;'
+'He sees this as one;' 'He who sees this does not see death' (Ch. Up.
+VI, 27); 'When he finds freedom from fear and rest in that which is
+invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has obtained the
+fearless' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all
+doubts are solved and all his works perish when he has been beheld who
+is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); 'He knows Brahman, he becomes
+Brahman only' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9); 'Knowing him only a man passes over
+death; there is no other path to go' (Svet. Up. III, 8). In these and
+similar passages, the term 'death' denotes Nescience; analogously to the
+use of the term in the following words of Sanatsujāta, 'Delusion I call
+death; and freedom from delusion I call immortality' (Sanatsuj. II, 5).
+The knowledge again of the essential unity and non-difference of Brahman--
+which is ascertained from decisive texts such as 'The True, knowledge,
+the Infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'Knowledge, bliss is
+Brahman' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 28)--is confirmed by other passages, such as
+'Now if a man meditates on another deity, thinking the deity is one and
+he another, he does not know' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10); 'Let men meditate
+upon him as the Self (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7); 'Thou art that' (Ch. Up. VI, 8,
+7); 'Am I thou, O holy deity? and art thou me, O holy deity?'; 'What I
+am that is he; what he is that am I.'--This the Sūtrakāra himself will
+declare 'But as the Self (scriptural texts) acknowledge and make us
+apprehend (the Lord)' (Ve. Sū. IV, 1, 3). Thus the Vākyakāra also, 'It
+is the Self--thus one should apprehend (everything), for everything is
+effected by that.' And to hold that by such cognition of the oneness of
+Brahman essentially false bondage, together with its cause, comes to an
+end, is only reasonable.
+
+Scripture is of greater force than Perception
+
+But, an objection is raised--how can knowledge, springing from the
+sacred texts, bring about a cessation of the view of difference, in
+manifest opposition to the evidence of Perception?--How then, we rejoin,
+can the knowledge that this thing is a rope and not a snake bring about,
+in opposition to actual perception, the cessation of the (idea of the)
+snake?--You will perhaps reply that in this latter case there is a
+conflict between two forms of perception, while in the case under
+discussion the conflict is between direct perception and Scripture which
+is based on perception. But against this we would ask the question how,
+in the case of a conflict between two equal cognitions, we decide as to
+which of the two is refuted (sublated) by the other. If--as is to be
+expected--you reply that what makes the difference between the two is
+that one of them is due to a defective cause while the other is not: we
+point out that this distinction holds good also in the case of Scripture
+and perception being in conflict. It is not considerations as to the
+equality of conflicting cognitions, as to their being dependent or
+independent, and so on, that determine which of the two sublates the
+other; if that were the case, the perception which presents to us the
+flame of the lamp as one only would not be sublated by the cognition
+arrived at by inference that there is a succession of different flames.
+Wherever there is a conflict between cognitions based on two different
+means of knowledge we assign the position of the 'sublated one' to that
+which admits of being accounted for in some other way; while that
+cognition which affords no opening for being held unauthoritative and
+cannot be accounted for in another way, is the 'sublating one [FOOTNOTE
+25:1].' This is the principle on which the relation between 'what
+sublates' and 'what is sublated' is decided everywhere. Now apprehension
+of Brahman--which is mere intelligence, eternal, pure, free,
+self-luminous--is effected by Scripture which rests on endless unbroken
+tradition, cannot therefore be suspected of any, even the least,
+imperfection, and hence cannot be non-authoritative; the state of
+bondage, on the other hand, with its manifold distinctions is proved by
+Perception, Inference, and so on, which are capable of imperfections and
+therefore may be non-authoritative. It is therefore reasonable to
+conclude that the state of bondage is put an end to by the apprehension
+of Brahman. And that imperfection of which Perception--through which we
+apprehend a world of manifold distinctions--may be assumed to be
+capable, is so-called Nescience, which consists in the beginningless
+wrong imagination of difference.--Well then--a further objection is
+raised--let us admit that Scripture is perfect because resting on an
+endless unbroken tradition; but must we then not admit that texts
+evidently presupposing the view of duality, as e.g. 'Let him who desires
+the heavenly world offer the Jyotishtoma-sacrifice'--are liable to
+refutation?--True, we reply. As in the case of the Udgātri and
+Pratihartri breaking the chain (not at the same time, but) in
+succession [FOOTNOTE 26:1], so here also the earlier texts (which refer
+to duality and transitory rewards) are sublated by the later texts which
+teach final release, and are not themselves sublated by anything else.
+
+The texts which represent Brahman as devoid of qualities have greater
+force
+
+The same reasoning applies to those passages in the Vedānta-texts which
+inculcate meditation on the qualified Brahman, since the highest Brahman
+is without any qualities.--But consider such passages as 'He who
+cognises all, who knows all' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'His high power is
+revealed as manifold, as essential, acting as force and knowledge' (Svet.
+Up. VI, 8); 'He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true' (Ch. Up.
+VIII, 1, 5); how can these passages, which clearly aim at defining the
+nature of Brahman, be liable to refutation?--Owing to the greater weight,
+we reply, of those texts which set forth Brahman as devoid of qualities.
+'It is not coarse, not fine, not short, not long' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8);
+'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'That
+which is free from qualities,' 'that which is free from stain'--these
+and similar texts convey the notion of Brahman being changeless, eternal
+intelligence devoid of all difference; while the other texts--quoted
+before--teach the qualified Brahman. And there being a conflict between
+the two sets of passages, we--according to the Mīmāmsā principle
+referred to above--decide that the texts referring to Brahman as devoid
+of qualities are of greater force, because they are later in order
+[FOOTNOTE 27:1] than those which speak of Brahman as having qualities.
+Thus everything is settled. The text Taitt. Up. II, 1 refers to Brahman
+as devoid of qualities.
+
+But--an objection is raised--even the passage 'The True, knowledge,
+infinite is Brahman' intimates certain qualities of Brahman, viz. true
+being, knowledge, infinity!--Not so, we reply. From the circumstance
+that all the terms of the sentence stand in co-ordination, it follows
+that they convey the idea of one matter (sense) only. If against this
+you urge that the sentence may convey the idea of one matter only, even
+if directly expressing a thing distinguished by several qualities; we
+must remark that you display an ignorance of the meaning of language
+which appears to point to some weakmindedness on your part. A sentence
+conveys the idea of one matter (sense) only when all its constitutive
+words denote one and the same thing; if, on the other hand, it expresses
+a thing possessing several attributes, the difference of these
+attributes necessarily leads to a difference in meaning on the part of
+the individual words, and then the oneness of meaning of the sentence is
+lost.--But from your view of the passage it would follow that the
+several words are mere synonyms!--Give us your attention, we reply, and
+learn that several words may convey one meaning without being idle
+synonyms. From the determination of the unity of purport of the whole
+sentence [FOOTNOTE 27:2] we conclude that the several words, applied to
+one thing, aim at expressing what is opposite in nature to whatever is
+contrary to the meanings of the several words, and that thus they have
+meaning and unity of meaning and yet are not mere synonyms. The details
+are as follows. Brahman is to be defined as what is contrary in nature
+to all other things. Now whatever is opposed to Brahman is virtually set
+aside by the three words (constituting the definition of Brahman in the
+Taittiriya-text). The word 'true' (or 'truly being') has the purport of
+distinguishing Brahman from whatever things have no truth, as being the
+abodes of change; the word 'knowledge' distinguishes Brahman from all
+non-sentient things whose light depends on something else (which are not
+self-luminous); and the word 'infinite' distinguishes it from whatever
+is limited in time or space or nature. Nor is this 'distinction' some
+positive or negative attribute of Brahman, it rather is just Brahman
+itself as opposed to everything else; just as the distinction of white
+colour from black and other colours is just the true nature of white,
+not an attribute of it. The three words constituting the text thus _have_
+a meaning, have _one_ meaning, and are non-synonymous, in so far as they
+convey the essential distinction of one thing, viz. Brahman from
+everything else. The text thus declares the one Brahman which is
+self-luminous and free from all difference. On this interpretation of
+the text we discern its oneness in purport with other texts, such as
+'Being only this was in the beginning, one only, without a second.'
+Texts such as 'That from whence these beings are born' (Taitt. Up. III,
+1); 'Being only this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'Self
+alone was this in the beginning' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 1), &c., describe
+Brahman as the cause of the world; and of this Brahman the Taittirīya
+passage 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' gives the strict
+definition.
+
+In agreement with the principle that all sākhās teach the same doctrine
+we have to understand that, in all the texts which speak of Brahman as
+cause, Brahman must be taken as being 'without a second', i.e. without
+any other being of the same or a different kind; and the text which aims
+at defining Brahman has then to be interpreted in accordance with this
+characteristic of Brahman, viz. its being without a second. The
+statement of the Chāndogya as to Brahman being without a second must
+also be taken to imply that Brahman is non-dual as far as qualities are
+concerned; otherwise it would conflict with those passages which speak
+of Brahman as being without qualities and without stain. We therefore
+conclude that the defining Taittirīya-text teaches Brahman to be an
+absolutely homogeneous substance.
+
+But, the above explanation of the passage being accepted, it follows
+that the words 'true being,' 'knowledge,' &c., have to be viewed as
+abandoning their direct sense, and merely suggesting a thing distinct in
+nature from all that is opposite (to what the three words directly
+denote), and this means that we resort to so-called implication (implied
+meaning, lakshanā)!--What objection is there to such a proceeding? we
+reply. The force of the general purport of a sentence is greater than
+that of the direct denotative power of the simple terms, and it is
+generally admitted that the purport of grammatical co-ordination is
+oneness (of the matter denoted by the terms co-ordinated).--But we never
+observe that all words of a sentence are to be understood in an implied
+sense!--Is it then not observed, we reply, that _one_ word is to be
+taken in its implied meaning if otherwise it would contradict the
+purport of the whole sentence? And if the purport of the sentence, which
+is nothing but an aggregate of words employed together, has once been
+ascertained, why should we not take two or three or all words in an
+implied sense--just as we had taken one--and thus make them fit in with
+the general purport? In agreement herewith those scholars who explain to
+us the sense of imperative sentences, teach that in imperative sentences
+belonging to ordinary speech all words have an implied meaning only (not
+their directly denotative meaning). For, they maintain, imperative forms
+have their primary meaning only in (Vedic) sentences which enjoin
+something not established by other means; and hence in ordinary speech
+the effect of the action is conveyed by implication only. The other
+words also, which form part of those imperative sentences and denote
+matters connected with the action, have their primary meaning only if
+connected with an action not established by other means; while if
+connected with an ordinary action they have a secondary, implied,
+meaning only [FOOTNOTE 30:1]. Perception reveals to us non-differenced
+substance only
+
+We have so far shown that in the case of a conflict between Scripture
+and Perception and the other instruments of knowledge, Scripture is of
+greater force. The fact, however, is that no such conflict is observed
+to exist, since Perception itself gives rise to the apprehension of a
+non-differenced Brahman whose nature is pure Being.--But how can it be
+said that Perception, which has for its object things of various kinds--
+and accordingly expresses itself in judgments such as 'Here is a jar,'
+'There is a piece of cloth'--causes the apprehension of mere Being? If
+there were no apprehension of difference, all cognitions would have one
+and the same object, and therefore would give rise to one judgment only--
+as takes place when one unbroken perceptional cognition is continued for
+some time.--True. We therefore have to enquire in what way, in the
+judgment 'here is a jar,' an assertion is made about being as well as
+some special form of being. These implied judgments cannot both be
+founded on perception, for they are the results of acts of cognition
+occupying different moments of time, while the perceptional cognition
+takes place in one moment (is instantaneous). We therefore must decide
+whether it is the essential nature of the jar, or its difference from
+other things, that is the object of perception. And we must adopt the
+former alternative, because the apprehension of difference presupposes
+the apprehension of the essential nature of the thing, and, in addition,
+the remembrance of its counterentities (i.e. the things from which the
+given thing differs). Hence difference is not apprehended by Perception;
+and all judgments and propositions relative to difference are founded on
+error only.
+
+Difference--bheda--does not admit of logical definition
+
+The Logicians, moreover, are unable to give a definition of such a thing
+as 'difference.' Difference cannot in the first place be the essential
+nature (of that which differs); for from that it would follow that on
+the apprehension of the essential nature of a thing there would at once
+arise not only the judgment as to that essential nature but also
+judgments as to its difference from everything else.--But, it may be
+objected to this, even when the essential nature of a thing is
+apprehended, the judgment 'this thing is different from other things'
+depends on the remembrance of its counterentities, and as long as this
+remembrance does not take place so long the judgment of difference is
+not formed!--Such reasoning, we reply, is inadmissible. He who maintains
+that 'difference' is nothing but 'essential nature' has no right to
+assume a dependence on counterentities since, according to him,
+essential nature and difference are the same, i.e. nothing but essential
+nature: the judgment of difference can, on his view, depend on
+counterentities no more than the judgment of essential nature does. His
+view really implies that the two words 'the jar' and 'different' (in the
+judgment 'the jar is different') are synonymous, just as the words
+'hasta' and 'kara' are (both of which mean 'hand').
+
+Nor, in the second place, can 'difference' be held to be an attribute
+(dharma). For if it were that, we should have to assume that
+'difference' possesses difference (i.e. is different) from essential
+nature; for otherwise it would be the same as the latter. And this
+latter difference would have to be viewed as an attribute of the first
+difference, and this would lead us on to a third difference, and so in
+infinitum. And the view of 'difference' being an attribute would further
+imply that difference is apprehended on the apprehension of a thing
+distinguished by attributes such as generic character and so on, and at
+the same time that the thing thus distinguished is apprehended on the
+apprehension of difference; and this would constitute a logical seesaw.--
+'Difference' thus showing itself incapable of logical definition, we are
+confirmed in our view that perception reveals mere 'Being' only.
+
+Moreover, it appears that in states of consciousness such as 'Here is a
+jar,' 'There is a piece of cloth,' 'The jar is perceived,' 'The piece of
+cloth is perceived,' that which constitutes the things is Being
+(existence; sattā) and perception (or 'consciousness'; anubhūti). And we
+observe that it is pure Being only which persists in all states of
+cognition: this pure Being alone, therefore, is _real_. The differences,
+on the other hand, which do not persist, are unreal. The case is
+analogous to that of the snake-rope. The rope which persists as a
+substrate is real, while the non-continuous things (which by wrong
+imagination are superimposed on the rope) such as a snake, a cleft in
+the ground, a watercourse, and so on, are unreal.
+
+But--our adversary objects--the instance is not truly analogous. In the
+case of the snake-rope the non-reality of the snake results from the
+snake's being sublated (bādhita) by the cognition of the true nature of
+the substrate 'This is a rope, not a snake'; it does not result from the
+non-continuousness of the snake. In the same way the reality of the rope
+does not follow from its persistence, but from the fact of its being not
+sublated (by another cognition). But what, we ask, establishes the
+non-reality of jars and pieces of cloth?--All are agreed, we reply, that
+we observe, in jars and similar things, individual difference
+(vyāvritti, literally 'separation,' 'distinction'). The point to decide
+is of what nature such difference is. Does it not mean that the judgment
+'This is a jar' implies the negation of pieces of cloth and other
+things? But this means that by this judgment pieces of cloth and other
+things are sublated (bādhita). Individual difference (vyāvritti) thus
+means the cessation (or absence), due to sublation, of certain objects
+of cognition, and it proves the non-reality of whatever has
+non-continuous existence; while on the other hand, pure Being, like the
+rope, persists non-sublated. Hence everything that is additional to pure
+Being is non-real.--This admits of being expressed in technical form.
+'Being' is real because it persists, as proved by the case of the rope
+in the snake-rope; jars and similar things are non-real because they are
+non-continuous, as proved by the case of the snake that has the rope for
+its substrate.
+
+From all this it follows that persisting consciousness only has real
+being; it alone is.
+
+Being and consciousness are one. Consciousness is svayamprakāsa.
+
+But, our adversary objects, as mere Being is the object of consciousness,
+it is different therefrom (and thus there exists after all 'difference'
+or 'plurality').--Not so, we reply. That there is no such thing as
+'difference,' we have already shown above on the grounds that it is not
+the object of perception, and moreover incapable of definition. It
+cannot therefore be proved that 'Being' is the object of consciousness.
+Hence Consciousness itself is 'Being'--that which is.--This
+consciousness is self-proved, just because it is consciousness. Were it
+proved through something else, it would follow that like jars and
+similar things it is not consciousness. Nor can there be assumed, for
+consciousness, the need of another act of consciousness (through which
+its knowledge would be established); for it shines forth (prakāsate)
+through its own being. While it exists, consciousness--differing therein
+from jars and the like--is never observed not to shine forth, and it
+cannot therefore be held to depend, in its shining forth, on something
+else.--You (who object to the above reasoning) perhaps hold the
+following view:--even when consciousness has arisen, it is the object
+only which shines forth--a fact expressed in sentences such as: the jar
+is perceived. When a person forms the judgment 'This is a jar,' he is
+not at the time conscious of a consciousness which is not an object and
+is not of a definite character. Hence the existence of consciousness is
+the reason which brings about the 'shining forth' of jars and other
+objects, and thus has a similar office as the approximation of the
+object to the eye or the other organs of sense (which is another
+condition of perceptive consciousness). After this the existence of
+consciousness is inferred on the ground that the shining forth of the
+object is (not permanent, but) occasional only [FOOTNOTE 34:1]. And
+should this argumentation be objected to on the ground of its implying
+that consciousness--which is essentially of the nature of intelligence--
+is something non-intelligent like material things, we ask you to define
+this negation of non-intelligence (which you declare to be
+characteristic of consciousness). Have we, perhaps, to understand by it
+the invariable concomitance of existence and shining forth? If so, we
+point out that this invariable concomitance is also found in the case of
+pleasure and similar affections; for when pleasure and so on exist at
+all, they never are non-perceived (i.e. they exist in so far only as we
+are conscious of them). It is thus clear that we have no consciousness
+of consciousness itself--just as the tip of a finger, although touching
+other things, is incapable of touching itself.
+
+All this reasoning, we reply, is entirely spun out of your own fancy,
+without any due consideration of the power of consciousness. The fact is,
+that in perceiving colour and other qualities of things, we are not
+aware of a 'shining forth' as an attribute of those things, and as
+something different from consciousness; nor can the assumption of an
+attribute of things called 'light,' or 'shining forth,' be proved in any
+way, since the entire empirical world itself can be proved only through
+consciousness, the existence of which we both admit. Consciousness,
+therefore, is not something which is inferred or proved through some
+other act of knowledge; but while proving everything else it is proved
+by itself. This may be expressed in technical form as follows--
+Consciousness is, with regard to its attributes and to the empirical
+judgments concerning it, independent of any other thing, because through
+its connexion with other things it is the cause of their attributes and
+the empirical judgments concerning them. For it is a general principle
+that of two things that which through its connexion with the other is
+the cause of the attributes of--and the empirical judgments about--the
+latter, is itself independent of that other as to those two points. We
+see e.g. that colour, through its conjunction with earth and the like,
+produces in them the quality of visibility, but does not itself depend
+for its visibility on conjunction with colour. Hence consciousness is
+itself the cause of its own 'shining forth,' as well as of the
+empirically observed shining forth of objects such as jars and the like.
+
+Consciousness is eternal and incapable of change.
+
+This self-luminous consciousness, further, is eternal, for it is not
+capable of any form of non-existence--whether so--called antecedent
+non-existence or any other form. This follows from its being
+self-established. For the antecedent non-existence of self-established
+consciousness cannot be apprehended either through consciousness or
+anything else. If consciousness itself gave rise to the apprehension of
+its own non-existence, it could not do so in so far as 'being,' for that
+would contradict its being; if it is, i.e. if its non-existence is not,
+how can it give rise to the idea of its non-existence? Nor can it do so
+if not being; for if consciousness itself is not, how can it furnish a
+proof for its own non-existence? Nor can the non-existence of
+consciousness be apprehended through anything else; for consciousness
+cannot be the object of anything else. Any instrument of knowledge
+proving the non-existence of consciousness, could do so only by making
+consciousness its object--'this is consciousness'; but consciousness, as
+being self-established, does not admit of that objectivation which is
+implied in the word 'this,' and hence its previous non-existence cannot
+be proved by anything lying outside itself.
+
+As consciousness thus does not admit of antecedent non-existence, it
+further cannot be held to originate, and hence also all those other
+states of being which depend on origination cannot be predicated of it.
+
+As consciousness is beginningless, it further does not admit of any
+plurality within itself; for we observe in this case the presence of
+something which is contrary to what invariably accompanies plurality
+(this something being 'beginninglessness' which is contrary to the
+quality of having a beginning--which quality invariably accompanies
+plurality). For we never observe a thing characterised by plurality to
+be without a beginning.--And moreover difference, origination, &c., are
+objects of consciousness, like colour and other qualities, and hence
+cannot be attributes of consciousness. Therefore, consciousness being
+essentially consciousness only, nothing else that is an object of
+consciousness can be its attribute. The conclusion is that consciousness
+is free from difference of any kind.
+
+The apparent difference between Consciousness and the conscious subject
+is due to the unreal ahamkāra.
+
+From this it further follows that there is no substrate of
+consciousness--different from consciousness itself--such as people
+ordinarily mean when speaking of a 'knower.' It is self-luminous
+consciousness itself which constitutes the so-called 'knower.' This
+follows therefrom also that consciousness is not non-intelligent (jada);
+for non-intelligence invariably accompanies absence of Selfhood
+(anātmatva); hence, non-intelligence being absent in consciousness,
+consciousness is not non-Self, that means, it is the Self.
+
+But, our adversary again objects, the consciousness which expresses
+itself in the judgment 'I know,' proves that the quality of being a
+'knower' belongs to consciousness!--By no means, we reply. The
+attribution to consciousness of this quality rests on error, no less
+than the attribution, to the shell, of the quality of being silver.
+Consciousness cannot stand in the relation of an agent toward itself:
+the attribute of being a knowing agent is erroneously imputed to it--an
+error analogous to that expressed in the judgment 'I am a man,' which
+identifies the Self of a person with the outward aggregate of matter
+that bears the external characteristics of humanity. To be a 'knower'
+means to be the agent in the action of knowing; and this is something
+essentially changeful and non-intelligent (jada), having its abode in
+the ahamkāra, which is itself a thing subject to change. How, on the
+other hand, could such agency possibly belong to the changeless
+'witness' (of all change, i.e. consciousness) whose nature is pure Being?
+That agency cannot be an attribute of the Self follows therefrom also
+that, like colour and other qualities, agency depends, for its own proof,
+on seeing, i.e. consciousness.
+
+That the Self does not fall within the sphere (is not an object of), the
+idea of 'I' is proved thereby also that in deep sleep, swoon, and
+similar states, the idea of the 'I' is absent, while the consciousness
+of the Self persists. Moreover, if the Self were admitted to be an agent
+and an object of the idea of 'I,' it would be difficult to avoid the
+conclusion that like the body it is non-intelligent, something merely
+outward ('being for others only, not for itself') and destitute of
+Selfhood. That from the body, which is the object of the idea of 'I,'
+and known to be an agent, there is different that Self which enjoys the
+results of the body's actions, viz. the heavenly word, and so on, is
+acknowledged by all who admit the validity of the instruments of
+knowledge; analogously, therefore, we must admit that different from the
+knower whom we understand by the term 'I,' is the 'witnessing' inward
+Self. The non-intelligent ahamkāra thus merely serves to manifest the
+nature of non-changing consciousness, and it effects this by being its
+abode; for it is the proper quality of manifesting agents to manifest
+the objects manifested, in so far as the latter abide in them. A mirror,
+e.g., or a sheet of water, or a certain mass of matter, manifests a face
+or the disc of the moon (reflected in the mirror or water) or the
+generic character of a cow (impressed on the mass of matter) in so far
+as all those things abide in them.--In this way, then, there arises the
+erroneous view that finds expression in the judgment 'I know.'--Nor must
+you, in the way of objection, raise the question how self-luminous
+consciousness is to be manifested by the non-intelligent ahamkāra, which
+rather is itself manifested by consciousness; for we observe that the
+surface of the hand, which itself is manifested by the rays of sunlight
+falling on it, at the same time manifests those rays. This is clearly
+seen in the case of rays passing through the interstices of network; the
+light of those rays is intensified by the hand on which they fall, and
+which at the same time is itself manifested by the rays.
+
+It thus appears that the 'knowing agent,' who is denoted by the 'I,' in
+the judgment 'I know,' constitutes no real attribute of the Self, the
+nature of which is pure intelligence. This is also the reason why the
+consciousness of Egoity does not persist in the states of deep sleep and
+final release: in those states this special form of consciousness passes
+away, and the Self appears in its true nature, i.e. as pure
+consciousness. Hence a person who has risen from deep, dreamless sleep
+reflects, 'Just now I was unconscious of myself.'
+
+Summing up of the pūrvapaksha view.
+
+As the outcome of all this, we sum up our view as follows.--Eternal,
+absolutely non-changing consciousness, whose nature is pure
+non-differenced intelligence, free from all distinction whatever, owing
+to error illusorily manifests itself (vivarttate) as broken up into
+manifold distinctions--knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, acts of
+knowledge. And the purpose for which we enter on the consideration of
+the Vedānta-texts is utterly to destroy what is the root of that error,
+i.e. Nescience, and thus to obtain a firm knowledge of the oneness of
+Brahman, whose nature is mere intelligence--free, pure, eternal.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 22:1. In agreement with the use made of this passage by the
+Pūrvapakshin, vijńāna must here be understood in the sense of avidyā.
+Vijńānasabdena vividham jńāyate-neneti karanavyutpattyā-vidyā-bhidhiyate.
+Sru. Pra.]
+
+[FOOTNOTE 25:1. The distinction is illustrated by the different views
+Perception and Inference cause us to take of the nature of the flame of
+the lamp. To Perception the flame, as long as it burns, seems one and
+the same: but on the ground of the observation that the different
+particles of the wick and the oil are consumed in succession, we infer
+that there are many distinct flames succeeding one another. And we
+accept the Inference as valid, and as sublating or refuting the
+immediate perception, because the perceived oneness of the flame admits
+of being accounted for 'otherwise,' viz. on the ground of the many
+distinct flames originating in such rapid succession that the eye
+mistakes them for one. The inference on the other hand does not admit of
+being explained in another way.]
+
+[FOOTNOTE 26:1. The reference is to the point discussed Pū. Mī. Sū. VI,
+5, 54 (Jaim. Nyā. Mālā Vistara, p. 285).]
+
+[FOOTNOTE 27:1. The texts which deny all qualities of Brahman are later
+in order than the texts which refer to Brahman as qualified, because
+denial presupposes that which is to be denied.]
+
+[FOOTNOTE 27:2. The unity of purport of the sentence is inferred from
+its constituent words having the same case-ending.]
+
+[FOOTNOTE 30:1. The theory here referred to is held by some of the
+Mīmāmsakas. The imperative forms of the verb have their primary meaning,
+i.e. the power of originating action, only in Vedic sentences which
+enjoin the performance of certain actions for the bringing about of
+certain ends: no other means of knowledge but the Veda informing us that
+such ends can be accomplished by such actions. Nobody, e.g. would offer
+a soma sacrifice in order to obtain the heavenly world, were he not told
+by the Veda to do so. In ordinary life, on the other hand, no imperative
+possesses this entirely unique originative force, since any action which
+may be performed in consequence of a command may be prompted by other
+motives as well: it is, in technical Indian language, established
+already, apart from the command, by other means of knowledge. The man
+who, e.g. is told to milk a cow might have proceeded to do so, apart
+from the command, for reasons of his own. Imperatives in ordinary speech
+are therefore held not to have their primary meaning, and this
+conclusion is extended, somewhat unwarrantably one should say, to all
+the words entering into an imperative clause.]
+
+[FOOTNOTE 34:1. Being not permanent but occasional, it is an effect only,
+and as such must have a cause.]
+
+
+
+
+THE GREAT SIDDHĀNTA.
+
+This entire theory rests on a fictitious foundation of altogether hollow
+and vicious arguments, incapable of being stated in definite logical
+alternatives, and devised by men who are destitute of those particular
+qualities which cause individuals to be chosen by the Supreme Person
+revealed in the Upanishads; whose intellects are darkened by the
+impression of beginningless evil; and who thus have no insight into the
+nature of words and sentences, into the real purport conveyed by them,
+and into the procedure of sound argumentation, with all its methods
+depending on perception and the other instruments of right knowledge.
+The theory therefore must needs be rejected by all those who, through
+texts, perception and the other means of knowledge--assisted by sound
+reasoning--have an insight into the true nature of things.
+
+
+
+
+There is no proof of non-differenced substance.
+
+To enter into details.--Those who maintain the doctrine of a substance
+devoid of all difference have no right to assert that this or that is a
+proof of such a substance; for all means of right knowledge have for
+their object things affected with difference.--Should any one taking his
+stand on the received views of his sect, assert that the theory of a
+substance free from all difference (does not require any further means
+of proof but) is immediately established by one's own consciousness; we
+reply that he also is refuted by the fact, warranted by the witness of
+the Self, that all consciousness implies difference: all states of
+consciousness have for their object something that is marked by some
+difference, as appears in the case of judgments like 'I saw this.' And
+should a state of consciousness--although directly apprehended as
+implying difference--be determined by some fallacious reasoning to be
+devoid of difference, this determination could be effected only by means
+of some special attributes additional to the quality of mere Being; and
+owing to these special qualities on which the determination depends,
+that state of consciousness would clearly again be characterised by
+difference. The meaning of the mentioned determination could thus only
+be that of a thing affected with certain differences some other
+differences are denied; but manifestly this would not prove the
+existence of a thing free from all difference. To thought there at any
+rate belongs the quality of being thought and self-illuminatedness, for
+the knowing principle is observed to have for its essential nature the
+illumining (making to shine forth) of objects. And that also in the
+states of deep sleep, swoon, &c., consciousness is affected with
+difference we shall prove, in its proper place, in greater detail.
+Moreover you yourself admit that to consciousness there actually belong
+different attributes such as permanency (oneness, self-luminousness, &c.
+), and of these it cannot be shown that they are only Being in general.
+And even if the latter point were admitted, we observe that there takes
+place a discussion of different views, and you yourself attempt to prove
+your theory by means of the differences between those views and your own.
+It therefore must be admitted that reality is affected with difference
+well established by valid means of proof.
+
+
+
+
+Sabda proves difference.
+
+As to sound (speech; sabda) it is specially apparent that it possesses
+the power of denoting only such things as are affected with difference.
+Speech operates with words and sentences. Now a word (pada) originates
+from the combination of a radical element and a suffix, and as these two
+elements have different meanings it necessarily follows that the word
+itself can convey only a sense affected with difference. And further,
+the plurality of words is based on plurality of meanings; the sentence
+therefore which is an aggregate of words expresses some special
+combination of things (meanings of words), and hence has no power to
+denote a thing devoid of all difference.--The conclusion is that sound
+cannot be a means of knowledge for a thing devoid of all difference.
+
+
+
+
+Pratyaksha--even of the nirvikalpaka kind--proves difference.
+
+Perception in the next place--with its two subdivisions of
+non-determinate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka)
+perception--also cannot be a means of knowledge for things devoid of
+difference. Determinate perception clearly has for its object things
+affected with difference; for it relates to that which is distinguished
+by generic difference and so on. But also non-determinate perception has
+for its object only what is marked with difference; for it is on the
+basis of non-determinate perception that the object distinguished by
+generic character and so on is recognised in the act of determinate
+perception. Non-determinate perception is the apprehension of the object
+in so far as destitute of some differences but not of all difference.
+Apprehension of the latter kind is in the first place not observed ever
+to take place, and is in the second place impossible: for all
+apprehension by consciousness takes place by means of some distinction
+'This is such and such.' Nothing can be apprehended apart from some
+special feature of make or structure, as e.g. the triangularly shaped
+dewlap in the case of cows. The true distinction between non-determinate
+and determinate perception is that the former is the apprehension of the
+first individual among a number of things belonging to the same class,
+while the latter is the apprehension of the second, third, and so on,
+individuals. On the apprehension of the first individual cow the
+perceiving person is not conscious of the fact that the special shape
+which constitutes the generic character of the class 'cows' extends to
+the present individual also; while this special consciousness arises in
+the case of the perception of the second and third cow. The perception
+of the second individual thus is 'determinate' in so far as it is
+determined by a special attribute, viz. the extension, to the
+perception, of the generic character of a class--manifested in a certain
+outward shape--which connects this act of perception with the earlier
+perception (of the first individual); such determination being
+ascertained only on the apprehension of the second individual. Such
+extension or continuance of a certain generic character is, on the other
+hand, not apprehended on the apprehension of the first individual, and
+perception of the latter kind thence is 'non-determinate.' That it is
+such is not due to non-apprehension of structure, colour, generic
+character and so on, for all these attributes are equally objects of
+sensuous perception (and hence perceived as belonging to the first
+individual also). Moreover that which possesses structure cannot be
+perceived apart from the structure, and hence in the case of the
+apprehension of the first individual there is already perception of
+structure, giving rise to the judgment 'The thing is such and such.' In
+the case of the second, third, &c., individuals, on the other hand, we
+apprehend, in addition to the thing possessing structure and to the
+structure itself, the special attribute of the persistence of the
+generic character, and hence the perception is 'determinate.' From all
+this it follows that perception never has for its object that which is
+devoid of all difference.
+
+
+
+
+The bhedābheda view is untenable.
+
+The same arguments tend to refute the view that there is difference and
+absence of difference at the same time (the so-called bhedābheda view).
+Take the judgment 'This is such and such'; how can we realise here the
+non-difference of 'being this' and 'being such and such'? The 'such and
+such' denotes a peculiar make characterised, e.g. by a dewlap, the
+'this' denotes the thing distinguished by that peculiar make; the
+non-difference of these two is thus contradicted by immediate
+consciousness. At the outset the thing perceived is perceived as
+separate from all other things, and this separation is founded on the
+fact that the thing is distinguished by a special constitution, let us
+say the generic characteristics of a cow, expressed by the term 'such
+and such.' In general, wherever we cognise the relation of
+distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby, the two
+clearly present themselves to our mind as absolutely different.
+Somethings--e.g. staffs and bracelets--appear sometimes as having a
+separate, independent existence of their own; at other times they
+present themselves as distinguishing attributes of other things or
+beings (i.e. of the persons carrying staffs or wearing bracelets). Other
+entities--e.g. the generic character of cows--have a being only in so
+far as they constitute the form of substances, and thus always present
+themselves as distinguishing attributes of those substances. In both
+cases there is the same relation of distinguishing attribute and thing
+distinguished thereby, and these two are apprehended as absolutely
+different. The difference between the two classes of entities is only
+that staffs, bracelets, and similar things are capable of being
+apprehended in separation from other things, while the generic
+characteristics of a species are absolutely incapable thereof. The
+assertion, therefore, that the difference of things is refuted by
+immediate consciousness, is based on the plain denial of a certain form
+of consciousness, the one namely--admitted by every one--which is
+expressed in the judgment 'This thing is such and such.'--This same
+point is clearly expounded by the Sūtrakāra in II, 2, 33.
+
+
+
+
+Inference also teaches difference.
+
+Perception thus having for its object only what is marked by difference,
+inference also is in the same case; for its object is only what is
+distinguished by connexion with things known through perception and
+other means of knowledge. And thus, even in the case of disagreement as
+to the number of the different instruments of knowledge, a thing devoid
+of difference could not be established by any of them since the
+instruments of knowledge acknowledged by all have only one and the same
+object, viz. what is marked by difference. And a person who maintains
+the existence of a thing devoid of difference on the ground of
+differences affecting that very thing simply contradicts himself without
+knowing what he does; he is in fact no better than a man who asserts
+that his own mother never had any children.
+
+
+
+
+Perception does not reveal mere being.
+
+In reply to the assertion that perception causes the apprehension of
+pure Being only, and therefore cannot have difference for its object;
+and that 'difference' cannot be defined because it does not admit of
+being set forth in definite alternatives; we point out that these
+charges are completely refuted by the fact that the only objects of
+perception are things distinguished by generic character and so on, and
+that generic character and so on--as being relative things--give at once
+rise to the judgment as to the distinction between themselves and the
+things in which they inhere. You yourself admit that in the case of
+knowledge and in that of colour and other qualities this relation holds
+good, viz. that something which gives rise to a judgment about another
+thing at the same time gives rise to a judgment about itself; the same
+may therefore be admitted with regard to difference [FOOTNOTE 44:1].
+
+For this reason the charge of a regressus in infinitum and a logical
+seesaw (see above, p. 32) cannot be upheld. For even if perceptive
+cognition takes place within one moment, we apprehend within that moment
+the generic character which constitutes on the one hand the difference
+of the thing from others, and on the other hand the peculiar character
+of the thing itself; and thus there remains nothing to be apprehended in
+a second moment.
+
+Moreover, if perception made us apprehend only pure Being judgments
+clearly referring to different objects--such as 'Here is a jar,' 'There
+is a piece of cloth'--would be devoid of all meaning. And if through
+perception we did not apprehend difference--as marked by generic
+character, &c., constituting the structure or make of a thing, why
+should a man searching for a horse not be satisfied with finding a
+buffalo? And if mere Being only were the object of all our cognitions,
+why should we not remember, in the case of each particular cognition,
+all the words which are connected with all our cognitions? And further,
+if the cognition of a horse and that of an elephant had one object only,
+the later cognition would cause us to apprehend only what was
+apprehended before, and there being thus no difference (of object of
+cognition) there would be nothing to distinguish the later state of
+cognition from remembrance. If on the other hand a difference is
+admitted for each state of consciousness, we admit thereby that
+perception has for its objects things affected with difference.
+
+If all acts of cognition had one and the same object only, everything
+would be apprehended by one act of cognition; and from this it would
+follow that there are no persons either deaf or blind!
+
+Nor does, as a matter of fact, the eye apprehend mere Being only; for
+what it does apprehend is colour and the coloured thing, and those other
+qualities (viz. extension, &c.), which inhere in the thing together with
+colour. Nor does feeling do so; for it has for its objects things
+palpable. Nor have the ear and the other senses mere Being for their
+object; but they relate to what is distinguished by a special sound or
+taste or smell. Hence there is not any source of knowledge causing us to
+apprehend mere Being. If moreover the senses had for their object mere
+Being free from all difference, it would follow that Scripture which has
+the same object would (not be originative of knowledge but) perform the
+function of a mere anuvāda, i.e. it would merely make statements about
+something, the knowledge of which is already established by some other
+means. And further, according to your own doctrine, mere Being, i.e.
+Brahman, would hold the position of an object with regard to the
+instruments of knowledge; and thus there would cling to it all the
+imperfections indicated by yourself--non-intelligent nature,
+perishableness and so on.--From all this we conclude that perception has
+for its object only what is distinguished by difference manifesting
+itself in generic character and so on, which constitute the make or
+structure of a thing. (That the generic character of a thing is nothing
+else but its particular structure follows) from the fact that we do not
+perceive anything, different from structure, which could be claimed as
+constituting the object of the cognition that several individuals
+possess one and the same general form. And as our theory sufficiently
+accounts for the ordinary notions as to generic character, and as
+moreover even those who hold generic character to be something different
+from structure admit that there is such a thing as (common) structure,
+we adhere to the conclusion that generic character is nothing but
+structure. By 'structure' we understand special or distinctive form; and
+we acknowledge different forms of that kind according to the different
+classes of things. And as the current judgments as to things being
+different from one another can be explained on the basis of the
+apprehension of generic character, and as no additional entity is
+observed to exist, and as even those who maintain the existence of such
+an additional thing admit the existence of generic character, we further
+conclude that difference (bheda) is nothing but generic character (jāti).--
+But if this were so, the judgment as to difference would immediately
+follow from the judgment as to generic character, as soon as the latter
+is apprehended! Quite true, we reply. As a matter of fact the judgment
+of difference is immediately formulated on the basis of the judgment as
+to generic character. For 'the generic character' of a cow, e.g., means
+just the exclusion of everything else: as soon as that character is
+apprehended all thought and speech referring to other creatures
+belonging to the same wider genus (which includes buffaloes and so on
+also) come to an end. It is through the apprehension of difference only
+that the idea of non-difference comes to an end.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 44:1. Colour reveals itself as well as the thing that has
+colour; knowledge reveals itself as well as the object known; so
+difference manifests itself as well as the things that differ.]
+
+
+
+
+Plurality is not unreal.
+
+Next as to the assertion that all difference presented in our
+cognition--as of jars, pieces of cloth and the like--is unreal because
+such difference does not persist. This view, we maintain, is altogether
+erroneous, springs in fact from the neglect of distinguishing between
+persistence and non-persistence on the one hand, and the relation
+between what sublates and what is sublated on the other hand. Where two
+cognitions are mutually contradictory, there the latter relation holds
+good, and there is non-persistence of what is sublated. But jars, pieces
+of cloth and the like, do not contradict one another, since they are
+separate in place and time. If on the other hand the non-existence of a
+thing is cognised at the same time and the same place where and when its
+existence is cognised, we have a mutual contradiction of two cognitions,
+and then the stronger one sublates the other cognition which thus comes
+to an end. But when of a thing that is perceived in connexion with some
+place and time, the non-existence is perceived in connexion with some
+other place and time, there arises no contradiction; how then should the
+one cognition sublate the other? or how can it be said that of a thing
+absent at one time and place there is absence at other times and places
+also? In the case of the snake-rope, there arises a cognition of
+non-existence in connexion with the given place and time; hence there is
+contradiction, one judgment sublates the other and the sublated
+cognition comes to an end. But the circumstance of something which is
+seen at one time and in one place not persisting at another time and in
+another place is not observed to be invariably accompanied by falsehood,
+and hence mere non-persistence of this kind does not constitute a reason
+for unreality. To say, on the other hand, that what is is real because
+it persists, is to prove what is proved already, and requires no further
+proof.
+
+
+
+
+Being and consciousness are not one.
+
+Hence mere Being does not alone constitute reality. And as the
+distinction between consciousness and its objects--which rests just on
+this relation of object and that for which the object is--is proved by
+perception, the assertion that only consciousness has real existence is
+also disposed of.
+
+
+
+
+The true meaning of Svayamprakāsatva.
+
+We next take up the point as to the self-luminousness of consciousness
+(above, p. 33). The contention that consciousness is not an object holds
+good for the knowing Self at the time when it illumines (i.e.
+constitutes as its objects) other things; but there is no absolute rule
+as to all consciousness never being anything but self-luminous. For
+common observation shows that the consciousness of one person may become
+the object of the cognition of another, viz. of an inference founded on
+the person's friendly or unfriendly appearance and the like, and again
+that a person's own past states of consciousness become the object of
+his own cognition--as appears from judgments such as 'At one time I knew.'
+It cannot therefore be said 'If it is consciousness it is self-proved'
+(above p. 33), nor that consciousness if becoming an object of
+consciousness would no longer be consciousness; for from this it would
+follow that one's own past states, and the conscious states of others--
+because being objects of consciousness--are not themselves consciousness.
+Moreover, unless it were admitted that there is inferential knowledge of
+the thoughts of others, there would be no apprehension of the connexion
+of words and meaning, and this would imply the absolute termination of
+all human intercourse depending on speech. Nor also would it be possible
+for pupils to attach themselves to a teacher of sacred lore, for the
+reason that they had become aware of his wisdom and learning. The
+general proposition that consciousness does not admit of being an object
+is in fact quite untenable. The essential 'nature of consciousness or
+knowledge--consists therein that it shines forth, or manifests itself,
+through its own being to its own substrate at the present moment; or (to
+give another definition) that it is instrumental in proving its own
+object by its own being [FOOTNOTE 48:1].
+
+Now these two characteristics are established by a person's own state of
+consciousness and do not vanish when that consciousness becomes the
+object of another state of consciousness; consciousness remains also in
+the latter case what it is. Jars and similar things, on the other hand,
+do not possess consciousness, not because they are objects of
+consciousness but because they lack the two characteristics stated
+above. If we made the presence of consciousness dependent on the absence
+of its being an object of consciousness, we should arrive at the
+conclusion that consciousness is not consciousness; for there are
+things--e.g. sky-flowers--which are not objects of consciousness and at
+the same time are not consciousness. You will perhaps reply to this that
+a sky-flower's not being consciousness is due not to its not being an
+object of consciousness, but to its non-existence!--Well then, we
+rejoin, let us say analogously that the reason of jars and the like not
+being contradictory to Nescience (i.e. of their being jada), is their
+not being of the nature of consciousness, and let us not have recourse
+to their being objects of consciousness!--But if consciousness is an
+object of consciousness, we conclude that it also is non-contradictory
+of Nescience, like a jar!--At this conclusion, we rejoin, you may arrive
+even on the opposite assumption, reasoning as follows: 'Consciousness is
+non-contradictory of Nescience, because it is not an object of
+consciousness, like a sky-flower! All which shows that to maintain as a
+general principle that something which is an object of consciousness
+cannot itself be consciousness is simply ridiculous.'
+
+[FOOTNOTE 48:1. The comment of the Sru. Pra. on the above definitions
+runs, with a few additional explanations, as follows: The term
+'anubhūti' here denotes knowledge in general, not only such knowledge as
+is not remembrance (which limited meaning the term has sometimes). With
+reference to the 'shining forth' it might be said that in this way jars
+also and similar things know or are conscious because they also shine
+forth' (viz. in so far as they are known); to exclude jars and the like
+the text therefore adds 'to its own substrate' (the jar 'shines forth,'
+not to itself, but to the knowing person). There are other attributes
+of the Self, such as atomic extension, eternity, and so on, which are
+revealed (not through themselves) but through an act of knowledge
+different from them; to exclude those the text adds 'through its own
+being.' In order to exclude past states of consciousness or acts of
+knowledge, the text adds 'at the present moment.' A past state of
+consciousness is indeed not revealed without another act of knowledge
+(representing it), and would thus by itself be excluded; but the text
+adds this specification (viz. 'at the present moment') on purpose, in
+order to intimate that a past state of consciousness can be represented
+by another state--a point denied by the opponent. 'At the present
+moment' means 'the connexion with the object of knowledge belonging to
+the present time.' Without the addition of 'to its own substrate' the
+definition might imply that a state of consciousness is manifest to
+another person also; to exclude this the clause is added. This first
+definition might be objected to as acceptable only to those who maintain
+the svayamprakāsatva-theory (which need not be discussed here); hence a
+second definition is given. The two clauses 'to its own substrate' and
+'at the present moment' have to be supplied in this second definition
+also. 'Instrumental in bringing about' would apply to staffs, wheels,
+and such like implements also; hence the text adds 'its own object.'
+(Staffs, wheels, &c. have no 'objects.') Knowledge depending on sight
+does not bring about an object depending on hearing; to exclude this
+notion of universal instrumentality the text specifies the object by the
+words 'its own.' The clause 'through its own being' excludes the sense
+organs, which reveal objects not by their own being, but in so far as
+they give rise to knowledge. The two clauses 'at the present moment' and
+'to its own substrate' have the same office in the second definition as
+in the first.]
+
+
+
+
+Consciousness is not eternal.
+
+It was further maintained by the pūrvapakshin that as consciousness is
+self-established it has no antecedent non-existence and so on, and that
+this disproves its having an origin. But this is an attempt to prove
+something not proved by something else that is equally unproved;
+comparable to a man blind from birth undertaking to guide another blind
+man! You have no right to maintain the non-existence of the antecedent
+non-existence of consciousness on the ground that there is nothing to
+make us apprehend that non-existence; for there is something to make us
+apprehend it, viz. consciousness itself!--But how can consciousness at
+the time when it is, make us apprehend its own previous non-existence
+which is contradictorily opposed to it?--Consciousness, we rejoin, does
+not necessarily constitute as its objects only what occupies the same
+time with itself; were it so it would follow that neither the past nor
+the future can be the object of consciousness. Or do you mean that there
+is an absolute rule that the Antecedent non-existence of consciousness,
+if proved, must be contemporaneous with consciousness? Have you then, we
+ask, ever observed this so as to be able to assert an absolute rule? And
+if it were observed, that would prove the existence of previous
+non-existence, not its negation!--The fact, however, is that no person
+in his senses will maintain the contemporaneous existence of
+consciousness and its own antecedent non-existence. In the case of
+perceptive knowledge originating from sensation, there is indeed this
+limitation, that it causes the apprehension of such things only as are
+actually present at the same time. But this limitation does not extend
+to cognitions of all kinds, nor to all instruments of knowledge; for we
+observe that remembrance, inference, and the magical perception of Yogis
+apprehend such things also as are not present at the time of
+apprehension. On this very point there rests the relation connecting the
+means of knowledge with their objects, viz. that the former are not
+without the latter. This does not mean that the instrument of knowledge
+is connected with its object in that way that it is not without
+something that is present at the time of cognition; but rather that the
+instrument of knowledge is opposed to the falsehood of that special form
+in which the object presents itself as connected with some place and
+time.--This disposes also of the contention that remembrance has no
+external object; for it is observed that remembrance is related to such
+things also as have perished.--Possibly you will now argue as follows.
+The antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be ascertained by
+perception, for it is not something present at the time of perception.
+It further cannot be ascertained by the other means of knowledge, since
+there is no characteristic mark (linga) on which an inference could be
+based: for we do not observe any characteristic mark invariably
+accompanied by the antecedent non-existence of consciousness. Nor do we
+meet with any scriptural text referring to this antecedent
+non-existence. Hence, in the absence of any valid instrument of
+knowledge, the antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be
+established at all.--If, we reply, you thus, altogether setting aside
+the force of self-provedness (on which you had relied hitherto), take
+your stand on the absence of valid means of knowledge, we again must
+request you to give in; for there is a valid means of knowledge whereby
+to prove the antecedent non-existence of consciousness, viz. valid
+non-perception (anupalabdhi).
+
+Moreover, we observe that perceptional knowledge proves its object, be
+it a jar or something else, to exist only as long as it exists itself,
+not at all times; we do not, through it, apprehend the antecedent or
+subsequent existence of the jar. Now this absence of apprehension is due
+to the fact that consciousness itself is limited in time. If that
+consciousness which has a jar for its object were itself apprehended as
+non-limited in time, the object also--the jar--would be apprehended
+under the same form, i.e. it would be eternal. And if self-established
+consciousness were eternal, it would be immediately cognised as eternal;
+but this is not the case. Analogously, if inferential consciousness and
+other forms of consciousness were apprehended as non-limited in time,
+they would all of them reveal their objects also as non-limited, and
+these objects would thus be eternal; for the objects are conform in
+nature to their respective forms of consciousness.
+
+
+
+
+There is no consciousness without object.
+
+Nor is there any consciousness devoid of objects; for nothing of this
+kind is ever known. Moreover, the self-luminousness of consciousness has,
+by our opponent himself, been proved on the ground that its essential
+nature consists in illumining (revealing) objects; the self-luminousness
+of consciousness not admitting of proof apart from its essential nature
+which consists in the lighting up of objects. And as moreover, according
+to our opponent, consciousness cannot be the object of another
+consciousness, it would follow that (having neither an object nor itself
+being an object) it is something altogether unreal, imaginary.
+
+Nor are you justified in maintaining that in deep sleep, swoon,
+senselessness and similar states, pure consciousness, devoid of any
+object, manifests itself. This view is negatived by 'valid
+non-perception' (see above, p. 52). If consciousness were present in
+those states also, there would be remembrance of it at the time of
+waking from sleep or recovery from swoon; but as a matter of fact there
+is no such remembrance.--But it is not an absolute rule that something
+of which we were conscious must be remembered; how then can the absence
+of remembrance prove the absence of previous consciousness?--Unless, we
+reply, there be some cause of overpowering strength which quite
+obliterates all impressions--as e.g. the dissolution of the body--the
+absence of remembrance does necessarily prove the absence of previous
+consciousness. And, moreover, in the present case the absence of
+consciousness does not only follow from absence of remembrance; it is
+also proved by the thought presenting itself to the person risen from
+sleep, 'For so long a time I was not conscious of anything.'--Nor may it
+be said that even if there was consciousness, absence of remembrance
+would necessarily follow from the absence (during deep sleep) of the
+distinction of objects, and from the extinction of the consciousness of
+the 'I'; for the non-consciousness of some one thing, and the absence of
+some one thing cannot be the cause of the non-remembrance of some other
+thing, of which there had been consciousness. And that in the states in
+question the consciousness of the 'I' does persist, will moreover be
+shown further on.
+
+But, our opponent urges, have you not said yourself that even in deep
+sleep and similar states there is consciousness marked by difference?--
+True, we have said so. But that consciousness is consciousness of the
+Self, and that this is affected by difference will be proved further on.
+At present we are only interested in denying the existence of your pure
+consciousness, devoid of all objects and without a substrate. Nor can we
+admit that your pure consciousness could constitute what we call the
+consciousness of the Self; for we shall prove that the latter has a
+substrate.
+
+It thus cannot be maintained that the antecedent non-existence of
+consciousness does not admit of being proved, because consciousness
+itself does not prove it. And as we have shown that consciousness itself
+may be an object of consciousness, we have thereby disproved the alleged
+impossibility of antecedent non-existence being proved by other means.
+Herewith falls the assertion that the non-origination of consciousness
+can be proved.
+
+
+
+
+Consciousness is capable of change.
+
+Against the assertion that the alleged non-origination of consciousness
+at the same time proves that consciousness is not capable of any other
+changes (p. 36), we remark that the general proposition on which this
+conclusion rests is too wide: it would extend to antecedent
+non-existence itself, of which it is evident that it comes to an end,
+although it does not originate. In qualifying the changes as changes of
+'Being,' you manifest great logical acumen indeed! For according to your
+own view Nescience also (which is not 'Being') does not originate, is
+the substrate of manifold changes, and comes to an end through the rise
+of knowledge! Perhaps you will say that the changes of Nescience are all
+unreal. But, do you then, we ask in reply, admit that any change is
+real? You do not; and yet it is only this admission which would give a
+sense to the distinction expressed by the word 'Being' [FOOTNOTE 54:1].
+
+Nor is it true that consciousness does not admit of any division within
+itself, because it has no beginning (p. 36). For the non-originated Self
+is divided from the body, the senses, &c., and Nescience also, which is
+avowedly without a beginning, must needs be admitted to be divided from
+the Self. And if you say that the latter division is unreal, we ask
+whether you have ever observed a real division invariably connected with
+origination! Moreover, if the distinction of Nescience from the Self is
+not real, it follows that Nescience and the Self are essentially one.
+You further have yourself proved the difference of views by means of the
+difference of the objects of knowledge as established by non-refuted
+knowledge; an analogous case being furnished by the difference of acts
+of cleaving, which results from the difference of objects to be cleft.
+And if you assert that of this knowing--which is essentially knowing
+only--nothing that is an object of knowledge can be an attribute, and
+that these objects--just because they are objects of knowledge--cannot
+be attributes of knowing; we point out that both these remarks would
+apply also to eternity, self-luminousness, and the other attributes of
+'knowing', which are acknowledged by yourself, and established by valid
+means of proof. Nor may you urge against this that all these alleged
+attributes are in reality mere 'consciousness' or 'knowing'; for they
+are essentially distinct. By 'being conscious' or 'knowing', we
+understand the illumining or manifesting of some object to its own
+substrate (i.e. the substrate of knowledge), by its own existence (i.e.
+the existence of knowledge) merely; by self-luminousness (or
+'self-illuminatedness') we understand the shining forth or being
+manifest by its own existence merely to its own substrate; the terms
+'shining forth', 'illumining', 'being manifest' in both these
+definitions meaning the capability of becoming an object of thought and
+speech which is common to all things, whether intelligent or
+non-intelligent. Eternity again means 'being present in all time';
+oneness means 'being defined by the number one'. Even if you say that
+these attributes are only negative ones, i.e. equal to the absence of
+non-intelligence and so on, you still cannot avoid the admission that
+they are attributes of consciousness. If, on the other hand, being of a
+nature opposite to non-intelligence and so on, be not admitted as
+attributes of consciousness--whether of a positive or a negative
+kind--in addition to its essential nature; it is an altogether unmeaning
+proceeding to deny to it such qualities, as non-intelligence and the
+like.
+
+We moreover must admit the following alternative: consciousness is
+either proved (established) or not. If it is proved it follows that it
+possesses attributes; if it is not, it is something absolutely nugatory,
+like a sky-flower, and similar purely imaginary things.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 54:1. The Sānkara is not entitled to refer to a distinction of
+real and unreal division, because according to his theory all
+distinction is unreal.]
+
+
+
+
+Consciousness is the attribute of a permanent Conscious self.
+
+Let it then be said that consciousness is proof (siddhih) itself. Proof
+of what, we ask in reply, and to whom? If no definite answer can be
+given to these two questions, consciousness cannot be defined as
+'proof'; for 'proof' is a relative notion, like 'son.' You will perhaps
+reply 'Proof to the Self'; and if we go on asking 'But what is that
+Self'? you will say, 'Just consciousness as already said by us before.'
+True, we reply, you said so; but it certainly was not well said. For if
+it is the nature of consciousness to be 'proof' ('light,'
+'enlightenment') on the part of a person with regard to something, how
+can this consciousness which is thus connected with the person and the
+thing be itself conscious of itself? To explain: the essential character
+of consciousness or knowledge is that by its very existence it renders
+things capable of becoming objects, to its own substrate, of thought and
+speech. This consciousness (anubhūti), which is also termed jńāna,
+avagati, samvid, is a particular attribute belonging to a conscious Self
+and related to an object: as such it is known to every one on the
+testimony of his own Self--as appears from ordinary judgments such as 'I
+know the jar,' 'I understand this matter,' 'I am conscious of (the
+presence of) this piece of cloth.' That such is the essential nature of
+consciousness you yourself admit; for you have proved thereby its
+self-luminousness. Of this consciousness which thus clearly presents
+itself as the attribute of an agent and as related to an object, it
+would be difficult indeed to prove that at the same time it is itself
+the agent; as difficult as it would be to prove that the object of
+action is the agent.
+
+For we clearly see that this agent (the subject of consciousness) is
+permanent (constant), while its attribute, i. e. consciousness, not
+differing herein from joy, grief, and the like, rises, persists for some
+time, and then comes to an end. The permanency of the conscious subject
+is proved by the fact of recognition, 'This very same thing was formerly
+apprehended by me.' The non-permanency of consciousness, on the other
+hand, is proved by thought expressing itself in the following forms, 'I
+know at present,' 'I knew at a time,' 'I, the knowing subject, no longer
+have knowledge of this thing.' How then should consciousness and (the
+conscious subject) be one? If consciousness which changes every moment
+were admitted to constitute the conscious subject, it would be
+impossible for us to recognise the thing seen to-day as the one we saw
+yesterday; for what has been perceived by one cannot be recognised by
+another. And even if consciousness were identified with the conscious
+subject and acknowledged as permanent, this would no better account for
+the fact of recognition. For recognition implies a conscious subject
+persisting from the earlier to the later moment, and not merely
+consciousness. Its expression is 'I myself perceived this thing on a
+former occasion.' According to your view the quality of being a
+conscious agent cannot at all belong to consciousness; for consciousness,
+you say, is just consciousness and nothing more. And that there exists a
+pure consciousness devoid of substrate and objects alike, we have
+already refuted on the ground that of a thing of this kind we have
+absolutely no knowledge. And that the consciousness admitted by both of
+us should be the Self is refuted by immediate consciousness itself. And
+we have also refuted the fallacious arguments brought forward to prove
+that mere consciousness is the only reality.--But, another objection is
+raised, should the relation of the Self and the 'I' not rather be
+conceived as follows:--In self-consciousness which expresses itself in
+the judgment 'I know,' that intelligent something which constitutes the
+absolutely non-objective element, and is pure homogeneous light, is the
+Self; the objective element (yushmad-artha) on the other hand, which is
+established through its being illumined (revealed) by the Self is the
+_I_--in 'I know'--and this is something different from pure
+intelligence, something objective or external?
+
+By no means, we reply; for this view contradicts the relation of
+attribute and substrate of attribute of which we are directly conscious,
+as implied in the thought 'I know.'
+
+Consider also what follows.--'If the _I_ were not the Self, the
+inwardness of the Self would not exist; for it is just the consciousness
+of the _I_ which separates the inward from the outward.
+
+'"May I, freeing myself from all pain, enter on free possession of
+endless delight?" This is the thought which prompts the man desirous of
+release to apply himself to the study of the sacred texts. Were it a
+settled matter that release consists in the annihilation of the I, the
+same man would move away as soon as release were only hinted at. "When I
+myself have perished, there still persists some consciousness different
+from me;" to bring this about nobody truly will exert himself.
+
+'Moreover the very existence of consciousness, its being a consciousness
+at all, and its being self-luminous, depend on its connexion with a Self;
+when that connexion is dissolved, consciousness itself cannot be
+established, not any more than the act of cutting can take place when
+there is no person to cut and nothing to be cut. Hence it is certain
+that the I, i.e. the knowing subject, is the inward Self.'
+
+This scripture confirms when saying 'By what should he know the knower?'
+(Bri. Up. II, 4, 15); and Smriti also, 'Him who knows this they call the
+knower of the body' (Bha. Gī. XIII, 1). And the Sūtrakāra also, in the
+section beginning with 'Not the Self on account of scriptural statement'
+(II, 3, 17), will say 'For this very reason (it is) a knower' (II, 3,
+18); and from this it follows that the Self is not mere consciousness.
+
+What is established by consciousness of the 'I' is the I itself, while
+the not-I is given in the consciousness of the not-I; hence to say that
+the knowing subject, which is established by the state of consciousness,
+'I know,' is the not-I, is no better than to maintain that one's own
+mother is a barren woman. Nor can it be said that this 'I,' the knowing
+subject, is dependent on its light for something else. It rather is
+self-luminous; for to be self-luminous means to have consciousness for
+one's essential nature. And that which has light for its essential
+nature does not depend for its light on something else. The case is
+analogous to that of the flame of a lamp or candle. From the
+circumstance that the lamp illumines with its light other things, it
+does not follow either that it is not luminous, or that its luminousness
+depends on something else; the fact rather is that the lamp being of
+luminous nature shines itself and illumines with its light other things
+also. To explain.--The one substance tejas, i.e. fire or heat, subsists
+in a double form, viz. as light (prabhā), and as luminous matter.
+Although light is a quality of luminous substantial things, it is in
+itself nothing but the substance tejas, not a mere quality like e.g.
+whiteness; for it exists also apart from its substrates, and possesses
+colour (which is a quality). Having thus attributes different from those
+of qualities such as whiteness and so on, and possessing illumining
+power, it is the substance tejas, not anything else (e.g. a quality).
+Illumining power belongs to it, because it lights up itself and other
+things. At the same time it is practically treated as a quality because
+it always has the substance tejas for its substrate, and depends on it.
+This must not be objected to on the ground that what is called light is
+really nothing but dissolving particles of matter which proceed from the
+substance tejas; for if this were so, shining gems and the sun would in
+the end consume themselves completely. Moreover, if the flame of a lamp
+consisted of dissolving particles of matter, it would never be
+apprehended as a whole; for no reason can be stated why those particles
+should regularly rise in an agglomerated form to the height of four
+fingers breadth, and after that simultaneously disperse themselves
+uniformly in all directions--upwards, sideways, and downwards. The fact
+is that the flame of the lamp together with its light is produced anew
+every moment and again vanishes every moment; as we may infer from the
+successive combination of sufficient causes (viz. particles of oil and
+wick) and from its coming to an end when those causes are completely
+consumed.
+
+Analogously to the lamp, the Self is essentially intelligent (kid-rūpa),
+and has intelligence (kaitanya) for its quality. And to be essentially
+intelligent means to be self-luminous. There are many scriptural texts
+declaring this, compare e.g. 'As a mass of salt has neither inside nor
+outside but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed that Self has
+neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of knowledge' (Bri.
+Up. IV, 5, 13); 'There that person becomes self-luminous, there is no
+destruction of the knowing of the knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 14; 30); 'He
+who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 4); 'Who
+is that Self? That one who is made of knowledge, among the prānas,
+within the heart, the light, the person' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7); 'For it is
+he who sees, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, considers, acts, the person
+whose Self is knowledge' (Pr. Up. IV, 9); 'Whereby should one know the
+knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15). 'This person knows,' 'The seer does not
+see death nor illness nor pain' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2); 'That highest
+person not remembering this body into which he was born' (Ch. Up. VIII,
+12, 3); 'Thus these sixteen parts of the spectator that go towards the
+person; when they have readied the person, sink into him' (Pr. Up. VI,
+5); 'From this consisting of mind, there is different an interior Self
+consisting of knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 4). And the Sūtrakāra also will
+refer to the Self as a 'knower' in II, 3, 18. All which shows that the
+self-luminous Self is a knower, i.e. a knowing subject, and not pure
+light (non-personal intelligence). In general we may say that where
+there is light it must belong to something, as shown by the light of a
+lamp. The Self thus cannot be mere consciousness. The grammarians
+moreover tell us that words such as 'consciousness,' 'knowledge,' &c.,
+are relative; neither ordinary nor Vedic language uses expressions such
+as 'he knows' without reference to an object known and an agent who
+knows.
+
+With reference to the assertion that consciousness constitutes the Self,
+because it (consciousness) is not non-intelligent (jada), we ask what
+you understand by this absence of non-intelligence.' If you reply
+'luminousness due to the being of the thing itself (i.e. of the thing
+which is ajada)'; we point out that this definition would wrongly
+include lamps also, and similar things; and it would moreover give rise
+to a contradiction, since you do not admit light as an attribute,
+different from consciousness itself. Nor can we allow you to define
+ajadatva as 'being of that nature that light is always present, without
+any exception,' for this definition would extend also to pleasure, pain,
+and similar states. Should you maintain that pleasure and so on,
+although being throughout of the nature of light, are non-intelligent
+for the reason that, like jars, &c., they shine forth (appear) to
+something else and hence belong to the sphere of the not-Self; we ask in
+reply: Do you mean then to say that knowledge appears to itself?
+Knowledge no less than pleasure appears to some one else, viz. the 'I':
+there is, in that respect, no difference between the judgment 'I know,'
+and the judgment 'I am pleased.' Non-intelligence in the sense of
+appearingness-to-itself is thus not proved for consciousness; and hence
+it follows that what constitutes the Self is the non-jada 'I' which is
+proved to itself by its very Being. That knowledge is of the nature of
+light depends altogether on its connection with the knowing 'I': it is
+due to the latter, that knowledge, like pleasure, manifests itself to
+that conscious person who is its substrate, and not to anybody else. The
+Self is thus not mere knowledge, but is the knowing 'I.'
+
+
+
+
+The view that the conscious subject is something unreal, due to the
+ahamkāra, cannot be maintained.
+
+We turn to a further point. You maintain that consciousness which is in
+reality devoid alike of objects and substrate presents itself, owing to
+error, in the form of a knowing subject, just as mother o' pearl appears
+as silver; (consciousness itself being viewed as a real substrate of an
+erroneous imputation), because an erroneous imputation cannot take place
+apart from a substrate. But this theory is indefensible. If things were
+as you describe them, the conscious 'I' would be cognised as co-ordinate
+with the state of consciousness 'I am consciousness,' just as the
+shining thing presenting itself to our eyes is judged to be silver. But
+the fact is that the state of consciousness presents itself as something
+apart, constituting a distinguishing attribute of the I, just as the
+stick is an attribute of Devadatta who carries it. The judgment 'I am
+conscious' reveals an 'I' distinguished by consciousness; and to declare
+that it refers only to a state of consciousness--which is a mere
+attribute--is no better than to say that the judgment 'Devadatta carries
+a stick' is about the stick only. Nor are you right in saying that the
+idea of the Self being a knowing agent, presents itself to the mind of
+him only who erroneously identifies the Self and the body, an error
+expressing itself in judgments such as 'I am stout,' and is on that
+account false; for from this it would follow that the consciousness
+which is erroneously imagined as a Self is also false; for it presents
+itself to the mind of the same person. You will perhaps rejoin that
+consciousness is not false because it (alone) is not sublatcd by that
+cognition which sublates everything else. Well, we reply, then the
+knowership of the Self also is not false; for that also is not sublatcd.
+You further maintain that the character of being a knower, i.e. the
+agent in the action of knowing, does not become the non-changing Self;
+that being a knower is something implying change, of a non-intelligent
+kind (jada), and residing in the ahamkāra which is the abode of change
+and a mere effect of the Unevolved (the Prakriti); that being an agent
+and so on is like colour and other qualities, an attribute of what is
+objective; and that if we admit the Self to be an agent and the object
+of the notion of the 'I,' it also follows that the Self is, like the
+body, not a real Self but something external and non-intelligent. But
+all this is unfounded, since the internal organ is, like the body,
+non-intelligent, an effect of Prakriti, an object of knowledge,
+something outward and for the sake of others merely; while being a
+knowing subject constitutes the special essential nature of intelligent
+beings. To explain. Just as the body, through its objectiveness,
+outwardness, and similar causes, is distinguished from what possesses
+the opposite attributes of subjectiveness, inwardness, and so on; for
+the same reason the ahamkāra also--which is of the same substantial
+nature as the body--is similarly distinguished. Hence the ahamkāra is
+no more a knower than it is something subjective; otherwise there would
+be an evident contradiction. As knowing cannot be attributed to the
+ahamkāra, which is an object of knowledge, so knowership also cannot be
+ascribed to it; for of that also it is the object. Nor can it be
+maintained that to be a knower is something essentially changing. For to
+be a knower is to be the substrate of the quality of knowledge, and as
+the knowing Self is eternal, knowledge which is an essential quality of
+the Self is also eternal. That the Self is eternal will be declared in
+the Sūtra, II, 3, 17; and in II, 3, 18 the term 'jńa' (knower) will show
+that it is an essential quality of the Self to be the abode of
+knowledge. That a Self whose essential nature is knowledge should be the
+substrate of the (quality of) knowledge--just as gems and the like are
+the substrate of light--gives rise to no contradiction whatever.
+
+Knowledge (the quality) which is in itself unlimited, is capable of
+contraction and expansion, as we shall show later on. In the so-called
+kshetrajńa--condition of the Self, knowledge is, owing to the influence
+of work (karman), of a contracted nature, as it more or less adapts
+itself to work of different kinds, and is variously determined by the
+different senses. With reference to this various flow of knowledge as
+due to the senses, it is spoken of as rising and setting, and the Self
+possesses the quality of an agent. As this quality is not, however,
+essential, but originated by action, the Self is essentially unchanging.
+This changeful quality of being a knower can belong only to the Self
+whose essential nature is knowledge; not possibly to the non-intelligent
+ahamkāra. But, you will perhaps say, the ahamkāra, although of non-
+intelligent nature, may become a knower in so far as by approximation to
+intelligence it becomes a reflection of the latter. How, we ask in
+return, is this becoming a reflection of intelligence imagined to take
+place? Does consciousness become a reflection of the ahamkāra, or does
+the ahamkāra become a reflection of consciousness? The former
+alternative is inadmissible, since you will not allow to consciousness
+the quality of being a knower; and so is the latter since, as explained
+above, the non-intelligent ahamkāra can never become a knower. Moreover,
+neither consciousness nor the ahamkāra are objects of visual perception.
+Only things seen by the eye have reflections.--Let it then be said that
+as an iron ball is heated by contact with fire, so the consciousness of
+being a knower is imparted to the ahamkāra through its contact with
+Intelligence.--This view too is inadmissible; for as you do not allow
+real knowership to Intelligence, knowership or the consciousness of
+knowership cannot be imparted to the ahamkāra by contact with
+Intelligence; and much less even can knowership or the consciousness of
+it be imparted to Intelligence by contact with the essentially non-
+intelligent ahamkāra. Nor can we accept what you say about
+'manifestation.' Neither the ahamkāra, you say, nor Intelligence is
+really a knowing subject, but the ahamkāra manifests consciousness
+abiding within itself (within the ahamkāra), as the mirror manifests the
+image abiding within it. But the essentially non-intelligent ahamkāra
+evidently cannot 'manifest' the self-luminous Self. As has been said
+'That the non-intelligent ahamkāra should manifest the self-luminous
+Self, has no more sense than to say that a spent coal manifests the Sun.'
+The truth is that all things depend for their proof on self-luminous
+consciousness; and now you maintain that one of these things, viz. the
+non-intelligent ahamkāra--which itself depends for its light on
+consciousness--manifests consciousness, whose essential light never
+rises or sets, and which is the cause that proves everything! Whoever
+knows the nature of the Self will justly deride such a view! The
+relation of 'manifestation' cannot hold good between consciousness and
+the ahamkāra for the further reason also that there is a contradiction
+in nature between the two, and because it would imply consciousness not
+to be consciousness. As has been said, 'One cannot manifest the other,
+owing to contradictoriness; and if the Self were something to be
+manifested, that would imply its being non-intelligent like a jar.' Nor
+is the matter improved by your introducing the hand and the sunbeams
+(above, p. 38), and to say that as the sunbeams while manifesting the
+hand, are at the same time manifested by the hand, so consciousness,
+while manifesting the ahamkāra, is at the same time itself manifested by
+the latter. The sunbeams are in reality not manifested by the hand at
+all. What takes place is that the motion of the sunbeams is reversed
+(reflected) by the opposed hand; they thus become more numerous, and
+hence are perceived more clearly; but this is due altogether to the
+multitude of beams, not to any manifesting power on the part of the hand.
+
+What could, moreover, be the nature of that 'manifestation' of the Self
+consisting of Intelligence, which would be effected through the ahamkāra?
+It cannot be origination; for you acknowledge that what is self-
+established cannot be originated by anything else. Nor can it be
+'illumination' (making to shine forth), since consciousness cannot--
+according to you--be the object of another consciousness. For the same
+reason it cannot be any action assisting the means of being conscious of
+consciousness. For such helpful action could be of two kinds only. It
+would either be such as to cause the connexion of the object to be known
+with the sense-organs; as e.g. any action which, in the case of the
+apprehension of a species or of one's own face, causes connexion between
+the organ of sight and an individual of the species, or a looking-glass.
+Or it would be such as to remove some obstructive impurity in the mind
+of the knowing person; of this kind is the action of calmness and self-
+restraint with reference to scripture which is the means of apprehending
+the highest reality. Moreover, even if it were admitted that
+consciousness may be an object of consciousness, it could not be
+maintained that the 'I' assists the means whereby that consciousness is
+effected. For if it did so, it could only be in the way of removing any
+obstacles impeding the origination of such consciousness; analogous to
+the way in which a lamp assists the eye by dispelling the darkness which
+impedes the origination of the apprehension of colour. But in the case
+under discussion we are unable to imagine such obstacles. There is
+nothing pertaining to consciousness which obstructs the origination of
+the knowledge of consciousness and which could be removed by the
+ahamkāra.--There is something, you will perhaps reply, viz. Nescience!
+Not so, we reply. That Nescience is removed by the ahamkāra cannot be
+admitted; knowledge alone can put an end to Nescience. Nor can
+consciousness be the abode of Nescience, because in that case Nescience
+would have the same abode and the same object as knowledge.
+
+In pure knowledge where there is no knowing subject and no object of
+knowledge--the so-called 'witnessing' principle (sākshin)--Nescience
+cannot exist. Jars and similar things cannot be the abode of Nescience
+because there is no possibility of their being the abode of knowledge,
+and for the same reason pure knowledge also cannot be the abode of
+Nescience. And even if consciousness were admitted to be the abode of
+Nescience, it could not be the object of knowledge; for consciousness
+being viewed as the Self cannot be the object of knowledge, and hence
+knowledge cannot terminate the Nescience abiding within consciousness.
+For knowledge puts an end to Nescience only with regard to its own
+objects, as in the case of the snake-rope. And the consequence of this
+would be that the Nescience attached to consciousness could never be
+destroyed by any one.--If Nescience, we further remark, is viewed as
+that which can be defined neither as Being nor non-Being, we shall show
+later on that such Nescience is something quite incomprehensible.--On
+the other hand, Nescience, if understood to be the antecedent non-
+existence of knowledge, is not opposed in nature to the origination of
+knowledge, and hence the dispelling of Nescience cannot be viewed as
+promoting the means of the knowledge of the Self.--From all this it
+follows that the ahamkāra cannot effect in any way 'manifestation of
+consciousness.'
+
+Nor (to finish up this point) can it be said that it is the essential
+nature of manifesting agents to manifest things in so far as the latter
+have their abode in the former; for such a relation is not observed in
+the case of lamps and the like (which manifest what lies outside them).
+The essential nature of manifesting agents rather lies therein that they
+promote the knowledge of things as they really are, and this is also the
+nature of whatever promotes knowledge and the means thereof. Nor is it
+even true that the mirror manifests the face. The mirror is only the
+cause of a certain irregularity, viz. the reversion of the ocular rays
+of light, and to this irregularity there is due the appearance of the
+face within the mirror; but the manifesting agent is the light only. And
+it is evident that the ahamkāra is not capable of producing an
+irregularity (analogous to that produced by the mirror) in consciousness
+which is self-luminous.--And--with regard to the second analogous
+instance alleged by you--the fact is that the species is known through
+the individual because the latter is its substrate (as expressed in the
+general principle, 'the species is the form of the individual'), but not
+because the individual 'manifests' the species. Thus there is no reason,
+either real or springing from some imperfection, why the consciousness
+of consciousness should be brought about by its abiding in the ahamkāra,
+and the attribute of being the knowing agent or the consciousness of
+that cannot therefore belong to the ahamkāra. Hence, what constitutes
+the inward Self is not pure consciousness but the 'I' which proves
+itself as the knowing subject. In the absence of egoity, 'inwardness'
+could not be established for consciousness.
+
+
+
+
+The conscious subject persists in deep sleep.
+
+We now come to the question as to the nature of deep sleep. In deep
+sleep the quality of darkness prevails in the mind and there is no
+consciousness of outward things, and thus there is no distinct and clear
+presentation of the 'I'; but all the same the Self somehow presents
+itself up to the time of waking in the one form of the 'I,' and the
+latter cannot therefore be said to be absent. Pure consciousness assumed
+by you (to manifest itself in deep sleep) is really in no better case;
+for a person risen from deep sleep never represents to himself his
+state of consciousness during sleep in the form, 'I was pure
+consciousness free from all egoity and opposed in nature to everything
+else, witnessing Nescience'; what he thinks is only 'I slept well.' From
+this form of reflection it appears that even during sleep the Self. i.e.
+the 'I,' was a knowing subject and perceptive of pleasure. Nor must you
+urge against this that the reflection has the following form: 'As now I
+feel pleasure, so I slept then also'; for the reflection is distinctly
+_not_ of that kind. [FOOTNOTE 68:1] Nor must you say that owing to the
+non-permanency of the 'I' its perception of pleasure during sleep
+cannot connect itself with the waking state. For (the 'I' is permanent
+as appears from the fact that) the person who has risen from sleep
+recalls things of which he was conscious before his sleep, 'I did such
+and such a thing,' 'I observed this or that,' 'I said so or so.'--But,
+you will perhaps say, he also reflects, 'For such and such a time I was
+conscious of nothing!'--'And what does this imply?' we ask.--'It implies
+a negation of everything!'--By no means, we rejoin. The words 'I was
+conscious' show that the knowing 'I' persisted, and that hence what is
+negated is only the objects of knowledge. If the negation implied in 'of
+nothing' included everything, it would also negative the pure
+consciousness which you hold to persist in deep sleep. In the judgment
+'I was conscious of nothing,' the word 'I' clearly refers to the 'I,' i.
+e. the knowing Self which persists even during deep sleep, while the
+words 'was conscious of nothing' negative all knowledge on the part of
+that 'I'; if, now, in the face of this, you undertake to prove by means
+of this very judgment that knowledge--which is expressly denied--existed
+at the time, and that the persisting knowing Self did not exist, you may
+address your proof to the patient gods who give no reply!--But--our
+opponent goes on to urge--I form the following judgment also: 'I then
+was not conscious of myself,' and from this I understand that the 'I'
+did not persist during deep sleep!--You do not know, we rejoin, that
+this denial of the persistence of the 'I' flatly contradicts the state
+of consciousness expressed in the judgment 'I was not conscious of
+myself' and the verbal form of the judgment itself!--But what then is
+denied by the words 'of myself?--This, we admit, is a reasonable
+question. Let us consider the point. What is negatived in that judgment
+is not the knowing 'I' itself, but merely the distinctions of caste,
+condition of life, &c. which belong to the 'I' at the time of waking. We
+must distinguish the objects of the several parts of the judgment under
+discussion. The object of the '(me) myself' is the 'I' distinguished by
+class characteristics as it presents itself in the waking state; the
+object of the word 'I' (in the judgment) is that 'I' which consists of a
+uniform flow of self-consciousness which persists in sleep also, but is
+then not quite distinct. The judgment 'I did not know myself' therefore
+means that the sleeper was not conscious of the place where he slept, of
+his special characteristics, and so on.--It is, moreover, your own view
+that in deep sleep the Self occupies the position of a witnessing
+principle with regard to Nescience. But by a witness (sākshin) we
+understand some one who knows about something by personal observation
+(sākshāt); a person who does not know cannot be a witness. Accordingly,
+in scripture as well as in ordinary language a knowing subject only, not
+mere knowledge, is spoken of as a witness; and with this the Reverend
+Pānini also agrees when teaching that the word 'sākshin' means one who
+knows in person (Pā. Sū. V, 2, 91). Now this witness is nothing else but
+the 'I' which is apprehended in the judgment 'I know'; and how then
+should this 'I' not be apprehended in the state of sleep? That which
+itself appears to the Self appears as the 'I,' and it thus follows that
+also in deep sleep and similar states the Self which then shines forth
+appears as the 'I.'
+
+[FOOTNOTE 68:1. I. e. the reflection as to the perception of pleasure
+refers to the past state of sleep only, not to the present moment of
+reflection.]
+
+
+
+
+The conscious subject persists in the state of release.
+
+To maintain that the consciousness of the 'I' does not persist in the
+state of final release is again altogether inappropriate. It in fact
+amounts to the doctrine--only expressed in somewhat different words--
+that final release is the annihilation of the Self. The 'I' is not a
+mere attribute of the Self so that even after its destruction the
+essential nature of the Self might persist--as it persists on the
+cessation of ignorance; but it constitutes the very nature of the Self.
+Such judgments as 'I know', 'Knowledge has arisen in me', show, on the
+other hand, that we are conscious of knowledge as a mere attribute of
+the Self.--Moreover, a man who suffering pain, mental or of other kind--
+whether such pain be real or due to error only--puts himself in relation
+to pain--'I am suffering pain'--naturally begins to reflect how he may
+once for all free himself from all these manifold afflictions and enjoy
+a state of untroubled ease; the desire of final release thus having
+arisen in him he at once sets to work to accomplish it. If, on the other
+hand, he were to realise that the effect of such activity would be the
+loss of personal existence, he surely would turn away as soon as
+somebody began to tell him about 'release'. And the result of this would
+be that, in the absence of willing and qualified pupils, the whole
+scriptural teaching as to final release would lose its authoritative
+character.--Nor must you maintain against this that even in the state of
+release there persists pure consciousness; for this by no means improves
+your case. No sensible person exerts himself under the influence of the
+idea that after he himself has perished there will remain some entity
+termed 'pure light!'--What constitutes the 'inward' Self thus is the 'I',
+the knowing subject.
+
+This 'inward' Self shines forth in the state of final release also as an
+'I'; for it appears to itself. The general principle is that whatever
+being appears to itself appears as an 'I'; both parties in the present
+dispute establish the existence of the transmigrating Self on such
+appearance. On the contrary, whatever does not appear as an 'I', does
+not appear to itself; as jars and the like. Now the emancipated Self
+does thus appear to itself, and therefore it appears as an 'I'. Nor does
+this appearance as an 'I' imply in any way that the released Self is
+subject to Nescience and implicated in the Samsāra; for this would
+contradict the nature of final release, and moreover the consciousness
+of the 'I' cannot be the cause of Nescience and so on. Nescience
+(ignorance) is either ignorance as to essential nature, or the cognition
+of something under an aspect different from the real one (as when a
+person suffering from jaundice sees all things yellow); or cognition of
+what is altogether opposite in nature (as when mother o' pearl is
+mistaken for silver). Now the 'I' constitutes the essential nature of
+the Self; how then can the consciousness of the 'I,' i.e. the
+consciousness of its own true nature, implicate the released Self in
+Nescience, or, in the Samsāra? The fact rather is that such
+consciousness destroys Nescience, and so on, because it is essentially
+opposed to them. In agreement with this we observe that persons like the
+rishi Vāmadeva, in whom the intuition of their identity with Brahman had
+totally destroyed all Nescience, enjoyed the consciousness of the
+personal 'I'; for scripture says, 'Seeing this the rishi Vāmadeva
+understood,_I_ was Manu and the Sun' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). And the
+highest Brahman also, which is opposed to all other forms of Nescience
+and denoted and conceived as pure Being, is spoken of in an analogous
+way; cp. 'Let me make each of these three deities,' &c. (Ch. Up. VI, 3,
+3); 'May I be many, may I grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'He thought,
+shall I send forth worlds?' (Ait. Ār. II, 4, 1, 1); and again, 'Since I
+transcend the Destructible, and am higher also than the Indestructible,
+therefore I am proclaimed in the world and in the Veda as the highest
+Person' (Bha. Gī. XV, 18); 'I am the Self, O Gūdākesa.' (Bha. Gī. X, 20);
+'Never was I not' (Bha. Gī. II, 12); 'I am the source and the
+destruction of the whole world' (Bha. Gī. VII, 6); 'I am the source of
+all; from me proceeds everything' (Bha. Gī. X, 8); 'I am he who raises
+them from the ocean of the world of death' (Bha. Gī. XII, 7); 'I am the
+giver of seed, the father' (Bha. Gī. XIV, 4); 'I know the things past'
+(Bha. Gī. VII, 26).--But if the 'I' (aham) constitutes the essential
+nature of the Self, how is it that the Holy One teaches the principle of
+egoity (ahamkāra) to belong to the sphere of objects, 'The great
+elements, the ahamkāra, the understanding (buddhi), and the Unevolved'
+(Bha. Gī. XIII, 5)?--As in all passages, we reply, which give
+information about the true nature of the Self it is spoken of as the 'I',
+we conclude that the 'I' constitutes the essential nature of the inward
+Self. Where, on the other hand, the Holy One declares the ahamkāra--a
+special effect of the Unevolved--to be comprised within the sphere of
+the Objective, he means that principle which is called ahamkāra, because
+it causes the assumption of Egoity on the part of the body which belongs
+to the Not-self. Such egoity constitutes the ahamkāra also designated as
+pride or arrogance, which causes men to slight persons superior to
+themselves, and is referred to by scripture in many places as something
+evil. Such consciousness of the 'I' therefore as is not sublated by
+anything else has the Self for its object; while, on the other hand,
+such consciousness of the 'I' as has the body for its object is mere
+Nescience. In agreement with this the Reverend Parāsara has said, 'Hear
+from me the essential nature of Nescience; it is the attribution of
+Selfhood to what is not the Self.' If the Self were pure consciousness
+then pure consciousness only, and not the quality of being a knowing
+subject, would present itself in the body also, which is a Not-self
+wrongly imagined to be a Self. The conclusion therefore remains that the
+Self is nothing but the knowing 'I'. Thus it has been said, 'As is
+proved by perception, and as also results from reasoning and tradition,
+and from its connexion with ignorance, the Self presents itself as a
+knowing 'I'. And again,'That which is different from body, senses, mind,
+and vital airs; which does not depend on other means; which is permanent,
+pervading, divided according to bodies-that is the Self blessed in
+itself.' Here 'not dependent on other means' means 'self-luminous'; and
+'pervading' means 'being of such a nature as to enter, owing to
+excessive minuteness, into all non-sentient things.'
+
+
+
+
+In cases of Scripture conflicting with Perception, Scripture is not
+stronger. The True cannot be known through the Untrue.
+
+With reference to the assertion (p. 24 ff.) that Perception, which
+depends on the view of plurality, is based on some defect and hence
+admits of being otherwise accounted for--whence it follows that it is
+sublated by Scripture; we ask you to point out what defect it is on
+which Perception is based and may hence be accounted for otherwise.--'
+The beginningless imagination of difference' we expect you to reply.--
+But, we ask in return, have you then come to know by some other means
+that this beginningless imagination of difference, acting in a manner
+analogous to that of certain defects of vision, is really the cause of
+an altogether perverse view of things?--If you reply that this is known
+just from the fact that Perception is in conflict with Scripture, we
+point out that you are reasoning in a circle: you prove the
+defectiveness of the imagination of plurality through the fact that
+Scripture tells us about a substance devoid of all difference; and at
+the same time you prove the latter point through the former. Moreover,
+if Perception gives rise to perverse cognition because it is based on
+the imagination of plurality, Scripture also is in no better case--for
+it is based on the very same view.--If against this you urge that
+Scripture, although based on a defect, yet sublates Perception in so far
+as it is the cause of a cognition which dispels all plurality
+apprehended through Perception, and thus is later in order than
+Perception; we rejoin that the defectiveness of the foundation of
+Scripture having once been recognised, the circumstance of its being
+later is of no avail. For if a man is afraid of a rope which he mistakes
+for a snake his fear does not come to an end because another man, whom
+he considers to be in error himself, tells him 'This is no snake, do not
+be afraid.' And that Scripture _is_ founded on something defective is
+known at the very time of hearing Scripture, for the reflection (which
+follows on hearing) consists in repeated attempts to cognise the oneness
+of Brahman--a cognition which is destructive of all the plurality
+apprehended through the first hearing of the Veda.--We further ask, 'By
+what means do you arrive at the conclusion that Scripture cannot
+possibly be assumed to be defective in any way, while defects may be
+ascribed to Perception'? It is certainly not Consciousness--self-proved
+and absolutely devoid of all difference--which enlightens you on this
+point; for such Consciousness is unrelated to any objects whatever, and
+incapable of partiality to Scripture. Nor can sense-perception be the
+source of your conviction; for as it is founded on what is defective it
+gives perverse information. Nor again the other sources of knowledge;
+for they are all based on sense-perception. As thus there are no
+acknowledged means of knowledge to prove your view, you must give it up.
+But, you will perhaps say, we proceed by means of the ordinary empirical
+means and objects of knowledge!--What, we ask in reply, do you
+understand by 'empirical'?--What rests on immediate unreflective
+knowledge, but is found not to hold good when tested by logical
+reasoning!--But what is the use, we ask, of knowledge of this kind? If
+logical reasoning refutes something known through some means of
+knowledge, that means of knowledge is no longer authoritative!--Now you
+will possibly argue as follows: 'Scripture as well as Perception is
+founded on Nescience; but all the same Perception is sublated by
+Scripture. For as the object of Scripture, i.e. Brahman, which is one
+and without a second, is not seen to be sublated by any ulterior
+cognition, Brahman, i.e. pure non-differenced Consciousness, remains as
+the sole Reality.'--But here too you are wrong, since we must decide
+that something which rests on a defect is unreal, although it may remain
+unrefuted. We will illustrate this point by an analogous instance. Let
+us imagine a race of men afflicted with a certain special defect of
+vision, without being aware of this their defect, dwelling in some
+remote mountain caves inaccessible to all other men provided with sound
+eyes. As we assume all of these cave dwellers to be afflicted with the
+same defect of vision, they, all of them, will equally see and judge
+bright things, e.g. the moon, to be double. Now in the case of these
+people there never arises a subsequent cognition sublating their
+primitive cognition; but the latter is false all the same, and its
+object, viz., the doubleness of the moon, is false likewise; the defect
+of vision being the cause of a cognition not corresponding to reality.--
+And so it is with the cognition of Brahman also. This cognition is based
+on Nescience, and therefore is false, together with its object, viz.
+Brahman, although no sublating cognition presents itself.--This
+conclusion admits of various expressions in logical form. 'The Brahman
+under dispute is false because it is the object of knowledge which has
+sprung from what is affected with Nescience; as the phenomenal world is.'
+'Brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge; as the world
+is.' 'Brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge, the rise
+of which has the Untrue for its cause; as the world is.'
+
+You will now perhaps set forth the following analogy. States of dreaming
+consciousness--such as the perception of elephants and the like in one's
+dreams--are unreal, and yet they are the cause of the knowledge of real
+things, viz. good or ill fortune (portended by those dreams). Hence
+there is no reason why Scripture--although unreal in so far as based on
+Nescience--should not likewise be the cause of the cognition of what is
+real, viz. Brahman.--The two cases are not parallel, we reply. The
+conscious states experienced in dreams are not unreal; it is only their
+objects that are false; these objects only, not the conscious states,
+are sublated by the waking consciousness. Nobody thinks 'the cognitions
+of which I was conscious in my dream are unreal'; what men actually
+think is 'the cognitions are real, but the things are not real.' In the
+same way the illusive state of consciousness which the magician produces
+in the minds of other men by means of mantras, drugs, &c., is true, and
+hence the cause of love and fear; for such states of consciousness also
+are not sublated. The cognition which, owing to some defect in the
+object, the sense organ, &c., apprehends a rope as a snake is real, and
+hence the cause of fear and other emotions. True also is the imagination
+which, owing to the nearness of a snake, arises in the mind of a man
+though not actually bitten, viz. that he has been bitten; true also is
+the representation of the imagined poison, for it may be the cause of
+actual death. In the same way the reflection of the face in the water is
+real, and hence enables us to ascertain details belonging to the real
+face. All these states of consciousness are real, as we conclude from
+their having a beginning and actual effects.--Nor would it avail you to
+object that in the absence of real elephants, and so on, the ideas of
+them cannot be real. For ideas require only _some_ substrate in general;
+the mere appearance of a thing is a sufficient substrate, and such an
+appearance is present in the case in question, owing to a certain defect.
+The thing we determine to be unreal because it is sublated; the idea is
+non-sublated, and therefore real.
+
+Nor can you quote in favour of your view--of the real being known
+through the unreal--the instance of the stroke and the letter. The
+letter being apprehended through the stroke (i.e. the written character)
+does not furnish a case of the real being apprehended through the unreal;
+for the stroke itself is real.--But the stroke causes the idea of the
+letter only in so far as it is apprehended as being a letter, and this
+'being a letter' is untrue!--Not so, we rejoin. If this 'being a letter'
+were unreal it could not be a means of the apprehension of the letter;
+for we neither observe nor can prove that what is non-existent and
+indefinable constitutes a means.--Let then the idea of the letter
+constitute the means!--In that case, we rejoin, the apprehension of the
+real does not spring from the unreal; and besides, it would follow
+therefrom that the means and what is to be effected thereby would be one,
+i.e. both would be, without any distinction, the idea of the letter only.
+Moreover, if the means were constituted by the stroke in so far as it is
+_not_ the letter, the apprehension of all letters would result from the
+sight of one stroke; for one stroke may easily be conceived as _not_
+being _any_ letter.--But, in the same way as the word 'Devadatta'
+conventionally denotes some particular man, so some particular stroke
+apprehended by the eye may conventionally symbolise some particular
+letter to be apprehended by the ear, and thus a particular stroke may be
+the cause of the idea of a particular letter!--Quite so, we reply, but
+on this explanation the real is known through the real; for both stroke
+and conventional power of symbolisation are real. The case is analogous
+to that of the idea of a buffalo being caused by the picture of a
+buffalo; that idea rests on the similarity of picture and thing
+depicted, and that similarity is something real. Nor can it be said
+(with a view to proving the pūrvapaksha by another analogous instance)
+that we meet with a cognition of the real by means of the unreal in the
+case of sound (sabda) which is essentially uniform, but causes the
+apprehension of different things by means of difference of tone (nāda).
+For sound is the cause of the apprehension of different things in so far
+only as we apprehend the connexion of sound manifesting itself in
+various tones, with the different things indicated by those various
+tones [FOOTNOTE 77:1]. And, moreover, it is not correct to argue on the
+ground of the uniformity of sound; for only particular significant
+sounds such as 'ga,' which can be apprehended by the ear, are really
+'sound.'--All this proves that it is difficult indeed to show that the
+knowledge of a true thing, viz. Brahman, can be derived from Scripture,
+if Scripture--as based on Nescience--is itself untrue.
+
+Our opponent may finally argue as follows:--Scripture is not unreal in
+the same sense as a sky-flower is unreal; for antecedently to the
+cognition of universal non-duality Scripture is viewed as something that
+_is_, and only on the rise of that knowledge it is seen to be unreal. At
+this latter time Scripture no longer is a means of cognising Brahman,
+devoid of all difference, consisting of pure Intelligence; as long on
+the other hand as it is such a means, Scripture _is_; for then we judge
+'Scripture is.'--But to this we reply that if Scripture is not (true),
+the judgment 'Scripture is' is false, and hence the knowledge resting on
+false Scripture being false likewise, the object of that knowledge, i.e.
+Brahman itself, is false. If the cognition of fire which rests on mist
+being mistaken for smoke is false, it follows that the object of that
+cognition, viz. fire itself, is likewise unreal. Nor can it be shown
+that (in the case of Brahman) there is no possibility of ulterior
+sublative cognition; for there may be such sublative cognition, viz. the
+one expressed in the judgment 'the Reality is a Void.' And if you say
+that this latter judgment rests on error, we point out that according to
+yourself the knowledge of Brahman is also based on error. And of our
+judgment (viz. 'the Reality is a Void') it may truly be said that all
+further negation is impossible.--But there is no need to continue this
+demolition of an altogether baseless theory.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 77:1. And those manifestations of sound by means of various
+tones are themselves something real.]
+
+
+
+
+No scriptural texts teach a Brahman devoid of all difference.
+
+We now turn to the assertion that certain scriptural texts, as e.g.
+'Being only was this in the beginning,' are meant to teach that there
+truly exists only one homogeneous substance, viz. Intelligence free from
+all difference.--This we cannot allow. For the section in which the
+quoted text occurs, in order to make good the initial declaration that
+by the knowledge of one thing all things are known, shows that the
+highest Brahman which is denoted by the term 'Being' is the substantial
+and also the operative cause of the world; that it is all-knowing,
+endowed with all powers; that its purposes come true; that it is the
+inward principle, the support and the ruler of everything; and that
+distinguished by these and other good qualities it constitutes the Self
+of the entire world; and then finally proceeds to instruct Svetaketu
+that this Brahman constitutes his Self also ('Thou art that'). We have
+fully set forth this point in the Vedārtha-samgraha and shall establish
+it in greater detail in the present work also, in the so-called
+ārambhana-adhikarana.--In the same way the passage 'the higher knowledge
+is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended, &c.' (Mu. Up. I, 1,
+5) first denies of Brahman all the evil qualities connected with Prakriti,
+and then teaches that to it there belong eternity, all-pervadingness,
+subtilty, omnipresence, omniscience, imperishableness, creativeness with
+regard to all beings, and other auspicious qualities. Now we maintain
+that also the text 'True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman', does not
+prove a substance devoid of all difference, for the reason that the
+co-ordination of the terms of which it consists explains itself in so
+far only as denoting one thing distinguished by several attributes. For
+'co-ordination' (sāmānādhikaranya, lit.'the abiding of several things in
+a common substrate') means the reference (of several terms) to one
+thing, there being a difference of reason for the application (of
+several terms to one thing). Now whether we take the several terms,'
+True','Knowledge','Infinite', in their primary sense, i. e. as denoting
+qualities, or as denoting modes of being opposed to whatever is contrary
+to those qualities; in either case we must needs admit a plurality of
+causes for the application of those several terms to one thing. There is
+however that difference between the two alternatives that in the former
+case the terms preserve their primary meaning, while in the latter case
+their denotative power depends on so-called 'implication' (lakshanā).
+Nor can it be said that the opposition in nature to non-knowledge,
+&c.(which is the purport of the terms on the hypothesis of lakshanā),
+constitutes nothing more than the essential nature (of one
+non-differenced substance; the three terms thus having one purport
+only); for as such essential nature would be sufficiently apprehended
+through one term, the employment of further terms would be purposeless.
+This view would moreover be in conflict with co-ordination, as it would
+not allow of difference of motive for several terms applied to one
+thing. On the other hand it cannot be urged against the former
+alternative that the distinction of several attributes predicated of one
+thing implies a distinction in the thing to which the attributes belong,
+and that from this it follows that the several terms denote several
+things--a result which also could not be reconciled with
+'co-ordination'; for what 'co-ordination' aims at is just to convey the
+idea of one thing being qualified by several attributes. For the
+grammarians define 'coordination' as the application, to one thing, of
+several words, for the application of each of which there is a different
+motive.
+
+You have further maintained the following view:--In the text 'one only
+without a second', the phrase 'without a second' negatives all duality
+on Brahman's part even in so far as qualities are concerned. We must
+therefore, according to the principle that all Sākhās convey the same
+doctrine, assume that all texts which speak of Brahman as cause, aim at
+setting forth an absolutely non-dual substance. Of Brahman thus
+indirectly defined as a cause, the text 'The True, knowledge, infinite
+is Brahman,' contains a direct definition; the Brahman here meant to be
+defined must thus be devoid of all qualities. Otherwise, moreover, the
+text would be in conflict with those other texts which declare Brahman
+to be without qualities and blemish.--But this also cannot be admitted.
+What the phrase 'without a second' really aims at intimating is that
+Brahman possesses manifold powers, and this it does by denying the
+existence of another ruling principle different from Brahman. That
+Brahman actually possesses manifold powers the text shows further on,
+'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'it sent forth fire,'
+and so on.--But how are we to know that the mere phrase 'without a
+second' is meant to negative the existence of all other causes in
+general?--As follows, we reply. The clause 'Being only this was in the
+beginning, one only,' teaches that Brahman when about to create
+constitutes the substantial cause of the world. Here the idea of some
+further operative cause capable of giving rise to the effect naturally
+presents itself to the mind, and hence we understand that the added
+clause 'without a second' is meant to negative such an additional cause.
+If it were meant absolutely to deny all duality, it would deny also the
+eternity and other attributes of Brahman which you yourself assume. You
+in this case make just the wrong use of the principle of all the--Sākhās
+containing the same doctrine; what this principle demands is that the
+qualities attributed in all--Sākhās to Brahman as cause should be taken
+over into the passage under discussion also. The same consideration
+teaches us that also the text 'True, knowledge', &c., teaches Brahman to
+possess attributes; for this passage has to be interpreted in agreement
+with the texts referring to Brahman as a cause. Nor does this imply a
+conflict with the texts which declare Brahman to be without qualities;
+for those texts are meant to negative the evil qualities depending on
+Prakriti.--Those texts again which refer to mere knowledge declare
+indeed that knowledge is the essential nature of Brahman, but this does
+not mean that mere knowledge constitutes the fundamental reality. For
+knowledge constitutes the essential nature of a knowing subject only
+which is the substrate of knowledge, in the same way as the sun, lamps,
+and gems are the substrate of Light. That Brahman is a knowing subject
+all scriptural texts declare; cp. 'He who is all knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1,
+9); 'It thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'This divine being thought' (Ch. Up.
+VI, 3, 2); 'He thought, let me send forth the worlds' (Ait. Ār. II,4, 1,
+2); 'He who arranges the wishes--as eternal of those who are not eternal,
+as thinker of (other) thinkers, as one of many' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13);
+'There are two unborn ones--one who knows, one who does not know--one
+strong, the other weak' (Svet. Up. I, 9); 'Let us know Him, the highest
+of Lords, the great Lord, the highest deity of deities, the master of
+masters, the highest above the god, the lord of the world, the adorable
+one' (Svet. Up. VI, 7); 'Of him there is known no effect (body) or
+instrument; no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is
+revealed as manifold, forming his essential nature, as knowledge,
+strength, and action' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'That is the Self, free from
+sin, ageless, deathless, griefless, free from hunger and thirst, whose
+wishes are true, whose purposes are true' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5). These
+and other texts declare that to Brahman, whose essential nature is
+knowledge, there belong many excellent qualities--among which that of
+being a knowing subject stands first, and that Brahman is free from all
+evil qualities. That the texts referring to Brahman as free from
+qualities, and those which speak of it as possessing qualities, have
+really one and the same object may be inferred from the last of the
+passages quoted above; the earlier part of which--'free from sin,' up to
+'free from thirst'--denies of Brahman all evil qualities, while its
+latter part--'whose wishes are true,' and so on--asserts of its certain
+excellent qualities. As thus there is no contradiction between the two
+classes of texts, there is no reason whatever to assume that either of
+them has for its object something that is false.--With regard to the
+concluding passage of the Taittiriya-text, 'from whence all speech,
+together with the mind, turns away, unable to reach it [FOOTNOTE 82:1],'
+we point out that with the passage 'From terror of it the wind blows,'
+there begins a declaration of the qualities of Brahman, and that the
+next section 'one hundred times that human bliss,' &c., makes statements
+as to the relative bliss enjoyed by the different classes of embodied
+souls; the concluding passage 'He who knows the bliss of that Brahman
+from whence all speech, together with the mind, turns away unable to
+reach it,' hence must be taken as proclaiming with emphasis the infinite
+nature of Brahman's auspicious qualities. Moreover, a clause in the
+chapter under discussion--viz. 'he obtains all desires, together with
+Brahman the all-wise' (II, 1)--which gives information as to the fruit
+of the knowledge of Brahman clearly declares the infinite nature of the
+qualities of the highest all-wise Brahman. The desires are the
+auspicious qualities of Brahman which are the objects of desire; the man
+who knows Brahman obtains, together with Brahman, all qualities of it.
+The expression 'together with' is meant to bring out the primary
+importance of the qualities; as also described in the so-called dahara-
+vidyā (Ch. Up. VIII, 1). And that fruit and meditation are of the same
+character (i.e. that in meditations on Brahman its qualities are the
+chief matter of meditation, just as these qualities are the principal
+point in Brahman reached by the Devotee) is proved by the text
+'According to what a man's thought is in this world, so will he be after
+he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1). If it be said that the
+passage 'By whom it is not thought by him it is thought', 'not
+understood by those who understand' (Ke. Up. II, 3), declares Brahman
+not to be an object of knowledge; we deny this, because were it so,
+certain other texts would not teach that final Release results from
+knowledge; cp. 'He who knows Brahman obtains the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II,
+1, 1); 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman.' And, moreover, the text
+'He who knows Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing; he
+who knows Brahman as existing, him we know himself as existing' (Taitt
+Up. II, 6, 1), makes the existence and non-existence of the Self
+dependent on the existence and non-existence of knowledge which has
+Brahman for its object. We thus conclude that all scriptural texts
+enjoin just the knowledge of Brahman for the sake of final Release. This
+knowledge is, as we already know, of the nature of meditation, and what
+is to be meditated on is Brahman as possessing qualities. (The text from
+the Ke. Up. then explains itself as follows:--) We are informed by the
+passage 'from whence speech together with mind turns away, being unable
+to reach it', that the infinite Brahman with its unlimited excellences
+cannot be defined either by mind or speech as being so or so much, and
+from this we conclude the Kena text to mean that Brahman is not thought
+and not understood by those who understand it to be of a definitely
+limited nature; Brahman in truth being unlimited. If the text did not
+mean this, it would be self-contradictory, parts of it saying that
+Brahman is _not_ thought and _not_ understood, and other parts, that it
+_is_ thought and _is_ understood.
+
+Now as regards the assertion that the text 'Thou mayest not see the seer
+of seeing; thou mayest not think the thinker of thinking' (Bri. Up. III,
+5, 2), denies the existence of a seeing and thinking subject different
+from mere seeing and thinking--This view is refuted by the following
+interpretation. The text addresses itself to a person who has formed the
+erroneous opinion that the quality of consciousness or knowledge does
+not constitute the essential nature of the knower, but belongs to it
+only as an adventitious attribute, and tells him 'Do not view or think
+the Self to be such, but consider the seeing and thinking Self to have
+seeing and thinking for its essential nature.'--Or else this text may
+mean that the embodied Self which is the seer of seeing and the thinker
+of thinking should be set aside, and that only the highest Self--the
+inner Self of all beings--should be meditated upon.--Otherwise a
+conflict would arise with texts declaring the knowership of the Self,
+such as 'whereby should he know the knower?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15).
+
+Your assertion that the text 'Bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1)
+proves pure Bliss to constitute the essential nature of Brahman is
+already disposed of by the refutation of the view that knowledge
+(consciousness) constitutes the essential nature of Brahman; Brahman
+being in reality the substrate only of knowledge. For by bliss we
+understand a pleasing state of consciousness. Such passages as
+'consciousness, bliss is Brahman,' therefore mean 'consciousness--the
+essential character of which is bliss--is Brahman.' On this identity of
+the two things there rests that homogeneous character of Brahman, so
+much insisted upon by yourself. And in the same way as numerous passages
+teach that Brahman, while having knowledge for its essential nature, is
+at the same time a knowing subject; so other passages, speaking of
+Brahman as something separate from mere bliss, show it to be not mere
+bliss but a subject enjoying bliss; cp. 'That is one bliss of Brahman'
+(Taitt. Up. II, 8, 4); 'he knowing the bliss of Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II,
+9, 1). To be a subject enjoying bliss is in fact the same as to be a
+conscious subject.
+
+We now turn to the numerous texts which, according to the view of our
+opponent, negative the existence of plurality.--'Where there is duality
+as it were' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'There is not any plurality here; from
+death to death goes he who sees here any plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19);
+'But when for him the Self alone has become all, by what means, and whom,
+should he see?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15) &c.--But what all these texts deny
+is only plurality in so far as contradicting that unity of the world
+which depends on its being in its entirety an effect of Brahman, and
+having Brahman for its inward ruling principle and its true Self. They
+do not, on the other hand, deny that plurality on Brahman's part which
+depends on its intention to become manifold--a plurality proved by the
+text 'May I be many, may I grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3). Nor can our
+opponent urge against this that, owing to the denial of plurality
+contained in other passages this last text refers to something not real;
+for it is an altogether laughable assertion that Scripture should at
+first teach the doctrine, difficult to comprehend, that plurality as
+suggested by Perception and the other means of Knowledge belongs to
+Brahman also, and should afterwards negative this very doctrine!
+
+Nor is it true that the text 'If he makes but the smallest "antaram" (i.
+e. difference, interval, break) in it there is fear for him' (Taitt. Up.
+II, 7) implies that he who sees plurality within Brahman encounters fear.
+For the other text 'All this is Brahman; let a man meditate with calm
+mind on all this as beginning, ending and breathing in it, i.e. Brahman'
+(Ch. Up. III, 14, 1) teaches directly that reflection on the plurality
+of Brahman is the cause of peace of mind. For this passage declares that
+peace of mind is produced by a reflection on the entire world as
+springing from, abiding within, and being absorbed into Brahman, and
+thus having Brahman for its Self; and as thus the view of Brahman
+constituting the Self of the world with all its manifold distinctions of
+gods, men, animals, inanimate matter and so on, is said to be the cause
+of peace of mind, and, consequently, of absence of fear, that same view
+surely cannot be a _cause_ of fear!--But how then is it that the Taitt.
+text declares that 'there is fear for him'?--That text, we reply,
+declares in its earlier part that rest in Brahman is the cause of
+fearlessness ('when he finds freedom from fear, rest, in that which is
+invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported; then he has obtained
+fearlessness'); its latter part therefore means that fear takes place
+when there is an interval, a break, in this resting in Brahman. As the
+great Rishi says 'When Vāsudeva is not meditated on for an hour or even
+a moment only; that is loss, that is great calamity, that is error, that
+is change.'
+
+The Sūtra III, 2, ii does not, as our opponent alleges, refer to a
+Brahman free from all difference, but to Brahman as possessing
+attributes--as we shall show in its place. And the Sūtra IV, 2, 3
+declares that the things seen in dreams are mere 'Māyā' because they
+differ in character from the things perceived in the waking state; from
+which it follows that the latter things are real.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 82:1. Which passage appears to refer to a nirguna brahman,
+whence it might be inferred that the connected initial passage--'Satyam
+jńanam,' &c.--has a similar purport.]
+
+
+
+
+Nor do Smriti and Purāna teach such a doctrine.
+
+Nor is it true that also according to Smriti and Purānas only non-
+differenced consciousness is real and everything else unreal.--'He who
+knows me as unborn and without a beginning, the supreme Lord of the
+worlds' (Bha. Gī. X, 3); 'All beings abide in me, I abide not in them.
+Nay, the beings abide not in me--behold my lordly power. My Self
+bringing forth the beings supports them but does not abide in them' (Bha.
+Gī. IX, 4, 5); 'I am the origin and the dissolution of the entire world;
+higher than I there is nothing else: on me all this is strung as pearls
+on a thread' (Bha. Gī. VII, 6, 7); 'Pervading this entire Universe by a
+portion (of mine) I abide' (Bha. Gī. X, 42); 'But another, the highest
+Person, is called the highest Self who, pervading the three worlds
+supports them, the eternal Lord. Because I transcend the Perishable and
+am higher than the Imperishable even, I am among the people and in the
+Veda celebrated as the supreme Person' (Bha. Gī. XV, 17, 18).
+
+'He transcends the fundamental matter of all beings, its modifications,
+properties and imperfections; he transcends all investing (obscuring)
+influences, he who is the Self of all. Whatever (room) there is in the
+interstices of the world is filled by him; all auspicious qualities
+constitute his nature. The whole creation of beings is taken out of a
+small part of his power. Assuming at will whatever form he desires he
+bestows benefits on the whole world effected by him. Glory, strength,
+dominion, wisdom, energy, power and other attributes are collected in
+him, Supreme of the supreme in whom no troubles abide, ruler over high
+and low, lord in collective and distributive form, non-manifest and
+manifest, universal lord, all-seeing, all-knowing, all-powerful, highest
+Lord. The knowledge by which that perfect, pure, highest, stainless
+homogeneous (Brahman) is known or perceived or comprehended--that is
+knowledge: all else is ignorance' (Vishnu Purāna VI, 5, 82-87).--'To
+that pure one of mighty power, the highest Brahman to which no term is
+applicable, the cause of all causes, the name "Bhagavat" is suitable.
+The letter bha implies both the cherisher and supporter; the letter ga
+the leader, mover and creator. The two syllables bhaga indicate the six
+attributes--dominion, strength, glory, splendour, wisdom, dispassion.
+That in him--the universal Self, the Self of the beings--all beings
+dwell and that he dwells in all, this is the meaning of the letter va.
+Wisdom, might, strength, dominion, glory, without any evil qualities,
+are all denoted by the word bhagavat. This great word bhagavat is the
+name of Vāsudeva who is the highest Brahman--and of no one else. This
+word which denotes persons worthy of reverence in general is used in its
+primary sense with reference to Vāsudeva only; in a derived sense with
+regard to other persons' (Vi. Pu. VI, 5, 72 ff.); 'Where all these
+powers abide, that is the form of him who is the universal form: that is
+the great form of Hari. That form produces in its sport forms endowed
+with all powers, whether of gods or men or animals. For the purpose of
+benefiting the worlds, not springing from work (karman) is this action
+of the unfathomable one; all-pervading, irresistible' (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 69-
+71); 'Him who is of this kind, stainless, eternal, all-pervading,
+imperishable, free from all evil, named Vishnu, the highest abode' (Vi.
+Pu. I, 22,53); 'He who is the highest of the high, the Person, the
+highest Self, founded on himself; who is devoid of all the
+distinguishing characteristics of colour, caste and the like; who is
+exempt from birth, change, increase, decay and death; of whom it can
+only be said that he ever is. He is everywhere and in him everything
+abides; hence he is called Vāsudeva by those who know. He is Brahman,
+eternal, supreme, imperishable, undecaying; of one essential nature and
+ever pure, as free from all defects. This whole world is Brahman,
+comprising within its nature the Evolved and the Unevolved; and also
+existing in the form of the Person and in that of time' (Vi. Pu. I, 2,
+10-14); 'The Prakriti about which I told and which is Evolved as well as
+Unevolved, and the Person--both these are merged in the highest Self.
+The highest Self is the support of all, the highest Lord; as Vishnu he
+is praised in the Vedas and the Vedānta-texts' (Vi. Pu. VI, 4, 38, 39).
+'Two forms are there of that Brahman, one material, the other immaterial.
+These two forms, perishable and imperishable, are within all things: the
+imperishable one is the highest Brahman, the perishable one this whole
+world. As the light of a fire burning in one place spreads all around,
+so the energy of the highest Brahman constitutes this entire world' (Vi.
+Pu. I, 23,53-55). 'The energy of Vishnu is the highest, that which is
+called the embodied soul is inferior; and there is another third energy
+called karman or Nescience, actuated by which the omnipresent energy of
+the embodied soul perpetually undergoes the afflictions of worldly
+existence. Obscured by Nescience the energy of the embodied soul is
+characterised in the different beings by different degrees of
+perfection' (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 61-63).
+
+These and other texts teach that the highest Brahman is essentially free
+from all imperfection whatsoever, comprises within itself all auspicious
+qualities, and finds its pastime in originating, preserving, reabsorbing,
+pervading, and ruling the universe; that the entire complex of
+intelligent and non-intelligent beings (souls and matter) in all their
+different estates is real, and constitutes the form, i.e. the body of
+the highest Brahman, as appears from those passages which co-ordinate it
+with Brahman by means of terms such as sarīra (body), rūpa (form), tanu
+(body), amsa (part), sakti (power), vibhūti (manifestation of power),
+and so on;--that the souls which are a manifestation of Brahman's power
+exist in their own essential nature, and also, through their connexion
+with matter, in the form of embodied souls (kshetrajńa);--and that the
+embodied souls, being engrossed by Nescience in the form of good and
+evil works, do not recognise their essential nature, which is knowledge,
+but view themselves as having the character of material things.--The
+outcome of all this is that we have to cognise Brahman as carrying
+plurality within itself, and the world, which is the manifestation of
+his power, as something real.
+
+When now the text, in the sloka 'where all difference has vanished' (Vi.
+Pu. VI, 7, 53), declares that the Self, although connected with the
+different effects of Prakriti, such as divine, human bodies, and so on,
+yet is essentially free from all such distinctions, and therefore not
+the object of the words denoting those different classes of beings, but
+to be defined as mere knowledge and Being; to be known by the Self and
+not to be reached by the mind of the practitioner of Yoga (yogayuj);
+this must in no way be understood as denying the reality of the world.--
+But how is this known?--As follows, we reply. The chapter of the Purāna
+in which that sloka occurs at first declares concentration (Yoga) to be
+the remedy of all the afflictions of the Samsāra; thereupon explains the
+different stages of Yoga up to the so-called pratyāhāra (complete
+restraining of the senses from receiving external impressions); then, in
+order to teach the attainment of the 'perfect object' (subhāsraya)
+required for dhāranā, declares that the highest Brahman, i. e. Vishnu,
+possesses two forms, called powers (sakti), viz. a denned one (mūrta)
+and an undefined one (amūrta); and then teaches that a portion of the
+'defined' form, viz. the embodied soul (kshetrajńa), which is
+distinguished by its connexion with matter and involved in Nescience--
+that is termed 'action,' and constitutes a third power--is not perfect.
+The chapter further teaches that a portion of the undefined form which
+is free from Nescience called action, separated from all matter, and
+possessing the character of pure knowledge, is also not the 'perfect
+object,' since it is destitute of essential purity; and, finally,
+declares that the 'perfect object' is to be found in that defined form
+which is special to Bhagavat, and which is the abode of the three powers,
+viz. that non-defined form which is the highest power, that non-defined
+form which is termed embodied soul, and constitutes the secondary
+(apara) power, and Nescience in the form of work--which is called the
+third power, and is the cause of the Self, which is of the essence of
+the highest power, passing into the state of embodied soul. This defined
+form (which is the 'perfect object') is proved by certain Vedānta-texts,
+such as 'that great person of sun-like lustre' (Svet. Up. III, 8). We
+hence must take the sloka, 'in which all differences vanish,' &c., to
+mean that the pure Self (the Self in so far as knowledge only) is not
+capable of constituting the 'perfect object.' Analogously two other
+passages declare 'Because this cannot be reflected upon by the beginner
+in Yoga, the second (form) of Vishnu is to be meditated upon by Yogins-
+the highest abode.' 'That in which all these powers have their abode,
+that is the other great form of Hari, different from the (material)
+Visva form.'
+
+In an analogous manner, Parāsara declares that Brahmā, Katurmukha,
+Sanaka, and similar mighty beings which dwell within this world, cannot
+constitute the 'perfect object' because they are involved in Nescience;
+after that goes on to say that the beings found in the Samsāra are in
+the same condition--for they are essentially devoid of purity since they
+reach their true nature, only later on, when through Yoga knowledge has
+arisen in them--; and finally teaches that the essential individual
+nature of the highest Brahman, i.e. Vishnu, constitutes the 'perfect
+object.' 'From Brahmā down to a blade of grass, all living beings that
+dwell within this world are in the power of the Samsāra due to works,
+and hence no profit can be derived by the devout from making them
+objects of their meditation. They are all implicated in Nescience, and
+stand within the sphere of the Samsāra; knowledge arises in them only
+later on, and they are thus of no use in meditation. Their knowledge
+does not belong to them by essential nature, for it comes to them
+through something else. Therefore the stainless Brahman which possesses
+essential knowledge,' &c. &c.--All this proves that the passage 'in
+which all difference vanishes' does not mean to deny the reality of the
+world.
+
+Nor, again, does the passage 'that which has knowledge for its essential
+nature' (Vi. Pu. 1,2,6) imply that the whole complex of things different
+from knowledge is false; for it declares only that the appearance of the
+Self--the essential nature of which is knowledge--as gods, men, and so
+on, is erroneous. A declaration that the appearance of mother o' pearl
+as silver is founded on error surely does not imply that all the silver
+in the world is unreal!--But if, on the ground of an insight into the
+oneness of Brahman and the world--as expressed in texts where the two
+appear in co-ordination--a text declares that it is an error to view
+Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, under the form of material
+things, this after all implies that the whole aggregate of things is
+false!--By no means, we rejoin. As our sįstra distinctly teaches that
+the highest Brahman, i. e. Vishnu, is free from all imperfections
+whatsoever, comprises within himself all auspicious qualities, and
+reveals his power in mighty manifestations, the view of the world's
+reality cannot possibly be erroneous. That information as to the oneness
+of two things by means of co-ordination does not allow of sublation (of
+either of the two), and is non-contradictory, we shall prove further on.
+Hence also the sloka last referred to does not sublate the reality of
+the world.
+
+'That from whence these beings are born, by which, when born, they live,
+into which they enter when they die, endeavour to know that; that is
+Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 1). From this scriptural text we ascertain
+that Brahman is the cause of the origination, and so on, of the world.
+After this we learn from a Purāna text ('He should make the Veda grow by
+means of Itihāsa and Purāna; the Veda fears that a man of little reading
+may do it harm') that the Veda should be made to grow by Itihāsa and
+Purāna. By this 'making to grow' we have to understand the elucidation
+of the sense of the Vedic texts studied by means of other texts,
+promulgated by men who had mastered the entire Veda and its contents,
+and by the strength of their devotion had gained full intuition of Vedic
+truth. Such 'making to grow' must needs be undertaken, since the purport
+of the entire Veda with all its Sākhās cannot be fathomed by one who has
+studied a small part only, and since without knowing that purport we
+cannot arrive at any certitude.
+
+The Vishnu Purāna relates how Maitreya, wishing to have his knowledge of
+Vedic matters strengthened by the holy Parāsara, who through the favour
+of Pulastya and Vasishtha had obtained an insight into the true nature
+of the highest divinity, began to question Parāsara, 'I am desirous to
+hear from thee how this world originated, and how it will again
+originate in future, and of what it consists, and whence proceed animate
+and inanimate things; how and into what it has been resolved, and into
+what it will in future be resolved?' &c. (Vi. Pu. I, 1). The questions
+asked refer to the essential nature of Brahman, the different modes of
+the manifestation of its power, and the different results of
+propitiating it. Among the questions belonging to the first category,
+the question 'whence proceed animate and inanimate things?' relates to
+the efficient and the material cause of the world, and hence the clause
+'of what the world consists' is to be taken as implying a question as to
+what constitutes the Self of this world, which is the object of creation,
+sustentation, and dissolution. The reply to this question is given in
+the words 'and the world is He.' Now the identity expressed by this
+clause is founded thereon that he (i.e. Brahman or Vishnu) pervades the
+world as its Self in the character of its inward Ruler; and is not
+founded on unity of substance of the pervading principle and the world
+pervaded. The phrase 'consists of' (-maya) does not refer to an effect
+(so that the question asked would be as to the causal substance of which
+this world is an effect), for a separate question on this point would be
+needless. Nor does the--maya express, as it sometimes does-e.g. in the
+case of prana-maya [FOOTNOTE 92:1], the own sense of the word to which it
+is attached; for in that case the form of the reply 'and the world is
+He' (which implies a distinction between the world and Vishnu) would be
+inappropriate; the reply would in that case rather be 'Vishnu only.'
+What 'maya' actually denotes here is abundance, prevailingness, in
+agreement with Pānini, V, 4, 21, and the meaning is that Brahman
+prevails in the world in so far as the entire world constitutes its body.
+The co-ordination of the two words 'the world' and 'He' thus rests on
+that relation between the two, owing to which the world is the body of
+Brahman, and Brahman the Self of the world. If, on the other hand, we
+maintained that the sāstra aims only at inculcating the doctrine of one
+substance free from all difference, there would be no sense in all those
+questions and answers, and no sense in an entire nastra devoted to the
+explanation of that one thing. In that case there would be room for one
+question only, viz. 'what is the substrate of the erroneous imagination
+of a world?' and for one answer to this question, viz. 'pure
+consciousness devoid of all distinction!'--And if the co-ordination
+expressed in the clause 'and the world is he' was meant to set forth the
+absolute oneness of the world and Brahman, then it could not be held
+that Brahman possesses all kinds of auspicious qualities, and is opposed
+to all evil; Brahman would rather become the abode of all that is impure.
+All this confirms the conclusion that the co-ordination expressed in
+that clause is to be understood as directly teaching the relation
+between a Self and its body.--The sloka, 'From Vishnu the world has
+sprung: in him he exists: he is the cause of the subsistence and
+dissolution of this world: and the world is he' (Vi. Pu. I, 1, 35),
+states succinctly what a subsequent passage--beginning with 'the highest
+of the high' (Vi. Pu. I, 2, 10)--sets forth in detail. Now there the
+sloka,'to the unchangeable one' (I, 2, 1), renders homage to the holy
+Vishnu, who is the highest Brahman in so far as abiding within his own
+nature, and then the text proceeds to glorify him in his threefold form
+as Hiranyagarbha, Hari, and Sankara, as Pradhāna, Time, and as the
+totality of embodied souls in their combined and distributed form. Here
+the sloka, 'Him whose essential nature is knowledge' (I, 2, 6),
+describes the aspect of the highest Self in so far as abiding in the
+state of discrete embodied souls; the passage cannot therefore be
+understood as referring to a substance free from all difference. If the
+sāstra aimed at teaching that the erroneous conception of a manifold
+world has for its substrate a Brahman consisting of non-differenced
+intelligence, there would be room neither for the objection raised in I,
+3, I ('How can we attribute agency creative and otherwise to Brahman
+which is without qualities, unlimited, pure, stainless?') nor for the
+refutation of that objection, 'Because the powers of all things are the
+objects of (true) knowledge excluding all (bad) reasoning, therefore
+there belong to Brahman also such essential powers as the power of
+creating, preserving, and so on, the world; just as heat essentially
+belongs to fire [FOOTNOTE 94:1].' In that case the objection would rather
+be made in the following form: 'How can Brahman, which is without
+qualities, be the agent in the creation, preservation, and so on, of the
+world?' and the answer would be, 'Creation by Brahman is not something
+real, but something erroneously imagined.'--The purport of the objection
+as it stands in the text is as follows: 'We observe that action creative
+and otherwise belongs to beings endowed with qualities such as goodness,
+and so on, not perfect, and subject to the influence of karman; how then
+can agency creative, and so on, be attributed to Brahman which is devoid
+of qualities, perfect, not under the influence of karman, and incapable
+of any connexion with action?' And the reply is, 'There is nothing
+unreasonable in holding that Brahman as being of the nature described
+above, and different in kind from all things perceived, should possess
+manifold powers; just as fire, which is different in kind from water and
+all other material substances, possesses the quality of heat and other
+qualities.' The slokas also, which begin with the words 'Thou alone art
+real' (Vi. Pu. I, 4, 38 ff.), do not assert that the whole world is
+unreal, but only that, as Brahman is the Self of the world, the latter
+viewed apart from Brahman is not real. This the text proceeds to confirm,
+'thy greatness it is by which all movable and immovable things are
+pervaded.' This means--because all things movable and immovable are
+pervaded by thee, therefore all this world has thee for its Self, and
+hence 'there is none other than thee' and thus thou being the Self of
+all art alone real. Such being the doctrine intended to be set forth,
+the text rightly says, 'this all-pervasiveness of thine is thy
+greatness'; otherwise it would have to say, 'it is thy error.' Were this
+latter view intended, words such as 'Lord of the world,' 'thou,' &c.,
+could not, moreover, be taken in their direct sense, and there would
+arise a contradiction with the subject-matter of the entire chapter, viz.
+the praise of the Holy one who in the form of a mighty boar had uplifted
+in play the entire earth.--Because this entire world is thy form in so
+far as it is pervaded as its Self by thee whose true nature is knowledge;
+therefore those who do not possess that devotion which enables men to
+view thee as the Self of all, erroneously view this world as consisting
+only of gods, men, and other beings; this is the purport of the next
+sloka, 'this which is seen.'--And it is an error not only to view the
+world which has its real Self in thee as consisting of gods, men, and so
+on, but also to consider the Selfs whose true nature is knowledge as
+being of the nature of material beings such as gods, men, and the like;
+this is the meaning of the next sloka, 'this world whose true nature is
+knowledge.'--Those wise men, on the other hand, who have an insight into
+the essentially intelligent Self, and whose minds are cleared by
+devotion--the means of apprehending the Holy one as the universal Self--,
+they view this entire world with all its manifold bodies--the effects of
+primeval matter--as thy body--a body the Self of which is constituted by
+knowledge abiding apart from its world-body; this is the meaning of the
+following sloka: 'But those who possess knowledge,' &c.--If the
+different slokas were not interpreted in this way, they would be mere
+unmeaning reiterations; their constitutive words could not be taken in
+their primary sense; and we should come into conflict with the sense of
+the passages, the subject-matter of the chapter, and the purport of the
+entire sāstra. The passage, further, 'Of that Self although it exists in
+one's own and in other bodies, the knowledge is of one kind' (Vi. Pu. II,
+14, 31 ff.), refers to that view of duality according to which the
+different Selfs--although equal in so far as they are all of the essence
+of knowledge--are constituted into separate beings, gods, men, &c., by
+their connexion with different portions of matter all of which are
+modifications of primary matter, and declares that view to be false. But
+this does not imply a denial of the duality which holds good between
+matter on the one hand and Self on the other: what the passage means is
+that the Self which dwells in the different material bodies of gods, men,
+and so on, is of one and the same kind. So the Holy one himself has said,
+'In the dog and the low man eating dog's flesh the wise see the same';
+'Brahman, without any imperfection, is the same' (Bha. Gī. V, 18, 19).
+And, moreover, the clause 'Of the Self although existing in one's own
+and in other bodies' directly declares that a thing different from the
+body is distributed among one's own and other bodies.
+
+Nor does the passage 'If there is some other (para) different (anya)
+from me,' &c. (Vi. Pu. II, 13, 86) intimate the oneness of the Self; for
+in that case the two words 'para' and 'anya' would express one meaning
+only (viz. 'other' in the sense of 'distinct from'). The word 'para'
+there denotes a Self distinct from that of one's own Self, and the word
+'anya' is introduced to negative a character different from that of pure
+intelligence: the sense of the passage thus is 'If there is some Self
+distinct from mine, and of a character different from mine which is pure
+knowledge, then it can be said that I am of such a character and he of a
+different character'; but this is not the case, because all Selfs are
+equal in as far as their nature consists of pure knowledge.--Also the
+sloka beginning 'Owing to the difference of the holes of the flute' (Vi.
+Pu. II, 14, 32) only declares that the inequality of the different Selfs
+is owing not to their essential nature, but to their dwelling in
+different material bodies; and does not teach the oneness of all Selfs.
+The different portions of air, again, passing through the different
+holes of the flute--to which the many Selfs are compared--are not said
+to be one but only to be equal in character; they are one in character
+in so far as all of them are of the nature of air, while the different
+names of the successive notes of the musical scale are applied to them
+because they pass out by the different holes of the instrument. For an
+analogous reason the several Selfs are denominated by different names,
+viz. gods and so on. Those material things also which are parts of the
+substance fire, or water, or earth, are one in so far only as they
+consist of one kind of substance; but are not absolutely one; those
+different portions of air, therefore, which constitute the notes of the
+scale are likewise not absolutely one. Where the Purāna further says 'He
+(or "that") I am and thou art He (or "that"); all this universe that has
+Self for its true nature is He (or "that"); abandon the error of
+distinction' (Vi. Pu. II, 16, 23); the word 'that' refers to the
+intelligent character mentioned previously which is common to all Selfs,
+and the co-ordination stated in the two clauses therefore intimates that
+intelligence is the character of the beings denoted 'I' and 'Thou';
+'abandon therefore,' the text goes on to say, 'the illusion that the
+difference of outward form, divine and so on, causes a corresponding
+difference in the Selfs.' If this explanation were not accepted (but
+absolute non-difference insisted upon) there would be no room for the
+references to difference which the passages quoted manifestly contain.
+
+Accordingly the text goes on to say that the king acted on the
+instruction he had received, 'he abandoned the view of difference,
+having recognised the Real.'--But on what ground do we arrive at this
+decision (viz. that the passage under discussion is not meant to teach
+absolute non-duality)?--On the ground, we reply, that the proper topic
+of the whole section is to teach the distinction of the Self and the
+body--for this is evident from what is said in an early part of the
+section, 'as the body of man, characterised by hands, feet, and the like,'
+&c. (Vi. Pu. II, 13, 85).--For analogous reasons the sloka 'When that
+knowledge which gives rise to distinction' &c. (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 94)
+teaches neither the essential unity of all Selfs nor the oneness of the
+individual Self and the highest Self. And that the embodied soul and the
+highest Self should be essentially one, is no more possible than that
+the body and the Self should be one. In agreement herewith Scripture
+says, 'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of
+them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up.
+III, 1, 1). 'There are two drinking their reward in the world of their
+own works, entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those
+who know Brahman call them shade and light,' &c. (Ka. Up. I, 3, 1). And
+in this sāstra also (i.e. the Vishnu Purāna) there are passages of
+analogous import; cp. the stanzas quoted above, 'He transcends the
+causal matter, all effects, all imperfections such as the gunas' &c.
+
+The Sūtras also maintain the same doctrine, cp. I, 1, 17; I, 2, 21; II,
+1, 22; and others. They therein follow Scripture, which in several
+places refers to the highest and the individual soul as standing over
+against each other, cp. e.g. 'He who dwells in the Self and within the
+Self, whom the Self does not know, whose body the Self is, who rules the
+Self from within' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Embraced by the intelligent
+Self (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21); 'Mounted by the intelligent Self (IV, 3, 35).
+Nor can the individual Self become one with the highest Self by freeing
+itself from Nescience, with the help of the means of final Release; for
+that which admits of being the abode of Nescience can never become quite
+incapable of it. So the Purāna says, 'It is false to maintain that the
+individual Self and the highest Self enter into real union; for one
+substance cannot pass over into the nature of another substance.'
+Accordingly the Bhagavad Gītā declares that the released soul attains
+only the same attributes as the highest Self. 'Abiding by this knowledge,
+they, attaining to an equality of attributes with me, do neither come
+forth at the time of creation, nor are troubled at the time of general
+destruction' (XIV, 2). Similarly our Purāna says, 'That Brahman leads
+him who meditates on it, and who is capable of change, towards its own
+being (ātmabhāva), in the same way as the magnet attracts the iron' (Vi.
+Pu. VI, 7, 30). Here the phrase 'leads him towards his own being' means
+'imparts to him a nature like his own' (not 'completely identifies him
+with itself'); for the attracted body does not become essentially one
+with the body attracting.
+
+The same view will be set forth by the Sūtrakāra in IV, 4, 17; 21, and I,
+3, 2. The Vritti also says (with reference to Sū. IV, 4, 17) 'with the
+exception of the business of the world (the individual soul in the state
+of release) is equal (to the highest Self) through light'; and the
+author of the Dramidabhāshya says, 'Owing to its equality (sāyujya) with
+the divinity the disembodied soul effects all things, like the divinity.'
+The following scriptural texts establish the same view, 'Those who
+depart from hence, after having known the Self and those true desires,
+for them there is freedom in all the worlds' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 6); 'He
+who knows Brahman reaches the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'He obtains
+all desires together with the intelligent Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1);
+'Having reached the Self which consists of bliss, he wanders about in
+these worlds having as much food and assuming as many forms as he likes'
+(Taitt. Up. III, 10, 5); 'There he moves about' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3);
+'For he is flavour; for only after having perceived a flavour can any
+one perceive pleasure' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); 'As the flowing rivers go to
+their setting in the sea, losing name and form; thus he who knows, freed
+from name and form, goes to the divine Person who is higher than the
+high' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8); 'He who knows, shaking off good and evil,
+reaches the highest oneness, free from stain' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3).
+
+The objects of meditation in all the vidyās which refer to the highest
+Brahman, are Brahman viewed as having qualities, and the fruit of all
+those meditations. For this reason the author of the Sūtras declares
+that there is option among the different vidyās--cp. Ve. Sū. III, 3, II;
+III., 3, 59. In the same way the Vākyakāra teaches that the qualified
+Brahman only is the object of meditation, and that there is option of
+vidyās; where he says '(Brahman) connected (with qualities), since the
+meditation refers to its qualities.' The same view is expressed by the
+Bhāshyakāra in the passage beginning 'Although he who bases himself on
+the knowledge of Being.'--Texts such as 'He knows Brahman, he becomes
+Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9) have the same purport, for they must be
+taken in connexion with the other texts (referring to the fate of him
+who knows) such as 'Freed from name and form he goes to the divine
+Person who is higher than the high'; 'Free from stain he reaches the
+highest oneness' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8; III, 1,3); 'Having approached the
+highest light he manifests himself in his own shape' (Kh. Up. VIII, 3,
+4). Of him who has freed himself from his ordinary name and form, and
+all the distinctions founded thereon, and has assumed the uniform
+character of intelligence, it may be said that he is of the character of
+Brahman.--Our Purāna also propounds the same view. The sloka (VI, 7, 91),
+'Knowledge is the means to obtain what is to be obtained, viz. the
+highest Brahman: the Self is to be obtained, freed from all kinds of
+imagination,' states that that Self which through meditation on Brahman,
+is freed from all imagination so as to be like Brahman, is the object to
+be attained. (The three forms of imagination to be got rid of are so-
+called karma-bhāvanā, brahma-bhāvanā and a combination of the two. See
+Vi. Pu. VI, 7.) The text then goes on, 'The embodied Self is the user of
+the instrument, knowledge is its instrument; having accomplished Release--
+whereby his object is attained--he may leave off.' This means that the
+Devotee is to practise meditation on the highest Brahman until it has
+accomplished its end, viz. the attainment of the Self free from all
+imagination.--The text continues, 'Having attained the being of its
+being, then he is non-different from the highest Self; his difference is
+founded on Nescience only.' This sloka describes the state of the
+released soul. 'Its being' is the being, viz. the character or nature,
+of Brahman; but this does not mean absolute oneness of nature; because
+in this latter case the second 'being' would be out of place and the
+sloka would contradict what had been said before. The meaning is: when
+the soul has attained the nature of Brahman, i.e. when it has freed
+itself from all false imagination, then it is non-different from the
+highest Self. This non-difference is due to the soul, as well as the
+highest Self, having the essential nature of uniform intelligence. The
+difference of the soul--presenting itself as the soul of a god, a man,
+&c.--from the highest Self is not due to its essential nature, but rests
+on the basis of Nescience in the form of work: when through meditation
+on Brahman this basis is destroyed, the difference due to it comes to an
+end, and the soul no longer differs from the highest Self. So another
+text says, 'The difference of things of one nature is due to the
+investing agency of outward works; when the difference of gods, men,
+&c., is destroyed, it has no longer any investing power' (Vi. Pu. II,
+14, 33).--The text then adds a further explanation, 'when the knowledge
+which gives rise to manifold difference is completely destroyed, who
+then will produce difference that has no real existence?' The manifold
+difference is the distinction of gods, men, animals, and inanimate
+things: compare the saying of Saunaka:'this fourfold distinction is
+founded on false knowledge.' The Self has knowledge for its essential
+nature; when Nescience called work--which is the cause of the manifold
+distinctions of gods, men, &c.--has been completely destroyed through
+meditation on the highest Brahman, who then will bring about the
+distinction of gods, & c., from the highest Self--a distinction which in
+the absence of a cause cannot truly exist.--That Nescience is called
+karman (work) is stated in the same chapter of the Purāna (st.
+61--avidyā karmasamjńa).
+
+The passage in the Bhagavad Gītā, 'Know me to be the kshetrajńa' (XIII,
+2), teaches the oneness of all in so far as the highest Self is the
+inward ruler of all; taken in any other sense it would be in conflict
+with other texts, such as 'All creatures are the Perishable, the
+unchanging soul is the Imperishable; but another is the highest Person'
+(Bha. Gī. XV, 16). In other places the Divine one declares that as
+inward Ruler he is the Self of all: 'The Lord dwells in the heart of all
+creatures' (XVIII, 61), and 'I dwell within the heart of all' (XV, 15).
+and 'I am the Self which has its abode within all creatures' (X, 20).
+The term 'creature' in these passages denotes the entire aggregate of
+body, &c., up to the Self.--Because he is the Self of all, the text
+expressly denies that among all the things constituting his body there
+is any one separate from him,'There is not anything which is without me'
+(X, 39). The place where this text occurs is the winding up of a
+glorification of the Divine one, and the text has to be understood
+accordingly. The passage immediately following is 'Whatever being there
+is, powerful, beautiful, or glorious, even that know thou to have sprung
+from a portion of my glory; pervading this entire Universe by a portion
+of mine I do abide' (X, 41; 42).
+
+All this clearly proves that the authoritative books do _not_ teach the
+doctrine of one non-differenced substance; that they do _not_ teach that
+the universe of things is false; and that they do _not_ deny the
+essential distinction of intelligent beings, non-intelligent things, and
+the Lord.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 92:1. 'Prānamaya' is explained as meaning 'prana' only.]
+
+[FOOTNOTE 94:1. The sense in which this sloka has to be taken is 'As in
+ordinary life we ascribe to certain things (e.g. gems, mantras) certain
+special powers because otherwise the effects they produce could not be
+accounted for; so to Brahman also,' &c.]
+
+
+
+
+The theory of Nescience cannot be proved.
+
+We now proceed to the consideration of Nescience.--According to the view
+of our opponent, this entire world, with all its endless distinctions of
+Ruler, creatures ruled, and so on, is, owing to a certain defect,
+fictitiously superimposed upon the non-differenced, self-luminous
+Reality; and what constitutes that defect is beginningless Nescience,
+which invests the Reality, gives rise to manifold illusions, and cannot
+be denned either as being or non-being. Such Nescience, he says, must
+necessarily be admitted, firstly on the ground of scriptural texts, such
+as 'Hidden by what is untrue' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2), and secondly because
+otherwise the oneness of the individual souls with Brahman--which is
+taught by texts such as 'Thou are that'--cannot be established. This
+Nescience is neither 'being,' because in that case it could not be the
+object of erroneous cognition (bhrama) and sublation (bādha); nor is it
+'non-being,' because in that case it could not be the object of
+apprehension and sublation [FOOTNOTE 102:1]. Hence orthodox Philosophers
+declare that this Nescience falls under neither of these two opposite
+categories.
+
+Now this theory of Nescience is altogether untenable. In the first place
+we ask, 'What is the substrate of this Nescience which gives rise to the
+great error of plurality of existence?' You cannot reply 'the individual
+soul'; for the individual soul itself exists in so far only as it is
+fictitiously imagined through Nescience. Nor can you say 'Brahman'; for
+Brahman is nothing but self-luminous intelligence, and hence
+contradictory in nature to Nescience, which is avowedly sublated by
+knowledge.
+
+'The highest Brahman has knowledge for its essential nature: if
+Nescience, which is essentially false and to be terminated by knowledge,
+invests Brahman, who then will be strong enough to put an end to it?'
+
+'What puts an end to Nescience is the knowledge that Brahman is pure
+knowledge!'--'Not so, for that knowledge also is, like Brahman, of the
+nature of light, and hence has no power to put an end to Nescience.--And
+if there exists the knowledge that Brahman is knowledge, then Brahman is
+an object of knowledge, and that, according to your own teaching,
+implies that Brahman is not of the nature of consciousness.'
+
+To explain the second of these slokas.--If you maintain that what
+sublates Nescience is not that knowledge which constitutes Brahman's
+essential nature, but rather that knowledge which has for its object the
+truth of Brahman being of such a nature, we demur; for as both these
+kinds of knowledge are of the same nature, viz. the nature of light,
+which is just that which constitutes Brahman's nature, there is no
+reason for making a distinction and saying that one knowledge is
+contradictory of Nescience, and the other is not. Or, to put it
+otherwise--that essential nature of Brahman which is apprehended through
+the cognition that Brahman is knowledge, itself shines forth in
+consequence of the self-luminous nature of Brahman, and hence we have no
+right to make a distinction between that knowledge which constitutes
+Brahman's nature, and that of which that nature is the object, and to
+maintain that the latter only is antagonistic to Nescience.--Moreover
+(and this explains the third sloka), according to your own view Brahman,
+which is mere consciousness, cannot be the object of another
+consciousness, and hence there is no knowledge which has Brahman for its
+object. If, therefore, knowledge is contradictory to non-knowledge
+(Nescience), Brahman itself must be contradictory to it, and hence
+cannot be its substrate. Shells (mistaken for silver) and the like which
+by themselves are incapable of throwing light upon their own true nature
+are not contradictory to non-knowledge of themselves, and depend, for
+the termination of that non-knowledge, on another knowledge (viz. on the
+knowledge of an intelligent being); Brahman, on the other hand, whose
+essential nature is established by its own consciousness, is
+contradictorily opposed to non-knowledge of itself, and hence does not
+depend, for the termination of that non-knowledge, on some other
+knowledge.--If our opponent should argue that the knowledge of the
+falsity of whatever is other than Brahman is contradictory to non-
+knowledge, we ask whether this knowledge of the falsity of what is other
+than Brahman is contradictory to the non-knowledge of the true nature of
+Brahman, or to that non-knowledge which consists in the view of the
+reality of the apparent world. The former alternative is inadmissible;
+because the cognition of the falsity of what is other than Brahman has a
+different object (from the non-knowledge of Brahman's true nature) and
+therefore cannot be contradictory to it; for knowledge and non-knowledge
+are contradictory in so far only as they refer to one and the same
+object. And with regard to the latter alternative we point out that the
+knowledge of the falsity of the world is contradictory to the non-
+knowledge which consists in the view of the reality of the world; the
+former knowledge therefore sublates the latter non-knowledge only, while
+the non-knowledge of the true nature of Brahman is not touched by it.--
+Against this it will perhaps be urged that what is here called the non-
+knowledge of the true nature of Brahman, really is the view of Brahman
+being dual in nature, and that this view is put an end to by the
+cognition of the falsity of whatever is other than Brahman; while the
+true nature of Brahman itself is established by its own consciousness.--
+But this too we refuse to admit. If non-duality constitutes the true
+nature of Brahman, and is proved by Brahman's own consciousness, there
+is room neither for what is contradictory to it, viz. that non-knowledge
+which consists in the view of duality, nor for the sublation of that non-
+knowledge.--Let then non-duality be taken for an attribute (not the
+essential nature) of Brahman!--This too we refuse to admit; for you
+yourself have proved that Brahman, which is pure Consciousness, is free
+from attributes which are objects of Consciousness.--From all this it
+follows that Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, cannot be the
+substrate of Nescience: the theory, in fact, involves a flat
+contradiction.
+
+When, in the next place, you maintain that Brahman, whose nature is
+homogeneous intelligence, is invested and hidden by Nescience, you
+thereby assert the destruction of Brahman's essential nature. Causing
+light to disappear means either obstructing the origination of light, or
+else destroying light that exists. And as you teach that light
+(consciousness) cannot originate, the 'hiding' or 'making to disappear'
+of light can only mean its destruction.--Consider the following point
+also. Your theory is that self-luminous consciousness, which is without
+object and without substrate, becomes, through the influence of an
+imperfection residing within itself, conscious of itself as connected
+with innumerous substrata and innumerous objects.--Is then, we ask, that
+imperfection residing within consciousness something real or something
+unreal?--The former alternative is excluded, as not being admitted by
+yourself. Nor can we accept the latter alternative; for if we did we
+should have to view that imperfection as being either a knowing subject,
+or an object of knowledge, or Knowing itself. Now it cannot be 'Knowing,'
+as you deny that there is any distinction in the nature of knowing;
+and that 'Knowing,' which is the substrate of the imperfection, cannot
+be held to be unreal, because that would involve the acceptance of the
+Mādhyamika doctrine, viz. of a general void [FOOTNOTE 106:1].
+
+And if knowers, objects of knowledge and knowing as determined by those
+two are fictitious, i.e. unreal, we have to assume another fundamental
+imperfection, and are thus driven into a _regressuss in infinitum_.--To
+avoid this difficulty, it might now be said that real consciousness
+itself, which constitutes Brahman's nature, is that imperfection.--But
+if Brahman itself constitutes the imperfection, then Brahman is the
+basis of the appearance of a world, and it is gratuitous to assume an
+additional avidyā to account for the vorld. Moreover, as Brahman is
+eternal, it would follow from this hypothesis that no release could ever
+take place. Unless, therefore, you admit a real imperfection apart from
+Brahman, you are unable to account for the great world-error.
+
+What, to come to the next point, do you understand by the
+inexplicability (anirvakaniyatā) of Nescience? Its difference in nature
+from that which _is_, as well as that which _is not_! A thing of such
+kind would be inexplicable indeed; for none of the means of knowledge
+apply to it. That is to say--the whole world of objects must be ordered
+according to our states of consciousness, and every state of
+consciousness presents itself in the form, either of something existing
+or of something non-existing. If, therefore, we should assume that of
+states of consciousness which are limited to this double form, the
+object can be something which is neither existing nor non-existing, then
+anything whatever might be the object of any state of consciousness
+whatever.
+
+Against this our opponent may now argue as follows:--There is, after all,
+something, called avidyā, or ajńāna, or by some other name, which is a
+positive entity (bhāva), different from the antecedent non-existence of
+knowledge; which effects the obscuration of the Real; which is the
+material cause of the erroneous superimposition on the Real, of manifold
+external and internal things; and which is terminated by the cognition
+of the true nature of the one substance which constitutes Reality. For
+this avidyā is apprehended through Perception as well as Inference.
+Brahman, in so far as limited by this avidyā, is the material cause of
+the erroneous superimposition--upon the inward Self, which in itself is
+changeless pure intelligence, but has its true nature obscured by this
+superimposition--of that plurality which comprises the ahamkāra, all
+acts of knowledge and all objects of knowledge. Through special forms of
+this defect (i.e. avidyā) there are produced, in this world superimposed
+upon Reality, the manifold special superimpositions presenting
+themselves in the form of things and cognitions of things--such as
+snakes (superimposed upon ropes), silver (superimposed on shells), and
+the like. Avidyā constitutes the material cause of this entire false
+world; since for a false thing we must needs infer a false cause. That
+this avidyā or ajńāna (non-knowledge) is an object of internal
+Perception, follows from the fact that judgments such as 'I do not know',
+'I do not know either myself or others,' directly present themselves to
+the mind. A mental state of this kind has for its object not that non-
+knowledge which is the antecedent non-existence of knowledge--for such
+absence of knowledge is ascertained by the sixth means of proof
+(anupalabdhi); it rather is a state which presents its object directly,
+and thus is of the same kind as the state expressed in the judgment 'I
+am experiencing pleasure.' Even if we admit that 'absence of something'
+(abhāva) can be the object of perception, the state of consciousness
+under discussion cannot have absence of knowledge in the Self for its
+object. For at the very moment of such consciousness knowledge exists;
+or if it does not exist there can be no consciousness of the absence of
+knowledge. To explain. When I am conscious that I am non-knowing, is
+there or is there not apprehension of the Self as having non-existence
+of knowledge for its attribute, and of knowledge as the counterentity of
+non-knowledge? In the former case there can be no consciousness of the
+absence of knowledge, for that would imply a contradiction. In the
+latter case, such consciousness can all the less exist, for it
+presupposes knowledge of that to which absence of knowledge belongs as
+an attribute (viz. the Self) and of its own counterentity, viz.
+knowledge. The same difficulty arises if we view the absence of
+knowledge as either the object of Inference, or as the object of the
+special means of proof called 'abhāva' (i.e. anupalabdhi). If, on the
+other hand, non-knowledge is viewed (not as a merely negative, but) as a
+positive entity, there arises no contradiction even if there is (as
+there is in fact) at the same time knowledge of the Self as qualified by
+non-knowledge, and of knowledge as the counterentity of non-knowledge;
+and we therefore must accept the conclusion that the state of
+consciousness expressed by 'I am non-knowing,' has for its object a non-
+knowledge which is a positive entity.--But, a Nescience which is a
+positive entity, contradicts the witnessing consciousness, whose nature
+consists in the lighting up of the truth of things! Not so, we reply.
+Witnessing consciousness has for its object not the true nature of
+things, but Nescience; for otherwise the lighting up (i.e. the
+consciousness) of false things could not take place. Knowledge which has
+for its object non-knowledge (Nescience), does not put an end to that
+non-knowledge. Hence there is no contradiction (between kaitanya and
+ajńana).--But, a new objection is raised, this positive entity,
+Nescience, becomes an object of witnessing Consciousness, only in so far
+as it (Nescience) is defined by some particular object (viz. the
+particular thing which is not known), and such objects depend for their
+proof on the different means of knowledge. How then can that Nescience,
+which is defined by the 'I' (as expressed e. g. in the judgment, 'I do
+not know myself'), become the object of witnessing Consciousness?--There
+is no difficulty here, we reply. All things whatsoever are objects of
+Consciousness, either as things known or as things not known. But while
+the mediation of the means of knowledge is required in the case of all
+those things which, as being non-intelligent (jada), can be proved only
+in so far as being objects known (through some means of knowledge), such
+mediation is not required in the case of the intelligent (ajada) inner
+Self which proves itself. Consciousness of Nescience is thus possible in
+all cases (including the case 'I do not know myself'), since witnessing
+Consciousness always gives definition to Nescience.--From all this it
+follows that, through Perception confirmed by Reasoning, we apprehend
+Nescience as a positive entity. This Nescience, viewed as a positive
+entity, is also proved by Inference, viz. in the following form: All
+knowledge established by one of the different means of proof is preceded
+by something else, which is different from the mere antecedent non-
+existence of knowledge; which hides the object of knowledge; which is
+terminated by knowledge; and which exists in the same place as knowledge;
+because knowledge possesses the property of illumining things not
+illumined before;--just as the light of a lamp lit in the dark illumines
+things.--Nor must you object to this inference on the ground that
+darkness is not a substance, but rather the mere absence of light, or
+else the absence of visual perception of form and colour, and that hence
+darkness cannot be brought forward as a similar instance proving
+Nescience to be a positive entity. For that Darkness must be considered
+a positive substance follows, firstly, from its being more or less dense,
+and secondly, from its being perceived as having colour.
+
+To all this we make the following reply. Neither Perception alone, nor
+Perception aided by Reasoning, reveals to us a positive entity,
+Nescience, as implied in judgments such as 'I am non-knowing,' 'I know
+neither myself nor others.' The contradiction which was urged above
+against the view of non-knowledge being the antecedent non-existence of
+knowledge, presents itself equally in connexion with non-knowledge
+viewed as a positive entity. For here the following alternative presents
+itself--the inner Reality is either known or not known as that which
+gives definition to Nescience by being either its object or its
+substrate. If it be thus known, then there is in it no room for
+Nescience which is said to be that which is put an end to by the
+cognition of the true nature of the Inner Reality. If, on the other hand,
+it be not thus known, how should there be a consciousness of Nescience
+in the absence of that which defines it, viz. knowledge of the substrate
+or of the object of Nescience?--Let it then be said that what is
+contradictory to non-knowledge is the clear presentation of the nature
+of the inner Self, and that (while there is consciousness of ajńāna) we
+have only an obscure presentation of the nature of the Self; things
+being thus, there is no contradiction between the cognition of the
+substrate and object of Nescience on the one side, and the consciousness
+of ajńāna on the other.--Well, we reply, all this holds good on our side
+also. Even if ajńāna means antecedent non-existence of knowledge, we can
+say that knowledge of the substrate and object of non-knowledge has for
+its object the Self presented obscurely only; and thus there is no
+difference between our views--unless you choose to be obstinate!
+
+Whether we view non-knowledge as a positive entity or as the antecedent
+non-existence of knowledge, in either case it comes out as what the word
+indicates, viz. non-knowledge. Non-knowledge means either absence of
+knowledge, or that which is other than knowledge, or that which is
+contradictory to knowledge; and in any of these cases we have to admit
+that non-knowledge presupposes the cognition of the nature of knowledge.
+Even though the cognition of the nature of darkness should not require
+the knowledge of the nature of light, yet when darkness is considered
+under the aspect of being contrary to light, this presupposes the
+cognition of light. And the non-knowledge held by you is never known in
+its own nature but merely as 'non-knowledge,' and it therefore
+presupposes the cognition of knowledge no less than our view does,
+according to which non-knowledge is simply the negation of knowledge.
+Now antecedent non-existence of knowledge is admitted by you also, and
+is an undoubted object of consciousness; the right conclusion therefore
+is that what we are conscious of in such judgments as 'I am non-knowing,'
+&c., is this very antecedent non-existence of knowledge which we both
+admit.
+
+It, moreover, is impossible to ascribe to Brahman, whose nature is
+constituted by eternal free self-luminous intelligence, the
+consciousness of Nescience; for what constitutes its essence is
+consciousness of itself. If against this you urge that Brahman, although
+having consciousness of Self for its essential nature, yet is conscious
+of non-knowledge in so far as its (Brahman's) nature is hidden; we ask
+in return what we have to understand by Brahman's nature being hidden.
+You will perhaps say 'the fact of its not being illumined.' But how, we
+ask, can there be absence of illumination of the nature of that whose
+very nature consists in consciousness of Self, i.e. self-illumination?
+If you reply that even that whose nature is consciousness of Self may be
+in the state of its nature not being illumined by an outside agency, we
+point out that as according to you light cannot be considered us an
+attribute, but constitutes the very nature of Brahman, it would--
+illumination coming from an external agency--follow that the very nature
+of Brahman can be destroyed from the outside. This we have already
+remarked.--Further, your view implies on the one hand that this non-
+knowledge which is the cause of the concealment of Brahman's nature
+hides Brahman in so far as Brahman is conscious of it, and on the other
+hand that having hidden Brahman, it becomes the object of consciousness
+on the part of Brahman; and this evidently constitutes a logical see-saw.
+You will perhaps say [FOOTNOTE 111:1] that it hides Brahman in so far
+only as Brahman is conscious of it. But, we point out, if the
+consciousness of ajńāna takes place on the part of a Brahman whose
+nature is not hidden, the whole hypothesis of the 'hiding' of Brahman's
+nature loses its purport, and with it the fundamental hypothesis as to
+the nature of ajnāna; for if Brahman may be conscious of ajnāna (without
+a previous obscuration of its nature by ajnāna) it may as well be held
+to be in the same way conscious of the world, which, by you, is
+considered to be an effect of ajnāna.
+
+How, further, do you conceive this consciousness of ajnāna on Brahman's
+part? Is it due to Brahman itself, or to something else? In the former
+case this consciousness would result from Brahman's essential nature,
+and hence there would never be any Release. Or else, consciousness of
+ajnāna constituting the nature of Brahman, which is admittedly pure
+consciousness, in the same way as the consciousness of false silver is
+terminated by that cognition which sublates the silver, so some
+terminating act of cognition would eventually put an end to Brahman's
+essential nature itself.--On the second alternative we ask what that
+something else should be. If you reply 'another ajnāna,' we are led into
+a _regressus in infinitum_.--Let it then be said [FOOTNOTE 112:1] that
+ajnāna having first hidden Brahman then becomes the object of its
+consciousness. This, we rejoin, would imply that ajnāna acting like a
+defect of the eye by its very essential being hides Brahman, and then
+ajnāna could not be sublated by knowledge. Let us then put the case as
+follows:--Ajnāna, which is by itself beginningless, at the very same
+time effects Brahman's witnessing it (being conscious of it), and
+Brahman's nature being hidden; in this way the _regressus in infinitum_
+and other difficulties will be avoided.--But this also we cannot admit;
+for Brahman is essentially consciousness of Self, and cannot become a
+witnessing principle unless its nature be previously hidden.--Let then
+Brahman be hidden by some other cause!--This, we rejoin, would take away
+from ajnāna its alleged beginninglessness, and further would also lead
+to an infinite regress. And if Brahman were assumed to become a witness,
+without its essential nature being hidden, it could not possess--what
+yet it is maintained to possess--the uniform character of consciousness
+of Self.--If, moreover, Brahman is hidden by avidyā, does it then not
+shine forth at all, or does it shine forth to some extent? On the former
+alternative the not shining forth of Brahman--whose nature is mere light--
+reduces it to an absolute non-entity. Regarding the latter alternative
+we ask, 'of Brahman, which is of an absolutely homogeneous nature, which
+part do you consider to be concealed, and which to shine forth?' To that
+substance which is pure light, free from all division and distinction,
+there cannot belong two modes of being, and hence obscuration and light
+cannot abide in it together.--Let us then say that Brahman, which is
+homogeneous being, intelligence, bliss, has its nature obscured by
+avidyā, and hence is seen indistinctly as it were.--But how, we ask, are
+we to conceive the distinctness or indistinctness of that whose nature
+is pure light? When an object of light which has parts and
+distinguishing attributes appears in its totality, we say that it
+appears distinctly; while we say that its appearance is indistinct when
+some of its attributes do not appear. Now in those aspects of the thing
+which do not appear, light (illumination) is absent altogether, and
+hence we cannot there speak of indistinctness of light; in those parts
+on the other hand which do appear, the light of which they are the
+object is distinct. Indistinctness is thus not possible at all where
+there is light. In the case of such things as are apprehended as objects,
+indistinctness may take place, viz. in so far as some of their
+distinguishing attributes are not apprehended. But in Brahman, which is
+not an object, without any distinguishing attributes, pure light, the
+essential nature of which it is to shine forth, indistinctness which
+consists in the non-apprehension of certain attributes can in no way be
+conceived, and hence not be explained as the effect of avidyā.
+
+We, moreover, must ask the following question: 'Is this indistinctness
+which you consider an effect of avidyā put an end to by the rise of true
+knowledge or not?' On the latter alternative there would be no final
+release. In the former case we have to ask of what nature Reality is.
+'It is of an essentially clear and distinct nature.' Does this nature
+then exist previously (to the cessation of indistinctness), or not? If
+it does, there is no room whatever either for indistinctness the effect
+of avidyā, or for its cessation. If it does not previously exist, then
+Release discloses itself as something to be effected, and therefore non-
+eternal.--And that such non-knowledge is impossible because there is no
+definable substrate for it we have shown above.--He, moreover, who holds
+the theory of error resting on a non-real defect, will find it difficult
+to prove the impossibility of error being without any substrate; for, if
+the cause of error may be unreal, error may be supposed to take place
+even in case of its substrate being unreal. And the consequence of this
+would be the theory of a general Void.
+
+The assertion, again, that non-knowledge as a positive entity is proved
+by Inference, also is groundless. But the inference was actually set
+forth!--True; but it was set forth badly. For the reason you employed
+for proving ajńāna is a so-called contradictory one (i.e. it proves the
+contrary of what it is meant to prove), in so far as it proves what is
+not desired and what is different from ajńāna (for what it proves is
+that there is a certain _knowledge_, viz. that all knowledge resting on
+valid means of proof has non-knowledge for its antecedent). (And with
+regard to this knowledge again we must ask whether it also has non-
+knowledge for its antecedent.) If the reason (relied on in all this
+argumentation) does not prove, in this case also, the antecedent
+existence of positive non-knowledge, it is too general (and hence not to
+be trusted in any case). If, on the other hand, it does prove antecedent
+non-knowledge, then this latter non-knowledge stands in the way of the
+non-knowledge (which you try to prove by inference) being an object of
+consciousness, and thus the whole supposition of ajńāna as an entity
+becomes useless.
+
+The proving instance, moreover, adduced by our opponent, has no proving
+power; for the light of a lamp does not possess the property of
+illumining things not illumined before. Everywhere illumining power
+belongs to knowledge only; there may be light, but if there is not also
+Knowledge there is no lighting up of objects. The senses also are only
+causes of the origination of knowledge, and possess no illumining power.
+The function of the light of the lamp on the other hand is a merely
+auxiliary one, in so far as it dispels the darkness antagonistic to the
+organ of sight which gives rise to knowledge; and it is only with a view
+to this auxiliary action that illumining power is conventionally
+ascribed to the lamp.--But in using the light of the lamp as a proving
+instance, we did not mean to maintain that it possesses illumining power
+equal to that of light; we introduced it merely with reference to the
+illumining power of knowledge, in so far as preceded by the removal of
+what obscures its object!--We refuse to accept this explanation.
+Illumining power does not only mean the dispelling of what is
+antagonistic to it, but also the defining of things, i.e. the rendering
+them capable of being objects of empirical thought and speech; and this
+belongs to knowledge only (not to the light of the lamp). If you allow
+the power of illumining what was not illumined, to auxiliary factors
+also, you must first of all allow it to the senses which are the most
+eminent factors of that kind; and as in their case there exists no
+different thing to be terminated by their activity, (i.e. nothing
+analogous to the ajńāna to be terminated by knowledge), this whole
+argumentation is beside the point.
+
+There are also formal inferences, opposed to the conclusion of the
+pūrvapakshin.--Of the ajńāna under discussion, Brahman, which is mere
+knowledge, is not the substrate, just because it is ajńāna; as shown by
+the case of the non-knowledge of the shell (mistaken for silver) and
+similar cases; for such non-knowledge abides within the knowing subject.--
+The ajńāna under discussion does not obscure knowledge, just because it
+is ajńāna; as shown by the cases of the shell, &c.; for such non-
+knowledge hides the object.--Ajńāna is not terminated by knowledge,
+because it does not hide the object of knowledge; whatever non-knowledge
+is terminated by knowledge, is such as to hide the object of knowledge;
+as e.g. the non-knowledge of the shell.--Brahman is not the substrate of
+ajńāna, because it is devoid of the character of knowing subject; like
+jars and similar things.--Brahman is not hidden by ajńāna, because it is
+not the object of knowledge; whatever is hidden by non-knowledge is the
+object of knowledge; so e.g. shells and similar things.--Brahman is not
+connected with non-knowledge to be terminated by knowledge, because it
+is not the object of knowledge; whatever is connected with non-knowledge
+to be terminated by knowledge is an object of knowledge; as e.g. shells
+and the like. Knowledge based on valid means of proof, has not for its
+antecedent, non-knowledge other than the antecedent non-existence of
+knowledge; just because it is knowledge based on valid proof; like that
+valid knowledge which proves the ajńāna maintained by you.--Knowledge
+does not destroy a real thing, because it is knowledge in the absence of
+some specific power strengthening it; whatever is capable of destroying
+things is--whether it be knowledge or ajńāna--strengthened by some
+specific power; as e.g. the knowledge of the Lord and of Yogins; and as
+the ajńāna consisting in a pestle (the blow of which destroys the pot).
+
+Ajńāna which has the character of a positive entity cannot be destroyed
+by knowledge; just because it is a positive entity, like jars and
+similar things.
+
+But, it now may be said, we observe that fear and other affections,
+which are positive entities and produced by previous cognitions, are
+destroyed by sublative acts of cognition!--Not so, we reply. Those
+affections are not destroyed by knowledge; they rather pass away by
+themselves, being of a momentary (temporary) nature only, and on the
+cessation of their cause they do not arise again. That they are of a
+momentary nature only, follows from their being observed only in
+immediate connexion with the causes of their origination, and not
+otherwise. If they were not of a temporary nature, each element of the
+stream of cognitions, which are the cause of fear and the like, would
+give rise to a separate feeling of fear, and the result would be that
+there would be consciousness of many distinct feelings of fear (and this
+we know not to be the case).--In conclusion we remark that in defining
+right knowledge as 'that which has for its antecedent another entity,
+different from its own antecedent non-existence,' you do not give proof
+of very eminent logical acuteness; for what sense has it to predicate of
+an entity that it is different from nonentity?--For all these reasons
+Inference also does not prove an ajńāna which is a positive entity. And
+that it is not proved by Scripture and arthāpatti, will be shown later
+on. And the reasoning under Sū. II, 1, 4. will dispose of the argument
+which maintains that of a false thing the substantial cause also must be
+false.
+
+We thus see that there is no cognition of any kind which has for its
+object a Nescience of 'inexplicable' nature.--Nor can such an
+inexplicable entity be admitted on the ground of apprehension, erroneous
+apprehension and sublation (cp. above, p. 102). For that only which is
+actually apprehended, can be the object of apprehension, error and
+sublation, and we have no right to assume, as an object of these states
+of consciousness, something which is apprehended neither by them nor any
+other state of consciousness.--'But in the case of the shell, &c.,
+silver is actually apprehended, and at the same time there arises the
+sublating consciousness "this silver is not real," and it is not
+possible that one thing should appear as another; we therefore are
+driven to the hypothesis that owing to some defect, we actually
+apprehend silver of an altogether peculiar kind, viz. such as can be
+defined neither as real nor as unreal.'--This also we cannot allow,
+since this very assumption necessarily implies that one thing appears as
+another. For apprehension, activity, sublation, and erroneous cognition,
+all result only from one thing appearing as another, and it is not
+reasonable to assume something altogether non-perceived and groundless.
+The silver, when apprehended, is not apprehended as something
+'inexplicable,' but as something real; were it apprehended under the
+former aspect it could be the object neither of erroneous nor of
+sublative cognition, nor would the apprehending person endeavour to
+seize it. For these reasons you (the anirva-kaniyatva-vādin) also must
+admit that the actual process is that of one thing appearing as another.
+
+Those also who hold other theories as to the kind of cognition under
+discussion (of which the shell, mistaken for silver, is an instance)
+must--whatsoever effort they may make to avoid it--admit that their
+theory finally implies the appearing of one thing as another. The so-
+called asatkhyāti-view implies that the non-existing appears as existing;
+the ātmakhyāti-view, that the Self--which here means 'cognition'--
+appears as a thing; and the akhyāti-view, that the attribute of one
+thing appears as that of another, that two acts of cognition appear as
+one, and--on the view of the non-existence of the object--that the non-
+existing appears as existing [FOOTNOTE 118:1].
+
+Moreover, if you say that there is originated silver of a totally new
+inexplicable kind, you are bound to assign the cause of this origination.
+This cause cannot be the perception of the silver; for the perception
+has the silver for its object, and hence has no existence before the
+origination of the silver. And should you say that the perception,
+having arisen without an object, produces the silver and thereupon makes
+it its object, we truly do not know what to say to such excellent
+reasoning!--Let it then be said that the cause is some defect in the
+sense-organ.--This, too, is inadmissible; for a defect abiding in the
+percipient person cannot produce an objective effect.--Nor can the
+organs of sense (apart from defects) give rise to the silver; for they
+are causes of cognitions only (not of things cognised). Nor, again, the
+sense-organs in so far as modified by some defect; for they also can
+only produce modifications in what is effected by them, i.e. cognition.
+And the hypothesis of a beginningless, false ajńāna constituting the
+general material cause of all erroneous cognitions has been refuted
+above.
+
+How is it, moreover, that this new and inexplicable thing (which you
+assume to account for the silver perceived on the shell) becomes to us
+the object of the idea and word 'silver,' and not of some other idea and
+term, e.g. of a jar?--If you reply that this is due to its similarity to
+silver, we point out that in that case the idea and the word presenting
+themselves to our mind should be that of 'something resembling silver.'
+Should you, on the other hand, say that we apprehend the thing as silver
+because it possesses the generic characteristics of silver, we ask
+whether these generic characteristics are real or unreal. The former
+alternative is impossible, because something real cannot belong to what
+is unreal; and the latter is impossible because something unreal cannot
+belong to what is real.
+
+But we need not extend any further this refutation of an altogether ill-
+founded theory.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 102:1. 'Nescience' is sublated (refuted) by the cognition of
+Brahman, and thereby shown to have been the object of erroneous
+cognition: it thus cannot be 'being,' i.e. real. Nor can it be
+altogether unreal, 'non-being,' because in that case it could not be the
+object either of mental apprehension or of sublation.]
+
+[FOOTNOTE 106:1. If the imperfection inhering in Consciousness is itself
+of the nature of consciousness, and at the same time unreal, we should
+have to distinguish two kinds of Consciousness--which is contrary to the
+fundamental doctrine of the oneness of Consciousness. And if, on the
+other hand, we should say that the Consciousness in which the
+imperfection inheres is of the same nature as the latter, i.e. unreal,
+we are landed in the view of universal unreality.]
+
+[FOOTNOTE 111:1. Allowing the former view of the question only.]
+
+[FOOTNOTE 112:1. Adopting the latter view only; see preceding note.]
+
+[FOOTNOTE 118:1. For a full explanation of the nature of these 'khyātis,'
+see A. Venis' translation of the Vedānta Siddhānta Muktāvali (Reprint
+from the Pandit, p. 130 ff.).]
+
+
+
+
+All knowledge is of the Real.
+
+'Those who understand the Veda hold that all cognition has for its
+object what is real; for Sruti and Smriti alike teach that everything
+participates in the nature of everything else. In the scriptural account
+of creation preceded by intention on the part of the Creator it is said
+that each of these elements was made tripartite; and this tripartite
+constitution of all things is apprehended by Perception as well. The red
+colour in burning fire comes from (primal elementary) fire, the white
+colour from water, the black colour from earth--in this way Scripture
+explains the threefold nature of burning fire. In the same way all
+things are composed of elements of all things. The Vishnu Purāna, in its
+account of creation, makes a similar statement: "The elements possessing
+various powers and being unconnected could not, without combination,
+produce living beings, not having mingled in any way. Having combined,
+therefore, with one another, and entering into mutual associations--
+beginning with the principle called Mahat, and extending down to the
+gross elements--they formed an egg," &c. (Vi. Pu. I, 2, 50; 52). This
+tripartiteness of the elements the Sūtrakāra also declares (Ve. Sū. III,
+1, 3). For the same reason Sruti enjoins the use of Putīka sprouts when
+no Soma can be procured; for, as the Mīmāmsakas explain, there are in
+the Putīka plant some parts of the Soma plant (Pū. Mī. Sū.); and for the
+same reason nīvāra grains may be used as a substitute for rice grains.
+That thing is similar to another which contains within itself some part
+of that other thing; and Scripture itself has thus stated that in shells,
+&c., there is contained some silver, and so on. That one thing is
+called "silver" and another "shell" has its reason in the relative
+preponderance of one or the other element. We observe that shells are
+similar to silver; thus perception itself informs us that some elements
+of the latter actually exist in the former. Sometimes it happens that
+owing to a defect of the eye the silver-element only is apprehended, not
+the shell-element, and then the percipient person, desirous of silver,
+moves to pick up the shell. If, on the other hand, his eye is free from
+such defect, he apprehends the shell-element and then refrains from
+action. Hence the cognition of silver in the shell is a true one. In the
+same way the relation of one cognition being sublated by another
+explains itself through the preponderant element, according as the
+preponderance of the shell-element is apprehended partially or in its
+totality, and does not therefore depend on one cognition having for its
+object the false thing and another the true thing. The distinctions made
+in the practical thought and business of life thus explain themselves on
+the basis of everything participating in the nature of everything else.'
+
+In dreams, again, the divinity creates, in accordance with the merit or
+demerit of living beings, things of a special nature, subsisting for a
+certain time only, and perceived only by the individual soul for which
+they are meant. In agreement herewith Scripture says, with reference to
+the state of dreaming, 'There are no chariots in that state, no horses,
+no roads; then he creates chariots, horses, and roads. There are no
+delights, no joys, no bliss; then he creates delights, joys, and bliss.
+There are no tanks, no lakes, no rivers; then he creates tanks, lakes,
+and rivers. For he is the maker' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10). The meaning of
+this is, that although there are then no chariots, &c., to be perceived
+by other persons, the Lord creates such things to be perceived by the
+dreaming person only. 'For he is the maker'; for such creative agency
+belongs to him who possesses the wonderful power of making all his
+wishes and plans to come true. Similarly another passage, 'That person
+who is awake in those who are asleep, shaping one lovely sight after
+another, that indeed is the Bright, that is Brahman, that alone is
+called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one goes
+beyond it' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 8).--The Sūtrakāra also, after having in two
+Sūtras (III, 2, 1; 2) stated the hypothesis of the individual soul
+creating the objects appearing in dreams, finally decides that that
+wonderful creation is produced by the Lord for the benefit of the
+individual dreamer; for the reason that as long as the individual soul
+is in the samsāra state, its true nature--comprising the power of making
+its wishes to come true--is not fully manifested, and hence it cannot
+practically exercise that power. The last clause of the Katha text ('all
+worlds are contained in it,' &c.) clearly shows that the highest Self
+only is the creator meant. That the dreaming person who lies in his
+chamber should go in his body to other countries and experience various
+results of his merit or demerit--being at one time crowned a king,
+having at another time his head cut off, and so on--is possible in so
+far as there is created for him another body in every way resembling the
+body resting on the bed.
+
+The case of the white shell being seen as yellow, explains itself as
+follows. The visual rays issuing from the eye are in contact with the
+bile contained in the eye, and thereupon enter into conjunction with the
+shell; the result is that the whiteness belonging to the shell is
+overpowered by the yellowness of the bile, and hence not apprehended;
+the shell thus appears yellow, just as if it were gilt. The bile and its
+yellowness is, owing to its exceeding tenuity, not perceived by the
+bystanders; but thin though it be it is apprehended by the person
+suffering from jaundice, to whom it is very near, in so far as it issues
+from his own eye, and through the mediation of the visual rays, aided by
+the action of the impression produced on the mind by that apprehension,
+it is apprehended even in the distant object, viz. the shell.--In an
+analogous way the crystal which is placed near the rose is apprehended
+as red, for it is overpowered by the brilliant colour of the rose; the
+brilliancy of the rose is perceived in a more distinct way owing to its
+close conjunction with the transparent substance of the crystal.--In the
+same way the cognition of water in the mirage is true. There always
+exists water in connexion with light and earth; but owing to some defect
+of the eye of the perceiving person, and to the mysterious influence of
+merit and demerit, the light and the earth are not apprehended, while
+the water _is_ apprehended.--In the case again of the firebrand swung
+round rapidly, its appearance as a fiery wheel explains itself through
+the circumstance that moving very rapidly it is in conjunction with all
+points of the circle described without our being able to apprehend the
+intervals. The case is analogous to that of the perception of a real
+wheel; but there is the difference that in the case of the wheel no
+intervals are apprehended, because there are none; while in the case of
+the firebrand none are apprehended owing to the rapidity of the movement.
+But in the latter case also the cognition is true.--Again, in the case
+of mirrors and similar reflecting surfaces the perception of one's own
+face is likewise true. The fact is that the motion of the visual rays
+(proceeding from the eye towards the mirror) is reversed (reflected) by
+the mirror, and that thus those rays apprehend the person's own face,
+subsequently to the apprehension of the surface of the mirror; and as in
+this case also, owing to the rapidity of the process, there is no
+apprehension of any interval (between the mirror and the face), the face
+presents itself as being in the mirror.--In the case of one direction
+being mistaken for another (as when a person thinks the south to be
+where the north is), the fact is that, owing to the unseen principle (i.
+e. merit or demerit), the direction which actually exists in the other
+direction (for a point which is to the north of me is to the south of
+another point) is apprehended by itself, apart from the other elements
+of direction; the apprehension which actually takes place is thus
+likewise true. Similar is the case of the double moon. Here, either
+through pressure of the finger upon the eye, or owing to some abnormal
+affection of the eye, the visual rays are divided (split), and the
+double, mutually independent apparatus of vision thus originating,
+becomes the cause of a double apprehension of the moon. One apparatus
+apprehends the moon in her proper place; the other which moves somewhat
+obliquely, apprehends at first a place close by the moon, and then the
+moon herself, which thus appears somewhat removed from her proper place.
+Although, therefore, what is apprehended is the one moon distinguished
+by connection with two places at the same time--an apprehension due to
+the double apparatus of vision--yet, owing to the difference of
+apprehensions, there is a difference in the character of the object
+apprehended, and an absence of the apprehension of unity, and thus a
+double moon presents itself to perception. That the second spot is
+viewed as qualifying the moon, is due to the circumstance that the
+apprehension of that spot, and that of the moon which is not apprehended
+in her proper place, are simultaneous. Now here the doubleness of the
+apparatus is real, and hence the apprehension of the moon distinguished
+by connexion with two places is real also, and owing to this doubleness
+of apprehension, the doubleness of aspect of the object apprehended, i.e.
+the moon, is likewise real. That there is only one moon constituting the
+true object of the double apprehension, this is a matter for which
+ocular perception by itself does not suffice, and hence what is actually
+seen is a double moon. That, although the two eyes together constitute
+one visual apparatus only, the visual rays being divided through some
+defect of the eyes, give rise to a double apparatus--this we infer from
+the effect actually observed. When that defect is removed there takes
+place only one apprehension of the moon as connected with her proper
+place, and thus the idea of one moon only arises. It is at the same time
+quite clear how the defect of the eye gives rise to a double visual
+apparatus, the latter to a double apprehension, and the latter again to
+a doubleness of the object of apprehension.
+
+We have thus proved that all cognition is true. The shortcomings of
+other views as to the nature of cognition have been set forth at length
+by other philosophers, and we therefore do not enter on that topic. What
+need is there, in fact, of lengthy proofs? Those who acknowledge the
+validity of the different means of knowledge, perception, and so on, and--
+what is vouched for by sacred tradition--the existence of a highest
+Brahman--free from all shadow of imperfection, of measureless excellence,
+comprising within itself numberless auspicious qualities, all-knowing,
+immediately realising all its purposes--, what should they not be able
+to prove? That holy highest Brahman--while producing the entire world as
+an object of fruition for the individual souls, in agreement with their
+respective good and ill deserts--creates certain things of such a nature
+as to become common objects of consciousness, either pleasant or
+unpleasant, to all souls together, while certain other things are
+created in such a way as to be perceived only by particular persons, and
+to persist for a limited time only. And it is this distinction--viz. of
+things that are objects of general consciousness, and of things that are
+not so--which makes the difference between what is called 'things
+sublating' and 'things sublated.'--Everything is explained hereby.
+
+
+
+
+Neither Scripture nor Smriti and Purāna teach Nescience.
+
+The assertion that Nescience--to be defined neither as that which is nor
+as that which is not--rests on the authority of Scripture is untrue. In
+passages such as 'hidden by the untrue' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2), the word
+'untrue' does not denote the Undefinable; it rather means that which is
+different from 'rita,' and this latter word--as we see from the passage
+'enjoying the rita' (Ka. Up. 1,3, 1)--denotes such actions as aim at no
+worldly end, but only at the propitiation of the highest Person, and
+thus enable the devotee to reach him. The word 'anrita' therefore
+denotes actions of a different kind, i.e. such as aim at worldly results
+and thus stand in the way of the soul reaching Brahman; in agreement
+with the passage 'they do not find that Brahma-world, for they are
+carried away by anrita' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2). Again, in the text 'Then
+there was neither non-Being nor Being' (Ri. Samh. X, 129, 1), the terms
+'being' and 'non-being' denote intelligent and non-intelligent beings in
+their distributive state. What that text aims at stating is that
+intelligent and non-intelligent beings, which at the time of the
+origination of the world are called 'sat' and 'tyat' (Taitt. Up. II, 6),
+are, during the period of reabsorption, merged in the collective
+totality of non-intelligent matter which the text denotes by the term
+'darkness' (Ri. Samh. X, 129, 3). There is thus no reference whatever to
+something 'not definable either as being or non-being': the terms
+'being' and 'non-being' are applied to different mode; of being at
+different times. That the term 'darkness' denotes the collective
+totality of non-intelligent matter appears from another scriptural
+passage, viz, 'The Non-evolved (avyaktam) is merged in the Imperishable
+(akshara), the Imperishable in darkness (tamas), darkness becomes one
+with the highest divinity.' True, the word 'darkness' denotes the subtle
+condition of primeval matter (prakriti), which forms the totality of non-
+intelligent things; but this very Prakriti is called Māyā--in the text
+'Know Prakriti to be Māyā,' and this proves it be something
+'undefinable': Not so, we reply; we meet with no passages where the word
+'Māyā' denotes that which is undefinable. But the word 'Māyā' is
+synonymous with 'mithyā,' i.e. falsehood, and hence denotes the
+Undefinable also. This, too, we cannot admit; for the word 'Māyā' does
+not in all places refer to what is false; we see it applied e.g. to such
+things as the weapons of Asuras and Rākshasas, which are not 'false' but
+real. 'Māyā,' in such passages, really denotes that which produces
+various wonderful effects, and it is in this sense that Prakriti is
+called Māyā. This appears from the passage (Svet. Up. IV, 9) 'From that
+the "māyin" creates all this, and in that the other one is bound up by
+māyā.' For this text declares that Prakriti--there called Māyā--produces
+manifold wonderful creations, and the highest Person is there called
+'māyin' because he possesses that power of māyā; not on account of any
+ignorance or nescience on his part. The latter part of the text
+expressly says that (not the Lord but) another one, i.e. the individual
+soul is bound up by māyā; and therewith agrees another text, viz. 'When
+the soul slumbering in beginningless Māyā awakes' (Gaud. Kā.). Again, in
+the text 'Indra goes multiform through the Māyās' (Ri. Samh. VI, 47, 18),
+the manifold powers of Indra are spoken of, and with this agrees what
+the next verse says, 'he shines greatly as Tvashtri': for an unreal
+being does not shine. And where the text says 'my Māyā is hard to
+overcome' (Bha. Gī. VII, 14), the qualification given there to Māyā, viz.
+'consisting of the gunas,' shows that what is meant is Prakriti
+consisting of the three gunas.--All this shows that Scripture does not
+teach the existence of a 'principle called Nescience, not to be defined
+either as that which is or that which is not.'
+
+Nor again is such Nescience to be assumed for the reason that otherwise
+the scriptural statements of the unity of all being would be unmeaning.
+For if the text 'Thou art that,' be viewed as teaching the unity of the
+individual soul and the highest Self, there is certainly no reason,
+founded on unmeaningness, to ascribe to Brahman, intimated by the word
+'that'--which is all-knowing, &c.--Nescience, which is contradictory to
+Brahman's nature.--Itihāsa and Purāna also do not anywhere teach that to
+Brahman there belongs Nescience.
+
+But, an objection is raised, the Vishnu Purāna, in the sloka, 'The stars
+are Vishnu,' &c. (II, 12, 38), first refers to Brahman as one only, and
+comprising all things within itself; thereupon states in the next sloka
+that this entire world, with all its distinctions of hills, oceans, &c.,
+is sprung out of the 'ajńāna' of Brahman, which in itself is pure 'jńāna,'
+i.e. knowledge; thereupon confirms the view of the world having sprung
+from ajńāna by referring to the fact that Brahman, while abiding in its
+own nature, is free from all difference (sl. 40); proves in the next two
+slokas the non-reality of plurality by a consideration of the things of
+this world; sums up, in the following sloka, the unreality of all that
+is different from Brahman; then (43) explains that action is the root of
+that ajńāna which causes us to view the one uniform Brahman as manifold;
+thereupon declares the intelligence constituting Brahman's nature to be
+free from all distinction and imperfection (44); and finally teaches
+(45) that Brahman so constituted, alone is truly real, while the so-
+called reality of the world is merely conventional.--This is not, we
+reply, a true representation of the drift of the passage. The passage at
+the outset states that, in addition to the detailed description of the
+world given before, there will now be given a succinct account of
+another aspect of the world not yet touched upon. This account has to be
+understood as follows. Of this universe, comprising intelligent and non-
+intelligent beings, the intelligent part--which is not to be reached by
+mind and speech, to be known in its essential nature by the Self only,
+and, owing to its purely intelligential character, not touched by the
+differences due to Prakriti--is, owing to its imperishable nature,
+denoted as that which is; while the non-intelligent, material; part
+which, in consequence of the actions of the intelligent beings undergoes
+manifold changes, and thus is perishable, is denoted as that which is
+not. Both parts, however, form the body of Vāsudeva, i.e. Brahman, and
+hence have Brahman for their Self. The text therefore says (37), 'From
+the waters which form the body of Vishnu was produced the lotus-shaped
+earth, with its seas and mountains': what is meant is that the entire
+Brahma-egg which has arisen from water constitutes the body of which
+Vishnu is the soul. This relation of soul and body forms the basis of
+the statements of co-ordination made in the next sloka (38), 'The stars
+are Vishnu,' &c.; the same relation had been already declared in
+numerous previous passages of the Purāna ('all this is the body of Hari,'
+&c.). All things in the world, whether they are or are not, are
+Vishnu's body, and he is their soul. Of the next sloka, 'Because the
+Lord has knowledge for his essential nature,' the meaning is 'Because of
+the Lord who abides as the Self of all individual souls, the essential
+nature is knowledge only--while bodies divine, human, &c., have no part
+in it--, therefore all non-intelligent things, bodies human and divine,
+hills, oceans, &c., spring from his knowledge, i.e. have their root in
+the actions springing from the volitions of men, gods, &c., in whose
+various forms the fundamental intelligence manifests itself. And since
+non-intelligent matter is subject to changes corresponding to the
+actions of the individual souls, it may be called 'non-being,' while the
+souls are 'being.'--This the next sloka further explains 'when knowledge
+is pure,' &c. The meaning is 'when the works which are the cause of the
+distinction of things are destroyed, then all the distinctions of bodies,
+human or divine, hills, oceans, &c.--all which are objects of fruition
+for the different individual souls--pass away.' Non-intelligent matter,
+as entering into various states of a non-permanent nature, is called
+'non-being'; while souls, the nature of which consists in permanent
+knowledge, are called 'being.' On this difference the next sloka insists
+(41). We say 'it is' of that thing which is of a permanently uniform
+nature, not connected with the idea of beginning, middle and end, and
+which hence never becomes the object of the notion of non-existence;
+while we say 'it is not' of non-intelligent matter which constantly
+passes over into different states, each later state being out of
+connexion with the earlier state. The constant changes to which non-
+intelligent matter is liable are illustrated in the next sloka, 'Earth
+is made into a jar,' &c. And for this reason, the subsequent sloka goes
+on to say that there _is_ nothing but knowledge. This fundamental
+knowledge or intelligence is, however, variously connected with manifold
+individual forms of being due to karman, and hence the text adds: 'The
+one intelligence is in many ways connected with beings whose minds
+differ, owing to the difference of their own acts' (sl 43, second half).
+Intelligence, pure, free from stain and grief, &c., which constitutes
+the intelligent element of the world, and unintelligent matter--these
+two together constitute the world, and the world is the body of Vāsudeva;
+such is the purport of sloka 44.--The next sloka sums up the whole
+doctrine; the words 'true and untrue' there denote what in the preceding
+verses had been called 'being' and 'non-being'; the second half of the
+sloka refers to the practical plurality of the world as due to karman.
+
+Now all these slokas do not contain a single word supporting the
+doctrine of a Brahman free from all difference; of a principle called
+Nescience abiding within Brahman and to be defined neither as that which
+is nor as that which is not; and of the world being wrongly imagined,
+owing to Nescience. The expressions 'that which is' and 'that which is
+not' (sl 35), and 'satya' (true) and 'asatya' (untrue; sl 45), can in no
+way denote something not to be defined either as being or non-being. By
+'that which is not' or 'which is untrue,' we have to understand not what
+is undefinable, but that which has no true being, in so far as it is
+changeable and perishable. Of this character is all non-intelligent
+matter. This also appears from the instance adduced in sl 42: the jar is
+something perishable, but not a thing devoid of proof or to be sublated
+by true knowledge. 'Non-being' we may call it, in so far as while it is
+observed at a certain moment in a certain form it is at some other
+moment observed in a different condition. But there is no contradiction
+between two different conditions of a thing which are perceived at
+different times; and hence there is no reason to call it something
+futile (tuchcha) or false (mithyā), &c.
+
+
+
+
+Scripture does not teach that Release is due to the knowledge of a non-
+qualified Brahman.--the meaning of 'tat tvam asi.'
+
+Nor can we admit the assertion that Scripture teaches the cessation of
+avidyā to spring only from the cognition of a Brahman devoid of all
+difference. Such a view is clearly negatived by passages such as the
+following: 'I know that great person of sun-like lustre beyond darkness;
+knowing him a man becomes immortal, there is no other path to go' (Svet.
+Up. III, 8); 'All moments sprang from lightning, the Person--none is
+lord over him, his name is great glory--they who know him become
+immortal' (Mahānā. Up. I, 8-11). For the reason that Brahman is
+characterised by difference all Vedic texts declare that final release
+results from the cognition of a qualified Brahman. And that even those
+texts which describe Brahman by means of negations really aim at setting
+forth a Brahman possessing attributes, we have already shown above.
+
+In texts, again, such as 'Thou art that,' the co-ordination of the
+constituent parts is not meant to convey the idea of the absolute unity
+of a non-differenced substance: on the contrary, the words 'that' and
+'thou' denote a Brahman distinguished by difference. The word 'that'
+refers to Brahman omniscient, &c., which had been introduced as the
+general topic of consideration in previous passages of the same section,
+such as 'It thought, may I be many'; the word 'thou,' which stands in co-
+ordination to 'that,' conveys the idea of Brahman in so far as having
+for its body the individual souls connected with non-intelligent matter.
+This is in accordance with the general principle that co-ordination is
+meant to express one thing subsisting in a twofold form. If such
+doubleness of form (or character) were abandoned, there could be no
+difference of aspects giving rise to the application of different terms,
+and the entire principle of co-ordination would thus be given up. And it
+would further follow that the two words co-ordinated would have to be
+taken in an implied sense (instead of their primary direct meaning). Nor
+is there any need of our assuming implication (lakshanā) in sentences
+[FOOTNOTE 130:1] such as 'this person is that Devadatta (known to me
+from former occasions)'; for there is no contradiction in the cognition
+of the oneness of a thing connected with the past on the one hand, and
+the present on the other, the contradiction that arises from difference
+of place being removed by the accompanying difference of time. If the
+text 'Thou art that' were meant to express absolute oneness, it would,
+moreover, conflict with a previous statement in the same section, viz.
+'It thought, may I be many'; and, further, the promise (also made in the
+same section) that by the knowledge of one thing all things are to be
+known could not be considered as fulfilled. It, moreover, is not
+possible (while, however, it would result from the absolute oneness of
+'tat' and 'tvam') that to Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge,
+which is free from all imperfections, omniscient, comprising within
+itself all auspicious qualities, there should belong Nescience; and that
+it should be the substrate of all those defects and afflictions which
+spring from Nescience. If, further, the statement of co-ordination
+('thou art that') were meant to sublate (the previously existing wrong
+notion of plurality), we should have to admit that the two terms 'that'
+and 'thou' have an implied meaning, viz. in so far as denoting, on the
+one hand, one substrate only, and, on the other, the cessation of the
+different attributes (directly expressed by the two terms); and thus
+implication and the other shortcomings mentioned above would cling to
+this interpretation as well. And there would be even further
+difficulties. When we form the sublative judgment 'this is not silver,'
+the sublation is founded on an independent positive judgment, viz. 'this
+is a shell': in the case under discussion, however, the sublation would
+not be known (through an independent positive judgment), but would be
+assumed merely on the ground that it cannot be helped. And, further,
+there is really no possibility of sublation, since the word 'that' does
+not convey the idea of an attribute in addition to the mere substrate.
+To this it must not be objected that the substrate was previously
+concealed, and that hence it is the special function of the word 'that'
+to present the substrate in its non-concealed aspect; for if, previously
+to the sublative judgment, the substrate was not evident (as an object
+of consciousness), there is no possibility of its becoming the object
+either of an error or its sublation.--Nor can we allow you to say that,
+previously to sublation, the substrate was non-concealed in so far as
+(i. e. was known as) the object of error, for in its 'non-concealed'
+aspect the substrate is opposed to all error, and when that aspect
+shines forth there is no room either for error or sublation.--The
+outcome of this is that as long as you do not admit that there is a real
+attribute in addition to the mere substrate, and that this attribute is
+for a time hidden, you cannot show the possibility either of error or
+sublation. We add an illustrative instance. That with regard to a man
+there should arise the error that he is a mere low-caste hunter is only
+possible on condition of a real additional attribute--e.g. the man's
+princely birth--being hidden at the time; and the cessation of that
+error is brought about by the declaration of this attribute of princely
+birth, not by a mere declaration of the person being a man: this latter
+fact being evident need not be declared at all, and if it is declared it
+sublates no error.--If, on the other hand, the text is understood to
+refer to Brahman as having the individual souls for its body, both words
+('that' and 'thou') keep their primary denotation; and, the text thus
+making a declaration about one substance distinguished by two aspects,
+the fundamental principle of 'co-ordination' is preserved, On this
+interpretation the text further intimates that Brahman--free from all
+imperfection and comprising within itself all auspicious qualities--is
+the internal ruler of the individual souls and possesses lordly power.
+It moreover satisfies the demand of agreement with the teaching of the
+previous part of the section, and it also fulfils the promise as to all
+things being known through one thing, viz. in so far as Brahman having
+for its body all intelligent and non-intelligent beings in their gross
+state is the effect of Brahman having for its body the same things in
+their subtle state. And this interpretation finally avoids all conflict
+with other scriptural passages, such as 'Him the great Lord, the highest
+of Lords' (Svet. Up. VI, 7); 'His high power is revealed as manifold'
+(ibid. VI, 8); 'He that is free from sin, whose wishes are true, whose
+purposes are true' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1), and so on.
+
+But how, a question may be asked, can we decide, on your interpretation
+of the text, which of the two terms is meant to make an original
+assertion with regard to the other?--The question does not arise, we
+reply; for the text does not mean to make an original assertion at all,
+the truth which it states having already been established by the
+preceding clause, 'In that all this world has its Self.' This clause
+does make an original statement--in agreement with the principle that
+'Scripture has a purport with regard to what is not established by other
+means'--that is, it predicates of 'all this,' i.e. this entire world
+together with all individual souls, that 'that,' i.e. Brahman is the
+Self of it. The reason of this the text states in a previous passage,
+'All these creatures have their root in that which is, their dwelling
+and their rest in that which is'; a statement which is illustrated by an
+earlier one (belonging to a different section), viz. 'All this is
+Brahman; let a man meditate with calm mind on this world as beginning,
+ending, and breathing in Brahman' (Ch. Up. III. 14, 1). Similarly other
+texts also teach that the world has its Self in Brahman, in so far as
+the whole aggregate of intelligent and non-intelligent beings
+constitutes Brahman's body. Compare 'Abiding within, the ruler of beings,
+the Self of all'; 'He who dwells in the earth, different from the earth,
+whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the
+earth within--he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal. He who
+dwells in the Self,'&c. (Bri. Up. III, 7,3; 22); 'He who moving within
+the earth, and so on--whose body is death, whom death does not know, he
+is the Self of all beings, free from sin, divine, the one God, Nårāyana'
+(Subāl. Up. VII, 1); 'Having created that he entered into it; having
+entered it he became sat and tyat' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And also in the
+section under discussion the passage 'Having entered into them with this
+living Self let me evolve names and forms,' shows that it is only
+through the entering into them of the living soul whose Self is Brahman,
+that all things possess their substantiality and their connexion with
+the words denoting them. And as this passage must be understood in
+connexion with Taitt. Up. II, 6 (where the 'sat' denotes the individual
+soul) it follows that the individual soul also has Brahman for its Self,
+owing to the fact of Brahman having entered into it.--From all this it
+follows that the entire aggregate of things, intelligent and non-
+intelligent, has its Self in Brahman in so far as it constitutes
+Brahman's body. And as, thus, the whole world different from Brahman
+derives its substantial being only from constituting Brahman's body, any
+term denoting the world or something in it conveys a meaning which has
+its proper consummation in Brahman only: in other words all terms
+whatsoever denote Brahman in so far as distinguished by the different
+things which we associate with those terms on the basis of ordinary use
+of speech and etymology.--The text 'that art thou' we therefore
+understand merely as a special expression of the truth already
+propounded in the clause 'in that all this has its Self.'
+
+This being so, it appears that those as well who hold the theory of the
+absolute unity of one non-differenced substance, as those who teach the
+doctrine of bhedābheda (co-existing difference and non-difference), and
+those who teach the absolute difference of several substances, give up
+all those scriptural texts which teach that Brahman is the universal
+Self. With regard to the first-mentioned doctrine, we ask 'if there is
+only one substance; to what can the doctrine of universal identity
+refer?'--The reply will perhaps be 'to that very same substance.'--But,
+we reply, this point is settled already by the texts defining the nature
+of Brahman [FOOTNOTE 134:1], and there is nothing left to be determined
+by the passages declaring the identity of everything with Brahman.--But
+those texts serve to dispel the idea of fictitious difference!--This, we
+reply, cannot, as has been shown above, be effected by texts stating
+universal identity in the way of co-ordination; and statements of co-
+ordination, moreover, introduce into Brahman a doubleness of aspect, and
+thus contradict the theory of absolute oneness.--The bhedābheda view
+implies that owing to Brahman's connexion with limiting adjuncts
+(upādhi) all the imperfections resulting therefrom--and which avowedly
+belong to the individual soul--would manifest themselves in Brahman
+itself; and as this contradicts the doctrine that the Self of all is
+constituted by a Brahman free from all imperfection and comprising
+within itself all auspicious qualities, the texts conveying that
+doctrine would have to be disregarded. If, on the other hand, the theory
+be held in that form that 'bhedābheda' belongs to Brahman by its own
+nature (not only owing to an upādhi), the view that Brahman by its
+essential nature appears as individual soul, implies that imperfections
+no less than perfections are essential to Brahman, and this is in
+conflict with the texts teaching that everything is identical with
+Brahman free from all imperfections.--For those finally who maintain
+absolute difference, the doctrine of Brahman being the Self of all has
+no meaning whatsoever--for things absolutely different can in no way be
+one--and this implies the abandonment of all Vedānta-texts together.
+
+Those, on the other hand, who take their stand on the doctrine,
+proclaimed by all Upanishads, that the entire world forms the body of
+Brahman, may accept in their fulness all the texts teaching the identity
+of the world with Brahman. For as genus (jāti) and quality (guna), so
+substances (dravya) also may occupy the position of determining
+attributes (viseshana), in so far namely as they constitute the body of
+something else. Enunciations such as 'the Self (soul) is, according to
+its works, born either (as) a god, or a man, or a horse, or a bull,'
+show that in ordinary speech as well as in the Veda co-ordination has to
+be taken in a real primary (not implied) sense. In the same way it is
+also in the case of generic character and of qualities the relation of
+'mode' only (in which generic character and qualities stand to
+substances) which determines statements of co-ordination, such as 'the
+ox is broken-horned,' 'the cloth is white.' And as material bodies
+bearing the generic marks of humanity are definite things, in so far
+only as they are modes of a Self or soul, enunciations of co-ordination
+such as 'the soul has been born as a man, or a eunuch, or a woman,' are
+in every way appropriate. What determines statements of co-ordination is
+thus only the relation of 'mode' in which one thing stands to another,
+not the relation of generic character, quality, and so on, which are of
+an exclusive nature (and cannot therefore be exhibited in co-ordination
+with substances). Such words indeed as denote substances capable of
+subsisting by themselves occasionally take suffixes, indicating that
+those substances form the distinguishing attributes of other substances--
+as when from danda, 'staff,' we form dandin, 'staff-bearer'; in the case,
+on the other hand, of substances not capable of subsisting and being
+apprehended apart from others, the fact of their holding the position of
+attributes is ascertained only from their appearing in grammatical co-
+ordination.--But, an objection is raised, if it is supposed that in
+sentences such as 'the Self is born, as god, man, animal,' &c., the body
+of a man, god, &c., stands towards the Self in the relation of a mode,
+in the same way as in sentences such as 'the ox is broken-horned,' 'the
+cloth is white,' the generic characteristic and the quality stand in the
+relation of modes to the substances ('cow,' 'cloth') to which they are
+grammatically co-ordinated; then there would necessarily be simultaneous
+cognition of the mode, and that to which the mode belongs, i.e. of the
+body and the Self; just as there is simultaneous cognition of the
+generic character and the individual. But as a matter of fact this is
+not the case; we do not necessarily observe a human, divine, or animal
+body together with the Self. The co-ordination expressed in the form
+'the Self is a man,' is therefore an 'implied' one only (the statement
+not admitting of being taken in its primary literal sense).--This is not
+so, we reply. The relation of bodies to the Self is strictly analogous
+to that of class characteristics and qualities to the substances in
+which they inhere; for it is the Self only which is their substrate and
+their final cause (prayojana), and they are modes of the Self. That the
+Self only is their substrate, appears from the fact that when the Self
+separates itself from the body the latter perishes; that the Self alone
+is their final cause, appears from the fact that they exist to the end
+that the fruits of the actions of the Self may be enjoyed; and that they
+are modes of the Self, appears from the fact that they are mere
+attributes of the Self manifesting itself as god, man, or the like.
+These are just the circumstances on account of which words like 'cow'
+extend in their meaning (beyond the class characteristics) so as to
+comprise the individual also. Where those circumstances are absent, as
+in the case of staffs, earrings, and the like, the attributive position
+is expressed (not by co-ordination but) by means of special derivative
+forms--such as dandin (staff-bearer), kundalin (adorned with earrings).
+In the case of bodies divine, human, &c., on the other hand, the
+essential nature of which it is to be mere modes of the Self which
+constitutes their substrate and final cause, both ordinary and Vedic
+language express the relation subsisting between the two, in the form of
+co-ordination, 'This Self is a god, or a man,' &c. That class
+characteristics and individuals are invariably observed together, is due
+to the fact of both being objects of visual perception; the Self, on the
+other hand, is not such, and hence is not apprehended by the eye, while
+the body is so apprehended. Nor must you raise the objection that it is
+hard to understand how that which is capable of being apprehended by
+itself can be a mere mode of something else: for that the body's
+essential nature actually consists in being a mere mode of the Self is
+proved--just as in the case of class characteristics and so on--by its
+having the Self only for its substrate and final cause, and standing to
+it in the relation of a distinguishing attribute. That two things are
+invariably perceived together, depends, as already observed, on their
+being apprehended by means of the same apparatus, visual or otherwise.
+Earth is naturally connected with smell, taste, and so on, and yet these
+qualities are not perceived by the eye; in the same way the eye which
+perceives the body does not perceive that essential characteristic of
+the body which consists in its being a mere mode of the Self; the reason
+of the difference being that the eye has no capacity to apprehend the
+Self. But this does not imply that the body does not possess that
+essential nature: it rather is just the possession of that essential
+nature on which the judgment of co-ordination ('the Self is a man, god,'
+&c.) is based. And as words have the power of denoting the relation of
+something being a mode of the Self, they denote things together with
+this relation.--But in ordinary speech the word 'body' is understood to
+mean the mere body; it does not therefore extend in its denotation up to
+the Self!--Not so, we reply. The body is, in reality, nothing but a mode
+of the Self; but, for the purpose of showing the distinction of things,
+the word 'body' is used in a limited sense. Analogously words such as
+'whiteness,' 'generic character of a cow,' 'species,''quality,' are used
+in a distinctive sense (although 'whiteness' is not found apart from a
+white thing, of which it is the prakāra, and so on). Words such as
+'god,' 'man,' &c., therefore do extend in their connotation up to the
+Self. And as the individual souls, distinguished by their connexion with
+aggregates of matter bearing the characteristic marks of humanity,
+divine nature, and so on, constitute the body of the highest Self, and
+hence are modes of it, the words denoting those individual souls extend
+in their connotation up to the very highest Self. And as all intelligent
+and non-intelligent beings are thus mere modes of the highest Brahman,
+and have reality thereby only, the words denoting them are used in co-
+ordination with the terms denoting Brahman.--This point has been
+demonstrated by me in the Vedārthasamgraha. A Sūtra also (IV, 1, 3) will
+declare the identity of the world and Brahman to consist in the relation
+of body and Self; and the Vākyakāra too says 'It is the Self--thus
+everything should be apprehended.'
+
+[FOOTNOTE 130:1. Which are alleged to prove that sāmānādhikaranya is to
+be explained on the basis of lakshanā.]
+
+[FOOTNOTE 134:1. Such as 'The True, knowledge,' &c.]
+
+
+
+
+Summary statement as to the way in which different scriptural texts are
+to reconciled.
+
+The whole matter may be summarily stated as follows. Some texts declare
+a distinction of nature between non-intelligent matter, intelligent
+beings, and Brahman, in so far as matter is the object of enjoyment, the
+souls the enjoying subjects, and Brahman the ruling principle. 'From
+that the Lord of Māyā creates all this; in that the other one is bound
+up through that Māyā' (Svet. Up. IV, 9); 'Know Prakriti to be Māyā, and
+the great Lord the ruler of Māyā' (10); 'What is perishable is the
+Pradhāna, the immortal and imperishable is Hara: the one God rules the
+Perishable and the Self' (Svet Up. I, 10)--In this last passage the
+clause 'the immortal and imperishable is Hara,' refers to the enjoying
+individual soul, which is called 'Hara,' because it draws (harati)
+towards itself the pradhāna as the object of its enjoyment.--' He is the
+cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither
+parent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI, 9); 'The master of the pradhāna and of
+the individual souls' (Svet. Up. VI, 16); 'The ruler of all, the lord of
+the Selfs, the eternal, blessed, undecaying one' (Mahānār. Up. XI, 3);
+'There are two unborn ones, one knowing, the other not knowing, one a
+ruler, the other not a ruler' (Svet. Up. 1, 9); 'The eternal among the
+non-eternal, the intelligent one among the intelligent, who though one
+fulfils the desires of many' (Svet. Up. VI, 13); 'Knowing the enjoyer,
+the object of enjoyment and the Mover' (Svet. Up. I, 12); 'One of them
+eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Svet. Up. IV,
+6); 'Thinking that the Self is different from the Mover, blessed by him
+he reaches Immortality' (Svet. Up. I, 6); 'There is one unborn female
+being, red, white, and black, uniform but producing manifold offspring.
+There is one unborn male being who loves her and lies by her; there is
+another who leaves her after he has enjoyed her' (Svet. Up. IV, 5). 'On
+the same tree man, immersed, bewildered, grieves on account of his
+impotence; but when he sees the other Lord contented and knows his glory,
+then his grief passes away' (Svet. Up. IV, 9).--Smriti expresses itself
+similarly.--'Thus eightfold is my nature divided. Lower is this Nature;
+other than this and higher know that Nature of mine which constitutes
+the individual soul, by which this world is supported' (Bha. Gģ. VII, 4,
+5). 'All beings at the end of a Kalpa return into my Nature, and again
+at the beginning of a Kalpa do I send them forth. Resting on my own
+Nature again and again do I send forth this entire body of beings, which
+has no power of its own, being subject to the power of nature' (Bha. Gī.
+IX, 7, 8); 'With me as supervisor Nature brings forth the movable and
+the immovable, and for this reason the world ever moves round' (Bha. Gī.
+IX, 10); 'Know thou both Nature and the Soul to be without beginning'
+(XIII, 19); 'The great Brahman is my womb, in which I place the embryo,
+and thence there is the origin of all beings' (XIV, 3). This last
+passage means--the womb of the world is the great Brahman, i.e. non-
+intelligent matter in its subtle state, commonly called Prakriti; with
+this I connect the embryo, i.e. the intelligent principle. From this
+contact of the non-intelligent and the intelligent, due to my will,
+there ensues the origination of all beings from gods down to lifeless
+things.
+
+Non-intelligent matter and intelligent beings--holding the relative
+positions of objects of enjoyment and enjoying subjects, and appearing
+in multifarious forms--other scriptural texts declare to be permanently
+connected with the highest Person in so far as they constitute his body,
+and thus are controlled by him; the highest Person thus constituting
+their Self. Compare the following passages: 'He who dwells in the earth
+and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth
+is, and who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within,
+the immortal,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3-23); 'He who moves within the
+earth, whose body the earth is, &c.; he who moves within death, whose
+body death is,' &c.(Subāla Up. VII, 1). In this latter passage the word
+'death' denotes what is also called 'darkness,' viz. non-intelligent
+matter in its subtle state; as appears from another passage in the same
+Upanishad,'the Imperishable is merged in darkness.' And compare also
+'Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all' (Taitt. Ār.
+III, 24).
+
+Other texts, again, aim at teaching that the highest Self to whom non-
+intelligent and intelligent beings stand in the relation of body, and
+hence of modes, subsists in the form of the world, in its causal as well
+as in its effected aspect, and hence speak of the world in this its
+double aspect as that which is (the Real); so e.g. 'Being only this was
+in the beginning, one only without a second--it desired, may I be many,
+may I grow forth--it sent forth fire,' &c., up to 'all these creatures
+have their root in that which is,' &c., up to 'that art thou, O
+Svetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 2-8); 'He wished, may I be many,' &c., up to 'it
+became the true and the untrue' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). These sections also
+refer to the essential distinction of nature between non-intelligent
+matter, intelligent beings, and the highest Self which is established by
+other scriptural texts; so in the Chāndogya passage, 'Let me enter those
+three divine beings with this living Self, and let me then evolve names
+and forms'; and in the Taitt. passage, 'Having sent forth that he
+entered into it; having entered it he became sat and tyat, knowledge and
+(what is) without knowledge, the true and the untrue,' &c. These two
+passages evidently have the same purport, and hence the soul's having
+its Self in Brahman--which view is implied in the Ch. passage--must be
+understood as resting thereon that the souls (together, with matter)
+constitute the body of Brahman as asserted in the Taitt. passage ('it
+became knowledge and that which is without knowledge,' i.e. souls and
+matter). The same process of evolution of names and forms is described
+elsewhere also, 'All this was then unevolved; it became evolved by form
+and name' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7). The fact is that the highest Self is in
+its causal or in its 'effected' condition, according as it has for its
+body intelligent and non-intelligent beings either in their subtle or
+their gross state; the effect, then, being non-different from the cause,
+and hence being cognised through the cognition of the cause, the result
+is that the desired 'cognition of all things through one' can on our
+view be well established. In the clause 'I will enter into these three
+divine beings with this living Self,' &c., the term 'the three divine
+beings' denotes the entire aggregate of non-sentient matter, and as the
+text declares that the highest Self evolved names and forms by entering
+into matter by means of the living souls of which he is the Self, it
+follows that all terms whatsoever denote the highest Self as qualified
+by individual Selfs, the latter again being qualified by non-sentient
+matter. A term which denotes the highest Self in its causal condition
+may therefore be exhibited in co-ordination with another term denoting
+the highest Self in its 'effected' state, both terms being used in their
+primary senses. Brahman, having for its modes intelligent and non-
+intelligent things in their gross and subtle states, thus constitutes
+effect and cause, and the world thus has Brahman for its material cause
+(upādāna). Nor does this give rise to any confusion of the essential
+constituent elements of the great aggregate of things. Of some parti-
+coloured piece of cloth the material cause is threads white, red, black,
+&c.; all the same, each definite spot of the cloth is connected with one
+colour only white e.g., and thus there is no confusion of colours even
+in the 'effected' condition of the cloth. Analogously the combination of
+non-sentient matter, sentient beings, and the Lord constitutes the
+material cause of the world, but this does not imply any confusion of
+the essential characteristics of enjoying souls, objects of enjoyment,
+and the universal ruler, even in the world's 'effected' state. There is
+indeed a difference between the two cases, in so far as the threads are
+capable of existing apart from one another, and are only occasionally
+combined according to the volition of men, so that the web sometimes
+exists in its causal, sometimes in its effected state; while non-
+sentient matter and sentient beings in all their states form the body of
+the highest Self, and thus have a being only as the modes of that--on
+which account the highest Self may, in all cases, be denoted by any term
+whatsoever. But the two cases are analogous, in so far as there persists
+a distinction and absence of all confusion, on the part of the
+constituent elements of the aggregate. This being thus, it follows that
+the highest Brahman, although entering into the 'effected' condition,
+remains unchanged--for its essential nature does not become different--
+and we also understand what constitutes its 'effected' condition, viz.
+its abiding as the Self of non-intelligent and intelligent beings in
+their gross condition, distinguished by name and form. For becoming an
+effect means entering into another state of being.
+
+Those texts, again, which speak of Brahman as devoid of qualities,
+explain themselves on the ground of Brahman being free from all touch of
+evil. For the passage, Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5--which at first negatives all
+evil qualities 'free from sin, from old age, from death, from grief,
+from hunger and thirst', and after that affirms auspicious qualities
+'whose wishes and purposes come true'--enables us to decide that in
+other places also the general denial of qualities really refers to evil
+qualities only.--Passages which declare knowledge to constitute the
+essential nature of Brahman explain themselves on the ground that of
+Brahman--which is all-knowing, all-powerful, antagonistic to all evil, a
+mass of auspicious qualities--the essential nature can be defined as
+knowledge (intelligence) only--which also follows from the 'self-
+luminousness' predicated of it. Texts, on the other hand, such as 'He
+who is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'His high power is revealed as
+manifold, as essential, acting as force and knowledge' (Svet. Up. VI, 8);
+'Whereby should he know the knower' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 14), teach the
+highest Self to be a knowing subject. Other texts, again, such as 'The
+True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1), declare
+knowledge to constitute its nature, as it can be denned through
+knowledge only, and is self-luminous. And texts such as 'He desired, may
+I be many' (Taitt. Up. II, 6); 'It thought, may I be many; it evolved
+itself through name and form' (Ch. Up. VI, 2), teach that Brahman,
+through its mere wish, appears in manifold modes. Other texts, again,
+negative the opposite view, viz. that there is a plurality of things not
+having their Self in Brahman. 'From death to death goes he who sees here
+any plurality'; 'There is here not any plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19);
+'For where there is duality as it were' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 14). But these
+texts in no way negative that plurality of modes--declared in passages
+such as 'May I be many, may I grow forth'--which springs from Brahman's
+will, and appears in the distinction of names and forms. This is proved
+by clauses in those 'negativing' texts themselves, 'Whosoever looks for
+anything elsewhere than in the Self', 'from that great Being there has
+been breathed forth the Rig-veda,' &c. (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6, 10).--On
+this method of interpretation we find that the texts declaring the
+essential distinction and separation of non-sentient matter, sentient
+beings, and the Lord, and those declaring him to be the cause and the
+world to be the effect, and cause and effect to be identical, do not in
+any way conflict with other texts declaring that matter and souls form
+the body of the Lord, and that matter and souls in their causal
+condition are in a subtle state, not admitting of the distinction of
+names and forms while in their 'effected' gross state they are subject
+to that distinction. On the other hand, we do not see how there is any
+opening for theories maintaining the connexion of Brahman with Nescience,
+or distinctions in Brahman due to limiting adjuncts (upādhi)--such and
+similar doctrines rest on fallacious reasoning, and flatly contradict
+Scripture.
+
+There is nothing contradictory in allowing that certain texts declare
+the essential distinction of matter, souls, and the Lord, and their
+mutual relation as modes and that to which the modes belong, and that
+other texts again represent them as standing in the relation of cause
+and effect, and teach cause and effect to be one. We may illustrate this
+by an analogous case from the Karmakānda. There six separate oblations
+to Agni, and so on, are enjoined by separate so-called originative
+injunctions; these are thereupon combined into two groups (viz. the new
+moon and the full-moon sacrifices) by a double clause referring to those
+groups, and finally a so-called injunction of qualification enjoins the
+entire sacrifice as something to be performed by persons entertaining a
+certain wish. In a similar way certain Vedānta-texts give instruction
+about matter, souls, and the Lord as separate entities ('Perishable is
+the pradhāna, imperishable and immortal Hara,' &c., Svet Up. I, 10; and
+others); then other texts teach that matter and souls in all their
+different states constitute the body of the highest Person, while the
+latter is their Self ('Whose body the earth is,' &c.); and finally
+another group of texts teaches--by means of words such as 'Being,'
+'Brahman,' 'Self,' denoting the highest Self to which the body belongs--
+that the one highest Self in its causal and effected states comprises
+within itself the triad of entities which had been taught in separation
+('Being only this was in the beginning'; 'In that all this has its Self;
+'All this is Brahman').--That the highest Self with matter and souls for
+its body should be simply called the highest Self, is no more
+objectionable than that that particular form of Self which is invested
+with a human body should simply be spoken of as Self or soul--as when we
+say 'This is a happy soul.'
+
+
+
+
+Nescience cannot be terminated by the simple act of cognising Brahman as
+the universal self.
+
+The doctrine, again, that Nescience is put an end to by the cognition of
+Brahman being the Self of all can in no way be upheld; for as bondage is
+something real it cannot be put an end to by knowledge. How, we ask, can
+any one assert that bondage--which consists in the experience of
+pleasure and pain caused by the connexion of souls with bodies of
+various kind, a connexion springing from good or evil actions--is
+something false, unreal? And that the cessation of such bondage is to be
+obtained only through the grace of the highest Self pleased by the
+devout meditation of the worshipper, we have already explained. As the
+cognition of universal oneness which you assume rests on a view of
+things directly contrary to reality, and therefore is false, the only
+effect it can have is to strengthen the ties of bondage. Moreover, texts
+such as 'But different is the highest Person' (Bha. Gī. XV, 17), and
+'Having known the Self and the Mover as separate' (Svet. Up. I, 6),
+teach that it is the cognition of Brahman as the inward ruler different
+from the individual soul, that effects the highest aim of man, i.e.
+final release. And, further, as that 'bondage-terminating' knowledge
+which you assume is itself unreal, we should have to look out for
+another act of cognition to put an end to it.--But may it not be said
+that this terminating cognition, after having put an end to the whole
+aggregate of distinctions antagonistic to it, immediately passes away
+itself, because being of a merely instantaneous nature?--No, we reply.
+Since its nature, its origination, and its destruction are all alike
+fictitious, we have clearly to search for another agency capable of
+destroying that avidyā which is the cause of the fiction of its
+destruction!--Let us then say that the essential nature of Brahman
+itself is the destruction of that cognition!--From this it would follow,
+we reply, that such 'terminating' knowledge would not arise at all; for
+that the destruction of what is something permanent can clearly not
+originate!--Who moreover should, according to you, be the cognising
+subject in a cognition which has for its object the negation of
+everything that is different from Brahman?--That cognising subject is
+himself something fictitiously superimposed on Brahman!--This may not be,
+we reply: he himself would in that case be something to be negatived,
+and hence an object of the 'terminating' cognition; he could not
+therefore be the subject of cognition!--Well, then, let us assume that
+the essential nature of Brahman itself is the cognising subject!--Do you
+mean, we ask in reply, that Brahman's being the knowing subject in that
+'terminating' cognition belongs to Brahman's essential nature, or that
+it is something fictitiously superimposed on Brahman? In the latter case
+that superimposition and the Nescience founded on it would persist,
+because they would not be objects of the terminating cognition, and if a
+further terminating act of knowledge were assumed, that also would
+possess a triple aspect (viz. knowledge, object known, and subject
+knowing), and we thus should be led to assume an infinite series of
+knowing subjects. If, on the other band, the essential nature of Brahman
+itself constitutes the knowing subject, your view really coincides with
+the one held by us. [FOOTNOTE 146:1] And if you should say that the
+terminating knowledge itself and the knowing subject in it are things
+separate from Brahman and themselves contained in the sphere of what is
+to be terminated by that knowledge, your statement would be no less
+absurd than if you were to say 'everything on the surface of the earth
+has been cut down by Devadatta with one stroke'--meaning thereby that
+Devadatta himself and the action of cutting down are comprised among the
+things cut down!--The second alternative, on the other hand--according
+to which the knowing subject is not Brahman itself, but a knower
+superimposed upon it--would imply that that subject is the agent in an
+act of knowledge resulting in his own destruction; and this is
+impossible since no person aims at destroying himself. And should it be
+said that the destruction of the knowing agent belongs to the very
+nature of Brahman itself [FOOTNOTE 147:1], it would follow that we can
+assume neither plurality nor the erroneous view of plurality, nor avidyā
+as the root of that erroneous view.--All this confirms our theory, viz.
+that since bondage springs from ajnāna in the form of an eternal stream
+of karman, it can be destroyed only through knowledge of the kind
+maintained by us. Such knowledge is to be attained only through the due
+daily performance of religious duties as prescribed for a man's caste
+and āsrama, such performance being sanctified by the accompanying
+thought of the true nature of the Self, and having the character of
+propitiation of the highest Person. Now, that mere works produce limited
+and non-permanent results only, and that on the other hand works not
+aiming at an immediate result but meant to please the highest Person,
+bring about knowledge of the character of devout meditation, and thereby
+the unlimited and permanent result of the intuition of Brahman being the
+Self of all--these are points not to be known without an insight into
+the nature of works, and hence, without this, the attitude described--
+which is preceded by the abandonment of mere works--cannot be reached.
+For these reasons the enquiry into Brahman has to be entered upon _after_
+the enquiry into the nature of works.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 146:1. According to which Brahman is not jńānam, but jńātri.]
+
+[FOOTNOTE 147:1. And, on that account, belongs to what constitutes man's
+highest aim.]
+
+
+
+
+The Vedāntin aiming to ascertain the nature of Brahman from Scripture,
+need not be disconcerted by the Mīmāmsā-theory of all speech having
+informing power with regard to actions only.
+
+Here another primā facie view [FOOTNOTE 148:1] finally presents itself.
+The power of words to denote things cannot be ascertained in any way but
+by observing the speech and actions of experienced people. Now as such
+speech and action always implies the idea of something to be done
+(kārya), words are means of knowledge only with reference to things to
+be done; and hence the matter inculcated by the Veda also is only things
+to be done. From this it follows that the Vedānta-texts cannot claim the
+position of authoritative means of knowledge with regard to Brahman,
+which is (not a thing to be done but) an accomplished fact.--Against
+this view it must not be urged that in the case of sentences expressive
+of accomplished facts--as e.g. that a son is born to somebody--the idea
+of a particular thing may with certainty be inferred as the cause of
+certain outward signs--such as e.g. a pleased expression of countenance--
+which are generally due to the attainment of a desired object; for the
+possible causes of joy, past, present, and future, are infinite in
+number, and in the given case other causes of joy, as e.g. the birth
+having taken place in an auspicious moment, or having been an easy one,
+&c., may easily be imagined. Nor, again, can it be maintained that the
+denotative power of words with regard to accomplished things may be
+ascertained in the way of our inferring either the meaning of one word
+from the known meaning of other words, or the meaning of the radical
+part of a word from the known meaning of a formative element; for the
+fact is that we are only able to infer on the basis of a group of words
+known to denote a certain thing to be done, what the meaning of some
+particular constituent of that group may be.--Nor, again, when a person,
+afraid of what he thinks to be a snake, is observed to dismiss his fear
+on being told that the thing is not a snake but only a rope, can we
+determine thereby that what terminates his fear is the idea of the non-
+existence of a snake. For there are many other ideas which may account
+for the cessation of his fear--he may think, e.g., 'this is a thing
+incapable of moving, devoid of poison, without consciousness'--the
+particular idea present to his mind we are therefore not able to
+determine.--The truth is that from the fact of all activity being
+invariably dependent on the idea of something to be done, we learn that
+the meaning which words convey is something prompting activity. All
+words thus denoting something to be done, the several words of a
+sentence express only some particular action to be performed, and hence
+it is not possible to determine that they possess the power of denoting
+their own meaning only, in connexion with the meaning of the other words
+of the sentence.--(Nor must it be said that what moves to action is not
+the idea of the thing to be done, but the idea of the means to do it;
+for) the idea of the means to bring about the desired end causes action
+only through the idea of the thing to be done, not through itself; as is
+evident from the fact that the idea of means past, future, and even
+present (when divorced from the idea of an end to be accomplished), does
+not prompt to action. As long as a man does not reflect 'the means
+towards the desired end are not to be accomplished without an effort of
+mine; it must therefore be accomplished through my activity'; so long he
+does not begin to act. What causes activity is thus only the idea of
+things to be done; and as hence words denote such things only, the Veda
+also can tell us only about things to be done, and is not therefore in a
+position to give information about the attainment of an infinite and
+permanent result, such result being constituted by Brahman, which is
+(not a thing to be done, but) an accomplished entity. The Veda does, on
+the other hand, actually teach that mere works have a permanent result
+('Imperishable is the merit of him who offers the kāturmāsya-sacrifices,'
+and so on); and hence it follows that to enter on an enquiry into
+Brahman for the reason that the knowledge of Brahman has an infinite and
+permanent result, while the result of works is limited and non-permanent,
+is an altogether unjustified proceeding.
+
+To this we make the following reply.--To set aside the universally known
+mode of ascertaining the connexion of words and their meanings, and to
+assert that all words express only one non-worldly meaning (viz. those
+things to be done which the Veda inculcates), is a proceeding for which
+men paying due attention to the means of proof can have only a slight
+regard. A child avowedly learns the connexion of words and meanings in
+the following way. The father and mother and other people about him
+point with the finger at the child's mother, father, uncle, &c, as well
+as at various domestic and wild animals, birds, snakes, and so on, to
+the end that the child may at the same time pay attention to the terms
+they use and to the beings denoted thereby, and thus again and again
+make him understand that such and such words refer to such and such
+things. The child thus observing in course of time that these words of
+themselves give rise to certain ideas in his mind, and at the same time
+observing neither any different connexion of words and things, nor any
+person arbitrarily establishing such connexion, comes to the conclusion
+that the application of such and such words to such and such things is
+based on the denotative power of the words. And being taught later on by
+his elders that other words also, in addition to those learned first,
+have their definite meaning, he in the end becomes acquainted with the
+meanings of all words, and freely forms sentences conveying certain
+meanings for the purpose of imparting those meanings to other persons.
+
+And there is another way also in which the connexion of words and things
+can easily be ascertained. Some person orders another, by means of some
+expressive gesture, to go and inform Devadatta that his father is doing
+well, and the man ordered goes and tells Devadatta 'Your father is doing
+well.' A by-stander who is acquainted with the meaning of various
+gestures, and thus knows on what errand the messenger is sent, follows
+him and hears the words employed by him to deliver his message: he
+therefore readily infers that such and such words have such and such a
+meaning.--We thus see that the theory of words having a meaning only in
+relation to things to be done is baseless. The Vedānta-texts tell us
+about Brahman, which is an accomplished entity, and about meditation on
+Brahman as having an unlimited result, and hence it behoves us to
+undertake an enquiry into Brahman so as fully to ascertain its nature.
+
+We further maintain that even on the supposition of the Veda relating
+only to things to be done, an enquiry into Brahman must be undertaken.
+For 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be
+meditated on' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5); 'He is to be searched out, him we
+must try to understand' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a Brāhmana having
+known him practise wisdom' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 21); 'What is within that
+small ether, that is to be sought for, that is to be understood' (Ch. Up.
+VIII, 1,1); 'What is in that small ether, that is to be meditated upon'
+(Mahānār. Up. X, 7)--these and similar texts enjoin a certain action,
+viz. meditation on Brahman, and when we then read 'He who knows Brahman
+attains the highest,' we understand that the attainment of Brahman is
+meant as a reward for him who is qualified for and enters on such
+meditation. Brahman itself and its attributes are thus established
+thereby only--that they subserve a certain action, viz. meditation.
+There are analogous instances in the Karmakānda of the Veda. When an
+arthavāda-passage describes the heavenly vorld as a place where there is
+no heat, no frost, no grief, &c., this is done merely with a view to
+those texts which enjoin certain sacrifices on those who are desirous of
+the heavenly world. Where another arthavāda says that 'those who perform
+certain sattra-sacrifices are firmly established,' such 'firm
+establishment' is referred to only because it is meant as the reward for
+those acting on the text which enjoins those sattras, 'Let him perform
+the rātri-sattras' (Pū. Mī. Sū. IV, 3, 17). And where a text says that a
+person threatening a Brāhmana is to be punished with a fine of one
+hundred gold pieces, this statement is made merely with reference to the
+prohibitory passage, 'Let him not threaten a Brāhmana'(Pū. Mī. Sū. III,
+4, 17).
+
+We, however, really object to the whole theory of the meaning of words
+depending on their connexion with 'things to be done,' since this is not
+even the case in imperative clauses such as 'bring the cow.' For you are
+quite unable to give a satisfactory definition of your 'thing to be done
+'(kārya). You understand by 'kārya' that which follows on the existence
+of action (kriti) and is aimed at by action. Now to be aimed at by
+action is to be the object (karman) of action, and to be the object of
+action is to be that which it is most desired to obtain by action
+(according to the grammarian's definition). But what one desires most to
+obtain is pleasure or the cessation of pain. When a person desirous of
+some pleasure or cessation of pain is aware that his object is not to be
+accomplished without effort on his part, he resolves on effort and
+begins to act: in no case we observe an object of desire to be aimed at
+by action in any other sense than that of its accomplishment depending
+on activity. The prompting quality (prerakatva) also, which belongs to
+objects of desire, is nothing but the attribute of their accomplishment
+depending on activity; for it is this which moves to action.--Nor can it
+be said that 'to be aimed at by action' means to be that which is
+'agreeable' (anukūla) to man; for it is pleasure only that is agreeable
+to man. The cessation of pain, on the other hand, is not what is
+'agreeable' to man. The essential distinction between pleasure and pain
+is that the former is agreeable to man, and the latter disagreeable
+(pratikūla), and the cessation of pain is desired not because it is
+agreeable, but because pain is disagreeable: absence of pain means that
+a person is in his normal condition, affected neither with pain nor
+pleasure. Apart from pleasure, action cannot possibly be agreeable, nor
+does it become so by being subservient to pleasure; for its essential
+nature is pain. Its being helpful to pleasure merely causes the resolve
+of undertaking it.--Nor, again, can we define that which is aimed at by
+action as that to which action is auxiliary or supplementary (sesha),
+while itself it holds the position of something principal to be
+subserved by other things (seshin); for of the sesha and seshin also no
+proper definition can be given. It cannot be said that a sesha is that
+which is invariably accompanied by an activity proceeding with a view to
+something else, and that the correlate of such a sesha is the seshin;
+for on this definition the action is not a sesha, and hence that which
+is to be effected by the action cannot be the correlative seshin. And
+moreover a seshin may not be defined as what is correlative to an action
+proceeding with a view to--i. e. aiming at--something else; for it is
+just this 'being aimed at' of which we require a definition, and
+moreover we observe that also the seshin (or 'pradhāna') is capable of
+action proceeding with a view to the sesha, as when e.g. a master does
+something for--let us say, keeps or feeds--his servant. This last
+criticism you must not attempt to ward off by maintaining that the
+master in keeping his servant acts with a view to himself (to his own
+advantage); for the servant in serving the master likewise acts with a
+view to himself.--And as, further, we have no adequate definition of
+'kārya,' it would be inappropriate to define sesha as that which is
+correlative to kārya, and seshin as that which is correlative to sesha.--
+Nor, finally, may we define 'that which is aimed at by action' as that
+which is the final end (prayojana) of action; for by the final end of an
+action we could only understand the end for which the agent undertakes
+the action, and this end is no other than the desired object. As thus
+'what is aimed at by action' cannot be defined otherwise than what is
+desired, kārya cannot be defined as what is to be effected by action and
+stands to action in the relation of principal matter (pradhāna or
+seshin).
+
+(Let it then be said that the 'niyoga,' i.e. what is commonly called the
+apūrva--the supersensuous result of an action which later on produces
+the sensible result--constitutes the prayojana--the final purpose--of
+the action.--But) the apūrva also can, as it is something different from
+the direct objects of desire, viz. pleasure and the cessation of pain,
+be viewed only as a means of bringing about these direct objects, and as
+something itself to be effected by the action; it is for this very
+reason that it is something different from the action, otherwise the
+action itself would be that which is effected by the action. The thing
+to be effected by the action-which is expressed by means of optative and
+imperative verbal forms such as yajeta, 'let him sacrifice'--is, in
+accordance with the fact of its being connected with words such as
+svargakāmah, 'he who is desirous of heaven', understood to be the means
+of bringing about (the enjoyment of) the heavenly world; and as the
+(sacrificial) action itself is transitory, there is assumed an
+altogether 'new' or 'unprecedented' (apūrva) effect of it which (later
+on) is to bring about the enjoyment of heaven. This so-called 'apūrva'
+can therefore be understood only with regard to its capability of
+bringing about the heavenly world. Now it certainly is ludicrous to
+assert that the apūrva, which is assumed to the end of firmly
+establishing the independent character of the effect of the action first
+recognised as such (i.e. independent), later on becomes the means of
+realising the heavenly world; for as the word expressing the result of
+the action (yajta) appears in syntactical connexion with 'svargakāmah'
+(desirous of heaven), it does not, from the very beginning, denote an
+independent object of action, and moreover it is impossible to recognise
+an independent result of action other than either pleasure or cessation
+of pain, or the means to bring about these two results.--What, moreover,
+do you understand by the apūrva being a final end (prayojana)?-You will
+perhaps reply, 'its being agreeable like pleasure.'--Is then the apūrva
+a pleasure? It is pleasure alone which is agreeable!--Well, let us then
+define the apūrva as a kind of pleasure of a special nature, called by
+that name!--But what proof, we ask, have you for this? You will, in the
+first place, admit yourself that you do not directly experience any
+pleasure springing from consciousness of your apūrva, which could in any
+way be compared to the pleasure caused by the consciousness of the
+objects of the senses.--Well, let us say then that as authoritative
+doctrine gives us the notion of an apūrva as something beneficial to man,
+we conclude that it will be enjoyed later on.--But, we ask, what is the
+authoritative doctrine establishing such an apūrva beneficial to man?
+Not, in the first place, ordinary, i.e. non-Vedic doctrine; for such has
+for its object action only which always is essentially painful. Nor, in
+the next place, Vedic texts; for those also enjoin action only as the
+means to bring about certain results such as the heavenly world. Nor
+again the Smriti texts enjoining works of either permanent or occasional
+obligation; for those texts always convey the notion of an apūrva only
+on the basis of an antecedent knowledge of the apūrva as intimated by
+Vedic texts containing terms such as svargakāmah. And we, moreover, do
+not observe that in the case of works having a definite result in this
+life, there is enjoyment of any special pleasure called apūrva, in
+addition to those advantages which constitute the special result of the
+work and are enjoyed here below, as e.g. abundance of food or freedom
+from sickness. Thus there is not any proof of the apūrva being a
+pleasure. The arthavāda-passages of the Veda also, while glorifying
+certain pleasurable results of works, as e.g. the heavenly world, do not
+anywhere exhibit a similar glorification of a pleasure called apūrva.
+
+From all this we conclude that also in injunctory sentences that which
+is expressed by imperative and similar forms is only the idea that the
+meaning of the root--as known from grammar--is to be effected by the
+effort of the agent. And that what constitutes the meaning of roots, viz.
+the action of sacrificing and the like, possesses the quality of
+pleasing the highest Person, who is the inner ruler of Agni and other
+divinities (to whom the sacrifices are ostensibly offered), and that
+through the highest Person thus pleased the result of the sacrifice is
+accomplished, we shall show later on, under Sū. III, 2, 37--It is thus
+finally proved that the Vedānta-texts give information about an
+accomplished entity, viz. Brahman, and that the fruit of meditation on
+Brahman is something infinite and permanent. Where, on the other hand,
+Scripture refers to the fruit of mere works, such as the kāturmāsya-
+sacrifices, as something imperishable, we have to understand this
+imperishableness in a merely relative sense, for Scripture definitely
+teaches that the fruit of all works is perishable.
+
+We thus arrive at the settled conclusion that, since the fruit of mere
+works is limited and perishable, while that of the cognition of Brahman
+is infinite and permanent, there is good reason for entering on an
+enquiry into Brahman--the result of which enquiry will be the accurate
+determination of Brahman's nature.--Here terminates the adhikarana of
+'Enquiry.'
+
+What then is that Brahman which is here said to be an object that should
+be enquired into?--To this question the second Sūtra gives a reply.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 148:1. This view is held by the Prābhākara Mīmāmsakas.]
+
+
+
+
+2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c., of this (world proceed).
+
+The expression 'the origin', &c., means 'creation, subsistence, and
+reabsorption'. The 'this' (in 'of this') denotes this entire world with
+its manifold wonderful arrangements, not to be fathomed by thought, and
+comprising within itself the aggregate of living souls from Brahmā down
+to blades of grass, all of which experience the fruits (of their former
+actions) in definite places and at definite times. 'That from which,' i.
+e. that highest Person who is the ruler of all; whose nature is
+antagonistic to all evil; whose purposes come true; who possesses
+infinite auspicious qualities, such as knowledge, blessedness, and so on;
+who is omniscient, omnipotent, supremely merciful; from whom the
+creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of this world proceed--he is
+Brahman: such is the meaning of the Sūtra.--The definition here given of
+Brahman is founded on the text Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'Bhrigu Vāruni went to
+his father Varuna, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman', &c., up to 'That from
+which these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that
+into which they enter at their death, try to know that: that is Brahman.'
+
+A doubt arises here. Is it possible, or not, to gain a knowledge of
+Brahman from the characteristic marks stated in this passage?--It is not
+possible, the Pūrvapakshin contends. The attributes stated in that
+passage--viz. being that from which the world originates, and so on--do
+not properly indicate Brahman; for as the essence of an attribute lies
+in its separative or distinctive function, there would result from the
+plurality of distinctive attributes plurality on the part of Brahman
+itself.--But when we say 'Devadatta is of a dark complexion, is young,
+has reddish eyes,' &c., we also make a statement as to several
+attributes, and yet we are understood to refer to one Devadatta only;
+similarly we understand in the case under discussion also that there is
+one Brahman only!--Not so, we reply. In Devadatta's case we connect all
+attributes with one person, because we know his unity through other
+means of knowledge; otherwise the distinctive power of several
+attributes would lead us, in this case also, to the assumption of
+several substances to which the several attributes belong. In the case
+under discussion, on the other hand, we do not, apart from the statement
+as to attributes, know anything about the unity of Brahman, and the
+distinctive power of the attributes thus necessarily urges upon us the
+idea of several Brahmans.--But we maintain that the unity of the term
+'Brahman' intimates the unity of the thing 'Brahman'!--By no means, we
+reply. If a man who knows nothing about cows, but wishes to know about
+them, is told 'a cow is that which has either entire horns, or mutilated
+horns, or no horns,' the mutally exclusive ideas of the possession of
+entire horns, and so on, raise in his mind the ideas of several
+individual cows, although the term 'cow' is one only; and in the same
+way we are led to the idea of several distinct Brahmans. For this reason,
+even the different attributes combined are incapable of defining the
+thing, the definition of which is desired.--Nor again are the
+characteristics enumerated in the Taitt. passage (viz. creation of the
+world, &c.) capable of defining Brahman in the way of secondary marks
+(upalakshana), because the thing to be defined by them is not previously
+known in a different aspect. So-called secondary marks are the cause of
+something already known from a certain point of view, being known in a
+different aspect--as when it is said 'Where that crane is standing, that
+is the irrigated field of Devadatta.'--But may we not say that from the
+text 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman,' we already have an
+idea of Brahman, and that hence its being the cause of the origin, &c.,
+of the world may be taken as collateral indications (pointing to
+something already known in a certain way)?--Not so, we reply; either of
+these two defining texts has a meaning only with reference to an aspect
+of Brahman already known from the other one, and this mutual dependence
+deprives both of their force.--Brahman cannot therefore be known through
+the characteristic marks mentioned in the text under discussion.
+
+To this primā facie view we make the following reply. Brahman can be
+known on the basis of the origination, subsistence, and reabsorption of
+the world--these characteristics occupying the position of collateral
+marks. No objection can be raised against this view, on the ground that,
+apart from what these collateral marks point to, no other aspect of
+Brahman is known; for as a matter of fact they point to that which is
+known to us as possessing supreme greatness (brihattva) and power of
+growth (brimhana)--this being the meaning of the root brimh (from which
+'Brahman' is derived). Of this Brahman, thus already known (on the basis
+of etymology), the origination, sustentation, and reabsorption of the
+world are collateral marks. Moreover, in the Taitt. text under
+discussion, the relative pronoun--which appears in three forms, (that)
+'from whence,' (that) 'by which,' (that) 'into which'--refers to
+something which is already known as the cause of the origin, and so on,
+of the world. This previous knowledge rests on the Ch. passage, 'Being
+only this was in the beginning,' &c., up to 'it sent forth fire'--which
+declares that the one principle denoted as 'being' is the universal
+material, and instrumental cause. There the clause 'Being only this was
+in the beginning, one only,' establishes that one being as the general
+material cause; the word 'without a second' negatives the existence of a
+second operative cause; and the clauses 'it thought, may I be many, may
+I grow forth', and 'it sent forth fire', establish that one being (as
+the cause and substance of everything). If, then, it is said that
+Brahman is that which is the root of the world's origination,
+subsistence, and reabsorption, those three processes sufficiently
+indicate Brahman as that entity which is their material and operative
+cause; and as being the material and the operative cause implies
+greatness (brihattva) manifesting itself in various powers, such as
+omniscience, and so on, Brahman thus is something already known; and as
+hence origination, &c., of the world are marks of something already
+known, the objection founded above on the absence of knowledge of
+another aspect of Brahman is seen to be invalid.--Nor is there really
+any objection to the origination, &c., of the world being taken as
+characteristic marks of Brahman in so far as they are distinctive
+attributes. For taken as attributes they indicate Brahman as something
+different from what is opposed to those attributes. Several attributes
+which do not contradict each other may serve quite well as
+characteristic marks defining one thing, the nature of which is not
+otherwise known, without the plurality of the attributes in any way
+involving plurality of the thing defined; for as those attributes are at
+once understood to belong to one substrate, we naturally combine them
+within that one substrate. Such attributes, of course, as the possession
+of mutilated horns (mentioned above), which are contradictorily opposed
+to each other, necessarily lead to the assumption of several individual
+cows to which they severally belong; but the origination, &c., of the
+world are processes separated from each other by difference of time only,
+and may therefore, without contradiction, be connected with one Brahman
+in succession.--The text 'from whence these beings', &c., teaches us
+that Brahman is the cause of the origination, &c., of the world, and of
+this Brahman thus known the other text 'The True, knowledge, the
+Infinite is Brahman', tells us that its essential nature marks it off
+from everything else. The term 'True' expresses Brahman in so far as
+possessing absolutely non-conditioned existence, and thus distinguishes
+it from non-intelligent matter, the abode of change, and the souls
+implicated in matter; for as both of these enter into different states
+of existence called by different names, they do not enjoy unconditioned
+being. The term 'knowledge' expresses the characteristic of permanently
+non-contracted intelligence, and thus distinguishes Brahman from the
+released souls whose intelligence is sometimes in a contracted state.
+And the term 'Infinite' denotes that, whose nature is free from all
+limitation of place, time, and particular substantial nature; and as
+Brahman's essential nature possesses attributes, infinity belongs both
+to the essential nature and to the attributes. The qualification of
+Infinity excludes all those individual souls whose essential nature and
+attributes are not unsurpassable, and who are distinct from the two
+classes of beings already excluded by the two former terms (viz. 'true
+being' and 'knowledge').--The entire text therefore defines Brahman--
+which is already known to be the cause of the origination, &c., of the
+world--as that which is in kind different from all other things; and it
+is therefore not true that the two texts under discussion have no force
+because mutually depending on each other. And from this it follows that
+a knowledge of Brahman may be gained on the ground of its characteristic
+marks--such as its being the cause of the origination, &c., of the world,
+free from all evil, omniscient, all-powerful, and so on.
+
+To those, on the other hand, who maintain that the object of enquiry is
+a substance devoid of all difference, neither the first nor the second
+Sūtra can be acceptable; for the Brahman, the enquiry into which the
+first Sūtra proposes, is, according to authoritative etymology,
+something of supreme greatness; and according to the second Sūtra it is
+the cause of the origin, subsistence, and final destruction of the world.
+The same remark holds good with regard to all following Sūtras, and the
+scriptural texts on which they are based--none of them confirm the
+theory of a substance devoid of all difference. Nor, again, does
+Reasoning prove such a theory; for Reasoning has for its object things
+possessing a 'proving' attribute which constantly goes together with an
+attribute 'to be proved.' And even if, in agreement with your view, we
+explained the second Sūtra as meaning 'Brahman is that whence proceeds
+the error of the origination, &c., of the world', we should not thereby
+advance your theory of a substance devoid of all difference. For, as you
+teach, the root of all error is Nescience, and Brahman is that which
+witnesses (is conscious of) Nescience, and the essence of witnessing
+consciousness consists in being pure light (intelligence), and the
+essence of pure light or intelligence is that, distinguishing itself
+from the Non-intelligent, it renders itself, as well as what is
+different from it, capable of becoming the object of empiric thought and
+speech (vyavahāra). All this implies the presence of difference--if
+there were no difference, light or intelligence could not be what it is,
+it would be something altogether void, without any meaning.--Here
+terminates the adhikarana of 'origination and so on.'
+
+An objection to the purport of the preceding Sūtras here presents itself.--
+The assertion that Brahman, as the cause of the origination, &c., of the
+world, must be known through the Vedānta-texts is unfounded; for as
+Brahman may be inferred as the cause of the world through ordinary
+reasoning, it is not something requiring to be taught by authoritative
+texts.--To this objection the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+3. Because Scripture is the source (of the knowledge of Brahman).
+
+Because Brahman, being raised above all contact with the senses, is not
+an object of perception and the other means of proof, but to be known
+through Scripture only; therefore the text 'Whence these creatures are
+born,' &c., has to be accepted as instructing us regarding the true
+nature of Brahman.--But, our opponent points out, Scripture cannot be
+the source of our knowledge of Brahman, because Brahman is to be known
+through other means. For it is an acknowledged principle that Scripture
+has meaning only with regard to what is not established by other sources
+of knowledge.--But what, to raise a primā facie counter objection, are
+those other sources of knowledge? It cannot, in the first place, be
+Perception. Perception is twofold, being based either on the sense-
+organs or on extraordinary concentration of mind (yoga). Of Perception
+of the former kind there are again two sub-species, according as
+Perception takes place either through the outer sense-organs or the
+internal organ (manas). Now the outer sense-organs produce knowledge of
+their respective objects, in so far as the latter are in actual contact
+with the organs, but are quite unable to give rise to the knowledge of
+the special object constituted by a supreme Self that is capable of
+being conscious of and creating the whole aggregate of things. Nor can
+internal perception give rise to such knowledge; for only purely
+internal things, such as pleasure and pain, fall within its cognisance,
+and it is incapable of relating itself to external objects apart from
+the outer sense-organs. Nor, again, perception based on Yoga; for
+although such perception--which springs from intense imagination--
+implies a vivid presentation of things, it is, after all, nothing more
+than a reproduction of objects perceived previously, and does not
+therefore rank as an instrument of knowledge; for it has no means of
+applying itself to objects other than those perceived previously. And if,
+after all, it does so, it is (not a means of knowledge but) a source of
+error.--Nor also inference either of the kind which proceeds on the
+observation of special cases or of the kind which rests on
+generalizations (cp. Nyāya Sū. I, 1,5,). Not inference of the former
+kind, because such inference is not known to relate to anything lying
+beyond the reach of the senses. Nor inference of the latter kind,
+because we do not observe any characteristic feature that is invariably
+accompanied by the presence of a supreme Self capable of being conscious
+of, and constructing, the universe of things.--But there _is_ such a
+feature, viz. the world's being an effected thing; it being a matter of
+common experience that whatever is an effect or product, is due to an
+agent who possesses a knowledge of the material cause, the instrumental
+cause, the final end, and the person meant to make use of the thing
+produced. It further is matter of experience that whatever consists of
+non-sentient matter is dependent on, or ruled by, a single intelligent
+principle. The former generalization is exemplified by the case of jars
+and similar things, and the latter by a living body in good health,
+which consists of non-intelligent matter dependent on an intelligent
+principle. And that the body is an effected thing follows from its
+consisting of parts.--Against this argumentation also objections may be
+raised. What, it must be asked, do you understand by this dependence on
+an intelligent principle? Not, we suppose, that the origination and
+subsistence of the non-intelligent thing should be dependent on the
+intelligent principle; for in that case your example would not help to
+prove your contention. Neither the origin nor the subsistence of a
+person's healthy body depends on the intelligent soul of that person
+alone; they rather are brought about by the merit and demerit of all
+those souls which in any way share the fruition of that body--the wife,
+e.g. of that person, and others. Moreover, the existence of a body made
+up of parts means that body's being connected with its parts in the way
+of so-called intimate relation (sama-vāya), and this requires a certain
+combination of the parts but not a presiding intelligent principle. The
+existence of animated bodies, moreover, has for its characteristic mark
+the process of breathing, which is absent in the case of the earth, sea,
+mountains, &c.--all of which are included in the class of things
+concerning which you wish to prove something--, and we therefore miss a
+uniform kind of existence common to all those things.--Let us then
+understand by the dependence of a non-intelligent thing on an
+intelligent principle, the fact of the motion of the former depending on
+the latter!--This definition, we rejoin, would comprehend also those
+cases in which heavy things, such as carriages, masses of stone, trees,
+&c., are set in motion by several intelligent beings (while what you want
+to prove is the dependence of a moving thing on one intelligent
+principle). If, on the other hand, you mean to say that all motion
+depends on intelligence in general, you only prove what requires no
+proof.--Another alternative, moreover, here presents itself. As we both
+admit the existence of individual souls, it will be the more economical
+hypothesis to ascribe to them the agency implied in the construction of
+the world. Nor must you object to this view on the ground that such
+agency cannot belong to the individual souls because they do not possess
+the knowledge of material causes, &c., as specified above; for all
+intelligent beings are capable of direct knowledge of material causes,
+such as earth and so on, and instrumental causes, such as sacrifices and
+the like. Earth and other material substances, as well as sacrifices and
+the like, are directly perceived by individual intelligent beings at the
+present time (and were no doubt equally perceived so at a former time
+when this world had to be planned and constructed). Nor does the fact
+that intelligent beings are not capable of direct insight into the
+unseen principle--called 'apūrva,' or by similar names--which resides in
+the form of a power in sacrifices and other instrumental causes, in any
+way preclude their being agents in the construction of the world. Direct
+insight into powers is nowhere required for undertaking work: what _is_
+required for that purpose is only direct presentative knowledge of the
+things endowed with power, while of power itself it suffices to have
+some kind of knowledge. Potters apply themselves to the task of making
+pots and jars on the strength of the direct knowledge they possess of
+the implements of their work--the wheel, the staff, &c.--without
+troubling about a similar knowledge of the powers inherent in those
+implements; and in the same way intelligent beings may apply themselves
+to their work (to be effected by means of sacrifices, &c.), if only they
+are assured by sacred tradition of the existence of the various powers
+possessed by sacrifices and the like.--Moreover, experience teaches that
+agents having a knowledge of the material and other causes must be
+inferred only in the case of those effects which can be produced, and
+the material and other causes of which can be known: such things, on the
+other hand, as the earth, mountains, and oceans, can neither be produced,
+nor can their material and other causes ever be known; we therefore have
+no right to infer for them intelligent producers. Hence the quality of
+being an effected thing can be used as an argument for proving the
+existence of an intelligent causal agent, only where that quality is
+found in things, the production of which, and the knowledge of the
+causes of which, is possible at all.--Experience further teaches that
+earthen pots and similar things are produced by intelligent agents
+possessing material bodies, using implements, not endowed with the power
+of a Supreme Lord, limited in knowledge and so on; the quality of being
+an effect therefore supplies a reason for inferring an intelligent agent
+of the kind described only, and thus is opposed to the inference of
+attributes of a contrary nature, viz. omniscience, omnipotence, and
+those other attributes that belong--to the highest Soul, whose existence
+you wish to establish.--Nor does this (as might be objected) imply an
+abandonment of all inference. Where the thing to be inferred is known
+through other means of proof also, any qualities of an opposite nature
+which maybe suggested by the inferential mark (linga) are opposed by
+those other means of proof, and therefore must be dropped. In the case
+under discussion, however, the thine; to be inferred is something not
+guaranteed by any other means of proof, viz. a person capable of
+constructing the entire universe; here there is nothing to interfere
+with the ascription to such a person of all those qualities which, on
+the basis of methodical inference, necessarily belong to it.--The
+conclusion from all this is that, apart from Scripture, the existence of
+a Lord does not admit of proof.
+
+Against all this the Pūrvapakshin now restates his case as follows:--It
+cannot be gainsaid that the world is something effected, for it is made
+up of parts. We may state this argument in various technical forms. 'The
+earth, mountains, &c., are things effected, because they consist of
+parts; in the same way as jars and similar things.' 'The earth, seas,
+mountains, &c., are effects, because, while being big; (i.e. non-atomic),
+they are capable of motion; just as jars and the like.' 'Bodies, the
+world, &c., are effects, because, while being big, they are solid
+(mūrtta); just as jars and the like.'--But, an objection is raised, in
+the case of things made up of parts we do not, in addition to this
+attribute of consisting of parts, observe any other aspect determining
+that the thing is an effect--so as to enable us to say 'this thing is
+effected, and that thing is not'; and, on the other hand, we do observe
+it as an indispensable condition of something being an effect, that
+there should be the possibility of such an effect being brought about,
+and of the existence of such knowledge of material causes, &c. (as the
+bringing about of the effect presupposes).--Not so, we reply. In the
+case of a cause being inferred on the ground of an effect, the knowledge
+and power of the cause must be inferred in accordance with the nature of
+the effect. From the circumstance of a thing consisting of parts we know
+it to be an effect and on this basis we judge of the power and knowledge
+of the cause. A person recognises pots, jars and the like, as things
+produced, and therefrom infers the constructive skill and knowledge of
+their maker; when, after this, he sees for the first time a kingly
+palace with all its various wonderful parts and structures, he concludes
+from the special way in which the parts are joined that this also is an
+effected thing, and then makes an inference as to the architect's
+manifold knowledge and skill. Analogously, when a living body and the
+world have once been recognised to be effects, we infer--as their maker--
+some special intelligent being, possessing direct insight into their
+nature and skill to construct them.--Pleasure and pain, moreover, by
+which men are requited for their merit and demerit, are themselves of a
+non-intelligent nature, and hence cannot bring about their results
+unless they are controlled by an intelligent principle, and this also
+compels us to assume a being capable of allotting to each individual
+soul a fate corresponding to its deserts. For we do not observe that non-
+intelligent implements, such as axes and the like, however much they may
+be favoured by circumstances of time, place, and so on, are capable of
+producing posts and pillars unless they be handled by a carpenter. And
+to quote against the generalization on which we rely the instance of the
+seed and sprout and the like can only spring from an ignorance and
+stupidity which may be called truly demoniac. The same remark would
+apply to pleasure and pain if used as a counter instance. (For in all
+these cases the action which produces an effect must necessarily be
+guided by an intelligent principle.)--Nor may we assume, as a 'less
+complicated hypothesis,' that the guiding principle in the construction
+of the world is the individual souls, whose existence is acknowledged by
+both parties. For on the testimony of observation we must deny to those
+souls the power of seeing what is extremely subtle or remote in time or
+place (while such power must necessarily be ascribed to a world-
+constructing intelligence). On the other hand, we have no ground for
+concluding that the Lord is, like the individual souls, destitute of
+such power; hence it cannot be said that other means of knowledge make
+it impossible to infer such a Lord. The fact rather is that as his
+existence is proved by the argument that any definite effect presupposes
+a causal agent competent to produce that effect, he is proved at the
+same time as possessing the essential power of intuitively knowing and
+ruling all things in the universe.--The contention that from the world
+being an effect it follows that its maker does not possess lordly power
+and so on, so that the proving reason would prove something contrary to
+the special attributes (belonging to a supreme agent, viz. omnipotence,
+omniscience, &c.), is founded on evident ignorance of the nature of the
+inferential process. For the inference clearly does not prove that there
+exist in the thing inferred all the attributes belonging to the proving
+collateral instances, including even those attributes which stand in no
+causal relation to the effect. A certain effect which is produced by
+some agent presupposes just so much power and knowledge on the part of
+that agent as is requisite for the production of the effect, but in no
+way presupposes any incapability or ignorance on the part of that agent
+with regard to things other than the particular effect; for such
+incapability and ignorance do not stand towards that effect in any
+causal relation. If the origination of the effect can be accounted for
+on the basis of the agent's capability of bringing it about, and of his
+knowledge of the special material and instrumental causes, it would be
+unreasonable to ascribe causal agency to his (altogether irrelevant)
+incapabilities and ignorance with regard to other things, only because
+those incapabilities, &c., are observed to exist together with his
+special capability and knowledge. The question would arise moreover
+whether such want of capability and knowledge (with regard to things
+other than the one actually effected) would be helpful towards the
+bringing about of that one effect, in so far as extending to all other
+things or to some other things. The former alternative is excluded
+because no agent, a potter e.g., is quite ignorant of all other things
+but his own special work; and the second alternative is inadmissible
+because there is no definite rule indicating that there should be
+certain definite kinds of want of knowledge and skill in the case of all
+agents [FOOTNOTE 168:1], and hence exceptions would arise with regard to
+every special case of want of knowledge and skill. From this it follows
+that the absence of lordly power and similar qualities which (indeed is
+observed in the case of ordinary agents but) in no way contributes
+towards the production of the effects (to which such agents give rise)
+is not proved in the case of that which we wish to prove (i.e. a Lord,
+creator of the world), and that hence Inference does not establish
+qualities contrary (to the qualities characteristic of a Lord).
+
+A further objection will perhaps be raised, viz. that as experience
+teaches that potters and so on direct their implements through the
+mediation of their own bodies, we are not justified in holding that a
+bodiless Supreme Lord directs the material and instrumental causes of
+the universe.--But in reply to this we appeal to the fact of experience,
+that evil demons possessing men's bodies, and also venom, are driven or
+drawn out of those bodies by mere will power. Nor must you ask in what
+way the volition of a bodiless Lord can put other bodies in motion; for
+volition is not dependent on a body. The cause of volitions is not the
+body but the internal organ (manas), and such an organ we ascribe to the
+Lord also, since what proves the presence of an internal organ endowed
+with power and knowledge is just the presence of effects.--But volitions,
+even if directly springing from the internal organ, can belong to
+embodied beings only, such only possessing internal organs!--This
+objection also is founded on a mistaken generalization: the fact rather
+is that the internal organ is permanent, and exists also in separation
+from the body. The conclusion, therefore, is that--as the individual
+souls with their limited capacities and knowledge, and their dependence
+on merit and demerit, are incapable of giving rise to things so variously
+and wonderfully made as worlds and animated bodies are--inference
+directly leads us to the theory that there is a supreme intelligent
+agent, called the Lord, who possesses unfathomable, unlimited powers and
+wisdom, is capable of constructing the entire world, is without a body,
+and through his mere volition brings about the infinite expanse of this
+entire universe so variously and wonderfully planned. As Brahman may
+thus be ascertained by means of knowledge other than revelation, the
+text quoted under the preceding Sūtra cannot be taken to convey
+instruction as to Brahman. Since, moreover, experience demonstrates that
+material and instrumental causes always are things absolutely distinct
+from each other, as e.g. the clay and the potter with his implements;
+and since, further, there are substances not made up of parts, as e.g.
+ether, which therefore cannot be viewed as effects; we must object on
+these grounds also to any attempt to represent the one Brahman as the
+universal material and instrumental cause of the entire world.
+
+Against all this we now argue as follows:--The Vedānta-text declaring
+the origination, &c., of the world does teach that there is a Brahman
+possessing the characteristics mentioned; since Scripture alone is a
+means for the knowledge of Brahman. That the world is an effected thing
+because it consists of parts; and that, as all effects are observed to
+have for their antecedents certain appropriate agents competent to
+produce them, we must infer a causal agent competent to plan and
+construct the universe, and standing towards it in the relation of
+material and operative cause--this would be a conclusion altogether
+unjustified. There is no proof to show that the earth, oceans, &c.,
+although things produced, were created at one time by one creator. Nor
+can it be pleaded in favour of such a conclusion that all those things
+have one uniform character of being effects, and thus are analogous to
+one single jar; for we observe that various effects are distinguished by
+difference of time of production, and difference of producers. Nor again
+may you maintain the oneness of the creator on the ground that
+individual souls are incapable of the creation of this wonderful
+universe, and that if an additional principle be assumed to account for
+the world--which manifestly is a product--it would be illegitimate to
+assume more than one such principle. For we observe that individual
+beings acquire more and more extraordinary powers in consequence of an
+increase of religious merit; and as we may assume that through an
+eventual supreme degree of merit they may in the end qualify themselves
+for producing quite extraordinary effects, we have no right to assume a
+highest soul of infinite merit, different from all individual souls. Nor
+also can it be proved that all things are destroyed and produced all at
+once; for no such thing is observed to take place, while it is, on the
+other hand, observed that things are produced and destroyed in
+succession; and if we infer that all things are produced and destroyed
+because they are effects, there is no reason why this production and
+destruction should not take place in a way agreeing with ordinary
+experience. If, therefore, what it is desired to prove is the agency of
+one intelligent being, we are met by the difficulty that the proving
+reason (viz. the circumstance of something being an effect) is not
+invariably connected with what it is desired to prove; there, further,
+is the fault of qualities not met with in experience being attributed to
+the subject about which something has to be proved; and lastly there is
+the fault of the proving collateral instances being destitute of what
+has to be proved--for experience does not exhibit to us one agent
+capable of producing everything. If, on the other hand, what you wish to
+prove is merely the existence of an intelligent creative agent, you
+prove only what is proved already (not contested by any one).--Moreover,
+if you use the attribute of being an effect (which belongs to the
+totality of things) as a means to prove the existence of one omniscient
+and omnipotent creator, do you view this attribute as belonging to all
+things in so far as produced together, or in so far as produced in
+succession? In the former case the attribute of being an effect is not
+established (for experience does not show that all things are produced
+together); and in the latter case the attribute would really prove what
+is contrary to the hypothesis of one creator (for experience shows that
+things produced in succession have different causes). In attempting to
+prove the agency of one intelligent creative being only, we thus enter
+into conflict with Perception and Inference, and we moreover contradict
+Scripture, which says that 'the potter is born' and 'the cartwright is
+born' (and thus declares a plurality of intelligent agents). Moreover,
+as we observe that all effected things, such as living bodies and so on,
+are connected with pleasure and the like, which are the effects of
+sattva (goodness) and the other primary constituents of matter, we must
+conclude that effected things have sattva and so on for their causes.
+Sattva and so on--which constitute the distinctive elements of the
+causal substance--are the causes of the various nature of the effects.
+Now those effects can be connected with their causes only in so far as
+the internal organ of a person possessing sattva and so on undergoes
+modifications. And that a person possesses those qualities is due to
+karman. Thus, in order to account for the origination of different
+effects we must necessarily assume the connexion of an intelligent agent
+with karman, whereby alone he can become the cause of effects; and
+moreover the various character of knowledge and power (which the various
+effects presuppose) has its reason in karman. And if it be said that it
+is (not the various knowledge, &c., but) the mere wish of the agent that
+causes the origination of effects, we point out that the wish, as being
+specialised by its particular object, must be based on sattva and so on,
+and hence is necessarily connected with karman. From all this it follows
+that individual souls only can be causal agents: no legitimate inference
+leads to a Lord different from them in nature.--This admits of various
+expressions in technical form. 'Bodies, worlds, &c., are effects due to
+the causal energy of individual souls, just as pots are'; 'the Lord is
+not a causal agent, because he has no aims; just as the released souls
+have none'; 'the Lord is not an agent, because he has no body; just as
+the released souls have none.' (This last argumentation cannot be
+objected to on the ground that individual souls take possession of
+bodies; for in their case there exists a beginningless subtle body by
+means of which they enter into gross bodies).--'Time is never devoid of
+created worlds; because it is time, just like the present time (which
+has its created world).'
+
+Consider the following point also. Does the Lord produce his effects,
+with his body or apart from his body? Not the latter; for we do not
+observe causal agency on the part of any bodiless being: even the
+activities of the internal organ are found only in beings having a body,
+and although the internal organ be eternal we do not know of its
+producing any effects in the case of released disembodied souls. Nor
+again is the former alternative admissible; for in that case the Lord's
+body would either be permanent or non-permanent. The former alternative
+would imply that something made up of parts is eternal; and if we once
+admit this we may as well admit that the world itself is eternal, and
+then there is no reason to infer a Lord. And the latter alternative is
+inadmissible because in that case there would be no cause of the body,
+different from it (which would account for the origination of the body).
+Nor could the Lord himself be assumed as the cause of the body, since a
+bodiless being cannot be the cause of a body. Nor could it be maintained
+that the Lord can be assumed to be 'embodied' by means of some other
+body; for this leads us into a _regressus in infinitum._--Should we,
+moreover, represent to ourselves the Lord (when productive) as engaged
+in effort or not?--The former is inadmissible, because he is without a
+body. And the latter alternative is excluded because a being not making
+an effort does not produce effects. And if it be said that the effect, i.
+e. the world, has for its causal agent one whose activity consists in
+mere desire, this would be to ascribe to the subject of the conclusion
+(i.e. the world) qualities not known from experience; and moreover the
+attribute to be proved would be absent in the case of the proving
+instances (such as jars, &c., which are not the work of agents engaged
+in mere wishing). Thus the inference of a creative Lord which claims to
+be in agreement with observation is refuted by reasoning which itself is
+in agreement with observation, and we hence conclude that Scripture is
+the only source of knowledge with regard to a supreme soul that is the
+Lord of all and constitutes the highest Brahman. What Scripture tells us
+of is a being which comprehends within itself infinite, altogether
+unsurpassable excellences such as omnipotence and so on, is antagonistic
+to all evil, and totally different in character from whatever is
+cognised by the other means of knowledge: that to such a being there
+should attach even the slightest imperfection due to its similarity in
+nature to the things known by the ordinary means of knowledge, is thus
+altogether excluded.--The Pūrvapakshin had remarked that the oneness of
+the instrumental and the material cause is neither matter of observation
+nor capable of proof, and that the same holds good with regard to the
+theory that certain non-composite substances such as ether are created
+things; that these points also are in no way contrary to reason, we
+shall show later on under Sū. I, 4, 23, and Sū. II, 3, 1.
+
+The conclusion meanwhile is that, since Brahman does not fall within the
+sphere of the other means of knowledge, and is the topic of Scripture
+only, the text 'from whence these creatures,' &c., _does_ give
+authoritative information as to a Brahman possessing the characteristic
+qualities so often enumerated. Here terminates the adhikarana of
+'Scripture being the source.'
+
+A new objection here presents itself.--Brahman does not indeed fall
+within the province of the other means of knowledge; but all the same
+Scripture does not give authoritative information regarding it: for
+Brahman is not something that has for its purport activity or cessation
+from activity, but is something fully established and accomplished
+within itself.--To this objection the following Sūtra replies.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 168:1. A certain potter may not possess the skill and
+knowledge required to make chairs and beds; but some other potter may
+possess both, and so on. We cannot therefore point to any definite want
+of skill and knowledge as invariably accompanying the capability of
+producing effects of some other kind.]
+
+
+
+
+4. But that (i.e. the authoritativeness of Scripture with regard to
+Brahman) exists on account of the connexion (of Scripture with the
+highest aim of man).
+
+The word 'but' is meant to rebut the objection raised. _That_, i.e. the
+authoritativeness of Scripture with regard to Brahman, is possible, on
+account of samanvaya, i.e. connexion with the highest aim of man--that
+is to say because the scriptural texts are connected with, i.e. have for
+their subject, Brahman, which constitutes the highest aim of man. For
+such is the connected meaning of the whole aggregate of words which
+constitutes the Upanishads--'That from whence these beings are
+born'(Taitt. Up. III, 1, 1). 'Being only this was in the beginning, one,
+without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2), &c. &c. And of aggregates of words
+which are capable of giving information about accomplished things known
+through the ordinary means of ascertaining the meaning of words, and
+which connectedly refer to a Brahman which is the cause of the
+origination, subsistence, and destruction of the entire world, is
+antagonistic to all imperfection and so on, we have no right to say that,
+owing to the absence of a purport in the form of activity or cessation
+of activity, they really refer to something other than Brahman.
+
+For all instruments of knowledge have their end in determining the
+knowledge of their own special objects: their action does not adapt
+itself to a final purpose, but the latter rather adapts itself to the
+means of knowledge. Nor is it true that where there is no connexion with
+activity or cessation of activity all aim is absent; for in such cases
+we observe connexion with what constitutes the general aim, i.e. the
+benefit of man. Statements of accomplished matter of fact--such as 'a
+son is born to thee.' 'This is no snake'--evidently have an aim, viz. in
+so far as they either give rise to joy or remove pain and fear.
+
+Against this view the Pūrvapakshin now argues as follows. The Vedānta-
+texts do not impart knowledge of Brahman; for unless related to activity
+or the cessation of activity, Scripture would be unmeaning, devoid of
+all purpose. Perception and the other means of knowledge indeed have
+their aim and end in supplying knowledge of the nature of accomplished
+things and facts; Scripture, on the other hand, must be supposed to aim
+at some practical purpose. For neither in ordinary speech nor in the
+Veda do we ever observe the employment of sentences devoid of a
+practical purpose: the employment of sentences not having such a purpose
+is in fact impossible. And what constitutes such purpose is the
+attainment of a desired, or the avoidance of a non-desired object, to be
+effected by some action or abstention from action. 'Let a man desirous
+of wealth attach himself to the court of a prince'; 'a man with a weak
+digestion must not drink much water'; 'let him who is desirous of the
+heavenly world offer sacrifices'; and so on. With regard to the
+assertion that such sentences also as refer to accomplished things--'a
+son is born to thee' and so on--are connected with certain aims of man,
+viz. joy or the cessation of fear, we ask whether in such cases the
+attainment of man's purpose results from the thing or fact itself, as e.
+g. the birth of a son, or from the knowledge of that thing or fact.--You
+will reply that as a thing although actually existing is of no use to
+man as long as it is not known to him, man's purpose is accomplished by
+his knowledge of the thing.--It then appears, we rejoin, that man's
+purpose is effected through mere knowledge, even if there is no actual
+thing; and from this it follows that Scripture, although connected with
+certain aims, is not a means of knowledge for the actual existence of
+things. In all cases, therefore, sentences have a practical purpose;
+they determine either some form of activity or cessation from activity,
+or else some form of knowledge. No sentence, therefore, can have for its
+purport an accomplished thing, and hence the Vedānta-texts do not convey
+the knowledge of Brahman as such an accomplished entity.
+
+At this point somebody propounds the following view. The Vedānta-texts
+_are_ an authoritative means for the cognition of Brahman, because as a
+matter of fact they also aim at something to be done. What they really
+mean to teach is that Brahman, which in itself is pure homogeneous
+knowledge, without a second, not connected with a world, but is, owing
+to beginningless Nescience, viewed as connected with a world, should be
+freed from this connexion. And it is through this process of dissolution
+of the world that Brahman becomes the object of an injunction.--But
+which texts embody this injunction, according to which Brahman in its
+pure form is to be realised through the dissolution of this apparent
+world with its distinction of knowing subjects and objects of
+knowledge?--Texts such as the following: 'One should not see (i. e.
+represent to oneself) the seer of seeing, one should not think the
+thinker of thinking' (Bri. Up. III, 4, 2); for this means that we should
+realise Brahman in the form of pure Seeing (knowledge), free from the
+distinction of seeing agents and objects of sight. Brahman is indeed
+accomplished through itself, but all the same it may constitute an
+object to be accomplished, viz. in so far as it is being disengaged from
+the apparent world.
+
+This view (the Mīmāmsaka rejoins) is unfounded. He who maintains that
+injunction constitutes the meaning of sentences must be able to assign
+the injunction itself, the qualification of the person to whom the
+injunction is addressed, the object of the injunction, the means to
+carry it out, the special mode of the procedure, and the person carrying
+out the injunction. Among these things the qualification of the person
+to whom the injunction addresses itself is something not to be enjoined
+(but existing previously to the injunction), and is of the nature either
+of cause (nimitta) or a result aimed at (phala). We then have to decide
+what, in the case under discussion (i.e. the alleged injunction set
+forth by the antagonist), constitutes the qualification of the person to
+whom the injunction addresses itself, and whether it be of the nature of
+a cause or of a result.--Let it then be said that what constitutes the
+qualification in our case is the intuition of the true nature of Brahman
+(on the part of the person to whom the injunction is addressed).--This,
+we rejoin, cannot be a cause, as it is not something previously
+established; while in other cases the nimitta is something so
+established, as e.g. 'life' is in the case of a person to whom the
+following injunction is addressed, 'As long as his life lasts he is to
+make the Agnihotra-oblation.' And if, after all, it were admitted to be
+a cause, it would follow that, as the intuition of the true nature of
+Brahman is something permanent, the object of the injunction would have
+to be accomplished even subsequently to final release, in the same way
+as the Agnihotra has to be performed permanently as long as life lasts.--
+Nor again can the intuition of Brahman's true nature be a result; for
+then, being the result of an action enjoined, it would be something non-
+permanent, like the heavenly world.--What, in the next place, would be
+the 'object to be accomplished' of the injunction? You may not reply
+'Brahman'; for as Brahman is something permanent it is not something
+that can be realised, and moreover it is not denoted by a verbal form
+(such as denote actions that can be accomplished, as e.g. yāga,
+sacrifice).--Let it then be said that what is to be realised is Brahman,
+in so far as free from the world!--But, we rejoin, even if this be
+accepted as a thing to be realised, it is not the object (vishaya) of
+the injunction--that it cannot be for the second reason just stated--but
+its final result (phala). What moreover is, on this last assumption, the
+thing to be realised--Brahman, or the cessation of the apparent world?--
+Not Brahman; for Brahman is something accomplished, and from your
+assumption it would follow that it is not eternal.--Well then, the
+dissolution of the world!--Not so, we reply; for then it would not be
+Brahman that is realised.--Let it then be said that the dissolution of
+the world only is the object of the injunction!--This, too, cannot be,
+we rejoin; that dissolution is the result (phala) and cannot therefore
+be the object of the injunction. For the dissolution of the world means
+final release; and that is the result aimed at. Moreover, if the
+dissolution of the world is taken as the object of the injunction, that
+dissolution would follow from the injunction, and the injunction would
+be carried out by the dissolution of the world; and this would be a case
+of vicious mutual dependence.--We further ask--is the world, which is to
+be put an end to, false or real?--If it is false, it is put an end to by
+knowledge alone, and then the injunction is needless. Should you reply
+to this that the injunction puts an end to the world in so far as it
+gives rise to knowledge, we reply that knowledge springs of itself from
+the texts which declare the highest truth: hence there is no need of
+additional injunctions. As knowledge of the meaning of those texts
+sublates the entire false world distinct from Brahman, the injunction
+itself with all its adjuncts is seen to be something baseless.--If, on
+the other hand, the world is true, we ask--is the injunction, which puts
+an end to the world, Brahman itself or something different from Brahman?
+If the former, the world cannot exist at all: for what terminates it,
+viz. Brahman, is something eternal; and the injunction thus being
+eternal itself Cannot be accomplished by means of certa n actions.--Let
+then the latter alternative be accepted!--But in that case, the niyoga
+being something which is accomplished by a set of performances the
+function of which it is to put an end to the entire world, the
+performing person himself perishes (with the rest of the world), and the
+niyoga thus remains without a substrate. And if everything apart from
+Brahman is put an end to by a performance the function of which it is to
+put an end to the world, there remains no result to be effected by the
+niyoga, consequently there is no release.
+
+Further, the dissolution of the world cannot constitute the instrument
+(karana) in the action enjoined, because no mode of procedure
+(itikartavyatā) can be assigned for the instrument of the niyoga, and
+unless assisted by a mode of procedure an instrument cannot operate,--
+But why is there no 'mode of procedure'?--For the following reasons. A
+mode of procedure is either of a positive or a negative kind. If
+positive, it may be of two kinds, viz. either such as to bring about the
+instrument or to assist it. Now in our case there is no room for either
+of these alternatives. Not for the former; for there exists in our case
+nothing analogous to the stroke of the pestle (which has the manifest
+effect of separating the rice grains from the husks), whereby the
+visible effect of the dissolution of the whole world could be brought
+about. Nor, secondly, is there the possibility of anything assisting the
+instrument, already existing independently, to bring about its effect;
+for owing to the existence of such an assisting factor the instrument
+itself, i.e. the cessation of the apparent world, cannot be established.
+Nor must you say that it is the cognition of the non-duality of Brahman
+that brings about the means for the dissolution of the world; for, as we
+have already explained above, this cognition directly brings about final
+Release, which is the same as the dissolution of the world, and thus
+there is nothing left to be effected by special means.--And if finally
+the mode of procedure is something purely negative, it can, owing to
+this its nature, neither bring about nor in any way assist the
+instrumental cause. From all this it follows that there is no
+possibility of injunctions having for their object the realisation of
+Brahman, in so far as free from the world.
+
+Here another primā facie view of the question is set forth.--It must be
+admitted that the Vedānta-texts are not means of authoritative knowledge,
+since they refer to Brahman, which is an accomplished thing (not a thing
+'to be accomplished'); nevertheless Brahman itself is established, viz.
+by means of those passages which enjoin meditation (as something 'to be
+done'). This is the purport of texts such as the following: 'The Self is
+to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated upon' (Bri.
+Up. II, 4, 5); 'The Self which is free from sin must be searched out'
+(Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a man meditate upon him as the Self' (Bri. Up.
+I, 4, 7); 'Let a man meditate upon the Self as his world' (Bri. Up. I, 4,
+15).--These injunctions have meditation for their object, and meditation
+again is defined by its own object only, so that the injunctive word
+immediately suggests an object of meditation; and as such an object
+there presents itself, the 'Self' mentioned in the same sentence. Now
+there arises the question, What are the characteristics of that Self?
+and in reply to it there come in texts such as 'The True, knowledge,
+infinite is Brahman'; 'Being only this was in the beginning, one without
+a second.' As these texts give the required special information, they
+stand in a supplementary relation to the injunctions, and hence are
+means of right knowledge; and in this way the purport of the Vedānta-
+texts includes Brahman--as having a definite place in meditation which
+is the object of injunction. Texts such as 'One only without a second'
+(Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'That is the true, that is the Self (Ch. Up. VI, 8,
+7); 'There is here not any plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19), teach that
+there is one Reality only, viz. Brahman, and that everything else is
+false. And as Perception and the other means of proof, as well as that
+part of Scripture which refers to action and is based on the view of
+plurality, convey the notion of plurality, and as there is contradiction
+between plurality and absolute Unity, we form the conclusion that the
+idea of plurality arises through beginningless avidyā, while absolute
+Unity alone is real. And thus it is through the injunction of meditation
+on Brahman--which has for its result the intuition of Brahman--that man
+reaches final release, i.e. becomes one with Brahman, which consists of
+non-dual intelligence free of all the manifold distinctions that spring
+from Nescience. Nor is this becoming one with Brahman to be accomplished
+by the mere cognition of the sense of certain Vedānta-texts; for this is
+not observed--the fact rather being that the view of plurality persists
+even after the cognition of the sense of those texts--, and, moreover,
+if it were so, the injunction by Scripture of hearing, reflecting, &c.,
+would be purposeless.
+
+To this reasoning the following objection might be raised.--We observe
+that when a man is told that what he is afraid of is not a snake, but
+only a rope, his fear comes to an end; and as bondage is as unreal as
+the snake imagined in the rope it also admits of being sublated by
+knowledge, and may therefore, apart from all injunction, be put an end
+to by the simple comprehension of the sense of certain texts. If final
+release were to be brought about by injunctions, it would follow that it
+is not eternal--not any more than the heavenly world and the like; while
+yet its eternity is admitted by every one. Acts of religious merit,
+moreover (such as are prescribed by injunctions), can only be the causes
+of certain results in so far as they give rise to a body capable of
+experiencing those results, and thus necessarily produce the so-called
+samsāra-state (which is opposed to final release, and) which consists in
+the connexion of the soul with some sort of body, high or low. Release,
+therefore, is not something to be brought about by acts of religious
+merit. In agreement herewith Scripture says, 'For the soul as long as it
+is in the body, there is no release from pleasure and pain; when it is
+free from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touch it' (Ch. Up.
+VIII, 12, 1). This passage declares that in the state of release, when
+the soul is freed from the body, it is not touched by either pleasure or
+pain--the effects of acts of religious merit or demerit; and from this
+it follows that the disembodied state is not to be accomplished by acts
+of religious merit. Nor may it be said that, as other special results
+are accomplished by special injunctions, so the disembodied state is to
+be accomplished by the injunction of meditation; for that state is
+essentially something _not_ to be effected. Thus scriptural texts say,
+'The wise man who knows the Self as bodiless among the bodies, as
+persisting among non-persisting things, as great and all-pervading; he
+does not grieve' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22); 'That person is without breath,
+without internal organ, pure, without contact' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2).--
+Release which is a bodiless state is eternal, and cannot therefore be
+accomplished through meritorious acts.
+
+In agreement herewith Scripture says, 'That which thou seest apart from
+merit (dharma) and non-merit, from what is done and not done, from what
+exists and what has to be accomplished--tell me that' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 14).--
+Consider what follows also. When we speak of something being
+accomplished (effected-sādhya) we mean one of four things, viz. its
+being originated (utpatti), or obtained (prāpti), or modified (vikriti),
+or in some way or other (often purely ceremonial) made ready or fit
+(samskriti). Now in neither of these four senses can final Release be
+said to be accomplished. It cannot be originated, for being Brahman
+itself it is eternal. It cannot be attained: for Brahman, being the Self,
+is something eternally attained. It cannot be modified; for that would
+imply that like sour milk and similar things (which are capable of
+change) it is non-eternal. Nor finally can it be made 'ready' or 'fit.'
+A thing is made ready or fit either by the removal of some imperfection
+or by the addition of some perfection. Now Brahman cannot be freed from
+any imperfection, for it is eternally faultless; nor can a perfection be
+added to it, for it is absolutely perfect. Nor can it be improved in the
+sense in which we speak of improving a mirror, viz. by polishing it; for
+as it is absolutely changeless it cannot become the object of any action,
+either of its own or of an outside agent. And, again, actions affecting
+the body, such as bathing, do not 'purify' the Self (as might possibly
+be maintained) but only the organ of Egoity (ahamkartri) which is the
+product of avidyā, and connected with the body; it is this same
+ahamkartri also that enjoys the fruits springing from any action upon
+the body. Nor must it be said that the Self _is_ the ahamkartri; for the
+Self rather is that which is conscious of the ahamkartri. This is the
+teaching of the mantras: 'One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other
+looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1); 'When he is in union with
+the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise men call him the Enjoyer'
+(Ka. Up. I, 3,4); 'The one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the
+Self within all beings, watching over all works, dwelling in all beings,
+the witness, the perceiver, the only one, free from qualities' (Svet. Up.
+VI, 11); 'He encircled all, bright, bodiless, scatheless, without
+muscles, pure, untouched by evil' (Īsa. Up. 8).--All these texts
+distinguish from the ahamkartri due to Nescience, the true Self,
+absolutely perfect and pure, free from all change. Release therefore--
+which _is_ the Self--cannot be brought about in any way.--But, if this
+is so, what then is the use of the comprehension of the texts?--It is of
+use, we reply, in so far as it puts an end to the obstacles in the way
+of Release. Thus scriptural texts declare: 'You indeed are our father,
+you who carry us from our ignorance to the other shore' (Pra. Up. VI, 8);
+'I have heard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes
+grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine' (Ch. Up.
+VII, 1, 3); 'To him whose faults had thus been rubbed out Sanatkumāra
+showed the other bank of Darkness' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2). This shows that
+what is effected by the comprehension of the meaning of texts is merely
+the cessation of impediments in the way of Release. This cessation
+itself, although something effected, is of the nature of that kind of
+nonexistence which results from the destruction of something existent,
+and as such does not pass away.--Texts such as 'He knows Brahman, he
+becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9); 'Having known him he passes beyond
+death' (Svet. Up. III,8), declare that Release follows immediately on
+the cognition of Brahman, and thus negative the intervention of
+injunctions.--Nor can it be maintained that Brahman is related to action
+in so far as constituting the object of the action either of knowledge
+or of meditation; for scriptural texts deny its being an object in
+either of these senses. Compare 'Different is this from what is known,
+and from what is unknown' (Ke. Up. II, 4); 'By whom he knows all this,
+whereby should he know him?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'That do thou know as
+Brahman, not that on which they meditate as being this' (Ke. Up. II, 4).
+Nor does this view imply that the sacred texts have no object at all;
+for it is their object to put an end to the view of difference springing
+from avidyā. Scripture does not objectivise Brahman in any definite form,
+but rather teaches that its true nature is to be non-object, and thereby
+puts an end to the distinction, fictitiously suggested by Nescience, of
+knowing subjects, acts of knowledge, and objects of knowledge. Compare
+the text 'You should not see a seer of seeing, you should not think a
+thinker of thought,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 4, 2).--Nor, again, must it be
+said that, if knowledge alone puts an end to bondage, the injunctions of
+hearing and so on are purposeless; for their function is to cause the
+origination of the comprehension of the texts, in so far as they divert
+from all other alternatives the student who is naturally inclined to
+yield to distractions.--Nor, again, can it be maintained that a
+cessation of bondage through mere knowledge is never observed to take
+place; for as bondage is something false (unreal) it cannot possibly
+persist after the rise of knowledge. For the same reason it is a mistake
+to maintain that the cessation of bondage takes place only after the
+death of the body. In order that the fear inspired by the imagined snake
+should come to an end, it is required only that the rope should be
+recognised as what it is, not that a snake should be destroyed. If the
+body were something real, its destruction would be necessary; but being
+apart from Brahman it is unreal. He whose bondage does not come to an
+end, in him true knowledge has not arisen; this we infer from the effect
+of such knowledge not being observed in him. Whether the body persist or
+not, he who has reached true knowledge is released from that very moment.--
+The general conclusion of all this is that, as Release is not something
+to be accomplished by injunctions of meditation, Brahman is not proved
+to be something standing in a supplementary relation to such injunctions;
+but is rather proved by (non-injunctory) texts, such as 'Thou art that';
+'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'; 'This Self is Brahman.'
+
+This view (the holder of the dhyāna-vidhi theory rejoins) is untenable;
+since the cessation of bondage cannot possibly spring from the mere
+comprehension of the meaning of texts. Even if bondage were something
+unreal, and therefore capable of sublation by knowledge, yet being
+something direct, immediate, it could not be sublated by the indirect
+comprehension of the sense of texts. When a man directly conscious of a
+snake before him is told by a competent by-stander that it is not a
+snake but merely a rope, his fear is not dispelled by a mere cognition
+contrary to that of a snake, and due to the information received; but
+the information brings about the cessation of his fear in that way that
+it rouses him to an activity aiming at the direct perception, by means
+of his senses, of what the thing before him really is. Having at first
+started back in fear of the imagined snake, he now proceeds to ascertain
+by means of ocular perception the true nature of the thing, and having
+accomplished this is freed from fear. It would not be correct to say
+that in this case words (viz. of the person informing) produce this
+perceptional knowledge; for words are not a sense-organ, and among the
+means of knowledge it is the sense-organs only that give rise to direct
+knowledge. Nor, again, can it be pleaded that in the special case of
+Vedic texts sentences may give rise to direct knowledge, owing to the
+fact that the person concerned has cleansed himself of all imperfection
+through the performance of actions not aiming at immediate results, and
+has been withdrawn from all outward objects by hearing, reflection, and
+meditation; for in other cases also, where special impediments in the
+way of knowledge are being removed, we never observe that the special
+means of knowledge, such as the sense-organs and so on, operate outside
+their proper limited sphere.--Nor, again, can it be maintained that
+meditation acts as a means helpful towards the comprehension of texts;
+for this leads to vicious reciprocal dependence--when the meaning of the
+texts has been comprehended it becomes the object of meditation; and
+when meditation has taken place there arises comprehension of the
+meaning of the texts!--Nor can it be said that meditation and the
+comprehension of the meaning of texts have different objects; for if
+this were so the comprehension of the texts could not be a means helpful
+towards meditation: meditation on one thing does not give rise to
+eagerness with regard to another thing!--For meditation which consists
+in uninterrupted remembrance of a thing cognised, the cognition of the
+sense of texts, moreover, forms an indispensable prerequisite; for
+knowledge of Brahman--the object of meditation--cannot originate from
+any other source.--Nor can it be said that that knowledge on which
+meditation is based is produced by one set of texts, while that
+knowledge which puts an end to the world is produced by such texts as
+'thou art that,' and the like. For, we ask, has the former knowledge the
+same object as the latter, or a different one? On the former alternative
+we are led to the same vicious reciprocal dependence which we noted
+above; and on the latter alternative it cannot be shown that meditation
+gives rise to eagerness with regard to the latter kind of knowledge.
+Moreover, as meditation presupposes plurality comprising an object of
+meditation, a meditating subject and so on, it really cannot in any
+perceptible way be helpful towards the origination of the comprehension
+of the sense of texts, the object of which is the oneness of a Brahman
+free from all plurality: he, therefore, who maintains that Nescience
+comes to an end through the mere comprehension of the meaning of texts
+really implies that the injunctions of hearing, reflection, and
+meditation are purposeless.
+
+The conclusion that, since direct knowledge cannot spring from texts,
+Nescience is not terminated by the comprehension of the meaning of texts,
+disposes at the same time of the hypothesis of the so-called 'Release in
+this life' (jīvanmukti). For what definition, we ask, can be given of
+this 'Release in this life'?--'Release of a soul while yet joined to a
+body'!--You might as well say, we reply, that your mother never had any
+children! You have yourself proved by scriptural passages that 'bondage'
+means the being joined to a body, and 'release' being free from a body!--
+Let us then define jīvanmukti as the cessation of embodiedness, in that
+sense that a person, while the appearance of embodiedness persists, is
+conscious of the unreality of that appearance.--But, we rejoin, if the
+consciousness of the unreality of the body puts an end to embodiedness,
+how can you say that jīvanmukti means release of a soul while joined to
+a body? On this explanation there remains no difference whatsoever
+between 'Release in this life' and Release after death; for the latter
+also can only be defined as cessation of the false appearance of
+embodiedness.--Let us then say that a person is 'jīvanmukta' when the
+appearance of embodiedness, although sublated by true knowledge, yet
+persists in the same way as the appearance of the moon being double
+persists (even after it has been recognised as false).--This too we
+cannot allow. As the sublating act of cognition on which Release depends
+extends to everything with the exception of Brahman, it sublates the
+general defect due to causal Nescience, inclusive of the particular
+erroneous appearance of embodiedness: the latter being sublated in this
+way cannot persist. In the case of the double moon, on the other hand,
+the defect of vision on which the erroneous appearance depends is _not_
+the object of the sublative art of cognition, i.e. the cognition of the
+oneness of the moon, and it therefore remains non-sublated; hence the
+false appearance of a double moon may persist.--Moreover, the text 'For
+him there is delay only as long as he is not freed from the body; then
+he will be released' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2), teaches that he who takes his
+stand on the knowledge of the Real requires for his Release the putting
+off of the body only: the text thus negatives jivanmukti. Āpastamba also
+rejects the view of jivanmukti, 'Abandoning the Vedas, this world and
+the next, he (the Samnyāsin) is to seek the Self. (Some say that) he
+obtains salvation when he knows (the Self). This opinion is contradicted
+by the sāstras. (For) if Salvation were obtained when the Self is known,
+he should not feel any pain even in this world. Hereby that which
+follows is explained' (Dh. Sū. II, 9, 13-17).--This refutes also the
+view that Release is obtained through mere knowledge.--The conclusion to
+be drawn from all this is that Release, which consists in the cessation
+of all Plurality, cannot take place as long as a man lives. And we
+therefore adhere to our view that Bondage is to be terminated only by
+means of the injunctions of meditation, the result of which is direct
+knowledge of Brahman. Nor must this be objected to on the ground that
+Release, if brought about by injunctions, must therefore be something
+non-eternal; for what is effected is not Release itself, but only the
+cessation of what impedes it. Moreover, the injunction does not directly
+produce the cessation of Bondage, but only through the mediation of the
+direct cognition of Brahman as consisting of pure knowledge, and not
+connected with a world. It is this knowledge only which the injunction
+produces.--But how can an injunction cause the origination of knowledge?--
+How, we ask in return, can, on your view, works not aiming at some
+immediate result cause the origination of knowledge?--You will perhaps
+reply 'by means of purifying the mind' (manas); but this reply may be
+given by me also.--But (the objector resumes) there is a difference. On
+my view Scripture produces knowledge in the mind purified by works;
+while on your view we must assume that in the purified mind the means of
+knowledge are produced by injunction.--The mind itself, we reply,
+purified by knowledge, constitutes this means.--How do you know this?
+our opponent questions.--How, we ask in return, do you know that the
+mind is purified by works, and that, in the mind so purified of a person
+withdrawn from all other objects by hearing, reflection and meditation,
+Scripture produces that knowledge which destroys bondage?--Through
+certain texts such as the following: 'They seek to know him by sacrifice,
+by gifts, by penance, by fasting' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22); 'He is to be
+heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5); 'He
+knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9).--Well, we reply,
+in the same way our view--viz. that through the injunction of meditation
+the mind is cleared, and that a clear mind gives rise to direct
+knowledge of Brahman--is confirmed by scriptural texts such as 'He is to
+be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5);
+'He who knows Brahman reaches the highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He is
+not apprehended by the eye nor by speech' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8); 'But by a
+pure mind' (?); 'He is apprehended by the heart, by wisdom, by the mind'
+(Ka. Up. II, 6, 9). Nor can it be said that the text 'not that which
+they meditate upon as this' (Ke. Up. I, 4) negatives meditation; it does
+not forbid meditation on Brahman, but merely declares that Brahman is
+different from the world. The mantra is to be explained as follows:
+'What men meditate upon as this world, that is not Brahman; know Brahman
+to be that which is not uttered by speech, but through which speech is
+uttered.' On a different explanation the clause 'know that to be
+Brahman' would be irrational, and the injunctions of meditation on the
+Self would--be meaningless.--The outcome of all this is that unreal
+Bondage which appears in the form of a plurality of knowing subjects,
+objects of knowledge, &c., is put an end to by the injunctions of
+meditation, the fruit of which is direct intuitive knowledge of Brahman.
+
+Nor can we approve of the doctrine held by some that there is no
+contradiction between difference and non-difference; for difference and
+non-difference cannot co-exist in one thing, any more than coldness and
+heat, or light and darkness.--Let us first hear in detail what the
+holder of this so-called bhedābheda view has to say. The whole universe
+of things must be ordered in agreement with our cognitions. Now we are
+conscious of all things as different and non-different at the same time:
+they are non-different in their causal and generic aspects, and
+different in so far as viewed as effects and individuals. There indeed
+is a contradiction between light and darkness and so on; for these
+cannot possibly exist together, and they are actually met with in
+different abodes. Such contradictoriness is not, on the other hand,
+observed in the case of cause and effect, and genus and individual; on
+the contrary we here distinctly apprehend one thing as having two
+aspects--'this jar is clay', 'this cow is short-horned.' The fact is
+that experience does not show us anything that has one aspect only. Nor
+can it be said that in these cases there is absence of contradiction
+because as fire consumes grass so non-difference absorbs difference; for
+the same thing which exists as clay, or gold, or cow, or horse, &c., at
+the same time exists as jar or diadem, or short-horned cow or mare.
+There is no command of the Lord to the effect that one aspect only
+should belong to each thing, non-difference to what is non-different,
+and difference to what is different.--But one aspect only belongs to
+each thing, because it is thus that things are perceived!--On the
+contrary, we reply, things have twofold aspects, just because it is _thus_
+that they are perceived. No man, however wide he may open his eyes, is
+able to distinguish in an object--e.g. a jar or a cow--placed before him
+which part is the clay and which the jar, or which part is the generic
+character of the cow and which the individual cow. On the contrary, his
+thought finds its true expression in the following judgments: 'this jar
+is clay'; 'this cow is short-horned.' Nor can it be maintained that he
+makes a distinction between the cause and genus as objects of the idea
+of persistence, and the effect and individual as objects of the idea of
+discontinuance (difference); for as a matter of fact there is no
+perception of these two elements in separation. A man may look ever so
+close at a thing placed before him, he--will not be able to perceive a
+difference of aspect and to point out 'this is the persisting, general,
+element in the thing, and that the non-persistent, individual, element.'
+Just as an effect and an individual give rise to the idea of one thing,
+so the effect plus cause, and the individual _plus_ generic character,
+also give rise to the idea of one thing only. This very circumstance
+makes it possible for us to recognise each individual thing, placed as
+it is among a multitude of things differing in place, time, and
+character.--Each thing thus being cognised as endowed with a twofold
+aspect, the theory of cause and effect, and generic character and
+individual, being absolutely different, is clearly refuted by perception.
+
+But, an objection is raised, if on account of grammatical co-ordination
+and the resulting idea of oneness, the judgment 'this pot is clay' is
+taken to express the relation of difference, _plus_ non-difference, we
+shall have analogously to infer from judgments such as 'I am a man', 'I
+am a divine being' that the Self and the body also stand in the
+bhedābheda-relation; the theory of the co-existence of difference and
+non-difference will thus act like a fire which a man has lit on his
+hearth, and which in the end consumes the entire house!--This, we reply,
+is the baseless idea of a person who has not duly considered the true
+nature of co-ordination as establishing the bhedābheda-relation. The
+correct principle is that all reality is determined by states of
+consciousness not sublated by valid means of proof. The imagination,
+however, of the identity of the Self and the body is sublated by all the
+means of proof which apply to the Self: it is in fact no more valid than
+the imagination of the snake in the rope, and does not therefore prove
+the non-difference of the two. The co-ordination, on the other hand,
+which is expressed in the judgment 'the cow is short-horned' is never
+observed to be refuted in any way, and hence establishes the bhedābheda-
+relation.
+
+For the same reasons the individual soul (jīva) is not absolutely
+different from Brahman, but stands to it in the bhedābheda-relation in
+so far as it is a part (amsa) of Brahman. Its non-difference from
+Brahman is essential (svābhāvika); its difference is due to limiting
+adjuncts (aupādhika). This we know, in the first place, from those
+scriptural texts which declare non-difference--such as 'Thou art that'
+(Ch. Up. VI); 'There is no other seer but he' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 23);
+'This Self is Brahman' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19); and the passage from the
+Brahmasūkta in the Samhitopanishad of the Ātharvanas which, after having
+said that Brahman is Heaven and Earth, continues, 'The fishermen are
+Brahman, the slaves are Brahman, Brahman are these gamblers; man and
+woman are born from Brahman; women are Brahman and so are men.' And, in
+the second place, from those texts which declare difference: 'He who,
+one, eternal, intelligent, fulfils the desires of many non-eternal
+intelligent beings' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); 'There are two unborn, one
+knowing, the other not-knowing; one strong, the other weak' (Svet. Up. I,
+9); 'Being the cause of their connexion with him, through the qualities
+of action and the qualities of the Self, he is seen as another' (Svet.
+Up. V, 12); 'The Lord of nature and the souls, the ruler of the
+qualities, the cause of the bondage, the existence and the release of
+the samsāra' (Svet. Up. VI, 16); 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords
+of the organs' (Svet. Up. VI, 9); 'One of the two eats the sweet fruit,
+without eating the other looks on' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'He who dwelling
+in the Self (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Embraced by the intelligent Self he
+knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within' (Bri. Up. IV, 3,
+21); 'Mounted by the intelligent Self he goes groaning' (Bri. Up. IV, 3,
+35); 'Having known him he passes beyond death' (Svet. Up. III, 8).--On
+the ground of these two sets of passages the individual and the highest
+Self must needs be assumed to stand in the bhedābheda-relation. And
+texts such as 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9),
+which teach that in the state of Release the individual soul enters into
+Brahman itself; and again texts such as 'But when the Self has become
+all for him, whereby should he see another' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 13), which
+forbid us to view, in the state of Release, the Lord as something
+different (from the individual soul), show that non-difference is
+essential (while difference is merely aupādhika).
+
+But, an objection is raised, the text 'He reaches all desires together
+in the wise Brahman,' in using the word 'together' shows that even in
+the state of Release the soul is different from Brahman, and the same
+view is expressed in two of the Sūtras, viz. IV, 4, 17; 21.--This is not
+so, we reply; for the text, 'There is no other seer but he' (Bri. Up.
+III, 7, 23), and many similar texts distinctly negative all plurality in
+the Self. The Taittirīya-text quoted by you means that man reaches
+Brahman with all desires, i.e. Brahman comprising within itself all
+objects of desire; if it were understood differently, it would follow
+that Brahman holds a subordinate position only. And if the Sūtra IV, 4,
+17 meant that the released soul is separate from Brahman it would follow
+that it is deficient in lordly power; and if this were so the Sūtra
+would be in conflict with other Sūtras such as IV, 4, 1.--For these
+reasons, non-difference is the essential condition; while the
+distinction of the souls from Brahman and from each other is due to
+their limiting adjuncts, i.e. the internal organ, the sense-organs, and
+the body. Brahman indeed is without parts and omnipresent; but through
+its adjuncts it becomes capable of division just as ether is divided by
+jars and the like. Nor must it be said that this leads to a
+reprehensible mutual dependence--Brahman in so far as divided entering
+into conjunction with its adjuncts, and again the division in Brahman
+being caused by its conjunction with its adjuncts; for these adjuncts
+and Brahman's connexion with them are due to action (karman), and the
+stream of action is without a beginning. The limiting adjuncts to which
+a soul is joined spring from the soul as connected with previous works,
+and work again springs from the soul as joined to its adjuncts: and as
+this connexion with works and adjuncts is without a beginning in time,
+no fault can be found with our theory.--The non-difference of the souls
+from each other and Brahman is thus essential, while their difference is
+due to the Upādhis. These Upādhis, on the other hand, are at the same
+time essentially non-distinct and essentially distinct from each other
+and Brahman; for there are no other Upādhis (to account for their
+distinction if non-essential), and if we admitted such, we should again
+have to assume further Upādhis, and so on _in infinitum_. We therefore
+hold that the Upādhis are produced, in accordance with the actions of
+the individual souls, as essentially non-different and different from
+Brahman.
+
+To this bhedābheda view the Pūrvapakshin now objects on the following
+grounds:--The whole aggregate of Vedānta-texts aims at enjoining
+meditation on a non-dual Brahman whose essence is reality, intelligence,
+and bliss, and thus sets forth the view of non-difference; while on the
+other hand the karma-section of the Veda, and likewise perception and
+the other means of knowledge, intimate the view of the difference of
+things. Now, as difference and non-difference are contradictory, and as
+the view of difference may be accounted for as resting on beginningless
+Nescience, we conclude that universal non-difference is what is real.--
+The tenet that difference and non-difference are not contradictory
+because both are proved by our consciousness, cannot be upheld. If one
+thing has different characteristics from another there is distinction
+(bheda) of the two; the contrary condition of things constitutes non-
+distinction (abheda); who in his senses then would maintain that these
+two-suchness and non-suchness--can be found together? You have
+maintained that non-difference belongs to a thing viewed as cause and
+genus, and difference to the same viewed as effect and individual; and
+that, owing to this twofold aspect of things, non-difference and
+difference are not irreconcileable. But that this view also is untenable,
+a presentation of the question in definite alternatives will show. Do
+you mean to say that the difference lies in one aspect of the thing and
+the non-difference in the other? or that difference _and_ non-difference
+belong to the thing possessing two aspects?--On the former alternative
+the difference belongs to the individual and the non-difference to the
+genus; and this implies that there is no one thing with a double aspect.
+And should you say that the genus and individual together constitute one
+thing only, you abandon the view that it is difference of aspect which
+takes away the contradictoriness of difference and non-difference. We
+have moreover remarked already that difference in characteristics and
+its opposite are absolutely contradictory.--On the second alternative we
+have two aspects of different kind and an unknown thing supposed to be
+the substrate of those aspects; but this assumption of a triad of
+entities proves only their mutual difference of character, not their non-
+difference. Should you say that the non-contradictoriness of two aspects
+constitutes simultaneous difference and non-difference in the thing
+which is their substrate, we ask in return--How can two aspects which
+have a thing for their substrate, and thus are different from the thing,
+introduce into that thing a combination of two contradictory attributes
+(viz. difference and non-difference)? And much less even are they able
+to do so if they are viewed as non-different from the thing which is
+their substrate. If, moreover, the two aspects on the one hand, and the
+thing in which they inhere on the other, be admitted to be distinct
+entities, there will be required a further factor to bring about their
+difference and non-difference, and we shall thus be led into a _regressus
+in infinitum._--Nor is it a fact that the idea of a thing inclusive of
+its generic character bears the character of unity, in the same way as
+the admittedly uniform idea of an individual; for wherever a state of
+consciousness expresses itself in the form 'this is such and such' it
+implies the distinction of an attribute or mode, and that to which the
+attribute or mode belongs. In the case under discussion the genus
+constitutes the mode, and the individual that to which the mode belongs:
+the idea does not therefore possess the character of unity.
+
+For these very reasons the individual soul cannot stand to Brahman in
+the bhedābheda-relation. And as the view of non-difference is founded on
+Scripture, we assume that the view of difference rests on beginningless
+Nescience.--But on this view want of knowledge and all the imperfections
+springing therefrom, such as birth, death, &c., would cling to Brahman
+itself, and this would contradict scriptural texts such as 'He who is
+all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'That Self free from all evil' (Ch. Up.
+VIII, 1, 5). Not so, we reply. For all those imperfections we consider
+to be unreal. On your view on the other hand, which admits nothing but
+Brahman and its limiting adjuncts, all the imperfections which spring
+from contact with those adjuncts must really belong to Brahman. For as
+Brahman is without parts, indivisible, the upādhis cannot divide or
+split it so as to connect themselves with a part only; but necessarily
+connect themselves with Brahman itself and produce their effects on it.--
+Here the following explanation may possibly be attempted. Brahman
+determined by an upādhi constitutes the individual soul. This soul is of
+atomic size since what determines it, viz. the internal organ, is itself
+of atomic size; and the limitation itself is without beginning. All the
+imperfections therefore connect themselves only with that special place
+that is determined by the upādhi, and do not affect the highest Brahman
+which is not limited by the upādhi.--In reply to this we ask--Do you
+mean to say that what constitutes the atomic individual soul is a part
+of Brahman which is limited and cut off by the limiting adjunct; or some
+particular part of Brahman which, without being thereby divided off, is
+connected with an atomic upādhi; or Brahman in its totality as connected
+with an upādhi; or some other intelligent being connected with an upādhi,
+or finally the upādhi itself?--The first alternative is not possible,
+because Brahman cannot be divided; it would moreover imply that the
+individual soul has a beginning, for division means the making of one
+thing into two.--On the second alternative it would follow that, as a
+part of Brahman would be connected with the upādhi, all the
+imperfections due to the upādhis would adhere to that part. And further,
+if the upādhi would not possess the power of attracting to itself the
+particular part of Brahman with which it is connected, it would follow
+that when the upādhi moves the part with, which it is connected would
+constantly change; in other words, bondage and release would take place
+at every moment. If, on the contrary, the upādhi possessed the power of
+attraction, the whole Brahman--as not being capable of division--would
+be attracted and move with the upādhi. And should it be said that what
+is all-pervading and without parts cannot be attracted and move, well
+then the upādhi only moves, and we are again met by the difficulties
+stated above. Moreover, if all the upādhis were connected with the parts
+of Brahman viewed as one and undivided, all individual souls, being
+nothing but parts of Brahman, would be considered as non-distinct. And
+should it be said that they are not thus cognised as one because they
+are constituted by different parts of Brahman, it would follow that as
+soon as the upādhi of one individual soul is moving, the identity of
+that soul would be lost (for it would, in successive moments, be
+constituted by different parts of Brahman).--On the third alternative
+(the whole of) Brahman itself being connected with the upādhi enters
+into the condition of individual soul, and there remains no non-
+conditioned Brahman. And, moreover, the soul in all bodies will then be
+one only.--On the fourth alternative the individual soul is something
+altogether different from Brahman, and the difference of the soul from
+Brahman thus ceases to depend on the upādhis of Brahman.--And the fifth
+alternative means the embracing of the view of the Kārvāka (who makes no
+distinction between soul and matter).--The conclusion from all this is
+that on the strength of the texts declaring non-difference we must admit
+that all difference is based on Nescience only. Hence, Scripture being
+an authoritative instrument of knowledge in so far only as it has for
+its end action and the cessation of action, the Vedānta-texts must be
+allowed to be a valid means of knowledge with regard to Brahman's nature,
+in so far as they stand in a supplementary relation to the injunctions
+of meditation.
+
+This view is finally combated by the Mīmāmsaka. Even if, he says, we
+allow the Vedānta-texts to have a purport in so far as they are
+supplementary to injunctions of meditation, they cannot be viewed as
+valid means of knowledge with regard to Brahman. Do the texts referring
+to Brahman, we ask, occupy the position of valid means of knowledge in
+so far as they form a syntactic whole with the injunctions of meditation,
+or as independent sentences? In the former case the purport of the
+syntactic whole is simply to enjoin meditation, and it cannot therefore
+aim at giving instruction about Brahman. If, on the other hand, the
+texts about Brahman are separate independent sentences, they cannot have
+the purport of prompting to action and are therefore devoid of
+instructive power. Nor must it be said that meditation is a kind of
+continued remembrance, and as such requires to be defined by the object
+remembered; and that the demand of the injunction of meditation for
+something to be remembered is satisfied by texts such as 'All this is
+that Self', 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' &c., which set
+forth the nature and attributes of Brahman and--forming a syntactic
+whole with the injunctions--are a valid means of knowledge with regard
+to the existence of the matter they convey. For the fact is that the
+demand on the part of an injunction of meditation for an object to be
+remembered may be satisfied even by something unreal (not true), as in
+the case of injunctions such as 'Let him meditate upon mind as Brahman'
+(Ch. Up. III, 18, 1): the real existence of the object of meditation is
+therefore not demanded.--The final conclusion arrived at in this
+pūrvapaksha is therefore as follows. As the Vedānta-texts do not aim at
+prompting to action or the cessation of action; as, even on the
+supposition of their being supplementary to injunctions of meditation,
+the only thing they effect is to set forth the nature of the object of
+meditation; and as, even if they are viewed as independent sentences,
+they accomplish the end of man (i.e. please, gratify) by knowledge
+merely--being thus comparable to tales with which we soothe children or
+sick persons; it does not lie within their province to establish the
+reality of an accomplished thing, and hence Scripture cannot be viewed
+as a valid means for the cognition of Brahman.
+
+To this primā facie view the Sūtrakāra replies, 'But this on account of
+connexion.' 'Connexion' is here to be taken in an eminent sense, as
+'connexion with the end of man.' That Brahman, which is measureless
+bliss and therefore constitutes the highest end of man, is connected
+with the texts as the topic set forth by them, proves Scripture to be a
+valid means for the cognition of Brahman. To maintain that the whole
+body of Vedānta-texts-which teach us that Brahman is the highest object
+to be attained, since it consists of supreme bliss free of all blemish
+whatsoever--is devoid of all use and purpose merely because it does not
+aim at action or the cessation of action; is no better than to say that
+a youth of royal descent is of no use because he does not belong to a
+community of low wretches living on the flesh of dogs!
+
+The relation of the different texts is as follows. There are individual
+souls of numberless kinds-gods, Asuras, Gandharvas, Siddhas, Vidyādharas,
+Kinnaras, Kimpurushas, Yakshas, Rākshasas, Pisākas, men, beasts, birds,
+creeping animals, trees, bushes, creepers, grasses and so on--
+distinguished as male, female, or sexless, and having different sources
+of nourishment and support and different objects of enjoyment. Now all
+these souls are deficient in insight into the true nature of the highest
+reality, their understandings being obscured by Nescience operating in
+the form of beginningless karman; and hence those texts only are fully
+useful to them which teach that there exists a highest Brahman--which
+the souls in the state of release may cognise as non-different from
+themselves, and which then, through its own essential nature, qualities,
+power and energies, imparts to those souls bliss infinite and
+unsurpassable. When now the question arises--as it must arise--, as to
+how this Brahman is to be attained, there step in certain other Vedānta-
+texts--such as He who knows Brahman reaches the highest' (Bri. Up. II, 1,
+1), and 'Let a man meditate on the Self as his world' (Bri. Up. 1, 4,
+15)--and, by means of terms denoting 'knowing' and so on, enjoin
+meditation as the means of attaining Brahman. (We may illustrate this
+relation existing between the texts setting forth the nature of Brahman
+and those enjoining meditation by two comparisons.) The case is like
+that of a man who has been told 'There is a treasure hidden in your
+house'. He learns through this sentence the existence of the treasure,
+is satisfied, and then takes active steps to find it and make it his own.--
+Or take the case of a young prince who, intent on some boyish play,
+leaves his father's palace and, losing his way, does not return. The
+king thinks his son is lost; the boy himself is received by some good
+Brahman who brings him up and teaches him without knowing who the boy's
+father is. When the boy has reached his sixteenth year and is
+accomplished in every way, some fully trustworthy person tells him,
+'Your father is the ruler of all these lands, famous for the possession
+of all noble qualities, wisdom, generosity, kindness, courage, valour
+and so on, and he stays in his capital, longing to see you, his lost
+child. Hearing that his father is alive and a man so high and noble, the
+boy's heart is filled with supreme joy; and the king also, understanding
+that his son is alive, in good health, handsome and well instructed,
+considers himself to have attained all a man can wish for. He then takes
+steps to recover his son, and finally the two are reunited.
+
+The assertion again that a statement referring to some accomplished
+thing gratifies men merely by imparting a knowledge of the thing,
+without being a means of knowledge with regard to its real existence--so
+that it would be comparable to the tales we tell to children and sick
+people--, can in no way be upheld. When it is ascertained that a thing
+has no real existence, the mere knowledge or idea of the thing does not
+gratify. The pleasure which stories give to children and sick people is
+due to the fact that they erroneously believe them to be true; if they
+were to find out that the matter present to their thought is untrue
+their pleasure would come to an end that very moment. And thus in the
+case of the texts of the Upanishads also. If we thought that these texts
+do not mean to intimate the real existence of Brahman, the mere idea of
+Brahman to which they give rise would not satisfy us in any way.
+
+The conclusion therefore is that texts such as 'That from whence these
+beings are born' &c. do convey valid instruction as to the existence of
+Brahman, i.e. that being which is the sole cause of the world, is free
+from all shadow of imperfection, comprises within itself all auspicious
+qualities, such as omniscience and so on, and is of the nature of
+supreme bliss.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'connexion'.
+
+
+
+
+5. On account of seeing (i.e. thinking) that which is not founded on
+Scripture (i.e. the Pradhāna) is not (what is taught by the texts
+referring to the origination of the world).
+
+We have maintained that what is taught by the texts relative to the
+origination of the world is Brahman, omniscient, and so on. The present
+Sūtra and the following Sūtras now add that those texts can in no way
+refer to the Pradhāna and similar entities which rest on Inference only.
+
+We read in the Chāndogya, 'Being only was this in the beginning, one
+only, without a second.--It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth.--
+It sent forth fire' (VI, 2, 1 ff.)--Here a doubt arises whether the
+cause of the world denoted by the term 'Being' is the Pradhāna. assumed
+by others, which rests on Inference, or Brahman as defined by us.
+
+The Pūrvapakshin maintains that the Pradhāna is meant. For he says, the
+Chāndogya text quoted expresses the causal state of what is denoted by
+the word 'this', viz. the aggregate of things comprising manifold
+effects, such as ether, &c., consisting of the three elements of
+Goodness, Passion and Darkness, and forming the sphere of fruition of
+intelligent beings. By the 'effected' state we understand the assuming,
+on the part of the causal substance, of a different condition; whatever
+therefore constitutes the essential nature of a thing in its effected
+state the same constitutes its essential nature in the causal state also.
+Now the effect, in our case, is made up of the three elements Goodness,
+Passion and Darkness; hence the cause is the Pradhāna which consists in
+an equipoise of those three elements. And as in this Pradhāna all
+distinctions are merged, so that it is pure Being, the Chāndogya text
+refers to it as 'Being, one only, without a second.' This establishes
+the non-difference of effect and cause, and in this way the promise that
+through the knowledge of one thing all things are to be known admits of
+being fulfilled. Otherwise, moreover, there would be no analogy between
+the instance of the lump of clay and the things made of it, and the
+matter to be illustrated thereby. The texts speaking of the origination
+of the world therefore intimate the Pradhāna taught by the great Sage
+Kapila. And as the Chāndogya passage has, owing to the presence of an
+initial statement (pratijńā) and a proving instance, the form of an
+inference, the term 'Being' means just that which rests on inference,
+viz. the Pradhāna.
+
+This primā facie view is set aside by the words of the Sūtra. That which
+does not rest on Scripture, i.e. the Pradhāna, which rests on Inference
+only, is not what is intimated by the texts referring to the origination
+of the world; for the text exhibits the root 'īksh'--which means 'to
+think'--as denoting a special activity on the part of what is termed
+'Being.' 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth.' 'Thinking'
+cannot possibly belong to the non-sentient Pradhāna: the term 'Being'
+can therefore denote only the all-knowing highest Person who is capable
+of thought. In agreement with this we find that, in all sections which
+refer to creation, the act of creation is stated to be preceded by
+thought. 'He thought, shall I send forth worlds. He sent forth these
+worlds' (Ait. Ār. II, 4, 1, 2); 'He thought he sent forth Prāna' (Pr. Up.
+VI, 3); and others.--But it is a rule that as a cause we must assume
+only what corresponds to the effect!--Just so; and what corresponds to
+the total aggregate of effects is the highest Person, all-knowing, all-
+powerful, whose purposes realise themselves, who has minds and matter in
+their subtle state for his body. Compare the texts 'His high power is
+revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge' (Svet.
+Up. VI, 8); 'He who is all-knowing, all-perceiving' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9);
+'He of whom the Unevolved is the body, of whom the Imperishable is the
+body, of whom Death is the body, he is the inner Self of all things'
+(Subāl. Up. VII).--This point (viz. as to the body of the highest
+Person) will be established under Sū. II, 1, 4. The present Sūtra
+declares that the texts treating of creation cannot refer to the
+Pradhāna; the Sūtra just mentioned will dispose of objections. Nor is
+the Pūrvapakshin right in maintaining that the Chāndogya passage is of
+the nature of an Inference; for it does not state a reason (hetu--which
+is the essential thing in an Inference). The illustrative instance (of
+the lump of clay) is introduced merely in order to convince him who
+considers it impossible that all things should be known through one
+thing--as maintained in the passage 'through which that is heard which
+was not heard,' &c.,--that this _is_ possible after all. And the mention
+made in the text of 'seeing' clearly shows that there is absolutely no
+intention of setting forth an Inference.
+
+Let us assume, then, the Pūrvapakshin resumes, that the 'seeing' of the
+text denotes not 'seeing' in its primary, direct sense--such as belongs
+to intelligent beings only; but 'seeing' in a secondary, figurative
+sense which there is ascribed to the Pradhāna in the same way as in
+passages immediately following it is ascribed to fire and water--'the
+fire saw'; 'the water saw' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3). The transference, to non-
+existent things, of attributes properly belonging to sentient beings is
+quite common; as when we say 'the rice-fields look out for rain'; 'the
+rain delighted the seeds.'--This view is set aside by the next Sūtra.
+
+
+
+
+6. If it be said that (the word 'seeing') has a secondary (figurative)
+meaning; we deny this, on account of the word 'Self' (being applied to
+the cause of the world).
+
+The contention that, because, in passages standing close by, the word
+'seeing' is used in a secondary sense, the 'seeing' predicated of the
+Sat ('Being') is also to be taken in a secondary sense, viz. as denoting
+(not real thought but) a certain condition previous to creation, cannot
+be upheld; for in other texts met with in the same section (viz. 'All
+this has that for its Self; that is the True, that is the Self', Ch. Up.
+VI, 8, 7), that which first had been spoken of as Sat is called the
+'Self'. The designation 'Self' which in this passage is applied to the
+Sat in its relation to the entire world, sentient or non-sentient, is in
+no way appropriate to the Pradhāna. We therefore conclude that, as the
+highest Self is the Self of fire, water, and earth also, the words fire,
+&c. (in the passages stating that fire, &c. thought) denote the highest
+Self only. This conclusion agrees with the text 'Let me enter into these
+three beings with this living Self, and evolve names and forms', for
+this text implies that fire, water, &c. possess substantial being and
+definite names only through the highest Self having entered into them.
+The thought ascribed in the text to fire, water, &c. hence is thought in
+the proper sense, and the hypothesis that, owing to its connexion with
+these latter texts, the thought predicated of 'Being' ('it thought,' &c.
+) should be thought in a figurative sense only thus lapses altogether.
+
+
+
+
+The next following Sūtra confirms the same view.
+
+7. Because release is taught of him who takes his stand on it.
+
+Svetaketu, who is desirous of final release, is at first--by means of
+the clause 'Thou art that'--instructed to meditate on himself as having
+his Self in that which truly is; and thereupon the passage 'for him
+there is delay' only as long as 'I shall not be released, then I shall
+be united' teaches that for a man taking his stand upon that teaching
+there will be Release, i.e. union with Brahman--which is delayed only
+until this mortal body falls away. If, on the other hand, the text would
+teach that the non-intelligent Pradhāna is the general cause, it could
+not possibly teach that meditation on this Pradhāna being a man's Self
+is the means towards his Release. A man taking his stand on such
+meditation rather would on death be united with a non-sentient principle,
+according to the scriptural saying, 'According as his thought is in this
+world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14,
+1). And Scripture, which is more loving than even a thousand parents,
+cannot possibly teach such union with the Non-sentient, which is
+acknowledged to be the cause of all the assaults of suffering in its
+threefold form. Moreover, those who hold the theory of the Pradhāna
+being the cause of the world do not themselves maintain that he who
+takes his stand upon the Pradhāna attains final release.
+
+
+
+
+The Pradhāna is not the cause of the world for the following reason also:
+
+8. And because there is no statement of its having to be set aside.
+
+If the word 'Sat' denoted the Pradhāna as the cause of the world, we
+should expect the text to teach that the idea of having his Self in that
+'Sat' should be set aside by Svetaketu as desirous of Release; for that
+idea would be contrary to Release. So far from teaching this, the text,
+however, directly inculcates that notion in the words 'Thou art that.'--
+The next Sūtra adds a further reason.
+
+
+
+
+9. And on account of the contradiction of the initial statement.
+
+The Pradhāna's being the cause of the world would imply a contradiction
+of the initial statement, viz. that through the knowledge of one thing
+all things are to be known. Now, on the principle of the non-difference
+of cause and effect, this initial statement can only be fulfilled in
+that way that through the knowledge of the 'Sat', which is the cause,
+there is known the entire world, whether sentient or non-sentient, which
+constitutes the effect. But if the Pradhāna were the cause, the
+aggregate of sentient beings could not be known through it--for sentient
+beings are not the effect of a non-sentient principle, and there would
+thus arise a contradiction.--The next Sūtra supplies a further reason.
+
+
+
+
+10. On account of (the individual soul) going to the Self.
+
+With reference to the 'Sat' the text says, 'Learn from me the true
+nature of sleep. When a man sleeps here, he becomes united with the Sat,
+he is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say he sleeps (svapiti),
+because he is gone to his own (sva-apīta)' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1). This text
+designates the soul in the state of deep sleep as having entered into,
+or being merged or reabsorbed in, the Self. By reabsorption we
+understand something being merged in its cause. Now the non-intelligent
+Pradhāna cannot be the cause of the intelligent soul; hence the soul's
+going to its Self can only mean its going to _the_, i.e. the universal,
+Self. The term 'individual soul' (jīva) denotes Brahman in so far as
+having an intelligent substance for its body, Brahman itself
+constituting the Self; as we learn from the text referring to the
+distinction of names and forms. This Brahman, thus called jīva., is in
+the state of deep sleep, no less than in that of a general pralaya, free
+from the investment of names and forms, and is then designated as mere
+'Being' (sat); as the text says, 'he is then united with the Sat'. As
+the soul is in the state of deep sleep free from the investment of name
+and form, and invested by the intelligent Self only, another text says
+with reference to the same state,' Embraced by the intelligent Self he
+knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within' (Bri. Up. IV, 3,
+21). Up to the time of final release there arise in the soul invested by
+name and form the cognitions of objects different from itself. During
+deep sleep the souls divest themselves of names and forms, and are
+embraced by the 'Sat' only; but in the waking state they again invest
+themselves with names and forms, and thus bear corresponding distinctive
+names and forms. This, other scriptural texts also distinctly declare,
+'When a man lying in deep sleep sees no dream whatever, he becomes one
+with that prāna alone;--from that Self the prānas proceed, each towards
+its place' (Kau. Up. 111,3); 'Whatever these creatures are here, whether
+a lion or a wolf or a boar or a gnat or a mosquito, that they become
+again' (Ch. Up. VI, 9, 3).--Hence the term 'Sat' denotes the highest
+Brahman, the all-knowing highest Lord, the highest Person. Thus the
+Vrittikāra also says, 'Then he becomes united with the Sat--this is
+proved by (all creatures) entering into it and coming back out of it.'
+And Scripture also says, 'Embraced by the intelligent Self.'--The next
+Sūtra gives an additional reason.
+
+
+
+
+11. On account of the uniformity of view.
+
+'In the beginning the Self was all this; there was nothing else
+whatsoever thinking. He thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent
+forth these worlds' (Ait. Ār. II, 4, 1, 1); 'From that Self sprang ether,
+from ether air, from air fire, from fire water, from water earth' (Taitt.
+Up. II, 1); 'From this great Being were breathed forth the Rig-veda,' &c.--
+These and similar texts referring to the creation have all the same
+purport: they all teach us that the Supreme Lord is the cause of the
+world. We therefore conclude that in the Ch. passage also the Sat,
+which is said to be the cause of the world, is the Supreme Lord.
+
+
+
+
+12. And because it is directly stated in Scripture.
+
+The text of the same Upanishad directly declares that the being denoted
+by the word 'Sat' evolves, as the universal Self, names and forms; is
+all-knowing, all-powerful, all-embracing; is free from all evil, &c.;
+realises all its wishes and purposes. 'Let me, entering those beings
+with this living; Self, evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'All
+these creatures have their root in the Sat, they dwell in the Sat, they
+rest in the Sat' (VI, 8, 4); 'All this has that for its Self; it is the
+True, it is the Self (VI, 8, 7); 'Whatever there is of him here in the
+world, and whatever is not, all that is contained within it' (VIII, 1,
+3); 'In it all desires are contained. It is the Self free from sin, free
+from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose wishes
+come true, whose purposes come true' (VIII, 1, 5).--And analogously
+other scriptural texts, 'Of him there is no master in the world, no
+ruler; not even a sign of him. He is the cause, the lord of the lords of
+the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI,
+9). 'The wise one who, having created all forms and having given them
+names, is calling them by those names' (Taitt. Ar. III, 12, 7); 'He who
+entered within is the ruler of all beings, the Self of all' (Taitt. Ar.
+III, 24); 'The Self of all, the refuge, the ruler of all, the Lord of
+the souls' (Mahānār. Up. XI); 'Whatsoever is seen or heard in this world,
+inside or outside, pervading that all Nārāyana abides' (Mahānār. Up. XI);
+'He is the inner Self of all beings, free from all evil, the divine, the
+only god Nārāyana.'--These and other texts which declare the world to
+have sprung from the highest Lord, can in no way be taken as
+establishing the Pradhāna. Hence it remains a settled conclusion that
+the highest Person, Nārāyana, free from all shadow of imperfection, &c.,
+is the single cause of the whole Universe, and is that Brahman which
+these Sūtras point out as the object of enquiry.
+
+For the same reasons the theory of a Brahman, which is nothing but non-
+differenced intelligence, must also be considered as refuted by the
+Sūtrakāra, with the help of the scriptural texts quoted; for those texts
+prove that the Brahman, which forms the object of enquiry, possesses
+attributes such as thinking, and so on, in their real literal sense. On
+the theory, on the other hand, of a Brahman that is nothing but
+distinctionless intelligence even the witnessing function of
+consciousness would be unreal. The Sūtras propose as the object of
+enquiry Brahman as known from the Vedānta-texts, and thereupon teach
+that Brahman is intelligent (Sū. I, 1, 5 ff.) To be intelligent means to
+possess the quality of intelligence: a being devoid of the quality of
+thought would not differ in nature from the Pradhāna. Further, on the
+theory of Brahman being mere non-differenced light it would be difficult
+to prove that Brahman is self-luminous. For by light we understand that
+particular thing which renders itself, as well as other things, capable
+of becoming the object of ordinary thought and speech; but as a thing
+devoid of all difference does not, of course, possess these two
+characteristics it follows that it is as devoid of intelligence as a pot
+may be.--Let it then be assumed that although a thing devoid of all
+distinction does not actually possess these characteristics, yet it has
+the potentiality of possessing them!--But if it possesses the attribute
+of potentiality, it is clear that you abandon your entire theory of a
+substance devoid of all distinction!--Let us then admit, on the
+authority of Scripture, that the universal substance possesses this one
+distinguishing attribute of self-luminousness.--Well, in that case you
+must of course admit, on the same authority, all those other qualities
+also which Scripture vouches for, such as all-knowingness, the
+possession of all powers, and so on.--Moreover, potentiality means
+capability to produce certain special effects, and hence can be
+determined on the ground of those special effects only. But if there are
+no means of knowing these particular effects, there are also no means of
+cognising potentiality.--And those who hold the theory of a substance
+devoid of all difference, have not even means of proof for their
+substance; for as we have shown before, Perception, Inference, Scripture,
+and one's own consciousness, are all alike in so far as having for their
+objects things marked by difference.--It therefore remains a settled
+conclusion that the Brahman to be known is nothing else but the highest
+Person capable of the thought 'of becoming many' by manifesting himself
+in a world comprising manifold sentient and non-sentient creatures.--
+Here terminates the adhikarana of 'seeing'.
+
+So far the Sūtras have declared that the Brahman which forms the object
+of enquiry is different from the non-intelligent Pradhāna, which is
+merely an object of fruition for intelligent beings. They now proceed to
+show that Brahman--which is antagonistic to all evil and constituted by
+supreme bliss--is different from the individual soul, which is subject
+to karman, whether that soul be in its purified state or in the impure
+state that is due to its immersion in the ocean of manifold and endless
+sufferings, springing from the soul's contact with Prakriti (Pradhāna).
+
+
+
+
+13. The Self consisting of Bliss (is the highest Self) on account of
+multiplication.
+
+We read in the text of the Taittirīyas, 'Different from this Self, which
+consists of Understanding, is the other inner Self which consists of
+bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 5).--Here the doubt arises whether the Self
+consisting of bliss be the highest Self, which is different from the
+inner Self subject to bondage and release, and termed 'jīva.' (i.e.
+living self or individual soul), or whether it be that very inner Self,
+i.e. the jīva.--It _is_ that inner Self, the Pūrvapakshin contends. For
+the text says 'of that this, i.e. the Self consisting of bliss, is the
+sārīra Self'; and sārīra means that which is joined to a body, in other
+words, the so-called jīva.--But, an objection is raised, the text
+enumerates the different Selfs, beginning with the Self consisting of
+bliss, to the end that man may obtain the bliss of Brahman, which was,
+at the outset, stated to be the cause of the world (II, 1), and in the
+end teaches that the Self consisting of bliss is the cause of the world
+(II, 6). And that the cause of the world is the all-knowing Lord, since
+Scripture says of him that 'he thought,' we have already explained.--
+That cause of the world, the Pūrvapakshin rejoins, is not different from
+the jīva; for in the text of the Chāndogyas that Being which first is
+described as the creator of the world is exhibited, in two passages, in
+co-ordination with the jīva ('having entered into them with that living
+Self' and 'Thou art that, O Svetaketu'). And the purport of co-
+ordination is to express oneness of being, as when we say, 'This person
+here is that Devadatta we knew before.' And creation preceded by thought
+can very well be ascribed to an intelligent jīva. The connexion of the
+whole Taittirīya-text then is as follows. In the introductory clause,
+'He who knows Brahman attains the Highest,' the true nature of the jīva,
+free from all connexion with matter, is referred to as something to be
+attained; and of this nature a definition is given in the words, 'The
+True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman.' The attainment of the jīva in
+this form is what constitutes Release, in agreement with the text, 'So
+long as he is in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain; but
+when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches
+him' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1). This true nature of the Self, free from all
+avidyā, which the text begins by presenting as an object to be attained,
+is thereupon declared to be the Self consisting of bliss. In order to
+lead up to this--just as a man points out to another the moon by first
+pointing out the branch of a tree near which the moon is to be seen--the
+text at first refers to the body ('Man consists of food'); next to the
+vital breath with its five modifications which is within the body and
+supports it; then to the manas within the vital breath; then to the
+buddhi within the manas--'the Self consisting of breath'; 'the Self
+consisting of mind' (manas); 'the Self consisting of understanding'
+(vijńāna). Having thus gradually led up to the jīva, the text finally
+points out the latter, which is the innermost of all ('Different from
+that is the inner Self which consists of bliss'), and thus completes the
+series of Selfs one inside the other. We hence conclude that the Self
+consisting of bliss is that same jīva-self which was at the outset
+pointed out as the Brahman to be attained.--But the clause immediately
+following, 'Brahman is the tail, the support (of the Self of bliss'),
+indicates that Brahman is something different from the Self of bliss!--
+By no means (the Pūrvapakshin rejoins). Brahman is, owing to its
+different characteristics, there compared to an animal body, and head,
+wings, and tail are ascribed to it, just as in a preceding clause the
+body consisting of food had also been imagined as having head, wings,
+and tail--these members not being something different from the body, but
+the body itself. Joy, satisfaction, great satisfaction, bliss, are
+imagined as the members, non-different from it, of Brahman consisting of
+bliss, and of them all the unmixed bliss-constituted Brahman is said to
+be the tail or support. If Brahman were something different from the
+Self consisting of bliss, the text would have continued, 'Different from
+this Self consisting of bliss is the other inner Self--Brahman.' But
+there is no such continuation. The connexion of the different clauses
+stands as follows: After Brahman has been introduced as the topic of the
+section ('He who knows Brahman attains the Highest'), and defined as
+different in nature from everything else ('The True, knowledge'), the
+text designates it by the term 'Self,' &c. ('From that Self sprang
+ether'), and then, in order to make it clear that Brahman is the
+innermost Self of all, enumerates the pranamaya and so on--designating
+them in succession as more and more inward Selfs--, and finally leads up
+to the ānandamaya as the innermost Self('Different from this, &c., is the
+Self consisting of bliss'). From all which it appears that the term
+'Self' up to the end denotes the Brahman mentioned at the beginning.--
+But, in immediate continuation of the clause, 'Brahman is the tail, the
+support,' the text exhibits the following sloka: 'Non-existing becomes
+he who views Brahman as non-existing; who knows Brahman as existing, him
+we know as himself existing.' Here the existence and non-existence of
+the Self are declared to depend on the knowledge and non-knowledge of
+Brahman, not of the Self consisting of bliss. Now no doubt can possibly
+arise as to the existence or non-existence of this latter Self, which,
+in the form of joy, satisfaction, &c., is known to every one. Hence the
+sloka cannot refer to that Self, and hence Brahman is different from
+that Self.--This objection, the Pūrvapakshin rejoins, is unfounded. In
+the earlier parts of the chapter we have corresponding slokas, each of
+them following on a preceding clause that refers to the tail or support
+of a particular Self: in the case, e.g. of the Self consisting of food,
+we read, 'This is the tail, the support,' and then comes the sloka,
+'From food are produced all creatures,' &c. Now it is evident that all
+these slokas are meant to set forth not only what had been called 'tail,'
+but the entire Self concerned (Self of food, Self of breath, &c.); and
+from this it follows that also the sloka, 'Non-existing becomes he,'
+does not refer to the 'tail' only as something other than the Self of
+bliss, but to the entire Self of bliss. And there may very well be a
+doubt with regard to the knowledge or non-knowledge of the existence of
+that Self consisting of unlimited bliss. On your view also the
+circumstance of Brahman which forms the tail not being known is due to
+its being of the nature of limitless bliss. And should it be said that
+the Self of bliss cannot be Brahman because Brahman does not possess a
+head and other members; the answer is that Brahman also does not possess
+the quality of being a tail or support, and that hence Brahman cannot be
+a tail.--Let it then be said that the expression, 'Brahman is the tail,'
+is merely figurative, in so far as Brahman is the substrate of all
+things imagined through avidyā!--But, the Pūrvapakshin rejoins, we may
+as well assume that the ascription to Brahman of joy, as its head and so
+on, is also merely figurative, meant to illustrate the nature of Brahman,
+i.e. the Self of bliss as free from all pain. To speak of Brahman or the
+Self as consisting of bliss has thus the purpose of separating from all
+pain and grief that which in a preceding clause ('The True, knowledge,
+the Infinite is Brahman') had already been separated from all changeful
+material things. As applied to Brahman (or the Self), whose nature is
+nothing but absolute bliss, the term 'ānandamaya' therefore has to be
+interpreted as meaning nothing more than 'ānanda'; just as prānamaya
+means prāna.
+
+The outcome of all this is that the term 'ānandamaya' denotes the true
+essential nature--which is nothing but absolute uniform bliss--of the
+jiva that appears as distinguished by all the manifold individualising
+forms which are the figments of Nescience. The Self of bliss is the jīva
+or pratyag-ātman, i.e. the individual soul.
+
+Against this primā facie view the Sūtrakāra contends that the Self
+consisting of bliss is the highest Self 'on account of multiplication.'--
+The section which begins with the words,'This is an examination of bliss,'
+and terminates with the sloka, 'from whence all speech turns back'
+(Taitt. Up. II, 8), arrives at bliss, supreme and not to be surpassed,
+by successively multiplying inferior stages of bliss by a hundred; now
+such supreme bliss cannot possibly belong to the individual soul which
+enjoys only a small share of very limited happiness, mixed with endless
+pain and grief; and therefore clearly indicates, as its abode, the
+highest Self, which differs from all other Selfs in so far as being
+radically opposed to all evil and of an unmixed blessed nature. The text
+says, 'Different from this Self consisting of understanding (vijńāna)
+there is the inner Self consisting of bliss'. Now that which consists of
+understanding (vijńāna) is the individual soul (jīva), not the internal
+organ (buddhi) only; for the formative element, 'maya,' ('consisting of';
+in vijńānamaya) indicates a difference (between vijńāna and vijńānamaya).
+The term 'prāna-maya' ('consisting of breath') we explain to mean
+'prāna' only, because no other explanation is possible; but as
+vijńānamaya may be explained as,--jīva, we have no right to neglect
+'maya' as unmeaning. And this interpretation is quite suitable, as the
+soul in the states of bondage and release alike is a 'knowing' subject.
+That moreover even in 'prānamaya', and so on, the affix 'maya' may be
+taken as having a meaning will be shown further on.--But how is it then
+that in the sloka which refers to the vijńānamaya, 'Understanding
+(vijńāna) performs the sacrifice', the term 'vijńāna' only is used?--The
+essential nature, we reply, of the knowing subject is suitably called
+'knowledge', and this term is transferred to the knowing subject itself
+which is defined as possessing that nature. For we generally see that
+words which denote attributes defining the essential nature of a thing
+also convey the notion of the essential nature of the thing itself. This
+also accounts for the fact that the sloka ('Vijńāna performs the
+sacrifice, it performs all sacred acts') speaks of vijńāna as being the
+agent in sacrifices and so on; the buddhi alone could not be called an
+agent. For this reason the text does not ascribe agency to the other
+Selfs (the prānamaya and so on) which are mentioned before the
+vijńānamaya; for they are non-intelligent instruments of intelligence,
+and the latter only can be an agent. With the same view the text further
+on (II, 6), distinguishing the intelligent and the non-intelligent by
+means of their different characteristic attributes, says in the end
+'knowledge and non-knowledge,' meaning thereby that which possesses the
+attribute of knowledge and that which does not. An analogous case is met
+with in the so-called antaryāmi-brāhmana (Bri. Up. III. 7). There the
+Kānvas read, 'He who dwells in knowledge' (vijńāna; III, 7, 16), but
+instead of this the Mādhyandinas read 'he who dwells in the Self,' and
+so make clear that what the Kānvas designate as 'knowledge' really is
+the knowing Self.--That the word vijńāna, although denoting the knowing
+Self, yet has a neuter termination, is meant to denote it as something
+substantial. We hence conclude that he who is different from the Self
+consisting of knowledge, i.e. the individual Self, is the highest Self
+which consists of bliss.
+
+It is true indeed that the sloka, 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice,
+'directly mentions knowledge only, not the knowing Self; all the same we
+have to understand that what is meant is the latter, who is referred to
+in the clause, 'different from this is the inner Self which consists of
+knowledge.' This conclusion is supported by the sloka referring to the
+Self which consists of food (II, 2); for that sloka refers to food only,
+'From food are produced all creatures,' &c., all the same the preceding
+clause 'this man consists of the essence of food' does not refer to food,
+but to an effect of it which consists of food. Considering all this the
+Sūtrakāra himself in a subsequent Sūtra (I, 1, 18) bases his view on the
+declaration, in the scriptural text, of difference.--We now turn to the
+assertion, made by the Pūrvapakshin, that the cause of the world is not
+different from the individual soul because in two Chāndogya passages it
+is exhibited in co-ordination with the latter ('having entered into them
+with this living Self,' 'Thou art that'); and that hence the
+introductory clause of the Taitt. passage ('He who knows Brahman reaches
+the Highest') refers to the individual soul--which further on is called
+'consisting of bliss,' because it is free from all that is not pleasure.--
+This view cannot be upheld; for although the individual soul is
+intelligent, it is incapable of producing through its volition this
+infinite and wonderful Universe--a process described in texts such as
+'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth.--It sent forth fire,' &c.
+That even the released soul is unequal to such 'world business' as
+creation, two later Sūtras will expressly declare. But, if you deny that
+Brahman, the cause of the world, is identical with the individual soul,
+how then do you account for the co-ordination in which the two appear in
+the Chāndogya texts?--How, we ask in return, can Brahman, the cause of
+all, free from all shadow of imperfection, omniscient, omnipotent, &c.
+&c., be one with the individual soul, all whose activities--whether it be
+thinking, or winking of an eye, or anything else--depend on karman,
+which implies endless suffering of various kind?--If you reply that this
+is possible if one of two things is unreal, we ask--which then do you
+mean to be unreal? Brahman's connexion with what is evil?--or its
+essential nature, owing to which it is absolutely good and antagonistic
+to all evil?--You will perhaps reply that, owing to the fact of Brahman,
+which is absolutely good and antagonistic to all evil, being the
+substrate of beginningless Nescience, there presents itself the false
+appearance of its being connected with evil. But there you maintain what
+is contradictory. On the one side there is Brahman's absolute perfection
+and antagonism to all evil; on the other it is the substrate of
+Nescience, and thereby the substrate of a false appearance which is
+involved in endless pain; for to be connected with evil means to be the
+substrate of Nescience and the appearance of suffering which is produced
+thereby. Now it is a contradiction to say that Brahman is connected with
+all this and at the same time antagonistic to it!--Nor can we allow you
+to say that there is no real contradiction because that appearance is
+something false. For whatever is false belongs to that group of things
+contrary to man's true interest, for the destruction of which the
+Vedānta-texts are studied. To be connected with what is hurtful to man,
+and to be absolutely perfect and antagonistic to all evil is self-
+contradictory.--But, our adversary now rejoins, what after all are we to
+do? The holy text at first clearly promises that through the cognition
+of one thing everything will be known ('by which that which is not heard
+_is_ heard,' &c., Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3); thereupon declares that Brahman is
+the sole cause of the world ('Being only this was in the beginning'),
+and possesses exalted qualities such as the power of realising its
+intentions ('it thought, may I be many'); and then finally, by means of
+the co-ordination, 'Thou art that' intimates that Brahman is one with
+the individual soul, which we know to be subject to endless suffering!
+Nothing therefore is left to us but the hypothesis that Brahman is the
+substrate of Nescience and all that springs from it!--Not even for the
+purpose, we reply, of making sense of Scripture may we assume what in
+itself is senseless and contradictory!--Let us then say that Brahman's
+connexion with evil is real, and its absolute perfection unreal!--
+Scripture, we reply, aims at comforting the soul afflicted by the
+assaults of threefold pain, and now, according to you, it teaches that
+the assaults of suffering are real, while its essential perfection and
+happiness are unreal figments, due to error! This is excellent comfort
+indeed!--To avoid these difficulties let us then assume that both
+aspects of Brahman--viz. on the one hand its entering into the
+distressful condition of individual souls other than non-differenced
+intelligence, and on the other its being the cause of the world, endowed
+with all perfections, &c.--are alike unreal!--Well, we reply, we do not
+exactly admire the depth of your insight into the connected meaning of
+texts. The promise that through the knowledge of one thing everything
+will be known can certainly not be fulfilled if everything is false, for
+in that case there exists nothing that could be known. In so far as the
+cognition of one thing has something real for its object, and the
+cognition of all things is of the same kind, and moreover is comprised
+in the cognition of one thing; in so far it can be said that everything
+is known through one thing being known. Through the cognition of the
+real shell we do not cognise the unreal silver of which the shell is the
+substrate.--Well, our adversary resumes, let it then be said that the
+meaning of the declaration that through the cognition of one thing
+everything is to be known is that only non-differenced Being is real,
+while everything else is unreal.--If this were so, we rejoin, the text
+would not say, 'by which the non-heard is heard, the non-known is
+known'; for the meaning of this is, 'by which when heard and known' (not
+'known as false') 'the non-heard is heard,' &c. Moreover, if the meaning
+were that only the one non-differenced substance understood to be the
+cause of the world is real, the illustrative instance, 'As by one lump
+of clay everything made of clay is known,' would not be suitable; for
+what is meant there is that through the cognition of the (real) lump of
+clay its (real) effects are known. Nor must 'you say that in the
+illustrative instance also the unreality of the effect is set forth; for
+as the person to be informed is not in any way convinced at the outset
+that things made of clay are unreal, like the snake imagined in the
+rope, it is impossible that such unreality should be referred to as if
+it were something well known (and the clause, 'as by one lump of clay,'
+&c., undoubtedly _does_ refer to something well known), in order to
+render the initial assertion plausible. And we are not aware of any
+means of knowledge--assisted or non-assisted by ratiocination--that
+would prove the non-reality of things effected, previous to the
+cognition produced by texts such as 'That art thou'; a point which will
+be discussed at length under II, 1.--'Being only this was in the
+beginning, one, without a second'; 'it thought, may I be many, may I
+grow forth; it sent forth fire'; 'Let me now enter those three beings
+with this living Self and evolve names and forms'; 'All these creatures,
+my son, have their root in the True, they dwell in the True, they rest
+in the True,' &c.; these passages declare in succession that that which
+really is is the Self of this world; that previous to creation there is
+no distinction of names and forms; that for the creation of the world
+Brahman, termed 'the True' (or 'Real'), requires no other operative
+cause but itself; that at the time of creation it forms a resolution,
+possible to itself only, of making itself manifold in the form of
+endless movable and immovable things; that in accordance with this
+resolution there takes place a creation, proceeding in a particular
+order, of an infinite number of manifold beings; that by Brahman
+entering into all non-intelligent beings with the living soul--which has
+its Self in Brahman--there takes place an evolution, infinite in extent,
+of all their particular names and forms; and that everything different
+from Brahman has its root and abode in that, is moved by that, lives by
+that, rests on that. All the different points--to be learned from
+Scripture only--which are here set forth agree with what numerous other
+scriptural texts teach about Brahman, viz. that it is free from all
+evil, devoid of all imperfection, all-knowing, all-powerful; that all
+its wishes and purposes realise themselves; that it is the cause of all
+bliss; that it enjoys bliss not to be surpassed. To maintain then that
+the word 'that,' which refers back to the Brahman mentioned before, i.e.
+a Brahman possessing infinite attributes, should aim at conveying
+instruction about a substance devoid of all attributes, is as unmeaning
+as the incoherent talk of a madman.
+
+The word 'thou' again denotes the individual soul as distinguished by
+its implication in the course of transmigratory existence, and the
+proper sense of this term also would have to be abandoned if it were
+meant to suggest a substance devoid of all distinctions. And that, in
+the case of a being consisting of non-differenced light, obscuration by
+Nescience would be tantamount to complete destruction, we have already
+explained above.--All this being thus, your interpretation would involve
+that the proper meaning of the two words 'that' and 'thou'--which refer
+to one thing--would have to be abandoned, and both words would have to
+be taken in an implied sense only.
+
+Against this the Pūrvapakshin now may argue as follows. Several words
+which are applied to one thing are meant to express one sense, and as
+this is not possible in so far as the words connote different attributes,
+this part of their connotation becomes inoperative, and they denote only
+the unity of one substance; implication (lakshanā), therefore, does not
+take place. When we say 'blue (is) (the) lotus' we employ two words with
+the intention of expressing the unity of one thing, and hence do not aim
+at expressing a duality of attributes, viz. the quality of blueness and
+the generic character of a lotus. If this latter point was aimed at, it
+would follow that the sentence would convey the oneness of the two
+aspects of the thing, viz. its being blue and its being a lotus; but
+this is not possible, for the thing (denoted by the two terms) is not
+characterised by (the denotation of) the word 'lotus,' in so far as
+itself characterised by blueness; for this would imply a reciprocal
+inherence (samavāya) of class-characteristics and quality [FOOTNOTE 219:1].
+What the co-ordination of the two words conveys is, therefore, only the
+oneness of a substance characterised by the quality of blueness, and at
+the same time by the class attributes of a lotus. In the same way, when
+we say 'this (person is) that Devadatta' the co-ordination of the words
+cannot possibly mean that Devadatta in so far as distinguished by his
+connexion with a past time and a distant place is one with Devadatta in
+so far as distinguished by his connexion with the present time and a
+near place; what it means to express is only that there is oneness on
+the part of a personal substance--which substance is characterised by
+connexion with both places and moments of time. It is true indeed that
+when we at first hear the one word 'blue' we form the idea of the
+attribute of blueness, while, after having apprehended the relation of
+co-ordination (expressed in 'blue is the lotus'), this idea no longer
+presents itself, for this would imply a contradiction; but all the same
+'implication' does not take place. The essence of co-ordination consists,
+in all cases, therein that it suppresses the distinguishing elements in
+the words co-ordinated. And as thus our explanation cannot be charged
+with 'implication,' it cannot be objected to.
+
+All this, we rejoin, is unfounded. What the words in all sentences
+whatsoever aim at conveying is only a particular connexion of the things
+known to be denoted by those words. Words such as 'blue,' standing in co-
+ordination with others, express that some matter possessing the
+attribute of blueness, &c., as known from the ordinary use of language,
+is connected with some other matter. When, e.g., somebody says 'bring
+the blue lotus,' a thing is brought which possesses the attribute of
+blueness. And when we are told that 'a herd of elephants excited with
+passion lives in the Vindhya-forest,' we again understand that what is
+meant is something possessing several attributes denoted by several
+words. Analogously we have to understand, as the thing intimated by
+Vedānta-texts in the form of coordination, Brahman as possessing such
+and such attributes.--It is an error to assume that, where a sentence
+aims at setting forth attributes, one attribute is to be taken as
+qualifying the thing in so far as qualified by another attribute; the
+case rather is that the thing itself is equally qualified by all
+attributes. For co-ordination means the application, to one thing, of
+several words having different reasons of application; and the effect of
+co-ordination is that one and the same thing, because being connected--
+positively or negatively--with some attribute other than that which is
+conveyed by one word, is also known through other words. As e.g. when it
+is said that 'Devadatta (is) dark-complexioned, young, reddish-eyed, not
+stupid, not poor, of irreproachable character.' Where two co-ordinate
+words express two attributes which cannot exist combined in one thing,
+one of the two words is to be taken in a secondary sense, while the
+other retains its primary meaning, as e.g. in the case of the sentence,
+'The Vāhīka man is an ox.' But in the case of the 'blue lotus' and the
+like, where there is nothing contradictory in the connexion of the two
+attributes with one thing, co-ordination expresses the fact of one thing
+being characterised by two attributes.--Possibly our opponent will here
+make the following remark. A thing in so far as defined by its
+correlation to some one attribute is something different from the thing
+in so far as defined by its correlation to some second attribute; hence,
+even if there is equality of case affixes (as in 'nīlam utpalam'), the
+words co-ordinated are incapable of expressing oneness, and cannot,
+therefore, express the oneness of a thing qualified by several
+attributes; not any more than the juxtaposition of two words such as
+'jar' and 'cloth'--both having the same case-ending--can prove that
+these two things are one. A statement of co-ordination, therefore,
+rather aims at expressing the oneness of a thing in that way that it
+presents to the mind the essential nature of the thing by means of
+(words denoting) its attributes.--This would be so, we reply, if it were
+only the fact of a thing's standing in correlation to two attributes
+that is in the way of its unity. But this is not the case; for what
+stands in the way of such unity is the fact of there being several
+attributes which are not capable of being combined in one thing. Such
+incapability is, in the case of the generic character of a jar and that
+of a piece of cloth, proved by other means of knowledge; but there is no
+contradiction between a thing being blue and its being a lotus; not any
+more than there is between a man and the stick or the earrings he wears,
+or than there is between the colour, taste, smell, &c., of one and the
+same thing. Not only is there no contradiction, but it is this very fact
+of one thing possessing two attributes which makes possible co-
+ordination--the essence of which is that, owing to a difference of
+causes of application, several words express one and the same thing. For
+if there were nothing but essential unity of being, what reason would
+there be for the employment of several words? If the purport of the
+attributes were, not to intimate their connexion with the thing, but
+merely to suggest the thing itself, one attribute would suffice for such
+suggestion, and anything further would be meaningless. If, on the other
+hand, it were assumed that the use of a further 'suggestive' attribute
+is to bring out a difference of aspect in the thing suggested, such
+difference of aspect would imply differentiation in the thing (which you
+maintain to be free from all difference).--Nor is there any shade even
+of 'implication' in the judgment, 'This person is that Devadatta'; for
+there is absolutely no contradiction between the past Devadatta, who was
+connected with some distant place, and the present Devadatta, who is
+connected with the place before us. For this very reason those who
+maintain the permanency of things prove the oneness of a thing related
+to two moments of time on the basis of the judgment of recognition
+('this is that'); if there really were a contradiction between the two
+representations it would follow that all things are (not permanent but)
+momentary only. The fact is that the contradiction involved in one thing
+being connected with two places is removed by the difference of the
+correlative moments of time. We therefore hold to the conclusion that co-
+ordinated words denote one thing qualified by the possession of several
+attributes.
+
+For this very reason the Vedic passage, 'He buys the Soma by means of a
+cow one year old, of a tawny colour, with reddish-brown eyes' (arunayā,
+ekahāyanyā, pińgākshyā), must be understood to enjoin that the purchase
+is to be effected by means of a cow one year old, possessing the
+attributes of tawny colour, &c. This point is discussed Pū. Mī. Sū. III,
+1, 12.--The Pūrvapakshin there argues as follows: We admit that the word
+'arunayā' ('by means of a tawny one') denotes the quality of tawniness
+inclusive of the thing possessing that quality; for qualities as well as
+generic character exist only in so far as being modes of substances. But
+it is not possible to restrict tawny colour to connexion with a cow one
+year old, for the injunction of two different things (which would result
+from such restriction; and which would necessitate the sentence to be
+construed as----) 'He buys by means of a cow one year old, and that a
+red one' is not permissible [FOOTNOTE 222:1]. We must therefore break up
+the sentence into two, one of which is constituted by the one word
+'arunayā'--this word expressing that tawny colour extends equally to all
+the substances enjoined in that section (as instrumental towards the end
+of the sacrifice). And the use of the feminine case-termination of the
+word is merely meant to suggest a special instance (viz. the cow) of all
+the things, of whatever gender, which are enjoined in that section.
+Tawniness must not therefore be restricted to the cow one year old only.--
+Of this pūrvapaksha the Sūtra disposes in the following words: 'There
+being oneness of sense, and hence connexion of substance and quality
+with one action, there is restriction.'--The fact that the two words
+'arunayā' and 'ekahāyanyā'--which denote a substance, viz. a cow one
+year old, distinguished by the quality of possessing tawny colour--stand
+in co-ordination establishes that they have one sense; and is the
+substance, viz. the cow, and the quality, viz. tawny colour--which the
+word 'arunayā' denotes as standing in the relation of distinguishing
+attribute and thing distinguished thereby--can thus, without any
+contradiction, be connected with the one action called 'the buying of
+the Soma', tawny colour is restricted to the cow one year old which is
+instrumental with regard to the purchase. If the connexion of tawniness
+with the action of buying were to be determined from syntactical
+connexion--in the same way as there is made out the connexion of the cow
+one year old with that action--then the injunctory sentence would indeed
+enjoin two matters (and this would be objectionable). But such is not
+the case; for the one word 'arunyā' denotes a substance characterised by
+the quality of tawniness, and the co-ordination in which 'arunayā'
+stands to 'ekahāyanyā' makes us apprehend merely that the thing
+characterised by tawniness also is one year old, but does not make a
+special statement as to the connexion of that quality with the thing.
+For the purport of co-ordination is the unity of a thing distinguished
+by attributes; according to the definition that the application to one
+thing of several words possessing different reasons of application,
+constitutes co-ordination. For the same reason, the syntactical unity
+(ekavākyatvam) of sentences such as 'the cloth is red' follows from all
+the words referring to one thing. The function of the syntactical
+collocation is to express the connexion of the cloth with the action of
+being; the connexion of the red colour (with the cloth) on the other
+hand is denoted by the word 'red' only. And what is ascertained from co-
+ordination (sāmānādhikaranya) is only that the cloth is a substance to
+which a certain colour belongs. The whole matter may, without any
+contradiction, be conceived as follows. Several words--having either the
+affixes of the oblique cases or that of the nominative case--which
+denote one or two or several qualities, present to the mind the idea of
+that which is characterised by those qualities, and their co-ordination
+intimates that the thing characterised by all those attributes is one
+only; and the entire sentence finally expresses the connexion in which
+the thing with its attributes stands to the action denoted by the verb.
+This may be illustrated by various sentences exhibiting the co-
+ordination of words possessing different case-endings, as e.g. 'There
+stands Devadatta, a young man of a darkish complexion, with red eyes,
+wearing earrings and carrying a stick' (where all the words standing in
+apposition to Devadatta have the nominative termination); 'Let him make
+a stage curtain by means of a white cloth' (where 'white' and 'cloth'
+have instrumental case-endings), &c. &c. We may further illustrate the
+entire relation of co-ordinated words to the action by means of the
+following two examples: 'Let him boil rice in the cooking-pot by means
+of firewood': here we take in simultaneously the idea of an action
+distinguished by its connexion with several things. If we now consider
+the following amplified sentence, 'Let a skilful cook prepare, in a
+vessel of even shape, boiled rice mixed with milk, by means of sticks of
+dry khādira wood,' we find that each thing connected with the action is
+denoted by an aggregate of co-ordinated words; but as soon as each thing
+is apprehended, it is at one and the same moment conceived as something
+distinguished by several attributes, and as such connects itself with
+the action expressed by the verb. In all this there is no contradiction
+whatever.--We must further object to the assertion that a word denoting
+a quality which stands in a sentence that has already mentioned a
+substance denotes the quality only (exclusive of the substance so
+qualified), and that hence the word 'arunayā' also denotes a quality
+only. The fact is that neither in ordinary nor in Vedic language we ever
+meet with a word which--denoting a quality and at the same time standing
+in co-ordination with a word denoting a substance--denotes a _mere_
+quality. Nor is it correct to say that a quality-word occurring in a
+sentence which has already mentioned a substance denotes a mere quality:
+for in a sentence such as 'the cloth (is) white,' where a substance is
+mentioned in the first place, the quality-word clearly denotes (not mere
+whiteness but) something which possesses the quality of whiteness. When,
+on the other hand, we have a collocation of words such as 'patasya
+suklah' ('of the cloth'--gen.; 'white' nom.), the idea of a cloth
+distinguished by whiteness does not arise; but this is due not to the
+fact of the substance being mentioned first, but to the fact of the two
+words exhibiting different case-terminations. As soon as we add to those
+two words an appropriate third one, e.g. 'bhāgah' (so that the whole
+means 'The white part of a cloth'), the co-ordination of two words with
+the same case-termination gives rise to the idea of a thing
+distinguished by the attribute of whiteness.--Nor can we agree to the
+contention that, as the buying of the Soma is exclusively concluded by
+the cow one year old (as instrumental in the purchase), the quality of
+tawniness (denoted by the word 'arunayā') cannot connect itself with the
+action expressed by the verb; for a word that denotes a quality and
+stands in co-ordination with a word denoting a substance which has no
+qualities opposed in nature to that quality, denotes a quality abiding
+in that substance, and thus naturally connects itself with the action
+expressed by the verb. And since, as shown, the quality of tawniness
+connects itself with its substance (the cow) on the mere basis of the
+form of the words, it is wrong (on the part of the Pūrvapakshin to
+abandon this natural connexion and) to establish their connexion on the
+ground of their being otherwise incapable of serving as means of the
+purchase.
+
+All this confirms our contention, viz. that the co-ordination of 'thou'
+and 'that' must be understood to express oneness, without, at the same
+time, there being given up the different attributes denoted by the two
+words. This however is not feasible for those who do not admit a highest
+Self free from all imperfection and endowed with all perfections, and
+different from that intelligent soul which is conditioned by Nescience,
+involved in endless suffering and undergoing alternate states of purity
+and impurity.--But, an objection is raised, even if such a highest Self
+be acknowledged, it would have to be admitted that the sentence aims at
+conveying the oneness of that which is distinguished by the different
+attributes denoted by the words co-ordinated, and from this it follows
+that the highest Self participates in all the suffering expressed by the
+word 'thou'!--This is not so, we reply; since the word 'thou' also
+denotes the highest Self, viz. in so far as it is the inner Ruler
+(antaryāmin) of all souls.--The connected meaning of the text is as
+follows. That which is denoted as 'Being,' i.e. the highest Brahman
+which is the cause of all, free from all shadow of imperfection, &c.,
+resolved 'to be many'; it thereupon sent forth the entire world,
+consisting of fire, water, &c.; introduced, in this world so sent forth,
+the whole mass of individual souls into different bodies divine, human,
+&c., corresponding to the desert of each soul--the souls thus
+constituting the Self of the bodies; and finally, itself entering
+according to its wish into these souls--so as to constitute their inner
+Self--evolved in all these aggregates, names and forms, i.e. rendered
+each aggregate something substantial (vastu) and capable of being
+denoted by a word. 'Let me enter into these beings with this living Self
+(jīvena ātmana) means 'with this living _me_,' and this shows the living
+Self, i.e. the individual soul to have Brahman for its Self. And that
+this having Brahman for its Self means Brahman's being the inner Self of
+the soul (i.e. the Self inside the soul, but not identical with it),
+Scripture declares by saying that Brahman entered into it. This is
+clearly stated in the passage Taitt. Up. II, 6, 'He sent forth all this,
+whatever there is. Having sent forth he entered into it. Having entered
+it he became _sat_ and _tyat_.' For here 'all this' comprises beings
+intelligent as well as non-intelligent, which afterwards are
+distinguished as _sat_ and _tyat_, as knowledge (vijńāna) and non-
+knowledge. Brahman is thus said to enter into intelligent beings also.
+Hence, owing to this evolution of names and forms, all words denote the
+highest Self distinguished by non-intelligent matter and intelligent
+souls.--Another text, viz. Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7,'All this has its Self in
+that,' denotes by 'all this' the entire world inclusive of intelligent
+souls, and says that of this world that (i.e. Brahman) is the Self.
+Brahman thus being the Self with regard to the whole universe of matter
+and souls, the universe inclusive of intelligent souls is the body of
+Brahman.--Other scriptural texts teach the same doctrine; cp. 'Entered
+within, the ruler of beings, the Self of all' (Taitt. Ār. III, 24);'He
+who dwelling in the earth is within the earth--whose body is the earth,'
+& c., up to 'he who dwelling within the Self is within the Self, whom
+the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who rules the Self
+from within, he is thy Self, the Ruler within, the Immortal' (Bri. Up.
+III, 7, 3-22; Mādhyand. Sā.); 'He who moves within the earth, of whom
+the earth is the body, &c.--who moves within the Imperishable, of whom
+the Imperishable is the body, whom the Imperishable does not know; he
+the inward ruler of all beings, free from evil, the divine, the one god,
+Nārayana' (Subā. Up. VII). All these texts declare that the world
+inclusive of intelligent souls is the body of the highest Self, and the
+latter the Self of everything. Hence those words also that denote
+intelligent souls designate the highest Self as having intelligent souls
+for his body and constituting the Self of them; in the same way as words
+denoting non-sentient masses of matter, such as the bodies of gods, men,
+& c., designate the individual souls to which those bodies belong. For
+the body stands towards the embodied soul in the relation of a mode
+(prakāra); and as words denoting a mode accomplish their full function
+only in denoting the thing to which the mode belongs, we must admit an
+analogous comprehensiveness of meaning for those words which denote a
+body. For, when a thing is apprehended under the form 'this is such,'
+the element apprehended as 'such' is what constitutes a mode; now as
+this element is relative to the thing, the idea of it is also relative
+to the thing, and finds its accomplishment in the thing only; hence the
+word also which expresses the mode finds its accomplishment in the
+thing. Hence words such as 'cow', 'horse', 'man', which denote a mode,
+viz. a species, comprise in their meaning also that mass of matter which
+exhibits the characteristics of the species, and as that mass of matter
+constitutes the body and therefore is a mode of a soul, and as that soul
+again, so embodied, is a mode of the highest Self; it follows that all
+these words extend in their signification up to the highest Self. The
+meaning of all words then is the highest Self, and hence their co-
+ordination with words directly denoting that highest Self is a primary
+(not merely 'implied') one.
+
+But, an objection is raised, we indeed observe that words denoting
+species or qualities stand in co-ordination to words denoting substances,
+'the ox is short-horned,' 'the sugar is white'; but where substances
+appear as the modes of other substances we find that formative affixes
+are used, 'the man is dandin, kundalin' (bearing a stick; wearing
+earrings).--This is not so, we reply. There is nothing to single out
+either species, or quality, or substance, as what determines co-
+ordination: co-ordination disregards such limitations. Whenever a _thing_
+(whether species, or quality, or substance) has existence as a _mode_
+only--owing to its proof, existence and conception being inseparably
+connected with something else--the words denoting it, as they designate
+a substance characterised by the attribute denoted by them,
+appropriately enter into co-ordination with other words denoting the
+same substance as characterised by other attributes. Where, on the other
+hand, a substance which is established in separation from other things
+and rests on itself, is assumed to stand occasionally in the relation of
+mode to another substance, this is appropriately expressed by the use of
+derived forms such as 'dandin, kundalin.' Hence such words as 'I,' 'thou,'
+&c., which are different forms of appellation of the individual soul,
+at bottom denote the highest Self only; for the individual souls
+together with non-sentient matter are the body--and hence modes--of the
+highest Self. This entire view is condensed in the co-ordination 'Thou
+art that.' The individual soul being thus connected with the highest
+Self as its body, its attributes do not touch the highest Self, not any
+more than infancy, youth, and other attributes of the material body
+touch the individual soul. Hence, in the co-ordination 'Thou art that,'
+the word 'that' denotes the highest Brahman which is the cause of the
+world, whose purposes come true, which comprises within itself all
+blessed qualities, which is free from all shadow of evil; while the word
+'thou' denotes the same highest Self in so far as having for its body
+the individual souls together with their bodies. The terms co-ordinated
+may thus be taken in their primary senses; there is no contradiction
+either with the subject-matter of the section, or with scripture in
+general; and not a shadow of imperfection such as Nescience, and so on,
+attaches to Brahman, the blameless, the absolutely blessed. The co-
+ordination with the individual soul thus proves only the difference of
+Brahman from the soul, which is a mere mode of Brahman; and hence we
+hold that different from the Self consisting of knowledge, i.e. the
+individual soul, is the Self consisting of bliss, i.e. the highest Self.
+
+Nor is there any force in the objection that as the Self of bliss is
+said to be 'sārira,' i.e. embodied-viz. in the clause 'of him the
+embodied Self is the same' (Taitt. Up. II, 5, 6)--it cannot be different
+from the individual soul. For throughout this section the recurring
+clause 'of him the embodied Self is the same as of the preceding one,'
+refers to the highest Self, calling that the 'embodied' one. The clause
+'From that same Self sprang ether' (II, 1) designates the highest
+Brahman-which is different from the individual soul and is introduced as
+the highest cause of all things created--as the 'Self'; whence we
+conclude that all things different from it--from ether up to the Self of
+food constitute its body. The Subāla-upanishad moreover states quite
+directly that all beings constitute the body of the highest Self: 'He of
+whom the earth is the body, of whom water is the body, of whom fire is
+the body, of whom wind is the body, of whom ether is the body, of whom
+the Imperishable is the body, of whom Death is the body, he the inner
+Self of all, the divine one, the one god Nārāyana.' From this it follows
+that what constitutes the embodied Self of the Self of food is nothing
+else but the highest Self referred to in the clause 'From that same Self
+sprang ether.' When, then, the text further on says with regard to the
+Self of breath, 'of him the embodied Self is the same as of the
+preceding one' (II, 3), the meaning can only be that what constitutes
+the embodied Self of the 'preceding' Self of food, viz. the highest Self
+which is the universal cause, is also the embodied Self of the Self
+consisting of breath. The same reasoning holds good with regard to the
+Self consisting of mind and the Self consisting of knowledge. In the
+case, finally, of the Self consisting of bliss, the expression 'the
+same' (esha eva) is meant to convey that that Self has its Self in
+nothing different from itself. For when, after having understood that
+the highest Self is the embodied Self of the vijńānamaya also, we are
+told that the embodied Self of that vijńānamaya is also the embodied
+Self of the ānandamaya, we understand that of the ānandamaya--which we
+know to be the highest Self on the ground of 'multiplication'--its own
+Self is the Self. The final purport of the whole section thus is that
+everything different from the highest Self, whether of intelligent or
+non-intelligent nature, constitutes its body, while that Self alone is
+the non-conditioned embodied Self. For this very reason competent
+persons designate this doctrine which has the highest Brahman for its
+subject-matter as the 'sārīraka,' i. e. the doctrine of the 'embodied'
+Self.--We have thus arrived at the conclusion that the Self of bliss is
+something different from the individual Self, viz. the highest Self.
+
+Here the Pūrvapakshin raises the following objection.--The Self
+consisting of bliss (ānandamaya) is not something different from the
+individual soul, because the formative element--maya denotes something
+made, a thing effected. That this is the meaning of--maya in ānandamaya
+we know from Pānini IV, 3, 144.--But according to Pā. V, 4, 21,--maya
+has also the sense of 'abounding in'; as when we say 'the sacrifice is
+annamaya,' i.e. abounds in food. And this may be its sense in
+'ānandamaya' also!--Not so, the Pūrvapakshin replies. In 'annamaya,' in
+an earlier part of the chapter,--maya has the sense of 'made of',
+'consisting of'; and for the sake of consistency, we must hence ascribe
+the same sense to it in 'ānandamaya.' And even if, in the latter word,
+it denoted abundance, this would not prove that the ānandamaya is other
+than the individual soul. For if we say that a Self 'abounds' in bliss,
+this implies that with all this bliss there is mixed some small part of
+pain; and to be 'mixed with pain' is what constitutes the character of
+the individual soul. It is therefore proper to assume, in agreement with
+its previous use, that 'ānandamaya' means 'consisting of bliss.' In
+ordinary speech as well as in Vedic language (cp. common words such as
+'mrinmaya,' 'hiranmaya'; and Vedic clauses such as 'parnamayijuhūh')
+-maya as a rule means 'consisting of,' and this meaning hence presents
+itself to the mind first. And the individual soul _may_ be denoted as
+'made of bliss'; for in itself it is of the essence of bliss, and its
+Samsāra state therefore is something 'made of bliss.' The conclusion
+therefore is that, owing to the received meaning of -maya, the
+ānandamaya is none other than the individual soul.--To this primā facie
+view the next Sūtra refers and refutes it.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 219:1. I.e. we should not in that case be able to decide
+whether the quality (i.e., here, the blueness) inheres in the class (i.e.,
+here, the lotus), or vice versa.]
+
+[FOOTNOTE 222:1. For it would imply so-called vākyabheda, 'split of the
+sentence,' which arises when one injunctory clause is made to enjoin two
+different things.]
+
+
+
+
+14. If, on account of its being a word denoting an effect, (ānandamaya
+be said) not (to denote the highest Self); (we say) no, on account of
+abundance.
+
+We deny the conclusion of the Pūrvapakshin, on the ground of there being
+abundance of bliss in the highest Brahman, and 'abundance' being one of
+the possible meanings of -maya.--Since bliss such as described in the
+Taitt. Up.--bliss which is reached by successively multiplying by
+hundred all inferior kinds of bliss--cannot belong to the individual
+soul, we conclude that it belongs to Brahman; and as Brahman cannot be
+an effect, and as -maya, may have the sense of 'abounding in,' we
+conclude that the ānandamaya is Brahman itself; inner contradiction
+obliging us to set aside that sense of -maya which is recommended by
+regard to 'consequence' and frequency of usage. The regard for
+consistency, moreover, already has to be set aside in the case of the
+'prānamaya'; for in that term -maya cannot denote 'made of.' The
+'prānamaya' Self can only be called by that name in so far as air with
+its five modifications has (among others) the modification called prāna,
+i.e. breathing out, or because among the five modifications or functions
+of air prāna is the 'abounding,' i.e. prevailing one.--Nor can it be
+truly said that -maya is but rarely used in the sense of 'abounding in':
+expressions such as 'a sacrifice abounding in food' (annamaya), 'a
+procession with many carriages' (sakatamayī), are by no means uncommon.--
+Nor can we admit that to call something 'abounding in bliss' implies the
+presence of _some_ pain. For 'abundance' precludes paucity on the part
+of that which is said to abound, but does not imply the presence of what
+is contrary. The presence or absence of what is contrary has to be
+ascertained by other means of proof; and in our case we do ascertain the
+absence of what is contrary to bliss by such means, viz. the clause
+'free from evil,' &c. Abundance of bliss on the part of Brahman
+certainly implies a relation to paucity on the part of some other bliss;
+and in accordance with this demand the text says 'That is one measure of
+human bliss,' &c. (II, 8, 1). The bliss of Brahman is of measureless
+abundance, compared to the bliss of the individual soul.--Nor can it be
+maintained that the individual soul may be viewed as being an effect of
+bliss. For that a soul whose essential nature is knowledge and bliss
+should in any way be changed into something else, as a lump of clay is
+made into a pot, is an assumption contradicted by all scripture, sacred
+tradition, and reasoning. That in the Samsāra state the soul's bliss and
+knowledge are contracted owing to karman will be shown later on.--The
+Self of bliss therefore is other than the individual soul; it is Brahman
+itself.
+
+A further reason for this conclusion is supplied by the next Sūtra.
+
+
+
+
+15. And because he is declared to be the cause of thatra.
+
+'For who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that bliss existed
+not in the ether? He alone causes bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). This means--
+He alone is the cause of bliss on the part of the individual souls.--
+Some one is here designated as the cause of bliss enjoyed by the souls;
+and we thus conclude that the causer of bliss, who must be other than
+the souls to which bliss is imparted, is the highest Self abounding in
+bliss.
+
+In the passage quoted the term 'bliss' denotes him who abounds in bliss,
+as will be shown later on.--A further reason is given in the next Sūtra.
+
+
+
+
+16. And because that (Brahman) which is referred to in the mantra is
+declared (to be the ānandamaya).
+
+That Brahman which is described in the mantra, 'True Being, knowledge,
+infinite is Biahman,' is proclaimed as the Self abounding in bliss. And
+that Brahman is the highest Brahman, other than the individual soul; for
+the passage 'He who knows Brahman attains the Highest' refers to Brahman
+as something to be obtained by the individual soul, and the words 'On
+this the following verse is recorded' show that the verse is related to
+that same Brahman. The mantra thus is meant to render clear the meaning
+of the Brāhmana passage. Now the Brahman to be reached by the meditating
+Devotee must be something different from him. The same point is rendered
+clear by all the following Brāhmana passages and mantras: 'from that
+same Self sprang ether,' and so on. The Self abounding in bliss
+therefore is other than the individual soul.
+
+Here an opponent argues as follows:--We indeed must acknowledge that the
+object to be reached is something different from the meditating Devotee;
+but the fact is that the Brahman described in the mantra does not
+substantially differ from the individual soul; that Brahman is nothing
+but the soul of the Devotee in its pure state, consisting of mere non-
+differenced intelligence, free from all shade of Nescience. To this pure
+condition it is reduced in the mantra describing it as true Being,
+knowledge, infinite. A subsequent passage, 'that from which all speech,
+with the mind, turns away, unable to reach it' (II. 9), expresses this
+same state of non-differentiation, describing it as lying beyond mind
+and speech. It is this therefore to which the mantra refers, and the
+Self of bliss is identical with it.--To this view the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+17. Not the other, on account of impossibility.
+
+The other than the highest Self, i.e. the one called jīva, even in the
+state of release, is not that Self which the mantra describes; for this
+is not possible. For to a Self of that kind unconditioned intelligence
+(such as is, in the mantra, ascribed to Brahman; cp. the term
+'vipaskitā') cannot belong. Unconditioned intelligence is illustrated by
+the power of all one's purposes realising themselves; as expressed in
+the text 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth.' Intelligence
+(vipaskittvam, i.e. power of insight into various things) does indeed
+belong to the soul in the state of release; but as in the Samsāra state
+the same soul is devoid of such insight, we cannot ascribe to it non-
+conditioned intelligence. And if the released soul is viewed as being
+mere non-differenced intelligence, it does not possess the capacity of
+seeing different things, and hence cannot of course possess vipaskittva
+in the sense stated above. That, however, the existence of a substance
+devoid of all difference cannot be proved by any means of knowledge, we
+have already shown before. Again, if the clause 'from whence speech
+returns,' &c., were meant to express that speech and mind return from
+Brahman, this could not mean that the Real is devoid of all difference,
+but only that mind and speech are not means for the knowledge of Brahman.
+And from this it would follow that Brahman is something altogether empty,
+futile. Let us examine the context. The whole section, beginning with
+'He who knows Brahman reaches Brahman,' declares that Brahman is all-
+knowing, the cause of the world, consisting of pure bliss, the cause of
+bliss in others; that through its mere wish it creates the whole
+universe comprising matter and souls; that entering into the universe of
+created things it constitutes their Self; that it is the cause of fear
+and fearlessness; that it rules Vāyu Āditya and other divine beings;
+that its bliss is ever so much superior to all other bliss; and many
+other points. Now, all at once, the clause 'from whence speech returns'
+is said to mean that neither speech nor mind applies to Brahman, and
+that thus there are no means whatever of knowing Brahman! This is idle
+talk indeed! In the clause '(that) from which speech returns,' the
+relative pronoun 'from which' denotes bliss; this bliss is again
+explicitly referred to in the clause 'knowing the bliss of Brahman'--the
+genitive 'of Brahman' intimating that the bliss belongs to Brahman; what
+then could be the meaning of this clause which distinctly speaks of a
+knowledge of Brahman, if Brahman had at the same time to be conceived as
+transcending all thought and speech? What the clause really means rather
+is that if one undertakes to state the definite amount of the bliss of
+Brahman--the superabundance of which is illustrated by the successive
+multiplications with hundred--mind and speech have to turn back
+powerless, since no such definite amount can be assigned. He who knows
+the bliss of Brahman as not to be defined by any definite amount, does
+not fear anything.--That, moreover, the all-wise being referred to in
+the mantra is other than the individual soul in the state of release, is
+rendered perfectly clear by what--in passages such as 'it desired,' &c.--
+is said about its effecting, through its mere volition, the origination
+and subsistence of the world, its being the inner Self of the world, and
+so on.
+
+
+
+
+18. And on account of the declaration of difference.
+
+The part of the chapter--beginning with the words 'From that same Self
+there sprang ether'--which sets forth the nature of the Brahman referred
+to in the mantra, declares its difference from the individual soul, no
+less than from the Selfs consisting of food, breath, and mind, viz. in
+the clause 'different from this which consists of knowledge, is the
+other inner Self which consists of bliss.'--Through this declaration of
+difference from the individual soul we know that the Self of bliss
+referred to in the mantra is other than the individual soul.
+
+
+
+
+19. And on account of desire, there is no regard to what is inferred (i.
+e. matter).
+
+In order that the individual soul which is enthralled by Nescience may
+operate as the cause of the world, it must needs be connected with non-
+sentient matter, called by such names as pradhāna, or ānumānika (that
+which is inferred). For such is the condition for the creative energy of
+Brahmā and similar beings. Our text, on the other hand, teaches that the
+creation of the aggregate of sentient and non-sentient things results
+from the mere wish of a being free from all connexion with non-sentient
+matter, 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth;' 'He sent forth
+all, whatever there is' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). We thus understand that that
+Self of bliss which sends forth the world does not require connexion
+with non-sentient matter called ānumānika, and hence conclude that it is
+other than the individual soul.--A further reason is stated in the next
+Sūtra.
+
+
+
+
+20. And Scripture teaches the joining of this (i.e. the individual soul)
+with that (i.e. bliss) in that (i.e. the ānandamaya).
+
+'A flavour he is indeed; having obtained a flavour this one enjoys
+bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). This text declares that this one, i.e. the so-
+called individual soul, enjoys bliss through obtaining the ānandamaya,
+here called 'flavour.' Now to say that any one is identical with that by
+obtaining which he enjoys bliss, would be madness indeed.--It being thus
+ascertained that the Self of bliss is the highest Brahman, we conclude
+that in passages such as 'if that bliss were not in the ether' (Taitt.
+Up. II, 7). and 'knowledge, bliss is Brahman' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 28), the
+word 'ānanda' denotes the 'ānandamaya'; just as vijńāna means the
+vijńānamaya. It is for the same reason (viz. of ānanda meaning the same
+as ānandamaya) that the clause 'he who knows the bliss of Brahman'
+exhibits Brahman as being connected with ānanda, and that the further
+clause 'he who knows this reaches the Self of bliss,' declares the
+reaching of the Self of bliss to be the fruit of the knowledge of bliss.
+In the subsequent anuvāka also, in the clauses 'he perceived that food
+is Brahman,' 'he perceived that breath is Brahman,' &c. (III, i; 2, &c.),
+the words 'food,' 'breath,' and so on, are meant to suggest the Self
+made of food, the Self made of breath, &c., mentioned in the preceding
+anuvāka; and hence also in the clause 'he perceived that bliss is
+Brahman,' the word 'bliss' must be understood to denote the Self of
+bliss. Hence, in the same anuvāka, the account of the fate after death
+of the man who knows concludes with the words 'having reached the Self
+of bliss' (III, 10,5). It is thus finally proved that the highest
+Brahman--which in the previous adhikarana had to be shown to be other
+than the so-called Pradhāna--is also other than the being called
+individual soul.--This concludes the topic of the ānandamaya.
+
+A new doubt here presents itself.--It must indeed be admitted that such
+individual souls as possess only a moderate degree of merit are unable
+to accomplish the creation of the world by their mere wish, to enjoy
+supreme bliss, to be the cause of fearlessness, and so on; but why
+should not beings like Āditya and Prajāpati, whose merit is
+extraordinarily great, be capable of all this?--Of this suggestion the
+next Sūtra disposes.
+
+
+
+
+21. The one within (the sun and the eye); on account of his qualities
+being declared.
+
+It is said in the Chāndogya: 'Now that person bright as gold, who is
+seen within the sun, with beard bright as gold and hair bright as gold,
+golden altogether to the very tips of his nails, whose eyes are like
+blue lotus; his name is Ut, for he has risen (udita) above all evil. He
+also who knows this rises above all evil. Rik and Sāman are his joints.-
+So much with reference to the devas.--Now with reference to the body.--
+Now that person who is seen within the eye, he is Rik, he is Sāman,
+Uktha, Yajus, Brahman. The form of this person (in the eye) is the same
+as of that person yonder (in the sun), the joints of the one are the
+joints of the other, the name of the one is the--name of the other' (Ch.
+Up. I, 7).--Here there arises the doubt whether that person dwelling
+within the eye and the sun be the individual soul called Āditya, who
+through accumulation of religious merit possesses lordly power, or the
+highest Self other than that soul.
+
+That individual soul of high merit, the Pūrvapakshin maintains. For the
+text states that that person has a body, and connexion with a body
+belongs to individual souls only, for it is meant to bring the soul into
+contact with pleasure and pain, according to its deserts. It is for this
+reason that Scripture describes final Release where there is no
+connexion with works as a state of disembodiedness. 'So long as he is in
+the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain. But when he is free
+from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up. VIII,
+12, 1). And a soul of transcendent merit may possess surpassing wisdom
+and power, and thus be capable of being lord of the worlds and the
+wishes (I, 6, 8). For the same reason such a soul may be the object of
+devout meditation, bestow rewards, and by being instrumental in
+destroying evil, be helpful towards final release. Even among men some
+are seen to be of superior knowledge and power, owing to superior
+religious merit; and this holds good with regard to the Siddhas and
+Gandharvas also; then with regard to the devas; then with regard to the
+divine beings, beginning with Indra. Hence, also, one among the divine
+beings, beginning with Brahmā, may in each kalpa reach, through a
+particularly high degree of merit, vast lordly power and thus effect the
+creation of the world, and so on. On this supposition the texts about
+that which constitutes the cause of the world and the inward Self of the
+world must also be understood to refer to some such soul which, owing to
+superiority of merit, has become all-knowing and all-powerful. A so-
+called highest Self, different from the individual souls, does not
+therefore exist. Where the texts speak of that which is neither coarse
+nor fine nor short, &c., they only mean to characterise the individual
+soul; and those texts also which refer to final Release aim only at
+setting forth the essential nature of the individual soul and the means
+of attaining that essential nature.
+
+This primā facie view is set aside by the Sūtra. The person who is
+perceived within the sun and within the eye, is something different from
+the individual soul, viz. the highest Self; because there are declared
+qualities belonging to that. The text ascribes to him the quality of
+having risen above, i.e. being free from all evil, and this can belong
+to the highest Self only, not to the individual soul. For to be free
+from all evil means to be free from all influence of karman, and this
+quality can belong to the highest Self only, differing from all
+individual souls which, as is shown by their experience of pleasure and
+pain, are in the bonds of karman. Those essential qualities also which
+presuppose freedom from all evil (and which are mentioned in other Vedic
+passages), such as mastery over all worlds and wishes, capability of
+realising one's purposes, being the inner Self of all, &c., belong to
+the highest Self alone. Compare passages such as 'It is the Self free
+from evil, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and
+thirst, whose wishes come true, whose purposes come true' (Ch. Up. VIII,
+1, 5); and 'He is the inner Self of all, free from evil, the divine one,
+the one god Nārāyana' (Subā. Up.). Attributes such as the attribute of
+being the creator of the whole universe--which presupposes the power of
+realising one's wishes--(cp. the passage 'it desired, may I be many');
+the attribute of being the cause of fear and fearlessness; the attribute
+of enjoying transcending bliss not limited by the capabilities of
+thought and speech and the like, are essential characteristics of that
+only which is not touched by karman, and they cannot therefore belong to
+the individual soul.--Nor is there any truth in the contention that the
+person within the sun, &c., cannot be a being different from individual
+souls because it possesses a body. For since a being which possesses the
+power of realising all its desires can assume a body through its mere
+wish, it is not generally true that embodiedness proves dependence on
+karman.--But, it may be said, by a body we understand a certain
+combination of matter which springs from the primal substance (prakriti)
+with its three constituents. Now connexion with such a body cannot
+possibly be brought about by the wish of such souls even as are free
+from all evil and capable of realising their desires; for such connexion
+would not be to the soul's benefit. In the case, on the other hand, of a
+soul subject to karman and not knowing its own essential nature, such
+connexion with a body necessarily takes place in order that the soul may
+enjoy the fruit of its actions--quite apart from the soul's desire.--
+Your objection would be well founded, we reply, if the body of the
+highest Self were an effect of Prakriti with its three constituents; but
+it is not so, it rather is a body suitable to the nature and intentions
+of that Self. The highest Brahman, whose nature is fundamentally
+antagonistic to all evil and essentially composed of infinite knowledge
+and bliss--whereby it differs from all other souls--possesses an
+infinite number of qualities of unimaginable excellence, and,
+analogously, a divine form suitable to its nature and intentions, i.e.
+adorned with infinite, supremely excellent and wonderful qualities--
+splendour, beauty, fragrance, tenderness, loveliness, youthfulness, and
+so on. And in order to gratify his devotees he individualises that form
+so as to render it suitable to their apprehension--he who is a boundless
+ocean as it were of compassion, kindness and lordly power, whom no
+shadow of evil may touch---he who is the highest Self, the highest
+Brahman, the supreme soul, Nārāyana!--Certain texts tell us that the
+highest Brahman is the sole cause of the entire world: 'From which these
+beings originate' (Taitt. Up.); 'Being only was this in the beginning'
+(Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'The Self only was this in the beginning' (Ai. Up. I,
+1); 'Nārāyana alone existed, not Brahmā nor Siva.' Other texts define
+his nature: 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1,
+1); 'Knowledge, bliss is Brahman' (Bri. Up. III. 9. 28); and others
+again deny of Brahman all connexion with evil qualities and inferior
+bodies sprung from Prakriti, and all dependence on karman, and proclaim
+his glorious qualities and glorious forms: 'Free from qualities' (?);
+'Free from taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'Free from old age, from death and
+grief, from hunger and thirst, realising his wishes and purposes' (Ch.
+Up. VIII, 1, 5); 'There is no effect and no cause known of him, no one
+is seen like to him or superior: his high power is revealed as manifold,
+as inherent action of force and knowledge' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'That
+highest great lord of lords, the highest deity of deities' (Svet. Up. VI,
+7); 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is
+of him neither parent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI, 9); 'Having created all
+forms and given names to them the wise one goes on calling them by those
+names' (Taitt. Ār. III, 12, 7); 'I know that great Person of sunlike
+lustre beyond the darkness' (Svet. Up. III, 8); 'All moments originated
+from the Person shining like lightning' (Mahānār. Up. I, 6).--This
+essential form of his the most compassionate Lord by his mere will
+individualises as a shape human or divine or otherwise, so as to render
+it suitable to the apprehension of the devotee and thus satisfy him.
+This the following scriptural passage declares, 'Unborn he is born in
+many ways' (Gau. Kā. III, 24); and likewise Smriti. 'Though unborn I,
+the imperishable Self, the Lord of the beings, presiding over my Nature,
+manifest myself by my Māya for the protection of the Good and the
+destruction of the evil doers '(Bha. Gī. IV, 6. 8). The 'Good' here are
+the Devotees; and by 'Māya' is meant the purpose, the knowledge of the
+Divine Being--; in agreement with the Naighantukas who register 'Māya'
+as a synonym of jńāna (knowledge). In the Mahābhārata also the form
+assumed by the highest Person in his avatāras is said not to consist of
+Prakriti, 'the body of the highest Self does not consist of a
+combination of material elements.'--For these reasons the Person within
+the Sun and the eye is the highest Self which is different from the
+individual soul of the Sun, &c.
+
+
+
+
+22. And on account of the declaration of difference (the highest Self
+is) other (than the individual souls of the sun, &c.).
+
+There are texts which clearly state that the highest Self is different
+from Āditya and the other individual souls: 'He who, dwelling within
+Aditya (the sun), is different from Āditya, whom Āditya does not know,
+of whom Āditya is the body, who rules Āditya from within; who dwelling
+within the Self is different from the Self,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 9 ff.
+); 'Of whom the Imperishable is the body, whom the Imperishable does not
+know; who moves within Death, of whom Death is the body, whom Death does
+not know; he is the inner self of all beings, free from evil, divine,
+the one God Nārāyana' (Sub. Up. VII). These texts declare all individual
+souls to be the body of the sinless highest Self which is said to be the
+inward principle of all of them.--It is thereby completely proved that
+the highest Self is something different from all individual souls such
+as Āditya, and so on.--Here terminates the adhikarana of the 'one within.'
+
+The text, 'That from which these beings are born,' teaches that Brahman
+is the cause of the world; to the question thence arising of what nature
+that cause of the world is, certain other texts give a reply in general
+terms (' Being only this was in the beginning'; 'It sent forth fire';
+'The Self only this was in the beginning,' &c.); and thereupon it is
+shown on the basis of the special nature of that cause as proved by the
+attributes of 'thought' and 'bliss,' that Brahman is different from the
+pradhāna and the individual souls. The remaining part of this Pāda now
+is devoted to the task of proving that where such special terms as Ether
+and the like are used in sections setting forth the creation and
+government of the world, they designate not the thing-sentient or non-
+sentient--which is known from ordinary experience, but Brahman as proved
+so far.
+
+
+
+
+23. Ether (is Brahman), on account of the characteristic marks.
+
+We read in the Chāndogya (I, 9), 'What is the origin of this world?'
+'Ether,' he replied. 'For all these beings spring from the ether only,
+and return into the ether. Ether is greater than these; ether is their
+rest.' Here there arises the doubt whether the word 'ether' denotes the
+well-known element or Brahman.--The Pūrvapakshin maintains the former
+alternative. For, he says, in the case of things to be apprehended
+through words we must accept that sense of the word which, proved by
+etymology, is immediately suggested by the word. We therefore conclude
+from the passage that the well-known Ether is the cause of the entire
+aggregate of things, moving or non-moving, and that hence Brahman is the
+same as Ether.--But has it not been shown that Brahman is something
+different from non-sentient things because its creative activity is
+preceded by thought?--This has been asserted indeed, but by no means
+proved. For the proper way to combine the different texts is as follows.
+Having been told that 'that from which these beings are born is Brahman',
+we desire to know more especially what that source of all beings is, and
+this desire is satisfied by the special information given by the text,
+'All these things spring from the ether.' It thus being ascertained that
+the ether only is the cause of the origin, and so on, of the world, we
+conclude that also such general terms as 'Being' ('Being only was this
+in the beginning') denote the particular substance called 'ether.' And
+we further conclude that in passages such as 'the Self only was all this
+in the beginning', the word 'Self (ātman) also denotes the ether; for
+that word is by no means limited to non-sentient things--cp., e.g., the
+phrase, 'Clay constitutes the Self of the jar'--, and its etymology also
+(ātman from āp, to reach) shows that it may very well be applied to the
+ether. It having thus been ascertained that the ether is the general
+cause or Brahman, we must interpret such words as 'thinking' (which we
+meet with in connexion with the creative activity of the general cause)
+in a suitable, i.e. secondary, or metaphorical sense. If the texts
+denoted the general cause by general terms only, such as 'Being', we
+should, in agreement with the primary sense of 'thinking', and similar
+terms, decide that that cause is an intelligent being; but since, as a
+matter of fact, we ascertain a particular cause on the basis of the word
+'ether', our decision cannot be formed on general considerations of what
+would suit the sense.--But what then about the passage, 'From the Self
+there sprang the ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1), from which it appears
+that the ether itself is something created?--All elementary substances,
+we reply, such as ether, air, and so on, have two different states, a
+gross material one, and a subtle one. The ether, in its subtle state, is
+the universal cause; in its gross state it is an effect of the primal
+cause; in its gross state it thus springs from itself, i.e. ether in the
+subtle state. The text, 'All these beings spring from ether only' (Ch.
+Up. I, 9, 1), declares that the whole world originates from ether only,
+and from this it follows that ether is none other than the general cause
+of the world, i.e. Brahman. This non-difference of Brahman from the
+empirically known ether also gives a satisfactory sense to texts such as
+the following: 'If this ether were not bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 1);
+'Ether, indeed, is the evolver of names and forms' (Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 1,
+and so on).--It thus appears that Brahman is none other than the well-
+known elemental ether.
+
+This primā facie view is set aside by the Sūtra. The word 'ether' in the
+text under discussion denotes the highest Self with its previously
+established characteristics--which is something quite different from the
+non-sentient elemental ether. For the qualities which the passage
+attributes to ether, viz. its being the one cause of the entire world,
+its being greater than all, and the rest of all, clearly indicate the
+highest Self. The non-intelligent elemental ether cannot be called the
+cause of all, since intelligent beings clearly cannot be its effects;
+nor can it be called the 'rest' of intelligent beings, for non-sentient
+things are evil and antagonistic to the true aim of man; nor can it be
+called 'greater' than all, for it is impossible that a non-sentient
+element should possess all excellent qualities whatever and thus be
+absolutely superior to everything else.--Nor is the Pūrvapakshin right
+when maintaining that, as the word 'ether' satisfies the demand for a
+special cause of the world, all other texts are to be interpreted in
+accordance herewith. The words, 'All these beings indeed spring from the
+ether only,' merely give expression to something generally known, and
+statements of this nature presuppose other means of knowledge to prove
+them. Now these other means required are, in our case, supplied by such
+texts as 'Being only was this in the beginning,' and these, as we have
+shown, establish the existence of Brahman. To Brahman thus established,
+the text mentioning the ether merely refers as to something well known.
+Brahman may suitably be called 'ether' (ākāsa), because being of the
+nature of light it shines (ākāsate) itself, and makes other things shine
+forth (ākāsayati). Moreover, the word 'ether' is indeed capable of
+conveying the idea of a special being (as cause), but as it denotes a
+special non-intelligent thing which cannot be admitted as the cause of
+the intelligent part of the world we must deny all authoritativeness to
+the attempt to tamper, in the interest of that one word, with the sense
+of other texts which have the power of giving instruction as to an
+entirely new thing (viz. Brahman), distinguished by the possession of
+omniscience, the power of realising its purposes and similar attributes,
+which we ascertain from certain complementary texts-such as 'it thought,
+may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'it desired, may I be many, may I
+grow forth.' We also point out that the agreement in purport of a number
+of texts capable of establishing the existence of a wonderful being
+possessing infinite wonderful attributes is not lightly to be
+disregarded in favour of one single text vhich moreover (has not the
+power of intimating something not known before, but) only makes a
+reference to what is already established by other texts.--As to the
+averment that the word 'Self' is not exclusively limited to sentient
+beings, we remark that that word is indeed applied occasionally to non-
+sentient things, but prevailingly to that which is the correlative of a
+body, i.e. the soul or spirit; in texts such as 'the Self only was this
+in the beginning,' and 'from the Self there sprang the ether,' we must
+therefore understand by the 'Self,' the universal spirit. The denotative
+power of the term 'atman,' which is thus proved by itself, is moreover
+confirmed by the complementary passages 'it desired, may I send forth
+the worlds', 'it desired, may I be many, may I grow forth.'--We thus
+arrive at the following conclusion: Brahman, which--by the passage
+'Being only this was in the beginning'--is established as the sole cause
+of the world, possessing all those manifold wonderful attributes which
+are ascertained from the complementary passages, is, in the text under
+discussion, referred to as something already known, by means of the term
+'ether.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of' ether.'
+
+
+
+
+24. For the same reason breath (is Brahman).
+
+We read in the Chāndogya (I, 10; ii), 'Prastotri, that deity which
+belongs to the Prastāva,' &c.; and further on, 'which then is that deity?
+He said--Breath. For all these beings merge into breath alone, and from
+breath they arise. This is the deity belonging to the Prastāva. If
+without knowing that deity you had sung forth, your head would have
+fallen off.' Here the word 'breath,' analogously to the word 'ether'
+denotes the highest Brahman, which is different from what is commonly
+called breath; we infer this from the fact that special characteristics
+of Brahman, viz. the whole world's entering into and rising from it, are
+in that text referred to as well-known things. There indeed here arises
+a further doubt; for as it is a matter of observation that the existence,
+activity, &c., of the whole aggregate of creatures depend on breath,
+breath--in its ordinary acceptation--may be called the cause of the
+world. This doubt is, however, disposed of by the consideration that
+breath is not present in things such as stones and wood, nor in
+intelligence itself, and that hence of breath in the ordinary sense it
+cannot be said that 'all beings enter into it,' &c. We therefore
+conclude that Brahman is here called 'breath' in so far as he bestows
+the breath of life on all beings. And the general result of the
+discussion carried on in connexion with the last two Sūtras thus is that
+the words 'ether' and 'breath' denote something other than what is
+ordinarily denoted by those terms, viz. the highest Brahman, the sole
+cause of this entire world, free from all evil, &c. &c.--Here terminates
+the adhikarana of 'breath.'
+
+The subsequent Sūtras up to the end of the Pāda demonstrate that the
+being which the texts refer to as 'Light' or 'Indra'--terms which in
+ordinary language are applied to certain other well-known beings--, and
+which is represented as possessing some one or other supremely exalted
+quality that is invariably connected with world-creative power, is no
+other than the highest Brahman.
+
+
+
+
+25. The light (is Brahman), on account of the mention of feet.
+
+We read in the Chāndogya. (III, 13, 7), 'Now that light which shines
+above this heaven, higher than everything, in the highest worlds beyond
+which there are no other worlds, that is the same light which is within
+man.'--Here a doubt arises, viz. whether the brightly shining thing here
+called 'light' is the well-known light of the sun and so on, viewed as a
+causal universal principle (Brahman); or the all-knowing, &c., highest
+Person of infinite splendour, who is different in nature from all
+sentient and non-sentient beings, and is the highest cause.--The
+Pūrvapakshin maintains that the reference is to ordinary light. For, he
+says, the passage does not mention a particular characteristic attribute
+which can belong to the highest Self only--while such attributes _were_
+met with in the texts referring to Ether and Breath--, and as thus there
+is no opening for a recognition of the highest Self, and as at the same
+time the text identifies 'light' with the intestinal heat of living
+beings, we conclude that the text represents the well-known ordinary
+light as Brahman, the cause of the world--which is possible as causal
+agency is connected with extreme light and heat.--This primā facie view
+the Sūtra sets aside. The light which the text states to be connected
+with heaven and possessing supreme splendour can be the highest Person
+only, since a preceding passage in the same section--' All the beings
+are one foot of it, three feet are the Immortal in heaven'--refers to
+all beings as being a foot of that same being which is connected with
+heaven. Although the passage, 'That light which shines above,' &c., does
+not mention a special attribute of the highest Person, yet the passage
+previously quoted refers to the highest Person as connected with heaven,
+and we therefore recognise that Person as the light connected with
+heaven, mentioned in the subsequent passage.
+
+Nor does the identification, made in a clause of the text, of light with
+the intestinal heat give rise to any difficulty; for that clause is
+meant to enjoin meditation on the highest Brahman in the form of
+intestinal heat, such meditation having a special result of its own.
+Moreover, the Lord himself declares that he constitutes the Self of the
+intestinal fire, 'Becoming the Vaisvānara-fire I abide in the body of
+living creatures' (Bha. Gī. XV, 14).
+
+
+
+
+26. If it be objected that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the
+metre being denoted; (we reply) not so, because thus the direction of
+the mind (on Brahman) is declared; for thus it is seen.
+
+The previous section at first refers to the metre called Gāyatrī, 'The
+Gāyatrī indeed is everything' (III, 12, 1), and then introduces--with
+the words 'this is also declared by a Rik_ verse'--the verse, 'Such is
+the greatness of it (viz. the Gāyatrī),' &c. Now, as this verse also
+refers to the metre, there is not any reference to the highest Person.--
+To this objection the second part of the Sūtra replies. The word
+'Gāyatrī' does not here denote the metre only, since this cannot
+possibly be the Self of all; but the text declares the application of
+the idea of Gāyatrī to Brahman, i.e. teaches, to the end of a certain
+result being obtained, meditation on Brahman in so far as similar to
+Gāyatrī. For Brahman having four feet, in the sense indicated by the rik_,
+may be compared to the Gāyatrī with its four (metrical) feet. The
+Gāyatrī (indeed has as a rule three feet, but) occasionally a Gāyatrī
+with four feet is met with; so, e.g., 'Indras sakīpatih | valena pīditah |
+duskyavano vrishā | samitsu sāsahih.' We see that in other passages also
+words primarily denoting metres are employed in other senses; thus, e.g.,
+in the samvargavidyā (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 8), where Virāj (the name of a
+metre of ten syllables) denotes a group of ten divine beings.
+
+For this conclusion the next Sūtra supplies a further argument.
+
+
+
+
+27. And thus also, because (thus only) the designation of the beings,
+and so on, being the (four) feet is possible.
+
+The text, moreover, designates the Gāyatrī as having four feet, after
+having referred to the beings, the earth, the body, and the heart; now
+this has a sense only if it is Brahman, which here is called Gāyatrī.
+
+
+
+
+28. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (recognised) on account of the
+difference of designation; (we say) not so, on account of there being no
+contradiction in either (designation).
+
+In the former passage, 'three feet of it are what is immortal in heaven,'
+heaven is referred to as the abode of the being under discussion;
+while in the latter passage, 'that light which shines above this heaven,'
+heaven is mentioned as marking its boundary. Owing to this discrepancy,
+the Brahman referred to in the former text is not recognised in the
+latter.--This objection the Sūtra disposes of by pointing out that owing
+to the essential agreement of the two statements, nothing stands in the
+way of the required recognition. When we say, 'The hawk is on the top of
+the tree,' and 'the hawk is above the top of the tree,' we mean one and
+the same thing.--The 'light,' therefore, is nothing else but the most
+glorious and luminous highest Person. Him who in the former passage is
+called four-footed, we know to have an extraordinarily beautiful shape
+and colour--(cp., e.g., 'I know that great Person of sunlike colour
+beyond the darkness' (Svet. Up. III, 9))--, and as hence his brilliancy
+also must be extraordinary, he is, in the text under discussion, quite
+appropriately called 'light.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'light.'
+
+It has been shown that the being endowed with supreme brilliance, called
+'Light,' which the text mentions as something well known, is the highest
+Person. The Sūtrakāra will now show that the being designated as Indra
+and Prāna, which the text enjoins as an object of meditation, for the
+reason that it is the means for attaining immortality--a power which is
+inseparable from causal power--, is likewise the highest Person.
+
+
+
+
+29. Prāna is Brahman, on account of connexion.
+
+We read in the Pratardana-vidyā in the Kaushītaki-brāhmana that
+'Pratardana, the son of Divodāsa, came, by fighting and strength, to the
+beloved abode of Indra.' Being asked by Indra to choose a boon he
+requests the God to bestow on him that boon which he himself considers
+most beneficial to man; whereupon Indra says, 'I am prāna (breath), the
+intelligent Self, meditate on me as Life, as Immortality.' Here the
+doubt arises whether the being called Prāna and Indra, and designating
+itself as the object of a meditation most beneficial to man, is an
+individual soul, or the highest Self.--An individual soul, the
+Pūrvapakshin maintains. For, he says, the word 'Indra' is known to
+denote an individual God, and the word 'Prāna,' which stands in
+grammatical co-ordination with Indra, also applies to individual souls.
+This individual being, called Indra, instructs Pratardana that
+meditation on himself is most beneficial to man. But what is most
+beneficial to man is only the means to attain immortality, and such a
+means is found in meditation on the causal principle of the world, as we
+know from the text, 'For him there is delay only so long as he is not
+delivered; then he will be perfect' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2). We hence
+conclude that Indra, who is known as an individual soul, is the causal
+principle, Brahman.
+
+This view is rejected by the Sūtra. The being called Indra and Prāna is
+not a mere individual soul, but the highest Brahman, which is other than
+all individual souls. For on this supposition only it is appropriate
+that the being introduced as Indra and Prāna should, in the way of
+grammatical co-ordination, be connected with such terms as 'blessed,'
+'non-ageing,' 'immortal.' ('That Prāna indeed is the intelligent Self,
+blessed, non-ageing, immortal,' Kau. Up. III, 9.)
+
+
+
+
+30. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the
+speaker denoting himself; (we say, not so), because the multitude of
+connexions with the inner Self (is possible only) in that (speaker if
+viewed as Brahman).
+
+An objection is raised.--That the being introduced as Indra and Prāna
+should be the highest Brahman, for the reason that it is identical with
+him who, later on, is called 'blessed,' 'non-ageing,' 'immortal'--this we
+cannot admit. 'Know me only, I am prāna, meditate on me as the
+intelligent Self, as life, as immortality'--the speaker of these words
+is Indra, and this Indra enjoins on Pratardana meditation on his own
+person only, the individual character of which is brought out by
+reference to certain deeds of strength such as the slaying of the son of
+Tvashtri ('I slew the three-headed son of Tvashtri,' &c.). As thus the
+initial part of the section clearly refers to an individual being, the
+terms occurring in the concluding part ('blessed,' 'non-ageing,'
+'immortal') must be interpreted so as to make them agree with what
+precedes.--This objection the Sūtra disposes of. 'For the multitude of
+connexions with the Self'--i.e. the multitude of things connected with
+the Self as its attributes--is possible only 'in that,' i.e. in that
+speaker viewed as the highest Brahman. 'For, as in a car, the
+circumference of the wheel is placed on the spokes, and the spokes on
+the nave, thus are these objects placed on the subjects, and the
+subjects on the prāna. That prāna indeed is the intelligent Self,
+blessed, non-ageing, immortal.' The 'objects' (bhūtamātrāh) here are the
+aggregate of non-sentient things; the 'subjects' (prajńāmātrāh) are the
+sentient beings in which the objects are said to abide; when thereupon
+the texts says that of these subjects the being called Indra and Prāna
+is the abode, and that he is blessed, non-ageing, immortal; this
+qualification of being the abode of this Universe, with all its non-
+sentient and sentient beings, can belong to the highest Self only, which
+is other than all individual souls.
+
+The Sūtra may also be explained in a somewhat different way, viz. 'there
+is a multitude of connexions belonging to the highest Self, i.e. of
+attributes special to the highest Self, in that, viz. section.' The text
+at first says, 'Choose thou that boon for me which thou deemest most
+beneficial to man'--to which the reply is, 'Meditate on me.' Here Indra-
+prāna is represented as the object of a meditation which is to bring
+about Release; the object of such meditation can be none but the highest
+Self.--'He makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a
+good deed; and him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds he
+makes do a bad deed.' The causality with regard to all actions which is
+here described is again a special attribute of the highest Self.--The
+same has to be said with regard to the attribute of being the abode of
+all, in the passage about the wheel and spokes, quoted above; and with
+regard to the attributes of bliss, absence of old age and immortality,
+referred to in another passage quoted before. Also the attributes of
+being 'the ruler of the worlds, the lord of all,' can belong to the
+highest Self only.--The conclusion therefore is that the being called
+Indra and Prāna is none other but the highest Self.--But how then can
+Indra, who is known to be an individual person only, enjoin meditation
+on himself?--To this question the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+31. The instruction (given by Indra about himself) (is possible) through
+insight based on Scripture, as in the case of Vāmadeva.
+
+The instruction which, in the passages quoted, Indra gives as to the
+object of meditation, i.e. Brahman constituting his Self, is not based
+on such an insight into his own nature as is established by other means
+of proof, but on an intuition of his own Self, mediated by Scripture.
+'Having entered into them with this living Self let me evolve names and
+forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'In it all that exists has its Self (Ch. Up.
+VI, 8, 7); Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all'
+(Taitt. Ar. III, 21); 'He who dwelling in the Self is different from the
+Self,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22)--from these and similar texts Indra has
+learned that the highest Self has the indiviual souls for its body, and
+that hence words such as 'I' and 'thou,' which denote individual beings,
+extend in their connotation up to the highest Self; when, therefore, he
+says, 'Know me only', and 'Meditate on me', he really means to teach
+that the highest Self, of which his own individual person is the body,
+is the proper object of meditation. 'As in the case of Vāmadeva.' As the
+Rishi Vāmadeva perceiving that Brahman is the inner Self of all, that
+all things constitute its body, and that the meaning of words denoting a
+body extends up to the principle embodied, denotes with the word 'I' the
+highest Brahman to which he himself stands in the relation of a body,
+and then predicates of this 'I' Manu Sūrya and other beings--'Seeing
+this the Rishi. Vāmadeva understood, I am Manu, I am Sūrya' (Bri. Up. I,
+4, 10). Similarly Prahlāda says, 'As the Infinite one abides within all,
+he constitutes my "I" also; all is from me, I am all, within me is all.'
+(Vi. Pu. I, 19, 85.) The next Sūtra states, in reply to an objection,
+the reason why, in the section under discussion, terms denoting the
+individual soul, and others denoting non-sentient things are applied to
+Brahman.
+
+
+
+
+32. If it be said (that Brahman is not meant) on account of
+characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; we
+say no, on account of the threefoldness of meditation; on account of
+(such threefold meditation) being met (in other texts also); and on
+account of (such threefold meditation) being appropriate here (also).
+
+An objection is raised. 'Let none try to find out what speech is, let
+him know the speaker'; 'I slew the three-headed son of Tvashtri; I
+delivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees, to the wolves'; these passages
+state characteristic marks of an individual soul (viz. the god Indra).--
+'As long as Prāna dwells in this body, so long there is life'; 'Prāna
+alone is the conscious Self, and having laid hold of this body, it makes
+it rise up.'--These passages again mention characteristic attributes of
+the chief vital air. Hence there is here no 'multitude of attributes
+belonging to the Self.'--The latter part of the Sūtra refutes this
+objection. The highest Self is called by these different terms in order
+to teach threefoldness of devout meditation; viz. meditation on Brahman
+in itself as the cause of the entire world; on Brahman as having for its
+body the totality of enjoying (individual) souls; and on Brahman as
+having for its body the objects and means of enjoyment.--This threefold
+meditation on Brahman, moreover, is met with also in other chapters of
+the sacred text. Passages such as 'The True, knowledge, infinite is
+Brahman,' 'Bliss is Brahman,' dwell on Brahman in itself. Passages again
+such as 'Having created that he entered into it. Having entered it he
+became _sat_ and _tyat_, defined and undefined,' &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 6),
+represent Brahman as having for its body the individual souls and
+inanimate nature. Hence, in the chapter under discussion also, this
+threefold view of Brahman is quite appropriate. Where to particular
+individual beings such as Hiranyagarbha, and so on, or to particular
+inanimate things such as prakriti, and so on, there are attributed
+qualities especially belonging--to the highest Self; or where with words
+denoting such persons and things there are co-ordinated terms denoting
+the highest Self, the intention of the texts is to convey the idea of
+the highest Self being the inner Self of all such persons and things.--
+The settled conclusion, therefore, is that the being designated as Indra
+and Prāna is other than an individual soul, viz. the highest Self.
+
+
+
+
+SECOND PĀDA.
+
+THE contents of the first Pāda may be summed up as follows:--It has been
+shown that a person who has read the text of the Veda; who further,
+through the study of the Karma-Mīmāmsa, has acquired a full knowledge of
+the nature of (sacrificial and similar) works, and has recognised that
+the fruits of such works are limited and non-permanent; in whom there
+has arisen the desire for the highest aim of man, i.e. Release, which,
+as he has come to know in the course of reading the Vedānta portions of
+scripture, is effected by meditation on the nature of Brahman--such
+meditation having an infinite and permanent result; who has convinced
+himself that words are capable of conveying information about
+accomplished things (not only about things to be done), and has arrived
+at the conclusion that the Vedānta-texts are an authoritative means of
+knowledge with regard to the highest Brahman;--that such a person, we
+say, should begin the study of the Sārīraka-Mīmāmsā which indicates the
+method how Brahman is to be known through the Vedānta-texts.
+
+We next have shown that the text 'That from which these creatures are
+born,' &c., conveys the idea of the highest Brahman as that being which
+in sport, as it were, creates, sustains, and finally reabsorbs this
+entire universe, comprising within itself infinite numbers of variously
+constituted animated beings--moving and non-moving--, of objects of
+enjoyment for those beings, of means of enjoyment, and of abodes of
+enjoyment; and which is the sole cause of all bliss. We have established
+that this highest Brahman, which is the sole cause of the world, cannot
+be the object of the other means of knowledge, and hence is to be known
+through scripture only. We have pointed out that the position of
+scripture as an authoritative means of knowledge is established by the
+fact that all the Vedānta-texts connectedly refer to the highest Brahman,
+which, although not related to any injunctions of action or abstention
+from action, by its own essential nature constitutes the highest end of
+man. We have proved that Brahman, which the Vedānta-texts teach to be
+the sole cause of the world, must be an intelligent principle other than
+the non-sentient pradhāna, since Brahman is said to think. We have
+declared that this intelligent principle is other than the so-called
+individual soul, whether in the state of bondage or that of release;
+since the texts describe it as in the enjoyment of supreme bliss, all-
+wise, the cause of fear or fearlessness on the part of intelligent
+beings, the inner Self of all created things, whether intelligent or non-
+intelligent, possessing the power of realising all its purposes, and so
+on.--We have maintained that this highest Being has a divine form,
+peculiar to itself, not made of the stuff of Prakriti, and not due to
+karman.--We have explained that the being which some texts refer to as a
+well-known cause of the world--designating it by terms such as ether or
+breath, which generally denote a special non-sentient being--is that
+same highest Self which is different from all beings, sentient or non-
+sentient.--We have declared that, owing to its connexion with heaven,
+this same highest Self is to be recognised in what the text calls a
+'light,' said to possess supreme splendour, such as forms a special
+characteristic of the highest Being. We have stated that, as we
+recognise through insight derived from scripture, that same highest
+Person is denoted by terms such as Indra, and so on; as the text
+ascribes to that 'Indra' qualities exclusively belonging to the highest
+Self, such, e.g., as being the cause of the attainment of immortality.--
+And the general result arrived at was that the Vedānta-texts help us to
+the knowledge of one being only, viz. Brahman, or the highest Person, or
+Nārāyana--of whom it is shown that he cannot possibly be the object of
+the other means of knowledge, and whom the possession of an unlimited
+number of glorious qualities proves to differ totally from all other
+beings whatsoever.
+
+Now, although Brahman is the only object of the teaching of the Vedānta-
+texts, yet some of these texts might give rise to the notion that they
+aim at setting forth (not Brahman), but some particular being comprised
+within either the pradhāna or the aggregate of individual souls. The
+remaining Pādas of the first Adhyāya therefore apply themselves to the
+task of dispelling this notion and proving that what the texts in
+question aim at is to set forth certain glorious qualities of Brahman.
+The second Pāda discusses those texts which contain somewhat obscure
+references to the individual soul; the third Pāda those which contain
+clear references to the same; and the fourth Pāda finally those texts
+which appear to contain even clearer intimations of the individual soul,
+and so on.
+
+
+
+
+1. Everywhere; because there is taught what is known.
+
+We read in the Chāndogya, 'Man is made of thought; according to what his
+thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life.
+Let him form this thought: he who consists of mind, whose body is breath,
+whose form is light,' &c. (III, 14). We here understand that of the
+meditation enjoined by the clause 'let him form this thought' the object
+is the being said to consist of mind, to have breath for its body, &c. A
+doubt, however, arises whether the being possessing these attributes be
+the individual soul or the highest Self.--The Pūrvapakshin maintains the
+former alternative. For, he says, mind and breath are instruments of the
+individual soul; while the text 'without breath, without mind,'
+distinctly denies them to the highest Self. Nor can the Brahman
+mentioned in a previous clause of the same section ('All this indeed is
+Brahman') be connected as an object with the meditation enjoined in the
+passage under discussion; for Brahman is there referred to in order to
+suggest the idea of its being the Self of all--which idea constitutes a
+means for bringing about that calmness of mind which is helpful towards
+the act of meditation enjoined in the clause 'Let a man meditate with
+calm mind,' &c. Nor, again, can it be said that as the meditation
+conveyed by the clause 'let him form this thought' demands an object,
+Brahman, although mentioned in another passage, only admits of being
+connected with the passage under discussion; for the demand for an
+object is fully satisfied by the being made of mind, &c., which is
+mentioned in that very passage itself; in order to supply the object we
+have merely to change the case-terminations of the words 'manomayah
+prānasarīrah,' &c. It having thus been determined that the being made of
+mind is the individual soul, we further conclude that the Brahman
+mentioned in the concluding passage of the section ('That is Brahman')
+is also the individual soul, there called Brahman in order to glorify it.
+
+This primā facie view is set aside by the Sūtra. The being made of mind
+is the highest Self; for the text states certain qualities, such as
+being made of mind, &c., which are well known to denote, in all Vedānta-
+texts, Brahman only. Passages such as 'He who is made of mind, the guide
+of the body of breath' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 7); 'There is the ether within
+the heart, and in it there is the Person, consisting of mind, immortal,
+golden' (Taitt. Up. I. 6, 1); 'He is conceived by the heart, by wisdom,
+by the mind. Those who know him are immortal' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 9); 'He is
+not apprehended by the eye nor by speech, but by a purified mind' (Mu.
+Up. III, 1, 8); 'The breath of breath' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 183); 'Breath
+alone is the conscious Self, and having laid hold of this body it makes
+it rise up' (Kau. Up. III, 3); 'All these beings merge into breath alone,
+and from breath they arise' (Ch. Up. I, 11, 5)--these and similar texts
+refer to Brahman as consisting of mind, to be apprehended by a purified
+mind, having breath for its body, and being the abode and ruler of
+breath. This being so, we decide that in the concluding passage, 'my
+Self within the heart, that is Brahman,' the word 'Brahman' has to be
+taken in its primary sense (and does not denote the individual soul).
+The text which declares Brahman to be without mind and breath, merely
+means to deny that the thought of Brahman depends on a mind (internal
+organ), and that its life depends on breath.
+
+Or else we may interpret the Vedic text and the Sūtra as follows. The
+passage 'All this is Brahman; let a man meditate with a calm mind on
+this world as originating, ending, and breathing in Brahman,' conveys
+the imagination of meditation on Brahman as the Self of all. The
+subsequent clause 'Let him form the thought,' &c., forms an additional
+statement to that injunction, the purport of which is to suggest certain
+attributes of Brahman, such as being made of mind. So that the meaning
+of the whole section is 'Let a man meditate on Brahman, which is made of
+mind, has breath for its body, &c., as the Self of the whole world.'--
+Here a doubt presents itself. Does the term 'Brahman' in this section
+denote the individual soul or the highest Self?--The individual soul,
+the Pūrvapakshin maintains, for that only admits of being exhibited in
+co-ordination with the word 'all.' For the word 'all' denotes the entire
+world from Brahmā down to a blade of grass; and the existence of Brahmā
+and other individual beings is determined by special forms of karman,
+the root of which is the beginningless Nescience of the individual soul.
+The highest Brahman, on the other hand, which is all-knowing, all-
+powerful, free from all evil and all shadow of Nescience and similar
+imperfections, cannot possibly exist as the 'All' which comprises within
+itself everything that is bad. Moreover we find that occasionally the
+term 'Brahman' is applied to the individual soul also; just as the
+highest Lord (paramesvara) may be called 'the highest Self' (paramātman)
+or 'the highest Brahman.' That 'greatness' (brihattva; which is the
+essential characteristic of 'brahman') belongs to the individual soul
+when it has freed itself from its limiting conditions, is moreover
+attested by scripture: 'That (soul) is fit for infinity' (Svet. Up. V,
+9). And as the soul's Nescience is due to karman (only), the text may
+very well designate it--as it does by means of the term 'tajjalān'--as
+the cause of the origin, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world.
+That is to say--the individual soul which, in its essential nature, is
+non-limited, and therefore of the nature of Brahman, owing to the
+influence of Nescience enters into the state of a god, or a man, or an
+animal, or a plant.
+
+This view is rejected by the Sūtra. 'Everywhere,' i.e. in the whole
+world which is referred to in the clause 'All this is Brahman' we have
+to understand the highest Brahman--which the term 'Brahman' denotes as
+the Self of the world--, and not the individual soul; 'because there is
+taught what is known,' i.e. because the clause 'All this is Brahman'--
+for which clause the term 'tajjalān' supplies the reason--refers to
+Brahman as something generally known. Since the world springs from
+Brahman, is merged in Brahman, and depends on Brahman for its life,
+therefore--as the text says--'All this has its Self in Brahman'; and
+this shows to us that what the text understands by Brahman is that being
+from which, as generally known from the Vedānta texts, there proceed the
+creation, and so on, of the world. That the highest Brahman only, all-
+wise and supremely blessed, is the cause of the origin, &c., of the
+world, is declared in the section which begins. 'That from which these
+beings are born,' &c., and which says further on, 'he knew that Bliss is
+Brahman, for from bliss these beings are born' (Taitt. Up. III, 6); and
+analogously the text 'He is the cause, the lord of lords of the organs,'
+&c. (Svet. Up. VI, 9), declares the highest Brahman to be the cause of
+the individual soul. Everywhere, in fact, the texts proclaim the
+causality of the highest Self only. As thus the world which springs from
+Brahman, is merged in it, and breathes through it, has its Self in
+Brahman, the identity of the two may properly be asserted; and hence the
+text--the meaning of which is 'Let a man meditate with calm mind on the
+highest Brahman of which the world is a mode, which has the world for
+its body, and which is the Self of the world'--first proves Brahman's
+being the universal Self, and then enjoins meditation on it. The highest
+Brahman, in its causal condition as well as in its so-called 'effected'
+state, constitutes the Self of the world, for in the former it has for
+its body all sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle form, and
+in the latter the same beings in their gross condition. Nor is there any
+contradiction between such identity with the world on Brahman's part,
+and the fact that Brahman treasures within itself glorious qualities
+antagonistic to all evil; for the imperfections adhering to the bodies,
+which are mere modes of Brahman, do not affect Brahman itself to which
+the modes belong. Such identity rather proves for Brahman supreme lordly
+power, and thus adds to its excellences. Nor, again, can it rightly be
+maintained that of the individual soul also identity with the world can
+be predicated; for the souls being separate according to the bodies with
+which they are joined cannot be identical with each other. Even in the
+state of release, when the individual soul is not in any way limited, it
+does not possess that identity with the world on which there depends
+causality with regard to the world's creation, sustentation, and
+reabsorption; as will be declared in Sūtra IV, 4, 17. Nor, finally, does
+the Pūrvapakshin improve his case by contending that the individual soul
+may be the cause of the creation, &c., of the world because it (viz. the
+soul) is due to karman; for although the fact given as reason is true,
+all the same the Lord alone is the cause of the Universe.--All this
+proves that the being to which the text refers as Brahman is none other
+than the highest Self.
+
+This second alternative interpretation of the Sūtra is preferred by most
+competent persons. The Vrittikāra, e.g. says, 'That Brahman which the
+clause "All this is Brahman" declares to be the Self of all is the Lord.'
+
+
+
+
+2. And because the qualities meant to be stated are possible (in
+Brahman).
+
+The qualities about to be stated can belong to the highest Self only.
+'Made of mind, having breath for its body,' &c. 'Made of mind' means to
+be apprehended by a purified mind only. The highest Self can be
+apprehended only by a mind purified by meditation on that Self, such
+meditation being assisted by the seven means, viz. abstention, &c. (see
+above, p. 17). This intimates that the highest Self is of pure goodness,
+precluding all evil, and therefore different in nature from everything
+else; for by the impure minded impure objects only can be apprehended.--
+'Having the vital breath for its body' means--being the supporter of all
+life in the world. To stand in the relation of a body to something else,
+means to abide in that other thing, to be dependent on it, and to
+subserve it in a subordinate capacity, as we shall fully show later on.
+And all 'vital breath' or 'life' stands in that relation to the highest
+Self. 'Whose form is light'; i.e. who is of supreme splendour, his form
+being a divine one of supreme excellence peculiar to him, and not
+consisting of the stuff of Prakriti.--'Whose purposes are true'; i.e.
+whose purposes realise themselves without any obstruction. 'Who is the
+(or "of the") Self of ether'; i.e. who is of a delicate and transparent
+nature, like ether; or who himself is the Self of ether, which is the
+causal substance of everything else; or who shines forth himself and
+makes other things shine forth.--'To whom all works belong'; i.e. he of
+whom the whole world is the work; or he to whom all activities belong.--
+'To whom all wishes belong'; i.e. he to whom all pure objects and means
+of desire and enjoyment belong. 'He to whom all odours and tastes
+belong'; i.e. he to whom there belong, as objects of enjoyment, all
+kinds of uncommon, special, perfect, supremely excellent odours and
+tastes; ordinary smells and tastes being negatived by another text, viz.
+'That which is without sound, without touch, without taste,' &c. (Ka. Up.
+I, 3, 15).--'He who embraces all this'; i.e. he who makes his own the
+whole group of glorious qualities enumerated.--'He who does not speak,'
+because, being in possession of all he could desire, he 'has no regard
+for anything'; i.e. he who, in full possession of lordly power, esteems
+this whole world with all its creatures no higher than a blade of grass,
+and hence abides in silence.--All these qualities stated in the text can
+belong to the highest Self only.
+
+
+
+
+3. But, on account of impossibility, not the embodied soul.
+
+Those who fully consider this infinite multitude of exalted qualities
+will recognise that not even a shadow of them can belong to the
+individual soul--whether in the state of bondage or that of release--
+which is a thing as insignificant as a glow-worm and, through its
+connexion with a body, liable to the attacks of endless suffering. It is
+not possible therefore to hold that the section under discussion should
+refer to the individual soul.
+
+
+
+
+4. And because there is (separate) denotation of the object and the
+agent.
+
+The clause 'When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him'
+denotes the highest Brahman as the object to be obtained, and the
+individual soul as that which obtains it. This shows that the soul which
+obtains is the person meditating, and the highest Brahman that is to be
+obtained, the object of meditation: Brahman, therefore, is something
+different from the attaining soul.
+
+
+
+
+5. On account of the difference of words.
+
+The clause 'That is the Self of me, within the heart' designates the
+embodied soul by means of a genitive form, while the object of
+meditation is exhibited in the nominative case. Similarly, a text of the
+Vājasaneyins, which treats of the same topic, applies different terms to
+the embodied and the highest Self, 'Like a rice grain, or a barley grain,
+or a canary seed, or the kernel of a canary seed, thus that golden
+Person is within the Self' (Sat. Br. X, 6, 3, 2). Here the locative form,
+'within the Self,' denotes the embodied Self, and the nominative, 'that
+golden Person,' the object to be meditated on.--All this proves the
+highest Self to be the object of meditation.
+
+
+
+
+6. And on account of Smriti.
+
+'I dwell within the hearts of all, from me come memory and knowledge, as
+well as their loss'; 'He who free from delusion knows me to be the
+highest Person'; 'The Lord, O Arjuna, is seated in the heart of all
+Beings, driving round by his mysterious power all beings as if mounted
+on a machine; to him fly for refuge' (Bha. Gi. XV, 15, 19; XVIII, 61).
+These Smriti-texts show the embodied soul to be the meditating subject,
+and the highest Self the object of meditation.
+
+
+
+
+7. Should it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to Brahman) on
+account of the smallness of the abode, and on account of the denotation
+of that (viz. minuteness of the being meditated on); we say no, because
+(Brahman) has thus to be meditated upon, and because (in the same
+passage) it is said to be like ether.
+
+It might be contended that, as the text 'he is my Self within the heart'
+declares the being meditated on to dwell within a minute abode, viz. the
+heart; and as moreover another text--'smaller than a grain of rice,' &c.,
+declares it to be itself of minute size, that being cannot be the
+highest Self, but only the embodied soul. For other passages speak of
+the highest Self as unlimited, and of the embodied soul as having the
+size of the point of a goad (cp. e.g. Mu. Up. I, 1, 6, and Svet. Up. V,
+8).--This objection the Sūtra rebuts by declaring that the highest Self
+is spoken of as such, i.e. minute, on account of its having to be
+meditated upon as such. Such minuteness does not, however, belong to its
+true nature; for in the same section it is distinctly declared to be
+infinite like ether--'greater than the earth, greater than the sky,
+greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 3).
+This shows that the designation of the highest Self as minute is for the
+purpose of meditation only.--The connexion of the whole section then is
+as follows. The clause 'All this is Brahman; let a man meditate with
+calm mind on this world as beginning, ending, and breathing in Brahman,'
+enjoins meditation on Brahman as being the Self of all, in so far as it
+is the cause of the origin and destruction of all, and entering into all
+beings as their soul gives life to them. The next clause, 'Man is made
+of thought; according as his thought is in this world, so will he be
+when he has departed this life,' declares the attainment of the desired
+object to depend on the nature of the meditation; and the following
+clause, 'Let him therefore form the following thought,' thereupon
+repeats the injunction with a view to the declaration of details. The
+clause 'He who consists of mind,' &c., up to 'who is never surprised,'
+then states the nature and qualities, of the being to be meditated upon,
+which are to be comprised in the meditation. Next, the clause 'He is my
+Self,' up to 'the kernel of a canary seed,' declares that the highest
+Person, for the purpose of meditation, abides in the heart of the
+meditating devotee; representing it as being itself minute, since the
+heart is minute. After this the clause 'He also is my Self,' up to 'who
+is never surprised,' describes those aspects of the being meditated upon
+as within the heart, which are to be attained by the devotee. Next, the
+words 'this my Self within the heart is that Brahman' enjoins the
+reflection that the highest Brahman, as described before, is, owing to
+its supreme kindness, present in our hearts in order thereby to refresh
+and inspirit us. Then the clause 'When I shall have departed from hence
+I shall obtain him' suggests the idea that there is a certainty of
+obtaining him on the basis of devout meditation; and finally the clause
+'He who has this faith has no doubt' declares that the devotee who is
+firmly convinced of his aim being attainable in the way described, will
+attain it beyond any doubt.--From all this it appears that the
+'limitation of abode,' and the 'minuteness' ascribed to Brahman, are
+merely for the purpose of meditation.
+
+
+
+
+8. Should it be said that there is attainment of fruition (of pleasure
+and pain); we reply, not so, on account of difference.
+
+But, if the highest Brahman is assumed to dwell within bodies, like the
+individual soul, it follows that, like the latter, it is subject to the
+experience of pleasure and pain, such experience springing from
+connexion with bodies!--Of this objection the Sūtra disposes by
+remarking 'not so, on account of difference (of reason).' For what is
+the cause of experiences, pleasurable or painful, is not the mere
+dwelling within a body, but rather the subjection to the influence of
+good and evil deeds; and such subjection is impossible in the case of
+the highest Self to which all evil is foreign. Compare the scriptural
+text 'One of the two eats the sweet fruit, the other one looks on
+without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1).--Here finishes the adhikarana of
+'what is known everywhere.'
+
+Well then, if the highest Self is not an enjoyer, we must conclude that
+wherever fruition is referred to, the embodied soul only is meant!--Of
+this view the next adhikarana disposes.
+
+
+
+
+9. The eater (is the highest Self) on account of there being taken all
+that is movable and immovable.
+
+We read in the Kathavallī (I, 3, 25), 'Who then knows where he is to
+whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food, and death itself a
+condiment?' A doubt here arises whether the 'eater', suggested by the
+words 'food' and 'condiment,' is the individual soul or the highest Self.--
+The individual soul, the Pūrvapakshin maintains; for all enjoyment
+presupposes works, and works belong to the individual soul only.--Of
+this view the Sūtra disposes. The 'eater' can be the highest Self only,
+because the taking, i. e. eating, of the whole aggregate of movable and
+immovable things can be predicated of that Self only. 'Eating' does not
+here mean fruition dependent on work, but rather the act of reabsorption
+of the world on the part of the highest Brahman, i. e. Vishnu, who is
+the cause of the origination, subsistence, and final destruction of the
+universe. This appears from the fact that Vishnu is mentioned in the
+same section, 'He reaches the end of his journey, and that is the
+highest place of Vishnu' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 9). Moreover the clause 'to whom
+death is a condiment' shows that by the Brahmans and Kshattriyas,
+mentioned in the text, we have to understand the whole universe of
+moving and non-moving things, viewed as things to be consumed by the
+highest Self. For a condiment is a thing which, while itself being eaten,
+causes other things to be eaten; the meaning of the passage, therefore,
+is that while death itself is consumed, being a condiment as it were,
+there is at the same time eaten whatever is flavoured or made palatable
+by death, and that is the entire world of beings in which the Brahmans
+and Kshattriyas hold the foremost place. Now such eating of course is
+destruction or reabsorption, and hence such enjoyment--meaning general
+reabsorption--can belong to the highest Self only.
+
+
+
+
+10. And on account of the topic of the whole section.
+
+Moreover the highest Brahman constitutes the topic of the entire section.
+Cp. 'The wise who knows the Self as great and omnipresent does not
+grieve' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22); 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda, nor
+by understanding, nor by much learning. He whom the Self chooses, by him
+the Self can be gained; the Self chooses him as his own' (I, 2, 23).--
+Moreover, the clause (forming part of the text under discussion),'Who
+knows him (i.e. the being which constitutes the topic of the section)
+where he is?' clearly shows that we have to recognise here the Self of
+which it had previously been said that it is hard to know unless it
+assists us with its grace.
+
+To this conclusion a new objection presents itself.--Further on in the
+same Upanishad (I, 3, 1) we meet with the following text: 'There are two,
+drinking their reward in the world of their own works, entered into the
+cave, dwelling on the highest summit; those who know Brahman call them
+shade and light, likewise those householders who perform the Trinakiketa-
+sacrifice.' Now this text clearly refers to the individual soul which
+enjoys the reward of its works, together with an associate coupled to it.
+And this associate is either the vital breath, or the organ of knowledge
+(buddhi). For the drinking of 'rita' is the enjoyment of the fruit of
+works, and such enjoyment does not suit the highest Self. The buddhi, or
+the vital breath, on the other hand, which are instruments of the
+enjoying embodied soul, may somehow be brought into connexion with the
+enjoyment of the fruit of works. As the text is thus seen to refer to
+the embodied soul coupled with some associate, we infer, on the ground
+of the two texts belonging to one section, that also the 'eater'
+described in the former text is none other than the individual soul.--To
+this objection the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+11. The 'two entered into the cave' are the two Selfs; on account of
+this being seen.
+
+The two, entered into the cave and drinking their reward, are neither
+the embodied soul together with the vital breath, nor the embodied soul
+together with the buddhi; it is rather the embodied Self and the highest
+Self which are designated by those terms. For this is seen, i.e. it is
+seen that in that section the individual Self and the highest Self only
+are spoken of as entered into the cave. To the highest Self there refers
+I, 2, 12, 'The wise who by meditation on his Self recognises the Ancient
+who is difficult to see, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in
+the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and
+sorrow far behind.' And to the individual soul there refers I, 4, 7,
+'Who is together with the vital breath, who is Aditi, who is made of the
+deities, who entering into the cave abides therein, who was born
+variously through the elements.' Aditi here means the individual soul
+which enjoys (atti) the fruits of its works; which is associated with
+the vital breath; which is made of the deities, i.e. whose enjoyment is
+dependent on the different sense-organs; which abides in the hollow of
+the heart; and which, being connected with the elementary substances,
+earth, and so on, is born in various forms--human, divine, &c.--That the
+text speaks of the two Selfs as drinking their reward (while actually
+the individual soul only does so) is to be understood in the same way as
+the phrase 'there go the umbrella-bearers' (one of whom only carries the
+umbrella). Or else we may account for this on the ground that both are
+agents with regard to the drinking, in so far as the 'drinking'
+individual soul is caused to drink by the highest Self.
+
+
+
+
+12. And on account of distinctive qualities.
+
+Everywhere in that section we meet with statements of distinctive
+attributes of the two Selfs, the highest Self being represented as the
+object of meditation and attainment, and the individual Self as the
+meditating and attaining subject. The passage 'When he has known and
+understood that which is born from Brahman, the intelligent, to be
+divine and venerable, then he obtains everlasting peace' (I, 1, 17)
+refers to the meditating individual soul which recognises itself as
+being of the nature of Brahman. On the other hand, I, 3, 2, 'That which
+is a bridge for sacrificers, the highest imperishable Brahman for those
+who wish to cross over to the fearless shore, the Nākiketa, may we be
+able to know that,' refers to the highest Self as the object of
+meditation; 'Nākiketa' here meaning that which is to be reached through
+the Nākiketa-rite. Again, the passage 'Know the Self to be sitting in
+the chariot and the body to be the chariot' (I, 3, 3) refers to the
+meditating individual soul; and the verse, I, 3, 9, 'But he who has
+understanding for his charioteer, and holds the reins of the mind, he
+reaches the end of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vishnu.'
+refers to the embodied and the highest Selfs as that which attains and
+that which is to be attained. And in the text under discussion also (I,
+3, 1), the two Selfs are distinctly designated as light and shade, the
+one being all-knowing, the other devoid of knowledge.
+
+But, a new objection is raised, the initial passage, I, 1, 20, 'That
+doubt which there is when a man is dead--some saying, he is; others, he
+is not,' clearly asks a question as to the true nature of the individual
+soul, and we hence conclude that that soul forms the topic of the whole
+chapter.--Not so, we reply. That question does not spring from any doubt
+as to the existence or non-existence of the soul apart from the body;
+for if this were so the two first boons chosen by Nākiketas would be
+unsuitable. For the story runs as follows: When the sacrifice offered by
+the father of Nākiketas--at which all the possessions of the sacrificer
+were to be given to the priests--is drawing towards its close, the boy,
+feeling afraid that some deficiency on the part of the gifts might
+render the sacrifice unavailing, and dutifully wishing to render his
+father's sacrifice complete by giving his own person also, repeatedly
+asks his father, 'And to whom will you give me'? The father, irritated
+by the boy's persistent questioning, gives an angry reply, and in
+consequence of this the boy goes to the palace of Yama, and Yama being
+absent, stays there for three days without eating. Yama on his return is
+alarmed at this neglect of hospitality, and wishing to make up for it
+allows him to choose three boons. Nākiketas, thereupon, full of faith
+and piety, chooses as his first boon that his father should forgive him.
+Now it is clear that conduct of this kind would not be possible in the
+case of one not convinced of the soul having an existence independent of
+the body. For his second boon, again, he chooses the knowledge of a
+sacrificial fire, which has a result to be experienced only by a soul
+that has departed from the body; and this choice also can clearly be
+made only by one who knows that the soul is something different from the
+body. When, therefore, he chooses for his third boon the clearing up of
+his doubt as to the existence of the soul after death (as stated in v.
+20), it is evident that his question is prompted by the desire to
+acquire knowledge of the true nature of the highest Self--which
+knowledge has the form of meditation on the highest Self--, and by means
+thereof, knowledge of the true nature of final Release which consists in
+obtaining the highest Brahman. The passage, therefore, is not concerned
+merely with the problem as to the separation of the soul from the body,
+but rather with the problem of the Self freeing itself from all bondage
+whatever--the same problem, in fact, with which another scriptural
+passage also is concerned, viz. 'When he has departed there is no more
+knowledge' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 12). The full purport of Nākiketas' question,
+therefore, is as follows: When a man qualified for Release has died and
+thus freed himself from all bondage, there arises a doubt as to his
+existence or non-existence--a doubt due to the disagreement of
+philosophers as to the true nature of Release; in order to clear up this
+doubt I wish to learn from thee the true nature of the state of Release.--
+Philosophers, indeed, hold many widely differing opinions as to what
+constitutes Release. Some hold that the Self is constituted by
+consciousness only, and that Release consists in the total destruction
+of this essential nature of the Self. Others, while holding the same
+opinion as to the nature of the Self, define Release as the passing away
+of Nescience (avidyā). Others hold that the Self is in itself non-
+sentient, like a stone, but possesses, in the state of bondage, certain
+distinctive qualities, such as knowledge, and so on. Release then
+consists in the total removal of all these qualities, the Self remaining
+in a state of pure isolation (kaivalya). Others, again, who acknowledge
+a highest Self free from all imperfection, maintain that through
+connexion with limiting adjuncts that Self enters on the condition of an
+individual soul; Release then means the pure existence of the highest
+Self, consequent on the passing away of the limiting adjuncts. Those,
+however, who understand the Vedānta, teach as follows: There is a
+highest Brahman which is the sole cause of the entire universe, which is
+antagonistic to all evil, whose essential nature is infinite knowledge
+and blessedness, which comprises within itself numberless auspicious
+qualities of supreme excellence, which is different in nature from all
+other beings, and which constitutes the inner Self of all. Of this
+Brahman, the individual souls--whose true nature is unlimited knowledge,
+and whose only essential attribute is the intuition of the supreme Self--
+are modes, in so far, namely, as they constitute its body. The true
+nature of these souls is, however, obscured by Nescience, i.e. the
+influence of the beginningless chain of works; and by _Release_ then we
+have to understand that intuition of the highest Self, which is the
+natural state of the individual souls, and which follows on the
+destruction of Nescience.--When Nākiketas desires Yama graciously to
+teach him the true nature of Release and the means to attain it, Yama at
+first tests him by dwelling on the difficulty of comprehending Release,
+and by tempting him with various worldly enjoyments. But having in this
+way recognised the boy's thorough fitness, he in the end instructs him
+as to the kind of meditation on the highest Self which constitutes
+knowledge of the highest Reality, as to the nature of Release--which
+consists in reaching the abode of the highest Self--, and as to all the
+required details. This instruction begins, I, 2, 12, 'The Ancient one
+who is difficult to see,' &c., and extends up to I, 3, 9. 'and that is
+the highest place of Vishnu.'--It thus is an established conclusion that
+the 'eater' is no other than the highest Self.--Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'the eater.'
+
+
+
+
+13. (The Person) within the eye (is the highest Self) on account of
+suitability.
+
+The Chandogas have the following text: 'The Person that is seen within
+the eye, that is the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is
+Brahman' (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1). The doubt here arises whether the person
+that is here spoken of as abiding within the eye is the reflected Self,
+or some divine being presiding over the sense of sight, or the embodied
+Self, or the highest Self.--It is the reflected Self, the Pūrvapakshin
+maintains; for the text refers to the person seen as something well
+known, and the expression, 'is seen,' clearly refers to something
+directly perceived. Or it may be the individual soul, for that also may
+be referred to as something well known, as it is in special connexion
+with the eye: people, by looking into the open eye of a person,
+determine whether the living soul remains in him or is departing. Or
+else we may assume that the Person seen within the eye is some
+particular divine being, on the strength of the scriptural text, Bri. Up.
+V, 5, 2, 'He (the person seen within the sun) rests with his rays in him
+(the person within the eye).' Any of these beings may quite suitably be
+referred to as something well known.--Of these alternatives the Sūtra
+disposes by declaring that the Person within the eye is the highest Self.
+For the text goes on to say about the Person seen within the eye, 'They
+call him Samyadvāma, for all blessings go towards him. He is also Vāmanī,
+for he leads all blessings. He is also Bhāmanī, for he shines in all
+worlds.' And all these attributes can be reconciled with the highest
+Self only.
+
+
+
+
+14. And on account of the statement as to abode, and so on.
+
+Abiding within the eye, ruling the eye, and so on are predicated by
+scripture of the highest Self only, viz. in Bri. Up. III, 7, 18, 'He who
+dwells within the eye, who rules the eye within.' We therefore recognise
+that highest Self in the text, 'That Person which is seen within the eye.'
+The argument founded on reference to 'something well known' thus suits
+the highest Self very well; and also the clause which denotes immediate
+perception ('is seen') appears quite suitable, since the highest Self is
+directly intuited by persons practising mystic concentration of mind
+(Yoga).
+
+
+
+
+15. And on account of the text referring only to what is characterised
+by pleasure.
+
+The Person abiding within the eye is the highest Person, for the
+following reason also. The topic of the whole section is Brahman
+characterised by delight, as indicated in the passage 'Ka (pleasure) is
+Brahman, Kha (ether) is Brahman' (Ch. Up. IV,10, 5). To that same Brahman
+the passage under discussion ('The Person that is seen in the eye')
+refers for the purpose of enjoining first a place with which Brahman is
+to be connected in meditation, and secondly some special qualities--such
+as comprising and leading all blessings--to be attributed to Brahman in
+meditation.--The word 'only' in the Sūtra indicates the independence of
+the argument set forth.
+
+But--an objection is raised--between the Brahman introduced in the
+passage 'Ka is Brahman,'&c., and the text under discussion there
+intervenes the vidyā of the Fires (Ch. Up. IV, 11-13), and hence Brahman
+does not readily connect itself with our passage. For the text says that
+after the Fires had taught Upakosala the knowledge of Brahman ('Breath
+is Brahman, Ka is Brahman,' &c.), they taught him a meditation on
+themselves ('After that the Gārhapatya fire taught him,' &c., Ch. Up.
+IV, 11, 1). And this knowledge of the Fires cannot be considered a mere
+subordinate part of the knowledge of Brahman, for the text declares that
+it has special fruits of its own--viz. the attainment of a ripe old age
+and prosperous descendants, &c.--which are not comprised in the results
+of the knowledge of Brahman, but rather opposed to them in nature.--To
+this we make the following reply. As both passages (viz. IV, 10, 5,
+'Breath is Brahman,' &c.; and IV, 15, 1, 'this is Brahman') contain the
+word Brahman, and as from the words of the Fires, 'the teacher will tell
+you the way,' it follows that the knowledge of Brahman is not complete
+before that way has been taught, we determine that the knowledge of the
+Fires which stands between the two sections of the knowledge of Brahman
+is a mere subordinate member of the latter. This also appears from the
+fact that the Gārhapatya fire begins to instruct Upakosala only after he
+has been introduced into the knowledge of Brahman. Upakosala moreover
+complains that he is full of sorrows (I, 10, 3), and thus shows himself
+to be conscious of all the sufferings incidental to human life-birth,
+old age, death, &c.--which result from man being troubled by manifold
+desires for objects other than the attainment of Brahman; when therefore
+the Fires conclude their instruction by combining in saying, 'This, O
+friend, is the knowledge of us and the knowledge of the Self which we
+impart to thee,' it is evident that the vidyā of the Fires has to be
+taken as a subordinate member of the knowledge of the Self whose only
+fruit is Release. And from this it follows that the statement of the
+results of the Agnividyā has to be taken (not as an injunction of
+results-phalavidhi--but) merely as an arthavāda (cp. Pū. Mī. Sū. IV, 3,
+1). It, moreover, is by no means true that the text mentions such fruits
+of the Agnividyā as would be opposed to final Release; all the fruits
+mentioned suit very well the case of a person qualified for Release. 'He
+destroys sin' (Ch. Up. IV, 11, 2; 12, 2; 13, 2), i.e. he destroys all
+evil works standing in the way of the attainment of Brahman. 'He obtains
+the world,' i. e. all impeding evil works having been destroyed he
+obtains the world of Brahman. 'He reaches his full age,' i.e. he fully
+reaches that age which is required for the completion of meditation on
+Brahman. 'He lives long,' i.e. he lives unassailed by afflictions until
+he reaches Brahman. 'His descendants do not perish,' i.e. his pupils,
+and their pupils, as well as his sons, grandsons, &c., do not perish; i.
+e. they are all knowers of Brahman, in agreement with what another text
+declares to be the reward of knowledge of Brahman--'In his family no one
+is born ignorant of Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). 'We guard him in this
+world and the other,' i.e. we Fires guard him from all troubles until he
+reaches Brahman.--The Agnividyā thus being a member of the Brahmavidyā,
+there is no reason why the Brahman introduced in the earlier part of the
+Brahmavidyā should not be connected with the latter part--the function
+of this latter part being to enjoin a place of meditation (Brahman being
+meditated on as the Person within the eye), and some special qualities
+of Brahman to be included in the meditation.--But (an objection is
+raised) as the Fires tell Upakosala 'the teacher will tell you the way,'
+we conclude that the teacher has to give information as to the way to
+Brahman only; how then can his teaching refer to the place of meditation
+and the special qualities of Brahman?--We have to consider, we reply, in
+what connexion the Fires address those words to Upakosala. His teacher
+having gone on a journey without having imparted to him the knowledge of
+Brahman, and Upakosala being dejected on that account, the sacred fires
+of his teacher, well pleased with the way in which Upakosala had tended
+them, and wishing to cheer him up, impart to him the general knowledge
+of the nature of Brahman and the subsidiary knowledge of the Fires. But
+remembering that, as scripture says, 'the knowledge acquired from a
+teacher is best,' and hence considering it advisable that the teacher
+himself should instruct Upakosala as to the attributes of the highest
+Brahman, the place with which it is to be connected in meditation and
+the way leading to it, they tell him 'the teacher will tell you the way,'
+the 'way' connoting everything that remains to be taught by the
+teacher. In agreement herewith the teacher--having first said, 'I will
+tell you this; and as water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil
+clings to one who knows it'--instructs him about Brahman as possessing
+certain auspicious attributes, and to be meditated upon as abiding
+within the eye, and about the way leading to Brahman.--It is thus a
+settled conclusion that the text under discussion refers to that Brahman
+which was introduced in the passage 'Ka is Brahman,' and that hence the
+Person abiding within the eye is the highest Self.
+
+But--an objection is raised--how do you know that the passage 'Ka
+(pleasure) is Brahman, Kha (ether) is Brahman' really refers to the
+highest Brahman, so as to be able to interpret on that basis the text
+about the Person within the eye? It is a more obvious interpretation to
+take the passage about Ka and Kha as enjoining a meditation on Brahman
+viewed under the form of elemental ether and of ordinary worldly
+pleasure. This interpretation would, moreover, be in agreement with
+other similarly worded texts (which are generally understood to enjoin
+meditation on Brahman in a definite form), such as 'Name is Brahman',
+'Mind is Brahman.'
+
+
+
+
+16. For that very reason that (ether) is Brahman.
+
+Because the clause 'What is Ka the same is Kha' speaks of ether as
+characterised by pleasure, the ether which is denoted by 'Kha' is no
+other than the highest Brahman. To explain. On the Fires declaring
+'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' Upakosala says, 'I
+understand that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand Ka and Kha.'
+The meaning of this is as follows. The Fires cannot speak of meditation
+on Brahman under the form of breath and so on, because they are engaged
+in giving instruction to me, who am afraid of birth, old age, death, &c.,
+and desirous of final Release. What they declare to me therefore is
+meditation on Brahman itself. Now here Brahman is exhibited in co-
+ordination with certain well-known things, breath and so on. That
+Brahman should be qualified by co-ordination with breath is suitable,
+either from the point of view of Brahman having the attribute of
+supporting the world, or on account of Brahman being the ruler of breath,
+which stands to it in the relation of a body. Hence Upakosala says, 'I
+understand that breath is Brahman.' With regard to pleasure and ether,
+on the other hand, there arises the question whether they are exhibited
+in the relation of qualifying attributes of Brahman on the ground of
+their forming the body of Brahman, and hence being ruled by it, or
+whether the two terms are meant to determine each other, and thus to
+convey a notion of the true nature of Brahman being constituted by
+supreme delight. On the former alternative the declaration of the Fires
+would only state that Brahman is the ruler of the elemental ether and of
+all delight depending on the sense-organs, and this would give no notion
+of Brahman's true nature; on the latter alternative the Fires would
+declare that unlimited delight constitutes Brahman's true nature. In
+order to ascertain which of the two meanings has to be taken, Upakosala
+therefore says, 'I do not understand Ka and Kha.' The Fires,
+comprehending what is in his mind, thereupon reply, 'What is Ka the same
+is Kha, what is Kha the same is Ka,' which means that the bliss which
+constitutes Brahman's nature is unlimited. The same Brahman therefore
+which has breath for its attribute because breath constitutes its body,
+is of the nature of unlimited bliss; the text therefore adds, 'They
+taught him that (viz. Brahman) as breath and as ether.' What the text,
+'Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' teaches thus is Brahman as consisting
+of unlimited bliss, and this Brahman is resumed in the subsequent text
+about the Person seen within the eye. That Person therefore is the
+highest Self.
+
+
+
+
+17. And on account of the statement of the way of him who has heard the
+Upanishads.
+
+Other scriptural texts give an account of the way--the first station of
+which is light--that leads up to the highest Person, without any
+subsequent return, the soul of him who has read the Upanishads, and has
+thus acquired a knowledge of the true nature of the highest Self. Now
+this same way is described by the teacher to Upakosala in connexion with
+the instruction as to the Person in the eye, 'They go to light, from
+light to day,' &c. This also proves that the Person within the eye is
+the highest Self.
+
+
+
+
+18. Not any other, on account of non-permanency of abode, and of
+impossibility.
+
+As the reflected Self and the other Selfs mentioned by the Pūrvapakshin
+do not necessarily abide within the eye, and as conditionless
+immortality and the other qualities (ascribed in the text to the Person
+within the eye) cannot possibly belong to them, the Person within the
+eye cannot be any Self other than the highest Self. Of the reflected
+Self it cannot be said that it permanently abides within the eye, for
+its presence there depends on the nearness to the eye of another person.
+The embodied Self again has its seat within the heart, which is the root
+of all sense-organs, so as to assist thereby the activities of the
+different senses; it cannot therefore abide within the eye. And with
+regard to the divinity the text says that 'he rests with his rays in him,
+i.e. the eye': this implies that the divine being may preside over the
+organ of sight although itself abiding in another place; it does not
+therefore abide in the eye. Moreover, non-conditioned immortality and
+similar qualities cannot belong to any of these three Selfs. The Person
+seen within the eye therefore is the highest Self.
+
+We have, under Sū. I, 2, 14, assumed as proved that the abiding within
+the eye and ruling the eye, which is referred to in Bri. Up. III, 7, 18
+('He who dwells in the eye,' &c.), can belong to the highest Self only,
+and have on that basis proved that the Self within the eye is the
+highest Self.--Here terminates the adhikarana of that 'within.'--The
+next Sūtra now proceeds to prove that assumption.
+
+
+
+
+19. The internal Ruler (referred to) in the clauses with respect to the
+gods, with respect to the worlds, &c. (is the highest Self), because the
+attributes of that are designated.
+
+The Vājasaneyins, of the Kānwa as well as the Mādhyandina branch, have
+the following text: 'He who dwelling in the earth is within the earth,
+whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the
+earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the Immortal.' The text
+thereupon extends this teaching as to a being that dwells in things, is
+within them, is not known by them, has them for its body and rules them;
+in the first place to all divine beings, viz. water, fire, sky, air, sun,
+the regions, moon, stars, ether, darkness, light; and next to all
+material beings, viz. breath, speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, knowledge,
+seed--closing each section with the words, 'He is thy Self, the ruler
+within, the Immortal.' The Mādhyandinas, however, have three additional
+sections, viz. 'He who dwells in all worlds,' &c.; 'he who dwells in all
+Vedas,' &c.; 'He who dwells in all sacrifices'; and, moreover, in place
+of 'He who dwells in knowledge' (vijńąna) they read 'He who dwells in
+the Self.'--A doubt here arises whether the inward Ruler of these texts
+be the individual Self or the highest Self.
+
+The individual Self, the Pūrvapakshin maintains. For in the
+supplementary passage (which follows upon the text considered so far)
+the internal Ruler is called the 'seer' and 'hearer,' i.e. his knowledge
+is said to depend on the sense-organs, and this implies the view that
+the 'seer' only (i.e. the individual soul only) is the inward Ruler; and
+further the clause 'There is no other seer but he' negatives any other
+seer.
+
+This view is set aside by the Sūtra. The Ruler within, who is spoken of
+in the clauses marked in the text by the terms 'with respect of the gods,'
+'with respect of the worlds,' &c., is the highest Self free from all
+evil, Nārāyana. The Sūtra purposely joins the two terms 'with respect to
+the gods' and 'with respect to the worlds' in order to intimate that, in
+addition to the clauses referring to the gods and beings (bhūta)
+exhibited by the Kānva-text, the Mādhyandina-text contains additional
+clauses referring to the worlds, Vedas, &c. The inward Ruler spoken of
+in both these sets of passages is the highest Self; for attributes of
+that Self are declared in the text. For it is a clear attribute of the
+highest Self that being one only it rules all worlds, all Vedas, all
+divine beings, and so on. Uddālaka asks, 'Dost thou know that Ruler
+within who within rules this world and the other world and all beings?
+&c.--tell now that Ruler within'; and Yājńavalkya replies with the long
+passus, 'He who dwells in the earth,' &c., describing the Ruler within
+as him who, abiding within all worlds, all beings, all divinities, all
+Vedas, and all sacrifices, rules them from within and constitutes their
+Self, they in turn constituting his body. Now this is a position which
+can belong to none else but the highest Person, who is all-knowing, and
+all whose purposes immediately realise themselves. That it is the
+highest Self only which rules over all and is the Self of all, other
+Upanishad-texts also declare; cp. e.g. 'Entered within, the ruler of
+creatures, the Self of all'; 'Having sent forth this he entered into it.
+Having entered it he became sat and tyat,' &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 6).
+Similarly the text from the Subāla-Up., which begins, 'there was not
+anything here in the beginning,' and extends up to 'the one God,
+Nārāyana,' shows that it is the highest Brahman only which rules all, is
+the Self of all, and has all beings for its body. Moreover, essential
+immortality (which the text ascribes to the Ruler within) is an
+attribute of the highest Self only.--Nor must it be thought that the
+power of seeing and so on that belongs to the highest Self is dependent
+on sense-organs; it rather results immediately from its essential
+nature, since its omniscience and power to realise its purposes are due
+to its own being only. In agreement herewith scripture says, 'He sees
+without eyes, he hears without ears, without hands and feet he grasps
+and hastes' (Svet. Up. III, 19). What terms such as 'seeing' and
+'hearing' really denote is not knowledge in so far as produced by the
+eye and ear, but the intuitive presentation of colour and sound. In the
+case of the individual soul, whose essentially intelligising nature is
+obscured by karman, such intuitive knowledge arises only through the
+mediation of the sense-organs; in the case of the highest Self, on the
+other hand, it springs from its own nature.--Again, the clause 'there is
+no other seer but he' means that there is no seer other than the seer
+and ruler described in the preceding clauses. To explain. The clauses
+'whom the earth does not know,' &c., up to 'whom the Self does not know'
+mean to say that the Ruler within rules without being perceived by the
+earth, Self, and the other beings which he rules. This is confirmed by
+the subsequent clauses, 'unseen but a seer', 'unheard but a hearer,' &c.
+And the next clauses, 'there is no other seer but he,' &c., then mean to
+negative that there is any other being which could be viewed as the
+ruler of that Ruler. Moreover, the clauses 'that is the Self of thee,'
+'He is the Self of thee' exhibit the individual Self in the genitive
+form ('of thee'), and thus distinguish it from the Ruler within, who is
+declared to be their Self.
+
+
+
+
+20. And not that which Smriti assumes, on account of the declaration of
+qualities not belonging to that; nor the embodied one.
+
+'That which Smriti assumes' is the Pradhāna; the 'embodied one' is the
+individual soul. Neither of these can be the Ruler within, since the
+text states attributes which cannot possibly belong to either. For there
+is not even the shadow of a possibility that essential capability of
+seeing and ruling all things, and being the Self of all, and immortality
+should belong either to the non-sentient Pradhāna or to the individual
+soul.--The last two Sūtras have declared that the mentioned qualities
+belong to the highest Self, while they do not belong to the individual
+soul. The next Sūtra supplies a new, independent argument.
+
+
+
+
+21. For both also speak of it as something different.
+
+Both, i.e. the Mādhyandinas as well as the Kānvas, distinguish in their
+texts the embodied soul, together with speech and other non-intelligent
+things, from the Ruler within, representing it as an object of his rule.
+The Mādhyandinas read, 'He who dwells in the Self, whom the Self does
+not know,' &c.; the Kānvas, 'He who dwells within understanding', &c.
+The declaration of the individual Self being ruled by the Ruler within
+implies of course the declaration of the former being different from the
+latter.
+
+The conclusion from all this is that the Ruler within is a being
+different from the individual soul, viz. the highest Self free from all
+evil, Nārāyana.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the internal Ruler'.
+
+
+
+
+22. That which possesses the qualities of invisibility, &c., on account
+of the declaration of attributes.
+
+The Ātharvanikas read in their text, 'The higher knowledge is that by
+which that Indestructible is apprehended. That which is invisible,
+unseizable, without origin and qualities, &c., that it is which the wise
+regard as the source of all beings'; and further on, 'That which is
+higher than the high Imperishable' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5, 6; II, 1, 2). The
+doubt here arises whether the Indestructible, possessing the qualities
+of imperceptibility, &c., and that which is higher than the
+Indestructible, should be taken to denote the Pradhāna and the soul of
+the Sānkhyas, or whether both denote the highest Self.--The Pūrvapakshin
+maintains the former alternative. For, he says, while in the text last
+discussed there is mentioned a special attribute of an intelligent being,
+viz. in the clause 'unseen but a seer', no similar attribute is stated
+in the former of the two texts under discussion, and the latter text
+clearly describes the collective individual soul, which is higher than
+the imperishable Pradhāna, which itself is higher than all its effects.
+The reasons for this decision are as follows:--Colour and so on reside
+in the gross forms of non-intelligent matter, viz. the elements, earth,
+and so on. When, therefore, visibility and so on are expressly negatived,
+such negation suggests a non-sentient thing cognate to earth, &c., but
+of a subtle kind, and such a thing is no other than the Pradhāna. And as
+something higher than this Pradhāna there are known the collective souls
+only, under whose guidance the Pradhāna gives birth to all its effects,
+from the so-called Mahat downwards to individual things. This
+interpretation is confirmed by the comparisons set forth in the next
+sloka, 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its threads, as plants
+spring from the earth, as hair grows on the head and body of the living
+man, thus does everything arise here from the Indestructible.' The
+section therefore is concerned only with the Pradhāna and the individual
+soul.
+
+This primā facie view is set aside by the Sūtra. That which possesses
+invisibility and the other qualities stated in the text, and that which
+is higher than the high Indestructible, is no other than the highest
+Self. For the text declares attributes which belong to the highest Self
+only, viz. in I, 1, 9, 'He who knows all, cognises all,' &c. Let us
+shortly consider the connexion of the text. The passage beginning 'the
+higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended'
+declares an indestructible being possessing the attributes of
+invisibility and so on. The clause 'everything arises here from the
+Indestructible' next declares that from that being all things originate.
+Next the sloka, 'He who knows all and cognises all,' predicates of that
+Indestructible which is the source of all beings, omniscience, and
+similar qualities. And finally the text, 'That which is higher than the
+high Indestructible,' characterises that same being--which previously
+had been called invisible, the source of beings, indestructible, all-
+knowing, &c.--as the highest of all. Hence it is evident that in the
+text 'higher than the high Indestructible' the term 'Indestructible'
+does not denote the invisible, &c. Indestructible, which is the chief
+topic of the entire section; for there can of course be nothing higher
+than that which, as being all-knowing, the source of all, &c., is itself
+higher than anything else. The 'Indestructible' in that text therefore
+denotes the elements in their subtle condition.
+
+
+
+
+23. Not the two others, on account of distinction and statement of
+difference.
+
+The section distinguishes the indestructible being, which is the source
+of all, &c., from the Pradhāna as well as the individual soul, in so far,
+namely, as it undertakes to prove that by the cognition of one thing
+everything is known; and it moreover, in passages such as 'higher than
+the high Indestructible,' explicitly states the difference of the
+indestructible being from those other two.--The text first relates that
+Brahmā told the knowledge of Brahman, which is the foundation of the
+knowledge of all, to his eldest son Atharvan: this introduces the
+knowledge of Brahman as the topic of the section. Then, the text
+proceeds, in order to obtain this knowledge of Brahman, which had been
+handed down through a succession of teachers to Angiras, Saunaka
+approached Angiras respectfully and asked him: 'What is that through
+which, if known, all this is known?' i.e. since all knowledge is founded
+on the knowledge of Brahman, he enquires after the nature of Brahman.
+Angiras replies that he who wishes to attain Brahman must acquire two
+kinds of knowledge, both of them having Brahman for their object: an
+indirect one which springs from the study of the sāstras, viz. the Veda,
+Sikshā, Kalpa, and so on, and a direct one which springs from
+concentrated meditation (yoga). The latter kind of knowledge is the
+means of obtaining Brahman, and it is of the nature of devout meditation
+(bhakti), as characterised in the text 'He whom the Self chooses, by him
+the Self can be gained' (III, 2, 3). The means again towards this kind
+of knowledge is such knowledge as is gained from sacred tradition,
+assisted by abstention and the other six auxiliary means (sec above, p.
+17); in agreement with the text, 'Him the Brahmattas seek to know by the
+study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting' (Bri.
+Up. IV, 4, 22).--Thus the Reverend Parāsara also says, 'The cause of
+attaining him is knowledge and work, and knowledge is twofold, according
+as it is based on sacred tradition or springs from discrimination.' The
+Mundaka-text refers to the inferior kind of knowledge in the passage
+'the lower knowledge is the Rig-veda,' &c., up to 'and the dharma-
+sāstras'; this knowledge is the means towards the intuition of Brahman;
+while the higher kind of knowledge, which is called 'upāsanā,' has the
+character of devout meditation (bhakti), and consists in direct
+intuition of Brahman, is referred to in the clause 'the higher knowledge
+is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended.' The text next
+following, 'That which is invisible, &c., then sets forth the nature of
+the highest Brahman, which is the object of the two kinds of knowledge
+previously described. After this the passage 'As the spider sends forth
+and draws in its thread' declares that from that indestructible highest
+Brahman, as characterised before, there originates the whole universe of
+things, sentient and non-sentient. The next soka (tapasā kīyate, &c.)
+states particulars about this origination of the universe from Brahman.
+'Brahman swells through brooding'; through brooding, i.e. thought--in
+agreement with a later text, 'brooding consists of thought'--Brahman
+swells, i.e. through thought in the form of an intention, viz. 'may I
+become many,' Brahman becomes ready for creation. From it there springs
+first 'anna,' i.e. that which is the object of fruition on the part of
+all enjoying agents, viz. the non-evolved subtle principles of all
+elements. From this 'anna' there spring successively breath, mind, and
+all other effected things up to work, which is the means of producing
+reward in the form of the heavenly world, and Release. The last sloka of
+the first chapter thereupon first states the qualities, such as
+omniscience and so on, which capacitate the highest Brahman for creation,
+and then declares that from the indestructible highest Brahman there
+springs the effected (kārya) Brahman, distinguished by name and form,
+and comprising all enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment.--The
+first sloka of the second chapter declares first that the highest
+Brahman is absolutely real ('That is true'), and then admonishes those
+who desire to reach the indestructible highest Self, which possesses all
+the blessed qualities stated before and exists through itself, to turn
+away from other rewards and to perform all those sacrificial works
+depending on the three sacred fires which were seen and revealed by
+poets in the four Vedas and are incumbent on men according to caste and
+āsrama. The section 'this is your path' (I, 2, 1) up to 'this is the
+holy Brahma-world gained by your good works' (I, 2, 6) next states the
+particular mode of performing those works, and declares that an omission
+of one of the successive works enjoined in Druti and Smriti involves
+fruitlessness of the works actually performed, and that something not
+performed in the proper way is as good as not performed at all. Stanzas
+7 and ff. ('But frail in truth are those boats') declare that those who
+perform this lower class of works have to return again and again into
+the Samsāra, because they aim at worldly results and are deficient in
+true knowledge. Stanza 8 ('but those who practise penance and faith')
+then proclaims that works performed by a man possessing true knowledge,
+and hence not aiming at worldly rewards, result in the attainment of
+Brahman; and stanzas 12 a, 13 ('having examined all these worlds')
+enjoin knowledge, strengthened by due works, on the part of a man who
+has turned away from _mere_ works, as the means of reaching Brahman; and
+due recourse to a teacher on the part of him who is desirous of such
+knowledge.--The first chapter of the second section of the Upanishad (II,
+1)then clearly teaches how the imperishable highest Brahman, i.e. the
+highest Self--as constituting the Self of all things and having all
+things for its body--has all things for its outward form and emits all
+things from itself. The remainder of the Upanishad ('Manifest, near,' &c.
+) teaches how this highest Brahman, which is imperishable and higher
+than the soul, which itself is higher than the Unevolved; which dwells
+in the highest Heaven; and which is of the nature of supreme bliss, is
+to be meditated upon as within the hollow of the heart; how this
+meditation has the character of devout faith (bhakti); and how the
+devotee, freeing himself from Nescience, obtains for his reward
+intuition of Brahman, which renders him like Brahman.
+
+It thus clearly appears that 'on account of distinction and statement of
+difference' the Upanishad does not treat of the Pradhāna and the soul.
+For that the highest Brahman is different from those two is declared in
+passages such as 'That heavenly Person is without body; he is both
+without and within, not produced, without breath and without mind, pure,
+higher than what is higher than the Imperishable' (II, 1, 2); for the
+last words mean 'that imperishable highest Self possessing invisibility
+and similar qualities, which is higher than the aggregate of individual
+souls, which itself is higher than the non-evolved subtle elements.' The
+term 'akshara' (imperishable) is to be etymologically explained either
+as that which pervades (asnute) or that which does not pass away (a-
+ksharati), and is on either of these explanations applicable to the
+highest Self, either because that Self pervades all its effects or
+because it is like the so-called Mahat (which is also called akshara),
+free from all passing away or decaying.--Here terminates the adhikarana
+of 'invisibility and so on.'
+
+
+
+
+24. And on account of the description of its form.
+
+'Fire is his head, his eyes the sun and the moon, the regions his ears,
+his speech the Vedas disclosed, the wind his breath, his heart the
+universe; from his feet came the earth; he is indeed the inner Self of
+all things' (II, 1, 4)--the outward form here described can belong to
+none but the highest Self; that is, the inner Self of all beings. The
+section therefore treats of the highest Self.
+
+
+
+
+25. Vaisvānara (is the highest Self), on account of the distinctions
+qualifying the common term.
+
+The Chandogas read in their text, 'You know at present that Vaisvānara
+Self, tell us that,' &c., and further on, 'But he who meditates on the
+Vaisvānara Self as a span long,' &c. (Ch. Up. V, 11, 6; 18, 1). The
+doubt here arises whether that Vaisvānara Self can be made out to be the
+highest Self or not. The Pūrvapakshin maintains the latter alternative.
+For, he says, the word Vaisvānara is used in the sacred texts in four
+different senses. It denotes in the first place the intestinal fire, so
+in Bri. Up, V, 9, 'That is the Vaisvānara fire by which the food that is
+eaten is cooked, i.e. digested. Its noise is that which one hears when
+one covers one's ears. When man is on the point of departing this life
+he does not hear that noise.'--It next denotes the third of the elements,
+so in Ri_. Samh. X, 88, 12, 'For the whole world the gods have made the
+Agni Vaisvānara a sign of the days.'--It also denotes a divinity, so Ri_.
+Samh. I, 98, 1, 'May we be in the favour of Vaisvānara, for he is the
+king of the kings,' &c. And finally it denotes the highest Self, as in
+the passage, 'He offered it in the Self, in the heart, in Agni
+Vaisvānara'; and in Pra. Up. I, 7, 'Thus he rises as Vaisvānara,
+assuming all forms, as breath of life, as fire.'--And the characteristic
+marks mentioned in the introductory clauses of the Chandogya-text under
+discussion admit of interpretations agreeing with every one of these
+meanings of the word Vaisvānara.
+
+Against this primā facie view the Sūtra declares itself. The term
+'Vaisvānara' in the Chāndogya-text denotes the highest Self, because the
+'common' term is there qualified by attributes specially belonging to
+the highest Self. For the passage tells us how Aupamanyava and four
+other great Rhshis, having met and discussed the question as to what was
+their Self and Brahman, come to the conclusion to go to Uddālaka because
+he is reputed to know the Vaisvānara Self. Uddālaka, recognising their
+anxiety to know the Vaisvānara Self, and deeming himself not to be fully
+informed on this point, refers them to Asvapati Kaikeya as thoroughly
+knowing the Vaisvānara Self; and they thereupon, together with Uddālaka,
+approach Asvapati. The king duly honours them with presents, and as they
+appear unwilling to receive them, explains that they may suitably do so,
+he himself being engaged in the performance of a religious vow; and at
+the same time instructs them that even men knowing Brahman must avoid
+what is forbidden and do what is prescribed. When thereupon he adds that
+he will give them as much wealth as to the priests engaged in his
+sacrifice, they, desirous of Release and of knowing the Vaisānara Self,
+request him to explain that Self to them. Now it clearly appears that as
+the Rishis are said to be desirous of knowing--that Brahman which is the
+Self of the individual souls ('what is our Self, what is Brahman'), and
+therefore search for some one to instruct them on that point, the
+Vaisvānara Self--to a person acquainted with which they address
+themselves--can be the highest Self only. In the earlier clauses the
+terms used are 'Self' and 'Brahman,' in the later 'Self' and 'Vaisvānara';
+from this it appears also that the term 'Vaisvānara,' which takes the
+place of 'Brahman,' denotes none other but the highest Self. The results,
+moreover, of the knowledge of the Vaisvānara Self, which are stated in
+subsequent passages, show that the Vaisvānara Self is the highest
+Brahman. 'He eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs'; 'as
+the fibres of the Ishīkā reed when thrown into the fire are burnt, thus
+all his sins are burned' (V, 18, I; 24, 3).
+
+The next Sūtra supplies a further reason for the same conclusion.
+
+
+
+
+26. That which the text refers to is an inferential mark--thus.
+
+The text describes the shape of Vaisvānara, of whom heaven, &c., down to
+earth constitute the several limbs; and it is known from Scripture and
+Smriti that such is the shape of the highest Self. When, therefore, we
+recognise that shape as referred to in the text, this supplies an
+inferential mark of Vaisvānara being the highest Self.--The 'thus' (iti)
+in the Sūtra denotes a certain mode, that is to say, 'a shape of such a
+kind being recognised in the text enables us to infer that Vaisvānara is
+the highest Self.' For in Scripture and Smriti alike the highest Person
+is declared to have such a shape. Cp. e.g. the text of the Įtharvanas.
+'Agni is his head, the sun and moon his eyes, the regions his cars, his
+speech the Vedas disclosed, the wind his breath, his heart the Universe;
+from his feet came the earth; he is indeed the inner Self of all things'
+(Mu. Up. II, I, 4). 'Agni' in this passage denotes the heavenly world,
+in agreement with the text 'that world indeed is Agni.' And the
+following Smrriti texts: 'He of whom the wise declare the heavenly world
+to be the head, the ether the navel, sun and moon the eyes, the regions
+the ears, the earth the feet; he whose Self is unfathomable is the
+leader of all beings'; and 'of whom Agni is the mouth, heaven the head,
+the ether the navel, the earth the feet, the sun the eye, the regions
+the ear; worship to him, the Self of the Universe!'--Now our text
+declares the heavenly world and so on to constitute the head and the
+other limbs of Vaisvānara. For Kaikeya on being asked by the Rishis to
+instruct them as to the Vasvānara Self recognises that they all know
+something about the Vaisvānara Self while something they do not know
+(for thus only we can explain his special questions), and then in order
+to ascertain what each knows and what not, questions them separately.
+When thereupon Aupamanyava replies that he meditates on heaven only as
+the Self, Kaikeya, in order to disabuse him from the notion that heaven
+is the whole Vaisvānara Self, teaches him that heaven is the head of
+Vaisvānara, and that of heaven which thus is a part only of Vaisvānara,
+Sutejas is the special name. Similarly he is thereupon told by the other
+Rishis that they meditate only on sun, air, ether, and earth, and
+informs them in return that the special names of these beings are 'the
+omniform,' 'he who moves in various ways,' 'the full one,''wealth and
+'firm rest,' and that these all are mere members of the Vaisvānara Self,
+viz. its eyes, breath, trunk, bladder, and feet. The shape thus
+described in detail can belong to the highest Self only, and hence
+Vaisvānara is none other but the highest Self.
+
+The next Sūtra meets a further doubt as to this decision not yet being
+well established.
+
+
+
+
+27. Should it be said that it is not so, on account of the word, &c.,
+and on account of the abiding within; we say, no; on account of
+meditation being taught thus, on account of impossibility; and because
+they read of him as person.
+
+An objection is raised. Vaisvānara cannot be ascertained to be the
+highest Self, because, on the account of the text and of the abiding
+within, we can understand by the Vaisvānara in our text the intestinal
+fire also. The text to which we refer occurs in the Vaisvānara-vidyā of
+the Vājasaneyins, 'This one is the Agni Vaisvānara,' where the two words
+'Agni' and 'Vaisvānara' are exhibited in co-ordination. And in the
+section under discussion the passage, 'the heart is the Gārhapatya fire,
+the mind the Anvāhārya-pakana fire, the mouth the Āhavanīya fire' (Ch.
+Up. V, 18, 2), represents the Vaisvānara in so far as abiding within the
+heart and so on as constituting the triad of sacred fires. Moreover the
+text, 'The first food which a man may take is in the place of Soma. And
+he who offers that first oblation should offer it to Prāna' (V, 19, 1),
+intimates that Vaisvānara is the abode of the offering to Prāna. In the
+same way the Vājasaneyins declare that Vaisvānara abides within man, viz.
+in the passage 'He who knows this Agni Vaisvānara shaped like a man
+abiding within man.' As thus Vaisvānara appears in co-ordination with
+the word 'Agni,' is represented as the triad of sacred fires, is said to
+be the abode of the oblation to Breath, and to abide within man, he must
+be viewed as the intestinal fire, and it is therefore not true that he
+can be identified with the highest Self only.
+
+This objection is set aside by the Sūtra. It is not so 'on account of
+meditation (on the highest Self) being taught thus,' i.e. as the text
+means to teach that the highest Brahman which, in the manner described
+before, has the three worlds for its body should be meditated upon as
+qualified by the intestinal fire which (like other beings) constitutes
+Brahman's body. For the word 'Agni' denotes not only the intestinal fire,
+but also the highest Self in so far as qualified by the intestinal fire.--
+But how is this to be known?--'On account of impossibility;' i.e.
+because it is impossible that the mere intestinal fire should have the
+three worlds for its body. The true state of the case therefore is that
+the word Agni, which is understood to denote the intestinal fire, when
+appearing in co-ordination with the term Vaisvānara represented as
+having the three worlds for his body, denotes (not the intestinal fire,
+but) the highest Self as qualified by that fire viewed as forming the
+body of the Self. Thus the Lord also says, 'As Vaisvānara fire I abide
+in the body of living creatures and, being assisted by breath inspired
+and expired, digest the fourfold food' (Bha Gī. XIV, 15). 'As Vaisvānara
+fire' here means 'embodied in the intestinal fire.'--The Chāndogya text
+under discussion enjoins meditation on the highest Self embodied in the
+Vaisvānara fire.--Moreover the Vājasaneyins read of him, viz. the
+Vaisvānara, as man or person, viz. in the passage 'That Agni Vaisvānara
+is the person' (Sa. Brā. X, 6, 1, 11). The intestinal fire by itself
+cannot be called a person; unconditioned personality belongs to the
+highest Self only. Compare 'the thousand-headed person' (Ri. Samh.), and
+'the Person is all this' (Sve. Up. III, 15).
+
+
+
+
+28. For the same reasons not the divinity and the element.
+
+For the reasons stated Vaisvānara can be neither the deity Fire, nor the
+elemental fire which holds the third place among the gross elements.
+
+
+
+
+29. Jaimini thinks that there is no objection to (the word 'Agni')
+directly (denoting the highest Self).
+
+So far it has been maintained that the word 'Agni,' which stands in co-
+ordination with the term 'Vaisvānara,' denotes the highest Self in so
+far as qualified by the intestinal fire constituting its body; and that
+hence the text under discussion enjoins meditation on the highest Self.
+Jaimini, on the other hand, is of opinion that there is no reasonable
+objection to the term 'Agni,' no less than the term: 'Vaisvānara,' being
+taken _directly_ to denote the highest Self. That is to say--in the same
+way as the term 'Vaisvānara,' although a common term, yet when qualified
+by attributes especially belonging to the highest Self is known to
+denote the latter only as possessing the quality of ruling all men; so
+the word 'Agni' also when appearing in connexion with special attributes
+belonging to the highest Self denotes that Self only. For any quality on
+the ground of which 'Agni' may be etymologically explained to denote
+ordinary fire--as when e.g. we explain 'agni' as he who 'agre nayati'--
+may also, in its highest non-conditioned degree, be ascribed to the
+supreme Self. Another difficulty remains. The passage (V, 18, 1) 'yas tv
+etam evam prādesamātram abhivimānam,' &c. declares that the non-limited
+highest Brahman is limited by the measure of the pradesas, i.e. of the
+different spaces-heaven, ether, earth, &c.--which had previously been
+said to constitute the limbs of Vaisvānara. How is this possible?
+
+
+
+
+30. On account of definiteness; thus Āsmarathya opines.
+
+The teacher Āsmarathya is of opinion that the text represents the
+highest Self as possessing a definite extent, to the end of rendering
+the thought of the meditating devotee more definite. That is to say--the
+limitation due to the limited extent of heaven, sun, &c. has the purpose
+of rendering definite to thought him who pervades (abhi) all this
+Universe and in reality transcends all measure (vimāna).--A further
+difficulty remains. For what purpose is the highest Brahman here
+represented like a man, having a head and limbs?--This point the next
+Sūtra elucidates.
+
+
+
+
+31. On account of meditation, Bādari thinks.
+
+The teacher Bādari thinks that the representation in the text of the
+supreme Self in the form of a man is for the purpose of devout
+meditation. 'He who in this way meditates on that Vaisvānara Self as
+"prādesamātra" and "abhivimāna," he eats food in all worlds, in all
+beings, in all Selfs.' What this text enjoins is devout meditation for
+the purpose of reaching Brahman. 'In this way' means 'as having a human
+form.' And 'the eating' of food in all worlds, &c. means the gaining of
+intuitional knowledge of Brahman which abides everywhere and is in
+itself of the nature of supreme bliss. The special kind of food, i.e.
+the special objects of enjoyment which belong to the different Selfs
+standing under the influence of karman cannot be meant here; for those
+limited objects have to be shunned by those who desire final release. A
+further question arises. If Vaisvānara is the highest Self, how can the
+text say that the altar is its chest, the grass on the altar its hairs,
+and so on? (V, 18, 2.) Such a statement has a sense only if we
+understand by Vaisvānara the intestinal fire.--This difficulty the next
+Sūtra elucidates.
+
+
+
+
+32. On account of imaginative identification, thus Jaimini thinks; for
+thus the text declares.
+
+The teacher Jaimini is of opinion that the altar is stated to be the
+chest of Vaisvānara, and so on, in order to effect an imaginative
+identification of the offering to Prāna which is daily performed by the
+meditating devotees and is the means of pleasing Vaisvānara, having the
+heaven and so on for his body, i.e. the highest Self, with the Agnihotra-
+offering. For the fruit due to meditation on the highest Self, as well
+as the identity of the offering to breath with the Agnihotra, is
+declared in the following text, 'He who without knowing this offers the
+Agnihotra--that would be as if removing the live coals he were to pour
+his libation on dead ashes. But he who offers this Agnihotra with a full
+knowledge of its purport, he offers it in all worlds, in all beings, in
+all Selfs. As the fibres of the Ishīkā reed when thrown into the fire
+are burnt, thus all his sins are burnt.' (V, 24, 1-3.)
+
+
+
+
+33. Moreover, they record him in that.
+
+They (i.e. the Vājasaneyins) speak of him, viz. Vaisvānara who has
+heaven for his head, &c.--i.e. the highest Self--as within that, i.e.
+the body of the devotee, so as to form the abode of the oblation to
+Prāna; viz. in the text,'Of that Vaisvānara Self the head is Sutejas,'
+and so on. The context is as follows. The clause 'He who meditates on
+the Vaisvānara Self as prādesamātra,' &c. enjoins meditation on the
+highest Self having the three worlds for its body, i.e. on Vaisvānara.
+The following clause 'he eats food in all worlds' teaches that the
+attaining of Brahman is the reward of such meditation. And then the text
+proceeds to teach the Agnihotra offered to Prāna, which is something
+subsidiary to the meditation taught. The text here establishes an
+identity between the members--fire, sun, &c.--of the Vaisvānara enjoined
+as object of meditation (which members are called Sutejas, Visvarūpa, &c.
+), and parts--viz. head, eye, breath, trunk, bladder, feet--of the
+worshipper's body. 'The head is Sutejas'--that means: the head of the
+devotee is (identical with) heaven, which is the head of the highest
+Self; and so on up to 'the feet,' i.e. the feet of the devotee are
+identical with the earth, which constitutes the feet of the highest Self,
+The devotee having thus reflected on the highest Self, which has the
+three worlds for its body, as present within his own body, thereupon is
+told to view his own chest, hair, heart, mind and mouth as identical
+with the altar, grass and the other things which are required for the
+Agnihotra; further to identify the oblation to Prāna with the Agnihotra,
+and by means of this Prāna-agnihotra to win the favour of Vaisvānara, i.
+e. the highest Self. The final--conclusion then remains that Vaisvānara
+is none other than the highest Self, the supreme Person.--Here
+terminates the adhikarana of 'Vaisvānara.'
+
+
+
+
+THIRD PĀDA.
+
+1. The abode of heaven, earth, &c. (is the highest Self), on account of
+terms which are its own.
+
+The followers of the Atharva-veda have the following text, 'He in whom
+the heaven, the earth and the sky are woven, the mind also, with all the
+vital airs, know him alone as the Self, and leave off other words; he is
+the bank (setu) of the Immortal' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5). The doubt here
+arises whether the being spoken of as the abode of heaven, earth, and so
+on, is the individual soul or the highest Self.
+
+The Pūrvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he remarks, in
+the next sloka, 'where like spokes in the nave of a wheel the arteries
+meet, he moves about within, becoming manifold,' the word 'where' refers
+back to the being which in the preceding sloka had been called the abode
+of heaven, earth, and so on, the clause beginning with 'where' thus
+declaring that that being is the basis of the arteries; and the next
+clause declares that same being to become manifold or to be born in many
+ways. Now, connexion with the arteries is clearly characteristic of the
+individual soul; and so is being born in many forms, divine and so on.
+Moreover, in the very sloka under discussion it is said that that being
+is the abode of the mind and the five vital airs, and this also is a
+characteristic attribute of the individual soul. It being, on these
+grounds, ascertained that the text refers to the individual soul we must
+attempt to reconcile therewith, as well as we can, what is said about
+its being the abode of heaven, earth, &c.
+
+This primā facie view is set aside by the Sūtra. That which is described
+as the abode of heaven, earth, &c. is none other than the highest
+Brahman, on account of a term which is 'its own,' i.e. which specially
+belongs to it. The clause we have in view is 'he is the bank of the
+Immortal.' This description applies to the highest Brahman only, which
+alone is, in all Upanishads, termed the cause of the attainment of
+Immortality; cp. e.g. 'Knowing him thus a man becomes immortal; there is
+no other path to go' (Sve. Up. III, 8). The term 'setu' is derived from
+_si_, which means to bind, and therefore means that which binds, i.e.
+makes one to attain immortality; or else it may be understood to mean
+that which leads towards immortality that lies beyond the ocean of
+samsāra, in the same way as a bank or bridge (setu) leads to the further
+side of a river.--Moreover the word 'Self (ātman) (which, in the text
+under discussion, is also applied to that which is the abode of heaven,
+earth, &c.), without any further qualification, primarily denotes
+Brahman only; for 'ātman' comes from _āp_, to reach, and means that
+which 'reaches' all other things in so far as it rules them. And further
+on (II, 2, 7) there are other terms, 'all knowing,' 'all cognising,'
+which also specially belong to the highest Brahman only. This Brahman
+may also be represented as the abode of the arteries; as proved e.g. by
+Mahānār. Up. (XI, 8-12), 'Surrounded by the arteries he hangs ... in the
+middle of this pointed flame there dwells the highest Self.' Of that
+Self it may also be said that it is born in many ways; in accordance
+with texts such as 'not born, he is born in many ways; the wise know the
+place of his birth.' For in order to fit himself to be a refuge for
+gods, men, &c. the supreme Person, without however putting aside his
+true nature, associates himself with the shape, make, qualities and
+works of the different classes of beings, and thus is born in many ways.
+Smriti says the same: 'Though being unborn, of non-perishable nature,
+the Lord of all beings, yet presiding over my Prakriti I am born by my
+own mysterious power' (Bha. Gī. IV, 6). Of the mind also and the other
+organs of the individual soul the highest Self is strictly the abode;
+for it is the abode of everything.--The next Sūtra supplies a further
+reason.
+
+
+
+
+2. And on account of its being declared that to which the released have
+to resort.
+
+The Person who is the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is also
+declared by the text to be what is to be reached by those who are
+released from the bondage of Samsāra existence. 'When the seer sees the
+brilliant maker and Lord as the Person who has his source in Brahman,
+then possessing true knowledge he shakes off good and evil, and, free
+from passion, reaches the highest oneness' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3). 'As the
+flowing rivers disappear in the sea, losing their name and form, thus a
+wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is
+higher than the high' (III, 2, 8). For it is only those freed from the
+bondage of Samsāra who shake off good and evil, are free from passion,
+and freed from name and form.
+
+For the Samsāra state consists in the possession of name and form, which
+is due to connexion with non-sentient matter, such connexion springing
+from good and evil works. The Person therefore who is the abode of
+heaven, earth, &c., and whom the text declares to be the aim to be
+reached by those who, having freed themselves from good and evil, and
+hence from all contact with matter, attain supreme oneness with the
+highest Brahman, can be none other than this highest Brahman itself.
+
+This conclusion, based on terms exclusively applicable to the highest
+Brahman, is now confirmed by reference to the absence of terms specially
+applicable to the individual soul.
+
+
+
+
+3. Not that which is inferred, on account of the absence of terms
+denoting it, and (so also not) the bearer of the Prānas (i. e. the
+individual soul).
+
+As the section under discussion does not treat of the Pradhāna, there
+being no terms referring to that, so it is with regard to the individual
+soul also. In the text of the Sūtra we have to read either anumānam, i.
+e. 'inference,' in the sense of 'object of inference,' or else ānumānam,
+'object of inference'; what is meant being in both cases the Pradhana
+inferred to exist by the Sānkhyas.
+
+
+
+
+4. On account of the declaration of difference.
+
+'On the same tree man sits immersed in grief, bewildered by "anīsā"; but
+when he sees the other one, the Lord, contented, and his glory; then his
+grief passes away' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 2). This, and similar texts, speak
+of that one, i.e. the one previously described as the abode of heaven,
+earth, &c., as different from the individual soul.--The text means--the
+individual soul grieves, being bewildered by her who is not 'īsa,' i.e.
+Prakriti, the object of fruition. But its grief passes away when it sees
+him who is other than itself, i.e. the beloved Lord of all, and his
+greatness which consists in his ruling the entire world.
+
+
+
+
+5. On account of the subject-matter.
+
+It has been already shown, viz. under I, 2, 21, that the highest Brahman
+constitutes the initial topic of the Upanishad. And by the arguments set
+forth in the previous Sūtras of the present Pāda, we have removed all
+suspicion as to the topic started being dropped in the body of the
+Upanishad.
+
+
+
+
+6. And on account of abiding and eating.
+
+'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them
+eats the sweet fruit; without eating, the other looks on' (Mu. Up. III,
+1, 1). This text declares that one enjoys the fruit of works while the
+other, without enjoying, shining abides within the body. Now this
+shining being which does not enjoy the fruit of works can only be the
+being previously described as the abode of heaven, earth, &c., and
+characterised as all knowing, the bridge of immortality, the Self of all;
+it can in no way be the individual Self which, lamenting, experiences
+the results of its works. The settled conclusion, therefore, is that the
+abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is none other than the highest Self.--
+Here terminates the adhikarana of 'heaven, earth, and so on.'
+
+
+
+
+7. The bhūman (is the highest Self), as the instruction about it is
+additional to that about serenity.
+
+The Chandogas read as follows: 'Where one sees nothing else, hears
+nothing else, knows nothing else, that is fulness (bhūman). Where one
+sees something else, hears something else, knows something else, that is
+the Little' (Ch. Up. VII, 23, 24).
+
+The term 'bhūman' is derived from _bahu_ (much, many), and primarily
+signifies 'muchness.' By 'much' in this connexion, we have however to
+understand, not what is numerous, but what is large, for the text uses
+the term in contrast with the 'Little' (alpa), i.e. the 'Small.' And the
+being qualified as 'large,' we conclude from the context to be the Self;
+for this section of the Upanishad at the outset states that he who knows
+the Self overcomes grief (VII, 1, 3), then teaches the knowledge of the
+bhūman, and concludes by saying that 'the Self is all this' (VII, 25, 2).
+
+The question now arises whether the Self called bhūman is the individual
+Self or the highest Self.--The Pūrvapakshin maintains the former view.
+For, he says, to Narada who had approached Sanatkumāra with the desire
+to be instructed about the Self, a series of beings, beginning with
+'name' and ending with 'breath,' are enumerated as objects of devout
+meditation; Nārada asks each time whether there be anything greater than
+name, and so on, and each time receives an affirmative reply ('speech is
+greater than name,' &c.); when, however, the series has advanced as far
+as Breath, there is no such question and reply. This shows that the
+instruction about the Self terminates with Breath, and hence we conclude
+that breath in this place means the individual soul which is associated
+with breath, not a mere modification of air. Also the clauses 'Breath is
+father, breath is mother,' &c. (VII, 15, 1), show that breath here is
+something intelligent. And this is further proved by the clause 'Slayer
+of thy father, slayer of thy mother,' &c. (VII, 15, 2; 3), which
+declares that he who offends a father, a mother, &c., as long as there
+is breath in them, really hurts them, and therefore deserves reproach;
+while no blame attaches to him who offers even the grossest violence to
+them after their breath has departed. For a conscious being only is
+capable of being hurt, and hence the word 'breath' here denotes such a
+being only. Moreover, as it is observed that also in the case of such
+living beings as have no vital breath (viz. plants), suffering results,
+or does not result, according as injury is inflicted or not, we must for
+this reason also decide that the breath spoken of in the text as
+something susceptible of injury is the individual soul. It consequently
+would be an error to suppose, on the ground of the comparison of Prāna
+to the nave of a wheel in which the spokes are set, that Prāna here
+denotes the highest Self; for the highest Self is incapable of being
+injured. That comparison, on the other hand, is quite in its place, if
+we understand by Prāna the individual soul, for the whole aggregate of
+non-sentient matter which stands to the individual soul in the relation
+of object or instrument of enjoyment, has an existence dependent on the
+individual soul. And this soul, there called Prāna, is what the text
+later on calls Bhūman; for as there is no question and reply as to
+something greater than Prāna, Prāna continues, without break, to be the
+subject-matter up to the mention of bhūman. The paragraphs intervening
+between the section on Prāna (VII, 15) and the section on the bhūman
+(VII, 23 ff.) are to be understood as follows. The Prāna section closes
+with the remark that he who fully knows Prāna is an ativādin, i.e. one
+who makes a final supreme declaration. In the next sentence then, 'But
+this one in truth is an ativādin who makes a supreme statement by means
+of the True,' the clause 'But this one is an ativādin' refers back to
+the previously mentioned person who knows the Prāna, and the relative
+clause 'who makes,' &c., enjoins on him the speaking of the truth as an
+auxiliary element in the meditation on Prāna. The next paragraph, 'When
+one understands the truth then one declares the truth,' intimates that
+speaking the truth stands in a supplementary relation towards the
+cognition of the true nature of the Prāna as described before. For the
+accomplishment of such cognition the subsequent four paragraphs enjoin
+reflection, faith, attendance on a spiritual guide, and the due
+performance of sacred duties. In order that such duties may be
+undertaken, the next paragraphs then teach that bliss constitutes the
+nature of the individual soul, previously called Prāna, and finally that
+the Bhūman, i.e. the supreme fulness of such bliss, is the proper object
+of inquiry. The final purport of the teaching, therefore, is that the
+true nature of the individual soul, freed from Nescience, is abundant
+bliss--a conclusion which perfectly agrees with the initial statement
+that he who knows the Self passes beyond sorrow. That being, therefore,
+which has the attribute of being 'bhūman,' is the individual Self. This
+being so, it is also intelligible why, further on, when the text
+describes the glory and power of the individual Self, it uses the term
+'I'; for 'I' denotes just the individual Self: 'I am below, I am above,
+&c., I am all this' (VII, 25, 1). This conclusion having been settled,
+all remaining clauses must be explained so as to agree with it.
+
+This primā facie view is set aside by the Sūtra. The being characterised
+in the text as 'bhūman' is not the individual Self, but the highest Self,
+since instruction is given about the bhūman in addition to 'serenity'
+(samprasāda). 'Samprasāda' denotes the individual soul, as we know from
+the following text, 'Now that "serenity", having risen from out this
+body, and having reached the highest light, appears in its true form'
+(Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 4). Now in the text under discussion instruction is
+given about a being called 'the True,' and possessing the attribute of
+'bhūman,' as being something additional to the individual soul; and this
+being called 'the True' is none other than the highest Brahman. Just as
+in the series of beings beginning with name and ending with breath, each
+successive being is mentioned in addition to the preceding one--
+wherefrom we conclude that it is something really different from what
+precedes; so that being also which is called 'the True,' and which is
+mentioned in addition to the individual Self called Prāna, is something
+different from the individual Self, and this being called 'the True' is
+the same as the Bhūman; in other words, the text teaches that the Bhūman
+is the highest Brahman called 'the True.' This the Vrittikāra also
+declares: 'But the Bhūman only. The Bhūman is Brahman, because in the
+series beginning with name instruction is given about it subsequently to
+the individual Self.'
+
+But how do we know that the instruction as to 'the True' is in addition
+to, and refers to something different from, the being called Prāna?--The
+text, after having declared that he who knows the Prāna is an ativādin,
+goes on, 'But really that one is an ativādin who makes a supreme
+declaration by means of the True.' The 'but' here clearly separates him
+who is an ativādin by means of the True from the previous ativādin, and
+the clause thus does not cause us to recognise him who is ativādin by
+means of Prāna; hence 'the True' which is the cause of the latter
+ativādin being what he is must be something different from the Prāna
+which is the cause of the former ativādin's quality.--But we have
+maintained above that the text enjoins the speaking of 'the True' merely
+as an auxiliary duty for him who knows Prāna; and that hence the Prāna
+continues to be the general subject-matter!--This contention is
+untenable, we reply. The conjunction 'but' shows that the section gives
+instruction about a new ativādin, and does not merely declare that the
+ativādin previously mentioned has to speak the truth. It is different
+with texts such as 'But that one indeed is an Agnihotrin who speaks the
+truth'; there we have no knowledge of any further Agnihotrin, and
+therefore must interpret the text as enjoining truthfulness as an
+obligation incumbent on the ordinary Agnihotrin. In the text under
+discussion, on the other hand, we have the term 'the True', which makes
+us apprehend that there is a further ativādin different from the
+preceding one; and we know that that term is used to denote the highest
+Brahman, as e.g. in the text, 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is
+Brahman.' The ativādin who takes his stand on this Brahman, therefore,
+must be viewed as different from the preceding ativādin; and a
+difference thus established on the basis of the meaning and connexion of
+the different sentences cannot be set aside. An ativādin ('one who in
+his declaration goes beyond') is one who maintains, as object of his
+devotion, something which, as being more beneficial to man, surpasses
+other objects of devotion. The text at first declares that he who knows
+Prāna, i.e. the individual soul, is an ativādin, in so far as the object
+of his devout meditation surpasses the objects from name up to hope; and
+then goes on to say that, as that object also is not of _supreme_
+benefit to man, an ativādin in the full sense of the term is he only who
+proclaims as the object of his devotion the highest Brahman, which alone
+is of supreme unsurpassable benefit to man. 'He who is an ativādin by
+the True,' i.e. he who is an ativādin characterised by the highest
+Brahman as the object of his meditation. For the same reason the pupil
+entreats, 'Sir, may I be an ativādin with the True!' and the teacher
+replies, 'But we must desire to know the True!'--Moreover, the text, VII,
+26, I, 'Prāna springs from the Self,' declares the origination from the
+Self of the being called Prāna; and from this we infer that the Self
+which is introduced as the general subject-matter of the section, in the
+clause 'He who knows the Self passes beyond death,' is different from
+the being called Prāna.--The contention that, because there is no
+question and answer as to something greater than Prāna, the instruction
+about the Self must be supposed to come to an end with the instruction
+about Prāna, is by no means legitimate. For that a new subject is
+introduced is proved, not only by those questions and answers; it may be
+proved by other means also, and we have already explained such means.
+The following is the reason why the pupil does not ask the question
+whether there is anything greater than Prāna. With regard to the non-
+sentient objects extending from name to hope--each of which surpasses
+the preceding one in so far as it is more beneficial to man--the teacher
+does not declare that he who knows them is an ativādin; when, however,
+he comes to the individual soul, there called Prāna, the knowledge of
+whose true nature he considers highly beneficial, he expressly says that
+'he who sees this, notes this, understands this is an ativādin' (VII, 15,
+4). The pupil therefore imagines that the instruction about the Self is
+now completed, and hence asks no further question. The teacher on the
+other hand, holding that even that knowledge is not the highest,
+spontaneously continues his teaching, and tells the pupil that truly he
+only is an ativādin who proclaims the supremely and absolutely
+beneficial being which is called 'the True,' i.e. the highest Brahman.
+On this suggestion of the highest Brahman the pupil, desirous to learn
+its true nature and true worship, entreats the teacher, 'Sir, may I
+become an ativādin by the True!' Thereupon the teacher--in order to help
+the pupil to become an ativādin,--a position which requires previous
+intuition of Brahman--enjoins on him meditation on Brahman which is the
+means to attain intuition ('You must desire to know the True!'); next
+recommends to him reflection (manana) which is the means towards
+meditation ('You must desire to understand reflection'); then--taking it
+for granted that the injunction of reflection implies the injunction of
+'hearing' the sacred texts which is the preliminary for reflecting--
+advises him to cherish faith in Brahman which is the preliminary means
+towards hearing ('You must desire to understand faith'); after that
+tells him to practise, as a preliminary towards faith, reliance on
+Brahman ('You must desire to understand reliance'); next admonishes him,
+to apply himself to 'action,' i.e. to make the effort which is a
+preliminary requisite for all the activities enumerated ('You must
+desire to understand action'). Finally, in order to encourage the pupil
+to enter on all this, the teacher tells him to recognise that bliss
+constitutes the nature of that Brahman which is the aim of all his
+effort ('You must desire to understand bliss'); and bids him to realise
+that the bliss which constitutes Brahman's nature is supremely large and
+full ('You must endeavour to understand the "bhūman," i.e. the supreme
+fulness of bliss'). And of this Brahman, whose nature is absolute bliss,
+a definition is then given as follows,' Where one sees nothing else,
+hears nothing else, knows nothing else, that is bhūman.' This means--
+when the meditating devotee realises the intuition of this Brahman,
+which consists of absolute bliss, he does not see anything apart from it,
+since the whole aggregate of things is contained within the essence and
+outward manifestation (vibhūti) of Brahman. He, therefore, who has an
+intuitive knowledge of Brahman as qualified by its attributes and its
+vibhūti--which also is called aisvarya, i.e. lordly power--and
+consisting of supreme bliss, sees nothing else since there _is_ nothing
+apart from Brahman; and sees, i.e. feels no pain since all possible
+objects of perception and feeling are of the nature of bliss or pleasure;
+for pleasure is just that which, being experienced, is agreeable to
+man's nature.--But an objection is raised, it is an actual fact that
+this very world is perceived as something different from Brahman, and as
+being of the nature of pain, or at the best, limited pleasure; how then
+can it be perceived as being a manifestation of Brahman, as having
+Brahman for its Self, and hence consisting of bliss?--The individual
+souls, we reply, which are under the influence of karman, are conscious
+of this world as different from Brahman, and, according to their
+individual karman, as either made up of pain or limited pleasure. But as
+this view depends altogether on karman, to him who has freed himself
+from Nescience in the form of karman, this same world presents itself as
+lying within the intuition of Brahman, together with its qualities and
+vibhūti, and hence as essentially blissful. To a man troubled with
+excess of bile the water he drinks has a taste either downright
+unpleasant or moderately pleasant, according to the degree to which his
+health is affected; while the same water has an unmixedly pleasant taste
+for a man in good health. As long as a boy is not aware that some
+plaything is meant to amuse him, he does not care for it; when on the
+other hand he apprehends it as meant to give him delight, the thing
+becomes very dear to him. In the same way the world becomes an object of
+supreme love to him who recognises it as having Brahman for its Self,
+and being a mere plaything of Brahman--of Brahman, whose essential
+nature is supreme bliss, and which is a treasure-house, as it were, of
+numberless auspicious qualities of supreme excellence. He who has
+reached such intuition of Brahman, sees nothing apart from it and feels
+no pain. This the concluding passages of the text set forth in detail,
+'He who sees, perceives and understands this, loves the Self, delights
+in the Self, revels in the Self, rejoices in the Self; he becomes a Self
+ruler, he moves and rules in all worlds according to his pleasure. But
+those who have a different knowledge from this, they are ruled by others,
+they live in perishable worlds, they do not move in all the worlds
+according to their liking.' 'They are ruled by others,' means 'they are
+in the power of karman.' And further on, 'He who sees this does not see
+death, nor illness, nor pain; he who sees this sees everything and
+obtains everything everywhere.'
+
+That Brahman is of the nature of supreme bliss has been shown in detail
+under I, 1, 12 ff.--The conclusion from all this is that, as the text
+applies the term 'bhūman' to what was previously called the Real or True,
+and which is different from the individual soul there called Prāna, the
+bhūman is the highest Brahman.
+
+
+
+
+8. And on account of the suitability of the attributes.
+
+The attributes also which the text ascribes to the bhūman suit the
+highest Self only. So immortality ('The Bhūman is immortal,' VII, 24, 1);
+not being based on something else ('it rests in its own greatness');
+being the Self of all ('the bhūman is below,' &c., 'it is all this');
+being that which produces all ('from the Self there springs breath,' &c.
+). All these attributes can be reconciled with the highest Self only.--
+The Pūrvapakshin has pointed to the text which declares the 'I' to be
+the Self of all (VII, 25, 1); but what that text really teaches is
+meditation on Brahman under the aspect of the 'I.' This appears from the
+introductory clause 'Now follows the instruction with regard to the I.'
+That of the 'I,' i.e. the individual Self, also the highest Self is the
+true Self, scripture declares in several places, so e.g. in the text
+about the inward Ruler (Bri. Up. III, 7). As therefore the individual
+soul finds its completion in the highest Self only, the word 'I' also
+extends in its connotation up to the highest Self; and the instruction
+about the 'I' which is given in the text has thus for its object
+meditation on the highest Self in so far as having the individual Self
+for its body. As the highest Self has all beings for its body and thus
+is the Self of all, it is the Self of the individual soul also; and this
+the text declares in the passage beginning 'Now follows the instruction
+about the Self,' and ending 'Self is all this.' In order to prove this
+the text declares that everything originates from the highest Self which
+forms the Self of the individual soul also, viz. in the passage 'From
+the Self of him who sees this, perceives this, knows this, there springs
+breath,' &c.--that means: breath and all other beings spring from the
+highest Self which abides within the Self of the meditating devotee as
+its inner ruler. Hence, the text means to intimate, meditation should be
+performed on the 'I,' in order thus firmly to establish the cognition
+that the highest Self has the 'I,' i.e. the individual soul for its body.
+
+It is thus an established conclusion that the bhūman is the highest Self.
+Here terminates the adhikarana of 'fulness.'
+
+
+
+
+9. The Imperishable (is Brahman), on account of its supporting that
+which is the end of ether.
+
+The Vājasaneyins, in the chapter recording the questions asked by Gārgī,
+read as follows: 'He said, O Gārgī, the Brāhmanas call that the
+Imperishable. It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long, it
+is not red, not fluid, it is without a shadow,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8).
+A doubt here arises whether that Imperishable be the Pradhāna, or the
+individual soul, or the highest Self.--The Pradhāna, it may be
+maintained in the first place. For we see that in passages such as
+'higher than that which is higher than the Imperishable' the term
+'Imperishable' actually denotes the Pradhāna; and moreover the qualities
+enumerated, viz. not being either coarse or fine, &c., are
+characteristic of the Pradhāna.--But, an objection is raised, in texts
+such as 'That knowledge by which the Imperishable is apprehended' (Mu.
+Up. I, 1, 5), the word 'Imperishable' is seen to denote the highest
+Brahman!--In cases, we reply, where the meaning of a word may be
+determined on the basis either of some other means of proof or of
+Scripture, the former meaning presents itself to the mind first, and
+hence there is no reason why such meaning should not be accepted.--But
+how do you know that the ether of the text is not ether in the ordinary
+sense?--From the description, we reply, given of it in the text, 'That
+above the heavens,' &c. There it is said that all created things past,
+present and future rest on ether as their basis; ether cannot therefore
+be taken as that elementary substance which itself is comprised in the
+sphere of things created. We therefore must understand by 'ether' matter
+in its subtle state, i.e. the Pradhāna; and the Imperishable which
+thereupon is declared to be the support of that Pradhāna, hence cannot
+itself be the Pradhāna.--Nor is there any force in the argument that a
+sense established by some other means of proof presents itself to the
+mind more immediately than a sense established by Scripture; for as the
+word 'akshara' (i.e. the non-perishable) intimates its sense directly
+through the meaning of its constituent elements other means of proof
+need not be regarded at all.
+
+Moreover Yājńavalkya had said previously that the ether is the cause and
+abode of all things past, present and future, and when Gārgī thereupon
+asks him in what that ether 'is woven,' i.e. what is the causal
+substance and abode of ether, he replies 'the Imperishable.' Now this
+also proves that by the 'Imperishable' we have to understand the
+Pradhāna which from other sources is known to be the causal substance,
+and hence the abode, of all effected things whatsoever.
+
+This primā facie view is set aside by the Sūtra. The 'Imperishable' is
+the highest Brahman, because the text declares it to support that which
+is the end, i. e. that which lies beyond ether, viz. unevolved matter
+(avyākritam). The ether referred to in Gārgī's question is not ether in
+the ordinary sense, but what lies beyond ether, viz. unevolved matter,
+and hence the 'Imperishable' which is said to be the support of that
+'unevolved' cannot itself be the 'unevolved,' i.e. cannot be the
+Pradhāna. Let us, then, the Pūrvapakshin resumes, understand by the
+'Imperishable,' the individual soul; for this may be viewed as the
+support of the entire aggregate of non-sentient matter, inclusive of the
+elements in their subtle condition; and the qualities of non-coarseness,
+&c., are characteristic of that soul also. Moreover there are several
+texts in which the term 'Imperishable' is actually seen to denote the
+individual soul; so e.g. 'the non-evolved' is merged in the
+'Imperishable'; 'That of which the non-evolved is the body; that of
+which the Imperishable is the body'; 'All the creatures are the
+Perishable, the non-changing Self is called the Imperishable' (Bha. GĪ.
+XV, 16).
+
+To this alternative primā facie view the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+10. And this (supporting) (springs) from command.
+
+The text declares that this supporting of ether and all other things
+proceeds from command. 'In the command of that Imperishable sun and moon
+stand, held apart; in the command of that Imperishable heaven and earth
+stand, held apart,' &c. Now such supreme command, through which all
+things in the universe are held apart, cannot possibly belong to the
+individual soul in the state either of bondage or of release. The
+commanding 'Imperishable' therefore is none other than the supreme
+Person.
+
+
+
+
+11. And on account of the exclusion of (what is of) another nature (than
+Brahman).
+
+Another nature, i. e. the nature of the Pradhāna, and so on. A
+supplementary passage excludes difference on the part of the
+Imperishable from the supreme Person. 'That Imperishable, O Gārgī, is
+unseen but seeing; unheard but hearing; unthought but thinking; unknown
+but knowing. There is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but
+it, nothing that thinks but it, nothing that knows but it. In that
+Imperishable, O Gārgī, the ether is woven, warp and woof.' Here the
+declaration as to the Imperishable being what sees, hears, &c. excludes
+the non-intelligent Pradhāna; and the declaration as to its being all-
+seeing, &c. while not seen by any one excludes the individual soul. This
+exclusion of what has a nature other than that of the highest Self thus
+confirms the view of that Self being meant.--Or else the Sūtra may be
+explained in a different way, viz. 'On account of the exclusion of the
+existence of another.' On this alternative the text 'There is nothing
+that sees but it,' &c., is to be understood as follows: 'while this
+Imperishable, not seen by others but seeing all others, forms the basis
+of all things different from itself; there is no other principle which,
+unseen by the Imperishable but seeing it, could form _its_ basis,' i.e.
+the text would exclude the existence of any other thing but the
+Imperishable, and thus implicitly deny that the Imperishable is either
+the Pradhāna or the individual Self.--Moreover the text 'By the command
+of that Imperishable men praise those who give, the gods follow the
+Sacrficer, the fathers the Darvī-offering,' declares the Imperishable to
+be that on the command of which there proceed all works enjoined by
+Scripture and Smriti. such as sacrificing, giving, &c., and this again
+shows that the Imperishable must be Brahman, the supreme Person. Again,
+the subsequent _passus_, 'Whosoever without knowing that Imperishable,'
+&c., declares that ignorance of the Imperishable leads to the Samsāra,
+while knowledge of it helps to reach Immortality: this also proves that
+the Imperishable is the highest Brahman.--Here terminates the adhikarana
+of 'the Imperishable.'
+
+
+
+
+12. On account of his being designated as the object of seeing, he (i.e.
+the highest Self) (is that object).
+
+The followers of the Atharva-veda, in the section containing the
+question asked by Satyakāma, read as follows: 'He again who meditates
+with this syllable Aum of three Mātrās on the highest Person, he comes
+to light and to the sun. As a snake frees itself from its skin, so he
+frees himself from evil. He is led up by the Sāman verses to the Brahma-
+world; he sees the person dwelling in the castle who is higher than the
+individual souls concreted with bodies and higher (than those)' (Pra. Up.
+V, 2). Here the terms 'he meditates' and 'he sees' have the same sense,
+'seeing' being the result of devout meditation; for according to the
+principle expressed in the text (Ch. Up. III, 14) 'According as man's
+thought is in this world,' what is reached by the devotee is the object
+of meditation; and moreover the text exhibits the same object, viz. 'the
+highest Person' in connexion with both verbs.
+
+The doubt here presents itself whether the highest Person in this text
+be the so-called four-faced Brahmā, the Lord of the mundane egg who
+represents the individual souls in their collective aspect, or the
+supreme Person who is the Lord of all.--The Pūrvapakshin maintains the
+former view. For, he argues, on the introductory question, 'He who here
+among men should meditate until death on the syllable Om, what would he
+obtain by it?' The text first declares that he who meditates on that
+syllable as having one Mātrā, obtains the world of men; and next, that
+he who meditates on it as having two Mātrās obtains the world of the
+atmosphere. Hence the Brahma-world, which the text after that represents
+as the object reached by him who meditates on Om as having three
+syllables, must be the world of Brahmā Katurmukha who is constituted by
+the aggregate of the individual souls. What the soul having reached that
+world sees, therefore is the same Brahmā Katurmukha; and thus only the
+attribute 'etasmāj' jīvaghanāt parāt param' is suitable; for the
+collective soul, i. e. Brahmā Katurmukha, residing in the Brahma-world
+is higher (para) than the distributive or discrete soul (jīva) which is
+concreted (ghanī-bhūta) with the body and sense-organs, and at the same
+time is higher (para) than these. The highest Person mentioned in the
+text, therefore, is Brahmāa Katurmukha; and the qualities mentioned
+further on, such as absence of decay, &c., must be taken in such a way
+as to agree with that Brahmā.
+
+To this primā facie view the Sūtra replies that the object of seeing is
+He, i.e. the highest Self, on account of designation. The text clearly
+designates the object of seeing as the highest Self. For the concluding
+sloka, which refers to that object of seeing, declares that 'by means of
+the Omkāra he who knows reaches that which is tranquil, free from decay,
+immortal, fearless, the highest'--all which attributes properly belong
+to the highest Self only, as we know from texts such as 'that is the
+Immortal, that is the fearless, that is Brahman' (Ch. Up. IV, 15, i).
+The qualification expressed in the clause 'etasmāj_ _jīva.--ghanāt,' &c.
+may also refer to the highest Self only, not to Brahmā Katurmukha; for
+the latter is himself comprehended by the term 'jīvaghana.' For that
+term denotes all souls which are embodied owing to karman; and that
+Katurmukha is one of those we know from texts such as 'He who first
+creates Brahmā' (Svet. Up. VI, 18). Nor is there any strength in the
+argument that, since the Brahma-world mentioned in the text is known to
+be the world of Katurmukha, as it follows next on the world of the
+atmosphere, the being abiding there must needs be Katurmukha. We rather
+argue as follows--as from the concluding clause 'that which is tranquil,
+free from decay,' &c., we ascertain that the object of intuition is the
+highest Brahman, the Brahma-world spoken of as the abode of the seeing
+devotee cannot be the perishable world of Brahmā Katurmukha. A further
+reason for this conclusion is supplied by what the text says about 'him
+who is freed from all evil being led up by the Sāman verses to the world
+of Brahman'; for the place reached by him who is freed from all evil
+cannot be the mere abode of Katurmukha. Hence also the concluding sloka
+says with reference to that Brahma-world 'that which the wise teach':
+what the wise see and teach is the abode of the highest, of Vishnu; cp.
+the text 'the wise ever see that highest abode of Vishnu.' Nor is it
+even strictly true that the world of Brahmā follows on the atmosphere,
+for the svarga-world and several others lie between the two.
+
+We therefore shortly explain the drift of the whole chapter as follows.
+At the outset of the reply given to Satyakāma there is mentioned, in
+addition to the highest (para) Brahman, a lower (apara) Brahman. This
+lower or effected (kārya) Brahman is distinguished as twofold, being
+connected either with this terrestrial world or yonder, non-terrestrial,
+world. Him who meditates on the Pranava as having one syllable, the text
+declares to obtain a reward in this world--he reaches the world of men.
+He, on the other hand, who meditates on the Pranava as having two
+syllables is said to obtain his reward in a super-terrestrial sphere--he
+reaches the world of the atmosphere. And he finally who, by means of the
+trisyllabic Pranava which denotes the highest Brahman, meditates on this
+very highest Brahman, is said to reach that Brahman, i. e. the supreme
+Person.--The object of seeing is thus none other than the highest Self.--
+Here terminates the adhikarana of the 'object of seeing.'
+
+
+
+
+13. The small (ether) (is Brahman), on account of the subsequent
+(arguments).
+
+The Chandogas have the following text, 'Now in that city of Brahman
+there is the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether. Now
+what is within that small ether that is to be sought for, that is to be
+understood' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 1).--The question here arises whether that
+small ether (space) within the lotus of the heart be the material
+clement called ether, or the individual Self, or the highest Self.--The
+first view presenting itself is that the element is meant, for the
+reason that the word 'ether' is generally used in that sense; and
+because the clause 'what is within that small ether' shows that the
+ether mentioned constitutes the abode of something else that is to be
+enquired into.--This view is set aside by the Sūtra. The small ether
+within the heart is the highest Brahman, on account of the subsequent
+reasons, contained in clauses of the same section. The passage 'That
+Self which is free from evil, free from old age, free from death, free
+from grief, free from hunger and thirst, whose wishes and purposes come
+true' (VIII, 7, 1) ascribes to that small ether qualities--such as
+unconditioned Selfhood, freedom from evil, &c.--which clearly show that
+ether to be the highest Brahman. And this conclusion is confirmed by
+what other texts say about him who knows the small ether attaining the
+power of realising his own wishes,'Those who depart from hence having
+come to know the Self and those real wishes, for them there is freedom
+in all worlds'; and 'whatever object he desires, by his mere will it
+comes to him; having obtained it he is happy' (Ch, Up. VIII, 1, 6; 2, 9).
+If moreover the ether within the heart were the elemental ether, the
+comparison instituted in the passage 'As large as that (elemental) ether
+is, so large is this ether within the heart' would be wholly
+inappropriate. Nor must it be said that that comparison rests on the
+limitation of the ether within the heart (so that the two terms compared
+would be the limited elemental ether within the heart, and the universal
+elemental ether); for there still would remain the inappropriate
+assertion that the ether within the heart is the abode of heaven, earth
+and all other things.--But, an objection is raised, also on the
+alternative of the small ether being the highest Brahman, the comparison
+to the universal elemental ether is unsuitable; for scripture explicitly
+states that the highest Self is (not as large but) larger than
+everything else, 'larger than the earth, larger than the sky,' &c. (Ch.
+Up. III, 14, 3). Not so, we reply; what the text says as to the ether
+within the heart being as large as the universal ether is meant (not to
+make a conclusive statement as to its extent but only) to negative that
+smallness of the ether which is established by its abiding within the
+heart. Similarly we say 'the sun moves with the speed of an arrow'; the
+sun indeed moves much faster than an arrow, but what our assertion means
+is merely that he does not move slowly.--But, a further doubt is started,
+the passage 'That Self which is free from sin,' &c. does not appear to
+refer back to the small ether within the heart. For the text makes a
+distinction between that ether and that within that ether which it
+declares to be the due object of search and enquiry. This latter object
+therefore is the topic of discussion, and when the text says later on
+'That Self, free from sin, &c. is to be searched out' we must understand
+it to refer to the same object of search.--This would be so, we reply,
+if the text did not distinguish the small ether and that which abides
+within it; but as a matter of fact it does distinguish the two. The
+connexion is as follows. The text at first refers to the body of the
+devotee as the city of Brahman, the idea being that Brahman is present
+therein as object of meditation; and then designates an organ of that
+body, viz. the small lotus-shaped heart as the palace of Brahman. It
+then further refers to Brahman--the all knowing, all powerful, whose
+love towards his devotees is boundless like the ocean--as the small
+ether within the heart, meaning thereby that Brahman who for the benefit
+of his devotees is present within that palace should be meditated upon
+as of minute size, and finally--in the clause 'that is to be searched
+out'--enjoins as the object of meditation that which abides in that
+Brahman, i.e. on the one hand, its essential freedom from all evil
+qualities, and on the other the whole treasure of its auspicious
+qualities, its power of realising its wishes and so on. The 'that' (in
+'that is to be searched out') enjoins as objects of search the small
+ether, i.e. Brahman itself as well as the qualities abiding within it.--
+But how, it may be asked, do you know that the word 'that' really refers
+to both, viz. the highest Brahman, there called 'small ether,' and the
+qualities abiding in it, and that hence the clause enjoins an enquiry
+into both these entities?--Listen, attentively, we reply, to our
+explanation! The clause 'As large as this ether is, so large is this
+ether within the heart' declares the exceeding greatness of the small
+ether; the clause 'Both heaven and earth are contained within it' up to
+'lightning and stars' declares that same small ether to be the abode of
+the entire world; and the clause 'And whatever there is for him in this
+world, and whatever there is not, all that is contained within it'
+declares that whatever objects of enjoyment there are for the devotee in
+this world, and whatever other objects there are not for him, i.e. are
+merely wishes but not obtained by him, all those objects are contained
+within that same small ether. The text next declares that that small
+ether, although dwelling within the heart which is a part of the body,
+is not affected by the body's old age and decay, for being extremely
+minute it is not capable of change; and adds 'that true being is the
+Brahman-city,' i.e. that Reality which is the cause of all is the city
+called Brahman, i.e. the abode of the entire Universe. The following
+clause 'in it all desires are contained' again referring to the small
+ether ('in it') declares that in it all desires, i.e. all desirable
+qualities are contained. The text next proceeds to set forth that the
+small ether possesses Selfhood and certain desirable auspicious
+qualities-this is done in the passage 'It is the Self free from sin' &c.
+up to 'whose purposes realise themselves.' The following section--'And
+as here on earth' down to 'for them there is freedom in all the worlds'--
+declares that those who do not know those eight qualities and the Self,
+called 'small ether,' which is characterised by them, and who perform
+actions aiming at objects of enjoyment different from that Self, obtain
+perishable results only, and do not attain the power of realising their
+wishes; while those on the other hand who know the Self called 'small
+ether' and the qualities abiding within it, through the grace of that
+very same highest Self, obtain all their wishes and the power of
+realising their purposes. On the ground of this connected consideration
+of the whole chapter we are able to decide that the text enjoins as the
+object of search and enquiry both the highest Brahman and the whole body
+of auspicious qualities abiding within it. This the Vākyakāra also
+renders clear in the passage beginning 'In the text "what is within
+that" there is designation of wishes (i.e. desirable qualities).'--For
+all these reasons the small ether is the highest Brahman.
+
+
+
+
+14. On account of the going and of the word; for thus it is seen; and
+(there is) an inferential sign.
+
+'As people who do not know the country walk again and again over a gold
+treasure' &c., 'thus do all these creatures day after day go into _that_
+Brahma-world' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2). The circumstance, here stated, of
+all individual souls going to a place which the qualification _'that'_
+connects with the subject-matter of the whole chapter, i.e. the small
+ether; and the further circumstance of the goal of their going being
+called the Brahma-world, also prove that the small ether is none other
+than the highest Brahman.--But in what way do these two points prove
+what they are claimed to prove?--'For thus it is seen'; the Sūtra adds.
+For we see it stated in other texts, that all individual souls go daily
+to Brahman, viz. in the state of deep sleep, 'All these creatures having
+become united with the True do not know that they are united with the
+True'; 'Having come back from the True they know not that they have come
+back from the True' (Ch. Up. VI, 9, 2; 10, 2). And in the same way we
+see that the word 'Brahma-world' denotes the highest Brahman; so e.g.
+'this is the Brahma-world, O King' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 32).--The Sūtra
+subjoins a further reason. Even if the going of the souls to Brahman
+were not seen in other texts, the fact that the text under discussion
+declares the individual souls to abide in Brahman in the state of deep
+sleep, enjoying freedom from all pain and trouble just as if they were
+merged in the pralaya state, is a sufficient 'inferential sign' to prove
+that the 'small ether' is the highest Brahman. And similarly the term
+'Brahma-world' as exhibited in the text under discussion, if understood
+as denoting co-ordination (i.e. 'that world which is Brahman'), is
+sufficient to prove by itself that the 'small ether'--to which that term
+is applied--is the highest Brahman; it therefore is needless to appeal
+to other passages. That this explanation of 'Brahma-world' is preferable
+to the one which understands by Brahma-world 'the world of Brahman' is
+proved by considerations similar to those by which the Pū. Mī. Sūtras
+prove that 'Nishāda-sthapati' means a headman who at the same time is a
+Nishāda.--Another explanation of the passage under discussion may also
+be given. What is said there about all these creatures daily 'going into
+the Brahma-world,' may not refer at all to the state of deep sleep, but
+rather mean that although 'daily going into the Brahman-world,' i. e.
+although at all time moving above the small ether, i. e. Brahman which
+as the universal Self is everywhere, yet all these creatures not knowing
+Brahman do not find, i.e. obtain it; just as men not knowing the place
+where a treasure is hidden do not find it, although they constantly pass
+over it. This constant moving about on the part of ignorant creatures on
+the surface, as it were, of the small ether abiding within as their
+inward Ruler, proves that small ether to be the highest Brahman. That
+the highest Brahman abides within as the inner Self of creatures which
+dwell in it and are ruled by it, we are told in other texts also, so e.g.
+in the Antaryāmin-brāhmana. 'He who dwells in the Self, within the Self,
+whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who rules the
+Self within; unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing' (Bri. Up. III, 7,
+22; 23).--On this interpretation we explain the last part of the Sūtra
+as follows. Even if other texts did not refer to it, this daily moving
+about on the part of ignorant creatures, on the ether within the heart--
+which the comparison with the treasure of gold shows to be the supreme
+good of man--, is in itself a sufficient proof for the small ether being
+Brahman.
+
+
+
+
+15. And on account of there being observed in that (small ether),
+supporting which is a greatness of that (i. e. Brahman).
+
+In continuation of the passage 'It is the Self free from Sin,' &c.,
+which refers to the small ether, the text says: 'it is a bank, a
+limitary support, that these worlds may not be confounded.' What the
+text here says about the small ether supporting the world proves it to
+be the highest Brahman; for to support the world is the glory of Brahman.
+Compare 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of
+all things. He is a bank and a boundary, so that these worlds may not be
+confounded' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22); 'By the command of that Imperishable,
+O Gārgī, heaven and earth stand, held apart' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 9). Now
+this specific greatness of the highest Brahman, which consists in its
+supporting the world, is also observed in the small ether--which proves
+the latter to be none other than Brahman.
+
+
+
+
+16. And on account of the settled meaning.
+
+The word 'ether,' moreover, is known to have, among other meanings, that
+of Brahman. Compare 'For who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if
+that ether were not bliss?' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); 'All these beings take
+their rise from the ether' (Ch. Up. I, 9, 1). It has to be kept in view
+that in the text under discussion the meaning 'Brahman' is supported by
+what is said about the qualities of the small ether--viz. freedom from
+sin, &c.--and hence is stronger than the other meaning--, according to
+which ākāsa signifies the elemental ether.
+
+So far the Sūtras have refuted the view of the small ether being the
+element. They now enter on combating the notion that the small ether may
+possibly be the individual soul.
+
+
+
+
+17. If it be said that on account of reference to the other one he is
+meant; we say no, on account of impossibility.
+
+An objection is raised to the argumentation that, on account of
+complementary passages, the small ether must be explained to mean the
+highest Self.
+
+For, the objector says, a clear reference to him who is 'other' than the
+highest Self, i.e. to the individual soul, is contained in the following
+passage (VIII, 12, 3): 'Thus does that serenity (samprasāda), having
+risen from this body and approached the highest light, appear in its own
+form.' 'That is the Self,' he said. 'That is the immortal, the fearless,
+this is Brahman' (VIII, 7, 3?). We admit that for the different reasons
+stated above the ether within the heart cannot be the elemental ether;
+but owing to the force of the intimations conveyed by the complementary
+passages just quoted, we must adopt the view that what is meant is the
+individual soul. And as the word 'ākāsa' may be connected with prakāsa
+(light), it may be applied to the individual soul also.--This view is
+set aside by the Sūtra. The small ether cannot be the individual soul
+because the qualities attributed in the text to the former, viz. freedom
+from sin, &c., cannot possibly belong to the individual soul.
+
+
+
+
+18. Should it be said that from a subsequent passage (it appears that
+the individual Soul is meant); rather (the soul) in so far as its true
+nature has become manifest.
+
+The Pūrvapakshin now maintains that we ascertain from a subsequent
+declaration made by Prajāpati that it is just the individual Soul that
+possesses freedom from sin and the other qualities enumerated. The whole
+teaching of Prajāpati, he says, refers to the individual Soul only.
+Indra having heard that Prajāpati had spoken about a Self free from sin,
+old age, &c., the enquiry into which enables the soul to obtain all
+worlds and desires, approaches Prajāpati with the wish to learn the true
+nature of that Self which should be enquired into. Prajāpati thereupon,
+wishing to test the capacity of his pupil for receiving true instruction,
+gives him successive information about the embodied soul in the state of
+waking, dream and dreamless sleep. When he finds that Indra sees no good
+in instruction of this kind and thus shows himself fit to receive
+instruction about the true nature of the disembodied Self, he explains
+to him that the body is a mere abode for a ruling Self; that that
+bodiless Self is essentially immortal; and that the soul, as long as it
+is joined to a body due to karman, is compelled to experience pleasure
+and pain corresponding to its embodied state, while it rises above all
+this when it has freed itself from the body (VIII, 12, 1). He then
+continues: 'Thus that serenity having risen from this body and
+approached the highest light, appears in its own form'; thus teaching
+him the true nature, free from a body, of the individual soul. He next
+informs him that the 'highest light' which the soul reaches is the
+supreme Person ('That is the supreme Person'), and that the soul having
+reached that highest light and freed itself from what obscured its own
+true nature, obtains in the world of Brahman whatever enjoyments it
+desires, and is no longer connected with a body springing from karman
+and inseparable from pain and pleasure, or with anything else that
+causes distress. ('He moves about there laughing,' &c.). He next
+illustrates the connexion with a body, of the soul in the Samsāra state,
+by means of a comparison: 'Like as a horse attached to a cart,' &c.
+After that he explains that the eye and the other sense-organs are
+instruments of knowledge, colour, and so on, the objects of knowledge,
+and the individual Self the knowing subject; and that hence that Self is
+different from the body and the sense-organs ('Now where the sight has
+entered' up to 'the mind is his divine eye'). Next he declares that,
+after having divested itself of the body and the senses, the Self
+perceives all the objects of its desire by means of its 'divine eye,' i.
+e. the power of cognition which constitutes its essential nature ('He by
+means of the divine eye,' &c.). He further declares that those who have
+true knowledge know the Self as such ('on that Self the devas meditate');
+and in conclusion teaches that he who has that true knowledge of the
+Self obtains for his reward the intuition of Brahman--which is suggested
+by what the text says about the obtaining of all worlds and all desires
+('He obtains all worlds and all desires,' &c., up to the end of the
+chapter).--It thus appears that the entire chapter proposes as the
+object of cognition the individual soul free from sin, and so on. The
+qualities, viz. freedom from guilt, &c., may thus belong to the
+individual Self, and on this ground we conclude that the small ether is
+the individual Self.
+
+This view the second half of the Sūtra sets aside. The two sections,
+that which treats of the small ether and that which contains the
+teaching of Prajāpati, have different topics. Prajāpati's teaching
+refers to the individual soul, whose true nature, with its qualities
+such as freedom from evil, &c., is at first hidden by untruth, while
+later on, when it has freed itself from the bondage of karman, risen
+from the body, and approached the highest light, it manifests itself in
+its true form and then is characterised by freedom from all evil and by
+other auspicious qualities. In the section treating of the small ether,
+on the other hand, we have to do with the small ether, i.e. the highest
+Brahman, whose true nature is never hidden, and which therefore is
+unconditionally characterised by freedom from evil, and so on.--
+Moreover, the daharākāsa-section ascribes to the small ether other
+attributes which cannot belong to the individual Self even 'when its
+true nature has manifested itself.' The small ether is there called a
+bank and support of all worlds; and one of its names,'satyam,' is
+explained to imply that it governs all sentient and non-sentient beings.
+All this also proves that the small ether is none other than the highest
+Self. That the individual soul, 'even when its true nature is manifest,'
+cannot be viewed as a bank and support of the worlds, &c., we shall show
+under IV, 4.
+
+But if this is so, what then is the meaning of the reference to the
+individual soul which is made in the section treating of the small ether,
+viz. in the passage, 'Now that serene being, which after having risen
+from this body,' &c. (VIII, 3, 4)?
+
+To this question the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+19. And the reference has a different meaning.
+
+The text in question declares that the released individual soul when
+reaching the highest light, i.e. Brahman, which is free from all sin,
+and so on, attains its true nature, which is characterised by similar
+freedom from sin, and so on. Now this reference to the individual soul,
+as described in the teaching of Prajāpati, has the purpose of giving
+instruction (not about the qualities of the individual soul, but) about
+the nature of that which is the cause of the qualities of the individual
+soul, i.e. the qualities specially belonging to the supreme Person. The
+reason why, in the section containing the teaching of Prajāpati,
+information is given as to the true nature of the released individual
+soul is that such knowledge assists the doctrine referring to the small
+ether. For the individual Self which wishes to reach Brahman must know
+his own true nature also, so as to realise that he, as being himself
+endowed with auspicious qualities, will finally arrive at an intuition
+of the highest Brahman, which is a mass of auspicious qualities raised
+to the highest degree of excellence. The cognition of the soul's own
+true nature is itself comprised in the result of the meditation on
+Brahman, and the results which are proclaimed in the teaching of
+Prajāpati ('He obtains all worlds and all wishes'; 'He moves about there
+laughing,' &c.) thus really are results of the knowledge of the small
+ether.
+
+
+
+
+20. If it be said, owing to the scriptural declaration of smallness;
+that has been explained.
+
+The text describes the ether within the heart as being of small compass,
+and this agrees indeed with the individual soul which elsewhere is
+compared to the point of an awl, but not with Brahman, which is greater
+than everything.--The reply to this objection has virtually been given
+before, viz. under I, 2, 7, where it is said that Brahman may be viewed
+as of small size, for the purpose of devout meditation.
+
+It thus remains a settled conclusion that the small ether is none other
+but the highest Person who is untouched by even a shadow of imperfection,
+and is an ocean of infinite, supremely exalted, qualities--knowledge,
+strength, lordly power, &c. The being, on the other hand, which in the
+teaching of Prajāpati is described as first having a body due to karman--
+as we see from passages such as 'they strike it as it were, they cut it
+as it were'--and as afterwards approaching the highest light, and then
+manifesting its essential qualities, viz. freedom from sin, &c., is the
+individual soul; not the small ether (or Brahman).
+
+The next Sūtra supplies a further reason for this conclusion.
+
+
+
+
+21. And on account of the imitation of that.
+
+The individual soul, free from bondage, and thus possessing the
+qualities of freedom from sin, &c., cannot be the small ether, i.e. the
+highest Brahman, because it is stated to 'imitate,' i.e. to be equal to
+that Brahman. The text making that statement is Mu. Up. III, 1, 3, 'When
+the seer (i.e. the individual soul) sees the brilliant maker, the Lord,
+the Person who has his source in Brahman; then becoming wise and shaking
+off good and evil, he reaches the highest equality, free from passions.'
+The being to which the teaching of Prajāpati refers is the 'imitator,' i.
+e. the individual soul; the Brahman which is 'imitated' is the small
+ether.
+
+
+
+
+22. The same is declared by Smriti also.
+
+Smriti also declares that the transmigrating soul when reaching the
+state of Release 'imitates,' i.e. attains supreme equality of attributes
+with the highest Brahman. 'Abiding by this knowledge they, attaining to
+equality of attributes with me, are not born again at the time of
+creation, nor are they affected by the general dissolution of the world'
+(Bha. Gī. XIV, 2).
+
+Some maintain that the last two Sūtras constitute a separate adhikarana
+(head of discussion), meant to prove that the text Mu. Up. II, 2, 10
+('After him the shining one, everything shines; by the light of him all
+this is lighted'), refers to the highest Brahman. This view is, however,
+inadmissible, for the reason that with regard to the text quoted no
+pūrvapaksha can arise, it having been proved under I, 2, 21 ff., and 1,3,
+1, ff., that the whole section of which that text forms part is
+concerned with Brahman; and it further having been shown under I, 1, 24
+ff., that Brahman is apprehended under the form of light.--The
+interpretation moreover does not fit in with the wording of the Sūtras.--
+Here terminates the adhikarana of the 'small one.'
+
+
+
+
+23. On account of the term, the one measured.
+
+We read in the Kathavallī 'The Person of the size of a thumb stands in
+the middle of the Self, as lord of the past and the future, and
+henceforward fears no more'; 'That Person of the size of a thumb is like
+a light without smoke,' &c. (Ka. Up. II, 4, 1; 13). And 'The Person not
+larger than a thumb, the inner Self, is always settled in the heart of
+men' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 17). A doubt here arises whether the being measured
+by the extent of a span be the individual soul or the highest Self.--The
+Pūrvapakshin maintains the former view; for, he says, another scriptural
+text also declares the individual soul to have that measure, 'the ruler
+of the vital airs moves through his own works, of the size of a thumb,
+brilliant like the sun, endowed with purposes and egoity' (Svet. Up. V,
+7; 8). Moreover, the highest Self is not anywhere else, not even for the
+purpose of meditation, represented as having the size of a thumb. It
+thus being determined that the being of the length of a thumb is the
+individual Self, we understand the term 'Lord,' which is applied to it,
+as meaning that it is the Lord of the body, the sense-organs, the
+objects and the instruments of fruition.--Of this view the Sūtra
+disposes, maintaining that the being a thumb long can be none but the
+highest Self, just on account of that term. For lordship over all things
+past and future cannot possibly belong to the individual Self, which is
+under the power of karman.--But how can the highest Self be said to have
+the measure of a thumb?--On this point the next Sūtra satisfies us.
+
+
+
+
+24. But with reference to the heart, men being qualified.
+
+In so far as the highest Self abides, for the purpose of devout
+meditation, in the heart of the devotee--which heart is of the measure
+of a thumb--it may itself be viewed as having the measure of a thumb.
+The individual soul also can be said to have the measure of a thumb only
+in so far as dwelling within the heart; for scripture directly states
+that its real size is that of the point of a goad, i.e. minute. And as
+men only are capable of devout meditation, and hence alone have a claim
+on scripture, the fact that the hearts of other living creatures also,
+such as donkeys, horses, snakes, &c., have the same size, cannot give
+rise to any objection.--The discussion of this matter will be completed
+later on [FOOTNOTE 326:1].
+
+
+
+
+25. Also beings above them (i.e. men), Bādarāyana thinks, on account of
+possibility.
+
+In order to prove that the highest Brahman may be viewed as having the
+size of a thumb, it has been declared that the scriptural texts
+enjoining meditation on Brahman are the concern of men. This offers an
+opportunity for the discussion of the question whether also other
+classes of individual souls, such as devas, are qualified for knowledge
+of Brahman. The Pūrvapakshin denies this qualification in the case of
+gods and other beings, on the ground of absence of capability. For, he
+says, bodiless beings, such as gods, are incapable of the accomplishment
+of meditation on Brahman, which requires as its auxiliaries the seven
+means enumerated above (p. 17)--This must not be objected to on the
+ground of the devas, and so on, having bodies; for there is no means of
+proof establishing such embodiedness. We have indeed proved above that
+the Vedānta-texts may intimate accomplished things, and hence are an
+authoritative means for the cognition of Brahman; but we do not meet
+with any Vedānta-text, the purport of which is to teach that the devas,
+and so on, possess bodies. Nor can this point be established through
+mantras and arthavāda texts; for these are merely supplementary to the
+injunctions of actions (sacrificial, and so on), and therefore have a
+different aim. And the injunctions themselves prove nothing with regard
+to the devas, except that the latter are that with a view to which those
+actions are performed. In the same way it also cannot be shown that the
+gods have any desires or wants (to fulfil or supply which they might
+enter on meditation of Brahman). For the two reasons above we therefore
+conclude that the devas, and so on, are not qualified for meditation on
+Brahman.--This view is contradicted by the Sūtra. Such meditation is
+possible in the case of higher beings also Bādarāyana thinks; on account
+of the possibility of want and capacity on their part also. Want and
+wish exist in their case since they also are liable to suffering,
+springing from the assaults, hard to be endured, of the different kinds
+of pain, and since they also know that supreme enjoyment is to be found
+in the highest Brahman, which is untouched by the shadow even of
+imperfection, and is a mass of auspicious qualities in their highest
+perfection. 'Capability', on the other hand, depends on the possession
+of a body and sense-organs of whatever degree of tenuity; and that the
+devas, from Brahma downward, possess a body and sense-organs, is
+declared in all the Upanishads, in the chapters treating of creation and
+the chapters enjoining meditation. In the Chāndogya, e.g. it is related
+how the highest Being having resolved on creation, evolved the aggregate
+of non-sentient matter with its different kinds, and then produced the
+fourfold multitude of living creatures, each having a material body
+corresponding to its karman, and a suitable name of its own. Similarly,
+all the other scriptural accounts of creation declare that there are
+four classes of creatures--devas, men, animals, and non-moving beings,
+such as plants--and the difference of these classes depends on the
+individual Selfs being joined to various bodies capacitating them to
+experience the results of their works, each in that one of the fourteen
+worlds--beginning with the world of Brahmā--which is the suitable place
+for retribution. For in themselves, apart from bodies, the individual
+Selfs are not distinguished as men, gods, and so on. In the same way the
+story of the devas and Asuras approaching Prajāpati with fuel in their
+hands, staying with him as pupils for thirty-two years, &c. (Ch. Up.
+VIII, 7 ff.), clearly shows that the devas possess bodies and sense-
+organs. Analogously, mantras and arthavādas, which are complementary to
+injunctions of works, contain unmistakeable references to the corporeal
+nature of the gods ('Indra holding in his hand the thunderbolt'; 'Indra
+lifted the thunderbolt', &c.); and as the latter is not contradicted by
+any other means of proof it must be accepted on the authority stated.
+Nor can it be said that those mantras and arthavādas are really meant to
+express something else (than those details mentioned above), in so far,
+namely, as they aim at proclaiming or glorifying the action with which
+they are connected; for those very details subserve the purpose of
+glorification, and so on, and without them glorification is not possible.
+For we praise or glorify a thing by declaring its qualities; if such
+qualities do not exist all glorification lapses. It cannot by any means
+be maintained that anything may be glorified by the proclamation of its
+qualities, even if such qualities do not really exist. Hence the
+arthavādas which glorify a certain action, just thereby intimate the
+real existence of the qualities and details of the action. The mantras
+again, which are prescribed in connexion with the actions, serve the
+purpose of throwing light on the use to be derived from the performance
+of the actions, and this they accomplish by making statements as to the
+particular qualities, such as embodiedness and the like, which belong to
+the devas and other classes of beings. Otherwise Indra, and so on, would
+not be remembered at the time of performance; for the idea of a divinity
+presents itself to the mind only in connexion with the special
+attributes of that divinity. In the case of such qualities as are not
+established by other means of proof, the primary statement is made by
+the arthavāda or the mantra: the former thereby glorifies the action,
+and the latter proclaims it as possessing certain qualities or details;
+and both these ends are accomplished by making statements as to the gods,
+&c., possessing certain qualities, such as embodiedness and the like.
+In the case, again, of certain qualities being already established by
+other means of proof, the mantras and arthavādas merely refer to them
+(as something already known), and in this way perform their function of
+glorification and elucidation. And where, thirdly, there is a
+contradiction between the other means of knowledge and what mantras and
+arthavādas state (as when, e.g. a text of the latter kind says that 'the
+sacrificial post is the sun'), the intention of the text is
+metaphorically to denote, by means of those apparently unmeaning terms,
+certain other qualities which are not excluded by the other means of
+knowledge; and in this way the function of glorification and elucidation
+is again accomplished. Now what the injunction of a sacrificial action
+demands as its supplement, is a statement as to the power of the
+divinity to whom the sacrifice is offered; for the performance which
+scripture enjoins on men desirous of certain results, is itself of a
+merely transitory nature, and hence requires some agent capable of
+bringing about, at some future time, the result desired as, e.g. the
+heavenly world. 'Vāyu is the swiftest god; he (the sacrificer)
+approaches Vāyu with his own share; the god then leads him to
+prosperity' (Taitt. Samh. I, 2, 1); 'What he seeks by means of that
+offering, may he obtain that, may he prosper therein, may the gods
+favourably grant him that' (Taitt. Br. III, 5, 10, 5); these and similar
+arthavādas and mantras intimate that the gods when propitiated by
+certain sacrificial works, give certain rewards and possess the power to
+do so; and they thus connect themselves with the general context of
+scripture as supplying an evidently required item of information.
+Moreover, the mere verb 'to sacrifice' (yaj), as denoting worship of the
+gods, intimates the presence of a deity which is to be propitiated by
+the action called sacrifice, and thus constitutes the main element of
+that action. A careful consideration of the whole context thus reveals
+that everything which is wanted for the due accomplishment of the action
+enjoined is to be learned from the text itself, and that hence we need
+not have recourse to such entities as the 'unseen principle' (apūrva),
+assumed to be denoted by, or to be imagined in connexion with, the
+passages enjoining certain actions. Hence the dharmasāstras, itihāsas,
+and purānas also, which are founded on the different brāhmanas, mantras
+and arthavādas, clearly teach that Brahma and the other gods, as well as
+the Asuras and other superhuman beings, have bodies and sense-organs,
+constitutions of different kinds, different abodes, enjoyments, and
+functions.--Owing to their having bodies, the gods therefore are also
+qualified for meditation on Brahman.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 326:1. The 'pramitādhikarana' is resumed in Sūtra 41.]
+
+
+
+
+26. If it be said that there results a contradiction to work; we deny
+this, on account of the observation of the assumption of several
+(bodies).
+
+An objection here presents itself. If we admit the gods to have bodies,
+a difficulty arises at the sacrifices, as it is impossible that one and
+the same corporeal Indra--who is at the same time invited by many
+sacrificers 'come, O Indra', 'come, O Lord of the red horses,' &c.--
+should be present at all those places. And that the gods, Agni and so on,
+really do come to the sacrifices is proved by the following scriptural
+text: 'To whose sacrifice do the gods go, and to whose not? He who first
+receives the gods, sacrifices to them on the following day' (Taitt. Samh.
+I, 6, 7, 1). In refutation of this objection the Suūtra points out that
+there is seen, i.e. recorded, the assumption of several bodies at the
+same time, on the part of beings endowed with special powers, such as
+Saubhari.
+
+
+
+
+27. If it be said (that a contradiction will result) with regard to
+words; we say no, since beings originate from them (as appears) from
+perception and inference.
+
+Well then let us admit that there is no difficulty as far as sacrifices
+are concerned, for the reason stated in the preceding Sūtra. But another
+difficulty presents itself with regard to the words of which the Veda
+consists. For if Indra and the other gods are corporeal beings, it
+follows that they are made up of parts and hence non-permanent. This
+implies either that the Vedic words denoting them--not differing therein
+from common worldly words such as Devadatta--are totally devoid of
+meaning during all those periods which precede the origination of the
+beings called Indra and so on, or follow on their destruction; or else
+that the Veda itself is non-permanent, non-eternal.--This objection is
+not valid, the Sūtra points out, for the reason that those beings, viz.
+Indra and so on, again and again originate from the Vedic words. To
+explain. Vedic words, such as Indra and so on, do not, like the word
+Devadatta and the like, denote, on the basis of convention, one
+particular individual only: they rather denote by their own power
+particular species of beings, just as the word 'cow' denotes a
+particular species of animals. When therefore a special individual of
+the class called Indra has perished, the creator, apprehending from the
+Vedic word 'Indra' which is present to his mind the class
+characteristics of the beings denoted by that word, creates another
+Indra possessing those very same characteristics; just as the potter
+fashions a new jar, on the basis of the word 'jar' which is stirring in
+_his_ mind.--But how is this known?--'Through perception and inference,'
+i.e. through Scripture and Smriti. Scripture says, e.g. 'By means of the
+Veda Prajāpati evolved names and forms, the being and the non-being';
+and 'Saying "bhūh" (earth) he created the earth; saying "bhuvah" he
+created the air,' and so on; which passages teach that the creator at
+first bethinks himself of the characteristic make of a thing, in
+connexion with the word denoting it, and thereupon creates an individual
+thing characterised by that make. Smriti makes similar statements;
+compare, e. g. 'In the beginning there was sent forth by the creator,
+divine speech--beginningless and endless--in the form of the Veda, and
+from it there originated all creatures'; and 'He, in the beginning,
+separately created from the words of the Veda the names and works and
+shapes of all things'; and 'The names and forms of beings, and all the
+multiplicity of works He in the beginning created from the Veda.' This
+proves that from the corporeality of the gods, and so on, it follows
+neither that the words of the Veda are unmeaning nor that the Veda
+itself is non-eternal.
+
+
+
+
+28. And for this very reason eternity (of the Veda).
+
+As words such as Indra and Vasishtha, which denote gods and Rishis,
+denote (not individuals only, but) classes, and as the creation of those
+beings is preceded by their being suggested to the creative mind through
+those words; for this reason the eternity of the Veda admits of being
+reconciled with what scripture says about the mantras and kāndas
+(sections) of the sacred text having 'makers' and about Rishis seeing
+the hymns; cp. such passages as 'He chooses the makers of mantras';
+'Reverence to the Rishis who are the makers of mantras'; 'That is Agni;
+this is a hymn of Visvāmitra.' For by means of these very texts
+Prajāpati presents to his own mind the characteristics and powers of the
+different Rishis who make the different sections, hymns, and mantras,
+thereupon creates them endowed with those characteristics and powers,
+and appoints them to remember the very same sections, hymns, &c. The
+Rishis being thus gifted by Prajāpati with the requisite powers, undergo
+suitable preparatory austerities and finally _see_ the mantras, and so
+on, proclaimed by the Vasishthas and other Rishis of former ages of the
+world, perfect in all their sounds and accents, without having learned
+them from the recitation of a teacher. There is thus no conflict between
+the eternity of the Veda and the fact that the Rishis are the _makers_
+of its sections, hymns, and so on. A further objection is raised. Let it
+be admitted that after each pralaya of the kind called 'contingent'
+(naimittika), Prajāpati may proceed to create new Indras, and so on, in
+the way of remembering on the basis of the Veda the Indras, and so on,
+of preceding periods. In the case, on the other hand, of a pralaya of
+the kind called elemental (prākritika), in which the creator, Prajāpati
+himself, and words--which are the effects of the elemental ahankāra--
+pass away, what possibility is there of Prajāpati undertaking a new
+creation on the basis of Vedic words, and how can we speak of the
+permanency of a Veda which perishes? He who maintains the eternity of
+the Veda and the corporeality of gods, and so on, is thus really driven
+to the hypothesis of the course of mundane existence being without a
+beginning (i.e. not preceded by a pralaya).--Of this difficulty the next
+Sūtra disposes.
+
+
+
+
+29. And on account of the equality of names and forms there is no
+contradiction, even in the renovation (of the world); as appears from--
+Sruti and Smriti.
+
+On account of the sameness of names and forms, as stated before, there
+is no difficulty in the way of the origination of the world, even in the
+case of total pralayas. For what actually takes place is as follows.
+When the period of a great pralaya draws towards its close, the divine
+supreme Person, remembering the constitution of the world previous to
+the pralaya, and forming the volition 'May I become manifold' separates
+into its constituent elements the whole mass of enjoying souls and
+objects of enjoyment which, during the pralaya state, had been merged in
+him so as to possess a separate existence (not actual but) potential
+only, and then emits the entire world just as it had been before, from
+the so-called Mahat down to the Brahman-egg, and Hiranyagarbha
+(Prajāpati). Having thereupon manifested the Vedas in exactly the same
+order and arrangement they had had before, and having taught them to
+Hiranyagarbha, he entrusts to him the new creation of the different
+classes of beings, gods, and so on, just as it was before; and at the
+same time abides himself within the world so created as its inner Self
+and Ruler. This view of the process removes all difficulties. The
+superhuman origin and the eternity of the Veda really mean that
+intelligent agents having received in their minds an impression due to
+previous recitations of the Veda in a fixed order of words, chapters,
+and so on, remember and again recite it in that very same order of
+succession. This holds good both with regard to us men and to the
+highest Lord of all; there however is that difference between the two
+cases that the representations of the Veda which the supreme Person
+forms in his own mind are spontaneous, not dependent on an impression
+previously made.
+
+To the question whence all this is known, the Sūtra replies 'from
+Scripture and Smriti.' The scriptural passage is 'He who first creates
+Brahmā and delivers the Vedas to him' (Svet. Up. VI, 18). And as to
+Smriti we have the following statement in Manu, 'This universe existed
+in the shape of darkness, &c.--He desiring to produce beings of many
+kinds from his own body, first with a thought created the waters and
+placed his seed in them. That seed became a golden egg equal to the sun
+in brilliancy; in that he himself was born as Brahmā, the progenitor of
+the whole world' (Manu I, 5; 8-9). To the same effect are the texts of
+the Paurānikas, 'From the navel of the sleeping divinity there sprung up
+a lotus, and in that lotus there was born Brahma fully knowing all Vedas
+and Vedāngas. And then Brahmā was told by him (the highest Divinity),
+'Do thou create all beings, O Great-minded one'; and the following
+passage, 'From the highest Nārāyana there was born the Four-faced one.'--
+And in the section which begins 'I will tell the original creation,' we
+read 'Because having created water (nāra) I abide within it, therefore
+my name shall be Nārāyana. There I lie asleep in every Kalpa, and as I
+am sleeping there springs from my navel a lotus, and in that lotus there
+is born the Four-faced one, and I tell him "Do thou, Great-minded one,
+create all beings."'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the deities.'
+
+
+
+
+30. On account of the impossibility (of qualification for the
+madhuvidyā, &c.) (Jaimini maintains the non-qualification (of gods,
+&c.).)
+
+So far it has been proved that also the gods, and so on, are qualified
+for the knowledge of Brahman. But a further point here presents itself
+for consideration, viz. whether the gods are qualified or not to
+undertake those meditations of which they themselves are the objects.
+The Sūtra states as a pūrvapaksha view held by Jaimini, that they are
+not so qualified, for the reason that there are no other Ādityas, Vasus,
+and so on, who could be meditated on by the Ādityas and Vasus themselves;
+and that moreover for the Ādityas and Vasus the qualities and position
+of those classes of deities cannot be objects of desire, considering
+that they possess them already. The so-called Madhuvidyā (Ch. Up. III)
+represents as objects of devout meditation certain parts of the sun
+which are being enjoyed by the different classes of divine beings, Vasus,
+Ādityas, and so on--the sun being there called 'madhu.' i.e. honey or
+nectar, on account of his being the abode of a certain nectar to be
+brought about by certain sacrificial works to be known from the Rig-veda,
+and so on; and as the reward of such meditation the text names the
+attainment of the position of the Vasus, Ādityas, and so on.
+
+
+
+
+31. And on account of (meditating on the part of the gods) being in the
+Light.
+
+'Him the devas meditate upon as the light of lights, as immortal time'
+(Bri. Up. IV, 4, 16). This text declares that the meditation of the gods
+has for its object the Light, i.e. the highest Brahman. Now this express
+declaration as to the gods being meditating devotees with regard to
+meditations on Brahman which are common to men and gods, implies a
+denial of the gods being qualified for meditations on other objects. The
+conclusion therefore is that the Vasus, and so on, are not qualified for
+meditations on the Vasus and other classes of deities.
+
+
+
+
+32. But Bādarāyana (maintains) the existence (of qualification); for
+there is (possibility of such).
+
+The Reverend Bādarāyana thinks that the Ādityas, Vasus, and so on, are
+also qualified for meditations on divinities. For it is in their case
+also possible that their attainment of Brahman should be viewed as
+preceded by their attainment of Vasu-hood or Āditya-hood, in so far,
+namely, as they meditate on Brahman as abiding within themselves. They
+may be Vasus and Ādityas in the present age of the world, but at the
+same time be desirous of holding the same position in future ages also.
+In the Madhuvidyā we have to distinguish two sections, concerned
+respectively with Brahman in its causal and its effected state. The
+former section, extending from the beginning up to 'when from thence he
+has risen upwards,' enjoins meditation on Brahman in its condition as
+effect, i.e. as appearing in the form of creatures such as the Vasus,
+and so on; while the latter section enjoins meditation on the causal
+Brahman viewed as abiding within the sun as its inner Self. The purport
+of the whole vidyā is that he who meditates on Brahman in this its
+twofold form will in a future age of the world enjoy Vasu-hood, and will
+finally attain Brahman in its causal aspect, i.e. the very highest
+Brahman. From the fact that the text, 'And indeed to him who thus knows
+the Brahma-upanishad, the sun does not rise and does not set; for him
+there is day once and for all,' calls the whole Madhuvidyā a 'Brahma'--
+upanishad, and that the reward declared is the attainment of Vasu-hood,
+and so on, leading up to the attainment of Brahman, we clearly are
+entitled to infer that the meditations which the text enjoins, viz. on
+the different parts of the sun viewed as objects of enjoyment for the
+Vasus, and so on, really are meant as meditations on Brahman as abiding
+in those different forms. Meditation on the Vasus and similar beings is
+thus seen to be possible for the Vasus themselves. And as Brahman really
+constitutes the only object of meditation, we also see the
+appropriateness of the text discussed above, 'On him the gods meditate
+as the light of lights.' The Vrittikāra expresses the same opinion, 'For
+there is possibility with regard to the Madhu-vidyā, and so on, Brahman
+only being the object of meditation everywhere.'--Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'honey.'
+
+The Sūtras now enter on a discussion of the question whether the Sūdras
+also are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.
+
+The Pūrvapakshin maintains that they are so qualified; for qualification,
+he says, depends on want and capacity, and both these are possible in
+the case of Sūdras also. The Sūdra is not indeed qualified for any works
+depending on a knowledge of the sacred fires, for from such knowledge he
+is debarred; but he possesses qualification for meditation on Brahman,
+which after all is nothing but a certain mental energy. The only works
+prerequisite for meditation are those works which are incumbent on a man
+as a member of a caste or āsrama, and these consist, in the Sūdra's case,
+in obedience to the higher castes. And when we read 'therefore the Sūdra
+is not qualified for sacrifices,' the purport of this passage is only to
+make a confirmatory reference to something already settled by reason,
+viz. that the Sūdra is not qualified for the performance of sacrifices
+which cannot be accomplished by one not acquainted with the sacred fires
+(and not to deny the Sūdra's competence for devout meditation).--But how
+can meditation on Brahman be undertaken by a man who has not studied the
+Vedas, inclusive of the Vedānta, and hence knows nothing about the
+nature of Brahman and the proper modes of meditation?--Those also, we
+reply, who do not study Veda and Vedānta may acquire the requisite
+knowledge by hearing Itihāsas and Purānas; and there are texts which
+allow Sūdras to become acquainted with texts of that kind; cp. e.g. 'one
+is to make the four castes to hear texts, the Brāhmana coming first.'
+Moreover, those Purānas and Itihāsas make mention of Sūdras, such as
+Vidura, who had a knowledge of Brahman. And the Upanishads themselves,
+viz. in the so-called Samvarga-vidyā, show that a Sūdra is qualified for
+the knowledge of Brahman; for there the teacher Raikva addresses
+Jānasruti, who wishes to learn from him, as Sūdra, and thereupon
+instructs him in the knowledge of Brahman (Ch. Up. IV, 2, 3). All this
+proves that Sūdras also have a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.
+
+This conclusion we deny, on the ground of the absence of capability. It
+is impossible that the capability of performing meditations on Brahman
+should belong to a person not knowing the nature of Brahman and the due
+modes of meditation, and not qualified by the knowledge of the requisite
+preliminaries of such meditation, viz. recitation of the Veda,
+sacrifices, and so on. Mere want or desire does not impart qualification
+to a person destitute of the required capability. And this absence of
+capability is due, in the Sūdra's case, to absence of legitimate study
+of the Veda. The injunctions of sacrificial works naturally connect
+themselves with the knowledge and the means of knowledge (i.e. religious
+ceremonies and the like) that belong to the three higher castes, for
+these castes actually possess the knowledge (required for the
+sacrifices), owing to their studying the Veda in agreement with the
+injunction which prescribes such study for the higher castes; the same
+injunctions do not, on the other hand, connect themselves with the
+knowledge and means of knowledge belonging to others (than members of
+the three higher castes). And the same naturally holds good with regard
+to the injunctions of meditation on Brahman. And as thus only such
+knowledge as is acquired by study prompted by the Vedic injunction of
+study supplies a means for meditation on Brahman, it follows that the
+Sūdra for whom that injunction is not meant is incapable of such
+meditation. Itihāsas and Purānas hold the position of being helpful
+means towards meditation in so far only as they confirm or support the
+Veda, not independently of the Veda. And that Sūdras are allowed to hear
+Itihāsas and Purānas is meant only for the end of destroying their sins,
+not to prepare them for meditation on Brahman. The case of Vidura and
+other Sūdras having been 'founded on Brahman,' explains itself as
+follows:--Owing to the effect of former actions, which had not yet
+worked themselves out, they were born in a low caste, while at the same
+time they possessed wisdom owing to the fact that the knowledge acquired
+by them in former births had not yet quite vanished.
+
+(On these general grounds we object to Sūdras being viewed as qualified
+for meditation on Brahman.) The Sūtra now refutes that argument, which
+the Pūrvapakshin derives from the use of the word 'Sūdra' in the
+Samvarga-vidyā.
+
+
+
+
+33. (That) grief of him (arose), this is intimated by his (Jānasruti's)
+resorting to him (Raikva) on hearing a disrespectful speech about
+himself.
+
+From what the text says about Jānasruti Pautrāyana having been taunted
+by a flamingo for his want of knowledge of Brahman, and having thereupon
+resorted to Raikva, who possessed the knowledge of Brahman, it appears
+that sorrow (suk) had taken possession of him; and it is with a view to
+this that Raikva addresses him as Sūdra. For the word Sūdra,
+etymologically considered, means one who grieves or sorrows (sokati).
+The appellation 'sūdra' therefore refers to his sorrow, not to his being
+a member of the fourth caste. This clearly appears from a consideration
+of the whole story. Jānasruti Pautrāyana was a very liberal and pious
+king. Being much pleased with his virtuous life, and wishing to rouse in
+him the desire of knowing Brahman, two noble-minded beings, assuming the
+shape of flamingoes, flew past him at night time, when one of them
+addressed the other, 'O Bhallāksha. the light of Jānasruti has spread
+like the sky; do not go near that it may not burn thee.' To this praise
+of Jānasruti the other flamingo replied, 'How can you speak of him,
+being what he is, as if he were Raikva "sayuktvān"?' i.e. 'how can you
+speak of Jānasruti, being what he is, as if he were Raikva, who knows
+Brahman and is endowed with the most eminent qualities? Raikva, who
+knows Brahman, alone in this world is truly eminent. Janasruti may be
+very pious, but as he does not know Brahman what quality of his could
+produce splendour capable of burning me like the splendour of Raikva?'
+The former flamingo thereupon asks who that Raikva is, and its companion
+replies, 'He in whose work and knowledge there are comprised all the
+works done by good men and all the knowledge belonging to intelligent
+creatures, that is Raikva.' Jānasruti, having heard this speech of the
+flamingo--which implied a reproach to himself as being destitute of the
+knowledge of Brahman, and a glorification of Raikva as possessing that
+knowledge--at once sends his door-keeper to look for Raikva; and when
+the door-keeper finds him and brings word, the king himself repairs to
+him with six hundred cows, a golden necklace, and a carriage yoked with
+mules, and asks him to teach him the deity on which he meditates, i.e.
+the highest deity. Raikva, who through the might of his Yoga-knowledge
+is acquainted with everything that passes in the three worlds, at once
+perceives that Jānasruti is inwardly grieved at the slighting speech of
+the flamingo, which had been provoked by the king's want of knowledge of
+Brahman, and is now making an effort due to the wish of knowing Brahman;
+and thus recognises that the king is fit for the reception of that
+knowledge. Reflecting thereupon that a knowledge of Brahman may be
+firmly established in this pupil even without long attendance on the
+teacher if only he will be liberal to the teacher to the utmost of his
+capability, he addresses him: 'Do thou take away (apāhara) (these
+things), O Sūdra; keep (the chariot) with the cows for thyself.' What he
+means to say is, 'By so much only in the way of gifts bestowed on me,
+the knowledge of Brahman cannot be established in thee, who, through the
+desire for such knowledge, art plunged in grief'--the address 'O Sūdra'
+intimating that Raikva knows Jānasruti to be plunged in grief, and on
+that account fit to receive instruction about Brahman. Jānasruti
+thereupon approaches Raikva for a second time, bringing as much wealth
+as he possibly can, and moreover his own daughter. Raikva again
+intimates his view of the pupil's fitness for receiving instruction by
+addressing him a second time as 'Sūdra,' and says, 'You have brought
+these, O Sūdra; by this mouth only you made me speak,' i.e. 'You now
+have brought presents to the utmost of your capability; by this means
+only you will induce me, without lengthy service on your part, to utter
+speech containing that instruction about Brahman which you desire.'--
+Having said this he begins to instruct him.--We thus see that the
+appellation 'sūdra' is meant to intimate the grief of Jānasruti--which
+grief in its turn indicates the king's fitness for receiving instruction;
+and is not meant to declare that Jānasruti belongs to the lowest caste.
+
+
+
+
+34. And on account of (Jānasruti ) kshattriya-hood being understood.
+
+The first section of the vidyā tells us that Jānasruti bestowed much
+wealth and food; later on he is represented as sending his door-keeper
+on an errand; and in the end, as bestowing on Raikva many villages--
+which shows him to be a territorial lord. All these circumstances
+suggest Jānasruti's being a Kshattriya, and hence not a member of the
+lowest caste.--The above Sūtra having declared that the kshattriya-hood
+of Jānasruti is indicated in the introductory legend, the next Sūtra
+shows that the same circumstance is indicated in the concluding legend.
+
+
+
+
+35. On account of the inferential sign further on, together with
+Kaitraratha.
+
+The kshattriya-hood of Jānasruti is further to be accepted on account of
+the Kshattriya Abhipratārin Kaitraratha, who is mentioned further on in
+this very same Samvargavidyā which Raikva imparts to Jānasruti.--But why?--
+As follows. The section beginning 'Once a Brahmakārin begged of Saunaka
+Kāpeya and Abhipratārin Kākshaseni while being waited on at their meal,'
+and ending 'thus do we, O Brahmakārin, meditate on that being,' shows
+Kāpeya, Abhipratārin, and the Brahmakārin to be connected with the
+Samvarga-vidyā. Now Abhipratārin is a Kshattriya, the other two are
+Brāhmanas. This shows that there are connected with the vidyā, Brāhmanas,
+and from among non-Brāhmanas, a Kshattriya only, but not a Sūdra. It
+therefore appears appropriate to infer that the person, other than the
+Brāhmana Raikva, who is likewise connected with this vidyā, viz.
+Jānasruti, is likewise a Kshattriya, not a Sūdra.--But how do we know
+that Abhipratārin is a Kaitraratha and a Kshattriya? Neither of these
+circumstances is stated in the legend in the Samvarga-vidyā! To this
+question the Sūtra replies, 'on account of the inferential mark.' From
+the inferential mark that Saunaka Kāpeya and Abhipratārin Kākshaseni are
+said to have been sitting together at a meal we understand that there is
+some connexion between Abhipratārin and the Kāpeyas. Now another
+scriptural passage runs as follows: 'The Kāpeyas made Kaitraratha
+perform that sacrifice' (Tānd Brā. XX, 12, 5), and this shows that one
+connected with the Kāpeyas was a Kaitraratha; and a further text shows
+that a Kaitraratha is a Kshattriya. 'from him there was descended a
+Kaitraratha who was a prince.' All this favours the inference that
+Abhipratārin was a Kaitraratha and a Kshattriya.
+
+So far the Sūtras have shown that there is no inferential mark to prove
+what is contradicted by reasoning, viz. the qualification of the Sūdras.
+The next Sūtra declares that the non-qualification of the Sūdra proved
+by reasoning is confirmed by Scripture and Smriti.
+
+
+
+
+36. On account of the reference to ceremonial purifications, and on
+account of the declaration of their absence.
+
+In sections the purport of which is to give instruction about Brahman
+the ceremony of initiation is referred to, 'I will initiate you; he
+initiated him' (Ch. Up. IV, 4). And at the same time the absence of such
+ceremonies in the case of Sūdras is stated: 'In the Sūdra there is not
+any sin, and he is not fit for any ceremony' (Manu X, 126); and 'The
+fourth caste is once born, and not fit for any ceremony' (Manu X, 4).
+
+
+
+
+37. And on account of the procedure, on the ascertainment of the non-
+being of that.
+
+That a Sūdra is not qualified for knowledge of Brahman appears from that
+fact also that as soon as Gautama has convinced himself that Jābāla, who
+wishes to become his pupil, is not a Sūdra, he proceeds to teach him the
+knowledge of Brahman.
+
+
+
+
+38. And on account of the prohibition of hearing, studying, and
+performance of (Vedic) matter.
+
+The Sūdra is specially forbidden to hear and study the Veda and to
+perform the things enjoined in it. 'For a Sūdra is like a cemetery,
+therefore the Veda must not be read in the vicinity of a Sūdra;'
+'Therefore the Sūdra is like a beast, unfit for sacrifices.' And he who
+does not hear the Veda recited cannot learn it so as to understand and
+perform what the Veda enjoins. The prohibition of hearing thus implies
+the prohibition of understanding and whatever depends on it.
+
+
+
+
+39. And on account of Smriti.
+
+Smriti also declares this prohibition of hearing, and so on. 'The ears
+of him who hears the Veda are to be filled with molten lead and lac; if
+he pronounces it his tongue is to be slit; if he preserves it his body
+is to be cut through.' And 'He is not to teach him sacred duties or vows.
+'--It is thus a settled matter that the Sūdras are not qualified for
+meditations on Brahman.
+
+We must here point out that the non-qualification of Sūdras for the
+cognition of Brahman can in no way be asserted by those who hold that a
+Brahman consisting of pure non-differenced intelligence constitutes the
+sole reality; that everything else is false; that all bondage is unreal;
+that such bondage may be put an end to by the mere cognition of the true
+nature of Reality--such cognition resulting from the hearing of certain
+texts; and that the cessation of bondage thus effected constitutes final
+Release. For knowledge of the true nature of Reality, in the sense
+indicated, and the release resulting from it, may be secured by any one
+who learns from another person that Brahman alone is real and that
+everything else is falsely superimposed on Brahman. That the cognition
+of such truth can be arrived at only on the basis of certain Vedic texts,
+such as 'Thou art that,' is a restriction which does not admit of proof;
+for knowledge of the truth does not depend on man's choice, and at once
+springs up in the mind even of an unwilling man as soon as the
+conditions for such origination are present. Nor can it be proved in any
+way that bondage can be put an end to only through such knowledge of the
+truth as springs from Vedic texts; for error comes to an end through the
+knowledge of the true nature of things, whatever agency may give rise to
+such knowledge. True knowledge, of the kind described, will spring up in
+the mind of a man as soon as he hears the non-scriptural declaration,
+'Brahman, consisting of non-differenced intelligence, is the sole
+Reality; everything else is false,' and this will suffice to free him
+from error. When a competent and trustworthy person asserts that what
+was mistaken for silver is merely a sparkling shell, the error of a
+Sūdra no less than of a Brāhmana comes to an end; in the same way a
+Sūdra also will free himself from the great cosmic error as soon as the
+knowledge of the true nature of things has arisen in his mind through a
+statement resting on the traditional lore of men knowing the Veda. Nor
+must you object to this on the ground that men knowing the Veda do not
+instruct Sūdras, and so on, because the text, 'he is not to teach him
+sacred things,' forbids them to do so; for men who have once learned--
+from texts such as 'Thou art that'--that Brahman is their Self, and thus
+are standing on the very top of the Veda as it were, move no longer in
+the sphere of those to whom injunctions and prohibitions apply, and the
+prohibition quoted does not therefore touch them. Knowledge of Brahman
+may thus spring up in the mind of Sūdras and the like, owing to
+instruction received from one of those men who have passed beyond all
+prohibition. Nor must it be said that the instance of the shell and the
+silver is not analogous, in so far, namely, as the error with regard to
+silver in the shell comes to an end as soon as the true state of things
+is declared; while the great cosmic error that clouds the Sūdra's mind
+does not come to an end as soon as, from the teaching of another man, he
+learns the truth about Reality. For the case of the Sūdra does not
+herein differ from that of the Brāhmana; the latter also does not at
+once free himself from the cosmic error. Nor again will it avail to
+plead that the sacred texts originate the demanded final cognition in
+the mind of the Brāhmana as soon as meditation has dispelled the
+obstructive imagination of plurality; for in the same way, i.e. helped
+by meditation, the non-Vedic instruction given by another person
+produces the required cognition in the mind of the Sūdra. For meditation
+means nothing but a steady consideration of the sense which sentences
+declaratory of the unity of Brahman and the Self may convey, and the
+effect of such meditation is to destroy all impressions opposed to such
+unity; you yourself thus admit that the injunction of meditation aims at
+something visible (i.e. an effect that can be definitely assigned,
+whence it follows that the Sūdra also is qualified for it, while he
+would not be qualified for an activity having an 'adrishta,' i.e.
+supersensuous, transcendental effect). The recital of the text of the
+Veda also and the like (are not indispensable means for bringing about
+cognition of Brahman, but) merely subserve the origination of the _desire_
+of knowledge. The desire of knowledge may arise in a Sūdra also (viz. in
+some other way), and thereupon real knowledge may result from non-Vedic
+instruction, obstructive imaginations having previously been destroyed
+by meditation. And thus in his case also non-real bondage will come to
+an end.--The same conclusion may also be arrived at by a different road.
+The mere ordinary instruments of knowledge, viz. perception and
+inference assisted by reasoning, may suggest to the Sūdra the theory
+that there is an inward Reality constituted by non-differenced self-
+luminous intelligence, that this inward principle witnesses Nescience,
+and that owing to Nescience the entire apparent world, with its manifold
+distinctions of knowing subjects and objects of knowledge, is
+superimposed upon the inner Reality. He may thereupon, by uninterrupted
+meditation on this inner Reality, free himself from all imaginations
+opposed to it, arrive at the intuitive knowledge of the inner principle,
+and thus obtain final release. And this way being open to release, there
+is really no use to be discerned in the Vedānta-texts, suggesting as
+they clearly do the entirely false view that the real being (is not
+absolutely homogeneous intelligence, but) possesses infinite
+transcendent attributes, being endowed with manifold powers, connected
+with manifold creations, and so on. In this way the qualification of
+Sūdras for the knowledge of Brahman is perfectly clear. And as the
+knowledge of Brahman may be reached in this way not only by Sūdras but
+also by Brāhmanas and members of the other higher castes, the poor
+Upanishad is practically defunct.--To this the following objection will
+possibly be raised. Man being implicated in and confused by the
+beginningless course of mundane existence, requires to receive from
+somewhere a suggestion as to this empirical world being a mere error and
+the Reality being something quite different, and thus only there arises
+in him a desire to enter on an enquiry, proceeding by means of
+perception, and so on. Now that which gives the required suggestion is
+the Veda, and hence we cannot do without it.--But this objection is not
+valid. For in the minds of those who are awed by all the dangers and
+troubles of existence, the desire to enter on a philosophical
+investigation of Reality, proceeding by means of Perception and
+Inference, springs up quite apart from the Veda, owing to the
+observation that there are various sects of philosophers. Sānkhyas, and
+so on, who make it their business to carry on such investigations. And
+when such desire is once roused, Perception and Inference alone (in the
+way allowed by the Sānkaras themselves) lead on to the theory that the
+only Reality is intelligence eternal, pure, self-luminous, non-dual, non-
+changing, and that everything else is fictitiously superimposed thereon.
+That this self-luminous Reality possesses no other attribute to be
+learned from scripture is admitted; for according to your opinion also
+scripture sublates everything that is not Brahman and merely
+superimposed on it. Nor should it be said that we must have recourse to
+the Upanishads for the purpose of establishing that the Real found in
+the way of perception and inference is at the same time of the nature of
+bliss; for the merely and absolutely Intelligent is seen of itself to be
+of that nature, since it is different from everything that is not of
+that nature.--There are, on the other hand, those who hold that the
+knowledge which the Vedānta-texts enjoin as the means of Release is of
+the nature of devout meditation; that such meditation has the effect of
+winning the love of the supreme Spirit and is to be learned from
+scripture only; that the injunctions of meditation refer to such
+knowledge only as springs from the legitimate study of the Veda on the
+part of a man duly purified by initiation and other ceremonies, and is
+assisted by the seven means (see above, p. 17); and that the supreme
+Person pleased by such meditation bestows on the devotee knowledge of
+his own true nature, dissolves thereby the Nescience springing from
+works, and thus releases him from bondage. And on this view the proof of
+the non-qualification of the Sūdra, as given in the preceding Sūtras,
+holds good.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the exclusion of the
+Sūdras.'
+
+Having thus completed the investigation of qualification which had
+suggested itself in connexion with the matter in hand, the Sūtras return
+to the being measured by a thumb, and state another reason for its being
+explained as Brahman--as already understood on the basis of its being
+declared the ruler of what is and what will be.
+
+
+
+
+40. On account of the trembling.
+
+In the part of the Katha-Upanishad which intervenes between the passage
+'The Person of the size of a thumb stands in the middle of the Self (II,
+4, 12), and the passage 'The Person of the size of a thumb, the inner
+Self' (II, 6, 17), we meet with the text 'whatever there is, the whole
+world, when gone forth, trembles in its breath. A great terror, a raised
+thunderbolt; those who knew it became immortal. From fear of it fire
+burns, from fear the sun shines, from fear Indra and Vāyu, and Death as
+the fifth run away' (II, 6, 2; 3). This text declares that the whole
+world and Agni, Sūrya, and so on, abiding within that Person of the size
+of a thumb, who is here designated by the term 'breath,' and going forth
+from him, tremble from their great fear of him. 'What will happen to us
+if we transgress his commandments?'--thinking thus the whole world
+trembles on account of great fear, as if it were a raised thunderbolt.
+In this explanation we take the clause 'A great fear, a raised
+thunderbolt,' in the sense of '(the world trembles) from great fear,' &c.,
+as it is clearly connected in meaning with the following clause: 'from
+fear the fire burns,' &c.--Now what is described here is the nature of
+the highest Brahman; for that such power belongs to Brahman only we know
+from other texts, viz.: 'By the command of that Imperishable, O Gārgī,
+sun and moon stand apart' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 9); and 'From fear of it the
+wind blows, from fear the sun rises; from fear of it Agni and Indra, yea
+Death runs as the fifth' (Taitt. Up. II, 8, 1).--The next Sūtra supplies
+a further reason.
+
+
+
+
+41. On account of light being seen (declared in the text).
+
+Between the two texts referring to the Person of the size of a thumb,
+there is a text declaring that to that Person there belongs light that
+obscures all other light, and is the cause and assistance of all other
+light; and such light is characteristic of Brahman only. 'The sun does
+not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, and
+much less this fire. After him, the shining one, everything shines; by
+his light all this is lighted' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 15)--This very same sloka
+is read in the Ātharvana (i.e. Mundaka) with reference to Brahman.
+Everywhere, in fact, the texts attribute supreme luminousness to Brahman
+only. Compare: 'Having approached the highest light he manifests himself
+in his own shape' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3); 'Him the gods meditate on as
+the light of lights, as immortal time' (Bri. Up. IV, 4,16); 'Now that
+light which shines above this heaven' (Ch. Up. III, 13, 7).--It is thus
+a settled conclusion that the Person measured by a thumb is the highest
+Brahman.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'him who is measured' (by a
+thumb).
+
+
+
+
+42. The ether, on account of the designation of something different, and
+so on.
+
+We read in the Chāndogya. 'The ether is the evolver of forms and names.
+That within which these forms and names are (or "that which is within--
+or without--these forms and names") is Brahman, the Immortal, the Self'
+(VIII, 14). A doubt here arises whether the being here called ether be
+the released individual soul, or the highest Self.--The Pūrvapakshin
+adopts the former view. For, he says, the released soul is introduced as
+subject-matter in an immediately preceding clause,'Shaking off all as a
+horse shakes his hair, and as the moon frees himself from the mouth of
+Rāhu; having shaken off the body I obtain, satisfied, the uncreated
+world of Brahman' Moreover, the clause 'That which is without forms and
+names' clearly designates the released soul freed from name and form.
+And 'the evolver of names and forms' is again that same soul
+characterised with a view to its previous condition; for the individual
+soul in its non-released state supported the shapes of gods, and so on,
+and their names. With a view, finally, to its present state in which it
+is free from name and form, the last clause declares 'that is Brahman,
+the Immortal'. The term 'ether' may very well be applied to the released
+soul which is characterised by the possession of non-limited splendour.--
+But, as the text under discussion is supplementary to the section
+dealing with the small ether within the heart (VIII, 1, 1 ff.), we
+understand that that small ether is referred to here also; and it has
+been proved above that that small ether is Brahman!--Not so, we reply.
+The text under discussion is separated from the section treating of the
+small ether within the heart, by the teaching of Prajāpati. and that
+teaching is concerned with the characteristics of the individual soul in
+its different conditions up to Release; and moreover the earlier part of
+the section under discussion speaks of the being which shakes off evil,
+and this undoubtedly is the released individual soul introduced in the
+teaching of Prajāpati. All this shows that the ether in our passage
+denotes the released individual soul.
+
+This view is set aside by the Sūtra. The ether in our passage is the
+highest Brahman, because the clause 'Ether is the evolver of forms and
+names' designates something other than the individual soul. The ether
+which evolves names and forms cannot be the individual soul either in
+the state of bondage or that of release. In the state of bondage the
+soul is under the influence of karman, itself participates in name and
+form, and hence cannot bring about names and forms. And in its released
+state it is expressly said not to take part in the world-business (Ve.
+Sū. IV, 4, 17), and therefore is all the less qualified to evolve names
+and forms. The Lord, on the other hand, who is the ruling principle in
+the construction of the Universe is expressly declared by scripture to
+be the evolver of names and forms; cp. 'Entering into them with this
+living Self, let me evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'Who is
+all-knowing, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born this
+Brahman, name, form, and matter' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9), &c. Hence the ether
+which brings about names and forms is something different from the soul
+for which name and form are brought about; it is in fact the highest
+Brahman. This the next clause of the text confirms, 'That which is
+within those forms and names'; the purport of which is: because that
+ether is within names and forms, not being touched by them but being
+something apart, therefore it is the evolver of them; this also
+following from his being free from evil and endowed with the power of
+realising his purposes. The 'and so on' in the Sūtra refers to the
+Brahma-hood, Self-hood, and immortality mentioned in the text ('That is
+the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self'). For Brahma-hood, i.e. greatness,
+and so on, in their unconditioned sense, belong to the highest Self only.
+It is thus clear that the ether is the highest Brahman.--Nor is the
+Pūrvapakshin right in maintaining that a clause immediately preceding
+('shaking off all evil') introduces the individual soul as the general
+topic of the section. For what the part of the text immediately
+preceding the passage under discussion does introduce as general topic,
+is the highest Brahman, as shown by the clause 'I obtain the Brahma-
+world.' Brahman is, it is true, represented there as the object to be
+obtained by the released soul; but as the released soul cannot be the
+evolver of names and forms, &c., we must conclude that it is Brahman
+(and not the released soul), which constitutes the topic of the whole
+section. Moreover (to take a wider view of the context of our passage)
+the term 'ether' prompts us to recognise here the small ether (mentioned
+in the first section of the eighth book) as the general topic of the
+book; and as the teaching of Prajāpati is meant to set forth (not the
+individual soul by itself but) the nature of the soul of the meditating
+devotee, it is proper to conclude that the text under discussion is
+meant finally to represent, as the object to be obtained, the small
+ether previously inculcated as object of meditation. In conclusion we
+remark that the term 'ether' is nowhere seen to denote the individual
+Self.--The ether that evolves names and forms, therefore, is the highest
+Brahman.
+
+But, an objection is raised, there is no other Self different from the
+individual Self; for scripture teaches the unity of all Selfs and denies
+duality. Terms such as 'the highest Self,' 'the highest Brahman,' 'the
+highest Lord,' are merely designations of the individual soul in the
+state of Release. The Brahma-world to be attained, therefore, is nothing
+different from the attaining individual soul; and hence the ether also
+that evolves names and forms can be that soul only.--To this objection
+the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+43. On account of difference in deep sleep and departing.
+
+We have to supply 'on account of designation' from the preceding Sūtra.
+Because the text designates the highest Self as something different from
+the individual Self in the state of deep sleep as well as at the time of
+departure, the highest Self is thus different. For the Vājasaneyaka,
+after having introduced the individual Self in the passage 'Who is that
+Self?--He who consisting of knowledge is among the prānas,' &c. (_Bri_.
+Up. IV, 3, 7), describes how, in the state of deep sleep, being not
+conscious of anything it is held embraced by the all-knowing highest
+Self, embraced by the intelligent Self it knows nothing that is without,
+nothing that is within' (IV, 3, 21). So also with reference to the time
+of departure, i.e. dying 'Mounted by the intelligent Self it moves along
+groaning' (IV, 3, 35). Now it is impossible that the unconscious
+individual Self, either lying in deep sleep or departing from the body,
+should at the same time be embraced or mounted by itself, being all-
+knowing. Nor can the embracing and mounting Self be some other
+individual Self; for no such Self can be all-knowing.--The next Sūtra
+supplies a further reason.
+
+
+
+
+44. And on account of such words as Lord.
+
+That embracing highest Self is further on designated by terms such as
+Lord, and so on. 'He is the Lord of all, the master of all, the ruler of
+all. He does not become greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works.
+He is the lord of all, the king of beings, the protector of beings. He
+is a bank and a boundary so that these worlds may not be confounded.
+Brāhmanas seek to know him by the study of the Veda. He who knows him
+becomes a Muni. Wishing for that world only, mendicants leave their
+homes' (IV, 4, 22). 'This indeed is the great unborn Self, the strong,
+the giver of wealth,--undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is
+Brahman' (IV, 4, 24; 25). Now all the qualities here declared, viz.
+being the lord of all, and so on, cannot possibly belong to the
+individual Self even in the state of Release; and we thus again arrive
+at the conclusion that the ether evolving forms and names is something
+different from the released individual soul. The declarations of general
+Unity which we meet with in the texts rest thereon, that all sentient
+and non-sentient beings are effects of Brahman, and hence have Brahman
+for their inner Self. That this is the meaning of texts such as 'All
+this is Brahman,' &c., we have explained before. And the texts denying
+plurality are to be understood in the same way.--Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'the designation of something different, and so on.'
+
+
+
+
+FOURTH PĀDA.
+
+1. If it be said that some (mention) that which rests on Inference; we
+deny this because (the form) refers to what is contained in the simile
+of the body; and (this the text) shows.
+
+So far the Sūtras have given instruction about a Brahman, the enquiry
+into which serves as a means to obtain what is the highest good of man,
+viz. final release; which is the cause of the origination, and so on, of
+the world; which differs in nature from all non-sentient things such as
+the Pradhāna, and from all intelligent beings whether in the state of
+bondage or of release; which is free from all shadow of imperfection;
+which is all knowing, all powerful, has the power of realising all its
+purposes, comprises within itself all blessed qualities, is the inner
+Self of all, and possesses unbounded power and might. But here a new
+special objection presents itself. In order to establish the theory
+maintained by Kapila, viz. of there being a Pradhāna and individual
+souls which do _not_ have their Self in Brahman, it is pointed out by
+some that in certain branches of the Veda there are met with certain
+passages which appear to adumbrate the doctrine of the Pradhāna being
+the universal cause. The Sūtras now apply themselves to the refutation
+of this view, in order thereby to confirm the theory of Brahman being
+the only cause of all.
+
+We read in the Katha-Upanishad, 'Beyond the senses there are the objects,
+beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is the
+intellect, the great Self is beyond the intellect. Beyond the Great
+there is the Unevolved, beyond the Unevolved there is the Person. Beyond
+the Person there is nothing--this is the goal, the highest road' (Ka. Up.
+I, 3, 11). The question here arises whether by the 'Unevolved' be or be
+not meant the Pradhāna, as established by Kapila's theory, of which
+Brahman is not the Self.--The Pūrvapakshin maintains the former
+alternative. For, he says, in the clause 'beyond the Great is the
+Unevolved, beyond the Unevolved is the Person,' we recognise the
+arrangement of entities as established by the Sānkhya-system, and hence
+must take the 'Unevolved' to be the Pradhāna. This is further confirmed
+by the additional clause 'beyond the Person there is nothing,' which (in
+agreement with Sānkhya principles) denies that there is any being beyond
+the soul, which itself is the twenty-fifth and last of the principles
+recognised by the Sānkhyas. This primā facie view is expressed in the
+former part of the Sūtra, 'If it be said that in the sākhās of some that
+which rests on Inference, i.e. the Pradhāna, is stated as the universal
+cause.'
+
+The latter part of the Sūtra refutes this view. The word 'Unevolved'
+does not denote a Pradhāna independent of Brahman; it rather denotes the
+body represented as a chariot in the simile of the body, i.e. in the
+passage instituting a comparison between the Self, body, intellect, and
+so on, on the one side, and the charioteer, chariot, &c. on the other
+side.--The details are as follows. The text at first--in the section
+beginning 'Know the Self to be the person driving,' &c., and ending 'he
+reaches the end of the journey, and that is the highest place of Vishnu'
+(I, 3, 3-9)--compares the devotee desirous of reaching the goal of his
+journey through the samsāra, i.e. the abode of Vishnu, to a man driving
+in a chariot; and his body, senses, and so on, to the chariot and parts
+of the chariot; the meaning of the whole comparison being that he only
+reaches the goal who has the chariot, &c. in his control. It thereupon
+proceeds to declare which of the different beings enumerated and
+compared to a chariot, and so on, occupy a superior position to the
+others in so far, namely, as they are that which requires to be
+controlled--'higher than the senses are the objects,' and so on. Higher
+than the senses compared to the horses--are the objects--compared to
+roads,--because even a man who generally controls his senses finds it
+difficult to master them when they are in contact with their objects;
+higher than the objects is the mind-compared to the reins--because when
+the mind inclines towards the objects even the non-proximity of the
+latter does not make much difference; higher than the mind (manas) is
+the intellect (buddhi)--compared to the charioteer--because in the
+absence of decision (which is the characteristic quality of buddhi) the
+mind also has little power; higher than the intellect again is the
+(individual) Self, for that Self is the agent whom the intellect serves.
+And as all this is subject to the wishes of the Self, the text
+characterises it as the 'great Self.' Superior to that Self again is the
+body, compared to the chariot, for all activity whereby the individual
+Self strives to bring about what is of advantage to itself depends on
+the body. And higher finally than the body is the highest Person, the
+inner Ruler and Self of all, the term and goal of the journey of the
+individual soul; for the activities of all the beings enumerated depend
+on the wishes of that highest Self. As the universal inner Ruler that
+Self brings about the meditation of the Devotee also; for the Sūtra (II,
+3, 41) expressly declares that the activity of the individual soul
+depends on the Supreme Person. Being the means for bringing about the
+meditation and the goal of meditation, that same Self is the highest
+object to be attained; hence the text says 'Higher than the Person there
+is nothing--that is the goal, the highest road.' Analogously scripture,
+in the antaryāmin-Brāhmana, at first declares that the highest Self
+within witnesses and rules everything, and thereupon negatives the
+existence of any further ruling principle 'There is no other seer but he,'
+&c. Similarly, in the Bhagavad-gītā, 'The abode, the agent, the
+various senses, the different and manifold functions, and fifth the
+Divinity (i.e. the highest Person)' (XVIII, 14); and 'I dwell within the
+heart of all; memory and perception, as well as their loss, come from
+me' (XV, 15). And if, as in the explanation of the text under discussion,
+we speak of that highest Self being 'controlled,' we must understand
+thereby the soul's taking refuge with it; compare the passage Bha. Gī.
+XVIII, 61-62, 'The Lord dwells in the heart of all creatures, whirling
+them round as if mounted on a machine; to Him go for refuge.'
+
+Now all the beings, senses, and so on, which had been mentioned in the
+simile, are recognised in the passage 'higher than the senses are the
+objects,' &c., being designated there by their proper names; but there
+is no mention made of the body which previously had been compared to the
+chariot; we therefore conclude that it is the body which is denoted by
+the term 'the Unevolved.' Hence there is no reason to see here a
+reference to the Pradhāna as established in the theory of Kapila. Nor do
+we recognise, in the text under discussion, the general system of Kapila.
+The text declares the objects, i.e. sounds and so on, to be superior to
+the senses; but in Kapila's system the objects are not viewed as the
+causes of the senses. For the same reason the statement that the manas
+is higher than the objects does not agree with Kapila's doctrine. Nor is
+this the case with regard to the clause 'higher than the buddhi is the
+great one, the Self; for with Kapila the 'great one' (mahat) is the
+buddhi, and it would not do to say 'higher than the great one is the
+great one.' And finally the 'great one,' according to Kapila, cannot be
+called the 'Self.' The text under discussion thus refers only to those
+entities which had previously appeared in the simile. The text itself
+further on proves this, when saying 'That Self is hidden in all beings
+and does not shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their
+sharp and subtle intellect. A wise man should keep down speech in the
+mind, he should keep that within knowledge (which is) within the Self;
+he should keep knowledge within the great Self, and that he should keep
+within the quiet Self.' For this passage, after having stated that the
+highest Self is difficult to see with the inner and outer organs of
+knowledge, describes the mode in which the sense-organs, and so on, are
+to be held in control. The wise man should restrain the sense-organs and
+the organs of activity within the mind; he should restrain that (i.e.
+the mind) within knowledge, i.e. within the intellect (buddhi), which
+abides within the Self; he should further restrain the intellect within
+the great Self, i.e. the active individual Self; and that Self finally
+he should restrain within the quiet Self, i.e. the highest Brahman,
+which is the inner ruler of all; i.e. he should reach, with his
+individual Self so qualified, the place of Vishnu, i.e. Brahman.--But
+how can the term 'the Unevolved' denote the evolved body?--To this
+question the next Sūtra furnishes a reply.
+
+
+
+
+2. But the subtle (body), on account of its capability.
+
+The elements in their fine state are what is called the 'Unevolved,' and
+this entering into a particular condition becomes the body. It is the
+'Unevolved' in the particular condition of the body, which in the text
+under discussion is called the 'Unevolved.' 'On account of its
+capability,' i.e. because Unevolved non-sentient matter, when assuming
+certain states and forms, is capable of entering on activities promoting
+the interest of man. But, an objection is raised, if the 'Unevolved' is
+taken to be matter in its subtle state, what objection is there to our
+accepting for the explanation of our text that which is established in
+the Sānkhya-system? for there also the 'Unevolved' means nothing else
+but matter in its subtle state.
+
+
+
+
+To this the next Sūtra replies--
+
+3. (Matter in its subtle state) subserves an end, on account of its
+dependence on him (viz. the Supreme Person).
+
+Matter in its subtle state subserves ends, in so far only as it is
+dependent on the Supreme Person who is the cause of all. We by no means
+wish to deny unevolved matter and all its effects in themselves, but in
+so far only as they are maintained not to have their Self in the Supreme
+Person. For the fact is that they constitute his body and He thus
+constitutes their Self; and it is only through this their relation to
+him that the Pradhāna, and so on, are capable of accomplishing their
+several ends. Otherwise the different essential natures of them all
+could never exist,--nor persist, nor act. It is just on the ground of
+this dependence on the Lord not being acknowledged by the Sānkhyas that
+their system is disproved by us. In Scripture and Smriti alike, wherever
+the origination and destruction of the world are described, or the
+greatness of the Supreme Person is glorified, the Pradhāna and all its
+effects, no less than the individual souls, are declared to have their
+Self in that Supreme Person. Compare, e.g. the text which first says
+that the earth is merged in water, and further on 'the elements are
+merged in the Mahat, the Mahat in the Unevolved, the Unevolved in the
+Imperishable, the Imperishable in Darkness; Darkness becomes one with
+the highest divinity.' And 'He of whom the earth is the body,' &c. up to
+'he of whom the Unevolved is the body; of whom the Imperishable is the
+body; of whom death is the body; he the inner Self of all beings, free
+from all evil, the divine one, the one God Nārāyana.' And Earth, water,
+fire, air, ether, mind, intellect, egoity--thus eightfold is my nature
+divided. Lower is this nature; other than this and higher know that
+nature of mine which has become the individual soul by which this world
+is supported. Remember that all beings spring from this; I am the origin
+and the dissolution of the whole Universe. Higher than I there is none
+else; all this is strung on me as pearls on a thread' (Bha. Gī VII, 4-7).
+And 'the Evolved is Vishnu, and the Unevolved, he is the Person and time.--
+The nature (prakriti) declared by me, having the double form of the
+Evolved and the Unevolved, and the soul-both these are merged in the
+highest Self. That Self is the support of all, the Supreme Person who
+under the name of Vishnu is glorified in the Vedas and the Vedānta books.'
+
+
+
+
+4. And on account of there being no statement of its being an object of
+knowledge.
+
+If the text meant the Non-evolved as understood by the Sānkhyas it would
+refer to it as something to be known; for the Sānkhyas, who hold the
+theory of Release resulting from the discriminative knowledge of the
+Evolved, the Non-evolved, and the soul, admit that all these are objects
+of knowledge. Now our text does not refer to the Un-evolved as an object
+of knowledge, and it cannot therefore be the Pradhāna assumed by the
+Sānkhyas.
+
+
+
+
+5. Should it be said that (the text) declares (it); we say, not so; for
+the intelligent Self (is meant), on account of subject-matter.
+
+'He who has meditated on that which is without sound, without touch,
+without form, without decay, without taste, eternal, without smell,
+without beginning, without end, beyond the Great, unchangeable; is freed
+from the jaws of death' (Ka. Up. II, 3,15), this scriptural text,
+closely following on the text under discussion, represents the
+'Unevolved' as the object of knowledge!--Not so, we reply. What that
+sloka represents as the object of meditation is (not the Unevolved but)
+the intelligent Self, i.e. the Supreme Person. For it is the latter who
+forms the general subject-matter, as we infer from two preceding
+passages, viz. 'He who has knowledge for his charioteer, and who holds
+the reins of the mind, he reaches the end of his journey, the highest
+place of Vishnu'; and 'That Self is hidden in all beings and does not
+shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and
+subtle intellect.' For this reason, also, the clause 'Higher than the
+person there is nothing' cannot be taken as meant to deny the existence
+of an entity beyond the 'purusha' in the Sānkhya sense. That the highest
+Self possesses the qualities of being without sound, &c., we moreover
+know from other scriptural texts, such as Mu. Up. I, 1, 6 'That which is
+not to be seen, not to be grasped,' &c. And the qualification 'beyond
+the Great, unchangeable' is meant to declare that the highest Self is
+beyond the individual Self which had been called 'the Great' in a
+previous passage 'beyond the intellect is the Great Self.'
+
+
+
+
+6. And of three only there is this mention and question.
+
+In the Upanishad under discussion there is mention made of three things
+only as objects of knowledge--the three standing to one another in the
+relation of means, end to be realised by those means, and persons
+realising,--and questions are asked as to those three only. There is no
+mention of, nor question referring to, the Unevolved.--Nakiketas
+desirous of Release having been allowed by Death to choose three boons,
+chooses for his first boon that his father should be well disposed
+towards him--without which he could not hope for spiritual welfare. For
+his second boon he chooses the knowledge of the Nakiketa-fire, which is
+a means towards final Release. 'Thou knowest, O Death, the fire-
+sacrifice which leads to heaven; tell it to me, full of faith. Those who
+live in the heaven-world reach Immortality--this I ask as my second boon.'
+The term 'heaven-world' here denotes the highest aim of man, i.e.
+Release, as appears from the declaration that those who live there enjoy
+freedom from old age and death; from the fact that further on (I, 1, 26)
+works leading to perishable results are disparaged; and from what Yama
+says in reply to the second demand 'He who thrice performs this Nākiketa-
+rite overcomes birth and death.' As his third boon he, in the form of a
+question referring to final release, actually enquires about three
+things, viz. 'the nature of the end to be reached, i.e. Release; the
+nature of him who wishes to reach that end; and the nature of the means
+to reach it, i.e. of meditation assisted by certain works. Yama, having
+tested Nakiketas' fitness to receive the desired instruction, thereupon
+begins to teach him. 'The Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has
+entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the
+abyss; having known him as God, by means of meditation on his Self, the
+wise one leaves joy and sorrow behind.' Here the clause 'having known
+the God,' points to the divine Being that is to be meditated upon; the
+clause 'by means of meditation on his Self points to the attaining agent,
+i.e. the individual soul as an object of knowledge; and the clause
+'having known him the wise ones leave joy and sorrow behind' points to
+the meditation through which Brahman is to be reached. Nakiketas,
+pleased with the general instruction received, questions again in order
+to receive clearer information on those three matters, 'What thou seest
+as different from dharma and different from adharma, as different from
+that, from that which is done and not done, as different from what is
+past or future, tell me that'; a question referring to three things, viz.
+an object to be effected, a means to effect it, and an effecting agent--
+each of which is to be different from anything else past, present, or
+future [FOOTNOTE 362:1]. Yama thereupon at first instructs him as to the
+Pranava, 'That word which all the Vedas record, which all penances
+proclaim, desiring which men become religious students; that word I tell
+thee briefly--it is Om'--an instruction which implies praise of the
+Pranava, and in a general way sets forth that which the Pranava
+expresses, e.g. the nature of the object to be reached, the nature of
+the person reaching it, and the means for reaching it, such means here
+consisting in the word 'Om,' which denotes the object to be reached
+[FOOTNOTE 362:2]. He then continues to glorify the Pranava (I, a,
+16-17), and thereupon gives special information in the first place about
+the nature of the attaining subject, i.e., the individual soul, 'The
+knowing Self is not born, it dies not,' &c. Next he teaches Nakiketas as
+to the true nature of the object to be attained, viz. the highest
+Brahman or Vishnu, in the section beginning 'The Self smaller than
+small,' and ending 'Who then knows where he is?' (I, 2, 20-25). Part of
+this section, viz. 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda,' &c., at the
+same time teaches that the meditation through which Brahman is attained
+is of the nature of devotion (bhakti). Next the sloka I, 3, 1 'There are
+the two drinking their reward' shows that, as the object of devout
+meditation and the devotee abide together, meditation is easily
+performed. Then the section beginning 'Know the Self to be him who
+drives in the chariot,' and ending 'the wise say the path is hard' (I,
+3, 3-14), teaches the true mode of meditation, and how the devotee
+reaches the highest abode of Vishnu; and then there is a final reference
+to the object to be reached in I, 3,15, 'That which is without sound,
+without touch,' &c. It thus appears that there are references and
+questions regarding those three matters only; and hence the 'Un-evolved'
+cannot mean the Pradhāna of the Sānkhyas.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 362:1. The commentary proposes different ways of finding those
+three objects of enquiry in the words of Nakiketas. According to the
+first explanation, 'that which is different from dharma' is a means
+differing from all ordinary means; 'adharma' 'not-dharma' is what is not
+a means, but the result to be reached: hence 'that which is different
+from adharma' is a result differing from all ordinary results. 'What is
+different from that' is an agent different from 'that'; i.e. an ordinary
+agent, and so on. (Sru. Prakās. p. 1226.)]
+
+[FOOTNOTE 362:2. The syllable 'Om,' which denotes Brahman, is a means
+towards meditation (Brahman being meditated upon under this form), and
+thus indirectly a means towards reaching Brahman.]
+
+
+
+
+7. And as in the case of the 'Great.'
+
+In the case of the passage 'Higher than the intellect is the Great Self,'
+we conclude from the co-ordination of 'the Great' with the Self that
+what the text means is not the 'Great' principle of the Sankhyas;
+analogously we conclude that the 'Unevolved,' which is said to be higher
+than the Self, cannot be the Pradhāna of Kapila's system.
+
+
+
+
+8. On account of there being no special characteristic; as in the case
+of the cup.
+
+In the discussion of the following passages also we aim only at refuting
+the system of the Sankhyas; not at disproving the existence and nature
+of Prakriti, the 'great' principle, the ahamāra, and so on, viewed as
+dependent on Brahman. For that they exist in this latter relation is
+proved by Scripture as well as Smriti.--A text of the followers of the
+Atharvan runs as follows: 'Her who produces all effects, the non-knowing
+one, the unborn one, wearing eight forms, the firm one--she is known (by
+the Lord) and ruled by him, she is spread out and incited and ruled by
+him, gives birth to the world for the benefit of the souls. A cow she is
+without beginning and end, a mother producing all beings; white, black,
+and red, milking all wishes for the Lord. Many babes unknown drink her.
+the impartial one; but one God only, following his own will, drinks her
+submitting to him. By his own thought and work the mighty God strongly
+enjoys her, who is common to all, the milkgiver, who is pressed by the
+sacrifices. The Non-evolved when being counted by twenty-four is called
+the Evolved.' This passage evidently describes the nature of Prakriti,
+and so on, and the same Upanishad also teaches the Supreme Person who
+constitutes the Self of Prakriti, and so on. 'Him they call the twenty-
+sixth or also the twenty-seventh; as the Person devoid of all qualities
+of the Sānkhyas he is known by the followers of the Atharvan [FOOTNOTE
+364:1].'--Other followers of the Atharvan read in their text that there
+are sixteen originating principles (prakriti) and eight effected things
+(vikāra; Garbha Up. 3).--The Svetāsvataras again set forth the nature of
+Prakriti, the soul and the Lord as follows. 'The Lord supports all this
+together, the Perishable and the Imperishable, the Evolved and the
+Unevolved; the other one is in bondage, since he is an enjoyer; but
+having known the God he is free from all fetters. There are two unborn
+ones, the one knowing and a Lord, the other without knowledge and lordly
+power; there is the one unborn female on whom the enjoyment of all
+enjoyers depends; and there is the infinite Self appearing in all shapes,
+but itself inactive. When a man finds out these three, that is Brahman.
+The Perishable is the Pradhāna, the Immortal and Imperishable is Hara;
+the one God rules the Perishable and the Self. From meditation on him,
+from union with him, from becoming one with him there is in the end
+cessation of all Māya' (Svet. Up. I, 8-10). And 'The sacred verses, the
+offerings, the sacrifices, the vows, the past, the future, and all that
+the Vcdas declare--from that the Ruler of Māya creates all this; and in
+this the other one is bound up through Māya. Know then Prakriti to be
+Māya and the great Lord the ruler of Māya; with his members this whole
+world is filled' (Svet. Up. V, 9-10). And, further on, 'The master of
+Pradhāna and the soul, the lord of the gunas, the cause of the bondage,
+existence, and release of worldly existence' (VI, 16). Thus likewise in
+Smriti, 'Do thou know both Nature and the soul to be without beginning,
+and know all effects and qualities to have sprung from Nature. Nature is
+declared to be the cause of the activity of causes and effects, whilst
+the soul is the cause of there being enjoyment of pleasure and pain. For
+the soul abiding in Nature experiences the qualities derived from Nature,
+the reason being its connexion with the qualities, in its births in good
+and evil wombs' (Bha. Gī. XIII, 19-21). And 'Goodness, Passion, and
+Darkness--these are the qualities which, issuing from nature, bind in
+the body the embodied soul, the undecaying one' (XIV, 5). And 'All
+beings at the end of a kalpa return into my Nature, and again, at the
+beginning of a kalpa, do I send them forth. Presiding over my own nature
+again and again do I send forth this vast body of beings which has no
+freedom of its own, being subject to Nature.--With me as ruler Nature
+brings forth all moving and non-moving things, and for this reason the
+world does ever go round' (Bha. Gī. IX, 7, 8, 10). What we therefore
+refuse to accept are a Prakriti, and so on, of the kind assumed by
+Kapila, i.e. not having their Self in Brahman.--We now proceed to
+explain the Sūtra.
+
+We read in the Svetāsvatara-Upanishad 'There is one ajā, red, white, and
+black, producing manifold offspring of the same nature. One aja loves
+her and lies by her; another leaves her after having enjoyed her.' A
+doubt arises here whether this mantra declares a mere Prakriti as
+assumed in Kapila's system, or a Prakriti having its Self in Brahman.
+
+The Pūrvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he points out,
+the text refers to the non-originatedness of Prakriti, calling her ajā,
+i.e. unborn, and further says that she by herself independently produces
+manifold offspring resembling herself. This view is rejected by the
+Sūtra, on the ground that there is no intimation of a special
+circumstance determining the acceptance of the Prakriti as assumed by
+the Sānkhyas, i.e. independent of Brahman; for that she is ajā, i. e.
+not born, is not a sufficiently special characteristic. The case is
+analogous to that of the 'cup.' In the mantra 'There is a cup having its
+mouth below and its bottom above' (Bri. Up. II, 2, 3), the word kamasa
+conveys to us only the idea of some implement used in eating, but we are
+unable to see what special kind of kamasa is meant; for in the case of
+words the meaning of which is ascertained on the ground of their
+derivation (as 'kamasa' from 'kam,' to eat or drink), the special sense
+of the word in any place cannot be ascertained without the help of
+considerations of general possibility, general subject-matter, and so on.
+Now in the case of the cup we are able to ascertain that the cup meant
+is the head, because there is a complementary passage 'What is called
+the cup with its mouth below and its bottom above is the head'; but if
+we look out for a similar help to determine the special meaning of ajā,
+we find nothing to convince us that the aja, i. e. the 'unborn'
+principle, is the Prakriti of the Sānkhyas. Nor is there anything in the
+text to convey the idea of that ajā having the power of independent
+creation; for the clause 'giving birth to manifold offspring' declares
+only that she creates, not that she creates unaided. The mantra does not
+therefore tell us about an 'unborn' principle independent of Brahman.--
+There moreover is a special reason for understanding by the ajā
+something that depends on Brahman. This the following Sūtra states.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 364:1. These quotations are from the Kulikā-Upanishad (transl.
+by Deussen, Seventy Upanishads, p. 638 ff.) The translation as given
+above follows the readings adopted by Rāmānuja and explained in the--
+Sruta-Prakāsikā.]
+
+
+
+
+9. But she begins with light; for thus some read in their text.
+
+The 'but' has assertory force. 'Light' in the Sūtra means Brahman, in
+accordance with the meaning of the term as known from texts such as 'On
+him the gods meditate, the light of lights' (Bri. Up. X, 4, 16); 'That
+light which shines beyond heaven' (Ch. Up. III, 13, 7). 'She begins with
+light' thus means 'she has Brahman for her cause.'--'For thus some read
+in their text,' i.e. because the members of one Sākhā, viz the
+Taittiriyas read in their text that this 'ajā' has Brahman for her cause.
+The Mahānārāyana-Upanishad (of the Taittirīyas) at first refers to
+Brahman abiding in the hollow of the heart as the object of meditation.
+'Smaller than the small, greater than the great, the Self placed in the
+hollow of this creature'; next declares that all the worlds and Brahma
+and the other gods originated from that Self; and then says that there
+sprung from it also this ajā which is the cause of all 'The one ajā
+(goat), red, white and black, which gives birth to numerous offspring of
+the same shape, one aja (he-goat) loves and lies by her; another one
+forsakes her after having enjoyed her.' The subject-matter of the entire
+section evidently is to give instruction as to the whole aggregate of
+things other than Brahman originating from Brahman and thus having its
+Self in it; hence we conclude that also the ajā which gives birth to
+manifold creatures like her, and is enjoyed by the soul controlled by
+karman, while she is abandoned by the soul possessing true knowledge is,
+no less than vital airs, seas, mountains, &c., a creature of Brahman,
+and hence has its Self in Brahman. We then apply to the interpretation
+of the Svetāsvatara-text the meaning of the analogous Mahānārayana-text,
+as determined by the complementary passages, and thus arrive at the
+conclusion that the ajā in the former text also is a being having its
+Self in Brahman. That this is so, moreover, appears from the
+Svetāsvatara itself. For in the early part of that Upanishad, we have
+after the introductory question, 'Is Brahman the cause?' the passage
+'The sages devoted to meditation and concentration have seen the person
+whose Self is the divinity, hidden in its own qualities' (I, 1, 3);
+which evidently refers to the ajā as being of the nature of a power of
+the highest Brahman. And as further on also (viz. in the passages 'From
+that the Māyin creates all this, and in this the other is bound up
+through Māya'; 'Know then Prakriti to be Māyā and the Great Lord the
+ruler of Māyā'; and 'he who rules every place of birth,' V, 9-11) the
+very same being is referred to, there remains not even a shadow of proof
+for the assertion that the mantra under discussion refers to an
+independent Prakriti as assumed by the Sānkhyas.
+
+But a further objection is raised, if the Prakriti denoted by ajā begins
+with, i.e. is caused by Brahman, how can it be called ajā, i.e. the non-
+produced one; or, if it is non-produced, how can it be originated by
+Brahman? To this the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+10. And on account of the teaching of formation (i.e. creation) there is
+no contradiction; as in the case of the honey.
+
+The 'and' expresses disposal of a doubt that had arisen. There is no
+contradiction between the Prakriti being ajā and originating from light.
+On account of instruction being given about the formation (kalpana), i.e.
+creation of the world. This interpretation of 'kalpana' is in agreement
+with the use of the verb klip in the text, 'as formerly the creator made
+(akalpayat) sun and moon.'
+
+In our text the sloka 'from that the Lord of Māyā creates all this'
+gives instruction about the creation of the world. From that, i.e. from
+matter in its subtle causal state when it is not yet divided, the Lord
+of all creates the entire Universe. From this statement about creation
+we understand that Prakriti exists in a twofold state according as it is
+either cause or effect. During a pralaya it unites itself with Brahman
+and abides in its subtle state, without any distinction of names and
+forms; it then is called the 'Unevolved,' and by other similar names. At
+the time of creation, on the other hand, there reveal themselves in
+Prakriti Goodness and the other gunas, it divides itself according to
+names and forms, and then is called the 'Evolved,' and so on, and,
+transforming itself into fire, water, and earth, it appears as red,
+white, and black. In its causal condition it is ajā, i.e. unborn, in its
+effected condition it is 'caused by light, i.e. Brahman'; hence there is
+no contradiction. The case is analogous to that of the 'honey.' The sun
+in his causal state is one only, but in his effected state the Lord
+makes him into honey in so far namely as he then, for the purpose of
+enjoyment on the part of the Vasus and other gods, is the abode of
+nectar brought about by sacrificial works to be learned from the Rik and
+the other Vedas; and further makes him to rise and to set. And between
+these two conditions there is no contradiction. This is declared in the
+Madhuvidyā (Ch. Up. III), from 'The sun is indeed the honey of the Devas,'
+down to 'when from thence he has risen upwards he neither rises nor
+sets; being one he stands in the centre'--'one' here means 'of one
+nature.'--The conclusion therefore is that the Svetāsvatara mantra under
+discussion refers to Prakriti as having her Self in Brahman, not to the
+Prakriti assumed by the Sānkhyas.
+
+Others, however, are of opinion that the one ajā of which the mantra
+speaks has for its characteristics light, water, and earth. To them we
+address the following questions. Do you mean that by what the text
+speaks of as an ajā, consisting of fire, water, and earth, we have to
+understand those three elements only; or Brahman in the form of those
+three elements; or some power or principle which is the cause of the
+three elements? The first alternative is in conflict with the
+circumstance that, while fire, water, and earth are several things, the
+text explicitly refers to _one_ Ajā. Nor may it be urged that fire,
+water, and earth, although several, become one, by being made tripartite
+(Ch. Up. VI, 3, 3); for this making them tripartite, does not take away
+their being several; the text clearly showing that each several element
+becomes tripartite, 'Let me make each of these three divine beings
+tripartite.'--The second alternative again divides itself into two
+alternatives. Is the one ajā Brahman in so far as having passed over
+into fire, water, and earth; or Brahman in so far as abiding within
+itself and not passing over into effects? The former alternative is
+excluded by the consideration that it does not remove plurality (which
+cannot be reconciled with the _one_ ajā). The second alternative is
+contradicted by the text calling that ajā red, white, and black; and
+moreover Brahman viewed as abiding within itself cannot be characterised
+by fire, water, and earth. On the third alternative it has to be assumed
+that the text denotes by the term 'ajā' the three elements, and that on
+this basis there is imagined a causal condition of these elements; but
+better than this assumption it evidently is to accept the term 'ajā' as
+directly denoting the causal state of those three elements as known from
+scripture.
+
+Nor can we admit the contention that the term 'ajā' is meant to teach
+that Prakriti should metaphorically be viewed as a she-goat; for such a
+view would be altogether purposeless. Where--in the passage 'Know the
+Self to be him who drives in the chariot'--the body, and so on, are
+compared to a chariot, and so on, the object is to set forth the means
+of attaining Brahman; where the sun is compared to honey, the object is
+to illustrate the enjoyment of the Vasus and other gods; but what
+similar object could possibly be attained by directing us to view
+Prakriti as a goat? Such a metaphorical view would in fact be not merely
+useless; it would be downright irrational. Prakriti is a non-intelligent
+principle, the causal substance of the entire material Universe, and
+constituting the means for the experience of pleasure and pain, and for
+the final release, of all intelligent souls which are connected with it
+from all eternity. Now it would be simply contrary to good sense,
+metaphorically to transfer to Prakriti such as described the nature of a
+she-goat--which is a sentient being that gives birth to very few
+creatures only, enters only occasionally into connexion with others, is
+of small use only, is not the cause of herself being abandoned by others,
+and is capable of abandoning those connected with her. Nor does it
+recommend itself to take the word ajā (understood to mean 'she-goat')
+in a sense different from that in which we understand the term 'aja'
+which occurs twice in the same mantra.--Let then all three terms be
+taken in the same metaphorical sense (aja meaning he-goat).--It would be
+altogether senseless, we reply, to compare the soul which absolutely
+dissociates itself from Prakriti ('Another aja leaves her after having
+enjoyed her') to a he-goat which is able to enter again into connexion
+with what he has abandoned, or with anything else.--Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'the cup.'
+
+
+
+
+11. Not from the mention of the number even, on account of the diversity
+and of the excess.
+
+The Vājasaneyins read in their text 'He in whom the five "five-people"
+and the ether rest, him alone I believe to be the Self; I, who know,
+believe him to be Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 17). The doubt here arises
+whether this text be meant to set forth the categories as established in
+Kapila's doctrine, or not.--The Pūrvapakshin maintains the former view,
+on the ground that the word 'five-people,' qualified by the word 'five,'
+intimates the twenty-five categories of the Sānkhyas. The compound 'five-
+people' (pańkajanāh) denotes groups of five beings, just as the term
+pańka-pūlyah denotes aggregates of five bundles of grass. And as we want
+to know how many such groups there are, the additional qualification
+'five' intimates that there are five such groups; just as if it were
+said 'five five-bundles, i. e. five aggregates consisting of five
+bundles each.' We thus understand that the 'five five-people' are twenty-
+five things, and as the mantra in which the term is met with refers to
+final release, we recognise the twenty-five categories known from the
+Sānkhya-smriti which are here referred to as objects to be known by
+persons desirous of release. For the followers of Kapila teach that
+'there is the fundamental causal substance which is not an effect. There
+are seven things, viz. the Mahat, and so on, which are causal substances
+as well as effects. There are sixteen effects. The soul is neither a
+causal substance nor an effect' (Sān. Kā. 3). The mantra therefore is
+meant to intimate the categories known from the Sānkhya.--To this the
+Sūtra replies that from the mention of the number twenty-five supposed
+to be implied in the expression 'the five five-people,' it does not
+follow that the categories of the Sānkhyas are meant. 'On account of the
+diversity,' i.e. on account of the five-people further qualified by the
+number five being different from the categories of the Sānkhyas. For in
+the text 'in whom the five five-people and the ether rest,' the 'in
+whom' shows the five-people to have their abode, and hence their Self,
+in Brahman; and in the continuation of the text, 'him I believe the Self,'
+the 'him' connecting itself with the preceding 'in whom' is recognised
+to be Brahman. The five five-people must therefore be different from the
+categories of the Sānkhya-system. 'And on account of the excess.'
+Moreover there is, in the text under discussion, an excess over and
+above the Sānkhya categories, consisting in the Self denoted by the
+relative pronoun 'in whom,' and in the specially mentioned Ether. What
+the text designates therefore is the Supreme Person who is the Universal
+Lord in whom all things abide--such as he is described in the text
+quoted above, 'Therefore some call him the twenty-sixth, and others the
+twenty-seventh.' The 'even' in the Sūtra is meant to intimate that the
+'five five-people' can in no way mean the twenty-five categories, since
+there is no pentad of groups consisting of five each. For in the case of
+the categories of the Sānkhyas there are no generic characteristics or
+the like which could determine the arrangement of those categories in
+fives. Nor must it be urged against this that there is a determining
+reason for such an arrangement in so far as the tattvas of the Sānkhyas
+form natural groups comprising firstly, the five organs of action;
+secondly, the five sense-organs; thirdly, the five gross elements;
+fourthly, the subtle parts of those elements; and fifthly, the five
+remaining tattvas; for as the text under discussion mentions the ether
+by itself, the possibility of a group consisting of the five gross
+elements is precluded. We cannot therefore take the compound 'five
+people' as denoting a group consisting of five constituent members, but,
+in agreement with Pān. II, 1, 50, as merely being a special name. There
+are certain beings the special name of which is 'five-people,' and of
+these beings the additional word 'pańka' predicates that they are five
+in number. The expression is thus analogous to the term 'the seven seven-
+rishis' (where the term 'seven-rishis' is to be understood as the name of
+a certain class of rishis only).--Who then are the beings called 'five-
+people?'--To this question the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+12. The breath, and so on, on the ground of the complementary passage.
+
+We see from a complementary passage, viz. 'They who know the breath of
+breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of food, the
+mind of mind,' that the 'five-people' are the breath, and eye, and so on,
+all of which have their abode in Brahman.
+
+But, an objection is raised, while the mantra 'in whom the five five-
+people,' &c., is common to the Kānvas and the Mādhyandinas, the
+complementary passage 'they who know the breath of breath,' &c., in the
+text of the former makes no mention of food, and hence we have no reason
+to say that the 'five-people' in their text are the breath, eye, and so
+on.
+
+To this objection the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+13. By light, food not being (mentioned in the text) of some.
+
+In the text of some, viz. the Kānvas, where food is not mentioned, the
+five-people are recognised to be the five senses, owing to the phrase
+'of lights' which is met with in another complementary passage. In the
+mantra, 'him the gods worship as the light of lights,' which precedes
+the mantra about the 'five-people,' Brahman is spoken of as the light of
+lights, and this suggests the idea of certain lights the activity of
+which depends on Brahman. The mantra leaves it undetermined what these
+lights are; but from what follows about the 'five-people,' &c., we learn
+that what is meant are the senses which light up as it were their
+respective objects. In 'the breath of breath' the second 'breath' (in
+the genitive case) denotes the sense-organ of touch, as that organ is
+connected with air, and as the vital breath (which would otherwise
+suggest itself as the most obvious explanation of prāna) does not
+harmonise with the metaphorical term 'light.' 'Of the eye' refers to the
+organ of sight; 'of the ear' to the organ of hearing. 'Of food'
+comprises the senses of smell and taste together: it denotes the sense
+of smell on the ground that that sense is connected with earth, which
+may be 'food,' and the sense of taste in so far as 'anna' may be also
+explained as that by means of which eating goes on (adyate). 'Of mind'
+denotes mind, i. e. the so-called internal organ. Taste and smell thus
+being taken in combination, we have the required number of five, and we
+thus explain the 'five-people' as the sense-organs which throw light on
+their objects, together with the internal organ, i.e. mind. The meaning
+of the clause about the 'five-people' therefore is that the senses--
+called 'five-people'--and the elements, represented by the Ether, have
+their basis in Brahman; and as thus all beings are declared to abide in
+Brahman, the five 'five-people' can in no way be the twenty-five
+categories assumed by the Sānkhyas.--The general Conclusion is that the
+Vedānta-texts, whether referring to numbers or not, nowhere set forth
+the categories established in Kapila's system.
+
+
+
+
+14. And on account of (Brahman) as described being declared to be the
+cause with regard to Ether, and so on.
+
+Here the philosopher who holds the Pradhāna to be the general cause
+comes forward with another objection. The Vedānta-texts, he says, do not
+teach that creation proceeds from one and the same agent only, and you
+therefore have no right to hold that Brahman is the sole cause of the
+world. In one place it is said that our world proceeded from 'Being',
+'Being only this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1). In other
+places the world is said to have sprung from 'Non-being', 'Non-being
+indeed this was in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, i); and 'Non-being
+only was this in the beginning; it became Being' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1).
+As the Vedānta-texts are thus not consequent in their statements
+regarding the creator, we cannot conclude from them that Brahman is the
+sole cause of the world. On the other hand, those texts do enable us to
+conclude that the Pradhāna only is the universal cause. For the text
+'Now all this was then undeveloped' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7) teaches that the
+world was merged in the undeveloped Pradhāna. and the subsequent clause,
+'That developed itself by form and name,' that from that Undeveloped
+there resulted the creation of the world. For the Undeveloped is that
+which is not distinguished by names and forms, and this is none other
+than the Pradhāna. And as this Pradhāna is at the same time eternal, as
+far as its essential nature is concerned, and the substrate of all
+change, there is nothing contradictory in the different accounts of
+creation calling it sometimes 'Being' and sometimes 'Non-being'; while,
+on the other hand, these terms cannot, without contradiction, both be
+applied to Brahman. The causality of the Undeveloped having thus been
+ascertained, such expressions as 'it _thought_, may I be many,' must be
+interpreted as meaning its being about to proceed to creation. The terms
+'Self' and 'Brahman' also may be applied to the Pradhāna in so far as it
+is all-pervading (atman from āpnoti), and preeminently great (brihat).
+We therefore conclude that the only cause of the world about which the
+Vedānta-texts give information is the Pradhāna.
+
+This view is set aside by the Sūtra. The word _and_ is used in the sense
+of _but_. It is possible to ascertain from the Vedānta-texts that the
+world springs from none other than the highest Brahman, which is all-
+knowing, lord of all, free from all shadow of imperfection, capable of
+absolutely realising its purposes, and so on; since scripture declares
+Brahman as described to be the cause of Ether, and so on. By 'Brahman as
+described' is meant 'Brahman distinguished by omniscience and other
+qualities, as described in the Sūtra "that from which the origination,
+and so on, of the world proceed," and in other places.' That Brahman
+only is declared by scripture to be the cause of Ether, and so on, i.e.
+the being which is declared to be the cause in passages such as 'From
+that Self sprang Ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'that sent forth fire'(Ch.
+Up. VI, 2, 3), is none other than Brahman possessing omniscience and
+similar qualities. For the former of these texts follows on the passage
+'The True, intelligence, infinite is Brahman; he reaches all desires
+together with the intelligent Brahman,' which introduces Brahman as the
+general subject-matter--that Brahman being then referred to by means of
+the connecting words 'from that.' In the same way the 'that' (in 'that
+sent forth fire') refers back to the omniscient Brahman introduced in
+the clause 'that thought, may I be many.' This view is confirmed by a
+consideration of all the accounts of creation, and we hence conclude
+that Brahman is the sole cause of the world.--But the text 'Non-being
+indeed this was in the beginning' calls the general cause 'something
+that is not'; how then can you say that we infer from the Vedānta-texts
+as the general cause of the world a Brahman that is all-knowing,
+absolutely realises its purposes, and so on?--To this question the next
+Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+15. From connexion.
+
+The fact is that Brahman intelligent, consisting of bliss, &c., connects
+itself also with the passage 'Non-being was this in the beginning'
+(Taitt. Up. II, 7). For the section of the text which precedes that
+passage (viz. 'Different from this Self consisting of understanding is
+the Self consisting of Bliss;--he wished, may I be many;--he created all
+whatever there is. Having created he entered into it; having entered it
+he became sat and tyat') clearly refers to Brahman consisting of Bliss,
+which realises its purposes, creates all beings, and entering into them
+is the Self of all. When, therefore, after this we meet with the sloka
+('Non-being this was in the beginning') introduced by the words 'On this
+there is also this sloka'--which shows that the sloka is meant to throw
+light on what precedes; and when further or we have the passage 'From
+fear of it the wind blows' &c., which, referring to the same Brahman,
+predicates of it universal rulership, bliss of nature, and so on; we
+conclude with certainty that the sloka about 'Non-being' also refers to
+Brahman. As during a pralaya the distinction of names and forms does not
+exist, and Brahman also then does not exist in so far as connected with
+names and forms, the text applies to Brahman the term 'Non-being.' The
+text 'Non-being only this was in the beginning' explains itself in the
+same way.--Nor can we admit the contention that the text 'Now all this
+was then undeveloped 'refers to the Pradhāna as the cause of the world;
+for the Undeveloped there spoken of is nothing else but Brahman in so
+far as its body is not yet evolved. For the text continues 'That same
+being entered thither to the very tips of the finger-nails;' 'When
+seeing, eye by name; when hearing, ear by name; when thinking, mind by
+name;' 'Let men meditate upon him as Self;' where the introductory words
+'that same being' refer back to the Undeveloped--which thus is said to
+enter into all things and thereby to become their ruler. And it is known
+from another text also (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2) that it is the all-creative
+highest Brahman which enters into its creation and evolves names and
+forms. The text 'Having entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self
+of all' moreover shows that the creative principle enters into its
+creatures for the purpose of ruling them, and such entering again cannot
+be attributed to the non-sentient Pradhāna. The Undeveloped therefore is
+Brahman in that state where its body is not yet developed; and when the
+text continues 'it developed itself by names and forms' the meaning is
+that Brahman developed itself in so far as names and forms were
+distinguished in the world that constitutes Brahman's body. On this
+explanation of the texts relating to creation we further are enabled to
+take the thought, purpose, &c., attributed to the creative principle, in
+their primary literal sense. And, we finally remark, neither the term
+'Brahman' nor the term 'Self in any way suits the Pradhāna, which is
+neither absolutely great nor pervading in the sense of entering into
+things created with a view to ruling them. It thus remains a settled
+conclusion that Brahman is the sole cause of the world.--Here terminates
+the adhikarana of '(Brahman's) causality.'
+
+
+
+
+16. Because it denotes the world.
+
+The Sānkhya comes forward with a further objection. Although the
+Vedānta-texts teach an intelligent principle to be the cause of the
+world, they do not present to us as objects of knowledge anything that
+could be the cause of the world, apart from the Pradhāna and the soul as
+established by the Sānkhya-system. For the Kaushītakins declare in their
+text, in the dialogue of Bālāki and Ajātasatru, that none but the
+enjoying (individual) soul is to be known as the cause of the world,
+'Shall I tell you Brahman? He who is the maker of those persons and of
+whom this is the work (or "to whom this work belongs") he indeed is to
+be known' (Kau. Up. IV, 19). Bālāki at the outset proposes Brahman as
+the object of instruction, and when he is found himself not to know
+Brahman, Ajātasatru instructs him about it, 'he indeed is to be known.'
+But from the relative clause 'to whom this work belongs,' which connects
+the being to be known with work, we infer that by Brahman we have here
+to understand the enjoying soul which is the ruler of Prakriti, not any
+other being. For no other being is connected with work; work, whether
+meritorious or the contrary, belongs to the individual soul only. Nor
+must you contest this conclusion on the ground that 'work' is here to be
+explained as meaning the object of activity, so that the sense of the
+clause would be 'he of whom this entire world, as presented by
+perception and the other means of knowledge, is the work.' For in that
+case the separate statements made in the two clauses, 'who is the maker
+of those persons' and 'of whom this is the work,' would be devoid of
+purport (the latter implying the former). Moreover, the generally
+accepted meaning of the word 'karman,' both in Vedic and worldly speech,
+is work in the sense of good and evil actions. And as the origination of
+the world is caused by actions of the various individual souls, the
+designation of 'maker of those persons' also suits only the individual
+soul. The meaning of the whole passage therefore is 'He who is the cause
+of the different persons that have their abode in the disc of the sun,
+and so on, and are instrumental towards the retributive experiences of
+the individual souls; and to whom there belongs karman, good and evil,
+to which there is due his becoming such a cause; _he_ indeed is to be
+known, _his_ essential nature is to be cognised in distinction from
+Prakriti.' And also in what follows, 'The two came to a person who was
+asleep. He pushed him with a stick,' &c., what is said about the
+sleeping man being pushed, roused, &c., all points only to the
+individual soul being the topic of instruction. Further on also the text
+treats of the individual soul only, 'As the master feeds with his
+people, nay as his people feed on the master, thus does this conscious
+Self feed with the other Selfs.' We must consider also the following
+passage--which contains the explanation given by Ajatasatru to Bālāki,
+who had been unable to say where the soul goes at the time of deep
+sleep--' There are the arteries called Hitas. In these the person is;
+when sleeping he sees no dream, then he (or that, i.e. the aggregate of
+the sense-organs) becomes one with this prāna alone. Then speech goes to
+him with all names, &c., the mind with all thoughts. And when he awakes,
+then, as from a burning fire sparks proceed in all directions, thus from
+that Self the prānas proceed each towards its place, from the prānas the
+gods, from the gods the worlds.' The individual soul which passes
+through the states of dream, deep sleep and waking, and is that into
+which there are merged and from which there proceed speech and all the
+other organs, is here declared to be the abode of deep sleep 'then it
+(viz. the aggregate of the organs) becomes one in that prāna.' Prāna
+here means the individual soul in so far as supporting life; for the
+text continues 'when _that_ one awakes' and neither the vital breath nor
+the Lord (both of whom might be proposed as explanations of prāna) can
+be said to be asleep and to wake. Or else 'asmin prāne' might be
+explained as 'in the vital breath (which abides) in the individual
+soul,' the meaning of the clause being 'all the organs, speech and so
+on, become one in the vital breath which itself abides in this soul.'
+The word 'prāna' would thus be taken in its primary literal sense; yet
+all the same the soul constitutes the topic of the section, the vital
+breath being a mere instrument of the soul. The Brahman mentioned at the
+outset therefore is none other than the individual soul, and there is
+nothing to prove a lord different from it. And as the attributes which
+the texts ascribe to the general cause, viz. thought and so on, are
+attributes of intelligent beings only, we arrive at the conclusion that
+what constitutes the cause of the world is the non-intelligent Pradhāna
+guided by the intelligent soul.
+
+This primā facie view the Sūtra disposes of, by saying 'because (the
+work) denotes the world.' It is not the insignificant individual soul--
+which is under the influence of its good and evil works, and by
+erroneously imputing to itself the attributes of Prakriti becomes the
+cause of the effects of the latter--that is the topic of our text; but
+rather the Supreme Person who is free from all shadow of imperfection
+such as Nescience and the like, who is a treasure of all possible
+auspicious qualities in their highest degree of perfection, who is the
+sole cause of this entire world. This is proved by the circumstance that
+the term 'work' connected with 'this' (in 'of whom this (is) the work')
+denotes the Universe which is an effect of the Supreme Person. For the
+word 'this' must, on account of its sense, the general topic of the
+section and so on, be taken in a non-limited meaning, and hence denotes
+the entire world, as presented by Perception and the other means of
+knowledge, with all its sentient and non-sentient beings. That the term
+'work' does not here denote good and evil actions, appears from the
+following consideration of the context. Bālāki at first offers to teach
+Brahman ('Shall I tell you Brahman?') and thereupon holds forth on
+various persons abiding in the sun, and so on, as being Brahman.
+Ajatasatru however refuses to accept this instruction as not setting
+forth Brahman, and finally, in order to enlighten Bālāki, addresses him
+'He, O Bālāki, who is the maker of those persons,' &c. Now as the
+different personal souls abiding in the sun, &c., and connected with
+karman in the form of good and evil actions, are known already by Bālāki,
+the term 'karman'--met with in the next clause--is clearly meant to
+throw light on some Person so far not known to Bālāki, and therefore
+must be taken to mean not good and evil deeds or action in general, but
+rather the entire Universe in so far as being the outcome of activity.
+On this interpretation only the passage gives instruction about
+something not known before. Should it be said that this would be the
+case also if the subject to which the instruction refers were the true
+essential nature of the soul, indicated here by its connexion with
+karman, we reply that this would involve the (objectionable) assumption
+of so-called implication (lakshanā), in so far namely as what the clause
+would directly intimate is (not the essential nature of the soul as free
+from karman but rather) the connexion of the soul with karman. Moreover
+if the intention of the passage were this, viz. to give instruction as
+to the soul, the latter being pointed at by means of the reference to
+karman, the intention would be fully accomplished by saying 'to whom
+karman belongs, he is to be known;' while in the text as it actually
+stands 'of whom this is the karman' the 'this' would be unmeaning. The
+meaning of the two separate clauses 'who is the maker of those persons'
+and 'of whom this is the work' is as follows. He who is the creator of
+those persons whom you called Brahman, and of whom those persons are the
+creatures; he of whom this entire world is the effect, and before whom
+all things sentient and non-sentient are equal in so far as being
+produced by him; he, the highest and universal cause, the Supreme Person,
+is the object to be known. The meaning implied here is--although the
+origination of the world has for its condition the deeds of individual
+souls, yet those souls do not independently originate the means for
+their own retributive experience, but experience only what the Lord has
+created to that end in agreement with their works. The individual soul,
+hence, cannot stand in creative relation to those persons.--What the
+text under discussion inculcates as the object of knowledge therefore is
+the highest Brahman which is known from all Vedānta-texts as the
+universal cause.
+
+
+
+
+17. Should it be said that this is not so on account of the inferential
+marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; we reply that this
+has been explained before.
+
+With reference to the plea urged by the Pūrvapakshin that, owing to
+inferential marks pointing to the individual soul, and the circumstance
+of mention being made of the chief vital air, we must decide that the
+section treats of the enjoying individual soul and not of the highest
+Self, the Sūtra remarks that this argumentation has already been
+disposed of, viz. in connexion with the Pratardana vidyā. For there it
+was shown that when a text is ascertained, on the ground of a
+comprehensive survey of initial and concluding clauses, to refer to
+Brahman, all inferential marks which point to other topics must be
+interpreted so as to fall in with the principal topic. Now in our text
+Brahman is introduced at the outset 'Shall I tell you Brahman?' it is
+further mentioned in the middle of the section, for the clause 'of whom
+this is the work' does not refer to the soul in general but to the
+highest Person who is the cause of the whole world; and at the end again
+we hear of a reward which connects itself only with meditations on
+Brahman, viz. supreme sovereignty preceded by the conquest of all evil.
+'Having overcome all evil he obtains pre-eminence among all beings,
+sovereignty and supremacy--yea, he who knows this.' The section thus
+being concerned with Brahman, the references to the individual soul and
+to the chief vital air must also be interpreted so as to fall in with
+Brahman. In the same way it was shown above that the references to the
+individual soul and the chief vital air which are met with in the
+Pratardana vidyā really explain themselves in connexion with a threefold
+meditation on Brahman. As in the passage 'Then with this prāna alone he
+becomes one' the two words 'this' and 'prāna' may be taken as co-
+ordinated and it hence would be inappropriate to separate them (and to
+explain 'in the prāna which abides in this soul'), and as the word
+'prāna' is ascertained to mean Brahman also, we must understand the
+mention of prāna to be made with a view to meditation on Brahman in so
+far as having the prāna for its body. But how can the references to the
+individual soul be put in connexion with Brahman?--This point is taken
+up by the next Sūtra.
+
+
+
+
+18. But Jaimini thinks that it has another purport, on account of the
+question and answer; and thus some also.
+
+The 'but' is meant to preclude the idea that the mention made of the
+individual soul enables us to understand the whole section as concerned
+with that soul.--The teacher Jaimini is of opinion that the mention made
+of the individual soul has another meaning, i.e. aims at conveying the
+idea of what is different from the individual soul, i.e. the nature of
+the highest Brahman. 'On account of question and answer.' According to
+the story told in the Upanishad, Ajātasatru leads Bālāki to where a
+sleeping man is resting, and convinces him that the soul is different
+from breath, by addressing the sleeping person, in whom breath only is
+awake, with names belonging to prāna [FOOTNOTE 383:1] without the sleeper
+being awaked thereby, and after that rousing him by a push of his staff.
+Then, with a view to teaching Bālāki the difference of Brahman from the
+individual soul, he asks him the following questions: 'Where, O Bālāki,
+did this person here sleep? Where was he? Whence did he thus come back?'
+To these questions he thereupon himself replies, 'When sleeping he sees
+no dream, then he becomes one in that prāna alone.--From that Self the
+organs proceed each towards its place, from the organs the gods, from
+the gods the worlds.' Now this reply, no less than the questions,
+clearly refers to the highest Self as something different from the
+individual Self. For that entering into which the soul, in the state of
+deep sleep, attains its true nature and enjoys complete serenity, being
+free from the disturbing experiences of pleasure and pain that accompany
+the states of waking and of dream; and that from which it again returns
+to the fruition of pleasure and pain; that is nothing else but the
+highest Self. For, as other scriptural texts testify ('Then he becomes
+united with the True,' Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1; 'Embraced by the intelligent
+Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within,' Bri, Up.
+IV, 3, 21), the abode of deep sleep is the intelligent Self which is
+different from the individual Self, i.e. the highest Self. We thus
+conclude that the reference, in question and answer, to the individual
+soul subserves the end of instruction being given about what is
+different from that soul, i.e. the highest Self. We hence also reject
+the Pūrvapakshin's contention that question and answer refer to the
+individual soul, that the veins called hita are the abode of deep sleep,
+and that the well-known clause as to the prāna must be taken to mean
+that the aggregate of the organs becomes one in the individual soul
+called prāna. For the veins are the abode, not of deep sleep, but of
+dream, and, as we have shown above, Brahman only is the abode of deep
+sleep; and the text declares that the individual soul, together with all
+its ministering organs, becomes one with, and again proceeds from,
+Brahman only--which the text designates as Prāna.--Moreover some, viz.
+the Vājasaneyins in this same colloquy of Bālāki and Ajātasatru as
+recorded in their text, clearly distinguish from the vijńāna-maya, i.e.
+the individual soul in the state of deep sleep, the highest Self which
+then is the abode of the individual soul. 'Where was then the person,
+consisting of intelligence, and from whence did he thus come back?--When
+he was thus asleep, then the intelligent person, having through the
+intelligence of the senses absorbed within himself all intelligence,
+lies in the ether that is within the heart.' Now the word 'ether' is
+known to denote the highest Self; cf. the text 'there is within that the
+small ether'(Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 1). This shows us that the individual soul
+is mentioned in the Vājasaneyin passage to the end of setting forth what
+is different from it, viz. the prājńa Self, i.e. the highest Brahman.
+The general conclusion therefore is that the Kaushītaki-text under
+discussion proposes as the object of knowledge something that is
+different from the individual soul, viz. the highest Brahman which is
+the cause of the whole world, and that hence the Vedānta-texts nowhere
+intimate that general causality belongs either to the individual soul or
+to the Pradhāna under the soul's guidance. Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'denotation of the world.'
+
+[FOOTNOTE 383:1. The names with which the king addresses the sleeper are
+_Great one, clad in white raiment, Soma, king._ The Sru. Pra. comments
+as follows: _Great one_; because according to Sruti Prāna is the oldest
+and best. _Clad in white raiment_; because Sruti says that water is the
+raiment of Prāna; and elsewhere, that what is white belongs to water.
+_Soma_; because scripture says 'of this prāna water is the body, light
+the form, viz. yonder moon.' _King_; for Sruti says 'Prāna indeed is the
+ruler.']
+
+
+
+
+19. On account of the connected meaning of the sentences.
+
+In spite of the conclusion arrived at there may remain a suspicion that
+here and there in the Upanishads texts are to be met with which aim at
+setting forth the soul as maintained in Kapila's system, and that hence
+there is no room for a being different from the individual soul and
+called Lord. This suspicion the Sūtra undertakes to remove, in connexion
+with the Maitreyi-brāhmana, in the Brihadaranyaka. There we read 'Verily,
+a husband is dear, not for the love of the husband, but for the love of
+the Self a husband is dear, and so on. Everything is dear, not for the
+love of everything, but for the love of the Self everything is dear. The
+Self should be seen, should be heard, should be reflected on, should be
+meditated upon. When the Self has been seen, heard, reflected upon,
+meditated upon, then all this is known' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6).--Here the
+doubt arises whether the Self enjoined in this passage as the object of
+seeing, &c., be the soul as held by the Sānkhyas, or the Supreme Lord,
+all-knowing, capable of realising all his purposes, and so on. The
+Pūrvapakshin upholds the former alternative. For, he says, the beginning
+no less than the middle and the concluding part of the section conveys
+the idea of the individual soul only. In the beginning the individual
+soul only is meant, as appears from the connexion of the Self with
+husband, wife, children, wealth, cattle, and so on. This is confirmed by
+the middle part of the section where the Self is said to be connected
+with origination and destruction, 'a mass of knowledge, he having risen
+from these elements vanishes again into them. When he has departed there
+is no more consciousness.' And in the end we have 'whereby should he
+know the knower'; where we again recognise the knowing subject, i.e. the
+individual soul, not the Lord. We thus conclude that the whole text is
+meant to set forth the soul as held by the Sānkhyas.--But in the
+beginning there is a clause, viz. 'There is no hope of immortality by
+wealth,' which shows that the whole section is meant to instruct us as
+to the means of immortality; how then can it be meant to set forth the
+individual soul only?--You state the very reason proving that the text
+is concerned with the individual soul only! For according to the Sānkhya-
+system immortality is obtained through the cognition of the true nature
+of the soul viewed as free from all erroneous imputation to itself of
+the attributes of non-sentient matter; and the text therefore makes it
+its task to set forth, for the purpose of immortality, the essential
+nature of the soul free from all connexion with Prakriti, 'the _Self_
+should be heard,' and so on. And as the souls dissociated from Prakriti
+are all of a uniform nature, all souls are known through the knowledge
+of the soul free from Prakriti, and the text therefore rightly says that
+through the Self being known everything is known. And as the essential
+nature of the Self is of one and the same kind, viz. knowledge or
+intelligence, in all beings from gods down to plants, the text rightly
+asserts the unity of the Self 'that Self is all this'; and denies all
+otherness from the Self, on the ground of the characteristic attributes
+of gods and so on really being of the nature of the Not-self, 'he is
+abandoned by everything,' &c. The clause, 'For where there is duality as
+it were,' which denies plurality, intimates that the plurality
+introduced into the homogeneous Self by the different forms--such as of
+gods, and so on--assumed by Prakriti, is false. And there is also no
+objection to the teaching that 'the Rig-veda and so on are breathed
+forth from that great being (i.e. Prakriti); for the origination of the
+world is caused by the soul in its quality as ruler of Prakriti.--It
+thus being ascertained that the whole Maitreyī-brāhmana is concerned
+with the soul in the Sānkhya sense, we, according to the principle of
+the unity of purport of all Vedānta-texts, conclude that they all treat
+of the Sānkhya soul only, and that hence the cause of the world is to be
+found not in a so-called Lord but in Prakriti ruled and guided by the
+soul.
+
+This primā facie view is set aside by the Sūtra. The whole text refers
+to the Supreme Lord only; for on this supposition only a satisfactory
+connexion of the parts of the text can be made out. On being told by
+Yājńavalkya that there is no hope of immortality through wealth,
+Maitreyī expresses her slight regard for wealth and all such things as
+do not help to immortality, and asks to be instructed as to the means of
+immortality only ('What should I do with that by which I do not become
+immortal? What my lord knows tell that clearly to me'). Now the Self
+which Yājńavalkya, responding to her requests, points out to her as the
+proper object of knowledge, can be none other than the highest Self; for
+other scriptural texts clearly teach that the only means of reaching
+immortality is to know the Supreme Person--'Having known him thus man
+passes beyond death'; 'Knowing him thus he becomes immortal here, there
+is no other path to go' (Svet. Up. III, 8). The knowledge of the true
+nature of the individual soul which obtains immortality, and is a mere
+manifestation of the power of the Supreme Person, must be held to be
+useful towards the cognition of the Supreme Person who brings about
+Release, but is not in itself instrumental towards such Release; the
+being the knowledge of which the text declares to be the means of
+immortality is therefore the highest Self only. Again, the causal power
+with regard to the entire world which is expressed in the passage, 'from
+that great Being there were breathed forth the Rig veda,' &c., cannot
+possibly belong to the mere individual soul which in its state of
+bondage is under the influence of karman and in the state of release has
+nothing to do with the world; it can in fact belong to the Supreme
+Person only. Again, what the text says as to everything being known by
+the knowledge of one thing ('By the seeing indeed of the Self,' &c.) is
+possible only in the case of a Supreme Self which constitutes the Self
+of all. What the Pūrvapakshin said as to everything being known through
+the cognition of the one individual soul, since all individual souls are
+of the same type--this also cannot be upheld; for as long as there is a
+knowledge of the soul only and not also of the world of non-sentient
+things, there is no knowledge of everything. And when the text
+enumerates different things ('this Brahman class, this Kshatra class,'
+&c.), and then concludes 'all this is that Self'--where the 'this' denotes
+the entire Universe of animate and inanimate beings as known through
+Perception, Inference, and so on--universal unity such as declared here
+is possible only through a highest Self which is the Self of all. It is
+not, on the other hand, possible that what the word 'this' denotes, i.e.
+the whole world of intelligent and non-intelligent creatures, should be
+one with the personal soul as long as it remains what it is, whether
+connected with or disassociated from non-sentient matter. In the same
+spirit the passage, 'All things abandon him who views all things
+elsewhere than in the Self,' finds fault with him who views anything
+apart from the universal Self. The qualities also which in the earlier
+Maitreyī-brāhmana (II, 4, 12) are predicated of the being under
+discussion, viz. greatness, endlessness, unlimitedness, cannot belong to
+any one else but the highest Self. That Self therefore is the topic of
+the Brāhmana.
+
+We further demur to our antagonist's maintaining that the entire
+Brāhmana treats of the individual soul because that soul is at the
+outset represented as the object of enquiry, this being inferred from
+its connexion with husband, wife, wealth, &c. For if the clause 'for the
+love (literally, _for the _desire) of the Self refers to the individual
+Self, we cannot help connecting (as, in fact, we must do in any case)
+that Self with the Self referred to in the subsequent clause, 'the Self
+indeed is to be seen,' &c.; the connexion having to be conceived in that
+way that the information given in the former clause somehow subserves
+the cognition of the Self enjoined in the latter clause. 'For the desire
+of the Self would then mean 'for the attainment of the objects desired
+by the Self.' But if it is first said that husband, wife, &c., are dear
+because they fulfil the wishes of the individual Self, it could hardly
+be said further on that the nature of that Self must be enquired into;
+for what, in the circumstances of the case, naturally is to be enquired
+into and searched for are the dear objects but not the true nature of
+him to whom those objects are dear, apart from the objects themselves.
+It would certainly be somewhat senseless to declare that since husband,
+wife, &c., are dear because they fulfil the desires of the individual
+soul, therefore, setting aside those dear objects, we must enquire into
+the true nature of that soul apart from all the objects of its desire.
+On the contrary, it having been declared that husband, wife, &c., are
+dear not on account of husband, wife, &c., but on account of the Self,
+they should not be dropped, but included in the further investigation,
+just because they subserve the Self. And should our opponent (in order
+to avoid the difficulty of establishing a satisfactory connexion between
+the different clauses) maintain that the clause, 'but everything is dear
+for the love of the Self,' is not connected with the following clause,
+'the Self is to be seen,' &c., we point out that this would break the
+whole connexion of the Brahmāna. And if we allowed such a break, we
+should then be unable to point out what is the use of the earlier part
+of the Brahmāna. We must therefore attempt to explain the connexion in
+such a way as to make it clear why all search for dear objects--husband,
+wife, children, wealth, &c.--should be abandoned and the Self only
+should be searched for. This explanation is as follows. After having
+stated that wealth, and so on, are no means to obtain immortality which
+consists in permanent absolute bliss, the text declares that the
+pleasant experiences which we derive from wealth, husband, wife, &c..
+and which are not of a permanent nature and always alloyed with a great
+deal of pain, are caused not by wealth, husband, wife, &c., themselves,
+but rather by the highest Self whose nature is absolute bliss. He
+therefore who being himself of the nature of perfect bliss causes other
+beings and things also to be the abodes of partial bliss, he--the
+highest Self--is to be constituted the object of knowledge. The clauses,
+'not for the wish of the husband a husband is dear,' &c., therefore must
+be understood as follows--a husband, a wife, a son, &c., are not dear to
+us in consequence of a wish or purpose on their part, 'may I, for my own
+end or advantage be dear to him,' but they are dear to us for the wish
+of the Self, i.e. to the end that there may be accomplished the desire
+of the highest Self--which desire aims at the devotee obtaining what is
+dear to him. For the highest Self pleased with the works of his devotees
+imparts to different things such dearness, i.e. joy-giving quality as
+corresponds to those works, that 'dearness' being bound in each case to
+a definite place, time, nature and degree. This is in accordance with
+the scriptural text, 'For he alone bestows bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7).
+Things are not dear, or the contrary, to us by themselves, but only in
+so far as the highest Self makes them such. Compare the text, 'The same
+thing which erst gave us delight later on becomes the source of grief;
+and what was the cause of wrath afterwards tends to peace. Hence there
+is nothing that in itself is of the nature either of pleasure or of pain.'
+
+But, another view of the meaning of the text is proposed, even if the
+Self in the clause 'for the desire of the Self' were accepted as
+denoting the individual Self, yet the clause 'the Self must be seen'
+would refer to the highest Self only. For in that case also the sense
+would be as follows--because the possession of husband, wife, and other
+so-called dear things is aimed at by a person to whom they are dear, not
+with a view of bringing about what is desired by them (viz. husband,
+wife, &c.), but rather to the end of bringing about what is desired by
+himself; therefore that being which is, to the individual soul,
+absolutely and unlimitedly dear, viz. the highest Self, must be
+constituted the sole object of cognition, not such objects as husband,
+wife, wealth, &c., the nature of which depends on various external
+circumstances and the possession of which gives rise either to limited
+pleasure alloyed with pain or to mere pain.--But against this we remark
+that as, in the section under discussion, the words designating the
+individual Self denote the highest Self also, [FOOTNOTE 391:1], the term
+'Self' in both clauses, 'For the desire of the Self' and 'The Self is to
+be seen,' really refers to one and the same being (viz. the highest
+Self), and the interpretation thus agrees with the one given above.--In
+order to prove the tenet that words denoting the individual soul at the
+same time denote the highest Self, by means of arguments made use of by
+other teachers also, the Sūtrakāra sets forth the two following Sūtras.
+
+
+
+
+20. (It is) a mark indicating that the promissory statement is proved;
+thus Āsmarathya thinks.
+
+According to the teacher Āsmarathya the circumstance that terms denoting
+the individual soul are used to denote Brahman is a mark enabling us to
+infer that the promissory declaration according to which through the
+knowledge of one thing everything is known is well established. If the
+individual soul were not identical with Brahman in so far as it is the
+effect of Brahman, then the knowledge of the soul--being something
+distinct from Brahman--would not follow from the knowledge of the
+highest Self. There are the texts declaring the oneness of Brahman
+previous to creation, such as 'the Self only was this in the beginning'
+(Ait. Ār. II, 4, 1, 1), and on the other hand those texts which declare
+that the souls spring from and again are merged in Brahman; such as 'As
+from a blazing fire sparks being like unto fire fly forth a thousandfold,
+thus are various beings brought forth from the Imperishable, and return
+thither also' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 1). These two sets of texts together make
+us apprehend that the souls are one with Brahman in so far as they are
+its effects. On this ground a word denoting the individual soul denotes
+the highest Self as well.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 391:1. If it be insisted upon that the Self in 'for the desire
+of the Self' is the individual Self, we point out that terms denoting
+the individual Self at the same time denote the highest Self also. This
+tenet of his Rāmānuja considers to be set forth and legitimately proved
+in Sūtra 23, while Sūtras 21 and 22 although advocating the right
+principle fail to assign valid arguments.]
+
+
+
+
+21. Because (the soul) when it will depart is such; thus Audulomi thinks.
+
+It is wrong to maintain that the designation of Brahman by means of
+terms denoting the individual soul is intended to prove the truth of the
+declaration that through the knowledge of one thing everything is known,
+in so far namely as the soul is an effect of Brahman and hence one with
+it. For scriptural texts such as 'the knowing Self is not born, it dies
+not' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18), declare the soul not to have originated, and it
+moreover is admitted that the world is each time created to the end of
+the souls undergoing experiences retributive of their former deeds;
+otherwise the inequalities of the different parts of the creation would
+be inexplicable. If moreover the soul were a mere effect of Brahman, its
+Release would consist in a mere return into the substance of Brahman,--
+analogous to the refunding into Brahman of the material elements, and
+that would mean that the injunction and performance of acts leading to
+such Release would be purportless. Release, understood in that sense,
+moreover would not be anything beneficial to man; for to be refunded
+into Brahman as an earthen vessel is refunded into its own causal
+substance, i.e. clay, means nothing else but complete annihilation. How,
+under these circumstances, certain texts can speak of the origination
+and reabsorption of the individual soul will be set forth later on.--
+According to the opinion of the teacher Audulomi, the highest Selfs
+being denoted by terms directly denoting the individual soul is due to
+the soul's becoming Brahman when departing from the body. This is in
+agreement with texts such as the following, 'This serene being having
+risen from this body and approached the highest light appears in its
+true form' (Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 4); 'As the flowing rivers disappear in the
+sea, losing their name and form, thus a wise man freed from name and
+form goes to the divine Person who is higher than the high' (Mu. Up. III,
+2, 8).
+
+
+
+
+22. On account of (Brahman's) abiding (within the individual soul); thus
+Kāsakritsna (holds).
+
+We must object likewise to the view set forth in the preceding Sūtra,
+viz. that Brahman is denoted by terms denoting the individual soul
+because that soul when departing becomes one with Brahman. For that view
+cannot stand the test of being submitted to definite alternatives.--Is
+the soul's not being such, i.e. not being Brahman, previously to its
+departure from the body, due to its own essential nature or to a
+limiting adjunct, and is it in the latter case real or unreal? In the
+first case the soul can never become one with Brahman, for if its
+separation from Brahman is due to its own essential nature, that
+separation can never vanish as long as the essential nature persists.
+And should it be said that its essential nature comes to an end together
+with its distinction from Brahman, we reply that in that case it
+perishes utterly and does not therefore become Brahman. The latter view,
+moreover, precludes itself as in no way beneficial to man, and so on.--
+If, in the next place, the difference of the soul from Brahman depends
+on the presence of real limiting adjuncts, the soul is Brahman even
+before its departure from the body, and we therefore cannot reasonably
+accept the distinction implied in saying that the soul becomes Brahman
+only when it departs. For on this view there exists nothing but Brahman
+and its limiting adjuncts, and as those adjuncts cannot introduce
+difference into Brahman which is without parts and hence incapable of
+difference, the difference resides altogether in the adjuncts, and hence
+the soul is Brahman even before its departure from the body.--If, on the
+other hand, the difference due to the adjuncts is not real, we ask--what
+is it then that becomes Brahman on the departure of the soul?--Brahman
+itself whose true nature had previously been obscured by Nescience, its
+limiting adjunct!--Not so, we reply. Of Brahman whose true nature
+consists in eternal, free, self-luminous intelligence, the true nature
+cannot possibly be hidden by Nescience. For by 'hiding' or 'obscuring'
+we understand the cessation of the light that belongs to the essential
+nature of a thing. Where, therefore, light itself and alone constitutes
+the essential nature of a thing, there can either be no obscuration at
+all, or if there is such it means complete annihilation of the thing.
+Hence Brahman's essential nature being manifest at all times, there
+exists no difference on account of which it could be said to _become_
+Brahman at the time of the soul's departure; and the distinction
+introduced in the last Sūtra ('when departing') thus has no meaning. The
+text on which Audulomi relies, 'Having risen from this body,' &c., does
+not declare that that which previously was not Brahman becomes such at
+the time of departure, but rather that the true nature of the soul which
+had previously existed already becomes manifest at the time of departure.
+This will be explained under IV, 4, 1.
+
+The theories stated in the two preceding Sūtras thus having been found
+untenable, the teacher Kāsakritsna states his own view, to the effect
+that words denoting the jīva are applied to Brahman because Brahman
+abides as its Self within the individual soul which thus constitutes
+Brahman's body. This theory rests on a number of well-known texts,
+'Entering into them with this living (individual) soul let me evolve
+names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'He who dwelling within the Self,
+&c., whose body the Self is,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'He who moves
+within the Imperishable, of whom the Imperishable is the body,' &c;
+'Entered within, the ruler of beings, the Self of all.' That the term
+'jīva' denotes not only the jīva itself, but extends in its denotation
+up to the highest Self, we have explained before when discussing the
+text, 'Let me evolve names and forms.' On this view of the identity of
+the individual and the highest Self consisting in their being related to
+each other as body and soul, we can accept in their full and unmutilated
+meaning all scriptural texts whatever--whether they proclaim the
+perfection and omniscience of the highest Brahman, or teach how the
+individual soul steeped in ignorance and misery is to be saved through
+meditation on Brahman, or describe the origination and reabsorption of
+the world, or aim at showing how the world is identical with Brahman.
+For this reason the author of the Sūtras, rejecting other views, accepts
+the theory of Kāsakritsna. Returning to the Maitreyī-brāhmana we proceed
+to explain the general sense, from the passage previously discussed
+onwards. Being questioned by Maitreyī as to the means of immortality,
+Yājńavalkya teaches her that this means is given in meditation on the
+highest Self ('The Self is to be seen,' &c.). He next indicates in a
+general way the nature of the object of meditation ('When the Self is
+seen,' &c.), and--availing himself of the similes of the drum, &c.--of
+the government over the organs, mind, and so on, which are instrumental
+towards meditation. He then explains in detail that the object of
+meditation, i.e. the highest Brahman, is the sole cause of the entire
+world; and the ruler of the aggregate of organs on which there depends
+all activity with regard to the objects of the senses ('As clouds of
+smoke proceed,' &c.; 'As the ocean is the home of all the waters'). He,
+next, in order to stimulate the effort which leads to immortality, shows
+how the highest Self abiding in the form of the individual Self, is of
+one uniform character, viz. that of limitless intelligence ('As a lump
+of salt,' &c.), and how that same Self characterised by homogeneous
+limitless intelligence connects itself in the Samsāra state with the
+products of the elements ('a mass of knowledge, it rises from those
+elements and again vanishes into them'). He then adds, 'When he has
+departed, there is no more knowledge'; meaning that in the state of
+Release, where the soul's unlimited essential intelligence is not
+contracted in any way, there is none of those specific cognitions by
+which the Self identifying itself with the body, the sense-organs, &c.,
+views itself as a man or a god, and so on. Next--in the passage, 'For
+where there is duality as it were'--he, holding that the view of a
+plurality of things not having their Self in Brahman is due to ignorance,
+shows that for him who has freed himself from the shackles of ignorance
+and recognises this whole world as animated by Brahman, the view of
+plurality is dispelled by the recognition of the absence of any
+existence apart from Brahman. He then proceeds, 'He by whom he knows all
+this, by what means should he know Him?' This means--He, i.e. the
+highest Self, which abiding within the individual soul as its true Self
+bestows on it the power of knowledge so that the soul knows all this
+through the highest Self; by what means should the soul know Him? In
+other words, there is no such means of knowledge: the highest Self
+cannot be fully understood by the individual soul. 'That Self,' he
+continues, 'is to be expressed as--not so, not so!' That means--He, the
+highest Lord, different in nature from everything else, whether sentient
+or non-sentient, abides within all beings as their Self, and hence is
+not touched by the imperfections of what constitutes his body merely. He
+then concludes, 'Whereby should he know the Knower? Thus, O Maitreyī,
+thou hast been instructed. Thus far goes Immortality'; the purport of
+these words being--By what means, apart from the meditation described,
+should man know Him who is different in nature from all other beings,
+who is the sole cause of the entire world, who is the Knower of all, Him
+the Supreme Person? It is meditation on Him only which shows the road to
+Immortality. It thus appears that the Maitreyī-brāhmana is concerned
+with the highest Brahman only; and this confirms the conclusion that
+Brahman only, and with it Prakriti as ruled by Brahman, is the cause of
+the world.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the connexion of
+sentences.'
+
+
+
+
+23. (Brahman is) the material cause on account of this not being in
+conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative instances.
+
+The claims raised by the atheistic Sānkhya having thus been disposed of,
+the theistic Sānkhya comes forward as an opponent. It must indeed be
+admitted, he says, that the Vedānta-texts teach the cause of the world
+to be an all-knowing Lord; for they attribute to that cause thought and
+similar characteristics. But at the same time we learn from those same
+texts that the material cause of the world is none other than the
+Pradhāna; with an all-knowing, unchanging superintending Lord they
+connect a Pradhāna, ruled by him, which is non-intelligent and undergoes
+changes, and the two together only they represent as the cause of the
+world. This view is conveyed by the following texts, 'who is without
+parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (Svet.
+Up. VI, 18); 'This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying' (Bri. Up. IV,
+4, 25); 'He knows her who produces all effects, the non-knowing one, the
+unborn one, wearing eight forms, the firm one. Ruled by him she is
+spread out, and incited and guided by him gives birth to the world for
+the benefit of the souls. A cow she is without beginning and end, a
+mother producing all beings' (see above, p. 363). That the Lord creates
+this world in so far only as guiding Prakriti, the material cause, we
+learn from the following text, 'From that the Lord of Māya creates all
+this. Know Māya to be Prakriti and the Lord of Māya the great Lord'
+(Svet. Up. IV, 9, 10). And similarly Smriti, 'with me as supervisor
+Prakriti brings forth the Universe of the movable and the immovable'
+(Bha. GĪ. IX, 10). Although, therefore, the Pradhāna is not expressly
+stated by Scripture to be the material cause, we must assume that there
+is such a Pradhāna and that, superintended by the Lord, it constitutes
+the material cause, because otherwise the texts declaring Brahman to be
+the cause of the world would not be fully intelligible. For ordinary
+experience shows us on all sides that the operative cause and the
+material cause are quite distinct: we invariably have on the one side
+clay, gold, and other material substances which form the material causes
+of pots, ornaments, and so on, and on the other hand, distinct from them,
+potters, goldsmiths, and so on, who act as operative causes. And we
+further observe that the production of effects invariably requires
+several instrumental agencies. The Vedānta-texts therefore cannot
+possess the strength to convince us, in open defiance of the two
+invariable rules, that the one Brahman is at the same time the material
+and the operative cause of the world; and hence we maintain that Brahman
+is only the operative but not the material cause, while the material
+cause is the Pradhāna guided by Brahman.
+
+This primā facie view the Sūtra combats. Prakriti, i.e. the material
+cause, not only the operative cause, is Brahman only; this view being in
+harmony with the promissory declaration and the illustrative instances.
+The promissory declaration is the one referring to the knowledge of all
+things through the knowledge of one, 'Did you ever ask for that
+instruction by which that which is not heard becomes heard?' &c. (Ch, Up.
+VI, 1, 3). And the illustrative instances are those which set forth the
+knowledge of the effect as resulting from the knowledge of the cause,
+'As by one lump of clay there is made known all that is made of clay; as
+by one nugget of gold, &c.; as by one instrument for paring the nails,'
+&c. (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4). If Brahman were merely the operative cause of the
+world, the knowledge of the entire world would not result from the
+knowledge of Brahman; not any more than we know the pot when we know the
+potter. And thus scriptural declaration and illustrative instances would
+be stultified. But if Brahman is the general material cause, then the
+knowledge of Brahman implies the knowledge of its effect, i.e. the world,
+in the same way as the knowledge of such special material causes as a
+lump of clay, a nugget of gold, an instrument for paring the nails,
+implies the knowledge of all things made of clay, gold or iron--such as
+pots, bracelets, diadems, hatchets, and so on. For an effect is not a
+substance different from its cause, but the cause itself which has
+passed into a different state. The initial declaration thus being
+confirmed by the instances of clay and its products, &c., which stand in
+the relation of cause and effect, we conclude that Brahman only is the
+material cause of the world. That Scripture teaches the operative and
+the material causes to be separate, is not true; it rather teaches the
+unity of the two. For in the text, 'Have you asked for that ādesa (above,
+and generally, understood to mean "instruction"), by which that which is
+not heard becomes heard?' the word 'ādesa' has to be taken to mean _ruler_,
+in agreement with the text, 'by the command--or rule--of that
+Imperishable sun and moon stand apart' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 9), so that the
+passage means, 'Have you asked for that Ruler by whom, when heard and
+known, even that which is not heard and known, becomes heard and known?'
+This clearly shows the unity of the operative (ruling or supervising)
+cause and the material cause; taken in conjunction with the subsequent
+declaration of the unity of the cause previous to creation, 'Being only,
+this was in the beginning, one only,' and the denial of a further
+operative cause implied in the further qualification 'advitīyam,' i.e.
+'without a second.'--But how then have we to understand texts such as
+the one quoted above (from the Kūlika-Upanishad) which declare Prakriti
+to be eternal and the material cause of the world?--Prakriti, we reply,
+in such passages denotes Brahman in its causal phase when names and
+forms are not yet distinguished. For a principle independent of Brahman
+does not exist, as we know from texts such as 'Everything abandons him
+who views anything as apart from the Self; and 'But where for him the
+Self has become all, whereby should he see whom?' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6;
+15). Consider also the texts, 'All this is Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1);
+and 'All this has its Self in that' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7); which declare
+that the world whether in its causal or its effected condition has
+Brahman for its Self. The relation of the world to Brahman has to be
+conceived in agreement with scriptural texts such as 'He who moves
+within the earth,' &c., up to 'He who moves within the Imperishable';
+and 'He who dwells within the earth,' &c., up to 'He who dwells within
+the Self (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3-23). The highest Brahman, having the whole
+aggregate of non-sentient and sentient beings for its body, ever is the
+Self of all. Sometimes, however, names and forms are not evolved, not
+distinguished in Brahman; at other times they are evolved, distinct. In
+the latter state Brahman is called an effect and manifold; in the former
+it is called one, without a second, the cause. This causal state of
+Brahman is meant where the text quoted above speaks of the cow without
+beginning and end, giving birth to effects, and so on.--But, the text,
+'The great one is merged in the Unevolved, the Unevolved is merged in
+the Imperishable,' intimates that the Unevolved originates and again
+passes away; and similarly the Mahābhārata says, 'from that there sprung
+the Non-evolved comprising the three gunas; the Non-evolved is merged in
+the indivisible Person.'--These texts, we reply, present no real
+difficulty. For Brahman having non-sentient matter for its body, that
+state which consists of the three gunas and is denoted by the term
+'Unevolved' is something effected. And the text, 'When there was
+darkness, neither day nor night,' states that also in a total pralaya
+non-sentient matter having Brahman for its Self continues to exist in a
+highly subtle condition. This highly subtle matter stands to Brahman the
+cause of the world in the relation of a mode (prakāra), and it is
+Brahman viewed as having such a mode that the text from the Kūl.
+Upanishad refers to. For this reason also the text, 'the Imperishable is
+merged in darkness, darkness becomes one with the highest God,' declares
+not that darkness is completely merged and lost in the Divinity but only
+that it becomes one with it; what the text wants to intimate is that
+state of Brahman in which, having for its mode extremely subtle matter
+here called 'Darkness,' it abides without evolving names and forms. The
+mantra, 'There was darkness, hidden in darkness,' &c. (Ri. Samh. X, 129,
+3), sets forth the same view; and so does Manu (I, 5), 'This universe
+existed in the shape of Darkness, unperceived, destitute of distinctive
+marks, unattainable by reasoning, unknowable, wholly immersed as it were
+in deep sleep.' And, as to the text, 'from that the Lord of Māya creates
+everything,' we shall prove later on the unchangeableness of Brahman,
+and explain the scriptural texts asserting it.
+
+As to the contention raised by the Pūrvapakshin that on the basis of
+invariable experience it must be held that one and the same principle
+cannot be both material and operative cause, and that effects cannot be
+brought about by one agency, and that hence the Vedānta-texts can no
+more establish the view of Brahman being the sole cause than the command
+'sprinkle with fire' will convince us that fire may perform the office
+of water; we simply remark that the highest Brahman which totally
+differs in nature from all other beings, which is omnipotent and
+omniscient, can by itself accomplish everything. The invariable rule of
+experience holds good, on the other hand, with regard to clay and
+similar materials which are destitute of intelligence and hence
+incapable of guiding and supervising; and with regard to potters and
+similar agents who do not possess the power of transforming themselves
+into manifold products, and cannot directly realise their intentions.--
+The conclusion therefore remains that Brahman alone is the material as
+well as the operative cause of the Universe.
+
+
+
+
+24. And on account of the statement of reflection.
+
+Brahman must be held to be both causes for that reason also that texts
+such as 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'It thought,
+may I be many, may I grow forth,' declare that the creative Brahman
+forms the purpose of its own Self multiplying itself. The text clearly
+teaches that creation on Brahman's part is preceded by the purpose 'May
+I, and no other than I, become manifold in the shape of various non-
+sentient and sentient beings.'
+
+
+
+
+25. And on account of both being directly declared.
+
+The conclusion arrived at above is based not only on scriptural
+declaration, illustrative instances and statements of reflection; but in
+addition Scripture directly states that Brahman alone is the material as
+well as operative cause of the world. 'What was the wood, what the tree
+from which they have shaped heaven and earth? You wise ones, search in
+your minds, whereon it stood, supporting the worlds.--Brahman was the
+wood, Brahman the tree from which they shaped heaven and earth; you wise
+ones, I tell you, it stood on Brahman, supporting the worlds.'--Here a
+question is asked, suggested by the ordinary worldly view, as to what
+was the material and instruments used by Brahman when creating; and the
+answer--based on the insight that there is nothing unreasonable in
+ascribing all possible powers to Brahman which differs from all other
+beings--declares that Brahman itself is the material and the instruments;--
+whereby the ordinary view is disposed of.--The next Sūtra supplies a
+further reason.
+
+
+
+
+26. On account of (the Self) making itself.
+
+Of Brahman which the text had introduced as intent on creation, 'He
+wished, may I be many' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), a subsequent text says, 'That
+itself made its Self (II, 7), so that Brahman is represented as the
+object as well as the agent in the act of creation. It being the Self
+only which here is made many, we understand that the Self is material
+cause as well as operative one. The Self with names and forms non-
+evolved is agent (cause), the same Self with names and forms evolved is
+object (effect). There is thus nothing contrary to reason in one Self
+being object as well as agent.
+
+A new doubt here presents itself.--'The True, knowledge, infinite is
+Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'Bliss is Brahman' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 28);
+'Free from sin, free from old age, free from death and grief, free from
+hunger and thirst' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1,5); 'Without parts, without action,
+tranquil, without fault, without taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'This great
+unborn Self, undecaying, undying' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25)--from all these
+texts it appears that Brahman is essentially free from even a shadow of
+all the imperfections which afflict all sentient and non-sentient beings,
+and has for its only characteristics absolutely supreme bliss and
+knowledge. How then is it possible that this Brahman should form the
+purpose of becoming, and actually become, manifold, by appearing in the
+form of a world comprising various sentient and non-sentient beings--all
+of which are the abodes of all kinds of imperfections and afflictions?
+To this question the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+27. Owing to modification.
+
+This means--owing to the essential nature of modification (parināma).
+The modification taught in our system is not such as to introduce
+imperfections into the highest Brahman, on the contrary it confers on it
+limitless glory. For our teaching as to Brahman's modification is as
+follows. Brahman--essentially antagonistic to all evil, of uniform
+goodness, differing in nature from all beings other than itself, all-
+knowing, endowed with the power of immediately realising all its
+purposes, in eternal possession of all it wishes for, supremely blessed--
+has for its body the entire universe, with all its sentient and non-
+sentient beings--the universe being for it a plaything as it were--and
+constitutes the Self of the Universe. Now, when this world which forms
+Brahman's body has been gradually reabsorbed into Brahman, each
+constituent element being refunded into its immediate cause, so that in
+the end there remains only the highly subtle, elementary matter which
+Scripture calls Darkness; and when this so-called Darkness itself, by
+assuming a form so extremely subtle that it hardly deserves to be called
+something separate from Brahman, of which it constitutes the body, has
+become one with Brahman; then Brahman invested with this ultra-subtle
+body forms the resolve 'May I again possess a world-body constituted by
+all sentient and non-sentient beings, distinguished by names and forms
+just as in the previous aeon,' and modifies (parināmayati) itself by
+gradually evolving the world-body in the inverse order in which
+reabsorption had taken place.
+
+All Vedānta-texts teach such modification or change on Brahman's part.
+There is, e.g., the text in the Brihad-Āranyaka which declares that the
+whole world constitutes the body of Brahman and that Brahman is its Self.
+That text teaches that earth, water, fire, sky, air, heaven, sun, the
+regions, moon and stars, ether, darkness, light, all beings, breath,
+speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, knowledge form the body of Brahman which
+abides within them as their Self and Ruler. Thus in the Kānva-text; the
+Mādhyandina-text reads 'the Self' instead of 'knowledge'; and adds the
+worlds, sacrifices and vedas. The parallel passage in the Subāla-
+Upanishad adds to the beings enumerated as constituting Brahman's body
+in the Brihad-Āranyaka, buddhi, ahamkāra, the mind (kitta), the Un-
+evolved (avyakta), the Imperishable (akshara), and concludes 'He who
+moves within death, of whom death is the body, whom death does not know,
+he is the inner Self of all, free from all evil, divine, the one god
+Nārāyana. The term 'Death' here denotes matter in its extremely subtle
+form, which in other texts is called Darkness; as we infer from the
+order of enumeration in another passage in the same Upanishad, 'the
+Unevolved is merged in the Imperishable, the Imperishable in Darkness.'
+That this Darkness is called 'Death' is due to the fact that it obscures
+the understanding of all souls and thus is harmful to them. The full
+text in the Subāla-Up. declaring the successive absorption of all the
+beings forming Brahman's body is as follows, 'The earth is merged in
+water, water in fire, fire in air, air in the ether, the ether in the
+sense-organs, the sense-organs in the tanmātras, the tanmātras in the
+gross elements, the gross elements in the great principle, the great
+principle in the Unevolved, the Unevolved in the Imperishable; the
+Imperishable is merged in Darkness; Darkness becomes one with the
+highest Divinity.' That even in the state of non-separation (to which
+the texts refer as 'becoming one') non-sentient matter as well as
+sentient beings, together with the impressions of their former deeds,
+persists in an extremely subtle form, will be shown under II, 1, 35. We
+have thus a Brahman all-knowing, of the nature of supreme bliss and so
+on, one and without a second, having for its body all sentient and non-
+sentient beings abiding in an extremely subtle condition and having
+become 'one' with the Supreme Self in so far as they cannot be
+designated as something separate from him; and of this Brahman Scripture
+records that it forms the resolve of becoming many--in so far, namely,
+as investing itself with a body consisting of all sentient and non-
+sentient beings in their gross, manifest state which admits of
+distinctions of name and form--and thereupon modifies (parināma) itself
+into the form of the world. This is distinctly indicated in the
+Taittirīya-Upanishad, where Brahman is at first described as 'The True,
+knowledge, infinite,' as 'the Self of bliss which is different from the
+Self of Understanding,' as 'he who bestows bliss'; and where the text
+further on says, 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth. He
+brooded over himself, and having thus brooded he sent forth all whatever
+there is. Having sent forth he entered it. Having entered it he became
+sat and tyat, defined and undefined, supported and non-supported,
+knowledge and non-knowledge, real and unreal.' The 'brooding' referred
+to in this text denotes knowing, viz. reflection on the shape and
+character of the previous world which Brahman is about to reproduce.
+Compare the text 'whose brooding consists of knowledge' (Mu. Up. I, 1,
+9). The meaning therefore is that Brahman, having an inward intuition of
+the characteristics of the former world, creates the new world on the
+same pattern. That Brahman in all kalpas again and again creates the
+same world is generally known from Sruti and Smriti. Cp. 'As the creator
+formerly made sun and moon, and sky and earth, and the atmosphere and
+the heavenly world,' and 'whatever various signs of the seasons are seen
+in succession, the same appear again and again in successive yugas and
+kalpas.'
+
+The sense of the Taittirīya-text therefore is as follows. The highest
+Self, which in itself is of the nature of unlimited knowledge and bliss,
+has for its body all sentient and non-sentient beings--instruments of
+sport for him as it were--in so subtle a form that they may be called
+non-existing; and as they are his body he may be said to consist of them
+(tan-maya). Then desirous of providing himself with an infinity of
+playthings of all kinds he, by a series of steps beginning with Prakriti
+and the aggregate of souls and leading down to the elements in their
+gross state, so modifies himself as to have those elements for his body--
+when he is said to consist of them--and thus appears in the form of our
+world containing what the text denotes as sat and tyat, i.e. all
+intelligent and non-intelligent things, from gods down to plants and
+stones. When the text says that the Self having entered into it became
+sat and tyat, the meaning is that the highest Self, which in its causal
+state had been the universal Self, abides, in its effected state also,
+as the Self of the different substances undergoing changes and thus
+becomes this and that. While the highest Self thus undergoes a change--
+in the form of a world comprising the whole aggregate of sentient and
+non-sentient beings--all imperfection and suffering are limited to the
+sentient beings constituting part of its body, and all change is
+restricted to the non-sentient things which constitute another part. The
+highest Self is _effected_ in that sense only that it is the ruling
+principle, and hence the Self, of matter and souls in their gross or
+evolved state; but just on account of being this, viz. their inner Ruler
+and Self, it is in no way touched by their imperfections and changes.
+Consisting of unlimited knowledge and bliss he for ever abides in his
+uniform nature, engaged in the sport of making this world go round. This
+is the purport of the clause 'it became the real and the unreal':
+although undergoing a change into the multiplicity of actual sentient
+and non-sentient things, Brahman at the same time was the Real, i.e.
+that which is free from all shadow of imperfection, consisting of
+nothing but pure knowledge and bliss. That all beings, sentient and non-
+sentient, and whether in their non-evolved or evolved states, are mere
+playthings of Brahman, and that the creation and reabsorption of the
+world are only his sport, this has been expressly declared by Dvaipāyana,
+Parāsara and other Rishis,'Know that all transitory beings, from the
+Unevolved down to individual things, are a mere play of Hari'; 'View his
+action like that of a playful child,' &c. The Sūtrakāra will distinctly
+enounce the same view in II, 1, 33. With a similar view the text 'from
+that the Lord of Māya sends forth all this; and in that the other is
+bound by Māyā' (Svet. Up. IV, 9), refers to Prakriti and soul, which
+together constitute the body of Brahman, as things different from
+Brahman, although then, i.e. at the time of a pralaya, they are one with
+Brahman in so far as their extreme subtlety does not admit of their
+being conceived as separate; this it does to the end of suggesting that
+even when Brahman undergoes the change into the shape of this world, all
+changes exclusively belong to non-sentient matter which is a mode of
+Brahman, and all imperfections and sufferings to the individual souls
+which also are modes of Brahman. The text has to be viewed as agreeing
+in meaning with 'that Self made itself.' Of a similar purport is the
+account given in Manu, 'He being desirous to send forth from his body
+beings of many kinds, first with a thought created the waters and placed
+his seed in them' (I, 8).
+
+It is in this way that room is found for those texts also which proclaim
+Brahman to be free from all imperfection and all change. It thus remains
+a settled conclusion that Brahman by itself constitutes the material as
+well as the operative cause of the world.
+
+
+
+
+28. And because it is called the womb.
+
+Brahman is the material as well as the operative cause of the world for
+that reason also that certain texts call it the womb, 'the maker, the
+Lord, the Person, Brahman, the womb' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3); 'that which
+the wise regard as the womb of all beings' (I, 1, 6). And that 'womb'
+means as much as material cause, appears from the complementary passage
+'As a spider sends forth and draws in its threads' (I, 1, 7)--
+
+
+
+
+29. Herewith all (texts) are explained, explained.
+
+Hereby, i.e. by the whole array of arguments set forth in the four pādas
+of the first adhyāya; all those particular passages of the Vedānta-texts
+which give instruction as to the cause of the world, are explained as
+meaning to set forth a Brahman all-wise, all-powerful, different in
+nature from all beings intelligent and non-intelligent. The repetition
+of the word 'explained' is meant to indicate the termination of the
+adhyāya.
+
+
+
+
+SECOND ADHYĀYA
+
+FIRST PĀDA.
+
+1. If it be said that there would result the fault of there being no
+room for (certain) Smritis: (we reply) 'no,' because there would result
+the fault of want of room for other Smritis.
+
+The first adhyāya has established the truth that what the Vedānta-texts
+teach is a Supreme Brahman, which is something different as well from
+non-sentient matter known through the ordinary means of proof, viz.
+Perception and so on, as from the intelligent souls whether connected
+with or separated from matter; which is free from even a shadow of
+imperfection of any kind; which is an ocean as it were of auspicious
+qualities and so on; which is the sole cause of the entire Universe;
+which constitutes the inner Self of all things. The second adhyāya is
+now begun for the purpose of proving that the view thus set forth cannot
+be impugned by whatever arguments may possibly be brought forward. The
+Sūtrakāra at first turns against those who maintain that the Vedanta-
+texts do not establish the view indicated above, on the ground of that
+view being contradicted by the Smriti of Kapila, i. e. the Sānkhya-
+system.
+
+But how can it be maintained at all that Scripture does not set forth a
+certain view because thereby it would enter into conflict with Smriti?
+For that Smriti if contradicted by Scripture is to be held of no account,
+is already settled in the Pūrva Mīmāmsā ('But where there is
+contradiction Smriti is not to be regarded,' I, 3, 3).--Where, we reply,
+a matter can be definitely settled on the basis of Scripture--as e.g. in
+the case of the Vedic injunction, 'he is to sing, after having touched
+the Udumbara branch' (which clearly contradicts the Smriti injunction
+that the whole branch is to be covered up)--Smriti indeed need not be
+regarded. But the topic with which the Vedānta-texts are concerned is
+hard to understand, and hence, when a conflict arises between those
+texts and a Smriti propounded by some great Rishi, the matter does not
+admit of immediate decisive settlement: it is not therefore unreasonable
+to undertake to prove by Smriti that Scripture does not set forth a
+certain doctrine. That is to say--we possess a Smriti composed with a
+view to teach men the nature and means of supreme happiness, by the
+great Rishi Kapila to whom Scripture, Smriti, Itihāsa and Purāna alike
+refer as a person worthy of all respect (compare e. g. 'the Rishi Kapila,'
+Svet. Up. V, 2), and who moreover (unlike Brihaspati and other Smriti--
+writers) fully acknowledges the validity of all the means of earthly
+happiness which are set forth in the karmakānda of the Veda, such as the
+daily oblations to the sacred fires, the New and Full Moon offerings and
+the great Soma sacrifices. Now, as men having only an imperfect
+knowledge of the Veda, and moreover naturally slow-minded, can hardly
+ascertain the sense of the Vedānta-texts without the assistance of such
+a Smriti, and as to be satisfied with that sense of the Vedānta which
+discloses itself on a mere superficial study of the text would imply the
+admission that the whole Sānkhya Smriti, although composed by an able
+and trustworthy person, really is useless; we see ourselves driven to
+acknowledge that the doctrine of the Vedānta-texts cannot differ from
+the one established by the Sānkhyas. Nor must you object that to do so
+would force on us another unacceptable conclusion, viz. that those
+Smritis, that of Manu e.g., which maintain Brahman to be the universal
+cause, are destitute of authority; for Manu and similar works inculcate
+practical religious duty and thus have at any rate the uncontested
+function of supporting the teaching of the karmakānda of the Veda. The
+Sānkhya Smriti, on the other hand, is entirely devoted to the setting
+forth of theoretical truth (not of practical duty), and if it is not
+accepted in that quality, it is of no use whatsoever.--On this ground
+the Sūtra sets forth the primā facie view, 'If it be said that there
+results the fault of there being no room for certain Smritis.'
+
+The same Sūtra replies 'no; because there would result the fault of want
+of room for other Smritis.' For other Smritis, that of Manu e.g., teach
+that Brahman is the universal cause. Thus Manu says, 'This (world)
+existed in the shape of darkness, and so on. Then the divine Self
+existent, indiscernible but making discernible all this, the great
+elements and the rest, appeared with irresistible power, dispelling the
+darkness. He, desiring to produce beings of many kinds from his own body,
+first with a thought created the waters, and placed his seed in them'
+(Manu I, 5-8). And the Bhagavad-gitā, 'I am the origin and the
+dissolution of the whole Universe' (VII, 6). 'I am the origin of all;
+everything proceeds from me' (X, 8). Similarly, in the Mahābhārata, to
+the question 'Whence was created this whole world with its movable and
+immovable beings?' the answer is given, 'Nārāyana assumes the form of
+the world, he the infinite, eternal one'; and 'from him there originates
+the Unevolved consisting of the three gunas'; and 'the Unevolved is
+merged in the non-acting Person.' And Parāsara says, 'From Vishnu there
+sprang the world and in him it abides; he makes this world persist and
+he rules it--he is the world.' Thus also Āpastamba, 'The living beings
+are the dwelling of him who lies in all caves, who is not killed, who is
+spotless'; and 'From him spring all bodies; he is the primary cause, he
+is eternal, permanent.' (Dharmasū. I, 8, 22, 4; 23, 2).--If the question
+as to the meaning of the Vedānta-texts were to be settled by means of
+Kapila's Smriti, we should have to accept the extremely undesirable
+conclusion that all the Smritis quoted are of no authority. It is true
+that the Vedānta-texts are concerned with theoretical truth lying
+outside the sphere of Perception and the other means of knowledge, and
+that hence students possessing only a limited knowledge of the Veda
+require some help in order fully to make out the meaning of the Vedānta.
+But what must be avoided in this case is to give any opening for the
+conclusion that the very numerous Smritis which closely follow the
+doctrine of the Vedānta, are composed by the most competent and
+trustworthy persons and aim at supporting that doctrine, are irrelevant;
+and it is for this reason that Kapila's Smriti which contains a doctrine
+opposed to Scripture must be disregarded. The support required is
+elucidation of the sense conveyed by Scripture, and this clearly cannot
+be effected by means of a Smriti contradicting Scripture. Nor is it of
+any avail to plead, as the Pūrvapakshin does, that Manu and other
+Smritis of the same kind fulfil in any case the function of elucidating
+the acts of religious duty enjoined in the karmakānda. For if they
+enjoin acts of religious duty as means to win the favour of the Supreme
+Person but do not impress upon us the idea of that Supreme Person
+himself who is to be pleased by those acts, they are also not capable of
+impressing upon us the idea of those acts themselves. That it is the
+character of all religious acts to win the favour of the Supreme Spirit,
+Smriti distinctly declares, 'Man attains to perfection by worshipping
+with his proper action Him from whom all Beings proceed; and by whom all
+this is stretched out' (Bha. Gī. XVIII, 46); 'Let a man meditate on
+Nārāyana, the divine one, at all works, such as bathing and the like; he
+will then reach the world of Brahman and not return hither' (Daksha-
+smriti); and 'Those men with whom, intent on their duties, thou art
+pleased, O Lord, they pass beyond all this Māya and find Release for
+their souls' (Vi. Pu.). Nor can it be said that Manu and similar Smritis
+have a function in so far as setting forth works (not aiming at final
+Release but) bringing about certain results included in transmigratory
+existence, whether here on earth or in a heavenly world; for the
+essential character of those works also is to please the highest Person.
+As is said in the Bhagavad-gītā (IX, 23, 24); 'Even they who devoted to
+other gods worship them with faith, worship me, against ordinance. For I
+am the enjoyer and the Lord of all sacrifices; but they know me not in
+truth and hence they fall,' and 'Thou art ever worshipped by me with
+sacrifices; thou alone, bearing the form of pitris and of gods, enjoyest
+all the offerings made to either.' Nor finally can we admit the
+contention that it is rational to interpret the Vedįnta-texts in
+accordance with Kapila's Smriti because Kapila, in the Svetāsvatara text,
+is referred to as a competent person. For from this it would follow that,
+as Brihaspati is, in Sruti and Smriti, mentioned as a pattern of
+consummate wisdom, Scripture should be interpreted in agreement with the
+openly materialistic and atheistic Smriti composed by that authority.
+But, it may here be said, the Vedānta-texts should after all be
+interpreted in agreement with Kapila's Smriti, for the reason that
+Kapila had through the power of his concentrated meditation (yoga)
+arrived at an insight into truth.--To this objection the next Sūtra
+replies.
+
+
+
+
+2. And on account of the non-perception (of truth on the part) of others.
+
+The 'and' in the Sūtra has the force of 'but,' being meant to dispel the
+doubt raised. There are many other authors of Smritis, such as Manu, who
+through the power of their meditation had attained insight into the
+highest truth, and of whom it is known from Scripture that the purport
+of their teaching was a salutary medicine to the whole world ('whatever
+Manu said that was medicine'). Now, as these Rishis did not see truth in
+the way of Kapila, we conclude that Kapila's view, which contradicts
+Scripture, is founded on error, and cannot therefore be used to modify
+the sense of the Vedānta-texts.--Here finishes the adhikarana treating
+of 'Smriti.'
+
+
+
+
+3. Hereby the Yoga is refuted.
+
+By the above refutation of Kapila's Smriti the Yoga-smriti also is
+refuted.--But a question arises, What further doubt arises here with
+regard to the Yoga system, so as to render needful the formal extension
+to the Yoga of the arguments previously set forth against the Sānkhya?--
+It might appear, we reply, that the Vedānta should be supported by the
+Yoga-smriti, firstly, because the latter admits the existence of a Lord;
+secondly, because the Vedānta-texts mention Yoga as a means to bring
+about final Release; and thirdly, because Hiranyagarbha, who proclaimed
+the Yoga-smriti is qualified for the promulgation of all Vedānta-texts.--
+But these arguments refute themselves as follows. In the first place the
+Yoga holds the Pradhāna, which is independent of Brahman, to be the
+general material cause, and hence the Lord acknowledged by it is a mere
+operative cause. In the second place the nature of meditation, in which
+Yoga consists, is determined by the nature of the object of meditation,
+and as of its two objects, viz. the soul and the Lord, the former does
+not have its Self in Brahman, and the latter is neither the cause of the
+world nor endowed with the other auspicious qualities (which belong to
+Brahman), the Yoga is not of Vedic character. And as to the third point,
+Hiranyagarbha himself is only an individual soul, and hence liable to be
+overpowered by the inferior gunas, i.e. passion and darkness; and hence
+the Yoga-smriti is founded on error, no less than the Purānas,
+promulgated by him, which are founded on rajas and tamas. The Yoga
+cannot, therefore, be used for the support of the Vedānta.--Here
+finishes the adhikarana of 'the refutation of the Yoga.'
+
+
+
+
+4. Not, on account of the difference of character of that; and its being
+such (appears) from Scripture.
+
+The same opponent who laid stress on the conflict between Scripture and
+Smriti now again comes forward, relying this time (not on Smriti but) on
+simple reasoning. Your doctrine, he says, as to the world being an
+effect of Brahman which you attempted to prove by a refutation of the
+Sānkhya Smriti shows itself to be irrational for the following reason.
+Perception and the other means of knowledge show this world with all its
+sentient and non-sentient beings to be of a non-intelligent and impure
+nature, to possess none of the qualities of the Lord, and to have pain
+for its very essence; and such a world totally differs in nature from
+the Brahman, postulated by you, which is said to be all-knowing, of
+supreme lordly power, antagonistic to all evil, enjoying unbroken
+uniform blessedness. This difference in character of the world from
+Brahman is, moreover, not only known through Perception, and so on, but
+is seen to be directly stated in Scripture itself; compare 'Knowledge
+and non-knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1); 'Thus are these objects placed
+on the subjects, and the subjects on the prāna' (Kau. Up. III, 9); 'On
+the same tree man sits grieving, immersed, bewildered by his own
+impotence' (Svet. Up. IV, 7); 'The soul not being a Lord is bound
+because he has to enjoy' (Svet. Up. I, 8); and so on; all which texts
+refer to the effect, i.e. the world as being non-intelligent, of the
+essence of pain, and so on. The general rule is that an effect is non-
+different in character from its cause; as e.g. pots and bracelets are
+non-different in character from their material causes--clay and gold.
+The world cannot, therefore, be the effect of Brahman from which it
+differs in character, and we hence conclude that, in agreement with the
+Sānkhya Smriti, the Pradhāna which resembles the actual world in
+character must be assumed to be the general cause. Scripture, although
+not dependent on anything else and concerned with super-sensuous objects,
+must all the same come to terms with ratiocination (tarka); for all the
+different means of knowledge can in many cases help us to arrive at a
+decisive conclusion, only if they are supported by ratiocination. For by
+tarka we understand that kind of knowledge (intellectual activity) which
+in the case of any given matter, by means of an investigation either
+into the essential nature of that matter or into collateral (auxiliary)
+factors, determines what possesses proving power, and what are the
+special details of the matter under consideration: this kind of
+cognitional activity is also called ūha. All means of knowledge equally
+stand in need of tarka; Scripture however, the authoritative character
+of which specially depends on expectancy (ākānkshā), proximity
+(sannidhi), and compatibility (yogyatā), throughout requires to be
+assisted by tarka. In accordance with this Manu says,'He who
+investigates by means of reasoning, he only knows religious duty, and
+none other.' It is with a view to such confirmation of the sense of
+Scripture by means of Reasoning that the texts declare that certain
+topics such as the Self must be 'reflected on' (mantavya).--Now here it
+might possibly be said that as Brahman is ascertained from Scripture to
+be the sole cause of the world, it must be admitted that intelligence
+exists in the world also, which is an effect of Brahman. In the same way
+as the consciousness of an intelligent being is not perceived when it is
+in the states of deep sleep, swoon, &c., so the intelligent nature of
+jars and the like also is not observed, although it really exists; and
+it is this very difference of manifestation and non-manifestation of
+intelligence on which the distinction of intelligent and non-intelligent
+beings depends.--But to this we reply that permanent non-perception of
+intelligence proves its non-existence. This consideration also refutes
+the hypothesis of things commonly called non-intelligent possessing the
+power, or potentiality, of consciousness. For if you maintain that a
+thing possesses the power of producing an effect while yet that effect
+is never and nowhere _seen_ to be produced by it, you may as well
+proclaim at a meeting of sons of barren women that their mothers possess
+eminent procreative power! Moreover, to prove at first from the Vedānta-
+texts that Brahman is the material cause of the world, and from this
+that pots and the like possess potential consciousness, and therefrom
+the existence of non-manifested consciousness; and then, on the other
+hand, to start from the last principle as proved and to deduce therefrom
+that the Vedānta-texts prove Brahman to be the material cause of the
+world, is simply to argue in a circle; for that the relation of cause
+and effect should exist between things different in character is just
+what cannot be proved.--What sameness of character, again, of causal
+substance and effects, have you in mind when you maintain that from the
+absence of such sameness it follows that Brahman cannot be proved to be
+the material cause of the world? It cannot be complete sameness of all
+attributes, because in that case the relation of cause and effect (which
+after all requires _some_ difference) could not be established. For we
+do not observe that in pots and jars which are fashioned out of a lump
+of clay there persists the quality of 'being a lump' which belongs to
+the causal substance. And should you say that it suffices that there
+should be equality in some or any attribute, we point out that such is
+actually the case with regard to Brahman and the world, both of which
+have the attribute of 'existence' and others. The true state of the case
+rather is as follows. There is equality of nature between an effect and
+a cause, in that sense that those essential characteristics by which the
+causal substance distinguishes itself from other things persist in its
+effects also: those characteristic features, e.g., which distinguish
+gold from clay and other materials, persist also in things made of gold-
+bracelets and the like. But applying this consideration to Brahman and
+the world we find that Brahman's essential nature is to be antagonistic
+to all evil, and to consist of knowledge, bliss and power, while the
+world's essential nature is to be the opposite of all this. Brahman
+cannot, therefore, be the material cause of the world.
+
+But, it may be objected, we observe that even things of different
+essential characteristics stand to each other in the relation of cause
+and effect. From man, e.g., who is a sentient being, there spring nails,
+teeth, and hair, which are non-sentient things; the sentient scorpion
+springs from non-sentient dung; and non-sentient threads proceed from
+the sentient spider.--This objection, we reply, is not valid; for in the
+instances quoted the relation of cause and effect rests on the non-
+sentient elements only (i.e. it is only the non-sentient matter of the
+body which produces nails, &c.).
+
+But, a further objection is raised, Scripture itself declares in many
+places that things generally held to be non-sentient really possess
+intelligence; compare 'to him the earth said'; 'the water desired'; 'the
+prānas quarrelling among themselves as to their relative pre-eminence
+went to Brahman.' And the writers of the Purānas ako attribute
+consciousness to rivers, hills, the sea, and so on. Hence there is after
+all no essential difference in nature between sentient and so-called non-
+sentient beings.--To this objection the Pūrvapakshin replies in the next
+Sūtra.
+
+
+
+
+5. But (there is) denotation of the superintending (deities), on account
+of distinction and entering.
+
+The word 'but' is meant to set aside the objection started. In texts
+such as 'to him the earth said,' the terms 'earth' and so on, denote the
+divinities presiding over earth and the rest.--How is this known?--'
+Through distinction and connexion.' For earth and so on are denoted by
+the distinctive term 'divinities'; so e.g. 'Let me enter into those
+three divinities' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2), where fire, water, and earth are
+called divinities; and Kau. Up. II, 14, 'All divinities contending with
+each other as to pre-eminence,' and 'all these divinities having
+recognised pre-eminence in prāna.' The 'entering' of the Sūtra refers to
+Ait. Ar. II, 4, 2, 4, 'Agni having become speech entered into the mouth;
+Aditya having become sight entered into the eyes,' &c., where the text
+declares that Agni and other divine beings entered into the sense-organs
+as their superintendents.
+
+We therefore adhere to our conclusion that the world, being non-
+intelligent and hence essentially different in nature from Brahman,
+cannot be the effect of Brahman; and that therefore, in agreement with
+Smriti confirmed by reasoning, the Vedānta-texts must be held to teach
+that the Pradhāna is the universal material cause. This primā facie view
+is met by the following Sūtra.
+
+
+
+
+6. But it is seen.
+
+The 'but' indicates the change of view (introduced in the present Sūtra).
+The assertion that Brahman cannot be the material cause of the world
+because the latter differs from it in essential nature, is unfounded;
+since it is a matter of observation that even things of different nature
+stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. For it is
+observed that from honey and similar substances there originate worms
+and other little animals.--But it has been said above that in those
+cases there is sameness of nature, in so far as the relation of cause
+and effect holds good only between the non-intelligent elements in both!--
+This assertion was indeed made, but it does not suffice to prove that
+equality of character between cause and effect which you have in view.
+For, being apprehensive that from the demand of equality of character in
+some point or other only it would follow that, as all things have
+certain characteristics in common, anything might originate from
+anything, you have declared that the equality of character necessary for
+the relation of cause and effect is constituted by the persistence, in
+the effect, of those characteristic points which differentiate the cause
+from other things. But it is evident that this restrictive rule does not
+hold good in the case of the origination of worms and the like from
+honey and so on; and hence it is not unreasonable to assume that the
+world also, although differing in character from Brahman, may originate
+from the latter. For in the case of worms originating from honey,
+scorpions from dung, &c., we do _not_ observe--what indeed we _do_
+observe in certain other cases, as of pots made of clay, ornaments made
+of gold--that the special characteristics distinguishing the causal
+substance from other things persist in the effects also.
+
+
+
+
+7. If it be said that (the effect is) non-existing; we say no, there
+being a mere denial.
+
+But, an objection is raised, if Brahman, the cause, differs in nature
+from the effect, viz. the world, this means that cause and effect are
+separate things and that hence the effect does not exist in the cause, i.
+e. Brahman; and this again implies that the world originates from what
+has no existence!--Not so, we reply. For what the preceding Sūtra has
+laid down is merely the denial of an absolute rule demanding that cause
+and effect should be of the same nature; it was not asserted that the
+effect is a thing altogether different and separate from the cause. We
+by no means abandon our tenet that Brahman the cause modifies itself so
+as to assume the form of a world differing from it in character. For
+such is the case with the honey and the worms also. There is difference
+of characteristics, but--as in the case of gold and golden bracelets--
+there is oneness of substance.--An objection is raised.
+
+
+
+
+8. On account of such consequences in reabsorption (the Vedānta-texts
+would be) inappropriate.
+
+The term 'reabsorption' here stands as an instance of all the states of
+Brahman, reabsorption, creation, and so on--among which it is the first
+as appears from the texts giving instruction about those several states
+'Being only was this in the beginning'; 'The Self only was this in the
+beginning.' If we accept the doctrine of the oneness of substance of
+cause and effect, then, absorption, creation, &c. of the world all being
+in Brahman, the different states of the world would connect themselves
+with Brahman, and the latter would thus be affected by all the
+imperfections of its effect; in the same way as all the attributes of
+the bracelet are present in the gold also. And the undesirable
+consequence of this would be that contradictory attributes as predicated
+in different Vedānta-texts would have to be attributed to one and the
+same substance; cp. 'He who is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'Free
+from sin, free from old age and death' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5); 'Of him
+there is known neither cause nor effect' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'Of these
+two one eats the sweet fruit' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'The Self that is not a
+Lord is bound because he has to enjoy' (Svet. Up. I, 8); 'On account of
+his impotence he laments, bewildered' (Svet. Up. IV, 7).--Nor can we
+accept the explanation that, as Brahman in its causal as well as its
+effected state has all sentient and non-sentient beings for its body;
+and as all imperfections inhere in that body only, they do not touch
+Brahman in either its causal or effected state. For it is not possible
+that the world and Brahman should stand to each other in the relation of
+effect and cause, and if it were possible, the imperfections due to
+connexion with a body would necessarily cling to Brahman. It is not, we
+say, possible that the intelligent and non-intelligent beings together
+should constitute the body of Brahman. For a body is a particular
+aggregate of earth and the other elements, depending for its subsistence
+on vital breath with its five modifications, and serving as an abode to
+the sense-organs which mediate the experiences of pleasure and pain
+retributive of former works: such is in Vedic and worldly speech the
+sense connected with the term 'body.' But numerous Vedic texts--'Free
+from sin, from old age and death' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1); 'Without eating the
+other one looks on' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'Grasping without hands, hasting
+without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears' (Svet. Up.
+III, 19); 'Without breath, without mind' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2)--declare
+that the highest Self is free from karman and the enjoyment of its
+fruits, is not capable of enjoyment dependent on sense-organs, and has
+no life dependent on breath: whence it follows that he cannot have a
+body constituted by all the non-sentient and sentient beings. Nor can
+either non-sentient beings in their individual forms such as grass,
+trees, &c., or the aggregate of all the elements in their subtle state
+be viewed as the abode of sense-activity (without which they cannot
+constitute a body); nor are the elements in their subtle state combined
+into earth and the other gross elements (which again would be required
+for a body). And sentient beings which consist of mere intelligence are
+of course incapable of all this, and hence even less fit to constitute a
+body. Nor may it be said that to have a body merely means to be the
+abode of fruition, and that Brahman may possess a body in this latter
+sense; for there are abodes of fruition, such as palaces and the like,
+which are not considered to be bodies. Nor will it avail, narrowing the
+last definition, to say that that only is an abode of enjoyment directly
+abiding in which a being enjoys pain and pleasure; for if a soul enters
+a body other than its own, that body is indeed the abode in which it
+enjoys the pains and pleasures due to such entering, but is not admitted
+to be in the proper sense of the word the _body_ of the soul thus
+entered. In the case of the Lord, on the other hand, who is in the
+enjoyment of self-established supreme bliss, it can in no way be
+maintained that he must be joined to a body, consisting of all sentient
+and non-sentient beings, for the purpose of enjoyment.--That view also
+according to which a 'body' means no more than a _means_ of enjoyment is
+refuted hereby.
+
+You will now possibly try another definition, viz. that the body of a
+being is constituted by that, the nature, subsistence and activity of
+which depend on the will of that being, and that hence a body may be
+ascribed to the Lord in so far as the essential nature, subsistence, and
+activity of all depend on him.--But this also is objectionable; since in
+the first place it is not a fact that the nature of a body depends on
+the will of the intelligent soul joined with it; since, further, an
+injured body does not obey in its movements the will of its possessor;
+and since the persistence of a dead body does not depend on the soul
+that tenanted it. Dancing puppets and the like, on the other hand, are
+things the nature, subsistence, and motions of which depend on the will
+of intelligent beings, but we do not on that account consider them to be
+the bodies of those beings. As, moreover, the nature of an eternal
+intelligent soul does not depend on the will of the Lord, it cannot be
+its body under the present definition.--Nor again can it be said that
+the body of a being is constituted by that which is exclusively ruled
+and supported by that being and stands towards it in an exclusive
+subservient relation (sesha); for this definition would include actions
+also. And finally it is a fact that several texts definitely declare
+that the Lord is without a body, 'Without hands and feet he grasps and
+hastens' &c.
+
+As thus the relation of embodied being and body cannot subsist between
+Brahman and the world, and as if it did subsist, all the imperfections
+of the world would cling to Brahman; the Vedānta--texts are wrong in
+teaching that Brahman is the material cause of the world.
+
+To this primā facie view the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+9. Not so; as there are parallel instances.
+
+The teaching of the Vedānta-texts is not inappropriate, since there are
+instances of good and bad qualities being separate in the case of one
+thing connected with two different states. The 'but' in the Sūtra
+indicates the impossibility of Brahman being connected with even a
+shadow of what is evil. The meaning is as follows. As Brahman has all
+sentient and non-sentient things for its body, and constitutes the Self
+of that body, there is nothing contrary to reason in Brahman being
+connected with two states, a causal and an effected one, the essential
+characteristics of which are expansion on the one hand and contraction
+on the other; for this expansion and contraction belong (not to Brahman
+itself, but) to the sentient and non-sentient beings. The imperfections
+adhering to the body do not affect Brahman, and the good qualities
+belonging to the Self do not extend to the body; in the same way as
+youth, childhood, and old age, which are attributes of embodied beings,
+such as gods or men, belong to the body only, not to the embodied Self;
+while knowledge, pleasure and so on belong to the conscious Self only,
+not to the body. On this understanding there is no objection to
+expressions such as 'he is born as a god or as a man' and 'the same
+person is a child, and then a youth, and then an old man' That the
+character of a god or man belongs to the individual soul only in so far
+as it has a body, will be shown under III, 1, 1.
+
+The assertion made by the Pūrvapakshin as to the impossibility of the
+world, comprising matter and souls and being either in its subtle or its
+gross condition, standing to Brahman in the relation of a body, we
+declare to be the vain outcome of altogether vicious reasoning springing
+from the idle fancies of persons who have never fully considered the
+meaning of the whole body of Vedānta-texts as supported by legitimate
+argumentation. For as a matter of fact all Vedānta-texts distinctly
+declare that the entire world, subtle or gross, material or spiritual,
+stands to the highest Self in the relation of a body. Compare e.g.the
+antaryāmin-brāhmana, in the Kānva as well as the Mādhyandina-text, where
+it is said first of non-sentient things ('he who dwells within the earth,
+whose body the earth is' &c.), and afterwards separately of the
+intelligent soul ('he who dwells in understanding,' according to the
+Kānvas; 'he who dwells within the Self,' according to the Mādhyandinas)
+that they constitute the body of the highest Self. Similarly the Subāla-
+Upanishad declares that matter and souls in all their states constitute
+the body of the highest Self ('He who dwells within the earth' &c.), and
+concludes by saying that that Self is the soul of all those beings ('He
+is the inner Self of all' &c.). Similarly Smriti, 'The whole world is
+thy body'; 'Water is the body of Vishnu'; 'All this is the body of Hari';
+'All these things are his body'; 'He having reflected sent forth from
+his body'--where the 'body' means the elements in their subtle state. In
+ordinary language the word 'body' is not, like words such as _jar_,
+limited in its denotation to things of one definite make or character,
+but is observed to be applied directly (not only secondarily or
+metaphorically) to things of altogether different make and
+characteristics--such as worms, insects, moths, snakes, men, four-footed
+animals, and so on. We must therefore aim at giving a definition of the
+word that is in agreement with general use. The definitions given by the
+Pūrvapakshin--'a body is that which causes the enjoyment of the fruit of
+actions' &c.--do not fulfil this requirement; for they do not take in
+such things as earth and the like which the texts declare to be the body
+of the Lord. And further they do not take in those bodily forms which
+the Lord assumes according to his wish, nor the bodily forms released
+souls may assume, according to 'He is one' &c. (Ch. Up. VII, 36, 2); for
+none of those embodiments subserve the fruition of the results of
+actions. And further, the bodily forms which the Supreme Person assumes
+at wish are not special combinations of earth and the other elements;
+for Smriti says, 'The body of that highest Self is not made from a
+combination of the elements.' It thus appears that it is also too narrow
+a definition to say that a body is a combination of the different
+elements. Again, to say that a body is that, the life of which depends
+on the vital breath with its five modifications is also too narrow, viz
+in respect of plants; for although vital air is present in plants, it
+does not in them support the body by appearing in five special forms.
+Nor again does it answer to define a body as either the abode of the
+sense-organs or as the cause of pleasure and pain; for neither of these
+definitions takes in the bodies of stone or wood which were bestowed on
+Ahalyā and other persons in accordance with their deeds. We are thus led
+to adopt the following definition--Any substance which a sentient soul
+is capable of completely controlling and supporting for its own purposes,
+and which stands to the soul in an entirely subordinate relation, is the
+body of that soul. In the case of bodies injured, paralysed, &c.,
+control and so on are not actually perceived because the power of
+control, although existing, is obstructed; in the same way as, owing to
+some obstruction, the powers of fire, heat, and so on may not be actually
+perceived. A dead body again begins to decay at the very moment in which
+the soul departs from it, and is actually dissolved shortly after; it
+(thus strictly speaking is not a body at all but) is spoken of as a body
+because it is a part of the aggregate of matter which previously
+constituted a body. In this sense, then, all sentient and non-sentient
+beings together constitute the body of the Supreme Person, for they are
+completely controlled and supported by him for his own ends, and are
+absolutely subordinate to him. Texts which speak of the highest Self as
+'bodiless among bodies' (e.g. Ka. Up. I. 2, 22), only mean to deny of
+the Self a body due to karman; for as we have seen, Scripture declares
+that the Universe is his body. This point will be fully established in
+subsequent adhikaranas also. The two preceding Sūtras (8 and 9) merely
+suggest the matter proved in the adhikarana beginning with II, 1, 21.
+
+
+
+
+10. And on account of the objections to his view.
+
+The theory of Brahman being the universal cause has to be accepted not
+only because it is itself free from objections, but also because the
+pradhāna theory is open to objections, and hence must be abandoned. For
+on this latter theory the origination of the world cannot be accounted
+for. The Sānkhyas hold that owing to the soul's approximation to
+Prakriti the attributes of the latter are fictitiously superimposed upon
+the soul which in itself consists entirely of pure intelligence free
+from all change, and that thereon depends the origination of the
+empirical world. Now here we must raise the question as to the nature of
+that approximation or nearness of Prakriti which causes the
+superimposition on the changeless soul of the attributes of Prakriti.
+Does that nearness mean merely the existence of Prakriti or some change
+in Prakriti? or does it mean some change in the soul?--Not the latter;
+for the soul is assumed to be incapable of change.--Nor again a change
+in Prakriti; for changes in Prakriti are supposed, in the system, to be
+the effects of superimposition, and cannot therefore be its cause. And
+if, finally, the nearness of Prakriti means no more than its existence,
+it follows that even the released soul would be liable to that
+superimposition (for Prakriti exists always).--The Sānkhya is thus
+unable to give a rational account of the origination of the world. This
+same point will be treated of fully in connexion with the special
+refutation of the Sānkhya theory. (II, 2, 6.)
+
+
+
+
+11. Also in consequence of the ill-foundedness of reasoning.
+
+The theory, resting on Scripture, of Brahman being the universal cause
+must be accepted, and the theory of the Pradhāna must be abandoned,
+because all (mere) reasoning is ill-founded. This latter point is proved
+by the fact that the arguments set forth by Buddha, Kanāda, Akshapāda,
+Jina, Kapila and Patańjali respectively are all mutually contradictory.
+
+
+
+
+12. Should it be said that inference is to be carried on in a different
+way; (we reply that) thus also it follows that (the objection raised) is
+not got rid of.
+
+Let us then view the matter as follows. The arguments actually set forth
+by Buddha and others may have to be considered as invalid, but all the
+same we may arrive at the Pradhāna theory through other lines of
+reasoning by which the objections raised against the theory are refuted.--
+But, we reply, this also is of no avail. A theory which rests
+exclusively on arguments derived from human reason may, at some other
+time or place, be disestablished by arguments devised by people more
+skilful than you in reasoning; and thus there is no getting over the
+objection founded on the invalidity of all mere argumentation. The
+conclusion from all this is that, with regard to supersensuous matters,
+Scripture alone is authoritative, and that reasoning is to be applied
+only to the support of Scripture. In agreement herewith Manu says, 'He
+who supports the teaching of the Rishis and the doctrine as to sacred
+duty with arguments not conflicting with the Veda, he alone truly knows
+sacred duty' (Manu XII, 106). The teaching of the Sānkhyas which
+conflicts with the Veda cannot therefore be used for the purpose of
+confirming and elucidating the meaning of the Veda.--Here finishes the
+section treating of 'difference of nature.'
+
+
+
+
+13. Thereby also the remaining (theories) which are not comprised
+(within the Veda) are explained.
+
+Not comprised means those theories which are not known to be comprised
+within (countenanced by) the Veda. The Sūtra means to say that by the
+demolition given above of the Sānkhya doctrine which is not comprised
+within the Veda the remaining theories which are in the same position,
+viz. the theories of Kanāda, Akshapāda, Jina, and Buddha, must likewise
+be considered as demolished.
+
+Here, however, a new objection may be raised, on the ground namely that,
+since all these theories agree in the view of atoms constituting the
+general cause, it cannot be said that their reasoning as to the causal
+substance is ill-founded.--They indeed, we reply, are agreed to that
+extent, but they are all of them equally founded on Reasoning only, and
+they are seen to disagree in many ways as to the nature of the atoms
+which by different schools are held to be either fundamentally void or
+non-void, having either a merely cognitional or an objective existence,
+being either momentary or permanent, either of a definite nature or the
+reverse, either real or unreal, &c. This disagreement proves all those
+theories to be ill-founded, and the objection is thus disposed of.--Here
+finishes the section of 'the remaining (theories) non-comprised (within
+the Veda).'
+
+
+
+
+14. If it be said that from (Brahman) becoming an enjoyer, there follows
+non-distinction (of Brahman and the individual soul); we reply--it may
+be as in ordinary life.
+
+The Sānkhya here comes forward with a new objection. You maintain, he
+says, that the highest Brahman has the character either of a cause or an
+effect according as it has for its body sentient and non-sentient beings
+in either their subtle or gross state; and that this explains the
+difference in nature between the individual soul and Brahman. But such
+difference is not possible, since Brahman, if embodied, at once becomes
+an enjoying subject (just like the individual soul). For if, possessing
+a body, the Lord necessarily experiences all pain and pleasure due to
+embodiedness, no less than the individual soul does.--But we have, under
+I, 2, 8, refuted the view of the Lord's being liable to experiences of
+pleasure and pain!--By no means! There you have shown only that the
+Lord's abiding within the heart of a creature so as to constitute the
+object of its devotion does not imply fruition on his part of pleasure
+and pain. Now, however, you maintain that the Lord is embodied just like
+an individual soul, and the unavoidable inference from this is that,
+like that soul, he undergoes pleasurable and painful experiences. For we
+observe that embodied souls, although not capable of participating in
+the changing states of the body such as childhood, old age, &c., yet
+experience pleasures and pains caused by the normal or abnormal
+condition of the matter constituting the body. In agreement with this
+Scripture says, 'As long as he possesses a body there is for him no
+escape from pleasure and pain; but when he is free of the body then
+neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1). As thus,
+the theory of an embodied Brahman constituting the universal cause does
+not allow of a distinction in nature between the Lord and the individual
+soul; and as, further, the theory of a mere Brahman (i.e. an absolutely
+homogeneous Brahman) leads to the conclusion that Brahman is the abode
+of all the imperfections attaching to the world, in the same way as a
+lump of clay or gold participates in the imperfections of the thing
+fashioned out of it; we maintain that the theory of the Pradhāna being
+the general cause is the more valid one.
+
+To this objection the Sūtra replies in the words, 'it may be, as in
+ordinary life.' The desired distinction in nature between the Lord and
+the individual soul may exist all the same. That a soul experiences
+pleasures and pains caused by the various states of the body is not due
+to the fact of its being joined to a body, but to its karman in the form
+of good and evil deeds. The scriptural text also which you quote refers
+to that body only which is originated by karman; for other texts ('He is
+onefold, he is threefold'; 'If he desires the world of the Fathers'; 'He
+moves about there eating, playing, rejoicing'; Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2; VIII,
+2, 1; 12, 3) show that the person who has freed himself from the bondage
+of karman and become manifest in his true nature is not touched by a
+shadow of evil while all the same he has a body. The highest Self, which
+is essentially free from all evil, thus has the entire world in its
+gross and its subtle form for its body; but being in no way connected
+with karman it is all the less connected with evil of any kind.--'As in
+ordinary life.' We observe in ordinary life that while those who either
+observe or transgress the ordinances of a ruler experience pleasure or
+pain according as the ruler shows them favour or restrains them, it does
+not follow from the mere fact of the ruler's having a body that he
+himself also experiences the pleasure and pain due to the observance or
+transgression of his commands. The author of the Dramida-bhāshya gives
+expression to the same view, 'As in ordinary life a prince, although
+staying in a very unpleasant place infested with mosquitoes and full of
+discomforts of all kind is yet not touched by all these troubles, his
+body being constantly refreshed by fans and other means of comfort,
+rules the countries for which he cares and continues to enjoy all
+possible pleasures, such as fragrant odours and the like; so the Lord of
+creation, to whom his power serves as an ever-moving fan as it were, is
+not touched by the evils of that creation, but rules the world of
+Brahman and the other worlds for which he cares, and continues to enjoy
+all possible delights.' That the nature of Brahman should undergo
+changes like a lump of clay or gold we do not admit, since many texts
+declare Brahman to be free from all change and imperfection.--Others
+give a different explanation of this Sūtra. According to them it refutes
+the pūrvapaksha that on the view of Brahman being the general cause the
+distinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment cannot be
+accounted for--proving the possibility of such distinction by means of
+the analogous instance of the sea and its waves and flakes of foam. But
+this interpretation is inappropriate, since for those who hold that
+creation proceeds from Brahman connected with some power or Nescience or
+a limiting adjunct (upādhi) no such primā facie view can arise. For on
+their theory the enjoying subject is that which is conditioned by the
+power or Nescience or upādhi inhering in the causal substance, and the
+power or Nescience or upādhi is the object of enjoyment; and as the two
+are of different nature, they cannot pass over into each other. The view
+of Brahman itself undergoing an essential change (on which that primā
+facie view might possibly be held to arise) is not admitted by those
+philosophers; for Sūtra II, 1, 35 teaches that the individual souls and
+their deeds form a stream which has no beginning (so that the
+distinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment is eternal).
+But even if it be held that Brahman itself undergoes a change, the doubt
+as to the non-distinction of subjects and objects of enjoyment does not
+arise; for the distinction of the two groups will, on that view, be
+analogous to that of jars and platters which are modifications of the
+one substance clay, or to that of bracelets and crowns fashioned out of
+the one substance gold. And on the view of Brahman itself undergoing a
+change there arises a further difficulty, viz. in so far as Brahman
+(which is nothing but pure non-conditioned intelligence) is held to
+transform itself into (limited) enjoying souls and (non-sentient)
+objects of enjoyment.
+
+
+
+
+15. The non-difference (of the world) from that (viz. Brahman) follows
+from what begins with the word ārambhana.
+
+Under II, 1, 7 and other Sūtras the non-difference of the effect, i.e.
+the world from the cause, i.e. Brahman was assumed, and it was on this
+basis that the proof of Brahman being the cause of the world proceeded.
+The present Sūtra now raises a primā facie objection against that very
+non-difference, and then proceeds to refute it.
+
+On the point in question the school of Kanāda argues as follows. It is
+in no way possible that the effect should be non-different from the
+cause. For cause and effect are the objects of different ideas: the
+ideas which have for their respective objects threads and a piece of
+cloth, or a lump of clay and a jar, are distinctly not of one and the
+same kind. The difference of words supplies a second argument; nobody
+applies to mere threads the word 'piece of cloth,' or vice versā. A
+third argument rests on the difference of effects: water is not fetched
+from the well in a lump of clay, nor is a well built with jars. There,
+fourthly, is the difference of time; the cause is prior in time, the
+effect posterior. There is, fifthly, the difference of form: the cause
+has the shape of a lump, the effect (the jar) is shaped like a belly
+with a broad basis; clay in the latter condition only is meant when we
+say 'The jar has gone to pieces.' There, sixthly, is a numerical
+difference: the threads are many, the piece of cloth is one only. In the
+seventh place, there is the uselessness of the activity of the producing
+agent (which would result from cause and effect being identical); for if
+the effect were nothing but the cause, what could be effected by the
+activity of the agent?--Let us then say that, although the effect _exists_
+(at all times), the activity of the agent must be postulated as helpful
+towards the effect.--But in that case the activity of the agent would
+have to be assumed as taking place perpetually, and as hence everything
+would exist always, there would be no distinction between eternal and
+non-eternal things!--Let us then say that the effect, although always
+existing, is at first non-manifest and then is manifested through the
+activity of the agent; in this way that activity will not be purposeless,
+and there will be a distinction between eternal and non-eternal things!--
+This view also is untenable. For if that manifestation requires another
+manifestation (to account for it) we are driven into a _regressus in
+infinitum_. If, on the other hand, it is independent of another
+manifestation (and hence eternal), it follows that the effect also is
+eternally perceived. And if, as a third alternative, the manifestation
+is said to originate, we lapse into the asatkāryavāda (according to
+which the effect does not exist before its origination). Moreover, if
+the activity of the agent serves to manifest the effect, it follows that
+the activity devoted to a jar will manifest also waterpots and similar
+things. For things which admittedly possess manifesting power, such as
+lamps and the like, are not observed to be restricted to particular
+objects to be manifested by them: we do not see that a lamp lit for
+showing a jar does _not_ at the same time manifest waterpots and other
+things. All this proves that the activity of the agent has a purpose in
+so far only as it is the cause of the origination of an effect which
+previously did _not_ exist; and thus the theory of the previous
+existence of the effect cannot be upheld. Nor does the fact of definite
+causes having to be employed (in order to produce definite effects; clay
+e.g. to produce a jar) prove that that only which already exists can
+become an effect; for the facts explain themselves also on the
+hypothesis of the cause having definite potentialities (determining the
+definite effect which will result from the cause).
+
+But, an objection is raised, he also who holds the theory of the
+previous non-existence of the effect, can really do nothing with the
+activity of the agent. For as, on his view, the effect has no existence
+before it is originated, the activity of the agent must be supposed to
+operate elsewhere than on the effect; and as this 'elsewhere' comprises
+without distinction all other things, it follows that the agent's
+activity with reference to threads may give rise to waterpots also (not
+only to cloth).--Not so, the Vaiseshika replies. Activity applied to a
+certain cause gives rise to those effects only the potentiality of which
+inheres in that cause.
+
+Now, against all this, the following objection is raised. The effect is
+non-different from the cause. For in reality there is no such thing as
+an effect different from the cause, since all effects, and all empirical
+thought and speech about effects, are based on Nescience. Apart from the
+causal substance, clay, which is seen to be present in effected things
+such as jars, the so-called effect, i.e. the jar or pot, rests
+altogether on Nescience. All effected things whatever, such as jars,
+waterpots, &c., viewed as different from their causal substance, viz.
+clay, which is perceived to exist in these its effects, rest merely on
+empirical thought and speech, and are fundamentally false, unreal; while
+the causal substance, i.e. clay, alone is real. In the same way the
+entire world in so far as viewed apart from its cause, i.e. Brahman
+which is nothing but pure non-differenced Being, rests exclusively on
+the empirical assumption of Egoity and so on, and is false; while
+reality belongs to the causal Brahman which is mere Being. It follows
+that there is no such thing as an effect apart from its cause; the
+effect in fact is identical with the cause. Nor must you object to our
+theory on the ground that the corroborative instance of the silver
+erroneously imagined in the shell is inappropriate because the non-
+reality of such effected things as jars is by no means well proved while
+the non-reality of the shell-silver is so proved; for as a matter of
+fact it is determined by reasoning that it is the causal substance of
+jars, viz. clay, only that is real while the reality of everything apart
+from clay is disproved by reasoning. And if you ask whereupon that
+reasoning rests, we reply--on the fact that the clay only is continuous,
+permanent, while everything different from it is discontinuous, non-
+permanent. For just as in the case of the snake-rope we observe that the
+continuously existing rope only--which forms the substrate of the
+imagined snake--is real, while the snake or cleft in the ground, which
+is non-continuous, is unreal; so we conclude that it is the permanently
+enduring clay-material only which is real, while the non-continuous
+effects, such as jars and pots, are unreal. And, further, since what is
+real, i. e. the Self, does not perish, and what is altogether unreal, as
+e.g. the horn of a hare, is not perceived, we conclude that an effected
+thing, which on the one hand is perceived and on the other is liable to
+destruction, must be viewed as something to be defined neither as that
+which is nor as that which is not. And what is thus undefinable, is
+false, no less than the silver imagined in the shell, the
+anirvakanīyatva of which is proved by perception and sublation (see
+above, p. 102 ff.).--We further ask, 'Is a causal substance, such as
+clay, when producing its effect, in a non-modified state, or has it
+passed over into some special modified condition?' The former
+alternative cannot be allowed, because thence it would follow that the
+cause originates effects at all times; and the latter must equally be
+rejected, because the passing over of the cause into a special state
+would oblige us to postulate a previous passing over into a different
+state (to account for the latter passing over) and again a previous one,
+&c., so that a _regressus in infinitum_ would result.--Let it then be
+said that the causal substance when giving rise to the effect is indeed
+unchanged, but connected with a special operative cause, time and place
+(this connexion accounting for the origination of the effect).--But this
+also we cannot allow; for such connexion would be with the causal
+substance either as unchanged or as having entered on a changed
+condition; and thus the difficulties stated above would arise again.--
+Nor may you say that the origination of jars, gold coins, and sour milk
+from clay, gold, and milk respectively is actually perceived; that this
+perception is not sublated with regard to time and place--while, on the
+other hand, the perception of silver in the shell is so sublated--and
+that hence all those who trust perception must necessarily admit that
+the effect _does_ originate from the cause. For this argumentation does
+not stand the test of being set forth in definite alternatives. Does the
+mere gold, &c., by itself originate the svastika-ornament? or is it the
+gold coins (used for making ornaments) which originate? or is it the
+gold, as forming the substrate of the coins [FOOTNOTE 434:1]? The mere
+gold, in the first place, cannot be originative as there exists no
+effect different from the gold (to which the originative activity could
+apply itself); and a thing cannot possibly display originative activity
+with regard to itself.--But, an objection is raised, the svastika-
+ornament is perceived as different from the gold!--It is not, we reply,
+different from the gold; for the gold is recognised in it, and no other
+thing but gold is perceived.--But the existence of another thing is
+proved by the fact of there being a different idea, a different word,
+and so on!--By no means, we reply. Other ideas, words, and so on, which
+have reference to an altogether undefined thing are founded on error, no
+less than the idea of, and the word denoting, shell-silver, and hence
+have no power of proving the existence of another thing. Nor, in the
+second place, is the _gold coin_ originative of the svastika-ornament;
+for we do not perceive the coin in the svastika, as we do perceive the
+threads in the cloth. Nor, in the third place, is the effect originated
+by the gold in so far as being the substrate of the coin; for the gold
+in so far as forming the substrate of the coin is not perceived in the
+svastika. As it thus appears that all effects viewed apart from their
+causal substances are unreal, we arrive at the conclusion that the
+entire world, viewed apart from Brahman, is also something unreal; for
+it also is an effect.
+
+In order to facilitate the understanding of the truth that everything
+apart from Brahman is false, we have so far reasoned on the assumption
+of things such as clay, gold, &c., being real, and have thereby proved
+the non-reality of all effects. In truth, however, all special causal
+substances are unreal quite as much as jars and golden ornaments are;
+for they are all of them equally effects of Brahman.
+
+'In that all this has its Self; it is the True' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7);
+'There is here no plurality; from death to death goes he who sees here
+plurality as it were' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'For where there is duality
+as it were, there one sees another; but when for him the Self only has
+become all, whereby then should he see and whom should he see?' (Bri. Up.
+II, 4, 13); 'Indra goes manifold by means of his māyās' (Bri. Up. II, 5,
+19);--these and other similar texts teach that whatever is different
+from Brahman is false. Nor must it be imagined that the truth intimated
+by Scripture can be in conflict with Perception; for in the way set
+forth above we prove that all effects are false, and moreover Perception
+really has for its object pure Being only (cp. above, p. 30). And if
+there is a conflict between the two, superior force belongs to Scripture,
+to which no imperfection can be attributed; which occupies a final
+position among the means of knowledge; and which, although dependent on
+Perception, and so on, for the apprehension of the form and meaning of
+words, yet is independent as far as proving power is concerned. Hence it
+follows that everything different from Brahman, the general cause, is
+unreal.
+
+Nor must this conclusion be objected to on the ground that from the
+falsity of the world it follows that the individual souls also are non-
+real. For it is Brahman itself which constitutes the individual souls:
+Brahman alone takes upon itself the condition of individual soul in all
+living bodies; as we know from many texts: 'Having entered into them
+with this living Self (Ch. Up. VI, 3); 'The one god hidden within all
+beings' (Svet. Up. VI, 11); 'The one god entered in many places'; 'That
+Self hidden in all beings does not shine forth' (Ka. Up. I, 3,12);
+'There is no other seer but he' (Bri. Up. III, 3, 23); and others.--But
+if you maintain that the one Brahman constitutes the soul in all living
+bodies, it follows that any particular pain or pleasure should affect
+the consciousness of all embodied beings, just as an agreeable sensation
+affecting the foot gives rise to a feeling of pleasure in the head; and
+that there would be no distinction of individual soul and Lord, released
+souls and souls in bondage, pupils and teachers, men wise and ignorant,
+and so on.
+
+Now, in reply to this, some of those who hold the non-duality of Brahman
+give the following explanation. The many individual souls are the
+reflections of the one Brahman, and their states of pain, pleasure, and
+so on, remain distinct owing to the different limiting adjuncts (on
+which the existence of each individual soul as such depends), in the
+same way as the many reflected images of one and the same face in
+mirrors, crystals, sword-blades, &c., remain distinct owing to their
+limiting adjuncts (viz. mirrors, &c.); one image being small, another
+large, one being bright, another dim, and so on.--But you have said that
+scriptural texts such as 'Having entered with this living Self show that
+the souls are not different from Brahman!--They are indeed not different
+in reality, but we maintain their distinction on the basis of an
+imagined difference.--To whom then does that imagination belong? Not to
+Brahman surely whose nature, consisting of pure intelligence, allows no
+room for imagination of any kind! Nor also to the individual souls; for
+this would imply a faulty mutual dependence, the existence of the soul
+depending on imagination and that imagination residing in the soul! Not
+so, the advaita-vādin replies. Nescience (wrong imagination) and the
+existence of the souls form an endless retrogressive chain; their
+relation is like that of the seed and the sprout. Moreover, mutual
+dependence and the like, which are held to constitute defects in the
+case of real things, are unable to disestablish Nescience, the very
+nature of which consists in being that which cannot rationally be
+established, and which hence may be compared to somebody's swallowing a
+whole palace and the like (as seen in a dream or under the influence of
+a magical illusion). In reality the individual souls are non-different
+from Brahman, and hence essentially free from all impurity; but as they
+are liable to impurity caused by their limiting adjuncts--in the same
+way as the face reflected in a mirror is liable to be dimmed by the
+dimness of the mirror--they may be the abodes of Nescience and hence may
+be viewed as the figments of wrong imagination. Like the dimness of the
+reflected face, the imperfection adhering to the soul is a mere error;
+for otherwise it would follow that the soul can never obtain release.
+And as this error of the souls has proceeded from all eternity, the
+question as to its cause is not to be raised.
+
+This, we reply, is the view of teachers who have no insight into the
+true nature of aduality, and are prompted by the wish of capturing the
+admiration and applause of those who believe in the doctrine of duality.
+For if, as a first alternative, you should maintain that the abode of
+Nescience is constituted by the soul in its essential, not fictitiously
+imagined, form; this means that Brahman itself is the abode of Nescience.
+If, in the second place, you should say that the abode of Nescience is
+the soul, viewed as different from Brahman and fictitiously imagined in
+it, this would mean that the Non-intelligent (jada) is the abode of
+Nescience. For those who hold the view of Non-duality do not acknowledge
+a third aspect different from these two (i.e. from Brahman which is pure
+intelligence, and the Non-intelligent fictitiously superimposed on
+Brahman). And if, as a third alternative, it be maintained that the
+abode of Nescience is the soul in its essential nature, this nature
+being however qualified by the fictitiously imagined aspect; we must
+negative this also, since that which has an absolutely homogeneous
+nature cannot in any way be shown to be qualified, apart from Nescience.
+The soul is qualified in so far only as it is the abode of Nescience,
+and you therefore define nothing.--Moreover, the theory of Nescience
+abiding within the individual soul is resorted to for the purpose of
+establishing a basis for the distinction of bondage and release, but it
+really is quite unable to effect this. For if by Release be understood
+the destruction of Nescience, it follows that when one soul attains
+Release and Nescience is thus destroyed, the other souls also will be
+released.--But Nescience persists because other souls are not released!--
+Well then the one soul also is not released since Nescience is not
+destroyed!--But we assume a different Nescience for each soul; that soul
+whose Nescience is destroyed will be released, and that whose Nescience
+is not destroyed will remain in Bondage!--You now argue on the
+assumption of a special avidyā for each soul. But what about the
+distinction of souls implied therein? Is that distinction essential to
+the nature of the soul, or is it the figment of Nescience? The former
+alternative is excluded, as it is admitted that the soul essentially is
+pure, non-differenced intelligence; and because on that alternative the
+assumption of avidyā to account for the distinction of souls would be
+purposeless. On the latter alternative two subordinate alternatives
+arise--Does this avidyā which gives rise to the fictitious distinction
+of souls belong to Brahman? or to the individual souls?--If you say 'to
+Brahman', your view coincides with mine.--Well then, 'to the souls'!--
+But have you then quite forgotten that Nescience is assumed for the
+purpose of accounting for the distinction of souls?--Let us then view
+the matter as follows--those several avidyās which are assumed for the
+purpose of establishing the distinction of souls bound and released, to
+those same avidyās the distinction of souls is due.--But here you reason
+in a manifest circle: the avidyās are established on the basis of the
+distinction of souls, and the distinction of souls is established when
+the avidyās are established. Nor does the argument of the seed and
+sprout apply to the present question. For in the case of seeds and
+plants each several seed gives rise to a different plant; while in the
+case under discussion you adopt the impossible procedure of establishing
+the several avidyās on the basis of the very souls which are assumed to
+be due to those avidyās. And if you attempt to give to the argument a
+somewhat different turn, by maintaining that it is the avidyās abiding
+in the earlier souls which fictitiously give rise to the later souls, we
+point out that this implies the souls being short-lived only, and
+moreover that each soul would have to take upon itself the consequences
+of deeds not its own and escape the consequences of its own deeds. The
+same reasoning disposes of the hypothesis that it is Brahman which
+effects the fictitious existence of the subsequent souls by means of the
+avidyās abiding within the earlier souls. And if there is assumed a
+beginningless flow of avidyās, it follows that there is also a
+beginningless flow of the condition of the souls dependent on those
+avidyās, and that steady uniformity of the state of the souls which is
+supposed to hold good up to the moment of Release could thus not be
+established. Concerning your assertion that, as Nescience is something
+unreal and hence altogether unproved, it is not disestablished by such
+defects as mutual dependence which touch real things only; we remark
+that in that case Nescience would cling even to released souls and the
+highest Brahman itself.--But impure Nescience cannot cling to what has
+for its essence pure cognition!--Is Nescience then to be dealt with by
+rational arguments? If so, it will follow that, on account of the
+arguments set forth (mutual dependence, and so on), it likewise does not
+cling to the individual souls. We further put the following question--
+When the Nescience abiding in the individual soul passes away, owing to
+the rise of the knowledge of truth, does then the soul also perish or
+does it not perish? In the former case Release is nothing else but
+destruction of the essential nature of the soul; in the latter case the
+soul does not attain Release even on the destruction of Nescience, since
+it continues to exist as soul different from Brahman.--You have further
+maintained that the distinction of souls as pure and impure, &c., admits
+of being accounted for in the same way as the dimness or clearness, and
+so on, of the different images of a face as seen reflected in mirrors,
+crystals, sword-blades and the like. But here the following point
+requires consideration. On what occasion do the smallness, dimness and
+other imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts (i.e. the mirrors, &c.)
+pass away?--When the mirrors and other limiting adjuncts themselves pass
+away!--Does then, we ask, the reflected image which is the substrate of
+those imperfections persist or not? If you say that it persists, then by
+analogy the individual soul also must be assumed to persist, and from
+this it follows that it does not attain Release. And if the reflected
+image is held to perish together with its imperfections, by analogy the
+soul also will perish and then Release will be nothing but annihilation.--
+Consider the following point also. The destruction of a non-advantageous
+(apurushārtha) defect is of advantage to him who is conscious of that
+disadvantage. Is it then, we ask, in the given case Brahman--which
+corresponds to the thing reflected--that is conscious of the
+imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts? or is it the soul which
+corresponds to the reflected image? or is it something else? On the two
+former alternatives it appears that the comparison (between Brahman and
+the soul on the one hand, and the thing reflected and the reflection on
+the other--on which comparison your whole theory is founded) does not
+hold good; for neither the face nor the reflection of the face is
+conscious of the imperfections due to the adjuncts; for neither of the
+two is a being capable of consciousness. And, moreover, Brahman's being
+conscious of imperfections would imply its being the abode of Nescience.
+And the third alternative, again, is impossible, since there is no other
+knowing subject _but_ Brahman and the soul.--It would, moreover, be
+necessary to define who is the imaginatively shaping agent (kalpaka)
+with regard to the soul as formed from Nescience. It cannot be Nescience
+itself, because Nescience is not an intelligent principle. Nor can it be
+the soul, because this would imply the defect of what has to be proved
+being presupposed for the purposes of the proof; and because the
+existence of the soul is that which _is formed_ by Nescience, just as
+shell-silver is. And if, finally, you should say that Brahman is the
+fictitiously forming agent, we have again arrived at a Brahman that is
+the abode of Nescience.--If Brahman is not allowed to be the abode of
+Nescience, we further must ask whether Brahman sees (is conscious of)
+the individual souls or not. If not, it is not possible that Brahman
+should give rise to this manifold creation which, as Scripture declares,
+is preceded by 'seeing' on his part, and to the differentiation of names
+and forms. If, on the other hand, Brahman which is of an absolutely
+homogeneous nature sees the souls, it cannot do so without Nescience;
+and thus we are again led to the view of Nescience abiding in Brahman.
+
+For similar reasons the theory of the distinction of Māya and Nescience
+must also be abandoned. For even if Brahman possesses Māyā, i.e.
+illusive power, it cannot, without Nescience, be conscious of souls. And
+without being conscious of others the lord of Māyā is unable to delude
+them by his Māyā; and Māyā herself cannot bring about the consciousness
+of others on the part of its Lord, for it is a mere means to delude
+others, after they have (by other means) become objects of consciousness.--
+Perhaps you will say that the Māyā of Brahman causes him to be conscious
+of souls, and at the same time is the cause of those souls' delusion.
+But if Māyā causes Brahman--which is nothing but self-illuminated
+intelligence, absolutely homogeneous and free from all foreign elements--
+to become conscious of other beings, then Māyā is nothing but another
+name for Nescience.--Let it then be said that Nescience is the cause of
+the cognition of what is contrary to truth; such being the case, Māyā
+which presents all false things different from Brahman as false, and
+thus is not the cause of wrong cognition on the part of Brahman, is _not_
+avidyā.--But this is inadmissible; for, when the oneness of the moon is
+known, that which causes the idea of the moon being double can be
+nothing else but avidyā. Moreover, if Brahman recognises all beings
+apart from himself as false, he does not delude them; for surely none
+but a madman would aim at deluding beings known by him to be unreal!--
+Let us then define avidyā as the cause of a disadvantageous cognition of
+unreal things. Māyā then, as not being the cause of such a
+disadvantageous cognition on Brahman's part, cannot be of the nature of
+avidyā!--But this also is inadmissible; for although the idea of the
+moon being double is not the cause of any pain, and hence not
+disadvantageous to man, it is all the same caused by avidyā; and if, on
+the other hand, Māyā which aims at dispelling that idea (in so far as it
+presents the image and idea of one moon) did not present what is of
+disadvantage, it would not be something to be destroyed, and hence would
+be permanently connected with Brahman's nature.--Well, if it were so,
+what harm would there be?--The harm would be that such a view implies
+the theory of duality, and hence would be in conflict with the texts
+inculcating non-duality such as 'For where there is duality as it were,
+&c.; but when for him the Self only has become all, whereby then should
+he see, and whom should he see?'--But those texts set forth the Real;
+Māyā on the other hand is non-real, and hence the view of its permanency
+is not in real conflict with the texts!--Brahman, we reply, has for its
+essential nature unlimited bliss, and hence cannot be conscious of, or
+affected with, unreal Māyā, without avidyā. Of what use, we further ask,
+should an eternal non-real Māyā be to Brahman?--Brahman by means of it
+deludes the individual souls!--But of what use should such delusion be
+to Brahman?--It affords to Brahman a kind of sport or play!--But of what
+use is play to a being whose nature is unlimited bliss?--Do we not then
+see in ordinary life also that persons in the enjoyment of full
+happiness and prosperity indulge all the same in play?--The cases are
+not parallel, we reply. For none but persons not in their right mind
+would take pleasure in an unreal play, carried on by means of implements
+unreal and known by them to be unreal, and in the consciousness, itself,
+unreal of such a play!--The arguments set forth previously also prove
+the impossibility of the fictitious existence of an individual soul
+considered as the abode of avidyā, apart from Brahman considered as the
+abode of Māyā.
+
+We thus arrive at the conclusion that those who hold the non-duality of
+Brahman must also admit that it is Brahman alone which is affected with
+beginningless avidyā, and owing to this avidyā is conscious of plurality
+within itself. Nor must it be urged against him who holds this view of
+avidyā belonging to Brahman that he is unable to account for the
+distinction of bondage and release, for as there is only the one Brahman
+affected with Nescience and to be released by the cessation of that
+Nescience, the distinction of souls bound and released, &c., has no true
+existence: the empirical distinction of souls bound and released, of
+teachers and pupils, &c. is a merely fictitious one, and all such
+fiction can be explained by means of the avidyā of one intelligent being.
+The case is analogous to that of a person dreaming: the teachers and
+pupils and all the other persons and things he may see in his dream are
+fictitiously shaped out of the avidyā of the one dreaming subject. For
+the same reason there is no valid foundation for the assumption of many
+avidyās. For those also who hold that avidyā belongs to the individual
+souls do not maintain that the distinction of bondage and release, of
+one's own self and other persons, is real; and if it is unreal it can be
+accounted for by the avidyā of one subject. This admits of being stated
+in various technical ways.--The distinctions of bondage and of one's own
+self and other persons are fictitiously shaped by one's own avidyā; for
+they are unreal like the distinctions seen by a dreaming person.--Other
+bodies also have a Self through me only; for they are bodies like this
+my body.--Other bodies also are fictitiously shaped by my avidyā; for
+they are bodies or effects, or non-intelligent or fictitious creations,
+as this my body is.--The whole class of intelligent subjects is nothing
+but _me_; for they are of intelligent nature; what is _not me_ is seen
+to be of non-intelligent nature; as e.g. jars.--It thus follows that the
+distinctions of one's own self and other persons, of souls bound and
+released, of pupils and teachers, and so on, are fictitiously created by
+the avidyā of one intelligent subject.
+
+The fact is that the upholder of Duality himself is not able to account
+for the distinction of souls bound and released. For as there is an
+infinity of past aeons, it follows that, even if one soul only should
+attain release in each aeon, all souls would by this time have attained
+release; the actual existence of non-released souls cannot thus be
+rationally accounted for.--But the souls are 'infinite'; this accounts
+for there being souls not yet released!--What, pray, do you understand
+by this 'infinity' of souls? Does it mean that they cannot be counted?
+This we cannot allow, for although a being of limited knowledge may not
+be able to count them, owing to their large number, the all-knowing Lord
+surely can count them; if he could not do so it would follow that he is
+not all-knowing.--But the souls are really numberless, and the Lord's
+not knowing a definite number which does not exist does not prove that
+he is not all-knowing!--Not so, we reply. Things which are definitely
+separate (bhinna) from each other cannot be without number. Souls have a
+number, because they are separate; just as mustard seeds, beans, earthen
+vessels, pieces of cloth, and so on. And from their being separate it
+moreover follows that souls, like earthen vessels, and so on, are non-
+intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perishable; and it further
+follows therefrom that Brahman is not infinite. For by infinity we
+understand the absence of all limitation. Now on the theory which holds
+that there is a plurality of separate existences, Brahman which is
+considered to differ in character from other existences cannot be said
+to be free from substantial limitation; for substantial limitation means
+nothing else than the existence of other substances. And what is
+substantially limited cannot be said to be free from temporal and
+spatial limitation; for observation shows that it is just those things
+which differ in nature from other things and thus are substantially
+limited--such as earthen vessels, and so on--which are also limited in
+point of space and time. Hence all intelligent existences, including
+Brahman, being substantially limited, are also limited in point of space
+and time. But this conclusion leads to a conflict with those scriptural
+texts which declare Brahman to be free from all limitation whatsoever
+('The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' and similar texts), and
+moreover would imply that the souls as well as Brahman are liable to
+origination, decay, and so on; for limitation in time means nothing else
+but a being's passing through the stages of origination, decay, and so
+on.
+
+The dvaita-view thus being found untenable on all sides, we adhere to
+our doctrine that this entire world, from Brahmā down to a blade of
+grass, springs from the avidyā attached to Brahman which in itself is
+absolutely unlimited; and that the distinctions of consciousness of
+pleasure and pain, and all similar distinctions, explain themselves from
+the fact of all of them being of the nature of avidya, just as the
+distinctions of which a dreaming person is conscious. The one Brahman,
+whose nature is eternal self-illuminedness, free from all heterogeneous
+elements, owing to the influence of avidyā illusorily manifests itself
+(vivarttate) in the form of this world; and as thus in reality there
+exists nothing whatever different from Brahman, we hold that the world
+is 'non-different' from Brahman.
+
+To this the Dvaitavādin, i.e. the Vaiseshika, replies as follows. The
+doctrine that Brahman, which in itself is pure, non-differenced self-
+illuminedness, has its own true nature hidden by avidyā and hence sees
+plurality within itself, is in conflict with all the valid means of
+right knowledge; for as Brahman is without parts, obscuration, i.e.
+cessation, of the light of Brahman, would mean complete destruction of
+Brahman; so that the hypothesis of obscuration is altogether excluded.
+This and other arguments have been already set forth; as also that the
+hypothesis of obscuration contradicts other views held by the Advaitin.
+Nor is there any proof for the assertion that effects apart from their
+causes are mere error, like shell-silver, the separate existence of the
+effect being refuted by Reasoning; for as a matter of fact there is no
+valid reasoning of the kind. The assertion that the cause only is real
+because it persists, while the non-continuous effects--such as jars and
+waterpots--are unreal, has also been refuted before, on the ground that
+the fact of a thing not existing at one place and one time does not
+sublate its real existence at another time and place. Nor is there any
+soundness in the argumentation that the effect is false because, owing
+to its being perceived and its being perishable, it cannot be defined
+either as real or unreal. For a thing's being perceived and its being
+perishable does not prove the thing's falseness, but only its non-
+permanency. To prove a thing's falseness it is required to show that it
+is sublated (i.e. that its non-existence is proved by valid means) with
+reference to that very place and time in connexion with which it is
+perceived; but that a thing is sublated with reference to a place and
+time _other_ than those in connexion with which it is perceived, proves
+only that the thing does not exist in connexion with that place and time,
+but not that it is false. This view also may be put in technical form,
+viz. effects such as jars and the like are real because they are not
+sublated with regard to their definite place and time; just as the Self
+is.--Nor is there any truth in the assertion that the effect cannot
+originate from the cause either modified or unmodified; for the effect
+may originate from the cause if connected with certain favouring
+conditions of place, time, &c. Nor can you show any proof for the
+assertion that the cause, whether modified or non-modified, cannot enter
+into connexion with such favouring conditions; as a matter of fact the
+cause may very well, without being modified, enter into such connexion.--
+But from this it follows that the cause must have been previously
+connected with those conditions, since previously also it was equally
+unmodified!--Not so, we reply. The connexion with favouring conditions
+of time, place, &c., into which the cause enters, depends on some other
+cause, and not therefore on the fact of its not being modified. No fault
+then can be found with the view of the cause, when having entered into a
+special state depending on its connexion with time, place, &c.,
+producing the effect. Nor can it be denied in any way that the cause
+possesses originative agency with regard to the effect; for such agency
+is actually observed, and cannot be proved to be irrational.--Further
+there is no proof for the assertion that originative agency cannot
+belong either to mere gold or to a (first) effect of gold such as coined
+gold, or to gold in so far as forming the substrate for coins and the
+like; for as a matter of fact mere gold (gold in general), if connected
+with the helpful factors mentioned above, may very well possess
+originative capacity. To say that we do not perceive any effect
+different from gold is futile; for as a matter of fact we perceive the
+svastika-ornament which is different from mere gold, and the existence
+of different terms and ideas moreover proves the existence of different
+things. Nor have we here to do with a mere error analogous to that of
+shell-silver. For a real effected thing, such as a golden ornament, is
+perceived during the whole period intervening between its origination
+and destruction, and such perception is not sublated with regard to that
+time and place. Nor is there any valid line of reasoning to sublate that
+perception. That at the same time when the previously non-perceived
+svastika-ornament is perceived the gold also is recognised, is due to
+the fact of the gold persisting as the substrate of the ornament, and
+hence such recognition of the causal substance does not disprove the
+reality of the effect.--And the attempts to prove the unreality of the
+world by means of scriptural texts we have already disposed of in a
+previous part of this work.
+
+We further object to the assertion that it is one Self which bestows on
+all bodies the property of being connected with the Self; as from this
+it would follow that one person is conscious of all the pains and
+pleasures caused by all bodies. For, as seen in the case of Saubhari and
+others, it is owing to the oneness of the Self that one person is
+conscious of the pains and pleasures due to several bodies. Nor again
+must you allege that the non-consciousness (on the part of one Self of
+all pleasures and pains whatever), is due to the plurality of the Egos,
+which are the subjects of cognition, and not to the plurality of Selfs;
+for the Self is none other than the subject of cognition and the Ego.
+The organ of egoity (ahamkāra), on the other hand, which is the same as
+the internal organ (antahkarana), cannot be the knowing subject, for it
+is of a non-intelligent nature, and is a mere instrument like the body
+and the sense-organs. This also has been proved before.--Nor is there
+any proof for your assertion that all bodies must be held to spring from
+the avidyā of one subject, because they are bodies, non-intelligent,
+effects, fictitious. For that all bodies are the fictitious creations of
+avidyā is not true; since that which is not sublated by valid means of
+proof must be held to be real.--Nor again can you uphold the assertion
+that all intelligent subjects are non-different, i.e. one, because we
+observe that whatever is other than a subject of cognition is non-
+intelligent; for this also is disproved by the fact of the plurality of
+intelligent subjects as proved by the individual distribution, among
+them, of pleasures and pains.--You have further maintained 'Through me
+only all bodies are animated by a Self; they are the fictitious
+creations of _my_ avidyā; _I_ alone constitute the whole aggregate of
+intelligent subjects,' and, on the basis of these averments, have
+attempted to prove the oneness of the Ego. But all this is nothing but
+the random talk of a person who has not mastered even the principles of
+his own theory; for according to your theory the Self is pure
+intelligence to which the whole distinction of 'I,' 'Thou,' &c., is
+altogether foreign. Moreover, if it be held that everything different
+from pure, non-differenced intelligence is false, it follows that all
+effort spent on learning the Veda with a view to Release is fruitless,
+for the Veda also is the effect of avidyā, and the effort spent on it
+therefore is analogous to the effort of taking hold of the silver
+wrongly imagined in the shell. Or, to put it from a different point of
+view, all effort devoted to Release is purposeless, since it is the
+effect of knowledge depending on teachers of merely fictitious existence.
+Knowledge produced by texts such as 'Thou art that' does not put an end
+to bondage, because it is produced by texts which are the fictitious
+product of avidyā; or because it is itself of the nature of avidyā; or
+because it has for its abode knowing subjects, who are mere creatures of
+avidyā; or because it is the product of a process of study which depends
+on teachers who are the mere creatures of avidyā; it is thus no better
+than knowledge resting on texts teaching how bondage is to be put an end
+to, which one might have heard in a dream. Or, to put the matter again
+from a different point of view, Brahman constituted by pure non-
+differenced intelligence is false, since it is to be attained by
+knowledge, which is the effect of avidyā; or since it is to be attained
+by knowledge abiding in knowing subjects who are mere figments of avidyā;
+or because it is attained through knowledge which is the mere figment of
+avidyā. For whatever is attained through knowledge of that kind is false;
+as e.g. the things seen in dreams or a town of the Gandharvas (Fata
+Morgana).
+
+Nor does Brahman, constituted by pure non-differenced intelligence,
+shine forth by itself, so as not to need--for its cognition--other means
+of knowledge. And that that self-luminous knowledge which you declare to
+be borne witness to by itself, really consists in the knowledge of
+particular objects of knowledge--such knowledge abiding in particular
+cognising subjects--this also has been proved previously. And the
+different arguments which were set forth as proving Brahman's non-
+differenced nature, are sufficiently refuted by what we have said just
+now as to all such arguments themselves being the products of avidyā.
+
+Nor again is there any sense in the theory that the principle of non-
+differenced intelligence 'witnesses' avidyā, and implicates itself in
+the error of the world. For 'witnessing' and error are observed to abide
+only in definite conscious subjects, not in consciousness in general.
+Nor can that principle of pure intelligence be proved to possess
+illumining power or light depending on itself only. For by light
+(enlightenment) we can understand nothing but definite well-established
+knowledge (siddhi) on the part of some knowing subject with regard to
+some particular object. It is on this basis only that you yourself prove
+the self-illuminedness of your universal principle; to an absolutely non-
+differenced intelligence not implying the distinction of subject and
+object such 'svayamprakāsatā' could not possibly belong. With regard
+again to what you so loudly proclaim at your meetings, viz. that real
+effects are seen to spring even from unreal causes, we point out that
+although you allow to such effects, being non-sublatcd as it were, a
+kind of existence called 'empirical' (or 'conventional'--vyāvahārika),
+you yourself acknowledge that fundamentally they are nothing but
+products of avidyā; you thus undermine your own position. We have, on
+the other hand, already disposed of this your view above, when proving
+that in all cases effects are originated by real causes only. Nor may
+you plead that what perception tells us in such cases is contradicted by
+Scripture; for as, according to you, Scripture itself is an effect, and
+hence of the essence of avidyā, it is in no better case than the
+instances quoted. You have further declared that, although Brahman is to
+be attained only through unreal knowledge, yet it is real since when
+once attained it is not sublated by any subsequent cognition. But this
+reasoning also is not valid; for when it has once been ascertained that
+some principle is attained through knowledge resting on a vicious basis,
+the fact that we are not aware of a subsequent sublation of that
+principle is irrelevant. That the principle 'the reality of things is a
+universal Void' is false, we conclude therefrom that the reasoning
+leading to that principle is ascertained to be ill-founded, although we
+are not aware of any subsequent truth sublating that principle. Moreover,
+for texts such as 'There is here no plurality whatsoever', 'Knowledge,
+bliss is Brahman,' the absence of subsequent sublation is claimed on the
+ground that they negative the whole aggregate of things different from
+mere intelligence, and hence are later in order than all other texts
+(which had established that aggregate of things). But somebody may rise
+and say 'the Reality is a Void', and thus negative the existence of the
+principle of mere Intelligence also; and the latter principle is thus
+sublated by the assertion as to the Void, which is later in order than
+the texts which it negatives. On the other hand the assertion as to the
+Void being the universal principle is not liable to subsequent sublation;
+for it is impossible for any negation to go beyond it. And as to resting
+on a vicious basis, there is in that respect no difference between
+Perception and the other means of knowledge, and the view of general
+unreality, founded on the Vedānta. The proper conclusion therefore is
+that all cognitions whatsoever abide in real subjects of cognition and
+are themselves real, consisting in mental certainty with regard to
+special objects. Some of these cognitions rest on defects which
+themselves are real; others spring from a combination of causes, real
+and free from all defect. Unless we admit all this we shall not be able
+to account in a satisfactory way for the distinction of things true and
+things false, and for all empirical thought. For empirical thought,
+whether true or of the nature of error, presupposes inward light
+(illumination) in the form of certainty with regard to a particular
+object, and belonging to a real knowing subject; mere non-differenced
+Being, on the other hand (not particularised in the form of a knowing
+subject), cannot be the cause of states of consciousness, whether
+referring to real or Unreal things, and cannot therefore form the basis
+of empirical thought.
+
+Against our opponent's argument that pure Being must be held the real
+substrate of all erroneous superimposition (adhyāsa), for the reason
+that no error can exist without a substrate, we remark that an error may
+take place even when its substrate is unreal, in the same way as an
+error may exist even when the defect (giving rise to the error), the
+abode of the defect, the subject of cognition and the cognition itself
+are unreal. The argument thus loses its force. Possibly he will now
+argue that as an error is never seen to exist where the substrate is
+unreal, the reality of pure Being (as furnishing the required basis for
+error) must necessarily be admitted. But, we point out, it also is a
+fact that errors are never observed where the defect, the abode of the
+defect, the knowing subject and the act of knowledge are unreal; and if
+we pay regard to observation, we must therefore admit the reality of all
+these factors as well. There is really no difference between the two
+cases, unless our opponent chooses to be obstinate.
+
+You further asserted that, on the theory of many really different Selfs,
+it would follow from the infinity of the past aeons that all souls must
+have been released before this, none being left in the state of bondage;
+and that hence the actually observed distinction of souls bound and
+released remains unexplained. But this argumentation is refuted by the
+fact of the souls also being infinite. You indeed maintained that, if
+the souls are really separate, they must necessarily have a definite
+number like beans, mustard-seeds, earthen vessels, and so on; but these
+instances are beside the point, as earthen vessels, and so on, are also
+infinite in number.--But do we not actually see that all these things
+have definite numbers, 'Here are ten jars; a thousand beans,' &c.?--True,
+but those numbers do not belong to the essential nature of jars, and so
+on, but only to jars in so far as connected with time, place, and other
+limiting adjuncts. And that souls also have definite numbers in this
+sense, we readily admit. And from this it does not follow that all souls
+should be released; for essentially the souls are infinite (in number).--
+Nor are you entitled to maintain that the real separation of individual
+souls would imply that, as earthen vessels and the like, they are non-
+intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perishable. For the
+circumstance of individuals of one species being distinct from each
+other, does in no way imply that they possess the characteristics of
+things belonging to another species: the individual separation of jars
+does not imply their having the characteristics of pieces of cloth.--You
+further maintain that from the hypothesis of a real plurality of souls
+it follows that Brahman is substantially limited, and in consequence of
+this limited with regard to time and space also, and that hence its
+infinity is disproved. But this also is a mistaken conclusion. Things
+substantially limited may be limited more or less with regard to time
+and place: there is no invariable rule on this point, and the measure of
+their connexion with space and time has hence to be determined in
+dependence on other means of knowledge. Now Brahman's connexion with _all_
+space and _all_ time results from such other means of proof, and hence
+there is no contradiction (between this non-limitation with regard to
+space and time, and its limitation in point of substance--which is due
+to the existence of other souls).--But mere substantial limitation, as
+meaning the absence of non-limitation of any kind, by itself proves that
+Brahman is not infinite!--Well, then you yourself are in no better case;
+for you admit that Brahman is something different from avidyā. From this
+admission it follows that Brahman also is something 'different', and
+thus all the disadvantages connected with the view of difference cling
+to your theory as well. If on the other hand it should not be allowed
+that Brahman differs in nature from avidyā, then Brahman's nature itself
+is constituted by avidyā, and the text defining Brahman as 'the True,
+knowledge, infinite' is contrary to sense.--If the reality of
+'difference' is not admitted, then there is no longer any distinction
+between the proofs and the mutual objections set forth by the advocates
+of different theories, and we are landed in general confusion. The proof
+of infinity, we further remark, rests altogether on the absence of
+limitation of space and time, not on absence of substantial limitation;
+absence of such limitation is something very much akin to the 'horn of a
+hare' and is perceived nowhere. On the view of difference, on the other
+hand, the whole world, as constituting Brahman's body, is its mode, and
+Brahman is thus limited neither through itself nor through other things.--
+We thus arrive at the conclusion that, as effects are real in so far as
+different from their cause, the effect of Brahman, i.e. the entire world,
+is different from Brahman.
+
+Against this view the Sūtra now declares itself as follows.--The non-
+difference of the world from Brahman, the highest cause, follows from
+'what begins with the word ārambhana'--which proves such non-difference;
+'what begins with the word ārambhana' means those clauses at the head of
+which that word is met with, viz. 'vākārambhanam vikāro nāmadheyam
+mrittikety eva satyam'; 'Being only this was in the beginning, one only,
+without a second'; 'it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth; it sent
+forth fire'; 'having entered with this living Self; 'In the True, my son,
+all these creatures have their root, in the True they dwell, in the True
+they rest'; 'In that all that exists has its Self; it is the True, it is
+the Self; and thou art it, O Svetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 1-8)--it is these
+clauses and others of similar purport which are met with in other
+chapters, that the Sūtra refers to. For these texts prove the non-
+difference from Brahman of the world consisting of non-sentient and
+sentient beings. This is as follows. The teacher, bearing in his mind
+the idea of Brahman constituting the sole cause of the entire world and
+of the non-difference of the effect from the cause, asks the pupil,
+'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which the non-heard is
+heard, the non-perceived is perceived, the not known is known'; wherein
+there is implied the promise that, through the knowledge of Brahman the
+general cause, its effect, i.e. the whole Universe, will be known? The
+pupil, not knowing that Brahman is the sole cause of the Universe,
+raises a doubt as to the possibility of one thing being known through
+another,'How then, Sir, is that instruction?' and the teacher thereupon,
+in order to convey the notion of Brahman being the sole universal cause,
+quotes an instance showing that the non-difference of the effect from
+the cause is proved by ordinary experience, 'As by one clod of clay
+there is known everything that is made of clay'; the meaning being 'as
+jars, pots, and the like, which are fashioned out of one piece of clay,
+are known through the cognition of that clay, since their substance is
+not different from it.'In order to meet the objection that according to
+Kanāda's doctrine the effect constitutes a substance different from the
+cause, the teacher next proceeds to prove the non-difference of the
+effect from the cause by reference to ordinary experience,
+'vākārambhanam vikāro namadheyam mrittikety eva satyam'. Ārambhanam must
+here be explained as that which is taken or touched (ā-rabh = ā-labh;
+and 'ālambhah sparsahimsayoh'); compare Pānini III, 3, 113, as to the
+form and meaning of the word. 'Vākā,' 'on account of speech,' we take to
+mean 'on account of activity preceded by speech'; for activities such as
+the fetching of water in a pitcher are preceded by speech,'Fetch water
+in the pitcher,' and so on. For the bringing about of such activity, the
+material clay (which had been mentioned just before) touches (enters
+into contact with) an effect (vikāra), i.e. a particular make or
+configuration, distinguished by having a broad bottom and resembling the
+shape of a belly, and a special name (nāmadheya), viz. _pitcher_, and so
+on, which is applied to that effect; or, to put it differently, to the
+end that certain activities may be accomplished, the substance clay
+receives a new configuration and a new name. [FOOTNOTE 455:1] Hence jars
+and other things of clay are clay (mrittikā), i.e. are of the substance
+of clay, only; this _only_ is true (satyam), i.e. known through
+authoritative means of proof; _only_ (eva), because the effects are not
+known as different substances. One and the same substance therefore,
+such as clay or gold, gives occasion for different ideas and words only
+as it assumes different configurations; just as we observe that one and
+the same Devadatta becomes the object of different ideas and terms, and
+gives rise to different effects, according to the different stages of
+life--youth, old age, &c.--which he has reached.--The fact of our saying
+'the jar has perished' while yet the clay persists, was referred to by
+the Pūrvapakshin as proving that the effect is something different from
+the cause; but this view is disproved by the view held by us that
+origination, destruction, and so on, are merely different states of one
+and the same causal substance. According as one and the same substance
+is in this or that state, there belong to it different terms and
+different activities, and these different states may rightly be viewed
+as depending on the activity of an agent. The objections again which are
+connected with the theory of 'manifestation' are refuted by our not
+acknowledging such a thing at all as 'manifestation.' Nor does the
+admission of origination render the doctrine of the reality of the
+effect irrational; for it is only the Real that originates.--But it is a
+contradiction to maintain that that which previously exists is
+originated!--This, we reply, is the objection of a person who knows
+nothing about the true nature of origination and destruction. A
+substance enters into different states in succession; what passes away
+is the substance in its previous states, what originates is the
+substance in its subsequent states. As thus the substance in all its
+states has being, there is nothing irrational in the satkārya theory.--
+But the admission of the origination of a non-existing state lands us in
+the asatkārya theory!--If he, we retort, who holds the asatkārya theory
+is of opinion that the origination of the effect does not itself
+originate, he is similarly landed in the satkārya theory; and if he
+holds that the origination itself originates, he is led into a
+_regressus in infinitum_. According to us, on the other hand, who hold
+that states are incapable of being apprehended and of acting apart from
+that of which they are states, origination, destruction, and so on,
+belong only to a substance which is in a certain state; and on this
+theory no difficulty remains. And in the same way as the state of being
+a jar results from the clay abandoning the condition of being either two
+halves of a jar or a lump of clay, plurality results from a substance
+giving up the state of oneness, and oneness from the giving up of
+plurality; hence this point also gives rise to no difficulty.
+
+We now consider the whole Chāndogya-text in connexion. 'Sad eva somyedam
+agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam.' This means--That which is Being, i.e. this
+world which now, owing to the distinction of names and forms, bears a
+manifold shape, was in the beginning one only, owing to the absence of
+the distinction of names and forms. And as, owing to the 'Sat' being
+endowed with all powers, a further ruling principle is out of the
+question, the world was also 'without a second.' This proves the non-
+difference of the world from Brahman. In the same way the next clause
+also,' It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' which describes the
+creation of the world as proceeding from a resolve of the Self to
+differentiate itself into a world consisting of manifold beings movable
+and immovable, viz. Fire, and so on, enables us to determine that the
+effect, i. e. the world, is non-different from the highest cause, i.e.
+the highest Brahman.
+
+And as now a further doubt may arise as to how the highest Brahman with
+all its perfections can be designated as one with the world, and how the
+world can be designated as one, without a second, not dependent on
+another guiding principle; and how this thought, i.e. the resolution, on
+the part of the Supreme cause, of differentiating itself into a manifold
+world, and the creation corresponding to that resolution are possible;
+the text continues,'That deity thought--Let me now enter those three
+beings with this living Self (jīva ātman) and distinguish names and
+forms'--which means, 'Let me make the aggregate of non-sentient things
+(for this is meant by the "three beings") to possess various names and
+forms, by entering into them by means of the gīva, which is of the
+nature of my Self.'The possession of names and forms must thus be
+understood to be effected by the jīva entering into matter as its Self.
+There is another scriptural text also which makes it clear that the
+highest Brahman enters, so as to be their Self, into the world together
+with the jīvas. 'Having sent forth that he entered into it. Having
+entered into it he became sat and tyat (i.e. sentient and non-sentient
+beings).'And that the entire aggregate of sentient and non-sentient
+beings, gross or subtle, in their effected or their causal state,
+constitutes the body of the highest Brahman, and that on the other hand
+the highest Brahman constitutes their Self--this is proved by the
+antaryāmin-brāhmana and similar texts. This disposes of the doubt raised
+above. Since Brahman abides, as their Self, in all non-sentient matter
+together with the jīvas, Brahman is denoted by the term 'world' in so
+far only as it (i.e. Brahman) has non-sentient and sentient beings for
+its body, and hence utterances such as 'This which is Being only was in
+the beginning one only' are unobjectionable in every way. All change and
+all imperfection belongs only to the beings constituting Brahman's body,
+and Brahman itself is thus proved to be free from all imperfection, a
+treasure as it were of all imaginable holy qualites. This point will be
+further elucidated under II, 1, 22.--The Chāndogya-text then further
+teaches that all sentient and non-sentient beings have their Self in
+Brahman 'in that all this has its Self; and further inculcates this
+truth in 'Thou art that.'
+
+Texts met with in other sections also teach this same non-difference of
+the general cause and its effect: 'All this indeed is Brahman' (Ch. Up.
+III, 14, 1); 'When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known,
+then all this is known' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6); 'That Self is all this'
+(Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman indeed is all this' (Mai. Up. IV, 6); 'The
+Self only is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2). Other texts, too, negative
+difference: 'Everything abandons him who looks for anything elsewhere
+than in the Self (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'There is not any plurality here'
+(Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'From death to death goes he who sees here any
+plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19). And in the same spirit the passage 'For
+where there is duality as it were, one sees the other; but when for him
+the Self has become all, whereby then should he sec and whom?'(Bri. Up.
+11,4, 13)--in setting forth that the view of duality belongs to him who
+does not know and the view of non-duality to him who knows--intimates
+that non-difference only is real.
+
+It is in this way that we prove, by means of the texts beginning with
+ārambhana, that the world is non-different from the universal cause, i.e.
+the highest Brahman. Brahman only, having the aggregate of sentient and
+non-sentient beings for its body and hence for its modes (prakāra), is
+denoted by all words whatsoever. The body of this Brahman is sometimes
+constituted by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle state,
+when--just owing to that subtle state--they are incapable of being
+(conceived and) designated as apart from Brahman whose body they form:
+Brahman is then in its so-called causal condition. At other times the
+body of Brahman is constituted by all sentient and non-sentient beings
+in their gross, manifest state, owing to which they admit of being
+thought and spoken of as having distinct names and forms: Brahman then
+is in its 'effected' state. The effect, i.e. the world, is thus seen to
+be non-different from the cause, i.e. the highest Brahman. And that in
+the effected as well as the causal state of Brahman's body as
+constituted by sentient and non-sentient beings, and of Brahman embodied
+therein, perfections and imperfections are distributed according to the
+difference of essential nature between Brahman and its body, as proved
+by hundreds of scriptural texts, we have shown above.
+
+Those on the other hand who establish the non-difference of cause and
+effect, on the basis of the theory of the effect's non-reality, are
+unable to prove what they wish to prove; for the True and the False
+cannot possibly be one. If these two were one, it would follow either
+that Brahman is false or that the world is real.--Those again who (like
+Bhāskara) hold the effect also to be real--the difference of the soul
+and Brahman being due to limiting conditions, while their non-difference
+is essential; and the difference as well as the non-difference of
+Brahman and matter being essential--enter into conflict with all those
+texts which declare that the soul and Brahman are distinct in so far as
+the soul is under the power of karman while Brahman is free from all
+evil, &c., and all those texts which teach that non-sentient matter
+undergoes changes while Brahman does not. For as, according to them,
+nothing exists but Brahman and the limiting adjuncts, Brahman--as being
+indivisible--must be undivided while entering into connexion with the
+upādhis, and hence itself undergoes a change into inferior forms. And if
+they say that it is only the power (sakti), not Brahman itself, which
+undergoes a change; this also is of no avail since Brahman and its power
+are non-different.
+
+Others again (Yādavaprakāsa) hold that the general cause, i.e. Brahman,
+is pure Being in which all distinctions and changes such as being an
+enjoying subject, and so on, have vanished, while however it is endowed
+with all possible potentialities. During a pralaya this causal substance
+abides self-luminous, with all the distinctions of consciousness of
+pleasure and pain gone to rest, comparable to the soul of a man held by
+dreamless sleep, different however in nature from mere non-sentient
+matter. During the period of a creation, on the other hand, just as the
+substance called clay assumes the forms of jars, platters, and so on, or
+as the water of the sea turns itself into foam, waves, bubbles, and so
+on, the universal causal substance abides in the form of a triad of
+constituent parts, viz. enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and a
+ruler. The attributes of being a ruler, or an object of enjoyment, or an
+enjoying subject, and the perfections and imperfections depending on
+those attributes, are therefore distributed in the same way as the
+attributes of being a jar or pitcher or platter; and the different
+effects of these attributes are distributed among different parts of the
+substance, clay. The objects of enjoyment, subjects of enjoyment, and
+the ruler are one, on the other hand, in so far as 'that which is'
+constitutes their substance; just as jars, platters and pitchers are one
+in so far as their substance is constituted by clay. It is thus one
+substance only, viz. 'that which is,' that appears in different
+conditions, and it is in this sense that the world is non-different from
+Brahman.--But this theory is really in conflict with all Scripture,
+Smriti, Itihāsa, Purāna and Reasoning. For Scripture, Smriti, Itihāsa
+and Purāna alike teach that there is one supreme cause, viz. Brahman--a
+being that is the Lord of all Lords, all-knowing, all-powerful,
+instantaneously realising all its purposes, free of all blemish, not
+limited either by place or time, enjoying supreme unsurpassable bliss.
+Nor can it be held that above the Lord there is 'pure Being' of which
+the Lord is a part only. For 'This which is "being" only was in the
+beginning one only, without a second; it thought, may I be many, may I
+grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'Verily, in the beginning this was
+Brahman, one only. Being one it was not strong enough. It created the
+most excellent Kshattra, viz. those Kshattras among the Devas--Indra,
+Varuna, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mrityu, īsāna' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 11);
+'In the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing
+whatsoever else blinking. He thought, shall I send forth worlds' (Ait.
+Įr. II, 4, 1, 1, 2); 'There was in truth Nārāyana only, not Brahmā, not
+Īsāna, nor heaven and earth, nor the nakshatras, nor the waters, nor
+Agni, nor Soma, nor Sūrya. Being alone he felt no delight. Of him merged
+in meditation' &c. (Mahānā. Up. I, 1)--these and other texts prove that
+the highest cause is the Lord of all Lords, Nārāyana. For as the terms
+'Being,' 'Brahman,' 'Self,' which are met with in sections treating of
+the same topic, are in one of those parallel sections particularised by
+the term 'Nārāyana,' it follows that they all mean Nārāyana. That the
+Lord only is the universal cause is shown by the following text also,
+'He the highest great lord of lords, the highest deity of deities--he is
+the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him
+neither parent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI, 7, 9). Similarly the Manu Smriti,
+'Then the divine Self-existent (Brahmā)--desirous to produce from his
+own body beings of many kind--first with a thought created the waters
+and placed his seed in them' (Ma. I, 6-8). Itihāsas and Purānas also
+declare the Supreme Person only to be the universal cause, 'Nārāyana, of
+whom the world is the body, of infinite nature, eternal, when desirous
+to create sent forth from a thousandth part of himself the souls in two
+divisions.' 'From Vishnu the world originated and in him it abides.'
+
+Nor is it possible to hold that the Lord is pure 'Being' only, for such
+'Being' is admitted to be an element of the Lord; and moreover all
+'Being' has difference. Nor can it be maintained that the Lord's
+connexion with all his auspicious qualities--knowledge, bliss, and so
+on--is occasional (adventitious) merely; it rather is essential and
+hence eternal. Nor may you avail yourself of certain texts--viz. 'His
+high power (sakti) is revealed as manifold, as essential, and (so) his
+knowledge, strength and action' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'He who is all-
+knowing, all-cognising' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9), and others--to the end of
+proving that what is essential is only the Lord's connexion with the
+_potentialities_ (sakti) of knowledge, bliss, and so on. For in the
+Svetāsvatara-text the word 'essential' independently qualifies
+'knowledge, strength, and action' no less than 'sakti'; and your
+explanation would necessitate so-called implication (lakshanā). Nor
+again can it be said that in words such as sarvjńa (all-knowing), the
+formative suffix expresses potentiality only, as it admittedly does in
+other words such as pākaka (cook); for grammar does not teach that all
+these (krit) affixes in general express potentiality or capability only.
+It rather teaches (cp. Pānini III, 2, 54) that a few krit-affixes only
+have this limited meaning; and in the case of pākaka and similar words
+we must assume capability to be denoted, because there is no other
+explanation open to us.--If, moreover, the Lord were held to be only a
+part of the Sat it would follow that the Sat, as the whole, would be
+superior to the Lord just as the ocean is superior to a wave, and this
+would be in conflict with ever so many scriptural texts which make
+statements about the Lord, cp. e.g. 'Him the highest great lord of
+lords'; 'There is none seen like to him or superior' (Svet. Up. VI, 7,
+8). If, moreover, mere Being is held to be the Self of all and the
+general whole, and the Lord only a particular part of it, this would
+imply the stultification of all those texts which declare the Lord to be
+the general Self and the whole of which all beings are parts; for jars
+and platters certainly cannot be held to be parts of, and to have their
+being in, pitchers (which themselves are only special things made of
+clay). Against this you perhaps will plead that as Being in general is
+fully present in all its parts, and hence also in that part which is the
+Lord, all other things may be viewed as having their Self in and being
+parts of, him.--But from your principles we might with equal right draw
+the inference that as Being in general is fully present in the jar, the
+Lord is a part of the jar and has his Self in that! From enunciations
+such as 'the jar is,' 'the cloth is,' it appears that Being is an
+attribute of things, and cannot therefore be a substance and a cause. By
+the 'being' of a thing we understand the attribute of its being suitable
+for some definite practical effect; while its 'non-being' means its
+suitability for an effect of an opposite nature.--Should it on the other
+hand be held that substances only have being, the (unacceptable)
+consequence would be that actions, and so on, are non-existent. And if
+(to avoid this consequence) it were said that the being of actions, and
+so on, depends on their connexion with substances, it would be difficult
+to show (what yet should be shown) that 'being' is everywhere of one and
+the same nature. Moreover, if everything were non-different in so far as
+'being,' there would be a universal consciousness of the nature of
+everything, and from this there would follow a general confusion of all
+good and evil (i.e. every one would have conscious experience of
+everything) This point we have explained before. For all these reasons
+non-difference can only have the meaning set forth by us.--Here the
+following doubt may arise. In the case of childhood, youth, and so on,
+we observe that different ideas and different terms are applied to
+different states of one and the same being; in the case of clay, wood,
+gold, &c., on the other hand, we observe that different ideas and terms
+are applied to different things. On what ground then do you determine
+that in the case of causes and effects, such as e.g. clay and jars, it
+is mere difference of state on which the difference of ideas and terms
+is based?--To this question the next Sūtra gives a reply.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 434:1. In other words--is the golden ornament originated by
+the mere formless substance, gold; or by the form belonging to that
+special piece of gold (a coin, a bar, &c.), out of which the ornament is
+fashioned; or by the substance, gold, in so far as possessing that
+special form? The rukaka of the text has to be taken in the sense of
+nishka.]
+
+[FOOTNOTE 455:1. The meaning of the four words constituting the clause
+therefore would be, 'On account of speech (i.e. for the sake of the
+accomplishment of certain activities such as the bringing of water,
+which are preceded by speech), there is touched (by the previously
+mentioned substance clay) an effect and a name; i.e. for the sake of, &c.,
+clay modifies itself into an effect having a special name.'The
+Commentary remarks that' ārambhanam 'cannot be taken in the sense of
+upādāna; since, on the theory of the unreality of effects, the effect is
+originated not by speech but by thought (imagination) only; and on the
+parināma doctrine the effect is likewise not originated by speech but by
+Brahman.]
+
+
+
+
+16. And because (the cause) is perceived in the existence of the effect.
+
+This means--because gold which is the cause is perceived in the
+existence of its effects, such as earrings and the like; i.e. on account
+of the recognition of gold which expresses itself in the judgment 'this
+earring is gold.' We do not on the other hand perceive the presence of
+clay, and so on, in gold, and so on. The case of the cause and the
+effect is thus analagous to that of the child and the youth: the word
+'effect' denotes nothing else but the causal substance which has passed
+over into a different condition. He also who holds the effect to be a
+new thing acknowledges that the effect is connected with a different
+state, and as this different state suffices to account for the
+difference of ideas and words, we are not entitled to assume a new
+substance which is not perceived. Nor must it be said that the
+recognition of the gold in the earring is due to generic nature (the two
+_things_ being different, but having the same generic nature); for we
+perceive no new substance which could be the abode of the generic
+character. What we actually perceive is one and the same substance
+possessing the generic characteristics of gold, first in the causal
+state and then in the effected state. Nor again can it be said that even
+on the supposition of difference of substance, recognition of the cause
+in the effect results from the continuity of the so-called intimate
+cause (samavāyi-kāraina). For where there is difference of substances
+we do not observe that mere continuity of the abode gives rise to the
+recognition (of one substance) in the other substance residing in that
+abode.-But in the case of certain effects, as e.g. scorpions and other
+vermin which originate from dung, that recognition of the causal
+substance, i.e. dung (to which you refer as proving the identity of
+cause and effect), is not observed to take place!--You misstate the
+case, we reply; here also we _do_ recognise in the effect that substance
+which is the primal cause, viz. earth.--But in smoke, which is the
+effect of fire, we do not recognise fire!--True! but this does not
+disprove our case. Fire is only the operative cause of smoke; for smoke
+originates from damp fuel joined with fire. That smoke is the effect of
+damp fuel is proved thereby, as well as that both have smell (which
+shows them to be alike of the substance of earth).--As thus the identity
+of the substance is perceived in the effect also, we are entitled to
+conclude that the difference of ideas and terms rests on difference of
+state only. The effect, therefore, is non-different from the
+cause.--This is so for the following reason also.
+
+
+
+
+17. And on account of the existence of that which is posterior.
+
+On account of the existence of the posterior, i.e. the effect existing
+in the cause--for this reason also the effect is non-different from the
+cause. For in ordinary language as well as in the Veda the effect is
+spoken of in terms of the cause; as when we say, 'all these things--jars,
+platters, &c.--were clay only this morning'; or when the Veda says,
+'Being only was this in the beginning.'
+
+
+
+
+18. If it be said 'not, on account of the designation of the (effect as
+the) non-existent; we reply, not so, on account (of such designation
+being due to) another attribute, (as appears) from the complementary
+passage, from Reasoning, and from another Vedic text.
+
+The assertion that ordinary speech as well as the Veda acknowledges the
+existence of the effect in the cause cannot be upheld 'on account of the
+designation of (the effect as) the non-existent.' For the Veda says,
+'Non-being only was this in the beginning' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1); 'Non-
+being indeed was this in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 6. 1); 'In the
+beginning truly this was not anything whatever.' And in ordinary
+language we say 'In the morning all this--jars, platters, and so on,--
+was not.'--This objection the Sūtra proceeds to refute. 'Not so, on
+account of such designation being due to another attribute.' The
+designation of the effected substance as the non-existent is due to the
+effect having at an earlier time a different quality, i.e. a different
+constitution; not to its being, as you think, absolutely non-existing.
+The quality different from the quality of existence is non-existence;
+that is to say, of the world designated as _this_, the quality of
+existence is constituted by name and form, while the quality of non-
+existence consists in the subtle state opposed to name and form.--But
+how is this known?--'From the complementary passage, from Reasoning, and
+from another text.' The complementary passage is the one following on
+the last text quoted above, viz. 'that Non-existent formed the resolve
+"may I be". The resolve referred to in this complementary text serving
+as an inferential sign to determine that the Non-existence spoken of is
+other than absolute Non-existence, we, on the basis of the observation
+that all the three texts quoted treat of the same matter, conclude that
+in the other two texts also the Non-existent has to be understood in the
+same sense. 'From Reasoning.' Reasoning shows Being and Non-being to be
+attributes of things. The possession, on the part of clay, of a certain
+shape, a broad base, a belly-shaped body, and so on, is the cause of our
+thinking and saying 'the jar exists,' while the connexion, on the part
+of the clay, with a condition opposed to that of a jar is the cause of
+our thinking and saying 'the jar does not exist.' A condition of the
+latter kind is e. g.--the clay's existing in the form of two separate
+halves of a jar, and it is just this and similar conditions of the clay
+which account for our saying that the jar does not exist. We do not
+perceive any non-existence of the jar different from the kind of non-
+existence described; and as the latter sufficiently accounts for all
+current ideas and expressions as to non-existence, there is no occasion
+to assume an additional kind of non-existence.--And also 'from another
+text.' The text meant is that often quoted, 'Being only was this in the
+beginning.' For there the view of the absolute non-being of the effect
+is objected to, 'But how could it be thus?' &c., and then the decision
+is given that from the beginning the world was 'being.' This matter is
+clearly set forth in the text 'This was then undistinguished; it became
+distinguished by name and form' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7).
+
+The next two Sūtras confirm the doctrine of the non-difference of the
+effect from the cause by two illustrative instances.
+
+
+
+
+19. And like a piece of cloth.
+
+As threads when joined in a peculiar cross-arrangement are called a
+piece of cloth, thus acquiring a new name, a new form, and new functions,
+so it is with Brahman also.
+
+
+
+
+20. And as the different vital airs.
+
+As the one air, according as it undergoes in the body different
+modifications, acquires a new name, new characteristics, and new
+functions, being then called prāna, apāna, and so on; thus the one
+Brahman becomes the world, with its manifold moving and non-moving
+beings.--The non-difference of the world from Brahman, the highest cause,
+is thus fully established.
+
+Here terminates the 'ārambhana' adhikarana.
+
+
+
+
+21. From the designation of the 'other' (as non-different from Brahman)
+there result (Brahman's) not creating what is beneficial, and other
+imperfections.
+
+'Thou art that'; 'this Self is Brahman'--these and similar texts which
+declare the non-difference of the world from Brahman, teach, as has been
+said before, at the same time the non-difference from Brahman of the
+individual soul also. But an objection here presents itself. If these
+texts really imply that the 'other one,' i.e. the soul, is Brahman,
+there will follow certain imperfections on Brahman's part, viz. that
+Brahman, endowed as it is with omniscience, the power of realising its
+purposes, and so on, does not create a world of a nature beneficial to
+itself, but rather creates a world non-beneficial to itself; and the
+like. This world no doubt is a storehouse of numberless pains, either
+originating in living beings themselves or due to the action of other
+natural beings, or caused by supernatural agencies. No rational
+independent person endeavours to produce what is clearly non-beneficial
+to himself. And as you hold the view of the non-difference of the world
+from Brahman, you yourself set aside all those texts which declare
+Brahman to be different from the soul; for were there such difference,
+the doctrine of general non-difference could not be established. Should
+it be maintained that the texts declaring difference refer to difference
+due to limiting adjuncts, while the texts declaring non-difference mean
+essential non-difference, we must ask the following question--does the
+non-conditioned Brahman know, or does it not know, the soul which is
+essentially non-different from it? If it does not know it, Brahman's
+omniscience has to be abandoned. If, on the other hand, it knows it,
+then Brahman is conscious of the pains of the soul--which is non-
+different from Brahman--as its own pains; and from this there
+necessarily follows an imperfection, viz. that Brahman does not create
+what is beneficial and does create what is non-beneficial to itself. If,
+again, it be said that the difference of the soul and Brahman is due to
+Nescience on the part of both, and that the texts declaring difference
+refer to difference of this kind, the assumption of Nescience belonging
+to the soul leads us to the very alternatives just stated and to their
+respective results. Should the ajńana, on the other hand, belong to
+Brahman, we point out that Brahman, whose essential nature is self-
+illuminedness, cannot possibly be conscious of ajńana and the creation
+of the world effected by it. And if it be said that the light of Brahman
+is obscured by ajńana, we point to all the difficulties, previously set
+forth, which follow from this hypothesis--to obscure light means to make
+it cease, and to make cease the light of Brahman, of whom light is the
+essential nature, means no less than to destroy Brahman itself. The view
+of Brahman being the cause of the world thus shows itself to be
+untenable.--This primā facie view the next Sūtra refutes.
+
+
+
+
+22. But (Brahman is) additional, on account of the declaration of
+difference.
+
+The word 'but' sets aside the primā facie view. To the individual soul
+capable of connexion with the various kinds of pain there is additional,
+i.e. from it there is different, Brahman.--On what ground?--'Owing to
+the declaration of difference.' For Brahman is spoken of as different
+from the soul in the following texts:--'He who dwells in the Self and
+within the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the
+body, who rules the Self within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the
+immortal' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Knowing as separate the Self and the
+Mover, blessed by him he gains Immortality' (Svet. Up. I, 6); 'He is the
+cause, the Lord of the lords of the organs' (i.e. the individual souls)
+(Svet Up. VI, 9); 'One of them eats the sweet fruit; without eating the
+other looks on' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'There are two, the one knowing, the
+other not knowing, both unborn, the one a ruler, the other not a ruler'
+(Svet. Up. I, 9); 'Embraced by the prājńa. Self (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21);
+'Mounted by the prājńa. Self' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 35); 'From that the ruler
+of māyā sends forth all this, in that the other is bound up through māyā
+(Svet. Up. IV, 9); 'the Master of the Pradhāna and the souls, the lord
+of the gunas' (Svet. Up. VI, 16);'the eternal among eternals, the
+intelligent among the intelligent, who, one, fulfils the desires of
+many' (Svet. Up. VI, 13); 'who moves within the Unevolved, of whom the
+Unevolved is the body, whom the Unevolved does not know; who moves
+within the Imperishable, of whom the Imperishable is the body, whom the
+Imperishable does not know; who moves within Death, of whom Death is the
+body, whom Death does not know; he is the inner Self of all beings, free
+from evil, the divine one, the one God, Nārāyana'; and other similar
+texts.
+
+
+
+
+23. And as in the analogous case of stones and the like, there is
+impossibility of that.
+
+In the same way as it is impossible that the different non-sentient
+things such as stones, iron, wood, herbs, &c., which are of an extremely
+low constitution and subject to constant change, should be one in nature
+with Brahman, which is faultless, changeless, fundamentally antagonistic
+to all that is evil, &c. &c.; so it is also impossible that the
+individual soul, which is liable to endless suffering, and a mere
+wretched glowworm as it were, should be one with Brahman who, as we know
+from the texts, comprises within himself the treasure of all auspicious
+qualities, &c. &c. Those texts, which exhibit Brahman and the soul in
+coordination, must be understood as conveying the doctrine, founded on
+passages such as 'of whom the Self is the body,' that as the jīva
+constitutes Brahman's body and Brahman abides within the jīva as its
+Self, Brahman has the jīva for its mode; and with this doctrine the co-
+ordination referred to is not only not in conflict but even confirms it--
+as we have shown repeatedly, e.g. under Sū. I, 4, 22. Brahman in all its
+states has the souls and matter for its body; when the souls and matter
+are in their subtle state Brahman is in its causal condition; when, on
+the other hand, Brahman has for its body souls and matter in their gross
+state, it is 'effected' and then called world. In this way the co-
+ordination above referred to fully explains itself. The world is non-
+different from Brahman in so far as it is its effect. There is no
+confusion of the different characteristic qualities; for liability to
+change belongs to non-sentient matter, liability to pain to sentient
+souls, and the possession of all excellent qualities to Brahman: hence
+the doctrine is not in conflict with any scriptural text. That even in
+the state of non-separation-described in texts such as, 'Being only this
+was in the beginning'--the souls joined to non-sentient matter persist
+in a subtle condition and thus constitute Brahman's body must
+necessarily be admitted; for that the souls at that time also persist in
+a subtle form is shown under Sūtras II, I, 34; 35. Non-division, at that
+time, is possible in so far as there is no distinction of names and
+forms. It follows from all this that Brahman's causality is not contrary
+to reason.
+
+Those, on the other hand, who explain the difference, referred to in
+Sūtra 22, as the difference between the jīva in its state of bondage and
+the jīva in so far as free from avidyā, i.e. the unconditioned Brahman,
+implicate themselves in contradictions. For the jiva., in so far as free
+from avidyā, is neither all-knowing, nor the Lord of all, nor the cause
+of all, nor the Self of all, nor the ruler of all--it in fact possesses
+none of those characteristics on which the scriptural texts found the
+difference of the released soul; for according to the view in question
+all those attributes are the mere figment of Nescience. Nor again can
+the Sūtra under discussion be said to refer to the distinction, from the
+individual soul, of a Lord fictitiously created by avidyā--a distinction
+analogous to that which a man in the state of avidyā makes between the
+shell and the silver; for it is the task of the Vedānta to convey a
+knowledge of that true Brahman which is introduced as the object of
+enquiry in the first Sūtra ('Now then the enquiry into Brahman') and
+which is the cause of the origination and so on of the world, and what
+they at this point are engaged in is to refute the objections raised
+against the doctrine of that Brahman on the basis of Smriti and
+Reasoning.--The two Sūtras II, 1, 8; 9 really form a complementary
+statement to what is proved in the present adhikarana; for their purport
+is to show also that things of different nature can stand to each other
+in the relation of cause and effect. And the Sūtra II, 1, 7 has
+reference to what is contained in the previous adhikarana.
+
+Here terminates the adhikarana of 'designation of the other.'
+
+
+
+
+24. Should it be said that (it is) not, on account of the observation of
+employment; we say, not so; for as in the case of milk.
+
+We have so far determined that it is in no way unreasonable to hold that
+the highest Brahman, which is all-knowing, capable of realising its
+purposes, &c., has all beings, sentient and non-sentient, for its body,
+and hence constitutes the Self of all and differs in nature from
+everything else. We now proceed to show that it is not unreasonable to
+hold that, possessing all those attributes, it is able to effect by its
+mere will and wish the creation of this entire manifold Universe.--But,
+it may here be said, it is certainly a matter of observation that agents
+of limited power are obliged to employ a number of instrumental agencies
+in order to effect their purposes; but how should it follow therefrom
+that the view of the all-powerful Brahman producing the world without
+such instrumental agencies is in any way irrational?--As, we reply, it
+is observed in ordinary life that even such agents as possess the
+capability of producing certain effects stand in need of certain
+instruments, some slow-witted person may possibly imagine that Brahman,
+being destitute of all such instruments, is incapable of creating the
+world. It is this doubt which we have to dispel. It is seen that potters,
+weavers, &c., who produce jars, cloth, and the like, are incapable of
+actually producing unless they make use of certain implements, although
+they may fully possess the specially required skill. Men destitute of
+such skill are not capable of production, even with the help of
+implements; those having the capacity produce by means of the
+instruments only. This leads to the conclusion that Brahman also,
+although possessing all imaginable powers, is not capable of creating
+the world without employing the required instrumental agencies. But
+before creation there existed nothing that could have assisted him, as
+we know from texts such as 'Being only this was in the beginning';
+'there was Nārayana alone.' Brahman's creative agency thus cannot be
+rendered plausible; and hence the primā facie view set forth in the
+earlier part of the Sūtra, 'Should it be said that (it is) not; on
+account of the observation of employment (of instruments).'
+
+This view is set aside by the latter part of the Sūtra, 'not so; for as
+in the case of milk.' It is by no means a fact that every agent capable
+of producing a certain effect stands in need of instruments. Milk, e.g.
+and water, which have the power of producing certain effects, viz. sour
+milk and ice respectively, produce these effects unaided. Analogously
+Brahman also, which possesses the capacity of producing everything, may
+actually do so without using instrumental aids. The 'for' in the Sūtra
+is meant to point out the fact that the proving instances are generally
+known, and thus to indicate the silliness of the objection. Whey and
+similar ingredients are indeed sometimes mixed with milk, but not to the
+end of making the milk turn sour, but merely in order to accelerate the
+process and give to the sour milk a certain flavour.
+
+
+
+
+25. And as in the case of the gods and so on, in (their) world.
+
+As the gods and similar exalted beings create, each in his own world,
+whatever they require by their mere volition, so the Supreme Person
+creates by his mere volition the entire world. That the gods about whose
+powers we know from the Veda only (not through perception) are here
+quoted as supplying a proving instance, is done in order to facilitate
+the comprehension of the creative power of Brahman, which is also known
+through the Veda.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the observation of
+employment.'
+
+
+
+
+26. Or the consequence of the entire (Brahman entering into the effect),
+and stultification of (Brahman's) being devoid of parts.
+
+'Being only was this in the beginning'; 'This indeed was in the
+beginning not anything'; 'The Self alone indeed was this in the
+beginning'--these and other texts state that in the beginning Brahman
+was one only, i.e. without parts--that means: Brahman, in its causal
+state, was without parts because then all distinction of matter and
+souls had disappeared. This one, non-divided, Brahman thereupon having
+formed the resolution of being many divided itself into the aggregate of
+material things--ether, air, and so on--and the aggregate of souls from
+Brahmā down to blades of grass. This being so, it must be held that the
+entire highest Brahman entered into the effected state; that its
+intelligent part divided itself into the individual souls, and its non-
+intelligent part into ether, air, and so on. This however stultifies all
+those often-quoted texts which declare Brahman in its causal state to be
+devoid of parts. For although the cause is constituted by Brahman in so
+far as having for its body matter and souls in their subtle state, and
+the effect by Brahman invested with matter and souls in their gross
+state; the difficulty stated above cannot be avoided, since also that
+element in Brahman which is embodied is held to enter into the effect.
+If, on the other hand, Brahman is without parts, it cannot become many,
+and it is not possible that there should persist a part not entering
+into the effected state. On the ground of these unacceptable results we
+conclude that Brahman cannot be the cause.--This objection the next
+Sūtra disposes of.
+
+
+
+
+27. But on account of Scripture; (Brahman's possession of various
+powers) being founded upon the word.
+
+The 'but' sets aside the difficulty raised. There is no
+inappropriateness; 'on account of Scripture.' Scripture declares on the
+one hand that Brahman is not made up of parts, and on the other that
+from it a multiform creation proceeds. And in matters vouched for by
+Scripture we must conform our ideas to what Scripture actually says.--
+But then Scripture might be capable of conveying to us ideas of things
+altogether self-contradictory; like as if somebody were to tell us
+'Water with fire'!--The Sūtra therefore adds 'on account of its being
+founded on the word.' As the possession, on Brahman's part, of various
+powers (enabling it to emit the world) rests exclusively on the
+authority of the word of the Veda and thus differs altogether from other
+matters (which fall within the sphere of the other means of knowledge
+also), the admission of such powers is not contrary to reason. Brahman
+cannot be either proved or disproved by means of generalisations from
+experience.
+
+
+
+
+28. And thus in the Self; for (there are) manifold (powers).
+
+If attributes belonging to one thing were on that account to be ascribed
+to other things also, it would follow that attributes observed in non-
+sentient things, such as jars and the like, belong also to the
+intelligent eternal Self, which is of an altogether different kind. But
+that such attributes do not extend to the Self is due to the variety of
+the essential nature of things. This the Sūtra expresses in 'for (there
+are) manifold (powers).' We perceive that fire, water, and so on, which
+are of different kind, possess different powers, viz. heat, and so on:
+there is therefore nothing unreasonable in the view that the highest
+Brahman which differs in kind from all things observed in ordinary life
+should possess innumerous powers not perceived in ordinary things. Thus
+Parāsara also--in reply to a question founded on ordinary observation--
+viz. 'How can creative energy be attributed to Brahman, devoid of
+qualities, pure, &c.?'--declares 'Numberless powers, lying beyond the
+sphere of all ordinary thought, belong to Brahman, and qualify it for
+creation, and so on; just as heat belongs to fire.' Similarly, Scripture
+says, 'what was that wood, what was that tree from which they built
+heaven and earth?' &c. (Ri. Samh. X, 81); and 'Brahman was that wood,
+Brahman was that tree', and so on.--Objections founded on ordinary
+generalisations have no force against Brahman which differs in nature
+from all other things.
+
+
+
+
+29. And on account of the defects of his view also.
+
+On his view, i.e. on the view of him who holds the theory of the
+Pradhāna or something similar, the imperfections observed in ordinary
+things would attach themselves to the Pradhāna also, since it does not
+differ in nature from those things. The legitimate conclusion therefore
+is that Brahman only which differs in nature from all other things can
+be held to be the general cause.
+
+The Pradhāna, moreover, is without parts; how then is it possible that
+it should give rise to a manifold world, comprising the 'great principle,'
+and so on?--But there _are_ parts of the Pradhāna, viz. Goodness,
+Passion, and Darkness!--This we reply necessitates the following
+distinction. Does the aggregate of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness
+constitute the Pradhāna? or is the Pradhāna the effect of those three?
+The latter alternative is in conflict with your own doctrine according
+to which the Pradhāna is cause only. It moreover contradicts the number
+of tattvas (viz. 24) admitted by you; and as those three gunas also have
+no parts one does not see how they can produce an effect. On the former
+alternative, the gunas not being composed of parts must be held to
+aggregate or join themselves without any reference to difference of
+space, and from such conjunction the production of gross effects cannot
+result.--The same objection applies to the doctrine of atoms being the
+general cause. For atoms, being without parts and spatial distinction of
+parts, can join only without any reference to such spatial distinction,
+and hence do not possess the power of originating effects.
+
+
+
+
+30. And (the divinity is) endowed with all powers, because that is seen.
+
+The highest divinity which is different in nature from all other things
+is endowed with all powers; for scriptural texts show it to be such,
+'His high power is revealed as manifold, as essential, and so his
+knowledge, force, and action' (Svet. Up. VI, 8). In the same way another
+text first declares the highest divinity to differ in nature from
+everything else, 'Free from sin, from old age, from death and grief,
+from hunger and thirst', and then goes on to represent it as endowed with
+all powers, 'realising all its wishes, realising all its intentions', &c.
+(Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5). Compare also 'He, consisting of mind, having prana
+for his body, whose form is light, who realises his wishes,' &c. (Ch. Up.
+III, 14, 2).
+
+
+
+
+31. Not, on account of the absence of organs; this has been explained
+(before).
+
+Although the one Brahman is different from all other beings and endowed
+with all powers, we yet infer from the text 'Of him there is known no
+effect and no instrument,' that as it is destitute of instruments it
+cannot produce any effect.--To this objection an answer has already been
+given in II, 1, 27; 28, 'on account of its being founded on the word,'
+and 'for there are manifold (powers).' That for which the sacred word is
+the only means of knowledge, and which is different from all other
+things, is capable of producing those effects also of the instrumental
+means of which it is destitute. It is in this spirit that Scripture says
+'He sees without eyes, he hears without ears, without hands and feet he
+hastens and grasps' (Svet. Up. III, 19).--Here terminates the adhikarana
+of 'the consequence of the entire (Brahman).'
+
+
+
+
+32. (Brahman is) not (the cause); on account of (the world) having the
+nature of what depends on a motive.
+
+Although the Lord, who before creation is alone, is endowed with all
+kinds of powers since he differs in nature from all other beings, and
+hence is by himself capable of creating the world; we all the same
+cannot ascribe to him actual causality with regard to the world; for
+this manifold world displays the nature of a thing depending on a motive,
+and the Lord has no motive to urge him to creation. In the case of all
+those who enter on some activity after having formed an idea of the
+effect to be accomplished, there exists a motive in the form of
+something beneficial either to themselves or to others. Now Brahman, to
+whose essential nature it belongs that all his wishes are eternally
+fulfilled, does not attain through the creation of the world any object
+not attained before. Nor again is the second alternative possible. For a
+being, all whose wishes are fulfilled, could concern itself about others
+only with a view to benefitting them. No merciful divinity would create
+a world so full, as ours is, of evils of all kind--birth, old age, death,
+hell, and so on;--if it created at all, pity would move it to create a
+world altogether happy. Brahman thus having no possible motive cannot be
+the cause of the world.--This primā facie view is disposed of in the
+next Sūtra.
+
+
+
+
+33. But (it is) mere sport, as in ordinary life.
+
+The motive which prompts Brahman--all whose wishes are fulfilled and who
+is perfect in himself--to the creation of a world comprising all kinds
+of sentient and non-sentient beings dependent on his volition, is
+nothing else but sport, play. We see in ordinary life how some great
+king, ruling this earth with its seven dvīpas, and possessing perfect
+strength, valour, and so on, has a game at balls, or the like, from no
+other motive than to amuse himself; hence there is no objection to the
+view that sport only is the motive prompting Brahman to the creation,
+sustentation, and destruction of this world which is easily fashioned by
+his mere will.
+
+
+
+
+34. Not inequality and cruelty, on account of there being regard; for so
+(Scripture) declares.
+
+It must indeed be admitted that the Lord, who differs in nature from all
+other beings, intelligent and non-intelligent, and hence possesses
+powers unfathomable by thought, is capable of creating this manifold
+world, although before creation he is one only and without parts. But
+the assumption of his having actually created the world would lay him
+open to the charge of partiality, in so far as the world contains beings
+of high, middle, and low station--gods, men, animals, immovable beings;
+and to that of cruelty, in so far as he would be instrumental in making
+his creatures experience pain of the most dreadful kind.--The reply to
+this is 'not so, on account of there being regard'; i.e. 'on account of
+the inequality of creation depending on the deeds of the intelligent
+beings, gods, and so on, about to be created.'--Sruti and Smriti alike
+declare that the connexion of the individual souls with bodies of
+different kinds--divine, human, animal, and so on--depends on the karman
+of those souls; compare 'He who performs good works becomes good, he who
+performs bad works becomes bad. He becomes pure by pure deeds, bad by
+bad deeds' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 5). In the same way the reverend Parāsara
+declares that what causes the difference in nature and status between
+gods, men, and so on, is the power of the former deeds of the souls
+about to enter into a new creation--'He (the Lord) is the operative
+cause only in the creation of new beings; the material cause is
+constituted by the potentialities of the beings to be created. The being
+to be embodied requires nothing but an operative cause; it is its own
+potentiality which leads its being into that condition of being (which
+it is to occupy in the new creation).' Potentiality here means karman.
+
+
+
+
+35. If it be said 'not so, on account of non-distinction of deeds'; we
+say, 'not so, on account of beginninglessness'; this is reasonable, and
+it is also observed.
+
+But before creation the individual souls do not exist; since Scripture
+teaches non-distinction 'Being only this was in the beginning.' And as
+then the souls do not exist, no karman can exist, and it cannot
+therefore be said that the inequality of creation depends on karman.--Of
+this objection the Sūtra disposes by saying 'on account of
+beginninglessness,' i.e. although the individual souls and their deeds
+form an eternal stream, without a beginning, yet non-distinction of them
+'is reasonable' (i.e. may reasonably be asserted) in so far as, previous
+to creation, the substance of the souls abides in a very subtle
+condition, destitute of names and forms, and thus incapable of being
+designated as something apart from Brahman, although in reality then
+also they constitute Brahman's body only. If it were not admitted (that
+the distinctions in the new creation are due to karman), it would
+moreover follow that souls are requited for what they have not done, and
+not requited for what they have done. The fact of the souls being
+without a beginning is observed, viz., to be stated in Scripture,'The
+intelligent one is not born and dies not' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18); so also
+the fact of the flow of creation going on from all eternity, 'As the
+creator formed sun and moon formerly.' Moreover, the text, 'Now all this
+was then undeveloped. It became developed by form and name' (Bri. Up. I,
+4, 7), states merely that the names and forms of the souls were
+developed, and this shows that the souls themselves existed from the
+beginning. Smriti also says, 'Dost thou know both Prakriti and the soul
+to be without beginning?' (Bha. Gī. XIII, 19.)--As Brahman thus differs
+in nature from everything else, possesses all powers, has no other
+motive than sport, and arranges the diversity of the creation in
+accordance with the different karman of the individual souls, Brahman
+alone can be the universal cause.
+
+
+
+
+36. And because all the attributes are proved (to be present in Brahman).
+
+As all those attributes required to constitute causality which have been
+or will be shown to be absent in the Pradhāna, the atoms, and so on, can
+be shown to be present in Brahman, it remains a settled conclusion that
+Brahman only is the cause of the world. Here terminates the adhikarana
+of 'that which has the nature of depending on a motive.'
+
+
+
+
+SECOND PĀDA.
+
+1. Not that which is inferred, on account of the impossibility of
+construction, and on account of activity.
+
+The Sūtras have so far set forth the doctrine that the highest Brahman
+is the cause of the origination and so on of the world, and have refuted
+the objections raised by others. They now, in order to safeguard their
+own position, proceed to demolish the positions held by those very
+adversaries. For otherwise it might happen that some slow-witted persons,
+unaware of those other views resting on mere fallacious arguments, would
+imagine them possibly to be authoritative, and hence might be somewhat
+shaken in their belief in the Vedic doctrine. Another pāda therefore is
+begun to the express end of refuting the theories of others. The
+beginning is made with the theory of Kapila, because that theory has
+several features, such as the view of the existence of the effect in the
+cause, which are approved of by the followers of the Veda, and hence is
+more likely, than others, to give rise to the erroneous view of its
+being the true doctrine. The Sūtras I, 1, 5 and ff. have proved only
+that the Vedic texts do not set forth the Sānkhya view, while the task
+of the present pāda is to demolish that view itself: the Sūtras cannot
+therefore be charged with needless reiteration.
+
+The outline of the Sānkhya doctrine is as follows. 'There is the
+fundamental Prakriti, which is not an effect; there are the seven
+effects of Prakriti, viz. the Mahat and so on, and the sixteen effects
+of those effects; and there is the soul, which is neither Prakriti nor
+effect'--such is the comprehensive statement of the principles. The
+entity called 'fundamental Prakriti' is constituted by the three
+substances called Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, (when) in a state of
+complete equipoise, none of the three being either in defect or in
+excess; the essential nature of those three consists respectively in
+pleasure, pain, and dullness; they have for their respective effects
+lightness and illumination, excitement and mobility, heaviness and
+obstruction; they are absolutely non-perceivable by means of the senses,
+and to be defined and distinguished through their effects only. Prakriti,
+consisting in the equipoise of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas is one, itself
+non-sentient but subserving the enjoyment and final release of the many
+sentient beings, eternal, all-pervading, ever active, not the effect of
+anything, but the one general cause. There are seven Principles which
+are the effects of Prakriti and the causal substances of everything else;
+these seven are the Mahat, the ahankāra, the subtle matter (tanmātra) of
+sound, the subtle matter of touch, the subtle matter of colour, the
+subtle matter of taste, and the subtle matter of smell. The ahankāra is
+threefold, being either modified (vaikārika), or active (taijasa), or
+the originator of the elements (bhūtādi).
+
+The vaikārika is of sattva-nature and the originator of the sense--
+organs; the bhūtādi is of tamas--nature, and the cause of those subtle
+matters (tanmātra) which in their turn are the cause of the gross
+elements; the taijasa is of the nature of ragas, and assists the other
+two. The five gross elements are the ether and so on; the five
+intellectual senses are hearing and so on; the five organs of action are
+speech and so on. With the addition of the internal organ (manas) these
+are the sixteen entities which are mere effects.--The soul, not being
+capable of any change, is not either the causal matter or the effect of
+anything. For the same reason it is without attributes, consisting of
+mere intelligence, eternal, non-active, all-pervading, and different in
+each body. Being incapable of change and non-active, it can neither be
+an agent nor an enjoyer; but although this is so, men in their confusion
+of mind, due to the closeness to each other of Prakriti and the soul,
+erroneously attribute to Prakriti the intelligence of the soul, and to
+the soul the activity of Prakriti--just as the redness of the rose
+superimposes itself on the crystal near it,--and thus consider the soul
+to be an 'I' and an enjoyer. Fruition thus results from ignorance, and
+release from knowledge of the truth. This their theory the Sānkhyas
+prove by means of perception, inference, and authoritative tradition.
+Now with regard to those matters which are proved by perception, we
+Vedāntins have no very special reason for dissenting from the Sānkhyas;
+and what they say about their authoritative tradition, claiming to be
+founded on the knowledge of all-knowing persons such as Kapila, has been
+pretty well disproved by us in the first adhyāya. If, now, we further
+manage to refute the inference which leads them to assume the Pradhāna
+as the cause of the--world, we shall have disestablished their whole
+theory. We therefore proceed to give this refutation.
+
+On this point the Sānkhyas reason as follows. It must necessarily be
+admitted that the entire world has one cause only; for if effects were
+assumed to originate from several causes we should never arrive at an
+ultimate cause. Assume that parts such as e.g. threads produce a whole
+(i.e. in the case of threads, a piece of cloth) in the way of their
+being joined together by means of their six sides, which are parts of
+the threads. You must then further assume that the threads themselves
+are in the same way produced by their parts, having a similar
+constitution. And these parts again by their parts, until you reach the
+atoms; these also must be assumed to produce their immediate effects by
+being joined together with their six sides, for otherwise solid
+extension (prathiman) could not be brought about. And then the atoms
+also as being wholes, consisting of parts [FOOTNOTE 482:1], must be
+viewed as produced by their parts, and these again by their parts and so
+on, so that we never arrive at an ultimate cause. In order therefore to
+establish such an ultimate cause we must have recourse to the hypothesis
+of the general cause being constituted by one substance, which possesses
+the power of transforming itself in various different ways, without at
+the same time forfeiting its own essential nature, and which forms the
+general substrate for an infinity of different effects, from the Mahat
+downwards. This one general cause is the Pradhāna constituted by the
+equipoise of the three gunas. The reasons for the assumption of this
+Pradhāna are as follows:--'On account of the limitedness of particular
+things; of connexion (anvaya); of activity proceeding from special power;
+and of the difference and non-difference of cause and effect--the Non-
+evolved (Pradhāna) is the general cause of this many-natured Universe'
+(vaisvarūpya) (Sānkhya Kā. I, 15; 16).--The term 'vaisvarūpya' denotes
+that which possesses all forms, i.e. the entire world with its variously
+constituted parts--bodies, worlds, and so on. This world, which on
+account of its variegated constitution must be held to be an effect, has
+for its cause the Unevolved (avyakta = Prakriti), which is of the same
+nature as the world. Why so? Because it is an effect; for we perceive
+that every effect is different from its special cause--which has the
+same nature as the effect--and at the same time is non-different. Such
+effected things as e.g. a jar and a gold ornament are different from
+their causes, i.e. clay and gold, which have the same nature as the
+effects, and at the same time non-different. Hence the manifold-natured
+world originates from the Pradhāna which has the same nature, and is
+again merged in it: the world thus has the Pradhāna alone for its cause.
+This Pradhāna is constituted by the equipoise of the three gunas, and
+thus is a cause possessing a nature equal to that of its effect, i.e.
+the world; for the world is of the nature of pleasure, pain, and
+dullness, which consist of sattva, rajas, and tamas respectively. The
+case is analogous to that of a jar consisting of clay; of that also the
+cause is none other than the substance clay. For in every case
+observation shows that only such causal substances as are of the same
+nature as the effects possess that power which is called the origination
+of the effect. That the general cause can be found only in the unevolved
+Pradhāna, which consists of the three gunas in a state of equipoise and
+is unlimited with regard to space as well as time, follows from the
+limitedness of the particular things, viz. the Mahat, the ahankāra, and
+so on. These latter things are limited like jars and so on, and hence
+incapable of originating the entire world. Hence it follows that this
+world, consisting of the three gunas, has for its only cause the
+Pradhāna, which is constituted by those three gunas in a state of
+equipoise.
+
+Against this argumentation the Sūtra says, 'Not that which is inferred,
+on account of the impossibility of construction, and on account of
+activity.'--'Inference' means 'that which is inferred,' i.e. the
+Pradhāna. The Pradhāna postulated by you is not capable of constructing
+this manifold-natured world, because while itself being non-intelligent
+it is not guided by an intelligent being understanding its nature.
+Whatever is of this latter kind is incapable of producing effects; as e.
+g. wood and the like by themselves are not capable of constructing a
+palace or a carriage. As it is matter of observation that non-
+intelligent wood, not guided by an intelligent agent understanding its
+nature, cannot produce effects; and as it is observed that if guided by
+such an agent matter does enter on action so as to produce effects; the
+Pradhāna, which is not ruled by an intelligent agent, cannot be the
+general cause. The 'and' in the Sūtra is meant to add as a further
+argument that 'presence' (anvaya) has no proving force. For whiteness
+present in cows and so on is not invariably accompanied by the quality
+of being the cause of the class characteristics of cows. Nor must it be
+said that qualities such as whiteness, although present in the effect,
+may not indeed be causes, but that substances such as gold and the like
+which are present in certain effects are invariably accompanied by the
+quality of being causes, and that hence also the substances called
+sattva, rajas, and tamas, which are found present in all effects, are
+proved to be the causes of all those effects. For sattva and so on are
+attributes of substances, but not themselves substances. Sattva and so
+on are the causes of the lightness, light, &c.. belonging to substances
+such as earth and the like, and hence distinctive attributes of the
+essential nature of those substances, but they are not observed to be
+present in any effects in a substantial form, as clay, gold, and other
+substances are. It is for this reason that they are known as 'gunas.'
+You have further said that the world's having one cause only must be
+postulated in order that an ultimate cause may be reached. But as the
+sattva, rajas, and tamas are not one but three, you yourself do not
+assume one cause, and hence do not manage to arrive at an ultimate cause.
+For your Pradhāna consists in the equipoise of the three gunas; there
+are thus several causes, and you have no more an ultimate cause than
+others. Nor can you say that this end is accomplished through the three
+gunas being unlimited. For if the three gunas are all alike unlimited,
+and therefore omnipresent, there is nowhere a plus or minus of any of
+them, and as thus no inequality can result, effects cannot originate. In
+order to explain the origination of results it is therefore necessary to
+assume limitation of the gunas.
+
+Nor is our view confirmed by those cases only in which it is clearly
+perceived that matter produces effects only when guided by an
+intelligent principle; other cases also (where the fact is not perceived
+with equal clearness) are in favour of our view. This the next Sūtra
+declares.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 482:1. As follows from their having six sides.]
+
+
+
+
+2. If it be said--like milk or water; there also (intelligence guides).
+
+What has been said--the Sānkhya rejoins--as to the impossibility of the
+Pradhāna not guided by an intelligent principle constructing this
+variously constituted world, is unfounded; for the Pradhāna may be
+supposed to act in the same way as milk and water do. Milk, when turning
+into sour milk, is capable of going by itself through a series of
+changes: it does not therefore depend on anything else. In the same way
+we observe that the homogeneous water discharged from the clouds
+spontaneously proceeds to transform itself into the various saps and
+juices of different plants, such as palm trees, mango trees, wood-apple
+trees, lime trees, tamarind trees, and so on. In the same way the
+Pradhāna, of whose essential nature it is to change, may, without being
+guided by another agent, abide in the interval between two creations in
+a state of homogeneousness, and then when the time for creation comes
+modify itself into many various effects due to the loss of equilibrium
+on the part of the gunas. As has been said '(the Pradhāna acts), owing
+to modification, as water according to the difference of the abodes of
+the several gunas' (Sānkhya Kā. I, 16). In this way the Unevolved acts
+independently of anything else.
+
+To this reasoning the Sūtra replies 'there also.' Also, in the instances
+of milk and water, activity is not possible in the absence of an
+intelligent principle, for these very cases have already been referred
+to as proving our position. The Sūtra II, 1, 24 (where the change of
+milk into sour milk is instanced) meant to prove only that a being
+destitute of other visible instruments of action is able to produce its
+own special effect, but not to disprove the view of all agency
+presupposing an intelligent principle. That even in water and so on an
+intelligent principle is present is proved by scriptural texts, 'he who
+dwells in water' and so on.
+
+
+
+
+3. And because from the independence (of the Pradhāna) there would
+follow the non-existence of what is different (from creation, i.e. of
+the pralaya condition).
+
+That the Pradhāna which is not guided by an intelligent principle is not
+the universal cause is proved also by the fact that, if we ascribe to it
+a power for change independent of the guidance of a Lord capable of
+realising all his purposes, it would follow that the pralaya state,
+which is different from the state of creation, would not exist; while on
+the other hand the guidance of the Pradhāna by a Lord explains the
+alternating states of creation and pralaya as the effects of his
+purposes. Nor can the Sānkhya retort that our view gives rise to similar
+difficulties in so far, namely, as the Lord, all whose wishes are
+eternally accomplished, who is free from all imperfection, &c. &c.,
+cannot be the originator of either creation or pralaya, and as the
+creation of an unequal world would lay him open to the charge of
+mercilessness. For, as explained before, even a being perfect and
+complete may enter on activity for the sake of sport; and as the reason
+for a particular creation on the part of an all-knowing Lord may be his
+recognition of Prakriti having reached a certain special state, it is
+the deeds of the individual souls which bring about the inequalities in
+the new creation.--But if this is so, all difference of states is caused
+exclusively by the good and evil deeds of the individual souls; and what
+position remains then for a ruling Lord? Prakriti, impressed by the good
+and evil deeds of the souls, will by herself modify herself on such
+lines as correspond to the deserts of the individual souls; in the same
+way as we observe that food and drink, if either vitiated by poison or
+reinforced by medicinal herbs and juices, enter into new states which
+render them the causes of either pleasure or pain. Hence all the
+differences between states of creation and pralaya, as also the
+inequalities among created beings such as gods, men, and so on, and
+finally the souls reaching the condition of Release, may be credited to
+the Pradhāna, possessing as it does the capability of modifying itself
+into all possible forms!--You do not, we reply, appear to know anything
+about the nature of good and evil works; for this is a matter to be
+learned from the Sastra. The Sastra is constituted by the aggregate of
+words called Veda, which is handed on by an endless unbroken succession
+of pupils learning from qualified teachers, and raised above all
+suspicion of imperfections such as spring from mistake and the like. It
+is the Veda which gives information as to good and evil deeds, the
+essence of which consists in their pleasing or displeasing the Supreme
+Person, and as to their results, viz. pleasure and pain, which depend on
+the grace or wrath of the Lord. In agreement herewith the Dramidākārya
+says, 'From the wish of giving rise to fruits they seek to please the
+Self with works; he being pleased is able to bestow fruits, this is the
+purport of the Sāstra.' Thus Sruti also says, 'Sacrifices and pious
+works which are performed in many forms, all that he bears (i.e. he
+takes to himself); be the navel of the Universe' (Mahānār. Up. I, 6).
+And in the same spirit the Lord himself declares,'From whom there
+proceed all beings, by whom all this is pervaded--worshipping him with
+the proper works man attains to perfection' (Bha. Gī. XVIII, 46); and
+'These evil and malign haters, lowest of men, I hurl perpetually into
+transmigrations and into demoniac wombs' (Bha. Gī. XVI, 19). The divine
+Supreme Person, all whose wishes are eternally fulfilled, who is all-
+knowing and the ruler of all, whose every purpose is immediately
+realised, having engaged in sport befitting his might and greatness and
+having settled that work is of a twofold nature, such and such works
+being good and such and such being evil, and having bestowed on all
+individual souls bodies and sense-organs capacitating them for entering
+on such work and the power of ruling those bodies and organs; and having
+himself entered into those souls as their inner Self abides within them,
+controlling them as an animating and cheering principle. The souls, on
+their side, endowed with all the powers imparted to them by the Lord and
+with bodies and organs bestowed by him, and forming abodes in which he
+dwells, apply themselves on their own part, and in accordance with their
+own wishes, to works either good or evil. The Lord, then, recognising
+him who performs good actions as one who obeys his commands, blesses him
+with piety, riches, worldly pleasures, and final release; while him who
+transgresses his commands he causes to experience the opposites of all
+these. There is thus no room whatever for objections founded on
+deficiency, on the Lord's part, of independence in his dealings with men,
+and the like. Nor can he be arraigned with being pitiless or merciless.
+For by pity we understand the inability, on somebody's part, to bear the
+pain of others, coupled with a disregard of his own advantage. When pity
+has the effect of bringing about the transgression of law on the part of
+the pitying person, it is in no way to his credit; it rather implies the
+charge of unmanliness (weakness), and it is creditable to control and
+subdue it. For otherwise it would follow that to subdue and chastise
+one's enemies is something to be blamed. What the Lord himself aims at
+is ever to increase happiness to the highest degree, and to this end it
+is instrumental that he should reprove and reject the infinite and
+intolerable mass of sins which accumulates in the course of beginning
+and endless aeons, and thus check the tendency on the part of individual
+beings to transgress his laws. For thus he says: 'To them ever devoted,
+worshipping me in love, I give that means of wisdom by which they attain
+to me. In mercy only to them, dwelling in their hearts, do I destroy the
+darkness born of ignorance with the brilliant light of knowledge' (Bha.
+Gī. X, 10, 11).--It thus remains a settled conclusion that the Pradhāna,
+which is not guided by an intelligent principle, cannot be the general
+cause.--Here a further objection is raised. Although Prakriti, as not
+being ruled by an intelligent principle, is not capable of that kind of
+activity which springs from effort, she may yet be capable of that kind
+of activity which consists in mere transformation. For we observe
+parallel cases; the grass and water e.g. which are consumed by a cow
+change on their own account into milk. In the same way, then, Prakriti
+may on her own account transform herself into the world.--To this the
+next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+4. Nor like grass and so on; because (milk) does not exist elsewhere.
+
+This argumentation does not hold good; for as grass and the like do not
+transform themselves without the guidance of an intelligent principle,
+your proving instance is not established.--But why is it not established?--
+'Because it does not exist elsewhere.' If grass, water and so on changed
+into milk even when consumed by a bull or when not consumed at all, then
+indeed it might be held that they change without the guidance of an
+intelligent principle. But nothing of the kind takes place, and hence we
+conclude that it is the intelligent principle only which turns the grass
+eaten by the cow into milk.--This point has been set forth above under
+Sūtra 3; the present Sūtra is meant to emphasise and particularise it.
+
+
+
+
+5. And if you say--as the man and the stone; thus also.
+
+Here the following view might be urged. Although the soul consists of
+mere intelligence and is inactive, while the Pradhāna is destitute of
+all power of thought; yet the non-sentient Pradhāna may begin to act
+owing to the mere nearness of the soul. For we observe parallel
+instances. A man blind but capable of motion may act in some way, owing
+to the nearness to him of some lame man who has no power of motion but
+possesses good eyesight and assists the blind man with his intelligence.
+And through the nearness of the magnetic stone iron moves. In the same
+way the creation of the world may result from the connexion of Prakriti
+and the soul. As has been said, 'In order that the soul may know the
+Pradhāna and become isolated, the connexion of the two takes place like
+that of the lame and the blind; and thence creation springs' (Sānkhya Kā.
+21). This means--to the end that the soul may experience the Pradhāna,
+and for the sake of the soul's emancipation, the Pradhāna enters on
+action at the beginning of creation, owing to the nearness of the soul.
+
+To this the Sūtra replies 'thus also.' This means--the inability of the
+Pradhāna to act remains the same, in spite of these instances. The lame
+man is indeed incapable of walking, but he possesses various other
+powers--he can see the road and give instructions regarding it; and the
+blind man, being an intelligent being, understands those instructions
+and directs his steps accordingly. The magnet again possesses the
+attribute of moving towards the iron and so on. The soul on the other
+hand, which is absolutely inactive, is incapable of all such changes. As,
+moreover, the mere nearness of the soul to the Pradhāna is something
+eternal, it would follow that the creation also is eternal. If, on the
+other hand, the soul is held to be eternally free, then there can be no
+bondage and no release.
+
+
+
+
+6. And on account of the impossibility of the relation of principal (and
+subordinate) matter.
+
+You Sānkhyas maintain that the origination of the world results from a
+certain relation between principal and subordinate entities which
+depends on the relative inferiority and superiority of the gunas--
+'according to the difference of the abodes of the several gunas'
+(Sānkhya Kā. I, 16).
+
+But, as in the pralaya state the three gunas are in a state of equipoise,
+none of them being superior or inferior to the others, that relation of
+superiority and subordination cannot then exist, and hence the world
+cannot originate. Should it, on the other hand, be maintained that even
+in the pralaya state there is a certain inequality, it would follow
+therefrom that creation is eternal.
+
+
+
+
+7. And if another inference be made (the result remains unchanged), on
+account of (the Pradhāna) being destitute of the power of a knowing
+subject.
+
+Even if the Pradhāna were inferred by some reasoning different from the
+arguments so far refuted by us, our objections would remain in force
+because, anyhow, the Pradhāna is devoid of the power of a cognising
+subject. The Pradhāna thus cannot be established by any mode of
+inference.
+
+
+
+
+8. And even if it be admitted; on account of the absence of a purpose.
+
+Even if it were admitted that the Pradhāna is established by Inference,
+the Sānkhya theory could not be accepted for the reason that the
+Pradhāna is without a purpose. For, according to the view expressed in
+the passage, 'In order that the soul may know the Pradhāna and become
+isolated' (Sānkhya Kā. I, 21), the purpose of the Pradhāna is fruition
+and final release on the part of the soul; but both these are impossible.
+For, as the soul consists of pure intelligence, is inactive, changeless,
+and spotless, and hence eternally emancipated, it is capable neither of
+fruition which consists in consciousness of Prakriti, nor of Release
+which consists in separation from Prakriti. If, on the other hand, it be
+held that the soul constituted as described is, owing to the mere
+nearness of Prakriti, capable of fruition, i.e. of being conscious of
+pleasure and pain, which are special modifications of Prakriti, it
+follows that, as Prakriti is ever near, the soul will never accomplish
+emancipation.
+
+
+
+
+9. And (it is) objectionable on account of the contradictions.
+
+The Sānkhya-system, moreover, labours from many internal contradictions.--
+The Sānkhyas hold that while Prakriti is for the sake of another and the
+object of knowledge and fruition, the soul is independent, an enjoying
+and knowing agent, and conscious of Prakriti; that the soul reaches
+isolation through the instrumentality of Prakriti only, and that as its
+nature is pure, permanent, unchanging consciousness, absence of all
+activity and isolation belong to that nature; that for this reason the
+accomplishing of the means of bondage and release and of release belong
+to Prakriti only; and that, owing to Prakriti's proximity to the
+unchanging non-active soul, Prakriti, by a process of mutual
+superimposition (adhyāsa), works towards the creation of a world and
+subserves the purposes of the soul's fruition and emancipation.--'Since
+the aggregate of things is for the sake of another; since there is an
+opposite of the three gunas and the rest; since there is superintendence;
+since there is an experiencing subject; and since there is activity for
+the sake of isolation; the soul exists' (Sānkhya Kā. 17); 'And from that
+contrast the soul is proved to be a witness, isolated, neutral,
+cognising and inactive' (18).--And after having stated that the activity
+of the Pradhāna is for the purpose of the release of the Self, the text
+says, 'therefore no (soul) is either bound or released, nor does it
+migrate; it is Prakriti which, abiding in various beings, is bound and
+released and migrates' (62). And 'From this connexion therewith (i.e.
+with the soul) the non-intelligent appears as intelligent; and although
+all agency belongs to the gunas, the indifferent (soul) becomes an agent.
+In order that the soul may know the Pradhāna and become isolated, the
+connexion of the two takes place like that of the lame and the blind;
+and thence creation springs' (20, 21).--Now to that which is eternally
+unchanging, non-active and isolated, the attributes of being a witness
+and an enjoying and cognising agent can in no way belong. Nor also can
+such a being be subject to error resting on superimposition; for error
+and superimposition both are of the nature of change. And, on the other
+hand, they also cannot belong to Prakriti, since they are attributes of
+intelligent beings. For by superimposition we understand the attribution,
+on the part of an intelligent being, of the qualities of one thing to
+another thing; and this is the doing of an intelligent being, and
+moreover a change. Nor is it possible that superimposition and the like
+should take place in the soul only if it is in approximation to Prakriti.--
+They may take place just on account of the non-changing nature of the
+soul!--Then, we reply, they would take place permanently. And that mere
+proximity has no effective power we have already shown under II, 1, 4.
+And if it is maintained that it is Prakriti only that migrates, is bound
+and released, how then can she be said to benefit the soul, which is
+eternally released? That she does so the Sānkhyas distinctly assert, 'By
+manifold means Prakriti, helpful and endowed with the gunas, without any
+benefit to herself, accomplishes the purpose of the soul, which is
+thankless and not composed of the gunas' (Sānkhya Kā. 60).--The Sānkhyas
+further teach that Prakriti, on being seen by any soul in her true
+nature, at once retires from that soul--'As a dancer having exhibited
+herself on the stage withdraws from the soul, so Prakriti withdraws from
+the soul when she has manifested herself to it' (59); 'My opinion is
+that there exists nothing more sensitive than Prakriti, who knowing "I
+have been seen" does not again show itself to the soul' (61). But this
+doctrine also is inappropriate. For, as the soul is eternally released
+and above all change, it never sees Prakriti, nor does it attribute to
+itself her qualities; and Prakriti herself does not see herself since
+she is of non-intelligent nature; nor can she wrongly impute to herself
+the soul's seeing of itself as her own seeing of herself, for she
+herself is non-intelligent and the soul is incapable of that change
+which consists in seeing or knowing.--Let it then be said that the
+'seeing' means nothing more than the proximity of Prakriti to the soul!--
+But this also does not help you; for, as said above, from that there
+would follow eternal seeing, since the two are in eternal proximity.
+Moreover, the ever unchanging soul is not capable of an approximation
+which does not form an element of its unchanging nature.--Moreover, if
+you define the seeing as mere proximity and declare this to be the cause
+of Release, we point out that it equally is the cause of bondage--so
+that bondage and release would both be permanent.--Let it then be said
+that what causes bondage is wrong seeing--while intuition of the true
+nature of things is the cause of Release!--But as both these kinds of
+seeing are nothing but proximity, it would follow that both take place
+permanently. And if, on the other hand, the proximity of Soul and
+Prakriti were held not to be permanent, then the cause of such proximity
+would have to be assigned, and again the cause of that, and so on _ad
+infinitum_.--Let us then, to escape from these difficulties, define
+proximity as nothing more than the true nature of soul and Prakriti!--As
+the true nature is permanent, we reply, it would follow therefrom that
+bondage and release would be alike permanent.--On account of all these
+contradictory views the system of the Sānkhyas is untenable.
+
+We finally remark that the arguments here set forth by us at the same
+time prove the untenableness of the view of those who teach that there
+is an eternally unchanging Brahman whose nature is pure, non-differenced
+intelligence, and which by being conscious of Nescience experiences
+unreal bondage and release. For those philosophers can show no more than
+the Sānkhyas do how their Brahman can be conscious of Nescience, can be
+subject to adhyāsa, and so on. There is, however, the following
+difference between the two theories. The Sānkhyas, in order to account
+for the definite individual distribution of birth, death, and so on,
+assume a plurality of souls. The Vedāntins, on the other hand, do not
+allow even so much, and their doctrine is thus all the more irrational.
+The assertion that there is a difference (in favour of the Vedāntins)
+between the two doctrines, in so far as the Vedāntins hold Prakriti to
+be something unreal, while the Sānkhyas consider it to be real, is
+unfounded; for pure, homogeneous intelligence, eternally non-changing,
+cannot possibly be conscious of anything different from itself, whether
+it be unreal or real. And if that thing is held to be unreal, there
+arise further difficulties, owing to its having to be viewed as the
+object of knowledge, of refutation, and so on.
+
+Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the impossibility of construction.'
+
+
+
+
+10. Or in the same way as the big and long from the short and the atomic.
+
+We have shown that the theory of the Pradhāna being the universal cause
+is untenable, since it rests on fallacious arguments, and suffers from
+inner contradictions. We shall now prove that the view of atoms
+constituting the universal cause is untenable likewise. 'Or in the same
+way as the big and long from the short and the atomic' 'Is untenable'
+must be supplied from the preceding Sūtra; 'or' has to be taken in the
+sense of 'and.' The sense of the Sūtra is--in the same way as the big
+and long, i.e. as the theory of ternary compounds originating from the
+short and the atomic, i.e. from binary compounds and simple atoms is
+untenable, so everything else which they (the Vaiseshikas) maintain is
+untenable; or, in other words--as the theory of the world originating
+from atoms through binary compounds is untenable, so everything else is
+likewise untenable.--Things consisting of parts, as e.g. a piece of
+cloth, are produced by their parts, e.g. threads, being joined by means
+of the six sides which are parts of those parts. Analogously the atoms
+also must be held to originate binary compounds in the way of combining
+by means of their six sides; for if the atoms possessed no distinction
+of parts (and hence filled no space), a group of even a thousand atoms
+would not differ in extension from a single atom, and the different
+kinds of extension--minuteness, shortness, bigness, length, &c.--would
+never emerge. If, on the other hand, it is admitted that the atoms also
+have distinct sides, they have parts and are made up of those parts, and
+those parts again are made up of their parts, and so on in infinitum.--
+But, the Vaiseshika may object, the difference between a mustard seed
+and a mountain is due to the paucity of the constituent parts on the one
+hand, and their multitude on the other. If, now, it be held that the
+atom itself contains an infinity of parts, the mustard seed and the
+mountain alike will contain an infinity of parts, and thus their
+inequality cannot be accounted for. We must therefore assume that there
+is a limit of subdivision (i.e. that there are real atoms which do not
+themselves consist of parts).--Not so, we reply. If the atoms did not
+possess distinct parts, there could originate no extension greater than
+the extension of one atom (as already shown), and thus neither mustard
+seed nor mountain would ever be brought about.--But what, then, are we
+to do to get out of this dilemma?--You have only to accept the Vedic
+doctrine of the origination of the world.
+
+Others explain the above Sūtra as meant to refute an objection against
+the doctrine of Brahman being the general cause. But this does not suit
+the arrangement of the Sūtras, and would imply a meaningless iteration.
+The objections raised by some against the doctrine of Brahman have been
+disposed of in the preceding pāda, and the present pāda is devoted to
+the refutation of other theories. And that the world admits of being
+viewed as springing from an intelligent principle such as Brahman was
+shown at length under II, 1, 4. The sense of the Sūtra, therefore, is
+none other than what we stated above.--But what are those other
+untenable views to which the Sūtra refers?--To this question the next
+Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+11. On both assumptions also there is no motion, and thence non-being
+(of the origination of the world).
+
+The atomic theory teaches that the world is produced by the successive
+formation of compounds, binary, ternary, and so on, due to the
+aggregation of atoms--such aggregation resulting from the motion of the
+atoms. The primary motion of the atoms--which are the cause of the
+origination of the entire world--is assumed to be brought about by the
+unseen principle (adrishta), 'The upward flickering of fire, the sideway
+motion of air, the primary motion on the part of atoms and of the manas
+are caused by the unseen principle.'--Is then, we ask, this primary
+motion of the atoms caused by an adrishta residing in them, or by an
+adrishta residing in the souls? Neither alternative is possible. For the
+unseen principle which is originated by the good and evil deeds of the
+individual souls cannot possibly reside in the atoms; and if it could,
+the consequence would be that the atoms would constantly produce the
+world. Nor again can the adrishta residing in the souls be the cause of
+motion originating in the atoms.--Let it then be assumed that motion
+originates in the atoms, owing to their being in contact with the souls
+in which the adrishta abides!--If this were so, we reply, it would
+follow that the world would be permanently created, for the adrishta, of
+the souls forms an eternal stream.-But the adrishta requires to be
+matured in order to produce results. The adrishtas of some souls come to
+maturity in the same state of existence in which the deeds were
+performed; others become mature in a subsequent state of existence only;
+and others again do not become mature before a new Kalpa has begun. It
+is owing to this dependence on the maturation of the adrishtas that the
+origination of the world does not take place at all times.--But this
+reasoning also we cannot admit. For there is nothing whatever to
+establish the conclusion that all the different adrishtas which spring
+from the manifold actions performed at different times, without any
+previous agreement, by the infinite multitude of individual Selfs should
+reach a state of uniform maturation at one and the same moment of time
+(so as to give rise to a new creation). Nor does this view of yours
+account for the fact of the entire world being destroyed at the same
+time, and remaining in a state of non-maturation for the period of a
+dviparārdha.--Nor can you say that the motion of the atoms is due to
+their conjunction with (souls whose) adrishta possesses certain specific
+qualities imparted to them by the will of the Lord; for by mere
+inference the existence of a Lord cannot be proved, as we have shown
+under I, 1. The origin of the world cannot, therefore, be due to any
+action on the part of the atoms.
+
+
+
+
+12. And because owing to the acknowledgment of samavāya, there results a
+_regressus in infinitum_ from equality.
+
+The Vaiseshika doctrine is further untenable on account of the
+acknowledgment of samavāya.--Why so?--Because the samavāya also, like
+part, quality, and generic characteristics, requires something else to
+establish it, and that something else again requires some further thing
+to establish it--from which there arises an infinite regress. To explain.
+The Vaiseshikas assume the so-called samavāya relation, defining it as
+'that connexion which is the cause of the idea "this is here," in the
+case of things permanently and inseparably connected, and standing to
+each other in the relation of abode and thing abiding in the abode.' Now,
+if such a samavāya relation is assumed in order to account for the fact
+that things observed to be inseparably connected--as, e.g., class
+characteristics are inseparably connected with the individuals to which
+they belong--are such, i.e. inseparably connected, a reason has also to
+be searched for why the samavāya, which is of the same nature as those
+things (in so far, namely, as it is also inseparably connected with the
+things connected by it), is such; and for that reason, again, a further
+reason has to be postulated, and so on, _in infinitum_. Nor can it be
+said that inseparable connexion must be assumed to constitute the
+essential nature of samavāya (so that no further reason need be demanded
+for its inseparable connexion); for on this reasoning you would have to
+assume the same essential nature for class characteristics, qualities,
+and so on (which would render the assumption of a samavāya needless for
+them also). Nor is it a legitimate proceeding to postulate an unseen
+entity such as the samavāya is, and then to assume for it such and such
+an essential nature.--These objections apply to the samavāya whether it
+be viewed as eternal or non-eternal. The next Sūtra urges a further
+objection against it if viewed as eternal.
+
+
+
+
+13. And because (the world also) would thus be eternal.
+
+The samavāya is a relation, and if that relation is eternal that to
+which the relation belongs must also be eternal, so that we would arrive
+at the unacceptable conclusion that the world is eternal.
+
+
+
+
+14. And on account of (the atoms) having colour and so on, the reverse
+(takes place); as it is observed.
+
+From the view that the atoms of four kinds--viz. of earth or water or
+fire or air--possess colour, taste, smell, and touch, it would follow
+that the atoms are non-eternal, gross, and made up of parts--and this is
+the reverse of what the Vaiseshikas actually teach as to their atoms,
+viz. that they are eternal, subtle, and not made up of parts. For things
+possessing colour, e.g. jars, are non-eternal, because it is observed
+that they are produced from other causes of the same, i.e. non-eternal
+nature, and so on. To a non-perceived thing which is assumed in
+accordance with what is actually perceived, we may not ascribe any
+attributes that would be convenient to us; and it is in accordance with
+actual experience that you Vaiseshikas assume the atoms to possess
+colour and other qualities. Hence your theory is untenable.--Let it then,
+in order to avoid this difficulty, be assumed that the atoms do not
+possess colour and other sensible qualities. To this alternative the
+next Sūtra refers.
+
+
+
+
+15. And as there are objections in both cases.
+
+A difficulty arises not only on the view of the atoms having colour and
+other sensible qualities, but also on the view of their being destitute
+of those qualities. For as the qualities of effected things depend on
+the qualities of their causes, earth, water, and so on, would in that
+case be destitute of qualities. And if to avoid this difficulty, it be
+held that the atoms do possess qualities, we are again met by the
+difficulty stated in the preceding Sūtra. Objections thus arising in
+both cases, the theory of the atoms is untenable.
+
+
+
+
+16. And as it is not accepted, it is altogether disregarded.
+
+Kapila's doctrine, although to be rejected on account of it's being in
+conflict with Scripture and sound reasoning, yet recommends itself to
+the adherents of the Veda on some accounts--as e.g. its view of the
+existence of the effect in the cause. Kanāda's theory, on the other hand,
+of which no part can be accepted and which is totally destitute of proof,
+cannot but be absolutely disregarded by all those who aim at the highest
+end of man.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the big and long'.
+
+
+
+
+17. Even on the aggregate with its two causes, there is non-
+establishment of that.
+
+We so far have refuted the Vaiseshikas, who hold the doctrine of atoms
+constituting the general cause. Now the followers of Buddha also teach
+that the world originates from atoms, and the Sūtras therefore proceed
+to declare that on their view also the origination, course, and so on,
+of the world cannot rationally be accounted for. These Bauddhas belong
+to four different classes. Some of them hold that all outward things,
+which are either elements (bhūta) or elemental (bhautika), and all
+inward things which are either mind (kitta) or mental (kaitta),--all
+these things consisting of aggregates of the atoms of earth, water, fire
+and air--are proved by means of Perception as well as Inference. Others
+hold that all external things, earth, and so on, are only to be inferred
+from ideas (vijńāna). Others again teach that the only reality are ideas
+to which no outward things correspond; the (so-called) outward things
+are like the things seen in dreams. The three schools mentioned agree in
+holding that the things admitted by them have a momentary existence only,
+and do not allow that, in addition to the things mentioned, viz.
+elements and elemental things, mind and mental things, there are certain
+further independent entities such as ether, Self, and so on.--Others
+finally assert a universal void, i.e. the non-reality of everything.
+
+The Sūtras at first dispose of the theory of those who acknowledge the
+real existence of external things. Their opinion is as follows. The
+atoms of earth which possess the qualities of colour, taste, touch and
+smell; the atoms of water which possess the qualities of colour, taste
+and touch; the atoms of fire which possess the qualities of colour and
+touch; and the atoms of air which possess the quality of touch only,
+combine so as to constitute earth, water, fire and air; and out of the
+latter there originate the aggregates called bodies, sense-organs, and
+objects of sense-organs. And that flow of ideas, which assumes the form
+of the imagination of an apprehending agent abiding within the body, is
+what constitutes the so-called Self. On the agencies enumerated there
+rests the entire empiric world.--On this view the Sūtra remarks, 'Even
+on the aggregate with its two causes, there is non-establishment of
+that'. That aggregate which consists of earth and the other elements and
+of which the atoms are the cause; and that further aggregate which
+consists of bodies, sense-organs and objects, and of which the elements
+are the cause--on neither of these two aggregates with their twofold
+causes can there be proved establishment of that, i.e. can the
+origination of that aggregate which we call the world be rationally
+established. If the atoms as well as earth and the other elements are
+held to have a momentary existence only, when, we ask, do the atoms
+which perish within a moment, and the elements, move towards combination,
+and when do they combine? and when do they become the 'objects of states
+of consciousness'? and when do they become the abodes of the activities
+of appropriation, avoidance and so on (on the part of agents)? and what
+is the cognising Self? and with what objects does it enter into contact
+through the sense-organs? and which cognising Self cognises which
+objects, and at what time? and which Self proceeds to appropriate which
+objects, and at what time? For the sentient subject has perished, and
+the object of sensation has perished; and the cognising subject has
+perished, and the object cognised has perished. And how can one subject
+cognise what has been apprehended through the senses of another? and how
+is one subject to take to itself what another subject has cognised? And
+should it be said that each stream of cognitions is one (whereby a kind
+of unity of the cognising subject is claimed to be established), yet
+this affords no sufficient basis for the ordinary notions and activities
+of life, since the stream really is nothing different from the
+constituent parts of the stream (all of which are momentary and hence
+discrete).--That in reality the Ego constitutes the Self and is the
+knowing subject, we have proved previously.
+
+
+
+
+18. If it be said that (this) is to be explained through successive
+causality; we say 'no,' on account of their not being the causes of
+aggregation.
+
+'If it be said that through the successive causality of Nescience and so
+on, the formation of aggregates and other matters may be satisfactorily
+accounted for.' To explain. Although all the entities (acknowledged by
+the Bauddhas) have a merely momentary existence, yet all that is
+accounted for by avidyā. Avidyā means that conception, contrary to
+reality, by which permanency, and so on, are ascribed to what is
+momentary, and so on. Through avidyā there are originated desire,
+aversion, &c., which are comprised under the general term 'impression'
+(samskāra); and from those there springs cognition (vijńāna) which
+consists in the 'kindling' of mind; from that mind (kitta) and what is
+of the nature of mind (kaitta) and the substances possessing colour, and
+so on, viz. earth, water, &c. From that again the six sense-organs,
+called 'the six abodes'; from that the body, called 'touch' (sparsa);
+from that sensation (vedanā), and so on. And from that again avidyā, and
+the whole series as described; so that there is an endlessly revolving
+cycle, in which avidyā, and so on, are in turn the causes of the links
+succeeding them. Now all this is not possible without those aggregates
+of the elements and elemental things which are called earth, and so on;
+and thereby the rationality of the formation of those aggregates is
+proved.
+
+To this the second half of the Sūtra replies 'Not so, on account of
+(their) not being the causes of aggregation'.--This cannot rationally be
+assumed, because avidyā, and so on, cannot be operative causes with
+regard to the aggregation of earth and the other elements and elemental
+things. For avidyā, which consists in the view of permanency and so on,
+belonging to what is non-permanent, and desire, aversion and the rest,
+which are originated by avidyā cannot constitute the causes of (other)
+momentary things entering into aggregation; not any more than the
+mistaken idea of shell-silver is the cause of the aggregation of things
+such as shells. Moreover, on the Bauddha doctrine, he who views a
+momentary thing as permanent himself perishes at the same moment; who
+then is the subject in whom the so-called samskāras, i.e. desire,
+aversion, and so on, originate? Those who do not acknowledge one
+permanent substance constituting the abode of the samskāras have no
+right to assume the continuance of the samskāras.
+
+
+
+
+19. And on account of the cessation of the preceding one on the
+origination of the subsequent one.
+
+For the following reason also the origination of the world cannot be
+accounted for on the view of the momentariness of all existence. At the
+time when the subsequent momentary existence originates, the preceding
+momentary existence has passed away, and it cannot therefore stand in a
+causal relation towards the subsequent one. For if non-existence had
+causal power, anything might originate at any time at any place.--Let it
+then be said that what constitutes a cause is nothing else but existence
+in a previous moment.--But, if this were so, the previous momentary
+existence of a jar, let us say, would be the cause of all things
+whatever that would be met with in this threefold world in the
+subsequent moment-cows, buffaloes, horses, chairs, stones, &c.!--Let us
+then say that a thing existing in a previous moment is the cause only of
+those things, existing in the subsequent moment, which belong to the
+same species.--But from this again it would follow that one jar existing
+in the previous moment would be the cause of all jars, to be met with in
+any place, existing in the following moment!--Perhaps you mean to say
+that one thing is the cause of one subsequent thing only. But how then
+are we to know which thing is the cause of which one subsequent thing?--
+Well then I say that the momentarily existing jar which exists in a
+certain place is the cause of that one subsequent momentary jar only
+which exists at the very same place!--Very good, then you hold that a
+place is something permanent! (while yet your doctrine is that there is
+nothing permanent).--Moreover as, on your theory, the thing which has
+entered into contact with the eye or some other sense-organ does no
+longer exist at the time when the idea originates, nothing can ever be
+the object of a cognition.
+
+
+
+
+20. There not being (a cause), there results contradiction of the
+admitted principle; otherwise simultaneousness.
+
+If it be said that the effect may originate even when a cause does not
+exist, then--as we have pointed out before--anything might originate
+anywhere and at any time. And not only would the origination of the
+effect thus remain unexplained, but an admitted principle would also be
+contradicted. For you hold the principle that there are four causes
+bringing about the origination of a cognition, viz. the adhipati-cause,
+the sahakāri-cause, the ālambhana-cause, and the samanantara-cause. The
+term adhipati denotes the sense-organs.--And if, in order to avoid
+opposition to an acknowledged principle, it be assumed that the
+origination of a further momentary jar takes place at the time when the
+previous momentary jar still exists, then it would follow that the two
+momentary jars, the causal one and the effected one, would be perceived
+together; but as a matter of fact they are not so perceived. And,
+further, the doctrine of general momentariness would thus be given up.
+And should it be said that (this is not so, but that) momentariness
+remains, it would follow that the connexion of the sense-organ with the
+object and the cognition are simultaneous.
+
+
+
+
+21. There is non-establishment of pratisankhyā and apratisankhyā
+destruction, on account of non-interruption.
+
+So far the hypothesis of origination from that which is not has been
+refuted. The present Sūtra now goes on to declare that also the absolute
+(niranvaya) destruction of that which is cannot rationally be
+demonstrated. Those who maintain the momentariness of all things teach
+that there are two kinds of destruction, one of a gross kind, which
+consists in the termination of a series of similar momentary existences,
+and is capable of being perceived as immediately resulting from agencies
+such as the blow of a hammer (breaking a jar, e.g.); and the other of a
+subtle kind, not capable of being perceived, and taking place in a
+series of similar momentary existences at every moment. The former is
+called pratisankhyā-destruction; the latter apratisankhyā-destruction.--
+Both these kinds of destruction are not possible.--Why?--On account of
+the non-interruption, i.e. on account of the impossibility of the
+complete destruction of that which is. The impossibility of such
+destruction was proved by us under II, 1, 14, where we showed that
+origination and destruction mean only the assumption of new states on
+the part of one and the same permanent substance, and therefrom proved
+the non-difference of the effect from the cause.--Here it may possibly
+be objected that as we see that a light when extinguished passes away
+absolutely, such absolute destruction may be inferred in other cases
+also. But against this we point out that in the case of a vessel of clay
+being smashed we perceive that the material, i.e. clay, continues to
+exist, and that therefrom destruction is ascertained to be nothing else
+but the passing over of a real substance into another state. The proper
+assumption, therefore, is that the extinguished light also has passed
+over into a different state, and that in that state it is no longer
+perceptible may be explained by that state being an extremely subtle one.
+
+
+
+
+22. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either
+case.
+
+It has been shown that neither origination from nothing, as held by the
+advocates of general momentariness, is possible; nor the passing away
+into nothing on the part of the thing originated. The acknowledgment of
+either of these views gives rise to difficulties. If the effect
+originates from nothing, it is itself of the nature of nothing; for it
+is observed that effects share the nature of what they originate from.
+Pitchers and ornaments, e.g. which are produced from clay and gold
+respectively, possess the nature of their causal substances. But you
+hold yourself that the world is not seen to be of the nature of
+nothingness; and certainly it is not observed to be so.--Again, if that
+which is underwent absolute destruction, it would follow that after one
+moment the entire world would pass away into nothingness; and
+subsequently the world again originating from nothingness, it would
+follow that, as shown above, it would itself be of the nature of
+nothingness (i.e. there would no longer be a _real_ world).--There being
+thus difficulties on both views, origination and destruction cannot take
+place as described by you.
+
+
+
+
+23. And in the case of space also, on account of there being no
+difference.
+
+In order to prove the permanency of external and internal things, we
+have disproved the view that the two forms of destruction called
+pratisankhyā and apratisankhyā mean reduction of an existing thing to
+nothing. This gives us an opportunity to disprove the view of
+Ether (space) being likewise a mere irrational non-entity, as the
+Bauddhas hold it to be. Ether cannot be held to be a mere irrational non-
+entity, because, like those things which are admitted to be positive
+existences, i.e. earth, and so on, it is proved by consciousness not
+invalidated by any means of proof. For the formation of immediate
+judgments such as 'here a hawk flies, and there a vulture,' implies our
+being conscious of ether as marking the different places of the flight
+of the different birds. Nor is it possible to hold that Space is nothing
+else but the non-existence (abhāva) of earth, and so on; for this view
+collapses as soon as set forth in definite alternatives. For whether we
+define Space as the antecedent and subsequent non-existence of earth,
+and so on, or as their mutual non-existence, or as their absolute non-
+existence--on none of these alternatives we attain the proper idea of
+Space. If, in the first place, we define it as the antecedent and
+subsequent non-existence of earth, and so on, it will follow that, as
+the idea of Space can thus not be connected with earth and other things
+existing at the present moment, the whole world is without Space.
+
+If, in the second place, we define it as the mutual non-existence of
+earth, and so on, it will follow that, as such mutual non-existence
+inheres in the things only which stand towards each other in the
+relation of mutual non-existence, there is no perception of Space in the
+intervals between those things (while as a matter of fact there is). And,
+in the third place, absolute non-existence of earth, and so on, cannot
+of course be admitted. And as non-existence (abhāva) is clearly
+conceived as a special state of something actually existing, Space even
+if admitted to be of the nature of abhāva, would not on that account be
+a futile non-entity (something 'tukcha' or 'nirupākhya').
+
+
+
+
+24. And on account of recognition.
+
+We return to the proof of the, previously mooted, permanence of things.
+The 'anusmriti' of the Sūtra means cognition of what was previously
+perceived, i.e. recognition. It is a fact that all things which were
+perceived in the past may be recognised, such recognition expressing
+itself in the form 'this is just that (I knew before).' Nor must you say
+that this is a mere erroneous assumption of oneness due to the fact of
+the thing now perceived being similar to the thing perceived before, as
+in the case of the flame (where a succession of flames continually
+produced anew is mistaken for one continuous flame); for you do not
+admit that there is one permanent knowing subject that could have that
+erroneous idea. What one person has perceived, another cannot judge to
+be the same as, or similar to, what he is perceiving himself. If
+therefore you hold that there is an erroneous idea of oneness due to the
+perception of similarity residing in different things perceived at
+different times, you necessarily must acknowledge oneness on the part of
+the cognising subject. In the case of the flame there is a valid means
+of knowledge to prove that there really is a succession of similar
+flames, but in the case of the jar, we are not aware of such a means,
+and we therefore have no right to assume that recognition is due to the
+similarity of many successive jars.---Perhaps you will here argue as
+follows. The momentariness of jars and the like is proved by Perception
+as well as Inference. Perception in the first place presents as its
+object the present thing which is different from non-present things, in
+the same way as it presents the blue thing as different from the yellow;
+it is in this way that we know the difference of the present thing from
+the past and the future. Inference again proceeds as follows--jars and
+the like are momentary because they produce effects and have existence
+(sattva); what is non-momentary, such as the horn of a hare, does not
+produce effects and does not possess existence. We therefore conclude
+from the existence of the last momentary jar that the preceding jar-
+existences also are perishable, just because they are momentary
+existences like the existence of the last jar.--But both this perception
+and this inference have already been disproved by what was said above
+about the impossibility of momentary existences standing to one another
+in the relation of cause and effect. Moreover, that difference of the
+present object from the non-present object which is intimated by
+Perception does not prove the present object to be a different _thing_
+(from the past object of Perception), but merely its being connected with
+the present time. This does not prove it to be a different thing, for
+the same thing can be connected with different times. The two reasons
+again which were said to prove the momentariness of jars are invalid
+because they may be made to prove just the contrary of what they are
+alleged to prove. For we may argue as follows--From existence and from
+their having effects it follows that jars, and so on, are permanent; for
+whatever is non-permanent, is non-existent, and does not produce effects,
+as e.g. the horn of a hare. The capacity of producing effects can in
+fact be used only to prove non-momentariness on the part of jars, and so
+on; for as things perishing within a moment are not capable of acting,
+they are not capable of producing effects. Further, as it is seen in the
+case of the last momentary existence that its destruction is due to a
+visible cause (viz. the blow of a hammer or the like), the proper
+conclusion is that also the other momentary jars (preceding the last
+one) require visible causes for their destruction; and (as no such causes
+are seen, it follows that) the jar is permanent and continuous up to the
+time when a destructive cause, such as the blow of a hammer, supervenes.
+Nor can it be said that hammers and the like are not the causes of
+destruction, but only the causes of the origination of a new series of
+momentary existences dissimilar to the former ones--in the case of the
+jar, e.g. of a series of momentary fragments of a jar; for we have
+proved before that the destruction of jars, and so on, means nothing but
+their passing over into a different condition, e.g. that of fragments.
+And even if destruction were held to be something different from the
+origination of fragments, it would yet be reasonable to infer, on the
+ground of immediate succession in time, that the cause of the
+destruction is the blow of the hammer.
+
+Hence it is impossible to deny in any way the permanency of things as
+proved by the fact of recognition. He who maintains that recognition
+which has for its object the oneness of a thing connected with
+successive points of time has for its objects different things, might as
+well say that several cognitions of, let us say, blue colour have for
+their object something different from blue colour. Moreover, for him who
+maintains the momentariness of the cognising subject and of the objects
+of cognition, it would be difficult indeed to admit the fact of
+Inference which presupposes the ascertainment and remembrance of general
+propositions. He would in fact not be able to set forth the reason
+required to prove his assertion that things are momentary; for the
+speaker perishes in the very moment when he states the proposition to be
+proved, and another person is unable to complete what has been begun by
+another and about which he himself does not know anything.
+
+
+
+
+25. Not from non-entity, this not being observed.
+
+So far we have set forth the arguments refuting the views of the
+Vaibhāshikas as well as the Sautrāntikas--both which schools maintain
+the reality of external things.--Now the Sautrāntika comes forward and
+opposes one of the arguments set forth by us above, viz. that, on the
+view of general momentariness, nothing can ever become an object of
+cognition, since the thing which enters into connexion with the sense-
+organ is no longer in existence when the cognition originates.--It is
+not, he says, the persistence of the thing up to the time of cognition
+which is the cause of its becoming an object of cognition. To be an
+object of cognition means nothing more than to be the cause of the
+origination of cognition. Nor does this definition imply that the sense-
+organs also are the objects of cognition. For a cause of cognition is
+held to be an object of cognition only in so far as it imparts to the
+cognition its own form (and this the sense-organs do not). Now even a
+thing that has perished may have imparted its form to the cognition, and
+on the basis of that form, blue colour, and so on, the thing itself is
+inferred. Nor can it be said (as the Yogākāras do) that the form of
+subsequent cognitions is due to the action of previous cognitions (and
+not to the external thing); for on this hypothesis it could not be
+explained how in the midst of a series of cognitions of blue colour
+there all at once arises the cognition of yellow colour. The manifold
+character of cognitions must therefore be held to be due to the manifold
+character of real thing.--To this we reply 'not from non-entity; this
+not being observed.' The special forms of cognition, such as blue colour,
+and so on, cannot be the forms of things that have perished, and
+therefore are not in Being, since this is not observed. For it is not
+observed that when a substrate of attributes has perished, its
+attributes pass over into another thing. (Nor can it be said that the
+thing that perished leaves in cognition a reflection of itself, for)
+reflections also are only of persisting things, not of mere attributes.
+We therefore conclude that the manifoldness of cognitions can result
+from the manifoldness of things only on the condition of the thing
+persisting at the time of cognition.--The Sūtras now set forth a further
+objection which applies to both schools.
+
+
+
+
+26. And thus there would be accomplishment on the part of non-active
+people also.
+
+Thus, i.e. on the theory of universal momentariness, origination from
+the non-existent, causeless cognition, and so on, it would follow that
+persons also not making any efforts may accomplish all their ends. It is
+a fact that the attainment of things desired and the warding off of
+things not desired is effected through effort, and so on. But if all
+existences momentarily perish, a previously existing thing, or special
+attributes of it, such as after-effects (through which Svarga and the
+like are effected) or knowledge (through which Release is effected) do
+not persist, and hence nothing whatever can be accomplished by effort.
+And as thus all effects would be accomplished without a cause, even
+perfectly inert men would accomplish all the ends to be reached in this
+and in the next life, including final release. Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'the aggregates.'
+
+
+
+
+27. Not non-existence, on account of consciousness.
+
+Here now come forward the Yogākāras, who hold that cognitions (ideas)
+only are real. There is no reasonable ground, they say, for the view
+that the manifoldness of ideas is due to the manifoldness of things,
+since ideas themselves--no less than the things assumed by others--have
+their distinct forms, and hence are manifold. And this manifold nature
+of ideas is sufficiently explained by so-called vāsanā. Vāsanā means a
+flow of ideas (states of consciousness--pratyaya) of different character.
+We observe, e.g., that a cognition which has the form of a jar (i.e. the
+idea of a jar) gives rise to the cognition of the two halves of a jar,
+and is itself preceded and produced by the cognition of a jar, and this
+again by a similar cognition, and so on; this is what we call a stream
+or flow of ideas.--But how, then, is it that internal cognitions have
+the forms of external things, mustard-grains, mountains, and so on?--
+Even if real things are admitted, the Yogākāra replies, their becoming
+objects of thought and speech depends altogether on the light of
+knowledge, for otherwise it would follow that there is no difference
+between the objects known by oneself and those known by others. And that
+cognitions thus shining forth to consciousness have forms (distinctive
+characteristics) must needs be admitted; for if they were without form
+they could not shine forth. Now we are conscious only of one such form,
+viz. that of the cognition; that this form at the same time appears to
+us as something external (i.e. as the form of an outward thing) is due
+to error. From the general law that we are conscious of ideas and things
+together only, it follows that the thing is not something different from
+the idea.
+
+As, moreover, the fact of one idea specially representing one particular
+thing only, whether it be a jar or a piece of cloth or anything else,
+requires for its explanation an equality in character of the idea and
+the thing, those also who hold the existence of external things must
+needs assume that the idea has a form similar to that of the thing; and
+as this suffices for rendering possible practical thought and
+intercourse, there is nothing authorising us to assume the existence of
+things in addition to the ideas. Hence cognitions only constitute
+reality; external things do not exist.
+
+To this the Sūtra replies, 'Not non-existence, on account of
+consciousness.' The non-existence of things, apart from ideas, cannot be
+maintained, because we are conscious of cognitions as what renders the
+knowing subject capable of thought and intercourse with regard to
+particular _things_. For the consciousness of all men taking part in
+worldly life expresses itself in forms such as 'I know the jar.'
+Knowledge of this kind, as everybody's consciousness will testify,
+presents itself directly as belonging to a knowing subject and referring
+to an object; those therefore who attempt to prove, on the basis of this
+very knowledge, that Reality is constituted by mere knowledge, are fit
+subjects for general derision. This point has already been set forth in
+detail in our refutation of those crypto-Bauddhas who take shelter under
+a pretended Vedic theory.--To maintain, as the Yogākāras do, that the
+general rule of idea and thing presenting themselves together proves the
+non-difference of the thing from the idea, implies a self-contradiction;
+for 'going together' can only be where there are different things. To
+hold that it is a general rule that of the idea--the essential nature of
+which is to make the thing to which it refers capable of entering into
+common thought and intercourse--we are always conscious together with
+the thing, and then to prove therefrom that the thing is not different
+from the idea, is a laughable proceeding indeed. And as, according to
+you, cognitions perish absolutely, and do not possess any permanently
+persisting aspect, it is rather difficult to prove that such cognitions
+form a series in which each member colours or affects the next one
+(vāsanā); for how is the earlier cognition, which has absolutely
+perished, to affect the later one, which has not yet arisen? We conclude
+therefore that the manifoldness of cognitions is due solely to the
+manifoldness of things. We are directly conscious of cognitions (ideas)
+as rendering the things to which they refer capable of being dealt with
+by ordinary thought and speech, and the specific character of each
+cognition thus depends on the relation which connects it with a
+particular thing. This relation is of the nature of conjunction
+(samyoga), since knowledge (cognition) also is a substance. Just as
+light (prabhā), although a substance, stands to the lamp in the relation
+of an attribute (guna), so knowledge stands in the relation of an
+attribute to the Self, but, viewed in itself, it is a substance.--From
+all this it follows that external things are not non-existent.
+
+The next Sūtra refutes the opinion of those who attempt to prove the
+baselessness of the cognitions of the waking state by comparing them to
+the cognitions of a dreaming person.
+
+
+
+
+28. And on account of difference of nature (they are) not like dreams.
+
+Owing to the different nature of dream-cognitions, it cannot be said
+that, like them, the cognitions of the waking state also have no things
+to correspond to them. For dream-cognitions are originated by organs
+impaired by certain defects, such as drowsiness, and are moreover
+sublated by the cognitions of the waking state; while the cognitions of
+the waking state are of a contrary nature. There is thus no equality
+between the two sets.--Moreover, if all cognitions are empty of real
+content, you are unable to prove what you wish to prove since your
+inferential cognition also is devoid of true content. If, on the other
+hand, it be held to have a real content, then it follows that no
+cognition is devoid of such content; for all of them are alike
+cognitions, just like the inferential cognition.
+
+
+
+
+29. The existence (is) not, on account of the absence of perception.
+
+The existence of mere cognitions devoid of corresponding things is not
+possible, because such are nowhere perceived. For we nowhere perceive
+cognitions not inherent in a cognising subject and not referring to
+objects. That even dream-cognitions are not devoid of real matter we
+have explained in the discussion of the different khyātis (above, p.
+118).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'perception.'
+
+
+
+
+30. And on account of its being unproved in every way.
+
+Here now come forward the Mādhyamikas who teach that there is nothing
+but a universal Void. This theory of a universal Nothing is the real
+purport of Sugata's doctrine; the theories of the momentariness of all
+existence, &c., which imply the acknowledgment of the reality of things,
+were set forth by him merely as suiting the limited intellectual
+capacities of his pupils.--Neither cognitions nor external objects have
+real existence; the Void (the 'Nothinj') only constitutes Reality, and
+final Release means passing over into Non-being. This is the real view
+of Buddha, and its truth is proved by the following considerations. As
+the Nothing is not to be proved by any argument, it is self-proved. For
+a cause has to be assigned for that only which _is_. But what _is_ does
+not originate either from that which is or that which is not. We never
+observe that which is to originate from Being; for things such as jars,
+and so on, do not originate as long as the lump of clay, &c., is non-
+destroyed. Nor can Being originate from Non-being; for if the jar were
+supposed to originate from Non-being, i.e. that non-being which results
+from the destruction of the lump of clay, it would itself be of the
+nature of Non-being. Similarly it can be shown that nothing can
+originate either from itself or from anything else. For the former
+hypothesis would imply the vicious procedure of the explanation
+presupposing the thing to be explained; and moreover no motive can be
+assigned for a thing originating from itself. And on the hypothesis of
+things originating from other things, it would follow that anything
+might originate from anything, for all things alike are _other_ things.
+And as thus there is no origination there is also no destruction. Hence
+the _Nothing_ constitutes Reality: origination, destruction, Being, Non-
+being, and so on, are mere illusions (bhrānti). Nor must it be said that
+as even an illusion cannot take place without a substrate we must assume
+something real to serve as a substrate; for in the same way as an
+illusion may arise even when the defect, the abode of the defect, and
+the knowing subject are unreal, it also may arise even when the
+substrate of the illusion is unreal. Hence the _Nothing_ is the only
+reality.--To this the Sūtra replies, 'And on account of its being in
+everyway unproved'--the theory of general Nothingness which you hold
+cannot stand. Do you hold that everything is being or non-being, or
+anything else? On none of these views the Nothingness maintained by you
+can be established. For the terms _being_ and _non-being_ and the ideas
+expressed by them are generally understood to refer to particular
+states of actually _existing_ things only. If therefore you declare
+'everything is nothing,' your declaration is equivalent to the
+declaration, 'everything is being,' for your statement also can only
+mean that everything that _exists_ is capable of abiding in a certain
+condition (which you call 'Nothing'). The absolute Nothingness you have
+in mind cannot thus be established in any way. Moreover, he who tries to
+establish the tenet of universal Nothingness can attempt this in so far
+only as,--through some means of knowledge, he has come to know
+Nothingness, and he must therefore acknowledge the truth of that means.
+For if it were not true it would follow that everything is real. The
+view of general Nothingness is thus altogether incapable of proof.--Here
+terminates the adhikarana of 'unprovedness in every way.'
+
+
+
+
+31. Not so, on account of the impossibility in one.
+
+The Bauddhas have been refuted. As now the Jainas also hold the view of
+the world originating from atoms and similar views, their theory is
+reviewed next.--The Jainas hold that the world comprises souls (jīva),
+and non-souls (ajīva), and that there is no Lord. The world further
+comprises six substances (dravya), viz. souls (jīva), merit (dharma),
+demerit (adharma), bodies (pudgala), time (kāla), and space (ākāsa). The
+souls are of three different kinds-bound (in the state of bondage),
+perfected by Yoga (Yogasiddha), and released (mukta). 'Merit' is that
+particular world-pervading substance which is the cause of the motion of
+all things moving; 'demerit' is that all-pervading substance which is
+the cause of stationariness, 'Body' is that substance which possesses
+colour, smell, taste, and touch. It is of two kinds, atomic or
+compounded of atoms; to the latter kind belong wind, fire, water, earth,
+the bodies of living creatures, and so on. 'Time' is a particular atomic
+substance which is the cause of the current distinction of past, present,
+and future. 'Space' is one, and of infinite extent. From among these
+substances those which are not atomic are comprehended under the term
+'the five astikāyas (existing bodies)'--the astikāya of souls, the
+astikāya of merit, the astikāya of demerit, the astikāya of matter, the
+astikāya of space. This term 'astikāya' is applied to substances
+occupying several parts of space.--They also use another division of
+categories which subserves the purpose of Release; distinguishing souls,
+non-souls, influx (āsrava), bondage, nijara, samvara, and Release.
+_Release_ comprises the means of Release also, viz. perfect knowledge,
+good conduct, and so on. The soul is that which has knowledge, seeing,
+pleasure, strength (vīrya) for its qualities. Non-soul is the aggregate
+of the things enjoyed by the souls. 'Influx' is whatever is instrumental
+towards the souls having the fruition of objects, viz. the sense-organs,
+and so on.--Bondage is of eight different kinds, comprising the four
+ghātikarman, and the four aghātikarman. The former term denotes whatever
+obstructs the essential qualities of the soul, viz. knowledge,
+intuition, strength, pleasure; the latter whatever causes pleasure,
+pain, and indifference, which are due to the persistence of the wrong
+imagination that makes the soul identify itself with its body.--'Decay'
+means the austerities (tapas), known from the teaching of the Arhat,
+which are the means of Release.--Samvara is such deep meditation
+(Samādhi) as stops the action of the sense-organs.--Release, finally, is
+the manifestation of the Self in its essential nature, free from all
+afflictions such as passion, and so on.--The atoms which are the causes
+of earth and the other compounds, are not, as the Vaiseshikas and others
+hold, of four different kinds, but have all the same nature; the
+distinctive qualities of earth, and so on, are due to a modification
+(parināma) of the atoms. The Jainas further hold that the whole complex
+of things is of an ambiguous nature in so far as being existent and
+non-existent, permanent and non-permanent, separate and non-separate. To
+prove this they apply their so-called sapta-bhangī-nyāya ('the system of
+the seven paralogisms')--'May be, it is'; 'May be, it is not'; 'May be,
+it is and is not'; 'May be, it is not predicable'; 'May be, it is and is
+not predicable'; 'May be, it is not, and is not predicable'; 'May be, it
+is and is not, and is not predicable.' With the help of this they prove
+that all things--which they declare to consist of substance (dravya),
+and paryāya--to be existing, one and permanent in so far as they are
+substances, and the opposite in so far as they are paryāyas. By paryāya
+they understand the particular states of substances, and as those are of
+the nature of Being as well as Non-being, they manage to prove
+existence, non-existence, and so on.--With regard to this the Sūtra
+remarks that no such proof is possible,'Not so, on account of the
+impossibility in one'; i.e. because contradictory attributes such as
+existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one
+thing, not any more than light and darkness. As a substance and
+particular states qualifying it--and (by the Jainas), called
+paryāya--are different things (padārtha), one substance cannot be
+connected with opposite attributes. It is thus not possible that a
+substance qualified by one particular state, such as existence, should
+at the same time be qualified by the opposite state, i. e.
+non-existence. The non-permanency, further, of a substance consists in
+its being the abode of those particular states which are called
+origination and destruction; how then should permanency, which is of an
+opposite nature, reside in the substance at the same time? Difference
+(bhinnatva) again consists in things being the abodes of contradictory
+attributes; non-difference, which is the opposite of this, cannot hence
+possibly reside in the same things which are the abode of difference;
+not any more than the generic character of a horse and that of a buffalo
+can belong to one animal. We have explained this matter at length,
+when--under Sūtra I, 1--refuting the bhedābheda-theory. Time we are
+conscious of only as an attribute of substances (not as an independent
+substance), and the question as to its being and non-being, and so on,
+does not therefore call for a separate discussion. To speak of time as
+being and non-being in no way differs from generic characteristics
+(jāti), and so on, being spoken of in the same way; for--as we have
+explained before--of jāti and the like we are conscious only as
+attributes of substances.--But (the Jaina may here be supposed to ask
+the Vedāntin), how can you maintain that Brahman, although one only, yet
+at the same time is the Self of all?--Because, we reply, the whole
+aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of
+the Supreme Person, omniscient, omnipotent, and so on. And that the body
+and the person embodied and their respective attributes are of totally
+different nature (so that Brahman is not touched by the defects of his
+body), we have explained likewise.--Moreover, as your six substances,
+soul, and so on, are not one substance and one paryāya, their being one
+substance, and so on, cannot be used to prove their being one and also
+not one, and so on.--And if it should be said that those six substances
+are such (viz. one and several, and so on), each owing to its own
+paryāya and its own nature, we remark that then you cannot avoid
+contradicting your own theory of everything being of an ambiguous
+nature. Things which stand to each other in the relation of mutual
+non-existence cannot after all be identical.--Hence the theory of the
+Jainas is not reasonable. Moreover it is liable to the same objections
+which we have above set forth as applying to all theories of atoms
+constituting the universal cause, without the guidance of a Lord.
+
+
+
+
+33. And likewise non-entireness of the Self.
+
+On your view there would likewise follow non-entireness of the Self. For
+your opinion is that souls abide in numberless places, each soul having
+the same size as the body which it animates. When, therefore, the soul
+previously abiding in the body of an elephant or the like has to enter
+into a body of smaller size, e. g. that of an ant, it would follow that
+as the soul then occupies less space, it would not remain entire, but
+would become incomplete.--Let us then avoid this difficulty by assuming
+that the soul passes over into a different state--which process is
+called paryāya,--which it may manage because it is capable of
+contraction and dilatation.--To this the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+34. Nor also is there non-contradiction from paryāya; on account of
+change, and so on.
+
+Nor is the difficulty to be evaded by the assumption of the soul
+assuming a different condition through contraction or dilatation. For
+this would imply that the soul is subject to change, and all the
+imperfections springing from it, viz. non-permanence, and so on, and
+hence would not be superior to non-sentient things such as jars and the
+like.
+
+
+
+
+35. And on account of the endurance of the final (size), and the
+(resulting) permanency of both; there is no difference.
+
+The final size of the soul, i.e. the size it has in the state of Release,
+is enduring since the soul does not subsequently pass into another body;
+and both, i.e. the soul in the state of Release and the size of that
+soul, are permanent (nitya). From this it follows that that ultimate
+size is the true essential size of the soul and also belongs to it
+previously to Release. Hence there is no difference of sizes, and the
+soul cannot therefore have the size of its temporary bodies. The Ārhata
+theory is therefore untenable.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the
+impossibility in one.'
+
+
+
+
+36. (The system) of the Lord (must be disregarded), on account of
+inappropriateness.
+
+So far it has been shown that the doctrines of Kapila, Kanāda, Sugata,
+and the Arhat must be disregarded by men desirous of final beatitude;
+for those doctrines are all alike untenable and foreign to the Veda. The
+Sūtras now declare that, for the same reasons, the doctrine of Pasupati
+also has to be disregarded. The adherents of this view belong to four
+different classes--Kāpālas, Kālāmukhas, Pāsupatas, and Saivas. All of
+them hold fanciful theories of Reality which are in conflict with the
+Veda, and invent various means for attaining happiness in this life and
+the next. They maintain the general material cause and the operative
+cause to be distinct, and the latter cause to be constituted by Pasupati.
+They further hold the wearing of the six so-called 'mudrā' badges and
+the like to be means to accomplish the highest end of man.
+
+Thus the Kāpālas say, 'He who knows the true nature of the six mudrās,
+who understands the highest mudrā, meditating on himself as in the
+position called bhagāsana, reaches Nirvāna. The necklace, the golden
+ornament, the earring, the head-jewel, ashes, and the sacred thread are
+called the six mudrās. He whose body is marked with these is not born
+here again.'--Similarly the Kālāmukhas teach that the means for
+obtaining all desired results in this world as well as the next are
+constituted by certain practices--such as using a skull as a drinking
+vessel, smearing oneself with the ashes of a dead body, eating the flesh
+of such a body, carrying a heavy stick, setting up a liquor-jar and
+using it as a platform for making offerings to the gods, and the like.
+'A bracelet made of Rudrāksha-seeds on the arm, matted hair on the head,
+a skull, smearing oneself with ashes, &c.'--all this is well known from
+the sacred writings of the Saivas. They also hold that by some special
+ceremonial performance men of different castes may become Brāhmanas and
+reach the highest āsrama: 'by merely entering on the initiatory ceremony
+(dīkshā) a man becomes a Brāhmana at once; by undertaking the kāpāla
+rite a man becomes at once an ascetic.'
+
+With regard to these views the Sūtra says 'of pati, on account of
+inappropriateness.' A 'not' has here to be supplied from Sūtra 32. The
+system of Pasupati has to be disregarded because it is inappropriate, i.
+e. because the different views and practices referred to are opposed to
+one another and in conflict with the Veda. The different practices
+enumerated above, the wearing of the six mudrās and so on, are opposed
+to each other; and moreover the theoretical assumptions of those people,
+their forms of devotion and their practices, are in conflict with the
+Veda. For the Veda declares that Nārāyana who is the highest Brahman is
+alone the operative and the substantial cause of the world, 'Nārāyana is
+the highest Brahman, Nārāyana is the highest Reality, Nārāyana is the
+highest light, Nārāyana is the highest Self'; 'That thought, may I be
+many, may I grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'He desired, may I be many,
+may I grow forth' (Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1), and so on. In the same way the
+texts declare meditation on the Supreme Person, who is the highest
+Brahman, to be the only meditation which effects final release; cp. 'I
+know that great Person of sunlike lustre beyond the darkness. A man who
+knows him passes over death; there is no other path to go' (Svet. Up.
+III, 8). And in the same way all texts agree in declaring that the works
+subserving the knowledge of Brahman are only those sacrificial and other
+works which the Veda enjoins on men in the different castes and stages
+of life: 'Him Brāhmanas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by
+sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting. Wishing for that world only,
+mendicants wander forth from their homes' (Bri. Up. XI, 4, 22). In some
+texts enjoining devout meditation, and so on, we indeed meet with terms
+such as Prajāpati, Siva, Indra, Ākāsa, Prāna, &c., but that these all
+refer to the supreme Reality established by the texts concerning
+Nārāyana--the aim of which texts it is to set forth the highest Reality
+in its purity--, we have already proved under I, 1, 30. In the same way
+we have proved under Sū. I, 1, 2 that in texts treating of the creation
+of the world, such as 'Being only this was in the beginning,' and the
+like, the words _Being_, _Brahman_, and so on, denote nobody else but
+Nārāyana, who is set forth as the universal creator in the account of
+creation given in the text, 'Alone indeed there was Nārāyana, not Brahmā,
+not Isāna--he being alone did not rejoice' (Mahopanishad I).--As the
+Pasupati theory thus teaches principles, meditations and acts
+conflicting with the Veda, it must be disregarded.
+
+
+
+
+37. And on account of the impossibility of rulership.
+
+Those who stand outside the Veda arrive through inference at the
+conclusion that the Lord is a mere operative cause. This being so, they
+must prove the Lord's being the ruler (of the material cause) on the
+basis of observation. But it is impossible to prove that the Lord is the
+ruler of the Pradhāna in the same way as the potter e.g. is the ruler of
+the clay. For the Lord is without a body, while the power of ruling
+material causes is observed only in the case of embodied beings such as
+potters. Nor may you have recourse to the hypothesis of the Lord being
+embodied; for--as we have shown under I, 1, 3--there arise difficulties
+whether that body, which as body must consist of parts, be viewed as
+eternal or as non-eternal.
+
+
+
+
+38. If you say, as in the case of the organs; we deny this, on account
+of enjoyment and so on.
+
+It may possibly be said that, in the same way as the enjoying
+(individual) soul, although in itself without a body, is seen to rule
+the sense-organs, the body, and so on, the great Lord also, although
+without a body, may rule the Pradhāna. But this analogy cannot be
+allowed 'on account of enjoyment,' and so on. The body's being ruled by
+the soul is due to the unseen principle in the form of good and evil
+works, and has for its end the requital of those works. Your analogy
+would thus imply that the Lord also is under the influence of an unseen
+principle, and is requited for his good and evil works.--The Lord cannot
+therefore be a ruler.
+
+
+
+
+39. Finiteness or absence of omniscience.
+
+'Or' here has the sense of 'and.' If the Lord is under the influence of
+the adrishta, it follows that, like the individual soul, he is subject
+to creation, dissolution, and so on, and that he is not omniscient. The
+Pasupati theory cannot therefore be accepted.--It is true that the Sūtra,
+'but in case of conflict (with Scripture) it is not to be regarded' (Pū.
+Mī. Sū. I, 3, 3), has already established the non-acceptability of all
+views contrary to the Veda; the present adhikarana, however, raises this
+question again in order specially to declare that the Pasupati theory _is_
+contrary to the Veda. Although the Pāsupata and the Saiva systems
+exhibit some features which are not altogether contrary to the Veda, yet
+they are unacceptable because they rest on an assumption contrary to the
+Veda, viz. of the difference of the general, instrumental and material
+causes, and imply an erroneous interchange of higher and lower entities.--
+Here terminates the adhikarana of 'Pasupati.'
+
+
+
+
+40. On account of the impossibility of origination.
+
+The Sūtras now proceed to refute a further doubt, viz. that the
+Pańkarātra tantra--which sets forth the means of attaining supreme
+beatitude, as declared by the Lord (Bhagavat)--may also be destitute of
+authority, in so far, namely, as belonging to the same class as the
+tantras of Kapila and others. The above Sūtra raises the doubt.
+
+The theory of the Bhāgavatas is that from Vāsudeva, who is the highest
+Brahman and the highest cause, there originates the individual soul
+called Sankarshana; from Sankarshana the internal organ called Pradyumna;
+and from Pradyumna the principle of egoity called Aniruddha. Now this
+theory implies the origination of the individual soul, and this is
+contrary to Scripture. For scriptural texts declare the soul to be
+without a beginning--cp. 'the intelligent one is not born and does not
+die' (Ka. Up. II, 18), and other texts.
+
+
+
+
+41. And there is not (origination) of the instrument from the agent.
+
+'The internal organ called Pradyumna originates from Sankarshana,' i. e.
+the internal organ originates from the individual soul which is the
+agent. But this is inadmissible, since the text 'from him there is
+produced breath, mind, and all sense-organs' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) declares
+that the mind also springs from none else but the highest Brahman. As
+the Bhāgavata doctrine thus teaches things opposed to Scripture, its
+authoritativeness cannot be admitted.--Against these objections the next
+Sūtra declares itself.
+
+
+
+
+42. Or, if they are of the nature of that which is knowledge and so on,
+there is no contradiction to that (i.e. the Bhāgavata doctrine).
+
+The 'or' sets aside the view previously maintained. By 'that which is
+knowledge and so on' [FOOTNOTE 524:1] we have to understand the highest
+Brahman. If Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha are of the nature of
+the highest Brahman, then truly there can be no objection to a body of
+doctrine which sets forth this relation. The criticism that the
+Bhāgavatas teach an inadmissible origination of the individual soul, is
+made by people who do not understand that system. What it teaches is
+that the highest Brahman, there called Vāsudeva, from kindness to those
+devoted to it, voluntarily abides in a fourfold form, so as to render
+itself accessible to its devotees. Thus it is said in the Paushkara-
+samhitā, 'That which enjoins that Brahmanas have to worship, under its
+proper names, the fourfold nature of the Self; that is the authoritative
+doctrine.' That this worship of that which is of a fourfold nature means
+worship of the highest Brahman, called Vāsudeva, is declared in the
+Sātvata-samhitā, 'This is the supreme sāstra, the great Brahmopanishad,
+which imparts true discrimination to Brahmawas worshipping the real
+Brahman under the name of Vāsudeva.' That highest Brahman, called
+Vāsudeva, having for its body the complete aggregate of the six
+qualities, divides itself in so far as it is either the 'Subtle'
+(sūkshma), or 'division' (vyūha), or 'manifestation' (vibhava), and is
+attained in its fulness by the devotees who, according to their
+qualifications, do worship to it by means of works guided by knowledge.
+'From the worship of the vibhava-aspect one attains to the vyūha, and
+from the worship of the vyūha one attains to the "Subtile" called
+Vāsudeva, i.e. the highest Brahman'--such is their doctrine. By the
+'vibhava' we have to understand the aggregate of beings, such as Rama,
+Krishna, &c., in whom the highest Being becomes manifest; by the 'vyūha'
+the fourfold arrangement or division of the highest Reality, as Vāsudeva,
+Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha; by the 'Subtle' the highest
+Brahman itself, in so far as it has for its body the mere aggregate of
+the six qualities--as which it is called 'Vāsudeva.' Compare on this
+point the Paushkara, 'That body of doctrine through which, by means of
+works based on knowledge, one fully attains to the imperishable highest
+Brahman, called Vāsudeva,' and so on, Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and
+Aniruddha are thus mere bodily forms which the highest Brahman
+voluntarily assumes. Scripture already declares, 'Not born he is born in
+many ways,' and it is this birth--consisting in the voluntary assumption
+of bodily form, due to tenderness towards its devotees--which the
+Bhāgavata system teaches; hence there lies no valid objection to the
+authoritativeness of that system. And as Sankarshana. Pradyumna, and
+Aniruddha are the beings ruling over the individual souls, internal
+organs and organs of egoity, there can be no objection to their being
+themselves denoted by those latter terms, viz. individual soul, and so
+on. The case is analogous to that of Brahman being designated, in some
+texts, by terms such as ether, breath, and the like.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 524:1. Or 'by that which is knowledge and cause.']
+
+
+
+
+43. And on account of contradiction.
+
+The origination of the jīva is, moreover, distinctly controverted in the
+books of the Bhāgavatas also. Thus in the Parama-samhitā 'The nature of
+Prakriti consists therein that she is non-sentient, for the sake of
+another, eternal, ever-changing, comprising within herself the three
+gunas and constituting the sphere of action and experience for all
+agents. With her the soul (purusha) is connected in the way of
+inseparable association; that soul is known to be truly without
+beginning and without end.' And as all Samhitas make similar statements
+as to the eternity of the soul, the Pańkarātra doctrine manifestly
+controverts the view of the essential nature of the jiva being something
+that originates. How it is possible that in the Veda as well as in
+common life the soul is spoken of as being born, dying, &c., will be
+explained under Sū. II, 3, 17. The conclusion, therefore, is that the
+Bhāgavata system also denies the origination of the soul, and that hence
+the objections raised on this ground against its authoritativeness are
+without any force. Another objection is raised by some. Sāndilya, they
+argue, is said to have promulgated the Pańkarātra doctrine because he
+did not find a sure basis for the highest welfare of man in the Veda and
+its auxiliary disciplines, and this implies that the Pańkarātra is
+opposed to the Veda.--his objection, we reply, springs from nothing else
+but the mere unreasoning faith of men who do not possess the faintest
+knowledge of the teachings of the Veda, and have never considered the
+hosts of arguments which confirm that teaching. When the Veda says,
+'Morning after morning those speak untruth who make the Agnihotra
+offering before sunrise,' it is understood that the censure there passed
+on the offering before sunrise is really meant to glorify the offering
+after sunrise. We meet with a similar case in the 'bhūma-vidyā' (Ch. Up.
+VII, 2). There at the beginning Nārada says, 'I know the Rig-veda, the
+Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Ātharvana as the fourth, the Itihāsa-
+purāna as the fifth,' and so on, enumerating all the various branches of
+knowledge, and finally summing up 'with all this I know the mantras only,
+I do not know the Self.' Now this declaration of the knowledge of the
+Self not being attainable through any branch of knowledge except the
+knowledge of the Bhūman evidently has no other purpose but to glorify
+this latter knowledge, which is about to be expounded. Or else Nārada's
+words refer to the fact that from the Veda and its auxiliary disciplines
+he had not obtained the knowledge of the highest Reality. Analogous to
+this is the case of Sāndilya's alleged objection to the Veda. That the
+Bhāgavata doctrine is meant to facilitate the understanding of the sense
+of the Veda which by itself is difficult of comprehension, is declared
+in the Paramasamhita,'I have read the Vedas at length, together with all
+the various auxiliary branches of knowledge. But in all these I cannot
+see a clear indication, raised above all doubt, of the way to
+blessedness, whereby I might reach perfection'; and 'The wise Lord Hari,
+animated by kindness for those devoted to him, extracted the essential
+meaning of all the Vedānta-texts and condensed it in an easy form.' The
+incontrovertible fact then is as follows. The Lord who is known from the
+Vedānta-texts, i.e. Vāsudeva, called there the highest Brahman--who is
+antagonistic to all evil, whose nature is of uniform excellence, who is
+an ocean, as it were, of unlimited exalted qualities, such as infinite
+intelligence, bliss, and so on, all whose purposes come true--perceiving
+that those devoted to him, according as they are differently placed in
+the four castes and the four stages of life, are intent on the different
+ends of life, viz. religious observances, wealth, pleasure, and final
+release; and recognising that the Vedas--which teach the truth about his
+own nature, his glorious manifestations, the means of rendering him
+propitious and the fruits of such endeavour--are difficult to fathom by
+all beings other than himself, whether gods or men, since those Vedas
+are divided into Rik, Yajus, Sāman, and Atharvan; and being animated by
+infinite pity, tenderness, and magnanimity; with a view to enable his
+devotees to grasp the true meaning of the Vedas, himself composed the
+Pańkarātra-sāstra. The author of the Sūtras (Vyāsa)--who first composed
+the Sūtras, the purport of which it is to set forth the arguments
+establishing the Vedānta doctrine, and then the Bhārata-samhitā (i.e.
+the Mahābhārata) in a hundred thousand slokas in order to support
+thereby the teaching of the Veda--himself says in the chapter called
+Mokshadharma, which treats of knowledge, 'If a householder, or a
+Brahmakārin, or a hermit, or a mendicant wishes to achieve success, what
+deity should he worship?' and so on; explains then at great length the
+Pańkarātra system, and then says, 'From the lengthy Bhārata story,
+comprising one hundred thousand slokas, this body of doctrine has been
+extracted, with the churning-staff of mind, as butter is churned from
+curds--as butter from milk, as the Brahmana from men, as the Āranyaka
+from the Vedas, as Amrita from medicinal herbs.--This great Upanishad,
+consistent with the four Vedas, in harmony with Sānkhya and Yoga, was
+called by him by the name of Pańkarātra. This is excellent, this is
+Brahman, this is supremely beneficial. Fully agreeing with the Rik, the
+Yajus, the Sāman, and the Atharvān-giras, this doctrine will be truly
+authoritative.' The terms Sānkhya and Yoga here denote the concentrated
+application of knowledge and of works. As has been said, 'By the
+application of knowledge on the part of the Sānkhya, and of works on the
+part of the Yogins.' And in the Bhīshmaparvan we read, 'By Brahmanas,
+Kshattriyas, Vaisyas and Sūdras, Mādhava is to be honoured, served and
+worshipped--he who was proclaimed by Sankarshana in agreement with the
+Sātvata law.'--How then could these utterances of Bādarāyana, the
+foremost among all those who understand the teaching of the Veda, be
+reconciled with the view that in the Sūtras he maintains the non-
+authoritativeness of the Sātvata doctrine, the purport of which is to
+teach the worship of, and meditation on, Vāsudeva, who is none other
+than the highest Brahman known from the Vedānta-texts?
+
+But other passages in the Mahābhārata, such as 'There is the Sānkhya,
+the Yoga, the Pańkarātra, the Vedas, and the Pasupata doctrine; do all
+these rest on one and the same basis, or on different ones?' and so on,
+declare that the Sānkhya and other doctrines also are worthy of regard,
+while yet in the Sārīraka Sūtras those very same doctrines are formally
+refuted. Why, therefore, should not the same hold good in the case of
+the Bhāgavata doctrine?--Not so, we reply. In the Mahābhārata also
+Bādarayana applies to the Sānkhya and other doctrines the same style of
+reasoning as in the Sūtras. The question, asked in the passage quoted,
+means 'Do the Sānkhya, the Yoga, the Pasupata, and the Pańkarātra set
+forth one and the same reality, or different ones? If the former, what
+is that reality? If the latter, they convey contradictory doctrines, and,
+as reality is not something which may be optionally assumed to be either
+such or such, one of those doctrines only can be acknowledged as
+authoritative, and the question then arises which is to be so
+acknowledged?'--The answer to the question is given in the passage
+beginning, 'Know, O royal Sage, all those different views. The
+promulgator of the Sānkhya is Kapila,' &c. Here the human origin of the
+Sānkhya, Yoga, and Pāsupata is established on the ground of their having
+been produced by Kapila, Hiranyagarbha, and Pasupati. Next the clause
+'Aparāntatamas is said to be the teacher of the Vedas' intimates the non-
+human character of the Vedas; and finally the clause 'Of the whole
+Pańkarātra, Nārāyana himself is the promulgator' declares that Nārāyana
+himself revealed the Pańkarātra doctrine. The connected purport of these
+different clauses is as follows. As the systems of human origin set
+forth doctrines mutually contradictory, and, moreover, teach what is in
+conflict with the matter known from the Veda--which, on account of its
+non-human character, is raised above all suspicion of error and other
+imperfections--they cannot be accepted as authoritative with regard to
+anything not depending on human action and choice. Now the matter to be
+known from the Veda is Nārāyana, who is none other than the highest
+Brahman. It hence follows that the entities set forth in those different
+systems--the pradhāna, the soul (purusha), Pasupati, and so on--have to
+be viewed as real only in so far as Nārāyana, i.e. the highest Brahman,
+as known from the Vedānta-texts, constitutes their Self. This the text
+directly declares in the passage, 'In all those doctrines it is seen, in
+accordance with tradition and reasoning, that the lord Narayawa is the
+only basis.' This means--'To him who considers the entities set forth in
+those systems with the help of argumentation, it is evident that
+Nārāyana alone is the basis of all those entities.' In other words, as
+the entities set forth in those systems are not Brahman, any one who
+remembers the teaching of texts such as 'all this indeed is Brahman,'
+'Nārāyana is all,' which declare Brahman to be the Self of all, comes to
+the conclusion that Nārāyana alone is the basis of those entities. As
+thus it is settled that the highest Brahman, as known from the Vedānta-
+texts, or Nārāyana, himself is the promulgator of the entire Pańkarātra,
+and that this system teaches the nature of Nārāyana and the proper way
+of worshipping him, none can disestablish the view that in the
+Pańkarātra all the other doctrines are comprised. For this reason the
+Mahābhārata says, 'Thus the Sānkhya-yoga and the Veda and the Āranyaka,
+being members of one another, are called the Pańkarātra,' i.e. the
+Sānkhya, the Yoga, the Vedas, and the Āranyakas, which are members of
+one another because they are one in so far as aiming at setting forth
+one Truth, together are called the Pańkarātra.--The Sānkhya explains the
+twenty-five principles, the Yoga teaches certain practices and means of
+mental concentration, and the Āranyakas teach that all the subordinate
+principles have their true Self in Brahman, that the mental
+concentration enjoined in the Yoga is a mode of meditation on Brahman,
+and that the rites and works which are set forth in the Veda are means
+to win the favour of Brahman--thus giving instruction as to Brahman's
+nature. Now all these elements, in their inward connexion, are clearly
+set forth in the Pańkarātra by the highest Brahman, i.e. Nārāyana,
+himself. The Sārīraka Sāstra (i.e. the Vedānta) does not disprove the
+principles assumed by the Sānkhyas, but merely the view of their not
+having Brahman for their Self; and similarly in its criticism on the
+Yoga and Pāsupata systems, it merely refutes the view of the Lord being
+a mere instrumental cause, the erroneous assumptions as to the relative
+position of higher and lower entities, and certain practices not
+warranted by the Veda; but it does not reject the Yoga itself, nor again
+the lord Pāsupati. Hence Smriti says,' The Sānkhya, the Yoga, the
+Pańkarātra, the Vedas, and the Psupata doctrine--all these having their
+proof in the Self may not be destroyed by arguments.' The essential
+points in all these doctrines are to be adopted, not to be rejected
+absolutely as the teaching of Jina. or Sugata is to be rejected. For, as
+said in the Smriti text quoted above, in all those doctrines it is seen,
+according to tradition and reasoning, that the lord Nārāyana is the only
+basis.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the impossibility of
+origination.'
+
+
+
+
+THIRD PĀDA.
+
+1. Not Ether; on account of the absence of scriptural statement.
+
+We have demonstrated that the Sānkhya-system and other systems standing
+outside the Veda are untenable since they rest on fallacious reasoning
+and are self-contradictory. In order to prove that our own view is
+altogether free from all objections of this kind, we shall now explain
+in detail the mode in which this world, with all its sentient and non-
+sentient beings, is produced by Brahman, whom we hold to be the general
+creator.
+
+The first doubt here presenting itself is whether Ether be something
+produced or not.--The Pūrvapakshin maintains that it is not produced,
+since there is no scriptural statement to that effect. A scriptural
+statement may be expected with regard to what is possible; but what is
+impossible--as e.g. the origination of a sky-flower or of Ether--cannot
+possibly be taught by Scripture. For the origination of Ether, which is
+not made up of parts and is all pervasive, cannot be imagined in any way.
+For this very reason, i.e. the impossibility of the thing, the Chandogya,
+in its account of creation, mentions the origination of fire, water, &c.
+only (but not of Ether)--'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,'
+'It sent forth fire,' and so on. When therefore the Taittirīya, the
+Atharvana, and other texts tell us that Ether did originate--'From that
+Self sprang Ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'From him is born breath, mind,
+and all organs of sense, Ether, air, light, water,' &c. (Mu. Up. II, 1,
+4)--such statements are contrary to sense, and hence refute themselves.--
+To this the Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+2. But there is.
+
+But there is origination of Ether. For Scripture, which is concerned
+with matters transcending sense perception, is able to establish the
+truth even of the origination of Ether, although this be not proved by
+other means of knowledge. And in a matter known from Scripture a
+contradictory inference, such as that Ether cannot originate because it
+is without parts, is not of sufficient force. That the non-
+originatedness of the Self also does not rest on its being without parts
+will be shown further on.--Here the Pūrvapakshin raises an objection.
+
+
+
+
+3. It has a secondary sense, on account of impossibility and of the text.
+
+It is reasonable to assume that in passages such as 'From that Self
+there sprang Ether.' the origination of Ether is not to be taken in its
+literal sense; for according to the Chāndogya-text 'it sent forth fire.'
+Brahman engaged in creation first produces fire, and fire thus having
+the first place, the text cannot possibly mean to say that Ether also
+was produced. Moreover, there is another text, viz.'Vāyu and antariksha
+(i.e. Ether), this is the Immortal,' according to which Ether is
+immortal, i. e. non-produced.--But how can one and the same word viz. it
+'sprang' (i.e. originated), be taken in a metaphorical sense with
+reference to Ether, and in its literal sense with reference to fire, and
+so on?--To this the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+4. There may be (a double sense) of the one (word), as in the case of
+the word 'Brahman.'
+
+Since in the clause 'from that Self there sprang Brahman,' the word
+'sprang' cannot be taken in its literal senbe, it may be used there in a
+secondary sense; while the same word as connected with the subsequent
+clauses 'from Vāyu Agni,' &c., may have its primary sense. This would be
+analogous to the use of the word Brahman in Mu. Up. I, 1. There in the
+clause 'From him is born that Brahman, name, form, and matter' (9). the
+word _Brahman_ is used in a secondary sense, i.e. denotes the Pradhāna;
+while in the same chapter, in the clause 'Brahman swells by means of
+brooding' (8), the same word denotes Brahman in its primary sense. It is
+true indeed that in this latter case the word 'Brahman' occurs twice;
+while in the Taitt. text the word 'sambhūta' occurs once only, and has
+to be carried over from the first clause into the subsequent ones; but
+this makes no difference, for, in the case of such carrying over of a
+word, no less than in the case of actual repetition, the general
+denotation of the word is repeated.--The next Sūtra refutes this
+objection.
+
+
+
+
+5. The non-abandonment of the promissory statement (results) from non-
+difference.
+
+It is not appropriate to assume, from deference to the Chāndogya-text, a
+secondary meaning for those other texts also which declare Ether to have
+originated. For the Chāndogyaitself virtually admits the origination of
+Ether; in so far, namely, as the clause 'that by which the non-heard is
+heard,' &c., declares that through the knowledge of Brahman everything
+is known. This declaration is not abandoned, i.e. is adhered to, only if
+the Ether also is an effect of Brahman and thus non-different from it.
+
+
+
+
+6. (As follows also) from (other) texts.
+
+That Ether is an originated thing follows from other clauses also in the
+Chāndogya: 'Being only this was in the beginning, one without a second'
+affirms the oneness of everything before creation, and 'In that all this
+has its Self implies that everything is an effect of, and hence non-
+different from, Brahman.--Nor does the statement as to the creation of
+fire, 'it sent forth fire,' exclude the creation of Ether. For the first
+place which there is assigned to fire rests only thereon that no mention
+is made of the creation of Ether, and this has no force to negative the
+creation of Ether as positively stated in other texts.
+
+
+
+
+7. But the division (origination) extends over all effects; as in
+ordinary life.
+
+The 'but' has the sense of 'and.' As the clause 'In that all this has
+its Self' and similar ones directly state that Ether also is a creation
+of Brahman, the division, i.e. the origination of Ether from Brahman, is
+implicitly declared thereby. As in ordinary life. When in ordinary life
+somebody has said 'all these men are the sons of Devadatta,' it is known
+that any particulars which may afterwards be given about the descent of
+some of them are meant to apply to all.--In accordance with this our
+conclusion we interpret the text 'Air and Ether, this is the Immortal,'
+as asserting only that air and Ether continue to exist for a long time,
+as the Devas do.
+
+
+
+
+8. Hereby air is explained.
+
+The same argumentation explains the origination of air also. That a
+special Sūtra is devoted to the origination of air--instead of disposing
+in one Sūtra of Ether and air--is for the sake of Sūtra 10, which states
+that 'hence (i.e. from air) there originated fire.'
+
+
+
+
+9. But there is non-origination of that which is (only); on account of
+impossibility.
+
+The 'but' has an affirmative sense. There is non-origination of that
+which is, i.e. of Brahman only; of whatever is different from Brahman
+non-origination cannot possibly be established. This means--the
+origination of Ether and air has been proved only in order to illustrate
+a general truth. Only that which _is_, i.e. Brahman, which is the
+general cause, cannot originate. Whatever is other than Brahman, i. e.
+the entire world comprising the Unevolved, the great principle (mahat),
+ahankāra, the tanmātras, the sense-organs, the Ether, the air, and so on,
+cannot possibly be shown to be non-originated, since its being an effect
+is proved by the text declaring that everything is known through one
+thing, and in other ways.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the Ether.'
+
+
+
+
+10. Fire (is produced) thence, for thus Scripture declares.
+
+It has been stated that everything different from Brahman is the effect
+of Brahman. The doubt now arises whether the more remote effects of
+Brahman originate, each of them, only from that substance which is their
+immediately antecedent cause or from Brahman in the form of that
+substance.--The decision is that they originate from those substances
+only; for the text 'from air fire' directly states the origination of
+fire from air.
+
+
+
+
+11. Water (from fire).
+
+Water also originates 'thence,' i. e from fire; for so the texts declare
+'From fire water' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'that sent forth water' (Ch. Up.
+VI, 2, 3).
+
+
+
+
+12. Earth (from water).
+
+Earth originates from water; for so the texts declare 'From water earth'
+(Taitt Up. II. 1, 1). 'It (water) sent forth food' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3).
+But how can the word 'food' denote earth?--To this the next Sūtra
+replies.
+
+
+
+
+13. Earth on account of the subject-matter, the colour, and other texts.
+
+That the word 'food' denotes the earth is to be inferred from the fact
+that the section in which the word occurs has for its subject-matter the
+creation of the elements; as everything eatable is a product of the
+earth, the term denoting the effect is there applied to denote the cause.
+In the same chapter, where the colour of the elements is mentioned ('The
+red colour of a flame is the colour of fire, the white one that of water,
+the black one that of food '), the collocation of words clearly shows
+that 'food' means something of the same kind as fire and water, viz. the
+elements of earth. And there are other texts also which treat of the
+same topic and declare the origination of earth from water, cp. Taitt.
+Up. II, 1, 'from fire sprang water, from water earth.' All this proves
+that the term 'food' denotes earth, and that hence earth originates from
+water.
+
+Fire and the other substances, the origination of which has been
+detailed, are mentioned merely as instances, and it must be understood
+that also other entities, such as the 'Mahat,' and so on, originate only
+from the immediately preceding cause, in agreement with scriptural
+statements. And texts such as 'From him is born breath, mind, and all
+organs of sense, ether, air, light, water, and the earth, the support of
+all' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3); 'From him is born that Brahman, name, form, and
+food' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'From that Self there sprang ether' (Taitt. Up.
+II, 1, 1); 'It (i.e. that which is) sent forth fire' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3)--
+(which seems to teach the direct origination from Brahman of the
+different elements, and so on)--may be interpreted on the understanding
+of Brahman being their mediate cause also.--This primā facie view the
+next Sūtra disposes of.
+
+
+
+
+14. But he; from the inferential mark supplied by their reflection.
+
+The 'but' indicates the setting aside of the primā facie view raised. Of
+all effected things, the _Mahat_, and so on, the highest Person himself,
+in so far as embodied in the immediately preceding substance, is the
+direct cause.--How is this known?--'From the inferential mark supplied
+by the reflection of them.' By 'reflection' the Sūtra means the resolve
+expressed in the recurring phrase, 'May I be many'; 'That fire thought,
+may I be many'; 'That water thought, may I be many' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3;
+4). As these texts declare that there was thought in the form of a
+resolve of self-multiplication--which thought can belong to a Self only,
+we conclude that also the Mahat, the ahankāra, the Ether, and so on,
+accomplish the sending forth of their respective effects only after
+similar thought, and such thought can belong only to the highest Brahman
+embodied in the Mahat, ahankāra, and so on. That the highest Brahman is
+embodied in all beings and constitutes their Self, is directly stated in
+the antaryāmin-brāhmana, 'He who abiding in the earth; abiding in water;
+abiding in fire,' &c. &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3 ff.); and likewise in the
+Subāla-Up, 'Whose body is the earth,' &c. &c., up to 'Whose body is the
+Unevolved.' The Pūrvapakshin had maintained that the creation, from
+Brahman, of breath, and so on, which is declared in texts such as 'From
+him are born breath, mind,' &c., may be understood as a mediate creation.
+This point is taken up by the next Sūtra.
+
+
+
+
+15. But the order of succession (which is stated) in reverse order (of
+the true one) is possible, (only if the origination of all effects is)
+thence (i.e. from Brahman).
+
+The 'but' has an asseverative sense. The direct origination from Brahman
+of all effects--which in passages such as the one quoted by the
+Pūrvapakshin is stated in a form the reverse of the (true) order of
+origination according to which the Unevolved, the Mahat, the ahankāra,
+Ether, and so on, succeed each other--is possible only on the
+supposition of the origination of each effect being really from Brahman
+itself in the form of a special causal substance. To understand the
+causality of Brahman as a merely mediate one would be to contradict all
+those statements of immediate origination. Texts such as the one quoted
+thus confirm the conclusion that everything originates from Brahman
+directly.
+
+
+
+
+16. If it be said that knowledge and mind (which are mentioned) between
+(breath and the elements) (are stated) in order of succession, owing to
+an inferential mark of this; we say, not so, on account of non-
+difference.
+
+'Knowledge' in the Sūtra denotes the means of knowledge, i.e. the sense-
+organs.--An objection is raised against the conclusion arrived at under
+the preceding Sūtra. We cannot, the opponent says, admit the conclusion
+that the passage from the Mundka Up. 'from him is born breath, mind,' &c.,
+declares the immediate origination from Brahman of all things, and that
+hence the passage confirms the view, first suggested by the inferential
+mark of 'thought' (see above, Sū. 14), that everything springs from
+Brahman direct. For the purport of the text is to state a certain order
+of succession, and we hence conclude that all the beings mentioned were
+successively created. In the second half of the text we recognise the
+series of ether, air, fire, &c., which is known to us from other texts,
+and from the fact of their being exhibited in one and the same text we
+conclude that knowledge and mind--which are mentioned between breath on
+the one side and the elements on the other--must be viewed as created in
+that order. The text therefore in no way confirms the direct origination
+of everything from Brahman. To this the Sūtra replies, 'Not so, on
+account of non-difference.' The first words of the text 'from him is
+born' connect themselves equally with breath, and knowledge, and mind,
+and the scries of elements beginning with ether; and the meaning of the
+whole therefore is to declare that all the entities spring directly from
+Brahman, not to teach the order of succession in which they are produced.
+It moreover cannot have the purport of teaching a certain order of
+succession, because the order stated contradicts the order established
+by other scriptural passages; such as the one beginning 'the earth is
+merged in water,' and ending 'darkness becomes one.' We hence hold to
+the conclusion that all effects originate from Brahman only, in so far
+as embodied in the Unevolved, and so on, and that the terms 'fire' and
+so on denote Brahman, which is the Self of all those substances.--But to
+interpret all these words as denoting Brahman is to set aside their
+special denotative power as established by etymology!--To this objection
+the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+17. But that which abides in the things movable and immovable, i.e. the
+terms denoting those things, are non-secondary (i.e. of primary
+denotative power, viz. with regard to Brahman); since (their denotative
+power) is effected by the being of that (i.e. Brahman).
+
+The 'but' sets aside the objection raised. (The primā facie view here is
+as follows.) As Brahman, which has all things for its modes, is not the
+object of Perception and the other means of knowledge which give rise to
+the apprehension of the things only which are Brahman's modes, and as
+hence, previously to the study of the Vedānta-texts, the idea of that to
+which the modes belong (i.e. of Brahman) does not arise, and as the
+knowledge of all words finally denoting Brahman depends on the existence
+of the idea of that to which the modes belong (i. e. Brahman); all the
+individual words are used in worldly language only separately to denote
+special things. In other words, as the terms 'fire' and so on have
+denotative power with regard to particular things only, their denotative
+power with regard to Brahman is secondary, indirect only.--Of this view
+the Sūtra disposes by saying 'that which abides in the moving and the
+non-moving,' &c. The meaning is--the terms which abide in, i.e. are
+connected with, the different moving and non-moving things, and hence
+denote those things, possess with regard to Brahman a denotative power
+which is not 'bhākta,' i.e. secondary or figurative, but primary and
+direct. 'Why so?' Because the denotative power of all words is dependent
+on the being of Brahman. For this we know from the scriptural passage
+which tells how names and forms were evolved by Brahman.--Here
+terminates the adhikarana of 'fire.'
+
+
+
+
+18. Not the Self, on account of scriptural statement, and on account of
+the eternity (which results) from them.
+
+The Sūtras so far have stated that this entire world, from Ether
+downwards, originates from the highest Brahman. It now becomes a matter
+for discussion whether the individual soul also originates in the same
+way or not.--It does so originate, the Pūrvapakshin maintains. For on
+this assumption only the scriptural statement as to the cognition of all
+things through the cognition of one thing holds good, and moreover
+Scripture declares that before creation everything was one. Moreover,
+there are texts directly stating that the soul also was produced in the
+same way as Ether and other created things.
+
+'Prajāpati sent forth all creatures'; 'All these creatures have their
+root in the True, they abide in the True, they rest on the True' (Ch. Up.
+VI, 8, 6); 'From whence these beings are produced' (Taitt. Up. III, 1,
+1). As these passages declare the origination of the world inclusive of
+sentient beings, we conclude that the souls also originate. Nor must
+this be objected to on the ground than from the fact that Brahman is
+eternal, and the other fact that texts such as 'That art them' teach the
+soul to be of the nature of Brahman, it follows that the soul also is
+eternal. For if we reasoned in this style we should have to admit also
+that the Ether and the other elements are eternal, since texts such as
+'in that all this has its Self' and 'all this indeed is Brahman
+'intimate them also to be of the nature of Brahman. Hence the individual
+soul also originates no less than Ether and the rest.--To this the Sūtra
+replies, 'Not the Self, on account of scriptural statement.' The Self is
+not produced, since certain texts directly deny its origination; cp.
+'the intelligent one is not born nor does he die' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18);
+'There are two unborn ones, one intelligent and strong, the other non-
+intelligent and weak' (Svet. Up. I, 9). And the eternity of the soul is
+learned from the same texts, cp. 'There is one eternal thinker,' &c. (Ka.
+Up. II,5, 13); 'Unborn, eternal, everlasting is that ancient one; he is
+not killed though the body is killed' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18).--For these
+reasons the soul is not produced.
+
+But how then about the declaration that through the cognition of one
+thing everything is known?-There is no difficulty here, since the soul
+also is an effect, and since effect and cause are non-different.--But
+this implies that the soul is an originated thing just like Ether and so
+on!--Not so, we reply. By a thing being an effect we mean its being due
+to a substance passing over into some other state; and from this point
+of view the soul also is an effect. There is, however, the difference,
+that the 'other condition' which is represented by the soul is of a
+different kind from that which constitutes non-sentient things, such as
+Ether and so on. The 'otherness' on which the soul depends consists in
+the contraction and expansion of intelligence; while the change on which
+the origination of Ether and so on depends is a change of essential
+nature. And change of the latter kind is what we deny of the soul. We
+have shown that there are three entities of distinct nature, viz.
+objects of fruition, enjoying subjects, and a Ruler; that origination
+and so on which are characteristic of the objects do not belong to the
+subjects, and that the latter are eternal; that the characteristic
+qualities of the objects and likewise those of the subjects--viz.
+liability to pain and suffering--do not belong to the Ruler; that the
+latter is eternal, free from all imperfections, omniscient, immediately
+realising all his purposes, the Lord of the lords of the organs, the
+highest Lord of all; and that sentient and non-sentient beings in all
+their states constitute the body of the Lord while he constitutes their
+Self. While Brahman thus has for its modes (prakāra) the sentient and
+non-sentient beings in which it ever is embodied, during certain periods
+those beings abide in so subtle a condition as to be incapable of
+receiving designations different from that of Brahman itself; Brahman
+then is said to be in its causal state. When, on the other hand, its
+body is constituted by all those beings in their gross state, when they
+have separate, distinct names and forms, Brahman is said to be in its
+effected condition. When, now, Brahman passes over from the causal state
+into the effected state, the aggregate of non-sentient things which in
+the causal state were destitute of name and form undergoes an essential
+change of nature--implying the possession of distinct names and so on--
+so as to become fit to constitute objects of fruition for sentient
+beings; the change, on the other hand, which the sentient beings (the
+souls) undergo on that occasion is nothing more than a certain expansion
+of intelligence (or consciousness), capacitating them to experience the
+different rewards or punishments for their previous deeds. The ruling
+element of the world, i.e. the Lord, finally, who has the sentient and
+non-sentient beings for his modes, undergoes a change in so far as he is,
+at alternating periods, embodied in all those beings in their
+alternating states. The two modes, and he to whom the modes belong, thus
+undergo a common change in so far as in the case of all of them the
+causal condition passes over into a different condition.
+
+It is with reference to this change undergone by one substance in
+passing over into a different state that the Chandogya says that through
+the knowledge of one thing everything is known, and illustrates this by
+the case of the lump of clay (knowing which we know all things made of
+clay). Texts such as 'Prajāpati sent forth the creatures,' which declare
+the origination of the soul, really mean only to state that the souls
+are by turns associated with or dissociated from bodies--the effect of
+which is that their intelligence is either contracted or expanded. Texts
+again which deny the origination of the soul and affirm its permanency
+('He is not born and does not die,' &c.) mean to say that the soul does
+not, like the non-sentient element of creation, undergo changes of
+essential nature. And finally there are texts the purport of which it is
+to declare the absence of change of essential nature as well as of
+alternate expansion and contraction of intelligence--cp. 'That is the
+great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV,
+4, 25); 'the eternal thinker,' &c. (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); such texts have
+for their subject the highest Lord.--All this also explains how Brahman,
+which is at all times differentiated by the sentient and non-sentient
+beings that constitute its body, can be said to be one only previous to
+creation; the statement is possible because at that time the
+differentiation of names and forms did not exist. That that which makes
+the difference between plurality and unity is the presence or absence of
+differentiation through names and forms, is distinctly declared in the
+text, 'Now all this was undifferentiated. It became differentiated by
+form and name' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7).--Those also who hold that the
+individual soul is due to Nescience; and those who hold it to be due to
+a real limiting adjunct (upādhi); and those who hold that Brahman, whose
+essential nature is mere Being, assumes by itself the threefold form of
+enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler; can all of
+them explain the unity which Scripture predicates of Brahman in the
+pralaya state, only on the basis of the absence of differentiation by
+names and forms; for according to them also (there is no absolute unity
+at any time, but) either the potentiality of Nescience, or the
+potentiality of the limiting adjunct, or the potentialities of enjoying
+subjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler persist in the pralaya
+condition also. And, moreover, it is proved by the two Sūtras, II, 1, 33;
+35, that the distinction of the several individual souls and the stream
+of their works are eternal.
+
+There is, however, the following difference between those several views.
+The first-mentioned view implies that Brahman itself is under the
+illusive influence of beginningless Avidyā. According to the second view,
+the effect of the real and beginningless limiting adjunct is that
+Brahman itself is in the state of bondage; for there is no other entity
+but Brahman and the adjunct. According to the third view, Brahman itself
+assumes different forms, and itself experiences the various unpleasant
+consequences of deeds. Nor would it avail to say that that part of
+Brahman which is the Ruler is not an experiencing subject; for as
+Brahman is all-knowing it recognises the enjoying subject as non-
+different from itself, and thus is itself an enjoying subject.--
+According to our view, on the other hand, Brahman, which has for its
+body all sentient and non-sentient beings, whether in their subtle or
+their gross state, is always--in its effected as well as in its causal
+condition free from all shadow of imperfection, and a limitless ocean as
+it were of all exalted qualities. All imperfections, and suffering, and
+all change belong not to Brahman, but only to the sentient and non-
+sentient beings which are its modes. This view removes all difficulties.--
+Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the Self.'
+
+
+
+
+19. For this very reason (the individual soul is) a knower.
+
+It has been shown that, different therein from Ether and the rest, the
+soul is not produced. This leads to the consideration of the soul's
+essential nature. Is that essential nature constituted by mere
+intelligence as Sugata and Kapila hold; or is the soul as Kanāda thinks,
+essentially non-intelligent, comparable to a stone, while intelligence
+is merely an adventitious quality of it; or is it essentially a knowing
+subject?--The soul is mere intelligence, the Pūrvapakshin maintains; for
+the reason that Scripture declares it to be so. For in the antaryāmin-
+brāhmana the clause which in the Mādhyandina-text runs as follows, 'he
+who abides in the Self,' is in the text of the Kānvas represented by the
+clause 'he who abides in knowledge.' Similarly the text 'knowledge
+performs the sacrifice and all sacred acts' (Taitt. Up. II, 5, I) shows
+that it is knowledge only which is the true nature of the active Self.
+And Smriti texts convey the same view, as e.g. 'it in reality is of the
+nature of absolutely spotless intelligence.' A second Pūrvapakshin
+denies the truth of this view. If, he says, we assume that the Self's
+essential nature consists either in mere knowledge or in its being a
+knowing subject, it follows that as the Self is omnipresent there must
+be consciousness at all places and at all times. On that doctrine we,
+further, could not account for the use of the instruments of cognition
+(i.e. the sense-organs, &c.); nor for the fact that in the states of
+deep sleep, swoon and so on, the Self although present is not observed
+to be conscious, while on the other hand consciousness is seen to arise
+as soon as the conditions of the waking state are realised. We therefore
+conclude that neither intelligence or consciousness, nor being a knowing
+agent, constitutes the essence of the soul, but that consciousness is a
+mere adventitious or occasional attribute. And the omnipresence of the
+Self must needs be admitted since its effects are perceived everywhere.
+Nor is there any valid reason for holding that the Self moves to any
+place; for as it is assumed to be present everywhere the actual
+accomplishment of effects (at certain places only) may be attributed to
+the moving of the body only.--Scripture also directly declares that in
+the state of deep sleep there is no consciousness, 'I do not indeed at
+the present moment know myself, so as to be able to say "that am I," nor
+do I know those beings.' Similarly Scripture declares the absence of
+consciousness in the state of final release, 'when he has departed there
+is no consciousness' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 12); where the Self is spoken of
+as having knowledge for its essential nature, the meaning only is that
+knowledge constitutes its specific quality, and the expression is
+therefore not to be urged in its literal sense.
+
+Against all this the Sūtra declares 'for this very reason a knower.'
+This Self is essentially a knower, a knowing subject; not either mere
+knowledge or of non-sentient nature.--Why?--'For this very reason,' i.e.
+on account of Scripture itself. 'For this reason' refers back to the 'on
+account of Scripture' in the preceding Sūtra. For in the Chāndogya,
+where the condition of the released and the non-released soul is
+described, the text says 'He who knows, let me smell this, he is the
+Self--with the mind seeing those pleasures he rejoices-the devas who are
+in the world of Brahman--whose desires are true, whose purposes are true--
+not remembering the body into which he was born' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 4-5;
+1, 5; 12, 3). And elsewhere 'The seer does not see death' (Ch. Up. VII,
+26, 2). Similarly we read in the Vājasaneyaka, in reply to the question
+'Who is that Self?'--'He who is within the heart, surrounded by the
+Prānas, the person of light, consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3,
+7); 'By what should one know the knower?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'That
+person knows.' And 'for he is the knower, the hearer, the smeller, the
+taster, the perceiver, the thinker, the agent--he the person whose Self
+is knowledge'; and 'thus these sixteen parts of that seer' (Pra. Up. IV,
+9; VI, 5). To the objection that if being a cognising subject
+constituted the essential nature of the Self it would follow that as the
+Self is omnipresent, there would be consciousness always and everywhere,
+the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+20. On account of (its) passing out, moving and returning.
+
+The Self is not omnipresent, but on the contrary, of atomic size (anu).--
+How is this known?--Since Scripture says that it passes out, goes and
+returns. Its passing out is described in the following passage 'by that
+light this Self departs, either through the eye, or through the skull,
+or through other parts of the body' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2). Its going in
+the following text 'all those who pass away out of this world go to the
+moon,' and its returning in the text 'from that world he comes again
+into this world, for action.' All this going, and so on, cannot be
+reconciled with the soul being present everywhere.
+
+
+
+
+21. And on account of the latter two (being effected) through the Self.
+
+The 'and' has affirming power. The 'passing out' might somehow be
+reconciled with a non-moving Self (such as the omnipresent Self would
+be) if it were taken in the sense of the Self separating from the body;
+but for the going and returning no analogous explanation is possible.
+They, therefore, must be taken as effected by the Self itself (which,
+then, cannot be omnipresent and non-moving).
+
+
+
+
+22. If it be said that (the soul) is not atomic, on account of
+scriptural statement of (what is) not that; we say no, on account of the
+other one being the topic.
+
+The passage 'He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Prānas, the
+person consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7) introduces as the
+topic of discussion the personal Self, and further on in the same
+chapter we read 'the unborn Self, the great one' (IV, 4, 22). The
+personal Self, being expressly called _great_, cannot, therefore, be
+atomic!--Not so, we reply. 'Since the other one is the topic.' In the
+second text quoted that Self which is other than the personal Self--i.e.
+the highest Self (prājńa) constitutes the topic. In the beginning of the
+chapter, indeed, the individual Self is introduced, but later on,
+between the two texts quoted, the instruction begins to concern itself
+with the highest Self, 'he by whom there is known the Self of
+intelligence' (pratibuddha ātmā; IV, 4, 13). It is this latter Self
+which, in 22 is called _great_, not the individual Self.
+
+
+
+
+23. And on account of the very word, and of measure.
+
+Scripture directly applies the word 'anu' to the individual Self, 'By
+thought is to be known that atomic Self into which Breath has entered
+fivefold' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 9).--By the term 'unmāna' in the Sūtra we
+have to understand measurement by selection of comparative instances.
+Scripture declares the minuteness of the individual Self by reference to
+things which are like atoms in size, 'The individual soul is to be known
+as part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundred
+times, and yet it is to be infinite' (Svet. Up. V, 9); 'that lower one
+is seen of the measure of the point of a goad' (V, 8). For these reasons
+also the individual Self must be viewed as atomic.--But this conflicts
+with the fact that sensation extends over the whole body!--This
+objection the next Sūtra refutes by means of an analogous instance.
+
+
+
+
+24. There is no contradiction, as in the case of sandal-ointment.
+
+As a drop of sandal-ointment, although applied to one spot of the body
+only, yet produces a refreshing sensation extending over the whole body;
+thus the Self also, although dwelling in one part of the body only, is
+conscious of sensations taking place in any part of the body.
+
+
+
+
+25. Should it be said (that this is not so) on account of specialisation
+of abode; we say no, on account of the acknowledgment (of a place of the
+Self), viz. in the heart.
+
+There is a difference. The drop of ointment can produce its effect as at
+any rate it is in contact with a definite part of the body. But we know
+of no such part in the case of the soul!--Not so, we reply. Scripture
+informs us that the Self abides in a definite part of the body, viz. the
+heart. 'For that Self is in the heart, there are a hundred and one veins.'
+And in reply to the question 'What is that Self?' the text has 'He who
+is within the heart, surrounded by the Prānas, the Person of light,
+consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7).--The parallel case of
+the sandal-ointment is referred to in order to point out that the Self
+abides in some particular part of the body; while the ointment is not
+bound to any special place.--In the next Sūtra the Sūtrakāra proceeds to
+state how, according to his own view, the Self, although abiding in one
+spot only, gives rise to effects extending over the whole body.
+
+
+
+
+26. Or on account of its quality as light.
+
+The 'or' is meant to set aside the view previously stated. The Self
+extends through the whole body by means of its quality, viz. knowledge
+or consciousness. 'As light.' As the light of things abiding in one
+place--such as gems, the sun, and so on--is seen to extend to many
+places, so the consciousness of the Self dwelling in the heart pervades
+the entire body. That the knowledge of the knowing subject may extend
+beyond its substrate, as the light of a luminous body does, we have
+already explained under the first Sūtra.--But it has been said that the
+Self is _mere_ knowledge; how then can knowledge be said to be a quality--
+which is something different from the essential nature of a thing?--This
+the next Sūtra explains.
+
+
+
+
+27. There is distinction as in the case of smell; and thus Scripture
+declares.
+
+Just as smell, which is perceived as a quality of earth, is distinct
+from earth; thus knowledge of which we are conscious as the quality of a
+knowing subject--which relation expresses itself in judgments such as 'I
+know'--is different from the knowing subject. Scriptural texts also
+prove this relation, as e.g. 'This Person knows.'
+
+
+
+
+28. On account of the separate statement.
+
+Scripture even states quite directly that knowledge is something
+distinct from the knowing subject, viz. in the passage 'For there is not
+known any intermission of the knowing of the knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 3,
+30).--It has been said that in passages such as 'he who abiding in
+knowledge' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice'
+(Taitt. Up. II, 5, 1); 'having knowledge for its nature, absolutely free
+from stain,'Scripture speaks of the Self as being mere knowledge (not a
+knower). This point the next Sūtra elucidates.
+
+
+
+
+29. But (the Self) is designated as that because it has that quality
+(viz. knowledge) for its essential quality; as in the case of the
+intelligent (prājńa) Self.
+
+The 'but' discards the objection. Because that quality, viz. the quality
+of knowledge, is the essential quality, therefore the Self is, in the
+passages quoted, designated as knowledge. For knowledge constitutes the
+essential quality of the Self. Similarly, the intelligent highest Self
+is occasionally called 'Bliss,' because bliss is its essential quality.
+Compare 'If that bliss existed not in the ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 1);
+'He perceived that bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1). That bliss
+is the essential attribute of Brahman is proved by texts such as 'That
+is one bliss of Brahman'; 'He who knows the bliss of Brahman is afraid
+of nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 4, 1).--Or else the analogous case to which
+the Sūtra refers may be that of the intelligent Brahman being designated
+by the term 'knowledge,' in texts such as 'Truth, knowledge, the
+Infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1). That knowledge is the essential
+quality of Brahman is known from passages such as 'together with the
+intelligent Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He who is all-knowing' (Mu.
+Up. I, 1, 9).
+
+
+
+
+30. And there is no objection, since (the quality of knowledge) exists
+wherever the Self is; this being observed.
+
+Since knowledge is an attribute which is met with wherever a Self is,
+there is no objection to the Self being designated by that attribute.
+Similarly we observe that special kinds of cows, as e.g. hornless ones,
+are designated by the term 'cow,' since the quality of possessing the
+generic character of cows is met with everywhere in connexion with the
+essential character of such animals with mutilated horns; since in fact
+that quality contributes to define their essential character. The 'and'
+of the Sūtra is meant to suggest a further argument, viz. that to apply
+to the Self the term 'knowledge' is suitable for that reason also that
+like knowledge the Self is self-illuminated. The objection that
+knowledge or consciousness cannot be an attribute inseparably connected
+with the essential nature of the Self as there is no consciousness in
+deep sleep and similar states is taken up in the next Sūtra.
+
+
+
+
+31. Since there may be manifestation of that which exists; as in the
+case of virile power and so on.
+
+The 'but' is meant to set the raised objection aside. The case may be
+that while consciousness is present also in deep sleep, and so on, it is
+manifested in the waking state only; whence there would be no objection
+to viewing consciousness as an essential attribute of the Self. 'As in
+the case of virile power and the like.' Special substances such as the
+virile element are indeed present in the male child already, but then
+are not manifest, while later on they manifest themselves with advancing
+youth; but all the same the possession of those substances is essential
+to the male being, not merely adventitious. For to be made up of seven
+elementary substances (viz. blood, humour, flesh, fat, marrow, bone, and
+semen) is an essential, property of the body. That even in deep sleep
+and similar states the 'I' shines forth we have explained above.
+Consciousness is always there, but only in the waking state and in
+dreams it is observed to relate itself to objects. And that to be a
+subject of cognition, and so on, are essential attributes of the Self,
+we have also proved before. The conclusion, therefore, is that to be a
+knowing subject is the essential character of the Self. And that Self is
+of atomic size. The text 'when he has departed there is no
+consciousness' (samjńā; Bri. Up. II, 4, 12) does not declare that the
+released Self has no consciousness; but only that in the case of that
+Self there is absent that knowledge (experience) of birth, death, and so
+on, which in the Samsāra state is caused by the connexion of the Self
+with the elements--as described in the preceding passage, 'that great
+being having risen from out these elements again perishes after them.'
+For the text as to the absence of samjńā after death must be interpreted
+in harmony with other texts describing the condition of the released
+soul, such as 'the seeing one does not see death nor illness nor pain;
+the seeing one sees everything and obtains everything everywhere' (Ch.
+Up. VII, 25, 2); 'not remembering that body into which he was born--
+seeing these pleasures with the mind he rejoices' (VIII, 12, 3; 5).
+
+The Sūtras now proceed to refute the doctrine of the Self being (not a
+knower) but mere knowledge, and being omnipresent.
+
+
+
+
+32. There would result permanent consciousness or non-consciousness, or
+else limitative restriction to either.
+
+On the other view, i.e. on the view of the Self being omnipresent and
+mere knowledge, it would follow either that consciousness and also non-
+consciousness would permanently take place together everywhere; or else
+that there would be definite permanent restriction to either of the two,
+i.e. either permanent consciousness or permanent non-consciousness.--If
+the omnipresent Self, consisting of mere knowledge only, were the cause
+of all that actual consciousness and non-consciousness on the part of
+Selfs which takes place in the world, it might be conceived either as
+the cause of both--i.e. consciousness and non-consciousness--and this
+would mean that there is everywhere and at all times simultaneous
+consciousness and non-consciousness. If, on the other hand, it were the
+cause of consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be
+unconsciousness of anything; and if it were the cause of non-
+consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be consciousness of
+anything. On our view, on the other hand, the actually perceived
+distribution of consciousness and non-consciousness explains itself,
+since we hold the Self to abide within bodies only, so that naturally
+consciousness takes place there only, not anywhere else.--The view,
+finally (held by the Vaiseshikas), of the consciousness of the Self
+depending on its organs (mind, senses, &c.; while the omnipresent Self
+is, apart from those organs, non-sentient, jada), results in the same
+difficulties as the view criticised above; for as all the Selfs are
+omnipresent they are in permanent conjunction with all organs; and
+moreover it would follow that the adrishtas (due to the actions of the
+different bodies) could not thus be held apart (but would cling to all
+Selfs, each of which is in contact with all bodies).
+
+Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the _knower_.'
+
+
+
+
+33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of Scripture (thus) having a
+purport.
+
+It has been shown that the individual Self is a knowing subject and
+atomic. Now the question arises whether that Self is an agent or, being
+itself non-active, erroneously ascribes to itself the activity of the
+non-sentient gunas. The primā facie answer is that the individual Self
+is not an agent, since the sacred texts concerned with the Self declare
+that the Self does not act, while the gunas do act. Thus, e.g. in the
+Kathavallī, where the text at first denies of the individual Self all
+the attributes of Prakriti, such as being born, ageing and dying ('he is
+not born, he does not die'), and then also denies that the Self is the
+agent in acts such as killing and the like, 'If the slayer thinks that
+he slays, if the slain thinks that he is slain, they both do not
+understand; for this one does not slay, nor is that one slain' (I, 2,
+19). This means--if one thinks the Self to be the slayer one does not
+know the Self. And the Lord himself teaches that non-agency is the
+essential nature of the individual soul, and that it is mere delusion on
+the Self's part to ascribe to itself agency. 'By the attributes (guna)
+of Prakriti, actions are wrought all round.' He who is deluded by self-
+conceit thinks 'I am the agent'; 'when the seer beholds no other agent
+than the gunas'; 'Prakriti is said to be the cause of all agency of
+causes and effects, whilst the soul is the cause of all enjoyment of
+pleasure and pain' (Bha. Gī. III, 27; XIV, 19; XIII, 20).--The soul,
+therefore, is an enjoyer only, while all agency belongs to Prakriti--To
+this the Sūtra replies, 'an agent, on account of Scripture thus having a
+meaning.' The Self only is an agent, not the gunas, because thus only
+Scripture has a meaning. For the scriptural injunctions, such as 'he who
+desires the heavenly world is to sacrifice,' 'He who desires Release is
+to meditate on Brahman,' and similar ones, enjoin action on him only who
+will enjoy the fruit of the action--whether the heavenly world, or
+Release, or anything else. If a non-sentient thing were the agent, the
+injunction would not be addressed to another being (viz. to an
+intelligent being--to which it actually is addressed). The term 'sāstra'
+(scriptural injunction) moreover comes from sās, to command, and
+commanding means impelling to action. But scriptural injunctions impel
+to action through giving rise to a certain conception (in the mind of
+the being addressed), and the non-sentient Pradhāna cannot be made to
+conceive anything. Scripture therefore has a sense only, if we admit
+that none but the intelligent enjoyer of the fruit of the action is at
+the same time the agent. Thus the Pūrva Mimamsa declares 'the fruit of
+the injunction belongs to the agent' (III, 7, 18). The Pūrvapakshin had
+contended that the text 'if the slayer thinks, &c.,' proves the Self not
+to be the agent in the action of slaying; but what the text really means
+is only that the Self as being eternal cannot be killed. The text, from
+Smriti, which was alleged as proving that the gunas only possess active
+power, refers to the fact that in all activities lying within the sphere
+of the samsara, the activity of the Self is due not to its own nature
+but to its contact with the different gunas. The activity of the gunas,
+therefore, must be viewed not as permanent, but occasional only. In the
+same sense Smriti says 'the reason is the connexion of the soul with the
+guwas, in its births, in good and evil wombs' (Bha. Gī. XIII, 21).
+Similarly it is said there (XVIII, 16) that 'he who through an untrained
+understanding looks upon the isolated Self as an agent, that man of
+perverted mind does not see'; the meaning being that, since it appears
+from a previous passage that the activity of the Self depends on five
+factors (as enumerated in sl. 16), he who views the isolated Self to be
+an agent has no true insight.
+
+
+
+
+34. On account of taking and the declaration as to its moving about.
+
+The text beginning 'And as a great king,' &c., declares that 'the Self
+taking the pranas moves about in its own body, according to its
+pleasure' (Bri. Up. II, 1, 18), i.e. it teaches that the Self is active
+in taking to itself the prānas and moving about in the body.
+
+
+
+
+35. And on account of the designation (of the Self as the agent) in
+actions. If not so, there would be change of grammatical expression.
+
+Because in the text 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice, it performs all
+works' (Taitt. Up. II, 5) the Self is designated as the agent in all
+worldly and Vedic works, for this reason also the Self must be held to
+be an agent. And should it be said that the word 'knowledge' in that
+text denotes not the Self, but the internal organ or buddhi, we point
+out that in that case there would be a change of grammatical expression,
+that is to say, as the buddhi is the instrument of action, the text
+would exhibit the instrumental case instead of the nominative case 'by
+knowledge, and so on' (vijńānena instead of vijńānam).
+
+
+
+
+36. (There would be) absence of definite rule, as in the case of
+consciousness.
+
+The Sūtra points out a difficulty which arises on the view of the Self
+not being an agent. Sūtra 32 has declared that if the Self were all-
+pervading it would follow that there would be no definite determination
+with regard to consciousness. Similarly, if the Self were not an agent
+but all activity belonged to Prakriti it would follow that as Prakriti
+is a common possession of all souls, all actions would result in
+enjoyment (experience) on the part of all souls, or else on the part of
+none; for as each Self is held to be omnipresent, they are all of them
+in equal proximity to all parts of the Pradhāna. For the same reason it
+could not be maintained that the distribution of results between the
+different souls depends on the different internal organs which are
+joined to the souls; for if the souls are omnipresent, no soul will be
+exclusively connected with any particular internal organ.
+
+
+
+
+37. On account of the inversion of power.
+
+If the internal organ were the agent, then--since it is impossible that
+a being other than the agent should be the enjoyer of the fruit of the
+action--the power of enjoyment also would belong to the internal organ,
+and would consequently have to be denied of the Self. But if this were
+so, there would be no longer any proof for the existence of the Self;
+for they expressly teach that 'the person (i.e. the soul) exists, on
+account of the fact of enjoyment.'
+
+
+
+
+38. And on account of the absence of samādhi.
+
+If the internal organ were the agent, it would be such even in that
+final state of meditation, called samādhi, which is the instrument of
+Release. But that state consists therein that the meditating being
+realises its difference from Prakriti, and this is a conception which
+Prakriti itself (of which the internal organ is only a modification)
+cannot form. The Self alone, therefore, is the agent. But this would
+imply that the activity of the Self is never at rest! Of this difficulty
+the next Sūtra disposes.
+
+
+
+
+39. And as the carpenter, in both ways.
+
+The Self, although always provided with the instruments of action, such
+as the organ of speech, and so on, acts when it wishes to do so, and
+does not act when it does not wish to do so. Just as a carpenter,
+although having his axe and other implements ready at hand, works or
+does not work just as he pleases. If the internal organ, on the contrary,
+were essentially active, it would constantly be acting, since as a non-
+intelligent being it could not be influenced by particular reasons for
+action, such as the desire for enjoyment.
+
+Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the agent.'
+
+
+
+
+40. But from the highest, this being declared by Scripture.
+
+Is the activity of the individual soul independent (free), or does it
+depend on the highest Self? It is free; for if it were dependent on the
+highest Self, the whole body of scriptural injunctions and prohibitions
+would be unmeaning. For commandments can be addressed to such agents
+only as are capable of entering on action or refraining from action,
+according to their own thought and will.
+
+This primā facie view is set aside by the Sūtra. The activity of the
+individual soul proceeds from the highest Self as its cause. For
+Scripture teaches this. 'Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the
+Self of all'; 'who dwelling in the Self is different from the Self, whom
+the Self does not know, whose body the Self is, who rules the Self from
+within, he is thy Self, the inward ruler, the immortal one.' Smriti
+teaches the same, 'I dwell within the heart of all; memory and knowledge
+as well as their loss come from me'(Bha. Gī. XV, 15); 'The Lord, O
+Arjuna, dwells in the heart of all creatures, whirling, by his
+mysterious power, all creatures as if mounted on a machine' (Bha. Gī.
+XVIII, 61).--But this view implies the meaninglessness of all scriptural
+injunctions and prohibitions!--To this the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+41. But with a view to the efforts made (the Lord makes the soul act) on
+account of the (thus resulting) non-meaninglessness of injunctions and
+prohibitions and the rest.
+
+The inwardly ruling highest Self promotes action in so far as it regards
+in the case of any action the volitional effort made by the individual
+soul, and then aids that effort by granting its favour or permission
+(anumati); action is not possible without permission on the part of the
+highest Self. In this way (i.e. since the action primarily depends on
+the volitional effort of the soul) injunctions and prohibitions are not
+devoid of meaning. The 'and the rest' of the Sūtra is meant to suggest
+the grace and punishments awarded by the Lord.--The case is analogous to
+that of property of which two men are joint owners. If one of these
+wishes to transfer that property to a third person he cannot do so
+without the permission of his partner, but that that permission is given
+is after all his own doing, and hence the fruit of the action (reward or
+anything) properly belongs to him only.--That, in the case of evil
+actions, allowance of the action on the part of one able to stop it does
+not necessarily prove hardheartedness, we have shown above when
+explaining the Sānkhya doctrine.--But there is a scriptural text.--'He
+(the Lord) makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a
+good deed, and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these
+worlds do a bad deed' (Kau. Up. III, 8)--which means that the Lord
+himself causes men to do good and evil actions, and this does not agree
+with the partial independence claimed above for the soul.--The text
+quoted, we reply, does not apply to all agents, but means that the Lord,
+wishing to do a favour to those who are resolved on acting so as fully
+to please the highest Person, engenders in their minds a tendency
+towards highly virtuous actions, such as are means to attain to him;
+while on the other hand, in order to punish those who are resolved on
+lines of action altogether displeasing to him, he engenders in their
+minds a delight in such actions as have a downward tendency and are
+obstacles in the way of the attainment of the Lord. Thus the Lord
+himself says, 'I am the origin of all, everything proceeds from me;
+knowing this the wise worship me with love. To them ever devoted,
+worshipping me in love, I give that means of wisdom by which they attain
+to me. In mercy only to them, dwelling in their hearts, do I destroy the
+darkness born of ignorance, with the brilliant light of knowledge' (Bha.
+Gī. X, 8; 10-11). And further on the Lord--after having described
+'demoniac' people, in the passus beginning 'they declare the world to be
+without a Truth, without a resting-place, without a Ruler,' and ending
+'malignantly hating me who abides in their own bodies and those of
+others'--declares, 'These evil and malign haters, most degraded of men,
+I hurl perpetually into transmigrations and into demoniac wombs' (XVI, 8-
+19).
+
+Here terminates the adhikarana of 'that which depends on the Highest.'
+
+
+
+
+42. (The soul is) a part, on account of the declarations of difference
+and otherwise; some also record (that Brahman is of) the nature of
+slaves, fishermen, and so on.
+
+The Sūtras have declared that the individual soul is an agent, and as
+such dependent on the highest Person. The following question now arises--
+Is the individual soul absolutely different from Brahman? or is it
+nothing else than Brahman itself in so far as under the influence of
+error? or is it Brahman in so far as determined by a limiting adjunct
+(upādhi)? or is it a part (amsa) of Brahman?--The doubt on this point is
+due to the disagreement of the scriptural texts.--But this whole matter
+has already been decided under Sū. II, 1, 22.--True. But as a difficulty
+presents itself on the ground of the conflicting nature of the texts--
+some asserting the difference and some the unity of the individual soul
+and Brahman--the matter is here more specially decided by its being
+proved that the soul is a part of Brahman. As long as this decision
+remains unsettled, the conclusions arrived at under the two Sūtras
+referred to, viz. that the soul is non-different from Brahman and that
+Brahman is 'additional' to the soul, are without a proper basis.
+
+Let it then first be said that the soul is absolutely different from
+Brahman, since texts such as 'There are two, the one knowing, the other
+not knowing, both unborn, the one strong, the other weak' (Svet. Up. I,
+9) declare their difference. Texts which maintain the non-difference of
+a being which is knowing and another which is not knowing, if taken
+literally, convey a contradiction--as if one were to say, 'Water the
+ground with fire'!-and must therefore be understood in some secondary
+metaphorical sense. To hold that the individual soul is a part of
+Brahman does not explain matters; for by a 'part' we understand that
+which constitutes part of the extension of something. If, then, the soul
+occupied part of the extension of Brahman, all its imperfections would
+belong to Brahman. Nor can the soul be a part of Brahman if we take
+'part' to mean a _piece_ (khanda); for Brahman does not admit of being
+divided into pieces, and moreover, the difficulties connected with the
+former interpretation would present themselves here also. That something
+absolutely different from something else should yet be a part of the
+latter cannot in fact be proved.
+
+Or else let it be said that the soul is Brahman affected by error
+(bhrama). For this is the teaching of texts such as 'Thou art that';
+'this Self is Brahman.' Those texts, on the other hand, which declare
+the difference of the two merely restate what is already established by
+perception and the other means of knowledge, and therefore are shown, by
+those texts the purport of which it is to teach non-duality not
+established by other means, to lie--like perception and the other means
+of knowledge themselves--within the sphere of Nescience.
+
+Or let it be assumed, in the third place, that the individual soul is
+Brahman as determined by a beginningless limiting adjunct (upādhi). For
+it is on this ground that Scripture teaches the Self to be Brahman. And
+that upādhi must not be said to be a mere erroneous imagination, for on
+that view the distinction of bondage, release, and so on, would be
+impossible.
+
+Against all these views the Sūtra declares that the soul is a part of
+Brahman; since there are declarations of difference and also 'otherwise,'
+i.e. declarations of unity. To the former class belong all those texts
+which dwell on the distinction of the creator and the creature, the
+ruler and the ruled, the all-knowing and the ignorant, the independent
+and the dependent, the pure and the impure, that which is endowed with
+holy qualities and that which possesses qualities of an opposite kind,
+the lord and the dependent. To the latter class belong such texts as
+'Thou art that' and 'this Self is Brahman.' Some persons even record
+that Brahman is of the nature of slaves, fishermen, and so on. The
+Ātharvanikas, that is to say, have the following text,' Brahman are the
+slaves. Brahman are these fishers,' and so on; and as Brahman there is
+said to comprise within itself all individual souls, the passage teaches
+general non-difference of the Self. In order, then, that texts of both
+these classes may be taken in their primary, literal sense, we must
+admit that the individual soul is a part of Brahman. Nor is it a fact
+that the declarations of difference refer to matters settled by other
+means of knowledge, such as perception and so on, and on that account
+are mere reiterations of something established otherwise (in consequence
+of which they would have no original proving force of their own, and
+would be sublated by the texts declaring non-duality). For the fact that
+the soul is created by Brahman, is ruled by it, constitutes its body, is
+subordinate to it, abides in it, is preserved by it, is absorbed by it,
+stands to it in the relation of a meditating devotee, and through its
+grace attains the different ends of man, viz. religious duty, wealth,
+pleasure and final release--all this and what is effected thereby, viz.
+the distinction of the soul and Brahman, does not fall within the
+cognisance of perception and the other means of proof, and hence is not
+established by something else. It is therefore not true that the texts
+declaring the creation of the world, and so on, are mere reiterations of
+differences established by other means of authoritative knowledge, and
+hence have for their purport to teach things that are false.--[Nor will
+it do to say that the texts declaring duality teach what indeed is not
+established by other means of knowledge but is erroneous.] 'Brahman
+conceives the thought of differentiating itself, forms the resolution of
+becoming many, and accordingly creates the ether and the other elements,
+enters into them as individual soul, evolves all the different forms and
+names, takes upon himself all the pleasures and pains which spring from
+experiencing the infinite multitude of objects thus constituted, abides
+within and inwardly rules all beings, recognises itself in its jīva-
+condition to be one with the universal causal Brahman, and finally
+accomplishes its release from the samsāra and the body of sacred
+doctrine by which this release is effected'--all this the Veda indeed
+declares, but its real purport is that all this is only true of a
+Brahman under the influence of an illusion, and therefore is unreal!--
+while at the same time Brahman is defined as that the essential nature
+of which is absolutely pure intelligence! Truly, if such were the
+purport of the Veda, what more would the Veda be than the idle talk of a
+person out of his mind!
+
+Nor finally is there any good in the theory of the soul being Brahman in
+so far as determined by a limiting adjunct. For this view also is in
+conflict with the texts which distinguish Brahman as the ruling and the
+soul as the ruled principle, and so on. One and the same Devadatta does
+not become double as it were--a ruler on the one hand and a ruled
+subject on the other--because he is determined by the house in which he
+is, or by something else.
+
+In order to be able to account for the twofold designations of the soul,
+we must therefore admit that the soul is a _part_ of Brahman.
+
+
+
+
+43. And on account of the mantra.
+
+'One part (quarter) of it are all beings, three feet (quarters) of it
+are the Immortal in heaven' (Ch. Up. III, 12, 6)--on account of this
+mantra also the soul must be held to be a part of Brahman. For the word
+'foot' denotes a part. As the individual souls are many the mantra uses
+the plural form 'all beings.' In the Sūtra (42) the word 'part' is in
+the singular, with a view to denote the whole class. For the same reason
+in II, 3, 18 also the word 'atman' is in the singular. For that the
+individual Selfs are different from the Lord, and are many and eternal,
+is declared by texts such as 'He who, eternal and intelligent, fulfils
+the desires of many who likewise are eternal and intelligent' (Ka. Up.
+II, 5, 13). Since thus the plurality of the eternal individual Selfs
+rests on good authority, those who have an insight into the true nature
+of Selfs will discern without difficulty different characteristics
+distinguishing the individual Selfs, although all Selfs are alike in so
+far as having intelligence for their essential nature. Moreover the
+Sūtra II, 3, 48 directly states the plurality of the individual Selfs.
+
+
+
+
+44. Moreover it is so stated in Smriti.
+
+Smriti moreover declares the individual soul to be a part of the highest
+Person, 'An eternal part of myself becomes the individual soul (jīva) in
+the world of life' (Bha. Gī. XV, 7). For this reason also the soul must
+be held to be a part of Brahman.
+
+But if the soul is a part of Brahman, all the imperfections of the soul
+are Brahman's also! To this objection the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+45. But as in the case of light and so on. Not so is the highest.
+
+The 'but' discards the objection. 'Like light and so on.' The individual
+soul is a part of the highest Self; as the light issuing from a luminous
+thing such as fire or the sun is a part of that body; or as the generic
+characteristics of a cow or horse, and the white or black colour of
+things so coloured, are attributes and hence parts of the things in
+which those attributes inhere; or as the body is a part of an embodied
+being. For by a part we understand that which constitutes one place
+(desa) of some thing, and hence a distinguishing attribute (viseshna) is
+a part of the thing distinguished by that attribute. Hence those
+analysing a thing of that kind discriminate between the _distinguishing_
+clement or part of it, and the _distinguished_ element or part. Now
+although the distinguishing attribute and the thing distinguished
+thereby stand to each other in the relation of part and whole, yet we
+observe them to differ in essential character. Hence there is no
+contradiction between the individual and the highest Self--the former of
+which is a viseshana of the latter--standing to each other in the
+relation of part and whole, and their being at the same time of
+essentially different nature. This the Sūtra declares 'not so is the
+highest,' i.e. the highest Self is not of the same nature as the
+individual soul. For as the luminous body is of a nature different from
+that of its light, thus the highest Self differs from the individual
+soul which is a part of it. It is this difference of character--due to
+the individual soul being the distinguishing clement and the highest
+Self being the substance distinguished thereby--to which all those texts
+refer which declare difference. Those texts, on the other hand, which
+declare non-difference are based on the circumstance that attributes
+which are incapable of separate existence are ultimately bound to the
+substance which they distinguish, and hence are fundamentally valid.
+That in declarations such as 'Thou art that' and 'this Self is Brahman,'
+the words _thou_ and _Self_, no less than the words _that_ and _Brahman_,
+denote Brahman in so far as having the individual souls for its body,
+and that thus the two sets of words denote fundamentally one and the
+same thing, has been explained previously.
+
+
+
+
+46. And Smriti texts declare this.
+
+That the world and Brahman stand to each other in the relation of part
+and whole, the former being like the light and the latter like the
+luminous body, or the former being like the power and the latter like
+that in which the power inheres, or the former being like the body and
+the latter like the soul; this Parāsara also and other Smriti writers
+declare, 'As the light of a fire which abides in one place only spreads
+all around, thus this whole world is the power (sakti) of the highest
+Brahman.' The 'and' in the Sūtra implies that scriptural texts also ('of
+whom the Self is the body' and others) declare that the individual Self
+is a part of Brahman in so far as it is its body.
+
+But if all individual souls are equal in so far as being alike parts of
+Brahman, alike actuated by Brahman, and alike knowing subjects, what is
+the reason that, as Scripture teaches, some of them are allowed to read
+the Veda and act according to its injunctions, while others are excluded
+therefrom; and again that some are to see, feel, and so on, while others
+are excluded from these privileges?--This question is answered by the
+next Sūtra.
+
+
+
+
+47. Permission and exclusion (result) from connexion with a body; as in
+the case of light and so on.
+
+Although all souls are essentially of the same nature in so far as they
+are parts of Brahman, knowing subjects and so on, the permissions and
+exclusions referred to are possible for the reason that each individual
+soul is joined to some particular body, pure or impure, whether of a
+Brāhmana or Kshattriya or Vaisya or Sūdra, and so on. 'As in the case of
+fire and so on.' All fire is of the same kind, and yet one willingly
+fetches fire from the house of a Brāhmana, while one shuns fire from a
+place where dead bodies are burnt. And from a Brāhmana one accepts food
+without any objection, while one refuses food from a low person.
+
+
+
+
+48. And on account of non-connectedness there is no confusion.
+
+Although the souls, as being parts of Brahman and so on, are of
+essentially the same character, they are actually separate, for each of
+them is of atomic size and resides in a separate body. For this reason
+there is no confusion or mixing up of the individual spheres of
+enjoyment and experience. The Sūtrakāra introduces this reference to an
+advantage of his own view of things, in order to intimate that the views
+of the soul being Brahman deluded or else Brahman affected by a limiting
+adjunct are on their part incapable of explaining how it is that the
+experiences of the individual Self and the highest Self, and of the
+several individual Selfs, are not mixed up.
+
+But may not, on the view of the soul being Brahman deluded, the
+distinction of the several spheres of experience be explained by means
+of the difference of the limiting adjuncts presented by Nescience?--This
+the next Sūtra negatives.
+
+
+
+
+49. And it is a mere apparent argument.
+
+The argumentation by which it is sought to prove that that being whose
+nature is constituted by absolutely uniform light, i.e. intelligence, is
+differentiated by limiting adjuncts which presuppose an obscuration of
+that essential nature, is a mere apparent (fallacious) one. For, as we
+have shown before, obscuration of the light of that which is nothing but
+light means destruction of that light.--If we accept as the reading of
+the Sūtra 'ābhāsāh' (in plural) the meaning is that the various reasons
+set forth by the adherents of that doctrine are all of them fallacious.
+The 'and' of the Sūtra is meant to point out that that doctrine,
+moreover, is in conflict with texts such as 'thinking himself to be
+different from the Mover'(Svet. Up. I, 6); 'there are two unborn ones,
+one a ruler, the other not a ruler' (I, 9); 'of those two one eats the
+sweet fruit' (V, 6); and others. For even if difference is due to
+upādhis which are the figment of Nescience, there is no escaping the
+conclusion that the spheres of experience must be mixed up, since the
+theory admits that the thing itself with which all the limiting adjuncts
+connect themselves is one only.
+
+But this cannot be urged against the theory of the individual soul being
+Brahman in so far as determined by real limiting adjuncts; for on that
+view we may explain the difference of spheres of experience as due to
+the beginningless adrishtas which are the cause of the difference of the
+limiting adjuncts!--To this the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+50. On account of the non-determination of the adrishtas.
+
+As the adrishtas also which are the causes of the series of upādhis have
+for their substrate Brahman itself, there is no reason for their
+definite allotment (to definite individual souls), and hence again there
+is no definite separation of the spheres of experience. For the limiting
+adjuncts as well as the adrishtas cannot by their connexion with Brahman
+split up Brahman itself which is essentially one.
+
+
+
+
+51. And it is thus also in the case of purposes and so on.
+
+For the same reason there can be no definite restriction in the case of
+purposes and so on which are the causes of the, different adrishtas. (For
+they also cannot introduce plurality into Brahman that is fundamentally
+one.)
+
+
+
+
+52. Should it be said (that that is possible) owing to the difference of
+place; we deny this, on account of (all upādhis) being within (all
+places).
+
+Although Brahman is one only and not to be split by the several limiting
+adjuncts with which it is connected, yet the separation of the spheres
+of enjoyment is not impossible since the places of Brahman which are
+connected with the upādhis are distinct.--This the Sūtra negatives on
+the ground that, as the upādhis move here and there and hence all places
+enter into connexion with all upādhis, the mixing up of spheres of
+enjoyment cannot be avoided. And even if the upādhis were connected with
+different places, the pain connected with some particular place would
+affect the whole of Brahman which is one only.--The two Sūtras II, 3, 32
+and 37 have stated an objection against those who, without taking their
+stand on the Veda, held the view of an all-pervading soul. The Sūtras II,
+3, 50 and ff., on the other hand, combat the view of those who, while
+basing their doctrine on the Veda, teach the absolute unity of the Self.--
+Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the part.'
+
+
+
+
+FOURTH PĀDA.
+
+1. Thus the prānas.
+
+After having taught that Ether and all the other elements are effects,
+and hence have originated, the Sūtras had shown that the individual soul,
+although likewise an effect, does not originate in the sense of
+undergoing a change of essential nature; and had in connexion therewith
+clearly set forth wherein the essential nature of the soul consists.
+They now proceed to elucidate the question as to the origination of the
+instruments of the individual soul, viz. the organs and the vital breath.
+
+The point here to be decided is whether the organs are effects as the
+individual soul is an effect, or as ether and the other elements are. As
+the soul is, thus the prānas are, the Pūrvapakshin maintains. That means--
+as the soul is not produced, thus the organs also are not produced--For
+the latter point no less than the former is directly stated in Scripture;
+the wording of the Sūtra 'thus the prānas' being meant to extend to the
+case of the prānas also, the authority of Scripture to which recourse
+was had in the case of the soul.--But what is the scriptural text you
+mean?
+
+'Non-being, truly this was in the beginning. Here they say, what was
+that? Those Rishis indeed were that Non-being, thus they say. And who
+were those Rishis? The prānas indeed were those Rishis.' This is the
+passage which declares that before the origination of the world the
+Rishis existed. As 'prānāh' is in the plural, we conclude that what is
+meant is the organs and the vital air. Nor can this text be interpreted
+to mean only that the prānas exist for a very long time (but are not
+uncreated); as we may interpret the texts declaring Vāyu and the
+atmosphere (antariksha) to be immortal: 'Vāyu and the atmosphere are
+immortal'; 'Vāyu is the deity that never sets' (Bri. Up. II, 3, 3; I, 5,
+22). For the clause 'Non-being indeed was this in the beginning'
+declares that the prānas existed even at the time when the entire world
+was in the pralaya state. Those texts, then, which speak of an
+origination of the prānas must be explained somehow, just as we did with
+the texts referring to the origination of the individual soul.
+
+To this the Siddhāntin replies, 'the prānas also originate in the same
+way as ether, and so on.'--Why?--Because we have scriptural texts
+directly stating that before creation everything was one, 'Being only
+this was in the beginning,' 'The Self only was this in the beginning.'
+And moreover, the text 'from that there is produced the prāna and the
+mind and all organs'(Mu. Up. II, 3, 1) declares that the organs
+originated; they therefore cannot have existed before creation. Nor is
+it permissible to ascribe a different meaning to the texts which declare
+the origination of the sense-organs--as we may do in the case of the
+texts declaring the origination of the soul. For we have no texts
+directly denying the origination of the sense-organs, or affirming their
+eternity, while we _have_ such texts in the case of the individual soul.
+In the text quoted by the Pūrvapakshin, 'Non-being indeed was this in
+the beginning,' &c., the word prāna can denote the highest Self only;
+for from texts such as 'All these beings indeed enter into breath alone,
+and from breath they arise'(Ch. Up. I, 11, 5), the word prāna is known
+to be one of the designations of the highest Self. And as to the clause
+'the prānas indeed are those Rishis,' we remark that the term Rishi may
+properly be applied to the all-seeing highest Self, but not to the non-
+intelligent organs.
+
+But how then is the plural form 'the Rishis are the prānas' to be
+accounted for? This the next Sūtra explains.
+
+
+
+
+2. (The scriptural statement of the plural) is secondary, on account of
+impossibility; and since (the highest Self) is declared before that.
+
+The plural form exhibited by the text must be taken (not in its literal,
+but) in a secondary figurative sense, since there is no room there for a
+plurality of things. For Scripture declares that previous to creation
+the highest Self only exists.
+
+
+
+
+3. On account of speech having for its antecedent that.
+
+For the following reason also the word 'prāna,' in the text quoted, can
+denote Brahman only. Speech, i.e. the names which have for their object
+all things apart from Brahman, presupposes the existence of the entire
+universe of things--ether, and so on--which is the object of speech. But,
+as according to the text 'this was then non-differentiated; it was
+thereupon differentiated by names and forms,' then (i.e. before the
+differentiation of individual things), no things having name and form
+existed, there existed also no effects of speech and the other organs of
+action and sensation, and hence it cannot be inferred that those organs
+themselves existed.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the origination
+of the prānas.'
+
+
+
+
+4. (They are seven) on account of the going of the seven and of
+specification.
+
+The question here arises whether those organs are seven only, or eleven--
+the doubt on this point being due to the conflicting nature of
+scriptural texts.--The Pūrvapakshin maintains the former alternative.--
+On what grounds?--'On account of going, and of specification.' For the
+text refers to the 'going,' i.e. to the moving about in the different
+worlds, together with the soul when being born or dying, of seven prānas
+only, 'seven are these worlds in which the prānas move which rest in the
+cave, being placed there as seven and seven' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 8)--where
+the repetition 'seven and seven' intimates the plurality of souls to
+which the prānas are attached. Moreover those moving prānas are
+distinctly specified in the following text, 'when the five instruments
+of knowledge stand still, together with the mind (manas), and when the
+buddhi does not move, that they call the highest "going"' (gati--Ka. Up.
+II, 6, 10). The 'highest going' here means the moving towards Release,
+all movement within the body having come to an end. As thus the text
+declares that at the time of birth and death seven prānas only accompany
+the soul, and as, with regard to the condition of final concentration,
+those prānas are distinctly specified as forms of knowledge (jńānāni),
+we conclude that the prānas are the seven following instruments of the
+soul--the organs of hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting and smelling, the
+buddhi and the manas. In various other passages indeed, which refer to
+the prānas, higher numbers are mentioned, viz. up to fourteen, speech,
+the hands, the feet, the anus, the organ of generation, the ahankāra and
+the kitta being added to those mentioned above; cp. e.g. 'there are
+eight grahas' (Bri. Up. III, 2, i); 'Seven are the prānas of the head,
+two the lower ones '(Taitt. Samh. V, 3, 2, 5). But as the text says
+nothing about those additional organs accompanying the soul, we assume
+that they are called prānas in a metaphorical sense only, since they all,
+more or less, assist the soul.--This view the next Sūtra sets aside.
+
+
+
+
+5. But the hands and so on also; (since they assist the soul) abiding
+(in the body). Hence (it is) not so.
+
+The organs are not seven only, but eleven, since the hands and the rest
+also contribute towards the experience and fruition of that which abides
+in the body, i.e. the soul, and have their separate offices, such as
+seizing, and so on. Hence it is not so, i.e. it must not be thought that
+the hands and the rest are not organs. Buddhi, ahankāra and kitta, on
+the other hand, are (not independent organs but) mere designations of the
+manas, according as the latter is engaged in the functions of deciding
+(adhyavasāya), or misconception (abhimāna), or thinking (kintā). The
+organs therefore are eleven. From this it follows that in the passage
+'Ten are these prānas in man, and Ātman is the eleventh' (Bri. Up. II, 4,
+ii), the word Ātman denotes the manas. The number _eleven_ is confirmed
+by scriptural and Smriti passages, cp. 'the ten organs and the one' (Bha.
+Gī. XIII, 5); 'ten are the vaikārika beings, the manas is the eleventh,'
+and others. Where more organs are mentioned, the different functions of
+the manas are meant; and references to smaller numbers are connected
+with special effects of the organs, such as accompanying the soul, and
+the like.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the going of the seven.'
+
+
+
+
+6. And (they are) minute.
+
+As the text 'these are all alike, all infinite' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 13),
+declares speech, mind, and breath to be infinite, we conclude that the
+prānas are all-pervading.--To this the Sūtra replies, that they are
+minute; for the text 'when the vital breath passes out of the body, all
+the prānas pass out after it' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 2), proves those prānas to
+be of limited size, and as when passing out they are not perceived by
+bystanders, they must be of minute size--The text which speaks of them
+as infinite is a text enjoining meditation ('he who meditates on them as
+infinite'), and infinity there means only that abundance of activities
+which is an attribute of the prāna to be meditated on.
+
+
+
+
+7. And the best.
+
+By 'the best' we have to understand the chief vital air (mukhya prāna),
+which, in the colloquy of the prānas, is determined to be the best
+because it is the cause of the preservation of the body. This chief
+vital air the Pūrvapakshin maintains to be something non-created, since
+Scripture (Ri. Samh. V, 129, 2), 'By its own law the One was breathing
+without wind,' shows that an effect of it, viz. the act of breathing,
+existed even previously to creation, at the time of a great pralaya; and
+because texts declaring it to have been created--such as 'from him is
+born breath' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3)--may be interpreted in the same way as
+the texts declaring that the soul is something created (sec p. 540 ff.).--
+To this the reply is that, since this view contradicts scriptural
+statements as to the oneness of all, previous to creation; and since the
+Mundaka-text declares the prāna to have been created in the same way as
+earth and the other elements; and since there are no texts plainly
+denying its createdness, the chief vital air also must be held to have
+been created. The words 'the One was breathing without wind' by no means
+refer to the vital breath of living creatures, but intimate the
+existence of the highest Brahman, alone by itself; as indeed appears
+from the qualification 'without wind.'--That the vital breath, although
+really disposed of in the preceding Sūtras, is specially mentioned in
+the present Sūtra, is with a view to the question next raised for
+consideration.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the minuteness of the
+prānas.'
+
+
+
+
+8. Neither air nor function, on account of its being stated separately.
+
+Is this main vital breath nothing else but air, the second of the
+elements? Or is it a certain motion of the air? Or is it air that has
+assumed some special condition?--The first alternative may be adopted,
+on account of the text 'prāna is air.'--Or, since mere air is not called
+breath, while this term is generally applied to that motion of air which
+consists in inhalation and exhalation, we may hold that breath is a
+motion of air.--Of both these views the Sūtra disposes by declaring 'not
+so, on account of separate statement.' For in the passage 'From him
+there is produced breath, mind, and all sense-organs, ether and air,' &c,
+breath and air are mentioned as two separate things. For the same reason
+breath also cannot be a mere motion or function of air; for the text
+does not mention any functions of fire and the other elements, side by
+side with these elements, as separate things (and this shows that breath
+also cannot, in that text, be interpreted to denote a function of air).
+The text 'prāna is air,' on the other hand, intimates (not that breath
+is identical with air, but) that breath is air having assumed a special
+form, not a thing altogether different from it, like fire. In ordinary
+language, moreover, the word _breath_ does not mean a mere motion but a
+substance to which motion belongs; we say,'the breath moves to and fro
+in inhalation and exhalation.'
+
+Is breath, which we thus know to be a modification of air, to be
+considered as a kind of elementary substance, like fire, earth, and so
+on? Not so, the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+9. But like the eye and the rest, on account of being taught with them,
+and for other reasons.
+
+Breath is not an element, but like sight and the rest, a special
+instrument of the soul. This appears from the fact that the texts
+mention it together with the recognised organs of the soul, the eye, and
+so on; so e.g. in the colloquy of the prānas. And such common mention is
+suitable in the case of such things only as belong to one class.--The
+'and for other reasons' of the Sūtra refers to the circumstance of the
+principal breath being specially mentioned among the organs comprised
+under the term 'prāna'; cp. 'that principal breath' (Ch. Up. I, 2, 7);
+'that central breath' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 21).--But if the chief breath is,
+like the eye and the other organs, an instrument of the soul, there must
+be some special form of activity through which it assists the soul, as
+the eye e.g. assists the soul by seeing. But no such activity is
+perceived, and the breath cannot therefore be put in the same category
+as the organs of sensation and action!--To this objection the next Sūtra
+replies.
+
+
+
+
+10. And there is no objection on account of its not having an activity
+(karana); for (Scripture) thus declares.
+
+The karana of the Sūtra means kriyā, action. The objection raised on the
+ground that the principal breath does not exercise any form of activity
+helpful to the soul, is without force, since as a matter of fact
+Scripture declares that there is such an activity, in so far as the
+vital breath supports the body with all its organs. For the text (Ch. Up.
+V, 1, 7 ff.) relates how on the successive departure of speech, and so
+on, the body and the other organs maintained their strength, while on
+the departure of the vital breath the body and all the organs at once
+became weak and powerless.--The conclusion therefore is that the breath,
+in its fivefold form of prāna, apāna, and so on, subserves the purposes
+of the individual soul, and thus occupies the position of an instrument,
+no less than the eye and the other organs.
+
+But as those five forms of breath, viz. prāna, udāna, &c., have
+different names and functions they must be separate principles (and
+hence there is not _one_ principal breath)! To this the next Sūtra
+replies.
+
+
+
+
+11. It is designated as having five functions like mind.
+
+As desire, and so on, are not principles different from mind, although
+they are different functions and produce different effects--according to
+the text, 'Desire, purpose, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness,
+absence of firmness, shame, reflection, fear--all this is mind' (Bri. Up.
+I, 5, 3); so, on the ground of the text, 'prāna, apāna, vyāna, udāna,
+samāna--all this is prāna' (ibid.), apāna and the rest must be held to
+be different functions of prāna only, not independent principles.--Here
+terminates the adhikarana of what is 'a modification of air.'
+
+
+
+
+12. And (it is) minute.
+
+This prāna also is minute, since as before (i.e. as in the case of the
+organs) the text declares it to pass out of the body, to move, and so on,
+'him when he passes out the prāna follows after' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 2). A
+further doubt arises, in the case of prāna, owing to the fact that in
+other texts it is spoken of as of large extent, 'It is equal to these
+three worlds, equal to this Universe' (Bri. Up. I, 3, 22); 'On prāna
+everything is founded'; 'For all this is shut up in prāna.' But as the
+texts declaring the passing out, and so on, of the prāna, prove it to be
+of limited size, the all-embracingness ascribed to prāna in those other
+texts must be interpreted to mean only that the life of all living and
+breathing creatures depends on breath.--Here terminates the adhikarana
+of 'the minuteness of the best.'
+
+
+
+
+13. But the rule (over the prānas) on the part of Fire and the rest,
+together with him to whom the prāna belong (i.e. the soul), is owing to
+the thinking of that (viz. the highest Self); on account of scriptural
+statement.
+
+It has been shown that the prānas, together with the main prāna,
+originate from Brahman, and have a limited size. That the prānas are
+guided by Agni and other divine beings has also been explained on a
+previous occasion, viz. under Sū. II, 1, 5. And it is known from
+ordinary experience that the organs are ruled by the individual soul,
+which uses them as means of experience and fruition. And this is also
+established by scriptural texts, such as 'Having taken these prānas he
+(i.e. the soul) moves about in his own body, according to his
+pleasure'(Bri. Up. II, 1, 18). The question now arises whether the rule
+of the soul and of the presiding divine beings over the prānas depends
+on them (i.e. the soul and the divinities) only, or on some other being.--
+On them only, since they depend on no one else!--Not so, the Sūtra
+declares. The rule which light, and so on, i.e. Agni and the other
+divinities, together with him to whom the prānas belong i.e. the soul,
+exercise over the prānas, proceeds from the thinking of that, i.e. from
+the will of the highest Self.--How is this known?--'From scriptural
+statement.' For Scripture teaches that the organs, together with their
+guiding divinities and the individual soul, depend in all their doings
+on the thought of the highest Person. 'He, who abiding within Fire,
+rules Fire from within.--He, who abiding within the air--within the Self--
+within the eye, and so on' (Bri. Up III, 7); 'From fear of it the wind
+blows, from fear of it the sun rises, from fear of it Agni and Indra,
+yea Death runs as the fifth' (Taitt. Up. II, 8, 1); 'By the command of
+that Imperishable one, sun and moon stand, held apart'(Bri Up III, 8, 9).
+
+
+
+
+14. And on account of the eternity of this.
+
+As the quality, inhering in all things, of being ruled by the highest
+Self, is eternal and definitely fixed by being connected with his
+essential nature, it is an unavoidable conclusion that the rule of the
+soul and of the divinities over the organs depends on the will of the
+highest Self. The text, 'Having sent forth this he entered into it,
+having entered into it he became sat and tyat' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), shows
+that the entering on the part of the highest Person into all things, so
+as to be their ruler, is connected with his essential nature. Similarly
+Smriti says, 'Pervading this entire Universe by a portion of mine I do
+abide' (Bha. Gī. X, 42).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the rule of
+Fire and the rest.'
+
+
+
+
+15. They, with the exception of the best, are organs, on account of
+being so designated.
+
+Are all principles called prānas to be considered as 'organs'
+(indriyāni), or is the 'best,' i.e. the chief prāna, to be excepted?--
+All of them, without exception, are organs; for they all are called
+prānas equally, and they all are instruments of the soul.--Not so, the
+Sūtra replies. The 'best' one is to be excepted, since only the prawas
+other than the best are designated as organs. Texts such as 'the organs
+are ten and one' (Bha. Gī. XIII, 5) apply the term 'organ' only to the
+senses of sight and the rest, and the internal organ.
+
+
+
+
+16. On account of scriptural statement of difference, and on account of
+difference of characteristics.
+
+Texts such as 'from him is born prāna, and the internal organ, and all
+organs' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) mention the vital breath separately from the
+organs, and this shows that the breath is not one of the organs. The
+passage indeed mentions the internal organ (manas) also as something
+separate; but in other passages the manas is formally included in the
+organs, 'the (five) organs with mind as the sixth' (Bha. Gī. XV, 7).
+That the vital breath differs in nature from the organ of sight and the
+rest, is a matter of observation. For in the state of deep sleep the
+function of breath is seen to continue, while those of the eye, and so
+on, are not perceived. The work of the organs, inclusive of the manas,
+is to act as instruments of cognition and action, while the work of
+breath is to maintain the body and the organs. It is for the reason that
+the subsistence of the organs depends on breath, that the organs
+themselves are called prānas. Thus Scripture says, 'they all became the
+form of that (breath), and therefore they are called after him prānas'
+(Bri. Up. I, 5, 21). 'They became its form' means--they became its body,
+their activity depended on it.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the
+_organs_.'
+
+
+
+
+17. But the making of names and forms (belongs) to him who renders
+tripartite, on account of scriptural teaching.
+
+The Sūtras have shown that the creation of the elements and organs in
+their collective aspect (samashti) and the activity of the individual
+souls proceed from the highest Self; and they have also further
+confirmed the view that the rule which the souls exercise over their
+organs depends on the highest Self. A question now arises with regard to
+the creation of the world in its discrete aspect (vyashti), which
+consists in the differentiation of names and forms (i.e. of individual
+beings). Is this latter creation the work of Hiranyagarbha only, who
+represents the collective aggregate of all individual souls; or,
+fundamentally, the work of the highest Brahman having Hiranyagarbha for
+its body--just as the creation of water e.g. is the work of the highest
+Brahman having sire for its body?--The Pūrvapakshin maintains the former
+alternative. For, he says, the text 'Having entered with this living-
+soul-self (anena jīvenāt-manā), let me differentiate names and forms'
+(Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2), declares the jīva-soul to be the agent in
+differentiation. For the resolve of the highest deity is expressed, not
+in the form 'let me differentiate names and forms by myself (svena
+rūpena), but 'by this soul-self,' i.e. by a part of the highest Self, in
+the form of the individual soul.--But on this interpretation the first
+person in 'vyākaravāni' (let me enter), and the grammatical form of
+'having entered,' which indicates the agent, could not be taken in their
+literal, but only in an implied, sense--as is the case in a sentence
+such as 'Having entered the hostile army by means of a spy, I will
+estimate its strength' (where the real agent is not the king, who is the
+speaker, but the spy).--The cases are not analogous, the Pūrvapakshin
+replies. For the king and the spy are fundamentally separate, and hence
+the king is agent by implication only. But in the case under discussion
+the soul is a part, and hence contributes to constitute the essential
+nature of, the highest Self; hence that highest Self itself enters and
+differentiates in the form of the soul. Nor can it be said that the
+instrumental case ('with this soul-self') has the implied meaning of
+association ('together with this soul-self'); for if a case can be taken
+in its primary sense, it is not proper to understand it in a sense which
+has to be expressed by means of a preposition. But the third case,
+jīvena, cannot here be understood even in its primary sense, i.e. that
+of the instrument of the action; for if Brahman is the agent in the acts
+of entering and differentiating, the soul is not that which is most
+suitable to accomplish the end of action (while yet grammar defines the
+_instrumental_ case--karana--on this basis). Nor can it be said that the
+activity of the soul comes to an end with the entering, while the
+differentiation of names and forms is Brahman's work, for the past
+participle (pravisya) indicates (according to the rules of grammar) that
+the two actions--of entering and differentiating--belong to the same
+agent. And although the soul as being a part of the highest Self shares
+in its nature, yet in order to distinguish it from the highest Self, the
+text by means of the clause 'with _that_ living Self refers to it as
+something outward (not of the nature of the Self). The agent in the
+action of differentiation of names and forms therefore is Hiranyagarbha.
+Smriti texts also ascribe to him this activity; cp.'he in the beginning
+made, from the words of the Veda, the names and forms of beings, of the
+gods and the rest, and of actions.'
+
+Against this view the Sūtra declares itself. The differentiation of
+names and forms belongs to him who renders tripartite, i.e. the highest
+Brahman; since it is assigned by Scripture to the latter only. For the
+text 'That divinity thought, let me, having entered these three beings
+with this living-soul-self, differentiate names and forms--let me make
+each of these three tripartite,' shows that all the activities mentioned
+have one and the same agent. But the rendering tripartite cannot belong
+to Brahma (Hiranyagarbha), who abides within the Brahma-egg, for that
+egg itself is produced from fire, water, and earth, only after these
+elements have been rendered tripartite; and Smriti says that Brahmā
+himself originated in that egg, 'in that egg there originated Brahmā,
+the grandfather of all the worlds.' As thus the action of rendering
+tripartite can belong to the highest Brahman only, the differentiation
+of names and forms, which belongs to the same agent, also is Brahman's
+only.--But how then does the clause 'with that living-soul-self' fit in?--
+The co-ordination 'with that soul, with the Self,' shows that the term
+'soul' here denotes the highest Brahman as having the soul for its body;
+just as in the clauses 'that fire thought'; 'it sent forth water';
+'water thought,' and so on, what is meant each time is Brahman having
+fire, water, and so on, for its body. The work of differentiating names
+and forms thus belongs to the highest Brahman which has for its body
+Hiranyagarbha, who represents the soul in its aggregate form. On this
+view the first person (in 'let me differentiate') and the agency
+(conveyed by the form of 'pravisya') may, without any difficulty, be
+taken in their primary literal senses; and the common agency, implied in
+the connexion of pravisya and vyākaravāni, is accounted for. The view
+here set forth as to the relation of Brahman and Hiranyagarbha also
+explains how the accounts of Hiranyagarbha's (Brahmā's) creative
+activity can say that he differentiated names and forms.
+
+The whole passus beginning 'that divinity thought,' therefore has the
+following meaning--'Having entered into those three beings, viz. Fire,
+Water, and Earth, with my Self which is qualified by the collective soul
+(as constituting its body), let me differentiate names and forms, i.e.
+let me produce gods and all the other kinds of individual beings, and
+give them names; and to that end, since fire, water, and earth have not
+yet mutually combined, and hence are incapable of giving rise to
+particular things, let me make each of them tripartite, and thus fit
+them for creation.'--The settled conclusion then is, that the
+differentiation of names and forms is the work of the highest Brahman
+only.
+
+But, an objection is raised, the fact that the differentiation of names
+and forms must be due to the same agent as the rendering tripartite,
+does not after all prove that the former is due to the highest Self. For
+the rendering tripartite may itself belong to the individual soul. For
+the text relates how, after the creation of the cosmic egg, a process of
+tripartition was going on among the individual living beings created by
+Brahmā. 'Learn from me, my friend, how those three beings having reached
+man become tripartite, each of them. The earth when eaten is disposed of
+in three ways; its grossest portion becomes feces, its middle portion
+flesh, its subtlest portion mind,' and so on. Similarly, in the
+preceding section, it is described how the process of tripartition goes
+on in the case of fire, sun, moon, and lightning, which all belong to
+the world created by Brahmā, 'the red colour of burning fire is the
+colour of fire,' &c. And the text moreover states the original
+tripartition to have taken place after the differentiation of names and
+forms: 'That divinity having entered into these three beings
+differentiated names and forms. Each of these (beings) it rendered
+tripartite.'--To this objection the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+18. Flesh is of earthy nature; in the case of the two others also
+according to the text.
+
+The view that the description of tripartition, given in the passage
+'each of these he made tripartite,' refers to a time subsequent to the
+creation of the mundane egg and to the gods created by Brahmā, cannot be
+upheld. For from it there would follow that, as in the passage 'earth
+when eaten is disposed of in three ways,' &c., flesh is declared to be
+more subtle than feces, and mind yet subtler, it would have to be
+assumed--in agreement with the nature of the causal substance--that
+flesh is made of water and manas of fire [FOOTNOTE 581:1]. And similarly
+we should have to assume that urine--which is the grossest part of
+water drunk (cp. VI, 5, 2)--is of the nature of earth, and breath, which
+is its subtlest part, of the nature of fire. But this is not admissible;
+for as the text explicitly states that earth when eaten is disposed of
+in three ways, flesh and mind also must be assumed to be of an earthy
+nature. In the same way we must frame our view concerning 'the two
+others,' i.e. water and fire, 'according to the text.' That means--the
+three parts into which water divides itself when drunk, must be taken to
+be all of them modifications of water, and the three parts of fire when
+consumed must be held to be all of them modifications of fire. Thus
+feces, flesh and mind are alike transformations of earth; urine, blood
+and breath transformations of water; bones, marrow and speech
+transformations of fire.
+
+This moreover agrees with the subsequent statement (VI, 5, 4), 'For,
+truly, mind consists of earth, breath of water, speech of fire.' The
+process of tripartition referred to in VI, 3, 4, is not therefore the
+same as the one described in the section that tells us what becomes of
+food when eaten, water when drunk, &c. Were this (erroneous) assumption
+made, and were it thence concluded that mind, breath and speech--as
+being the subtlest created things--are made of fire, this would flatly
+contradict the complementary text quoted above ('mind consists of earth,'
+&c.). When the text describes how earth, water and fire, when eaten,
+are transformed in a threefold way, it refers to elements which had
+already been rendered tripartite; the process of tripartition must
+therefore have taken place before the creation of the cosmic egg.
+Without such tripartition the elements would be incapable of giving rise
+to any effects; such capability they acquire only by being mutually
+conjoined, and that is just the process of tripartition. In agreement
+herewith Smriti says, 'Separate from each other, without connexion,
+those elements with their various powers were incapable of producing
+creatures. Bul having combined completely, entered into mutual
+conjunction, abiding one within the other, the principles--from the
+highest Mahat down to individual things--produced the mundane egg.'--
+When the text therefore says (VI, 3, 3) 'The divinity having entered
+into those three beings with that soul-self differentiated names and
+forms; he made each of these tripartite,' the order in which the text
+mentions the activities of differentiation and tripartition is refuted
+by the order demanded by the sense [FOOTNOTE 583:1].--The text then
+proceeds to exemplify the process of tripartition, by means of burning
+fire, the sun and lightning, which indeed are things contained within
+the mundane egg (while yet the tripartition of elements took place
+before the egg, with all its contents, was created); but this is done
+for the information of Svetaketu, who himself is a being within the
+mundane egg, and has to be taught with reference to things he knows.
+
+But, a final objection is raised, as on this view of the matter the
+elements--earth, water and fire--which are eaten and drunk, are already
+tripartite, each of them containing portions of all, and thus are of a
+threefold nature, how can they be designated each of them by a simple
+term--_earth_, _water_, _fire_?--To this the next Sūtra replies.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 581:1. I.e. if the tripartition of earth (i. e. solid food)
+when eaten, which is described in VI, 5, 1, were the same tripartition
+which is described in VI, 3, 3-4, we should have to conclude that the
+former tripartition consists, like the latter, in an admixture to earth
+of water and fire.]
+
+[FOOTNOTE 583:1. That means--in reality the tripartition of the elements
+came first, and after that the creation of individual beings.]
+
+
+
+
+19. But on account of their distinctive nature there is that designation,
+that designation.
+
+Each element indeed is of a threefold nature, owing to the primary
+tripartition; but as in each mixed element one definite element prevails--
+so that each element has a distinctive character of its own--a definite
+designation is given to each.--The repetition (of 'that designation') in
+the Sūtra indicates the completion of the adhyāya.--Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'the fashioning of names and forms.'
+
+
+
+
+THIRD ADHYĀYA.
+
+FIRST PĀDA.
+
+1. In obtaining another of that, it goes enveloped, (as appears) from
+question and explanation.
+
+That the Vedānta-texts establish as the proper object of meditation, on
+the part of all men desirous of Release, the highest Brahman, which is
+the only cause of the entire world, which is not touched by even a
+shadow of imperfection, which is an ocean, as it were, of supremely
+exalted qualities, and which totally differs in nature from all other
+beings--this is the point proved in the two previous adhyāyas; there
+being given at the same time arguments to disprove the objections raised
+against the Vedānta doctrine on the basis of Smriti and reasoning, to
+refute the views held by other schools, to show that the different
+Vedānta-texts do not contradict each other, and to prove that the Self
+is the object of activities (enjoined in injunctions of meditation, and
+so on). In short, those two adhyāyas have set forth the essential nature
+of Brahman. The subsequent part of the work now makes it its task to
+enquire into the mode of attaining to Brahman, together with the means
+of attainment. The third adhyāya is concerned with an enquiry into
+meditation--which is the means of attaining to Brahman; and as the
+motive for entering on such meditation is supplied by the absence of all
+desire for what is other than the thing to be obtained, and by the
+desire for that thing, the points first to be enquired into are the
+imperfections of the individual soul--moving about in the different
+worlds, whether waking or dreaming or merged in dreamless sleep, or in
+the state of swoon; and those blessed characteristics by which Brahman
+is raised above all these imperfections. These are the topics of the
+first and second pādas of the adhyāya.
+
+The first question to be considered is whether the soul, when moving
+from one body into another, is enveloped by those subtle rudiments of
+the elements from which the new body is produced, or not. The
+Pūrvapakshin maintains the latter alternative; for, he says, wherever
+the soul goes it can easily provide itself there with those rudiments.
+Other reasons supporting this primā facie view will be mentioned and
+refuted further on.--The Sūtra states the view finally accepted, 'In
+obtaining another "of that" it goes enveloped.' The 'of that' refers
+back to the form, i.e. body, mentioned in II, 4, 17. The soul when
+moving towards another embodiment goes enveloped by the rudiments of the
+elements. This is known 'from question and explanation,' i.e. answer.
+Question and answer are recorded in the 'Knowledge of the five fires'
+(Ch. Up. V, 3-10), where Pravāhana, after having addressed to Svetaketu
+several other questions, finally asks 'Do you know why in the fifth
+libation water is called man?' In answer to this last question the text
+then explains how the Devas, i.e. the prānas attached to the soul, offer
+into the heavenly world, imagined as a sacrificial fire, the oblation
+called sraddhā; how this sraddhā changes itself into a body con sisting
+of amrita, which body is called moon; how the same prānas offer this
+body of amrita in Parjanya, imagined as a fire, whereupon the body so
+offered becomes rain; how the same prānas throw that rain on to the
+earth, also imagined as a sacrificial fire, whereupon it becomes food;
+how this food is then offered into man, also compared to fire, where it
+becomes seed; and how, finally, this seed is offered into woman, also
+compared to a fire, and there becomes an embryo. The text then goes on,
+'Thus in the fifth oblation water becomes purushavakas,' i.e. to be
+designated by the term _man_. And this means that the water which, in a
+subtle form, was throughout present in the previous oblations also, now,
+in that fifth oblation, assumes the form of a man.--From this question
+and answer it thus appears that the soul moves towards a new embodiment,
+together with the subtle rudiments from which the new body springs.--But
+the words, 'water becomes purushavakas,' only intimate that water
+assumes the form of a man, whence we conclude that water only invests
+the soul during its wanderings; how then can it be held that the soul
+moves invested by the rudiments of all elements?--To this question the
+next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+2. But on account of (water) consisting of the three elements; on
+account of predominance.
+
+Water alone could not produce a new body; for the text Ch. Up. VI, 3, 4,
+'Each of these he made tripartite,' shows that all the elements were'
+made tripartite to the end of producing bodies. That the text under
+discussion mentions water only, is due to the predominance of water; and
+that among the elements giving rise to a new body water predominates, we
+infer from the fact that blood and the other humours are the
+predominating element in the body.
+
+
+
+
+3. And on account of the going of the prānas.
+
+That the soul goes embedded in the subtle rudiments of the elements
+follows therefrom also that when passing out of the old body it is said
+to be followed by the prānas, 'when he thus passes out, the chief prāna
+follows after him,' &c. (Bri. Up. V, 4, 2). Compare also Smriti: 'It
+draws to itself the organs of sense, with the mind for the sixth. When
+the Ruler (soul) obtains a new body, and passes out of another, he takes
+with him those organs and then moves on, as the wind takes the odours
+from their abodes (the flowers)' (Bha. Gī. XV, 8). But the prānas cannot
+move without a substrate, and hence we must admit that the rudiments of
+the elements--which are their substrate--are also moving.
+
+
+
+
+4. If it be said (that it is not so) on account of scriptural statement
+as to going to Agni and the rest; we say no, on account of the secondary
+nature (of the statement).
+
+But the text, 'when the speech of the dead person enters into fire,' &c.
+(Bri. Up. III, 2, 13). declares that when a person dies his organs go
+into fire, and so on; they cannot therefore accompany the soul. Hence
+the text which asserts the latter point must be explained in some other
+way!--Not so, the Sūtra replies. The text stating that the organs go to
+fire, and so on, cannot be taken in its literal sense; for it continues,
+'the hairs of the body enter into herbs, the hair of the head into
+trees' (which manifestly is not true, in its literal sense). The going
+of speech, the eye, and so on, must therefore be understood to mean that
+the different organs approach the divinities (Agni and the rest) who
+preside over them.
+
+
+
+
+5. Should it be said, on account of absence of mention in the first
+(reply); we say no, for just that (is meant), on the ground of fitness.
+
+An objection is raised to the conclusion arrived at under III, 1, 1; on
+the ground that in the first oblation, described in Ch. Up. V, 4, 2, as
+being made into the heavenly world, water is not mentioned at all as the
+thing offered. The text says, 'on that altar the gods offer sraddhā';
+and by sraddhā (belief) everybody understands a certain activity of mind.
+Water therefore is not the thing offered.--Not so, we reply. It is
+nothing else but water, which there is called sraddhā. For thus only
+question and answer have a sense. For the question is, 'Do you know why
+in the fifth libation water is called man?' and at the outset of the
+reply sraddhā is mentioned as constituting the oblation made into the
+heavenly world viewed as a fire. If here the word sraddhā did not denote
+water, question and answer would refer to different topics, and there
+would be no connexion. The form in which the final statement is
+introduced (iti tu pańkamyām, &c., 'but thus in the fifth oblation,' &c.),
+moreover, also intimates that sraddhā means water. The word 'iti,'
+_thus_, here intimates that the answer is meant to dispose of the
+question, 'Do you know _how_?' &c. Sraddhā becomes moon, rain, food,
+seed, embryo in succession, and _thus_ the water comes to be called man.
+Moreover, the word sraddhā is actually used in the Veda in the sense of
+'water'; 'he carries water, sraddhā indeed is water' (Taitt. Samh. I, 6,
+8, 1). Aad what the text says as to king Soma (the moon) originating
+from sraddhā when offered, also shows that sraddhā must mean water.
+
+
+
+
+6. 'On account of this not being stated by Scripture'; not so, on
+account of those who perform sacrifices and so on being understood.
+
+But, a further objection is raised, in the whole section under
+discussion no mention at all is made of the soul; the section cannot
+therefore prove that the soul moves, enveloped by water. The text speaks
+only of different forms of water sraddhā and the rest.--This, the Sūtra
+points out, is not so, on account of those who perform sacrifices being
+understood. For further on in the same chapter it is said, that those
+who, while destitute of the knowledge of Brahman, practise sacrifices,
+useful works and alms, reach the heavenly world and become there of the
+essence of the moon (somarājānah); whence, on the results of their good
+works being exhausted, they return again and enter on a new embryonic
+state (Ch. Up. V, 10). Now in the preceding section (V, 9) it is said
+that they offer sraddhā in the heavenly world, and that from that
+oblation there arises the king Soma--an account which clearly refers to
+the same process as the one described in V, 10. We herefrom infer that
+what is meant in V, 9 is that that being which was distinguished by a
+body of sraddhā, becomes a being distinguished by a body of the nature
+of the moon. The word body denotes that the nature of which it is to be
+the attribute of a soul, and thus extends in its connotation up to the
+soul. The meaning of the section therefore is that it is the soul which
+moves enveloped by water and the other rudimentary elements.--But the
+phrase 'him the gods eat' (V, 10, 4) shows that the king Soma cannot be
+the soul, for that cannot be eaten!--To this the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+7. Or it is metaphorical, on account of their not knowing the Self. For
+thus Scripture declares.
+
+He who performs sacrifices, and so on, and thus does not know the Self,
+is here below and in yonder world a mere means of enjoyment for the
+devas. He serves them here, by propitiating them with sacrifices, and so
+on; and when the gods, pleased with his service, have taken him up into
+yonder world, he there is a common means of enjoyment for them (since
+they are gratified by the presence of a faithful servant). That those
+not knowing the Self serve and benefit the gods, Scripture explicitly
+declares, 'He is like a beast for the devas' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). Smriti
+also declares, that while those who know the Self attain to Brahman,
+those who do not know it are means of enjoyment for the devas, 'To the
+gods go the worshippers of the gods, and they that are devoted to me go
+to me' (Bha. Gī. VII, 23). When Scripture speaks of the soul being eaten
+by the gods, it therefore only means that the soul is to them a source
+of enjoyment. That eating the soul means no more than satisfaction with
+it, may also be inferred from the following scriptural passage, 'The
+gods in truth do not eat nor do they drink; by the mere sight of that
+amrita they are satisfied.'--It thus remains a settled conclusion that
+the soul moves enveloped by the subtle rudiments of the elements.--Here
+terminates the adhikarana of 'the obtaining of another body.'
+
+
+
+
+8. On the passing away of the works, with a remainder, according to
+Scripture and Smriti; as it went and not so.
+
+The text declares that those who only perform sacrifices and useful
+works ascend by the road of the fathers, and again return to the earth
+when they have fully enjoyed the fruit of their works, 'having dwelt
+there yāvat sampātam, they return by the same way' (Ch. Up. V, 10, 5).
+The question here arises whether the descending soul carries a certain
+remainder (anusaya) of its works or not.--It does not, since it has
+enjoyed the fruit of all its works. For by 'anusaya' we have to
+understand that part of the karman which remains over and above the part
+retributively enjoyed; but when the fruit of the entire karman has been
+enjoyed, there is no such remainder. And that this is so we learn from
+the phrase 'yāvat sampātam ushitvā,' which means 'having dwelt there as
+long as the karman lasts' (sampatanty anena svargalokam iti sampātah).
+Analogously another text says, 'Having obtained the end of whatever deed
+he does on earth, he again returns from that world to this world to
+action' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 6).--Against this primā facie view the Sūtra
+declares 'with a remainder he descends, on account of what is seen, i.e.
+scriptural text, and Smriti.' The scriptural text is the one 'Those
+whose conduct has been good' (V, 10, 7), which means that among the
+souls that have returned, those whose karman is good obtain a good birth
+as Brāhmanas or the like, while those whose karman is bad are born again
+as low creatures-dogs, pigs, Kāndālas, and the like. This shows that the
+souls which have descended are still connected with good or evil karman.
+Smriti also declares this: 'Men of the several castes and orders, who
+always stand firm in the works prescribed for them, enjoy after death
+the rewards of their works, and by virtue of a remnant (of their works)
+they are born again in excellent countries, castes and families, endowed
+with beauty, long life, learning in the Vedas, wealth, good conduct,
+happiness and wisdom. Those who act in a contrary manner perish'
+(Gautama Dha. Sū. XI, 29); 'Afterwards when a man returns to this world
+he obtains, by virtue of a remainder of works, birth in a good family,
+beauty of form, beauty of complexion, strength, aptitude for learning,
+wisdom, wealth, and capacity for fulfilling his duties. Therefore,
+rolling like a wheel (from the one to the other), in both worlds he
+dwells in happiness' (Āpast. Dha. Sū. II, 1, 2, 3). The clause 'as long
+as his works last' (yāvat-sampātam) refers to that part of his works
+only which was performed with a view to reward (as promised for those
+works by the Veda); and the same holds true with regard to the passage
+'whatever work man does here on earth' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 6). Nor is it
+possible that works, the fruit of which has not yet been enjoyed, and
+those the result of which has not been wiped out by expiatory ceremonies,
+should be destroyed by the enjoyment of the fruits of other works. Hence
+those who have gone to that world return with a remnant of their works,
+'as they went and not so'--i.e. in the same way as they ascended and
+also in a different way. For the ascent takes place by the following
+stages--smoke, night, the dark half of the moon, the six months of the
+sun's southern progress, the world of the fathers, ether, moon. The
+descent, on the other hand, goes from the place of the moon, through
+ether, wind, smoke, mist, cloud. The two journeys are alike in so far as
+they pass through ether, but different in so far as the descent touches
+wind, and so on, and does not touch the world of the fathers, and other
+stages of the ascent.
+
+
+
+
+9. 'On account of conduct'; not so, since (karana) connotes works; thus
+Kārshnājini thinks.
+
+In the phrases 'those whose works were good' (ramanīya-karanāh), and
+'those whose works were bad' (kapūyā-karanāh), the word karana does not
+denote good and evil works (i.e. not such works as the Veda on the one
+hand enjoins as leading to certain rewards, and on the other prohibits,
+threatening punishment), for, in Vedic as well as ordinary language, the
+term karana is generally used in the sense of ākāra, i.e. general
+conduct. In ordinary speech such words as ākāra, sīla, vritta are
+considered synonymous, and in the Veda we read 'whatever works (karmāni)
+are blameless, those should be regarded, not others. Whatever our good
+conduct (su-karitāni) was, that should be observed by thee, nothing
+else' (Taitt. Up. I, 11, 2)--where 'works' and 'conduct' are
+distinguished. Difference in quality of birth therefore depends on
+conduct, not on the remainder of works performed with a view to certain
+results.--This primā facie view the Sūtra sets aside, 'not so, because
+the scriptural term karana connotes works; thus the teacher Kārshnājini
+thinks.' For mere conduct does not lead to experiences of pleasure and
+pain; pleasure and pain are the results of _works_ in the limited sense.
+
+
+
+
+10. 'There is purposelessness'; not so, on account of the dependence on
+that.
+
+But if conduct has no result, it follows that good conduct, as enjoined
+in the Smritis, is useless!--Not so, we reply; for holy works enjoined
+by the Veda depend on conduct, in so far as a man of good conduct only
+is entitled to perform those works. This appears from passages such as
+the following: 'A man who is not pure is unfit for all religious work,'
+and 'Him who is devoid of good conduct the Vedas do not purify.'
+Kārshnājini's view thus is, that the karana of the text implies karman.
+
+
+
+
+11. But only good and evil works, thus Bādari thinks.
+
+As the verb ā-kar takes karman for its object (punyam karmā karati, &c.),
+and as the separate denotation (i.e. the use of apparently equivalent
+words, viz. ākar and karman) can be accounted for on the ground that one
+of them refers to works established by manifest texts, and the other to
+texts inferred from actually existing rules of good conduct; and as,
+when the primary meaning is possible, no secondary meaning must be
+adopted; nothing else but good and evil works (in the Vedic sense) are
+denoted by the word karana: such is the opinion of the teacher Bādari.
+This opinion of Bādari, the author of the Sūtra states as representing
+his own. On the other hand, he adopts the view of Kārshnajini in so far
+as he considers such items of virtuous _conduct_ as the Sandhyā--which
+are enjoined by scriptural texts, the existence of which is inferred on
+the basis of conduct as enjoined by Smriti--to have the result of
+qualifying the agent for the performance of other works.--The conclusion
+therefore is that the souls descend, carrying a remnant of their works.--
+Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the passing of works.'
+
+
+
+
+12. Of those also who do not perform sacrifices (the ascent) is declared
+by Scripture.
+
+It has been said that those who perform only sacrifices, and so on, go
+to the moon and thence return with a remainder of their works. The
+question now arises whether those also who do not perform sacrifices go
+to the moon. The phrase 'who do not perform sacrifices' denotes evil-
+doers of two kinds, viz. those who do not do what is enjoined, and those
+who do what is forbidden.--These also go to the moon, the Pūrvapakshin
+maintains; for the text contains a statement to that effect, 'All who
+depart from this world go to the moon' (Ka. Up. I, 2)--where it is said
+that all go, without any distinction. So that those who perform good
+works and those who perform evil works, equally go to the moon.--This
+the next Sūtra negatives.
+
+
+
+
+13. But of the others having enjoyed in Samyamana, there is ascent and
+descent; as such a course is declared.
+
+Of the others, i.e. those who do not perform sacrifices, and so on,
+there is ascent to the moon and descent from there, only after they have
+in the kingdom of Yama suffered the punishments due to their actions.
+For the text declares that evil-doers fall under the power of Yama, and
+have to go to him, 'He who thinks, this is the world there is no other,
+falls again and again under my sway' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 6); 'the son of
+Vivasvat, the gathering place of men' (Rik Samh. X, 14, 1); 'King Yama,'
+and other texts.
+
+
+
+
+14. Smriti texts also declare this.
+
+That all beings are under the sway of Yama, Parāsara also and other
+Smriti writers declare, 'And all these pass under the sway of Yama.'
+
+
+
+
+15. Moreover there are seven.
+
+The Smritis moreover declare that there are seven hells, called Raurava,
+and so on, to which evil-doers have to go.--But how do they, if moving
+about in those seven places, reach the palace of Yama?
+
+
+
+
+16. On account of his activity there also, there is no contradiction.
+
+As their going to those seven places also is due to the command of Yama,
+there is no contradiction.--Thus those also who do not perform
+sacrifices, and so on, after having gone to the world of Yama, and there
+undergone punishments according to the nature of their works, later on
+ascend to the moon and again descend from there.--Of this conclusion the
+next Sūtra disposes.
+
+
+
+
+17. But, of knowledge and work--as these are the leading topics.
+
+The 'but' sets aside the view developed so far. It cannot be admitted
+that those also who do not perform sacrifices, and so on, reach the moon;
+because the path of the gods and the path of the fathers are meant for
+the enjoyment of the fruits 'of knowledge and work.'That is to say--as
+those who do not perform sacrifices cannot ascend by the path of the
+gods, since they are destitute of knowledge; so they also cannot go by
+the path of the fathers, since they are destitute of meritorious works.
+And that these two paths are dependent respectively on knowledge and
+works, we know from the fact that these two are the leading topics. For
+knowledge forms the leading topic with regard to the path of the gods,
+'Those who know this, and those who in the forest follow faith and
+austerities, go to light,' &c.; and works have the same position with
+regard to the path of the fathers, "they who living in a village perform
+sacrifices, &c. go to the smoke," &c. The text, 'all those who depart
+from this world go to the moon,' must therefore be interpreted to mean
+'all those who perform sacrifices go to the moon.'--But if evil-doers do
+not go to the moon, the fifth oblation cannot take place, and no new
+body can be produced. For the text says, 'In the fifth oblation water is
+called man,' and, as we have shown, that fifth oblation presupposes the
+soul's going to the moon. In order, therefore, to understand how in
+their case also a new embodiment is possible, it must needs be admitted
+that they also ascend to the moon.--To this the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+18. Not in the case of the third (place), as it is thus perceived.
+
+The third 'place' does not, for the origination of a new body, depend on
+the fifth oblation. The term,'the third place,' denotes mere evil-doers.
+That these do not, for the origination of a new body, depend on the
+fifth oblation, is seen from Scripture. For, in answer to the question
+'Do you know why that world never becomes full?' the text says, 'On
+neither of these two ways are those small creatures continually
+returning, of whom it may be said, Live and die. This is the third place.
+Therefore that world never becomes full.' As this passage states that in
+consequence of 'the third place' (i.e. the creatures forming a third
+class) not ascending to and descending from the heavenly world that
+world never becomes full, it follows that that third place does not, for
+the origination of bodies, depend on the fifth oblation. The clause, 'in
+the fifth oblation,' moreover, merely states that the connexion of water
+with the fifth fire is the cause of the water 'being called man' (i. e.
+becoming an embryo), but does not deny the origination of embryos in
+other ways; for the text contains no word asserting such a limitation.
+
+
+
+
+19. It moreover is recorded, in the world.
+
+Smriti, moreover, states that the bodies of some specially meritorious
+persons, such as Draupadī, Dhrishtadyumna and others, were formed
+independently of the fifth oblation' (i.e. sexual union).
+
+
+
+
+20. And on account of its being seen.
+
+And it is seen in Scripture also, that the bodies of some beings
+originate independently of the fifth oblation: 'Of all beings there are
+indeed three origins only, that which springs from an egg, that which
+springs from a living being, that which springs from a germ' (Ch. Up. VI,
+3, 1). It is observed that from among these beings those springing from
+a germ and those springing from heat originate without that fifth
+oblation.--But the text quoted does not refer to the creatures springing
+from heat; for it says that there are three origins only!--To this the
+next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+21. The third term includes that which springs from heat.
+
+Creatures sprung from heat are included in the third term--viz. that
+which springs from a germ--which is exhibited in the text quoted. The
+settled conclusion therefore is that the evil-doers do not go to the
+moon.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'those who do not perform
+sacrifices.'
+
+
+
+
+22. There is entering into similarity of being with those, there being a
+reason.
+
+The text describes the manner in which those who perform sacrifices, and
+so on, descend from the moon as follows: 'They return again that way as
+they came, to the ether, from the ether to the air. Then having become
+air they become smoke, having become smoke they become mist,' &c. The
+doubt here arises whether the soul when reaching ether, and so on,
+becomes ether in the same sense as here on earth it becomes a man or
+other being, or merely becomes similar to ether, and so on.--The former
+view is the true one; for as the soul in the sraddhā state becomes the
+moon, so it must likewise be held to _become_ ether, and so on, there
+being no reason for a difference in the two cases.--This primā facie
+view the Sūtra sets aside. The descending soul enters into similarity of
+being with ether, and so on; since there is a reason for this. When the
+soul becomes a man or becomes the moon, there is a reason for that,
+since it thereby becomes capacitated for the enjoyment of pain and
+pleasure. But there is no similar reason for the soul becoming ether,
+and so on, and hence the statement that the soul becomes ether, and so
+on, can only mean that, owing to contact with them, it becomes similar
+to them.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'entering into similarity of
+being.'
+
+
+
+
+23. Not very long; on account of special statement.
+
+Does the soul in its descent through ether, and so on, stay at each
+stage for a not very long time, or is there nothing to define that time?--
+It stays at each stage for an indefinite time, there being nothing to
+define the time.--
+
+Not so, the Sūtra decides. For there is a special statement, i.e. the
+text says that when the soul has become rice or grain or the like, the
+passing out of that stage is beset with difficulties. From this we infer
+that as there is no such statement concerning the earlier stages, the
+soul stays at each of them for a short time only.--Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'the not very long time.'
+
+
+
+
+24. Into (plants) animated by other souls, because the statement is as
+in the previous cases.
+
+The text declares that 'he descending souls are born as rice, corn,'
+&c., 'they are born here as rice, corn, herbs, trees,' &c. The question
+here is whether the souls cling to plants animated by other souls which
+have those plants for their bodies; or whether the descending souls
+themselves are born with those plants for their bodies.--The latter view
+is the right one; for the text says, 'they are born as rice, grain,' and
+so on, and this expression is of the same kind as when we say 'he is
+born as a man, as a deva,' and so on. The text therefore means that the
+souls are embodied in the different plants.--This view the Sūtra
+rejects. The souls merely cling to those plants which constitute the
+bodies of other souls; 'since the statement is as in the previous
+cases,' i.e. because the text only says that the souls become plants as
+it had previously been said that they become ether, and so on. Where the
+text means to say that the soul enters on the condition of an enjoying
+soul (i.e. of a soul assuming a new body for the purpose of retributive
+enjoyment), it refers to the deeds which lead to such enjoyment; so e.
+g. in the passage, 'Those whose works have been good obtain a good
+birth,' & c. But in the text under discussion there is no such reference
+to karman. For those works--viz. sacrifices and the like--which were
+undertaken with a view to reward, such as enjoyment of the heavenly
+world, are, in the case of the descending souls, completely wiped out by
+the enjoyment of the heavenly world (which precedes the descent of the
+souls); and those works on the other hand, the action of which has not
+yet begun, lead to the embodiments mentioned further on ('Those whose
+works are good'). And in the interval between those two conditions no
+new karman originates. When, therefore, the text says that the souls are
+born as plants, the statement cannot be taken in its literal sense.
+
+
+
+
+25. It is unholy. Not so, on the ground of Scripture.
+
+The conclusion arrived at above cannot be accepted, since there is a
+reason why the descending soul should enter on the condition of an
+enjoying soul. Such works as sacrifices, the fruit of which is the
+enjoyment of the heavenly world, are mixed with evil, for they imply
+injury to living beings as in the case of the goat offered to Agnīshomau.
+And such injury is evil as it is forbidden by texts such as 'let him not
+harm any creature.' Nor can it be said that the injunctions of
+sacrificing animals constitute exceptions to the general rule of not
+harming any creature.--For the two injunctions refer to different things.
+The injunction to kill the goat for Agnīshomau intimates that the
+killing of the animal subserves the accomplishment of the sacrifice,
+while the injunction not to 'harm' teaches that such harming has
+disastrous consequences. Should it be said that the prohibition of
+harming does not refer to such actions as the sacrifice of the goat
+which proceed on the basis of scriptural injunction, but only to such
+actions as spring from natural passion or desire (rāga); we remark that
+in the case of sacrifices also the action is equally prompted by natural
+desire. Injunctions such as 'He who desires the heavenly world is to
+sacrifice', teach that sacrifices are to be undertaken by persons
+desirous of certain pleasant results, and such persons having thus
+learned by what means the result is to be accomplished proceed to action
+from the natural desire of the result. This applies to the killing of
+the goat also which is offered to Agnīshomau; man learns from Scripture
+that such actions help to accomplish the sacrifice which effects the
+result, and then performs those actions from natural desire. The case in
+no way differs from that of harm done in ordinary life--where the agent
+always is prompted by natural desire, having somehow arrived at the
+conclusion that his action will accomplish something aimed at by himself.
+The same holds good with regard to works of permanent obligation. Men
+learn from Scripture that through the performance of the special duties
+of their caste they attain happiness of the highest kind, and then apply
+themselves to their duties from a natural desire of such happiness, and
+therefore such works also are mixed with evil. Hence the souls of those
+who have performed sacrifices, and so on, which contain an element of
+evil, at first experience in the heavenly world that result which is to
+be enjoyed there, and then embodying themselves in non-moving things
+such as plants, experience the fruit of that part of their actions which
+is of a harmful nature. That embodiment in non-moving beings is the
+result of evil deeds Smriti declares: 'Owing to those defects of work
+which are due to the body, a man becomes a non-moving being.' From all
+this it follows that the souls embody themselves in plants to the end of
+enjoying the fruits of their works.--To this the Sūtra replies--it is
+not so, on account of scriptural statement. For Scripture declares that
+the killing of sacrificial animals makes them to go up to the heavenly
+world, and therefore is not of the nature of harm. This is declared in
+the text, 'The animal killed at the sacrifice having assumed a divine
+body goes to the heavenly world'; 'with a golden body it ascends to the
+heavenly world.' An action which is the means of supreme exaltation is
+not of the nature of harm, even if it involves some little pain; it
+rather is of beneficial nature.--With this the mantra also agrees: 'Thou
+dost not die, thou goest to the gods on easy paths; where virtuous men
+go, not evil-doers, there the divine Savitri may lead thee.' An act
+which has a healing tendency, although it may cause a transitory pain,
+men of insight declare to be preservative and beneficial.
+
+
+
+
+26. After that conjunction with him who performs the act of generation.
+
+The declaration that the descending souls _become_ rice plants, and so
+on, cannot be taken literally for that reason also, that the text
+afterwards declares them to _become_ those who perform the act of
+generation: 'Whoever the being may be that eats the food and begets
+offspring, that being he (i.e. the soul that has descended) becomes.'
+Now the meaning of this latter text can only be that the soul enters
+into conjunction with the creature which eats the grain; and hence we
+have to interpret the previous text, as to the soul's becoming a plant,
+in the same way.
+
+
+
+
+27. From the yoni the body.
+
+Only after having reached a yoni the soul, affected with a remnant of
+its works, obtains a new body, and only in a body there can be the
+enjoyment of pleasure and pain. When, therefore, previous to that the
+soul is said to reach ether, wind, and so on, this can only mean that it
+enters into conjunction with them.--Here terminates the adhikarana of
+'that animated by another soul.'
+
+
+
+
+SECOND PĀDA.
+
+1. In the intermediate sphere the creation (is effected by the soul);
+for (Scripture) says (so).
+
+So far it has been shown that the soul in the waking state suffers
+affliction since, in accordance with its deeds, it goes, returns, is
+born, and so on. Next an enquiry is instituted into its condition in the
+state of dream. With reference to the state of dreaming Scripture says,
+'There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads; then he
+creates chariots, horses and roads. There are no blessings, no happiness,
+no joys; then he himself creates blessings, happiness, joys, and so on.
+For he is the creator' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10). A doubt here arises whether
+this creation of chariots and the rest is accomplished by the individual
+soul, or by the Lord.--'The creation in the intermediate state' is due
+to the individual soul only. 'The intermediate state' means the sphere
+of dreams, in agreement with the passage 'There is a third intermediate
+state, the place of dreams' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 1). And that creation is
+effected by the soul only; for what is referred to in the passages 'he
+creates,' 'For he is the maker,' is none other but the dreaming soul.
+
+
+
+
+2. And some (state the soul to be) the shaper; and sons, and so on.
+
+And the followers of one sākhā state in their text that the dreaming
+soul is the shaper of its desires: 'He, the person who is awake in those
+who sleep, shaping one desired thing (kāma) after the other.' The term
+'kāma' there denotes not mere desires, but such things as sons and the
+like which are objects of desire. For sons and so on are introduced as
+'kāmas' in previous passages: 'Ask for all kāmas according to thy wish';
+'Choose sons and grandsons living a hundred years' (Ka. Up. I, 1, 25;
+23). The individual soul thus creates chariots, and so on, in its dreams.
+That the soul has the power of realising all its wishes is known from
+the declaration of Prajāpati. It is therefore able to create, even in
+the absence of special instruments.--This view is set aside by the next
+Sūtra.
+
+
+
+
+3. But it is mere Māyā; on account of the true nature (of the soul) not
+being fully manifested.
+
+The things appearing in dreams-chariots, lotus tanks, and so on--are
+absolute Māyā, i.e. things created by the Supreme Person. For the term
+'Māyā' denotes wonderful things, as appears from passages such as 'She
+was born in the race of Janaka, appearing like the wonderful power of
+the divine being in bodily shape' (devamāyā). The sense of the passage
+'there are no chariots,' &c. then is--there are no chariots and horses
+to be perceived by any other person but the dreaming one; and then 'he
+creates chariots,' &c.--i. e. the Supreme Person creates things to be
+perceived by the dreamer and persisting for a certain time only. Those
+things therefore are of a wonderful nature (but not illusions). And the
+creation of such wonderful things is possible for the Supreme Person who
+can immediately realise all his wishes; but not for the individual soul.
+The latter also, indeed, fundamentally possesses that power; but as in
+the Samsāra state the true nature of the soul is not fully manifested,
+it is then incapable of accomplishing such wonderful creations. The text
+'the person shaping one desired thing after the other' declares the
+Supreme Person to be the creator, for the clauses immediately preceding
+and following that text (viz. 'He who is awake in those who sleep'; and
+'that is the Bright, that is Brahman, that alone is called the Immortal;
+all worlds are contained in it and no one goes beyond'--Ka. Up. II, 5,
+8) mention attributes distinctively characteristic of the Supreme Person.
+And the Bri. Up. text, 'For he is the maker,' must therefore, in
+agreement with the Katha-text, also be understood as declaring that it
+is the Supreme Person only that creates the things seen in a dream.--But
+if it is the true nature of the soul to be free from all imperfections,
+and so on, why then does this not manifest itself?--To this the next
+Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+4. But owing to the wish of the highest it is hidden; for from that are
+its bondage and the opposite state.
+
+The _but_ sets the objection aside. Owing to the wish of the highest, i.
+e. the Supreme Person, the essential nature of the individual soul is
+hidden. The Supreme Person hides the true, essentially blessed, nature
+of the soul which is in a state of sin owing to the endless chain of
+karman. For this reason we find it stated in Scripture that the bondage
+and release of the soul result from the wish of the Supreme Person only
+'when he finds freedom from fear and rest in that invisible, incorporeal,
+undefined, unsupported; then he has gone to fearlessness '; 'for he
+alone causes blessedness'; 'from fear of it the wind blows' (Taitt. Up.
+II, 7, 8).
+
+
+
+
+5. Or that (results) also from connexion with the body.
+
+The obscuration of the soul's true nature results either from the soul's
+connexion with the body or from its connexion with the power of matter
+in a subtle state. As long as the creation lasts, the soul is obscured
+by its connexion with matter in the form of a body; at the time of a
+pralaya, on the other hand, by its connexion with matter of so
+exceedingly subtle a kind as not to admit of differentiation by means of
+name and form. As thus its true nature is not manifest, the soul is
+unable to create, in dreams, chariots, lotus tanks, and so on, by its
+mere wish. And what the texts say about a being that is awake in those
+who sleep and is the abode of all worlds ('in that all the worlds abide,
+and no one goes beyond it'--Ka. Up. II, 4, 9) can apply to the Supreme
+Person only. The things seen by an individual soul in its dreams
+therefore are specially created by the Supreme Person, and are meant by
+him to be a retribution--whether reward or punishment--for deeds of
+minor importance: they therefore last for the time of the dream only,
+and are perceived by that one soul only.
+
+
+
+
+6. And it is suggestive, according to Scripture; this the experts also
+declare.
+
+The things seen in dreams are not created by the wish of the individual
+soul for this reason also, that according to Scripture dreams are
+prophetic of future good or ill fortune. 'When a man engaged in some
+work undertaken for some special wish sees a woman in his dream, he may
+infer success from his dream vision.' Those also who understand the
+science of dreams teach that dreams foreshadow good and evil fortune.
+But that which depends on one's own wish can have no prophetic quality;
+and as ill fortune is not desired the dreamer would create for himself
+only such visions as would indicate good fortune. Hence the creation
+which takes place in dreams can be the Lord's work only.--Here
+terminates the adhikarana of 'the intermediate state.'
+
+
+
+
+7. The absence of that takes place in the nādīs and in the Self,
+according to scriptural statement.
+
+Next the state of deep dreamless sleep is enquired into. Scripture says,
+'When a man is asleep, reposing and at perfect rest, so that he sees no
+dream, then he lies asleep in those nādīs' (Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 3); 'When
+he is in profound sleep and is conscious of nothing, there are seventy-
+two thousand veins called hita which from the heart spread through the
+pericardium. Through them he moves forth and rests in the pericardium'
+(Bri. Up. II, 1, 19). 'When a man sleeps here, he becomes united with
+the True' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1). These texts declare the veins, the
+pericardium, and Brahman to be the place of deep sleep; and hence there
+is a doubt whether each of them in turns, or all of them together, are
+that place. There is an option between them, since they are not in
+mutual dependence, and since the sleeping soul cannot at the same time
+be in several places!--To this the Sūtra replies--the absence of dreams,
+i.e. deep sleep takes place in the veins, in the pericardium, and in the
+highest Self together; since these three are declared by Scripture. When
+different alternatives may be combined, on the ground of there being
+different effects in each case, it is improper to assume an option which
+implies sublation of some of the alternatives. And in the present case
+such combination is possible, the veins and the pericardium holding the
+position of a mansion, as it were, and a couch within the mansion, while
+Brahman is the pillow, as it were. Thus Brahman alone is the immediate
+resting-place of the sleeping soul.
+
+
+
+
+8. Hence the awaking from that.
+
+Since Brahman alone directly is the place of deep sleep, Scripture is
+able to declare that the souls awake from that, i.e. Brahman; compare
+'Having come back from the True they do not know that they come from the
+True' (Ch. Up. VI, 10, 2), and other texts.--Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'the absence of that.'
+
+
+
+
+9. But the same, on account of work, remembrance, text, and injunction.
+
+Does the same person who had gone to sleep rise again at the time of
+waking, or a different one?--Since the soul in deep sleep frees itself
+from all limiting adjuncts, unites itself with Brahman, and thus being
+in no way different from the released soul, is no longer in any way
+connected with its previous body, organs, and so on; the person rising
+from sleep is a different one.--This view the Sūtra sets aside, saying
+'but the same.' For there remains the work, i.e. the good and evil deeds
+previously done by the sleeper, for which the same person has to undergo
+retribution before the knowledge of truth arises. There is next
+remembrance--'I, the waking person, am the same as I who was asleep.'
+Scripture also declares this: 'Whatever these creatures are here,
+whether a lion, or tiger, or wolf, &c., that they become again' (Ch. Up.
+VI, 10, 2). And, lastly, the injunctions which enjoin certain acts for
+the sake of final Release would be purportless if the person merged in
+deep sleep attained Release. Nor can it be said that the sleeping soul
+is free from all limiting adjuncts and manifests itself in its true
+nature (so as not to be different from the released soul). For with
+regard to the sleeping person the text says,'In truth he thus does not
+know himself that he is I, nor does he know anything that exists. He is
+gone to utter annihilation. I see no good in this' (Ch. Up. VIII, ii, 1);
+while, on the other hand, the texts, 'Having approached the highest
+light he manifests himself in his true nature; he moves about there
+laughing, playing, delighting himself; 'He becomes a Self-ruler; he
+moves about in all the worlds according to his wish'; 'The seeing one
+sees everything, and attains everything everywhere' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3;
+VII, 25, 2; 26, 2), declare that the released soul is all-knowing, and
+so on. What is true about the sleeping person is that he is still
+comprised within the Samsāra, but for the time having put off all
+instruments of knowledge and action and become incapable of knowledge
+and enjoyment repairs to the place of utter rest, i.e. the highest Self,
+and having there refreshed himself, again rises to new enjoyment of
+action.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'work, remembrance, text, and
+injunction.'
+
+
+
+
+10. In the swooning person there is half-combination; this being the
+remaining (hypothesis).
+
+With regard to a person lying in a swoon or stunned, the question arises
+whether that state of swoon is one of the other states, viz. deep sleep
+and so on, or whether it is a special condition of its own.--The former
+alternative must be accepted. For the term 'swoon' may be explained as
+denoting either deep sleep or some other acknowledged state, and there
+is no authority for assuming an altogether different new state.--This
+view the Sūtra sets aside. The condition of a swooning person consists
+in reaching half, viz. of what leads to death; for this is the only
+hypothesis remaining. A swoon cannot be either dreaming or being awake;
+for in a swoon there is no consciousness. And as it is different in
+character as well as in the occasions giving rise to it from deep sleep
+and death, it cannot be either of those two states; for there are
+special circumstances occasioning a swoon, such as a blow on the head.
+The only possible alternative then is to view a swoon as a state in
+which there is made a half-way approach to death. For while death
+consists in the complete cessation of the soul's connexion with the body
+or organs of any kind, a swoon consists in the soul's remaining
+connected with the subtle body and organs only. Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'the swooning person.'
+
+
+
+
+11. Not on account of place even (is there any imperfection) of the
+Highest; for everywhere (it is described) as having twofold
+characteristics.
+
+The different states of the individual soul have been discussed, to the
+end that an insight into their imperfections may give rise to
+indifference towards all worldly enjoyments. Next now, in order to give
+rise to the desire of attaining to Brahman, the Sūtras proceed to
+expound how Brahman's nature is raised above all imperfections and
+constituted by mere blessed qualities. The following point requires to
+be considered first. Do those imperfections which cling to the
+individual soul in consequence of its different states--viz. the waking
+state, dreams, deep sleep, swoon, departure from the body--affect also
+the highest Brahman which as its inner Ruler abides within the soul in
+those different states, or not?--They do affect it, since Brahman abides
+within the bodies which are in those different states.--But Sūtras such
+as I, 2, 8 have already declared that the highest Brahman, because not
+subject to the influence of karman, is free from all imperfections; how
+then can imperfections cling to it for the reason that it is connected
+with this or that place?--In the following way. As was shown under III,
+2, 6, works give rise to imperfection and suffering in so far as they
+cause the connexion of the soul with a body. The efficient cause therein
+is the imperfection inherent in the connexion with a body; for otherwise
+the works themselves would directly give rise to pain, and what then
+would be the use of the connexion with a body? Hence, even in the case
+of a being not subject to karman, its connexion with various unholy
+bodies will cause imperfection and suffering. And even when such a being
+voluntarily enters into such bodies in order to rule them, connexion
+with imperfections is unavoidable; no less than to be immersed in blood
+and purulent matter, even if done voluntarily, will make a man unclean.
+Although therefore Brahman is the sole cause of the world and a treasure-
+house of all blessed qualities, yet it is affected by the imperfections
+springing therefrom that, as declared by Scripture, it abides within
+matter, bodies, and their parts, and thus is connected with them (cp.
+'he who abides within earth, within the soul, within the eye, within the
+seed,' &c., Bri. Up. III, 7, 3).
+
+Of this primā facie view the Sūtra disposes by saying--'Not even from
+place, such as earth, soul, &c., is there possible for the highest Self
+a shadow even of imperfection; since everywhere in Scripture as well as
+Smriti Brahman is described as having characteristics of a double kind;
+viz. on the one hand freedom from all imperfections, and on the other
+possession of all blessed qualities. For Scripture says that the Supreme
+Person is free from evil, free from old age, free from death, free from
+grief, free from hunger and thirst; that all his wishes realise
+themselves, that all its purposes realise themselves' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1,
+5)--And Smriti says, 'He comprises within himself all blessed qualities,
+by a particle of his power the whole mass of beings is supported. In him
+there are combined energy, strength, might, wisdom, valour, and all
+other noble qualities. He is the Highest of the high, no pain or other
+imperfections affect him, the Lord of all, high or low. From all evil he
+is free, he whose name is Vishnu, the highest abode.' These and other
+passages teach that Brahman possesses the double characteristics stated
+above.
+
+
+
+
+12. Should it be said 'on account of difference'; not so, because with
+reference to each the text says what is not that.
+
+But, an objection is raised, we observe, that the individual soul also,
+although in reality possessing the same twofold attributes, viz. freedom
+from all evil and so on, as we learn from the teaching of Prajāpati (Ch.
+Up. VIII, 7), yet is affected with imperfections owing to the fact that
+it is connected with bodies, divine, human, and so on, and thus
+undergoes a variety of conditions. Analogously we cannot avoid the
+conclusion that the inner Ruler also, although in reality possessing
+those same twofold attributes, is also affected by imperfection, because
+through its connexion with those different bodies it likewise undergoes
+a variety of conditions.--This objection the Sūtra sets aside in the
+words, 'not so, because with reference to each the text says what is not
+that,' i.e. what is contrary. For where the text says that the inner
+Ruler dwells within the earth, within the soul, within the eye, and so
+on, it concludes each clause by saying, 'that is thy Self, the inner
+Ruler, the immortal one,' i.e. declares the inner Ruler to be immortal,
+and thus denies of him any imperfections due to his connexion with the
+bodies which he voluntarily enters in order to rule them. The true
+(perfect) nature of the individual soul, on the other hand, is obscured
+as long as it is connected with a body, as we have explained under III,
+2, 5.--But, as the Pūrvapakshin has pointed out, even if the highest
+Self voluntarily enters into bodies, it cannot escape connexion with the
+imperfections which depend on the essential nature of those bodies.--Not
+so, we reply. The fact is, that not even non-sentient things are,
+essentially or intrinsically, bad; but in accordance with the nature of
+the works of those beings which are under the rule of karman, one thing,
+owing to the will of the Supreme Person, causes pain to one man at one
+time and pleasure at another time, and causes pleasure or pain to one
+person and the opposite to another person. If the effects of things
+depended on their own nature only, everything would at all times be
+productive for all persons, either of pleasure only or of pain only. But
+this is not observed to be the case. In agreement herewith Smriti says,
+'Because one and the same thing causes pain and pleasure and envy and
+wrath, the nature of a thing cannot lie in itself. As the same thing
+which erst gave rise to love causes pain later on, and that which once
+caused anger now causes satisfaction, nothing is in itself of the nature
+either of pleasure or of pain.' To the soul therefore which is subject
+to karman the connexion with different things is the source of
+imperfection and suffering, in agreement with the nature of its works;
+while to the highest Brahman, which is subject to itself only, the same
+connexion is the source of playful sport, consisting therein that he in
+various ways guides and rules those things.
+
+
+
+
+13. Some also (teach) thus.
+
+Moreover, the followers of one sākhā explicitly teach that the connexion
+with one and the same body is for the individual soul a source of
+disadvantage, while for the highest Brahman it is nothing of the kind,
+but constitutes an accession of glory in so far as it manifests him as a
+Lord and Ruler, 'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree.
+One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu.
+Up. III, 1, 1).--But the text, 'Having entered by means of that jīva-
+self I will differentiate names and forms,' teaches that the
+differentiation of names and forms depends on the entering into the
+elements of the jīva-soul whose Self is Brahman, and this implies that
+Brahman also, as the Self of the individual soul, possesses definite
+shapes, divine, human, and so on, and is to be denominated by the
+corresponding names. Brahman thus falls within the sphere of beings to
+which injunctions and prohibitions are addressed--such as 'a Brāhmana is
+to sacrifice'--and hence necessarily is under the power of karman.--To
+this the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+14. For (Brahman is) without form merely, since it is the principal
+agent with regard to that.
+
+Brahman, although by entering into bodies, human, divine, and so on, it
+becomes connected with various forms, yet is in itself altogether devoid
+of form, and therefore does not share that subjection to karman which in
+the case of the soul is due to its embodiedness.--Why?--Because as it is
+that which brings about names and forms it stands to them in the
+relation of a superior (pradhāna). For the text, 'The Ether (Brahman)
+indeed is the accomplisher of names and forms; that which is without
+these two is Brahman,' teaches that Brahman, although entering into all
+beings, is not touched by name and form, but is that which brings about
+name and form.--But, an objection is raised, if Brahman is the inner
+ruler of beings in so far as he has them for its body, how can it be
+said that it is altogether destitute of form?--There is a difference, we
+reply. The individual soul is connected with the shape of the body in
+which it dwells because it participates in the pleasures and pains to
+which the body gives rise; but as Brahman does not share those pleasures
+and pains, it has no shape or form. And the scriptural injunctions and
+prohibitions apply to those only who are under the power of karman. The
+highest Brahman therefore is like a being without form, and hence,
+although abiding within all things, free from all imperfection and
+endowed with all blessed qualities.
+
+But, an objection is raised, texts such as 'the True, knowledge,
+infinite is Brahman' suggest a Brahman whose nature is constituted
+exclusively by non-differentiated light; while at the same time a
+Brahman endowed with qualities--such as omniscience, being the cause of
+the world, being the inner Self of all, having the power of immediately
+realising its wishes and purposes--is expressly negatived by texts such
+as 'not so, not so' (Bri. Up. II, 3, 6), and therefore must be held to
+be false. How then can it be maintained that Brahman possesses the
+'twofold characteristics' mentioned under Sūtra 11?--To this the next
+Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+15. And in the same way as (a Brahman) consisting of light; (the texts
+thus) not being devoid of meaning.
+
+In order that texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'
+may not be devoid of meaning, we have to admit that light (intelligence)
+constitutes the essential nature of Brahman. But analogously we have
+also to admit that Brahman possesses the 'twofold characteristics'; for
+otherwise the texts declaring it to be free from all imperfections, all-
+knowing, the cause of the world, and so on, would in their turn be
+devoid of meaning.
+
+
+
+
+16. And (the text) says so much only.
+
+Moreover the text 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' only
+teaches that Brahman has light for its essential nature, and does not
+negative those other attributes of Brahman--omniscience, being the cause
+of the world, &c.--which are intimated by other texts. What is the
+object of the negation in 'not so, not so' will be shown further on.
+
+
+
+
+17. (This Scripture) also shows, and it is also stated in Smriti.
+
+That Brahman is a treasure as it were of all blessed qualities and free
+from all imperfections, the whole body of Vedānta-texts clearly declares:
+'That highest great lord of lords, that highest deity of deities'; 'He
+is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him
+neither parent nor lord '; 'There is no effect and no cause known of him,
+no one is seen like unto him or higher. His high power is revealed as
+manifold, as essential action of knowledge and strength' (Svet. Up. VI,
+7-9); 'He who is all-knowing, whose brooding consists of knowledge' (Mu.
+I, 1,9); 'From fear of him the wind blows, from fear of him the sun
+moves'; 'That is one bliss of Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 8); 'That from
+which all speech with the mind turns away, not having reached it,
+knowing the bliss of that Brahman man fears nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 9);
+'He who is without parts, without action, tranquil, without fault,
+without taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19).--And Smriti: 'He who knows me to be
+unborn and without a beginning, the Supreme Lord of the worlds';
+'Pervading this entire universe, by one part of mine I do abide'; 'With
+me as supervisor Prakriti brings forth the universe of the movable and
+the immovable, and for this reason the world does ever move round'; 'But
+another is the Supreme Person, who is called the Supreme Spirit, who
+pervading the three worlds supports them--the eternal Lord' (Bha. Gī. X,
+3; 42; IX, 10; XV, 17); 'The all-working, all-powerful one, rich in
+knowledge and strength, who becomes neither less nor more, who is self-
+dependent, without beginning, master of all; who knows neither weariness
+nor exhaustion, nor fear, wrath and desire; the blameless one, raised
+above all, without support, imperishable.'--As thus Brahman in whatever
+place it may abide has the 'twofold characteristics,' the imperfections
+dependent on those places do not touch it.
+
+
+
+
+18. For this very reason comparisons, such as reflected images of the
+sun and the like.
+
+Because Brahman, although abiding in manifold places, ever possesses the
+twofold characteristics, and hence does not share the imperfections due
+to those places, scriptural texts illustrate its purity in the midst of
+inferior surroundings by comparing it to the sun reflected in water,
+mirrors, and the like. Compare e.g., 'As the one ether is rendered
+manifold by jars and the like, or as the one sun becomes manifold in
+several sheets of water; thus the one Self is rendered manifold by
+abiding in many places. For the Self of all beings, although one, abides
+in each separate being and is thus seen as one and many at the same time,
+as the moon reflected in water.'
+
+
+
+
+19. But because it is not apprehended like water, there is no equality.
+
+The 'but' indicates an objection.--The highest Self is not apprehended
+in earth and other places in the same way as the sun or a face is
+apprehended in water or a mirror. For the sun and a face are erroneously
+apprehended as abiding in water or a mirror; they do not really abide
+there. When, on the other hand, Scripture tells us that the highest Self
+dwells in the earth, in water, in the soul, &c., we apprehend it as
+really dwelling in all those places. That the imperfections caused by
+water and mirrors do not attach themselves to the sun or a face is due
+to the fact that the sun and the face do not really abide in the water
+and the mirror. Hence there is no real parallelism between the thing
+compared (the highest Self) and the thing to which it is compared (the
+reflected image).
+
+
+
+
+20. The participation (on Brahman's part) in increase and decrease, due
+to its abiding within (is denied); on account of the appropriateness of
+both (comparisons), and because thus it is seen.
+
+The comparison of the highest Self to the reflected sun and the rest is
+meant only to deny of the Self that it participates in the imperfections--
+such as increase, decrease, and the like--which attach to the earth and
+the other beings within which the Self abides.--How do we know this?--
+From the circumstance that on this supposition both comparisons are
+appropriate. In the scriptural text quoted above Brahman is compared to
+ether, which although one becomes manifold through the things--jars and
+so on--within it; and to the sun, which is multiplied by the sheets of
+water in which he is reflected. Now the employment of these comparisons--
+with ether which really does abide within the jars and so on, and with
+the sun which in reality does not abide in the water--is appropriate
+only if they are meant to convey the idea that the highest Self does not
+participate in the imperfections inherent in earth and so on. Just as
+ether, although connecting itself separately with jars, pots, and so on,
+which undergo increase and decrease, is not itself touched by these
+imperfections; and just as the sun, although seen in sheets of water of
+unequal extent, is not touched by their increase and decrease; thus the
+highest Self, although abiding within variously-shaped beings, whether
+non-sentient like earth or sentient, remains untouched by their various
+imperfections--increase, decrease, and so on--remains one although
+abiding in all of them, and ever keeps the treasure of its blessed
+qualities unsullied by an atom even of impurity.--The comparison of
+Brahman with the reflected sun holds good on the following account. As
+the sun is not touched by the imperfections belonging to the water,
+since he does not really abide in the water and hence there is no reason
+for his sharing those imperfections, thus the highest Self, which really
+abides within earth and the rest, is not affected by their imperfections;
+for as the nature of the highest Self is essentially antagonistic to all
+imperfection, there is no reason for its participating in the
+imperfection of others.--'And as this is seen.' This means--Since we
+observe in ordinary life also that comparisons are instituted between
+two things for the reason that although they do not possess all
+attributes in common, they yet have some attribute in common. We say, e.
+g. 'this man is like a lion.'--The conclusion from all this is that the
+highest Self, which is essentially free from all imperfections and a
+treasure as it were of all blessed qualities, in no way suffers from
+dwelling within the earth and the rest.
+
+An objection is raised. In the Brihad-āranyaka, in the chapter beginning
+'There are two forms of Brahman, the material and the immaterial,' the
+whole material world, gross and subtle, is at first referred to as
+constituting the form of Brahman, and next a special form of Brahman is
+mentioned: 'And what is the form of that Person? Like a saffron-coloured
+raiment,' &c. But thereupon the text proceeds, 'Now follows the teaching--
+not so, not so; for there is not anything else higher than this "not so.
+" 'This passage, referring to all the previously mentioned forms of
+Brahman by means of the word 'so,' negatives them; intimating thereby
+that Brahman is nothing else than pure Being, and that all distinctions
+are mere imaginations due to Brahman not knowing its own essential
+nature. How then can Brahman possess the twofold characteristics?--To
+this the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+21. For the text denies the previously declared so-muchness; and
+declares more than that.
+
+It is impossible to understand the text 'not so, not so' as negativing
+those distinctions of Brahman which had been stated previously. If the
+text meant that, it would be mere idle talk. For none but a person not
+in his right mind would first teach that all the things mentioned in the
+earlier part of the section are distinctive attributes of Brahman--as
+which they are not known by any other means of proof--and thereupon
+deliberately negative his own teaching. Although among the things
+mentioned there are some which, in themselves, are known through other
+means of proof, yet they are not thus known to be modes of Brahman, and
+others again are known neither in themselves nor as modes of Brahman.
+The text therefore cannot merely refer to them as things otherwise known,
+but gives fundamental instruction about them. Hence the later passage
+cannot be meant as a sheer negation, but must be taken as denying the
+previously described 'so-muchness' of Brahman; i.e. the passage denies
+that limited nature of Brahman which would result from Brahman being
+viewed as distinguished by the previously stated attributes only. The
+word _so_ refers to that limited nature, and the phrase _not so_
+therefore means that Brahman is not distinguished by the previously
+stated modes _only_. This interpretation is further confirmed by the
+fact that after that negative phrase further qualities of Brahman are
+declared by the text: 'For there is not anything higher than this _not
+so_. Then comes the name, the _True of the True_; for the prānas are the
+True, and he is the True of them.' That means: Than that Brahman which
+is expressed by the phrase 'not so' there is no other thing higher, i.e.
+there is nothing more exalted than Brahman either in essential nature or
+in qualities. And of that Brahman the name is the 'True of the True.'
+This name is explained in the next clause, 'for the prānas,' &c. The
+term prānas here denotes the individual souls, so called because the
+prānas accompany them. They are the 'True' because they do not, like the
+elements, undergo changes implying an alteration of their essential
+nature. And the highest Self is the 'True of the True' because while the
+souls undergo, in accordance with their karman, contractions and
+expansions of intelligence, the highest Self which is free from all sin
+knows of no such alternations. He is therefore more eminently _true_
+than they are. As thus the complementary passage declares Brahman to be
+connected with certain qualities, the clause 'not so, not so' (to which
+that passage is complementary) cannot deny that Brahman possesses
+distinctive attributes, but only that Brahman's nature is confined to
+the attributes previously stated.--Brahman therefore possesses the
+twofold characteristics. That the clause 'not so' negatives Brahman's
+being fully described by the attributes previously mentioned, was above
+proved on the ground that since Brahman is not the object of any other
+means of proof, those previous statements cannot refer to what is
+already proved, and that the final clause cannot therefore be meant to
+deny what the previous clauses expressly teach. The next Sūtra now
+confirms this circumstance of Brahman not lying within the sphere of the
+other means of proof.
+
+
+
+
+22. That (is) unmanifested; for (this Scripture) declares.
+
+Brahman is not manifested by other means of proof; for Scripture says,
+'His form is not to be seen, no one beholds him with the eye' (Ka. Up.
+II, 6, 9); 'He is not apprehended by the eye nor by speech' (Mu. Up. III,
+1, 8).
+
+
+
+
+23. Also in perfect conciliation, according to Scripture and Smriti.
+
+Moreover, it is only in the state of perfect conciliation or endearment,
+i.e. in meditation bearing the character of devotion, that an intuition
+of Brahman takes place, not in any other state. This Scripture and
+Smriti alike teach. 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda, nor by
+understanding, nor by much learning. He whom the Self chooses by him the
+Self can be gained. The Self chooses him as his own' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23);
+'When a man's nature has become purified by the serene light of
+knowledge, then he sees him, meditating on him as without parts' (Mu. Up.
+III, 1, 9). Smriti: 'Neither by the Vedas, nor austerities, nor gifts,
+nor by sacrifice, but only by exclusive devotion, may I in this form be
+known and beheld in truth and also entered into' (Bha. Gī. XI, 53,54).
+The scriptural text beginning 'Two are the forms of Brahman,' which
+declares the nature of Brahman for the purposes of devout meditation,
+cannot therefore refer to Brahman's being characterised by two forms, a
+material and an immaterial, as something already known; for apart from
+Scripture nothing is known about Brahman.
+
+
+
+
+24. And there is non-difference (of the intention of Brahman's
+distinguishing attributes), as in the case of light; and the light (is)
+intuited as constituting Brahman's essential nature by repetition of the
+practice (of meditation).
+
+That the clause 'not so' negatives not Brahman's possessing two forms, a
+material and an immaterial one, but only Brahman's nature being
+restricted to those determinations, follows therefrom also that in the
+vision of Vāmadeva and others who had attained to intuition into
+Brahman's nature, the fact of Brahman having all material and immaterial
+beings for its attributes is apprehended in non-difference, i.e. in the
+same way as the fact of light (i.e. knowledge) and bliss constituting
+Brahman's essential nature. Compare the text 'Seeing this the Rishi
+Vāmadeva understood, I am Manu and the sun' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). And
+that light and bliss constitute Brahman's nature was perceived by
+Vāmadeva and the rest through repeated performance of the practice of
+devout meditation. In the same way then, i.e. by repeated meditation,
+they also became aware that Brahman has all material and immaterial
+things for its distinguishing modes.--The next Sūtra sums up the proof
+of Brahman's possessing twofold characteristics.
+
+
+
+
+25. Hence (Brahman is distinguished) by what is infinite; for thus the
+characteristics (hold good).
+
+By the arguments stated it is proved that Brahman is distinguished by
+the infinite multitude of blessed qualities. And this being so, it
+follows that Brahman possesses the twofold characteristics.--Here
+terminates the adhikarana of 'that which has twofold characteristics.'
+
+
+
+
+26. But on account of twofold designation, as the snake and its coils.
+
+It has been shown in the preceding adhikarana that the entire non-
+sentient universe is the outward form of Brahman. For the purpose of
+proving Brahman's freedom from all imperfection, an enquiry is now begun
+into the particular mode in which the world may be conceived to
+constitute the form of Brahman. Is the relation of the two like that of
+the snake and its coils; or like that of light and the luminous body,
+both of which fall under the same genus; or like that of the individual
+soul and Brahman, the soul being a distinguishing attribute and for that
+reason a part (amsa) of Brahman?--On the assumption of this last
+alternative, which is about to be established here, it has been already
+shown under two preceding Sūtras (I, 4, 23; II, 1, 14), that from
+Brahman, as distinguished by sentient and non-sentient beings in their
+subtle form, there originates Brahman as distinguished by all those
+beings in their gross form.
+
+Which then of the alternatives stated above is the true one?--The
+material world is related to Brahman as the coils to the snake, 'on
+account of twofold designation.' For some texts declare the identity of
+the two: 'Brahman only is all this'; 'The Self only is all this.' Other
+texts again refer to the difference of the two: 'Having entered into
+these three deities with this jīva-self, let me differentiate names and
+forms.' We therefore consider all non-sentient things to be special
+forms or arrangements of Brahman, as the coils are of a coiled-up snake
+or a coiled-up rope.
+
+
+
+
+27. Or else like light and its abode, both being fire.
+
+The _or_ sets aside the other two alternatives. If Brahman itself only
+appeared in the form of non-sentient things--as the snake itself only
+constitutes the coils--both sets of texts, those which declare
+difference as well as those which declare the unchangeableness of
+Brahman, would be contrary to sense. We therefore, adopting the second
+alternative, hold that the case under discussion is analogous to that of
+light and that in which it abides, i.e. the luminous body. The two are
+different, but at the same time they are identical in so far as they
+both are fire (tejas). In the same way the non-sentient world
+constitutes the form of Brahman.
+
+
+
+
+28. Or else in the manner stated above.
+
+The _but_ sets aside the two preceding alternatives. One substance may
+indeed connect itself with several states, but the former of the two
+alternatives implies that Brahman itself constitutes the essential
+nature of non-sentient matter, and thus there is no escape from the
+objections already stated under Sūtra 27. Let then the second
+alternative be adopted according to which Brahma-hood (brahmatva)
+constitutes a genus inhering in Brahman as well as in non-sentient
+matter, just as fire constitutes the common genus for light and luminous
+bodies. But on this view Brahman becomes a mere abstract generic
+character inhering in the Lord (isvara), sentient souls and non-sentient
+matter, just as the generic character of horses (asvatva) inheres in
+concrete individual horses; and this contradicts all the teaching of
+Sruti and Smriti (according to which Brahman is the highest concrete
+entity). We therefore hold that non-sentient matter stands to Brahman in
+the same relation as the one previously proved for the individual soul
+in Sūtra II, 3, 43; 46; viz. that it is an attribute incapable of being
+realised apart from Brahman and hence is a part (amsa) of the latter.
+The texts referring to the two as non-different may thus be taken in
+their primary sense; for the part is only a limited place of that of
+which it is a part. And the texts referring to the two as different may
+also be taken in their primary sense; for the distinguishing attribute
+and that to which the attribute belongs are essentially different. Thus
+Brahman's freedom from all imperfection is preserved.--Lustre is an
+attribute not to be realised apart from the gem, and therefore is a part
+of the gem; the same relation also holds good between generic character
+and individuals having that character, between qualities and things
+having qualities, between bodies and souls. In the same way souls as
+well as non-sentient matter stand to Brahman in the relation of parts.
+
+
+
+
+29. And on account of denial.
+
+Texts such as 'This is that great unborn Self, undecaying, undying' (Bri.
+Up. IV, 4, 25), 'By the old age of the body that does not age' (Ch. Up.
+VIII, 1, 5), deny of Brahman the properties of non-sentient matter. From
+this it follows that the relation of the two can only be that of
+distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished, and hence of part and
+whole. Brahman distinguished by sentient and non-sentient beings in
+their subtle state is the cause; distinguished by the same beings in
+their gross state is the effect: the effect thus is non-different from
+the cause, and by the knowledge of the causal Brahman the effect is
+likewise known. All these tenets are in full mutual agreement. Brahman's
+freedom from defects also is preserved; and this and Brahman's being the
+abode of all blessed qualities prove that Brahman possesses the 'twofold
+characteristics.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the coils of the
+snake.'
+
+
+
+
+30. (There is something) higher than that; on account of the
+designations of bridge, measure, connexion, and difference.
+
+The Sūtras now proceed to refute an erroneous view based on some
+fallacious arguments, viz. that there is a being higher even than the
+highest Brahman, the supreme cause, material as well as operative, of
+the entire world--a refutation which will confirm the view of Brahman
+being free from all imperfections and a treasure as it were of countless
+transcendentally exalted qualities.--There is some entity higher than
+the Brahman described so far as being the cause of the world and
+possessing the twofold characteristics. For the text 'That Self is a
+bank (or bridge), a boundary' (Ch. Up. VIII, 4, 1) designates the Self
+as a bank or bridge (setu). And the term 'setu' means in ordinary
+language that which enables one to reach the other bank of a river; and
+from this we conclude that in the Vedic text also there must be meant
+something to be reached. The text further says that that bridge is to be
+crossed: 'He who has crossed that bridge, if blind,' &c.; this also
+indicates that there must be something to be reached by crossing. Other
+texts, again, speak of the highest Brahman as something measured, i.e.
+limited. 'Brahman has four feet (quarters), sixteen parts.' Such
+declarations of Brahman being something limited suggest the existence of
+something unlimited to be reached by that bridge. Further there are
+texts which declare a connexion of the bridge as that which is a means
+towards reaching, and a thing connected with the bridge as that to be
+reached: 'the highest bridge of the Immortal' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'he is
+the bridge of the Immortal' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5). For this reason also
+there is something higher than the Highest.--And other texts again
+expressly state that being beyond the Highest to be something different:
+'he goes to the divine Person who is higher than the Highest' (Mu. Up.
+III, 2, 8); 'by this Person this whole universe is filled; what is
+higher than that is without form and without suffering' (Svet. Up. III,
+9-10). All this combined shows that there is something higher than the
+highest Brahman.--The next Sūtra disposes of this view.
+
+
+
+
+31. But on account of resemblance.
+
+The 'but' sets aside the pūrvapaksha. There is no truth in the assertion
+that from the designation of the Highest as a bridge (or bank) it
+follows that there is something beyond the Highest. For Brahman in that
+text is not called a bank with regard to something to be reached thereby;
+since the additional clause 'for the non-confounding of these worlds'
+declares that it is compared to a bridge or bank in so far as it binds
+to itself (setu being derived from _si_, to bind) the whole aggregate of
+sentient and non-sentient things without any confusion. And in the
+clause 'having passed beyond that bridge' the _passing beyond_ means
+_reaching_; as we say, 'he passes beyond the Vedanta,' meaning 'he has
+fully mastered it.'
+
+
+
+
+32. It subserves the purpose of thought; as in the case of the feet.
+
+Where the texts speak of Brahman as having four quarters, and sixteen
+parts, or say that 'one quarter of him are all these beings' (Ch. Up.
+III, 12, 6), they do so for the purpose of thought, i.e. meditation,
+only. For as texts such as 'the Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'
+teach Brahman, the cause of the world, to be unlimited, it cannot in
+itself be subject to measure. The texts referring to measure therefore
+aim at meditation only, in the same way as texts such as 'Speech is one
+foot (quarter) of him, breath another, the eye another, the mind
+another' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 2).--But how can something that in itself is
+beyond all measure, for the purpose of meditation, be spoken of as
+measured? To this the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+33. Owing to difference of place, as in the case of light, and so on.
+
+Owing to the difference of limiting adjuncts constituted by special
+places, such as speech, and so on, Brahman in so far as connected with
+these adjuncts may be viewed as having measure; just as light and the
+like although spread everywhere may be viewed as limited, owing to its
+connexion with different places--windows, jars, and so on.
+
+
+
+
+34. And on account of possibility.
+
+Nor is there any truth in the assertion that, because texts such as 'he
+is the bridge of the Immortal' intimate a distinction between that which
+causes to reach and the object reached, there must be something to be
+reached different from that which causes to reach; for the highest Self
+may be viewed as being itself a means towards itself being reached; cp.
+'The Self cannot be reached by the Veda, and so on; he whom the Self
+chooses by him the Self can be gained' (Ch. Up. I, 2, 23).
+
+
+
+
+35. Thus, from the denial of anything else.
+
+Nor can we allow the assertion that there is something higher than the
+highest because certain texts ('the Person which is higher than the
+highest'; 'beyond the Imperishable there is the highest,' &c.) refer to
+such a difference. For the same texts expressly deny that there is
+anything else higher than the highest--'than whom there is nothing else
+higher, than whom there is nothing smaller or larger' (Svet. Up. III, 9).
+So also other texts: 'For there is nothing else higher than this "not
+so"' (i.e. than this Brahman designated by the phrase 'not so'; Bri. Up.
+II, 3, 6); 'Of him none is the Lord, his name is great glory' (Mahānār.
+Up. I, 10).
+
+But what then is the entity referred to in the text 'tato yad
+uttarataram '? (Svet. Up. III, 10)?--The passage immediately preceding
+(8), 'I know that great person, &c.; a man who knows him passes over
+death,' had declared that the knowledge of Brahman is the only way to
+immortality; and the clause (9), 'Higher than whom there is nothing else,'
+had confirmed this by declaring that Brahman is the Highest and that
+there is no other thing higher. In agreement herewith we must explain
+stanza 10 as giving a reason for what had been said, 'Because that which
+is the highest (uttarataram), viz. the Supreme Person is without form
+and without suffering, therefore (tatah) those who know him become
+immortal,' &c. On any other explanation stanza 10 would not be in
+harmony with stanza 8 where the subject is introduced, and with what is
+declared in stanza 9.--Analogously in the text 'He goes to the divine
+Person who is higher than the highest' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8) 'the highest'
+means the aggregate soul (samashā-purusha), which in a previous passage
+had been said to be 'higher than the high Imperishable' (II, 1, 2); and
+the 'higher' refers to the Supreme Person, with all his transcendent
+qualities, who is superior to the aggregate soul.
+
+
+
+
+36. The omnipresence (possessed) by that, (understood) from the
+declaration of extent.
+
+That omnipresence which is possessed 'by that,' i.e. by Brahman, and
+which is known 'from declarations of extent,' and so on, i.e. from texts
+which declare Brahman to be all-pervading, is also known from texts such
+as 'higher than that there is nothing.' Declarations of extent are e.g.
+the following: 'By this Person this whole Universe is filled' (Svet. Up.
+III. 9); 'whatever is seen or heard in this world, is pervaded inside
+and outside by Nārāyana' (Mahānār. Up.); 'The eternal, pervading,
+omnipresent, which the Wise consider as the source of all beings' (Mu.
+Up. I, 1, 6). The 'and the rest' in the Sātra comprises passages such as
+'Brahman indeed is all this,' 'The Self indeed is all this,' and the
+like. The conclusion is that the highest Brahman is absolutely supreme.--
+Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the Highest.'
+
+
+
+
+37. From thence the reward; on account of possibility.
+
+It has been shown, for the purpose of giving rise to a desire for devout
+meditation, that the soul in all its states is imperfect, while the
+Supreme Person to be reached by it is free from imperfections, the owner
+of blessed qualities and higher than everything else. Being about to
+investigate the nature of meditation, the Sūtrakāra now declares that
+the meditating devotee receives the reward of meditation, i.e. Release,
+which consists in attaining to the highest Person, from that highest
+Person only: and that analogously the rewards for all works prescribed
+by the Veda--whether to be enjoyed in this or the next world--come from
+the highest Person only. The Sūtra therefore says generally, 'from
+thence the reward.'--'Why so?'--'Because that only is possible.'
+
+For it is he only--the all-knowing, all-powerful, supremely generous one--
+who being pleased by sacrifices, gifts, offerings, and the like, as well
+as by pious meditation, is in a position to bestow the different forms
+of enjoyment in this and the heavenly world, and Release which consists
+in attaining to a nature like his own. For action which is non-
+intelligent and transitory is incapable of bringing about a result
+connected with a future time.
+
+
+
+
+38. And on account of scriptural declaration.
+
+That he bestows all rewards--whether in the form of enjoyment or Release--
+Scripture also declares 'This indeed is the great, the unborn Self, the
+eater of food, the giver of wealth' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 24); and 'For he
+alone causes delight' (Taitt. Up. II, 7).--Next a primā facie view is
+stated.
+
+
+
+
+39. For the same reasons Jaimini (thinks it to be) religious action.
+
+For the same reasons, viz. possibility and scriptural declaration, the
+teacher Jaimini thinks that religious works, viz. sacrifices, gifts,
+offerings, and meditation, of themselves bring about their rewards. For
+we observe that in ordinary life actions such as ploughing and the like,
+and charitable gifts and so on, bring about their own reward, directly
+or indirectly. And although Vedic works do not bring about their rewards
+immediately, they may do so mediately, viz. by means of the so-called
+_apūrva_. This follows also from the form of the Vedic injunctions, such
+as 'He who is desirous of the heavenly world is to sacrifice.' As such
+injunctions enjoin sacrifices as the means of bringing about the object
+desired to be realised, viz. the heavenly world and the like, there is
+no other way left than to assume that the result (which is seen not to
+spring directly from the sacrifice) is accomplished by the mediation of
+the apūrva.
+
+
+
+
+40. But the former, Bādarāyana (thinks), on account of the designation
+(of deities) as the cause.
+
+The reverend Bādarāyana maintains the previously declared awarding of
+rewards by the Supreme Person since the scriptural texts referring to
+the different sacrifices declare that the deities only, Agni, Vāyu, and
+so on, who are propitiated by the sacrifices--which are nothing else but
+means to propitiate deities--are the cause of the rewards attached to
+the sacrifices. Compare texts such as 'Let him who is desirous of
+prosperity offer a white animal to Vāyu. For Vāyu is the swiftest god.
+The man thus approaches Vāyu with his proper share, and Vāyu leads him
+to prosperity.' And the whole instruction which the texts give, as to
+the means by which men desirous of certain results are to effect those
+results, is required on account of the injunctions only, and hence it
+cannot be doubted that it has reference to the injunctions. The
+apparatus of means to bring about the results thus being learnt from the
+text only, no person acquainted with the force of the means of proof
+will assent to that apparatus, as stated by the text, being set aside
+and an apūrva about which the text says nothing being fancifully assumed.
+And that the imperative verbal forms of the injunctions denote as the
+thing to be effected by the effort of the sacrificer, only that which on
+the basis of the usage of language and grammatical science is recognised
+as the meaning of the root-element of such words as 'yajeta,' viz. the
+sacrifice (yāga), which consists in the propitiation of a divine being,
+and not some additional supersensuous thing such as the apūrva, we have
+already proved above (p. 153 ff.). Texts such as 'Vāyu is the swiftest
+god' teach that Vāyu and other deities are the bestowers of rewards. And
+that it is fundamentally the highest Self--as constituting the inner
+Self of Vāyu and other deities--which is pleased by offerings, and
+bestows rewards for them is declared by texts such as 'Offerings and
+pious works, all this he bears who is the nave of the Universe. He is
+Agni and Vāyu, he is Sun and Moon' (Mahānār. Up. I, 6, 7). Similarly in
+the antaryāmin-brāhmana, 'He who dwells in Vāyu, of whom Vāyu is the
+body'; 'He who dwells in Agni,' &c. Smriti expresses itself similarly,
+'Whatsoever devotee wishes to worship with faith whatsoever divine form,
+of him do I make that faith unshakable. Endued with such faith he
+endeavours to propitiate him and obtains from him his desires--those
+indeed being ordained by me' (Bha. Gī. VII, 21-22); 'For I am the
+enjoyer and the Lord of all sacrifices' (IX, 24)--where Lord means him
+who bestows the reward for the sacrifices. 'To the gods go the
+worshippers of the gods, and those devoted to me go to me' (VII, 23). In
+ordinary life men, by agriculture and the like, acquire wealth in
+various forms, and by means of this propitiate their king, either
+directly or through his officials and servants; and the king thereupon
+is seen to reward them in a manner corresponding to the measure of their
+services and presents. The Vedānta-texts, on the other hand, give
+instruction on a subject which transcends the sphere of all the other
+means of knowledge, viz. the highest Person who is free from all shadow
+even of imperfection, and a treasure-house as it were of all exalted
+qualities in their highest state of perfection; on sacrifices, gifts,
+oblations, which are helpful towards the propitiation of that Person; on
+praise, worship, and meditation, which directly propitiate him; and on
+the rewards which he, thus propitiated, bestows, viz. temporal happiness
+and final Release.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'reward.'
+
+
+
+
+THIRD PĀDA.
+
+1. What is understood from all the Vedānta-texts (is one), on account of
+the non-difference of injunction and the rest.
+
+The Sūtras have stated whatever has to be stated to the end of rousing
+the desire of meditation-concluding with the fact that Brahman bestows
+rewards. Next the question is introduced whether the vidyās (i.e. the
+different forms of meditation on Brahman which the Vedānta-texts enjoin)
+are different or non-different, on the decision of which question it
+will depend whether the qualities attributed to Brahman in those vidyās
+are to be comprised in one act of meditation or not.--The first
+subordinate question arising here is whether one and the same meditation--
+as e.g. the vidyā of Vaisvānara--which is met with in the text of
+several sākhās, constitutes one vidyā or several.--The vidyās are
+separate, the Pūrvapakshin maintains; for the fact that the same matter
+is, without difference, imparted for a second time, and moreover stands
+under a different heading--both which circumstances necessarily attend
+the text's being met with in different sākhās--proves the difference of
+the two meditations. It is for this reason only that a restrictive
+injunction, such as the one conveyed in the text, 'Let a man tell this
+science of Brahman to those only who have performed the rite of carrying
+fire on their head' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 10)--which restricts the impaiting
+of knowledge to the Ātharvanikas, to whom that rite is peculiar--has any
+sense; for if the vidyās were one, then the rite mentioned, which is a
+part of the vidyā, would be valid for the members of other sākhās also,
+and then the restriction enjoined by the text would have no meaning.--
+This view is set aside by the Sūtra, 'What is understood from all the
+Vedānta-texts' is one and the same meditation, 'because there is non-
+difference of injunction and the rest.' By injunction is meant the
+injunction of special activities denoted by different verbal roots--such
+as upāsīta 'he should meditate,' vidyāt 'he should know.' The and the
+rest' of the Sūtra is meant to comprise as additional reasons the
+circumstances mentioned in the Pūrva Mīmāmsā-sūtras (II, 4, 9). Owing to
+all these circumstances, non-difference of injunction and the rest, the
+same vidyā is recognised in other sākhās also. In the Chāandogya (V, 12,
+2) as well as in the Vājasaneyaka we meet with one and the same
+injunction (viz. 'He should meditate on Vaisvānara'). The form
+(character, rūpa) of the meditations also is the same, for the form of a
+cognition solely depends on its object; and the object is in both cases
+the same, viz. Vaisvānara. The name of the two vidyās also is the same,
+viz. the knowledge of Vaisvānara. And both vidyās are declared to have
+the same result, viz. attaining to Brahman. All these reasons establish
+the identity of vidyās even in different sākhās.--The next Sūtra refers
+to the reasons set forth for his view by the Pūrvapakshin and refutes
+them.
+
+
+
+
+2. If it be said (that the vidyās are not one) on account of difference,
+we deny this, since even in one (vidyā there may be repetition).
+
+If it be said that there is no oneness of vidyā, because the fact of the
+same matter being stated again without difference, and being met with in
+a different chapter, proves the object of injunction to be different; we
+reply that even in one and the same vidyā some matter may be repeated
+without any change, and under a new heading (in a different chapter); if,
+namely, there is difference of cognising subjects. Where the cognising
+person is one only, repetition of the same matter under a new heading
+can only be explained as meaning difference of object enjoined, and
+hence separation of the two vidyās. But where the cognising persons are
+different (and this of course is eminently so in the case of different
+sākhās), the double statement of one and the same matter explains itself
+as subserving the cognition of those different persons, and hence does
+not imply difference of matter enjoined.--The next Sūtra refutes the
+argument founded on a rite enjoined in the Mundaka.
+
+
+
+
+3. For (the sirovrata) concerns the mode of the study of the Veda; also
+on account of (that rite) being a heading in the samākāra; and the
+restriction is like that of the libations.
+
+What the text says as to a restriction connected with the 'vow of the
+head,' does not intimate a difference of vidyās. For that vow does not
+form part of the vidyā. The restriction refers only to a peculiarity of
+the _study_ of the Veda on the part of the Ātharvanikas, being meant to
+establish that they should possess that special qualification which the
+rite produces; but it does not affect the vidyā itself. This is proved
+by the subsequent clause, 'a man who has not performed that rite may not
+_read_ the text,' which directly connects the rite with the studying of
+the text. And it is further proved by the fact that in the book of the
+Ātharvanikas, called 'sāmākara,' that rite is referred to as a rite
+connected with the Veda (not with the special vidyā set forth in the
+Mundaka), viz. in the passage, 'this is explained already by the Veda-
+observance' (which extends the details of the sirovrata, there called
+veda-vrata, to other observances). By the _knowledge of Brahman_
+(referred to in the Mundaka-text 'let a man tell this science of Brahman
+to those only,' &c.), we have therefore to understand knowledge of the
+Veda in general. And that restriction is 'like that of the
+libations'--i. e. it is analogous to the restriction under which the
+sava-libations, beginning with the Saptasūrya-libation, and terminating
+with the Sataudana-libation, are offered in the one fire which is used
+by the followers of the Atharvan, and not in the ordinary three fires.
+
+
+
+
+4. Scripture also declares this.
+
+Scripture also shows that (identical) meditation is what all the Vedānta-
+texts intimate. The Chāndogya (VIII, 1, 1 ff.) declares that that which
+is within the small space in the heart is to be enquired into, and then
+in reply to the question what the thing to be enquired into is, says
+that it is the highest Self possessing the eight attributes, freedom
+from all evil and the rest, which is to be meditated upon within the
+heart. And then the Taittiriya-text, referring to this declaration in
+the Chāndogya, says, 'Therein is a small space, free from all grief;
+what is within that is to be meditated upon' (Mahānār. Up. X, 23), and
+thus likewise enjoins meditation on the highest Self possessing the
+eight qualities. And this is possible only if, owing to unity of vidya,
+the qualities mentioned in the first text are included also in the
+meditation enjoined in the second text.--Having thus established the
+unity of meditations, the Sūtras proceed to state the practical effect
+of such unity.
+
+
+
+
+5. (Meditation) thus being equal, there is combination (of gunas); on
+account of non-difference of purport in the case of what subserves
+injunction.
+
+The meditation in all Vedānta-texts thus being the same, the qualities
+mentioned in one text are to be combined with those mentioned in another;
+'on account of non-difference of purport in the case of what subserves
+injunction.' We find that in connexion with certain injunctions of
+meditation--such as the meditation on Vaisvānara, or the small ether
+within the heart--the text of some individual Vedānta-book mentions
+certain secondary matters (qualities, guna) which subserve that
+meditation; and as these gunas are connected with the meditation they
+are to be comprised in it, so that they may accomplish their aim, i.e.
+of subserving the meditation. For the same reason therefore we have to
+enclose in the meditation gunas mentioned in other Vedānta-texts; for
+being also connected with the meditation they subserve it in the same
+way.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what is intimated by all
+Vedānta-texts.
+
+
+
+
+6. If it be said that there is difference on account of the text; we say
+no; on account of non-difference.
+
+So far it has been shown that the non-difference of injunction, and so
+on, establishes the unity of meditations, and that owing to the latter
+the special features of meditation enjoined in different texts have to
+be combined. Next, an enquiry is entered upon whether in the case of
+certain particular meditations there actually exists, or not, that non-
+difference of injunction which is the cause of meditations being
+recognised as identical. A meditation on the Udgītha is enjoined in the
+text of the Chandogas, as well as in that of the Vājasaneyins (Ch. Up. I,
+2; Bri. Up. I, 3); and the question arises whether the two are to be
+viewed as one meditation or not. The Pūrvapakshin maintains the former
+alternative. For, he says, there is no difference of injunction, and so
+on, since both texts enjoin as the object of meditation the Udgītha
+viewed under the form of Prāna; since there is the same reward promised
+in both places, viz. mastering of one's enemies; since the form of
+meditation is the same, the Udgītha being in both cases viewed under the
+form of Prāna; since the injunction is the same, being conveyed in both
+cases by the same verbal root (vid, to know); and since both meditations
+have the same technical name, viz. udgītha-vidyā. The Sūtra states this
+view in the form of the refutation of an objection raised by the
+advocate of the final view. We do not admit, the objector says, the
+unity maintained by you, since the texts clearly show a difference of
+form. The text of the Vājasaneyins represents as the object of
+meditation that which is the agent in the act of singing out the Udgītha;
+while the text of the Chandogas enjoins meditation on what is the object
+of the action of singing out (i. e. the Udgītha itself). This
+discrepancy establishes difference in the character of the meditation,
+and as this implies difference of the object enjoined, the mere non-
+difference of injunction, and so on, is of no force, and hence the two
+meditations are separate ones.--This objection the Pūrvapakshin impugns,
+'on account of non-difference.' For both texts, at the outset, declare
+that the Udgītha is the means to bring about the conquest of enemies
+(Let us overcome the Asuras at the sacrifices by means of the Udgītha'
+(Bri. Up.); 'The gods took the Udgītha, thinking they would with that
+overcome the Asuras'--Ch. Up.). In order therefore not to stultify this
+common beginning, we must assume that in the clause 'For them that
+breath sang out' (Bri. Up.), the Udgītha, which really is the object of
+the action of singing, is spoken of as the agent. Otherwise the term
+udgītha in the introductory passage ('by means of the Udgītha') would
+have to be taken as by implication denoting the agent (while directly it
+indicates the instrument).--Hence there is oneness of the two vidyās.--
+Of this view the next Sūtra disposes.
+
+
+
+
+7. Or not, on account of difference of subject-matter; as in the case of
+the attribute of being higher than the high, and so on.
+
+There is no unity of the two vidyās, since the subject-matter of the two
+differs. For the tale in the Chāndogya-text, which begins 'when the
+Devas and the Asuras struggled together,' connects itself with the
+pranava (the syllable Om) which is introduced as the object of
+meditation in Chįnd. I, 1, 1, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as
+the Udgītha'; and the clause forming part of the tale,'they meditated on
+that chief breath as Udgītha.' therefore refers to a meditation on the
+pranava which is a part only of the Udgītha. In the text of the Vāja-
+saneyins; on the other hand, there is nothing to correspond to the
+introductory passage which in the Chāndogya-text determines the subject-
+matter, and the text clearly states that the meditation refers to the
+whole Udgītha (not only the pranava). And this difference of leading
+subject-matter implies difference of matter enjoined, and this again
+difference of the character of meditation, and hence there is no unity
+of vidyās. Thus the object of meditation for the Chandogas is the
+pranava viewed under the form of Prāna; while for the Vājasaneyins it is
+the Udgātri (who sings the Udgītha), imaginatively identified with Prāna.
+Nor does there arise, on this latter account, a contradiction between
+the later and the earlier part of the story of the Vājasaneyins. For as
+a meditation on the Udgātri necessarily extends to the Udgītha, which is
+the object of the activity of singing, the latter also helps to bring
+about the result, viz. the mastering of enemies.--There is thus no unity
+of vidyā, although there may be non-difference of injunction, and so on.--
+'As in the case of the attribute of being higher than the high,' &c. In
+one and the same sākhā there are two meditations, in each of which the
+highest Self is enjoined to be viewed under the form of the pranava (Ch.
+Up. I, 6; I, 9), and in so far the two vidyās are alike. But while the
+former text enjoins that the pranava has to be viewed under the form of
+a golden man, in the latter he has to be viewed as possessing the
+attributes of being higher than the high, and owing to this difference
+of attributes the two meditations must be held separate (a_ fortiori_,
+then, those meditations are separate which have different objects of
+meditation).
+
+
+
+
+8. If that be declared on account of name; (we object, since) that is
+also (where the objects of injunction differ).
+
+If the oneness of the vidyās be maintained on the ground that both have
+the same name, viz. udgītha-vidyā, we point out that oneness is found
+also where the objects enjoined are different. The term agnihotra is
+applied equally to the permanent agnihotra and to that agnihotra which
+forms part of the sacrifice called 'Kundapāyinām ayanam'; and the term
+udgītha is applied equally to the many different meditations described
+in the first prapāthaka of the Chāndogya.
+
+
+
+
+9. And (this is) appropriate, on account of the extension.
+
+Since the pranava, which is a part of the udgītha, is introduced as the
+subject of meditation in the first prapāthaka of the Chāndogya, and
+extends over the later vidyās also, it is appropriate to assume that
+also in the clause 'the gods took the udgītha'--which stands in the
+middle--the term udgītha denotes the pranava. Expressions such as 'the
+cloth is burned' show that frequently the whole denotes the part.--The
+conclusion from all this is that in the Chāndogya the object of
+meditation is constituted by the pranava--there termed udgītha--viewed
+under the form of prāna; while in the Vājasaneyaka the term udgītha
+denotes the whole udgītha, and the object of meditation is he who
+produces the udgītha, i.e. the udgātri, viewed under the form of prāna.
+And this proves that the two vidyās are separate.--Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'difference.'
+
+
+
+
+10. On account of non-difference of everything, those elsewhere.
+
+The Chāndogya and the Vajasaneyaka alike record a meditation on Prana;
+the object of meditation being Prana as possessing the qualities of
+being the oldest and the best, and also as possessing certain other
+qualities such as being the richest, and so on (Ch. Up. V, 1; Bri. Up.
+VI, 1). In the text of the Kaushītakins, on the other hand, there is a
+meditation on Prāna which mentions the former qualities ('being the
+best' and 'being the oldest'), but not the latter ('being the richest,'
+and so on). This, the Pūrvapakshin maintains, constitutes a difference
+between the objects of meditation, and hence between the meditations
+themselves.--This view the Sūtra sets aside 'on account of non-
+difference of everything, those elsewhere.' There is no difference of
+meditation. Those qualities, viz. being the richest, and so on, are to
+be meditated upon in the other place also, viz. in the meditation on
+Prāna of the Kaushītakins; 'since there is non-difference of everything,'
+i.e. since the text of the Kaushītakins also exhibits the very same
+method, in all its details, for proving what it is undertaken to prove,
+viz. that Prāna is the oldest and best. And for that proof it is
+required that Prāna should be viewed as possessing also the quality of
+being the richest, and so on, and these qualities therefore have to be
+comprised in the meditation of the Kaushītakins also. Hence there is no
+difference of meditation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-
+difference of everything.'
+
+In the same way as the meditation on Prāna as the oldest and best cannot
+be accomplished without Prāna being also meditated upon as the richest,
+and so on, and as hence these latter qualities have to be comprised in
+the meditation on Prāna of the Kaushītakins, although they are not
+expressly mentioned there; thus those qualities of Brahman also, without
+which the meditation on Brahman cannot be accomplished, must be included
+in all meditations on Brahman--this is the point to be proved next.
+
+
+
+
+11. Bliss and other qualities, as belonging to the subject of the
+qualities.
+
+The point to be decided here is whether, or not, the essential qualities
+of Brahman are to be included in all meditations on the highest Brahman.--
+Since there is no valid reason for including in a meditation those
+qualities which are not expressly mentioned in the section containing
+that meditation, only those qualities which are thus expressly mentioned
+should be included!--This primā facie view is negatived by the Sūtra.
+The clause, 'on account of non-difference,' has to be carried on from
+the preceding Sūtra. As the 'subject of the qualities,' i.e. Brahman is
+the same in all meditations, the qualities which do not exist apart from
+their subject, viz. bliss, and so on, are to be comprised in all
+meditations.--But for the same reason then such qualities as 'having joy
+for its head' (Taitt. Up. II, 5) would also have to be included in all
+meditations on Brahman!--This the next Sūtra negatives.
+
+
+
+
+12. Such qualities as having joy for its head, and so on, are not
+established, for if there were difference (of members) there would be
+increase and decrease.
+
+The declaration that the essential qualities of Brahman are established
+for all meditations, does not imply that such attributes as 'having joy
+for its head' are equally established. For the latter are not qualities
+of Brahman, since they are mere elements in a figurative representation
+of Brahman under the form of an animal body. Otherwise, i.e. if Brahman
+really possessed different members, such as head, wings, and so on, it
+would be liable to increase and decrease, and this would be in conflict
+with texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.'--But if
+this reasoning holds good, then all the infinite qualities belonging to
+Brahman such as lordly power, generosity, compassion, and so on--all of
+which are incapable of existing apart from the subject to which they
+belong-would have to be comprehended in all those meditations on Brahman
+where they are not expressly mentioned; and this could not possibly be
+done, as those qualities are infinite in number.--This difficulty the
+next Sūtra removes.
+
+
+
+
+13. But the others, on account of equality with the thing.
+
+Those other qualities which are 'equal to the thing,' i. e. which are
+attributes determining the essential character of the thing, and
+therefore necessarily entering into the idea of the thing, must be
+included in all meditations, no less than the thing itself. To this
+class belong qualities such as true being, knowledge, bliss, purity,
+infinity, and so on. For of Brahman--which by texts such as 'that from
+which all these beings,' &c. had been suggested as the cause of the
+world--the essential definition is given in texts such as 'the True,
+knowledge, infinite is Brahman'; 'bliss is Brahman,' and others; and
+hence, in order that a true notion may be formed of Brahman as the
+object of meditation, such qualities as true being, bliss, and so on,
+have to be included in all meditations on Brahman. Such additional
+qualities, on the other hand, as e.g. compassion, which indeed cannot
+exist apart from the subject to which they belong, but are not necessary
+elements of the idea of Brahman, are to be included in those meditations
+only where they are specially mentioned.
+
+But, an objection is raised, if 'having joy for its head' and the like
+are not qualities of Brahman, but merely serve the purpose of a
+figurative representation of Brahman, for what purpose then is this
+representation introduced? For if something is represented as something
+else, there must be some motive for doing so. Where, e.g. the sacred
+text compares the meditating devotee to a charioteer, its body and
+organs to a chariot, and so on, it does so for the purpose of assisting
+the subjection to the Self of the means of meditation, i.e. the body,
+the senses, and so on. But in the present case no such purpose is to be
+discerned, and hence it must needs be admitted that having joy for its
+head, and so on, are real qualities of Brahman.--The next Sūtra disposes
+of this difficulty.
+
+
+
+
+14. For meditation, owing to the absence of purpose.
+
+As no other purpose can be assigned, the text must be supposed to
+represent Brahman as having joy for its head, and so on, for the purpose
+of meditation. In order to accomplish the meditation on Brahman which is
+enjoined in the text 'he who knows (i.e. meditates on) Brahman reaches
+the Highest,' the text represents the Brahman consisting of bliss as
+made up of joy, satisfaction, &c., and compares these to the head, the
+wings, and so on. The Self of bliss, which is the inmost of all the
+Selfs mentioned in the text, is by this means represented to the mind in
+a definite shape; just as in the preceding sections the Self of food,
+the Self of breath, and the rest had similarly been represented in
+definite shapes, consisting of head, wings, and so on. As thus the
+qualities of having joy for its head, &c. are merely secondary marks of
+the Self of bliss, they are not necessarily included in each meditation
+that involves the idea of that Self.
+
+
+
+
+15. And on account of the term 'Self.'
+
+That this is so further follows from the fact that in the clause
+'different from this is the inner Self consisting of bliss' the term
+'Self is used. For as the Self cannot really possess a head, wings, and
+tail, its having joy for its head, and so on, can only be meant in a
+metaphorical sense, for the sake of easier comprehension.--But, in the
+preceding sections, the term _Self_ had been applied to what is _not_ of
+the nature of Self--the text speaking of the Self of breath, the Self of
+mind, and so on; how then are we able to determine that in the phrase
+'the Self of bliss' the term Self denotes a true _Self_?--To this the
+next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+16. There is reference to the Self, as in other places; on account of
+the subsequent passage.
+
+In the clause,'different from that is the Self of bliss,' the term Self
+can refer to the highest Self only; 'as in other cases,' i.e. as in
+other passages--'the Self only was this in the beginning; it thought,
+let me send forth the worlds,' and similar ones--the term 'Self denotes
+the highest Self only.--But whereby is this proved?--'By the subsequent
+passagel, i.e. by the passage, 'he desired, may I be many, may I grow
+forth,'--which refers to the Self of bliss.
+
+
+
+
+17. If it be said 'on account of connexion'; it may be so, on account of
+ascertainment.
+
+But as in the preceding sections the term Self is seen to be connected
+with what is not of the nature of the Self, such as the Self of breath,
+and so on, it is not possible to draw a valid conclusion from the
+subsequent passage!--It _is_ possible, the Sūtra replies, 'on account of
+ascertainment.' For the previous clause, 'from that Self there
+originated the Ether,' settles in the mind the idea of the highest Self,
+and that idea then is transferred in succession to the (so-called) Self
+of breath, the Self of mind, and so on, until it finally finds rest in
+the Self of bliss, beyond which there is no other Self; while at the
+same time the subsequent clause 'he desired' confirms the idea of the
+highest Self. The term Self thus connects itself from the beginning with
+things which are not true Selfs, because the highest Self is as it were
+viewed in them.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'bliss and the rest.'
+
+
+
+
+18. The new (thing is enjoined); on account of the statement of what has
+to be done.
+
+The Sūtra discusses an additional question connected with the meditation
+on breath. Both texts--the Chāndogya as well as the Vājasaneyaka-declare
+that water constitutes a dress for prana, and refer to the rinsing of
+the mouth with water. The doubt here arises whether what the texts mean
+to enjoin is the rinsing of the mouth, or a meditation on prāna as
+having water for its dress.--The Pūrvapakshin maintains the former view;
+for, he says, the Vājasaneyaka uses the injunctive form 'he is to rinse,'
+while there is no injunctive form referring to the meditation; and
+what the text says in praise of the breath thus not being allowed to
+remain naked may be taken as a mere glorification of the act of rinsing.
+And as ordinary rinsing of the mouth, subsequent to eating, is already
+established by Smriti and custom, we must conclude that the text means
+to enjoin rinsing of the mouth of a different kind, viz. as auxiliary to
+the meditation on prāna.--To this the Sūtra replies that what the text
+enjoins is the new' thing, i.e. the previously non-established
+meditation on water as forming the dress of prāna. 'On account of the
+statement of what has to be done,' i.e. on account of the statement of
+what is not established--for only on the latter condition Scripture has
+a meaning. The beginning as well as the end of the Vājasaneyaka-text
+clearly refers to a meditation on the water used for rinsing as forming
+a dress for prāna; and as rinsing is already established by Smriti and
+custom, we naturally infer that what the text enjoins is a meditation on
+breath as having the water used in rinsing for its dress. This also
+explains why the Chāndogya-text does not mention the rinsing at all, but
+merely the clothing of breath with water.--Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'the statement of what has to be done.'
+
+
+
+
+19. And (the qualities) thus being equal, on account of non-difference.
+
+In the book of the Vājasaneyaka, called Agnirahasya, we meet with a
+meditation on Brahman called Sāndilyavidyā; and there is also a Sāndilya-
+vidyā in the Brihadāranyaka. The Pūrvapakshin holds that these two
+meditations are different since the latter text mentions qualities--such
+as Brahman being the lord of all--which are not mentioned in the former;
+the objects of meditation thus being different, the meditations
+themselves are different.--This the Sūtra negatives. The object of
+meditation is 'equal,' for both texts state the same qualities, such as
+'consisting of mind,' and so on; and the additional qualities stated in
+the Brihad-āranyaka, such as the rulership of Brahman,'do not differ'
+from those equally stated by both texts, such as Brahman realising all
+its purposes, and so on. Thus the objects of meditation do not differ in
+character.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what is equal.'
+
+
+
+
+20. On account of connexion, thus elsewhere also.
+
+In the Brihad-āranyaka (V, 5) it is said that Brahman is to be meditated
+upon as abiding within the orb of the sun and within the right eye; and
+then the text mentions two secret names of Brahman--_aham_ and _ahar_.
+Here the Pūrvapakshin holds that both these names are to be comprehended
+in each of the two meditations 'On account of connexion,' i.e. on
+account of the object of meditation, i.e. Brahman being one only,
+although connected with different abodes, it is 'thus elsewhere also,' i.
+e. the same conclusion which had been arrived at in the case of the
+Sāndilya-vidyās, has to be accepted with regard to Brahman abiding in
+the sun and in the eye. The meditation is one only, and hence the two
+secret names apply to Brahman in both its abodes.--This view the next
+Sūtra negatives.
+
+
+
+
+21. Or not so, on account of difference.
+
+This is not so, for as Brahman is to be meditated upon in two different
+abodes, the meditations are separate. In both the Sāndilya-vidyās, on
+the other hand, Brahman is to be meditated upon as abiding within the
+heart.
+
+
+
+
+22. The text also declares this.
+
+That the qualities of that which abides within the sun and that which
+abides in the eye are not to be combined, the text itself moreover shows
+by specially stating that the characteristics of the one are those of
+the other. For such a special transfer of qualities is needed only where
+the qualities are not of themselves established, i.e. where the two
+things are naturally different.--Here terminates the adhikarana of
+'connexion,'
+
+
+
+
+23. And for the same reason the holding together and the pervading the
+sky.
+
+In the Taittiriyaka and in the khilas of the Rānāyanīyas we have the
+following passage: 'Gathered together are the powers among which Brahman
+is the oldest; Brahman as the oldest in the beginning stretched out the
+sky. Brahman was born as the first of all beings; who may rival that
+Brahman?' which declares that Brahman gathered together all the most
+ancient powers, that it pervades the sky, and so on. And as these
+attributes are not stated in connexion with any special meditation, we
+must infer that they are to be included in all meditations whatever on
+Brahman.--This primā facie view is controverted by the Sūtra. The
+holding together of all powers, &c., although not mentioned in connexion
+with any special meditation, is not to be included in all meditations
+whatever, but to be connected with particular meditations 'on the same
+ground,' i.e. according to difference of place. _Where_ those qualities
+have to be included must be decided on the ground of feasibility. The
+attribute of pervading the whole heaven cannot be included in a
+meditation on Brahman as abiding within a small place such as the heart,
+and hence the other attributes also which are stated together with the
+attribute mentioned cannot be included in those meditations. And when we
+find that in meditations on Brahman as abiding within a small place it
+is said that Brahman is greater than the earth, or that the ether within
+the heart is as great as the universal ether, these attributes cannot be
+taken in their literal sense and hence included in those meditations,
+but must be viewed as merely meant to glorify the object proposed for
+meditation.--Herewith terminates the adhikarana of 'holding together.'
+
+
+
+
+24. And although (they both be) meditations on man; on account of others
+not being recorded.
+
+In the Taittiriyaka as well as the Chāndogya we meet with a meditation
+on man (purusha-vidyā), in which parts of the sacrifice are fancifully
+identified with the parts of the human body.--Here the Pūrvapakshin
+maintains that these two meditations are identical; for, he says, both
+meditations have the same name (purusha-vidyā), and the same character
+as stated above; and as the Taittirīyaka mentions no fruit of the
+meditation, the fruit declared in the Chāndogya holds good for the
+Taittirīyaka also, and thus there is no difference of fruit.--This view
+the Sūtra negatives. Although both meditations are meditations on man,
+yet they are separate 'on account of the others not being recorded,' i.e.
+on account of the qualities recorded in one sākhā not being recorded in
+the other. For the Taittirīyaka mentions the three libations, while the
+Chāndogya does not, and so on. The character of the two meditations thus
+differs. And there is a difference of result also. For an examination of
+the context in the Taittirīyaka shows that the purusha-vidyā is merely a
+subordinate part of a meditation on Brahman, the fruit of which the text
+declares to be that the devotee reaches the greatness of Brahman; while
+the Chāndogya meditation is an independent one, and has for its reward
+the attainment of long life. The two meditations are thus separate, and
+hence the details of one must not be included in the other.--Here
+terminates the adhikarana of 'the meditation on man.'
+
+
+
+
+25. On account of the difference of sense of piercing and so on.
+
+The text of the Ātharvanikas exhibits at the beginning of their
+Upanishad some mantras, 'Pierce the sukra, pierce the heart.' The
+followers of the Sāma-veda read at the beginning of their rahasya-
+brāhmana 'O God Savitri, promote the sacrifice.' The Kāthakas and the
+Taittirīyakas have 'May Mitra be propitious to us, may Varuna be
+propitious.' The Sātyāyanins have 'Thou art a white horse, a tawny and a
+black one!' The Kaushītakins have a Brāhmana referring to the Mahavrata-
+ceremony, 'Indra having slain Vritra became great.' The Kaushītakins
+also have a Mahāvrata-brāhmana. 'Prajāpati is the year; his Self is that
+Mahāvrata.' The Vājasaneyins have a Brāhmana referring to the Pravargya,
+'The gods sat down for a sattra-celebration.' With reference to all this
+a doubt arises whether these mantras and the sacrificial works referred
+to in the Brāhmana texts form parts of the meditations enjoined in the
+Upanishads or not.--The Pūrvapakshin affirms this, on the ground that as
+the mantras and works are mentioned in the immediate neighbourhood of
+the meditations the idea of their forming parts of the latter naturally
+presents itself. Such mantras as 'pierce the heart' and works such as
+the pravargya may indeed--on the basis of direct statement (sruti),
+inferential mark (linga), and syntactical connexion (vākya), which are
+stronger than mere proximity--be understood to be connected with certain
+actions; but, on the other hand, mantras such as 'May Varuna be
+propitious' have no application elsewhere, and are suitable
+introductions to meditations. We therefore take them to be parts of the
+meditations, and hence hold that those mantras are to be included in all
+meditations.--This view the Sūtra sets aside 'on account of the
+difference of sense of piercing, and so on.' The inferential marks
+contained in texts such as 'pierce the sukra, pierce the heart'; 'I
+shall speak the right, I shall speak the true,' show that the mantras
+have an application in connexion with certain magical practices, or else
+the study of the Veda, and the like, and do not therefore form part of
+meditations. That is to say--in the same way as the mantra 'pierce the
+heart' enables us to infer that also the mantra 'pierce the sukra'
+belongs to some magical rite, so we infer from the special meaning of
+mantras such as 'I shall speak the right,' &c., that also mantras such
+as 'May Mitra be propitious' are connected with the study of the Veda,
+and do not therefore form part of meditations. That mantras of this kind
+and Brāhmana passages relative to the Pravargya and the like are placed
+at the beginning of Upanishads is owing to their having, like the latter,
+to be studied in the forest.--Herewith terminates the adhikarana of
+'piercing and the like.'
+
+
+
+
+26. But in the case of the getting rid of (it has to be combined with
+the obtaining), as it is supplementary to statements of obtaining; as in
+the case of the kusas, the metres, the praise, and the singing. This has
+been explained.
+
+The Chandogas read in their text 'Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes
+his hair, and shaking off the body as the moon frees herself from the
+mouth of Rāhu, I obtain the world of Brahman' (Ch. Up. VIII, 13). The
+Ātharvanikas have 'He who knows, shaking off good and evil, free from
+passion, reaches the highest oneness.' The Sātyāyanins have 'His sons
+obtain his inheritance, his friends the good, his enemies the evil he
+has done.' The Kaushītakins 'He shakes off his good and his evil deeds.
+His beloved relatives obtain the good, his unbeloved relatives the evil
+he has done.' Two of these texts mention only the shaking off, on the
+part of him who knows, of his good and evil works; one mentions only the
+obtainment of these works, on the part of friends and enemies; and one
+mentions both these occurrences.--Now both the occurrences, although
+mentioned in several meditations, must be considered elements of all
+meditations: for whoever, on the basis of a knowledge of Brahman,
+reaches Brahman, necessarily leaves behind all his good and evil works,
+and those works unless thus left behind cannot be obtained by others.
+Meditation on those two matters therefore enters as an element into all
+meditations. The doubtful point, however, is whether there is option
+between the meditation on the abandonment of works, and that on the
+obtainment of works by others, and that on both these events; or whether
+in each case all these meditations are to be combined.--There is option,
+the Pūrvapakshin holds; for the reason that the texts make different
+declarations on this point. For, if the meditations had to be combined,
+there would be in each case meditation on both the matters mentioned;
+and as such double meditation is established by the Kaushitakin text, it
+would follow that the statements of the other texts are without meaning.
+Thus the only motive for the declarations made in different places can
+be to allow option. Nor must this conclusion be controverted on the
+ground that declarations of the same matter, made in different places,
+are made with reference to the difference of students severally reading
+the several texts; for this holds good in those cases only where
+identical statements are made in different texts; while in the case
+under discussion two sākhās mention the abandonment of works, and one
+their passing over to other persons. Nor can you account for the
+difference of statement on the ground of difference of vidyās; for you
+yourself maintain that the meditations in question form part of all
+meditations.--This view the Sūtra impugns, 'but where the getting rid of
+is mentioned,' &c. Where a text mentions either the abandonment only of
+works or only their being obtained by others, both these matters must
+necessarily be combined, since the statement as to the works being
+obtained forms a supplement to the statement of their being abandoned.
+For the former statement declares the place to which the good and evil
+works, got rid of by him who knows Brahman, are transferred.--This
+supplementary relation of two statements the Sūtra illustrates by some
+parallel cases. A clause in the text of the Sātyāyanins, 'the kusas are
+the children of the udumbara tree,' forms a defining supplement to a
+more general statement in the text of the Kaushītakins, 'the kusas are
+the children of the tree.' The clause, 'the metres of the gods are prior,'
+defines the order of the metres which in other texts mentioning 'the
+metres of the gods and Asuras' had been left undefined, and therefore
+forms a supplement to those texts. Analogous is the relation of the
+clause, 'he assists the stotra of the shodasin when the sun has half
+risen,' to the less definite statement 'he assists with gold the stotra
+of the shodasin;' and the relation of the clause, 'the adhvaryu is not
+to sing,' to the general injunction 'all the priests join in the singing.'
+Unless we admit that one statement, which defines some other more
+general statement, may stand to the latter in a supplementary relation,
+we are driven to assume an optional proceeding, and this is
+objectionable as long as there is any other way open; according to a
+principle laid down in the Pūrva Mīmāmsā (X, 8, 15). As the clauses
+referring to the abandonment of the works, and those referring to their
+being taken up by others, thus form one connected whole, there is no
+such thing as mere abandonment and mere taking up, and hence there can
+be no option between the two. That the text of the Kaushītakins mentions
+both thus explains itself, on the ground that the several declarations
+of what is really only one and the same matter are directed to different
+hearers.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'getting rid of.'
+
+
+
+
+27. At departing; there being nothing to be reached. For thus others
+(also declare).
+
+The further question arises whether the putting off of all good and evil
+deeds takes place only at the time when the soul leaves the body, or
+also after it has departed and is on its journey to the world of Brahman.
+The Pūrvapakshin holds the latter view, for, he says, the texts declare
+both. The Kaushītakins say that the soul shakes off its good and evil
+deeds when it crosses the river Virajā in the world of Brahman; while
+the Tāndins say 'Shaking off all evil, and shaking off the body,' &c.,
+which shows that the deeds are shaken off at the time when the soul
+leaves the body. And when the Sātyāyanaka says that 'his sons obtain his
+inheritance, his friends his good deeds,' and so on, this also intimates
+that the deeds are shaken off at the time when the soul leaves the body.
+We therefore must conclude that a part of the deeds is left behind at
+the moment of death, and the remainder on the journey to the world of
+Brahman.--This view the Sūtra controverts. All the good and evil deeds
+of the dying man are left behind, without remainder, at the time when
+the soul parts from the body. For after the soul of him who knows has
+departed from the body, 'there is nothing to be reached,' i.e. there are
+no further pleasures and pains to be enjoyed as the result of good and
+evil deeds, different from the obtaining of Brahman, which is the fruit
+of knowledge. Thus others 'also declare that, subsequently to the soul's
+departure from the body, there is no enjoyment of any pain or pleasure
+different from the obtaining of Brahman. 'But when he is free of the
+body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him'; 'Thus does that
+serene being, rising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as
+it has approached the highest light' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1; 3); 'For him
+there is delay only so long as he is not freed (from the body); then he
+will be perfect' (VI, 14, 2).
+
+
+
+
+28. As it is desired; on account of there being no contradiction of
+either.
+
+The time when good and evil deeds are left behind thus having been
+determined on the basis of the reason of the thing, the several words of
+the passages must be construed as it is desired, i.e. so as not to
+contradict either, i.e. either the declaration of scripture or the
+reason of the thing. Thus in the text of the Kaushītakins the later
+clause, 'he shakes off his good and evil deeds,' must be taken as coming
+before the earlier passage 'having entered on that path of the gods.'--
+Here the Pūrvapakshin raises a new objection.
+
+
+
+
+29. There is meaning of the soul's going (only) on the twofold
+hypothesis; for otherwise there is contradiction.
+
+It is only on the hypothesis of a part of the good and evil works being
+left behind at the time of the soul's departure from the body, and
+another part later on, and the effacement of works thus taking place in
+a double way, that a sense can be found in the scriptural declaration of
+the soul proceeding on the path of the gods. For otherwise there would
+be a contradiction. For if all the works perished at the time of the
+soul's departure from the body, the subtle body also would perish, and
+if this were so, no going on the part of the mere Self would be possible.
+It is not therefore possible that at the time of the soul's departure
+from the body all works should perish without a remainder.--To this the
+next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+30. (That assumption) is justified; on account of the perception of
+things which are marks of that; as in ordinary experience.
+
+The assumption of all the works perishing at the time of 'departure'
+involves no contradiction; since we perceive, in the sacred texts,
+matters which are marks of connexion with a body even on the part of the
+soul which has divested itself of all its works and become manifest in
+its true nature. Compare 'Having approached the highest light he
+manifests himself in his true form'; 'He moves about there laughing,
+playing, and rejoicing'; 'He becomes a self-ruler, he moves about in all
+worlds according to his will'; 'He becomes one, he becomes three,' &c.
+(Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3; VII, 25, 2; 26, 2). All these texts refer to the
+soul's connexion with a body. The soul therefore, joined to the subtle
+body, may proceed on the path of the gods, even after all its works have
+passed away. But how can the subtle body persist, when the works which
+originate it have passed away? Through the power of knowledge, we reply.
+Knowledge does not indeed by itself originate the subtle body, but it
+possesses the power of making that body persist, even after the gross
+body--which is the instrument for the experience of all ordinary pains
+and pleasures--and all works have passed away, so as thereby to make the
+soul capable of moving on the path of the gods, and thus to obtain
+Brahman which is the fruit of knowledge. 'As in ordinary life.' As in
+ordinary life, a tank, which may have been made with a view to the
+irrigation of rice-fields and the like, is maintained and used for the
+purpose of drawing drinking-water, and so on, even after the intentions
+which originally led to its being made have passed away.--Here an
+objection is raised. It may be admitted, that at the time when a man
+possessing true knowledge dies, all his works pass away without a
+remainder, and that the subtle body only remains, enabling him to move
+towards Brahman; but it cannot be held that the soul in that state does
+not experience pain and pleasure; for we know from sacred tradition that
+Vasishtha, Avāntara-tamas, and others, who had reached intuition of the
+highest truth, entered after death on other embodiments, and experienced
+pain and pleasure due to the birth of sons, various calamities, and so
+on.--To this the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+31. Of those who have a certain office there is subsistence (of their
+works) as long as the office lasts.
+
+We do not maintain that all those who have reached true knowledge divest
+themselves at the time of death of all their good and evil works; we
+limit our view to those who immediately after death attain to moving on
+the path, the first stage of which is light. Persons like Vasishtha, on
+the other hand, who are entrusted with certain offices, do not
+immediately after death attain to moving on the path beginning with
+light, since the duties undertaken by them are not completely
+accomplished. In the case of beings of this kind, who owing to
+particular deeds have been appointed to particular offices, the effect
+of the works which gave rise to the office does not pass away before
+those offices are completely accomplished; for the effect of a work is
+exhausted only through the complete enjoyment of its result. In the case
+of those persons, therefore, the effects of the works which gave rise to
+their office continue to exist as long as the office itself, and hence
+they do not after death enter on the path beginning with light.--Here
+terminates the adhikarana of 'passing away.'
+
+
+
+
+32. There is no restriction (since) all (have to go on that path).
+(Thus) there is non-contradiction of sacred text and Smriti.
+
+The question here is whether Brahman is to be reached on the path of the
+gods by those only who take their stand on those meditations which, like
+the Upakosala-vidyā, describe that path, or by all who practise any of
+the meditations on Brahman. The Pūrvapakshin holds the former view,
+since there is no proof to show that in other vidyās the going on that
+path is not mentioned, and since those other vidyās-such as the texts
+'and those who in the forest meditate on faith and austerities,'and'
+those who in the forest worship faith, the True' (Ch. Up. V, 10, 1; Bri.
+Up. VI, 2, 15)--suggest to the mind the idea of the knowledge of Brahman.
+This the Sūtra negatives. There is no restriction to that limited class
+of devotees, since all who carry on meditations have to go on that path.
+For on this latter assumption only text and inference, i.e. scripture
+and authoritative tradition, are not contradicted. As to scripture, the
+Chāndogya and the Vājasaneyaka alike, in the Pańkāgni-vidyā, declare
+that all those who practise meditation go on that path. In the
+Vājasaneyaka the words 'who know this' refer to those who practise the
+meditation on the five fires, while the following words 'those who in
+the forest meditate on faith and the True' refer to those who meditate
+on Brahman; and the text then goes on to say that all those devotees go
+to Brahman, on the path of the gods. Texts such as 'the True, knowledge,
+infinite is Brahman,' and 'the True must be enquired into,' prove that
+the term 'the True' denotes Brahman; and as in the Chāndogya the term
+'tapas' occurs in the corresponding place, we conclude that both these
+terms, viz. _the True_ and tapas, denote nothing else but Brahman.
+Meditation on Brahman, preceded by faith, is mentioned elsewhere also;
+in the text which begins 'The True must be enquired into' we read
+further on 'Faith must be enquired into' (Ch. Up. VII, 18, 16; 19).
+Smriti also declares that all those who know Brahman proceed on the path
+of the gods, 'Fire, the light, the day, the bright fortnight, the six
+months of the sun's northern progress--proceeding by that road those who
+know Brahman go to Brahman' (Bha. Gī. VIII, 24). And there are many
+other Sruti and Smriti passages of this kind. The conclusion therefore
+is that the Upakosalavidyā and similar texts merely refer to that going
+of the soul which is common to all vidyās.--Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'non-restriction.'
+
+
+
+
+33. But the conceptions of the Imperishable are to be comprised (in all
+meditations). There being equality (of the Brahman to be meditated on)
+and (those conceptions) existing (in Brahman); as in the case of what
+belongs to the upasad. This has been explained.
+
+We read in the Brihad-āranyaka (III, 8, 9),'O Gārgī, the Brāhmanas call
+that the Akshara. It is neither coarse nor fine,' and so on. And in the
+Atharvana (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5) we have 'The higher knowledge is that by
+which the Akshara is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized,'
+&c. The doubt here arises whether all the qualities there predicated of
+Brahman--called akshara, i.e. the Imperishable--and constituting
+something contrary in nature to the apparent world, are to be included
+in all meditations on Brahman, or only those where the text specially
+mentions them. The Pūrvapakshin advocates the latter view; for, he says,
+there is no authority for holding that the qualities which characterise
+one meditation are characteristic of other meditations also; and such
+negative attributes as are mentioned in those two texts do not--as
+positive qualities such as bliss do--contribute to the apprehension of
+the true nature of Brahman. What those two texts do is merely to deny of
+Brahman, previously apprehended as having bliss, and so on, for its
+essential qualities, certain qualities belonging to the empirical world,
+such as grossness, and so on; for all negation must refer to an
+established basis.--This view the Sūtra refutes. The ideas of absence of
+grossness, and so on, which are connected with Brahman viewed as the
+Akshara, are to be included in all meditations on Brahman. For the
+imperishable (akshara) Brahman is the same in all meditations, and
+qualities such as non-grossness enter into the conception of its
+essential nature. The apprehension of a thing means the apprehension of
+its specific character. But mere bliss, and so on, does not suggest the
+specific character of Brahman, since those qualities belong also to the
+individual soul. What is specifically characteristic of Brahman is bliss,
+and so on, in so far as fundamentally opposed to all evil and
+imperfection. The individual soul, on the other hand, although
+fundamentally free from evil, yet is capable of connexion with evil. Now
+being fundamentally opposed to evil implies having a character the
+opposite of grossness and all similar qualities which belong to the
+empirical world, material and mental. He therefore who thinks of Brahman
+must think of it as having for its essential nature bliss, knowledge,
+and so on, in so far as distinguished by absence of grossness and the
+like, and those qualities, being no less essential than bliss, and so on,
+must therefore be included in all meditations on Brahman.--The Sūtra
+gives an instance illustrating the principle that qualities (secondary
+matters) follow the principal matter to which they belong. As the mantra
+'Agnir vai hotram vetu,' although given in the Sāma-veda, yet has to be
+recited in the Yajur-veda style, with a subdued voice, because it stands
+in a subordinate relation to the upasad-offerings prescribed for the
+four-days 'sacrifice called Jamadagnya; those offerings are the
+principal matter to which the subordinate matter--the mantra--has to
+conform. This point is explained in the first section, i.e. in the Pūrva
+Mīmāmsā-sūtras III, 3, 9.--But this being admitted, it would follow that
+as Brahman is the principal matter in all meditations on Brahman, and
+secondary matters have to follow the principal matter, also such
+qualities as 'doing all works, enjoying all odours and the like,' which
+are mentioned in connexion with special meditations only, would
+indiscriminately have to be included in all meditations.--With reference
+to this the next Sūtra says.
+
+
+
+
+34. So much; on account of reflection.
+
+Only so much, i.e. only those qualities which have to be included in all
+meditations on Brahman, without which the essential special nature of
+Brahman cannot be conceived, i.e. bliss, knowledge, and so on,
+characterised by absence of grossness and the like. Other qualities,
+such as doing all works and the like, although indeed following their
+substrate, are explicitly to be meditated on in special meditations only.--
+Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the idea of the Imperishable.'
+
+
+
+
+35. Should it be said that (the former reply refers) to that Self to
+which the aggregate of material things belongs (since) otherwise the
+difference (of the two replies) could not be accounted for; we say--no;
+as in the case of instruction
+
+In the Brihad-aranyaka (III, 4; 5) the same question is asked twice in
+succession ('Tell me the Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the
+Self who is within all'), while Yājńavalkya gives a different answer to
+each ('He who breathes in the upbreathing,' &c.; 'He who overcomes
+hunger and thirst,' &c.). The question here is whether the two
+meditations, suggested by these sections, are different or not. They are
+different, since the difference of reply effects a distinction between
+the two vidyās. The former reply declares him who is the maker of
+breathing forth, and so on to be the inner Self of all; the latter
+describes him as free from hunger, thirst, and so on. It thence appears
+that the former passage refers to the inner (individual) Self which is
+different from body, sense-organs, internal organ and vital breath;
+while the latter refers to that which again differs from the inner Self,
+viz. the highest Self, free from hunger, thirst, and so on. As the
+individual soul is inside the aggregate of material things, it may be
+spoken of as being that inner Self of all. Although this kind of
+inwardness is indeed only a relative one, we nevertheless must accept it
+in this place; for if, desirous of taking this 'being the inner Self of
+all' in its literal sense, we assumed the highest Self to be meant, the
+difference of the two replies could not be accounted for. The former
+reply evidently refers to the individual soul, since the highest Self
+cannot be conceived as breathing forth, and so on; and the latter reply,
+which declares the Self to be raised above hunger, &c., evidently refers
+to the highest Self. This is expressed in the earlier part of the Sūtra:
+'The former reply refers to the Self to which there belongs the
+aggregate of material things, i.e. the individual soul as being the
+inner Self of all; otherwise we could not account for the difference of
+the two replies.'--The last words of the Sūtra negative this--'not so,'
+i.e. there is no difference of vidyās, since both assertions and replies
+refer to the highest Self. The question says in both places, 'the
+Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the Self who is within all,'
+and this clearly refers to the highest Self only. We indeed observe that
+in some places the term _Brahman_ is, in a derived sense, applied to the
+individual soul also; but the text under discussion, for distinction's
+sake, adds the qualification 'the Brahman which is manifest' (sākshāt).
+The quality of 'aparokshatva' (i.e. being that which does not transcend
+the senses but lies openly revealed) also, which implies being connected
+with all space and all time, suits Brahman only, which from texts such
+as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' is known to be infinite.
+In the same way the attribute of being the inner Self of all can belong
+to the highest Self only, which texts such as 'He who dwelling within
+the earth,' &c., declare to be the inner ruler of the universe. The
+replies to the two questions likewise can refer to Brahman only. The
+unconditional causal agency with regard to breath, declared in the
+clause 'he who breathes in the upbreathing,' &c., can belong to the
+highest Self only, not to the individual soul, since the latter
+possesses no such causal power when in the state of deep sleep. Ushasta
+thereupon, being not fully enlightened, since causality with regard to
+breathing may in a sense be attributed to the individual soul also,
+again asks a question, in reply to which Yājńavalkya clearly indicates
+Brahman, 'Thou mayest not see the seer of sight,' &c., i.e. thou must
+not think that my previous speech has named as the causal agent of
+breathing the individual soul, which is the causal agent with regard to
+those activities which depend on the sense-organs, viz. seeing, hearing,
+thinking, and knowing; for in the state of deep sleep, swoon, and so on,
+the soul possesses no such power. And moreover another text also--'Who
+could breathe if that bliss existed not in the ether?' (Taitt. Up. II,
+7)--declares that the highest Self only is the cause of the breathing of
+all living beings. In the same way the answer to the second question can
+refer to the highest Self only, which alone can be said to be raised
+above hunger, thirst, and so on. For this reason also both replies wind
+up with the same phrase, 'Everything else is of evil.' The iteration of
+question and reply serves the purpose of showing that the same highest
+Brahman which is the cause of all breathing is beyond all hunger, thirst,
+and so on.--The Sūtra subjoins a parallel instance. 'As in the case of
+instruction.' As in the vidyā of that which truly is (Ch. Up. VI, 1 ff.),
+question and reply are iterated several times, in order to set forth the
+various greatness and glory of Brahman.--Thus the two sections under
+discussion are of the same nature, in so far as setting forth that the
+one Brahman which is the inner Self of all is the cause of all life and
+raised beyond all imperfections; and hence they constitute one
+meditation only.--To this a new objection is raised. The two sections
+may indeed both refer to the highest Brahman; nevertheless there is a
+difference of meditation, as according to the one Brahman is to be
+meditated upon as the cause of all life, and according to the other as
+raised above all defects; this difference of character distinguishes the
+two meditations. And further there is a difference of interrogators; the
+first question being asked by Ushasta, the second by Kahola.
+
+
+
+
+36. There is interchange (of ideas), for the texts distinguish; as in
+other cases.
+
+There is no difference of vidyā because both questions and answers have
+one subject-matter, and because the one word that possesses enjoining
+power proves the connexion of the two sections. Both questions have for
+their topic Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all; and in the second
+question the word 'eva' ('just,' 'very') in 'Tell me just that Brahman,'
+&c., proves that the question of Kahola has for its subject the Brahman,
+to the qualities of which the question of Ushasta had referred. Both
+answers again refer to the one Brahman, viewed as the Self of all. The
+idea of the injunction of the entire meditation again is suggested in
+the second section only, 'Therefore a Brahmana, after he has done with
+learning, is to wish to stand by real strength.' The object of
+meditation being thus ascertained to be one, there must be effected a
+mutual interchange of the ideas of Ushasta and Kahola, i.e. Ushasta's
+conception of Brahman being the cause of all life must be entertained by
+the interrogating Kahola also; and vice versa the conception of Kahola
+as to Brahman being beyond hunger, thirst, and so on, must be
+entertained by Ushasta also. This interchange being made, the difference
+of Brahman, the inner Self of all, from the individual soul is
+determined by both sections. For this is the very object of
+Yājńavalkya's replies: in order to intimate that the inner Self of all
+is different from the individual soul, they distinguish that Self as the
+cause of all life and as raised above hunger, thirst, and so on. Hence
+Brahman's being the inner Self of all is the only quality that is the
+subject of meditation; that it is the cause of life and so on are only
+means to prove its being such, and are not therefore to be meditated on
+independently.--But if this is so, to what end must there be made an
+interchange, on the part of the two interrogators, of their respective
+ideas?--Brahman having, on the ground of being the cause of all life,
+been ascertained by Ushasta as the inner Self of all, and different from
+the individual soul, Kahola renews the question, thinking that the inner
+Self of all must be viewed as different from the soul, on the ground of
+some special attribute which cannot possibly belong to the soul; and
+Yājńavalkya divining his thought thereon declares that the inner Self
+possesses an attribute which cannot possibly belong to the soul, viz.
+being in essential opposition to all imperfection. The interchange of
+ideas therefore has to be made for the purpose of establishing the idea
+of the individual nature of the object of meditation.--'As elsewhere,' i.
+e. as in the case of the knowledge of that which truly is, the repeated
+questions and replies only serve to define one and the same Brahman, not
+to convey the idea of the object of meditation having to be meditated on
+under new aspects.--But a new objection is raised--As there is, in the
+Sad-vidyā also, a difference between the several questions and answers,
+how is that vidyā known to be one?--To this question the next Sūtra
+replies.
+
+
+
+
+37. For one and the same (highest divinity), called the 'truly being,'
+and so on (is the subject of that meditation).
+
+For the highest divinity, called there _that which is_--which was
+introduced in the clause 'that divinity thought,' &c.--is intimated by
+all the following sections of that chapter. This is proved by the fact
+that the attributes--'that_ which truly _is' and so on--which were
+mentioned in the first section and confirmed in the subsequent ones, are
+finally summed up in the statement, 'in that all this has its Self, that
+is the True, that is the Self.'
+
+Some interpreters construe the last two Sūtras as constituting two
+adhikaranas. The former Sūtra, they say, teaches that the text, 'I am
+thou, thou art I,' enjoins a meditation on the soul and the highest Self
+as interchangeable. But as on the basis of texts such as 'All this is
+indeed Brahman,' 'all this has its Self in Brahman,' 'Thou art that,'
+the text quoted is as a matter of course understood to mean that there
+is one universal Self, the teaching which it is by those interpreters
+assumed to convey would be nothing new; and their interpretation
+therefore must be rejected. The point as to the oneness of the
+individual and the highest Self will moreover be discussed under IV, I,
+3. Moreover, there is no foundation for a special meditation on Brahman
+as the individual soul and the individual soul as Brahman, apart from
+the meditation on the Self of all being one.--The second Sūtra, they say,
+declares the oneness of the meditation on the True enjoined in the text,
+'whosoever knows this great wonderful first-born as the True Brahman'
+(_Bri_. Up. V, 4), and of the meditation enjoined in the subsequent
+passage (V, 5. 2), 'Now what is true, that is the Āditya, the person
+that dwells in yonder orb, and the person in the right eye.' But this
+also is untenable. For the difference of abode mentioned in the latter
+passage (viz. the abode in the sun and in the eye) establishes difference
+of vidyā, as already shown under Sū. III, 3, 21. Nor is it possible to
+assume that the two meditations comprised in the latter text which have
+a character of their own in so far as they view the True as embodied in
+syllables, and so on, and which are declared to be connected with a
+special result ('he who knows this destroys evil and leaves it'), should
+be identical with the one earlier meditation which has an independent
+character of its own and a result of its own ('he conquers these
+worlds'). Nor can it be said that the declaration of a fruit in 'he
+destroys evil and leaves it' refers merely to the fruit (not of the
+entire meditation but) of a subordinate part of the meditation; for
+there is nothing to prove this. The proof certainly cannot be said to
+lie in the fact of the vidyās being one; for this would imply reasoning
+in a circle, viz. as follows--it being settled that the vidyās are one,
+it follows that the fruit of the former meditation only is the main one,
+while the fruits of the two later meditations are subordinate ones; and--
+it being settled that those two later fruits are subordinate ones, it
+follows that, as thus there is no difference depending on connexion with
+fruits, the two later meditations are one with the preceding one.--All
+this proves that the two Sūtras can be interpreted only in the way
+maintained by us.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'being within.'
+
+
+
+
+38. Wishes and the rest, here and there; (as is known from the abode,
+and so on).
+
+We read in the Chāndogya (VIII, I, 1), 'There is that city of Brahman,
+and in it the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether,' &c.;
+and in the Vājasaneyaka, 'He is that great unborn Self who consists of
+knowledge,' and so on. A doubt here arises whether the two texts
+constitute one meditation or not.--The two meditations are separate, the
+Pūrvapakshin maintains; for they have different characters. The
+Chāndogya represents as the object of meditation the ether as
+distinguished by eight different attributes, viz. freedom from all evil
+and the rest; while, according to the Vājasaneyaka, the being to be
+meditated on is he who dwells within that ether, and is distinguished by
+attributes such as lordship, and so on.--To this we reply that the
+meditations are not distinct, since there is no difference of character.
+For desires and so on constitute that character 'here and there,' i.e.
+in both texts nothing else but Brahman distinguished by attributes, such
+as having true wishes, and so on, forms the subject of meditation. This
+is known 'from the abode and so on,' i.e. the meditation is recognised
+as the same because in both texts Brahman is referred to as abiding in
+the heart, being a bridge, and so on. Lordship and the rest, which are
+stated in the Vājasaneyaka, are special aspects of the quality of being
+capable to realise all one's purposes, which is one of the eight
+qualities declared in the Chāndogya, and as such prove that all the
+attributes going together with that quality in the Chāndogya are valid
+for the Vājasaneyaka also. The character of the two vidyās therefore
+does not differ. The connexion with a reward also does not differ, for
+it consists in both cases in attaining to Brahman; cp. Ch. Up. VIII, 12,
+3 'Having approached the highest light he is manifested in his own form,'
+and Bri. Up. V, 4, 24 'He becomes indeed the fearless Brahman.' That,
+in the Chāndogya-text, the term _ether_ denotes the highest Brahman, has
+already been determined under I, 3, 14. As in the Vājasaneyaka, on the
+other hand, he who abides in the ether is recognised as the highest Self,
+we infer that by the ether in which he abides must be understood the
+ether within the heart, which in the text 'within there is a little
+hollow space (sushira)' (Mahānār. Up. XI, 9) is called sushira. The two
+meditations are therefore one. Here an objection is raised. It cannot be
+maintained that the attributes mentioned in the Chāndogya have to be
+combined with those stated in the Vājasaneyaka (lordship, rulership, &c.
+), since even the latter are not truly valid for the meditation. For the
+immediately preceding passage, 'By the mind it is to be perceived that
+there is here no plurality: from death to death goes he who sees here
+any plurality; as one only is to be seen that eternal being, not to be
+proved by any means of proof,' as well as the subsequent text, 'that
+Self is to be described by No, no,' shows that the Brahman to be
+meditated upon is to be viewed as devoid of attributes; and from this we
+infer that the attributes of lordship and so on, no less than the
+qualities of grossness and the like, have to be denied of Brahman. From
+this again we infer that in the Chāndogya also the attributes of
+satyakāmatva and so on are not meant to be declared as Brahman's true
+qualities. All such qualities--as not being real qualities of Brahman--
+have therefore to be omitted in meditations aiming at final release.--
+This objection the next Sūtra disposes of.
+
+
+
+
+39. On account of emphasis there is non-omission.
+
+Attributes, such as having the power of immediately realising one's
+purposes, and so on, which are not by other means known to constitute
+attributes of Brahman, and are in the two texts under discussion, as
+well as in other texts, emphatically declared to be attributes of
+Brahman, as constituting the object of meditations undertaken with a
+view to final release, cannot be omitted from those meditations, but
+must be comprised within them. In the Chāndogya. the passage, 'Those who
+depart from hence, after having cognised the Self and those self-
+realising desires, move about at will in all those worlds,' enjoins the
+knowledge of Brahman as distinguished by the power of realising its
+desires and similar qualities, while the text, 'Those who depart from
+here not having cognised the Self, &c., do _not_ move about at will,' &c.,
+finds fault with the absence of such knowledge, and in this way
+emphasises the importance of the possession of it. In the same way the
+repeated declarations as to Brahman's ruling power ('the lord of all,
+the king of all beings,' &c.) show that stress is to be laid upon the
+quality indicated. It truly cannot be held that Scripture, which in
+tender regard to man's welfare is superior to a thousand of parents,
+should, deceitfully, give emphatic instruction as to certain qualities--
+not known through any other means of knowledge--which fundamentally
+would be unreal and hence utterly to be disregarded, and thus throw men
+desirous of release, who as it is are utterly confused by the
+revolutions of the wheel of Samsāra, into even deeper confusion and
+distress. That the text, 'there is not any diversity here; as one only
+is to be seen that eternal being,' teaches a unitary view of the world
+in so far as everything is an effect of Brahman and thus has Brahman for
+its Self, and negatives the view of plurality--established antecedently
+to Vedic teaching--as excluding Brahman's being the universal Self, we
+have explained before. In the clause 'not so, not so' the so refers back
+to the world as established by other means of proof, and the clause thus
+declares that Brahman who is the Self of all is different in nature from
+the world. This is confirmed by the subsequent passage, 'He is
+incomprehensible, for he is not comprehended, he is undecaying,' &c.;
+which means--as he is different in nature from what is comprehended by
+the other means of proof he is not grasped by those means; as he is
+different from what suffers decay he does not decay, and so on. And
+analogously, in the Chandogya, the text 'by the old age of the body he
+does not age' &c. first establishes Brahman's being different in nature
+from everything else, and then declares it to be satyakāma, and so on.--
+But, an objection is raised, the text, 'Those who depart from hence,
+having cognised the Self and those true desires, move about at will in
+all worlds. Thus he who desires the world of the fathers,' &c., really
+declares that the knowledge of Brahman as possessing the power of
+immediately realising its wishes has for its fruit something lying
+within the sphere of transmigratory existence, and from this we infer
+that for him who is desirous of release and of reaching Brahman the
+object of meditation is not to be found in Brahman in so far as
+possessing qualities. The fruit of the highest knowledge is rather
+indicated in the passage, 'Having approached the highest light it
+manifests itself in its own form'; and hence the power of realising its
+wishes and the rest are not to be included in the meditation of him who
+wishes to attain to Brahman.--To this objection the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+40. In the case of him who has approached (Brahman); just on that
+account, this being declared by the text.
+
+When the soul, released from all bonds and manifesting itself in its
+true nature, has approached, i.e. attained to Brahman; then just on that
+account, i.e. on account of such approach, the text declares it to
+possess the power of moving about at will in all worlds. 'Having
+approached the highest light he manifests himself in his true form. He
+is the highest Person. He moves about there laughing, playing,' &c. This
+point will be proved in greater detail in the fourth adhyāya. Meanwhile
+the conclusion is that such qualities as satyakāmatva have to be
+included in the meditation of him also who is desirous of release; for
+the possession of those qualities forms part of the experience of the
+released soul itself.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'wishes and the
+rest'
+
+
+
+
+41. There is non-restriction of determination, because this is seen; for
+there is a separate fruit, viz. non-obstruction.
+
+There are certain meditations connected with elements of sacrificial
+actions; as e.g. 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as udgītha.'
+These meditations are subordinate elements of the sacrificial acts with
+which they connect themselves through the udgītha and so on, in the same
+way as the quality of being made of parna wood connects itself with the
+sacrifice through the ladle (made of parna wood), and are to be
+undertaken on that very account. Moreover the statement referring to
+these meditations, viz. 'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith,
+with the Upanishad, that becomes more vigorous,' does not allow the
+assumption of a special fruit for these meditations (apart from the
+fruit of the sacrificial performance); while in the case of the ladle
+being made of parna wood the text mentions a special fruit ('he whose
+ladle is made of parna wood does not hear an evil sound'). The
+meditations in question are therefore necessarily to be connected with
+the particular sacrificial performances to which they belong.--This view
+the Sūtra refutes, 'There is non-restriction with regard to the
+determinations.' By 'determination' we have here to understand the
+definite settling of the mind in a certain direction, in other words,
+meditation. The meditations on the udgītha and so on are not definitely
+connected with the sacrificial performances; 'since that is seen,' i.e.
+since the texts themselves declare that there is no such necessary
+connexion; cp. the text, 'therefore both perform the sacrificial work,
+he who thus knows it (i. e. who possesses the knowledge implied in the
+meditations on the sacrifice), as well as he who does not know'--which
+declares that he also who does not know the meditations may perform the
+work. Were these meditations auxiliary elements of the works, there
+could be no such absence of necessary connexion (as declared in this
+text). It thus being determined that they are not auxiliary elements, a
+special result must be assigned to the injunction of meditation, and
+this we find in the greater strength which is imparted to the sacrifice
+by the meditation, and which is a result different from the result of
+the sacrifice itself. The _greater strength_ of the performance consists
+herein, that its result is not impeded, as it might be impeded, by the
+result of some other performance of greater force. This result, viz.
+absence of obstruction, is something apart from the general result of
+the action, such as the reaching of the heavenly world, and so on. This
+the Sūtra means when saying, 'for separate is non-obstruction.' As thus
+those meditations also which refer to auxiliary members of sacrifices
+have their own results, they may or may not be combined with the
+sacrifices, according to wish. Their case is like that of the godohana
+vessel which, with the view of obtaining a certain special result, may
+be used instead of the kamasa.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-
+restriction of determination.'
+
+
+
+
+42. Just as in the case of the offerings. This has been explained.
+
+In the daharavidyā (Ch. Up. VIII, 1 ff.) the text, 'those who depart
+having known here the Self, and those true desires,' declares at first a
+meditation on the small ether, i.e. the highest Self, and separately
+therefrom a meditation on its qualities, viz. true desires, and so on.
+The doubt here arises whether, in the meditation on those qualities, the
+meditation on the highest Self--as that to which the qualities belong--
+is to be repeated or not.--It is not to be repeated, the Pūrvapakshin
+maintains; for the highest Self is just that which is constituted by the
+qualities--freedom from all evil, and so on--and as that Self so
+constituted can be comprised in one meditation, there is no need of
+repeating the meditation on account of the qualities.--This view the
+Sūtra sets aside. The meditation has to be repeated. The highest Self
+indeed is that being to which alone freedom from evil and the other
+qualities belong, and it forms the object of the first meditation; yet
+there is a difference between it as viewed in its essential being and as
+viewed as possessing those qualities; and moreover, the clause 'free
+from evil, from old age,' &c. enjoins a meditation on the Self as
+possessing those qualities. It is therefore first to be meditated on in
+its essential nature, and then there takes place a repetition of the
+meditation on it in order to bring in those special qualities. The case
+is analogous to that of 'the offerings.' There is a text 'He is to offer
+a purodāsa on eleven potsherds to Indra the ruler, to Indra the supreme
+ruler, to Indra the self-ruler.' This injunction refers to one and the
+same Indra, possessing the qualities of rulership and so on; but as,
+through connexion with those several qualities, the aspects of Indra
+differ, the oblation of the purodāsa has to be repeated. This is
+declared in the Sānkarshana, 'The divinities are different on account of
+separation.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'offerings.'
+
+
+
+
+43. On account of the plurality of indicatory marks; for that (proof) is
+stronger. This also is declared (in the Pūrva Mīmāmsā).
+
+The Taittirīyaka contains another daharavidyā, 'The thousand-headed god,
+the all-eyed one,' &c. (Mahānār. Up. XI). Here the doubt arises whether
+this vidyā, as being one with the previously introduced vidyā, states
+qualities to be included in the meditation enjoined in that vidyā, or
+qualities to be included in the meditations on the highest Self as
+enjoined in all the Vedānta-texts.--The former is the case, the
+Pūrvapakshin holds, on account of the leading subject-matter. For in the
+preceding section (X) the meditation on the small ether is introduced as
+the subject-matter. 'There is the small lotus placed in the middle of
+the town (of the body), free from all evil, the abode of the Highest;
+within that there is a small space, free from sorrow--what is within
+that should be meditated upon' (Mahānār. Up. X, 23). Now, as the lotus
+of the heart is mentioned only in section X, the 'Nārāyana-section'
+('the heart resembling the bud of a lotus, with its point turned
+downwards,' XI, 6), we conclude that that section also is concerned with
+the object of meditation to which the daharavidyā refers.--Against this
+view the Sūtra declares itself, 'on account of the majority of
+indicatory marks'; i.e. there are in the text several marks proving that
+that section is meant to declare characteristics of that which
+constitutes the object of meditation in all meditations on the highest
+being. For that being which in those meditations is denoted as the
+Imperishable, Siva, Sambhu. the highest Brahman, the highest light, the
+highest entity, the highest Self, and so on, is here referred to by the
+same names, and then declared to be Nārāyana. There are thus several
+indications to prove that Nārāyana is none other than that which is the
+object of meditation in all meditations on the Highest, viz. Brahman,
+which has bliss and the rest for its qualities. By 'linga' (inferential
+mark) we here understand clauses (vākya) which contain a specific
+indication; for such clauses have, according to the Pūrva Mīmāmsā,
+greater proving power than leading subject-matter (prakarana). The
+argumentation that the clause 'the heart resembling the bud of a lotus
+flower,' &c., proves that section to stand in a dependent relation to
+the daharavidyā, is without force; for it being proved by a stronger
+argument that the section refers to that which is the object of
+meditation in all meditations, the clause mentioned may also be taken as
+declaring that in the daharavidyā also the object of meditation is
+Nārāyana. Nor must it be thought that the accusatives with which the
+section begins (sahasrasirsham, &c.) are to be connected with the
+'meditating' enjoined in the previous section; for the 'meditating' is
+there enjoined by a gerundive form ('tasmin yad antas tad upāsitavyam'),
+and with this the subsequent accusatives cannot be construed. Moreover,
+the subsequent clause ('all this is Nārāyana,' &c., where the nominative
+case is used) shows that those accusatives are to be taken in the sense
+of nominatives.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the plurality of
+indicatory marks.'
+
+
+
+
+44. There is option with regard to what precedes (i.e. the altar made of
+bricks) on account of subject-matter, and hence there is action; as in
+the case of the mānasa cup.
+
+In the Vājasaneyaka, in the Agnirahasya chapter, there are references to
+certain altars built of mind, 'built of mind, built of speech,' &c. The
+doubt here arises whether those structures of mind, and so on, which
+metaphorically are called fire-altars, should be considered as being of
+the nature of action, on account of their connexion with a performance
+which itself is of the nature of action; or merely of the nature of
+meditation, as being connected with an activity of the nature of
+meditation. The Sūtra maintains the former view. Since those things
+'built of mind, and so on,' are, through being _built_ (or _piled _up),
+constituted as fire-altars, they demand a performance with which to
+connect themselves; and as in immediate proximity to them no performance
+is enjoined, and as the general subject-matter of the section is the
+fire-altar built of bricks--introduced by means of the clause 'Non-being
+this was in the beginning'---which is invariably connected with a
+performance of the nature of outward action, viz. a certain sacrificial
+performance--we conclude that the altars built of mind, &c., which the
+text mentions in connexion with the same subject-matter, are themselves
+of the nature of action, and as such can be used as alternatives for the
+altar built of bricks. [FOOTNOTE 668:1]. An analogous case is presented
+by the so-called _mental_ cup. On the tenth, so-called avivākya, day of
+the Soma sacrifice extending over twelve days, there takes place the
+mental offering of a Soma cup, all the rites connected with which are
+rehearsed in imagination only; the offering of that cup is thus really
+of the nature of thought only, but as it forms an auxiliary element in
+an actual outward sacrificial performance it itself assumes the
+character of an action.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 668:1. So that for the actual outward construction of a brick
+altar there may optionally be substituted the merely mental construction
+of an imaginary altar.]
+
+
+
+
+45. And on account of the transfer.
+
+That the altar built of thought is an optional substitute for the altar
+built of bricks, and of the nature of an action, appears therefrom also
+that the clause 'of these each one is as great as that previous one,'
+explicitly transfers to the altars of mind, and so on, the powers of the
+previous altar made of bricks. All those altars thus having equal
+effects there is choice between them. The altars of mind, and so on,
+therefore are auxiliary members of the sacrificial performance which
+they help to accomplish, and hence themselves of the nature of action.--
+Against this view the next Sūtra declares itself.
+
+
+
+
+46. But it is a meditation only, on account of assertion and what is
+seen.
+
+The altars built of mind, and so on, are not of the nature of action,
+but of meditation only, i.e. they belong to a performance which is of
+the nature of meditation only. For this is what the text asserts, viz.
+in the clauses 'they are built of knowledge only,' and 'by knowledge
+they are built for him who thus knows.' As the energies of mind, speech,
+sight, and so on, cannot be piled up like bricks, it is indeed a matter
+of course that the so-called altars constructed of mind, and so on, can
+be mental constructions only; but the text in addition specially
+confirms this by declaring that those altars are elements in an activity
+of purely intellectual character, and hence themselves mere creatures of
+the intellect. Moreover there is seen in the text a performance
+consisting of thought only to which those fires stand in a subsidiary
+relation, 'by the mind they were established on hearths, by the mind
+they were built up, by the mind the Soma cups were drawn thereat; by the
+mind they chanted, and by the mind they recited; whatever rite is
+performed at the sacrifice, whatever sacrificial rite there is, that, as
+consisting of mind, was performed by the mind only, on those (fire-
+altars) composed of mind, built up of mind.' From this declaration, that
+whatever sacrificial rite is actually performed in the case of fire-
+altars built of bricks is performed mentally only in the case of altars
+built of mind, it follows that the entire performance is a mental one
+only, i.e. an act of meditation.--But, an objection is raised, as the
+entire passus regarding the altars of mind does not contain any word of
+injunctive power, and as the text states no special result (from which
+it appears to follow that the passus does not enjoin a new independent
+performance), we must, on the strength of the fact that the leading
+subject-matter is an actual sacrificial performance as suggested by the
+altars built of brick, give up the idea that the altars built of mind,
+&c., are mental only because connected with a performance of merely
+mental nature.--This objection the next Sūtra refutes.
+
+
+
+
+47. And on account of the greater strength of direct statement, and so
+on, there is no refutation.
+
+The weaker means of proof, constituted by so-called leading subject-
+matter, cannot refute what is established by three stronger means of
+proof--direct statement, inferential mark, and syntactical connexion--
+viz. that there is an independent purely mental performance, and that
+the altars made of mind are parts of the latter. The direct statement is
+contained in the following passage, 'Those fire-altars indeed are built
+of knowledge,'--which is further explained in the subsequent passage,
+'by knowledge alone these altars are built for him who knows this'--the
+sense of which is: the structures of mind, and so on, are built in
+connexion with a performance which consists of knowledge (i.e.
+meditation).--The inferential mark is contained in the passage, 'For him
+all beings at all times build them, even while he is asleep.' And the
+syntactical connexion (vākya) consists in the connexion of the two words
+evamvide (for him who knows this), and kinvanti (they build)--the sense
+being: for him who accomplishes the performance consisting of knowledge
+all beings at all times build those altars. The proving power of the
+passage above referred to as containing an indicatory mark (linga) lies
+therein that a construction mentally performed at all times by all
+beings cannot possibly connect itself with a sacrificial performance
+through the brick-altar, which is constructed by certain definite agents
+and on certain definite occasions only, and must therefore be an element
+in a mental performance, i.e. a meditation.--The next Sūtra disposes of
+the objection that the text cannot possibly mean to enjoin a new mental
+performance, apart from the actual performance, because it contains no
+word of injunctive force and does not mention a special result.
+
+
+
+
+48. On account of connexions and the rest, as in the case of the
+separateness of other cognitions. And this is seen (elsewhere also); as
+declared (in the Pūrva Mīmāmsā).
+
+That the text enjoins a meditative performance different from the actual
+performance of which the brick-altar is a constituent element, follows
+from the reasons proving separation, viz. _the connexions_. i.e. the
+things connected with the sacrifice, such as the Soma cups, the hymns,
+the recitations, and so on. What is meant is that the special mention of
+the cups, and so on, made in the passage 'by the mind the Soma cups were
+drawn thereat,' proves the difference of the performance.--The 'and the
+rest' of the Sūtra comprises the previously stated arguments, viz.
+direct statement, and so on. 'As other meditations,' i.e. the case is
+analogous to that of other meditations such as the meditation on the
+small ether within the heart, which are likewise proved by textual
+statement, and so on, to be different and separate from actual outward
+sacrificial performances.--The existence of a separate meditative act
+having thus been ascertained, the requisite injunction has to be
+construed on the basis of the text as it stands.
+
+Such construction of injunctions on the basis of texts of arthavāda
+character is seen in other places also; the matter is discussed in Pū.
+Mī. Sūtras III, 5, 21.--The result of the meditative performance follows
+from the passage 'of these (altars made of mind, and so on) each is as
+great as that former one (i.e. the altar built of bricks)'--for this
+implies that the same result which the brick-altar accomplishes through
+the sacrifice of which it forms an element is also attained through the
+altars made of mind, and so on, through the meditations of which they
+form parts.--The next Sūtra disposes of the argumentation that, as this
+formal transfer of the result of the brick-altar to the altars built of
+mind, and so on, shows the latter to possess the same virtues as the
+former, we are bound to conclude that they also form constituent
+elements of an actual (not merely meditative) performance.
+
+
+
+
+49. Not so, on account of this being observed on account of similarity
+also; as in the case of Death; for (the person in yonder orb) does not
+occupy the worlds (of Death).
+
+From a transfer or assimilation of this kind it does not necessarily
+follow that things of different operation are equal, and that hence
+those altars of mind, and so on, must connect themselves with an actual
+outward performance. For it is observed that such assimilation rests
+sometimes on a special point of resemblance only; so in the text, 'The
+person in yonder orb is Death indeed,'--where the feature of resemblance
+is the destroying power of the two; for the person within yonder orb
+does certainly not occupy the same worlds, i.e. the same place as Death.
+Analogously, in the case under discussion, the fact that the altars made
+of mind are treated as, in a certain respect, equivalent to the altar
+built of bricks, does not authorise us to connect those altars with the
+sacrificial performance to which the altar of bricks belongs. When the
+text says that the altar made of mind is as great as the altar of bricks,
+this only means that the same result which is attained through the brick-
+altar in connexion with its own sacrificial performance is also attained
+through the altar of mind in connexion with the meditational performance
+into which it enters.
+
+
+
+
+50. And by a subsequent (Brāhmana) also the 'being of such a kind' of
+the word (is proved). But the connexion is on account of plurality.
+
+The subsequent Brāhmana (Sat. Br. X, 5, 4) also proves that the text
+treating of the altars made of mind, and so on, enjoins a meditation
+only. For that Brāhmana (which begins 'This brick-built fire-altar is
+this world; the waters are its enclosing-stones,' &c.) declares further
+on 'whosoever knows this thus comes to be that whole Agni who is the
+space-filler,' and from this it appears that what is enjoined there is a
+meditation with a special result of its own. And further on (X, 6) there
+is another meditation enjoined, viz. one on Vaisvānara. All this shows
+that the Agnirahasya book (Sat. Br. X) is not solely concerned with the
+injunction of outward sacrificial acts.--But what then is the reason
+that such matters as the mental (meditative) construction of fire-altars
+which ought to be included in the Brihad-āranyaka are included in the
+Agnirahasya?--'That connexion is on account of plurality,' i.e. the
+altars made of mind, and so on, are, in the sacred text, dealt with in
+proximity to the real altar made of bricks, because so many details of
+the latter are mentally to be accomplished in the meditation.--Here
+terminates the adhikarana of 'option with the previous one.'
+
+
+
+
+51. Some, on account of the existence of a Self within a body.
+
+In all meditations on the highest Self the nature of the meditating
+subject has to be ascertained no less than the nature of the object of
+meditation and of the mode of meditation. The question then arises
+whether the meditating Self is to be viewed as the knowing, doing, and
+enjoying Self, subject to transmigration; or as that Self which
+Prajāpati describes (Ch. Up. VIII, 1), viz. a Self free from all sin and
+imperfection.--Some hold the former view, on the ground that the
+meditating Self is within a body. For as long as the Self dwells within
+a body, it _is_ a knower, doer, enjoyer, and so on, and it can bring
+about the result of its meditation only as viewed under that aspect. A
+person who, desirous of the heavenly world or a similar result, enters
+on some sacrificial action may, after he has reached that result,
+possess characteristics different from those of a knowing, doing, and
+enjoying subject, but those characteristics cannot be attributed to him
+as long as he is in the state of having to bring about the means of
+accomplishing those ends; in the latter state he must be viewed as an
+ordinary agent, and there it would be of no use to view him as something
+different. And the same holds equally good with regard to a person
+engaged in meditation.--But, an objection is raised, the text 'as the
+thought of a man is in this world, so he will be when he has departed
+this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1) _does_ declare a difference (between the
+agent engaged in sacrificial action, and the meditating subject), and
+from this it follows that the meditating Self is to be conceived as
+having a nature free from all evil, and so on.--Not so, the Pūrvapakshin
+replies; for the clause, 'howsoever they meditate on him,' proves that
+that text refers to the equality of the object meditated upon (not of
+the meditating subject).--To this the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+52. But this is not so, (but rather) difference; since it is of the
+being of that; as in the case of intuition.
+
+It is not true that the meditating subject must be conceived as having
+the ordinary characteristics of knowing, acting, &c.; it rather
+possesses those characteristic properties--freedom from evil, and so on--
+which distinguish the state of Release from the Samsāra state. At the
+time of meditation the Self of the devotee is of exactly the same nature
+as the released Self. 'For it is of the being of that,' i.e. it attains
+the nature of that--as proved by the texts, 'as the thought of a man is
+in this world, so he will be when he has departed,' and 'howsoever he
+meditate on him, such he becomes himself.' Nor can it be maintained that
+these texts refer only to meditation on the highest Self (without
+declaring anything as to the personal Self of the devotee); for the
+personal Self constitutes the body of Brahman which is the object of
+meditation, and hence itself falls under the category of object of
+meditation. The character of such meditation, therefore, is that it is a
+meditation on the highest Self as having for its body the individual
+Self, distinguished by freedom from evil and the other qualities
+mentioned in the teaching of Prajāpati. And hence the individual Self is,
+in such meditation, to be conceived (not as the ordinary Self, but)
+under that form which it has to attain (i.e. the pure form which belongs
+to it in the state of Release). 'As in the case of intuition'--i.e. as
+in the case of intuition of Brahman. As the intuition of Brahman has for
+its object the essential nature of Brahman, so the intuition of the
+individual soul also has for its object its permanent essential nature.
+In the case of sacrificial works the conception of the true nature of
+the Self forms an auxiliary factor. An injunction such as 'Let him who
+is desirous of the heavenly world sacrifice,' enjoins the performance of
+the sacrifice to the end of a certain result being reached; while the
+conception of the Self as possessing characteristics such as being a
+knowing subject, and so on--which are separate from the body--has the
+function of proving its qualification for works meant to effect results
+which will come about at some future time. So much only (i.e. the mere
+cognition of the Self as something different from the body) is required
+for works (as distinguished from meditations).--Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'being in the body.'
+
+
+
+
+53. But those (meditations) which are connected with members (of
+sacrifices) are not (restricted) to (particular) sākhās, but rather
+(belong) to all sākhās.
+
+There are certain meditations connected with certain constituent
+elements of sacrifices-as e.g. 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om
+(as) the Udgītha '(Ch. Up. I, 1, 1); 'Let a man meditate on the fivefold
+Saman as the five worlds' (Ch. Up. II, 2, 1), &c. The question here
+arises whether those meditations are restricted to the members of those
+sākhās in whose texts they are mentioned; or to be connected with the
+Udgītha, and so on, in all sākhās. There is here a legitimate ground for
+doubt, in so far as, although the general agreement of all Vedānta-texts
+is established, the Udgītha, and so on, are different in each Veda since
+the accents differ in the different Vedas--The Pūrvapakshin declares
+that those meditations are limited each to its particular sākhā; for, he
+says, the injunction 'Let him meditate on the Udgītha' does indeed,
+verbally, refer to the Udgītha in general; but as what stands nearest to
+this injunction is the special Udgītha of the sākhā, in whose text this
+injunction occurs, and which shares the peculiarities of accent
+characteristic of that sākhā, we decide that the meditation is enjoined
+on members of that sākhā only.--The Sūtra sets this opinion aside. The
+injunction of meditations of this type is valid for all sākhās, since
+the text expressly connects them with the Udgītha in general. They
+therefore hold good wherever there is an Udgītha. The individual
+Udgīthas of the several sākhās are indeed distinguished by different
+accentuation; but the general statement, 'Let him meditate on the
+Udgītha.' suggests to the mind not any particular Udgītha, but _the_
+Udgītha in general, and hence there is no reason to restrict the
+meditation to a particular sākhā. From the principle moreover that all
+sākhās teach the same doctrine, it follows that the sacrifice enjoined
+in the different sākhās is one only; and hence there is no reason to
+hold that the Udgītha suggested by the injunction of the meditation is a
+particular one. For the Udgītha is only an element in the sacrifice, and
+the sacrifice is one and the same. The meditations are not therefore
+limited to particular sākhās.
+
+
+
+
+54. Or there is no contradiction as in the case of mantras and the rest.
+
+The 'or' here has the sense of 'and.' The 'and the rest' comprises
+generic characteristics, qualities, number, similarity, order of
+succession, substances, and actions. As there is nothing contrary to
+reason in mantras and the rest, although mentioned in the text of one
+sākhā only, finding, on the basis of such means of proof as direct
+statement, and so on, their application in all sākhās, since the
+sacrifice to which they belong is one and the same in all sākhās; so
+there is likewise no contradiction in the meditations under discussion
+being undertaken by members of all sākhās.--Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'what is connected with constituent elements of the
+sacrifice.'
+
+
+
+
+55. There is pre-eminence of plenitude, as in the case of the sacrifice;
+for thus Scripture shows.
+
+The sacred text (Ch. Up. V, 12 ff.) enjoins a meditation on Vaisvānara,
+the object of which is the highest Self, as having for its body the
+entire threefold world, and for its limbs the heavenly world, the sun,
+the wind, and so on. The doubt here arises whether separate meditations
+have to be performed on the highest Being in its separate aspects, or in
+its aggregate as well as in its distributed aspect, or in its aggregate
+aspect only.--In its separate aspects, the Pūrvapakshin maintains; since
+at the outset a meditation of that kind is declared. For on the Rishis
+in succession telling Asvapati the objects of their meditation, viz. the
+sky, the sun, and so on, Asvapati explains to them that these
+meditations refer to the head, eye, and so on, of the highest Being, and
+mentions for each of these meditations a special fruit. And the
+concluding explanation 'he who worships Vaisvānara as a span long, &c.,'
+is merely meant to gather up into one, as it were, the preceding
+meditations on the parts of Vaisvānara.--Another Pūrvapakshin holds that
+this very concluding passage enjoins a further meditation on Vaisvānara
+in his collective aspect, in addition to the previously enjoined
+meditations on his limbs; for that passage states a separate result, 'he
+eats food in all worlds,' &c. Nor does this destroy the unity of the
+whole section. The case is analogous to that of the meditation on
+'plenitude' (bhūman; Ch. Up. VII, 23). There, in the beginning,
+separate meditations are enjoined on name, and so on, with special
+results of their own; and after that a meditation is enjoined on bhūman,
+with a result of its own, 'He becomes a Self-ruler,' &c. The entire
+section really refers to the meditation on bhūman; but all the same
+there are admitted subordinate meditations on name, and so on, and a
+special result for each.--These views are set aside by the Sūtra, 'There
+is pre-eminence of plenitude,' i.e. there is reason to assume that
+Vaisvānara in his fulness, i.e. in his collective aspect, is meant;
+since we apprehend unity of the entire section. From the beginning of
+the section it is manifest that what the Rishis desire to know is the
+Vaisānara Self; it is that Self which Asvapati expounds to them as
+having the Universe for his body, and in agreement therewith the last
+clause of his teaching intimates that the intuition of Brahman (which is
+none other than the Vaisvānara Self)--which is there characterised as
+the food of all worlds, all beings, all Selfs--is the fruit of the
+meditation on Vaisvānara. This summing up proves the whole section to
+deal with the same subject. And on the basis of this knowledge we
+determine that what the text says as to meditations on the separate
+members of the Vaisānara Self and their special results is merely of the
+nature of explanatory comment (anuvāda) on parts of the meditation on
+the collective Self.--This decision is arrived at as in the case of the
+sacrifice. For to the injunction of certain sacrifices--such as 'Let a
+man, on the birth of a son, offer a cake on twelve potsherds to
+Vaisvānara'--the text similarly adds remarks on parts of the oblation,
+'there is an oblation on eight potsherds,' and so on.--The meditation
+therefore has to be performed on the entire Vaisvānara Self only, not on
+its parts. This, moreover, Scripture itself intimates, in so far, namely,
+as declaring the evil consequences of meditation on parts of the Self
+only, 'your head would have fallen off if you had not come to me'; 'you
+would have become blind,' and so on. This also shows that the reference
+to the text enjoining meditations on name, &c., proves nothing as to our
+passage. For there the text says nothing as to disadvantages connected
+with those special meditations; it only says that the meditation on
+plenitude (bhūman) has a more excellent result. The section, therefore,
+although really concerned with enjoining the meditation on the bhūman,
+at the same time means to declare that the special meditations also are
+fruitful; otherwise the meditation on the bhūman could not be
+recommended, for the reason that it has a more excellent result than the
+preceding meditations.--The conclusion, therefore, is that the text
+enjoins a meditation on the collective Vaisvānara Self only.--Here
+terminates the adhikarana of 'the pre-eminence of plenitude.'
+
+
+
+
+56. (The meditations are) separate, on account of the difference of
+words, and so on.
+
+The instances coming under this head of discussion are all those
+meditations on Brahman which have for their only result final Release,
+which consists in attaining to Brahman--such as the meditation on that
+which is, the meditation on the bhūman, the meditation on the small
+space within the heart, the Upakosala meditation, the Sāndilya
+meditation, the meditation on Vaisvānara, the meditation on the Self of
+bliss, the meditation on the Imperishable, and others--whether they be
+recorded in one sākhā only or in several sākhās. To a different category
+belong those meditations which have a special object such as Prāna, and
+a special result.--The doubt here arises whether the meditations of the
+former class are all to be considered as identical, or as separate--The
+Pūrvapakshin holds that they are all one; for, he says, they all have
+one and the same object of meditation, viz. Brahman. For the nature of
+all cognition depends on the object cognised; and the nature of the
+meditations thus being one, the meditations themselves are one.--This
+view the Sūtra controverts. The meditations are different, on account of
+the difference of terms and the rest. The 'and the rest' comprises
+repetition (abhyāsa), number (samkhyā), quality (guna), subject-matter
+(prakriyā), and name (nāmadheya; cp. Pū. Mī. Sū. II, 2, 1 ff.). We meet
+in those meditations with difference of connexion, expressing itself in
+difference of words, and so on; which causes difference on the part of
+the meditations enjoined. The terms enjoining meditation, 'he knows,'
+'he is to meditate' (veda; upāsīta), and so on, do indeed all of them
+denote a certain continuity of cognition, and all these cognitions have
+for their object Brahman only, but all the same those cognitions differ
+in so far as they have for their object Brahman, as variously qualified
+by special characteristics mentioned in the meditation; in one
+meditation he is spoken of as the sole cause of the world, in another as
+free from all evil, and so on. We therefore arrive at the decision that
+clauses which describe special forms of meditation having for their
+result the attainment to Brahman, and are complete in themselves, convey
+the idea of separate independent meditations, and thus effect separation
+of the vidyās. This entire question was indeed already decided in the
+Pūrva Mimāmsa-sūtras (II, 2, 1), but it is here argued again to the end
+of dispelling the mistaken notion that the Vedānta-texts aim at
+knowledge only, and not at the injunction of activities such as
+meditation. The meditations, therefore, are separate ones.--Here
+terminates the adhikarana of 'difference of words and the rest.'
+
+
+
+
+57. Option, on account of the non-difference of result.
+
+It has been proved that the meditation on that which truly is, the
+meditation on the small ether within the heart, and so on--all of which
+have for their result the attainment to Brahman--are separate
+meditations. The question now arises whether all these meditations
+should be combined by each meditating devotee, on account of such
+combination being useful to him; or whether, in the absence of any use
+of such combination, they should be undertaken optionally.--They may be
+combined, the Pūrvapakshin holds; since it is observed that different
+scriptural matters are combined even when having one and the same result.
+The Agnihotra, the Daisapūrnamāsa oblation, and other sacrifices, all of
+them have one and the same result, viz. the possession of the heavenly
+world; nevertheless, one and the same agent performs them all, with a
+view to the greater fulness of the heavenly bliss aimed at. So the
+different meditations on Brahman also may be cumulated with a view to
+greater fulness of intuition of Brahman.--This view the Sūtra rejects.
+Option only between the several meditations is possible, on account of
+the non-difference of result. For to all meditations on Brahman alike
+Scripture assigns one and the same result, viz. intuitive knowledge of
+Brahman, which is of the nature of supreme, unsurpassable bliss. 'He who
+knows Brahman attains the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1), &c. The
+intuitive knowledge of Brahman constitutes supreme, unsurpassable bliss;
+and if such intuition may be reached through one meditation, of what use
+could other meditations be? The heavenly world is something limited in
+respect of place, time, and essential nature, and hence a person
+desirous of attaining to it may cumulate works in order to take
+possession of it to a greater extent, and so on. But an analogous
+proceeding cannot be resorted to with regard to Brahman, which is
+unlimited in every sense. All meditations on Brahman tend to dispel
+Nescience, which stands in the way of the intuition of Brahman, and thus
+equally have for their result the attaining to Brahman; and hence there
+is option between them. In the case, on the other hand, of those
+meditations which aim at other results than Brahman, there may either be
+choice between the several meditations, or they may be cumulated--as one
+may also do in the case of sacrifices aiming at the attainment of the
+heavenly world;--for as those results are not of an infinite nature one
+may aim at realising them in a higher degree. This the next Sūtra
+declares.
+
+
+
+
+58. But meditations aiming at objects of desire may, according to one's
+liking, be cumulated or not; on account of the absence of the former
+reason.
+
+The last clause means--on account of their results not being of an
+infinite nature.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'option.'
+
+
+
+
+59. They belong to the constituent members, as the bases.
+
+A doubt arises whether meditations such as the one enjoined in the text,
+'Let him meditate on the syllable Om as the Udgītha,' which are
+connected with constituent elements of the sacrifice such as the Udgītha,
+contribute towards the accomplishment of the sacrifice, and hence must
+be performed at the sacrifice as part of it; or whether they, like the
+godohana vessel, benefit the agent apart from the sacrifice, and
+therefore may be undertaken according to desire.--But has it not been
+already decided under III, 3, 42 that those meditations are generally
+beneficial to man, and not therefore restricted to the sacrifices?--True;
+it is just for the purpose of further confirming that conclusion that
+objections are now raised against it on the ground of some inferential
+marks (linga) and reasoning. For there it was maintained on the strength
+of the text 'therefore he does both' that those meditations have results
+independent of the sacrifice. But there are several reasons favouring
+the view that those meditations must be connected with the sacrifices as
+subordinate members, just as the Udgītha and the rest to which the
+meditations refer.
+
+Their case is by no means analogous to that of the godohana vessel, for,
+while in the case of the latter, the text expressly declares the
+existence of a special result, 'For him who is desirous of cattle he is
+to bring water in a godohana,' the texts enjoining those meditations do
+not state special results for them. For clauses such as 'he is to
+meditate on the Udgītha' intimate only that the Udgītha is connected
+with the meditation; while their connexion with certain results is known
+from other clauses, such as 'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith,
+with the Upanishad, that is more vigorous' (according to which the
+result of such meditations is only to strengthen the result of the
+sacrifices). And when a meditation of this kind has, on the ground of
+its connexion with the Udgītha or the like--which themselves are
+invariably connected with sacrifices--been cognised to form an element
+of a sacrifice, some other passage which may declare a fruit for that
+meditation can only be taken as an arthavāda; just as the passage which
+declares that he whose sacrificial ladle is made of parna wood does not
+hear an evil sound. In the same way, therefore, as the Udgītha and so on,
+which are the bases of those meditations, are to be employed only as
+constituent parts of the sacrifices, so the meditations also connected
+with those constituent parts are themselves to be employed as
+constituent parts of the sacrifices only.
+
+
+
+
+60. And on account of injunction.
+
+The above conclusion is further confirmed by the fact of injunction, i.e.
+thereby that clauses such as 'he is to meditate on the Udgītha' enjoin
+the meditation as standing to the Udgītha in the relation of a
+subordinate member. Injunctions of this kind differ from injunctions
+such as 'he is to bring water in the godohana vessel for him who desires
+cattle'; for the latter state a special qualification on the part of him
+who performs the action, while the former do not, and hence cannot claim
+independence.
+
+
+
+
+61. On account of rectification.
+
+The text 'from the seat of the Hotri he sets right the wrong Udgīha'
+shows that the meditation is necessarily required for the purpose of
+correcting whatever mistake may be made in the Udgītha. This also proves
+that the meditation is an integral part of the sacrificial performance.
+
+
+
+
+62. And on account of the declaration of a quality being common (to all
+the Vedas).
+
+The text 'By means of that syllable the threefold knowledge proceeds.
+With _Om_ the Adhvaryu gives orders, with _Om_ the Hotri recites, with _Om_
+the Udgātri sings,' which declares the pranava--which is a 'quality' of
+the meditation, in so far as it is its basis--to be common to the three
+Vedas, further shows that the meditation has to be employed in connexion
+with the sacrifice. For the meditation is connected with the Udgītha,
+and the Udgitha is an integral part of all sacrificial performances
+whatever.
+
+Of the primā facie view thus far set forth the next Sūtra disposes.
+
+
+
+
+63. Rather not, as the text does not declare their going together.
+
+It is not true that the meditations on the Udgītha and the rest are
+bound to the sacrifices in the same way as the Udgītha, and so on,
+themselves are; for Scripture does not declare that they go together
+with, i.e. are subordinate constituents of the Udgītha, and so on. The
+clause 'Let him meditate on the Udgītha' does not indeed itself state
+another qualification on the part of the agent (i.e. does not state that
+the agent in entering on the meditation is prompted by a motive other
+than the one prompting the sacrifice); but the subsequent clause,
+'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith, with the Upanishad, that
+becomes more vigorous,' intimates that knowledge is the means to render
+the sacrificial work more efficacious, and from this it follows that the
+meditation is enjoined as a means towards effecting a result other than
+the result of the sacrifice. And hence the meditation cannot be viewed
+as a subordinate member of the Udgītha, which itself is a subordinate
+member of the sacrifice. It rather has the Udgītha for its basis only.
+He only indeed who is qualified for the sacrifice is qualified for the
+meditation, since the latter aims at greater efficaciousness of the
+sacrifice; but this does not imply that the meditation necessarily goes
+with the sacrifice. By the greater vigour of the sacrifice is meant its
+non-obstruction by some other sacrificial work of greater strength, its
+producing its effect without any delay.--The case of a statement such as
+'he whose ladle is of parna wood hears no evil sound' is different.
+There the text does not declare that the quality of consisting of parna
+wood is the direct means of bringing about the result of no evil sound
+being heard; hence there is no valid reason why that quality should not
+be subordinate to the ladle, which itself is subordinate to the
+sacrifice; and as it is not legitimate to assume for the mere
+subordinate constituents of a sacrifice special fruits (other than the
+general fruit of the sacrifice), the declaration as to no evil sound
+being heard is to be viewed as a mere arthavāda (i.e. a mere additional
+statement meant further to glorify the result of the sacrifice--of which
+the ladle made of parna wood is a subordinate instrument).
+
+
+
+
+64. And because (Scripture) shows it.
+
+A scriptural text, moreover, shows that the meditation is necessary for,
+and restricted to, the sacrificial performance. For the text 'A Brahman
+priest who knows this saves the sacrifice, the sacrificer, and all the
+officiating priests'--which declares that all priests are saved through
+the knowledge of the Brahman--has sense only on the understanding that
+that knowledge is not restricted to the Udjātri, and so on (i.e. not to
+those priests who are engaged in carrying out the details of the
+sacrifices which are the 'bases' of the meditations).--The conclusion,
+therefore, is that those meditations are not restricted to the
+sacrifices, subordinate members of which serve as their 'bases.'--This
+terminates the adhikarana of 'like the bases.'
+
+
+
+
+FOURTH PĀDA.
+
+1. The benefit to man results from thence, on account of scriptural
+statement; thus Bādarāyana thinks.
+
+We have concluded the investigation into the oneness or diverseness of
+meditations--the result of which is to indicate in which cases the
+special points mentioned in several meditations have to be combined, and
+in which not. A further point now to be investigated is whether that
+advantage to the meditating devotee, which is held to accrue to him from
+the meditation, results from the meditation directly, or from works of
+which the meditations are subordinate members.--The Reverend Bādarāyana
+holds the former view. The benefit to man results from thence, i.e. from
+the meditation, because Scripture declares this to be so. 'He who knows
+Brahman reaches the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'I know that great
+Person of sun-like lustre beyond the darkness. A man who knows him truly
+passes over death; there is no other path to go' (Svet. Up. III, 8); 'As
+the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, losing their name and their
+form, thus a man who possesses knowledge, freed from name and form, goes
+to the divine Person who is greater than the great' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8).--
+Against this view the Pūrvapakshin raises an objection.
+
+
+
+
+2. On account of (the Self) standing in a complementary relation, they
+are arthavādas, as in other cases; thus Jaimini opines.
+
+What has been said as to Scripture intimating that a beneficial result
+is realised through the meditations by themselves is untenable. For
+texts such as 'he who knows Brahman reaches the Highest' do not teach
+that the highest aim of man is attained through knowledge; their purport
+rather is to inculcate knowledge of Truth on the part of a Self which is
+the agent in works prescribed. Knowledge, therefore, stands in a
+complementary relation to sacrificial works, in so far as it imparts to
+the acting Self a certain mystic purification; and the texts which
+declare special results of knowledge, therefore, must be taken as mere
+arthavādas. 'As in the case of other things; so Jaimini thinks,' i.e. as
+Jaimini holds that in the case of substances, qualities, and so on, the
+scriptural declaration of results is of the nature of arthavāda.--But it
+has been shown before that the Vedānta-texts represent as the object to
+be attained, by those desirous of Release, on the basis of the knowledge
+imparted by them, something different from the individual Self engaged
+in action; cp. on this point Sū. I, 1, 15; I, 3, 5; I, 2, 3; I, 3, 18.
+And Sū. II, 1, 22 and others have refuted the view that Brahman is to be
+considered as non-different from the personal soul, because in texts
+such as 'thou art that' it is exhibited in co-ordination with the latter.
+And other Sūtras have proved that Brahman must, on the basis of numerous
+scriptural texts, be recognised as the inner Self of all things material
+and immaterial. How then can it be said that the Vedānta-texts merely
+mean to give instruction as to the true nature of the active individual
+soul, and that hence all meditation is merely subservient to sacrificial
+works?--On the strength of numerous inferential marks, the Pūrvapakshin
+replies, which prove that in the Vedānta-texts all meditation is really
+viewed as subordinate to knowledge, and of the declarations of co-
+ordination of Brahman and the individual soul (which must be taken to
+imply that the two are essentially of the same nature), we cannot help
+forming the conclusion that the real purport of the Vedānta-texts is to
+tell us of the true nature of the individual soul in so far as different
+from its body.--But, again it is objected, the agent is connected no
+less with ordinary worldly works than with works enjoined by the Veda,
+and hence is not invariably connected with sacrifices (i.e. works of the
+latter type); it cannot, therefore, be maintained that meditations on
+the part of the agent necessarily connect themselves with sacrifices in
+so far as they effect a purification of the sacrificer's mind!--There is
+a difference, the Pūrvapakshin rejoins. Worldly works can proceed also
+if the agent is non-different from the body; while an agent is qualified
+for sacred works only in so far as he is different from the body, and of
+an eternal non-changing nature. Meditations, therefore, properly connect
+themselves with sacrifices, in so far as they teach that the agent
+really is of that latter nature. We thus adhere to the conclusion that
+meditations are constituents of sacrificial actions, and hence are of no
+advantage by themselves.--But what then are those inferential marks
+which, as you say, fully prove that the Vedānta-texts aim at setting
+forth the nature of the individual soul?--To this the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+3. On account of (such) conduct being seen.
+
+It is seen, viz in Scripture, that those who knew Brahman busied
+themselves chiefly with sacrifices.--Asvapati Kaikeya had a deep
+knowledge of the Self; but when three Rishis had come to him to receive
+instruction regarding the Self, he told them 'I am about, to perform a
+sacrifice, Sirs' (Ch. Up. V, II). Similarly we learn from Smriti that
+Janaka and other princes deeply versed in the knowledge of Brahman
+applied themselves to sacrificial works, 'By works only Janaka and
+others attained to perfection'; 'He also, well founded in knowledge,
+offered many sacrifices.' And this fact--that those who know Brahman
+apply themselves to works chiefly--shows that knowledge (or meditation)
+has no independent value, but serves to set forth the true nature of the
+active Self, and thus is subordinate to work.--An even more direct proof
+is set forth in the next Sūtra.
+
+
+
+
+4. On account of direct scriptural statement.
+
+Scripture itself directly declares knowledge to be subordinate to works,
+'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith, with the Upanishad, that
+is more vigorous'. Nor can it be said that this text refers, on the
+ground of leading subject-matter (prakarana), to the Udgītha only; for
+direct scriptural statement (suti) is stronger than subject-matter, and
+the words 'whatever he does with knowledge' clearly refer to knowledge
+in general.
+
+
+
+
+5. On account of the taking hold together.
+
+The text 'then both knowledge and work take hold of him' (Bri. Up. IV, 4,
+2) shows that knowledge and work go together, and this going together is
+possible only if, in the manner stated, knowledge is subordinate to work.
+
+
+
+
+6. On account of injunction for such a one.
+
+That knowledge is subordinate to works follows therefrom also that works
+are enjoined on him only who possesses knowledge. For texts such as 'He
+who has learnt the Veda from a family of teachers,' &c. (Ch. Up. VIII,
+15), enjoin works on him only who has mastered the sacred texts so as
+fully to understand their meaning--for this is the sense of the term
+'learning' (adhyayana). Hence the knowledge of Brahman also is enjoined
+with a view to works only: it has no independent result of its own.
+
+
+
+
+7. On account of definite rule.
+
+Another argument for our conclusion is that the text 'Doing works here
+let a man desire to live a hundred years,' &c. (Is. Up. II), expressly
+enjoins lifelong works on him who knows the Self. The general conclusion,
+therefore, is that knowledge (meditation) is merely auxiliary to works.
+Of this view the next Sūtra finally disposes.
+
+
+
+
+8. But on account of the teaching of the different one, Badarāyana's
+(view is valid); as this is seen.
+
+Knowledge by itself benefits man; since Scripture teaches that the
+object of knowledge is the highest Brahman which, as it is of an
+absolutely faultless and perfect nature, is other than the active
+individual soul.
+
+Badarāyana, therefore, holds that knowledge has an independent fruit of
+its own. Let the inferential marks (referred to by the Pūrvapakshin) be;
+the direct teaching of the texts certainly refers to a being different
+from the Self that acts; for we clearly see that their object is the
+highest creative Brahman with all its perfections and exalted qualities,
+which cannot possibly be attributed to the individual Self whether in
+the state of Release or of bondage: 'Free from evil, free from old age,'
+&c. &c. In all those texts there is not the slightest trace of any
+reference to the wretched individual soul, as insignificant and weak as
+a tiny glow-worm, implicated in Nescience and all the other evils of
+finite existence. And the fruit of that knowledge of the highest Person
+the texts expressly declare, in many places, to be immortality--which
+consists in attaining to Him. The view of knowledge by itself
+benefitting man therefore is well founded.--The Sūtras proceed to
+dispose of the so-called inferential marks.
+
+
+
+
+9. But the declarations are equal.
+
+The argument that knowledge must be held subordinate to work because we
+learn from Scripture that those who know Brahman perform sacrificial
+works, will not hold good; since, on the other hand, we also see that
+men knowing Brahman abandoned all work; cp. texts such as 'The Rishis
+descended from Kavasha said: For what purpose should we study the Veda?
+for what purpose should we sacrifice?' As it thus appears that those who
+know Brahman give up works, knowledge cannot be a mere auxiliary to
+works.--But how can it be accounted for that those who know Brahman both
+do and do not perform works?--Works may be performed in so far as
+sacrifices and the like, if performed by one not having any special wish,
+stand in subordinate relation to the knowledge of Brahman; hence there
+is no objection to texts enjoining works. And as, on the other hand,
+sacrifices and such-like works when aiming at results of their own are
+opposed to the knowledge of Brahman which has Release for its only
+result, there is all the less objection to texts which suggest the non-
+performance of works. If, on the other hand, knowledge were subordinate
+to works, works could on no account be dispensed with.--Against the
+assertion that Scripture directly declares knowledge to be subordinate
+to works the next Sūtra declares itself.
+
+
+
+
+10. (It is) non-comprehensive.
+
+The scriptural declaration does not refer to all meditations, but only
+to the meditation on the Udgītha. In the clause 'what he does with
+knowledge,' the 'what' is in itself indefinite, and therefore must be
+defined as connecting itself with the Udgītha mentioned in the previous
+clause, 'Let him meditate on the Udgītha.' The sentence cannot be
+construed to mean 'whatever he does is to be done with knowledge,' but
+means 'that which he does with knowledge becomes more vigorous,' and _that
+which is_ done with knowledge that is the Udgītha. The next Sūtra
+refutes the argument set forth in Sūtra 5.
+
+
+
+
+11. There is distribution, as in the case of the hundred.
+
+As knowledge and work have different results, the text 'of him knowledge
+and work lay hold' must be understood in a distributive sense, i.e. as
+meaning that knowledge lays hold of him to the end of bringing about its
+own particular result, and that so likewise does work. 'As in the case
+of a hundred,' i.e. as it is understood that, when a man selling a field
+and a gem is said to receive two hundred gold pieces, one hundred are
+given for the field and one hundred for the gem.
+
+
+
+
+12. Of him who has merely read the Veda.
+
+Nor is there any force in the argument that knowledge is only auxiliary
+to work because works are enjoined on him who possesses knowledge. For
+the text which refers to the man 'who has read the Veda' enjoins works
+on him who has merely _read_ the texts, and _reading_ there means
+nothing more than the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables called
+Veda, without any insight into their meaning. A man who has thus
+mastered the words of the Veda apprehends therefrom that it makes
+statements as to works having certain results, and then on his own
+account applies himself to the enquiry into the meaning of those
+declarations; he who is desirous of work applies himself to the
+knowledge of works; he who is desirous of Release applies himself to the
+knowledge of Brahman. And even if the injunction of _reading_ were
+understood as prompting to the understanding of the text also, all the
+same, knowledge would not be a subsidiary to works. For _knowledge_, in
+the sense of the Upanishads, is something different from mere cognition
+of sense. In the same way as the performance of such works as the
+Jyotishtoma sacrifice is something different from the cognition of the
+true nature of those works; so that vidyā, which effects the highest
+purpose of man, i. e. devout meditation (dhyāna, upāsanā), is something
+different from the mere cognition of the true nature of Brahman.
+Knowledge of that kind has not the most remote connexion even with works.
+
+
+
+
+
+13. Not so, on account of non-specification.
+
+Nor is it true that the text 'Doing works here,' &c., is meant to divert
+him who knows the Self from knowledge and restrict him to works. For
+there is no special reason to hold that that text refers to works as
+independent means of a desirable result: it may as well be understood to
+refer to works merely subordinate to knowledge. As he who knows the Self
+has to practise meditation as long as he lives, he may also have to
+practise, for the same period, works that are helpful to meditation.
+Having thus refuted the objection on the ground of the reason of the
+matter, the Sūtrakāra proceeds to give his own interpretation of the
+text.
+
+
+
+
+14. Or the permission is for the purpose of glorification.
+
+The _or_ has assertive force. The introductory words of the Upanishad,
+'Hidden in the Lord is all this,' show knowledge to be the subject-
+matter; hence the permission of works can aim only at the glorification
+of knowledge. The sense of the text therefore is--owing to the power of
+knowledge a man although constantly performing works is not stained by
+them.
+
+
+
+
+15. Some also, by proceeding according to their liking.
+
+In some sākhās, moreover, we read that he who possesses the knowledge of
+Brahman may, according to his liking, give up the state of a householder,
+'What shall we do with offspring, we who have this Self and this world?'
+(Bri. Up. V, 4, 22.) This text also proves knowledge not to be
+subsidiary to works; for if it were so subsidiary, it would not be
+possible for him who knows Brahman to give up householdership (with all
+the works obligatory on that state) according to his liking.
+
+
+
+
+16. And destruction.
+
+There is moreover a Vedānta-text which declares the knowledge of Brahman
+to destroy work-good and evil--which is the root of all the afflictions
+of transmigratory existence: 'The knot of the heart is broken, all
+doubts are solved, all his works perish when He has been beheld who is
+high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). This also contradicts the view of
+knowledge being subordinate to works.
+
+
+
+
+17. And of him who is chaste; for in Scripture (this is declared).
+
+The knowledge of Brahman belongs to those who have to observe chastity,
+and men living in that state have not to perform the Agnihotra, the
+Darsapūrnamāsa, and similar works. For this reason also knowledge cannot
+be subsidiary to works.--But, it may be objected, there is no such
+condition of life; for texts such as 'he is to perform the Agnihotra as
+long as he lives,' declare men to be obliged to perform sacrifices and
+the like up to the end of their lives, and Smriti texts contradicting
+Scripture have no authority.--To meet this the Sūtra adds 'for in
+Scripture.' The three stages of life are recognised in Scripture only;
+cp. texts such as 'Those who in the forest practise penance and faith'
+(Ch. Up. V, 10, 1); 'Wishing for that world only mendicants wander forth
+from their homes' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22). The text as to the lifelong
+obligatoriness of the Agnihotra is valid for those only who do not
+retire from worldly life.
+
+
+
+
+18. A reference (only) Jaimini (holds them to be), on account of absence
+of injunction; for (Scripture) forbids.
+
+The argument for the three stages of life, founded on their mention in
+Vedic texts, has no force, since all those references are only of the
+nature of anuvāda. For none of those texts contain injunctive forms. The
+text 'There are three branches of sacred observance,' &c. (Ch. Up. II,
+23, 1), is meant to glorify the previous meditation on Brahman under the
+form of the pranava, as appears from the concluding clause 'he who is
+firmly grounded in Brahman obtains immortality'; it therefore cannot
+mean to enjoin the three conditions of life as valid states. In the same
+way the text 'And those who in the forest practise penance and faith'
+refers to the statements previously made as to the path of the gods, and
+cannot therefore be meant to make an original declaration as to another
+condition of life. Scripture moreover expressly forbids that other
+condition, 'a murderer of men is he who removes the fire,' &c. There are
+therefore no conditions of life in which men are bound to observe
+chastity. This is the opinion of the teacher Jaimini.
+
+
+
+
+19. It is to be accomplished, Bādarayana holds, on account of scriptural
+statement of equality.
+
+Bādarāyana is of opinion that, in the same way as the condition of
+householdership, those other conditions of life also are obligatory;
+since in the section beginning 'there are three branches of sacred duty'
+all the three conditions of life are equally referred to, with a view to
+glorifying him who is firmly grounded in Brahman. The reference there
+made to the condition of the householder necessarily presupposes that
+condition to be already established and obligatory, and the same
+reasoning then holds good with regard to the other conditions mentioned.
+Nor must it be said that the special duties mentioned at the beginning
+of the section--sacrifice, study, charity, austerity, Brahmakarya--all
+of them belong to the state of the householder (in which case the text
+would contain no reference to the other conditions of life); for on that
+supposition the definite reference to a threefold division of duties,
+'Sacrifice, &c. are the first, austerity the second, Brahmakarya the
+third,' would be unmeaning. The proper explanation is to take the words'
+sacrifice, study, and charity' as descriptive of the condition of the
+householder; the word 'austerity' as descriptive of the duties of the
+Vaikhānasa and the wandering mendicant, who both practise mortification;
+and the word 'Brahmakarya' as referring to the duties of the Brahmakarin.
+The term 'Brahmasamstha' finally, in the concluding clause, refers to
+all the three conditions of life, as men belonging to all those
+conditions may be founded on Brahman. Those, the text means to say, who
+are destitute of this foundation on Brahman and only perform the special
+duties of their condition of life, obtain the worlds of the blessed;
+while he only who at the same time founds himself on Brahman attains to
+immortality.--In the text 'and those who in the forest,' &c. the mention
+made of the forest shows that the statement as to the path of the gods
+has for its presupposition the fact that that stage of life which is
+especially connected with the forest is one generally recognised.--So
+far it has been shown that the other stages of life are no less
+obligatory than that of the householder, whether we take the text under
+discussion as containing merely a reference to those stages (as
+established by independent means of proof) or as directly enjoining them.
+The next Sūtra is meant to show that the latter view is after all the
+right one.
+
+
+
+
+20. Or an injunction, as in the case of the carrying.
+
+As the second part of the text 'Let him approach carrying the firewood
+below the ladle; for above he carries it for the gods' (which refers to
+a certain form of the Agnihotra), although having the form of an anuvāda,
+yet must be interpreted as an injunction, since the carrying of firewood
+above is not established by any other injunction; so the text under
+discussion also must be taken as an injunction of the different stages
+of life (which are not formally enjoined elsewhere). No account being
+taken of the text of the Jābālas, 'Having completed his studentship he
+is to become a householder,' &c., it is thus a settled conclusion that
+the texts discussed, although primarily concerned with other topics,
+must at the same time be viewed as proving the validity of the several
+conditions of life. From this it follows that the text enjoining the
+performance of the Agnihotra up to the end of life, and similar texts,
+are not universally binding, but concern those only who do not retire
+from worldly life.--The final conclusion therefore is that as the
+knowledge of Brahman is enjoined on those who lead a life of austerity
+(which does not require the performance of sacrifices and the like), it
+is not subordinate to works, but is in itself beneficial to man.--Here
+terminates the adhikarana of 'benefit to man.'
+
+
+
+
+21. If it be said that they are mere glorification, on account of their
+reference; not so, on account of the newness.
+
+The following point is next enquired into. Are texts such as 'That
+Udgītha is the best of all essences, the highest, holding the supreme
+place, the eighth' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 3) meant to glorify the Udgītha as a
+constituent element of the sacrifice, or to enjoin a meditation on the
+Udgītha as the best of all essences, and so on? The Pūrvapakshin holds
+the former view, on the ground that the text declares the Udgītha to be
+the best of all essences in so far as being a constituent element of the
+sacrifice. The case is analogous to that of texts such as 'the ladle is
+this earth, the āhavanīya is the heavenly world,' which are merely meant
+to glorify the ladle and the rest as constituent members of the
+sacrifice.--This view the latter part of the Sūtra sets aside 'on
+account of newness.' Texts, as the one referring to the Udgītha, cannot
+be mere glorifications; for the fact of the Udgītha being the best of
+essences is not established by any other means of proof, and the text
+under discussion cannot therefore be understood as a mere anuvāda, meant
+for glorification. Nor is there, in proximity, any injunction of the
+Udgītha on account of connexion with which the clause declaring the
+Udgītha to be the best of all essences could naturally be taken as an
+anuvāda (glorifying the thing previously enjoined in the injunctive
+text); while there is such an injunction in connexion with the (anuvāda)
+text 'The ladle is this earth,' and so on. We thus cannot but arrive at
+the conclusion that the text is meant to enjoin a meditation on the
+Udgītha as being the best of all essences, and so on--the fruit of such
+meditation being an increase of vigour and efficacy on the part of the
+sacrifice.
+
+
+
+
+22. And on account of the words denoting becoming.
+
+That the texts under discussion have an injunctive purport also follows
+from the fact that they contain verbal forms denoting becoming or
+origination--'he is to meditate' and the like; for all such forms have
+injunctive force. All these texts therefore are meant to enjoin special
+forms of meditation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of mere
+glorification.'
+
+
+
+
+23. Should it be said that (the stories told in the Upanishads) are for
+the purpose of the Pāriplava; not so, since (certain stories) are
+specified.
+
+We meet in the Vedānta-texts with certain stories such as 'Pratardana
+the son of Divodāsa came to the beloved abode of Indra,' &c., and
+similar ones. The question here arises whether the stories are merely
+meant to be recited at the Asvamedha sacrifice or to convey knowledge of
+a special kind.--The Pūrvapakshin maintains that as the text' they tell
+the stories' declares the special connexion of those stories with the so-
+called pāriplava performance, they cannot be assumed to be mainly
+concerned with knowledge.--This view the Sūtra negatives, on the ground
+that not all stories of that kind are specially connected with the
+pāriplava. The texts rather single out special stories only as suitable
+for that performance; on the general injunction quoted above there
+follows an injunction defining _which_ stories are to be told, 'King
+Manu, the son of Vivasvat,' &c. The stories told in the Vedānta-texts do
+not therefore form parts of the pāriplava performance, but are connected
+with injunctions of meditations.
+
+
+
+
+24. This follows also from the textual connexion (of those stories with
+injunctions).
+
+That those stories subserve injunctions of meditation is proved thereby
+also that they are exhibited in textual connexion with injunctions such
+as 'the Self is to be seen,' and so on. Their position therefore is
+analogous to that of other stories told in the texts, which somehow
+subserve injunctions of works, and are not merely meant for purposes of
+recitation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the pāriplava.'
+
+
+
+
+25. For this very reason there is no need of the lighting of the fire
+and so on.
+
+The Sūtras return, from their digression into the discussion of two
+special points, to the question as to those whose condition of life
+involves chastity. The above Sūtra declares that as persons of that
+class are referred to by Scripture as specially concerned with
+meditation ('He who is founded on Brahman reaches immortality;' 'those
+who in the forest,' &c.), their meditation does not presuppose a
+knowledge of the kindling of fire and so on, i.e. a knowledge of the
+Agnihotra, the Darsapūrnamāsa, and all those other sacrifices which
+require the preliminary establishnlent of the sacred fires, but a
+knowledge of those works only which are enjoined for their special
+condition of life.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the kindling of
+the fire.'
+
+
+
+
+26. And there is need of all (works), on account of the scriptural
+statement of sacrifices and the rest; as in the case of the horse.
+
+If knowledge (meditation), without any reference to sacrifices and the
+like, is able to bring about immortality, it must be capable of
+accomplishing this in the case of householders also; and the mention
+made of sacrifices and the rest in texts such as 'Brāhmanas seek to know
+him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts' (Bri. Up. IV, 4,
+22), does not prove sacrifices and so on to be auxiliary to knowledge,
+since the stress there lies (not on the sacrifices and so on, but) on
+the desire of knowledge.--Of this view the Sūtra disposes. In the case
+of householders, for whom the Agnihotra and so on are obligatory,
+knowledge presupposes all those works, since scriptural texts such as
+the one quoted directly state that sacrifices and the like are auxiliary
+to knowledge. 'They seek to know by means of sacrifices' can be said
+only if sacrifices are understood to be a means through which knowledge
+is brought about; just as one can say 'he desires to slay with a sword,'
+because the sword is admitted to be an instrument wherewith one can kill.
+What we have to understand by knowledge in this connexion has been
+repeatedly explained, viz. a mental energy different in character from
+the mere cognition of the sense of texts, and more specifically denoted
+by such terms as dhyāna or upāsana, i.e. meditation; which is of the
+nature of remembrance (i.e. representative thought), but in intuitive
+clearness is not inferior to the clearest presentative thought
+(pratyaksha); which by constant daily practice becomes ever more perfect,
+and being duly continued up to death secures final Release. Such
+meditation is originated in the mind through the grace of the Supreme
+Person, who is pleased and conciliated by the different kinds of acts of
+sacrifice and worship duly performed by the Devotee day after day. This
+is what the text 'they seek to know through the sacrifice' really means.
+The conclusion therefore is that in the case of householders knowledge
+has for its pre-requisite all sacrifices and other works of permanent
+and occasional obligation. 'As a horse.' As the horse, which is a means
+of locomotion for man, requires attendants, grooming, &c., so knowledge,
+although itself the means of Release, demands the co-operation of the
+different works. Thus the Lord himself says, 'The work of sacrifice,
+giving, and austerities is not to be relinquished, but is indeed to be
+performed; for sacrifices, gifts, and austerities are purifying to the
+thoughtful.' 'He from whom all beings proceed and by whom all this is
+pervaded-worshipping Him with the proper works man attains to perfection'
+(Bha. Gī. XVIII, 5; 46).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the need
+of all.'
+
+
+
+
+27. But all the same he must be possessed of calmness, subjection of the
+senses, &c., since those are enjoined as auxiliaries to that, and must
+necessarily be accomplished.
+
+The question is whether the householder also must practise calmness and
+so on, or not. The Pūrvapakshin says he must not, since the performance
+of works implies the activity of the outer and inner organs of action,
+and since calmness and so on are of an exactly opposite nature.--This
+view the Sūtra sets aside. The householder also, although engaged in
+outward activity, must, in so far as he possesses knowledge, practise
+calmness of mind and the rest also; for these qualities or states are by
+Scripture enjoined as auxiliaries to knowledge, 'Therefore he who knows
+this, having become calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected,
+should see the Self in Self (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23). As calmness of mind
+and the rest are seen, in so far as implying composure and concentration
+of mind, to promote the origination of knowledge, they also must
+necessarily be aimed at and practised. Nor can it be said that between
+works on the one side and calmness and so on on the other, there is an
+absolute antagonism; for the two have different spheres of application.
+Activity of the organs of action is the proper thing in the case of
+works enjoined; quiescence in the case of works not enjoined and such as
+have no definite purpose. Nor also can it be objected that in the case
+of works implying the activity of organs, calmness of mind and so on are
+impossible, the mind then being necessarily engrossed by the impressions
+of the present work and its surroundings; for works enjoined by
+Scripture have the power of pleasing the Supreme Person, and hence,
+through his grace, to cause the destruction of all mental impressions
+obstructive of calmness and concentration of mind. Hence calmness of
+mind and the rest are to be aimed at and practised by householders also.--
+Here terminates the adhikarana of 'calmness' and so on.
+
+
+
+
+28. And there is permission of all food in the case of danger of life;
+on account of this being seen.
+
+In the meditation on prāna, according to the Vājasaneyins and the
+Chāndogas, there is a statement as to all food being allowed to him who
+knows the prāna. 'By him there is nothing eaten that is not food' (Bri.
+Up. VI, 1, 14; and so on). A doubt here arises whether this permission
+of all food is valid for him who possesses the knowledge of prāna, in
+all circumstances, or only in the case of life being in danger.--The
+Pūrvapakshin holds the former view, on account of no special conditions
+being stated in the text.--This the Sūtra sets aside 'in the case of
+danger to life'; for the reason that, as the text shows, the eating of
+food of all kinds is permitted even for those who know Brahman itself--
+the knowledge of which of course is higher than that of prāna--only when
+their life is in danger. The text alluded to is the one telling how
+Ushasta Kākrāyana, who was well versed in the knowledge of Brahman, once,
+when in great distress, ate unlawful food. We therefore conclude that
+what the text says as to all food being lawful for him who knows prāna,
+can refer only to occasions when food of any kind must be eaten in order
+to preserve life.
+
+
+
+
+29. And on account of non-sublation.
+
+The conclusion above arrived at is confirmed by the consideration that
+thus only those texts are not stultified which enjoin, for those who
+know Brahman, purity in matters of food with a view to the origination
+of knowledge of Brahman. Cp.' when the food is pure the mind becomes
+pure' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2).
+
+
+
+
+30. This is said in Smriti also.
+
+That for those as well who know Brahman, as for others, the eating of
+food of any kind is lawful only in case of extreme need, Smriti also
+declares, 'He who being in danger of his life eats food from anywhere is
+stained by sin no more than the lotus leaf by water.'
+
+
+
+
+31. And hence also a scriptural passage as to non-proceeding according
+to liking.
+
+The above conclusion is further confirmed by a scriptural passage
+prohibiting licence of conduct on the part of any one. The text meant is
+a passage in the Samhitā of the Kathas, 'Therefore a Brahmawa does not
+drink spirituous liquor, thinking "may I not be stained by sin."'--Here
+terminates the adhikarana of 'the allowance of all food.'
+
+
+
+
+32. The works of the āsramas also, on account of their being enjoined.
+
+It has been said that sacrifices and other works are auxiliary to the
+knowledge of Brahman. The doubt now arises whether those works are to be
+performed by him also who merely wishes to fulfil the duties of his
+āsrama, without aiming at final Release, or not. They are not, the
+Pūrvapakshin holds, for that things auxiliary to knowledge should stand
+in subordinate relation to a certain state of life would imply the
+contradiction of permanent and non-permanent obligation.--Of this view
+the Sūtra disposes, 'The works of the āsramas also.' The works belonging
+to each āsrama have to be performed by those also who do not aim at more
+than to live according to the āsrama; for they are specifically enjoined
+by texts such as as long as life lasts he is to offer the Agnihotra';
+this implies a permanent obligation dependent on life. And that the same
+works are also to be performed as being auxiliary to knowledge appears
+from the texts enjoining them in that aspect, 'Him they seek to know by
+the study of the Veda' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22); this the next Sūtra
+declares.
+
+
+
+
+33. And on account of co-operativeness.
+
+These works are to be performed also on account of their being co-
+operative towards knowledge in so far, namely, as they give rise to the
+desire of knowledge; and their thus being enjoined for a double purpose
+does not imply contradiction any more than the double injunctions of the
+Agnihotra, which one text connects with the life of the sacrificer and
+another text with his desire to reach the heavenly world.--Nor does this
+imply a difference of works--this the next Sūtra declares.
+
+
+
+
+34. In any case they are the same, on account of twofold inferential
+signs.
+
+There is no radical difference of works; but in any case, i.e. whether
+they be viewed as duties incumbent on the āsrama or as auxiliary to
+knowledge, sacrifices and other works are one and the same. For
+Scripture, in enjoining them in both these aspects, makes use of the
+same terms, so that we recognise the same acts, and there is no means of
+proof to establish difference of works.
+
+
+
+
+35. And Scripture also declares (knowledge) not to be overpowered.
+
+Texts such as 'By works of sacred duty he drives away evil' declare that
+sacrifices and similar works have the effect of knowledge 'not being
+overpowered,' i.e. of the origination of knowledge not being obstructed
+by evil works. Sacrifices and similar works being performed day after
+day have the effect of purifying the mind, and owing to this, knowledge
+arises in the mind with ever increasing brightness. This proves that the
+works are the same in either case.--Here terminates the adhikarana of
+'the being enjoined' (of sacrifices, and so on).
+
+
+
+
+36. Also in the case of those outside, as this is seen.
+
+It has been declared that the members of the four āsramas have a claim
+to the knowledge of Brahman, and that the duties connected with each
+āsrarna promote knowledge. A doubt now arises whether those men also who,
+on account of poverty and so on, stand outside the āsramas are qualified
+for the knowledge of Brahman, or rtot.--They are not, the Pūrvapakshin
+holds, since such knowledge is to be attained in a way dependent on the
+special duties of each āsrama; while those who do not belong to an
+āsrama are not concerned with āsrama duties.--This view the Sūtra
+rejects. Those also who do not stand within any āsrama are qualified for
+knowledge, 'because that is seen,' i.e. because the texts declare that
+men such as Raikva, Bhīshma, Samvarta and others who did not belong to
+āsrama were well grounded in the knowledge of Brahman. It can by no
+means be maintained that it is āsrama duties only that promote knowledge;
+for the text 'by gifts, by penance, by fasting, and so on' (Bri. Up. IV,
+4, 22) distinctly declares that charity also and other practices, which
+are not confined to the āsramas, are helpful towards knowledge. In the
+same way as in the case of those bound to chastity--who, as the texts
+show, may possess the knowledge of Brahman--knowledge is promoted by
+practices other than the Agnihotra and the like, so--it is concluded--in
+the case of those also who do not belong to any abrama knowledge may be
+promoted by certain practices not exclusively connected with any āsrama,
+such as prayer, fasting, charity, propitiation of the divinity, and so
+on.
+
+
+
+
+37. Smriti also states this.
+
+Smriti also declares that men not belonging to an āsrama grow in
+knowledge through prayer and the like. 'Through prayer also a Brāhmana
+may become perfect. May he perform other works or not, one who befriends
+all creatures is called a Brāhmana' (Manu Smri. II, 17).
+
+
+
+
+38. And there is the promotion (of knowledge) through special acts (of
+duty).
+
+The above conclusion is founded not only on Reasoning and Smriti; but
+Scripture even directly states that knowledge is benefited by practices
+not exclusively prescribed for the āsramas, 'By penance, abstinence,
+faith, and knowledge he is to seek the Self (Pr. Up. I, 10).
+
+
+
+
+39. But better than that is the other also on account of an inferential
+mark.
+
+Better than to be outside the āsramas is the condition of standing
+within an āsrama. The latter state may be due to misfortune; but he who
+can should be within an āsrama, which state is the more holy and
+beneficial one. This follows from inference only, i.e. Smriti; for
+Smriti says, 'A Brāhmana is to remain outside the āsramas not even for
+one day.' For one who has passed beyond the stage of Brahmakarya, or
+whose wife has died, the impossibility to procure a wife constitutes the
+misfortune (which prevents him from belonging to an āsrama).--Here
+terminates the adhikarana of 'widowers.'
+
+
+
+
+40. But of him who has become that there is no becoming not that,
+according to Jaimini also, on account of (Scripture) restraining from
+the absence of the forms of that.
+
+The doubt here arises whether those also who have fallen from the state
+of life of a Naishthika, Vaikhānasa or Pārivrājaka are qualified for the
+knowledge of Brahman or not.--They are so, since in their case, no less
+than in that of widowers and the like, the growth of knowledge may be
+assisted by charity and other practices not confined to āsramas.--This
+primā facie view the Sūtra sets aside. 'He who has become that,' i.e. he
+who has entered on the condition of a Naishthika or the like 'cannot
+become not that,' i.e. may not live in a non-āsrama condition; since
+scriptural texts restrain men who once have entered the Naishthika, &c.,
+state 'from the absence of the forms of that,' i.e. from the
+discontinuance of the special duties of their āsrama. Compare texts such
+as 'He is to go into the forest, and is not to return from thence';
+'Having renounced the world he is not to return.' And hence persons who
+have lapsed from their āsrama are not qualified for meditation on
+Brahman. This view of his the Sūtrakāra strengthens by a reference to
+the opinion of Jaimini.--But cannot a Naishthika who, through some sin,
+has lapsed from his duties and position, make up for his transgression
+by some expiatory act and thus again become fit for meditation on
+Brahman?--To this point the next Sūtra refers.
+
+
+
+
+41. Nor the (expiatory performance) described in the chapter treating of
+qualification; that being impossible on account of the Smriti referring
+to such lapse.
+
+Those expiatory performances which are described in the chapter treating
+of qualification (Pū. Mī. Sū. VI) are not possible in the case of him
+who has lapsed from the condition of a Naishthika; since such expiations
+do not apply to him, as is shown by a Smriti text referring to such
+lapse, viz. 'He who having once entered on the duties of a Naishthika
+lapses from them, for such a slayer of the Self I do not see any
+expiatory work by which he might become clean.' The expiatory ceremony
+referred to in the Pūrva Mimāmsā therefore applies to the case of other
+Brahmakārins only.
+
+
+
+
+42. A minor one, thus some; (and hence they hold) the existence (of
+expiation), as in the case of eating. This has been explained.
+
+Some teachers are of opinion that even on the part of Naishthikas and
+the rest the lapse from chastity constitutes only a minor offence which
+can be atoned for by expiatory observances; in the same way as in the
+case of the eating of forbidden food the same prāyaskitta may be used by
+the ordinary Brahmakārin and by Naishthikas and the rest. This has been
+stated by the Smriti writer, 'For the others also (i.e. the Naishthikas
+and so on) the same (rules and practices as those for the Upakurvāna)
+hold good, in so far as not opposed to their āsrama.'
+
+
+
+
+43. But in either case (such men) stand outside; on account of Smriti
+and custom.
+
+Whether the point under discussion constitutes a minor or a major
+offence, in any case those who have lapsed stand outside the category of
+those qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. For Smriti, i.e. the text
+quoted above, 'I see no expiatory performance by which he, a slayer of
+Brahman as he is, could become pure again,' declares that expiations are
+powerless to restore purity. And custom confirms the same conclusion;
+for good men shun those Naishthikas who have lapsed, even after they
+have performed prāyaskittas, and do not impart to them the knowledge of
+Brahman, The conclusion, therefore, is that such men are not qualified
+for knowing Brahman.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'him who has
+become that.'
+
+
+
+
+44. By the Lord (of the sacrifice), since Scripture declares a fruit--
+thus Ātreya thinks.
+
+A doubt arises whether the meditations on such constituent elements of
+the sacrifice as the Udgītha, and so on, are to be performed by the
+sacrificer (for whose benefit the sacrifice is offered), or by the
+officiating priests. Ātreya advocates the former view; on the ground of
+Scripture showing that in the case of such meditations as the one on the
+small ether within the heart, fruit and meditation belong to the same
+person, and that in the case of such meditations as the one on the
+Udgītha the fruit belongs to the sacrificer (whence we conclude that the
+meditation also is his). Nor can it be said that the sacrificer is not
+competent for such meditation, for the reason that like the godohana
+vessel it is connected with an element of the sacrifice (which latter
+the priests only can perform). For the godohana vessel serves to bring
+water, and this of course none else can do but the Adhvaryu; while a
+meditation on the Udgītha as being the essence of all essences can very
+well be performed by the Sacrificer--true though it be that the Udgītha
+itself can be performed by the Udgātri priest only.--Against this view
+the next Sūtra declares itself.
+
+
+
+
+45. (They are) the priest's work, Audulomi thinks; since for that he is
+engaged.
+
+The teacher Audulomi is of opinion that the meditation on the Udgītha
+and the like is the work of the priest, since it is he who is engaged
+for the purpose of performing that which gives rise to the fruit, i.e.
+of the entire sacrifice with all its subordinate parts. Injunctions
+referring to the performance of the sacrifices such as 'he chooses the
+priests; he gives to the priests their fee' indicate that the entire
+sacrificial performance is the work of the priests, and that hence all
+activities comprised within it--mental as well as bodily--belong to the
+priests. Capability or non-capability does not constitute the criterion
+in this case. For although the meditations in question aim directly at
+the benefit of man (not at the greater perfection of the sacrifice), yet
+since they fall within the sphere of qualification of those who are
+qualified for the sacrifice, and since the sacrifice with all its
+subordinate elements has to be performed by the priests, and since the
+text 'whatever he does with knowledge that becomes more vigorous'
+declares knowledge to belong to the same agent as the works which are
+benefited by such knowledge, we conclude that those meditations also are
+the exclusive duty of the priests. In the case of the meditations on the
+small ether, &c., on the other hand, the text says nothing as to their
+having to be performed by priests, and we therefore assume in accordance
+with the general principle that 'the fruit belongs to the performer,'
+that the agent there is the person to whom Scripture assigns the fruit.--
+Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the lord (of the sacrifice).'
+
+
+
+
+46. There is injunction of other auxiliary means for him who is such, as
+in the case of injunction and so on; (the term _mauna_ denoting)
+according to an alternative meaning a third something.
+
+'Therefore let a Brāhmana after he has done with learning wish to stand
+by a childlike state; and after having done with the childlike state and
+learning (he is) a Muni' (Bri. Up. III, 5). A doubt arises whether this
+text enjoins Muni-hood in the same way as it enjoins learning and the
+childlike state, or merely refers to it as something already established.--
+The Purvapakshin holds the latter view on the ground that as 'Muni-hood'
+and 'learning' both connote knowledge, the word 'Muni' merely refers
+back to the knowledge already enjoined in the phrase 'after he has done
+with learning.' For the text presents no word of injunctive force with
+regard to Muni-hood.--This view the Sūtra controverts. 'For him who is
+such,' i.e. for those who possess knowledge, 'there is an injunction of
+a different co-operative factor' 'in the same way as injunctions and
+the rest.' By the _injunctions_ in the last clause we have to understand
+the special duties of the different āsramas, i.e. sacrifices and the
+like, and also such qualifications as quietness of mind and the like;
+and by the 'and the rest' is meant the learning of and pondering on the
+sacred texts. Stated at length, the meaning of the Sūtra then is as
+follows--in the same way as texts such as 'him Brāhmanas seek to know
+through the reciting of the Veda, through sacrifices and charity, and so
+on,' and 'Quiet, subdued,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23) enjoin sacrifices
+and so on, and quietness of mind and the like, as helpful towards
+knowledge; and as texts such as 'the Self is to be heard, to be pondered
+upon' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5) mention hearing and pondering as helpful
+towards knowledge; thus the text under discussion enjoins learning, a
+childlike state of mind, and Muni-hood as three further different
+auxiliaries of knowledge.--'Muni-hood' does _not_ denote the same thing
+as 'learning'--this the Sūtra intimates by the clause 'alternatively a
+third,' i.e. as the word muni is observed alternatively to denote
+persons such as Vyāsa distinguished by their power of profound
+reflection (manana), the abstract term munihood denotes a third thing
+different from _learning_ and the 'childlike state.' Hence, although the
+phrase 'then a Muni' does not contain a word of directly injunctive
+power, we must all the same understand it in an injunctive sense, viz.
+'then let him be or become a Muni'; for Muni-hood is not something
+previously established. Such munihood is also something different from
+mere _reflection_ (manana); it is the reiterated representation before
+the mind of the object of meditation, the idea of that object thus
+becoming more and more vivid. The meaning of the entire text therefore
+is as follows. A Brāhmana is at first fully to master knowledge, i.e. he
+is to attain, by means of hearing and pondering, to the knowledge of
+Brahman in all its fulness and perfection. This is to be effected
+through the growth of purity of mind and heart, due to the grace of the
+Lord; for this Smriti declares, 'Neither by the Vedas nor by austerities,
+and so on, can I be so seen--; but by devotion exclusive I may be known'
+(Bha. Gī. XI, 53-54); and Scripture also says, 'Who has the highest
+devotion for God' (Svet. Up. VI, 23), and 'That Self cannot be gained by
+the study of the Veda,' &c. 'He whom the Self chooses by him the Self is
+to be attained' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23). After that 'he is to stand by a
+childlike state'; what this means will be explained further on. And
+after that he is to be a Muni, i.e. he is to fix his thoughts so
+exclusively and persistently on Brahman as to attain to the mode of
+knowledge called meditation. Having by the employment of these three
+means reached true knowledge he--the text goes on to say--having done
+with amauna and mauna is a Brāhmana. Amauna, i.e. non-mauna, denotes all
+the auxiliaries of knowledge different from mauna: employing these and
+mauna as well he reaches the highest goal of knowledge. And, the text
+further says, there is no other means but those stated whereby to become
+such, i.e. a true Brāhmana. The entire text thus evidently means to
+enjoin on any one standing within any āsrama learning, a childlike state,
+and mauna as auxiliary means of knowledge, in addition to sacrifices and
+the other special duties of the āsramas.--But, an objection is raised,
+if knowledge, aided by pānditya, and so on, and thus being auxiliary to
+the action of the special duties of the āsramas, is thus declared to be
+the means of attaining to Brahman; how then are we to understand the
+Chāndogya's declaring that a man, in order to attain to Brahman, is
+throughout his life to carry on the duties of a householder [FOOTNOTE 711:
+1]?--To this the next Sūtra replies.
+
+[FOOTNOTE 711:1. Ch. Up. VIII, 13.]
+
+
+
+
+47. But on account of the existence (of knowledge) in all, there is
+winding up with the householder.
+
+As knowledge belongs to the members of all āsramas it belongs to the
+householder also, and for this reason the Upanishad winds up with the
+latter. This winding up therefore is meant to illustrate the duties (not
+of the householder only, but) of the members of all āsramas. Analogously
+in the text under discussion (Bri. Up. III, 5) the clause 'A Brāhmana
+having risen above the desire for sons, the desire for wealth, and the
+desire for worlds, wanders about as a mendicant,' intimates duties
+belonging exclusively to the condition of the wandering beggar, and then
+the subsequent clause 'therefore let a Brāhmana having done with
+learning,' &c., enjoins pānditya, bālya, and mauna (not as incumbent on
+the pārivrājaka only, but) as illustrating the duties of all āsramas.--
+This the next Sūtra explicitly declares.
+
+
+
+
+48. On account of the others also being taught, in the same way as the
+condition of the Muni.
+
+The injunction, on him who has passed beyond all desire, of mauna
+preceded by pārivrājya (wandering about as a mendicant), is meant to
+illustrate the duties of all āsramas. For the duties of the other
+āsramas are taught by Scripture no less than those of the Muni (and the
+householder). Similarly it was shown above that in the text 'There are
+three branches of sacred duty--he who is founded on Brahman goes to
+immortality,' the term 'founded on Brahman' applies equally to members
+of all āsramas.--It therefore remains a settled conclusion that the
+text under discussion enjoins pānditya, bālya, and mauna as being
+auxiliaries to knowledge in the same way as the other duties of the
+āsramas, such as sacrifices and the rest.--Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'the injunction of other auxiliaries.'
+
+
+
+
+49. Not manifesting itself; on account of the connexion.
+
+In the text discussed above we meet with the word 'bālya,' which may
+mean either 'being a child' or 'being and doing like a child.' The
+former meaning is excluded, as that particular age which is called
+childhood cannot be assumed at will. With regard to the latter meaning,
+however, a doubt arises, viz. whether the text means to say that he who
+aims at perfect knowledge is to assume all the ways of a child, as e.g.
+its wilful behaviour, or only its freedom from pride and the like.--The
+former, the Pūrvapakshin maintains. For the text gives no specification,
+and texts enjoining restraints of different kinds (on the man desirous
+of knowledge) are sublated by this specific text which enjoins him to be
+in all points like a child.--This view the Sūtra disposes of. 'Not
+manifesting itself.' That aspect of a child's nature which consists in
+the child not manifesting its nature (viz. in pride, arrogance, and so
+on), the man aiming at true knowledge is to make his own. 'On account of
+connexion,' i.e. because thus only the 'balya' of the text gives a
+possible sense. The other characteristic features of 'childhood' the
+texts declare to be opposed to knowledge, 'He who has not turned away
+from wicked conduct, who is not tranquil and attentive, or whose mind is
+not at peace, he can never attain the Self by knowledge' (Ka. Up. I, 2,
+24); 'When food is pure, the whole nature becomes pure' (Ch. Up. VII, 26,
+2), and so on.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-manifestation.'
+
+
+
+
+50. What belongs to this world, there being no obstruction at hand; as
+this is seen.
+
+Knowledge, as enjoined by Scripture, is twofold, having for its fruit
+either exaltation within the sphere of the Samsāra, or final Release.
+With regard to the former the question arises whether it springs up only
+immediately subsequent to the good works which are the means to bring it
+about; or, indefinitely, either subsequent to such works or at some
+later time.--The Pūrvapakshin holds the former view. A man reaches
+knowledge through his good deeds only, as the Lord himself declares,
+'Four kinds of men doing good works worship me,' &c.(Bha. Gī. VII, 16);
+and when those works have been accomplished there is no reason why the
+result, i.e. knowledge, should be delayed.--This view the Sūtra disposes
+of. 'What is comprised in this world,' i.e. meditation, the result of
+which is worldly exaltation, springs up immediately after the works to
+which it is due, in case of there being no other works of greater
+strength obstructing the rise of knowledge; but if there is an
+obstruction of the latter kind, knowledge springs up later on only. 'For
+this is seen,' i.e. Scripture acknowledges the effects of such
+obstruction; for a statement such as 'what he does with knowledge, with
+faith, with the Upanishad that is more vigorous,' means that works
+joined with the knowledge of the Udgītha, and so on, produce their
+results without obstruction (which implies that the action of other
+works is liable to be obstructed).--Here terminates the adhikarana of
+'what belongs to this world.'
+
+
+
+
+51. In the same way there is non-determination with regard to what has
+Release for its result; that condition being ascertained, that condition
+being ascertained.
+
+So likewise in the case of the origination, through works of very great
+merit, of such knowledge as has for its result final Release, the time
+is not definitely fixed; for here also there is ascertained the same
+condition, viz. the termination of the obstruction presented by other
+works. A further doubt might in this case be raised on the ground that
+such works as give rise to knowledge leading to final Release are
+stronger than all other works, and therefore not liable to obstruction.
+But this doubt is disposed of by the reflection that even in the case of
+a man knowing Brahman there may exist previous evil deeds of
+overpowering strength.--The repetition of the last words of the Sūtra
+indicates the completion of the adhyāya.--Here terminates the adhikarana
+of 'what has Release for its result.'
+
+
+
+
+FOURTH ADHYĀYA
+
+FIRST PĀDA.
+
+1. Repetition, on account of the text teaching (what has to be done more
+than once).
+
+The third adhyāya was concerned with the consideration of meditation,
+together with its means. The Sūtras now enter on a consideration of the
+results of meditation, after a further preliminary clearing up of the
+nature of meditation. The question here arises whether the act of
+knowledge of Brahman inculcated in Vedānta-texts, such as 'He who knows
+Brahman reaches the Highest,' 'Having known him thus he passes beyond
+death,' 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman,' is, in the view of
+Scripture, to be performed once only, or to be repeated more than once.--
+Once suffices, the Pūrvapakshin maintains; for as the text enjoins
+nothing more than knowing there is no authority for a repetition of the
+act. Nor can it be said that the act of knowing, analogous to the act of
+beating the rice-grains until they are freed from the husks, is a
+visible means towards effecting the intuition of Brahman, and hence must,
+like the beating, be repeated until the effect is accomplished; for
+knowing is not a visible means towards anything. Such acts as the
+Jyotishtoma sacrifice and the knowledge inculcated in the Vedānta-texts
+are alike of the nature of conciliation of the Supreme Person; through
+whom thus conciliated man obtains all that is beneficial to him, viz.
+religious duty, wealth, pleasure, and final Release. This has been shown
+under III, 2, 38. The meaning of Scripture therefore is accomplished by
+performing the act of knowledge once only, as the Jyotishtoma is
+performed once.--This view the Sūtra sets aside. The meaning of
+Scripture is fulfilled only by repeated acts of knowledge 'on account of
+teaching,' i.e. because the teaching of Scripture is conveyed by means
+of the term 'knowing' (vedana), which is synonymous with meditating
+(dhyāna, upāsana). That these terms are so synonymous appears from the
+fact that the verbs vid, upās, dhyāi are in one and the same text used
+with reference to one and the same object of knowledge. A text begins, e.
+g. 'Let him meditate (upāsīta) on mind as Brahman,' and concludes 'he
+who knows (veda) this shines, warms,' &c. (Ch. Up. III, 18). In the same
+way the knowledge of Raikva is at first referred to by means of vid, 'He
+who knows (veda) what he knows is thus spoken of by me,' and further on
+by means of upās,'teach me the deity on which you meditate' (Ch. Up. IV,
+1, 2). Similarly texts which have the same meaning as the text 'He who
+knows Brahman reaches the Highest'--viz. 'the Self should be seen, be
+heard, be reflected on, be meditated upon (nididhyāsitavya)'--'Then he
+sees him meditating (dhyāyamāna) on him as without parts' (Mu. Up. III,
+1, 8), and others--use the verb dhyāi to express the meaning of vid. Now
+dhyāi means to think of something not in the way of mere representation
+(smriti), but in the way of _continued_ representation. And upās has the
+same meaning; for we see it used in the sense of thinking with
+uninterrupted concentration of the mind on one object. We therefore
+conclude that as the verb 'vid' is used interchangeably with dhyāi and
+upās, the mental activity referred to in texts such as 'he knows
+Brahman' and the like is an often-repeated continuous representation.
+
+
+
+
+2. And on account of an inferential mark.
+
+Inferential mark here means Smriti. Smriti also declares that that
+knowledge which effects Release is of the nature of continued
+representation. Meditation therefore has to be repeated.--Here
+terminates the adhikarana of 'repetition.'
+
+
+
+
+3. But as the Self; this (the ancient Devotees) acknowledge (since the
+texts) make (them) apprehend (in that way).
+
+The following point is now taken into consideration. Is Brahman to be
+meditated upon as something different from the meditating Devotee, or as
+the Self of the latter?--The Pūrvapakshin holds the former view. For, he
+says, the individual soul is something different from Brahman; as has
+been proved under II, 1, 22; III, 4, 8; I, 1, 15. And Brahman must be
+meditated upon as it truly is; for if it is meditated upon under an
+unreal aspect, the attaining to Brahman also will not be real, according
+to the principle expressed in the text, 'According as a man's thought is
+in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up.
+III, 14, 1). This view the Sūtra sets aside. Brahman is rather to be
+meditated upon as being the Self of the meditating Devotee. As the
+meditating individual soul is the Self of its own body, so the highest
+Brahman is the Self of the individual soul--this is the proper form of
+meditation.--Why? Because the great Devotees of olden times acknowledged
+this to be the true nature of meditation; compare the text 'Then I am
+indeed thou, holy divinity, and thou art me.'--But how can the Devotees
+claim that Brahman which is a different being is their 'Ego'?--Because
+the texts enable them to apprehend this relation as one free from
+contradiction. 'He who dwelling within the Self is different from the
+Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who
+rules the Self from within; he is thy Self, the inner ruler, the
+immortal one'(Bri. Up. III, 7, 3); 'In the True all these beings have
+their root, they dwell in the True, they rest in the True;--in that all
+that exists has its Self' (Kh. Up. VI, 8); 'All this indeed is Brahman'
+(Kh. Up. III, 14, 1)--all these texts teach that all sentient and non-
+sentient beings spring from Brahman, are merged in him, breathe through
+him, are ruled by him, constitute his body; so that he is the Self of
+all of them. In the same way therefore as, on the basis of the fact that
+the individual soul occupies with regard to the body the position of a
+Self, we form such judgments of co-ordination as 'I am a god--I am a
+man'; the fact of the individual Self being of the nature of Self
+justifies us in viewing our own Ego as belonging to the highest Self. On
+the presupposition of all ideas being finally based on Brahman and hence
+all words also finally denoting Brahman, the texts therefore make such
+statements of mutual implication as 'I am thou, O holy divinity, and
+thou art me.' On this view of the relation of individual soul and
+highest Self there is no real contradiction between two, apparently
+contradictory, sets of texts, viz. those on the one hand which negative
+the view of the soul being different from the highest Self, 'Now if a
+man meditates upon another divinity, thinking "the divinity is one and I
+another," he does not know'; 'He is incomplete, let him meditate upon
+Him as the Self'; 'Everything abandons him who views anything apart from
+the Self (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10; 7-II, 4, 6); and on the other hand those
+texts which set forth the view of the soul and the highest Self being
+different entities, 'Thinking of the (individual) Self and the Mover as
+different'(Svet. Up. I, 6). For our view implies a denial of difference
+in so far as the individual 'I' is of the nature of the Self; and it
+implies an acknowledgment of difference in so far as it allows the
+highest Self to differ from the individual soul in the same way as the
+latter differs from its body. The clause 'he is incomplete' (in one of
+the texts quoted above) refers to the fact that Brahman which is
+different from the soul constitutes the Self of the soul, while the soul
+constitutes the body of Brahman.--It thus remains a settled conclusion
+that Brahman is to be meditated upon as constituting the Self of the
+meditating Devotee.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'meditation under
+the aspect of Self.'
+
+
+
+
+4. Not in the symbol; for (the symbol) is not that one (i.e. the Self of
+the Devotee).
+
+'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1); 'He who
+meditates on name as Brahman' (Ch. Up. VII, 15)--with regard to these
+and similar meditations on outward symbols (pratīka) of Brahman there
+arises a doubt, viz. whether in them the symbols are to be thought of as
+of the nature of Self or not. The Pūrvapakshin holds the former view.
+For, he says, in form those injunctions do not differ from other
+injunctions of meditation on Brahman, and Brahman, as we have seen,
+constitutes the Self of the meditating Devotee.--This view the Sūtra
+sets aside. A pratīka cannot be meditated on as being of the nature of
+Self; for the pratīka is not the Self of the meditating Devotee. What,
+in those meditations, is to be meditated upon is the pratīka only, not
+Brahman: the latter enters into the meditation only as qualifying its
+aspect. For by a meditation on a pratīka we understand a meditation in
+which something that is not Brahman is viewed under the aspect of
+Brahman, and as the pratīka--the object of meditation--is not the Self
+of the Devotee it cannot be viewed under that form.--But an objection is
+raised here also, it is Brahman which is the real object of meditation;
+for where Brahman _may_ be viewed as the object of meditation, it is
+inappropriate to assume as objects non-sentient things of small power
+such as the mind, and so on. The object of meditation therefore is
+Brahman viewed under the aspect of mind, and so on.--This objection the
+next Sūtra disposes of.
+
+
+
+
+5. The view of Brahman, on account of superiority.
+
+The view of Brahman may appropriately be superimposed on mind and the
+like; but not the view of mind, and so on, on Brahman. For Brahman is
+something superior to mind, and so on; while the latter are inferior to
+Brahman. To view a superior person, a prince e.g., as a servant would be
+lowering; while, on the other hand, to view a servant as a prince is
+exalting.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'symbols.'
+
+
+
+
+6. And the ideas of Āditya and the rest on the member; on account of
+this being rational.
+
+'He who shines up there let a man meditate on him as the Udgītha' (Ch.
+Up. I, 3, 1).--With regard to this and similar meditations connected
+with subordinate parts of sacrificial performances there arises the
+doubt whether the idea of Āditya and so on has to be superimposed on the
+subordinate part of the sacrifice, such as the Udgītha, or vice versā (i.
+e. whether Āditya should be meditated upon under the aspect of the
+Udgītha, or vice versā).--The Pūrvapakshin holds the former view. For
+the general principle is that the lower being should be viewed under the
+aspect of the higher, and the Udgītha and so on, which are parts of the
+sacrifices through which certain results are effected, are superior to
+the divinities who do not accomplish any result.--Of this view the Sūtra
+disposes. The ideas of Āditya and so on are to be superimposed on the
+'members,' i.e. the Udgītha and so on, which are constituent members of
+the sacrifices; because of the gods only superiority can be established.
+For it is only through the propitiation of the gods that sacrifices are
+capable of bringing about their results. The Udgītha and the rest
+therefore are to be viewed under the aspect of Āditya and so on.--Here
+terminates the adhikarana of 'the ideas of Āditya and so on.'
+
+
+
+
+7. Sitting; on account of possibility.
+
+It has been shown that that special form of cognitional activity which
+the Vedānta-texts set forth as the means of accomplishing final Release
+and which is called meditation (dhyāna; upāsana) has to be frequently
+repeated, and is of the nature of continued representation. A question
+now arises as to the way in which it has to be carried on.--There being
+no special restrictive rule, the Pūrvapakshin holds that the Devotee may
+carry it on either sitting or lying down or standing or walking.--This
+view the Sūtra sets aside. Meditation is to be carried on by the Devotee
+in a sitting posture, since in that posture only the needful
+concentration of mind can be reached. Standing and walking demand effort,
+and lying down is conducive to sleep. The proper posture is sitting on
+some support, so that no effort may be required for holding the body up.
+
+
+
+
+8. And on account of meditation.
+
+Since, as intimated by the text,'the Self is to be meditated upon,' the
+mental activity in question is of the nature of meditation, it requires
+as its necessary condition concentration of mind. For by meditation is
+understood thought directed upon one object and not disturbed by the
+ideas of other things.
+
+
+
+
+9. And with reference to immobility.
+
+And it is with reference to their immobility that the earth and other
+inanimate things--the air, the sky, the waters, the mountains--may be
+spoken of as thinking, 'the earth thinks (dhyāyati) as it were,' and so
+on. Movelessness hence is characteristic of the intensely meditating
+person also, and such movelessness is to be realised in the sitting
+posture only.
+
+
+
+
+10. And Smriti texts say the same.
+
+Smriti texts also declare that he only who sits can meditate, 'Having
+placed his steady seat upon a pure spot, there seated upon that seat,
+concentrating his mind he should practise Yoga' (Bha. Gī. VI, 11-12).
+
+
+
+
+11. Where concentration of mind (is possible), there; on account of
+there being no difference.
+
+As the texts do not say anything as to special places and times, the
+only requisite of such places and times is that they should favour
+concentration of mind. This agrees with the declaration 'Let a man apply
+himself to meditation in a level and clean place, &c., favourable to the
+mind' (Svet. Up. II, 10).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the
+sitting one.'
+
+
+
+
+12. Up to death; for there also it is seen.
+
+The question now arises whether the meditation described which is the
+means of final Release is to be accomplished within one day, or to be
+continued day after day, until death.--The view that it is accomplished
+within one day, as this will satisfy the scriptural injunction, is
+disposed of by the Sūtra. Meditation is to be continued until death. For
+Scripture declares that meditation has to take place 'there,' i.e. in
+the whole period from the first effort after meditation up to death,
+'Acting thus as long as life lasts he reaches the world of Brahman.'--
+Here terminates the adhikarana of 'up to death.'
+
+
+
+
+13. On the attainment of this, there result the non-clinging and the
+destruction of later and earlier sins; this being declared.
+
+Having, so far, elucidated the nature of meditation, the Sūtras now
+begin to consider the result of meditation. Scripture declares that on
+the knowledge of Brahman being attained a man's later and earlier sins
+do not cling to him but pass away. 'As water does not cling to a lotus
+leaf, so no evil deed clings to him who knows this' (Ch. Up. IV, 14, 3);
+'Having known that he is not sullied by any evil deed' (Bri. Up. IV, 4,
+23); 'As the fibres of the Ishīkā reed when thrown into the fire are
+burnt, thus all his sins are burnt' (Ch. Up. V, 24, 3); 'All his works
+perish when He has been beheld who is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8).--
+The doubt here arises whether this non-clinging and destruction of all
+sins is possible as the result of mere meditation, or not.--It is not
+possible, the Pūrvapakshin maintains; for Scripture declares, 'no work
+the fruits of which have not been completely enjoyed perishes even in
+millions of aeons.' What the texts, quoted above, say as to the non-
+clinging and destruction of works occurs in sections complementary to
+passages inculcating knowledge as the means of final Release, and may
+therefore be understood as somehow meant to eulogize knowledge. Nor can
+it be said that knowledge is enjoined as an expiation of sins, so that
+the destruction of sins could be conceived as resulting from such
+expiation; for knowledge--as we see from texts such as 'He who knows
+Brahman reaches the Highest,' 'He knows Brahman and he becomes Brahman'--
+is enjoined as a means to reach Brahman. The texts as to the non-
+clinging and destruction of sins therefore can only be viewed as
+arthavāda passages supplementary to the texts enjoining knowledge of
+Brahman.--This view the Sūtra sets aside. When a man reaches knowledge,
+the non-clinging and destruction of all sins may be effected through the
+power of knowledge. For Scripture declares the power of knowledge to be
+such that 'to him who knows this, no evil deed clings,' and so on. Nor
+is this in conflict with the text stating that no work not fully enjoyed
+perishes; for this latter text aims at confirming the power of works to
+produce their results; while the texts under discussion have for their
+aim to declare that knowledge when once sprung up possesses the power of
+destroying the capability of previously committed sins to produce their
+own evil results and the power of obstructing that capability on the
+part of future evil actions. The two sets of texts thus refer to
+different matters, and hence are not mutually contradictory. There is in
+fact no more contradiction between them than there is between the power
+of fire to produce heat and the power of water to subdue such heat. By
+knowledge effecting the non-clinging of sin we have to understand its
+obstructing the origination of the power, on the part of sin, to cause
+that disastrous disposition on the part of man which consists in
+unfitness for religious works; for sins committed tend to render man
+unfit for religious works and inclined to commit further sinful actions
+of the same kind. By knowledge effecting the destruction of sin, on the
+other hand, we understand its destroying that power of sin after it has
+once originated. That power consists, fundamentally, in displeasure on
+the part of the Lord. Knowledge of the Lord, which, owing to the supreme
+dearness of its object is itself supremely dear, possesses the
+characteristic power of propitiating the Lord--the object of knowledge--
+and thus destroys the displeasure of the Lord due to the previous
+commission of sins on the part of the knowing Devotee; and at the same
+time obstructs the origination of further displeasure on the Lord's part,
+which otherwise would be caused by sins committed subsequently to the
+origination of such knowledge. What Scripture says about sin not
+clinging to him who knows can however be understood only with regard to
+such sins as spring from thoughtlessness; for texts such as 'he who has
+not turned away from evil conduct' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 24) teach that
+meditation, becoming more perfect day after day, cannot be accomplished
+without the Devotee having previously broken himself off from all evil
+conduct.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the reaching of that.'
+
+
+
+
+14. Of the other also there is thus non-clinging; but at death.
+
+It has been said that, owing to knowledge, earlier and subsequent sins
+do not cling and are destroyed. The same holds good also with regard to
+the other, i.e. to good works--they also, owing to knowledge, do not
+cling and are destroyed; for there is the same antagonism between
+knowledge and the fruit of those works, and Scripture moreover expressly
+declares this. Thus we read, 'Day and night do not pass that bank--
+neither good nor evil deeds. All sins turn back from it' (Ch. Up. VIII, 4,
+1); 'He shakes off his good and evil deeds' (Kau. Up. I, 4). In the
+former of these texts good works are expressly designated as 'sin'
+because their fruits also are something not desirable for him who aims
+at Release; there is some reason for doing this because after all good
+works are enjoined by Scripture and their fruits are desired by men, and
+they hence might be thought not to be opposed to knowledge.--But even to
+him who possesses the knowledge of Brahman, the fruits of good deeds--
+such as seasonable rain, good crops, &c.--are desirable because they
+enable him to perform his meditations in due form; how then can it be
+said that knowledge is antagonistic to them and destroys them?--Of this
+point the Sūtra disposes by means of the clause 'but on death.' Good
+works which produce results favourable to knowledge and meditation
+perish only on the death of the body (not during the lifetime of the
+Devotee).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the other.'
+
+
+
+
+15. But only those former works the effects of which have not yet begun;
+on account of that being the term.
+
+A new doubt arises here, viz. whether all previous good and evil works
+are destroyed by the origination of knowledge, or only those the effects
+of which have not yet begun to operate.--All works alike, the
+Pūrvapakshin says; for the texts-as e.g. 'all sins are burned'--declare
+the fruits of knowledge to be the same in all cases; and the fact of the
+body continuing to exist subsequently to the rise of knowledge may be
+accounted for by the force of an impulse once imparted, just as in the
+case of the revolution of a potter's wheel.--This view the Sūtra sets
+aside. Only those previous works perish the effects of which have not
+yet begun to operate; for the text 'For him there is delay as long as he
+is not delivered from the body' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2) expressly states
+when the delay of the body's death will come to an end (the body
+meanwhile continuing to exist through the influence of the
+anārabdhakārya works). There is no proof for the existence of an impetus
+accounting for the continuance of the body's life, other than the Lord's
+pleasure or displeasure caused by--good or evil deeds.--Here terminates
+the adhikarana of 'the works the operation of which has not yet begun.'
+
+
+
+
+16. But the Agnihotra and the rest, (because they tend) to that effect
+only; this being seen.
+
+It might here be said that special works incumbent on the several
+āsramas, as e. g. the Agnihotra, need not be undertaken by those who are
+not desirous of their results, since these works also fall under the
+category of good works the result of which does not 'cling.'--This view
+the Sūtra sets aside. Such works as the Agnihotra must be performed,
+since there is no possibility of their results not clinging; for him who
+knows, those works have knowledge for their exclusive effect. This we
+learn from Scripture itself: 'Him Brāhmanas seek to know by the study of
+the Veda, by sacrifices, gifts, austerities, and fasting.' This passage
+shows that works such as the Agnihotra give rise to knowledge, and as
+knowledge in order to grow and become more perfect has to be practised
+day after day until death, the special duties of the āsrama also, which
+assist the rise of knowledge, have daily to be performed. Otherwise,
+those duties being omitted, the mind would lose its clearness and
+knowledge would not arise.--But if good works such as the Agnihotra only
+serve the purpose of giving rise to knowledge, and if good works
+previous to the rise of knowledge perish, according to the texts 'Having
+dwelt there till their works are consumed' (Ch. Up. V, 10, 5) and
+'having obtained the end of his deeds' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6), to what then
+applies the text 'His sons enter upon his inheritance, his friends upon
+his good works'?--This point is taken up by the next Sūtra.
+
+
+
+
+17. According to some (a class of good works) other than these, of both
+kinds.
+
+The text quoted above from one sākhā ('His friends enter upon his good
+deeds') refers to good works other than the Agnihotra and the rest, the
+only object of which is to give rise to knowledge, viz. to all those
+manifold good works, previous or subsequent to the attaining to
+knowledge, the results of which are obstructed by other works of greater
+strength. Those texts also which declare works not to cling or to be
+destroyed through knowledge refer to this same class of works.--The next
+Sūtra recalls the fact, already previously established, that the results
+of works actually performed may somehow be obstructed.
+
+
+
+
+18. For (there is the text) 'whatever he does with knowledge.'
+
+The declaration made in the text 'whatever he does with knowledge that
+is more vigorous,' viz. that the knowledge of the Udgītha has for its
+result non-obstruction of the result of the sacrifice, implies that the
+result of works actually performed _may_ be obstructed. We thus arrive
+at the conclusion that the text of the Sātyāyanins,' his friends enter
+upon his good works,' refers to those good works of the man possessing
+knowledge the results of which were somehow obstructed (and hence did
+not act themselves out during his lifetime, so that on his death they
+may be transferred to others).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the
+Agnihotra and the rest.'
+
+
+
+
+19. But having destroyed by fruition the other two sets he becomes one
+with Brahman.
+
+There now arises the doubt whether the good and evil works other than
+those the non-clinging and destruction of which have been declared, that
+is to say those works the results of which have begun to act, come to an
+end together with that bodily existence in which knowledge of Brahman
+originates, or with the last body due to the action of the works last
+mentioned, or with another body due to the action of the anārabdhakārya.--
+The second of these alternatives is the one to be accepted, for there is
+a text declaring that works come to an end with the deliverance of the
+Self from the current bodily existence: 'For him there is delay so long
+as he is not delivered (from the body), then he will become one with
+Brahman' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2).--This view the Sūtra sets aside. Having
+destroyed the other good and evil works the results of which had begun
+to operate by retributive experience he, subsequently to the termination
+of such retributive enjoyment, becomes one with Brahman. If those good
+and evil works are such that their fruits may be fully enjoyed within
+the term of one bodily existence, they come to an end together with the
+current bodily existence; if they require several bodily existences for
+the full experience of their results, they come to an end after several
+existences only. This being so, the deliverance spoken of in the text
+quoted by the Pūrvapakshin means deliverance from those works when
+completely destroyed by retributive enjoyment, not deliverance from
+bodily existence about which the text says nothing. All those works, on
+the other hand, good and evil, which were performed before the rise of
+knowledge and the results of which have not yet begun to operate--works
+which have gradually accumulated in the course of infinite time so as to
+constitute an infinite quantity--are at once destroyed by the might of
+the rising knowledge of Brahman. And works performed subsequently to the
+rise of such knowledge do not 'cling.' And, as Scripture teaches, the
+friends of the man possessing true knowledge take over, on his death,
+his good works, and his enemies his evil deeds. Thus there remains no
+contradiction.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the destruction of
+the others.'
+
+
+
+
+SECOND PĀDA.
+
+1. Speech with mind, on account of this being seen and of scriptural
+statement.
+
+The Sūtras now begin an enquiry into the mode of the going to Brahman of
+him who knows. At first the soul's departure from the body is considered.
+On this point we have the text, 'When a man departs from hence his
+speech is combined (sampadyate) with his mind, his mind with his breath,
+his breath with fire, fire with the highest deity' (Ch. Up. VI, 6, 1).
+The doubt here arises whether the speech's being combined with the mind,
+referred to in the text, means that the function of speech only is
+merged in mind, or the organ of speech itself.--The Pūrvapakshin holds
+the former view; for, he says, as mind is not the causal substance of
+speech, the latter cannot be merged in it; while the scriptural
+statement is not altogether irrational in so far as the functions of
+speech and other organs are controlled by the mind, and therefore may be
+conceived as being withdrawn into it.--This view the Sūtra sets aside.
+Speech itself becomes combined with mind; since that is seen. For the
+activity of mind is observed to go on even when the organ of speech has
+ceased to act.--But is this not sufficiently accounted for by the
+assumption of the mere function of speech being merged in mind?--To this
+the Sūtra replies 'and on account of the scriptural word.' The text says
+distinctly that speech itself, not merely the function of speech,
+becomes one with the mind. And when the function of speech comes to an
+end, there is no other means of knowledge to assure us that the function
+only has come to an end and that the organ itself continues to have an
+independent existence. The objection that speech cannot become one with
+mind because the latter is not the causal substance of speech, we meet
+by pointing out that the purport of the text is not that speech is
+merged in mind, but only that it is combined or connected with it.
+
+
+
+
+2. And for the same reason all follow after.
+
+Because speech's becoming one with mind means only conjunction with the
+latter, not merging within it; there is also no objection to what
+Scripture says as to all other organs that follow speech being united
+with mind.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'speech.'
+
+
+
+
+3. That mind in breath, owing to the subsequent clause.
+
+That mind, i.e. mind united with all the organs unites itself with
+breath; not merely the function of mind. This appears from the clause
+following upon the text quoted above, 'mind (unites itself) with breath.'
+Here, however, a further doubt suggests itself. The text 'Mind is made
+of earth' declares earth to be the causal substance of mind, and the
+text 'that (viz. water) sent forth earth' declares water to be the
+causal substance of earth; while the further text 'breath is made of
+water' shows water to be the causal substance of breath. Considering
+therefore that in the text 'mind becomes united with breath' the term
+_breath_ is naturally understood to denote the causal substance of
+breath, i.e. water, the appropriate sense to be given to the statement
+that mind is united with water is that mind is completely refunded into
+its own causal substance--so that the 'being united' would throughout be
+understood 'as being completely merged.'--The reply to this, however,
+is, that the clauses 'Mind is made of food, breath is made of water,'
+only mean that mind and breath are nourished and sustained by food and
+water, not that food and water are the causal substances of mind and
+breath. The latter indeed is impossible; for mind consists of ahamkāra,
+and as breath is a modification of ether and other elements, the word
+_breath_ may suggest water.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'mind.'
+
+
+
+
+4. That (is united) with the ruler, on account of the going to it, and
+so on.
+
+As from the statements that speech becomes united with mind and mind
+with breath it follows that speech and mind are united with mind and
+breath only; so we conclude from the subsequent clause 'breath with
+fire' that breath becomes united with fire only.--Against this primā
+facie view the Sūtra declares 'that breath becomes united with the ruler
+of the organs, i.e. the individual soul, on account of the going to it,
+and so on.' That breath goes to the individual soul, the following text
+declares, 'At the time of death all the prānas go to the Self of a man
+about to expire' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 38), Similarly Scripture mentions the
+departure of prāna together with the soul, 'after him thus departing the
+prawa departs'; and again its staying together with the soul, 'What is
+that by whose departure I shall depart, and by whose staying I shall
+stay?' (Pr. Up. VI, 3). We therefore conclude that the text 'breath with
+fire' means that breath joined with the individual soul becomes united
+with fire. Analogously we may say in ordinary life that the Yamuna is
+flowing towards the sea, while in reality it is the Yamuna joined with
+the Gangā which flows on.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the ruler.'
+
+
+
+
+5. With the elements, this being stated by Scripture.
+
+There arises the further question whether breath joined with the soul
+unites itself with fire only or with all the elements combined.--With
+fire, so much only being declared by Scripture!--This view the Sūtra
+sets aside. Breath and soul unite themselves with all the elements; for
+Scripture declares the soul, when moving out, to consist of all the
+elements--'Consisting of earth, consisting of water, consisting of fire.
+'--But this latter text explains itself also on the assumption of breath
+and soul unitrng themselves in succession with fire and the rest, one at
+a time!--This the next Sūtra negatives.
+
+
+
+
+6. Not with one; for both declare this.
+
+Not with one; because each element by itself is incapable of producing
+an effect. Such incapability is declared by Scripture and tradition
+alike. The text 'Having entered these beings with this jīva soul let me
+reveal names and forms--let me make each of these three tripartite' (Ch.
+Up. VI, 3) teaches that the elements were rendered tripartite in order
+to be capable of evolving names and forms; and of similar import is the
+following Smriti text, 'Possessing various powers these (elements),
+being separate from one another, were unable to produce creatures
+without combining. But having entered into mutual conjunction they, from
+the Mahat down to individual beings, produce the Brahma egg.' From this
+it follows that in the clause 'breath is united with fire' the word _fire_
+denotes fire mixed with the other elements. Breath and soul therefore
+are united with the aggregate of the elements.--Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'the elements.'
+
+
+
+
+7. And it is common up to the beginning of the way; and the immortality
+(is that which is obtained), without having burned.
+
+Is this departure of the soul common to him who knows and him who does
+not know?--It belongs to him only who does not know, the Pūrvapakshin
+holds. For Scripture declares that for him who knows there is no
+departure, and that hence he becomes immortal then and there
+(irrespective of any departure of the soul to another place), 'when all
+desires which once dwelt in his heart are undone, then the mortal
+becomes immortal, then he obtains Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 7). This
+view the Sūtra sets aside. For him also who knows there is the same way
+of passing out up to the beginning of the path, i.e. previously to the
+soul's entering the veins. For another text expressly declares that the
+soul of him also who knows passes out by way of a particular vein:
+'there are a hundred and one veins of the heart; one of them penetrates
+the crown of the head; moving upwards by that a man reaches immortality,
+the others serve for departing in different directions' (Ch. Up. VIII, 6,
+5). Scripture thus declaring that the soul of him who knows passes out
+by way of a particular vein, it must of course be admitted that it _does_
+pass out; and as up to the soul's entering the vein no difference is
+mentioned, we must assume that up to that moment the departure of him
+who knows does not differ from that of him who does not know. A
+difference however is stated with regard to the stage of the soul's
+entering the vein, viz. Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2, 'By that light the Self
+departs, either through the eye, or through the skull, or through other
+parts of the body.' As this text must be interpreted in agreement with
+the text relative to the hundred and one veins, the departure by way of
+the head must be understood to belong to him who knows, while the other
+modes of departing belong to other persons. The last clause of the Sūtra
+'and the immortality, without having burned' replies to what the
+Pūrvapakshin said as to the soul of him who knows being declared by
+Scripture to attain to immortality then and there. The immortality
+referred to in the text 'when all desires of his heart are undone'
+denotes that non-clinging and destruction of earlier and later sins
+which comes to him who knows, together with the rise of knowledge,
+without the connexion of the soul with the body, and the sense-organs
+being burned, i.e. dissolved at the time.--'He reaches Brahman' in the
+same text means that in the act of devout meditation the devotee has an
+intuitive knowledge of Brahman.
+
+
+
+
+8. Since, up to the union with that (i.e. Brahman) the texts describe
+the Samsāra state.
+
+The immortality referred to must necessarily be understood as not
+implying dissolution of the soul's connexion with the body, since up to
+the soul's attaining to Brahman the texts describe the Samsāra state.
+That attaining to Brahman takes place, as will be shown further on,
+after the soul--moving on the path the first stage of which is light--
+has reached a certain place. Up to that the texts denote the Samsāra
+state of which the connexion with a body is characteristic. 'For him
+there is delay so long as he is not delivered (from the body); then he
+will be united' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2); 'Shaking off all evil as a horse
+shakes his hairs, and as the moon frees herself from the mouth of Rāhu;
+having shaken off the body I obtain self, made and satisfied, the
+uncreated world of Brahman' (VIII, 13).
+
+
+
+
+9. And the subtle (body persists), on account of a means of knowledge,
+it being thus observed (in Scripture).
+
+The bondage of him who knows is not, at that stage, dissolved, for this
+reason also that the subtle body continues to persist.--How is this
+known?--Through a means of knowledge, viz. because it is thus seen in
+Scripture. For Scripture states that he who knows, when on the path of
+the gods, enters into a colloquy with the moon and others, 'he is to
+reply,' &c. (Kau. Up. I, 3 ff.). This implies the existence of a body,
+and thence it follows that, at that stage, the subtle body persists. The
+state of bondage therefore is not yet dissolved.
+
+
+
+
+10. Hence not in the way of destruction of bondage.
+
+It thus appears that the text 'when all desires which once entered his
+heart are undone, then does the mortal become immortal, then he obtains
+Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 7), does not mean such immortality as would
+imply complete destruction of the state of bondage.
+
+
+
+
+11. And to that very (subtle body) (there belongs) the warmth, this only
+being reasonable.
+
+It is observed that when a man is about to die there is some warmth left
+in some part or parts of the gross body. Now this warmth cannot really
+belong to the gross body, for it is not observed in other parts of that
+body (while yet there is no reason why it should be limited to some
+part); but it may reasonably be attributed to the subtle body which may
+abide in some part of the gross body (and into which the warmth of the
+entire gross body has withdrawn itself). We therefore conclude that this
+partial perception of warmth is due to the departing subtle body. This
+confirms the view laid down in Sūtra 7.--The next Sūtra disposes of a
+further doubt raised as to the departure of the soul of him who knows.
+
+
+
+
+12. If it be said that on account of the denial (it is not so); we deny
+this. From the embodied soul; for (that one is) clear, according to some.
+
+The contention that the soul of him who knows departs from the body in
+the same way as other souls do cannot be upheld, since Scripture
+expressly negatives such departure. For Bri. Up. IV, 4, at first
+describes the mode of departure on the part of him who does not possess
+true knowledge ('He taking to himself those elements of light descends
+into the heart' up to 'after him thus departing the Prāna departs');
+then refers to his assuming another body ('he makes to himself another,
+newer and more beautiful shape'); then concludes the account of him who
+does not possess true knowledge ('having attained the end of these works
+whatever he does here, he again returns from that world to this world of
+action. So much for the man who desires'); and thereupon proceeds
+explicitly to deny the departure from the body of him who possesses true
+knowledge, 'But he who does not desire, who is without desire, free from
+desire, who has obtained his desire, who desires the Self only, of him
+(tasya) the prānas do not pass forth,--being Brahman only he goes into
+Brahman.' Similarly a previous section also, viz. the one containing the
+questions put by Årtabhāga, directly negatives the view of the soul of
+him who knows passing out of the body. There the clause 'he again
+conquers death' introduces him who knows as the subject-matter, and
+after that the text continues: 'Yājńavalkya, he said, when that person
+dies, do the prānas pass out of him (asmāt) or not?--No, said
+Yājńavalkya, they are gathered up in him (atraiva), he swells, inflated
+the dead lies' (Bri. Up. III, 2, 10-11). From these texts it follows
+that he who knows attains to immortality _here_ (without his soul
+passing out of the body and moving to another place).--This view the
+Sūtra rejects. 'Not so; from the embodied soul.' What those texts deny
+is the moving away of the prānas from the embodied individual soul, not
+from the body. 'Of him (tasya) the prānas do not pass forth'--here the
+'of him' refers to the subject under discussion, i.e. the embodied soul
+which is introduced by the clause 'he who does not desire,' not to the
+body which the text had not previously mentioned. The sixth case (tasya)
+here denotes the embodied soul as that which is connected with the
+prānas ('the prānas belonging to that, i.e. the soul, do not pass out'),
+not as that from which the passing out takes its start.--But why should
+the 'tasya' not denote the body as the point of starting ('the prānas
+do not pass forth from that (tasya), viz. the body')?--Because, we reply,
+the soul which is actually mentioned in its relation of connexion with
+the prānas (as indicated by tasya) suggests itself to the mind more
+immediately than the body which is not mentioned at all; if therefore
+the question arises as to the starting-point of the passing forth of the
+prānas the soul is (on the basis of the text) apprehended as that
+starting-point also (i.e. the clause 'the prānas of him do not pass
+forth' implies at the same time 'the prānas do not pass forth from him,
+i.e. from the soul'). Moreover, as the prānas are well known to be
+connected with the soul and as hence it would serve no purpose to state
+that connexion, we conclude that the sixth case which expresses
+connexion in general is here meant to denote the starting-point in
+particular. And no dispute on this point is really possible; since
+'according to some' it is 'clear' that what the text means to express is
+the embodied soul as the starting-point of the prānas. The _some_ are
+the Mādhyandinas, who in their text of the Brihad-āranyaka read 'na
+tasmāt prāna utkrāmanti'--'the prānas do not pass forth _from _him' (the
+'tasya' thus being the reading of the Kānva Sākhā only).--But, an
+objection is raised, there is no motive for explicitly negativing the
+passing away of the prānas from the soul; for there is no reason to
+assume that there should be such a passing away (and the general rule is
+that a denial is made of that only for which there is a presumption).--
+Not so, we reply. The Chāndogya-text 'For him there is delay only as
+long as he is not delivered (from the body); then he will be united'
+declares that the soul becomes united with Brahman at the time of its
+separation from the body, and this suggests the idea of the soul of him
+who knows separating itself at that very time (i.e. the time of death)
+from the prānas also. But this would mean that the soul cannot reach
+union with Brahman by means of proceeding on the path of the gods, and
+for this reason the Brihad-āranyaka ('of him the prānas do not pass
+forth') explicitly declares that the prānas do not depart from the soul
+of him who knows, before that soul proceeding on the path of the gods
+attains to union with Brahman.
+
+The same line of refutation would have to be applied to the arguments
+founded by our opponent on the question of Ārtabhāga, if that question
+be viewed as referring to him who possesses true knowledge. The fact
+however is that that passage refers to him who does _not_ possess that
+knowledge; for none of the questions and answers of which the section
+consists favours the presumption of the knowledge of Brahman being under
+discussion. The matters touched upon in those questions and answers are
+the nature of the senses and sense objects viewed as graha and atigraha;
+water being the food of fire; the non-separation of the prānas from the
+soul at the time of death; the continuance of the fame--there called
+_name_--of the dead man; and the attainment, on the part of the soul of
+the departed, to conditions of existence corresponding to his good or
+evil deeds. The passage immediately preceding the one referring to the
+non-departure of the prānas merely means that death is conquered in so
+far as it is a fire and fire is the food of water; this has nothing to
+do with the owner of true knowledge. The statement that the prānas of
+the ordinary man who does not possess true knowledge do not depart means
+that at the time of death the prānas do not, like the gross body,
+abandon the jīva, but cling to it like the subtle body and accompany it.
+
+
+
+
+13. Smriti also declares this.
+
+Smriti also declares that the soul of him who knows departs by means of
+an artery of the head. 'Of those, one is situated above which pierces
+the disc of the sun and passes beyond the world of Brahman; by way of
+that the soul reaches the highest goal' (Yājń. Smri. III, 167).--Here
+terminates the adhikarana of 'up to the beginning of the road.'
+
+
+
+
+14. With the Highest; for thus it says.
+
+It has been shown that at the time of departure from the body the soul
+together with the organs and prānas unites itself with the subtle
+elements, fire and the rest; and the notion that the soul of him who
+knows forms an exception has been disposed of. The further question now
+arises whether those subtle elements move on towards producing their
+appropriate effects, in accordance with the works or the nature of
+meditation (of some other soul with which those elements join
+themselves), or unite themselves with the highest Self.--The
+Pūrvapakshin holds that, as in the case of union with the highest Self,
+they could not give rise to their peculiar effects, i.e. the experience
+of pleasure and pain, they move towards some place where they can give
+rise to their appropriate effects.--Of this view the Sūtra disposes.
+They unite themselves with the highest Self; for Scripture declares
+'warmth in the highest Being' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 6). And the doings of
+those elements must be viewed in such a way as to agree with Scripture.
+As in the states of deep sleep and a pralaya, there is, owing to union
+with the highest Self, a cessation of all experience of pain and
+pleasure; so it is in the case under question also.--Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'union with the Highest.'
+
+
+
+
+15. Non-division, according to statement.
+
+Is this union with the highest Self to be understood as ordinary
+'merging,' i.e. a return on the part of the effected thing into the
+condition of the cause (as when the jar is reduced to the condition of a
+lump of clay), or as absolute non-division from the highest Self, such
+as is meant in the clauses preceding the text last quoted, 'Speech is
+merged in mind'? &c.--The former view is to be adopted; for as the
+highest Self is the causal substance of all, union with it means the
+return on the part of individual beings into the condition of that
+causal substance.--This view the Sūtra rejects. Union here means non-
+division, i.e. connexion of such kind that those subtle elements are
+altogether incapable of being thought and spoken of as separate from
+Brahman. This the text itself declares, since the clause 'warmth in the
+highest Being' is connected with and governed by the preceding clause
+'Speech is merged in mind.' This preceding clause intimates a special
+kind of connexion, viz. absolute non-separation, and there is nothing to
+prove that the dependent clause means to express something different;
+nor is there any reason why at the time of the soul's departure those
+elements should enter into the causal condition; nor is there anything
+said about their again proceeding from the causal substance in a new
+creation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-separation.'
+
+
+
+
+16. A lighting up of the point of the abode of that; having the door
+illuminated by that (the soul), owing to the power of its knowledge and
+the application of remembrance of the way which is an element of that
+(viz. of knowledge), being assisted by him who abides within the heart,
+(passes out) by way of the hundred and first artery.
+
+So far it has been shown that, up to the beginning of the journey, the
+souls of them as well who possess true knowledge as of those who do not,
+pass out of the body in the same way. Now a difference is stated in the
+case of those who have true knowledge. We have on this point the
+following text: 'There are a hundred and one arteries of the heart; one
+of them penetrates the crown of the head; moving upwards by that a man
+reaches immortality; the others serve for departing in different
+directions' (Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 5). The doubt here arises whether he who
+knows departs by this hundred and first artery in the top of the head,
+while those who do not know depart by way of the other arteries; or
+whether there is no definite rule on this point.--There is no definite
+rule, the Pūrvapakshin holds. For as the arteries are many and
+exceedingly minute, they are difficult to distinguish, and the soul
+therefore is not able to follow any particular one. The text therefore
+(is not meant to make an original authoritative statement as to
+different arteries being followed by different souls, but) merely refers
+in an informal way to what is already settled (viz. by the reason of the
+thing), i.e. the casual departure of any soul by any artery.--This view
+the Sūtra rejects 'By way of the hundred and first.' The soul of him who
+possesses true knowledge departs only by way of the hundred and first
+artery in the crown of the head. Nor is that soul unable to distinguish
+that particular artcry. For, through the power of his supremely clear
+knowledge which has the effect of pleasing the Supreme Person, and
+through the application of remembrance of the way--which remembrance is
+a part of that knowledge--the soul of him who knows wins the favour of
+the Supreme Person who abides within the heart, and is assisted by him.
+Owing to this the abode of that, i.e. the heart which is the abode of
+the soul, is illuminated, lit up at its tip, and thus, through the grace
+of the Supreme Soul, the individual soul has the door (of egress from
+the body) lit up and is able to recognise that artery. There is thus no
+objection to the view that the soul of him who knows passes out by way
+of that particular artery only.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the
+abode of that.'
+
+
+
+
+17. Following the rays.
+
+Scripture teaches that the soul of him who knows, after having passed
+forth from the heart by way of the hundred and first artery, follows the
+rays of the sun and thus reaches the disc of the sun: 'when he departs
+from this body he goes upwards by these rays only' (eva) (Ch. Up. VIII,
+6, 5). The idea here suggests itself that the going of the soul cannot
+be exclusively bound' to those rays, since when a man dies during the
+night it _cannot_ follow tae rays of the sun. Hence the text quoted
+above can refer only to a part of the actual cases.--This view the Sūtra
+rejects. The soul moves upwards, following the rays only; the text
+expressly asserting this by means of the 'eva'--which would be out of
+place were there any alternative. Nor is there any strength in the
+argument that the soul of him who dies at night cannot follow the rays
+as there are none. For in summer the experience of heat at night-time
+shows that there are present rays then also; while in winter, as
+generally in bad weather, that heat is overpowered by cold and hence is
+not perceived (although actually present). Scripture moreover states
+that the arteries and rays are at all times mutually connected: 'As a
+very long highway goes to two villages, so the rays of the sun go to
+both worlds, to this one and to the other. They stretch themselves forth
+from the sun and enter into these arteries'; they stretch themselves
+forth from these arteries and enter into yonder sun' (Ch. Up. VIII, 6,
+2).--As thus there are rays at night also, the souls of those who know
+reach Brahman by way of the rays only.--Here terminates the adhikarana
+of 'the following up the rays.'
+
+
+
+
+18. Should it be said, not in the night; we say, no; because the
+connexion persists as long as the body does. Scripture also declares
+this.
+
+It is now enquired into whether the soul of him who, while having true
+knowledge, dies at night reaches Brahman or not. Although, as solar rays
+exist at night, the soul may move on at night also following those rays;
+yet, since dying at night is spoken of in the Sūtras as highly
+objectionable, we conclude that he who dies at night cannot accomplish
+the highest end of man, viz. attainment to Brahman. The Sūtras eulogize
+death occurring in daytime and object to death at night-time: 'Day-time,
+the bright half of the month and the northern progress of the sun are
+excellent for those about to die; the contrary times are unfavourable.'
+According to this, their different nature, dying in day-time may be
+assumed to lead to a superior state of existence, and dying at night to
+an inferior state. He who dies at night cannot therefore ascend to
+Brahman.--This view the Sūtra refutes: 'Because, in the case of him who
+knows, the connexion with works exists as long as the body does.' This
+is to say--since those works which have not yet begun to produce their
+results and which are the cause of future inferior states of existence
+are destroyed by the contact with knowledge, while at the same time
+later works do not 'cling' (also owing to the presence of true
+knowledge), and those works which have begun to act come to an end with
+the existence of the last body; there is no reason why he who knows
+should remain in bondage, and hence he reaches Brahman even if dying at
+night-time. Scripture also declares this, 'for him there is delay only
+as long as he is not freed from the body, then he will be united.' The
+text which praises the advantages of night-time, the light half of the
+month, &c., therefore must be understood as referring to those who do
+not possess true knowledge.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'night.'
+
+
+
+
+19. For the same reason also during the southern progress of the sun.
+
+The reasoning stated above also proves that the owner of true knowledge
+who may happen to die during the southern progress of the sun reaches
+Brahman. A further doubt, however, arises here. The text 'He who dies
+during the sun's southern progress reaches the greatness of the Fathers
+and union with the moon' (Mahānār. Up. 25) declares that he who dies
+during the southern progress reaches the moon; and the other text 'when
+this ceases they return again the same way' (Bri. Up. VI, 2, 16) states
+that he returns again to the earth. We further know that Bhīshma and
+others, although fully possessing the knowledge of Brahman, put off
+their death until the beginning of the northern progress. All this seems
+to prove that he who dies during the southern progress does not reach
+Brahman.--This doubt we dispose of as follows. Those only who do not
+possess true knowledge return from the moon; while he who has such
+knowledge does not return even after he has gone to the moon. For a
+complementary clause in the Mahānārāyana Up., 'from there he reaches the
+greatness of Brahman,' shows that the abode in the moon forms for him,
+who having died during the southern progress wishes to reach Brahman, a
+mere stage of rest. And even if there were no such complementary passage,
+it would follow from the previously stated absence of any reason for
+bondage that the going of the wise man's soul to the moon in no way
+precludes his reaching Brahman. Bhīshma and others who through the power
+of Yoga were able to choose the time of their death put it off until the
+beginning of the northern progress in order to proclaim before the world
+the excellence of that season and thus to promote pious faith and
+practice.--But we also meet with an authoritative statement made with
+reference to wise men about to die, as to difference of time of death
+being the cause of a man either returning or not returning to this world,
+'I will declare at which time the Yogins departing return not, and also
+the time at which they return. The sire, the light, the day, the bright
+fortnight, the six months of the sun's northern progress--the knowers of
+Brahman departing there go to Brahman. The smoke, the night, the dark
+fortnight, the six months of the southern progress--the Yogin departing
+there having reached the light of the moon returns again. These are held
+to be the perpetual paths of the world--the white and the black; by the
+one man goes not to return, by the other he returns again' (Bha. Gī.
+VIII, 23-26).--To this point the next Sūtra refers.
+
+
+
+
+20. And those two (paths) are, with a view to the Yogins, mentioned as
+to be remembered.
+
+The text quoted does not state an injunction for those about to die, of
+a special time of death; but there are rather mentioned in it those two
+matters belonging to Smriti and therefore to be remembered, viz. the two
+paths--the path of the Gods and the path of the Fathers--with a view to
+those who know and practise Yoga; the text intimating that Yogins should
+daily think of those paths which are included in Yoga meditation. In
+agreement herewith the text concludes, 'Knowing these two paths no Yogin
+is ever deluded. Hence in all times, O Arjuna, be engaged in Yoga' (Bha.
+Gī. VIII, 27). Through the terms 'the fire, the light,' 'the smoke, the
+night,' &c. the path of the Gods and the path of the Fathers are
+recognised. Where, in the beginning, the text refers to 'the time when,'
+the word 'time' must be understood to denote the divine beings ruling
+time, since Fire and the rest cannot be time. What the Bha. Gī. aims at
+therefore is to enjoin on men possessing true knowledge the remembrance
+of that path of the Gods originally enjoined in the text, 'they go to
+light' (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 10); not to determine the proper time of dying
+for those about to die.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the southern
+progress.'
+
+
+
+
+THIRD PĀDA.
+
+1. On the path beginning with light, that being known.
+
+The Sūtras now go on to determine the road which the soul of the wise
+man follows, after having--assisted by the Person within the heart--
+passed out of the body by way of one particular artery. Now of that road
+various accounts are given in Scripture. There is a detailed account in
+the Chāndogya. (IV, 15), 'now whether people perform obsequies for him
+or not,' &c. Another account is given in the eighth book of the same
+Upanishad, 'then he moves upwards by those very rays' (VIII, 6, 5).
+
+The Kaushītakins again give a different account: 'He having reached the
+path of the Gods comes to the world of Agni,' &c. (Kau. Up. I, 3).
+Different again in the Brihad-āranyaka: 'Those who thus know this and
+those who in the forest meditate on faith and the True,' &c. (Bri. Up.
+VI, 2, 15). The same Upanishad, in another place (V, 10), gives a
+different account: 'When the person goes away from this world he comes
+to the wind,' &c.--A doubt here arises whether all these texts mean to
+give instruction as to one and the same road--the first stage of which
+is light--having to be followed by the soul of the wise man; or whether
+they describe different roads on any of which the soul may proceed.--The
+Pūrvapakshin holds the latter view; for he says the roads described
+differ in nature and are independent one of the other.--This view the
+Sūtra disposes of. All texts mean one and the same road only, viz. the
+one beginning with light, and the souls proceed on that road only. For
+that road is known, i.e. is recognised in all the various descriptions,
+although it is, in different texts, described with more or less fulness.
+We therefore have to proceed here as in the case of the details (guna)
+which are mentioned in different meditations referring to one and the
+same object, i.e. we have to combine the details mentioned in different
+places into one whole. The two Chāandogya-texts--the one in the
+Upakosalavidyā and the one in the Vidyā of the five fires--describe
+exactly the same road. And in the Vidyā of the five fires as given in
+the Brihad-āranyaka the same road, beginning with light, is also
+described, although there are differences in minor points; we therefore
+recognise the road described in the Chāndogya. And in the other texts
+also we everywhere recognise the divinities of certain stages of the
+road, Agni, Āditya, and so on.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'that
+which begins with light.'
+
+
+
+
+2. From the year to Vāyu; on account of non-specification and
+specification.
+
+In their description of the path beginning with light the Chandogas
+mention the year between the months and the sun, 'from the months to the
+year, from the year to the sun' (Ch. Up. V, 10, 1); while the
+Vājasaneyins mention, in that very place, the world of the Gods,'from
+the months to the world of the Gods, from the world of the Gods to the
+sun' (Bri. Up. VI, 2. 15). Now, as the two paths are identical, we have
+to supplement each by the additional item given in the other (and the
+question then arises whether the order of the stages be 1. months, 2.
+year, 3. world of the Gods, 4. sun; or 1. months, 2. world of the Gods,
+3. year, 4. sun). The year and the world of the Gods are equally
+entitled--to the place after the months in so far as textual declaration
+goes; for both texts say 'from the months.' But we observe that the
+advance is throughout from the shorter periods of time to the longer
+ones ('from the day to the bright fortnight, from the bright fortnight
+to the six months of the northern progress'), and as therefore the year
+naturally presents itself to the mind immediately after the six months,
+we decide that the order is--months, year, world of the Gods, sun.--In
+another place (Bri. Up. V, 10) the Vājasaneyins mention the wind as the
+stage preceding the sun ('the wind makes room for him--he mounts upwards;
+he comes to the sun'). The Kaushītakins, on the other hand, place the
+world of the wind subsequent to light, referred to by them as the world
+of Agni ('Having entered on the path of the Gods he comes to the world
+of Agni, to the world of the wind,' &c., Kau. Up. I, 3). Now in this
+latter text the fact of the world of the wind following upon light is to
+be inferred only from the succession of the clauses ('to the world of
+Agni'--'to the world of the wind'), while the 'upwards' in the text of
+the Vājasaneyins is a direct statement of succession given by the text
+itself; and as this latter order of succession has greater force than
+the former, we have to place, in the series of stages, the world of Vāyu
+directly before the world of the sun. But above we have determined that
+the same place (after the year and before the sun) has to be assigned to
+the world of the Gods also; and hence a doubt arises whether the world
+of the Gods and Vāyu are two different things--the soul of the wise man
+passing by them in optional succession--or one and the same thing--the
+soul coming, after the year, to Vāyu who is the world of the Gods.--They
+are different things, the Pūrvapakshin says; for they are generally
+known to be so. And there are definite indications in the text that the
+world of the Gods as well as Vāyu is to be placed immediately before the
+sun--this being indicated for Vāyu by the 'upwards' referred to above,
+and for the world of the Gods by the ablative case (devalokāt) in the
+Chānd. text, 'from the world of the Gods he goes to the sun'--and as
+thus there is no difference between the two, we conclude that the soul
+passes by them in either order it may choose.--This view the Sūtra
+negatives: 'From the year to Vāyu.' The soul, having departed from the
+year, comes to Vāyu. This is proved 'by non-specification and
+specification.' For the term 'the world of the Gods' is a term of
+general meaning, and hence can denote Vāyu in so far as being the world
+of the Gods; while on the other hand the term Vāyu specifically denotes
+that divine being only. The Kaushītakins speak of 'the world of Vāyu';
+but this only means 'Vāyu who at the same time is a world.' That Vāyu
+may be viewed as the world of the Gods is confirmed by another
+scriptural passage, viz. 'he who blows (Vāyu) is the houses of the Gods.
+'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'Vāyu.'
+
+
+
+
+3. Beyond lightning there is Varuna, on account of connexion.
+
+According to the text of the Kaushītakins the soul goes on to the world
+of Vāyu, to the world of Varuna, to the world of Indra, to the world of
+Prajāpati, to the world of Brahman. The doubt here arises whether Varuna
+and the divinities of the following stages are to be inserted in the
+series after Vāyu, in agreement with the order of enumeration in the
+text of the Kaushītakins; or at the end of the whole series as stated in
+the Chāndogya. Up. (IV, 15, 5), Varuna thus coming after lightning.--The
+decision is in favour of the latter view because Varuna, the god of
+waters, is naturally connected with lightning which dwells within the
+clouds.--This terminates the adhikarana of 'Varuna.'
+
+
+
+
+4. Conductors, this being indicated.
+
+The decision here is that light, Vāyu, and the rest mentioned in the
+texts as connected with the soul's progress on the path of the Gods are
+to be interpreted not as mere marks indicating the road, nor as places
+of enjoyment for the soul, but as divinities appointed by the Supreme
+Person to conduct the soul along the stages of the road; for this is
+indicated by what the Chandogya. says with regard to the last stage, viz.
+lightning, 'There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman.' What
+here is said as to that person not human, viz. that he leads the soul,
+is to be extended to the other beings also, light and the rest.--But if
+that not human person leads the souls from lightning to Brahman, what
+then about Varuna, Indra, and Prajāpati, who, as was decided above, are
+in charge of stages beyond lightning? Do they also lead the soul along
+their stages?
+
+
+
+
+5. From thence by him only who belongs to lightning, the text stating
+that.
+
+The only leader from lightning up to Brahman is the not-human person
+connected with lightning; for the text states this directly. Varuna,
+Indra, and Prajāpati take part in the work in so far only as they may
+assist the person connected with lightning.--Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'the conductors.'
+
+
+
+
+6. (Him who meditates on) the effected Brahman, (thus opines) Bādari;
+because for him going is possible.
+
+The following question now presents itself for consideration. Does the
+troop of conducting divinities, Agni and the rest, lead on those who
+meditate on the effected Brahman, i.e. Hiranyagarbha; or those only who
+meditate on the highest Brahman; or those who meditate on the highest
+Brahman and those who meditate on the individual Self as having Brahman
+for its Self?--The teacher Bādari is of opinion that the divinities lead
+on those only who meditate on the effected Brahman. For he only who
+meditates on Hiranyagarbha can move; while a person meditating on the
+highest Brahman which is absolutely complete, all-knowing, present
+everywhere, the Self of all, cannot possibly be conceived as moving to
+some other place in order to reach Brahman; for him Brahman rather is
+something already reached. For him the effect of true knowledge is only
+to put an end to that Nescience which has for its object Brahman, which,
+in reality, is eternally reached. He, on the other hand, who meditates on
+Hiranyagarbha may be conceived as moving in order to reach his object,
+which is something abiding within a special limited place. It is he
+therefore who is conducted on by Agni and the other escorting deities.
+
+
+
+
+7. And on account of (Brahman) being specified.
+
+The text 'a person not human leads them to the worlds of Brahman' (Bri.
+Up. VI. 2, 15) by using the word 'world,' and moreover in the plural,
+determines the specification that the not-human person leads those only
+who meditate on Hiranyagarbha, who dwells within some particular world.
+Moreover, the text 'I enter the hall of Prajāpati, the house' (Ch. Up.
+VIII, 14) shows that he who goes on the path beginning with light aims
+at approaching Hiranyagarbha. But if this is so, there is a want of
+appropriate denotation in the clause, 'There is a person not human, he
+leads them to Brahman'; if Hiranyagarbha is meant, the text should say
+'He leads them to Brahmā (Brahmānam).'
+
+
+
+
+8. But on account of nearness there is that designation.
+
+Hiranyagarbha is the first created being (as declared by the text 'he
+who creates Brahma'); he thus stands near to Brahman, and therefore may
+be designated by the same term (viz. Brahman). This explanation is
+necessitated by the reasons set forth in the preceding Sūtras (which
+show that the real highest Brahman cannot be meant).--But, if the soul
+advancing on the path of the Gods reaches Hiranyagarbha only, texts such
+as 'This is the path of the Gods, the path of Brahman; those who proceed
+on that path do not return to the life of man' (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 6), and
+'moving upwards by that a man reaches immortality' (VIII, 6, 6), are
+wrong in asserting that that soul attains to immortality and does not
+return; for the holy books teach that Hiranyagarbha, as a created being,
+passes away at the end of a dviparārdha-period; and the text 'Up to the
+world of Brahman the worlds return again' (Bha. Gī. VIII, 16) shows that
+those who have gone to Hiranyagarbha necessarily return also.
+
+
+
+
+9. On the passing away of the effected (world of Brahma), together with
+its ruler, (the souls go) to what is higher than that; on account of
+scriptural declaration.
+
+On the passing away of the effected world of Brahma, together with its
+ruler Hiranyagarbha, who then recognises his qualification for higher
+knowledge, the soul also which had gone to Hiranyagarbha attains to true
+knowledge and thus reaches Brahman, which is higher than that, i.e.
+higher than the effected world of Brahmā. This is known from the texts
+declaring that he who proceeds on the path of light reaches immortality
+and does not return; and is further confirmed by the text, 'They all,
+reaching the highest immortality, become free in the world of Brahman
+(Brahmā) at the time of the great end' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 6).
+
+
+
+
+10. And on account of Smriti.
+
+This follows from Smriti also, which declares 'when the pralaya has come
+and the end of the Highest, they all together with Brahman enter the
+highest place.'--For all these reasons Bādari holds that the troop of
+the conducting deities, beginning with Light, leads the souls of those
+only who meditate on the effected Brahman, i e. Hiranyagarbha.
+
+
+
+
+11. The Highest, Jaimini thinks; on account of primariness of meaning.
+
+The teacher Jaimini is of opinion that those deities lead on the souls
+of those only who meditate on the highest Brahman. For in the text 'a
+person not human leads them to Brahman' the word Brahman is naturally
+taken in its primary sense (i.e. the highest Brahman); the secondary
+sense (i.e. the effected Brahman) can be admitted only if there are
+other valid reasons to refer the passage to the effected Brahman. And
+the alleged impossibility of the soul's going is no such valid reason;
+for although Brahman no doubt is present everywhere, Scripture declares
+that the soul of the wise frees itself from Nescience only on having
+gone to some particular place. That the origination of true knowledge
+depends on certain conditions of caste, āsrama, religious duty, purity
+of conduct, time, place, and so on, follows from certain scriptural
+texts, as e.g. 'Brāhmanas desire to know him through the study of the
+Veda' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22); in the same way it follows from the text
+declaring the soul's going to Brahman that the final realisation of that
+highest knowledge which implies the cessation of all Nescience depends
+on the soul's going to some particular place. The arguments founded on
+texts alleged to declare that the soul of the wise does not pass out of
+the body at all we have refuted above. The argument that the
+specification implied in the text which mentions _Brahman-worlds_
+clearly points to the effected Brahman, i.e. Hiranyagarbha, is equally
+invalid. For the compound 'the Brahman-world' is to be explained as'the
+world which is Brahman'; just as according to the Pūrva Mīmāmsā the
+compound 'Nishāda-sthapati' denotes a sthapati who is a Nishāda (not a
+sthapati of the Nishādas). A thing even which is known as one only may
+be designated by a plural form, as in a mantra one girdle is spoken of
+as 'the fetters of Aditi.' And as to the case under discussion, we know
+on the authority of Scripture, Smriti, Itihāsa, and Purāna, that the
+wonderful worlds springing from the mere will of a perfect and
+omnipresent being cannot be but infinite.
+
+
+
+
+12. And because Scripture declares it.
+
+And Scripture moreover directly declares that the soul which has
+departed by way of the artery in the upper part of the head and passed
+along the path of the Gods reaches the highest Brahman: 'This serene
+being having risen from the body, having reached the highest light
+manifests itself in its own shape' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3).--Against the
+contention that the text 'I enter the hall of Prajāpati, the house'
+shows that he who proceeds on the path beginning with light aims at the
+effected Brahman, the next Sūtra argues.
+
+
+
+
+13. And there is no aiming at the effected (Brahman).
+
+The aim of the soul is not at Hiranyagarbha, but at the highest Brahman
+itself. For the complementary sentence 'I am the glorious among
+Brāhmanas' shows that what the soul aims at is the condition of the
+universal Self, which has for its antecedent the putting off of all
+Nescience. For this appears from the preceding text, 'As a horse shakes
+his hairs and as the moon frees herself from the mouth of Rāhu; having
+shaken off the body may I obtain--the uncreated Brahman-world' declares
+that the Brahman-world, which is the thing to be reached, is something
+non-created, and explicitly states that reaching that world implies
+freedom from all bondage whatsoever.--It is for these reasons that
+Jaimini holds that the deities speeding the soul on its way lead on him
+only who has the highest Brahman for the object of his meditation.
+
+
+
+
+Now the Reverend Bādarāyana declares his own view, which constitutes the
+final conclusion in this matter.
+
+14. Those not depending on symbols he leads, thus Bādarāyana thinks;
+there being a defect in both cases; and he whose thought is that.
+
+Bādarāyana is of opinion that the deities lead those not depending on
+symbols, i.e. all meditating devotees other than those depending on
+symbols. That is to say, the view that those are led who meditate on the
+effected Brahman cannot be upheld; nor is there an exclusive rule that
+those only should be led on who meditate on the highest Brahman. The
+truth is that those are led who meditate on the highest Brahman, and
+also those who meditate on the Self (soul) as different from matter
+(Prakriti) and having Brahman for its true Self. Souls of both these
+kinds are led on to Brahman. Those on the other hand whose object of
+meditation is such things as name and so on, which fall within what is a
+mere effect of Brahman--such things being viewed either under the aspect
+of Brahman, just as some valiant man may be viewed under the aspect of a
+lion (which view expresses itself in the judgment 'Devadatta is a lion
+'); or by themselves (without reference to Brahman)--all those are not
+led on to Brahman. Why so?' Because there is a defect in both cases,' i.
+e. in both the views rejected by Bādarāyana. The view that those are led
+who meditate on the effected Brahman is in conflict with texts such as
+'having risen from this body and reached the highest light' (Ch. Up.
+VIII, 12, 3)--for the nature of the fruit depends on the nature of the
+meditation; and the view that those only are led to the highest Brahman
+who meditate on the highest Brahman, would stultify texts such as the
+one which expressly declares Agni and the rest of the deities to lead on
+those who possess the knowledge of the five fires ('Those who know this,
+viz. the Vidyā of the five fires, and those who in the forest meditate
+on faith and austerity go to light--there is a person not human, he
+leads them to Brahman,' Ch. Up. V, 10). Both these views thus being
+defective, we adhere to the conclusion that the deities lead on to
+Brahman the two classes of souls mentioned above.--This the Sūtra
+further declares in the words 'he whose thought is that' (tatkratuh),
+the sense of which is that he whose thought is that reaches that, i.e.
+that the nature of what is reached depends on the nature of the
+meditation. This argument is founded on the text, 'According to what his
+thought is (yathā-kratuh) in this world, so will he be when he has
+departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14), which implies the principle that
+what a soul after death attains is according to its thought and
+meditation in this life; and moreover we have direct scriptural
+statements to the effect that those who possess the knowledge of the
+five fires proceed on the path of the Gods, and that those who proceed
+on that path reach Brahman and do not return. Analogous reasoning proves
+that meditation on the soul as free from matter and having Brahman for
+its true Self also leads to the highest Brahman. In the case of those,
+on the other hand, who rely on the symbols (in which they meditatively
+contemplate Brahman), beginning with name and terminating with prāna.
+('He who meditates on name as Brahman,' Ch. Up. VII, 1 ff.), the
+meditation is not proved by texts of the two kinds previously mentioned
+to lead to Brahman; it rather is contaminated by an element not of the
+nature of intelligence, and hence--according to the principle that the
+result of a meditation is the same in nature as the meditation itself--
+the soul of the inferior devotee practising such meditation does not
+proceed by the path of light and does not reach Brahman.--That this
+distinction is declared by Scripture itself, the next Sūtra shows.
+
+
+
+
+15. And Scripture declares the difference.
+
+The text, 'He who meditates on name as Brahman, for him there is
+movement as he wishes as far as name extends,' &c. (Ch. Up. VII, 1 ff.),
+declares that those who meditate on the series of symbols beginning with
+name and ending with prāna attain to a result of limited nature and not
+depending on any particular path. Those therefore who meditate on the
+Intelligent either as mixed with the Non-intelligent or by itself,
+viewing it either under the aspect of Brahman or as separated from
+Brahman, are not led on by the conducting deities. On the other hand, it
+remains a settled conclusion that the deities speed on their way those
+who meditate on the highest Brahman and on the soul as separated from
+Prakriti and having Brahman for its true Self.--Here terminates the
+adhikarana of 'the effected.'
+
+
+
+
+FOURTH PĀDA.
+
+1. (On the soul's) having approached (the highest light) there is
+manifestation; (as we infer) from the word 'own.'
+
+The Sūras now proceed to consider the _kind_ of superior existence
+(aisvarya) which the released souls enjoy.--The text says, 'Thus does
+that serene being, having risen from the body and having approached the
+highest light, manifest itself in its own form' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3).
+Does this passage mean that the soul having approached the highest light
+assumes a new body, to be brought about then, as e.g. the body of a deva;
+or that it only manifests its own natural character?--The text must be
+understood in the former sense, the Pūrvapakshin holds. For otherwise
+the scriptural texts referring to Release would declare what is of no
+advantage to man. We do not observe that its own nature is of any
+advantage to the soul. In the state of dreamless sleep the body and the
+sense-organs cease to act, and you may say the pure soul then abides by
+itself, but in what way does this benefit man? Nor can it be said that
+mere cessation of pain constitutes the well-being of the soul which has
+approached the highest light, and that in this sense manifestation of
+its own nature may be called Release; for Scripture clearly teaches that
+the released soul enjoys an infinity of positive bliss, 'One hundred
+times the bliss of Prajāpati is one bliss of Brahman and of a sage free
+from desires'; 'for having tasted a flavour he experiences bliss' (Taitt.
+Up. II, 7). Nor can it be said that the true nature of the soul is
+consciousness of the nature of unlimited bliss which, in the Samsāra
+condition, is hidden by Nescience and manifests itself only when the
+soul reaches Brahman. For, as explained previously, intelligence which
+is of the nature of light cannot be hidden; hiding in that case would be
+neither more nor less than destruction. Nor can that which is mere light
+be of the nature of bliss; for bliss is pleasure, and to be of the
+nature of pleasure is to be such as to agree with the Self. But, if the
+Self is mere light, where is the being by which light is to be
+apprehended as agreeable to its own nature? (i.e. where is the knowing
+subject conscious of bliss?) He, therefore, who holds the Self to be
+mere light, can in no way prove that it is of the nature of bliss. If,
+moreover, that which the soul effects on approaching the highest light
+is merely to attain to its own true nature, we point out that that
+nature is something eternally accomplished, and that hence the
+declaration that 'it manifests (accomplishes) itself in its own nature'
+would be purportless. We hence conclude that on approaching the highest
+light the soul connects itself with a new form only then brought about.
+On this view the term 'accomplishes itself is taken in its direct sense,
+and the expression 'in its own shape' also is suitable in so far as the
+soul accomplishes itself in a nature specially belonging to it and
+characterised by absolute bliss.--This view the Sūtra rejects. That
+special condition into which the soul passes on having, on the path of
+the Gods, approached the highest light is a manifestation of its own
+true nature, not an origination of a new character. For this is proved--
+by the specification implied in the term 'own,' in the phrase 'in its
+own nature.' If the soul assumed a new body, this specification would be
+without meaning; for, even without that, it would be clear that the new
+body belongs to the soul.--Against the assertion that the soul's own
+true nature is something eternally accomplished, and that hence a
+declaration of that nature 'accomplishing itself would be unmeaning, the
+next Sūtra declares itself.
+
+
+
+
+2. The released one; on account of the promise.
+
+What the text says about the soul accomplishing itself in its own form
+refers to the released soul which, freed from its connexion with works
+and what depends thereon, i.e. the body and the rest, abides in its true
+essential nature.--That essential nature no doubt is something eternally
+accomplished, but as in the Samsāra state it is obscured by Nescience in
+the form of Karman; the text refers to the cessation of such obscuration
+as 'accomplishment.'--How is this known?--'From the promise,'i.e. from
+the fact that the text promises to set forth such cessation. For
+Prajāpati when saying again and again, 'I will explain that further to
+you,' does so with a view to throw light on the individual soul--first
+introduced in the clause 'that Self which is free from sin, &c.' (VIII,
+7, 1)--in so far as freed from all connexion with the three empirical
+conditions of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep, and released from
+the body which is due to Karman and the cause of joy and sorrow. When,
+therefore, he concludes 'that serene being, i.e. the soul, having risen
+from this body and having approached the highest light accomplishes
+itself in its true form,' we understand that such 'accomplishment' means
+the final release, i.e. the cessation of all bondage, which is gained by
+the soul, previously connected with Karman, as soon as it approaches the
+highest light.--The Pūrvapakshin had said that as in the state of deep
+sleep the manifestation of the true nature of the soul is seen in no way
+to benefit man, Scripture, if declaring that Release consists in a
+manifestation of the true nature of the soul, would clearly teach
+something likewise not beneficial to man; and that hence the
+'accomplishment in its own form' must mean the soul's entering on such a
+new condition of existence as would be a cause of pleasure, viz. the
+condition of a deva or the like. To this the next Sūtra replies.
+
+
+
+
+3. The Self, on account of subject-matter.
+
+The subject-matter of the whole section shows that by the Self
+manifesting itself in its own form there is meant the Self as possessing
+the attributes of freedom from all evil and sin and so on. For the
+teaching of Prajāpati begins as follows: 'the Self which is free from
+sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst,
+whose desires and thoughts spontaneously realise themselves.' And that
+this Self which forms the subject-matter of the entire section is the
+individual Self we have shown under I, 3, 19. The manifestation of the
+true nature of the soul when reaching the highest light therefore means
+the manifestation of that Self which has freedom from sin and so on for
+its essential attributes-that nature being in the Samsāra state obscured
+through Nescience. When therefore at the moment of Release those
+essential qualities assert themselves, the case is one of manifestation
+of what already exists, not one of origination. Thus the reverend
+Saunaka says, 'As the lustre of the gem is not created by the act of
+polishing, so the essential intelligence of the Self is not created by
+the putting off of imperfections. As the well is not the cause of the
+production of rain water, but only serves to manifest water which
+already exists--for whence should that originate which is not?--thus
+knowledge and the other attributes of the Self are only manifested
+through the putting off of evil qualities; they are not produced, for
+they are eternal.' Intelligence, therefore, bliss, and the other
+essential qualities of the soul which were obscured and contracted by
+Karman, expand and thus manifest themselves when the bondage due to
+Karman passes away and the soul approaches the highest light. On this
+view of 'manifestation' there remains no difficulty.--Here terminates
+the adhikarana of 'on approaching manifestation.'
+
+
+
+
+4. In non-division; because that is seen.
+
+Is the soul, when it has reached the highest light and freed itself from
+all bondage, conscious of itself as separate from the highest Self or as
+non-separate in so far as being a mere 'mode' (prakāra) of that Self?--
+The former view is the right one. For Scriptural and Smriti texts alike
+declare that the released soul stands to the highest Self in the
+relation of fellowship, equality, equality of attributes, and all this
+implies consciousness of separation. Compare 'He attains all desires
+together with the all-knowing Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'When the
+seer sees the shining maker, the Lord, the Person who has his source in
+Brahman; then, possessing perfect knowledge, and shaking off good and
+evil, free from all passions he reaches the highest equality' (Mu. Up.
+III, 1, 3); 'Taking their stand upon this knowledge they, attaining to
+an equality of attributes with me, are neither born at the time of a
+creation nor are they agitated when a pralaya takes place' (Bha. Gī. XIV,
+2).--Against this view the Sūtra declares itself 'in non-division.' The
+released soul is conscious of itself as non-divided from the highest
+Brahman. 'For this is seen,' i.e. for the soul having reached Brahman
+and freed itself from the investment of Nescience sees itself in its
+true nature. And this _true nature_ consists herein that the souls have
+for their inner Self the highest Self while they constitute the body of
+that Self and hence are _modes_ (prakāra) of it. This is proved by all
+those texts which exhibit the soul and Brahman in co-ordination--'Thou
+art that' 'this Self is Brahman'; 'In that all this has its Self'; 'All
+this in truth is Brahman'; and by other texts, such as 'He who dwells
+within the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the
+body,' &c.; and 'He who abides within, the ruler of creatures, he is thy
+Self; as explained by us under Sūtra I, 4, 22. The consciousness of the
+released soul therefore expresses itself in the following form: 'I am
+Brahman, without any division.' Where the texts speak of the soul's
+becoming equal to, or having equal attributes with, Brahman, the meaning
+is that the nature of the individual soul--which is a mere mode of
+Brahman--is equal to that of Brahman, i.e. that on putting off its body
+it becomes equal to Brahman in purity. The text declaring that the soul
+'attains all its desires together with Brahman' intimates that the soul,
+together with Brahman of which it is a mode, is conscious of the
+attributes of Brahman. The different texts are thus in no conflict. Nor,
+on this view of the soul being non-divided from Brahman in so far as
+being its mode, is there any difficulty on account of what is said about
+the soul under Sū. IV, 4, 8; or on account of the doctrines conveyed in
+II, 1, 22; III, 4, 8.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-division,
+on account of its being seen.'
+
+
+
+
+5. In (a nature like) that of Brahman, thus Jaimini thinks; on account
+of suggestion and the rest.
+
+Owing to the fact that different texts give different accounts, the
+question now arises of what character that essential nature of the Self
+is in which it manifests itself on reaching Brahman. Is that nature
+constituted by freedom from evil and sin and the rest (i.e. the
+attributes enumerated Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); or by mere intelligence
+(vijńāna); or by both, there being no opposition between intelligence
+and those other attributes?--The teacher Jaimini holds that the soul
+manifests itself in its Brahman character, i.e. in a character
+constituted by freedom from sin, and so on. These latter attributes are,
+in the text of the 'small lotus,' mentioned as belonging to Brahman (Ch.
+Up. VIII, 1, 5), and may hence be referred to as the 'Brahman' character.
+And that this Brahman character is the character of the released soul
+also follows from 'suggestion and the rest.' For freedom from all evil
+and the rest are, in the teaching of Prajāpati, referred to as
+attributes of the soul (VIII, 7, 1). The 'and the rest' of the Sūtra
+refers to the activities of the released soul--laughing, playing,
+rejoicing, and so on (mentioned in VIII, 12, 3)--which depend on the
+power belonging to the soul in that state to realise all its ideas and
+wishes. It is for these reasons that Jaimini holds that mere
+intelligence does not constitute the true nature of the released soul.
+
+
+
+
+6. In the sole nature of intelligence; as that is its Self. Thus
+Audulomi thinks.
+
+Intelligence (consciousness; kaitanya) alone is the true nature of the
+soul, and hence it is in that character only that the released soul
+manifests itself; this is the view of the teacher Audulomi. That
+intelligence only constitutes the true being of the soul, we learn from
+the express statement 'As a lump of salt has neither inside nor outside,
+but is altogether a mass of taste; so this Self has neither inside nor
+outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 13).
+When, therefore, the text attributes to the soul freedom from evil and
+the rest, it does not mean to predicate of it further positive qualities,
+but only to exclude all the qualities depending on avidyā--change,
+pleasure, pain, and so on--For these reasons Audulomi holds that the
+released soul manifests itself as mere intelligence.--Next the teacher
+Bādarāyana determines the question by propounding his own view.
+
+
+
+
+7. Thus also, on account of existence of the former qualities (as
+proved) by suggestion, Bādarayana holds absence of contradiction.
+
+The teacher Bādarāyana is of opinion that even thus, i.e. although the
+text declares the soul to have mere intelligence for its essential
+nature, all the same the previously stated attributes, viz. freedom from
+all sin, and so on, are not to be excluded. For the authority of a
+definite statement in the Upanishads proves them to exist ('That Self
+which is free from sin,' &c.); and of authorities of equal strength one
+cannot refute the other. Nor must you say that the case is one of
+essential contradiction, and that hence we necessarily must conclude
+that freedom from sin, and so on (do not belong to the true nature of
+the soul, but) are the mere figments of Nescience (from which the
+released soul is free). For as there is equal authority for both sides,
+why should the contrary view not be held? (viz. that the soul is
+essentially free from sin, &c., and that the kaitanya is non-essential.)
+For the principle is that where two statements rest on equal authority,
+that only which suffers from an intrinsic impossibility is to be
+interpreted in a different way (i.e. different from what it means on the
+face of it), so as not to conflict with the other. But while admitting
+this we deny that the text which describes the Self as a mass of mere
+knowledge implies that the nature of the Self comprises nothing whatever
+but knowledge.--But what then is the purport of that text?--The meaning
+is clear, we reply; the text teaches that the entire Self, different
+from all that is non-sentient, is self-illumined, i.e. not even a small
+part of it depends for its illumination on something else. The fact,
+vouched for in this text, of the soul in its entirety being a mere mass
+of knowledge in no way conflicts with the fact, vouched for by other
+texts, of its possessing qualities such as freedom from sin and so on,
+which inhere in it as the subject of those qualities; not any more than
+the fact of the lump of salt being taste through and through--which fact
+is known through the sense of taste--conflicts with the fact of its
+possessing such other qualities as colour, hardness, and so on, which
+are known through the eye and the other sense-organs. The meaning of the
+entire text is as follows--just as the lump of salt has throughout one
+and the same taste, while other sapid things such as mangoes and other
+fruit have different tastes in their different parts, rind and so on; so
+the soul is throughout of the nature of knowledge or self-illuminedness.--
+Here terminates the adhikarana of 'that which is like Brahman.'
+
+
+
+
+8. By the mere will; Scripture stating that.
+
+Concerning the released soul Scripture states, 'He moves about there,
+laughing, playing, rejoicing, be it with women, or chariots, or
+relatives' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3). The doubt here arises whether the
+soul's meeting with relatives and the rest presupposes an effort on its
+part or follows on its mere will--as things spring from the mere will of
+the highest Person.--An effort is required; for we observe in ordinary
+life that even such persons as kings and the like who are capable of
+realising all their wishes do not accomplish the effects desired without
+some effort.--Against this view the Sūtra says 'by the mere will.' For,
+in a previous passage, Scripture expressly says, 'He who desires the
+world of the Fathers, by his mere will the Fathers rise to receive him,'
+&c. (VIII, 2, 1). And there is no other text declaring the need of effort
+which would oblige us to define and limit the meaning of the text last
+quoted.
+
+
+
+
+9. And for this very reason without another ruler.
+
+Since the released soul realises all its wishes, it does not stand under
+another ruler. For to be under a ruler means to be subject to injunction
+and prohibition, and to be such is opposed to being free in the
+realisation of all one's wishes. Hence Scripture says, 'he is a Self-
+ruler' (Ch. Up. VII, 25).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'wishes.'
+
+
+
+
+10. The absence, Bādari holds; for thus Scripture says.
+
+A doubt arises whether the Released has a body and sense-organs, or not;
+or whether he has them or not just as he pleases. The teacher Bādari
+holds that body and sense-organs are absent; since the text declares
+this. The text--'as long as he is embodied there is no freedom from
+pleasure and pain; but when he is free from the body then neither
+pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1)--declares that
+pleasure and pain are necessarily connected with embodiedness; and the
+text--'having risen from this body and reached the highest light he
+manifests himself in his own shape' (VIII, 12, 3)--declares that the
+Released one is without a body.
+
+
+
+
+11. The presence, Jaimini holds; because the text declares manifoldness.
+
+The teacher Jaimini holds that the Released one has a body and senses;
+because the text declares manifoldness--'He is onefold, he is threefold,
+he is fivefold, he is sevenfold' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2). The Self which is
+one and indivisible cannot be manifold, and the various forms of
+manifoldness of which the text speaks therefore must depend on the body.
+The text which speaks of the absence of a body refers to the absence of
+that body only which is due to Karman; for this latter body only is the
+cause of pleasure and pain. Next the Reverend Bādarāyana decides this
+point by the declaration of his own view.
+
+
+
+
+12. For this reason Bādarāyana (holds him to be) of both kinds; as in
+the case of the twelve days' sacrifice.
+
+'For this reason,' i.e. for the reason that the text refers to the wish
+of the Released, the Reverend Bādarāyana is of opinion that the Released
+may, at his liking, be with or without a body. This satisfies both kinds
+of texts. The case is analogous to that of the twelve days' sacrifice
+which, on the basis of twofold texts--'Those desirous of prosperity are
+to celebrate the dvādasāha,' and 'The priest is to offer the dvādasāha
+for him who desires offspring'--belongs, according to difference of wish,
+either to the sattra or the ahīna class of sacrifices.--The next Sūtra
+declares that the body and the sense-organs of the Released are not
+necessarily created by the Released himself.
+
+
+
+
+13. In the absence of a body, as in the state of dream; that being
+possible.
+
+As in the absence of a body and other instruments of enjoyment created
+by himself, the Released may undergo experiences of pleasure by means of
+instruments created by the highest Person, the Released, although
+capable of realising all his wishes, may not himself be creative. As in
+the state of dream the individual soul has experiences depending on
+chariots and other implements created by the Lord ('He creates chariots,
+horses,' &c., Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10); thus the released soul also may have
+experience of different worlds created by the Lord engaged in playful
+sport.
+
+
+
+
+14. When there is a body, as in the waking state.
+
+When, on the other hand, the released soul possesses a body created by
+its own will, then it enjoys its various delights in the same way as a
+waking man does.--In the same way as the highest Person creates out of
+himself, for his own delight, the world of the Fathers and so on; so he
+sometimes creates such worlds for the enjoyment of the released souls.
+But sometimes, again, the souls using their own creative will-power
+themselves create their own worlds, which however are included within
+the sphere of sport of the highest Person (so that the souls in enjoying
+them do not pass beyond the intuition of Brahman).
+
+But it has been taught that the soul is of atomic size; how then can it
+connect itself with many bodies?--To this question the next Sūtra
+replies.
+
+
+
+
+15. The entering is as in the case of a lamp; for thus Scripture
+declares.
+
+Just as a lamp, although abiding in one place only, enters through the
+light proceeding from it into connexion with many places; so the soul
+also, although limited to one place, may through its light-like
+consciousness enter into several bodies. It may do this as well as in
+this life the soul, although abiding in one spot of the body only, viz.
+the heart, pervades the whole body by means of its consciousness and
+thus makes it its own. There is however the following difference between
+the two cases. The non-released soul has its intellectual power
+contracted by the influence of Karman, and hence is incapable of that
+expansive pervasion without which it cannot identify itself with other
+bodies. The released soul, on the other hand, whose intellectual power
+is non-contracted is capable of extending as far as it likes, and thus
+to make many bodies its own. For Scripture declares, 'That living soul
+is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair
+divided a hundred times, and yet it is capable of infinity' (Svet. Up. V,
+9). The non-released soul is ruled by Karman, the released one only by
+its will--this is the difference.--But, a new difficulty is raised,
+Scripture declares that when the soul reaches Brahman all its inner and
+outer knowledge is stopped: 'Embraced by the highest Self the soul knows
+nothing that is without, nothing that is within' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21).
+How then can it be said to know all things?--To this the next Sūtra
+replies.
+
+
+
+
+16. It refers either to dreamless sleep or to union (sampatti); for this
+is manifested.
+
+Texts as the one last quoted do not refer to the released soul, but
+either to deep sleep or to 'union' (sampatti), i.e. the time of dying;
+the latter in accordance with the text 'then his speech is united
+(sampadyate) with his mind,--heat with the highest divinity' (Ch. Up. VI,
+15, 1). In both those states the soul attains to the highest Self and is
+unconscious. That in the states of deep sleep and dying the soul is
+unconscious and that the released soul is all-knowing, Scripture reveals.
+The text 'In truth he thus does not know himself that he is I, nor does
+he know anything that exists. He is gone to utter annihilation. I see no
+good in this' (Ch. Up. VIII, 11, 1) declares that the soul is
+unconscious in the state of deep sleep; and a subsequent text in the
+same section declares the released soul to be all-knowing, 'He seeing
+these pleasures with the divine eye, i.e. the mind, rejoices' (VIII, 12,
+5). The same is clearly stated in the text,'He who sees this sees
+everything, and obtains everything everywhere' (VII, 2, 6, 2). That at
+death there is unconsciousness appears from the text, 'having risen from
+these elements he vanishes again in them. When he has departed there is
+no more knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 13). From all this it follows that
+the text as to the soul being held in embrace by the prājńa Self refers
+either to deep sleep or death.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-
+being.'
+
+
+
+
+17. With the exception of world-energy; on account of leading subject-
+matter and of non-proximity.
+
+The doubt here presents itself whether the power of the released soul is
+a universal power such as belongs to the Supreme Person, extending to
+the creation, sustentation, and so on, of the worlds; or is limited to
+the intuition of the Supreme Person.--The Pūrvapakshin maintains the
+former view. For he says Scripture declares that the soul reaches
+equality with the Supreme Person: 'Free from stain he reaches the
+highest equality' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3); and moreover Scripture ascribes
+to the released soul the power of realising all its thoughts. And these
+two conditions are not fulfilled unless the soul possess the special
+powers of the Lord with regard to the government, &c., of the world.--To
+this the Sūtra replies, 'with the exception of world-energy.' The
+released soul, freed from all that hides its true nature, possesses the
+power of intuitively beholding the pure Brahman, but does not possess
+the power of ruling and guiding the different forms of motion and rest
+belonging to animate and inanimate nature.--How is this known?--'From
+subject-matter.' For it is with special reference to the highest Brahman
+only that the text mentions ruling and controlling power over the entire
+world. 'That from whence these beings are born, that through which they
+live when born, that into which they enter at death, endeavour to know
+that; that is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 1, 1). If such universal ruling
+and controlling power belonged to the released soul as well, it would
+not be used--as the text actually uses it--for defining Brahman; for all
+definition rests on special individual attributes. Analogously many
+other texts speak of universal ruling and controlling power with
+exclusive reference to the Supreme Person--'Being only this was in the
+beginning, &c.--it thought, may I be many' (Ch. Up. VI, 2); 'In the
+beginning this was Brahman, one only--it created the most excellent
+Kshattra,' &c. (Bri. Up. I, 4, 11); 'In the beginning all this was Self,
+one only--it thought, let me send forth these worlds' (Ait. Ār. II, 4, 1,
+1); 'There was Narayana alone, not Brahmā, and so on.' 'He who dwelling
+within the earth,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3).--This also follows 'from
+non-proximity'; for in all those places which speak of world-controlling
+power the context in no way suggests the idea of the released soul, and
+hence there is no reason to ascribe such power to the latter.
+
+
+
+
+18. If it be said that this is not so, on account of direct teaching; we
+reply not so, on account of the texts declaring that which abides within
+the spheres of those entrusted with special functions.
+
+But, an objection is raised, certain texts directly declare that the
+released soul also possesses 'world-energy.' Compare 'He becomes a self-
+ruler; he moves in all worlds according to his wishes' (Ch. Up. VII, 25,
+2); 'He moves through these worlds, enjoying any food he wishes, and
+assuming any shape he wishes' (Taitt. Up. III, 10, 5). We cannot
+therefore accept the restriction laid down in the last Sūtra.--Not so,
+the latter half of the present Sūtra declares, 'on account of the texts
+declaring that which abides in the spheres of those entrusted with
+special functions.' The meaning of the texts quoted is that the released
+soul participates in the enjoyments connected with the spheres of
+Hiranyagarbha and other beings which are entrusted with special
+functions. The soul whose knowledge is no longer obstructed by Karman
+freely enjoys all the different worlds in which the power of Brahman
+manifests itself and thus is fully satisfied.--But if the released soul,
+no less than the soul implicated in the Samsāra, experiences enjoyments
+belonging to the sphere of change, it follows that the sum of its
+enjoyments is finite and limited, and that hence the released soul is no
+better off than the soul in the state of bondage!--Of this doubt the
+next Sūtra disposes.
+
+
+
+
+19. That which is not within change; for thus Scripture declares the
+abiding (of the soul).
+
+That which is not within change, i.e. the highest Brahman which is free
+from all change and of an absolutely perfect and blessed nature--this,
+together with the manifestations of its glory, is what forms the object
+of consciousness for the released soul. The worlds which are subject to
+change thus form objects for that soul's experience, in so far as they
+form part of Brahman's manifestation. For Scripture declares that the
+released soul thus abides within, i.e. is conscious of the changeless
+highest Brahman, 'when he finds freedom from fear and an abode in that
+which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he obtains
+the fearless' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). And that the world is contained within
+Brahman as its manifestation is declared in the text, 'In that all the
+worlds abide, and no one goes beyond' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 8). The meaning of
+the text stating that the Released freely move in all worlds, and
+similar texts, therefore is only that the released soul while conscious
+of Brahman with its manifestations experiences also the enjoyments,
+lying within the sphere of change, which abide in the world of
+Hiranyagarbha and similar beings; not that it possesses the world-
+energies--creative, ruling, and so on--which are the distinctive
+attribute of the highest Lord.
+
+
+
+
+20. And thus Perception and Inference show.
+
+That the energies connected with the rule of the entire world are
+exclusive attributes of the highest Person, Scripture and Smriti alike
+declare. Compare scriptural texts such as 'From fear of him the wind
+blows,' &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 8, 1); 'By the command of that Imperishable
+one sun and moon stand, held apart' (Bri. Up. III, 9); 'He is the lord
+of all, the king of all beings, the protector of all beings' (Bri. Up.
+IV, 4, 22). And Smriti texts such as 'With me as Supervisor, Prakriti
+brings forth the Universe of the movable and the immovable, and for this
+reason the world ever moves round'; 'Pervading this entire Universe by a
+portion of mine I do abide' (Bha. Gī. IX, 10; X, 42). Scripture and
+Smriti likewise declare that of the bliss which is enjoyed by the
+released soul the highest Person alone is the cause--'For he alone
+causes blessedness' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); 'He who serves me with
+unswerving devotion, surpasses these qualities and is fitted for
+becoming one with Brahman. For I am the abode of Brahman, of infinite
+immortality, of everlasting virtue, and of absolute bliss' (Bha. Gī. XIV,
+26-27). The exalted qualities of the soul--freedom from evil and sin and
+so on--which manifest themselves in the state of Release no doubt belong
+to the soul's essential nature; but that the soul is of such a nature
+fundamentally depends on the Supreme Person, and on him also depends the
+permanency of those qualities; they are permanent in so far as the Lord
+himself on whom they depend is permanent. It is in the same way that all
+the things which constitute the means of enjoyment and sport on the part
+of the Lord are permanent in so far as the Lord himself is permanent. It
+thus appears that the equality to the Lord which the released soul may
+claim does not extend to the world-ruling energies.
+
+
+
+
+21. And on account of the indication of the equality of enjoyment only.
+
+The previous conclusion is confirmed by the further fact that the text
+directly teaches the released soul to be equal to Brahman in so far only
+as enjoying direct insight into the true nature of Brahman. 'He reaches
+all objects of desire, together with the all-knowing Brahman' (Taitt. Up.
+II, 1, 1).--The conclusion thus is that we have to shape our ideas as to
+the powers of the released soul in accordance with what the texts say as
+to the Lord only possessing the power of ruling and controlling the
+entire world, and that hence the latter power cannot be attributed to
+the soul.--But if the powers of the released soul altogether depend on
+the Lord, it may happen that He, being independent in all his doings,
+may will the released soul to return into the Sawsara.--Of this doubt
+the next Sūtra disposes.
+
+
+
+
+22. Non-return, according to Scripture; non-return, according to
+Scripture.
+
+We know from Scripture that there is a Supreme Person whose nature is
+absolute bliss and goodness; who is fundamentally antagonistic to all
+evil; who is the cause of the origination, sustentation, and dissolution
+of the world; who differs in nature from all other beings, who is all-
+knowing, who by his mere thought and will accomplishes all his purposes;
+who is an ocean of kindness as it were for all who depend on him; who is
+all-merciful; who is immeasurably raised above all possibility of any
+one being equal or superior to him; whose name is the _highest Brahman_.
+And with equal certainty we know from Scripture that this Supreme Lord,
+when pleased by the faithful worship of his Devotees--which worship
+consists in daily repeated meditation on Him, assisted by the
+performance of all the practices prescribed for each caste and āsrama--
+frees them from the influence of Nescience which consists of karman
+accumulated in the infinite progress of time and hence hard to overcome;
+allows them to attain to that supreme bliss which consists in the direct
+intuition of His own true nature: and after that does not turn them back
+into the miseries of Samsāra. The text distinctly teaching this is 'He
+who behaves thus all his life through reaches the world of Brahman and
+does not return' (Ch. Up. VIII, 15). And the Lord himself declares
+'Having obtained me great-souled men do not come into rebirth, the
+fleeting abode of misery; for they have reached the highest perfection.
+Up to the world of Brahma the worlds return again, O Arjuna; but having
+attained to me, O son of Kunti, there is no rebirth' (Bha. Gi. VIII, 1,
+5-16). As, moreover, the released soul has freed itself from the bondage
+of karman, has its powers of knowledge fully developed, and has all its
+being in the supremely blissful intuition of the highest Brahman, it
+evidently cannot desire anything else nor enter on any other form of
+activity, and the idea of its returning into the Samsāra therefore is
+altogether excluded. Nor indeed need we fear that the Supreme Lord when
+once having taken to himself the Devotee whom he greatly loves will turn
+him back into the Samsāra. For He himself has said, 'To the wise man I
+am very dear, and dear he is to me. Noble indeed are all these, but the
+wise man I regard as my very Self. For he, with soul devoted, seeks me
+only as his highest goal. At the end of many births the wise man goes to
+me, thinking all is Vāsudeva. Such great-souled men are rarely met with'
+(Bha. Gī. VII, 17-19).--The repetition of the words of the Sūtra
+indicates the conclusion of this body of doctrine. Thus everything is
+settled to satisfaction.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'with the
+exception of the world-energies.'
+
+Here terminates the fourth pāda of the fourth adhyāya of the commentary
+on the Sārīraka Mīmāmsā, composed by the reverend teacher Rāmānuja. This
+completes the fourth adhyāya, and the whole work; and the entire body of
+doctrine is thus brought to a conclusion.
+
+
+
+
+INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS
+
+amsa, part,
+
+akshara, the Imperishable,
+
+akhyāti, the view that the attribute of one thing appears as that of
+another,
+
+Agnirahasya, chapter in the Vājasaneyaka (Sat. Bra. X),
+
+Agnividyā, knowledge of the Fires (i.e. Ch. Up. IV, 11-13),
+
+agnihotra,
+
+aghātikarman,
+
+anga, subordinate matter,
+
+angin, principal matter,
+
+ajada, intelligent,
+
+ajadatva, intelligence,
+
+ajā,'the unborn' principle, goat,
+
+ajńāna, non-knowledge, Nescience,
+
+ajiva, non-soul,
+
+anu, of atomic size,
+
+atigraha,
+
+ativādin, one who makes a final supreme declaration,
+
+Aditi, the individual soul,
+
+adrishta, supersensuous, transcendental, the unseen principle
+
+advitīya, without a second,
+
+advaita-vādin,
+
+advaitin, he who holds the view of non-duality,
+
+adharma, demerit,
+
+adhikarana, chapter, passim.
+
+adhipati, sense-organ,
+
+adhyayana, learning,
+
+adhyavasāya, the deciding,
+
+adhyāsa, superimposition,
+
+anavasāda, freedom from dejection,
+
+anātmatva, absence of selfhood,
+
+anārabdhakārya, (works) the effects of which have not yet begun,
+
+aniruddha, principle of egoity,
+
+anirvakaniyatā, inexplicability,
+
+anirvakaniyatvā,
+
+anirvakaniyatā-vadin,
+
+anīsā,
+
+anukūla, agreeable,
+
+anuddharsha, absence of exultation,
+
+anupalabdhi, non-perception,
+
+anubhūti, consciousness,
+
+anumati, favour, permission,
+
+anumāna, inference,
+
+anuvāda, reference to what is established by other means, explanatory
+comment,
+
+anusaya, remainder,
+
+anusmriti, recognition,
+
+anrita, untrue,
+
+antahkarana, internal organ,
+
+antaram, difference, interval, break,
+
+antariksha, ether, atmosphere,
+
+antaryāmin, the inner Ruler,
+
+antaryami-brāhmana,
+
+anna, food,
+
+anvaya, connexion, presence,
+
+apara, secondary, lowest,
+
+aparokshatva, being that which does not transcend the senses,
+
+apāna,
+
+apurushārtha, non-advantageous,
+
+apūrva, unprecedented, new, the supersensuous result of an action which
+later on produces the sensible result,
+
+apratisahkhyā,
+
+abhāva, absence of something, non-existence,
+
+abhimāna, misconception,
+
+abhivimāna,
+
+abheda, non-distinction,
+
+amūrta, undefined,
+
+amrita,
+
+amauna, non-mauna (see mauna),
+
+arthavāda, an additional statement,
+
+arthāpatti,
+
+avagati, consciousness,
+
+avatāra, incarnation,
+
+avidyā, Nescience,
+
+avivākya, (day of Soma sacrifice),
+
+avyakta, the Unevolved,
+
+avyākritam, unevolved matter,
+
+asvatva, generic character of horses,
+
+asatkārya,
+
+asatkāryavāda, the theory that the effect does not exist before its
+origination,
+
+asatkhyāti, the view that the non-existing appears as existing,
+
+asatya, untrue,
+
+astikāya, existing body,
+
+ahamkartri, organ of Egoity,
+
+ahamkāra, the 'I,' egoity,
+
+aham, 'I,' a secret name of Brahman,
+
+ahar, a secret name of Brahman,
+
+ahīna, class of sacrifices,
+
+ākānkshā, expectancy,
+
+ākāsa, ether,
+
+ākāra, conduct,
+
+ātmakhyāti, the view that the Self appears as a thing,
+
+atman, Self,
+
+ātmabhāva, own being,
+
+Āditya, Sun,
+
+ādesa, instruction,
+
+ānanda, bliss,
+
+ānandamaya, consisting of bliss,
+
+ānumāna, object of inference,
+
+ānumānika, to be inferred,
+
+ābhāsa, appearance,
+
+ārambhana that which is taken or touched,
+
+ārambhana-adhikarana,
+
+Ārhata, a Jaina,
+
+ālambhana,
+
+āsrama, stage of life,
+
+āsrava, influx,
+
+itikartavyatā, mode of procedure,
+
+indriya, sense-organ,
+
+īksh, to think,
+
+īsvara, the Lord,
+
+utpatti, being originated,
+
+udāna,
+
+udgātri,
+
+udgītha,
+
+udgītha-vidyā,
+
+unmana, measure,
+
+upakurvāna, a Brahmakārin who has completed his course of study and
+becomes a householder,
+
+Upakosala-vidyā,
+
+upalakshana, secondary mark,
+
+upasad, certain offerings,
+
+upādāna, material cause,
+
+upādhi, limiting adjunct,
+
+upās, to meditate,
+
+upāsana, meditation,
+
+upāsana, meditation,
+
+ūha, a kind of cognitional activity,
+
+rita,
+
+ekavākyatva, syntactical unity,
+
+aisvarya, lordly power, superior existence,
+
+om, omkāra, the syllable Om, aupādhika, limiting adjuncts,
+
+karana, instrument, activity, action, the instrumental case,
+
+karmakānda,
+
+karman, action, works, good and evil deeds,
+
+karma-bhāvanā,
+
+karma-mīmāmsā,
+
+kalpa, world period,
+
+kalpaka, the shaping agent,
+
+kalpana, formation, i.e.creation,
+
+kalyāna, virtuous conduct,
+
+kāpāla, skull,
+
+kāma, desired thing,
+
+kārya, thing to be done,
+
+kāla, time,
+
+Kundapāyinām ayanam,
+
+kriti, action,
+
+kaivalya, isolation,
+
+kriyā, action, works,
+
+kshetrajńa, embodied soul,
+
+khanda, a piece,
+
+khyāti,
+
+gati, the going,
+
+guna, quality, attribute, secondary matter, details,
+
+godohana, a sacrificial vessel,
+
+graha,
+
+ghanī-bhūta, concreted,
+
+ghātikarman,
+
+kfaturmukha, four-faced,
+
+kamasa, cup,
+
+karana, conduct, works,
+
+kitta, mind,
+
+kid-rūpa, essentially intelligent,
+
+kinta, thinking,
+
+kaitanya, intelligence,
+
+kaitta, mental,
+
+gada, non-intelligent,
+
+gāti, generic character,
+
+giva, individual soul,
+
+gīva ātmā, living Self,
+
+givaghana,
+
+givanmukta, released in this life,
+
+gīvanmukti, release in this life,
+
+gńa., knower,
+
+gńātri, knower,
+
+gńāna., knowledge, consciousness, pl. forms of knowledge,
+
+tajjalan,
+
+tatkratuh, according to what his thought is,
+
+tattva of the Sānkhyas,
+
+tat tvam asi,
+
+tanu, body,
+
+tan-maya, consisting of that,
+
+tanmātra, the subtle matter,
+
+tapas, austerity,
+
+tamas, darkness,
+
+tarka, ratiocination,
+
+tukch, futile,
+
+tejas, fire or heat,
+
+taijasa, active,
+
+tyat, that,
+
+dama,
+
+dahara-vidyā,
+
+daharākāsa, small ether,
+
+dīkshā, initiatory ceremony,
+
+devamāyā,
+
+desa, place,
+
+dosha, imperfection, a».
+
+dravya, substance,
+
+dvādasāha, the twelve days' sacrifice,
+
+dviparārdha,
+
+dvīpa, island,
+
+dvaita, duality,
+
+dvaitavādin, (the Vaiseshika) who holds the view of duality,
+
+dharma, attribute,
+
+dhyāna, devout meditation,
+
+dhyana-vidhi,
+
+dhyai, to meditate or to know,
+
+nādī, vein,
+
+nāda, tone,
+
+nāmadheya, name,
+
+nitya, permanent,
+
+nityānityavastuviveka,
+
+nididhyāsana, meditation,
+
+nididhyāsitavya, to be meditated upon,
+
+nimitta, cause,
+
+niyoga, i.e. apūrva, supersensuous result of an action which later on
+products the sensible result,
+
+niranvaya, absolute,
+
+nirupākhya, non-entity,
+
+nirjara, decay,
+
+nirvikalpaka, non-determinate,
+
+Nishāda-sthapati,
+
+nivāra, wild rice,
+
+naimittika, contingent,
+
+naishhthika, a perpetual religious student observing the vow of
+chastity,
+
+pańkaganah, 'five-people,'
+
+pańkāgni-vidyā,
+
+pada, word,
+
+padārtha, a thing,
+
+para, highest,
+
+paramātman, higher Self,
+
+paramesara, highest Lord,
+
+parinama, modification,
+
+paryāya, particular states of substances
+
+pāńditya, learning,
+
+pāriplava, a performance of the Asvamedha sacrifice,
+
+pārivrajaka, an ascetic,
+
+pārivrājya, the wandering about as a mendicant,
+
+putika, a plant,
+
+pudgala, body,
+
+purusha soul,
+
+purushavakas, to he designated by the term 'man,'
+
+purusha-vidyā,
+
+purushottama, the highest Person,
+
+pūrvapaksha, primā facie view,
+
+pūrvapakshin, he who holds the primā facie view, passim.
+
+prakarana, leading subject-matter,
+
+prakāra, mode,
+
+prakās, to shine forth,
+
+prakāsa, light,
+
+prakriti, primeval matter, originating principle, nature,
+
+prakriyā, subject-matter,
+
+prajńamatrah, subjects,
+
+pranava, the syllable Om,
+
+Pratardana-vidyā (i.e. Kau. Up III),
+
+pratikūla, disagreeable,
+
+pratījńā, initial statement,
+
+pratlbuddha atma, the Self of intelligence,
+
+pratisankhya,
+
+pratīka, symbol,
+
+pratyaksha, perception, presentative thought,
+
+pratyakshatā, immediate presentation,
+
+pratyag-ātman, the individual soul,
+
+pratyaa, consciousness,
+
+pratyāhāra, complete restraining of the senses from receiving external
+impressions,
+
+prathiman, solid extension,
+
+pradesa, space,
+
+pradyumna, the internal organ,
+
+pradhāna, principal matter, non-sentient principle,
+
+pradhāna, a superior,
+
+prabhā, light,
+
+prayojana, final cause,
+
+pralaya, destruction of the world,
+
+prāgńa, knowing, conscious, intelligent, the personal Self, the highest
+Self,
+
+prāna, breath, breathing out; soul; Breath, a name of Brahman,
+
+prāna, pl. organs and vital breath,
+
+prānamaya, consisting of breath,
+
+prānāgnihotra,
+
+prādesamātra,
+
+prāpti, the being obtained,
+
+prāyaskitta, expiatory rite,
+
+prerakatva, prompting quality,
+
+phala, result,
+
+phalavidhi, injunction of results,
+
+bādha, sublation,
+
+bādhita, sublated,
+
+bālya, childlike state,
+
+buddhi, internal organ, intellect,
+
+brimh, root from which 'Brahman' is derived,
+
+brimhana, growth,
+
+brihat, great,
+
+brihattva, greatness,
+
+brahmakarya, chastity,
+
+brahmagignāsā, enquiry into Brahman,
+
+brahmatva, Brahma-hood,
+
+brahman,
+
+brahma-bhāvanā,
+
+brahmavidyā, knowledge of Brahman,
+
+brahmasamstha, founded on Brahman,
+
+bhakti, devotion, devout meditation,
+
+bhagavat, the Lord, then a holy person,
+
+bhagāsana,
+
+bhākta, secondary or figurative,
+
+bhāva, entity,
+
+bhinna, separate,
+
+bhinnatva, difference,
+
+bhūta, beings,
+
+bhūta, element,
+
+bhūtamātrāh, objects,
+
+bhūtādi, originator of the elements,
+
+bhūman,'muchness,' fulness of bliss,
+
+bhūma-vidyā (Ch. Up. VII, 2),
+
+bheda, difference,
+
+bhedābheda, view that there is difference and absence of difference at
+the same time,
+
+bhautika, elemental,
+
+bhrama, erroneous cognition, error,
+
+bhrānti, illusion,
+
+madhu, 'honey,' the sun,
+
+madhuividyā,
+
+manana, reflection,
+
+manas, internal organ, mind,
+
+mantavya, to be reflected on,
+
+mantra,
+
+-maya, consisting of, made of,
+
+Mahat, the Great Principle (of the Sānkhya),
+
+mahāvrata-brāhmana,
+
+mātrā, mora (metrical unit),
+
+mānasa, mental (offering of a Soma cup),
+
+māyā,
+
+māyin, possessing māyā,
+
+mithyā, false,
+
+mithyātva, falsehood,
+
+mukta, released,
+
+mukhya prāna, chief vital air,
+
+mudrā, a badge,
+
+muni,
+
+mūrta, defined,
+
+mauna, Muni-hood, state of a Muni,
+
+yathākratub, according as his thought is,
+
+yushmad-artha, the objective element,
+
+yoga, mystic concentration of mind,
+
+yogayug, practitioner of Yoga,
+
+yogasiddha, perfected by Yoga,
+
+yogyatā, compatibility,
+
+yoni, female organ of generation,
+
+rajas, passion,
+
+rahasya-brāhmana,
+
+rāga, passion,
+
+rukaka = nishka,
+
+rūpa, form, character,
+
+lakshanā, implied meaning, implication,
+
+linga, inferential mark,
+
+vastu, substance,
+
+vākya, syntactical connexion,
+
+vākyabheda, split of a sentence,
+
+vāyu, wind,
+
+vāasanā, a flow of ideas, states of consciousness,
+
+vikāra, effected thing, effect,
+
+vikriti, being Modified,
+
+vijńāna, understanding, knowledge, idea,
+
+vijńānamaya, consisting of understanding, (the soul in deep sleep).
+
+vid, to know or to meditate,
+
+vidyā, form of meditation on Brahman,
+
+viniyoga, application,
+
+vipaskit, intelligent,
+
+vipaskittva, intelligence,
+
+vibhava, manifestation,
+
+vibhūti, manifestation of power,
+
+vimoka, freeness of mind,
+
+vivrit, to manifest itself,
+
+viveka, abstention,
+
+viseshana, determining attribute,
+
+vishaya, object,
+
+virya, strength,
+
+vritta, conduct,
+
+vedana, knowledge,
+
+vedanā, sensation,
+
+veda-vrata,
+
+vaikārika, modified,
+
+vaikhānasa, hermit,
+
+vaisvarūpya, many-natured universe,
+
+vaisvānara-vidyā
+
+vyavahāra, speech,
+
+vyashti, discrete aspect (of the world),
+
+vyāna,
+
+vyāvahārika, conventional,
+
+vyāvritti, individual difference,
+
+vyūha, division,
+
+sakti, power, potentiality,
+
+sabda, sound,
+
+sama,
+
+sarira, body,
+
+sākhā,
+
+Sāndilya-vidyā,
+
+sārira, joined to a body,
+
+sāriraka (doctrine) of the embodied (self),
+
+sāstra, science, scriptural injunction,
+
+sirovrata, vow of (carrying fire on the) head,
+
+sila, conduct,
+
+subhāsraya, perfect object,
+
+sudra (etymology),
+
+sesha, supplementary,
+
+seshin, principal matter to be subserved by other things,
+
+sraddhi, faith, belief,
+
+sravana, hearing,
+
+sruti, scriptural statement, rg,
+
+samyamana,
+
+samyoga, conjunction,
+
+samvara, a kind of deep meditation,
+
+samvargavidyā
+
+samvid, consciousness,
+
+samsāra,
+
+samskāra, impression,
+
+samskriti, the being made ready,
+
+samkarshana, the individual soul,
+
+samrkhyā, number,
+
+samjńā, consciousness,
+
+sat, Being,
+
+satkārya,
+
+sattra class of sacrifices,
+
+sattva, goodness,
+
+satya, true,
+
+satyakāma, realising its desire,
+
+satyakāmatva, power of realising one's desire,
+
+sad-vidyā, meditation on that which truly is (Kb. Up. VI, i ff.),
+
+sanniclhi, proximity,
+
+sapta-bhangi-nyāya, the system of the seven paralogisms,
+
+samanantara,
+
+samanvaya, connexion,
+
+samavāya, intimate relation, reciprocal inherence,
+
+samavāyi-karana, intimate cause,
+
+samashti, collective aspect (of the world),
+
+samashti-purusha, the aggregate soul,
+
+samākāra, a book of the Ātharvanikas,
+
+samādhi, meditation,
+
+samāna,
+
+sarnpatti, union,
+
+sampad, to be combined,
+
+sampāta, yāvat sampātam,
+
+samprasāda, serenity,
+
+sambhūta,
+
+sayuktvān,
+
+sarvajńa, all-knowing,
+
+savikalpaka, determinate,
+
+sahakārin,
+
+sākshāt, manifest,
+
+sākshātkāra, immediate presentation,
+
+sākshin, the witnessing principle,
+
+sādhya, effected,
+
+sāmānādhikaranya, co-ordination,
+
+sāyugya, equality,
+
+siddhi, proof, definite well-established knowledge,
+
+sukarita, good conduct,
+
+sushira, a hollow place,
+
+sūkshma, the Subtle,
+
+setu, bank or bridge,
+
+somarājan,
+
+sparsa, touch,
+
+smriti, representation,
+
+svayamprakāsa, self-proved,
+
+svayamprakāsatva, self-luminousness,
+
+svayamprakāsatā,
+
+svarga, heaven,
+
+svastika,
+
+svaclhyaya, one's own text,
+
+svādhyāya, essential, rgr.
+
+Hara,
+
+hita, arteries so called,
+
+hetu, reason,
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary
+by Ramanuja, by Trans. George Thibaut
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE VEDANTA-SUTRAS ***
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