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| committer | nfenwick <nfenwick@pglaf.org> | 2025-01-21 20:49:53 -0800 |
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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..93cf3e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #68187 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68187) diff --git a/old/68187-0.txt b/old/68187-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index ab66337..0000000 --- a/old/68187-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20602 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of History of the War in the Peninsula -and in the South of France from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, vol. 3 -of 6, by William Francis Patrick Napier - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France - from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, vol. 3 of 6 - -Author: William Francis Patrick Napier - -Release Date: May 27, 2022 [eBook #68187] - -Language: English - -Produced by: Brian Coe, John Campbell and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The - Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE -PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR -1814, VOL. 3 OF 6 *** - - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. - - A superscript is denoted by ^x or ^{xx}, for example Nov^r or 5^{th}. - - Omitted text is indicated by four asterisks, * * * *. - - All changes noted in the ERRATA have been applied to the etext. - - Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been - placed at the end of the book. - - Several Sidenotes have the abbreviation S. As in other volumes, this - stands for Soult. - - With a few exceptions noted at the end of the book, variant spellings - of names have not been changed. - - The tables in this book are best viewed using a monospace font. - - Minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book. - - Volume 1 of this series can be found at - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67318 - Volume 2 of this series can be found at - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67554 - - - - - HISTORY - - OF THE - - WAR IN THE PENINSULA - - AND IN THE - - SOUTH OF FRANCE, - - FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814. - - BY - - W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B. - - COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, AND MEMBER OF - THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES. - - VOL. III. - - LONDON: - THOMAS & WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-STREET. - - MDCCCXXXI. - - - - -TABLE OF CONTENTS. - - - BOOK IX. - - - CHAPTER I. - - Inactivity of the Asturians and Gallicians--Guerilla system - in Navarre and Aragon--The Partidas surround the third - corps--Blake abandons Aragon--Suchet’s operations against the - Partidas--Combat of Tremendal--The advantages of Suchet’s - position--Troubles at Pampeluna--Suchet ordered by Napoleon to - repair there--Observations on the Guerilla system _Page_ 1 - - - CHAPTER II. - - Continuation of the operations in Catalonia--St. Cyr sends Lecchi - to the Ampurdan; he returns with the intelligence of the Austrian - war--Of Verdier’s arrival in the Ampurdan, and of Augereau’s - appointment to the command of the seventh corps--Augereau’s - inflated proclamation--It is torn down by the Catalonians--He - remains sick at Perpignan--St. Cyr continues to command--Refuses - to obey Joseph’s orders to remove into Aragon--Presses Verdier - to commence the siege of Gerona--Reinforces Verdier--Remains - himself at Vich--Constancy of the Spaniards--St. Cyr marches - from Vich, defeats three Spanish battalions, and captures a - convoy--Storms St. Felieu de Quixols--Takes a position to cover - Verdier’s operations--Siege of Gerona--State of the contending - parties--Assault of Monjouic fails--General Fontanes storms - Palamos--Wimphen and the Milans make a vain attempt to throw - succours into Gerona--Monjouic abandoned 17 - - - CHAPTER III. - - Claros and Rovira attack Bascara and spread dismay along the - French frontier--Two Spanish officers pass the Ter and enter - Gerona with succours--Alvarez remonstrates with the junta of - Catalonia--Bad conduct of the latter--Blake advances to the aid - of the city--Pestilence there affects the French army--St. Cyr’s - firmness--Blake’s timid operations--O’Donnel fights Souham, but - without success--St. Cyr takes a position of battle--Garcia - Conde forces the French lines and introduces a convoy into - Gerona--Blake retires--Siege resumed--Garcia Conde comes out of - the city--Ridiculous error of the French--Conde forces the French - lines and escapes--Assault on Gerona fails--Blake advances a - second time--Sends another convoy under the command of O’Donnel - to the city--O’Donnel with the head of the convoy succeeds, - the remainder is cut off--Blake’s incapacity--He retires--St. - Cyr goes to Perpignan--Augereau takes the command of the - siege--O’Donnel breaks through the French lines--Blake advances a - third time--Is beaten by Souham--Pino takes Hostalrich--Admiral - Martin intercepts a French squadron--Captain Hallowell destroys a - convoy in Rosas-bay--Distress in Gerona--Alvarez is seized with - delirium, and the city surrenders--Observations 31 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - Plot at Seville against the Supreme Junta defeated by lord - Wellesley--Junta propose a new form of government--Opposed by - Romana--Junta announce the convocation of the national Cortez, - but endeavour to deceive the people--A Spanish army assembled in - the Morena under Eguia--Bassecour sends cavalry to reinforce Del - Parque, who concentrates the Spanish army of the left at Ciudad - Rodrigo--He is joined by the Gallician divisions--Santocildes - occupies Astorga--French endeavour to surprise him, but are - repulsed--Ballasteros quits the Asturias and marching by Astorga - attempts to storm Zamora--Enters Portugal--Del Parque demands the - aid of the Portuguese army--Sir A. Wellesley refuses, giving his - reason in detail--Del Parque’s operations--Battle of Tamames--Del - Parque occupies Salamanca, but hearing that French troops were - assembling at Valladolid retires to Bejar 55 - - - CHAPTER V. - - Areizaga takes the command of Equia’s army and is ordered to - advance against Madrid--Folly of the Supreme Junta--Operations in - La Mancha--Combat of Dos Barrios--Cavalry combat of Ocaña--Battle - of Ocaña--Destruction of the Spanish army 67 - - - CHAPTER VI. - - King Joseph’s return to Madrid--Del Parque’s operations--Battle - of Alba de Tormes--Dispersion of the Spanish troops--Their - great sufferings and patience--The Supreme Junta treat sir - A. Wellesley’s counsels with contempt--He breaks up from the - Guadiana and moves to the Mondego--Vindication of his conduct for - having remained so long on the Guadiana--French remain torpid - about Madrid--Observations 86 - - - BOOK X. - - CHAPTER I. - - Joseph prepares to invade Andalusia--Distracted state of - affairs in that province--Military position and resources - described--Invasion of Andalusia--Passes of the Morena forced - by the French--Foolish deceit of the Supreme Junta--Tumult in - Seville--Supreme Junta dissolved--Junta of Seville re-assembles, - but disperses immediately after--The French take Jaen--Sebastiani - enters Grenada--King Joseph enters Cordoba and afterwards - marches against Seville--Albuquerque’s march to Cadiz--Seville - surrenders--Insurrection at Malaga put down by Sebastiani--Victor - invests Cadiz--Faction in that city--Mortier marches against - Badajos--The visconde de Gand flies to Ayamonte--Inhospitable - conduct of the bishop of Algarve 101 - - - CHAPTER II. - - Operations in Navarre, Aragon, and Valencia--Pursuit of - the student Mina--Suchet’s preparations--His incursion - against Valencia--Returns to Aragon--Difficulty of the - war in Catalonia--Operations of the seventh corps--French - detachments surprised at Mollet and San Perpetua--Augereau - enters Barcelona--Sends Duhesme to France--Returns to - Gerona--O’Donnel rallies the Spanish army near Centellas--Combat - of Vich--Spaniards make vain efforts to raise the blockade of - Hostalrich--Augereau again advances to Barcelona--Sends two - divisions to Reus--Occupies Manreza and Villa Franca--French - troops defeated at Villa Franca and Esparaguera--Swartz abandons - Manreza--Is defeated at Savadel--Colonel Villatte communicates - with the third corps by Falcet--Severolli retreats from Reus to - Villa Franca--Is harassed on the march--Augereau’s unskilful - conduct--Hostalrich falls--Gallant exploit of the governor, - Julian Estrada--Cruelty of Augereau 124 - - - CHAPTER III. - - Suchet marches against Lerida--Description of that - fortress--Suchet marches to Tarega--O’Donnel advances from - Taragona--Suchet returns to Balaguer--Combat of Margalef--Siege - of Lerida--The city stormed--Suchet drives the inhabitants into - the citadel and thus forces it to surrender 144 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - Reflections on that act--Lazan enters Alcanitz, but is driven out - by the French--Colonel Petit taken with a convoy by Villa Campa, - and assassinated after the action--Siege of Mequinenza--Fall - of that place--Morella taken--Suchet prepares to enter - Catalonia--Strength and resources of that province 158 - - - CHAPTER V. - - Operations in Andalusia--Blockade of Cadiz--Dissentions in - that city--Regency formed--Albuquerque sent to England--Dies - there--Regency consent to admit British troops--General Colin - Campbell obtains leave to put a garrison in Ceuta, and to destroy - the Spanish lines at San Roque--General William Stewart arrives - at Cadiz--Seizes Matagorda--Tempest destroys many vessels--Mr. - Henry Wellesley and general Graham arrive at Cadiz--Apathy of - the Spaniards--Gallant defence of Matagorda--Heroic conduct of a - sergeant’s wife--General Campbell sends a detachment to occupy - Tarifa--French prisoners cut the cables of the prison-hulks, - and drift during a tempest--General Lacey’s expedition to the - Ronda--His bad conduct--Returns to Cadiz--Reflections on the - state of affairs 169 - - - CHAPTER VI. - - Continuation of the operations in Andalusia--Description of - the Spanish and Portuguese lines of position south of the - Tagus--Situation of the armies in Estremadura--Complex operations - in that province--Soult’s policy 188 - - - CHAPTER VII. - - Situation of the armies north of the Tagus--Operations in Old - Castile and the Asturias--Ney menaces Ciudad Rodrigo--Loison - repulsed from Astorga--Kellerman chases Carrera from the - Gata mountains--Obscurity of the French projects--Siege of - Astorga--Mahi driven into Gallicia--Spaniards defeated at - Mombouey--Ney concentrates the sixth corps at Salamanca--The - ninth corps and the imperial guards enter Spain--Massena - assumes the command of the army of Portugal and of the - northern provinces--Ney commences the first siege of Ciudad - Rodrigo--Julian Sanchez breaks out of the town--Massena - arrives and alters the plan of attack--Daring action of three - French soldiers--Place surrenders--Andreas Herrasti--His fine - conduct--Reflections upon the Spanish character 201 - - - BOOK XI. - - CHAPTER I. - - Lord Wellington’s policy--Change of administration in - England--Duel between lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning--Lord - Wellesley joins the new ministry--Debates in Parliament--Factious - violence on both sides--Lord Wellington’s sagacity and firmness - vindicated--His views for the defence of Portugal--Ministers - accede to his demands--Grandeur of Napoleon’s designs against the - Peninsula--Lord Wellington enters into fresh explanation with the - English ministers--Discusses the state of the war--Similarity - of his views with those of sir John Moore--His reasons for not - advancing into Spain explained and vindicated 215 - - - CHAPTER II. - - Greatness of lord Wellington’s plans--Situation of the - belligerents described--State of the French--Character of - Joseph--Of his Ministers--Disputes with the Marshals--Napoleon’s - policy--Military governments--Almenara sent to Paris--Curious - deception executed by the marquis of Romana, Mr. Stuart, - and the historian Cabanes--Prodigious force of the French - army--State of Spain--Inertness of Gallicia--Secret plan of - the Regency for encouraging the Guerillas--Operations of those - bands--Injustice and absurdity of the Regency, with respect to - South America--England--State of parties--Factious injustice on - both sides--Difficulty of raising money--Bullion committee--Wm. - Cobbett--Lord King--Mr. Vansittart--Extravagance of the - Ministers--State of Portugal--Parties in that country--Intrigues - of the Patriarch and the Souza’s--Mr. Stuart is appointed - Plenipotentiary--His firmness--Princess Carlotta claims the - regency of the whole Peninsula, and the succession to the throne - of Spain 234 - - - CHAPTER III. - - Lord Wellington’s scheme for the defence of Portugal--Vastness - of his designs--Number of his troops--Description of the - country--Plan of defence analysed--Difficulty of supplying the - army--Resources of the belligerents compared--Character of the - British soldier 254 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - Character of Miguel Alava--Portuguese government demand more - English troops--Lord Wellington refuses, and reproaches the - Regency--The factious conduct of the latter--Character of the - light division--General Crawfurd passed the Coa--His activity - and skilful arrangements--Is joined by Carrera--Skirmish - at Barba del Puerco--Carrera invites Ney to desert--Romana - arrives at head-quarters--Lord Wellington refuses to succour - Ciudad Rodrigo--His decision vindicated--Crawfurd’s ability - and obstinacy--He maintains his position--Skirmish at - Alameda--Captain Kraükenberg’s gallantry--Skirmish at Villa de - Puerco--Colonel Talbot killed--Gallantry of the French captain - Guache--Combat of the Coa--Comparison between general Picton and - general Crawfurd 273 - - - CHAPTER V. - - Slight operations in Gallicia, Castile, the Asturias, - Estremadura, and Andalusia--Reynier passes the Tagus--Hill - makes a parallel movement--Romana spreads his troops - over Estremadura--Lord Wellington assembles a reserve at - Thomar--Critical situation of Silveira--Captures a Swiss - battalion at Puebla de Senabria--Romana’s troops defeated at - Benvenida--Lascy and captain Cockburne land troops at Moguer - but are forced to reimbark--Lord Wellington’s plan--How - thwarted--Siege of Almeida--Allies advance to Frexadas--The - magazine of Almeida explodes--Treachery of Bareiros--Town - surrenders--The allies withdraw behind the Mondego--Fort of - Albuquerque ruined by an explosion--Reynier marches on Sabugal, - but returns to Zarza Mayor--Napoleon directs Massena to - advance--Description of the country--Erroneous notions of lord - Wellington’s views entertained by both armies 296 - - - CHAPTER VI. - - Third Invasion of Portugal--Napoleon’s prudence in military - affairs vindicated--Massena concentrated his corps--Occupies - Guarda--Passes the Mondego--Marches on Viseu--Lord Wellington - falls back--Secures Coimbra, passes to the right bank of the - Mondego, and is joined by the reserve from Thomar--General - Hill anticipates his orders, and by a forced march reaches the - Alva--The allied army is thus interposed between the French - and Coimbra--Daring action of colonel Trant--Contemporaneous - events in Estremadura, and the Condado de Niebla--Romana - defeated--Gallantry of the Portuguese cavalry under general - Madden--Dangerous crisis of affairs--Violence of the Souza - faction--An indiscreet letter from an English officer, creates - great confusion at Oporto--Lord Wellington rebukes the Portuguese - Regency--He is forced to alter his plans, and resolves to offer - battle--Chooses the position of Busaco 312 - - - CHAPTER VII. - - General Pack destroys the bridges on the Criz and Dao--Remarkable - panic in the light division--The second and sixth corps arrive in - front of Busaco--Ney and Regnier desire to attack, but Massena - delays--The eighth corps and the cavalry arrive--Battle of - Busaco--Massena turns the right of the allies--Lord Wellington - falls back, and orders the northern militia to close on the - French rear--Cavalry skirmish on the Mondego--Coimbra evacuated, - dreadful scene there--Disorders in the army--Lord Wellington’s - firmness contrasted with Massena’s indolence--Observations 325 - - - CHAPTER VIII. - - Massena resumes his march--The militia close upon his - rear--Cavalry skirmish near Leiria--Allies retreat upon the - lines--Colonel Trant surprises Coimbra--The French army continues - its march--Cavalry skirmish at Rio Mayor--General Crawfurd is - surprised at Alemquer and retreats by the wrong road--Dangerous - results of this error--Description of the lines of Torres - Vedras--Massena arrives in front of them--Romana reinforces - Lord Wellington with two Spanish divisions--Remarkable works - executed by the light division at Aruda--The French skirmish at - Sobral--General Harvey wounded--General St. Croix killed--Massena - takes a permanent position in front of the Lines--He is harassed - on the rear and flanks by the British cavalry and the Portuguese - militia 340 - - - CHAPTER IX. - - State of Lisbon--Embargo on the vessels in the river--Factious - conduct of the Patriarch--The desponding letters from the - army--Alarm--Lord Liverpool--Lord Wellington displays the - greatest firmness, vigour, and dignity, of mind--He rebukes - the Portuguese Regency, and exposes the duplicity and - presumption of the Patriarch’s faction--Violence of this - faction--Curious revelation made by Baron Eben and the editor - of the Brazilienza--Lord Wellesley awes the Court of Rio - Janeiro--Strengthens the authority of Lord Wellington and Mr. - Stuart--The French seize the Islands in the river--Foolish - conduct of the governor of Setuval--General Fane sent to the left - bank of the Tagus--Lord Wellington’s embarrassments become more - serious--The heights of Almada fortified--Violent altercation of - the Regency upon this subject--The Patriarch insults Mr. Stuart - and nearly ruins the common cause 364 - - - CHAPTER X. - - Massena’s pertinacity--He collects boats on the Tagus, - and establishes a depôt at Santarem--Sends general Foy to - Paris--Casts a bridge over the Zezere--Abandons his position in - front of the Lines--Is followed by lord Wellington--Exploit of - serjeant Baxter--Massena assumes the position of Santarem--Lord - Wellington sends general Hill across the Tagus--Prepares to - attack the French--Abandons this design and assumes a permanent - position--Policy of the hostile generals exposed--General - Gardanne arrives at Cardigos with a convoy, but retreats - again--The French marauders spread to the Mondego--Lord - Wellington demands reinforcements--Beresford takes the command - on the left of the Tagus--Operations of the militia in - Beira--General Drouet enters Portugal with the ninth corps--Joins - Massena at Espinhal--Occupies Leiria--Claparede defeats Silveira - and takes Lamego--Returns to the Mondego--Seizes Guarda and - Covilhao--Foy returns from France--The duke of Abrantes wounded - in a skirmish at Rio Mayor--General Pamplona organizes a secret - communication with Lisbon--Observations 377 - - - BOOK XII. - - CHAPTER I. - - General sketch of the state of the war--Lord Wellington objects - to maritime operations--Expedition to Fuengirola--Minor - operations in Andalusia--National Cortez assemble in the - Isla de Leon--Its proceedings--New regency chosen--Factions - described--Violence of all parties--Unjust treatment of the - colonies 402 - - - CHAPTER II. - - Soult assumes the direction of the blockade of Cadiz--His - flotilla--Enters the Troccadero canal--Villantroys, or - cannon-mortars, employed by the French--Inactivity of the - Spaniards--Napoleon directs Soult to aid Massena--Has some - notion of evacuating Andalusia--Soult’s first expedition - to Estremadura--Carries the bridge of Merida--Besieges - Olivenza--Ballasteros defeated at Castellejos--Flies into - Portugal--Romana’s divisions march from Cartaxo to the succour of - Olivenza--That place surrenders--Romana dies--His character--Lord - Wellington’s counsels neglected by the Spanish generals--First - siege of Badajos--Mendizabel arrives--Files the Spanish army into - Badajos--Makes a grand sally--Is driven back with loss--Pitches - his camp round San Christoval--Battle of the Gebora--Continuation - of the blockade of Cadiz--Expedition of the allies under general - Lapeña--Battle of Barosa--Factions in Cadiz 421 - - - CHAPTER III. - - Siege of Badajos continued--Imas surrenders--His cowardice - and treachery--Albuquerque and Valencia de Alcantara taken - by the French--Soult returns to Andalusia--Relative state of - the armies at Santarem--Retreat of the French--Massena’s able - movement--Skirmish at Pombal--Combat of Redinha--Massena halts - at Condeixa--Montbrun endeavours to seize Coimbra--Baffled by - colonel Trant--Condeixa burnt by the French--Combat of Casal - Nova--General Cole turns the French at Panella--Combat of Foz - d’Aronce--Massena retires behind the Alva 450 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - Allies halt for provisions--State of the campaign--Passage of the - Ceira--Passage of the Alva--Massena retires to Celerico--Resolves - to march upon Coria--Is prevented by Ney, who is deprived of - his command and sent to France--Massena abandons Celerico and - takes post at Guarda--The allies oblige the French to quit that - position, and Massena takes a new one behind the Coa--Combat of - Sabugal--Trant crosses the Coa and cuts the communication between - Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo--His danger--He is released by the - British cavalry and artillery--Massena abandons Portugal 473 - - - CHAPTER V. - - Estimate of the French loss--Anecdote of Colonel Waters--Lord - Wellington’s great conceptions explained--How impeded--Affairs - in the south of Spain--Formation of the fourth and fifth - Spanish armies--Siege of Campo Mayor--Place falls--Excellent - conduct of major Tallaia--Beresford surprises Montbrun--Combat - of cavalry--Campo Mayor recovered--Beresford takes - cantonments round Elvas--His difficulties--Reflections upon - his proceedings--He throws a bridge near Jerumenha and - passes the Guadiana--Outposts of cavalry cut off by the - French--Castaños arrives at Elvas--Arrangements relative to - the chief command--Beresford advances against Latour Maubourg, - who returns to Llerena--General Cole takes Olivenza--Cavalry - skirmish near Usagre--Lord Wellington arrives at Elvas, examines - Badajos--Skirmish there--Arranges the operations--Political - difficulties--Lord Wellington returns to the Agueda--Operations - in the north--Skirmishes on the Agueda--Massena advances to - Ciudad Rodrigo--Lord Wellington reaches the army--Retires behind - the Dos Casas--Combat of Fuentes Onoro--Battle of Fuentes - Onoro--Evacuation of Almeida 489 - - - CHAPTER VI. - - Lord Wellington quits the army of Beira--Marshal Beresford’s - operations--Colonel Colborne’s beats up the French quarters - in Estremadura, and intercepts their convoys--First English - siege of Badajos--Captain Squires breaks ground before San - Cristoval--His works overwhelmed by the French fire--Soult - advances to relieve the place--Beresford raises the siege--Holds - a conference with the Spanish generals, and resolves to - fight--Colonel Colborne rejoins the army, which takes a position - at Albuera--Allied cavalry driven in by the French--General Blake - joins Beresford--General Cole arrives on the frontier--Battle of - Albuera 523 - - - CHAPTER VII. - - Continuation of the battle of Albuera--Dreadful state of both - armies--Soult retreats to Solano--General Hamilton resumes the - investment of Badajos--Lord Wellington reaches the field of - battle--Third and seventh divisions arrive--Beresford follows - Soult--The latter abandons the castle of Villalba and retreats - to Llerena--Cavalry action at Usagre--Beresford quits the - army--General Hill reassumes the command of the second division, - and lord Wellington renews the siege of Badajos.--Observations 542 - - - _Papers relating to the former volumes._ - - I. Letter from major-general F. Ponsonby 559 - - II. Note upon the situation of Spain in 1808, dictated by - Napoleon 560 - - - APPENDIX. - - No. I. - - Returns of the French army in the Peninsula, extracted from the - French muster-rolls 567 - - No. II. - - Extracts of letters from lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, and - one from sir John Moore to major-general M’Kenzie, commanding in - Portugal 573 - - No. III. - - Extracts from the correspondence of a field-officer of engineers, - employed at Cadiz, and extracts from the official abstract of - military reports from the British commanders at Cadiz 580 - - No. IV. - - Extracts from king Joseph’s correspondence 583 - - No. V. - - Extracts of letters from lord Wellington 586 - - No. VI. - - Extracts from a report made by the duke of Dalmatia to the prince - of Wagram and Neufchatel 603 - - Intercepted letter from marshal Mortier to the emperor 607 - - No. VII. - - Miscellaneous correspondence of the French marshals and others, - and extracts from general Pelet’s journal 607 - - No. VIII. - - The French officers, prisoners of war at Oporto, to general Trant 623 - - No. IX. - - A letter from lieutenant-general Graham to the right hon. H. - Wellesley, and state of the troops at Tarifa, under his command 624 - - Extract of a letter from general Frederick Ponsonby, and various - other documents 629 - - No. X. - - Extracts from the correspondence of captain Squires, of the - engineers 638 - - No. XI. - - Extract of a letter from general Campbell to lord Melville 639 - - - - -ERRATA. - - - Page 10, line 6, _for_ “Caspe secured the communication between the - wings of the third corps and Fraga, and its - wooden bridge, &c.” _read_ “Caspe secured the - communication between the wings of the third - corps, while Fraga and its wooden bridge, &c.” - - .. 14, .. last, _for_ “absolutely” _read_ “absolute.” - - .. 71, .. 16, _for_ “Bulluno” _read_ “Belluno.” - - .. 91, .. 20, _for_ “thousend” _read_ “thousand.” - - .. 139, margin, _for_ “Istoria militaire degl’Italiano” _read_ - “Istoria militáre degl’Italiani.” - - .. 143, .. 10, _for_ “Augereau’s” _read_ “Augereau.” - - .. 194, .. 3 from bottom, _for_ “marched” _read_ “march.” - - .. 216, .. 15, _for_ “fitting, out &c.” _read_ “fitting out, &c.” - - .. 219, .. 6 from bottom, _for_ “even that in case” _read_ “even - in that case.” - - .. 249, .. 3, _for_ “denied” _read_ “desired.” - - .. 278, .. 14 from bottom, _for_ “him” _read_ “he.” - - .. 304, .. 10 from bottom, _for_ “amounted” _read_ “mounted.” - - .. 306, .. 11 from bottom, _for_ “only” _read_ “principal.” - - .. 319, .. 23, _for_ “severally” _read_ “several.” - - .. 382, .. 6, _for_ “where” _read_ “there.” - - .. 392, .. 5, _for_ “right bank” _read_ “left bank.” - - .. 417, .. 4, _for_ “latter” _read_ “Cortes.” - - .. 431, .. 17, _for_ “besieged” _read_ “besiegers.” - - .. 443, .. 2 from bottom, _for_ “Dikies” _read_ “Dilke.” - - .. 465, margin, _for_ “Campagne de Français” _read_ “Campagne - des Français.” - - .. 470, .. 9, _for_ “Fons” _read_ “Foz.” - - .. 470, .. 17, _for_ “Fons” _read_ “Foz.” - - .. 512, .. 2, _for_ “eight” _read_ “eighth.” - - - - -LIST OF PLATES. - - - No. 1. Suchet’s Operations, 1809-10 _to face page_ 10 - - 2. Siege of Gerona _to face page_ 48 - - 3. Areizaga’s Operations, 1809 _to face page_ 84 - - 4. Invasion of Andalusia, 1810 _to face page_ 108 - - 5. Defence of Portugal, 1810 _to face page_ 266 - - 6. Crawfurd’s Operations, 1810 _to face page_ 292 - - 7. Operations on the Mondego, 1810 _to face page_ 334 - - 8. Lines of Torres Vedras, 1810 _to face page_ 358 - - 9. Battle of Barosa, March 5th, 1811 _to face page_ 446 - - 10. Massena’s Retreat, Combat of Sabugal, 1811 _to face page_ 486 - - 11. Battle of Fuentes Onoro _to face page_ 516 - - 12. Battle of Albuera _to face page_ 540 - - - - -NOTICE. - - -The manuscript authorities consulted for this volume consist of -original papers and correspondence of the duke of Wellington, marshal -Soult, king Joseph, Mr. Stuart,[1] general Graham,[2] general -Pelet,[3] general Campbell,[4] captain Codrington,[5] and colonel -Cox,[6] together with many private journals and letters of officers -employed during the war. - -Before the Appendix two papers are inserted, the one a letter from -major-general Frederick Ponsonby relative to a passage in the -description of the battle of Talavera; the other is an original note -by the emperor Napoleon, which I had not seen when I published my -first volume. The reader is referred to it as confirmatory of the -arguments used by me when objecting to Joseph’s retreat from Madrid. - - - The reader is informed that, in the second volume, Book VI. & - VII. should be Book VI., and Book IX. should be Book VIII. - - - - - HISTORY - - OF THE - - PENINSULAR WAR. - - - - -BOOK IX. - - -CHAPTER I. - -[Sidenote: 1809.] - -When Gallicia was delivered by the campaign of Talavera, the Asturias -became the head of a new line of operation threatening the enemy’s -principal communication with France. But this advantage was feebly -used. Kellerman’s division at Valladolid, and Bonet’s at San Andero, -sufficed to hold both Asturians and Gallicians in check; and the -sanguinary operations in the valley of the Tagus, were colaterally, -as well as directly, unprofitable to the allies. In other parts the -war was steadily progressive in favour of the French; yet their -career was one of pains and difficulties. - -Hitherto Biscay had been tranquil, and Navarre so submissive, that -the artillery employed against Zaragoza, was conveyed by the country -people, without an escort, from Pampeluna to Tudela. But when the -battle of Belchite terminated the regular warfare in Aragon, the -Guerilla system commenced in those parts; and as the chiefs acquired -reputation at the moment when Blake was losing credit by defeats, -the dispersed soldiers flocked to their standards; hoping thus to -cover past disgrace, and to live with a greater license, because the -regular armies suffered under the restraints without enjoying the -benefits of discipline, while the irregulars purveyed for themselves. - -Zaragoza is surrounded by rugged mountains, and every range became -the mother of a Guerilla brood; nor were the regular Partizan corps -less numerous than the Partidas. On the left of the Ebro, the -Catalonian colonels, Baget, Perena, Pedroza, and the chief Theobaldo, -brought their Migueletes to the Sierra de Guara, overhanging Huesca -and Barbastro. In this position, commanding the sources of the -Cinca and operating on both sides of that river, they harassed -the communication between Zaragoza and the French outposts; and -maintained an intercourse with the governor of Lerida, who directed -the movements and supplied the wants of all the bands in Aragon. - -On the right of the Ebro, troops raised in the district of Molina, -were united to the corps of Gayan, and that officer, taking -possession of the mountains of Montalvan, the valley of the Xiloca, -and the town of Daroca, pushed his advanced guards even to the plain -of Zaragoza, and occupied Nuestra Senora del Aguilar. This convent, -situated on the top of a high rock, near Cariñena, he made a depôt -of provisions and ammunition, and surrounded the building with an -entrenched camp for three thousand men. - -On Gayan’s left, general Villa Campa, a man of talent and energy, -established himself at Calatayud, with the regular regiments of Soria -and La Princessa, and making fresh levies, rapidly formed a large -force, with which he cut the direct line of communication between -Zaragoza and Madrid. - -Beyond Villa Campa’s positions the circle of war was continued -by other bands; which, descending from the Moncayo mountains, -infested the districts of Taranzona and Borja, and intercepted the -communications between Tudela and Zaragoza. - -The younger Mina, called the student, vexed all the country between -Tudela and Pampeluna; and the inhabitants of the high Pyrennean -valleys of Roncal, Salazar, Anso, and Echo, were also in arms, and -commanded by Renovalles. This general officer, taken at Zaragoza, -was, by the French, said to have broken his parole; but he, pleading -a previous breach of the capitulation, fled to Lerida, and from -thence passing with some regular officers into the valleys, took the -command of the insurrection, and succeeded in surprising several -French detachments. His principal post was at the convent of San Juan -de la Pena, which is built on a rock, remarkable in Spanish history -as a place of refuge maintained with success against the Moorish -conquerors. The bodies of twenty-two kings of Aragon rested in the -church, and the whole rock was held in veneration by the Aragonese, -and supposed to be invulnerable. From this post Saraza, acting under -Renovalles, continually menaced Jaca, and communicating with Baget, -Pedroza, and Father Theobaldo, completed, as it were, the investment -of the third corps. - -All these bands, amounting to, at least, twenty thousand armed -men, commenced their operations at once, cutting off isolated men, -intercepting convoys and couriers, and attacking the weakest parts -of the French army. Meanwhile Blake having rallied his fugitives at -Tortoza, abandoned Aragon to its fate, and proceeding to Taragona, -endeavoured to keep the war alive in Catalonia. - -Suchet, in following up his victory at Belchite, had sent detachments -as far as Morella, on the borders of Valencia, and pushed his -scouting parties close up to Tortoza; but finding the dispersion of -Blake’s troops complete, he posted Meusnier’s division on the line -of the Guadalupe, with orders to repair the castle of Alcanitz, so -as to form a head of cantonments on the right bank of the Ebro. Then -crossing that river at Caspe with the rest of the army, he made -demonstrations against Mequinenza, and even menaced Lerida, obliging -the governor to draw in his detachments, and close the gates. Suchet, -however, continued his march by Fraga, recrossed the Cinca, and -leaving Habert’s division to guard that line, returned himself in the -latter end of June to Zaragoza by the road of Monzon. - -Having thus dispersed the regular Spanish forces and given full -effect to his victory; the French General sought to fix himself -firmly in the positions he had gained. Sensible that arms may win -battles, but cannot render conquest permanent, he projected a system -of civil administration which enabled him to support his troops, -and yet to offer some security of property to those inhabitants -who remained tranquil. But, as it was impossible for the people to -trust to any system, or to avoid danger, while the mountains swarmed -with the Partidas, Suchet resolved to pursue the latter without -relaxation, and to put down all resistance in Aragon before he -attempted to enlarge the circle of his conquests. Foreseeing that -while he thus laid a solid base for further operations, he should -also form an army capable of executing any enterprize. - -He commenced on the side of Jaca, and having dislodged the Spaniards -from their positions near that castle, in June, supplied it with ten -months’ provisions. After this operation, Almunia and Cariñena, on -the right of the Ebro, were occupied by his detachments; and having -suddenly drawn together four battalions and a hundred cuirassiers at -the latter point, he surrounded Nuestra Senora del Aguilar, during -the night of the 19th, destroyed the entrenched camp, and sent a -detachment in pursuit of Gayan. On the same day, Pedrosa was repulsed -on the other side of the Ebro, near Barbastro, and general Habert -defeated Perena. - -The troops sent in pursuit of Gayan dispersed his corps at Uzed, -and Daroca was occupied by the French. The vicinity of Calatayud -and the mountains of Moncayo were then scoured by detachments from -Zaragoza, one of which took possession of the district of Cinco -Villas. Meanwhile Jaca was continually menaced by the Spaniards at -St. Juan de la Pena, and Saraza, descending from thence by the valley -of the Gallego, on the 23d of August, surprised and slew a detachment -of seventy men close to Zaragoza. On the 26th, however, five French -battalions stormed the sacred rock, and penetrated up the valleys of -Anso and Echo in pursuit of Renovalles. Nevertheless, that chief, -retiring to Roncal, obtained a capitulation for the valley without -surrendering himself. - -These operations having, in a certain degree, cleared Aragon of -the bands on the side of Navarre and Castile, the French general -proceeded against those on the side of Catalonia. Baget, Perena, and -Pedrosa, chased from the Sierra de Guarra, rallied between the Cinca -and the Noguerra, and were joined by Renovalles, who assumed the -chief command; but on the 23d of September, the whole being routed -by general Habert, the men dispersed, and the chiefs took refuge in -Lerida and Mequinenza. - -Suchet, then occupied Fraga, Candasnos, and Monzon, established -a flying bridge on the Cinca, near the latter town, raised some -field-works to protect it, and that done, resolved to penetrate the -districts of Venasques and Benevarres, the subjection of which would -have secured his left flank, and opened a new line of communication -with France. The inhabitants, having notice of his project, assembled -in arms, and being joined by the dispersed soldiers of the defeated -Partizans, menaced a French regiment posted at Graus. Colonel La -Peyrolerie, the commandant, marched the 17th of October, by Roda, -to meet them; and having reached a certain distance up the valley, -was surrounded, yet he broke through in the night, and regained his -post. During his absence the peasantry of the vicinity came down to -kill his sick men, but the townsmen of Graus would not suffer this -barbarity; and marshal Suchet affirms that such humane conduct was -not rare in Aragonese towns. - -While this was passing in the valley of Venasque, the governor of -Lerida caused Caspe, Fraga, and Candasnos to be attacked, and some -sharp fighting took place. The French maintained their posts, but -the whole circle of their cantonments being still infested by the -smaller bands, petty actions were fought at Belchite, and on the side -of Molino, at Arnedo, and at Soria. Mina also still intercepted the -communications with Pampeluna; and Villa Campa, quitting Calatayud, -rallied Gayan’s troops, and gathered others on the rocky mountain of -Tremendal, where a large convent and church once more furnished as a -citadel for an entrenched camp. Against this place colonel Henriod -marched in November, from Daroca, with from fifteen hundred to two -thousand men and three pieces of artillery, and driving back some -advanced posts from Ojos Negros to Origuela; came in front of the -main position at eleven o’clock in the morning of the 25th. - - -COMBAT OF TREMENDAL. - -The Spaniards were on a mountain, from the centre of which a tongue -of land shooting out, overhung Origuela, and on the upper part of -this tongue stood the fortified convent of Tremendal. To the right -and left the rocks were nearly perpendicular, and Henriod, seeing -that Villa Campa was too strongly posted to be beaten by an open -attack, imposed upon his adversary by skirmishing and making as if -he would turn the right of the position by the road of Albaracin. -Villa Campa was thus induced to mass his forces on that side. In the -night, the fire of the bivouacs enabled the Spaniards to see that the -main body of the French troops and the baggage were retiring, and, -at the same time, Henriod, with six chosen companies and two pieces -of artillery, coming against the centre, suddenly drove the Spanish -outposts into the fortified convent, and opened a fire with his -guns, as if to cover the retreat. The skirmish soon ceased, and Villa -Campa, satisfied that the French had retired, was thrown completely -off his guard, when Henriod’s six companies, secretly scaling the -rocks of the position, rushed amongst the sleeping Spaniards, -killed and wounded five hundred, and put the whole army to flight. -Meanwhile, on the other side of the Ebro, a second attempt was made -against the valley of Venasque, which being successful, that district -was disarmed. - -Petty combats still continued to be fought in other parts of Aragon, -but the obstinacy of the Spaniards gradually gave way. In the month -of December, Suchet (assisted by general Milhaud, with a moveable -column from Madrid,) took the towns of Albaracin and Teruel, the -insurgent junta fled to Valencia, and the subjection of Aragon was, -in a manner effected. The interior was disarmed and quieted, and -the Partidas, which still hung upon the frontiers, were recruited, -as well as supplied, from other provinces, and acted chiefly on the -defensive. The Aragonese also were so vexed by the smaller bands, now -dwindling into mere banditti, that a smuggler of Barbastro raised a -Spanish corps, with which he chased and suppressed many of them. - -Reinforcements were now pouring into Spain, and enabled the French -general to prepare for extended operations. The original Spanish army -of Aragon was reduced to about eight thousand men; of which, a part -were wandering with Villa Campa, a part were in Tortoza, and the rest -about Lerida and Mequinenza. Those fortresses were, indeed, the only -obstacles to a junction of the third with the seventh corps; and in -them the Spanish troops who still kept the field took refuge, when -closely pressed by the invaders. - -The policy of the Supreme Junta was however, always to form fresh -corps upon the remnants of their beaten armies. Hence Villa Campa, -keeping in the mountains of Albaracin, recruited his ranks, and -still infested the western frontier of Aragon: Garcia Novarro, -making Tortoza his base of operations lined the banks of the Algas, -and menaced Alcanitz: and Perena, trusting to the neighbourhood -of Lerida for support, posted himself between the Noguera and the -Segre. But the activity of the French gave little time to effect any -considerable organization. - -Suchet’s positions formed a circle round Zaragoza; and Tudela, Jaca, -and the castle of Aljaferia were garrisoned; but his principal forces -were on the Guadalupe and the Cinca, occupying Alcanitz, Caspe, -Fraga, Monzon, Barbastro, Benevarres, and Venasque; of which the -first, third, and fourth were places of strength: and certainly, -whether his situation be regarded in a political, or a military -light, it was become most important. One year had sufficed, not only -to reduce the towns and break the armies, but in part to conciliate -the feelings of the Aragonese--confessedly the most energetic portion -of the nation--and to place the third corps, with reference to the -general operations of the war, in a most formidable position. - -1º. The fortified castle of Alcanitz formed a head of cantonments on -the right bank of the Ebro; and being situated at the entrance of the -passes leading into Valencia, it also furnished a base, from which -Suchet could invade that rich province; and by which also, he could -place the Catalonian army between two fires, whenever the seventh -corps should again advance beyond the Llobregat. - -2º. Caspe secured the communication between the wings of the third -corps, while Fraga and its wooden bridge over the Cinca, offered the -means of passing that uncertain river at all seasons. - -3º. Monzon, a regular fortification, in some measure balanced Lerida; -and its flying bridge over the Cinca enabled the French to forage all -the country between Lerida and Venasques; moreover a co-operation -of the garrison of Monzon, the troops at Barbastro, and those at -Benevarres, could always curb Perena. - -4º. The possession of Venasques permitted Suchet to communicate with -the moveable columns, (appointed to guard the French frontier,) while -the castle of Jaca rendered the third corps in a manner independent -of Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. In fine, the position on the Cinca -and the Guadalupe, menacing alike Catalonia and Valencia, connected -the operations of the third with the seventh corps; and henceforward -we shall find these two armies gradually approximating until they -form but one force, acting upon a distinct system of invasion against -the south. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 1._ - - SUCHET’S OPERATIONS - 1809-10. - - _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] - -Suchet’s projects were, however, retarded by insurrections in -Navarre, which, at this period, assumed a serious aspect. The student -Mina, far from being quelled by the troops sent at different periods -in chase of him, daily increased his forces, and, by hardy and sudden -enterprizes, kept the Navarrese in commotion. The duke of Mahon, -one of Joseph’s Spanish adherents, appointed viceroy of Navarre, was -at variance with the military authorities; and all the disorders -attendant on a divided administration, and a rapacious system, -ensued. General D’Agoult, the governor of Pampeluna, was accused of -being in Mina’s pay. His suicide during an investigation seems to -confirm the suspicion, but it is also abundantly evident, that the -whole administration of Navarre was oppressive, venal, and weak. - -To avert the serious danger of an insurrection so close to France, -the emperor directed Suchet to repair there with a part of the third -corps. That general soon restored order in Pampeluna, and eventually -captured Mina himself; but he was unable to suppress the system of -the Partidas. “_Espoz y Mina_” took his nephew’s place; and from that -time to the end of the war, the communications of the French were -troubled, and considerable losses inflicted upon their armies by this -celebrated man--undoubtedly the most conspicuous person among the -Partida chiefs. And here it may be observed how weak and inefficient -this guerilla system was to deliver the country, and that, even as an -auxiliary, its advantages were nearly balanced by the evils. - -It was in the provinces lying between France and the Ebro that -it commenced. It was in those provinces that it could effect the -greatest injury to the French cause; and it was precisely in those -provinces that it was conducted with the greatest energy, although -less assisted by the English than any other part of Spain: a fact -leading to the conclusion, that ready and copious succours may be -hurtful to a people situated as the Spaniards were. When so assisted, -men are apt to rely more upon their allies than upon their own -exertions. But however this may be, it is certain that the Partidas -of Biscay, Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia, although they amounted at -one time to above thirty thousand men, accustomed to arms, and often -commanded by men of undoubted enterprize and courage, never occupied -half their own number of French at one time; never absolutely -defeated a single division; never prevented any considerable -enterprize; never, with the exception of the surprise of Figueras, to -be hereafter spoken of, performed any exploit seriously affecting the -operations of a single “corps d’armée.” - -It is true, that if a whole nation will but persevere in such a -system, it must in time destroy the most numerous armies. But no -people will thus persevere, the aged, the sick, the timid, the -helpless, are all hinderers of the bold and robust. There will, also, -be a difficulty to procure arms, for it is not on every occasion -that so rich and powerful a people as the English, will be found in -alliance with insurrection; and when the invaders follow up their -victories by a prudent conduct, as was the case with Suchet and some -others of the French generals, the result is certain. The desire of -ease natural to mankind, prevails against the suggestions of honour; -and although the opportunity of covering personal ambition with the -garb of patriotism may cause many attempts to throw off the yoke, -the bulk of the invaded people will gradually become submissive and -tranquil. It is a fact that, notwithstanding the violent measures -resorted to by the Partida chiefs to fill their ranks, deserters -from the French and even from the British formed one-third of their -bands. - -To raise a whole people against an invader may be easy, but to direct -the energy thus aroused, is a gigantic task, and, if misdirected, -the result will be more injurious than advantageous. That it was -misdirected in Spain was the opinion of many able men of all sides, -and to represent it otherwise, is to make history give false lessons -to posterity. Portugal was thrown completely into the hands of lord -Wellington; but that great man, instead of following the example of -the Supreme Junta, and encouraging independent bands, enforced a -military organization upon totally different principles. The people -were, indeed, called upon and obliged to resist the enemy, but it -was under a regular system, by which all classes were kept in just -bounds, and the whole physical and moral power of the nation rendered -subservient to the plan of the general-in-chief. To act differently -is to confess weakness: it is to say that the government being -unequal to the direction of affairs permits anarchy. - -The Partida system in Spain, was the offspring of disorder, and -disorder in war is weakness accompanied by ills the least of which is -sufficient to produce ruin. It is in such a warfare, that habits of -unbridled license, of unprincipled violence, and disrespect for the -rights of property are quickly contracted, and render men unfit for -the duties of citizens; and yet it has with singular inconsistency -been cited, as the best and surest mode of resisting an enemy, by -politicians, who hold regular armies in abhorrence, although a high -sense of honour, devotion to the cause of the country, temperance, -regularity, and decent manners are of the very essence of the -latter’s discipline. - -[Sidenote: Extract from the Life of Mina.] - -Regular armies have seldom failed to produce great men, and one -great man is sufficient to save a nation: but when every person is -permitted to make war in the manner most agreeable to himself;--for -one that comes forward with patriotic intentions, there will be two -to act from personal interest; in short, there will be more robbers -than generals. One of the first exploits of Espoz y Mina was to -slay the commander of a neighbouring band, because, under the mask -of patriotism, he was plundering his own countrymen: nay, this the -most fortunate of all the chiefs, would never suffer any other -Partida than his own to be in his district; he also, as I have before -related, made a species of commercial treaty with the French, and -strove earnestly and successfully to raise his band to the dignity -of a regular force. Nor was this manner of considering the guerilla -system confined to the one side. The following observations of St. -Cyr, a man of acknowledged talents, show that, after considerable -experience of this mode of warfare, he also felt that the evil was -greater than the benefit. - -“Far from casting general blame on the efforts made by the Catalans, -I admired them; but, as they often exceeded the bounds of reason, -their heroism was detrimental to their cause. Many times it caused -the destruction of whole populations without necessity and without -advantage.” - -“When a country is invaded by an army stronger than that which -defends it, it is beyond question that the population should come -to the assistance of the troops, and lend them every support; but, -without an absolute necessity, the former should not be brought on -to the field of battle.”--“It is inhuman to place their inexperience -in opposition to hardened veterans.” - -“Instead of _exasperating_ the people of Catalonia, the leaders -should have endeavoured to _calm_ them, and have directed their -ardour so as to second the army on great occasions. But they excited -them without cessation, led them day after day into fire, fatigued -them, harassed them, forced them to abandon their habitations, to -embark if they were on the coast, if inland to take to the mountains -and perish of misery within sight of their own homes, thus abandoned -to the mercy of a hungry and exasperated soldiery. The people’s -ardour was exhausted daily in partial operations, and hence, on great -occasions, when they could have been eminently useful, they were not -to be had.” - -“Their good will had been so often abused by the folly of their -leaders, that many times their assistance was called for in vain. -The peasantry, of whom so much had been demanded, began to demand in -their turn. They insisted that the soldiers should fight always to -the last gasp, were angry when the latter retreated, and robbed and -ill-used them when broken by defeat.” - -“They had been so excited, so exasperated against the French, that -they became habitually ferocious, and their ferocity was often -as dangerous to their own party, as to the enemy. The atrocities -committed against their own chiefs disgusted the most patriotic, -abated their zeal, caused the middle classes to desire peace as -the only remedy of a system so replete with disorder. Numbers of -distinguished men, even those who had vehemently opposed Joseph at -first, began to abandon Ferdinand; and it is certain that, but for -the expedition to Russia, that branch of the Bourbons which reigns in -Spain, would never have remounted the throne.” - -“The cruelties exercised upon the French military were as little -conformable to the interest of the Spaniards. Those men were but the -slaves of their duty, and of the state; certain of death a little -sooner or a little later, they, like the Spaniards, were victims of -the same ambition. The soldier naturally becomes cruel in protracted -warfare; but the treatment experienced from the Catalans brought out -this disposition prematurely; and that unhappy people were themselves -the victims of a cruelty, which either of their own will or excited -by others, they had exercised upon those troops that fell into -their power; and this without any advantage to their cause, while a -contrary system would, in a little time, have broken up the seventh -corps,--seeing that the latter was composed of foreigners, naturally -inclined to desert. But the murders of all wounded, and sick, and -helpless men, created such horror, that the desertion, which at first -menaced total destruction, ceased entirely.” - -Such were St. Cyr’s opinions; and, assuredly, the struggle in -Catalonia, of which it is now the time to resume the relation, was -not the least successful in Spain. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA. - - -[Sidenote: See Vol II. p. 102.] - -The narrative of the Catalonian affairs was broken off at the -moment, when St. Cyr having established his quarters at Vich, -received intelligence of the Austrian war, and that Barcelona had -been relieved by the squadron of admiral Comaso. His whole attention -was then directed towards Gerona; and with a view to hastening -general Reille’s preparation for the siege of that place, a second -detachment, under Lecchi, proceeded to the Ampurdan. - -During this time Conpigny continued at Taragona, and Blake made -his fatal march into Aragon; but those troops which, under Milans -and Wimphen, had composed Reding’s left wing, were continually -skirmishing with the French posts in the valley of Vich, and the -Partizans, especially Claros and the doctor Rovira, molested the -communications in a more systematic manner than before. - -Lecchi returned about the 18th of May, with intelligence that -Napoleon had quitted Paris for Germany, that general Verdier had -replaced Reille in the Ampurdan, and that marshal Augereau had -reached Perpignan in his way to supersede St. Cyr himself in the -command of the seventh corps. The latter part of this information -gave St. Cyr infinite discontent. In his “Journal of Operations,” he -asserts that his successor earnestly sought for the appointment, and -his own observations on the occasion are sarcastic and contemptuous -of his rival. - -Augereau, who having served in Catalonia during the war of the -revolution, imagined, that he had then acquired an influence which -might be revived on the present occasion, framed a proclamation that -vied with the most inflated of Spanish manifestoes. But the latter, -although turgid, were in unison with the feelings of the people, -whereas, Augereau’s address, being at utter variance with those -feelings, was a pure folly. This proclamation he sent into Catalonia, -escorted by a battalion; but even on the frontier, the Miguelette -colonel, Porta, defeated the escort, and tore down the few copies -that had been posted. - -The French marshal, afflicted with the gout, remained at Perpignan, -and St. Cyr continued to command; but reluctantly, because (as he -affirms) the officers and soldiers were neglected, and himself -exposed to various indignities, the effects of Napoleon’s ill-will. -The most serious of these affronts was permitting Verdier to -correspond directly with the minister of war in France, and the -publishing of his reports in preference to St. Cyr’s. For these -reasons, the latter contented himself with a simple discharge of his -duty. Yet, after the conspiracy in the second corps, Napoleon cannot -be justly blamed for coldness towards an officer, who, however free -himself from encouraging the malcontents in the French army, was -certainly designed for their leader. It is rather to be admired that -the emperor discovered so little jealousy; when a man has once raised -himself to the highest power, he must inevitably give offence to his -former comrades, for, as all honours and rewards, flowing from him, -are taken as personal favours, so all checks and slights, or even -the cessation of benefits, are regarded as personal injuries. Where -the sanction of time is wanting, to identify the sovereign with the -country, the discontented easily convince themselves that revenge is -patriotism. - -[Sidenote: See Vol. II p. 363.] - -While St. Cyr was preparing for the siege of Gerona, Joseph, as -we have seen, directed him to march into Aragon, to repel Blake’s -movement against Suchet. This order he refused to obey, and with -reason; for it would have been a great error to permit Blake’s false -movement to occupy two “Corps d’Armée,” and so retard the siege of -Gerona, to the infinite detriment of the French affairs in Catalonia. -Barcelona was never safe while Hostalrich and Gerona were in the -Spaniard’s possession. St. Cyr was well aware of this, but the evils -of a divided command are soon felt. He who had been successful in all -his operations, was urgent, for many reasons, to commence the siege -without delay, but Verdier, who had failed at Zaragoza, was cautious -in attacking a town which had twice baffled Duhesme, and when pressed -to begin, complained that he could not, after placing garrisons in -Rosas and Figueras, bring ten thousand men before Gerona; which, -seeing the great extent of the works, were insufficient. - -St. Cyr, disregarding the works, observed that the garrison did not -exceed three thousand men, that it could not well be increased, and -that expedition was of more consequence than numbers. Nevertheless, -considering that a depôt of provisions, established for the service -of the siege at Figueras, and which it was unlikely Napoleon would -replenish, must, by delay, be exhausted, as well as the supplies -which he had himself collected at Vich: he sent all his own -cannoniers, sappers, and artillery horses, two squadrons of cavalry, -and six battalions of infantry to the Ampurdan, and having thus -increased the number of troops there to eighteen thousand men, again -urged Verdier to be expedite. - -These reinforcements marched the 22d of May, and the covering army -diminished to about twelve thousand men under arms, continued to hold -the valley of Vich until the middle of June. During this time, the -Miguelettes often skirmished with the advanced posts, but without -skill or profit; and the inhabitants of the town, always remained -in the high mountains unsheltered and starving, yet still firm of -resolution not to dwell with the invaders. This may be attributed -partly to fear, but more to that susceptibility to grand sentiments, -which distinguishes the Spanish peasants. Although little remarkable -for hardihood in the field, their Moorish blood is attested by -their fortitude; and, men and women alike, they endure calamity -with a singular and unostentatious courage. In this they are truly -admirable. But their virtues are passive, their faults active, and, -continually instigated by a peculiar arrogance, they are perpetually -projecting enterprises which they have not sufficient vigour to -execute, although at all times they are confident and boasting more -than becomes either wise or brave men. - -Early in June, St. Cyr, having consumed nearly all his corn, resolved -to approach Gerona, and secure the harvest which was almost ripe in -that district; but, previous to quitting Vich, he sent his sick and -wounded men, under a strong escort, to Barcelona, and disposed his -reserves in such a manner that the operation was effected without -loss. The army, loaded with as much grain as the men could carry, -then commenced crossing the mountains which separate Vich from the -districts of Gerona and Hostalrich. This march, conducted by the way -of Folgarolas, San Saturnino, Santa Hillario, and Santa Coloma de -Farnes, lasted two days; and, the 21st of June, the head-quarters -being fixed at Caldas de Malavella, the Fort of St. Felieu de Quixols -was stormed, and the Spanish privateers driven to seek another -harbour. The French army was then distributed in a half circle, -extending from St. Felieu to the Oña river. Intermediate posts were -established at St. Grace, Vidreras, Mallorquinas, Rieu de Arenas, -Santa Coloma de Farnes, Castaña, and Bruñola; thus cutting off the -communications between Gerona and the districts occupied by Conpigny, -Wimphen, the Milans, and Claros. - -During the march from Vich, the French defeated three Spanish -battalions, and captured a convoy, coming from the side of Martorel, -and destined for Gerona. St. Cyr calls them the forerunners of -Blake’s army; a curious error, for Blake was, on that very day, -being defeated at Belchite, two hundred miles from Santa Coloma. -Strictly speaking, there was, at this period, no Catalonian army, -the few troops that kept the field were acting independently, and -Conpigny, the nominal commander-in-chief, remained at Taragona. He -and the other authorities, more occupied with personal quarrels and -political intrigues than with military affairs, were complaining and -thwarting each other. Thus the Spanish and French operations were -alike weakened by internal divisions. - -Verdier was slow, cautious, and more attentive to the facilities -afforded for resistance than to the number of regular soldiers within -the works; he, or rather Reille, had appeared before Gerona on the -6th of May, but it was not till the 4th of June that, reinforced with -Lecchi’s division, he completed the investment of the place on both -sides of the Ter. On the 8th, however, ground was broken; and thus, -at the very moment when Blake, with the main body of his army, was -advancing against Zaragoza, in other words, seeking to wrest Aragon -from the French, Catalonia was slipping from his own hands. - - -THIRD SIEGE OF GERONA. - -When this memorable siege commenced, the relative situations of -the contending parties were as follows:--Eighteen thousand French -held the Ampurdan, and invested the place. Of this number about -four thousand were in Figueras, Rosas, and the smaller posts of -communication; and it is remarkable that Verdier asserted that -the first-named place, notwithstanding its great importance, was -_destitute of a garrison_, when he arrived there from France. A -fact consistent with Lord Collingwood’s description of the Catalan -warfare, but irreconcilable with the enterprise and vigour attributed -to them by others. - -[Sidenote: Imperial Muster Roll. MSS.] - -St. Cyr, the distribution of whose forces has been already noticed, -covered the siege with twelve thousand men; and Duhesme, having -about ten thousand, including sick, continued to hold Barcelona. -Forty thousand French were, therefore, disposed between that city -and Figueras; while, on the Spanish side, there was no preparation. -Blake was still in Aragon; Conpigny, with six thousand of the worst -troops, was at Taragona; the Milans watched Duhesme; Wimphen, with a -few thousand, held the country about the Upper Llobregat. Juan Claros -and Rovira kept the mountains on the side of Olot and Ripol; and, -in the higher Catalonia, small bands of Miguelettes were dispersed -under different chiefs. The Somatenes, however, continuing their own -system of warfare, not only disregarded the generals, as in the time -of Reding, but fell upon and robbed the regular troops, whenever a -favourable opportunity occurred. - -The Spanish privateers, dislodged from St. Filieu, now resorted to -Palamos-bay, and the English fleet, under Lord Collingwood, watched -incessantly to prevent any French squadron, or even single vessels, -from carrying provisions by the coast. But from Gerona, the governor -did not fail to call loudly on the generals, and even on the _Supreme -Central Junta_, for succours; yet his cry was disregarded; and when -the siege commenced, his garrison did not exceed three thousand -regular troops: his magazines and hospitals were but scantily -provided, and he had no money. Alvarez Mariano was however, of a -lofty spirit, great fortitude, and in no manner daunted. - -[Sidenote: See Vol. I. p. 78.] - -The works of Gerona, already described, were little changed since the -first siege; but there, as in Zaragoza, by a mixture of superstition, -patriotism, and military regulations, the moral as well as physical -force of the city had been called forth. There, likewise, a sickness, -common at a particular season of the year, was looked for to thin the -ranks of the besiegers, and there also women were enrolled, under the -title of the Company of Sta. Barbara, to carry off the wounded, and -to wait upon the hospitals, and at every breath of air, says St. Cyr, -their ribbons were seen to float amidst the bayonets of the soldiers! -To evince his own resolution, the governor forbad the mention of a -capitulation under pain of death; but severe punishments were only -denounced, not inflicted upon faint-hearted men. Alvarez, master of -his actions, and capable of commanding without phrenzy, had recourse -to no barbarous methods of enforcing authority; obstinate his defence -was, and full of suffering to the besieged, yet free from the stain -of cruelty, and rich in honour. - -On the 4th of June the siege was begun, and, on the 12th, a -mortar-battery, from the heights of Casen Rocca, on the left of the -Ter, and two breaching-batteries, established against the outworks of -Fort Monjouic, being ready to play, the town was summoned in form. -The answer was an intimation that henceforth all flags of truce would -be fired upon; the only proceeding indicative of the barbarian in the -conduct of Alvarez. - -The 13th the small suburb of Pedreto was taken possession of by the -French, and early on the morning of the 14th, the batteries opened -against Monjouic, while the town was bombarded from the Casen Rocca. - -The 17th the besieged drove the enemy from Pedreto, but were finally -repulsed with the loss of above a hundred men. - -The 19th the stone towers of St. Narcis and St. Louis, forming the -outworks of Monjouic, being assaulted, the besieged, panic-stricken, -abandoned them and the tower of St. Daniel also. The French -immediately erected breaching-batteries, four hundred yards from the -northern bastion of Monjouic. Tempestuous weather retarded their -works, but they made a practicable opening by the 4th of July, and -with a strange temerity resolved to give the assault, although the -flank fire of the works was not silenced, nor the glacis crowned, -nor the covered way or counterscarp injured, and that a half moon, -in a perfect state, covered the approaches to the breach. The latter -was proved by the engineers, in a false attack, on the night of -the 4th, and the resolution to assault was then adopted; yet the -storming-force drawn from the several quarters of investment was only -assembled in the trenches on the night of the 7th; and during these -four days, the batteries ceasing to play, the Spaniards retrenched, -and barricadoed the opening. - -At four o’clock in the morning of the 8th, the French column, jumping -out of the trenches, rapidly cleared the space between them and the -fort, descended the ditch, and mounted to the assault with great -resolution; but the Spaniards had so strengthened the defences that -no impression could be made, and the assailants taken in flank and -rear by the fire from the half moon, the covered way, and the eastern -bastion, were driven back. Twice they renewed the attempt, but the -obstacles were insurmountable, and the assault failed, with a loss of -a thousand men killed and wounded. The success of the besieged was -however mitigated by an accidental explosion, which destroyed the -garrison of the small fort of St. Juan, situated between Monjouic -and the city. - -About the period of this assault which was given without St. Cyr’s -knowledge, the latter finding that Claros and Rovira interrupted -the convoys coming from Figueras to Gerona, withdrew a brigade of -Souham’s division from Santa Coloma de Farnés, and posted it on the -left of the Ter, at Bañolas. The troops on the side of Hostalrich -were thus reduced to about eight thousand men under arms, although -an effort to raise the siege was to be expected. For letters from -Alvarez, urgently demanding succours of Blake, had been intercepted, -and the latter, after his defeat in Aragon, was, as I have said, -collecting men at Taragona. - -Meanwhile, to secure the coast-line from Rosas to Quixols before -Blake could reach the scene of action, St. Cyr resolved to take -Palamos. To effect this, general Fontanes marched from St. Filieu, -on the 5th of July, with an Italian brigade, six guns, and some -squadrons of dragoons. Twice he summoned the place, and the bearer -being each time treated with scorn, the troops moved on to the -attack; but in passing a flat part of the coast near Torre Valenti, -they were cannonaded by six gun-boats so sharply, that they could not -keep the road until the artillery had obliged the boats to sheer off. - - -STORMING OF PALAMOS. - -This town having a good roadstead, and being only one march from -Gerona, was necessarily a place of importance; and the works, -although partly ruined, were so far repaired by the Catalans as to -be capable of some defence. Twenty guns were mounted; and the town, -built on a narrow rocky peninsula had but one front, the approach to -which was over an open plain, completely commanded from the left by -some very rugged hills, where a considerable number of Somatenes were -assembled, with their line touching upon the walls of the town. - -Fontanes drove the Somatenes from this position, and a third time, -summoned the place to surrender. The bearer was killed, and the -Italians immediately stormed the works. When the Spaniards flying -towards the shore endeavoured to get on board their vessels, the -latter put off to sea, and some of Fontanes’ troops having turned the -town during the action, intercepted the fugitives, and put all to the -sword. - -Scarcely had Palamos fallen when Wimphen and the Milans, arriving -near Hostalrich, began to harass Souham’s outposts at Santa -Coloma, hoping to draw St. Cyr’s attention to that side, while a -reinforcement for the garrison of Gerona should pass through the left -of his line into the city. The French general was not deceived; but -the Spaniards nevertheless sent fifteen hundred chosen men, under -the command of one Marshal, an Englishman, to penetrate secretly -through the enemy’s posts at Llagostera. They were accompanied by -an aide-de-camp of Alvarez, called Rich, apparently an Englishmen -also, and they succeeded on the 9th in passing general Pino’s posts -unobserved. A straggler, however, was taken, and St. Cyr being thus -informed of the march, and judging that the attempt to break the line -of investment would be made in the night and by the road of Casa de -Selva, immediately placed one body of men in ambush near that point, -and sent another in pursuit of the succouring column. - -As the French general had foreseen, the Spaniards continued their -march through the hills at dusk, but being suddenly fired upon by -the ambuscade, hastily retired, and the next day fell in with the -other troops, when a thousand men were made prisoners: the rest -dispersing, escaped the enemy, yet were ill used and robbed of their -arms by the Somatenes. St. Cyr says that Mr. Marshal, having offered -to capitulate, fled during the negotiation, and thus abandoned his -men; but the Spanish general Conpigny affirmed that the men abandoned -Marshal, and refused to fight, that Rich ran away before he had seen -the enemy, and that both he and the troops merited severe punishment. -It is also certain that Marshal’s flight was to Gerona, where he -afterwards fell fighting gallantly. - -This disappointment was sensibly felt by Alvarez. Sickness and battle -had already reduced his garrison to fifteen hundred men, and he was -thus debarred of the best of all defences, namely, frequent sallies -as the enemy neared the walls. His resolution was unshaken, but he -did not fail to remonstrate warmly with Conpigny, and even denounced -his inactivity to the Supreme Junta. That general excused himself on -the ground of Blake’s absence, the want of provisions, and the danger -of carrying the contagious sickness of Taragona into Gerona; and -finally adduced colonel Marshal’s unfortunate attempt, as proof that -due exertion had been made. Yet he could not deny that Gerona had -been invested two months, had sustained forty days of open trenches, -a bombardment and an assault without any succour, and that during -that time, he himself remained at Taragona, instead of being at -Hostalrich with all the troops he could collect. - -From the prisoners taken the French ascertained that neither Conpigny -nor Blake had any intention of coming to the relief of Gerona, until -sickness and famine, which pressed as heavily on the besiegers as -on the besieged, should have weakened the ranks of the former; and -this plan receives unqualified praise from St. Cyr, who seems to have -forgotten, that with an open breach, a town, requiring six thousand -men to man the works, and having but fifteen hundred, might fall at -any moment. - -After the failure of the assault at Monjouic, Verdier recommenced his -approaches in due form, opened galleries for a mine, and interrupted -the communication with the city by posting men in the ruins of the -little fort of St. Juan. But his operations were retarded by Claros -and Rovira, who captured a convoy of powder close to the French -frontier. To prevent a recurrence of such events, the brigade of -Souham’s division was pushed from Bañolas to St. Lorenzo de la Muja; -and, on the 2d of August, the fortified convent of St. Daniel, -situated in the valley of the Galligan, between the Constable fort -and Monjouic, was taken by the French, who thus entirely intercepted -the communication between the latter place and the city. - -On the 4th of August, the glacis of Monjouic being crowned, the -counterscarp blown in, and the flank defences ruined, the ditch -was passed, and the half moon in front of the curtain carried by -storm, but no lodgement was effected. During the day, Alvarez made -an unsuccessful effort to retake the ruins of St. Juan; and at the -same time, two hundred Spaniards who had come from the sea-coast with -provisions, and penetrated to the convent of St. Daniel, thinking -that their countrymen still held it, were made prisoners. - -On the 5th the engineers having ascertained that the northern bastion -being hollow, the troops would, after storming it, be obliged to -descend a scarp of twelve or fourteen feet, changed the line of -attack, and commenced new approaches against the eastern bastion. A -second practical breach was soon opened, and preparations made for -storming on the 12th, but in the night of the 11th, the garrison -blew up the magazines, spiked the guns, and, without loss, regained -Gerona. Thus the fort fell, after thirty-seven days of open trenches -and one assault. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -Verdier, elated by the capture of Monjouic, boasted, in his -despatches, of the difficulties that he had overcome, and they were -unquestionably great, for the rocky nature of the soil had obliged -him to raise his trenches instead of sinking them, and his approaches -had been chiefly carried on by the flying sap. But he likewise -expressed his scorn of the garrison, held their future resistance -cheap, and asserted that fifteen days would suffice to take the -town; in which he was justified neither by past nor succeeding -facts; for the Spaniards indignant at his undeserved contempt, -redoubled their exertions and falsified all his predictions; and -while these events were passing close to Gerona, Claros and Rovira, -at the head of two thousand five hundred Miguelettes, attacked -Bascara a post between Figuera and Gerona at the moment when a -convoy, escorted by a battalion had arrived there from Belgarde. -The commandant of Figueras indeed, uniting some “_gens d’armes_” -and convalescents to a detachment of his garrison, succoured the -post on the 6th; but, meanwhile, the escort of the convoy had fallen -back on France and spread such terror, that Augereau applied to St. -Cyr for three thousand men to protect the frontier. That general -refused this ill-timed demand, and, in his Memoirs, takes occasion -to censure the system of moveable columns, as more likely to create -than to suppress insurrections, as being harassing to the troops, -weakening to the main force, and yet ineffectual, seeing that the -peasantry must always be more moveable than the columns, and better -informed of their marches and strength. There is great force in -these observations, and if an army is in such bad moral discipline -that the officers commanding the columns cannot be trusted, it is -unanswerable. It must also be conceded that this system, at all times -requiring a nice judgement, great talents, and excellent arrangement, -was totally inapplicable to the situation and composition of the -seventh corps. Yet, with good officers and well combined plans, it is -difficult to conceive any more simple or efficient mode of protecting -the flanks and rear of an invading army, than that of moveable -columns supported by small fortified posts; and it is sufficient -that Napoleon was the creator of this system, to make a military man -doubtful of the soundness of St. Cyr’s objections. The emperor’s -views, opinions, and actions, will in defiance of all attempts to -lessen them, go down, with a wonderful authority to posterity. - -A few days after the affair of Bascara, eight hundred volunteers, -commanded by two officers, named Foxa and Cantera, quitted Olot, and -making a secret march through the mountains, arrived in the evening -of the 10th, upon the Ter, in front of Angeles; but being baffled in -an attempt to pass the river there, descended the left bank in the -night, pierced the line of investment, and, crossing at a ford near -St. Pons, entered Gerona at day-break. This hardy exploit gave fresh -courage to the garrison; yet the enemy’s approaches hourly advanced, -pestilence wasted the besieged, and the Spanish generals outside the -town still remained inactive. - -In this conjuncture, Alvarez and his council were not wanting to -themselves; while defending the half ruined walls of Gerona with -inflexible constancy, they failed not to remonstrate against the -cold-blooded neglect of those who should have succoured them; and -the Supreme Junta of Catalonia, forwarded their complaints to the -Central Junta at Seville, with a remarkable warmth and manliness of -expression. - -“The generals of our army,” they said, “have formed no efficient plan -for the relief of Gerona; not one of the three lieutenant-generals -here has been charged to conduct an expedition to its help; they -say that they act in conformity to a plan approved by your Majesty. -Can it be true that your Majesty approves of abandoning Gerona to -her own feeble resources! If so, her destruction is inevitable; and -should this calamity befall, will the other places of Catalonia and -the Peninsula have the courage to imitate her fidelity, when they -see her temples and houses ruined, her heroic defenders dead, or -in slavery? And if such calamities should threaten towns in other -provinces, ought they to reckon upon Catalonian assistance when -this most interesting place can obtain no help from them?”--“Do you -not see the consequences of this melancholy reflection, which is -sufficient to freeze the ardour, to desolate the hearts of the most -zealous defenders of our just cause? Let this bulwark of our frontier -be taken, and the province is laid open, our harvests, treasures, -children, ourselves, all fall to the enemy, and the country has no -longer any real existence.” - -In answer to this address, money was promised, a decree was passed to -lend Catalonia every succour, and Blake received orders to make an -immediate effort to raise the siege. How little did the language of -the Spaniards agree with their actions! Blake, indeed, as we shall -find, made a feeble effort to save the heroic and suffering city; -but the Supreme Central Junta were only intent upon thwarting and -insulting the English general, after the battle of Talavera, and this -was the moment that the Junta of Catalonia, so eloquent, so patriotic -with the pen, were selling, to foreign merchants, the arms supplied -by England for the defence of their country! - -Towards the end of August, when the French fire had opened three -breaches in Gerona, and the bombardment had reduced a great part of -the city to ashes, Blake commenced his march from Taragona with a -force of eight or ten thousand regulars. Proceeding by Martorel, El -Valles, and Granollers, he reached Vich, and from thence crossed the -mountains to St. Hillario, where he was joined by Wimphen and the -Milans; and as he had free communication with Rovira and Claros, he -could direct a body of not less than twenty thousand men against the -circle of investment. His arrival created considerable alarm among -the French. The pestilence which wasted the besieged, was also among -the besiegers, and the hospitals of Figueras and Perpignan contained -many thousand patients. The battalions in the field could scarcely -muster a third of their nominal strength. Even the generals were -obliged to rise from sick-beds to take the command of the brigades; -and the covering army, inferior in number to the Spanish force, -was extended along more than thirty miles of mountainous wooded -country, intersected by rivers, and every way favourable for Blake’s -operations. - -Verdier was filled with apprehension, lest a disastrous action should -oblige him to raise the long-protracted siege, notwithstanding his -fore-boasts to the contrary. But it was on such occasions that St. -Cyr’s best qualities were developed. A most learned and practised -soldier, and of a clear methodical head, he was firm in execution, -decided and prompt in council; and, although, apparently wanting -in those original and daring views, which mark the man of superior -genius, seems to have been perfectly fitted for struggling against -difficulties. So far from fearing an immediate battle, he observed, -“that it was to be desired, because his men were now of confirmed -courage. Blake’s inaction was the thing to be dreaded, for, -notwithstanding every effort, not more than two days provisions could -be procured, to supply the troops when together, and it would be -necessary after that period to scatter them again in such a manner, -that scarcely two thousand would be disposable at any given point. -The Spaniards had already commenced skirmishing in force on the -side of Bruñola, and as Blake expected no reinforcements, he would -probably act immediately. Hence it was necessary to concentrate as -many men as possible, in the course of the night and next day, and -deliver battle, and there were still ten thousand good troops under -arms, without reckoning those that might be spared from the investing -corps.” - -On the other hand, Blake, with an army, numerous indeed but by no -means spirited, was from frequent defeat, become cautious without -being more skilful. He resolved to confine his efforts to the -throwing supplies of men and provisions into the town; forgetting -that the business of a relieving army is not to protract, but to -raise a siege, and that to save Gerona was to save Catalonia. - -He had collected and loaded with flour, about two thousand beasts of -burthen, and placed them in the mountains, on the side of Olot, under -an escort of four thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry. Garcia -Conde, an ambitious and fiery young man of considerable promise, -undertook to conduct them to Gerona, by the flat ground between the -Ter and the Oña, precisely opposite to that of the French attack. -To facilitate this attempt, Blake caused colonel Henry O’Donnel to -fall upon Souham’s posts, near Bruñola, on the evening of the 31st of -August, supporting this attack with another detachment under general -Logoyri. At the same time he directed colonel Landen to collect the -Miguelettes and Somatenes on the side of Palamos, and take possession -of “_N. S. de los Angelos_,” a convent, situated on a high mountain -behind Monjouic. Claros and Rovira also received directions to attack -the French on the side of Casen Rocca. Thus the enemy were to be -assailed in every quarter, except that on which the convoy was to -pass. - -O’Donnel, commencing the operations, attacked and carried a part of -the position occupied by one of Souham’s battalions at Bruñola, but -the latter, with an impetuous charge, again recovered the ground. -The Spanish general, being joined by Loygori, renewed the skirmish, -but could make no further impression on the enemy. Meanwhile, St. -Cyr, having transferred his head-quarters to Fornels, was earnestly -advised to concentrate his troops on the left of the Ter, partly, -that it was thought Blake would attempt to penetrate on that side; -partly that, being so close to the Spanish army, the French divisions -might, if ordered to assemble on their actual centre, be cut off in -detail during their march. But he argued that his opponent must be -exceedingly timid, or he would have attacked Souham with all his -forces, and broken the covering line at once; and, seeing that such -an opportunity was neglected, he did not fear to concentrate his own -troops, on the Oña, by a flank march close under the beard of his -unskilful adversary. - -Souham’s division, falling back in the night, took post the 1st of -September, on the heights of San Dalmaz, reaching to Hostalnou, and -at eight o’clock, the head of Pino’s division entered this line, -prolonging it, by the left, in rear of the village of Rieudellot. At -twelve o’clock, these two divisions were established in position, -and at the distance of four miles in their rear, Verdier with a -strong detachment of the besieging corps, was placed in reserve on -the main road to Gerona. Lecchi was sick, and his troops, commanded -by Millosewitz, took post at Salt, guarding the bridge and the flat -ground about St. Eugenio; having also instructions to cross the -Ter and march against Rovira and Claros, if they should press the -Westphalian division which remained at San Pons. The trenches under -Monjouic were guarded. The mortar battery of Casa Rocca was disarmed, -and the Westphalians had orders, if attacked, to retire to Sarria, -and look to the security of the parc and the trenches. A thick -fog and heavy rain interrupted the view, and both armies remained -apparently quiet until the middle of the day, when the weather -clearing, St. Cyr rode to examine the Spanish positions; for the -heads of Blake’s columns were disposed as if he would have penetrated -at once, by Bruñola, Coloma de Farnés, Vidreras, and Mallorquinas. -Scarcely had the French general quitted Fornels, when Garcia Conde, -who, under cover of the mist had been moving down the mountains, -crossed the Ter at Amer, and decended the heights of Bañolas with his -convoy. He was now on the flat ground, where there was no other guard -than the two thousand men under Millosewitz, placed, as I have said, -at Salt to watch the garrison and the movements of Rovira and Claros; -and consequently, with their rear to the advancing convoy. - -Verdier’s reserve, the nearest support, was six miles distant, and -separated from Millosewitz by considerable heights, and the Spanish -columns, coming into the plain without meeting a single French post, -advanced unperceived close to the main body, and, with one charge, -put the whole to flight. The fugitives, in their panic, at first -took the direction of the town; but being fired upon, turned towards -the heights of Palau, made for Fornels; and would have gone straight -into Blake’s camp, if they had not met St. Cyr on his return from -viewing that general’s positions. Rallying and reinforcing them with -a battalion from Pino’s division, he instantly directed them back -again upon Salt, and at the same time sent Verdier orders to follow -Garcia Conde with the reserve; but the latter had already conducted -his convoy safely into the town. Alvarez, also, sallying forth, had -destroyed the French works near St. Ugenio, and thinking the siege -raised, had immediately sent five hundred sick men out of the town, -into the convent of St. Daniel, which place had been abandoned by the -French two days before. - -Verdier after causing some trifling loss to Conde, passed the bridge -of Salt, and marched down the left of the Ter to Sarria, to save his -parcs, which were threatened by Rovira and Claros; for when those two -Partizans skirmished with the Westphalian troops, the latter retired -across the Ter, abandoning their camp and two dismounted mortars. -Thus the place was succoured for a moment; but, as Blake made no -further movement, Alvarez was little benefitted by the success. The -provisions received, did not amount to more than seven or eight days’ -consumption; and the reinforcement, more than enough to devour the -food, was yet insufficient to raise the siege by sallies. - -While Millosewitz’s troops were flying on the one side of the Ter, -the reports of Claros and Rovira, exaggerating their success on the -other side of that river, had caused Alvarez to believe that Blake’s -army was victorious, and the French in flight. Hence, he refrained -from destroying the bridge of Salt, and Verdier, as we have seen, -crossed it to recover his camp at Sarria. But for this error, the -garrison, reinforced by Conde’s men, might have filled the trenches, -razed the batteries, and even retaken Monjouic before Verdier could -have come to their support. - -St. Cyr having but one day’s provisions left, now resolved to seek -Blake, and deliver battle; but the Spanish general retired up the -mountains, when he saw the French advancing, and his retreat enabled -St. Cyr again to disseminate the French troops. Thus ended the first -effort to relieve Gerona. It was creditable to Garcia Conde, but so -contemptible, with reference to the means at Blake’s disposal, that -Alvarez believed himself betrayed; and, trusting thenceforth only to -his own heroism, permitted Conde’s troops to go back, or to remain as -they pleased; exacting, however, from those who stopped, an oath not -to surrender. Renewing the edict against speaking of a capitulation, -he reduced the rations of the garrison first to one half, and -afterwards to a fourth of the full allowance, a measure which caused -some desertions to the enemy; but the great body of the soldiers and -citizens were as firm as their chief, and the townsmen freely sharing -their own scanty food with the garrison, made common cause in every -thing. - -Garcia Conde’s success must be attributed partly to the negligence -of St. Cyr’s subordinates; but the extended cantonments, occupied in -the evening of the 31st, gave Blake, as the French general himself -acknowledges, an opportunity of raising the siege without much -danger or difficulty: nor were St. Cyr’s dispositions for the next -day perfectly combined. It is evident that giving Blake credit for -sound views, he was himself so expectant of a great battle that he -forgot to guard against minor operations. The flat country between -the left of the Oña and the Ter was the natural line for a convoy to -penetrate to the town; hence it was a fault to leave two thousand men -in that place, with their front to the garrison, and their rear to -the relieving army, when the latter could steal through the mountains -until close upon them. Cavalry posts at least should have been -established at the different inlets to the hills, and beacons raised -on convenient eminences. The main body of the army appears also to -have been at too great a distance from the town; the firing that took -place in the plain of Salt was disregarded by Verdier’s reserve; and -the first information of the attack was brought to Fornels by the -fugitives themselves. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr’s Journal of Operations.] - -St. Cyr says that his generals of division were negligent, and so -weakened by sickness as to be unable to look to their outposts; that -he had recommended to Verdier the raising of field-works at the -bridge of Salt and in the passes of the hills, and, when his advice -was disregarded, forbore, from the peculiar situation in which he -himself was placed by the French government, to enforce his undoubted -authority. But St. Cyr avows that his soldiers answered honestly to -every call he made; and he was bound, while he retained the command, -to enforce every measure necessary for maintaining their honour. In -other respects, his prudence and vigilance were such as beseemed -his great reputation. It was not so with Blake. The whole of his -operations proved that he had lost confidence, and was incapable of -any great enterprize. He should have come up with a resolution to -raise the siege or to perish. He contented himself with a few slight -skirmishes, and the introduction of a small convoy of provisions; and -then notwithstanding the deep suffering of this noble city, turned -away, with a cold look, and a donation that mocked its wants. - -When the siege was resumed, St. Cyr withdrew the French posts from -Palau and Monte Livio, leaving the way apparently open on that side, -for the return of Garcia Conde, who, deceived by this wile came out -at daybreak on the 3d of September, with fifteen hundred men and the -beasts of burthen. Halting, for a little time, just beyond the gate, -he examined the country in front with his glass; every thing appeared -favourable and his troops were beginning to move forward, when the -noise of drums beating to arms gave notice that an ambuscade was -placed behind Palau. St. Cyr had, indeed, posted a brigade there in -the hope of surprising the Spaniards, but the French forgetting the -ambush, were performing the regular service of the camp at day-light, -and a cry of astonishment burst from the Spanish column as it hastily -retreated again into the town. - -Baffled by this ridiculous mistake, and concluding that the next -attempt would be by Castellar and La Bispal, St. Cyr placed -Mazzuchelli’s brigade (the same that had been behind Palau) in the -valley of the Oña in such a manner that it could fall upon Conde’s -rear when the latter should again come forth. He also put a battalion -on the hills in a position to head the Spanish column, and drive it -back either upon Mazzuchelli’s brigade or upon La Bispal, where he -also posted three battalions and a squadron of Pino’s division. - -The 4th of September one thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, -and eleven hundred mules again came out of Gerona, and ascending -the heights in which the fort of the Capuchin was situated, pushed -in single files along a by-path, leading to Castellar da Selva. -Mazzuchelli saw them plainly, but did not attack, waiting for the -fire of the battalion ahead, and that battalion did not fire because -Mazzuchelli did not attack, and it was supposed the Spaniards were -part of his brigade. Garcia Conde quickly perceived their double -error, and with great readiness filing off to his left, turned the -right of the battalion in his front, and gained Castellar without -hurt, although the French in Monjouic observing all that passed, -played their guns upon the rear of his column. Being informed by the -peasants at Castellar, that troops were also waiting for him at La -Bispal, he made for Caza de Selva, and General Pino having notice of -his approach, directed two battalions to seize the summit of a ridge -which crossed the Spanish line of march, but the battalions took a -wrong direction; the Spaniards moved steadily on, and although their -rear was attacked by Pino’s personal escort, and that fifty men and -some mules were captured, the main body escaped with honour. - -There were now four open breaches in Gerona; Mazzuchelli’s brigade -and the troops at La Bispal were added to the investing corps, and -the immediate fall of the city seemed inevitable, when the French -store of powder failed, and ten days elapsed before a fresh supply -could be obtained. Alvarez profitted of this cessation, to retrench -and barricade the breaches in the most formidable manner. Verdier -had retaken the convent of St. Daniel in the valley of Galligan, -and obliged the five hundred sick men to return to the town on the -4th; but Landen, the officer sent by Blake, on the 31st of August, -to seize the convent of _Madona de los Angeles_, had fortified that -building, and introduced small supplies of provisions; thus reviving, -in the mind of Alvarez, a plan for taking possession of the heights -beyond those on which the Capuchin and Constable forts were situated, -by which, in conjunction with the post at Madona de los Angeles, and -with the assistance of Blake’s army, he hoped to maintain an open -communication with the country. A bold and skilful conception, but -he was unable to effect it; for making a sally from the Capuchins on -the 6th with eighteen hundred men, he was beaten by a single French -regiment; and the same day Mazzuchelli’s Italians stormed Madona de -los Angeles, and put the garrison to the sword. - -During these events, Verdier marched against Claros and Rovira who -were posted at St. Gregorio, near Amer. He was repulsed with loss, -and the French general Joba was killed. Meanwhile the batteries -having recommenced their fire on the 13th, Alvarez made a general -sally, by the gates of San Pedro, beat the guards from the trenches, -and spiked the guns in one of the breaching batteries. The 18th, -however, Verdier thinking the breaches practicable, proposed to give -the assault, and required assistance from St. Cyr, but disputes -between the generals of the covering and the investing forces were -rife. The engineers of the latter declared the breaches practicable, -those of the former asserted that they were not, and that while -the fort of Calvary, outside the walls, although in ruins was in -possession of the Spaniards, no assault should be attempted. - -Either from negligence, or the disputes between St. Cyr and Augereau, -above five thousand convalescents capable of duty were retained in -a body at Perpignan, and Verdier could not produce so many under -arms for the assault, nor even for this number were there officers -to lead, so wasting was the sickness. The covering army was scarcely -better off, and Blake had again taken the position of St. Hilario. -Howbeit, St. Cyr, seeing no better remedy, consented to try the storm -provided Calvary were first taken. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr’s Journal of Operations] - -Souham’s division was appointed to watch Blake, Pino was directed to -make a false attack on the opposite quarter to where the breaches -were established, and, on the 19th, Verdier’s troops, in three -columns, advanced rapidly down the valley of Galligan to the assault. -But the fort of Calvary had not been taken, and its fire swept the -columns of attack along the whole line of march. Two hundred men fell -before they reached the walls, and just as the summit of the largest -breach was gained, the French batteries, which continued to play on -the Spanish retrenchments, brought down a large mass of wall upon the -head of the attacking column. The besieged resisted manfully, and -the besiegers were completely repulsed from all the breaches with a -loss of six hundred men. Verdier accused his soldiers of cowardice, -and blamed St. Cyr for refusing to bring the covering troops to -the assault; but that general, asserting that the men behaved -perfectly well, called a council of war, and proposed to continue -the operations with as much vigour as the nature of the case would -permit. His persevering spirit was not partaken by the council, and -the siege was turned into a blockade. - -Blake now advanced with his army, and from the 20th to the 25th, -made as if he would raise the blockade; but his object was merely -to introduce another convoy. St. Cyr, divining his intention and -judging that he would make the attempt on the 26th, resolved to let -him penetrate the covering line, and then fall on him before he could -reach the town. In this view, Souham’s division was placed behind -Palau and Pino’s division at Casa de Selva, and Lecchi’s division of -the investing troops, was directed to meet the Spaniards in front, -while the two former came down upon their rear. - -Blake assembled his troops on the side of Hostalrich, then made a -circuitous route to La Bispal, and, taking post on the heights of -St. Sadurni, detached ten thousand men, under Wimphen, to protect -the passage of the convoy, of which Henry O’Donnel led the advanced -guard. At day-break, on the 26th, O’Donnel fell upon the rear of -the French troops at Castellar, broke through them, and reached -the fort of the Constable with the head of the convoy; but the two -French battalions which he had driven before him, rallying on the -heights of San Miguel to the right of the Spanish column, returned -to the combat, and at the same time St. Cyr in person, with a part -of Souham’s division came upon the left flank of the convoy, and, -pressing it strongly, obliged the greater part to retrograde. -When Pino’s division, running up from Casa de Selva, attacked the -rear-guard under Wimphen, the route was complete, and Blake made -no effort to save the distressed troops. O’Donnel with a thousand -men and about two hundred mules got safely into the town, but the -remainder of the convoy was taken. The Italians gave no quarter and -three thousand of the Spaniards were slain. - -After this action, some troops being sent towards Vidreras, to menace -Blake’s communications with Hostalrich, he retired by the side of St. -Filieu de Quixols, and Gerona was again abandoned to her sufferings -which were become almost insupportable. Without money, without -medicines, without food; pestilence within the walls, the breaches -open. “If,” said Alvarez, “the captain-general be unable to make a -vigorous effort, the whole of Catalonia must rise to our aid, or -Gerona will soon be but a heap of carcases and ruins, the memory of -which will afflict posterity!” - -St. Cyr now repaired to Perpignan to make arrangements for future -supply, but finding Augereau in a good state of health, obliged that -marshal to assume the command. Then, he says, every thing needful -was bestowed with a free hand upon the seventh corps, because he -himself was no longer in the way; but a better reason is to be found -in the state of Napoleon’s affairs. Peace had been concluded with -Austria, the English expeditions to the Scheldt and against Naples -had failed, and all the resources of the French government becoming -disposable, not only the seventh, but every “corps d’armée” in Spain -was reinforced. - -Augereau, escorted by the five thousand convalescents from Perpignan, -reached the camp before Gerona, the 12th of October. In the course -of the following night, O’Donnel, issuing from the town, on the side -of the plain, broke through the guards, fell upon Souham’s quarters, -obliged that general to fly in his shirt, and finally effected a -junction with Milans, at Santa Coloma; having successfully executed -as daring an enterprise as any performed during this memorable -siege. Augereau, however, pressed the blockade, and thinking the -spirit of the Spaniards reduced, offered an armistice for a month, -with the free entry of provisions, if Alvarez would promise to -surrender unless relieved before the expiration of that period. Such, -however, was the steady virtue of this man and his followers, that, -notwithstanding the grievous famine, the offer was refused. - -Blake, on the 29th of October took possession once more of the -heights of Bruñola. Souham, with an inferior force put him to -flight, and this enabled Augereau to detach Pino against the town of -Hostalrich, which was fortified with an old wall and towers, defended -by two thousand men, and supported by the fire of the castle. It -was carried by storm, and the provisions and stores laid up there -captured, although Blake, with his army, was only a few miles off. -This disaster was however, more than balanced by an action off the -coast. Rear-admiral Baudin, with a French squadron, consisting of -three ships of the line, two frigates, and sixteen large store-ships, -having sailed from Toulon for Barcelona, about the 20th of October, -was intercepted by admiral Martin on the 23d. During the chase -several of the smaller vessels were burnt by the enemy, the rest -were driven on shore at different places, and two of the line of -battle ships were set on fire by their own crews. The store-ships and -some of the armed vessels, taking refuge at Rosas, put up boarding -nettings, and protecting their flanks by Rosas and the Trinity-fort, -presented a formidable front, having above twenty guns on board -disposed for defence, besides the shore batteries. On the 31st of -November however, captain Hallowell appeared in the bay with a -squadron; and the same evening, sending his boats in, destroyed the -whole fleet, in despite of a very vigorous resistance which cost the -British seventy men killed and wounded. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 2._ - - SIEGE of GERONA - 1810. - - _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] - -Meanwhile the distress of Gerona increased, desertions became -frequent, and ten officers having failed in a plot to oblige the -governor to capitulate, went over in a body to the enemy. During -November, famine and sickness increased within the city, and the -French stores of powder were again exhausted; but on the 6th of -December, ammunition having arrived, the suburb of Marina, that of -Girondella, the fort of Calvary, and all the other towers beyond the -walls, were carried by the besiegers; and the besieged, confined -to the circuit of the walls, were cut off from the Capuchin and -Constable forts. Alvarez, who had been ill for some days, roused -himself for a last effort; and, making a general sally, on the 7th, -retook the suburb of Girondella and the redoubts; and opening a way -to the outworks of the Constable, carried off the garrison. The next -day, overcome by suffering, he became delirious. A council of war -assembled, and after six months of open trenches, Gerona yielded -on the 10th. The garrison marched out with the honours of war, the -troops were to be exchanged in due course, the inhabitants were to -be respected, and none but soldiers were to be considered prisoners. -Such was the termination of a defence which eclipsed the glory of -Zaragoza. - -French and Spanish writers alike, affirm that Augereau treated -Alvarez with a rigour and contumely that excited every person’s -indignation; and that, in violation of the capitulation, the monks -were, by an especial order of Napoleon, sent to France. This last -accusation admits, however, of dispute; the monks had during the -siege, formed themselves into a regular corps, named the Crusaders; -they were disciplined and clothed in a sort of uniform; and being -to all intents soldiers, it can hardly be said, that to constitute -them prisoners, was a violation, although it was undoubtedly a harsh -interpretation of the terms. - -Alvarez died at Figueras in his way to France; but so long as virtue -and courage are esteemed in the world, his name will be held in -veneration; and if Augereau forgot what was due to this gallant -Spaniard’s merit, posterity will not forget to do justice to both. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. In this siege, the constancy with which the Geronans bore the -most terrible sufferings accounts for the protracted resistance; -but constancy alone could not have enabled them to defy the regular -progress of the engineer; as I have before observed, the combinations -of science are not to be defied with impunity. But the French -combinations were not scientific; and this, saving the right of -Gerona to the glory she earned so hardly, was the secret of the -defence. - -2º. General St. Cyr, after observing that the attack on Montjouic was -ill judged and worse executed, says, “The principal approaches should -have been conducted against the Marcadel, because the soil there, was -easy to work in, full of natural hollows and clifts, and the defences -open in flank and rear to batteries on the Monte Livio and the -Casen Rocca. Whereas on the side of Montjouic, the approaches, from -the rocky nature of the soil, could only be carried forward by the -flying sap, with great loss and difficulty.” If however, the Marcadel -had fallen, the greatest part of the city would still have been -covered by the Oña, and Montjouic, and the forts of the Constable -and Capuchin, (regular places complete in themselves,) would have -remained to be taken, unless it can be supposed, that a governor who -defended the feeble walls of the town after those outworks fell, -would have surrendered all, because a lodgement was made in an -isolated quarter. These things are, however, ordinarily doubtful; -and certainly, it must always be a great matter with a general, to -raise the moral confidence of his own army, or to sink that of his -adversary, even though it should be by a momentary and illusive -success. - -3º. The faulty execution of the attack on Montjouic is less doubtful -than the choice of direction. The cessation of the breaching fire for -four days previous to the assault, and the disregard of the rules -of art already noticed, amply account for failure; and it is to be -observed, that this failure caused the delay of a whole month in the -progress of the siege; that during that month disease invaded the -army, and the soldiers, as they will be found to do in all protracted -operations, became careless and disinclined to the labours of the -trenches. - -4º. The assault on the body of the place was not better conducted -than that against Montjouic; and considering these facts, together -with the jealousy and disputes between the generals, the mixture of -Germans, Italians, and French in the army, and the mal-administration -of the hospitals, by which so many men were lost, and so many more -kept from their duty, it is rather surprising that Gerona was taken -at all. - -5º. The foregoing conclusions in no wise affect the merits of the -besieged, because the difficulties and errors of their adversaries -only prolonged their misery. They fought bravely; they endured -unheard of sufferings with constancy; and their refusal to accept -the armistice offered by Augereau, is as noble and affecting an -instance of virtue as any that history has recorded. Yet how mixed -are good and evil principles in man; how dependent upon accidental -circumstances is the development of his noble or base qualities! -Alvarez, so magnanimous, so firm, so brave, so patriotic at Gerona, -was the same Alvarez who, one year before, surrendered the Barcelona -Montjouic, on the insolent summons of Duhesme! At that period, the -influence of a base court, degraded public feeling, and what was weak -in his character came to the surface; but in times more congenial to -virtuous sentiments, all the nobility of the man’s nature broke forth. - -6º. When the siege of Gerona is contrasted with that of Zaragoza, -it may shake the opinion of those who regard the wild hostility of -the multitude as superior to the regulated warfare of soldiers. -The number of enemies that came against the latter was rather less -than those who came against the former city. The regular garrison -of Zaragoza was above thirty thousand; that of Gerona about three -thousand. The armed multitude, in the one, amounted to at least -twenty-five thousand; in the other, they were less than six thousand. -Cruelty and murder marked every step in the defence of Zaragoza; -the most horrible crimes were necessary to prolong the resistance, -above forty thousand persons perished miserably, and the town was -taken within three months. In Gerona there was nothing to blush -for; the fighting was more successful; the actual loss inflicted -upon the enemy greater; the suffering within the walls neither -wantonly produced nor useless; the period of its resistance doubled -that of Zaragoza; and every proceeding tended to raise instead of -sinking the dignity of human nature. There was less of brutal rule, -more of reason, and consequently more real heroism, more success at -the moment, and a better example given to excite the emulation of -generous men. - -7º. With reference to the general posture of affairs, the fall of -Gerona was a reproach to the Spanish and English cabinets. The latter -having agents in Catalonia, and such a man as lord Collingwood in -the Mediterranean, to refer to, were yet so ignorant, or so careless -of what was essential to the success of the war, as to let Gerona -struggle for six months, when half the troops employed by sir John -Stuart to alarm Naples, if carried to the coast of Catalonia, and -landed at Palamos, would have raised the siege. It was not necessary -that this army should have been equipped for a campaign, a single -march would have effected the object. An engineer and a few thousand -pounds would have rendered Palamos a formidable post; and that place -being occupied by English troops, and supported by a fleet, greater -means than the French could have collected in 1809, would not have -reduced Gerona. The Catalans, indeed, were not more tractable nor -more disposed than others to act cordially with their allies; but -the natural sterility of the country, the condensed manufacturing -population, the number of strong posts and large fortified towns in -their possession, and, above all, the long and difficult lines of -communication which the French must have guarded for the passage of -their convoys, would have rendered the invaders’ task most difficult. - -8º. From the commencement of the Spanish insurrection, the policy -of the Valencians had been characterised by a singular indifference -to the calamities that overwhelmed the other parts of Spain. The -local Junta in that province, not content with asserting their own -exclusive authority, imagined that it was possible to maintain -Valencia independent, even though the rest of the Peninsula should -be conquered. Hence the siege of Zaragoza passed unheeded, and the -suffering of Gerona made no impression on them. With a regular -army of above ten thousand men, more than thirty thousand armed -irregulars, and a large fleet at Carthagena, the governors of this -rich province, so admirably situated for offensive operations, never -even placed the fortified towns of their own frontier in a state of -defence, and carelessly beheld the seventh and third corps gradually -establishing, at the distance of a few days’ march from Valencia -itself, two solid bases for further invasion! But it is now time to -revert to the operations of the “_Central Supreme Junta_,” that it -may be fully understood how the patriotism, the constancy, the lives, -and the fortunes of the Spanish people were sported with by those who -had so unhappily acquired a momentary power in the Peninsula. - - - - -CHAP. IV. - - -When sir Arthur Wellesley retired to the frontier of Portugal, the -calumnies propagated in Andalusia, relative to the cause of that -movement, were so far successful that no open revolt took place; but -the public hatred being little diminished, a design was formed to -establish a better government, as a preliminary to which, measures -were secretly taken to seize the members of the Junta, and transport -them to Manilla. The old Junta of Seville being the chief movers of -this sedition, no good could be expected from the change, otherwise, -such an explosion, although sure to be attended with slaughter and -temporary confusion, was not unlikely to prove advantageous to the -nation at large, it being quite obvious that some violent remedy was -wanting to purge off the complicated disorders of the state. - -“_Spain_,” said lord Wellesley, “_has proved untrue to our alliance, -because she is untrue to herself._”--“_Until some great change shall -be effected in the conduct of the military resources of Spain, and -in the state of her armies, no British army can attempt safely to -co-operate with Spanish troops in the territories of Spain.”--“No -alliance can protect her from the results of internal disorders and -national infirmity._” - -This evident discontent of the British ambassador led the -conspirators to impart their designs to him, in the hopes of -assistance; but he being accredited to the existing government, -apprised it of the danger, concealing, however, with due regard -to humanity, the names of those engaged in the plot. The Junta, in -great alarm, immediately sought to mitigate the general hatred; -but still averse to sacrificing any power, projected a counter -scheme. They had, for the public good according to some, for private -emolument according to others, hitherto permitted trading, under -licenses, with the towns occupied by the enemy. This regulation -and some peculiarly-heavy exactions they now rescinded, and, as a -final measure of conciliation, appointed, with many protestations of -patriotism, commissioners to prepare a scheme of government which -should serve until the fit period for convoking the Cortes arrived. - -But the commissioners, principally chosen from amongst the members -of the Junta, soon made manifest the real designs of that body. They -proposed that five persons should form a supreme executive council, -every member of the existing Junta, in rotation, to have a place; -the colonies to be represented as an integral part of the empire; -and the council so composed, to rule until the Cortes should meet, -and then to preside in that assembly. Thus under the pretence of -resigning their power, by a simple change of form, the present and -the future authority of the Junta were to be confirmed, and even the -proposal, in favour of the colonies, was, following the opinion of -lord Wellesley, a mere expedient to obtain a momentary popularity, -and entirely unconnected with enlarged or liberal views of policy and -government. - -[Sidenote: Vol. II. p. 348.] - -This project was foiled by Romana, who, being of the commission, -dissented from his colleagues; and it was on this occasion that -he drew up that accusatory paper, quoted in another part of this -history, and the bad acts therein specified, although sufficiently -heinous, were not the only charges made at this period. It was -objected to some amongst the Junta, that having as merchants, -contracted for supplying the army, they in their public capacity, -raised the price to be paid by the treasury for the articles; and -that the members generally were venal in their patronage, difficult -of access, and insolent of demeanour. - -Romana proposed a council of regency, to be composed of five persons, -not members of the Junta. This council to be assisted by a fresh -chosen Junta, also composed of five members and a procurator-general, -and to be stiled “_The Permanent Deputation of the Realm_.” One of -this body to be a South American, and the whole to represent the -Cortes, until the meeting of that assembly, which, he thought, could -not be too soon. His plan, introduced by misplaced declarations in -favour of arbitrary power, and terminated by others equally strong -in favour of civil liberty, was not well considered. The “_Permanent -Deputation_,” being to represent the Cortes, it was obvious that it -must possess the right of controlling the Regency; but the numbers -and dignity of both being equal, and their interests opposed, it -was as obvious that a struggle would commence, in which the latter, -having the sole distribution of honours and emoluments, could not -fail to conquer, and no Cortes would be assembled. - -Some time before this, when the terror caused by sir Arthur -Wellesley’s retreat from Spain, was fresh, Don Martin de Garay -had applied to lord Wellesley for advice, as to the best form of -government, and that nobleman also recommended a “_Council of -Regency_,” and, like Romana, proposed a second council; but with -this essential difference, that the latter were only to arrange the -details for electing the members of Cortes, a proclamation for the -convocation of which was to be immediately published, together with -a list of grievances, “_a Bill of Rights_” founded on an enlarged -conciliatory policy and having equal regard for the interests of -the colonies as for those of the mother country. Garay approved of -this advice while danger menaced the Junta; but when the arrangement -for the command of the armies had been completed, and the first -excitement had subsided, his solicitude for the improvement of the -government ceased. It must, however, be acknowledged, that lord -Wellesley, condemned the existing system, as much for its democratic -form as for its inefficiency; because the English cabinet never -forgot, that they were the champions of privilege, nor, that the war -was essentially, less for the defence of Spain, than the upholding of -the aristocratic system of Europe. - -To evade Romana’s proposition, the Junta, on the 28th of October, -announced that the National Cortes should be convoked on the 1st -of January, 1810, and assembled for business on the 1st of March -following. Having thus, in some measure, met the public wishes, they -joined to this announcement a virulent attack on the project of a -Regency, affirming, and not without some foundation as regarded -Romana’s plan, that such a government would disgust the colonies, -trample on the king’s rights, and would never assemble the Cortes; -moreover that it would soon be corrupted by the French. Then -enlarging on their own merits in a turgid declamatory style, they -defended their past conduct by a tissue of misrepresentations, which -deceived nobody; for, to use the words of lord Wellesley, “_no plan -had been adopted for any effectual redress of grievances, correction -of abuses or relief from exactions, and the administration of -justice, the regulation of revenue, finance, commerce, the security -of persons and property, and every other great branch of government, -were as defective as the military establishments_.” - -However, the promise of assembling the Cortes sufficed to lull -the public wrath; and the Junta resolved to recommence offensive -military operations, which they fondly imagined would, at once, crush -the enemy, and firmly establish their own popularity and power. -They were encouraged by a false, but general impression throughout -Andalusia, that Austria had broken off negotiations with France; and -in September and October, fresh levies, raised in Estremadura and -Andalusia, were incorporated with the remains of Cuesta’s old army; -the whole forming a body of more than sixty thousand soldiers, of -which nearly ten thousand were cavalry. Nor was the assembling and -equipment of this force a matter of great difficulty; for owing to -the feeble resistance made against the invaders, the war had hitherto -drawn so little on the population, that the poorer sort never evaded -a call for personal service; and the enormous accumulation of English -stores and money at Cadiz and Seville, were sufficient for every -exigency. - -In October Eguia advanced with this army a short way into La Mancha; -but when the French, unwilling to lose the resources of that fertile -province made a movement towards him, he regained the Sierra Morena -on the 16th, taking post, first at St. Elena, and finally at La -Carolina. The first and fourth corps then occupied the whole of La -Mancha, with advanced posts at the foot of the mountains; the second -and fifth corps were established in the valley of the Tagus and at -Toledo; and the reserve at Madrid. During these movements, Bassecour, -who commanded in Estremadura, detached eight hundred horsemen to -reinforce the duke Del Parque, and quartered the rest of his forces -behind the Guadiana. Thus in the latter end of October, there were -sixty thousand men, under Eguia, covering Seville by the line of La -Mancha; ten thousand under Bassecour on the line of Estremadura, and -about six thousand employed as guards to the Junta and in the service -of the depôts behind the Morena. - -[Sidenote: See Vol. II. p. 427.] - -In the north, the Spanish army of the left was concentrated near -Ciudad Rodrigo. For when Beresford marched down the Portuguese -frontier to the Tagus, the duke Del Parque, reinforced with the eight -hundred cavalry from Estremadura, and with the Gallician divisions -of Mendizabel and Carrera, (amounting to thirteen thousand men, -completely equipped from English stores, brought out to Coruña in -July,) made a movement into the rugged country, about the Sierra de -Francia, and sent his scouting parties as far as Baños. At the same -time general Santocildes, marching from Lugo with two thousand men, -took possession of Astorga, and menaced the rear of the sixth corps, -which after forcing the pass of Baños, had been quartered between the -Tormes and the Esla. In this situation, a French detachment attempted -to surprise one of the gates of Astorga, on the 9th of October, -and, being repulsed, returned to their cantonments. Soon afterwards -Ballasteros, having again collected about eight thousand men in the -Asturias, armed and equipped them from English stores, and, coming -down to Astorga, crossed the Esla, and attempted to storm Zamora. -Failing in this, he entered Portugal by the road of Miranda, and from -thence proceeded to join the duke Del Parque. Thus the old armies -of Gallicia and the Asturias being broken up, those provinces were -ordered to raise fresh forces; but there was in Gallicia a general -disposition to resist the authority of the Central Junta. - -Del Parque, eager to act against the sixth corps, demanded, through -Perez Castro the Spanish envoy at Lisbon, that the Portuguese army -should join him; but this being referred to sir Arthur Wellesley, he -gave it a decided negative, grounding his refusal upon reasons which -I shall insert at large, as giving a clear and interesting view of -the military state of affairs at this period. - -[Sidenote: Letter from Sir A. Wellesley, Sept. 23, 1809. MS.] - -“The enemy, he said, were superior to the allies, including those -which Beresford might bring into the field, not only in numbers, but -(adverting to the composition of the Spanish armies, the want of -cavalry in some, of artillery in others, of clothing, ammunition, and -arms, and the deficiency of discipline in all) superior in efficiency -even to a greater degree than in numbers. These circumstances, and -the absolute deficiency in means, were the causes why, after a great -victory at Talavera, the armies had been obliged to recur to the -defensive, and nothing had altered for the better since. - -“But, besides these considerations, the enemy enjoyed peculiar -advantages from his central position, which enabled him to frustrate -the duke Del Parque’s intended operations. He could march a part, or -the whole of his forces to any quarter, whereas the operation of the -different corps of the allies must necessarily be isolated, and each -for a time exposed to defeat. Thus there was nothing to prevent the -enemy from throwing himself upon the duke Del Parque and Beresford, -with the whole corps of Ney, which was at Salamanca, of Soult, -which was at Plasencia, and with the force under Kellerman, which -was near Valladolid, in which case, even if he, sir Arthur, had the -inclination, he had not the means of marching in time to save them -from destruction. - -“In the same manner the British army, if it took an advanced -position, would be liable to a fatal disaster; so likewise would -the Spanish army of La Mancha. It followed, then, that if any one -of these armies made a forward movement, the whole must co-operate, -or the single force in activity would be ruined; but the relative -efficiency and strength of the hostile forces, as laid down in the -commencement of the argument, forbad a general co-operation with -any hopes of solid success; and the only consequence that could -follow would be, that, after a battle or two, some brilliant actions -performed by a part, and some defeats sustained by others, and after -the loss of many valuable officers and soldiers, the allies would be -forced again to resume those defensive positions, which they ought -never to have quitted. - -“Satisfied that this was the only just view of affairs, he, although -prepared to make an effort to prevent Ciudad Rodrigo from falling -into the enemy’s hands, was resolved not to give the duke Del Parque -any assistance to maintain his former position, and he advised the -Portuguese government, not to risk Bereford’s army in a situation -which could only lead to mischief. The proposed operation of the -duke Del Parque was not the mode to save Ciudad Rodrigo. The only -effectual one was to post himself in such a situation as that the -enemy could not attack and defeat him without a long previous -preparation, which would give time for aid to arrive, and a march, -in which the enemy himself might be exposed to defeat. To expose -those troops to defeat which were ultimately to co-operate in defence -of Ciudad Rodrigo, was not the way of preventing the success of an -attempt of that fortress. The best way was to place the Spanish -force in such a post that it could not be attacked without risk -to the enemy, and from whence it could easily co-operate with the -other corps, which must be put in motion, if Ciudad was to be saved; -and although he would not take upon himself to point out the exact -position which the duke Del Parque ought to occupy, he was certain -that, in his present forward one, although joined by Beresford, he -could not avoid defeat. Ciudad Rodrigo would be lost, and other -misfortunes would follow, none of which could occur under any other -probable, or even possible concurrence of circumstances. In fine, -that he had long been of opinion that the war must necessarily be -defensive on the part of the allies, and that Portugal at least, if -not Spain, ought to avail herself of the short period, which the -enemy seemed disposed to leave her in tranquillity, to organize, -and equip, and discipline her armies. Those objects could not be -accomplished, unless the troops were kept quiet, and yet they were -much more important to all parties, than any desultory successful -operations against the French troops about Salamanca; but any success -was doubtful, and certain to be temporary, because the enemy would -immediately collect in numbers sufficient to crush the allies, who -must then return, having failed in their object, lost a number of -men, and, what was worse, time, which would have been more usefully -employed in preparing for a great and well combined effort.” - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence with Don M. Forjas, -October 19, 1809. MSS.] - -This reasoning, solid, clear, convincing, made no impression upon the -Spanish Junta or their general. Castro replied to it, by demanding a -positive and definitive answer, as to when the Portuguese army would -be in a condition to co-operate with the Spaniards in the Spanish -territories. “_When there is a Spanish army with which the Portuguese -can co-operate on some defined plan, which all parties will have -the means, and will engage to carry into execution, as far as any -person can engage to carry into execution a military operation._” -“_When means shall be pointed out, and fixed, for the subsistence of -the Portuguese troops while they remain in Spain, so that they may -not starve, and be obliged to retire for want of food, as was the -case when lately in that country._” “_When decided answers shall be -given upon those points, I shall be enabled to tell the governors -of Portugal that their excellencies have an army in a state to be -sent into Spain._” This was sir Arthur’s reply, which ended the -negotiation, and the duke Del Parque commenced operations by himself. - -To favour the junction of Ballasteros, his first movement was towards -Ledesma. General Marchand immediately drew together, at Salamanca, -eleven thousand men and fourteen guns, and marched to meet him. -Thereupon, the duke, without having effected his junction, fell -back to Tamames; taking post half-way up a mountain of remarkable -strength, where he awaited the enemy, with a thousand cavalry and -twenty thousand infantry, of which the Gallicians only could be -accounted experienced soldiers. - - -BATTLE OF TAMAMES. - -General Losada commanded the Spanish right, count Belvidere the -reserve, Martin Carrera the left, which being on the most accessible -part of the mountain was covered and flanked by the cavalry. -Marchand, desirous of fighting before Ballasteros could arrive, -moved rapidly, reached the foot of the mountain early on the 18th of -October, and immediately fell upon Del Parque’s left. The Spanish -cavalry fled rather hastily; the French horsemen followed closely, -the infantry surprised in the midst of an evolution, were thrown -into disorder, and the artillery was taken. Carrera, Mendizabel, and -the duke, rallied the troops on the higher ground, reinforced them -from the reserve, and coming down with a fresh impetus, recovered -the guns, and discomfitted the French with the loss of an eagle, one -cannon, and several hundred men. During this brilliant combat on -the left, the right and centre were felt by the French skirmishers; -but the ground was too strong to make any impression. Marchand, -seeing his men repulsed in all quarters with loss, and fearing to -be enclosed by Ballasteros in that disordered state, retreated to -Salamanca. - -Del Parque did not venture to follow up his victory until the 21st, -when, being joined by Ballasteros, he pushed with nearly thirty -thousand men for Ledesma; crossed the Tormes there on the 23d, turned -Salamanca by a night march, and early in the morning of the 24th -crowned the heights of San Cristoval in rear of that city, hoping to -cut off Marchand’s retreat. But that general had timely information, -and was already at Toro, behind the Douro. Meanwhile, the news of the -defeat at Tamames reached Madrid, Dessolle’s division was detached -through the Puerto Pico to reinforce the sixth corps; and Kellerman -was directed to advance from Valladolid, and take the command of the -whole. - -When the duke Del Parque heard of this reinforcement, he fell back, -not to Ciudad Rodrigo, but by the way of Alba de Tormes to Bejar, -which latter place he reached on the 8th of November. And while -these events were taking place in Castile, the Central Junta having -finally concocted their schemes, were commencing an enterprise of -unparalleled rashness on the side of La Mancha. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -In the arrangement of warlike affairs, difficulties being always -overlooked by the Spaniards, they are carried on from one phantasy -to another so swiftly, that the first conception of an enterprise is -immediately followed by a confident anticipation of complete success, -which continues until the hour of battle; and then when it might be -of use, generally abandons them. Now the Central Junta having, to -deceive the people, affirmed that sir Arthur Wellesley retreated to -the frontiers of Portugal at the very moment when the French might -have been driven to the Pyrenees, came very soon to believe this -their own absurd calumny, and resolved to send the army at Carolina -headlong against Madrid: nay, such was their pitch of confidence, -that forenaming the civil and military authorities, they arranged a -provisionary system for the future administration of the capital, -with a care, that they denied to the army which was to put them in -possession. - -Eguia was considered unfit to conduct this enterprise, and -Albuquerque was distasteful to the Junta; wherefore, casting their -eyes upon general Areizaga, they chose him, whose only recommendation -was, that, at the petty battle of Alcanitz, Blake had noticed his -courage. He was then at Lerida, but reached La Carolina in the latter -end of October; and being of a quick lively turn, and as confident as -the Junta could desire, readily undertook to drive the French from -Madrid. - -This movement was to commence early in November, and at first, only -Villa Campa, with the bands from Aragon, were to assist. But when -Areizaga, after meeting the enemy, began to lose confidence, the -duke of Albuquerque, successor to Bassecour in Estremadura, received -instructions to cause a diversion, by marching on Arzobispo and -Talavera de la Reyna. The duke Del Parque, coming by the pass of -Baños, was to join him there; and thus nearly ninety thousand men -were to be put in motion against Madrid, but precisely on that plan -which sir Arthur Wellesley had just denounced as certain to prove -disastrous. Indeed, every chance was so much in favour of the French, -that taking into consideration the solid reasons for remaining on -the defensive, Areizaga’s irruption may be regarded as an extreme -example of military rashness; and the project of uniting Del Parque’s -forces with Albuquerque’s, at Talavera, was also certain to fail; -because, the enemy’s masses were already in possession of the point -of junction, and the sixth corps could fall on Del Parque’s rear. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 1.] - -Partly to deceive the enemy, partly because they would never admit -of any opposition to a favourite scheme, the Junta spread a report -that the British army was to co-operate; and permitted Areizaga to -march, under the impression that it was so. Yet nothing could be more -untrue. Sir Arthur Wellesley being at this period at Seville, held -repeated conversations with the Spanish ministers and the members of -the Junta, and reiterating all his former objections to offensive -operations, warned his auditors that the project in question was -peculiarly ill-judged, and would end in the destruction of their -army. The Spanish ministers, far from attending to his advice, did -not even _officially inform him of Areizaga’s march until the 18th of -November_, the very day before the fatal termination of the campaign. -Yet, on _the 16th they had repeated their demand for assistance_, and -with a vehemence, deaf to reason, required that the British should -instantly co-operate with Albuquerque and Del Parque’s forces. Sir -Arthur, firm to his first views, never gave the slightest hopes that -his army would so act; and he assured the Junta, that the diversion -proposed would have no effect whatever. - - -OPERATIONS IN LA MANCHA. - -Areizaga, after publishing an address to the troops on the 3d of -November, commenced his march from La Carolina, with sixty pieces -of artillery, and from fifty to sixty thousand men, of which about -eight thousand were cavalry. Several British officers and private -gentlemen, and the baron Crossard, an Austrian military agent, -attended the head-quarters which was a scene of gaiety and boasting; -for Areizaga, never dreaming of misfortune, gave a free scope to his -social vivacity. The army marched by the roads of Manzanares and -Damiel, with scarcely any commissariat preparation, and without any -military equipment save arms; but the men were young, robust, full -of life and confidence; and being without impediments of any kind, -made nearly thirty miles each day. They moved however in a straggling -manner, quartering and feeding as they could in the villages on their -route, and with so little propriety, that the peasantry of La Mancha -universally abandoned their dwellings, and carried off their effects. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MSS.] - -Although the French could not at first give credit to the rumours -of this strange incursion, they were aware that some great movement -was in agitation, and only uncertain from what point and for what -specific object the effort would be made. Jourdan had returned to -France; Soult was major-general of the French armies, and under his -advice, the king, who was inclined to abandon Madrid, prepared to -meet the coming blow. But the army was principally posted towards -Talavera; for the false reports had, in some measure, succeeded in -deceiving the French as to the approach of the English; and it was -impossible at once to conceive the full insanity of the Junta. - -The second corps, commanded by general Heudelet, being withdrawn -from Placentia, was, on the 5th of November, posted at Oropesa and -Arzobispo, with an advanced guard at Calzada, and scouting parties -watching Naval Moral, and the course of the Tietar. - -The fifth corps, under Mortier, was concentrated at Talavera. - -Of the fourth corps, half a division garrisoned Madrid in the absence -of Dessolle’s troops; and the other half, under general Liger Belair, -was behind the Tajuna, guarding the eastern approaches to the -capital. The remaining divisions, commanded by Sebastiani, were, the -one at Toledo, the other with Milhaud’s cavalry at Ocaña. - -[Sidenote: Imperial Muster Roll. MSS.] - -The first corps, about twenty-one thousand strong, and commanded by -marshal Victor, was at Mora and Yebenes, a day’s march in advance of -Toledo, but the cavalry of this corps under the command of Latour -Maubourg occupied Consuegra and Madrilejos, on the road to the Sierra -Morena. The whole army including the French and Spanish guards, was -above eighty thousand fighting men, without reckoning Dessolle’s -division, which was on the other side of the Guadarama mountains. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MSS.] - -In the night of the 6th, information reached the king, that six -thousand Spanish horsemen, supported by two thousand foot, had come -down upon Consuegra from the side of Herencia, and that a second -column likewise composed of cavalry and infantry, had passed the -Puerto de Piche, and fallen upon the outposts at Madrilejos. All the -prisoners taken in the skirmishes agreed that the Spanish army was -above fifty thousand strong, and the duke of Belluno immediately -concentrated the first corps at Yebenes, but kept his cavalry at -Mora, by which he covered the roads leading from Consuegra and -Madrilejos upon Toledo. On the 8th, there were no Spaniards in front -of the first corps, yet officers sent towards Ocaña, were chased back -by cavalry; and Soult judged what was indeed the truth, that Areizaga -continuing his reckless march, had pushed by Tembleque towards -Aranjuez, leaving the first corps on his left flank. The division of -the fourth corps was immediately moved from Toledo by the right bank -of the Tagus to Aranjuez, from whence Sebastiani carried it to Ocaña, -thus concentrating about eight thousand infantry, and fifteen hundred -cavalry at that point on the 9th; and the same day Victor retired -with the first corps to Ajofrin. - -On the 10th, Gazan’s division of the fifth corps was ordered to march -from Talavera to Toledo; and the first corps which had reached the -latter town, was directed to move up the right bank of the Tagus -to Aranjuez to support Sebastiani, who holding fast at Ocaña, sent -six squadrons to feel for the enemy towards Guardia. The Spaniards -continuing their movement, met those squadrons and pursued them -towards Ocaña. - - -COMBAT OF DOS BARRIOS. - -Areizaga, ignorant of what was passing around him, and seeing only -Sebastiani’s cavalry on the table-land between the town of Dos -Barrios and Ocaña, concluded that they were unsupported, and directed -the Spanish horse to charge them without delay. The French thus -pressed, drew back behind their infantry which was close at hand -and unexpectedly opened a brisk fire on the Spanish squadrons which -were thrown into confusion, and being charged in that state by the -whole mass of the enemy’s cavalry, were beaten, with the loss of two -hundred prisoners and two pieces of cannon. Areizaga’s main body -was, however, coming up, and Sebastiani fell back upon Ocaña. The -next morning he took up a position on some heights lining the left -bank of the Tagus and covering Aranjuez, the Spaniards entered Dos -Barrios, and their impetuous movement ceased. They had come down from -the Morena like a stream of lava; and burst into La Mancha with a -rapidity that scarcely gave time for rumour to precede them. But this -swiftness of execution, generally so valuable in war, was here but -an outbreak of folly. Without any knowledge of the French numbers or -position, without any plan of action, Areizaga rushed like a maniac -into the midst of his foes, and then suddenly stood still, trembling -and bewildered. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 1.] - -From the 10th to the 13th he halted at Dos Barrios, and informed his -government of Sebastiani’s stubborn resistance, and of the doubts -which now for the first time assailed his own mind. It was then the -Junta changing their plans, eagerly demanded the assistance of the -British army, and commanded the dukes of Albuquerque and Del Parque -to unite at Talavera. Albuquerque commenced his movement immediately, -and the Junta did not hesitate to assure both their generals and the -public, that sir Arthur was also coming on. - -Thus encouraged, and having had time to recover from his first -incertitude, Areizaga on the 14th, made a flank march by his right to -Santa Cruz la Zarza, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa Maurique, -turn the French left, and penetrate to the capital by the eastern -side; but during his delay at Dos Barrios the French forces had been -concentrated from every quarter. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MSS.] - -South of Ocaña, the ground is open and undulating, but on the north, -the ramifications of the Cuença mountains, leading down the left -bank of the Tagus, presented, at Santa Cruz, ridges which stretching -strong and rough towards Aranjuez, afforded good positions for -Sebastiani to cover that place. Soult was awake to his adversary’s -projects, yet could not believe that he would dare such a movement -unless certain of support from the British army; and therefore kept -the different corps quiet on the eleventh, waiting for Heudelet’s -report from Oropesa. In the night it arrived, stating that rumours of -a combined Spanish and English army being on the march, were rife, -but that the scouts could not discover that the allied force was -actually within several marches. - -Soult, now judging that although the rumours should be true, his -central position would enable him to defeat Areizaga and return -by the way of Toledo in time to meet the allies in the valley of -the Tagus, put all his masses again into activity. The first corps -was directed to hasten its march to Aranjuez; the fifth corps to -concentrate at Toledo; the second corps to abandon Oropesa, Calzada -and Arzobispo, and replacing the fifth corps at Talavera, to be -in readiness to close upon the main body of the army. Finally, -information being received of the duke Del Parque’s retreat from -Salamanca to Bejar and of the re-occupation of Salamanca by the sixth -corps, Dessolle’s division was recalled to Madrid. - -During the 12th, while the first, second, and fifth corps were in -march, general Liger Belair’s brigade continued to watch the banks of -the Tajuna, and the fourth corps preserved its offensive positions -on the height in the front of Aranjuez, having fifteen hundred men -in reserve at the bridge of Bayona. The 14th the general movement -was completed. Two corps were concentrated at Aranjuez to assail the -Spaniards in front; one at Toledo to cross the Tagus and fall upon -their left flank, and the king’s guards at Madrid, formed a reserve -for the fourth and first corps. The second corps was at Talavera, -and Dessolle’s division was in the Guadarama on its return to the -capital. In fine, all was prepared for the attack of Dos Barrios, -when Areizaga’s flank march to Santa Cruz la Zarza occasioned new -combinations. - -In the evening of the 15th, it was known that the Spaniards had made -a bridge at Villa Maurique, and passed two divisions and some cavalry -over the Tagus. The duke of Belluno was immediately ordered to carry -the first and fourth corps (with the exception of a brigade left in -Aranjuez) up the left bank of the Tagus, operating, to fix Areizaga, -and force him to deliver battle; and, with a view of tempting the -Spaniard, by an appearance of timidity, the bridges of La Reyna and -Aranjuez were broken down. - -While these dispositions were making on the French side, the Spanish -general commenced a second bridge over the Tagus; and part of his -cavalry, spreading in small detachments, scoured the country, and -skirmished on a line extending from Arganda to Aranjuez. The Partidas -also, being aided by detachments from the army, obliged the French -garrison to retire from Guardalaxara upon Arganda, and occupied -the former town on the 12th. But, in the night of the 13th, eight -French companies and some troops of light cavalry, by a sudden march, -surprised them, killed and wounded two or three hundred men, and took -eighty horses and a piece of artillery. - -The 16th the infantry of the first and fourth corps was at Morata -and Bayona, the cavalry at Perales and Chinchon, and, during this -time, the fifth corps, leaving a brigade of foot and one of horse at -Toledo, marched by Illescas towards Madrid, to act as a reserve to -the duke of Belluno. - -The 17th Areizaga continued his demonstrations on the side of the -Tajuna, and hastened the construction of his second bridge; but on -the approach of the duke of Belluno with the first corps, he stayed -the work, withdrew his divisions from the right bank of the Tagus, -and on the 18th, (the cavalry of the first corps having reached -Villarejo de Salvanes,) he destroyed his bridges, called in his -parties, and drew up for battle on the heights of Santa Cruz de la -Zarza. - -Hitherto the continual movements of the Spanish army, and the -unsettled plans of the Spanish general, rendered it difficult for the -French to fix a field of battle; but now Areizaga’s march to St. Cruz -had laid his line of operations bare. The French masses were close -together, the duke of Belluno could press on the Spanish front with -the first corps, and the king, calling the fourth corps from Bayona, -could throw twenty-five or thirty thousand men on Areizaga’s rear, -by the road of Aranjuez and Ocaña. It was calculated that no danger -could arise from this double line of operations, because a single -march would bring both the king and Victor upon Areizaga; and if the -latter should suddenly assail either, each would be strong enough to -sustain the shock. Hence, when Soult knew that the Spaniards were -certainly encamped at Santa Cruz, he caused the fifth corps, then in -march for Madrid, to move during the night of the 17th upon Aranjuez. -The fourth corps received a like order. The king, himself, quitting -Madrid, arrived there on the evening of the 18th, with the Royal -French Guards, two Spanish battalions of the line, and a brigade of -Dessolle’s division which had just arrived; in all about ten thousand -men. The same day, the duke of Belluno concentrated the first corps -at Villarejo de Salvanés, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa -Maurique, and attack the Spanish position on the 19th. - -A pontoon train, previously prepared at Madrid, enabled the French to -repair the broken bridges, near Aranjuez, in two hours; and about one -o’clock on the 18th, a division of cavalry, two divisions of infantry -of the fourth corps, and the advanced guard of the fifth corps, -passed the Tagus, part at the bridge of La Reyna, and part at a ford. -General Milhaud with the leading squadrons, immediately pursued a -small body of Spanish horsemen; and was thus led to the table-land, -between Antiguela and Ocaña, where he suddenly came upon a front of -fifteen hundred cavalry supported by three thousand more in reserve. -Having only twelve hundred dragoons, he prepared to retire; but at -that moment general Paris arrived with another brigade, and was -immediately followed by the light cavalry of the fifth corps; the -whole making a reinforcement of about two thousand men. With these -troops Sebastiani came in person, and took the command at the instant -when the Spaniards, seeing the inferiority of the French, were -advancing to the charge. - - -CAVALRY COMBAT AT OCAÑA. - -The Spaniards came on at a trot, but Sebastiani directed Paris, -with a regiment of light cavalry and the Polish lancers, to turn -and fall upon the right flank of the approaching squadrons, which -being executed with great vigour, especially by the Poles, caused -considerable confusion in the Spanish ranks, and their general -endeavoured to remedy it by closing to the assailed flank. But to -effect this he formed his left and centre in one vast column. -Sebastiani charged headlong into the midst of it with his reserves, -and the enormous mass yielding to the shock, got into confusion, -and finally gave way. Many were slain, several hundred wounded, and -eighty troopers and above five hundred horses were taken. The loss of -the French bore no proportion in men, but general Paris was killed, -and several superior officers were wounded. - -This unexpected encounter with such a force of cavalry, led Soult -to believe that the Spanish general, aware of his error, was -endeavouring to recover his line of operations. The examination of -the prisoners confirmed this opinion; and in the night, information -from the duke of Belluno, and the reports of officers sent towards -Villa Maurique arrived, all agreeing that only a rear-guard was to -be seen at Santa Cruz de la Zarza. It then became clear that the -Spaniards were on the march, and that a battle could be fought the -next day. In fact Areizaga had retraced his steps by a flank movement -through Villa Rubia and Noblejas, with the intention of falling upon -the king’s forces as they opened out from Aranjuez. He arrived on the -morning of the 19th at Ocaña; but judging from the cavalry fight, -that the enemy could attack first, drew up his whole army on the same -plain, in two lines, a quarter of a mile asunder. - -Ocaña is covered on the north by a ravine, which commencing gently -half a mile eastward of the town, runs deepening and with a curve, -to the west, and finally connects itself with gullies and hollows, -whose waters run off to the Tagus. Behind the deepest part of this -ravine was the Spanish left, crossing the main road from Aranjuez -to Dos Barrios. One flank rested on the gullies, the other on Ocaña. -The centre was in front of the town, which was occupied by some -infantry as a post of reserve, but the right wing stretched in the -direction of Noblejas along the edge of a gentle ridge _in front_ -of the shallow part of the ravine. The cavalry was on the flank and -rear of the right wing. Behind the army there was an immense plain, -but closed in and fringed towards Noblejas with rich olive woods, -which were occupied by infantry to protect the passage of the Spanish -baggage, still filing by the road from Zarza. Such were Areizaga’s -dispositions. - -Joseph passed the night of the 18th in reorganizing his forces. The -whole of the cavalry, consisting of nine regiments, was given to -Sebastiani. Four divisions of infantry, with the exception of one -regiment, left at Aranjuez to guard the bridge, were placed under the -command of marshal Mortier, who was also empowered, if necessary, -to direct the movements of the cavalry. The artillery was commanded -by general Senarmont. The Royal Guards remained with the King, and -marshal Soult directed the whole of the movements. - -Before day-break, on the 19th, the monarch marched with the intention -of falling upon the Spaniards wherever he could meet with them. At -Antiguela his troops quitting the high road, turned to their left, -gained the table-land of Ocaña somewhat beyond the centre of the -Spanish position, and discovered Areizaga’s army in order of battle. -The French cavalry instantly forming to the front, covered the -advance of the infantry, which drew up in successive lines as the -divisions arrived on the plain. The Spanish outposts fell back, and -were followed by the French skirmishers, who spread along the hostile -front and opened a sharp fire. - -About forty-five thousand Spanish infantry, seven thousand cavalry, -and sixty pieces of artillery were in line. The French force was only -twenty-four thousand infantry, five thousand sabres and lances, and -fifty guns, including the battery of the Royal Guard. But Areizaga’s -position was miserably defective. The whole of his left wing, fifteen -thousand strong, was paralized by the ravine; it could neither attack -nor be attacked: the centre was scarcely better situated, and the -extremity of his right wing was uncovered, save by the horse, who -were, although superior in number, quite dispirited by the action of -the preceding evening. These circumstances dictated the order of the -attack. - - -BATTLE OF OCAÑA. - -At ten o’clock, Sebastiani’s cavalry gaining ground to his left, -turned the Spanish right. General Leval, with two divisions of -infantry in columns of regiments, each having a battalion displayed -in front, followed the cavalry, and drove general Zayas from the -olive-woods. General Girard, with his division arranged in the same -manner, followed Leval in second line; and at the same moment, -general Dessolles menaced the centre with one portion of his troops, -while another portion lined the edge of the ravine to support the -skirmishers and awe the Spanish left wing. The king remained in -reserve with his guards. Thus the French order of battle was in two -columns: the principal one, flanked by the cavalry, directed against -and turning the Spanish right, the second keeping the Spanish centre -in check; and each being supported by reserves. - -These dispositions were completed at eleven o’clock; at which hour, -Senarmont, massing thirty pieces of artillery, opened a shattering -fire on Areizaga’s centre. Six guns, detached to the right, played -at the same time across the ravine against the left; and six others -swept down the deep hollow, to clear it of the light troops. The -Spaniards were undisciplined and badly commanded, but discovered -no appearance of fear; their cries were loud and strong, their -skirmishing fire brisk; and, from the centre of their line, sixteen -guns opened with a murderous effect upon Leval’s and Girard’s -columns, as the latter were pressing on towards the right. To -mitigate the fire of this battery, a French battalion, rushing out -at full speed, seized a small eminence close to the Spanish guns, -and a counter battery was immediately planted there. Then the -Spaniards gave back: their skirmishers were swept out of the ravine -by a flanking fire of grape; and Senarmont immediately drawing the -artillery from the French right, took Ocaña as his pivot, and, -prolonging his fire to the left, raked Areizaga’s right wing in its -whole length. - -During this cannonade, Leval, constantly pressing forward, obliged -the Spaniards to change their front, by withdrawing the right wing -_behind_ the shallow part of the ravine, which, as I have before -said, was in its rear when the action commenced. By this change, the -whole army, still drawn up in two lines, at the distance of a quarter -of a mile asunder, was pressed into somewhat of a convex form with -the town of Ocaña in the centre, and hence Senarmont’s artillery tore -their ranks with a greater destruction than before. Nevertheless, -encouraged by observing the comparatively feeble body of infantry -approaching them, the Spaniards suddenly retook the offensive, their -fire, redoubling, dismounted two French guns; Mortier himself was -wounded slightly, Leval severely; the line advanced, and the leading -French divisions wavered and gave back. - -The moment was critical, and the duke of Treviso lost no time -in exhortations to Leval’s troops, but, like a great commander, -instantly brought up Girard’s division through the intervals of -the first line, and displayed a front of fresh troops, keeping one -regiment in square on the left flank: for he expected that Areizaga’s -powerful cavalry, which still remained in the plain, would charge -for the victory. Girard’s fire soon threw the Spanish first line -into disorder; and meanwhile, Dessolles, who had gained ground by -an oblique movement, left in front, seeing the enemy’s right thus -shaken, seized Ocaña itself, and issued forth on the other side. - -The light cavalry of the king’s guard, followed by the infantry, -then poured through the town; and, on the extreme left, Sebastiani, -with a rapid charge, cut off six thousand infantry, and obliged them -to surrender. The Spanish cavalry, which had only suffered a little -from the cannonade, and had never made an effort to turn the tide -of battle, now drew off entirely: the second line of infantry gave -ground as the front fell back upon it in confusion; and Areizaga, -confounded and bewildered, ordered the left wing, which had scarcely -fired a shot, to retreat, and then quitted the field himself. - -For half an hour after this, the superior officers who remained, -endeavoured to keep the troops together in the plain, and strove to -reach the main road leading to Dos Barrios; but Girard and Dessolle’s -divisions being connected after passing Ocaña, pressed on with steady -rapidity, while the Polish lancers and a regiment of chasseurs, -outflanking the Spanish right, continually increased the confusion: -finally, Sebastiani, after securing his prisoners, came up again -like a whirlwind, and charged full in the front with five regiments -of cavalry. Then the whole mass broke, and fled each man for himself -across the plain; but, on the right of the routed multitude, a deep -ravine leading from Yepes to Dos Barrios, in an oblique direction, -continually contracted the space; and the pursuing cavalry arriving -first at Barrios, headed nearly ten thousand bewildered men, and -forced them to surrender. The remainder turned their faces to all -quarters; and such was the rout, that the French were also obliged -to disperse to take prisoners, for, to their credit, no rigorous -execution was inflicted; and hundreds, merely deprived of their arms, -were desired, in raillery, “to return to their homes, and abandon -war as a trade they were unfit for.” This fatal battle commenced at -eleven o’clock; thirty pieces of artillery, a hundred and twenty -carriages, twenty-five stand of colours, three generals, six hundred -inferior officers, and eighteen thousand privates were taken before -two o’clock, and the pursuit was still hot. Seven or eight thousand -of the Spaniards, however, contrived to make away towards the -mountain of Tarancon; others followed the various routes through La -Mancha to the Sierra Morena; and many saved themselves in Valencia -and Murcia. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Letter from Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 30, -1809. MSS.] - -Meanwhile, the first corps, passing the Tagus by a ford, had -re-established the bridge at Villa Maurique before ten o’clock in -the morning, and finding Santa Cruz de la Zarza abandoned, followed -Areizaga’s traces; at Villatobas, the light cavalry captured -twelve hundred carriages, and a little farther on, took a thousand -prisoners, from the column which was making for Tarancon. Thus -informed of the result of the battle, the duke of Belluno halted at -Villatobas, but sent his cavalry forward. At La Guardia they joined -Sebastiani’s horsemen; and the whole continuing the pursuit to -Lillo, made five hundred more prisoners, together with three hundred -horses. This finished the operations of the day: only eighteen -hundred cannon-shot had been fired, and an army of more than fifty -thousand men had been ruined. The French lost seventeen hundred -men, killed and wounded; the Spaniards five thousand: and, before -nightfall, all the baggage and military carriages, three thousand -animals, forty-five pieces of artillery, thirty thousand muskets, and -twenty-six thousand captives were in the hands of the conquerors! - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 3._ - - AREIZAGA’S - Operations, - 1809. - - _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] - -[Sidenote: Letter from Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 30, -1809. MSS.] - -Areizaga reached Tembleque during the night, and La Carolina the -third day after. On the road, he met general Benaz with a thousand -dragoons that had been detached to the rear before the battle -commenced; this body he directed on Madrilegos to cover the retreat -of the fugitives; but so strongly did the panic spread that when -Sebastiani approached that post on the 20th, Benaz’s men fled, -without seeing an enemy, as fearfully as any who came from the fight. -Even so late as the 24th, only four hundred cavalry, belonging to all -regiments, could be assembled at Manzanares; and still fewer at La -Carolina. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - - -Joseph halted at Dos Barrios, the night of the battle, and the next -day directed Sebastiani, with all the light cavalry and a division -of infantry, upon Madrilegos and Consuegra; the first corps, by St. -Juan de Vilharta, upon the Sierra Morena, and the fifth corps, by -Tembleque and Mora, upon Toledo. One division of the fourth corps -guarded the spoil and the prisoners at Ocaña. A second division, -reinforced with a brigade of cavalry, was posted, by detachments, -from Aranjuez to Consuegra. - -The monarch himself, with his guards and Dessolle’s first brigade, -returned, on the 20th, to Madrid. - -Three days had sufficed to dissipate the storm on the side of La -Mancha, but the duke Del Parque still menaced the sixth corps in -Castile, and the reports from Talavera again spoke of Albuquerque -and the English being in motion. The second brigade of Dessolle’s -division had returned from Old Castile on the 19th, and the -uncertainty with respect to the British movements, obliged the king -to keep all his troops in hand. Nevertheless, fearing that, if Del -Parque gained upon the sixth corps, he might raise an insurrection -in Leon, Gazan’s division of the fifth corps was sent, from Toledo, -through the Puerto Pico, to Marchand’s assistance, and Kellerman was -again directed to take the command of the whole. - -During these events, the British army remained tranquil about -Badajos; but Albuquerque, following his orders, had reached Peralada -de Garbin, and seized the bridge of Arzobispo, in expectation of -being joined by the duke Del Parque. That general, however, who -had above thirty thousand men, thought, when Dessolle’s division -was recalled to Madrid, that he could crush the sixth corps, and, -therefore, advanced from Bejar towards Alba de Tormes on the 17th, -two days before the battle of Ocaña. Thus, when Albuquerque expected -him on the Tagus, he was engaged in serious operations beyond the -Tormes, and, having reached Alba, the 21st, sent a division to take -possession of Salamanca, which Marchand had again abandoned. The 22d -he marched towards Valladolid, and his advanced guard and cavalry -entered Fresno and Carpio. Meanwhile Kellerman, collecting all the -troops of his government, and being joined by Marchand, moved upon -Medina del Campo, and the 23d, fell with a body of horse upon the -Spaniards at Fresno. The Spanish cavalry fled at once; but the -infantry stood firm, and repulsed the assailants. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool. MSS.] - -The 24th the duke carried his whole army to Fresno, intending to give -battle; but on the 26th imperative orders to join Albuquerque having -reached him, he commenced a retrograde movement. Kellerman, without -waiting for the arrival of Gazan’s division, instantly pursued, and -his advanced guard of cavalry overtook and charged the Spanish army -at the moment when a part of their infantry and all their horse had -passed the bridge of Alba de Tormes; being repulsed, it retired upon -the supports, and the duke, seeing that an action was inevitable, -brought the remainder of his troops, with the exception of one -division, back to the right bank. - - -BATTLE OF ALBA DE TORMES. - -Scarcely was the line formed, when Kellerman came up with two -divisions of dragoons and some artillery, and, without hesitating, -sent one division to outflank the Spanish right, and, with the other, -charged fiercely in upon the front. The Spanish horsemen, flying -without a blow, rode straight over the bridge, and the infantry of -the right being thus exposed, were broken and sabred; but those on -the left stood fast and repulsed the enemy. The duke rallied his -cavalry on the other side of the river, and brought them back to the -fight, but the French were also reinforced, and once more the Spanish -horse fled without a blow. By this time it was dark, and the infantry -of the left wing, under Mendizabel and Carrera, being unbroken, made -good their retreat across the river, yet not without difficulty, and -under the fire of some French infantry, which arrived just in the -dusk. During the night the duke retreated upon Tamames unmolested, -but at day-break a French patrol coming up with this rear, his whole -army threw away their arms and fled outright. Kellerman having, -meanwhile entered Salamanca, did not pursue, yet the dispersion was -complete. - -After this defeat, Del Parque rallied his army in the mountains -behind Tamames, and, in ten or twelve days, again collected about -twenty thousand men; they were however without artillery, scarcely -any had preserved their arms, and such was their distress for -provisions, that two months afterwards, when the British arrived -on the northern frontier, the peasantry still spoke with horror of -the sufferings of these famished soldiers. Many actually died of -want, and every village was filled with sick. Yet the mass neither -dispersed nor murmured! For Spaniards, though hasty in revenge and -feeble in battle, are patient, to the last degree, in suffering. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dec. 7, 1809. MSS.] - -This result of the duke Del Parque’s operation amply justified sir -Arthur Wellesley’s advice to the Portuguese regency. In like manner -the battle of Ocaña, and the little effect produced by the duke of -Albuquerque’s advance to Arzobispo, justified that which he gave to -the Central Junta. It might be imagined that the latter would have -received his after-counsels with deference; but the course of that -body was never affected by either reason or experience. Just before -the rout of Alba de Tormes, sir Arthur Wellesley proposed that ten -thousand men, to be taken from the duke Del Parque, should _reinforce -Albuquerque, that the latter might maintain the strong position of -Meza d’Ibor, and cover Estremadura for the winter_. Meanwhile Del -Parque’s force, thus reduced one-third, could be more easily fed, and -might keep aloof from the enemy until the British army should arrive -on the northern frontier of Portugal, a movement long projected, -and, as he informed them, only delayed _to protect Estremadura until -the duke of Albuquerque had received the reinforcement_. The only -reply of the Junta was an order, directing Albuquerque _immediately -to quit the line of the Tagus, and take post at Llerena, behind the -Guadiana_. Thus abandoning Estremadura to the enemy, and exposing -his own front in a bad position to an army coming from Almaraz, and -his right flank and rear to an army coming from La Mancha. - -This foolish and contemptuous proceeding, being followed by Del -Parque’s defeat, which endangered Ciudad Rodrigo, sir Arthur -at once commenced his march for the north. He knew that twenty -thousand Spanish infantry and six thousand mounted cavalry were -again collected in La Carolina; that the troops (eight thousand), -who escaped from Ocaña, on the side of Tarancon, were at Cuença, -under general Echevarria; and as the numbers re-assembled in the -Morena were (the inactivity of the French after the battle of Ocaña -considered) sufficient to defend the passes and cover Seville for -the moment, there was no reason why the British army should remain -in unhealthy positions to aid people who would not aid themselves. -Albuquerque’s retrograde movement was probably a device of the Junta -to oblige sir Arthur to undertake the defence of Estremadura; but it -only hastened his departure. It did not comport with his plans to -engage in serious operations on that side; yet to have retired when -that province was actually attacked, would have been disreputable -for his arms, wherefore, seizing this unhappily favourable moment to -quit Badajos, he crossed the Tagus, and marched into the valley of -the Mondego, leaving general Hill, with a mixed force of ten thousand -men, at Abrantes. - -The Guadiana pestilence had been so fatal that many officers blamed -him for stopping so long; but it was his last hold on Spain, and the -safety of the southern provinces was involved in his proceedings. It -was not his battle of Talavera, but the position maintained by him -on the frontier of Estremadura, which, in the latter part of 1809, -saved Andalusia from subjection; and this is easy of demonstration, -for, Joseph having rejected Soult’s project against Portugal, dared -not invade Andalusia, by Estremadura, with the English army on his -right flank; neither could he hope to invade it by the way of La -Mancha, without drawing sir Arthur into the contest. But Andalusia -was, at this period, the last place where the intrusive king desired -to meet a British army. He had many partisans in that province, who -would necessarily be overawed if the course of the war carried sir -Arthur beyond the Morena; nor could the Junta, in that case, have -refused Cadiz, as a place of arms, to their ally. Then the whole -force of Andalusia and Murcia would have rallied round the English -forces behind the Morena; and, as Areizaga had sixty thousand men, -and Albuquerque ten thousand, it is no exaggeration to assume that a -hundred thousand could have been organized for defence, and the whole -of the troops, in the south of Portugal, would have been available to -aid in the protection of Estremadura. Thus, including thirty thousand -English, there would have been a mass of at least one hundred -thousand soldiers, disposable for active operations, assembled in the -Morena. - -From La Carolina to Madrid is only ten marches, and while posted at -the former, the army could protect Lisbon as well as Seville, because -a forward movement would oblige the French to concentrate round the -Spanish capital. Andalusia would thus have become the principal -object of the invaders; but the allied armies, holding the passes of -the Morena, their left flank protected by Estremadura and Portugal, -their right by Murcia and Valencia, and having rich provinces and -large cities behind them, and a free communication with the sea, and -abundance of ports, could have fought a fair field for Spain. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Moore’s Correspondence.] - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -It was a perception of these advantages that caused sir John Moore -to regret the ministers had not chosen the southern instead of the -northern line for his operations. Lord Wellesley, also, impressed -with the importance of Andalusia, urged his brother to adopt some -plan of this nature, and the latter, sensible of its advantages, -would have done so, but for the impossibility of dealing with the -Central Junta. Military possession of Cadiz and the uncontrolled -command of a Spanish force were the only conditions upon which he -would undertake the defence of Andalusia; conditions they would -not accede to, but, without which, he could not be secured against -the caprices of men whose proceedings were one continued struggle -against reason. This may seem inconsistent with a former assertion, -that Portugal was the true base of operations for the English; but -political as well as physical resources and moral considerations -weighed in that argument. - -For the protection, then, of Andalusia and Estremadura, during -a dangerous crisis of affairs, sir Arthur persisted, at such an -enormous sacrifice of men, to hold his position on the Guadiana. Yet -it was reluctantly, and more in deference to his brother’s wishes -than his own judgement, that he remained after Areizaga’s army was -assembled. Having proved the Junta by experience, he was more clear -sighted, as to their perverseness, than lord Wellesley; who, being -in daily intercourse with the members, obliged to listen to their -ready eloquence in excuse for past errors, and more ready promises of -future exertion, clung longer to the notion, that Spain could be put -in the right path, and that England might war largely in conjunction -with the united nations of the Peninsula, instead of restricting -herself to the comparatively obscure operation of defending Lisbon. -He was finally undeceived, and the march from Badajos for ever -released the British general from a vexatious dependence on the -Spanish government. - -Meanwhile the French, in doubt of his intentions, appeared torpid. -Kellerman remained at Salamanca, watching the movements of the duke -Del Parque; and Gazan returned to Madrid. Milhaud, with a division of -the fourth corps, and some cavalry, was detached against Echavaria; -but, on his arrival at Cuença, finding that the latter had retreated, -by Toboado, to Hellin, in Murcia, combined his operations with -general Suchet, and, as I have before related, assisted to reduce -the towns of Albaracin and Teruel. Other movements there were none, -and, as the Spanish regiments of the guard fought freely against -their countrymen, and many of the prisoners, taken at Ocaña, offered -to join the invaders’ colours, the king conceived hopes of raising a -national army. French writers assert that the captives at Ocaña made -a marked distinction between Napoleon and Joseph. They were willing -to serve the French emperor, but not the intrusive king of Spain. -Spanish authors, indeed, assume that none entered the enemy’s ranks -save by coercion and to escape; and that many did so with that view, -and were successful, must be supposed, or the numbers said to have -reassembled in the Morena, and at Cuença, cannot be reconciled with -the loss sustained in the action. - -The battles of Ocaña and Alba de Tormes terminated the series of -offensive operations, which the Austrian war, and the reappearance of -a British army in the Peninsula had enabled the allies to adopt, in -1809. Those operations had been unsuccessful; the enemy again took -the lead, and the fourth epoch of the war commenced. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. Although certain that the British army would not co-operate -in this short campaign, the Junta openly asserted, that it would -join Albuquerque in the valley of the Tagus. The improbability of -Areizaga’s acting, without such assistance, gave currency to the -fiction, and an accredited fiction is, in war, often more useful than -the truth; in this, therefore, they are to be commended; but, when -deceiving their own general, they permitted Areizaga to act under -the impression that he would be so assisted, they committed not an -error but an enormous crime. Nor was the general much less criminal -for acting upon the mere assertion that other movements were combined -with his, when no communication, no concerting of the marches, -no understanding with the allied commander, as to their mutual -resources, and intentions, had taken place. - -2º. A rushing wind, a blast from the mountains, tempestuous, -momentary, such was Areizaga’s movement on Dos Barrios, and assuredly -it would be difficult to find its parallel. There is no post so -strong, no town so guarded, that, by a fortunate stroke, may not be -carried; but who, even on the smallest scale, acts on this principle, -unless aided by some accidental circumstance applicable to the -moment? Areizaga obeyed the orders of his government; but no general -is bound to obey orders (at least without remonstrance) which involve -the safety of his army; to that he should sacrifice everything but -victory: and many great commanders have sacrificed even victory, -rather than appear to undervalue this vital principle. - -3º. At Dos Barrios the Spanish general, having first met with -opposition, halted for three days, evidently without a plan, and -ignorant both of the situation of the first corps on his left flank, -and of the real force in his front: yet this was the only moment -in which he could hope for the slightest success. If, instead of a -feeble skirmish of cavalry, he had borne forward, with his whole -army, on the 11th, Sebastiani must have been overpowered and driven -across the Tagus, and Areizaga, with fifty thousand infantry and a -powerful cavalry, would, on the 12th, have been in the midst of the -separated French corps, for their movement of concentration was not -completely effected until the night of the 14th. But such a stroke -was not for an undisciplined army, and this was another reason -against moving from the Morena at all, seeing that the calculated -chances were all against Areizaga, and his troops not such as could -improve accidental advantages. - -4º. The flank march, from Dos Barrios to Santa Cruz, although -intended to turn the French left, and gain Madrid, was a circuitous -route of at least a hundred miles, and, as there were three rivers -to cross, namely, the Tagus, the Tajuna, and Henares, only great -rapidity could give a chance of success; but Areizaga was slow. So -late as the 15th, he had passed the Tagus with only two divisions -of infantry. Meanwhile the French moving on the inner circle, got -between him and Madrid, and the moment one corps out of the three -opposed to him approached, he recrossed the Tagus and concentrated -again on the strong ground of Santa Cruz de la Zarza. The king by -the way of Aranjuez had, however, already cut his line of retreat, -and then Areizaga who, on the 10th, had shrunk from an action with -Sebastiani, when the latter had only eight thousand men, now sought -a battle, on the same ground with the king, who was at the head of -thirty thousand; the first corps being also in full march upon the -Spanish traces and distant only a few miles. Here it may be remarked -that Victor, who was now to the eastward of the Spaniards, had been -on the 9th to the westward at Yebenes and Mora, having moved in ten -days, on a circle of a hundred and fifty miles, completely round this -Spanish general, who pretended, to treat his adversaries, as if they -were blind men. - -5º. Baron Crossand, it is said, urged Areizaga to entrench himself -in the mountains, to raise the peasantry, and to wait the effect of -Albuquerque’s and Del Parque’s operations. If so, his military ideas -do not seem of a higher order than Areizaga’s, and the proposal was -but a repetition of Mr. Frere’s former plan for Albuquerque; a plan -founded on the supposition, that the rich plains of La Mancha were -rugged mountains. In taking a permanent position at Santa Cruz or -Tarancon, Areizaga must have resigned all direct communication with -Andalusia, and opened a fresh line of communication with Valencia, -which would have been exposed to the third corps from Aragon. Yet -without examining whether either the Spanish general or army were -capable of such a difficult operation, as adopting an accidental -line of operations, the advice, if given at all, was only given on -the 18th, and on the 19th, the first corps, the fourth, the greatest -part of the fifth, the reserve and the royal guards, forming a mass -of more than fifty thousand fighting men, would have taught Areizaga -that men and not mountains decide the fate of a battle. But in fact, -there were no mountains to hold; between Zarza and the borders of -Valencia, the whole country is one vast plain; and on the 18th, there -was only the alternative of fighting the weakest of the two French -armies, or of retreating by forced marches through La Mancha. The -former was chosen, Areizaga’s army was destroyed, and in the battle -he discovered no redeeming quality. His position was ill chosen, -he made no use of his cavalry, his left wing never fired a shot, -and when the men undismayed by the defeat of the right, demanded to -be led into action, he commanded a retreat, and quitted the field -himself at the moment when his presence was most wanted. - -6º. The combinations of the French were methodical, well arranged, -effectual, and it may seem misplaced, to do ought but commend -movements so eminently successful. Yet the chances of war are -manifold enough to justify the drawing attention to some points -of this short campaign. Areizaga’s burst from the mountains was -so unexpected and rapid, that it might well make his adversaries -hesitate; and hence perhaps the reason why the first corps circled -round the Spanish army, and was singly to have attacked the latter in -front at Zarza, on the 19th; whereas, reinforced with the division -of the fourth corps from Toledo, it might have fallen on the rear -and flank from Mora a week before. That is, during the three days -Areizaga remained at Dos Barrios, from whence Mora is only four hours -march. - -7º. The 11th, the king knew the English army had not approached the -valley of the Tagus; Areizaga only quitted Dos Barrios the 13th, and -he remained at Zarza until the 18th. During eight days therefore, -the Spanish general was permitted to lead, and had he been a man -of real enterprise he would have crushed the troops between Dos -Barrios and Aranjuez on the 10th or 11th. Indeed, the boldness with -which Sebastiani maintained his offensive position beyond Aranjuez, -from the 9th to the 14th, was a master-piece. It must, however, be -acknowledged that Soult could not at once fix a general, who marched -fifty thousand men about like a patrole of cavalry, without the -slightest regard to his adversary’s positions or his own line of -operations. - -8º. In the battle, nothing could be more scientific than the mode in -which the French closed upon and defeated the right and centre, while -they paralized the left of the Spaniards. The disparity of numbers -engaged, and the enormous amount of prisoners, artillery, and other -trophies of victory prove it to have been a fine display of talent. -But Andalusia was laid prostrate by this sudden destruction of her -troops; why then was the fruit of victory neglected? Did the king, -unable to perceive his advantages, control the higher military -genius of his advising general, or was he distracted by disputes -amongst the different commanders? or, did the British army at Badajos -alarm him? An accurate knowledge of these points is essential in -estimating the real share Spain had in her own deliverance. - -[Sidenote: Letter to Lord Liverpool. MS.] - -9º. Sir Arthur Wellesley absolutely refused to co-operate in this -short and violent campaign. He remained a quiet spectator of events -at the most critical period of the war; and yet on paper the Spanish -projects promised well. Areizaga’s army exceeded fifty thousand -men, Albuquerque’s ten thousand, and thirty thousand were under Del -Parque, who, at Tamames had just overthrown the best corps in the -French army. Villa Campa also, and the Partida bands on the side of -Cuença were estimated at ten thousand; in fine, there were a hundred -thousand Spanish soldiers ready. The British army at this period, -although much reduced by sickness, had still twenty thousand men fit -to bear arms, and the Portuguese under Beresford were near thirty -thousand, making a total of a hundred and fifty thousand allies. -Thirty thousand to guard the passes of the Sierra de Gredos and watch -the sixth corps, a hundred and twenty thousand to attack the seventy -thousand French covering Madrid! Why then, was sir Arthur Wellesley, -who only four months before so eagerly undertook a like enterprise -with fewer forces, now absolutely deaf to the proposals of the Junta? -“_Because moral force is to physical force, as three to one in war._” -He had proved the military qualities of Spaniards and French, had -foresaw, to use his own expressions, “_after one or two battles, -and one or two brilliant actions by some, and defeats sustained by -others, that all would have to retreat again_:” yet this man, so -cautious, so sensible of the enemy’s superiority, was laying the -foundation of measures that finally carried him triumphant through -the Peninsula. False then are the opinions of those, who, asserting -Napoleon might have been driven over the Ebro in 1808-9, blame sir -John Moore’s conduct. Such reasoners would as certainly have charged -the ruin of Spain on sir Arthur Wellesley, if at this period the -chances of war had sent him to his grave. But in all times the wise -and brave man’s toil has been the sport of fools! - -[Sidenote: 1810.] - -Alba de Tormes ended the great military transactions of 1809. In -the beginning, Napoleon broke to atoms and dispersed the feeble -structure of the Spanish insurrection, but after his departure the -invasion stagnated amidst the bickerings of his lieutenants. Sir -Arthur Wellesley turned the war back upon the invaders for a moment, -but the jealousy and folly of his ally soon obliged him to retire to -Portugal. The Spaniards then tried their single strength, and were -trampled under foot at Ocaña, and notwithstanding the assistance of -England, the offensive passed entirely from their hands. In the next -book we shall find them every where acting on the defensive, and -every where weak. - - - - -BOOK X. - - -CHAPTER I. - - -Napoleon, victorious in Germany, and ready to turn his undivided -strength once more against the Peninsula, complained of the past -inactivity of the king, and Joseph prepared to commence the campaign -of 1810 with vigour. His first operations, however, indicated great -infirmity of purpose. When Del Parque’s defeat on one side and -Echevaria’s on the other had freed his flanks, and while the British -army was still at Badajos, he sent the fourth corps towards Valencia, -but immediately afterwards recalled it, and also the first corps, -which, since the battle of Ocaña, had been at Santa Cruz de Mudela. -The march of this last corps through La Mancha had been marked by -this peculiarity, that, for the first time since the commencement -of the war, the peasantry, indignant at the flight of the soldiers, -guided the pursuers to the retreats of the fugitives. - -[Sidenote: Appendix No. IV. Sec. 1.] - -Joseph’s vacillation was partly occasioned by the insurrection in -Navarre, under Renovalles and Mina. But lord Wellington, previous -to quitting the Guadiana, had informed the Junta of Badajos, as a -matter of courtesy, that he was about to evacuate their district; -and his confidential letter being published in the town Gazette, -and ostentatiously copied into the Seville papers, Joseph naturally -suspected it to be a cloak to some offensive project. However, -the false movements of the first and fourth corps distracted the -Spaniards, and emboldened the French partizans, who were very -numerous both in Valencia and Andalusia. The troubles in Navarre were -soon quieted by Suchet; the distribution of the British army in the -valley of the Mondego became known, and Joseph seriously prepared -for the conquest of Andalusia. This enterprise, less difficult than -an invasion of Portugal, promised immediate pecuniary advantages, -which was no slight consideration to a sovereign whose ministers were -reduced to want from the non-payment of their salaries, and whose -troops were thirteen months in arrears of pay. Napoleon, a rigid -stickler for the Roman maxim, that “War should support war,” paid -only the corps near the frontiers of France, and rarely recruited the -military chest. - -Both the military and political affairs of Andalusia were now at the -lowest ebb. The calm produced by the promise to convoke the National -Cortes had been short lived. The disaster of Ocaña revived all the -passions of the people, and afforded the old Junta of Seville, the -council of Castile, and other enemies of the Central Junta, an -opportunity to pull down a government universally obnoxious; and the -general discontent was increased by the measures adopted to meet the -approaching crisis. The marquis of Astorga had been succeeded by the -archbishop of Laodicea, under whose presidency the Junta published -a manifesto, assuring the people that there was no danger,--that -Areizaga could defend the Morena against the whole power of -France,--that Albuquerque would, from the side of Estremadura, fall -upon the enemy’s rear,--and that a second Baylen might be expected. -But, while thus attempting to delude the public, they openly sent -property to Cadiz, and announced that they would transfer their -sittings to that town on the 1st of February. - -Meanwhile, not to seem inactive, a decree was issued for a levy of -a hundred thousand men, and for a forced loan of half the jewels, -plate, and money belonging to individuals; sums left for pious -purposes were also appropriated to the service of the state. - -To weaken their adversaries, the Junta offered Romana the command of -the army in the Morena,--sent Padre Gil on a mission to Sicily, and -imprisoned the Conde de Montijo and Francisco Palafox. The marquis of -Lazan, accused of being in league with his brother, was also confined -in Pensicola, and the Conde de Tilly, detected in a conspiracy to -seize the public treasure and make for America, was thrown into a -dungeon, where his infamous existence terminated. Romana refused to -serve, and Blake, recalled from Catalonia, was appointed to command -the troops re-assembled at La Carolina; but most of the other -generals kept aloof, and in Gallicia the Conde de Noronha, resigning -his command, issued a manifesto against the Junta. Hence the -public hatred increased, and the partizans of Palafox and Montijo, -certain that the people would be against the government under any -circumstances, only waited for a favourable moment to commence -violence. Andalusia generally, and Seville in particular, were but -one remove from anarchy, when the intrusive monarch reached the foot -of the Morena with a great and well organized army. - -The military preparation of the Junta was in harmony with their -political conduct. The decree for levying a hundred thousand men, -issued when the enemy was but a few marches from the seat of -government, was followed by an order to distribute a hundred thousand -poniards, as if assassination were the mode in which a great nation -could or ought to defend itself, especially when the regular forces -at the disposal of the Junta, were still numerous enough, if well -directed, to have made a stout resistance. Areizaga had twenty-five -thousand men in the Morena; Echevaria, with eight thousand, was close -by, at Hellin; five or six thousand were spread over Andalusia, and -Albuquerque had fifteen thousand behind the Guadiana. The troops -at Carolina were, however, dispirited and disorganized. Blake had -not arrived, and Albuquerque, distracted with contradictory orders -transmitted almost daily by the Junta, could contrive no reasonable -plan of action, until the movements of the enemy enabled him to -disregard all instructions. Thus, amidst a whirlpool of passions, -intrigues, and absurdities, Andalusia, although a mighty vessel, and -containing all the means of safety, was destined to sink. - -This great province, composed of four kingdoms, namely, Jaen and -Cordoba in the north, Grenada and Seville in the south, was protected -on the right by Murcia and on the left by Portugal. The northern -frontier only was accessible to the French, who could attack it -either by La Mancha or Estremadura; but, between those provinces, -the Toledo and Guadalupe mountains forbad all military communication -until near the Morena, when, abating somewhat of their surly -grandeur, they left a space through which troops could move from one -province to the other in a direction parallel to the frontier of -Andalusia. - -Towards La Mancha, the Morena was so savage that only the royal -road to Seville was practicable for artillery. Entering the hills, -a little in advance of Santa Cruz de Mudela, at a pass of wonderful -strength, called the Despenas Perros, it led by La Carolina and -Baylen to Andujar. On the right, indeed, another route passed through -the Puerto del Rey, but fell into the first at Navas Toloza, a little -beyond the Despenas Perros; and there were other passes also, but all -falling again into the main road, before reaching La Carolina. Santa -Cruz de Mudela was therefore a position menacing the principal passes -of the Morena from La Mancha. - -To the eastward of Santa Cruz the town of Villa Nueva de los Infantes -presented a second point of concentration for the invaders. From -thence roads, practicable for cavalry and infantry, penetrated the -hills by La Venta Quemada and the Puerto de San Esteban, conducting -to Baeza, Ubeda, and Jaen. - -In like manner, on the westward of Santa Cruz, roads, or, rather, -paths, penetrated into the kingdom of Cordoba. One, entering the -mountains, by Fuen Caliente, led upon Montoro; a second, called the -La Plata, passed by La Conquista to Adamuz, and it is just beyond -these roads that the ridges, separating La Mancha from Estremadura, -begin to soften down, permitting military ingress to the latter, -by the passes of Mochuello, Almaden de Azogues, and Agudo. But the -barrier of the Morena still shut in Andalusia from Estremadura, -the military communication between those provinces being confined -to three great roads, namely, one from Medellin, by Llerena, to -Guadalcanal; another from Badajos to Seville, by the defiles of -Monasterio and Ronquillo; and a third by Xeres de los Caballeros, -Fregenal, and Araceña. From Almaden, there was also a way, through -Belalcazar, to Guadalcanal; and all these routes, except that of -Araceña, whether from La Mancha or Estremadura, after crossing the -mountains, led into the valley of the Guadalquivir, a river whose -waters, drawn from a multitude of sources, at first roll westward, -washing the foot of the Morena as far as the city of Cordoba, but -then, bending gradually towards the south, flow by Seville, and are -finally lost in the Atlantic. - -To defend the passage of the Morena, Areizaga posted his right in -the defiles of San Esteban and Montizon, covering the city of Jaen, -the old walls of which were armed. His left occupied the passes -of Fuen Caliente and Mochuello, covering Cordoba. His centre was -established at La Carolina and in the defiles of the Despenas Perros -and Puerto del Rey, which were entrenched, but with so little skill -and labour as to excite the ridicule rather than the circumspection -of the enemy. And here it may be well to notice an error relative -to the strength of mountain-defiles, common enough even amongst men -who, with some experience, have taken a contracted view of their -profession. - -From such persons it is usual to hear of narrow passes, in which -the greatest multitudes may be resisted. But, without stopping to -prove that local strength is nothing, if the flanks can be turned -by other roads, we may be certain that there are few positions so -difficult as to render superior numbers of no avail. Where one man -can climb another can, and a good and numerous infantry, crowning -the acclivities on the right and left of a disputed pass, will soon -oblige the defenders to retreat, or to fight upon equal terms. If -this takes place at any point of an extended front of defiles, such -as those of the Sierra Morena, the dangerous consequences to the -whole of the beaten army are obvious. - -Hence such passes should only be considered as fixed points, around -which an army should operate freely in defence of more exposed -positions, for defiles are doors, the keys of which are on the -summits of the hills around them. A bridge is a defile, yet troops -are posted, not in the middle, but behind a bridge, to defend the -passage. By extending this principle, we shall draw the greatest -advantages from the strength of mountain-passes. The practice of -some great generals may, indeed, be quoted against this opinion; -nevertheless, it seems more consonant to the true principles of war -to place detachments in defiles, and keep the main body in some -central point behind, ready to fall on the heads of the enemy’s -columns as they issue from the gorges of the hills. - -Pierced by many roads, and defended by feeble dispirited troops, -the Morena presented no great obstacle to the French; but, as they -came up against it by the way of La Mancha only, there were means -to render their passage difficult. If Albuquerque, placing his -army either at Almaden de Azogues, or Agudo, had operated against -their right flank, he must have been beaten, or masked by a strong -detachment, before Areizaga could have been attacked. Nor was -Andalusia itself deficient of interior local resources for an -obstinate defence. - -Parallel to the Morena, and at the distance of about a hundred -miles, the Sierra Nevada, the Apulxaras, and the Sierra Ronda, -extend from the borders of Murcia to Gibraltar, cutting off a narrow -tract of country along the coast of the Mediterranean: and the -intermediate space between these sierras and the Morena is broken by -less extensive ridges, forming valleys which, gradually descending -and widening, are finally lost in the open country about Seville. -Andalusia may therefore be considered as presenting three grand -divisions of country:--1º. The upper, or rugged, between the Sierra -Morena and the Sierra Nevada. 2º. The lower, or open country, about -Seville. 3º. The coast-tract between the Nevada and Ronda, and the -Mediterranean. This last is studded, in its whole length, with -sea-port towns and castles, such as Malaga, Velez-Malaga, Motril, -Ardra, Marbella, Estipona, and an infinity of smaller places. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 4._ - - INVASION - of - ANDALUSIA - 1810. - - _Published by T. & W. Boone, 1830._] - -No important line of defence is offered by the Guadalquivir. An -army, after passing the Morena, would follow the course of its -waters to gain the lower parts of Andalusia, and, thus descending, -the advantage of position would be with the invaders. But, to reach -the Mediterranean coast, not only the ridges of the Nevada or Ronda -must be crossed, but most of the minor parallel ridges enclosing the -valleys, whose waters run towards the Atlantic. Now all those valleys -contain great towns, such as Jaen and Cordoba, Ubeda, Grenada, and -Alcala Real, most of which, formerly fortified, and still retaining -their ancient walls, were capable of defence; wherefore the enemy -could not have approached the Mediterranean, nor Grenada, nor the -lower country about Seville, without first taking Jaen, or Cordoba, -or both. The difficulty of besieging those places, while a Spanish -army was stationed at Alcala Real, or Ecija, while the mountains, on -both flanks and in the rear, were filled with insurgents, and while -Albuquerque hung upon the rear at Almada, is apparent. Pompey’s sons, -acting upon this system, nearly baffled Cæsar, although that mighty -man had friends in the province, and, with his accustomed celerity, -fell upon his youthful adversaries before their arrangements were -matured. - -But in this, the third year of the war, the Junta were unprovided -with any plan of defence beyond the mere occupation of the passes -in the Morena. Those, once forced, Seville was open, and, from that -great city, the French could penetrate into all parts, and their -communication with Madrid became of secondary importance, because -Andalusia abounded in the materials of war, and Seville, the capital -of the province, and, from its political position, the most important -town in Spain, was furnished with arsenals, cannon-founderies, and -all establishments necessary to a great military power. - - -INVASION OF ANDALUSIA. - -The number of fighting-men destined for this enterprise was about -sixty-five thousand. Marshal Soult directed the movements; but the -king was disposed to take a more prominent part, in the military -arrangements than a due regard for his own interest would justify. -To cover Madrid, and to watch the British army, the second corps -was posted between Talavera and Toledo, with strong detachments -pushed into the valley of the Tagus. Two thousand men, drawn from -the reserve, garrisoned the capital; as many were in Toledo, and two -battalions occupied minor posts, such as Arganda and Guadalaxara. -Gazan’s division was recalled from Castile, Milhaud’s from Aragon; -and the first, fourth, and fifth corps, the king’s guards, and the -reserve, increased by some reinforcements from France, were directed -upon Andalusia. - -During the early part of January, 1810, the troops, by easy marches, -gained the foot of the Morena, and there Milhaud’s division, coming -by the way of Benillo, rejoined the fourth corps. A variety of -menacing demonstrations, made along the front of the Spanish line of -defence, between the 14th and 17th, caused Areizaga to abandon his -advanced positions and confine himself to the passes of the Morena; -but, on the 18th, the king arrived in person at Santa Cruz de Mudela, -and the whole army was collected in three distinct masses. - -In the centre, the artillery, the king’s guards, the reserve, and the -fifth corps, under marshal Mortier, were established at Santa Cruz -and Elviso, close to the mouths of the Despenas Perros and the Puerto -del Rey. - -On the left, Sebastiani, with the fourth corps, occupied Villa Nueva -de los Infantes, and prepared to penetrate, by Venta Quemada and -Puerto San Esteban, into the kingdom of Jaen. - -On the right, the duke of Belluno, placing a detachment in Agudo, -to watch Albuquerque, occupied Almaden de Azogues, with the first -corps, pushed an advanced guard into the pass of Mochuelo, and sent -patrols through Benalcazar and Hinojosa towards Guadalcanal. By -these dispositions, Areizaga’s line of defence in the Morena, and -Albuquerque’s line of retreat from Estremadura, were alike threatened. - -On the 20th, Sebastiani, after a slight skirmish, forced the defiles -of Esteban, making a number of prisoners; and when the Spaniards -rallied behind the Guadalen, one of the tributary torrents of the -Guadalquiver, he again defeated them, and advancing into the plains -of Ubeda, secured the bridges over the Guadalquiver. - -In the centre Dessolles carried the Puerto del Rey without firing a -shot, and Gazan’s division crowning the heights right and left of the -Despenas Perros, turned all the Spanish works in that pass, which was -abandoned. Mortier, with the main body and the artillery, then poured -through, reached La Carolina in the night, and the next day took -possession of Andujar, having passed in triumph over the fatal field -of Baylen; more fatal to the Spaniards than to the French, for the -foolish pride, engendered by that victory, was one of the principal -causes of their subsequent losses. - -Meanwhile the duke of Belluno pushed detachments to Montoro, Adamuz, -and Pozzoblanco, and his patrols appeared close to Cordoba. His and -Sebastini’s flanking parties communicated also with the fifth corps -at Andujar; and thus, in two days, by skilful combinations upon an -extent of fifty miles, the lofty barrier of the Morena was forced, -and Andalusia beheld the French masses portentously gathered on the -interior slopes of the mountains. - -In Seville all was anarchy: Palafox and Montijo’s partisans were -secretly preparing to strike, and the Ancient Junta openly discovered -a resolution to resume their former power. The timid, and those -who had portable property, endeavoured to remove to Cadiz; but the -populace opposed this, and the peasantry came into the city so fast -that above a hundred thousand persons were within the walls, and the -streets were crowded with multitudes that, scarcely knowing what to -expect or wish, only wanted a signal to break out into violence. -The Central Junta, fearing alike, the enemy, and their own people, -prepared to fly, yet faithful to their system of delusion, while -their packages were actually embarking for Cadiz, assured the people -that the enemy had indeed forced the pass of Almaden, leading from -La Mancha into Estremadura, but that no danger could thence arise. -Because the duke Del Parque was in full march to join Albuquerque; -and those generals when united being stronger than the enemy would -fall upon his flank, while Areizaga would co-operate from the Morena -and gain a great victory. - -It was on the 20th of January, and at the very moment when the Morena -was being forced at all points, that this deluding address was -published, it was not until the day after that the Junta despatched -orders for the duke Del Parque (who was then in the mountains beyond -Ciudad Rodrigo) to effect that junction with Albuquerque from which -such great things were expected! Del Parque received the despatch on -the 24th, and prepared to obey. Albuquerque, alive to all the danger -of the crisis, had left general Contreras at Medellin, with four -thousand five hundred men, destined to form a garrison for Badajos, -and marched himself on the 22d, with about nine thousand, towards -Agudo, intending to fall upon the flank of the first corps; but he -had scarcely commenced his movement, when he learned that Agudo and -Almaden were occupied, and that the French patrols were already at -Benalcazar and Hinojosa, within one march of his own line of retreat -upon Seville. - -In this conjuncture, sending Contreras to Badajos, and his own -artillery through the defile of Monasterio, he marched with his -infantry to Guadalcanal. During the movement, he continued to -receive contradictory and absurd orders from the Junta, some of -which, he disregarded, and others he could not obey; but conforming -to circumstances, when the Morena was forced, he descended into the -basin of Seville, crossed the Guadalquivir a few leagues from that -city, at the ferry of Cantillana, reached Carmona on the 24th, and -immediately pushed with his cavalry for Ecija to observe the enemy’s -progress. Meanwhile the storm, so long impending over the Central -Junta, burst at Seville. - -Early on the 24th a great tumult arose. Mobs traversing all the -quarters of the city, called out, some for the deposition of the -Junta, others for the heads of the members. Francisco Palafox and -Montijo were released, and the Junta of Seville being re-established -by acclamation, the Central Junta, committed to their hands the -defence of Andalusia, and endeavoured themselves to reach Cadiz, each -as he could; but with the full intention of reuniting and resuming -their authority. On the road however, some of them were cast into -prison by the people, some were like to be slain at Xerez, and the -Junta of Seville had no intention that the Central Junta should ever -revive. Saavedra, the President of the former, by judicious measures -calmed the tumult in the city, restored Romana to the command of his -old army, which was now under the duke Del Parque, made some other -popular appointments, and in conjunction with his colleagues sent a -formal proposition to the Junta at Badajos, inviting them to take -into consideration the necessity of constituting a Regency, which -was readily acceded to. But the events of war crowding on, overlaid -their schemes; and three days after the flight of the Central Junta, -treason and faction being busy amongst the members of the Seville -Junta, they also disbanded, some remaining in the town; others, and -amongst them Saavedra, repairing to Cadiz. The tumults were then -renewed with greater violence, and Romana was called upon to assume -the command and defend the city; but he evaded this dangerous honour, -and proceeded to Badajos. - -Thus abandoned to themselves, the people of Seville, discovered the -same disposition, as the people of other towns in the Peninsula, -had done upon like occasions. If men like the Tios of Zaragoza, had -assumed command, they might have left a memorable tale and a ruined -city, but there were none so firm, or so ferocious; and finally, a -feeling of helplessness produced fear in all, and Seville was ready -to submit to the invaders. - -When the passage of the mountains was completely effected, the French -corps again received their artillery, but the centre and right wing -of the army remained stationary, and a detachment of the first corps, -which had approached Cordoba, returned to Montoro. Areizaga rallied -his troops at Jaen, but Sebastiani marching from Ubeda, drove him -upon Alcala Real, and Jaen surrendered with forty-six guns mounted -on the walls. The Spanish general made one more stand; but being -again beaten, and all his artillery captured, his army dispersed. -Five thousand infantry and some squadrons of cavalry throwing away -their arms escaped to Gibraltar; and Areizaga himself, with a remnant -of horse, flying into the kingdom of Murcia, was there superceded -by Blake. Meanwhile, Sebastiani marched upon Grenada, and entering -it the 28th of January, was received with apparent joy, so entirely -had the government of the Central Junta extinguished the former -enthusiasm of the people. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -As the capture of Jaen secured the left flank of the French, the -king with the centre and right, moved on Cordoba the 27th, and there -also, as at Jaen and Grenada, the invaders were received without any -mark of aversion,[7] and thus the upper country was conquered. But -the projects of Joseph were not confined to Andalusia; he had opened -a secret communication with Valencia, where his partisans undertook -to raise a commotion whenever a French force should appear before -the city. Hence, judging that no serious opposition would be made in -Andalusia, he directed Sebastiani to cross the Sierra Nevada, and -seize the Grenadan coast, an operation that would enable him with -greater facility to act against Valencia. To ensure the success of -the latter enterprise, he wrote from Cordoba to Suchet, urging him -to make a combined movement from Aragon, and promising a powerful -detachment from Andalusia, to meet him under the walls of Valencia. - -Dessolles, with the reserve, occupied Cordoba and Jaen; but the first -and fifth corps, followed by the king’s guards, proceeded without -delay towards Ecija, where it will be remembered, Albuquerque’s -cavalry had been posted since the night of the 24th. As the French -approached, the duke fell back upon Carmona, from whence he could -retreat either to Seville, or Cadiz, the way to the latter being -through Utrera. But from Ecija there was a road through Moron to -Utrera, shorter than that leading through Carmona, and along this -road the cavalry of the first corps was pushed on the 27th. - -Albuquerque now despairing for Seville, resolved to make for Cadiz, -and lest the enemy should reach Utrera before him, gained that town -with great expedition, and thence moving through Lebrija and Xeres, -by long marches, journeying day and night, reached Cadiz on the 3d of -February. Some French cavalry overtook and skirmished with his rear -at Utrera; but he was not pursued further, save by scouting parties; -for the king had altered the original plan of operations, and ordered -the first corps which was then pushing for Cadiz, to change its -direction and march by Carmona against Seville, and the 30th, the -advanced guards came on that city. - -Some entrenchments and batteries had been raised for defence, and -the mob still governing, fired upon the bearer of the first French -summons, and announced in lofty terms a resolution to fight. Besides -the populace, there were about seven thousand troops, composed partly -of fugitives from the Morena, partly of the original garrison of the -town; nevertheless, the city, after some negotiation, surrendered on -the 31st, with all its stores, founderies, and arsenals complete, and -on the 1st of February the king entered in triumph. The lower country -was thus conquered, and there remained only Cadiz, and the coast -tract lying between the Mediterranean and the Sierra de Nevada to -subdue. - -The first corps was immediately sent against Cadiz, and the fifth -against Estremadura; and Sebastiani having placed fifteen hundred -men in the Alhambra, and incorporated among his troops, a Swiss -battalion, composed of those who had abandoned the French service in -the battle of Baylen, seized Antequera. He was desirous to establish -himself firmly in those parts before he crossed the Nevada, but his -measures were precipitated by unexpected events. At Malaga, the -people had imprisoned the members of the local Junta, and headed by -a Capuchin friar, resolved to fight the French, and a vast multitude -armed in all manners took post above Antequera and Alhama, where the -road from Grenada enters the hills. - -[Sidenote: General Campbell’s Correspondence from Gibraltar. MSS.] - -As this insurrection was spreading, not only in the mountains, but -through the plains of Grenada, Sebastiani resolved to fall on at -once, lest the Grenadans having Gibraltar on the one flank, Murcia -on the other, and in their own country, many sea-ports and fortified -towns, should organize a regular system of resistance. The 5th of -February, after a slight skirmish at Alhama, he penetrated the hills, -driving the insurgents upon Malaga; but near that place they rallied, -and an engagement, with the advanced guard of the French, under -general Milhaud, taking place, about five hundred Spaniards fell, and -the conquerors entered the town fighting. A few of the vanquished -took refuge on board some English ships of war; the rest submitted, -and more than a hundred pieces of heavy, and about twenty pieces of -field artillery with ammunition, stores, and a quantity of British -merchandize, became the spoil of the conquerors. Velez-Malaga opened -its gates the next day, Motril was occupied, and the insurrection was -quelled; for in every other part, both troops and peasantry, were -terrified and submissive to the last degree. - -Meanwhile, Victor followed the traces of Albuquerque with such -diligence, as to reach Chiclana on the 5th of February, and it is -generally supposed, that he might have rendered himself master -of Leon, for the defensive works at Cadiz, and the Isla were in -no way improved, but rather deteriorated since the period of Sir -George Smith’s negotiation. The bridge of Zuazo was indeed broken, -and the canal of Santa Petri a great obstacle; but Albuquerque’s -troops were harassed, dispirited, ill clothed, badly armed, and in -every way inefficient; the people of Cadiz were apathetic, and the -authorities, as usual, occupied with intrigues and private interests. -In this state, eight thousand Spanish soldiers could scarcely have -defended a line of ten miles against twenty-five thousand French, if -a sufficient number of boats could have been collected to cross the -canal. - -Venegas was governor of Cadiz; but when it was known that the Central -Junta had been deposed at Seville, a Municipal Junta, chiefly -composed of merchants, was elected by general ballot. This body, as -inflated and ambitious of power as any that had preceded it, would -not suffer the fugitive members of the Central Junta to assume any -authority; and the latter, maugre their extreme reluctance, were -obliged to submit, but, by the advice of Jovellanos, appointed a -Regency, composed of men not taken from amongst themselves. The -Municipal Junta vehemently opposed this proceeding, but finally, -the judicious intervention of Mr. Bartholomew Frere induced them to -acquiesce; and the 29th of January, the bishop of Orense, general -Castaños, Antonio de Escaño, Saavedra, and Fernandez de Leon, were -appointed Regents, until the Cortes could be assembled. Leon was -afterwards replaced by one Lardizabal, a native of New Spain. - -The council of Castile, which had been reinstated before the -fall of Seville, now charged the deposed Junta, and truly, with -usurpation--the public voice added peculation and other crimes; -and the Regency, which they had themselves appointed, seized their -papers, sequestered their effects, threw some of the members into -prison, and banished others to the provinces: thus completely -extinguishing this at once odious, ridiculous, and unfortunate -oligarchy. Amongst the persons composing it, there were undoubtedly, -some of unsullied honour and fine talents, ready and eloquent of -speech, and dexterous in argument; but it is not in Spain only, that -men possessing all the “grace and ornament” of words have proved to -be mean and contemptible statesmen. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -Albuquerque, elected president of the Municipal Junta, and commander -of the forces, endeavoured to place the Isla de Leon in a state to -resist a sudden attack; and the French, deceived as to its strength, -after an ineffectual summons, proceeded to gird the whole bay with -works. Meanwhile, Marshal Mortier, leaving a brigade of the fifth -corps at Seville, pursued a body of four thousand men, that, under -the command of the Visconde de Gand, had retired from that town -towards the Morena; they evaded him, and fled to Ayamonte, yet -were like to be destroyed, because the bishop of Algarve, from -national jealousy, would not suffer them to pass the Portuguese -frontier. Mortier disregarding these fugitives, passed the Morena, -by Ronquillos and Monasterio, and marching against Badajos, summoned -it, the 12th of February. Contreras’ detachment had however, arrived -there on the 26th of January, and Mortier, finding, contrary to his -expectation, that the place was in a state of defence, retired to -Merida. - -This terminated the first series of operations in the fourth epoch -of the war; operations which, in three weeks, had put the French in -possession of Andalusia and Southern Estremadura, with the exception -of Gibraltar and Cadiz in the one, and of Badajos, Olivenza, and -Albuquerque in the other province. Yet, great as were the results -of this memorable irruption, more might have been obtained; and the -capture of Cadiz would have been a fatal blow to the Peninsula. - -From Andujar to Seville is only a hundred miles, yet the French took -ten days to traverse that space; a tardiness for which there appears -no adequate cause. The king, apparently elated at the acclamations -and seeming cordiality with which the towns, and even villages, -greeted him, moved slowly. He imagined that Seville would open her -gates at once; and thinking that the possession of that town, would -produce the greatest moral effect, in Andalusia, and all over Spain, -changed the first judicious plan of campaign, and marched thither -in preference to Cadiz. The moral influence of Seville, was however -transferred, along with the government, to Cadiz; and Joseph was -deceived in his expectations of entering the former city as he had -entered Cordoba. When he discovered his error there was still time to -repair it by a rapid pursuit of Albuquerque, but he feared to leave -a city with a hundred thousand people in a state of excitement upon -his flank; and resolving first to reduce Seville, he met indeed with -no formidable resistance, yet so much of opposition, as left him only -the alternative of storming the town or entering by negotiation. The -first his humanity forbad; the latter cost him time, which was worth -his crown, for Albuquerque’s proceedings were only secondary: the -ephemeral resistance of Seville was the primary cause of the safety -of Cadiz. - -The march by which the Spanish duke secured the Isla de Leon, is -only to be reckoned from Carmona. Previous to his arrival there, his -movements, although judicious, were more the result of necessity -than of skill. After the battle of Ocaña, he expected that Andalusia -would be invaded; yet, either fettered by his orders or ill-informed -of the enemy’s movements, his march upon Agudo was too late, and his -after-march upon Guadalcanal, was the forced result of his position; -he could only do that, or abandon Andalusia and retire to Badajos. - -From Guadalcanal, he advanced towards Cordoba on the 23d, and he -might have thrown himself into that town; yet the prudence of -taking such a decided part, was dependent upon the state of public -sentiment, of which he must have been a good judge. Albuquerque -indeed, imagined, that the French were already in possession of the -place, whereas they did not reach it until four days later; but -they could easily have entered it on the 24th: and as he believed -that they had done so, it is apparent that he had no confidence in -the people’s disposition. In this view, his determination to cross -the Guadalquivir, and take post at Carmona, was the fittest for the -occasion. It was at Carmona he first appears to have considered -Seville a lost city; and when the French approached, we find him -marching, with a surprising energy, towards Cadiz, yet he was again -late in deciding; for the enemy’s cavalry, moving by the shorter -road to Utrera, overtook his rear-guard: and the infantry would -assuredly have entered the Island of Leon with him, if the king had -not directed them upon Seville. The ephemeral resistance of that city -therefore saved Albuquerque; and he, in return, saved Cadiz. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -Lord Wellington’s plans were deeply affected by the invasion of -Andalusia: but before treating of the stupendous campaign he was now -meditating, it is necessary, once more to revert to the operations in -the other parts of the Peninsula, tracing them up to a fixed point; -because, although bearing strongly on the main action of the war, to -recur to them chronologically, would totally destroy, the unity of -narrative indispensable to a just handling of the subject. - - -OPERATIONS IN NAVARRE, ARAGON, AND VALENCIA. - -Suchet, being ordered to quell the disorders in Navarre, repaired to -Pampeluna, but previously directed an active pursuit of the student -Mina, who, availing himself of the quarrel between the military -governor and the viceroy, was actually master of the country between -that fortress and Tudela, and was then at Sanguessa. General Harispe, -with some battalions, marched straight against him from Zaragoza, -while detachments from Tudela and Pampeluna endeavoured to surround -him by the flanks, and a fourth body moving into the valleys of Ainsa -and Medianoz, cut him off from the Cinca river. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -Harispe quickly reached Sanguessa, but the column from Pampeluna -being retarded, Mina, with surprising boldness, crossed its line -of march, and attacked Tafalla, thus cutting the great French line -of communication; the garrison, however, made a strong resistance, -and Mina disappeared the next day. At this period, however, -reinforcements from France were pouring into Navarre, and a division, -under Loison, was at Logroño, wherefore Harispe having, in concert -with this general and with the garrison of Pampeluna, occupied -Sanguessa, Sos, Lodosa, Puenta de Reyna, and all the passages of -the Arga, Aragon, and Ebro rivers, launched a number of moveable -columns, that continually pursued Mina, until chased into the high -parts of the Pyrenees, cold and hunger obliged his band to disperse. -The enterprising chief himself escaped with seven followers, and when -the French were tracking him from house to house, he, with a romantic -simplicity, truly Spanish, repaired to Olite, that he might see -Suchet pass on his way from Zaragoza to Pampeluna. - -But that general, while seemingly occupied with the affairs of -Pampeluna, was secretly preparing guns and materials, for a -methodical war of invasion, beyond the frontiers of Aragon, and when -general Reynier, coming soon afterwards from France, with troops -intended to form an eighth corps, was appointed governor of Navarre, -Suchet returned to Zaragoza. During his absence, some petty actions -had taken place, but his general arrangements were not disturbed, and -the emperor having promised to increase the third corps to thirty -thousand men, with the intention of directing it at once against -Valencia, all the stores befitting such an enterprise were collected -at Terruel in the course of January. The resistance of Gerona, -and other events in Catalonia having, however, baffled Napoleon’s -calculations, this first destination of the third corps was changed. -Suchet was ordered to besiege Tortoza or Lerida; the eighth corps, -then forming at Logroño, was directed to cover his rear, and the -seventh corps to advance to the Lower Ebro and support the siege. -Nor was this arrangement definitive; fresh orders sent the eighth -corps towards Castile, and just at this moment Joseph’s letter from -Cordoba, calling upon Suchet to march against Valencia, arrived, and -gave a new turn to the affairs of the French in Spain. - -A decree of the emperor, dated the 8th of January, and constituting -Aragon a particular government, rendered Suchet independent of the -king’s orders, civil or military. But this decree, together with a -renewed order to commence the siege of Lerida, had been intercepted, -and the French general, doubtful of Napoleon’s real views, undertook -the enterprise against Valencia. Desirous, however, of first -intimidating the partisans hanging on the borders of Aragon, he -detached Laval against Villa Campa, and the latter being defeated on -the side of Cuença, his troops dispersed for the moment. - -Suchet then fortified a post at Terruel, to serve as a temporary base -of operations, and drew together at that place twelve battalions -of infantry, a regiment of cuirassiers, several squadrons of light -cavalry, and some field artillery, and, at the same time, caused -six battalions and three squadrons of cavalry to be assembled at -Alcanitz, under general Habert. The remainder of the third corps was -distributed on the line of the Cinca, and on the right bank of the -Ebro. The castles of Zaragoza, Alcanitz, Monzon, Venasque, Jaca, -Tudela, and other towns, were placed in a state of defence, and four -thousand men, newly arrived from France, were pushed to Daroca, to -link the active columns to those left in Aragon. These arrangements -occupied the whole of February, and, on the 1st of March, a duplicate -of the order, directing Suchet to commence the siege of Lerida, -reached Terruel. But as Habert’s column having marched on the 27th, -by the road of Morella, was already committed in the province of -Valencia, the operation went on. - - -INCURSION TO VALENCIA. - -The first day, brought Suchet’s column, in presence of the Valencian -army, for Ventura Caro, captain-general of that province, was in -march to attack the French at Terruel, and his advanced guard of five -or six thousand regulars, accompanied by armed peasants, was drawn up -on some high ground behind the river Mingares, the bed of which is a -deep ravine so suddenly sunk, as not to be perceived until close upon -it. The village and castle of Alventoza, situated somewhat in advance -of the Spaniard’s centre, were occupied, and commanded a bridge over -the river. Their right rested on the village and bridge of Puenseca, -and their left on the village of Manzanera, where the ground was -rather more practicable. - -Suchet, judging that Caro would not fight so far from Valencia, -while Habert’s column was turning his right, sent a division before -daylight, on the 2d, to turn the left of the position, and cut off -the retreat; but, although the French, after a skirmish, crossed the -ravine, the Spaniards retired with little loss upon Segorbe, and Caro -fell back to the city of Valencia. Suchet entered Segorbe the 3d, and -on the 4th was at Murviedro, the ancient Saguntum, four leagues from -Valencia. At the same time, Habert, who had defeated a small corps at -Morella, arrived at Villa Real on the sea coast. The country between -their lines of march was mountainous and impracticable, but after -passing Saguntum, the Huerta, or garden of Valencia, the richest -and most delightful part of Spain, opened, the two columns, united, -and arriving before the city on the 5th of March, seized the suburb -Seranos, and the harbour called the Grao. - -Suchet’s spies at first confirmed the hopes of an insurrection -within the walls, but the treason was detected, the leader, a -baron Pozzo Blanco, publicly executed, and the archbishop and many -others imprisoned; in fine, the plan had failed, the populace were -in arms, and there was no movement of French troops on the side -of Murcia. Five days the French general remained before the city, -vainly negotiating, and then, intrigue failing, and his army being -inadequate to force the defences, he resolved to retire. In the -night of the 10th he commenced his retreat in one column by Segorbe -and Terruel. Meanwhile the Spanish partisans were gathering on his -rear. Combats had already taken place at Liria and Castellon de la -Plana, and general Villa Campa, who had reassembled his dispersed -troops, captured four guns, with their ammunition and escort, between -Terruel and Daroca; cut off another detachment of a hundred men left -at Alventoza, and, having invested the post at Terruel, on the 7th, -by a bold and ready witted attempt, nearly carried the castle. The -12th, however, the head of Suchet’s column came in sight, Villa Campa -retired, and the 17th the French general reached Zaragoza. - -During his absence, Perena had invested Monzon, and when the garrison -of Fraga marched to its relief, the Spaniards from Lerida, entered -the latter town, and destroyed the bridge and French entrenchments. -Mina, also, was again become formidable, and, although several -columns were sent in chase of him, it is probable, that they would -have done no more than disperse his band for the moment, but for an -accident, which threw him into their hands a prisoner. - -Suchet’s failure at Valencia was more hurtful to the French than -would at first sight appear. It happened at the moment when the -National Cortes, so long desired, was at last directed to assemble; -and as it seemed to balance the misfortunes of Andalusia, it was -hailed by the Spaniards as the commencement of a better era. But the -principal military advantage was the delaying of the sieges of Lerida -and Mequinenza, whereby the subjection of Catalonia was retarded: -and although Suchet labours, and successfully, to show that he was -drawn into this enterprise by the force of circumstances, Napoleon’s -avowed discontent was well founded. The operations in Catalonia -were so hampered by the nature of the country, that it was only at -certain conjunctures, any progress could be made, and one of the -most favourable of those conjunctures, was lost, for want of the -co-operation of the third corps; but to understand this, the military -topography of Catalonia must be well considered. - -[Sidenote: Vol. I. Book I. Chap. VI.] - -That province is divided in its whole length by shoots from the -Pyrenees, which, with some interruptions, run to the Atlantic shores; -for the sierras separating Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia from -the central parts of Spain, are but continuations of those shoots. -The Ebro, forcing its way transversely through the ridges, parts -Catalonia from Valencia, but the hills, thus broken by the river, -push their rocky heads southward to the sea, cutting off Taragona -from Tortoza, and enclosing what may be called the eastern region of -Catalonia, which contains Rosas, Gerona, Hostalrich, Vich, Barcelona, -Manreza, Taragona, Reus, and many more towns. The torrents, the -defiles, and other military features of this region have been -before described. The western portion of Catalonia lying beyond the -principal spine, is bounded partly by Aragon, partly by Valencia; -and, like the eastern region, it is an assemblage of small plains and -rugged valleys, each, the bed of a river, descending towards the Ebro -from the Pyrenees. It contains the fortresses of Balaguer, Lerida, -Mequinenza, Cervera, and, near the mouth of the Ebro, Tortoza, which, -however, belongs in a military view rather to Valencia than Catalonia. - -Now the mountain ridge, parting the eastern from the western region -of Catalonia, could only be passed by certain routes, for the most -part impracticable for artillery, and those practicable, leading upon -walled towns at both sides of the defiles. Thus Cervera is situated -on the principal and direct line from Lerida to Barcelona; Balaguer, -Cardona, and Montserrat, on another and more circuitous road to -the same city. Between Lerida and Taragona, stands Momblanch, and -between Taragona, and Tortoza, the Fort St. Felippe blocks the Col de -Balaguer. All these places were in the hands of the Spaniards, and a -number of smaller fortresses, or castles, such as Urgel, Berga, and -Solsona, served as rallying points, where the warlike Somatenes, of -the higher valleys, took refuge from the moveable columns, and from -whence, supplied with arms and ammunition, they sallied, to harass, -the flanks and rear, of both the French corps. - -In the eastern region, the line of operations for the seventh corps, -was between the mountains and the sea-coast, and parallel with both; -hence, the Spanish irregular forces, holding all the communications, -and the high valleys on both sides of the great dividing spine, could -at all times descend upon the rear and flanks of the French, while -the regular troops, opposed to them on a narrow front, and supported -by the fortresses of Gerona, Hostalrich, and Taragona, could advance -or retire as circumstances dictated. And upon this principle, the -defence of Catalonia was conducted. - -Detachments and sometimes the main body of the Spanish army, passing -by the mountains, or by sea from Taragona, harassed the French -flanks, and when defeated, retired on Vich, Manresa, Montserrat, -or Cervera, and finally to Taragona. From this last, the generals -communicated with Tortoza, Valencia, Gibraltar, the Balearic Isles, -and even Sicily, and drew succours of all kinds from those places, -and meanwhile the bands in the mountains continued to vex the -French communications; and it was only during the brief period of -lassitude in the Spanish army, following any great defeat, that the -seventh corps could chase those mountaineers. Nor, until Gerona -and Hostalrich fell, was it easy to make any but sudden and short -incursions towards Taragona, because the Miguelettes from the higher -valleys, and detachments from the army at Taragona, again passing -by the hills or by sea, joined the garrisons, and interrupted the -communications; and thus obliged the French to retire, because the -country beyond the Llobregat could never feed them long. - -But when Barcelona could not be succoured by sea, it was -indispensable to conduct convoys by land, and to insure their -arrival, the whole army was obliged to make frequent movements in -advance, retiring again when the object was effected; and this being -often renewed, offered many opportunities for cutting off minor -convoys, detachments, and even considerable bodies isolated by the -momentary absence of the army. Thus, during the siege of Gerona, -Blake passed through the mountains and harassed the besiegers. -When the place fell, he retired again to Taragona, and Augereau -took the occasion to attack the Miguelettes, and Somatenes, in the -high valleys; but in the midst of this operation admiral Baudin’s -squadron, was intercepted by admiral Martin; and the insatiable -craving of Barcelona, obliged Augereau to reassemble his army, and -conduct a convoy there by land. Yet he was soon obliged to return -again, lest he should himself consume the provisions he brought for -the city. This retreat, as usual, drew on the Spaniards, who were -again defeated; and Augereau once more advanced, in the intention -of co-operating with the third corps, which, he supposed, would, -following the Emperor’s design, be before Lerida or Tortoza. However, -when Augereau thus advanced, Suchet was on the march to Valencia; and -Henry O’Donnel who had succeeded Blake in the command, recommenced -the warfare on the French communications, and forced Augereau again -to retire to Gerona, at the moment when Suchet, having returned to -Aragon, was ready to besiege Lerida; thus, like unruly horses in a -chariot dragging different ways, the French impeded each other’s -movements. I shall now briefly narrate the events touched upon above. - - -OPERATIONS OF THE SEVENTH CORPS. - -Gerona having fallen, general Souham with a division, scoured the -high valleys, beating the Miguelettes of Claros and Rovira, at -Besalu, Olot, Ribas, and Campredon; and at Ripoll, he destroyed -a manufactory for arms. Being afterwards reinforced with Pino’s -division, he marched from Olot, by the road of Esteban and Manlieu; -the Somatenes disputed the defiles near the last point, but the -French forcing the passage, again took possession of Vich. Meanwhile -Blake having been called to Andalusia, the Provincial Junta of -Catalonia rejecting the duke Del Parque, took upon themselves to give -the command to Henry O’Donnel, whose courage during the siege of -Gerona had gained him a high reputation. He was now with the remains -of Blake’s army at Vich, and as the French approached that town he -retired to the pass of Col de Sespina, from whence he had a free -retreat upon Moya and Manresa. Souham’s advanced guard, pursued, -and at Tona, captured some baggage, but the Spaniard turned on -finding his rear pressed, and when the pursuers mounted the heights -of Sespino, charged with a shock, that sent them headlong down the -hills again. Souham rallied the beaten troops in the plain, and the -next day offered battle; but O’Donnel continued his retreat, and the -French general returned to Vich. - -During these events, Augereau, leaving a detachment in Hostalrich to -blockade the castle, marched to Barcelona, by the road of Cardedieu, -having previously ordered Duhesme, to post three battalions and five -squadrons of cuirassiers, with some guns, near the junction, of the -roads of Cardedieu and Manresa, to watch O’Donnel. Colonel Guery, -commanding this detachment, placed one battalion at Granollers, a -second at Santa Perpetua, and with the remainder occupied Mollet, -taking however no military precautions; and O’Donnel who had been -joined by Campo Verde, from the side of Cervera, sent him to fall -upon the French posts. Campo Verde, passing by Tarrassa and Sabadel, -surprised and put to the sword or captured all the troops at Santa -Perpetua and Mollet; but those at Granollers, threw themselves into a -large building, and defended it for three days, when by the approach -of Augereau they were relieved. The marshal finding the streets of -Mollet strewed with French carcasses, ordered up the division of -Souham from Vich, but passed on himself to Barcelona. When there, he -became convinced how oppressive Duhesme’s conduct had been, and sent -him to France in disgrace; after which, unable to procure provisions -without exhausting the magazines of Barcelona, he resumed his former -position at Gerona, and Souham, passing the defiles of Garriga, -returned to Vich. - -All this time the blockade of Hostalrich continued; but the retreat -of Augereau, and the success of Campo Verde’s enterprise, produced -extraordinary joy over all Catalonia. The prisoners taken, were -marched from town to town, and the action everywhere exaggerated; -the decree for enrolling a fifth of the male population was enforced -with vigour, and the execution entrusted to the Baron d’Erolles, a -native of Talarn, who afterwards obtained considerable celebrity. -The army, in which there was still a large body of Swiss troops, -was thus reinforced; the confidence of the people increased hourly, -and a Local Junta was established at Arenys de Mar, to organise the -Somatenes on the coast, and to direct the application of succours -from the sea. The Partisans, also reassembling their dispersed bands -in the higher valleys, again vexed the Ampurdan, and incommoded the -troops blockading the citadel of Hostalrich. - -O’Donnel himself, moving to Manresa, called the Miguelettes from -the Lerida side, to his assistance; and soon formed a body of more -than twelve thousand fighting-men, with which he took post at Moya, -in the beginning of February, and harassed the French in front of -Vich, while, in the rear of that town, Rovira occupied the heights -above Roda. Souham, seeing the crests of the hills thus swarming with -enemies, and, having but five thousand men of all arms to oppose to -them, demanded reinforcements; but Augereau paid little attention -to him: and, on the 20th, O’Donnel, descending the mountain of -Centellas, entered the plains in three columns, and the French -general had scarcely time to draw up his troops a little in front of -the town, ere he was attacked with a vigour hitherto unusual with the -Spaniards. - - -COMBAT OF VICH. - -Rovira commenced the action, by driving the enemy’s posts, on the -side of Roda, back upon the town, and soon afterwards O’Donnel, -coming close up on the front of the French position, opened all his -guns, and, throwing out skirmishers along the whole of the adverse -line, filed his cavalry, under cover of their fire, to the right, -intending to outflank Souham’s left; but the latter general, leaving -a battalion to hold Rovira in check, encouraged his own infantry, -and sent his dragoons against the Spanish horsemen, who, at the -first charge, were driven back in confusion. The foot then fell in -on the French centre, but, failing to make any serious impression, -the Spanish general, whose great superiority of numbers enabled him -to keep heavy masses in reserve, endeavoured to turn both flanks of -the enemy at the same time. Souham was now hard pressed, his infantry -were few, his reserves all engaged, and himself severely wounded in -the head. O’Donnel, who had rallied his cavalry, and brought up his -Swiss regiments, was full of confidence, and in person fiercely led -the whole mass once more against the left; but, at this critical -period, the French infantry, far from wavering, firmly closed their -ranks, and sent their volleys more rapidly into the hostile ranks, -while the cavalry, sensible that the fate of all (for there was no -retreat) hung upon the issue of their charge, met their adversaries -with such a full career that horse and man went down before them, and -the Swiss, being separated from the rest, surrendered. Rovira was -afterwards driven away, and the Spanish army returned to the hills, -having lost a full fourth of its own numbers, and killed or wounded -twelve hundred of the enemy. - -O’Donnel’s advance, had been the signal, for all the irregular -bands to act against the various quarters of the French; they -were, however, with the exception of a slight succour, thrown into -Hostalrich, unsuccessful, and, being closely pursued by the moveable -columns, dispersed. Thus the higher valleys were again subdued, the -Junta fled from Arenys de Mar, Campo Verde returned to the country -about Cervera, and O’Donnel, quitting the Upper Llobregat, retired by -Taraza, Martorel, and Villa Franca to the camp of Taragona, leaving -only an advanced guard at Ordal. - -It was at this moment, when Upper Catalonia was in a manner abandoned -by the Spanish general, that the emperor, directed the seventh -corps upon the Lower Ebro, to support Suchet’s operations against -Lerida and Mequinenza. Augereau, therefore, leaving a detachment -under Verdier, in the Ampurdan, and two thousand men to blockade -Hostalrich, ordered his brother and general Mazzucchelli (the one -commanding Souham’s, and the other Pino’s division) to march upon -Manreza, while he himself, with the Westphalian division, repaired -once more to Barcelona, and from thence directed all the subsequent -movements. - -General Augereau, passing by Col de Sespina, entered Manreza, the -16th of March, and there joined Mazzucchelli; but the inhabitants -abandoned the place, and general Swartz was sent with a brigade, from -Moncada, to take possession, while the two divisions continued their -movement, by Montserrat, upon Molino del Rey. The 21st they advanced -to Villa Franca, and the Spaniards retired from Ordal towards -Taragona. But the French, acting under orders from Barcelona, left a -thousand men in Villa Franca, and, after scouring the country on the -right and left, passed the Col de San Cristina, and established their -quarters about Reus, by which the Spanish army at Taragona was placed -between them and the troops at Villa Franca. - -O’Donnel, whose energy and military talents, were superior to his -predecessors, saw, and instantly profited from this false position. -By his orders, general Juan Caro marched, with six thousand men, -against the French in Villa Franca, and, on the 28th, killed many -and captured the rest, together with some artillery and stores; but, -being wounded himself, resigned the command to general Gasca, after -the action. Augereau, alarmed for Manreza, detached troops, both by -Olesa and Montserrat, to reinforce Swartz. The first reached their -destinations, but the others, twelve hundred strong, were intercepted -by Gasca, and totally defeated at Esparaguera on the 3d of April. -Campo Verde then, coming down from the side of Cervera, took the -chief command, and proceeded against Manreza, by Montserrat, while -Milans de Boch, and Rovira, hemmed in the French on the opposite -side, and the Somatenes gathered on the hills to aid the operations. -Swartz evacuated the town in the night, and thinking to baffle the -Spaniards, by taking the road of Taraza and Sabadel, was followed -closely and beaten, by Rovira and Milans, on the 5th of April, and, -with great difficulty and the loss of all his baggage, reached -Barcelona. - -These operations having insulated the French divisions at Reus, -an officer was despatched, by sea, with orders to recall them to -Barcelona. Meanwhile count Severoli, who had taken the command of -them, and whose first instructions were to co-operate with Suchet, -feared to pass the mountains between Reus and the Ebro, lest he -should expose his rear to an attack from Taragona, and perhaps -fail of meeting the third corps at last. Keeping, therefore, on -the defensive at Reus, he detached colonel Villatte, at the head -of two battalions and some cavalry, across the hills, by Dos Aguas -and Falcet, to open a communication with the third corps, a part of -which had just seized Mora and Flix, on the Lower Ebro. Villatte -accomplished his object, and returned with great celerity, fighting -his way through the Somatenes, who were gathering round the defiles -in his rear. He regained Reus, just as Severoli, having received the -order of recall, was commencing his march for Barcelona. - -[Sidenote: Vacani Istoria Militáre degl’Italiani in Ispagna.] - -In the night of the 6th, this movement took place, but in such -confusion, that, from Taragona, O’Donnel perceived the disorder; -and sending a detachment, under colonel Orry, to harass the French, -followed himself with the rest of his army. Nevertheless, Severoli’s -rear guard, covered the retreat successfully, until a position was -attained near Villa Franca; and there Orry, pressing on too closely, -was wounded and taken, and his troops rejoined their main body. As -these divisions arrived, Campo Verde fell back to Cervera, Severoli -reached Barcelona, and Augereau retired to Gerona, having lost more -than three thousand men, by a series of most unskilful movements. The -situation in which he voluntarily placed himself, was precisely such -as a great general would rejoice to see his adversary choose. - -Barcelona, the centre of his operations, was encircled by mountains, -to be passed only at certain defiles; now Reus and Manresa, were -beyond those defiles, and several days march from each other. Rovira -and Milans being about San Culgat, cut the communication between -Manresa and Barcelona; and O’Donnel, at Taragona, was nearer to -the defiles of Cristina, than the French divisions at Reus. His -communication with Campo Verde, was open by Valls, Pla, and Santa -Coloma de Querault; and with Milans and Rovira, by Villa Franca, San -Sadurni, and Igualada. - -Augereau indeed, placed a battalion in Villa Franca, but this only -rendered his situation worse; for what could six hundred men effect -in a mountainous country against three considerable bodies of the -enemy? The result was inevitable. The battalion, at Villa Franca, was -put to the sword; Swartz only saved a remnant of his brigade by a -timely flight; the divisions at Reus with difficulty made good their -retreat; and O’Donnel, who, one month before, had retired from the -battle of Vich, broken and discomfited by only five thousand French, -now, with that very beaten army, baffled Augereau, and obliged him, -although at the head of more than twenty thousand men, to abandon -Lower Catalonia, and retire to Gerona with disgrace: a surprising -change, yet one in which fortune had no share. - -[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Memoirs.] - -Augereau’s talents for handling small corps in a battle, have been -recorded by a master hand. There is a vast difference between that -and conducting a campaign; but the truth is, that Catalonia had, -like Aragon, been declared a particular government, and Augereau, -afflicted with gout, remained in the palace of Barcelona, affecting -the state of a viceroy, when he should have been at the head -of his troops in the field. On the other hand, his opponent, a -hardy resolute man, excited by a sudden celebrity, was vigilant, -indefatigable, and eager. He merited the success he obtained; and, -with better and more experienced troops, that success would have been -infinitely greater. Yet if the expedition to Valencia had not taken -place, O’Donnel, distracted by a double attack, would have remained -at Taragona; and neither the action of Vich, nor the disasters at -Mollet, Villa Franca, and Esparaguera, would have taken place. - -Napoleon, discontented, as he well might be, with these operations, -appointed M’Donald, duke of Tarentum, to supersede Augereau; but, in -the meantime, the latter, having reached Gerona, disposed his troops -in the most commodious manner to cover the blockade of Hostalrich, -giving Severoli the command. - - -FALL OF HOSTALRICH CASTLE. - -[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Memoirs.] - -This citadel was invested early in January. Situated on a high rock, -armed with forty guns, well garrisoned, and commanded by a brave man, -it was nearly impregnable; and the French at first endeavoured to -reduce it by a simple blockade: but, towards the middle of February, -commenced the erection of mortar-batteries. Severoli also pressed the -place more vigorously than before, and although O’Donnel, collecting -convoys on the side of Vich and Mattaro, caused the blockading troops -to be attacked at several points by the Miguelettes, every attempt -to introduce supplies failed. The garrison was reduced to extremity, -and honourable terms were offered, but the governor, Julian Estrada, -rejected them, and prepared to break through the enemy’s line, an -exploit always expected from a good garrison in Turenne’s days, and, -as Napoleon has shewn by numerous examples, generally successful. - -O’Donnel, who could always communicate with the garrison, being -aware of their intention, sent some vessels to Arenys de Mar, and -made demonstrations from thence, and from the side of St. Celoni, to -favour the enterprise; and in the night of the 12th, Estrada, leaving -his sick behind, came forth with about fourteen hundred men. He first -made as if for St. Celoni, but afterwards turning to his right, broke -through on the side of St. Felieu de Buxalieu and pushed for Vich; -but the French closing rapidly from the right and left, pursued so -closely, that Estrada himself was wounded, and taken, together with -about three hundred men; many also were killed, the rest dispersed -in the mountains, and eight hundred reached Vich in safety. This -courageous action was therefore successful. Thus, on the 14th of -May, after four months of blockade and ten weeks of bombardment, the -castle fell, the line of communication with Barcelona was completed, -and the errors committed by Duhesme were partly remedied, but at -an expense of two years of field operations, many battles, and four -sieges. - -[Sidenote: Victoires et Conquêtes des Français.] - -Two small islands, called Las Medas, situated at the mouth of the -Ter, and affording a safe anchorage, were next seized, and this event -which facilitated the passage of the French vessels, stealing from -port to port with provisions, or despatches, finished Augereau’s -career. It had been the very reverse of St. Cyr’s. The latter, -victorious in the field, was humane afterwards; but Augereau -endeavouring, to frighten those people into submission, who he had -failed to beat, erected gibbets along the high-roads, upon which -every man taken in arms was hung up without remorse, producing -precisely the effect that might be expected. The Catalans more -animated by their successes, than daunted by this barbarous severity, -became incredibly savage in their revenge, and thus all human feeling -lost, both parties were alike steeped in blood and loaded with -crimes. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -While Augereau lost, in Barcelona, the fruits of his success at -Gerona, Suchet, sensible how injurious the expedition to Valencia -had proved, was diligently repairing that error. Reinforcements from -France, had raised his fighting men to about twenty-three thousand, -and of these, he drew out thirteen thousand to form the siege of -Lerida; the remainder, were required to maintain the forts in Aragon, -and to hold in check the Partisans, principally in the higher -valleys of the Pyrenees. Villa Campa however, with from three to -four thousand men, still kept about the lordship of Molina, and the -mountains of Albaracin. - -Two lines of operation were open to Suchet, the one, short and -direct, by the high road leading from Zaragoza through Fraga to -Lerida; the other circuitous, over the Sierra de Alcubierre, to -Monzon, and from thence to Lerida. The first was inconvenient, -because the Spaniards, when they took Fraga, destroyed the bridge -over the Cinca. Moreover, the fortress of Mequinenza, the Octogesa -of Cæsar, situated at the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, -was close on the right flank, and might seriously incommode the -communications with Zaragoza, whereas the second route, although -longer, was safer, and less exhausted of forage and provisions. - -Monzon was already a considerable military establishment, the -battering train consisting of forty pieces, with seven hundred rounds -of ammunition attached to each, was directed there, and placed under -the guard of Habert’s division, which occupied the line of the Cinca. -Leval leaving general Chlopiski with a brigade at Daroca, to observe -Villa Campa, drew nearer to Zaragoza with the rest of his division. -Musnier marched with one brigade to Alcanitz, and was there joined -by his second brigade, which had been conducted to that point, from -Terruel, across the Sierra de Gudar. And while these movements were -executing, the castles of Barbastro, Huesca, Ayerbe, Zuera, Pina, -Bujarola, and other points on the left of the Ebro, were occupied by -detachments. - -The right bank of that river, being guarded by Leval’s division, and -the country on the left bank, secured by a number of fortified posts, -there remained two divisions of infantry, and about nine hundred -cavalry, disposable for the operations against Lerida. On the Spanish -side, Campo Verde was with O’Donnel at Manreza, and Garcia Novaro at -Taragona, having small detachments on the right bank of the Ebro to -cover Tortoza; Perenna with five battalions occupied Balaguer on the -Upper Segre. - -Such were the relative situations of both parties, when general -Musnier quitting Alcanitz towards the end of March, crossed the -Guadalupe, drove Novarro’s detachments within the walls of Tortoza, -and then remounting the Ebro, seized some boats, and passing that -river at Mora and at Flix, communicated as I have before related, -with colonel Villatte of the seventh corps. And while this was -passing on the Ebro, general Habert crossed the Cinca in two columns, -one of which moved straight upon Balaguer, while the other passed -the Segre at Camarasa. Perenna, fearing to be attacked on both sides -of that river, and not wishing to defend Balaguer, retired down the -left bank, and using the Lerida bridge, remounted the right bank to -Corbins, where he took post behind the Noguerra, at its confluence -with the Segre. - -Suchet himself repaired to Monzon the 10th of April, and placed a -detachment at Candasnos to cover his establishments from the garrison -of Mequinenza, and the 13th he advanced with a brigade of infantry, -and all his cavalry, by Almacellas, against Lerida; meanwhile Habert, -descending the right bank of the Segre, forced the passage of the -Noguerra, and obliged Perenna to retire within the place. The same -day Musnier came up from Flix, and the town being thus encompassed, -the operations of the seventh and third corps were connected. -Suchet’s line of operations from Aragon, was short, direct, and easy -to supply, because the produce of that province was greater than -the consumption; but Augereau’s line, was long and unsafe, and the -produce of Catalonia was at no time equal to the consumption. - -Lerida, celebrated in ancient and modern times, contained about -eighteen thousand inhabitants. Situated upon the high road from -Zaragoza to Barcelona, and about sixty-five miles from each; it -possessed a stone bridge over the Segre, and was only a short -distance from the Ebro, and the Cinca rivers; its strategic -importance was therefore great, and the more so, that it in a manner -commanded the plains of Urgel, called the granary of Catalonia. -The regular governor was named Gonsalez, but Garcia Conde had been -appointed chief commandant, to appease his discontent at O’Donnel’s -elevation; and the troops he brought with him had encreased the -garrison to nine thousand regulars, besides the armed inhabitants. - -The river Segre covered the town on the south-east, and the head of -the bridge was protected on the left bank, by a rampart and ditch -enclosing a square stone building. The body of the place on the north -side, was defended by a wall, without either ditch or covered way, -but strengthened and flanked by bastions, and by towers. This wall on -the east, was joined to a rocky hill more than two hundred and fifty -feet high, the top of which sustained the citadel, an assemblage -of huge solid edifices, clustered about a castle of great height, -and surrounded by an irregular work flanked by good bastions with -ramparts from forty to fifty feet high. - -The descent from this rock into the town, was gentle, and the works -were there strengthened by ditches; on the other parts, the walls -could be seen to their base; yet the great height of the rock -rendered it impossible to breach them, and the approaches were nearly -inaccessible. Between the citadel-rock and the river, the town was -squeezed out, about two or three hundred yards, and the salient part -was secured by an entrenchment, and by two bastions called the Carmen -and the Magdalen. - -To the westward of the town, at the distance of seven or eight -hundred yards, the hill, on which Afranius and Petrieus encamped -to oppose Cæsar, was crowned, on the end next to Lerida, by Fort -Garden, which was again covered by a large horn-work, with ditches -above twenty feet deep; and at the farthest extremity of the Afranian -hill, two large redoubts called the Pilar and San Fernando, secured -the whole of the flat summit. All the works of Lerida were in good -condition, and armed with more than one hundred pieces of artillery; -the magazines were full, and the people enthusiastic. A local Junta -also had been formed to excite public feeling; and two officers of -artillery had already been murdered and their heads nailed to the -gates of the town. - -The siege was to be a joint operation by the third and seventh corps, -but the information derived from colonel Villatte, and the appearance -of Spanish Partisans on the lower Ebro, led Suchet to suspect that -the seventh corps had already retired, and that the burthen would -rest on him alone, wherefore he still kept his battering train at -Monzon, intending to wait until O’Donnel’s plans should be clearly -indicated, before he commenced the siege. Meanwhile, he established a -communication across the Segre, by means of a rope ferry, one league -above Lerida, and after closely examining the defences, prepared -materials for the construction of batteries. - -Two battalions of the investing troops had been left at Monzon and -Balaguer, but the remainder were thus distributed. On the left bank -of the Segre, at Alcoteletge, four thousand men, including the -cavalry, which was composed of a regiment of cuirassiers and one -of hussars, were stationed as a corps of observation; and Harispe, -with three battalions, invested the bridge-head of Lerida. By this -disposition, the ferry-boat was protected, and all danger from the -sudden rising of the Segre obviated, because the stone bridge of -Balaguer furnished a certain communication. The rest of the troops -occupied different positions, on the roads to Monzon, Fraga, and -Corbins, but as the number was insufficient to complete the circle -of investment round Fort Garden, that part was continually scoured by -patrols. - -Scarcely were these arrangements completed when a Spanish officer, -pretending to bear propositions for an exchange of prisoners, was -stopped on the left bank of the Segre, and the French general -detained him, suspecting his real object was to gain information; for -rumours obtained, that O’Donnel was collecting troops at Momblanch, -that Campo Verde was at Cervera, and that the Somatenes of the high -valleys were in arms on the upper Segre. Suchet anxious to ascertain -the truth of these reports, reinforced Harispe with three hundred -hussars on the 19th of April, and carried the corps of observation -to Balaguer. The governor of Lerida took that opportunity to make -a sally, but was repulsed, and the 21st, the French general, to -strengthen his position at Balaguer, caused the bridge of Camarasa, -above that town, to be broken, and then advanced as far as Tarrega, -forty miles on the road to Barcelona, to obtain intelligence; for he -was still uncertain of Augereau’s movements, and like every other -general, French or English, found it extremely difficult to procure -authentic information. On this occasion, however, by a happy fortune, -he ascertained that O’Donnel, with two divisions, was at Momblanch, -ready to descend the mountains and succour Lerida; wherefore -returning by one forced march to Balaguer, he directed Musnier -to resume his former position at Alcoleletge. This rapidity was -well-timed, for O’Donnel had passed the defiles of Momblanch, with -eight thousand chosen infantry, and six hundred cavalry, and encamped -at Vinaxa, about twenty-five miles from Lerida, on the 22d. There a -note from Garcia Conde, saying that, the French reserve being drawn -off, the investing force was weak, reached him, and he being willing -to seize the favourable moment, immediately pushed forward, reached -Juneda, fourteen miles from Lerida, by ten o’clock in the morning of -the 23d, and, after a halt of two hours, resumed his march with the -cavalry and one division of infantry, leaving the other to follow -more leisurely. - - -COMBAT OF MARGALEF. - -Four miles from Juneda, stood the ruined village of Margalef, and -from thence to Lerida was an open country, on which O’Donnel could -perceive no covering force. Hence, trusting implicitly to Conde’s -information (already falsified by Suchet’s activity), the Spanish -general descended the hills, and crossed the plain in three columns, -one following the high road and the other two marching on the right -and left. The centre outstripping the flankers, soon beat back -the advanced posts of Harispe; but that general, charged with his -three hundred hussars, upon the Spanish column, so suddenly, that -it was thrown into confusion, and fled towards Margalef, to which -place, the flank columns also retreated, yet in good order. During -this skirmish, the garrison sallied over the bridge, but the French -infantry stood firm, and the besieged, seeing the rout of O’Donnel’s -column, returned to the town. - -Meanwhile, Musnier, hearing the firing, guessed the real state of -affairs, and marched at once with his infantry and four hundred -cuirassiers from Alcoteletge across the plain towards Margalef, -hoping to cut off the Spaniards’ retreat. O’Donnel had, however, -rallied his troops, and was already in line of battle, the artillery -on the right and the cavalry on the left, his second division being, -however, still in the rear. The French cuirassiers and a battery of -light artillery, came up at a quick pace, a cannonade commenced, and -the Spanish cavalry rode forward, but the cuirassiers, commanded by -general Boussard, charged hotly, and forced them back on the line -of battle in such a manner that the latter wavered, when Boussard, -observing the confusion, came with a rude shock upon the flank of -the infantry. The Walloon guards made an effort to form square, -but the confusion was extreme, and nearly all the Spanish infantry -threw down their arms or were sabred. The cuirassiers, elated with -their success, then met and overthrew a Swiss regiment, forming the -advanced guard of the second Spanish division; but the main body of -the latter checked their fury, and O’Donnel retreated in good order, -and without further loss to the defile of Momblanch. - -This action, although not discreditable to O’Donnel, was very -unfortunate. The plain was strewed with carcases; three Spanish -guns, one general, eight colonels, and above five thousand men were -captured; and the next day the prisoners, being first ostentatiously -marched under the walls of the town, were shown to the Spanish -officer who had been detained on the 19th, after which he was -dismissed by the road of Cervera, that he might spread the news of -the defeat. - -Suchet wishing to profit from the effect of this victory upon the -besieged, attempted the night after the battle, to storm the -redoubts of San Fernando and Pilar. He was successful with the -latter, and the assailants descended into the ditch of San Fernando, -from whence the Spaniards, only fifty in number and unprovided with -hand grenades, could not drive them, and a parley ensuing it was -agreed that the French should retire without being molested. Thus the -Pilar was also saved, for being commanded by San Fernando, it was -necessarily evacuated. Previous to this attempt, Suchet had summoned -the city to surrender, offering safe conduct for commissioners to -count the dead on the field of Margalef, and to review the prisoners; -but Garcia Conde replied, “_that Lerida never looked for external -succour in her defences_.” - - -SIEGE OF LERIDA. - -The absolute retreat of Augereau, was now fully ascertained, yet the -victory of Margalef, and the apathy of the Valencians, encouraged -Suchet to commence the siege in form. The prisoners were sent to -France by the way of Jaca; the battering train was brought up from -Monzon, and all the other necessary preparations being completed, -the Spanish outposts were driven within the walls between the 26th -and 27th. The following night, under the direction of general Haxo, -ground was broken three hundred yards from the bastions of the Carmen -and Magdalen; the Spaniards threw some fire-balls, and opened a few -guns, but without interrupting the workmen, and when day broke, the -besiegers were well covered in the trenches. - -In the night of the 30th the first parallel was completed. -Breaching and counter-batteries were commenced, six sixteen-pounders -were destined to batter the left face of the Carmen, four long -twelve-pounders, to ruin the defences of the Magdalen, and four -mortars of eight inches to throw shells into the citadel. The weather -was rainy and the labour heavy, yet the works advanced rapidly, -and on the 2d of May, a fourth battery, armed with two mortars and -two sixteen-pounders, was raised against the Carmen. Meanwhile the -Spanish musqueteers, incommoded the trenches from the left bank -of the Segre, which obliged the French to contract the circle of -investment on that side. - -In the evening of the 4th of May, six hundred Spaniards, sallying -from the Carmen, carried the fourth battery and all the left of the -trenches, while another body, coming from the Magdalen, menaced the -right of the French works. The French guards held the latter in -check, and the reserves finally drove the former back into the town, -but after this attack, a ditch and rampart, to serve as a place of -arms, was carried from the battery which had been taken, down to the -river, and as the light troops still continued to ply the trenches -from the other side of the Segre, ground was broken there, close to -the water, and a battery of two guns was constructed to answer six -Spanish field-pieces, posted on the bridge itself. The parallel of -the main attack was also extended on the right, embracing a part of -the northern front of the citadel, and two mortars were placed at -this extremity. - -All the French batteries opened at day-break on the 7th, the mortars -played into the town and citadel, and four Spanish guns were -dismounted in the Carmen. Nevertheless, the counter fire silenced -three French batteries, the dismounted guns were replaced, and three -hundred men stealing out at dusk by the Puerta Nueva, fell upon the -right of the parallels, took the two mortars, and penetrated as far -as the approaches against the Magdalen. This sally was repulsed by -the French reserves, but the latter pursuing too far, suffered from -grape, and in the night a violent storm, with rain, damaged the -batteries and overflowed the trenches. From the 8th to the 11th the -French only laboured at the works, and opened a second parallel one -hundred and fifty yards in advance of the first, with the intention -of forming fresh batteries; that being closer under the citadel-rock, -would be less exposed to its plunging fire. More guns, and of a -larger size, were also mounted; three new batteries were constructed; -and marksmen were planted to harass the Spanish cannoneers. - -On the 12th the besiegers recommenced their fire from eight -batteries, containing fifteen guns and nineteen mortars. The besieged -replied at first sharply, but in a little time stammered in their -answers, and the French artillery taking the ascendent, the walls of -the Carmen and Magdalen crumbled under their salvos, and a portable -magazine blew up in the citadel. Towards evening two breaches in -the Carmen, and one in the Magdalen appeared practicable, and after -dark, some Swiss deserters coming out through the openings, brought -intelligence, that the streets of the town behind the breaches, were -retrenched and defended by batteries. - -Suchet’s hopes of an early termination to the siege now rose high. -He had from the first supposed, that the vehemence of the citizens, -and of the armed peasantry who had entered the place, would oblige -the governor to fight the town to the last, instead of reserving -his efforts for the defence of the citadel. He knew that armed -mobs easily excited, are as easily discouraged, and he projected -to carry the breaches briskly, and, with one sweep, to force all -the inhabitants into the citadel, being well assured that they -would hamper, if not entirely mar, the defence of that formidable -fortress: but he resolved first, to carry the forts of San Fernando -and the Pilar and the horn-work of Fort Garden, lest the citizens, -flying from the assault of the breaches, should take refuge on that -side. To effect this, three columns, provided with ladders and other -necessary implements, simultaneously mounted the hill of Afranius -that night; one marched against the redoubts, and the others were -ordered to storm the horn-work on two sides. The Pilar was carried -without difficulty, and the garrison flying towards Fort Garden, fell -in with the second French column, which arrived with the fugitives -at the ditch of the horn-work, and being there joined by the third -column, which had taken a wrong direction, the whole mass entered -the place fighting. The Spaniards saved themselves in Fort Garden, -and meanwhile the people in Fernando resisted desperately, and that -redoubt was not taken until two-thirds of the defendants were put to -the sword. Thus the French effected their object with the loss of a -hundred men. - -During this operation the great batteries only played into the -citadel, but, at daybreak, renewed their fire on the breaches; steps -were also cut in the parallel, to facilitate the advance of the -troops to the assault; and all the materials, necessary to effect -a solid lodgement on the walls, were conveyed into the trenches. On -the other hand, the Spaniards were preparing a grand sally, to retake -the horn-work of Fort Garden, but the French arrangements being -first completed, at seven o’clock, in the evening of the 13th, four -shells were thrown as a signal, and the storming-parties, jumping -out of the trenches, rushed towards the breaches, two advancing -against the Carmen, a third attacking the Magdalen, and a fourth, -moving close by the river, endeavouring to break in on that side. The -Spaniards, unexpectant of the attack, at first permitted the French -to mount the breaches unmolested; but, soon recovering, poured such -a fire of musquetry and artillery upon the head of the principal -columns that they staggered, yet, being encouraged by general Habert, -finally forced their way into the town; and, at the same moment, the -troops on the right and left, being also successful, turned all the -retrenchments in the streets. On the other side of the river, general -Harispe carried the bridge, and Suchet himself, with the reserve, -followed close upon the steps of the storming-parties; the Spaniards -were thus overpowered, and the regular troops commenced a retreat -into the citadel. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -It was now that the French general put his design in execution. -Harispe’s brigade passing the bridge, made for the gate of St. -Anthony, looking towards Fort Garden, and cut off all egress from the -town; and this done, the French columns advanced from every side, -in a concentric direction, upon the citadel, and, with shouts, and -stabs, and musquetry, drove men, women, and children before them, -while the guns of the castle smote friends and foes alike. Then, -flying up the ascent, the shrieking and terrified crowds rushed into -the fortress with the retiring garrison, and crowded the summit of -the rock; but, all that night, the French shells fell amongst the -hapless multitude, and, at daylight, the fire was redoubled, and the -carnage swelled, until Garcia Conde, overpowered by the cries and -sufferings of the miserable people, hoisted the white flag. - -At twelve o’clock, the horrible scene terminated, and the -capitulation that followed was honourable in terms to the besieged; -but Fort Garden being included, Suchet became master of Lerida, with -its immense stores and near eight thousand prisoners, for the whole -loss of the garrison had been only twelve hundred men. - -Thus suddenly was this powerful fortress reduced, by a proceeding, -politic indeed, but scarcely to be admitted within the pale of -civilized warfare. For, though a town, taken by assault, be -considered the lawful prey of a licentious soldiery, this remnant -of barbarism, disgracing the military profession, does not warrant -the driving of unarmed helpless people, into a situation, where they -must perish from the fire of the enemy, unless a governor fail in his -duty. Suchet justifies it, on the ground, that he thus spared a great -effusion of blood which must necessarily have attended a protracted -siege, and the fact is true. But this is to spare soldiers’ blood at -the expense of women’s and children’s, and, had Garcia Conde’s nature -been stern, he, too, might have pleaded expediency, and the victory -would have fallen to him who could longest have sustained the sight -of mangled infants and despairing mothers. - - - - -CHAP. IV. - - -When Lerida fell, Conde was accused of treachery, but there seems no -foundation for the charge; the cause stated by Suchet is sufficient -for the effect; yet the defence was very unskilful. The walls, on -the side of the attack, could not be expected, and scarcely did, -offer an impediment to the French general; hence the citadel should -have been the better prepared, and, as the besiegers’ force, the -corps of observation being deducted, did not exceed the garrison in -number, it might have baffled Suchet’s utmost efforts. Engineers -require that the relative strength of besiegers and besieged, should -not be less than four to one; yet here the French invested a force -equal to themselves, and in a short time reduced a great fortress in -the midst of succouring armies, for Lerida had communications, 1º. -With the armed population of the high valleys; 2º. With O’Donnel’s -corps of fourteen thousand; 3º. With Cervera, where Campo Verde was -posted with four thousand men; 4º. With Tortoza, where the marquis of -Lazan, now released from his imprisonment, commanded from five to six -thousand; 5º. With Valencia, in which province there was a disposable -army of fifteen thousand regular and more than thirty thousand -irregular soldiers. - -It is evident that, if all these forces had been directed with skill -and concert upon Lerida, not only the siege would have been raised, -but the very safety of the third corps endangered; and it was to -obviate this danger that Napoleon directed the seventh corps to take -such a position on the Lower Ebro as would keep both O’Donnel and -the Valencians in check; but Augereau, as we have seen, failed to do -this; and St. Cyr asserts that the seventh corps could never safely -venture to pass the mountains, and enter the valley of the Ebro. On -the other hand, Suchet affirms that Napoleon’s instructions could -have been obeyed without difficulty. St. Cyr himself, under somewhat -similar circumstances, blockaded Taragona for a month; Augereau, who -had more troops and fewer enemies, might have done the same, and yet -spared six thousand men to pass the mountains; Suchet would then have -been tranquil with respect to O’Donnel, and would have had a covering -army to protect the siege, and these troops, fed from the resources -of Aragon, would have relieved Catalonia. - -Augereau has been justified, on the ground, that the blockade of -Hostalrich would have been raised while he was on the Ebro. The -danger of this could not have escaped the emperor, yet his military -judgement, unerring in principle, was often false in application, -because men measure difficulties by the standard of their own -capacity, and Napoleon’s standard only suited the heroic proportions. -One thing is, however, certain, that Catalonia presented the most -extraordinary difficulties to the invaders. The powerful military -organization of the Miguelettes and Somatenes,--the well-arranged -system of fortresses,--the ruggedness and sterility of the -country,--the ingenuity and readiness of a manufacturing population -thrown out of work,--and, finally, the aid of an English fleet, -combined to render the conquest of this province a gigantic task. -Nevertheless, the French made progress, each step planted slowly -indeed and with pain, but firmly, and insuring the power of making -another. - -Hostalrich and Lerida fell on the same day. The acquisition of the -first consolidated the French line of communication with Barcelona; -and, by the capture of the second, Suchet obtained large magazines, -stores of powder, ten thousand muskets, the command of several -dangerous rivers, easy access to the higher valleys, and a firm -footing in the midst of the Catalonian strong holds; and he had taken -or killed fifteen thousand Spanish soldiers. Yet this was but the -prelude to greater struggles. The Miguelettes supplied O’Donnel with -abundance of men, and neither his courage nor his abilities were at -fault. Urgel, Cardona, Berga, Cervera, Mequinenza, Taragona, San -Felippe Balaguer, and Tortoza the link of connexion between Valencia -and Catalonia, were still to be subdued, and, during every great -operation, the Partisans, being unmolested, recovered strength. - -Thus while the siege of Lerida was going on, the marquis of Lazan -entered the town of Alcanitz with five thousand men, and would have -carried the castle, but that general Laval despatched two thousand -men, from Zaragoza, to its succour, when the Spaniards, after a -skirmish in the streets, retired; and, while this was passing at -Alcanitz, Villa Campa, intercepted four hundred men conducting a -convoy of provisions from Calatayud to Zaragoza. Colonel Petit, the -commander, being attacked in the defile of Frasno, was forced to -abandon his convoy, and, under a continued fire, to fight his way for -ten miles, until his detachment, reduced to one hundred and eighty -wounded men, passed the Xalon river, and, at the village of Arandiza, -finally repulsed the assailants. The remainder of this desperate band -were taken or killed, and Petit himself, wounded, a prisoner, and -sitting in the midst of several Spanish officers, was basely murdered -the evening after the action. Villa Campa put the assassin to death, -but, at the same time, suffered the troops to burn alive the Alcalde -of Frasno, an old man taken among the French. - -This action happened the day Lerida fell; and, the next day, -Chlopiski, following Villa Campa’s march from Daroca, reached Frasno. -The Spaniards were no longer there, and Chlopiski, dividing his -forces, pursued them, by the routes of Calatayud and Xarava, to -Molina, where he destroyed a manufactory for arms, and so pressed -the Spanish general, that his troops disbanded, and several hundred -retired to their homes. At the same time, an attack, made from the -side of Navarre, on the garrison of Ayerbe, was repulsed. - -But these petty events, while they evinced the perseverance of the -Spaniards, proved also the stability of Suchet’s power in Aragon. -His system was gradually sapping the spirit of resistance in that -province. In Lerida his conduct was as gentle and moderate as the -nature of this unjust war would permit; and, however questionable, -the morality of the proceeding by which he reduced the citadel, -it must be acknowledged that his situation required most decided -measures, for the retreat of the seventh corps set free not only -O’Donnel’s army, but Campo Verde’s and all the irregular bands. The -Somatenes of the high valleys appeared in force, on the Upper Segre -the very day of the assault; eight hundred Miguelettes attacked -Venasque three days after; and Campo Verde, marching from Cervera, by -Agramunt, took post in the mountains of Lliniana, above Talarn and -Tremp, where great bodies of the Somatenes also assembled. - -Their plans were disconcerted by the sudden fall of Lerida; the -Miguelettes were repulsed from Venasque; the Somatenes defeated at -Tremp; and general Habert, marching from Balaguer, cut off Campo -Verde from Cervera, and forced him to retreat upon Cardona. But, if -the citadel of Lerida had held out, and O’Donnel, less hasty, had -combined his march, at a later period, with these Somatenes and with -Campo Verde, the third corps could scarcely have escaped a disaster; -whereas, now the plain of Urgel and all the fertile valleys opening -upon Lerida fell to the French, and Suchet, after taking measures -to secure them, turned his arms against Mequinenza, which, by its -situation at the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, just where the -latter begins to be navigable, was the key to further operations. The -French general could not advance in force against Tortoza, nor avail -himself of the water-carriage, until Mequinenza should fall. - -Suchet’s activity was extreme; one detachment, sent the day after the -assault of Lerida, by the left bank of the Segre, was already before -the place, and general Musnier’s division, descending the right -bank of that river, drove in some of the outposts and commenced the -investment on the 20th of May. - -Mequinenza, built on an elbow of land formed by the meeting of -the Segre and Ebro, was fortified by an old Moorish wall, and -strengthened by modern batteries, especially on the Fraga road, the -only route by which artillery could approach. A shoot from the Sierra -de Alcubierre filled the space between the two rivers, and narrowing -as they closed, ended in a craggy rock, seven hundred feet high and -overhanging the town, which was built between its base and the water. - -This rock was crowned by a castle, with a rampart, which being -inaccessible on two sides from the steepness, and covered, on a -third, by the town, could only be assailed, on the fourth, along a -high neck of land, three hundred yards wide, that joined the rock to -the parent hills; and the rampart on that side, was bastioned, lined -with masonry, and protected by a ditch, counterscarp, and covered way -with palisades. - -No guns could be brought against this fort, until the country people, -employed by Suchet, had opened a way from Torriente, over the hills, -and this occupied the engineers until the 1st of June. Meanwhile -the brigade, which had defeated Lazan, at Alcanitz, arrived on the -right bank of the Ebro, and completed the investment. The 30th of -May, general Rogniat, coming from France, with a reinforcement of -engineer-officers, and several companies of sappers and miners, also -reached the camp, and, taking the direction of the works, contracted -the circle of investment, and commenced active operations. - - -SIEGE OF MEQUINENZA. - -The Spaniards made an ineffectual sally the 31st; and, the 2d of -June, the French artillery, consisting of eighteen pieces, of which -six were twenty-four-pounders, being brought over the hills, the -advanced posts of the Spaniards were driven into the castle, and, -during the night, ground was broken two hundred yards from the place, -under a destructive fire of grape. The workmen suffered severely; -and, while this was passing on the height, approaches were made -against the town, in the narrow space between the Ebro and the foot -of the rock. Strong infantry posts were also entrenched, close to the -water, on the right bank of that river, to prevent the navigation; -yet eleven boats, freighted with inhabitants and their property, -quitted the town, and nine effected their escape. - -In the night of the 3d the parallels on the rock were perfected, the -breaching-batteries commenced, and parapets of sand-bags were raised, -from behind which the French infantry plied the embrasures of the -castle with musketry. The works against the town were also advanced; -but, in both places, the nature of the ground greatly impeded the -operations. The trenches above, being in a rocky soil, were opened -chiefly by blasting; those below were in a space too narrow for -batteries, and, moreover, searched by a plunging fire, both from the -castle, and from a gun mounted on a high tower in the town wall. The -troops on the right bank of the Ebro, however, opened their musketry -with such effect on the wall, that a part of the garrison quitted it; -both it and the tower were then escaladed without difficulty; and the -Spaniards all retired to the castle. The French placed a battalion in -the houses, and put those next the rock in a state of defence; and -although the garrison of the castle rolled down large stones from -above; they killed more of the inhabitants than of the enemy. - -The 6th the French batteries on the rock, three in number, were -completed; and, in the night, forty grenadiers carried by storm a -small outwork called the horse-shoe. The 7th Suchet, who had been -at Zaragoza, arrived in the camp; and, on the 8th, sixteen pieces -of artillery, of which four were mortars, opened on the castle. The -Spaniards answered with such vigour, that three French guns were -dismounted; yet the besiegers acquired the superiority, and, at -nine o’clock in the morning, the place was nearly silenced, and the -rampart broken in two places. The Spaniards endeavoured to keep up -the defence with musketry, while they mounted fresh guns, but the -interior of the castle was so severely searched by the bombardment, -that, at ten o’clock, the governor capitulated. Fourteen hundred men -became prisoners of war; forty-five guns, large stores of powder and -of cast iron were captured, and provisions for three months were -found in the magazines. - -Two hours after the fall of Mequinenza, general Mont-Marie, -commanding the troops on the right bank of the Ebro, marched, with -his brigade, against Morella, in the kingdom of Valencia, and took it -on the 13th of June; for the Spaniards, with a wonderful negligence, -had left that important fortress, commanding one of the principal -entrances into the kingdom of Valencia, without arms or a garrison. -When it was lost, general O’Donoju, with a division of the Valencian -army, advanced to retake it, but Mont-Marie defeated him. The works -were then repaired, and Morella became a strong and important place -of arms. - -By these rapid and successful operations Suchet secured, 1º. A -fortified frontier against the regular armies of Catalonia and -Valencia; 2º. Solid bases for offensive operations, and free entrance -to those provinces; 3º. The command of several fertile tracts of -country and of the navigation of the Ebro; 4º. The co-operation of -the seventh corps, which, by the fall of Lerida, could safely engage -beyond the Llobregat. But, to effect the complete subjugation of -Catalonia, it was necessary to cut off its communications by land -with Valencia, and to destroy O’Donnel’s base. The first could only -be attained, by taking Tortoza, the second by capturing Taragona. -Hence the immediate sieges of those two great places, the one by -the third, and the other by the seventh corps, were ordered by the -emperor. - -Suchet was ready to commence his part, but many and great obstacles -arose: the difficulty of obtaining provisions, in the eastern region -of Catalonia, was increased by O’Donnel’s measures, and that general, -still commanding above twenty thousand men, was neither daunted by -past defeats, nor insensible to the advantages of his position. His -harsh manners and stern sway, rendered him hateful to the people, but -he was watchful to confirm the courage, and to excite the enthusiasm -of his troop’s by conferring rewards and honours on the field of -battle; and, being of singular intrepidity himself, his exhortations -had more effect. - -Two years of incessant warfare had also formed several good -officers, and the full strength and importance of every position -and town were, by dint of experience, becoming known. With these -helps O’Donnel long prevented the siege of Tortoza, and found -full employment for the enemy during the remainder of the year. -Nevertheless, the conquest of Catalonia advanced, and the fortified -places fell one after another, each serving, by its fall, to -strengthen the hold of the French, in the same proportion that it had -before impeded their progress. - -The foundations of military strength were however, deeply cast in -Catalonia. There the greatest efforts were made by the Spaniards, -and ten thousand British soldiers, hovering on the coast, ready to -land on the rear of the French, or to join the Catalans in an action, -would at any period of 1809 and 1810, have paralized the operations -of the seventh corps, and saved Gerona, Hostalrich, Tortoza, -Taragona, and even Lerida. While those places were in the hands of -the Spaniards and their hopes were high, English troops from Sicily -were reducing the Ionian islands or loitering on the coast of Italy, -but when all the fortresses of Catalonia had fallen, when the regular -armies were nearly destroyed, and when the people were worn out with -suffering, a British army which could have been beneficially employed -elsewhere, appeared, as if in scorn of common sense, on the eastern -coast of Spain. - -Notwithstanding the many years of hostility with France, the English -ministers were still ignorant of every military principle; and yet -too arrogant to ask advice of professional men; for it was not until -after the death of Mr. Perceval, and when the decisive victory -of Salamanca shewed the giant in his full proportions, that even -Wellington himself was permitted the free exercise of his judgement, -although he was more than once reminded by Mr. Perceval, whose -narrow views continually clogged the operations, that the whole -responsibility of failure would rest on his head. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -Suchet’s preparations equally menaced Valencia, and Catalonia, and -the authorities in the former province, perceiving, although too -late, that an exclusive and selfish policy would finally bring -the enemy to their own doors, resolved to co-operate with the -Catalonians, while the Murcians, now under the direction of Blake, -waged war on the side of Grenada, and made excursions against the -fourth corps. The acts of the Valencians shall be treated of when the -course of the history leads me back to Catalonia, but those of the -Murcian army belong to the - - -OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA. - -[Sidenote: King Joseph’s Correspondence, captured at Victoria. MSS.] - -During the month of February, the first corps was before Cadiz, the -fourth in Grenada, Dessolles’ division at Cordoba, Jaen, and Ubeda, -and the fifth corps (with the exception of six battalions and some -horse left at Seville) in Estremadura. The king, accompanied by -marshal Soult, moved with his guards and a brigade of cavalry, to -different points, and received from all the great towns assurances -of their adhesion to his cause. But as the necessities of the -army demanded immediate and heavy contributions, both of money -and provisions, moveable columns were employed to collect them, -especially for the fourth corps, and with so little attention to -discipline as soon to verify the observations of St. Cyr, that they -were better calculated to create than to suppress insurrections. -The people exasperated by disorders, and violence, and at the same -time excited by the agents of their own and the British government, -suddenly rose in arms and Andalusia, like other parts of Spain, -became the theatre of a petty and harassing warfare. - -The Grenadans of the Alpujarras, were the first to resist, and this -insurrection spreading on the one hand through the Sierra de Ronda, -and on the other, towards Murcia, received succours from Gibraltar, -and was aided by the troops and armed peasantry under the command -of Blake. The communication between the first and fourth corps -across the Sierra de Ronda, was maintained by a division of the -former, posted at Medina Sidonia, and by some infantry and hussars -of the latter quartered in the town of Ronda. From this place, the -insurgents, principally smugglers, drove the French, while at the -other extremity Blake marching from Almeria, took Ardra and Motril. -The mountaineers of Jaen and Cordoba at the same time interrupted -Dessolles’ communications with La Mancha. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -These movements took place in the beginning of March, and the king -and Soult being then in the city of Grenada, sent one column across -the mountain by Orgiva to fall upon the flank of Blake at Motril, -while a second moving by Guadix and Ohanes upon Almeria, cut off -his retreat. This obliged the Murcians to disperse, and at the same -time, Dessolles defeated the insurgents on the side of Ubeda; and -the garrison of Malaga, consisting of three battalions, marched to -restore the communications with the first corps. Being joined by the -detachment beaten at Ronda, they retook that post on the 21st of -March; but during their absence the people from the Alpuxaras entered -Malaga, killed some of the inhabitants as favourers of the enemy, -and would have done more, but that another column from Grenada came -down on them, and the insurrection was thus strangled in its birth. -It had however, sufficed to prevent the march of the troops designed -to co-operate with Suchet at Valencia, and it was of so threatening -a character, that the fifth corps was recalled from Estremadura, and -all the French troops at Madrid, consisting of the garrison, and a -part of the second corps, were directed upon Almagro in La Mancha, -the capital itself being left in charge of some Spanish battalions in -the invader’s service. The king then repaired to La Mancha, fearing -an offensive movement, by the Valencian and Murcian armies, but -after a time returned to Madrid. The duke of Dalmatia then remained -chief commander of Andalusia, and proceeded to organize a system -of administration so efficacious, that neither the efforts of the -Spanish government, nor of the army in Cadiz, nor the perpetual -incursions of Spanish troops issuing from Portugal, and supported -by British corps on that frontier, could seriously shake his hold, -but this will be better shewn hereafter; at present, it is more -convenient to notice. - - -THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ. - -Marshal Victor declining, as we have seen, an assault on the Isla, -spread his army round the margin of the bay, and commenced works of -contravallation on an extent of not less than twenty-five miles. The -towns, the islands, castles, harbours, and rivers, he thus enclosed -are too numerous, and in their relative bearings, too intricate for -minute description; yet, looking as it were from the French camps, I -shall endeavour to point out the leading features. - -The blockade was maintained in three grand divisions or entrenched -positions, namely, Chiclana, Puerto Real, and Santa Maria. The first, -having its left on the sea coast near the Torre Bermeja, was from -thence carried across the Almanza, and the Chiclana rivers, to the -Zuraque, on a line of eight miles, traced along a range of thickly -wooded hills, and bordering a marsh from one to three miles broad. -This marsh, traversed in its breadth by the above-mentioned rivers, -and by a number of navigable water courses or creeks, was also cut in -its whole length by the Santi Petri, a natural channel connecting the -upper harbour of Cadiz with the open sea. The Santi Petri, nine miles -long, from two to three hundred yards wide, and of depth to float -a seventy-four, received the waters of all the creeks crossing the -marsh and was the first Spanish line of defence. In the centre, the -bridge of Zuazo, by which the only road to Cadiz passes, was broken -and defended by batteries on both sides. On the right hand, the -Caraccas, or Royal Arsenal, situated on an island just in the harbour -mouth of the channel, and on account of the marsh inattackable, save -by water or by bombardment, was covered with strong batteries and -served as an advanced post. On the left hand the castle of Santi -Petri, also built on an island, defended the sea mouth of the channel. - -Beyond the Santi Petri was the Isla de Leon, in form a triangular -island, the base of which rests on that channel, the right side on -the harbour, the left on the open sea, and the apex points towards -Cadiz. All this island was a salt-marsh, except one high and strong -ridge in the centre, about four miles long, upon which the large town -of La Isla stands, and which being within cannon shot of the Santi -Petri, offered the second line of defence. - -From the apex, called the Torre Gardo, a low and narrow isthmus about -five miles long, connected the island with the rocks upon which Cadiz -stood, and across the centre of this narrow isthmus, a cut called the -Cortadura, defended by the large unfinished fort of Fernando, offered -a third line of defence. The fourth and final line, was the land -front of the city itself, regularly and completely fortified. - -On the Chiclana side therefore, the hostile forces were only -separated by the marsh; and although the Spaniards commanded the -Santi Petri, the French having their chief depôts in the town of -Chiclana, could always acquire the mastery in the marsh and might -force the passage of the channel, because the Chiclana, Zuraque, and -Almanza creeks, were navigable above the lines of contravallation. -The thick woods behind, also afforded the means of constructing an -armed flotilla, and such was the nature of the ground bordering the -Santi Petri itself, on both sides, that off the high road, it could -only be approached by water, or by narrow footpaths, leading between -the salt-pans of the marsh. - -The central French or Puerto Real division extending from the Zuraque -on the left, to the San Pedro, a navigable branch of the Guadalete -on the right; measured about seven miles. From the Zuraque to the -town of Puerto Real, the line was traced along a ridge skirting the -marsh, so as to form with the position of Chiclana a half circle. -Puerto Real itself was entrenched, but a tongue of land four miles -long projected from thence perpendicularly on to the narrow isthmus -of Cadiz. This tongue, cloven in its whole length by the creek or -canal of Troccadero, separated the inner from the outward harbour, -and at its extreme points stood the village of Troccadero, and the -fort of Matagorda; opposed to which there was on the isthmus of Cadiz -a powerful battery called the Puntales. From Matagorda to the city -was above four thousand yards, but across the channel to Puntales was -only twelve hundred, it was the nearest point to Cadiz and to the -isthmus, and was infinitely the most important post of offence. From -thence the French could search the upper harbour with their fire and -throw shells into the Caraccas and the fort of Fernando, while their -flotilla safely moored in the Troccadero creek, could make a descent -upon the isthmus, and thus turn the Isla, and all the works between -it and the city. Nevertheless, the Spaniards dismantled and abandoned -Matagorda. - -The third or Santa Maria division of blockade, followed the sweep of -the bay, and reckoning from the San Pedro, on the left, to the castle -of Santa Catalina the extreme point of the outer harbour, on the -right, was about five miles. The town of Santa Maria, built at the -mouth of the Guadalete in the centre of this line, was entrenched and -the ground about Santa Catalina was extremely rugged. - -Besides these lines of blockade which were connected by a covered -way, concealed by thick woods, and when finished armed with three -hundred guns, the towns of Rota and San Lucar de Barameda were -occupied. The first, situated on a cape of land opposite to Cadiz, -was the northern point of the great bay or roadstead. The second -commanded the mouth of Guadalquivir. Behind the line of blockade, -Latour Maubourg, with a covering division, took post at Medina -Sidonia, his left being upon the upper Guadalete, and his advanced -posts watching the passes of the Sierra de Ronda. Such was the -position of the first corps. I shall now relate the progress of -events within the blockaded city. - -[Sidenote: Albuquerque’s Manifesto.] - -The fall of the Central Junta, the appointment of the regency and -the proclamation for convoking the national Cortes have been already -touched upon. Albuquerque, hailed as a deliverer, elected governor, -commander in chief, and president of the Junta, appeared to have -unlimited power; but in reality, possessed no authority except over -his own soldiers, and he did not meddle with the administration. The -regency appointed provisionally and composed of men without personal -energy or local influence, was obliged to bend and truckle to the -Junta of Cadiz; and that imperious body without honour, talents, or -patriotism, sought only to obtain the command of the public revenue -for dishonest purposes, and meanwhile, privately trafficked with the -public stores. - -[Sidenote: Private Correspondence of Officers from Cadiz. 1810. MSS.] - -Albuquerque’s troops were in a deplorable state; the whole had -been long without pay, and the greater part were without arms, -accoutrements, ammunition, or clothes. When he demanded supplies, -the Junta declared that they could not furnish them; but the duke -affirming this to be untrue, addressed a memorial to the Regency, and -the latter, anxious to render the Junta odious, yet fearing openly to -attack them, persuaded Albuquerque to publish his memorial. The Junta -replied by an exposition, false as to facts, base and ridiculous in -reasoning; for although they had elected the duke president of their -own body, they accused him amongst other things, with retreating from -Carmona too quickly; and they finished with an intimation, that, -supported by the populace of Cadiz, they were able and ready to -wreak their vengeance on all enemies. Matters being thus brought to -a crisis, both Albuquerque and the Regency gave way, and the former -being sent ambassador to England, died in that country some months -after of a phrenzy brought on, as it is said, by grief and passion at -the unworthy treatment he received. - -But the misery of the troops, the great extent of the positions, -the discontent of the seamen, the venal spirit of the Junta, the -apathy of the people, the feebleness of the Regency, the scarcity -of provisions, and the machinations of the French, who had many -favourers and those amongst the men in power, all combined to place -Cadiz in the greatest jeopardy; and this state of affairs would have -led to a surrender, if England had not again filled the Spanish -store-houses, and if the Regency had not consented to receive British -troops into the city. - -[Sidenote: General Campbell’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -At the same time, general Colin Campbell (who had succeeded Sir John -Cradock as governor of Gibraltar) performed a great service to his -country, for, by persevering negotiation, he obtained that an English -garrison should likewise enter Ceuta, and that the Spanish lines of -San Roque, and the forts round the harbour of Algesiras should be -demolished. Both measures were very essential to the present and -permanent interests of England; but the first especially, because -it cleared the neighbourhood of the fortress, and gave it a secure -harbour. Gibraltar, at this time, contained a mixed and disaffected -population of more than twelve thousand persons, and merchandize to -the value of two millions sterling, which could have been easily -destroyed by bombardment; and Ceuta which was chiefly garrisoned -by condemned troops, and filled with galley-slaves, and its works -miserably neglected, had only six days’ provisions, and was at the -mercy of the first thousand French that could cross the streights. -The possession of it would have availed the enemy in many ways, -especially in obtaining provisions from Barbary, where his emissaries -were exceedingly active. - -[Sidenote: Official Abstract of Operations at Cadiz. 1810. MSS.] - -General William Stewart arrived in Cadiz, on the 11th of February, -with two thousand men, a thousand more joined him from Gibraltar, -and the whole were received with an enthusiasm, that proved sir -George Smith’s perception to have been just, and that Mr. Frere’s -unskilful management of the Central Junta, had alone prevented a -similar measure the year before. The 17th of February, a Portuguese -regiment, thirteen hundred strong, was also admitted into the -city, and Spanish troops came in daily in small bodies. Two ships -of war, the Euthalion and Undaunted, arrived from Mexico with six -millions of dollars; and another British battalion, a detachment -of artillery, and more native troops, having joined the garrison, -the whole force assembled behind the Santi Petri, was not less than -four thousand Anglo-Portuguese, and fourteen thousand Spaniards. Yet -there was little of enthusiasm amongst the latter; and in all this -time, not a man among the citizens had been enrolled or armed, or -had volunteered, either to labour or to fight. The ships recovered -at Ferrol, had been transferred to Cadiz, so there were in the bay, -twenty-three men of war, of which four of the line and three frigates -were British; and thus, money, troops, and a fleet, in fine, all -things necessary to render Cadiz formidable, were collected, yet to -little purpose, because procrastination, jealousy, ostentation, and -a thousand absurdities, were the invariable attendants of Spanish -armies and governments. - -General Stewart’s first measure, was to recover Matagorda. In -the night of the 22d, a detachment consisting of fifty seamen -and marines, twenty-five artillery-men, and sixty-seven of the -ninety-fourth regiment, the whole under the command of captain -M’Lean, pushed across the channel during a storm, and taking -possession of the dismantled fort, before morning effected a -solid lodgement, and although the French cannonaded the work with -field-artillery all the next day, the garrison, supported by the fire -of Puntales, was immoveable. - -The remainder of February passed without any event of importance, yet -the people suffered from the want of provisions, especially fresh -meat; and from the 7th to the 10th of March, a continued tempest, -beating upon the coast, drove three Spanish and one Portuguese sail -of the line, and a frigate and from thirty to forty merchantmen, on -shore, between San Lucar and St. Mary’s. One ship of the line was -taken, the others burnt and part of the crews brought off by boats -from the fleet; but many men, and amongst others a part of the fourth -English regiment fell into the hands of the enemy, together with an -immense booty. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, Sect. 1.] - -Early in March, Mr. Henry Wellesley, minister plenipotentiary -arrived, and on the 24th of that month, general Graham coming from -England assumed the chief command of the British, and immediately -caused an exact military survey of the Isla to be made. It then -appeared, that the force hitherto assigned for its defence, was -quite inadequate, and that to secure it against the utmost efforts -of the enemy, twenty thousand soldiers, and a system of redoubts, -and batteries, requiring the labour of four thousand men for three -months, were absolutely necessary. Now, the Spaniards had only -worked beyond the Santi Petri, and that without judgement; their -batteries in the marsh were ill placed, their entrenchments on the -tongue of land at the sea mouth of that channel, were of contemptible -strength, and the Caraccas which they had armed with one hundred -and fifty guns, being full of dry timber could be easily burned by -carcasses. The interior defences of the Isla were quite neglected, -and while they had abandoned the important posts of Matagorda, and -the Troccadero, they had pushed their advanced batteries, to the -junction of the Chiclana road with the Royal Causeway, in the marsh, -that is to say, one mile and a half beyond the bridge of Zuazo, and -consequently exposed, without support, to flank attacks both by water -and land. - -It was in vain that the English engineers presented plans, and -offered to construct the works; the Spaniards would never consent -to pull down a house, or destroy a garden; their procrastination, -paralized their allies, and would have lost the place, had the enemy -been prepared to press it vigorously. Nor were the English works -(when the Spaniards would permit any to be constructed) well and -rapidly completed, for the Junta furnished bad materials, there was a -paucity of engineer-officers, and, from the habitual negligence of -the ministerial departments at home, neither the proper stores, nor -implements had been sent out. Indeed, an exact history, drawn from -the private journals of commanders of British expeditions, during the -war with France, would show an incredible carelessness of preparation -on the part of the different cabinets. The generals were always -expected to “make bricks without straw,” and thus the laurels of the -British army were for many years blighted. Even in Egypt, the success -of the venerable hero, Abercrombie, was due, more to his perseverance -and unconquerable energy before the descent, than to his daring -operations afterwards. - -Additional reinforcements reached Cadiz the 31st of March, and both -sides continued to labour, but the allies slowly and without harmony, -and, the supplies being interrupted, scarcity increased, many persons -were forced to quit Cadiz, and two thousand men were sent to Ayamonte -to collect provisions on the Guadiana. But now Matagorda, which, -though frequently cannonaded, had been held fifty-five days, impeded -the completion of the enemy’s works at the Troccadero point. This -small fort, of a square form, without a ditch, with bomb-proofs -insufficient for the garrison, and with one angle projecting towards -the land, was little calculated for resistance, and, as it could -only bring seven guns to bear, a Spanish seventy-four and an armed -flotilla were moored on the flanks, to co-operate in the defence. The -French had however raised great batteries behind some houses on the -Troccadero, and, as daylight broke, on the 21st of April, a hissing -shower of heated shot, falling on the seventy-four, and in the midst -of the flotilla, obliged them to cut their cables and take shelter -under the works of Cadiz. Then the fire of forty-eight guns and -mortars, of the largest size, was concentrated upon the little fort -of Matagorda, and the feeble parapet disappeared in a moment before -this crashing flight of metal. The naked rampart and the undaunted -hearts of the garrison remained, but the troops fell fast, the enemy -shot quick and close, a staff, bearing the Spanish flag, was broken -six times in an hour, and the colours were at last fastened to the -angle of the work itself, while the men, especially the sailors, -besought the officers to hoist the British ensign, attributing the -slaughter to their fighting under a foreign flag. Thirty hours the -tempest lasted, and sixty-four men out of one hundred and forty were -down, when general Graham, finding a diversion he had projected -impracticable, sent boats to carry off the survivors. The bastion -was then blown up, under the direction of major Lefebre, an engineer -of great promise, and he also fell, the last man whose blood wetted -the ruins thus abandoned. Here I must record an action of which -it is difficult to say whether it were most feminine or heroic. A -sergeant’s wife, named Retson, was in a casemate with the wounded -men, when a very young drummer was ordered to fetch water from the -well of the fort; seeing the child hesitate, she snatched the vessel -from his hand, braved the terrible cannonade herself, and, although a -shot cut the bucket-cord from her hand, she recovered the vessel, and -fulfilled her mission.[8] - -[Sidenote: General Campbell’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -After the evacuation of Matagorda, the war languished at Cadiz; but -Sebastiani’s cavalry infested the neighbourhood of Gibraltar, and -he himself entered the capital of Murcia, on the 23d of April, when -Blake retired upon Alicant and Carthagena. Meanwhile the French -covered Matagorda point with batteries; but they were pressed for -provisions, and general Campbell, throwing a detachment into Tarifa, -drove their foragers from that vicinity, which abounds with cattle. -The Spaniards at San Roque promised to reinforce this detachment, -but their tardiness enabled the enemy to return with four hundred -foot and some cavalry, and although the former were repulsed, the -horse foraged the country, and drove off several herds of cattle -during the action. General Campbell then increased the detachment to -five hundred men, joining some guns, and placing the whole under the -command of major Brown of the 28th. - -In May the French prisoners, cutting the cables of two hulks, drifted -in a heavy gale to the French side of the bay; and the boats sent -against them being beat off, by throwing cold shot from the decks, -above fifteen hundred men saved themselves, in despite of the fire -from the allied fleet, and from Puntales, which was continued -after the vessels had grounded, although the miserable creatures, -thus struggling for life, had been treated with horrible cruelty, -and, being all of Dupont’s or Vedel’s corps, were prisoners only -by a dishonourable breach of faith. Meanwhile, in Cadiz, disorder -was daily increasing. The Regency having recalled Cuesta to their -military councils, he published an attack on the deposed Central -Junta, and was answered so as to convince the world, that the -course of all parties had been equally detrimental to the state. -Thus fresh troubles were excited. The English general was hampered -by the perverse spirit of the authorities, and the Spanish troops -were daily getting more inefficient from neglect, when the departure -of Albuquerque enabled Blake to take the chief command in the Isla, -and his presence produced some amelioration in the condition and -discipline of the troops. At his instance, also, the Municipal Junta -consented, although reluctantly, that the British engineers should -commence a regular system of redoubts for the defence of the Isla. - -[Sidenote: General Graham’s Despatches. MSS.] - -English reinforcements continued to arrive, and four thousand -Spaniards, from Murcia, joined the garrison, or, rather, army now -within the lines; but such was the state of the native troops, and -the difficulty of arranging plans, that hitherto the taking of -Matagorda had been the only check given to the enemy’s works. It -was, however, necessary to do something; and, after some ill-judged -plans of the Regency had been rejected by Graham, general Lacy was -embarked, with three thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry, to -aid the armed peasants, or Serranos, of the Ronda. These people had -been excited to arms, and their operations successfully directed -by captain Cowley and Mr. Mitchel, two British artillery-officers, -sent from Gibraltar, and general Campbell offered to reinforce Lacy, -from Gibraltar, if he would attack Malaga, where there were twenty -thousand males fit to carry arms. The French were only two thousand, -and cooped in the citadel, a Moorish castle, containing but twelve -guns, and dependent for water on the town, which was itself only -supplied by aqueducts from without. Lacy rejected this enterprise, -but demanded that eight hundred men, from Gibraltar, should make a -diversion to the eastward, while he, landing at Algesiras, moved -on Ronda; and, this being assented to, the English armament sailed -under the command of general Bowes. Lacy made good his movement -upon Ronda the 18th of June; but the French, having fortified -it, were too strong at that point, or, rather, Lacy, a man of no -enterprise, durst not act, and, when he was joined by many thousand -mountaineers, he arrested their leaders for some offence, which so -disgusted the men that they disbanded. The enemy, alarmed by these -operations, which were seconded from the side of Murcia, and by an -insurrection at Baeza, put all their disposable troops in motion; -but the insurrection at Baeza was quickly crushed, and general Rey, -marching from Seville, against Lacy, entirely defeated and cut him -off from Gibraltar, so that he was forced to re-embark with a few men -at Estipona, and returned to Cadiz in July. - -Here it is impossible not to reflect on the little use made of the -naval power, and the misapplication of the military strength in -the southern parts of Spain. The British, Portuguese, and Spanish -soldiers, at Cadiz, were, in round numbers, 30,000, the British in -Gibraltar 5000, in Sicily 16,000, forming a total of more than fifty -thousand effective troops, aided by a great navy, and favourably -placed for harassing that immense, and, with the exception of -the Valencian and Murcian coasts, uninterrupted French line of -operations, which extended from the south of Italy to Cadiz, for, -even from the bottom of Calabria, troops and stores were brought to -Spain. Yet a Neapolitan rabble, under Murat, in Calabria, and from -fifteen to twenty thousand French around Cadiz, were allowed to -paralize this mighty power. - -It is true that vigilance, temper, and arrangement, and favourable -localities, are all required, in the combined operations of a fleet -and army, and troops disembarking, also require time to equip for -service. But Minorca offered a central station, and a place of arms -for the army, and a spacious port for the fleet; the operations would -always have been short, and independent of the Spanish authorities, -and lord Collingwood was fitted, by his talents, discretion, zeal, -experience, and accurate knowledge of those coasts, successfully to -direct such a floating armament. What coast-siege, undertaken by the -seventh or third corps, could have been successfully prosecuted, -if the garrison had been suddenly augmented with fifteen or twenty -thousand men from the ocean? After one or two successful descents, -the very appearance of a ship of war would have checked the -operations of a siege, and obliged the enemy to concentrate: whereas, -the slight expeditions of this period, were generally disconcerted by -the presence of a few French companies. - -In July the British force, in Cadiz, was increased to eight thousand -five hundred men, and Sir Richard Keats arrived to take the command -of the fleet. The enemy, intent upon completing his lines, and -constructing flotillas at Chiclana, Santa Maria, and San Lucar de -Barameda, made no attacks, and his works, have been much censured, -as ostentatiously extended, and leading to nothing. This is however -a rash criticism; for the Chiclana camp was necessary to blockade -the Isla, and, as the true point for offensive operations, was at -the Troccadero, the lines of Puerto Real and Santa Maria, were -necessary to protect that position, to harass the fleet, to deprive -the citizens of good water, which, in ordinary times, was fetched -from Puerto Maria, and finally to enable the flotilla, constructing -at San Lucar, to creep round the coast. The chances from storms, -as experience proved, almost repaid the labour, and it is to be -considered that Soult contemplated a serious attack upon Cadiz, not -with a single corps, generally weaker than the blockaded troops, -but, when time should ripen, with a powerful army. Events in other -parts of the Peninsula first impeded, and finally frustrated this -intention, yet the lines were, in this view, not unnecessary or -ostentatious. - -Neither was it a slight political advantage, that the duke of -Dalmatia should hold sway in Seville for the usurper’s government, -while the National Cortes, and the Regency, were cooped up in a -narrow corner of the province. Moreover the preparations at Matagorda -constantly and seriously menaced Cadiz, and a British division was -necessarily kept there, for the English generals were well assured, -that otherwise, some fatal disaster would befall the Spaniards. Now -if a single camp of observation at Chiclana had constituted all the -French works, no mischief could have been apprehended, and Graham’s -division, consisting of excellent soldiers would have been set free, -instead of being cooped up, without any counterbalance in the number -of French troops at the blockade; for the latter aided indirectly, -and at times directly, in securing the submission of Andalusia, and -if not at Cadiz, they must have been covering Seville as long as -there was an army in the Isla. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - - -While the blockade of Cadiz proceeded, Seville scarcely required -a garrison, and in March, six hundred infantry, under colonel -Remond, and two hundred cavalry, commanded by the duke D’Aremberg, -were despatched from thence, against the viscount De Gand, who was -still at Ayamonte, vainly demanding refuge in Portugal. He had four -thousand troops, but declining an engagement, passed by his left -through Gibraleon into the Sierra de Aroche, bordering on the Condado -de Niebla. The French then occupied Moguer and Huelva, towns situated -at the mouths of the Odiel and Tinto rivers, from whence Cadiz had -hitherto drawn supplies, and the viscount returning to Ayamonte, -sailed with his troops to Cadiz, being replaced by general Copons, -who came with two thousand men to gather provisions on the lower -Guadiana, and in the Tinto and Odiel districts. - -On the other side of Seville, Sebastiani had an uneasy task. The -vicinity of Gibraltar and of the Murcian army, the continued descents -on the coast, and the fierceness of the Moorish blood, rendered -Grenada the most disturbed portion of Andalusia, and a great part of -that fine province, visited by the horrors of insurrectional war, was -ravaged and laid waste. - -In the northern parts of Andalusia, about Jaen and Cordoba, Dessolles -reduced the struggle to a trifling Guerilla warfare; but it was not -so in La Mancha, where the Partidas became so numerous and the war -so onerous, that one of Joseph’s ministers, writing to a friend, -described that province as peopled with beggars and brigands. -Meanwhile Estremadura was the scene of various complicated movements -and combats, producing no great results, indeed, but important as -being connected with and bearing on the defence of Portugal. - -The Spanish and Portuguese line of frontier, south of the Tagus, may -be divided into three parts. - -1º. From the Tagus to Badajos, on the Guadiana. 2º. From Badajos to -the Morena. 3º. From the Morena to the sea. Each of these divisions -is about sixty miles. Along the first, two-thirds of which is -mountainous and one-third undulating plains and thick woods, a double -chain of fortresses guard the respective frontiers. Alcantara, -Valencia de Alcantara, Albuquerque, and Badajos are the Spanish; -Montalvao, Castello de Vide, Marvao, Aronches, Campo Mayor, and -Elvas, the Portuguese places. The three first on either side are in -the mountains, the others in the open country, which spreads from the -Guadiana to Portalegre, a central point, from whence roads lead to -all the above-named fortresses. - -From Badajos to the Morena, forms the second division of the country, -it is rugged and the chain of fortresses continued. On the Portuguese -side, Juramenha, Mourao and Moura; on the Spanish, Olivenza (formerly -Portuguese), Xeres de los Cavalleros, and Aroche. - -From the Morena to the sea, the lower Guadiana separates the -two kingdoms. The Spanish side, extremely rugged, contained the -fortresses of San Lucar de Guadiana, Lepe, and Ayamonte. The -Portuguese frontier, Serpa, Mertola, Alcontin, and Castro Marin, -and, although the greater number of these places were dismantled, -the walls of all were standing, some in good repair, and those of -Portugal for the most part garrisoned by militia and ordenanza. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -When Mortier attempted Badajos, on the 12th of February, Romana was -near Truxillo, and the place was so ill provided, that a fortnight’s -blockade would have reduced it; but the French general, who had only -brought up eight thousand infantry and a brigade of cavalry, could -not invest it in face of the troops assembling in the vicinity, and -therefore retired to Zafra, leaving his horsemen near Olivenza. -In this position he remained until the 19th of February, when his -cavalry was surprised at Valverde, and the commander Beauregard -slain. Romana returned to Badajos the 20th and the 27th, and Mortier -then leaving some troops in Zafra, marched to Merida, to connect -himself with the second corps, which had arrived at Montijo, on the -Guadiana. - -It will be remembered that this corps, commanded by general Mermet, -occupied the valley of the Tagus in its whole length during the -invasion of Andalusia, and communicating with the sixth corps through -the pass of Baños, formed an intermediate reserve between Mortier and -Kellerman. The latter was at Bejar, and Miranda de Castanar, watching -the duke Del Parque, in the early part of January; but withdrew -to Salamanca, when the British army arrived in the valley of the -Mondego, and the duke Del Parque, leaving Martin Carrera with a weak -division in the Sierra de Gata, marched, with thirteen thousand men, -through the pass of Perales, crossed the Tagus at Barca de Alconete -on the 10th of February, and on the 12th, the day Mortier summoned -Badajos, was in position with his right at Albuquerque and his left -on the Guadiana. - -When Mermet, whose advanced guard was at Placentia, knew of this -movement, he first detached three thousand men across the Tagus, -by Seradillo, to observe Del Parque, and soon afterwards Soult’s -brother, with four thousand men from Talavera, crossed the bridge -of Arzobispo, and advancing by Caceres, surprised some Spanish -troops at Villa del Rey and reaching Montijo, pushed patrols close -to Badajos. The remainder of the second corps arrived at Caceres by -degrees; general Reynier then took the command, and, as I have said, -was joined by Mortier, who immediately commenced defensive works at -Merida, and prepared gabions and facines as if to besiege Badajos. - -These demonstrations attracted the notice of general Hill, who -advanced with ten thousand men from Abrantes to Portalegre, and -Romana, finding himself, by the junction of the duke Del Parque’s -army, at the head of twenty-five thousand men, resolved to act -against the communications of the French. - -His first division, commanded by Charles O’Donnel, brother to the -Catalan general, occupied Albuquerque. The second, under Mendizabel, -was posted near Castello de Vide. The third, consisting of five -thousand Asturians, was sent, under Ballasteros, to Olivenza, and the -fourth remained at Badajos. The fifth, under Contreras, was detached -to Monasterio, with orders to interrupt Mortier’s communication with -Seville. - -Contreras reached Xeres de los Cavalleros the 1st of March, but a -detachment from Zafra soon drove him thence, and Romana retired to -Campo Mayor with three divisions, leaving Ballasteros with the fourth -at Olivenza. On the other hand, Mortier, uneasy about Contreras’ -movements, repaired to Zafra, leaving the second corps at Merida, -and the 10th, Romana, advanced again towards Albuquerque; but having -pushed a detachment beyond the Salor river, it was surprised by -general Foy. The 14th O’Donnel endeavoured to surprise Foy, but the -latter, with very inferior numbers, fought his way through the Puerto -de Trasquillon, and the Spaniards took possession of Caceres. - -At this period the insurrections in Grenada, the movements of the -Murcian army, and the general excitement of Valencia, in consequence -of Suchet’s retreat, caused Joseph to recall Mortier for the defence -of Andalusia, and the latter, after holding a council of war with -Reynier, destroyed the works at Merida, the 19th of March, and -retired to Seville, leaving Gazan’s division at Monasterio. Reynier -having sent his stores to Truxillo drove the Spaniards out of Caceres -the 20th, and followed them to the Salor, but afterwards took post at -Torremacho, and O’Donnel returned to Caceres. - -There are two routes leading from Merida and Badajos to Seville: 1º. -The Royal Causeway, which passes the Morena by Zafra, Los Santos, -Monasterio, and Ronquillo. 2º. A shorter, but more difficult, road, -which, running westward of the causeway, passes the mountains by -Xeres de los Cavalleros, Fregenal, and Araceña. These parallel -routes, have no cross communications in the Morena, but on the -Estremaduran side, a road runs from Xeres de los Cavalleros to -Zafra, and on the Andalusian side, from Araceña to Ronquillo. When, -therefore, Mortier retired, Ballasteros marched from Olivenza to -Xeres de los Cavalleros, and being joined by Contreras, their united -corps, amounting to ten thousand men, gained the Royal Causeway by -Zafra, and, on the evening of the 29th of March, came up with Gazan, -and fought an undecided action; but the next day, the Spaniards -being repulsed, Ballasteros retired to Araceña and Contreras to the -high mountains above Ronquillo. From Araceña, Ballasteros marched to -Huerva, within a few leagues of Seville, but Gerard’s division drove -him back to Araceña, and defeated him there; yet again entering the -Condado de Neibla, he established himself at Zalamea de Real on the -Tinto river. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -Meanwhile, Romana detached a force to seize Merida, and cut the -communication of the fifth corps with Reynier, but that general, -marching with eight thousand men from Torremocha, passed through to -Medellin before the Spaniards arrived, and pushed troops, the 2d of -April, into the Morena, intending to take Contreras in rear, while -Gazan attacked him in front; and this would have happened, but that -O’Donnel, immediately threatened Merida, and so drew Reynier back. -Nevertheless, Contreras was attacked by Gazan, at Pedroche, and so -completely defeated, that he regained Zafra in the night of the -14th, with only two thousand men, and Ballasteros also, assailed by -a detachment from Seville, retired to Araceña. The 20th, Reynier -marched to Montijo, and O’Donnel retired from Caceres, but his rear -guard was defeated at La Rocca the 21st, and his division would -have been lost, if Mendizabel and Hill also had not come to his -aid, when Reynier declining a general action, retired to Merida. -The insurrection in the Alpuxaras was now quelled, the Valencians -remained inactive, Joseph re-entered Madrid, Soult assumed the -government of Andalusia, and Mortier returned to Estremadura. -While on the Spanish side, Contreras was displaced, and Imas, his -successor, advanced to Ronquillo, in Mortier’s rear; Ballasteros -remained at Aroche; Hill returned to Portalegre; and Romana encamped, -with fourteen thousand men, near Bajados, where a Spanish plot was -formed to assassinate him. It was discovered, but the villain who was -to have executed the atrocious deed escaped. - -Notwithstanding Romana’s presence, Reynier and the younger Soult, -passed the Guadiana below Badajos, with only four hundred cavalry, -and closely examined the works of that fortress, in despite of the -whole Spanish army; and at the same time, Mortier’s advanced guards -arrived on the Guadiana, and a reinforcement of four thousand men -joined the second corps from Toledo. But as the want of provisions -would not permit the French to remain concentrated, Mortier returned -to the Morena, to watch Imas. The 14th of May, a French detachment -again came close up to Badajos, then took the road to Olivenza, and -would have cut off Ballasteros, if Hill had not by a sudden march to -Elvas, arrested their movements. Meanwhile, Ballasteros again menaced -Seville, and was again driven back upon Aroche, with a loss of three -hundred men. - -To check these frequent incursions, the French threatened the -frontier of Portugal, by the Lower Guadiana; sometimes appearing -at Gibraleon, and Villa Blanca, sometimes towards Serpa, the -possession of which would have lamed Ballasteros’ movements, yet the -advantages were still chequered. A Portuguese flotilla intercepted, -at the mouth of the Guadiana, a convoy of provisions going to the -first corps; and O’Donnel having made an attempt during Reynier’s -absence, to surprise Truxillo, was repulsed, and regained Albuquerque -with great difficulty. It would be perplexing, to trace in detail -all the movements, on the line from Badajos to Ayamonte, yet two -circumstances there were, of historical importance. In the beginning -of July, when Lacy was in the Sierra de Ronda, Ballasteros near -Aroche, and Copons in the Condado Neibla, the French marched against -Lacy, leaving Seville garrisoned solely by Spaniards in Joseph’s -service; and while this example was furnished by the enemy, the -Portuguese and Spanish troops on the frontier, complaining, the one -of inhospitality, the other of robbery and violence, would, but for -the mediation of the British authorities, have come to blows, for the -mutual spirit of hatred extended to the governments on both sides. - -Hitherto, Hill had not meddled in the Spanish operations, save, -when Romana was hardly pressed, but the latter’s demands for aid -were continual, and most of his projects were ill judged, and -contrary to lord Wellington’s advice. On the 26th of June however, -Reynier passing the Guadiana, foraged all the country about Campo -Mayor, and then turned by Montijo to Merida; it was known that his -corps belonged to the army assembling in Castile for the invasion -of Portugal, and that he had collected mules and other means of -transport in Estremadura; and the spies asserted, that he was going -to cross the Tagus. Hill, therefore, gathered his divisions well -in hand, ready to move as Reynier moved, to cross the Tagus if he -crossed it, and by parallel operations to guard the frontier of -Beira. The march of the second corps was, however, postponed, and the -after operations belonging to greater combinations, will be treated -of in another place. - -Although, apparently complicated, the movements in Estremadura were -simple in principle. The valley of the Guadiana as far as Badajos, -is separated from the valley of the Tagus, by a range of heights, -connecting the Guadalupe mountains with those of Albuquerque, and the -country between those hills and the Tagus, contained fertile valleys, -and considerable towns; such as Valencia de Alcantara and Caceres. To -profit from their resources was an object to both parties. Reynier, -whose base was at Truxillo, could easily make incursions as far as -Caceres, but beyond that town, the Salor, presented a barrier, from -behind which, the Spaniards supported by the fort of Albuquerque, -could observe whether the incursion was made in force, and act -accordingly; hence O’Donnel’s frequent advances and retreats. - -Reynier could not operate seriously, unless in unison with the fifth -corps, and by the valley of the Guadiana; and, therefore, Merida, -on account of its stone bridge, was the key of his movements; but -Mortier’s base of operations, being in Andalusia, his front, was -spread, from Zafra to Merida, to cover his line of retreat, and to -draw provisions from about Llerena; but the road of Xeres de los -Cavalleros was open to the Spaniards, and the frequent advances -of Ballasteros and Contreras, were to harass Mortier’s line of -communication. The clue of affairs was this; Romana, holding Badajos, -and being supported by Hill, acted on both flanks of the French, -and the Portuguese frontier furnished a retreat from every part of -his lines of operation; but, as his projects were generally vague -and injudicious, lord Wellington forbad Hill to assist, except for -definite and approved objects. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.] - -To put an end to the Spanish system, Mortier had only to unite the -two corps and give battle, or, if that was refused, to besiege -Badajos, which, from its influence, situation, and the advantage -of its stone bridge, was the key to the Alemtejo; and this he -ardently desired. Soult, however, would not permit him to undertake -any decisive operation while Andalusia was exposed to sudden -insurrections and descents from Cadiz, and to say that either marshal -was wrong would be rash, because two great interests clashed. Mortier -and Reynier united, could have furnished twenty thousand infantry, -fifty guns, and more than three thousand cavalry, all excellent -troops. Romana having garrisoned Badajos, Olivenza, and Albuquerque, -could not bring more than fifteen thousand men into line, and must -have joined Hill. But with a mixed force and divided command, the -latter could not have ventured a battle in the plain country beyond -Portalegre. A defeat would have opened Lisbon to the victor, and -lord Wellington must then have detached largely from the north, the -king and Soult could have reinforced Mortier, and the ultimate -consequences are not to be assumed. - -On the other hand, Soult, judging, that ere further conquests were -attempted, the great province of Andalusia, should be rendered a -strong hold and independent of extraneous events, bent all his -attention to that object. An exact and economical arrangement, -provided for the current consumption of his troops; vast reserve -magazines were filled without overwhelming the people; and the -native municipal authorities, recognized and supported in matters of -police and supply, acted zealously, yet without any imputation upon -their patriotism; for those who see and feel the miseries, flowing -from disorderly and wasting armies, may honestly assist a general -labouring to preserve regularity. Yet all this could not be the work -of a day, and meanwhile the marshals under Soult’s orders, being -employed only in a military capacity, desired the entire control -of their own corps, and to be engaged in great field operations, -because, thus only could they be distinguished; whereas the duke -of Dalmatia while contributing to the final subjugation of Spain, -by concentrating the elements of permanent strength in Andalusia, -was also well assured, that, in fixing a solid foundation for -future military operations, he should obtain reputation as an able -administrator and pacificator of a conquered country. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -His views, however, clashed, not more with those of the generals, -than with the wishes of the king, whose poverty, forced him to grasp -at all the revenues of Andalusia, and who having led the army, in -person across the Morena, claimed both as monarch and conqueror. -But he who wields the sword will always be first served. Soult, -guided by the secret orders of Napoleon, resisted the king’s -demands, and thus excited the monarch’s hatred to an incredible -degree; nevertheless, the duke of Dalmatia, never lost the emperor’s -confidence, and his province, reference being had to the nature of -the war, was admirably well governed. The people were gradually -tranquillized; the military resources of the country drawn forth, and -considerable bodies of native troops raised, and even successfully -employed, to repress the efforts of the Partisan chiefs. The arsenal -of construction at Seville was put into full activity; the mines of -lead at Linares were worked; the copper of the river Tinto gathered -for the supply of the founderies, and every provision for the use of -a large army collected; privateers also were fitted out, a commerce -was commenced with neutral nations in the ports of Grenada, and -finally, a secret, but considerable, traffic carried on with Lisbon -itself, demonstrated the administrative talents of Soult. Andalusia -soon became the most powerful establishment of the French in Spain. - -Both marshals appear to have entertained sound views, and the -advantages of either plan being considered, leads to the reflection -that they might have been reconciled. A reinforcement of twenty-five -thousand men in Estremadura, during the months of June and July, -would have left scarcely a shadow of defence for Portugal; and -it would seem that Napoleon had an eye to this, as we find him -directing Suchet, in July, to co-operate with fifteen thousand men -in the invasion, whenever Tortoza should fall. The application of -this reasoning will, however, be better understood as the narrative -advances; and whether Napoleon’s recent marriage with the Austrian -princess drew him away from business, or that, absorbed by the -other many and great interests of his empire, he neglected Spanish -affairs, or whether deceived by exaggerated accounts of successes, -he thought the necessity for more troops less than it really was, I -have not been able to ascertain. Neither can I find any good reason, -why the king, whose army was increased to twenty thousand men before -the end of June, made no movement to favour the attack on Portugal. -It is, however, scarcely necessary to seek any other cause, than -the inevitable errors, that mar all great military combinations not -directed by a single hand. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - - -The operations, south of the Tagus, having been described, those -which occurred, north of that river, shall now be traced; for -previous to the invasion of Portugal, the French, stretching in -one great line across the Peninsula, from Cadiz to Gihon, eagerly -discussed the remnants of the Spanish armies. - -It will be remembered, that the duke Del Parque left Martin Carrera -in the Gata mountains, to interrupt the communication, between the -Salamanca country and the valley of the Tagus. Julian Sanchez also, -issuing from time to time out of Ciudad Rodrigo, cut off the French -foragers in the open country between the Agueda and the Douro; and -beyond the Douro, the Gallician army, under Garcia (in number about -ten thousand), occupied Puebla de Senabria, Puente Ferrada, Villa -Franca, and Astorga, and menaced the right flank, and rear, of the -sixth corps. Mahy was organising a second army at Lugo, and in the -Asturias, the captain-general D’Arco, commanded seven thousand men, -three thousand of which were posted at Cornellana, under general -Ponte. Thus an irregular line of defence, six hundred miles long, -was offered to the invaders, but without depth or substance, save at -Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo, behind which the British and Portuguese -troops were lying. - -On the other hand, the French, holding the interior line, kept -their masses only on the principal routes, communicating by moveable -columns, and thus menacing all the important points without -scattering their forces. The influx of fresh troops from France, -continually added to their solidity, especially in Old Castile, where -Ney had resumed the command, and was supported by Kellerman with the -force of his government, and by an eighth corps under the duke of -Abrantes. - -The invasion of Andalusia was the signal for a general movement -of all the French in Spain; and while Victor and Mortier, menaced -Cadiz and Badajos, Ney summoned Ciudad Rodrigo, and Bonet, entering -the Asturias, threatened Gallicia by the Concija d’Ibas. At the -same time, Loison, with eight thousand fresh men, occupied Leon and -Medina del Campo, and the advanced guard of the eighth corps passed -Valladolid. Loison gave out that he would invade Gallicia by Puebla -de Senabria, and on the 15th of February, his cavalry cut to pieces -five hundred Spanish troops at Alcanizas, but he finally marched -against Astorga, and, at the same time, Bonet destroyed Ponte’s force -at Potes de Sierra, and advanced to Nava de Suarna. These movements -alarmed the Spaniards. Garcia, menaced at once by Bonet and by -Loison, and fearing equally for Astorga and Lugo, threw two-thirds of -his army into the former, and carried the remainder to Villa Franca, -to support Mahi. - -Ney, however, made only a feint of escalading Ciudad Rodrigo, and -Loison, although supported by the men from Leon, who advanced to -Puente Orbijo, was repulsed from Astorga. Junot then concentrated the -eighth corps at Benevente, intending to besiege Astorga in form; but -he was suddenly called towards Madrid, lest disorders should arise -in the capital during the king’s absence, and Mahi and Garcia being -apprised of this, immediately brought up the new levies to the edge -of the mountains, thinking that they might relieve the Asturians -by threatening an irruption into the plains of Leon. But as Loison -still remained at Benevente, they were unable to effect their object, -and, after drawing off five thousand men from Astorga, retired to -Villa Franca. Bonet, however, did not pass Nava de Suarna, and when -general Arco had rallied the Asturian fugitives at Louarca, Garcia, -leaving Mahi to command in Gallicia, marched himself with the remnant -of the old army of the left, to join Romana at Badajos. Meanwhile -Kellerman advanced to Alba de Tormes, and detachments from his and -Ney’s force chased Carrera from the Gata and Bejar mountains, driving -him sometimes over the Alagon, sometimes into Portugal. But it is -unnecessary to trace all these movements, for the French, while -preparing for greater operations, were continually spreading false -reports, and making demonstrations in various directions to mislead -the allies, and to cover their own projects. - -Those projects were at first obscure. It is certain that the invasion -of Portugal by the northern line, was not finally arranged, until -a later period, yet it seems probable that, while Bonet drew the -attention of the Gallician army towards Lugo, the duke of Abrantes -designed to penetrate by Puebla Senabria, not as Loison announced, -for the invasion of Gallicia, but to turn the Tras os Montes and -descend by the route of Chaves upon Oporto, while Ney, calling the -second corps to the aid of the sixth, should invest Ciudad Rodrigo. -But whatever designs might have been contemplated, they were -frustrated partly by the insurrection in Grenada and the failure of -Suchet against Valencia, partly by disunion amongst the generals, for -here also Ney and Junot complained reciprocally, and every where it -was plainly seen that the French corps d’armée, however formidable in -themselves, would not, in the absence of Napoleon, act cordially in a -general system. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -When the commotions in the south subsided, Junot returned to Old -Castile, Loison joined the sixth corps on the Tormes, Kellerman -retired to Valladolid, detachments, placed on the Douro, maintained -the communications between Ney and Junot, and the latter, having -drawn a reinforcement from Bonet, invested Astorga with ten thousand -infantry, two thousand cavalry, eighteen field-guns, six twenty-four -pounders, and two mortars. His covering-divisions were placed, one at -Benevente, to watch the road of Mombuey, one near Puebla de Senabria, -and one at Puente Ferrada. Mahi immediately concentrated the -Gallician army at Villa Franca and Fonceabadon, and detached fifteen -hundred men, under Echevarria, to Mombuey and Puebla, to harass the -flank and rear of the investing army; yet his force was weak. The -Gallician authorities had frequently assured lord Wellington that -it amounted to twenty thousand well-organized troops; but it now -appeared that only eight thousand were in the field, and those ill -provided, and prone to desertion. - - -SIEGE OF ASTORGA. - -Santocildes, governor of this place, was an officer of courage; his -garrison consisted of two thousand five hundred infantry, besides -cannoneers and armed peasantry, and the Moorish ramparts had been -strengthened by fresh works; but there was little ammunition, -scarcely twenty days’ rations, and nothing outside the walls, capable -of seriously disturbing the enemy. The town stood in an open plain, -and had three suburbs: Puerto de Hierro, to the north; St. Andreas, -to the east; and Retebia, to the west. On the two last Junot made -false attacks, but conducted his real approaches, against the front, -between Puerto de Hierro and Retebia. The place was invested the 22d -of March; and Puerto de Hierro was carried by storm, two sallies -repulsed, and the trenches opened, before the end of the month. -A breach was then commenced, but the battering-guns soon became -unserviceable, and the line of approach was flanked by the houses -of Retebia, which were filled with Spanish infantry. Nevertheless, -the town suffered from shells, and the wall was so much broken, on -the 20th of April, that an assault was ordered. A previous attack on -Retebia had failed; but Santocildes was distressed for ammunition, -and, during the preparations for storming, offered to capitulate. - -Junot refused the terms demanded, and, at five o’clock in the evening -of the 21st, some picked troops ran up to the breach; but it was -well retrenched and stockaded, and defended with great obstinacy, -and the flank fire from Retebia stopped the supporting columns. The -storming-party, thus abandoned to its own exertions, was held at bay -on the summit of the breach; and being plied on both flanks, and in -front, with shot from the houses of the town, and in rear by the -musketry from Retebia, would have been totally destroyed, but for -the scarcity of ammunition, which paralized the Spanish defence. -Three hundred French fell on the breach itself, but the remainder -finally effected a lodgement in the ruins, and, during the night, -a second attack on Retebia proving successful, a communication -was opened from the parallels to the lodgement, and strong -working-parties were sent forward, who cut through the stockade into -the town, when the governor surrendered. - -Mahi, who had advanced to the edge of the mountains, as if he would -have succoured the place, hearing of this event, retired to Bembibre, -where his rear was overtaken and defeated by general Clausel on the -24th. He then fell back to Lugo, and recalled his detachment from -Mombuey; but the French from Benevente were already in that quarter, -and, on the 25th, totally defeated Echevaria at Castro Contrijo. -Meanwhile, Junot placed garrisons in Astorga and Leon, and restored -Bonet his division. That general, who had retired to Santander during -the siege, then re-occupied Oviedo and Gihon, defeated the Asturians, -and once more menaced Gallicia by the road of Concija, and by that -of Sales; several slight actions ensued; but the French did not -penetrate farther, and the Junta of Gallicia reinforced the Asturians -with three thousand men. - -During the siege of Astorga, the sixth corps was concentrated at -Salamanca, a strong detachment of Kellerman’s troops siezed the pass -of Baños, and Martin Carrera, quitting the hills, joined the English -light division near Almeida. In fine, the great operations were -commencing, and the line of communication with France, was encumbered -with the advancing reinforcements. A large battering-train, -collected from Segovia, Burgos, and Pampeluna, arrived at Salamanca; -general Martineau, with ten thousand men for the eighth corps, -reached Valladolid; general Drouet passed the Pyrennees with a ninth -corps, composed of the fourth battalions of regiments already in -Spain; and these were followed by seventeen thousand of the imperial -guards, whose presence gave force to the rumour, that the emperor -himself was coming to take the chief command. - -Fortunately for the allies, this report, although rife amongst all -parties, and credited both by Joseph’s ministers, and the French -ambassador at Madrid, proved groundless; and a leader for the -projected operations was still to be named. I have been informed -that marshal Ney resumed the command of the sixth corps, under the -impression that he was to conduct the enterprise against Portugal, -that the intrigues of marshal Berthier, to whom he was obnoxious, -frustrated his hopes, and that Napoleon, fatigued with the disputes -of his lieutenants, had resolved to repair in person to the -Peninsula: that his marriage, and some important political affairs, -diverted him from that object, and that Massena, prince of Esling, -was finally chosen, partly for his great name in arms, and partly -that he was of higher rank than the other marshals, and a stranger -to all the jealousies and disputes in the Peninsula. His arrival was -known in May amongst the allies, and lord Wellington had no longer to -dread the formidable presence of the French emperor. - -That Massena’s base of operations might not be exposed to the -interference of any other authority in Spain, the four military -governments, of Salamanca, Valladolid, Asturias, and St. Andero were -placed under his temporary authority, which thus became absolute in -the northern provinces. But previous to taking the command of the -troops, he repaired to Madrid, to confer with the king; and it would -seem that some hesitation as to the line of invasion still prevailed -in the French councils, because, in the imperial muster-rolls, the -head-quarters of the army of Portugal are marked as being at Caceres -in Estremadura, and the imperial guards are returned as part of that -army, yet during the month of April only; a circumstance strongly -indicating Napoleon’s intention to assume the command himself. The -northern line was, however, definitively adopted; and, while the -prince of Esling was still in the capital, the eighth corps passed -the Tormes, and Ney commenced the - - -FIRST SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -This fortress had been commanded, in the beginning of the year, by -a person whose conduct had been so suspicious, that lord Wellington -demanded his removal. But don Andreas Herrasti, the actual governor, -was a veteran of fifty years’ service, whose silver hairs, dignified -countenance, and courteous manners excited respect; and whose -courage, talents, and honour were worthy of his venerable appearance. -His garrison amounted to six thousand fighting men, besides the -citizens; and the place, built on a height overhanging the northern -bank of the Agueda river, was amply supplied with artillery and -stores of all kinds. The works were, however, weak, consisting of -an old rampart, nearly circular, about thirty feet in height, and -without other flanks than a few projections containing some light -guns: a second wall, about twelve feet high, called a “_fausse -braie_,” with a ditch and covered way, surrounded the first; but was -placed so low on the hill, as scarcely to offer any cover to the -upper rampart. There were no bomb-proofs, even for the magazine, -and Herrasti was forced to place his powder in the church, which he -secured as he might. - -Beyond the walls, and totally severed from the town, the suburb of -Francisco, defended by an earthern entrenchment, and strengthened by -two large convents, formed an outwork to the north-east of the place. -The convent of Santa Cruz served a like purpose on the north-west; -and between these posts there was a ridge called the Little Teson, -which, somewhat inferior in height to the town, was only a hundred -and fifty yards from the body of the place. There was also a Greater -Teson, which, rising behind the lesser at the distance of six hundred -yards from the walls, overlooked the ramparts, and saw into the -bottom of the ditch. - -The country immediately about Ciudad Rodrigo, although wooded, was -easy for troops; especially on the left bank of the Agueda, to which -the garrison had access by a stone bridge within pistol-shot of the -castle-gate. But the Agueda itself, rising in the Sierra de Francia, -and running into the Douro, is subject to great and sudden floods; -and six or seven miles below the town, near San Felices, the channel -deepens into one continued and frightful chasm, many hundred feet -deep, and overhung with huge desolate rocks. - -During February and March, the French departed as lightly as they -had advanced against Ciudad Rodrigo; but, on the 25th of April, a -camp was pitched upon a lofty ridge five miles eastward of the city; -and, in a few days, a second, and then a third, arose: and these -portentous clouds continued to gather on the hills until June, when -fifty thousand fighting men came down into the plain, and throwing -two bridges over the Agueda, begirt the fortress. - -This multitude, composed of the sixth and eighth corps, and a reserve -of cavalry, was led by Ney, Junot, and Montbrun. The sixth corps -invested the place; the eighth occupied San Felices Grande, and -other points, and the cavalry swarmed on both sides of the river; -but the battering train and a great escort was still two days’ march -in the rear; for the rains inundating the flat country between the -Agueda and the Tormes, rendered the roads impassable. The bridges -were established on the 2d and 7th of June; the one above, the other -below the town; and on the 13th, ground was broken on the Greater -Teson. The 22d, the artillery arrived, and preparations were made to -contract the circle of investment on the left bank of the Agueda, -which had hitherto been but slightly watched. But that night, Julian -Sanchez, with two hundred horsemen, passed silently out of the -castle-gate, and, crossing the river, fell upon the nearest French -posts, pierced their line in a moment, and reached the English light -division, then behind the Azava, six miles from Ciudad Rodrigo. This -event, induced Ney, to reinforce his troops on the left bank, and -a movement, to be hereafter noticed, was directed against general -Crawfurd the 25th, on which day, also, the French batteries opened. - -[Sidenote: Intercepted French Correspondence. MSS.] - -Ney’s plan, was to breach the body of the place without attending to -the Spanish fire. Salvos, from forty-six guns, constantly directed -on one point, soon broke the old masonry of the ramparts; but the -besieged, who could bring twenty-four guns to bear on the Teson, -shot so well that three magazines blew up at once in the trenches, -and killed above a hundred of the assailants. On the 27th, the -prince of Esling arrived in the camp, and summoned the governor to -surrender. Herrasti answered in the manner to be expected from so -good a soldier; and the fire was resumed until the 1st of July, when -Massena, sensible that the mode of attack was faulty, directed the -engineers to raise counter-batteries, to push their parallels to the -Lesser Teson, work regularly forward, blow in the counterscarp, and -pass the ditch in form. Meanwhile, to facilitate the progress of the -new works, the convent of Santa Cruz, on the right flank, was carried -after a fierce resistance; and, on the left, the suburb was attacked, -taken, and retaken by a sally, in which great loss was inflicted -on the French. Howbeit, the latter remained masters of every thing -beyond the walls. - -During the cessation of fire, consequent upon the change in the -French dispositions, Herrasti removed the ruins from the foot of the -breach, and strengthened his flank defences: but, on the 9th of July, -the besieger’s batteries, being established on the Lesser Teson, -re-opened with a terrible effect. In twenty-four hours, the fire of -the Spanish guns was nearly silenced, part of the town was in flames, -a reserve magazine exploded on the walls, the counterscarp was blown -in by a mine, on an extent of thirty-six feet, the ditch filled by -the ruins, and a broad way made into the place. At this moment, -three French soldiers, of heroic courage, suddenly running out of -the ranks, mounted the breach, looked into the town, and having -thus, in broad daylight, proved the state of affairs, discharged -their muskets, and, with matchless fortune, retired unhurt to their -comrades. - -The columns of assault immediately assembled. The troops, animated -by the presence of Ney, and excited by the example of the three -men who had so gallantly proved the breach, were impatient for the -signal. A few moments would have sent them raging into the midst of -the city, when the white flag waved on the rampart, and the venerable -governor was seen standing alone on the ruins, and signifying, by his -gestures, that he desired to capitulate. He had stricken manfully, -while reason warranted hope, and it was no dishonour to his silver -hairs, that he surrendered when resistance could only lead to -massacre and devastation. - -Six months had now elapsed, since the French resuming the plan of -conquest interrupted by the Austrian war and by the operations of -sir Arthur Wellesley, had retaken the offensive. Battle after battle -they had gained, fortress after fortress they had taken, and sent the -Spanish forces, broken and scattered, to seek for refuge in the most -obscure parts: solid resistance there was none; and the only hope of -deliverance for the Peninsula rested upon the British general. How -he realized that hope shall be related in the next book. Meanwhile, -the reader should bear in mind that the multifarious actions related -in the foregoing chapters, were contemporaneous; and that he has been -led, as it were, round the margin of a lake, whose turbulent waters -spread on every side. Tedious to read, and trifling many of the -circumstances must appear, yet, as a whole, they form what has been -called the Spanish military policy: and, without accurate notions on -that head, it would be impossible to appreciate the capacity of the -man who, like Milton’s phantom, paved a broad way through the chaotic -warfare. - -I have been charged with incompetence to understand, and, most -unjustly, with a desire to underrate the Spanish resistance; but it -is the province of history to record, foolish as well as glorious -deeds, that posterity may profit from all: and neither will I -mislead those who read my work, nor sacrifice the reputation of -my country’s arms to shallow declamation upon the unconquerable -spirit of independence. To expose the errors is not to undervalue -the fortitude of a noble people; for in their constancy, in the -unexampled patience, with which they bore the ills inflicted alike by -a ruthless enemy, and by their own sordid governments, the Spaniards -were truly noble: but shall I say that they were victorious in their -battles, or faithful in their compacts; that they treated their -prisoners with humanity; that their Juntas were honest or wise; their -generals skilful; their soldiers firm? I speak but the bare truth, -when I assert, that they were incapable of defending their own cause! -Every action, every correspondence, every proceeding of the six years -that the war lasted, rise up in support of this fact; and to assume -that an insurrection so conducted did, or could possibly baffle -the prodigious power of Napoleon is an illusion. Spain baffle him! -Her efforts were amongst the very smallest causes of his failure. -Portugal has far greater claims to that glory. Spain furnished the -opportunity; but it was England, Austria, Russia, or rather fortune, -that struck down that wonderful man. The English, more powerful, more -rich, more profuse, perhaps more brave than the ancient Romans; the -English, with a fleet, for grandeur and real force, never matched, -with a general equal to any emergency, fought as if for their own -existence. The Austrians brought four hundred thousand good troops to -arrest the conqueror’s progress, the snows of Russia destroyed three -hundred thousand of his best soldiers; and finally, when he had lost -half a million of veterans, not one of whom died on Spanish ground, -Europe, in one vast combination, could only tear the Peninsula from -him, by tearing France along with it. What weakness, then, what -incredible delusion to point to Spain, with all her follies, and -her never-ending defeats, as a proof that a people fighting for -independence must be victorious. She was invaded, because she adhered -to the great European aristocracy; she was delivered, because England -enabled that aristocracy to triumph for a moment, over the principles -of the French revolution. - - - - -BOOK XI. - - -CHAPTER I. - - -The defence of Portugal, was not the result of any fortuitous -combination of circumstances, nor was lord Wellington moved thereto, -by any hasty ambition to magnify his own reputation, but calmly and -deliberately, formed his resolution, after a laborious and cautious -estimate of the difficulties and chances of success. Reverting then -to the period, when, by retreating upon Badajos, he divorced his -operations from the folly of Spain, I shall succinctly trace his -military and political proceedings up to the moment, when, confident -in the soundness of his calculations, he commenced his project, -unmoved by the power of his enemy, the timidity of his friends, the -imprudence of his subordinates, or the intrigues of discontented men, -who secretly, and with malignant perseverance, laboured to thwart his -measures and to ruin his designs. - -[Sidenote: Lord Castlereagh’s Statement] - -[Sidenote: Mr. Canning’s Statement] - -After the retreat from Spain in 1809, he repaired to Seville, partly -to negotiate with the Central Junta, upon matters touching the war, -but principally to confer with his brother, ere the latter quitted -the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley’s departure was caused by the state of -politics in England, where a change in the administration was about -to take place,--a change, sudden indeed, but not unexpected; because -the ineptitude of the government, was, in private, acknowledged by -many of its members, and the failure of the Walcheren expedition, -was only the signal, for a public avowal of jealousies and wretched -personal intrigues, which had rendered the Cabinet of St. James’s -the most inefficient, Spain excepted, of any in Europe. Mr. Canning, -the principal mover of those intrigues, had secretly, denounced lord -Castlereagh to his colleagues, as a man incapable of conducting the -public affairs, and exacted from them a promise to dismiss him. -Nevertheless, he permitted that nobleman, ignorant of the imputation -on his abilities, to plan, and conduct the fitting out, of the most -powerful armament that ever quitted England. But when it became -evident that only loss and ruin waited on this unhappy expedition, -Mr. Canning claimed the fulfilment of the promise, and the intrigue -thus becoming known to lord Castlereagh, was by him characterised -as “_a breach of every principle of good faith, both public and -private_.” This was followed by a duel; and by the dissolution of the -administration. Mr. Perceval and lord Liverpool were then empowered -to form another Cabinet; and after a fruitless negotiation with lord -Grey, and lord Grenville, assumed the lead themselves, and offered -the department of foreign affairs to lord Wellesley. - -Contrary to the general expectation, he accepted it. His brother had -opened to him those great views for the defence of Portugal, which -were afterwards so gloriously realized, but which could never have -been undertaken with confidence by the general, unless secure of -some powerful friend in the administration, embued with the same -sentiments, bound by a common interest, and resolute, to support -him when the crisis of danger arrived. It was therefore wise, and -commendable, in lord Wellesley, to sacrifice something of his own -personal pretensions, to be enabled to forward projects, promising -so much glory to the country and his own family, and the first -proceedings in parliament justified his policy. - -[Sidenote: See Parliamentary Debates.] - -Previous to the change in the Cabinet, sir Arthur Wellesley had been -created baron Douro, and viscount Wellington; but those honours, -although well deserved, were undoubtedly conferred as much from party -as from patriotic feeling, and greatly excited the anger of the -opposition members, who with few exceptions, assailed the general, -personally, and with an acrimony not to be justified. His merits, -they said, were nought; his actions silly, presumptuous, rash; -his campaign one deserving not reward, but punishment. Yet he had -delivered Portugal, cleared Gallicia and Estremadura, and obliged -one hundred thousand French veterans to abandon the offensive and -concentrate about Madrid! - -Lord Grey opposing his own crude military notions, to the practised -skill of sir Arthur, petulantly censured the latter’s dispositions at -Talavera; others denied that he was successful in that action; and -some, forgetting that they were amenable to history, even proposed to -leave his name out of the vote of thanks to the army! That battle, so -sternly fought, so hardly won, they would have set aside with respect -to the commander, as not warranting admission to a peerage always -open to venal orators; and the passage of the Douro, so promptly, -so daringly, so skilfully, so successfully executed, that it seemed -rather the result of inspiration than of natural judgement, they -would have cast away as a thing of no worth! - -This spirit of faction was, however, not confined to one side: -there was a ministerial person, at this time, who in his dread -of the opposition, wrote to lord Wellington complaining of his -inaction, and calling upon him to do something that would excite a -public sensation: _any thing provided blood was spilt_. A calm but -severe rebuke, and the cessation of all friendly intercourse with -the writer, discovered the general’s abhorrence of this detestable -policy; but when such passions were abroad, it is evident that lord -Wellesley’s accession to the government, was essential to the success -of lord Wellington’s projects. - -Those projects delivered the Peninsula and changed the fate of -Europe; and every step made towards their accomplishment merits -attention, as much from the intrinsic interest of the subject, as -that it has been common to attribute his success to good fortune and -to the strenuous support he received from the Cabinet at home. Now -it is far from my intention to deny the great influence of fortune -in war, or that the duke of Wellington has always been one of her -peculiar favourites; but I will make it clearly appear, that if he -met with great success, he had previously anticipated it, and upon -solid grounds, that the Cabinet did not so much support him as it -was supported by him; and finally, that his prudence, foresight, and -firmness were at least as efficient causes as any others that can be -adduced. - -Immediately after the retreat from Jaraceijo, and while the -ministers were yet unchanged, lord Castlereagh, brought, by continual -reverses, to a more sober method of planning military affairs, had -demanded lord Wellington’s opinion upon the expediency, the chance of -success, and the expense of defending Portugal. This letter reached -the general on the 14th of September, 1809; but the subject required -many previous inquiries and a careful examination of the country; -and, at that period, any plan for the defence of Portugal, was -necessarily to be modified, according to the energy or feebleness of -the Spaniards in Andalusia. Hence it was not until after his return -from Seville, a few days previous to the defeat at Ocaña, that lord -Wellington replied to lord Liverpool, who, during the interval, had -succeeded lord Castlereagh in the war department. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool. Badajos, 14th Nov. -1809. MSS.] - -Adverting to the actual state of the French troops in the Peninsula, -he observed, that, unless the Spanish armies met with some great -disaster, the former _could not then make an attack upon Portugal_; -yet, if events should enable them to do so, that the forces at that -moment in the latter might defend it. “But the peace in Germany,” he -said, “might enable France to reinforce her armies in Spain largely, -when the means of invading Portugal would be increased, not only -in proportion to the additional troops then poured in, but also in -proportion to the effect which such a display of additional strength -would necessarily have upon the spirit of the Spaniards. Even in -that case, _until Spain should have been conquered and rendered -submissive_, the French would find it difficult, if not impossible, -to obtain possession of Portugal, _provided England employed her -armies in defence of that country, and that the Portuguese military -service was organised to the full extent of which it was capable._ -But the number of British forces employed should not be less than -thirty thousand effective men. Although the Portuguese regular force, -actually enrolled, consisted of thirty-nine thousand infantry, three -thousand artillery, and three thousand cavalry; and the militia -amounted to forty-five thousand, exclusive of the ordenanças.” - -The next point of consideration was the probable expense. “The actual -yearly cost of the British army in Portugal, exclusive of the hire of -transport-vessels, was about £1,800,000, being only half a million -sterling more than they would cost if employed in England. Hence -the most important consideration was the expense of renovating, and -supporting the Portuguese military, and civil services. The British -government, had already subsidised the Portuguese Regency, at the -rate of six hundred thousand pounds yearly, being the expense of -twenty thousand men, which the latter were bound by treaty to place -at the service of the English commander-in-chief. - -“But this was far from sufficient to render the Portuguese army -efficient for the impending contest. The revenue of Portugal was -between eight and nine millions of dollars, the expenses between -fourteen and fifteen millions, leaving a deficiency of more than six -millions of dollars. Hence, for that year, the most pressing only of -the civil and military demands had been paid, and the public debt -and the salaries of the public servants were in arrear. The advances -already made by Great Britain amounted to two millions of dollars; -there remained a deficiency of four millions of dollars, which, after -a careful inquiry, it appeared could not be made good by Portugal; -and it was obvious that the administration would, when distressed, -gradually appropriate the subsidy to support the civil authorities to -the detriment of the military service. Nay, already money from the -English military chest had been advanced to prevent the Portuguese -army from disbanding from want of food. - -“It was impossible to diminish the expenses of the Regency, and -yet the French invasion and the emigration to the Brazils had so -impoverished the country that it was impossible to raise the revenue -or to obtain money by loans. The people were unable to pay the taxes -already imposed, and the customs, which formed the principal branch -of Portuguese revenue, were reduced to nothing by the transfer of -the Brazilian trade from the mother-country to Great Britain. This -transfer, so profitable to the latter, was ruinous to Portugal, and, -therefore, justice as well as policy required that England should -afford pecuniary assistance to the Regency. - -“Without it, nothing could be expected from the Portuguese army. The -officers of that army had, for many years, done no duty, partly that -their country having been, with some trifling exceptions, at peace -nearly half a century, they had continued in the same garrisons, and -lived with their families; and, to these advantages, added others -arising from abuses in the service. Now the severe but necessary -discipline introduced by marshal Beresford, had placed the Portuguese -officers in a miserable situation. All abuses had been extirpated, -additional expenses had been inflicted, and the regular pay was -not only insufficient to support them in a country where all the -necessaries of life were enormously dear, but it was far below the -pay of the English, Spanish, and French officers, with whom, or -against whom, they were to fight. - -“If, therefore, the war was to be carried on, it was advisable to -grant a subsidy of one hundred and thirty thousand pounds yearly, to -enable the Regency to increase the pay of the Portuguese officers; -and to this sum, for the reasons before-mentioned, should be added -a further subsidy of about three hundred thousand pounds, to supply -the actual deficiency in the Portuguese revenues. Or, if the English -cabinet preferred it, they might take ten thousand more Portuguese -troops into pay, which could be done at an expense of two hundred -and fifty thousand pounds. With such assistance, the difficulties of -the moment might be overcome; but, without it, he lord Wellington, -felt assured, that the whole financial and military system of the -Portuguese would break down at once; all the expense, hitherto -incurred, would be cast away, and all hopes of defending the country -extinguished. It was for the ministers to decide. - -“There remained two other points to consider--the re-embarkation of -the British army, in the event of failure, and the chances of the -Portuguese nation continuing the contest alone. As to the first, he -could carry off everything safely, except the horses of the cavalry -and artillery, those could not be carried off, if the embarkation -took place after a lost battle; and, if under other circumstances, -the expense of horse-transports would be more than the worth of the -animals. As to the second point, if the British army evacuated -Portugal, under any circumstances, he could not give hopes that the -contest could be prolonged effectually by the natives. Although -I,” he said, “_consider the Portuguese government and army as the -principals in the contest for their own independence, and that -their success or failure must depend principally upon their own -exertions and the bravery of their army, and that I am sanguine in -my expectations of both, when excited by the example of British -officers and troops, I have no hope of either, if his Majesty should -now withdraw the army from the Peninsula, or if it should be obliged -to evacuate it by defeat. There is no doubt that the immediate -consequences will be the possession of Lisbon by the enemy, probably -without a contest; and other consequences will follow, affecting the -state of the war, not only in Portugal but Spain._ If, therefore, it -should be thought advisable now to withdraw, or if, eventually the -British army should be obliged to withdraw from Portugal, I would -recommend a consideration of the means of carrying away such of the -Portuguese military as should be desirous of emigrating, rather than -continue, by their means, the contest in this country.” - -Peniché and Setuval offered secure points of embarkation in the event -of failure, but neither were likely to come within the scope of the -operations, and lord Wellington’s opinion as to the facility of -carrying off the army from Lisbon was founded chiefly upon admiral -Berkeley’s assurances that the embarkation would not take longer -than four hours, during which time, even though the left bank of -that river should be occupied by the enemy, the ships of war could -sustain the fire and at the same time sweep with their own guns all -the ground above Passo d’Arcos, which, from the circumstance of -its having no surf, was thought preferable to St. Julian’s for an -embarkation. But the admiral’s views, as I shall have occasion to -observe hereafter, were erroneous; the fleet could not remain in the -Tagus, if the enemy were in possession of the left bank. - -Although alarmed at the number of men demanded, a number which, -from the recent loss sustained on the Walcheren expedition, they -truly observed, would, in case of disaster, endanger the safety of -England, the ministers assented to lord Wellington’s proposals, -undertook to pay ten thousand additional Portuguese troops, and to -advance money for the increased stipends to the officers; but thus -pledging themselves to an annual subsidy of nearly one million, they -with justice required that the Portuguese Regency, under pain of the -subsidy being stopped, should keep all that part of the military -establishment which remained under their own direction in a state of -complete efficiency. - -Thus supported, lord Wellington proceeded with vigorous intelligence -to meet the impending contest. His troops removed from the Guadiana, -took healthy cantonments on the north-eastern frontier of Portugal, -and he expected a reinforcement of five thousand infantry and a -regiment of cavalry from England. Smaller detachments had already -reached him, and the army when it commenced its march from the -Guadiana was numerically thirty thousand strong; but those actually -under arms scarcely amounted to twenty thousand; nine thousand were -in hospital, and many in the ranks were still tottering from the -effects of past illness. - -The 20th of January, the head-quarters, and the artillery parcs, were -established at Viseu, in Upper Beira. The cavalry, was quartered, -by single regiments, at Golegao, Punhete, Torres Novas, Celerico, -and Santarem. General Hill, was left with five thousand British, and -a like number of Portuguese at Abrantes, and the remainder of the -infantry (one regiment, forming the garrison of Lisbon, excepted) was -distributed along the valley of the Mondego. - -The plans of the English general, were--at first, grounded, upon -the supposition, that the French would follow the right or northern -line, in preference to the centre or southern line of operations, -against the Peninsula, that is, _attack Portugal from the side of -Old Castile_, rather than _Andalusia from the side of La Mancha_. In -this he was mistaken. The movements were again directed by Napoleon, -his views were as usual gigantic, and not Andalusia alone, but every -part of the Peninsula, was destined to feel the weight of his arms. -Fresh troops, flushed with their recent German victories, were -crowding into Spain, reinforcing the corps to their right and left, -scouring the main communications, and following the footsteps of -the old bands, as the latter were impelled forward in the career of -invasion. Hence, the operations against Andalusia so deeply affected -the defence of Portugal, that, on the 31st of January, at the moment -Seville was opening her gates, lord Wellington demanded fresh -instructions, reiterating the question, whether _Portugal should be -defended at all_, but at the same time transmitting, one of those -clear and powerful statements, which he invariably drew up for the -ministers’ information previous to undertaking any great enterprise; -statements, in which, showing the bearings of past and present -events, and drawing conclusions as to the future with a wonderful -accuracy, he has given irrefragable proofs, that envious folly has -attributed to fortune, and the favour of the cabinet, successes, -which were the result of his own sagacity and unalterable firmness. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, 31st Jan. 1810. MSS.] - -“The enemy,” he said, “aimed at conquering the south; he would no -doubt obtain Seville with all its resources, and the defeat and -dispersion of the Spanish armies would be the consequences of any -action, in which either their imprudence or necessity, or even -expediency, might engage them. The armies might, however be lost and -the authorities dispersed, but the war of Partisans would continue; -Cadiz might possibly hold out, and the Central Junta even exist -within its walls; but it would be without authority, because the -French would possess all the provinces. This state of affairs, left -Portugal untouched; but it was chiefly to that country he wished to -draw the ministers’ attention. - -“They already knew its military situation and resources. If arms -could be supplied to the militia, a gross force of ninety thousand -men, regularly organized, could be calculated upon, exclusive of the -armed population and of the British army. Much had been done within -the last nine months, for the enrollment, organization, and equipment -of this great force; but much remained to be done, and with very -insufficient means, before the fifty thousand men, composing the -militia, could possibly contend with the enemy; and although this -should be effected, the whole army would still want that confidence -in themselves and in their officers, which is only to be acquired by -military experience. - -“When the affairs of Spain should, as before supposed, be brought to -that pass, _that a regular resistance would cease, no possibility -existed of the contest in that country being renewed on such a scale -as to afford a chance of success, although the possession of each -part might be precarious, depending upon the strength of the French -force holding it, and that the whole might prove a burthen rather -than an advantage to the French government_. Thence arose this -question, ‘Will the continuation of the contest in Portugal, afford -any reasonable prospect of advantage against the common enemy, or of -benefit to the allies?’ - -“It was impossible to calculate upon any certain grounds the degree -of assistance to be expected from the Portuguese troops. For the -regulars every thing that discipline could effect had been done, and -they had been armed and equipped as far as the means of the country -would go. The militia also had been improved to the extent which -the expense of keeping them embodied would permit. The Portuguese -had confidence in the British nation and army; they were loyal to -their Prince; detested the French government, and were individually -determined to do every thing for the cause. Still they were not to be -certainly calculated upon until inured to war, because the majority -of their officers were of an inferior description and inexperienced -in military affairs.” - -Under these circumstances, and _adverting to the approaching -subjection of Spain_, he demanded to know whether “_the enemy, -bending the greatest part of his force against Portugal, that country -should be defended, or measures taken to evacuate it, carrying off -all persons, military and others, for whose conveyance means could -be found_. But, under any circumstances, (he said) the British army -could always be embarked in despite of the enemy.” - -[Sidenote: Mr. James Moore’s Narrative]. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 12.] - -Such being the view taken of this important subject by lord -Wellington, it may seem proper here to notice an argument which, -with equal ignorance and malice, has often been thrust forward in -disparagement of sir John Moore, namely, that he declared Portugal -could not be defended, whereas lord Wellington did defend that -country. The former general premising that he was not prepared to -answer a question of such magnitude, observed, that the frontier, -being, although rugged, open, could not be defended against a -superior force; yet that Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, -Celerico, Viseu, might be occupied as temporary positions to check -the advance of an enemy, and cover the embarkation of stores, &c. -which could only be made at Lisbon, that the Portuguese in their own -mountains would be of much use, and that he hoped that they could -alone defend the Tras os Montes. That, if the French succeeded in -Spain, it would be vain to resist them in Portugal “_because the -latter was without a military force_,” and if it were otherwise, from -the experience of Roriça and Vimiero, no reliance was to be placed on -their troops. But this opinion, hastily given, had reference only -to the _state of affairs existing at that moment_, being expressly -founded on the _miserable condition and unpromising character of the -Portuguese military_, Spain also being supposed conquered. - -[Sidenote: Letter to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 14. 1809. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid. Jan. 31, 1810. MSS.] - -Lord Wellington, after two campaigns in the country; after the -termination of the anarchy, which prevailed during sir John -Cradock’s time; after immense subsidies had been granted to -Portugal, her whole military force re-organized, and her regular -troops disciplined, paid, and officered by England; after the war -in Germany had cost Napoleon fifty thousand men, the campaign in -the Peninsula at least fifty thousand more; in fine, after mature -consideration, and when Spain was still fighting, when Andalusia, -Catalonia, Murcia, Valencia, Gallicia, and the Asturias, were still -uninvaded; when Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, most important posts -with reference to this question, were still in possession of the -Spaniards, and prepared for defence, lord Wellington, I say, came to -the conclusion, that Portugal might be defended against the enemy -then in the Peninsula, provided _an enormous additional subsidy and -a powerful auxiliary army were furnished by England, and that one -earnest and devoted effort was made by the whole Portuguese nation_. -And when Andalusia fell, he warned his government, that, _although -success could only be expected from the devotion and ardour of the -Portuguese, their army could not even then be implicitly trusted_. -Lisbon also, he considered as the only secure point of resistance, -and he occupied Viseu, Guarda, Almeida, Belmonte, and Celerico, as -temporary posts. But, in all things concerning this war, there was -between those generals, a remarkable similarity of opinion and plan -of action. - -[Sidenote: Mr. James Moore’s Narrative.] - -“_The French_,” said sir John Moore, “_will find the Spaniards -troublesome subjects, but in the first instance they will have little -more than a march to subdue the country_.” - -[Sidenote: Letter to Lord Liverpool, Jan. 31, 1810. MSS.] - -“_The defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies will be_,” said -lord Wellington, “_the probable consequence of any action in which -either imprudence, necessity, or even expediency, may lead them to -engage. The armies may be lost, the authorities dispersed, but the -war of Partisans will probably continue._” - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 3.] - -And when the edge of the sword was, in 1810, as in 1808, descending -on the unguarded front of Andalusia, lord Wellington, on the first -indication of Joseph’s march, designed to make a movement similar in -principle to that executed by sir John Moore on Sahagun, that is, -by an irruption into Castile, to threaten the enemy’s rear, in such -sort that he should be obliged to return from Andalusia or suffer -his forces in Castile to be beaten. Nor was he at first deterred -from this project, by the knowledge, that fresh troops were entering -Spain. The Junta, indeed, assured him that only eight thousand men -had reinforced the French; but, although circumstances led him to -doubt this assertion, he was not without hopes to effect his purpose -before the reinforcements, whatever they might be, could come into -line. He had even matured his plan, as far as regarded the direction -of the march, when other considerations obliged him to relinquish it, -and these shall be here examined, because French and Spanish writers -then, and since, have accused him of looking on with indifference, if -not with satisfaction, at the ruin of the Central Junta’s operation, -as if it only depended upon him to render them successful. - -Why he refused to join in the Spanish projects has been already -explained. He abandoned his own,-- - -1º. Because the five thousand men promised from England had not -arrived, and his hospitals being full, he could not, including Hill’s -division, bring more than twenty thousand British soldiers into the -field. Hill’s division, however, could not be moved without leaving -the rear of the army exposed to the French in the south,--a danger, -which success in Castile, by recalling the latter from Andalusia, -would only increase. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -2º. The Portuguese had suffered cruelly during the winter from hunger -and nakedness, the result of the scarcity of money before-mentioned. -To bring them into line, was to risk a total disorganization, -destructive alike of present and future advantages. On the other -hand, the French in Castile, consisting of the sixth corps and the -troops of Kellerman’s government, lord Wellington knew to be at least -thirty thousand strong, of which twenty thousand were in one mass; -and, although the rest were dispersed from Burgos to Avila, and from -Zamora to Valladolid, they could easily have concentrated in time to -give battle, and would have proved too powerful. That this reasoning -was sound shall now be shewn. - -[Sidenote: Rolls of the French army.] - -Mortier’s march from Seville would not have terminated at Badajos, if -the British force at Abrantes, instead of advancing to Portalegre, -had been employed in Castile. The invasion of Andalusia, was only -part of a general movement throughout Spain; and when the king placed -himself at the head of the army, to force the Morena, Kellerman -marched from Salamanca to Miranda del Castanar and Bejar, with the -sixth corps, and thus secured the defiles leading into the valley -of the Tagus, and at the same time, the second corps coming down -that valley, communicated with the sixth by the pass of Baños, and -with the fifth by Seradillo and Caceres. Hence, without losing hold -of Andalusia, three _corps d’armée_, namely, the sixth, second, and -fifth, amounting to fifty thousand men, could, on an emergency, -be brought together to oppose any offensive movement of lord -Wellington’s. Nor was this the whole of the French combinations; for, -in rear of all these forces, Napoleon was crowding the Peninsula with -fresh armies, and not eight thousand, as the Central Junta asserted, -but one hundred thousand men, rendered disposable by the peace with -Austria and the evacuation of Walcheren, were crossing, or to cross, -the western Pyrennees. - -Of these, the first detachments reinforced the divisions in the -field, but the succeeding troops formed an eighth and ninth -corps, and the former, under the command of the duke of Abrantes, -advancing gradually through Old Castile, was actually in the -plains of Valladolid, and would, in conjunction with Kellerman, -have overwhelmed the British army; but for that sagacity, which -the French, with derisive but natural anger, and the Spaniards, -with ingratitude, have termed “_The selfish caution of the English -system_.” - -Truly, it would be a strange thing, to use so noble and costly a -machine, as a British army, with all its national reputation to -support, as lightly as those Spanish multitudes, collected in a day, -dispersed in an hour, reassembled again without difficulty, incapable -of attaining, and consequently, incapable of losing, any military -reputation. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -The greatness of the French reinforcements having dispelled the -idea of offensive operations, lord Wellington turned his whole -attention to Portugal, and notwithstanding the unfavourable change of -circumstances, the ministers consented that he should undertake its -defence; yet, the majority yielding to the influence of his brother, -rather than to their own conviction of its practicability, and -throwing the responsibility entirely on the shoulders of the general. -The deep designs, the vast combinations, and the mighty efforts, by -which he worked out the deliverance of that country, were beyond the -compass of their policy; and even now, it is easier to admire than to -comprehend, the moral intrepidity which sustained him under so many -difficulties, and the sagacity which enabled him to overcome them; -for he had an enemy with a sharp sword to fight, the follies and -fears of several weak cabinets to correct, the snares of unprincipled -politicians to guard against, and finally to oppose public opinion. -Failure was every where anticipated, and there were but few who even -thought him serious in his undertaking. But having now brought the -story of the war down to the period, when not Spain nor Portugal, but -England was to contend with France; before I enter upon the narrative -of this memorable contest, it will be well to take a survey of the -respective conditions and plans of the belligerents, and to shew how -great the preparations, how prodigious the forces on both sides, and -with what a power each was impelled forward to the shock. - -_State of the French._--France victorious, and in a state of the -highest prosperity, could with ease, furnish double the number of -men, required to maintain the struggle in the Peninsula for many -years. But the utmost strength of the Spaniards having been proved, -it was evident that if the French could crush the British armies, -disorder and confusion might indeed be prolonged for a few years, -yet no effectual resistance made, and as in the war of succession, -the people would gradually accommodate themselves to the change of -dynasty, especially as the little worth of Ferdinand was now fully -demonstrated, by an effort to effect his release. The agent, a baron -Kolli being detected, and his place supplied by one of the French -police to ascertain the intentions of the captive king, the latter, -influenced by personal fears alone, not only refused to make the -attempt, but dishonourably denounced Kolli to the French government. -The only real obstacles then to the entire conquest of the Peninsula -were Cadiz and Portugal. The strength of the former was precarious, -and the enormous forces assembled to subdue the latter appeared to be -equal to the task. Yet in war, there are always circumstances, which, -though extraneous to the military movements, influence them as much -as the wind influences the sailing of a ship, and amongst the most -important of these, must be reckoned the conduct of the intrusive -king. - -Joseph was a man of so amiable a nature, that even the Spaniards -never accused him of any thing worse than being too convivial; but -it is evident that he was unequal to his task and mistook his -true situation, when, resisting Napoleon’s policy, he claimed the -treatment of an independent king. He should have known that he was a -tool, and in Spain, could only be a tool of the emperor’s. To have -refused a crown, like his brother Lucien, would have been heroic -firmness, but like his brother Louis, first to accept, and then -to resist the hand that conferred it, was a folly that, without -ameliorating the condition of the Spaniards, threw fatal obstacles in -Napoleon’s path. Joseph’s object was to create a Spanish party for -himself by gentle and just means, but the scales fell from the hands -of justice when the French first entered the Peninsula, and while -the English supported Spain, it was absurd to expect even a sullen -submission, much less attachment from a nation so abused, neither was -it possible to recast public feeling, until the people had passed -through the furnace of war. The French soldiers were in Spain for -conquest, and without them the intrusive monarch could not keep his -throne. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 1.] - -Now Joseph’s Spanish ministers, were men who joined him upon -principle, and who, far from shewing a renegado zeal in favour of the -French, were as ardently attached to their own country, as any of -those who shouted for Ferdinand VII.; and whenever Spanish interests -clashed (and that was constantly) with those of the French armies, -they as well as the king invariably supported the former; and so -strenuously, that in Paris it was even supposed that they intended -to fall on the emperor’s troops. Thus civil contention weakened the -military operations, and obliged Napoleon either to take the command -in person, or to adopt a policy which however defective, will upon -inspection prove perhaps, to have been the best adapted to the -actual state of affairs. - -He suffered, or as some eager to lower a great man’s genius to their -own level, have asserted, he fomented disputes between the marshals -and the king, but the true question is, could he prevent those -disputes? A wise policy, does not consist in pushing any one point -to the utmost perfection of which it may be susceptible, but in -regulating and balancing opposing interests, in such a manner, that -the greatest benefit shall arise from the working of the whole. - -To arrive at a sound judgement of Napoleon’s measures, it would -be necessary to weigh all the various interests of his political -position, but there are not sufficient materials yet before the -world, to do this correctly, and we may be certain, that his -situation with respect both to foreign and domestic policy, required -extraordinary management. It must always be remembered, that, he was -not merely a conqueror, but the founder, of a political structure -too much exposed to storms from without, to bear any tampering with -its internal support. If money be the sinew of war, it is the vital -stream of peace, and there is nothing more remarkable in Napoleon’s -policy, than the care with which he handled financial matters; -avoiding as he would the plague, that fictitious system of public -credit, so fatuitously cherished in England. He could not without -hurting France, transmit large quantities of gold to Spain, and the -only resource left was to make “_the war maintain the war_.” - -[Sidenote: See Vol. I. p. 420.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Sections 2 and 3.] - -But Joseph’s desire of popularity, and the feelings of his ministers, -were much opposed to this system; nor were the proceeds always -applied for the benefit of the troops. This demanded a remedy; -yet openly to declare the king of no consideration would have been -impolitic in the highest degree. The emperor adopted an intermediate -course, and formed what were called “_particular military -governments_,” such as Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia, and Andalusia; -in which the marshal, or general, named governor possessed both the -civil and military power: in short, he created viceroys as he had -threatened to do when at Madrid; and, though many disadvantages -attended this arrangement, it appears to have been wise and -consistent with the long reach which distinguishes all Napoleon’s -measures. The principal disadvantages were, that it mortally offended -the king, by thwarting his plans for establishing a national party; -that many of the governors were wantonly oppressive, and attentive -only to their own situation, without regarding the general objects of -the war; that both the Spanish ministers and the people regarded it -as a step towards dismembering Spain, and especially with respect to -the provinces beyond the Ebro; and, indeed, the annexing those parts -to France, if not resolved upon, was at one time contemplated by the -emperor. - -[Sidenote: Memoires de St. Helene.] - -On the other hand, experience proved, that Joseph was not a general -equal to the times. Napoleon himself admits, that, at this period, -the marauding system necessary to obtain supplies, joined to the -Guerilla warfare, had relaxed the discipline of the French armies, -and introduced a horrible license, while the military movements were -feebly pushed. Hence, perhaps, the only effectual means to obtain the -resources of Spain for the troops, with least devastation, was to -make the success of each “_corps d’armée_,” and the reputation of -its commander, dependent upon the welfare of the province in which it -was fighting. And, although some of the governors, had neither the -sense nor the justice to fulfil this expectation; others, such as -Soult and Suchet, did tranquillize the people, and yet provided all -necessary things for their own troops; results which would certainly -not have been attained under the supreme government of the king, -because he knew nothing of war, loved pleasure, was of an easy, -obliging disposition, and had a court to form and maintain. - -I am aware that the first-named generals, especially Soult, were -included by Joseph amongst those who, by oppressing the people, -extended the spirit of resistance; but this accusation was the result -of personal enmity; and facts, derived from less interested quarters, -as well as the final results, prove that those officers had a longer -reach in their policy than the king could understand. - -There is yet another view in which the matter may be considered. -Napoleon says he left many provinces of Italy under the harsh -government of Austria, that the spirit of jealousy, common to the -small states of that country, might be broken, and the whole rendered -amenable and ready to assimilate, when he judged the time ripe to -re-form one great kingdom. Now the same policy may be traced in the -military governments of Spain. The marshal’s sway, however, wisely -adapted to circumstances, being still the offspring of war and -violence, must, of necessity, be onerous and harsh; but the Peninsula -once subdued, this system would have been replaced by the peaceful -government of the king, who would then have been regarded as a -deliverer. Something of this nature was also necessary to sweep away -the peculiar privileges which many provinces possessed, and of which -they were extremely tenacious; and the iron hand of war, only, could -introduce that equality which was the principal aim and scope of the -constitution of Bayonne. - -[Sidenote: King Joseph’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -Nevertheless, the first effects of the decree establishing this -system, were injurious to the French cause. Fresh contributions were -exacted to supply the deficiency occasioned by the cessation of -succours from France; and, to avoid these, men, who would otherwise -have submitted tranquilly, fled from the military governments. The -Partidas also suddenly and greatly increased, and a fresh difficulty -arose about their treatment when prisoners. These bodies, although -regardless of the laws of war themselves, claimed all the rights of -soldiers from their adversaries, and their claim was supported by -the Spanish government. Thus, when Soult, as major-general for the -king, proclaimed that military execution would be done on the bands -in Andalusia, as assassins, and beyond the pale of military law, the -Regency answered, by a retaliatory declaration; and both parties had -strong grounds for what they did: the Junta, because the defence of -the country now rested chiefly on the Partidas; Joseph, because the -latter, while claiming the usages of war, did not act upon them, and -were, by the Junta, encouraged in assassination. Mina, and, indeed, -all the chiefs, put their prisoners to death whenever it became -inconvenient to keep them; and Saraza publicly announced his hope of -being able to capture Madame Suchet when she was pregnant, that he -might destroy the mother and the infant together! And such things -were common during this terrible war. The difficulties occurring -in argument were, however, overcome in practice; the question of -the treatment of the prisoners was generally decided by granting no -quarter on either side. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 2.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 5.] - -Joseph, incensed at the edict establishing the governments, sent the -marquis of Almenara to Paris, to remonstrate with his brother, and to -complain of the violence and the injustice of the French generals, -especially Ney and Kellerman; and he denounced one act of the latter, -which betrayed the most wanton contempt of justice and propriety; -namely, the seizure of the national archives at Simancas; by which, -infinite confusion was produced, and the utmost indignation excited, -without obtaining the slightest benefit, political or military. -Another object of Almenara’s mission was to ascertain if there was -really any intention of seizing the provinces beyond the Ebro; and -this gave rise to a curious intrigue; for his correspondence, being -intercepted, was brought to Mr. Stuart, the British envoy, and he, -in concert with Romana, and Cabanes the Spanish historian, simulated -the style and manner of Napoleon’s state-papers, and composed a -counterfeit “_senatus consultum_” and decree for annexing the -provinces beyond the Ebro to France, and transmitted them to Joseph, -whose discontent and fears were thereby greatly increased. Meanwhile, -his distress for money was extreme; and his ministers were at times -actually destitute of food. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 1.] - -These political affairs impeded the action of the armies, but the -intrinsic strength of the latter was truly formidable; for, reckoning -the king’s French guards, the force in the Peninsula was not less -than _three hundred and seventy thousand men, and eighty thousand -horses_. Of these, forty-eight thousand men were in hospital, four -thousand prisoners, and twenty-nine thousand detached; leaving nearly -two hundred and eighty thousand fighting men actually under arms, -ready either for battle or siege: and moreover, a fresh reserve, -eighteen thousand strong, was in march to enter Spain. In May, -this prodigious force had been re-organized; and in July was thus -distributed:-- - - -_Governments or Armies in the 2d Line._ - - Total Strength. - 1. Catalonia Seventh corps Duke of Tarento 55,647 - 2. Aragon Third corps Gen. Suchet 33,007 - { Detachments and } - 3. Navarre { a division of the } Gen. Reille 21,887 - { Imperial Guards } - 4. Biscay Detachments Gen. Caffarelli 6,570 - 5. Old Castile, { Divisions of the } - comprising Burgos, { Imperial Guards } Gen. Dorsenne 10,303 - Aranda, and Soria { and Cavalry } - 6. Valladolid, &c. Detachments Gen. Kellerman 6,474 - 7. Asturias One division Gen. Bonet 9,898 - ------- - Total for the governments 143,786 - ------- - - -_Armies in the 1st Line._ - - _Army of the South_, composed of the first, fourth, and - fifth corps, under the command of Soult 72,769 - - _Army of the Centre_, composed of the Royal Guards, two - divisions of infantry, and two of cavalry, under the - personal command of the king 24,187 - - _Army of Portugal_, composed of a reserve of cavalry and - the second, sixth, and eighth corps, under the command of - Massena 86,896 - - The ninth corps, commanded by general Drouet, distributed, - by divisions, along the great line of communication from - Vittoria to Valladolid 23,815 - - A division under general Serras, employed as a moveable - column to protect the rear of the army of Portugal 10,605 - ------- - 218,272 - ------- - -Thus the plan of invasion was determined in three distinct lines, -namely, the third and seventh corps on the left; the army of the -south in the centre; the army of Portugal on the right. But the -interior circle was still held by the French; and their lines of -communication were crowded with troops. - - -[Sidenote: Memoirs of Contreras, published by himself.] - -_State of Spain._--On the right, the armies of Valencia and -Catalonia, were opposed to the third and seventh corps; but the -utmost efforts of the last could only retard, not prevent the sieges -of Taragona and Tortoza. In the centre, the Murcian troops and -those assembled at Cadiz, were only formidable by the assistance -of the British force under general Graham. On the left, Romana, -supported by the frontier fortresses, maintained a partizan warfare -from Albuquerque to Ayamonte, but looked to Hill for safety, and to -Portugal for refuge. In the north, the united forces of Gallicia and -Asturias, did not exceed fifteen thousand men; and Mahi declared -his intention of retiring to Coruña if Bonet advanced beyond the -frontiers. Indeed, the Gallicians were so backward to join the -armies, that, at a later period, Contreras was used to send through -the country moveable columns, attended by an executioner, to oblige -the villages to furnish their quota of men. Yet, with all this -severity, and with money and arms continually furnished by England, -Gallicia never was of any signal service to the British operations. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.] - -But, as in the human body livid spots and blotches appear as the -vital strength decays, so, in Spain, the Partidas suddenly and -surprisingly increased as the regular armies disappeared. Many -persons joined these bands, as a refuge from starvation; others from -a desire to revenge the licentious conduct of the marauding French -columns; and, finally, the Regency, desirous of pushing the system -to its utmost extent, established secret Guerilla Juntas, in each -province, enjoining them, diligently to collect stores and provisions -in secure places. District inspectors and paymasters, selected by -the nearest general officer in command of regular troops, were also -appointed, as superintendents of details relative to the discipline -and payment of the Partidas, and particular tracts were charged with -the supplies, each according to its means. Lastly, every province was -divided into three parts, each part, following its population, being -to furnish seven, eight, or nine squadrons of this irregular force; -and the whole, whenever circumstances required it, to unite and act -in mass. - -The first burst of these bands, occasioned the French considerable -loss, impeded their communications, and created great alarm. It was -a second insurrection of the whole country. The Murcians, in concert -with the peasants of Grenada and Jaen, waged war in the mountains of -Andalusia; Franquisette and Palarea beset the neighbourhood of Ciudad -Real, and Toledo in La Mancha. El Principe, Saornil, and Juan Abril, -descending from the Carpentino mountains, sometimes on the side of -Segovia, sometimes on the side of Madrid, carried off small French -posts, close to the capital, and slew the governor of Segovia, at the -very gates of that town. - -On the other side of Madrid, the Empecinado, with twelve hundred -cavalry and infantry, kept the hills above Guadalaxara, and ventured -sometimes to give battle in the plain. Espoz y Mina was formidable -in Navarre. Longa and Campillo, at the head of two thousand men, -harassed Biscay and the neighbourhood of Vittoria, and the chain -of communication, between these great bands and the Empecinado, -was maintained by Amor, Merino, and the Friar Sapia, the two first -acting about Burgos, and the third holding the mountains above Soria. -In the Asturias, Escaidron, continually hanging upon the flanks and -rear of Bonet, between St. Andero and Oviedo, acted in concert with -Campillo on one side, and with Porlier on the other, and this last -chief, sometimes throwing himself into the mountains on the borders -of Gallicia, and sometimes sailing from Coruña, constantly troubled -the Asturias by his enterprises. To curb these bands, the French -fortified all their own posts of communication and correspondence, -slew numbers of the Guerillas, and suppressed others. Many were -robbers who, under pretence of acting against the enemy, merely -harassed their own countrymen; and few were really formidable, though -all were vexatious. Enough, however, has been said upon this point! - -But, while reduced to this irregular warfare, for preventing the -entire submission of Old Spain, the Regency, with inconceivable folly -and injustice, were alienating the affections of their colonies, and -provoking civil war; as if the terrible struggle in the Peninsula -were not sufficient for the ruin of their country. The independence -of Spain was, with them, of subordinate interest to the continuance -of oppression in South America. Money, arms, and troops, were -withdrawn from the Peninsula, to subdue the so-called rebellious -colonists; nor was any reflection made on the inconsistency, of -expecting Napoleon’s innumerable hosts to be beaten close to their -own doors, by Guerilla operations, and yet attempting, with a few -divisions, to crush whole nations, acting in the same manner, at -three thousand miles distance. Such being the state of French and -Spanish affairs, it remains to examine the condition of England and -Portugal, as affecting the war in the Peninsula. - - -_England._--The contentions of party were vehement, and the -ministers’ policy resolved itself into three principal points: 1º. -The fostering the public inclination for the war; 2º. The furnishing -money for the expenses; and, 3º. The recruiting of the armies. The -last was provided for by an act passed in the early part of 1809, -which offered eleven guineas bounty to men passing from the militia -to the line, and ten guineas bounty to recruits for the militia; this -was found to furnish about twenty-four thousand men in the year; but -the other points were not so easily disposed of. The opposition, in -parliament, was powerful, eloquent, and not very scrupulous. The -desperate shifts which formed the system of the ministers, were, -indeed, justly attacked, but when particulars, touching the contest -in Portugal, were discussed, faction was apparent. The accuracy -of Beresford’s report of the numbers and efficiency of the native -forces, was most unjustly questioned, and the notion of successful -resistance, assailed by arguments and by ridicule, until gloom and -doubt were widely spread in England, and disaffection wonderfully -encouraged in Portugal; nor was the mischief thus caused, one of the -smallest difficulties encountered by the English general. - -On the other side, the ministers, trusting to their majorities in -parliament, reasoned feebly and ignorantly, yet wilfully, and like -men expecting that fortune would befriend them, they knew not why or -wherefore, and they dealt also more largely than their adversaries -in misrepresentations to mislead the public mind. Every treasury -newspaper teemed with accounts of battles which were never fought, -plans which were never arranged, places taken which were never -attacked, and victories gained where no armies were. The plains -of the Peninsula could scarcely contain the innumerable forces of -the Spaniards and Portuguese; cowardice, weakness, treachery, and -violence were the only attributes of the enemy; if a battle was -expected, his numbers were contemptible; if a victory was gained, -his host was countless. Members of parliament related stories of the -enemy which had no foundation in truth, and nothing, that consummate -art of intrigue could bring to aid party spirit, and to stifle -reason, was neglected. - -[Sidenote: Paper against Gold.] - -But the great and permanent difficulty was to raise money. The -country, inundated with bank-notes, was destitute of gold; Napoleon’s -continental system burthened commerce, the exchanges were continually -rising against England, and all the evils which sooner or later are -the inevitable result of a fictitious currency, were too perceptible -to be longer disregarded in parliament. A committee appointed to -investigate the matter, made early in the following session, a report -in which the evils of the existing system, and the causes of the -depreciation were elaborately treated, and the necessity of returning -to cash payments enforced: but the authors did not perceive, or at -least did not touch upon the injustice, and the ruin, attending -a full payment in coin of sterling value, of debts contracted -in a depreciated paper currency. The celebrated writer, William -Cobbett, did not fail, however, to point out this very clearly, -and subsequent experience has confirmed his views. The government -endeavoured to stave off the discussion of the bullion question, -but lord King, by demanding gold from those of his tenants whose -leases were drawn before the depreciation of bank-notes, proved the -hollowness of the system, and drove the ministers to the alternative, -of abandoning the prosecution of the war, or of denying the facts -adduced in the bullion report. They adopted the latter; and at the -instance of Vansittart, the chancellor of the exchequer, the house -voted in substance, that a pound-note and a shilling, were equal in -value to a golden guinea of full weight, at the moment when light -guineas were openly selling at twenty-eight shillings. This vote, -although well calculated to convince the minister’s opponents, that -no proposition could be too base, or absurd, to meet with support in -the existing parliament, did not, however, remove the difficulties of -raising money, and no resource remained, but that of the desperate -spendthrift, who never intending to pay, cares not on what terms he -supplies his present necessities. The peculiar circumstances of the -war, had, however, given England a monopoly of the world’s commerce -by sea, and the ministers affirming, that, the country, was in a -state of unexampled prosperity, began a career of expense, the like -of which no age or nation had ever seen; yet without one sound or -reasonable ground for expecting ultimate success, save the genius of -their general, which they but half appreciated, and which the first -bullet might have extinguished for ever. - - -_State of Portugal._--In this country, three parties were apparent. -That of the _people_ ready to peril body and goods for independence. -That of the _fidalgos_, who thought to profit from the nation’s -energy without any diminution of ancient abuses. That of the -_disaffected_, who desired the success of the French; some as -thinking that an ameliorated government must follow, some from mere -baseness of nature. This party, looked to have Alorna, Pamplona, and -Gomez Freire, as chiefs if the enemy triumphed; for those noblemen, -in common with many others, had entered the French service in Junot’s -time, under the authority of the prince regent’s edict to that -effect. Freire more honourable than his companions, refused to bear -arms against his country, but the two others had no scruples, and -Pamplona even sketched a plan of invasion, which is at this day in -the military archives at Paris. - -The great body of the people, despising both their civil governors -and military chiefs, relied on the British general and army; but -the fidalgos, or cast of nobles, working in unison with, and -supported by the regency, were a powerful body, and their political -proceedings after the departure of sir John Cradock, demand notice. -The patriarch, formerly bishop of Oporto, the Monteiro Mor, and the -marquess of Das Minas, composed the regency, and they and every other -member of the government were jealous of each other, exceedingly -afraid of their superiors in the Brazils, and, with the exception -of the secretary, Miguel Forjas, unanimous in support of abuses; -and as the military organization carried on by Beresford, was only -a restoration of the ancient institutions of the country, it was -necessarily hateful to the regency, and to the fidalgos, who profited -by its degeneracy. This, together with the unavoidable difficulties -in finance, and other matters, retarded the progress of the regular -army towards efficiency during 1809, and rendered the efforts to -organize the militia, and ordenança, nearly nugatory. Nevertheless, -the energy of lord Wellington and of Beresford, and the comparatively -zealous proceedings of Forjas, proved so disagreeable to Das Minas, -who was in bad health, that he resigned, and immediately became a -centre, round which all discontented persons, and they were neither -few, nor inactive, gathered. The times, obliged the government, to -permit an unusual freedom of discussion in Lisbon; it naturally -followed that the opinions of designing persons were most obtruded, -and those opinions being repeated in the British parliament, were -printed in the English newspapers, and re-echoed in Lisbon. Thus -a picture of affairs was painted in the most glaring colours of -misrepresentation, at the moment when the safety of the country -depended upon the devoted submission of the people. - -After Das Minas’ resignation, four new members were added to the -regency, namely, Antonio, commonly called, Principal Souza, the -Conde de Redondo, the marquis de Olhao, and doctor Noguiera. The two -last were men of some discretion, but the first, daring, restless, -irritable, indefatigable, and a consummate intriguer, created the -utmost disorder, seeking constantly to thwart the proceedings of the -British generals. He was strenuously assisted by the patriarch, whose -violence and ambition were no way diminished, and whose influence -amongst the people was still very considerable. - -An exceedingly powerful cabal, was thus formed, whose object was to -obtain the supreme direction, not only of the civil, but military -affairs, and to control both Wellington and Beresford. The Conde -Linhares, head of the Souza family, was prime minister in the -Brazils; the Principal was in the regency at Lisbon; the chevalier -Souza was envoy at the British court, and a fourth of the family, don -Pedro de Souza, was in a like situation near the Spanish regency; -so that playing into each others hands, and guided by the subtle -Principal, they were enabled to concoct very dangerous intrigues; and -their proceedings, as might be expected, were at first supported with -a high hand by the cabinet of Rio Janeiro. Lord Wellesley’s energetic -interference reduced the latter, indeed, to a reasonable disposition, -yet the cabal secretly continued their machinations, and what they -durst not attempt by force, they sought to attain by artifice. - -In the latter end of the year 1809, Mr. Villiers was replaced as -envoy, by Mr. Charles Stuart, and this gentleman, well experienced -in the affairs of the Peninsula, and disdaining the petty jealousies -which had hitherto marked the intercourse of the principal political -agents with the generals, immediately applied his masculine -understanding, and resolute temper, to forward the views of lord -Wellington. It is undoubted, that the dangerous political crisis -which followed his arrival, could not have been sustained, if a -diplomatist less firm, less able, or less willing to support the -plans of the commander had been employed. - -To resist the French was the desire of two of the three parties in -Portugal, but with the fidalgos, it was a question of interest more -than of patriotism. Yet less sagacious than the clergy, the great -body of which perceiving at once that they must stand or fall with -the English army heartily aided the cause, the fidalgos clung rather -to the regency. Now the caballers in that body, who were the same -people that had opposed sir Hew Dalrymple, hoped not only to beat -the enemy, but to establish the supremacy of the northern provinces -(of which they themselves were the lords) in the administration of -the country, and would therefore consent to no operations militating -against this design. - -Another spring of political action, was the hatred and jealousy of -Spain common to the whole Portuguese nation. It created difficulties -during the military operations, but it had a visibly advantageous -effect upon the people, in their intercourse with the British. For -when the Spaniards shewed a distrust of their allies, the Portuguese -were more minded to rely implicitly on the latter, to prove that they -had no feeling in common with their neighbours. - -Yet, notwithstanding this mutual dislike, the princess Carlotta, wife -to the Prince Regent, and sister to Ferdinand, claimed, not only -the succession to the throne of Spain in the event of her brother’s -death or perpetual captivity, but the immediate government of the -whole Peninsula as hereditary Regent; and to persuade the tribunals -to acknowledge her claims, was the object of Pedro Souza’s mission to -Cadiz. The council of Castile, always ready to overthrow the Spanish -Regency, readily recognized Carlotta’s pretensions in virtue of the -decision of the secret Cortes of 1789 which abolished the Salique -law of Philip the Fifth: but the regents would pay no attention to -them, yet Souza renewing his intrigues when the Cortes assembled, -by corruption obtained an acknowledgement of the princess’s claim. -His further progress was, however, promptly arrested by lord -Wellington, who foresaw that his success would not only affect the -military operations in Portugal, by placing them under the control -of the Spanish government, but the policy of England afterwards, if -power over the whole Peninsula was suffered thus to centre in one -family. Moreover, he judged it a scheme, concocted at Rio Janeiro, to -embarrass himself and Beresford; for it was at first kept secret from -the British Cabinet, and it was proposed that the princess should -reside at Madeira, where, surrounded by the contrivers of this plan, -she could only have acted under their directions. Thus it is plain -that arrogance, deceit, and personal intrigues, were common to the -Portuguese and Spanish governments; and why they did not produce the -same fatal effects in the one as in the other country, will be shewn -in the succeeding chapters. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 9.] - -When lord Wellington required thirty thousand British troops to -defend Portugal, he considered the number that could be fed, rather -than what was necessary to fight the enemy; and hence it was, that -he declared success would depend upon the exertions and devotion of -the native forces. Yet knowing, from his experience in Spain, how -passions, prejudices, and abuses would meet him at every turn, he -would trust neither the simple enthusiasm of the people, nor the free -promises of their governors, but insisted that his own authority as -_marshal-general of Portugal_ should be independent of the local -government, and absolute over all arrangements concerning the English -and Portuguese forces, whether regulars, militia, or “ordenanças;” -for his designs were vast, and such as could only be effected by -extraordinary means. - -Armed with this power, and with the influence derived from the money -supplied by England, he first called upon the Regency, to revive and -enforce the ancient military laws of the realm, by which all men -were to be enrolled, and bear arms. That effected, he demanded that -the people should be warned and commanded to destroy their mills, -to remove their boats, break down their bridges, lay waste their -fields, abandon their dwellings, and carry off their property, on -whatever line the invaders should penetrate: and that this might be -deliberately and effectually performed, he designed at the head of -all the allied regular forces, to front the enemy, in such sort, -that, without bringing on a decisive battle, the latter should yet -be obliged to keep constantly in a mass, while the whole population, -converted into soldiers, and closing on the rear and flanks, should -cut off all resources, save those carried in the midst of the troops. - -But it was evident, that if the French could find, or carry, -supplies, sufficient to maintain themselves until the British -commander, forced back upon the sea, should embark or giving battle -be defeated, the whole of this system must necessarily fall to -pieces, and the miserable ruined people submit without further -struggle. To avoid such a calamitous termination, it was necessary -to find a position, covering Lisbon, where the allied forces could -neither be turned by the flanks, nor forced in front by numbers, -nor reduced by famine, and from which a free communication could -be kept up with the irregular troops closing round the enemy. The -mountains filling the tongue of land upon which Lisbon is situated, -furnished this key-stone to the arch of defence. Accurate plans of -all the positions, had been made under the directions of sir Charles -Stuart in 1799, and, together with the French colonel Vincent’s -minutes, shewing how they covered Lisbon, were in lord Wellington’s -possession; and from those documents the original notion of the -celebrated lines of Torres Vedras are said to have been derived; but -the above-named officers only contemplated such a defence as might be -made by an army in movement, before an equal or a greater force. It -was lord Wellington, who first conceived the design, of turning those -vast mountains into one stupendous and impregnable citadel, wherein -to deposit the independence of the whole Peninsula. - -Hereafter the lines shall be described more minutely; at present -it must suffice to observe, that intrenchments, inundations, and -redoubts secured more than five hundred square miles of mountainous -country lying between the Tagus and the ocean. Nor was this the -most gigantic part of the English general’s undertaking. He was a -foreigner, ill supported by his own government, and holding power -under that of Portugal by a precarious tenure; he was vehemently -opposed by the local authorities, by the ministers, and by the -nobility of that country; and yet, in this apparently weak position, -he undertook at one and the same time, to overcome the abuses -engendered by centuries of misgovernment, and to oblige a whole -people, sunk in sloth, to arise in arms, to devastate their own -lands, and to follow him to battle against the most formidable power -of modern times. - -Notwithstanding the secret opposition of the Regency, and of -the _fidalgos_, the ancient military laws were revived, and so -effectually, that the returns for the month of May gave a gross -number of more than four hundred and thirty thousand men in arms, of -which about fifty thousand were regular troops, fifty-five thousand -militia, and the remainder “ordenanças;” but this multitude was -necessarily subject to many deductions. The “_capitans mor_,” or -chiefs of districts, were at first exceedingly remiss in their duty, -the total number of “ordenanças” really assembled, fell far short of -the returns, and all were ill-armed. This also was the case with the -militia, only thirty-two thousand of which had muskets and bayonets: -and deserters were so numerous, and the native authorities connived -at absence under false pretences, to such an extent, that scarcely -twenty-six thousand men ever remained with their colours. Of the -regular troops the whole were in good condition, and thirty thousand -being in the pay of England, were completely equipped, clothed, -disciplined, and for the most part commanded by British officers; -but, deduction being made for sick men and recruits, the actual -number under arms did not exceed twenty-four thousand infantry, three -thousand five hundred cavalry, and three thousand artillery. Thus the -disposable native force was about fifty-six thousand men, one-half of -which were militia. - -At this period, the British troops employed in the Peninsula, -exclusive of the garrison of Gibraltar, somewhat exceeded -thirty-eight thousand men of all arms, but six thousand were in -hospital or detached, and above seven thousand were in Cadiz. The -latter city was protected by an allied force of nearly thirty -thousand men, while the army, on whose exertions the fate of the -Peninsula rested, was reduced to twenty-five thousand British; such -was the policy of the English Cabinet; for this was the ministers’ -and not the general’s arrangement. The ordenanças being set aside, -the actual force at the disposition of lord Wellington, cannot be -estimated higher than eighty thousand men, and the frontier to -defend, reckoning from Braganza to Ayamonte, four hundred miles -long. The great military features, and the arrangements made to take -advantage of them in conformity with the general plan of defence, -shall now be described. - -The Portuguese land frontier presents four great divisions open to -invasion:-- - -1º. The northern line of the Entre Minho and the Tras os Montes, -extending from the mouth of the Minho, to Miranda on the Douro. - -2º. The eastern line of the Tras os Montes following the course of -the Douro from Miranda to Castel Rodrigo. - -3º. The frontier of Beira from Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminhal on the -Tagus. - -4º. The Alemtejo and the Algarve frontiers, stretching, in one line -from the Tagus to the mouth of the Guadiana. - -But these divisions may be simplified with respect to the military -aspect of the country; for Lisbon taken as the centre, and the -distance from thence to Oporto as the radius, a sweep of the compass -to Rosaminhal will trace the frontier of Beira; and the space lying -between this arc, the Tagus, and the sea-coast, furnished the main -body of the defence. The southern and northern provinces being -considered as the wings, were rendered subservient to the defence of -the whole, but had each a separate system for itself, based on the -one general principle, that the country should be wasted, and the -best troops opposed to the enemy without risking a decisive action, -while the irregular forces closed round the flanks and rear of the -invaders. - -The northern and southern provinces have been already described, -Beira remains to be noticed. Separated by the Douro from the Entre -Minho and Tras os Montes, it cannot well be invaded on that line, -except one or both of those provinces be first subdued; but from -Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminhal, that is from the Douro to the Tagus, -the frontier touches upon Spain, and perhaps the clearest method to -describe the conformation of the country will be to enter the camp of -the enemy. - -An invading army then, would assemble at Ciudad Rodrigo, or at Coria, -or at both those places. In the latter case, the communications -could be maintained, directly over the Gata mountains by the pass of -Perales, or circuitously, by Placentia and the pass of Baños, and -the distance being by Perales not more than two marches, the corps -could either advance simultaneously, or unite and force their way -at one point only. In this situation, the frontier of Beira between -the Douro and the Tagus, would offer them an opening of ninety miles -against which to operate. But in the centre, the Sierra de Estrella, -lifting its snowy peaks to the clouds and stretching out its gigantic -arms, would seem to grasp and claim the whole space; the summit -is impassable, and streaming down on either hand, numerous rivers -cleaving deeply, amidst ravines and bristled ridges, continually -oppose the progress of an army. Nevertheless, the invaders could -penetrate to the right and left of this mountain in the following -directions:-- - -_From Ciudad Rodrigo._--1º. By the valley of the Douro.--2º. By the -valley of the Mondego.--3º. By the valley of the Zezere. - -_From Coria._--1º. By Castello Branco and the valley of the Tagus; -and, 2º. By the mountains of Sobreira Formosa. - -To advance by the valley of the Douro, would be a flank movement -through an extremely difficult country, and would belong rather to -an invasion of the northern provinces than of Beira, because a fresh -base must be established at Lamego or Oporto, before the movement -could be prosecuted against Lisbon. - -To gain the valley of the Mondego there are three routes. The -first passing by Almeida and Celerico, the second by Trancoso and -Viseu, the third by Alfayates and Guarda over the high ridges of -the Estrella. To gain the valley of the Zezere, the march is by -Alfayates, Sabugal, and Belmonte, and whether to the Zezere or -the Mondego, these routes, although rugged, are practicable for -artillery; but between Guarda and Belmonte some high table-land -offers a position where an army could seal the passage on either side -of the mountain, except by the Trancoso road. In fact, the position -of Guarda may be called the breast-plate of the Estrella. - -On the side of Coria, an invading army must first force or turn the -passages of the Elga and Ponçul rivers, to reach Castello Branco, and -that done, proceed to Abrantes by the valley of the Tagus or over the -savage mountain of Sobreira Formosa. But the latter is impracticable -for heavy artillery, even in summer, the ways broken and tormented by -the deep channels of the winter torrents, the country desert, and the -positions if defended, nearly impregnable. Nor is the valley of the -Tagus to be followed, save by light corps, for the villages are few, -the ridges not less steep than those of Sobreira, and the road quite -impracticable for artillery of any calibre. - -Such, and so difficult, being the lines of invasion through Beira, it -would seem that a superior enemy might be met with advantage on the -threshold of the kingdom; but it is not so. For, first, the defending -army must occupy all the positions on this line of ninety miles, -while the enemy, posted at Ciudad Rodrigo and Coria, could, in two -marches, unite and attack on the centre, or at either extremity, with -an overwhelming force. Secondly, the weakness of the Beira frontier -consists in this, _the Tagus along its whole course is, from June -to December, fordable as low down as Salvatierra, close under the -lines_. A march through the Alemtejo and the passage of the river at -any place below Abrantes would, therefore, render all the frontier -positions useless; and although there were no enemy on the borders of -the Alemtejo itself, the march from Ciudad Rodrigo by Perales, Coria, -and Alcantara, and thence by the southern bank to the lowest ford in -the river, would be little longer than the route by the valley of the -Mondego or that of the Zezere. For these reasons _the frontier of -Portugal must be always yielded to superior numbers_. - -Both the conformation of the country, and the actual situation of -the French corps, led lord Wellington to expect, that the principal -attacks would be by the north of Beira and by the Alemtejo, while -an intermediate connecting corps would move by Castello Branco -upon Abrantes, and, under this impression, he made the following -dispositions. Elvas, Almeida, and Valença, in the first, and Peniché, -Abrantes, and Setuval, in the second line of fortresses, were -garrisoned with native troops, part regulars, part militia. - -General Baccellar, having Silveira and the British colonels, Trant, -Miller, and J. Wilson, under his orders, occupied the provinces -beyond the Douro, with twenty-one regiments of militia, including the -garrison of Valença, on the Minho. - -The country between Penamacor and the Tagus, that is to say, the -lines of the Elga and the Ponçul, was guarded by ten regiments of -militia, a regiment of native cavalry, and the Lusitanian legion. In -the Alemtejo, including the garrisons, four regiments of militia were -stationed, and three regiments held the fortresses of the Algarves. -There remained in reserve, twelve regiments of the fifty composing -the whole militia force, and these were distributed in Estremadura on -both sides of the Tagus, but principally about Setuval. The regular -Portuguese troops, deducting those in garrison at Almeida Elvas and -Cadiz, were at Thomar and Abrantes. - -But the British, organized in five divisions of infantry and one of -cavalry, were distributed as follows:-- - - Men. - 1st Division General Spencer, about 6000 Viseu. - 2d Division, including } General Hill, ” 5000 Abrantes. - the 13th Dragoons } - 3d Division General Picton, ” 3000 Celerico. - 4th Division General Cole, ” 4000 Guarda. - Light Division Robert Crawfurd, ” 2400 Pinhel. - The Cavalry General Cotton, ” 3000 { Valley of - { Mondego. - ------ - Total 23,400 under arms. - ------ - -Thus the wings of the defence were composed solely of militia and -ordenança, and the whole of the regular force was in the centre. The -Portuguese at Thomar, and the four British divisions of infantry -posted at Viseu, Guarda, Pinhel, and Celerico, formed a body of -thirty-eight thousand men, the greater part of which could, in -two marches, be united either at Guarda or between that position -and the Douro. On the other side Beresford and Hill could, in as -short a period, unite by the boat-bridge of Abrantes, and thus -thirty-two thousand men would be concentrated on that line. If the -enemy should attempt the passage of the Elga either direct from -Coria, or by a flank movement of the second corps from Estremadura, -across the Tagus, Beresford could succour the militia by moving over -the Sobreira Formosa to Castello Branco, while Hill could reach -that place much quicker than general Reynier, in consequence of an -arrangement which merits particular attention. - -It has been already said that the march from Abrantes to Castello -Branco is over difficult mountains; to have repaired the roads -between these places would have been more useful to the enemy than -to the allies, as facilitating a passage for superior numbers to -penetrate by the shortest line to Lisbon. But lord Wellington, after -throwing boat-bridges over the Tagus and the Zezere, and fortifying -Abrantes, established between the latter and Castello Branco a line -of communication by the left bank of the Tagus, through Niza, to -the pass of Vilha Velha, where, by a flying bridge, the river was -recrossed, and from thence a good road led to Castello Branco. Now -the pass of Vilha Velha is prodigiously strong for defence, and the -distance from Abrantes to Castello Branco being nearly the same by -Niza as by the other bank of the river, the march of troops was yet -much accelerated, for the road near Vilha Velha being reconstructed -by the engineers, was excellent. - -Thus all the obstacles to an enemy’s march by the north bank were -preserved, and the line by Vilha Velha, enabled not only Hill to -pass from Portalegre, or Abrantes, to Castello Branco by a flank -movement in less time than Reynier, but it also provided a lateral -communication for the whole army, which we shall hereafter find -of vital importance in the combinations of the English general, -supplying the loss of the road by Alcantara and the pass of Perales, -which otherwise would have been adopted. - -The French, also, in default of a direct line of communication -between Estremadura and the Ciudad Rodrigo country, were finally -forced to adopt the circuitous road of Almaraz and the pass of Baños, -and it was in allusion to this inconvenience that I said both parties -sighed over the ruins of Alcantara. - -But, notwithstanding this facility of movement and of concentration, -the allies could not deliver a decisive battle near the frontier, -because the enemy could unite an overwhelming force in the Alemtejo, -before the troops from the north could reach that province, and a -battle lost there, would, in the dry season, decide the fate of -Lisbon. To have concentrated the whole army in the south, would have -been to resign half the kingdom and all its resources to the enemy; -but to save those resources for himself, or to destroy them, was the -very basis of lord Wellington’s defence, and all his dispositions -were made to oblige _the French to move in masses_, and to _gain time -himself_, time to secure the harvests, time to complete his lines, -time to perfect the discipline of the native troops, and to give -full effect to the arming and organization of the ordenança, and, -above all things, time to consolidate that moral ascendancy over the -public mind which he was daily acquiring. A closer examination of his -combinations will shew, that they were well adapted to effect these -objects. - -1º. The enemy durst not advance, except with _concentrated masses_, -because, on the weakest line of resistance, he was sure to encounter -above twenty thousand men. - -2º. If, choosing the Alemtejo, he suddenly dispersed Romana’s -troops and even forced back Hill’s, the latter passing the Tagus -at Abrantes, and uniting with Beresford, could dispute the passage -of the Tagus until the arrival of the army from the north; and no -regular and sustained attempt could be made on that side without -first besieging Badajos or Elvas to form a place of arms. - -3º. A principal attack on the central line could not be made without -sufficient notice being given by the collection of magazines at -Coria, and by the passage of the Elga and Ponçul, Beresford and Hill -could then occupy the Sobreira Formosa. But an invasion on this -line, save by a light corps in connexion with other attacks, was not -to be expected; for, although the enemy should force the Sobreira -and reach Abrantes, he could not besiege the latter, in default of -heavy artillery. The Zezere, a large and exceedingly rapid river, -with rugged banks, would be in his front, the Tagus on his left, the -mountains of Sobreira in his rear, and the troops from Guarda and the -valley of the Mondego would have time to fall back. - -4º. An attack on Guarda could always be resisted long enough to -gain time for the orderly retreat of the troops near Almeida, to -the valley of the Mondego, and moreover the road from Belmonte -towards Thomar by the valley of the Zezere was purposely broken and -obstructed. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 5._ - - Defence - of - _Portugal_ - 1810. - - _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] - -The space between Guarda and the Douro, an opening of about thirty -miles leading into the valley of the Mondego, remains to be examined. -Across this line of invasion, the Agueda, the Coa, and the Pinel, -run, in almost parallel directions from the Sierra de Francia and -Sierra de Estrella, into the Douro, all having this peculiarity, -that as they approach the Douro their channels invariably deepen -into profound and gloomy chasms, and there are few bridges. But -the principal obstacles were the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and -Almeida, both of which it was necessary to take before an invading -army could establish a solid base of invasion. After this the -lines of the Douro and of the Mondego would be open; if the French -adopted the second, they could reach it by Guarda, by Alverca, and -by Trancoso, concentrating at Celerico, when they would have to -choose between the right and the left bank. If the latter, they must -march between the Mondego and the Estrella mountains, until they -reached the Alva, a river falling at right angles into the Mondego, -and behind which they would find the allied army in a position of -surprising strength. If, to avoid that, they marched by the right of -the Mondego upon Coimbra, there were other obstacles to be hereafter -noticed; but, in either case, the allied forces, having _interior -lines of communication_, could, as long as the Belmonte road was -sealed, concentrate in time behind the Alva, or in front of Coimbra. -Hence it was on the side of the Alemtejo that danger was most to -be apprehended; and it behoved general Hill to watch vigilantly -and act decisively in opposition to general Reynier; for the latter -having necessarily the lead in the movements, might, by skilful -evolutions and rapid marches, either join the sixth and eighth -corps before Hill was aware of his design, and thus overwhelm the -allied divisions on the Mondego, or drawing Hill across the Tagus, -furnish an opportunity for a corps from Andalusia to penetrate by the -southern bank of that river. - -In these dispositions the English general had regard only to the -enemy’s actual situation, and expecting the invasion in summer; -but in the winter season the rivers and torrents being full, and -the roads deteriorated, the defence would be different; fewer -troops would then suffice to guard the Tagus, and the Zezere, the -Sobreira Formosa would be nearly impassable, a greater number of the -allied troops, could be collected about Guarda, and a more stubborn -resistance made on the northern line. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -Every probable movement being thus previously well considered, lord -Wellington trusted that his own military quickness, and the valour -of the British soldiers, could baffle any unforeseen strokes during -the retreat, and once within the Lines, (the Portuguese people -and the government doing their part) he looked confidently to the -final result. He judged that, in a wasted country, and with thirty -regiments of militia, in the mountains on the flank and rear of the -enemy, the latter could not long remain before the Lines, and his -retreat would be equivalent to a victory for the allies. There were -however many hazards. The English commander, sanguine and confident -as he was, knew well how many counter-combinations were to be -expected; in fine, how much fortune was to be dreaded in a contest -with eighty thousand French veterans having a competent general at -their head. Hence, to secure embarkation in the event of disaster, a -third line of entrenchments was prepared, and twenty-four thousand -tons of shipping were constantly kept in the river to receive the -British forces; measures were also taken to procure a like quantity -for the reception of the Portuguese troops, and such of the citizens -as might wish to emigrate. It only remained to feed the army. - -In the Peninsula generally, the supplies were at all times a source -of infinite trouble on both sides, and this, not as some have -supposed, because Spain is incapable of supplying large armies; -there was throughout the war an abundance of food in that country -but it was unevenly distributed; some places were exhausted, others -overflowing, the difficulty was to transport provisions, and in -this the allies enjoyed a great advantage; their convoys could pass -unmolested, whereas the French always required strong guards first -to collect food and then to bring it up to their armies. In Portugal -there was however a real deficiency, even for the consumption of the -people, and after a time scarcely any food for man or beast, (some -cattle and straw from the northern provinces excepted,) was to be -obtained in that country: nay, the whole nation was at last in a -manner fed by England. Every part of the world accessible to ships -and money was rendered subservient to the cravings of this insatiable -war, and even thus, it was often a doubtful and a painful struggle -against famine, while near the sea, but at a distance from that -nurse of British armies, the means of transport necessarily regulated -the extent of the supply. Now wheel-carriage was scarce and bad in -Portugal, and for the most part the roads forbade its use; hence the -only resource, for the conveyance of stores, was water-carriage, to a -certain distance, and afterwards beasts of burthen. - -Lisbon, Abrantes, and Belem Castle, on the Tagus; Figueras and Raiva -de Pena Cova, on the Mondego; and, finally, Oporto and Lamego, on -the Douro, were the principal depôts formed by lord Wellington, and -his magazines of consumption were established at Viseu, Celerico, -Condeixa, Leiria, Thomar, and Almeida. From those points four hundred -miserable bullock-cars and about twelve thousand hired mules, -organized in brigades of sixty each, conveyed the necessary warlike -stores and provisions to the armies; when additional succours could -be obtained, it was eagerly seized, but this was the ordinary amount -of transport. - -With such means and with such preparations was the defence of -Portugal undertaken, and it must be evident to the most superficial -observer, that, amidst so many difficulties, and with such a number -of intricate combinations, lord Wellington’s situation was not one -in which a general could sleep, and that, due allowance being made -for fortune, it is puerile to attribute the success to aught but his -talents and steel-hardened resolution. - -In the foregoing exposition of the political and military force -of the powers brought into hostile contact, I have only touched, -and lightly, upon the points of most importance, designing no more -than to indicate the sound and the diseased parts of each. The -unfavourable circumstances for France would appear to be the absence -of the emperor,--the erroneous views of the king,--the rivalry of -the marshals,--the impediments to correspondence,--the necessity of -frequently dispersing from the want of magazines,--the iniquity of -the cause, and the disgust of the French officers, who, for the most -part, spoiled by a rapid course of victories on the continent, could -not patiently endure a service replete with personal dangers, over -and above the ordinary mishaps of war, yet promising little ultimate -reward. - -For the English, the quicksands were--the memory of former failures -on the continent,--the financial drain,--a powerful and eloquent -opposition pressing a cabinet so timid and selfish that the general -dared not risk a single brigade, lest an accident should lead to a -panic amongst the ministers which all lord Wellesley’s vigour would -be unable to stem,--the intrigues of the Souza party,--and the -necessity of persuading the Portuguese to devastate their country for -the sake of defending a _European cause_. Finally, the babbling of -the English newspapers, from whose columns the enemy constantly drew -the most certain information of the strength and situation of the -army. - -On the other side, France had possession of nearly all the fortified -towns of the Peninsula, and, while her enormous army threatened to -crush every opponent, she offered a constitution, and recalled to the -recollection of the people that it was but a change of one French -dynasty for another. The church started from her touch, but the -educated classes did not shrink less from the British government’s -known hostility to all free institutions. What, then, remained -for England to calculate upon? The extreme hatred of the people -to the invaders, arising from the excesses and oppressions of the -armies,--the chances of another continental war,--the complete -dominion of the ocean with all its attendant advantages,--the -recruiting through the militia, which was, in fact, a conscription -with two links in the chain instead of one; and, not least, the -ardour of the troops to measure themselves with the conquerors of -Europe, and to raise a rival to the French emperor. And here, as -general Foy has been at some pains to misrepresent the character of -the British soldiers, I will set down what many years’ experience -gives me the right to say is nearer the truth than his dreams. - -That the British infantry soldier is more robust than the soldier -of any other nation, can scarcely be doubted by those who, in 1815, -observed his powerful frame, distinguished amidst the united armies -of Europe, and, notwithstanding his habitual excess in drinking, he -sustains fatigue, and wet, and the extremes of cold and heat with -incredible vigour. When completely disciplined, and three years are -required to accomplish this, his port is lofty, and his movements -free; the whole world cannot produce a nobler specimen of military -bearing, nor is the mind unworthy of the outward man. He does not, -indeed, possess that presumptuous vivacity which would lead him to -dictate to his commanders, or even to censure real errors, although -he may perceive them; but he is observant, and quick to comprehend -his orders, full of resources under difficulties, calm and resolute -in danger, and more than usually obedient and careful of his officers -in moments of imminent peril. - -It has been asserted that his undeniable firmness in battle, is the -result of a phlegmatic constitution uninspired by moral feeling. -Never was a more stupid calumny uttered! Napoleon’s troops fought in -bright fields, where every helmet caught some beams of glory, but -the British soldier conquered under the cold shade of aristocracy; -no honours awaited his daring, no despatch gave his name to the -applauses of his countrymen, his life of danger and hardship was -uncheered by hope, his death unnoticed. Did his heart sink therefore! -Did he not endure with surpassing fortitude the sorest of ills, -sustain the most terrible assaults in battle unmoved, and, with -incredible energy overthrow every opponent, at all times proving -that, while no physical military qualification was wanting, the fount -of honour was also full and fresh within him! - -The result of a hundred battles and the united testimony of impartial -writers of different nations have given the first place, amongst the -European infantry, to the British; but, in a comparison between the -troops of France and England, it would be unjust not to admit that -the cavalry of the former stands higher in the estimation of the -world. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -In resuming the thread of military events, it is necessary to refer -back to the commencement of the year, because the British operations -on the frontier of Beira were connected, although not conducted, -in actual concert with those of the Spaniards; and here I deem it -right to notice the conduct of Miguel Alava, that brave, generous, -and disinterested Spaniard, through whom this connexion was kept up. -Attached to the British head-quarters, as the military correspondent -of the Junta, he was too sagacious not to perceive the necessity -of zealously seconding the English general; yet, in the manner of -doing it, he never forgot the dignity of his own country, and, as he -was too frank and honest for intrigues, his intercourse was always -honourable to himself and advantageous to both nations. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.] - -It will be remembered that, in February, Ney threatened Ciudad -Rodrigo at the same time that Mortier menaced Badajos and that Hill -advanced from Abrantes to Portalegre; lord Wellington immediately -reinforced the line between Pinhel and Guarda, and sent the light -division across the Coa, to observe the enemy’s proceedings. The -Portuguese Regency were alarmed, and demanded more British troops; -but lord Wellington replying that the numbers already fixed would -be as great as he could feed, took occasion to point out, that the -measures agreed upon, with respect to the native forces, were -neither executed with vigour nor impartiality, and that the carriages -and other assistance, required for the support of the British -soldiers then in the country were not supplied. These matters he -urgently advised them to amend before they asked for more troops; -and, at the same time, as the Regency in the hope of rendering him -unpopular with the natives, intimated a wish that he should take the -punishment of offenders into his own hands; he informed them that, -although he advised the adoption of severe measures, he would not be -made the despotic punisher of the people, while the actual laws were -sufficient for the purpose. - -When the siege of Astorga was commenced by the French, the Portuguese -army was brought up to Cea and Viseu, and the militia in the northern -provinces, were ordered to concentrate at Braganza to guard the Tras -os Montes. Ciudad Rodrigo, being soon afterwards seriously menaced, -lord Wellington sent a brigade of heavy cavalry to Belmonte, and -transferred his own quarters to Celerico, intending to succour -Ciudad if occasion offered; but the conduct of the Portuguese -Regency cramped his operations. The resources of the country were -not brought forward, and the English general could scarcely maintain -his actual position, much less advance; yet the Regency treated his -remonstrances lightly, exactly following the system of the Spanish -Central Junta during the campaign of Talavera: lord Wellington was, -however, in a different situation. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.] - -Writing sharply, he told them that “their conduct was evasive and -frivolous; that the army could neither move forward nor remain -without food; that the time was one which would not admit of idle -or hollow proceedings, or partiality, or neglect of public for -private interests; that the resources were in the country, could -be drawn forth, and must be so if the assistance of England was -desired; finally, that punishment should follow disobedience, and, -to be effectual, must begin with the higher classes.” Then, issuing -a proclamation, he pointed out the duties and the omission of both -magistrates and people, and by this vigourous conduct procured some -immediate relief for his troops. - -Meanwhile, Crawfurd commenced a series of remarkable operations. His -three regiments of infantry were singularly fitted for any difficult -service; they had been for several years under sir John Moore, and, -being carefully disciplined in the peculiar school of that great -man, came to the field with such a knowledge of arms that, in six -years of real warfare, no weakness could be detected in their system. -But the enemy’s posts on the Agueda rendered it impossible for the -light division to remain, without cavalry, beyond the Coa, unless -some support was at hand nearer than Guarda or Celerico. Crawfurd -proposed that, while he advanced to the Agueda, Cole, with the fourth -division, should take up the line of the Coa. But that general would -not quit his own position at Guarda; and lord Wellington approving, -and yet desirous to secure the line of the Coa with a view to -succour Ciudad Rodrigo, brought up the third division to Pinhel, and -reinforcing Crawfurd with the first German hussars, (consisting of -four hundred excellent and experienced soldiers,) and with a superb -troop of horse-artillery, commanded by captain Ross, gave him the -command of all the outposts, ordering Picton and Cole to support -him, if called upon. - -In the middle of March, Crawfurd lined the bank of the Agueda with -his hussars, from Escalhon on the left, to Navas Frias on the right, -a distance of twenty-five miles, following the course of the river. -The infantry were disposed in small parties in the villages between -Almeida and the Lower Agueda; the artillery was at Fort Conception, -and two battalions of Portuguese caçadores soon afterwards arrived, -making a total of four thousand men, and six guns. The French at this -period were extended in divisions from San Felices to Ledesma and -Salamanca, but they did not occupy the pass of Perales; and Carrera’s -Spanish division being at Coria, was in communication with Crawfurd, -whose line, although extended, was very advantageous. From Navas -Frias to the Douro, the Agueda was rendered unfordable by heavy rain, -and only four bridges crossed it on that whole extent, namely, one at -Navas Frias; one at Villar, about a league below the first; one at -Ciudad Rodrigo; and one at San Felices, called the bridge of Barba -del Puerco. While therefore, the hussars kept a good watch at the two -first bridges which were distant, the troops could always concentrate -under Almeida before the enemy could reach them from that side; and -on the side of Barba del Puerco, the ravine was so profound that a -few companies of the ninety-fifth were considered capable of opposing -any numbers. - -This arrangement sufficed while the Agueda was swollen; but that -river was capricious, often falling many feet in a night without -apparent reason: when it was fordable, Crawfurd always withdrew his -outposts, and concentrated his division; and his situation demanded a -quickness and intelligence in the troops, the like of which has never -been surpassed. Seven minutes sufficed for the division to get under -arms in the middle of the night; and a quarter of an hour, night or -day, to bring it in order of battle to the alarm-posts, with the -baggage loaded and assembled at a convenient distance in the rear. -And this not upon a concerted signal, or as a trial, but at all times -and certain. - -The 19th of March, general Ferey, a bold officer, either to create -a fear of French enterprise at the commencement of the campaign, or -to surprise the division, collected six hundred grenadiers close -to the bridge of San Felices, and, just as the moon, rising behind -him, cast long shadows from the rocks, and rendered the bottom of -the chasm dark, he silently passed the bridge, and, with incredible -speed, ascending the opposite side, bayonetted the sentries, and fell -upon the piquet so fiercely that friends and enemies went fighting -into the village of Barba del Puerco while the first shout was still -echoing in the gulf below. So sudden was the attack, and so great -the confusion, that the British companies could not form, but each -soldier encountering the nearest enemy, fought hand to hand; and -their colonel, Sydney Beckwith, conspicuous by his lofty stature and -daring actions, a man capable of rallying a whole army in flight, -urged the contest with such vigour that, in a quarter of an hour, the -French column was borne back, and pushed over the edge of the descent. - -This skirmish proved that, while the Agueda was swollen, the enemy -could gain nothing by slight operations; but it was difficult -to keep in advance of the Coa: the want of money had reduced the -whole army to straits, and Crawfurd, notwithstanding his prodigious -activity, being unable to feed his division, gave the reins to -his fiery temper, and seized some church-plate, with a view to -the purchasing of corn. For this impolitic act he was immediately -rebuked, and such redress granted that no mischief followed; and -the proceeding itself had some effect in procuring supplies, as it -convinced the priests that the distress was not feigned. - -When the sixth corps again approached Ciudad Rodrigo in the latter -end of April, lord Wellington, as I have before said, moved his -head-quarters to Celerico, and Carrera took post at St. Martin -Trebeja, occupying the pass of Perales; being, however, menaced there -by Kellerman’s troops, he came down, in May, from the hills to Ituero -on the Azava river, and connected his left with the light division, -which was then posted at Gallegos Espeja and Barba del Puerco. -Crawfurd and he then agreed that, if attacked, the British should -concentrate in the wood behind Espeja, and, if unable to maintain -themselves there, unite with the Spaniards at Nava d’Aver, and -finally retire to Villa Mayor, a village covering the passage of the -Coa by the bridge of Seceira, from whence there was a sure retreat to -Guarda. - -It was at this period that Massena’s arrival in Spain became known -to the allies; the deserters, for the first time, ceased to speak -of the emperor’s commanding in person; yet all agreed that serious -operations would soon commence. Howbeit, as the river continued -unfordable, Crawfurd maintained his position; but, towards the end -of May, certain advice of the march of the French battering-train -was received through Andreas Herrasti: and, the 1st of June, Ney, -descending upon Ciudad Rodrigo, threw a bridge, on trestles, over the -Agueda at the convent of Caridad, two miles above; and, a few days -afterwards, a second at Carboneras, four miles below the fortress. As -this concentration of the French relieved the northern provinces of -Portugal from danger, sixteen regiments of militia were brought down -from Braganza to the Lower Douro; provisions came by water to Lamego, -and the army was enabled to subsist. - -The 8th of June four thousand French cavalry crossed the Agueda, -Crawfurd concentrated his forces at Gallegos and Espeja, and the -Spaniards occupied the wood behind the last-named village. It was -at this moment, when Spain was overwhelmed, and when the eye could -scarcely command the interminable lines of French in his immediate -front, that Martin Carrera thought fit to invite marshal Ney to -desert! - -Nothing could be more critical than Crawfurd’s position. From the -Agueda to the Coa the whole country, although studded with woods and -scooped into hollows, was free for cavalry and artillery, and there -were at least six thousand horsemen and fifty guns within an hour’s -march of his position. His right was at Espeja, where thick woods -in front rendered it impossible to discover an enemy until close -upon the village; while wide plains behind, almost precluded hope, -in a retreat before the multitude of French cavalry and artillery. -The confluence of the Azava with the Agueda offered more security -on his left, because the channel of the former river there became a -chasm, and the ground rose high and rugged at each side of the bridge -of Marialva, two miles in front of Gallegos. Nevertheless, the bank -on the enemy’s side was highest, and, to obtain a good prospect, it -was necessary to keep posts beyond the Azava; moreover the bridge -of Marialva could be turned by a ford, below the confluence of the -streams. The 10th, the Agueda became fordable in all parts, but, as -the enemy occupied himself raising redoubts, to secure his bridge -at Carboneras, and making preparations for the siege of Rodrigo, -Crawfurd, trusting to his own admirable arrangements, and to the -surprising discipline of his troops, still maintained his dangerous -position: thus encouraging the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and -protecting the villages in the plain between the Azava and the Coa -from the enemy’s foraging parties. - -On the 18th, the eighth corps was seen to take post at San Felices, -and other points; and all the villages, from the Sierra de Francia to -the Douro, were occupied by the French army. The 23d, Julian Sanchez, -breaking out of Ciudad, came into Gallegos. On the 25th, the French -batteries opened against the fortress, their cavalry closed upon the -Azava, and Crawfurd withdrew his outposts to the left bank. The 26th, -it was known that Herrasti had lost one hundred and fifty killed, and -five hundred wounded; and, the 29th, a Spaniard, passing the French -posts, brought Carrera a note, containing these words: “_O venir -luego! luego! luego! a socorrer esta plaza_.” (“Oh! come, now! now! -now! to the succour of this place.”) And, on the 1st of July, the -gallant old man repeated his _“Luego, luego, luego, por ultimo vez_.” - -Meanwhile, lord Wellington (hoping that the enemy, by detaching -troops, would furnish an opportunity of relieving Ciudad Rodrigo) -transferred his quarters to Alverca, a village half-way between -Almeida and Celerico. The Spaniards supposed he would attack; and -Romana, quitting Badajos, came to propose a combined movement for -carrying off the garrison. This was a trying moment! The English -general had come from the Guadiana with the avowed purpose of -securing Rodrigo; he had, in a manner, pledged himself to make it a -point in his operations; his army was close at hand; the garrison -brave and distressed; the governor honourably fulfilling his part. -To permit such a place to fall without a stroke struck, would be a -grievous disaster, and a more grievous dishonour to the British arms; -the troops desired the enterprise; the Spaniards demanded it, as a -proof of good faith; the Portuguese to keep the war away from their -own country: finally, policy seemed to call for an effort, lest the -world might deem the promised defence of Portugal a heartless and a -hollow boast. Nevertheless, Romana returned without his object. Lord -Wellington absolutely refused to venture even a brigade; and thus -proved himself a truly great commander, and of a steadfast mind. - -It was not a single campaign but a terrible war that he had -undertaken. If he lost but five thousand men, his own government -would abandon the contest; if he lost fifteen, he must abandon it -himself. His whole disposable force did not exceed fifty-six thousand -men: of these, twelve thousand were with Hill, and one-half of the -remainder were untried and raw. But this included all, even to the -Portuguese cavalry and garrisons. All could not, however, be brought -into line, because Reynier, acting in concert with Massena, had, -at this period, collected boats, and made demonstrations to pass -the Tagus and move upon Coria; French troops were also crossing the -Morena, in march towards Estremadura, which obliged lord Wellington -to detach eight thousand Portuguese to Thomar, as a reserve, and -these and Hill’s corps being deducted, not quite twenty-five thousand -men were available to carry off the garrison in the face of sixty -thousand French veterans. This enterprise would also take the army -two marches from Guarda, and Coria was scarcely more distant from -that place, hence, a division must have been left at Guarda, lest -Reynier, deceiving Hill, should reach it first. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Section I.] - -Twenty thousand men of all arms remained, and there were two modes -of using them. 1º. In an open advance and battle. 2º. In a secret -movement and surprise. To effect the last, the army might have -assembled in the night upon the Azava, and filed over the single -bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo, with a view of capturing the battering -train, by a sally, or of bringing off the garrison. But, without -dwelling on the fact that Massena’s information was so good that he -knew, in two days after it occurred, the object of Romana’s visit, -such a movement could scarcely have been made unobserved, even in the -early part of the siege, and, certainly, not towards the end, when -the enemy were on the Azava. - -An open battle a madman only would have ventured. The army, passing -over a plain, in the face of nearly three times its own numbers, -must have exposed its flanks to the enemy’s bridges on the Agueda, -because the fortress was situated in the bottom of a deep bend of -the river, and the French were on the convex side. What hope then -for twenty thousand mixed soldiers cooped up between two rivers, -when eight thousand cavalry and eighty guns should come pouring over -the bridges on their flanks, and fifty thousand infantry followed -to the attack? What would even a momentary success avail? Five -thousand undisciplined men brought off from Ciudad Rodrigo, would -have ill supplied the ten or twelve thousand good troops lost in the -battle, and the temporary relief of the fortress would have been a -poor compensation for the loss of Portugal. For what was the actual -state of affairs in that country?--The militia deserting in crowds -to the harvest, the Regency in full opposition to the general, the -measures for laying waste the country not perfected, and the public -mind desponding! The enemy would soon have united his whole force and -advanced to retrieve his honour, and who was to have withstood him? - -Massena, sagacious and well understanding his business, only desired -that the attempt should be made. He held back his troops, appeared -careless, and in his proclamations taunted the English general, that -he was afraid!--that the sails were flapping on the ships prepared -to carry him away--that he was a man, who, insensible to military -honour, permitted his ally’s towns to fall without risking a shot -to save them, or to redeem his plighted word! But all this subtlety -failed; lord Wellington was unmoved, and abided his own time. “If -thou art a great general, Marius, come down and fight! If thou art a -great general, Silo, make me come down and fight!” - -Ciudad Rodrigo left to its fate, held out yet a little longer, and -meanwhile the enemy pushing infantry on to the Azava; Carrera retired -to the Dos Casas river, and Crawfurd, reinforced with the sixteenth -and fourteenth light dragoons, placed his cavalry at Gallegos, and -concentrated his infantry in the wood of Alameda, two miles in rear. -From thence he could fall back, either to the bridge of Almeida -by San Pedro or to the bridge of Castello Bom by Villa Formosa. -Obstinate however not to relinquish a foot of ground that he could -keep either by art or force, he disposed his troops in single ranks -on the rising grounds, in the evening of the 2d of July, and then -sending some horsemen to the rear to raise the dust, marched the -ranks of infantry in succession, and slowly, within sight of the -enemy, hoping that the latter would imagine the whole army was come -up to succour Ciudad Rodrigo. He thus gained two days; but, on the -4th of July, a strong body of the enemy assembled at Marialva, and -a squadron of horse, crossing the ford below that bridge, pushed at -full speed towards Gallegos driving back the picquets. The enemy -then passed the river, and the British retired skirmishing upon -Alameda, leaving two guns, a troop of British and a troop of German -hussars to cover the movement. This rear-guard drew up on a hill -half-cannon shot from a streamlet with marshy banks, which crossed -the road to Alameda; in a few moments a column of French horsemen -was observed coming on at a charging pace, diminishing its front as -it approached the bridge, but resolute to pass, and preserving the -most perfect order, notwithstanding some well-directed shots from -the guns. Captain Kraüchenberg, of the hussars, proposed to charge. -The English officer did not conceive his orders warranted it; and -the gallant German rode full speed against the head of the advancing -columns with his single troop, and with such a shock, that he killed -the leading officers, overthrew the front ranks, and drove the whole -back. Meanwhile the enemy crossed the stream at other points, and a -squadron coming close up to Alameda was driven off by a volley from -the third caçadores. - -This skirmish not being followed up by the enemy, Crawfurd took a -fresh post with his infantry and guns in a wood near Fort Conception. -His cavalry, reinforced by Julian Sanchez and Carrera’s divisions, -were disposed higher up on the Duas Casas, and the French withdrew -behind the Azava, leaving only a piquet at Gallegos. Their marauding -parties however entered the villages of Barquillo and Villa de Puerco -for three nights successively; and Crawfurd, thinking to cut them -off, formed an ambuscade in a wood near Villa de Puerco with six -squadrons, another of three squadrons near Barquillo, and disposed -his artillery, five companies of the ninety-fifth and the third -caçadores in reserve, for the enemy were again in force at Gallegos -and even in advance of it. - -A little after day-break, on the 11th, two French parties were -observed, the one of infantry near Villa de Puerco, the other of -cavalry at Barquillo. An open country on the right would have enabled -the six squadrons to get between the infantry in Villa de Puerco and -their point of retreat. This was circuitous, and Crawfurd preferred -pushing straight through a stone enclosure as the shortest road: the -enclosure proved difficult, the squadrons were separated, and the -French, two hundred strong, had time to draw up in square on a rather -steep rise of land; yet so far from the edge, as not to be seen -until the ascent was gained. The two squadrons which first arrived, -galloped in upon them, and the charge was rough and pushed home, but -failed. The troopers received the fire of the square in front and on -both sides, and in passing saw and heard the French captain Guache -and his serjeant-major exhorting the men to shoot carefully. - -Scarcely was this charge over when the enemy’s cavalry came out of -Barquillos, and the two squadrons riding against it, made twenty-nine -men and two officers prisoners, a few being also wounded. Meanwhile -colonel Talbot mounting the hill with four squadrons of the -fourteenth dragoons, bore gallantly in upon captain Guache; but the -latter again opened such a fire, that Talbot himself and fourteen -men went down close to the bayonets, and the stout Frenchman made -good his retreat; after which Crawfurd returned to the camp, having -had thirty-two troopers, besides the colonel, killed or wounded in -this unfortunate affair. That day Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered, and -the Spanish troops, grieved and irritated, separated from the light -division, and marching by the pass of Perales, rejoined Romana; but -Crawfurd assumed a fresh position, a mile and a half from Almeida, -and demanded a reinforcement of two battalions. Lord Wellington -replied that he would give him two divisions, if he could hold his -ground; but that he could not do so; yet, knowing the temper of the -man, he repeated his former orders _not to fight beyond the Coa_. - -On the 21st, the enemy’s cavalry again advanced, Fort Conception was -blown up, and Crawfurd fell back to Almeida, apparently disposed to -cross the Coa. Yet nothing was further from his thoughts. Braving -the whole French army, he had kept with a weak division, for three -months, within two hours march, of sixty thousand men, appropriating -the resources of the plains entirely to himself; but this exploit, -only to be appreciated by military men, did not satisfy his feverish -thirst of distinction. Hitherto he had safely affronted a superior -power, and forgetting that his stay beyond the Coa was a matter of -sufferance, not real strength, with headstrong ambition, he resolved, -in defiance of reason and of the reiterated orders of his general, to -fight on the right bank. - - -COMBAT OF THE COA. - -Crawfurd’s whole force under arms consisted of four thousand -infantry, eleven hundred cavalry, and six guns, and his position, -one mile and a half in length, extended in an oblique line towards -the Coa. The cavalry piquets were upon the plain in his front, his -right on some broken ground, and his left resting on an unfinished -tower, eight hundred yards from Almeida, was defended by the guns of -that fortress; but his back was on the edge of the ravine forming the -channel of the Coa, and the bridge was more than a mile distant, in -the bottom of the chasm. - -A stormy night ushered in the 24th of July. The troops, drenched -with rain, were under arms before day-light, expecting to retire, -when a few pistol shots in front, followed by an order for the -cavalry reserves and the guns to advance, gave notice of the enemy’s -approach; and as the morning cleared, twenty-four thousand French -infantry, five thousand cavalry, and thirty pieces of artillery -were observed marching beyond the Turones. The British line was -immediately contracted and brought under the edge of the ravine; -but meanwhile Ney, who had observed Crawfurd’s false disposition, -came down with the stoop of an eagle. Four thousand horsemen and a -powerful artillery swept the plain. The allied cavalry gave back, -and Loison’s division coming up at a charging pace, made towards the -centre and left of the position. - -While the French were thus pouring onward, several ill-judged changes -were made on the English side, part of the troops were advanced, -others drawn back, and the forty-third most unaccountably placed -within an enclosure of solid masonry, at least ten feet high, -situated on the left of the road with but one narrow outlet about -half-musket shot down the ravine. While thus imprisoned, the firing -in front redoubled, the cavalry, the artillery, and the caçadores -successively passed by in retreat, and the sharp clang of the -ninety-fifth rifle was heard along the edge of the plain above. A -few moments later, and the forty-third would have been surrounded; -but that here, as in every other part of this field, the quickness -and knowledge of the battalion officers remedied the faults of the -general. One minute sufficed to loosen some large stones, a powerful -effort burst the enclosure, and the regiment, re-formed in column -of companies, was the next instant up with the riflemen; there -was no room to array the line, no time for any thing but battle, -every captain carried off his company as an independent body, and -joining as he could with the ninety-fifth or fifty-second, the whole -presented a mass of skirmishers, acting in small parties and under no -regular command; yet each confident in the courage and discipline of -those on his right and left, and all regulating their movements by a -common discretion and keeping together with surprising vigour. - -It is unnecessary to describe the first burst of French soldiers. -It is well known with what gallantry the officers lead, with what -vehemence the troops follow, and with what a storm of fire they waste -a field of battle. At this moment, with the advantage of ground and -numbers, they were breaking over the edge of the ravine, their guns -ranged along the summit, played hotly with grape, and their hussars, -galloping over the glacis of Almeida, poured down the road, sabring -every thing in their way. Ney, desirous that Montbrun should follow -this movement with the whole of the French cavalry, and so cut off -the troops from the bridge, sent five officers in succession to urge -him on, and so mixed were friends and enemies at the moment, that -only a few guns of the fortress durst open, and no courage could have -availed against such overwhelming numbers. But Montbrun enjoyed an -independent command, and, as the attack was made without Massena’s -knowledge, he would not stir. Then the British regiments, with -singular intelligence and discipline, extricated themselves from -their perilous situation. For falling back slowly, and yet stopping -and fighting whenever opportunity offered, they made their way -through a rugged country tangled with vineyards, in despite of their -enemies, who were so fierce and eager, that even the horsemen rode in -amongst the enclosures, striking at the soldiers as they mounted the -walls or scrambled over the rocks. - -As the retreating troops approached the river, they came upon a more -open space; but the left wing being harder pressed, and having the -shortest distance, arrived while the bridge was still crowded and -some of the right wing distant. Major M’Leod, of the forty-third, -seeing this, rallied four companies on a hill just in front of the -passage, and was immediately joined by a party of the ninety-fifth, -and at the same time, two other companies were posted by -brigade-major Rowan, on another hill flanking the road, these posts -were thus maintained until the enemy, gathering in great numbers, -made a second burst, when the companies fell back. At this moment the -right wing of the fifty-second was seen marching towards the bridge, -which was still crowded with the passing troops, M’Leod, a very young -man, but with a natural genius for war, immediately turned his horse -round, called to the troops to follow, and, taking off his cap, rode -with a shout towards the enemy. The suddenness of the thing, and the -distinguished action of the man, produced the effect he designed; a -mob of soldiers rushed after him, cheering and charging as if a whole -army had been at their backs, and the enemy’s skirmishers, astonished -at this unexpected movement, stopped short. Before they could recover -from their surprise, the fifty-second crossed the river, and M’Leod, -following at full speed, gained the other side also without a -disaster. - -As the regiments passed the bridge, they planted themselves in loose -order on the side of the mountain. The artillery drew up on the -summit and the cavalry were disposed in parties on the roads to the -right, because two miles higher up the stream there were fords, and -beyond them the bridge of Castello Bom, and it was to be apprehended -that, while the sixth corps was in front, the reserves, and a -division of the eighth corps, then on the Agueda, might pass at those -places and get between the division and Celerico. The river was, -however, rising fast from the rains, and it was impossible to retreat -farther. - -The French skirmishers, swarming on the right bank, opened a biting -fire, which was returned as bitterly; the artillery on both sides -played across the ravine, the sounds were repeated by numberless -echoes, and the smoke, rising slowly, resolved itself into an immense -arch, spanning the whole chasm, and sparkling with the whirling -fuzes of the flying shells. The enemy gathered fast and thickly; his -columns were discovered forming behind the high rocks, and a dragoon -was seen to try the depth of the stream above, but two shots from -the fifty-second killed horse and man, and the carcasses, floating -between the hostile bands, showed that the river was impassable. The -monotonous tones of a French drum were then heard, and in another -instant, the head of a noble column was at the long narrow bridge. -A drummer and an officer in a splendid uniform, leaped forward -together, and the whole rushed on with loud cries. The depth of the -ravine at first deceived the soldiers’ aim, and two-thirds of the -passage was won ere an English shot had brought down an enemy; yet -a few paces onwards the line of death was traced, and the whole of -the leading French section fell as one man! Still the gallant column -pressed forward, but no foot could pass that terrible line; the -killed and wounded railed together, until the heap rose nearly even -with the parapet, and the living mass behind melted away rather than -gave back. - -The shouts of the British now rose loudly, but they were confidently -answered, and, in half an hour, a second column, more numerous than -the first, again crowded the bridge. This time, however, the range -was better judged, and ere half the distance was won, the multitude -was again torn, shattered, dispersed, and slain; ten or twelve men -only succeeded in crossing, and took shelter under the rocks at the -brink of the river. The skirmishing was renewed, and a French surgeon -coming down to the very foot of the bridge, waved his handkerchief -and commenced dressing the wounded under the hottest fire; nor was -his appeal unheeded: every musket turned from him, although his -still undaunted countrymen were preparing for a third attempt. -The impossibility of forcing the passage was, however, become too -apparent, and this last effort, made with feebler numbers and less -energy, failed almost as soon as it commenced. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 6._ - - CRAWFURD’S - _OPERATIONS_ - 1810. - - _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] - -Nevertheless, the combat was unnecessarily continued. By the French, -as a point of honour, to cover the escape of those who had passed -the bridge. By the English, from ignorance of their object. One -of the enemy’s guns was dismantled, a powder-magazine blew up, and -many continued to fall on both sides until about four o’clock; when -a heavy rain causing a momentary cessation of fire the men amongst -the rocks returned, unmolested, to their own party, the fight ceased, -and Crawfurd retired behind the Pinhel river. Forty-four Portuguese, -two hundred and seventy-two British, including twenty-eight officers, -were killed, wounded, or taken, and it was at first supposed that -lieutenant Dawson and half a company of the fifty-second, which -had been posted in the unfinished tower, were also captured: but -that officer kept close until the evening, and then, with great -intelligence, passed all the enemy’s posts, and, crossing the Coa at -a ford, rejoined his regiment. - -In this action the French lost above a thousand men, the slaughter at -the bridge was fearful to behold; but Massena claimed to have taken -two pieces of artillery, and it was true; for the guns intended to -arm the unfinished tower, near Almeida, were lying dismounted at -the foot of the building. They, however, belonged to the garrison -of Almeida, not to the light division, and that they were not -mounted and the tower garrisoned was a great negligence; the enemy’s -cavalry could not otherwise have fallen so dangerously on the left -of the position, and the after-investment of Almeida would have -been retarded. In other respects, the governor, severely censured -by Crawfurd, at the time, for not opening his fire sooner and more -vigorously, was unblameable; the whole affair had been so mismanaged -by the general himself, that friends and enemies were mingled -together from the first, and the shots from the fortress would have -killed both. - -During the fight, general Picton came up alone from Pinhel, Crawfurd -desired the support of the third division; it was refused; and, -excited by some previous disputes, the generals separated after a -sharp altercation. Picton was decidedly wrong, because Crawfurd’s -situation was one of extreme danger; he durst not retire, and Massena -might undoubtedly have thrown his reserves, by the bridge of Castello -Bom, upon the right flank of the division, and destroyed it, between -the Coa and the Pinhel rivers. Picton and Crawfurd were, however, not -formed by nature to act cordially together. The stern countenance, -robust frame, saturnine complexion, caustic speech, and austere -demeanour of the first promised little sympathy with the short thick -figure, dark flashing eyes, quick movements, and fiery temper of -the second; nor, indeed, did they often meet without a quarrel. -Nevertheless, they had many points of resemblance in their characters -and fortunes. Both were inclined to harshness, and rigid in command, -both prone to disobedience, yet exacting entire submission from -inferiors, and they were alike ambitious and craving of glory. -They both possessed decided military talents, were enterprising -and intrepid, yet neither were remarkable for skill in handling -troops under fire. This, also, they had in common, that both, after -distinguished services, perished in arms, fighting gallantly, and -being celebrated as generals of division while living, have, since -their death, been injudiciously spoken of, as rivalling their great -leader in war. - -That they were officers of mark and pretension is unquestionable, and -Crawfurd more so than Picton, because the latter never had a separate -command, and his opportunities were necessarily more circumscribed; -but to compare either to the duke of Wellington displays ignorance of -the men and of the art they professed. If they had even comprehended -the profound military and political combinations he was conducting; -the one would have carefully avoided fighting on the Coa; and the -other, far from refusing, would have eagerly proffered his support. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -During the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, Mahi, coming down from the -Gallician mountains, menaced Astorga, and a detachment of his army, -under Toboado Gil, occupied Puebla de Senabria; acting in concert -with Silveira; and an expedition sailing from Coruña, under Porlier, -seized Santona, and dismantled that and other points on the coast, -near Santander. Mahi’s movements could not be well opposed by either -Kellerman or Serras, during the siege, because the former had a -strong detachment in Baños, and the troops of the latter were spread -over too great an extent of ground; but, when the place fell, the -eighth corps, being detached beyond the Tormes, to gather provisions, -enabled Serras to act against the Gallicians. The latter were driven -into the mountains, and Toboado Gil, removing his stores from Puebla -Senabria, drew closer to Silveira, in expectation of an attack; but -Serras, only placing a Swiss battalion and sixty dragoons at Puebla, -fell back to Zamora, and the eighth corps re-occupied the country -between the Tormes and the Agueda. - -Bonet defeated the Spaniards at Sales, and entered Castropol, on -the frontier of Gallicia, but returned to Oviedo, on hearing of the -expedition to Santona. The Spaniards then re-embarked for Coruña, -the project of a larger armament, to be directed against Santander -itself, was adopted, and Mahi affirmed that, if more arms and -ammunition were sent to him from England, he would clear the plains -of Leon, as far as the Esla river. His demands were complied with; -sir Home Popham was appointed to superintend the naval expeditions -against the coast of the Asturias and Biscay, and a serious -interruption of the French communications was planned, but never -realised. - -Meanwhile, general Reynier passed the Tagus with the second corps, -but it appears that this movement should have been executed in June; -for boats were collected at Barca de Alconete, in the middle of that -month, and the French only waited for a detachment from Andalusia, -when Mendizabel, taking the road of Zafra, attacked that detachment, -at Los Santos, on the 23d, and Reynier immediately moved to its -succour with one division of infantry and all his cavalry. - -But, at this period, the insurrection caused by Lascy’s expedition to -the Ronda, had drawn all the troops of the fifth corps from Seville -to that side, the duke of Aremberg and general Remond had fallen back -behind the river Tinto, and Copons had advanced to collect provisions -on the Odiel. In this threatening state of affairs, instead of -returning to Merida, Reynier endeavoured to surprise Imas, at Xeres -de los Cavalleros, and failing in that, pushed across the Morena -against Ballasteros, the latter being at Campo Frio, beyond Araceña, -and, ignorant that Imas had retreated, could only save himself by a -hasty flight across the frontier of Portugal. Meanwhile, Lascy was -beaten in the Ronda, the fifth corps retired to Seville, D’Aremberg -and Remond re-occupied Huelva and Moguer; and Reynier, going back to -Merida, resumed his design of passing the Tagus. - -His boats were still at Alconete, for the Spaniards had neglected -this opportunity of destroying them; but, as it was necessary to -cover the operations both from Hill’s division which was concentrated -at Campo Mayor, and from the Portuguese troops behind the Elga river, -a strong rear guard was placed on the Salor to watch the former, and -the French division at Baños advanced to Coria to awe the latter. -Reynier then quitting Merida the 10th of July, marched, by Truxillo -and Caceres, upon Alconete and Almaraz, and effected the passage; his -rear guard following on the 16th. - -This cautious operation saved him from an attack meditated by Hill, -who had received orders to unite with Romana, and drive the second -corps back, with a view to gather the harvest for the victualling of -Badajos and the other frontier fortresses. But the passage of the -Tagus being thus effected by the French, general Hill made a parallel -movement, which, on his part, only required thirty-six hours; and -meanwhile, lord Wellington assembled a reserve at Thomar, under the -command of general Leith, consisting of eight thousand Portuguese and -two thousand British infantry, just arrived from England. - -Soon after Reynier had reached Coria, he detached a force, by -Perales, upon Sabugal, but recalled it when he found that Hill, -having crossed the Tagus by Vilha Velha, was at Castello Branco on -the 21st. The two generals then faced each other. Hill, joined by -a strong body of Portuguese cavalry, under general Fane, encamped, -with sixteen thousand men and eighteen guns, at Sarzedas, just in -front of the Sobreira Formosa; his advanced guard in Castello Branco; -his horsemen on the line of the Ponçul; and a brigade of Portuguese -infantry at Fundao, to keep up the communication with Guarda, and to -cover the Estrada Nova. Behind him, Leith occupied the line of the -Zezere: and thus twenty-six thousand men, besides the militia, were -in observation between the Estrella and the Tagus. - -Reynier first made demonstrations on the side of Salvatierra; but -being repulsed by some Portuguese cavalry, divided his forces between -Penamacor and Zarza Mayor, established a post of one hundred and -fifty men on the left bank of the Tagus, near the mouth of the Rio -Del Monte, and, by continual movements, rendered it doubtful whether -he meant to repass the Tagus or to advance upon Sarzedas, or to join -Massena. Meanwhile, Ballasteros returned to Araceña, Imas to Xeres -de los Cavalleros, O’Donnel entered Truxillo, and Carlos d’España -cut off the French post on the Rio del Monte. Romana was, however, -soon obliged to concentrate his troops again; for Mortier was on -the Guadalquivir, with a view to re-enter Estremadura. Such was the -situation of the armies in the beginning of August; and when Massena -was assured that Reynier had crossed the Tagus, he directed the sixth -corps and the cavalry upon Almeida, which led, as we have seen, to -the combat on the Coa; during which, Loison, imagining the governor -to be a native, pressed him to desert the cause of the English: -“_that vile people, whose object was to enslave the Portuguese_.” - -Lord Wellington’s situation was critical. Ciudad Rodrigo furnished -the French with a place of arms; they might disregard Almeida: and -their tardy investment of it, viewed in conjunction with the great -magazines collecting at Ciudad Rodrigo, indicated an intention of -so doing. But Massena’s dispositions were such as rendered his true -designs difficult to be discovered. The sixth corps and the reserve -cavalry were, indeed, around Almeida; but, by telegraphic intercourse -with the garrison, it was known that the investment was not real, and -the heads of the columns pointed towards Celerico. Loison’s advanced -guard was in Pinhel the day after Crawfurd’s action; the second -corps, divided between Zarza Mayor and Penamacor, and with boats, -near Alcantara, on the Tagus, menaced equally the line of that river -and the line of the Zezere; and it was as likely that Massena would -join Reynier as that Reynier would join Massena. The eighth corps and -the divisions of Serras and Kellerman were between the Tormes and the -Esla, and might break into the northern provinces of Portugal, while -the sixth and second corps should hold the allies in check: and this -was undoubtedly the surest course; because the taking of Oporto would -have furnished many resources, stricken the natives with terror, -opened the great coast-road to Lisbon, and enabled Massena to avoid -all the difficult country about the Mondego. The English general -must then have retired before the second and sixth corps, unless he -attacked Ney; an unpromising measure, because of the enemy’s strength -in horse: in fine, Massena had one hundred and sixteen thousand men -and the initial operations in his power, and lord Wellington was -obliged to wait upon his movements. - -The actual position of the allies was too extended and too forward; -yet to retire at once would have seemed timid: hence lord Wellington -remained quiet during the 25th, 26th, and 27th of July, although -the enemy’s posts were thickening on the Pinhel river. But the -28th, the British cavalry advanced to Frexadas, and the infantry -withdrew behind the Mondego, except the fourth division, which -remained at Guarda. The light division occupied Celerico; the other -divisions were posted at Penhancos, Carapichina, and Fornos; the -Portuguese troops being a day’s march behind. The sick and wounded -men transferred daily to the rear, and the line of retreat kept free -from encumbrance. The enemy then made a demonstration towards St. Joa -de Pesquera, and defeated some militia at Fosboa, on the Douro, but -finally retired across the Coa, and, after a few skirmishes with the -garrison on the 3d of August, left the communication with Almeida -again free. At the same time, a detachment of Reynier’s horse was -encountered at Atalaya, near Fundao, and beaten by the Portuguese -cavalry and ordenança, with a loss of fifty killed or taken. - -On the side of Gallicia, Kellerman advanced from Benevente to Castro -Contrijo, and detachments from Serras’s division penetrated towards -Monterey, ordering provisions for ten thousand men on the road to -Braganza. But Silveira, marching on Senabria, defeated the enemy’s -cavalry there on the 6th; invested the Swiss on the 7th; and, on -the 10th, obliged them to capitulate at the moment when Serras was -coming to their relief. Five hundred men and an eagle were taken, -and Silveira, who did not lose a man, would have given battle to -Serras also, if Beresford, alarmed at such rashness, had not sent -him imperative orders to retreat; an operation he effected with some -difficulty. - -This advantage in the north was balanced by a disaster in -Estremadura. The Spanish generals, never much disposed to respect -lord Wellington’s counsels, were now less so than before, from the -discontent engendered by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. He had pressed -upon Romana the policy of avoiding battles; had procured permission -that Campo Mayor should be given to him as a place of arms, with -leave to retire into Portugal when overmatched by the enemy; and he -had shewn him that Hill’s departure greatly augmented the necessity -of caution. Nevertheless, Romana joined Ballasteros; and, as their -united force amounted to fourteen thousand infantry and fifteen -hundred horse, the English general immediately foresaw that they -would offer battle, be defeated, and lay open the whole frontier of -the Alemtejo; he, therefore, directed Hill to send Madden’s brigade -of Portuguese cavalry to their assistance. - -Madden reached Campo Mayor the 14th of August, but Romana’s advanced -guard had been already intercepted at Benvenida, and having lost six -hundred men, was going to lay down its arms, when fortunately Carrera -arrived with the Spanish cavalry and disengaged them. The whole then -retreated across the Morena to Monte Molin and Fregenal, but the -French pursued and slew or took four hundred more. The following -day Mortier entered Zafra, and Romana retired to Almendralejos. The -enemy did not, however, press this advantage, because Lascy with -three thousand men from Cadiz convoyed by Capt. Cockburn of the -British navy, had landed near Moguer and driven the duke of Aremberg -towards Seville, while Copons drove Remond upon Zalamea; and although -the French soon rallied and obliged Lascy to re-embark, Mortier was -withdrawn towards the Morena, and Romana again advanced to Zafra. -This affair at Moguer was very trifling, but a tumid description in -Cockburn’s despatches obtained for it a momentary celebrity. - -It would appear that Massena had been waiting for Mortier’s movements -to develope his own plans, for on the day that the latter entered -Zafra, the sixth corps formally invested Almeida; and lord Wellington -immediately bringing up the Portuguese, recrossed the Mondego; the -British being at Pinhel, Frexadas, and Guarda, and the Portuguese at -Celerico, Govea, Melho, and Trancoso. In this situation, expecting -a vigorous defence from Almeida, he had good hopes to delay the -enemy for six weeks or two months, when the rains setting in would -give him additional advantages in the defence of the country. He had -intended to keep the light division on the Cabeça Negro overhanging -the bridge of the Coa, and thus secure a communication with the -garrison, or force the French to invest the place with their whole -army: Crawfurd’s rashness marred this plan, and he himself was so -dispirited by the action on the 24th, that the commander-in-chief did -not think it prudent to renew the project. Yet Massena’s tardiness -and the small force with which he finally invested the place, led -lord Wellington to think of assembling secretly a large and chosen -body of men behind the Cabeça Negro, with the view of suddenly -forcing the bridge and the fords and taking the French battering -train, or at least bringing off the garrison; but while revolving -this great stroke in his mind, an unexpected and terrible disaster -broke his measures. - - -SIEGE OF ALMEIDA. - -[Sidenote: Colonel Cox’s Narrative.] - -This fortress, although regularly constructed with six bastions, -ravelins, an excellent ditch, and covered way, was extremely -defective. The ramparts were too high for the glacis, and from some -near ground, on the side of the attack, the bottom of the ditch might -be seen. An old square castle, built on a mound in the centre of -the town, contained three bomb proofs, the doors of which were not -secure; but with the exception of some damp casements in one bastion, -there was no other magazine for the powder. Colonel Cox was governor, -and his garrison composed of one regular and two militia regiments, a -body of artillery and a squadron of cavalry, amounted to about four -thousand men. - -On the 18th, the trenches were begun under cover of a false attack, -and in the morning of the 26th (the second parallel being commenced) -sixty-five pieces of artillery mounted in ten batteries opened at -once. Many houses were soon in flames and the garrison was unable to -extinguish them; the counter fire was, however, briskly maintained, -little military damage was sustained, and towards evening the -cannonade slackened on both sides; but just after dark the ground -suddenly trembled, the castle bursting into a thousand pieces, gave -vent to a column of smoke and fire, and with a prodigious noise the -whole town sunk into a shapeless ruin! Treason or accident had -caused the magazines to explode, and the devastation was incredible. -The ramparts were breached, the greatest part of the guns thrown into -the ditch, five hundred people were struck dead on the instant, and -only six houses left standing; the stones thrown out hurt forty of -the besiegers in the trenches, and the surviving garrison, aghast at -the horrid commotion, disregarded all exhortations to rally. Fearing -that the enemy would take the opportunity to storm the ramparts, the -governor beat to arms, and, running to the walls with the help of -an artillery officer, fired off the few guns that remained; but the -French shells fell thickly all the night, and in the morning of the -27th, two officers appeared at the gates, with a letter from Massena, -offering terms. - -Cox, sensible that further resistance was impossible, still hoped -that the army would make a movement to relieve him, if he could -impose upon the enemy for two or three days; and he was in act of -refusing the prince of Esling’s offer, when a mutiny, headed openly -by the lieutenant-governor, one Bernardo Costa, and secretly by -José Bareiros, the chief of artillery, who had been for some time -in secret correspondence with the French, obliged him to yield. The -remainder of the native officers disturbed by fear, or swayed by the -influence of those two, were more willing to follow than to oppose -their dishonourable proceedings, and Costa expressed his resolution -to hoist the white flag. The governor seeing no remedy by force, -endeavoured to procrastinate, and, being ignorant of Bareiros’ -treason, sent him to the enemy with counter propositions. Bareiros -immediately informed Massena of the true state of garrison, and never -returned; and the final result was a surrender upon agreement that -the militia should retire to their homes, and the regulars remain -prisoners of war. - -[Sidenote: Justification of Colonel W. Cox.] - -[Sidenote: Note by Gen. Pelet. Appendix to Vol. XII. Victoires et -Conquestes des Français.] - -While the treaty was pending and even after the signature of the -articles, in the night of the 27th, the French bombarded the place. -This act, unjustifiable and strange, because Massena’s aide-de-camp, -colonel Pelet, was actually within the walls when the firing -commenced, was excused, on the ground of an error in the transmission -of orders; it, however, lasted during the whole night, and Cox also -asserts that the terms of the capitulation with respect to the -militia were violated. Pelet indignantly denies this, affirming that -when the garrison still amounting to three thousand men perceived -the marquis d’Alorna amongst the French generals, the greatest -part immediately demanded service, and formed a brigade under -general Pamplona. Yet, so easily are men’s minds moved by present -circumstances, that the greater number deserted again, when they -afterwards saw the allied armies. - -Bareiros, having joined the enemy, escaped punishment, but De -Costa, being tried, was afterwards shot as a traitor, by the -orders of marshal Beresford. His cowardice and mutiny merited -this chastisement, yet the principal evidence against him was an -explanatory letter, written to lord Liverpool, by Cox, while a -prisoner at Verdun. - -The explosion, the disappearance of the steeple, and cessation of -fire, proclaimed the misfortune of Almeida in the allied camp; but -the surrender was first ascertained by lord Wellington on the 29th, -when, with a telescope, he observed many French officers on the -glacis of the place. The army then withdrew to its former position -behind the Mondego; and while these things were passing on the Coa, -the powder-magazine in Albuquerque, being struck with lightning, also -exploded and killed four hundred men; and, on the 1st of September, -general Reynier, after several demonstrations towards Castello -Branco, in one of which he lost a squadron of horse, suddenly -reached Sabugal. The British piquets on the Pinhel were attacked the -following day by the horsemen of the sixth corps, the enemy’s plans -seemed to be ripe for execution; and lord Wellington transferring his -quarters to Govea, withdrew his infantry behind Celerico, and fixed -his cavalry at that place with posts of observation at Guarda and at -Trancoso. Reynier, however, suddenly returned to Zarza Mayor, and, -throwing a bridge over the Tagus at Alcantara, again involved the -French projects in obscurity. - -Massena experienced considerable difficulty in feeding his forces, -and he seemed at first, either disinclined to commence the invasion -or undecided as to the mode. Two months had elapsed since the -surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeida had only resisted for ten days, -the French army was still behind the Coa, and it would seem, by an -intercepted letter, dictated by Napoleon, in September, that he -expected further inaction: “Lord Wellington,” he observed to Massena, -“has only eighteen thousand men, Hill has only six thousand; and it -would be ridiculous to suppose that twenty-five thousand English can -balance sixty thousand French, if the latter do not trifle, but fall -boldly on after having _well observed where the blow may be given_. -You have twelve thousand cavalry, and four times as much artillery -as is necessary for Portugal. Leave six thousand cavalry and a -proportion of guns between Ciudad Rodrigo, Alcantara, and Salamanca, -and with the rest commence operations. The emperor is too distant, -and the positions of the enemy change too often, to direct how you -should attack; but it is certain that the utmost force the English -can muster, including the troops at Cadiz, will be twenty-eight -thousand men.” - -This letter was accurate as to the numbers of the English army, but -Napoleon was ignorant how strongly lord Wellington was thrusting -Portugal forward in the press. - -Massena had commenced the invasion before these instructions reached -him; but to understand his operations it is essential to have a -clear idea of the country in which they were conducted. The advanced -positions of the allies extended from Almeida over the Sierra de -Estrella, by Guarda to Fundao, Sarzedas, and Castello Branco: no -enemy could penetrate that line unless by force, and a serious -attack on any one point was to be the signal for a gradual retreat -of the whole, in concentric directions towards the Lines. But, if -Guarda were evacuated, the enemy while menacing Celerico, could move -either by Belmonte or Covilhao and separate general Hill from lord -Wellington, the distance between those generals being twice as great -as the enemy’s perpendicular line of march would be. - -To balance this disadvantage, the road from Covilhao was broken up, -a Portuguese brigade placed in Fundao, and general Leith’s corps -was stationed at Thomar, between two entrenched positions, which -formed the second temporary line of resistance. The first of those -positions was behind the Zezere, extending from the Barca de Codies -to the confluence of that river with the Tagus. The second behind -the Alva, a strong and swift stream descending from the Estrella and -falling into the Mondego some miles above Coimbra. Both were strong, -the rivers deep and difficult of access, and the Sierra de Murcella -closely hugs the left bank of the Alva. - -Hill’s line of retreat from Sarzedas to the Zezere, has been already -noticed, and from that river to the Alva, there was a military road -constructed through the mountains to Espinhal. But the country from -Celerico to the Murcella, a distance of about sixty miles, is one -long defile, lying between the Sierra Estrella and the Mondego. The -ridge upon which Celerico stands, being a shoot from the Estrella, -and encircled by a sweep of the Mondego, closes this defile in front. -In like manner the Sierra Murcella, covered by the Alva river, closes -it in the rear, and the intermediate parts are but a succession of -smaller streams and lower ridges. The principal road was repaired -and joined to the road of Espinhal, and a branch was also carried -across the Mondego to Coimbra. Thus an internal communication was -established for the junction of all the corps. Nevertheless, between -Celerico and the Alva, the country was not permanently tenable, -because, from Guarda and Covilhao, there were roads over the Estrella -to Gouvea, Cea, and Gallices, towns in rear of Celerico; and the -enemy could also turn the whole tract by moving through Trancoso and -Viseu, and so down the right bank of the Mondego to Coimbra. - -But lord Wellington keeping the head of his army one march behind -Celerico, in observation of the routes over the Estrella, and his -rear close to the Alva, was master of his retreat; and as the Mondego -was fordable in summer and bridged at several points, he could pass -it by a flank movement in a few hours. Now the right bank was also -one great defile, lying between the river and the Sierra de Alcoba or -Caramula. This mountain stretching with some breaks from the Douro to -Coimbra, separates the valley of the Mondego from the coast line, and -in approaching Coimbra sends out a lofty transverse shoot, called the -Sierra de Busaco, exactly in a line with the Sierra de Murcella, and -barring the way on the right bank of the Mondego in the same manner -that the latter Sierra bars it on the left bank. Moreover this route -to Coimbra was the worst in Portugal, and crossed by several deep -tributaries of the Mondego, the most considerable of which were the -Criz and Dao. The Vouga, however, opened a passage through the Alcoba -near Viseu, and that way the French could gain the great road from -Oporto, and so continue their movement upon Coimbra. - -Such being the ground on both sides of the Mondego, the weakest point -was obviously towards the Estrella, and lord Wellington kept the mass -of his forces there. But Massena was ill-acquainted with the military -features, and absolutely ignorant of the lines of Torres Vedras. -Indeed, so circumspectly had those works been carried on, that only -vague rumours of their existence reached the bulk of the English -army; and many British officers imagined that the campaign was -only to cloak the general’s intention of embarking when he reached -Lisbon. In England the opposition asserted that he would do so: -the Portuguese dreaded it; the French army universally believed it; -and the British minsters seem to have entertained the same opinion; -for at this time an officer of engineers arrived at Lisbon, whose -instructions, received personally from lord Liverpool, were unknown -to lord Wellington, and commenced thus:--“_As it is probable that the -army will embark in September._” - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -THIRD INVASION OF PORTUGAL. - - -Massena’s command, extended from the banks of the Tagus to the Bay -of Biscay, from Almeida to Burgos, and the number of his troops -present under arms exceeded one hundred and ten thousand men. -From these must be deducted thirteen thousand in the Asturias and -province of Santander, four thousand in the government of Valladolid, -eight thousand under Serras at Zamora and Benevente, and lastly, -the reserve of Bayonne under general Drouet, nineteen thousand -strong, which, organized as a ninth corps had only entered Spain in -August, being replaced at Bayonne by a fresh reserve under general -Caffarelli. Thus, the active army of invasion did not much exceed -seventy thousand; and as every man, combatant or non-combatant, is -borne on the strength of a French army, not more than fifty-five -thousand infantry and about eight thousand horsemen were with the -eagles. The ninth corps had however orders to follow the traces of -the prince of Esling, and the void thus left at Burgos and Valladolid -was supplied by sixteen thousand of the young guard. - -This arrangement shows how absurdly Napoleon has been called a -rash warrior, and one never thinking of retreat. No man ever made -bolder marches, but no man ever secured his base with more care. -Here he would not suffer any advance to fresh conquests until his -line of communication had been strengthened with three additional -fortresses,--namely, Astorga, Ciudad, and Almeida; and while he -employed sixty-five thousand men in the invasion of Portugal, he kept -more than eighty thousand in reserve. Thus, even the total loss of -the army destined to make what is technically termed “a point” upon -Lisbon, would, as a mere military disaster, have scarcely shaken his -hold of Spain. - -Massena’s instructions were to convert, Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, -into places of arms for the conquest of Portugal, and to move on both -sides of the Tagus against Lisbon in the beginning of September. -Either thinking his force too weak to act upon two lines at the same -time, or trusting to the co-operation of Soult’s army from Andalusia, -he relinquished the Alemtejo, looking only to the northern bank of -the Tagus; and hence, as the experience of Junot’s march in 1807, -warned him off the Sobreira mountains, his views were confined to the -three roads of Belmonte, Celerico, and Viseu. - -[Sidenote: Note by General Pelet.] - -The strength of the positions about the Alva was known to him, as -were also the measures taken to impede a descent from Covilhao to -Espinhal; but Alorna, Pamplona, and the other Portuguese in the -French camp, with a singular ignorance, asserted that the road by -Viseu and Coimbra was easy, and that no important position covered -the latter town. Wherefore the French general resolved suddenly to -assemble all his forces, distribute thirteen days’ bread to the -soldiers, and pour in one solid mass down the right bank of the -Mondego, not doubting to reach Coimbra before general Hill could join -lord Wellington. - -In pursuance of this project the three corps were directed to -concentrate on the 16th of September; Reynier’s at Guarda; Ney’s, -and the heavy cavalry, at Maçal da Chao, and Junot’s at Pinhel. By -this disposition all three roads were alike menaced; and the allies -being kept in suspense as to the ultimate object, Massena hoped to -gain one march, a great thing, seeing that from Coimbra he was not -more than a hundred miles, whereas Hill’s distance from that town -was longer. But, to cover the real object with more care, and to -keep Hill as long as possible at Sarzedas, the French general caused -Guarda to be siezed on the 12th, by a detachment, which withdrew -again immediately, as if it were only a continuation of the former -feints; and meanwhile Reynier, having first ascertained that Mortier -was at Monasterio, threatening Estremadura, suddenly destroyed the -boat-bridge at Alcantara, and marched towards Sabugal. - -On the 13th the allies re-established their post at Guarda; but on -the 15th, it was again driven away by a considerable mass of the -enemy, and retired up the side of the Estrella. At the same time -the cavalry in front of Celerico was forced back in the centre, and -the post at Trancoso chased towards Mongualde on the left. Lord -Wellington then felt assured that the invasion was at last in serious -progress; and having ascertained, beyond a doubt, that the troops in -Guarda were of Reynier’s corps, despatched his final orders for Hill -and Leith to concentrate on the Alva. - -On the 16th, Reynier descended from Guarda to the plains bordering -the Mondego; and being there joined by the sixth corps and Montbrun’s -horsemen, the whole passed the river, and, pushing through Celerico, -drove back the cavalry posts of the allies to the village of Cortiço; -but there the first German hussars turning, overthrew the leading -squadrons, and made some prisoners. Near Cortiço, the road branching -off to the bridge of Fornos and to Gouvea; a French brigade took the -latter to cover the march of the main body which made for Fornos. But -this feint was closely watched; for there is a custom, peculiar to -the British army, of sending mounted officers, singly to observe the -enemy’s motions; and, such is their habit, that they will penetrate -through the midst of his cantonments, cross the line of his movement, -and hover, just out of musket-shot, for whole days, on the skirts of -his columns, until they obtain a clear notion of the numbers and the -true direction of the march. Colonel Waters, one of these exploring -officers, being close on the left of Reynier’s troops during this -day, reported their movements, and in the evening, leading some of -the German cavalry behind the enemy, took several prisoners and the -baggage of a general. - -The French operations were decisive. Lord Wellington directed the -first, third, and fourth divisions upon the Alva, withdrew his heavy -cavalry from the front, and placed the light division at St. Romao, -in the Estrella, to cover the head-quarters, which were transferred, -that night, to Cea. - -The 17th, the whole of the second and sixth corps were observed to -pass the bridge of Fornos, and the advanced guard entered Mongualde; -but the eighth corps still kept the road leading towards Oporto, for -ten thousand militia of the northern provinces, forming the brigades -of Trant, Wilson, and Miller, were collected upon the Douro to -harass the enemy’s right flank and rear, and Trant, with about three -thousand, was already at Moimenta de Beira, in the defiles leading -through the hills to Lamego. The country between the Coa and Coimbra, -on both sides of the Mondego, had been before laid waste, the -mills were destroyed, the ordenança were in arms, and the helpless -population hidden amongst the highest mountains. - -On the 18th, the French advanced guard reached the deserted city of -Viseu. Pack’s Portuguese brigade immediately passed the Mondego at -Fosdao, and took post beyond the Criz; and general Pakenham, with a -brigade of the first division, entered Coimbra, to protect it from -the enemy’s scouting parties. On the 19th, captain Somers Cocks, -a very gallant and zealous officer, commanding the cavalry post -which had been driven from Guarda, came down from the Estrella, and -following the enemy through Celerico, ascertained that neither sick -men nor stores were left behind: hence it was evident that Massena, -relinquishing his communications, had thrown his cavalry, infantry, -artillery, parcs, baggage and hospital waggons, in one mass, upon -the worst road in Portugal. The allies were now in motion also to -cross the Mondego, when a false report, that the enemy was again on -the left bank, arrested the general movement. The next day, however, -the third, fourth, and light divisions, and the British cavalry -passed the river at Pena Cova, Olivarez, and other places, and were -distributed; the light division at Mortagao supporting Pack; the -third and fourth in the villages between the Sierra de Busaco and -Mortagao; and the horse on a plain in front of the latter place, -connecting the light division with Pack’s brigade. - -But the eighth corps still pointed towards the valley of the Vouga; -and it was doubtful whether Massena would not that way gain the main -road from Oporto to Coimbra; wherefore general Spencer, with the -first division, marched upon Milheada, and Trant was directed to join -him by a march through San Pedro de Sul to Sardao. Meanwhile Leith -arrived on the Alva, and general Hill was only one march behind; for -having discovered Reynier’s movements on the 12th, and, at the same -time, getting intelligence that all the French boats on the Tagus -had been destroyed, he, with a ready decision, anticipating lord -Wellington’s orders, directed his artillery by Thomar, and putting -his troops in motion that evening, reached Espisnal on the 20th, -and was there joined by general Lecor, who, with equal vigour and -judgement, had brought the Portuguese brigade, by long marches, from -Fundao. On the 21st, Hill arrived on the Alva, and pushed his cavalry -in observation beyond that river. Thus the two corps of the allied -army were united on the same day that the main body of the enemy -entered Viseu; and, although the French horsemen were on the Criz, -the bridges had been destroyed by Pack; and the project of surprising -Coimbra was baffled. - -Neither had Massena failed to experience other evil consequences -from his false movement. He had been obliged to repair the road from -day to day for his artillery; and it was still twenty miles from -Viseu on the 19th. Trant, aware of this, formed the hardy project of -destroying it; and quitting Moimenta de Beira in the night, with -a squadron of cavalry, two thousand militia, and five guns, on the -20th, surprised a patrole of ten men, from whom he learnt that the -convoy was at hand, and that Montbrun’s cavalry was close in the -rear. The defiles were, however, narrow, and, Trant charging the head -of the escort, took a hundred prisoners and some baggage. The convoy -then fell back, and the militia followed; the ways being so narrow -that Montbrun could never come up to the front. At this time, a -resolute attack would have thrown all into confusion, but the militia -were unmanageable; and the enemy, having at last rallied a few men, -and repulsed the Portuguese cavalry, with a loss of twelve troopers, -the whole got into disorder, and Trant, seeing nothing more was to -be effected, returned to Moimenta de Beira, and from thence marched -to Lamego with his prisoners. The French, ignorant of the number and -quality of their assailants, still fell back, and did not finally -reach Viseu until the 23d; by which, Massena lost two most important -days. - -While these events were passing in the valley of Mondego, a small -expedition from Cadiz again landed at Moguer, to aid Copons in -collecting provisions on the Tinto. It was, however, quickly obliged -to re-embark; and Copons was defeated by general Remond, with the -loss of three hundred men on the 15th. Meanwhile, Romana attacked the -French posts near Monasterio, pushing his cavalry towards Seville. -Soult sent the fifth corps against him, and he retired; but was -beaten at Los Santos on the same day that Copons had been defeated on -the Tinto. The pursuit was continued to Fuente del Maestre; and the -whole army was like to disperse in flight, when Madden’s Portuguese -cavalry came up, and, charging the pursuers with signal gallantry, -overthrew the leading squadrons, recovered some prisoners, and gained -time for the Spaniards to rally. Nevertheless, the French entered -Zafra, and Romana retreated, by Almendralejo and Merida to Montijo, -on the 18th, throwing a garrison into Olivenza, and three battalions -into Badajos. Being, however, sensible that the latter place was in -no condition to resist a serious attack, he directed the Junta to -repair to Valencia d’Alcantara, and took refuge himself at Elvas. - -Lord Wellington’s anticipations were thus realized and the Alemtejo -laid open. Fortunately for the allies, Sebastiani was at this -moment near Carthagena in pursuit of the Murcian army, and a fresh -insurrection breaking out in the mountains of Grenada the castles -of Motril and Almunecar were taken; Copons also advanced to the -Tinto, and all these calls upon Soult taking place at one time, he -was unable to bring quite twelve thousand men to Zafra; a number -inadequate to the invasion of the Alemtejo, the more especially -that several regiments withdrawn from Cadiz, and others coming from -England had reached Lisbon about this period, and formed a reserve -for the allies, of more than five thousand British troops. Wherefore -the French returned to Ronquillo, the Spaniards again advanced to -Xeres de los Cavalleros, and Araceña, and this dangerous crisis -glided gently away. But, to understand this, it is necessary to shew -how encreasing political embarrassments had thwarted the original -plan of the English general. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II.] - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.] - -The first vexatious interference of the Souza faction had been -checked, but the loss of Almeida furnished a favourable opportunity -to renew their clamorous hostility to the military proceedings. -Falsely asserting, that the provisions of that fortress had been -carried away by the English commissaries; and as falsely pretending -that lord Wellington had promised to raise the siege, this party -hypocritically assumed, that his expressions of sorrow for its fall -were indications of an intention to remove by a splendid victory the -public despondency. They vehemently insisted, also, on a defence -of the frontier, inveighed against the destruction of the mills, -and endeavoured to force their own friends of the fidalgo faction -even on to the staff of marshal Beresford, that they might the more -readily embarrass the operations. Meanwhile, neglecting or delaying -the measures agreed upon for laying waste the country, they protected -the minor authorities when disobedient, refrained from punishing -delinquents, and took every occasion to mislead the public mind at -the very moment when the enemy commenced the invasion. Nor was there -wanting either accident or indiscretion to encrease the growing -confusion. - -When Almeida fell, an officer of the guards writing to a friend -at Oporto, indiscreetly asserted, that Massena was advancing in -front with a hundred thousand French, and that eighty thousand more -were moving in rear of the allies upon Lisbon. This letter being -immediately made public, created such a panic amongst the English -merchants, that one and all applied for ships to carry their families -and property away, and there arose such a tumult that Trant was -obliged to quit his command for the purpose of suppressing the -commotion. To dry this source of mischief lord Wellington issued -proclamations; and, in the orders of the day, declared that he would -not seek to ascertain the author of this and similar letters, being -assured that the feelings and sense of the officers would prevent any -repetition. - -To the regency he addressed himself in a more peremptory and -severe manner, reproving them for the false colouring given to his -communications, and informing them that he would never “_permit -public clamour and panic to induce him to change, in the smallest -degree, a system and plan of operation which he had adopted after -mature consideration, and which daily experience proved to be the -only one likely to produce a good end_.” But this remonstrance only -increased the virulence of his opponents; and such was their conduct, -that, before lord Wellington reached Busaco, he was obliged to tell -them, “_their miserable intrigues must cease or he would advise his -own government to withdraw the British army_.” - -Meanwhile their proceedings had been so mischievously successful, -that the country between the Mondego, the Tagus, and the Lines, still -contained provisions sufficient for the French during the ensuing -winter, and the people were alike unprepared to expect an enemy or to -attempt a removal of their property. - -Lord Wellington could but choose then, between stopping the invaders -on the Mondego, or wasting the country by force as he retreated. -But what an act the last! His hopes depended upon the degree of -moral strength he was enabled to call forth, and he would have had -to retire with a mixed force before a powerful army and an eminent -commander, his rear guard engaged, and his advance driving miserable -multitudes before it to the capital, where nothing was prepared to -save them from famine, but where the violent and powerful faction in -the regency was ready to misrepresent every proceeding, and inflame -the people’s minds; and this, when the court of Rio Janeiro was -discontented, and the English ministers, as I shall have occasion -to shew, panic-stricken by the desponding letters of some general -officers about the commander-in-chief! It was evidently necessary to -fight, although Massena had above sixty thousand veterans, and lord -Wellington could only bring about fifty thousand men into line, more -than half of which were untried soldiers. - -The consequences of such a battle were not, however, to be estimated -by the result on the field. The French general might indeed gain -every thing by a victory; but, if defeated, his powerful cavalry and -the superior composition and experience of his army would prevent -it from being very injurious; or a serious check might induce him -to turn his attention from Coimbra towards Oporto, contenting -himself with the capture of that city, and the reduction of the -northern provinces, until more formidable preparations should enable -him to renew his first design. Nor could the time thus gained by -the allies be as profitably employed in the defence. The French -could be reinforced to any amount, whereas the English general’s -resources could not be much improved, and it was very doubtful if -either England or Portugal would longer endure the war, without some -palpable advantage to balance the misery and the expense. - -Such was the state of affairs, when the allies passed to the right -bank of the Mondego with a view to fight the battle thus forced upon -their general. While the French remained concentrated at Viseu, the -first division, under Spencer, was held at Milheada in observation of -the great road from Oporto; the light division at Mortagao watching -the road from Viseu, and the remainder of the army in reserve ready -to move to either side. But when the French advanced guard had -repaired the bridges over the Criz, and passed that river, lord -Wellington recalled the first division, and fixed upon the Sierra de -Busaco for his position of battle. - -This mountain, about eight miles in length, abuts to the right on the -Mondego, and on the left is connected with the Sierra de Caramula by -a hilly rugged country, impervious to the march of an army. A road -along the crest of Busaco afforded an easy communication, and at Pena -Cova, just behind the right hand extremity, a ford in the Mondego -permitted the troops to pass in a few hours to the Murcella ridge, -behind the Alva. The face of Busaco was steep, rough, and fit for -defence. The artillery of the allies fixed on certain points, could -play along the front freely, and there was some ground on the summit -suitable for a small body of cavalry; but neither guns nor horsemen -of the enemy had a fair field, their infantry were to contend -with every difficulty, and the approach to the position was also -unfavourable to an attacking army. - -After passing the Criz, a table-land permitted Massena to march, in a -wide order of battle, to Mortagao; but then a succession of ascending -ridges led to the Sierra Busaco, which was separated from the last -by a chasm, so profound, that the naked eye could hardly distinguish -the movement of troops in the bottom, yet in parts so narrow that -twelve-pounders could range to the salient points on the opposite -side. From Mortagao four roads conducted to Coimbra. The first, -unfrequented and narrow, crossed the Caramula to Boyalva, a village -situated on the western slope of that sierra, and from thence led to -Sardao and Milheada. The other roads, penetrating through the rough -ground in front, passed over the Sierra de Busaco; one by a large -convent on the right hand of the highest point of the ridge; a second -on the left hand of this culminating point, by a village called St. -Antonio de Cantara; and a third, which was a branch from the second, -followed the Mondego to Pena Cova. - -When this formidable position was chosen, some officers expressed -their fears that Massena would not assail it. “_But, if he does, -I shall beat him_,” was the reply of the English general, who was -well assured that the prince would attack; for his advanced guard -was already over the Criz, the second and sixth corps were in mass -on the other side of that river, and it was improbable that so -celebrated a commander would, at the mere sight of a strong position, -make a retrograde movement, change all his dispositions, and adopt -a new line of operations by the Vouga, which would be exposed also -to the militia under Baccellar. Massena was, indeed, only anxious -for a battle, and, being still under the influence of Alorna’s and -Pamplona’s false reports, as to the nature of the country in his -front, never doubted that the allies would retire before him. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - - -General Pack, on the 22d, destroyed the bridges over the Criz, -and fell back upon the light division; but, the 23d, the enemy -re-established the communications, passed the river, and obliged -the British horse to quit the plain, and take to the hills behind -Mortagao. Three squadrons of light and one regiment of heavy cavalry -were retained there by lord Wellington; but the rest he sent over -the Sierra de Busaco to the low country about Milheada, whence he -recalled Spencer, and at the same time caused the third and fourth -divisions to take their ground on the position, the former at St. -Antonio de Cantara, the latter at the convent. But the light division -falling back only a league, encamped in a pine-wood, where happened -one of those extraordinary panics that, in ancient times, were -attributed to the influence of a hostile god. No enemy was near, -no alarm was given, yet suddenly the troops, as if seized with a -phrenzy, started from sleep, and dispersed in every direction; nor -was there any possibility of allaying this strange terror, until some -persons called out that the enemy’s cavalry were amongst them, when -the soldiers mechanically run together in masses, and the illusion -was instantly dissipated. - -The 24th, the enemy appeared in force, and skirmished with the -picquets in front of Montagao, when the light division, again -retiring four miles, occupied strong ground, and, in the evening, -some of the enemy’s cavalry approaching too close, were charged by a -squadron of the fourteenth dragoons, and overthrown, with the loss of -twenty or thirty men. - -Early on the 25th, Crawfurd moved down from his post, and appeared -somewhat disposed to renew the scene at the Coa; for the enemy’s -cavalry were gathering in front, and the heads of three infantry -columns were plainly descried on the table-land above Mortagao, -coming on abreast, and with a most impetuous pace, while heavy clouds -of dust, rising and loading the atmosphere for miles behind, showed -that the whole French army had passed the Criz, and was in full -march to attack. The cavalry skirmishers were already exchanging -pistol-shots, when lord Wellington, suddenly arriving, ordered the -division to retire, and, taking the personal direction, covered the -retreat with the fifty-second and ninety-fifth, the cavalry, and -Ross’s troop of horse-artillery. Nor was there a moment to lose: -the enemy, with incredible rapidity, brought up both infantry and -guns, and fell on so briskly, that all the skill of the general -and the readiness of the excellent troops composing the rear -guard, could scarcely prevent the division from being dangerously -engaged. Howbeit, a series of rapid and beautiful movements, a -sharp cannonade, and an hour’s march, brought everything back, in -good order, to the great position; but, almost at the same moment, -the opposite ridge was crowned by the masses of the sixth corps, -and the French batteries opened as the English troops mounted the -steep ascent on which the convent was situated. Meanwhile, Reynier, -taking the left hand route, along which a Portuguese battalion had -retired, arrived at St. Antonio de Cantara, in front of the third -division, and before three o’clock, forty thousand French infantry -were embattled on the two points, and the sharp musketry of the -skirmishers arose from the dark-wooded chasms beneath. - -Ney, whose military glance was magical, perceived in an instant that -the position, a crested not a table mountain, could not hide any -strong reserve, that it was scarcely half occupied, and that great -part of the allied troops were moving from one place to another, with -that sort of confusion which generally attends the first taking up -of unknown ground. He desired to make an early and powerful attack; -but the prince of Esling was at Montagao, ten miles in the rear, and -an aide-de-camp, despatched to inform him of the state of affairs, -after attending two hours for an audience, was (as I have been -informed) told that everything must await Massena’s arrival. Thus -a most favourable opportunity was lost; for the first division of -the allies, although close at hand, was not upon the ridge; Leith’s -troops, now called the fifth division, were in the act of passing -the Mondego; Hill was still behind the Alva; scarcely twenty-five -thousand men were actually in line, and there were great intervals -between the divisions. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 5.] - -Reynier coincided with Ney; and they wrote in concert to Massena, -on the 26th, intimating their joint desire to attack. The prince -of Esling, however, did not reach the field until twelve o’clock, -bringing with him the eighth corps, with which, and the cavalry, -he formed a reserve, connecting the sixth and second corps, and -then sending out his skirmishers along the whole front, proceeded -carefully to examine the position from left to right. - -The situation of the allies was now greatly changed. Hill’s corps, -having crossed the Mondego, was posted athwart the road leading over -the Sierra to Pena Cova; on his left Leith prolonged the line of -defence, having the Lusitanian legion in reserve. Picton, with the -third division, supported by Champlemond’s Portuguese brigade, was -next to Leith, and Spencer, with the first division, occupied the -highest part of the ridge, being between Picton and the convent. The -fourth division closed the extreme left, covering a path leading to -Milheada, where the cavalry held the flat country, one heavy regiment -only being kept in reserve on the summit of the sierra. Pack’s -brigade, forming an advanced guard to the first division, was posted -half way down the descent, and the light division, supported by a -German brigade, occupied a piece of ground jutting out nearly half a -mile in front of and about two hundred feet lower than the convent, -the space between being naturally scooped like the hollow of a wave -before it breaks. Along the whole of the front skirmishers were -thrown out on the mountain side, and about fifty pieces of artillery -were disposed upon the salient points. - -Ney was averse to attack after the delay which had taken place, but -Massena resolved to attempt carrying the position. Reynier thought -that he had only to deal with a rear-guard of the allies, and the -prince, whether partaking of this error, or confident in the valour -of his army, directed the second and sixth corps to fall on the next -day, each to its own front, while the eighth corps, the cavalry, and -the artillery remained in reserve. To facilitate the attack the light -French troops, dropping by twos and threes into the lowest parts of -the valley, endeavoured, in the evening, to steal up the wooded -dells and hollows, and to establish themselves unseen close to the -picquets of the light division. Some companies of rifle corps and -caçadores checked this, but similar attempts made with more or less -success at different points of the position, seeming to indicate a -night attack, excited all the vigilance of the troops. Yet, were it -otherwise, none but veterans, tired of war, could have slept, for the -weather was calm and fine, and the dark mountain masses, rising on -either side, were crowned with innumerable fires, around which more -than a hundred thousand brave men were gathered. - - -BATTLE OF BUSACO. - -Before day-break on the 27th, the French formed five columns of -attack; three under Ney, opposite to the convent, and two under -Reynier, at St. Antonio de Cantara, these points being about three -miles asunder. Reynier’s troops had comparatively easier ground -before them, and were in the midst of the picquets and skirmishers -of the third division almost as soon as they could be perceived to -be in movement. The allies resisted vigorously, and six guns played -along the ascent with grape, but in less than half an hour the French -were close upon the summit, so swiftly and with such astonishing -power and resolution did they scale the mountain, overthrowing every -thing that opposed their progress. The right of the third division -was forced back; the eighth Portuguese regiment was broken to pieces, -and the hostile masses gained the highest part of the crest, just -between the third and the fifth divisions. The leading battalions -immediately established themselves amongst the crowning rocks, and -a confused mass wheeled to the right, intending to sweep the summit -of the sierra, but at that moment lord Wellington caused two guns to -open with grape upon their flank, while a heavy musketry was still -poured into their front, and, in a little time, the forty-fifth and -the eighty-eighth regiments charged so furiously that even fresh -men could not have withstood them. The French, quite spent with -their previous efforts, opened a straggling fire, and both parties, -mingling together, went down the mountain side with a mighty clamour -and confusion; the dead and dying strewing the way even to the bottom -of the valley. - -Meanwhile the French who first gained the summit had re-formed their -ranks with the right resting upon a precipice overhanging the reverse -side of the Sierra, and thus the position was in fact gained, if -any reserve had been at hand, for the greatest part of the third -division, British and Portuguese, were fully engaged, and a misty -cloud capped the summit, so that the enemy, thus ensconced amongst -the rocks, could not be seen, except by general Leith. That officer -had put his first brigade in motion to his own left as soon as he -perceived the vigorous impression made on the third division, and he -was now coming on rapidly; yet he had two miles of rugged ground to -pass in a narrow column before he could mingle in the fight. Keeping -the royals in reserve, he directed the thirty-eighth to turn the -right of the French; but the precipice prevented this; and meanwhile -colonel Cameron, informed by a staff-officer of the critical state -of affairs, formed the ninth regiment in line under a violent fire, -and, without returning a single shot, ran in upon and drove the -grenadiers from the rocks with irresistible bravery, plying them with -a destructive musketry as long as they could be reached, and yet with -excellent discipline refraining from pursuit, lest the crest of the -position should be again lost, for the mountain was so rugged that it -was impossible to judge clearly of the general state of the action. -The victory was, however, secure. Hill’s corps edged in towards the -scene of action; the second brigade of Leith joined the first, and a -great mass of fresh troops was thus concentrated, while Reynier had -neither reserves nor guns to restore the fight. - -Ney’s attack had as little success. From the abutment of the mountain -upon which the light division was stationed, the lowest parts of the -valley could be discerned. The ascent was steeper and more difficult -than where Reynier had attacked, and Crawfurd, in a happy mood of -command, had made masterly dispositions. The table-land between him -and the convent was sufficiently scooped to conceal the forty-third -and fifty-second regiments, drawn up in line; and a quarter of a mile -behind them, but on higher ground and close to the convent, a brigade -of German infantry appeared to be the only solid line of resistance -on this part of the position. In front of the two British regiments, -some rocks, overhanging the descent, furnished natural embrasures, in -which the guns of the division were placed, and the whole face of the -hill was planted with the skirmishers of the rifle corps and of the -two Portuguese caçadores battalions. - -While it was yet dark, a straggling musketry was heard in the deep -hollows separating the armies; and when the light broke, the three -divisions of the sixth corps were observed entering the woods below -and throwing forward a profusion of skirmishers; soon afterwards -Marchand’s division emerging from the hollow, took the main road, as -if to turn the right of the light division, Loison’s made straight up -the face of the mountain in front, and the third remained in reserve. - -General Simon’s brigade, which led Loison’s attack, ascended with a -wonderful alacrity, and though the light troops plied it unceasingly -with musketry, and the artillery bullets swept through it from the -first to the last section, its order was never disturbed, nor its -speed in the least abated. Ross’s guns were worked with incredible -quickness, yet their range was palpably contracted every round, -and the enemy’s shot came singing up in a sharper key, until the -skirmishers, breathless and begrimed with powder, rushed over the -edge of the ascent, when the artillery suddenly drew back, and the -victorious cries of the French were heard within a few yards of the -summit. Crawfurd, who standing alone on one of the rocks, had been -intently watching the progress of the attack, then turned, and in a -quick shrill tone desired the two regiments in reserve to charge. The -next moment a horrid shout startled the French column, and eighteen -hundred British bayonets went sparkling over the brow of the hill. -Yet so truly brave and hardy were the leaders of the enemy, that each -man of the first section raised his musket, and two officers and ten -soldiers fell before them. Not a Frenchman had missed his mark! They -could do no more! The head of their column was violently overturned -and driven upon the rear, both flanks were lapped over by the -English wings, and three terrible discharges at five yards’ distance -completed the route. In a few minutes a long trail of carcasses and -broken arms indicated the line of retreat. The main body of the -British stood fast; but several companies followed the pursuit down -the mountain, until Ney moving forward his reserve, and opening his -guns from the opposite height killed some men, and thus warned the -rest to recover their own ground. The German brigade then spread over -the hill, and the light division resumed its original position. - -Loison shewed no disposition to renew the attack, but Marchand’s -people, who had followed the main road, broke into several masses, -gained a pine wood half-way up the mountain, and sent a cloud of -their skirmishers against the highest part, at the very moment that -Simon was defeated. Such however was the difficulty of ascending, -that Pack alone held the enemy in check, and half a mile higher up, -Spencer shewed a line of the royal guards which forbade any hope of -success; and from the salient point of land occupied by the light -division, Crawfurd’s artillery took the main body of the French in -the wood, in flank. Ney, who was there in person, after sustaining -this murderous fire for an hour, relinquished the attack. The -desultory fighting of the light troops then ceased, and before two -o’clock Crawfurd having assented to a momentary truce, parties of -both armies were mixed amicably together searching for the wounded -men. - -Towards evening, however, a French company having, with signal -audacity, seized a village within half-musket shot of the light -division, refused to retire; which so incensed Crawfurd that, turning -twelve guns on the village, he overwhelmed it with bullets for -half an hour. After paying the French captain this distinguished -honour, the English general recovering his temper, sent a company of -the forty-third down, which cleared the village in a few minutes. -Meanwhile an affecting incident, contrasting strongly with the savage -character of the preceding events, added to the interest of the day. -A poor orphan Portuguese girl, about seventeen years of age, and -very handsome, was seen coming down the mountain and driving an ass, -loaded with all her property, through the midst of the French army. -She had abandoned her dwelling in obedience to the proclamation, -and now passed over the field of battle with a childish simplicity, -totally unconscious of her perilous situation, and scarcely -understanding which were the hostile and which the friendly troops, -for no man on either side was so brutal as to molest her. - -In this battle of Busaco, the French after astonishing efforts of -valour, were repulsed, in the manner to be expected from the strength -of the ground, and the goodness of the soldiers opposed to them; and -their loss, although prodigiously exaggerated at the time, was great. -General Graind’orge and about eight hundred men were slain, generals -Foy and Merle wounded, Simon made prisoner, and the sum total may be -estimated at four thousand five hundred men, while that of the allies -did not exceed thirteen hundred. For on the one side musketry and -artillery were brought into full activity, but the French sought to -gain the day by resolution and audacity rather than by fire. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 7._ - - OPERATIONS - on the - MONDEGO, - 1810. - - _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] - -After this Massena judged the position of Busaco impregnable, and -to turn it by the Mondego impossible, as the allies could pass -that river quicker than himself. But a peasant informed him of the -road leading from Mortagao over the Caramula to Boyalva, and he -resolved to turn lord Wellington’s left. To cover this movement -the skirmishing was renewed with such vigour on the 28th, that a -general battle was for some time expected. Yet an ostentatious -display of men, the disappearance of baggage, and the throwing up -of entrenchments on the hill covering the roads to Mortagao plainly -indicated some other design. Howbeit, it was not until evening when -the enemy’s masses in front being sensibly diminished, and his -cavalry descried winding over the distant mountains, that the project -became quite apparent. Hill then crossed the Mondego, and retired by -Espinal upon Thomar, while the centre and left of the army defiled in -the night by the other roads upon Milheada. In this manner Busaco was -evacuated before the 29th, the guns followed the convent road, and -the light division furnished the rear-guard until they passed Fornos, -when the open country enabled the cavalry to relieve them. - -Massena’s scouts reached Boyalva in the evening of the 28th, and it -has been erroneously asserted, that Trant’s absence from Sardao alone -enabled the French general to execute his design. Trant was however -at Sardao, four miles from Boyalva before one o’clock on the 28th; -but having, through a mistake of Baccellar’s, marched from Lamego, by -the circuitous route of Oporto, instead of the direct road through -San Pedro do Sul, he lost men from fatigue and desertion, and could -bring only fifteen hundred militia into line; hence his absence or -presence could have produced no effect whatever, even though he had, -as lord Wellington intended, been at Boyalva itself. - -Accordingly, the French cavalry, pushing between him and the British -horse, on the 29th cut off one of his patroles, and the next morning -drove him, with the loss of twenty men, behind the Vouga. When -Massena’s main body had cleared the defiles of Boyalva, it marched -upon Coimbra, and the allies, crossing the Mondego at that city, -commenced the passage of the defiles leading upon Condexa and Pombal. -The commissariat stores, which had been previously removed from -Raiva de Pena Cova to Figueras, were embarked at Peniché; the light -division and the cavalry remained on the right bank of the river; and -Baccellar was directed to bring down all the militia of the northern -provinces upon the Vouga. - -But, notwithstanding the proclamations and the urgent, and even -menacing remonstrances of the English general, the Portuguese Regency -had not wasted the country behind the Mondego. During the few days -that the enemy was stopped at Busaco, only the richest inhabitants -had quitted Coimbra; when the allied army retreated, that city was -still populous; and when the approach of the enemy left no choice -but to fly or to risk the punishment of death and infamy announced -in the proclamation, so direful a scene of distress ensued that the -most hardened of men could not behold it without emotion. Mothers, -with children of all ages; the sick, the old, the bedridden, and even -lunatics, went or were carried forth; the most part, with little -hope and less help, to journey for days in company with contending -armies. Fortunately for this unhappy multitude, the weather was fine, -and the roads firm, or the greatest number must have perished in the -most deplorable manner. And, notwithstanding all this misery, the -object was not gained: the people fled, but the provisions were left, -and the mills were but partially and imperfectly ruined. - -On the 1st of October, the outposts were attacked, and driven from -the hills bounding the plain of Coimbra to the north. The French, on -entering this plain, suffered some loss from a cannonade, and the -British cavalry were drawn up in line, but with no serious intention -of fighting, and were soon after withdrawn across the Mondego, yet -somewhat unskilfully; for the French following briskly, cut down some -men even in the middle of the river, and were only prevented from -forcing the passage by a strong skirmish, in which fifty or sixty men -fell. - -This scrambling affair obliged the light division to march hastily -through the city, to gain the defiles of Condeixa, which commence at -the end of the bridge; and all the inhabitants who had not before -quitted the place rushed out, each with what could be caught up in -the hand, and driving before them a number of animals loaded with -sick people or children. At the entrance to the bridge, the press was -so great that the troops halted for a few moments, just under the -prison; the jailor had fled with the keys, the prisoners, crowding -to the windows, were endeavouring to tear down the bars with their -hands, and even with their teeth, and bellowing in the most frantic -manner, while the bitter lamentations of the multitude increased, -and the pistol-shots of the cavalry, engaged at the ford below, were -distinctly heard. - -Captain William Campbell, an officer of Crawfurd’s staff, burst the -prison-doors, and released the wretched inmates, while the troops -forced their way over the bridge; yet, at the other end, the up-hill -road, passing between high rocks, was so crowded that no effort, even -of the artillery, could make way. A troop of French dragoons crossed -a ford, and hovering close upon the flank, increased the confusion; -and a single regiment of foot would have sufficed to destroy the -division, wedged in, as it was, in a hollow way, and totally -incapable of advancing, retreating, or breaking out on either side. -At last, some of the infantry opened a passage on the right flank, -and, by great exertions, the road was cleared for the guns; but it -was not until after dusk that the division reached Condeixa, although -the distance was less than eight miles. Head-quarters were that night -at Redinha, and the next day at Leiria. - -Hitherto the marches had been easy, the weather fine, and provisions -abundant; nevertheless, the usual disorders of a retreat had already -commenced. In Coimbra, a quantity of harness and intrenching tools -were scattered in the streets; at Leiria, the magazines were -plundered by the troops and camp-followers; and, at Condeixa, a -magazine of tents, shoes, spirits, and salt meat was destroyed, or -abandoned to the enemy: and, while the streets were flowing, ancle -deep, with rum, the light division and Pack’s Portuguese brigade, at -the distance of a quarter of a mile, were obliged to slaughter their -own bullocks, and received only half rations of liquor. - -Lord Wellington arrested this growing disorder with a strong hand. -Three men, taken in the fact at Leiria, were hanged on the spot; and -some regiments, whose discipline was more tainted than others, were -forbidden to enter a village. This vigorous exercise of command, -aided by the fine weather and the enemy’s inactivity, restored -order amongst the allies; while Massena’s conduct, the reverse of -the English general’s, introduced the confusion of a retreat in -the pursuing army. In Coimbra, the French general permitted waste; -and, in a few days, resources were dissipated that, under good -arrangements, would have supplied his troops for two months: and, -during this licentious delay, the advantage gained by his dangerous -flank march to Boyalva was lost. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. “_Attack vigorously, after having observed well where to -strike._” This simple, but profound expression in Napoleon’s letter -of service, forms the test by which the prince of Esling’s operations -should be judged. - -2º. The design of turning the strong ground behind Celerico, by the -route of Viseu, required close and rapid movements; yet the French -general did not quit Viseu, to march against Coimbra, until the tenth -day after passing the Pinhel. This was not a “_a vigorous attack_.” - -3º. Massena should have brought the allies to action in a forward -position; and he might have done so either when Almeida fell, or -before that event, because the complement of mules for the service -of the army not being then full, the commissariat was dependent -upon the country carts; and when the first retrograde movement took -place from Alverca, the drivers fled with their animals, producing -infinite confusion in the rear. The commissary-general Kennedy -contrived, indeed, to procure fifteen hundred additional mules; but, -intermediately, a brisk advance of the enemy would have forced the -English general to fight, or retire more hastily than would have -beseemed his reputation, or suited his political position. - -4º. If the prince of Esling had not been misled by Alorna and -Pamplona, and the more readily that the estates of the latter were -situated about Coimbra, he would have judged that the line his -adversary had studied for eight months, and now so carefully and -jealously guarded, was more likely to afford advantages, than the -circuitous route by Viseu, which was comparatively neglected. The -French general, ill acquainted with the scene of action, but having -the stronger and more moveable army, should have followed closely. - -A rapid pursuit, through Celerico, would have brought the French -army on to the Alva before Hill or even Leith could have joined -lord Wellington. The latter must then have fought with half his own -army, or he must have retreated to the Lines. If he offered battle, -his position could be turned either by the right or left; on the -left by the slopes of the Estrella, on the right by crossing the -Mondego, for Busaco was too extensive to be occupied before Hill -and Leith arrived. Now, the road by Viseu being the longest and -least practicable, demanded great diligence to compensate for the -difficulties of the way, and to gain Coimbra and force the allies -to a battle before Hill arrived, were objects more readily to be -attained by the left bank of the Mondego. The point where to strike -was therefore not “_well considered_,” and it is clear that Massena -did not rightly estimate the greatness of his enterprise. - -5º. When the rocks of Busaco glittering with bayonets first rose on -the prince of Esling’s view, two fresh questions were to be solved. -Was he to attack or to turn that formidable post? Or, availing -himself of his numerical strength and central situation, was he to -keep the allies in check, seize Oporto, and neglect Lisbon until -better combinations could be made? The last question has been already -discussed; but, contrary to the general opinion, the attack upon -Busaco appears to me faulty in the execution rather than in the -conception; and the march by which that position was finally turned, -a violation of the soundest principles of war. In a purely military -view, the English general may be censured for not punishing his -adversary’s rashness. - -With respect to the attack, sixty-five thousand French veterans had -no reason to believe that fifty thousand mixed and inexperienced -troops, distributed on a mountain more than eight miles long, were -impregnably posted. It would have been no overweening presumption -in the French general to expect, that three corps well disposed, -supported by a numerous artillery, and led on the first day, (as -Ney desired,) might carry some part of the position, and it is an -error, also, to suppose that guns could not have been used: the -light division were constantly within range, and thirty pieces of -artillery employed on that point would have wonderfully aided the -attack by the sixth corps. But when a general in chief remains ten -miles from a field of battle, gives his adversary two days to settle -in a position, makes his attacks without connection, and without -artillery, and brings forward no reserves, success is impossible even -with the valiant soldiers Massena commanded. - -6º. “_An army should always be in condition to fight._” - -“_A general should never abandon one line of communication without -establishing another._” - -“_Flank marches within reach of an enemy are rash and injudicious._” - -These maxims of the greatest of all generals have been illustrated -by many examples; Senef, Kollin, Rosbach, the valley of the Brenta, -Salamanca, attest their value. Now, Massena violated all three, by -his march to Boyalva, and some peculiar circumstances, or desperate -crisis of affairs should be shewn, to warrant such a departure -from general principles. Sir Joshua Reynolds, treating of another -art says, “_genius begins where rules end_.” But here genius was -dormant, and rules disregarded. Massena was not driven to a desperate -game. The conquest of Oporto was open to him, or a march by Viseu -upon the Vouga, which, though demanding time, was safe; while in -that by Boyalva, he threw his whole army into a single and narrow -defile, within ten miles of an enemy in position; and that also (as -I have been informed by an officer of marshal Ney’s staff) with much -disorder: the baggage and commissariat, the wounded and sick, the -artillery, cavalry, and infantry, mixed together; discord raging -amongst the generals, confusion amongst the soldiers, and in the -night season when every difficulty is doubled. His “_army was not, -then, in a condition to fight_.” He was making “_a flank march within -reach of an enemy in position_,” and he was “_abandoning his line of -communication without having established another_.” - -7º. Lord Wellington was within four hours march of either end of the -defile, through which the French army was moving. He might have sent -the first division and the cavalry (forming with Portuguese regular -troops, and Trant’s militia, a mass of twelve or fourteen thousand -men) to Sardao, to head the French in the defile; while the second, -third, fourth, fifth, and light divisions, advancing by Martagao, -assailed their rear. That he did not do so, is to be attributed to -his political position. War is full of mischances, and the loss of a -single brigade might have caused the English government to abandon -the contest altogether. Nevertheless, his retreat was more critically -dangerous than such an attack would have been, and in a military view -the battle of Busaco should not have been fought: it was extraneous -to his original plan, it was forced upon him by events, and was in -fine a political battle. - -8º. Massena’s march, being unopposed, was successful. The allied -army could not cope with him in the open country between Busaco and -the sea, where his cavalry would have had a fair field; hence lord -Wellington, reverting to his original plan, retreated by the Coimbra -and Espinhal roads. But the prince of Esling was at Avelans de Cima -and Milheada on the 30th, the allied cavalry and the light division -being still on the right bank of the Mondego, which was fordable in -many places below Coimbra. Had the French general, directing his -march through Tentugal, crossed at those fords, and pushed rapidly -on to Leiria, by the route sir Arthur Wellesley followed, in 1808, -against Junot, the communication with Lisbon would have been cut: -terror and confusion would then have raged in the capital, the -patriarch’s faction would have triumphed, and a dangerous battle must -have been risked before the Lines could be reached. - -9º. When the allies had gained Leiria, and secured their line of -retreat, the fate of Portugal was still in the French general’s -hands. If he had established a fresh base at Coimbra, employed the -ninth corps to seize Oporto, secured his line of communication with -that city and with Almeida by fortified posts, and afterwards, -extending his position by the left, attacked Abrantes, and given his -hand to a corps sent by Soult from the south; not only would the -campaign have been so far a successful one, but in no other manner -could he have so effectually frustrated his adversary’s political and -military projects. Lord Wellington dreaded such a proceeding, and -hailed the renewed advance of the French army, as the rising of a -heavy cloud discovering a clear sky in the horizon beneath. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Sect. 2.] - -Even at Coimbra, the prince was unacquainted with the existence -of the lines, and believed that, beyond Santarem, the country was -open for the usage of all arms. It is strange that, when Junot, -Loison, Foy, and many other officers, who had served in Portugal, -were present, better information was not obtained; but every part -of this campaign illustrated Massena’s character, as drawn by -Napoleon:--“Brave, decided, and intrepid; dull in conversation, but -in danger acquiring clearness and force of thought; ambitious, -filled with self-love, neglectful of discipline, regardless of good -administration, and, consequently, disliked by the troops; his -dispositions for battle were bad, but his temper was pertinacious to -the last degree, and he was never discouraged!” - -10º. It appears that the French reached Coimbra at the moment when -the fourteen days’ bread, carried by the soldiers, was exhausted, and -it is worthy of consideration that French soldiers are accustomed to -carry so much bread. Other nations, especially the English, would -not husband it; yet it was a practice of the ancient Romans, and it -ought to be the practice of all armies. It requires a long previous -discipline and well-confirmed military habits; but, without it, men -are only half efficient, especially for offensive warfare. The secret -of making perfect soldiers is only to be found in national customs -and institutions; men should come to the ranks fitted, by previous -habits, for military service, instead of being stretched as it were -upon the bed of Procrustes, by a discipline which has no resource but -fear. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - - -From the 1st of October until the 3d, the French army was in -disorder. The 4th, Massena resumed his march by Condeixa and Leiria, -leaving his sick and wounded, with a slender guard, (in all about -four thousand seven hundred men,) at Coimbra. His hospital was -established at the convent of Santa Clara, on the left bank of the -river, and all the inhabitants, who were averse or unable to reach -the Lines, came down from their hiding-places in the mountains. -But scarcely had the prince left the city, when Trant, Miller, and -Wilson, with nearly ten thousand militia, closed upon his rear, -occupying the sierras on both sides of the Mondego, and cutting off -all communication with Almeida. - -On the evening of the 4th, the French drove the English picquets from -Pombal, and, the next morning, pushed so suddenly upon Leiria, as to -create some confusion; but the road being crossed at right angles, -by a succession of parallel ravines, captain Somers Cocks took -advantage of one, to charge the head of the enemy, and checked him -until general Anson’s brigade of cavalry, and captain Bull’s troop -of artillery, arrived to his support. The French then, forming three -columns, endeavoured to bear down the British with the centre, while -the others turned the flanks. The ravines were, however, difficult -to pass; Bull’s artillery played well into the principal body, and -Anson, charging as it emerged from every defile, slew a great -number. The British lost three officers and about fifty men, the -enemy considerably more, and, in five hours, he did not gain as many -miles of ground, although he had thirty-six squadrons opposed to ten. -During this delay, Leiria was cleared, and the army retreated; the -right by Thomar and Santarem, the centre by Batalha and Rio Mayor, -the left by Alcobaça and Obidos, and at the same time a native force, -under colonel Blunt, was thrown into Peniché. Massena followed, in -one column, by the way of Rio Mayor; but, meanwhile, an exploit, as -daring and hardy as any performed by a Partizan officer during the -war, convicted him of bad generalship, and shook his plan of invasion -to its base. - - -SURPRISE OF COIMBRA. - -Colonel Trant reached Milheada, intending to form a junction with -Wilson and Miller; but these last were still distant, and, believing -that his own arrival was unknown at Coimbra, he resolved, alone to -attack the French in that city. Having surprised a small post at -Fornos early in the morning of the 7th, he sent his cavalry, at -full gallop, through the streets of Coimbra, with orders to pass -the bridge, and cut off all communication with the French army, of -whose progress he was ignorant. Meanwhile, his infantry penetrated -at different points into the principal parts of the town, and the -enemy, astounded, made little or no resistance. The convent of Santa -Clara surrendered at discretion, and thus, on the third day after the -prince of Esling had quitted the Mondego, his depôts and hospitals, -and nearly five thousand prisoners wounded and unwounded, amongst -which there was a company of the marines of the imperial guards, fell -into the hands of a small militia force! The next day, Miller and -Wilson, arriving, spread their men on all the lines of communication, -and picked up above three hundred more prisoners, while Trant -conducted his to Oporto. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VIII.] - -During the first confusion, the Portuguese committed some violence -on the prisoners; and the Abbé du Pradt and other French writers -have not hesitated to accuse Trant of disgracing his country and his -uniform by encouraging this conduct; whereas, his exertions repressed -it; and if the fact, that not more than ten men lost their lives -under such critical circumstances, was not sufficient refutation, the -falsehood is placed beyond dispute in a letter of thanks, written to -colonel Trant, by the French officers who fell into his hands. - -This disaster made no change in Massena’s dispositions. He continued -his march, and, on the 8th, his advanced guard drove the cavalry -picquets out of Rio Mayor. General Slade, who commanded, took no -heed of this; and the enemy, pushing rapidly on, was like to have -taken the brigade of artillery in Alcoentre; a good deal of confusion -ensued, but the royals and the sixteenth drove the French out of -the town, sabred many, and made twelve prisoners. The next day the -skirmish was renewed with various turns of fortune, but, finally, the -British retreated. - -Meanwhile the allied army was entering the Lines. The first, fourth, -and fifth divisions in the centre by Sobral, the third division -on the left by Torres Vedras, and Hill’s corps on the right by -Alhandra. The light division and Pack’s brigade should also have -entered by Aruda. But Crawfurd, who had reached Alemquer on the 9th, -was still there, at three o’clock, p. m. on the 10th. The weather -being stormy, the men were placed under cover, and no indication of -marching was given by the general. The cavalry had already filed into -the Lines; yet no guards were posted, no patroles sent forward, nor -any precaution taken against surprise, although the town, situated in -a deep ravine, was peculiarly favourable for such an attempt. - -Some officers, uneasy at this state of affairs, anxiously watched -the height in front, and, about four o’clock, observed some French -dragoons on the summit, which was within cannon shot. The alarm was -given, and the regiments got under arms, but the posts of assembly -had been marked on an open space, very much exposed, and from -whence the road led through an ancient gateway to the top of the -mountain behind. The enemy’s numbers increased every moment, and they -endeavoured to create a belief that their artillery was come up. This -feint was easily seen through, but the general desired the regiments -to break and re-form on the other side of the archway, out of gun -range, and in a moment all was disorder. The baggage animals were -still loading, the streets were crowded with the followers of the -division, and the whole in one confused mass rushed or were driven -headlong to the archway. Several were crushed, and with worse troops, -a general panic must have ensued; but the greatest number of the -soldiers, ashamed of the order, stood firm in their ranks until the -first confusion had abated. - -Nevertheless the mischief was sufficiently great, and the enemy’s -infantry descending the heights, endeavoured some to turn the town -on the left, while others pushed directly through the streets -in pursuit, and thus with his front in disorder, and his rear -skirmishing, Crawfurd commenced a retreat. The weather was, however, -so boisterous that the fire soon ceased, and a few men wounded and -the loss of some baggage was all the hurt sustained; yet so uncertain -is every thing in war, that this affair had like to have produced the -most terrible results in another quarter. - -The division, instead of marching by Caregada and Cadafaes, followed -the route of Sobral, and was obliged in the night to make a flank -march of several miles along the foot of the Lines to gain Aruda, -which was meanwhile left open to the enemy. Hence, the cavalry -patroles from Villa Franca, meeting some stragglers and followers of -the camp near Caregada, were by them told that the light division was -cut off, a report confirmed in some measure by the unguarded state of -Aruda, and by the presence of the enemy’s scouts on that side. This -information alarmed general Hill for the safety of the second line, -and the more so that the weakest part was in the vicinity of Aruda; -he made a retrograde movement towards Alverca with a view to watch -the valley of Calandrix, or to gain the pass of Bucellas according to -circumstances. Hence, when the enemy was in full march against the -Lines, the front from Alhandra to the forts above Sobral, a distance -of eight or nine miles, was quite disgarnished of troops. The true -state of affairs was, however, quickly ascertained, and Hill regained -Alhandra before day-light on the 11th. - -During this time the second and the eighth corps passed Alemquer, the -former marching upon Villa Franca, the latter upon Sobral. Reynier’s -movements were languid, he did not discover the unguarded state of -Alhandra, and his picquets did not enter Villa Franca until the next -day; but general Clausel, one of the most distinguished officers in -the French army, coming upon Sobral in the dusk with the head of the -eighth corps dislodged the troops of the first division, occupied -the ridge on which the town is built, and in the night threw up some -entrenchments close under the centre of the allies position. - -It is however time to give a more detailed description of those -celebrated works, improperly called - - -THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS. - -[Sidenote: Memoranda of the lines, &c. by Col. J. T. Jones, Royal -Engineers, printed for private circulation.] - -It has been already said, that they consisted of three distinct -ranges of defence. - -The first, extending from Alhandra on the Tagus to the mouth of the -Zizandre on the sea-coast, was, following the inflections of the -hills, twenty-nine miles long. - -The second, traced at a distance varying from six to ten miles in -rear of the first, stretched from Quintella on the Tagus to the mouth -of the St. Lorenza, being twenty-four miles in length. - -The third, intended to cover a forced embarkation, extended from -Passo d’Arcos on the Tagus to the tower of Junquera on the coast. -Here an outer line, constructed on an opening of three thousand -yards, enclosed an entrenched camp designed to cover the embarkation -with fewer troops, should the operation be delayed by bad weather; -and within this second camp, Fort St. Julian’s (whose high ramparts -and deep ditches defied an escalade) was armed and strengthened to -enable a rear-guard to protect both itself and the army. - -The nearest part of the second line was twenty-four miles from these -works at Passo d’Arcos, and some parts of the first line were two -long marches distant; but the principal routes led through Lisbon, -where measures were taken to retard the enemy and give time for the -embarkation. - -Of these stupendous Lines, the second, whether regarded for its -strength or importance, was undoubtedly the principal, and the others -only appendages, the one as a final place of refuge, the other as an -advanced work to stem the first violence of the enemy, and to enable -the army to take up its ground on the second line without hurry or -pressure. Massena having, however, wasted the summer season on the -frontiers, the first line acquired such strength, both from labour -and from the fall of rain, that lord Wellington resolved to abide his -opponent’s charge there. - -The ground presented to the French being, as it were, divided into -five parts or positions, shall be described in succession from right -to left. - -1º. From Alhandra to the head of the valley of Calandrix. This -distance, of about five miles, was a continuous and lofty ridge, -defended by thirteen redoubts, and for two miles rendered -inaccessible by a scarp fifteen to twenty feet high, executed along -the brow. It was guarded by the British and Portuguese divisions -under general Hill, and flanked from the Tagus by a strong flotilla -of gun-boats, manned by British seamen. - -2º. From the head of the vale of Calandrix to the Pé de Monte. -This position, also five miles in length, consisted of two salient -mountains forming the valley of Aruda, that town being exactly in -the mouth of the pass. Only three feeble redoubts, totally incapable -of stopping an enemy for an instant, were constructed here; the -defence of the ground was entrusted to general Crawfurd and the light -division. - -3º. The Monte Agraça. This lofty mountain overtopped the adjacent -country in such a manner, that from its summit the whole of the -first line could be distinctly observed. The right was separated -from the Aruda position, by a deep ravine which led to nothing, the -left overlooked the village and valley of Zibreira, and the centre -overhung the town of Sobral. The summit of this mountain was crowned -by an immense redoubt, mounting twenty-five guns, and having three -smaller works, containing nineteen guns, clustered around. The -garrisons, amounting to two thousand men, were supplied by Pack’s -brigade, and on the reverse of the position, which might be about -four miles in length, the fifth division, under general Leith, was -posted in reserve. - -4º. From the valley of Zibreira to Torres Vedras. This position, -seven miles long, was at first without works, because it was only -when the rains had set in, that the resolution to defend the first -line permanently, was adopted. But the ground being rough and well -defined, and the valley in front watered by the Zizandre, now -become a considerable river, it presented a fine field of battle for -a small army. The first and fourth, and a sixth division formed of -troops just arrived from England and from Cadiz, were there posted, -under the immediate command of lord Wellington himself; and his -head-quarters were fixed at Pero Negro, near the Secorra, a rock, on -which a telegraph was erected, communicating with every part of the -Lines. - -5º. From the heights of Torres Vedras to the mouth of the Zizandre. -The right flank of this position and the pass in front of the town -of Torres Vedras were secured, first, by one great redoubt, mounting -forty guns, and, secondly, by several smaller forts, judiciously -planted so as to command all the approaches. From these works to the -sea a range of moderate heights were crowned with small forts; but -the chief defence there, after the rains had set in, was to be found -in the Zizandre, which was not only unfordable, but overflowed its -banks, and formed an impassable marsh. A paved road, parallel to the -foot of the hills, run along the whole front, that is, from Torres -Vedras, by Runa Sobral and Aruda, to Alhandra. This was the nature of -the _first_ line of defence; the _second_ was still more formidable. - -1º. From the mouth of the St. Lourença to Mafra, a distance of seven -miles, there was a range of hills naturally steep, artificially -scarped, and covered by a deep, and in many parts impracticable -ravine. The salient points were secured by forts, which flanked and -commanded the few accessible points; but as this line was extensive, -a secondary post was fortified a few miles in the rear, to secure a -road leading from Ereceira to Cintra. - -2º. On the right of the above line the Tapada, or royal park of -Mafra, offered some open ground for an attack. Yet it was strong, -and, together with the pass of Mafra, was defended by a system of -fourteen redoubts, constructed with great labour and care, well -considered with respect to the natural disposition of the ground, -and, in some degree, connected with the secondary post spoken of -above: in front, the Sierra de Chypre, covered with redoubts, -obstructed all approaches to Mafra itself. - -3º. From the Tapada to the pass of Bucellas, a space of ten or twelve -miles, which formed the middle of the second line, the country is -choked by the Monte Chique, the Cabeça, or head of which is in the -centre of, and overtopping all the other, mountain masses. A road, -conducted along a chain of hills, high and salient, but less bold -than any other parts of the line, connected Mafra with the Cabeça, -and was secured by a number of forts. The country in front was -extremely difficult, and a second and stronger range of heights, -parallel to and behind the first, offered a good fighting position, -which could only be approached with artillery by the connecting -road in front, and to reach that, either the Sierra de Chypre, on -the left, or the pass of the Cabeça de Monte Chique, on the right, -must have been carried. Now the works covering the latter consisted -of a cluster of redoubts constructed on the inferior rocky heads in -advance of the Cabeça, and completely commanding all the approaches, -and both from their artificial and natural strength, nearly -impregnable to open force. The Cabeça and its immediate flanks were -considered secure in their natural precipitous strength; and, in like -manner, the ridges connecting the Cabeça with the pass of Bucellas, -being impregnable, were left untouched, save the blocking of one bad -mule road that led over them. - -4º. From Bucellas (the pass of which was difficult and strongly -defended by redoubts on each side) a ridge, or rather a collection -of impassable rocks, called the Sierra de Serves, stretches to the -right for two miles without a break, and then dies away by gradual -slopes in the low ground about the Tagus. These declivities and the -flat banks of the river offered an opening two miles and a half -wide, which was laboriously and carefully strengthened by redoubts, -water-cuts, and retrenchments, and connected by a system of forts -with the heights of Alhandra, but it was the weakest part of the -whole line in itself, and the most dangerous from its proximity to -the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda. - -There were five roads practicable for artillery piercing the _first -line_ of defence, namely, two at Torres Vedras, two at Sobral, and -one at Alhandra; but as two of these united again at the Cabeça, -there were, in fact, only four points of passage through the _second -line_, that is to say, at Mafra, Monte Chique, Bucellas, and -Quintella in the flat ground. The aim and scope of all the works -was to bar those passes and to strengthen the favourable fighting -positions between them, without impeding the movements of the army. -These objects were attained, and it is certain that the loss of the -_first line_ would not have been injurious, save in reputation, -because the retreat was secure upon the _second and stronger line_, -and the guns of the first were all of inferior calibre, mounted on -common truck carriages, and consequently immoveable and useless to -the enemy. - -The movements of the allies were free and unfettered by the works. -But the movements of the French army were impeded and cramped by the -great Monte Junta, which, rising opposite the centre of the first -line, sent forth a spur called the Sierra de Baragueda in a slanting -direction, so close up to the heights of Torres Vedras that the -narrow pass of Ruña alone separated them. As this pass was commanded -by heavy redoubts, Massena was of necessity obliged to dispose his -forces on one or other side of the Baragueda, and he could not -transfer his army to either without danger; because the sierra, -although not impassable, was difficult, and the movement, which would -require time and arrangement, could always be overlooked from the -Monte Agraça, whence, in a few hours, the allied forces could pour -down upon the head, flank, or rear of the French while in march. And -this with the utmost rapidity, because communications had been cut by -the engineers to all important points of the Lines, and a system of -signals were established, by which orders were transmitted from the -centre to the extremities in a few minutes. - -Thus much I have thought fit to say respecting _the Lines_, too -little for the professional reader, too much, perhaps, for a general -history. But I was desirous to notice, somewhat in detail, works, -more in keeping with ancient than modern military labours, partly -that a just idea might be formed of the talents of the British -engineers who constructed them, and partly to show that lord -Wellington’s measures of defence were not, as some French military -writers have supposed, dependent upon the first line. Had that been -stormed, the standard of Portuguese independence could still have -been securely planted amidst the rocks of the second position. - -To occupy fifty miles of fortification, to man one hundred and fifty -forts, and to work six hundred pieces of artillery, required a number -of men; but a great fleet in the Tagus, a superb body of marines -sent out from England, the civic guards of Lisbon, the Portuguese -heavy artillery corps, the militia and the ordenança of Estremadura -furnished, altogether, a powerful reserve. The native artillery and -the militia supplied all the garrisons of the forts on the second, -and most of those on the first line. The British marines occupied -the third line: the navy manned the gun-boats on the river, and -aided, in various ways, the operation in the field. The recruits from -the depôts, and all the men on furlough, being called in, rendered -the Portuguese army stronger than it had yet been; and the British -army, reinforced, as I have said, both from Cadiz and England, and -remarkably healthy, presented such a front as a general would desire -to see in a dangerous crisis. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 8._ - - LINES - of - _Torres Vedras_ - 1810. - - _Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._] - -It was, however, necessary not only to have strength, but the -appearance of strength; and lord Wellington had so dealt with Romana -that, without much attention to the wishes of his own government, the -latter agreed to join the allies with two divisions. The first, under -his own command, crossed the Tagus at Aldea Gallega on the 19th of -October, reached head-quarters the 24th, and was posted at Enxara -de los Cavalleros, just behind the Monte Agraça; the other followed -in a few days: and thus, before the end of October, not less than one -hundred and thirty thousand fighting men received rations within the -Lines; more than seventy thousand being regular troops, completely -disposable and unfettered by the works. - -Meanwhile, Mendizabel, with the remainder of the Spanish army, -reinforced by Madden’s Portuguese dragoons, advanced towards Zafra. -Ballasteros, at the same time, moved upon Araceña; and Mortier, -ignorant of Romana’s absence, retired across the Morena on the 8th, -for Soult was then seriously menacing Cadiz. Thus fortune combined, -with the dispositions of the English general, to widen the distance, -and to diversify the objects of the French armies, at the moment -when the allies were concentrating the greatest force on the most -important point. - -Massena, surprised at the extent and strength of works, the existence -of which had only become known to him five days before he came upon -them, employed several days to examine their nature. The heights -of Alhandra he judged inattackable; but the valleys of Calandrix -and Aruda attracted his attention. Through the former he could turn -Hill’s position, and come at once upon the weakest part of the -second line; yet the abattis and the redoubts erected, and hourly -strengthening, gave him little encouragement to attack there; while -the nature of the ground about Aruda was such that he could not -ascertain what number of troops guarded it, although he made several -demonstrations, and frequently skirmished with the light division, to -oblige Crawfurd to shew his force. That general, by making the town -of Aruda an advanced post, rendered it impossible to discover his -true situation without a serious affair; and, in a short time, his -division, with prodigious labour, secured the position in a manner -really worthy of admiration. - -Across the ravine on the left, a loose stone wall, sixteen feet -thick and forty feet high, was raised; and across the great valley -of Aruda, a double line of abattis was drawn; not composed, as is -usual, of the limbs of trees, but of full-grown oaks and chestnuts, -dug up with all their roots and branches, dragged, by main force, for -several hundred yards, and then reset and crossed, so that no human -strength could break through. Breast-works, at convenient distances, -to defend this line of trees, were then cast up; and along the -summits of the mountain, for a space of nearly three miles, including -the salient points, other stone walls, six feet high and four in -thickness, with banquettes, were built; so that a good defence could -have been made against the attacks of twenty thousand men. - -The next points that drew Massena’s attention were the Monte Agraça -and the vale of the Upper Zizandre, where, from the recent period -at which lord Wellington had resolved to offer battle on the first -line, no outworks had been constructed; and the valley of Zibreira, -and even the hills above Runa, had not been fortified. Here it -was possible to join battle on more equal terms, but the position -of the allies was still very formidable; the flanks and rear were -protected by great forts, and not only was a powerful mass of troops -permanently posted there, but six battalions, drawn from Hill’s -corps, and placed at Bucellas, could, in a very short time, have come -into action. - -Beyond Runa, the Baragueda ridge and the forts of Torres Vedras -forbad any flank movement by the French general; and it only remained -for him to dispose his troops in such a manner between Villa Franca -and Sobral that, while the heads of the columns menaced the weakest -points of the Lines, a few hours would suffice to concentrate the -whole army at any part between the Tagus and the Baragueda ridge. The -second corps, still holding the hills opposite Alhandra, extended -its right along some open ground as far as Aruda, and being covered, -at that point, by a force of cavalry, was connected with the eighth -corps; the head of which was pushed forward on Sobral, occupying the -lower ridges of the Baragueda, and lining the banks of the Zizandre -as far as Duas Portas on the road to Runa: the outposts of the two -armies being nearly in contact. - -Massena did not bring the sixth corps beyond Otta, and his -dispositions were not made without several skirmishes, especially -near Sobral, on the morning of the 14th, when, attempting to dislodge -the seventy-first regiment from a field-work, his troops were -repulsed, pursued, and driven from their own retrenchments, which -were held until evening; and only evacuated because the whole of the -eight corps was advancing for the purpose of permanently establishing -its position. The loss of the allies in these petty affairs amounted -to one hundred and fifty; of which, the greatest part fell at Sobral; -that of the enemy was estimated higher. The English general Harvey -was wounded, and at Villa Franca the fire of the gun-boats killed -the French general St. Croix, a young man of signal ability and -promise. - -The war was now reduced to a species of blockade: Massena’s object -being to feed his army until reinforcements reached it; lord -Wellington’s to starve the French before succour could arrive. -The former spread his moveable columns in the rear to seek for -provisions, and commenced forming magazines at Santarem, where his -principal depôt was established; but the latter drew down all the -militia and ordenança of the north on the French rear, putting their -right in communication with the garrison of Peniché, and their -left with the militia of Lower Beira. To strengthen the latter he -prevailed on Carlos d’España to cross the Tagus, and act between -Castello Branco and Abrantes; and thus the French were completely -enclosed, without any weakening of the regular army. - -To aid the communication between Peniché and the militia, a Spanish -light battalion and a strong body of English cavalry advanced to -Ramalhal. Obidos, surrounded by old walls, was placed in a temporary -state of defence, and garrisoned by three hundred Portuguese, -under major Fenwick; and a moveable column, under colonel Waters, -issuing from Torres Vedras, made incursions against the enemy’s -marauding detachments, capturing many prisoners, and part of a -considerable convoy which was passing the Baragueda. The French were -thus continually harassed, yet their detachments scoured the whole -country, even beyond Leiria, and obtained provisions in considerable -quantities. - -[Sidenote: See Annals of the Peninsular War, Vol. II. p. 331.] - -Meanwhile, the main bodies of the hostile forces remained quiet, -although the French right was greatly exposed. Lord Wellington -had four British divisions and Romana’s corps, forming a mass of -twenty-five thousand men, close round Sobral, and, by directing the -greatest part of his cavalry and the six battalions, at Bucellas, -upon Aruda, he could have assembled from eight to ten thousand men -there also, who, advancing a short distance into the plain, could, in -conjunction with Hill, have kept the second corps in check; while the -twenty-five thousand, pouring down at daylight from the Monte Agraça, -from the valley of Zibreira, and from the side of Ruña, could have -enveloped and crushed the head of the eighth corps long before the -sixth could have reached the scene of action. But war is a curious -and complicated web! and while the purely military part was thus -happily situated and strong, the political part was one of weakness -and alarm. Scarcely could the English general maintain a defensive -attitude, struggling as he was against the intrigues and follies of -men who have, nevertheless, been praised for their “earnest and manly -co-operation.” - - - - -CHAPTER IX. - - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.] - -The presence of the enemy, in the heart of the country, embarrassed -the finances, and the Regency applied to England for an additional -subsidy. Mr. Stuart, seeing the extreme distress, took upon himself -to direct the house of Sampayo to furnish provisions to the troops -on the credit of the first subsidy; he also made the greatest -exertions to feed the fugitive inhabitants, forty thousand of whom -arrived before the 13th of October, and others were hourly coming in, -destitute and starving. Corn, purchased at any price, was sought for -in all countries; from Ireland, America, and Egypt; and one thousand -tons of government shipping were lent to merchants to fetch grain -from Algiers. One commission of citizens was formed to facilitate the -obtaining cattle and corn from the northern provinces; another to -regulate the transport of provisions to the army, and to push a trade -with Spain through the Alemtejo. Small craft were sent up the Tagus -to carry off both the inhabitants and their stock, from the islands -and from the left bank, and post-vessels were established along the -coast to Oporto. Bullion and jewels were put on board the men of war, -a proclamation was issued, calling upon the people to be tranquil, -and a strong police was established to enforce this object. Finally, -to supply the deficiency of tonnage created by the sending off the -transports in search of corn, an embargo was laid upon the port of -Lisbon; it was strongly protested against by the Americans, but an -imperious necessity ruled. - -All these measures were vehemently opposed by the Patriarch and his -faction; and that nothing might be wanting to shew how entirely the -fate of the Peninsula depended, in that hour, upon lord Wellington’s -firmness, the fears of the British cabinet, which had been encreasing -as the crisis approached, were now plainly disclosed. During the -retreat from the north, affairs seemed so gloomy to the eyes of some -officers of rank, that their correspondence bore evidence of their -feelings; and the letters of general Spencer and general Charles -Stewart appeared so desponding to lord Liverpool, that he transmitted -them to lord Wellington, and, by earnestly demanding an opinion upon -their contents, shewed how deeply they had disturbed his own mind. - -Thus beset on every side, the English general rose like a giant. -Without noticing either the arguments or the forebodings in these -letters, he took a calm historical review of the grounds upon which -he had undertaken the defence of Portugal, and which he had before -pointed out to the minister he was addressing; then shewing that, -up to that period, his views had been in every instance borne out -by the results, he demonstrated that it was reasonable to confide -in his judgement of what was to come. Having thus vindicated his -own prudence and foresight by irresistible facts, he proceeded to -trace the probable course of future events, entered largely into -both his own and the enemy’s designs, and with such a judgement and -sagacity that the subsequent course of the war never belied his -anticipations. This remarkable letter exists, and, were all other -records of lord Wellington’s genius to be lost, it would alone -suffice to vindicate his great reputation to posterity. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 3.] - -Having with conscious superiority replied to his own government, he, -with a fierceness rendered necessary by the crisis, turned upon the -patriarch and his coadjutors. Reproaching them for their unpatriotic, -foolish, and deceitful conduct, he told them plainly, that they were -unfaithful servants of their country and their prince, and threatened -_to withdraw the British army altogether_, if the practices of which -he complained were not amended. - -“The king of England and the prince regent of Portugal had,” he said, -“entrusted him with the conduct of the military operations, and he -would not suffer any person to interfere. He knew what to do, and he -would not alter his plans to meet the _senseless suggestions of the -Regency_. Let the latter look to their own duties! Let them provide -food for the army and the people, and keep the capital tranquil.” -“With principal Souza,” he said, “it was not possible to act, and, -if that person continued in power, the country would be lost. Either -the principal or himself must quit their employments; if himself, he -would take care that the world should know the reasons; meanwhile he -would address the prince upon the conduct of the Regency.” - -[Sidenote: Appendix No. V. Section 4.] - -“He had hoped,” he resumed in another letter, “that the Portuguese -government was satisfied with his acts, and that instead of -endeavouring to render all defence useless by disturbing the minds of -the populace at Lisbon, they would have adopted measures to secure -the tranquillity of that capital. But, like other weak individuals, -they added duplicity to weakness, and their past expressions of -approbation and gratitude he supposed were intended to convey -censure. All he asked from them was to preserve tranquillity, to -provide food for their own troops while employed in the Lines, and -to be prepared, in case of disaster, to save those persons and -their families who were obnoxious to the enemy.” “I have,” he said -“little doubt of final success, but _I have fought a sufficient -number of battles to know, that the result of any is not certain, -even with the best arrangements_.” These reproaches were neither too -severe nor ill-timed, for the war had been hanging in even balance, -and the weight of interested folly thus thrown in by the Regency, -was beginning to sink the scale. Yet to shew the justice of lord -Wellington’s complaints, it is necessary to resume the thread of -those intrigues which have been before touched upon. - -[Sidenote: Appendix No. V. Section 8.] - -Instead of performing their own duties, the government assumed, that -the struggle could be maintained on the frontier, and when they -should have been removing the people and the provisions from the -line of retreat, they were discussing the expediency of military -operations which were quite impracticable. When convinced of their -error by facts, they threw the burthen of driving the country upon -the general, although they knew that he was ignorant even of the -names and places of abode of those officers and magistrates who -were to execute it, and that there was but one Portuguese agent at -head-quarters to give assistance in translating the necessary orders. - -When this was remarked to them, they issued the orders themselves, -but made the execution referable to the general, without his -knowledge, and well knowing that he had no means of communicating -with the country people, and this at the very moment of the enemy’s -advance. The battle of Busaco, by delaying the French army, alone -enabled the orders even to reach the persons to whom they were -addressed. But it was the object of the Regency, by nourishing and -soothing the national indolence, to throw the odium of harsh and -rigorous measures upon the British authorities. Lord Wellington, -however, while he reproached them for this conduct, never shrunk from -the odium; he avowed himself, in his proclamations, the author of the -plan for wasting the country, and he was willing the Regency should -shelter themselves under his name, but he was not willing to lose the -fruit of his responsibility, or, that those whose courage did shrink -from the trial, “should seek popularity with the populace at the -expense of the best interests of the country.” - -After the disputes which followed the fall of Almeida, the English -government convinced that a more secure and powerful grasp must be -taken of Portugal, insisted, at the instance of lord Wellington, that -their envoy, Mr. Stuart, should have a seat in the Regency, and that -the subsidy should be placed under the control of the British instead -of the native authorities. The 2d of October, Mr. Stuart took his -seat, and together with doctor Noguera, the Conde de Redondo, and the -marquis Olhao (the former of whom was decidedly averse to the Souzas’ -faction, and the two latter moderate in their conduct) proceeded to -control the intrigues and violence of the Patriarch and principal -Souza. It was full time, for both were formally protesting against -the destruction of the mills in Beira, and vigorously opposing every -measure proposed by lord Wellington. They were deeply offended by -the suppression of the Lusitanian legion, which about this time was -incorporated with the regular forces; and they had openly declared, -that the Portuguese troops should not retreat from the frontiers, and -that if the enemy obliged the British army to embark, not a native, -whether soldier or citizen, should go with it. When the allies, -notwithstanding this, fell back to the Lines, Souza proposed that the -Regency should fly to the Algarves, which being indignantly protested -against by Mr. Stuart, Souza threatened to quit the government. The -dispute was then referred to lord Wellington, and, on the 6th of -October, drew from him those severe expressions of which an abstract -has been given above. - -Meanwhile, the restless Principal pursued his designs with activity, -and, in conjunction with his brothers and the Patriarch, established -a regular and systematic opposition to lord Wellington’s plans -of defence. Factious in council, they were also clamorous out of -doors, where many echoed their sentiments, from anger at some wanton -ravages, that, in despite of the general’s utmost efforts, had marked -the retreat. They courted the mob of Lisbon servilely and grossly; -and Antonio Souza getting the superintendence of the succours for -the fugitive population, became the avowed patron of all persons -preferring complaints. He took pains to stimulate and exasperate -the public griefs, and to exaggerate the causes of them, frequently -hinting that the Portuguese people and not the British army had -formerly driven out the French. All these calumnies being echoed by -the numerous friends and partisans of the caballers, and by the -fidalgos, who endeavoured to spread discontent as widely as possible; -there wanted but slight encouragement from the Brazils, to form a -national party, and openly attack the conduct of the war. - -To obtain this encouragement, Raymundo, the old tool of the party in -the Oporto violences, was sent to the court of Rio Janeiro, to excite -the prince regent against lord Wellington; and the Patriarch himself -wrote to the prince of Wales and to the duke of Sussex, thinking to -incense them also against the English general. The extent and nature -of the intrigues may be estimated from a revelation made at the time -by baron Eben, and by the editor of a Lisbon newspaper, called the -_Brazilienza_. - -Those persons abandoning the faction, asserted that the -Patriarch, the Souzas, and (while he remained in Portugal) the -ex-plenipotentiary, Mr. Villiers, were personally opposed to -lord Wellington, marshal Beresford, and Mr. de Forjas, and had -sought to remove them from their situations, and to get the duke -of Brunswick appointed generallissimo in Portugal; that they had -also endeavoured to engage the duke of Sussex to take a leading -part, but that his royal highness had repulsed them at the outset; -that their plan was to engage a newspaper to be their organ in -London, as the _Brazilienza_ was to have been in Lisbon; that in -their correspondence lord Wellington was designated under the name -of _Alberoni_; lord Wellesley, _Lama_; Beresford, _Ferugem_; Mr. -Stuart, _Labre_; the Patriarch, _Saxe_; Antonio Souza, _Lamberti_; -colonel Bunbury and Mr. Peel, then under secretaries of state, -as _Thin_ and _By-Thin_. That after Mr. Villier’s departure, the -intrigue was continued by the Patriarch and the Souzas, but upon a -different plan; for, overborne by the vigour of Mr. Stuart in the -council, they agreed to refrain from openly opposing either him or -Forjas, but resolved to write down what either might utter, and -transmit, that which suited their purpose, to the Conde de Linhares -and the chevalier Souza; these persons undertaking to represent the -information so received, after their own fashion, to the cabinets of -St. James’ and Rio Janeiro. - -The violent temper of the Patriarch unfitted him to execute this -plan; he made open display of his hostility to the English general; -and it is worthy of observation that, while thus thwarting every -measure necessary to resist the enemy, his faction did not hesitate -to exercise the most odious injustice and cruelty against those whom -they denominated well-wishers to the French. By a decree of the -prince regent’s, dated the 20th of March, 1809, private denunciations -in cases of disaffection, were permitted, the informer’s name to be -kept secret; and in September, 1810, this infamous system, although -strenuously opposed by Mr. Stuart, was acted upon, and many persons -suddenly sent to the islands, and others thrown into dungeons. -Some might have been guilty; and the government pretended that a -traitorous correspondence with the enemy was carried on through a -London house, which they indicated; but it does not appear that a -direct crime was brought home to any, and it is certain that many -innocent persons were oppressed. - -All these things shewing that vigorous measures were necessary to -prevent the ruin of the general cause, lord Wellesley dealt so with -the Brazilian court, that every intrigue there was soon crushed, -lord Wellington’s power in Portugal confirmed, and his proceedings -approved of. Authority was also given him to dismiss or to retain -Antonio Souza and even to remove lord Strangford, the British envoy -at Rio Janeiro, if it suited him so to do. The subsidies were placed -under his and Mr. Stuart’s control; admiral Berkeley was appointed -to a seat in the Regency; and, in fine, Portugal was reduced to the -condition of a vassal state. A policy which could never have been -attempted, however necessary, if the people at large had not been -willing to acquiesce; but firm in their attachment to independence -and abhorring the invaders, they submitted cheerfully to this -temporary assumption of command, and fully justified the sagacity of -the man, who thus dared to grasp at the whole power of Portugal with -one hand, while he kept the power of France at bay with the other. - -Although so strongly armed, lord Wellington removed no person, but -with equal prudence and moderation reserved the exercise of this -great authority until further provocation should render it absolutely -necessary. But this remedy for the disorders above related was not -perfected for a long time, nor until after a most alarming crisis of -affairs had been brought on by the conduct of the Lisbon cabal. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 5.] - -From the strength of the Lines, it is plain that offensive operations -were far more to be dreaded on the left, than on the right bank of -the Tagus. In the Alemtejo, the enemy could more easily subsist, -more effectually operate to the injury of Lisbon, and more securely -retreat upon his own resources. Now lord Wellington had repeatedly -urged the Regency to oblige the inhabitants to abandon their -dwellings, and carry off their herds and grain, especially those near -the banks, and on the numerous islands in the river, and above all -things to destroy or remove every boat. To carry this into effect -a commission had been appointed, but so many delays and obstacles -were interposed by the Patriarch and his coadjutors, that the -commissioners did not leave Lisbon until the enemy were close upon -that river; both banks being still stocked with cattle and corn, and -what was worse forty large boats on the right side, by which the -French immediately made themselves masters of the islands, especially -of Lizirias, where they obtained abundance of provisions. But while -the Regency thus provided for the enemy, they left the fortresses of -Palmella, St. Felippe de Setuval, and Abrantes with empty magazines. - -Lord Wellington thinking that the ordenança on the left bank, of whom -four hundred were armed with English muskets and furnished with three -pieces of artillery, would be sufficient to repel plundering parties -attempting to cross the Tagus, was unwilling to spare men from the -Lines. He wanted numbers there and he also judged that the ordenança -would, if once assisted by a regular force, leave the war to their -allies. But Antonio Souza was continually urging the planting of -ambuscades, and other like frivolities, upon the left bank of the -Tagus; and as his opinions were spread abroad by his party, the -governor of Setuval adopted the idea, and suddenly advanced with his -garrison to Salvatierra on the river side. - -This ridiculous movement attracted the enemy’s attention, and lord -Wellington fearing they would pass over a detachment, disperse the -Portuguese troops, and seize Setuval before it could be succoured, -peremptorily ordered the governor to return to that fortress. This -retrograde movement caused the dispersion of the ordenança, and -consternation reigned in the Alemtejo. The supply of grain coming -from Spain was stopped, the chain of communications broken, and, the -alarm spreading to Lisbon, there was no remedy but to send general -Fane, with some guns and Portuguese cavalry, that could be ill -spared from the Lines, to that side. Fane immediately destroyed all -the boats he could find, hastened the removal of provisions, and -patrolling the banks of the river as high as the mouth of the Zezere, -kept a strict watch upon the enemy’s movements. - -Other embarrassments were however continually arising. The number -of prisoners in Lisbon had accumulated so as to become a serious -inconvenience; because, for some reason which does not appear, the -English Admiralty would not permit them to be transported to England -in ships of war, and other vessels could not be spared. About this -time also admiral Berkeley, whose elaborate report the year before, -stated that, although the enemy should seize the heights of Almada, -he could not injure the fleet in the river, now admitted that he was -in error; and the engineers were directed to construct secondary -lines on that side. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 7.] - -Another formidable evil, arising from the conduct of the Regency, was -the state of the Portuguese army. The troops were so ill supplied -that more than once they would have disbanded, had they not been -relieved from the British magazines. Ten thousand soldiers of the -line deserted between April and December, and the militia and -ordenança abandoned their colours in far greater numbers; for, as -no remonstrance could induce the Regency to put the laws in force -against the delinquents, that which was at first the effect of want -became a habit; so that even when regularly fed from the British -stores within the Lines, the desertion was alarmingly great. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 10.] - -Notwithstanding the mischiefs thus daily growing up, neither the -Patriarch nor the Principal ceased their opposition. The order to -fortify the heights of Almada caused a violent altercation in the -Regency, and lord Wellington, greatly incensed, denounced them to the -Prince Regent; and his letter produced such a paroxysm of anger in -the Patriarch, that he personally insulted Mr. Stuart, and vented his -passion in the most indecent language against the general. Soon after -this, the deplorable state of the finances obliged the government to -resort to the dangerous expedient of requisitions in kind for the -feeding of the troops: and in that critical moment the Patriarch, -whose influence was, from various causes, very great, took occasion -to declare that “he would not suffer burthens to be laid upon the -people which were evidently for no other purpose than _to nourish the -war in the heart of the kingdom_.” - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 7.] - -But it was his and his coadjutors’ criminal conduct that really -nourished the war, for there were ample means to have carried off in -time ten-fold the quantity of provisions left for the enemy. Massena -could not then have remained a week before the Lines, and his retreat -would have been attended with famine and disaster, if the measures -previously agreed to by the Regency had been duly executed. Whereas -now, the country about Thomar, Torres Novas, Gollegao, and Santarem -was absolutely untouched; the inhabitants remained; the mills, but -little injured, were quickly repaired, and lord Wellington had the -deep mortification to find that his well considered design was -frustrated by the very persons from whom he had a right to expect -the most zealous support. There was, indeed, every reason to believe -that the prince of Esling would be enabled to maintain his positions -until an overwhelming force should arrive from Spain to aid him. -“_It is heart-breaking_,” was the bitter reflection of the British -general, “_to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy -and folly_.” - - - - -CHAPTER X. - - -The increasing strength of the works, and the report of British -deserters (unhappily very numerous at this period), soon convinced -Massena that it was impracticable to force the Lines without great -reinforcements. His army suffered from sickness, from the irregular -forces in the rear, and from the vengeance of individuals, driven to -despair by the excesses which many French soldiers, taking advantage -of the times, committed in their foraging courses. Nevertheless, with -an obstinate pertinacity, only to be appreciated by those who have -long made war, the French general maintained his forward position, -until the country for many leagues behind him was a desert, and then, -reluctantly yielding to necessity, he sought for a fresh camp in -which to make head against the allies, while his foragers searched -more distant countries for food. - -Early in October artillery officers had been directed to collect -boats for crossing both the Tagus and the Zezere. Montbrun’s cavalry, -stretching along the right bank of the former, gathered provisions, -and stored them at Santarem, and both there and at Barquiña (a creek -in the Tagus, below the mouth of the Zezere), rafts were formed and -boats constructed with wheels, to move from one place to another; -but, from the extreme paucity of materials and tools, the progress -was necessarily slow. Meanwhile Fane, reinforced by some infantry, -watched them closely from the left bank; Carlos d’España came down -from Castello Branco to Abrantes; Trant acted sharply on the side of -Ourem, and Wilson’s Portuguese militia so infested the country from -Espinhal to the Zezere, that Loison’s division was detached upon -Thomar to hold him in check. - -Towards the end of October, however, all the hospitals, stores, and -other incumbrances of the French army were removed to Santarem, -and, on the 31st, two thousand men forded the Zezere above Punhete -to cover the construction of a bridge. From this body, four hundred -infantry and two hundred dragoons, under general Foy, moved against -Abrantes, and, after skirmishing with the garrison, made towards -Sobreira Formosa. The allies’ bridge of Villa Velha was foolishly -burnt, but Foy, with a smaller escort, pushed for Pena Macor, and -the 8th had gained Ciudad Rodrigo, on his way to France, having -undertaken to carry information of the state of affairs to Napoleon; -a task which he performed with singular rapidity, courage, and -address. The remainder of his escort retiring down the Zezere, were -attacked by Wilson, and suffered some loss. - -The bridge on the Zezere was destroyed by floods, the 6th; but the -enemy having entrenched the height over Punhete, not only restored -it, but cast a second at Martinchel, higher up the river. Massena -then commenced his retrograde march, but with great caution, because -his position was overlooked from the Monte Agraça, and the defile of -Alemquer being in the rear of the eighth corps, it was an operation -of some danger to withdraw from before the Lines. To cover the -movement from the knowledge of the Partizans in the rear, Montbrun’s -cavalry marched upon Leiria and his detachments scoured the roads -to Pombal, on the one side, and towards the Zezere, on the other. -Meanwhile the sixth corps marched from Otta and Alemquer to Thomar, -and Loison removed to Golegao with his division, reinforced by a -brigade of dragoons. - -These dispositions being made, general Clausel withdrew from Sobral -during the night of the 14th, and the whole of the eighth corps -passed the defile in the morning of the 15th, under the protection of -some cavalry left in front of Aruda, and of a strong rear-guard on -the height covering Alemquer. The second corps then retreated from -Alhandra by the royal causeway upon Santarem, while the eighth corps -marched by Alcoentre upon Alcanhede and Torres Novas. - -This movement was not interrupted by lord Wellington. The morning of -the 15th proved foggy, and it was some hours after day-break ere he -perceived the void space in his front which disclosed the ability -of the French general’s operations. Fane had reported on the 14th -that boats were collecting at Santarem, and information arrived at -the same time that reinforcements for Massena were on the march from -Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy’s intention was not clearly developed. It -might be a retreat to Spain; it might be to pass round the Monte -Junta, and so push the head of his army on Torres Vedras, while the -allies were following the rear. Lord Wellington, therefore, kept the -principal part of the army stationary, but directed the second and -light divisions to follow the enemy, the former along the causeway to -Villa Franca, the latter to Alemquer, at the same time calling up -his cavalry, and requesting admiral Berkeley to send all the boats of -the fleet up the Tagus, to enable the allies to pass rapidly to the -other bank, if necessary. - -[Sidenote: Private Journal of the Hon. Captain Somers Cocks, 16th -Dragoons.] - -Early on the 16th the enemy was tracked, marching in two columns, the -one upon Rio Mayor, the other upon Santarem. Having passed Alcoentre, -it was clear that he had no views on Torres Vedras; but whether -he was in retreat to cross the Zezere by the bridges at Punhete -and Martinchel, or making for the Mondego, was still uncertain. In -either case, it was important to strike a blow at the rear, before -the reinforcements and convoy, said to be on the road from Ciudad -Rodrigo, could be met with. The first division was immediately -brought up to Alemquer, the fifth entered Sobral, the light division -and cavalry marched in pursuit, four hundred prisoners were made, -principally marauders; and a remarkable exploit was performed by -one Baxter, a serjeant of the sixteenth dragoons. This man, having -only five troopers, came suddenly upon a piquet of fifty men, who -were cooking. The Frenchmen ran to their arms, and killed one of -the dragoons; but the rest broke in amongst them so strongly, that -Baxter, with the assistance of some countrymen, made forty-two -captives. - -The 17th, the eighth corps marched upon Alcanhede and Pernes, the -head of the second corps reached Santarem, and Fane, deceived by some -false movements, reported that they were in full retreat, and the -troops at Santarem only a rear guard. This information seeming to -be confirmed by the state of the immense plains skirting the Tagus, -which were left covered with straw-ricks, it was concluded that -Massena intended to pass the Zezere, over which it was known that -he had cast a second bridge. Hill was immediately ordered to cross -the Tagus with the second division and thirteenth dragoons, and move -upon Abrantes, either to succour that fortress or to head the march -of the French. Meanwhile, the fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions were -directed upon Alemquer, the first division and Pack’s brigades upon -Cartaxo, and the light division reached El Valle, a village on the -Rio Mayor, where a considerable rear guard was formed, and an unequal -engagement would have ensued, but for the opportune arrival of the -commander-in-chief. In the evening the enemy joined their main body -on the heights of Santarem. - -Hitherto, lord Wellington, regarding the security of the Lines with a -jealous eye, acted very cautiously. On the 15th and 16th, while the -French were still hampered by the defiles, his pursuit was slack, -although it would in no degree have risked the safety of the Lines, -or of the pursuing troops, to have pushed the first, second, and -light divisions and Pack’s brigade vigorously against the enemy’s -rear. On the 18th, however, when Hill had passed the Tagus at -Villada, and Fane was opposite to Abrantes, lord Wellington, whether -deceived by false reports, or elated at this retrograde movement, -this proof of his own superior sagacity, prepared, with a small -force, to assail what he conceived the rear guard of an army in full -retreat. But the French general had no intention of falling back any -farther; his great qualities were roused by the difficulty of his -situation, he had carried off his army with admirable arrangement, -and his new position was chosen with equal sagacity and resolution. - -Santarem is situated on a mountain, which, rising almost -precipitously from the Tagus, extends about three miles inland. In -front, a secondary range of hills formed an outwork, covered by the -Rio Mayor, which is composed of two streams, running side by side -to within a mile of the Tagus, but there they unite and flow in a -direction parallel with that river for many miles; the ground between -being an immense flat, called the plain of Santarem. - -In advancing by the royal road from Lisbon, the allies ascended the -Rio Mayor, until they reached the Ponte Seca, a raised causeway, -eight hundred yards long, leading to the foot of the French -position. On the right hand, as far as the Tagus, a flat sedgy -marsh, not impassable, but difficult from deep water-cuts, covered -the French left. On the other hand, the two streams of the Rio Mayor -overflowing, presented a vast impassable sheet of water and marsh, -covering the French right, and, in the centre, the causeway offered -only a narrow line of approach, barred at the enemy’s end, by an -abattis, and by a gentle eminence, with a battery looking down the -whole length. To force this dangerous passage was only a preliminary -step; the secondary range of hills was then to be carried before the -great height of Santarem could be reached; finally, the town, with -its old walls, offered a fourth point of resistance. - -In this formidable position, the second corps covered the rich plain -of Golegao, which was occupied by Loison’s division of the sixth -corps, placed there to watch the Tagus, and keep up the chain of -communication with Punhete. On Reynier’s right, in a rugged country, -which separated Santarem from the Monte Junta and the Sierra de -Alcoberte, the eighth corps was posted; not in a continuous line -with the second, but having the right pushed forward to Alcanhete, -the centre at Pernes, and the left thrown back to Torres Novas, where -Massena’s head-quarters were fixed. On the right of Alcanhete, the -cavalry were disposed as far as Leiria, and the sixth corps was at -Thomar, in reserve, having previously obliged Wilson’s militia to -retire from the Zezere upon Espinhal. - -Massena thus enclosed an immense tract of fertile country; the plain -of Golegao supplied him with maize and vegetables, and the Sierra de -Alcoberte with cattle. He presented a formidable head to the allies -at Santarem, commanded the road, by Leiria, to Coimbra, with the -eighth corps and the cavalry; that from Thomar, by Ourem, to Coimbra, -with the sixth corps; and, by his bridges over the Zezere, opened -a line of operations towards the Spanish frontier, either through -Castello Branco, or by the Estrada Nova and Belmonte. Preserving the -power of offensive operations, by crossing the Tagus on his left, or -of turning the Monte Junta by his right, he necessarily paralized a -great part of the allied force, and appeared, even in retreating, to -take the offensive. - -His first dispositions were, however, faulty in detail. Between -Santarem and the nearest division of the eighth corps there was a -distance of ten or twelve miles, where the British general might -penetrate, turn the right of the second corps, and cut it off from -the rest of the army. Reynier, fearing such an attempt, hurried off -his baggage and hospitals to Golegao, despatched a regiment up the -Rio Mayor to watch two bridges on his right, by which he expected -the allies to penetrate between him and the eighth corps, and -then calling upon Junot for succour, and upon Massena for orders, -proceeded to strengthen his own position. It was this march of -Reynier’s baggage, that led Fane to think the enemy was retreating to -the Zezere, which, corresponding with lord Wellington’s high-raised -expectations, induced him to make dispositions; not for a general -attack, by separating the second corps from the rest of the army, -but, as I have before said, for assaulting Santarem in front with a -small force, thinking he had only to deal with a rear guard. - -On the 19th, the light division entering the plain between the -Rio Mayor and the Tagus advanced against the heights by the sedgy -marsh. The first division under Spencer, was destined to attack the -causeway, and Pack’s Portuguese brigade and the cavalry were ordered -to cross the Rio Mayor at the bridges of Saliero and Subajeira and -turn the right of the French. The columns were formed for the attack, -and the skirmishers of the light division were exchanging shots -with the enemy in the sedgy marsh, when it was found that the guns -belonging to Pack’s brigade had not arrived; and lord Wellington, -not quite satisfied with the appearance of his adversary’s force, -after three hours’ demonstrations, ordered the troops to retire to -their former ground. It was, indeed, become evident, that the French -were determined to maintain this position. Every advantageous spot -of ground was fully occupied, the most advanced centinels boldly -returned the fire of the skirmishers, large bodies of reserve were -descried, some in arms, others cooking, the strokes of the hatchet, -and the fall of trees, resounded from the woods clothing the hills, -and the commencement of a triple line of abattis, and the fresh earth -of entrenchments were discernible in many places. - -On the 20th the demonstrations were renewed; but, as the enemy’s -intention to fight was no longer doubtful, they soon ceased, and -orders were sent to general Hill to halt at Chamusca, on the left -bank of the Tagus. General Crawfurd, however, still thought it was -but a rear-guard at Santarem; his eager spirit was chafed, he seized -a musket, and, followed only by a serjeant, advanced in the night -along the causeway, commencing a personal skirmish with the French -piquets, from whose fire he escaped by miracle, convinced at last -that the enemy were not yet in flight. - -Meanwhile Clausel brought his division from Alcanhete close up to -Santarem, and Massena carefully examining the dispositions of the -allies, satisfied himself, that no great movement was in agitation; -wherefore, recalling the baggage of the second corps, he directed -Clausel to advance towards Rio Mayor; a feint which instantly obliged -lord Wellington to withdraw the first division and Pack’s brigade -to Cartaxo; and the light division was also held in readiness to -retreat. In truth, Massena was only to be assailed by holding the -second corps in check at the Ponte Seca, while a powerful mass of -troops penetrated in the direction of Tremes and Pernes; but heavy -rains rendered all the roads impracticable, and as the position of -Santarem was maintained for several months, and many writers have -rashly censured the conduct of both generals, it may be well to shew -here that they acted wisely and like great captains. - -It has been already seen how, without any extreme dissemination -of his force, the French general contrived to menace a variety of -points and to command two distinct lines of retreat; but there were -other circumstances that equally weighed with him. He expected -momentarily to be joined by the ninth corps, which had been added to -his command, and by a variety of detachments; his position, touching -upon Leiria and upon the Zezere, enabled him to give his hand to his -reinforcements and convoys, either by the line of the Mondego or that -of Belmonte and the Estrada Nova; at the same time he was ready to -communicate with any troops coming from Andalusia to his assistance. -He was undoubtedly open to a dangerous attack, between Santarem -and Alcanhete; but he judged that his adversary would not venture -such a decisive operation, requiring rapid well-timed movements, -with an army composed of three different nations and unpractised in -great evolutions. In this, guided by his long experience of war, he -calculated upon moral considerations with confidence, and he that -does not understand this part of war is but half a general. - -Like a great commander, he calculated likewise upon the military and -political effect, that his menacing attitude would have. While he -maintained Santarem, he appeared, as it were, to besiege Lisbon; he -also prolonged the sufferings of that city, and it has been estimated -that forty thousand persons died from privations within the Lines -during the winter of 1810: moreover he encouraged the disaffected, -and shook the power which the English had assumed in Portugal, -thus rendering their final success so doubtful in appearance, that -few men had sagacity enough to judge rightly upon the subject. At -this period also, as the illness of George the Third, by reviving -the question of a Regency in England, had greatly strengthened the -opposition in parliament, it was most important that the arguments of -the latter against the war should seem to be enforced by the position -of the French army. It is plain therefore that, while any food was -to be obtained, there were abundant reasons to justify Massena in -holding his ground; and it must be admitted that, if he committed -great errors in the early part of his campaign, in the latter part he -proved himself a daring, able, and most pertinacious commander. - -On the side of the British general, such were the political -difficulties, that a battle was equally to be desired and dreaded. -Desirable, because a victory would have silenced his opponents both -in England and Portugal, and placed him in a situation to dictate -the measures of war to the ministers instead of having to struggle -incessantly against their fears. Desirable to relieve the misery of -the Portuguese people, who were in a state of horrible suffering; -but, above all things desirable, lest a second and a third army, now -gathering in Castile and in Andalusia, should reach Massena, and -again shut up the allies in their works. - -Dreaded, because a defeat or even a repulse would have been -tantamount to the ruin of the cause; for it was at this period that -the disputes in the Regency, relative to the Lines, at Almada, were -most violent, and the slightest disaster would have placed the -Patriarch at the head of a national party. Dreaded, because of the -discussions relative to the appointment of a Regency in England, -as any serious military check would have caused the opposition -to triumph, and the troops to be withdrawn from Portugal. In this -balanced state it was essential that a battle, upon which so many -great interests hung, should not be fought, except on terms of -advantage. Now those terms were not to be had. Lord Wellington, who -had received some reinforcements from Hallifax and England, had -indeed more than seventy thousand fighting men under arms, and the -enemy at this time was not more than fifty thousand: nevertheless, if -we analyze the composition and situation of both, it will be found -that the latter, from the advantage of position, could actually bring -more soldiers into the fight. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.] - -In the Portuguese army, since the month of April, the deaths had -been four thousand, the disbanded four thousand, the deserters ten -thousand, the recruits thirty thousand; the numbers were therefore -increased, but the efficiency for grand evolutions rather decreased. -The Spanish auxilliaries also, ill-governed and turbulent, were at -open discord with the Portuguese, and their general was neither able -in war himself nor amenable to those who were. - -While the heights of Almada were naked, the left bank of the Tagus -could not be watched with less than twelve thousand men; and as from -Alcanhete the march to Torres Vedras was shorter than from Cartaxo, -two British divisions were employed to protect the Lines; during -the attack upon Pernes, Reynier also might break out from Santarem, -and ten thousand men were required to hold him in check: thus, the -disposable troops would have fallen short of forty-five thousand, -comprehending soldiers of three nations and many recruits. Lord -Wellington’s experience in the movement of great armies was not -at this period equal to his adversary’s, and the attack was to be -made in a difficult country, with deep roads, where the Alviella, -the Almonda, and other rivers, greatly swelled by incessant rain, -furnished a succession of defensive lines to the enemy, and the means -of carrying off two-thirds of his army. Victory might crown the -attempt, but the stakes were unequal. If Massena lost even a third of -his force, the ninth corps could have replaced it. If lord Wellington -failed, the Lines were gone, and with them the whole Peninsula. - -He judged it best to remain on the defensive; to strengthen the -Lines; and to get the works at Almada sufficiently forward; -meanwhile, quieting the troubles occasioned by the Patriarch, to -perfect the discipline of the Portuguese troops, and improve the -organization of the militia in rear of the enemy. In this view, the -light division, supported by a brigade of cavalry, occupied Valle and -the heights overlooking the marsh and inundation; the bridge at the -English end of the causeway was mined; a sugar-loaf hill, looking -straight down the approach, was crowned with embrasures for artillery -and laced in front with a zigzag covered way, capable of containing -five hundred infantry: thus the causeway being blocked, the French -could not, while the inundation kept up, make any sudden irruption -from Santarem. - -On the left of the light division, posts were extended along the -inundation to Malhorquija; thence, by a range of heights to Rio -Mayor; and behind the latter place, Anson’s cavalry was stationed -in observation of the roads leading from Pernes and Alcanhede. In -rear of Anson, a position was entrenched at Alcoentre, and occupied -by a division of infantry. Thus all the routes leading upon the -Lines between the Tagus and the Monte Junta, were secured by what -are technically called heads of cantonments, under cover of which, -the other divisions were disposed in succession; the first and the -head-quarters being at Cartaxo, a few miles in the rear of Valle; the -remainder at Alemquer and Sobral. Torres Vedras was, however, always -occupied in force, lest the enemy should make a sudden march round -the Monte Junta. - -Massena, satisfied that his front was safe, continued to build -boats, fortified a post at Tancos, on the Tagus, and expected, with -impatience, the arrival of a convoy escorted by five thousand men, -with which general Gardanne was coming from Ciudad Rodrigo. This -reinforcement, consisting of detachments and convalescents left in -Castile when the army entered Portugal, marched by Belmonte and the -Estrada Nova, and the 27th, was at Cardijos, within a few leagues of -the French bridges on the Zezere. The advance of a cavalry patrol on -either side would have opened the communications, and secured the -junction; but, at that moment, Gardanne, harassed by the ordenança, -and deceived by a false rumour that general Hill was in Abrantes, -ready to move against him, suddenly retreated upon Sabugal, with such -haste and blindness that he sacrificed a part of his convoy, and lost -many men. - -Notwithstanding this event, Massena, expecting to be joined by -the ninth corps, greatly strengthened his position at Santarem, -which enabled him to draw the bulk of his forces to his right, and -to continue his marauding excursions in the most daring manner. -General Ferey, with a strong detachment of the sixth corps, crossing -the Zezere, foraged the country as far as Castello Branco without -difficulty, and returned without loss: Junot occupied Leiria and -Ourem with detachments of the eighth corps, and on the 9th of -December a battalion endeavoured to surprise Coimbra: Trant, however, -baffled that project. Meanwhile, Drouet avowed a design to invade -the Tras os Montes, but the 22d of December occupied the line of the -Coa with the ninth corps, and Massena’s patroles appeared again on -the Mondego above Coimbra, making inquiries about the fords: all the -spies likewise reported that a great reunion of forces from the south -was to have place near Madrid. - -These things gave reason to fear, either that Massena intended to -file behind the Mondego and seize Oporto, or that the reinforcements -coming to him were so large that he meant to establish bridges over -the Mondego, and occupy the northern country also. It was known that -a tenth corps was forming at Burgos; the head of the fifth corps was -again in Estremadura; the French boats at Punhete and Barquiña were -numerous and large; and in all parts there was evidence of great -forces assembling for a mighty effort on both sides of the Tagus. - -It was calculated that, before the end of January, more than forty -thousand fresh troops would co-operate with Massena; and preparations -were made accordingly. An outward line of defence, from Aldea -Gallega to Setuval, was already in a forward state; Abrantes, -Palmella, and St. Felippe de Setuval had been at last provisioned; -and a chain of forts parallel to the Tagus were constructing on -the hills lining the left bank from Almada to Traffaria. Labourers -had also been continually employed in strengthening the works of -Alhandra, Aruda, and Monte Agraça, which were now nearly impregnable, -soldiers only being wanting to defy the utmost force that could -be brought against them. To procure these, lord Wellington wrote -earnestly to lord Liverpool on the 29th of December, demonstrating -the absolute necessity of reinforcing the army; and, on the receipt -of his letter, five thousand British were ordered to embark for -Lisbon, and three regiments were drafted from Sicily. - -Sickness obliged general Hill to go home in December; and, as Soult -was known to be collecting a disposable force behind the Morena, -the troops on the left bank of the Tagus were augmented, and -marshal Beresford assumed the command: for the Portuguese army was -now generally incorporated with the British divisions. His force, -composed of eighteen guns, two divisions of infantry, and five -regiments of cavalry, Portuguese and British, was about fourteen -thousand men, exclusive of Carlos d’Espana’s brigade, which, being at -Abrantes, was under the marshal’s orders. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. X. Section 1.] - -To prevent the passage of the Tagus; to intercept all communication -between Massena and Soult; to join the main body of the army, by -Vellada if in retreat; and by Abrantes if in advance; were the -instructions given to Beresford; hence, fixing his quarters at -Chamusca, he disposed his troops along the Tagus, from Almeyrim by -Chamusca, as high as the mouth of the Zezere, establishing signals -between his different quarters. He also beat the roads leading -towards Spanish Estremadura; established a sure and rapid intercourse -with Elvas and the other frontier fortresses; organized good sources -of intelligence at Golegao, at Santarem, and especially at Thomar, -and, in addition to these general precautions, erected batteries -opposite the mouth of the Zezere. But, against the advice of the -engineers, he placed them at too great distance from the river, and -in other respects unsuitable, and offering nothing threatening to the -enemy: for the French craft dropped down frequently towards Santarem, -without hindrance, until colonel Colborne, of the sixty-sixth -regiment, moored a guard-boat close to the mouth of the Zezere, -disposing fires in such a manner on the banks of the Tagus that -nothing could pass without being observed. - -On the side of Santarem, as all the country between Alcanhete and the -Ponte Seca continued impracticable from the rain, the main bodies of -both armies were, of necessity, tranquil. Anson’s cavalry, however, -acting in concert with major Fenwick, who came down from Obidos -towards Rio Mayor, harassed the enemy’s foraging parties; and in the -Upper Beira several actions of importance had taken place with the -militia, which it is time to notice as forming an essential part of -lord Wellington’s combinations. - -It will be remembered that the ninth corps, being ordered to scour -Biscay and Upper Castile in its progress towards the frontier -of Portugal, was so long delayed that, instead of keeping the -communications of Massena free, and securing his base, Drouet lost -all connexion with the army of Portugal. Meanwhile the Partidas of -Leon and Salamanca gave such employment to Serras’ division that -the Tras os Montes were unmolested, and Silveira, falling down to -the Lower Douro, appeared, on the 29th, before Almeida. Its former -garrison had entered the French service, yet immediately deserted to -their countrymen, and Silveira then blockaded the place closely, and -made an attempt to surprise a French post at San Felices, but failed. - -In November, however, the head of the ninth corps reached Ciudad -Rodrigo, bringing a large convoy of provisions, collected in Castile, -for Massena. Lord Wellington, anxious to prevent this from reaching -its destination, directed Silveira to intercept it if possible, -and ordered Miller on the 16th to Viseu, in support. On the 13th, -general Gardanne, with four thousand infantry and three squadrons of -cavalry, raised the blockade of Almeida, took possession of Pinhel, -and, supported by the ninth corps, conducted the convoy towards -Sabugal and Penamacor. The 16th, he was between Valverde and Pereiro -Gavillos, but Silveira falling upon him killed some of his men, took -many prisoners, and then retiring to Trancoso on the 17th, united -with Miller, the latter taking post at Guarda. Nevertheless, Gardanne -pursued his march, but finally, as we have seen, retreated from -Cardigos in a panic. - -Drouet had not yet received the orders to put himself under Massena’s -command, but, at the representation of Foy, moved forward into -Portugal, and to hide his object, spread the report, already noticed, -of his intention to penetrate the Tras os Montes; the 17th December, -however he passed the Coa with fourteen thousand infantry and two -thousand cavalry, and crossing the Mondego the 18th, encamped near -Gouvea, the 22d. Thence the cavalry and one division under general -Claparede, marched against Silveira, and after a skirmish occupied -Trancoso; meanwhile, Drouet with eleven battalions, and the troops -under Gardanne, made for the Alva and reached Ponte Murcella the 24th. - -Hitherto lord Wellington’s communications with Baccellar, had been -carried on, through Trant on the side of Coimbra, and through Wilson -on that of Espinhal and Abrantes. But this sudden advance of the -ninth corps obliged Wilson to cross the Mondego to avoid being -enclosed, and Drouet effecting his junction with Massena by Espinhal, -established his division at Leiria; and then spreading towards the -sea cut off all communication between the allies and the northern -provinces. On the 2d of January, however, Trant intercepted a letter -from Drouet to Claparede, giving an account of his own arrival, -and of the state of Massena’s army; intimating also, that a great -operation was in contemplation, and that the fifth corps was daily -expected in the Alemtejo: Claparede was desired to seize Guarda, to -forage the neighbouring villages, and to watch the road of Belmonte; -and if Silveira should be troublesome, to defeat him. - -Silveira, an insufficient man, naturally vain, and inflated with -his former successes, had indeed, already attacked Claparede, and -was defeated with the loss of two hundred men at Ponte Abad, on the -side of Trancoso. Baccellar, alarmed for the safety of Oporto, then -recalled Miller and Wilson. The first moved upon Viseu; the last who -had already repassed the Mondego and taken a hundred stragglers of -Drouet’s division, marched hastily towards the same point. Meanwhile, -Silveira again provoked Claparede, who pressed him so closely, from -the 10th to the 13th of January, that he drove him with loss over -the Douro at Pezo de Ragoa, seized Lamego, and menaced Oporto before -any troops could concentrate to oppose him. Yet when Baccellar -brought up his reserve to the Pavia, and Miller’s and Wilson’s corps -reached Castro d’Airo, Claparede returned to Moimenta de Beira, being -followed by Wilson. Meanwhile, the arrival of the ninth corps having -relieved the French troops in Leon, the latter again menaced Tras os -Montes, and Silveira marched to Braganza. Miller died at Viseu, but -Wilson and Trant continued to harass the enemy’s parties. - -Claparede taking post at Guarda, according to his instructions, -seized Covilhao; while Foy, who in returning from France had -collected about three thousand infantry and cavalry convalescents, -was marching by the road of Belmonte. Foy had escaped innumerable -perils. At Pancorbo he was fain to fly from the Partidas, with the -loss of his despatches and half his escort, and now at Enxabarda -entering the Estrada Nova, he was harassed by colonel Grant with a -corps of ordenança from the Lower Beira; and although he suffered -nothing here by the sword, three hundred of his men died on the -mountain from cold. On the 2d of February he reached Santarem, where -affairs were working to a crisis. - -During December and January, the country being always more or -less flooded, the armies continued in observation; but Massena’s -positions were much strengthened, his out posts were reinforced, and -his marauding excursions extended in proportion to his increasing -necessities. The weak point on either side was towards Rio Mayor, -any movement there created great jealousy, especially as the season -advanced and the roads became firmer. Hence, on the 19th of January -(some reinforcements having landed at Lisbon a few days before) a -fear lest the allies should be concentrating at Alcoentre, induced -Junot to drive the out posts from Rio Mayor to probe the state of -affairs, and a general attack was expected; but after a skirmish he -returned with a wound which disabled him for the rest of the campaign. - -Early in February, a column of six thousand French again scouring -all the country beyond the Zezere, got much concealed food near -Pedragoa; while other detachments arriving on the Mondego below -Coimbra, even passed that river, and carried off four hundred oxen -and two thousand sheep intended for the allies. These excursions -gave rise to horrible excesses, which broke down the discipline of -the French army, and were not always executed with impunity; the -British cavalry at various times redeemed many cattle and brought in -a considerable number of prisoners, amongst them an aide-de-camp of -general Clausel’s. - -Meanwhile, Massena, organized a secret communication with Lisbon, -through the Portuguese general Pamplona, who effected it by the help -of the fidalgos in that capital: their agents, under the pretence of -selling sugar to the inhabitants of Thomar and Torres Novas, passed -by the road of Caldas and thence through the mountains of Pedragoa. -Lord Wellington, on the other hand, was understood to have gained -a French officer of rank, and it is certain that both generals had -excellent information. - -In this manner hostilities were carried on, each commander -impatiently waiting for reinforcements which should enable him to -act offensively. How both were disappointed, and how other events -hitherto unnoticed, bore upon the plans of each, must be the subject -of another book. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. “_War is not a conjectural art._” Massena forgetting this, -assumed that the allies would not make a stand in front of Lisbon, -and that the militia would not venture to attack Coimbra, but the -battle of Busaco and the capture of his hospitals evinced the -soundness of the maxim. Again, he conjectured that the English would -re-embark if pressed; the Lines put an end to his dream; yet once -awake, he made war like a great man, proving more formidable with -reduced means and in difficulties, than he had been when opportunity -was rife and his numbers untouched. His stay at Santarem shews what -thirty thousand additional men acting on the left bank of the Tagus -could have done, had they arrived on the heights of Almada before -admiral Berkeley’s error was discovered: the supply of provisions -from Alemtejo and from Spain would then have been transferred from -Lisbon to the French armies, and the fleet would have been driven -from the Tagus; when, the misery of the inhabitants, the fears of the -British cabinet, the machinations of the Patriarch, and the little -chance of final success would probably have induced the British -general to embark. - -2º. It has been observed, that Massena, in the first week might have -easily passed the Tagus, secured the resources of the Alemtejo, and -sent the British fleet out of the port. This was not so practicable -as it might at first sight appear. The rains were heavy; the fords -impassable; the French had not boats sufficient for a bridge; a -weak detachment would have been useless, a strong detachment would -have been dangerous: to collect boats, cast a bridge, and raise the -entrenchments necessary to defend it, in the face of the allied -forces, would have been neither a safe nor certain operation; -moreover, Massena would then have relinquished the certain aid of the -ninth for the uncertain assistance of the fifth corps. - -3º. Lord Wellington conjecturing the French to be in full retreat, -had like to have received a severe check at Santarem; he recovered -himself in time, and with this exception, it would be difficult to -support essential objections to his operations: yet, many have been -urged, as that, he might have straightened the enemy’s quarters more -effectually at Santarem; and that Hill’s corps, passing through -Abrantes, could have destroyed the bridges at Punhete, and lining the -Zezere cut off Massena’s reinforcements, and obliged him to abandon -his positions or even to capitulate. This last idea, advanced at -the time by colonel Squires, an engineer of great zeal and ability, -perfectly acquainted with the localities, merits examination. - -As a simple operation it was feasible, but the results were not -so certain; the Lines of Almada being unfinished, the rashness of -leaving the Tagus unguarded, before an enemy who possessed eighty -large boats, exclusive of those forming the bridges on the Zezere, -is apparent; Hill’s corps must then have been replaced, and the army -before Santarem would have been so weak as to invite a concentrated -attack, to the great danger of the Torres Vedras Lines. Nor was -the forcing of the French works at Punhete a matter of certainty; -the ground was strong, there were two bridges over the Zezere, and -the sixth corps, being within a short march, might, by passing at -Martinchel, have taken Hill in flank. - -4º. The same officer, at a later period, miscalculating the enemy’s -numbers at thirty thousand men, and the allies at more than seventy -thousand regulars, proposed that Beresford should cross the Tagus -at Azingha, behind the Almonda, and march upon Golegao, while lord -Wellington, concentrating at Rio Mayor, pushed upon Torres Novas. -It was no common head that conceived this project, by which seventy -thousand men would, in a single march, have been placed in the midst -of the enemy’s extended quarters; but the hand of Napoleon could -scarcely have launched such a thunder-bolt. Massena had still fifty -thousand fighting-men; the boats from Abrantes must have been brought -down, to pass the Tagus; the concentration of troops at Rio Mayor -could scarcely have escaped the enemy’s notice; exact concert, in -point of time, was essential, yet the eighth corps could have held -the allies in check on the Alviella, while Reynier, from Santarem, -and Ney, from Thomar, crushed Beresford between the Almonda and -the Tagus: moreover the roads about Tremes were nearly impassable -from rain during December; in January, Soult, of whose operations -I shall speak in the next book, was menacing the Alemtejo, and a -disaster happening to the allies would have relieved the enemy’s -difficulties, when nothing else could. A campaign is like other works -of art; accessaries, however splendid, must be rejected when not -conducive to the main object. That judgement, which duly classes the -value of every feasible operation, is the best quality of a general, -and lord Wellington possessed it in a remarkable degree; to it, his -genius and his courage were both subservient; without it he might -have performed many brilliant exploits in the Peninsula, but could -never have conducted the war to a successful end. - - - - -BOOK XII. - - -CHAPTER I. - - -In the preceding book, Spanish affairs have been little noticed, -although lord Wellington’s combinations were deeply affected by them. -The general position of the allies, extending from Coruña to Cadiz, -presented a great crescent, in the convex of which the French armies -were operating, and it was clear that, when checked at Lisbon, the -most important point, their wings, could reinforce the centre, unless -the allied forces, at the horns of the crescent, acted vigorously -on a system which the harbours and fortresses, at either extremity, -pointed out as suitable to those who possessed the absolute command -of the sea. A British army and fleet were therefore established at -Cadiz, and a squadron of frigates at Coruña; and how far this warfare -relieved the pressure on lord Wellington I shall now show. - -The Gallician troops, under Mahi, usually hanging on the borders of -Leon, were always reported to be above twenty thousand men when arms -or stores were demanded from England; but there were never more than -ten or twelve thousand in line, and, although Serras’ division, of -only eight thousand, was spread over the plains, from Benevente to -the Agueda, during Massena’s advance, no stroke of importance was -effected against it; the arrival of the ninth corps, in October, put -an end to all hopes from the Gallicians in that quarter, although -the Partidas often surprised both posts and convoys. Behind Mahi -there was, however, a second army, from four to six thousand strong, -embodied to defend the coast line towards the Asturias; and, in the -latter province, about eight thousand men, including the irregular -bands of Porlier and other chiefs, constantly watched Bonet’s -movements. - -That general frequently mastered the Asturias, but could never -maintain himself there; because the country is a long defile, lying -between the great mountains and the sea, and being crossed by a -succession of parallel ridges and rivers, is admirably calculated for -partizan warfare in connexion with a fleet. Thus, if he penetrated -towards Gallicia, British and Spanish frigates, from Coruña, landing -troops at the ports of Gihon, Santander, or Santona, could always -form a junction with the great bands of Longa, Mina, and Amor, and -excite insurrections on his rear. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.] - -In this manner Porlier, as before related, forced him to withdraw -from Castropol, after he had defeated general Ponte at Sales, about -the period of Almeida being invested; and the advantages of such -operations being evident, the British government sent sir Home Popham -to direct the naval, and general Walker the military affairs at -Coruña. Preparations were then made to embark a considerable force, -under Renovales, to renew the attack at Santona and Santander; the -Partidas of the interior were to move at the same time; a battalion -of marines was assembled, in England, to garrison Santona, when -taken; and Mahi promised to co-operate by an incursion. Serras, -however, threatened the frontier of Gallicia, and Mahi remained in -suspense, and this, together with the usual procrastination of the -Spaniards, and the late arrival of sir Home Popham, delayed the -expedition until October. Meanwhile, Porlier, Escadron, and other -chiefs commenced an isolated attack in the beginning of September. -Serras returned to Zamora, Mahi sent a division into Leon, and Bonet, -aware of the preparations at Coruña, first concentrated at Oviedo, -and then fell back towards Santander, leaving a post at Gihon. - -On the 16th of October Renovales sailed but with only thirteen -hundred men; accompanied, however, by general Walker, who carried -ten thousand stand of arms and ammunition. The 19th, entering the -harbour of Gihon, they captured some French vessels; and Porlier, -coming up on the land side, took some treasure and eighty prisoners. -The next day, Renovales proceeded to Santona, but tempests impeded -his landing, and he returned to Coruña the 2d of November, with only -eight hundred and fifty men: a frigate and a brig had foundered, with -the remainder of his troops, in a dreadful gale, which destroyed all -the Spanish naval force along the coast, twelve vessels being wrecked -even in the harbour of Coruña. Meanwhile, Mahi, leaving Toboado Gil’s -division to watch Serras, entered the Asturias with the rest of the -Gallicians, and being joined first by the troops of that province, -and soon after by Renovales, was very superior to the French; yet he -effected nothing, and Bonet maintained his line from Gihon, through -Oviedo, to the borders of Leon. - -[Sidenote: Abstract of General Walker’s Military Reports from -Gallicia. MSS.] - -In this manner hostilities wore feebly on; the Junta of the Asturias -continued, as from the first, distinguished by their venality and -indifference to the public good; their province was in a miserable -and exhausted state; and the powers of the British naval officers on -the coast not being defined, occasioned some dispute between them -and general Walker; and gave opportunity to the Junta to interfere -improperly with the distribution of the English stores. Gallicia was -comparatively rich, but its Junta culpably inactive in the discharge -of duties and oppressive in government, disgusted the whole province, -and a general desire to end their power was prevalent. In the course -of the winter a combination of the clergy was formed to oppose both -the Local Junta and the General Cortes, and assumed so threatening an -aspect that Mahi, who was then on the coast, applied to be taken in -an English vessel to Coruña, to ensure his personal safety; one Acuña -was soon after arrested at Ponferrada, the discontent spread, and -the army was more employed to overawe these factions than to oppose -the enemy. Little advantage, therefore, was derived from the Spanish -operations in the north, and general Walker, despairing to effect any -thing useful, desired either that a British force should be placed at -his disposal or that he might join the army in Portugal. - -These expeditions from Coruña naturally encreased the audacity of the -inland partidas, who could only become really dangerous, by having -a sea-port where they could receive supplies and reinforcements, -or embarking save themselves in extremity, and change the theatre -of operations. To prevent this, the emperor employed considerable -numbers of men in the military governments touching on the Bay of -Biscay, and directed, as we have seen, the corps d’armée, in their -progress towards Portugal, to scour all the disturbed countries -to the right and left. The ninth corps was thus employed during -the months of August and September, but when it passed onward, -the partidas resumed their activity. Mina, Longa, Campillo, and -Amor, frequently united about Villar Caya and Espinosa in numbers -sufficient to attack large French detachments with success; and to -aid them, general Walker repeatedly recommended the taking possession -of Santona with a corps of British troops. That town, having the -best winter harbour along the coast, and being built on a mountain -promontory joined to the main by a narrow sandy neck, could have been -made very strong; it would have cut off Bonet’s communication with -France by sea, have given the British squadron a secure post from -whence to vex the French coasts; and it offered a point of connexion -with the partidas of the Rioja, Biscay, and Navarre. - -[Sidenote: Letter to Lord Liverpool. 7th May, 1811. MSS.] - -Lord Liverpool, swayed by these considerations, desired to employ a -corps of four thousand men to secure it; but, having first demanded -lord Wellington’s opinion, the latter “earnestly recommended that -no such maritime operations should be undertaken. For,” said he, -“unless a very large force was sent, it would scarcely be able to -effect a landing, and maintain the situation of which it might take -possession. Then that large force would be unable to move or effect -any object at all adequate to the expense, or to the expectations -which would be formed from its strength, owing to the want of those -equipments and supplies in which an army landed from its ships -must be deficient. It was vain to hope for any assistance, even in -this way, much less military assistance from the Spaniards; the -first thing they would require uniformly would be money; then arms, -ammunition, clothing of all descriptions, provisions, forage, horses, -means of transport, and every thing which the expedition would have a -right to require from them; and, after all, _this extraordinary and -perverse people would scarcely allow the commander of the expedition -to have a voice in the plan of operations, to be followed when the -whole should be ready to undertake any, if indeed they ever should be -ready_.” - -Meanwhile Napoleon caused Caffarelli’s reserve to enter Spain, -ordered Santona to be fortified, directed other reinforcements -from France upon the northern provinces, and finally sent marshal -Bessieres to command the young guard, the third and fourth -governments, and that of the Asturias, including Bonet’s division, -the whole forming a distinct force, called the army of the north. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 6.] - -The 1st of January, 1811, this army exceeded seventy thousand, of -which fifty-nine thousand men and eight thousand horses, were present -under arms; and Bessieres, who had received unusual powers, was -especially ordered to support and furnish all necessary assistance -to the army of Portugal. This was the state of the northern parts of -Spain. - -In the middle parts, the army of the centre, or that immediately -under the king, at first about twenty thousand, was, before the end -of the year, carried up to twenty-seven thousand, exclusive of -French and Spanish guards and juramentados, or native troops, who had -taken the oath of allegiance: with this power he protected his court, -watched the movements of the Valencians, and chased the Guerillas of -the interior. - -The summer and autumn of 1810 were, however, for reasons -before-mentioned, the period of greatest activity with these -irregulars; numerous petty actions were constantly fought around -the capital, many small French posts, and numbers of isolated -men and officers, were cut off, and few despatches reached their -destinations without a considerable escort. To remedy this, the lines -of correspondence were maintained by small fortified posts which -run from Madrid; through Guadarama and Segovia to the provinces of -Valladolid and Salamanca; through Buitrago and Somosierra to the -army of the north; through Guadalaxara and Calatayud to the army of -Aragon; through La Mancha to the army of the south; and by the valley -of the Tagus, Arzobispo, and Truxillo, to the fifth corps during its -incursions into Estremadura; a brigade of cavalry, was also generally -stationed at Truxillo. - -As the warfare of the Partidas was merely a succession of surprises -and massacres, little instruction, and no pleasure, can be derived -from the details; but in the course of the summer and autumn, not -less than twelve considerable, and an infinite number of trifling -affairs, took place between the moveable columns and these bands: and -the latter being almost always beaten; at the close of the year, only -the Empecinado, Sanchez, Longa, Campillo, Porlier, and Mina retained -any reputation, and the country people were so harassed, that -counter Partidas, in many places assisted the French. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 4.] - -The situation of the army of the centre enabled the king to aid -Massena, either by an advance upon the Elga, or by reinforcing, or, -at least, supporting the fifth corps in Estremadura. But Joseph, -troubled by the Partidas, and having many convoys to protect, was -also averse to join any of the marshals, with all of whom, except -Massena, he was on ill terms; neither were his relations with -Napoleon such as to induce him to take an interest in any military -operations, save those which affected the immediate security of his -court. His poverty was extreme; he was surrounded by French and -Spanish intriguers; his plan of organizing a national party was -thwarted by his brother’s regulations; plots were formed, or supposed -to be formed, against his person, and, in this uneasy posture, the -secondary part he was forced to sustain, combined with his natural -gentleness which shrunk from the terrible scenes of bloodshed and -devastation continually before his eyes, rendered his situation so -irksome, that he resolved to vacate the throne and retire to France, -a resolution which he soon afterwards partially executed. Such -being the course of affairs in the northern and central provinces, -it remains to trace the more important military operations at the -southern horn of the crescent, where the allies were most favourably -situated to press the left flank of the invaders. - -Sebastiani was peculiarly exposed to a harassing warfare, because of -the city of Grenada and other towns in the interior, which he was -obliged to hold at the same time with those on the coast, although -the two districts were completely separated by the mountains. Hence -a large body of troops were necessarily kept in the strip of country -bordering the Mediterranean, although menaced, on the one flank by -Gibraltar and the Spanish troops at San Roque, on the other by the -Murcian army, and, in front by continual descents from the sea; -yet, from the shallowness and length of their position, unable to -concentrate in time to avoid being cut off in detail. Now the Murcian -army, nominally twenty thousand, was based upon the cities of Murcia -and Carthagena, and menaced alike the coast-line and that of Grenada -by the route of Baza and Guadix; and any movement towards the latter -was sure to attract the French, while troops landing from Cadiz or -Gibraltar fell upon their disseminated posts along the coast. - -To meet this system, Sebastiani, keeping his reserves about Grenada, -where he had entrenched a permanent camp, made sudden incursions, -sometimes against the Murcians, sometimes against the Spanish forces -on the side of Gibraltar; but that fortress afforded a refuge to -the patriots on one side, and Carthagena, surrounded by arid lands, -where, for two marches, no water is to be found, always offered a -sure retreat on the other. Meanwhile the French general endeavoured -to gain the important castles on the coast, and to put them into a -state of defence; yet Estipona and Marbella were defended by the -Spaniards, and the latter sustained many attacks, nor was it finally -reduced until the 9th of December, when the garrison, of one hundred -men, took refuge on board the Topaze frigate. But Sebastiani’s hold -of these towns, and even the security of the French troops along the -coast, depended upon the communications across the mountains with -Grenada, Chiclana, and Seville, and to impede these, general Campbell -sent British officers into the Ronda, who successfully directed the -wild mountaineers of that district, until their operations were -marred by Lascy’s misconduct. - -The various movements and insurrections in Grenada during the summer -of 1810 have been already noted, but, in October, general Campbell -and admiral Penrose, conjointly with the governor of Ceuta, renewed -the design of surprising Malaga, where were many privateers and a -flotilla of gun-boats, supposed to be destined against the islands -near Ceuta. The French depôt for the siege of Marbella was at -Fuengirola, which is only thirty miles from Malaga, and it was judged -that an attack there would draw the troops from the latter place; and -the more surely, as general Valdemoro, commanding the Spanish force -at San Roque, engaged to co-operate on the side of Ronda. - - -EXPEDITION OF FUENGIROLA. - -[Sidenote: General C. Campbell’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. XI.] - -On the 13th of October, captain Hope, in the Topaze, sailed from -Ceuta, with a division of gun-boats and a convoy, containing a -brigade of twelve-pounders, sixty-five gunners, a battalion of -the eighty-ninth regiment, a detachment of foreign deserters, and -the Spanish imperial regiment of Toledo, in all fifteen hundred -men, including serjeants. Lord Blayney, commanding this force, was -directed to make a false attack on Fuengirola, and should the enemy -come out from Malaga, he was to sail against that place. A landing -was effected the same day, and Sebastiani instantly marched, leaving -only three hundred men in Malaga: lord Blayney was as instantly -apprised of the success of the demonstration, yet he remained two -days cannonading the castle with twelve-pounders, although the -heavier metal of the gun-boats and of the frigate, had failed to make -any impression on the walls; and during this time his dispositions -betrayed the utmost contempt of military rules. On the second day, -while he was on board a gun-boat himself, the garrison, which did not -exceed two hundred men, having first descried Sebastiani’s column, -made a sally, took the battery, and drove the British part of the -investing force headlong towards the boats. Lord Blayney landed, -rallied his men, and retook the artillery; but at this moment two -squadrons of French cavalry came up, and his lordship, mistaking -them for Spaniards, ordered the firing to cease. He was immediately -made prisoner; his troops again fled to the beach, and would have -been sabred but for the opportune arrival of the Rodney with the -eighty-second regiment, the flank companies of which were immediately -disembarked and first checked the enemy. The Spanish regiment, -untouched by the panic, regained the ships regularly and without -loss; but, of the British, two officers and thirty men were killed -or wounded, and one general, seven inferior officers, and nearly -two hundred serjeants and privates taken. Thus an expedition, well -contrived and adequate to its object, was ruined by misconduct, and -terminated in disaster and disgrace. - -[Sidenote: General Campbell’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -Scarcely was this affair finished, when Valdemoro and the marquis of -Portasgo appeared in the Ronda, an insurrection commenced at Velez -Malaga and in the neighbouring villages; and Blake, who had returned -from Cadiz to the army in Murcia, advanced, with eight thousand men, -towards Cullar on the side of Baza. General Campbell immediately -furnished money to Portasgo, and embarked a thousand stand of arms -for the people of Velez Malaga. An English frigate was also sent to -cruize along the coast, yet Sebastiani, relieved from the fear of a -descent, soon quelled this insurrection; and then sending Milhaud on -before with some cavalry, followed himself with reinforcements for -general Rey, who was opposed to Blake. The latter, retiring behind -the Almanzora river, was overtaken by Milhaud, and, being defeated -on the 4th of November, his army dispersed: at the same time, a -contagious fever, breaking out at Carthagena, spread along the coast -to Gibraltar and Cadiz, and the Spanish operations on the side of -Murcia ceased. - -In the kingdom of Seville, the war turned chiefly upon the blockade -of the Isla, and the movements of the Spanish armies in Estremadura. -Provisions for Cadiz were principally drawn from the Condado de -Neibla, and it has been seen that Copons, aided by descents from the -ocean, endeavoured to secure this important resource; but neither his -efforts, nor the descents, would have availed, if Ballasteros had -not co-operated by constantly menacing Seville from Araceña and the -Aroche mountains. Neither could Ballasteros have maintained the war -there, were it not for the support of Badajos and Olivenza; under -cover of which, Romana’s army protected his line of operation, and -sent military supplies and reinforcements. On the possession of -Badajos, therefore, the supply of Cadiz chiefly depended. - -Seville was the French point of defence; Cadiz Estremadura and the -Condado de Neibla their points of offence. The want of provisions, or -the desire to cut off the Spanish convoys, or the sudden irruption -of troops from Cadiz, threatening their posts at Moguer and Huelva, -always drew them towards the coast; the enterprises of Ballasteros -brought them towards Araceña; and, in like manner, the advance of -Romana towards the mountains brought them to Estremadura; but Romana -had wasted the greater part of the latter province, and as the fifth -corps alone was disposable either for offensive movements, or for the -defence of the country around Seville, Soult contented himself with -such advantages as could be gained by sudden strokes; frequently, -however, crossing the mountains to prevent the Spaniards from -permanently establishing themselves on the frontier of Andalusia. - -In October, Romana entered the Lines of Torres Vedras, and -Mendizabal, who remained with two divisions, finding that Mortier, -unconscious of Romana’s absence, had retired across the mountains, -occupied Merida. He would also have established himself in the yet -unwasted country about Llerena; but the appearance of a moveable -column on the frontier of La Mancha, sent him back to Badajos, and, -on the 20th of November, he united with Ballasteros. The French -then fortified Gibraleon and other posts in the Condado de Neibla; -Girard’s division re-appeared at Guadalcanal, and being joined by -the column from La Mancha, foraged the country towards Llerena: -whereupon Mendizabel took post at Zafra with nine thousand infantry -and two thousand cavalry, including Madden’s Portuguese brigade. -Meanwhile, Copons, who had four thousand men, was totally defeated at -Castillejos by D’Aremberg, and retired to Puebla de Gusman. - -At Cadiz, no change or military event had occurred after the affair -of Matagorda, save the expeditions against Moguer already noticed, -and a slight attempt of the Spaniards against the Chiclana works in -September; but all men’s hopes and expectations had been wonderfully -raised by political events which it was fondly hoped would secure -both independence and a good constitution to Spain. After two years -of intrigues and delay, the National Cortes was assembled, and -the long suppressed voice of the people was at last to be heard. -Nevertheless the members of the Cortes could not be duly and legally -chosen in the provinces possessed by the enemy; and as some members -were captured by the French on their journey to Cadiz, many persons -unknown, even by name, to their supposed constituents, were chosen: -a new principle of election, unknown to former Cortes, was also -adopted; for all persons twenty-five years old, not holding office -or pension under the government, nor incapacitated by crime, nor by -debts to the state, nor by bodily infirmity, were eligible to sit if -chosen. A supplement of sixty-eight members was likewise provided -to supply accidental vacancies; and it was agreed that twenty-six -persons then in Spain, natives of the colonies, should represent -those dependencies. - -Towards the latter end of September this great assembly met, and -immediately took the title of Majesty: it afterwards declared -the press free in respect of political, but not of religious -matters, abolished some of the provincial juntas, re-appointed -captains-general, and proceeded to form a constitution worded in -the spirit of republican freedom. These things, aided by a vehement -eloquence, drew much attention to the proceedings of the Cortes, -and a fresh impulse seemed given to the war: but men brought up -under despotism do not readily attain the fashions of freedom. The -Provincial Junta, the Central Junta, the Junta of Cadiz, the Regency, -had all been, in succession, violent and tyrannical in act, while -claiming only to be popular leaders, and this spirit did not desert -the Cortes. Abstract principles of liberty were freely promulgated, -yet tyrannical and partial proceedings were of common occurrence; and -the reformations, by outstripping the feelings and understandings -of the nation, weakened the main springs of its resistance to -the French. It was not for liberty, but for national pride and -from religious influence, that the people struck. Freedom had no -attractions for the nobles, nor for the monastics, nor even for the -merchants; and the Cortes, in suppressing old establishments and -violating old forms and customs, wounded powerful interests, created -active enemies, and shocked those very prejudices which had produced -resistance to Napoleon. - -In the administration of the armies, in the conduct of the war, -in the execution of the laws, and the treatment of the colonies, -there was as much of vanity, of intrigue, of procrastination, -negligence, folly, and violence as before. Hence the people were -soon discontented; and when the power of the religious orders was -openly attacked by a proposition to abolish the inquisition, the -clergy became active enemies of the Cortes. The great cause of feudal -privileges being once given up, the natural tendency of the Cortes -was towards the enemy. A broad line of distinction was thus drawn -between the objects of the Spanish and English governments in the -prosecution of the war; and, ere the contest was finished, there was -a schism between the British cabinet and the Spanish government, -which would inevitably have thrown the latter into Napoleon’s hands, -if fortune had not, at the moment, betrayed him in Russia. - -The Regency, jealous of the Cortes, and little pleased with the -inferior title of highness accorded them, were far from partaking of -the republican spirit, and so anxious to check any tendency towards -innovation, that early in the year they had invited the duke of -Orleans to command the provinces bordering on France, permitted him -to issue proclamations, and received him at Cadiz with the honours -of a royal prince; intending to oppose his authority to that of the -Local Juntas at the moment, and finally to that of the Cortes. The -latter, however, refused their sanction to this appointment, obliged -the duke to quit Spain, and soon afterwards displaced the Regency -of Five; appointing Joachim Blake, Gabriel Cisgar, and Pedro Agar -in their stead. During the absence of the two first, substitutes -were provided, but one of them (Palacios) making some difficulty -about taking the oath to the Cortes, was immediately declared to -have forfeited the confidence of the nation; so peremptorily did the -Cortes proceed. - -Nevertheless, the new regents, not more pleased with the democratic -spirit than their predecessors, and yet wishing to retain the power -in their own hands, refused to listen to the princess of Brazils’ -claim, and thus factions sprung up on every side; for the republicans -were not paramount in the Cortes at first, and the majority were -so subtilely dealt with by Pedro Souza, as actually to acknowledge -Carlotta’s hereditary claim to the succession and to the immediate -control of the whole Peninsula; and, as I have before noticed, would -have proclaimed her sole Regent, but for the interference of lord -Wellington. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.] - -Don Manuel Lapeña being declared captain-general of Andalusia, and -commander of the forces in the Isla, was subservient to the views of -the Cortes; but the new Regency, anxious to have a counterbalancing -force, and being instigated also by persons from Badajos, enemies to -Romana, removed that officer in December, and ordered his divisions -to separate from the British army and come to Cadiz. The conduct of -those divisions had, indeed, given little satisfaction either to the -British or Portuguese, but numbers were so absolutely necessary to -lord Wellington, that colonel O’Neal was sent to remonstrate with -the Regency; and, by shewing that the fall of Estremadura, and the -total loss of communication with the interior of Spain would ensue, -obtained a momentary respite. - -In matters relating to the war against the French, or to the -administration of the country, the Spanish leaders were incapable -of acting cordially on any mature plan; but with respect to the -colonies, all parties agreed to push violence, injustice, cruelty, -and impolicy to their utmost bounds. To please the British -government, the first Regency had published, in May, a decree, -permitting the South Americans to export their own products, under -certain conditions. This legalizing of a trade, which could not be -suppressed, and which was but a decent return to England for her -assistance, gave offence to the Municipal Junta of Cadiz, and its -resentment was so much dreaded that the Regency, in June, disowned -their own decree of the previous month, and even punished the -printers, as having given birth to a forged instrument. Exasperated -at this treatment, the colonies, who had resisted all the intrigues -of the French, with a firmness and singleness of purpose very -displeasing to the government in Old Spain, openly discovered their -discontent, and then the authorities in the Mother Country, throwing -off the mask of liberality and patriotism, exposed their own secret -views. “It is not enough that Americans should be Spanish subjects -now, but that in all cases they should belong to Spain,” was the -proclamation of the Regency, in answer to a declaration from the -Caraccas, avowing attachment to the cause of Ferdinand: meaning that, -if Spain should pass under the power of the usurper America must -follow, as having no right to decide in any case for herself. - -When the Cortes met, America expected more justice; she had -contributed ninety millions of dollars for the support of the war, -and many of her sons had served zealously in person; she had also -been declared an integral part of the empire by the Central Junta, -and her deputies were now permitted to sit in the Great National -Assembly. She was however soon made to understand, that the first -of these privileges meant eternal slavery, and that the second was -a mere form. “The Americans complain of having been tyrannized over -for three hundred years! they shall now suffer for three thousand -years,” and “I know not to what class of beast the Americans belong:” -such were the expressions heard and applauded in the Cortes, when -the rights of the colonists were agitated in that assembly. Better -to lose Spain to Joseph, if America be retained, than to save Spain -if America be separated from her, was a feeling deeply rooted in -every Spanish heart, a sentiment covertly expressed in many public -documents, and openly acted upon; for, when repeated insults, -treachery, and continued violence, had driven the colonists to defend -their rights in arms, the money and stores, supplied by England -for the support of the war against the French, were applied to the -fitting out of expeditions against America. Thus the convocation of -the National Cortes, far from improving the posture of affairs, dried -up the chief sources of revenue, weakened the army in the field, -offended many powerful bodies in the state, involved the nation in a -colonial war, and struck at the root of the alliance with England. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -While the Spaniards were occupied with the debates of the Cortes, -the French works were laboured with care. The chain of forts was -perfected, each being complete in itself with ditch and palisades and -a week’s provisions; the batteries at the Trocadero were powerful, -and the flotillas at San Lucar de Barameda, Santa Maria, Puerto -Real, and Chiclana, were ready for action. Soult repaired in person -to San Lucar, and in the last night of October, thirty pinnaces and -gun-boats slipping out of the Guadalquivir eluded the allied fleet, -passed along the coast to Rota, and from thence, aided by shore -batteries, fought their way to Santa Maria and the San Pedro. But, -to avoid the fire of the fleet and forts in doubling Matagorda, the -duke of Dalmatia, remembering what he had formerly effected at Campo -Saucos on the Minho, transported his flotilla on rollers, overland; -and in November, one hundred and thirty armed vessels and transports -were assembled in the Trocadero canal. This success was, however, -alloyed by the death of general Senarmont, an artillery officer of -the highest reputation. - -At the Trocadero point there were immense batteries, and some -notable pieces of ordnance called cannon-mortars, or Villantroys, -after the inventor. These huge engines were cast in Seville, and, -being placed in slings, threw shells with such prodigious force as -to range over Cadiz, a distance of more than five thousand yards. -But to obtain this flight the shells were partly filled with -lead, and their charge of powder was too small for an effective -explosion. Nevertheless, they produced some alarm in the city, and -were troublesome to the shipping. But Soult’s real design was first -to ruin, by a superior fire, the opposite fort of the Puntales, then -pass the straits with his flotilla, and establish his army between -the Isla and the city; nor was this plan chimerical, for on the side -of besieged there was neither concert nor industry. - -Two drafts, made, in August and September, by lord Wellington, had -reduced Graham’s force to five thousand men, and in October the fever -broke out in Cadiz; but as Soult’s preparations became formidable, -reinforcements were drawn from Gibraltar and Sicily, and, at the end -of the year, seven thousand British, Germans, and Portuguese, were -still behind the Santi Petri. Graham felt confident, 1º. that, with -due preparation, he could maintain the Puntales even though its fire -should be silenced. 2º. That Soult must establish a stronger flotilla -than the allies, or his communication with Matagorda could not be -maintained. 3º. That the intercourse between the army in Isla and the -garrison of Cadiz could not be interrupted, unless the great redoubt -of the Cortadura was lost. - -[Sidenote: Graham’s Despatches MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4.] - -To ensure a superiority of naval means, admiral Keats drew all the -armed craft from Gibraltar. To secure the land defence, general -Graham perseveringly urged the Regency to adopt certain plans, and -he was warmly seconded by sir Henry Wellesley; but neither their -entreaties, nor the imminence of the danger, could overcome the -apathy of the Spaniards. Their army, reinforced by a small body from -Ceuta, was wanting in discipline, clothing, and equipments, and only -sixteen thousand men of all arms were effective on a muster-roll of -twenty-three thousand. The labour of the British troops, far from -being assisted, were vexatiously impeded; it was the end of December, -and after many sharp altercations, ere Graham could even obtain leave -to put the interior line of the Cortadura in a state of defence, -although, by a sudden disembarkation, the enemy might enter it from -the rear, and cut off the army of the Isla from the city. But while -the duke of Dalmatia was thus collecting means of attack, the events -in Portugal prevented the execution of his design. - -[Sidenote: The King’s Correspondence, captured at Vittoria] - -When Massena passed the frontier, his communications with France -became so uncertain, that the emperor’s principal source of -information was through the English newspapers. Foy brought the -first exact intelligence of the posture of affairs. It was then -that the army of the north was directed to support the army of -Portugal; that the ninth corps was made a component part of the -latter; that the prince of Esling was enjoined to hold fast between -Santarem and the Zezere; to besiege Abrantes; and to expect the duke -of Dalmatia, who had been already several times commanded to move -through the Alemtejo, to his assistance. The emperor seems even to -have contemplated the evacuation of Andalusia and the concentration -of the whole army of the south on the Tagus, a project that would -have strengthened rather than weakened the French in the Peninsula, -because it was more important to crush the regular warfare in -Portugal, than to hold any particular province. - -Massena’s instructions reached him in due time, Soult’s were -intercepted by the Guerillas, and the duplicates did not arrive -before the end of December; a delay affording proof that thirty -thousand men would scarcely have compensated for the uncertainty -of the French communications. Postponing his design against Cadiz, -the duke of Dalmatia repaired to Seville, carrying with him Latour -Maubourg’s cavalry and five thousand infantry from the first corps. -His instructions neither prescribed a line of movement nor enjoined -any specific operation; the prince of Esling was to communicate -his plan to which Soult’s was to be subordinate. But no certain -intelligence even of Massena’s early proceedings had reached Seville, -and such were the precautions of lord Wellington, such the activity -of the Partidas, that from the time Soult quitted Cadiz, until his -operation terminated, no communication could be effected between the -two marshals, and each acted in perfect ignorance of the plans and -situation of the other. - -[Sidenote: Marshal Soult’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: King Joseph’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -The duke of Dalmatia considering that Sebastiani had his hands full, -and that the blockade of Cadiz, the protection of Seville on the -side of Neibla and of Araceña, would not permit the drawing off more -than twenty thousand men, represented to the emperor that with such -a force, he durst not penetrate the Alemtejo, leaving Olivenza and -Badajos, and Ballasteros, (who would certainly join Mendizabel) on -his rear; while Romana alone, without reckoning British troops, could -bring ten thousand men against his front; hence he demanded leave to -besiege those places, and Napoleon consented. Meanwhile, order was -taken to secure Andalusia during the operations. Dessolles’ division -had been recalled to form the army of the centre, and general Godinot -took his place at Cordoba; a column of observation was posted under -general Digeon at Ecija; Seville entrenched on the side of Neibla, -was given over to general Daricau, and a detachment under Remond -was posted at Gibraleon. The expeditionary army, consisting of -sixteen thousand infantry, artillery, sappers and miners, and about -four thousand cavalry and fifty-four guns, was assembled on the 2d -January. An equipage of siege, a light pontoon train, and seventeen -hundred carts, for stores and provisions were also prepared, and -Soult’s administration was now so efficient, that he ordered a levy -of five thousand young Spaniards, called “_escopeteros_” (fuzileers) -to maintain the police of the province. - - -SOULT’S FIRST EXPEDITION TO ESTREMADURA. - -[Sidenote: 1811.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Sect. 5, 6.] - -Mortier moving from Guadalcanal, entered Zafra on the 5th January, -Mendizabel retired to Merida, and Ballasteros, in consequence of -orders from the Regency, passed over the mountains to Frejenal. -Winter tempests raged, and the French convoy which moved on -Araceña, being overwhelmed by storms, was detained at the foot of -the mountains, and to cover it, Gazan marching from Zafra, drove -Ballasteros out of Frejenal. Meanwhile, the Spanish leaders, as well -those in Estremadura, as in Cadiz, were quite ignorant of Soult’s -intentions, some asserting that he was going to pass the Tagus at -Almaraz, others, that his object was only to crush Ballasteros. Lord -Wellington alone divined the truth, and it was he who first gave -Mendizabel notice, that the French were not assembling at Seville -at all, so destitute of intelligence and of military knowledge were -the Spaniards. Now when the French were breaking into Estremadura, -terror and confusion spread far and wide; Badajos was ill -provisioned, Albuquerque in ruins, Olivenza nearly dismantled; and, -in the midst of this disorder, Ballasteros was drawn off towards the -Condada de Neibla by the Regency, who thus deprived Estremadura of -half its defenders at the moment of invasion. - -Lord Wellington had advised that the troops should be concentrated, -the bridges over the Guadiana mined for destruction, and the -passage of that river disputed to gain time; but these things being -neglected, an advanced guard of cavalry alone carried the bridge of -Merida on the 6th. Soult then turned upon Olivenza with the infantry, -and while Latour Maubourg’s dragoons held Mendizabel in check on the -side of Badajos, Briche’s light horsemen collected cattle on the -side of Estremadura; Gazan’s division, still posted near Frejenal, -protected the march of the artillery and convoy, and La Houssaye’s -brigade, belonging to the army of the centre, quitting Truxillo, -marched against the Partidas and scoured the banks of the Tagus from -Arzobispo to Alcantara. - - -FIRST SIEGE OF OLIVENZA. - -This place, although regularly fortified with nine bastions, a -covered way, and some unfinished ravelins, was incapable of a -good defence. With an old breach slightly repaired, very few guns -mounted, and commanding no passage of the Guadiana, it was of little -importance to the French, yet, as containing four thousand troops, it -was of some consequence to reduce it. Lord Wellington had pressed -Romana to destroy the defences entirely, or to supply it with the -means of resistance, and the marquis decided on the former; but -Mendizabel slighting his orders, had thrown his best division into -the place. - -It was invested the 11th of January; an abandoned outwork, three -hundred and forty yards south of the town, was taken possession -of the first night; and breaching batteries of eight guns, and -counter-batteries of six guns were then marked out. The trenches -were opened on the west, and approaches carried on by the flying sap -against the old breach; but the rains were heavy and continual, the -scarcity of entrenching-tools great, and it was not until the 18th, -when the head of the convoy had passed the mountains, that the works -could be properly advanced. - -On the 19th the covered way was crowned, and the 20th the breaching -batteries opened their fire; two mortars also threw shells into -the town, and a globe of compression was prepared to blow in the -counterscarp. In the evening, the governor of Badajos skirmished -unsuccessfully with Latour Maubourg’s horsemen, and, on the 21st, the -mine was completed and preparations made for the passage of the ditch. - -Mendizabel, unable from the absence of Ballasteros’ division to -relieve Olivenza, demanded succour, and Romana sent Carlos D’España’s -brigade from Abrantes the 18th, and general Virues, with his own -Spanish division, from Cartaxo on the 20th. The 21st, the governor -of Olivenza was informed of this, and replied that he would maintain -the place to the last moment; but the next day he capitulated, having -still provisions, ammunition, eighteen guns, and four thousand one -hundred effective soldiers. The 26th Soult marched against Badajos. - -Meanwhile Ballasteros advanced upon Neibla, but being followed by -Gazan, was overtaken at Castillejos on the 28th, and, after a sharp -battle, driven with the loss of a thousand men over the Guadiana. The -Spanish artillery was saved in the castle of Paymigo, the infantry -took refuge at Alcontin and Mertola; and, that nothing might be left -to alarm the French in that quarter, the Regency recalled Copon’s -force to Cadiz. In this manner a fortress was taken, and twelve -thousand men, who, well employed, might have frustrated the French -designs against Badajos, were all dispersed, withdrawn, or made -prisoners in twenty days after the commencement of Soult’s expedition. - -For many months previous to these events lord Wellington had striven -to teach the Spanish commander that there was but one safe mode -of proceeding in Estremadura, and Romana had just yielded to his -counsels, when the sudden arrival of the French threw every thing -into confusion. The defence of the Guadiana, the dismantling of -Olivenza, the concentration of the forces were all neglected. Romana, -however, had sent his divisions towards the frontier, and they -reached Montemor the 22d; the 23d they received Mendizabel’s orders -to halt as Olivenza had surrendered; and the 24th Romana died of -an aneurism in the heart. He was a worthy man and of quick parts, -although deficient in military talent. His death was a great loss, -yet his influence was on the wane; he had many enemies, and his -authority was chiefly sustained by the attachment of his troops, -and by his riches, for his estates being in the Balearic Isles, his -revenues did not suffer by the war. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 6.] - -Mendizabel now commanded in Estremadura. He had received Romana’s -orders to adopt lord Wellington’s plan, which was still to -concentrate all the Spanish troops, amounting to at least ten -thousand men, on the frontier, and, before the enemy appeared on the -right bank of the Guadiana, to occupy a certain position of great -natural strength close to Badajos; the right touching the fort of -St. Christoval, the front covered by the Gebora river and by the -Guadiana, the fortress of Campo Mayor immediately in rear of the -left, and Elvas behind the centre. When Mendizabel was entrenched -on this position, and a strong garrison in Badajos, the English -general thought Soult could not invest or even straighten the -communications of the town, yet, knowing well the people he dealt -with, prophetically observed, “_with soldiers of any other nation -success is certain, but no calculation can be made of any operation -in which Spanish troops are engaged_.” - -When Olivenza fell, a small garrison was in Albuquerque, and another -in Valencia d’Alcantara; Carlos d’España was in Campo Mayor, and -Virues, with Romana’s divisions, at Montemor. When Soult drove back -the outposts of Badajos on the 26th, Mendizabel shut himself up with -six thousand men in that fortress; but, although a siege had been -expected for a year, the place was still unprovisioned. It was, -however, still possible to execute the English general’s plan, yet -no Spaniard moved, and, on the 27th, Latour Maubourg, crossing the -Guadiana at Merida, forded the Gebora, and cut off the communications -with Campo Mayor and Elvas! - - -FRENCH SIEGE OF BADAJOS. - -This city stands on a tongue of land at the confluence of the -Guadiana with the Rivillas; the first is a noble river five hundred -yards broad, the second a trifling stream. A rock, one hundred feet -high, and crowned by an old castle, overhangs the meeting of the -waters, and the town, spreading out like a fan as the land opens -between the rivers, is protected by eight regular curtains and -bastions, from twenty-three to thirty feet in height, with good -counterscarps, covered way, and glacis. On the left bank of the -Guadiana the outworks were, 1º. the Lunette of San Roque, covering -a dam and sluice on the Rivillas, by which an inundation could be -commanded; 2º. an isolated redoubt, called the Picurina, situated -beyond the Rivillas, and four hundred yards from the town; 3º. -the Pardaleras, a defective crown-work, central between the Lower -Guadiana and the Rivillas, and two hundred yards from the ramparts. - -On the right bank of the Guadiana a hill, crowned by a regular fort -three hundred feet square, called San Christoval, overlooked the -interior of the castle, and a quarter of a mile farther down the -stream, the bridge, six hundred yards in length, was protected by a -bridge-head, slightly connected with San Christoval, but commanded on -every side. - -[Sidenote: Conquête de l’Andalusie, par Edouard Lapéne.] - -Soult constructed a ferry on the Guadiana, above the confluence of -the Gebora, and three attacks were opened against the town the 28th, -two on the side of Picurina and one on that of the Pardaleras. The -29th and 30th slight sallies were repulsed, but tempestuous weather -spoiled the works. Gazan’s division was distant; the infantry before -the place were few, and, on the 30th, the garrison making a vigorous -sally from the Pardaleras, killed or wounded sixty men and cleared -the trenches. Meanwhile some Spanish cavalry, gliding round the left -of the French, sabred several engineers and sappers, and then retired. - -[Sidenote: Siege de Badajos, par le Col. Lamare.] - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Correspondence. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.] - -In the night of the 2d of February a violent tempest flooded the -Rivillas, carried away the French bridges, drowned men and horses, -damaged the depôts, and reduced the besiegers to the greatest -distress. The cavalry employed in the investment could no longer -forage; scarcity was felt in the camp; the convoys could only arrive -by detachments; the rigour of winter bivouacs caused sickness, and, -on the 3d, the Spaniards, making a second sally from Pardaleras, -killed or wounded eighty men and ruined a part of the parallel. -The same day Gazan arrived in camp, but the French cavalry being -withdrawn from the right bank of the Guadiana, in consequence of -rigorous weather, the communication was re-established with Elvas, -and Mendizabel called the divisions in Portugal to his assistance. -Virues immediately marched upon Elvas, Carlo d’España, and Madden -united at Campo Mayor, and Julian Sanchez brought down his Partida -from Upper Estremadura. - -In the night of the 5th, Mendizabel repaired to Elvas in person; -passed the Caya the next day, and being joined on the road by the -troops from Campo Mayor, pushed the few French horsemen still on the -right of the Guadiana over the Gebora. The Portuguese brigade crossed -that river in pursuit, and captured some baggage; but the infantry -entered Badajos, for Mendizabel again neglecting lord Wellington’s -counsel, designed not to take up a position behind the Gebora, but -to raise the siege by a sally; yet he delayed this until the next -day, thus risking to have his whole army shut up in an ill-provided -fortress; for Latour Maubourg, seeing that Madden was unsupported, -turned and drove him back over the Gebora with loss. Badajos now -contained sixteen thousand men, and, early on the 7th, Carrera and -Carlos d’España, at the head of five thousand infantry and three -hundred cavalry, breaking out at the Picurina side, with one burst -carried the trenches and the batteries; the soldiers fought with -surprising ardour, but the entire want of arrangement on the part of -the generals (unworthy to command the brave men under them) ruined -all. They had not even provided the means to spike the guns, and -when Mortier brought his reserves against the front and flank of -the attack, the whole driven back in disorder, re-entered the city, -having eighty-five officers and near six hundred soldiers killed and -wounded; the enemy also lost several engineers and four hundred men. - -While this action took place on the left bank, Latour Maubourg -occupied the ground between the Gebora and the Caya, and again cut -off the communication with Elvas and Campo Mayor; but his forces -were too weak to maintain themselves there, and Mendizabel, leaving -the defence of the town entirely to the governor, Rafael Menacho, -pitched his own camp round San Christoval. Some days previous to -this, the French had bombarded Badajos, a proceeding only mischievous -to themselves; for the inhabitants, terrified by the shells, fled -in great numbers while the communication was open, but left behind -their provisions; which enabled Menacho to feed his garrison without -difficulty. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. X. Section 2.] - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool. MSS.] - -Soult observing the numbers, and awake to all the real resources -of the Spanish succouring army, feared lest delay should produce a -change of commanders, or of system, and resolved to bring matters -to a crisis. On the 11th he stormed the Pardaleras; on the 12th, he -sent fifteen hundred cavalry across the Guadiana to Montijo; and, -on the 14th, threw shells into the camp about Christoval, which -obliged Mendizabel to remove from the heights in front of that fort. -Meanwhile, intelligence that Castaños was appointed captain-general -of Estremadura created the greatest anger amongst Romana’s soldiers: -they had long considered themselves independent of the central -government, and in this mood, although the position behind the -Gebora, recommended by lord Wellington, was at last occupied, little -attention was paid to military discipline. The English general had -expressly advised Mendizabel to increase the great natural strength -of this position with entrenchments; for his design was that the -Spaniards, whom he thought quite unequal to open field-operations, -should have an impregnable post, whence they could safely aid in the -defence of the town, and yet preserve a free communication with the -Alemtejo, until the arrival of his own reinforcements (which he -expected in the latter end of January) should enable him to raise -the siege. Mendizabel, with that arrogance which is peculiar to his -nation, rejected this counsel, and hung twelve days on the heights of -Christoval in a torpid state; and, when driven thence by the French -shells, merely destroyed a small bridge over the Gebora, but neither -cast up entrenchments, nor kept a guard in his front, nor disposed -his men with care. Soult observing these things, suddenly leaped upon -him. - - -BATTLE OF THE GEBORA. - -The Guadiana and the Gebora rivers covered the Spanish position; this -did not deter the duke of Dalmatia from attempting to pass both and -surprise the camp. But first to deprive Mendizabel of the aid of San -Christoval, and to create a diversion, the French mortar-batteries -again threw shells on the 17th: yet the swell of the rivers would not -permit the main operation to be commenced before the evening of the -18th, when the cavalry drew down the right bank of the Guadiana from -Montijo, and the artillery and infantry crossed at the French ferry, -four miles above the confluence of the Gebora. These combinations -were so exactly executed, that, at daybreak, on the 19th, six -thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry were in order of battle -on the right bank of the Guadiana; the Gebora was however still to -be forded, and, behind it, the Spaniards had ten thousand infantry, -a considerable artillery, and fifteen hundred cavalry, besides many -armed followers of the camp; the whole number not being less than -fifteen thousand. - -A thick mist covered the country, no Spanish posts were in advance, -and Soult, riding through the French ranks, and exhorting the -soldiers to fight manfully, commenced the passage of the Gebora. His -cavalry forded five miles up the stream, but his infantry passed -in two columns, on the right and left of the ruined bridge: a few -shots, near the latter, first alarmed the Spaniards, and, as the -instant clamour amongst the multitude indicated that the surprise was -complete, Mortier, who directed the movements, rapidly formed the -line of battle. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 8.] - -At eight o’clock the fog cleared away, and the first beams of the -sun and the certainty of victory, flashed together on the French -soldiers; for the horsemen were already surrounding the Spanish left; -and in the centre, infantry, cavalry, and guns, heaped together, -were waving to and fro in disorder; while the right having fallen -away from San Christoval was unsupported. In one moment, Girard, -with three battalions, stood between the Spaniards and the fort; the -artillery roared on both sides; and the French bore forward as one -man to the attack: six battalions pressed the centre; Girard moved -perpendicularly on the right, and Latour Maubourg charged the left. -Thus surrounded, Mendizabel’s people instinctively crowding together -on the centre, resisted, for some time, by their inert weight; -but the French infantry closed with a destroying musketry, the -horsemen rode in with loose bridles, and the Spaniards were shaken, -divided, and slaughtered. Their cavalry fled outright, even Madden’s -Portuguese, either from panic, or from hatred of their allies, -disregarded alike his exhortations and example, and shamefully turned -their backs. At ten o’clock the fight was over; Virues was taken, -Mendizabel and Carrera escaped with difficulty, España alone made -good his retreat to Campo Mayor with two thousand men; a few more -reached Elvas, three thousand got into Badajos, by the bridge, and -nine hundred bodies strewed the field: eight thousand, including -armed followers, were made prisoners; and guns, colours, muskets, -ammunition, baggage, all, fell into the enemy’s hands. - -It was a disastrous and a shameful defeat. In the depth of winter, -Soult, with a small force, had passed two difficult rivers, carried a -strong position, and annihilated an army which had been two years in -constant service. Mendizabel, instead of destroying the bridge over -the Gebora, should have cast others, that he might freely issue to -attack the French while crossing the Guadiana; he should have opposed -them again in passing the Gebora; or he might have passed through -Badajos, and fallen on the troops in the trenches, with his whole -army, while Soult was still entangled between the rivers. - -In the evening after the action the French cast up entrenchments, -posting three battalions and the heavy cavalry on the important -position they had gained; and the next day the works of the siege -were renewed with greater activity; yet the difficulty of Soult’s -undertaking was rendered apparent by his victories. The continual -rains, interrupting the arrival of his convoys, obliged him to employ -a number of men at a great distance to gather provisions; nearly two -thousand French had been killed or wounded in the two sieges and in -this battle, many also were sick, and Badajos was still powerful. The -body of the place was entire, the garrison nine thousand strong, -and, by the flight of the inhabitants, well provided with food; and -there was no want of other stores: the governor was resolute and -confident; the season rigorous for the besiegers; no communication -had been yet opened with Massena; and lord Wellington, in momentary -expectation that his reinforcements would arrive, was impatient -to bring on a crisis; meanwhile, the duke of Dalmatia’s power, in -Andalusia, was menaced in the most serious manner. - - -CONTINUATION OF THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ. - -[Sidenote: Official Abstract of Military Reports. MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 5.] - -When general Graham was aware of Soult’s departure, and knew, also, -that the fifth corps had quitted Seville, he undertook, in concert -with the Spaniards, to drive Victor out of his lines. A force, -sailing from Cadiz the 29th of January, was to have been joined, -in rear of the enemy, by the troops from Tarifa under major Brown, -and by three thousand Spaniards, from Algesiras and San Roque under -general Beguines; but contrary winds detained even the vessels -carrying counter orders to Beguines and Brown, and they advanced, -the first to Medina, the other to Casa Vieja. Victor, having notice -of this project, at first kept close, but afterwards sent troops to -retake Medina and Casa Vieja; and, in the course of February, twelve -thousand men, drawn from the northern governments, were directed upon -Andalusia, to reinforce the different corps. The first corps was thus -increased to twenty thousand men, of which fifteen thousand were -before Cadiz, and the remainder at San Lucar, Medina, Sidonia, and -other quarters. Nevertheless, on the 21st of February, ten thousand -infantry and near six hundred cavalry, of the allies, were again -embarked at Cadiz; being to land at Tarifa, and march upon the rear -of the enemy’s camp at Chiclana. Meanwhile, general Zayas, commanding -the Spanish forces left in the Isla, was to cast a bridge over the -San Petri, near the sea mouth; Ballasteros, also, with the remains of -his army, was directed to menace Seville, the irregular bands were -to act against Sebastiani, and insurrections were expected in all -quarters. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 2.] - -The British troops passed their port in a gale, the 22d, but, landing -at Algesiras, marched to Tarifa the next day. Being there joined -by the twenty-eighth, and the flank companies of the ninth and -eighty-second regiments, somewhat more than four thousand effective -troops (including two companies of the twentieth Portuguese and one -hundred and eighty German hussars) were assembled under general -Graham; all good and hardy troops, and himself a daring old man and -of a ready temper for battle. - -General La Peña arrived on the 27th, with seven thousand Spaniards, -and Graham, for the sake of unanimity, ceded the chief command, -although it was contrary to his instructions. The next day, the -whole, moving forward about twelve miles, passed the mountain ridges -that, descending from Ronda to the sea, separate the plains of -San Roque from those of Medina and Chiclana: but being now within -four leagues of the enemy’s posts, the troops were re-organized. -The vanguard was given to Lardizabal; the centre to the prince of -Anglona; the reserve, composed of two Spanish regiments and the -British were confided to Graham; but the cavalry of both nations, -formed in one body, was commanded by colonel Whittingham, then in the -Spanish service. - -[Sidenote: Intercepted Letter of General Werlé to Sebastiani, Alhama, -March 12.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 6.] - -The French covering division, under general Cassagne, consisted of -three battalions and a regiment of horse at Medina, with outposts at -Vejer de la Frontera and Casa Viejas. Before La Peña’s arrival, the -irregulars had attacked Casa Viejas, and general Beguines had even -taken Medina; but Cassagne, reinforced by a battalion of infantry -from Arcos, retook and entrenched it the 29th; and the signal of -action being thus given, the French generals in the higher provinces, -perceiving that the people were ready for commotion, gathered in -their respective forces at Seville, Ecija, and Cordoba; following -the orders left by Soult. In Grenada the insurgents were especially -active; Sebastiani, doubtful if the storm would not break on his -head, concentrated a column at Estipona as a good covering point to -the coast line, and one whence he could easily gain Ronda. Victor -manned his works at Rota, Santa Maria, Puerto Real, and the Trocadero -with a mixed force, of refugee French, juramentados, and regular -troops; but he assembled eleven thousand good soldiers near Chiclana, -taking post between the roads of Conil and Medina, to await the -development of the allies’ project. - -At first, La Peña’s march pointed to Medina Sidonia, his vanguard -stormed Casa Viejas on the 2d of March, and the troops from -Algesiras, amounting to sixteen hundred infantry, besides several -hundreds of irregular cavalry, came in to him; encreasing his force -to twelve thousand infantry, eight hundred horsemen, and twenty-four -guns. The 3d he resumed his march, but hearing that Medina Sidonia -was entrenched, turned towards the coast, and drove the French -from Vejer de la Frontera. The following evening he continued his -movement, and at nine o’clock on the morning of the 5th, after a -skirmish, in which his advanced guard of cavalry was routed by a -French squadron, he reached the Cerro de Puerco, called by the -English, the heights of Barosa; being then only four miles from the -sea mouth of the Santi Petri. - -Barosa is a low ridge, creeping in from the coast, about one mile -and a half, and overlooking a high and broken plain of small extent. -This plain was bounded on the left by the coast clifts, on the right -by the forest of Chiclana, and in front by a pine-wood, beyond which -rose the narrow height of Bermeja, filling the space between the -Almanza creek and the sea. The Bermeja hill, could be reached either -by moving through the wood in front, or along the beach under the -clifts. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 1.] - -At Tarifa, Graham, judging that Victor would surely come out of his -lines to fight, had obtained from La Peña a promise to make short -marches; to keep the troops fresh for battle; and not to approach the -enemy except in a concentrated mass. Nevertheless, the day’s march -from Casa Vieja, being made through bad roads, with ignorant guides, -had occupied fifteen hours, and the night march to Barosa had been -still more fatiguing. The troops came up in a straggling manner, -and ere they had all arrived, La Peña, as if in contempt of his -colleague, without either disclosing his own plans, or communicating -by signal or otherwise with Zayas, sent the vanguard, reinforced -by a squadron and three guns, straight against the mouth of the -Santi Petri. Zayas had, indeed, cast his bridge there on the 2d, -and commenced an entrenchment; but, in the following night, being -surprised by the French, was driven again into the Isla: hence the -movement of the vanguard was exceedingly dangerous. Lardizabal, -however, after a sharp skirmish, in which he lost nearly three -hundred men, forced the enemy’s posts between the Almanza creek and -the sea, and effected a junction with Zayas. - -Graham was extremely desirous of holding the Barosa height, as the -key both to offensive and defensive movements, and he argued that no -general in his senses would lend his flank to an enemy, by attacking -the Bermeja while Barosa was occupied in force. Lascy, the chief of -the Spanish staff, having however opposed this reasoning, La Peña -commanded Graham to march the British troops through the wood to -Bermeja. With great temper, he obeyed this uncourteous order; and -leaving the flank companies of the ninth and eighty-second, under -major Brown, as a guard for the baggage, commenced his march, in the -full persuasion that La Peña would remain with Anglona’s division and -the cavalry at Barosa; and the more so, as a Spanish detachment was -still on the side of Medina. But scarcely had the British entered -the wood, when La Peña, without any notice, carried off the corps of -battle, directed the cavalry to follow by the sea-road, and repaired -himself to Santi Petri, leaving Barosa crowded with baggage, and -protected only by a rear guard of four guns and five battalions. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 7.] - -During these movements, Victor remained close in the forest of -Chiclana, and the patrols of the allied cavalry reported that -they could see no enemy; Graham’s march therefore, being only of -two miles, seemed secure. The French marshal was, however, keenly -watching the allies’ progress; having recalled his infantry from -Medina Sidonia as soon as La Peña had reached Barosa, he momentarily -expected their arrival; but he felt so sure of success, that the -cavalry at Medina and Arcos were directed upon Vejer and other -places, to cut off the fugitives after the approaching battle. The -duke of Belluno had in hand fourteen pieces of artillery and nine -thousand excellent troops, of the divisions of Laval, Ruffin, and -Villatte; from these he drew three grenadier battalions as reserves, -attaching two of them and three squadrons of cavalry to the division -of Ruffin, which formed his left wing, the other to the division of -Laval, which formed his centre. Villatte’s troops, about two thousand -five hundred in number, after being withdrawn from Bermeja, were -posted close to a bridge on the Almanza creek, to cover the works of -the camp, and to watch the Spanish forces at Santi Petri and Bermeja. - - -BATTLE OF BAROSA. - -When Victor observed that Graham’s corps was in the wood, that a -strong body of Spaniards was on the Bermeja, that a third body, with -all the baggage, was at Barosa, and a fourth still in march from -Vejer; he took Villatte’s division as his pivot, and coming forth -with a rapid pace into the plain, directed Laval against the English, -while himself, with Ruffin’s brigade, ascending the reverse side of -Barosa, cut off the Spanish detachment on the road to Medina, and -drove the whole of the rear guard off the height towards the sea; -dispersing the baggage and followers of the army in all directions, -and taking three Spanish guns. - -Major Brown, seeing the general confusion, and being unable to stem -the torrent, slowly retired into the plain, sending notice of what -was passing to Graham, and demanding orders. That general, being -then near Bermeja, answered, that he was to fight; and instantly -facing about himself, regained the plain with the greatest celerity, -expecting to find La Peña, with the corps of battle and the cavalry, -on the height: but when the view opened, he beheld Ruffin, flanked -by the chosen battalions, near the top of Barosa at the one side, -the Spanish rear guard and baggage flying in confusion on the other, -the French cavalry between the summit and the sea, and Laval close -on his own left flank; but La Peña he could see no where. In this -desperate situation, he felt that to retreat upon Bermeja, and thus -bring the enemy, pell mell with the allies on to that narrow ridge, -must be disastrous, hence, without a moment’s hesitation, he resolved -to attack, although the key of the field of battle was already in the -enemy’s possession. - -Ten guns, under major Duncan, instantly opened a terrific fire -against Laval’s column, while colonel Andrew Barnard, with the -riflemen and the Portuguese companies, running out to the left, -commenced the fight: the remainder of the British troops, without any -attention to regiments or brigades, so sudden was the affair, formed -two masses, one of which under general Dilke marched hastily against -Ruffin, and the other under colonel Wheately against Laval. Duncan’s -guns ravaged the French ranks; Laval’s artillery replied vigorously; -Ruffin’s batteries took Wheately’s column in flank; and the infantry -on both sides pressed forward eagerly, and with a pealing musketry; -but, when near together, a fierce, rapid, prolonged charge of the -British overthrew the first line of the French, and, notwithstanding -its extreme valour, drove it in confusion, over a narrow dip of -ground upon the second, which was almost immediately broken in the -same manner, and only the chosen battalion, hitherto posted on the -right, remained to cover the retreat. - -Meanwhile Brown, on receiving his orders, had marched headlong -against Ruffin. Nearly half of his detachment went down under the -enemy’s first fire; yet he maintained the fight, until Dilke’s -column, which had crossed a deep hollow and never stopt even to -re-form the regiments, came up, with little order indeed, but in a -fierce mood, when the whole run up towards the summit; there was -no slackness on any side, and at the very edge of the ascent their -gallant opponents met them. A dreadful, and for some time a doubtful, -fight ensued, but Ruffin and Chaudron Rousseau, commanding the chosen -grenadiers, both fell mortally wounded; the English bore strongly -onward, and their incessant slaughtering fire forced the French from -the hill with the loss of three guns and many brave soldiers. - -The discomfitted divisions, retiring concentrically, soon met, and -with infinite spirit endeavoured to re-form and renew the action; -but the play of Duncan’s guns, close, rapid, and murderous, rendered -the attempt vain. Victor was soon in full retreat, and the British -having been twenty-four hours under arms, without food, were too -exhausted to pursue. - -While these terrible combats of infantry were fighting, La Peña -looked idly on, neither sending his cavalry, nor his horse-artillery, -nor any part of his army, to the assistance of his ally, nor yet -menacing the right of the enemy, which was close to him and weak. -The Spanish Walloon guards, the regiment of Ciudad Real, and some -Guerilla cavalry, indeed turned without orders, coming up just as -the action ceased; and it was expected that colonel Whittingham, an -Englishman commanding a powerful body of horse, would have done as -much; but no stroke in aid of the British was struck by a Spanish -sabre that day, although the French cavalry did not exceed two -hundred and fifty men, and it is evident that the eight hundred under -Whittingham might, by sweeping round the left of Ruffin’s division, -have rendered the defeat ruinous. So certain, indeed, was this, that -colonel Frederick Ponsonby, drawing off the hundred and eighty German -hussars belonging to the English army, reached the field of battle, -charged the French squadrons just as their retreating divisions met, -overthrew them, took two guns, and even attempted, though vainly, to -sabre Rousseau’s chosen battalions. - -Such was the fight of Barosa. Short, for it lasted only one hour -and a half, but most violent and bloody; for fifty officers, sixty -serjeants, and above eleven hundred British soldiers, and more than -two thousand Frenchmen were killed and wounded; and from the latter, -six guns, an eagle, and two generals (both mortally wounded) were -taken, together with four hundred other prisoners. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 1.] - -After the action, Graham remained some hours on the height, still -hoping that La Peña would awake to the prospect of success and glory, -which the extreme valour of the British had opened. Four thousand -men and a powerful artillery had come over the Santi Petri; hence -the Spanish general was at the head of twelve thousand infantry and -eight hundred cavalry, all fresh troops; while before him were only -the remains of the French line of battle retreating in the greatest -disorder upon Chiclana. But all military feeling being extinct in La -Peña, Graham would no longer endure such command. The morning of the -6th saw the British filing over Zaya’s bridge into the Isla. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 9._ - - BATTLE of BAROSA - _5^{th} March, 1811_. - - _London Published by T. & W. BOONE Nov^r 1830._] - -[Sidenote: Official Abstracts of Military Reports, MSS.] - -On the French side, Cassagne’s reserve came in from Medina, a council -of war was held in the night of the 5th, and Victor, although of a -disponding nature, proposed another attack; but the suggestion being -ill received, nothing was done; and the 6th, Admiral Keats, landing -his seamen and marines, dismantled, with exception of Catalina, every -fort from Rota to Santa Maria, and even obtained momentary possession -of the latter place. Confusion and alarm then prevailed in the French -camp; the duke of Belluno, leaving garrisons at the great points of -his lines, and a rear guard at Chiclana, retreated behind the San -Pedro, where he expected to be immediately attacked. If La Peña had -even then pushed to Chiclana, Graham and Keats were willing to make a -simultaneous attack upon the Trocadero; but the 6th and 7th passed, -without even a Spanish patrole following the French. On the 8th -Victor returned to Chiclana, and La Peña instantly recrossing the -Santi Petri, destroyed the bridge, and his detachment on the side of -Medina being thus cut off from the Isla, was soon afterwards obliged -to retire to Algesiras. - -All the passages in this extraordinary battle were so broadly marked, -that observations would be useless. The contemptible feebleness of La -Peña furnished a surprising contrast to the heroic vigour of Graham, -whose attack was an inspiration rather than a resolution, so wise, so -sudden was the decision, so swift, so conclusive was the execution. -The original plan of the enterprise having however been rather rashly -censured, some remarks on that head may be useful. “Sebastiani, it -is said, might, by moving on the rear of the allies, have crushed -them, and they had no right to calculate upon his inactivity.” This -is weak. Graham, weighing the natural dislike of one general to serve -under another, judged, that Sebastiani, harassed by insurrections -in Grenada, would not hastily abandon his own district to succour -Victor, before it was clear where the blow was to be struck. The -distance from Tarifa to Chiclana was about fifty miles, whereas, from -Sebastiani’s nearest post to Chiclana was above a hundred, and the -real object of the allies could not be known until they had passed -the mountains separating Tarifa from Medina. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 5.] - -Combining these moral and physical considerations, Graham had reason -to expect several days of free action; and thus indeed it happened, -and with a worthy colleague he would have raised the blockade: more -than that could scarcely have been hoped, as the French forces would -have concentrated either before Cadiz or about Seville or Ecija; and -they had still fifty thousand men in Andalusia. - -Victor’s attack on the 5th, was well-judged, well-timed, vigorous; -with a few thousand more troops he alone would have crushed the -allies. The unconquerable spirit of the English prevented this -disaster; but if Graham or his troops had given way, or even -hesitated, the whole army must have been driven like sheep into an -enclosure; the Almanza creek on one side, the sea on the other, the -San Petri to bar their flight, and the enemy hanging on their rear in -all the fierceness of victory. Indeed, such was La Peña’s misconduct, -that the French, although defeated, gained their main point; the -blockade was renewed, and it is remarkable that, during the action, a -French detachment passed near the bridge of Zuazo without difficulty, -and brought back prisoners; thus proving that with a few more troops -Victor might have seized the Isla. Meanwhile Ballasteros, who had -gone against Seville, was chased, in a miserable condition, to the -Aroche hills, by Daricau. - -In Cadiz violent disputes arose. La Peña, in an address to the -Cortes, claimed the victory for himself. He affirmed that all the -previous arrangements were made with the knowledge and approbation -of the English general, and the latter’s retreat into the Isla -he indicated as the real cause of failure: Lascy and general -Cruz-Murgeon also published inaccurate accounts of the action, and -even had deceptive plans engraved to uphold their statements. Graham, -stung by these unworthy proceedings, exposed the conduct of La Peña -in a letter to the British envoy; and when Lascy let fall some -expressions personally offensive, he enforced an apology with his -sword; but having thus shewn himself superior to his opponents at all -points, the gallant old man soon afterwards relinquished his command -to general Cooke, and joined lord Wellington’s army. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -While discord prevailed at Cadiz, the siege of Badajos continued. -Early in March, the second parallel being completed and the -Pardaleras taken into the works, the approaches were carried by -sap to the covered way, and mines were prepared to blow in the -counterscarp. Nevertheless, Rafael Menacho, the governor, was in no -manner dismayed; his sallies were frequent and vigorous, his activity -and courage inspired his troops with confidence, he had begun to -retrench in the streets behind the part attacked, and as the fire of -the besiegers was also inferior to that of the besieged, every thing -seemed to promise favourably for the latter: but, on the evening of -the 2d, during a sally, in which the nearest French batteries were -carried, the guns spiked, and trenches partly ruined, Menacho was -killed, and the command fell to Imas, a man so unworthy that a worse -could not be found. At once the spirit of the garrison died away, the -besiegers’ works advanced rapidly, the ditch was passed, a lodgement -was made on one of the ravelins, the rampart was breached, and the -fire of the besieged being nearly extinguished, on the 10th of March -the place was summoned in a peremptory manner. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Despatch.] - -At this time the great crisis of the campaign had passed, and a -strong body of British and Portuguese troops were ready to raise the -siege of Badajos. In three different ways, by telegraph, by a letter, -and by a confidential messenger, the governor was informed, that -Massena was in full retreat and that the relieving army was actually -in march. The breach was still impracticable, provisions were -plentiful, the garrison above eight thousand strong, the French army -reduced, by sickness, by detachments and the previous operations, to -less than fourteen thousand men. Imas read the letter, and instantly -surrendered, handing over at the same moment the intelligence thus -obtained to the enemy. But he also demanded that his grenadiers -should march out of the breach, it was granted, and he was obliged -to enlarge the opening himself ere they could do so! Yet this man so -covered with opprobrium, and who had secured his own liberty while -consigning his fellow soldiers to a prison, and his character to -infamy, was never punished by the Spanish rulers: lord Wellington’s -indignant remonstrances forced them, indeed, to bring him to trial, -but they made the process last during the whole war. - -When the place fell, Mortier marched against Campo Mayor, and Latour -Maubourg seizing Albuquerque and Valencia d’Alcantara, made six -hundred prisoners; but Soult, alarmed by the effects of the battle -of Barosa, returned to Andalusia, having, in fifty days, mastered -four fortresses and invested a fifth; having killed or dispersed ten -thousand men, and having taken twenty thousand with a force which, at -no time, exceeded the number of his prisoners: yet great and daring -and successful as his operations had been, the principal object of -his expedition was frustrated, for Massena was in retreat. Lord -Wellington’s combinations had palsied the hand of the conqueror. - -While the siege of Badajos was proceeding, no change took place in -the main positions of either army at Santarem. The English general, -certain that the French, who were greatly reduced by sickness, must -soon quit their ground if he could relieve Badajos, was only waiting -for his reinforcements to send Beresford with fourteen thousand men -against Soult; when the battle of the Gebora ruined this plan and -changed his situation. The arrival of the reinforcements could not -then enable him to detach a sufficient number of men to relieve -Badajos, and it was no longer a question of starving Massena out, -but of beating him, before Soult could take Badajos and the two -armies be joined. In this difficulty, abandoning the design of -raising the siege by a detachment, lord Wellington prepared to attack -Massena’s army in front on the side of Tremes, while Beresford, -crossing at Abrantes, fell upon the rear; he hoped thus to force -back the French right and centre, and to cut off the left and to -drive it into the Tagus. However, nothing could be attempted until -the troops from England arrived, and day after day passed in vain -expectation of their coming. Being embarked in January, they would -have reached Lisbon before the end of that month, had sir Joseph -Yorke, the admiral, charged to conduct the fleet, taken advantage -of a favourable wind, which blew when the troops were first put on -board; but he neglected this opportunity, contrary gales followed, -and a voyage of ten days was thus prolonged for six weeks. - -[Sidenote: See Vol. II] - -On the other hand, the French general’s situation was becoming very -perilous. To besiege Abrantes was above his means, and although that -fortress was an important strategic point for the allies who had a -moveable bridge, it would not have been so for the French. Massena -could only choose then, to force the passage of the Tagus alone, or -to wait until Soult appeared on the left bank, or to retreat. For -sometime he seemed inclined to the first, shewing great jealousy of -the works opposite the mouth of the Zezere, and carrying his boats -on wheel-carriages along the banks of the Tagus, as if to alarm -Beresford and oblige him to concentrate to his left: yet that general -relaxed nothing of his vigilance, neither spy nor officer passed his -lines of observation, and Massena knew, generally, that Soult was -before Badajos, but nothing more. However, time wore away, sickness -wasted the army, food became daily scarcer, the organization of the -troops was seriously loosened, the leading generals were at variance, -and the conspiracy to put St. Cyr at the head of the army in Spain -was by no means relinquished. - -Under these accumulating difficulties even Massena’s obstinacy gave -way; he promised to retreat when he had no more provisions left than -would serve his army for the march. A tardy resolution; yet adopted -at the moment, when to maintain his position was more important -than ever, as ten days longer at Santarem would have insured the -co-operation of Soult. General Pelet says, that the latter marshal, -by engaging in the siege of Badajos and Olivenza, instead of coming -directly down upon the Tagus, was the cause of Massena’s failure; -this can hardly be sustained. Before those sieges and the battle of -the Gebora, Mendizabel could have assembled twenty thousand men on -Soult’s rear, and there was a large body of militia on the Ponçul -and the Elga; Beresford had fourteen thousand British and Portuguese -regulars, besides ordenança; while the infinite number of boats at -lord Wellington’s command would have enabled him to throw troops -upon the left bank of the Tagus, with a celerity that would have -baffled any effort of Massena to assist the duke of Dalmatia. Now, -if the latter had been defeated; with what argument could he have -defended his reputation as a general, after having left three or four -garrisoned fortresses and thirty-five thousand men upon his flank -and rear; to say nothing of the results threatened by the battle of -Barosa. - -The true cause of Massena’s failure was the insufficiency of his -means to oppose the English general’s combinations. The French army -reduced by sickness to forty thousand fighting men, exclusive of -Drouet’s troops at Leiria, would have been unable to maintain its -extended position against the attack meditated by lord Wellington; -and when Massena, through the means of the fidalgos, knew that the -English reinforcements were come, he prepared to retreat. Those -troops landed the 2d of March, and, the 6th, the French had evacuated -the position of Santarem. - -[Sidenote: Muster-Rolls of the French Army.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII.] - -At this time Napoleon directed the armies of Spain to be remodelled. -The king’s force was diminished; the army of the south increased; -general Drouet was ordered to march with eleven thousand men to the -fifth corps, which he was appointed to command, in place of Mortier; -the remainder of the ninth corps was to compose two divisions, under -the command of Clausel and Foy, and to be incorporated with the army -of Portugal. Marmont was appointed to relieve Ney in the command -of the sixth corps; Loison was removed to the second corps; and -Bessieres was ordered to post six thousand men at Ciudad Rodrigo, -to watch the frontiers of Portugal and support Claparede. Of the -imperial guards; seven thousand were to assemble at Zamora, to -hold the Gallicians in check, and the remainder at Valladolid, with -strong parties of cavalry in the space between those places, that -intelligence of what was passing in Portugal might be daily received. -Thus Massena was enabled to adopt any operation that might seem good -to him, without reference to his original base; but the order for the -execution of these measures did not reach the armies until a later -period. - - -RETREAT OF THE FRENCH FROM SANTAREM. - -Several lines of operation were open to the prince of Esling. 1º. He -could pass the Tagus, between Punhete and Abrantes, by boats or by -fords, which were always practicable after a week of dry weather. 2º. -He could retire, by the Sobreira Formosa, upon Castello Branco, and -open a communication with the king by Placentia, and with the duke of -Dalmatia by Alcantara. 3º. He could march, by the Estrada Nova and -Belmonte, to Sabugal, and afterwards act according to circumstances. -4º. He could gain the Mondego, and ascend the left bank of that -river towards Guarda and Almeida; or, crossing it, march upon Oporto -through an untouched country. Of these four plans, the first was -perilous, and the weather too unsettled to be sure of the fords. The -second and third were difficult, from the ruggedness of the Sobreira, -and exposed, because the allies could break out by Abrantes upon the -flank of the army while in retreat. Massena decided on the last, but -his actual position being to the left of the line of retreat, he -was necessarily forced to make a flank movement, with more than ten -thousand sick men and all his stores, under the beard of an adversary -before he could begin his retreat. Yet this he executed, and in a -manner bespeaking the great commander. - -Commencing his preparations by destroying munition, and all guns that -could not be horsed, he passed his sick and baggage, by degrees, -upon Thomar, keeping only his fighting-men in the front, and at the -same time indicating an intention of passing the Zezere. But when -the impediments of the army had gained two marches, Ney suddenly -assembled the sixth corps and the cavalry on the Lys, near Leiria, as -if with the intention of advancing against Torres Vedras, a movement -that necessarily kept lord Wellington in suspense. Meanwhile, the -second and eighth corps, quitting Santarem, Tremes, and Alcanhete, -in the night of the 5th, fell back, by Pernes, upon Torres Novas and -Thomar, destroying the bridges on the Alviella behind them. The next -morning the boats were burnt at Punhete, and Loison retreated by -the road of Espinal to cover the flank of the main line of retreat; -the remainder of the army, by rapid concentric marches, made for a -position in front of Pombal: the line of movement to the Mondego was -thus secured, and four days gained; for lord Wellington, although -aware that a retreat was in execution, was quite unable to take -any decided step, lest he should open the Lines to his adversary. -Nevertheless he had caused Beresford to close to his right on the -5th, and at daylight, on the 6th, discovering the empty camps of -Santarem, followed the enemy closely with his own army. - -Thomar seemed to be the French point of concentration; but as their -boats were still maintained at Punhete, general William Stewart -crossed the Tagus, at Abrantes, with the greatest part of Beresford’s -corps, while the first, fourth, and sixth divisions, and two brigades -of cavalry, marched to Golegao; the light division also reached -Pernes, where the bridge was rapidly repaired by captain Tod, of -the royal staff-corps. The 7th, the enemy having burnt his boats on -the Zezere, the Abrantes bridge was brought down to that river, and -Stewart, crossing, moved to Thomar; on which place the divisions at -Golegao were likewise directed. But the retreat being soon decidedly -pronounced for the Mondego, the troops at Thomar were ordered to -halt; and the light division, German hussars, and royal dragoons -followed the eighth corps, taking two hundred prisoners. - -This day’s march disclosed a horrible calamity. A large house, -situated in an obscure part of the mountains, was discovered, filled -with starving persons. Above thirty women and children had sunk, -and, sitting by the bodies, were fifteen or sixteen survivors, of -whom one only was a man, but all so enfeebled as to be unable to eat -the little food we had to offer them. The youngest had fallen first; -all the children were dead; none were emaciated in the bodies, but -the muscles of the face were invariably drawn transversely, giving -the appearance of laughing, and presenting the most ghastly sight -imaginable. The man seemed most eager for life; the women appeared -patient and resigned, and, even in this distress, had arranged the -bodies of those who first died, with decency and care. - -While one part of the army was thus in pursuit, the third and -fifth divisions moved, from the Lines, upon Leiria; the Abrantes’ -boats fell down the river to Tancos, where a bridge was fixed; and -the second and fourth divisions, and some cavalry, were directed -to return from Thomar to the left bank of the Tagus, to relieve -Badajos: Beresford also, who remained with a part of his corps near -Barca, had already sent a brigade of cavalry to Portalegre for that -purpose. This was on the morning of the 9th; but the enemy, instead -of continuing his retreat, concentrated the sixth and eighth corps -and Montbrun’s cavalry on a table-land, in front of Pombal, where the -light division skirmished with his advanced posts, and the German -horse charged his cavalry with success, taking some prisoners. - -Lord Wellington, finding the French disposed to accept battle, was -now compelled to alter his plans. To fight with advantage, it was -necessary to bring up, from Thomar, the troops destined to relieve -Badajos; not to fight, was giving up to the enemy Coimbra, and the -untouched country behind, as far as Oporto: Massena would thus retire -with the advantages of a conqueror. However, intelligence received -that morning, from Badajos, described it as being in a sufficient -state, and capable of holding out yet a month. This decided the -question. - -The fourth division and the heavy cavalry, already on the march for -the Alemtejo, were countermanded; general Nightingale, with a brigade -of the first division and some horse, was directed by the road of -Espinal, to observe the second corps; and the rest of the army was -concentrically directed upon Pombal. How dangerous a captain Massena -could be, was here proved. His first movement began the 4th, it was -the 11th before a sufficient number of troops could be assembled to -fight him at Pombal, and, during these seven days, he had executed -one of the most difficult operations in war, gained three or four -marches, and completely organized his system of retreat. - - -SKIRMISH AT POMBAL. - -Pack’s brigade and the cavalry, the first, third, fourth, fifth, -sixth, and light divisions, and the Portuguese troops, which were -attached, like the ancient Latin auxiliaries of the Roman legion, -to each British division, were assembling in front of the enemy on -the 10th; when Massena, who had sent his baggage over the Soure -river in the night by the bridge of Pombal, suddenly retired through -that town. He was so closely followed by the light division, that -the streets being still encumbered, Ney drew up a rear-guard on a -height behind the town, and threw a detachment into the old castle -of Pombal. He had, however, waited too long. The French army was -moving in some confusion and in a very extended column of march, by -a narrow defile, between the mountains and the Soure river, which -was fordable; and the British divisions were in rapid motion along -the left bank, with the design of crossing lower down, and cutting -Massena’s line of retreat. But darkness came on too fast, and the -operation terminated with a sharp skirmish at Pombal, whence the -ninety-fifth and the third caçadores of the light division, after -some changes of fortune, drove the French from the castle and town -with such vigour, that the latter could not destroy the bridge, -although it was mined. About forty of the allies were hurt, and the -loss of the enemy was somewhat greater. - -In the night Massena continued his retreat, which now assumed a -regular and concentrated form. The baggage and sick, protected by the -reserve cavalry, marched first; these were followed by the eighth -corps; and the sixth, with some light cavalry, and the best horsed -of the artillery, were destined to stem the pursuit. Ney had been -ordered to detach Marcognet’s brigade on the 10th, from the Lys, to -seize Coimbra; but some delay having taken place, Montbrun was now -appointed for that service. - -Lord Wellington’s immediate object was to save Coimbra, and he -designed, by skilful, rather than daring, operations, to oblige -Massena to quit the Portuguese territory: the moral effect of such an -event, he judged, would be sufficient; but as his reinforcements were -still distant, he was obliged to retain the fourth division and the -heavy cavalry from the relief of Badajos, and was therefore willing -to strike a sudden stroke, if a fair occasion offered. Howbeit the -country was full of strong positions, the roads hollow and confined -by mountains on either hand, every village formed a defile; the -weather also, being moderate, was favourable to the enemy, and Ney, -with a wonderfully happy mixture of courage, readiness, and skill, -illustrated every league of ground by some signal combination of war. - -Day-break, on the 12th, saw both armies in movement, and eight miles -of march, and some slight skirmishing, brought the head of the -British into a hollow way, leading to a high table-land on which Ney -had disposed five thousand infantry, a few squadrons of cavalry, and -some light guns. His centre was opposite the hollow road, his wings -were covered by wooded heights, which he occupied with light troops; -his right rested on the ravine of the Soure, his left on the Redinha, -which circling round his rear fell into the Soure. Behind him the -village of Redinha, situated in a hollow, covered a narrow bridge and -a long and dangerous defile; and, beyond the stream, some very rugged -heights, commanding a view of the position in front of the village, -were occupied by a division of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and -a battery of heavy guns; all so skilfully disposed as to give the -appearance of a very considerable force. - - -COMBAT OF REDINHA. - -After examining the enemy’s position for a short time, lord -Wellington first directed the light division, now commanded by sir -William Erskine, to attack the wooded slopes covering Ney’s right: -in less than an hour these orders were executed. The fifty-second, -the ninety-fifth, and the caçadores, assisted by a company of the -forty-third, carried the ascent and cleared the woods, and their -skirmishers even advanced on to the open plain; but the French -battalions, supported by four guns, immediately opened a heavy -rolling fire, and at the same moment, colonel Ferriere, of the third -French hussars, charged and took fourteen prisoners. This officer, -during the whole campaign, had never failed to break in upon the -skirmishers in the most critical moments; sometimes with a squadron, -sometimes with only a few men; he was, however, sure to be found in -the right place, and was continually proving how much may be done, -even in the most rugged mountains, by a small body of good cavalry. - -Erskine’s line, consisting of five battalions of infantry and six -guns, being now formed in such a manner that it outflanked the French -right, tending towards the ford of the Redinha, was reinforced with -two regiments of dragoons; meanwhile Picton seized the wooded heights -protecting the French left, and thus Ney’s position was laid bare. -Nevertheless, that marshal observing that lord Wellington, deceived -as to his real numbers, was bringing the mass of the allied troops -into line; far from retreating, even charged Picton’s skirmishers, -and continued to hold his ground with an astonishing confidence if -we consider his position; for the third division was nearer to the -village and bridge than his right, and there were already cavalry -and guns enough on the plain to overwhelm him. In this posture both -sides remained for about an hour, when, three shots were fired from -the British centre as a signal for a forward movement, and a most -splendid spectacle of war was exhibited. The woods seemed alive with -troops; and in a few moments thirty thousand men, forming three -gorgeous lines of battle, were stretched across the plain; but -bending on a gentle curve, and moving majestically onwards, while -horsemen and guns, springing forward simultaneously from the centre -and from the left wing, charged under a general volley from the -French battalions: the latter were instantly hidden by the smoke, and -when that cleared away no enemy was to be seen. - -Ney keenly watching the progress of this grand formation, had opposed -Picton’s foremost skirmishers with his left, and, at the same moment, -withdrew the rest of his people with such rapidity, that he gained -the village ere the cavalry could touch him: the utmost efforts of -Picton’s skirmishers and of the horse-artillery scarcely enabled -them to gall the hindmost of the French left with their fire. One -howitzer was, indeed, dismounted close to the bridge, but the village -of Redinha was in flames; and the marshal wishing to confirm the -courage of his soldiers at the commencement of the retreat, in person -superintended the carrying it off: this he effected, yet with the -loss of fifteen or twenty men, and with great danger to himself, for -the British guns were thundering on his rear, and the light troops -of the third division, chasing like heated blood hounds, passed the -river almost at the same time with the French. The reserves of the -latter cannonaded the bridge from the heights beyond, but a fresh -disposition of attack being made by lord Wellington, while the third -division continued to press the left, Ney fell back upon the main -body, then at Condeixa, ten miles in the rear. - -The British had twelve officers and two hundred men killed and -wounded in this combat, and the enemy lost as many; but he might -have been utterly destroyed; for there is no doubt, that the duke -of Elchingen remained a quarter of an hour too long upon his -first position, and that, deceived by the skilful arrangement of -his reserve, lord Wellington paid him too much respect. Yet the -extraordinary facility and precision with which the English general -handled so large a force, was a warning to the French commander, and -produced a palpable effect upon the after operations. - -On the 13th, the allies renewed the pursuit, and before ten o’clock -discovered the French army, the second corps which was at Espinhal -excepted, in order of battle. The crisis of Massena’s retreat had -arrived, the defiles of Condeixa, leading upon Coimbra, were behind -him; those of Miranda de Corvo, leading to the Puente de Murcella, -were on his left; and in the fork of these two roads Ney was seated -on a strong range of heights covered by a marsh, his position being -only to be approached by the highway leading through a deep hollow -against his right. Trees were felled to obstruct the passage; a -palisado was constructed across the hollow; breast-works were thrown -up on each side, and Massena expected to stop the pursuit, while -Montbrun seized Coimbra: for he designed to pass the Mondego, and -either capture Oporto or maintain a position between the Douro and -the Mondego, until the operations of Soult should draw the British -away; or until the advance of Bessieres with the army of the north, -should enable himself again to act offensively. Hitherto the French -general had appeared the abler tactician, but now his adversary -assumed the superiority. - -When at Thomar lord Wellington had sent Baccellar orders to look to -the security of Oporto, and had directed Wilson and Trant also to -abandon the Mondego and the Vouga the moment the fords were passable, -retiring across the Douro; breaking up the roads as they retreated, -and taking care to remove or to destroy all boats and means of -transport. Now, Wilson was in march for the Vouga, but Trant having -destroyed an arch of the Coimbra bridge on the city side, and placed -guards at the fords as far as Figueras, resolved to oppose the -enemy’s passage; for the sound of guns had reached his outposts, the -river was rising, and he felt assured that the allied army was close -upon the heels of the enemy. - -[Sidenote: Campagne des Français en Portugal.] - -As early as the evening of the 11th, the French appeared at the -suburb of Santa Clara, and a small party of their dragoons actually -forded the Mondego at Pereiras that day: on the 12th, some French -officers examined the bridge of Coimbra, but a cannon-shot from the -other side wounded one of them, and a general skirmish took place -along the banks of the river, during which a party attempting to -feel their way along the bridge, were scattered by a round of grape. -The fords were, however, actually practicable for cavalry, and there -were not more than two or three hundred militia and a few guns at the -bridge; for Baccellar had obliged Trant to withdraw the greatest part -of his force on the 11th; nevertheless the latter opposed the enemy -with the remainder, and it would appear that the French imagined the -reinforcement, which reached Lisbon the 2d of March, had been sent -by sea to the Mondego and was in Coimbra. This was an error. Coimbra -was saved by the same man and the same militia that had captured it -during the advance. - -Montbrun sent his report to Massena early on the 13th, and the latter -too readily crediting his opinion of Trant’s strength, relinquished -the idea of passing the Mondego, and determined to retire by the -Puente de Murcella: but to ensure the power of changing his front, -and to secure his communication with Reynier and Loison, he had -carried Clausel’s division to Fonte Coberta, a village about five -miles on his left; situated at the point where the Anciao road -falls into that leading to Murcella. There Loison rejoined him, and -being thus pivotted on the Anciao Sierra, and covering the line of -communication with the second corps while Ney held Condeixa, he -considered his position secure. His baggage was, however, observed -filing off by the Murcella road when the allies first came upon Ney, -and lord Wellington instantly comprehending the state of affairs, as -instantly detached the third division by a very difficult path over -the Sierra de Anciao to turn the enemy’s left. - -For some time all appeared quiet in the French lines. Massena, in -repairing to Fonte Coberta, had left Ney orders, it is said, to fire -Condeixa at a certain hour when all the divisions were simultaneously -to concentrate at Casal Nova, in a second position, perpendicular -to the first, and covering the road to Puente Murcella. But towards -three o’clock Picton was descried winding round the bluff end of a -mountain, about eight miles distant, and as he was already beyond the -French left, instant confusion pervaded their camp: a thick smoke -arose from Condeixa, the columns were seen hurrying towards Casal -Nova; and the British immediately pushed forward. The felled trees -and other obstacles impeded their advance at first, and a number of -fires, simultaneously kindled, covered the retreating troops with -smoke, while the flames of Condeixa stopped the artillery, hence the -skirmishers and some cavalry only could close with the rear of the -enemy, but so rapidly, as to penetrate between the division at Fonte -Coberta and the rest of the French; and it is affirmed that the -prince of Esling, who was on the road, only escaped capture by taking -the feathers out of his hat and riding through some of the light -troops. - -Condeixa being thus evacuated, the British cavalry pushed towards -Coimbra, opened the communication with Trant, and cutting off -Montbrun, captured a part of his horsemen. The rest of the army -kindled their fires, and the light division planted piquets close up -to the enemy; but, about ten at night, the French divisions, whose -presence at Fonte Coberta was unknown to lord Wellington, stole out, -and passing close along the front of the British posts, made for -Miranda de Corvo. The noise of their march was heard, but the night -was dark, it was imagined to be the moving of the French baggage to -the rear, and being so reported to sir William Erskine, that officer, -without any further inquiry, put the light division in march at -day-light on the 14th. - - -COMBAT OF CASAL NOVA. - -The morning was so obscured that nothing could be descried at the -distance of a hundred feet, but the sound of a great multitude was -heard on the hills in front; and it being evident that the French -were there in force, many officers represented the rashness of thus -advancing without orders and in such a fog; but Erskine, with an -astounding negligence, sent the fifty-second forward in a simple -column of sections, without a vanguard or other precaution, and even -before the piquets had come in from their posts. The road dipped -suddenly, descending into a valley, and the regiment was immediately -lost in the mist, which was so thick, that the troops unconsciously -passing the enemy’s outposts had like to have captured Ney himself, -whose bivouac was close to the piquets. The riflemen followed in a -few moments, and the rest of the division was about to plunge into -the same gulf; when the rattling of musketry and the booming of -round shot were heard, and the vapour slowly rising, discovered the -fifty-second on the slopes of the opposite mountain, engaged, without -support, in the midst of the enemy’s army. - -At this moment lord Wellington arrived. His design had been to turn -the left of the French, for their front position was very strong, -and behind it they occupied the ridges, in succession, to the Deuca -river and the defiles of Miranda de Corvo. There was, however, a -road leading from Condeixa to Espinhal, and the fourth division was -already in march by it for Panella, having orders, to communicate -with Nightingale; to attack Reynier; and to gain the sources of the -Deuca and Ceira rivers: between the fourth division and Casal Nova -the third division was more directly turning the enemy’s left flank; -and meanwhile the main body was coming up to the front, but as it -marched in one column, required time to reach the field. Howbeit -Erskine’s error forced on this action, and the whole of the light -division were pushed forward to succour the fifty-second. - -The enemy’s ground was so extensive, and his skirmishers so thick -and so easily supported, that, in a little time, the division was -necessarily stretched out in one thin thread, and closely engaged in -every part, without any reserve; nor could it even thus present an -equal front, until Picton sent the riflemen, of the sixtieth, to -prolong the line. Nevertheless, the fight was vigorously maintained -amidst the numerous stone enclosures on the mountain side; some -advantages were even gained, and the right of the enemy was partially -turned; yet the main position could not be shaken, until Picton near -and Cole further off, had turned it by the left. Then, the first, -fifth, and sixth divisions, the heavy cavalry, and the artillery, -came up on the centre, and Ney commenced his retreat, covering his -rear with guns and light troops, and retiring from ridge to ridge -with admirable precision, and, for a long time, without confusion and -with very little loss. Towards the middle of the day, however, the -British guns and the skirmishers got within range of his masses, and -the retreat became more rapid and less orderly; yet he finally gained -the strong pass of Miranda de Corvo, which had been secured by the -main body of the French. - -Montbrun also rejoined the army at Miranda. He had summoned Coimbra -on the 13th at noon, and, without waiting for an answer, passed -over the mountain and gained the right bank of the Deuca by a very -difficult march. The loss of the light division this day was eleven -officers and a hundred and fifty men; that of the enemy was greater, -and about a hundred prisoners were taken. - -During the action of the 14th, Reynier, seeing the approach of the -fourth division, hastily abandoned Panella; and Cole having effected -a junction with Nightingale, passed the Deuca; when Massena fearing -lest they should gain his rear, set fire to the town of Miranda, -and passed the Ceira that night. His whole army was now compressed -and crowded in one narrow line, between the higher sierras and the -Mondego; and to lighten the march, he destroyed a great quantity of -ammunition and baggage; yet his encumbrances were still so heavy, and -the confusion in his army so great, that he directed Ney to cover the -passage with a few battalions; yet charged him not to risk an action. -Ney, however, disregarding this order, kept on the left bank, ten or -twelve battalions, a brigade of cavalry, and some guns. - - -COMBAT OF FOZ D’ARONCE. - -The 15th, the weather was so obscure that the allies could not reach -the Ceira, before four o’clock in the evening, and the troops, as -they came up, proceeded to kindle fires for the night; thinking that -Ney’s position being strong, nothing would be done. The French right -rested on some thickly wooded and rugged ground, and their left upon -the village of Foz d’Aronce, but lord Wellington, having cast a rapid -glance over it, directed the light division, and Pack’s brigade, to -hold the right in play, ordered the third division against the left, -and at the same moment the horse-artillery, galloping forward to a -rising ground, opened with a great and sudden effect. Ney’s left -wing being surprised and overthrown by the first charge of the third -division, dispersed in a panic, and fled in such confusion towards -the river, that some, missing the fords, rushed into the deeps and -were drowned, and others crowding on the bridge were crushed to -death. On the right the ground was so rugged and close that the -action resolved itself into a skirmish, and thus Ney was enabled to -use some battalions to check the pursuit of his left, but meanwhile -darkness came on and the French troops in their disorder fired on -each other. Only four officers and sixty men fell on the side of the -British. The enemy’s loss was not less than five hundred, of which -one-half were drowned; and an eagle was afterwards found in the bed -of the river when the waters subsided. - -In the night Massena retired behind the Alva; yet Ney, -notwithstanding this disastrous combat, maintained the left bank of -the Ceira, until every encumbrance had passed; and then blowing up -seventy feet of the bridge, sent his corps on, but remained himself, -with a weak rear guard, on the opposite bank. Thus terminated the -first part of the retreat from Santarem, during which the French -commander, if we except his errors with regard to Coimbra, displayed -infinite ability, but withal a harsh and ruthless spirit. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Despatches] - -I pass over the destruction of Redinha, Condeixa, Miranda de -Corvo, and many villages on the route; the burning of those towns -covered the retrograde movements of the army, and something must be -attributed to the disorder, which usually attends a forced retreat: -but the town of Leiria, and the convent of Alcobaça, were given to -the flames by express orders from the French head-quarters; and, -although the laws of war rigorously interpreted, authorize such -examples when the inhabitants take arms, it can only be justly -done, for the purpose of overawing the people, and not from a -spirit of vengeance when abandoning the country. But every horror -that could make war hideous attended this dreadful march! Distress, -conflagrations, death, in all modes! from wounds, from fatigue, from -water, from the flames, from starvation! On every side unlimited -violence, unlimited vengeance! I myself saw a peasant hounding on -his dog, to devour the dead and dying; and the spirit of cruelty -once unchained smote even the brute creation. On the 15th the French -general, to diminish the encumbrances of his march, ordered a number -of beasts of burthen to be destroyed; the inhuman fellow, charged -with the execution, hamstringed five hundred asses and left them to -starve, and thus they were found by the British army on that day. -The mute but deep expression of pain and grief, visible in these -poor creatures’ looks, wonderfully roused the fury of the soldiers; -and so little weight has reason with the multitude, when opposed by -a momentary sensation, that no quarter would have been given to any -prisoner at that moment. Excess of feeling would have led to direct -cruelty. This shews how dangerous it is in war to listen to the -passions at all, since the most praiseworthy could be thus perverted -by an accidental combination of circumstances. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -On the 16th the allies halted, partly because the Ceira was -swollen and unfordable, partly from the extreme exhaustion of the -troops who had suffered far greater privations than the enemy. The -latter, following his custom, carried fifteen days’ bread; the -allies depended upon a commissariat, which broke down under the -difficulties; not from any deficiency in the chief (Mr. Kennedy), who -was distinguished alike for zeal, probity, and talent; but from the -ill conduct of the Portuguese government; who, deaf to the repeated -representations of lord Wellington and Beresford, would neither feed -the Portuguese troops regularly while at Santarem, nor fill their -magazines, nor collect the means of transport for the march. Hence, -after passing Pombal, the greater part of the native force had been -unable to continue the pursuit; and the brigades under general Pack -and colonel Ashworth, which did keep up and engaged daily with the -enemy, were actually four days without food of any sort. Numbers died -of inanition on the roads, and to save the whole from destruction, -the British supplies were shared with them. The commissary-general’s -means were thus overlaid, the whole army suffered, and an imperative -necessity obliged lord Wellington to halt. Nevertheless he had saved -Coimbra, forced the enemy into a narrow, intricate, and ravaged -country, and, with an inferior force, turned him out of every strong -position; and this, by a series of movements, based on the soundest -principles of war. For, noting the skill and tenacity with which -Massena and Ney clung to every league of ground and every ridge -defensible, against superior numbers, he seized the higher slopes -of the mountains by Picton’s flank march on the 13th; and again by -Cole’s on the 14th; and thus, continually menacing the passes in -rear of the French, obliged them to abandon positions which could -scarcely have been forced: and this method of turning the strength -of the country to profit is the true key to mountain warfare. He who -receives battle in the hills has always the advantage; and he who -first seizes the important points chooses his own field of battle. - -In saying an inferior force, I advert to the state of the Portuguese -army and to Badajos; for lord Wellington, having saved Coimbra, and -seen that the French would not accept a general battle, except on -very advantageous terms, had detached a brigade of cavalry, some -guns, and a division of native infantry, from Condeixa, to the -Alemtejo. He had, therefore, actually less than twenty-five thousand -men in hand, during the subsequent operations. In the night of the -13th, also, he received intelligence that Badajos had surrendered, -and, feeling all the importance of this event, detached the fourth -division likewise to the Alemtejo, for he designed that Beresford -should immediately retake the lost fortress: but, as the road of -Espinhal was the shortest line to the Tagus, general Cole, as we have -seen, moved into it by Panella, thus threatening Massena’s flank and -rear at the same moment that he gained a march towards his ultimate -destination. Meanwhile, Trant and Wilson, with the militia, moving -up the right bank of the Mondego, parallel to the enemy’s line of -retreat, forbad his foragers to pass that river, and were at hand -either to interfere between him and Oporto, or to act against his -flank and rear. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 9.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -Such were the dispositions of the English general; but the military -horizon was still clouded. Intelligence came from the north that -Bessieres, after providing for his government, had been able to -draw together, at Zamora, above seven thousand men, and menaced an -invasion of Gallicia; and, although Mahi had an army of sixteen -thousand men, lord Wellington anticipated no resistance. In the -south, affairs were even more gloomy. The battle of Barosa, the -disputes which followed, and the conduct of Imas and Mendizabel, -proved that, from Spain, no useful co-operation was ever to be -expected. Mortier, also, had invested Campo Mayor, and it was hardly -expected to hold out until Beresford arrived. The Spaniards, to whom -it had been delivered, under an engagement of honour, entered into -by Romana, to keep it against the enemy, had disloyally neglected -and abandoned it at the very moment when Badajos fell, and two -hundred Portuguese militia, thrown in at the moment, had to defend -this fortress, which required a garrison of five thousand regulars. -Nor was the enemy, immediately in the British front, the last to be -considered. - -Ney withdrew from the Ceira in the evening of the 16th, and on the -17th the light division forded that river with great difficulty, -while the rest of the army passed over a trestle bridge, thrown in -the night by the staff-corps. The French were, however, again in -position immediately behind the Alva and on the Sierra de Moita, -and they destroyed the Ponte Murcella and the bridge near Pombeira; -while the second corps moved towards the upper part of the river, -and Massena spread his foraging parties to a considerable distance, -designing to halt for several days. Nevertheless the first, third, -and fifth divisions were directed on the 18th, by the Sierra de St. -Quiteria, to menace the French left, and they made way over the -mountains with a wonderful perseverance and strength, while the sixth -and light divisions cannonaded the enemy on the Lower Alva. - -As the upper course of the river, now threatened by lord Wellington’s -right, was parallel to the line of Massena’s retreat, that marshal -recalled the second corps, and, quitting the Lower Alva also, -concentrated on the Sierra de Moita, lest the divisions, moving up -the river, should cross, and fall on his troops while separated and -in march. It then behoved the allies to concentrate also, lest the -heads of their columns should be crushed by the enemy’s masses. -The Alva was deep, wide, and rapid, yet the staff-corps succeeded -in forming a most ingenious raft-bridge, and the light division -immediately passed between Ponte Murcella and Pombeira; and at the -same time the right wing of the army entered Arganil, while Trant and -Wilson closed on the other side of the Mondego. - -Massena now recommenced his retreat with great rapidity, and being -desirous to gain Celerico and the defiles leading upon Guarda -betimes, he again destroyed baggage and ammunition, and abandoned -even his more distant foraging parties, who were intercepted and -taken, to the number of eight hundred, in returning to the Alva: -for lord Wellington, seeing the success of his combinations, had -immediately directed all his columns upon Moita, and the whole army -was assembled there the 19th. The pursuit was renewed the 20th, -through Penhancos, but only with the light division and the cavalry; -the communication was, however, again opened with Wilson and Trant -who had reached the bridge of Fornos, and with Silveira, who was -about Trancoso. The third and sixth divisions followed in reserve, -but the remainder of the army halted at Moita, until provisions, -sent by sea from Lisbon to the Mondego, could come up to them. The -French reached Celerico the 21st, with two corps and the cavalry, -and immediately opened the communication with Almeida, by posting -detachments of horse on the Pinhel, and at the same time Reynier, who -had retired through Govea, occupied Guarda with the second corps. - -Massena had now regained his original base of operations, and his -retreat may be said to have terminated; but he was far from wishing -to re-enter Spain, where he could only appear as a baffled general, -and shorn of half his authority; because Bessieres commanded the -northern provinces, which, at the commencement of the invasion, -had been under himself. Hence, anxious to hold on to Portugal, -and that his previous retreat might appear as a mere change of -position, he formed the design of throwing all his sick men and other -incumbrances into Almeida, and then, passing the Estrella at Guarda, -make a countermarch, through Sabugal and Pena Macor, to the Elga; -establishing a communication across the Tagus with Soult, and by the -valley of the Tagus with the king. - -[Sidenote: General Pelet’s Notes. See Vol. xxi. Victoires et -Conquêtes des Français.] - -But now the factions in his army had risen to such a height that he -could no longer command the obedience of his lieutenants; Montbrun, -Junot, Drouet, Reynier, and Ney were all at variance with each other -and with him. The first had, in the beginning of the retreat, been -requested to secure Coimbra; instead of which he quitted Portugal, -carrying with him Claparede’s division; Marcognet’s brigade was then -ordered for that operation, but it did not move; finally, Montbrun -undertook it, and failed in default of vigour. Junot was disabled by -his wound, but his faction did not the less shew their discontent. -Reynier’s dislike to the prince was so strong, that the officers -carrying flags of truce, from his corps, never failed to speak of it -to the British; and Ney, more fierce than all of them, defied his -authority. To him the dangerous delay at Pombal, the tardiness of -Marcognet’s brigade, and, finally, the too-sudden evacuation of the -position at Condeixa, have been attributed: and it is alleged that, -far from being ordered to set fire to that town on the 13th, as the -signal for a preconcerted retreat, that he had promised Massena to -maintain the position for twenty-four hours longer. The personal -risk of the latter, in consequence of the hasty change of position, -would seem to confirm this; but it is certain that, when Picton was -observed passing the Sierra de Anciao by a road before unknown to the -French, and by which the second corps could have been separated from -the army, and the passes of Miranda de Corvo seized, Ney would have -been frantic to have delayed his movement. - -At Miranda, the long gathering anger broke out in a violent -altercation between the prince and the marshal; and at Celerico, -Ney, wishing to fall back on Almeida, to shorten the term of the -retreat, absolutely refused to concur in the projected march to -Coria; and even marched his troops in a contrary direction. Massena, -a man not to be opposed with impunity, then deprived him of his -command, giving the sixth corps to Loison; and each marshal sent -confidential officers to Paris to justify their conduct to the -emperor. From both of those officers I have derived information, -but as each thinks that the conduct of his general was approved by -Napoleon, their opinions are irreconcilable upon many points; I have, -therefore, set down in the narrative the leading sentiments of each, -without drawing any other conclusions than those deducible from the -acknowledged principles of art and from unquestioned facts. Thus -judging, it appears that Massena’s general views were as superior to -Ney’s as the latter’s readiness and genius in the handling of troops -in action were superior to the prince’s. Yet the duke of Elchingen -often played too near the flame, whereas nothing could be grander -than the conceptions of Massena: nor was the project now meditated by -him the least important. - -From Guarda to Zarza Mayor and Coria was not two days longer march -than to Ciudad Rodrigo, but the army of Portugal must have gone to -the latter place a beaten army, seeking for refuge and succour in its -fortresses and reserves, and being separated from the central line of -invasion: whereas, by gaining Coria, a great movement of war, wiping -out the notion of a forced retreat, would have been accomplished. -A close and concentric direction would also have been given to the -three armies of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal; and -a powerful demonstration effected against Lisbon, which would -inevitably bring lord Wellington back to the Tagus. Thus the -conquests of the campaign, namely, Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeida, Badajos, -and Olivenza, would have been preserved, and meanwhile the army of -the north could have protected Castile and menaced the frontier of -Portugal. Massena, having maturely considered this plan, gave orders, -on the 23d, for the execution; but Ney, as we have seen, thwarted him. - -Meanwhile the English horse and the militia, hovering round Celerico, -made, in different skirmishes, a hundred prisoners, and killed as -many more; and the French cavalry posts withdrew from the Pinhel. -The sixth corps then took a position at Guarda; the second corps at -Belmonte; the eighth corps and the cavalry in the eastern valleys of -the Estrella. - -Ney’s insubordination had rendered null the plan of marching upon the -Elga; but Massena expected still to maintain himself at Guarda with -the aid of the army of the south, and to hold open the communications -with the king and with Soult. His foragers had gathered provisions -in the western valleys of the Estrella, and he calculated upon being -able to keep his position for eight days with his own force alone; -and, independent of the general advantage, it was essential to hold -Guarda for some time, because Drouet had permitted Julian Sanchez -to cut off a large convoy destined for Ciudad Rodrigo, and had left -Almeida with only ten days’ provisions. Lord Wellington’s ready -boldness, however, disarranged all the prince’s calculations. - -The troops had come up from Moita on the 28th, and with them the -reinforcements, which were organized as a seventh division. - -The light division and the cavalry then passed the Mondego at -Celerico, and, driving the French out of Frexadas, occupied the -villages beyond that place: at the same time, the militia took post -on the Pinhel river, cutting the communication with Almeida, while -the third division was established at Porca de Misarella, half way up -the mountain, to secure the bridges over the higher Mondego. Early on -the 29th the third, sixth, and light divisions, and two regiments of -light cavalry, disposed in five columns of attack on a half circle -round the foot of the Guarda mountain, ascended by as many paths, all -leading upon the town of Guarda, and outflanking both the right and -left of the enemy; they were supported on one wing by the militia, -on the other by the fifth division, and in the centre by the first -and seventh divisions. A battle was expected, but the absence of Ney -was at once felt by both armies; the appearance of the allied columns -threw the French into the greatest confusion, and, without firing a -shot, this great and nearly impregnable position was abandoned. Had -the pursuit been as vigorous as the attack, it is not easy to see how -the second corps could have rejoined Massena; but Reynier quitting -Belmonte in the night, recovered his communication with a loss of -only three hundred prisoners, although the horse-artillery and -cavalry had been launched against him at daylight on the 30th. Much -more could however have been done, if general Slade had pushed his -cavalry forward with the celerity and vigour the occasion required. - -On the 1st of April, the allied army descended the mountains, and -reached the Coa; but the French general, anxious to maintain at -once his hold of Portugal and the power of operating either on the -side of Coria or of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, was in position on -the right bank of that river. The sixth corps was at Rovina, with -detachments guarding the bridge of Seceiras and the ford of Atalayon, -and the communication with Almeida was maintained by a brigade of -the ninth corps, which was posted near the ford of Junça. The second -corps was on the hills behind Sabugal, stretching towards Alfayates, -but having strong detachments at the bridge of Sabugal and the ford -of Rapoulha de Coa. The eighth corps was at Alfayates, and a post was -established at Rendo to maintain the communication between the second -and the sixth corps. In this situation, the French army was disposed -on two sides of a triangle, the apex of which was at Sabugal, and -both fronts were covered by the Coa, because Sabugal was situated -in a sharp bend of the stream: by holding Alfayates, Massena also -commanded the passes leading through St. Martin Trebeja to Coria. - -Along the whole course of the Coa, which is a considerable river, the -banks are rugged, but the ravine continually deepens as the stream -flows; and, during the first two days of April, the allies occupied -a line parallel to the enemy’s right, which could not be attacked. -Meanwhile Trant and Wilson, passing the Coa below Almeida, penetrated -between that fortress and Ciudad Rodrigo, as if the passage of -the river was to be made on that side. Lord Wellington’s aim was, -however, against the other flank, and, to protect the left and rear -of the army, he placed the sixth division opposite the sixth corps, -and a battalion of the seventh division at the bridge of Seceiras. - -At daylight, on the 3d of April the cavalry under general Slade, -being on the extreme right, was directed to cross the Upper Coa; the -light division was ordered to ford a little below; the third division -still lower; and the fifth division, with the artillery, to force -the bridge of Sabugal; the first and seventh, with the exception of -the battalion at Seceiras, were held in reserve. The English general -having thus, ten thousand men pivotted on the fifth division at -Sabugal, designed to turn Reynier’s left, to separate him from the -eighth corps, and to surround him before he could be succoured by the -sixth corps. One of those accidents which are frequent in war marred -this well-concerted plan, and brought on the - - -COMBAT OF SABUGAL. - -The morning was so foggy, that the troops could not gain their -respective posts of attack with that simultaneous regularity which is -so essential to success; and in the light division no measures were -taken by sir William Erskine to put the columns in a right direction: -the brigades were not even held together, and he carried off the -cavalry and the third caçadores without communicating with colonel -Beckwith. This officer, who commanded the first brigade, being -without any instructions, halted at a ford to await further orders, -and at that moment a staff officer rode up, and somewhat hastily -asked, why he did not attack? The thing appeared rash, but with an -enemy in his front he could make no reply, and instantly passing -the river, which was deep and rapid, mounted a very steep wooded -hill on the other side. Four companies of the ninety-fifth led in -skirmishing order, and were followed by the forty-third regiment; -but the caçadores and the other brigade, being in movement to the -true point, were already distant, and a dark heavy rain setting in -rendered it impossible for some time to distinguish friends or foes. -The attack was thus made too soon, for, owing to the obscurity, none -of the divisions of the army had reached their respective posts. It -was made also in a partial, disseminated, and dangerous manner, and -on the wrong point; for Reynier’s whole corps was directly in front, -and Beckwith, having only one bayonet regiment and four companies of -riflemen, was advancing against more than twelve thousand infantry, -supported by cavalry and artillery. - -Scarcely had the riflemen reached the top of the hill, when a compact -and strong body of French drove them back upon the forty-third; the -weather cleared at that instant, and Beckwith at once saw and felt -all his danger; but he met it with a heart that nothing could shake. -Leading a fierce charge he beat back the enemy, and the summit of the -hill was attained, but at the same moment two French guns opened with -grape at the distance of a hundred yards, a fresh body appeared in -front, and considerable forces came on either flank of the regiment. -Fortunately, Reynier, little expecting to be attacked, had for the -convenience of water, placed his principal masses in the low ground -behind the height on which the action commenced; his renewed attack -was therefore up hill; yet the musketry, heavy from the beginning, -now encreased to a storm; the French sprung up the acclivity with -great clamour, and it was evident that nothing but the most desperate -fighting could save the regiment from destruction. - -Captain Hopkins, commanding a flank company of the forty-third, -immediately ran out to the right, and with admirable presence of mind -seized a small eminence, close to the French guns and commanding -the ascent up which the French troops turning the right flank were -approaching. His first fire was so sharp, that the assailants were -thrown into confusion; they rallied and were again disordered by the -volleys of this company; a third time they endeavoured to form a head -of attack; when Hopkins with a sudden charge increased the disorder, -and at the same moment the two battalions of the fifty-second -regiment, which had been attracted by the fire, entered the line. -Meanwhile, the centre and left of the forty-third were furiously -engaged and wonderfully excited; for Beckwith wounded in the head, -and with the blood streaming down his face, rode amongst the foremost -of the skirmishers, directing all with ability, and praising the men, -in a loud cheerful tone. - -The musket-bullets flew thicker and closer every instant, but the -French fell fast, a second charge cleared the hill, a howitzer was -taken, and the British skirmishers were even advanced a short way -down the descent, when small bodies of French cavalry came galloping -in from all parts, and obliged them to take refuge with the main body -of the regiment. The English line was instantly formed behind a stone -wall above; yet one squadron of dragoons surmounted the ascent, and, -with incredible desperation, riding up to this wall, were in the act -of firing over it with their pistols, when a rolling volley laid -nearly the whole of them lifeless on the ground. By this time however -a second and stronger column of infantry had rushed up the face of -the hill, endeavouring to break in and retake the howitzer which was -on the edge of the descent and only fifty yards from the wall; but no -man could reach it and live, so deadly was the forty-third’s fire. -Meanwhile two English guns came into action, and the two battalions -of the fifty-second charging upon the flank of the assailants, -vindicated the right of the division to the height. A squadron of -French cavalry, which had followed the columns in their last attack, -then fell in amongst the fifty-second men, extended as they were from -the circumstances of the action, and at first created considerable -confusion, but it was finally repulsed. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 10._ - - MASSENA’S RETREAT - Combat of Sabugal - 1811. - - _London Published by T. & W. BOONE Nov^r 1830._] - -[Sidenote: Official Despatch.] - -Reynier, convinced at last that he had acted unskilfully in sending -up his troops piece-meal, put all his reserves, amounting to nearly -six thousand infantry with artillery and cavalry, in motion, and -outflanking the division on its left, appeared resolute to storm the -contested height. But, at this critical period, the fifth division -passed the bridge of Sabugal, the British cavalry appeared on the -hills beyond the enemy’s left, and general Colville with the leading -brigade of the third division issuing out of the woods on Reynier’s -right, opened a fire on that flank, which instantly decided the fate -of the day. The French general hastily retreated upon Rendo, where -the sixth corps, which had been put in march when the first shots -were heard, met him, and together they fell back upon Alfayates, -pursued by the English cavalry. The loss of the allies in this bloody -encounter, which did not last quite an hour, was nearly two hundred -killed and wounded, that of the enemy was enormous; three hundred -dead bodies were heaped together on the hill, the greatest part round -the captured howitzer, and more than twelve hundred were wounded; -so unwisely had Reynier handled his masses and so true and constant -was the English fire. Although, the principal causes of this -disproportion undoubtedly was, first, the heavy rain which gave the -French only a partial view of the British, and secondly, the thick -wood which ended near the top of hill, leaving an open and exposed -space upon which the enemy mounted after the first attack; yet it was -no exaggeration in lord Wellington to say, “that this was one of the -most glorious actions that British troops were ever engaged in.” - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 2.] - -The next day, the light division took the route of Valdespina, to -feel for the enemy on the side of the passes leading upon Coria; -but Massena was in full retreat for Ciudad Rodrigo, and on the 5th -crossed the frontier of Portugal. Here the vigour of the French -discipline on sudden occasions was surprisingly manifested. Those men -who had for months been living by rapine, whose retreat had been one -continued course of violence and devastation, passed an imaginary -line of frontier, and became the most orderly of soldiers; not the -slightest rudeness was offered to any Spaniard, and every thing -demanded was scrupulously paid for, although bread was sold at two -shillings a pound! Massena himself also, fierce and terrible as he -was in Portugal, always treated the Spaniards with gentleness and -moderation. - -While these events were passing at Sabugal, Trant crossing the -Lower Coa with four thousand militia, had taken post two miles from -Almeida, when the river suddenly flooded behind him. Near fort -Conception, there was a brigade of the ninth corps, which had been -employed to cover the march of the battering train from Almeida to -Ciudad Rodrigo; but ere those troops discovered Trant’s dangerous -situation, he constructed a temporary bridge and was going to retire -on the 6th, when he received a letter from the British head-quarters, -desiring him to be vigilant in cutting the communication with -Almeida, and fearless, because the next day a British force would be -up to his assistance. Marching then to Val de Mula, he interposed -between the fortress and the brigade of the ninth corps. The latter -were already within half a mile of his position, and his destruction -appeared inevitable; but suddenly two cannon shots were heard to -the southward, the enemy immediately formed squares and commenced a -retreat, and six squadrons of British cavalry and Bull’s troop of -horse-artillery came sweeping over the plain in their rear. Military -order and coolness, marked the French retreat across the Turones, -yet the cannon shots ploughed with a fearful effect through their -dense masses, and the horsemen continually flanked their line of -march: they however gained the rough ground, and finally escaped -over the Agueda by Barba del Puerco; but with the loss of three -hundred men killed, wounded, and prisoners. The prince of Esling -had reached Ciudad Rodrigo two days before, and lord Wellington now -stood victorious on the confines of Portugal, having executed what to -others appeared incredibly rash and vain even to attempt. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -Massena entered Portugal with sixty-five thousand men; his -reinforcements while at Santarem were about ten thousand; he repassed -the frontier with forty-five thousand; hence the invasion of Portugal -cost him about thirty thousand men, of which fourteen thousand might -have fallen by the sword or been taken. Not more than six thousand -were lost during the retreat; but had lord Wellington, unrestrained -by political considerations, attacked him vigorously at Redinha, -Condeixa, Casal Nova, and Miranda de Corvo, half the French army -would have been lost. It is unquestionable that a retreating army -should fight as little as possible. - -When Massena reached the Agueda, his cavalry detachments, heavy -artillery, and convalescents, again augmented his army to more than -fifty thousand men, but the fatigues of the retreat and the want -of provisions, would not suffer him to shew a front to the allies; -wherefore, drawing two hundred thousand rations from Ciudad, he fell -back to Salamanca, and lord Wellington invested Almeida. The light -division occupied Gallegos and Espeja, the rest of the army were -disposed in villages on both sides of the Coa, and the head-quarters -were transferred to Villa Formosa. - -Here colonel Waters, who had been taken near Belmonte during the -retreat, rejoined the army. Confident in his own resources, he had -refused his parole, and, when carried to Ciudad Rodrigo, rashly -mentioned his intention of escaping to the Spaniard in whose house -he was lodged. This man betrayed him; but a servant, detesting his -master’s treachery, secretly offered his aid, and Waters coolly -desired him to get the rowels of his spurs sharpened. When the French -army was near Salamanca, Waters, being in the custody of _gens -d’armes_, waited until their chief, who rode the only good horse in -the party, had alighted, then giving the spur to his own beast, he -galloped off! an act of incredible resolution and hardihood, for he -was on a large plain, and before him, and for miles behind him, the -road was covered with the French columns. His hat fell off, and, -thus distinguished, he rode along the flank of the troops, some -encouraging him, others firing at him, and the _gens d’armes_, sword -in hand, close at his heels; but suddenly breaking at full speed, -between two columns, he gained a wooded hollow, and, having baffled -his pursuers, evaded the rear of the enemy’s army. The third day he -reached head-quarters, where lord Wellington had caused his baggage -to be brought, observing that he would not be long absent. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII.] - -Massena, having occupied Salamanca, and communicated with Bessieres, -sent a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, and lord Wellington was unable -to prevent its entrance. He had sent the militia to their homes, -disposed his army between the Coa and the Agueda, and blockaded -Almeida; but the Portuguese regulars were in a dreadful state, and -daily decreasing in numbers; while the continued misconduct of -the Regency, and the absolute want of money gave no hope of any -amelioration; it was therefore impossible to take a position beyond -the Agueda. - -The depôts were re-established at Lamego on the Douro, and at Raiva -on the Mondego; and magazines of consumption were formed at Celerico, -from whence the mule-brigades brought up the provisions by the way -of Castello Bom: measures were also taken at Guarda, Pena Macor, and -Castello Branco, to form commissariat establishments which were to be -supplied from Abrantes. But the transport of stores was difficult, -and this consideration, combined with the capricious nature of -the Agueda and Coa, rendered it dangerous to blockade both Ciudad -Rodrigo and Almeida; seeing that the troops would have those rivers -behind them, while the position itself would be weak and extended. -The blockade of Almeida was undertaken because, from intercepted -letters and other sources, it was known to have provisions only for -a fortnight; but the operation formed no part of the plan which lord -Wellington was now revolving in his mind, and he was even prepared to -relinquish it altogether if hardly pressed. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, May 7th, 1810. MSS.] - -The success in Portugal had given stability to the English ministers; -and it would appear that they at first meant to limit their future -efforts to the defence of that country, for lord Liverpool required -the return of many battalions. But offensive warfare in Spain, -occupied the general’s thoughts, and two lines of operation had -presented themselves to his mind.--1º. Under the supposition that it -would be long ere Massena could again make any serious attempt on -Portugal; to remain on the defensive in Beira, and march against the -army of the South to raise the siege of Cadiz. 2º. If Almeida fell -to the blockade, to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo; or if Almeida did not so -fall, to besiege both together, and, when they were taken, march at -once into the heart of Spain, and open a communication with Valencia -and with the army of Sicily. This great and lofty conception would -have delivered Andalusia as certainly as any direct operation; for -thus Madrid, the great depôt of the French, would have been taken, -the northern and southern armies cut asunder, and the English base -momentarily fixed on the Mediterranean coast: then the whole of the -Spanish and British force could have been concentrated, and one or -two great battles must have decided the fate of Spain. - -Filled with this grand project lord Wellington demanded -reinforcements from England, and leave to carry his design -into execution, if occasion offered: yet he checked his secret -aspirations, when reflecting upon the national pride and perverseness -of the Spaniards, and on their uncertain proceedings, and the great -difficulty, if not impossibility, of ensuring any reasonable concert -and assistance. When to this he also added the bad disposition of the -Portuguese Regency, and the timid temper of the English ministers, -so many jarring elements were presented that he could make no fixed -combinations. Nevertheless, maturing the leading points of action -in his own mind, he resolved to keep them in view; adapting his -proceedings to circumstances as they should arise. - -His projects were however necessarily conditional upon whether -Napoleon reinforced his armies again, which would create new -combinations; and before any other measure, it was essential to -recapture Badajos; not only as its possession by the enemy affected -the safety of Cadiz, but, as it bore upon the execution of both the -above-mentioned plans, and upon the safety of Portugal, by enabling -the enemy to besiege Elvas: yet so deeply and sagaciously had he -probed the nature of the contest, that we shall find his after -operations strictly conformable to these his first conceptions, -and always successful. Judging now that Massena would be unable to -interrupt the blockade of Almeida, lord Wellington left the command -of the northern army to general Spencer, and departed for the -Alemtejo, where Beresford was operating: but, as this was one of the -most critical periods of the war, it is essential to have a clear -notion of the true state of affairs in the South, at the moment when -Beresford commenced his memorable campaign. - -[Sidenote: Intercepted Letter from Chief of Engineers, Garbé, Mar. -25th.] - -[Sidenote: Official Abstract of Military Reports, from Cadiz, 1811. -MSS.] - -Soult returned to Andalusia immediately after the fall of Badajos, -leaving Mortier to besiege Campo Mayor, and his arrival at Seville -and the fame of his successes restored tranquillity in that province, -and confidence amongst the troops. Both had been grievously shaken -by the battle of Barosa, and the works of Arcos, Lucar, Medina, and -Alcalade Gazules, intended to defend the rear of the first corps, had -been stopped, and the utmost despondency prevailed. Discontent and -gloom were, however, also strong in Cadiz, the government had for -some days pretended to make a fresh effort against Victor; but the -fall of Badajos menaced the city with famine, and hence Zayas was -finally detached with six thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry -to Huelva. His object was to gather provisions in the Conda de -Neibla, where Ballasteros had, on the 10th, surprised and dispersed -Remond’s detachment. The French, were however soon reinforced, Zayas -was checked by D’Aremberg, and as many of his men deserted to -Ballasteros, he withdrew the rest. Blake then assumed the command, -Ballasteros and Copons were placed under his orders, and the united -corps, amounting to eleven thousand infantry and twelve hundred -cavalry, were called the _fourth army_. Meanwhile Mendizabal rallying -his fugitives from the battle of the Gebora, at Villa Viciosa, -re-formed a weak corps, called the _fifth army_; during these -proceedings, Mortier occupied Albuquerque and Valencia d’Alcantara, -and carried on the - - -SIEGE OF CAMPO MAYOR. - -This fortress being commanded, at four hundred yards distance, by a -hill, on which there was an abandoned horn-work, would have fallen at -once, but for the courage and talents of major Tallaia, a Portuguese -engineer. With only two hundred men and five mounted guns, he made -such skilful dispositions, that the French opened regular trenches, -battered the wall in breach with six guns, bombarded the palace with -eleven mortars, and pushed a sap to the crest of the glacis. At -the end of five days a breach was made, but Tallaia, although ill -seconded by the garrison, repulsed one partial assault, and, being -summoned for the second time, demanded and obtained twenty-four hours -to wait for succour. None arrived, and this brave man surrendered the -21st of March. Mortier then returned to the Guadiana, leaving Latour -Maubourg to dismantle the works and remove the artillery and stores -to Badajos. - -Such was the posture of affairs when Beresford who had quitted the -northern army after the combat of Foz d’Aronce, arrived at Portalegre -with twenty thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and eighteen -guns. - -His instructions were to relieve Campo Mayor, and to besiege Olivenza -and Badajos. The first had already surrendered, but the marshal, -being within two marches of it, judged that he might surprise the -besieging corps, and, with this view, put his troops in motion the -23d. In the morning of the 25th his advanced guard of cavalry, -supported by a detachment of infantry, under colonel Colborne, came -suddenly upon Campo Mayor, just as Latour Maubourg was marching -out in confusion, with twelve hundred cavalry, three battalions of -infantry, some horse-artillery and the battering train of thirteen -guns. The allies pursued him, and passing over a wooded rise of -ground, issued forth at the other side by some gentle slopes on -either flank of the French, who were in a fine plain. Colonel -Colborne was on the right and at a considerable distance from the -enemy, but colonel Head, with the thirteenth light dragoons, was -on the left, close to them, and supported by colonel Otway with -two squadrons of the seventh Portuguese. The heavy cavalry was -in reserve; and while in this state the French hussars, suddenly -charging with a loose rein from behind their infantry, fell some on -the Portuguese and some on the thirteenth dragoons. So fiercely did -these last on both sides come together, that many men were dismounted -by the shock, and both parties pierced clear through to the opposite -side, then re-formed, and passed again in the same fearful manner -to their own ground: but Head’s troopers rallied quicker than the -French, and riding a third time closely in upon them, overthrew horse -and man, receiving at the same time the fire of the infantry squares. -Nevertheless, without flinching, they galloped upon the battering -train, hewed down the gunners, and, drawing up beyond the French -line of march, barred the way, in expectation that the heavy cavalry -would also fall on; but Beresford would not suffer the latter to -charge, and the French infantry returned for their guns and resumed -their march. The thirteenth and the Portuguese, however, continued -the pursuit, in a rash and disorderly manner, even to the bridge -of Badajos, and being repulsed by the guns of that fortress, were -followed by Mortier in person, and lost some prisoners. Of the allies -one hundred men were killed or hurt, and above seventy taken. Of the -enemy about three hundred suffered, one howitzer was captured, and -the French colonel Chamorin was slain in single combat by a trooper -of the thirteenth. - -_To profit from sudden opportunities, a general must be constantly -with his advanced guard in an offensive movement._ When this combat -commenced, Beresford was with the main body, and baron Trip, a -staff-officer, deceived by appearances, informed him, that the -thirteenth had been cut off. Hence the marshal, anxious to save his -cavalry, which he knew could not be reinforced, would not follow up -the first blow, truly observing that the loss of one regiment was -enough. But the regiment was not lost, and, the country being open -and plain, the enemy’s force and the exact posture of affairs were -easy to be discerned. The thirteenth were reprimanded, perhaps -justly, for having pursued so eagerly without orders, yet the -unsparing admiration of the whole army consoled them. - -Campo Mayor was thus recovered so suddenly, that the French left -eight hundred rations of bread in the magazines; and they also -evacuated Albuquerque and Valencia d’Alcantara, being infinitely -dismayed by the appearance of so powerful an army in the south: -indeed, so secretly and promptly had lord Wellington assembled it, -that its existence was only known to the French general by the blow -at Campo Mayor. But, to profit from such able dispositions, it was -necessary to be as rapid in execution, giving the enemy no time to -recover from his first surprise; and this was the more essential, -because the breach in Badajos was not closed, nor the trenches -obliterated, nor the exhausted magazines and stores replenished. -Soult had carried away six battalions and a regiment of cavalry, four -hundred men were thrown into Olivenza, three thousand into Badajos; -thus, with the losses sustained during the operations, Mortier’s -numbers were reduced to less than ten thousand men: he could not -therefore have maintained the line of the Guadiana and collected -provisions also, and Beresford should have instantly marched upon -Merida, driven back the fifth corps, and opened a fresh communication -by Jerumenha with Elvas; the fall of Badajos would then have been -inevitable. The confusion occasioned by the sudden appearance of -the army at Campo Mayor and the charge of the thirteenth dragoons -guaranteed the success of this march; the English general might even -have passed the river at Merida before Mortier could have ascertained -his object. - -Beresford, neglecting this happy opportunity, put his troops into -quarters round Elvas, induced thereto by the fatigue and wants of -the soldiers; especially those of the fourth division, who had been -marching incessantly since the 6th of the month, and were bare-footed -and exhausted. - -He had been instructed, by lord Wellington, to throw a bridge over -the Guadiana at Jerumenha; to push back the fifth corps; and to -invest Olivenza and Badajos. The Portuguese government had undertaken -not only to provide the means for these operations, but had actually -reported that they were collected at Elvas and Jerumenha; that is -to say, that provisions, shoes, battering guns, ammunition, and -transport were there; that the Guadiana abounded in serviceable -craft; that twenty large boats, formerly belonging to Cuesta, which -had been brought away from Badajos before the siege, were at Elvas; -and that all other necessaries would be sent from Lisbon. It now -appeared that no magazines of provisions or stores had been formed; -that very little transport was provided; that only five of Cuesta’s -boats had been brought from Badajos; that there was no serviceable -craft on the river, and that some small pontoons, sent from Lisbon, -were unfit to bear the force of the current, or to sustain the -passage of guns. The country, also, was so deficient in provisions, -that the garrison-stores of Elvas were taken to feed the army. - -All these circumstances combined to point out Merida as the true line -of operations; moreover, plenty of food was to be had on the left -bank of the Guadiana, and the measures necessary to remedy the evil -state of affairs on the right bank, did not require the presence of -an army to protect them. The great distress of the fourth division -for shoes, alone offered any serious obstacle; but, under the -circumstances, it would not have been too much to expect a momentary -effort from such an excellent division, or, it might without danger -even have been left behind. - -Marshal Beresford preferred halting until he could procure the means -of passing at Jerumenha; an error which may be considered as the -first and principal cause of those long and bloody operations which -afterwards detained lord Wellington nearly two years on the frontiers -of Portugal. For, during Beresford’s delay, general Phillipon, one -of the ablest governors that ever defended a fortress, levelled the -trenches, restored the glacis, and stopped the breach; meanwhile -Latour Maubourg, who had succeeded Mortier in command of the troops, -covered the country with foraging parties and filled the magazines. - -Captain Squires, of the engineers, now undertook to bridge the -Guadiana under Jerumenha, by fixing trestle-piers on each side in -the shallows, and connecting them with the five Spanish boats; -wherefore, a squadron of cavalry was secretly passed over, by a ford, -to protect the workmen from surprise. The 3d of April, the bridge -being finished, the troops assembled during the night in the woods -near Jerumenha, being to cross at daylight; but the river suddenly -swelling, swept away the trestles, rendered the ford impassable, -and stopped the operations. No more materials could be immediately -procured, and the Spanish boats were converted into flying bridges -for the cavalry and artillery, while Squires constructed a slight -narrow bridge for infantry with the pontoons and with casks taken -from the neighbouring villages. To cover this operation a battalion -was added to the squadron already on the left bank, and the army -commenced passing the 5th of April; but it was late in the night of -the 6th, ere the whole had crossed and taken up their position, which -was on a strong range of hills, covered by a swampy rivulet. - -During this time, Latour Maubourg was so entirely occupied in -securing and provisioning Badajos, that his foragers were extended -fifty miles to the rear, and he took no notice whatever of -Beresford’s proceedings; an error savouring rather of the Spanish -than of the French method of making war: for it is evident that a -moveable column of five thousand infantry, with guns and cavalry, -could have easily cut off the small detachment of the British on -the left bank, and thus have completely frustrated the operations. -The allied troops, being most numerous, should have been carried -over in the boats, and entrenched on the other side in sufficient -force to resist any attack before the construction of the bridge -was attempted: it is not easy to say which general acted with -most imprudence; Latour Maubourg in neglecting, or Beresford in -unnecessarily tempting fortune. - -When the British were in possession of the left bank, the French -general awaking, collected three thousand infantry, five hundred -cavalry, and four guns at Olivenza, whence he marched, at daylight on -the 7th, to oppose a passage which had been completed the day before. -He, however, surprised a squadron of the thirteenth, which was in -front, and then came so close up to the main body as to exchange -shots; yet he was permitted to retire unmolested, in the face of -more than twenty thousand men! - -During these proceedings, the fifth Spanish army re-occupied Valencia -d’Alcantara and Albuquerque; having cavalry posts at La Rocca and -Montijo. Ballasteros also entered Fregenal, and Castaños, who was -appointed to command in Gallicia as well as Estremadura, arrived -at Elvas. This general was in friendly intercourse with Beresford, -but had a grudge against Blake. At first, he pretended to the chief -command, as the elder captain-general; but Blake demanded a like -authority over Beresford, who was not disposed to admit the claim. -Now Castaños, having little liking for a command under such difficult -circumstances, and being desirous to thwart Blake, and fearful lest -Beresford should, under these circumstances, refuse to pass the -Guadiana, arranged, that he who brought the greatest force in the -field should be generalissimo. Thus the youngest officer commanded in -chief. - -Beresford, being joined by Madden’s cavalry, and having traced out -entrenchments capable of covering several thousand men, ordered -his bridges to be reconstructed in a more substantial manner; -brought up a Portuguese regiment of militia to labour at the works; -left a strong detachment of British infantry and some Portuguese -horse for their protection, and advanced with the remainder of the -army. Hereupon Latour Maubourg retired upon Albuera, and Beresford -summoned Olivenza on the 9th, apparently expecting no defence; but -the governor having rejected the summons, the army encamped round -the place, and major A. Dickson was despatched to Elvas to prepare -battering-guns for the siege. The communication was now opened with -Ballasteros at Fregenal, and Castaños having carried Morillo’s -division of infantry and Penne Villamur’s cavalry from Montijo to -Merida, pushed a part on to Almendralejos. Latour Maubourg then -retired to Llerena; and, on the 11th, Beresford, leaving general -Cole with the fourth division, Madden’s cavalry, and a brigade of -nine pounders to besiege Olivenza, took post himself at Albuera; -communicating, by his left, with Almendralejos, and spreading his -cavalry in front, so as to cut off all communication with Badajos. -The army now lived on the resources of the country; and a brigade was -sent to Talavera Real to collect supplies. - -The 14th, six twenty-four pounders reached Olivenza, and, being -placed in a battery constructed on the abandoned horn-work formerly -noticed, played with such success that the breach became practicable -before the morning of the 15th. Some riflemen posted in the vineyards -kept down the fire of the place, and the garrison, consisting of -three hundred and eighty men, with fifteen guns, surrendered at -discretion. Cole was immediately directed upon Zafra by the road of -Almendral; and Beresford, who had recalled the brigade from Talavera, -was already in movement for the same place by the royal causeway. -This movement was to drive Latour Maubourg over the Morena, and cut -off general Maransin. The latter general had been in pursuit of -Ballasteros ever since the retreat of Zayas, and having defeated -him at Fregenal on the 12th, was following up his victory towards -Salvatierra: an alcalde, however, gave him notice of the allies -approach, and he retreated in safety. Meanwhile two French regiments -of cavalry, advancing from Llerena to collect contributions, had -reached Usagre, where meeting with the British cavalry, they were -suddenly charged by the thirteenth dragoons, and followed for six -miles so vigorously that three hundred were killed or taken, without -the loss of a man on the part of the pursuers. - -On the 16th general Cole arrived from Olivenza, and the whole army -being thus concentrated about Zafra, Latour Maubourg retired on the -18th to Guadalcanal; the Spanish cavalry then occupied Llerena, -and the resources of Estremadura were wholly at the service of the -allies. During these operations, general Charles Alten, coming from -Lisbon with a brigade of German light infantry, reached Olivenza, -and lord Wellington also arrived at Elvas, where Beresford, after -drawing his infantry nearer to Badajos, went to meet him. The -presence of the general-in-chief was very agreeable to the troops; -they had seen, with surprise, great masses put in motion without any -adequate results, and thought the operations had been slow, without -being prudent. The whole army was over the Guadiana on the 7th, and, -including the Spaniards from Montijo, Beresford commanded at least -twenty-five thousand men, whereas Latour Maubourg never had more than -ten thousand, many of whom were dispersed foraging, far and wide: -yet the French general had maintained himself in Estremadura for ten -days; and during this time, no corps being employed to constrain the -garrison of Badajos, the governor continued to bring in timber and -other materials for the defence, at his pleasure. - -Lord Wellington arrived the 21st. The 22d, he forded the Guadiana -just below the mouth of the Caya with Madden’s cavalry and Alten’s -Germans, pushing close up to Badajos. A convoy, escorted by some -infantry and cavalry, was coming in from the country, and an effort -was made to cut it off; but the governor sallied, the allies lost a -hundred men, and the convoy reached the town. - -Lord Wellington, now considering that Soult would certainly endeavour -to disturb the siege with a considerable force, demanded the assent -of the Spanish generals to the following plan of combined operations, -before he would commence the investment of the place. 1º. That -Blake, marching up from Ayamonte, should take post at Xeres de los -Cavalleros. 2º. That Ballasteros should occupy Burquillo on his left. -3º. That the cavalry of the fifth army, stationed at Llerena, should -observe the road of Guadalcanal, and communicate through Zafra, -by the right, with Ballasteros. These dispositions were to watch -the passes of the Morena. 4º. That Castaños should furnish three -battalions for the siege, and keep the rest of his corps at Merida, -to support the Spanish cavalry. 5º. That the British army should be -in second line, and, in the event of a battle, Albuera, centrically -situated with respect to the roads leading from Andalusia to Badajos, -should be the point of concentration for all the allied forces. - -In consequence of the neglect of the Portuguese government, the whole -of the battering-train and stores for the siege were necessarily -taken from the ramparts and magazines of Elvas; the utmost prudence -was therefore required to secure the safety of these guns, lest that -fortress, half dismantled, should be exposed to a siege. Hence, as -the Guadiana, by rising ten feet, had again carried away the bridge -at Jerumenha on the 24th, lord Wellington directed the line of -communication with Portugal to be re-established by Merida, until -settled weather would admit of fresh arrangements. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 10.] - -Howbeit, political difficulties intervening obliged him to delay -the siege. The troops under Mendizabel had committed many excesses -in Portugal; the disputes between them and the inhabitants were -pushed so far, that the Spanish general pillaged the town of -Fernando; while the Portuguese government, in reprisal, meant to -seize Olivenza, which had formerly belonged to them. The Spanish -Regency publicly disavowed Mendizabel’s conduct, and Mr. Stuart’s -strenuous representations deterred the Portuguese from plunging the -two countries into a war; but this affair, joined to the natural -slowness and arrogance of the Spaniards, prevented both Castaños and -Blake from giving an immediate assent to the English general’s plans: -meanwhile, intelligence reached the latter that Massena was again -in force on the Agueda; wherefore, reluctantly directing Beresford -to postpone the siege until the Spanish generals should give in -their assent, or until the fall of Almeida should enable a British -reinforcement to arrive, he repaired with the utmost speed to the -Agueda. - - -OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH. - -During his absence, the blockade of Almeida had been closely pressed, -while the army was so disposed as to cut off all communication. The -allied forces were, however, distressed for provisions, and great -part of their corn came from the side of Ledesma; being smuggled by -the peasants through the French posts, and passed over the Agueda -by ropes, which were easily hidden amongst the deep chasms of that -river, near its confluence with the Douro. - -Massena was, however, intent upon relieving the place. His retreat -upon Salamanca had been to restore the organization and equipments -of his army, which he could not do at Ciudad Rodrigo, without -consuming the stores of that fortress. His cantonments extended from -San Felices by Ledesma to Toro, his cavalry was in bad condition, -his artillery nearly unhorsed: but from Bessieres he expected, with -reason, aid, both of men and provisions, and in that expectation -was prepared to renew the campaign immediately. Discord, that bane -of military operations, interfered. Bessieres had neglected and -continued to neglect the army of Portugal; symptoms of hostilities -with Russia were so apparent, even at this period, that he looked -rather to that quarter than to what was passing before him; his -opinion that a war in the north was inevitable was so openly -expressed as to reach the English army; and meanwhile, Massena vainly -demanded the aid, which was necessary to save the only acquisition of -his campaign. - -A convoy of provisions had entered Ciudad Rodrigo on the 13th of -April; on the 16th a reinforcement and a second convoy also succeeded -in gaining that fortress, although general Spencer crossed the -Agueda, with eight thousand men, to intercept them; a rear-guard of -two hundred men was indeed, overtaken; but, although surrounded by -the cavalry in an open plain, they made their way into the place. - -Towards the end of the month, the new organization, decreed by -Napoleon, was put in execution. Two divisions of the ninth corps -joined Massena; and Drouet was preparing to march with the remaining -eleven thousand infantry and cavalry, to reinforce and take the -command of the fifth corps; when Massena, having collected all his -own detachments, and received a promise of assistance from Bessieres, -prevailed upon him to defer his march until an effort had been made -to relieve Almeida. With this view the French army was put in motion -towards the frontier of Portugal. The light division immediately -resumed its former positions, the left at Gallegos and Marialva, -the right at Espeja; the cavalry were dispersed, partly towards the -sources of the Azava, and partly behind Gallegos, and, while in -this situation, colonel O’Meara and eighty men of the Irish brigade -were taken by Julian Sanchez; the affair having been, it was said, -preconcerted, to enable the former to quit the French service. - -On the 23d, two thousand French infantry and a squadron of cavalry -marching out of Ciudad Rodrigo, made a sudden effort to seize the -bridge of Marialva; but the passage was bravely maintained by captain -Dobbs, with only a company of the fifty-second and some riflemen. - -On the 25th, Massena reached Ciudad Rodrigo; and the 27th, his -advanced guards felt all the line of the light division from Espeja -to Marialva. Lord Wellington arrived on the 28th, and immediately -concentrated the main body of the allies behind the Dos Casas river. -The Azava being swollen and difficult to ford, the enemy continued -to feel the line of the outposts; but, on the 2d of May, the waters -having subsided, the whole French army was observed coming out -of Ciudad Rodrigo, wherefore, the light division, after a slight -skirmish of horse at Gallegos, commenced a retrograde movement, -from that place and from Espeja, upon Fuentes Onoro. The country -immediately in rear of those villages was wooded as far as the Dos -Casas, but an open plain between the two lines of march offered the -enemy’s powerful cavalry an opportunity of cutting off the retreat. -As the French appeared regardless of this advantage, the division -remained in the woods bordering the right and left of the plain -until the middle of the night, when the march was renewed, and the -Dos Casas was crossed at Fuentes Onoro. This beautiful village had -escaped all injury during the previous warfare, although occupied -alternately, for above a year, by both sides. Every family in it was -well known to the light division, it was therefore a subject of deep -regret to find that the preceding troops had pillaged it, leaving -only the shells of houses where, three days before, a friendly -population had been living in comfort. This wanton act, was so warmly -felt by the whole army, that eight thousand dollars were afterwards -collected by general subscription for the poor inhabitants; yet the -injury sunk deeper than the atonement. - -Lord Wellington had determined not to risk much to maintain his -blockade, and he was well aware that Massena, reinforced by the -army of the north and by the ninth corps, could bring down superior -numbers. Nevertheless, when the moment arrived, trusting to the -valour of his troops and the ascendancy which they had acquired over -the enemy during the pursuit from Santarem, he resolved to abide a -battle; but not to seek one, because his force, reduced to thirty-two -thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry in bad condition, and -forty-two guns, was unable, seeing the superiority of the French -horse, to oppose the enemy’s march. - -The allies occupied a fine table-land, lying between the Turones -and the Dos Casas, the left at Fort Conception; the centre opposite -to the village of Alameda; the right at Fuentes Onoro; the whole -distance being five miles. The Dos Casas, flowing in a deep ravine, -protected the front of this line, and the French general could not, -with any prudence, venture to march, by his own right, against -Almeida, lest the allies, crossing the ravine at the villages of -Alameda and Fuentes Onoro, should fall on his flank, and drive him -into the Agueda. Hence, to cover the blockade, which was maintained -by Pack’s brigade and an English regiment, it was sufficient to leave -the fifth division near Fort Conception, and the sixth division -opposite Alameda. The first and third were then concentrated on a -gentle rise, about a cannon-shot behind Fuentes Onoro, where the -steppe of land which the army occupied turned back, and ended on the -Turones, becoming rocky and difficult as it approached that river. - - -FIRST COMBAT OF FUENTES ONORO. - -The French came up in three columns abreast, the cavalry, the sixth -corps, and Drouet’s division against Fuentes Onoro; but the eighth -and second corps against Alameda and Fort Conception, seeming to -menace the left of the position; wherefore, the light division, after -passing the Dos Casas, reinforced the sixth division. General Loison -however, without waiting for Massena’s orders, fell upon Fuentes -Onoro, which was occupied by five battalions of chosen troops, -detached from the first and third divisions. - -Most of the houses of this village were quite in the bottom of the -ravine, but an old chapel and some buildings on a craggy eminence, -overhung one end. The low parts were vigorously defended; yet -the violence of the attack was so great, and the cannonade so -heavy, that the British abandoned the streets, and could scarcely -maintain the upper ground about the chapel. Colonel Williams, the -commanding officer, fell badly wounded, and the fight was becoming -very dangerous, when the twenty-fourth, the seventy-first, and the -seventy-ninth regiments, coming down from the main position, charged -so roughly, that the French were forced back, and, after a severe -contest, finally driven over the stream of the Dos Casas. During the -night the detachments were withdrawn; but the twenty-fourth, the -seventy-first, and seventy-ninth regiments were left in the village, -where two hundred and sixty of the allies and somewhat more of the -French had fallen. - -On the 4th Massena arrived, and, being joined by Bessieres with -twelve hundred cavalry and a battery of the imperial guard, examined -all the line, and made dispositions for the next day. His design was -to hold the left of the allies in check with the second corps, but to -turn the right with the remainder of the army. - -Forty thousand infantry, and five thousand horse, with thirty pieces -of artillery, were under arms, and they had shewn in the action of -the 3d that their courage was not abated; it was, therefore, a very -audacious resolution in the English general to receive battle on -such dangerous ground. His position, as far as Fuentes Onoro, was -indeed strong and free for the use of all arms, and it covered his -communication by the bridge of Castello Bom; but, on his right flank, -the plain was continued in a second steppe to Nava d’Aver, where a -considerable hill overlooking all the country, commanded the roads -leading to the bridges of Seceiras and Sabugal. The enemy could, -therefore, by a direct march from Ciudad Rodrigo, place his army at -once in line of battle upon the right flank of the allies, and attack -them while entangled between the Dos Casas, the Turones, the Coa, and -the fortress of Almeida; and the bridge of Castello Bom only would -have been open for retreat. To prevent this stroke, and to cover his -communications with Sabugal and Seceiras, lord Wellington, yielding -to general Spencer’s earnest suggestions, stretched his right wing -out to Nava d’Aver, the hill of which he caused Julian Sanchez -to occupy, supporting him by the seventh division, under general -Houston. Thus the line of battle was above seven miles in length, -besides the circuit of blockade. The Dos Casas, indeed, still covered -the front; but above Fuentes Onoro, the ravine became gradually -obliterated, resolving itself into a swampy wood, which extended to -Poço Velho, a village half way between Fuentes and Nava d’Aver. The -left wing of the seventh division occupied this wood and the village -of Poço Velho, but the right wing was refused. - - -BATTLE OF FUENTES ONORO. - -It was Massena’s intention to have made his dispositions in the -night, in such a manner as to commence the attack at day-break on the -5th; but a delay of two hours occurring, the whole of his movements -were plainly descried. The eighth corps withdrawn from Alameda, and -supported by all the French cavalry, was seen marching above the -village of Poço Velho, and at the same time the sixth corps and -Drouet’s division took ground to their own left, but still keeping a -division in front of Fuentes. At this sight the light division and -the English horse hastened to the support of general Houston; while -the first and third divisions made a movement parallel to that of the -sixth corps. The latter, however, drove the left wing of the seventh -division, consisting of Portuguese and British, from the village of -Poço Velho with loss, and was gaining ground in the wood also, when -the riflemen of the light division arriving at that point, restored -the fight. The French cavalry, then passing Poço Velho, commenced -forming in order of battle on the plain, between the wood and the -hill of Nava d’Aver. Julian Sanchez immediately retired across the -Turones, partly in fear, but more in anger, at the death of his -lieutenant, who, having foolishly ridden close up to the enemy, -making many violent gestures, was mistaken for a French officer, and -shot by a soldier of the guards, before the action commenced. - -Montbrun occupied himself with this weak partida for an hour; but -when the Guerilla chief had fallen back, the French general turned -the right of the seventh division, and charged the British cavalry, -which had moved up to its support. The combat was unequal; for, by -an abuse too common, so many men had been drawn from the ranks as -orderlies to general officers, and for other purposes, that not -more than a thousand troopers were in the field. After one shock, -in which the enemy were partially checked and the French colonel -Lamotte taken fighting hand to hand, by general Charles Stewart, the -cavalry withdrew behind the light division. Houston’s people, being -thus entirely exposed, were charged strongly, and captain Ramsay’s -horse-artillery was cut off and surrounded. The light division -instantly threw itself into squares, but the main body of the French -horsemen were upon the seventh division, ere a like formation could -be effected: nevertheless the troops stood firm, and, although some -were cut down, the chasseurs Brittaniques, taking advantage of a -loose wall, received the attack with such a fire that the enemy -recoiled. Immediately after this, a great commotion was observed -amongst the French squadrons; men and officers closed in confusion -towards one point where a thick dust was rising, and where loud -cries and the sparkling of blades and flashing of pistols, indicated -some extraordinary occurrence. Suddenly the multitude was violently -agitated, an English shout arose, the mass was rent asunder, and -Norman Ramsay burst forth at the head of his battery, his horses -breathing fire and stretching like greyhounds along the plain, his -guns bounding like things of no weight, and the mounted gunners in -close and compact order protecting the rear. But while this brilliant -action was passing in one part, the enemy were making progress in the -wood, and the English divisions being separated and the right wing -turned, it was abundantly evident that the battle would soon be lost, -if the original position was not immediately regained. - -In this posture of affairs lord Wellington directed the seventh -division to cross the Turones and move down the left bank to -Frenada, the light division to retire over the plain, the cavalry -to cover the rear. He also withdrew the first and third divisions, -placing them and the Portuguese in line on the steppe, before -described as running perpendicular to the ravine of Fuentes Onoro. - -General Crawfurd, who had resumed the command of the light division, -first covered the passage of the seventh division over the Turones, -and then retired slowly over the plain in squares, having the British -cavalry principally on his right flank. He was followed by the -enemy’s horse, which continually outflanked him, and near the wood -surprised and sabred an advanced post of the guards, making colonel -Hill and fourteen men prisoners, but then continuing their charge -against the forty-second regiment, the French were repulsed. Many -times Montbrun made as if he would storm the light division squares, -but the latter were too formidable to be meddled with; yet, in all -this war, there was not a more dangerous hour for England. The whole -of that vast plain as far as the Turones was covered with a confused -multitude, amidst which the squares appeared but as specks, for -there was a great concourse, composed of commissariat followers of -the camp, servants, baggage, led horses, and peasants attracted by -curiosity, and finally, the broken piquets and parties coming out -of the woods. The seventh division was separated from the army by -the Turones, five thousand French cavalry, with fifteen pieces of -artillery, were close at hand impatient to charge; the infantry of -the eighth corps was in order of battle behind the horsemen; the -wood was filled with the skirmishers of the sixth corps, and if the -latter body, pivoting upon Fuentes, had issued forth, while Drouet’s -divisions fell on that village, while the eighth corps attacked the -light division, and while the whole of the cavalry made a general -charge; the loose multitude encumbering the plain would have been -driven violently in upon the first division, in such a manner as to -have intercepted the latter’s fire and broken their ranks. - -No such effort was made; Montbrun’s horsemen merely hovered about -Crawfurd’s squares, the plain was soon cleared, the cavalry took post -behind the centre, and the light division formed a reserve to the -right of the first division, sending the riflemen amongst the rocks -to connect it with the seventh division, which had arrived at Frenada -and was there joined by Julian Sanchez. - -At sight of this new front, so deeply lined with troops, the French -stopped short, and commenced a heavy cannonade, which did great -execution from the closeness of the allied masses; but twelve British -guns replied with vigour and the violence of the enemy’s fire abated; -their cavalry then drew out of range, and a body of French infantry -attempting to glide down the ravine of the Turones was repulsed -by the riflemen and the light companies of the guards. But all -this time a fierce battle was going on at Fuentes Onoro. Massena -had directed Drouet to carry this village at the very moment when -Montbrun’s cavalry should turn the right wing; it was, however, two -hours later ere the attack commenced. The three British regiments -made a desperate resistance, but overmatched in number, and little -accustomed to the desultory fighting of light troops, they were -pierced and divided; two companies of the seventy-ninth were taken, -colonel Cameron was mortally wounded, and the lower part of the town -was carried; the upper part was, however, stiffly held, and the -rolling of the musketry was incessant. - -Had the attack been made earlier, and the whole of Drouet’s division -thrown frankly into the fight, while the sixth corps moving through -the wood closely turned the village, the passage must have been -forced and the left of the new position outflanked; but now lord -Wellington having all his reserves in hand, detached considerable -masses to the support of the regiments in Fuentes. The French -continued also to reinforce their troops until the whole of the -sixth corps and a part of Drouet’s division were engaged, when -several turns of fortune occurred. At one time the fighting was on -the banks of the stream and amongst the lower houses; at another -upon the rugged heights and round the chapel, and some of the -enemy’s skirmishers even penetrated completely through towards the -main position; but the village was never entirely abandoned by the -defenders, and, in a charge of the seventy-first, seventy-ninth, and -eighty-eighth regiments, led by colonel M’Kinnon against a heavy -mass which had gained the chapel eminence, a great number of the -French fell. In this manner the fight lasted until evening, when the -lower part of the town was abandoned by both parties, the British -maintaining the chapel and crags, and the French retiring a cannon -shot from the stream. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3. Plate 11._ - - Battle of - FUENTES ONORO - _5^{TH} MAY, 1811._ - - _London Published by T. & W. BOONE Nov^r 1830._] - -When the action ceased, a brigade of the light division relieved the -regiments in the village; and a slight demonstration by the second -corps near Fort Conception, having been repulsed by a battalion -of the Lusitanian legion, both armies remained in observation. -Fifteen hundred men and officers, of which three hundred were -prisoners, constituted the loss of the allies; that of the enemy was -estimated at the time to be near five thousand, but this exaggerated -calculation was founded upon the erroneous supposition that four -hundred dead were lying about Fuentes Onoro. All armies make rash -estimates on such occasions. Having had charge to bury the carcasses -at that point, I can affirm that, immediately about the village, not -more than one hundred and thirty bodies were to be found, one-third -of which were British. - -During the battle, the French convoy for the supply of Almeida, -being held at Gallegos, in readiness to move, lord Wellington -sent Julian Sanchez from Frenada, to menace it, and to disturb -the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. This produced no effect, -and a more decisive battle being expected on the 6th, the light -division made breast-works amongst the crags of Fuentes Onoro, while -lord Wellington entrenched that part of the position, which was -immediately behind this village, so that the carrying of it would -have scarcely benefitted the enemy. Fuentes Onoro, strictly speaking, -was not tenable; there was a wooded tongue of land on the British -right, that overlooked, at half-cannon shot, all the upper as well -as the lower part of the village both in flank and rear, yet was too -distant from the position to be occupied by the allies: had Ney been -at the head of the sixth corps, he would have quickly crowned this -ridge, and then Fuentes could only have been maintained by submitting -to a butchery. - -On the 6th the enemy sent his wounded to the rear, making no -demonstration of attack, and as the 7th passed in a like inaction, -the British entrenchments were perfected. The 8th Massena withdrew -his main body to the woods leading upon Espeja and Gallegos, but -still maintained posts at Alameda and Fuentes. On the 10th, without -being in any manner molested, he retired across the Agueda; the sixth -and eight corps, and the cavalry, at Ciudad Rodrigo, the second corps -by the bridge of Barba del Puerco. Bessieres also carried off the -imperial guards, for Massena had been recalled to France, and Marmont -assumed the command of the army of Portugal. - -Both sides claimed the victory; the French, because they won the -passage at Poço Velho, cleared the wood, turned our right flank, -obliged the cavalry to retire, and forced lord Wellington to -relinquish three miles of ground, and to change his front. The -English, because the village of Fuentes so often attacked, was -successfully defended, and because the principal object (the covering -the blockade of Almeida) was attained. - -Certain it is, that Massena at first gained great advantages. -Napoleon would have made them fatal! but it is also certain that, -with an overwhelming cavalry, on ground particularly suitable to -that arm, the prince of Esling having, as it were, indicated all the -errors of the English general’s position, stopped short at the very -moment when he should have sprung forward. By some this has been -attributed to negligence, by others to disgust at being superseded -by Marmont; but the true reason seems to be, that discord in his -army had arisen to actual insubordination. The imperial guards would -not charge at his order; Junot did not second him cordially; Loison -neglected his instructions; Drouet sought to spare his own divisions -in the fight; and Reynier remained perfectly inactive. Thus the -machinery of battle being shaken, would not work. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 8.] - -General Pelet censures lord Wellington for not sending his cavalry -against Reynier after the second position was taken up; asserting -that any danger, on that side, would have forced the French to -retreat; but the criticism is unsustainable, being based on the -notion that the allies had fifty thousand men in the field, whereas, -including Sanchez’ Partida, they had not thirty-five thousand. It -may be with more justice objected to Massena that he did not launch -some of his numerous horsemen, by the bridge of Seceiras, or Sabugal, -against Guarda and Celerico, to destroy the magazines, cut the -communication, and capture the mules and other means of transport -belonging to the allied army. The vice of the English general’s -position would then have been clearly exposed, for, although the -second regiment of German hussars was on the march from Lisbon, it -had not passed Coimbra at this period, and could not have protected -the depôts. But it can never be too often repeated that war, however -adorned by splendid strokes of skill, is commonly a series of errors -and accidents. All the operations, on both sides, for six weeks, -furnished illustration of this truth. - -Ney’s opposition had prevented Massena’s march upon Coria, which -would have secured Badajos and Campo Mayor, and, probably, added -Elvas to them. Latour Maubourg’s tardiness had like to have cost -Mortier a rear guard and a battering-train. By refusing the line -of Merida, Beresford enabled the French to secure Badajos. At -Sabugal, the petulance of a staff-officer marred an admirable -combination, and produced a dangerous combat. Drouet’s negligence -placed Almeida at the mercy of the allies, and a mistaken notion of -Massena’s sufferings during the retreat, induced lord Wellington to -undertake two great operations at the same time, which were above -his strength. In the battle of Fuentes Onoro, more errors than skill -were observable on both sides, and the train of accidents did not -stop there. The prize contended for presented another example of the -uncertainty of war. - - -EVACUATION OF ALMEIDA. - -General Brennier, a prisoner at Vimiero, and afterwards exchanged, -was governor of this fortress. During the battle of Fuentes Onoro, -his garrison, consisting of fifteen hundred men, skirmished boldly -with the blockading force, and loud explosions, supposed to be -signals of communication with the relieving army, were frequent in -the place. When all hopes of succour vanished, a soldier, named -Tillet, contrived, with extraordinary courage and presence of mind, -to penetrate, although in uniform, through the posts of blockade, -carrying Brennier orders to evacuate the fortress. The French general -had, however, by crossing the Agueda, left Almeida to its fate; the -British general placed the light division in its old position on the -Azava with cavalry posts on the Lower Agueda, and desired sir William -Erskine to send the fourth regiment to Barba del Puerco, while -general Alexander Campbell continued the blockade with the sixth -division and with general Pack’s brigade. - -Campbell’s dispositions were either negligently made, or negligently -executed. Erskine never transmitted the orders to the fourth -regiment, and, in the mean time, Brennier, undismayed by the -retreat of the French army, was preparing, like Julian Estrada, at -Hostalrich, to force his way through the blockading troops. An open -country and a double line of posts greatly enhanced the difficulty, -yet Brennier was resolute not only to cut his own passage but to -render the fortress useless to the allies. To effect this, he ruined -all the principal bastions, and kept up a constant fire of his -artillery in a singular manner, for always he fired several guns at -one moment with very heavy charges, placing one across the muzzle of -another, so that, while some shots flew towards the besiegers and a -loud explosion was heard, others destroyed pieces without attracting -notice. - -At midnight of the 10th, all being ready, he sprung his mines, -sallied forth in a compact column, broke through the piquets, and -passed between the quarters of the reserves, with a nicety that -proved at once his talent of observation and his coolness. General -Pack following, with a few men collected on the instant, plied him -with a constant fire, yet nothing could shake or retard his column, -which in silence, and without returning a shot, gained the rough -country leading upon Barba del Puerco. Here it halted for a moment, -just as daylight broke, and Pack, who was at hand, hearing that -some English dragoons were in a village, a short distance to the -right, sent an officer to bring them out upon the French flank, thus -occasioning a slight skirmish and consequent delay. The troops of -blockade had paid little attention at first to the explosion of the -mines, thinking them a repetition of Brennier’s previous practice; -but Pack’s fire having roused them, the thirty-sixth regiment was -close at hand, and the fourth, also, having heard the firing at Valde -Mula, was rapidly gaining the right flank of the enemy. Brennier, -having driven off the cavalry, was again in march; yet the British -regiments, throwing off their knapsacks, followed at such a pace, -that they overtook the rear of his column in the act of descending -the deep chasm of Barba del Puerco, killed and wounded many, captured -about three hundred, and even passed the bridge in pursuit; there -however the second corps, which was in order of battle, awaiting -Brennier’s approach, repulsed them with a loss of thirty or forty -men. Had sir William Erskine given the fourth regiment its orders, -the French column would have been lost. - -Lord Wellington, stung by this event, and irritated by several -previous examples of undisciplined valour, issued a remonstrance -to the army. It was justly strong, and the following remarks are -as applicable to some writers as to soldiers:--“_The officers of -the army may depend upon it that the enemy to whom they are opposed -is not less prudent than powerful. Notwithstanding what has been -printed in gazettes and newspapers, we have never seen small bodies, -unsupported, successfully opposed to large; nor has the experience of -any officer realized the stories which all have read of whole armies -being driven by a handful of light infantry and dragoons._” - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 11.] - -When Marmont had thus recovered the garrison of Almeida, he withdrew -the greatest part of his army towards Salamanca. Lord Wellington then -leaving the first, fifth, sixth, and light divisions, under general -Spencer, on the Azava, directed the third and seventh divisions and -the second German hussars upon Badajos: and on the 15th, hearing that -Soult, although hitherto reported, by Beresford, to be entirely on -the defensive, was actually marching into Estremadura, he set out -himself for that province; but, ere he could arrive, a great and -bloody battle had terminated the operations. - -While awaiting the Spanish generals accession to lord Wellington’s -plan, Beresford fixed his head-quarters at Almendralejos; but Latour -Maubourg remained at Guadalcanal, and his parties were foraging -the most fertile tracts between the armies. Penne Villamur was, -therefore, reinforced with five squadrons; and colonel John Colborne -was detached with a brigade of the second division, two Spanish -guns, and two squadrons of cavalry, to curb the French inroads, and -to raise the confidence of the people. Colborne, a man of singular -talent for war, by rapid marches and sudden changes of direction, in -concert with Villamur, created great confusion amongst the enemy’s -parties. He intercepted several convoys, and obliged the French -troops to quit Fuente Ovejuna, La Granja, Azuaga, and most of the -other frontier towns, and he imposed upon Latour Maubourg with so -much address, that the latter, imagining a great force was at hand, -abandoned Guadalcanal also and fell back to Constantino. - -Having cleared the country on that side, Colborne attempted to -surprise the fortified post of Benelcazar, and, by a hardy attempt, -was like to have carried it; for, riding on to the drawbridge with a -few officers in the grey of the morning, he summoned the commandant -to surrender, as the only means of saving himself from the Spanish -army which was close at hand and would give no quarter. The French -officer, amazed at the appearance of the party, was yet too resolute -to yield, and Colborne, quick to perceive the attempt had failed, -galloped off under a few straggling shot. After this, taking to the -mountains, he rejoined the army without any loss. - -During his absence, the Spanish generals acceded to lord Wellington’s -proposition; Blake was in march for Xeres Caballeros, and Ballasteros -was at Burgillos. The waters of the Guadiana had also subsided, the -bridge under Jerumenha was restored, and the preparations completed -for the - - -FIRST ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS. - -The 5th of May, general William Stewart invested this place, on -the left bank of the Guadiana, with two squadrons of horse, six -field-pieces, and three brigades of infantry, while the formation of -the depôt of the siege was commenced by the engineers and artillery. - -On the 7th the remainder of the infantry, reinforced by two thousand -Spaniards under Carlos d’España, encamped in the woods near the -fortress; but Madden’s Portuguese remained in observation near -Merida, and a troop of horse-artillery arriving from Lisbon was -attached to the English cavalry, which was still near Los Santos and -Zafra. The flying bridge was at first brought up from Jerumenha, and -re-established near the mouth of the Caya; it was however again drawn -over, because the right bank of the Guadiana being still open, some -French horse had come down the river. - -The 8th general Lumley invested Christoval on the right bank, with -a brigade of the fourth division, four light Spanish guns, the -seventeenth Portuguese infantry, and two squadrons of horse drafted -from the garrison of Elvas; nevertheless the troops did not arrive -simultaneously, and sixty French dragoons, moving under the fire of -the place, disputed the ground, and were only repulsed, after a sharp -skirmish, by the Portuguese infantry. - -Thus the first serious siege undertaken by the British army in -the Peninsula was commenced, and, to the discredit of the English -government, no army was ever so ill provided with the means of -prosecuting such enterprises. The engineer officers were exceedingly -zealous, and, notwithstanding some defects in the constitution -and customs of their corps tending rather to make regimental than -practical scientific officers, many of them were very well versed in -the theory of their business. But the ablest trembled when reflecting -on their utter destitution of all that belonged to real service. -Without a corps of sappers and miners, without a single private who -knew how to carry on an approach under fire, they were compelled -to attack fortresses defended by the most warlike, practised, and -scientific troops of the age: the best officers and the finest -soldiers were obliged to sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner, -to compensate for the negligence and incapacity of a government, -always ready to plunge the nation into war, without the slightest -care of what was necessary to obtain success. The sieges carried on -by the British in Spain were a succession of butcheries, because the -commonest resources of their art were denied to the engineers. - -Colonel Fletcher’s plan was to breach the castle of Badajos, while -batteries established on the right bank of the Guadiana should take -the defences in reverse; false attacks against the Pardaleras and -Picurina were also to be commenced by re-opening the French trenches; -but it was necessary to reduce the fort of Christoval ere the -batteries for ruining the defences of the castle could be erected. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. X. Section 3.] - -In double operations, whether of the field or of siege, it is -essential to move with an exact concert, lest the enemy should crush -each in detail, yet neither in the investment nor in the attack was -this maxim regarded. Captain Squires, although ill provided with -tools, was directed to commence a battery against Christoval on the -night of the 8th, under a bright moon, and at the distance of only -four hundred yards from the rampart. Exposed to a destructive fire -of musketry from the fort, and of shot and shells from the town, he -continued to work, with great loss, until the 10th, when the enemy, -making a furious sally, carried his battery. The French were, indeed, -immediately driven back, but the allies pursuing too hotly, were -taken in front and flank with grape, and lost four hundred men. -Thus five engineer and seven hundred officers and soldiers of the -line were already on the long and bloody list of victims offered to -this Moloch; and only one small battery against a small outwork was -completed! On the 11th it opened, but before sunset the fire of the -enemy had disabled four of its five guns, and killed many more of the -besiegers; nor could any other result be expected, seeing that this -single work was exposed to the undivided fire of the fortress, for -the approaches against the castle were not yet commenced, and two -distant batteries on the false attacks scarcely attracted the notice -of the enemy. - -To check future sallies, a second battery was erected against -the bridge-head, but this was also overmatched, and meanwhile -Beresford, having received intelligence that the French army was -again in movement, arrested the progress of all the works. On -the 12th, believing this information premature, he resumed the -labour, directing the trenches to be opened against the castle: -the intelligence was, however, true, and being confirmed at twelve -o’clock in the night, the working-parties were again drawn off, and -measures taken to raise the siege. - - -SOULT’S SECOND EXPEDITION TO ESTREMADURA. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 11.] - -The duke of Dalmatia resolved to succour Badajos the moment he heard -of Beresford’s being in Estremadura; the tardiness of the latter not -only gave the garrison time to organize a defence, but permitted the -French general to tranquillise his province and arrange a system -of resistance to the allied army in the Isla. With that view, he -commenced additional fortifications at Seville, renewing also the -construction of those which had been suspended in other places by -the battle of Barosa, and thus deceived Beresford, who believed -that, far from thinking to relieve Badajos, he was trembling for his -own province. Nothing could be more fallacious. There were seventy -thousand fighting men in Andalusia, and Drouet, who had quitted -Massena immediately after the battle of Fuentes Onoro, was likewise -in march for that province by the way of Avila and Toledo, bringing -with him eleven thousand men. - -All things being ready, Soult quitted Seville the 10th, with thirty -guns, three thousand heavy dragoons, and a division of infantry, -reinforced by a battalion of grenadiers belonging to the first corps, -and by two regiments of light cavalry belonging to the fourth corps. -The 11th he entered Olalla, where general Marasin joined him, and at -the same time a brigade of Godinot’s division marched from Cordoba -upon Constantino, to reinforce the fifth corps, which was falling -back from Guadalcanal in consequence of Colborne’s operations. The -13th a junction was effected with Latour Maubourg, who assumed the -command of the heavy cavalry, while Girard taking that of the fifth -corps, advanced to Los Santos. The 14th the French head-quarters -reached Villa Franca. Being then within thirty miles of Badajos, -Soult caused his heaviest guns to fire salvos during the night, to -give notice of his approach to the garrison; but the expedient failed -of success, and the 15th, in the evening, the army was concentrated -at Santa Marta. - -Beresford, as I have before said, remained in a state of uncertainty -until the night of the 12th, when he commenced raising the siege, -contrary to the earnest representations of the engineers, who -promised to put him in possession of the place in three days, if -he would persevere. This promise was ill-founded, and, if it had -been otherwise, Soult would have surprised him in the trenches: -his firmness, therefore, saved the army, and his arrangements for -carrying off the stores were admirably executed. The artillery and -the platforms were removed in the night of the 13th, and, at twelve -o’clock, on the 15th, all the guns and stores on the left bank, -having been passed over the Guadiana, the gabions and fascines -were burnt, and the flying bridge removed. These transactions were -completely masked by the fourth division, which, with the Spaniards, -continued to maintain the investment; it was not until the rear guard -was ready to draw off, that the French, in a sally, after severely -handling the piquets of Harvey’s Portuguese brigade, learned that the -siege was raised. But of the cause they were still ignorant. - -Beresford held a conference with the Spanish generals at Valverde, -on the 13th, when it was agreed to receive battle at the village -of Albuera. Ballasteros’ and Blake’s corps having already formed a -junction at Baracotta, were then falling back upon Almendral, and -Blake engaged to bring them into line at Albuera, before twelve -o’clock, on the 15th. Meanwhile, as Badajos was the centre of an -arc, sweeping through Valverde, Albuera, and Talavera Real, it was -arranged that Blake’s army should watch the roads on the right; the -British and the fifth Spanish army guard those leading upon the -centre; and that Madden’s Portuguese cavalry should observe those -on the left, conducting through Talavera Real. The main body of the -British being in the woods near Valverde, could reach Albuera by a -half march, and no part of the arc was more than four leagues from -Badajos; but the enemy being, on the 14th, at Los Santos, was eight -leagues distant from Albuera: hence, Beresford, thinking that he -could not be forestalled on any point of importance to the allies, -continued to keep the fourth division round the fortress. Colborne’s -moveable column joined the army on the 14th, Madden then retired -to Talavera Real, Blake’s army reached Almendral, and the allied -cavalry, under general Long, fell back before the enemy from Zafra -and Los Santos, to Santa Marta, where it was joined by the dragoons -of the fourth army. - -In the morning of the 15th, the British occupied the left of the -position of Albuera, which was a ridge about four miles long, having -the Aroya Val de Sevilla in rear and the Albuera river in front. The -right of the army was prolonged towards Almendral, the left towards -Badajos, and the ascent from the river was easy, the ground being in -all parts practicable for cavalry and artillery. Somewhat in advance -of the centre were the bridge and village of Albuera, the former -commanded by a battery, the latter occupied by Alten’s brigade. The -second division, under general William Stewart, was drawn up in one -line, the right on a commanding hill over which the Valverde road -passed; the left on the road of Badajos, beyond which the order of -battle was continued in two lines, by the Portuguese troops under -general Hamilton and colonel Collins. - -The right of the position, which was stronger, and higher, and -broader than any other part, was left open for Blake’s army, because -Beresford, thinking the hill on the Valverde road to be the key of -the position, as protecting his only line of retreat, was desirous to -secure it with the best troops. The fourth division and the infantry -of the fifth army were still before Badajos, but general Cole had -orders to send the seventeenth Portuguese regiment to Elvas; to throw -a battalion of Spaniards into Olivenza; to bring his second brigade, -which was before Christoval, over the Guadiana, by a ford above -Badajos, if practicable, and to be in readiness to march at the first -notice. - -In this posture of affairs, about three o’clock in the evening of the -15th, while Beresford was at some distance on the left, the whole -mass of the allied cavalry, closely followed by the French light -horsemen, came in from Santa Marta in a hurried manner, and passing -the Albuera abandoned all the wooded heights in front to the enemy, -whose dispositions being thus effectually concealed at the distance -of cannon-shot, the strength of the position was already sapped. -Beresford immediately formed a temporary right wing with the cavalry -and artillery, stretching his piquets along the road to Almendral, -and sending officers to hasten Blake’s movements; but that general, -who had only a few miles of good road to march, and who had promised -to be in line at noon, did not reach the ground before eleven at -night; and his rear was not there before three o’clock in the -morning of the 16th; meanwhile, as the enemy was evidently in force -on the Albuera road, Cole and Madden were ordered up. The orders -failed to reach the latter, but, at six o’clock in the morning, the -former reached the position with the infantry of the fifth army, -two squadrons of Portuguese cavalry, and two brigades of the fourth -division; the third brigade, under colonel Kemmis, being unable to -cross the Guadiana, above Badajos, was in march by Jerumenha. The -Spanish troops immediately joined Blake on the right, and the two -brigades of the fourth division, were drawn up in columns behind -the second division. The Portuguese squadrons reinforced colonel -Otway, whose horsemen, of the same nation, were pushed forward in -front of the left wing; and, as general Long seemed oppressed by the -responsibility of directing the troops of so many different nations, -general Lumley assumed the chief command of the allied squadrons, -which were concentrated in rear of the centre. - -The position was now occupied by thirty thousand infantry, above two -thousand cavalry, and thirty-eight pieces of artillery, of which -eighteen were nine-pounders; but, the brigade of the fourth division -being still absent, the British infantry, the pith and strength -of battle, did not amount to seven thousand, and already Blake’s -arrogance was shaking Beresford’s authority. The French had fifty -guns, and above four thousand veteran cavalry, but only nineteen -thousand chosen infantry; yet being of one nation, obedient to one -discipline, and animated by one spirit, their excellent composition -amply compensated for the inferiority of numbers, and their general’s -talent was immeasurably greater than his adversary’s. - -Soult examined Beresford’s position, without hindrance, on the -evening of the 15th, and having heard that the fourth division was -left before Badajos, and that Blake would not arrive before the -17th, he resolved to attack the next morning, for he had detected all -the weakness of the English general’s dispositions for battle. - -The hill in the centre, commanding the Valverde road, was undoubtedly -the key of the position if an attack was made parallel to the front; -but the heights on the right presented a sort of table-land, trending -backwards towards the Valverde road, and looking into the rear of the -line of battle. Hence it was evident that, if a mass of troops could -be placed there, they must be beaten, or the right wing of the allied -army would be rolled up on the centre and pushed into the narrow -ravine of the Aroya: the Valverde road could then be seized, the -retreat cut, and the powerful cavalry of the French would complete -the victory. Now the right of the allies and the left of the French -approximated to each other, being only divided by a wooded hill, -about cannon-shot distance from either but separated from the allies -by the Albuera, and from the French by a rivulet called the Feria. -This height, neglected by Beresford, was ably made use of by Soult. -During the night he placed behind it the artillery under general -Ruty; the fifth corps under Girard; and the heavy dragoons under -Latour Maubourg; thus concentrating fifteen thousand men and forty -guns within ten minutes’ march of Beresford’s right wing, and yet -that general could neither see a man nor draw a sound conclusion as -to the real plan of attack. - -The light cavalry; the division of the first corps under general -Werlé; Godinot’s brigade, and ten guns, still remained at the French -marshal’s disposal. These he formed in the woods, extending along -the banks of the Feria towards its confluence with the Albuera, and -Godinot was ordered to attack the village and bridge, and to bear -strongly against the centre of the position, with a view to attract -Beresford’s attention, to separate his wings, and to double up his -right at the moment when the principal attack should be developed. - - -BATTLE OF ALBUERA. - -During the night, Blake and Cole, as we have seen, arrived with -above sixteen thousand men; but so defective was the occupation of -the ground, that Soult had no change to make in his plans from this -circumstance, and, a little before nine o’clock in the morning, -Godinot’s division issued from the woods in one heavy column of -attack, preceded by ten guns. He was flanked by the light cavalry, -and followed by Werlé’s division of reserve, and, making straight -towards the bridge, commenced a sharp cannonade, attempting to force -the passage; at the same time Briché, with two regiments of hussars, -drew further down the river to observe colonel Otway’s horse. - -The allies’ guns on the rising ground above the village answered -the fire of the French, and ploughed through their columns, which -were crowding without judgement towards the bridge, although the -stream was passable above and below. But Beresford observing that -Werlé’s division did not follow closely, was soon convinced that -the principal effort would be on the right, and, therefore, sent -Blake orders to form a part of the first and all the second line of -the Spanish army, on the broad part of the hills, at right angles -to their actual front. Then drawing the Portuguese infantry of the -left wing to the centre, he sent one brigade down to support Alten, -and directed general Hamilton to hold the remainder in columns of -battalions, ready to move to any part of the field. The thirteenth -dragoons were posted near the edge of the river, above the bridge, -and, meanwhile, the second division marched to support Blake. The -horse-artillery, the heavy dragoons, and the fourth division also -took ground to the right, and were posted; the cavalry and guns -on a small plain behind the Aroya, and the fourth division in an -oblique line about half-musket shot behind them. This done, Beresford -galloped to Blake, for that general had refused to change his front -and, with great heat, told colonel Hardinge, the bearer of the order, -that the real attack was at the village and bridge. Beresford had -sent again to entreat that he would obey, but this message was as -fruitless as the former, and, when the marshal arrived, nothing had -been done. The enemy’s columns were, however, now beginning to appear -on the right, and Blake, yielding to this evidence, proceeded to -make the evolution, yet with such pedantic slowness, that Beresford, -impatient of his folly, took the direction in person. - -Great was the confusion and the delay thus occasioned, and ere the -troops could be put in order the French were amongst them. For -scarcely had Godinot engaged Alten’s brigade, when Werlé, leaving -only a battalion of grenadiers and some squadrons to watch the -thirteenth dragoons and to connect the attacks, countermarched -with the remainder of his division, and rapidly gained the rear of -the fifth corps as it was mounting the hills on the right of the -allies. At the same time the mass of light cavalry suddenly quitted -Godinot’s column, and crossing the river Albuera above the bridge, -ascended the left bank at a gallop, and, sweeping round the rear of -the fifth corps, joined Latour Maubourg, who was already in face -of Lumley’s squadrons. Thus half an hour had sufficed to render -Beresford’s position nearly desperate. Two-thirds of the French were -in a compact order of battle on a line perpendicular to his right, -and his army, disordered and composed of different nations, was -still in the difficult act of changing its front. It was in vain -that he endeavoured to form the Spanish line sufficiently in advance -to give room for the second division to support it; the French guns -opened, their infantry threw out a heavy musketry, and their cavalry, -outflanking the front and charging here and there, put the Spaniards -in disorder at all points; in a short time the latter gave way, and -Soult, thinking the whole army was yielding, pushed forward his -columns, while his reserves also mounted the hill, and general Ruty -placed all the batteries in position. - -At this critical moment general William Stewart arrived at the foot -of the height with colonel Colborne’s brigade, which formed the head -of the second division. The colonel, seeing the confusion above, -desired to form in order of battle previous to mounting the ascent, -but Stewart, whose boiling courage overlaid his judgement, led up -without any delay in column of companies, and attempted to open out -his line in succession as the battalions arrived at the summit. Being -under a destructive fire the foremost charged to gain room, but a -heavy rain prevented any object from being distinctly seen, and -four regiments of hussars and lancers, which had passed the right -flank in the obscurity, came galloping in upon the rear of the line -at the instant of its developement, and slew or took two-thirds of -the brigade. One battalion only (the thirty-first) being still in -column, escaped the storm and maintained its ground, while the French -horsemen, riding violently over every thing else, penetrated to all -parts. In the tumult, a lancer fell upon Beresford, but the marshal, -a man of great strength, putting his spear aside cast him from his -saddle, and a shift of wind blowing aside the mist and smoke, the -mischief was perceived from the plains by general Lumley, who sent -four squadrons out upon the lancers and cut many of them off. - -During this first unhappy effort of the second division, so great -was the confusion, that the Spanish line continued to fire without -cessation, although the British were before them; whereupon -Beresford, finding his exhortations to advance fruitless, seized an -ensign and bore him and his colours, by main force, to the front, yet -the troops would not follow, and the man went back again on being -released. In this crisis, the weather, which had ruined Colborne’s -brigade, also prevented Soult from seeing the whole extent of the -field of battle, and he still kept his heavy columns together. His -cavalry, indeed, began to hem in that of the allies, but the fire -of the horse-artillery enabled Lumley, covered as he was by the bed -of the Aroya and supported by the fourth division, to check them -on the plain, while Colborne still maintained the heights with the -thirty-first regiment; the British artillery, under major Dickson, -was likewise coming fast into action, and William Stewart, who had -escaped the charge of the lancers, was again mounting the hill -with general Houghton’s brigade, which he brought on with the same -vehemence, but, instructed by his previous misfortune, in a juster -order of battle. The weather now cleared, and a dreadful fire poured -into the thickest of the French columns convinced Soult that the day -was yet to be won. - -Houghton’s regiments soon got footing on the summit, Dickson placed -the artillery in line, the remaining brigade of the second division -came up on the left, and two Spanish corps at last moved forward. -The enemy’s infantry then recoiled, yet soon recovering, renewed the -fight with greater violence than before; the cannon on both sides -discharged showers of grape at half range, and the peals of musketry -were incessant and often within pistol shot; but the close formation -of the French embarrassed their battle, and the British line would -not yield them one inch of ground nor a moment of time to open their -ranks. Their fighting was, however, fierce and dangerous. Stewart was -twice hurt, colonel Duckworth, of the forty-eighth, was slain, and -the gallant Houghton, who had received many wounds without shrinking, -fell and died in the act of cheering his men. Still the struggle -continued with unabated fury. Colonel Inglis, twenty-two other -officers, and more than four hundred men out of five hundred and -seventy that had mounted the hill, fell in the fifty-seventh alone, -and the other regiments were scarcely better off, not one-third -were standing in any. Ammunition failed, and, as the English fire -slackened, the enemy established a column in advance upon the right -flank; the play of Dickson’s artillery checked them a moment, but -again the Polish lancers charging, captured six guns. And in this -desperate crisis, Beresford, who had already withdrawn the thirteenth -dragoons from the banks of the river and brought Hamilton’s -Portuguese into a situation to cover a retrograde movement, wavered! -destruction stared him in the face, his personal resources were -exhausted, and the unhappy thought of a retreat rose in his agitated -mind. Yet no order to that effect was given, and it was urged by -some about him that the day might still be redeemed with the fourth -division. While he hesitated, colonel Hardinge boldly ordered -general Cole to advance, and then riding to colonel Abercrombie, who -commanded the remaining brigade of the second division, directed -him also to push forward into the fight. The die being thus cast, -Beresford acquiesced, and this terrible battle was continued. - -The fourth division had only two brigades in the field; the one -Portuguese under general Harvey, the other commanded by sir W. Myers -and composed of the seventh and twenty-third British regiments, was -called the fuzileer brigade. General Cole directed the Portuguese -to move between Lumley’s dragoons and the hill, where they were -immediately charged by some of the French horsemen, but beat them -off with great loss: meanwhile he led the fuzileers in person up the -height. - -At this time six guns were in the enemy’s possession, the whole of -Werlé’s reserves were coming forward to reinforce the front column -of the French, and the remnant of Houghton’s brigade could no longer -maintain its ground; the field was heaped with carcasses, the -lancers were riding furiously about the captured artillery on the -upper part of the hill, and on the lower slopes, a Spanish and an -English regiment in mutual error were exchanging volleys: behind all, -general Hamilton’s Portuguese, in withdrawing from the heights above -the bridge, appeared to be in retreat. The conduct of a few brave -men soon changed this state of affairs. Colonel Robert Arbuthnot, -pushing between the double fire of the mistaken troops, arrested that -mischief, while Cole, with the fuzileers, flanked by a battalion of -the Lusitanian legion under colonel Hawkshawe, mounted the hill, -dispersed the lancers, recovered the captured guns, and appeared on -the right of Houghton’s brigade exactly as Abercrombie passed it on -the left. - -[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 12._ - - BATTLE of ALBUERA - _16^{TH} MAY, 1811._ - - _London Published by T. & W. BOONE Nov^r 1830._] - -Such a gallant line, issuing from the midst of the smoke and rapidly -separating itself from the confused and broken multitude, startled -the enemy’s heavy masses, which were increasing and pressing -onwards as to an assured victory: they wavered, hesitated, and then -vomiting forth a storm of fire, hastily endeavoured to enlarge their -front, while a fearful discharge of grape from all their artillery -whistled through the British ranks. Myers was killed; Cole and the -three colonels, Ellis, Blakeney, and Hawkshawe, fell wounded, and -the fuzileer battalions, struck by the iron tempest, reeled, and -staggered like sinking ships. Suddenly and sternly recovering, they -closed on their terrible enemies, and then was seen with what a -strength and majesty the British soldier fights. In vain did Soult, -by voice and gesture, animate his Frenchmen; in vain did the hardiest -veterans, extricating themselves from the crowded columns, sacrifice -their lives to gain time for the mass to open out on such a fair -field; in vain did the mass itself bear up, and fiercely striving, -fire indiscriminately upon friends and foes, while the horsemen -hovering on the flank threatened to charge the advancing line. -Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of -undisciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm, weakened the stability -of their order; their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in -their front; their measured tread shook the ground; their dreadful -volleys swept away the head of every formation; their deafening -shouts overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of -the tumultuous crowd, as foot by foot and with a horrid carnage it -was driven by the incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest -edge of the hill. In vain did the French reserves, joining with the -struggling multitude, endeavour to sustain the fight; their efforts -only increased the irremediable confusion, and the mighty mass giving -way like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the ascent. The rain -flowed after in streams discoloured with blood, and fifteen hundred -unwounded men, the remnant of six thousand unconquerable British -soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill! - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - - -While the fuzileers were thus striving on the upper part of the -hill, the cavalry and Harvey’s brigade continually advanced, and -Latour Maubourg’s dragoons, battered by Lefebre’s guns, retired -before them, yet still threatening the British with their right, -and covering the flank of their own infantry from a charge of -Lumley’s horse. Beresford, seeing that colonel Hardinge’s decision -had brought on the critical moment of the battle, then endeavoured -to secure a favourable result. Blake’s first line had not been at -all engaged, and were ordered to move upon the village; Alten’s -Germans and Hamilton’s and Collins’s Portuguese were thus rendered -disposable, forming a mass of ten thousand fresh men with which -the English general followed up the attack of the fuzileers and -Abercrombie’s brigade, and at the same time the Spanish divisions of -Zayas, Ballasteros, and España advanced. Nevertheless, so rapid was -the execution of the fuzileers, that the enemy’s infantry were never -attained by these reserves, which yet suffered severely; for general -Ruty got the French guns altogether, and worked them with prodigious -activity, while the fifth corps still made head, and, when the day -was irrevocably lost, he regained the other side of the Albuera, and -protected the passage of the broken infantry. - -Beresford, being too hardly handled to pursue, formed a fresh line -with his Portuguese, parallel to the hill from whence Soult had -advanced to the attack in the morning, and where the French troops -were now rallying with their usual celerity. Meanwhile the fight -continued at the village, but Godinot’s division and the connecting -battalion of grenadiers on that side were soon afterwards withdrawn, -and the action terminated before three o’clock. - -The serious fighting had endured only four hours, and in that space -of time, nearly seven thousand of the allies and above eight thousand -of their adversaries were struck down. Three French generals were -wounded, two slain, and eight hundred soldiers so badly hurt as to be -left on the field. On Beresford’s side only two thousand Spaniards, -and six hundred Germans and Portuguese, were killed or wounded; hence -it is plain with what a resolution the pure British fought, for they -had only fifteen hundred men left standing out of six thousand! The -laurel is nobly won when the exhausted victor reels as he places it -on his bleeding front. - -The trophies of the French were five hundred unwounded prisoners, a -howitzer, and several stand of colours; the British had nothing of -that kind to boast of; but the horrid piles of carcasses within their -lines told, with dreadful eloquence, who were the conquerors, and all -the night the rain poured down, and the river and the hills and the -woods on each side, resounded with the dismal clamour and groans of -dying men. Beresford, obliged to place his Portuguese in the front -line, was oppressed with the number of his wounded; they far exceeded -that of the sound amongst the British soldiers, and when the latter’s -piquets were established, few men remained to help the sufferers. In -this cruel situation he sent colonel Hardinge to demand assistance -from Blake; but wrath and mortified pride were predominant in that -general’s breast, and he refused; saying it was customary with allied -armies for each to take care of its own men. - -Morning came, and both sides remained in their respective situations, -the wounded still covering the field of battle, the hostile lines -still menacing and dangerous. The greater multitude had fallen on -the French part, but the best soldiers on that of the allies; and -the dark masses of Soult’s powerful cavalry and artillery, as they -covered all his front, seemed alone able to contend again for the -victory: the right of the French also appeared to threaten the -Badajos road, and Beresford, in gloom and doubt, awaited another -attack. On the 17th, however, the third brigade of the fourth -division came up by a forced march from Jerumenha, and enabled the -second division to retake their former ground between the Valverde -and the Badajos roads. On the 18th, Soult retreated. - -He left to the generosity of the English general several hundred men -too deeply wounded to be removed; but all that could travel he had, -in the night of the 17th, sent towards Seville, by the royal road, -through Santa Marta, Los Santos, and Monasterio: then, protecting his -movements with all his horsemen and six battalions of infantry, he -filed the army, in the morning, to its right, and gained the road of -Solano. When this flank march was completed, Latour Maubourg covered -the rear with the heavy dragoons, and Briché protected the march of -the wounded men by the royal road. - -The duke of Dalmatia remained the 19th at Solano. His intention -was to hold a position in Estremadura until he could receive -reinforcements from Andalusia; for he judged truly that, although -Beresford was in no condition to hurt Badajos, lord Wellington -would come down, and that fresh combats would be required to save -that fortress. On the 14th he had commenced repairing the castle -of Villalba, a large structure between Almendralejos and Santa -Marta, and he now continued this work; designing to form a head of -cantonments, that the allies would be unable to besiege before the -French army could be reinforced. - -When Beresford discovered the enemy’s retreat, he despatched general -Hamilton to make a show of re-investing Badajos, which was effected -at day-break the 19th, but on the left bank only. Meanwhile the -allied cavalry, supported by Alten’s Germans, followed the French -line of retreat. Soult then transferred his head-quarters to Fuente -del Maestre, and the Spanish cavalry cutting off some of his men -menaced Villalba. Lord Wellington reached the field of battle the -same day, and, after examining the state of affairs, desired the -marshal to follow the enemy cautiously; then returning to Elvas -himself, he directed the third and seventh divisions, which were -already at Campo Mayor, to complete the re-investment of Badajos on -the right bank. - -Meanwhile Beresford, advanced by the Solano road to Almendralejos, -where he found some more wounded men. His further progress was not -opposed. The number of officers who had fallen in the French army, -together with the privations endured, had produced despondence and -discontent; the garrison at Villalba was not even disposed to -maintain the castle, and under these circumstances, the duke of -Dalmatia evacuated it, and continued his own retreat in the direction -of Llerena, where he assumed a position on the 23d, his cavalry -being near Usagre. This abandonment of the royal road to Seville was -a well-considered movement. The country through which Soult passed -being more fruitful and open, he could draw greater advantage from -his superior cavalry; the mountains behind him were so strong he -had nothing to fear from an attack; and by Belalcazar and Almaden, -he could maintain a communication with La Mancha, from whence he -expected Drouet’s division. The road of Guadalcanal was in his rear, -by which he could draw reinforcements from Cordoba and from the -fourth corps, and meanwhile the allies durst not venture to expose -their left flank by marching on Monasterio. - -From Llerena, a detachment was sent to drive away a Spanish Partizan -corps which had cut his communications with Guadalcanal, and at -the same time Latour Maubourg was directed to scour the country -beyond Usagre; this led to an action; for that town, built upon -a hill, and covered towards Los Santos by a river with steep and -rugged banks, had only the one outlet by the bridge on that side, -and when Latour Maubourg approached, Lumley retired across the -river. The French light cavalry then marched along the right bank, -with the intention of crossing lower down and thus covering the -passage of the heavy horsemen; but before they could effect this -object, general Bron rashly passed the river with two regiments of -dragoons, and drew up in line just beyond the bridge. Lumley was -lying close behind a rising ground, and when the French regiments -had advanced a sufficient distance, Lefebre’s guns opened on them, -and the third, and fourth dragoon guards, charged them in front -while Madden’s Portuguese fell on their flank. They were overthrown -at the first shock, and fled towards the bridge, but that being -choked by the remainder of the cavalry advancing to their support, -the fugitives, turned to the right and left, endeavouring to save -themselves amongst some gardens situated on the banks of the river; -there they were pursued and sabred until the French on the opposite -side, seeing their distress, opened a fire of carbines and artillery -that obliged the British to discontinue the attack. Forty killed, -above a hundred wounded, and eighty prisoners were the fruits of this -brilliant action of general Lumley’s, which terminated Beresford’s -operations, for the miserable state to which the Regency had reduced -the Portuguese army imperatively called for the marshal’s presence. -General Hill, who had returned to Portugal, then re-assumed the -command of the second division, amidst the eager rejoicings of the -troops, and lord Wellington directed the renewed siege of Badajos in -person. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -No general ever gained a great battle with so little increase of -military reputation as marshal Beresford. His personal intrepidity -and strength, qualities so attractive for the multitude, were -conspicuously displayed, yet the breath of his own army withered -his laurels, and his triumph was disputed by the very soldiers who -followed his car. Their censures have been reiterated, without change -and without abatement, even to this hour; and a close examination -of his operations, while it detects many ill-founded objections, and -others tainted with malice, leaves little doubt that the general -feeling was right. - -When he had passed the Guadiana and driven the fifth corps upon -Guadalcanal, the delay that intervened, before he invested Badajos, -was unjustly attributed to him: it was lord Wellington’s order, -resulting from the tardiness of the Spanish generals, that paralyzed -his operations. But when the time for action arrived, the want -of concert in the investment, and the ill-matured attack on San -Christoval belonged to Beresford’s arrangements; and he is especially -responsible in reputation for the latter, because captain Squires -personally represented the inevitable result, and his words were -unheeded. - -During the progress of the siege, either the want of correct -intelligence, or a blunted judgement, misled the marshal. It was -remarked that, at all times, he too readily believed the idle tales -of distress and difficulties in the French armies, with which -the spies generally, and the deserters always, interlarded their -information. Thus he was incredulous of Soult’s enterprise, and that -marshal was actually over the Morena before the orders were given -for the commencing of the main attack of the castle of Badajos. -However, the firmness with which Beresford resisted the importunities -of the engineers to continue the siege, and the quick and orderly -removal of the stores and battering-train, were alike remarkable -and praiseworthy. It would have been happy if he had shewn as much -magnanimity in what followed. - -When he met Blake and Castaños at Valverde, the alternative of -fighting or retiring behind the Guadiana was the subject of -consideration. The Spanish generals were both in favour of giving -battle. Blake, who could not retire the way he had arrived, without -danger of having his march intercepted, was particularly earnest to -fight; affirming that his troops, who were already in a miserable -state, would disperse entirely if they were obliged to enter -Portugal. Castaños was of the same opinion. Beresford also argued -that it was unwise to relinquish the hope of taking Badajos, and -ungenerous to desert the people of Estremadura; that a retreat would -endanger Elvas, lay open the Alemtejo, and encourage the enemy to -push his incursions further, which he could safely do, having such a -fortress as Badajos with its bridge over the Guadiana, in his rear; -a battle must then be fought in the Alemtejo with fewer troops and -after a dispiriting retreat; there was also a greater scarcity of -food in the Portuguese than in the Spanish province, and, finally, as -the weather was menacing, the Guadiana might again rise before the -stores were carried over, when the latter must be abandoned, or the -army endangered to protect their passage. - -But these plausible reasons were but a mask; the true cause why the -English general adopted Blake’s proposals was the impatient temper -of the British troops. None of them had been engaged in the battles -under lord Wellington. At Busaco the regiments of the fourth division -were idle spectators on the left, as those of the second division -were on the right, while the action was in the centre. During -Massena’s retreat they had not been employed under fire, and the -combats of Sabugal and Fuentes Onoro had been fought without them. -Thus a burning thirst for battle was general, and Beresford had not -the art either of conciliating or of exacting the confidence of his -troops. It is certain that if he had retreated, a very violent and -unjust clamour would have been raised against him, and this was so -strongly and unceremoniously represented to him, by an officer on his -own staff, that he gave way. These are what may be termed the moral -obstacles of war. Such men as lord Wellington or sir John Moore can -stride over them, but to second-rate minds they are insuperable. -Practice and study may make a good general as far as the handling of -troops and the designing of a campaign, but that ascendancy of spirit -which leads the wise, and controls the insolence of folly, is a rare -gift of nature. - -Beresford yielded with an unhappy flexibility to the clamour of the -army and the representations of Blake, for it is unquestionable that -the resolution to fight was unwarrantable on any sound military -principle. We may pass over the argument founded upon the taking of -Badajos, because neither the measures nor the means of the English -general promised the slightest chance of success; the siege would -have died away of itself in default of resources to carry it on. -The true question to consider was, not whether Estremadura should -be deserted or Badajos abandoned, but whether lord Wellington’s -combinations and his great and well considered design for the -deliverance of the Peninsula, should be ruined and defaced at a blow. -To say that the Alemtejo could not have been defended until the -commander-in-chief arrived from the north with reinforcements was -mere trifling. Soult, with twenty or even thirty thousand men, durst -not have attempted the siege of Elvas in the face of twenty-four -thousand men such as Beresford commanded. The result of the battle -of Fuentes Onoro was known in the English and in the French camps, -before Beresford broke up from Badajos, hence he was certain that -additional troops would soon be brought down to the Guadiana; indeed, -the third and seventh divisions were actually at Campo Mayor the -23d of May. The danger to the Alemtejo was, therefore, slight, and -the necessity of a battle being by no means apparent, it remains to -analyze the chances of success. - -Soult’s numbers were not accurately known, but it was ascertained -that he had not less than twenty thousand veteran troops. He had also -a great superiority of cavalry and artillery, and the country was -peculiarly suitable for these arms; the martial character of the man -was also understood. Now the allies could bring into the field more -of infantry by ten thousand than the French, but they were of various -tongues, and the Spanish part ill armed, starving, and worn out -with fatigue, had been repeatedly and recently defeated by the very -troops they were going to engage. The French were compact, swift of -movement, inured to war, used to act together, and under the command -of one able and experienced general. The allied army was unwieldy, -each nation mistrusting the other, and the whole without unity of -spirit, or of discipline, or of command. On what, then, could marshal -Beresford found his hopes of success? The British troops. The latter -were therefore to be freely used. But was it a time to risk the total -destruction of two superb divisions and to encounter a certain and -heavy loss of men, whose value he knew so well when he calculated -upon them alone for victory in such circumstances? - -To resolve on battle was, however, easier than to prepare for it with -skill. Albuera, we have seen, was the point of concentration. Colonel -Colborne’s brigade did not arrive until the 14th, and these was no -certainty that it could arrive before the enemy did. Blake did not -arrive until three in the morning of the 16th. The fourth division -not until six o’clock. Kemmis with three fine British regiments, and -Maddens cavalry, did not come at all. These facts prove that the -whole plan was faulty, it was mere accident that a sufficient force -to give battle was concentrated. Beresford was too late, and the -keeping up the investment of Badajos, although laudable in one sense, -was a great error; it was only an accessary, and yet the success of -the principal object was made subservient to it. If Soult, instead -of passing by Villa Franca, in his advance, had pushed straight on -from Los Santos to Albuera, he would have arrived the 15th, when -Beresford had not much more than half his force in position; the -point of concentration would then have been lost, and the allies -scattered in all directions. If the French had even continued their -march by Solano instead of turning upon Albuera, they must inevitably -have communicated with Badajos, unless Beresford had fought without -waiting for Blake, and without Kemmis’s brigade. Why, then, did the -French marshal turn out of the way to seek a battle, in preference to -attaining his object without one? and why did he neglect to operate -by his right or left until the unwieldy allied army should separate -or get into confusion, as it inevitably would have done? Because the -English general’s dispositions were so faulty that no worse error -could well be expected from him, and Soult had every reason to hope -for a great and decided victory; a victory which would have more than -counterbalanced Massena’s failure. He knew that only one half of the -allied force was at Albuera on the 15th, and when he examined the -ground, every thing promised the most complete success. - -Marshal Beresford had fixed upon and studied his own field of battle -above a month before the action took place, and yet occupied it -in such a manner as to render defeat almost certain; his infantry -were not held in hand, and his inferiority in guns and cavalry was -not compensated for by entrenchments. But were any other proofs of -error wanting, this fact would suffice, he had a greater strength of -infantry on a field of battle scarcely four miles long, and three -times the day was lost and won, the allies being always fewest in -number at the decisive point. It is true that Blake’s conduct was -very perplexing; it is true that general William Stewart’s error cost -one brigade, and thus annihilated the command of colonel Colborne, a -man capable of turning the fate of a battle even with fewer troops -than those swept away from him by the French cavalry: but the neglect -of the hill beyond the Albuera, fronting the right of the position, -was Beresford’s own error and a most serious one; so also were the -successive attacks of the brigades, and the hesitation about the -fourth division. And where are we to look for that promptness in -critical moments which marks the great commander? It was colonel -Hardinge that gave the fourth division and Abercrombie’s brigade -orders to advance, and it was their astounding valour in attack, and -the astonishing firmness of Houghton’s brigade in defence that saved -the day; the person of the general-in-chief was indeed seen every -where, a gallant soldier! but the mind of the great commander was -seen no where. - -Beresford remained master of the field of battle, but he could not -take Badajos, that prize was the result of many great efforts, -and many deep combinations by a far greater man: neither did he -clear Estremadura, for Soult maintained positions from Llerena to -Usagre. What then did he gain? The power of simulating a renewal -of the siege, and holding his own cantonments on the left bank -of the Guadiana; I say simulating, for, if the third and seventh -divisions had not arrived from Beira, even the investment could not -have been completed. These illusive advantages he purchased at the -price of seven thousand men. Now lord Wellington fought two general -and several minor actions, with a smaller loss, and moreover turned -Massena and seventy thousand men out of Portugal! - -Such being the fruit of victory, what would have been the result -of defeat? There was no retreat, save by the temporary bridge of -Jerumenha, but, had the hill on the right been carried in the battle, -the Valverde road would have been in Soult’s possession, and the -line of retreat cut; and, had it been otherwise, Beresford, with -four thousand victorious French cavalry at his heels, could never -have passed the river. Back, then, must have come the army from the -north, the Lines of Lisbon would have been once more occupied--a -French force fixed on the south of the Tagus--Spain ruined--Portugal -laid prostrate--England in dismay. Could even the genius of lord -Wellington have recovered such a state of affairs? And yet, with -these results, the terrible balance hung for two hours, and -twice trembling to the sinister side, only yielded at last to the -superlative vigour of the fuzileers. The battle should never have -been fought. The siege of Badajos could not have been renewed without -reinforcements, and, with them, it could have been renewed without an -action, or at least without risking an unequal one. - -But would even the bravery of British soldiers have saved the day, at -Albuera, if the French general had not also committed great errors. -His plan of attack and his execution of it, up to the moment when the -Spanish line fell back in disorder, cannot be too much admired; after -that, the great error of fighting in dense columns being persisted -in beyond reason, lost the fairest field ever offered to the arms of -France. Had the fifth corps opened out while there was time to do so, -that is, between the falling back of the Spaniards and the advance -of Houghton’s brigade, what on earth could have saved Beresford from -a total defeat? The fire of the enemy’s columns alone destroyed -two-thirds of his British troops; the fire of their lines would have -swept away all! - -It has been said that Latour Maubourg and Godinot did not second -Soult with sufficient vigour; the latter certainly did not display -any great energy, but the village was maintained by Alten’s Germans, -who were good and hardy troops, and well backed up by a great body of -Portuguese. Latour Maubourg’s movements seem to have been objected -to without reason. He took six guns, sabred many Spaniards, and -overthrew a whole brigade of the British, without ceasing to keep -in check their cavalry. He was, undoubtedly, greatly superior in -numbers, but general Lumley handled the allied squadrons with skill -and courage, and drew all the advantage possible from his situation, -and, in the choice of that situation, none can deny ability to -marshal Beresford. The rising ground behind the horsemen, the bed of -the Aroya in their front, the aid of the horse-artillery, and the -support of the fourth division, were all circumstances of strength so -well combined that nothing could be better, and they dictated Latour -Maubourg’s proceedings, which seem consonant to true principles. If -he had charged in mass, under the fire of Lefebre’s guns, he must -have been thrown into confusion in passing the Aroya at the moment -when the fourth division, advancing along the slopes, would have -opened a musketry on his right flank; Lumley could then have charged, -or retired up the hill, according to circumstances. In this case, -great loss might have been sustained, and nothing very decisive could -have accrued to the advantage of the French, because no number of -cavalry, if unsustained by infantry and artillery, can make a serious -impression against the three arms united. - -On the other hand, a repulse might have been fatal not only to -himself but to the French infantry on the hill, as their left would -have been open to the enterprises of the allied cavalry. If Latour -Maubourg had stretched away to his own left, he would, in like -manner, have exposed the flank of Soult’s infantry, and his movements -would have been eccentric, and contrary to sound principles; and, -(in the event of a disaster to the corps on the hill, as really -happened,) destructive to the safety of the retreating army. By -keeping in mass on the plain, and detaching squadrons from time to -time, as favourable opportunities offered for partial charges, he -gained, as we have seen, great advantages during the action, and -kept his troopers well in hand for the decisive moment; finally, he -covered the retreat of the beaten infantry. Still it may be admitted -that, with such superior numbers, he might have more closely pressed -Lumley. - -When Soult had regained the hills at the other side of the Albuera, -the battle ceased, each side being, as we have seen, so hardly -handled that neither offered to renew the fight. Here was the -greatest failure of the French commander; he had lost eight thousand -men, but he had still fifteen thousand under arms, and his artillery -and his cavalry were comparatively untouched. On the side of the -allies, only fifteen hundred British infantry were standing; the -troops were suffering greatly from famine; the Spaniards had been -feeding on horseflesh, and were so extenuated by continual fatigue -and misery, that, for several days previous to the battle, they -had gone over in considerable numbers even to the French, hoping -thus to get food: these circumstances should be borne in mind, when -reflecting on their conduct in the battle; under such a commander -as Blake, and, while enduring such heavy privations, it was a great -effort of resolution, and honourable to them that they fought at all. -Their resistance feeble, when compared to the desperate valour of the -British, was by no means weak in itself or infirm; nor is it to be -wondered at that men so exhausted and so ill-managed should have been -deaf to the call of Beresford, a strange general, whose exhortations -they probably did not understand. When the fortune of the day changed -they followed the fuzileers with alacrity, and at no period did they -give way with dishonour. - -Nevertheless, all circumstances considered, they were not and could -not be equal to a second desperate struggle, a renewed attack on -the 17th, would have certainly ended in favour of the French; and -so conscious was Beresford of this, that, on the evening of the -16th, he wrote to lord Wellington, avowing that he anticipated a -certain and ruinous defeat the next day. The resolution with which he -maintained the position notwithstanding, was the strongest indication -of military talent he gave during the whole of his operations; had -Soult only persisted in holding his position with equal pertinacity, -Beresford must have retired. It was a great and decided mistake -of the French marshal not to have done so. There is nothing more -essential in war than a confident front; a general should never -acknowledge himself vanquished, for the front line of an army always -looks formidable, and the adversary can seldom see the real state of -what is behind. The importance of this maxim is finely indicated in -Livy, where he relates that, after a drawn battle, a god called out -in the night, the Etruscans had lost one man more than the Romans! -Hereupon the former retired, and the latter, remaining on the field, -gathered all the fruits of a real victory. - - - - -PAPERS RELATING TO THE FORMER VOLUMES. - - -_Letter from major-general F. Ponsonby to colonel Napier._ - -After the very handsome manner in which you have mentioned my -name, in your account of the battle of Talavera, it may appear -extraordinary that I should trouble you with this letter; but my -silence might be interpreted into the wish of taking praise to myself -which I do not deserve. - -The whole of your account of the charge made by general Anson’s -brigade is substantially correct; you have given the reason for -it, and the result; but there are two points, in the detail, which -are inaccurate. The first affecting the German hussars; the other -respecting myself. - -The Germans, on the left of the twenty-third, could not reach the -French columns, from the impracticability of the ravine where they -charged; this I ascertained, by personal observation, the following -day; the obstacle was much less serious where the twenty-third -attacked, headed by general Anson and colonel Seymour. The mountain -torrent, which gradually decreased as it descended into the plain, -was about thirty yards in front of the enemy, and the twenty-third, -though much broken in passing this obstacle, charged up to the -columns, and was repulsed, no rally could be attempted; but the -right squadron, under captain Drake, having an easier passage of the -ravine, and no French column immediately in front, passed through the -intervals, and caused much confusion, which, together with the delay -occasioned by the charge, prevented the masses of infantry which were -in readiness on the French right flank, from joining in the general -attack on our line. - -You will perceive that this account, which I believe to be the exact -truth, does not, in the slightest degree, affect the accuracy of your -description of the movement; but, if I am correct, it proves that -the Germans were obliged to halt by an insuperable difficulty, and -that I had no particular merit in the execution of the charge of the -twenty-third. - - Believe me - Very sincerely yours, - F. PONSONBY. - - _Malta, Dec. 30, 1829._ - - -_Note sur la Situation actuelle de l’Espagne._ - - _Rochefort, le Août, 1808._ - -1º. Les événemens inattendus du général Dupont sont une preuve de -plus que le succès de la guerre dépend de la prudence, de la bonne -conduite, et de l’expérience du général. - -2º. A la seule lecture du rapport du colonel d’Affry, on avoit -diviné tous les événemens; après une perte aussi considérable, on ne -peut être surpris que le roi et les généraux jugent convenable de -concentrer l’armée et d’évacuer Madrid. - -En examinant avec attention, non les rapports mensongers des -individus qui parlent dans leur sens, mais les faits tels qu’ils se -sont passés, on est convaincu: premièrement, que le général Castaños -n’avoit pas plus de vingt-cinq mille hommes de troupe de ligne et de -quinze mille paysans; un jour on sera à même de vérifier ce qui sera -avancé ici. Secondement, que si le général Dupont les eut attaqués -ou se fût battû; avec tout son corps réuni, il les eut complettement -défaits. - -3º. On pense qu’on aura tout le tems d’évacuer les blessés de Madrid -qui arrivent à Aranda; il faudra occuper aussi longtems qu’il sera -possible les hauteurs de Buitrago, afin de donner le temps au -maréchal Bessières de revenir de son mouvement de Gallice; qu’il faut -réorganiser la province de Burgos, les trois Biscayes, et la province -de Navarre; elle comprendront facilement que, dans ce moment plus que -jamais, elles doivent rester fidèles et se bien conduire sous peine -d’être traitées avec toute la rigueur de la guerre. - -4º. On pense que l’armée doit être divisée en trois corps, _le -corps principal_, ou de centre, où commande le roi, qu’on porteroit -à 30,000 hommes campé à Aranda; le corps de droite, du maréchal -Bessières d’environ 15 mille hommes faisant face à ce qui pourroit -arriver de Gallice ou d’Estramadura, occupant Valladolid par une -division, ayant une autre division intermédiaire avec le corps du -centre, et une troisième division de plus sur sa droite, selon les -circonstances; enfin le _corps de gauche_, ou d’Arragon destiné à -maintenir la Navarre et le pays environnant, occupant Logrono et -Tudela et liant sa droite au corps du centre, par une division qui au -besoin renforceroit ce corps et devra maintenir Soria par un corps -volant. - -Le corps du centre, et le corps de droite doivent s’appuyer sur -Burgos et le corps d’Arragon doit avoir son appui sur Pampelune. - -5º. Pour organiser le corps du centre dans ce bût, on croit qu’on -doit le renforcer de la brigade du 14^{me} et 44^{me} de ligne, -200 chevaux et 8 pièces de canon, qu’on tireroit du corps devant -Saragosse; de la brigade du général Mouton composée du 4^{me} legère, -15^{me} legère, du bataillon de Paris, et de huit pièces de canon; -de la brigade commandée par le maréchal Ney, et qui est déjà à une -marche en avant de Bayonne, composée du 43^{me}, et du 51^{me} de -ligne, du 26^{me} de chasseurs, et de 6 pièces de canon; enfin de -4 escadrons de marche de dragons et d’une régiment Polonais de la -garde; on réuniroit le 3^{me} bataillon aux deux premiers de tous les -régimens d’infanterie, et on méleroit les jeunes soldats aux anciens. - -On évalue à environ dix mille hommes de renfort que recevroit le -corps du centre, qui seroit alors composé: savoir des - - 18,000 qui le forment à présent 18,000 - Du renfort évalué à 10,000 - -Le détachement du depôt du 4^{me} legère, 15^{me} legère. - -14^{me}, 44^{me}, 43^{me}, et 51^{me} de ligne, le 2^{me} et 12^{me} -legère rejoindront insensiblement et porteront ce corps à 30,000 -hommes. - -Ces trente mille hommes ne sauroient être en meilleure mains, que -sous les ordres du maréchal Ney, hormis une réserve de 4 à 5 mille -hommes destinés à la garde du roi, et que le roi conserveroit auprès -de sa personne et feroit marcher avec le général Saligny, ou avec le -général Savary quand il le jugeroit nécessaire. - -Le corps du centre ce tiendrait à la hauteur d’Aranda, ses -communications bien assurées avec le maréchal Bessières à Valladolid, -des têtes de pont bien établies à Aranda et à Valladolid. Ce corps se -nourrira par Burgos et devra non seulement maintenir la tranquillité -dans cette province, mais encore assurer ses communications avec le -corps de Saragosse qui occupera Tudela et Logrono. - -Le corps du maréchal Bessières, fort de quinze mille hommes, devra -occuper Valladolid en faisant face à ce qui arrivera d’Estramadure et -de Castille, ayant ses trois divisions en échélons et se nourrissant -de la province de Valladolid, Placentia, et Leon. - -On enverra le maréchal Moncey pour commander le corps du général -Verdier, et on chargera le maréchal du commandement de la Biscaye et -de tous les derrières. - -On estime qu’on peut retirer du camp sous Saragosse le 14^{me} et -44^{me} de ligne, 200 chevaux, et 8 pièces de canon, le reste doit -être formé en trois divisions, et destiné, à maintenir la Navarre. La -position de Logrono est trop près, il faut occuper au moins jusqu’à -Tudela pour soumettre la Navarre, et tout ce qui bougeroit. Dans -l’ordre offensif, deux divisions peuvent se porter en marche forcée -sur l’armée. - -6º. Il ne faut point faire une guerre timide, ni souffrir aucun -rassemblement armé à deux marches d’aucun corps d’armée. Si l’ennemi -s’approche, il ne faut point se laisser décourager par ce qui s’est -passé, se confier dans sa supériorité, marcher à lui et le battre. -L’ennemi prendra lui même probablement une marche très circonspecte: -il y sera réduit du moment qu’il aura eu quelque exemple. - -Dans cette situation de choses, toutes les fois qu’on seroit -sérieusement attaqué par l’ennemi, on pourra lui opposer le corps du -roi, qui doit toujours être ensemble, et les deux tiers du corps du -maréchal Bessières. Se maréchal doit toujours tenir un tiers de son -corps, à une demi journée, un tiers à une journée du corps du centre, -et un tiers sur la droite, suivant les circonstances, également, un -tiers du corps du général Verdier doit se tenir à la gauche du roi, -pour le joindre si cela étoit nécessaire, de sorte que dans un jour -le roi puisse réunir 40 mille hommes. - -7º. Il faut débuter par des coups d’éclât, qui rélévent le moral -du soldat et qui fassent comprendre à l’habitant qu’il doit rester -tranquille, un des premiers coups le plus important à porter, et qui -seroit utile pour réléver l’opinion et compenser l’évacuation de -Madrid, seroit que la brigade du 14^{me} et 44^{me} qu’on rappelle -de Saragosse, aidée d’une détachement du corps du centre, soumette -Soria, le désarme et le fasse rester tranquille. Attaquer et culbuter -tout ce qui se présentera doit être l’instruction générale, donnée -au maréchal Bessières, au maréchal Ney, et au général Verdier, de -sorte qu’à une marche, ou à une marche et demie du corps François, -il n’y ait aucun rassemblement d’insurgés; on est d’opinion que si -l’avant garde du général Castaños s’avance sur l’Aranda et dépasse -les montagnes de Buitrago il faut, avec tout ce qu’on réunira dans -un jour, marcher à lui sans lui donner le tems de s’y établir -sérieusement, le culbuter, le jetter au delà des montagnes, et si -l’affaire est décisive, se reporter sur Madrid. L’ennemi doit essayer -de déloger l’armée Françoise de cette position, par trois points, -par la Gallice et l’Estramadure, par la droite d’Aranda, et enfin -par les rassemblemens des provinces d’Arragon, de Valence et autres -de Castille. Toutes ces combinaisons sont difficiles à l’ennemi, -et si on dissipe ces rassemblemens à mesure qu’ils se formeront -sur tous les points et qu’on les tienne à distance d’une ou deux -marches du cantonnement François, si alternativement les François -prennent l’offensive, tantôt à leur droite, en renforçant le maréchal -Bessières, pendant que le centre se tiendra dans une bonne position -derrière la rivière, et à l’abri de toute attaque, tantôt au centre -avec le corps du roi, les deux tiers du corps de droite, et un tiers -du corps de gauche, l’ennemi sera bientôt obligé à la plus grande -circonspection. - -8º. On auroit pu aussi conserver Madrid en renforçant le corps qui -s’y trouve, du 14^{me} et 44^{me} de ligne, de la brigade du général -Mouton, de celle du général Le Fevbre, qui en dernier lieu a été -renvoyée au marshal Bessières, et enfin du renfort qu’amène le -maréchal Ney. On auroit ainsi renforcé le corps de Madrid de plus de -14 mille hommes, et il est douteux que l’ennemi eut voulu se mesurer -avec des forces aussi considérables et s’exposer à une perte certaine. - -9º. Si de fortes raisons obligoient d’évacuer Aranda, on perdroit -l’espoir de rétablir ses communications avec le Portugal. Dans le -cas où un évènement quelconque porteroit à évacuer le Duero et à se -concentrer sur Burgos pour se réunir là avec le maréchal Bessières, -le corps du général Verdier peut communiquer par l’Ebre, et avoir -toujours son mouvement isolé pour maintenir la Navarre, contenir -l’Arragon, tous les rassemblemens de ce côté, et protéger la route -principale.[9] Pendant cet intervalle des renforts journaliers -arriveront à l’armée, jusqu’à ce qu’enfin les divisions de la grande -armée qui sont en marche, soient sur les Pyrénées. - -On a recommandé de tous tems le petit fort de Pancorvo. Il est -nécessaire de l’occuper, même quand on ne garderoit pas la ligne -de l’Ebre, c’est une vedette d’autant plus utile qu’elle domine la -plaine, et seroit un obstacle si jamais l’ennemi s’en emparoit.[9] - -10º. La troisième position qui se présente à l’armée, c’est la -gauche à Pampelune, et la droite sur Vittoria, maintenant ainsi -ses communications avec les places importantes de St. Sebastien -et de Pampelune. Au reste toutes ces notes peuvent difficilement -être de quelque utilité, les évènemens modifient nécessairement les -dispositions, tout dépend d’ailleurs de saisir un moment. - -11º. Résumé. Le premier but est de se maintenir à Madrid si cela est -possible. - -Le second, de maintenir ses communications avec le Portugal en -occupant la ligne du Duero. - -Le troisième, de conserver l’Ebre. - -Le quatrième de conserver ses communications avec Pampelune et St. -Sebastien afin que la grande armée arrivant, on puisse en peu de tems -culbuter et anéantir tous les révoltés. - - LIEUT.-GEN. BERTRAND. - - _Rochefort, 6 Août, 1808._ - - - - -APPENDIX. - - - - -APPENDIX. - - -No. I. - -SECTION 1.--GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN THE PENINSULA, -EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER ROLLS. - -King Joseph commanding, 1st Oct. 1809. - - Present under - arms Detached. Absent. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Prison. Men. Cav. Draught. - 180,814 28,091 10,407 3,165 46,109 4,124 237,330 23,196 8,060 - Deduct for the governments 10,407 3,165 - ------- ------ - Real total 226,927 28,091 - ------- ------ - -15th July, 1810. - - 273,403 52,336 29,462 7,846 47,107 4,915 349,972 41,848 18,334 - In march to join - 6,121 736 ” ” 636 ” 6,757 736 - ------- ------ ------ ----- ------ ----- ------- ------ - 279,524 53,072 29,462 7,846 47,743 4,915 356,729 60,918 - ------- ------ ------ ----- ------ ----- ------- ------ - -15th August, 1810. - - 279,639 52,063 25,340 6,017 46,982 5,995 351,961 41,446 16,634 - In march to join 1,957 681 511 - ------- ------ ------ - Total effective in Spain 353,918 42,127 17,145 - Troops destined for Spain, quartered on the - frontier 16,006 1,447 ” - ------- ------ ------ - Grand total 369,924 43,574 17,145 - ------- ------ ------ - -_Note._--By this state it appears that allowance being made for -casualties, the reinforcements for Spain, in consequence of the peace -with Austria, were not less than one hundred and fifty thousand men. - -15th Jan. 1811. - - Present under arms. Detached. Absent. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Men. Cav. Draught. - 295,227 52,462 17,780 4,714 48,831 361,838 41,189 15,987 - -15th April, 1811. - - 276,575 46,990 15,121 2,166 40,079 331,776 37,855 11,301 - -These states shew a decrease of nearly thirty thousand men in three -months. During this period the siege of Badajos, the retreat of -Massena, the battles of the Gebora, Barrosa, and Fuentes Onoro took -place. Hence, if the deaths in hospital be added to the losses -sustained in those operations we shall find that, at the period of -its greatest activity, the Guerilla system was more harassing than -destructive to the French army. - - -SECTION 2.--STATE OF THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL. - -April, 1810.--Head-quarter Caceres. Massena, Prince of Esling, -commanding. - - Pris- - Under arms. Detached. Hosp. oners. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Men. Cav. Draught. - - 2d corps d’armée - 18,372 4,449 1,119 132 1,628 7 21,126 3,520 1,061 - - 6th Ditto - 33,759 10,159 496 110 5,086 349 39,690 3,140 3,129 - - 8th Ditto - 28,045 7,070 25 ” 5,976 99 34,145 5,312 1,758 - --------------------------------------------------------------------- - Total active army - 80,176 21,678 1,640 242 12,690 455 94,961 15,972 5,948 - - Imperial guards - 17,380 3,800 174 15 733 ” 18,287 2,831 954 - - Province of St. Ander - 13,464 752 276 ” 1,774 377 15,891 15,752 ” - - Province of Valladolid - 4,509 124 123 ” 859 145 6,136 ” 126 - --------------------------------------------------------------------- - Total under Massena’s command - 116,029 26,254 2,213 257 16,056 977 135,275 19,555 7,056 - --------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -15th May, 1810. - - Etat major et gend’armes - 229 241 ” ” ” ” 229 241 ” - - 2d corps Reynier - 16,903 2,921 992 231 1,337 42 19,232 2,186 966 - - 6th do. Ney - 28,883 5,421 1,224 964 4,940 357 35,067 2,152 4,233 - - 8th do. Junot - 30,782 4,228 7 30 5,642 75 2,643 2,142 2,116 - - Reserve of cavalry. Montbrun - 4,776 4,851 246 189 95 ” 5,117 5,040 11 - --------------------------------------------------------------------- - Total active army - 71,573 17,662 2,489 1,414 12,014 474 86,076 11,761 7,315 - --------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -15th August, 1810. - - Etat major, &c - 199 222 ” ” 3 ” 202 222 ” - - 2d corps - 16,418 2,894 2,494 397 3,006 ” 21,913 1,969 1,304 - - 6th corps - 23,456 2,496 1,865 577 5,541 193 30,862 1,701 1,372 - - 8th corps - 18,803 1,959 436 169 4,996 98 24,235 2,016 1,112 - - Reserve of cavalry - 4,146 4,322 1,138 831 157 31 5,441 4,907 246 - - Artillerie et genie et du siege - 2,724 2,969 205 159 409 ” 3,339 108 3,128 - --------------------------------------------------------------------- - Total active army - 65,746 15,862 6,139 2,119 14,112 302 85,997 10,815 7,162 - - 6th Government Valladolid. Division Serras - 12,693 3,045 639 20 1,775 641 15,107 2,931 134 - - Asturias et St. Ander. Bonet - 12,913 ” 1,394 15 1,578 107 14,885 434 ” - --------------------------------------------------------------------- - Total under Massena - 91,352 18,907 8,172 2,154 17,465 1,050 115,989 13,746 7,296 - - 9th corps, Drouet Comte D’Erlon - 19,144 2,436 24 ” 3,147 ” 22,315 2,436 ” - --------------------------------------------------------------------- - General Total - 110,496 21,343 8,196 2,154 20,612 1,050 138,304 16,616 7,296 - --------------------------------------------------------------------- - - -Army of Portugal, 27th September, 1810. The 9th corps to the 15th -October. - -The reserve of cavalry, and the artillery of siege to the 1st -September only. - - Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Cav. Draught. - - Etat major - 192 219 ” ” 4 196 219 ” - - 2d corps - 16,575 2,921 2,397 287 2,214 21,186 1,872 1,336 - - 6th do. - 23,224 2,478 1,708 600 5,418 30,350 1,730 1,348 - - 8th do. - 18,807 2,958 663 140 4,656 24,126 2,027 1,071 - - Reserve of cavalry - 4,146 4,322 1,138 831 157 5,441 4,907 246 - - Artilleries of siege - 3,022 3,115 206 159 409 3,637 146 3,128 - - Battalion of march which quitted Bayonne the 2d of October - ” ” 474 16 ” 474 16 ” - -------------------------------------------------------------- - Total - 65,966 16,013 6,586 2,033 12,858 85,410 10,917 7,129 - - 9th corps - 19,062 2,072 413 ” 3,516 22,991 1,755 317 - - Division Serras - 8,586 1,015 269 35 1,750 10,605 1,050 ” - -------------------------------------------------------------- - Grand Total - 93,614 19,100 7,268 2,068 18,124 119,006 13,722 7,446 - -------------------------------------------------------------- - - -Army of Portugal--1st January, 1811. - -Head-quarters, Torres Novas. - -2d Corps, Head-quarters Santarem. - - Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Cav. Draught. - - Merle’s division, 9 battalions - 4,368 ” 150 ” 1,549 6,067 ” ” - - Heudelet’s do. 12 do. - 5,718 ” 451 ” 2,646 8,815 ” ” - - Lt. cavalry, Soult, 15 squadrons - 1,146 993 523 537 231 1,900 1,530 ” - - Artillery and engineers - 1,284 1,121 52 9 189 1,425 112 1,018 - -------------------------------------------------------------- - Total - 12,516 2,114 1,176 546 4,515 18,207 1,642 1,018 - -------------------------------------------------------------- - -6th Corps, Thomar. - - Marchand, 11 battalions - 4,987 28 529 ” 1,121 6,637 28 ” - - Mermet’s, 11 do. - 6,252 ” 743 ” 1,077 8,104 ” ” - - Loison, 12 do. - 4,589 ” 1,037 ” 3,291 8,917 ” ” - - Light cavalry, Lamotte, 7 squadrons - 652 651 663 663 117 1,432 1,314 ” - - Artillery and engineers, 28 companies - 1,769 1,372 47 78 165 1,981 52 1,398 - -------------------------------------------------------------- - Total - 18,272 2,051 3,019 741 5,771 27,094 1,394 1,398 - -------------------------------------------------------------- - -8th Corps, Pernes. - - Clausel, 11 battalions - 4,007 18 484 ” 3,989 8,627 18 ” - - Solignac, 14 do - 4,997 ” 1,953 ” 3,337 10,346 ” ” - - St. Croix’s dragoons, 12 squadrons - 981 1,024 698 698 238 1,917 1,722 ” - - Artillery and engineers - 1,106 859 24 4 359 1,522 151 712 - - On leave - ” ” ” ” ” 206 ” ” - -------------------------------------------------------------- - Total - 11,108 1,901 3,159 702 7,956 22,605 1,191 712 - -------------------------------------------------------------- - -Montbrun, Ourem. - - Reserve of cavalry 24 squadrons with artillery - 2,729 2,871 1,486 1,466 178 4,533 4,337 - ------------------------------------------------------------- - Artillery, engineers, and equipage of the army - 1,546 614 ” ” 283 2,090 614 - ------------------------------------------------------------- - -9th Corps, Leiria. - - Claparede, 15 battalions, Almeida - 7,863 11 369 ” 432 8,714 ” - - Couroux, 12 battalions, Leiria - 7,592 27 447 ” 1,299 9,338 27 - - Fournier’s cavalry, 7 squadrons at Toro - 1,698 1,591 60 67 114 1,872 1,658 - - Artillery and engineers, Ciudad Rodrigo - 670 464 ” 72 742 ” 464 - -------------------------------------------------------------- - Total - 17,823 2,093 876 139 2,637 19,924 2,149 - -------------------------------------------------------------- - -_Note._--Salamanca constituted a government containing the towns of -Alba de Tormes, Penaranda, and Salamanca, in which were deposited the -sick men, stragglers, equipages, and depôts, of the army of Portugal. -The total amounting to 2,354 men and 1,102 horses. - - Present under arms. - Men. Horses. - General Total of the army of Portugal in the - position of Santarem 46,171 9,551 - 9th Corps 17,823 2,093 - ------ ------ - 63,994 11,644 - Deduct troops of the 9th corps not in Portugal 10,231 2,066 - ------ ------ - Real numbers under Massena 53,763 9,578 - ------ ------ - - -Army of Portugal--1st April, 1811. - - Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. - - 8th corps, Junot 13,448 ” 992 ” 5,719 20,159 ” - 6th do. Marmont 13,984 ” 1,374 ” 1,576 16,934 ” - 2d corps, Reynier 10,837 ” 1,350 ” 4,318 16,505 ” - Montbrun - { Dragoon, 23 squadrons - { 4,173 4,404 ” ” ” 4,173 4,404 - { Light cavalry, 14 squadrons - { 3,636 3,906 ” ” 38 3,636 3,906 - { 1 squadron of gens-d’armes - { 190 72 ” ” 5 102 72 - - Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. - Artillery and Engineers - { Foot artillery. Almeida and Rodrigo - { 936 ” ” ” 88 1,055 ” - { Horse artillery - { 410 425 ” ” 23 453 425 - { Artillery of the train - { 2,181 2,378 ” ” 237 2,448 2,378 - { Workmen - { 259 ” ” ” 25 295 ” - { Engineers - { 1,448 60 ” ” 140 1,623 ” - { Military equipage - { 596 897 ” ” 60 668 897 - -------------------------------------------------- - Total artilleries, engineers, &c. - 5,969 3,335 ” ” 573 6,542 2,760 - Total of infantry - 37,269 ” 3,716 ” 11,613 53,598 ” - Total of cavalry - 7,999 8,382 ” ” 43 7,911 8,382 - --------------------------------------------------- - General Total 51,237 11,717 3,716 ” 12,229 68,051 11,142 - --------------------------------------------------- - -_Note._--In the imperial rolls there was no state of the army of -Portugal for May. Two divisions of the 9th corps, directed to be -added to the army of Portugal, are included in the state for April, -and the prince of Esling was empowered to distribute the cavalry -as he pleased, provided the brigade of general Fournier, from the -9th corps, was kept in the reserve. The detached men were in the -government of Salamanca. On the 1st of June, however, the army of -Portugal is returned as present under arms 44,548 men, 7,253 horses, -and 4,620 men detached. Hence, I have estimated the number of -fighting men and officers, including the imperial guards, at Fuentes -Onoro at 45,000, a number, perhaps, too great, when the artificers, -engineers, &c. are deducted. - - -SECTION 3.--ARMY OF THE SOUTH, SOULT, DUKE OF DALMATIA, COMMANDING. - - Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Cav. Draught. - - 1st of January 55,602 12,092 5,744 1,999 6,412 67,758 10,868 3,223 - ------------------------------------------------------- - 15th May 75,133 13,124 3,915 1,336 11,420 90,468 12,156 2,304 - - Deduct the troops of the 9th corps in march from the north - 11,917 1,619 ” ” ” 13,310 1,220 399 - ------------------------------------------------------ - Real total of the army of the South - 63,216 11,505 3,915 1,336 11,420 77,158 10,936 1,905 - ------------------------------------------------------ - - -SECTION 4. - -5th Corps, 15th January. - - Under arms. Detached. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. - - 18,766 6,158 3,035 640 - -16th December, 1810, le Duc de Dalmatie, va faire le siège de -Badajos, avec tout le 5^{em} corps d’armée, 8 régimens de cavalerie -formant 2,600 chevaux pris dans les l^{ere} et 5^{em} corps d’armée -sous les orders de general Latour Maubourg, 900 hommes du 63^{em} -regiment de ligne, 2 compagnies d’artillerie légère, 4 compagnies de -sappeurs, 1 compagnie de mineurs, et trois escadrons de cavalerie -Espagnols. - - -SECTION 5. - -1st Corps before Cadiz. - - Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Cav. Train. - - 15th February, 1811 - 20,572 1,886 1,331 681 1,254 23,457 1,495 1,072 - - Reinforcement on the march from the Governments - 5,209 775 ” ” 743 5,952 712 62 - ------------------------------------------------------------ - Total 25,781 2,661 1,331 681 1,997 29,409 2,407 1,035 - ------------------------------------------------------------ - - 4th corps, 15th Feb. - 16,706 4,007 741 397 1,699 19,143 3,618 793 - - Reinforcement on the march from the Governments - 6,620 1,457 ” ” 878 6,854 1,451 ” - ------------------------------------------------------------ - Total 22,726 5,464 741 397 2,577 25,998 5,069 793 - ------------------------------------------------------------ - -_Note._--A reinforcement of more than one thousand men likewise -joined the 5th corps while in front of Badajos. - - -SECTION 6.--ARMY OF THE NORTH--BESSIERES, DUKE OF ISTRIA, COMMANDING. - - Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses. - Men. Horses. Men. Men. Men. Cav. Train. - - 1st February, 1811 - 58,515 8,874 1,992 6,860 67,767 7,979 1,079 - ----------------------------------------------------------- - 15th April, 1811 - 53,148 6,930 2,221 5,350 60,719 6,065 879 - - -SECTION 7.--ARMÉE IMPÉRIALE DU MIDI DE L’ESPAGNE 1^{me} CORPS. - -Situation des présens sous les armes à l’époque du 22d Mars 1811. - - (Part 1 of 2) - - Etat des Dans les Emplacement des Troupes - Designation des presens Forts et dans les Forts - Division 1. Regimens sous les Redoutes. et Redoutes. - armes. - 9^{me} Infantrie ligne 1,000 - 24^{me} do. do. 800 400 Depuis et compris le Fort - St. Catherine jusqu’au - Rio St. Petro - 96^{me} do. do. 1,100 - - Division 2. Regimens - 16^{me} do. do. 350 350 Xeres et la Cartuxa - 8^{me} do. do. 713 - 45^{me} do. do. 1,072 744 Depuis et compris le Fort - Napoleon jusqu’à Chiese fe - 54^{me} do. do. 820 - Bataillon d’Elite 236 - - Division 3. Regimens - 27^{me} Infantrie ligne 1,400 - 63^{me} do. do. 845 - 94^{me} do. do. 1,500 650 Depuis et compris la Redoute - jusqu’à cette de Vellati - 95^{me} do. do. 1,414 472 Arcos, Medina, Vejer, et - Conil - Régiment de Marine. - 43^{me} Battalions de 900 900 Au Trocadero - marine - 2^e do. d’Ouvriers do. 615 615 Do. - 5^e Chasseurs 320 - - Cavalrie. - 1^e de Dragoons 230 50 De Montesà, Alcazar de Xeres - 2^e do. do. 218 72 Do. et à la Cartuxa - - Artillerie - à pied à Cheval 678 500 Sur la ligne du Blocas - Sapeurs 323 323 Au Trocadero - Mineurs 77 77 Do. - ------ ----- - 14,611 5,153 - ------ ----- - - - (Part 2 of 2; columns 1, 2 and 3 repeated) - - Etat des Dans les - Designation des presens Forts et Disposeables. - Division 1. Regimens sous les Redoutes. - armes. - 9^{me} Infantrie ligne 1,000 1,000 Sta Maria. - 24^{me} do. do. 800 400 400 Do. - 96^{me} do. do. 1,100 1,100 Do. San Lucar, Esta, - Chipiona, la Viala - Atta. - Division 2. Regimens - 16^{me} do. do. 350 350 - 8^{me} do. do. 713 713 Port Reale au - Trocadero. - 45^{me} do. do. 1,072 744 328 Port Reale. - 54^{me} do. do. 820 820 Chiclana. - Bataillon d’Elite 236 236 Do. - - Division 3. Regimens - 27^{me} Infantrie ligne 1,400 1,400 Do. - 63^{me} do. do. 845 845 Port Reale. - 94^{me} do. do. 1,500 650 850 Chiclana. - 95^{me} do. do. 1,414 472 942 Do. - - Régiment de Marine. - 43^{me} Battalions de 900 900 - marine - 2^e do. d’Ouvriers do. 615 615 - 5^e Chasseurs 320 320 Vejer et Conil. - - Cavalrie. - 1^e de Dragoons 230 50 180 Xeres. - 2^e do. do. 218 72 146 Arcos. - - Artillerie - à pied à Cheval 678 500 178 Santa Maria, Puerto - Reale, et Chiclana. - Sapeurs 323 323 - Mineurs 77 77 - ------ ----- ----- - 14,611 5,153 9,458 - ------ ----- ----- - - By this return, which is not extracted from the imperial rolls, but - was found amongst Colonel Lejeune’s intercepted papers, it appears - that Victor had above nine thousand disposable troops seventeen days - after the battle of Barosa. He must, therefore, have had about eleven - thousand disposable before that action, and Cassagne’s detachment - being deducted leaves about nine thousand for the battle of Barosa. - - -SECTION 8.--STATE OF THE BRITISH AND GERMAN TROOPS ON THE COA, 25TH -APRIL, 1811, EXTRACTED FROM THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S RETURNS. - - Under arms. Sick. Detached. - Men. Men. Men. - Cavalry 4 regiments 1,525 274 542 - Infantry 41 battalions 20,700 8,880 3,214 - Artillery 1,378 144 1,156 - ------ ----- ----- - Total of all arms 23,613 9,298 4,912 - ------ ----- ----- - - Guns 24 British, 18 Portuguese Total 42 - - _Note._--There are no separate returns of the army engaged in the - battle of Fuentes Onoro. Hence, the above is only an approximation - to the numbers of British and German troops; but if the Portuguese - and the Partida of Julian Sanchez be added, the whole number in - line will be about thirty-five thousand men of all arms. - - * * * * * - - -No. II. - -EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON TO LORD LIVERPOOL. - - -SECTION 1. - - “_November 30, 1809._ - -“I enclose copies and extracts of a correspondence which I have had -with Mr. Frere on the subject of the co-operation of the British army -with the corps of the duke of Albuquerque and the duke Del Parque in -this plan of diversion. - -“Adverting to the opinion which I have given to his majesty’s -ministers and the ambassador at Seville, it will not be supposed that -I could have encouraged the advance of general Areizaga, or could -have held out the prospect of any co-operation by the British army. - -“The first official information which I had from the government of -the movement of general Areizaga was on the 18th, the day before his -defeat, and I gave the answer on the 19th regarding the plan of which -I now enclose a copy. - -“I was at Seville, however, when the general commenced his march -from the Sierra Morena, and in more than one conversation with the -Spanish ministers and members of the Junta, I communicated to them my -conviction that general Areizaga would be defeated. The expectation, -however, of success from this large army, stated to consist of fifty -thousand men, was so general and so sanguine that the possibility -of disappointment was not even contemplated, and, accordingly, your -lordship will find that, on the 10th only, the government began to -think it necessary to endeavour to make a diversion in favour of -general Areizaga, and it is probable that it was thought expedient to -make this diversion only in consequence of the fall of the general’s -own hopes, after his first trial with the enemy on the night of the -10th instant.”--“I am anxious to cross the Tagus with the British -army and to station it on the frontiers of Old Castile, from thinking -that the point in which I can be of most use in preventing the enemy -from effecting any important object, and which best answers for my -future operations in the defence of Portugal. With this view, I have -requested Mr. Frere to urge the government to reinforce the duke -D’Albuquerque’s corps, in order to secure the passage of the lower -part of the Tagus. And, although the state of the season would render -it desirable that I should make the movement at an early period, I do -not propose to make it till I shall see most clearly the consequences -of that defeat, and some prospect that the city of Seville will be -secure after I shall move.” - - -SECTION 2. - - “_December 7, 1809._ - -“----I had urged the Spanish government to augment the army of the -duke D’Albuquerque to twenty thousand men, in order that it might -occupy, in a sufficient manner, the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz -and the passes through the mountains leading from Arzobispo to -Truxillo, in which position they would have covered effectually -the province of Estremadura, during the winter at least, and -would have afforded time and leisure for preparations for farther -opposition to the enemy, and I delayed the movement, which I have -long been desirous of making, to the northward of the Tagus, till -the reinforcements could be sent to the duke D’Albuquerque which I -had lately recommended should be drawn from the army of the duke -Del Parque. During the discussions upon the subject, the government -have given orders to the duke D’Albuquerque to retire with his corps -behind the Guadiana, to a position which he cannot maintain, thus -leaving open the road into Estremadura, and incurring the risk of the -loss of that province whenever the enemy choose to take possession of -it.” - - -SECTION 3. - - “_January 31, 1810._ - -“----There is no doubt that, if the enemy’s reinforcements have not -yet entered Spain, and are not considerably advanced within the -Spanish frontiers, the operation which they have undertaken is one -of some risk, and I have maturely considered of the means of making -a diversion in favour of the allies, which might oblige the enemy to -reduce his force in Andalusia, and would expose him to risk and loss -in this quarter. But the circumstances, which are detailed in the -enclosed copy of a letter to M. Frere, have obliged me to refrain -from attempting this operation at present. I have not, however, given -up all thoughts of it, and I propose to carry it into execution -hereafter, if circumstances will permit.” - - -SECTION 4. - - “_January 12, 1811._ - -“My former despatch will have informed your lordship that I was -apprehensive that the Spanish troops in Estremadura would not make -any serious opposition to the progress which it was my opinion the -enemy would attempt to make in that province; but as they had been -directed to destroy the bridges on the Guadiana, at Merida and -Medellin, and preparations had been ordered for that purpose, and to -defend the passage of the Guadiana as long as was practicable, I was -in hopes that the enemy would have been delayed at least for some -days before he should be allowed to pass that river. But I have been -disappointed in that expectation, and the town and bridge of Merida -appear to have been given up to an advanced guard of cavalry.” - - -SECTION 5. - - “_January 19, 1811._ - -“At the moment when the enemy entered Estremadura from Seville -general Ballasteros received an order from the Regency, dated the -21st December last, directing him to proceed with the troops under -his command into the Condada de Niebla. The force in Estremadura -was thus diminished by one-half, and the remainder are considered -insufficient to attempt the relief of the troops in Olivenza.” - -“The circumstances which I have above related will show your lordship -that the military system of the Spanish nation is not much improved, -and that it is not very easy to combine or regulate operations with -corps so ill organised, in possession of so little intelligence, and -upon whose actions so little reliance can be placed. It will scarcely -be credited that the first intelligence which general Mendizabel -received of the assembly of the enemy’s troops at Seville was from -hence; and if any combination was then made, either for retreat or -defence, it was rendered useless, or destroyed by the orders from the -Regency, to detach general Ballasteros into the Condado de Niebla, -which were dated the 21st of December, the very day on which Soult -broke up from Cadiz, with a detachment of infantry, and marched to -Seville.” - - -SECTION 6. - - “_February 2, 1811._ - -“The various events of the war will have shown your lordship that no -calculation can be made on the result of any operation in which the -Spanish troops are engaged. But if the same number of troops of any -other nation (ten thousand) were to be employed on this operation, -(the opening the communication with Badajos,) I should have no doubt -of their success, or of their ability to prevent the French from -attacking Badajos with the forces which they have now employed on -this service.” - - -SECTION 7. - - “_February 9, 1811._ - -“General Mendizabel has not adhered to the plan which was ordered by -the late marquess De la Romana, which provided for the security of -the communication with Elvas before the troops should be thrown to -the left of the Guadiana. I don’t believe that the strength of the -enemy, on either side of the Guadiana, is accurately known, but if -they should be in strength on the right of that river, it is to be -apprehended that the whole of the troops will be shut up in Badajos, -and I have reason to believe that this place is entirely unprovided -with provisions, notwithstanding that the siege of it has been -expected for the last year.” - - -SECTION 8. - - “_February 23, 1811._ - -“Although experience has taught me to place no reliance upon the -effect of the exertions of the Spanish troops, notwithstanding the -frequent instances of their bravery, I acknowledge that this recent -disaster has disappointed and grieved me much. The loss of this army -and its probable consequences, the fall of Badajos, have materially -altered the situation of the allies in this part of the Peninsula, -and it will not be an easy task to place them in the situation in -which they were, much less in that in which they would have been, -if that misfortune had not occurred. I am concerned to add to this -melancholy history, that the Portuguese brigade of cavalry did not -behave much better than the other troops. Brigadier-general Madden -did every thing in his power to induce them to charge, but in vain.” -“The operations of the Guerillas continue throughout the interior; -and I have proofs that the political hostility of the people of Spain -towards the enemy is increasing rather than diminishing. But I have -not yet heard of any measure being adopted to supply the regular -funds to pay and support an army, or to raise one.” - - -SECTION 9. - - “_March 21, 1811._ - -“It (Campo Mayor) had been given over to the charge of the marquis of -Romana, at his request, last year. But, lately, the Spanish garrison -had been first weakened and then withdrawn, in a manner not very -satisfactory to me, nor consistent with the honourable engagements -to defend the place into which the marquis entered when it was -delivered over to his charge. I am informed, however, that marshal -Bessieres has collected at Zamora about seven thousand men, composed -principally of the imperial guard, and of troops taken from all the -garrisons in Castile. He thus threatens an attack upon Gallicia, in -which province there are, I understand, sixteen thousand men under -general Mahi; but, from all I hear, I am apprehensive that that -general will make no defence, and that Gallicia will fall into the -hands of the enemy.” - - -SECTION 10. - - “_May 7, 1811._ - -“Your lordship will have observed, in my recent reports of the state -of the Portuguese force, that their numbers are much reduced, and I -don’t know what measure to recommend which will have the effect of -restoring them. All measures recommended to the existing government -in Portugal are either rejected, or are neglected, or are so executed -as to be of no use whatever; and the countenance which the prince -regent of Portugal has given to the governors of the kingdom, who -have uniformly manifested this spirit of opposition to every thing -proposed for the increase of the resources of the government and the -amelioration of their military system, must tend to aggravate these -evils. The radical defect, both in Spain and Portugal, is want of -money to carry on the ordinary operations of the government, much -more to defray the expenses of such a war as that in which we are -engaged.” - -“I have not received the consent of Castaños and Blake to the plan of -co-operation which I proposed for the siege of Badajos; and I have -been obliged to write to marshal Beresford to desire him to delay the -siege till they will positively promise to act as therein specified, -or till I can go to him with a reinforcement from hence.” - -“Depend upon it that Portugal should be the foundation of all your -operations in the Peninsula, of whatever nature they may be, upon -which point I have never altered my opinion. If they are to be -offensive, and Spain is to be the theatre of them, your commander -must be in a situation to be entirely independent of all Spanish -authorities; by which means alone he will be enabled to draw some -resources from the country and some assistance from the Spanish -armies.” - - -SECTION 11. - - “_May 22, 1811._ - -“On the night of the 15th instant I received, from marshal sir -William Beresford, letters of the 12th and 13th instant, which -reported that marshal Soult had broken up from Seville about the -10th, and had advanced towards Estremadura, notwithstanding the -reports which had been previously received, that he was busily -occupied in strengthening Seville, and the approaches to that city, -by works, and that all his measures indicated an intention to remain -on the defensive in Andalusia.” - - -SECTION 12. - -_Letter from sir J. Moore to major-general M’Kenzie, commanding in -Portugal._ - - _Salamanca, 29th November, 1808._ - -SIR, - -The armies of Spain, commanded by generals Castaños and Blake, -the one in Biscay and the other in Arragon, have been beaten and -dispersed. This renders my junction with sir David Baird’s corps -impracticable, but if it were, I cannot hope, with the British alone, -to withstand the formidable force which France has brought against -this country; and there is nothing else now in Spain to make head -against it. - -I have ordered sir David Baird to fall back on Coruña, re-embark, -and proceed to the Tagus; I myself, with the corps which marched -from Lisbon, mean to retire by Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida, and, by -taking up such positions as offer, endeavour to defend, for a time, -the frontier of Portugal, and cover Lisbon. But, looking forward -that this cannot be done for any considerable time against superior -numbers, it becomes necessary for me to give you this notice, that -you may embark the stores of the army, keeping on shore as little as -possible that may impede a re-embarkation of the whole army both now -with you and that which I am bringing. - -We shall have great difficulties on the frontier for subsistence; -colonel Murray wrote on this subject to colonel Donkin yesterday, -that supplies might be sent for us to Abrantes and Coimbra. Some -are already at Oporto, and more may be sent. I have desired sir D. -Baird, if he has with him a victualler, of small draft of water, to -send her there. On the subject of provisions the commissary-general -will write more in detail, and I hope you will use your influence -with the government of Portugal to secure its aid and assistance. It -will be right to consider with the Portuguese officers and engineers -what points may be immediately strengthened and are most defensible, -and what use you can make of the troops with you to support me in my -defence of the frontiers, and I shall be glad to hear from you upon -this subject. I cannot yet determine the line I shall take up, but -generally it will be Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, Celerico, -Viseu. The Portuguese, on their own mountains, can be of much use, -and I should hope, at any rate, that they will defend the Tras os -Montes. Mr. Kennedy will probably write to Mr. Erskine, who now had -better remain at Lisbon; but, if he does not write to him, this, -together with colonel Murray’s letter to colonel Donkin, will be -sufficient for you and Mr. Erskine to take means for securing to us -not only a supply of biscuit and salt provisions, but the supplies -of the country for ourselves and horses, &c. In order to alarm as -little as possible, it may be said that more troops are expected from -England, to join us through Portugal: this will do at first, but -gradually the truth will, of course, be known. I am in great want of -money, and nothing else will secure the aid of the country. - - I have the honour to be, &c. - J. MOORE. - - P.S. Elvas should be provisioned. - - * * * * * - - -No. III. - -EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF A FIELD-OFFICER OF ENGINEERS, -EMPLOYED AT CADIZ. - - -SECTION 1. - - “_May 7, 1810._ - -“We have at last broke ground for some works, but I am almost at a -loss to explain to you the cause of our delay. The truth is, we left -England so ill provided with tools and other requisites for beginning -works that till lately it has been positively impossible to commence, -even on a small scale, from our own resources and number of men. -These facts, with the backwardness of the Spaniards to contribute -either stores or workmen to the general cause, has kept us so long -inactive. We have now one thousand three hundred men at work, and the -Board of Ordnance has supplied us with more tools.” - - -SECTION 2. - - “_Isla, June 1, 1810._ - -“We might defy the power of France to expel us by force from hence if -all were done that might be done, or even what is projected, but we -have only British troops at work on this important position, and our -numbers will not permit the progress which the exigency of affairs -requires.”--“We have in our respected general (Graham) a confidence -which is daily on the increase. He has a mind and temper well adapted -to encounter difficulties which less favoured dispositions could -not bear. We may possibly maintain our ground. If we do, although -our success may have none of the brilliancy of victory, yet his -merits, who, by patience, prudence, and self-possession, shall have -kept all quiet within our lines, preserved tolerable harmony, and -kept an enterprizing enemy off with very inadequate means, should -be rewarded by his country’s good opinion, although none but those -who have witnessed can fully estimate the value of his exertions. -On the whole, our situation may be said to inspire hope, though not -security: to animate resistance, though not to promise victory.” - - -SECTION 3. - - “_June 29, 1810._ - -“I have been attending a committee of Spanish engineers and artillery -officers, to settle some determinate plan for taking up the ground -near the town of La Isla; but they will enter into no views which -include the destruction of a house or garden. They continue to -propose nothing but advanced batteries upon the marsh in front of -the town, the evident object of which is to keep the shells of the -enemy rather farther from the houses. At a general attack, all this -would be lost and carried, by small parties coming in on the flanks -and gorges. Instead of deepening the ditches and constructing good -redoubts at every seven hundred yards, this is what they propose, -although we offer to perform the labour for them. On a barren spot -they will agree to our working; but of what service is one redoubt, -if unsupported by a collateral defence, and if a general system is -not attended to. We have now been here three months, and although -they have been constantly urged to construct something at that weak -tongue of low land, St. Petri, still nothing of importance is begun -upon, nor do I imagine they will agree to any work of strength at -that point. I am almost in despair of seeing this place strongly -fortified, so as to resist an army of from fifty to one hundred -thousand men, which I am convinced it is capable of.”--“We have -now one thousand three hundred labourers of the line and eighty -carpenters, but, for the latter, the timber we are supplied with -from our ally, is so bad that these artificers produce not more than -one-fifth or one-sixth what they would be capable of if the materials -were good. To judge from their conduct it is impossible to suppose -them determined to oppose a vigorous resistance even in La Isla, and -I have no idea of there ever being a siege of Cadiz itself.”--“Of our -seven subalterns of engineers two are generally ill; we are obliged, -therefore, to get assistance from the line. The consequence is that -the work is neither so well nor so speedily executed. We ought to -have many more (engineers). It is not economy in the governments; and -with Lord Wellington they have hardly any with the army.” - - -EXTRACTS FROM THE OFFICIAL ABSTRACT OF MILITARY REPORTS FROM THE -BRITISH COMMANDERS AT CADIZ. - - -SECTION 4. - - _General William Stewart, March 13, 1810._ - -“The enemy’s force was supposed to be diminished, but no advantage -could be taken of it, on account of the inefficient state of the -Spanish troops.” - - - _General Graham, March 26, 1810._ - -“The isle of Leon required for its defence a larger force than had -been assigned. Its tenure was, in the then state of the defences, -very precarious.” - - - _May, 1810._ - -“General Blake, appointed to command the Spanish forces, introduced -some degree of activity and co-operation, in which the Spaniards had -been very deficient.” - - - _October, 1810._ - -“The progress made by the enemy at the Trocadero assumed a very -formidable character; while the Spaniards persisted in their apathy, -and neglected to fortify the most vulnerable points of their line.” - - - _General Graham to lord Liverpool, Cadiz, January 2, 1811._ - -“----As far as the exertions of the British engineers and soldiers -under my command have been concerned, I have every reason to be -satisfied. I can by no means say the same of the Spaniards, for, -besides the reluctance with which some of the most essential measures -of the defence were agreed to, our people were not permitted to carry -into execution the plan for the intrenchment of the left part of the -Cortadura de St. Fernando until after much delay and very unpleasant -contests.” - - * * * * * - - -No. IV. - - -EXTRACTS FROM KING JOSEPH’S CORRESPONDENCE. - - -SECTION 1. - -_The duke of Santa Fé to the King, Paris, June 20, 1810._ - -(Translation from the Spanish.) - -“Will your majesty believe that some politicians of Paris have -arrived at saying that in Spain there is preparing a new revolution, -very dangerous for the French; and they assert that the Spaniards -attached to your majesty will rise against them. Let your majesty -consider if ever was heard a more absurd chimera, and how prejudicial -it might be to us if it succeeded in gaining any credit. I hope that -such an idea will not be believed by any person of judgement, and -that it will soon subside, being void of probability.” - - -SECTION 2. - -_Ministerial letter from the King to the marquis of Almenara._ - -(Translation from the Spanish.) - - “_September 21, 1810._ - -“The impolitic violence of the military governors has attacked not -only men, and fields, and animals, but even the most sacred things in -the nation, as the memorials and the actions of families, in whose -preservation those only are interested to whom they belong, and from -which strangers cannot reap the least fruit. In this class are the -general archives of the kingdom, called the archives of Simancas, -which are found in the province of Valladolid, the governor, -Kellerman, has taken possession of them.” “Those archives, from the -time of their institution, for centuries past, have contained the -treaties of the kings since they were known in Castile; also, ancient -manuscripts of the kindred of the princes, the descents and titles -of families, pleadings in the tribunals, decisions of the Cortes; in -short, all that is publicly interesting to the history of the nation, -and privately to individuals.” - - -SECTION 3. - -_The Spanish secretary of state to the duke of Santa Fé._ - - “_Madrid, September 12, 1812._ - -“----Si l’Andalusie n’est pas entièrement pacifiée; si la junte -de Cadiz exista encore et si les Anglais y exercent leur fatale -influence, on doit l’attribuer en grande partie aux machinations, -et aux-trames ourdies par la junta et l’Angleterre au moment où -parvint à leur connaissance le décret du 8 Febrier, qui établit des -governmens militaire dans la Navarre, la Biscaye, l’Arragon, et la -Catalogne. Quelques governeur Françaises ayant traité ces provinces -comme si elles étaient absolument détachées de la monarchie.” - -“----Mais combiens n’est il pas dementi par la conduite de certains -governeurs qui paraissent s’obstiner a prolonger l’insurrection -d’Espagne plutôt qu’a la soumettre! Car dans plusieurs endroits on ne -se contente pas d’exclure toute idée de l’autorité du roi, en faisant -administrer la justice au nom de l’empereur mais ce qui est pire, -on à exigé que les tribunaux civils de Valladolid et de Palencia, -pretassent serment de fidelité et d’obeisance à sa majesté impériale -comme si la nation Espagnole n’avoit pas de roi.” - - -SECTION 4. - -_Memorial from the duke of Santa Fé and marquis of Almenara to the -prince of Wagram._ - -(Translated from the Spanish.) - - “_Paris, September 16, 1810._ - -“----The decrees of his majesty the emperor are the same for all the -generals. The prince of Esling, who has traversed all the provinces -to the borders of Portugal, who appears to be forming immense -magazines, and has much greater necessities than the governors of -provinces, has applied to the Spanish prefects, who have made the -arrangements, and supplied him with even more than he required; -and this speaks in favour of the Spanish people, for the prince of -Esling receives the blessings of the inhabitants of the provinces -through which his troops pass. Such is the effect of good order and -humanity amongst a people who know the rules of justice, and that war -demands sacrifices, but who will not suffer dilapidations and useless -vexations.” - - -SECTION 5. - -_Intercepted letter of comte de Casa Valencia, counsellor of state, -written to his wife, June 18, 1810._ - -“Il y a six mois que l’on ne nous paie point, et nous perissons. - -“----Avant hier j’écrivis à Almenara lui peignant ma situation et le -pryant de m’accorder quelque argent pour vivre; de me secourir, si -non comme ministre, du moins comme ami. Hier je restai trois heures -dans son antichambre esperant un reponse, je le vis enfin et elle fut -qu’il n’avait rien.” - -“----Rien que la faim m’attend aujourd’hui.” - - * * * * * - - -No. V. - -EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON. - - -SECTION 1. - - “_Celerico, May 11, 1810._ - -“----I observe that the minister Don Miguel Forjas considers the -inconvenience, on which I had the honour of addressing you, as of -ordinary occurrence, and he entertains no doubt that inconveniences -of this description will not induce me to desist from making the -movements which I might think the defence of the country would -require. It frequently happens that an army in operation cannot -procure the number of carriages which it requires, either from -the unwillingness of the inhabitants to supply them, or from the -deficiency of the number of carriages in the country. But it has -rarely happened that an army, thus unprovided with carriages, has -been obliged to carry on its operations in a country in which there -is literally no food, and in which, if there was food, there is no -money to purchase it; and, whenever that has been the case, the army -has been obliged to withdraw to the magazines which the country had -refused or been unable to remove to the army. This is precisely -the case of the allied armies in this part of the country; and, -however trifling the difficulty may be deemed by the regency and -the ministers, I consider a starving army to be so useless in any -situation, that I shall certainly not pretend to hold a position or -to make any movement in which the food of the troops is not secured. -I have no doubt of the ability or of the willingness of the country -to do all that can be required of them, if the authority of the -government is properly exerted to force individuals to attend to -their public duties rather than to their private interests in this -time of trial. I have written this same sentiment to the government -so frequently, that they must be as tired of reading it as I am -of writing it. But if they expect that individuals of the lower -orders are to relinquish the pursuit of their private interests -and business to serve the public, and mean to punish them for any -omission in this important duty, they must begin with the higher -classes of society. These must be forced to perform their duty, and -no name, however illustrious, and no protection, however powerful, -should shield from punishment those who neglect the performance of -their duty to the public in these times. Unless these measures are -strictly and invariably followed, it is vain to expect any serious -or continued exertion in the country, and the regency ought to be -aware, from the sentiments of his majesty’s government, which I have -communicated to them that the continuance of his majesty’s assistance -depends not on the ability or the inclination, but on the actual -effectual exertions of the people of Portugal in their own cause. I -have thought it proper to trouble you so much at length upon this -subject, in consequence of the light manner in which the difficulties -which I had stated to exist were noticed by Monsieur de Forjas. -I have to mention, however, that, since I wrote to you, although -there exist several causes of complaint of different kinds, and that -some examples must be made, we have received such assistance as has -enabled me to continue till this time in our positions, and I hope to -be able to continue as long as may be necessary. I concur entirely -in the measure of appointing a special commission to attend the head -quarters of the Portuguese army, and I hope that it will be adopted -without delay. I enclose a proclamation which I have issued, which -I hope will have some effect. It describes nearly the crimes, or -rather the omissions, of which the people may be guilty in respect -to the transport of the army; these may be as follow:--1st, refusing -to supply carts, boats, or beasts of burthen, when required; 2dly, -refusing to remove their articles or animals out of the reach of the -enemy; 3dly, disobedience of the orders of the magistrates to proceed -to and remain at any station with carriages, boats, &c.; 4th, -desertion from the service, either with or without carriages, &c.; -5th, embezzlement of provisions or stores which they may be employed -to transport. The crimes or omissions of the inferior magistrates -may be classed as follows:--1st, disobedience of the orders of their -superiors; 2d, inactivity in the execution of them; 3d, receiving -bribes, to excuse certain persons from the execution of requisitions -upon them.” - - -SECTION 2. - -_Lord Wellington to M. Forjas._ - - _Gouvea, September 6, 1810._ - - MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR, - -I have received your letter of the 1st of this month, informing me -that you had placed before the government of this kingdom my despatch -of the 27th of August, announcing the melancholy and unexpected -news of the loss of Almeida, and that the government had learned -with sorrow that an accident unforeseen had prevented my moving to -succour the place, hoping, at the same time, that the depression -of the people, caused by such an event, will soon vanish, by the -quick and great successes which they expect with certainty from the -efforts of the army. I have already made known to the government of -the kingdom that the fall of Almeida was unexpected by me, and that -I deplored its loss and that of my hopes, considering it likely to -depress and afflict the people of this kingdom. It was by no means my -intention, however, in that letter, to state whether it had or had -not been my intention to have succoured the place, and I now request -the permission of the government of the kingdom to say that, much -as I wish to remove the impression which this misfortune has justly -made on the public, I do not propose to alter the system and plan -of operations which have been determined, after the most serious -deliberation, as best adequate to further the general cause of the -allies, and, consequently, Portugal. I request the government to -believe that I am not insensible to the value of their confidence as -well as that of the public; as, also, that I am highly interested in -removing the anxiety of the public upon the late misfortune; but I -should forget my duty to my sovereign, to the prince regent, and to -the cause in general, if I should permit public clamour or panic -to induce me to change, in the smallest degree, the system and plan -of operations which I have adopted, after mature consideration, and -which daily experience shows to be the only one likely to produce a -good end. - - (Signed) WELLINGTON. - - -SECTION 3. - - _Gouvea, September 7, 1810._ - -----In order to put an end at once to these miserable intrigues, I -beg that you will inform the government that _I will not stay_ in the -country, and that I will advise the king’s government to withdraw -the assistance which his majesty affords them, if they interfere -in any manner with the appointment of marshal Beresford’s staff, -for which he is responsible, or with the operations of the army, or -with any of the points which, with the original arrangements with -marshal Beresford, were referred exclusively to his management. I -propose, also, to report to his majesty’s government, and refer to -their consideration, what steps ought to be taken, if the Portuguese -government refuse or delay to adopt the civil and political -arrangements recommended by me, and corresponding with the military -operations which I am carrying on. The preparatory measures for the -destruction of, or rather rendering useless the mills, were suggested -by me long ago, and marshal Beresford did not write to government -upon them till I had reminded him a second time of my wishes on the -subject. I now beg leave to recommend that these preparatory measures -may be adopted not only in the country between the Tagus and the -Mondego, laying north of Torres Vedras, as originally proposed, -but that they shall be forthwith adopted in all parts of Portugal, -and that the magistrates and others may be directed to render -useless the mills, upon receiving orders to do so from the military -officers. I have already adopted this measure with success in this -part of the country, and it must be adopted in others in which it -is probable that the enemy may endeavour to penetrate; and it must -be obvious to any person who will reflect upon the subject, that it -is only consistent with all the other measures which, for the last -twelve months, I have recommended to government to impede and make -difficult, and if possible prevent, the advance and establishment of -the enemy’s force in the country. But it appears that the government -have lately discovered that we are all wrong; they have become -impatient for the defeat of the enemy, and, in imitation of the -Central Junta, call out for a battle and early success. If I had had -the power I would have prevented the Spanish armies from attending -to this call; and if I had, the cause would now have been safe; -and, having the power now in my hands, I will not lose the only -chance which remains of saving the cause, by paying the smallest -attention to the senseless suggestions of the Portuguese government. -I acknowledge that I am much hurt at this change of conduct in the -government; and, as I must attribute it to the persons recently -introduced into the government, it affords additional reason with -me for disapproving of their nomination, and I shall write upon the -subject to the prince regent, if I should hear any more of this -conduct. I leave you to communicate the whole or any part of this -letter that you may think proper to the regency. - - (Signed) WELLINGTON. - - -SECTION 4. - - _Rio Mayor, October 6, 1810._ - -----You will do me the favour to inform the regency, and above all -the principal Souza, that his majesty and the prince regent having -entrusted me with the command of their armies, and likewise with -the conduct of the military operations, I will not suffer them, or -any body else, to interfere with them. That I know best where to -station my troops, and where to make a stand against the enemy, and -I shall not alter a system formed upon mature consideration, upon -any suggestion of theirs. I am responsible for what I do, and they -are not; and I recommend to them to look to the measures for which -they are responsible, which I long ago recommended to them, viz. to -provide for the tranquillity of Lisbon, and for the food of the army -and of the people, while the troops will be engaged with the enemy. -As for principal Souza, I beg you to tell him, from me, that I have -had no satisfaction in transacting the business of this country since -he has been a member of the government; that, being embarked in a -course of military operations, of which I hope to see the successful -termination, I shall continue to carry them on to the end, but that -no power on earth shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula for one -moment after I shall have obtained his majesty’s leave to resign -my charge, if principal Souza is to remain either a member of the -government or to continue at Lisbon. Either he must quit the country -or I will: and, if I should be obliged to go, I shall take care that -the world, or Portugal at least, and the prince regent shall be -made acquainted with my reasons. From the letter of the 3d, which I -have received from Monsieur Forjas, I had hoped that the government -was satisfied with what I had done, and intended to do, and that, -instead of endeavouring to render all farther defence fruitless, -by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, they would have -done their duty by adopting measures to secure the tranquillity of -the town; but I suppose that, like other weak individuals, they -add duplicity to their weakness, and that their expressions of -approbation, and even gratitude, were intended to convey censure. - - WELLINGTON. - -P.S.--All I ask from the Portuguese Regency is tranquillity in the -town of Lisbon, and provisions for their own troops while they will -be employed in this part of the country. I have but little doubt -of success; but, as I have fought a sufficient number of battles -to know that the result of any one is not certain, even with the -best arrangements, I am anxious that the government should adopt -preparatory arrangements, and take out of the enemy’s way those -persons and their families who would suffer if they were to fall into -their hands. - - -SECTION 5. - - _Pero Negro, October 28, 1810._ - -The cattle, and other articles of supply, which the government have -been informed have been removed from the island of Lizirias, are -still on the island, and most probably the secretary of state, Don M. -Forjas, who was at Alhandra yesterday, will have seen them. I shall -be glad to hear whether the government propose to take any and what -steps to punish the magistrates who have disobeyed their orders and -have deceived them by false reports. The officers and soldiers of -the militia, absent from their corps, are liable to penalties and -punishments, some of a civil, others of a military nature: first, -they are liable to a forfeiture of all their personal property, upon -information that they are absent from their corps without leave; -secondly, they are liable to be transferred to serve as soldiers -in the regiments of the line, upon the same information; and, -lastly, they are liable to the penalties of desertion inflicted by -the military tribunals. The two first are penalties which depend -upon the civil magistrate, and I should be very glad to have heard -of one instance in which the magistrates of Lisbon, or in which -the government had called upon the magistrates at Lisbon to carry -into execution the law in either of these respects. I entreat them -to call for the names of the officers and soldiers absent without -leave from any one of the Lisbon regiments of militia, to disgrace -any one or more of the principal officers, in a public manner, for -their shameful desertion of their posts in the hour of danger, and -to seize and dispose of the whole property of the militia soldiers -absent without leave, and to send these men to serve with any of -the regiments of the line. I entreat them to adopt these measures -without favour or distinction of any individuals in respect to any -one regiment, and to execute the laws _bonâ fide_ upon the subject; -and I shall be satisfied of their good intentions, and shall believe -that they are sincerely desirous of saving the country; but, if we -are to go on as we have hitherto, if Great Britain is to give large -subsidies and to expend large sums in support of a cause in which -those most interested sit by and take no part, and those at the -head of the government, with laws and powers to force the people -to exertion in the critical circumstances in which the country is -placed, are aware of the evil but neglect their duty and omit to -put the laws in execution, I must believe their professions to be -false, that they look to little dirty popularity instead of to save -their country; that they are unfaithful servants to their master, and -persons in whom his allies can place no confidence. In respect to the -military law, it may be depended upon that it will be carried into -execution, and that the day will yet come on which those military -persons who have deserted their duty in these critical times will be -punished as they deserve. The governors of the kingdom forget the -innumerable remonstrances which have been forwarded to them on the -defects in the proceedings of courts martial, which, in times of -active war, render them and their sentences entirely nugatory. As an -additional instance of these defects, I mention that officers of the -Olivera regiment of militia, who behaved ill in the action with the -enemy at Villa Nova de Fosboa, in the beginning of August last, and -a court martial was immediately assembled for this trial, are still, -in the end of October, under trial, and the trial will, probably, -not be concluded till Christmas. In like manner, the military trial -of those deserters of the militia, after assembling officers and -soldiers at great inconvenience, for the purpose cannot possibly be -concluded till the period will have gone by in which any benefit -might be secured from the example of the punishment of any one or -number of them. The defect in the administration of the military -law has been repeatedly pointed out to the government, and a remedy -for the evil has been proposed to them, and has been approved of by -the Prince Regent. But they will not adopt it; and it would be much -better if there was no law for the government of the army than that -the existing laws should continue without being executed. - - WELLINGTON. - - -SECTION 6. - - “_October 29, 1810._ - -“----In answer to lord Wellesley’s queries respecting the Portuguese -Regency, my opinion is that the Regency ought to be appointed by the -Prince Regent, but during his pleasure; they ought to have full power -to act in every possible case, to make appointments to offices, to -dismiss from office, to make and alter laws, in short, every power -which the prince himself could possess if he were on the spot. They -ought to report, in detail, their proceedings on every subject, and -their reasons for the adoption of every measure. The prince ought -to decline to receive any application from any of his officers or -subjects in Portugal not transmitted through the regular channels -of the government here, and ought to adopt no measure respecting -Portugal not recommended by the Regency. The smaller the number of -persons composing the Regency the better; but my opinion is that -it is not advisable to remove any of the persons now composing it -excepting principal Souza, with whom I neither can nor will have any -official intercourse. The patriarch is, in my opinion, a necessary -evil. He has acquired a kind of popularity and confidence through -the country which would increase if he was removed from office, and -he is the kind of man to do much mischief if he was not employed. -If we should succeed in removing the principal (which _must_ be -done), I think the patriarch will take warning, and will behave -better in future. In respect to military operations, there can be no -interference on the part of the Regency or any body else. If there -is I can no longer be responsible. If our own government choose to -interfere themselves, or that the Prince Recent should interfere, -they have only to give me their orders in detail, and I will carry -them strictly into execution, to the best of my abilities; and I will -be responsible for nothing but the execution; but, if I am to be -responsible, I must have full discretion and no interference on the -part of the Regency or any body else. I should like to see principal -Souza’s detailed instructions for his “_embuscados_” on the left -bank of the Tagus. If principal Souza does not go to England, or -somewhere out of Portugal, the country will be lost. The time we lose -in discussing matters which ought to be executed immediately, and in -the wrong direction given to the deliberations of the government, -is inconceivable. The gentlemen destined for the Alemtejo ought to -have been in the province on the evening of the 24th, but, instead of -that, three valuable days of fine weather will have been lost because -the government do not choose to take part in our arrangements, which, -however undeniably beneficial, will not be much liked by those whom -it will affect; although it is certain that, sooner or later, these -persons must and will be ruined, by leaving behind them all their -valuable property, and, as in the case of this part of the country, -every thing which can enable the enemy to remain in the country. -In answer to Mr. de Forjas’ note of the 22d, enclosed in yours, -(without date,) I have to say that I know of no carriages employed by -the British army excepting by the commissary-general, and none are -detained that I know of. I wish that the Portuguese governors, or its -officers, would state the names of those who have detained carriages, -contrary to my repeated orders; or the regiment, or where they are -stationed; but this they will never do. All that we do with the -carriages is to send back sick in them, when there are any. It will -not answer to make an engagement that the wheel-carriages from Lisbon -shall not come farther than Bucellas, Montachique, &c. many articles -required by the army cannot be carried by mules, and the carriages -must come on with them here. In many cases the Portuguese troops in -particular are ill provided with mules, therefore this must be left -to the commissary-general of the army, under a recommendation to him, -if possible, not to send the Lisbon wheel-carriages beyond the places -above mentioned. I wish, in every case, that a regulation made should -be observed, and the makers of regulations should take care always to -frame them as that they can be observed, which is the reason of my -entering so particularly into this point.” - - “WELLINGTON.” - - -SECTION 7. - - “_Pero Negro, October 31, 1810._ - -“----I am glad that the gentlemen feel my letters, and I hope that -they will have the effect of inducing them to take some decided steps -as well regarding the provisions in the Alemtejo as the desertion of -the militia. The _ordenanza_ artillery now begin to desert from the -works although they are fed by us with English rations and taken care -of in the same manner as our own troops. Your note, No.--, of 29th, -is strictly true in all its parts, the French could not have staid -here a week if all the provisions had been removed, and the length of -time they can now stay depends upon the quantity remaining of what -they have found in places from which there existed means of removing -every thing, if the quantity had been ten times greater. They are -stopped effectually; in front all the roads are occupied, and they -can get nothing from their rear; but all the military arrangements -which have been made are useless if they can find subsistence on the -ground which they occupy. For what I know to the contrary, they may -be able to maintain their position till the whole French army is -brought to their assistance. It is heart-breaking to contemplate the -chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly!” - - “WELLINGTON.” - - -SECTION 8. - - “_Pero Negro, November 1, 1810._ - -“I have no doubt that the government can produce volumes of papers -to prove that they gave orders upon the several subjects to which -the enclosures relate, but it would be very desirable if they would -state whether any magistrate or other person has been punished for -not obeying those orders. The fact is that the government, after -the appointment of principal Souza to be a member of the Regency, -conceived that the war could be maintained upon the frontier, -contrary to the opinion of myself and of every military officer in -the country, and, instead of giving positive orders preparatory to -the event which was most likely to occur, viz. that the allied army -would retire, they spent much valuable time in discussing, with -me, the expediency of a measure which was quite impracticable, and -omitted to give the orders which were necessary for the evacuation of -the country between the Tagus and the Mondego by the inhabitants. -Then, when convinced that the army would retire, they first imposed -that duty on me, although they must have known that I was ignorant -of the names, the nature of the offices, the places of abode of -the different magistrates who were to superintend the execution of -the measure, and, moreover, I have but one gentleman in my family -to give me any assistance in writing the Portuguese language, and -they afterwards issued the orders themselves, still making them -referable to me, without my knowledge or consent, and still knowing -that I had no means whatever of communicating with the country, and -they issued them at the very period when the enemy was advancing -from Almeida. If I had not been able to stop the enemy at Busaco -he must have been in his present situation long before the order -could have reached those to whom it was addressed. All this conduct -was to be attributed to the same cause, a desire to avoid to adopt -a measure which, however beneficial to the real interests of the -country, was likely to disturb the habits of indolence and ease of -the inhabitants, and to throw the odium of the measure upon me and -upon the British government. I avowed, in my proclamation, that -I was the author of that measure, and the government might have -sheltered themselves under that authority, but the principle of the -government has lately been to seek for popularity, and they will not -aid in any measure, however beneficial to the real interests of the -country, which may be unpopular with the mob of Lisbon. I cannot -agree in the justice of the expression of the astonishment by the -secretary of state that the measure should have been executed in -this part of the country at all. The same measure was carried into -complete execution in Upper Beira, notwithstanding that the army -was in that province, and the means of transport were required for -its service, not a soul remained, and, excepting at Coimbra, to -which town my personal authority and influence did not reach, not -an article of any description was left behind; and all the mills -upon the Coa and Mondego, and their dependent streams, were rendered -useless. But there were no discussions there upon the propriety of -maintaining the war upon the frontier. The orders were given, and -they were obeyed in time, and the enemy suffered accordingly. In -this part of the country, notwithstanding the advantage of having -a place of security to retire to, notwithstanding the advantage of -water-carriage, notwithstanding that the Tagus was fordable in many -places at the period when the inhabitants should have passed their -property to the left of the river, and fortunately filled at the -moment the enemy approached its banks; the inhabitants have fled from -their habitations as they would have done under any circumstances, -without waiting orders from me or from the government; but they have -left behind them every thing which could be useful to the enemy, and -could subsist their army, and all the mills untouched; accordingly, -the enemy still remain in our front, notwithstanding that their -communication is cut off with Spain and with every other military -body; and if the provisions which they have found will last, of -which I can have no knowledge, they may remain till they will be -joined by the whole French army in Spain. I believe that in Santarem -and Villa Franca alone, both towns upon the Tagus, and both having -the advantage of water-carriage, the enemy found subsistence for -their army for a considerable length of time. Thus will appear the -difference of a measure adopted in time, and the delay of it till -the last moment; and I only wish that the country and the allies may -not experience the evil consequences of the ill-fated propensity -of the existing Portuguese Regency to seek popularity. In the same -manner the other measure since recommended, viz. the removal of the -property of the inhabitants of Alemtejo to places of security has -been delayed by every means in the power of the government, and -has been adopted at last against their inclination: as usual, they -commenced a discussion with me upon the expediency of preventing the -enemy from crossing the Tagus, they then sent their civil officer to -me to receive instructions, and afterwards they conveyed to him an -instruction of the ----, to which I propose to draw the attention of -his royal highness the Prince Regent and of his majesty’s government. -His royal highness and his majesty’s government will then see in what -manner the existing Regency are disposed to co-operate with me. The -additional order of the 30th of October, marked 5 in the enclosures -from Mr. Forjas, shew the sense, which the Regency themselves -entertained of the insufficiency of their original instructions to -the Disembargador Jacinto Paes de Matos. I may have mistaken the -system of defence to be adopted for this country, and principal -Souza and other members of the Regency may be better judges of the -capacity of the troops and of the operations to be carried on than -I am. In this case they should desire his majesty and the Prince -Regent to remove me from the command of the army. But they cannot -doubt my zeal for the cause in which we are engaged, and they know -that not a moment of my time, nor a faculty of my mind, that is -not devoted to promote it; and the records of this government will -shew what I have done for them and their country. If, therefore, -they do not manifest their dissatisfaction and want of confidence -in the measures which I adopt by desiring that I should be removed, -they are bound, as honest men and faithful servants to their prince, -to co-operate with me by all means in their power, and thus should -neither thwart them by opposition, or render them nugatory by useless -delays and discussions. Till lately I have had the satisfaction -of receiving the support and co-operation of the government; and -I regret that, his royal highness the Prince Regent should have -been induced to make a change which has operated so materially to -the detriment of his people and of the allies. In respect to the -operations on the left of the Tagus, I was always of opinion that -the ordenança would be able to prevent the enemy from sending over -any of their plundering parties; and I was unwilling to adopt any -measure of greater solidity, from my knowledge, that, as soon as -circumstances should render it expedient, on any account, to withdraw -the troops, which I should have sent to the left of the Tagus, the -ordenança would disperse. The truth is, that, notwithstanding the -opinion of some of the government, every Portuguese, into whose hands -a firelock is placed, does not become a soldier capable of meeting -the enemy. Experience, which the members of the government have not -had, has taught me this truth, and in what manner to make use of -the different description of troops in this country; and it would -be very desirable, if the government would leave, exclusively, to -marshal Beresford and me, the adoption of all military arrangements. -The conduct of the governor of Setuval is, undoubtedly, the cause -of the inconvenience now felt on the left of the Tagus. He brought -forward his garrison to the river against orders, and did not -reflect, and possibly was not aware as I am, that if they had been -attacked in that situation, as they probably would have been, they -would have dispersed; and thus Setuval, as well as the regiment, -which was to have been its garrison, would have been lost. It was -necessary, therefore, at all events, to prevent that misfortune, -and to order the troops to retire to Setuval, and the ordenança as -usual dispersed, and the government will lose their five hundred -stand of new arms, and, if the enemy can cross the Tagus in time, -their 3-pounders. These are the consequences of persons interfering -in military operations, who have no knowledge of them, or of the -nature of the troops which are to carry them on. I am now under -the necessity, much to the inconvenience of the army, of sending a -detachment to the left of the Tagus.” - - -SECTION 9. - - “_December 5, 1810._ - -“All my proceedings have been founded on the following principles: -First, That, by my appointment of marshal-general of the Portuguese -army with the same powers as those vested in the late duc de la -Foéns, I hold the command of that army independent of the local -government of Portugal. Secondly, That, by the arrangements made -by the governors of the kingdom with the king’s government, when -sir William Beresford was asked for by the former to command -the Portuguese army, it was settled that the commander-in-chief -of the British army should direct the general operations of the -combined force. Thirdly, That, supposing that my appointment of -marshal-general did not give me the independent control over the -operations of the Portuguese army, or that, as commander-in-chief -of the British army, I did not possess the power of directing the -operation of the whole under the arrangement above referred to; it -follows that either the operations of the two armies must have been -separated, or the Portuguese government must have had the power of -directing the operations of the British army. Fourthly, It never was -intended that both armies should be exposed to the certain loss, -which would have been the consequence of a disjointed operation; and, -undoubtedly, his majesty’s government never intended to give over -the British army to the government of the kingdom, to make ducks and -drakes of. The government of the kingdom must, in their reply to -my letter, either deny the truth of these principles, or they must -prove that my charge against them is without foundation, and that -they did not delay and omit to adopt various measures, recommended by -me and marshal Beresford, calculated to assist and correspond with -the operations of the armies, upon the proposition and under the -influence of principal Souza, under the pretence of discussing with -me the propriety of my military arrangements.” - - “WELLINGTON.” - - -SECTION 10. - - “_Cartaxo, January 18, 1811._ - -“It is necessary that I should draw your attention, and that of the -Portuguese government, upon the earliest occasion, to the sentiments -which have dropped from the Patriarch, in recent discussions at the -meeting of the Regency. It appears that his eminence has expatiated -on the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, ‘which -were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the -heart of the kingdom.’ It must be recollected that these discussions -are not those of a popular assembly, they can scarcely be deemed -those of a ministerial council, but they are those of persons whom -his royal highness the Prince Regent has called to govern his -kingdom in the existing crisis of affairs. I have always been in -the habit of considering his eminence the Patriarch as one of those -in Portugal who are of opinion that all sacrifices are to be made, -provided the kingdom could preserve its independence; and, I think -it most important that the British government, and the government -of the Prince Regent, and the world, should be undeceived, if we -have been mistaken hitherto. His eminence objects to the adoption -of measures which have for their immediate object to procure funds -for the maintenance of his royal highness’s armies, because a war -may exist in the heart of the kingdom, but I am apprehensive the -Patriarch forgets the manner in which the common enemy first entered -this kingdom, in the year 1807, that in which they were expelled -from it, having had complete possession of it in 1808, and that -they were again in possession of the city of Oporto, and of the two -most valuable provinces of the kingdom in 1809, and the mode in -which they were expelled from those provinces. He forgets that it -was stated to him in the month of February, 1810, in the presence -of the Marquis of Olhao, of Don M. Forjas, and of Don Joa Antonio -Saltar de Mendoza, and Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, that it was -probable the enemy would invade this kingdom with such an army as -that it would be necessary to concentrate all our forces to oppose -him with any chance of success, and that this concentration could -be made with safety in the neighbourhood of the capital only, and -that the general plan of the campaign was communicated to him which -went to bring the enemy into the heart of the kingdom; and that he -expressed before all these persons his high approbation of it. If he -recollected these circumstances he would observe that nothing had -occurred in this campaign that had not been foreseen and provided -for by measures of which he had expressed his approbation, of whose -consequences he now disapproves. The Portuguese nation are involved -in a war not of aggression, or even defence on their parts, not of -alliance, not in consequence of their adherence to any political -system, for they abandoned all alliances and all political systems -in order to propitiate the enemy. The inhabitants of Portugal made -war purely and simply to get rid of the yoke of the tyrant whose -government was established in Portugal, and to save their lives and -properties; they chose this lot for themselves, principally at the -instigation of his eminence the Patriarch, and they called upon -his majesty, the ancient ally of Portugal, whose alliance had been -relinquished at the requisition of the common enemy, to aid them in -the glorious effort which they wished to make, and to restore the -independence of their country, and to secure the lives and properties -of its inhabitants. I will not state the manner in which his majesty -has answered the call, or enumerate the services rendered to this -nation by his army; whatever may be the result of the contest, -nothing can make me believe that the Portuguese nation will ever -forget them; but when a nation has adopted the line of resistance to -the tyrant under the circumstances under which it was unanimously -adopted by the Portuguese nation in 1808, and has been persevered -in, it cannot be believed that they intended to suffer none of the -miseries of war, or that their government act inconsistently with -their sentiments when they expatiate on ‘the inutility of laying -fresh burthens on the people, which were evidently for no other -purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the kingdom.’ The -patriarch in particular forgets his old principles, his own actions -which have principally involved his country in the contest when he -talks of discontinuing it, because, it has again, for the third -time, been brought into ‘the heart of the kingdom.’ Although the -Patriarch, particularly, and the majority of the existing government -approved of the plan which I explained to them in February, 1810, -according to which it was probable that this kingdom would be made -the seat of war which has since occurred, I admit that his eminence, -or any of those members may fairly disapprove of the campaign and of -the continuance of the enemy in Portugal. I have pointed out to the -Portuguese government, in more than one despatch, the difficulties -and risks which attended any attack upon the enemy’s position in -this country, and the probable success not only to ourselves but to -our allies of our perseverance in the plan which I had adopted, and -had hitherto followed so far successfully, as that the allies have -literally sustained no loss of any description, and this army is, at -this moment, more complete than it was at the opening of the campaign -in April last. The inhabitants of one part of the country alone have -suffered and are continuing to suffer. But without entering into -discussions which I wish to avoid on this occasion, I repeat, that if -my counsels had been followed these sufferings would at least have -been alleviated, and I observe that is the first time I have heard -that the sufferings of a part, and but a small part of any nation -have been deemed a reason for refusing to adopt a measure which had -for its object the deliverance of the whole. The Patriarch may, -however, disapprove of the system I have followed, and I conceive -that he is fully justified in desiring his majesty and the Prince -Regent to remove me from the command of these armies. This would be -a measure consistent with his former conduct in this contest, under -the circumstances of my having unfortunately fallen in his opinion, -but this measure is entirely distinct from the refusal to concur in -laying those burthens upon the people which are necessary to carry -on and to secure the object of the war. It must be obvious to his -eminence, and to every person acquainted with the real situation of -the affairs of Portugal, unless a great effort is made to render the -resources more adequate to the necessary expenditure all plans and -systems of operation will be alike, for the Portuguese army will be -able to carry on none. At this moment although all the corps are -concentrated in the neighbourhood of their magazines, with means of -transport, easy, by the Tagus, the Portuguese troops are frequently -in want of provisions because there is no money to pay the expense -of transport, and all the departments of the Portuguese army, -including the hospitals, are equally destitute of funds to enable -them to defray the necessary expenditure, and to perform their duty. -The deficiencies and difficulties have existed ever since I have -known the Portuguese army, and it is well known that it must have -been disbanded more than once, if it had not been assisted by the -provisions, stores, and funds, of the British army. It may likewise -occur to his eminence that in proportion as the operations of the -armies would be more extended, the expense would increase, and the -necessity for providing adequate funds to support it would become -more urgent, unless, indeed, the course of their operations should -annihilate at one blow both army and expenditure. The objection then -to adopt measures to improve the resources of the government, go to -decide the question whether the war should be carried on or not in -any manner. By desiring his majesty and the Prince Regent to remove -me from the command of their armies, his eminence would endeavour -to get rid of a person deemed incapable or unwilling to fulfil the -duties of his situation. By objecting to improve the resources of -the country he betrays an alteration of opinion respecting the -contest, and a desire to forfeit its advantages, and to give up -the independence of the country, and the security of the lives and -properties of the Portuguese nation. In my opinion the Patriarch is -in such a situation in this country that he ought to be called upon, -on the part of his majesty, to state distinctly what he meant by -refusing to concur in the measures which were necessary to insure the -funds, to enable this country to carry on the war; at all events, I -request that this letter may be communicated to him in the Regency, -and that a copy of it may be forwarded to his royal highness the -Prince Regent, in order that his royal highness may see that I -have given his eminence an opportunity of explaining his motives -either by stating his personal objections to me, or the alteration -of his opinions, his sentiments, and his wishes, in respect to the -independence of his country.” - - “WELLINGTON.” - - * * * * * - - -No. VI. - -EXTRACT FROM A REPORT MADE BY THE DUKE OF DALMATIA TO THE PRINCE OF -WAGRAM AND OF NEUFCHATEL. - - -SECTION 1. - - “_Seville, August 4th, 1810._ - -“Par une décision de l’Empereur du mois de Fevrier dernier S. -M. détermine qu’à compter du 1^{er} Janvier toutes les dépenses -d’administration générale du Genie et de l’artillerie seraient au -compte du gouvenement Espagnol; aussitôt que j’en fus instruit -je sollicitai S. M. C. d’assigner à cet effet une somme; mais je -ne pus obtenir que 2,000,000, de réaux (533,000 f.) et encore le -Roi entendait il que les payements ne remontassent qu’au mois -de Fevrier; cette somme était de beaucoup insuffisante. Je n’ai -cessé d’en faire la représentation, ainsi que Monsr. l’Intendant -Général; nos demandes n’ont pas été accueillies, et pour couvrir -autant que possible la différence j’ai du avoir recours aux recettes -extraordinaires faites sans la participation des ministres Espagnols. -J’espère que ce moyen réussira, déjà même il a produit quelques -sommes. L’état que je mets ci joint fait connaître les recouvremens -qui out été opérés sur les fonds de 533,000 f. du crédit mensuel -à l’époque du 1^{er} Août lesquels forment la somme de 3,731,000 -f. mais indépendamment il y a eu des recettes extraordinaires pour -au moins 500,000 f. qui ont reçu la même destination (les dépenses -d’administration générale) antérieurement à cette époque. J’avais -fait mettre à la disposition de Monsr. l’Intendant Général des -Valeurs pour plus d’un million qui devait servir à payer une partie -de l’armée. Mr. l’Intendant Général justifie de l’emploi de toutes -ces sommes dans ses comptes généraux. Les ministres de S. M. C. -n’admettent pas les comptes que je présente; d’abord ils ne veulent -pas allouer la somme de 500,000 f. qui a été reportée a l’article -des dépenses d’administration générale, s’appuyant sur ce sujet sur -la décision du roi qui ne fait remonter ces dépenses que jusqu’au -mois de Fevrier, quoique l’empereur ait expressement entendu que le -mois de Janvier devait aussi y être compris, ils ne veulent pas non -plus reconnaître les recettes extraordinaires, où ils prétendent -en précompter le produit sur le crédit mensuel de 533,000 f. Il -n’est pas dans mon pouvoir d’admettre leurs motifs, la décision -de l’empereur est expresse et tant que je serai dans la situation -délicate où je me trouve, mon devoir m’obligera de pourvoir aux -besoins du service par tous les moyens praticables. Les recettes -qui ont eu lieu en Andalusie ont servi à toutes les dépenses de -l’artillerie, du genie, des état majors et de l’administration -générale qui sont vraiment immenses, et quoiqu’on ait absolument -rien reçu de France ni de Madrid, j’ai en même temps pu faire payer -trois mois de solde à l’armée, c’est sans doute bien peu quand il -est du 8 à 10 mois d’arrière à la troupe et que l’insuffisance des -moyens oblige à augmenter encore cet arrière, mais ne recevant rien -je crois qu’il m’était impossible de mieux faire. V. A. en sera elle -même convaincue si elle veut s’arrêter un moment sur l’apperçu que -je vais lui donner des charges que l’Andalusie supporte. On consomme -tous les jours près de 100,000 rations de vivres et 20,000 rations -de fourrage; il y a 2000 malades aux hôpitaux. La forteresse de -Jaen, le fort de Malaga, l’Alhambra de Grenade, au dessus duquel -on a construit un grand camp retranché; tous les châteaux sur les -bords de la mer depuis le cap de Gata jusqu’à Fuengirola, le château -d’Alcala la Réal, la place de Ronda, les anciens châteaux d’Olbera -et de Moron, le château de Belalcazar, le château de Castillo de -Los Guardias et plusieurs autres portes sur les frontières de -l’Estremadura qu’on a dû aussi occuper. On a pourvu aux dépenses -que les travaux devant Cadiz et la construction d’une flottille -occasionment. On a établi à Grenade une poudrière et une fabrique -d’armes, laquelle jusqu’à présent a peu donné, mais qui par la suite -sera très utile. On a rétabli et mis dans une grande activité la -fonderie et l’arsenal de Seville où journellement 1500 ouvriers -sont employés. Nous manquions de poudre et de projectiles de feu et -d’affûts. J’ai fait rétablir deux moulins à poudre à Seville et fait -exploiter toutes les nitrières de l’Andalusie, à présent on compte -aussi à Seville des projectiles de tous les calibres, jusqu’aux -bombes de 12 pouces, tout le vieux fer a été ramassé, on a construit -les affûts nécessaires pour l’armement des batteries devant Cadiz. -On a fait des réquisitions en souliers et effets d’habillement -dont la troupe a profité. J’ai fait lever dans le pays 2000 mules -qui out été données à l’artillerie, aux équipages militaires et au -Génie. J’ai fait construire et organiser un équipage de 36 pièces de -montagnes, dont 12 obusiers, de 12 qui sont portés à dos de mulets -et vont être repartis dans tous les corps d’armée. La totalité de -ces dépenses ainsi qu’une infinité d’autres dont je ne fais pas -l’énumération sont au compte du gouvernement Espagnol, et le pays -les supporte indépendamment du crédit mensuel de 533,000 f. et des -recettes extraordinaires que je fais opérer lorsqu’il y a possibilité -dont l’application a lieu en faveur de l’administration générale -de l’armée, du Genie, de l’artillerie, des états majors, des frais -de courses et des dépenses secrettes. Ces charges sont immenses et -jamais le pays n’aurait pu les supporter si nous n’étions parvenus à -mettre de l’ordre et la plus grande régularité dans les dépenses et -consommations; mais il serait difficile de les augmenter, peut-être -même y aurait il du danger de chercher à le faire; c’est au point -que malgré que nous soyons à la récolte il faut déjà penser à faire -venir du bled des autres provinces, le produit de l’Andalusie -étant insuffisant pour la consommation de ses habitans et celle de -l’armée. Cependant S.M.C. et ses ministres qui sont parfaitement -instruits de cette situation ont voulu attirer à Madrid les revenues -de l’Andalusie: je dis les revenues car leurs demandes dépassaient -les recettes; des ordres ont même été expédiés en conséquence -aux commissaires Royaux des Préfectures et je me suis trouvé dans -l’obligation de m’opposer ouvertement à l’effet de cette mesure dont -l’exécution eut non seulement compromis tous les services de l’armée, -mais occasionné peut être, des mouvemens séditieux; d’ailleurs il -y avait impossibilité de la remplir, à ce sujet j’ai l’honneur -de mettre sous les yeux de V.A. extrait d’une lettre que j’eus -l’honneur d’écrire au roi le 13 Juillet dernier et copie de celle que -j’adressai à Monsieur le marquis d’Almenara, ministre des finances, -le 30 du même mois pour répondre à une des siennes, où il me peignait -l’état désespérant des finances de S.M.C. Je supplie avec instance -V.A. de vouloir bien rendre compte du contenu de ces lettres et du -présent rapport à S.M. l’empereur. - -“J’aurai voulu pour que S.M. fut mieux instruite de tout ce que s’est -fait en Andalousie pouvoir entrer dans des détails plus étendus; -mais j’ai dû me borner à traiter des points principaux, les détails -se trouvent dans ma correspondance, et dans les rapports de Monsieur -l’intendant général sur l’administration. Cependant d’après ce que -j’ai dit S.M. aura une idée exacte des opérations administratives -et autres qui ont eu lieu, ainsi que de l’état de ses troupes et -des embarras de ma situation: elle est telle aujourd’hui que je -dois supplier avec la plus vive instance S.M. au nom même de son -service de daigner la prendre en considération: j’ai des devoirs -à remplir dont je sais toute l’étendue, je m’y livre sans réserve -mais la responsabilité est trop forte pour que dans la position où -je me trouve je puisse la soutenir; en effet j’ai à combattre des -prétentions et des intérêts qui sont évidemment en opposition avec -ceux de l’armée et par conséquent avec ceux de l’empereur; je suis -forcé par mes propres devoirs de m’opposer à l’exécution des divers -ordres que le roi donne et faire souvent le contraire. J’ai aussi -constamment à lutter contre l’amour propre des chefs militaires, -que souvent peuvent différer d’opinion avec moi et naturellement -prétendent faire prévaloir leurs idées. Toutes ces considérations -me font regarder la tâche qui m’est imposée comme au dessus de -mes forces et me portent à désirer que S.M. l’empereur daigne me -faire connaître ses intentions ou pourvoir à mon remplacement et -mettre à la tête de son armée dans le midi de l’Espagne, un chef -plus capable que moi d’en diriger les opérations. Je me permettrai -seulement de faire observer à ce sujet que le bien du service de -l’empereur commande impérieusement que toutes les troupes qui sont -dans le midi de l’Espagne depuis le Tage jusqu’aux deux mers suivent -le même système d’opérations, et soyent par conséquent commandés -par un seul chef lequel doit être dans la pensée de l’empereur, -et avoir ses instructions afin que le cas se présentant où il lui -serait fait opposition d’une manière quelconque, il puisse se -conduire en conséquence et parvenir au but qui lui sera indiqué; -tout autre système retardera la marche des affaires et occasionera -inévitablement des désagréments qu’on peut autrement éviter.” - - “J’ai l’honneur, &c. - “(Signé) LE MARÉCHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.” - - -SECTION 2. - -_Intercepted Letter from marshal Mortier to the emperor, 13th July, -1810._ - - SIRE, - -L’état de nullité où je suis depuis que Monsieur le duc de Dalmatie, -major général, a pris l’initiative de tous les movemens même le -plus minutieux de 5^{eme} corps rend ici ma presence tout à fait -inutile, il ne me reste que le chagrin de voir d’excellentes troupes -animées du meilleur esprit, disseminées dans toute l’Andalusie et -perdant tous les jours de braves gens sans but ni résultat. Dans -cet état des choses je prie V.M. de vouloir bien me permettra des -me retirer à Burgos pour y attendre des ordres s’il ne juge pas à -propos de m’accorder un congé pour retourner en France, congé que -reclame ma santé à la suite d’une maladie grave dont je suis à peine -convalescent. - - J’ai l’honneur, &c. &c. - LE MARESCHAL DUC DE TRÉVISE. - - * * * * * - - -No. VII. - - -SECTION 1. - -_Extract from an intercepted despatch of Massena, dated July 10, -1810._ - -“Generals Romana and Carrera have gone to lord Wellington’s -head-quarters, but the latter has not abandoned his Lines.” - - -_General P. Boyer to S. Swartz, July 8._ - -“We are covering the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, a place strong by its -position and works, and which has been attacked with but little -method. The English army is opposite ours, but, for good reasons, -does not move: we compose the corps of observation; we are on the -look out for them.” - - -SECTION 2. - -_Extrait du Journal du C. de B. Pelet, premier aide-de-camp du -maréchal prince d’Essling._ - -“1810. 5 Août, à Ciudad Rodrigo.--Le capitaine du génie Boucherat -arrive du 2^e corps; il a fait la campagne du Portugal, 1807. -Beaucoup causé avec lui sur ce pays. Il a fait la route de Lisbonne à -Almeyda avec M. Mairet, et me remet un itinéraire qu’il en a dressé. -Il prétend ces routes très difficiles; les rivières très encaissées, -et inabordable sur les deux rives du Mondego. Celui-ci a peu d’eau, -doit être guéable presque partout; et une partie de ses rives bien -difficiles, et en certains endroits il n’y a pas plus de 20 toises -de largeur; un seul pont sans chemin (je crois à Fornos;) mais la -rivière n’est pas un obstacle aux communications des deux rives. La -route d’Idanha, Castelbranco, &c. mauvaise, cependant non absolument -impraticable à des pièces légères. Tage, très escarpé, rocailleux, -profond jusqu’à Abrantés * * * * Au dessous de cette ville, ou -plutôt au confluent du Zézère, le pays devient plat; le lit du Tage -s’élargit; il n’y a plus que des collines même éloignées, et tout -est très praticable. Les montagnes de Santarem sont des collines -peu élevées, praticables, accessibles sur leur sommet, peu propres -à être défendues ce qui est commune jusqu’à la mer pour celles de -Montachique, qui sont des plateaux arrondis, accessibles à toute -les armes; et on pourrait marcher ou manœuvrer dans toutes les -directions. J’ai fait copier cet itinéraire.” - -“1810. 7 Octobre, à Leyria.--Causé avec le général Loison des -position de Montachique, ensuite avec le prince.” - -“1810. 9 Octobre, à Riomajor. On dit que l’ennemi se retranche à -Alhandra et Bucella. Les généraux Reynier et Foy ont une carte de -Riomajor à Lisbonne; espèce de croquis fait à la hâte, d’après de -bons matériaux, mais où la figure est très mauvaise. Je le fais -copier.” - - -SECTION 3. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling. Sur la hauteur en arrière -de Moira, le 26 Septembre, 1810, à 10 heure ½._ - -J’ai l’honneur de vous adresser une lettre que je viens de recevoir -du général Reynier et copie d’une réponse. - -Vous trouverez également ci-joint une lettre du général Reynier -adressée à votre excellence. - -Je vous renouvelle, prince, l’assurance de ma haute considération. - - (Signé) LE MARÉCHAL DUC D’ELCHINGEN. - - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Elchingen. St. Antonio, le 26 -Septembre, à 8 heure du matin._ - -Depuis que le brouillard est dissipé, on apperçoit sur le Serra au -delà de St. Antonio, cinq bataillons Portugais qui étoient à mi-côte -et qui sont montés sur la crête à mesure que le brouillard s’est -éclairci. Il y a de plus au col où passe le chemin, 6 pièces de canon -et un détachement d’infantrie Anglaise, et à mi-côte une ligne de -tirailleurs partie Anglais qui s’étend depuis le chemin qui monte du -village de Carvailha à ma gauche, jusques vis-à-vis des postes du -6^e corps, on voit des troupes sur les sommités qui font face au 6^e -corps; mais comme on ne les apperçoit que de revers, ou ne peut juger -de leur nombre. - -On ne peut deviner s’il y a des troupes en arrière, mais d’après -l’organisation de la montagne dont les crêtes, sont étroites, et qui -a des pentes rapides de chaque côte il ne doit pas avoir de terrain -pour y placer de fortes réserves et manœuvres. Cela me parait une -arrière garde mais la position est forte, et il faut faire des -dispositions pour l’attaquer avec succès. J’attends des nouvelles -de ce que l’ennemi fait devant vous pour faire aucun mouvement; si -vous jugez que c’est une arrière garde et que vous l’attaquiez, -j’attaquerai aussi. Si vous jugez convenable d’attendre les ordres -de Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, j’attendrai aussi, comme -je pense qu’il viendra vers votre corps, je vous prie de lui faire -parvenir le rapport ci-joint avec les vôtres. - -J’ai l’honneur de vous prier, Monsieur le maréchal, d’agréer -l’hommage de mon respect. - - (Signé) REYNIER. - - -_A Monsieur le Général Reynier. Sur la hauteur en arrière de Moira, -le 26 Septembre 1810, à 10 heures ½ du matin._ - -Je reçois à l’instant, mon cher général, votre lettre de ce jour. -Je pense qu’une grande partie de l’armée Anglo-Portugaise a passé -la nuit sur la crête des montagnes qui domine toute la vallée de -Moira. Un paysan dit qu’il existe de l’autre côté de ces montagnes -une plaine assez belle d’une demi-lieue d’étendue, et très garnie -d’Oliviers. Depuis ce matin, l’ennemi marche par sa gauche, et semble -diriger ses colonnes principales sur la route d’Oporto; cependant -il tient encore assez de monde à la droite du parc qui couvre le -couvent des minimes nommé Sako; et il montre une 12^{ne} de pièces -d’artillerie. Le chemin de Coïmbre passe très près de ce courent. - -J’ai envoyé ce matin un de mes aides-de-camp au prince d’Essling pour -lui dire que nous sommes en présence, et qu’il serait nécessaire -qu’il arrivât pour prendre un parti. Si j’avais le commandement, -j’attaquerais sans hésiter un seul instant; mais je crois, mon cher -général, que vous ne pouvez rien compromettre en vous échelonnant -sur la droite de l’ennemi; et en poussant ses avant-postes, car -c’est véritablement par ce point qu’il faudrait le forcer à faire sa -retraite. - - Je vous renouvelle, &c. - (Signé) LE MARÉCHAL DUC D’ELCHINGEN. - - -SECTION 4. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, Commandant-en-chef, l’armée -de Portugal, Paris, le 4 Décembre, 1810._ - -Monsieur le prince d’Essling, le général Foy que vous avez expédié -est arrivé à Paris le 22 Novembre; il a fait connaître à sa majesté -et dans le plus grand détail ce qui s’est passé et votre situation. - -Dès le 4 Novembre le général Gardanne était en avant d’Almeida avec -un corps de 6,000 hommes. Le compte d’Erlon avec les divisions -Claparede, Conroux, et la division Fournier a dû se trouver à Guarda -vers le 20 Novembre. - -L’Empereur, prince, a vu par les journaux Anglais, que vous aviez -établi des ponts sur le Tage et que sous en avez un sur le Zézère, -défendu sur les deux rives pas de fortes têtes de pont. Sa majesté -pense que vous devez vous retrancher dans la position, que vous -occupez devant l’ennemi; qu’Abrantés se trouvant à 800 toises du -Tage, vous l’aurez isolé de son pont et bloqué pour en faire le -siège. L’Empereur vous recommande d’établir deux ponts sur le Zézère, -de défendre ces ponts par des ouvrages considérables, comme ceux du -Spitz devant Vienne. Votre ligne d’opérations et de communications -devant être établie par la route de Garda, partant du Zézère, -passant par Cardigos, suivant la crête des montagnes par Campinha et -Belmonte, vous aurez toujours la route de Castelbranco et Salvatera -pour faire des vivres. - -Je viens de donner de nouveau l’ordre déjà réitéré plusieurs -fois au duc de Dalmatie, d’envoyer le 5^{me} corps sur le Tage -entre Montalveo et Villaflor, pour faire sa jonction avec vous. -L’Empereur croit qu’il serait nécessaire de s’emparer d’Alcantara, -de fortifier et de consolider tous les ponts sur le Zézère et sur le -Tage, d’assurer toutes vos communications en saississant les points -favorables que peuvent offrir les localités pour fortifier de petites -positions; des châteaux ou maisons qui, occupées par peu de troupes, -soient à l’abri des incursions des milices. - -Vous sentirez, Monsieur le Prince d’Essling, l’avantage de -régulariser ainsi la guerre, ce qui vous mettra à même de profiter de -la réunion de tous les corps qui vont vous renforcer, pour marcher -sur lord Wellington et attaquer la gauche de sa position, soit pour -l’obliger à se rembarquer en marchant sur la rive gauche du Tage, ou -enfin, si tous ces moyens ne réussissaient pas, vous serez en mesure -de rester en position pendant les mois de Décembre et de Janvier, -en vous occupant d’organiser vos vivres et de bien établir vos -communications avec Madrid et Almeyda. - -L’armée du centre qui est à Madrid, ayant des détachements sur -Placentia, vos communications avec cette capitale ne sont pas -difficiles. - -Deux millions 500 mille francs destinés à la solde de votre armée -sont déjà à Valladolid; deux autre millions partent en ce moment de -Bayonne. Ainsi votre armée sera dans une bonne situation. - -Votre position deviendra très embarrassante pour les Anglais, qui, -indépendamment d’une consommation énorme d’hommes et d’argent, se -trouveront engagés dans une guerre de système, et ayant toujours -une immensité de bâtimens à la mer pour leur rembarquement. Il faut -donc, Prince, travailler sans cesse à vous fortifier vis-à-vis de la -position des ennemis, et pouvoir garder la vôtre avec moins de monde; -ce qui rendra une partie de votre armée mobile et vous mettra à même -de faire des incursions dans le pays. - -Vous trouverez ci-joint des moniteurs qui donnent des nouvelles -de Portugal, parvenues par la voie de l’Angleterre, datées du 12 -Novembre. - - Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, - Major-Général, - (Signé) ALEXANDRE. - - -SECTION 5. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, Commandant-en-chef, l’armée -de Portugal, Paris, le 22 Décembre, 1810._ - -Je vous expédie, Prince, le général Foy que l’Empereur a nommé -général de division; je vous envoie les moniteurs; vous y verrez que -nous apprenons par les nouvelles d’Angleterre qu’au 1 Décembre, vous -vous fortifiez dans votre position de Santarem. - -L’Empereur met la plus grande importance à ce que vous teniez -constamment en échec les Anglais, à ce que vous ayez des ponts sur le -Zézère et sur le Tage; la saison va devenir bonne pour les opérations -militaires, et vous aurez le moyen de harceler les Anglais et de -leur faire éprouver journellement des pertes. Par les nouvelles -des journaux Anglais, il parait qu’il y a beaucoup de malades dans -leur armée, ils ne comptent que -------- 27 à 28 mille hommes sous -les armes et un effectif de 31 milles, y compris la cavalerie et -l’artillerie. La situation de l’armée Anglaise en Portugal tient -Londres dans une angoise continuelle, et l’Empereur regarde comme un -grand avantage de tenir les Anglais en échec, de les attirer et de -leur faire perdre du monde dans des affaires d’avant-gardes, jusqu’à -ce que vous soyez à même de les engager dans une affaire générale. Je -réitère encore au maréchal duc de Trévise l’ordre de marcher sur le -Tage avec le 5^{me} corps. - -Le comte d’Erlon, qui réunit son corps à Ciudad-Rodrigo, va profiter -de ce moment où les pluies cessent pour reprendre l’offensive et -battre tous ces corps de mauvaises troupes que se trouvent sur vos -communications et sur vos flancs. - -Vos ponts étant bien assurés sur le Zézère, la ligne de vos -opérations la plus naturelle parait devoir être par la rive gauche de -cette rivière. - -Le général Foy, à qui l’Empereur a parlé longtems vous donnera plus -de détails. - - Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, - Major-Général, - (Signé) ALEXANDRE. - - -SECTION 6. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal d’Essling, Commandant-en-chef, l’armée de -Portugal, Paris, le 16 Janvier, 1811._ - -Je vous préviens, Prince, que par décret impérial, en date du 15 de -ce mois, l’Empereur a formé une armée du Nord de l’Espagne, dont le -commandement est confié à Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie qui va -établir son quartier général à Burgos. - -L’arrondissement de l’armée du Nord de l’Espagne est composé:-- - -1º. De la Navarre formant le 3^e governement de l’Espagne. - -2º. Des trois provinces de la Biscaye et de la province de Santander, -formant le 4^e gouvernement. - -3º. De la province des Asturies. - -4º. Des provinces de Burgos, Aranda, et Soria, formant le 5^e -gouvernement. - -5º. Des provinces de Palencia, Valladolid, Leon, Benevente, Toro, et -Zamore, formant le 6^e gouvernement. - -6º. De la province de Salamanque. - -Ainsi cet arrondissement comprend tout le pays occupé par les troupes -Françaises entre la mer, la France, le Portugal, et les limites de -l’arrondissement des armées du centre et de l’Arragon. - -Cette disposition en centralisant le pourvoir, va donner de -l’ensemble et une nouvelle impulsion d’activité aux opérations -dans toutes les provinces du Nord de l’Espagne; et Monsieur le -maréchal duc d’Istrie mettra un soin particulier à maintenir les -communications entre Valladolid, Salamanque, et Almeida. - -Je vous engage, Prince, à correspondre avec Monsieur le maréchal duc -d’Istrie toutes les fois que vous le jugerez utile au service. - -D’après les ordres de l’Empereur je préviens Monsieur le duc -d’Istrie que dans des circonstances imprévues, il doit appuyer -l’armée de Portugal et lui porter du secours; je le préviens aussi -que le 9^{me} corps d’armée serait sous ses ordres dans le cas où ce -corps rentrerait en Espagne. - - Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, - Major-Général, - (Signé) ALEXANDRE. - - -SECTION 7. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie, Paris, le 24 Janvier, 1811._ - -Vous verrez par le moniteur d’hier, Monsieur le duc de Dalmatie, que -les armées de Portugal étaient à la fin de l’année dernière dans -la même position. L’Empereur me charge de vous renouveller l’ordre -de vous porter au secours du prince d’Essling, qui est toujours -à Santarem; il a plusieurs ponts sur le Zézère, et il attend que -les eaux soient diminuées pour en jetter un sur le Tage. Il parait -certain que le 9^{me} corps a opéré sa jonction avec lui par le Nord, -c’est-à-dire, par Almeyda. - -L’Empereur _espère que le prince d’Essling aura jetté un pont sur le -Tage_; ce que lui donnera des vivres. - -Les corps insurgés de Valence et de Murcie vont se trouver occupé -par le corps du général Suchet, aussitôt que Tarragone sera tombé -entre nos mains, comme l’a fait la place de Tortose; alors Sa Majesté -_pense que le_ 5^{me} corps et une partie _du_ 4^{me} pourront-se -porter au _secours_ du prince d’Essling. - - Le Major Général, - (Signé) ALEXANDRE. - - -SECTION 8. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, Paris, le 25 Janvier, 1811._ - -Je vous préviens, prince, que Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie -s’est mis en marche dans les premiers jours de Janvier avec le 9^{me} -corps d’armée, un corps de cavalerie, et un équipage de siège pour -se porter sur Badajoz et faire le siège de cette place. Ces troupes -ont dû arriver le 10 de ce mois devant Badajoz; je mande au duc de -Dalmatie qu’après la prise de cette place il doit se porter sans -perdre de tems sur le Tage avec son équipage de siège pour vous -donner les moyens d’assiéger et de prendre Abrantés. - - Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, - Major Général, - (Signé) ALEXANDRE. - - -SECTION 9. - -_Au Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, major-général, Paris, le 6 -Fevrier, 1811._ - -Mon cousin, je pense que vous devez envoyer le moniteur d’aujourd’hui -au duc de Dalmatie, au duc de Trévise, au général Belliard, au duc -d’Istrie, aux commandans de Cuidad Rodrigo et d’Almeida, aux général -Thiébaut, et aux généraux Dorsenne, Cafarelli, et Reille. Ecrivez au -duc d’Istrie en lui envoyant le moniteur, pour lui annoncer qu’il y -trouvera les dernières nouvelles du Portugal, qui paraissent être du -13; que tout parait prendre une couleur avantageuse; que si Badajoz -a été pris dans le courant de Janvier, le duc de _Dalmatie a pû se -porter sur le Tage, et faciliter l’établissement du pont au prince -d’Essling_; qu’il devient donc très important de faire toutes les -dispositions que j’ai ordonnées afin que le général Drouet avec ses -deux divisions puisse être tout entier à la disposition du prince -d’Essling. Ecrivez en même tems au duc de Dalmatie pour lui faire -connaître la situation du duc d’Istrie, et lui réitérer l’ordre _de -favoriser le prince d’Essling_ pour son possage du Tage; que j’espère -que Badajoz aura été prix dans le courant de Janvier; et que vers le -20 _Janvier sa jonction aura eu lieu sur le Tage_, avec le prince -d’Essling; qu’il peut, si cela est nécessaire, retirer des troupes du -4^{me} corps; _qu’enfin tout est sur le Tage._ Sur ce je prie Dieu, -mon cousin, qu’il vous ait dans sa sainte et digne garde. - - (Signé) NAPOLEON. - -P.S. Je vous renvoie votre lettre au duc d’Istrie, faites le partir. - - -SECTION 10. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, commandant-en-chef l’armée -de Portugal, Paris, le 7 Février_, 1811. - -Je vous envoie, prince, le moniteur du 6, vous y trouverez les -dernières nouvelles que nous avons du Portugal; elles vont jusqu’au -13 Janvier, et annoncent _que tout prend une tournure avantageuse. -Si Badajoz a été pris dans le courant de Janvier, comme cela est -probable, le duc de Dalmatie aura pu faire marcher des troupes sur -le Tage, et vous faciliter l’établissement d’un pont._ Je lui en -ai donné et je lui en réitère l’ordre; l’Empereur espère que la -_jonction des troupes de ce maréchal a eu lieu maintenant avec vous -sur le Tage_. - -Les deux divisions d’infanterie du corps du général Drouet, vout -rester entièrement à votre disposition d’après les ordres que je -donne à Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, commandant en chef l’armée -du nord de l’Espagne; je lui mande de porter son quartier général -à Valladolid, d’établir des corps nombreux de cavalerie dans la -province de Salamanque afin d’assurer d’une manière journalière -sure et rapide la correspondance entre Almeyda, Cuidad Rodrigo et -Valladolid, et nous envoyer promptement toutes les nouvelles qui -pourront parvenir à l’armée de Portugal. - -Je lui prescris de tenir à Ciudad Rodrigo, un corps de 6,000 hommes -qui puisse éloigner toute espèce de troupe ennemie de Ciudad Rodrigo -et d’Almeida, faire même des incursions sur Pinhel et Guarda, -empêcher qu’il se forme aucun rassemblement sur les derrières du -9^{me} corps et présenter des dispositions offensives sur cette -frontière du Portugal. - -De réunir une forte brigade de la garde impériale vers Zamora d’où -elle sera à portée de soutenir le corps de Ciudad Rodrigo, et où elle -se trouvera d’ailleurs dans une position avancée pour agir suivant -les circonstances. - -De réunir une autre forte brigade de la garde à Valladolid où elle -sera en mesure d’appuyer la première et de réunir le reste de la -garde dans le gouvernement de Burgos. - -Par ces dispositions, prince, les deux divisions d’infanterie du -9^{me} corps, seront entièrement à votre disposition et avec ce -secours vous serez en mesure de tenir longtems la position que vous -occupez; de vous porter sur la rive gauche du Tage; ou enfin d’agir -comme vous le jugerez convenable sans avoir aucune inquiétude sur -le nord de l’Espagne, puisque le duc d’Istrie sera à portée de -marcher sur Almeyda et Ciudad Rodrigo et même sur Madrid, si des -circonstances inattendues le rendaient nécessaire. - -Dès que le duc d’Istrie aura fait ses dispositions il enverra -un officier au général Drouet, pour l’en instruire et lui faire -connoître qu’il peut rester en entier pour vous renforcer. - -Le général Foy a dû partir vers le 29 Janvier de Ciudad Rodrigo, avec -4 bataillons et 300 hommes de cavalerie pour vous rejoindre. - - Le Prince de Wagram et d’Neuchâtel, - Major Général, - (Signé) ALEXANDRE. - - -SECTION 11. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Guarda, le 29 Mars, 1811._ - -Mon cher Maréchal, vous aurez appris notre arrivée aux frontières du -Portugal, l’armée se trouve dans un pays absolument ruiné; et avec -toute ma volonté et la patience de l’armée, je crains de n’y pouvoir -tenir 8 jours, et je me verrai forcé de rentrer en Espagne. - -J’écris à Mr. le Cte. d’Erlon pour qu’il fasse approvisionner Almeyda -et Rodrigo; ces deux places n’auraient jamais dû cesser d’avoir pour -3 mois de vivres aux quels ou n’aurait pas dû toucher sous aucun -prétexte; et ma surprise est extrême d’apprendre qu’il n’y a que -pour 10 jours de vivres à Almeyda. Je lui écris aussi de prendre une -position entre Rodrigo et Almeyda, avec ses deux divisions; vous -sentez combien il est nécessaire, qu’il se place à portée de marcher -au secours d’Almeyda. - -Si je trouvais des vivres, je ne quitterais pas les frontières -d’Espagne et du Portugal, mais comme je vous l’ai dit, je ne vois -guère la possibilité d’y rester.... - - (Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. - - -SECTION 12. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Alfayates, le 2 Avril, 1811._ - -Mon cher Maréchal, le pays que l’armée occupe ne pouvant en aucune -manière le faire vivre, je me vois forcé de la faire rentrer -en Espagne. Voici les cantonnements que je lui ai assignés et -l’itinéraire de marche de chaque corps d’armée.... - - (Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. - - -SECTION 13. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Rodrigo, le 5 Avril, 1811._ - -Mon cher Maréchal, je suis arrivé avec toute l’armée sur Ciudad -Rodrigo, mes troupes depuis plusieurs jours sont sans pain; et je -suis obligé de faire prendre sur les approvisionnments de Rodrigo -200 mille rations de biscuit, que je vous prie d’ordonner de -remplacer avec les ressources qui peuvent se trouver à Salamanque et -Valladolid. Nous partirons ensuite pour les cantonnements que j’ai -eu soin de vous faire connaître. J’espère que vous aurez bien voulu -faire donner des ordres aux intendans de province, d’y faire préparer -des vivres, seul moyen d’y faire maintenir l’ordre. - -Je compte séjourner 3 à 4 jours ici pour voir si l’ennemi ne -s’approcherait pas des places. - - (Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. - - -SECTION 14. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 15 Avril, 1811._ - -Mon cher Maréchal, ma position devient toujours plus allarmante; -les places appellent des secours; je ne reçois pas de réponses de -vous à aucune de mes demandes; et si cet état de chose se prolonge, -je serai forcé de faire prendre à l’armée des cantonnements où elle -puisse vivre, et d’abandonner les places que je ne suis pas chargé de -défendre et encore bien moins d’approvisionner, mes troupes manquant -absolument de vivres. - - (Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. - - -SECTION 15. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal due d’Istrie, Paris, le 3 Avril, 1811._ - -Le general Foy est arrivé, Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, ainsi -que les deux aides-de-camp du maréchal prince d’Essling, le capitaine -Porcher, et le chef d’escadron Pelet. Il parait que le prince -d’Essling avec son corps d’armée prend position à Guarda, Belmonte, -et Alfuyates. Ainsi il protège Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeyda, Madrid et -l’Andalousie. Ses communications doivent s’établir facilement avec -l’armée du midi par Alcantara et Badajoz. Si ce qu’on ne prévoit pas, -le prince d’Essling étoit vivement attaqué par l’armée Anglaise, -l’empereur pense que _vous pourriez le soutenir avec une 15ne. de -milles hommes_. L’armée du centre doit avoir poussé un corps sur -Alcantara. L’armée du midi sera renforcée par ce que vous aurez déjà -fait partir, et d’après le prince d’Essling, elle va se trouver assez -forte pour ne rien craindre de l’ennemi.... - - (Le reste est sans intérêt.) - - Le Major Général, - (Signé) ALEXANDRE. - - -SECTION 16. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 17 Avril, 1811._ - - MON CHER MARECHAL, - -Le général Reynaud, commandant supérieur à Rodrigo, ainsi que le -général Marchand, qui est avec sa division autour de cette place, me -rendent compte que 2 divisions Portugaises avec une division Anglaise -ont pris position aux environs d’Almeyda. Quoique cette place ait -encore des vivres pour une 20^{ne} de jours, et que les Anglais et -les Portugais meurent de faim dans leurs positions, il faut faire des -dispositions pour les chasser au delà de la Coa, et pour ravitailler -cette place. Je vous propose en conséquence, mon cher maréchal, -de mettre à ma disposition 12 à 1500 chevaux, ceux de l’armée de -Portugal n’étant en état de rendre aucun service; je vous demande de -plus une division d’infanterie pour placer en réserve. Vers le 24 ou -le 29, ces forces se joindront aux 6 divisions que je compte réunir -de l’armée de Portugal pour attaquer l’ennemi, s’il nous attend dans -ses positions et le chasser au delà de la Coa. Il est impossible de -faire faire le moindre mouvement à toutes ces troupes, du moins à -celles de l’armée de Portugal pour attaquer l’ennemi; si on ne peut -leur faire distribuer pour 10 jours de biscuit et avoir de l’eau de -vie à la suite de l’armée. Je vous demande encore 15 à 18 pièces -d’artillerie bien attelées, celles à mes ordres étant hors d’état -de marcher. Avec ces moyens, nul doute que l’ennemi ne soit déposté -et chassé hors des frontières de l’Espagne et au delà de la Coa. -Mon cher maréchal, je vis ici au jour le jour; je suis sans le sol, -vous pouvez tout; il faut donc nous envoyer du biscuit, de l’eau de -vie, du pain et de l’orge. Ce sera avec ces moyens que nous pourrons -manœuvrer. Il ne faut pas perdre un instant. Il est très urgent de -marcher au secours d’Almeyda. C’est à vous à donner vos ordres; et -vous me trouverez porté de la meilleure volonté à faire tout ce qui -sera convenable aux intérêts de S. M. - - (Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. - - -SECTION 17. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 22 Avril, 1811._ - - MON CHER MARECHAL, - -J’ai reçu votre dépêche. Toutes vos promesses de vous réunir à moi -s’évanouissent donc dans le moment où j’en ai besoin, ravitailler -Almeida et Rodrigo est la 1^{re} opération et la seule qui peut -nous donner la faculté de rendre l’armée de Portugal disponible, -lorsqu’on n’aura plus rien à craindre sur le sort des places. En y -jettant pour 3 à 4 mois de vivres, on peut ensuite établir plusieurs -colonnes mobiles; on peut envoyer des troupes à Avila et Ségovie; on -peut au besoin appuyer le mouvement de l’armée d’Andalousie. Mais ne -serait il pas honteux de laisser rendre une place faute de vivres, -en présence de deux maréchaux de l’Empire? Je vous ai déjà prévenu -de la nullité de ma cavalerie, de l’impossibilité où se trouvent les -chevaux d’artillerie de rendre aucun service. Vous savez aussi que -je dois envoyer le 9^{me} corps en Andalousie; je voulais aussi le -faire concourir avant son départ au ravitaillement des places. Pouvez -vous, mon cher maréchal, balancer un seul instant à m’envoyer de la -cavalerie et des attelages d’artillerie? Si vous voulez garder votre -matériel? Ne vous ai-je pas prévenu que je commencerais mon mouvement -le 26? et vous paraissez attendre le (22) une seconde demande de ma -part. Vous le savez aussi bien que moi, perdre un ou deux jours à -la guerre est beaucoup; et ce délai peut avoir des suites fâcheuses -qu’on ne répare plus. - -Quand je vous ai dit que je ne réunerais que 6 divisions; c’était -pour ne pas tout dégarnir des points importans occupés par les corps -d’armée; mais de la cavalerie et de l’artillerie sont un secours -dont je ne puis me passer. Je vous prie en conséquence, mon cher -maréchal, de me faire arriver de la cavalerie et des attelages -d’artillerie à marches forcées. Réflechissez qu’une fois les places -réapprovisionnées, je pourrai disposer des ⅔ de l’armée, et que cette -opération passe avant tout. - -En m’offrant de nous envoyer les attelages pour 16 pièces, vous -aurez bien entendu, sans doute, mon cher maréchal y comprendre ceux -nécessaires pour les caissons des pièces. - - (Signé.) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. - - -SECTION 18. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 24 Avril, 1811._ - - MON CHER MARECHAL, - -Je me rends demain à Ciudad Rodrigo, où toute l’armée sera réunie -le 26. Le ravitaillement de la place d’Almeida est du plus haut -intérêt pour les armes de S. M; et il eut été bien à désirer que -les secours que j’ai en l’honneur de vous demander nous eussent été -envoyés. L’ennemi parait avoir de 20 à 29 mille hommes autour de -cette place. Vous dire que je n’aurai en cavalerie que 15 à 1800 -hommes, et seulement 20 pièces de canon pour toute l’armée, c’est -vous faire sentir, mon cher maréchal, combien votre secours m’eut -été nécessaire au moins sous deux rapports, pour votre armée même et -pour la tranquillité du nord de l’Espagne. Je n’ai pas ménagé mes -instances auprès de vous. Si mes efforts n’étaient pas heureux; votre -dévouement pour le service de l’Empereur, vous ferait certainement -regretter de ne pas les avoir secondés avec les moyens que vous -m’aviez fait espérer, avant que j’en eusse besoin. - - (Signé.) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. - - -SECTION 19. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Rodrigo, le 29 Avril, 1811._ - - MON CHER MARECHAL, - -Vos lettres sont inconcevables. Dans celle du 20, vous me dites que -vous ne pouvez me donner aucun secours. Par celle du 22, vous me -dites que le 25 ou le 26 vous me joindrez partout où je serai, et -que la tête de votre colonne arrivera à Salamanque le 26. Par celle -que je reçois à l’instant, vous me dites, que votre cavalerie et -votre artillerie se trouvent encore le 27 à une journée en arrière -de Salamanque; et vous concluez que mon mouvement doit être fini; et -vous me témoignez vos regrèts de n’avoir pû y coopérer. Convenez, -mon cher maréchal, que si l’armée de Portugal recevait un échec, -vous auriez bien des reproches à vous faire. Je vous ai demandé de -l’artillerie et des attelages et encore plus positivement de la -cavalerie; vous avez sous différens prétextes éludé ma demande. -Toutes les troupes qui sont en Espagne, sont de la même famille. -Vous êtes, jusques à ce qu’il y ait de nouveaux ordres, chargé de la -défense et de l’approvisionnement des places d’Almeida et de Rodrigo. -Je n’aurais pas mieux demandé que d’employer l’armée de Portugal sous -me ordres à défendre ces places, à marcher au secours de l’armée du -midi; mais comment puis-je le faire sans vivres? - -Je compte faire mon mouvement demain matin. J’ignore quelle pourra -être l’issue de ce mouvement; si ma lettre vous arrive dans la -journée de demain, votre cavalerie et votre artillerie pourraient -toujours se mettre en mouvement dans la nuit pour arriver après -demain 1er Mai à Cabrillas. Je vous prie de faire filer sans -s’arrêter le biscuit, la farine, le grain que vous n’aurez pas -manqué de réunir à la suite de vos troupes. Il est instant que ces -ressources comme beaucoup d’autres, arrivent à Rodrigo; cette place -n’aura pas pour 15 jours de vivres. A mon départ d’ici, il faudra que -des convois considerables y soient envoyés. - - (Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING. - - -SECTION 20. - -_A Monsieur le maréchal duc de Raguse, Paris, le 20 Avril, 1811._ - - MONSIEUR LE DUC DE RAGUSE, - -Vous trouverez ci-joint l’ordre de l’Empereur qui vous donne le -commandement de l’armée de Portugal. Je donne l’ordre au maréchal -prince d’Essling de vous remettre le commandement de cette armée. -Saisissez les rènes d’une main ferme; faites dans l’armée les -changemens qui deviendraient nécessaires. L’intention de l’Empereur -est que le duc d’Abrantes et le général Reynier restent sous vos -ordres. S. M. compte assez sur le dévouement que lui portent ses -généraux, pour être persuadé qu’ils vous seconderont de tous leurs -moyens. - -L’Empereur ordonne, Monsieur le duc de Raguse, que le prince -d’Essling en quittant l’armée n’emmène avec lui que son fils et un de -ses aides-de-camp. Mais son chef d’état-major, le général Fririon, -le colonel Pelet, ses autre aides-de-camp, tous le officiers de son -état-major doivent rester avec vous. - -Toutefois, Monsieur le duc, je vous le répète S. M. met en vous une -confiance entière. - - Le Major Général, &c. - (Signé.) ALEXANDRE. - - * * * * * - - -No. VIII. - -_Les Officiers Français Prisonniers de Guerre, détenus à la Maison, -Rue S. Jean, à Monsieur le Général Trant, Gouverneur de le Ville et -Province d’Oporto._ - - MONSIEUR LE GENERAL, - -Chacun des officiers Français prisonniers de guerre, détenus à la -maison rue S. Jean, pénétré des obligations qu’il vous a désirerait -vous offrir individuellement l’expression de sa reconnoissance. C’est -nous que ces messieurs ont choisi pour être auprès de vous leur -organes et nous sommes d’autant plus flattés de cette commission -agréable qu’il n’y en a pas un parmi nous qui dans son particulier -n’ait reçu de vous des services importants. Nous osons nous flatter -que vous agréerez favorablement ce foible témoignage de notre -gratitude et les sincères remerciments que nous venons vous présenter -pour toutes les bontés que vous avez eues pour nous. Ce n’est pas -sans un vif regret que nous envisageons le moment de votre départ, -mais ce que déjà vous avez fait pour nous, nous fait espérer que -votre solicitude s’étendra au delà de votre séjour et que pendant -votre absence nous continuerons à en éprouver les effets. - -Ce n’est pas, monsieur le général, d’après l’étendue de notre lettre -qu’il faudra mesurer celle de notre reconnoissance; nous sommes mieux -en état de sentir que d’éxprimer ce que nous vous devons et lorsque -des circonstances plus heureuses nous rameneront vers notre patrie, -nous nous ferons un devoir et une satisfaction de faire connaître -la manière dont nous avons été traités et les peines que vous vous -êtes donnés pour adoucir notre sort. Nous nous recommandons à la -continuation de votre bienveillance, et nous vous prions d’agréer -l’assurance de gratitude et de haute considération avec lesquelles -nous avons l’honneur d’être, monsieur le général, vos très humbles et -très obeissants serviteurs, - -Au nom des officiers Français, prisonniers de guerre. - - FALLOT, - Docteur médecin des armées Françaises attaché au - grand quartier général de l’armée de Portugal. - -Le colonel sous inspecteur au revues des troupes Françaises, - - CATELOT. - H. DELAHAYE, - C^{om.} de la marine. - - * * * * * - - -No. IX. - - -SECTION 1. - -_Letter from lieut.-general Graham to the right honourable Henry -Wellesley, Isla de Leon, 24th March, 1811._ - - SIR, - -You will do justice to my reluctance to enter into any controversy -for the purpose of counteracting the effects of that obloquy which -you yourself and many others assured me my conduct was exposed to by -the reports circulated, at Cadiz, relative to the issue of the late -expedition. - -But a copy of a printed statement of general La Peña having been -shewn to me, which, by implication at least, leaves the blame of -the failure of the most brilliant prospects on me, it becomes -indispensably necessary that I should take up my pen in self-defence. - -Having already sent you a copy of my despatch to the earl of -Liverpool, with a report of the action, I will not trouble you with -a detail of the first movements of the army, nor with any other -observation relative to them, than that the troops suffered much -unnecessary fatigue by marching in the night, and without good guides. - -Considering the nature of the service we were engaged in, I was most -anxious that the army should not come into contest with the enemy in -an exhausted state, nor be exposed to the attack of the enemy but -when it was well collected; and, in consequence of representations -to this effect, I understood that the march of the afternoon of the -4th was to be a short one, to take up for the night a position near -Conil; to prepare which, staff-officers, of both nations, were sent -forward with a proper escort. - -The march was, nevertheless, continued through the night, with those -frequent and harassing halts which the necessity of groping for the -way occasioned. - -When the British division began its march from the position of -Barrosa to that of Bermeja, _I left the general on the Barrosa -height, nor did I know of his intentions of quitting it_; and, when -I ordered the division to countermarch in the wood, I did so to -support the troops left for its defence, and believing the general to -be there in person. In this belief I sent no report of the attack, -which was made so near the spot where the general was supposed to be, -and, though confident in the bravery of the British troops, I was -not less so in the support I should receive from the Spanish army. -The distance, however, to Bermeja is trifling, and no orders were -given from head-quarters for the movement of any corps of the Spanish -army to support the British division, to prevent its defeat in this -unequal contest, or to profit of the success earned at so heavy -expense. The voluntary zeal of the two small battalions, (Walloon -guards and Ciudad Real,) which had been detached from my division, -brought them alone back from the wood; but, notwithstanding their -utmost efforts, they could only come at the close of the action. - -Had the whole body of the Spanish cavalry, with the horse-artillery, -been rapidly sent by the sea-beach to form in the plain, and to -envelop the enemy’s left; had the greatest part of the infantry been -marched through the pine-wood, in our rear, to turn his right, what -success might have been expected from such decisive movements? The -enemy must either have retired instantly, and without occasioning -any serious loss to the British division, or he would have exposed -himself to absolute destruction, his cavalry greatly outnumbered, -his artillery lost, his columns mixed and in confusion; a general -dispersion would have been the inevitable consequence of a close -pursuit; our wearied men would have found spirits to go on and would -have done so trusting to finding refreshments and repose at Chiclana. -This moment was lost. Within a quarter of an hour’s ride of the -scene of action, the general remained ignorant of what was passing, -_and nothing was done!_ Let not, then, this action of Barrosa form -any part of the general result of the transactions of the day; it -was an accidental feature; it was the result of no combination, it -was equally unseen and unheeded by the Spanish staff; the British -division, left alone, suffered the loss of more than one-fourth of -its number, and became unfit for future exertion. Need I say more to -justify my determination of declining any further co-operation in -the field towards the prosecution of the object of the expedition? -I am, however, free to confess that, having thus placed myself -and the British division under the direction of the Spanish -commander-in-chief in the field, (contrary to my instructions,) I -should not have thought myself justified to my king and country to -risk the absolute destruction of this division in a second trial. But -I have right to claim credit for what would have been my conduct from -what it was; and I will ask if it can be doubted, after my zealous -co-operation throughout, and the ready assistance afforded to the -troops left on Barrosa height, that the same anxiety for the success -of the cause would not have secured to the Spanish army the utmost -efforts of the British division during the whole of the enterprise, -_had we been supported as we had a right to expect_? - -There is not a man in the division who would not gladly have -relinquished his claim to glory, acquired by the action of Barrosa, -to have shared, with the Spaniards, the ultimate success that was -within our grasp as it were. - -The people of Spain, the brave and persevering people, are -universally esteemed, respected, and admired by all who value liberty -and independence; the hearts and hands of British soldiers will ever -be with them; the cause of Spain is felt by all to be a common one. - -I conclude with mentioning that the only request expressed to me, at -head-quarters, on the morning of the 6th, on knowing of my intention -to send the British troops across the river St. Petri, was _that the -opportunity of withdrawing the Spanish troops, during the night, was -lost_; and on my observing that, after such a defeat, there was no -risk of attack from an enemy, a very contrary opinion was maintained. - -In point of fact, no enemy ever appeared during several days employed -in bringing off the wounded and burying the dead. It may be proper -to remark on the report published relative to the enemy’s number at -St. Petri, (4500 men of Villat’s division,) that, by the concurrent -testimony of all the French officers here, general Villat’s division -had charge of the whole line,--what, then, must be the strength of -that division to have afforded 4500 men to St. Petri alone? In order -to establish, by authentic documents, facts which may have been -disputed, and to elucidate others, I enclose, by way of appendix, the -reports of various officers of this division. - - I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c. - (Signed) THO^S. GRAHAM, - Lt.-General. - -P.S. I must add this postscript distinctly to deny my having -spoken, at head-quarters, in the evening of the 5th, of sending -for more troops, or for provisions from the Isla. My visit was a -very short one, of mere ceremony. I may have asked if the Spanish -troops expected were arrived. This error must have arisen from the -difficulty of conversing in a foreign language. - -With this I send you a sketch of the ground, &c. of the action of -Barrosa; by which it will be seen how impossible, according to my -judgement, it would be for an enemy to expose his left flank, by -making a direct attack through the wood on the Barmeja position, -while that of Barrosa was occupied in force by the allied army. - - -SECTION 2. - -_Adjutant-general’s state of the troops assembled at Tarifa, under -the command of the lieut.-general Graham, 25th Feb. 1810._ - - Number of - Designations. bayonets. Commanders. - - Two squadrons of 2d } ” Major Busche. - German Hussars. } - - Detachment of artillery. Major Duncan. 10 guns - - Detachment of engineers 47 Captain Birch. - - Brigade of guards, reinforced } - by a detachment } 1221 Brigadier-gen. Dilke. - of the 2d battalion 95th } - rifles } - - 1st battalion 28th foot; } - 2d battalion 67th; 2d } - battalion 87th; reinforced } 1764 Colonel Wheatley. - with 2 companies } - of the 20th Portuguese } - - Flank battalion composed } - of detachments of the } - 3d battalion 95th rifles } 594 Lt.-col. A. Barnard, - and two companies of } 95th regt. - the 47th foot } - - Two companies of 2d battalion } - 9th regt.; two } - companies of 1st battalion } 475 Lt.-col. Brown, 28th regt. - 28th regt.; two } - companies of 2d battalion } - 82 regt. } - - One Company of the royal } 33 Lieutenant Reid. - staff corps } - ---- - Total number of bayonets 4114 - The hussars were about 180 - ---- - Total of sabres and bayonets 4294, with 10 guns. - - -SECTION 3. - -_Extract from a letter of general Frederick Ponsonby._ - -“I proceeded rapidly towards the entrance of the wood, found the -Germans, and conducted them along the right flank of our little army. -We came in contact with the French dragoons, whom we found nearly -abreast of our front line and about three hundred yards apart from -it on our right flank, our line had just halted and the firing was -gradually decreasing at the time we charged. I do not imagine the -French dragoons much exceeded us in number, they behaved well, but if -we had had half a dozen stout squadrons the mass of beaten infantry -would not have returned to their camp.” - - -SECTION 4.--STATE OF THE FIRST CORPS. - - (Part 1 of 3) - - [A] Genereaux de Brigade. - [B] Colonels. - [C] Chefs de Bt. ou Escadron. - [D] Capitaines. - [E] Lieutenants. - [F] Sous Lieutenants. - [G] Sous Officiers et Soldats. - [H] Total. - - (Part 1 of 3) - - ----------------------------+-----------------------------------++ - | || - | Tués. || - | || - +---+---+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++ - | | | | | | | | || - |[A]|[B]|[C]|[D]|[E]|[F]| [G] | [H] || - | | | | | | | | || - ----------------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++ - St. Petri, 4 {95 de Ligne| | | | | | | 3 | 3 || - {Etat Major | | | | | | | | || - { {Etat Major | 1 | 1 | | | | | | 2 || - { {9 Infr. Ligne| | | | | 1 | | 14 | 15 || - { 1 {24 Ligne | | | | 1 | 1 | | 33 | 35 || - { {96 Ligne | | 1 | | 1 | | | 39 | 41 || - { {1 Br. Elite | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 2 || - { {Etat Major | | | | | | | | || - { {45 Ligne | | | | 1 | | | 7 | 8 || - 5 Mars{ 2 {8 Ligne | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 63 | 74 || - { {54 Ligne | | | 1 | 2 | | | 26 | 29 || - { {Etat Major | | | | | | | | || - { {27 Infr. Ligne| | | | | 1 | | 20 | 21 || - { 3 {94 Ligne | | | | | 1 | | 9 | 10 || - { {95 Ligne | | | | | | | 1 | 1 || - { {1 Regt. | | | | | | | 2 | 2 || - {Dragoons {2 Regt. | | | | | | | 3 | 3 || - { {Artillerie | | | | | | | 16 | 16 || - Puerta St. Maria {45 Ligne | | | | | | | 10 | 10 || - {Artillerie| | | | 1 | | | | 1 || - Medina, 9 Mars, {94 | | | | | | | 4 | 4 || - 8 Dr. {95 | | | | | | | 4 | 4 || - +---+---+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++ - | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 6 | 3 | 255 | 281 || - ----------------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++ - - - (Part 2 of 3) - - ----------------------------+----------------------------------------++ - | || - | Blessés. || - | || - +---+---+---+----+----+----+------+------++ - | | | | | | | | || - |[A]|[B]|[C]| [D]| [E]| [F]| [G] | [H] || - | | | | | | | | || - ----------------------------+---+---+---+----+----+----+------+------++ - St. Petri, 4 {95 de Ligne| | 2 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 32 | 37 || - {Etat Major | | 2 | | 1 | | | | 3 || - { {Etat Major | | | | | | | | || - { {9 Infr. Ligne| | 1 | | 1 | 2 | | 70 | 74 || - { 1 {24 Ligne | | 1 | | 4 | 2 | | 214 | 221 || - { {96 Ligne | | | 1 | 3 | 2 | | 199 | 205 || - { {1 Br. Elite | | | | 2 | | 3 | 136 | 141 || - { {Etat Major | | | 1 | | 1 | | | 2 || - { {45 Ligne | | | | | | | 44 | 44 || - 5 Mars{ 2 {8 Ligne | | | | 2 | 6 | 3 | 622 | 633 || - { {54 Ligne | | | | 4 | 5 | 1 | 284 | 294 || - { {Etat Major | 1 | | | | | | | 1 || - { {27 Infr. Ligne| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 150 | 157 || - { 3 {94 Ligne | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 49 | 52 || - { {95 Ligne | | | | | | | 32 | 32 || - { {1 Regt. | | | | 3 | 1 | 2 | 30 | 36 || - {Dragoons {2 Regt. | | | | | | | 12 | 12 || - { {Artillerie | | | | | 3 | | 31 | 34 || - Puerta St. Maria {45 Ligne | | | | | | | 43 | 43 || - {Artillerie| | | | | | | 2 | 2 || - Medina, 9 Mars, {94 | | | | | | | 29 | 29 || - 8 Dr. {95 | | | 1 | | | | 18 | 19 || - +---+---+---+----+----+----+------+------++ - | 1 | 3 | 5 | 23 | 27 | 12 | 1997 | 2008 || - ----------------------------+---+---+---+----+----+----+------+------++ - - - (Part 3 of 3) - - ----------------------------+---------------------------++------- - | || - | Restes sus les Champ || - | grièvement Blessés || - +---+---+---+---+-----+-----++------- - | | | | | | || - |[A]|[B]|[D]|[F]| [G] | [H] || Total - | | | | | | ||General - ----------------------------+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++------- - St. Petri, 4 {95 de Ligne| | | | | 5 | 5 || 42 - {Etat Major | | | | | | || 3 - { {Etat Major | 1 | | | | | 1 || 3 - { {9 Infr. Ligne| | | | 1 | 18 | 19 || 108 - { 1 {24 Ligne | | | 2 | 1 | 21 | 24 || 280 - { {96 Ligne | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 || 249 - { {1 Br. Elite | | | 1 | | 59 | 60 || 203 - { {Etat Major | | | | | | || 2 - { {45 Ligne | | | | | 3 | 3 || 55 - 5 Mars{ 2 {8 Ligne | | | | | 19 | 19 || 726 - { {54 Ligne | | | | | | || 323 - { {Etat Major | | | | | | || 1 - { {27 Infr. Ligne| | | | 2 | 21 | 23 || 201 - { 3 {94 Ligne | | | | | | || 62 - { {95 Ligne | | | | | 1 | 1 || 34 - { {1 Regt. | | | 1 | | 3 | 4 || 42 - {Dragoons {2 Regt. | | | | | 4 | 4 || 19 - { {Artillerie | | 1 | | | | 1 || 51 - Puerta St. Maria {45 Ligne | | | | 1 | 27 | 28 || 81 - {Artillerie| | | | | 6 | 6 || 9 - Medina, 9 Mars, {94 | | | | | | || 33 - 8 Dr. {95 | | | | | 1 | 1 || 24 - +---+---+---+---+-----+-----++------- - | 1 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 180 | 202 || 2551 - ----------------------------+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++------- - - Certified copy by Count GAZAN. - - Total 2551 - - _Note by the Editor._-- - Deduct affair of the 4th about Santa Petri 45 - ” ” at Puerta Santa Maria. 81 - ” ” at Medina 64 - ---- - 190 - ---- - Remains loss at Barrosa 2361 - - -SECTION 5. - -_Intercepted papers of colonel Lejeune._ - -ORDRE. - -Il est ordonné à Monsieur le colonel baron le Jeune, mon A. D. C. -de partir sur le champ en poste pour porter les ordres ci-joints et -parcourir l’Andalousie et l’Estramadure. - -Monsieur le colonel le Jeune se rendra d’abord à Grenade auprès de -Monsieur le général Sebastiani, commandant du 4^{me} corps d’armée, -et il lui remettra les ordres qui le concernent. - -De Grenade, Monsieur le Jeune se rendra par Séville devant Cadiz, et -verra par lui-même la situation des choses, afin de pouvoir à son -retour en rendre un compte détaillé à l’Empereur. Monsieur le Jeune -remettra à Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie, les dépêches qui -lui sont destinées, soit à Séville, soit à Cadiz, soit partout où -il sera. Il se rendra ensuite au 5^{me} corps d’armée commandé par -Monsieur le maréchal duc de Trévise en Estremadure: le corps doit -être à Badajos, ou même sur le Tage. - -Monsieur le Jeune prendra une connaissance exacte de sa position, et -de celle des troupes de l’armée du centre commandée par le général ----- qui sont réunies sur le Tage. Il verra si ces corps sont en -communication avec l’armée de Portugal, et recueillera les nouvelles -que l’on pourrait avoir de cette armée de ce côté. - -Monsieur le Jeune prendra tous les renseignemens nécessaires pour -pouvoir réprondre à toutes les questions de l’Empereur, sur la -situation des choses en Andalousie, devant Cadiz, et en Estremadure, -d’où il viendra me rendre compte de sa mission. - - LE PRINCE DE WAGRAM ET DE NEUFCHATEL, - Major-général. - -_Paris, le 14 Février, 1811._ - - -SECTION 6. - -_Extracts from Lejeune’s reports._ - -CADIZ. - -“Montagnes de Ronda foyer d’insurrection entre le 4^{me} corps et le -premier.” - -“Les obusiers à la villantrois portent à 2560 toises: l’obus doit -peser 75 livres, et contient 11 à 12 onces de poudre: on charge -l’obusier à poudre d’un ⅓ du poids de l’obus pour obtenir cette -distance. Il n’y en a que le 4 en batterie: à la redoute Napoleon on -en a 12 en fondus: mais il manque de projectilles et de la poudre en -suffisante quantité. Toutes les obus n’éclatent pas en ville.” - -“Le pont de St. Pestri a été traversé le jour de l’affaire par un -sergent du 24^{me} qui est revenu avec les Espagnols que l’on a pris. -Le moment eut été favorable pour s’emparer de l’Isle.” - -“Le duc de Bellune bien ennuyé, désire beaucoup retourner: bon -général mais voyant les choses trop en noir.” - - -SECTION 7. - - _Puerto Real, 20 Mars, 1811._ - - MON CHER GENERAL, - -Enfin après 15 jours des plus cruelles souffrances je me trouve en -état de reprendre la plume et de continuer le réçit que j’ai eu -l’honneur de vous adresser dans ma lettre du 6 au 7 de ce mois. - -L’une des choses qui mérite d’abord de fixer votre attention, est la -composition de cette armée combinée dont nous avons été tout-à-coup -assaillis. J’ai déjà dit que le 26 Février une flotte de 180 voiles -était sortie de Cadiz portant 1500 hommes de débarquement, et que -de ce nombre étaient environ 4000 Anglais et 1000 Portugais. Cette -flotte se dirigea vers Tarifa où le débarquement se fit le lendemain -sans aucun accident. Il parait que les Anglais en réunissant les -garnisons d’Algéciras et de Gibraltar à quelques restes de troupes -venues récemment de Sicile, avaient déjà formé à Tarifa un petit -corps de 1000 Anglais et de 2000 Portugais commandé par le général -Stuart, et qui forma avec 2 ou 300 hommes de cavalerie, l’avant garde -de l’expédition dirigée contre nous. Cette armée ainsi composée de -10 à 12,000 Espagnols bien ou mal équipés, de 4 à 5000 Anglais et -de 3000 Portugais se mit enfin en campagne, et vint nous attaquer -le 5. Il parait que Monsieur le maréchal Victor ne fut instruit que -tard de la vraie direction prise par l’armée ennemie. Il arriva à -Chiclana le 5 entre 8 et 9 heures du matin, suivi des bataillons de -la 1^e et 2^{de} division: le plan d’opérations auquel il s’arrêta -fut d’envoyer sur le champ la division Villate avec un régiment de -cavalerie aux lignes de St. Petri, avec ordre de laisser arriver -l’ennemi, de lui résister foiblement pour l’engager à suivre notre -mouvement de retraite et de l’attirer ainsi sous la position St. -Anne, où il ne pouvait manquer de se trouver dans une situation -extrêmement desavantageuse. Pendant cette manœuvre Monsieur le -maréchal Victor s’était lui-même porté avec la 1^{re} et 2^{de} -division entre Conil et St. Petri, à peu près à la hauteur de la -Torre Barrosa avec l’intention de couper à l’ennemi la retraite des -montagnes. Là, rencontrant la queue de l’armée, qui finissait de -se filer, il la fit attaquer vigoureusement, culbuta tout ce qui -se rencontra devant lui et accula les Espagnols à la mer, mais les -Anglais que cette manœuvre hardie mettaient entre deux feux, et -dans l’impossibilité de regagner Conil, revinrent sur leurs pas, et -attaquant avec la rage du désespoir, ils forcèrent à la retraite nos -deux divisions, qui ne formaient pas ensemble 5000 hommes. - -Cependant Monsieur le maréchal Victor se croyait si sur de la -victoire qu’avant d’attaquer il envoya ordre aux troupes qui étaient -à Médina, de se porter entre Veger et Conil, pour ramasser le reste -des trainards; les bagages, et les trains de munitions qu’ils -pouvaient rencontrer. - -Le projet d’attirer l’ennemi sur le feu de St. Anne n’avait pas mieux -réussi du côté de la division Villatte; car si cette division fut -d’abord assaillie par presque toute l’armée combinée, les généraux -Anglais et Espagnols, avertis de bonne heure que Monsieur le maréchal -les tournaient avec un corps de troupes, arrêterent leurs colonnes -sur la rive gauche du ruisseau qui touche au Moulin d’Almanza, et -là, naturellement retranchés derrière ce marais, ils n’eurent à -garder que le pont et le Moulin, les seuls endroits par lesquels on -pouvait les attaquer. Quelque chose de plus malheureux, fut, que des -le commencement de l’action, nos lignes de St. Petri, n’étant pas -défendues, il sortit par le pont de Radeaux 5000 hommes de troupes -fraiches de la Isla, lesquels se plaçant en bataille devant la -division Villatte, et couverts par le ruisseau du Moulin d’Almanza -laissèrent au reste de l’armée combinée la liberté de se retourner -tout entière contre l’attaque de Monsieur le maréchal Victor. Ainsi -se termina la battaille du 5, l’ennemi coucha sur son champ de -battaille, sans poursuivre les divisions Laval et Rufin dans leur -retraite. Je vous ai déjà fait part de notre perte. Le général Rufin -que nous croyons tué par une balle, qui lui a traversé la tête, a été -porté par les Anglais à la Isla, où après deux jours de léthargie, il -a donné signes de vie; on dit qu’il va mieux. - -La perte de l’ennemi a été à peu près de 3000 Anglais ou Portugais, -et de 5 à 600 Espagnols, tués ou blessés; les Anglais ont eu beaucoup -des officiers mis hors de combat, on croit les généraux _Grâm_ et -Stuart ainsi que le général Peña blessés. Le 6 à la pointe du jour -nous nous attendions bien à une attaque générale qui pouvait nous -être très funeste; mais l’ennemi se contenta d’occuper avec 2000 -hommes, le fort de Médina, que nous avions un peu imprudemment -abandonnés; la flotille ennemie fit aussi des démonstrations -d’attaque sur le Trocadero, mais sans effet. Elle débarqua 6 à 700 -hommes entre le Port de St. Marie, et le fort St. Cataline, qui -fût sommé de se rendre; on répondit à coups de canons. Un officier -Anglais vint chez le gouverneur de St. Marie le prévenir qu’il allait -prendre possession de la ville, mais il avait laissé ses troupes à la -porte. Elles courent faire une action d’éclat en brulant et réduisant -la petite redoute St. Antoine, qui n’était point gardée; enchantés -de ce succès ils se rembarquèrent. M. le maréchal s’attendait bien -à être attaqués le 6 à Chiclana, il avait donné des ordres en -conséquence, ces ordres furent mal interprétés, et on endommagea -mal-à-propos dans la nuit quelques uns de nos ouvrages, mais ils -furent sur le champ réparés. Lui-même était venu à Puerto Réal avec -la division Laval, et avait envoyé la 1^{re} division à St. Marie -pour reprendre la ligne de Blocus comme avant la bataille du 5. Le -5^{me} regiment de chasseurs fut envoyé entre Puerto Real et Médina -à la ferme de Guerra en reconnaissance; il y rencontra une poste de -cavalerie ennemie, et la tailla en pièces. Le 6 au soir, on essaya -de reprendre le fort de Médina, mais sans succès. Le 7 il fallut y -envoyer plus de monde, et les Espagnols l’évacuèrent sans opposer de -résistance. - -Dans la nuit du 5 les Espagnols avaient rasés nos lignes de St. -Petri, ils employèrent pendant plusieurs jours et plusieurs nuits -6000 hommes, à transporter à la Isla, du bois, dont ils manquaient, -quelques jours après, nous avons fait cesser ces approvisionnements, -en reprenant la position de St. Petri, où on ne trouva personne; -les Espagnols craignant une répétition de l’affaire du 2 Mars, ont -détruits eux-même de fort bonne grace leur tête de pont, et replié -leur pont de Radeaux, des ce moment chacun resta chez soi, comme -avant les hostilités. - - - _Du 21 Mars, 1811._ - -Il est surprenant que l’armée combinée ne nous ait pas poursuivis le -5, bien plus surprenant encore qu’elle ne nous ait point attaqués le -6 au matin; on en conçoit plusieurs raisons. On conjecture d’abord -que la principale perte de la bataille étant tombée sur les Anglais, -qui ont eu un grand nombre d’officiers et même leurs généraux -mis hors de combat, les Espagnols n’ont pas osé venir seuls nous -attaquer. Le général _Grâm_ voulait cependant les y contraindre le -lendemain, mais sur leur refus formel, il les a traité de lâches, -de gens indignes d’être secourus. Ils ont répondu qu’ils feraient -une sortie de la Isla si l’on voulait mettre le tiers d’Anglais -ou Portugais avec les deux tiers d’Espagnols, le général Anglais -a répondu qu’il n’exposerait plus un seul de ses soldats avec des -troupes de cette espèce, et sur le champ il a donné ordre aux Anglais -et Portugais de se retirer. - -A Cadiz ou dans la ville de la Isla. Il parait même que le lendemain -les Anglais se sont embarqués pour se rendre à Gibraltar ou peut-être -à Lisbonne. Les gens du pays donnent pour certain que le général -_Grâm_, en envoyant ces jours derniers à Londres trente-trois -officiers des moins blessés, n’a pas dissimulé qu’il les chargeaint -d’exposer à son gouvernement quelle folie il y avait de sacrifier -de braves gens pour soutenir en Espagne un parti sans moyens, sans -bravoure et sans moralité. Si ce qui précède n’est pas vrai, au moins -sommes nous certains qu’une grande mésintelligence règne entre les -Espagnols et leurs alliés. Le 20, les Espagnols ont encore essayé -une sortie de la Carraca mais sans succès; ils s’y prennent un peu -tard. Nous sommes à présent très à mesure pour les recevoir. Ils font -semblant d’embarquer continuellement des troupes qui n’agissent pas -et qui ne peuvent plus nous nuire. Il est arrivé à Médina quelques -bataillons du 4^{me} corps, deux bataillons du soixante-trois sont -aussi venus de Séville. Nous apprenons avec la prise de Badajos, que -M. le maréchal Soult est à Séville. La blessure de M. le commandant -Bompar et les miennes vont un peu mieux. - - LEGENTIL. - -Excusez les imperfections de cette longue lettre, j’écris de mon lit, -dans une posture gênante. - -_Monsieur le général de division Lery, à Séville._ - - -SECTION 8. - -_Extracts from the intercepted report of general Garbé, commanding -the French engineers, at the Blockade of Cadiz._ - - _25 Mars, 1811._ - -“On avait apperçu le 26 de Février au matin un grand convoi partant -de la baye de Cadiz, pour se diriger sur Tarifa. Ce convoi portait -à peu près 6 ou 7000 hommes des troupes de débarquement, qui allait -joindre celles qui étaient déjà réunies sur la Barbate et dans les -environs de l’Alcala de los Gazules. Le 2 Mars à la pointe du jour, -l’ennemi commença son opération sur Caza Vieja, qui fut évacué, et en -même temps, il effectua vers l’embouchure de St. Petri, un passage -pour faciliter l’établissement d’un pont de radeaux et d’une tête de -pont. Il fit aussi débarquer des troupes dans l’Isletta del Coto, et -s’occupa d’y établir deux batteries. Le 3, on fit marcher la division -du général Rufin, qui prit position à moitié chemin de Puerto Real à -Médina Sidonia. Celle du général Laval, s’établit en avant de Puerto -Real, et le général Vilatte garda ses positions auprès de Chiclana. -Ce jour on n’apperçut aucun mouvement de l’ennemi. Tous les ouvrages -de la ligne étaient gardes par les garnisons qu’on avait désignées -auparavant. Santa Marie fut évacué et le pont replié sur la rive -gauche. - -“Puerto Real était défendu par une compagnie de sapeurs, deux du -45^{me} régiment, et par tous les réfugiés Français qu’on avoit armés. - -“Le 4 Monsieur le maréchal fit attaquer à la pointe du jour l’ennemi -dans sa tête de pont de Santi Petri. Cette attaque se fit par 4 -compagnies du 95^{me} régiment qui s’emparèrent de l’ouvrage, firent -prisonniers 500 hommes, et enlevèrent un drapeau. Il est certain que -si on eut employé dans cette opération 2 ou 3000 hommes on enlevait -le pont et l’Isle de Léon. L’ennemi fut si disconcerté qu’il avait -abandonné ses batteries et ses ouvrages fermés. Un pareil résultat -paraissait être d’un très bon augure pour les grandes opérations. On -fit partir le même jour de Médina une reconnaissance sur Casa Vieja. -On reçut avis dans la nuit que cette reconnaissance n’avait rencontré -personne, et que les colonnes ennemies se dirigeant sur Conil, le -mouvement ne pouvait avoir pour but que d’opérer la jonction de ce -corps d’armée, avec celui qui était resté dans l’île. Le 5, avant -le jour, on se mit en marche de la position qu’on occupait à moitié -chemin de Médina pour se porter sur Chiclana. Arrivé dans cet -endroit, Monsieur le maréchal donna l’ordre au général Villatte de -rassembler toute sa division vers les flèches de St. Petri, pour y -maintenir l’ennemi qui y paraissait en force, pendant qu’il dirigeait -sur la route de Conil, les divisions de Laval et Rufin, et le peu -de cavalerie qu’il avait avec lui. Il se porta de ce côté, et ne -tarda pas à rencontrer une forte colonne, qui marchait le long de -la mer entre St. Petri et Conil, et se dirigeait sur le premier de -ses endroits. Les troupes arrivées à portée de canon se formèrent. -Le général Rufin prit la gauche pour aller occuper un mamelon où -l’ennemi paraissait s’établir. Quand les deux divisions furent -formées, elle se trouvèrent en présence d’une armée, beaucoup plus -nombreuse qu’on ne l’avait cru d’abord. L’artillerie n’était pas -encore arrivée, et celle de l’ennemi commençait à jour de toute -parts. Le général Vilatte n’avait pu garder les flèches de St. Petri, -qui étaient au moment d’être prises, n’étant alors défendues que par -un seul bataillon du 27^{me} d’infantrie légère. - -“Cette division fut obligée de se replier et de repasser le ravin -dans lequel roulent les eaux du Moulin d’Almanza. Ce mouvement -empêcha le général Vilatte de se réunir aux deux autres divisions, -qui n’ayant en tout que dix bataillons, essuyaient un feu terrible de -la part de l’ennemi. Nos pertes devenaient d’autant plus sensible que -le nombre des combattans n’était que le tiers de celui de l’ennemi. -Des corps entiers se trouvaient accablés avant qu’on eut pu entamer -la ligne des Anglais. Il n’y avait point de réserve. Le deux mille -hommes de Médina Sidonia étaient en marche pour Conil. Il fallut -penser à la retraite qui se fit en bon ordre, jusque sur les hauteurs -en avant de Chiclana, où l’on fit camper une division pendant la -nuit. Les Anglais firent leur jonction avec les troupes de l’île -de Léon, et les Espagnols continuèrent d’occuper notre position du -Moulin d’Almanza et de St Petri. Si l’ennemi voulant continuer ses -opérations offensives dans la journée du 6, se fut présenté de bonne -heure, il est probable que dans la situation où nous nous trouvions -après la journée du 5 nous étions obligés d’évacuer le terrain -jusqu’à Puerto Réal, où on aurait pris la position dont j’ai parlé -plus haut, pour y livrer une seconde bataille, mais les opérations -ont manqué d’ensemble. Il s’est contenté de rentrer dans l’île et -pendant ce temps un très petit corps de troupes Anglaises opéraient -un débarquement entre St. Marie, et la pointe de St. Catherine, -qui n’eut d’autre résultat que d’enlever une batterie défendue par -quinze hommes et de se promener une ou deux heures dans les rues de -St. Marie. Monsieur le maréchal ne voyait aucun mouvement offensif, -ordonna de rétablir les grandes communications par St. Marie, chacun -rentra dans ses portes et cette mesure produisit beaucoup plus -d’effet, sur l’armée et les habitans du Pays, que les dispositions -qu’on auraient pu prendre.” - - * * * * * - - -No. X. - -EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF CAPTAIN SQUIRES, OF THE ENGINEERS. - - -SECTION 1. - - “_March 1, 1811._ - -“I have been employed in constructing batteries, opposite the mouth -of the Zezere, for twenty-five guns! though we have only one brigade -of nine pounders to arm them. - -“Thank God, for my own credit, I protested against these batteries -from the first, in my reports which were sent to lord Wellington, -and now I verily believe the marshal himself is ashamed of their -construction. Punhete, you know, is situated precisely at the -confluence of the Zezere with the Tagus, the enemy’s bridge is -about half a mile from the mouth of the river, and one mile, by -measurement, from the nearest of our heights, which we have crowned -with an eight-gun battery.” - - -SECTION 2. - -“I was truly sorry to hear that the Spaniards were so thoroughly -routed near Badajos, but Mendizabel was an idiot. On the 18th -February, the enemy threw a bridge over the Guadiana, above Badajos. -Don Carlos España, an active officer, whom I know very well, -reconnoitred the bridge, and made his report to Mendizabel, who was -playing at cards. Very well, said the chief, we’ll go and look at it -to-morrow! At day-break the Spanish army was surprised.” - - -SECTION 3. - -“May 17, 1811. I reconnoitred the ground in front of Cristoval, and -was pressed, by Colonel Fletcher, who was on the other side of the -Guadiana, to commence our operations that evening. The soil was hard -and rocky, and our tools infamous. I made, however, no difficulties, -and we began our battery on the night of the 8th, the moon being at -the full: our work was barely four hundred yards from Cristoval. In -spite, however, of a most destructive fire of musketry, and shot, and -shells, from various parts of the body of the place, we succeeded in -completing our battery on the night of the 10th; and, on the morning -of the 11th, at four, a. m. its fire was opened. The enemy’s fire -was, however, very superior to our own; and, before sunset, the -three guns and one howitzer were disabled, for against our little -attack was the whole attention of the enemy directed. On the other -side of the river the intended attack had not yet been begun, and we -sustained the almost undivided fire of Badajos! I told the marshal, -when I saw him on the 11th, that to continue to fight our battery was -a positive sacrifice; he did not, however, order us to desist until -our guns were silenced. If doubt and indecision had not governed all -our operations, and had we begun even on the night of the 9th, I am -satisfied that our plan of attack was excellent, and that we should -have entered the place on the 15th. It is true that two distant -batteries were erected, on the left bank of the river, against the -place, but they scarcely excited the enemy’s attention; our little -corps bore the brunt of the enemy’s exertions, which were great and -spirited. Including those who fell in the sortie, our loss has been -from six to seven hundred men. Both officers and men were exhausted, -mind and body; they felt and saw that they were absurdly sacrificed.” - - * * * * * - - -No. XI. - -EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL CAMPBELL TO LORD LIVERPOOL. - - “_Gibraltar, October 23, 1810._ - -“The troops at Malaga, with the exception of three hundred men, moved -upon Fuengirola, of which lord Blayney was apprised; but, in place -of his lordship taking advantage of this fortunate event, he wasted -two days in a fruitless attack on the fort of Fuengirola, cannonading -it from twelve-pounders, although he perceived that no impression -had been made on it by the fire of the shipping and gun-boats, the -artillery of which were double the calibre. In this situation he was -surprised by an inferior force, and, whilst he was on board of a -gun-boat, his guns taken and the whole thrown into confusion; at this -moment he was informed of the disaster, and, so far to his credit, he -retook his guns, but, immediately after, conceiving a body of French -cavalry to be Spaniards, he ordered the firing to cease, when he was -surrounded and made prisoner; his men, losing confidence, gave way, -and, hurrying to the beach, relinquished their honour and the field.” - - -END OF VOL. III. - - -LONDON: - -PRINTED BY W. MARCHANT, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] Lord Stuart de Rothesay. - -[2] First aide-de-camp to marshal Massena. - -[3] Admiral sir Edward Codrington. - -[4] Lord Lynedoch. - -[5] Lieut.-gov. of Gibraltar. - -[6] Governor of Almeida. - -[7] Dupont’s proceedings at Cordoba, as related in my first volume, -have been commented upon in a recent publication, entitled “_Annals -of the Peninsular Campaigns_.” - -Upon the authority of general Foy, the author asserts that Cordoba -was sacked, calls it “_a gratuitous atrocity_,” and “_an inhuman -butchery_” and no doubt, taking for fiction the stories of -Agathocles, Marius, Sylla, and a thousand others, gravely affirms, -that, _capacity and cruelty are rarely united_; that _Dupont was a -fool_, and that _Napoleon did not poison him in a dungeon_, but that -he must have “_dragged on a miserable existence exposed to universal -scorn and hatred_.” - -Unfortunately for the application of this nursery philosophy, Dupont, -although a bad officer, was a man of acknowledged talents, and became -minister of war at the restoration of the Bourbons, a period fixed -by the author of “_the Annals_,” _as the era of good government in -France_. But I rejected Foy’s authority, 1st, because his work, -unfinished and posthumous, discovered more of the orator than the -impartial historian, and he was politically opposed to Dupont. -Secondly, because he was not an eye witness, and his relation at -variance with the “_official journal of Dupont’s operations_” was -also contradicted by the testimony of a _British general of known -talents and accuracy, who obtained his information on the spot a few -months subsequent to the event_. - -“Some time after the victory, _order was restored, pillage was -forbidden under pain of death, and the chosen companies maintained -the police_.”--Journal of Operations. - -_Cordoba was not pillaged_, being one of the few places where the -_French were well received_.--Letters from a British general to -colonel Napier. - -On this point, therefore, I am clear; but the author of the -“_Annals_,” after contrasting my account with Foy’s, thus proceeds, -“It is only necessary to add, that the preceding statement is given -by colonel Napier _without any quotation of authority_.” - -A less concise writer might have thought it right to add that, _six -months_ previous to the publication of the _Annals_, colonel Napier, -hearing that some of his statements appeared inconclusive to the -author of that work, _because there was no quotation of authority_, -transmitted through a mutual friend, an assurance that he had -authority for every _statement_, and that he would willingly _furnish -the author with any or all of them_: no notice was taken of this -offer! - -[8] An interesting account of this noble-minded woman, is to be found -in a small volume, entitled, “_Sketches of a Soldier’s Life, in -Ireland_,” by the author of “_The Eventful Life of a Soldier_.” This -last work was erroneously designated, in my first volume, as “_The -Life of a Sergeant_.” - -[9] [Note in Napoleon’s own hand.] On ne doit pas oublier qu’en -approchant de France tout favourise la desertion. - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - Footnote [9] is referenced twice from page 563. - - Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been - corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within - the text and consultation of external sources. - - Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added, - when a predominant preference was found in the original book. - - To save space in the wide tables in Note I of the Appendix, the - headings ‘Hospital.’ and ‘Cavalry.’ have been abbreviated to - ‘Hosp.’ and ‘Cav.’. - - The original table in Note I, section 7, was quite wide and has been - split into two parts. The original table in Note IX, section 4, was - very wide and has been split into three parts. - - In those sections of the Appendix that are French documents, some - corrections to accents have been made silently; primarily é for e, - and e for é. Incorrect grammar and spelling has been left unchanged. - - Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, - and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained. - - Table of Contents: - Pg v: ‘Captain Hollowell’ replaced by ‘Captain Hallowell’. - Pg x: ‘maratime operations’ replaced by ‘maritime operations’. - Pg xii: ‘retreats to Lerena’ replaced by ‘retreats to Llerena’. - - Main text: - Pg 3: ‘Pyrennean vallies’ replaced by ‘Pyrennean valleys’. - Pg 3: ‘into the vallies’ replaced by ‘into the valleys’. - Pg 5: ‘Nuesta Senora’ replaced by ‘Nuestra Senora’. - Pg 11: ‘the commucations of’ replaced by ‘the communications of’. - Pg 13: ‘being unqual to’ replaced by ‘being unequal to’. - Pg 14: ‘very essense of’ replaced by ‘very essence of’. - Pg 18: ‘on the ocsion’ replaced by ‘on the occasion’. - Pg 21: ‘occupied by Coupigny’ replaced by ‘occupied by Conpigny’. - Pg 33: ‘calamity befal’ replaced by ‘calamity befall’. - Pg 47: ‘was betowed with’ replaced by ‘was bestowed with’. - Pg 54: ‘and carelesssly’ replaced by ‘and carelessly’. - Pg 61 (Sidenote): ‘Wellesly’ replaced by ‘Wellesley’. - Pg 63: ‘the Portugese’ replaced by ‘the Portuguese’. - Pg 64 (Sidenote): ‘Wellesly’ replaced by ‘Wellesley’. - Pg 73: ‘subborn resistance’ replaced by ‘stubborn resistance’. - Pg 86: ‘from Aranjues to’ replaced by ‘from Aranjuez to’. - Pg 92: ‘whose procedings’ replaced by ‘whose proceedings’. - Pg 96: ‘at Yevenes and’ replaced by ‘at Yebenes and’. - Pg 125: ‘war of invavasion’ replaced by ‘war of invasion’. - Pg 138: ‘evacuted the town’ replaced by ‘evacuated the town’. - Pg 139: ‘to recal them’ replaced by ‘to recall them’. - Pg 143 (Sidenote): ‘des Française’ replaced by ‘des Français’. - Pg 174: ‘Toccadero creek’ replaced by ‘Troccadero creek’. - Pg 179: ‘soldiers, and and a’ replaced by ‘soldiers, and a’. - Pg 197: ‘from about Lerena’ replaced by ‘from about Llerena’. - Pg 237: ‘required extrordinary’ replaced by ‘required extraordinary’. - Pg 237: ‘merely a a conqueror’ replaced by ‘merely a conqueror’. - Pg 242: ‘dictinct lines’ replaced by ‘distinct lines’. - Pg 243: ‘Gallicia and Asturia’ replaced by ‘Gallicia and Asturias’. - Pg 247: ‘in misrepresentions’ replaced by ‘in misrepresentations’. - Pg 261: ‘having Silviera and’ replaced by ‘having Silveira and’. - Pg 280: ‘secorrer esta plaza’ replaced by ‘socorrer esta plaza’. - Pg 304 (Sidenote): ‘Cox’s Narative’ replaced by ‘Cox’s Narrative’. - Pg 307: ‘lost a quadron’ replaced by ‘lost a squadron’. - Pg 331: ‘Portuguese caçadore’ replaced by ‘Portuguese caçadores’. - Pg 356: ‘3º. From Bucellas’ replaced by ‘4º. From Bucellas’. - Pg 359: ‘Massena, suprised’ replaced by ‘Massena, surprised’. - Pg 366: ‘own governmennt’ replaced by ‘own government’. - Pg 380: ‘Frenchmen run to’ replaced by ‘Frenchmen ran to’. - Pg 380: ‘with the assistace’ replaced by ‘with the assistance’. - Pg 396: ‘when Bacellar brought’ replaced by ‘when Baccellar brought’. - Pg 414: ‘Moguer and Heulva’ replaced by ‘Moguer and Huelva’. - Pg 454: ‘the posisition of’ replaced by ‘the position of’. - Pg 464: ‘the abler tactitian’ replaced by ‘the abler tactician’. - Pg 473: ‘from distruction’ replaced by ‘from destruction’. - Pg 485: ‘immediately run out’ replaced by ‘immediately ran out’. - Pg 514: ‘seventh divison’ replaced by ‘seventh division’. - Pg 583: ‘de St. Fernado’ replaced by ‘de St. Fernando’. - Pg 588: ‘wish to emove’ replaced by ‘wish to remove’. - - Appendix: - Pg 608 Note VII: missing heading ‘SECTION 2.’ inserted before - ‘Extrait du Journal du C. de B. Pelet’. - Pg 615 Note VII: ‘SECTION IX’ replaced by ‘SECTION 9’. - Pg 621 Note VII: ‘SECTION XVIII’ replaced by ‘SECTION 18’. - Pg 621 Note VII: ‘SECTION XIX’ replaced by ‘SECTION 19’. - Pg 622 Note VII: ‘SECTION XX’ replaced by ‘SECTION 20’. - Pg 628 Note IX: ‘SECTION II’ replaced by ‘SECTION 2’. - Pg 628 Note IX: ‘Brigadier-gen. Dilkes’ replaced by - ‘Brigadier-gen. Dilke’. - Pg 629 Note IX: ‘SECTION III’ replaced by ‘SECTION 3’. - Pg 635 Note IX: ‘SECTION 7’ replaced by ‘SECTION 8’. - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE -PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR -1814, VOL. 3 OF 6 *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. 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- text-align: center; - page-break-inside: avoid; - max-width: 100%;} - - -/* Footnotes */ -.footnotes {border: dashed 1px; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 3em; - padding-bottom: 1em;} - -.footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 90%;} -.footnote p {text-indent: 0em;} -.footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} - -.fnanchor { - vertical-align: super; - font-size: .8em; - text-decoration: none; -} - - -/* Transcriber's notes */ -.transnote {background-color: #E6E6FA; - color: black; - font-size:smaller; - padding:0.5em; - margin-bottom:5em; - font-family:sans-serif, serif; } - -.transnote p {text-indent: 0em;} - - -/* custom cover (cover.jpg) */ -.customcover {visibility: hidden; display: none;} -.x-ebookmaker .customcover {visibility: visible; display: block;} - -/* Illustration classes */ -.illowp70 {width: 70%;} - - /* ]]> */ </style> - </head> - -<body> -<p style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, vol. 3 of 6, by William Francis Patrick Napier</p> -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online -at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you -are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this eBook. -</div> - -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, vol. 3 of 6</p> -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: William Francis Patrick Napier</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: May 27, 2022 [eBook #68187]</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</p> - <p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em; text-align:left'>Produced by: Brian Coe, John Campbell and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)</p> -<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814, VOL. 3 OF 6 ***</div> - - -<div class="transnote"> -<p><strong>TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE</strong></p> - -<p>Omitted text is indicated by four asterisks, * * * *.</p> - -<p>All changes noted in the <a href="#ERRATA">ERRATA</a> have been applied to the etext. -The changes are indicated by a <span class="err">blue dashed line</span>.</p> - -<p>Footnote anchors are denoted by <span class="fnanchor">[number]</span>, and the footnotes have been -placed at the end of the book.</p> - -<p>Several Sidenotes have the abbreviation S. As in other volumes, this -stands for Soult.</p> - -<p>With a few exceptions noted at the end of the book, variant spellings -of names have not been changed.</p> - -<p>Minor changes to the text are noted at the <a href="#TN">end of the book</a>. -They are indicated by a <span class="corr">grey dotted line</span>.</p> - -<p class="customcover">The cover image was created by the transcriber -and is placed in the public domain.</p> - -<p><br />Volume 1 of this series can be found at<br /> -<span class="pad4"><a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67318">https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67318</a></span><br /> -Volume 2 of this series can be found at<br /> -<span class="pad4"><a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67554">https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67554</a></span></p> -</div> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> - -<h1> -<span class="lsp2 bold">HISTORY</span><br /> -<span class="fs50">OF THE</span><br /> -<span class="fs120">WAR IN THE PENINSULA</span></h1> -</div> - -<p class="p2 pfs80">AND IN THE</p> - -<p class="p2 pfs135">SOUTH OF FRANCE,</p> - -<p class="p2 pfs100">FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814.</p> - -<p class="p3 pfs70">BY</p> - -<p class="pfs135">W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B.</p> - -<p class="pfs70 lht2">COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, AND MEMBER OF<br /> -THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF MILITARY<br /> -SCIENCES.</p> - -<p class="p2 pfs120">VOL. III.</p> - -<p class="p3 pfs120">LONDON:</p> -<p class="pfs100">THOMAS & WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-STREET.</p> - -<hr class="r10a" /> - -<p class="pfs70 lsp">MDCCCXXXI.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_v"></a>[Pg v]</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="TABLE_OF_CONTENTS">TABLE OF CONTENTS.</h2> -</div> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<table class="autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs150" colspan="2">BOOK IX.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER I.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Inactivity of the Asturians and Gallicians—Guerilla system in Navarre and Aragon—The - Partidas surround the third corps—Blake abandons Aragon—Suchet’s operations against the - Partidas—Combat of Tremendal—The advantages of Suchet’s position—Troubles at - Pampeluna—Suchet ordered by Napoleon to repair there—Observations on the Guerilla system</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_1"><em>Page</em> 1</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER II.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Continuation of the operations in Catalonia—St. Cyr sends Lecchi to the Ampurdan; he returns with - the intelligence of the Austrian war—Of Verdier’s arrival in the Ampurdan, and of Augereau’s - appointment to the command of the seventh corps—Augereau’s inflated proclamation—It is torn - down by the Catalonians—He remains sick at Perpignan—St. Cyr continues to command—Refuses - to obey Joseph’s orders to remove into Aragon—Presses Verdier to commence the siege of Gerona—Reinforces - Verdier—Remains himself at Vich—Constancy of the Spaniards—St. Cyr marches from Vich, defeats - three Spanish battalions, and captures a convoy—Storms St. Felieu de Quixols—Takes a position to cover - Verdier’s operations—Siege of Gerona—State of the contending parties—Assault of Monjouic - fails—General Fontanes storms Palamos—Wimphen and the Milans make a vain attempt to throw succours - into Gerona—Monjouic abandoned</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_17">17</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER III.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Claros and Rovira attack Bascara and spread dismay along the French frontier—Two Spanish officers pass the - Ter and enter Gerona with succours—Alvarez remonstrates with the junta of Catalonia—Bad conduct of the - latter—Blake advances to the aid of the city—Pestilence there affects the French army—St. Cyr’s - firmness—Blake’s timid operations—O’Donnel fights Souham, but without success—St. Cyr takes a - position of battle—Garcia Conde forces the French lines and introduces a convoy into Gerona—Blake - retires—Siege resumed—Garcia Conde comes out of the city—Ridiculous error of the French—Conde - forces the French lines and escapes—Assault on Gerona fails—Blake advances a second time—Sends - another convoy under the command of O’Donnel to the city—O’Donnel with the head of the convoy succeeds, the - remainder is cut off—Blake’s incapacity—He retires—St. Cyr goes to Perpignan—Augereau takes - the command of the siege—O’Donnel breaks through the French lines—Blake advances a third time—Is - beaten by Souham—Pino takes Hostalrich—Admiral Martin intercepts a French squadron—<ins class="corr" id="tn-v" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Captain Hollowell'"> - Captain Hallowell</ins> - destroys a convoy in Rosas-bay—Distress in Gerona—Alvarez is seized with delirium, and the city - surrenders—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_31">31</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td>  <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vi"></a>[vi]</span></td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER IV.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Plot at Seville against the Supreme Junta defeated by lord Wellesley—Junta propose a new form of - government—Opposed by Romana—Junta announce the convocation of the national Cortez, but endeavour to - deceive the people—A Spanish army assembled in the Morena under Eguia—Bassecour sends cavalry to - reinforce Del Parque, who concentrates the Spanish army of the left at Ciudad Rodrigo—He is joined by the - Gallician divisions—Santocildes occupies Astorga—French endeavour to surprise him, but are - repulsed—Ballasteros quits the Asturias and marching by Astorga attempts to storm Zamora—Enters - Portugal—Del Parque demands the aid of the Portuguese army—Sir A. Wellesley refuses, giving his reason - in detail—Del Parque’s operations—Battle of Tamames—Del Parque occupies Salamanca, but hearing - that French troops were assembling at Valladolid retires to Bejar</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_55">55</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER V.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Areizaga takes the command of Equia’s army and is ordered to advance against Madrid—Folly of the Supreme - Junta—Operations in La Mancha—Combat of Dos Barrios—Cavalry combat of Ocaña—Battle of - Ocaña—Destruction of the Spanish army</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_67">67</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER VI.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">King Joseph’s return to Madrid—Del Parque’s operations—Battle of Alba de Tormes—Dispersion of - the Spanish troops—Their great sufferings and patience—The Supreme Junta treat sir A. Wellesley’s - counsels with contempt—He breaks up from the Guadiana and moves to the Mondego—Vindication of his - conduct for having remained so long on the Guadiana—French remain torpid about Madrid—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_86">86</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs150" colspan="2">BOOK X.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER I.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Joseph prepares to invade Andalusia—Distracted state of affairs in that province—Military position and - resources described—Invasion of Andalusia—Passes of the Morena forced by the French—Foolish deceit - of the Supreme Junta—Tumult in Seville—Supreme Junta dissolved—Junta of Seville re-assembles, but - disperses immediately after—The French take Jaen—Sebastiani enters Grenada—King Joseph enters - Cordoba and afterwards marches against Seville—Albuquerque’s march to Cadiz—Seville surrenders—Insurrection - at Malaga put down by Sebastiani—Victor invests Cadiz—Faction in that city—Mortier marches against - Badajos—The visconde de Gand flies to Ayamonte—Inhospitable conduct of the bishop of Algarve</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_101">101</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER II.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Operations in Navarre, Aragon, and Valencia—Pursuit of the student Mina—Suchet’s preparations—His - incursion against Valencia—Returns to Aragon—Difficulty of the war in Catalonia—Operations of the - seventh corps—French detachments surprised at Mollet and San Perpetua—Augereau enters Barcelona—Sends - Duhesme to France—Returns to Gerona—O’Donnel rallies the Spanish army near Centellas—Combat of - Vich—Spaniards make vain efforts to raise the blockade of Hostalrich—Augereau again advances to - Barcelona—Sends two divisions to Reus—Occupies Manreza and Villa Franca—French troops defeated at - <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vii"></a>[vii]</span> - Villa Franca and Esparaguera—Swartz abandons Manreza—Is defeated at Savadel—Colonel Villatte - communicates with the third corps by Falcet—Severolli retreats from Reus to Villa Franca—Is harassed on - the march—Augereau’s unskilful conduct—Hostalrich falls—Gallant exploit of the governor, Julian - Estrada—Cruelty of Augereau</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_124">124</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER III.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Suchet marches against Lerida—Description of that fortress—Suchet marches to Tarega—O’Donnel - advances from Taragona—Suchet returns to Balaguer—Combat of Margalef—Siege of Lerida—The - city stormed—Suchet drives the inhabitants into the citadel and thus forces it to surrender</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_144">144</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER IV.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Reflections on that act—Lazan enters Alcanitz, but is driven out by the French—Colonel Petit taken with - a convoy by Villa Campa, and assassinated after the action—Siege of Mequinenza—Fall of that - place—Morella taken—Suchet prepares to enter Catalonia—Strength and resources of that province</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_158">158</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER V.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Operations in Andalusia—Blockade of Cadiz—Dissentions in that city—Regency formed—Albuquerque - sent to England—Dies there—Regency consent to admit British troops—General Colin Campbell obtains - leave to put a garrison in Ceuta, and to destroy the Spanish lines at San Roque—General William Stewart arrives - at Cadiz—Seizes Matagorda—Tempest destroys many vessels—Mr. Henry Wellesley and general Graham - arrive at Cadiz—Apathy of the Spaniards—Gallant defence of Matagorda—Heroic conduct of a sergeant’s - wife—General Campbell sends a detachment to occupy Tarifa—French prisoners cut the cables of the - prison-hulks, and drift during a tempest—General Lacey’s expedition to the Ronda—His bad conduct—Returns - to Cadiz—Reflections on the state of affairs</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_169">169</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER VI.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Continuation of the operations in Andalusia—Description of the Spanish and Portuguese lines of position south - of the Tagus—Situation of the armies in Estremadura—Complex operations in that province—Soult’s - policy</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_188">188</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER VII.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Situation of the armies north of the Tagus—Operations in Old Castile and the Asturias—Ney menaces Ciudad - Rodrigo—Loison repulsed from Astorga—Kellerman chases Carrera from the Gata mountains—Obscurity of - the French projects—Siege of Astorga—Mahi driven into Gallicia—Spaniards defeated at Mombouey—Ney - concentrates the sixth corps at Salamanca—The ninth corps and the imperial guards enter Spain—Massena - assumes the command of the army of Portugal and of the northern provinces—Ney commences the first siege of Ciudad - Rodrigo—Julian Sanchez breaks out of the town—Massena arrives and alters the plan of attack—Daring - action of three French soldiers—Place surrenders—Andreas Herrasti—His fine conduct—Reflections - upon the Spanish character</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_201">201</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr><td>  <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_viii"></a>[viii]</span></td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs150" colspan="2">BOOK XI.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER I.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Lord Wellington’s policy—Change of administration in England—Duel between lord Castlereagh and Mr. - Canning—Lord Wellesley joins the new ministry—Debates in Parliament—Factious violence on both - sides—Lord Wellington’s sagacity and firmness vindicated—His views for the defence of Portugal—Ministers - accede to his demands—Grandeur of Napoleon’s designs against the Peninsula—Lord Wellington enters into - fresh explanation with the English ministers—Discusses the state of the war—Similarity of his views with - those of sir John Moore—His reasons for not advancing into Spain explained and vindicated</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_215">215</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER II.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Greatness of lord Wellington’s plans—Situation of the belligerents described—State of the French—Character - of Joseph—Of his Ministers—Disputes with the Marshals—Napoleon’s policy—Military - governments—Almenara sent to Paris—Curious deception executed by the marquis of Romana, Mr. Stuart, and - the historian Cabanes—Prodigious force of the French army—State of Spain—Inertness of Gallicia—Secret - plan of the Regency for encouraging the Guerillas—Operations of those bands—Injustice and absurdity of - the Regency, with respect to South America—England—State of parties—Factious injustice on both - sides—Difficulty of raising money—Bullion committee—Wm. Cobbett—Lord King—Mr. - Vansittart—Extravagance of the Ministers—State of Portugal—Parties in that country—Intrigues - of the Patriarch and the Souza’s—Mr. Stuart is appointed Plenipotentiary—His firmness—Princess - Carlotta claims the regency of the whole Peninsula, and the succession to the throne of Spain</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_234">234</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER III.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Lord Wellington’s scheme for the defence of Portugal—Vastness of his designs—Number of his - troops—Description of the country—Plan of defence analysed—Difficulty of supplying the - army—Resources of the belligerents compared—Character of the British soldier</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_254">254</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER IV.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Character of Miguel Alava—Portuguese government demand more English troops—Lord Wellington refuses, - and reproaches the Regency—The factious conduct of the latter—Character of the light division—General - Crawfurd passed the Coa—His activity and skilful arrangements—Is joined by Carrera—Skirmish at - Barba del Puerco—Carrera invites Ney to desert—Romana arrives at head-quarters—Lord Wellington - refuses to succour Ciudad Rodrigo—His decision vindicated—Crawfurd’s ability and obstinacy—He - maintains his position—Skirmish at Alameda—Captain Kraükenberg’s gallantry—Skirmish at Villa de - Puerco—Colonel Talbot killed—Gallantry of the French captain Guache—Combat of the Coa—Comparison - between general Picton and general Crawfurd</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_273">273</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER V.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Slight operations in Gallicia, Castile, the Asturias, Estremadura, and Andalusia—Reynier passes the Tagus—Hill - makes a parallel movement—Romana spreads his troops over Estremadura—Lord Wellington assembles a - <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_ix"></a>[ix]</span> - reserve at Thomar—Critical situation of Silveira—Captures a Swiss battalion at Puebla de Senabria—Romana’s - troops defeated at Benvenida—Lascy and captain Cockburne land troops at Moguer but are forced to reimbark—Lord - Wellington’s plan—How thwarted—Siege of Almeida—Allies advance to Frexadas—The magazine of - Almeida explodes—Treachery of Bareiros—Town surrenders—The allies withdraw behind the Mondego—Fort - of Albuquerque ruined by an explosion—Reynier marches on Sabugal, but returns to Zarza Mayor—Napoleon - directs Massena to advance—Description of the country—Erroneous notions of lord Wellington’s views - entertained by both armies</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_296">296</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER VI.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Third Invasion of Portugal—Napoleon’s prudence in military affairs vindicated—Massena concentrated his - corps—Occupies Guarda—Passes the Mondego—Marches on Viseu—Lord Wellington falls - back—Secures Coimbra, passes to the right bank of the Mondego, and is joined by the reserve from - Thomar—General Hill anticipates his orders, and by a forced march reaches the Alva—The allied army is - thus interposed between the French and Coimbra—Daring action of colonel Trant—Contemporaneous events - in Estremadura, and the Condado de Niebla—Romana defeated—Gallantry of the Portuguese cavalry under - general Madden—Dangerous crisis of affairs—Violence of the Souza faction—An indiscreet letter - from an English officer, creates great confusion at Oporto—Lord Wellington rebukes the Portuguese - Regency—He is forced to alter his plans, and resolves to offer battle—Chooses the position of Busaco</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_312">312</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER VII.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">General Pack destroys the bridges on the Criz and Dao—Remarkable panic in the light division—The second - and sixth corps arrive in front of Busaco—Ney and Regnier desire to attack, but Massena delays—The eighth - corps and the cavalry arrive—Battle of Busaco—Massena turns the right of the allies—Lord Wellington - falls back, and orders the northern militia to close on the French rear—Cavalry skirmish on the - Mondego—Coimbra evacuated, dreadful scene there—Disorders in the army—Lord Wellington’s firmness - contrasted with Massena’s indolence—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_325">325</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER VIII.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Massena resumes his march—The militia close upon his rear—Cavalry skirmish near Leiria—Allies - retreat upon the lines—Colonel Trant surprises Coimbra—The French army continues its march—Cavalry - skirmish at Rio Mayor—General Crawfurd is surprised at Alemquer and retreats by the wrong road—Dangerous - results of this error—Description of the lines of Torres Vedras—Massena arrives in front of - them—Romana reinforces Lord Wellington with two Spanish divisions—Remarkable works executed by the light - division at Aruda—The French skirmish at Sobral—General Harvey wounded—General St. Croix - killed—Massena takes a permanent position in front of the Lines—He is harassed on the rear and flanks - by the British cavalry and the Portuguese militia</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_340">340</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER IX.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">State of Lisbon—Embargo on the vessels in the river—Factious conduct of the Patriarch—The desponding - letters from the army—Alarm—Lord Liverpool—Lord Wellington displays the greatest firmness, vigour, - <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_x"></a>[x]</span> - and dignity, of mind—He rebukes the Portuguese Regency, and exposes the duplicity and presumption of the - Patriarch’s faction—Violence of this faction—Curious revelation made by Baron Eben and the editor of the - Brazilienza—Lord Wellesley awes the Court of Rio Janeiro—Strengthens the authority of Lord Wellington and - Mr. Stuart—The French seize the Islands in the river—Foolish conduct of the governor of Setuval—General - Fane sent to the left bank of the Tagus—Lord Wellington’s embarrassments become more serious—The heights - of Almada fortified—Violent altercation of the Regency upon this subject—The Patriarch insults Mr. Stuart - and nearly ruins the common cause</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_364">364</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER X.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Massena’s pertinacity—He collects boats on the Tagus, and establishes a depôt at Santarem—Sends general - Foy to Paris—Casts a bridge over the Zezere—Abandons his position in front of the Lines—Is followed - by lord Wellington—Exploit of serjeant Baxter—Massena assumes the position of Santarem—Lord - Wellington sends general Hill across the Tagus—Prepares to attack the French—Abandons this design and - assumes a permanent position—Policy of the hostile generals exposed—General Gardanne arrives at Cardigos - with a convoy, but retreats again—The French marauders spread to the Mondego—Lord Wellington demands - reinforcements—Beresford takes the command on the left of the Tagus—Operations of the militia in - Beira—General Drouet enters Portugal with the ninth corps—Joins Massena at Espinhal—Occupies - Leiria—Claparede defeats Silveira and takes Lamego—Returns to the Mondego—Seizes Guarda and - Covilhao—Foy returns from France—The duke of Abrantes wounded in a skirmish at Rio Mayor—General - Pamplona organizes a secret communication with Lisbon—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_377">377</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs150" colspan="2">BOOK XII.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER I.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">General sketch of the state of the war—Lord Wellington objects to <ins class="corr" id="tn-x" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'maratime operations'"> - maritime operations</ins>—Expedition to - Fuengirola—Minor operations in Andalusia—National Cortez assemble in the Isla de Leon—Its - proceedings—New regency chosen—Factions described—Violence of all parties—Unjust treatment - of the colonies</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_402">402</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER II.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Soult assumes the direction of the blockade of Cadiz—His flotilla—Enters the Troccadero - canal—Villantroys, or cannon-mortars, employed by the French—Inactivity of the Spaniards—Napoleon - directs Soult to aid Massena—Has some notion of evacuating Andalusia—Soult’s first expedition to - Estremadura—Carries the bridge of Merida—Besieges Olivenza—Ballasteros defeated at - Castellejos—Flies into Portugal—Romana’s divisions march from Cartaxo to the succour of Olivenza—That - place surrenders—Romana dies—His character—Lord Wellington’s counsels neglected by the Spanish - generals—First siege of Badajos—Mendizabel arrives—Files the Spanish army into Badajos—Makes - a grand sally—Is driven back with loss—Pitches his camp round San Christoval—Battle of the - Gebora—Continuation of the blockade of Cadiz—Expedition of the allies under general Lapeña—Battle - of Barosa—Factions in Cadiz</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_421">421</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td>  <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xi"></a>[xi]</span></td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER III.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Siege of Badajos continued—Imas surrenders—His cowardice and treachery—Albuquerque and Valencia de - Alcantara taken by the French—Soult returns to Andalusia—Relative state of the armies at - Santarem—Retreat of the French—Massena’s able movement—Skirmish at Pombal—Combat of - Redinha—Massena halts at Condeixa—Montbrun endeavours to seize Coimbra—Baffled by colonel - Trant—Condeixa burnt by the French—Combat of Casal Nova—General Cole turns the French at - Panella—Combat of Foz d’Aronce—Massena retires behind the Alva</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_450">450</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER IV.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Allies halt for provisions—State of the campaign—Passage of the Ceira—Passage of the - Alva—Massena retires to Celerico—Resolves to march upon Coria—Is prevented by Ney, who is - deprived of his command and sent to France—Massena abandons Celerico and takes post at Guarda—The - allies oblige the French to quit that position, and Massena takes a new one behind the Coa—Combat of - Sabugal—Trant crosses the Coa and cuts the communication between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo—His - danger—He is released by the British cavalry and artillery—Massena abandons Portugal</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_473">473</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER V.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Estimate of the French loss—Anecdote of Colonel Waters—Lord Wellington’s great conceptions - explained—How impeded—Affairs in the south of Spain—Formation of the fourth and fifth Spanish - armies—Siege of Campo Mayor—Place falls—Excellent conduct of major Tallaia—Beresford - surprises Montbrun—Combat of cavalry—Campo Mayor recovered—Beresford takes cantonments round - Elvas—His difficulties—Reflections upon his proceedings—He throws a bridge near Jerumenha and - passes the Guadiana—Outposts of cavalry cut off by the French—Castaños arrives at Elvas—Arrangements - relative to the chief command—Beresford advances against Latour Maubourg, who returns to Llerena—General - Cole takes Olivenza—Cavalry skirmish near Usagre—Lord Wellington arrives at Elvas, examines - Badajos—Skirmish there—Arranges the operations—Political difficulties—Lord Wellington - returns to the Agueda—Operations in the north—Skirmishes on the Agueda—Massena advances to Ciudad - Rodrigo—Lord Wellington reaches the army—Retires behind the Dos Casas—Combat of Fuentes - Onoro—Battle of Fuentes Onoro—Evacuation of Almeida</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_489">489</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER VI.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Lord Wellington quits the army of Beira—Marshal Beresford’s operations—Colonel Colborne’s beats up the - French quarters in Estremadura, and intercepts their convoys—First English siege of Badajos—Captain - Squires breaks ground before San Cristoval—His works overwhelmed by the French fire—Soult advances to - relieve the place—Beresford raises the siege—Holds a conference with the Spanish generals, and resolves - to fight—Colonel Colborne rejoins the army, which takes a position at Albuera—Allied cavalry driven in by - the French—General Blake joins Beresford—General Cole arrives on the frontier—Battle of Albuera</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_523">523</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td>  <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xii"></a>[xii]</span></td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER VII.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Continuation of the battle of Albuera—Dreadful state of both armies—Soult retreats to Solano—General - Hamilton resumes the investment of Badajos—Lord Wellington reaches the field of battle—Third and seventh - divisions arrive—Beresford follows Soult—The latter abandons the castle of Villalba and <ins class="corr" id="tn-xii" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'retreats to Lerena'"> - retreats to</ins> - Llerena—Cavalry action at Usagre—Beresford quits the army—General Hill reassumes the command of the - second division, and lord Wellington renews the siege of Badajos.—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_542">542</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2"><em>Papers relating to the former volumes.</em></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">  I.   Letter from major-general F. Ponsonby</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_559">559</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">II.   Note upon the situation of Spain in 1808, dictated by Napoleon</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_560">560</a></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<table class="p3 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs150" colspan="2">APPENDIX.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs120" colspan="2"><a href="#No_I">No. I.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Returns of the French army in the Peninsula, extracted from the French muster-rolls</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_567">567</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs120" colspan="2"><a href="#No_II">No. II.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Extracts of letters from lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, and one from sir John Moore to - major-general M’Kenzie, commanding in Portugal</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_573">573</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs120" colspan="2"><a href="#No_III">No. III.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Extracts from the correspondence of a field-officer of engineers, employed at Cadiz, and extracts - from the official abstract of military reports from the British commanders at Cadiz</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_580">580</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs120" colspan="2"><a href="#No_IV">No. IV.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Extracts from king Joseph’s correspondence</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_583">583</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs120" colspan="2"><a href="#No_V">No. V.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Extracts of letters from lord Wellington</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_586">586</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs120" colspan="2"><a href="#No_VI">No. VI.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Extracts from a report made by the duke of Dalmatia to the prince of Wagram and Neufchatel</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_603">603</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Intercepted letter from marshal Mortier to the emperor</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_607">607</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs120" colspan="2"><a href="#No_VII">No. VII.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Miscellaneous correspondence of the French marshals and others, and extracts from general Pelet’s journal</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_607">607</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs120" colspan="2"><a href="#No_VIII">No. VIII.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">The French officers, prisoners of war at Oporto, to general Trant</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_623">623</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td>  <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xiii"></a>[xiii]</span></td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs120" colspan="2"><a href="#No_IX">No. IX.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">A letter from lieutenant-general Graham to the right hon. H. Wellesley, and state of the troops at Tarifa, - under his command</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_624">624</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Extract of a letter from general Frederick Ponsonby, and various other documents</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_629">629</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs120" colspan="2"><a href="#No_X">No. X.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Extracts from the correspondence of captain Squires, of the engineers</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_638">638</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs120" colspan="2"><a href="#No_XI">No. XI.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Extract of a letter from general Campbell to lord Melville</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_639">639</a></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="ERRATA">ERRATA.</h2> -</div> - -<hr class="r5" /> - -<table class="autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">Page</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-10">10,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">line 6,</td> -<td class="tdct"><em>for</em></td> -<td class="tdlx">“Caspe secured the communication between the wings of the third corps and Fraga, and its wooden bridge, &c.” - <em>read</em> “Caspe secured the communication between the wings of the third corps, while Fraga and its wooden bridge, &c.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-14">14,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. last,</td> -<td class="tdct"><em>for</em></td> -<td class="tdl">“absolutely” <em>read</em> “absolute.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-71">71,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. 16,</td> -<td class="tdct"><em>for</em></td> -<td class="tdl">“Bulluno” <em>read</em> “Belluno.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-91">91,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. 20,</td> -<td class="tdct"><em>for</em></td> -<td class="tdl">“thousend” <em>read</em> “thousand.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-139">139,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">margin,</td> -<td class="tdct"><em>for</em></td> -<td class="tdl">“Istoria militaire degl’Italiano” <em>read</em> “Istoria militáre degl’Italiani.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-143">143,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. 10,</td> -<td class="tdct"><em>for</em></td> -<td class="tdl">“Augereau’s” <em>read</em> “Augereau.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-194">194,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. 3</td> -<td class="tdct">from bottom,</td> -<td class="tdl"><em>for</em> “marched” <em>read</em> “march.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-216">216,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. 15,</td> -<td class="tdct"><em>for</em></td> -<td class="tdl">“fitting, out &c.” <em>read</em> “fitting out, &c.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-219">219,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. 6</td> -<td class="tdct">from bottom,</td> -<td class="tdl"><em>for</em> “even that in case” <em>read</em> “even in that case.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-249">249,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. 3,</td> -<td class="tdct"><em>for</em></td> -<td class="tdl">“denied” <em>read</em> “desired.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-278">278,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. 14</td> -<td class="tdct">from bottom,</td> -<td class="tdl"><em>for</em> “him” <em>read</em> “he.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-304">304,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. 10</td> -<td class="tdct">from bottom,</td> -<td class="tdl"><em>for</em> “amounted” <em>read</em> “mounted.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-306">306,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. 11</td> -<td class="tdct">from bottom,</td> -<td class="tdl"><em>for</em> “only” <em>read</em> “principal.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-319">319,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. 23,</td> -<td class="tdct"><em>for</em></td> -<td class="tdl">“severally” <em>read</em> “several.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-382">382,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. 6,</td> -<td class="tdct"><em>for</em></td> -<td class="tdl">“where” <em>read</em> “there.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-392">392,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. 5,</td> -<td class="tdct"><em>for</em></td> -<td class="tdl">“right bank” <em>read</em> “left bank.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-417">417,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. 4,</td> -<td class="tdct"><em>for</em></td> -<td class="tdl">“latter” <em>read</em> “Cortes.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-431">431,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. 17,</td> -<td class="tdct"><em>for</em></td> -<td class="tdl">“besieged” <em>read</em> “besiegers.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-443">443,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. 2</td> -<td class="tdct">from bottom,</td> -<td class="tdl"><em>for</em> “Dikies” <em>read</em> “Dilke.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-465">465,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">margin,</td> -<td class="tdct"><em>for</em></td> -<td class="tdl">“Campagne de Français” <em>read</em> “Campagne des Français.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-470">470,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. 9,</td> -<td class="tdct"><em>for</em></td> -<td class="tdl">“Fons” <em>read</em> “Foz.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-470a">470,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. 17,</td> -<td class="tdct"><em>for</em></td> -<td class="tdl">“Fons” <em>read</em> “Foz.”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdct">..</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#err-512">512,</a></td> -<td class="tdct">.. 2,</td> -<td class="tdct"><em>for</em></td> -<td class="tdl">“eight” <em>read</em> “eighth.”</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="LIST_OF_PLATES">LIST OF PLATES.</h2> -</div> - -<table class="autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">No. 1.</td> -<td class="tdl">Suchet’s Operations, 1809-10</td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#i_b_010fp"><em>to face page</em>   10</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">2.</td> -<td class="tdl">Siege of Gerona</td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#i_b_048fp"><em>to face page</em>   48</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">3.</td> -<td class="tdl">Areizaga’s Operations, 1809</td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#i_b_084fp"><em>to face page</em>   84</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">4.</td> -<td class="tdl">Invasion of Andalusia, 1810</td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#i_b_108fp"><em>to face page</em> 108</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">5.</td> -<td class="tdl">Defence of Portugal, 1810</td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#i_b_266fp"><em>to face page</em> 266</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">6.</td> -<td class="tdl">Crawfurd’s Operations, 1810</td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#i_b_292fp"><em>to face page</em> 292</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">7.</td> -<td class="tdl">Operations on the Mondego, 1810</td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#i_b_334fp"><em>to face page</em> 334</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">8.</td> -<td class="tdl">Lines of Torres Vedras, 1810</td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#i_b_358fp"><em>to face page</em> 358</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">9.</td> -<td class="tdl">Battle of Barosa, March 5th, 1811</td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#i_b_446fp"><em>to face page</em> 446</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">10.</td> -<td class="tdl">Massena’s Retreat, Combat of Sabugal, 1811 <span class="pad4"> </span></td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#i_b_486fp"><em>to face page</em> 486</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">11.</td> -<td class="tdl">Battle of Fuentes Onoro</td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#i_b_516fp"><em>to face page</em> 516</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">12.</td> -<td class="tdl">Battle of Albuera</td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#i_b_540fp"><em>to face page</em> 540</a></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="p4 nobreak" id="NOTICE">NOTICE.</h2> -</div> - -<p>The manuscript authorities consulted for this volume consist -of original papers and correspondence of the duke of Wellington, -marshal Soult, king Joseph, Mr. Stuart,<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> general Graham,<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> -general Pelet,<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> general Campbell,<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> captain Codrington,<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> and -colonel Cox,<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> together with many private journals and letters of -officers employed during the war.</p> - -<p>Before the Appendix two papers are inserted, the one a letter -from major-general Frederick Ponsonby relative to a passage in -the description of the battle of Talavera; the other is an original -note by the emperor Napoleon, which I had not seen when I -published my first volume. The reader is referred to it as confirmatory -of the arguments used by me when objecting to Joseph’s -retreat from Madrid.</p> - - -<p class="p2 fs80 pad1">The reader is informed that, in the second volume, Book VI. & VII. should -be Book VI., and Book IX. should be Book VIII.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_1"></a>[Pg 1]</span><br /></p> - -<p class="center lht2"> -<span class="lsp2 bold fs135">HISTORY</span><br /> -<span class="fs60">OF THE</span><br /> -<span class="lsp2 fs150">PENINSULAR WAR.</span> -</p> - -<hr class="r20" /> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_IX">BOOK IX.</h2> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BIX_I">CHAPTER I.</h3> -</div> - - -<div class="sidenote">1809.</div> - -<p>When Gallicia was delivered by the campaign of -Talavera, the Asturias became the head of a new -line of operation threatening the enemy’s principal -communication with France. But this advantage -was feebly used. Kellerman’s division at Valladolid, -and Bonet’s at San Andero, sufficed to hold -both Asturians and Gallicians in check; and the -sanguinary operations in the valley of the Tagus, -were colaterally, as well as directly, unprofitable to -the allies. In other parts the war was steadily -progressive in favour of the French; yet their -career was one of pains and difficulties.</p> - -<p>Hitherto Biscay had been tranquil, and Navarre -so submissive, that the artillery employed against -Zaragoza, was conveyed by the country people, -without an escort, from Pampeluna to Tudela. But -when the battle of Belchite terminated the regular -warfare in Aragon, the Guerilla system commenced -in those parts; and as the chiefs acquired reputation -at the moment when Blake was losing credit<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_2"></a>[2]</span> -by defeats, the dispersed soldiers flocked to their -standards; hoping thus to cover past disgrace, and -to live with a greater license, because the regular -armies suffered under the restraints without enjoying -the benefits of discipline, while the irregulars -purveyed for themselves.</p> - -<p>Zaragoza is surrounded by rugged mountains, -and every range became the mother of a Guerilla -brood; nor were the regular Partizan corps less -numerous than the Partidas. On the left of the -Ebro, the Catalonian colonels, Baget, Perena, Pedroza, -and the chief Theobaldo, brought their -Migueletes to the Sierra de Guara, overhanging -Huesca and Barbastro. In this position, commanding -the sources of the Cinca and operating -on both sides of that river, they harassed the -communication between Zaragoza and the French -outposts; and maintained an intercourse with the -governor of Lerida, who directed the movements -and supplied the wants of all the bands in Aragon.</p> - -<p>On the right of the Ebro, troops raised in the -district of Molina, were united to the corps of -Gayan, and that officer, taking possession of the -mountains of Montalvan, the valley of the Xiloca, -and the town of Daroca, pushed his advanced -guards even to the plain of Zaragoza, and occupied -Nuestra Senora del Aguilar. This convent, situated -on the top of a high rock, near Cariñena, he -made a depôt of provisions and ammunition, and -surrounded the building with an entrenched camp -for three thousand men.</p> - -<p>On Gayan’s left, general Villa Campa, a man of -talent and energy, established himself at Calatayud, -with the regular regiments of Soria and La -Princessa, and making fresh levies, rapidly formed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_3"></a>[3]</span> -a large force, with which he cut the direct line of -communication between Zaragoza and Madrid.</p> - -<p>Beyond Villa Campa’s positions the circle of war -was continued by other bands; which, descending -from the Moncayo mountains, infested the districts -of Taranzona and Borja, and intercepted the communications -between Tudela and Zaragoza.</p> - -<p>The younger Mina, called the student, vexed all -the country between Tudela and Pampeluna; and -the inhabitants of the high <ins class="corr" id="tn-3" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Pyrennean vallies'"> -Pyrennean valleys</ins> of Roncal, Salazar, Anso, and Echo, were also in arms, -and commanded by Renovalles. This general officer, -taken at Zaragoza, was, by the French, said to -have broken his parole; but he, pleading a previous -breach of the capitulation, fled to Lerida, -and from thence passing with some regular officers -<ins class="corr" id="tn-3a" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'into the vallies'"> -into the valleys</ins>, took the command of the insurrection, -and succeeded in surprising several French -detachments. His principal post was at the convent -of San Juan de la Pena, which is built on -a rock, remarkable in Spanish history as a place -of refuge maintained with success against the -Moorish conquerors. The bodies of twenty-two -kings of Aragon rested in the church, and the -whole rock was held in veneration by the Aragonese, -and supposed to be invulnerable. From this post -Saraza, acting under Renovalles, continually menaced -Jaca, and communicating with Baget, Pedroza, -and Father Theobaldo, completed, as it were, -the investment of the third corps.</p> - -<p>All these bands, amounting to, at least, twenty -thousand armed men, commenced their operations at -once, cutting off isolated men, intercepting convoys -and couriers, and attacking the weakest parts of -the French army. Meanwhile Blake having rallied<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_4"></a>[4]</span> -his fugitives at Tortoza, abandoned Aragon to its -fate, and proceeding to Taragona, endeavoured to -keep the war alive in Catalonia.</p> - -<p>Suchet, in following up his victory at Belchite, -had sent detachments as far as Morella, on the -borders of Valencia, and pushed his scouting parties -close up to Tortoza; but finding the dispersion -of Blake’s troops complete, he posted Meusnier’s -division on the line of the Guadalupe, with -orders to repair the castle of Alcanitz, so as to form -a head of cantonments on the right bank of the -Ebro. Then crossing that river at Caspe with the -rest of the army, he made demonstrations against -Mequinenza, and even menaced Lerida, obliging -the governor to draw in his detachments, and close -the gates. Suchet, however, continued his march by -Fraga, recrossed the Cinca, and leaving Habert’s -division to guard that line, returned himself in the -latter end of June to Zaragoza by the road of -Monzon.</p> - -<p>Having thus dispersed the regular Spanish forces -and given full effect to his victory; the French -General sought to fix himself firmly in the positions -he had gained. Sensible that arms may win -battles, but cannot render conquest permanent, -he projected a system of civil administration which -enabled him to support his troops, and yet to offer -some security of property to those inhabitants who -remained tranquil. But, as it was impossible for -the people to trust to any system, or to avoid -danger, while the mountains swarmed with the -Partidas, Suchet resolved to pursue the latter -without relaxation, and to put down all resistance -in Aragon before he attempted to enlarge the -circle of his conquests. Foreseeing that while he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_5"></a>[5]</span> -thus laid a solid base for further operations, he -should also form an army capable of executing -any enterprize.</p> - -<p>He commenced on the side of Jaca, and having -dislodged the Spaniards from their positions near that -castle, in June, supplied it with ten months’ provisions. -After this operation, Almunia and Cariñena, -on the right of the Ebro, were occupied by -his detachments; and having suddenly drawn together -four battalions and a hundred cuirassiers -at the latter point, he surrounded <ins class="corr" id="tn-5" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Nuesta Senora'"> -Nuestra Senora</ins> del Aguilar, during the night of the 19th, destroyed -the entrenched camp, and sent a detachment -in pursuit of Gayan. On the same day, -Pedrosa was repulsed on the other side of the -Ebro, near Barbastro, and general Habert defeated -Perena.</p> - -<p>The troops sent in pursuit of Gayan dispersed -his corps at Uzed, and Daroca was occupied by -the French. The vicinity of Calatayud and the -mountains of Moncayo were then scoured by detachments -from Zaragoza, one of which took possession -of the district of Cinco Villas. Meanwhile -Jaca was continually menaced by the Spaniards -at St. Juan de la Pena, and Saraza, descending -from thence by the valley of the Gallego, on the -23d of August, surprised and slew a detachment -of seventy men close to Zaragoza. On the 26th, -however, five French battalions stormed the sacred -rock, and penetrated up the valleys of Anso and -Echo in pursuit of Renovalles. Nevertheless, that -chief, retiring to Roncal, obtained a capitulation for -the valley without surrendering himself.</p> - -<p>These operations having, in a certain degree, -cleared Aragon of the bands on the side of Navarre<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_6"></a>[6]</span> -and Castile, the French general proceeded -against those on the side of Catalonia. Baget, -Perena, and Pedrosa, chased from the Sierra de -Guarra, rallied between the Cinca and the Noguerra, -and were joined by Renovalles, who assumed -the chief command; but on the 23d of September, -the whole being routed by general Habert, -the men dispersed, and the chiefs took refuge in -Lerida and Mequinenza.</p> - -<p>Suchet, then occupied Fraga, Candasnos, and -Monzon, established a flying bridge on the Cinca, -near the latter town, raised some field-works -to protect it, and that done, resolved to penetrate -the districts of Venasques and Benevarres, the -subjection of which would have secured his -left flank, and opened a new line of communication -with France. The inhabitants, having -notice of his project, assembled in arms, and -being joined by the dispersed soldiers of the -defeated Partizans, menaced a French regiment -posted at Graus. Colonel La Peyrolerie, the commandant, -marched the 17th of October, by Roda, -to meet them; and having reached a certain distance -up the valley, was surrounded, yet he broke -through in the night, and regained his post. -During his absence the peasantry of the vicinity -came down to kill his sick men, but the townsmen -of Graus would not suffer this barbarity; and -marshal Suchet affirms that such humane conduct -was not rare in Aragonese towns.</p> - -<p>While this was passing in the valley of Venasque, -the governor of Lerida caused Caspe, Fraga, and -Candasnos to be attacked, and some sharp fighting -took place. The French maintained their posts, -but the whole circle of their cantonments being still<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_7"></a>[7]</span> -infested by the smaller bands, petty actions were -fought at Belchite, and on the side of Molino, at -Arnedo, and at Soria. Mina also still intercepted -the communications with Pampeluna; and Villa -Campa, quitting Calatayud, rallied Gayan’s troops, -and gathered others on the rocky mountain of Tremendal, -where a large convent and church once -more furnished as a citadel for an entrenched camp. -Against this place colonel Henriod marched in November, -from Daroca, with from fifteen hundred to -two thousand men and three pieces of artillery, and -driving back some advanced posts from Ojos Negros -to Origuela; came in front of the main position at -eleven o’clock in the morning of the 25th.</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF TREMENDAL.</h4> - -<p>The Spaniards were on a mountain, from the -centre of which a tongue of land shooting out, -overhung Origuela, and on the upper part of this -tongue stood the fortified convent of Tremendal. -To the right and left the rocks were nearly perpendicular, -and Henriod, seeing that Villa Campa was -too strongly posted to be beaten by an open attack, -imposed upon his adversary by skirmishing and -making as if he would turn the right of the position -by the road of Albaracin. Villa Campa was thus -induced to mass his forces on that side. In the night, -the fire of the bivouacs enabled the Spaniards to see -that the main body of the French troops and the -baggage were retiring, and, at the same time, Henriod, -with six chosen companies and two pieces of -artillery, coming against the centre, suddenly drove -the Spanish outposts into the fortified convent,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_8"></a>[8]</span> -and opened a fire with his guns, as if to cover -the retreat. The skirmish soon ceased, and -Villa Campa, satisfied that the French had retired, -was thrown completely off his guard, when Henriod’s -six companies, secretly scaling the rocks of the -position, rushed amongst the sleeping Spaniards, -killed and wounded five hundred, and put the -whole army to flight. Meanwhile, on the other -side of the Ebro, a second attempt was made -against the valley of Venasque, which being successful, -that district was disarmed.</p> - -<p>Petty combats still continued to be fought in -other parts of Aragon, but the obstinacy of the -Spaniards gradually gave way. In the month -of December, Suchet (assisted by general Milhaud, -with a moveable column from Madrid,) -took the towns of Albaracin and Teruel, the insurgent -junta fled to Valencia, and the subjection -of Aragon was, in a manner effected. The -interior was disarmed and quieted, and the -Partidas, which still hung upon the frontiers, -were recruited, as well as supplied, from other -provinces, and acted chiefly on the defensive. -The Aragonese also were so vexed by the smaller -bands, now dwindling into mere banditti, that -a smuggler of Barbastro raised a Spanish corps, -with which he chased and suppressed many of -them.</p> - -<p>Reinforcements were now pouring into Spain, -and enabled the French general to prepare for -extended operations. The original Spanish army -of Aragon was reduced to about eight thousand -men; of which, a part were wandering with Villa -Campa, a part were in Tortoza, and the rest about -Lerida and Mequinenza. Those fortresses were,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_9"></a>[9]</span> -indeed, the only obstacles to a junction of the -third with the seventh corps; and in them the -Spanish troops who still kept the field took refuge, -when closely pressed by the invaders.</p> - -<p>The policy of the Supreme Junta was however, -always to form fresh corps upon the remnants -of their beaten armies. Hence Villa Campa, -keeping in the mountains of Albaracin, recruited his -ranks, and still infested the western frontier of -Aragon: Garcia Novarro, making Tortoza his base -of operations lined the banks of the Algas, and -menaced Alcanitz: and Perena, trusting to the -neighbourhood of Lerida for support, posted himself -between the Noguera and the Segre. But the -activity of the French gave little time to effect -any considerable organization.</p> - -<p>Suchet’s positions formed a circle round Zaragoza; -and Tudela, Jaca, and the castle of Aljaferia -were garrisoned; but his principal forces were on -the Guadalupe and the Cinca, occupying Alcanitz, -Caspe, Fraga, Monzon, Barbastro, Benevarres, -and Venasque; of which the first, third, and fourth -were places of strength: and certainly, whether -his situation be regarded in a political, or a military -light, it was become most important. One -year had sufficed, not only to reduce the towns -and break the armies, but in part to conciliate -the feelings of the Aragonese—confessedly the -most energetic portion of the nation—and to place -the third corps, with reference to the general -operations of the war, in a most formidable -position.</p> - -<p>1º. The fortified castle of Alcanitz formed a -head of cantonments on the right bank of the Ebro; -and being situated at the entrance of the passes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_10"></a>[10]</span> -leading into Valencia, it also furnished a base, -from which Suchet could invade that rich province; -and by which also, he could place the Catalonian -army between two fires, whenever the seventh corps -should again advance beyond the Llobregat.</p> - -<p>2º. <ins class="err" id="err-10" title="Erratum: was 'Caspe secured the communication between the wings of the third corps and Fraga, and its wooden bridge'"> -Caspe secured the communication between -the wings of the third corps, while Fraga and -its wooden bridge</ins> over the Cinca, offered -the means of passing that uncertain river at all -seasons.</p> - -<p>3º. Monzon, a regular fortification, in some -measure balanced Lerida; and its flying bridge -over the Cinca enabled the French to forage all -the country between Lerida and Venasques; moreover -a co-operation of the garrison of Monzon, the -troops at Barbastro, and those at Benevarres, could -always curb Perena.</p> - -<p>4º. The possession of Venasques permitted -Suchet to communicate with the moveable columns, -(appointed to guard the French frontier,) while -the castle of Jaca rendered the third corps in a -manner independent of Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. -In fine, the position on the Cinca and the Guadalupe, -menacing alike Catalonia and Valencia, -connected the operations of the third with the -seventh corps; and henceforward we shall find -these two armies gradually approximating until -they form but one force, acting upon a distinct -system of invasion against the south.</p> - -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_010fp" style="max-width: 35em;"> - <p class="right fs60"><em>Vol. 3, Plate 1.</em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_010fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_010fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - <div class="caption"> -SUCHET’S OPERATIONS<br /> -1809-10.<br /> - -<p><em>Published by T. & W. Boone 1830.</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>Suchet’s projects were, however, retarded by insurrections -in Navarre, which, at this period, assumed -a serious aspect. The student Mina, far from -being quelled by the troops sent at different periods -in chase of him, daily increased his forces, and, -by hardy and sudden enterprizes, kept the Navarrese<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_11"></a>[11]</span> -in commotion. The duke of Mahon, one of -Joseph’s Spanish adherents, appointed viceroy of -Navarre, was at variance with the military authorities; -and all the disorders attendant on a divided -administration, and a rapacious system, ensued. -General D’Agoult, the governor of Pampeluna, -was accused of being in Mina’s pay. His -suicide during an investigation seems to confirm -the suspicion, but it is also abundantly evident, -that the whole administration of Navarre was oppressive, -venal, and weak.</p> - -<p>To avert the serious danger of an insurrection -so close to France, the emperor directed Suchet to -repair there with a part of the third corps. That -general soon restored order in Pampeluna, and -eventually captured Mina himself; but he was -unable to suppress the system of the Partidas. -“<i lang="es" xml:lang="es">Espoz y Mina</i>” took his nephew’s place; and -from that time to the end of the war, <ins class="corr" id="tn-11" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the commucations of'"> -the communications of</ins> the French were troubled, and considerable -losses inflicted upon their armies by this -celebrated man—undoubtedly the most conspicuous -person among the Partida chiefs. And here it may -be observed how weak and inefficient this guerilla -system was to deliver the country, and that, even -as an auxiliary, its advantages were nearly balanced -by the evils.</p> - -<p>It was in the provinces lying between France -and the Ebro that it commenced. It was in those -provinces that it could effect the greatest injury -to the French cause; and it was precisely in those -provinces that it was conducted with the greatest -energy, although less assisted by the English than -any other part of Spain: a fact leading to the -conclusion, that ready and copious succours may<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_12"></a>[12]</span> -be hurtful to a people situated as the Spaniards -were. When so assisted, men are apt to rely more -upon their allies than upon their own exertions. -But however this may be, it is certain that the -Partidas of Biscay, Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia, -although they amounted at one time to above -thirty thousand men, accustomed to arms, and -often commanded by men of undoubted enterprize -and courage, never occupied half their own number -of French at one time; never absolutely defeated -a single division; never prevented any considerable -enterprize; never, with the exception of the surprise -of Figueras, to be hereafter spoken of, performed -any exploit seriously affecting the operations of a -single “corps d’armée.”</p> - -<p>It is true, that if a whole nation will but persevere -in such a system, it must in time destroy the -most numerous armies. But no people will thus persevere, -the aged, the sick, the timid, the helpless, -are all hinderers of the bold and robust. There will, -also, be a difficulty to procure arms, for it is not on -every occasion that so rich and powerful a people -as the English, will be found in alliance with insurrection; -and when the invaders follow up their -victories by a prudent conduct, as was the case -with Suchet and some others of the French generals, -the result is certain. The desire of ease -natural to mankind, prevails against the suggestions -of honour; and although the opportunity of -covering personal ambition with the garb of patriotism -may cause many attempts to throw off the -yoke, the bulk of the invaded people will gradually -become submissive and tranquil. It is a fact that, -notwithstanding the violent measures resorted to -by the Partida chiefs to fill their ranks, deserters<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_13"></a>[13]</span> -from the French and even from the British formed -one-third of their bands.</p> - -<p>To raise a whole people against an invader may -be easy, but to direct the energy thus aroused, -is a gigantic task, and, if misdirected, the result -will be more injurious than advantageous. That -it was misdirected in Spain was the opinion of -many able men of all sides, and to represent it otherwise, -is to make history give false lessons to posterity. -Portugal was thrown completely into the -hands of lord Wellington; but that great man, -instead of following the example of the Supreme -Junta, and encouraging independent bands, enforced -a military organization upon totally different -principles. The people were, indeed, called upon -and obliged to resist the enemy, but it was under -a regular system, by which all classes were kept -in just bounds, and the whole physical and moral -power of the nation rendered subservient to the -plan of the general-in-chief. To act differently is -to confess weakness: it is to say that the government -<ins class="corr" id="tn-13" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'being unqual to'"> -being unequal to</ins> the direction of affairs permits -anarchy.</p> - -<p>The Partida system in Spain, was the offspring -of disorder, and disorder in war is weakness accompanied -by ills the least of which is sufficient to -produce ruin. It is in such a warfare, that habits -of unbridled license, of unprincipled violence, and -disrespect for the rights of property are quickly -contracted, and render men unfit for the duties of -citizens; and yet it has with singular inconsistency -been cited, as the best and surest mode of resisting -an enemy, by politicians, who hold regular -armies in abhorrence, although a high sense of -honour, devotion to the cause of the country, temperance,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_14"></a>[14]</span> -regularity, and decent manners are of the -<ins class="corr" id="tn-14" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'very essense of'"> -very essence of</ins> the latter’s discipline.</p> - -<p>Regular armies have seldom failed to produce -great men, and one great man is sufficient to save -a nation: but when every person is permitted to -make war in the manner most agreeable to himself;—for -one that comes forward with patriotic intentions, -there will be two to act from personal interest; -in short, there will be more robbers than -generals. One of the first exploits of Espoz y Mina -<span class="sidenote">Extract -from the -Life of -Mina.</span>was to slay the commander of a neighbouring band, -because, under the mask of patriotism, he was plundering -his own countrymen: nay, this the most -fortunate of all the chiefs, would never suffer any -other Partida than his own to be in his district; -he also, as I have before related, made a species of -commercial treaty with the French, and strove -earnestly and successfully to raise his band to the -dignity of a regular force. Nor was this manner -of considering the guerilla system confined to the -one side. The following observations of St. Cyr, a -man of acknowledged talents, show that, after considerable -experience of this mode of warfare, he -also felt that the evil was greater than the benefit.</p> - -<p>“Far from casting general blame on the efforts -made by the Catalans, I admired them; but, as -they often exceeded the bounds of reason, their -heroism was detrimental to their cause. Many -times it caused the destruction of whole populations -without necessity and without advantage.”</p> - -<p>“When a country is invaded by an army stronger -than that which defends it, it is beyond question -that the population should come to the assistance -of the troops, and lend them every support; but, -without an <ins class="err" id="err-14" title="Erratum: was 'absolutely'"> -absolute</ins> necessity, the former should<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_15"></a>[15]</span> -not be brought on to the field of battle.”—“It is -inhuman to place their inexperience in opposition -to hardened veterans.”</p> - -<p>“Instead of <em>exasperating</em> the people of Catalonia, -the leaders should have endeavoured to <em>calm</em> -them, and have directed their ardour so as to -second the army on great occasions. But they -excited them without cessation, led them day -after day into fire, fatigued them, harassed them, -forced them to abandon their habitations, to embark -if they were on the coast, if inland to take -to the mountains and perish of misery within -sight of their own homes, thus abandoned to the -mercy of a hungry and exasperated soldiery. The -people’s ardour was exhausted daily in partial -operations, and hence, on great occasions, when -they could have been eminently useful, they were -not to be had.”</p> - -<p>“Their good will had been so often abused by -the folly of their leaders, that many times their -assistance was called for in vain. The peasantry, -of whom so much had been demanded, began to -demand in their turn. They insisted that the -soldiers should fight always to the last gasp, were -angry when the latter retreated, and robbed and -ill-used them when broken by defeat.”</p> - -<p>“They had been so excited, so exasperated -against the French, that they became habitually -ferocious, and their ferocity was often as dangerous -to their own party, as to the enemy. The -atrocities committed against their own chiefs disgusted -the most patriotic, abated their zeal, -caused the middle classes to desire peace as the -only remedy of a system so replete with disorder. -Numbers of distinguished men, even those who<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_16"></a>[16]</span> -had vehemently opposed Joseph at first, began -to abandon Ferdinand; and it is certain that, -but for the expedition to Russia, that branch of -the Bourbons which reigns in Spain, would never -have remounted the throne.”</p> - -<p>“The cruelties exercised upon the French military -were as little conformable to the interest -of the Spaniards. Those men were but the -slaves of their duty, and of the state; certain -of death a little sooner or a little later, they, -like the Spaniards, were victims of the same -ambition. The soldier naturally becomes cruel -in protracted warfare; but the treatment experienced -from the Catalans brought out this disposition -prematurely; and that unhappy people -were themselves the victims of a cruelty, which -either of their own will or excited by others, -they had exercised upon those troops that fell -into their power; and this without any advantage -to their cause, while a contrary system would, in -a little time, have broken up the seventh corps,—seeing -that the latter was composed of foreigners, -naturally inclined to desert. But the murders -of all wounded, and sick, and helpless men, -created such horror, that the desertion, which at -first menaced total destruction, ceased entirely.”</p> - -<p>Such were St. Cyr’s opinions; and, assuredly, -the struggle in Catalonia, of which it is now the -time to resume the relation, was not the least successful -in Spain.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17"></a>[17]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BIX_II">CHAPTER II.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.</h4> - - -<div class="sidenote">See Vol II. -p. 102.</div> - -<p>The narrative of the Catalonian affairs was -broken off at the moment, when St. Cyr having -established his quarters at Vich, received intelligence -of the Austrian war, and that Barcelona -had been relieved by the squadron of admiral Comaso. -His whole attention was then directed towards -Gerona; and with a view to hastening -general Reille’s preparation for the siege of that -place, a second detachment, under Lecchi, proceeded -to the Ampurdan.</p> - -<p>During this time Conpigny continued at Taragona, -and Blake made his fatal march into Aragon; -but those troops which, under Milans and Wimphen, -had composed Reding’s left wing, were continually -skirmishing with the French posts in the -valley of Vich, and the Partizans, especially Claros -and the doctor Rovira, molested the communications -in a more systematic manner than before.</p> - -<p>Lecchi returned about the 18th of May, with -intelligence that Napoleon had quitted Paris for -Germany, that general Verdier had replaced Reille -in the Ampurdan, and that marshal Augereau had -reached Perpignan in his way to supersede St. Cyr -himself in the command of the seventh corps. The -latter part of this information gave St. Cyr infinite -discontent. In his “Journal of Operations,” he asserts -that his successor earnestly sought for the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_18"></a>[18]</span> -appointment, and his own observations <ins class="corr" id="tn-18" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'on the ocsion'"> -on the occasion</ins> are sarcastic and contemptuous of his rival.</p> - -<p>Augereau, who having served in Catalonia during -the war of the revolution, imagined, that he had -then acquired an influence which might be revived -on the present occasion, framed a proclamation -that vied with the most inflated of Spanish -manifestoes. But the latter, although turgid, were -in unison with the feelings of the people, whereas, -Augereau’s address, being at utter variance with -those feelings, was a pure folly. This proclamation -he sent into Catalonia, escorted by a battalion; but -even on the frontier, the Miguelette colonel, Porta, -defeated the escort, and tore down the few copies -that had been posted.</p> - -<p>The French marshal, afflicted with the gout, remained -at Perpignan, and St. Cyr continued to command; -but reluctantly, because (as he affirms) the -officers and soldiers were neglected, and himself -exposed to various indignities, the effects of Napoleon’s -ill-will. The most serious of these affronts -was permitting Verdier to correspond directly with -the minister of war in France, and the publishing -of his reports in preference to St. Cyr’s. For these -reasons, the latter contented himself with a simple -discharge of his duty. Yet, after the conspiracy in -the second corps, Napoleon cannot be justly blamed -for coldness towards an officer, who, however free -himself from encouraging the malcontents in the -French army, was certainly designed for their -leader. It is rather to be admired that the emperor -discovered so little jealousy; when a man -has once raised himself to the highest power, he -must inevitably give offence to his former comrades, -for, as all honours and rewards, flowing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_19"></a>[19]</span> -from him, are taken as personal favours, so all -checks and slights, or even the cessation of benefits, -are regarded as personal injuries. Where the -sanction of time is wanting, to identify the sovereign -with the country, the discontented easily -convince themselves that revenge is patriotism.</p> - -<p>While St. Cyr was preparing for the siege of -Gerona, Joseph, as we have seen, directed him to -march into Aragon, to repel Blake’s movement -against Suchet. This order he refused to obey, -<span class="sidenote">See Vol. II -p. 363.</span> and with reason; for it would have been a great -error to permit Blake’s false movement to occupy -two “Corps d’Armée,” and so retard the siege of -Gerona, to the infinite detriment of the French -affairs in Catalonia. Barcelona was never safe while -Hostalrich and Gerona were in the Spaniard’s possession. -St. Cyr was well aware of this, but the -evils of a divided command are soon felt. He who -had been successful in all his operations, was urgent, -for many reasons, to commence the siege -without delay, but Verdier, who had failed at Zaragoza, -was cautious in attacking a town which had -twice baffled Duhesme, and when pressed to begin, -complained that he could not, after placing garrisons -in Rosas and Figueras, bring ten thousand -men before Gerona; which, seeing the great extent -of the works, were insufficient.</p> - -<p>St. Cyr, disregarding the works, observed that -the garrison did not exceed three thousand men, -that it could not well be increased, and that expedition -was of more consequence than numbers. -Nevertheless, considering that a depôt of provisions, -established for the service of the siege at -Figueras, and which it was unlikely Napoleon would -replenish, must, by delay, be exhausted, as well as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20"></a>[20]</span> -the supplies which he had himself collected at -Vich: he sent all his own cannoniers, sappers, -and artillery horses, two squadrons of cavalry, -and six battalions of infantry to the Ampurdan, -and having thus increased the number of troops -there to eighteen thousand men, again urged Verdier -to be expedite.</p> - -<p>These reinforcements marched the 22d of May, -and the covering army diminished to about twelve -thousand men under arms, continued to hold the -valley of Vich until the middle of June. During -this time, the Miguelettes often skirmished with -the advanced posts, but without skill or profit; -and the inhabitants of the town, always remained -in the high mountains unsheltered and starving, -yet still firm of resolution not to dwell with the -invaders. This may be attributed partly to fear, -but more to that susceptibility to grand sentiments, -which distinguishes the Spanish peasants. Although -little remarkable for hardihood in the field, -their Moorish blood is attested by their fortitude; -and, men and women alike, they endure calamity -with a singular and unostentatious courage. In -this they are truly admirable. But their virtues -are passive, their faults active, and, continually -instigated by a peculiar arrogance, they are perpetually -projecting enterprises which they have -not sufficient vigour to execute, although at all -times they are confident and boasting more than -becomes either wise or brave men.</p> - -<p>Early in June, St. Cyr, having consumed nearly -all his corn, resolved to approach Gerona, and secure -the harvest which was almost ripe in that -district; but, previous to quitting Vich, he sent -his sick and wounded men, under a strong escort,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21"></a>[21]</span> -to Barcelona, and disposed his reserves in such a -manner that the operation was effected without loss. -The army, loaded with as much grain as the men -could carry, then commenced crossing the mountains -which separate Vich from the districts of Gerona -and Hostalrich. This march, conducted by the -way of Folgarolas, San Saturnino, Santa Hillario, -and Santa Coloma de Farnes, lasted two days; -and, the 21st of June, the head-quarters being -fixed at Caldas de Malavella, the Fort of St. Felieu -de Quixols was stormed, and the Spanish privateers -driven to seek another harbour. The French -army was then distributed in a half circle, extending -from St. Felieu to the Oña river. Intermediate -posts were established at St. Grace, Vidreras, -Mallorquinas, Rieu de Arenas, Santa Coloma de -Farnes, Castaña, and Bruñola; thus cutting off -the communications between Gerona and the districts -<ins class="corr" id="tn-21" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'occupied by Coupigny'"> -occupied by Conpigny</ins>, Wimphen, the Milans, -and Claros.</p> - -<p>During the march from Vich, the French defeated -three Spanish battalions, and captured a -convoy, coming from the side of Martorel, and destined -for Gerona. St. Cyr calls them the forerunners -of Blake’s army; a curious error, for Blake -was, on that very day, being defeated at Belchite, -two hundred miles from Santa Coloma. Strictly -speaking, there was, at this period, no Catalonian -army, the few troops that kept the field were -acting independently, and Conpigny, the nominal -commander-in-chief, remained at Taragona. He -and the other authorities, more occupied with personal -quarrels and political intrigues than with -military affairs, were complaining and thwarting<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22"></a>[22]</span> -each other. Thus the Spanish and French operations -were alike weakened by internal divisions.</p> - -<p>Verdier was slow, cautious, and more attentive -to the facilities afforded for resistance than to the -number of regular soldiers within the works; he, -or rather Reille, had appeared before Gerona on -the 6th of May, but it was not till the 4th of June -that, reinforced with Lecchi’s division, he completed -the investment of the place on both sides of the Ter. -On the 8th, however, ground was broken; and thus, -at the very moment when Blake, with the main body -of his army, was advancing against Zaragoza, in -other words, seeking to wrest Aragon from the -French, Catalonia was slipping from his own -hands.</p> - - -<h4>THIRD SIEGE OF GERONA.</h4> - -<p>When this memorable siege commenced, the -relative situations of the contending parties were -as follows:—Eighteen thousand French held the -Ampurdan, and invested the place. Of this number -about four thousand were in Figueras, Rosas, -and the smaller posts of communication; and it is -remarkable that Verdier asserted that the first-named -place, notwithstanding its great importance, -was <em>destitute of a garrison</em>, when he arrived there -from France. A fact consistent with Lord Collingwood’s -description of the Catalan warfare, but irreconcilable -with the enterprise and vigour attributed -to them by others.</p> - -<p>St. Cyr, the distribution of whose forces has -been already noticed, covered the siege with twelve<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23"></a>[23]</span> -thousand men; and Duhesme, having about ten -thousand, including sick, continued to hold Barcelona. -Forty thousand French were, therefore, disposed -<span class="sidenote">Imperial -Muster -Roll. MSS.</span>between that city and Figueras; while, on -the Spanish side, there was no preparation. Blake -was still in Aragon; Conpigny, with six thousand -of the worst troops, was at Taragona; the Milans -watched Duhesme; Wimphen, with a few thousand, -held the country about the Upper Llobregat. Juan -Claros and Rovira kept the mountains on the side -of Olot and Ripol; and, in the higher Catalonia, -small bands of Miguelettes were dispersed under -different chiefs. The Somatenes, however, continuing -their own system of warfare, not only -disregarded the generals, as in the time of Reding, -but fell upon and robbed the regular troops, whenever -a favourable opportunity occurred.</p> - -<p>The Spanish privateers, dislodged from St. Filieu, -now resorted to Palamos-bay, and the English fleet, -under Lord Collingwood, watched incessantly to -prevent any French squadron, or even single vessels, -from carrying provisions by the coast. But from -Gerona, the governor did not fail to call loudly on -the generals, and even on the <em>Supreme Central -Junta</em>, for succours; yet his cry was disregarded; -and when the siege commenced, his garrison did -not exceed three thousand regular troops: his magazines -and hospitals were but scantily provided, -and he had no money. Alvarez Mariano was however, -of a lofty spirit, great fortitude, and in no -manner daunted.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">See Vol. I. -p. 78.</div> - -<p>The works of Gerona, already described, were -little changed since the first siege; but there, as in -Zaragoza, by a mixture of superstition, patriotism, -and military regulations, the moral as well as physical<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_24"></a>[24]</span> -force of the city had been called forth. There, -likewise, a sickness, common at a particular season -of the year, was looked for to thin the ranks of the -besiegers, and there also women were enrolled, -under the title of the Company of Sta. Barbara, to -carry off the wounded, and to wait upon the hospitals, -and at every breath of air, says St. Cyr, their -ribbons were seen to float amidst the bayonets of -the soldiers! To evince his own resolution, the -governor forbad the mention of a capitulation under -pain of death; but severe punishments were only -denounced, not inflicted upon faint-hearted men. -Alvarez, master of his actions, and capable of -commanding without phrenzy, had recourse to no -barbarous methods of enforcing authority; obstinate -his defence was, and full of suffering to the besieged, -yet free from the stain of cruelty, and rich -in honour.</p> - -<p>On the 4th of June the siege was begun, and, on -the 12th, a mortar-battery, from the heights of -Casen Rocca, on the left of the Ter, and two -breaching-batteries, established against the outworks -of Fort Monjouic, being ready to play, the -town was summoned in form. The answer was an -intimation that henceforth all flags of truce would -be fired upon; the only proceeding indicative of the -barbarian in the conduct of Alvarez.</p> - -<p>The 13th the small suburb of Pedreto was taken -possession of by the French, and early on the -morning of the 14th, the batteries opened against -Monjouic, while the town was bombarded from the -Casen Rocca.</p> - -<p>The 17th the besieged drove the enemy from -Pedreto, but were finally repulsed with the loss of -above a hundred men.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25"></a>[25]</span></p> - -<p>The 19th the stone towers of St. Narcis and St. -Louis, forming the outworks of Monjouic, being -assaulted, the besieged, panic-stricken, abandoned -them and the tower of St. Daniel also. The -French immediately erected breaching-batteries, -four hundred yards from the northern bastion of -Monjouic. Tempestuous weather retarded their -works, but they made a practicable opening by the -4th of July, and with a strange temerity resolved -to give the assault, although the flank fire of the -works was not silenced, nor the glacis crowned, nor -the covered way or counterscarp injured, and that a -half moon, in a perfect state, covered the approaches -to the breach. The latter was proved by the engineers, -in a false attack, on the night of the 4th, and -the resolution to assault was then adopted; yet the -storming-force drawn from the several quarters of -investment was only assembled in the trenches on -the night of the 7th; and during these four days, -the batteries ceasing to play, the Spaniards retrenched, -and barricadoed the opening.</p> - -<p>At four o’clock in the morning of the 8th, the -French column, jumping out of the trenches, rapidly -cleared the space between them and the fort, -descended the ditch, and mounted to the assault -with great resolution; but the Spaniards had so -strengthened the defences that no impression could -be made, and the assailants taken in flank and rear -by the fire from the half moon, the covered way, -and the eastern bastion, were driven back. Twice -they renewed the attempt, but the obstacles were -insurmountable, and the assault failed, with a loss -of a thousand men killed and wounded. The success -of the besieged was however mitigated by an accidental -explosion, which destroyed the garrison of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26"></a>[26]</span> -the small fort of St. Juan, situated between Monjouic -and the city.</p> - -<p>About the period of this assault which was -given without St. Cyr’s knowledge, the latter -finding that Claros and Rovira interrupted the -convoys coming from Figueras to Gerona, withdrew -a brigade of Souham’s division from Santa Coloma -de Farnés, and posted it on the left of the Ter, at -Bañolas. The troops on the side of Hostalrich were -thus reduced to about eight thousand men under -arms, although an effort to raise the siege was to -be expected. For letters from Alvarez, urgently -demanding succours of Blake, had been intercepted, -and the latter, after his defeat in Aragon, was, as -I have said, collecting men at Taragona.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, to secure the coast-line from Rosas -to Quixols before Blake could reach the scene of -action, St. Cyr resolved to take Palamos. To effect -this, general Fontanes marched from St. Filieu, on -the 5th of July, with an Italian brigade, six guns, -and some squadrons of dragoons. Twice he summoned -the place, and the bearer being each time -treated with scorn, the troops moved on to the -attack; but in passing a flat part of the coast near -Torre Valenti, they were cannonaded by six gun-boats -so sharply, that they could not keep the -road until the artillery had obliged the boats to -sheer off.</p> - - -<h4>STORMING OF PALAMOS.</h4> - -<p>This town having a good roadstead, and being only -one march from Gerona, was necessarily a place of -importance; and the works, although partly ruined,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_27"></a>[27]</span> -were so far repaired by the Catalans as to be -capable of some defence. Twenty guns were -mounted; and the town, built on a narrow rocky -peninsula had but one front, the approach to -which was over an open plain, completely commanded -from the left by some very rugged hills, -where a considerable number of Somatenes were -assembled, with their line touching upon the walls -of the town.</p> - -<p>Fontanes drove the Somatenes from this position, -and a third time, summoned the place to surrender. -The bearer was killed, and the Italians immediately -stormed the works. When the Spaniards flying -towards the shore endeavoured to get on board their -vessels, the latter put off to sea, and some of Fontanes’ -troops having turned the town during the action, -intercepted the fugitives, and put all to the sword.</p> - -<p>Scarcely had Palamos fallen when Wimphen and -the Milans, arriving near Hostalrich, began to -harass Souham’s outposts at Santa Coloma, hoping -to draw St. Cyr’s attention to that side, while a -reinforcement for the garrison of Gerona should -pass through the left of his line into the city. -The French general was not deceived; but the -Spaniards nevertheless sent fifteen hundred chosen -men, under the command of one Marshal, an -Englishman, to penetrate secretly through the -enemy’s posts at Llagostera. They were accompanied -by an aide-de-camp of Alvarez, called Rich, -apparently an Englishmen also, and they succeeded -on the 9th in passing general Pino’s posts unobserved. -A straggler, however, was taken, and -St. Cyr being thus informed of the march, and -judging that the attempt to break the line of investment -would be made in the night and by the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28"></a>[28]</span> -road of Casa de Selva, immediately placed one -body of men in ambush near that point, and sent -another in pursuit of the succouring column.</p> - -<p>As the French general had foreseen, the Spaniards -continued their march through the hills at dusk, -but being suddenly fired upon by the ambuscade, -hastily retired, and the next day fell in with the -other troops, when a thousand men were made -prisoners: the rest dispersing, escaped the enemy, -yet were ill used and robbed of their arms by the -Somatenes. St. Cyr says that Mr. Marshal, having -offered to capitulate, fled during the negotiation, -and thus abandoned his men; but the Spanish -general Conpigny affirmed that the men abandoned -Marshal, and refused to fight, that Rich ran away -before he had seen the enemy, and that both he -and the troops merited severe punishment. It is -also certain that Marshal’s flight was to Gerona, -where he afterwards fell fighting gallantly.</p> - -<p>This disappointment was sensibly felt by Alvarez. -Sickness and battle had already reduced his garrison -to fifteen hundred men, and he was thus debarred -of the best of all defences, namely, frequent sallies -as the enemy neared the walls. His resolution was -unshaken, but he did not fail to remonstrate -warmly with Conpigny, and even denounced his -inactivity to the Supreme Junta. That general -excused himself on the ground of Blake’s absence, -the want of provisions, and the danger of carrying -the contagious sickness of Taragona into Gerona; -and finally adduced colonel Marshal’s unfortunate -attempt, as proof that due exertion had been made. -Yet he could not deny that Gerona had been -invested two months, had sustained forty days of -open trenches, a bombardment and an assault<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29"></a>[29]</span> -without any succour, and that during that time, -he himself remained at Taragona, instead of being -at Hostalrich with all the troops he could collect.</p> - -<p>From the prisoners taken the French ascertained -that neither Conpigny nor Blake had any intention -of coming to the relief of Gerona, until sickness -and famine, which pressed as heavily on the besiegers -as on the besieged, should have weakened -the ranks of the former; and this plan receives -unqualified praise from St. Cyr, who seems to have -forgotten, that with an open breach, a town, requiring -six thousand men to man the works, and having -but fifteen hundred, might fall at any moment.</p> - -<p>After the failure of the assault at Monjouic, -Verdier recommenced his approaches in due form, -opened galleries for a mine, and interrupted the -communication with the city by posting men in -the ruins of the little fort of St. Juan. But his -operations were retarded by Claros and Rovira, -who captured a convoy of powder close to the -French frontier. To prevent a recurrence of -such events, the brigade of Souham’s division was -pushed from Bañolas to St. Lorenzo de la Muja; -and, on the 2d of August, the fortified convent of -St. Daniel, situated in the valley of the Galligan, -between the Constable fort and Monjouic, was -taken by the French, who thus entirely intercepted -the communication between the latter place and -the city.</p> - -<p>On the 4th of August, the glacis of Monjouic -being crowned, the counterscarp blown in, and -the flank defences ruined, the ditch was passed, -and the half moon in front of the curtain carried -by storm, but no lodgement was effected. During -the day, Alvarez made an unsuccessful effort to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30"></a>[30]</span> -retake the ruins of St. Juan; and at the same time, -two hundred Spaniards who had come from the -sea-coast with provisions, and penetrated to the -convent of St. Daniel, thinking that their countrymen -still held it, were made prisoners.</p> - -<p>On the 5th the engineers having ascertained -that the northern bastion being hollow, the troops -would, after storming it, be obliged to descend a -scarp of twelve or fourteen feet, changed the line -of attack, and commenced new approaches against -the eastern bastion. A second practical breach -was soon opened, and preparations made for storming -on the 12th, but in the night of the 11th, the -garrison blew up the magazines, spiked the guns, -and, without loss, regained Gerona. Thus the fort -fell, after thirty-seven days of open trenches and -one assault.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31"></a>[31]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BIX_III">CHAPTER III.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>Verdier, elated by the capture of Monjouic, -boasted, in his despatches, of the difficulties that he -had overcome, and they were unquestionably great, -for the rocky nature of the soil had obliged him to -raise his trenches instead of sinking them, and his -approaches had been chiefly carried on by the flying -sap. But he likewise expressed his scorn of the -garrison, held their future resistance cheap, and -asserted that fifteen days would suffice to take -the town; in which he was justified neither by past -nor succeeding facts; for the Spaniards indignant -at his undeserved contempt, redoubled their exertions -and falsified all his predictions; and while -these events were passing close to Gerona, Claros -and Rovira, at the head of two thousand five hundred -Miguelettes, attacked Bascara a post between -Figuera and Gerona at the moment when a convoy, -escorted by a battalion had arrived there from Belgarde. -The commandant of Figueras indeed, uniting -some “<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">gens d’armes</i>” and convalescents to a detachment -of his garrison, succoured the post on the 6th; -but, meanwhile, the escort of the convoy had fallen -back on France and spread such terror, that Augereau -applied to St. Cyr for three thousand men to protect -the frontier. That general refused this ill-timed -demand, and, in his Memoirs, takes occasion -to censure the system of moveable columns, as -more likely to create than to suppress insurrections, -as being harassing to the troops, weakening to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_32"></a>[32]</span> -main force, and yet ineffectual, seeing that the -peasantry must always be more moveable than the -columns, and better informed of their marches and -strength. There is great force in these observations, -and if an army is in such bad moral discipline -that the officers commanding the columns cannot -be trusted, it is unanswerable. It must also be -conceded that this system, at all times requiring a -nice judgement, great talents, and excellent arrangement, -was totally inapplicable to the situation and -composition of the seventh corps. Yet, with good -officers and well combined plans, it is difficult to -conceive any more simple or efficient mode of protecting -the flanks and rear of an invading army, -than that of moveable columns supported by small -fortified posts; and it is sufficient that Napoleon was -the creator of this system, to make a military man -doubtful of the soundness of St. Cyr’s objections. -The emperor’s views, opinions, and actions, will in -defiance of all attempts to lessen them, go down, -with a wonderful authority to posterity.</p> - -<p>A few days after the affair of Bascara, eight -hundred volunteers, commanded by two officers, -named Foxa and Cantera, quitted Olot, and making -a secret march through the mountains, arrived in -the evening of the 10th, upon the Ter, in front of -Angeles; but being baffled in an attempt to pass -the river there, descended the left bank in the night, -pierced the line of investment, and, crossing at a -ford near St. Pons, entered Gerona at day-break. -This hardy exploit gave fresh courage to the garrison; -yet the enemy’s approaches hourly advanced, -pestilence wasted the besieged, and the Spanish -generals outside the town still remained inactive.</p> - -<p>In this conjuncture, Alvarez and his council were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33"></a>[33]</span> -not wanting to themselves; while defending the -half ruined walls of Gerona with inflexible constancy, -they failed not to remonstrate against the -cold-blooded neglect of those who should have succoured -them; and the Supreme Junta of Catalonia, -forwarded their complaints to the Central Junta at -Seville, with a remarkable warmth and manliness -of expression.</p> - -<p>“The generals of our army,” they said, “have -formed no efficient plan for the relief of Gerona; -not one of the three lieutenant-generals -here has been charged to conduct an expedition -to its help; they say that they act in conformity -to a plan approved by your Majesty. Can -it be true that your Majesty approves of abandoning -Gerona to her own feeble resources! If -so, her destruction is inevitable; and should this -<ins class="corr" id="tn-33" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'calamity befal'"> -calamity befall</ins>, will the other places of Catalonia -and the Peninsula have the courage to imitate -her fidelity, when they see her temples and -houses ruined, her heroic defenders dead, or in -slavery? And if such calamities should threaten -towns in other provinces, ought they to reckon -upon Catalonian assistance when this most interesting -place can obtain no help from them?”—“Do -you not see the consequences of this melancholy -reflection, which is sufficient to freeze the -ardour, to desolate the hearts of the most zealous -defenders of our just cause? Let this bulwark -of our frontier be taken, and the province is laid -open, our harvests, treasures, children, ourselves, -all fall to the enemy, and the country has -no longer any real existence.”</p> - -<p>In answer to this address, money was promised, -a decree was passed to lend Catalonia every succour,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34"></a>[34]</span> -and Blake received orders to make an immediate -effort to raise the siege. How little did -the language of the Spaniards agree with their -actions! Blake, indeed, as we shall find, made a -feeble effort to save the heroic and suffering city; -but the Supreme Central Junta were only intent -upon thwarting and insulting the English general, -after the battle of Talavera, and this was the -moment that the Junta of Catalonia, so eloquent, -so patriotic with the pen, were selling, to foreign -merchants, the arms supplied by England for the -defence of their country!</p> - -<p>Towards the end of August, when the French fire -had opened three breaches in Gerona, and the bombardment -had reduced a great part of the city -to ashes, Blake commenced his march from Taragona -with a force of eight or ten thousand regulars. -Proceeding by Martorel, El Valles, and Granollers, -he reached Vich, and from thence crossed the mountains -to St. Hillario, where he was joined by Wimphen -and the Milans; and as he had free communication -with Rovira and Claros, he could direct a body of not -less than twenty thousand men against the circle of -investment. His arrival created considerable alarm -among the French. The pestilence which wasted -the besieged, was also among the besiegers, and -the hospitals of Figueras and Perpignan contained -many thousand patients. The battalions in the -field could scarcely muster a third of their nominal -strength. Even the generals were obliged to rise -from sick-beds to take the command of the brigades; -and the covering army, inferior in number to the -Spanish force, was extended along more than thirty -miles of mountainous wooded country, intersected<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35"></a>[35]</span> -by rivers, and every way favourable for Blake’s -operations.</p> - -<p>Verdier was filled with apprehension, lest a disastrous -action should oblige him to raise the long-protracted -siege, notwithstanding his fore-boasts to -the contrary. But it was on such occasions that -St. Cyr’s best qualities were developed. A most -learned and practised soldier, and of a clear methodical -head, he was firm in execution, decided and -prompt in council; and, although, apparently wanting -in those original and daring views, which mark -the man of superior genius, seems to have been perfectly -fitted for struggling against difficulties. So -far from fearing an immediate battle, he observed, -“that it was to be desired, because his men were -now of confirmed courage. Blake’s inaction was -the thing to be dreaded, for, notwithstanding every -effort, not more than two days provisions could be -procured, to supply the troops when together, and -it would be necessary after that period to scatter -them again in such a manner, that scarcely -two thousand would be disposable at any given -point. The Spaniards had already commenced -skirmishing in force on the side of Bruñola, and as -Blake expected no reinforcements, he would probably -act immediately. Hence it was necessary -to concentrate as many men as possible, in the -course of the night and next day, and deliver battle, -and there were still ten thousand good troops under -arms, without reckoning those that might be spared -from the investing corps.”</p> - -<p>On the other hand, Blake, with an army, numerous -indeed but by no means spirited, was from -frequent defeat, become cautious without being -more skilful. He resolved to confine his efforts to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_36"></a>[36]</span> -the throwing supplies of men and provisions into -the town; forgetting that the business of a relieving -army is not to protract, but to raise a siege, and -that to save Gerona was to save Catalonia.</p> - -<p>He had collected and loaded with flour, about two -thousand beasts of burthen, and placed them in the -mountains, on the side of Olot, under an escort of -four thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry. -Garcia Conde, an ambitious and fiery young man -of considerable promise, undertook to conduct them -to Gerona, by the flat ground between the Ter and -the Oña, precisely opposite to that of the French -attack. To facilitate this attempt, Blake caused -colonel Henry O’Donnel to fall upon Souham’s -posts, near Bruñola, on the evening of the 31st of -August, supporting this attack with another detachment -under general Logoyri. At the same -time he directed colonel Landen to collect the Miguelettes -and Somatenes on the side of Palamos, -and take possession of “<em>N. S. de los Angelos</em>,” a convent, -situated on a high mountain behind Monjouic. -Claros and Rovira also received directions to attack -the French on the side of Casen Rocca. Thus -the enemy were to be assailed in every quarter, -except that on which the convoy was to pass.</p> - -<p>O’Donnel, commencing the operations, attacked -and carried a part of the position occupied by one -of Souham’s battalions at Bruñola, but the latter, -with an impetuous charge, again recovered the -ground. The Spanish general, being joined by -Loygori, renewed the skirmish, but could make -no further impression on the enemy. Meanwhile, -St. Cyr, having transferred his head-quarters to -Fornels, was earnestly advised to concentrate -his troops on the left of the Ter, partly, that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37"></a>[37]</span> -it was thought Blake would attempt to penetrate -on that side; partly that, being so close to -the Spanish army, the French divisions might, if -ordered to assemble on their actual centre, be -cut off in detail during their march. But he -argued that his opponent must be exceedingly -timid, or he would have attacked Souham with all -his forces, and broken the covering line at once; -and, seeing that such an opportunity was neglected, -he did not fear to concentrate his own troops, on the -Oña, by a flank march close under the beard of his -unskilful adversary.</p> - -<p>Souham’s division, falling back in the night, took -post the 1st of September, on the heights of San -Dalmaz, reaching to Hostalnou, and at eight o’clock, -the head of Pino’s division entered this line, prolonging -it, by the left, in rear of the village of -Rieudellot. At twelve o’clock, these two divisions -were established in position, and at the distance -of four miles in their rear, Verdier with a strong -detachment of the besieging corps, was placed in -reserve on the main road to Gerona. Lecchi was -sick, and his troops, commanded by Millosewitz, -took post at Salt, guarding the bridge and the -flat ground about St. Eugenio; having also instructions -to cross the Ter and march against Rovira -and Claros, if they should press the Westphalian -division which remained at San Pons. The -trenches under Monjouic were guarded. The mortar -battery of Casa Rocca was disarmed, and the -Westphalians had orders, if attacked, to retire to -Sarria, and look to the security of the parc and -the trenches. A thick fog and heavy rain interrupted -the view, and both armies remained apparently -quiet until the middle of the day, when<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38"></a>[38]</span> -the weather clearing, St. Cyr rode to examine the -Spanish positions; for the heads of Blake’s columns -were disposed as if he would have penetrated at -once, by Bruñola, Coloma de Farnés, Vidreras, -and Mallorquinas. Scarcely had the French general -quitted Fornels, when Garcia Conde, who, -under cover of the mist had been moving down -the mountains, crossed the Ter at Amer, and -decended the heights of Bañolas with his convoy. -He was now on the flat ground, where there was no -other guard than the two thousand men under Millosewitz, -placed, as I have said, at Salt to watch the -garrison and the movements of Rovira and Claros; -and consequently, with their rear to the advancing -convoy.</p> - -<p>Verdier’s reserve, the nearest support, was six -miles distant, and separated from Millosewitz by -considerable heights, and the Spanish columns, coming -into the plain without meeting a single French -post, advanced unperceived close to the main body, -and, with one charge, put the whole to flight. -The fugitives, in their panic, at first took the -direction of the town; but being fired upon, -turned towards the heights of Palau, made for -Fornels; and would have gone straight into Blake’s -camp, if they had not met St. Cyr on his return -from viewing that general’s positions. Rallying -and reinforcing them with a battalion from Pino’s -division, he instantly directed them back again -upon Salt, and at the same time sent Verdier orders -to follow Garcia Conde with the reserve; but -the latter had already conducted his convoy safely -into the town. Alvarez, also, sallying forth, had -destroyed the French works near St. Ugenio, and -thinking the siege raised, had immediately sent five<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39"></a>[39]</span> -hundred sick men out of the town, into the convent -of St. Daniel, which place had been abandoned by -the French two days before.</p> - -<p>Verdier after causing some trifling loss to Conde, -passed the bridge of Salt, and marched down the -left of the Ter to Sarria, to save his parcs, -which were threatened by Rovira and Claros; for -when those two Partizans skirmished with the -Westphalian troops, the latter retired across the -Ter, abandoning their camp and two dismounted -mortars. Thus the place was succoured for a moment; -but, as Blake made no further movement, -Alvarez was little benefitted by the success. The -provisions received, did not amount to more than -seven or eight days’ consumption; and the reinforcement, -more than enough to devour the food, -was yet insufficient to raise the siege by sallies.</p> - -<p>While Millosewitz’s troops were flying on the -one side of the Ter, the reports of Claros and -Rovira, exaggerating their success on the other -side of that river, had caused Alvarez to believe -that Blake’s army was victorious, and the French -in flight. Hence, he refrained from destroying the -bridge of Salt, and Verdier, as we have seen, -crossed it to recover his camp at Sarria. But for -this error, the garrison, reinforced by Conde’s men, -might have filled the trenches, razed the batteries, -and even retaken Monjouic before Verdier could -have come to their support.</p> - -<p>St. Cyr having but one day’s provisions left, -now resolved to seek Blake, and deliver battle; but -the Spanish general retired up the mountains, when -he saw the French advancing, and his retreat -enabled St. Cyr again to disseminate the French -troops. Thus ended the first effort to relieve Gerona.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_40"></a>[40]</span> -It was creditable to Garcia Conde, but so contemptible, -with reference to the means at Blake’s disposal, -that Alvarez believed himself betrayed; and, trusting -thenceforth only to his own heroism, permitted -Conde’s troops to go back, or to remain as they -pleased; exacting, however, from those who stopped, -an oath not to surrender. Renewing the edict -against speaking of a capitulation, he reduced the -rations of the garrison first to one half, and afterwards -to a fourth of the full allowance, a measure -which caused some desertions to the enemy; but -the great body of the soldiers and citizens were as -firm as their chief, and the townsmen freely sharing -their own scanty food with the garrison, made -common cause in every thing.</p> - -<p>Garcia Conde’s success must be attributed partly -to the negligence of St. Cyr’s subordinates; but -the extended cantonments, occupied in the evening -of the 31st, gave Blake, as the French general -himself acknowledges, an opportunity of raising -the siege without much danger or difficulty: nor -were St. Cyr’s dispositions for the next day perfectly -combined. It is evident that giving Blake credit -for sound views, he was himself so expectant of -a great battle that he forgot to guard against -minor operations. The flat country between the -left of the Oña and the Ter was the natural line -for a convoy to penetrate to the town; hence it -was a fault to leave two thousand men in that -place, with their front to the garrison, and their -rear to the relieving army, when the latter could -steal through the mountains until close upon them. -Cavalry posts at least should have been established -at the different inlets to the hills, and beacons -raised on convenient eminences. The main body<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41"></a>[41]</span> -of the army appears also to have been at too great -a distance from the town; the firing that took place -in the plain of Salt was disregarded by Verdier’s -reserve; and the first information of the attack -was brought to Fornels by the fugitives themselves.</p> - -<p>St. Cyr says that his generals of division were -negligent, and so weakened by sickness as to be -unable to look to their outposts; that he had -recommended to Verdier the raising of field-works -at the bridge of Salt and in the passes of the hills, -and, when his advice was disregarded, forbore, -from the peculiar situation in which he himself was -placed by the French government, to enforce his -undoubted authority. But St. Cyr avows that his -<span class="sidenote">St. Cyr’s -Journal of -Operations.</span>soldiers answered honestly to every call he made; -and he was bound, while he retained the command, -to enforce every measure necessary for maintaining -their honour. In other respects, his prudence and -vigilance were such as beseemed his great reputation. -It was not so with Blake. The whole -of his operations proved that he had lost confidence, -and was incapable of any great enterprize. -He should have come up with a resolution to raise -the siege or to perish. He contented himself with -a few slight skirmishes, and the introduction of a -small convoy of provisions; and then notwithstanding -the deep suffering of this noble city, turned -away, with a cold look, and a donation that mocked -its wants.</p> - -<p>When the siege was resumed, St. Cyr withdrew -the French posts from Palau and Monte Livio, -leaving the way apparently open on that side, for -the return of Garcia Conde, who, deceived by this -wile came out at daybreak on the 3d of September, -with fifteen hundred men and the beasts<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42"></a>[42]</span> -of burthen. Halting, for a little time, just beyond -the gate, he examined the country in front with -his glass; every thing appeared favourable and -his troops were beginning to move forward, when -the noise of drums beating to arms gave notice -that an ambuscade was placed behind Palau. St. -Cyr had, indeed, posted a brigade there in the -hope of surprising the Spaniards, but the French -forgetting the ambush, were performing the regular -service of the camp at day-light, and a cry of -astonishment burst from the Spanish column as it -hastily retreated again into the town.</p> - -<p>Baffled by this ridiculous mistake, and concluding -that the next attempt would be by Castellar -and La Bispal, St. Cyr placed Mazzuchelli’s brigade -(the same that had been behind Palau) in the -valley of the Oña in such a manner that it could -fall upon Conde’s rear when the latter should again -come forth. He also put a battalion on the hills in -a position to head the Spanish column, and drive -it back either upon Mazzuchelli’s brigade or upon -La Bispal, where he also posted three battalions -and a squadron of Pino’s division.</p> - -<p>The 4th of September one thousand infantry, -five hundred cavalry, and eleven hundred mules -again came out of Gerona, and ascending the -heights in which the fort of the Capuchin was -situated, pushed in single files along a by-path, -leading to Castellar da Selva. Mazzuchelli saw -them plainly, but did not attack, waiting for the -fire of the battalion ahead, and that battalion did -not fire because Mazzuchelli did not attack, and it -was supposed the Spaniards were part of his -brigade. Garcia Conde quickly perceived their -double error, and with great readiness filing off to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43"></a>[43]</span> -his left, turned the right of the battalion in his -front, and gained Castellar without hurt, although -the French in Monjouic observing all that passed, -played their guns upon the rear of his column. -Being informed by the peasants at Castellar, that -troops were also waiting for him at La Bispal, he -made for Caza de Selva, and General Pino having -notice of his approach, directed two battalions to -seize the summit of a ridge which crossed the -Spanish line of march, but the battalions took a -wrong direction; the Spaniards moved steadily on, -and although their rear was attacked by Pino’s -personal escort, and that fifty men and some -mules were captured, the main body escaped with -honour.</p> - -<p>There were now four open breaches in Gerona; -Mazzuchelli’s brigade and the troops at La Bispal -were added to the investing corps, and the immediate -fall of the city seemed inevitable, when the French -store of powder failed, and ten days elapsed before -a fresh supply could be obtained. Alvarez profitted -of this cessation, to retrench and barricade -the breaches in the most formidable manner. Verdier -had retaken the convent of St. Daniel in the -valley of Galligan, and obliged the five hundred -sick men to return to the town on the 4th; but -Landen, the officer sent by Blake, on the 31st of -August, to seize the convent of <em>Madona de los -Angeles</em>, had fortified that building, and introduced -small supplies of provisions; thus reviving, in the -mind of Alvarez, a plan for taking possession of the -heights beyond those on which the Capuchin and -Constable forts were situated, by which, in conjunction -with the post at Madona de los Angeles,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_44"></a>[44]</span> -and with the assistance of Blake’s army, he hoped -to maintain an open communication with the country. -A bold and skilful conception, but he was -unable to effect it; for making a sally from the Capuchins -on the 6th with eighteen hundred men, he -was beaten by a single French regiment; and the -same day Mazzuchelli’s Italians stormed Madona de -los Angeles, and put the garrison to the sword.</p> - -<p>During these events, Verdier marched against -Claros and Rovira who were posted at St. Gregorio, -near Amer. He was repulsed with loss, and the -French general Joba was killed. Meanwhile the -batteries having recommenced their fire on the 13th, -Alvarez made a general sally, by the gates of San -Pedro, beat the guards from the trenches, and -spiked the guns in one of the breaching batteries. -The 18th, however, Verdier thinking the breaches -practicable, proposed to give the assault, and required -assistance from St. Cyr, but disputes between -the generals of the covering and the investing -forces were rife. The engineers of the latter declared -the breaches practicable, those of the -former asserted that they were not, and that while -the fort of Calvary, outside the walls, although in -ruins was in possession of the Spaniards, no assault -should be attempted.</p> - -<p>Either from negligence, or the disputes between -St. Cyr and Augereau, above five thousand convalescents -capable of duty were retained in a -body at Perpignan, and Verdier could not produce -so many under arms for the assault, nor even for -this number were there officers to lead, so wasting -was the sickness. The covering army was scarcely -better off, and Blake had again taken the position<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45"></a>[45]</span> -of St. Hilario. Howbeit, St. Cyr, seeing no better -remedy, consented to try the storm provided Calvary -were first taken.</p> - -<p>Souham’s division was appointed to watch -Blake, Pino was directed to make a false attack on -the opposite quarter to where the breaches were established, -and, on the 19th, Verdier’s troops, in three -columns, advanced rapidly down the valley of Galligan -to the assault. But the fort of Calvary had -not been taken, and its fire swept the columns of -attack along the whole line of march. Two hundred -men fell before they reached the walls, and just as -the summit of the largest breach was gained, the -French batteries, which continued to play on the -Spanish retrenchments, brought down a large mass -of wall upon the head of the attacking column. The -besieged resisted manfully, and the besiegers were -completely repulsed from all the breaches with a loss -of six hundred men. Verdier accused his soldiers -of cowardice, and blamed St. Cyr for refusing to -<span class="sidenote">St. Cyr’s -Journal of -Operations</span>bring the covering troops to the assault; but that -general, asserting that the men behaved perfectly -well, called a council of war, and proposed to continue -the operations with as much vigour as the -nature of the case would permit. His persevering -spirit was not partaken by the council, and the -siege was turned into a blockade.</p> - -<p>Blake now advanced with his army, and from -the 20th to the 25th, made as if he would raise the -blockade; but his object was merely to introduce -another convoy. St. Cyr, divining his intention -and judging that he would make the attempt on the -26th, resolved to let him penetrate the covering -line, and then fall on him before he could reach -the town. In this view, Souham’s division was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46"></a>[46]</span> -placed behind Palau and Pino’s division at Casa de -Selva, and Lecchi’s division of the investing troops, -was directed to meet the Spaniards in front, while -the two former came down upon their rear.</p> - -<p>Blake assembled his troops on the side of Hostalrich, -then made a circuitous route to La Bispal, and, -taking post on the heights of St. Sadurni, detached -ten thousand men, under Wimphen, to protect the -passage of the convoy, of which Henry O’Donnel -led the advanced guard. At day-break, on the 26th, -O’Donnel fell upon the rear of the French troops at -Castellar, broke through them, and reached the -fort of the Constable with the head of the convoy; -but the two French battalions which he had driven -before him, rallying on the heights of San Miguel -to the right of the Spanish column, returned to the -combat, and at the same time St. Cyr in person, -with a part of Souham’s division came upon the -left flank of the convoy, and, pressing it strongly, -obliged the greater part to retrograde. When -Pino’s division, running up from Casa de Selva, -attacked the rear-guard under Wimphen, the route -was complete, and Blake made no effort to save the -distressed troops. O’Donnel with a thousand men -and about two hundred mules got safely into the -town, but the remainder of the convoy was taken. -The Italians gave no quarter and three thousand -of the Spaniards were slain.</p> - -<p>After this action, some troops being sent towards -Vidreras, to menace Blake’s communications with -Hostalrich, he retired by the side of St. Filieu de -Quixols, and Gerona was again abandoned to her -sufferings which were become almost insupportable. -Without money, without medicines, without -food; pestilence within the walls, the breaches<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47"></a>[47]</span> -open. “If,” said Alvarez, “the captain-general -be unable to make a vigorous effort, the whole of -Catalonia must rise to our aid, or Gerona will -soon be but a heap of carcases and ruins, the -memory of which will afflict posterity!”</p> - -<p>St. Cyr now repaired to Perpignan to make -arrangements for future supply, but finding Augereau -in a good state of health, obliged that marshal -to assume the command. Then, he says, every -thing needful <ins class="corr" id="tn-47" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'was betowed with'"> -was bestowed with</ins> a free hand upon -the seventh corps, because he himself was no -longer in the way; but a better reason is to be -found in the state of Napoleon’s affairs. Peace -had been concluded with Austria, the English expeditions -to the Scheldt and against Naples had -failed, and all the resources of the French government -becoming disposable, not only the seventh, -but every “corps d’armée” in Spain was reinforced.</p> - -<p>Augereau, escorted by the five thousand convalescents -from Perpignan, reached the camp before -Gerona, the 12th of October. In the course of the -following night, O’Donnel, issuing from the town, -on the side of the plain, broke through the guards, -fell upon Souham’s quarters, obliged that general -to fly in his shirt, and finally effected a junction -with Milans, at Santa Coloma; having successfully -executed as daring an enterprise as any performed -during this memorable siege. Augereau, however, -pressed the blockade, and thinking the spirit of -the Spaniards reduced, offered an armistice for a -month, with the free entry of provisions, if Alvarez -would promise to surrender unless relieved before -the expiration of that period. Such, however, was -the steady virtue of this man and his followers,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48"></a>[48]</span> -that, notwithstanding the grievous famine, the offer -was refused.</p> - -<p>Blake, on the 29th of October took possession -once more of the heights of Bruñola. Souham, -with an inferior force put him to flight, and this -enabled Augereau to detach Pino against the town -of Hostalrich, which was fortified with an old wall -and towers, defended by two thousand men, and -supported by the fire of the castle. It was carried -by storm, and the provisions and stores laid up -there captured, although Blake, with his army, was -only a few miles off. This disaster was however, -more than balanced by an action off the coast. -Rear-admiral Baudin, with a French squadron, -consisting of three ships of the line, two frigates, -and sixteen large store-ships, having sailed from -Toulon for Barcelona, about the 20th of October, -was intercepted by admiral Martin on the 23d. -During the chase several of the smaller vessels -were burnt by the enemy, the rest were driven on -shore at different places, and two of the line of -battle ships were set on fire by their own crews. -The store-ships and some of the armed vessels, -taking refuge at Rosas, put up boarding nettings, -and protecting their flanks by Rosas and the Trinity-fort, -presented a formidable front, having -above twenty guns on board disposed for defence, -besides the shore batteries. On the 31st of November -however, captain Hallowell appeared in the -bay with a squadron; and the same evening, sending -his boats in, destroyed the whole fleet, in despite -of a very vigorous resistance which cost the British -seventy men killed and wounded.</p> - -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_048fp" style="max-width: 35em;"> - <p class="right fs70"><em>Vol. 3, Plate 2.</em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_048fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_048fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - <div class="caption"> -SIEGE of GERONA<br /> -1810.<br /> - -<p><em>Published by T. & W. Boone 1830.</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>Meanwhile the distress of Gerona increased, desertions -became frequent, and ten officers having<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_49"></a>[49]</span> -failed in a plot to oblige the governor to capitulate, -went over in a body to the enemy. During November, -famine and sickness increased within the -city, and the French stores of powder were again -exhausted; but on the 6th of December, ammunition -having arrived, the suburb of Marina, that of -Girondella, the fort of Calvary, and all the other -towers beyond the walls, were carried by the besiegers; -and the besieged, confined to the circuit -of the walls, were cut off from the Capuchin and -Constable forts. Alvarez, who had been ill for -some days, roused himself for a last effort; and, -making a general sally, on the 7th, retook the -suburb of Girondella and the redoubts; and opening -a way to the outworks of the Constable, carried -off the garrison. The next day, overcome by -suffering, he became delirious. A council of war -assembled, and after six months of open trenches, -Gerona yielded on the 10th. The garrison marched -out with the honours of war, the troops were to be -exchanged in due course, the inhabitants were to be -respected, and none but soldiers were to be considered -prisoners. Such was the termination of a defence -which eclipsed the glory of Zaragoza.</p> - -<p>French and Spanish writers alike, affirm that -Augereau treated Alvarez with a rigour and contumely -that excited every person’s indignation; and -that, in violation of the capitulation, the monks -were, by an especial order of Napoleon, sent to -France. This last accusation admits, however, of -dispute; the monks had during the siege, formed -themselves into a regular corps, named the Crusaders; -they were disciplined and clothed in a sort -of uniform; and being to all intents soldiers, it can -hardly be said, that to constitute them prisoners,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50"></a>[50]</span> -was a violation, although it was undoubtedly a -harsh interpretation of the terms.</p> - -<p>Alvarez died at Figueras in his way to France; -but so long as virtue and courage are esteemed in -the world, his name will be held in veneration; -and if Augereau forgot what was due to this gallant -Spaniard’s merit, posterity will not forget to do -justice to both.</p> - - -<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4> - -<p>1º. In this siege, the constancy with which the -Geronans bore the most terrible sufferings accounts -for the protracted resistance; but constancy alone -could not have enabled them to defy the regular -progress of the engineer; as I have before observed, -the combinations of science are not to be -defied with impunity. But the French combinations -were not scientific; and this, saving the right of -Gerona to the glory she earned so hardly, was the -secret of the defence.</p> - -<p>2º. General St. Cyr, after observing that the -attack on Montjouic was ill judged and worse executed, -says, “The principal approaches should -have been conducted against the Marcadel, because -the soil there, was easy to work in, full of natural -hollows and clifts, and the defences open in flank -and rear to batteries on the Monte Livio and the -Casen Rocca. Whereas on the side of Montjouic, -the approaches, from the rocky nature of the soil, -could only be carried forward by the flying sap, -with great loss and difficulty.” If however, the -Marcadel had fallen, the greatest part of the city -would still have been covered by the Oña, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51"></a>[51]</span> -Montjouic, and the forts of the Constable and Capuchin, -(regular places complete in themselves,) -would have remained to be taken, unless it can be -supposed, that a governor who defended the feeble -walls of the town after those outworks fell, would -have surrendered all, because a lodgement was -made in an isolated quarter. These things are, -however, ordinarily doubtful; and certainly, it must -always be a great matter with a general, to raise -the moral confidence of his own army, or to sink -that of his adversary, even though it should be by -a momentary and illusive success.</p> - -<p>3º. The faulty execution of the attack on -Montjouic is less doubtful than the choice of direction. -The cessation of the breaching fire for four -days previous to the assault, and the disregard of -the rules of art already noticed, amply account for -failure; and it is to be observed, that this failure -caused the delay of a whole month in the progress -of the siege; that during that month disease invaded -the army, and the soldiers, as they will be -found to do in all protracted operations, became -careless and disinclined to the labours of the -trenches.</p> - -<p>4º. The assault on the body of the place was not -better conducted than that against Montjouic; and -considering these facts, together with the jealousy -and disputes between the generals, the mixture of -Germans, Italians, and French in the army, and -the mal-administration of the hospitals, by which so -many men were lost, and so many more kept from -their duty, it is rather surprising that Gerona was -taken at all.</p> - -<p>5º. The foregoing conclusions in no wise affect -the merits of the besieged, because the difficulties<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52"></a>[52]</span> -and errors of their adversaries only prolonged their -misery. They fought bravely; they endured unheard -of sufferings with constancy; and their refusal -to accept the armistice offered by Augereau, is -as noble and affecting an instance of virtue as any -that history has recorded. Yet how mixed are good -and evil principles in man; how dependent upon -accidental circumstances is the development of his -noble or base qualities! Alvarez, so magnanimous, -so firm, so brave, so patriotic at Gerona, was the -same Alvarez who, one year before, surrendered the -Barcelona Montjouic, on the insolent summons of -Duhesme! At that period, the influence of a base -court, degraded public feeling, and what was weak -in his character came to the surface; but in times -more congenial to virtuous sentiments, all the -nobility of the man’s nature broke forth.</p> - -<p>6º. When the siege of Gerona is contrasted with -that of Zaragoza, it may shake the opinion of those -who regard the wild hostility of the multitude as -superior to the regulated warfare of soldiers. -The number of enemies that came against the -latter was rather less than those who came -against the former city. The regular garrison of -Zaragoza was above thirty thousand; that of Gerona -about three thousand. The armed multitude, -in the one, amounted to at least twenty-five thousand; -in the other, they were less than six thousand. -Cruelty and murder marked every step in the defence -of Zaragoza; the most horrible crimes were -necessary to prolong the resistance, above forty -thousand persons perished miserably, and the town -was taken within three months. In Gerona there -was nothing to blush for; the fighting was more -successful; the actual loss inflicted upon the enemy<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53"></a>[53]</span> -greater; the suffering within the walls neither wantonly -produced nor useless; the period of its resistance -doubled that of Zaragoza; and every proceeding -tended to raise instead of sinking the dignity of -human nature. There was less of brutal rule, more -of reason, and consequently more real heroism, -more success at the moment, and a better example -given to excite the emulation of generous men.</p> - -<p>7º. With reference to the general posture of -affairs, the fall of Gerona was a reproach to the -Spanish and English cabinets. The latter having -agents in Catalonia, and such a man as lord Collingwood -in the Mediterranean, to refer to, were -yet so ignorant, or so careless of what was essential -to the success of the war, as to let Gerona struggle -for six months, when half the troops employed by -sir John Stuart to alarm Naples, if carried to the -coast of Catalonia, and landed at Palamos, would -have raised the siege. It was not necessary that -this army should have been equipped for a campaign, -a single march would have effected the -object. An engineer and a few thousand pounds -would have rendered Palamos a formidable post; -and that place being occupied by English troops, -and supported by a fleet, greater means than the -French could have collected in 1809, would not -have reduced Gerona. The Catalans, indeed, were -not more tractable nor more disposed than others to -act cordially with their allies; but the natural sterility -of the country, the condensed manufacturing -population, the number of strong posts and large -fortified towns in their possession, and, above all, -the long and difficult lines of communication which -the French must have guarded for the passage of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54"></a>[54]</span> -their convoys, would have rendered the invaders’ -task most difficult.</p> - -<p>8º. From the commencement of the Spanish insurrection, -the policy of the Valencians had been characterised -by a singular indifference to the calamities -that overwhelmed the other parts of Spain. -The local Junta in that province, not content with -asserting their own exclusive authority, imagined -that it was possible to maintain Valencia independent, -even though the rest of the Peninsula should -be conquered. Hence the siege of Zaragoza passed -unheeded, and the suffering of Gerona made no -impression on them. With a regular army of above -ten thousand men, more than thirty thousand armed -irregulars, and a large fleet at Carthagena, the -governors of this rich province, so admirably situated -for offensive operations, never even placed the fortified -towns of their own frontier in a state of defence, -<ins class="corr" id="tn-54" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'and carelesssly'"> -and carelessly</ins> beheld the seventh and third -corps gradually establishing, at the distance of a few -days’ march from Valencia itself, two solid bases -for further invasion! But it is now time to revert -to the operations of the “<em>Central Supreme Junta</em>,” -that it may be fully understood how the patriotism, -the constancy, the lives, and the fortunes of the -Spanish people were sported with by those who -had so unhappily acquired a momentary power -in the Peninsula.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55"></a>[55]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BIX_IV">CHAP. IV.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>When sir Arthur Wellesley retired to the frontier -of Portugal, the calumnies propagated in Andalusia, -relative to the cause of that movement, were -so far successful that no open revolt took place; -but the public hatred being little diminished, a -design was formed to establish a better government, -as a preliminary to which, measures were secretly -taken to seize the members of the Junta, and transport -them to Manilla. The old Junta of Seville -being the chief movers of this sedition, no good -could be expected from the change, otherwise, -such an explosion, although sure to be attended -with slaughter and temporary confusion, was -not unlikely to prove advantageous to the nation at -large, it being quite obvious that some violent remedy -was wanting to purge off the complicated -disorders of the state.</p> - -<p>“<em>Spain</em>,” said lord Wellesley, “<em>has proved untrue -to our alliance, because she is untrue to -herself.</em>”—“<em>Until some great change shall be -effected in the conduct of the military resources of -Spain, and in the state of her armies, no British -army can attempt safely to co-operate with Spanish -troops in the territories of Spain.”—“No alliance -can protect her from the results of internal disorders -and national infirmity.</em>”</p> - -<p>This evident discontent of the British ambassador -led the conspirators to impart their designs to him, -in the hopes of assistance; but he being accredited -to the existing government, apprised it of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56"></a>[56]</span> -danger, concealing, however, with due regard to -humanity, the names of those engaged in the plot. -The Junta, in great alarm, immediately sought to -mitigate the general hatred; but still averse to -sacrificing any power, projected a counter scheme. -They had, for the public good according to some, -for private emolument according to others, hitherto -permitted trading, under licenses, with the towns -occupied by the enemy. This regulation and some -peculiarly-heavy exactions they now rescinded, and, -as a final measure of conciliation, appointed, with -many protestations of patriotism, commissioners to -prepare a scheme of government which should -serve until the fit period for convoking the Cortes -arrived.</p> - -<p>But the commissioners, principally chosen from -amongst the members of the Junta, soon made -manifest the real designs of that body. They proposed -that five persons should form a supreme -executive council, every member of the existing -Junta, in rotation, to have a place; the colonies to -be represented as an integral part of the empire; -and the council so composed, to rule until the -Cortes should meet, and then to preside in that -assembly. Thus under the pretence of resigning -their power, by a simple change of form, the present -and the future authority of the Junta were to be -confirmed, and even the proposal, in favour of the -colonies, was, following the opinion of lord Wellesley, -a mere expedient to obtain a momentary -popularity, and entirely unconnected with enlarged -or liberal views of policy and government.</p> - -<p>This project was foiled by Romana, who, being -of the commission, dissented from his colleagues; -and it was on this occasion that he drew up that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57"></a>[57]</span> -accusatory paper, quoted in another part of this -history, and the bad acts therein specified, although -sufficiently heinous, were not the only charges -<span class="sidenote">Vol. II. -p. 348.</span>made at this period. It was objected to some -amongst the Junta, that having as merchants, -contracted for supplying the army, they in their -public capacity, raised the price to be paid by the -treasury for the articles; and that the members -generally were venal in their patronage, difficult -of access, and insolent of demeanour.</p> - -<p>Romana proposed a council of regency, to be composed -of five persons, not members of the Junta. This -council to be assisted by a fresh chosen Junta, also -composed of five members and a procurator-general, -and to be stiled “<em>The Permanent Deputation of the -Realm</em>.” One of this body to be a South American, -and the whole to represent the Cortes, until the meeting -of that assembly, which, he thought, could not be -too soon. His plan, introduced by misplaced declarations -in favour of arbitrary power, and terminated -by others equally strong in favour of civil -liberty, was not well considered. The “<em>Permanent -Deputation</em>,” being to represent the Cortes, it was -obvious that it must possess the right of controlling -the Regency; but the numbers and dignity of both -being equal, and their interests opposed, it was -as obvious that a struggle would commence, in -which the latter, having the sole distribution of -honours and emoluments, could not fail to conquer, -and no Cortes would be assembled.</p> - -<p>Some time before this, when the terror caused -by sir Arthur Wellesley’s retreat from Spain, was -fresh, Don Martin de Garay had applied to lord Wellesley -for advice, as to the best form of government, -and that nobleman also recommended a “<em>Council<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_58"></a>[58]</span> -of Regency</em>,” and, like Romana, proposed a second -council; but with this essential difference, that the -latter were only to arrange the details for electing -the members of Cortes, a proclamation for the convocation -of which was to be immediately published, -together with a list of grievances, “<em>a Bill -of Rights</em>” founded on an enlarged conciliatory -policy and having equal regard for the interests -of the colonies as for those of the mother country. -Garay approved of this advice while danger menaced -the Junta; but when the arrangement for the -command of the armies had been completed, and -the first excitement had subsided, his solicitude for -the improvement of the government ceased. It -must, however, be acknowledged, that lord Wellesley, -condemned the existing system, as much for -its democratic form as for its inefficiency; because -the English cabinet never forgot, that they were the -champions of privilege, nor, that the war was -essentially, less for the defence of Spain, than the -upholding of the aristocratic system of Europe.</p> - -<p>To evade Romana’s proposition, the Junta, on -the 28th of October, announced that the National -Cortes should be convoked on the 1st of January, -1810, and assembled for business on the 1st of -March following. Having thus, in some measure, -met the public wishes, they joined to this announcement -a virulent attack on the project of a -Regency, affirming, and not without some foundation -as regarded Romana’s plan, that such a government -would disgust the colonies, trample on -the king’s rights, and would never assemble the -Cortes; moreover that it would soon be corrupted -by the French. Then enlarging on their own merits -in a turgid declamatory style, they defended<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59"></a>[59]</span> -their past conduct by a tissue of misrepresentations, -which deceived nobody; for, to use the words of -lord Wellesley, “<em>no plan had been adopted for any -effectual redress of grievances, correction of abuses -or relief from exactions, and the administration of -justice, the regulation of revenue, finance, commerce, -the security of persons and property, and -every other great branch of government, were as -defective as the military establishments</em>.”</p> - -<p>However, the promise of assembling the Cortes -sufficed to lull the public wrath; and the Junta -resolved to recommence offensive military operations, -which they fondly imagined would, at once, -crush the enemy, and firmly establish their own -popularity and power. They were encouraged by -a false, but general impression throughout Andalusia, -that Austria had broken off negotiations -with France; and in September and October, -fresh levies, raised in Estremadura and Andalusia, -were incorporated with the remains of Cuesta’s -old army; the whole forming a body of more than -sixty thousand soldiers, of which nearly ten thousand -were cavalry. Nor was the assembling and -equipment of this force a matter of great difficulty; -for owing to the feeble resistance made against -the invaders, the war had hitherto drawn so little -on the population, that the poorer sort never -evaded a call for personal service; and the enormous -accumulation of English stores and money -at Cadiz and Seville, were sufficient for every exigency.</p> - -<p>In October Eguia advanced with this army a -short way into La Mancha; but when the French, -unwilling to lose the resources of that fertile province -made a movement towards him, he regained<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60"></a>[60]</span> -the Sierra Morena on the 16th, taking post, first -at St. Elena, and finally at La Carolina. The first -and fourth corps then occupied the whole of La -Mancha, with advanced posts at the foot of the -mountains; the second and fifth corps were established -in the valley of the Tagus and at Toledo; -and the reserve at Madrid. During these movements, -Bassecour, who commanded in Estremadura, -detached eight hundred horsemen to reinforce the -duke Del Parque, and quartered the rest of his -forces behind the Guadiana. Thus in the latter -end of October, there were sixty thousand men, -under Eguia, covering Seville by the line of La -Mancha; ten thousand under Bassecour on the -line of Estremadura, and about six thousand employed -as guards to the Junta and in the service of -the depôts behind the Morena.</p> - -<p>In the north, the Spanish army of the left was -concentrated near Ciudad Rodrigo. For when -Beresford marched down the Portuguese frontier -to the Tagus, the duke Del Parque, reinforced -with the eight hundred cavalry from Estremadura, -and with the Gallician divisions of Mendizabel and -Carrera, (amounting to thirteen thousand men, -completely equipped from English stores, brought -out to Coruña in July,) made a movement into the -rugged country, about the Sierra de Francia, and -sent his scouting parties as far as Baños. At -the same time general Santocildes, marching from -Lugo with two thousand men, took possession of -Astorga, and menaced the rear of the sixth corps, -<span class="sidenote">See Vol. II. -p. 427.</span>which after forcing the pass of Baños, had been -quartered between the Tormes and the Esla. In -this situation, a French detachment attempted to -surprise one of the gates of Astorga, on the 9th<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61"></a>[61]</span> -of October, and, being repulsed, returned to their -cantonments. Soon afterwards Ballasteros, having -again collected about eight thousand men in the -Asturias, armed and equipped them from English -stores, and, coming down to Astorga, crossed the -Esla, and attempted to storm Zamora. Failing in -this, he entered Portugal by the road of Miranda, and -from thence proceeded to join the duke Del Parque. -Thus the old armies of Gallicia and the Asturias -being broken up, those provinces were ordered to -raise fresh forces; but there was in Gallicia a general -disposition to resist the authority of the Central -Junta.</p> - -<p>Del Parque, eager to act against the sixth corps, -demanded, through Perez Castro the Spanish envoy -at Lisbon, that the Portuguese army should join -him; but this being referred to sir Arthur Wellesley, -he gave it a decided negative, grounding his -refusal upon reasons which I shall insert at large, -as giving a clear and interesting view of the -military state of affairs at this period.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Letter from -Sir A. <ins class="corr" id="tn-61" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Wellesly'"> -Wellesley</ins>, -Sept. -23, 1809. -MS.</div> - -<p>“The enemy, he said, were superior to the allies, -including those which Beresford might bring into -the field, not only in numbers, but (adverting to the -composition of the Spanish armies, the want of -cavalry in some, of artillery in others, of clothing, -ammunition, and arms, and the deficiency of discipline -in all) superior in efficiency even to a -greater degree than in numbers. These circumstances, -and the absolute deficiency in means, were -the causes why, after a great victory at Talavera, -the armies had been obliged to recur to the defensive, -and nothing had altered for the better -since.</p> - -<p>“But, besides these considerations, the enemy<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62"></a>[62]</span> -enjoyed peculiar advantages from his central position, -which enabled him to frustrate the duke Del -Parque’s intended operations. He could march a -part, or the whole of his forces to any quarter, -whereas the operation of the different corps of the -allies must necessarily be isolated, and each for a -time exposed to defeat. Thus there was nothing to -prevent the enemy from throwing himself upon the -duke Del Parque and Beresford, with the whole -corps of Ney, which was at Salamanca, of Soult, -which was at Plasencia, and with the force under -Kellerman, which was near Valladolid, in which -case, even if he, sir Arthur, had the inclination, -he had not the means of marching in time to save -them from destruction.</p> - -<p>“In the same manner the British army, if it -took an advanced position, would be liable to a -fatal disaster; so likewise would the Spanish army -of La Mancha. It followed, then, that if any one -of these armies made a forward movement, the -whole must co-operate, or the single force in activity -would be ruined; but the relative efficiency and -strength of the hostile forces, as laid down in the -commencement of the argument, forbad a general -co-operation with any hopes of solid success; and -the only consequence that could follow would be, -that, after a battle or two, some brilliant actions -performed by a part, and some defeats sustained by -others, and after the loss of many valuable officers -and soldiers, the allies would be forced again to -resume those defensive positions, which they ought -never to have quitted.</p> - -<p>“Satisfied that this was the only just view of -affairs, he, although prepared to make an effort to -prevent Ciudad Rodrigo from falling into the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63"></a>[63]</span> -enemy’s hands, was resolved not to give the duke -Del Parque any assistance to maintain his former -position, and he advised <ins class="corr" id="tn-63" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the Portugese'"> -the Portuguese</ins> government, -not to risk Bereford’s army in a situation which -could only lead to mischief. The proposed operation -of the duke Del Parque was not the mode to -save Ciudad Rodrigo. The only effectual one was -to post himself in such a situation as that the -enemy could not attack and defeat him without a -long previous preparation, which would give time -for aid to arrive, and a march, in which the enemy -himself might be exposed to defeat. To expose -those troops to defeat which were ultimately to -co-operate in defence of Ciudad Rodrigo, was not -the way of preventing the success of an attempt -of that fortress. The best way was to place the -Spanish force in such a post that it could not be -attacked without risk to the enemy, and from -whence it could easily co-operate with the other -corps, which must be put in motion, if Ciudad was -to be saved; and although he would not take upon -himself to point out the exact position which the -duke Del Parque ought to occupy, he was certain -that, in his present forward one, although joined by -Beresford, he could not avoid defeat. Ciudad -Rodrigo would be lost, and other misfortunes would -follow, none of which could occur under any other -probable, or even possible concurrence of circumstances. -In fine, that he had long been of opinion -that the war must necessarily be defensive on the -part of the allies, and that Portugal at least, if -not Spain, ought to avail herself of the short -period, which the enemy seemed disposed to leave -her in tranquillity, to organize, and equip, and -discipline her armies. Those objects could not be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64"></a>[64]</span> -accomplished, unless the troops were kept quiet, -and yet they were much more important to all -parties, than any desultory successful operations -against the French troops about Salamanca; but -any success was doubtful, and certain to be temporary, -because the enemy would immediately -collect in numbers sufficient to crush the allies, who -must then return, having failed in their object, lost -a number of men, and, what was worse, time, -which would have been more usefully employed -in preparing for a great and well combined effort.”</p> - -<p>This reasoning, solid, clear, convincing, made -no impression upon the Spanish Junta or their -general. Castro replied to it, by demanding a -positive and definitive answer, as to when the -Portuguese army would be in a condition to co-operate -with the Spaniards in the Spanish territories. -<span class="sidenote">Sir A. <ins class="corr" id="tn-64" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Wellesly'"> -Wellesley</ins>’s -Correspondence -with -Don M. -Forjas, -October 19, -1809. MSS.</span>“<em>When there is a Spanish army with which the Portuguese -can co-operate on some defined plan, which all -parties will have the means, and will engage to carry -into execution, as far as any person can engage to -carry into execution a military operation.</em>” “<em>When -means shall be pointed out, and fixed, for the subsistence -of the Portuguese troops while they remain -in Spain, so that they may not starve, and be obliged -to retire for want of food, as was the case when -lately in that country.</em>” “<em>When decided answers -shall be given upon those points, I shall be enabled -to tell the governors of Portugal that their excellencies -have an army in a state to be sent into -Spain.</em>” This was sir Arthur’s reply, which ended -the negotiation, and the duke Del Parque commenced -operations by himself.</p> - -<p>To favour the junction of Ballasteros, his first -movement was towards Ledesma. General Marchand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65"></a>[65]</span> -immediately drew together, at Salamanca, -eleven thousand men and fourteen guns, and marched -to meet him. Thereupon, the duke, without having -effected his junction, fell back to Tamames; -taking post half-way up a mountain of remarkable -strength, where he awaited the enemy, with a -thousand cavalry and twenty thousand infantry, -of which the Gallicians only could be accounted -experienced soldiers.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF TAMAMES.</h4> - -<p>General Losada commanded the Spanish right, -count Belvidere the reserve, Martin Carrera the -left, which being on the most accessible part of -the mountain was covered and flanked by the cavalry. -Marchand, desirous of fighting before -Ballasteros could arrive, moved rapidly, reached -the foot of the mountain early on the 18th of October, -and immediately fell upon Del Parque’s left. -The Spanish cavalry fled rather hastily; the -French horsemen followed closely, the infantry -surprised in the midst of an evolution, were -thrown into disorder, and the artillery was taken. -Carrera, Mendizabel, and the duke, rallied the -troops on the higher ground, reinforced them from -the reserve, and coming down with a fresh impetus, -recovered the guns, and discomfitted the French -with the loss of an eagle, one cannon, and several -hundred men. During this brilliant combat on the -left, the right and centre were felt by the French -skirmishers; but the ground was too strong to make -any impression. Marchand, seeing his men repulsed -in all quarters with loss, and fearing to be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66"></a>[66]</span> -enclosed by Ballasteros in that disordered state, -retreated to Salamanca.</p> - -<p>Del Parque did not venture to follow up his victory -until the 21st, when, being joined by Ballasteros, -he pushed with nearly thirty thousand men -for Ledesma; crossed the Tormes there on the 23d, -turned Salamanca by a night march, and early in -the morning of the 24th crowned the heights of -San Cristoval in rear of that city, hoping to cut off -Marchand’s retreat. But that general had timely -information, and was already at Toro, behind the -Douro. Meanwhile, the news of the defeat at Tamames -reached Madrid, Dessolle’s division was -detached through the Puerto Pico to reinforce the -sixth corps; and Kellerman was directed to advance -from Valladolid, and take the command of the -whole.</p> - -<p>When the duke Del Parque heard of this reinforcement, -he fell back, not to Ciudad Rodrigo, -but by the way of Alba de Tormes to Bejar, which -latter place he reached on the 8th of November. -And while these events were taking place in Castile, -the Central Junta having finally concocted their -schemes, were commencing an enterprise of unparalleled -rashness on the side of La Mancha.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67"></a>[67]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BIX_V">CHAPTER V.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>In the arrangement of warlike affairs, difficulties -being always overlooked by the Spaniards, they are -carried on from one phantasy to another so swiftly, -that the first conception of an enterprise is immediately -followed by a confident anticipation of complete -success, which continues until the hour of -battle; and then when it might be of use, generally -abandons them. Now the Central Junta -having, to deceive the people, affirmed that sir -Arthur Wellesley retreated to the frontiers of Portugal -at the very moment when the French might -have been driven to the Pyrenees, came very soon -to believe this their own absurd calumny, and resolved -to send the army at Carolina headlong -against Madrid: nay, such was their pitch of confidence, -that forenaming the civil and military -authorities, they arranged a provisionary system for -the future administration of the capital, with a care, -that they denied to the army which was to put -them in possession.</p> - -<p>Eguia was considered unfit to conduct this enterprise, -and Albuquerque was distasteful to the Junta; -wherefore, casting their eyes upon general Areizaga, -they chose him, whose only recommendation -was, that, at the petty battle of Alcanitz, Blake had -noticed his courage. He was then at Lerida, but -reached La Carolina in the latter end of October; -and being of a quick lively turn, and as confident -as the Junta could desire, readily undertook to drive -the French from Madrid.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68"></a>[68]</span></p> - -<p>This movement was to commence early in November, -and at first, only Villa Campa, with the -bands from Aragon, were to assist. But when -Areizaga, after meeting the enemy, began to lose -confidence, the duke of Albuquerque, successor to -Bassecour in Estremadura, received instructions to -cause a diversion, by marching on Arzobispo and -Talavera de la Reyna. The duke Del Parque, coming -by the pass of Baños, was to join him there; -and thus nearly ninety thousand men were to be -put in motion against Madrid, but precisely on -that plan which sir Arthur Wellesley had just denounced -as certain to prove disastrous. Indeed, -every chance was so much in favour of the French, -that taking into consideration the solid reasons for -remaining on the defensive, Areizaga’s irruption -may be regarded as an extreme example of military -rashness; and the project of uniting Del Parque’s -forces with Albuquerque’s, at Talavera, was also -certain to fail; because, the enemy’s masses were -already in possession of the point of junction, and -the sixth corps could fall on Del Parque’s rear.</p> - -<p>Partly to deceive the enemy, partly because they -would never admit of any opposition to a favourite -scheme, the Junta spread a report that the British -army was to co-operate; and permitted Areizaga to -march, under the impression that it was so. Yet -nothing could be more untrue. Sir Arthur Wellesley -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_II">No. II.</a> -Section 1.</span>being at this period at Seville, held repeated -conversations with the Spanish ministers and the -members of the Junta, and reiterating all his former -objections to offensive operations, warned his auditors -that the project in question was peculiarly -ill-judged, and would end in the destruction of -their army. The Spanish ministers, far from attending<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69"></a>[69]</span> -to his advice, did not even <em>officially inform -him of Areizaga’s march until the 18th of November</em>, -the very day before the fatal termination of the -campaign. Yet, on <em>the 16th they had repeated -their demand for assistance</em>, and with a vehemence, -deaf to reason, required that the British -should instantly co-operate with Albuquerque and -Del Parque’s forces. Sir Arthur, firm to his -first views, never gave the slightest hopes that -his army would so act; and he assured the Junta, -that the diversion proposed would have no effect -whatever.</p> - - -<h4>OPERATIONS IN LA MANCHA.</h4> - -<p>Areizaga, after publishing an address to the -troops on the 3d of November, commenced his -march from La Carolina, with sixty pieces of artillery, -and from fifty to sixty thousand men, of which -about eight thousand were cavalry. Several British -officers and private gentlemen, and the baron -Crossard, an Austrian military agent, attended the -head-quarters which was a scene of gaiety and -boasting; for Areizaga, never dreaming of misfortune, -gave a free scope to his social vivacity. -The army marched by the roads of Manzanares and -Damiel, with scarcely any commissariat preparation, -and without any military equipment save arms; -but the men were young, robust, full of life and -confidence; and being without impediments of any -kind, made nearly thirty miles each day. They -moved however in a straggling manner, quartering -and feeding as they could in the villages on their -route, and with so little propriety, that the peasantry<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70"></a>[70]</span> -of La Mancha universally abandoned their dwellings, -and carried off their effects.</p> - -<p>Although the French could not at first give credit -to the rumours of this strange incursion, they -were aware that some great movement was in agitation, -and only uncertain from what point and for -what specific object the effort would be made. -Jourdan had returned to France; Soult was major-general -of the French armies, and under his advice, -the king, who was inclined to abandon Madrid, -prepared to meet the coming blow. But the army -<span class="sidenote">S.<br /> -Journal of -Operations. -MSS.</span>was principally posted towards Talavera; for the false -reports had, in some measure, succeeded in deceiving -the French as to the approach of the English; and -it was impossible at once to conceive the full insanity -of the Junta.</p> - -<p>The second corps, commanded by general Heudelet, -being withdrawn from Placentia, was, on the -5th of November, posted at Oropesa and Arzobispo, -with an advanced guard at Calzada, and scouting -parties watching Naval Moral, and the course of -the Tietar.</p> - -<p>The fifth corps, under Mortier, was concentrated -at Talavera.</p> - -<p>Of the fourth corps, half a division garrisoned -Madrid in the absence of Dessolle’s troops; and the -other half, under general Liger Belair, was behind -the Tajuna, guarding the eastern approaches to the -capital. The remaining divisions, commanded by -Sebastiani, were, the one at Toledo, the other with -Milhaud’s cavalry at Ocaña.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Imperial -Muster -Roll. MSS.</div> - -<p>The first corps, about twenty-one thousand strong, -and commanded by marshal Victor, was at Mora and -Yebenes, a day’s march in advance of Toledo, -but the cavalry of this corps under the command<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71"></a>[71]</span> -of Latour Maubourg occupied Consuegra and Madrilejos, -on the road to the Sierra Morena. The whole -army including the French and Spanish guards, -was above eighty thousand fighting men, without -reckoning Dessolle’s division, which was on the -other side of the Guadarama mountains.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">S.<br /> -Journal of -Operations. -MSS.</div> - -<p>In the night of the 6th, information reached the -king, that six thousand Spanish horsemen, supported -by two thousand foot, had come down upon Consuegra -from the side of Herencia, and that a second -column likewise composed of cavalry and infantry, -had passed the Puerto de Piche, and fallen upon -the outposts at Madrilejos. All the prisoners taken -in the skirmishes agreed that the Spanish army -was above fifty thousand strong, and the duke of -<ins class="err" id="err-71" title="Erratum: was 'Bulluno'"> -Belluno</ins> immediately concentrated the first corps -at Yebenes, but kept his cavalry at Mora, by -which he covered the roads leading from Consuegra -and Madrilejos upon Toledo. On the 8th, -there were no Spaniards in front of the first corps, -yet officers sent towards Ocaña, were chased back -by cavalry; and Soult judged what was indeed the -truth, that Areizaga continuing his reckless march, -had pushed by Tembleque towards Aranjuez, -leaving the first corps on his left flank. The division -of the fourth corps was immediately moved -from Toledo by the right bank of the Tagus to -Aranjuez, from whence Sebastiani carried it to -Ocaña, thus concentrating about eight thousand -infantry, and fifteen hundred cavalry at that point -on the 9th; and the same day Victor retired with -the first corps to Ajofrin.</p> - -<p>On the 10th, Gazan’s division of the fifth corps -was ordered to march from Talavera to Toledo; and -the first corps which had reached the latter town,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_72"></a>[72]</span> -was directed to move up the right bank of the -Tagus to Aranjuez to support Sebastiani, who holding -fast at Ocaña, sent six squadrons to feel for the -enemy towards Guardia. The Spaniards continuing -their movement, met those squadrons and pursued -them towards Ocaña.</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF DOS BARRIOS.</h4> - -<p>Areizaga, ignorant of what was passing around -him, and seeing only Sebastiani’s cavalry on -the table-land between the town of Dos Barrios -and Ocaña, concluded that they were unsupported, -and directed the Spanish horse to charge -them without delay. The French thus pressed, -drew back behind their infantry which was close -at hand and unexpectedly opened a brisk fire on -the Spanish squadrons which were thrown into -confusion, and being charged in that state by the -whole mass of the enemy’s cavalry, were beaten, -with the loss of two hundred prisoners and two -pieces of cannon. Areizaga’s main body was, however, -coming up, and Sebastiani fell back upon -Ocaña. The next morning he took up a position -on some heights lining the left bank of the -Tagus and covering Aranjuez, the Spaniards entered -Dos Barrios, and their impetuous movement -ceased. They had come down from the Morena -like a stream of lava; and burst into La -Mancha with a rapidity that scarcely gave time for -rumour to precede them. But this swiftness of -execution, generally so valuable in war, was here -but an outbreak of folly. Without any knowledge -of the French numbers or position, without any<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_73"></a>[73]</span> -plan of action, Areizaga rushed like a maniac into -the midst of his foes, and then suddenly stood still, -trembling and bewildered.</p> - -<p>From the 10th to the 13th he halted at Dos Barrios, -and informed his government of Sebastiani’s -<ins class="corr" id="tn-73" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'subborn resistance'"> -stubborn resistance</ins>, and of the doubts which now -for the first time assailed his own mind. It was -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_II">No. II.</a> Section -1.</span>then the Junta changing their plans, eagerly demanded -the assistance of the British army, and -commanded the dukes of Albuquerque and Del -Parque to unite at Talavera. Albuquerque commenced -his movement immediately, and the Junta -did not hesitate to assure both their generals and the -public, that sir Arthur was also coming on.</p> - -<p>Thus encouraged, and having had time to recover -from his first incertitude, Areizaga on the 14th, made -a flank march by his right to Santa Cruz la Zarza, -intending to cross the Tagus at Villa Maurique, -turn the French left, and penetrate to the capital by -the eastern side; but during his delay at Dos Barrios -the French forces had been concentrated from -every quarter.</p> - -<p>South of Ocaña, the ground is open and undulating, -but on the north, the ramifications of the -Cuença mountains, leading down the left bank -of the Tagus, presented, at Santa Cruz, ridges -which stretching strong and rough towards Aranjuez, -afforded good positions for Sebastiani to -cover that place. Soult was awake to his adversary’s -<span class="sidenote">S.<br /> -Journal of -Operations. -MSS.</span>projects, yet could not believe that he would -dare such a movement unless certain of support -from the British army; and therefore kept the different -corps quiet on the eleventh, waiting for Heudelet’s -report from Oropesa. In the night it -arrived, stating that rumours of a combined Spanish<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_74"></a>[74]</span> -and English army being on the march, were rife, but -that the scouts could not discover that the allied -force was actually within several marches.</p> - -<p>Soult, now judging that although the rumours -should be true, his central position would enable -him to defeat Areizaga and return by the way of -Toledo in time to meet the allies in the valley of -the Tagus, put all his masses again into activity. -The first corps was directed to hasten its march to -Aranjuez; the fifth corps to concentrate at Toledo; -the second corps to abandon Oropesa, Calzada and -Arzobispo, and replacing the fifth corps at Talavera, -to be in readiness to close upon the main body of -the army. Finally, information being received of the -duke Del Parque’s retreat from Salamanca to Bejar -and of the re-occupation of Salamanca by the sixth -corps, Dessolle’s division was recalled to Madrid.</p> - -<p>During the 12th, while the first, second, and fifth -corps were in march, general Liger Belair’s brigade -continued to watch the banks of the Tajuna, and -the fourth corps preserved its offensive positions on -the height in the front of Aranjuez, having fifteen -hundred men in reserve at the bridge of Bayona. -The 14th the general movement was completed. -Two corps were concentrated at Aranjuez to assail -the Spaniards in front; one at Toledo to cross the -Tagus and fall upon their left flank, and the king’s -guards at Madrid, formed a reserve for the fourth -and first corps. The second corps was at Talavera, -and Dessolle’s division was in the Guadarama on -its return to the capital. In fine, all was prepared -for the attack of Dos Barrios, when Areizaga’s flank -march to Santa Cruz la Zarza occasioned new combinations.</p> - -<p>In the evening of the 15th, it was known that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75"></a>[75]</span> -the Spaniards had made a bridge at Villa Maurique, -and passed two divisions and some cavalry -over the Tagus. The duke of Belluno was immediately -ordered to carry the first and fourth corps -(with the exception of a brigade left in Aranjuez) -up the left bank of the Tagus, operating, to fix -Areizaga, and force him to deliver battle; and, -with a view of tempting the Spaniard, by an appearance -of timidity, the bridges of La Reyna and -Aranjuez were broken down.</p> - -<p>While these dispositions were making on the -French side, the Spanish general commenced a -second bridge over the Tagus; and part of his -cavalry, spreading in small detachments, scoured -the country, and skirmished on a line extending -from Arganda to Aranjuez. The Partidas also, -being aided by detachments from the army, obliged -the French garrison to retire from Guardalaxara -upon Arganda, and occupied the former town on -the 12th. But, in the night of the 13th, eight -French companies and some troops of light cavalry, -by a sudden march, surprised them, killed and -wounded two or three hundred men, and took -eighty horses and a piece of artillery.</p> - -<p>The 16th the infantry of the first and fourth -corps was at Morata and Bayona, the cavalry at -Perales and Chinchon, and, during this time, the -fifth corps, leaving a brigade of foot and one of -horse at Toledo, marched by Illescas towards Madrid, -to act as a reserve to the duke of Belluno.</p> - -<p>The 17th Areizaga continued his demonstrations -on the side of the Tajuna, and hastened the construction -of his second bridge; but on the approach -of the duke of Belluno with the first corps, -he stayed the work, withdrew his divisions from the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76"></a>[76]</span> -right bank of the Tagus, and on the 18th, (the -cavalry of the first corps having reached Villarejo -de Salvanes,) he destroyed his bridges, called in -his parties, and drew up for battle on the heights -of Santa Cruz de la Zarza.</p> - -<p>Hitherto the continual movements of the Spanish -army, and the unsettled plans of the Spanish -general, rendered it difficult for the French to fix -a field of battle; but now Areizaga’s march to -St. Cruz had laid his line of operations bare. -The French masses were close together, the -duke of Belluno could press on the Spanish front -with the first corps, and the king, calling the -fourth corps from Bayona, could throw twenty-five -or thirty thousand men on Areizaga’s rear, by the -road of Aranjuez and Ocaña. It was calculated -that no danger could arise from this double line of -operations, because a single march would bring -both the king and Victor upon Areizaga; and if -the latter should suddenly assail either, each would -be strong enough to sustain the shock. Hence, -when Soult knew that the Spaniards were certainly -encamped at Santa Cruz, he caused the fifth corps, -then in march for Madrid, to move during the -night of the 17th upon Aranjuez. The fourth -corps received a like order. The king, himself, -quitting Madrid, arrived there on the evening of -the 18th, with the Royal French Guards, two -Spanish battalions of the line, and a brigade of -Dessolle’s division which had just arrived; in all -about ten thousand men. The same day, the duke -of Belluno concentrated the first corps at Villarejo -de Salvanés, intending to cross the Tagus at -Villa Maurique, and attack the Spanish position on -the 19th.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77"></a>[77]</span></p> - -<p>A pontoon train, previously prepared at Madrid, -enabled the French to repair the broken bridges, -near Aranjuez, in two hours; and about one o’clock -on the 18th, a division of cavalry, two divisions of -infantry of the fourth corps, and the advanced -guard of the fifth corps, passed the Tagus, part at -the bridge of La Reyna, and part at a ford. General -Milhaud with the leading squadrons, immediately -pursued a small body of Spanish horsemen; and -was thus led to the table-land, between Antiguela -and Ocaña, where he suddenly came upon a front -of fifteen hundred cavalry supported by three -thousand more in reserve. Having only twelve -hundred dragoons, he prepared to retire; but at -that moment general Paris arrived with another -brigade, and was immediately followed by the light -cavalry of the fifth corps; the whole making a reinforcement -of about two thousand men. With -these troops Sebastiani came in person, and took -the command at the instant when the Spaniards, -seeing the inferiority of the French, were advancing -to the charge.</p> - - -<h4>CAVALRY COMBAT AT OCAÑA.</h4> - -<p>The Spaniards came on at a trot, but Sebastiani -directed Paris, with a regiment of light cavalry -and the Polish lancers, to turn and fall upon the -right flank of the approaching squadrons, which -being executed with great vigour, especially by -the Poles, caused considerable confusion in the -Spanish ranks, and their general endeavoured to -remedy it by closing to the assailed flank. But -to effect this he formed his left and centre in one<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78"></a>[78]</span> -vast column. Sebastiani charged headlong into -the midst of it with his reserves, and the enormous -mass yielding to the shock, got into confusion, -and finally gave way. Many were slain, -several hundred wounded, and eighty troopers and -above five hundred horses were taken. The loss -of the French bore no proportion in men, but -general Paris was killed, and several superior officers -were wounded.</p> - -<p>This unexpected encounter with such a force of -cavalry, led Soult to believe that the Spanish general, -aware of his error, was endeavouring to -recover his line of operations. The examination -of the prisoners confirmed this opinion; and in the -night, information from the duke of Belluno, and -the reports of officers sent towards Villa Maurique -arrived, all agreeing that only a rear-guard was to be -seen at Santa Cruz de la Zarza. It then became clear -that the Spaniards were on the march, and that a -battle could be fought the next day. In fact Areizaga -had retraced his steps by a flank movement through -Villa Rubia and Noblejas, with the intention of -falling upon the king’s forces as they opened out -from Aranjuez. He arrived on the morning of the -19th at Ocaña; but judging from the cavalry -fight, that the enemy could attack first, drew up -his whole army on the same plain, in two lines, -a quarter of a mile asunder.</p> - -<p>Ocaña is covered on the north by a ravine, -which commencing gently half a mile eastward -of the town, runs deepening and with a curve, -to the west, and finally connects itself with gullies -and hollows, whose waters run off to the Tagus. -Behind the deepest part of this ravine was the -Spanish left, crossing the main road from Aranjuez<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79"></a>[79]</span> -to Dos Barrios. One flank rested on the gullies, the -other on Ocaña. The centre was in front of the -town, which was occupied by some infantry as a -post of reserve, but the right wing stretched in -the direction of Noblejas along the edge of a gentle -ridge <em>in front</em> of the shallow part of the ravine. -The cavalry was on the flank and rear of the right -wing. Behind the army there was an immense plain, -but closed in and fringed towards Noblejas with -rich olive woods, which were occupied by infantry -to protect the passage of the Spanish baggage, still -filing by the road from Zarza. Such were Areizaga’s -dispositions.</p> - -<p>Joseph passed the night of the 18th in reorganizing -his forces. The whole of the cavalry, consisting -of nine regiments, was given to Sebastiani. -Four divisions of infantry, with the exception of -one regiment, left at Aranjuez to guard the bridge, -were placed under the command of marshal Mortier, -who was also empowered, if necessary, to direct -the movements of the cavalry. The artillery was -commanded by general Senarmont. The Royal -Guards remained with the King, and marshal Soult -directed the whole of the movements.</p> - -<p>Before day-break, on the 19th, the monarch -marched with the intention of falling upon the -Spaniards wherever he could meet with them. -At Antiguela his troops quitting the high road, -turned to their left, gained the table-land of Ocaña -somewhat beyond the centre of the Spanish position, -and discovered Areizaga’s army in order of -battle. The French cavalry instantly forming to -the front, covered the advance of the infantry, -which drew up in successive lines as the divisions -arrived on the plain. The Spanish outposts<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80"></a>[80]</span> -fell back, and were followed by the French skirmishers, -who spread along the hostile front and -opened a sharp fire.</p> - -<p>About forty-five thousand Spanish infantry, -seven thousand cavalry, and sixty pieces of artillery -were in line. The French force was -only twenty-four thousand infantry, five thousand -sabres and lances, and fifty guns, including -the battery of the Royal Guard. But Areizaga’s -position was miserably defective. The whole -of his left wing, fifteen thousand strong, was paralized -by the ravine; it could neither attack nor -be attacked: the centre was scarcely better situated, -and the extremity of his right wing was uncovered, -save by the horse, who were, although superior -in number, quite dispirited by the action of -the preceding evening. These circumstances dictated -the order of the attack.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF OCAÑA.</h4> - -<p>At ten o’clock, Sebastiani’s cavalry gaining -ground to his left, turned the Spanish right. General -Leval, with two divisions of infantry in columns of -regiments, each having a battalion displayed in -front, followed the cavalry, and drove general -Zayas from the olive-woods. General Girard, with -his division arranged in the same manner, followed -Leval in second line; and at the same moment, -general Dessolles menaced the centre with one -portion of his troops, while another portion lined -the edge of the ravine to support the skirmishers -and awe the Spanish left wing. The king remained -in reserve with his guards. Thus the French order<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81"></a>[81]</span> -of battle was in two columns: the principal one, -flanked by the cavalry, directed against and turning -the Spanish right, the second keeping the Spanish -centre in check; and each being supported by -reserves.</p> - -<p>These dispositions were completed at eleven -o’clock; at which hour, Senarmont, massing thirty -pieces of artillery, opened a shattering fire on -Areizaga’s centre. Six guns, detached to the -right, played at the same time across the ravine -against the left; and six others swept down the -deep hollow, to clear it of the light troops. The -Spaniards were undisciplined and badly commanded, -but discovered no appearance of fear; -their cries were loud and strong, their skirmishing -fire brisk; and, from the centre of their line, -sixteen guns opened with a murderous effect upon -Leval’s and Girard’s columns, as the latter were -pressing on towards the right. To mitigate the -fire of this battery, a French battalion, rushing out -at full speed, seized a small eminence close to the -Spanish guns, and a counter battery was immediately -planted there. Then the Spaniards gave -back: their skirmishers were swept out of the ravine -by a flanking fire of grape; and Senarmont -immediately drawing the artillery from the French -right, took Ocaña as his pivot, and, prolonging his -fire to the left, raked Areizaga’s right wing in its -whole length.</p> - -<p>During this cannonade, Leval, constantly pressing -forward, obliged the Spaniards to change their -front, by withdrawing the right wing <em>behind</em> the -shallow part of the ravine, which, as I have before -said, was in its rear when the action commenced.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_82"></a>[82]</span> -By this change, the whole army, still drawn up -in two lines, at the distance of a quarter of a mile -asunder, was pressed into somewhat of a convex -form with the town of Ocaña in the centre, and -hence Senarmont’s artillery tore their ranks with a -greater destruction than before. Nevertheless, encouraged -by observing the comparatively feeble -body of infantry approaching them, the Spaniards -suddenly retook the offensive, their fire, redoubling, -dismounted two French guns; Mortier himself was -wounded slightly, Leval severely; the line advanced, -and the leading French divisions wavered and -gave back.</p> - -<p>The moment was critical, and the duke of Treviso -lost no time in exhortations to Leval’s troops, -but, like a great commander, instantly brought up -Girard’s division through the intervals of the first -line, and displayed a front of fresh troops, keeping -one regiment in square on the left flank: for he -expected that Areizaga’s powerful cavalry, which -still remained in the plain, would charge for the -victory. Girard’s fire soon threw the Spanish first -line into disorder; and meanwhile, Dessolles, who -had gained ground by an oblique movement, left -in front, seeing the enemy’s right thus shaken, -seized Ocaña itself, and issued forth on the other -side.</p> - -<p>The light cavalry of the king’s guard, followed -by the infantry, then poured through the town; and, -on the extreme left, Sebastiani, with a rapid charge, -cut off six thousand infantry, and obliged them to -surrender. The Spanish cavalry, which had only -suffered a little from the cannonade, and had never -made an effort to turn the tide of battle, now drew off<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83"></a>[83]</span> -entirely: the second line of infantry gave ground -as the front fell back upon it in confusion; and -Areizaga, confounded and bewildered, ordered the -left wing, which had scarcely fired a shot, to -retreat, and then quitted the field himself.</p> - -<p>For half an hour after this, the superior officers -who remained, endeavoured to keep the troops -together in the plain, and strove to reach the main -road leading to Dos Barrios; but Girard and -Dessolle’s divisions being connected after passing -Ocaña, pressed on with steady rapidity, while the -Polish lancers and a regiment of chasseurs, outflanking -the Spanish right, continually increased -the confusion: finally, Sebastiani, after securing -his prisoners, came up again like a whirlwind, and -charged full in the front with five regiments of -cavalry. Then the whole mass broke, and fled -each man for himself across the plain; but, on the -right of the routed multitude, a deep ravine leading -from Yepes to Dos Barrios, in an oblique direction, -continually contracted the space; and the pursuing -cavalry arriving first at Barrios, headed nearly ten -thousand bewildered men, and forced them to -surrender. The remainder turned their faces to all -quarters; and such was the rout, that the French -were also obliged to disperse to take prisoners, for, -to their credit, no rigorous execution was inflicted; -and hundreds, merely deprived of their arms, were -desired, in raillery, “to return to their homes, and -abandon war as a trade they were unfit for.” This -fatal battle commenced at eleven o’clock; thirty -pieces of artillery, a hundred and twenty carriages, -twenty-five stand of colours, three generals, six -hundred inferior officers, and eighteen thousand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84"></a>[84]</span> -privates were taken before two o’clock, and the pursuit -was still hot. Seven or eight thousand of the Spaniards, -however, contrived to make away towards the -mountain of Tarancon; others followed the various -routes through La Mancha to the Sierra Morena; -and many saved themselves in Valencia and -Murcia.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the first corps, passing the Tagus -by a ford, had re-established the bridge at Villa -Maurique before ten o’clock in the morning, and -finding Santa Cruz de la Zarza abandoned, followed -Areizaga’s traces; at Villatobas, the light -cavalry captured twelve hundred carriages, and a -little farther on, took a thousand prisoners, from -the column which was making for Tarancon. Thus -informed of the result of the battle, the duke of -Belluno halted at Villatobas, but sent his cavalry -forward. At La Guardia they joined Sebastiani’s -horsemen; and the whole continuing the pursuit -to Lillo, made five hundred more prisoners, together -with three hundred horses. This finished the -operations of the day: only eighteen hundred -<span class="sidenote">S.<br /> -Journal of -Operations -MSS.</span>cannon-shot had been fired, and an army of more -than fifty thousand men had been ruined. The French -lost seventeen hundred men, killed and wounded; -<span class="sidenote">Letter -from Lord -Wellington -to Lord Liverpool, -Nov. 30, -1809. MSS.</span>the Spaniards five thousand: and, before nightfall, -all the baggage and military carriages, three thousand -animals, forty-five pieces of artillery, thirty -thousand muskets, and twenty-six thousand captives -were in the hands of the conquerors!</p> - -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_084fp" style="max-width: 35em;"> - <p class="p1 right fs70"><em>Vol. 3, Plate 3.</em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_084fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_084fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - <div class="caption"> -AREIZAGA’S Operations,<br /> -1809.<br /> - -<p><em>Published by T. & W. Boone 1830.</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>Areizaga reached Tembleque during the night, -and La Carolina the third day after. On the road, -he met general Benaz with a thousand dragoons -that had been detached to the rear before the battle<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85"></a>[85]</span> -commenced; this body he directed on Madrilegos -to cover the retreat of the fugitives; but so strongly -<span class="sidenote">Letter -from Lord -Wellington -to Lord Liverpool, -Nov. 30, -1809. MSS.</span>did the panic spread that when Sebastiani approached -that post on the 20th, Benaz’s men fled, -without seeing an enemy, as fearfully as any who -came from the fight. Even so late as the 24th, -only four hundred cavalry, belonging to all regiments, -could be assembled at Manzanares; and -still fewer at La Carolina.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86"></a>[86]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BIX_VI">CHAPTER VI.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>Joseph halted at Dos Barrios, the night of the -battle, and the next day directed Sebastiani, with -all the light cavalry and a division of infantry, -upon Madrilegos and Consuegra; the first corps, -by St. Juan de Vilharta, upon the Sierra Morena, -and the fifth corps, by Tembleque and Mora, upon -Toledo. One division of the fourth corps guarded -the spoil and the prisoners at Ocaña. A second -division, reinforced with a brigade of cavalry, -was posted, by detachments, <ins class="corr" id="tn-86" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'from Aranjues to'"> -from Aranjuez to</ins> Consuegra.</p> - -<p>The monarch himself, with his guards and -Dessolle’s first brigade, returned, on the 20th, to -Madrid.</p> - -<p>Three days had sufficed to dissipate the storm -on the side of La Mancha, but the duke Del Parque -still menaced the sixth corps in Castile, and the -reports from Talavera again spoke of Albuquerque -and the English being in motion. The second -brigade of Dessolle’s division had returned from Old -Castile on the 19th, and the uncertainty with -respect to the British movements, obliged the king -to keep all his troops in hand. Nevertheless, -fearing that, if Del Parque gained upon the sixth -corps, he might raise an insurrection in Leon, -Gazan’s division of the fifth corps was sent, from -Toledo, through the Puerto Pico, to Marchand’s -assistance, and Kellerman was again directed to -take the command of the whole.</p> - -<p>During these events, the British army remained<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87"></a>[87]</span> -tranquil about Badajos; but Albuquerque, following -his orders, had reached Peralada de Garbin, -and seized the bridge of Arzobispo, in expectation -of being joined by the duke Del Parque. That -general, however, who had above thirty thousand -men, thought, when Dessolle’s division was recalled -to Madrid, that he could crush the sixth corps, -and, therefore, advanced from Bejar towards Alba -de Tormes on the 17th, two days before the battle -of Ocaña. Thus, when Albuquerque expected him -on the Tagus, he was engaged in serious operations -beyond the Tormes, and, having reached Alba, -the 21st, sent a division to take possession of -Salamanca, which Marchand had again abandoned. -The 22d he marched towards Valladolid, and his -advanced guard and cavalry entered Fresno and -Carpio. Meanwhile Kellerman, collecting all the -troops of his government, and being joined by -Marchand, moved upon Medina del Campo, and -the 23d, fell with a body of horse upon the -Spaniards at Fresno. The Spanish cavalry fled -at once; but the infantry stood firm, and repulsed -the assailants.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Lord Wellington -to -Lord Liverpool. -MSS.</div> - -<p>The 24th the duke carried his whole army to -Fresno, intending to give battle; but on the 26th imperative -orders to join Albuquerque having reached -him, he commenced a retrograde movement. Kellerman, -without waiting for the arrival of Gazan’s -division, instantly pursued, and his advanced guard -of cavalry overtook and charged the Spanish army -at the moment when a part of their infantry and -all their horse had passed the bridge of Alba de -Tormes; being repulsed, it retired upon the -supports, and the duke, seeing that an action was -inevitable, brought the remainder of his troops,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_88"></a>[88]</span> -with the exception of one division, back to the -right bank.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF ALBA DE TORMES.</h4> - -<p>Scarcely was the line formed, when Kellerman -came up with two divisions of dragoons and some -artillery, and, without hesitating, sent one division -to outflank the Spanish right, and, with the -other, charged fiercely in upon the front. The -Spanish horsemen, flying without a blow, rode -straight over the bridge, and the infantry of the -right being thus exposed, were broken and sabred; -but those on the left stood fast and repulsed the -enemy. The duke rallied his cavalry on the other -side of the river, and brought them back to the -fight, but the French were also reinforced, and -once more the Spanish horse fled without a blow. -By this time it was dark, and the infantry of the -left wing, under Mendizabel and Carrera, being -unbroken, made good their retreat across the river, -yet not without difficulty, and under the fire of -some French infantry, which arrived just in the -dusk. During the night the duke retreated upon -Tamames unmolested, but at day-break a French -patrol coming up with this rear, his whole army -threw away their arms and fled outright. Kellerman -having, meanwhile entered Salamanca, did -not pursue, yet the dispersion was complete.</p> - -<p>After this defeat, Del Parque rallied his army -in the mountains behind Tamames, and, in ten -or twelve days, again collected about twenty -thousand men; they were however without artillery,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89"></a>[89]</span> -scarcely any had preserved their arms, and such -was their distress for provisions, that two months -afterwards, when the British arrived on the northern -frontier, the peasantry still spoke with horror of -the sufferings of these famished soldiers. Many -actually died of want, and every village was -filled with sick. Yet the mass neither dispersed -nor murmured! For Spaniards, though hasty in -revenge and feeble in battle, are patient, to the -last degree, in suffering.</p> - -<p>This result of the duke Del Parque’s operation -amply justified sir Arthur Wellesley’s advice to the -Portuguese regency. In like manner the battle of -Ocaña, and the little effect produced by the duke -of Albuquerque’s advance to Arzobispo, justified -that which he gave to the Central Junta. It might -be imagined that the latter would have received his -after-counsels with deference; but the course of -that body was never affected by either reason or -experience. Just before the rout of Alba de Tormes, -<span class="sidenote">Lord Wellington -to -Lord Liverpool, -Dec. 7, -1809. MSS.</span>sir Arthur Wellesley proposed that ten thousand -men, to be taken from the duke Del Parque, should -<em>reinforce Albuquerque, that the latter might maintain -the strong position of Meza d’Ibor, and cover -Estremadura for the winter</em>. Meanwhile Del -Parque’s force, thus reduced one-third, could be -more easily fed, and might keep aloof from the -enemy until the British army should arrive on the -northern frontier of Portugal, a movement long -projected, and, as he informed them, only delayed -<em>to protect Estremadura until the duke of Albuquerque -had received the reinforcement</em>. The only reply -of the Junta was an order, directing Albuquerque -<em>immediately to quit the line of the Tagus, and take -post at Llerena, behind the Guadiana</em>. Thus<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_90"></a>[90]</span> -abandoning Estremadura to the enemy, and exposing -his own front in a bad position to an army coming -from Almaraz, and his right flank and rear to an -army coming from La Mancha.</p> - -<p>This foolish and contemptuous proceeding, being -followed by Del Parque’s defeat, which endangered -Ciudad Rodrigo, sir Arthur at once commenced -his march for the north. He knew that twenty -thousand Spanish infantry and six thousand mounted -cavalry were again collected in La Carolina; that -the troops (eight thousand), who escaped from -Ocaña, on the side of Tarancon, were at Cuença, -under general Echevarria; and as the numbers -re-assembled in the Morena were (the inactivity of -the French after the battle of Ocaña considered) -sufficient to defend the passes and cover Seville -for the moment, there was no reason why the -British army should remain in unhealthy positions -to aid people who would not aid themselves. Albuquerque’s -retrograde movement was probably a -device of the Junta to oblige sir Arthur to undertake -the defence of Estremadura; but it only -hastened his departure. It did not comport with -his plans to engage in serious operations on that -side; yet to have retired when that province was -actually attacked, would have been disreputable -for his arms, wherefore, seizing this unhappily -favourable moment to quit Badajos, he crossed the -Tagus, and marched into the valley of the Mondego, -leaving general Hill, with a mixed force of -ten thousand men, at Abrantes.</p> - -<p>The Guadiana pestilence had been so fatal that -many officers blamed him for stopping so long; -but it was his last hold on Spain, and the safety of -the southern provinces was involved in his proceedings.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91"></a>[91]</span> -It was not his battle of Talavera, but -the position maintained by him on the frontier of -Estremadura, which, in the latter part of 1809, saved -Andalusia from subjection; and this is easy of demonstration, -for, Joseph having rejected Soult’s -project against Portugal, dared not invade Andalusia, -by Estremadura, with the English army on -his right flank; neither could he hope to invade it -by the way of La Mancha, without drawing sir -Arthur into the contest. But Andalusia was, at this -period, the last place where the intrusive king desired -to meet a British army. He had many partisans -in that province, who would necessarily be -overawed if the course of the war carried sir Arthur -beyond the Morena; nor could the Junta, in that -case, have refused Cadiz, as a place of arms, to their -ally. Then the whole force of Andalusia and -Murcia would have rallied round the English forces -behind the Morena; and, as Areizaga had sixty -thousand men, and Albuquerque ten <ins class="err" id="err-91" title="Erratum: was 'thousend'"> -thousand</ins>, it is no exaggeration to assume that a hundred thousand -could have been organized for defence, and -the whole of the troops, in the south of Portugal, -would have been available to aid in the protection -of Estremadura. Thus, including thirty thousand -English, there would have been a mass of at least -one hundred thousand soldiers, disposable for -active operations, assembled in the Morena.</p> - -<p>From La Carolina to Madrid is only ten marches, -and while posted at the former, the army could protect -Lisbon as well as Seville, because a forward movement -would oblige the French to concentrate round -the Spanish capital. Andalusia would thus have -become the principal object of the invaders; but -the allied armies, holding the passes of the Morena,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_92"></a>[92]</span> -their left flank protected by Estremadura and Portugal, -their right by Murcia and Valencia, and having -rich provinces and large cities behind them, and -a free communication with the sea, and abundance -of ports, could have fought a fair field for Spain.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Sir J. -Moore’s -Correspondence.</div> - -<p>It was a perception of these advantages that -caused sir John Moore to regret the ministers had -not chosen the southern instead of the northern -line for his operations. Lord Wellesley, also, impressed -with the importance of Andalusia, urged -his brother to adopt some plan of this nature, and -the latter, sensible of its advantages, would have -done so, but for the impossibility of dealing with -the Central Junta. Military possession of Cadiz -<span class="sidenote">Lord Wellesley’s -Correspondence, -Parl. Papers, -1810.</span>and the uncontrolled command of a Spanish force -were the only conditions upon which he would -undertake the defence of Andalusia; conditions -they would not accede to, but, without which, he -could not be secured against the caprices of men -<ins class="corr" id="tn-92" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'whose procedings'"> -whose proceedings</ins> were one continued struggle -against reason. This may seem inconsistent with -a former assertion, that Portugal was the true base -of operations for the English; but political as well -as physical resources and moral considerations -weighed in that argument.</p> - -<p>For the protection, then, of Andalusia and Estremadura, -during a dangerous crisis of affairs, sir -Arthur persisted, at such an enormous sacrifice of -men, to hold his position on the Guadiana. Yet it -was reluctantly, and more in deference to his brother’s -wishes than his own judgement, that he remained -after Areizaga’s army was assembled. Having -proved the Junta by experience, he was more clear -sighted, as to their perverseness, than lord Wellesley; -who, being in daily intercourse with the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93"></a>[93]</span> -members, obliged to listen to their ready eloquence -in excuse for past errors, and more ready promises -of future exertion, clung longer to the notion, that -Spain could be put in the right path, and that England -might war largely in conjunction with the united -nations of the Peninsula, instead of restricting herself -to the comparatively obscure operation of defending -Lisbon. He was finally undeceived, and the march -from Badajos for ever released the British general -from a vexatious dependence on the Spanish government.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the French, in doubt of his intentions, -appeared torpid. Kellerman remained at Salamanca, -watching the movements of the duke Del -Parque; and Gazan returned to Madrid. Milhaud, -with a division of the fourth corps, and some cavalry, -was detached against Echavaria; but, on his -arrival at Cuença, finding that the latter had retreated, -by Toboado, to Hellin, in Murcia, combined -his operations with general Suchet, and, as I have -before related, assisted to reduce the towns of Albaracin -and Teruel. Other movements there were -none, and, as the Spanish regiments of the guard -fought freely against their countrymen, and many -of the prisoners, taken at Ocaña, offered to join -the invaders’ colours, the king conceived hopes of -raising a national army. French writers assert -that the captives at Ocaña made a marked distinction -between Napoleon and Joseph. They were -willing to serve the French emperor, but not the -intrusive king of Spain. Spanish authors, indeed, -assume that none entered the enemy’s ranks save -by coercion and to escape; and that many did so -with that view, and were successful, must be supposed, -or the numbers said to have reassembled in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_94"></a>[94]</span> -the Morena, and at Cuença, cannot be reconciled -with the loss sustained in the action.</p> - -<p>The battles of Ocaña and Alba de Tormes terminated -the series of offensive operations, which the -Austrian war, and the reappearance of a British -army in the Peninsula had enabled the allies to -adopt, in 1809. Those operations had been unsuccessful; -the enemy again took the lead, and the -fourth epoch of the war commenced.</p> - - -<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4> - -<p>1º. Although certain that the British army would -not co-operate in this short campaign, the Junta -openly asserted, that it would join Albuquerque in -the valley of the Tagus. The improbability of -Areizaga’s acting, without such assistance, gave -currency to the fiction, and an accredited fiction is, -in war, often more useful than the truth; in this, -therefore, they are to be commended; but, when -deceiving their own general, they permitted Areizaga -to act under the impression that he would be -so assisted, they committed not an error but an -enormous crime. Nor was the general much less -criminal for acting upon the mere assertion that -other movements were combined with his, when no -communication, no concerting of the marches, no -understanding with the allied commander, as to -their mutual resources, and intentions, had taken -place.</p> - -<p>2º. A rushing wind, a blast from the mountains, -tempestuous, momentary, such was Areizaga’s movement -on Dos Barrios, and assuredly it would be -difficult to find its parallel. There is no post so<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95"></a>[95]</span> -strong, no town so guarded, that, by a fortunate -stroke, may not be carried; but who, even on the -smallest scale, acts on this principle, unless aided -by some accidental circumstance applicable to the -moment? Areizaga obeyed the orders of his government; -but no general is bound to obey orders -(at least without remonstrance) which involve the -safety of his army; to that he should sacrifice -everything but victory: and many great commanders -have sacrificed even victory, rather than -appear to undervalue this vital principle.</p> - -<p>3º. At Dos Barrios the Spanish general, having -first met with opposition, halted for three days, -evidently without a plan, and ignorant both of the -situation of the first corps on his left flank, and of -the real force in his front: yet this was the only -moment in which he could hope for the slightest -success. If, instead of a feeble skirmish of cavalry, -he had borne forward, with his whole army, on the -11th, Sebastiani must have been overpowered and -driven across the Tagus, and Areizaga, with fifty -thousand infantry and a powerful cavalry, would, -on the 12th, have been in the midst of the separated -French corps, for their movement of concentration -was not completely effected until the night -of the 14th. But such a stroke was not for an undisciplined -army, and this was another reason -against moving from the Morena at all, seeing that -the calculated chances were all against Areizaga, -and his troops not such as could improve accidental -advantages.</p> - -<p>4º. The flank march, from Dos Barrios to Santa -Cruz, although intended to turn the French left, -and gain Madrid, was a circuitous route of at least -a hundred miles, and, as there were three rivers to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_96"></a>[96]</span> -cross, namely, the Tagus, the Tajuna, and Henares, -only great rapidity could give a chance of success; -but Areizaga was slow. So late as the 15th, he -had passed the Tagus with only two divisions of -infantry. Meanwhile the French moving on the -inner circle, got between him and Madrid, and the -moment one corps out of the three opposed to him -approached, he recrossed the Tagus and concentrated -again on the strong ground of Santa Cruz de -la Zarza. The king by the way of Aranjuez had, -however, already cut his line of retreat, and then -Areizaga who, on the 10th, had shrunk from an -action with Sebastiani, when the latter had only -eight thousand men, now sought a battle, on the -same ground with the king, who was at the head -of thirty thousand; the first corps being also in full -march upon the Spanish traces and distant only a -few miles. Here it may be remarked that Victor, -who was now to the eastward of the Spaniards, -had been on the 9th to the westward <ins class="corr" id="tn-96" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'at Yevenes and'"> -at Yebenes and</ins> Mora, having moved in ten days, on a circle -of a hundred and fifty miles, completely round this -Spanish general, who pretended, to treat his adversaries, -as if they were blind men.</p> - -<p>5º. Baron Crossand, it is said, urged Areizaga -to entrench himself in the mountains, to raise the -peasantry, and to wait the effect of Albuquerque’s -and Del Parque’s operations. If so, his military -ideas do not seem of a higher order than Areizaga’s, -and the proposal was but a repetition of Mr. Frere’s -former plan for Albuquerque; a plan founded on -the supposition, that the rich plains of La Mancha -were rugged mountains. In taking a permanent -position at Santa Cruz or Tarancon, Areizaga must -have resigned all direct communication with Andalusia,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97"></a>[97]</span> -and opened a fresh line of communication -with Valencia, which would have been exposed to -the third corps from Aragon. Yet without examining -whether either the Spanish general or army -were capable of such a difficult operation, as adopting -an accidental line of operations, the advice, if -given at all, was only given on the 18th, and on -the 19th, the first corps, the fourth, the greatest -part of the fifth, the reserve and the royal guards, -forming a mass of more than fifty thousand fighting -men, would have taught Areizaga that men and -not mountains decide the fate of a battle. But in -fact, there were no mountains to hold; between -Zarza and the borders of Valencia, the whole country -is one vast plain; and on the 18th, there was -only the alternative of fighting the weakest of the -two French armies, or of retreating by forced -marches through La Mancha. The former was -chosen, Areizaga’s army was destroyed, and in the -battle he discovered no redeeming quality. His -position was ill chosen, he made no use of his -cavalry, his left wing never fired a shot, and when -the men undismayed by the defeat of the right, demanded -to be led into action, he commanded a retreat, -and quitted the field himself at the moment -when his presence was most wanted.</p> - -<p>6º. The combinations of the French were methodical, -well arranged, effectual, and it may seem -misplaced, to do ought but commend movements so -eminently successful. Yet the chances of war are -manifold enough to justify the drawing attention to -some points of this short campaign. Areizaga’s -burst from the mountains was so unexpected and -rapid, that it might well make his adversaries hesitate; -and hence perhaps the reason why the first<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98"></a>[98]</span> -corps circled round the Spanish army, and was -singly to have attacked the latter in front at Zarza, -on the 19th; whereas, reinforced with the division -of the fourth corps from Toledo, it might have fallen -on the rear and flank from Mora a week before. -That is, during the three days Areizaga remained at -Dos Barrios, from whence Mora is only four hours -march.</p> - -<p>7º. The 11th, the king knew the English army -had not approached the valley of the Tagus; Areizaga -only quitted Dos Barrios the 13th, and he -remained at Zarza until the 18th. During eight -days therefore, the Spanish general was permitted -to lead, and had he been a man of real enterprise -he would have crushed the troops between -Dos Barrios and Aranjuez on the 10th or 11th. Indeed, -the boldness with which Sebastiani maintained -his offensive position beyond Aranjuez, from -the 9th to the 14th, was a master-piece. It must, -however, be acknowledged that Soult could not at -once fix a general, who marched fifty thousand men -about like a patrole of cavalry, without the slightest -regard to his adversary’s positions or his own line -of operations.</p> - -<p>8º. In the battle, nothing could be more scientific -than the mode in which the French closed upon -and defeated the right and centre, while they paralized -the left of the Spaniards. The disparity of -numbers engaged, and the enormous amount of -prisoners, artillery, and other trophies of victory -prove it to have been a fine display of talent. But -Andalusia was laid prostrate by this sudden destruction -of her troops; why then was the fruit of -victory neglected? Did the king, unable to perceive -his advantages, control the higher military<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_99"></a>[99]</span> -genius of his advising general, or was he distracted -by disputes amongst the different commanders? or, -did the British army at Badajos alarm him? An -accurate knowledge of these points is essential in -estimating the real share Spain had in her own -deliverance.</p> - -<p>9º. Sir Arthur Wellesley absolutely refused to co-operate -in this short and violent campaign. He remained -a quiet spectator of events at the most critical -period of the war; and yet on paper the Spanish -projects promised well. Areizaga’s army exceeded -fifty thousand men, Albuquerque’s ten thousand, -and thirty thousand were under Del Parque, who, -at Tamames had just overthrown the best corps in -the French army. Villa Campa also, and the Partida -bands on the side of Cuença were estimated -at ten thousand; in fine, there were a hundred -thousand Spanish soldiers ready. The British army -at this period, although much reduced by sickness, -had still twenty thousand men fit to bear arms, and -the Portuguese under Beresford were near thirty -thousand, making a total of a hundred and fifty -thousand allies. Thirty thousand to guard the -passes of the Sierra de Gredos and watch the sixth -corps, a hundred and twenty thousand to attack the -seventy thousand French covering Madrid! Why -then, was sir Arthur Wellesley, who only four -months before so eagerly undertook a like enterprise -with fewer forces, now absolutely deaf to the proposals -of the Junta? “<em>Because moral force is to physical -force, as three to one in war.</em>” He had proved -the military qualities of Spaniards and French, had -foresaw, to use his own expressions, “<em>after one or -<span class="sidenote">Letter to -Lord Liverpool. -MS.</span>two battles, and one or two brilliant actions by some, -and defeats sustained by others, that all would have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100"></a>[100]</span> -to retreat again</em>:” yet this man, so cautious, so -sensible of the enemy’s superiority, was laying the -foundation of measures that finally carried him -triumphant through the Peninsula. False then -are the opinions of those, who, asserting Napoleon -might have been driven over the Ebro in 1808-9, -blame sir John Moore’s conduct. Such reasoners -would as certainly have charged the ruin of Spain -on sir Arthur Wellesley, if at this period the -chances of war had sent him to his grave. But in -all times the wise and brave man’s toil has been -the sport of fools!</p> - -<div class="sidenote">1810.</div> - -<p>Alba de Tormes ended the great military transactions -of 1809. In the beginning, Napoleon broke -to atoms and dispersed the feeble structure of -the Spanish insurrection, but after his departure -the invasion stagnated amidst the bickerings of his -lieutenants. Sir Arthur Wellesley turned the war -back upon the invaders for a moment, but the jealousy -and folly of his ally soon obliged him to -retire to Portugal. The Spaniards then tried their -single strength, and were trampled under foot at -Ocaña, and notwithstanding the assistance of England, -the offensive passed entirely from their hands. -In the next book we shall find them every where -acting on the defensive, and every where weak.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101"></a>[101]</span><br /></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_X">BOOK X.</h2> -</div> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BX_I">CHAPTER I.</h3> - - -<p>Napoleon, victorious in Germany, and ready -to turn his undivided strength once more against -the Peninsula, complained of the past inactivity of -the king, and Joseph prepared to commence the -campaign of 1810 with vigour. His first operations, -however, indicated great infirmity of purpose. -When Del Parque’s defeat on one side -and Echevaria’s on the other had freed his flanks, -and while the British army was still at Badajos, -he sent the fourth corps towards Valencia, but -immediately afterwards recalled it, and also the first -corps, which, since the battle of Ocaña, had been at -Santa Cruz de Mudela. The march of this last corps -through La Mancha had been marked by this peculiarity, -that, for the first time since the commencement -of the war, the peasantry, indignant at the -flight of the soldiers, guided the pursuers to the -retreats of the fugitives.</p> - -<p>Joseph’s vacillation was partly occasioned by -the insurrection in Navarre, under Renovalles and -Mina. But lord Wellington, previous to quitting -the Guadiana, had informed the Junta of Badajos, -as a matter of courtesy, that he was -about to evacuate their district; and his confidential<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102"></a>[102]</span> -letter being published in the town Gazette, -and ostentatiously copied into the Seville papers, -Joseph naturally suspected it to be a cloak to -some offensive project. However, the false movements -of the first and fourth corps distracted the -Spaniards, and emboldened the French partizans, -who were very numerous both in Valencia and -Andalusia. The troubles in Navarre were soon -quieted by Suchet; the distribution of the British -army in the valley of the Mondego became known, -and Joseph seriously prepared for the conquest of -Andalusia. This enterprise, less difficult than an -invasion of Portugal, promised immediate pecuniary -advantages, which was no slight consideration to -a sovereign whose ministers were reduced to want -<span class="sidenote">Appendix -<a href="#No_IV">No. IV.</a> -Sec. 1.</span>from the non-payment of their salaries, and whose -troops were thirteen months in arrears of pay. -Napoleon, a rigid stickler for the Roman maxim, -that “War should support war,” paid only the -corps near the frontiers of France, and rarely recruited -the military chest.</p> - -<p>Both the military and political affairs of Andalusia -were now at the lowest ebb. The calm produced -by the promise to convoke the National -Cortes had been short lived. The disaster of Ocaña -revived all the passions of the people, and afforded -the old Junta of Seville, the council of Castile, and -other enemies of the Central Junta, an opportunity -to pull down a government universally obnoxious; -and the general discontent was increased by the -measures adopted to meet the approaching crisis. -The marquis of Astorga had been succeeded by -the archbishop of Laodicea, under whose presidency -the Junta published a manifesto, assuring -the people that there was no danger,—that Areizaga<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103"></a>[103]</span> -could defend the Morena against the whole power -of France,—that Albuquerque would, from the side -of Estremadura, fall upon the enemy’s rear,—and -that a second Baylen might be expected. But, -while thus attempting to delude the public, they -openly sent property to Cadiz, and announced that -they would transfer their sittings to that town on -the 1st of February.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, not to seem inactive, a decree was -issued for a levy of a hundred thousand men, and -for a forced loan of half the jewels, plate, and -money belonging to individuals; sums left for -pious purposes were also appropriated to the service -of the state.</p> - -<p>To weaken their adversaries, the Junta offered -Romana the command of the army in the Morena,—sent -Padre Gil on a mission to Sicily, and imprisoned -the Conde de Montijo and Francisco -Palafox. The marquis of Lazan, accused of being -in league with his brother, was also confined in -Pensicola, and the Conde de Tilly, detected in a -conspiracy to seize the public treasure and make -for America, was thrown into a dungeon, where -his infamous existence terminated. Romana refused -to serve, and Blake, recalled from Catalonia, -was appointed to command the troops re-assembled -at La Carolina; but most of the other generals -kept aloof, and in Gallicia the Conde de Noronha, -resigning his command, issued a manifesto against -the Junta. Hence the public hatred increased, and -the partizans of Palafox and Montijo, certain that -the people would be against the government under -any circumstances, only waited for a favourable -moment to commence violence. Andalusia generally, -and Seville in particular, were but one remove<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104"></a>[104]</span> -from anarchy, when the intrusive monarch reached -the foot of the Morena with a great and well -organized army.</p> - -<p>The military preparation of the Junta was in -harmony with their political conduct. The decree -for levying a hundred thousand men, issued when -the enemy was but a few marches from the seat of -government, was followed by an order to distribute -a hundred thousand poniards, as if assassination -were the mode in which a great nation could or -ought to defend itself, especially when the regular -forces at the disposal of the Junta, were still -numerous enough, if well directed, to have made -a stout resistance. Areizaga had twenty-five thousand -men in the Morena; Echevaria, with eight -thousand, was close by, at Hellin; five or six -thousand were spread over Andalusia, and Albuquerque -had fifteen thousand behind the Guadiana. -The troops at Carolina were, however, dispirited -and disorganized. Blake had not arrived, and -Albuquerque, distracted with contradictory orders -transmitted almost daily by the Junta, could contrive -no reasonable plan of action, until the movements -of the enemy enabled him to disregard all -instructions. Thus, amidst a whirlpool of passions, -intrigues, and absurdities, Andalusia, although a -mighty vessel, and containing all the means of -safety, was destined to sink.</p> - -<p>This great province, composed of four kingdoms, -namely, Jaen and Cordoba in the north, -Grenada and Seville in the south, was protected -on the right by Murcia and on the left by Portugal. -The northern frontier only was accessible to the -French, who could attack it either by La Mancha -or Estremadura; but, between those provinces, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_105"></a>[105]</span> -Toledo and Guadalupe mountains forbad all military -communication until near the Morena, when, abating -somewhat of their surly grandeur, they left a -space through which troops could move from one -province to the other in a direction parallel to the -frontier of Andalusia.</p> - -<p>Towards La Mancha, the Morena was so savage -that only the royal road to Seville was practicable -for artillery. Entering the hills, a little in advance -of Santa Cruz de Mudela, at a pass of wonderful -strength, called the Despenas Perros, it led by La -Carolina and Baylen to Andujar. On the right, -indeed, another route passed through the Puerto -del Rey, but fell into the first at Navas Toloza, a -little beyond the Despenas Perros; and there were -other passes also, but all falling again into the -main road, before reaching La Carolina. Santa Cruz -de Mudela was therefore a position menacing the -principal passes of the Morena from La Mancha.</p> - -<p>To the eastward of Santa Cruz the town of Villa -Nueva de los Infantes presented a second point of -concentration for the invaders. From thence roads, -practicable for cavalry and infantry, penetrated the -hills by La Venta Quemada and the Puerto de San -Esteban, conducting to Baeza, Ubeda, and Jaen.</p> - -<p>In like manner, on the westward of Santa Cruz, -roads, or, rather, paths, penetrated into the kingdom -of Cordoba. One, entering the mountains, by Fuen -Caliente, led upon Montoro; a second, called the -La Plata, passed by La Conquista to Adamuz, and -it is just beyond these roads that the ridges, separating -La Mancha from Estremadura, begin to soften -down, permitting military ingress to the latter, by -the passes of Mochuello, Almaden de Azogues, and -Agudo. But the barrier of the Morena still shut<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_106"></a>[106]</span> -in Andalusia from Estremadura, the military communication -between those provinces being confined -to three great roads, namely, one from Medellin, -by Llerena, to Guadalcanal; another from Badajos -to Seville, by the defiles of Monasterio and Ronquillo; -and a third by Xeres de los Caballeros, -Fregenal, and Araceña. From Almaden, there was -also a way, through Belalcazar, to Guadalcanal; -and all these routes, except that of Araceña, whether -from La Mancha or Estremadura, after crossing -the mountains, led into the valley of the Guadalquivir, -a river whose waters, drawn from a multitude -of sources, at first roll westward, washing the -foot of the Morena as far as the city of Cordoba, -but then, bending gradually towards the south, -flow by Seville, and are finally lost in the Atlantic.</p> - -<p>To defend the passage of the Morena, Areizaga -posted his right in the defiles of San Esteban and -Montizon, covering the city of Jaen, the old walls -of which were armed. His left occupied the passes -of Fuen Caliente and Mochuello, covering Cordoba. -His centre was established at La Carolina and in -the defiles of the Despenas Perros and Puerto del -Rey, which were entrenched, but with so little -skill and labour as to excite the ridicule rather -than the circumspection of the enemy. And here -it may be well to notice an error relative to the -strength of mountain-defiles, common enough even -amongst men who, with some experience, have -taken a contracted view of their profession.</p> - -<p>From such persons it is usual to hear of narrow -passes, in which the greatest multitudes may be -resisted. But, without stopping to prove that local -strength is nothing, if the flanks can be turned by -other roads, we may be certain that there are few<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107"></a>[107]</span> -positions so difficult as to render superior numbers -of no avail. Where one man can climb another -can, and a good and numerous infantry, crowning -the acclivities on the right and left of a disputed -pass, will soon oblige the defenders to retreat, or -to fight upon equal terms. If this takes place at -any point of an extended front of defiles, such as -those of the Sierra Morena, the dangerous consequences -to the whole of the beaten army are -obvious.</p> - -<p>Hence such passes should only be considered as -fixed points, around which an army should operate -freely in defence of more exposed positions, for -defiles are doors, the keys of which are on the -summits of the hills around them. A bridge is a -defile, yet troops are posted, not in the middle, but -behind a bridge, to defend the passage. By extending -this principle, we shall draw the greatest -advantages from the strength of mountain-passes. -The practice of some great generals may, indeed, -be quoted against this opinion; nevertheless, it -seems more consonant to the true principles of -war to place detachments in defiles, and keep the -main body in some central point behind, ready to -fall on the heads of the enemy’s columns as they -issue from the gorges of the hills.</p> - -<p>Pierced by many roads, and defended by feeble -dispirited troops, the Morena presented no great -obstacle to the French; but, as they came up -against it by the way of La Mancha only, there -were means to render their passage difficult. If -Albuquerque, placing his army either at Almaden -de Azogues, or Agudo, had operated against their -right flank, he must have been beaten, or masked -by a strong detachment, before Areizaga could<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108"></a>[108]</span> -have been attacked. Nor was Andalusia itself -deficient of interior local resources for an obstinate -defence.</p> - -<p>Parallel to the Morena, and at the distance of -about a hundred miles, the Sierra Nevada, the -Apulxaras, and the Sierra Ronda, extend from the -borders of Murcia to Gibraltar, cutting off a narrow -tract of country along the coast of the Mediterranean: -and the intermediate space between these -sierras and the Morena is broken by less extensive -ridges, forming valleys which, gradually descending -and widening, are finally lost in the open country -about Seville. Andalusia may therefore be considered -as presenting three grand divisions of country:—1º. -The upper, or rugged, between the Sierra -Morena and the Sierra Nevada. 2º. The lower, or -open country, about Seville. 3º. The coast-tract -between the Nevada and Ronda, and the Mediterranean. -This last is studded, in its whole length, -with sea-port towns and castles, such as Malaga, -Velez-Malaga, Motril, Ardra, Marbella, Estipona, -and an infinity of smaller places.</p> - -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_108fp" style="max-width: 35em;"> - <p class="right fs70"><em>Vol. 3, Plate 4.</em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_108fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_108fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - <div class="caption"> -INVASION of ANDALUSIA<br /> -1810.<br /> - -<p><em>Published by T. & W. Boone, 1830.</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>No important line of defence is offered by the -Guadalquivir. An army, after passing the Morena, -would follow the course of its waters to gain the -lower parts of Andalusia, and, thus descending, -the advantage of position would be with the invaders. -But, to reach the Mediterranean coast, not -only the ridges of the Nevada or Ronda must be -crossed, but most of the minor parallel ridges enclosing -the valleys, whose waters run towards the -Atlantic. Now all those valleys contain great -towns, such as Jaen and Cordoba, Ubeda, Grenada, -and Alcala Real, most of which, formerly -fortified, and still retaining their ancient walls, were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109"></a>[109]</span> -capable of defence; wherefore the enemy could not -have approached the Mediterranean, nor Grenada, -nor the lower country about Seville, without first -taking Jaen, or Cordoba, or both. The difficulty -of besieging those places, while a Spanish army -was stationed at Alcala Real, or Ecija, while the -mountains, on both flanks and in the rear, were -filled with insurgents, and while Albuquerque -hung upon the rear at Almada, is apparent. Pompey’s -sons, acting upon this system, nearly baffled -Cæsar, although that mighty man had friends in -the province, and, with his accustomed celerity, -fell upon his youthful adversaries before their arrangements -were matured.</p> - -<p>But in this, the third year of the war, the Junta -were unprovided with any plan of defence beyond -the mere occupation of the passes in the Morena. -Those, once forced, Seville was open, and, from -that great city, the French could penetrate into all -parts, and their communication with Madrid became -of secondary importance, because Andalusia -abounded in the materials of war, and Seville, the -capital of the province, and, from its political -position, the most important town in Spain, was -furnished with arsenals, cannon-founderies, and all -establishments necessary to a great military power.</p> - - -<h4>INVASION OF ANDALUSIA.</h4> - -<p>The number of fighting-men destined for this -enterprise was about sixty-five thousand. Marshal -Soult directed the movements; but the king was -disposed to take a more prominent part, in the -military arrangements than a due regard for his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110"></a>[110]</span> -own interest would justify. To cover Madrid, and -to watch the British army, the second corps was -posted between Talavera and Toledo, with strong -detachments pushed into the valley of the Tagus. -Two thousand men, drawn from the reserve, garrisoned -the capital; as many were in Toledo, and -two battalions occupied minor posts, such as Arganda -and Guadalaxara. Gazan’s division was recalled -from Castile, Milhaud’s from Aragon; and -the first, fourth, and fifth corps, the king’s guards, -and the reserve, increased by some reinforcements -from France, were directed upon Andalusia.</p> - -<p>During the early part of January, 1810, the -troops, by easy marches, gained the foot of the -Morena, and there Milhaud’s division, coming by -the way of Benillo, rejoined the fourth corps. A -variety of menacing demonstrations, made along -the front of the Spanish line of defence, between -the 14th and 17th, caused Areizaga to abandon his -advanced positions and confine himself to the -passes of the Morena; but, on the 18th, the king -arrived in person at Santa Cruz de Mudela, and the -whole army was collected in three distinct masses.</p> - -<p>In the centre, the artillery, the king’s guards, the -reserve, and the fifth corps, under marshal Mortier, -were established at Santa Cruz and Elviso, close to -the mouths of the Despenas Perros and the Puerto -del Rey.</p> - -<p>On the left, Sebastiani, with the fourth corps, -occupied Villa Nueva de los Infantes, and prepared -to penetrate, by Venta Quemada and Puerto San -Esteban, into the kingdom of Jaen.</p> - -<p>On the right, the duke of Belluno, placing a -detachment in Agudo, to watch Albuquerque, -occupied Almaden de Azogues, with the first corps,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111"></a>[111]</span> -pushed an advanced guard into the pass of Mochuelo, -and sent patrols through Benalcazar and -Hinojosa towards Guadalcanal. By these dispositions, -Areizaga’s line of defence in the Morena, -and Albuquerque’s line of retreat from Estremadura, -were alike threatened.</p> - -<p>On the 20th, Sebastiani, after a slight skirmish, -forced the defiles of Esteban, making a number of -prisoners; and when the Spaniards rallied behind -the Guadalen, one of the tributary torrents of the -Guadalquiver, he again defeated them, and advancing -into the plains of Ubeda, secured the -bridges over the Guadalquiver.</p> - -<p>In the centre Dessolles carried the Puerto del -Rey without firing a shot, and Gazan’s division -crowning the heights right and left of the Despenas -Perros, turned all the Spanish works in that pass, -which was abandoned. Mortier, with the main -body and the artillery, then poured through, -reached La Carolina in the night, and the next -day took possession of Andujar, having passed in -triumph over the fatal field of Baylen; more fatal -to the Spaniards than to the French, for the foolish -pride, engendered by that victory, was one of the -principal causes of their subsequent losses.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the duke of Belluno pushed detachments -to Montoro, Adamuz, and Pozzoblanco, -and his patrols appeared close to Cordoba. His and -Sebastini’s flanking parties communicated also with -the fifth corps at Andujar; and thus, in two days, -by skilful combinations upon an extent of fifty miles, -the lofty barrier of the Morena was forced, and -Andalusia beheld the French masses portentously -gathered on the interior slopes of the mountains.</p> - -<p>In Seville all was anarchy: Palafox and Montijo’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_112"></a>[112]</span> -partisans were secretly preparing to strike, and the -Ancient Junta openly discovered a resolution to -resume their former power. The timid, and those -who had portable property, endeavoured to remove -to Cadiz; but the populace opposed this, and the -peasantry came into the city so fast that above a -hundred thousand persons were within the walls, -and the streets were crowded with multitudes that, -scarcely knowing what to expect or wish, only -wanted a signal to break out into violence. The -Central Junta, fearing alike, the enemy, and their -own people, prepared to fly, yet faithful to their -system of delusion, while their packages were -actually embarking for Cadiz, assured the people -that the enemy had indeed forced the pass of Almaden, -leading from La Mancha into Estremadura, -but that no danger could thence arise. Because the -duke Del Parque was in full march to join Albuquerque; -and those generals when united being -stronger than the enemy would fall upon his flank, -while Areizaga would co-operate from the Morena -and gain a great victory.</p> - -<p>It was on the 20th of January, and at the very -moment when the Morena was being forced at all -points, that this deluding address was published, -it was not until the day after that the Junta despatched -orders for the duke Del Parque (who was -then in the mountains beyond Ciudad Rodrigo) -to effect that junction with Albuquerque from which -such great things were expected! Del Parque received -the despatch on the 24th, and prepared to -obey. Albuquerque, alive to all the danger of the -crisis, had left general Contreras at Medellin, with -four thousand five hundred men, destined to form a -garrison for Badajos, and marched himself on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113"></a>[113]</span> -22d, with about nine thousand, towards Agudo, -intending to fall upon the flank of the first corps; -but he had scarcely commenced his movement, when -he learned that Agudo and Almaden were occupied, -and that the French patrols were already at Benalcazar -and Hinojosa, within one march of his own -line of retreat upon Seville.</p> - -<p>In this conjuncture, sending Contreras to Badajos, -and his own artillery through the defile of -Monasterio, he marched with his infantry to Guadalcanal. -During the movement, he continued to -receive contradictory and absurd orders from the -Junta, some of which, he disregarded, and others -he could not obey; but conforming to circumstances, -when the Morena was forced, he descended -into the basin of Seville, crossed the Guadalquivir -a few leagues from that city, at the ferry of Cantillana, -reached Carmona on the 24th, and immediately -pushed with his cavalry for Ecija to observe -the enemy’s progress. Meanwhile the storm, so -long impending over the Central Junta, burst at -Seville.</p> - -<p>Early on the 24th a great tumult arose. Mobs -traversing all the quarters of the city, called out, -some for the deposition of the Junta, others for the -heads of the members. Francisco Palafox and -Montijo were released, and the Junta of Seville -being re-established by acclamation, the Central -Junta, committed to their hands the defence of -Andalusia, and endeavoured themselves to reach -Cadiz, each as he could; but with the full intention -of reuniting and resuming their authority. -On the road however, some of them were cast into -prison by the people, some were like to be slain at -Xerez, and the Junta of Seville had no intention<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114"></a>[114]</span> -that the Central Junta should ever revive. Saavedra, -the President of the former, by judicious -measures calmed the tumult in the city, restored -Romana to the command of his old army, which -was now under the duke Del Parque, made some -other popular appointments, and in conjunction -with his colleagues sent a formal proposition to -the Junta at Badajos, inviting them to take into -consideration the necessity of constituting a Regency, -which was readily acceded to. But the -events of war crowding on, overlaid their schemes; -and three days after the flight of the Central Junta, -treason and faction being busy amongst the members -of the Seville Junta, they also disbanded, -some remaining in the town; others, and amongst -them Saavedra, repairing to Cadiz. The tumults -were then renewed with greater violence, and Romana -was called upon to assume the command and -defend the city; but he evaded this dangerous -honour, and proceeded to Badajos.</p> - -<p>Thus abandoned to themselves, the people of -Seville, discovered the same disposition, as the people -of other towns in the Peninsula, had done -upon like occasions. If men like the Tios of Zaragoza, -had assumed command, they might have -left a memorable tale and a ruined city, but there -were none so firm, or so ferocious; and finally, a -feeling of helplessness produced fear in all, and -Seville was ready to submit to the invaders.</p> - -<p>When the passage of the mountains was completely -effected, the French corps again received -their artillery, but the centre and right wing of the -army remained stationary, and a detachment of the -first corps, which had approached Cordoba, returned -to Montoro. Areizaga rallied his troops at Jaen,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115"></a>[115]</span> -but Sebastiani marching from Ubeda, drove him upon -Alcala Real, and Jaen surrendered with forty-six -guns mounted on the walls. The Spanish general -made one more stand; but being again beaten, and -all his artillery captured, his army dispersed. Five -thousand infantry and some squadrons of cavalry -throwing away their arms escaped to Gibraltar; and -Areizaga himself, with a remnant of horse, flying -into the kingdom of Murcia, was there superceded -by Blake. Meanwhile, Sebastiani marched -upon Grenada, and entering it the 28th of January, -was received with apparent joy, so entirely had -the government of the Central Junta extinguished -the former enthusiasm of the people.</p> - -<p>As the capture of Jaen secured the left flank of -the French, the king with the centre and right, -moved on Cordoba the 27th, and there also, as at -Jaen and Grenada, the invaders were received without -any mark of aversion,<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> and thus the upper -<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116"></a>[116]</span> -country was conquered. But the projects of Joseph -were not confined to Andalusia; he had opened -a secret communication with Valencia, where his -partisans undertook to raise a commotion whenever -a French force should appear before the city. Hence, -judging that no serious opposition would be made -in Andalusia, he directed Sebastiani to cross the -Sierra Nevada, and seize the Grenadan coast, an -operation that would enable him with greater facility -to act against Valencia. To ensure the success -of the latter enterprise, he wrote from Cordoba to -<span class="sidenote">Suchet’s -Memoirs.</span>Suchet, urging him to make a combined movement -from Aragon, and promising a powerful detachment -from Andalusia, to meet him under the walls of -Valencia.</p> - -<p>Dessolles, with the reserve, occupied Cordoba -and Jaen; but the first and fifth corps, followed by -the king’s guards, proceeded without delay towards -Ecija, where it will be remembered, Albuquerque’s -cavalry had been posted since the night of the 24th. -As the French approached, the duke fell back upon -Carmona, from whence he could retreat either to -Seville, or Cadiz, the way to the latter being -through Utrera. But from Ecija there was a -road through Moron to Utrera, shorter than that -leading through Carmona, and along this road -the cavalry of the first corps was pushed on -the 27th.</p> - -<p>Albuquerque now despairing for Seville, resolved -to make for Cadiz, and lest the enemy should -reach Utrera before him, gained that town with great -expedition, and thence moving through Lebrija<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117"></a>[117]</span> -and Xeres, by long marches, journeying day and -night, reached Cadiz on the 3d of February. Some -French cavalry overtook and skirmished with his -rear at Utrera; but he was not pursued further, -save by scouting parties; for the king had altered -the original plan of operations, and ordered the first -corps which was then pushing for Cadiz, to change -its direction and march by Carmona against Seville, -and the 30th, the advanced guards came on that -city.</p> - -<p>Some entrenchments and batteries had been -raised for defence, and the mob still governing, -fired upon the bearer of the first French summons, -and announced in lofty terms a resolution to fight. -Besides the populace, there were about seven -thousand troops, composed partly of fugitives from -the Morena, partly of the original garrison of the -town; nevertheless, the city, after some negotiation, -surrendered on the 31st, with all its stores, -founderies, and arsenals complete, and on the 1st -of February the king entered in triumph. The -lower country was thus conquered, and there remained -only Cadiz, and the coast tract lying between -the Mediterranean and the Sierra de Nevada -to subdue.</p> - -<p>The first corps was immediately sent against -Cadiz, and the fifth against Estremadura; and -Sebastiani having placed fifteen hundred men in -the Alhambra, and incorporated among his troops, -a Swiss battalion, composed of those who had -abandoned the French service in the battle of -Baylen, seized Antequera. He was desirous to -establish himself firmly in those parts before he -crossed the Nevada, but his measures were precipitated -by unexpected events. At Malaga, the people<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_118"></a>[118]</span> -had imprisoned the members of the local Junta, -and headed by a Capuchin friar, resolved to fight -the French, and a vast multitude armed in all manners -took post above Antequera and Alhama, where -the road from Grenada enters the hills.</p> - -<p>As this insurrection was spreading, not only in -the mountains, but through the plains of Grenada, -Sebastiani resolved to fall on at once, lest the Grenadans -having Gibraltar on the one flank, Murcia on -the other, and in their own country, many sea-ports -and fortified towns, should organize a regular system -of resistance. The 5th of February, after a slight -skirmish at Alhama, he penetrated the hills, driving -the insurgents upon Malaga; but near that place -they rallied, and an engagement, with the advanced -guard of the French, under general Milhaud, taking -place, about five hundred Spaniards fell, and the -conquerors entered the town fighting. A few of -the vanquished took refuge on board some English -ships of war; the rest submitted, and more -than a hundred pieces of heavy, and about twenty -pieces of field artillery with ammunition, stores, and -a quantity of British merchandize, became the spoil -<span class="sidenote">General -Campbell’s -Correspondence -from -Gibraltar. -MSS.</span>of the conquerors. Velez-Malaga opened its gates -the next day, Motril was occupied, and the insurrection -was quelled; for in every other part, both -troops and peasantry, were terrified and submissive -to the last degree.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, Victor followed the traces of Albuquerque -with such diligence, as to reach Chiclana -on the 5th of February, and it is generally supposed, -that he might have rendered himself master -of Leon, for the defensive works at Cadiz, and the -Isla were in no way improved, but rather deteriorated -since the period of Sir George Smith’s negotiation.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119"></a>[119]</span> -The bridge of Zuazo was indeed broken, -and the canal of Santa Petri a great obstacle; but -Albuquerque’s troops were harassed, dispirited, ill -clothed, badly armed, and in every way inefficient; -the people of Cadiz were apathetic, and the authorities, -as usual, occupied with intrigues and -private interests. In this state, eight thousand -Spanish soldiers could scarcely have defended a -line of ten miles against twenty-five thousand -French, if a sufficient number of boats could have -been collected to cross the canal.</p> - -<p>Venegas was governor of Cadiz; but when it -was known that the Central Junta had been -deposed at Seville, a Municipal Junta, chiefly composed -of merchants, was elected by general ballot. -This body, as inflated and ambitious of power as -any that had preceded it, would not suffer the -fugitive members of the Central Junta to assume -any authority; and the latter, maugre their extreme -reluctance, were obliged to submit, but, by the -advice of Jovellanos, appointed a Regency, composed -of men not taken from amongst themselves. The -Municipal Junta vehemently opposed this proceeding, -but finally, the judicious intervention of -Mr. Bartholomew Frere induced them to acquiesce; -and the 29th of January, the bishop of Orense, -general Castaños, Antonio de Escaño, Saavedra, -and Fernandez de Leon, were appointed Regents, -until the Cortes could be assembled. Leon was -afterwards replaced by one Lardizabal, a native of -New Spain.</p> - -<p>The council of Castile, which had been reinstated -before the fall of Seville, now charged the -deposed Junta, and truly, with usurpation—the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120"></a>[120]</span> -public voice added peculation and other crimes; -and the Regency, which they had themselves appointed, -seized their papers, sequestered their -effects, threw some of the members into prison, -and banished others to the provinces: thus completely -extinguishing this at once odious, ridiculous, -and unfortunate oligarchy. Amongst the persons -composing it, there were undoubtedly, some of unsullied -honour and fine talents, ready and eloquent -of speech, and dexterous in argument; but it is not -in Spain only, that men possessing all the “grace -and ornament” of words have proved to be mean -and contemptible statesmen.</p> - -<p>Albuquerque, elected president of the Municipal -Junta, and commander of the forces, endeavoured -to place the Isla de Leon in a state to resist a -sudden attack; and the French, deceived as to its -strength, after an ineffectual summons, proceeded -to gird the whole bay with works. Meanwhile, -Marshal Mortier, leaving a brigade of the fifth corps -at Seville, pursued a body of four thousand men, -that, under the command of the Visconde de Gand, -had retired from that town towards the Morena; -they evaded him, and fled to Ayamonte, yet were -<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s -Correspondence, -MSS.</span>like to be destroyed, because the bishop of Algarve, -from national jealousy, would not suffer -them to pass the Portuguese frontier. Mortier -disregarding these fugitives, passed the Morena, -by Ronquillos and Monasterio, and marching -against Badajos, summoned it, the 12th of February. -Contreras’ detachment had however, -arrived there on the 26th of January, and Mortier, -finding, contrary to his expectation, that the place -was in a state of defence, retired to Merida.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121"></a>[121]</span></p> - -<p>This terminated the first series of operations in -the fourth epoch of the war; operations which, in -three weeks, had put the French in possession of -Andalusia and Southern Estremadura, with the -exception of Gibraltar and Cadiz in the one, and -of Badajos, Olivenza, and Albuquerque in the -other province. Yet, great as were the results -of this memorable irruption, more might have been -obtained; and the capture of Cadiz would have -been a fatal blow to the Peninsula.</p> - -<p>From Andujar to Seville is only a hundred miles, -yet the French took ten days to traverse that space; -a tardiness for which there appears no adequate -cause. The king, apparently elated at the acclamations -and seeming cordiality with which the -towns, and even villages, greeted him, moved -slowly. He imagined that Seville would open her -gates at once; and thinking that the possession -of that town, would produce the greatest moral -effect, in Andalusia, and all over Spain, changed -the first judicious plan of campaign, and marched -thither in preference to Cadiz. The moral influence -of Seville, was however transferred, along with the -government, to Cadiz; and Joseph was deceived in -his expectations of entering the former city as he -had entered Cordoba. When he discovered his -error there was still time to repair it by a rapid -pursuit of Albuquerque, but he feared to leave -a city with a hundred thousand people in a state -of excitement upon his flank; and resolving first -to reduce Seville, he met indeed with no formidable -resistance, yet so much of opposition, as left him -only the alternative of storming the town or entering -by negotiation. The first his humanity<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122"></a>[122]</span> -forbad; the latter cost him time, which was worth -his crown, for Albuquerque’s proceedings were only -secondary: the ephemeral resistance of Seville was -the primary cause of the safety of Cadiz.</p> - -<p>The march by which the Spanish duke secured -the Isla de Leon, is only to be reckoned from Carmona. -Previous to his arrival there, his movements, -although judicious, were more the result -of necessity than of skill. After the battle of -Ocaña, he expected that Andalusia would be -invaded; yet, either fettered by his orders or ill-informed -of the enemy’s movements, his march -upon Agudo was too late, and his after-march upon -Guadalcanal, was the forced result of his position; -he could only do that, or abandon Andalusia and -retire to Badajos.</p> - -<p>From Guadalcanal, he advanced towards Cordoba -on the 23d, and he might have thrown himself -into that town; yet the prudence of taking such -a decided part, was dependent upon the state of -public sentiment, of which he must have been a -good judge. Albuquerque indeed, imagined, that -the French were already in possession of the place, -whereas they did not reach it until four days later; -but they could easily have entered it on the 24th: -and as he believed that they had done so, it is -apparent that he had no confidence in the people’s -disposition. In this view, his determination to -cross the Guadalquivir, and take post at Carmona, -was the fittest for the occasion. It was at Carmona -he first appears to have considered Seville a lost -city; and when the French approached, we find him -marching, with a surprising energy, towards Cadiz, -yet he was again late in deciding; for the enemy’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123"></a>[123]</span> -cavalry, moving by the shorter road to Utrera, -overtook his rear-guard: and the infantry would -assuredly have entered the Island of Leon with -him, if the king had not directed them upon -Seville. The ephemeral resistance of that city -therefore saved Albuquerque; and he, in return, -saved Cadiz.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124"></a>[124]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BX_II">CHAPTER II.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>Lord Wellington’s plans were deeply affected -by the invasion of Andalusia: but before treating -of the stupendous campaign he was now meditating, -it is necessary, once more to revert to the operations -in the other parts of the Peninsula, tracing them -up to a fixed point; because, although bearing -strongly on the main action of the war, to recur -to them chronologically, would totally destroy, the -unity of narrative indispensable to a just handling -of the subject.</p> - - -<h4>OPERATIONS IN NAVARRE, ARAGON, AND -VALENCIA.</h4> - -<p>Suchet, being ordered to quell the disorders in -Navarre, repaired to Pampeluna, but previously -directed an active pursuit of the student Mina, -who, availing himself of the quarrel between the -military governor and the viceroy, was actually -master of the country between that fortress and -Tudela, and was then at Sanguessa. General -Harispe, with some battalions, marched straight -against him from Zaragoza, while detachments -from Tudela and Pampeluna endeavoured to surround -him by the flanks, and a fourth body moving -into the valleys of Ainsa and Medianoz, cut him off -from the Cinca river.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125"></a>[125]</span></p> - -<div class="sidenote">Suchet’s -Memoirs.</div> - -<p>Harispe quickly reached Sanguessa, but the -column from Pampeluna being retarded, Mina, -with surprising boldness, crossed its line of march, -and attacked Tafalla, thus cutting the great French -line of communication; the garrison, however, made -a strong resistance, and Mina disappeared the next -day. At this period, however, reinforcements -from France were pouring into Navarre, and a -division, under Loison, was at Logroño, wherefore -Harispe having, in concert with this general and with -the garrison of Pampeluna, occupied Sanguessa, -Sos, Lodosa, Puenta de Reyna, and all the passages -of the Arga, Aragon, and Ebro rivers, launched -a number of moveable columns, that continually -pursued Mina, until chased into the high parts of -the Pyrenees, cold and hunger obliged his band to -disperse. The enterprising chief himself escaped -with seven followers, and when the French were -tracking him from house to house, he, with a -romantic simplicity, truly Spanish, repaired to -Olite, that he might see Suchet pass on his way -from Zaragoza to Pampeluna.</p> - -<p>But that general, while seemingly occupied with -the affairs of Pampeluna, was secretly preparing -guns and materials, for a methodical <ins class="corr" id="tn-125" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'war of invavasion'"> -war of invasion</ins>, beyond the frontiers of Aragon, and when -general Reynier, coming soon afterwards from -France, with troops intended to form an eighth -corps, was appointed governor of Navarre, Suchet -returned to Zaragoza. During his absence, some -petty actions had taken place, but his general -arrangements were not disturbed, and the emperor -having promised to increase the third corps to -thirty thousand men, with the intention of directing -it at once against Valencia, all the stores befitting<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_126"></a>[126]</span> -such an enterprise were collected at Terruel -in the course of January. The resistance of Gerona, -and other events in Catalonia having, however, -baffled Napoleon’s calculations, this first destination -of the third corps was changed. Suchet was -ordered to besiege Tortoza or Lerida; the eighth -corps, then forming at Logroño, was directed to -cover his rear, and the seventh corps to advance -to the Lower Ebro and support the siege. Nor -was this arrangement definitive; fresh orders sent -the eighth corps towards Castile, and just at this -moment Joseph’s letter from Cordoba, calling upon -Suchet to march against Valencia, arrived, and -gave a new turn to the affairs of the French in -Spain.</p> - -<p>A decree of the emperor, dated the 8th of -January, and constituting Aragon a particular -government, rendered Suchet independent of the -king’s orders, civil or military. But this decree, -together with a renewed order to commence the -siege of Lerida, had been intercepted, and the -French general, doubtful of Napoleon’s real views, -undertook the enterprise against Valencia. Desirous, -however, of first intimidating the partisans -hanging on the borders of Aragon, he detached -Laval against Villa Campa, and the latter being -defeated on the side of Cuença, his troops dispersed -for the moment.</p> - -<p>Suchet then fortified a post at Terruel, to serve -as a temporary base of operations, and drew -together at that place twelve battalions of -infantry, a regiment of cuirassiers, several squadrons -of light cavalry, and some field artillery, -and, at the same time, caused six battalions and -three squadrons of cavalry to be assembled at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127"></a>[127]</span> -Alcanitz, under general Habert. The remainder of -the third corps was distributed on the line of the -Cinca, and on the right bank of the Ebro. The -castles of Zaragoza, Alcanitz, Monzon, Venasque, -Jaca, Tudela, and other towns, were placed in a -state of defence, and four thousand men, newly -arrived from France, were pushed to Daroca, to -link the active columns to those left in Aragon. -These arrangements occupied the whole of February, -and, on the 1st of March, a duplicate of the -order, directing Suchet to commence the siege of -Lerida, reached Terruel. But as Habert’s column -having marched on the 27th, by the road of Morella, -was already committed in the province of -Valencia, the operation went on.</p> - - -<h4>INCURSION TO VALENCIA.</h4> - -<p>The first day, brought Suchet’s column, in presence -of the Valencian army, for Ventura Caro, -captain-general of that province, was in march to -attack the French at Terruel, and his advanced -guard of five or six thousand regulars, accompanied -by armed peasants, was drawn up on some high -ground behind the river Mingares, the bed of which -is a deep ravine so suddenly sunk, as not to be -perceived until close upon it. The village and -castle of Alventoza, situated somewhat in advance -of the Spaniard’s centre, were occupied, and commanded -a bridge over the river. Their right rested -on the village and bridge of Puenseca, and their -left on the village of Manzanera, where the -ground was rather more practicable.</p> - -<p>Suchet, judging that Caro would not fight so<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_128"></a>[128]</span> -far from Valencia, while Habert’s column was turning -his right, sent a division before daylight, on -the 2d, to turn the left of the position, and cut off -the retreat; but, although the French, after a -skirmish, crossed the ravine, the Spaniards retired -with little loss upon Segorbe, and Caro fell back -to the city of Valencia. Suchet entered Segorbe -the 3d, and on the 4th was at Murviedro, the -ancient Saguntum, four leagues from Valencia. -At the same time, Habert, who had defeated a -small corps at Morella, arrived at Villa Real on -the sea coast. The country between their lines of -march was mountainous and impracticable, but -after passing Saguntum, the Huerta, or garden of -Valencia, the richest and most delightful part of -Spain, opened, the two columns, united, and arriving -before the city on the 5th of March, seized -the suburb Seranos, and the harbour called the -Grao.</p> - -<p>Suchet’s spies at first confirmed the hopes of an -insurrection within the walls, but the treason was -detected, the leader, a baron Pozzo Blanco, publicly -executed, and the archbishop and many -others imprisoned; in fine, the plan had failed, -the populace were in arms, and there was no -movement of French troops on the side of Murcia. -Five days the French general remained before the -city, vainly negotiating, and then, intrigue failing, -and his army being inadequate to force the defences, -he resolved to retire. In the night of the -10th he commenced his retreat in one column by -Segorbe and Terruel. Meanwhile the Spanish -partisans were gathering on his rear. Combats -had already taken place at Liria and Castellon de -la Plana, and general Villa Campa, who had reassembled<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129"></a>[129]</span> -his dispersed troops, captured four -guns, with their ammunition and escort, between -Terruel and Daroca; cut off another detachment -of a hundred men left at Alventoza, and, having -invested the post at Terruel, on the 7th, by a -bold and ready witted attempt, nearly carried the -castle. The 12th, however, the head of Suchet’s -column came in sight, Villa Campa retired, and the -17th the French general reached Zaragoza.</p> - -<p>During his absence, Perena had invested Monzon, -and when the garrison of Fraga marched to its -relief, the Spaniards from Lerida, entered the latter -town, and destroyed the bridge and French entrenchments. -Mina, also, was again become formidable, -and, although several columns were sent -in chase of him, it is probable, that they would -have done no more than disperse his band for the -moment, but for an accident, which threw him into -their hands a prisoner.</p> - -<p>Suchet’s failure at Valencia was more hurtful to -the French than would at first sight appear. It -happened at the moment when the National Cortes, -so long desired, was at last directed to assemble; -and as it seemed to balance the misfortunes of -Andalusia, it was hailed by the Spaniards as the -commencement of a better era. But the principal -military advantage was the delaying of the sieges -of Lerida and Mequinenza, whereby the subjection -of Catalonia was retarded: and although Suchet -labours, and successfully, to show that he was -drawn into this enterprise by the force of circumstances, -Napoleon’s avowed discontent was well -founded. The operations in Catalonia were so -hampered by the nature of the country, that it was -only at certain conjunctures, any progress could be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130"></a>[130]</span> -made, and one of the most favourable of those conjunctures, -was lost, for want of the co-operation of -the third corps; but to understand this, the military -topography of Catalonia must be well considered.</p> - -<p>That province is divided in its whole length by -shoots from the Pyrenees, which, with some interruptions, -run to the Atlantic shores; for the sierras -separating Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia from the -central parts of Spain, are but continuations of those -shoots. The Ebro, forcing its way transversely -through the ridges, parts Catalonia from Valencia, -but the hills, thus broken by the river, push their -rocky heads southward to the sea, cutting off -Taragona from Tortoza, and enclosing what may -be called the eastern region of Catalonia, which -contains Rosas, Gerona, Hostalrich, Vich, Barcelona, -Manreza, Taragona, Reus, and many more -<span class="sidenote">Vol. I. -Book I. -Chap. VI.</span>towns. The torrents, the defiles, and other military -features of this region have been before described. -The western portion of Catalonia lying -beyond the principal spine, is bounded partly by -Aragon, partly by Valencia; and, like the eastern -region, it is an assemblage of small plains and -rugged valleys, each, the bed of a river, descending -towards the Ebro from the Pyrenees. It contains -the fortresses of Balaguer, Lerida, Mequinenza, -Cervera, and, near the mouth of the Ebro, Tortoza, -which, however, belongs in a military view rather -to Valencia than Catalonia.</p> - -<p>Now the mountain ridge, parting the eastern -from the western region of Catalonia, could only -be passed by certain routes, for the most part impracticable -for artillery, and those practicable, -leading upon walled towns at both sides of the -defiles. Thus Cervera is situated on the principal<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131"></a>[131]</span> -and direct line from Lerida to Barcelona; Balaguer, -Cardona, and Montserrat, on another and more circuitous -road to the same city. Between Lerida -and Taragona, stands Momblanch, and between -Taragona, and Tortoza, the Fort St. Felippe blocks -the Col de Balaguer. All these places were in -the hands of the Spaniards, and a number of smaller -fortresses, or castles, such as Urgel, Berga, and -Solsona, served as rallying points, where the warlike -Somatenes, of the higher valleys, took refuge -from the moveable columns, and from whence, -supplied with arms and ammunition, they sallied, -to harass, the flanks and rear, of both the French -corps.</p> - -<p>In the eastern region, the line of operations for -the seventh corps, was between the mountains and -the sea-coast, and parallel with both; hence, the -Spanish irregular forces, holding all the communications, -and the high valleys on both sides of the -great dividing spine, could at all times descend -upon the rear and flanks of the French, while the -regular troops, opposed to them on a narrow front, -and supported by the fortresses of Gerona, Hostalrich, -and Taragona, could advance or retire as circumstances -dictated. And upon this principle, -the defence of Catalonia was conducted.</p> - -<p>Detachments and sometimes the main body of -the Spanish army, passing by the mountains, or by -sea from Taragona, harassed the French flanks, -and when defeated, retired on Vich, Manresa, Montserrat, -or Cervera, and finally to Taragona. From -this last, the generals communicated with Tortoza, -Valencia, Gibraltar, the Balearic Isles, and even -Sicily, and drew succours of all kinds from those -places, and meanwhile the bands in the mountains<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132"></a>[132]</span> -continued to vex the French communications; and -it was only during the brief period of lassitude in -the Spanish army, following any great defeat, that -the seventh corps could chase those mountaineers. -Nor, until Gerona and Hostalrich fell, was it easy -to make any but sudden and short incursions towards -Taragona, because the Miguelettes from the -higher valleys, and detachments from the army at -Taragona, again passing by the hills or by sea, -joined the garrisons, and interrupted the communications; -and thus obliged the French to retire, -because the country beyond the Llobregat could -never feed them long.</p> - -<p>But when Barcelona could not be succoured by -sea, it was indispensable to conduct convoys by -land, and to insure their arrival, the whole army -was obliged to make frequent movements in advance, -retiring again when the object was effected; -and this being often renewed, offered many opportunities -for cutting off minor convoys, detachments, -and even considerable bodies isolated by the momentary -absence of the army. Thus, during the -siege of Gerona, Blake passed through the mountains -and harassed the besiegers. When the place -fell, he retired again to Taragona, and Augereau -took the occasion to attack the Miguelettes, and -Somatenes, in the high valleys; but in the midst of -this operation admiral Baudin’s squadron, was -intercepted by admiral Martin; and the insatiable -craving of Barcelona, obliged Augereau to -reassemble his army, and conduct a convoy there -by land. Yet he was soon obliged to return again, -lest he should himself consume the provisions he -brought for the city. This retreat, as usual, drew -on the Spaniards, who were again defeated; and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133"></a>[133]</span> -Augereau once more advanced, in the intention of -co-operating with the third corps, which, he supposed, -would, following the Emperor’s design, be -before Lerida or Tortoza. However, when Augereau -thus advanced, Suchet was on the march to -Valencia; and Henry O’Donnel who had succeeded -Blake in the command, recommenced the warfare -on the French communications, and forced Augereau -again to retire to Gerona, at the moment when -Suchet, having returned to Aragon, was ready to -besiege Lerida; thus, like unruly horses in a chariot -dragging different ways, the French impeded -each other’s movements. I shall now briefly narrate -the events touched upon above.</p> - - -<h4>OPERATIONS OF THE SEVENTH CORPS.</h4> - -<p>Gerona having fallen, general Souham with a -division, scoured the high valleys, beating the -Miguelettes of Claros and Rovira, at Besalu, Olot, -Ribas, and Campredon; and at Ripoll, he destroyed -a manufactory for arms. Being afterwards reinforced -with Pino’s division, he marched from Olot, by the -road of Esteban and Manlieu; the Somatenes disputed -the defiles near the last point, but the -French forcing the passage, again took possession -of Vich. Meanwhile Blake having been called -to Andalusia, the Provincial Junta of Catalonia -rejecting the duke Del Parque, took upon themselves -to give the command to Henry O’Donnel, -whose courage during the siege of Gerona had -gained him a high reputation. He was now with -the remains of Blake’s army at Vich, and as the -French approached that town he retired to the pass<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134"></a>[134]</span> -of Col de Sespina, from whence he had a free retreat -upon Moya and Manresa. Souham’s advanced -guard, pursued, and at Tona, captured some baggage, -but the Spaniard turned on finding his rear -pressed, and when the pursuers mounted the -heights of Sespino, charged with a shock, that sent -them headlong down the hills again. Souham rallied -the beaten troops in the plain, and the next -day offered battle; but O’Donnel continued his -retreat, and the French general returned to Vich.</p> - -<p>During these events, Augereau, leaving a detachment -in Hostalrich to blockade the castle, marched -to Barcelona, by the road of Cardedieu, having -previously ordered Duhesme, to post three battalions -and five squadrons of cuirassiers, with some guns, -near the junction, of the roads of Cardedieu and -Manresa, to watch O’Donnel. Colonel Guery, commanding -this detachment, placed one battalion at -Granollers, a second at Santa Perpetua, and with -the remainder occupied Mollet, taking however no -military precautions; and O’Donnel who had been -joined by Campo Verde, from the side of Cervera, -sent him to fall upon the French posts. Campo -Verde, passing by Tarrassa and Sabadel, surprised -and put to the sword or captured all the troops at -Santa Perpetua and Mollet; but those at Granollers, -threw themselves into a large building, and -defended it for three days, when by the approach -of Augereau they were relieved. The marshal finding -the streets of Mollet strewed with French carcasses, -ordered up the division of Souham from Vich, -but passed on himself to Barcelona. When there, -he became convinced how oppressive Duhesme’s -conduct had been, and sent him to France in disgrace; -after which, unable to procure provisions<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135"></a>[135]</span> -without exhausting the magazines of Barcelona, he -resumed his former position at Gerona, and Souham, -passing the defiles of Garriga, returned to Vich.</p> - -<p>All this time the blockade of Hostalrich continued; -but the retreat of Augereau, and the success -of Campo Verde’s enterprise, produced extraordinary -joy over all Catalonia. The prisoners -taken, were marched from town to town, and the -action everywhere exaggerated; the decree for -enrolling a fifth of the male population was enforced -with vigour, and the execution entrusted to -the Baron d’Erolles, a native of Talarn, who afterwards -obtained considerable celebrity. The army, -in which there was still a large body of Swiss -troops, was thus reinforced; the confidence of the -people increased hourly, and a Local Junta was -established at Arenys de Mar, to organise the Somatenes -on the coast, and to direct the application -of succours from the sea. The Partisans, also reassembling -their dispersed bands in the higher -valleys, again vexed the Ampurdan, and incommoded -the troops blockading the citadel of Hostalrich.</p> - -<p>O’Donnel himself, moving to Manresa, called the -Miguelettes from the Lerida side, to his assistance; -and soon formed a body of more than twelve thousand -fighting-men, with which he took post at -Moya, in the beginning of February, and harassed -the French in front of Vich, while, in the rear of -that town, Rovira occupied the heights above Roda. -Souham, seeing the crests of the hills thus swarming -with enemies, and, having but five thousand -men of all arms to oppose to them, demanded reinforcements; -but Augereau paid little attention to -him: and, on the 20th, O’Donnel, descending the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136"></a>[136]</span> -mountain of Centellas, entered the plains in three -columns, and the French general had scarcely time -to draw up his troops a little in front of the town, -ere he was attacked with a vigour hitherto unusual -with the Spaniards.</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF VICH.</h4> - -<p>Rovira commenced the action, by driving the -enemy’s posts, on the side of Roda, back upon the -town, and soon afterwards O’Donnel, coming close -up on the front of the French position, opened all -his guns, and, throwing out skirmishers along the -whole of the adverse line, filed his cavalry, under -cover of their fire, to the right, intending to outflank -Souham’s left; but the latter general, leaving -a battalion to hold Rovira in check, encouraged his -own infantry, and sent his dragoons against the -Spanish horsemen, who, at the first charge, were -driven back in confusion. The foot then fell in on -the French centre, but, failing to make any serious -impression, the Spanish general, whose great superiority -of numbers enabled him to keep heavy -masses in reserve, endeavoured to turn both flanks -of the enemy at the same time. Souham was now -hard pressed, his infantry were few, his reserves -all engaged, and himself severely wounded in the -head. O’Donnel, who had rallied his cavalry, and -brought up his Swiss regiments, was full of confidence, -and in person fiercely led the whole mass -once more against the left; but, at this critical -period, the French infantry, far from wavering, -firmly closed their ranks, and sent their volleys -more rapidly into the hostile ranks, while the cavalry,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137"></a>[137]</span> -sensible that the fate of all (for there was no -retreat) hung upon the issue of their charge, met -their adversaries with such a full career that horse -and man went down before them, and the Swiss, -being separated from the rest, surrendered. Rovira -was afterwards driven away, and the Spanish army -returned to the hills, having lost a full fourth of -its own numbers, and killed or wounded twelve -hundred of the enemy.</p> - -<p>O’Donnel’s advance, had been the signal, for all -the irregular bands to act against the various quarters -of the French; they were, however, with the -exception of a slight succour, thrown into Hostalrich, -unsuccessful, and, being closely pursued by -the moveable columns, dispersed. Thus the higher -valleys were again subdued, the Junta fled from -Arenys de Mar, Campo Verde returned to the -country about Cervera, and O’Donnel, quitting the -Upper Llobregat, retired by Taraza, Martorel, and -Villa Franca to the camp of Taragona, leaving only -an advanced guard at Ordal.</p> - -<p>It was at this moment, when Upper Catalonia -was in a manner abandoned by the Spanish general, -that the emperor, directed the seventh corps upon the -Lower Ebro, to support Suchet’s operations against -Lerida and Mequinenza. Augereau, therefore, leaving -a detachment under Verdier, in the Ampurdan, and -two thousand men to blockade Hostalrich, ordered -his brother and general Mazzucchelli (the one commanding -Souham’s, and the other Pino’s division) to -march upon Manreza, while he himself, with the -Westphalian division, repaired once more to Barcelona, -and from thence directed all the subsequent -movements.</p> - -<p>General Augereau, passing by Col de Sespina,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138"></a>[138]</span> -entered Manreza, the 16th of March, and there -joined Mazzucchelli; but the inhabitants abandoned -the place, and general Swartz was sent with a -brigade, from Moncada, to take possession, while the -two divisions continued their movement, by Montserrat, -upon Molino del Rey. The 21st they advanced -to Villa Franca, and the Spaniards retired -from Ordal towards Taragona. But the French, -acting under orders from Barcelona, left a thousand -men in Villa Franca, and, after scouring the country -on the right and left, passed the Col de San Cristina, -and established their quarters about Reus, by which -the Spanish army at Taragona was placed between -them and the troops at Villa Franca.</p> - -<p>O’Donnel, whose energy and military talents, -were superior to his predecessors, saw, and instantly -profited from this false position. By his orders, -general Juan Caro marched, with six thousand men, -against the French in Villa Franca, and, on the -28th, killed many and captured the rest, together -with some artillery and stores; but, being wounded -himself, resigned the command to general Gasca, -after the action. Augereau, alarmed for Manreza, -detached troops, both by Olesa and Montserrat, to -reinforce Swartz. The first reached their destinations, -but the others, twelve hundred strong, were -intercepted by Gasca, and totally defeated at Esparaguera -on the 3d of April. Campo Verde then, -coming down from the side of Cervera, took the -chief command, and proceeded against Manreza, -by Montserrat, while Milans de Boch, and Rovira, -hemmed in the French on the opposite side, and -the Somatenes gathered on the hills to aid the -operations. Swartz <ins class="corr" id="tn-138" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'evacuted the town'"> -evacuated the town</ins> in the night, -and thinking to baffle the Spaniards, by taking the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139"></a>[139]</span> -road of Taraza and Sabadel, was followed closely -and beaten, by Rovira and Milans, on the 5th of -April, and, with great difficulty and the loss of all -his baggage, reached Barcelona.</p> - -<p>These operations having insulated the French -divisions at Reus, an officer was despatched, by -sea, with orders <ins class="corr" id="tn-139" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'to recal them'"> -to recall them</ins> to Barcelona. Meanwhile -count Severoli, who had taken the command -of them, and whose first instructions were to co-operate -with Suchet, feared to pass the mountains -between Reus and the Ebro, lest he should expose -his rear to an attack from Taragona, and perhaps -fail of meeting the third corps at last. Keeping, -therefore, on the defensive at Reus, he detached -colonel Villatte, at the head of two battalions and -some cavalry, across the hills, by Dos Aguas and -Falcet, to open a communication with the third -corps, a part of which had just seized Mora and -Flix, on the Lower Ebro. Villatte accomplished -his object, and returned with great celerity, fighting -his way through the Somatenes, who were gathering -round the defiles in his rear. He regained -Reus, just as Severoli, having received the order of -recall, was commencing his march for Barcelona.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Vacani -<ins class="err" id="err-139" title="Erratum: was 'Istoria militaire degl’Italiano'"> -Istoria -Militáre -degl’Italiani</ins> in -Ispagna.</div> - -<p>In the night of the 6th, this movement took -place, but in such confusion, that, from Taragona, -O’Donnel perceived the disorder; and sending a -detachment, under colonel Orry, to harass the -French, followed himself with the rest of his -army. Nevertheless, Severoli’s rear guard, covered -the retreat successfully, until a position was attained -near Villa Franca; and there Orry, pressing on -too closely, was wounded and taken, and his troops -rejoined their main body. As these divisions arrived, -Campo Verde fell back to Cervera, Severoli reached<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140"></a>[140]</span> -Barcelona, and Augereau retired to Gerona, having -lost more than three thousand men, by a series of -most unskilful movements. The situation in which -he voluntarily placed himself, was precisely such -as a great general would rejoice to see his adversary -choose.</p> - -<p>Barcelona, the centre of his operations, was -encircled by mountains, to be passed only at certain -defiles; now Reus and Manresa, were beyond those -defiles, and several days march from each other. -Rovira and Milans being about San Culgat, cut -the communication between Manresa and Barcelona; -and O’Donnel, at Taragona, was nearer to -the defiles of Cristina, than the French divisions at -Reus. His communication with Campo Verde, was -open by Valls, Pla, and Santa Coloma de Querault; -and with Milans and Rovira, by Villa Franca, San -Sadurni, and Igualada.</p> - -<p>Augereau indeed, placed a battalion in Villa -Franca, but this only rendered his situation worse; -for what could six hundred men effect in a mountainous -country against three considerable bodies -of the enemy? The result was inevitable. The -battalion, at Villa Franca, was put to the sword; -Swartz only saved a remnant of his brigade by a -timely flight; the divisions at Reus with difficulty -made good their retreat; and O’Donnel, who, one -month before, had retired from the battle of Vich, -broken and discomfited by only five thousand -French, now, with that very beaten army, baffled -Augereau, and obliged him, although at the head -of more than twenty thousand men, to abandon -Lower Catalonia, and retire to Gerona with disgrace: -a surprising change, yet one in which -fortune had no share.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141"></a>[141]</span></p> - -<div class="sidenote">Napoleon’s -Memoirs.</div> - -<p>Augereau’s talents for handling small corps in -a battle, have been recorded by a master hand. -There is a vast difference between that and conducting -a campaign; but the truth is, that Catalonia -had, like Aragon, been declared a particular -government, and Augereau, afflicted with gout, -remained in the palace of Barcelona, affecting the -state of a viceroy, when he should have been at -the head of his troops in the field. On the other -hand, his opponent, a hardy resolute man, excited -by a sudden celebrity, was vigilant, indefatigable, -and eager. He merited the success he obtained; -and, with better and more experienced troops, -that success would have been infinitely greater. -Yet if the expedition to Valencia had not taken -place, O’Donnel, distracted by a double attack, -would have remained at Taragona; and neither -the action of Vich, nor the disasters at Mollet, -Villa Franca, and Esparaguera, would have taken -place.</p> - -<p>Napoleon, discontented, as he well might be, -with these operations, appointed M’Donald, duke -of Tarentum, to supersede Augereau; but, in the -meantime, the latter, having reached Gerona, -disposed his troops in the most commodious manner -to cover the blockade of Hostalrich, giving Severoli -the command.</p> - - -<h4>FALL OF HOSTALRICH CASTLE.</h4> - -<p>This citadel was invested early in January. -Situated on a high rock, armed with forty guns, -well garrisoned, and commanded by a brave man, -it was nearly impregnable; and the French at first<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142"></a>[142]</span> -endeavoured to reduce it by a simple blockade: -but, towards the middle of February, commenced the -erection of mortar-batteries. Severoli also pressed -the place more vigorously than before, and although -O’Donnel, collecting convoys on the side of Vich -and Mattaro, caused the blockading troops to be -attacked at several points by the Miguelettes, every -attempt to introduce supplies failed. The garrison -was reduced to extremity, and honourable terms -were offered, but the governor, Julian Estrada, rejected -them, and prepared to break through the -<span class="sidenote">Napoleon’s -Memoirs.</span>enemy’s line, an exploit always expected from a -good garrison in Turenne’s days, and, as Napoleon -has shewn by numerous examples, generally successful.</p> - -<p>O’Donnel, who could always communicate with -the garrison, being aware of their intention, sent -some vessels to Arenys de Mar, and made demonstrations -from thence, and from the side of St. Celoni, -to favour the enterprise; and in the night of the -12th, Estrada, leaving his sick behind, came forth -with about fourteen hundred men. He first made -as if for St. Celoni, but afterwards turning to his -right, broke through on the side of St. Felieu de Buxalieu -and pushed for Vich; but the French closing -rapidly from the right and left, pursued so closely, -that Estrada himself was wounded, and taken, together -with about three hundred men; many also were -killed, the rest dispersed in the mountains, and -eight hundred reached Vich in safety. This courageous -action was therefore successful. Thus, on -the 14th of May, after four months of blockade -and ten weeks of bombardment, the castle fell, the -line of communication with Barcelona was completed, -and the errors committed by Duhesme were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143"></a>[143]</span> -partly remedied, but at an expense of two years of -field operations, many battles, and four sieges.</p> - -<p>Two small islands, called Las Medas, situated -at the mouth of the Ter, and affording a safe anchorage, -were next seized, and this event which -facilitated the passage of the French vessels, stealing -from port to port with provisions, or despatches, -finished Augereau’s career. It had been the very -reverse of St. Cyr’s. The latter, victorious in the -field, was humane afterwards; but <ins class="err" id="err-143" title="Erratum: was 'Augereau’s'"> -Augereau</ins> endeavouring, -to frighten those people into submission, -<span class="sidenote">Victoires -et Conquêtes -<ins class="corr" id="tn-143" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'des Française'"> -des Français</ins>.</span>who he had failed to beat, erected gibbets along -the high-roads, upon which every man taken in arms -was hung up without remorse, producing precisely -the effect that might be expected. The Catalans -more animated by their successes, than daunted by -this barbarous severity, became incredibly savage -in their revenge, and thus all human feeling lost, -both parties were alike steeped in blood and loaded -with crimes.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144"></a>[144]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BX_III">CHAPTER III.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>While Augereau lost, in Barcelona, the fruits of -his success at Gerona, Suchet, sensible how injurious -the expedition to Valencia had proved, was diligently -repairing that error. Reinforcements from -France, had raised his fighting men to about twenty-three -thousand, and of these, he drew out thirteen -thousand to form the siege of Lerida; the remainder, -were required to maintain the forts in Aragon, -and to hold in check the Partisans, principally in -the higher valleys of the Pyrenees. Villa Campa -however, with from three to four thousand men, -still kept about the lordship of Molina, and the -mountains of Albaracin.</p> - -<p>Two lines of operation were open to Suchet, the -one, short and direct, by the high road leading from -Zaragoza through Fraga to Lerida; the other circuitous, -over the Sierra de Alcubierre, to Monzon, -and from thence to Lerida. The first was inconvenient, -because the Spaniards, when they took -Fraga, destroyed the bridge over the Cinca. Moreover, -the fortress of Mequinenza, the Octogesa of -Cæsar, situated at the confluence of the Segre and -the Ebro, was close on the right flank, and might -seriously incommode the communications with Zaragoza, -whereas the second route, although longer, -was safer, and less exhausted of forage and provisions.</p> - -<p>Monzon was already a considerable military establishment,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_145"></a>[145]</span> -the battering train consisting of forty -pieces, with seven hundred rounds of ammunition -attached to each, was directed there, and placed -under the guard of Habert’s division, which occupied -the line of the Cinca. Leval leaving -general Chlopiski with a brigade at Daroca, to observe -Villa Campa, drew nearer to Zaragoza with -the rest of his division. Musnier marched with -one brigade to Alcanitz, and was there joined by -his second brigade, which had been conducted to -that point, from Terruel, across the Sierra de Gudar. -And while these movements were executing, the -castles of Barbastro, Huesca, Ayerbe, Zuera, Pina, -Bujarola, and other points on the left of the Ebro, -were occupied by detachments.</p> - -<p>The right bank of that river, being guarded by -Leval’s division, and the country on the left bank, -secured by a number of fortified posts, there remained -two divisions of infantry, and about nine hundred -cavalry, disposable for the operations against Lerida. -On the Spanish side, Campo Verde was with -O’Donnel at Manreza, and Garcia Novaro at Taragona, -having small detachments on the right bank -of the Ebro to cover Tortoza; Perenna with five -battalions occupied Balaguer on the Upper Segre.</p> - -<p>Such were the relative situations of both parties, -when general Musnier quitting Alcanitz towards -the end of March, crossed the Guadalupe, drove -Novarro’s detachments within the walls of Tortoza, -and then remounting the Ebro, seized some boats, -and passing that river at Mora and at Flix, communicated -as I have before related, with colonel -Villatte of the seventh corps. And while this -was passing on the Ebro, general Habert crossed -the Cinca in two columns, one of which moved<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_146"></a>[146]</span> -straight upon Balaguer, while the other passed the -Segre at Camarasa. Perenna, fearing to be attacked -on both sides of that river, and not wishing to defend -Balaguer, retired down the left bank, and using -the Lerida bridge, remounted the right bank to -Corbins, where he took post behind the Noguerra, -at its confluence with the Segre.</p> - -<p>Suchet himself repaired to Monzon the 10th of -April, and placed a detachment at Candasnos to cover -his establishments from the garrison of Mequinenza, -and the 13th he advanced with a brigade of infantry, -and all his cavalry, by Almacellas, against Lerida; -meanwhile Habert, descending the right bank of the -Segre, forced the passage of the Noguerra, and obliged -Perenna to retire within the place. The same -day Musnier came up from Flix, and the town being -thus encompassed, the operations of the seventh -and third corps were connected. Suchet’s line of operations -from Aragon, was short, direct, and easy to -supply, because the produce of that province was -greater than the consumption; but Augereau’s line, -was long and unsafe, and the produce of Catalonia -was at no time equal to the consumption.</p> - -<p>Lerida, celebrated in ancient and modern times, -contained about eighteen thousand inhabitants. -Situated upon the high road from Zaragoza to Barcelona, -and about sixty-five miles from each; it possessed -a stone bridge over the Segre, and was only a -short distance from the Ebro, and the Cinca rivers; -its strategic importance was therefore great, and the -more so, that it in a manner commanded the plains of -Urgel, called the granary of Catalonia. The regular -governor was named Gonsalez, but Garcia -Conde had been appointed chief commandant, to -appease his discontent at O’Donnel’s elevation; and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_147"></a>[147]</span> -the troops he brought with him had encreased the -garrison to nine thousand regulars, besides the armed -inhabitants.</p> - -<p>The river Segre covered the town on the south-east, -and the head of the bridge was protected on -the left bank, by a rampart and ditch enclosing a -square stone building. The body of the place on -the north side, was defended by a wall, without -either ditch or covered way, but strengthened and -flanked by bastions, and by towers. This wall on the -east, was joined to a rocky hill more than two hundred -and fifty feet high, the top of which sustained -the citadel, an assemblage of huge solid edifices, -clustered about a castle of great height, and surrounded -by an irregular work flanked by good bastions -with ramparts from forty to fifty feet high.</p> - -<p>The descent from this rock into the town, was -gentle, and the works were there strengthened -by ditches; on the other parts, the walls could -be seen to their base; yet the great height of the -rock rendered it impossible to breach them, and -the approaches were nearly inaccessible. Between -the citadel-rock and the river, the town was -squeezed out, about two or three hundred yards, -and the salient part was secured by an entrenchment, -and by two bastions called the Carmen and -the Magdalen.</p> - -<p>To the westward of the town, at the distance of -seven or eight hundred yards, the hill, on which -Afranius and Petrieus encamped to oppose Cæsar, -was crowned, on the end next to Lerida, by Fort -Garden, which was again covered by a large horn-work, -with ditches above twenty feet deep; and at -the farthest extremity of the Afranian hill, two large -redoubts called the Pilar and San Fernando, secured<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_148"></a>[148]</span> -the whole of the flat summit. All the works of -Lerida were in good condition, and armed with more -than one hundred pieces of artillery; the magazines -were full, and the people enthusiastic. A local -Junta also had been formed to excite public feeling; -and two officers of artillery had already been murdered -and their heads nailed to the gates of the town.</p> - -<p>The siege was to be a joint operation by the -third and seventh corps, but the information derived -from colonel Villatte, and the appearance of -Spanish Partisans on the lower Ebro, led Suchet -to suspect that the seventh corps had already retired, -and that the burthen would rest on him alone, -wherefore he still kept his battering train at Monzon, -intending to wait until O’Donnel’s plans should -be clearly indicated, before he commenced the -siege. Meanwhile, he established a communication -across the Segre, by means of a rope ferry, one -league above Lerida, and after closely examining -the defences, prepared materials for the construction -of batteries.</p> - -<p>Two battalions of the investing troops had been left -at Monzon and Balaguer, but the remainder were -thus distributed. On the left bank of the Segre, at -Alcoteletge, four thousand men, including the cavalry, -which was composed of a regiment of cuirassiers -and one of hussars, were stationed as a corps of observation; -and Harispe, with three battalions, invested -the bridge-head of Lerida. By this disposition, -the ferry-boat was protected, and all danger from -the sudden rising of the Segre obviated, because the -stone bridge of Balaguer furnished a certain communication. -The rest of the troops occupied different -positions, on the roads to Monzon, Fraga, and -Corbins, but as the number was insufficient to complete<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_149"></a>[149]</span> -the circle of investment round Fort Garden, -that part was continually scoured by patrols.</p> - -<p>Scarcely were these arrangements completed -when a Spanish officer, pretending to bear propositions -for an exchange of prisoners, was stopped -on the left bank of the Segre, and the French -general detained him, suspecting his real object -was to gain information; for rumours obtained, that -O’Donnel was collecting troops at Momblanch, -that Campo Verde was at Cervera, and that the -Somatenes of the high valleys were in arms on the -upper Segre. Suchet anxious to ascertain the truth -of these reports, reinforced Harispe with three hundred -hussars on the 19th of April, and carried the -corps of observation to Balaguer. The governor of -Lerida took that opportunity to make a sally, but -was repulsed, and the 21st, the French general, -to strengthen his position at Balaguer, caused the -bridge of Camarasa, above that town, to be broken, -and then advanced as far as Tarrega, forty miles -on the road to Barcelona, to obtain intelligence; -for he was still uncertain of Augereau’s movements, -and like every other general, French or -English, found it extremely difficult to procure -authentic information. On this occasion, however, -by a happy fortune, he ascertained that O’Donnel, -with two divisions, was at Momblanch, ready to -descend the mountains and succour Lerida; wherefore -returning by one forced march to Balaguer, he -directed Musnier to resume his former position at Alcoleletge. -This rapidity was well-timed, for O’Donnel -had passed the defiles of Momblanch, with eight -thousand chosen infantry, and six hundred cavalry, -and encamped at Vinaxa, about twenty-five miles -from Lerida, on the 22d. There a note from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_150"></a>[150]</span> -Garcia Conde, saying that, the French reserve being -drawn off, the investing force was weak, reached -him, and he being willing to seize the favourable moment, -immediately pushed forward, reached Juneda, -fourteen miles from Lerida, by ten o’clock in the -morning of the 23d, and, after a halt of two hours, -resumed his march with the cavalry and one division -of infantry, leaving the other to follow more -leisurely.</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF MARGALEF.</h4> - -<p>Four miles from Juneda, stood the ruined village -of Margalef, and from thence to Lerida was an -open country, on which O’Donnel could perceive -no covering force. Hence, trusting implicitly to -Conde’s information (already falsified by Suchet’s -activity), the Spanish general descended the hills, -and crossed the plain in three columns, one following -the high road and the other two marching on -the right and left. The centre outstripping the -flankers, soon beat back the advanced posts of -Harispe; but that general, charged with his three -hundred hussars, upon the Spanish column, so -suddenly, that it was thrown into confusion, and -fled towards Margalef, to which place, the flank -columns also retreated, yet in good order. During -this skirmish, the garrison sallied over the bridge, -but the French infantry stood firm, and the besieged, -seeing the rout of O’Donnel’s column, returned -to the town.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, Musnier, hearing the firing, guessed -the real state of affairs, and marched at once with -his infantry and four hundred cuirassiers from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_151"></a>[151]</span> -Alcoteletge across the plain towards Margalef, -hoping to cut off the Spaniards’ retreat. O’Donnel -had, however, rallied his troops, and was -already in line of battle, the artillery on the right -and the cavalry on the left, his second division -being, however, still in the rear. The French -cuirassiers and a battery of light artillery, came -up at a quick pace, a cannonade commenced, and -the Spanish cavalry rode forward, but the cuirassiers, -commanded by general Boussard, charged -hotly, and forced them back on the line of battle in -such a manner that the latter wavered, when Boussard, -observing the confusion, came with a rude -shock upon the flank of the infantry. The Walloon -guards made an effort to form square, but the -confusion was extreme, and nearly all the Spanish -infantry threw down their arms or were sabred. -The cuirassiers, elated with their success, then met -and overthrew a Swiss regiment, forming the advanced -guard of the second Spanish division; but -the main body of the latter checked their fury, and -O’Donnel retreated in good order, and without -further loss to the defile of Momblanch.</p> - -<p>This action, although not discreditable to O’Donnel, -was very unfortunate. The plain was strewed -with carcases; three Spanish guns, one general, -eight colonels, and above five thousand men were -captured; and the next day the prisoners, being -first ostentatiously marched under the walls of the -town, were shown to the Spanish officer who had -been detained on the 19th, after which he was -dismissed by the road of Cervera, that he might -spread the news of the defeat.</p> - -<p>Suchet wishing to profit from the effect of this -victory upon the besieged, attempted the night<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_152"></a>[152]</span> -after the battle, to storm the redoubts of San Fernando -and Pilar. He was successful with the -latter, and the assailants descended into the ditch -of San Fernando, from whence the Spaniards, -only fifty in number and unprovided with hand -grenades, could not drive them, and a parley ensuing -it was agreed that the French should retire -without being molested. Thus the Pilar was also -saved, for being commanded by San Fernando, -it was necessarily evacuated. Previous to this attempt, -Suchet had summoned the city to surrender, -offering safe conduct for commissioners to count the -dead on the field of Margalef, and to review the -prisoners; but Garcia Conde replied, “<em>that Lerida -never looked for external succour in her defences</em>.”</p> - - -<h4>SIEGE OF LERIDA.</h4> - -<p>The absolute retreat of Augereau, was now fully -ascertained, yet the victory of Margalef, and the -apathy of the Valencians, encouraged Suchet to commence -the siege in form. The prisoners were sent -to France by the way of Jaca; the battering train -was brought up from Monzon, and all the other -necessary preparations being completed, the Spanish -outposts were driven within the walls between the -26th and 27th. The following night, under the -direction of general Haxo, ground was broken -three hundred yards from the bastions of the Carmen -and Magdalen; the Spaniards threw some -fire-balls, and opened a few guns, but without interrupting -the workmen, and when day broke, the -besiegers were well covered in the trenches.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 30th the first parallel was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_153"></a>[153]</span> -completed. Breaching and counter-batteries were -commenced, six sixteen-pounders were destined -to batter the left face of the Carmen, four long -twelve-pounders, to ruin the defences of the Magdalen, -and four mortars of eight inches to throw -shells into the citadel. The weather was rainy -and the labour heavy, yet the works advanced -rapidly, and on the 2d of May, a fourth battery, -armed with two mortars and two sixteen-pounders, -was raised against the Carmen. Meanwhile the -Spanish musqueteers, incommoded the trenches from -the left bank of the Segre, which obliged the -French to contract the circle of investment on that -side.</p> - -<p>In the evening of the 4th of May, six hundred -Spaniards, sallying from the Carmen, carried the -fourth battery and all the left of the trenches, -while another body, coming from the Magdalen, -menaced the right of the French works. The -French guards held the latter in check, and the reserves -finally drove the former back into the town, -but after this attack, a ditch and rampart, to serve -as a place of arms, was carried from the battery which -had been taken, down to the river, and as the light -troops still continued to ply the trenches from the -other side of the Segre, ground was broken there, -close to the water, and a battery of two guns was constructed -to answer six Spanish field-pieces, posted -on the bridge itself. The parallel of the main -attack was also extended on the right, embracing -a part of the northern front of the citadel, and two -mortars were placed at this extremity.</p> - -<p>All the French batteries opened at day-break on -the 7th, the mortars played into the town and -citadel, and four Spanish guns were dismounted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_154"></a>[154]</span> -in the Carmen. Nevertheless, the counter fire -silenced three French batteries, the dismounted -guns were replaced, and three hundred men stealing -out at dusk by the Puerta Nueva, fell upon -the right of the parallels, took the two mortars, -and penetrated as far as the approaches against the -Magdalen. This sally was repulsed by the French -reserves, but the latter pursuing too far, suffered -from grape, and in the night a violent storm, with -rain, damaged the batteries and overflowed the -trenches. From the 8th to the 11th the French only -laboured at the works, and opened a second parallel -one hundred and fifty yards in advance of -the first, with the intention of forming fresh batteries; -that being closer under the citadel-rock, -would be less exposed to its plunging fire. More -guns, and of a larger size, were also mounted; -three new batteries were constructed; and marksmen -were planted to harass the Spanish cannoneers.</p> - -<p>On the 12th the besiegers recommenced their -fire from eight batteries, containing fifteen guns -and nineteen mortars. The besieged replied at first -sharply, but in a little time stammered in their -answers, and the French artillery taking the ascendent, -the walls of the Carmen and Magdalen -crumbled under their salvos, and a portable magazine -blew up in the citadel. Towards evening -two breaches in the Carmen, and one in the Magdalen -appeared practicable, and after dark, some -Swiss deserters coming out through the openings, -brought intelligence, that the streets of the town -behind the breaches, were retrenched and defended -by batteries.</p> - -<p>Suchet’s hopes of an early termination to the -siege now rose high. He had from the first supposed,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_155"></a>[155]</span> -that the vehemence of the citizens, and of -the armed peasantry who had entered the place, -would oblige the governor to fight the town to the -last, instead of reserving his efforts for the defence -of the citadel. He knew that armed mobs easily -excited, are as easily discouraged, and he projected -to carry the breaches briskly, and, with one sweep, -to force all the inhabitants into the citadel, being -well assured that they would hamper, if not entirely -mar, the defence of that formidable fortress: but -he resolved first, to carry the forts of San Fernando -and the Pilar and the horn-work of Fort Garden, -lest the citizens, flying from the assault of the -breaches, should take refuge on that side. To -effect this, three columns, provided with ladders -and other necessary implements, simultaneously -mounted the hill of Afranius that night; one -marched against the redoubts, and the others were -ordered to storm the horn-work on two sides. The -Pilar was carried without difficulty, and the garrison -flying towards Fort Garden, fell in with the -second French column, which arrived with the fugitives -at the ditch of the horn-work, and being there -joined by the third column, which had taken a -wrong direction, the whole mass entered the place -fighting. The Spaniards saved themselves in Fort -Garden, and meanwhile the people in Fernando resisted -desperately, and that redoubt was not taken -until two-thirds of the defendants were put to the -sword. Thus the French effected their object with -the loss of a hundred men.</p> - -<p>During this operation the great batteries only -played into the citadel, but, at daybreak, renewed -their fire on the breaches; steps were also cut in -the parallel, to facilitate the advance of the troops<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_156"></a>[156]</span> -to the assault; and all the materials, necessary to -effect a solid lodgement on the walls, were conveyed -into the trenches. On the other hand, the -Spaniards were preparing a grand sally, to retake -the horn-work of Fort Garden, but the French -arrangements being first completed, at seven -o’clock, in the evening of the 13th, four shells were -thrown as a signal, and the storming-parties, jumping -out of the trenches, rushed towards the breaches, -two advancing against the Carmen, a third attacking -the Magdalen, and a fourth, moving close by the -river, endeavouring to break in on that side. The -Spaniards, unexpectant of the attack, at first permitted -the French to mount the breaches unmolested; -but, soon recovering, poured such a fire of -musquetry and artillery upon the head of the principal -columns that they staggered, yet, being encouraged -by general Habert, finally forced their -way into the town; and, at the same moment, the -troops on the right and left, being also successful, -turned all the retrenchments in the streets. On the -other side of the river, general Harispe carried the -bridge, and Suchet himself, with the reserve, followed -close upon the steps of the storming-parties; -the Spaniards were thus overpowered, and the regular -troops commenced a retreat into the citadel.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Suchet’s -Memoirs.</div> - -<p>It was now that the French general put his -design in execution. Harispe’s brigade passing the -bridge, made for the gate of St. Anthony, looking -towards Fort Garden, and cut off all egress from the -town; and this done, the French columns advanced -from every side, in a concentric direction, upon the -citadel, and, with shouts, and stabs, and musquetry, -drove men, women, and children before -them, while the guns of the castle smote friends<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_157"></a>[157]</span> -and foes alike. Then, flying up the ascent, the -shrieking and terrified crowds rushed into the fortress -with the retiring garrison, and crowded the -summit of the rock; but, all that night, the French -shells fell amongst the hapless multitude, and, at -daylight, the fire was redoubled, and the carnage -swelled, until Garcia Conde, overpowered by the -cries and sufferings of the miserable people, hoisted -the white flag.</p> - -<p>At twelve o’clock, the horrible scene terminated, -and the capitulation that followed was honourable -in terms to the besieged; but Fort Garden being -included, Suchet became master of Lerida, with its -immense stores and near eight thousand prisoners, -for the whole loss of the garrison had been only -twelve hundred men.</p> - -<p>Thus suddenly was this powerful fortress reduced, -by a proceeding, politic indeed, but scarcely -to be admitted within the pale of civilized warfare. -For, though a town, taken by assault, be considered -the lawful prey of a licentious soldiery, this remnant -of barbarism, disgracing the military profession, -does not warrant the driving of unarmed helpless -people, into a situation, where they must perish -from the fire of the enemy, unless a governor fail -in his duty. Suchet justifies it, on the ground, that -he thus spared a great effusion of blood which -must necessarily have attended a protracted siege, -and the fact is true. But this is to spare soldiers’ -blood at the expense of women’s and children’s, -and, had Garcia Conde’s nature been stern, he, too, -might have pleaded expediency, and the victory -would have fallen to him who could longest have -sustained the sight of mangled infants and despairing -mothers.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_158"></a>[158]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BX_IV">CHAP. IV.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>When Lerida fell, Conde was accused of treachery, -but there seems no foundation for the charge; -the cause stated by Suchet is sufficient for the -effect; yet the defence was very unskilful. The -walls, on the side of the attack, could not be expected, -and scarcely did, offer an impediment to the -French general; hence the citadel should have -been the better prepared, and, as the besiegers’ -force, the corps of observation being deducted, -did not exceed the garrison in number, it might -have baffled Suchet’s utmost efforts. Engineers -require that the relative strength of besiegers and -besieged, should not be less than four to one; yet -here the French invested a force equal to themselves, -and in a short time reduced a great fortress in the -midst of succouring armies, for Lerida had communications, -1º. With the armed population of the -high valleys; 2º. With O’Donnel’s corps of fourteen -thousand; 3º. With Cervera, where Campo Verde -was posted with four thousand men; 4º. With Tortoza, -where the marquis of Lazan, now released -from his imprisonment, commanded from five to -six thousand; 5º. With Valencia, in which province -there was a disposable army of fifteen thousand -regular and more than thirty thousand irregular -soldiers.</p> - -<p>It is evident that, if all these forces had been directed -with skill and concert upon Lerida, not only -the siege would have been raised, but the very safety -of the third corps endangered; and it was to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_159"></a>[159]</span> -obviate this danger that Napoleon directed the -seventh corps to take such a position on the Lower -Ebro as would keep both O’Donnel and the Valencians -in check; but Augereau, as we have seen, -failed to do this; and St. Cyr asserts that the -seventh corps could never safely venture to pass -the mountains, and enter the valley of the Ebro. -On the other hand, Suchet affirms that Napoleon’s -instructions could have been obeyed without difficulty. -St. Cyr himself, under somewhat similar -circumstances, blockaded Taragona for a month; -Augereau, who had more troops and fewer enemies, -might have done the same, and yet spared six -thousand men to pass the mountains; Suchet would -then have been tranquil with respect to O’Donnel, -and would have had a covering army to protect the -siege, and these troops, fed from the resources of -Aragon, would have relieved Catalonia.</p> - -<p>Augereau has been justified, on the ground, that -the blockade of Hostalrich would have been raised -while he was on the Ebro. The danger of this -could not have escaped the emperor, yet his military -judgement, unerring in principle, was often false in -application, because men measure difficulties by -the standard of their own capacity, and Napoleon’s -standard only suited the heroic proportions. One -thing is, however, certain, that Catalonia presented -the most extraordinary difficulties to the invaders. -The powerful military organization of the Miguelettes -and Somatenes,—the well-arranged system of -fortresses,—the ruggedness and sterility of the -country,—the ingenuity and readiness of a manufacturing -population thrown out of work,—and, -finally, the aid of an English fleet, combined to -render the conquest of this province a gigantic<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_160"></a>[160]</span> -task. Nevertheless, the French made progress, -each step planted slowly indeed and with pain, -but firmly, and insuring the power of making -another.</p> - -<p>Hostalrich and Lerida fell on the same day. The -acquisition of the first consolidated the French line -of communication with Barcelona; and, by the -capture of the second, Suchet obtained large magazines, -stores of powder, ten thousand muskets, the -command of several dangerous rivers, easy access -to the higher valleys, and a firm footing in the -midst of the Catalonian strong holds; and he had -taken or killed fifteen thousand Spanish soldiers. -Yet this was but the prelude to greater struggles. -The Miguelettes supplied O’Donnel with abundance -of men, and neither his courage nor his abilities -were at fault. Urgel, Cardona, Berga, Cervera, -Mequinenza, Taragona, San Felippe Balaguer, -and Tortoza the link of connexion between Valencia -and Catalonia, were still to be subdued, and, during -every great operation, the Partisans, being unmolested, -recovered strength.</p> - -<p>Thus while the siege of Lerida was going on, -the marquis of Lazan entered the town of Alcanitz -with five thousand men, and would have -carried the castle, but that general Laval despatched -two thousand men, from Zaragoza, to its succour, -when the Spaniards, after a skirmish in the streets, -retired; and, while this was passing at Alcanitz, -Villa Campa, intercepted four hundred men conducting -a convoy of provisions from Calatayud to -Zaragoza. Colonel Petit, the commander, being -attacked in the defile of Frasno, was forced to -abandon his convoy, and, under a continued fire, -to fight his way for ten miles, until his detachment,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_161"></a>[161]</span> -reduced to one hundred and eighty wounded men, -passed the Xalon river, and, at the village of -Arandiza, finally repulsed the assailants. The remainder -of this desperate band were taken or -killed, and Petit himself, wounded, a prisoner, and -sitting in the midst of several Spanish officers, -was basely murdered the evening after the action. -Villa Campa put the assassin to death, but, at the -same time, suffered the troops to burn alive the -Alcalde of Frasno, an old man taken among the -French.</p> - -<p>This action happened the day Lerida fell; and, -the next day, Chlopiski, following Villa Campa’s -march from Daroca, reached Frasno. The Spaniards -were no longer there, and Chlopiski, dividing his -forces, pursued them, by the routes of Calatayud -and Xarava, to Molina, where he destroyed a manufactory -for arms, and so pressed the Spanish -general, that his troops disbanded, and several hundred -retired to their homes. At the same time, an -attack, made from the side of Navarre, on the -garrison of Ayerbe, was repulsed.</p> - -<p>But these petty events, while they evinced the -perseverance of the Spaniards, proved also the -stability of Suchet’s power in Aragon. His system -was gradually sapping the spirit of resistance in -that province. In Lerida his conduct was as gentle -and moderate as the nature of this unjust war would -permit; and, however questionable, the morality of -the proceeding by which he reduced the citadel, it -must be acknowledged that his situation required -most decided measures, for the retreat of the -seventh corps set free not only O’Donnel’s army, but -Campo Verde’s and all the irregular bands. The -Somatenes of the high valleys appeared in force,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_162"></a>[162]</span> -on the Upper Segre the very day of the assault; -eight hundred Miguelettes attacked Venasque three -days after; and Campo Verde, marching from Cervera, -by Agramunt, took post in the mountains of -Lliniana, above Talarn and Tremp, where great -bodies of the Somatenes also assembled.</p> - -<p>Their plans were disconcerted by the sudden fall -of Lerida; the Miguelettes were repulsed from -Venasque; the Somatenes defeated at Tremp; and -general Habert, marching from Balaguer, cut off -Campo Verde from Cervera, and forced him to -retreat upon Cardona. But, if the citadel of Lerida -had held out, and O’Donnel, less hasty, had combined -his march, at a later period, with these Somatenes -and with Campo Verde, the third corps could -scarcely have escaped a disaster; whereas, now the -plain of Urgel and all the fertile valleys opening -upon Lerida fell to the French, and Suchet, after -taking measures to secure them, turned his arms -against Mequinenza, which, by its situation at the -confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, just where the -latter begins to be navigable, was the key to further -operations. The French general could not advance -in force against Tortoza, nor avail himself of the -water-carriage, until Mequinenza should fall.</p> - -<p>Suchet’s activity was extreme; one detachment, -sent the day after the assault of Lerida, by the left -bank of the Segre, was already before the place, -and general Musnier’s division, descending the right -bank of that river, drove in some of the outposts -and commenced the investment on the 20th of -May.</p> - -<p>Mequinenza, built on an elbow of land formed -by the meeting of the Segre and Ebro, was fortified -by an old Moorish wall, and strengthened by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_163"></a>[163]</span> -modern batteries, especially on the Fraga road, the -only route by which artillery could approach. A -shoot from the Sierra de Alcubierre filled the space -between the two rivers, and narrowing as they -closed, ended in a craggy rock, seven hundred feet -high and overhanging the town, which was built -between its base and the water.</p> - -<p>This rock was crowned by a castle, with a rampart, -which being inaccessible on two sides from -the steepness, and covered, on a third, by the town, -could only be assailed, on the fourth, along a high -neck of land, three hundred yards wide, that joined -the rock to the parent hills; and the rampart on that -side, was bastioned, lined with masonry, and protected -by a ditch, counterscarp, and covered way -with palisades.</p> - -<p>No guns could be brought against this fort, -until the country people, employed by Suchet, had -opened a way from Torriente, over the hills, and -this occupied the engineers until the 1st of June. -Meanwhile the brigade, which had defeated Lazan, -at Alcanitz, arrived on the right bank of the Ebro, -and completed the investment. The 30th of May, -general Rogniat, coming from France, with a reinforcement -of engineer-officers, and several companies -of sappers and miners, also reached the camp, -and, taking the direction of the works, contracted -the circle of investment, and commenced active -operations.</p> - - -<h4>SIEGE OF MEQUINENZA.</h4> - -<p>The Spaniards made an ineffectual sally the 31st; -and, the 2d of June, the French artillery, consisting<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_164"></a>[164]</span> -of eighteen pieces, of which six were twenty-four-pounders, -being brought over the hills, the advanced -posts of the Spaniards were driven into the -castle, and, during the night, ground was broken -two hundred yards from the place, under a destructive -fire of grape. The workmen suffered severely; -and, while this was passing on the height, approaches -were made against the town, in the narrow -space between the Ebro and the foot of the rock. -Strong infantry posts were also entrenched, close -to the water, on the right bank of that river, to -prevent the navigation; yet eleven boats, freighted -with inhabitants and their property, quitted the -town, and nine effected their escape.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 3d the parallels on the rock -were perfected, the breaching-batteries commenced, -and parapets of sand-bags were raised, from behind -which the French infantry plied the embrasures of -the castle with musketry. The works against the -town were also advanced; but, in both places, the -nature of the ground greatly impeded the operations. -The trenches above, being in a rocky soil, -were opened chiefly by blasting; those below were -in a space too narrow for batteries, and, moreover, -searched by a plunging fire, both from the castle, -and from a gun mounted on a high tower in the -town wall. The troops on the right bank of the -Ebro, however, opened their musketry with such -effect on the wall, that a part of the garrison -quitted it; both it and the tower were then -escaladed without difficulty; and the Spaniards -all retired to the castle. The French placed a -battalion in the houses, and put those next the -rock in a state of defence; and although the garrison<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_165"></a>[165]</span> -of the castle rolled down large stones from -above; they killed more of the inhabitants than of -the enemy.</p> - -<p>The 6th the French batteries on the rock, three -in number, were completed; and, in the night, -forty grenadiers carried by storm a small outwork -called the horse-shoe. The 7th Suchet, who had -been at Zaragoza, arrived in the camp; and, on -the 8th, sixteen pieces of artillery, of which four -were mortars, opened on the castle. The Spaniards -answered with such vigour, that three French guns -were dismounted; yet the besiegers acquired the -superiority, and, at nine o’clock in the morning, the -place was nearly silenced, and the rampart broken -in two places. The Spaniards endeavoured to -keep up the defence with musketry, while they -mounted fresh guns, but the interior of the castle -was so severely searched by the bombardment, -that, at ten o’clock, the governor capitulated. Fourteen -hundred men became prisoners of war; forty-five -guns, large stores of powder and of cast iron -were captured, and provisions for three months -were found in the magazines.</p> - -<p>Two hours after the fall of Mequinenza, general -Mont-Marie, commanding the troops on the right -bank of the Ebro, marched, with his brigade, -against Morella, in the kingdom of Valencia, and -took it on the 13th of June; for the Spaniards, with -a wonderful negligence, had left that important -fortress, commanding one of the principal entrances -into the kingdom of Valencia, without arms or a -garrison. When it was lost, general O’Donoju, -with a division of the Valencian army, advanced to -retake it, but Mont-Marie defeated him. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_166"></a>[166]</span> -works were then repaired, and Morella became a -strong and important place of arms.</p> - -<p>By these rapid and successful operations Suchet -secured, 1º. A fortified frontier against the regular -armies of Catalonia and Valencia; 2º. Solid bases -for offensive operations, and free entrance to those -provinces; 3º. The command of several fertile -tracts of country and of the navigation of the Ebro; -4º. The co-operation of the seventh corps, which, -by the fall of Lerida, could safely engage beyond -the Llobregat. But, to effect the complete subjugation -of Catalonia, it was necessary to cut off its -communications by land with Valencia, and to -destroy O’Donnel’s base. The first could only be -attained, by taking Tortoza, the second by capturing -Taragona. Hence the immediate sieges of those -two great places, the one by the third, and the -other by the seventh corps, were ordered by the -emperor.</p> - -<p>Suchet was ready to commence his part, but -many and great obstacles arose: the difficulty of -obtaining provisions, in the eastern region of Catalonia, -was increased by O’Donnel’s measures, and -that general, still commanding above twenty thousand -men, was neither daunted by past defeats, nor -insensible to the advantages of his position. His -harsh manners and stern sway, rendered him hateful -to the people, but he was watchful to confirm the -courage, and to excite the enthusiasm of his troop’s -by conferring rewards and honours on the field of -battle; and, being of singular intrepidity himself, -his exhortations had more effect.</p> - -<p>Two years of incessant warfare had also formed -several good officers, and the full strength and importance<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_167"></a>[167]</span> -of every position and town were, by dint -of experience, becoming known. With these helps -O’Donnel long prevented the siege of Tortoza, and -found full employment for the enemy during the -remainder of the year. Nevertheless, the conquest -of Catalonia advanced, and the fortified places fell -one after another, each serving, by its fall, to -strengthen the hold of the French, in the same -proportion that it had before impeded their progress.</p> - -<p>The foundations of military strength were however, -deeply cast in Catalonia. There the greatest -efforts were made by the Spaniards, and ten thousand -British soldiers, hovering on the coast, ready -to land on the rear of the French, or to join -the Catalans in an action, would at any period of -1809 and 1810, have paralized the operations of -the seventh corps, and saved Gerona, Hostalrich, -Tortoza, Taragona, and even Lerida. While those -places were in the hands of the Spaniards and -their hopes were high, English troops from -Sicily were reducing the Ionian islands or loitering -on the coast of Italy, but when all the fortresses -of Catalonia had fallen, when the regular -armies were nearly destroyed, and when the people -were worn out with suffering, a British army -which could have been beneficially employed elsewhere, -appeared, as if in scorn of common sense, -on the eastern coast of Spain.</p> - -<p>Notwithstanding the many years of hostility -with France, the English ministers were still ignorant -of every military principle; and yet too arrogant -to ask advice of professional men; for it was -not until after the death of Mr. Perceval, and when<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_168"></a>[168]</span> -the decisive victory of Salamanca shewed the giant -in his full proportions, that even Wellington himself -was permitted the free exercise of his judgement, -although he was more than once reminded -by Mr. Perceval, whose narrow views continually -clogged the operations, that the whole responsibility -of failure would rest on his head.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_169"></a>[169]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BX_V">CHAPTER V.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>Suchet’s preparations equally menaced Valencia, -and Catalonia, and the authorities in the former -province, perceiving, although too late, that an -exclusive and selfish policy would finally bring the -enemy to their own doors, resolved to co-operate -with the Catalonians, while the Murcians, now -under the direction of Blake, waged war on the side -of Grenada, and made excursions against the fourth -corps. The acts of the Valencians shall be treated -of when the course of the history leads me back to -Catalonia, but those of the Murcian army belong -to the</p> - - -<h4>OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.</h4> - -<p>During the month of February, the first corps -was before Cadiz, the fourth in Grenada, Dessolles’ -division at Cordoba, Jaen, and Ubeda, and the fifth -corps (with the exception of six battalions and some -horse left at Seville) in Estremadura. The king, -accompanied by marshal Soult, moved with his -guards and a brigade of cavalry, to different points, -and received from all the great towns assurances of -their adhesion to his cause. But as the necessities -of the army demanded immediate and heavy contributions, -both of money and provisions, moveable -columns were employed to collect them, especially -for the fourth corps, and with so little attention to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_170"></a>[170]</span> -discipline as soon to verify the observations of St. -Cyr, that they were better calculated to create than -<span class="sidenote">King Joseph’s -Correspondence, -captured -at -Victoria. -MSS.</span>to suppress insurrections. The people exasperated -by disorders, and violence, and at the same time -excited by the agents of their own and the British -government, suddenly rose in arms and Andalusia, -like other parts of Spain, became the theatre of a -petty and harassing warfare.</p> - -<p>The Grenadans of the Alpujarras, were the first -to resist, and this insurrection spreading on the one -hand through the Sierra de Ronda, and on the other, -towards Murcia, received succours from Gibraltar, -and was aided by the troops and armed peasantry -under the command of Blake. The communication -between the first and fourth corps across the Sierra -de Ronda, was maintained by a division of the -former, posted at Medina Sidonia, and by some infantry -and hussars of the latter quartered in the town -of Ronda. From this place, the insurgents, principally -smugglers, drove the French, while at the -other extremity Blake marching from Almeria, took -Ardra and Motril. The mountaineers of Jaen and -Cordoba at the same time interrupted Dessolles’ -communications with La Mancha.</p> - -<p>These movements took place in the beginning of -March, and the king and Soult being then in the city -of Grenada, sent one column across the mountain -by Orgiva to fall upon the flank of Blake at Motril, -while a second moving by Guadix and Ohanes -upon Almeria, cut off his retreat. This obliged the -Murcians to disperse, and at the same time, Dessolles -defeated the insurgents on the side of Ubeda; -and the garrison of Malaga, consisting of three battalions, -marched to restore the communications with -the first corps. Being joined by the detachment<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_171"></a>[171]</span> -beaten at Ronda, they retook that post on the 21st -of March; but during their absence the people from -the Alpuxaras entered Malaga, killed some of the -inhabitants as favourers of the enemy, and would -have done more, but that another column from -Grenada came down on them, and the insurrection -was thus strangled in its birth. It had however, -sufficed to prevent the march of the troops designed -to co-operate with Suchet at Valencia, and it was -of so threatening a character, that the fifth corps -was recalled from Estremadura, and all the French -troops at Madrid, consisting of the garrison, and a -part of the second corps, were directed upon Almagro -<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s -Correspondence. -MSS.</span>in La Mancha, the capital itself being left in -charge of some Spanish battalions in the invader’s -service. The king then repaired to La Mancha, -fearing an offensive movement, by the Valencian and -Murcian armies, but after a time returned to Madrid. -The duke of Dalmatia then remained chief commander -of Andalusia, and proceeded to organize a -system of administration so efficacious, that neither -the efforts of the Spanish government, nor of the -army in Cadiz, nor the perpetual incursions of -Spanish troops issuing from Portugal, and supported -by British corps on that frontier, could seriously -shake his hold, but this will be better shewn hereafter; -at present, it is more convenient to notice.</p> - - -<h4>THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ.</h4> - -<p>Marshal Victor declining, as we have seen, an assault -on the Isla, spread his army round the margin -of the bay, and commenced works of contravallation -on an extent of not less than twenty-five miles.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_172"></a>[172]</span> -The towns, the islands, castles, harbours, and rivers, -he thus enclosed are too numerous, and in their relative -bearings, too intricate for minute description; -yet, looking as it were from the French camps, I shall -endeavour to point out the leading features.</p> - -<p>The blockade was maintained in three grand divisions -or entrenched positions, namely, Chiclana, -Puerto Real, and Santa Maria. The first, having its -left on the sea coast near the Torre Bermeja, was -from thence carried across the Almanza, and the -Chiclana rivers, to the Zuraque, on a line of eight -miles, traced along a range of thickly wooded hills, -and bordering a marsh from one to three miles -broad. This marsh, traversed in its breadth by the -above-mentioned rivers, and by a number of navigable -water courses or creeks, was also cut in its whole -length by the Santi Petri, a natural channel connecting -the upper harbour of Cadiz with the open sea. -The Santi Petri, nine miles long, from two to three -hundred yards wide, and of depth to float a seventy-four, -received the waters of all the creeks crossing -the marsh and was the first Spanish line of defence. -In the centre, the bridge of Zuazo, by which the -only road to Cadiz passes, was broken and defended -by batteries on both sides. On the right hand, the -Caraccas, or Royal Arsenal, situated on an island -just in the harbour mouth of the channel, and on -account of the marsh inattackable, save by water or -by bombardment, was covered with strong batteries -and served as an advanced post. On the left hand -the castle of Santi Petri, also built on an island, defended -the sea mouth of the channel.</p> - -<p>Beyond the Santi Petri was the Isla de Leon, in -form a triangular island, the base of which rests on -that channel, the right side on the harbour, the left<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_173"></a>[173]</span> -on the open sea, and the apex points towards Cadiz. -All this island was a salt-marsh, except one high -and strong ridge in the centre, about four miles -long, upon which the large town of La Isla stands, -and which being within cannon shot of the Santi -Petri, offered the second line of defence.</p> - -<p>From the apex, called the Torre Gardo, a low -and narrow isthmus about five miles long, connected -the island with the rocks upon which Cadiz -stood, and across the centre of this narrow isthmus, -a cut called the Cortadura, defended by the large -unfinished fort of Fernando, offered a third line of -defence. The fourth and final line, was the land -front of the city itself, regularly and completely -fortified.</p> - -<p>On the Chiclana side therefore, the hostile forces -were only separated by the marsh; and although -the Spaniards commanded the Santi Petri, the -French having their chief depôts in the town of -Chiclana, could always acquire the mastery in the -marsh and might force the passage of the channel, -because the Chiclana, Zuraque, and Almanza -creeks, were navigable above the lines of contravallation. -The thick woods behind, also afforded the -means of constructing an armed flotilla, and such was -the nature of the ground bordering the Santi Petri -itself, on both sides, that off the high road, it could -only be approached by water, or by narrow footpaths, -leading between the salt-pans of the marsh.</p> - -<p>The central French or Puerto Real division extending -from the Zuraque on the left, to the San -Pedro, a navigable branch of the Guadalete on the -right; measured about seven miles. From the -Zuraque to the town of Puerto Real, the line was -traced along a ridge skirting the marsh, so as to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_174"></a>[174]</span> -form with the position of Chiclana a half circle. -Puerto Real itself was entrenched, but a tongue of -land four miles long projected from thence perpendicularly -on to the narrow isthmus of Cadiz. This -tongue, cloven in its whole length by the creek or -canal of Troccadero, separated the inner from the -outward harbour, and at its extreme points stood -the village of Troccadero, and the fort of Matagorda; -opposed to which there was on the isthmus -of Cadiz a powerful battery called the Puntales. -From Matagorda to the city was above four thousand -yards, but across the channel to Puntales was -only twelve hundred, it was the nearest point to -Cadiz and to the isthmus, and was infinitely the most -important post of offence. From thence the French -could search the upper harbour with their fire and -throw shells into the Caraccas and the fort of Fernando, -while their flotilla safely moored in the -<ins class="corr" id="tn-174" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Toccadero creek'"> -Troccadero creek</ins>, could make a descent upon the -isthmus, and thus turn the Isla, and all the works -between it and the city. Nevertheless, the Spaniards -dismantled and abandoned Matagorda.</p> - -<p>The third or Santa Maria division of blockade, -followed the sweep of the bay, and reckoning -from the San Pedro, on the left, to the castle of -Santa Catalina the extreme point of the outer harbour, -on the right, was about five miles. The town -of Santa Maria, built at the mouth of the Guadalete -in the centre of this line, was entrenched and the -ground about Santa Catalina was extremely rugged.</p> - -<p>Besides these lines of blockade which were connected -by a covered way, concealed by thick woods, -and when finished armed with three hundred guns, -the towns of Rota and San Lucar de Barameda were -occupied. The first, situated on a cape of land<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_175"></a>[175]</span> -opposite to Cadiz, was the northern point of the -great bay or roadstead. The second commanded -the mouth of Guadalquivir. Behind the line of -blockade, Latour Maubourg, with a covering division, -took post at Medina Sidonia, his left being upon the -upper Guadalete, and his advanced posts watching -the passes of the Sierra de Ronda. Such was the position -of the first corps. I shall now relate the progress -of events within the blockaded city.</p> - -<p>The fall of the Central Junta, the appointment -of the regency and the proclamation for convoking -the national Cortes have been already touched upon. -Albuquerque, hailed as a deliverer, elected governor, -commander in chief, and president of the Junta, -appeared to have unlimited power; but in reality, -possessed no authority except over his own soldiers, -and he did not meddle with the administration. -The regency appointed provisionally and composed -of men without personal energy or local influence, -was obliged to bend and truckle to the Junta of -Cadiz; and that imperious body without honour, -talents, or patriotism, sought only to obtain the -<span class="sidenote">Albuquerque’s -Manifesto.</span>command of the public revenue for dishonest purposes, -and meanwhile, privately trafficked with the -public stores.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Private -Correspondence -of Officers -from Cadiz. -1810. -MSS.</div> - -<p>Albuquerque’s troops were in a deplorable state; -the whole had been long without pay, and the -greater part were without arms, accoutrements, -ammunition, or clothes. When he demanded supplies, -the Junta declared that they could not furnish -them; but the duke affirming this to be untrue, -addressed a memorial to the Regency, and the -latter, anxious to render the Junta odious, yet fearing -openly to attack them, persuaded Albuquerque -to publish his memorial. The Junta replied by an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_176"></a>[176]</span> -exposition, false as to facts, base and ridiculous -in reasoning; for although they had elected the -duke president of their own body, they accused -him amongst other things, with retreating from Carmona -too quickly; and they finished with an intimation, -that, supported by the populace of Cadiz, -they were able and ready to wreak their vengeance -on all enemies. Matters being thus brought to a -crisis, both Albuquerque and the Regency gave -way, and the former being sent ambassador to England, -died in that country some months after of a -phrenzy brought on, as it is said, by grief and passion -at the unworthy treatment he received.</p> - -<p>But the misery of the troops, the great extent of -the positions, the discontent of the seamen, the -venal spirit of the Junta, the apathy of the people, -the feebleness of the Regency, the scarcity of provisions, -and the machinations of the French, who -had many favourers and those amongst the men in -power, all combined to place Cadiz in the greatest -jeopardy; and this state of affairs would have led to -a surrender, if England had not again filled the -Spanish store-houses, and if the Regency had not -consented to receive British troops into the city.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">General -Campbell’s -Correspondence. -MSS.</div> - -<p>At the same time, general Colin Campbell (who -had succeeded Sir John Cradock as governor of -Gibraltar) performed a great service to his country, -for, by persevering negotiation, he obtained that -an English garrison should likewise enter Ceuta, -and that the Spanish lines of San Roque, and the -forts round the harbour of Algesiras should be demolished. -Both measures were very essential to the -present and permanent interests of England; but -the first especially, because it cleared the neighbourhood -of the fortress, and gave it a secure harbour.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_177"></a>[177]</span> -Gibraltar, at this time, contained a mixed -and disaffected population of more than twelve thousand -persons, and merchandize to the value of two -millions sterling, which could have been easily destroyed -by bombardment; and Ceuta which was -chiefly garrisoned by condemned troops, and filled -with galley-slaves, and its works miserably neglected, -had only six days’ provisions, and was at the mercy -of the first thousand French that could cross the -streights. The possession of it would have availed -the enemy in many ways, especially in obtaining -provisions from Barbary, where his emissaries -were exceedingly active.</p> - -<p>General William Stewart arrived in Cadiz, on the -11th of February, with two thousand men, a thousand -more joined him from Gibraltar, and the -whole were received with an enthusiasm, that -proved sir George Smith’s perception to have been -just, and that Mr. Frere’s unskilful management of -the Central Junta, had alone prevented a similar -measure the year before. The 17th of February, -a Portuguese regiment, thirteen hundred strong, -was also admitted into the city, and Spanish troops -came in daily in small bodies. Two ships of war, -the Euthalion and Undaunted, arrived from Mexico -with six millions of dollars; and another British -battalion, a detachment of artillery, and more -native troops, having joined the garrison, the whole -<span class="sidenote">Official -Abstract of -Operations -at Cadiz. -1810. -MSS.</span>force assembled behind the Santi Petri, was not less -than four thousand Anglo-Portuguese, and fourteen -thousand Spaniards. Yet there was little of enthusiasm -amongst the latter; and in all this time, not -a man among the citizens had been enrolled or armed, -or had volunteered, either to labour or to fight. -The ships recovered at Ferrol, had been transferred<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_178"></a>[178]</span> -to Cadiz, so there were in the bay, twenty-three -men of war, of which four of the line and three -frigates were British; and thus, money, troops, and -a fleet, in fine, all things necessary to render Cadiz -formidable, were collected, yet to little purpose, because -procrastination, jealousy, ostentation, and a -thousand absurdities, were the invariable attendants -of Spanish armies and governments.</p> - -<p>General Stewart’s first measure, was to recover -Matagorda. In the night of the 22d, a detachment -consisting of fifty seamen and marines, twenty-five -artillery-men, and sixty-seven of the ninety-fourth -regiment, the whole under the command of -captain M’Lean, pushed across the channel during -a storm, and taking possession of the dismantled -fort, before morning effected a solid lodgement, and -although the French cannonaded the work with -field-artillery all the next day, the garrison, supported -by the fire of Puntales, was immoveable.</p> - -<p>The remainder of February passed without -any event of importance, yet the people suffered -from the want of provisions, especially fresh -meat; and from the 7th to the 10th of March, a -continued tempest, beating upon the coast, drove -three Spanish and one Portuguese sail of the line, -and a frigate and from thirty to forty merchantmen, -on shore, between San Lucar and St. Mary’s. One -ship of the line was taken, the others burnt and -part of the crews brought off by boats from the -fleet; but many men, and amongst others a part of -the fourth English regiment fell into the hands -of the enemy, together with an immense booty.</p> - -<p>Early in March, Mr. Henry Wellesley, minister -plenipotentiary arrived, and on the 24th of that -month, general Graham coming from England assumed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_179"></a>[179]</span> -the chief command of the British, and immediately -caused an exact military survey of the -Isla to be made. It then appeared, that the force -hitherto assigned for its defence, was quite inadequate, -and that to secure it against the utmost -efforts of the enemy, twenty thousand <ins class="corr" id="tn-179" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'soldiers, and and a'"> -soldiers, and a</ins> system of redoubts, and batteries, requiring -the labour of four thousand men for three months, -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -No. 3, -Sect. 1.</span>were absolutely necessary. Now, the Spaniards -had only worked beyond the Santi Petri, and that -without judgement; their batteries in the marsh -were ill placed, their entrenchments on the tongue -of land at the sea mouth of that channel, were of -contemptible strength, and the Caraccas which they -had armed with one hundred and fifty guns, being -full of dry timber could be easily burned by carcasses. -The interior defences of the Isla were -quite neglected, and while they had abandoned the -important posts of Matagorda, and the Troccadero, -they had pushed their advanced batteries, to the -junction of the Chiclana road with the Royal Causeway, -in the marsh, that is to say, one mile and -a half beyond the bridge of Zuazo, and consequently -exposed, without support, to flank attacks both by -water and land.</p> - -<p>It was in vain that the English engineers presented -plans, and offered to construct the works; -the Spaniards would never consent to pull down a -house, or destroy a garden; their procrastination, -paralized their allies, and would have lost the place, -had the enemy been prepared to press it vigorously. -Nor were the English works (when the Spaniards -would permit any to be constructed) well and rapidly -completed, for the Junta furnished bad materials, -there was a paucity of engineer-officers, and,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_180"></a>[180]</span> -from the habitual negligence of the ministerial -departments at home, neither the proper stores, nor -implements had been sent out. Indeed, an exact -history, drawn from the private journals of commanders -of British expeditions, during the war with -France, would show an incredible carelessness of -preparation on the part of the different cabinets. -The generals were always expected to “make bricks -without straw,” and thus the laurels of the British -army were for many years blighted. Even in -Egypt, the success of the venerable hero, Abercrombie, -was due, more to his perseverance and -unconquerable energy before the descent, than to -his daring operations afterwards.</p> - -<p>Additional reinforcements reached Cadiz the -31st of March, and both sides continued to labour, -but the allies slowly and without harmony, and, the -supplies being interrupted, scarcity increased, many -persons were forced to quit Cadiz, and two thousand -men were sent to Ayamonte to collect provisions -on the Guadiana. But now Matagorda, -which, though frequently cannonaded, had been -held fifty-five days, impeded the completion of the -enemy’s works at the Troccadero point. This small -fort, of a square form, without a ditch, with bomb-proofs -insufficient for the garrison, and with one -angle projecting towards the land, was little calculated -for resistance, and, as it could only bring -seven guns to bear, a Spanish seventy-four and an -armed flotilla were moored on the flanks, to co-operate -in the defence. The French had however raised -great batteries behind some houses on the Troccadero, -and, as daylight broke, on the 21st of April, a -hissing shower of heated shot, falling on the seventy-four, -and in the midst of the flotilla, obliged them<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_181"></a>[181]</span> -to cut their cables and take shelter under the works -of Cadiz. Then the fire of forty-eight guns and -mortars, of the largest size, was concentrated upon -the little fort of Matagorda, and the feeble parapet -disappeared in a moment before this crashing flight -of metal. The naked rampart and the undaunted -hearts of the garrison remained, but the troops fell -fast, the enemy shot quick and close, a staff, bearing -the Spanish flag, was broken six times in an hour, -and the colours were at last fastened to the angle -of the work itself, while the men, especially the -sailors, besought the officers to hoist the British -ensign, attributing the slaughter to their fighting -under a foreign flag. Thirty hours the tempest -lasted, and sixty-four men out of one hundred and -forty were down, when general Graham, finding a -diversion he had projected impracticable, sent boats -to carry off the survivors. The bastion was then -blown up, under the direction of major Lefebre, -an engineer of great promise, and he also fell, -the last man whose blood wetted the ruins thus -abandoned. Here I must record an action of -which it is difficult to say whether it were most -feminine or heroic. A sergeant’s wife, named -Retson, was in a casemate with the wounded men, -when a very young drummer was ordered to fetch -water from the well of the fort; seeing the child -hesitate, she snatched the vessel from his hand, -braved the terrible cannonade herself, and, although -a shot cut the bucket-cord from her hand, she recovered -the vessel, and fulfilled her mission.<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_182"></a>[182]</span></p> - -<p>After the evacuation of Matagorda, the war languished -at Cadiz; but Sebastiani’s cavalry infested -the neighbourhood of Gibraltar, and he himself -entered the capital of Murcia, on the 23d of April, -when Blake retired upon Alicant and Carthagena. -Meanwhile the French covered Matagorda point -<span class="sidenote">General -Campbell’s -Correspondence. -MSS.</span>with batteries; but they were pressed for provisions, -and general Campbell, throwing a detachment into -Tarifa, drove their foragers from that vicinity, -which abounds with cattle. The Spaniards at San -Roque promised to reinforce this detachment, but -their tardiness enabled the enemy to return with -four hundred foot and some cavalry, and although -the former were repulsed, the horse foraged the -country, and drove off several herds of cattle during -the action. General Campbell then increased the -detachment to five hundred men, joining some guns, -and placing the whole under the command of major -Brown of the 28th.</p> - -<p>In May the French prisoners, cutting the cables -of two hulks, drifted in a heavy gale to the French -side of the bay; and the boats sent against them -being beat off, by throwing cold shot from the -decks, above fifteen hundred men saved themselves, -in despite of the fire from the allied fleet, and from -Puntales, which was continued after the vessels had -grounded, although the miserable creatures, thus -struggling for life, had been treated with horrible -cruelty, and, being all of Dupont’s or Vedel’s corps, -were prisoners only by a dishonourable breach of -faith. Meanwhile, in Cadiz, disorder was daily -increasing. The Regency having recalled Cuesta -to their military councils, he published an attack -on the deposed Central Junta, and was answered so<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_183"></a>[183]</span> -as to convince the world, that the course of all -parties had been equally detrimental to the state. -Thus fresh troubles were excited. The English -general was hampered by the perverse spirit of the -authorities, and the Spanish troops were daily -getting more inefficient from neglect, when the -departure of Albuquerque enabled Blake to take -the chief command in the Isla, and his presence -produced some amelioration in the condition and -discipline of the troops. At his instance, also, the -Municipal Junta consented, although reluctantly, -that the British engineers should commence a -regular system of redoubts for the defence of the -Isla.</p> - -<p>English reinforcements continued to arrive, and -four thousand Spaniards, from Murcia, joined the -garrison, or, rather, army now within the lines; -but such was the state of the native troops, and -the difficulty of arranging plans, that hitherto the -taking of Matagorda had been the only check -given to the enemy’s works. It was, however, -<span class="sidenote">General -Graham’s -Despatches. -MSS.</span>necessary to do something; and, after some ill-judged -plans of the Regency had been rejected by -Graham, general Lacy was embarked, with three -thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry, to aid -the armed peasants, or Serranos, of the Ronda. -These people had been excited to arms, and their -operations successfully directed by captain Cowley -and Mr. Mitchel, two British artillery-officers, sent -from Gibraltar, and general Campbell offered to -reinforce Lacy, from Gibraltar, if he would attack -Malaga, where there were twenty thousand males -fit to carry arms. The French were only two thousand, -and cooped in the citadel, a Moorish castle,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_184"></a>[184]</span> -containing but twelve guns, and dependent for -water on the town, which was itself only supplied -by aqueducts from without. Lacy rejected this -enterprise, but demanded that eight hundred men, -from Gibraltar, should make a diversion to the -eastward, while he, landing at Algesiras, moved on -Ronda; and, this being assented to, the English -armament sailed under the command of general -Bowes. Lacy made good his movement upon -Ronda the 18th of June; but the French, having -fortified it, were too strong at that point, or, rather, -Lacy, a man of no enterprise, durst not act, and, -when he was joined by many thousand mountaineers, -he arrested their leaders for some offence, which so -disgusted the men that they disbanded. The enemy, -alarmed by these operations, which were seconded -from the side of Murcia, and by an insurrection at -Baeza, put all their disposable troops in motion; -but the insurrection at Baeza was quickly crushed, -and general Rey, marching from Seville, against -Lacy, entirely defeated and cut him off from Gibraltar, -so that he was forced to re-embark with a -few men at Estipona, and returned to Cadiz in -July.</p> - -<p>Here it is impossible not to reflect on the little -use made of the naval power, and the misapplication -of the military strength in the southern parts of -Spain. The British, Portuguese, and Spanish soldiers, -at Cadiz, were, in round numbers, 30,000, -the British in Gibraltar 5000, in Sicily 16,000, -forming a total of more than fifty thousand effective -troops, aided by a great navy, and favourably -placed for harassing that immense, and, with the -exception of the Valencian and Murcian coasts,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_185"></a>[185]</span> -uninterrupted French line of operations, which extended -from the south of Italy to Cadiz, for, even -from the bottom of Calabria, troops and stores were -brought to Spain. Yet a Neapolitan rabble, under -Murat, in Calabria, and from fifteen to twenty -thousand French around Cadiz, were allowed to -paralize this mighty power.</p> - -<p>It is true that vigilance, temper, and arrangement, -and favourable localities, are all required, in -the combined operations of a fleet and army, and -troops disembarking, also require time to equip for -service. But Minorca offered a central station, and -a place of arms for the army, and a spacious port -for the fleet; the operations would always have -been short, and independent of the Spanish authorities, -and lord Collingwood was fitted, by his -talents, discretion, zeal, experience, and accurate -knowledge of those coasts, successfully to direct -such a floating armament. What coast-siege, -undertaken by the seventh or third corps, could -have been successfully prosecuted, if the garrison -had been suddenly augmented with fifteen or twenty -thousand men from the ocean? After one or two -successful descents, the very appearance of a ship -of war would have checked the operations of a -siege, and obliged the enemy to concentrate: -whereas, the slight expeditions of this period, were -generally disconcerted by the presence of a few -French companies.</p> - -<p>In July the British force, in Cadiz, was increased -to eight thousand five hundred men, and Sir Richard -Keats arrived to take the command of the fleet. -The enemy, intent upon completing his lines, and -constructing flotillas at Chiclana, Santa Maria,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_186"></a>[186]</span> -and San Lucar de Barameda, made no attacks, and -his works, have been much censured, as ostentatiously -extended, and leading to nothing. This is -however a rash criticism; for the Chiclana camp -was necessary to blockade the Isla, and, as the true -point for offensive operations, was at the Troccadero, -the lines of Puerto Real and Santa Maria, were -necessary to protect that position, to harass the -fleet, to deprive the citizens of good water, which, -in ordinary times, was fetched from Puerto Maria, -and finally to enable the flotilla, constructing at -San Lucar, to creep round the coast. The chances -from storms, as experience proved, almost repaid -the labour, and it is to be considered that Soult -contemplated a serious attack upon Cadiz, not with -a single corps, generally weaker than the blockaded -troops, but, when time should ripen, with a powerful -army. Events in other parts of the Peninsula -first impeded, and finally frustrated this intention, -yet the lines were, in this view, not unnecessary or -ostentatious.</p> - -<p>Neither was it a slight political advantage, that -the duke of Dalmatia should hold sway in Seville -for the usurper’s government, while the National -Cortes, and the Regency, were cooped up in a -narrow corner of the province. Moreover the -preparations at Matagorda constantly and seriously -menaced Cadiz, and a British division was necessarily -kept there, for the English generals were -well assured, that otherwise, some fatal disaster -would befall the Spaniards. Now if a single -camp of observation at Chiclana had constituted -all the French works, no mischief could have been -apprehended, and Graham’s division, consisting of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_187"></a>[187]</span> -excellent soldiers would have been set free, instead -of being cooped up, without any counterbalance in -the number of French troops at the blockade; for -the latter aided indirectly, and at times directly, in -securing the submission of Andalusia, and if not -at Cadiz, they must have been covering Seville -as long as there was an army in the Isla.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_188"></a>[188]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BX_VI">CHAPTER VI.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>While the blockade of Cadiz proceeded, Seville -scarcely required a garrison, and in March, six -hundred infantry, under colonel Remond, and two -hundred cavalry, commanded by the duke D’Aremberg, -were despatched from thence, against the -viscount De Gand, who was still at Ayamonte, -vainly demanding refuge in Portugal. He had -four thousand troops, but declining an engagement, -passed by his left through Gibraleon into -the Sierra de Aroche, bordering on the Condado -de Niebla. The French then occupied Moguer and -Huelva, towns situated at the mouths of the Odiel -and Tinto rivers, from whence Cadiz had hitherto -drawn supplies, and the viscount returning to -Ayamonte, sailed with his troops to Cadiz, being -replaced by general Copons, who came with two -thousand men to gather provisions on the lower -Guadiana, and in the Tinto and Odiel districts.</p> - -<p>On the other side of Seville, Sebastiani had an -uneasy task. The vicinity of Gibraltar and of the -Murcian army, the continued descents on the -coast, and the fierceness of the Moorish blood, -rendered Grenada the most disturbed portion of -Andalusia, and a great part of that fine province, -visited by the horrors of insurrectional war, was -ravaged and laid waste.</p> - -<p>In the northern parts of Andalusia, about Jaen -and Cordoba, Dessolles reduced the struggle to -a trifling Guerilla warfare; but it was not so in -La Mancha, where the Partidas became so numerous<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_189"></a>[189]</span> -and the war so onerous, that one of Joseph’s -ministers, writing to a friend, described that province -as peopled with beggars and brigands. -Meanwhile Estremadura was the scene of various -complicated movements and combats, producing -no great results, indeed, but important as being -connected with and bearing on the defence of -Portugal.</p> - -<p>The Spanish and Portuguese line of frontier, -south of the Tagus, may be divided into three -parts.</p> - -<p>1º. From the Tagus to Badajos, on the Guadiana. -2º. From Badajos to the Morena. 3º. From -the Morena to the sea. Each of these divisions -is about sixty miles. Along the first, two-thirds of -which is mountainous and one-third undulating -plains and thick woods, a double chain of fortresses -guard the respective frontiers. Alcantara, -Valencia de Alcantara, Albuquerque, and Badajos -are the Spanish; Montalvao, Castello de Vide, Marvao, -Aronches, Campo Mayor, and Elvas, the Portuguese -places. The three first on either side are in -the mountains, the others in the open country, -which spreads from the Guadiana to Portalegre, a -central point, from whence roads lead to all the -above-named fortresses.</p> - -<p>From Badajos to the Morena, forms the second -division of the country, it is rugged and the -chain of fortresses continued. On the Portuguese -side, Juramenha, Mourao and Moura; on the -Spanish, Olivenza (formerly Portuguese), Xeres -de los Cavalleros, and Aroche.</p> - -<p>From the Morena to the sea, the lower Guadiana -separates the two kingdoms. The Spanish side, -extremely rugged, contained the fortresses of San<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_190"></a>[190]</span> -Lucar de Guadiana, Lepe, and Ayamonte. The -Portuguese frontier, Serpa, Mertola, Alcontin, and -Castro Marin, and, although the greater number -of these places were dismantled, the walls of all -were standing, some in good repair, and those of -Portugal for the most part garrisoned by militia -and ordenanza.</p> - -<p>When Mortier attempted Badajos, on the 12th -of February, Romana was near Truxillo, and the -place was so ill provided, that a fortnight’s blockade -<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s -Correspondence. -MSS.</span>would have reduced it; but the French general, -who had only brought up eight thousand infantry -and a brigade of cavalry, could not invest it in face -of the troops assembling in the vicinity, and therefore -retired to Zafra, leaving his horsemen near Olivenza. -In this position he remained until the 19th of -February, when his cavalry was surprised at Valverde, -and the commander Beauregard slain. -Romana returned to Badajos the 20th and the 27th, -and Mortier then leaving some troops in Zafra, -marched to Merida, to connect himself with the -second corps, which had arrived at Montijo, on -the Guadiana.</p> - -<p>It will be remembered that this corps, commanded -by general Mermet, occupied the valley of the -Tagus in its whole length during the invasion of -Andalusia, and communicating with the sixth corps -through the pass of Baños, formed an intermediate -reserve between Mortier and Kellerman. The -latter was at Bejar, and Miranda de Castanar, -watching the duke Del Parque, in the early part -of January; but withdrew to Salamanca, when the -British army arrived in the valley of the Mondego, -and the duke Del Parque, leaving Martin Carrera -with a weak division in the Sierra de Gata,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_191"></a>[191]</span> -marched, with thirteen thousand men, through the -pass of Perales, crossed the Tagus at Barca de -Alconete on the 10th of February, and on the -12th, the day Mortier summoned Badajos, was in -position with his right at Albuquerque and his left -on the Guadiana.</p> - -<p>When Mermet, whose advanced guard was at -Placentia, knew of this movement, he first detached -three thousand men across the Tagus, by Seradillo, -to observe Del Parque, and soon afterwards Soult’s -brother, with four thousand men from Talavera, -crossed the bridge of Arzobispo, and advancing by -Caceres, surprised some Spanish troops at Villa del -Rey and reaching Montijo, pushed patrols close -to Badajos. The remainder of the second corps -arrived at Caceres by degrees; general Reynier -then took the command, and, as I have said, was -joined by Mortier, who immediately commenced -defensive works at Merida, and prepared gabions -and facines as if to besiege Badajos.</p> - -<p>These demonstrations attracted the notice of -general Hill, who advanced with ten thousand -men from Abrantes to Portalegre, and Romana, -finding himself, by the junction of the duke Del -Parque’s army, at the head of twenty-five thousand -men, resolved to act against the communications -of the French.</p> - -<p>His first division, commanded by Charles O’Donnel, -brother to the Catalan general, occupied Albuquerque. -The second, under Mendizabel, was -posted near Castello de Vide. The third, consisting -of five thousand Asturians, was sent, -under Ballasteros, to Olivenza, and the fourth remained -at Badajos. The fifth, under Contreras,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_192"></a>[192]</span> -was detached to Monasterio, with orders to interrupt -Mortier’s communication with Seville.</p> - -<p>Contreras reached Xeres de los Cavalleros the -1st of March, but a detachment from Zafra soon -drove him thence, and Romana retired to Campo -Mayor with three divisions, leaving Ballasteros -with the fourth at Olivenza. On the other hand, -Mortier, uneasy about Contreras’ movements, repaired -to Zafra, leaving the second corps at Merida, -and the 10th, Romana, advanced again towards -Albuquerque; but having pushed a detachment -beyond the Salor river, it was surprised by general -Foy. The 14th O’Donnel endeavoured to surprise -Foy, but the latter, with very inferior numbers, -fought his way through the Puerto de Trasquillon, -and the Spaniards took possession of Caceres.</p> - -<p>At this period the insurrections in Grenada, -the movements of the Murcian army, and the -general excitement of Valencia, in consequence of -Suchet’s retreat, caused Joseph to recall Mortier -for the defence of Andalusia, and the latter, after -holding a council of war with Reynier, destroyed -the works at Merida, the 19th of March, and -retired to Seville, leaving Gazan’s division at -Monasterio. Reynier having sent his stores to -Truxillo drove the Spaniards out of Caceres the -20th, and followed them to the Salor, but afterwards -took post at Torremacho, and O’Donnel returned -to Caceres.</p> - -<p>There are two routes leading from Merida and -Badajos to Seville: 1º. The Royal Causeway, -which passes the Morena by Zafra, Los Santos, -Monasterio, and Ronquillo. 2º. A shorter, but -more difficult, road, which, running westward of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_193"></a>[193]</span> -the causeway, passes the mountains by Xeres de -los Cavalleros, Fregenal, and Araceña. These -parallel routes, have no cross communications in -the Morena, but on the Estremaduran side, a road -runs from Xeres de los Cavalleros to Zafra, and -on the Andalusian side, from Araceña to Ronquillo. -When, therefore, Mortier retired, Ballasteros -marched from Olivenza to Xeres de los Cavalleros, -and being joined by Contreras, their united corps, -amounting to ten thousand men, gained the Royal -Causeway by Zafra, and, on the evening of the -29th of March, came up with Gazan, and fought -an undecided action; but the next day, the Spaniards -being repulsed, Ballasteros retired to Araceña -and Contreras to the high mountains above -Ronquillo. From Araceña, Ballasteros marched to -Huerva, within a few leagues of Seville, but -Gerard’s division drove him back to Araceña, and -defeated him there; yet again entering the Condado -de Neibla, he established himself at Zalamea de -Real on the Tinto river.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, Romana detached a force to seize -Merida, and cut the communication of the fifth -corps with Reynier, but that general, marching with -eight thousand men from Torremocha, passed -through to Medellin before the Spaniards arrived, -and pushed troops, the 2d of April, into the Morena, -intending to take Contreras in rear, while Gazan -attacked him in front; and this would have happened, -but that O’Donnel, immediately threatened -Merida, and so drew Reynier back. Nevertheless, -Contreras was attacked by Gazan, at Pedroche, -and so completely defeated, that he regained -Zafra in the night of the 14th, with only two thousand -men, and Ballasteros also, assailed by a detachment<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_194"></a>[194]</span> -from Seville, retired to Araceña. The -20th, Reynier marched to Montijo, and O’Donnel -retired from Caceres, but his rear guard was defeated -at La Rocca the 21st, and his division would have -been lost, if Mendizabel and Hill also had not -come to his aid, when Reynier declining a general -action, retired to Merida. The insurrection in the -Alpuxaras was now quelled, the Valencians remained -inactive, Joseph re-entered Madrid, Soult -assumed the government of Andalusia, and Mortier -returned to Estremadura. While on the Spanish -side, Contreras was displaced, and Imas, his successor, -advanced to Ronquillo, in Mortier’s rear; -Ballasteros remained at Aroche; Hill returned to -Portalegre; and Romana encamped, with fourteen -thousand men, near Bajados, where a Spanish plot -<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s -Correspondence. -MSS.</span>was formed to assassinate him. It was discovered, -but the villain who was to have executed the -atrocious deed escaped.</p> - -<p>Notwithstanding Romana’s presence, Reynier and -the younger Soult, passed the Guadiana below Badajos, -with only four hundred cavalry, and closely -examined the works of that fortress, in despite of -the whole Spanish army; and at the same time, -Mortier’s advanced guards arrived on the Guadiana, -and a reinforcement of four thousand men joined -the second corps from Toledo. But as the want of -provisions would not permit the French to remain -concentrated, Mortier returned to the Morena, to -watch Imas. The 14th of May, a French detachment -again came close up to Badajos, then took the -road to Olivenza, and would have cut off Ballasteros, -if Hill had not by a sudden <ins class="err" id="err-194" title="Erratum: was 'marched'"> -march</ins> to Elvas, arrested their movements. Meanwhile, Ballasteros -again menaced Seville, and was again driven<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_195"></a>[195]</span> -back upon Aroche, with a loss of three hundred -men.</p> - -<p>To check these frequent incursions, the French -threatened the frontier of Portugal, by the Lower -Guadiana; sometimes appearing at Gibraleon, and -Villa Blanca, sometimes towards Serpa, the possession -of which would have lamed Ballasteros’ -movements, yet the advantages were still chequered. -A Portuguese flotilla intercepted, at the mouth of the -Guadiana, a convoy of provisions going to the first -corps; and O’Donnel having made an attempt during -Reynier’s absence, to surprise Truxillo, was repulsed, -and regained Albuquerque with great difficulty. -It would be perplexing, to trace in detail -all the movements, on the line from Badajos to Ayamonte, -yet two circumstances there were, of historical -importance. In the beginning of July, when Lacy -was in the Sierra de Ronda, Ballasteros near Aroche, -and Copons in the Condado Neibla, the French -marched against Lacy, leaving Seville garrisoned -solely by Spaniards in Joseph’s service; and while -this example was furnished by the enemy, the Portuguese -and Spanish troops on the frontier, complaining, -the one of inhospitality, the other of -robbery and violence, would, but for the mediation -of the British authorities, have come to blows, for -the mutual spirit of hatred extended to the governments -on both sides.</p> - -<p>Hitherto, Hill had not meddled in the Spanish -operations, save, when Romana was hardly pressed, -but the latter’s demands for aid were continual, and -most of his projects were ill judged, and contrary -to lord Wellington’s advice. On the 26th of June -however, Reynier passing the Guadiana, foraged -all the country about Campo Mayor, and then<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_196"></a>[196]</span> -turned by Montijo to Merida; it was known -that his corps belonged to the army assembling in -Castile for the invasion of Portugal, and that he -had collected mules and other means of transport -in Estremadura; and the spies asserted, that he -was going to cross the Tagus. Hill, therefore, -gathered his divisions well in hand, ready to move -as Reynier moved, to cross the Tagus if he crossed -it, and by parallel operations to guard the frontier -of Beira. The march of the second corps was, -however, postponed, and the after operations belonging -to greater combinations, will be treated of -in another place.</p> - -<p>Although, apparently complicated, the movements -in Estremadura were simple in principle. -The valley of the Guadiana as far as Badajos, is -separated from the valley of the Tagus, by a range -of heights, connecting the Guadalupe mountains -with those of Albuquerque, and the country between -those hills and the Tagus, contained fertile valleys, -and considerable towns; such as Valencia de Alcantara -and Caceres. To profit from their resources -was an object to both parties. Reynier, whose -base was at Truxillo, could easily make incursions -as far as Caceres, but beyond that town, the Salor, -presented a barrier, from behind which, the Spaniards -supported by the fort of Albuquerque, could observe -whether the incursion was made in force, and -act accordingly; hence O’Donnel’s frequent advances -and retreats.</p> - -<p>Reynier could not operate seriously, unless in -unison with the fifth corps, and by the valley of the -Guadiana; and, therefore, Merida, on account of its -stone bridge, was the key of his movements; but -Mortier’s base of operations, being in Andalusia,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_197"></a>[197]</span> -his front, was spread, from Zafra to Merida, to cover -his line of retreat, and to draw provisions <ins class="corr" id="tn-197" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'from about Lerena'"> -from about Llerena</ins>; but the road of Xeres de los Cavalleros -was open to the Spaniards, and the frequent advances -of Ballasteros and Contreras, were to harass Mortier’s -line of communication. The clue of affairs was -this; Romana, holding Badajos, and being supported -by Hill, acted on both flanks of the French, and the -Portuguese frontier furnished a retreat from every -part of his lines of operation; but, as his projects -were generally vague and injudicious, lord Wellington -forbad Hill to assist, except for definite and -approved objects.</p> - -<p>To put an end to the Spanish system, Mortier -had only to unite the two corps and give battle, or, -if that was refused, to besiege Badajos, which, from -its influence, situation, and the advantage of its -stone bridge, was the key to the Alemtejo; and this -he ardently desired. Soult, however, would not -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_V">No. V.</a> Section -1.</span>permit him to undertake any decisive operation -while Andalusia was exposed to sudden insurrections -and descents from Cadiz, and to say that either -marshal was wrong would be rash, because two -great interests clashed. Mortier and Reynier -united, could have furnished twenty thousand infantry, -fifty guns, and more than three thousand -cavalry, all excellent troops. Romana having garrisoned -Badajos, Olivenza, and Albuquerque, could -not bring more than fifteen thousand men into line, -and must have joined Hill. But with a mixed force -and divided command, the latter could not have -ventured a battle in the plain country beyond Portalegre. -A defeat would have opened Lisbon to the -victor, and lord Wellington must then have detached -largely from the north, the king and Soult could<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_198"></a>[198]</span> -have reinforced Mortier, and the ultimate consequences -are not to be assumed.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, Soult, judging, that ere further -conquests were attempted, the great province -of Andalusia, should be rendered a strong hold and -independent of extraneous events, bent all his attention -to that object. An exact and economical -arrangement, provided for the current consumption -of his troops; vast reserve magazines were filled -without overwhelming the people; and the native -municipal authorities, recognized and supported -in matters of police and supply, acted zealously, -yet without any imputation upon their patriotism; -for those who see and feel the miseries, flowing from -disorderly and wasting armies, may honestly assist a -general labouring to preserve regularity. Yet all this -could not be the work of a day, and meanwhile the -marshals under Soult’s orders, being employed only -in a military capacity, desired the entire control of -their own corps, and to be engaged in great field -operations, because, thus only could they be distinguished; -whereas the duke of Dalmatia while contributing -to the final subjugation of Spain, by concentrating -the elements of permanent strength in -Andalusia, was also well assured, that, in fixing a -solid foundation for future military operations, he -should obtain reputation as an able administrator -and pacificator of a conquered country.</p> - -<p>His views, however, clashed, not more with -those of the generals, than with the wishes of the -king, whose poverty, forced him to grasp at all -the revenues of Andalusia, and who having led -the army, in person across the Morena, claimed -both as monarch and conqueror. But he who wields -the sword will always be first served. Soult,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_199"></a>[199]</span> -guided by the secret orders of Napoleon, resisted -the king’s demands, and thus excited the monarch’s -hatred to an incredible degree; nevertheless, the -duke of Dalmatia, never lost the emperor’s confidence, -and his province, reference being had to the -nature of the war, was admirably well governed. -The people were gradually tranquillized; the military -resources of the country drawn forth, and considerable -bodies of native troops raised, and even -successfully employed, to repress the efforts of the -Partisan chiefs. The arsenal of construction at -Seville was put into full activity; the mines of -lead at Linares were worked; the copper of the -river Tinto gathered for the supply of the founderies, -and every provision for the use of a large -army collected; privateers also were fitted out, -a commerce was commenced with neutral nations -in the ports of Grenada, and finally, a secret, but -<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s -Correspondence. -MSS.</span>considerable, traffic carried on with Lisbon itself, -demonstrated the administrative talents of Soult. -Andalusia soon became the most powerful establishment -of the French in Spain.</p> - -<p>Both marshals appear to have entertained sound -views, and the advantages of either plan being -considered, leads to the reflection that they might -have been reconciled. A reinforcement of twenty-five -thousand men in Estremadura, during the -months of June and July, would have left scarcely -a shadow of defence for Portugal; and it would -seem that Napoleon had an eye to this, as we find -him directing Suchet, in July, to co-operate with -fifteen thousand men in the invasion, whenever -Tortoza should fall. The application of this reasoning -will, however, be better understood as the narrative -advances; and whether Napoleon’s recent<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_200"></a>[200]</span> -marriage with the Austrian princess drew him away -from business, or that, absorbed by the other -many and great interests of his empire, he neglected -Spanish affairs, or whether deceived by exaggerated -accounts of successes, he thought the -necessity for more troops less than it really was, I -have not been able to ascertain. Neither can I find -any good reason, why the king, whose army was -increased to twenty thousand men before the end of -June, made no movement to favour the attack on -Portugal. It is, however, scarcely necessary to -seek any other cause, than the inevitable errors, that -mar all great military combinations not directed -by a single hand.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_201"></a>[201]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BX_VII">CHAPTER VII.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>The operations, south of the Tagus, having been -described, those which occurred, north of that -river, shall now be traced; for previous to the invasion -of Portugal, the French, stretching in one -great line across the Peninsula, from Cadiz to -Gihon, eagerly discussed the remnants of the -Spanish armies.</p> - -<p>It will be remembered, that the duke Del Parque -left Martin Carrera in the Gata mountains, to interrupt -the communication, between the Salamanca -country and the valley of the Tagus. Julian -Sanchez also, issuing from time to time out of -Ciudad Rodrigo, cut off the French foragers in the -open country between the Agueda and the Douro; -and beyond the Douro, the Gallician army, under -Garcia (in number about ten thousand), occupied -Puebla de Senabria, Puente Ferrada, Villa Franca, -and Astorga, and menaced the right flank, and rear, -of the sixth corps. Mahy was organising a second -army at Lugo, and in the Asturias, the captain-general -D’Arco, commanded seven thousand men, -three thousand of which were posted at Cornellana, -under general Ponte. Thus an irregular line of -defence, six hundred miles long, was offered to the -invaders, but without depth or substance, save at -Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo, behind which the -British and Portuguese troops were lying.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the French, holding the interior<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_202"></a>[202]</span> -line, kept their masses only on the principal -routes, communicating by moveable columns, and -thus menacing all the important points without -scattering their forces. The influx of fresh -troops from France, continually added to their -solidity, especially in Old Castile, where Ney had -resumed the command, and was supported by -Kellerman with the force of his government, and -by an eighth corps under the duke of Abrantes.</p> - -<p>The invasion of Andalusia was the signal for a -general movement of all the French in Spain; and -while Victor and Mortier, menaced Cadiz and -Badajos, Ney summoned Ciudad Rodrigo, and -Bonet, entering the Asturias, threatened Gallicia -by the Concija d’Ibas. At the same time, Loison, -with eight thousand fresh men, occupied Leon and -Medina del Campo, and the advanced guard of -the eighth corps passed Valladolid. Loison gave -out that he would invade Gallicia by Puebla de -Senabria, and on the 15th of February, his cavalry -cut to pieces five hundred Spanish troops at Alcanizas, -but he finally marched against Astorga, and, -at the same time, Bonet destroyed Ponte’s force at -Potes de Sierra, and advanced to Nava de Suarna. -These movements alarmed the Spaniards. Garcia, -menaced at once by Bonet and by Loison, and -fearing equally for Astorga and Lugo, threw two-thirds -of his army into the former, and carried the -remainder to Villa Franca, to support Mahi.</p> - -<p>Ney, however, made only a feint of escalading -Ciudad Rodrigo, and Loison, although supported by -the men from Leon, who advanced to Puente -Orbijo, was repulsed from Astorga. Junot then concentrated -the eighth corps at Benevente, intending -to besiege Astorga in form; but he was suddenly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_203"></a>[203]</span> -called towards Madrid, lest disorders should arise in -the capital during the king’s absence, and Mahi and -Garcia being apprised of this, immediately brought -up the new levies to the edge of the mountains, -thinking that they might relieve the Asturians by -threatening an irruption into the plains of Leon. -But as Loison still remained at Benevente, they -were unable to effect their object, and, after drawing -off five thousand men from Astorga, retired -to Villa Franca. Bonet, however, did not pass -Nava de Suarna, and when general Arco had -rallied the Asturian fugitives at Louarca, Garcia, -leaving Mahi to command in Gallicia, marched -himself with the remnant of the old army of the -left, to join Romana at Badajos. Meanwhile -Kellerman advanced to Alba de Tormes, and detachments -from his and Ney’s force chased Carrera -from the Gata and Bejar mountains, driving him -sometimes over the Alagon, sometimes into Portugal. -But it is unnecessary to trace all these movements, -for the French, while preparing for greater operations, -were continually spreading false reports, and -making demonstrations in various directions to mislead -the allies, and to cover their own projects.</p> - -<p>Those projects were at first obscure. It is certain -that the invasion of Portugal by the northern -line, was not finally arranged, until a later period, -yet it seems probable that, while Bonet drew the -attention of the Gallician army towards Lugo, the -duke of Abrantes designed to penetrate by Puebla -Senabria, not as Loison announced, for the invasion -of Gallicia, but to turn the Tras os Montes -and descend by the route of Chaves upon Oporto, -while Ney, calling the second corps to the -aid of the sixth, should invest Ciudad Rodrigo.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_204"></a>[204]</span> -But whatever designs might have been contemplated, -they were frustrated partly by the insurrection -in Grenada and the failure of Suchet -against Valencia, partly by disunion amongst the -generals, for here also Ney and Junot complained -reciprocally, and every where it was plainly seen -that the French corps d’armée, however formidable -in themselves, would not, in the absence of Napoleon, -act cordially in a general system.</p> - -<p>When the commotions in the south subsided, -Junot returned to Old Castile, Loison joined the -sixth corps on the Tormes, Kellerman retired to -Valladolid, detachments, placed on the Douro, -maintained the communications between Ney and -Junot, and the latter, having drawn a reinforcement -from Bonet, invested Astorga with ten thousand -infantry, two thousand cavalry, eighteen field-guns, -six twenty-four pounders, and two mortars. His -covering-divisions were placed, one at Benevente, -to watch the road of Mombuey, one near Puebla -de Senabria, and one at Puente Ferrada. Mahi -immediately concentrated the Gallician army at -Villa Franca and Fonceabadon, and detached fifteen -hundred men, under Echevarria, to Mombuey and -Puebla, to harass the flank and rear of the investing -<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s -Correspondence, -MSS.</span>army; yet his force was weak. The Gallician -authorities had frequently assured lord Wellington -that it amounted to twenty thousand well-organized -troops; but it now appeared that only eight thousand -were in the field, and those ill provided, and -prone to desertion.</p> - - -<h4>SIEGE OF ASTORGA.</h4> - -<p>Santocildes, governor of this place, was an officer<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_205"></a>[205]</span> -of courage; his garrison consisted of two thousand -five hundred infantry, besides cannoneers and -armed peasantry, and the Moorish ramparts had -been strengthened by fresh works; but there was -little ammunition, scarcely twenty days’ rations, -and nothing outside the walls, capable of seriously -disturbing the enemy. The town stood in an open -plain, and had three suburbs: Puerto de Hierro, to -the north; St. Andreas, to the east; and Retebia, -to the west. On the two last Junot made false -attacks, but conducted his real approaches, against -the front, between Puerto de Hierro and Retebia. -The place was invested the 22d of March; and Puerto -de Hierro was carried by storm, two sallies repulsed, -and the trenches opened, before the end of the -month. A breach was then commenced, but the -battering-guns soon became unserviceable, and the -line of approach was flanked by the houses of -Retebia, which were filled with Spanish infantry. -Nevertheless, the town suffered from shells, and the -wall was so much broken, on the 20th of April, -that an assault was ordered. A previous attack on -Retebia had failed; but Santocildes was distressed -for ammunition, and, during the preparations for -storming, offered to capitulate.</p> - -<p>Junot refused the terms demanded, and, at five -o’clock in the evening of the 21st, some picked -troops ran up to the breach; but it was well retrenched -and stockaded, and defended with great -obstinacy, and the flank fire from Retebia stopped -the supporting columns. The storming-party, thus -abandoned to its own exertions, was held at bay on -the summit of the breach; and being plied on both -flanks, and in front, with shot from the houses of -the town, and in rear by the musketry from Retebia,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_206"></a>[206]</span> -would have been totally destroyed, but for the -scarcity of ammunition, which paralized the Spanish -defence. Three hundred French fell on the -breach itself, but the remainder finally effected a -lodgement in the ruins, and, during the night, a -second attack on Retebia proving successful, a -communication was opened from the parallels to -the lodgement, and strong working-parties were -sent forward, who cut through the stockade into -the town, when the governor surrendered.</p> - -<p>Mahi, who had advanced to the edge of the -mountains, as if he would have succoured the -place, hearing of this event, retired to Bembibre, -where his rear was overtaken and defeated by -general Clausel on the 24th. He then fell back to -Lugo, and recalled his detachment from Mombuey; -but the French from Benevente were already in -that quarter, and, on the 25th, totally defeated -Echevaria at Castro Contrijo. Meanwhile, Junot -placed garrisons in Astorga and Leon, and restored -Bonet his division. That general, who had retired -to Santander during the siege, then re-occupied -Oviedo and Gihon, defeated the Asturians, and -once more menaced Gallicia by the road of Concija, -and by that of Sales; several slight actions ensued; -but the French did not penetrate farther, and -the Junta of Gallicia reinforced the Asturians with -three thousand men.</p> - -<p>During the siege of Astorga, the sixth corps was -concentrated at Salamanca, a strong detachment of -Kellerman’s troops siezed the pass of Baños, and -Martin Carrera, quitting the hills, joined the English -light division near Almeida. In fine, the -great operations were commencing, and the line of -communication with France, was encumbered with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_207"></a>[207]</span> -the advancing reinforcements. A large battering-train, -collected from Segovia, Burgos, and Pampeluna, -arrived at Salamanca; general Martineau, -with ten thousand men for the eighth corps, reached -Valladolid; general Drouet passed the Pyrennees -with a ninth corps, composed of the fourth battalions -of regiments already in Spain; and these -were followed by seventeen thousand of the imperial -guards, whose presence gave force to the -rumour, that the emperor himself was coming to -take the chief command.</p> - -<p>Fortunately for the allies, this report, although -rife amongst all parties, and credited both by -Joseph’s ministers, and the French ambassador at -Madrid, proved groundless; and a leader for the -projected operations was still to be named. I -have been informed that marshal Ney resumed -the command of the sixth corps, under the impression -that he was to conduct the enterprise -against Portugal, that the intrigues of marshal -Berthier, to whom he was obnoxious, frustrated -his hopes, and that Napoleon, fatigued with the -disputes of his lieutenants, had resolved to repair in -person to the Peninsula: that his marriage, and some -important political affairs, diverted him from that -object, and that Massena, prince of Esling, was finally -chosen, partly for his great name in arms, and -partly that he was of higher rank than the other -marshals, and a stranger to all the jealousies and -disputes in the Peninsula. His arrival was known -in May amongst the allies, and lord Wellington -had no longer to dread the formidable presence -of the French emperor.</p> - -<p>That Massena’s base of operations might not be -exposed to the interference of any other authority<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_208"></a>[208]</span> -in Spain, the four military governments, of Salamanca, -Valladolid, Asturias, and St. Andero -were placed under his temporary authority, which -thus became absolute in the northern provinces. -But previous to taking the command of the troops, -he repaired to Madrid, to confer with the king; -and it would seem that some hesitation as to the -line of invasion still prevailed in the French -councils, because, in the imperial muster-rolls, the -head-quarters of the army of Portugal are marked as -being at Caceres in Estremadura, and the imperial -guards are returned as part of that army, yet during -the month of April only; a circumstance strongly indicating -Napoleon’s intention to assume the command -himself. The northern line was, however, definitively -adopted; and, while the prince of Esling -was still in the capital, the eighth corps passed -the Tormes, and Ney commenced the</p> - - -<h4>FIRST SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.</h4> - -<div class="sidenote">Lord Wellington’s -Correspondence. -MSS.</div> - -<p>This fortress had been commanded, in the beginning -of the year, by a person whose conduct -had been so suspicious, that lord Wellington demanded -his removal. But don Andreas Herrasti, -the actual governor, was a veteran of fifty years’ -service, whose silver hairs, dignified countenance, -and courteous manners excited respect; and whose -courage, talents, and honour were worthy of his -venerable appearance. His garrison amounted to -six thousand fighting men, besides the citizens; -and the place, built on a height overhanging the -northern bank of the Agueda river, was amply -supplied with artillery and stores of all kinds.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_209"></a>[209]</span> -The works were, however, weak, consisting of an -old rampart, nearly circular, about thirty feet in -height, and without other flanks than a few projections -containing some light guns: a second wall, -about twelve feet high, called a “<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">fausse braie</i>,” with -a ditch and covered way, surrounded the first; but -was placed so low on the hill, as scarcely to offer -any cover to the upper rampart. There were no -bomb-proofs, even for the magazine, and Herrasti -was forced to place his powder in the church, -which he secured as he might.</p> - -<p>Beyond the walls, and totally severed from -the town, the suburb of Francisco, defended by -an earthern entrenchment, and strengthened by -two large convents, formed an outwork to the -north-east of the place. The convent of Santa -Cruz served a like purpose on the north-west; and -between these posts there was a ridge called the -Little Teson, which, somewhat inferior in height -to the town, was only a hundred and fifty yards -from the body of the place. There was also a -Greater Teson, which, rising behind the lesser at -the distance of six hundred yards from the walls, -overlooked the ramparts, and saw into the bottom -of the ditch.</p> - -<p>The country immediately about Ciudad Rodrigo, -although wooded, was easy for troops; especially -on the left bank of the Agueda, to which the -garrison had access by a stone bridge within pistol-shot -of the castle-gate. But the Agueda itself, -rising in the Sierra de Francia, and running into -the Douro, is subject to great and sudden floods; -and six or seven miles below the town, near San -Felices, the channel deepens into one continued<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_210"></a>[210]</span> -and frightful chasm, many hundred feet deep, and -overhung with huge desolate rocks.</p> - -<p>During February and March, the French departed -as lightly as they had advanced against Ciudad -Rodrigo; but, on the 25th of April, a camp was -pitched upon a lofty ridge five miles eastward of -the city; and, in a few days, a second, and then a -third, arose: and these portentous clouds continued -to gather on the hills until June, when fifty -thousand fighting men came down into the plain, -and throwing two bridges over the Agueda, begirt -the fortress.</p> - -<p>This multitude, composed of the sixth and eighth -corps, and a reserve of cavalry, was led by Ney, -Junot, and Montbrun. The sixth corps invested -the place; the eighth occupied San Felices Grande, -and other points, and the cavalry swarmed on both -sides of the river; but the battering train and a -great escort was still two days’ march in the rear; -for the rains inundating the flat country between -the Agueda and the Tormes, rendered the roads -impassable. The bridges were established on the -2d and 7th of June; the one above, the other -below the town; and on the 13th, ground was -broken on the Greater Teson. The 22d, the artillery -arrived, and preparations were made to -contract the circle of investment on the left bank -of the Agueda, which had hitherto been but -slightly watched. But that night, Julian Sanchez, -with two hundred horsemen, passed silently out -of the castle-gate, and, crossing the river, fell -upon the nearest French posts, pierced their line -in a moment, and reached the English light division, -then behind the Azava, six miles from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_211"></a>[211]</span> -Ciudad Rodrigo. This event, induced Ney, to -reinforce his troops on the left bank, and a movement, -to be hereafter noticed, was directed against -general Crawfurd the 25th, on which day, also, -the French batteries opened.</p> - -<p>Ney’s plan, was to breach the body of the place -without attending to the Spanish fire. Salvos, -from forty-six guns, constantly directed on one -point, soon broke the old masonry of the ramparts; -but the besieged, who could bring twenty-four -guns to bear on the Teson, shot so well that three -magazines blew up at once in the trenches, and -killed above a hundred of the assailants. On the -27th, the prince of Esling arrived in the camp, -and summoned the governor to surrender. Herrasti -answered in the manner to be expected from so -good a soldier; and the fire was resumed until the -1st of July, when Massena, sensible that the mode -<span class="sidenote">Intercepted -French -Correspondence. -MSS.</span>of attack was faulty, directed the engineers to -raise counter-batteries, to push their parallels to -the Lesser Teson, work regularly forward, blow -in the counterscarp, and pass the ditch in form. -Meanwhile, to facilitate the progress of the new -works, the convent of Santa Cruz, on the right -flank, was carried after a fierce resistance; and, -on the left, the suburb was attacked, taken, and -retaken by a sally, in which great loss was inflicted -on the French. Howbeit, the latter remained -masters of every thing beyond the walls.</p> - -<p>During the cessation of fire, consequent upon -the change in the French dispositions, Herrasti -removed the ruins from the foot of the breach, and -strengthened his flank defences: but, on the 9th -of July, the besieger’s batteries, being established -on the Lesser Teson, re-opened with a terrible<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_212"></a>[212]</span> -effect. In twenty-four hours, the fire of the -Spanish guns was nearly silenced, part of the town -was in flames, a reserve magazine exploded on the -walls, the counterscarp was blown in by a mine, -on an extent of thirty-six feet, the ditch filled by -the ruins, and a broad way made into the place. -At this moment, three French soldiers, of heroic -courage, suddenly running out of the ranks, -mounted the breach, looked into the town, and -having thus, in broad daylight, proved the state of -affairs, discharged their muskets, and, with matchless -fortune, retired unhurt to their comrades.</p> - -<p>The columns of assault immediately assembled. -The troops, animated by the presence of Ney, and -excited by the example of the three men who had -so gallantly proved the breach, were impatient for -the signal. A few moments would have sent them -raging into the midst of the city, when the white flag -waved on the rampart, and the venerable governor -was seen standing alone on the ruins, and signifying, -by his gestures, that he desired to capitulate. He -had stricken manfully, while reason warranted hope, -and it was no dishonour to his silver hairs, that -he surrendered when resistance could only lead to -massacre and devastation.</p> - -<p>Six months had now elapsed, since the French -resuming the plan of conquest interrupted by the -Austrian war and by the operations of sir Arthur -Wellesley, had retaken the offensive. Battle after -battle they had gained, fortress after fortress they -had taken, and sent the Spanish forces, broken -and scattered, to seek for refuge in the most -obscure parts: solid resistance there was none; -and the only hope of deliverance for the Peninsula -rested upon the British general. How he realized<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_213"></a>[213]</span> -that hope shall be related in the next book. -Meanwhile, the reader should bear in mind that -the multifarious actions related in the foregoing -chapters, were contemporaneous; and that he has -been led, as it were, round the margin of a lake, -whose turbulent waters spread on every side. -Tedious to read, and trifling many of the circumstances -must appear, yet, as a whole, they form -what has been called the Spanish military policy: -and, without accurate notions on that head, it -would be impossible to appreciate the capacity of -the man who, like Milton’s phantom, paved a broad -way through the chaotic warfare.</p> - -<p>I have been charged with incompetence to understand, -and, most unjustly, with a desire to -underrate the Spanish resistance; but it is the -province of history to record, foolish as well as -glorious deeds, that posterity may profit from all: -and neither will I mislead those who read my work, -nor sacrifice the reputation of my country’s arms -to shallow declamation upon the unconquerable -spirit of independence. To expose the errors is -not to undervalue the fortitude of a noble people; -for in their constancy, in the unexampled patience, -with which they bore the ills inflicted alike by a -ruthless enemy, and by their own sordid governments, -the Spaniards were truly noble: but shall -I say that they were victorious in their battles, or -faithful in their compacts; that they treated their -prisoners with humanity; that their Juntas were -honest or wise; their generals skilful; their soldiers -firm? I speak but the bare truth, when -I assert, that they were incapable of defending their -own cause! Every action, every correspondence, -every proceeding of the six years that the war<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_214"></a>[214]</span> -lasted, rise up in support of this fact; and to -assume that an insurrection so conducted did, or -could possibly baffle the prodigious power of -Napoleon is an illusion. Spain baffle him! Her -efforts were amongst the very smallest causes of -his failure. Portugal has far greater claims to -that glory. Spain furnished the opportunity; but -it was England, Austria, Russia, or rather fortune, -that struck down that wonderful man. The -English, more powerful, more rich, more profuse, -perhaps more brave than the ancient Romans; the -English, with a fleet, for grandeur and real force, -never matched, with a general equal to any emergency, -fought as if for their own existence. The -Austrians brought four hundred thousand good -troops to arrest the conqueror’s progress, the -snows of Russia destroyed three hundred thousand -of his best soldiers; and finally, when he had lost -half a million of veterans, not one of whom died -on Spanish ground, Europe, in one vast combination, -could only tear the Peninsula from him, by -tearing France along with it. What weakness, then, -what incredible delusion to point to Spain, with all -her follies, and her never-ending defeats, as a proof -that a people fighting for independence must be -victorious. She was invaded, because she adhered -to the great European aristocracy; she was delivered, -because England enabled that aristocracy -to triumph for a moment, over the principles of the -French revolution.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_215"></a>[215]</span><br /></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XI">BOOK XI.</h2> -</div> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXI_I">CHAPTER I.</h3> - - -<p>The defence of Portugal, was not the result of -any fortuitous combination of circumstances, nor -was lord Wellington moved thereto, by any hasty -ambition to magnify his own reputation, but calmly -and deliberately, formed his resolution, after a laborious -and cautious estimate of the difficulties and -chances of success. Reverting then to the period, -when, by retreating upon Badajos, he divorced his -operations from the folly of Spain, I shall succinctly -trace his military and political proceedings -up to the moment, when, confident in the soundness -of his calculations, he commenced his project, -unmoved by the power of his enemy, the timidity -of his friends, the imprudence of his subordinates, -or the intrigues of discontented men, who secretly, -and with malignant perseverance, laboured to thwart -his measures and to ruin his designs.</p> - -<p>After the retreat from Spain in 1809, he repaired -to Seville, partly to negotiate with the -Central Junta, upon matters touching the war, -but principally to confer with his brother, ere the -latter quitted the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley’s -departure was caused by the state of politics in -England, where a change in the administration<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_216"></a>[216]</span> -was about to take place,—a change, sudden indeed, -but not unexpected; because the ineptitude of the -government, was, in private, acknowledged by many -of its members, and the failure of the Walcheren -expedition, was only the signal, for a public avowal -of jealousies and wretched personal intrigues, -which had rendered the Cabinet of St. James’s the -most inefficient, Spain excepted, of any in Europe. -Mr. Canning, the principal mover of those intrigues, -<span class="sidenote">Lord Castlereagh’s -Statement</span>had secretly, denounced lord Castlereagh -to his colleagues, as a man incapable of conducting -the public affairs, and exacted from them a promise -to dismiss him. Nevertheless, he permitted -that nobleman, ignorant of the imputation on his -<span class="sidenote">Mr. Canning’s -Statement</span>abilities, to plan, and conduct the <ins class="err" id="err-216" title="Erratum: was 'fitting, out'"> -fitting out,</ins> of the -most powerful armament that ever quitted England. -But when it became evident that only loss and ruin -waited on this unhappy expedition, Mr. Canning -claimed the fulfilment of the promise, and the intrigue -thus becoming known to lord Castlereagh, -was by him characterised as “<em>a breach of every -principle of good faith, both public and private</em>.” -This was followed by a duel; and by the dissolution -of the administration. Mr. Perceval and lord Liverpool -were then empowered to form another Cabinet; -and after a fruitless negotiation with lord Grey, -and lord Grenville, assumed the lead themselves, -and offered the department of foreign affairs to lord -Wellesley.</p> - -<p>Contrary to the general expectation, he accepted -it. His brother had opened to him those great -views for the defence of Portugal, which were -afterwards so gloriously realized, but which could -never have been undertaken with confidence by the -general, unless secure of some powerful friend in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_217"></a>[217]</span> -the administration, embued with the same sentiments, -bound by a common interest, and resolute, -to support him when the crisis of danger arrived. -It was therefore wise, and commendable, in lord -Wellesley, to sacrifice something of his own personal -pretensions, to be enabled to forward projects, -promising so much glory to the country and his -own family, and the first proceedings in parliament -justified his policy.</p> - -<p>Previous to the change in the Cabinet, sir Arthur -Wellesley had been created baron Douro, and -viscount Wellington; but those honours, although -well deserved, were undoubtedly conferred as much -from party as from patriotic feeling, and greatly -excited the anger of the opposition members, who -with few exceptions, assailed the general, personally, -and with an acrimony not to be justified. His -<span class="sidenote">See Parliamentary -Debates.</span>merits, they said, were nought; his actions silly, -presumptuous, rash; his campaign one deserving -not reward, but punishment. Yet he had delivered -Portugal, cleared Gallicia and Estremadura, and -obliged one hundred thousand French veterans -to abandon the offensive and concentrate about -Madrid!</p> - -<p>Lord Grey opposing his own crude military notions, -to the practised skill of sir Arthur, petulantly -censured the latter’s dispositions at Talavera; -others denied that he was successful in that action; -and some, forgetting that they were amenable to -history, even proposed to leave his name out of -the vote of thanks to the army! That battle, so -sternly fought, so hardly won, they would have set -aside with respect to the commander, as not warranting -admission to a peerage always open to -venal orators; and the passage of the Douro,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_218"></a>[218]</span> -so promptly, so daringly, so skilfully, so successfully -executed, that it seemed rather the result of -inspiration than of natural judgement, they would -have cast away as a thing of no worth!</p> - -<p>This spirit of faction was, however, not confined -to one side: there was a ministerial person, at this -time, who in his dread of the opposition, wrote to -lord Wellington complaining of his inaction, and -calling upon him to do something that would excite -a public sensation: <em>any thing provided blood -was spilt</em>. A calm but severe rebuke, and the -cessation of all friendly intercourse with the writer, -discovered the general’s abhorrence of this detestable -policy; but when such passions were abroad, -it is evident that lord Wellesley’s accession to the -government, was essential to the success of lord -Wellington’s projects.</p> - -<p>Those projects delivered the Peninsula and -changed the fate of Europe; and every step made -towards their accomplishment merits attention, as -much from the intrinsic interest of the subject, as -that it has been common to attribute his success -to good fortune and to the strenuous support he -received from the Cabinet at home. Now it is far -from my intention to deny the great influence of -fortune in war, or that the duke of Wellington has -always been one of her peculiar favourites; but -I will make it clearly appear, that if he met with -great success, he had previously anticipated it, and -upon solid grounds, that the Cabinet did not so -much support him as it was supported by him; -and finally, that his prudence, foresight, and firmness -were at least as efficient causes as any others -that can be adduced.</p> - -<p>Immediately after the retreat from Jaraceijo, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_219"></a>[219]</span> -while the ministers were yet unchanged, lord Castlereagh, -brought, by continual reverses, to a more -sober method of planning military affairs, had demanded -lord Wellington’s opinion upon the expediency, -the chance of success, and the expense of -defending Portugal. This letter reached the general -on the 14th of September, 1809; but the subject -required many previous inquiries and a careful -examination of the country; and, at that period, -any plan for the defence of Portugal, was necessarily -to be modified, according to the energy or feebleness -of the Spaniards in Andalusia. Hence it was not -until after his return from Seville, a few days -previous to the defeat at Ocaña, that lord Wellington -replied to lord Liverpool, who, during the -interval, had succeeded lord Castlereagh in the -war department.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Lord Wellington -to Lord Liverpool. -Badajos, -14th Nov. -1809. MSS.</div> - -<p>Adverting to the actual state of the French troops -in the Peninsula, he observed, that, unless the -Spanish armies met with some great disaster, the -former <em>could not then make an attack upon Portugal</em>; -yet, if events should enable them to do so, that -the forces at that moment in the latter might defend -it. “But the peace in Germany,” he said, “might -enable France to reinforce her armies in Spain -largely, when the means of invading Portugal -would be increased, not only in proportion to the -additional troops then poured in, but also in proportion -to the effect which such a display of additional -strength would necessarily have upon the -spirit of the Spaniards. <ins class="err" id="err-219" title="Erratum: was 'Even that in case'"> -Even in that case</ins>, <em>until -Spain should have been conquered and rendered submissive</em>, -the French would find it difficult, if not impossible, -to obtain possession of Portugal, <em>provided -England employed her armies in defence of that -country, and that the Portuguese military service<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_220"></a>[220]</span> -was organised to the full extent of which it was capable.</em> -But the number of British forces employed -should not be less than thirty thousand effective -men. Although the Portuguese regular -force, actually enrolled, consisted of thirty-nine -thousand infantry, three thousand artillery, and -three thousand cavalry; and the militia amounted -to forty-five thousand, exclusive of the ordenanças.”</p> - -<p>The next point of consideration was the probable -expense. “The actual yearly cost of the British -army in Portugal, exclusive of the hire of transport-vessels, -was about £1,800,000, being only -half a million sterling more than they would cost -if employed in England. Hence the most important -consideration was the expense of renovating, -and supporting the Portuguese military, and -civil services. The British government, had already -subsidised the Portuguese Regency, at the -rate of six hundred thousand pounds yearly, -being the expense of twenty thousand men, which -the latter were bound by treaty to place at the -service of the English commander-in-chief.</p> - -<p>“But this was far from sufficient to render the -Portuguese army efficient for the impending -contest. The revenue of Portugal was between -eight and nine millions of dollars, the expenses -between fourteen and fifteen millions, leaving a -deficiency of more than six millions of dollars. -Hence, for that year, the most pressing only of -the civil and military demands had been paid, -and the public debt and the salaries of the public -servants were in arrear. The advances already -made by Great Britain amounted to two millions -of dollars; there remained a deficiency of four -millions of dollars, which, after a careful inquiry,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_221"></a>[221]</span> -it appeared could not be made good by Portugal; -and it was obvious that the administration would, -when distressed, gradually appropriate the subsidy -to support the civil authorities to the detriment -of the military service. Nay, already money -from the English military chest had been advanced -to prevent the Portuguese army from -disbanding from want of food.</p> - -<p>“It was impossible to diminish the expenses of -the Regency, and yet the French invasion and -the emigration to the Brazils had so impoverished -the country that it was impossible to raise the -revenue or to obtain money by loans. The people -were unable to pay the taxes already imposed, -and the customs, which formed the principal -branch of Portuguese revenue, were reduced to -nothing by the transfer of the Brazilian trade -from the mother-country to Great Britain. This -transfer, so profitable to the latter, was ruinous -to Portugal, and, therefore, justice as well as -policy required that England should afford pecuniary -assistance to the Regency.</p> - -<p>“Without it, nothing could be expected from -the Portuguese army. The officers of that army -had, for many years, done no duty, partly that -their country having been, with some trifling -exceptions, at peace nearly half a century, they -had continued in the same garrisons, and lived -with their families; and, to these advantages, -added others arising from abuses in the service. -Now the severe but necessary discipline introduced -by marshal Beresford, had placed the Portuguese -officers in a miserable situation. All -abuses had been extirpated, additional expenses -had been inflicted, and the regular pay was not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_222"></a>[222]</span> -only insufficient to support them in a country -where all the necessaries of life were enormously -dear, but it was far below the pay of the English, -Spanish, and French officers, with whom, or -against whom, they were to fight.</p> - -<p>“If, therefore, the war was to be carried on, it -was advisable to grant a subsidy of one hundred -and thirty thousand pounds yearly, to enable the -Regency to increase the pay of the Portuguese -officers; and to this sum, for the reasons before-mentioned, -should be added a further subsidy of -about three hundred thousand pounds, to supply -the actual deficiency in the Portuguese revenues. -Or, if the English cabinet preferred it, they might -take ten thousand more Portuguese troops into -pay, which could be done at an expense of two -hundred and fifty thousand pounds. With such -assistance, the difficulties of the moment might be -overcome; but, without it, he lord Wellington, felt -assured, that the whole financial and military -system of the Portuguese would break down at -once; all the expense, hitherto incurred, would -be cast away, and all hopes of defending the -country extinguished. It was for the ministers -to decide.</p> - -<p>“There remained two other points to consider—the -re-embarkation of the British army, in the -event of failure, and the chances of the Portuguese -nation continuing the contest alone. As to -the first, he could carry off everything safely, -except the horses of the cavalry and artillery, -those could not be carried off, if the embarkation -took place after a lost battle; and, if under other -circumstances, the expense of horse-transports -would be more than the worth of the animals.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_223"></a>[223]</span> -As to the second point, if the British army -evacuated Portugal, under any circumstances, he -could not give hopes that the contest could be -prolonged effectually by the natives. Although -I,” he said, “<em>consider the Portuguese government -and army as the principals in the contest for their -own independence, and that their success or failure -must depend principally upon their own exertions -and the bravery of their army, and that I am -sanguine in my expectations of both, when excited -by the example of British officers and troops, I -have no hope of either, if his Majesty should now -withdraw the army from the Peninsula, or if it -should be obliged to evacuate it by defeat. There -is no doubt that the immediate consequences will be -the possession of Lisbon by the enemy, probably -without a contest; and other consequences will -follow, affecting the state of the war, not only in -Portugal but Spain.</em> If, therefore, it should be -thought advisable now to withdraw, or if, eventually -the British army should be obliged to withdraw -from Portugal, I would recommend a consideration -of the means of carrying away such of -the Portuguese military as should be desirous of -emigrating, rather than continue, by their means, -the contest in this country.”</p> - -<p>Peniché and Setuval offered secure points of -embarkation in the event of failure, but neither -were likely to come within the scope of the operations, -and lord Wellington’s opinion as to the -facility of carrying off the army from Lisbon was -founded chiefly upon admiral Berkeley’s assurances -that the embarkation would not take longer than -four hours, during which time, even though the -left bank of that river should be occupied by the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_224"></a>[224]</span> -enemy, the ships of war could sustain the fire and -at the same time sweep with their own guns all -the ground above Passo d’Arcos, which, from the -circumstance of its having no surf, was thought -preferable to St. Julian’s for an embarkation. But -the admiral’s views, as I shall have occasion to -observe hereafter, were erroneous; the fleet could -not remain in the Tagus, if the enemy were in possession -of the left bank.</p> - -<p>Although alarmed at the number of men demanded, -a number which, from the recent loss -sustained on the Walcheren expedition, they truly -observed, would, in case of disaster, endanger the -safety of England, the ministers assented to -lord Wellington’s proposals, undertook to pay ten -thousand additional Portuguese troops, and to advance -money for the increased stipends to the -officers; but thus pledging themselves to an annual -subsidy of nearly one million, they with justice -required that the Portuguese Regency, under -pain of the subsidy being stopped, should keep -all that part of the military establishment which -remained under their own direction in a state of -complete efficiency.</p> - -<p>Thus supported, lord Wellington proceeded -with vigorous intelligence to meet the impending -contest. His troops removed from the Guadiana, -took healthy cantonments on the north-eastern -frontier of Portugal, and he expected a -reinforcement of five thousand infantry and a regiment -of cavalry from England. Smaller detachments -had already reached him, and the army -when it commenced its march from the Guadiana -was numerically thirty thousand strong; but those -actually under arms scarcely amounted to twenty<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_225"></a>[225]</span> -thousand; nine thousand were in hospital, and -many in the ranks were still tottering from the -effects of past illness.</p> - -<p>The 20th of January, the head-quarters, and the -artillery parcs, were established at Viseu, in Upper -Beira. The cavalry, was quartered, by single -regiments, at Golegao, Punhete, Torres Novas, -Celerico, and Santarem. General Hill, was left -with five thousand British, and a like number of -Portuguese at Abrantes, and the remainder of the -infantry (one regiment, forming the garrison of -Lisbon, excepted) was distributed along the valley -of the Mondego.</p> - -<p>The plans of the English general, were—at first, -grounded, upon the supposition, that the French -would follow the right or northern line, in preference -to the centre or southern line of operations, -against the Peninsula, that is, <em>attack Portugal from -the side of Old Castile</em>, rather than <em>Andalusia from -the side of La Mancha</em>. In this he was mistaken. -The movements were again directed by Napoleon, -his views were as usual gigantic, and not Andalusia -alone, but every part of the Peninsula, was destined -to feel the weight of his arms. Fresh troops, flushed -with their recent German victories, were crowding -into Spain, reinforcing the corps to their right and -left, scouring the main communications, and following -the footsteps of the old bands, as the latter were -impelled forward in the career of invasion. Hence, -the operations against Andalusia so deeply affected -the defence of Portugal, that, on the 31st of -January, at the moment Seville was opening her -gates, lord Wellington demanded fresh instructions, -reiterating the question, whether <em>Portugal -should be defended at all</em>, but at the same time<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_226"></a>[226]</span> -transmitting, one of those clear and powerful statements, -which he invariably drew up for the ministers’ -information previous to undertaking any great enterprise; -statements, in which, showing the bearings -of past and present events, and drawing conclusions -as to the future with a wonderful accuracy, -he has given irrefragable proofs, that envious folly -has attributed to fortune, and the favour of the -cabinet, successes, which were the result of his -own sagacity and unalterable firmness.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Lord Wellington -to -Lord Liverpool, -31st Jan. -1810. MSS.</div> - -<p>“The enemy,” he said, “aimed at conquering -the south; he would no doubt obtain Seville with -all its resources, and the defeat and dispersion of -the Spanish armies would be the consequences of -any action, in which either their imprudence or -necessity, or even expediency, might engage them. -The armies might, however be lost and the authorities -dispersed, but the war of Partisans would -continue; Cadiz might possibly hold out, and the -Central Junta even exist within its walls; but it -would be without authority, because the French -would possess all the provinces. This state of -affairs, left Portugal untouched; but it was chiefly -to that country he wished to draw the ministers’ -attention.</p> - -<p>“They already knew its military situation and -resources. If arms could be supplied to the -militia, a gross force of ninety thousand men, regularly -organized, could be calculated upon, exclusive -of the armed population and of the -British army. Much had been done within the -last nine months, for the enrollment, organization, -and equipment of this great force; but much remained -to be done, and with very insufficient -means, before the fifty thousand men, composing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_227"></a>[227]</span> -the militia, could possibly contend with the enemy; -and although this should be effected, the whole -army would still want that confidence in themselves -and in their officers, which is only to be -acquired by military experience.</p> - -<p>“When the affairs of Spain should, as before -supposed, be brought to that pass, <em>that a regular -resistance would cease, no possibility existed of the -contest in that country being renewed on such a scale -as to afford a chance of success, although the possession -of each part might be precarious, depending -upon the strength of the French force holding it, -and that the whole might prove a burthen rather -than an advantage to the French government</em>. Thence -arose this question, ‘Will the continuation of the -contest in Portugal, afford any reasonable prospect -of advantage against the common enemy, or of -benefit to the allies?’</p> - -<p>“It was impossible to calculate upon any certain -grounds the degree of assistance to be expected -from the Portuguese troops. For the regulars -every thing that discipline could effect had been -done, and they had been armed and equipped as -far as the means of the country would go. The -militia also had been improved to the extent which -the expense of keeping them embodied would -permit. The Portuguese had confidence in the -British nation and army; they were loyal to their -Prince; detested the French government, and were -individually determined to do every thing for the -cause. Still they were not to be certainly calculated -upon until inured to war, because the -majority of their officers were of an inferior description -and inexperienced in military affairs.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_228"></a>[228]</span></p> - -<p>Under these circumstances, and <em>adverting to the -approaching subjection of Spain</em>, he demanded to -know whether “<em>the enemy, bending the greatest -part of his force against Portugal, that country -should be defended, or measures taken to evacuate -it, carrying off all persons, military and others, -for whose conveyance means could be found</em>. -But, under any circumstances, (he said) the -British army could always be embarked in despite -of the enemy.”</p> - -<p>Such being the view taken of this important -subject by lord Wellington, it may seem proper -here to notice an argument which, with equal ignorance -and malice, has often been thrust forward -in disparagement of sir John Moore, namely, that -he declared Portugal could not be defended, -<span class="sidenote">Mr. James -Moore’s -Narrative</span>whereas lord Wellington did defend that country. -The former general premising that he was not prepared -to answer a question of such magnitude, -observed, that the frontier, being, although rugged, -open, could not be defended against a superior -force; yet that Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, -Celerico, Viseu, might be occupied as temporary -positions to check the advance of an enemy, -and cover the embarkation of stores, &c. which -could only be made at Lisbon, that the Portuguese -in their own mountains would be of much -use, and that he hoped that they could alone defend -the Tras os Montes. That, if the French succeeded -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_II">No. II.</a> -Section 12.</span>in Spain, it would be vain to resist them in Portugal -“<em>because the latter was without a military -force</em>,” and if it were otherwise, from the experience -of Roriça and Vimiero, no reliance was to -be placed on their troops. But this opinion, hastily<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_229"></a>[229]</span> -given, had reference only to the <em>state of affairs -existing at that moment</em>, being expressly founded on -the <em>miserable condition and unpromising character -of the Portuguese military</em>, Spain also being supposed -conquered.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington, after two campaigns in the -country; after the termination of the anarchy, -which prevailed during sir John Cradock’s time; -after immense subsidies had been granted to Portugal, -her whole military force re-organized, and -her regular troops disciplined, paid, and officered -by England; after the war in Germany had cost -Napoleon fifty thousand men, the campaign in the -Peninsula at least fifty thousand more; in fine, -after mature consideration, and when Spain was -still fighting, when Andalusia, Catalonia, Murcia, -Valencia, Gallicia, and the Asturias, were still uninvaded; -when Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, most -important posts with reference to this question, -were still in possession of the Spaniards, and prepared -for defence, lord Wellington, I say, came to -<span class="sidenote">Letter -to Lord Liverpool, -Nov. 14. -1809. MSS.</span>the conclusion, that Portugal might be defended -against the enemy then in the Peninsula, provided -<em>an enormous additional subsidy and a powerful -auxiliary army were furnished by England, and -that one earnest and devoted effort was made by the -whole Portuguese nation</em>. And when Andalusia fell, -he warned his government, that, <em>although success -<span class="sidenote">Ibid. Jan. -31, 1810. -MSS.</span>could only be expected from the devotion and ardour -of the Portuguese, their army could not even then -be implicitly trusted</em>. Lisbon also, he considered as -the only secure point of resistance, and he occupied -Viseu, Guarda, Almeida, Belmonte, and Celerico, -as temporary posts. But, in all things concerning<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_230"></a>[230]</span> -this war, there was between those generals, -a remarkable similarity of opinion and plan -of action.</p> - -<p>“<em>The French</em>,” said sir John Moore, “<em>will find -<span class="sidenote">Mr. James -Moore’s -Narrative.</span>the Spaniards troublesome subjects, but in the first -instance they will have little more than a march to -subdue the country</em>.”</p> - -<p>“<em>The defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies -will be</em>,” said lord Wellington, “<em>the probable consequence -<span class="sidenote">Letter -to Lord Liverpool, -Jan. 31, -1810. MSS.</span>of any action in which either imprudence, -necessity, or even expediency, may lead them to -engage. The armies may be lost, the authorities -dispersed, but the war of Partisans will probably -continue.</em>”</p> - -<p>And when the edge of the sword was, in 1810, -as in 1808, descending on the unguarded front of -Andalusia, lord Wellington, on the first indication -of Joseph’s march, designed to make a movement -similar in principle to that executed by sir John -Moore on Sahagun, that is, by an irruption into -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_II">No. II.</a> -Section 3.</span>Castile, to threaten the enemy’s rear, in such sort -that he should be obliged to return from Andalusia -or suffer his forces in Castile to be beaten. Nor -was he at first deterred from this project, by the -knowledge, that fresh troops were entering Spain. -The Junta, indeed, assured him that only eight -thousand men had reinforced the French; but, -although circumstances led him to doubt this assertion, -he was not without hopes to effect his purpose -before the reinforcements, whatever they -might be, could come into line. He had even -matured his plan, as far as regarded the direction -of the march, when other considerations obliged -him to relinquish it, and these shall be here examined,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_231"></a>[231]</span> -because French and Spanish writers then, -and since, have accused him of looking on with -indifference, if not with satisfaction, at the ruin of -the Central Junta’s operation, as if it only depended -upon him to render them successful.</p> - -<p>Why he refused to join in the Spanish projects has -been already explained. He abandoned his own,—</p> - -<p>1º. Because the five thousand men promised -from England had not arrived, and his hospitals -being full, he could not, including Hill’s division, -bring more than twenty thousand British soldiers -into the field. Hill’s division, however, could not -be moved without leaving the rear of the army -exposed to the French in the south,—a danger, -which success in Castile, by recalling the latter -from Andalusia, would only increase.</p> - -<p>2º. The Portuguese had suffered cruelly during -the winter from hunger and nakedness, the result -of the scarcity of money before-mentioned. To -<span class="sidenote">Lord Wellington’s -Correspondence. -MSS.</span>bring them into line, was to risk a total disorganization, -destructive alike of present and future -advantages. On the other hand, the French in -Castile, consisting of the sixth corps and the troops -of Kellerman’s government, lord Wellington knew -to be at least thirty thousand strong, of which -twenty thousand were in one mass; and, although -the rest were dispersed from Burgos to Avila, and -from Zamora to Valladolid, they could easily have -concentrated in time to give battle, and would have -proved too powerful. That this reasoning was -sound shall now be shewn.</p> - -<p>Mortier’s march from Seville would not have -terminated at Badajos, if the British force at -Abrantes, instead of advancing to Portalegre, had<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_232"></a>[232]</span> -been employed in Castile. The invasion of Andalusia, -was only part of a general movement throughout -Spain; and when the king placed himself at -the head of the army, to force the Morena, Kellerman -marched from Salamanca to Miranda del -Castanar and Bejar, with the sixth corps, and -thus secured the defiles leading into the valley of -the Tagus, and at the same time, the second corps -coming down that valley, communicated with the -sixth by the pass of Baños, and with the fifth by -Seradillo and Caceres. Hence, without losing hold -of Andalusia, three <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">corps d’armée</i>, namely, the -sixth, second, and fifth, amounting to fifty thousand -men, could, on an emergency, be brought -together to oppose any offensive movement of lord -Wellington’s. Nor was this the whole of the -French combinations; for, in rear of all these -forces, Napoleon was crowding the Peninsula with -fresh armies, and not eight thousand, as the Central -<span class="sidenote">Rolls of -the French -army.</span>Junta asserted, but one hundred thousand men, -rendered disposable by the peace with Austria and -the evacuation of Walcheren, were crossing, or to -cross, the western Pyrennees.</p> - -<p>Of these, the first detachments reinforced the -divisions in the field, but the succeeding troops -formed an eighth and ninth corps, and the former, -under the command of the duke of Abrantes, -advancing gradually through Old Castile, was -actually in the plains of Valladolid, and would, -in conjunction with Kellerman, have overwhelmed -the British army; but for that sagacity, which -the French, with derisive but natural anger, and -the Spaniards, with ingratitude, have termed “<em>The -selfish caution of the English system</em>.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_233"></a>[233]</span></p> - -<p>Truly, it would be a strange thing, to use so -noble and costly a machine, as a British army, -with all its national reputation to support, as lightly -as those Spanish multitudes, collected in a day, -dispersed in an hour, reassembled again without -difficulty, incapable of attaining, and consequently, -incapable of losing, any military reputation.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_234"></a>[234]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXI_II">CHAPTER II.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>The greatness of the French reinforcements having -dispelled the idea of offensive operations, lord Wellington -turned his whole attention to Portugal, and -notwithstanding the unfavourable change of circumstances, -the ministers consented that he should -undertake its defence; yet, the majority yielding to -the influence of his brother, rather than to their own -conviction of its practicability, and throwing the responsibility -entirely on the shoulders of the general. -The deep designs, the vast combinations, and the -mighty efforts, by which he worked out the deliverance -of that country, were beyond the compass of -their policy; and even now, it is easier to admire -than to comprehend, the moral intrepidity which -sustained him under so many difficulties, and the -sagacity which enabled him to overcome them; for -he had an enemy with a sharp sword to fight, the follies -and fears of several weak cabinets to correct, the -snares of unprincipled politicians to guard against, -and finally to oppose public opinion. Failure was -every where anticipated, and there were but few -who even thought him serious in his undertaking. -But having now brought the story of the war down to -the period, when not Spain nor Portugal, but England -was to contend with France; before I enter -upon the narrative of this memorable contest, it will -be well to take a survey of the respective conditions -and plans of the belligerents, and to shew -how great the preparations, how prodigious the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_235"></a>[235]</span> -forces on both sides, and with what a power each -was impelled forward to the shock.</p> - -<p><em>State of the French.</em>—France victorious, and in -a state of the highest prosperity, could with ease, -furnish double the number of men, required to maintain -the struggle in the Peninsula for many years. -But the utmost strength of the Spaniards having -been proved, it was evident that if the French could -crush the British armies, disorder and confusion -might indeed be prolonged for a few years, yet no -effectual resistance made, and as in the war of -succession, the people would gradually accommodate -themselves to the change of dynasty, especially -as the little worth of Ferdinand was now fully demonstrated, -by an effort to effect his release. The -agent, a baron Kolli being detected, and his place -supplied by one of the French police to ascertain -the intentions of the captive king, the latter, influenced -by personal fears alone, not only refused -to make the attempt, but dishonourably denounced -Kolli to the French government. The only real -obstacles then to the entire conquest of the Peninsula -were Cadiz and Portugal. The strength of -the former was precarious, and the enormous forces -assembled to subdue the latter appeared to be equal -to the task. Yet in war, there are always circumstances, -which, though extraneous to the military -movements, influence them as much as the wind -influences the sailing of a ship, and amongst the -most important of these, must be reckoned the conduct -of the intrusive king.</p> - -<p>Joseph was a man of so amiable a nature, that -even the Spaniards never accused him of any thing -worse than being too convivial; but it is evident -that he was unequal to his task and mistook his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_236"></a>[236]</span> -true situation, when, resisting Napoleon’s policy, he -claimed the treatment of an independent king. He -should have known that he was a tool, and in Spain, -could only be a tool of the emperor’s. To have refused -a crown, like his brother Lucien, would have -been heroic firmness, but like his brother Louis, -first to accept, and then to resist the hand that conferred -it, was a folly that, without ameliorating the -condition of the Spaniards, threw fatal obstacles in -Napoleon’s path. Joseph’s object was to create a -Spanish party for himself by gentle and just means, -but the scales fell from the hands of justice when -the French first entered the Peninsula, and while -the English supported Spain, it was absurd to expect -even a sullen submission, much less attachment -from a nation so abused, neither was it possible -to recast public feeling, until the people had -passed through the furnace of war. The French -soldiers were in Spain for conquest, and without -them the intrusive monarch could not keep his -throne.</p> - -<p>Now Joseph’s Spanish ministers, were men who -joined him upon principle, and who, far from shewing -a renegado zeal in favour of the French, were -as ardently attached to their own country, as any of -those who shouted for Ferdinand VII.; and whenever -Spanish interests clashed (and that was constantly) -with those of the French armies, they as -well as the king invariably supported the former; -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_IV">No. IV.</a> -Section 1.</span>and so strenuously, that in Paris it was even supposed -that they intended to fall on the emperor’s -troops. Thus civil contention weakened the military -operations, and obliged Napoleon either to -take the command in person, or to adopt a policy -which however defective, will upon inspection prove<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_237"></a>[237]</span> -perhaps, to have been the best adapted to the actual -state of affairs.</p> - -<p>He suffered, or as some eager to lower a great -man’s genius to their own level, have asserted, he -fomented disputes between the marshals and the -king, but the true question is, could he prevent -those disputes? A wise policy, does not consist in -pushing any one point to the utmost perfection of -which it may be susceptible, but in regulating and -balancing opposing interests, in such a manner, that -the greatest benefit shall arise from the working of -the whole.</p> - -<p>To arrive at a sound judgement of Napoleon’s -measures, it would be necessary to weigh all the -various interests of his political position, but there -are not sufficient materials yet before the world, to -do this correctly, and we may be certain, that his -situation with respect both to foreign and domestic -policy, <ins class="corr" id="tn-237" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'required extrordinary'"> -required extraordinary</ins> management. It must -always be remembered, that, he was not <ins class="corr" id="tn-237a" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'merely a a conqueror'"> -merely a conqueror</ins>, but the founder, of a political structure -too much exposed to storms from without, to bear -any tampering with its internal support. If money -be the sinew of war, it is the vital stream of peace, -and there is nothing more remarkable in Napoleon’s -policy, than the care with which he handled financial -matters; avoiding as he would the plague, that -fictitious system of public credit, so fatuitously -cherished in England. He could not without hurting -France, transmit large quantities of gold to -Spain, and the only resource left was to make “<em>the -war maintain the war</em>.”</p> - -<p>But Joseph’s desire of popularity, and the -feelings of his ministers, were much opposed to -this system; nor were the proceeds always applied<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_238"></a>[238]</span> -for the benefit of the troops. This demanded a -remedy; yet openly to declare the king of no -consideration would have been impolitic in the -highest degree. The emperor adopted an intermediate -course, and formed what were called -“<em>particular military governments</em>,” such as Navarre, -Aragon, Catalonia, and Andalusia; in which the -marshal, or general, named governor possessed both -the civil and military power: in short, he created -viceroys as he had threatened to do when at -<span class="sidenote">See Vol. I. -p. 420.</span>Madrid; and, though many disadvantages attended -this arrangement, it appears to have been wise -and consistent with the long reach which distinguishes -all Napoleon’s measures. The principal -disadvantages were, that it mortally offended the -king, by thwarting his plans for establishing a -national party; that many of the governors were -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_IV">No. IV.</a> -Sections 2 -and 3.</span>wantonly oppressive, and attentive only to their -own situation, without regarding the general objects -of the war; that both the Spanish ministers and -the people regarded it as a step towards dismembering -Spain, and especially with respect to the -provinces beyond the Ebro; and, indeed, the -annexing those parts to France, if not resolved -upon, was at one time contemplated by the emperor.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, experience proved, that Joseph -was not a general equal to the times. Napoleon -himself admits, that, at this period, the marauding -<span class="sidenote">Memoires -de St. Helene.</span>system necessary to obtain supplies, joined to the -Guerilla warfare, had relaxed the discipline of -the French armies, and introduced a horrible -license, while the military movements were feebly -pushed. Hence, perhaps, the only effectual means -to obtain the resources of Spain for the troops, -with least devastation, was to make the success of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_239"></a>[239]</span> -each “<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">corps d’armée</i>,” and the reputation of its -commander, dependent upon the welfare of the -province in which it was fighting. And, although -some of the governors, had neither the sense nor -the justice to fulfil this expectation; others, such -as Soult and Suchet, did tranquillize the people, -and yet provided all necessary things for their -own troops; results which would certainly not -have been attained under the supreme government -of the king, because he knew nothing of war, -loved pleasure, was of an easy, obliging disposition, -and had a court to form and maintain.</p> - -<p>I am aware that the first-named generals, especially -Soult, were included by Joseph amongst -those who, by oppressing the people, extended -the spirit of resistance; but this accusation was -the result of personal enmity; and facts, derived -from less interested quarters, as well as the final -results, prove that those officers had a longer reach -in their policy than the king could understand.</p> - -<p>There is yet another view in which the matter -may be considered. Napoleon says he left many -provinces of Italy under the harsh government -of Austria, that the spirit of jealousy, common to -the small states of that country, might be broken, -and the whole rendered amenable and ready to -assimilate, when he judged the time ripe to re-form -one great kingdom. Now the same policy may -be traced in the military governments of Spain. -The marshal’s sway, however, wisely adapted to -circumstances, being still the offspring of war and -violence, must, of necessity, be onerous and -harsh; but the Peninsula once subdued, this system -would have been replaced by the peaceful government -of the king, who would then have been<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_240"></a>[240]</span> -regarded as a deliverer. Something of this nature -was also necessary to sweep away the peculiar -privileges which many provinces possessed, and -of which they were extremely tenacious; and the -iron hand of war, only, could introduce that equality -which was the principal aim and scope of the -constitution of Bayonne.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">King Joseph’s -Correspondence. -MSS.</div> - -<p>Nevertheless, the first effects of the decree establishing -this system, were injurious to the French -cause. Fresh contributions were exacted to supply -the deficiency occasioned by the cessation of -succours from France; and, to avoid these, men, -who would otherwise have submitted tranquilly, -fled from the military governments. The Partidas -also suddenly and greatly increased, and a fresh -difficulty arose about their treatment when prisoners. -These bodies, although regardless of the laws of -war themselves, claimed all the rights of soldiers -from their adversaries, and their claim was supported -by the Spanish government. Thus, when -Soult, as major-general for the king, proclaimed -that military execution would be done on the bands -in Andalusia, as assassins, and beyond the pale -of military law, the Regency answered, by a retaliatory -declaration; and both parties had strong -grounds for what they did: the Junta, because the -defence of the country now rested chiefly on the -Partidas; Joseph, because the latter, while claiming -the usages of war, did not act upon them, and -were, by the Junta, encouraged in assassination. -Mina, and, indeed, all the chiefs, put their -prisoners to death whenever it became inconvenient -to keep them; and Saraza publicly announced his -hope of being able to capture Madame Suchet -<span class="sidenote">Suchet’s -Memoirs.</span>when she was pregnant, that he might destroy the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_241"></a>[241]</span> -mother and the infant together! And such things -were common during this terrible war. The -difficulties occurring in argument were, however, -overcome in practice; the question of the treatment -of the prisoners was generally decided by granting -no quarter on either side.</p> - -<p>Joseph, incensed at the edict establishing the governments, -sent the marquis of Almenara to Paris, -to remonstrate with his brother, and to complain of -the violence and the injustice of the French generals, -especially Ney and Kellerman; and he denounced -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_IV">No. IV.</a> -Section 2.</span>one act of the latter, which betrayed the most -wanton contempt of justice and propriety; namely, -the seizure of the national archives at Simancas; -by which, infinite confusion was produced, and the -utmost indignation excited, without obtaining the -slightest benefit, political or military. Another -object of Almenara’s mission was to ascertain if -there was really any intention of seizing the provinces -beyond the Ebro; and this gave rise to a -curious intrigue; for his correspondence, being -intercepted, was brought to Mr. Stuart, the British -envoy, and he, in concert with Romana, and -Cabanes the Spanish historian, simulated the style -and manner of Napoleon’s state-papers, and composed -a counterfeit “<i lang="la" xml:lang="la">senatus consultum</i>” and decree -for annexing the provinces beyond the Ebro to -France, and transmitted them to Joseph, whose -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_IV">No. IV.</a> -Section 5.</span>discontent and fears were thereby greatly increased. -Meanwhile, his distress for money was extreme; and -his ministers were at times actually destitute of food.</p> - -<p>These political affairs impeded the action of the -armies, but the intrinsic strength of the latter was -truly formidable; for, reckoning the king’s French -guards, the force in the Peninsula was not less<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_242"></a>[242]</span> -than <em>three hundred and seventy thousand men, and -eighty thousand horses</em>. Of these, forty-eight thousand -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_I">No. I.</a> -Section 1.</span>men were in hospital, four thousand prisoners, -and twenty-nine thousand detached; leaving nearly -two hundred and eighty thousand fighting men -actually under arms, ready either for battle or -siege: and moreover, a fresh reserve, eighteen -thousand strong, was in march to enter Spain. -In May, this prodigious force had been re-organized; -and in July was thus distributed:—</p> - - -<table class="p2 autotable fs80 tabw90"> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs120" colspan="6"><em>Governments or Armies in the 2d Line.</em></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">Total Strength.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">1. Catalonia</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">Seventh corps</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">Duke of Tarento</td> -<td class="tdr">55,647</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">2. Aragon</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">Third corps</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">Gen. Suchet</td> -<td class="tdr">33,007</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">3. Navarre</td> -<td class="tdl fs180">{</td> -<td class="tdl">Detachments and a division of the Imperial Guards</td> -<td class="tdl fs180">}</td> -<td class="tdl">Gen. Reille</td> -<td class="tdr">21,887</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">4. Biscay</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">Detachments</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">Gen. Caffarelli</td> -<td class="tdr">6,570</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">5. Old Castile, comprising Burgos, Aranda, and Soria</td> -<td class="tdl fs180">{</td> -<td class="tdl">Divisions of the Imperial Guards and Cavalry</td> -<td class="tdl fs180">}</td> -<td class="tdl">Gen. Dorsenne</td> -<td class="tdr">10,303</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">6. Valladolid, &c.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">Detachments</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">Gen. Kellerman  </td> -<td class="tdr">6,474</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">7. Asturias</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">One division</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">Gen. Bonet</td> -<td class="tdr">9,898</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="3">Total for the governments</td> -<td class="tdr">143,786</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<table class="p2 autotable fs80 tabw90"> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs120" colspan="2"><em>Armies in the 1st Line.</em></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"><em>Army of the South</em>, composed of the first, fourth, and fifth corps, under the command of Soult</td> -<td class="tdrb">72,769</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"><em>Army of the Centre</em>, composed of the Royal Guards, two divisions of infantry, and two of cavalry, under the personal command of the king</td> -<td class="tdrb">24,187</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"><em>Army of Portugal</em>, composed of a reserve of cavalry and the second, sixth, and eighth corps, under the command of Massena</td> -<td class="tdrb">86,896</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">The ninth corps, commanded by general Drouet, distributed, by divisions, along the great line of communication from Vittoria to Valladolid</td> -<td class="tdrb">23,815</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">A division under general Serras, employed as a moveable column to protect the rear of the army of Portugal</td> -<td class="tdrb">10,605</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrb">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrb">218,272</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrb">———</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p>Thus the plan of invasion was determined in three -<ins class="corr" id="tn-242" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'dictinct lines'"> -distinct lines</ins>, namely, the third and seventh corps -on the left; the army of the south in the centre;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_243"></a>[243]</span> -the army of Portugal on the right. But the -interior circle was still held by the French; and -their lines of communication were crowded with -troops.</p> - - -<p><em>State of Spain.</em>—On the right, the armies of -Valencia and Catalonia, were opposed to the third -and seventh corps; but the utmost efforts of the -last could only retard, not prevent the sieges of -Taragona and Tortoza. In the centre, the Murcian -troops and those assembled at Cadiz, were only -formidable by the assistance of the British force -under general Graham. On the left, Romana, -supported by the frontier fortresses, maintained a -partizan warfare from Albuquerque to Ayamonte, -but looked to Hill for safety, and to Portugal for -refuge. In the north, the united forces of <ins class="corr" id="tn-243" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Gallicia and Asturia'"> -Gallicia and Asturias</ins>, did not exceed fifteen thousand men; -and Mahi declared his intention of retiring to -Coruña if Bonet advanced beyond the frontiers. -Indeed, the Gallicians were so backward to join -the armies, that, at a later period, Contreras was -<span class="sidenote">Memoirs -of Contreras, -published -by -himself.</span>used to send through the country moveable columns, -attended by an executioner, to oblige the villages -to furnish their quota of men. Yet, with all this -severity, and with money and arms continually -furnished by England, Gallicia never was of any -signal service to the British operations.</p> - -<p>But, as in the human body livid spots and blotches -appear as the vital strength decays, so, in Spain, -the Partidas suddenly and surprisingly increased as -the regular armies disappeared. Many persons -joined these bands, as a refuge from starvation; -others from a desire to revenge the licentious -conduct of the marauding French columns; and, -finally, the Regency, desirous of pushing the system<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_244"></a>[244]</span> -<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s -Papers, -MSS.</span>to its utmost extent, established secret Guerilla -Juntas, in each province, enjoining them, diligently -to collect stores and provisions in secure places. -District inspectors and paymasters, selected by the -nearest general officer in command of regular troops, -were also appointed, as superintendents of details -relative to the discipline and payment of the -Partidas, and particular tracts were charged with -the supplies, each according to its means. Lastly, -every province was divided into three parts, each -part, following its population, being to furnish -seven, eight, or nine squadrons of this irregular -force; and the whole, whenever circumstances required -it, to unite and act in mass.</p> - -<p>The first burst of these bands, occasioned the -French considerable loss, impeded their communications, -and created great alarm. It was a second -insurrection of the whole country. The Murcians, -in concert with the peasants of Grenada and Jaen, -waged war in the mountains of Andalusia; Franquisette -and Palarea beset the neighbourhood of -Ciudad Real, and Toledo in La Mancha. El Principe, -Saornil, and Juan Abril, descending from the -Carpentino mountains, sometimes on the side of -Segovia, sometimes on the side of Madrid, carried -off small French posts, close to the capital, and -slew the governor of Segovia, at the very gates of -that town.</p> - -<p>On the other side of Madrid, the Empecinado, -with twelve hundred cavalry and infantry, kept the -hills above Guadalaxara, and ventured sometimes -to give battle in the plain. Espoz y Mina was -formidable in Navarre. Longa and Campillo, at -the head of two thousand men, harassed Biscay -and the neighbourhood of Vittoria, and the chain of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_245"></a>[245]</span> -communication, between these great bands and the -Empecinado, was maintained by Amor, Merino, -and the Friar Sapia, the two first acting about -Burgos, and the third holding the mountains above -Soria. In the Asturias, Escaidron, continually -hanging upon the flanks and rear of Bonet, between -St. Andero and Oviedo, acted in concert -with Campillo on one side, and with Porlier on -the other, and this last chief, sometimes throwing -himself into the mountains on the borders of Gallicia, -and sometimes sailing from Coruña, constantly -troubled the Asturias by his enterprises. To curb -these bands, the French fortified all their own posts -of communication and correspondence, slew numbers -of the Guerillas, and suppressed others. Many -were robbers who, under pretence of acting against -the enemy, merely harassed their own countrymen; -and few were really formidable, though all were -vexatious. Enough, however, has been said upon -this point!</p> - -<p>But, while reduced to this irregular warfare, for -preventing the entire submission of Old Spain, the -Regency, with inconceivable folly and injustice, -were alienating the affections of their colonies, and -provoking civil war; as if the terrible struggle in -the Peninsula were not sufficient for the ruin of -their country. The independence of Spain was, -with them, of subordinate interest to the continuance -of oppression in South America. Money, -arms, and troops, were withdrawn from the Peninsula, -to subdue the so-called rebellious colonists; -nor was any reflection made on the inconsistency, -of expecting Napoleon’s innumerable hosts to be -beaten close to their own doors, by Guerilla -operations, and yet attempting, with a few divisions,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_246"></a>[246]</span> -to crush whole nations, acting in the same manner, -at three thousand miles distance. Such being the -state of French and Spanish affairs, it remains to -examine the condition of England and Portugal, as -affecting the war in the Peninsula.</p> - - -<p><em>England.</em>—The contentions of party were vehement, -and the ministers’ policy resolved itself into -three principal points: 1º. The fostering the public -inclination for the war; 2º. The furnishing money -for the expenses; and, 3º. The recruiting of the -armies. The last was provided for by an act passed -in the early part of 1809, which offered eleven -guineas bounty to men passing from the militia to -the line, and ten guineas bounty to recruits for the -militia; this was found to furnish about twenty-four -thousand men in the year; but the other -points were not so easily disposed of. The opposition, -in parliament, was powerful, eloquent, and -not very scrupulous. The desperate shifts which -formed the system of the ministers, were, indeed, -justly attacked, but when particulars, touching the -contest in Portugal, were discussed, faction was -apparent. The accuracy of Beresford’s report of -the numbers and efficiency of the native forces, was -most unjustly questioned, and the notion of successful -resistance, assailed by arguments and by -ridicule, until gloom and doubt were widely spread -in England, and disaffection wonderfully encouraged -in Portugal; nor was the mischief thus caused, one -of the smallest difficulties encountered by the -English general.</p> - -<p>On the other side, the ministers, trusting to their -majorities in parliament, reasoned feebly and ignorantly, -yet wilfully, and like men expecting that -fortune would befriend them, they knew not why or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_247"></a>[247]</span> -wherefore, and they dealt also more largely than -their adversaries <ins class="corr" id="tn-247" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'in misrepresentions'"> -in misrepresentations</ins> to mislead the -public mind. Every treasury newspaper teemed -with accounts of battles which were never fought, -plans which were never arranged, places taken -which were never attacked, and victories gained -where no armies were. The plains of the Peninsula -could scarcely contain the innumerable forces of -the Spaniards and Portuguese; cowardice, weakness, -treachery, and violence were the only attributes -of the enemy; if a battle was expected, his -numbers were contemptible; if a victory was gained, -his host was countless. Members of parliament -related stories of the enemy which had no foundation -in truth, and nothing, that consummate art of -intrigue could bring to aid party spirit, and to stifle -reason, was neglected.</p> - -<p>But the great and permanent difficulty was to -raise money. The country, inundated with bank-notes, -was destitute of gold; Napoleon’s continental -system burthened commerce, the exchanges were -continually rising against England, and all the evils -which sooner or later are the inevitable result of a -fictitious currency, were too perceptible to be longer -disregarded in parliament. A committee appointed -to investigate the matter, made early in the following -session, a report in which the evils of the existing -system, and the causes of the depreciation were -elaborately treated, and the necessity of returning -to cash payments enforced: but the authors did not -perceive, or at least did not touch upon the injustice, -and the ruin, attending a full payment in coin of -sterling value, of debts contracted in a depreciated -paper currency. The celebrated writer, William -<span class="sidenote">Paper -against -Gold.</span>Cobbett, did not fail, however, to point out this very<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_248"></a>[248]</span> -clearly, and subsequent experience has confirmed his -views. The government endeavoured to stave off -the discussion of the bullion question, but lord -King, by demanding gold from those of his tenants -whose leases were drawn before the depreciation of -bank-notes, proved the hollowness of the system, -and drove the ministers to the alternative, of abandoning -the prosecution of the war, or of denying the -facts adduced in the bullion report. They adopted -the latter; and at the instance of Vansittart, the chancellor -of the exchequer, the house voted in substance, -that a pound-note and a shilling, were equal -in value to a golden guinea of full weight, at the -moment when light guineas were openly selling at -twenty-eight shillings. This vote, although well -calculated to convince the minister’s opponents, -that no proposition could be too base, or absurd, -to meet with support in the existing parliament, -did not, however, remove the difficulties of raising -money, and no resource remained, but that of the -desperate spendthrift, who never intending to pay, -cares not on what terms he supplies his present -necessities. The peculiar circumstances of the war, -had, however, given England a monopoly of the -world’s commerce by sea, and the ministers affirming, -that, the country, was in a state of unexampled -prosperity, began a career of expense, the like of -which no age or nation had ever seen; yet without -one sound or reasonable ground for expecting ultimate -success, save the genius of their general, -which they but half appreciated, and which the first -bullet might have extinguished for ever.</p> - - -<p><em>State of Portugal.</em>—In this country, three parties -were apparent. That of the <em>people</em> ready to peril -body and goods for independence. That of the <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">fidalgos</i>,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_249"></a>[249]</span> -who thought to profit from the nation’s energy -without any diminution of ancient abuses. That of -the <em>disaffected</em>, who <ins class="err" id="err-249" title="Erratum: was 'denied'"> -desired</ins> the success of the French; -some as thinking that an ameliorated government -must follow, some from mere baseness of nature. This -party, looked to have Alorna, Pamplona, and Gomez -Freire, as chiefs if the enemy triumphed; for those -noblemen, in common with many others, had entered -the French service in Junot’s time, under the -authority of the prince regent’s edict to that effect. -Freire more honourable than his companions, refused -to bear arms against his country, but the -two others had no scruples, and Pamplona even -sketched a plan of invasion, which is at this day in -the military archives at Paris.</p> - -<p>The great body of the people, despising both -their civil governors and military chiefs, relied on -the British general and army; but the fidalgos, or -cast of nobles, working in unison with, and supported -by the regency, were a powerful body, and -their political proceedings after the departure of -sir John Cradock, demand notice. The patriarch, -formerly bishop of Oporto, the Monteiro Mor, and -the marquess of Das Minas, composed the regency, -and they and every other member of the government -were jealous of each other, exceedingly afraid of -their superiors in the Brazils, and, with the exception -of the secretary, Miguel Forjas, unanimous in -support of abuses; and as the military organization -carried on by Beresford, was only a restoration of -the ancient institutions of the country, it was necessarily -hateful to the regency, and to the fidalgos, -who profited by its degeneracy. This, together -with the unavoidable difficulties in finance, and -other matters, retarded the progress of the regular<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_250"></a>[250]</span> -army towards efficiency during 1809, and rendered -the efforts to organize the militia, and ordenança, -nearly nugatory. Nevertheless, the energy of lord -Wellington and of Beresford, and the comparatively -zealous proceedings of Forjas, proved so disagreeable -to Das Minas, who was in bad health, that he -resigned, and immediately became a centre, round -which all discontented persons, and they were -neither few, nor inactive, gathered. The times, -obliged the government, to permit an unusual freedom -of discussion in Lisbon; it naturally followed -that the opinions of designing persons were most -obtruded, and those opinions being repeated in the -British parliament, were printed in the English newspapers, -and re-echoed in Lisbon. Thus a picture of -affairs was painted in the most glaring colours of -misrepresentation, at the moment when the safety -of the country depended upon the devoted submission -of the people.</p> - -<p>After Das Minas’ resignation, four new members -were added to the regency, namely, Antonio, -commonly called, Principal Souza, the Conde de -Redondo, the marquis de Olhao, and doctor Noguiera. -The two last were men of some discretion, -but the first, daring, restless, irritable, indefatigable, -and a consummate intriguer, created the utmost -disorder, seeking constantly to thwart the proceedings -of the British generals. He was strenuously -assisted by the patriarch, whose violence and ambition -were no way diminished, and whose influence -amongst the people was still very considerable.</p> - -<p>An exceedingly powerful cabal, was thus formed, -whose object was to obtain the supreme direction, -not only of the civil, but military affairs, and to -control both Wellington and Beresford. The Conde<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_251"></a>[251]</span> -Linhares, head of the Souza family, was prime -minister in the Brazils; the Principal was in the -regency at Lisbon; the chevalier Souza was envoy -at the British court, and a fourth of the family, don -Pedro de Souza, was in a like situation near the -Spanish regency; so that playing into each others -hands, and guided by the subtle Principal, they -were enabled to concoct very dangerous intrigues; -and their proceedings, as might be expected, were -at first supported with a high hand by the cabinet -of Rio Janeiro. Lord Wellesley’s energetic interference -reduced the latter, indeed, to a reasonable -disposition, yet the cabal secretly continued their -machinations, and what they durst not attempt by -force, they sought to attain by artifice.</p> - -<p>In the latter end of the year 1809, Mr. Villiers -was replaced as envoy, by Mr. Charles Stuart, and -this gentleman, well experienced in the affairs of -the Peninsula, and disdaining the petty jealousies -which had hitherto marked the intercourse -of the principal political agents with the generals, -immediately applied his masculine understanding, -and resolute temper, to forward the views -of lord Wellington. It is undoubted, that the -dangerous political crisis which followed his arrival, -could not have been sustained, if a diplomatist less -firm, less able, or less willing to support the plans -of the commander had been employed.</p> - -<p>To resist the French was the desire of two of the -three parties in Portugal, but with the fidalgos, it -was a question of interest more than of patriotism. -Yet less sagacious than the clergy, the great body -of which perceiving at once that they must stand or -fall with the English army heartily aided the cause, -the fidalgos clung rather to the regency. Now the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_252"></a>[252]</span> -caballers in that body, who were the same people -that had opposed sir Hew Dalrymple, hoped not only -to beat the enemy, but to establish the supremacy -of the northern provinces (of which they themselves -were the lords) in the administration of the country, -and would therefore consent to no operations militating -against this design.</p> - -<p>Another spring of political action, was the hatred -and jealousy of Spain common to the whole Portuguese -nation. It created difficulties during the -military operations, but it had a visibly advantageous -effect upon the people, in their intercourse with -the British. For when the Spaniards shewed a -distrust of their allies, the Portuguese were more -minded to rely implicitly on the latter, to prove -that they had no feeling in common with their -neighbours.</p> - -<p>Yet, notwithstanding this mutual dislike, the -princess Carlotta, wife to the Prince Regent, and -sister to Ferdinand, claimed, not only the succession -to the throne of Spain in the event of her -brother’s death or perpetual captivity, but the immediate -government of the whole Peninsula as -hereditary Regent; and to persuade the tribunals -to acknowledge her claims, was the object of -Pedro Souza’s mission to Cadiz. The council of -Castile, always ready to overthrow the Spanish -Regency, readily recognized Carlotta’s pretensions -in virtue of the decision of the secret Cortes of -1789 which abolished the Salique law of Philip -the Fifth: but the regents would pay no attention to -them, yet Souza renewing his intrigues when the -Cortes assembled, by corruption obtained an acknowledgement -of the princess’s claim. His -further progress was, however, promptly arrested<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_253"></a>[253]</span> -by lord Wellington, who foresaw that his success -would not only affect the military operations in -Portugal, by placing them under the control of the -Spanish government, but the policy of England -afterwards, if power over the whole Peninsula was -suffered thus to centre in one family. Moreover, -he judged it a scheme, concocted at Rio Janeiro, -to embarrass himself and Beresford; for it was at -first kept secret from the British Cabinet, and it -was proposed that the princess should reside at -Madeira, where, surrounded by the contrivers of -this plan, she could only have acted under their -directions. Thus it is plain that arrogance, deceit, -and personal intrigues, were common to the Portuguese -and Spanish governments; and why they -did not produce the same fatal effects in the one -as in the other country, will be shewn in the succeeding -chapters.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_254"></a>[254]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXI_III">CHAPTER III.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>When lord Wellington required thirty thousand -British troops to defend Portugal, he considered -the number that could be fed, rather than what was -necessary to fight the enemy; and hence it was, -that he declared success would depend upon the -exertions and devotion of the native forces. Yet -knowing, from his experience in Spain, how passions, -prejudices, and abuses would meet him at -every turn, he would trust neither the simple enthusiasm -of the people, nor the free promises of -their governors, but insisted that his own authority -as <em>marshal-general of Portugal</em> should be independent -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_V">No. V.</a> -Section 9.</span>of the local government, and absolute over all -arrangements concerning the English and Portuguese -forces, whether regulars, militia, or -“ordenanças;” for his designs were vast, and such -as could only be effected by extraordinary means.</p> - -<p>Armed with this power, and with the influence -derived from the money supplied by England, he -first called upon the Regency, to revive and enforce -the ancient military laws of the realm, by which -all men were to be enrolled, and bear arms. -That effected, he demanded that the people should -be warned and commanded to destroy their mills, -to remove their boats, break down their bridges, -lay waste their fields, abandon their dwellings, -and carry off their property, on whatever line the -invaders should penetrate: and that this might be -deliberately and effectually performed, he designed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_255"></a>[255]</span> -at the head of all the allied regular forces, to front -the enemy, in such sort, that, without bringing on -a decisive battle, the latter should yet be obliged -to keep constantly in a mass, while the whole population, -converted into soldiers, and closing on -the rear and flanks, should cut off all resources, -save those carried in the midst of the troops.</p> - -<p>But it was evident, that if the French could find, -or carry, supplies, sufficient to maintain themselves -until the British commander, forced back upon the -sea, should embark or giving battle be defeated, -the whole of this system must necessarily fall to -pieces, and the miserable ruined people submit -without further struggle. To avoid such a calamitous -termination, it was necessary to find a position, -covering Lisbon, where the allied forces could -neither be turned by the flanks, nor forced in front -by numbers, nor reduced by famine, and from -which a free communication could be kept up with -the irregular troops closing round the enemy. -The mountains filling the tongue of land upon -which Lisbon is situated, furnished this key-stone -to the arch of defence. Accurate plans of all the -positions, had been made under the directions of -sir Charles Stuart in 1799, and, together with the -French colonel Vincent’s minutes, shewing how -they covered Lisbon, were in lord Wellington’s -possession; and from those documents the original -notion of the celebrated lines of Torres Vedras are -said to have been derived; but the above-named -officers only contemplated such a defence as might -be made by an army in movement, before an equal -or a greater force. It was lord Wellington, who first -conceived the design, of turning those vast mountains -into one stupendous and impregnable citadel,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_256"></a>[256]</span> -wherein to deposit the independence of the whole -Peninsula.</p> - -<p>Hereafter the lines shall be described more minutely; -at present it must suffice to observe, that -intrenchments, inundations, and redoubts secured -more than five hundred square miles of mountainous -country lying between the Tagus and the -ocean. Nor was this the most gigantic part of the -English general’s undertaking. He was a foreigner, -ill supported by his own government, and holding -power under that of Portugal by a precarious -tenure; he was vehemently opposed by the local -authorities, by the ministers, and by the nobility -of that country; and yet, in this apparently weak -position, he undertook at one and the same time, to -overcome the abuses engendered by centuries of -misgovernment, and to oblige a whole people, sunk -in sloth, to arise in arms, to devastate their own -lands, and to follow him to battle against the most -formidable power of modern times.</p> - -<p>Notwithstanding the secret opposition of the -Regency, and of the <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">fidalgos</i>, the ancient military -laws were revived, and so effectually, that the returns -for the month of May gave a gross number -of more than four hundred and thirty thousand -men in arms, of which about fifty thousand were -regular troops, fifty-five thousand militia, and the -remainder “ordenanças;” but this multitude was -necessarily subject to many deductions. The -“<i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">capitans mor</i>,” or chiefs of districts, were at first -exceedingly remiss in their duty, the total number -of “ordenanças” really assembled, fell far short of -the returns, and all were ill-armed. This also was -the case with the militia, only thirty-two thousand -of which had muskets and bayonets: and deserters<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_257"></a>[257]</span> -were so numerous, and the native authorities connived -at absence under false pretences, to such an -extent, that scarcely twenty-six thousand men ever -remained with their colours. Of the regular troops -the whole were in good condition, and thirty thousand -being in the pay of England, were completely -equipped, clothed, disciplined, and for the most -part commanded by British officers; but, deduction -being made for sick men and recruits, the -actual number under arms did not exceed twenty-four -thousand infantry, three thousand five hundred -cavalry, and three thousand artillery. Thus -the disposable native force was about fifty-six thousand -men, one-half of which were militia.</p> - -<p>At this period, the British troops employed in -the Peninsula, exclusive of the garrison of Gibraltar, -somewhat exceeded thirty-eight thousand -men of all arms, but six thousand were in hospital -or detached, and above seven thousand were in -Cadiz. The latter city was protected by an allied -force of nearly thirty thousand men, while the -army, on whose exertions the fate of the Peninsula -rested, was reduced to twenty-five thousand British; -such was the policy of the English Cabinet; -for this was the ministers’ and not the general’s -arrangement. The ordenanças being set aside, the -actual force at the disposition of lord Wellington, -cannot be estimated higher than eighty thousand -men, and the frontier to defend, reckoning from -Braganza to Ayamonte, four hundred miles long. -The great military features, and the arrangements -made to take advantage of them in conformity -with the general plan of defence, shall now be described.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_258"></a>[258]</span></p> - -<p>The Portuguese land frontier presents four great -divisions open to invasion:—</p> - -<p>1º. The northern line of the Entre Minho and -the Tras os Montes, extending from the mouth of -the Minho, to Miranda on the Douro.</p> - -<p>2º. The eastern line of the Tras os Montes -following the course of the Douro from Miranda to -Castel Rodrigo.</p> - -<p>3º. The frontier of Beira from Castel Rodrigo -to Rosaminhal on the Tagus.</p> - -<p>4º. The Alemtejo and the Algarve frontiers, -stretching, in one line from the Tagus to the -mouth of the Guadiana.</p> - -<p>But these divisions may be simplified with respect -to the military aspect of the country; for -Lisbon taken as the centre, and the distance from -thence to Oporto as the radius, a sweep of the -compass to Rosaminhal will trace the frontier of -Beira; and the space lying between this arc, the -Tagus, and the sea-coast, furnished the main body -of the defence. The southern and northern provinces -being considered as the wings, were rendered -subservient to the defence of the whole, -but had each a separate system for itself, based on -the one general principle, that the country should -be wasted, and the best troops opposed to the enemy -without risking a decisive action, while the irregular -forces closed round the flanks and rear of the -invaders.</p> - -<p>The northern and southern provinces have been -already described, Beira remains to be noticed. -Separated by the Douro from the Entre Minho -and Tras os Montes, it cannot well be invaded -on that line, except one or both of those provinces<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_259"></a>[259]</span> -be first subdued; but from Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminhal, -that is from the Douro to the Tagus, the -frontier touches upon Spain, and perhaps the -clearest method to describe the conformation of -the country will be to enter the camp of the -enemy.</p> - -<p>An invading army then, would assemble at Ciudad -Rodrigo, or at Coria, or at both those places. -In the latter case, the communications could be -maintained, directly over the Gata mountains by the -pass of Perales, or circuitously, by Placentia and -the pass of Baños, and the distance being by Perales -not more than two marches, the corps could -either advance simultaneously, or unite and force -their way at one point only. In this situation, the -frontier of Beira between the Douro and the -Tagus, would offer them an opening of ninety miles -against which to operate. But in the centre, the -Sierra de Estrella, lifting its snowy peaks to the -clouds and stretching out its gigantic arms, would -seem to grasp and claim the whole space; the summit -is impassable, and streaming down on either -hand, numerous rivers cleaving deeply, amidst -ravines and bristled ridges, continually oppose the -progress of an army. Nevertheless, the invaders -could penetrate to the right and left of this mountain -in the following directions:—</p> - -<p><em>From Ciudad Rodrigo.</em>—1º. By the valley of the -Douro.—2º. By the valley of the Mondego.—3º. -By the valley of the Zezere.</p> - -<p><em>From Coria.</em>—1º. By Castello Branco and the -valley of the Tagus; and, 2º. By the mountains of -Sobreira Formosa.</p> - -<p>To advance by the valley of the Douro, would -be a flank movement through an extremely difficult<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_260"></a>[260]</span> -country, and would belong rather to an invasion -of the northern provinces than of Beira, because -a fresh base must be established at Lamego or -Oporto, before the movement could be prosecuted -against Lisbon.</p> - -<p>To gain the valley of the Mondego there are -three routes. The first passing by Almeida and -Celerico, the second by Trancoso and Viseu, the -third by Alfayates and Guarda over the high -ridges of the Estrella. To gain the valley of the -Zezere, the march is by Alfayates, Sabugal, and -Belmonte, and whether to the Zezere or the Mondego, -these routes, although rugged, are practicable -for artillery; but between Guarda and Belmonte -some high table-land offers a position where -an army could seal the passage on either side of -the mountain, except by the Trancoso road. In -fact, the position of Guarda may be called the -breast-plate of the Estrella.</p> - -<p>On the side of Coria, an invading army must first -force or turn the passages of the Elga and Ponçul -rivers, to reach Castello Branco, and that done, -proceed to Abrantes by the valley of the Tagus -or over the savage mountain of Sobreira Formosa. -But the latter is impracticable for heavy artillery, -even in summer, the ways broken and tormented -by the deep channels of the winter torrents, -the country desert, and the positions if defended, -nearly impregnable. Nor is the valley of the -Tagus to be followed, save by light corps, for the -villages are few, the ridges not less steep than -those of Sobreira, and the road quite impracticable -for artillery of any calibre.</p> - -<p>Such, and so difficult, being the lines of invasion -through Beira, it would seem that a superior<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_261"></a>[261]</span> -enemy might be met with advantage on the -threshold of the kingdom; but it is not so. For, -first, the defending army must occupy all the positions -on this line of ninety miles, while the enemy, -posted at Ciudad Rodrigo and Coria, could, in -two marches, unite and attack on the centre, or at -either extremity, with an overwhelming force. -Secondly, the weakness of the Beira frontier consists -in this, <em>the Tagus along its whole course is, from -June to December, fordable as low down as Salvatierra, -close under the lines</em>. A march through the -Alemtejo and the passage of the river at any place -below Abrantes would, therefore, render all the -frontier positions useless; and although there were -no enemy on the borders of the Alemtejo itself, -the march from Ciudad Rodrigo by Perales, Coria, -and Alcantara, and thence by the southern bank -to the lowest ford in the river, would be little -longer than the route by the valley of the Mondego -or that of the Zezere. For these reasons -<em>the frontier of Portugal must be always yielded to -superior numbers</em>.</p> - -<p>Both the conformation of the country, and the -actual situation of the French corps, led lord -Wellington to expect, that the principal attacks -would be by the north of Beira and by the Alemtejo, -while an intermediate connecting corps would -move by Castello Branco upon Abrantes, and, -under this impression, he made the following dispositions. -Elvas, Almeida, and Valença, in the -first, and Peniché, Abrantes, and Setuval, in the -second line of fortresses, were garrisoned with -native troops, part regulars, part militia.</p> - -<p>General Baccellar, <ins class="corr" id="tn-261" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'having Silviera and'"> -having Silveira and</ins> the British colonels, Trant, Miller, and J. Wilson,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_262"></a>[262]</span> -under his orders, occupied the provinces beyond -the Douro, with twenty-one regiments of militia, -including the garrison of Valença, on the Minho.</p> - -<p>The country between Penamacor and the Tagus, -that is to say, the lines of the Elga and the -Ponçul, was guarded by ten regiments of militia, -a regiment of native cavalry, and the Lusitanian -legion. In the Alemtejo, including the garrisons, -four regiments of militia were stationed, and three -regiments held the fortresses of the Algarves. -There remained in reserve, twelve regiments of the -fifty composing the whole militia force, and these -were distributed in Estremadura on both sides of -the Tagus, but principally about Setuval. The regular -Portuguese troops, deducting those in garrison -at Almeida Elvas and Cadiz, were at -Thomar and Abrantes.</p> - -<p>But the British, organized in five divisions of -infantry and one of cavalry, were distributed as -follows:—</p> - -<table class="p2 autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdr fs80">Men.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">1st Division</td> -<td class="tdl">General Spencer,</td> -<td class="tdc">about</td> -<td class="tdr">6000</td> -<td class="tdl">Viseu.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">2d Division, including<br />the 13th Dragoons</td> -<td class="tdl">General Hill,</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdr">5000</td> -<td class="tdl">Abrantes.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">3d Division</td> -<td class="tdl">General Picton,</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdr">3000</td> -<td class="tdl">Celerico.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">4th Division</td> -<td class="tdl">General Cole,</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdr">4000</td> -<td class="tdl">Guarda.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Light Division</td> -<td class="tdl">Robert Crawfurd,</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdr">2400</td> -<td class="tdl">Pinhel.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">The Cavalry</td> -<td class="tdl">General Cotton,</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdr">3000</td> -<td class="tdl">Valley of Mondego.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Total</td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdr">23,400</td> -<td class="tdl">under arms.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p>Thus the wings of the defence were composed -solely of militia and ordenança, and the whole of -the regular force was in the centre. The Portuguese -at Thomar, and the four British divisions of -infantry posted at Viseu, Guarda, Pinhel, and -Celerico, formed a body of thirty-eight thousand men,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_263"></a>[263]</span> -the greater part of which could, in two marches, -be united either at Guarda or between that position -and the Douro. On the other side Beresford -and Hill could, in as short a period, unite by the -boat-bridge of Abrantes, and thus thirty-two thousand -men would be concentrated on that line. If -the enemy should attempt the passage of the Elga -either direct from Coria, or by a flank movement -of the second corps from Estremadura, across the -Tagus, Beresford could succour the militia by -moving over the Sobreira Formosa to Castello -Branco, while Hill could reach that place much -quicker than general Reynier, in consequence of an -arrangement which merits particular attention.</p> - -<p>It has been already said that the march from -Abrantes to Castello Branco is over difficult mountains; -to have repaired the roads between these -places would have been more useful to the enemy -than to the allies, as facilitating a passage for -superior numbers to penetrate by the shortest line -to Lisbon. But lord Wellington, after throwing -boat-bridges over the Tagus and the Zezere, and -fortifying Abrantes, established between the latter -and Castello Branco a line of communication by -the left bank of the Tagus, through Niza, to the -pass of Vilha Velha, where, by a flying bridge, the -river was recrossed, and from thence a good -road led to Castello Branco. Now the pass of -Vilha Velha is prodigiously strong for defence, and -the distance from Abrantes to Castello Branco -being nearly the same by Niza as by the other -bank of the river, the march of troops was yet -much accelerated, for the road near Vilha Velha -being reconstructed by the engineers, was excellent.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_264"></a>[264]</span></p> - -<p>Thus all the obstacles to an enemy’s march by -the north bank were preserved, and the line by -Vilha Velha, enabled not only Hill to pass from -Portalegre, or Abrantes, to Castello Branco by a -flank movement in less time than Reynier, but it -also provided a lateral communication for the whole -army, which we shall hereafter find of vital importance -in the combinations of the English general, -supplying the loss of the road by Alcantara -and the pass of Perales, which otherwise would -have been adopted.</p> - -<p>The French, also, in default of a direct line of -communication between Estremadura and the -Ciudad Rodrigo country, were finally forced to -adopt the circuitous road of Almaraz and the pass -of Baños, and it was in allusion to this inconvenience -that I said both parties sighed over the -ruins of Alcantara.</p> - -<p>But, notwithstanding this facility of movement -and of concentration, the allies could not deliver -a decisive battle near the frontier, because the -enemy could unite an overwhelming force in the -Alemtejo, before the troops from the north could -reach that province, and a battle lost there, would, -in the dry season, decide the fate of Lisbon. To -have concentrated the whole army in the south, -would have been to resign half the kingdom and -all its resources to the enemy; but to save those -resources for himself, or to destroy them, was the -very basis of lord Wellington’s defence, and all -his dispositions were made to oblige <em>the French -to move in masses</em>, and to <em>gain time himself</em>, time -to secure the harvests, time to complete his lines, -time to perfect the discipline of the native troops, -and to give full effect to the arming and organization<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_265"></a>[265]</span> -of the ordenança, and, above all things, -time to consolidate that moral ascendancy over the -public mind which he was daily acquiring. A -closer examination of his combinations will shew, -that they were well adapted to effect these objects.</p> - -<p>1º. The enemy durst not advance, except with -<em>concentrated masses</em>, because, on the weakest line of -resistance, he was sure to encounter above twenty -thousand men.</p> - -<p>2º. If, choosing the Alemtejo, he suddenly dispersed -Romana’s troops and even forced back Hill’s, -the latter passing the Tagus at Abrantes, and -uniting with Beresford, could dispute the passage -of the Tagus until the arrival of the army from the -north; and no regular and sustained attempt could -be made on that side without first besieging Badajos -or Elvas to form a place of arms.</p> - -<p>3º. A principal attack on the central line could -not be made without sufficient notice being given -by the collection of magazines at Coria, and by the -passage of the Elga and Ponçul, Beresford and -Hill could then occupy the Sobreira Formosa. -But an invasion on this line, save by a light corps -in connexion with other attacks, was not to be -expected; for, although the enemy should force -the Sobreira and reach Abrantes, he could not besiege -the latter, in default of heavy artillery. The -Zezere, a large and exceedingly rapid river, with -rugged banks, would be in his front, the Tagus on -his left, the mountains of Sobreira in his rear, and -the troops from Guarda and the valley of the Mondego -would have time to fall back.</p> - -<p>4º. An attack on Guarda could always be resisted -long enough to gain time for the orderly -retreat of the troops near Almeida, to the valley of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_266"></a>[266]</span> -the Mondego, and moreover the road from Belmonte -towards Thomar by the valley of the Zezere -was purposely broken and obstructed.</p> - -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_266fp" style="max-width: 35em;"> - <p class="right fs70"><em>Vol. 3, Plate 5.</em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_266fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_266fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> -Defence of <em>Portugal</em><br /> -1810.<br /> - -<p><em>Published by T. & W. Boone 1830.</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>The space between Guarda and the Douro, an -opening of about thirty miles leading into the -valley of the Mondego, remains to be examined. -Across this line of invasion, the Agueda, the Coa, -and the Pinel, run, in almost parallel directions -from the Sierra de Francia and Sierra de Estrella, -into the Douro, all having this peculiarity, that as -they approach the Douro their channels invariably -deepen into profound and gloomy chasms, and -there are few bridges. But the principal obstacles -were the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, -both of which it was necessary to take before an -invading army could establish a solid base of invasion. -After this the lines of the Douro and of -the Mondego would be open; if the French adopted -the second, they could reach it by Guarda, by -Alverca, and by Trancoso, concentrating at Celerico, -when they would have to choose between -the right and the left bank. If the latter, they -must march between the Mondego and the Estrella -mountains, until they reached the Alva, a river -falling at right angles into the Mondego, and behind -which they would find the allied army in a -position of surprising strength. If, to avoid that, -they marched by the right of the Mondego upon -Coimbra, there were other obstacles to be hereafter -noticed; but, in either case, the allied forces, -having <em>interior lines of communication</em>, could, as -long as the Belmonte road was sealed, concentrate -in time behind the Alva, or in front of Coimbra. -Hence it was on the side of the Alemtejo that -danger was most to be apprehended; and it behoved -general Hill to watch vigilantly and act<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_267"></a>[267]</span> -decisively in opposition to general Reynier; for -the latter having necessarily the lead in the movements, -might, by skilful evolutions and rapid -marches, either join the sixth and eighth corps -before Hill was aware of his design, and thus overwhelm -the allied divisions on the Mondego, or -drawing Hill across the Tagus, furnish an opportunity -for a corps from Andalusia to penetrate by -the southern bank of that river.</p> - -<p>In these dispositions the English general had -regard only to the enemy’s actual situation, and -expecting the invasion in summer; but in the -winter season the rivers and torrents being full, -and the roads deteriorated, the defence would be -different; fewer troops would then suffice to guard -the Tagus, and the Zezere, the Sobreira Formosa -would be nearly impassable, a greater number of -the allied troops, could be collected about Guarda, -and a more stubborn resistance made on the northern -line.</p> - -<p>Every probable movement being thus previously -well considered, lord Wellington trusted that his -own military quickness, and the valour of the -British soldiers, could baffle any unforeseen strokes -during the retreat, and once within the Lines, -(the Portuguese people and the government doing -their part) he looked confidently to the final result. -He judged that, in a wasted country, and with -thirty regiments of militia, in the mountains on the -flank and rear of the enemy, the latter could not -long remain before the Lines, and his retreat would -be equivalent to a victory for the allies. There -were however many hazards. The English commander, -sanguine and confident as he was, knew<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_268"></a>[268]</span> -well how many counter-combinations were to be -expected; in fine, how much fortune was to be -dreaded in a contest with eighty thousand French -veterans having a competent general at their head. -Hence, to secure embarkation in the event of disaster, -a third line of entrenchments was prepared, -and twenty-four thousand tons of shipping were -constantly kept in the river to receive the British -<span class="sidenote">Lord Wellington’s -Correspondence. -MSS.</span>forces; measures were also taken to procure a -like quantity for the reception of the Portuguese -troops, and such of the citizens as might wish to -emigrate. It only remained to feed the army.</p> - -<p>In the Peninsula generally, the supplies were -at all times a source of infinite trouble on both -sides, and this, not as some have supposed, because -Spain is incapable of supplying large armies; -there was throughout the war an abundance of -food in that country but it was unevenly distributed; -some places were exhausted, others -overflowing, the difficulty was to transport provisions, -and in this the allies enjoyed a great advantage; -their convoys could pass unmolested, -whereas the French always required strong guards -first to collect food and then to bring it up to their -armies. In Portugal there was however a real -deficiency, even for the consumption of the people, -and after a time scarcely any food for man or -beast, (some cattle and straw from the northern -provinces excepted,) was to be obtained in that -country: nay, the whole nation was at last in a -manner fed by England. Every part of the world -accessible to ships and money was rendered subservient -to the cravings of this insatiable war, and -even thus, it was often a doubtful and a painful -struggle against famine, while near the sea, but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_269"></a>[269]</span> -at a distance from that nurse of British armies, the -means of transport necessarily regulated the extent -of the supply. Now wheel-carriage was scarce and -bad in Portugal, and for the most part the roads -forbade its use; hence the only resource, for the -conveyance of stores, was water-carriage, to a -certain distance, and afterwards beasts of burthen.</p> - -<p>Lisbon, Abrantes, and Belem Castle, on the Tagus; -Figueras and Raiva de Pena Cova, on the Mondego; -and, finally, Oporto and Lamego, on the Douro, -were the principal depôts formed by lord Wellington, -and his magazines of consumption were -established at Viseu, Celerico, Condeixa, Leiria, -Thomar, and Almeida. From those points four -hundred miserable bullock-cars and about twelve -thousand hired mules, organized in brigades of -sixty each, conveyed the necessary warlike stores -and provisions to the armies; when additional -succours could be obtained, it was eagerly seized, -but this was the ordinary amount of transport.</p> - -<p>With such means and with such preparations was -the defence of Portugal undertaken, and it must -be evident to the most superficial observer, that, -amidst so many difficulties, and with such a number -of intricate combinations, lord Wellington’s situation -was not one in which a general could sleep, and -that, due allowance being made for fortune, it is -puerile to attribute the success to aught but his -talents and steel-hardened resolution.</p> - -<p>In the foregoing exposition of the political and -military force of the powers brought into hostile -contact, I have only touched, and lightly, upon -the points of most importance, designing no more -than to indicate the sound and the diseased parts -of each. The unfavourable circumstances for France<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_270"></a>[270]</span> -would appear to be the absence of the emperor,—the -erroneous views of the king,—the rivalry of the -marshals,—the impediments to correspondence,—the -necessity of frequently dispersing from the want -of magazines,—the iniquity of the cause, and the -disgust of the French officers, who, for the most -part, spoiled by a rapid course of victories on the -continent, could not patiently endure a service replete -with personal dangers, over and above the -ordinary mishaps of war, yet promising little ultimate -reward.</p> - -<p>For the English, the quicksands were—the -memory of former failures on the continent,—the -financial drain,—a powerful and eloquent opposition -pressing a cabinet so timid and selfish that the -general dared not risk a single brigade, lest an -accident should lead to a panic amongst the ministers -which all lord Wellesley’s vigour would be -unable to stem,—the intrigues of the Souza party,—and -the necessity of persuading the Portuguese to -devastate their country for the sake of defending a -<em>European cause</em>. Finally, the babbling of the English -newspapers, from whose columns the enemy -constantly drew the most certain information of the -strength and situation of the army.</p> - -<p>On the other side, France had possession of -nearly all the fortified towns of the Peninsula, and, -while her enormous army threatened to crush every -opponent, she offered a constitution, and recalled to -the recollection of the people that it was but a -change of one French dynasty for another. The -church started from her touch, but the educated -classes did not shrink less from the British government’s -known hostility to all free institutions. What, -then, remained for England to calculate upon? The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_271"></a>[271]</span> -extreme hatred of the people to the invaders, arising -from the excesses and oppressions of the armies,—the -chances of another continental war,—the complete -dominion of the ocean with all its attendant -advantages,—the recruiting through the militia, -which was, in fact, a conscription with two links in -the chain instead of one; and, not least, the ardour -of the troops to measure themselves with the conquerors -of Europe, and to raise a rival to the -French emperor. And here, as general Foy has -been at some pains to misrepresent the character of -the British soldiers, I will set down what many -years’ experience gives me the right to say is nearer -the truth than his dreams.</p> - -<p>That the British infantry soldier is more robust -than the soldier of any other nation, can scarcely be -doubted by those who, in 1815, observed his powerful -frame, distinguished amidst the united armies -of Europe, and, notwithstanding his habitual excess -in drinking, he sustains fatigue, and wet, and the -extremes of cold and heat with incredible vigour. -When completely disciplined, and three years are -required to accomplish this, his port is lofty, and -his movements free; the whole world cannot produce -a nobler specimen of military bearing, nor is the -mind unworthy of the outward man. He does not, -indeed, possess that presumptuous vivacity which -would lead him to dictate to his commanders, or -even to censure real errors, although he may perceive -them; but he is observant, and quick to comprehend -his orders, full of resources under difficulties, -calm and resolute in danger, and more than -usually obedient and careful of his officers in moments -of imminent peril.</p> - -<p>It has been asserted that his undeniable firmness<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_272"></a>[272]</span> -in battle, is the result of a phlegmatic constitution -uninspired by moral feeling. Never was a more -stupid calumny uttered! Napoleon’s troops fought -in bright fields, where every helmet caught some -beams of glory, but the British soldier conquered -under the cold shade of aristocracy; no honours -awaited his daring, no despatch gave his name to -the applauses of his countrymen, his life of danger -and hardship was uncheered by hope, his death -unnoticed. Did his heart sink therefore! Did he -not endure with surpassing fortitude the sorest of -ills, sustain the most terrible assaults in battle -unmoved, and, with incredible energy overthrow -every opponent, at all times proving that, while -no physical military qualification was wanting, -the fount of honour was also full and fresh -within him!</p> - -<p>The result of a hundred battles and the united -testimony of impartial writers of different nations -have given the first place, amongst the European -infantry, to the British; but, in a comparison -between the troops of France and England, it -would be unjust not to admit that the cavalry -of the former stands higher in the estimation of -the world.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_273"></a>[273]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXI_IV">CHAPTER IV.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>In resuming the thread of military events, it is -necessary to refer back to the commencement of the -year, because the British operations on the frontier -of Beira were connected, although not conducted, -in actual concert with those of the Spaniards; and -here I deem it right to notice the conduct of Miguel -Alava, that brave, generous, and disinterested Spaniard, -through whom this connexion was kept up. -Attached to the British head-quarters, as the military -correspondent of the Junta, he was too sagacious -not to perceive the necessity of zealously -seconding the English general; yet, in the manner -of doing it, he never forgot the dignity of his own -country, and, as he was too frank and honest for -intrigues, his intercourse was always honourable to -himself and advantageous to both nations.</p> - -<p>It will be remembered that, in February, Ney -threatened Ciudad Rodrigo at the same time that -Mortier menaced Badajos and that Hill advanced -from Abrantes to Portalegre; lord Wellington immediately -reinforced the line between Pinhel and -Guarda, and sent the light division across the Coa, -to observe the enemy’s proceedings. The Portuguese -Regency were alarmed, and demanded more -British troops; but lord Wellington replying that -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_V">No. V.</a> -Section 1.</span>the numbers already fixed would be as great as he -could feed, took occasion to point out, that the -measures agreed upon, with respect to the native<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_274"></a>[274]</span> -forces, were neither executed with vigour nor impartiality, -and that the carriages and other assistance, -required for the support of the British soldiers -then in the country were not supplied. These -matters he urgently advised them to amend before -they asked for more troops; and, at the same time, -as the Regency in the hope of rendering him unpopular -with the natives, intimated a wish that he -should take the punishment of offenders into his -own hands; he informed them that, although he -advised the adoption of severe measures, he would -not be made the despotic punisher of the people, -while the actual laws were sufficient for the -purpose.</p> - -<p>When the siege of Astorga was commenced by -the French, the Portuguese army was brought up -to Cea and Viseu, and the militia in the northern -provinces, were ordered to concentrate at Braganza -to guard the Tras os Montes. Ciudad Rodrigo, -being soon afterwards seriously menaced, lord Wellington -sent a brigade of heavy cavalry to Belmonte, -and transferred his own quarters to Celerico, -intending to succour Ciudad if occasion offered; -but the conduct of the Portuguese Regency cramped -his operations. The resources of the country were -not brought forward, and the English general could -scarcely maintain his actual position, much less advance; -yet the Regency treated his remonstrances -lightly, exactly following the system of the Spanish -Central Junta during the campaign of Talavera: -lord Wellington was, however, in a different situation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_V">No. V.</a> -Section 1.</div> - -<p>Writing sharply, he told them that “their conduct -was evasive and frivolous; that the army -could neither move forward nor remain without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_275"></a>[275]</span> -food; that the time was one which would not -admit of idle or hollow proceedings, or partiality, -or neglect of public for private interests; that the -resources were in the country, could be drawn -forth, and must be so if the assistance of England -was desired; finally, that punishment should follow -disobedience, and, to be effectual, must begin with -the higher classes.” Then, issuing a proclamation, -he pointed out the duties and the omission of both -magistrates and people, and by this vigourous conduct -procured some immediate relief for his troops.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, Crawfurd commenced a series of remarkable -operations. His three regiments of infantry -were singularly fitted for any difficult service; -they had been for several years under sir John -Moore, and, being carefully disciplined in the -peculiar school of that great man, came to the -field with such a knowledge of arms that, in six -years of real warfare, no weakness could be detected -in their system. But the enemy’s posts on -the Agueda rendered it impossible for the light -division to remain, without cavalry, beyond the -Coa, unless some support was at hand nearer than -Guarda or Celerico. Crawfurd proposed that, -while he advanced to the Agueda, Cole, with the -fourth division, should take up the line of the Coa. -But that general would not quit his own position at -Guarda; and lord Wellington approving, and yet -desirous to secure the line of the Coa with a view -to succour Ciudad Rodrigo, brought up the third -division to Pinhel, and reinforcing Crawfurd with -the first German hussars, (consisting of four hundred -excellent and experienced soldiers,) and with a -superb troop of horse-artillery, commanded by -captain Ross, gave him the command of all the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_276"></a>[276]</span> -outposts, ordering Picton and Cole to support him, -if called upon.</p> - -<p>In the middle of March, Crawfurd lined the -bank of the Agueda with his hussars, from Escalhon -on the left, to Navas Frias on the right, a distance -of twenty-five miles, following the course of the -river. The infantry were disposed in small parties -in the villages between Almeida and the Lower -Agueda; the artillery was at Fort Conception, -and two battalions of Portuguese caçadores soon -afterwards arrived, making a total of four thousand -men, and six guns. The French at this period -were extended in divisions from San Felices to -Ledesma and Salamanca, but they did not occupy -the pass of Perales; and Carrera’s Spanish division -being at Coria, was in communication with Crawfurd, -whose line, although extended, was very -advantageous. From Navas Frias to the Douro, -the Agueda was rendered unfordable by heavy -rain, and only four bridges crossed it on that whole -extent, namely, one at Navas Frias; one at Villar, -about a league below the first; one at Ciudad -Rodrigo; and one at San Felices, called the bridge -of Barba del Puerco. While therefore, the hussars -kept a good watch at the two first bridges which -were distant, the troops could always concentrate -under Almeida before the enemy could reach them -from that side; and on the side of Barba del Puerco, -the ravine was so profound that a few companies -of the ninety-fifth were considered capable of opposing -any numbers.</p> - -<p>This arrangement sufficed while the Agueda was -swollen; but that river was capricious, often falling -many feet in a night without apparent reason: -when it was fordable, Crawfurd always withdrew<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_277"></a>[277]</span> -his outposts, and concentrated his division; and -his situation demanded a quickness and intelligence -in the troops, the like of which has never been -surpassed. Seven minutes sufficed for the division -to get under arms in the middle of the night; and -a quarter of an hour, night or day, to bring it in -order of battle to the alarm-posts, with the baggage -loaded and assembled at a convenient distance in -the rear. And this not upon a concerted signal, -or as a trial, but at all times and certain.</p> - -<p>The 19th of March, general Ferey, a bold -officer, either to create a fear of French enterprise -at the commencement of the campaign, or to -surprise the division, collected six hundred grenadiers -close to the bridge of San Felices, and, -just as the moon, rising behind him, cast long -shadows from the rocks, and rendered the bottom -of the chasm dark, he silently passed the bridge, -and, with incredible speed, ascending the opposite -side, bayonetted the sentries, and fell upon the -piquet so fiercely that friends and enemies went -fighting into the village of Barba del Puerco while -the first shout was still echoing in the gulf below. -So sudden was the attack, and so great the confusion, -that the British companies could not form, -but each soldier encountering the nearest enemy, -fought hand to hand; and their colonel, Sydney -Beckwith, conspicuous by his lofty stature and -daring actions, a man capable of rallying a whole -army in flight, urged the contest with such vigour -that, in a quarter of an hour, the French column -was borne back, and pushed over the edge of the -descent.</p> - -<p>This skirmish proved that, while the Agueda -was swollen, the enemy could gain nothing by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_278"></a>[278]</span> -slight operations; but it was difficult to keep in -advance of the Coa: the want of money had reduced -the whole army to straits, and Crawfurd, -notwithstanding his prodigious activity, being -unable to feed his division, gave the reins to his -fiery temper, and seized some church-plate, with -a view to the purchasing of corn. For this impolitic -act he was immediately rebuked, and such -redress granted that no mischief followed; and -the proceeding itself had some effect in procuring -supplies, as it convinced the priests that the -distress was not feigned.</p> - -<p>When the sixth corps again approached Ciudad -Rodrigo in the latter end of April, lord Wellington, -as I have before said, moved his head-quarters to -Celerico, and Carrera took post at St. Martin -Trebeja, occupying the pass of Perales; being, -however, menaced there by Kellerman’s troops, he -came down, in May, from the hills to Ituero on -the Azava river, and connected his left with the -light division, which was then posted at Gallegos -Espeja and Barba del Puerco. Crawfurd and <ins class="err" id="err-278" title="Erratum: was 'him'"> -he</ins> then agreed that, if attacked, the British should -concentrate in the wood behind Espeja, and, if -unable to maintain themselves there, unite with -the Spaniards at Nava d’Aver, and finally retire to -Villa Mayor, a village covering the passage of the -Coa by the bridge of Seceira, from whence there -was a sure retreat to Guarda.</p> - -<p>It was at this period that Massena’s arrival in -Spain became known to the allies; the deserters, -for the first time, ceased to speak of the emperor’s -commanding in person; yet all agreed that serious -operations would soon commence. Howbeit, as -the river continued unfordable, Crawfurd maintained<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_279"></a>[279]</span> -his position; but, towards the end of May, certain -advice of the march of the French battering-train -was received through Andreas Herrasti: and, the -1st of June, Ney, descending upon Ciudad -Rodrigo, threw a bridge, on trestles, over the -Agueda at the convent of Caridad, two miles -above; and, a few days afterwards, a second at -Carboneras, four miles below the fortress. As this -concentration of the French relieved the northern -provinces of Portugal from danger, sixteen regiments -of militia were brought down from Braganza -to the Lower Douro; provisions came by water to -Lamego, and the army was enabled to subsist.</p> - -<p>The 8th of June four thousand French cavalry -crossed the Agueda, Crawfurd concentrated his -forces at Gallegos and Espeja, and the Spaniards -occupied the wood behind the last-named village. -It was at this moment, when Spain was overwhelmed, -and when the eye could scarcely command -the interminable lines of French in his immediate -front, that Martin Carrera thought fit to invite -marshal Ney to desert!</p> - -<p>Nothing could be more critical than Crawfurd’s -position. From the Agueda to the Coa the whole -country, although studded with woods and scooped -into hollows, was free for cavalry and artillery, and -there were at least six thousand horsemen and fifty -guns within an hour’s march of his position. His -right was at Espeja, where thick woods in front -rendered it impossible to discover an enemy until -close upon the village; while wide plains behind, -almost precluded hope, in a retreat before the multitude -of French cavalry and artillery. The confluence -of the Azava with the Agueda offered more<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_280"></a>[280]</span> -security on his left, because the channel of the -former river there became a chasm, and the ground -rose high and rugged at each side of the bridge of -Marialva, two miles in front of Gallegos. Nevertheless, -the bank on the enemy’s side was highest, -and, to obtain a good prospect, it was necessary to -keep posts beyond the Azava; moreover the bridge -of Marialva could be turned by a ford, below the -confluence of the streams. The 10th, the Agueda -became fordable in all parts, but, as the enemy -occupied himself raising redoubts, to secure his -bridge at Carboneras, and making preparations for -the siege of Rodrigo, Crawfurd, trusting to his own -admirable arrangements, and to the surprising discipline -of his troops, still maintained his dangerous -position: thus encouraging the garrison of Ciudad -Rodrigo, and protecting the villages in the plain -between the Azava and the Coa from the enemy’s -foraging parties.</p> - -<p>On the 18th, the eighth corps was seen to take -post at San Felices, and other points; and all the -villages, from the Sierra de Francia to the Douro, -were occupied by the French army. The 23d, -Julian Sanchez, breaking out of Ciudad, came into -Gallegos. On the 25th, the French batteries -opened against the fortress, their cavalry closed -upon the Azava, and Crawfurd withdrew his outposts -to the left bank. The 26th, it was known -that Herrasti had lost one hundred and fifty killed, -and five hundred wounded; and, the 29th, a -Spaniard, passing the French posts, brought Carrera -a note, containing these words: “<i lang="es" xml:lang="es">O venir -luego! luego! luego! a <ins class="corr" id="tn-280" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'secorrer esta plaza'"> -socorrer esta plaza</ins></i>.” (“Oh! come, now! now! now! to the succour of this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_281"></a>[281]</span> -place.”) And, on the 1st of July, the gallant old -man repeated his <i lang="es" xml:lang="es">“Luego, luego, luego, por ultimo -vez</i>.”</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, lord Wellington (hoping that the -enemy, by detaching troops, would furnish an opportunity -of relieving Ciudad Rodrigo) transferred -his quarters to Alverca, a village half-way between -Almeida and Celerico. The Spaniards supposed he -would attack; and Romana, quitting Badajos, came -to propose a combined movement for carrying off -the garrison. This was a trying moment! The -English general had come from the Guadiana with -the avowed purpose of securing Rodrigo; he had, -in a manner, pledged himself to make it a point in -his operations; his army was close at hand; the -garrison brave and distressed; the governor honourably -fulfilling his part. To permit such a place to -fall without a stroke struck, would be a grievous -disaster, and a more grievous dishonour to the -British arms; the troops desired the enterprise; -the Spaniards demanded it, as a proof of good faith; -the Portuguese to keep the war away from their -own country: finally, policy seemed to call for an -effort, lest the world might deem the promised defence -of Portugal a heartless and a hollow boast. -Nevertheless, Romana returned without his object. -Lord Wellington absolutely refused to venture even -a brigade; and thus proved himself a truly great -commander, and of a steadfast mind.</p> - -<p>It was not a single campaign but a terrible war -that he had undertaken. If he lost but five thousand -men, his own government would abandon the -contest; if he lost fifteen, he must abandon it himself. -His whole disposable force did not exceed -fifty-six thousand men: of these, twelve thousand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_282"></a>[282]</span> -were with Hill, and one-half of the remainder were -untried and raw. But this included all, even to -the Portuguese cavalry and garrisons. All could -not, however, be brought into line, because Reynier, -acting in concert with Massena, had, at this period, -collected boats, and made demonstrations to pass -the Tagus and move upon Coria; French troops -were also crossing the Morena, in march towards -Estremadura, which obliged lord Wellington to -detach eight thousand Portuguese to Thomar, as a -reserve, and these and Hill’s corps being deducted, -not quite twenty-five thousand men were available -to carry off the garrison in the face of sixty thousand -French veterans. This enterprise would also -take the army two marches from Guarda, and Coria -was scarcely more distant from that place, hence, a -division must have been left at Guarda, lest Reynier, -deceiving Hill, should reach it first.</p> - -<p>Twenty thousand men of all arms remained, and -there were two modes of using them. 1º. In an -open advance and battle. 2º. In a secret movement -and surprise. To effect the last, the army might -have assembled in the night upon the Azava, and -filed over the single bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo, -with a view of capturing the battering train, by a -sally, or of bringing off the garrison. But, without -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_VII">No. VII.</a> -Section I.</span>dwelling on the fact that Massena’s information -was so good that he knew, in two days after it occurred, -the object of Romana’s visit, such a movement -could scarcely have been made unobserved, -even in the early part of the siege, and, certainly, -not towards the end, when the enemy were on the -Azava.</p> - -<p>An open battle a madman only would have ventured. -The army, passing over a plain, in the face<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_283"></a>[283]</span> -of nearly three times its own numbers, must have -exposed its flanks to the enemy’s bridges on the -Agueda, because the fortress was situated in the -bottom of a deep bend of the river, and the -French were on the convex side. What hope then -for twenty thousand mixed soldiers cooped up between -two rivers, when eight thousand cavalry and -eighty guns should come pouring over the bridges -on their flanks, and fifty thousand infantry followed -to the attack? What would even a momentary -success avail? Five thousand undisciplined -men brought off from Ciudad Rodrigo, -would have ill supplied the ten or twelve thousand -good troops lost in the battle, and the temporary -relief of the fortress would have been a poor compensation -for the loss of Portugal. For what was -the actual state of affairs in that country?—The -militia deserting in crowds to the harvest, the -Regency in full opposition to the general, the measures -for laying waste the country not perfected, -and the public mind desponding! The enemy -would soon have united his whole force and advanced -to retrieve his honour, and who was to have -withstood him?</p> - -<p>Massena, sagacious and well understanding his -business, only desired that the attempt should be -made. He held back his troops, appeared careless, -and in his proclamations taunted the English -general, that he was afraid!—that the sails were -flapping on the ships prepared to carry him away—that -he was a man, who, insensible to military -honour, permitted his ally’s towns to fall without -risking a shot to save them, or to redeem his -plighted word! But all this subtlety failed; lord -Wellington was unmoved, and abided his own<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_284"></a>[284]</span> -time. “If thou art a great general, Marius, come -down and fight! If thou art a great general, Silo, -make me come down and fight!”</p> - -<p>Ciudad Rodrigo left to its fate, held out yet a -little longer, and meanwhile the enemy pushing -infantry on to the Azava; Carrera retired to the -Dos Casas river, and Crawfurd, reinforced with -the sixteenth and fourteenth light dragoons, placed -his cavalry at Gallegos, and concentrated his infantry -in the wood of Alameda, two miles in rear. -From thence he could fall back, either to the -bridge of Almeida by San Pedro or to the bridge -of Castello Bom by Villa Formosa. Obstinate -however not to relinquish a foot of ground that he -could keep either by art or force, he disposed his -troops in single ranks on the rising grounds, in the -evening of the 2d of July, and then sending some -horsemen to the rear to raise the dust, marched the -ranks of infantry in succession, and slowly, within -sight of the enemy, hoping that the latter would -imagine the whole army was come up to succour -Ciudad Rodrigo. He thus gained two days; but, -on the 4th of July, a strong body of the enemy -assembled at Marialva, and a squadron of horse, -crossing the ford below that bridge, pushed at full -speed towards Gallegos driving back the picquets. -The enemy then passed the river, and the British retired -skirmishing upon Alameda, leaving two guns, -a troop of British and a troop of German hussars -to cover the movement. This rear-guard drew up -on a hill half-cannon shot from a streamlet with -marshy banks, which crossed the road to Alameda; -in a few moments a column of French horsemen -was observed coming on at a charging pace, diminishing -its front as it approached the bridge,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_285"></a>[285]</span> -but resolute to pass, and preserving the most perfect -order, notwithstanding some well-directed -shots from the guns. Captain Kraüchenberg, of -the hussars, proposed to charge. The English -officer did not conceive his orders warranted it; -and the gallant German rode full speed against the -head of the advancing columns with his single -troop, and with such a shock, that he killed the -leading officers, overthrew the front ranks, and -drove the whole back. Meanwhile the enemy -crossed the stream at other points, and a squadron -coming close up to Alameda was driven off by a -volley from the third caçadores.</p> - -<p>This skirmish not being followed up by the -enemy, Crawfurd took a fresh post with his infantry -and guns in a wood near Fort Conception. -His cavalry, reinforced by Julian Sanchez and Carrera’s -divisions, were disposed higher up on the -Duas Casas, and the French withdrew behind the -Azava, leaving only a piquet at Gallegos. Their -marauding parties however entered the villages of -Barquillo and Villa de Puerco for three nights successively; -and Crawfurd, thinking to cut them off, -formed an ambuscade in a wood near Villa de -Puerco with six squadrons, another of three squadrons -near Barquillo, and disposed his artillery, -five companies of the ninety-fifth and the third -caçadores in reserve, for the enemy were again in -force at Gallegos and even in advance of it.</p> - -<p>A little after day-break, on the 11th, two French -parties were observed, the one of infantry near -Villa de Puerco, the other of cavalry at Barquillo. -An open country on the right would have enabled -the six squadrons to get between the infantry in -Villa de Puerco and their point of retreat. This<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_286"></a>[286]</span> -was circuitous, and Crawfurd preferred pushing -straight through a stone enclosure as the shortest -road: the enclosure proved difficult, the squadrons -were separated, and the French, two hundred -strong, had time to draw up in square on a rather -steep rise of land; yet so far from the edge, as not -to be seen until the ascent was gained. The two -squadrons which first arrived, galloped in upon -them, and the charge was rough and pushed home, -but failed. The troopers received the fire of the -square in front and on both sides, and in passing -saw and heard the French captain Guache and his -serjeant-major exhorting the men to shoot carefully.</p> - -<p>Scarcely was this charge over when the enemy’s -cavalry came out of Barquillos, and the two squadrons -riding against it, made twenty-nine men and -two officers prisoners, a few being also wounded. -Meanwhile colonel Talbot mounting the hill with -four squadrons of the fourteenth dragoons, bore -gallantly in upon captain Guache; but the latter -again opened such a fire, that Talbot himself and -fourteen men went down close to the bayonets, and -the stout Frenchman made good his retreat; after -which Crawfurd returned to the camp, having had -thirty-two troopers, besides the colonel, killed or -wounded in this unfortunate affair. That day -Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered, and the Spanish -troops, grieved and irritated, separated from the -light division, and marching by the pass of Perales, -rejoined Romana; but Crawfurd assumed a -fresh position, a mile and a half from Almeida, -and demanded a reinforcement of two battalions. -Lord Wellington replied that he would give him -two divisions, if he could hold his ground; but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_287"></a>[287]</span> -that he could not do so; yet, knowing the temper -of the man, he repeated his former orders <em>not to -fight beyond the Coa</em>.</p> - -<p>On the 21st, the enemy’s cavalry again advanced, -Fort Conception was blown up, and Crawfurd fell -back to Almeida, apparently disposed to cross the -Coa. Yet nothing was further from his thoughts. -Braving the whole French army, he had kept with -a weak division, for three months, within two hours -march, of sixty thousand men, appropriating the -resources of the plains entirely to himself; but -this exploit, only to be appreciated by military -men, did not satisfy his feverish thirst of distinction. -Hitherto he had safely affronted a superior -power, and forgetting that his stay beyond the Coa -was a matter of sufferance, not real strength, with -headstrong ambition, he resolved, in defiance of -reason and of the reiterated orders of his general, -to fight on the right bank.</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF THE COA.</h4> - -<p>Crawfurd’s whole force under arms consisted of -four thousand infantry, eleven hundred cavalry, -and six guns, and his position, one mile and a half -in length, extended in an oblique line towards the -Coa. The cavalry piquets were upon the plain in -his front, his right on some broken ground, and -his left resting on an unfinished tower, eight hundred -yards from Almeida, was defended by the -guns of that fortress; but his back was on the -edge of the ravine forming the channel of the Coa, -and the bridge was more than a mile distant, in the -bottom of the chasm.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_288"></a>[288]</span></p> - -<p>A stormy night ushered in the 24th of July. -The troops, drenched with rain, were under arms -before day-light, expecting to retire, when a few -pistol shots in front, followed by an order for the -cavalry reserves and the guns to advance, gave -notice of the enemy’s approach; and as the morning -cleared, twenty-four thousand French infantry, -five thousand cavalry, and thirty pieces of artillery -were observed marching beyond the Turones. The -British line was immediately contracted and -brought under the edge of the ravine; but meanwhile -Ney, who had observed Crawfurd’s false disposition, -came down with the stoop of an eagle. -Four thousand horsemen and a powerful artillery -swept the plain. The allied cavalry gave back, -and Loison’s division coming up at a charging -pace, made towards the centre and left of the -position.</p> - -<p>While the French were thus pouring onward, -several ill-judged changes were made on the English -side, part of the troops were advanced, others -drawn back, and the forty-third most unaccountably -placed within an enclosure of solid masonry, at -least ten feet high, situated on the left of the road -with but one narrow outlet about half-musket shot -down the ravine. While thus imprisoned, the -firing in front redoubled, the cavalry, the artillery, -and the caçadores successively passed by in retreat, -and the sharp clang of the ninety-fifth rifle was -heard along the edge of the plain above. A few -moments later, and the forty-third would have been -surrounded; but that here, as in every other part of -this field, the quickness and knowledge of the battalion -officers remedied the faults of the general. -One minute sufficed to loosen some large stones,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_289"></a>[289]</span> -a powerful effort burst the enclosure, and the -regiment, re-formed in column of companies, was -the next instant up with the riflemen; there was -no room to array the line, no time for any thing but -battle, every captain carried off his company as -an independent body, and joining as he could with -the ninety-fifth or fifty-second, the whole presented -a mass of skirmishers, acting in small parties and -under no regular command; yet each confident in -the courage and discipline of those on his right -and left, and all regulating their movements by a -common discretion and keeping together with surprising -vigour.</p> - -<p>It is unnecessary to describe the first burst of -French soldiers. It is well known with what -gallantry the officers lead, with what vehemence -the troops follow, and with what a storm of fire -they waste a field of battle. At this moment, with -the advantage of ground and numbers, they were -breaking over the edge of the ravine, their guns -ranged along the summit, played hotly with -grape, and their hussars, galloping over the glacis -of Almeida, poured down the road, sabring every -thing in their way. Ney, desirous that Montbrun -should follow this movement with the whole of the -French cavalry, and so cut off the troops from the -bridge, sent five officers in succession to urge him -on, and so mixed were friends and enemies at the -moment, that only a few guns of the fortress durst -open, and no courage could have availed against -such overwhelming numbers. But Montbrun enjoyed -an independent command, and, as the attack -was made without Massena’s knowledge, he would -not stir. Then the British regiments, with singular -intelligence and discipline, extricated themselves<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_290"></a>[290]</span> -from their perilous situation. For falling back -slowly, and yet stopping and fighting whenever -opportunity offered, they made their way through -a rugged country tangled with vineyards, in -despite of their enemies, who were so fierce and -eager, that even the horsemen rode in amongst the -enclosures, striking at the soldiers as they mounted -the walls or scrambled over the rocks.</p> - -<p>As the retreating troops approached the river, -they came upon a more open space; but the left -wing being harder pressed, and having the shortest -distance, arrived while the bridge was still crowded -and some of the right wing distant. Major -M’Leod, of the forty-third, seeing this, rallied -four companies on a hill just in front of the -passage, and was immediately joined by a party of -the ninety-fifth, and at the same time, two other -companies were posted by brigade-major Rowan, -on another hill flanking the road, these posts were -thus maintained until the enemy, gathering in -great numbers, made a second burst, when the -companies fell back. At this moment the right -wing of the fifty-second was seen marching towards -the bridge, which was still crowded with the -passing troops, M’Leod, a very young man, but -with a natural genius for war, immediately turned -his horse round, called to the troops to follow, -and, taking off his cap, rode with a shout towards -the enemy. The suddenness of the thing, and the -distinguished action of the man, produced the -effect he designed; a mob of soldiers rushed after -him, cheering and charging as if a whole army -had been at their backs, and the enemy’s skirmishers, -astonished at this unexpected movement, -stopped short. Before they could recover from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_291"></a>[291]</span> -their surprise, the fifty-second crossed the river, -and M’Leod, following at full speed, gained the -other side also without a disaster.</p> - -<p>As the regiments passed the bridge, they planted -themselves in loose order on the side of the mountain. -The artillery drew up on the summit and -the cavalry were disposed in parties on the roads -to the right, because two miles higher up the -stream there were fords, and beyond them the -bridge of Castello Bom, and it was to be apprehended -that, while the sixth corps was in front, -the reserves, and a division of the eighth corps, -then on the Agueda, might pass at those places -and get between the division and Celerico. The -river was, however, rising fast from the rains, and -it was impossible to retreat farther.</p> - -<p>The French skirmishers, swarming on the right -bank, opened a biting fire, which was returned as -bitterly; the artillery on both sides played across -the ravine, the sounds were repeated by numberless -echoes, and the smoke, rising slowly, resolved -itself into an immense arch, spanning the whole -chasm, and sparkling with the whirling fuzes of -the flying shells. The enemy gathered fast and -thickly; his columns were discovered forming -behind the high rocks, and a dragoon was seen to -try the depth of the stream above, but two shots -from the fifty-second killed horse and man, and -the carcasses, floating between the hostile bands, -showed that the river was impassable. The monotonous -tones of a French drum were then heard, -and in another instant, the head of a noble column -was at the long narrow bridge. A drummer and -an officer in a splendid uniform, leaped forward -together, and the whole rushed on with loud<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_292"></a>[292]</span> -cries. The depth of the ravine at first deceived -the soldiers’ aim, and two-thirds of the passage -was won ere an English shot had brought down an -enemy; yet a few paces onwards the line of death -was traced, and the whole of the leading French -section fell as one man! Still the gallant column -pressed forward, but no foot could pass that -terrible line; the killed and wounded railed together, -until the heap rose nearly even with the -parapet, and the living mass behind melted away -rather than gave back.</p> - -<p>The shouts of the British now rose loudly, but -they were confidently answered, and, in half an -hour, a second column, more numerous than the -first, again crowded the bridge. This time, however, -the range was better judged, and ere half -the distance was won, the multitude was again -torn, shattered, dispersed, and slain; ten or -twelve men only succeeded in crossing, and took -shelter under the rocks at the brink of the river. -The skirmishing was renewed, and a French surgeon -coming down to the very foot of the bridge, -waved his handkerchief and commenced dressing -the wounded under the hottest fire; nor was -his appeal unheeded: every musket turned from -him, although his still undaunted countrymen were -preparing for a third attempt. The impossibility -of forcing the passage was, however, become too -apparent, and this last effort, made with feebler -numbers and less energy, failed almost as soon as -it commenced.</p> - -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_292fp" style="max-width: 35em;"> - <p class="right fs70"><em>Vol. 3, Plate 6.</em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_292fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_292fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> -CRAWFURD’S <em>OPERATIONS</em><br /> -1810.<br /> - -<p><em>Published by T. & W. Boone 1830.</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>Nevertheless, the combat was unnecessarily continued. -By the French, as a point of honour, to -cover the escape of those who had passed the -bridge. By the English, from ignorance of their<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_293"></a>[293]</span> -object. One of the enemy’s guns was dismantled, -a powder-magazine blew up, and many continued -to fall on both sides until about four o’clock; when -a heavy rain causing a momentary cessation of fire -the men amongst the rocks returned, unmolested, to -their own party, the fight ceased, and Crawfurd -retired behind the Pinhel river. Forty-four Portuguese, -two hundred and seventy-two British, including -twenty-eight officers, were killed, wounded, -or taken, and it was at first supposed that lieutenant -Dawson and half a company of the fifty-second, -which had been posted in the unfinished tower, -were also captured: but that officer kept close until -the evening, and then, with great intelligence, -passed all the enemy’s posts, and, crossing the -Coa at a ford, rejoined his regiment.</p> - -<p>In this action the French lost above a thousand -men, the slaughter at the bridge was fearful to -behold; but Massena claimed to have taken two -pieces of artillery, and it was true; for the guns -intended to arm the unfinished tower, near Almeida, -were lying dismounted at the foot of the building. -They, however, belonged to the garrison of Almeida, -not to the light division, and that they were not -mounted and the tower garrisoned was a great negligence; -the enemy’s cavalry could not otherwise -have fallen so dangerously on the left of the position, -and the after-investment of Almeida would -have been retarded. In other respects, the governor, -severely censured by Crawfurd, at the time, for not -opening his fire sooner and more vigorously, was unblameable; -the whole affair had been so mismanaged -by the general himself, that friends and enemies -were mingled together from the first, and the shots -from the fortress would have killed both.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_294"></a>[294]</span></p> - -<p>During the fight, general Picton came up alone -from Pinhel, Crawfurd desired the support of the -third division; it was refused; and, excited by -some previous disputes, the generals separated -after a sharp altercation. Picton was decidedly -wrong, because Crawfurd’s situation was one of -extreme danger; he durst not retire, and Massena -might undoubtedly have thrown his reserves, by -the bridge of Castello Bom, upon the right flank -of the division, and destroyed it, between the Coa -and the Pinhel rivers. Picton and Crawfurd were, -however, not formed by nature to act cordially together. -The stern countenance, robust frame, saturnine -complexion, caustic speech, and austere demeanour -of the first promised little sympathy with the short -thick figure, dark flashing eyes, quick movements, -and fiery temper of the second; nor, indeed, did -they often meet without a quarrel. Nevertheless, -they had many points of resemblance in their characters -and fortunes. Both were inclined to harshness, -and rigid in command, both prone to disobedience, -yet exacting entire submission from -inferiors, and they were alike ambitious and craving -of glory. They both possessed decided military talents, -were enterprising and intrepid, yet neither -were remarkable for skill in handling troops under -fire. This, also, they had in common, that both, -after distinguished services, perished in arms, fighting -gallantly, and being celebrated as generals of -division while living, have, since their death, been -injudiciously spoken of, as rivalling their great -leader in war.</p> - -<p>That they were officers of mark and pretension is -unquestionable, and Crawfurd more so than Picton, -because the latter never had a separate command,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_295"></a>[295]</span> -and his opportunities were necessarily more circumscribed; -but to compare either to the duke of -Wellington displays ignorance of the men and of -the art they professed. If they had even comprehended -the profound military and political combinations -he was conducting; the one would have -carefully avoided fighting on the Coa; and the other, -far from refusing, would have eagerly proffered his -support.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_296"></a>[296]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXI_V">CHAPTER V.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>During the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, Mahi, -coming down from the Gallician mountains, menaced -Astorga, and a detachment of his army, -under Toboado Gil, occupied Puebla de Senabria; -acting in concert with Silveira; and an expedition -sailing from Coruña, under Porlier, seized Santona, -and dismantled that and other points on the coast, -near Santander. Mahi’s movements could not be -well opposed by either Kellerman or Serras, during -the siege, because the former had a strong detachment -in Baños, and the troops of the latter were -spread over too great an extent of ground; but, -when the place fell, the eighth corps, being detached -beyond the Tormes, to gather provisions, -enabled Serras to act against the Gallicians. The -latter were driven into the mountains, and Toboado -Gil, removing his stores from Puebla Senabria, -drew closer to Silveira, in expectation of an attack; -but Serras, only placing a Swiss battalion and sixty -dragoons at Puebla, fell back to Zamora, and the -eighth corps re-occupied the country between the -Tormes and the Agueda.</p> - -<p>Bonet defeated the Spaniards at Sales, and entered -Castropol, on the frontier of Gallicia, but -returned to Oviedo, on hearing of the expedition -to Santona. The Spaniards then re-embarked for -Coruña, the project of a larger armament, to be -directed against Santander itself, was adopted, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_297"></a>[297]</span> -Mahi affirmed that, if more arms and ammunition -were sent to him from England, he would clear the -plains of Leon, as far as the Esla river. His demands -were complied with; sir Home Popham was -appointed to superintend the naval expeditions -against the coast of the Asturias and Biscay, and a -serious interruption of the French communications -was planned, but never realised.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, general Reynier passed the Tagus -with the second corps, but it appears that this -movement should have been executed in June; for -boats were collected at Barca de Alconete, in the -middle of that month, and the French only waited -for a detachment from Andalusia, when Mendizabel, -taking the road of Zafra, attacked that detachment, -at Los Santos, on the 23d, and Reynier immediately -moved to its succour with one division of -infantry and all his cavalry.</p> - -<p>But, at this period, the insurrection caused by -Lascy’s expedition to the Ronda, had drawn all the -troops of the fifth corps from Seville to that side, -the duke of Aremberg and general Remond had -fallen back behind the river Tinto, and Copons -had advanced to collect provisions on the Odiel. In -this threatening state of affairs, instead of returning -to Merida, Reynier endeavoured to surprise Imas, at -Xeres de los Cavalleros, and failing in that, pushed -across the Morena against Ballasteros, the latter -being at Campo Frio, beyond Araceña, and, -ignorant that Imas had retreated, could only save -himself by a hasty flight across the frontier of -Portugal. Meanwhile, Lascy was beaten in the -Ronda, the fifth corps retired to Seville, D’Aremberg -and Remond re-occupied Huelva and Moguer;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_298"></a>[298]</span> -and Reynier, going back to Merida, resumed his -design of passing the Tagus.</p> - -<p>His boats were still at Alconete, for the Spaniards -had neglected this opportunity of destroying them; -but, as it was necessary to cover the operations -both from Hill’s division which was concentrated -at Campo Mayor, and from the Portuguese troops -behind the Elga river, a strong rear guard was -placed on the Salor to watch the former, and the -French division at Baños advanced to Coria to awe -the latter. Reynier then quitting Merida the -10th of July, marched, by Truxillo and Caceres, -upon Alconete and Almaraz, and effected the -passage; his rear guard following on the 16th.</p> - -<p>This cautious operation saved him from an attack -meditated by Hill, who had received orders to -unite with Romana, and drive the second corps -back, with a view to gather the harvest for the -victualling of Badajos and the other frontier fortresses. -But the passage of the Tagus being thus -effected by the French, general Hill made a parallel -movement, which, on his part, only required -thirty-six hours; and meanwhile, lord Wellington -assembled a reserve at Thomar, under the command -of general Leith, consisting of eight thousand -Portuguese and two thousand British infantry, just -arrived from England.</p> - -<p>Soon after Reynier had reached Coria, he detached -a force, by Perales, upon Sabugal, but -recalled it when he found that Hill, having crossed -the Tagus by Vilha Velha, was at Castello Branco -on the 21st. The two generals then faced each -other. Hill, joined by a strong body of Portuguese -cavalry, under general Fane, encamped, with sixteen<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_299"></a>[299]</span> -thousand men and eighteen guns, at Sarzedas, -just in front of the Sobreira Formosa; his advanced -guard in Castello Branco; his horsemen on the -line of the Ponçul; and a brigade of Portuguese -infantry at Fundao, to keep up the communication -with Guarda, and to cover the Estrada Nova. -Behind him, Leith occupied the line of the Zezere: -and thus twenty-six thousand men, besides the militia, -were in observation between the Estrella and -the Tagus.</p> - -<p>Reynier first made demonstrations on the side of -Salvatierra; but being repulsed by some Portuguese -cavalry, divided his forces between Penamacor -and Zarza Mayor, established a post of one hundred -and fifty men on the left bank of the Tagus, near -the mouth of the Rio Del Monte, and, by continual -movements, rendered it doubtful whether he meant -to repass the Tagus or to advance upon Sarzedas, -or to join Massena. Meanwhile, Ballasteros returned -to Araceña, Imas to Xeres de los Cavalleros, -O’Donnel entered Truxillo, and Carlos d’España -cut off the French post on the Rio del Monte. -Romana was, however, soon obliged to concentrate -his troops again; for Mortier was on the Guadalquivir, -with a view to re-enter Estremadura. Such -was the situation of the armies in the beginning -of August; and when Massena was assured that -Reynier had crossed the Tagus, he directed the -sixth corps and the cavalry upon Almeida, which -led, as we have seen, to the combat on the Coa; -during which, Loison, imagining the governor to -be a native, pressed him to desert the cause of the -English: “<em>that vile people, whose object was to -enslave the Portuguese</em>.”</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington’s situation was critical. Ciudad<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_300"></a>[300]</span> -Rodrigo furnished the French with a place of arms; -they might disregard Almeida: and their tardy investment -of it, viewed in conjunction with the great -magazines collecting at Ciudad Rodrigo, indicated -an intention of so doing. But Massena’s dispositions -were such as rendered his true designs difficult -to be discovered. The sixth corps and the reserve -cavalry were, indeed, around Almeida; but, by -telegraphic intercourse with the garrison, it was -known that the investment was not real, and the -heads of the columns pointed towards Celerico. -Loison’s advanced guard was in Pinhel the day after -Crawfurd’s action; the second corps, divided between -Zarza Mayor and Penamacor, and with boats, -near Alcantara, on the Tagus, menaced equally -the line of that river and the line of the Zezere; and -it was as likely that Massena would join Reynier -as that Reynier would join Massena. The eighth -corps and the divisions of Serras and Kellerman -were between the Tormes and the Esla, and might -break into the northern provinces of Portugal, -while the sixth and second corps should hold the -allies in check: and this was undoubtedly the -surest course; because the taking of Oporto would -have furnished many resources, stricken the natives -with terror, opened the great coast-road to Lisbon, -and enabled Massena to avoid all the difficult -country about the Mondego. The English general -must then have retired before the second and sixth -corps, unless he attacked Ney; an unpromising -measure, because of the enemy’s strength in horse: -in fine, Massena had one hundred and sixteen -thousand men and the initial operations in his -power, and lord Wellington was obliged to wait -upon his movements.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_301"></a>[301]</span></p> - -<p>The actual position of the allies was too extended -and too forward; yet to retire at once would -have seemed timid: hence lord Wellington remained -quiet during the 25th, 26th, and 27th of July, -although the enemy’s posts were thickening on the -Pinhel river. But the 28th, the British cavalry -advanced to Frexadas, and the infantry withdrew -behind the Mondego, except the fourth division, -which remained at Guarda. The light division -occupied Celerico; the other divisions were posted -at Penhancos, Carapichina, and Fornos; the Portuguese -troops being a day’s march behind. The -sick and wounded men transferred daily to the -rear, and the line of retreat kept free from encumbrance. -The enemy then made a demonstration -towards St. Joa de Pesquera, and defeated some -militia at Fosboa, on the Douro, but finally retired -across the Coa, and, after a few skirmishes with -the garrison on the 3d of August, left the communication -with Almeida again free. At the same -time, a detachment of Reynier’s horse was encountered -at Atalaya, near Fundao, and beaten by -the Portuguese cavalry and ordenança, with a loss -of fifty killed or taken.</p> - -<p>On the side of Gallicia, Kellerman advanced -from Benevente to Castro Contrijo, and detachments -from Serras’s division penetrated towards -Monterey, ordering provisions for ten thousand men -on the road to Braganza. But Silveira, marching -on Senabria, defeated the enemy’s cavalry there -on the 6th; invested the Swiss on the 7th; and, -on the 10th, obliged them to capitulate at the -moment when Serras was coming to their relief. -Five hundred men and an eagle were taken, and -Silveira, who did not lose a man, would have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_302"></a>[302]</span> -given battle to Serras also, if Beresford, alarmed -at such rashness, had not sent him imperative -orders to retreat; an operation he effected with -some difficulty.</p> - -<p>This advantage in the north was balanced by -a disaster in Estremadura. The Spanish generals, -never much disposed to respect lord Wellington’s -counsels, were now less so than before, from the -discontent engendered by the fall of Ciudad -Rodrigo. He had pressed upon Romana the -policy of avoiding battles; had procured permission -that Campo Mayor should be given to him as a -place of arms, with leave to retire into Portugal -when overmatched by the enemy; and he had -shewn him that Hill’s departure greatly augmented -the necessity of caution. Nevertheless, Romana -joined Ballasteros; and, as their united force -amounted to fourteen thousand infantry and fifteen -hundred horse, the English general immediately -foresaw that they would offer battle, be defeated, -and lay open the whole frontier of the Alemtejo; -he, therefore, directed Hill to send Madden’s -brigade of Portuguese cavalry to their assistance.</p> - -<p>Madden reached Campo Mayor the 14th of August, -but Romana’s advanced guard had been already -intercepted at Benvenida, and having lost six hundred -men, was going to lay down its arms, when -fortunately Carrera arrived with the Spanish cavalry -and disengaged them. The whole then retreated -across the Morena to Monte Molin and -Fregenal, but the French pursued and slew or took -four hundred more. The following day Mortier -entered Zafra, and Romana retired to Almendralejos. -The enemy did not, however, press this -advantage, because Lascy with three thousand men<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_303"></a>[303]</span> -from Cadiz convoyed by Capt. Cockburn of the -British navy, had landed near Moguer and driven -the duke of Aremberg towards Seville, while Copons -drove Remond upon Zalamea; and although -the French soon rallied and obliged Lascy to re-embark, -Mortier was withdrawn towards the Morena, -and Romana again advanced to Zafra. This -affair at Moguer was very trifling, but a tumid -description in Cockburn’s despatches obtained for -it a momentary celebrity.</p> - -<p>It would appear that Massena had been waiting -for Mortier’s movements to develope his own plans, -for on the day that the latter entered Zafra, the -sixth corps formally invested Almeida; and lord -Wellington immediately bringing up the Portuguese, -recrossed the Mondego; the British being at -Pinhel, Frexadas, and Guarda, and the Portuguese -at Celerico, Govea, Melho, and Trancoso. In this -situation, expecting a vigorous defence from Almeida, -he had good hopes to delay the enemy for six -weeks or two months, when the rains setting in -would give him additional advantages in the defence -of the country. He had intended to keep the light -division on the Cabeça Negro overhanging the -bridge of the Coa, and thus secure a communication -with the garrison, or force the French to invest the -place with their whole army: Crawfurd’s rashness -marred this plan, and he himself was so dispirited -by the action on the 24th, that the commander-in-chief -did not think it prudent to renew -the project. Yet Massena’s tardiness and the small -force with which he finally invested the place, led -lord Wellington to think of assembling secretly a -large and chosen body of men behind the Cabeça -Negro, with the view of suddenly forcing the bridge<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_304"></a>[304]</span> -and the fords and taking the French battering train, -or at least bringing off the garrison; but while revolving -this great stroke in his mind, an unexpected -and terrible disaster broke his measures.</p> - - -<h4>SIEGE OF ALMEIDA.</h4> - -<p>This fortress, although regularly constructed with -six bastions, ravelins, an excellent ditch, and covered -way, was extremely defective. The ramparts were -too high for the glacis, and from some near ground, -on the side of the attack, the bottom of the ditch -might be seen. An old square castle, built on a -mound in the centre of the town, contained three -bomb proofs, the doors of which were not secure; -but with the exception of some damp casements in -one bastion, there was no other magazine for the -powder. Colonel Cox was governor, and his garrison -<span class="sidenote">Colonel -<ins class="corr" id="tn-304" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Cox's Narative'"> -Cox’s Narrative</ins>.</span>composed of one regular and two militia regiments, -a body of artillery and a squadron of cavalry, -<ins class="err" id="err-304" title="Erratum: no change made; 'amounted' seems correct"> -amounted</ins> to about four thousand men.</p> - -<p>On the 18th, the trenches were begun under -cover of a false attack, and in the morning of the -26th (the second parallel being commenced) sixty-five -pieces of artillery mounted in ten batteries -opened at once. Many houses were soon in flames -and the garrison was unable to extinguish them; -the counter fire was, however, briskly maintained, -little military damage was sustained, and towards -evening the cannonade slackened on both sides; -but just after dark the ground suddenly trembled, -the castle bursting into a thousand pieces, gave -vent to a column of smoke and fire, and with a -prodigious noise the whole town sunk into a shapeless<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_305"></a>[305]</span> -ruin! Treason or accident had caused the -magazines to explode, and the devastation was incredible. -The ramparts were breached, the greatest -part of the guns thrown into the ditch, five -hundred people were struck dead on the instant, -and only six houses left standing; the stones thrown -out hurt forty of the besiegers in the trenches, and -the surviving garrison, aghast at the horrid commotion, -disregarded all exhortations to rally. Fearing -that the enemy would take the opportunity to -storm the ramparts, the governor beat to arms, -and, running to the walls with the help of an artillery -officer, fired off the few guns that remained; -but the French shells fell thickly all the night, and -in the morning of the 27th, two officers appeared at -the gates, with a letter from Massena, offering terms.</p> - -<p>Cox, sensible that further resistance was impossible, -still hoped that the army would make a movement -to relieve him, if he could impose upon the enemy for -two or three days; and he was in act of refusing the -prince of Esling’s offer, when a mutiny, headed -openly by the lieutenant-governor, one Bernardo -Costa, and secretly by José Bareiros, the chief of -artillery, who had been for some time in secret correspondence -with the French, obliged him to yield. -The remainder of the native officers disturbed by -fear, or swayed by the influence of those two, were -more willing to follow than to oppose their dishonourable -proceedings, and Costa expressed his -resolution to hoist the white flag. The governor -seeing no remedy by force, endeavoured to procrastinate, -and, being ignorant of Bareiros’ treason, sent -him to the enemy with counter propositions. Bareiros -immediately informed Massena of the true -state of garrison, and never returned; and the final<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_306"></a>[306]</span> -result was a surrender upon agreement that the -militia should retire to their homes, and the regulars -remain prisoners of war.</p> - -<p>While the treaty was pending and even after -the signature of the articles, in the night of the -27th, the French bombarded the place. This act, -unjustifiable and strange, because Massena’s aide-de-camp, -colonel Pelet, was actually within the -walls when the firing commenced, was excused, on -the ground of an error in the transmission of orders; -<span class="sidenote">Justification -of Colonel -W. -Cox.</span>it, however, lasted during the whole night, and Cox -also asserts that the terms of the capitulation with -respect to the militia were violated. Pelet indignantly -denies this, affirming that when the garrison -<span class="sidenote">Note by -Gen. Pelet. -Appendix -to Vol. XII. -Victoires et -Conquestes -des Français.</span>still amounting to three thousand men perceived -the marquis d’Alorna amongst the French generals, -the greatest part immediately demanded service, -and formed a brigade under general Pamplona. Yet, -so easily are men’s minds moved by present circumstances, -that the greater number deserted again, -when they afterwards saw the allied armies.</p> - -<p>Bareiros, having joined the enemy, escaped punishment, -but De Costa, being tried, was afterwards -shot as a traitor, by the orders of marshal Beresford. -His cowardice and mutiny merited this chastisement, -yet the <ins class="err" id="err-306" title="Erratum: was 'only'"> -principal</ins> evidence against him was an -explanatory letter, written to lord Liverpool, by Cox, -while a prisoner at Verdun.</p> - -<p>The explosion, the disappearance of the steeple, -and cessation of fire, proclaimed the misfortune of -Almeida in the allied camp; but the surrender was -first ascertained by lord Wellington on the 29th, -when, with a telescope, he observed many French -officers on the glacis of the place. The army then -withdrew to its former position behind the Mondego;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_307"></a>[307]</span> -and while these things were passing on the -Coa, the powder-magazine in Albuquerque, being -struck with lightning, also exploded and killed four -hundred men; and, on the 1st of September, general -Reynier, after several demonstrations towards Castello -Branco, in one of which he <ins class="corr" id="tn-307" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'lost a quadron'"> -lost a squadron</ins> of horse, suddenly reached Sabugal. The British -piquets on the Pinhel were attacked the following -day by the horsemen of the sixth corps, the enemy’s -plans seemed to be ripe for execution; and lord -Wellington transferring his quarters to Govea, withdrew -his infantry behind Celerico, and fixed his -cavalry at that place with posts of observation at -Guarda and at Trancoso. Reynier, however, suddenly -returned to Zarza Mayor, and, throwing a -bridge over the Tagus at Alcantara, again involved -the French projects in obscurity.</p> - -<p>Massena experienced considerable difficulty in -feeding his forces, and he seemed at first, either -disinclined to commence the invasion or undecided -as to the mode. Two months had elapsed since the -surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeida had only -resisted for ten days, the French army was still -behind the Coa, and it would seem, by an intercepted -letter, dictated by Napoleon, in September, -that he expected further inaction: “Lord Wellington,” -he observed to Massena, “has only -eighteen thousand men, Hill has only six thousand; -and it would be ridiculous to suppose that twenty-five -thousand English can balance sixty thousand -French, if the latter do not trifle, but fall boldly -on after having <em>well observed where the blow may be -given</em>. You have twelve thousand cavalry, and -four times as much artillery as is necessary for -Portugal. Leave six thousand cavalry and a proportion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_308"></a>[308]</span> -of guns between Ciudad Rodrigo, Alcantara, -and Salamanca, and with the rest commence -operations. The emperor is too distant, and the -positions of the enemy change too often, to direct -how you should attack; but it is certain that the -utmost force the English can muster, including the -troops at Cadiz, will be twenty-eight thousand -men.”</p> - -<p>This letter was accurate as to the numbers of the -English army, but Napoleon was ignorant how -strongly lord Wellington was thrusting Portugal -forward in the press.</p> - -<p>Massena had commenced the invasion before -these instructions reached him; but to understand -his operations it is essential to have a clear idea -of the country in which they were conducted. -The advanced positions of the allies extended from -Almeida over the Sierra de Estrella, by Guarda to -Fundao, Sarzedas, and Castello Branco: no enemy -could penetrate that line unless by force, and a -serious attack on any one point was to be the signal -for a gradual retreat of the whole, in concentric -directions towards the Lines. But, if Guarda were -evacuated, the enemy while menacing Celerico, -could move either by Belmonte or Covilhao and -separate general Hill from lord Wellington, the -distance between those generals being twice as -great as the enemy’s perpendicular line of march -would be.</p> - -<p>To balance this disadvantage, the road from Covilhao -was broken up, a Portuguese brigade placed in -Fundao, and general Leith’s corps was stationed at -Thomar, between two entrenched positions, which -formed the second temporary line of resistance. The -first of those positions was behind the Zezere, extending<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_309"></a>[309]</span> -from the Barca de Codies to the confluence -of that river with the Tagus. The second behind the -Alva, a strong and swift stream descending from -the Estrella and falling into the Mondego some -miles above Coimbra. Both were strong, the rivers -deep and difficult of access, and the Sierra -de Murcella closely hugs the left bank of the -Alva.</p> - -<p>Hill’s line of retreat from Sarzedas to the Zezere, -has been already noticed, and from that river to -the Alva, there was a military road constructed -through the mountains to Espinhal. But the country -from Celerico to the Murcella, a distance of -about sixty miles, is one long defile, lying between -the Sierra Estrella and the Mondego. The ridge -upon which Celerico stands, being a shoot from -the Estrella, and encircled by a sweep of the -Mondego, closes this defile in front. In like manner -the Sierra Murcella, covered by the Alva river, -closes it in the rear, and the intermediate parts -are but a succession of smaller streams and lower -ridges. The principal road was repaired and -joined to the road of Espinhal, and a branch was -also carried across the Mondego to Coimbra. Thus -an internal communication was established for -the junction of all the corps. Nevertheless, between -Celerico and the Alva, the country was not -permanently tenable, because, from Guarda and -Covilhao, there were roads over the Estrella to -Gouvea, Cea, and Gallices, towns in rear of Celerico; -and the enemy could also turn the whole -tract by moving through Trancoso and Viseu, and -so down the right bank of the Mondego to Coimbra.</p> - -<p>But lord Wellington keeping the head of his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_310"></a>[310]</span> -army one march behind Celerico, in observation -of the routes over the Estrella, and his rear close -to the Alva, was master of his retreat; and as the -Mondego was fordable in summer and bridged at -several points, he could pass it by a flank movement -in a few hours. Now the right bank was -also one great defile, lying between the river and -the Sierra de Alcoba or Caramula. This mountain -stretching with some breaks from the Douro to -Coimbra, separates the valley of the Mondego -from the coast line, and in approaching Coimbra -sends out a lofty transverse shoot, called the Sierra -de Busaco, exactly in a line with the Sierra de -Murcella, and barring the way on the right bank -of the Mondego in the same manner that the latter -Sierra bars it on the left bank. Moreover this -route to Coimbra was the worst in Portugal, and -crossed by several deep tributaries of the Mondego, -the most considerable of which were the Criz and -Dao. The Vouga, however, opened a passage -through the Alcoba near Viseu, and that way the -French could gain the great road from Oporto, and -so continue their movement upon Coimbra.</p> - -<p>Such being the ground on both sides of the -Mondego, the weakest point was obviously towards -the Estrella, and lord Wellington kept the mass of -his forces there. But Massena was ill-acquainted -with the military features, and absolutely ignorant -of the lines of Torres Vedras. Indeed, so circumspectly -had those works been carried on, that only -vague rumours of their existence reached the bulk -of the English army; and many British officers -imagined that the campaign was only to cloak the -general’s intention of embarking when he reached -Lisbon. In England the opposition asserted that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_311"></a>[311]</span> -he would do so: the Portuguese dreaded it; the -French army universally believed it; and the British -minsters seem to have entertained the same -opinion; for at this time an officer of engineers -arrived at Lisbon, whose instructions, received personally -from lord Liverpool, were unknown to lord -Wellington, and commenced thus:—“<em>As it is probable -that the army will embark in September.</em>”</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_312"></a>[312]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXI_VI">CHAPTER VI.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>THIRD INVASION OF PORTUGAL.</h4> - - -<p>Massena’s command, extended from the banks -of the Tagus to the Bay of Biscay, from Almeida to -Burgos, and the number of his troops present under -arms exceeded one hundred and ten thousand men. -From these must be deducted thirteen thousand in -the Asturias and province of Santander, four thousand -in the government of Valladolid, eight thousand -under Serras at Zamora and Benevente, and -lastly, the reserve of Bayonne under general Drouet, -nineteen thousand strong, which, organized as a -ninth corps had only entered Spain in August, -being replaced at Bayonne by a fresh reserve -under general Caffarelli. Thus, the active army -of invasion did not much exceed seventy thousand; -and as every man, combatant or non-combatant, -is borne on the strength of a French army, not -more than fifty-five thousand infantry and about -eight thousand horsemen were with the eagles. -The ninth corps had however orders to follow the -traces of the prince of Esling, and the void thus -left at Burgos and Valladolid was supplied by sixteen -thousand of the young guard.</p> - -<p>This arrangement shows how absurdly Napoleon -has been called a rash warrior, and one never thinking -of retreat. No man ever made bolder marches, -but no man ever secured his base with more care. -Here he would not suffer any advance to fresh conquests<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_313"></a>[313]</span> -until his line of communication had been -strengthened with three additional fortresses,—namely, -Astorga, Ciudad, and Almeida; and while -he employed sixty-five thousand men in the invasion -of Portugal, he kept more than eighty thousand -in reserve. Thus, even the total loss of the -army destined to make what is technically termed -“a point” upon Lisbon, would, as a mere military -disaster, have scarcely shaken his hold of Spain.</p> - -<p>Massena’s instructions were to convert, Ciudad -Rodrigo and Almeida, into places of arms for the -conquest of Portugal, and to move on both sides -of the Tagus against Lisbon in the beginning of -September. Either thinking his force too weak -to act upon two lines at the same time, or trusting -to the co-operation of Soult’s army from Andalusia, -he relinquished the Alemtejo, looking only to the -northern bank of the Tagus; and hence, as the experience -of Junot’s march in 1807, warned him off -the Sobreira mountains, his views were confined -to the three roads of Belmonte, Celerico, and -Viseu.</p> - -<p>The strength of the positions about the Alva -was known to him, as were also the measures taken -to impede a descent from Covilhao to Espinhal; -but Alorna, Pamplona, and the other Portuguese -in the French camp, with a singular ignorance, -<span class="sidenote">Note by -General -Pelet.</span>asserted that the road by Viseu and Coimbra was -easy, and that no important position covered the -latter town. Wherefore the French general resolved -suddenly to assemble all his forces, distribute -thirteen days’ bread to the soldiers, and pour -in one solid mass down the right bank of the Mondego, -not doubting to reach Coimbra before general -Hill could join lord Wellington.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_314"></a>[314]</span></p> - -<p>In pursuance of this project the three corps were -directed to concentrate on the 16th of September; -Reynier’s at Guarda; Ney’s, and the heavy cavalry, -at Maçal da Chao, and Junot’s at Pinhel. By this -disposition all three roads were alike menaced; and -the allies being kept in suspense as to the ultimate -object, Massena hoped to gain one march, a great -thing, seeing that from Coimbra he was not more -than a hundred miles, whereas Hill’s distance from -that town was longer. But, to cover the real -object with more care, and to keep Hill as long as -possible at Sarzedas, the French general caused -Guarda to be siezed on the 12th, by a detachment, -which withdrew again immediately, as if it were -only a continuation of the former feints; and meanwhile -Reynier, having first ascertained that Mortier -was at Monasterio, threatening Estremadura, suddenly -destroyed the boat-bridge at Alcantara, and -marched towards Sabugal.</p> - -<p>On the 13th the allies re-established their post -at Guarda; but on the 15th, it was again driven -away by a considerable mass of the enemy, and -retired up the side of the Estrella. At the same -time the cavalry in front of Celerico was forced -back in the centre, and the post at Trancoso chased -towards Mongualde on the left. Lord Wellington then -felt assured that the invasion was at last in serious -progress; and having ascertained, beyond a doubt, -that the troops in Guarda were of Reynier’s corps, -despatched his final orders for Hill and Leith to -concentrate on the Alva.</p> - -<p>On the 16th, Reynier descended from Guarda -to the plains bordering the Mondego; and being -there joined by the sixth corps and Montbrun’s horsemen, -the whole passed the river, and, pushing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_315"></a>[315]</span> -through Celerico, drove back the cavalry posts of -the allies to the village of Cortiço; but there the -first German hussars turning, overthrew the leading -squadrons, and made some prisoners. Near -Cortiço, the road branching off to the bridge of -Fornos and to Gouvea; a French brigade took -the latter to cover the march of the main body -which made for Fornos. But this feint was closely -watched; for there is a custom, peculiar to the -British army, of sending mounted officers, singly -to observe the enemy’s motions; and, such is their -habit, that they will penetrate through the midst -of his cantonments, cross the line of his movement, -and hover, just out of musket-shot, for whole days, -on the skirts of his columns, until they obtain a -clear notion of the numbers and the true direction -of the march. Colonel Waters, one of these exploring -officers, being close on the left of Reynier’s -troops during this day, reported their movements, -and in the evening, leading some of the German -cavalry behind the enemy, took several prisoners -and the baggage of a general.</p> - -<p>The French operations were decisive. Lord Wellington -directed the first, third, and fourth divisions -upon the Alva, withdrew his heavy cavalry from -the front, and placed the light division at St. -Romao, in the Estrella, to cover the head-quarters, -which were transferred, that night, to Cea.</p> - -<p>The 17th, the whole of the second and sixth -corps were observed to pass the bridge of Fornos, -and the advanced guard entered Mongualde; but -the eighth corps still kept the road leading towards -Oporto, for ten thousand militia of the northern -provinces, forming the brigades of Trant, Wilson,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_316"></a>[316]</span> -and Miller, were collected upon the Douro to -harass the enemy’s right flank and rear, and Trant, -with about three thousand, was already at Moimenta -de Beira, in the defiles leading through the hills -to Lamego. The country between the Coa and -Coimbra, on both sides of the Mondego, had been -before laid waste, the mills were destroyed, the -ordenança were in arms, and the helpless population -hidden amongst the highest mountains.</p> - -<p>On the 18th, the French advanced guard reached -the deserted city of Viseu. Pack’s Portuguese -brigade immediately passed the Mondego at -Fosdao, and took post beyond the Criz; and general -Pakenham, with a brigade of the first division, -entered Coimbra, to protect it from the -enemy’s scouting parties. On the 19th, captain -Somers Cocks, a very gallant and zealous officer, -commanding the cavalry post which had been -driven from Guarda, came down from the Estrella, -and following the enemy through Celerico, ascertained -that neither sick men nor stores were left -behind: hence it was evident that Massena, relinquishing -his communications, had thrown his -cavalry, infantry, artillery, parcs, baggage and -hospital waggons, in one mass, upon the worst road -in Portugal. The allies were now in motion also to -cross the Mondego, when a false report, that the -enemy was again on the left bank, arrested the -general movement. The next day, however, -the third, fourth, and light divisions, and the -British cavalry passed the river at Pena Cova, -Olivarez, and other places, and were distributed; -the light division at Mortagao supporting Pack; -the third and fourth in the villages between the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_317"></a>[317]</span> -Sierra de Busaco and Mortagao; and the horse -on a plain in front of the latter place, connecting -the light division with Pack’s brigade.</p> - -<p>But the eighth corps still pointed towards the -valley of the Vouga; and it was doubtful whether -Massena would not that way gain the main road -from Oporto to Coimbra; wherefore general -Spencer, with the first division, marched upon -Milheada, and Trant was directed to join him by -a march through San Pedro de Sul to Sardao. -Meanwhile Leith arrived on the Alva, and general -Hill was only one march behind; for having -discovered Reynier’s movements on the 12th, and, -at the same time, getting intelligence that all the -French boats on the Tagus had been destroyed, he, -with a ready decision, anticipating lord Wellington’s -orders, directed his artillery by Thomar, and -putting his troops in motion that evening, reached -Espisnal on the 20th, and was there joined by -general Lecor, who, with equal vigour and judgement, -had brought the Portuguese brigade, by -long marches, from Fundao. On the 21st, Hill -arrived on the Alva, and pushed his cavalry in -observation beyond that river. Thus the two corps -of the allied army were united on the same day -that the main body of the enemy entered Viseu; -and, although the French horsemen were on the -Criz, the bridges had been destroyed by Pack; -and the project of surprising Coimbra was baffled.</p> - -<p>Neither had Massena failed to experience other -evil consequences from his false movement. He -had been obliged to repair the road from day to -day for his artillery; and it was still twenty miles -from Viseu on the 19th. Trant, aware of this, -formed the hardy project of destroying it; and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_318"></a>[318]</span> -quitting Moimenta de Beira in the night, with a -squadron of cavalry, two thousand militia, and five -guns, on the 20th, surprised a patrole of ten men, -from whom he learnt that the convoy was at hand, -and that Montbrun’s cavalry was close in the rear. -The defiles were, however, narrow, and, Trant charging -the head of the escort, took a hundred prisoners -and some baggage. The convoy then fell back, and -the militia followed; the ways being so narrow that -Montbrun could never come up to the front. At -this time, a resolute attack would have thrown all -into confusion, but the militia were unmanageable; -and the enemy, having at last rallied a few men, -and repulsed the Portuguese cavalry, with a loss of -twelve troopers, the whole got into disorder, and -Trant, seeing nothing more was to be effected, -returned to Moimenta de Beira, and from thence -marched to Lamego with his prisoners. The -French, ignorant of the number and quality of -their assailants, still fell back, and did not finally -reach Viseu until the 23d; by which, Massena lost -two most important days.</p> - -<p>While these events were passing in the valley of -Mondego, a small expedition from Cadiz again -landed at Moguer, to aid Copons in collecting -provisions on the Tinto. It was, however, quickly -obliged to re-embark; and Copons was defeated by -general Remond, with the loss of three hundred -men on the 15th. Meanwhile, Romana attacked -the French posts near Monasterio, pushing his -cavalry towards Seville. Soult sent the fifth corps -against him, and he retired; but was beaten at Los -Santos on the same day that Copons had been -defeated on the Tinto. The pursuit was continued -to Fuente del Maestre; and the whole army was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_319"></a>[319]</span> -like to disperse in flight, when Madden’s Portuguese -cavalry came up, and, charging the pursuers -with signal gallantry, overthrew the leading -squadrons, recovered some prisoners, and gained -time for the Spaniards to rally. Nevertheless, the -French entered Zafra, and Romana retreated, by -Almendralejo and Merida to Montijo, on the 18th, -throwing a garrison into Olivenza, and three battalions -into Badajos. Being, however, sensible that the -latter place was in no condition to resist a serious -attack, he directed the Junta to repair to Valencia -d’Alcantara, and took refuge himself at Elvas.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington’s anticipations were thus realized -and the Alemtejo laid open. Fortunately for the -allies, Sebastiani was at this moment near Carthagena -in pursuit of the Murcian army, and a fresh insurrection -breaking out in the mountains of Grenada -the castles of Motril and Almunecar were taken; Copons -also advanced to the Tinto, and all these calls -upon Soult taking place at one time, he was unable to -bring quite twelve thousand men to Zafra; a number -inadequate to the invasion of the Alemtejo, the -more especially that <ins class="err" id="err-319" title="Erratum: was 'severally'"> -several</ins> regiments withdrawn -from Cadiz, and others coming from England had -reached Lisbon about this period, and formed a -reserve for the allies, of more than five thousand -British troops. Wherefore the French returned to -Ronquillo, the Spaniards again advanced to Xeres -de los Cavalleros, and Araceña, and this dangerous -crisis glided gently away. But, to understand this, -it is necessary to shew how encreasing political embarrassments -had thwarted the original plan of the -English general.</p> - -<p>The first vexatious interference of the Souza -faction had been checked, but the loss of Almeida<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_320"></a>[320]</span> -furnished a favourable opportunity to renew their clamorous -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_II">No. II.</a></span>hostility to the military proceedings. Falsely -asserting, that the provisions of that fortress had -been carried away by the English commissaries; and -as falsely pretending that lord Wellington had promised -to raise the siege, this party hypocritically assumed, -that his expressions of sorrow for its fall were -indications of an intention to remove by a splendid -victory the public despondency. They vehemently -insisted, also, on a defence of the frontier, inveighed -against the destruction of the mills, and endeavoured -<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s -Papers. -MSS.</span>to force their own friends of the fidalgo faction even -on to the staff of marshal Beresford, that they might -the more readily embarrass the operations. Meanwhile, -neglecting or delaying the measures agreed -upon for laying waste the country, they protected -the minor authorities when disobedient, refrained -from punishing delinquents, and took every occasion -to mislead the public mind at the very moment -when the enemy commenced the invasion. Nor -was there wanting either accident or indiscretion to -encrease the growing confusion.</p> - -<p>When Almeida fell, an officer of the guards writing -to a friend at Oporto, indiscreetly asserted, that -Massena was advancing in front with a hundred -thousand French, and that eighty thousand more -were moving in rear of the allies upon Lisbon. -This letter being immediately made public, created -such a panic amongst the English merchants, that one -and all applied for ships to carry their families and -property away, and there arose such a tumult that -Trant was obliged to quit his command for the purpose -of suppressing the commotion. To dry this -source of mischief lord Wellington issued proclamations; -and, in the orders of the day, declared that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_321"></a>[321]</span> -he would not seek to ascertain the author of this -and similar letters, being assured that the feelings -and sense of the officers would prevent any repetition.</p> - -<p>To the regency he addressed himself in a -more peremptory and severe manner, reproving -them for the false colouring given to his communications, -and informing them that he would never -“<em>permit public clamour and panic to induce him to -change, in the smallest degree, a system and plan of -operation which he had adopted after mature consideration, -and which daily experience proved to be -the only one likely to produce a good end</em>.” But this -remonstrance only increased the virulence of his opponents; -and such was their conduct, that, before -lord Wellington reached Busaco, he was obliged -to tell them, “<em>their miserable intrigues must -cease or he would advise his own government to -withdraw the British army</em>.”</p> - -<p>Meanwhile their proceedings had been so mischievously -successful, that the country between the -Mondego, the Tagus, and the Lines, still contained -provisions sufficient for the French during the ensuing -winter, and the people were alike unprepared to -expect an enemy or to attempt a removal of their -property.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington could but choose then, between -stopping the invaders on the Mondego, or wasting -the country by force as he retreated. But what -an act the last! His hopes depended upon the -degree of moral strength he was enabled to call -forth, and he would have had to retire with a mixed -force before a powerful army and an eminent commander, -his rear guard engaged, and his advance -driving miserable multitudes before it to the capital,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_322"></a>[322]</span> -where nothing was prepared to save them from -famine, but where the violent and powerful faction -in the regency was ready to misrepresent every proceeding, -and inflame the people’s minds; and this, -when the court of Rio Janeiro was discontented, -and the English ministers, as I shall have occasion -to shew, panic-stricken by the desponding letters of -some general officers about the commander-in-chief! -It was evidently necessary to fight, although -Massena had above sixty thousand veterans, and -lord Wellington could only bring about fifty thousand -men into line, more than half of which were -untried soldiers.</p> - -<p>The consequences of such a battle were not, however, -to be estimated by the result on the field. The -French general might indeed gain every thing by a -victory; but, if defeated, his powerful cavalry and -the superior composition and experience of his army -would prevent it from being very injurious; or a -serious check might induce him to turn his attention -from Coimbra towards Oporto, contenting himself -with the capture of that city, and the reduction of the -northern provinces, until more formidable preparations -should enable him to renew his first design. -Nor could the time thus gained by the allies be as -profitably employed in the defence. The French -could be reinforced to any amount, whereas the English -general’s resources could not be much improved, -and it was very doubtful if either England or Portugal -would longer endure the war, without some palpable -advantage to balance the misery and the -expense.</p> - -<p>Such was the state of affairs, when the allies -passed to the right bank of the Mondego with a view -to fight the battle thus forced upon their general.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_323"></a>[323]</span> -While the French remained concentrated at Viseu, the -first division, under Spencer, was held at Milheada in -observation of the great road from Oporto; the light -division at Mortagao watching the road from Viseu, -and the remainder of the army in reserve ready to -move to either side. But when the French advanced -guard had repaired the bridges over the Criz, -and passed that river, lord Wellington recalled the -first division, and fixed upon the Sierra de Busaco -for his position of battle.</p> - -<p>This mountain, about eight miles in length, abuts -to the right on the Mondego, and on the left is connected -with the Sierra de Caramula by a hilly -rugged country, impervious to the march of an -army. A road along the crest of Busaco afforded an -easy communication, and at Pena Cova, just behind -the right hand extremity, a ford in the Mondego -permitted the troops to pass in a few hours to the -Murcella ridge, behind the Alva. The face of Busaco -was steep, rough, and fit for defence. The -artillery of the allies fixed on certain points, could -play along the front freely, and there was some -ground on the summit suitable for a small body of -cavalry; but neither guns nor horsemen of the -enemy had a fair field, their infantry were to contend -with every difficulty, and the approach to the -position was also unfavourable to an attacking army.</p> - -<p>After passing the Criz, a table-land permitted -Massena to march, in a wide order of battle, to -Mortagao; but then a succession of ascending -ridges led to the Sierra Busaco, which was separated -from the last by a chasm, so profound, that -the naked eye could hardly distinguish the movement -of troops in the bottom, yet in parts so -narrow that twelve-pounders could range to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_324"></a>[324]</span> -salient points on the opposite side. From Mortagao -four roads conducted to Coimbra. The first, unfrequented -and narrow, crossed the Caramula to -Boyalva, a village situated on the western slope of -that sierra, and from thence led to Sardao and -Milheada. The other roads, penetrating through -the rough ground in front, passed over the Sierra -de Busaco; one by a large convent on the right -hand of the highest point of the ridge; a second -on the left hand of this culminating point, by a -village called St. Antonio de Cantara; and a third, -which was a branch from the second, followed the -Mondego to Pena Cova.</p> - -<p>When this formidable position was chosen, some -officers expressed their fears that Massena would -not assail it. “<em>But, if he does, I shall beat him</em>,” -was the reply of the English general, who was well -assured that the prince would attack; for his advanced -guard was already over the Criz, the second -and sixth corps were in mass on the other side of -that river, and it was improbable that so celebrated -a commander would, at the mere sight of a strong -position, make a retrograde movement, change all -his dispositions, and adopt a new line of operations -by the Vouga, which would be exposed also to the -militia under Baccellar. Massena was, indeed, only -anxious for a battle, and, being still under the influence -of Alorna’s and Pamplona’s false reports, as -to the nature of the country in his front, never -doubted that the allies would retire before him.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_325"></a>[325]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXI_VII">CHAPTER VII.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>General Pack, on the 22d, destroyed the -bridges over the Criz, and fell back upon the light -division; but, the 23d, the enemy re-established -the communications, passed the river, and obliged -the British horse to quit the plain, and take to the -hills behind Mortagao. Three squadrons of light -and one regiment of heavy cavalry were retained -there by lord Wellington; but the rest he sent over -the Sierra de Busaco to the low country about -Milheada, whence he recalled Spencer, and at the -same time caused the third and fourth divisions to -take their ground on the position, the former at -St. Antonio de Cantara, the latter at the convent. -But the light division falling back only a league, -encamped in a pine-wood, where happened one of -those extraordinary panics that, in ancient times, -were attributed to the influence of a hostile god. -No enemy was near, no alarm was given, yet suddenly -the troops, as if seized with a phrenzy, -started from sleep, and dispersed in every direction; -nor was there any possibility of allaying this strange -terror, until some persons called out that the -enemy’s cavalry were amongst them, when the soldiers -mechanically run together in masses, and the -illusion was instantly dissipated.</p> - -<p>The 24th, the enemy appeared in force, and -skirmished with the picquets in front of Montagao, -when the light division, again retiring four miles, -occupied strong ground, and, in the evening, some<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_326"></a>[326]</span> -of the enemy’s cavalry approaching too close, were -charged by a squadron of the fourteenth dragoons, -and overthrown, with the loss of twenty or thirty -men.</p> - -<p>Early on the 25th, Crawfurd moved down from -his post, and appeared somewhat disposed to renew -the scene at the Coa; for the enemy’s cavalry were -gathering in front, and the heads of three infantry -columns were plainly descried on the table-land -above Mortagao, coming on abreast, and with a most -impetuous pace, while heavy clouds of dust, rising -and loading the atmosphere for miles behind, -showed that the whole French army had passed the -Criz, and was in full march to attack. The cavalry -skirmishers were already exchanging pistol-shots, -when lord Wellington, suddenly arriving, ordered -the division to retire, and, taking the personal direction, -covered the retreat with the fifty-second and -ninety-fifth, the cavalry, and Ross’s troop of horse-artillery. -Nor was there a moment to lose: the -enemy, with incredible rapidity, brought up both -infantry and guns, and fell on so briskly, that all -the skill of the general and the readiness of the -excellent troops composing the rear guard, could -scarcely prevent the division from being dangerously -engaged. Howbeit, a series of rapid and beautiful -movements, a sharp cannonade, and an hour’s march, -brought everything back, in good order, to the -great position; but, almost at the same moment, -the opposite ridge was crowned by the masses of -the sixth corps, and the French batteries opened -as the English troops mounted the steep ascent on -which the convent was situated. Meanwhile, Reynier, -taking the left hand route, along which a -Portuguese battalion had retired, arrived at St.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_327"></a>[327]</span> -Antonio de Cantara, in front of the third division, -and before three o’clock, forty thousand French infantry -were embattled on the two points, and the -sharp musketry of the skirmishers arose from the -dark-wooded chasms beneath.</p> - -<p>Ney, whose military glance was magical, perceived -in an instant that the position, a crested not -a table mountain, could not hide any strong reserve, -that it was scarcely half occupied, and that -great part of the allied troops were moving from -one place to another, with that sort of confusion -which generally attends the first taking up of unknown -ground. He desired to make an early and -powerful attack; but the prince of Esling was at -Montagao, ten miles in the rear, and an aide-de-camp, -despatched to inform him of the state of -affairs, after attending two hours for an audience, -was (as I have been informed) told that everything -must await Massena’s arrival. Thus a most favourable -opportunity was lost; for the first division of -the allies, although close at hand, was not upon -the ridge; Leith’s troops, now called the fifth division, -were in the act of passing the Mondego; -Hill was still behind the Alva; scarcely twenty-five -thousand men were actually in line, and there were -great intervals between the divisions.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_V">No. 5.</a></div> - -<p>Reynier coincided with Ney; and they wrote in -concert to Massena, on the 26th, intimating their -joint desire to attack. The prince of Esling, however, -did not reach the field until twelve o’clock, -bringing with him the eighth corps, with which, -and the cavalry, he formed a reserve, connecting -the sixth and second corps, and then sending out -his skirmishers along the whole front, proceeded -carefully to examine the position from left to right.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_328"></a>[328]</span></p> - -<p>The situation of the allies was now greatly -changed. Hill’s corps, having crossed the Mondego, -was posted athwart the road leading over the Sierra -to Pena Cova; on his left Leith prolonged the line -of defence, having the Lusitanian legion in reserve. -Picton, with the third division, supported by -Champlemond’s Portuguese brigade, was next to -Leith, and Spencer, with the first division, occupied -the highest part of the ridge, being between -Picton and the convent. The fourth division -closed the extreme left, covering a path leading to -Milheada, where the cavalry held the flat country, -one heavy regiment only being kept in reserve on -the summit of the sierra. Pack’s brigade, forming -an advanced guard to the first division, was posted -half way down the descent, and the light division, -supported by a German brigade, occupied a piece -of ground jutting out nearly half a mile in front of -and about two hundred feet lower than the convent, -the space between being naturally scooped -like the hollow of a wave before it breaks. Along -the whole of the front skirmishers were thrown out -on the mountain side, and about fifty pieces of -artillery were disposed upon the salient points.</p> - -<p>Ney was averse to attack after the delay which -had taken place, but Massena resolved to attempt -carrying the position. Reynier thought that he -had only to deal with a rear-guard of the allies, and -the prince, whether partaking of this error, or confident -in the valour of his army, directed the second -and sixth corps to fall on the next day, each to its -own front, while the eighth corps, the cavalry, and the -artillery remained in reserve. To facilitate the attack -the light French troops, dropping by twos and -threes into the lowest parts of the valley, endeavoured,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_329"></a>[329]</span> -in the evening, to steal up the wooded -dells and hollows, and to establish themselves unseen -close to the picquets of the light division. -Some companies of rifle corps and caçadores -checked this, but similar attempts made with more -or less success at different points of the position, -seeming to indicate a night attack, excited all the -vigilance of the troops. Yet, were it otherwise, -none but veterans, tired of war, could have slept, -for the weather was calm and fine, and the dark -mountain masses, rising on either side, were crowned -with innumerable fires, around which more than -a hundred thousand brave men were gathered.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF BUSACO.</h4> - -<p>Before day-break on the 27th, the French formed -five columns of attack; three under Ney, opposite -to the convent, and two under Reynier, at St. -Antonio de Cantara, these points being about three -miles asunder. Reynier’s troops had comparatively -easier ground before them, and were in the midst of -the picquets and skirmishers of the third division -almost as soon as they could be perceived to be -in movement. The allies resisted vigorously, and -six guns played along the ascent with grape, but -in less than half an hour the French were close -upon the summit, so swiftly and with such astonishing -power and resolution did they scale the mountain, -overthrowing every thing that opposed their -progress. The right of the third division was -forced back; the eighth Portuguese regiment was -broken to pieces, and the hostile masses gained -the highest part of the crest, just between the third<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_330"></a>[330]</span> -and the fifth divisions. The leading battalions -immediately established themselves amongst the -crowning rocks, and a confused mass wheeled to -the right, intending to sweep the summit of the -sierra, but at that moment lord Wellington caused -two guns to open with grape upon their flank, -while a heavy musketry was still poured into their -front, and, in a little time, the forty-fifth and the -eighty-eighth regiments charged so furiously that -even fresh men could not have withstood them. -The French, quite spent with their previous -efforts, opened a straggling fire, and both parties, -mingling together, went down the mountain side -with a mighty clamour and confusion; the dead -and dying strewing the way even to the bottom of -the valley.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the French who first gained the -summit had re-formed their ranks with the right -resting upon a precipice overhanging the reverse -side of the Sierra, and thus the position was in -fact gained, if any reserve had been at hand, for -the greatest part of the third division, British and -Portuguese, were fully engaged, and a misty -cloud capped the summit, so that the enemy, thus -ensconced amongst the rocks, could not be seen, -except by general Leith. That officer had put his -first brigade in motion to his own left as soon as he -perceived the vigorous impression made on the -third division, and he was now coming on rapidly; -yet he had two miles of rugged ground to pass in -a narrow column before he could mingle in the -fight. Keeping the royals in reserve, he directed -the thirty-eighth to turn the right of the French; -but the precipice prevented this; and meanwhile -colonel Cameron, informed by a staff-officer of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_331"></a>[331]</span> -critical state of affairs, formed the ninth regiment -in line under a violent fire, and, without returning -a single shot, ran in upon and drove the grenadiers -from the rocks with irresistible bravery, plying -them with a destructive musketry as long as they -could be reached, and yet with excellent discipline -refraining from pursuit, lest the crest of the position -should be again lost, for the mountain was so -rugged that it was impossible to judge clearly -of the general state of the action. The victory -was, however, secure. Hill’s corps edged in towards -the scene of action; the second brigade of -Leith joined the first, and a great mass of fresh -troops was thus concentrated, while Reynier had -neither reserves nor guns to restore the fight.</p> - -<p>Ney’s attack had as little success. From the -abutment of the mountain upon which the light -division was stationed, the lowest parts of the -valley could be discerned. The ascent was steeper -and more difficult than where Reynier had attacked, -and Crawfurd, in a happy mood of command, had -made masterly dispositions. The table-land between -him and the convent was sufficiently scooped -to conceal the forty-third and fifty-second regiments, -drawn up in line; and a quarter of a mile -behind them, but on higher ground and close to -the convent, a brigade of German infantry appeared -to be the only solid line of resistance on -this part of the position. In front of the two -British regiments, some rocks, overhanging the -descent, furnished natural embrasures, in which the -guns of the division were placed, and the whole -face of the hill was planted with the skirmishers -of the rifle corps and of the two <ins class="corr" id="tn-331" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Portuguese caçadore'"> -Portuguese caçadores</ins> battalions.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_332"></a>[332]</span></p> - -<p>While it was yet dark, a straggling musketry -was heard in the deep hollows separating the -armies; and when the light broke, the three divisions -of the sixth corps were observed entering -the woods below and throwing forward a profusion -of skirmishers; soon afterwards Marchand’s division -emerging from the hollow, took the main road, -as if to turn the right of the light division, -Loison’s made straight up the face of the mountain -in front, and the third remained in reserve.</p> - -<p>General Simon’s brigade, which led Loison’s attack, -ascended with a wonderful alacrity, and -though the light troops plied it unceasingly with -musketry, and the artillery bullets swept through -it from the first to the last section, its order was -never disturbed, nor its speed in the least abated. -Ross’s guns were worked with incredible quickness, -yet their range was palpably contracted -every round, and the enemy’s shot came singing up -in a sharper key, until the skirmishers, breathless -and begrimed with powder, rushed over the edge of -the ascent, when the artillery suddenly drew back, -and the victorious cries of the French were heard -within a few yards of the summit. Crawfurd, who -standing alone on one of the rocks, had been intently -watching the progress of the attack, then -turned, and in a quick shrill tone desired the two -regiments in reserve to charge. The next moment -a horrid shout startled the French column, and -eighteen hundred British bayonets went sparkling -over the brow of the hill. Yet so truly brave and -hardy were the leaders of the enemy, that each -man of the first section raised his musket, and two -officers and ten soldiers fell before them. Not a -Frenchman had missed his mark! They could do<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_333"></a>[333]</span> -no more! The head of their column was violently -overturned and driven upon the rear, both flanks -were lapped over by the English wings, and three -terrible discharges at five yards’ distance completed -the route. In a few minutes a long trail of carcasses -and broken arms indicated the line of retreat. -The main body of the British stood fast; -but several companies followed the pursuit down -the mountain, until Ney moving forward his reserve, -and opening his guns from the opposite -height killed some men, and thus warned the rest -to recover their own ground. The German brigade -then spread over the hill, and the light division -resumed its original position.</p> - -<p>Loison shewed no disposition to renew the attack, -but Marchand’s people, who had followed the main -road, broke into several masses, gained a pine wood -half-way up the mountain, and sent a cloud of their -skirmishers against the highest part, at the very -moment that Simon was defeated. Such however -was the difficulty of ascending, that Pack alone -held the enemy in check, and half a mile higher -up, Spencer shewed a line of the royal guards -which forbade any hope of success; and from the -salient point of land occupied by the light division, -Crawfurd’s artillery took the main body of the -French in the wood, in flank. Ney, who was there -in person, after sustaining this murderous fire for -an hour, relinquished the attack. The desultory -fighting of the light troops then ceased, and before -two o’clock Crawfurd having assented to a momentary -truce, parties of both armies were mixed -amicably together searching for the wounded men.</p> - -<p>Towards evening, however, a French company -having, with signal audacity, seized a village within<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_334"></a>[334]</span> -half-musket shot of the light division, refused to -retire; which so incensed Crawfurd that, turning -twelve guns on the village, he overwhelmed it -with bullets for half an hour. After paying the -French captain this distinguished honour, the English -general recovering his temper, sent a company -of the forty-third down, which cleared the village -in a few minutes. Meanwhile an affecting incident, -contrasting strongly with the savage character of -the preceding events, added to the interest of the -day. A poor orphan Portuguese girl, about seventeen -years of age, and very handsome, was seen coming -down the mountain and driving an ass, loaded -with all her property, through the midst of the -French army. She had abandoned her dwelling in -obedience to the proclamation, and now passed -over the field of battle with a childish simplicity, -totally unconscious of her perilous situation, and -scarcely understanding which were the hostile and -which the friendly troops, for no man on either side -was so brutal as to molest her.</p> - -<p>In this battle of Busaco, the French after astonishing -efforts of valour, were repulsed, in the -manner to be expected from the strength of the -ground, and the goodness of the soldiers opposed -to them; and their loss, although prodigiously exaggerated -at the time, was great. General Graind’orge -and about eight hundred men were slain, -generals Foy and Merle wounded, Simon made -prisoner, and the sum total may be estimated at -four thousand five hundred men, while that of the -allies did not exceed thirteen hundred. For on the -one side musketry and artillery were brought into -full activity, but the French sought to gain the day -by resolution and audacity rather than by fire.</p> - -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_334fp" style="max-width: 35em;"> - <p class="right fs70"><em>Vol. 3, Plate 7.</em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_334fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_334fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - <div class="caption"> -OPERATIONS on the MONDEGO,<br /> -1810.<br /> - -<p><em>Published by T. & W. Boone 1830.</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_335"></a>[335]</span></p> - -<p>After this Massena judged the position of Busaco -impregnable, and to turn it by the Mondego impossible, -as the allies could pass that river quicker -than himself. But a peasant informed him of the -road leading from Mortagao over the Caramula to -Boyalva, and he resolved to turn lord Wellington’s -left. To cover this movement the skirmishing was -renewed with such vigour on the 28th, that a -general battle was for some time expected. Yet -an ostentatious display of men, the disappearance -of baggage, and the throwing up of entrenchments -on the hill covering the roads to Mortagao plainly -indicated some other design. Howbeit, it was not -until evening when the enemy’s masses in front -being sensibly diminished, and his cavalry descried -winding over the distant mountains, that the project -became quite apparent. Hill then crossed the -Mondego, and retired by Espinal upon Thomar, -while the centre and left of the army defiled in the -night by the other roads upon Milheada. In this -manner Busaco was evacuated before the 29th, the -guns followed the convent road, and the light -division furnished the rear-guard until they passed -Fornos, when the open country enabled the cavalry -to relieve them.</p> - -<p>Massena’s scouts reached Boyalva in the evening -of the 28th, and it has been erroneously asserted, -that Trant’s absence from Sardao alone enabled the -French general to execute his design. Trant was -however at Sardao, four miles from Boyalva before -one o’clock on the 28th; but having, through a -mistake of Baccellar’s, marched from Lamego, by -the circuitous route of Oporto, instead of the direct -road through San Pedro do Sul, he lost men -from fatigue and desertion, and could bring only<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_336"></a>[336]</span> -fifteen hundred militia into line; hence his absence -or presence could have produced no effect whatever, -even though he had, as lord Wellington intended, -been at Boyalva itself.</p> - -<p>Accordingly, the French cavalry, pushing between -him and the British horse, on the 29th cut off one of -his patroles, and the next morning drove him, with -the loss of twenty men, behind the Vouga. When -Massena’s main body had cleared the defiles of -Boyalva, it marched upon Coimbra, and the -allies, crossing the Mondego at that city, commenced -the passage of the defiles leading upon -Condexa and Pombal. The commissariat stores, -which had been previously removed from Raiva de -Pena Cova to Figueras, were embarked at Peniché; -the light division and the cavalry remained on the -right bank of the river; and Baccellar was directed -to bring down all the militia of the northern provinces -upon the Vouga.</p> - -<p>But, notwithstanding the proclamations and the -urgent, and even menacing remonstrances of the -English general, the Portuguese Regency had not -wasted the country behind the Mondego. During -the few days that the enemy was stopped at Busaco, -only the richest inhabitants had quitted Coimbra; -when the allied army retreated, that city was -still populous; and when the approach of the -enemy left no choice but to fly or to risk the -punishment of death and infamy announced in -the proclamation, so direful a scene of distress -ensued that the most hardened of men could not -behold it without emotion. Mothers, with children -of all ages; the sick, the old, the bedridden, and -even lunatics, went or were carried forth; the most -part, with little hope and less help, to journey for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_337"></a>[337]</span> -days in company with contending armies. Fortunately -for this unhappy multitude, the weather -was fine, and the roads firm, or the greatest number -must have perished in the most deplorable manner. -And, notwithstanding all this misery, the object -was not gained: the people fled, but the provisions -were left, and the mills were but partially and -imperfectly ruined.</p> - -<p>On the 1st of October, the outposts were attacked, -and driven from the hills bounding the plain of -Coimbra to the north. The French, on entering -this plain, suffered some loss from a cannonade, and -the British cavalry were drawn up in line, but -with no serious intention of fighting, and were -soon after withdrawn across the Mondego, yet -somewhat unskilfully; for the French following -briskly, cut down some men even in the middle -of the river, and were only prevented from forcing -the passage by a strong skirmish, in which fifty or -sixty men fell.</p> - -<p>This scrambling affair obliged the light division -to march hastily through the city, to gain the defiles -of Condeixa, which commence at the end of the -bridge; and all the inhabitants who had not before -quitted the place rushed out, each with what could -be caught up in the hand, and driving before -them a number of animals loaded with sick people -or children. At the entrance to the bridge, the -press was so great that the troops halted for a few -moments, just under the prison; the jailor had fled -with the keys, the prisoners, crowding to the windows, -were endeavouring to tear down the bars -with their hands, and even with their teeth, and -bellowing in the most frantic manner, while the -bitter lamentations of the multitude increased, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_338"></a>[338]</span> -the pistol-shots of the cavalry, engaged at the ford -below, were distinctly heard.</p> - -<p>Captain William Campbell, an officer of Crawfurd’s -staff, burst the prison-doors, and released -the wretched inmates, while the troops forced their -way over the bridge; yet, at the other end, the -up-hill road, passing between high rocks, was so -crowded that no effort, even of the artillery, could -make way. A troop of French dragoons crossed a -ford, and hovering close upon the flank, increased -the confusion; and a single regiment of foot would -have sufficed to destroy the division, wedged in, -as it was, in a hollow way, and totally incapable -of advancing, retreating, or breaking out on either -side. At last, some of the infantry opened a passage -on the right flank, and, by great exertions, the -road was cleared for the guns; but it was not until -after dusk that the division reached Condeixa, -although the distance was less than eight miles. -Head-quarters were that night at Redinha, and -the next day at Leiria.</p> - -<p>Hitherto the marches had been easy, the weather -fine, and provisions abundant; nevertheless, the -usual disorders of a retreat had already commenced. -In Coimbra, a quantity of harness and intrenching -tools were scattered in the streets; at Leiria, the -magazines were plundered by the troops and camp-followers; -and, at Condeixa, a magazine of tents, -shoes, spirits, and salt meat was destroyed, or abandoned -to the enemy: and, while the streets were -flowing, ancle deep, with rum, the light division -and Pack’s Portuguese brigade, at the distance of -a quarter of a mile, were obliged to slaughter their -own bullocks, and received only half rations of -liquor.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_339"></a>[339]</span></p> - -<p>Lord Wellington arrested this growing disorder -with a strong hand. Three men, taken in the fact -at Leiria, were hanged on the spot; and some -regiments, whose discipline was more tainted than -others, were forbidden to enter a village. This -vigorous exercise of command, aided by the fine -weather and the enemy’s inactivity, restored order -amongst the allies; while Massena’s conduct, the -reverse of the English general’s, introduced -the confusion of a retreat in the pursuing army. -In Coimbra, the French general permitted waste; -and, in a few days, resources were dissipated that, -under good arrangements, would have supplied his -troops for two months: and, during this licentious -delay, the advantage gained by his dangerous -flank march to Boyalva was lost.</p> - - -<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4> - -<p>1º. “<em>Attack vigorously, after having observed -well where to strike.</em>” This simple, but profound -expression in Napoleon’s letter of service, forms -the test by which the prince of Esling’s operations -should be judged.</p> - -<p>2º. The design of turning the strong ground -behind Celerico, by the route of Viseu, required -close and rapid movements; yet the French general -did not quit Viseu, to march against Coimbra, -until the tenth day after passing the Pinhel. This -was not a “<em>a vigorous attack</em>.”</p> - -<p>3º. Massena should have brought the allies to -action in a forward position; and he might have -done so either when Almeida fell, or before that -event, because the complement of mules for the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_340"></a>[340]</span> -service of the army not being then full, the commissariat -was dependent upon the country carts; -and when the first retrograde movement took place -from Alverca, the drivers fled with their animals, -producing infinite confusion in the rear. The -commissary-general Kennedy contrived, indeed, to -procure fifteen hundred additional mules; but, intermediately, -a brisk advance of the enemy would -have forced the English general to fight, or retire -more hastily than would have beseemed his reputation, -or suited his political position.</p> - -<p>4º. If the prince of Esling had not been misled -by Alorna and Pamplona, and the more readily that -the estates of the latter were situated about Coimbra, -he would have judged that the line his adversary -had studied for eight months, and now so carefully -and jealously guarded, was more likely to -afford advantages, than the circuitous route by Viseu, -which was comparatively neglected. The French -general, ill acquainted with the scene of action, but -having the stronger and more moveable army, should -have followed closely.</p> - -<p>A rapid pursuit, through Celerico, would have -brought the French army on to the Alva before -Hill or even Leith could have joined lord Wellington. -The latter must then have fought with half his own -army, or he must have retreated to the Lines. If -he offered battle, his position could be turned either -by the right or left; on the left by the slopes of -the Estrella, on the right by crossing the Mondego, -for Busaco was too extensive to be occupied before -Hill and Leith arrived. Now, the road by Viseu -being the longest and least practicable, demanded -great diligence to compensate for the difficulties -of the way, and to gain Coimbra and force the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_341"></a>[341]</span> -allies to a battle before Hill arrived, were objects -more readily to be attained by the left bank of the -Mondego. The point where to strike was therefore -not “<em>well considered</em>,” and it is clear that -Massena did not rightly estimate the greatness of -his enterprise.</p> - -<p>5º. When the rocks of Busaco glittering with -bayonets first rose on the prince of Esling’s view, -two fresh questions were to be solved. Was he to -attack or to turn that formidable post? Or, availing -himself of his numerical strength and central -situation, was he to keep the allies in check, seize -Oporto, and neglect Lisbon until better combinations -could be made? The last question has been -already discussed; but, contrary to the general -opinion, the attack upon Busaco appears to me -faulty in the execution rather than in the conception; -and the march by which that position was -finally turned, a violation of the soundest principles -of war. In a purely military view, the English -general may be censured for not punishing his -adversary’s rashness.</p> - -<p>With respect to the attack, sixty-five thousand -French veterans had no reason to believe that fifty -thousand mixed and inexperienced troops, distributed -on a mountain more than eight miles long, -were impregnably posted. It would have been no -overweening presumption in the French general to -expect, that three corps well disposed, supported by -a numerous artillery, and led on the first day, (as -Ney desired,) might carry some part of the position, -and it is an error, also, to suppose that guns could not -have been used: the light division were constantly -within range, and thirty pieces of artillery employed -on that point would have wonderfully aided the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_342"></a>[342]</span> -attack by the sixth corps. But when a general in -chief remains ten miles from a field of battle, gives -his adversary two days to settle in a position, makes -his attacks without connection, and without artillery, -and brings forward no reserves, success is impossible -even with the valiant soldiers Massena -commanded.</p> - -<p>6º. “<em>An army should always be in condition to -fight.</em>”</p> - -<p>“<em>A general should never abandon one line of communication -without establishing another.</em>”</p> - -<p>“<em>Flank marches within reach of an enemy are -rash and injudicious.</em>”</p> - -<p>These maxims of the greatest of all generals have -been illustrated by many examples; Senef, Kollin, -Rosbach, the valley of the Brenta, Salamanca, attest -their value. Now, Massena violated all three, by -his march to Boyalva, and some peculiar circumstances, -or desperate crisis of affairs should be -shewn, to warrant such a departure from general -principles. Sir Joshua Reynolds, treating of another -art says, “<em>genius begins where rules end</em>.” But -here genius was dormant, and rules disregarded. -Massena was not driven to a desperate game. -The conquest of Oporto was open to him, or a -march by Viseu upon the Vouga, which, though -demanding time, was safe; while in that by Boyalva, -he threw his whole army into a single and -narrow defile, within ten miles of an enemy in position; -and that also (as I have been informed by an -officer of marshal Ney’s staff) with much disorder: -the baggage and commissariat, the wounded and -sick, the artillery, cavalry, and infantry, mixed -together; discord raging amongst the generals, confusion -amongst the soldiers, and in the night season<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_343"></a>[343]</span> -when every difficulty is doubled. His “<em>army was -not, then, in a condition to fight</em>.” He was making -“<em>a flank march within reach of an enemy in position</em>,” -and he was “<em>abandoning his line of communication -without having established another</em>.”</p> - -<p>7º. Lord Wellington was within four hours march -of either end of the defile, through which the French -army was moving. He might have sent the first -division and the cavalry (forming with Portuguese -regular troops, and Trant’s militia, a mass of twelve -or fourteen thousand men) to Sardao, to head the -French in the defile; while the second, third, fourth, -fifth, and light divisions, advancing by Martagao, -assailed their rear. That he did not do so, is to be -attributed to his political position. War is full of -mischances, and the loss of a single brigade might -have caused the English government to abandon -the contest altogether. Nevertheless, his retreat -was more critically dangerous than such an attack -would have been, and in a military view the battle -of Busaco should not have been fought: it was -extraneous to his original plan, it was forced upon -him by events, and was in fine a political battle.</p> - -<p>8º. Massena’s march, being unopposed, was successful. -The allied army could not cope with him -in the open country between Busaco and the sea, -where his cavalry would have had a fair field; -hence lord Wellington, reverting to his original -plan, retreated by the Coimbra and Espinhal roads. -But the prince of Esling was at Avelans de Cima -and Milheada on the 30th, the allied cavalry and -the light division being still on the right bank of -the Mondego, which was fordable in many places -below Coimbra. Had the French general, directing -his march through Tentugal, crossed at those fords,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_344"></a>[344]</span> -and pushed rapidly on to Leiria, by the route sir -Arthur Wellesley followed, in 1808, against Junot, -the communication with Lisbon would have been -cut: terror and confusion would then have raged in -the capital, the patriarch’s faction would have triumphed, -and a dangerous battle must have been -risked before the Lines could be reached.</p> - -<p>9º. When the allies had gained Leiria, and -secured their line of retreat, the fate of Portugal -was still in the French general’s hands. If he had -established a fresh base at Coimbra, employed the -ninth corps to seize Oporto, secured his line of -communication with that city and with Almeida by -fortified posts, and afterwards, extending his position -by the left, attacked Abrantes, and given his -hand to a corps sent by Soult from the south; not -only would the campaign have been so far a -successful one, but in no other manner could he -have so effectually frustrated his adversary’s political -and military projects. Lord Wellington -dreaded such a proceeding, and hailed the renewed -advance of the French army, as the rising -of a heavy cloud discovering a clear sky in the -horizon beneath.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_VII">No. VII.</a> -Sect. 2.</div> - -<p>Even at Coimbra, the prince was unacquainted -with the existence of the lines, and believed -that, beyond Santarem, the country was open -for the usage of all arms. It is strange that, -when Junot, Loison, Foy, and many other officers, -who had served in Portugal, were present, -better information was not obtained; but every part -of this campaign illustrated Massena’s character, -as drawn by Napoleon:—“Brave, decided, and -intrepid; dull in conversation, but in danger acquiring -clearness and force of thought; ambitious,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_345"></a>[345]</span> -filled with self-love, neglectful of discipline, regardless -of good administration, and, consequently, -disliked by the troops; his dispositions for battle -were bad, but his temper was pertinacious to the -last degree, and he was never discouraged!”</p> - -<p>10º. It appears that the French reached Coimbra -at the moment when the fourteen days’ bread, carried -by the soldiers, was exhausted, and it is worthy of -consideration that French soldiers are accustomed -to carry so much bread. Other nations, especially -the English, would not husband it; yet it was a -practice of the ancient Romans, and it ought to -be the practice of all armies. It requires a long -previous discipline and well-confirmed military -habits; but, without it, men are only half efficient, -especially for offensive warfare. The secret -of making perfect soldiers is only to be found in -national customs and institutions; men should come -to the ranks fitted, by previous habits, for military -service, instead of being stretched as it were upon -the bed of Procrustes, by a discipline which has no -resource but fear.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_346"></a>[346]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXI_VIII">CHAPTER VIII.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>From the 1st of October until the 3d, the French -army was in disorder. The 4th, Massena resumed -his march by Condeixa and Leiria, leaving his sick -and wounded, with a slender guard, (in all about -four thousand seven hundred men,) at Coimbra. -His hospital was established at the convent of Santa -Clara, on the left bank of the river, and all the -inhabitants, who were averse or unable to reach the -Lines, came down from their hiding-places in the -mountains. But scarcely had the prince left the -city, when Trant, Miller, and Wilson, with nearly -ten thousand militia, closed upon his rear, occupying -the sierras on both sides of the Mondego, -and cutting off all communication with Almeida.</p> - -<p>On the evening of the 4th, the French drove the -English picquets from Pombal, and, the next morning, -pushed so suddenly upon Leiria, as to create -some confusion; but the road being crossed at right -angles, by a succession of parallel ravines, captain -Somers Cocks took advantage of one, to charge the -head of the enemy, and checked him until general -Anson’s brigade of cavalry, and captain Bull’s troop -of artillery, arrived to his support. The French -then, forming three columns, endeavoured to bear -down the British with the centre, while the others -turned the flanks. The ravines were, however, -difficult to pass; Bull’s artillery played well into -the principal body, and Anson, charging as it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_347"></a>[347]</span> -emerged from every defile, slew a great number. -The British lost three officers and about fifty men, -the enemy considerably more, and, in five hours, he -did not gain as many miles of ground, although he -had thirty-six squadrons opposed to ten. During this -delay, Leiria was cleared, and the army retreated; -the right by Thomar and Santarem, the centre by -Batalha and Rio Mayor, the left by Alcobaça and -Obidos, and at the same time a native force, under -colonel Blunt, was thrown into Peniché. Massena -followed, in one column, by the way of Rio Mayor; -but, meanwhile, an exploit, as daring and hardy as -any performed by a Partizan officer during the war, -convicted him of bad generalship, and shook his -plan of invasion to its base.</p> - - -<h4>SURPRISE OF COIMBRA.</h4> - -<p>Colonel Trant reached Milheada, intending to -form a junction with Wilson and Miller; but these -last were still distant, and, believing that his own -arrival was unknown at Coimbra, he resolved, alone -to attack the French in that city. Having surprised -a small post at Fornos early in the morning of -the 7th, he sent his cavalry, at full gallop, through -the streets of Coimbra, with orders to pass the -bridge, and cut off all communication with the -French army, of whose progress he was ignorant. -Meanwhile, his infantry penetrated at different -points into the principal parts of the town, and the -enemy, astounded, made little or no resistance. -The convent of Santa Clara surrendered at discretion, -and thus, on the third day after the prince -of Esling had quitted the Mondego, his depôts and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_348"></a>[348]</span> -hospitals, and nearly five thousand prisoners -wounded and unwounded, amongst which there -was a company of the marines of the imperial -guards, fell into the hands of a small militia force! -The next day, Miller and Wilson, arriving, spread -their men on all the lines of communication, and -picked up above three hundred more prisoners, -while Trant conducted his to Oporto.</p> - -<p>During the first confusion, the Portuguese committed -some violence on the prisoners; and the -Abbé du Pradt and other French writers have not -hesitated to accuse Trant of disgracing his country -and his uniform by encouraging this conduct; -whereas, his exertions repressed it; and if the -fact, that not more than ten men lost their lives -under such critical circumstances, was not sufficient -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_VIII">No. VIII.</a></span>refutation, the falsehood is placed beyond dispute -in a letter of thanks, written to colonel Trant, by -the French officers who fell into his hands.</p> - -<p>This disaster made no change in Massena’s dispositions. -He continued his march, and, on the -8th, his advanced guard drove the cavalry picquets -out of Rio Mayor. General Slade, who commanded, -took no heed of this; and the enemy, pushing rapidly -on, was like to have taken the brigade of artillery -in Alcoentre; a good deal of confusion ensued, but -the royals and the sixteenth drove the French out -of the town, sabred many, and made twelve prisoners. -The next day the skirmish was renewed -with various turns of fortune, but, finally, the -British retreated.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the allied army was entering the -Lines. The first, fourth, and fifth divisions in the -centre by Sobral, the third division on the left by -Torres Vedras, and Hill’s corps on the right by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_349"></a>[349]</span> -Alhandra. The light division and Pack’s brigade -should also have entered by Aruda. But Crawfurd, -who had reached Alemquer on the 9th, was still -there, at three o’clock, p. m. on the 10th. The -weather being stormy, the men were placed under -cover, and no indication of marching was given by -the general. The cavalry had already filed into -the Lines; yet no guards were posted, no patroles -sent forward, nor any precaution taken against surprise, -although the town, situated in a deep ravine, -was peculiarly favourable for such an attempt.</p> - -<p>Some officers, uneasy at this state of affairs, -anxiously watched the height in front, and, about -four o’clock, observed some French dragoons on -the summit, which was within cannon shot. The -alarm was given, and the regiments got under arms, -but the posts of assembly had been marked on an -open space, very much exposed, and from whence -the road led through an ancient gateway to the top -of the mountain behind. The enemy’s numbers -increased every moment, and they endeavoured to -create a belief that their artillery was come up. -This feint was easily seen through, but the general -desired the regiments to break and re-form on the -other side of the archway, out of gun range, and -in a moment all was disorder. The baggage animals -were still loading, the streets were crowded -with the followers of the division, and the whole -in one confused mass rushed or were driven headlong -to the archway. Several were crushed, and -with worse troops, a general panic must have -ensued; but the greatest number of the soldiers, -ashamed of the order, stood firm in their ranks -until the first confusion had abated.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless the mischief was sufficiently great,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_350"></a>[350]</span> -and the enemy’s infantry descending the heights, -endeavoured some to turn the town on the left, -while others pushed directly through the streets in -pursuit, and thus with his front in disorder, and -his rear skirmishing, Crawfurd commenced a retreat. -The weather was, however, so boisterous -that the fire soon ceased, and a few men wounded -and the loss of some baggage was all the hurt sustained; -yet so uncertain is every thing in war, that -this affair had like to have produced the most terrible -results in another quarter.</p> - -<p>The division, instead of marching by Caregada -and Cadafaes, followed the route of Sobral, and -was obliged in the night to make a flank march of -several miles along the foot of the Lines to gain -Aruda, which was meanwhile left open to the -enemy. Hence, the cavalry patroles from Villa -Franca, meeting some stragglers and followers of -the camp near Caregada, were by them told that -the light division was cut off, a report confirmed in -some measure by the unguarded state of Aruda, -and by the presence of the enemy’s scouts on that -side. This information alarmed general Hill for -the safety of the second line, and the more so that -the weakest part was in the vicinity of Aruda; -he made a retrograde movement towards Alverca -with a view to watch the valley of Calandrix, or -to gain the pass of Bucellas according to circumstances. -Hence, when the enemy was in full march -against the Lines, the front from Alhandra to the -forts above Sobral, a distance of eight or nine miles, -was quite disgarnished of troops. The true state -of affairs was, however, quickly ascertained, and -Hill regained Alhandra before day-light on the -11th.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_351"></a>[351]</span></p> - -<p>During this time the second and the eighth corps -passed Alemquer, the former marching upon Villa -Franca, the latter upon Sobral. Reynier’s movements -were languid, he did not discover the unguarded -state of Alhandra, and his picquets did -not enter Villa Franca until the next day; but -general Clausel, one of the most distinguished -officers in the French army, coming upon Sobral -in the dusk with the head of the eighth corps dislodged -the troops of the first division, occupied -the ridge on which the town is built, and in the -night threw up some entrenchments close under the -centre of the allies position.</p> - -<p>It is however time to give a more detailed description -of those celebrated works, improperly -called</p> - - -<h4>THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS.</h4> - -<div class="sidenote">Memoranda of the lines, &c. by Col. J. T. Jones, -Royal Engineers, printed for private circulation.</div> - -<p>It has been already said, that they consisted of -three distinct ranges of defence.</p> - -<p>The first, extending from Alhandra on the Tagus -to the mouth of the Zizandre on the sea-coast, -was, following the inflections of the hills, twenty-nine -miles long.</p> - -<p>The second, traced at a distance varying from -six to ten miles in rear of the first, stretched from -Quintella on the Tagus to the mouth of the St. -Lorenza, being twenty-four miles in length.</p> - -<p>The third, intended to cover a forced embarkation, -extended from Passo d’Arcos on the Tagus to the -tower of Junquera on the coast. Here an outer -line, constructed on an opening of three thousand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_352"></a>[352]</span> -yards, enclosed an entrenched camp designed to -cover the embarkation with fewer troops, should -the operation be delayed by bad weather; and -within this second camp, Fort St. Julian’s (whose -high ramparts and deep ditches defied an escalade) -was armed and strengthened to enable a rear-guard -to protect both itself and the army.</p> - -<p>The nearest part of the second line was twenty-four -miles from these works at Passo d’Arcos, and -some parts of the first line were two long marches -distant; but the principal routes led through Lisbon, -where measures were taken to retard the enemy and -give time for the embarkation.</p> - -<p>Of these stupendous Lines, the second, whether -regarded for its strength or importance, was undoubtedly -the principal, and the others only appendages, -the one as a final place of refuge, the -other as an advanced work to stem the first violence -of the enemy, and to enable the army to take up -its ground on the second line without hurry or -pressure. Massena having, however, wasted the -summer season on the frontiers, the first line -acquired such strength, both from labour and from -the fall of rain, that lord Wellington resolved to -abide his opponent’s charge there.</p> - -<p>The ground presented to the French being, as it -were, divided into five parts or positions, shall be -described in succession from right to left.</p> - -<p>1º. From Alhandra to the head of the valley of -Calandrix. This distance, of about five miles, was -a continuous and lofty ridge, defended by thirteen -redoubts, and for two miles rendered inaccessible -by a scarp fifteen to twenty feet high, executed -along the brow. It was guarded by the British<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_353"></a>[353]</span> -and Portuguese divisions under general Hill, and -flanked from the Tagus by a strong flotilla of gun-boats, -manned by British seamen.</p> - -<p>2º. From the head of the vale of Calandrix to -the Pé de Monte. This position, also five miles in -length, consisted of two salient mountains forming -the valley of Aruda, that town being exactly in -the mouth of the pass. Only three feeble redoubts, -totally incapable of stopping an enemy for an instant, -were constructed here; the defence of the -ground was entrusted to general Crawfurd and the -light division.</p> - -<p>3º. The Monte Agraça. This lofty mountain -overtopped the adjacent country in such a manner, -that from its summit the whole of the first line -could be distinctly observed. The right was separated -from the Aruda position, by a deep ravine -which led to nothing, the left overlooked the village -and valley of Zibreira, and the centre overhung -the town of Sobral. The summit of this -mountain was crowned by an immense redoubt, -mounting twenty-five guns, and having three smaller -works, containing nineteen guns, clustered -around. The garrisons, amounting to two thousand -men, were supplied by Pack’s brigade, and -on the reverse of the position, which might be -about four miles in length, the fifth division, under -general Leith, was posted in reserve.</p> - -<p>4º. From the valley of Zibreira to Torres Vedras. -This position, seven miles long, was at first without -works, because it was only when the rains had set -in, that the resolution to defend the first line -permanently, was adopted. But the ground being -rough and well defined, and the valley in front<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_354"></a>[354]</span> -watered by the Zizandre, now become a considerable -river, it presented a fine field of battle for a -small army. The first and fourth, and a sixth -division formed of troops just arrived from England -and from Cadiz, were there posted, under -the immediate command of lord Wellington himself; -and his head-quarters were fixed at Pero -Negro, near the Secorra, a rock, on which a telegraph -was erected, communicating with every part -of the Lines.</p> - -<p>5º. From the heights of Torres Vedras to the mouth -of the Zizandre. The right flank of this position and -the pass in front of the town of Torres Vedras were -secured, first, by one great redoubt, mounting forty -guns, and, secondly, by several smaller forts, judiciously -planted so as to command all the approaches. -From these works to the sea a range of moderate -heights were crowned with small forts; but the -chief defence there, after the rains had set in, was -to be found in the Zizandre, which was not only -unfordable, but overflowed its banks, and formed -an impassable marsh. A paved road, parallel to the -foot of the hills, run along the whole front, that is, -from Torres Vedras, by Runa Sobral and Aruda, -to Alhandra. This was the nature of the <em>first</em> -line of defence; the <em>second</em> was still more formidable.</p> - -<p>1º. From the mouth of the St. Lourença to -Mafra, a distance of seven miles, there was a -range of hills naturally steep, artificially scarped, -and covered by a deep, and in many parts impracticable -ravine. The salient points were secured -by forts, which flanked and commanded the few -accessible points; but as this line was extensive,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_355"></a>[355]</span> -a secondary post was fortified a few miles in the -rear, to secure a road leading from Ereceira to -Cintra.</p> - -<p>2º. On the right of the above line the Tapada, -or royal park of Mafra, offered some open -ground for an attack. Yet it was strong, and, -together with the pass of Mafra, was defended -by a system of fourteen redoubts, constructed with -great labour and care, well considered with respect -to the natural disposition of the ground, and, in -some degree, connected with the secondary post -spoken of above: in front, the Sierra de Chypre, -covered with redoubts, obstructed all approaches -to Mafra itself.</p> - -<p>3º. From the Tapada to the pass of Bucellas, a -space of ten or twelve miles, which formed the -middle of the second line, the country is choked -by the Monte Chique, the Cabeça, or head of -which is in the centre of, and overtopping all -the other, mountain masses. A road, conducted -along a chain of hills, high and salient, but less -bold than any other parts of the line, connected -Mafra with the Cabeça, and was secured by a -number of forts. The country in front was extremely -difficult, and a second and stronger range -of heights, parallel to and behind the first, offered -a good fighting position, which could only be approached -with artillery by the connecting road in -front, and to reach that, either the Sierra de Chypre, -on the left, or the pass of the Cabeça de Monte -Chique, on the right, must have been carried. -Now the works covering the latter consisted of a -cluster of redoubts constructed on the inferior -rocky heads in advance of the Cabeça, and completely -commanding all the approaches, and both<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_356"></a>[356]</span> -from their artificial and natural strength, nearly -impregnable to open force. The Cabeça and its -immediate flanks were considered secure in their -natural precipitous strength; and, in like manner, -the ridges connecting the Cabeça with the pass of -Bucellas, being impregnable, were left untouched, -save the blocking of one bad mule road that led -over them.</p> - -<p><ins class="corr" id="tn-356" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: '3º. From Bucellas'"> -4º. From Bucellas</ins> (the pass of which was difficult -and strongly defended by redoubts on each -side) a ridge, or rather a collection of impassable -rocks, called the Sierra de Serves, stretches to the -right for two miles without a break, and then dies -away by gradual slopes in the low ground about -the Tagus. These declivities and the flat banks of -the river offered an opening two miles and a half -wide, which was laboriously and carefully strengthened -by redoubts, water-cuts, and retrenchments, -and connected by a system of forts with the heights -of Alhandra, but it was the weakest part of the -whole line in itself, and the most dangerous from its -proximity to the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda.</p> - -<p>There were five roads practicable for artillery -piercing the <em>first line</em> of defence, namely, two -at Torres Vedras, two at Sobral, and one at -Alhandra; but as two of these united again -at the Cabeça, there were, in fact, only four -points of passage through the <em>second line</em>, that -is to say, at Mafra, Monte Chique, Bucellas, -and Quintella in the flat ground. The aim -and scope of all the works was to bar those -passes and to strengthen the favourable fighting -positions between them, without impeding the -movements of the army. These objects were attained, -and it is certain that the loss of the <em>first<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_357"></a>[357]</span> -line</em> would not have been injurious, save in reputation, -because the retreat was secure upon the <em>second -and stronger line</em>, and the guns of the first were -all of inferior calibre, mounted on common truck -carriages, and consequently immoveable and useless -to the enemy.</p> - -<p>The movements of the allies were free and unfettered -by the works. But the movements of the -French army were impeded and cramped by the -great Monte Junta, which, rising opposite the centre -of the first line, sent forth a spur called the Sierra -de Baragueda in a slanting direction, so close up -to the heights of Torres Vedras that the narrow -pass of Ruña alone separated them. As this pass -was commanded by heavy redoubts, Massena -was of necessity obliged to dispose his forces on -one or other side of the Baragueda, and he could -not transfer his army to either without danger; -because the sierra, although not impassable, was -difficult, and the movement, which would require -time and arrangement, could always be overlooked -from the Monte Agraça, whence, in a few hours, -the allied forces could pour down upon the head, -flank, or rear of the French while in march. And -this with the utmost rapidity, because communications -had been cut by the engineers to all important -points of the Lines, and a system of signals were -established, by which orders were transmitted from -the centre to the extremities in a few minutes.</p> - -<p>Thus much I have thought fit to say respecting -<em>the Lines</em>, too little for the professional reader, too -much, perhaps, for a general history. But I was -desirous to notice, somewhat in detail, works, more -in keeping with ancient than modern military -labours, partly that a just idea might be formed of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_358"></a>[358]</span> -the talents of the British engineers who constructed -them, and partly to show that lord Wellington’s -measures of defence were not, as some French military -writers have supposed, dependent upon the first -line. Had that been stormed, the standard of Portuguese -independence could still have been securely -planted amidst the rocks of the second position.</p> - -<p>To occupy fifty miles of fortification, to man -one hundred and fifty forts, and to work six hundred -pieces of artillery, required a number of men; -but a great fleet in the Tagus, a superb body of -marines sent out from England, the civic guards -of Lisbon, the Portuguese heavy artillery corps, -the militia and the ordenança of Estremadura furnished, -altogether, a powerful reserve. The native -artillery and the militia supplied all the garrisons -of the forts on the second, and most of those on -the first line. The British marines occupied the -third line: the navy manned the gun-boats on -the river, and aided, in various ways, the operation -in the field. The recruits from the depôts, and all -the men on furlough, being called in, rendered the -Portuguese army stronger than it had yet been; -and the British army, reinforced, as I have said, -both from Cadiz and England, and remarkably -healthy, presented such a front as a general would -desire to see in a dangerous crisis.</p> - -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_358fp" style="max-width: 35em;"> - <p class="right fs70"><em>Vol. 3, Plate 8.</em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_358fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_358fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - <div class="caption"> -LINES of <em>Torres Vedras</em><br /> -1810.<br /> - -<p><em>Published by T. & W. Boone 1830.</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>It was, however, necessary not only to have -strength, but the appearance of strength; and lord -Wellington had so dealt with Romana that, without -much attention to the wishes of his own government, -the latter agreed to join the allies with two -divisions. The first, under his own command, -crossed the Tagus at Aldea Gallega on the 19th -of October, reached head-quarters the 24th, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_359"></a>[359]</span> -was posted at Enxara de los Cavalleros, just behind -the Monte Agraça; the other followed in a few -days: and thus, before the end of October, not -less than one hundred and thirty thousand fighting -men received rations within the Lines; more than -seventy thousand being regular troops, completely -disposable and unfettered by the works.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, Mendizabel, with the remainder of -the Spanish army, reinforced by Madden’s Portuguese -dragoons, advanced towards Zafra. Ballasteros, -at the same time, moved upon Araceña; -and Mortier, ignorant of Romana’s absence, retired -across the Morena on the 8th, for Soult was then -seriously menacing Cadiz. Thus fortune combined, -with the dispositions of the English general, to -widen the distance, and to diversify the objects -of the French armies, at the moment when the -allies were concentrating the greatest force on the -most important point.</p> - -<p><ins class="corr" id="tn-359" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Massena, suprised'"> -Massena, surprised</ins> at the extent and strength -of works, the existence of which had only become -known to him five days before he came upon them, -employed several days to examine their nature. -The heights of Alhandra he judged inattackable; -but the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda attracted -his attention. Through the former he could turn -Hill’s position, and come at once upon the weakest -part of the second line; yet the abattis and the -redoubts erected, and hourly strengthening, gave -him little encouragement to attack there; while -the nature of the ground about Aruda was such -that he could not ascertain what number of -troops guarded it, although he made several demonstrations, -and frequently skirmished with the -light division, to oblige Crawfurd to shew his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_360"></a>[360]</span> -force. That general, by making the town of Aruda -an advanced post, rendered it impossible to discover -his true situation without a serious affair; -and, in a short time, his division, with prodigious -labour, secured the position in a manner really -worthy of admiration.</p> - -<p>Across the ravine on the left, a loose stone wall, -sixteen feet thick and forty feet high, was raised; -and across the great valley of Aruda, a double line -of abattis was drawn; not composed, as is usual, -of the limbs of trees, but of full-grown oaks and -chestnuts, dug up with all their roots and branches, -dragged, by main force, for several hundred yards, -and then reset and crossed, so that no human -strength could break through. Breast-works, at -convenient distances, to defend this line of trees, -were then cast up; and along the summits of the -mountain, for a space of nearly three miles, including -the salient points, other stone walls, six -feet high and four in thickness, with banquettes, -were built; so that a good defence could have -been made against the attacks of twenty thousand -men.</p> - -<p>The next points that drew Massena’s attention -were the Monte Agraça and the vale of the Upper -Zizandre, where, from the recent period at which -lord Wellington had resolved to offer battle on -the first line, no outworks had been constructed; -and the valley of Zibreira, and even the hills above -Runa, had not been fortified. Here it was possible -to join battle on more equal terms, but the position -of the allies was still very formidable; the flanks -and rear were protected by great forts, and not -only was a powerful mass of troops permanently -posted there, but six battalions, drawn from Hill’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_361"></a>[361]</span> -corps, and placed at Bucellas, could, in a very -short time, have come into action.</p> - -<p>Beyond Runa, the Baragueda ridge and the -forts of Torres Vedras forbad any flank movement -by the French general; and it only remained for -him to dispose his troops in such a manner between -Villa Franca and Sobral that, while the heads of -the columns menaced the weakest points of the -Lines, a few hours would suffice to concentrate the -whole army at any part between the Tagus and -the Baragueda ridge. The second corps, still -holding the hills opposite Alhandra, extended its -right along some open ground as far as Aruda, -and being covered, at that point, by a force of -cavalry, was connected with the eighth corps; the -head of which was pushed forward on Sobral, -occupying the lower ridges of the Baragueda, and -lining the banks of the Zizandre as far as Duas -Portas on the road to Runa: the outposts of the -two armies being nearly in contact.</p> - -<p>Massena did not bring the sixth corps beyond -Otta, and his dispositions were not made without -several skirmishes, especially near Sobral, on the -morning of the 14th, when, attempting to dislodge -the seventy-first regiment from a field-work, his -troops were repulsed, pursued, and driven from -their own retrenchments, which were held until -evening; and only evacuated because the whole -of the eight corps was advancing for the purpose -of permanently establishing its position. The loss -of the allies in these petty affairs amounted to one -hundred and fifty; of which, the greatest part fell -at Sobral; that of the enemy was estimated higher. -The English general Harvey was wounded, and at -Villa Franca the fire of the gun-boats killed the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_362"></a>[362]</span> -French general St. Croix, a young man of signal -ability and promise.</p> - -<p>The war was now reduced to a species of -blockade: Massena’s object being to feed his army -until reinforcements reached it; lord Wellington’s -to starve the French before succour could arrive. -The former spread his moveable columns in the -rear to seek for provisions, and commenced forming -magazines at Santarem, where his principal depôt -was established; but the latter drew down all the -militia and ordenança of the north on the French -rear, putting their right in communication with the -garrison of Peniché, and their left with the militia -of Lower Beira. To strengthen the latter he prevailed -on Carlos d’España to cross the Tagus, and -act between Castello Branco and Abrantes; and -thus the French were completely enclosed, without -any weakening of the regular army.</p> - -<p>To aid the communication between Peniché and -the militia, a Spanish light battalion and a strong -body of English cavalry advanced to Ramalhal. -Obidos, surrounded by old walls, was placed in a -temporary state of defence, and garrisoned by three -hundred Portuguese, under major Fenwick; and a -moveable column, under colonel Waters, issuing -from Torres Vedras, made incursions against the -enemy’s marauding detachments, capturing many -prisoners, and part of a considerable convoy which -was passing the Baragueda. The French were thus -continually harassed, yet their detachments scoured -the whole country, even beyond Leiria, and obtained -provisions in considerable quantities.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the main bodies of the hostile forces -remained quiet, although the French right was -greatly exposed. Lord Wellington had four<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_363"></a>[363]</span> -British divisions and Romana’s corps, forming a -mass of twenty-five thousand men, close round -Sobral, and, by directing the greatest part of his -cavalry and the six battalions, at Bucellas, upon -Aruda, he could have assembled from eight to ten -thousand men there also, who, advancing a short -distance into the plain, could, in conjunction with -Hill, have kept the second corps in check; while -the twenty-five thousand, pouring down at daylight -from the Monte Agraça, from the valley of Zibreira, -and from the side of Ruña, could have enveloped -and crushed the head of the eighth corps long -before the sixth could have reached the scene of -action. But war is a curious and complicated web! -and while the purely military part was thus happily -situated and strong, the political part was one of -weakness and alarm. Scarcely could the English -<span class="sidenote">See Annals -of the -Peninsular -War, -Vol. II. -p. 331.</span>general maintain a defensive attitude, struggling as -he was against the intrigues and follies of men -who have, nevertheless, been praised for their -“earnest and manly co-operation.”</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_364"></a>[364]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXI_IX">CHAPTER IX.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>The presence of the enemy, in the heart of the -country, embarrassed the finances, and the Regency -<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s -Papers. -MSS.</span>applied to England for an additional subsidy. Mr. -Stuart, seeing the extreme distress, took upon himself -to direct the house of Sampayo to furnish -provisions to the troops on the credit of the first -subsidy; he also made the greatest exertions to -feed the fugitive inhabitants, forty thousand of -whom arrived before the 13th of October, and -others were hourly coming in, destitute and starving. -Corn, purchased at any price, was sought for in all -countries; from Ireland, America, and Egypt; and -one thousand tons of government shipping were -lent to merchants to fetch grain from Algiers. One -commission of citizens was formed to facilitate the -obtaining cattle and corn from the northern provinces; -another to regulate the transport of provisions -to the army, and to push a trade with Spain -through the Alemtejo. Small craft were sent up -the Tagus to carry off both the inhabitants and -their stock, from the islands and from the left bank, -and post-vessels were established along the coast to -Oporto. Bullion and jewels were put on board the -men of war, a proclamation was issued, calling -upon the people to be tranquil, and a strong police -was established to enforce this object. Finally, to -supply the deficiency of tonnage created by the -sending off the transports in search of corn, an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_365"></a>[365]</span> -embargo was laid upon the port of Lisbon; it was -strongly protested against by the Americans, but an -imperious necessity ruled.</p> - -<p>All these measures were vehemently opposed by -the Patriarch and his faction; and that nothing -might be wanting to shew how entirely the fate of -the Peninsula depended, in that hour, upon lord -Wellington’s firmness, the fears of the British -cabinet, which had been encreasing as the crisis -approached, were now plainly disclosed. During -the retreat from the north, affairs seemed so gloomy -to the eyes of some officers of rank, that their correspondence -bore evidence of their feelings; and -the letters of general Spencer and general Charles -Stewart appeared so desponding to lord Liverpool, -that he transmitted them to lord Wellington, and, -by earnestly demanding an opinion upon their -contents, shewed how deeply they had disturbed -his own mind.</p> - -<p>Thus beset on every side, the English general rose -like a giant. Without noticing either the arguments -or the forebodings in these letters, he took a calm -historical review of the grounds upon which he had -undertaken the defence of Portugal, and which he -had before pointed out to the minister he was addressing; -then shewing that, up to that period, his -views had been in every instance borne out by the -results, he demonstrated that it was reasonable to -confide in his judgement of what was to come. -Having thus vindicated his own prudence and foresight -by irresistible facts, he proceeded to trace the -probable course of future events, entered largely -into both his own and the enemy’s designs, and -with such a judgement and sagacity that the subsequent -course of the war never belied his anticipations.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_366"></a>[366]</span> -This remarkable letter exists, and, were -all other records of lord Wellington’s genius to be -lost, it would alone suffice to vindicate his great -reputation to posterity.</p> - -<p>Having with conscious superiority replied to his -<ins class="corr" id="tn-366" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'own governmennt'"> -own government</ins>, he, with a fierceness rendered -necessary by the crisis, turned upon the patriarch -and his coadjutors. Reproaching them for their unpatriotic, -foolish, and deceitful conduct, he told -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_V">No. V.</a> -Section 3.</span>them plainly, that they were unfaithful servants of -their country and their prince, and threatened <em>to withdraw -the British army altogether</em>, if the practices -of which he complained were not amended.</p> - -<p>“The king of England and the prince regent of -Portugal had,” he said, “entrusted him with the -conduct of the military operations, and he would -not suffer any person to interfere. He knew what -to do, and he would not alter his plans to meet the -<em>senseless suggestions of the Regency</em>. Let the latter -look to their own duties! Let them provide food -for the army and the people, and keep the capital -tranquil.” “With principal Souza,” he said, “it -was not possible to act, and, if that person continued -in power, the country would be lost. Either -the principal or himself must quit their employments; -if himself, he would take care that the -world should know the reasons; meanwhile he -would address the prince upon the conduct of the -Regency.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Appendix -<a href="#No_V">No. V.</a> -Section 4.</div> - -<p>“He had hoped,” he resumed in another letter, -“that the Portuguese government was satisfied with -his acts, and that instead of endeavouring to render -all defence useless by disturbing the minds of the -populace at Lisbon, they would have adopted -measures to secure the tranquillity of that capital.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_367"></a>[367]</span> -But, like other weak individuals, they added duplicity -to weakness, and their past expressions of approbation -and gratitude he supposed were intended -to convey censure. All he asked from them was to -preserve tranquillity, to provide food for their own -troops while employed in the Lines, and to be prepared, in -case of disaster, to save those persons and -their families who were obnoxious to the enemy.” -“I have,” he said “little doubt of final success, -but <em>I have fought a sufficient number of battles to -know, that the result of any is not certain, even with -the best arrangements</em>.” These reproaches were -neither too severe nor ill-timed, for the war had -been hanging in even balance, and the weight of -interested folly thus thrown in by the Regency, was -beginning to sink the scale. Yet to shew the justice -of lord Wellington’s complaints, it is necessary -to resume the thread of those intrigues which have -been before touched upon.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Appendix -<a href="#No_V">No. V.</a> -Section 8.</div> - -<p>Instead of performing their own duties, the government -assumed, that the struggle could be maintained -on the frontier, and when they should have -been removing the people and the provisions from -the line of retreat, they were discussing the expediency -of military operations which were quite impracticable. -When convinced of their error by -facts, they threw the burthen of driving the country -upon the general, although they knew that he -was ignorant even of the names and places of abode -of those officers and magistrates who were to execute -it, and that there was but one Portuguese -agent at head-quarters to give assistance in translating -the necessary orders.</p> - -<p>When this was remarked to them, they issued -the orders themselves, but made the execution referable<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_368"></a>[368]</span> -to the general, without his knowledge, and -well knowing that he had no means of communicating -with the country people, and this at the very -moment of the enemy’s advance. The battle of -Busaco, by delaying the French army, alone enabled -the orders even to reach the persons to whom -they were addressed. But it was the object of the -Regency, by nourishing and soothing the national -indolence, to throw the odium of harsh and rigorous -measures upon the British authorities. Lord Wellington, -however, while he reproached them for -this conduct, never shrunk from the odium; he -avowed himself, in his proclamations, the author of -the plan for wasting the country, and he was willing -the Regency should shelter themselves under -his name, but he was not willing to lose the fruit of -his responsibility, or, that those whose courage did -shrink from the trial, “should seek popularity with -the populace at the expense of the best interests of -the country.”</p> - -<p>After the disputes which followed the fall of -Almeida, the English government convinced that a -more secure and powerful grasp must be taken of -Portugal, insisted, at the instance of lord Wellington, -that their envoy, Mr. Stuart, should have a -seat in the Regency, and that the subsidy should be -placed under the control of the British instead of -the native authorities. The 2d of October, Mr. -Stuart took his seat, and together with doctor Noguera, -the Conde de Redondo, and the marquis -Olhao (the former of whom was decidedly averse -to the Souzas’ faction, and the two latter moderate -in their conduct) proceeded to control the intrigues -and violence of the Patriarch and principal Souza. -It was full time, for both were formally protesting<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_369"></a>[369]</span> -against the destruction of the mills in Beira, and -vigorously opposing every measure proposed by -lord Wellington. They were deeply offended by -the suppression of the Lusitanian legion, which about -this time was incorporated with the regular forces; -and they had openly declared, that the Portuguese -troops should not retreat from the frontiers, and -that if the enemy obliged the British army to embark, -not a native, whether soldier or citizen, should -go with it. When the allies, notwithstanding this, -fell back to the Lines, Souza proposed that the -Regency should fly to the Algarves, which being -indignantly protested against by Mr. Stuart, Souza -threatened to quit the government. The dispute -was then referred to lord Wellington, and, on the -6th of October, drew from him those severe expressions -of which an abstract has been given above.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the restless Principal pursued his -designs with activity, and, in conjunction with his -brothers and the Patriarch, established a regular -and systematic opposition to lord Wellington’s plans -of defence. Factious in council, they were also -clamorous out of doors, where many echoed their -sentiments, from anger at some wanton ravages, -that, in despite of the general’s utmost efforts, had -marked the retreat. They courted the mob of -Lisbon servilely and grossly; and Antonio Souza -getting the superintendence of the succours for the -fugitive population, became the avowed patron of -all persons preferring complaints. He took pains -to stimulate and exasperate the public griefs, and -to exaggerate the causes of them, frequently hinting -that the Portuguese people and not the British -army had formerly driven out the French. All -these calumnies being echoed by the numerous<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_370"></a>[370]</span> -friends and partisans of the caballers, and by the -fidalgos, who endeavoured to spread discontent as -widely as possible; there wanted but slight encouragement -from the Brazils, to form a national -party, and openly attack the conduct of the war.</p> - -<p>To obtain this encouragement, Raymundo, the old -tool of the party in the Oporto violences, was sent -to the court of Rio Janeiro, to excite the prince -regent against lord Wellington; and the Patriarch -himself wrote to the prince of Wales and to the duke -of Sussex, thinking to incense them also against -the English general. The extent and nature of the -intrigues may be estimated from a revelation made -at the time by baron Eben, and by the editor of a -Lisbon newspaper, called the <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">Brazilienza</i>.</p> - -<p>Those persons abandoning the faction, asserted -that the Patriarch, the Souzas, and (while he remained -in Portugal) the ex-plenipotentiary, Mr. -Villiers, were personally opposed to lord Wellington, -marshal Beresford, and Mr. de Forjas, and had -sought to remove them from their situations, and to -get the duke of Brunswick appointed generallissimo -in Portugal; that they had also endeavoured to engage -the duke of Sussex to take a leading part, but -that his royal highness had repulsed them at the -outset; that their plan was to engage a newspaper to -be their organ in London, as the <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">Brazilienza</i> was -to have been in Lisbon; that in their correspondence -lord Wellington was designated under the -name of <em>Alberoni</em>; lord Wellesley, <em>Lama</em>; Beresford, -<em>Ferugem</em>; Mr. Stuart, <em>Labre</em>; the Patriarch, -<em>Saxe</em>; Antonio Souza, <em>Lamberti</em>; colonel Bunbury -and Mr. Peel, then under secretaries of state, as -<em>Thin</em> and <em>By-Thin</em>. That after Mr. Villier’s departure, -the intrigue was continued by the Patriarch<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_371"></a>[371]</span> -and the Souzas, but upon a different plan; for, overborne -by the vigour of Mr. Stuart in the council, -they agreed to refrain from openly opposing either -him or Forjas, but resolved to write down what -either might utter, and transmit, that which suited -their purpose, to the Conde de Linhares and the -chevalier Souza; these persons undertaking to represent -the information so received, after their own -fashion, to the cabinets of St. James’ and Rio -Janeiro.</p> - -<p>The violent temper of the Patriarch unfitted him -to execute this plan; he made open display of -his hostility to the English general; and it is worthy -of observation that, while thus thwarting every -measure necessary to resist the enemy, his faction -did not hesitate to exercise the most odious injustice -and cruelty against those whom they denominated -well-wishers to the French. By a decree -of the prince regent’s, dated the 20th of March, -1809, private denunciations in cases of disaffection, -were permitted, the informer’s name to be kept -secret; and in September, 1810, this infamous -system, although strenuously opposed by Mr. Stuart, -was acted upon, and many persons suddenly sent -to the islands, and others thrown into dungeons. -Some might have been guilty; and the government -pretended that a traitorous correspondence with the -enemy was carried on through a London house, -which they indicated; but it does not appear that -a direct crime was brought home to any, and it is -certain that many innocent persons were oppressed.</p> - -<p>All these things shewing that vigorous measures -were necessary to prevent the ruin of the general -cause, lord Wellesley dealt so with the Brazilian<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_372"></a>[372]</span> -court, that every intrigue there was soon crushed, -lord Wellington’s power in Portugal confirmed, -and his proceedings approved of. Authority was -also given him to dismiss or to retain Antonio Souza -and even to remove lord Strangford, the British -envoy at Rio Janeiro, if it suited him so to do. -The subsidies were placed under his and Mr. Stuart’s -control; admiral Berkeley was appointed to -a seat in the Regency; and, in fine, Portugal was -reduced to the condition of a vassal state. A policy -which could never have been attempted, however -necessary, if the people at large had not been -willing to acquiesce; but firm in their attachment -to independence and abhorring the invaders, they -submitted cheerfully to this temporary assumption -of command, and fully justified the sagacity of the -man, who thus dared to grasp at the whole power -of Portugal with one hand, while he kept the -power of France at bay with the other.</p> - -<p>Although so strongly armed, lord Wellington -removed no person, but with equal prudence and -moderation reserved the exercise of this great authority -until further provocation should render it absolutely -necessary. But this remedy for the disorders -above related was not perfected for a long time, -nor until after a most alarming crisis of affairs had -been brought on by the conduct of the Lisbon cabal.</p> - -<p>From the strength of the Lines, it is plain -that offensive operations were far more to be -dreaded on the left, than on the right bank of the -Tagus. In the Alemtejo, the enemy could more -easily subsist, more effectually operate to the injury -of Lisbon, and more securely retreat upon his -own resources. Now lord Wellington had repeatedly -urged the Regency to oblige the inhabitants<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_373"></a>[373]</span> -to abandon their dwellings, and carry off their -herds and grain, especially those near the banks, -and on the numerous islands in the river, and above -all things to destroy or remove every boat. To -carry this into effect a commission had been appointed, -but so many delays and obstacles were -interposed by the Patriarch and his coadjutors, that -the commissioners did not leave Lisbon until the -enemy were close upon that river; both banks -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_V">No. V.</a> -Section 5.</span>being still stocked with cattle and corn, and what -was worse forty large boats on the right side, by -which the French immediately made themselves -masters of the islands, especially of Lizirias, where -they obtained abundance of provisions. But while -the Regency thus provided for the enemy, they -left the fortresses of Palmella, St. Felippe de Setuval, -and Abrantes with empty magazines.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington thinking that the ordenança -on the left bank, of whom four hundred were -armed with English muskets and furnished with -three pieces of artillery, would be sufficient to -repel plundering parties attempting to cross the -Tagus, was unwilling to spare men from the Lines. -He wanted numbers there and he also judged that -the ordenança would, if once assisted by a regular -force, leave the war to their allies. But Antonio -Souza was continually urging the planting of ambuscades, -and other like frivolities, upon the left -bank of the Tagus; and as his opinions were spread -abroad by his party, the governor of Setuval -adopted the idea, and suddenly advanced with his -garrison to Salvatierra on the river side.</p> - -<p>This ridiculous movement attracted the enemy’s -attention, and lord Wellington fearing they would -pass over a detachment, disperse the Portuguese<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_374"></a>[374]</span> -troops, and seize Setuval before it could be succoured, -peremptorily ordered the governor to return -to that fortress. This retrograde movement -caused the dispersion of the ordenança, and consternation -reigned in the Alemtejo. The supply -of grain coming from Spain was stopped, the -chain of communications broken, and, the alarm -spreading to Lisbon, there was no remedy but to -send general Fane, with some guns and Portuguese -cavalry, that could be ill spared from the Lines, -to that side. Fane immediately destroyed all the -boats he could find, hastened the removal of provisions, -and patrolling the banks of the river as -high as the mouth of the Zezere, kept a strict watch -upon the enemy’s movements.</p> - -<p>Other embarrassments were however continually -arising. The number of prisoners in Lisbon had -accumulated so as to become a serious inconvenience; -because, for some reason which does not -appear, the English Admiralty would not permit -them to be transported to England in ships of war, -and other vessels could not be spared. About this -time also admiral Berkeley, whose elaborate report -the year before, stated that, although the enemy -should seize the heights of Almada, he could not -injure the fleet in the river, now admitted that -he was in error; and the engineers were directed to -construct secondary lines on that side.</p> - -<p>Another formidable evil, arising from the conduct -of the Regency, was the state of the Portuguese -army. The troops were so ill supplied that more -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_V">No. V.</a> -Section 7.</span>than once they would have disbanded, had they not -been relieved from the British magazines. Ten -thousand soldiers of the line deserted between -April and December, and the militia and ordenança<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_375"></a>[375]</span> -abandoned their colours in far greater numbers; -for, as no remonstrance could induce the -Regency to put the laws in force against the delinquents, -that which was at first the effect of want -became a habit; so that even when regularly fed -from the British stores within the Lines, the desertion -was alarmingly great.</p> - -<p>Notwithstanding the mischiefs thus daily growing -up, neither the Patriarch nor the Principal -ceased their opposition. The order to fortify the -heights of Almada caused a violent altercation in -the Regency, and lord Wellington, greatly incensed, -denounced them to the Prince Regent; and -his letter produced such a paroxysm of anger in -the Patriarch, that he personally insulted Mr. -Stuart, and vented his passion in the most indecent -language against the general. Soon after this, the -deplorable state of the finances obliged the government -to resort to the dangerous expedient of requisitions -in kind for the feeding of the troops: -and in that critical moment the Patriarch, whose -influence was, from various causes, very great, -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_V">No. V.</a> -Section 10.</span>took occasion to declare that “he would not suffer -burthens to be laid upon the people which were -evidently for no other purpose than <em>to nourish the -war in the heart of the kingdom</em>.”</p> - -<p>But it was his and his coadjutors’ criminal conduct -that really nourished the war, for there were -ample means to have carried off in time ten-fold -the quantity of provisions left for the enemy. -Massena could not then have remained a week -before the Lines, and his retreat would have been -attended with famine and disaster, if the measures -previously agreed to by the Regency had been duly -executed. Whereas now, the country about Thomar,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_376"></a>[376]</span> -Torres Novas, Gollegao, and Santarem was -absolutely untouched; the inhabitants remained; -the mills, but little injured, were quickly repaired, -and lord Wellington had the deep mortification to -find that his well considered design was frustrated -by the very persons from whom he had a right to -expect the most zealous support. There was, indeed, -every reason to believe that the prince of -Esling would be enabled to maintain his positions -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_V">No. V.</a> -Section 7.</span>until an overwhelming force should arrive from -Spain to aid him. “<em>It is heart-breaking</em>,” was -the bitter reflection of the British general, “<em>to -contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy -and folly</em>.”</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_377"></a>[377]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXI_X">CHAPTER X.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>The increasing strength of the works, and the -report of British deserters (unhappily very numerous -at this period), soon convinced Massena that it was -impracticable to force the Lines without great reinforcements. -His army suffered from sickness, -from the irregular forces in the rear, and from the -vengeance of individuals, driven to despair by the -excesses which many French soldiers, taking advantage -of the times, committed in their foraging -courses. Nevertheless, with an obstinate pertinacity, -only to be appreciated by those who have long -made war, the French general maintained his -forward position, until the country for many leagues -behind him was a desert, and then, reluctantly -yielding to necessity, he sought for a fresh camp -in which to make head against the allies, while -his foragers searched more distant countries for -food.</p> - -<p>Early in October artillery officers had been -directed to collect boats for crossing both the -Tagus and the Zezere. Montbrun’s cavalry, stretching -along the right bank of the former, gathered -provisions, and stored them at Santarem, and both -there and at Barquiña (a creek in the Tagus, -below the mouth of the Zezere), rafts were formed -and boats constructed with wheels, to move from -one place to another; but, from the extreme -paucity of materials and tools, the progress was -necessarily slow. Meanwhile Fane, reinforced by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_378"></a>[378]</span> -some infantry, watched them closely from the left -bank; Carlos d’España came down from Castello -Branco to Abrantes; Trant acted sharply on the -side of Ourem, and Wilson’s Portuguese militia so -infested the country from Espinhal to the Zezere, -that Loison’s division was detached upon Thomar -to hold him in check.</p> - -<p>Towards the end of October, however, all the -hospitals, stores, and other incumbrances of the -French army were removed to Santarem, and, on -the 31st, two thousand men forded the Zezere -above Punhete to cover the construction of a -bridge. From this body, four hundred infantry -and two hundred dragoons, under general Foy, -moved against Abrantes, and, after skirmishing -with the garrison, made towards Sobreira Formosa. -The allies’ bridge of Villa Velha was foolishly -burnt, but Foy, with a smaller escort, pushed for -Pena Macor, and the 8th had gained Ciudad -Rodrigo, on his way to France, having undertaken -to carry information of the state of affairs to Napoleon; -a task which he performed with singular rapidity, -courage, and address. The remainder of -his escort retiring down the Zezere, were attacked -by Wilson, and suffered some loss.</p> - -<p>The bridge on the Zezere was destroyed by floods, -the 6th; but the enemy having entrenched the -height over Punhete, not only restored it, but -cast a second at Martinchel, higher up the river. -Massena then commenced his retrograde march, -but with great caution, because his position was -overlooked from the Monte Agraça, and the defile -of Alemquer being in the rear of the eighth corps, -it was an operation of some danger to withdraw -from before the Lines. To cover the movement<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_379"></a>[379]</span> -from the knowledge of the Partizans in the rear, -Montbrun’s cavalry marched upon Leiria and his -detachments scoured the roads to Pombal, on the -one side, and towards the Zezere, on the other. -Meanwhile the sixth corps marched from Otta and -Alemquer to Thomar, and Loison removed to Golegao -with his division, reinforced by a brigade of -dragoons.</p> - -<p>These dispositions being made, general Clausel -withdrew from Sobral during the night of the 14th, -and the whole of the eighth corps passed the defile -in the morning of the 15th, under the protection of -some cavalry left in front of Aruda, and of a -strong rear-guard on the height covering Alemquer. -The second corps then retreated from Alhandra by -the royal causeway upon Santarem, while the eighth -corps marched by Alcoentre upon Alcanhede and -Torres Novas.</p> - -<p>This movement was not interrupted by lord Wellington. -The morning of the 15th proved foggy, -and it was some hours after day-break ere he perceived -the void space in his front which disclosed the -ability of the French general’s operations. Fane had -reported on the 14th that boats were collecting at -Santarem, and information arrived at the same time -that reinforcements for Massena were on the march -from Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy’s intention was -not clearly developed. It might be a retreat to -Spain; it might be to pass round the Monte Junta, -and so push the head of his army on Torres Vedras, -while the allies were following the rear. Lord -Wellington, therefore, kept the principal part of -the army stationary, but directed the second and -light divisions to follow the enemy, the former -along the causeway to Villa Franca, the latter to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_380"></a>[380]</span> -Alemquer, at the same time calling up his cavalry, -and requesting admiral Berkeley to send all the -boats of the fleet up the Tagus, to enable the allies -to pass rapidly to the other bank, if necessary.</p> - -<p>Early on the 16th the enemy was tracked, marching -in two columns, the one upon Rio Mayor, the -other upon Santarem. Having passed Alcoentre, it -was clear that he had no views on Torres Vedras; -but whether he was in retreat to cross the Zezere -by the bridges at Punhete and Martinchel, or -making for the Mondego, was still uncertain. In -either case, it was important to strike a blow at the -rear, before the reinforcements and convoy, said to -be on the road from Ciudad Rodrigo, could be met -with. The first division was immediately brought -up to Alemquer, the fifth entered Sobral, the light -division and cavalry marched in pursuit, four hundred -prisoners were made, principally marauders; -and a remarkable exploit was performed by one -<span class="sidenote">Private -Journal of -the Hon. -Captain -Somers -Cocks, 16th -Dragoons.</span>Baxter, a serjeant of the sixteenth dragoons. This -man, having only five troopers, came suddenly -upon a piquet of fifty men, who were cooking. -The <ins class="corr" id="tn-380" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Frenchmen run to'"> -Frenchmen ran to</ins> their arms, and killed one of -the dragoons; but the rest broke in amongst them -so strongly, that Baxter, <ins class="corr" id="tn-380a" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'with the assistace'"> -with the assistance</ins> of some countrymen, made forty-two captives.</p> - -<p>The 17th, the eighth corps marched upon Alcanhede -and Pernes, the head of the second corps -reached Santarem, and Fane, deceived by some -false movements, reported that they were in full -retreat, and the troops at Santarem only a rear -guard. This information seeming to be confirmed -by the state of the immense plains skirting the -Tagus, which were left covered with straw-ricks, it -was concluded that Massena intended to pass the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_381"></a>[381]</span> -Zezere, over which it was known that he had cast -a second bridge. Hill was immediately ordered to -cross the Tagus with the second division and thirteenth -dragoons, and move upon Abrantes, either -to succour that fortress or to head the march of the -French. Meanwhile, the fourth, fifth, and sixth -divisions were directed upon Alemquer, the first -division and Pack’s brigades upon Cartaxo, and the -light division reached El Valle, a village on the -Rio Mayor, where a considerable rear guard was -formed, and an unequal engagement would have -ensued, but for the opportune arrival of the commander-in-chief. -In the evening the enemy joined -their main body on the heights of Santarem.</p> - -<p>Hitherto, lord Wellington, regarding the security -of the Lines with a jealous eye, acted very cautiously. -On the 15th and 16th, while the French were still -hampered by the defiles, his pursuit was slack, -although it would in no degree have risked the -safety of the Lines, or of the pursuing troops, to -have pushed the first, second, and light divisions -and Pack’s brigade vigorously against the enemy’s -rear. On the 18th, however, when Hill had passed -the Tagus at Villada, and Fane was opposite to -Abrantes, lord Wellington, whether deceived by -false reports, or elated at this retrograde movement, -this proof of his own superior sagacity, prepared, -with a small force, to assail what he conceived -the rear guard of an army in full retreat. But -the French general had no intention of falling -back any farther; his great qualities were roused -by the difficulty of his situation, he had carried off -his army with admirable arrangement, and his new -position was chosen with equal sagacity and resolution.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_382"></a>[382]</span></p> - -<p>Santarem is situated on a mountain, which, rising -almost precipitously from the Tagus, extends about -three miles inland. In front, a secondary range of -hills formed an outwork, covered by the Rio Mayor, -which is composed of two streams, running side by -side to within a mile of the Tagus, but <ins class="err" id="err-382" title="Erratum: was 'where'"> -there</ins> they unite and flow in a direction parallel with that -river for many miles; the ground between being an -immense flat, called the plain of Santarem.</p> - -<p>In advancing by the royal road from Lisbon, the -allies ascended the Rio Mayor, until they reached -the Ponte Seca, a raised causeway, eight hundred -yards long, leading to the foot of the French position. -On the right hand, as far as the Tagus, a flat -sedgy marsh, not impassable, but difficult from -deep water-cuts, covered the French left. On the -other hand, the two streams of the Rio Mayor overflowing, -presented a vast impassable sheet of water -and marsh, covering the French right, and, in the -centre, the causeway offered only a narrow line of -approach, barred at the enemy’s end, by an abattis, -and by a gentle eminence, with a battery looking -down the whole length. To force this dangerous -passage was only a preliminary step; the secondary -range of hills was then to be carried before the -great height of Santarem could be reached; finally, -the town, with its old walls, offered a fourth point -of resistance.</p> - -<p>In this formidable position, the second corps -covered the rich plain of Golegao, which was occupied -by Loison’s division of the sixth corps, placed -there to watch the Tagus, and keep up the chain of -communication with Punhete. On Reynier’s right, -in a rugged country, which separated Santarem -from the Monte Junta and the Sierra de Alcoberte,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_383"></a>[383]</span> -the eighth corps was posted; not in a continuous -line with the second, but having the right pushed -forward to Alcanhete, the centre at Pernes, and the -left thrown back to Torres Novas, where Massena’s -head-quarters were fixed. On the right of Alcanhete, -the cavalry were disposed as far as Leiria, and -the sixth corps was at Thomar, in reserve, having -previously obliged Wilson’s militia to retire from -the Zezere upon Espinhal.</p> - -<p>Massena thus enclosed an immense tract of fertile -country; the plain of Golegao supplied him with -maize and vegetables, and the Sierra de Alcoberte -with cattle. He presented a formidable head to -the allies at Santarem, commanded the road, by -Leiria, to Coimbra, with the eighth corps and the -cavalry; that from Thomar, by Ourem, to Coimbra, -with the sixth corps; and, by his bridges over the -Zezere, opened a line of operations towards the -Spanish frontier, either through Castello Branco, or -by the Estrada Nova and Belmonte. Preserving -the power of offensive operations, by crossing the -Tagus on his left, or of turning the Monte Junta by -his right, he necessarily paralized a great part of -the allied force, and appeared, even in retreating, -to take the offensive.</p> - -<p>His first dispositions were, however, faulty in -detail. Between Santarem and the nearest division -of the eighth corps there was a distance of ten or -twelve miles, where the British general might penetrate, -turn the right of the second corps, and cut -it off from the rest of the army. Reynier, fearing -such an attempt, hurried off his baggage and hospitals -to Golegao, despatched a regiment up the -Rio Mayor to watch two bridges on his right, by -which he expected the allies to penetrate between<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_384"></a>[384]</span> -him and the eighth corps, and then calling upon -Junot for succour, and upon Massena for orders, -proceeded to strengthen his own position. It was -this march of Reynier’s baggage, that led Fane to -think the enemy was retreating to the Zezere, which, -corresponding with lord Wellington’s high-raised -expectations, induced him to make dispositions; not -for a general attack, by separating the second corps -from the rest of the army, but, as I have before -said, for assaulting Santarem in front with a small -force, thinking he had only to deal with a rear -guard.</p> - -<p>On the 19th, the light division entering the plain -between the Rio Mayor and the Tagus advanced -against the heights by the sedgy marsh. The first -division under Spencer, was destined to attack the -causeway, and Pack’s Portuguese brigade and the -cavalry were ordered to cross the Rio Mayor at the -bridges of Saliero and Subajeira and turn the -right of the French. The columns were formed -for the attack, and the skirmishers of the light -division were exchanging shots with the enemy in -the sedgy marsh, when it was found that the guns -belonging to Pack’s brigade had not arrived; and -lord Wellington, not quite satisfied with the appearance -of his adversary’s force, after three hours’ -demonstrations, ordered the troops to retire to their -former ground. It was, indeed, become evident, -that the French were determined to maintain this -position. Every advantageous spot of ground was -fully occupied, the most advanced centinels boldly -returned the fire of the skirmishers, large bodies -of reserve were descried, some in arms, others -cooking, the strokes of the hatchet, and the fall -of trees, resounded from the woods clothing the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_385"></a>[385]</span> -hills, and the commencement of a triple line of -abattis, and the fresh earth of entrenchments were -discernible in many places.</p> - -<p>On the 20th the demonstrations were renewed; -but, as the enemy’s intention to fight was no longer -doubtful, they soon ceased, and orders were sent to -general Hill to halt at Chamusca, on the left bank -of the Tagus. General Crawfurd, however, still -thought it was but a rear-guard at Santarem; -his eager spirit was chafed, he seized a musket, -and, followed only by a serjeant, advanced in the -night along the causeway, commencing a personal -skirmish with the French piquets, from whose -fire he escaped by miracle, convinced at last that -the enemy were not yet in flight.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Clausel brought his division from -Alcanhete close up to Santarem, and Massena -carefully examining the dispositions of the allies, -satisfied himself, that no great movement was in -agitation; wherefore, recalling the baggage of the -second corps, he directed Clausel to advance towards -Rio Mayor; a feint which instantly obliged -lord Wellington to withdraw the first division and -Pack’s brigade to Cartaxo; and the light division -was also held in readiness to retreat. In truth, Massena -was only to be assailed by holding the second -corps in check at the Ponte Seca, while a powerful -mass of troops penetrated in the direction of Tremes -and Pernes; but heavy rains rendered all the -roads impracticable, and as the position of Santarem -was maintained for several months, and many -writers have rashly censured the conduct of both -generals, it may be well to shew here that they -acted wisely and like great captains.</p> - -<p>It has been already seen how, without any extreme<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_386"></a>[386]</span> -dissemination of his force, the French general -contrived to menace a variety of points and to -command two distinct lines of retreat; but there -were other circumstances that equally weighed -with him. He expected momentarily to be joined -by the ninth corps, which had been added to his -command, and by a variety of detachments; his -position, touching upon Leiria and upon the Zezere, -enabled him to give his hand to his reinforcements -and convoys, either by the line of the Mondego -or that of Belmonte and the Estrada Nova; -at the same time he was ready to communicate -with any troops coming from Andalusia to his -assistance. He was undoubtedly open to a dangerous -attack, between Santarem and Alcanhete; -but he judged that his adversary would not venture -such a decisive operation, requiring rapid -well-timed movements, with an army composed of -three different nations and unpractised in great -evolutions. In this, guided by his long experience -of war, he calculated upon moral considerations -with confidence, and he that does not understand -this part of war is but half a general.</p> - -<p>Like a great commander, he calculated likewise -upon the military and political effect, that his -menacing attitude would have. While he maintained -Santarem, he appeared, as it were, to besiege Lisbon; -he also prolonged the sufferings of that city, and it -has been estimated that forty thousand persons -died from privations within the Lines during the winter -of 1810: moreover he encouraged the disaffected, -and shook the power which the English had assumed -in Portugal, thus rendering their final success -so doubtful in appearance, that few men had -sagacity enough to judge rightly upon the subject.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_387"></a>[387]</span> -At this period also, as the illness of George the -Third, by reviving the question of a Regency in -England, had greatly strengthened the opposition in -parliament, it was most important that the arguments -of the latter against the war should seem to -be enforced by the position of the French army. It -is plain therefore that, while any food was to be obtained, -there were abundant reasons to justify Massena -in holding his ground; and it must be admitted -that, if he committed great errors in the early part -of his campaign, in the latter part he proved himself -a daring, able, and most pertinacious commander.</p> - -<p>On the side of the British general, such were -the political difficulties, that a battle was equally -to be desired and dreaded. Desirable, because a -victory would have silenced his opponents both in -England and Portugal, and placed him in a situation -to dictate the measures of war to the ministers -instead of having to struggle incessantly against -their fears. Desirable to relieve the misery of the -Portuguese people, who were in a state of horrible -suffering; but, above all things desirable, lest a -second and a third army, now gathering in Castile -and in Andalusia, should reach Massena, and again -shut up the allies in their works.</p> - -<p>Dreaded, because a defeat or even a repulse -would have been tantamount to the ruin of the -cause; for it was at this period that the -disputes in the Regency, relative to the Lines, -at Almada, were most violent, and the slightest -disaster would have placed the Patriarch at the -head of a national party. Dreaded, because of the -discussions relative to the appointment of a Regency -in England, as any serious military check<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_388"></a>[388]</span> -would have caused the opposition to triumph, and -the troops to be withdrawn from Portugal. In this -balanced state it was essential that a battle, upon -which so many great interests hung, should not be -fought, except on terms of advantage. Now those -terms were not to be had. Lord Wellington, who -had received some reinforcements from Hallifax and -England, had indeed more than seventy thousand -fighting men under arms, and the enemy at this -time was not more than fifty thousand: nevertheless, -if we analyze the composition and situation of both, -it will be found that the latter, from the advantage -of position, could actually bring more soldiers into -the fight.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s -Papers, -MSS.</div> - -<p>In the Portuguese army, since the month of -April, the deaths had been four thousand, the disbanded -four thousand, the deserters ten thousand, the -recruits thirty thousand; the numbers were therefore -increased, but the efficiency for grand evolutions -rather decreased. The Spanish auxilliaries -also, ill-governed and turbulent, were at open discord -with the Portuguese, and their general was -neither able in war himself nor amenable to those -who were.</p> - -<p>While the heights of Almada were naked, the left -bank of the Tagus could not be watched with less than -twelve thousand men; and as from Alcanhete the -march to Torres Vedras was shorter than from Cartaxo, -two British divisions were employed to protect -the Lines; during the attack upon Pernes, Reynier -also might break out from Santarem, and ten thousand -men were required to hold him in check: -thus, the disposable troops would have fallen short -of forty-five thousand, comprehending soldiers of -three nations and many recruits. Lord Wellington’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_389"></a>[389]</span> -experience in the movement of great armies was -not at this period equal to his adversary’s, and -the attack was to be made in a difficult country, -with deep roads, where the Alviella, the Almonda, -and other rivers, greatly swelled by incessant rain, -furnished a succession of defensive lines to the -enemy, and the means of carrying off two-thirds -of his army. Victory might crown the attempt, -but the stakes were unequal. If Massena lost -even a third of his force, the ninth corps could -have replaced it. If lord Wellington failed, the -Lines were gone, and with them the whole Peninsula.</p> - -<p>He judged it best to remain on the defensive; -to strengthen the Lines; and to get the works at Almada -sufficiently forward; meanwhile, quieting the -troubles occasioned by the Patriarch, to perfect -the discipline of the Portuguese troops, and -improve the organization of the militia in rear of -the enemy. In this view, the light division, supported -by a brigade of cavalry, occupied Valle -and the heights overlooking the marsh and inundation; -the bridge at the English end of the -causeway was mined; a sugar-loaf hill, looking -straight down the approach, was crowned with -embrasures for artillery and laced in front with a -zigzag covered way, capable of containing five -hundred infantry: thus the causeway being -blocked, the French could not, while the inundation -kept up, make any sudden irruption from Santarem.</p> - -<p>On the left of the light division, posts were -extended along the inundation to Malhorquija; -thence, by a range of heights to Rio Mayor; -and behind the latter place, Anson’s cavalry was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_390"></a>[390]</span> -stationed in observation of the roads leading from -Pernes and Alcanhede. In rear of Anson, a position -was entrenched at Alcoentre, and occupied -by a division of infantry. Thus all the routes -leading upon the Lines between the Tagus and -the Monte Junta, were secured by what are technically -called heads of cantonments, under cover of -which, the other divisions were disposed in succession; -the first and the head-quarters being at Cartaxo, -a few miles in the rear of Valle; the remainder -at Alemquer and Sobral. Torres Vedras was, -however, always occupied in force, lest the enemy -should make a sudden march round the Monte -Junta.</p> - -<p>Massena, satisfied that his front was safe, continued -to build boats, fortified a post at Tancos, -on the Tagus, and expected, with impatience, the -arrival of a convoy escorted by five thousand men, -with which general Gardanne was coming from -Ciudad Rodrigo. This reinforcement, consisting -of detachments and convalescents left in Castile -when the army entered Portugal, marched by -Belmonte and the Estrada Nova, and the 27th, was -at Cardijos, within a few leagues of the French -bridges on the Zezere. The advance of a cavalry -patrol on either side would have opened the communications, -and secured the junction; but, at that -moment, Gardanne, harassed by the ordenança, -and deceived by a false rumour that general Hill -was in Abrantes, ready to move against him, suddenly -retreated upon Sabugal, with such haste and -blindness that he sacrificed a part of his convoy, -and lost many men.</p> - -<p>Notwithstanding this event, Massena, expecting -to be joined by the ninth corps, greatly strengthened<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_391"></a>[391]</span> -his position at Santarem, which enabled him -to draw the bulk of his forces to his right, and to -continue his marauding excursions in the most -daring manner. General Ferey, with a strong -detachment of the sixth corps, crossing the Zezere, -foraged the country as far as Castello Branco without -difficulty, and returned without loss: Junot -occupied Leiria and Ourem with detachments -of the eighth corps, and on the 9th of December -a battalion endeavoured to surprise Coimbra: -Trant, however, baffled that project. Meanwhile, -Drouet avowed a design to invade the Tras os -Montes, but the 22d of December occupied the -line of the Coa with the ninth corps, and Massena’s -patroles appeared again on the Mondego above -Coimbra, making inquiries about the fords: all the -spies likewise reported that a great reunion of -forces from the south was to have place near -Madrid.</p> - -<p>These things gave reason to fear, either that -Massena intended to file behind the Mondego and -seize Oporto, or that the reinforcements coming to -him were so large that he meant to establish bridges -over the Mondego, and occupy the northern country -also. It was known that a tenth corps was forming -at Burgos; the head of the fifth corps was again -in Estremadura; the French boats at Punhete -and Barquiña were numerous and large; and in -all parts there was evidence of great forces assembling -for a mighty effort on both sides of -the Tagus.</p> - -<p>It was calculated that, before the end of January, -more than forty thousand fresh troops would co-operate -with Massena; and preparations were made -accordingly. An outward line of defence, from Aldea<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_392"></a>[392]</span> -Gallega to Setuval, was already in a forward state; -Abrantes, Palmella, and St. Felippe de Setuval had -been at last provisioned; and a chain of forts parallel -to the Tagus were constructing on the hills lining -the <ins class="err" id="err-392" title="Erratum: was 'right bank'"> -left bank</ins> from Almada to Traffaria. Labourers -had also been continually employed in strengthening -the works of Alhandra, Aruda, and Monte Agraça, -which were now nearly impregnable, soldiers -only being wanting to defy the utmost force that -could be brought against them. To procure these, -lord Wellington wrote earnestly to lord Liverpool -on the 29th of December, demonstrating the absolute -necessity of reinforcing the army; and, on -the receipt of his letter, five thousand British were -ordered to embark for Lisbon, and three regiments -were drafted from Sicily.</p> - -<p>Sickness obliged general Hill to go home in December; -and, as Soult was known to be collecting a disposable -force behind the Morena, the troops on the -left bank of the Tagus were augmented, and marshal -Beresford assumed the command: for the Portuguese -army was now generally incorporated with the -British divisions. His force, composed of eighteen -guns, two divisions of infantry, and five regiments of -cavalry, Portuguese and British, was about fourteen -thousand men, exclusive of Carlos d’Espana’s -brigade, which, being at Abrantes, was under -the marshal’s orders.</p> - -<p>To prevent the passage of the Tagus; to intercept -all communication between Massena and Soult; -to join the main body of the army, by Vellada -if in retreat; and by Abrantes if in advance; -were the instructions given to Beresford; hence, -fixing his quarters at Chamusca, he disposed -his troops along the Tagus, from Almeyrim by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_393"></a>[393]</span> -Chamusca, as high as the mouth of the Zezere, -establishing signals between his different quarters. -He also beat the roads leading towards Spanish -Estremadura; established a sure and rapid intercourse -with Elvas and the other frontier fortresses; -organized good sources of intelligence at Golegao, -at Santarem, and especially at Thomar, and, in addition -to these general precautions, erected batteries -opposite the mouth of the Zezere. But, against -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_X">No. X.</a> -Section 1.</span>the advice of the engineers, he placed them at too -great distance from the river, and in other respects -unsuitable, and offering nothing threatening to the -enemy: for the French craft dropped down frequently -towards Santarem, without hindrance, until -colonel Colborne, of the sixty-sixth regiment, moored -a guard-boat close to the mouth of the Zezere, -disposing fires in such a manner on the banks -of the Tagus that nothing could pass without being -observed.</p> - -<p>On the side of Santarem, as all the country between -Alcanhete and the Ponte Seca continued impracticable -from the rain, the main bodies of both -armies were, of necessity, tranquil. Anson’s cavalry, -however, acting in concert with major -Fenwick, who came down from Obidos towards -Rio Mayor, harassed the enemy’s foraging parties; -and in the Upper Beira several actions of importance -had taken place with the militia, which -it is time to notice as forming an essential part of -lord Wellington’s combinations.</p> - -<p>It will be remembered that the ninth corps, -being ordered to scour Biscay and Upper Castile -in its progress towards the frontier of Portugal, -was so long delayed that, instead of keeping the -communications of Massena free, and securing his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_394"></a>[394]</span> -base, Drouet lost all connexion with the army of -Portugal. Meanwhile the Partidas of Leon and -Salamanca gave such employment to Serras’ division -that the Tras os Montes were unmolested, -and Silveira, falling down to the Lower Douro, -appeared, on the 29th, before Almeida. Its former -garrison had entered the French service, yet -immediately deserted to their countrymen, and -Silveira then blockaded the place closely, and -made an attempt to surprise a French post at San -Felices, but failed.</p> - -<p>In November, however, the head of the ninth -corps reached Ciudad Rodrigo, bringing a large -convoy of provisions, collected in Castile, for Massena. -Lord Wellington, anxious to prevent this -from reaching its destination, directed Silveira to -intercept it if possible, and ordered Miller on the -16th to Viseu, in support. On the 13th, general -Gardanne, with four thousand infantry and three -squadrons of cavalry, raised the blockade of Almeida, -took possession of Pinhel, and, supported -by the ninth corps, conducted the convoy towards -Sabugal and Penamacor. The 16th, he was between -Valverde and Pereiro Gavillos, but Silveira -falling upon him killed some of his men, took many -prisoners, and then retiring to Trancoso on the 17th, -united with Miller, the latter taking post at Guarda. -Nevertheless, Gardanne pursued his march, but -finally, as we have seen, retreated from Cardigos in -a panic.</p> - -<p>Drouet had not yet received the orders to put -himself under Massena’s command, but, at the representation -of Foy, moved forward into Portugal, -and to hide his object, spread the report, already -noticed, of his intention to penetrate the Tras os<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_395"></a>[395]</span> -Montes; the 17th December, however he passed -the Coa with fourteen thousand infantry and two -thousand cavalry, and crossing the Mondego the -18th, encamped near Gouvea, the 22d. Thence -the cavalry and one division under general Claparede, -marched against Silveira, and after a skirmish -occupied Trancoso; meanwhile, Drouet with -eleven battalions, and the troops under Gardanne, -made for the Alva and reached Ponte Murcella -the 24th.</p> - -<p>Hitherto lord Wellington’s communications with -Baccellar, had been carried on, through Trant on the -side of Coimbra, and through Wilson on that of Espinhal -and Abrantes. But this sudden advance of the -ninth corps obliged Wilson to cross the Mondego to -avoid being enclosed, and Drouet effecting his junction -with Massena by Espinhal, established his division -at Leiria; and then spreading towards the sea -cut off all communication between the allies and the -northern provinces. On the 2d of January, however, -Trant intercepted a letter from Drouet to Claparede, -giving an account of his own arrival, and of the state of -Massena’s army; intimating also, that a great operation -was in contemplation, and that the fifth corps -was daily expected in the Alemtejo: Claparede was -desired to seize Guarda, to forage the neighbouring -villages, and to watch the road of Belmonte; and -if Silveira should be troublesome, to defeat him.</p> - -<p>Silveira, an insufficient man, naturally vain, and -inflated with his former successes, had indeed, -already attacked Claparede, and was defeated with -the loss of two hundred men at Ponte Abad, on -the side of Trancoso. Baccellar, alarmed for the -safety of Oporto, then recalled Miller and Wilson. -The first moved upon Viseu; the last who had<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_396"></a>[396]</span> -already repassed the Mondego and taken a hundred -stragglers of Drouet’s division, marched hastily towards -the same point. Meanwhile, Silveira again -provoked Claparede, who pressed him so closely, -from the 10th to the 13th of January, that he drove -him with loss over the Douro at Pezo de Ragoa, -seized Lamego, and menaced Oporto before any -troops could concentrate to oppose him. Yet -<ins class="corr" id="tn-396" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'when Bacellar brought'"> -when Baccellar brought</ins> up his reserve to the -Pavia, and Miller’s and Wilson’s corps reached -Castro d’Airo, Claparede returned to Moimenta de -Beira, being followed by Wilson. Meanwhile, the -arrival of the ninth corps having relieved the French -troops in Leon, the latter again menaced Tras os -Montes, and Silveira marched to Braganza. Miller -died at Viseu, but Wilson and Trant continued to -harass the enemy’s parties.</p> - -<p>Claparede taking post at Guarda, according to -his instructions, seized Covilhao; while Foy, who -in returning from France had collected about three -thousand infantry and cavalry convalescents, was -marching by the road of Belmonte. Foy had escaped -innumerable perils. At Pancorbo he was -fain to fly from the Partidas, with the loss of his -despatches and half his escort, and now at Enxabarda -entering the Estrada Nova, he was harassed -by colonel Grant with a corps of ordenança from -the Lower Beira; and although he suffered nothing -here by the sword, three hundred of his men died -on the mountain from cold. On the 2d of February -he reached Santarem, where affairs were working -to a crisis.</p> - -<p>During December and January, the country being -always more or less flooded, the armies continued -in observation; but Massena’s positions were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_397"></a>[397]</span> -much strengthened, his out posts were reinforced, -and his marauding excursions extended in proportion -to his increasing necessities. The weak point on -either side was towards Rio Mayor, any movement -there created great jealousy, especially as the season -advanced and the roads became firmer. Hence, -on the 19th of January (some reinforcements -having landed at Lisbon a few days before) a fear -lest the allies should be concentrating at Alcoentre, -induced Junot to drive the out posts from Rio Mayor -to probe the state of affairs, and a general attack -was expected; but after a skirmish he returned with -a wound which disabled him for the rest of the -campaign.</p> - -<p>Early in February, a column of six thousand -French again scouring all the country beyond the -Zezere, got much concealed food near Pedragoa; -while other detachments arriving on the Mondego -below Coimbra, even passed that river, and carried off -four hundred oxen and two thousand sheep intended -for the allies. These excursions gave rise to horrible -excesses, which broke down the discipline of -the French army, and were not always executed -with impunity; the British cavalry at various times -redeemed many cattle and brought in a considerable -number of prisoners, amongst them an aide-de-camp -of general Clausel’s.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, Massena, organized a secret communication -with Lisbon, through the Portuguese general -Pamplona, who effected it by the help of the fidalgos -in that capital: their agents, under the pretence of -selling sugar to the inhabitants of Thomar and -Torres Novas, passed by the road of Caldas and -thence through the mountains of Pedragoa. Lord -Wellington, on the other hand, was understood to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_398"></a>[398]</span> -have gained a French officer of rank, and it is certain -that both generals had excellent information.</p> - -<p>In this manner hostilities were carried on, each -commander impatiently waiting for reinforcements -which should enable him to act offensively. How both -were disappointed, and how other events hitherto -unnoticed, bore upon the plans of each, must be the -subject of another book.</p> - - -<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4> - -<p>1º. “<em>War is not a conjectural art.</em>” Massena -forgetting this, assumed that the allies would not -make a stand in front of Lisbon, and that the militia -would not venture to attack Coimbra, but the battle -of Busaco and the capture of his hospitals evinced -the soundness of the maxim. Again, he conjectured -that the English would re-embark if pressed; -the Lines put an end to his dream; yet once awake, -he made war like a great man, proving more formidable -with reduced means and in difficulties, -than he had been when opportunity was rife and -his numbers untouched. His stay at Santarem -shews what thirty thousand additional men acting -on the left bank of the Tagus could have done, had -they arrived on the heights of Almada before admiral -Berkeley’s error was discovered: the supply -of provisions from Alemtejo and from Spain would -then have been transferred from Lisbon to the French -armies, and the fleet would have been driven from the -Tagus; when, the misery of the inhabitants, the fears -of the British cabinet, the machinations of the Patriarch, -and the little chance of final success would probably -have induced the British general to embark.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_399"></a>[399]</span></p> - -<p>2º. It has been observed, that Massena, in the -first week might have easily passed the Tagus, -secured the resources of the Alemtejo, and sent the -British fleet out of the port. This was not so practicable -as it might at first sight appear. The rains -were heavy; the fords impassable; the French had -not boats sufficient for a bridge; a weak detachment -would have been useless, a strong detachment -would have been dangerous: to collect boats, cast a -bridge, and raise the entrenchments necessary to -defend it, in the face of the allied forces, would -have been neither a safe nor certain operation; -moreover, Massena would then have relinquished -the certain aid of the ninth for the uncertain assistance -of the fifth corps.</p> - -<p>3º. Lord Wellington conjecturing the French to -be in full retreat, had like to have received a severe -check at Santarem; he recovered himself in time, -and with this exception, it would be difficult to -support essential objections to his operations: yet, -many have been urged, as that, he might have -straightened the enemy’s quarters more effectually -at Santarem; and that Hill’s corps, passing through -Abrantes, could have destroyed the bridges at -Punhete, and lining the Zezere cut off Massena’s -reinforcements, and obliged him to abandon his positions -or even to capitulate. This last idea, advanced -at the time by colonel Squires, an engineer -of great zeal and ability, perfectly acquainted with -the localities, merits examination.</p> - -<p>As a simple operation it was feasible, but the -results were not so certain; the Lines of Almada -being unfinished, the rashness of leaving the Tagus -unguarded, before an enemy who possessed eighty -large boats, exclusive of those forming the bridges<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_400"></a>[400]</span> -on the Zezere, is apparent; Hill’s corps must then -have been replaced, and the army before Santarem -would have been so weak as to invite a concentrated -attack, to the great danger of the Torres Vedras -Lines. Nor was the forcing of the French works -at Punhete a matter of certainty; the ground was -strong, there were two bridges over the Zezere, -and the sixth corps, being within a short march, -might, by passing at Martinchel, have taken Hill -in flank.</p> - -<p>4º. The same officer, at a later period, miscalculating -the enemy’s numbers at thirty thousand men, -and the allies at more than seventy thousand regulars, -proposed that Beresford should cross the -Tagus at Azingha, behind the Almonda, and march -upon Golegao, while lord Wellington, concentrating -at Rio Mayor, pushed upon Torres Novas. It was no -common head that conceived this project, by which -seventy thousand men would, in a single march, -have been placed in the midst of the enemy’s extended -quarters; but the hand of Napoleon could -scarcely have launched such a thunder-bolt. Massena -had still fifty thousand fighting-men; the boats -from Abrantes must have been brought down, to pass -the Tagus; the concentration of troops at Rio Mayor -could scarcely have escaped the enemy’s notice; -exact concert, in point of time, was essential, yet the -eighth corps could have held the allies in check on -the Alviella, while Reynier, from Santarem, and Ney, -from Thomar, crushed Beresford between the Almonda -and the Tagus: moreover the roads about Tremes -were nearly impassable from rain during December; -in January, Soult, of whose operations I shall speak -in the next book, was menacing the Alemtejo, and -a disaster happening to the allies would have relieved<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_401"></a>[401]</span> -the enemy’s difficulties, when nothing else could. -A campaign is like other works of art; accessaries, -however splendid, must be rejected when not conducive -to the main object. That judgement, which -duly classes the value of every feasible operation, -is the best quality of a general, and lord Wellington -possessed it in a remarkable degree; to it, his genius -and his courage were both subservient; without it -he might have performed many brilliant exploits in -the Peninsula, but could never have conducted the -war to a successful end.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_402"></a>[402]</span><br /></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XII">BOOK XII.</h2> -</div> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXII_I">CHAPTER I.</h3> - - -<p>In the preceding book, Spanish affairs have been -little noticed, although lord Wellington’s combinations -were deeply affected by them. The general -position of the allies, extending from Coruña to -Cadiz, presented a great crescent, in the convex of -which the French armies were operating, and it -was clear that, when checked at Lisbon, the most -important point, their wings, could reinforce the -centre, unless the allied forces, at the horns of the -crescent, acted vigorously on a system which the -harbours and fortresses, at either extremity, pointed -out as suitable to those who possessed the absolute -command of the sea. A British army and fleet were -therefore established at Cadiz, and a squadron of -frigates at Coruña; and how far this warfare relieved -the pressure on lord Wellington I shall now -show.</p> - -<p>The Gallician troops, under Mahi, usually hanging -on the borders of Leon, were always reported -to be above twenty thousand men when arms or -stores were demanded from England; but there -were never more than ten or twelve thousand in line, -and, although Serras’ division, of only eight thousand, -was spread over the plains, from Benevente to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_403"></a>[403]</span> -the Agueda, during Massena’s advance, no stroke of -importance was effected against it; the arrival -of the ninth corps, in October, put an end to all -hopes from the Gallicians in that quarter, although -the Partidas often surprised both posts and convoys. -Behind Mahi there was, however, a second army, -from four to six thousand strong, embodied to -defend the coast line towards the Asturias; and, -in the latter province, about eight thousand men, -including the irregular bands of Porlier and other -chiefs, constantly watched Bonet’s movements.</p> - -<p>That general frequently mastered the Asturias, -but could never maintain himself there; because the -country is a long defile, lying between the great -mountains and the sea, and being crossed by a succession -of parallel ridges and rivers, is admirably -calculated for partizan warfare in connexion with a -fleet. Thus, if he penetrated towards Gallicia, British -and Spanish frigates, from Coruña, landing troops -at the ports of Gihon, Santander, or Santona, could -always form a junction with the great bands of -Longa, Mina, and Amor, and excite insurrections -on his rear.</p> - -<p>In this manner Porlier, as before related, forced -him to withdraw from Castropol, after he had defeated -general Ponte at Sales, about the period of -Almeida being invested; and the advantages of -such operations being evident, the British government -sent sir Home Popham to direct the naval, -and general Walker the military affairs at Coruña. -Preparations were then made to embark a considerable -force, under Renovales, to renew the attack -at Santona and Santander; the Partidas of the interior -were to move at the same time; a battalion -of marines was assembled, in England, to garrison<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_404"></a>[404]</span> -Santona, when taken; and Mahi promised to co-operate -<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s -Papers. -MSS.</span>by an incursion. Serras, however, threatened -the frontier of Gallicia, and Mahi remained -in suspense, and this, together with the usual procrastination -of the Spaniards, and the late arrival -of sir Home Popham, delayed the expedition until -October. Meanwhile, Porlier, Escadron, and other -chiefs commenced an isolated attack in the beginning -of September. Serras returned to Zamora, -Mahi sent a division into Leon, and Bonet, aware -of the preparations at Coruña, first concentrated at -Oviedo, and then fell back towards Santander, -leaving a post at Gihon.</p> - -<p>On the 16th of October Renovales sailed but -with only thirteen hundred men; accompanied, however, -by general Walker, who carried ten thousand -stand of arms and ammunition. The 19th, entering -the harbour of Gihon, they captured some French -vessels; and Porlier, coming up on the land side, -took some treasure and eighty prisoners. The next -day, Renovales proceeded to Santona, but tempests -impeded his landing, and he returned to Coruña -the 2d of November, with only eight hundred and -fifty men: a frigate and a brig had foundered, -with the remainder of his troops, in a dreadful gale, -which destroyed all the Spanish naval force along -the coast, twelve vessels being wrecked even in -the harbour of Coruña. Meanwhile, Mahi, leaving -Toboado Gil’s division to watch Serras, entered the -Asturias with the rest of the Gallicians, and being -joined first by the troops of that province, and soon -after by Renovales, was very superior to the French; -yet he effected nothing, and Bonet maintained his -line from Gihon, through Oviedo, to the borders of -Leon.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_405"></a>[405]</span></p> - -<p>In this manner hostilities wore feebly on; the -Junta of the Asturias continued, as from the first, -distinguished by their venality and indifference to -the public good; their province was in a miserable -and exhausted state; and the powers of the British -naval officers on the coast not being defined, occasioned -some dispute between them and general -<span class="sidenote">Abstract -of General -Walker’s -Military -Reports -from Gallicia. -MSS.</span>Walker; and gave opportunity to the Junta to interfere -improperly with the distribution of the -English stores. Gallicia was comparatively rich, -but its Junta culpably inactive in the discharge -of duties and oppressive in government, disgusted -the whole province, and a general desire -to end their power was prevalent. In the course -of the winter a combination of the clergy was -formed to oppose both the Local Junta and the -General Cortes, and assumed so threatening an -aspect that Mahi, who was then on the coast, -applied to be taken in an English vessel to Coruña, -to ensure his personal safety; one Acuña was -soon after arrested at Ponferrada, the discontent -spread, and the army was more employed to overawe -these factions than to oppose the enemy. -Little advantage, therefore, was derived from the -Spanish operations in the north, and general Walker, -despairing to effect any thing useful, desired -either that a British force should be placed at his -disposal or that he might join the army in Portugal.</p> - -<p>These expeditions from Coruña naturally encreased -the audacity of the inland partidas, who -could only become really dangerous, by having a -sea-port where they could receive supplies and -reinforcements, or embarking save themselves in -extremity, and change the theatre of operations.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_406"></a>[406]</span> -To prevent this, the emperor employed considerable -numbers of men in the military governments -touching on the Bay of Biscay, and directed, as -we have seen, the corps d’armée, in their progress -towards Portugal, to scour all the disturbed countries -to the right and left. The ninth corps was -thus employed during the months of August and -September, but when it passed onward, the partidas -resumed their activity. Mina, Longa, Campillo, -and Amor, frequently united about Villar -Caya and Espinosa in numbers sufficient to attack -large French detachments with success; and to aid -them, general Walker repeatedly recommended the -taking possession of Santona with a corps of British -troops. That town, having the best winter -harbour along the coast, and being built on a mountain -promontory joined to the main by a narrow -sandy neck, could have been made very strong; -it would have cut off Bonet’s communication with -France by sea, have given the British squadron a -secure post from whence to vex the French coasts; -and it offered a point of connexion with the partidas -of the Rioja, Biscay, and Navarre.</p> - -<p>Lord Liverpool, swayed by these considerations, -desired to employ a corps of four thousand men to -secure it; but, having first demanded lord Wellington’s -<span class="sidenote">Letter to -Lord Liverpool. -7th May, -1811. MSS.</span>opinion, the latter “earnestly recommended -that no such maritime operations should -be undertaken. For,” said he, “unless a very -large force was sent, it would scarcely be able to -effect a landing, and maintain the situation of -which it might take possession. Then that large -force would be unable to move or effect any object -at all adequate to the expense, or to the expectations -which would be formed from its strength,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_407"></a>[407]</span> -owing to the want of those equipments and supplies -in which an army landed from its ships must -be deficient. It was vain to hope for any assistance, -even in this way, much less military assistance -from the Spaniards; the first thing they -would require uniformly would be money; then -arms, ammunition, clothing of all descriptions, -provisions, forage, horses, means of transport, and -every thing which the expedition would have a -right to require from them; and, after all, <em>this -extraordinary and perverse people would scarcely -allow the commander of the expedition to have a voice -in the plan of operations, to be followed when the -whole should be ready to undertake any, if indeed -they ever should be ready</em>.”</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Napoleon caused Caffarelli’s reserve -to enter Spain, ordered Santona to be fortified, -directed other reinforcements from France upon the -northern provinces, and finally sent marshal Bessieres -to command the young guard, the third and -fourth governments, and that of the Asturias, including -Bonet’s division, the whole forming a distinct -force, called the army of the north.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_I">No. I.</a> -Section 6.</div> - -<p>The 1st of January, 1811, this army exceeded -seventy thousand, of which fifty-nine thousand -men and eight thousand horses, were present under -arms; and Bessieres, who had received unusual -powers, was especially ordered to support and furnish -all necessary assistance to the army of Portugal. -This was the state of the northern parts of -Spain.</p> - -<p>In the middle parts, the army of the centre, or -that immediately under the king, at first about -twenty thousand, was, before the end of the year, -carried up to twenty-seven thousand, exclusive of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_408"></a>[408]</span> -French and Spanish guards and juramentados, or -native troops, who had taken the oath of allegiance: -with this power he protected his court, watched -the movements of the Valencians, and chased the -Guerillas of the interior.</p> - -<p>The summer and autumn of 1810 were, however, -for reasons before-mentioned, the period of -greatest activity with these irregulars; numerous -petty actions were constantly fought around the -capital, many small French posts, and numbers of -isolated men and officers, were cut off, and few -despatches reached their destinations without a -considerable escort. To remedy this, the lines of -correspondence were maintained by small fortified -posts which run from Madrid; through Guadarama -and Segovia to the provinces of Valladolid -and Salamanca; through Buitrago and Somosierra -to the army of the north; through Guadalaxara -and Calatayud to the army of Aragon; through -La Mancha to the army of the south; and by the -valley of the Tagus, Arzobispo, and Truxillo, to -the fifth corps during its incursions into Estremadura; -a brigade of cavalry, was also generally -stationed at Truxillo.</p> - -<p>As the warfare of the Partidas was merely a -succession of surprises and massacres, little instruction, -and no pleasure, can be derived from the details; -but in the course of the summer and autumn, not -less than twelve considerable, and an infinite -number of trifling affairs, took place between the -moveable columns and these bands: and the latter -being almost always beaten; at the close of -the year, only the Empecinado, Sanchez, Longa, -Campillo, Porlier, and Mina retained any reputation, -and the country people were so harassed,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_409"></a>[409]</span> -that counter Partidas, in many places assisted the -French.</p> - -<p>The situation of the army of the centre enabled -the king to aid Massena, either by an advance upon -the Elga, or by reinforcing, or, at least, supporting -the fifth corps in Estremadura. But Joseph, -troubled by the Partidas, and having many convoys -to protect, was also averse to join any of the -marshals, with all of whom, except Massena, he -was on ill terms; neither were his relations with -Napoleon such as to induce him to take an interest -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_IV">No. IV.</a> -Section 4.</span>in any military operations, save those which affected -the immediate security of his court. His poverty -was extreme; he was surrounded by French and -Spanish intriguers; his plan of organizing a national -party was thwarted by his brother’s regulations; -plots were formed, or supposed to be formed, -against his person, and, in this uneasy posture, the -secondary part he was forced to sustain, combined -with his natural gentleness which shrunk from the -terrible scenes of bloodshed and devastation continually -before his eyes, rendered his situation so -irksome, that he resolved to vacate the throne and retire -to France, a resolution which he soon afterwards -partially executed. Such being the course of affairs -in the northern and central provinces, it remains -to trace the more important military operations at -the southern horn of the crescent, where the allies -were most favourably situated to press the left -flank of the invaders.</p> - -<p>Sebastiani was peculiarly exposed to a harassing -warfare, because of the city of Grenada and other -towns in the interior, which he was obliged to -hold at the same time with those on the coast, -although the two districts were completely separated<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_410"></a>[410]</span> -by the mountains. Hence a large body of troops -were necessarily kept in the strip of country -bordering the Mediterranean, although menaced, -on the one flank by Gibraltar and the Spanish -troops at San Roque, on the other by the Murcian -army, and, in front by continual descents -from the sea; yet, from the shallowness and -length of their position, unable to concentrate in time -to avoid being cut off in detail. Now the Murcian -army, nominally twenty thousand, was based upon -the cities of Murcia and Carthagena, and menaced -alike the coast-line and that of Grenada by the -route of Baza and Guadix; and any movement towards -the latter was sure to attract the French, -while troops landing from Cadiz or Gibraltar fell -upon their disseminated posts along the coast.</p> - -<p>To meet this system, Sebastiani, keeping his reserves -about Grenada, where he had entrenched a -permanent camp, made sudden incursions, sometimes -against the Murcians, sometimes against the -Spanish forces on the side of Gibraltar; but that -fortress afforded a refuge to the patriots on one -side, and Carthagena, surrounded by arid lands, -where, for two marches, no water is to be found, -always offered a sure retreat on the other. Meanwhile -the French general endeavoured to gain the -important castles on the coast, and to put them into -a state of defence; yet Estipona and Marbella -were defended by the Spaniards, and the latter -sustained many attacks, nor was it finally reduced -until the 9th of December, when the garrison, -of one hundred men, took refuge on board the -Topaze frigate. But Sebastiani’s hold of these -towns, and even the security of the French troops -along the coast, depended upon the communications<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_411"></a>[411]</span> -across the mountains with Grenada, Chiclana, -and Seville, and to impede these, general Campbell -sent British officers into the Ronda, who successfully -directed the wild mountaineers of that -district, until their operations were marred by -Lascy’s misconduct.</p> - -<p>The various movements and insurrections in -Grenada during the summer of 1810 have been -already noted, but, in October, general Campbell -and admiral Penrose, conjointly with the -governor of Ceuta, renewed the design of surprising -Malaga, where were many privateers and -a flotilla of gun-boats, supposed to be destined -against the islands near Ceuta. The French depôt -for the siege of Marbella was at Fuengirola, -which is only thirty miles from Malaga, and it was -judged that an attack there would draw the -troops from the latter place; and the more surely, -as general Valdemoro, commanding the Spanish -force at San Roque, engaged to co-operate on the -side of Ronda.</p> - - -<h4>EXPEDITION OF FUENGIROLA.</h4> - -<div class="sidenote">General C. -Campbell’s -Correspondence. -MSS.</div> - -<p>On the 13th of October, captain Hope, in the -Topaze, sailed from Ceuta, with a division of gun-boats -and a convoy, containing a brigade of twelve-pounders, -sixty-five gunners, a battalion of the -eighty-ninth regiment, a detachment of foreign -deserters, and the Spanish imperial regiment of -Toledo, in all fifteen hundred men, including -serjeants. Lord Blayney, commanding this force, -was directed to make a false attack on Fuengirola, -and should the enemy come out from Malaga, he -was to sail against that place. A landing was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_412"></a>[412]</span> -effected the same day, and Sebastiani instantly -marched, leaving only three hundred men in Malaga: -lord Blayney was as instantly apprised of the success -of the demonstration, yet he remained two -days cannonading the castle with twelve-pounders, -although the heavier metal of the gun-boats and of -the frigate, had failed to make any impression on -the walls; and during this time his dispositions -betrayed the utmost contempt of military rules. -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_XI">No. XI.</a></span>On the second day, while he was on board a gun-boat -himself, the garrison, which did not exceed -two hundred men, having first descried Sebastiani’s -column, made a sally, took the battery, and drove -the British part of the investing force headlong -towards the boats. Lord Blayney landed, rallied -his men, and retook the artillery; but at this -moment two squadrons of French cavalry came up, -and his lordship, mistaking them for Spaniards, -ordered the firing to cease. He was immediately -made prisoner; his troops again fled to the beach, -and would have been sabred but for the opportune -arrival of the Rodney with the eighty-second regiment, -the flank companies of which were immediately -disembarked and first checked the enemy. The -Spanish regiment, untouched by the panic, regained -the ships regularly and without loss; but, -of the British, two officers and thirty men were -killed or wounded, and one general, seven inferior -officers, and nearly two hundred serjeants and -privates taken. Thus an expedition, well contrived -and adequate to its object, was ruined by misconduct, -and terminated in disaster and disgrace.</p> - -<p>Scarcely was this affair finished, when Valdemoro -and the marquis of Portasgo appeared in -the Ronda, an insurrection commenced at Velez<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_413"></a>[413]</span> -Malaga and in the neighbouring villages; and -Blake, who had returned from Cadiz to the army -in Murcia, advanced, with eight thousand men, -towards Cullar on the side of Baza. General -<span class="sidenote">General -Campbell’s -Correspondence. -MSS.</span>Campbell immediately furnished money to Portasgo, -and embarked a thousand stand of arms for the -people of Velez Malaga. An English frigate was also -sent to cruize along the coast, yet Sebastiani, relieved -from the fear of a descent, soon quelled this insurrection; -and then sending Milhaud on before with -some cavalry, followed himself with reinforcements -for general Rey, who was opposed to Blake. -The latter, retiring behind the Almanzora river, -was overtaken by Milhaud, and, being defeated on -the 4th of November, his army dispersed: at the -same time, a contagious fever, breaking out at -Carthagena, spread along the coast to Gibraltar -and Cadiz, and the Spanish operations on the side -of Murcia ceased.</p> - -<p>In the kingdom of Seville, the war turned -chiefly upon the blockade of the Isla, and the movements -of the Spanish armies in Estremadura. -Provisions for Cadiz were principally drawn from -the Condado de Neibla, and it has been seen that -Copons, aided by descents from the ocean, endeavoured -to secure this important resource; but -neither his efforts, nor the descents, would have -availed, if Ballasteros had not co-operated by constantly -menacing Seville from Araceña and the -Aroche mountains. Neither could Ballasteros -have maintained the war there, were it not for the -support of Badajos and Olivenza; under cover of -which, Romana’s army protected his line of operation, -and sent military supplies and reinforcements.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_414"></a>[414]</span> -On the possession of Badajos, therefore, the supply -of Cadiz chiefly depended.</p> - -<p>Seville was the French point of defence; Cadiz -Estremadura and the Condado de Neibla their -points of offence. The want of provisions, or the -desire to cut off the Spanish convoys, or the sudden -irruption of troops from Cadiz, threatening their -posts at <ins class="corr" id="tn-414" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Moguer and Heulva'"> -Moguer and Huelva</ins>, always drew them -towards the coast; the enterprises of Ballasteros -brought them towards Araceña; and, in like manner, -the advance of Romana towards the mountains -brought them to Estremadura; but Romana had -wasted the greater part of the latter province, and -as the fifth corps alone was disposable either for offensive -movements, or for the defence of the country -around Seville, Soult contented himself with such -advantages as could be gained by sudden strokes; -frequently, however, crossing the mountains to -prevent the Spaniards from permanently establishing -themselves on the frontier of Andalusia.</p> - -<p>In October, Romana entered the Lines of Torres -Vedras, and Mendizabal, who remained with two -divisions, finding that Mortier, unconscious of -Romana’s absence, had retired across the mountains, -occupied Merida. He would also have established -himself in the yet unwasted country about Llerena; -but the appearance of a moveable column on the -frontier of La Mancha, sent him back to Badajos, -and, on the 20th of November, he united with -Ballasteros. The French then fortified Gibraleon -and other posts in the Condado de Neibla; Girard’s -division re-appeared at Guadalcanal, and being -joined by the column from La Mancha, foraged -the country towards Llerena: whereupon Mendizabel<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_415"></a>[415]</span> -took post at Zafra with nine thousand infantry -and two thousand cavalry, including Madden’s -Portuguese brigade. Meanwhile, Copons, who -had four thousand men, was totally defeated at -Castillejos by D’Aremberg, and retired to Puebla -de Gusman.</p> - -<p>At Cadiz, no change or military event had -occurred after the affair of Matagorda, save the -expeditions against Moguer already noticed, and -a slight attempt of the Spaniards against the -Chiclana works in September; but all men’s hopes -and expectations had been wonderfully raised by -political events which it was fondly hoped would -secure both independence and a good constitution to -Spain. After two years of intrigues and delay, the -National Cortes was assembled, and the long suppressed -voice of the people was at last to be heard. -Nevertheless the members of the Cortes could not -be duly and legally chosen in the provinces possessed -by the enemy; and as some members were -captured by the French on their journey to Cadiz, -many persons unknown, even by name, to their -supposed constituents, were chosen: a new principle -of election, unknown to former Cortes, was also -adopted; for all persons twenty-five years old, not -holding office or pension under the government, -nor incapacitated by crime, nor by debts to the -state, nor by bodily infirmity, were eligible to sit if -chosen. A supplement of sixty-eight members was -likewise provided to supply accidental vacancies; -and it was agreed that twenty-six persons then in -Spain, natives of the colonies, should represent -those dependencies.</p> - -<p>Towards the latter end of September this great -assembly met, and immediately took the title of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_416"></a>[416]</span> -Majesty: it afterwards declared the press free in -respect of political, but not of religious matters, -abolished some of the provincial juntas, re-appointed -captains-general, and proceeded to form a -constitution worded in the spirit of republican -freedom. These things, aided by a vehement -eloquence, drew much attention to the proceedings -of the Cortes, and a fresh impulse seemed given -to the war: but men brought up under despotism -do not readily attain the fashions of freedom. The -Provincial Junta, the Central Junta, the Junta of -Cadiz, the Regency, had all been, in succession, -violent and tyrannical in act, while claiming only to -be popular leaders, and this spirit did not desert the -Cortes. Abstract principles of liberty were freely -promulgated, yet tyrannical and partial proceedings -were of common occurrence; and the reformations, -by outstripping the feelings and understandings of -the nation, weakened the main springs of its resistance -to the French. It was not for liberty, but for -national pride and from religious influence, that -the people struck. Freedom had no attractions -for the nobles, nor for the monastics, nor even for -the merchants; and the Cortes, in suppressing old -establishments and violating old forms and customs, -wounded powerful interests, created active enemies, -and shocked those very prejudices which had produced -resistance to Napoleon.</p> - -<p>In the administration of the armies, in the conduct -of the war, in the execution of the laws, and -the treatment of the colonies, there was as much -of vanity, of intrigue, of procrastination, negligence, -folly, and violence as before. Hence the -people were soon discontented; and when the -power of the religious orders was openly attacked<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_417"></a>[417]</span> -by a proposition to abolish the inquisition, the -clergy became active enemies of the Cortes. The -great cause of feudal privileges being once given up, -the natural tendency of the <ins class="err" id="err-417" title="Erratum: was 'latter'"> -Cortes</ins> was towards the -enemy. A broad line of distinction was thus drawn -between the objects of the Spanish and English -governments in the prosecution of the war; and, -ere the contest was finished, there was a schism -between the British cabinet and the Spanish government, -which would inevitably have thrown -the latter into Napoleon’s hands, if fortune had -not, at the moment, betrayed him in Russia.</p> - -<p>The Regency, jealous of the Cortes, and little -pleased with the inferior title of highness accorded -them, were far from partaking of the republican -spirit, and so anxious to check any tendency -towards innovation, that early in the year they had -invited the duke of Orleans to command the provinces -bordering on France, permitted him to issue -proclamations, and received him at Cadiz with the -honours of a royal prince; intending to oppose his -authority to that of the Local Juntas at the moment, -and finally to that of the Cortes. The -latter, however, refused their sanction to this appointment, -obliged the duke to quit Spain, and -soon afterwards displaced the Regency of Five; -appointing Joachim Blake, Gabriel Cisgar, and -Pedro Agar in their stead. During the absence -of the two first, substitutes were provided, but -one of them (Palacios) making some difficulty -about taking the oath to the Cortes, was immediately -declared to have forfeited the confidence -of the nation; so peremptorily did the Cortes -proceed.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless, the new regents, not more pleased<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_418"></a>[418]</span> -with the democratic spirit than their predecessors, -and yet wishing to retain the power in their own -hands, refused to listen to the princess of Brazils’ -claim, and thus factions sprung up on every side; for -the republicans were not paramount in the Cortes at -first, and the majority were so subtilely dealt with -by Pedro Souza, as actually to acknowledge Carlotta’s -hereditary claim to the succession and to the -immediate control of the whole Peninsula; and, -as I have before noticed, would have proclaimed -her sole Regent, but for the interference of lord -Wellington.</p> - -<p>Don Manuel Lapeña being declared captain-general -of Andalusia, and commander of the forces -in the Isla, was subservient to the views of the -Cortes; but the new Regency, anxious to have a -counterbalancing force, and being instigated also -by persons from Badajos, enemies to Romana, removed -that officer in December, and ordered his -divisions to separate from the British army and -come to Cadiz. The conduct of those divisions -had, indeed, given little satisfaction either to the -British or Portuguese, but numbers were so absolutely -<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s -Papers. -MSS.</span>necessary to lord Wellington, that colonel -O’Neal was sent to remonstrate with the Regency; -and, by shewing that the fall of Estremadura, and -the total loss of communication with the interior -of Spain would ensue, obtained a momentary respite.</p> - -<p>In matters relating to the war against the French, -or to the administration of the country, the Spanish -leaders were incapable of acting cordially on -any mature plan; but with respect to the colonies, -all parties agreed to push violence, injustice, cruelty, -and impolicy to their utmost bounds. To please<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_419"></a>[419]</span> -the British government, the first Regency had -published, in May, a decree, permitting the South -Americans to export their own products, under -certain conditions. This legalizing of a trade, -which could not be suppressed, and which was -but a decent return to England for her assistance, -gave offence to the Municipal Junta of Cadiz, and -its resentment was so much dreaded that the Regency, -in June, disowned their own decree of the -previous month, and even punished the printers, -as having given birth to a forged instrument. -Exasperated at this treatment, the colonies, who -had resisted all the intrigues of the French, with -a firmness and singleness of purpose very displeasing -to the government in Old Spain, openly -discovered their discontent, and then the authorities -in the Mother Country, throwing off the mask -of liberality and patriotism, exposed their own -secret views. “It is not enough that Americans -should be Spanish subjects now, but that in all -cases they should belong to Spain,” was the proclamation -of the Regency, in answer to a declaration -from the Caraccas, avowing attachment to -the cause of Ferdinand: meaning that, if Spain -should pass under the power of the usurper -America must follow, as having no right to decide -in any case for herself.</p> - -<p>When the Cortes met, America expected more -justice; she had contributed ninety millions of dollars -for the support of the war, and many of her -sons had served zealously in person; she had also -been declared an integral part of the empire by -the Central Junta, and her deputies were now permitted -to sit in the Great National Assembly. She -was however soon made to understand, that the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_420"></a>[420]</span> -first of these privileges meant eternal slavery, and -that the second was a mere form. “The Americans -complain of having been tyrannized over for -three hundred years! they shall now suffer for three -thousand years,” and “I know not to what class -of beast the Americans belong:” such were the -expressions heard and applauded in the Cortes, -when the rights of the colonists were agitated in -that assembly. Better to lose Spain to Joseph, if -America be retained, than to save Spain if America -be separated from her, was a feeling deeply rooted -in every Spanish heart, a sentiment covertly expressed -in many public documents, and openly -acted upon; for, when repeated insults, treachery, -and continued violence, had driven the colonists to -defend their rights in arms, the money and stores, -supplied by England for the support of the war -against the French, were applied to the fitting out -of expeditions against America. Thus the convocation -of the National Cortes, far from improving -the posture of affairs, dried up the chief sources -of revenue, weakened the army in the field, -offended many powerful bodies in the state, involved -the nation in a colonial war, and struck at -the root of the alliance with England.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_421"></a>[421]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXII_II">CHAPTER II.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>While the Spaniards were occupied with the debates -of the Cortes, the French works were laboured -with care. The chain of forts was perfected, each -being complete in itself with ditch and palisades -and a week’s provisions; the batteries at the Trocadero -were powerful, and the flotillas at San Lucar -de Barameda, Santa Maria, Puerto Real, and Chiclana, -were ready for action. Soult repaired in person -to San Lucar, and in the last night of October, -thirty pinnaces and gun-boats slipping out of the -Guadalquivir eluded the allied fleet, passed along -the coast to Rota, and from thence, aided by shore -batteries, fought their way to Santa Maria and the -San Pedro. But, to avoid the fire of the fleet and -forts in doubling Matagorda, the duke of Dalmatia, -remembering what he had formerly effected at Campo -Saucos on the Minho, transported his flotilla on -rollers, overland; and in November, one hundred -and thirty armed vessels and transports were assembled -in the Trocadero canal. This success was, -however, alloyed by the death of general Senarmont, -an artillery officer of the highest reputation.</p> - -<p>At the Trocadero point there were immense batteries, -and some notable pieces of ordnance called -cannon-mortars, or Villantroys, after the inventor. -These huge engines were cast in Seville, and, being -placed in slings, threw shells with such prodigious -force as to range over Cadiz, a distance of more -than five thousand yards. But to obtain this flight<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_422"></a>[422]</span> -the shells were partly filled with lead, and their -charge of powder was too small for an effective explosion. -Nevertheless, they produced some alarm -in the city, and were troublesome to the shipping. -But Soult’s real design was first to ruin, by a superior -fire, the opposite fort of the Puntales, then pass the -straits with his flotilla, and establish his army between -the Isla and the city; nor was this plan chimerical, -for on the side of besieged there was neither -concert nor industry.</p> - -<p>Two drafts, made, in August and September, by -lord Wellington, had reduced Graham’s force to five -thousand men, and in October the fever broke out -in Cadiz; but as Soult’s preparations became formidable, -reinforcements were drawn from Gibraltar -and Sicily, and, at the end of the year, seven thousand -British, Germans, and Portuguese, were still -behind the Santi Petri. Graham felt confident, 1º. -that, with due preparation, he could maintain the -Puntales even though its fire should be silenced. -2º. That Soult must establish a stronger flotilla than -the allies, or his communication with Matagorda -could not be maintained. 3º. That the intercourse -between the army in Isla and the garrison of Cadiz -could not be interrupted, unless the great redoubt -of the Cortadura was lost.</p> - -<p>To ensure a superiority of naval means, admiral -Keats drew all the armed craft from Gibraltar. To -secure the land defence, general Graham perseveringly -<span class="sidenote">Graham’s -Despatches -MSS.</span>urged the Regency to adopt certain plans, -and he was warmly seconded by sir Henry Wellesley; -but neither their entreaties, nor the imminence -of the danger, could overcome the apathy of the -Spaniards. Their army, reinforced by a small body -from Ceuta, was wanting in discipline, clothing, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_423"></a>[423]</span> -equipments, and only sixteen thousand men of all -arms were effective on a muster-roll of twenty-three -thousand. The labour of the British troops, far -from being assisted, were vexatiously impeded; it -was the end of December, and after many sharp -altercations, ere Graham could even obtain leave -to put the interior line of the Cortadura in a state -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_III">No. III.</a> -Sections 1, -2, 3, 4.</span>of defence, although, by a sudden disembarkation, -the enemy might enter it from the rear, and cut off -the army of the Isla from the city. But while the -duke of Dalmatia was thus collecting means of -attack, the events in Portugal prevented the execution -of his design.</p> - -<p>When Massena passed the frontier, his communications -with France became so uncertain, that the -emperor’s principal source of information was -through the English newspapers. Foy brought the -first exact intelligence of the posture of affairs. It -was then that the army of the north was directed to -support the army of Portugal; that the ninth corps -was made a component part of the latter; that the -prince of Esling was enjoined to hold fast between -Santarem and the Zezere; to besiege Abrantes; -and to expect the duke of Dalmatia, who had been -already several times commanded to move through -the Alemtejo, to his assistance. The emperor seems -<span class="sidenote">The King’s -Correspondence, -captured -at -Vittoria</span>even to have contemplated the evacuation of Andalusia -and the concentration of the whole army of -the south on the Tagus, a project that would have -strengthened rather than weakened the French in -the Peninsula, because it was more important to -crush the regular warfare in Portugal, than to hold -any particular province.</p> - -<p>Massena’s instructions reached him in due time, -Soult’s were intercepted by the Guerillas, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_424"></a>[424]</span> -duplicates did not arrive before the end of December; -a delay affording proof that thirty thousand men -would scarcely have compensated for the uncertainty -of the French communications. Postponing -his design against Cadiz, the duke of Dalmatia -repaired to Seville, carrying with him Latour -Maubourg’s cavalry and five thousand infantry from -the first corps. His instructions neither prescribed -a line of movement nor enjoined any specific operation; -the prince of Esling was to communicate -his plan to which Soult’s was to be subordinate. -But no certain intelligence even of Massena’s early -proceedings had reached Seville, and such were the -precautions of lord Wellington, such the activity -of the Partidas, that from the time Soult quitted -Cadiz, until his operation terminated, no communication -could be effected between the two marshals, -and each acted in perfect ignorance of the plans -and situation of the other.</p> - -<p>The duke of Dalmatia considering that Sebastiani -had his hands full, and that the blockade of -Cadiz, the protection of Seville on the side of Neibla -<span class="sidenote">Marshal -Soult’s -Correspondence. -MSS.</span>and of Araceña, would not permit the drawing off -more than twenty thousand men, represented to the -emperor that with such a force, he durst not penetrate -the Alemtejo, leaving Olivenza and Badajos, -and Ballasteros, (who would certainly join Mendizabel) -on his rear; while Romana alone, without -reckoning British troops, could bring ten thousand -men against his front; hence he demanded leave to -besiege those places, and Napoleon consented. -Meanwhile, order was taken to secure Andalusia -during the operations. Dessolles’ division had been -recalled to form the army of the centre, and general -Godinot took his place at Cordoba; a column of observation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_425"></a>[425]</span> -was posted under general Digeon at Ecija; -Seville entrenched on the side of Neibla, was given -over to general Daricau, and a detachment under -Remond was posted at Gibraleon. The expeditionary -army, consisting of sixteen thousand infantry, -artillery, sappers and miners, and about four -thousand cavalry and fifty-four guns, was assembled -on the 2d January. An equipage of siege, a light -pontoon train, and seventeen hundred carts, for -stores and provisions were also prepared, and -<span class="sidenote">King Joseph’s -Correspondence. -MSS.</span>Soult’s administration was now so efficient, that he -ordered a levy of five thousand young Spaniards, -called “<i lang="es" xml:lang="es">escopeteros</i>” (fuzileers) to maintain the police -of the province.</p> - - -<h4>SOULT’S FIRST EXPEDITION TO ESTREMADURA.</h4> - -<div class="sidenote">1811.</div> - -<p>Mortier moving from Guadalcanal, entered Zafra -on the 5th January, Mendizabel retired to Merida, -and Ballasteros, in consequence of orders from the -Regency, passed over the mountains to Frejenal. -Winter tempests raged, and the French convoy which -moved on Araceña, being overwhelmed by storms, was -detained at the foot of the mountains, and to cover it, -Gazan marching from Zafra, drove Ballasteros out of -Frejenal. Meanwhile, the Spanish leaders, as well -those in Estremadura, as in Cadiz, were quite ignorant -of Soult’s intentions, some asserting that he was -going to pass the Tagus at Almaraz, others, that his -object was only to crush Ballasteros. Lord Wellington -alone divined the truth, and it was he who first -gave Mendizabel notice, that the French were not assembling -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_II">No. II.</a> -Sect. 5, 6.</span>at Seville at all, so destitute of intelligence -and of military knowledge were the Spaniards. Now<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_426"></a>[426]</span> -when the French were breaking into Estremadura, -terror and confusion spread far and wide; Badajos -was ill provisioned, Albuquerque in ruins, Olivenza -nearly dismantled; and, in the midst of this -disorder, Ballasteros was drawn off towards the -Condada de Neibla by the Regency, who thus deprived -Estremadura of half its defenders at the moment -of invasion.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington had advised that the troops -should be concentrated, the bridges over the Guadiana -mined for destruction, and the passage of that -river disputed to gain time; but these things being -neglected, an advanced guard of cavalry alone carried -the bridge of Merida on the 6th. Soult then -turned upon Olivenza with the infantry, and while -Latour Maubourg’s dragoons held Mendizabel in -check on the side of Badajos, Briche’s light horsemen -collected cattle on the side of Estremadura; Gazan’s -division, still posted near Frejenal, protected -the march of the artillery and convoy, and La Houssaye’s -brigade, belonging to the army of the centre, -quitting Truxillo, marched against the Partidas and -scoured the banks of the Tagus from Arzobispo to -Alcantara.</p> - - -<h4>FIRST SIEGE OF OLIVENZA.</h4> - -<p>This place, although regularly fortified with nine -bastions, a covered way, and some unfinished ravelins, -was incapable of a good defence. With an old -breach slightly repaired, very few guns mounted, -and commanding no passage of the Guadiana, it -was of little importance to the French, yet, as containing -four thousand troops, it was of some consequence<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_427"></a>[427]</span> -to reduce it. Lord Wellington had pressed -Romana to destroy the defences entirely, or to -supply it with the means of resistance, and the -marquis decided on the former; but Mendizabel -slighting his orders, had thrown his best division -into the place.</p> - -<p>It was invested the 11th of January; an abandoned -outwork, three hundred and forty yards south -of the town, was taken possession of the first night; -and breaching batteries of eight guns, and counter-batteries -of six guns were then marked out. The -trenches were opened on the west, and approaches -carried on by the flying sap against the old breach; -but the rains were heavy and continual, the scarcity -of entrenching-tools great, and it was not until the -18th, when the head of the convoy had passed the -mountains, that the works could be properly advanced.</p> - -<p>On the 19th the covered way was crowned, and -the 20th the breaching batteries opened their fire; -two mortars also threw shells into the town, and a -globe of compression was prepared to blow in the -counterscarp. In the evening, the governor of Badajos -skirmished unsuccessfully with Latour Maubourg’s -horsemen, and, on the 21st, the mine was -completed and preparations made for the passage of -the ditch.</p> - -<p>Mendizabel, unable from the absence of Ballasteros’ -division to relieve Olivenza, demanded succour, -and Romana sent Carlos D’España’s brigade from -Abrantes the 18th, and general Virues, with his own -Spanish division, from Cartaxo on the 20th. The 21st, -the governor of Olivenza was informed of this, and -replied that he would maintain the place to the last -moment; but the next day he capitulated, having still<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_428"></a>[428]</span> -provisions, ammunition, eighteen guns, and four -thousand one hundred effective soldiers. The 26th -Soult marched against Badajos.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Ballasteros advanced upon Neibla, -but being followed by Gazan, was overtaken at -Castillejos on the 28th, and, after a sharp battle, -driven with the loss of a thousand men over the -Guadiana. The Spanish artillery was saved in the -castle of Paymigo, the infantry took refuge at -Alcontin and Mertola; and, that nothing might be -left to alarm the French in that quarter, the -Regency recalled Copon’s force to Cadiz. In this -manner a fortress was taken, and twelve thousand -men, who, well employed, might have frustrated -the French designs against Badajos, were all dispersed, -withdrawn, or made prisoners in twenty -days after the commencement of Soult’s expedition.</p> - -<p>For many months previous to these events lord -Wellington had striven to teach the Spanish commander -that there was but one safe mode of proceeding -in Estremadura, and Romana had just -yielded to his counsels, when the sudden arrival of -the French threw every thing into confusion. The -defence of the Guadiana, the dismantling of -Olivenza, the concentration of the forces were -all neglected. Romana, however, had sent his -divisions towards the frontier, and they reached -Montemor the 22d; the 23d they received Mendizabel’s -orders to halt as Olivenza had surrendered; -and the 24th Romana died of an aneurism in the -heart. He was a worthy man and of quick parts, -although deficient in military talent. His death -was a great loss, yet his influence was on the -wane; he had many enemies, and his authority -was chiefly sustained by the attachment of his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_429"></a>[429]</span> -troops, and by his riches, for his estates being in -the Balearic Isles, his revenues did not suffer by -the war.</p> - -<p>Mendizabel now commanded in Estremadura. -He had received Romana’s orders to adopt lord -Wellington’s plan, which was still to concentrate -all the Spanish troops, amounting to at least ten -thousand men, on the frontier, and, before the -enemy appeared on the right bank of the Guadiana, -to occupy a certain position of great natural strength -close to Badajos; the right touching the fort of St. -Christoval, the front covered by the Gebora river -and by the Guadiana, the fortress of Campo Mayor -immediately in rear of the left, and Elvas behind -the centre. When Mendizabel was entrenched on -this position, and a strong garrison in Badajos, -the English general thought Soult could not invest -or even straighten the communications of the town, -yet, knowing well the people he dealt with, -prophetically observed, “<em>with soldiers of any other -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_II">No. II.</a> -Section 6.</span>nation success is certain, but no calculation can be -made of any operation in which Spanish troops are -engaged</em>.”</p> - -<p>When Olivenza fell, a small garrison was in -Albuquerque, and another in Valencia d’Alcantara; -Carlos d’España was in Campo Mayor, and Virues, -with Romana’s divisions, at Montemor. When -Soult drove back the outposts of Badajos on the -26th, Mendizabel shut himself up with six thousand -men in that fortress; but, although a siege had been -expected for a year, the place was still unprovisioned. -It was, however, still possible to execute -the English general’s plan, yet no Spaniard moved, -and, on the 27th, Latour Maubourg, crossing the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_430"></a>[430]</span> -Guadiana at Merida, forded the Gebora, and cut -off the communications with Campo Mayor and -Elvas!</p> - - -<h4>FRENCH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.</h4> - -<p>This city stands on a tongue of land at the confluence -of the Guadiana with the Rivillas; the first -is a noble river five hundred yards broad, the second -a trifling stream. A rock, one hundred feet high, -and crowned by an old castle, overhangs the meeting -of the waters, and the town, spreading out like -a fan as the land opens between the rivers, is protected -by eight regular curtains and bastions, from -twenty-three to thirty feet in height, with good -counterscarps, covered way, and glacis. On the -left bank of the Guadiana the outworks were, -1º. the Lunette of San Roque, covering a dam and -sluice on the Rivillas, by which an inundation -could be commanded; 2º. an isolated redoubt, -called the Picurina, situated beyond the Rivillas, -and four hundred yards from the town; 3º. the -Pardaleras, a defective crown-work, central between -the Lower Guadiana and the Rivillas, and two -hundred yards from the ramparts.</p> - -<p>On the right bank of the Guadiana a hill, -crowned by a regular fort three hundred feet -square, called San Christoval, overlooked the interior -of the castle, and a quarter of a mile farther -down the stream, the bridge, six hundred yards in -length, was protected by a bridge-head, slightly -connected with San Christoval, but commanded on -every side.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_431"></a>[431]</span></p> - -<p>Soult constructed a ferry on the Guadiana, above -the confluence of the Gebora, and three attacks -were opened against the town the 28th, two on the -side of Picurina and one on that of the Pardaleras. -The 29th and 30th slight sallies were repulsed, -but tempestuous weather spoiled the works. Gazan’s -division was distant; the infantry before the -place were few, and, on the 30th, the garrison -<span class="sidenote">Conquête -de l’Andalusie, -par -Edouard -Lapéne.</span>making a vigorous sally from the Pardaleras, killed -or wounded sixty men and cleared the trenches. -Meanwhile some Spanish cavalry, gliding round -the left of the French, sabred several engineers -and sappers, and then retired.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Siege de -Badajos, -par le Col. -Lamare.</div> - -<p>In the night of the 2d of February a violent -tempest flooded the Rivillas, carried away the -French bridges, drowned men and horses, damaged -the depôts, and reduced the <ins class="err" id="err-431" title="Erratum: was 'besieged'"> -besiegers</ins> to the -greatest distress. The cavalry employed in the -investment could no longer forage; scarcity was -felt in the camp; the convoys could only arrive -by detachments; the rigour of winter bivouacs -caused sickness, and, on the 3d, the Spaniards, -making a second sally from Pardaleras, killed or -wounded eighty men and ruined a part of the -parallel. The same day Gazan arrived in camp, -but the French cavalry being withdrawn from the -<span class="sidenote">Lord Wellington’s -Correspondence. -MSS.</span>right bank of the Guadiana, in consequence of -rigorous weather, the communication was re-established -with Elvas, and Mendizabel called -the divisions in Portugal to his assistance. Virues -immediately marched upon Elvas, Carlo d’España, -<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s -Papers. -MSS.</span>and Madden united at Campo Mayor, and Julian -Sanchez brought down his Partida from Upper -Estremadura.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 5th, Mendizabel repaired to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_432"></a>[432]</span> -Elvas in person; passed the Caya the next day, -and being joined on the road by the troops from -Campo Mayor, pushed the few French horsemen -still on the right of the Guadiana over the Gebora. -The Portuguese brigade crossed that river in -pursuit, and captured some baggage; but the infantry -entered Badajos, for Mendizabel again -neglecting lord Wellington’s counsel, designed not -to take up a position behind the Gebora, but -to raise the siege by a sally; yet he delayed this -until the next day, thus risking to have his whole -army shut up in an ill-provided fortress; for Latour -Maubourg, seeing that Madden was unsupported, -turned and drove him back over the Gebora with -loss. Badajos now contained sixteen thousand -men, and, early on the 7th, Carrera and Carlos -d’España, at the head of five thousand infantry -and three hundred cavalry, breaking out at the -Picurina side, with one burst carried the trenches -and the batteries; the soldiers fought with surprising -ardour, but the entire want of arrangement -on the part of the generals (unworthy to command -the brave men under them) ruined all. They had -not even provided the means to spike the guns, -and when Mortier brought his reserves against the -front and flank of the attack, the whole driven -back in disorder, re-entered the city, having -eighty-five officers and near six hundred soldiers -killed and wounded; the enemy also lost several -engineers and four hundred men.</p> - -<p>While this action took place on the left bank, -Latour Maubourg occupied the ground between the -Gebora and the Caya, and again cut off the communication -with Elvas and Campo Mayor; but his -forces were too weak to maintain themselves there,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_433"></a>[433]</span> -and Mendizabel, leaving the defence of the town -entirely to the governor, Rafael Menacho, pitched -his own camp round San Christoval. Some days -previous to this, the French had bombarded Badajos, -a proceeding only mischievous to themselves; -for the inhabitants, terrified by the shells, -fled in great numbers while the communication -was open, but left behind their provisions; which -enabled Menacho to feed his garrison without -difficulty.</p> - -<p>Soult observing the numbers, and awake to all -the real resources of the Spanish succouring army, -feared lest delay should produce a change of commanders, -or of system, and resolved to bring matters -to a crisis. On the 11th he stormed the Pardaleras; -on the 12th, he sent fifteen hundred cavalry across the -Guadiana to Montijo; and, on the 14th, threw shells -into the camp about Christoval, which obliged Mendizabel -to remove from the heights in front of that -fort. Meanwhile, intelligence that Castaños was -appointed captain-general of Estremadura created -the greatest anger amongst Romana’s soldiers: they -had long considered themselves independent of the -central government, and in this mood, although the -position behind the Gebora, recommended by lord -Wellington, was at last occupied, little attention -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_X">No. X.</a> -Section 2.</span>was paid to military discipline. The English general -had expressly advised Mendizabel to increase -the great natural strength of this position with entrenchments; -for his design was that the Spaniards, -whom he thought quite unequal to open field-operations, -<span class="sidenote">Lord Wellington -to -Lord Liverpool. -MSS.</span>should have an impregnable post, whence -they could safely aid in the defence of the town, and -yet preserve a free communication with the Alemtejo, -until the arrival of his own reinforcements (which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_434"></a>[434]</span> -he expected in the latter end of January) should -enable him to raise the siege. Mendizabel, with -that arrogance which is peculiar to his nation, rejected -this counsel, and hung twelve days on the -heights of Christoval in a torpid state; and, when -driven thence by the French shells, merely destroyed -a small bridge over the Gebora, but neither cast up -entrenchments, nor kept a guard in his front, nor -disposed his men with care. Soult observing these -things, suddenly leaped upon him.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF THE GEBORA.</h4> - -<p>The Guadiana and the Gebora rivers covered the -Spanish position; this did not deter the duke of Dalmatia -from attempting to pass both and surprise the -camp. But first to deprive Mendizabel of the aid of -San Christoval, and to create a diversion, the French -mortar-batteries again threw shells on the 17th: yet -the swell of the rivers would not permit the main -operation to be commenced before the evening of -the 18th, when the cavalry drew down the right -bank of the Guadiana from Montijo, and the artillery -and infantry crossed at the French ferry, four -miles above the confluence of the Gebora. These -combinations were so exactly executed, that, at -daybreak, on the 19th, six thousand infantry and -three thousand cavalry were in order of battle on the -right bank of the Guadiana; the Gebora was however -still to be forded, and, behind it, the Spaniards -had ten thousand infantry, a considerable artillery, -and fifteen hundred cavalry, besides many armed -followers of the camp; the whole number not being -less than fifteen thousand.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_435"></a>[435]</span></p> - -<p>A thick mist covered the country, no Spanish -posts were in advance, and Soult, riding through the -French ranks, and exhorting the soldiers to fight -manfully, commenced the passage of the Gebora. His -cavalry forded five miles up the stream, but his infantry -passed in two columns, on the right and left of -the ruined bridge: a few shots, near the latter, first -alarmed the Spaniards, and, as the instant clamour -amongst the multitude indicated that the surprise -was complete, Mortier, who directed the movements, -rapidly formed the line of battle.</p> - -<p>At eight o’clock the fog cleared away, and the -first beams of the sun and the certainty of victory, -flashed together on the French soldiers; for the -horsemen were already surrounding the Spanish left; -and in the centre, infantry, cavalry, and guns, heaped -together, were waving to and fro in disorder; while -the right having fallen away from San Christoval -was unsupported. In one moment, Girard, with -three battalions, stood between the Spaniards and -the fort; the artillery roared on both sides; and -the French bore forward as one man to the attack: -six battalions pressed the centre; Girard moved -perpendicularly on the right, and Latour Maubourg -charged the left. Thus surrounded, Mendizabel’s -people instinctively crowding together on -the centre, resisted, for some time, by their inert -weight; but the French infantry closed with a destroying -musketry, the horsemen rode in with loose -bridles, and the Spaniards were shaken, divided, -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_II">No. II.</a> -Section 8.</span>and slaughtered. Their cavalry fled outright, -even Madden’s Portuguese, either from panic, or -from hatred of their allies, disregarded alike his -exhortations and example, and shamefully turned -their backs. At ten o’clock the fight was over;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_436"></a>[436]</span> -Virues was taken, Mendizabel and Carrera escaped -with difficulty, España alone made good his retreat -to Campo Mayor with two thousand men; -a few more reached Elvas, three thousand got into -Badajos, by the bridge, and nine hundred bodies -strewed the field: eight thousand, including armed -followers, were made prisoners; and guns, colours, -muskets, ammunition, baggage, all, fell into the -enemy’s hands.</p> - -<p>It was a disastrous and a shameful defeat. In -the depth of winter, Soult, with a small force, had -passed two difficult rivers, carried a strong position, -and annihilated an army which had been two years -in constant service. Mendizabel, instead of destroying -the bridge over the Gebora, should have -cast others, that he might freely issue to attack the -French while crossing the Guadiana; he should -have opposed them again in passing the Gebora; -or he might have passed through Badajos, and -fallen on the troops in the trenches, with his whole -army, while Soult was still entangled between the -rivers.</p> - -<p>In the evening after the action the French cast -up entrenchments, posting three battalions and -the heavy cavalry on the important position they -had gained; and the next day the works of the -siege were renewed with greater activity; yet -the difficulty of Soult’s undertaking was rendered -apparent by his victories. The continual rains, interrupting -the arrival of his convoys, obliged him -to employ a number of men at a great distance to -gather provisions; nearly two thousand French had -been killed or wounded in the two sieges and in -this battle, many also were sick, and Badajos was -still powerful. The body of the place was entire,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_437"></a>[437]</span> -the garrison nine thousand strong, and, by the -flight of the inhabitants, well provided with food; -and there was no want of other stores: the governor -was resolute and confident; the season rigorous for the -besiegers; no communication had been yet opened -with Massena; and lord Wellington, in momentary -expectation that his reinforcements would arrive, -was impatient to bring on a crisis; meanwhile, -the duke of Dalmatia’s power, in Andalusia, was -menaced in the most serious manner.</p> - - -<h4>CONTINUATION OF THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ.</h4> - -<div class="sidenote">Official -Abstract -of Military -Reports. -MSS.</div> - -<p>When general Graham was aware of Soult’s departure, -and knew, also, that the fifth corps had -quitted Seville, he undertook, in concert with the -Spaniards, to drive Victor out of his lines. A force, -sailing from Cadiz the 29th of January, was to -have been joined, in rear of the enemy, by the -troops from Tarifa under major Brown, and by -three thousand Spaniards, from Algesiras and San -Roque under general Beguines; but contrary -winds detained even the vessels carrying counter -orders to Beguines and Brown, and they advanced, -the first to Medina, the other to Casa Vieja. Victor, -having notice of this project, at first kept close, but -afterwards sent troops to retake Medina and Casa -Vieja; and, in the course of February, twelve thousand -men, drawn from the northern governments, -were directed upon Andalusia, to reinforce the different -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_I">No. I.</a> -Section 5.</span>corps. The first corps was thus increased to -twenty thousand men, of which fifteen thousand -were before Cadiz, and the remainder at San Lucar, -Medina, Sidonia, and other quarters. Nevertheless,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_438"></a>[438]</span> -on the 21st of February, ten thousand infantry and -near six hundred cavalry, of the allies, were again -embarked at Cadiz; being to land at Tarifa, and -march upon the rear of the enemy’s camp at Chiclana. -Meanwhile, general Zayas, commanding -the Spanish forces left in the Isla, was to cast a -bridge over the San Petri, near the sea mouth; -Ballasteros, also, with the remains of his army, was -directed to menace Seville, the irregular bands -were to act against Sebastiani, and insurrections -were expected in all quarters.</p> - -<p>The British troops passed their port in a gale, -the 22d, but, landing at Algesiras, marched to -Tarifa the next day. Being there joined by the -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_IX">No. IX.</a> -Section 2.</span>twenty-eighth, and the flank companies of the ninth -and eighty-second regiments, somewhat more than -four thousand effective troops (including two companies -of the twentieth Portuguese and one hundred -and eighty German hussars) were assembled under -general Graham; all good and hardy troops, and -himself a daring old man and of a ready temper -for battle.</p> - -<p>General La Peña arrived on the 27th, with seven -thousand Spaniards, and Graham, for the sake -of unanimity, ceded the chief command, although it -was contrary to his instructions. The next day, the -whole, moving forward about twelve miles, passed -the mountain ridges that, descending from Ronda -to the sea, separate the plains of San Roque from -those of Medina and Chiclana: but being now within -four leagues of the enemy’s posts, the troops were -re-organized. The vanguard was given to Lardizabal; -the centre to the prince of Anglona; the -reserve, composed of two Spanish regiments and -the British were confided to Graham; but the cavalry<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_439"></a>[439]</span> -of both nations, formed in one body, was -commanded by colonel Whittingham, then in the -Spanish service.</p> - -<p>The French covering division, under general Cassagne, -consisted of three battalions and a regiment -of horse at Medina, with outposts at Vejer de la -Frontera and Casa Viejas. Before La Peña’s arrival, -the irregulars had attacked Casa Viejas, and general -Beguines had even taken Medina; but Cassagne, -reinforced by a battalion of infantry from Arcos, -retook and entrenched it the 29th; and the signal -of action being thus given, the French generals in -the higher provinces, perceiving that the people -were ready for commotion, gathered in their respective -forces at Seville, Ecija, and Cordoba; -following the orders left by Soult. In Grenada -<span class="sidenote">Intercepted -Letter -of General -Werlé to -Sebastiani, -Alhama, -March 12.</span>the insurgents were especially active; Sebastiani, -doubtful if the storm would not break on his head, -concentrated a column at Estipona as a good -covering point to the coast line, and one whence -he could easily gain Ronda. Victor manned his -works at Rota, Santa Maria, Puerto Real, and the -Trocadero with a mixed force, of refugee French, -juramentados, and regular troops; but he assembled -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_I">No. I.</a> -Section 6.</span>eleven thousand good soldiers near -Chiclana, taking post between the roads of Conil -and Medina, to await the development of the -allies’ project.</p> - -<p>At first, La Peña’s march pointed to Medina -Sidonia, his vanguard stormed Casa Viejas on the -2d of March, and the troops from Algesiras, -amounting to sixteen hundred infantry, besides -several hundreds of irregular cavalry, came in to -him; encreasing his force to twelve thousand infantry, -eight hundred horsemen, and twenty-four<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_440"></a>[440]</span> -guns. The 3d he resumed his march, but hearing -that Medina Sidonia was entrenched, turned -towards the coast, and drove the French from -Vejer de la Frontera. The following evening he -continued his movement, and at nine o’clock on -the morning of the 5th, after a skirmish, in which -his advanced guard of cavalry was routed by a -French squadron, he reached the Cerro de Puerco, -called by the English, the heights of Barosa; -being then only four miles from the sea mouth of -the Santi Petri.</p> - -<p>Barosa is a low ridge, creeping in from the -coast, about one mile and a half, and overlooking -a high and broken plain of small extent. This -plain was bounded on the left by the coast clifts, -on the right by the forest of Chiclana, and in front -by a pine-wood, beyond which rose the narrow -height of Bermeja, filling the space between the -Almanza creek and the sea. The Bermeja hill, -could be reached either by moving through the -wood in front, or along the beach under the clifts.</p> - -<p>At Tarifa, Graham, judging that Victor would -surely come out of his lines to fight, had obtained -from La Peña a promise to make short marches; -to keep the troops fresh for battle; and not to -approach the enemy except in a concentrated -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_IX">No. IX.</a> -Section 1.</span>mass. Nevertheless, the day’s march from Casa -Vieja, being made through bad roads, with ignorant -guides, had occupied fifteen hours, and the night -march to Barosa had been still more fatiguing. -The troops came up in a straggling manner, and -ere they had all arrived, La Peña, as if in contempt -of his colleague, without either disclosing his own -plans, or communicating by signal or otherwise -with Zayas, sent the vanguard, reinforced by a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_441"></a>[441]</span> -squadron and three guns, straight against the mouth -of the Santi Petri. Zayas had, indeed, cast his -bridge there on the 2d, and commenced an entrenchment; -but, in the following night, being -surprised by the French, was driven again into -the Isla: hence the movement of the vanguard -was exceedingly dangerous. Lardizabal, however, -after a sharp skirmish, in which he lost nearly three -hundred men, forced the enemy’s posts between -the Almanza creek and the sea, and effected a -junction with Zayas.</p> - -<p>Graham was extremely desirous of holding the -Barosa height, as the key both to offensive and -defensive movements, and he argued that no -general in his senses would lend his flank to an -enemy, by attacking the Bermeja while Barosa -was occupied in force. Lascy, the chief of the -Spanish staff, having however opposed this reasoning, -La Peña commanded Graham to march -the British troops through the wood to Bermeja. -With great temper, he obeyed this uncourteous -order; and leaving the flank companies of the -ninth and eighty-second, under major Brown, as a -guard for the baggage, commenced his march, in -the full persuasion that La Peña would remain -with Anglona’s division and the cavalry at Barosa; -and the more so, as a Spanish detachment was -still on the side of Medina. But scarcely had the -British entered the wood, when La Peña, without -any notice, carried off the corps of battle, directed -the cavalry to follow by the sea-road, and repaired -himself to Santi Petri, leaving Barosa crowded -with baggage, and protected only by a rear guard -of four guns and five battalions.</p> - -<p>During these movements, Victor remained close<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_442"></a>[442]</span> -in the forest of Chiclana, and the patrols of the allied -cavalry reported that they could see no enemy; -Graham’s march therefore, being only of two miles, -seemed secure. The French marshal was, however, -keenly watching the allies’ progress; having recalled -his infantry from Medina Sidonia as soon as -La Peña had reached Barosa, he momentarily -expected their arrival; but he felt so sure of -success, that the cavalry at Medina and Arcos were -directed upon Vejer and other places, to cut off -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_I">No. I.</a> -Section 7.</span>the fugitives after the approaching battle. The -duke of Belluno had in hand fourteen pieces of -artillery and nine thousand excellent troops, of the -divisions of Laval, Ruffin, and Villatte; from these -he drew three grenadier battalions as reserves, attaching -two of them and three squadrons of cavalry to the -division of Ruffin, which formed his left wing, the -other to the division of Laval, which formed his centre. -Villatte’s troops, about two thousand five hundred in -number, after being withdrawn from Bermeja, were -posted close to a bridge on the Almanza creek, -to cover the works of the camp, and to watch the -Spanish forces at Santi Petri and Bermeja.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF BAROSA.</h4> - -<p>When Victor observed that Graham’s corps -was in the wood, that a strong body of Spaniards -was on the Bermeja, that a third body, with all the -baggage, was at Barosa, and a fourth still in -march from Vejer; he took Villatte’s division as -his pivot, and coming forth with a rapid pace -into the plain, directed Laval against the English, -while himself, with Ruffin’s brigade, ascending the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_443"></a>[443]</span> -reverse side of Barosa, cut off the Spanish detachment -on the road to Medina, and drove the whole -of the rear guard off the height towards the sea; -dispersing the baggage and followers of the army -in all directions, and taking three Spanish guns.</p> - -<p>Major Brown, seeing the general confusion, and -being unable to stem the torrent, slowly retired -into the plain, sending notice of what was passing -to Graham, and demanding orders. That general, -being then near Bermeja, answered, that he was -to fight; and instantly facing about himself, regained -the plain with the greatest celerity, expecting -to find La Peña, with the corps of battle and the -cavalry, on the height: but when the view opened, -he beheld Ruffin, flanked by the chosen battalions, -near the top of Barosa at the one side, the Spanish -rear guard and baggage flying in confusion on -the other, the French cavalry between the summit -and the sea, and Laval close on his own left flank; -but La Peña he could see no where. In this desperate -situation, he felt that to retreat upon Bermeja, -and thus bring the enemy, pell mell with the -allies on to that narrow ridge, must be disastrous, -hence, without a moment’s hesitation, he resolved -to attack, although the key of the field of battle -was already in the enemy’s possession.</p> - -<p>Ten guns, under major Duncan, instantly opened -a terrific fire against Laval’s column, while colonel -Andrew Barnard, with the riflemen and the Portuguese -companies, running out to the left, commenced -the fight: the remainder of the British -troops, without any attention to regiments or brigades, -so sudden was the affair, formed two masses, -one of which under general <ins class="err" id="err-443" title="Erratum: was 'Dikies'"> -Dilke</ins> marched hastily -against Ruffin, and the other under colonel<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_444"></a>[444]</span> -Wheately against Laval. Duncan’s guns ravaged the -French ranks; Laval’s artillery replied vigorously; -Ruffin’s batteries took Wheately’s column in flank; -and the infantry on both sides pressed forward -eagerly, and with a pealing musketry; but, when -near together, a fierce, rapid, prolonged charge -of the British overthrew the first line of the -French, and, notwithstanding its extreme valour, -drove it in confusion, over a narrow dip of ground -upon the second, which was almost immediately -broken in the same manner, and only the chosen -battalion, hitherto posted on the right, remained to -cover the retreat.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Brown, on receiving his orders, had -marched headlong against Ruffin. Nearly half -of his detachment went down under the enemy’s -first fire; yet he maintained the fight, until Dilke’s -column, which had crossed a deep hollow and -never stopt even to re-form the regiments, came up, -with little order indeed, but in a fierce mood, when -the whole run up towards the summit; there was -no slackness on any side, and at the very edge of -the ascent their gallant opponents met them. A -dreadful, and for some time a doubtful, fight ensued, -but Ruffin and Chaudron Rousseau, commanding -the chosen grenadiers, both fell mortally -wounded; the English bore strongly onward, and -their incessant slaughtering fire forced the French -from the hill with the loss of three guns and many -brave soldiers.</p> - -<p>The discomfitted divisions, retiring concentrically, -soon met, and with infinite spirit endeavoured to -re-form and renew the action; but the play of Duncan’s -guns, close, rapid, and murderous, rendered -the attempt vain. Victor was soon in full retreat,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_445"></a>[445]</span> -and the British having been twenty-four hours -under arms, without food, were too exhausted to -pursue.</p> - -<p>While these terrible combats of infantry were -fighting, La Peña looked idly on, neither sending -his cavalry, nor his horse-artillery, nor any part -of his army, to the assistance of his ally, nor yet -menacing the right of the enemy, which was close -to him and weak. The Spanish Walloon guards, -the regiment of Ciudad Real, and some Guerilla -cavalry, indeed turned without orders, coming -up just as the action ceased; and it was expected -that colonel Whittingham, an Englishman commanding -a powerful body of horse, would have -done as much; but no stroke in aid of the -British was struck by a Spanish sabre that day, -although the French cavalry did not exceed two -hundred and fifty men, and it is evident that the -eight hundred under Whittingham might, by -sweeping round the left of Ruffin’s division, have -rendered the defeat ruinous. So certain, indeed, was -this, that colonel Frederick Ponsonby, drawing off -the hundred and eighty German hussars belonging -to the English army, reached the field of battle, -charged the French squadrons just as their retreating -divisions met, overthrew them, took two -guns, and even attempted, though vainly, to sabre -Rousseau’s chosen battalions.</p> - -<p>Such was the fight of Barosa. Short, for it -lasted only one hour and a half, but most violent -and bloody; for fifty officers, sixty serjeants, -and above eleven hundred British soldiers, and -more than two thousand Frenchmen were killed -and wounded; and from the latter, six guns, -an eagle, and two generals (both mortally wounded)<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_446"></a>[446]</span> -were taken, together with four hundred other prisoners.</p> - -<p>After the action, Graham remained some hours -on the height, still hoping that La Peña would -awake to the prospect of success and glory, which -the extreme valour of the British had opened. -Four thousand men and a powerful artillery had -come over the Santi Petri; hence the Spanish general -was at the head of twelve thousand infantry -and eight hundred cavalry, all fresh troops; while -before him were only the remains of the French line -of battle retreating in the greatest disorder upon -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_IX">No. IX.</a> -Section 1.</span>Chiclana. But all military feeling being extinct -in La Peña, Graham would no longer endure such -command. The morning of the 6th saw the British -filing over Zaya’s bridge into the Isla.</p> - -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_446fp" style="max-width: 35em;"> - <p class="right fs70"><em>Vol. 3, Plate 9.</em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_446fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_446fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - <div class="caption"> -BATTLE of BAROSA<br /> -<em>5<sup>th</sup> March, 1811</em>.<br /> - -<p><em>London Published by <span class="smcap">T. & W. Boone</span> Nov<sup>r</sup> 1830.</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>On the French side, Cassagne’s reserve came -in from Medina, a council of war was held in the -night of the 5th, and Victor, although of a disponding -nature, proposed another attack; but the -suggestion being ill received, nothing was done; -and the 6th, Admiral Keats, landing his seamen -and marines, dismantled, with exception of Catalina, -every fort from Rota to Santa Maria, and -even obtained momentary possession of the latter -place. Confusion and alarm then prevailed in the -French camp; the duke of Belluno, leaving garrisons -at the great points of his lines, and a rear -<span class="sidenote">Official -Abstracts -of Military -Reports, -MSS.</span>guard at Chiclana, retreated behind the San Pedro, -where he expected to be immediately attacked. -If La Peña had even then pushed to Chiclana, -Graham and Keats were willing to make a simultaneous -attack upon the Trocadero; but the 6th -and 7th passed, without even a Spanish patrole -following the French. On the 8th Victor returned<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_447"></a>[447]</span> -to Chiclana, and La Peña instantly recrossing the -Santi Petri, destroyed the bridge, and his detachment -on the side of Medina being thus cut off -from the Isla, was soon afterwards obliged to retire -to Algesiras.</p> - -<p>All the passages in this extraordinary battle -were so broadly marked, that observations would -be useless. The contemptible feebleness of La -Peña furnished a surprising contrast to the heroic -vigour of Graham, whose attack was an inspiration -rather than a resolution, so wise, so sudden was the -decision, so swift, so conclusive was the execution. -The original plan of the enterprise having however -been rather rashly censured, some remarks on -that head may be useful. “Sebastiani, it is said, -might, by moving on the rear of the allies, have -crushed them, and they had no right to calculate -upon his inactivity.” This is weak. Graham, weighing -the natural dislike of one general to serve under -another, judged, that Sebastiani, harassed by insurrections -in Grenada, would not hastily abandon his -own district to succour Victor, before it was clear -where the blow was to be struck. The distance -from Tarifa to Chiclana was about fifty miles, -whereas, from Sebastiani’s nearest post to Chiclana -was above a hundred, and the real object of the -allies could not be known until they had passed -the mountains separating Tarifa from Medina.</p> - -<p>Combining these moral and physical considerations, -Graham had reason to expect several -days of free action; and thus indeed it happened, -and with a worthy colleague he would have raised -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_IX">No. IX.</a> -Section 5.</span>the blockade: more than that could scarcely -have been hoped, as the French forces would have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_448"></a>[448]</span> -concentrated either before Cadiz or about Seville -or Ecija; and they had still fifty thousand men in -Andalusia.</p> - -<p>Victor’s attack on the 5th, was well-judged, -well-timed, vigorous; with a few thousand more -troops he alone would have crushed the allies. -The unconquerable spirit of the English prevented -this disaster; but if Graham or his troops had -given way, or even hesitated, the whole army must -have been driven like sheep into an enclosure; -the Almanza creek on one side, the sea on the -other, the San Petri to bar their flight, and the -enemy hanging on their rear in all the fierceness -of victory. Indeed, such was La Peña’s misconduct, -that the French, although defeated, gained -their main point; the blockade was renewed, and -it is remarkable that, during the action, a French -detachment passed near the bridge of Zuazo without -difficulty, and brought back prisoners; thus proving -that with a few more troops Victor might have -seized the Isla. Meanwhile Ballasteros, who had -gone against Seville, was chased, in a miserable -condition, to the Aroche hills, by Daricau.</p> - -<p>In Cadiz violent disputes arose. La Peña, in an -address to the Cortes, claimed the victory for himself. -He affirmed that all the previous arrangements -were made with the knowledge and approbation -of the English general, and the latter’s retreat -into the Isla he indicated as the real cause of failure: -Lascy and general Cruz-Murgeon also published -inaccurate accounts of the action, and even had -deceptive plans engraved to uphold their statements. -Graham, stung by these unworthy proceedings, -exposed the conduct of La Peña in a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_449"></a>[449]</span> -letter to the British envoy; and when Lascy let -fall some expressions personally offensive, he enforced -an apology with his sword; but having thus -shewn himself superior to his opponents at all -points, the gallant old man soon afterwards relinquished -his command to general Cooke, and joined -lord Wellington’s army.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_450"></a>[450]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXII_III">CHAPTER III.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>While discord prevailed at Cadiz, the siege of -Badajos continued. Early in March, the second -parallel being completed and the Pardaleras taken -into the works, the approaches were carried by sap -to the covered way, and mines were prepared to -blow in the counterscarp. Nevertheless, Rafael -Menacho, the governor, was in no manner dismayed; -his sallies were frequent and vigorous, his activity -and courage inspired his troops with confidence, he -had begun to retrench in the streets behind the part -attacked, and as the fire of the besiegers was -also inferior to that of the besieged, every thing -seemed to promise favourably for the latter: but, -on the evening of the 2d, during a sally, in which -the nearest French batteries were carried, the guns -spiked, and trenches partly ruined, Menacho was -killed, and the command fell to Imas, a man so -unworthy that a worse could not be found. At once -the spirit of the garrison died away, the besiegers’ -works advanced rapidly, the ditch was passed, a -lodgement was made on one of the ravelins, the -rampart was breached, and the fire of the besieged -being nearly extinguished, on the 10th of March -the place was summoned in a peremptory manner.</p> - -<p>At this time the great crisis of the campaign had -passed, and a strong body of British and Portuguese -troops were ready to raise the siege of Badajos. -In three different ways, by telegraph, by a letter, -and by a confidential messenger, the governor<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_451"></a>[451]</span> -was informed, that Massena was in full retreat and -that the relieving army was actually in march. The -breach was still impracticable, provisions were -plentiful, the garrison above eight thousand strong, -the French army reduced, by sickness, by detachments -<span class="sidenote">Lord Wellington’s -Despatch.</span>and the previous operations, to less than -fourteen thousand men. Imas read the letter, and -instantly surrendered, handing over at the same -moment the intelligence thus obtained to the -enemy. But he also demanded that his grenadiers -should march out of the breach, it was granted, -and he was obliged to enlarge the opening himself -ere they could do so! Yet this man so covered with -opprobrium, and who had secured his own liberty -while consigning his fellow soldiers to a prison, -and his character to infamy, was never punished -by the Spanish rulers: lord Wellington’s indignant -remonstrances forced them, indeed, to bring -him to trial, but they made the process last during -the whole war.</p> - -<p>When the place fell, Mortier marched against -Campo Mayor, and Latour Maubourg seizing Albuquerque -and Valencia d’Alcantara, made six hundred -prisoners; but Soult, alarmed by the effects -of the battle of Barosa, returned to Andalusia, -having, in fifty days, mastered four fortresses and -invested a fifth; having killed or dispersed ten thousand -men, and having taken twenty thousand with a -force which, at no time, exceeded the number of his -prisoners: yet great and daring and successful as -his operations had been, the principal object of his -expedition was frustrated, for Massena was in retreat. -Lord Wellington’s combinations had palsied -the hand of the conqueror.</p> - -<p>While the siege of Badajos was proceeding, no<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_452"></a>[452]</span> -change took place in the main positions of either -army at Santarem. The English general, certain that -the French, who were greatly reduced by sickness, -must soon quit their ground if he could relieve Badajos, -was only waiting for his reinforcements to send -Beresford with fourteen thousand men against Soult; -when the battle of the Gebora ruined this plan and -changed his situation. The arrival of the reinforcements -could not then enable him to detach a sufficient -number of men to relieve Badajos, and it was -no longer a question of starving Massena out, but -of beating him, before Soult could take Badajos -and the two armies be joined. In this difficulty, -abandoning the design of raising the siege by a -detachment, lord Wellington prepared to attack -Massena’s army in front on the side of Tremes, while -Beresford, crossing at Abrantes, fell upon the rear; he -hoped thus to force back the French right and centre, -and to cut off the left and to drive it into the Tagus. -However, nothing could be attempted until the troops -from England arrived, and day after day passed in -vain expectation of their coming. Being embarked -in January, they would have reached Lisbon before -the end of that month, had sir Joseph Yorke, the -admiral, charged to conduct the fleet, taken advantage -of a favourable wind, which blew when the -troops were first put on board; but he neglected -this opportunity, contrary gales followed, and a -voyage of ten days was thus prolonged for six weeks.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the French general’s situation -was becoming very perilous. To besiege Abrantes -was above his means, and although that fortress -was an important strategic point for the allies who -had a moveable bridge, it would not have been so for -the French. Massena could only choose then, to force<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_453"></a>[453]</span> -the passage of the Tagus alone, or to wait until Soult -appeared on the left bank, or to retreat. For sometime -he seemed inclined to the first, shewing great -jealousy of the works opposite the mouth of the -Zezere, and carrying his boats on wheel-carriages -along the banks of the Tagus, as if to alarm Beresford -and oblige him to concentrate to his left: yet -that general relaxed nothing of his vigilance, neither -spy nor officer passed his lines of observation, and -Massena knew, generally, that Soult was before Badajos, -but nothing more. However, time wore -away, sickness wasted the army, food became daily -scarcer, the organization of the troops was seriously -loosened, the leading generals were at variance, and -<span class="sidenote">See Vol. II</span>the conspiracy to put St. Cyr at the head of the -army in Spain was by no means relinquished.</p> - -<p>Under these accumulating difficulties even Massena’s -obstinacy gave way; he promised to retreat -when he had no more provisions left than would serve -his army for the march. A tardy resolution; yet -adopted at the moment, when to maintain his position -was more important than ever, as ten days -longer at Santarem would have insured the co-operation -of Soult. General Pelet says, that the latter -marshal, by engaging in the siege of Badajos and -Olivenza, instead of coming directly down upon the -Tagus, was the cause of Massena’s failure; this can -hardly be sustained. Before those sieges and the -battle of the Gebora, Mendizabel could have assembled -twenty thousand men on Soult’s rear, and there -was a large body of militia on the Ponçul and the -Elga; Beresford had fourteen thousand British and -Portuguese regulars, besides ordenança; while the -infinite number of boats at lord Wellington’s command -would have enabled him to throw troops upon<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_454"></a>[454]</span> -the left bank of the Tagus, with a celerity that -would have baffled any effort of Massena to -assist the duke of Dalmatia. Now, if the latter had -been defeated; with what argument could he have -defended his reputation as a general, after having -left three or four garrisoned fortresses and thirty-five -thousand men upon his flank and rear; to say -nothing of the results threatened by the battle of -Barosa.</p> - -<p>The true cause of Massena’s failure was the insufficiency -of his means to oppose the English -general’s combinations. The French army reduced -by sickness to forty thousand fighting men, exclusive -of Drouet’s troops at Leiria, would have been -unable to maintain its extended position against -the attack meditated by lord Wellington; and when -Massena, through the means of the fidalgos, knew that -the English reinforcements were come, he prepared -to retreat. Those troops landed the 2d of March, -and, the 6th, the French had evacuated <ins class="corr" id="tn-454" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the posisition of'"> -the position of</ins> Santarem.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Muster-Rolls -of -the French -Army.</div> - -<p>At this time Napoleon directed the armies of -Spain to be remodelled. The king’s force was diminished; -the army of the south increased; general -Drouet was ordered to march with eleven thousand -men to the fifth corps, which he was appointed -to command, in place of Mortier; the remainder -of the ninth corps was to compose two divisions, -under the command of Clausel and Foy, and to be -incorporated with the army of Portugal. Marmont -was appointed to relieve Ney in the command of -the sixth corps; Loison was removed to the second -corps; and Bessieres was ordered to post six thousand -men at Ciudad Rodrigo, to watch the frontiers -of Portugal and support Claparede. Of the imperial<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_455"></a>[455]</span> -guards; seven thousand were to assemble at -Zamora, to hold the Gallicians in check, and the -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_VII">No. VII.</a></span>remainder at Valladolid, with strong parties of -cavalry in the space between those places, that -intelligence of what was passing in Portugal might -be daily received. Thus Massena was enabled to -adopt any operation that might seem good to him, -without reference to his original base; but the -order for the execution of these measures did not -reach the armies until a later period.</p> - - -<h4>RETREAT OF THE FRENCH FROM SANTAREM.</h4> - -<p>Several lines of operation were open to the prince -of Esling. 1º. He could pass the Tagus, between -Punhete and Abrantes, by boats or by fords, which -were always practicable after a week of dry weather. -2º. He could retire, by the Sobreira Formosa, upon -Castello Branco, and open a communication with -the king by Placentia, and with the duke of Dalmatia -by Alcantara. 3º. He could march, by the -Estrada Nova and Belmonte, to Sabugal, and -afterwards act according to circumstances. 4º. He -could gain the Mondego, and ascend the left bank of -that river towards Guarda and Almeida; or, crossing -it, march upon Oporto through an untouched -country. Of these four plans, the first was perilous, -and the weather too unsettled to be sure of -the fords. The second and third were difficult, -from the ruggedness of the Sobreira, and exposed, -because the allies could break out by -Abrantes upon the flank of the army while in -retreat. Massena decided on the last, but his -actual position being to the left of the line of retreat,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_456"></a>[456]</span> -he was necessarily forced to make a flank -movement, with more than ten thousand sick men -and all his stores, under the beard of an adversary -before he could begin his retreat. Yet this he -executed, and in a manner bespeaking the great -commander.</p> - -<p>Commencing his preparations by destroying munition, -and all guns that could not be horsed, he -passed his sick and baggage, by degrees, upon -Thomar, keeping only his fighting-men in the -front, and at the same time indicating an intention -of passing the Zezere. But when the impediments -of the army had gained two marches, Ney -suddenly assembled the sixth corps and the cavalry -on the Lys, near Leiria, as if with the intention of -advancing against Torres Vedras, a movement that -necessarily kept lord Wellington in suspense. Meanwhile, -the second and eighth corps, quitting Santarem, -Tremes, and Alcanhete, in the night of the -5th, fell back, by Pernes, upon Torres Novas and -Thomar, destroying the bridges on the Alviella -behind them. The next morning the boats were -burnt at Punhete, and Loison retreated by the road -of Espinal to cover the flank of the main line of -retreat; the remainder of the army, by rapid -concentric marches, made for a position in front of -Pombal: the line of movement to the Mondego -was thus secured, and four days gained; for lord -Wellington, although aware that a retreat was in -execution, was quite unable to take any decided -step, lest he should open the Lines to his adversary. -Nevertheless he had caused Beresford to close to -his right on the 5th, and at daylight, on the 6th, -discovering the empty camps of Santarem, followed -the enemy closely with his own army.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_457"></a>[457]</span></p> - -<p>Thomar seemed to be the French point of concentration; -but as their boats were still maintained -at Punhete, general William Stewart crossed the -Tagus, at Abrantes, with the greatest part of Beresford’s -corps, while the first, fourth, and sixth divisions, -and two brigades of cavalry, marched to -Golegao; the light division also reached Pernes, -where the bridge was rapidly repaired by captain -Tod, of the royal staff-corps. The 7th, the enemy -having burnt his boats on the Zezere, the Abrantes -bridge was brought down to that river, and Stewart, -crossing, moved to Thomar; on which place the -divisions at Golegao were likewise directed. But -the retreat being soon decidedly pronounced for the -Mondego, the troops at Thomar were ordered to -halt; and the light division, German hussars, and -royal dragoons followed the eighth corps, taking -two hundred prisoners.</p> - -<p>This day’s march disclosed a horrible calamity. -A large house, situated in an obscure part of the -mountains, was discovered, filled with starving persons. -Above thirty women and children had sunk, -and, sitting by the bodies, were fifteen or sixteen -survivors, of whom one only was a man, but -all so enfeebled as to be unable to eat the little -food we had to offer them. The youngest had -fallen first; all the children were dead; none were -emaciated in the bodies, but the muscles of the -face were invariably drawn transversely, giving the -appearance of laughing, and presenting the most -ghastly sight imaginable. The man seemed most -eager for life; the women appeared patient and -resigned, and, even in this distress, had arranged -the bodies of those who first died, with decency -and care.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_458"></a>[458]</span></p> - -<p>While one part of the army was thus in pursuit, -the third and fifth divisions moved, from the Lines, -upon Leiria; the Abrantes’ boats fell down the river -to Tancos, where a bridge was fixed; and the -second and fourth divisions, and some cavalry, were -directed to return from Thomar to the left bank of -the Tagus, to relieve Badajos: Beresford also, who -remained with a part of his corps near Barca, had -already sent a brigade of cavalry to Portalegre for -that purpose. This was on the morning of the -9th; but the enemy, instead of continuing his -retreat, concentrated the sixth and eighth corps -and Montbrun’s cavalry on a table-land, in front of -Pombal, where the light division skirmished with -his advanced posts, and the German horse charged -his cavalry with success, taking some prisoners.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington, finding the French disposed to -accept battle, was now compelled to alter his plans. -To fight with advantage, it was necessary to bring -up, from Thomar, the troops destined to relieve -Badajos; not to fight, was giving up to the enemy -Coimbra, and the untouched country behind, as -far as Oporto: Massena would thus retire with the -advantages of a conqueror. However, intelligence -received that morning, from Badajos, described it -as being in a sufficient state, and capable of holding -out yet a month. This decided the question.</p> - -<p>The fourth division and the heavy cavalry, already -on the march for the Alemtejo, were countermanded; -general Nightingale, with a brigade of the first -division and some horse, was directed by the road -of Espinal, to observe the second corps; and the -rest of the army was concentrically directed upon -Pombal. How dangerous a captain Massena -could be, was here proved. His first movement<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_459"></a>[459]</span> -began the 4th, it was the 11th before a sufficient -number of troops could be assembled to fight -him at Pombal, and, during these seven days, he had -executed one of the most difficult operations in war, -gained three or four marches, and completely organized -his system of retreat.</p> - - -<h4>SKIRMISH AT POMBAL.</h4> - -<p>Pack’s brigade and the cavalry, the first, third, -fourth, fifth, sixth, and light divisions, and the Portuguese -troops, which were attached, like the ancient -Latin auxiliaries of the Roman legion, to each -British division, were assembling in front of the -enemy on the 10th; when Massena, who had sent his -baggage over the Soure river in the night by the -bridge of Pombal, suddenly retired through that town. -He was so closely followed by the light division, -that the streets being still encumbered, Ney drew -up a rear-guard on a height behind the town, and -threw a detachment into the old castle of Pombal. -He had, however, waited too long. The French -army was moving in some confusion and in a very -extended column of march, by a narrow defile, -between the mountains and the Soure river, which -was fordable; and the British divisions were in rapid -motion along the left bank, with the design of -crossing lower down, and cutting Massena’s line of -retreat. But darkness came on too fast, and -the operation terminated with a sharp skirmish at -Pombal, whence the ninety-fifth and the third caçadores -of the light division, after some changes of -fortune, drove the French from the castle and town -with such vigour, that the latter could not destroy<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_460"></a>[460]</span> -the bridge, although it was mined. About forty -of the allies were hurt, and the loss of the enemy -was somewhat greater.</p> - -<p>In the night Massena continued his retreat, -which now assumed a regular and concentrated -form. The baggage and sick, protected by the -reserve cavalry, marched first; these were followed -by the eighth corps; and the sixth, with some light -cavalry, and the best horsed of the artillery, -were destined to stem the pursuit. Ney had been -ordered to detach Marcognet’s brigade on the 10th, -from the Lys, to seize Coimbra; but some delay -having taken place, Montbrun was now appointed -for that service.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington’s immediate object was to save -Coimbra, and he designed, by skilful, rather than -daring, operations, to oblige Massena to quit the -Portuguese territory: the moral effect of such an -event, he judged, would be sufficient; but as his reinforcements -were still distant, he was obliged to -retain the fourth division and the heavy cavalry from -the relief of Badajos, and was therefore willing to -strike a sudden stroke, if a fair occasion offered. -Howbeit the country was full of strong positions, the -roads hollow and confined by mountains on either -hand, every village formed a defile; the weather -also, being moderate, was favourable to the enemy, -and Ney, with a wonderfully happy mixture of courage, -readiness, and skill, illustrated every league -of ground by some signal combination of war.</p> - -<p>Day-break, on the 12th, saw both armies in -movement, and eight miles of march, and some slight -skirmishing, brought the head of the British into a -hollow way, leading to a high table-land on which -Ney had disposed five thousand infantry, a few<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_461"></a>[461]</span> -squadrons of cavalry, and some light guns. His -centre was opposite the hollow road, his wings -were covered by wooded heights, which he occupied -with light troops; his right rested on the -ravine of the Soure, his left on the Redinha, -which circling round his rear fell into the Soure. -Behind him the village of Redinha, situated in a -hollow, covered a narrow bridge and a long and -dangerous defile; and, beyond the stream, some -very rugged heights, commanding a view of the -position in front of the village, were occupied by -a division of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and -a battery of heavy guns; all so skilfully disposed -as to give the appearance of a very considerable -force.</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF REDINHA.</h4> - -<p>After examining the enemy’s position for a short -time, lord Wellington first directed the light division, -now commanded by sir William Erskine, -to attack the wooded slopes covering Ney’s right: -in less than an hour these orders were executed. -The fifty-second, the ninety-fifth, and the caçadores, -assisted by a company of the forty-third, carried -the ascent and cleared the woods, and their skirmishers -even advanced on to the open plain; but -the French battalions, supported by four guns, -immediately opened a heavy rolling fire, and at the -same moment, colonel Ferriere, of the third French -hussars, charged and took fourteen prisoners. -This officer, during the whole campaign, had never -failed to break in upon the skirmishers in the most -critical moments; sometimes with a squadron, sometimes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_462"></a>[462]</span> -with only a few men; he was, however, sure -to be found in the right place, and was continually -proving how much may be done, even in the -most rugged mountains, by a small body of good -cavalry.</p> - -<p>Erskine’s line, consisting of five battalions of -infantry and six guns, being now formed in such -a manner that it outflanked the French right, -tending towards the ford of the Redinha, was -reinforced with two regiments of dragoons; meanwhile -Picton seized the wooded heights protecting -the French left, and thus Ney’s position was -laid bare. Nevertheless, that marshal observing -that lord Wellington, deceived as to his real numbers, -was bringing the mass of the allied troops -into line; far from retreating, even charged Picton’s -skirmishers, and continued to hold his ground -with an astonishing confidence if we consider his -position; for the third division was nearer to the -village and bridge than his right, and there were -already cavalry and guns enough on the plain to -overwhelm him. In this posture both sides remained -for about an hour, when, three shots were -fired from the British centre as a signal for a forward -movement, and a most splendid spectacle of -war was exhibited. The woods seemed alive with -troops; and in a few moments thirty thousand -men, forming three gorgeous lines of battle, were -stretched across the plain; but bending on a gentle -curve, and moving majestically onwards, while -horsemen and guns, springing forward simultaneously -from the centre and from the left wing, charged -under a general volley from the French battalions: -the latter were instantly hidden by the smoke, and -when that cleared away no enemy was to be seen.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_463"></a>[463]</span></p> - -<p>Ney keenly watching the progress of this grand -formation, had opposed Picton’s foremost skirmishers -with his left, and, at the same moment, withdrew -the rest of his people with such rapidity, -that he gained the village ere the cavalry could -touch him: the utmost efforts of Picton’s skirmishers -and of the horse-artillery scarcely enabled -them to gall the hindmost of the French left with -their fire. One howitzer was, indeed, dismounted -close to the bridge, but the village of Redinha -was in flames; and the marshal wishing to confirm -the courage of his soldiers at the commencement -of the retreat, in person superintended the carrying -it off: this he effected, yet with the loss of -fifteen or twenty men, and with great danger to -himself, for the British guns were thundering on -his rear, and the light troops of the third division, -chasing like heated blood hounds, passed the river -almost at the same time with the French. The -reserves of the latter cannonaded the bridge from -the heights beyond, but a fresh disposition of attack -being made by lord Wellington, while the third -division continued to press the left, Ney fell back -upon the main body, then at Condeixa, ten miles in -the rear.</p> - -<p>The British had twelve officers and two hundred -men killed and wounded in this combat, and the -enemy lost as many; but he might have been utterly -destroyed; for there is no doubt, that the -duke of Elchingen remained a quarter of an hour -too long upon his first position, and that, deceived -by the skilful arrangement of his reserve, lord -Wellington paid him too much respect. Yet the -extraordinary facility and precision with which the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_464"></a>[464]</span> -English general handled so large a force, was a -warning to the French commander, and produced a -palpable effect upon the after operations.</p> - -<p>On the 13th, the allies renewed the pursuit, -and before ten o’clock discovered the French army, -the second corps which was at Espinhal excepted, -in order of battle. The crisis of Massena’s retreat -had arrived, the defiles of Condeixa, leading upon -Coimbra, were behind him; those of Miranda de -Corvo, leading to the Puente de Murcella, were on -his left; and in the fork of these two roads Ney -was seated on a strong range of heights covered -by a marsh, his position being only to be approached -by the highway leading through a deep hollow -against his right. Trees were felled to obstruct -the passage; a palisado was constructed across the -hollow; breast-works were thrown up on each -side, and Massena expected to stop the pursuit, -while Montbrun seized Coimbra: for he designed -to pass the Mondego, and either capture Oporto -or maintain a position between the Douro and -the Mondego, until the operations of Soult should -draw the British away; or until the advance of -Bessieres with the army of the north, should enable -himself again to act offensively. Hitherto the -French general had appeared <ins class="corr" id="tn-464" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the abler tactitian'"> -the abler tactician</ins>, but now his adversary assumed the superiority.</p> - -<p>When at Thomar lord Wellington had sent Baccellar -orders to look to the security of Oporto, and -had directed Wilson and Trant also to abandon the -Mondego and the Vouga the moment the fords were -passable, retiring across the Douro; breaking up -the roads as they retreated, and taking care to remove -or to destroy all boats and means of transport.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_465"></a>[465]</span> -Now, Wilson was in march for the Vouga, but Trant -having destroyed an arch of the Coimbra bridge on -the city side, and placed guards at the fords as far as -Figueras, resolved to oppose the enemy’s passage; -for the sound of guns had reached his outposts, -the river was rising, and he felt assured that the -allied army was close upon the heels of the -enemy.</p> - -<p>As early as the evening of the 11th, the French -appeared at the suburb of Santa Clara, and a small -party of their dragoons actually forded the Mondego -at Pereiras that day: on the 12th, some French officers -examined the bridge of Coimbra, but a cannon-shot -from the other side wounded one of them, and a -general skirmish took place along the banks of the -river, during which a party attempting to feel their -way along the bridge, were scattered by a round -of grape. The fords were, however, actually practicable -for cavalry, and there were not more than -two or three hundred militia and a few guns at the -bridge; for Baccellar had obliged Trant to withdraw -the greatest part of his force on the 11th; nevertheless -the latter opposed the enemy with the remainder, -and it would appear that the French imagined the -reinforcement, which reached Lisbon the 2d of -March, had been sent by sea to the Mondego and -<span class="sidenote"><ins class="err" id="err-465" title="Erratum: was 'Campagne de Français'"> -Campagne -des Français</ins> -en -Portugal.</span>was in Coimbra. This was an error. Coimbra -was saved by the same man and the same militia -that had captured it during the advance.</p> - -<p>Montbrun sent his report to Massena early on -the 13th, and the latter too readily crediting his -opinion of Trant’s strength, relinquished the idea -of passing the Mondego, and determined to retire -by the Puente de Murcella: but to ensure the power -of changing his front, and to secure his communication<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_466"></a>[466]</span> -with Reynier and Loison, he had carried -Clausel’s division to Fonte Coberta, a village -about five miles on his left; situated at the point -where the Anciao road falls into that leading to -Murcella. There Loison rejoined him, and being -thus pivotted on the Anciao Sierra, and covering -the line of communication with the second corps -while Ney held Condeixa, he considered his position -secure. His baggage was, however, observed filing -off by the Murcella road when the allies first came -upon Ney, and lord Wellington instantly comprehending -the state of affairs, as instantly detached -the third division by a very difficult path over the -Sierra de Anciao to turn the enemy’s left.</p> - -<p>For some time all appeared quiet in the French -lines. Massena, in repairing to Fonte Coberta, -had left Ney orders, it is said, to fire Condeixa -at a certain hour when all the divisions were -simultaneously to concentrate at Casal Nova, in a -second position, perpendicular to the first, and -covering the road to Puente Murcella. But towards -three o’clock Picton was descried winding -round the bluff end of a mountain, about eight -miles distant, and as he was already beyond the -French left, instant confusion pervaded their camp: -a thick smoke arose from Condeixa, the columns -were seen hurrying towards Casal Nova; and the -British immediately pushed forward. The felled -trees and other obstacles impeded their advance at -first, and a number of fires, simultaneously kindled, -covered the retreating troops with smoke, while the -flames of Condeixa stopped the artillery, hence the -skirmishers and some cavalry only could close with -the rear of the enemy, but so rapidly, as to penetrate -between the division at Fonte Coberta and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_467"></a>[467]</span> -rest of the French; and it is affirmed that the prince -of Esling, who was on the road, only escaped capture -by taking the feathers out of his hat and riding -through some of the light troops.</p> - -<p>Condeixa being thus evacuated, the British -cavalry pushed towards Coimbra, opened the communication -with Trant, and cutting off Montbrun, -captured a part of his horsemen. The rest of the -army kindled their fires, and the light division -planted piquets close up to the enemy; but, about -ten at night, the French divisions, whose presence -at Fonte Coberta was unknown to lord Wellington, -stole out, and passing close along the -front of the British posts, made for Miranda de -Corvo. The noise of their march was heard, but -the night was dark, it was imagined to be the -moving of the French baggage to the rear, and -being so reported to sir William Erskine, that -officer, without any further inquiry, put the light -division in march at day-light on the 14th.</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF CASAL NOVA.</h4> - -<p>The morning was so obscured that nothing could -be descried at the distance of a hundred feet, but -the sound of a great multitude was heard on the -hills in front; and it being evident that the French -were there in force, many officers represented -the rashness of thus advancing without orders and -in such a fog; but Erskine, with an astounding -negligence, sent the fifty-second forward in a -simple column of sections, without a vanguard or -other precaution, and even before the piquets had -come in from their posts. The road dipped suddenly,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_468"></a>[468]</span> -descending into a valley, and the regiment was -immediately lost in the mist, which was so thick, that -the troops unconsciously passing the enemy’s outposts -had like to have captured Ney himself, whose -bivouac was close to the piquets. The riflemen followed -in a few moments, and the rest of the division -was about to plunge into the same gulf; when -the rattling of musketry and the booming of round -shot were heard, and the vapour slowly rising, discovered -the fifty-second on the slopes of the opposite -mountain, engaged, without support, in the -midst of the enemy’s army.</p> - -<p>At this moment lord Wellington arrived. His -design had been to turn the left of the French, -for their front position was very strong, and behind -it they occupied the ridges, in succession, to the -Deuca river and the defiles of Miranda de Corvo. -There was, however, a road leading from Condeixa -to Espinhal, and the fourth division was already in -march by it for Panella, having orders, to communicate -with Nightingale; to attack Reynier; and to gain -the sources of the Deuca and Ceira rivers: between -the fourth division and Casal Nova the third division -was more directly turning the enemy’s left flank; and -meanwhile the main body was coming up to the front, -but as it marched in one column, required time to -reach the field. Howbeit Erskine’s error forced on -this action, and the whole of the light division were -pushed forward to succour the fifty-second.</p> - -<p>The enemy’s ground was so extensive, and his -skirmishers so thick and so easily supported, that, -in a little time, the division was necessarily stretched -out in one thin thread, and closely engaged in -every part, without any reserve; nor could it even -thus present an equal front, until Picton sent the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_469"></a>[469]</span> -riflemen, of the sixtieth, to prolong the line. Nevertheless, -the fight was vigorously maintained amidst -the numerous stone enclosures on the mountain -side; some advantages were even gained, and the -right of the enemy was partially turned; yet the -main position could not be shaken, until Picton -near and Cole further off, had turned it by the -left. Then, the first, fifth, and sixth divisions, the -heavy cavalry, and the artillery, came up on the -centre, and Ney commenced his retreat, covering -his rear with guns and light troops, and retiring -from ridge to ridge with admirable precision, and, -for a long time, without confusion and with very -little loss. Towards the middle of the day, however, -the British guns and the skirmishers got within -range of his masses, and the retreat became more -rapid and less orderly; yet he finally gained the -strong pass of Miranda de Corvo, which had been -secured by the main body of the French.</p> - -<p>Montbrun also rejoined the army at Miranda. He -had summoned Coimbra on the 13th at noon, and, -without waiting for an answer, passed over the mountain -and gained the right bank of the Deuca by a -very difficult march. The loss of the light division -this day was eleven officers and a hundred and fifty -men; that of the enemy was greater, and about a -hundred prisoners were taken.</p> - -<p>During the action of the 14th, Reynier, seeing the -approach of the fourth division, hastily abandoned -Panella; and Cole having effected a junction with -Nightingale, passed the Deuca; when Massena fearing -lest they should gain his rear, set fire to the town -of Miranda, and passed the Ceira that night. His -whole army was now compressed and crowded in one -narrow line, between the higher sierras and the Mondego;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_470"></a>[470]</span> -and to lighten the march, he destroyed a -great quantity of ammunition and baggage; yet his -encumbrances were still so heavy, and the confusion -in his army so great, that he directed Ney to -cover the passage with a few battalions; yet charged -him not to risk an action. Ney, however, disregarding -this order, kept on the left bank, ten or twelve -battalions, a brigade of cavalry, and some guns.</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF <ins class="err" id="err-470" title="Erratum: was 'FONS'"> -FOZ</ins> D’ARONCE.</h4> - -<p>The 15th, the weather was so obscure that the -allies could not reach the Ceira, before four o’clock -in the evening, and the troops, as they came up, -proceeded to kindle fires for the night; thinking -that Ney’s position being strong, nothing would be -done. The French right rested on some thickly -wooded and rugged ground, and their left upon -the village of <ins class="err" id="err-470a" title="Erratum: was 'Fons'"> -Foz</ins> d’Aronce, but lord Wellington, -having cast a rapid glance over it, directed the -light division, and Pack’s brigade, to hold the right -in play, ordered the third division against the left, -and at the same moment the horse-artillery, galloping -forward to a rising ground, opened with a great -and sudden effect. Ney’s left wing being surprised -and overthrown by the first charge of the third -division, dispersed in a panic, and fled in such -confusion towards the river, that some, missing -the fords, rushed into the deeps and were drowned, -and others crowding on the bridge were crushed to -death. On the right the ground was so rugged -and close that the action resolved itself into a -skirmish, and thus Ney was enabled to use some battalions -to check the pursuit of his left, but meanwhile<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_471"></a>[471]</span> -darkness came on and the French troops in their -disorder fired on each other. Only four officers -and sixty men fell on the side of the British. -The enemy’s loss was not less than five hundred, -of which one-half were drowned; and an eagle -was afterwards found in the bed of the river when -the waters subsided.</p> - -<p>In the night Massena retired behind the Alva; -yet Ney, notwithstanding this disastrous combat, -maintained the left bank of the Ceira, until every -encumbrance had passed; and then blowing up -seventy feet of the bridge, sent his corps on, but -remained himself, with a weak rear guard, on the -opposite bank. Thus terminated the first part of -the retreat from Santarem, during which the French -commander, if we except his errors with regard to -Coimbra, displayed infinite ability, but withal a -harsh and ruthless spirit.</p> - -<p>I pass over the destruction of Redinha, Condeixa, -Miranda de Corvo, and many villages on -the route; the burning of those towns covered the -retrograde movements of the army, and something -must be attributed to the disorder, which usually -attends a forced retreat: but the town of Leiria, and -the convent of Alcobaça, were given to the flames -by express orders from the French head-quarters; -<span class="sidenote">Lord Wellington’s -Despatches</span>and, although the laws of war rigorously interpreted, -authorize such examples when the inhabitants -take arms, it can only be justly done, for -the purpose of overawing the people, and not from -a spirit of vengeance when abandoning the country. -But every horror that could make war hideous -attended this dreadful march! Distress, conflagrations, -death, in all modes! from wounds, from -fatigue, from water, from the flames, from starvation!<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_472"></a>[472]</span> -On every side unlimited violence, unlimited -vengeance! I myself saw a peasant hounding on -his dog, to devour the dead and dying; and the -spirit of cruelty once unchained smote even the -brute creation. On the 15th the French general, -to diminish the encumbrances of his march, ordered -a number of beasts of burthen to be destroyed; -the inhuman fellow, charged with the execution, -hamstringed five hundred asses and left them to -starve, and thus they were found by the British -army on that day. The mute but deep expression -of pain and grief, visible in these poor creatures’ -looks, wonderfully roused the fury of the soldiers; -and so little weight has reason with the multitude, -when opposed by a momentary sensation, that no -quarter would have been given to any prisoner at -that moment. Excess of feeling would have led to -direct cruelty. This shews how dangerous it is in war -to listen to the passions at all, since the most praiseworthy -could be thus perverted by an accidental -combination of circumstances.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_473"></a>[473]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXII_IV">CHAPTER IV.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>On the 16th the allies halted, partly because the -Ceira was swollen and unfordable, partly from the -extreme exhaustion of the troops who had suffered -far greater privations than the enemy. The latter, -following his custom, carried fifteen days’ bread; -the allies depended upon a commissariat, which -broke down under the difficulties; not from any -deficiency in the chief (Mr. Kennedy), who was -distinguished alike for zeal, probity, and talent; but -from the ill conduct of the Portuguese government; -who, deaf to the repeated representations of lord -Wellington and Beresford, would neither feed the -Portuguese troops regularly while at Santarem, nor -fill their magazines, nor collect the means of transport -for the march. Hence, after passing Pombal, the -greater part of the native force had been unable -to continue the pursuit; and the brigades under -general Pack and colonel Ashworth, which did -keep up and engaged daily with the enemy, were -actually four days without food of any sort. -Numbers died of inanition on the roads, and to -save the whole <ins class="corr" id="tn-473" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'from distruction'"> -from destruction</ins>, the British supplies -were shared with them. The commissary-general’s -means were thus overlaid, the whole -army suffered, and an imperative necessity obliged -lord Wellington to halt. Nevertheless he had -saved Coimbra, forced the enemy into a narrow, -intricate, and ravaged country, and, with an inferior<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_474"></a>[474]</span> -force, turned him out of every strong position; -and this, by a series of movements, based on the -soundest principles of war. For, noting the skill -and tenacity with which Massena and Ney clung -to every league of ground and every ridge defensible, -against superior numbers, he seized the -higher slopes of the mountains by Picton’s flank -march on the 13th; and again by Cole’s on the -14th; and thus, continually menacing the passes -in rear of the French, obliged them to abandon -positions which could scarcely have been forced: -and this method of turning the strength of the -country to profit is the true key to mountain warfare. -He who receives battle in the hills has -always the advantage; and he who first seizes -the important points chooses his own field of -battle.</p> - -<p>In saying an inferior force, I advert to the state -of the Portuguese army and to Badajos; for lord -Wellington, having saved Coimbra, and seen that -the French would not accept a general battle, -except on very advantageous terms, had detached -a brigade of cavalry, some guns, and a division of -native infantry, from Condeixa, to the Alemtejo. -He had, therefore, actually less than twenty-five -thousand men in hand, during the subsequent -operations. In the night of the 13th, also, he received -intelligence that Badajos had surrendered, -and, feeling all the importance of this event, detached -the fourth division likewise to the Alemtejo, for he -designed that Beresford should immediately retake -the lost fortress: but, as the road of Espinhal was -the shortest line to the Tagus, general Cole, as we -have seen, moved into it by Panella, thus threatening -Massena’s flank and rear at the same moment<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_475"></a>[475]</span> -that he gained a march towards his ultimate destination. -Meanwhile, Trant and Wilson, with the -militia, moving up the right bank of the Mondego, -parallel to the enemy’s line of retreat, forbad his -foragers to pass that river, and were at hand either -to interfere between him and Oporto, or to act -against his flank and rear.</p> - -<p>Such were the dispositions of the English general; -but the military horizon was still clouded. -Intelligence came from the north that Bessieres, -after providing for his government, had been able -to draw together, at Zamora, above seven thousand -men, and menaced an invasion of Gallicia; and, -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_II">No. II.</a> -Section 9.</span>although Mahi had an army of sixteen thousand -men, lord Wellington anticipated no resistance. In -the south, affairs were even more gloomy. The -battle of Barosa, the disputes which followed, and -the conduct of Imas and Mendizabel, proved that, -from Spain, no useful co-operation was ever to -be expected. Mortier, also, had invested Campo -Mayor, and it was hardly expected to hold out -until Beresford arrived. The Spaniards, to whom -<span class="sidenote">Ibid.</span>it had been delivered, under an engagement of -honour, entered into by Romana, to keep it against -the enemy, had disloyally neglected and abandoned -it at the very moment when Badajos fell, and two -hundred Portuguese militia, thrown in at the moment, -had to defend this fortress, which required a -garrison of five thousand regulars. Nor was the -enemy, immediately in the British front, the last -to be considered.</p> - -<p>Ney withdrew from the Ceira in the evening of the -16th, and on the 17th the light division forded that -river with great difficulty, while the rest of the army -passed over a trestle bridge, thrown in the night by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_476"></a>[476]</span> -the staff-corps. The French were, however, again -in position immediately behind the Alva and on the -Sierra de Moita, and they destroyed the Ponte Murcella -and the bridge near Pombeira; while the second -corps moved towards the upper part of the river, and -Massena spread his foraging parties to a considerable -distance, designing to halt for several days. Nevertheless -the first, third, and fifth divisions were directed -on the 18th, by the Sierra de St. Quiteria, to menace -the French left, and they made way over the mountains -with a wonderful perseverance and strength, -while the sixth and light divisions cannonaded the -enemy on the Lower Alva.</p> - -<p>As the upper course of the river, now threatened by -lord Wellington’s right, was parallel to the line of -Massena’s retreat, that marshal recalled the second -corps, and, quitting the Lower Alva also, concentrated -on the Sierra de Moita, lest the divisions, moving up -the river, should cross, and fall on his troops while -separated and in march. It then behoved the allies -to concentrate also, lest the heads of their columns -should be crushed by the enemy’s masses. The Alva -was deep, wide, and rapid, yet the staff-corps succeeded -in forming a most ingenious raft-bridge, -and the light division immediately passed between -Ponte Murcella and Pombeira; and at the same -time the right wing of the army entered Arganil, -while Trant and Wilson closed on the other side of -the Mondego.</p> - -<p>Massena now recommenced his retreat with great -rapidity, and being desirous to gain Celerico and the -defiles leading upon Guarda betimes, he again destroyed -baggage and ammunition, and abandoned -even his more distant foraging parties, who were intercepted -and taken, to the number of eight hundred,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_477"></a>[477]</span> -in returning to the Alva: for lord Wellington, seeing -the success of his combinations, had immediately -directed all his columns upon Moita, and the whole -army was assembled there the 19th. The pursuit -was renewed the 20th, through Penhancos, but only -with the light division and the cavalry; the communication -was, however, again opened with Wilson -and Trant who had reached the bridge of -Fornos, and with Silveira, who was about Trancoso. -The third and sixth divisions followed in reserve, -but the remainder of the army halted at Moita, -until provisions, sent by sea from Lisbon to the -Mondego, could come up to them. The French -reached Celerico the 21st, with two corps and the -cavalry, and immediately opened the communication -with Almeida, by posting detachments of horse -on the Pinhel, and at the same time Reynier, who -had retired through Govea, occupied Guarda with -the second corps.</p> - -<p>Massena had now regained his original base of -operations, and his retreat may be said to have -terminated; but he was far from wishing to re-enter -Spain, where he could only appear as a -baffled general, and shorn of half his authority; -because Bessieres commanded the northern provinces, -which, at the commencement of the invasion, -had been under himself. Hence, anxious to hold -on to Portugal, and that his previous retreat might -appear as a mere change of position, he formed the -design of throwing all his sick men and other incumbrances -into Almeida, and then, passing the -Estrella at Guarda, make a countermarch, through -Sabugal and Pena Macor, to the Elga; establishing -a communication across the Tagus with Soult, and -by the valley of the Tagus with the king.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_478"></a>[478]</span></p> - -<p>But now the factions in his army had risen to -such a height that he could no longer command -the obedience of his lieutenants; Montbrun, Junot, -Drouet, Reynier, and Ney were all at variance -with each other and with him. The first had, in -the beginning of the retreat, been requested to -secure Coimbra; instead of which he quitted Portugal, -carrying with him Claparede’s division; -Marcognet’s brigade was then ordered for that -operation, but it did not move; finally, Montbrun -undertook it, and failed in default of vigour. Junot -was disabled by his wound, but his faction did not -the less shew their discontent. Reynier’s dislike to -the prince was so strong, that the officers carrying -flags of truce, from his corps, never failed to speak -of it to the British; and Ney, more fierce than all -of them, defied his authority. To him the dangerous -delay at Pombal, the tardiness of Marcognet’s -brigade, and, finally, the too-sudden evacuation -of the position at Condeixa, have been attributed: -<span class="sidenote">General -Pelet’s -Notes. See -Vol. xxi. -Victoires -et Conquêtes -des -Français.</span>and it is alleged that, far from being -ordered to set fire to that town on the 13th, as the -signal for a preconcerted retreat, that he had promised -Massena to maintain the position for twenty-four -hours longer. The personal risk of the latter, -in consequence of the hasty change of position, -would seem to confirm this; but it is certain that, -when Picton was observed passing the Sierra de -Anciao by a road before unknown to the French, -and by which the second corps could have been -separated from the army, and the passes of Miranda -de Corvo seized, Ney would have been frantic to -have delayed his movement.</p> - -<p>At Miranda, the long gathering anger broke out -in a violent altercation between the prince and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_479"></a>[479]</span> -marshal; and at Celerico, Ney, wishing to fall -back on Almeida, to shorten the term of the retreat, -absolutely refused to concur in the projected march -to Coria; and even marched his troops in a contrary -direction. Massena, a man not to be opposed with -impunity, then deprived him of his command, -giving the sixth corps to Loison; and each marshal -sent confidential officers to Paris to justify their -conduct to the emperor. From both of those -officers I have derived information, but as each -thinks that the conduct of his general was approved -by Napoleon, their opinions are irreconcilable upon -many points; I have, therefore, set down in the -narrative the leading sentiments of each, without -drawing any other conclusions than those deducible -from the acknowledged principles of art and from -unquestioned facts. Thus judging, it appears that -Massena’s general views were as superior to Ney’s -as the latter’s readiness and genius in the handling -of troops in action were superior to the prince’s. -Yet the duke of Elchingen often played too near -the flame, whereas nothing could be grander than -the conceptions of Massena: nor was the project -now meditated by him the least important.</p> - -<p>From Guarda to Zarza Mayor and Coria was not -two days longer march than to Ciudad Rodrigo, but -the army of Portugal must have gone to the latter -place a beaten army, seeking for refuge and succour -in its fortresses and reserves, and being separated -from the central line of invasion: whereas, by gaining -Coria, a great movement of war, wiping out the -notion of a forced retreat, would have been accomplished. -A close and concentric direction would also -have been given to the three armies of the south, of -the centre, and of Portugal; and a powerful demonstration<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_480"></a>[480]</span> -effected against Lisbon, which would inevitably -bring lord Wellington back to the Tagus. Thus -the conquests of the campaign, namely, Ciudad Rodrigo, -Almeida, Badajos, and Olivenza, would have -been preserved, and meanwhile the army of the north -could have protected Castile and menaced the frontier -of Portugal. Massena, having maturely considered -this plan, gave orders, on the 23d, for the execution; -but Ney, as we have seen, thwarted him.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the English horse and the militia, hovering -round Celerico, made, in different skirmishes, -a hundred prisoners, and killed as many more; and -the French cavalry posts withdrew from the Pinhel. -The sixth corps then took a position at Guarda; the -second corps at Belmonte; the eighth corps and the -cavalry in the eastern valleys of the Estrella.</p> - -<p>Ney’s insubordination had rendered null the -plan of marching upon the Elga; but Massena -expected still to maintain himself at Guarda -with the aid of the army of the south, and to -hold open the communications with the king -and with Soult. His foragers had gathered provisions -in the western valleys of the Estrella, -and he calculated upon being able to keep his -position for eight days with his own force alone; -and, independent of the general advantage, it was -essential to hold Guarda for some time, because -Drouet had permitted Julian Sanchez to cut off a -large convoy destined for Ciudad Rodrigo, and -had left Almeida with only ten days’ provisions. -Lord Wellington’s ready boldness, however, disarranged -all the prince’s calculations.</p> - -<p>The troops had come up from Moita on the -28th, and with them the reinforcements, which -were organized as a seventh division.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_481"></a>[481]</span></p> - -<p>The light division and the cavalry then passed -the Mondego at Celerico, and, driving the French -out of Frexadas, occupied the villages beyond that -place: at the same time, the militia took post on -the Pinhel river, cutting the communication with -Almeida, while the third division was established -at Porca de Misarella, half way up the mountain, -to secure the bridges over the higher Mondego. -Early on the 29th the third, sixth, and light divisions, -and two regiments of light cavalry, disposed -in five columns of attack on a half circle round -the foot of the Guarda mountain, ascended by as -many paths, all leading upon the town of Guarda, -and outflanking both the right and left of the -enemy; they were supported on one wing by the -militia, on the other by the fifth division, and in -the centre by the first and seventh divisions. -A battle was expected, but the absence of Ney -was at once felt by both armies; the appearance -of the allied columns threw the French into -the greatest confusion, and, without firing a shot, -this great and nearly impregnable position was -abandoned. Had the pursuit been as vigorous as -the attack, it is not easy to see how the second -corps could have rejoined Massena; but Reynier -quitting Belmonte in the night, recovered his communication -with a loss of only three hundred prisoners, -although the horse-artillery and cavalry had -been launched against him at daylight on the 30th. -Much more could however have been done, if general -Slade had pushed his cavalry forward with the -celerity and vigour the occasion required.</p> - -<p>On the 1st of April, the allied army descended -the mountains, and reached the Coa; but the French -general, anxious to maintain at once his hold of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_482"></a>[482]</span> -Portugal and the power of operating either on the -side of Coria or of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, -was in position on the right bank of that river. -The sixth corps was at Rovina, with detachments -guarding the bridge of Seceiras and the ford of -Atalayon, and the communication with Almeida -was maintained by a brigade of the ninth corps, -which was posted near the ford of Junça. The -second corps was on the hills behind Sabugal, -stretching towards Alfayates, but having strong -detachments at the bridge of Sabugal and the ford -of Rapoulha de Coa. The eighth corps was at -Alfayates, and a post was established at Rendo to -maintain the communication between the second and -the sixth corps. In this situation, the French army -was disposed on two sides of a triangle, the apex of -which was at Sabugal, and both fronts were covered -by the Coa, because Sabugal was situated in a sharp -bend of the stream: by holding Alfayates, Massena -also commanded the passes leading through St. -Martin Trebeja to Coria.</p> - -<p>Along the whole course of the Coa, which is a -considerable river, the banks are rugged, but the -ravine continually deepens as the stream flows; -and, during the first two days of April, the allies occupied -a line parallel to the enemy’s right, which -could not be attacked. Meanwhile Trant and -Wilson, passing the Coa below Almeida, penetrated -between that fortress and Ciudad Rodrigo, -as if the passage of the river was to be made on -that side. Lord Wellington’s aim was, however, -against the other flank, and, to protect the left and -rear of the army, he placed the sixth division -opposite the sixth corps, and a battalion of the -seventh division at the bridge of Seceiras.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_483"></a>[483]</span></p> - -<p>At daylight, on the 3d of April the cavalry under -general Slade, being on the extreme right, was -directed to cross the Upper Coa; the light division -was ordered to ford a little below; the third division -still lower; and the fifth division, with the artillery, -to force the bridge of Sabugal; the first and seventh, -with the exception of the battalion at Seceiras, -were held in reserve. The English general -having thus, ten thousand men pivotted on the -fifth division at Sabugal, designed to turn Reynier’s -left, to separate him from the eighth corps, and to -surround him before he could be succoured by the -sixth corps. One of those accidents which are frequent -in war marred this well-concerted plan, and -brought on the</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF SABUGAL.</h4> - -<p>The morning was so foggy, that the troops could -not gain their respective posts of attack with that -simultaneous regularity which is so essential to success; -and in the light division no measures were -taken by sir William Erskine to put the columns in -a right direction: the brigades were not even held -together, and he carried off the cavalry and the -third caçadores without communicating with colonel -Beckwith. This officer, who commanded the first -brigade, being without any instructions, halted at a -ford to await further orders, and at that moment a -staff officer rode up, and somewhat hastily asked, why -he did not attack? The thing appeared rash, but -with an enemy in his front he could make no reply, -and instantly passing the river, which was deep and -rapid, mounted a very steep wooded hill on the -other side. Four companies of the ninety-fifth led<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_484"></a>[484]</span> -in skirmishing order, and were followed by the -forty-third regiment; but the caçadores and the other -brigade, being in movement to the true point, were -already distant, and a dark heavy rain setting in -rendered it impossible for some time to distinguish -friends or foes. The attack was thus made too -soon, for, owing to the obscurity, none of the divisions -of the army had reached their respective -posts. It was made also in a partial, disseminated, -and dangerous manner, and on the wrong point; for -Reynier’s whole corps was directly in front, and -Beckwith, having only one bayonet regiment and -four companies of riflemen, was advancing against -more than twelve thousand infantry, supported by -cavalry and artillery.</p> - -<p>Scarcely had the riflemen reached the top of the -hill, when a compact and strong body of French drove -them back upon the forty-third; the weather cleared -at that instant, and Beckwith at once saw and felt all -his danger; but he met it with a heart that nothing -could shake. Leading a fierce charge he beat back -the enemy, and the summit of the hill was attained, -but at the same moment two French guns opened -with grape at the distance of a hundred yards, a fresh -body appeared in front, and considerable forces came -on either flank of the regiment. Fortunately, Reynier, -little expecting to be attacked, had for the convenience -of water, placed his principal masses in -the low ground behind the height on which the -action commenced; his renewed attack was therefore -up hill; yet the musketry, heavy from the -beginning, now encreased to a storm; the French -sprung up the acclivity with great clamour, and it -was evident that nothing but the most desperate -fighting could save the regiment from destruction.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_485"></a>[485]</span></p> - -<p>Captain Hopkins, commanding a flank company -of the forty-third, <ins class="corr" id="tn-485" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'immediately run out'"> -immediately ran out</ins> to the right, -and with admirable presence of mind seized a small -eminence, close to the French guns and commanding -the ascent up which the French troops turning the -right flank were approaching. His first fire was so -sharp, that the assailants were thrown into confusion; -they rallied and were again disordered by the -volleys of this company; a third time they endeavoured -to form a head of attack; when Hopkins with -a sudden charge increased the disorder, and at the -same moment the two battalions of the fifty-second -regiment, which had been attracted by the fire, entered -the line. Meanwhile, the centre and left of the -forty-third were furiously engaged and wonderfully -excited; for Beckwith wounded in the head, and with -the blood streaming down his face, rode amongst the -foremost of the skirmishers, directing all with ability, -and praising the men, in a loud cheerful tone.</p> - -<p>The musket-bullets flew thicker and closer every -instant, but the French fell fast, a second charge -cleared the hill, a howitzer was taken, and the -British skirmishers were even advanced a short way -down the descent, when small bodies of French -cavalry came galloping in from all parts, and -obliged them to take refuge with the main body of -the regiment. The English line was instantly formed -behind a stone wall above; yet one squadron of dragoons -surmounted the ascent, and, with incredible -desperation, riding up to this wall, were in the act of -firing over it with their pistols, when a rolling volley -laid nearly the whole of them lifeless on the ground. -By this time however a second and stronger column -of infantry had rushed up the face of the hill, endeavouring -to break in and retake the howitzer<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_486"></a>[486]</span> -which was on the edge of the descent and only -fifty yards from the wall; but no man could reach -it and live, so deadly was the forty-third’s fire. -Meanwhile two English guns came into action, and -the two battalions of the fifty-second charging upon -the flank of the assailants, vindicated the right of -the division to the height. A squadron of French -cavalry, which had followed the columns in their -last attack, then fell in amongst the fifty-second -men, extended as they were from the circumstances -of the action, and at first created considerable confusion, -but it was finally repulsed.</p> - -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_486fp" style="max-width: 35em;"> - <p class="right fs70"><em>Vol. 3, Plate 10.</em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_486fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_486fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - <div class="caption"> -MASSENA’S RETREAT<br /> -Combat of Sabugal<br /> -1811.<br /> - -<p><em>London Published by <span class="smcap">T. & W. Boone</span> Nov<sup>r</sup> 1830.</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>Reynier, convinced at last that he had acted unskilfully -in sending up his troops piece-meal, put -all his reserves, amounting to nearly six thousand -infantry with artillery and cavalry, in motion, and -outflanking the division on its left, appeared resolute -to storm the contested height. But, at this -critical period, the fifth division passed the bridge -of Sabugal, the British cavalry appeared on the -hills beyond the enemy’s left, and general Colville -with the leading brigade of the third division issuing -out of the woods on Reynier’s right, opened a -fire on that flank, which instantly decided the fate -of the day. The French general hastily retreated -upon Rendo, where the sixth corps, which had been -put in march when the first shots were heard, met -him, and together they fell back upon Alfayates, -pursued by the English cavalry. The loss of the -allies in this bloody encounter, which did not last -quite an hour, was nearly two hundred killed and -wounded, that of the enemy was enormous; three -hundred dead bodies were heaped together on the -hill, the greatest part round the captured howitzer, -and more than twelve hundred were wounded;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_487"></a>[487]</span> -so unwisely had Reynier handled his masses and so -true and constant was the English fire. Although, -the principal causes of this disproportion undoubtedly -was, first, the heavy rain which gave the -French only a partial view of the British, and -secondly, the thick wood which ended near the top of -hill, leaving an open and exposed space upon which -the enemy mounted after the first attack; yet it was -<span class="sidenote">Official Despatch.</span> -no exaggeration in lord Wellington to say, “that -this was one of the most glorious actions that -British troops were ever engaged in.”</p> - -<p>The next day, the light division took the route -of Valdespina, to feel for the enemy on the side of -the passes leading upon Coria; but Massena was in -full retreat for Ciudad Rodrigo, and on the 5th -crossed the frontier of Portugal. Here the vigour -of the French discipline on sudden occasions was -surprisingly manifested. Those men who had for -months been living by rapine, whose retreat had -been one continued course of violence and devastation, -passed an imaginary line of frontier, and became -the most orderly of soldiers; not the slightest -rudeness was offered to any Spaniard, and every -thing demanded was scrupulously paid for, although -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_IV">No. IV.</a> -Section 2.</span>bread was sold at two shillings a pound! Massena -himself also, fierce and terrible as he was in Portugal, -always treated the Spaniards with gentleness -and moderation.</p> - -<p>While these events were passing at Sabugal, -Trant crossing the Lower Coa with four thousand -militia, had taken post two miles from Almeida, -when the river suddenly flooded behind -him. Near fort Conception, there was a brigade -of the ninth corps, which had been employed -to cover the march of the battering train from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_488"></a>[488]</span> -Almeida to Ciudad Rodrigo; but ere those troops -discovered Trant’s dangerous situation, he constructed -a temporary bridge and was going to -retire on the 6th, when he received a letter from -the British head-quarters, desiring him to be vigilant -in cutting the communication with Almeida, -and fearless, because the next day a British force -would be up to his assistance. Marching then to -Val de Mula, he interposed between the fortress -and the brigade of the ninth corps. The latter -were already within half a mile of his position, and -his destruction appeared inevitable; but suddenly -two cannon shots were heard to the southward, the -enemy immediately formed squares and commenced -a retreat, and six squadrons of British cavalry and -Bull’s troop of horse-artillery came sweeping over -the plain in their rear. Military order and coolness, -marked the French retreat across the Turones, yet the -cannon shots ploughed with a fearful effect through -their dense masses, and the horsemen continually -flanked their line of march: they however gained the -rough ground, and finally escaped over the Agueda by -Barba del Puerco; but with the loss of three hundred -men killed, wounded, and prisoners. The prince of -Esling had reached Ciudad Rodrigo two days before, -and lord Wellington now stood victorious on the confines -of Portugal, having executed what to others -appeared incredibly rash and vain even to attempt.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_489"></a>[489]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXII_V">CHAPTER V.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>Massena entered Portugal with sixty-five thousand -men; his reinforcements while at Santarem -were about ten thousand; he repassed the frontier -with forty-five thousand; hence the invasion of -Portugal cost him about thirty thousand men, -of which fourteen thousand might have fallen by -the sword or been taken. Not more than six thousand -were lost during the retreat; but had lord -Wellington, unrestrained by political considerations, -attacked him vigorously at Redinha, Condeixa, -Casal Nova, and Miranda de Corvo, half -the French army would have been lost. It is unquestionable -that a retreating army should fight as -little as possible.</p> - -<p>When Massena reached the Agueda, his cavalry -detachments, heavy artillery, and convalescents, -again augmented his army to more than -fifty thousand men, but the fatigues of the retreat -and the want of provisions, would not suffer him to -shew a front to the allies; wherefore, drawing two -hundred thousand rations from Ciudad, he fell -back to Salamanca, and lord Wellington invested -Almeida. The light division occupied Gallegos -and Espeja, the rest of the army were disposed in -villages on both sides of the Coa, and the head-quarters -were transferred to Villa Formosa.</p> - -<p>Here colonel Waters, who had been taken near -Belmonte during the retreat, rejoined the army.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_490"></a>[490]</span> -Confident in his own resources, he had refused his -parole, and, when carried to Ciudad Rodrigo, rashly -mentioned his intention of escaping to the Spaniard -in whose house he was lodged. This man betrayed -him; but a servant, detesting his master’s treachery, -secretly offered his aid, and Waters coolly desired -him to get the rowels of his spurs sharpened. -When the French army was near Salamanca, Waters, -being in the custody of <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">gens d’armes</i>, waited -until their chief, who rode the only good horse -in the party, had alighted, then giving the spur -to his own beast, he galloped off! an act of incredible -resolution and hardihood, for he was on a -large plain, and before him, and for miles behind -him, the road was covered with the French columns. -His hat fell off, and, thus distinguished, -he rode along the flank of the troops, some encouraging -him, others firing at him, and the <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">gens -d’armes</i>, sword in hand, close at his heels; but suddenly -breaking at full speed, between two columns, -he gained a wooded hollow, and, having baffled -his pursuers, evaded the rear of the enemy’s army. -The third day he reached head-quarters, where lord -Wellington had caused his baggage to be brought, -observing that he would not be long absent.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_VII">No. VII.</a></div> - -<p>Massena, having occupied Salamanca, and communicated -with Bessieres, sent a convoy to Ciudad -Rodrigo, and lord Wellington was unable to prevent -its entrance. He had sent the militia to their -homes, disposed his army between the Coa and the -Agueda, and blockaded Almeida; but the Portuguese -regulars were in a dreadful state, and daily -decreasing in numbers; while the continued misconduct -of the Regency, and the absolute want of -money gave no hope of any amelioration; it was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_491"></a>[491]</span> -therefore impossible to take a position beyond the -Agueda.</p> - -<p>The depôts were re-established at Lamego on the -Douro, and at Raiva on the Mondego; and magazines -of consumption were formed at Celerico, -from whence the mule-brigades brought up the -provisions by the way of Castello Bom: measures -were also taken at Guarda, Pena Macor, and Castello -Branco, to form commissariat establishments -which were to be supplied from Abrantes. But the -transport of stores was difficult, and this consideration, -combined with the capricious nature of the Agueda -and Coa, rendered it dangerous to blockade both -Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida; seeing that the troops -would have those rivers behind them, while the -position itself would be weak and extended. The -blockade of Almeida was undertaken because, from -intercepted letters and other sources, it was known -to have provisions only for a fortnight; but the -operation formed no part of the plan which lord -Wellington was now revolving in his mind, and -he was even prepared to relinquish it altogether -if hardly pressed.</p> - -<p>The success in Portugal had given stability to -the English ministers; and it would appear that -they at first meant to limit their future efforts to -the defence of that country, for lord Liverpool -required the return of many battalions. But offensive -warfare in Spain, occupied the general’s -thoughts, and two lines of operation had presented -themselves to his mind.—1º. Under the supposition -<span class="sidenote">Lord Wellington -to -Lord Liverpool, -May 7th, -1810. MSS.</span>that it would be long ere Massena could again -make any serious attempt on Portugal; to remain -on the defensive in Beira, and march against the -army of the South to raise the siege of Cadiz.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_492"></a>[492]</span> -2º. If Almeida fell to the blockade, to besiege -Ciudad Rodrigo; or if Almeida did not so fall, -to besiege both together, and, when they were -taken, march at once into the heart of Spain, -and open a communication with Valencia and with -the army of Sicily. This great and lofty conception -would have delivered Andalusia as certainly -as any direct operation; for thus Madrid, the great -depôt of the French, would have been taken, the -northern and southern armies cut asunder, and the -English base momentarily fixed on the Mediterranean -coast: then the whole of the Spanish and British force -could have been concentrated, and one or two great -battles must have decided the fate of Spain.</p> - -<p>Filled with this grand project lord Wellington -demanded reinforcements from England, and leave -to carry his design into execution, if occasion offered: -yet he checked his secret aspirations, when reflecting -upon the national pride and perverseness of the -Spaniards, and on their uncertain proceedings, and -the great difficulty, if not impossibility, of ensuring -any reasonable concert and assistance. When to this -he also added the bad disposition of the Portuguese -Regency, and the timid temper of the English ministers, -so many jarring elements were presented that -he could make no fixed combinations. Nevertheless, -maturing the leading points of action in his own mind, -he resolved to keep them in view; adapting his proceedings -to circumstances as they should arise.</p> - -<p>His projects were however necessarily conditional -upon whether Napoleon reinforced his armies again, -which would create new combinations; and before -any other measure, it was essential to recapture -Badajos; not only as its possession by the enemy -affected the safety of Cadiz, but, as it bore upon<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_493"></a>[493]</span> -the execution of both the above-mentioned plans, -and upon the safety of Portugal, by enabling the -enemy to besiege Elvas: yet so deeply and sagaciously -had he probed the nature of the contest, that -we shall find his after operations strictly conformable -to these his first conceptions, and always successful. -Judging now that Massena would be unable -to interrupt the blockade of Almeida, lord -Wellington left the command of the northern army -to general Spencer, and departed for the Alemtejo, -where Beresford was operating: but, as this was -one of the most critical periods of the war, it is -essential to have a clear notion of the true state of -affairs in the South, at the moment when Beresford -commenced his memorable campaign.</p> - -<p>Soult returned to Andalusia immediately after -the fall of Badajos, leaving Mortier to besiege -Campo Mayor, and his arrival at Seville and the -fame of his successes restored tranquillity in that -province, and confidence amongst the troops. -<span class="sidenote">Intercepted -Letter -from -Chief of -Engineers, -Garbé, -Mar. 25th.</span>Both had been grievously shaken by the battle of -Barosa, and the works of Arcos, Lucar, Medina, and -Alcalade Gazules, intended to defend the rear of -the first corps, had been stopped, and the utmost -despondency prevailed. Discontent and gloom -<span class="sidenote">Official -Abstract -of Military -Reports, -from Cadiz, -1811. -MSS.</span>were, however, also strong in Cadiz, the government -had for some days pretended to make a fresh -effort against Victor; but the fall of Badajos menaced -the city with famine, and hence Zayas was -finally detached with six thousand infantry and -four hundred cavalry to Huelva. His object was -to gather provisions in the Conda de Neibla, where -Ballasteros had, on the 10th, surprised and dispersed -Remond’s detachment. The French, were however -soon reinforced, Zayas was checked by D’Aremberg,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_494"></a>[494]</span> -and as many of his men deserted to Ballasteros, -he withdrew the rest. Blake then assumed -the command, Ballasteros and Copons were placed -under his orders, and the united corps, amounting -to eleven thousand infantry and twelve hundred -cavalry, were called the <em>fourth army</em>. Meanwhile -Mendizabal rallying his fugitives from the -battle of the Gebora, at Villa Viciosa, re-formed a -weak corps, called the <em>fifth army</em>; during these -proceedings, Mortier occupied Albuquerque and -Valencia d’Alcantara, and carried on the</p> - - -<h4>SIEGE OF CAMPO MAYOR.</h4> - -<p>This fortress being commanded, at four hundred -yards distance, by a hill, on which there was an -abandoned horn-work, would have fallen at once, -but for the courage and talents of major Tallaia, a -Portuguese engineer. With only two hundred -men and five mounted guns, he made such skilful -dispositions, that the French opened regular trenches, -battered the wall in breach with six guns, bombarded -the palace with eleven mortars, and pushed -a sap to the crest of the glacis. At the end of five -days a breach was made, but Tallaia, although ill -seconded by the garrison, repulsed one partial -assault, and, being summoned for the second time, -demanded and obtained twenty-four hours to wait -for succour. None arrived, and this brave man -surrendered the 21st of March. Mortier then returned -to the Guadiana, leaving Latour Maubourg -to dismantle the works and remove the artillery -and stores to Badajos.</p> - -<p>Such was the posture of affairs when Beresford<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_495"></a>[495]</span> -who had quitted the northern army after the combat -of Foz d’Aronce, arrived at Portalegre with twenty -thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and -eighteen guns.</p> - -<p>His instructions were to relieve Campo Mayor, -and to besiege Olivenza and Badajos. The first -had already surrendered, but the marshal, being -within two marches of it, judged that he might -surprise the besieging corps, and, with this view, -put his troops in motion the 23d. In the morning -of the 25th his advanced guard of cavalry, supported -by a detachment of infantry, under colonel -Colborne, came suddenly upon Campo Mayor, -just as Latour Maubourg was marching out in confusion, -with twelve hundred cavalry, three battalions -of infantry, some horse-artillery and the battering -train of thirteen guns. The allies pursued him, -and passing over a wooded rise of ground, issued -forth at the other side by some gentle slopes -on either flank of the French, who were in a fine -plain. Colonel Colborne was on the right and at -a considerable distance from the enemy, but colonel -Head, with the thirteenth light dragoons, was on the -left, close to them, and supported by colonel Otway -with two squadrons of the seventh Portuguese. The -heavy cavalry was in reserve; and while in this state -the French hussars, suddenly charging with a loose -rein from behind their infantry, fell some on the -Portuguese and some on the thirteenth dragoons. -So fiercely did these last on both sides come -together, that many men were dismounted by the -shock, and both parties pierced clear through to -the opposite side, then re-formed, and passed -again in the same fearful manner to their own<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_496"></a>[496]</span> -ground: but Head’s troopers rallied quicker than -the French, and riding a third time closely in upon -them, overthrew horse and man, receiving at the -same time the fire of the infantry squares. Nevertheless, -without flinching, they galloped upon the -battering train, hewed down the gunners, and, -drawing up beyond the French line of march, -barred the way, in expectation that the heavy -cavalry would also fall on; but Beresford would not -suffer the latter to charge, and the French infantry -returned for their guns and resumed their march. -The thirteenth and the Portuguese, however, continued -the pursuit, in a rash and disorderly manner, -even to the bridge of Badajos, and being repulsed -by the guns of that fortress, were followed -by Mortier in person, and lost some prisoners. -Of the allies one hundred men were killed or hurt, -and above seventy taken. Of the enemy about -three hundred suffered, one howitzer was captured, -and the French colonel Chamorin was slain in single -combat by a trooper of the thirteenth.</p> - -<p><em>To profit from sudden opportunities, a general must -be constantly with his advanced guard in an offensive -movement.</em> When this combat commenced, Beresford -was with the main body, and baron Trip, a -staff-officer, deceived by appearances, informed -him, that the thirteenth had been cut off. Hence -the marshal, anxious to save his cavalry, which he -knew could not be reinforced, would not follow up -the first blow, truly observing that the loss of one -regiment was enough. But the regiment was not -lost, and, the country being open and plain, the -enemy’s force and the exact posture of affairs were -easy to be discerned. The thirteenth were reprimanded,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_497"></a>[497]</span> -perhaps justly, for having pursued so -eagerly without orders, yet the unsparing admiration -of the whole army consoled them.</p> - -<p>Campo Mayor was thus recovered so suddenly, -that the French left eight hundred rations of -bread in the magazines; and they also evacuated -Albuquerque and Valencia d’Alcantara, being infinitely -dismayed by the appearance of so powerful -an army in the south: indeed, so secretly -and promptly had lord Wellington assembled -it, that its existence was only known to the -French general by the blow at Campo Mayor. -But, to profit from such able dispositions, it was -necessary to be as rapid in execution, giving the -enemy no time to recover from his first surprise; -and this was the more essential, because the breach -in Badajos was not closed, nor the trenches obliterated, -nor the exhausted magazines and stores replenished. -Soult had carried away six battalions -and a regiment of cavalry, four hundred men were -thrown into Olivenza, three thousand into Badajos; -thus, with the losses sustained during the operations, -Mortier’s numbers were reduced to less than -ten thousand men: he could not therefore have -maintained the line of the Guadiana and collected -provisions also, and Beresford should have instantly -marched upon Merida, driven back the fifth corps, -and opened a fresh communication by Jerumenha -with Elvas; the fall of Badajos would then have -been inevitable. The confusion occasioned by the -sudden appearance of the army at Campo Mayor -and the charge of the thirteenth dragoons guaranteed -the success of this march; the English general -might even have passed the river at Merida before -Mortier could have ascertained his object.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_498"></a>[498]</span></p> - -<p>Beresford, neglecting this happy opportunity, -put his troops into quarters round Elvas, induced -thereto by the fatigue and wants of the soldiers; -especially those of the fourth division, who had -been marching incessantly since the 6th of the -month, and were bare-footed and exhausted.</p> - -<p>He had been instructed, by lord Wellington, to -throw a bridge over the Guadiana at Jerumenha; -to push back the fifth corps; and to invest Olivenza -and Badajos. The Portuguese government had -undertaken not only to provide the means for -these operations, but had actually reported that -they were collected at Elvas and Jerumenha; that -is to say, that provisions, shoes, battering guns, -ammunition, and transport were there; that the -Guadiana abounded in serviceable craft; that twenty -large boats, formerly belonging to Cuesta, which had -been brought away from Badajos before the siege, -were at Elvas; and that all other necessaries would -be sent from Lisbon. It now appeared that no -magazines of provisions or stores had been formed; -that very little transport was provided; that only -five of Cuesta’s boats had been brought from -Badajos; that there was no serviceable craft -on the river, and that some small pontoons, sent -from Lisbon, were unfit to bear the force of the -current, or to sustain the passage of guns. The -country, also, was so deficient in provisions, that -the garrison-stores of Elvas were taken to feed the -army.</p> - -<p>All these circumstances combined to point out Merida -as the true line of operations; moreover, plenty -of food was to be had on the left bank of the Guadiana, -and the measures necessary to remedy the evil -state of affairs on the right bank, did not require the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_499"></a>[499]</span> -presence of an army to protect them. The great distress -of the fourth division for shoes, alone offered -any serious obstacle; but, under the circumstances, -it would not have been too much to expect a momentary -effort from such an excellent division, or, -it might without danger even have been left behind.</p> - -<p>Marshal Beresford preferred halting until he -could procure the means of passing at Jerumenha; -an error which may be considered as the first and -principal cause of those long and bloody operations -which afterwards detained lord Wellington nearly -two years on the frontiers of Portugal. For, during -Beresford’s delay, general Phillipon, one of the -ablest governors that ever defended a fortress, -levelled the trenches, restored the glacis, and stopped -the breach; meanwhile Latour Maubourg, who had -succeeded Mortier in command of the troops, covered -the country with foraging parties and filled -the magazines.</p> - -<p>Captain Squires, of the engineers, now undertook -to bridge the Guadiana under Jerumenha, by fixing -trestle-piers on each side in the shallows, and connecting -them with the five Spanish boats; wherefore, -a squadron of cavalry was secretly passed over, -by a ford, to protect the workmen from surprise. -The 3d of April, the bridge being finished, the troops -assembled during the night in the woods near Jerumenha, -being to cross at daylight; but the river -suddenly swelling, swept away the trestles, rendered -the ford impassable, and stopped the operations. -No more materials could be immediately procured, -and the Spanish boats were converted into flying -bridges for the cavalry and artillery, while Squires -constructed a slight narrow bridge for infantry -with the pontoons and with casks taken from the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_500"></a>[500]</span> -neighbouring villages. To cover this operation -a battalion was added to the squadron already on -the left bank, and the army commenced passing -the 5th of April; but it was late in the night of the -6th, ere the whole had crossed and taken up their -position, which was on a strong range of hills, -covered by a swampy rivulet.</p> - -<p>During this time, Latour Maubourg was so -entirely occupied in securing and provisioning -Badajos, that his foragers were extended fifty miles -to the rear, and he took no notice whatever of -Beresford’s proceedings; an error savouring rather -of the Spanish than of the French method of -making war: for it is evident that a moveable -column of five thousand infantry, with guns and -cavalry, could have easily cut off the small detachment -of the British on the left bank, and thus -have completely frustrated the operations. The -allied troops, being most numerous, should have -been carried over in the boats, and entrenched -on the other side in sufficient force to resist any -attack before the construction of the bridge was -attempted: it is not easy to say which general -acted with most imprudence; Latour Maubourg in -neglecting, or Beresford in unnecessarily tempting -fortune.</p> - -<p>When the British were in possession of the left -bank, the French general awaking, collected three -thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and four -guns at Olivenza, whence he marched, at daylight -on the 7th, to oppose a passage which had been -completed the day before. He, however, surprised -a squadron of the thirteenth, which was in front, -and then came so close up to the main body as to -exchange shots; yet he was permitted to retire<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_501"></a>[501]</span> -unmolested, in the face of more than twenty thousand -men!</p> - -<p>During these proceedings, the fifth Spanish army -re-occupied Valencia d’Alcantara and Albuquerque; -having cavalry posts at La Rocca and Montijo. -Ballasteros also entered Fregenal, and Castaños, -who was appointed to command in Gallicia as well -as Estremadura, arrived at Elvas. This general -was in friendly intercourse with Beresford, but -had a grudge against Blake. At first, he pretended -to the chief command, as the elder captain-general; -but Blake demanded a like authority over Beresford, -who was not disposed to admit the claim. -Now Castaños, having little liking for a command -under such difficult circumstances, and being desirous -to thwart Blake, and fearful lest Beresford -should, under these circumstances, refuse to pass -the Guadiana, arranged, that he who brought the -greatest force in the field should be generalissimo. -Thus the youngest officer commanded in chief.</p> - -<p>Beresford, being joined by Madden’s cavalry, and -having traced out entrenchments capable of covering -several thousand men, ordered his bridges to -be reconstructed in a more substantial manner; -brought up a Portuguese regiment of militia to -labour at the works; left a strong detachment of -British infantry and some Portuguese horse for their -protection, and advanced with the remainder of the -army. Hereupon Latour Maubourg retired upon Albuera, -and Beresford summoned Olivenza on the 9th, -apparently expecting no defence; but the governor -having rejected the summons, the army encamped -round the place, and major A. Dickson was despatched -to Elvas to prepare battering-guns for the -siege. The communication was now opened with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_502"></a>[502]</span> -Ballasteros at Fregenal, and Castaños having carried -Morillo’s division of infantry and Penne Villamur’s -cavalry from Montijo to Merida, pushed a part -on to Almendralejos. Latour Maubourg then retired -to Llerena; and, on the 11th, Beresford, leaving -general Cole with the fourth division, Madden’s cavalry, -and a brigade of nine pounders to besiege Olivenza, -took post himself at Albuera; communicating, -by his left, with Almendralejos, and spreading his -cavalry in front, so as to cut off all communication -with Badajos. The army now lived on the resources -of the country; and a brigade was sent to Talavera -Real to collect supplies.</p> - -<p>The 14th, six twenty-four pounders reached Olivenza, -and, being placed in a battery constructed on -the abandoned horn-work formerly noticed, played -with such success that the breach became practicable -before the morning of the 15th. Some riflemen -posted in the vineyards kept down the fire of the -place, and the garrison, consisting of three hundred -and eighty men, with fifteen guns, surrendered at -discretion. Cole was immediately directed upon -Zafra by the road of Almendral; and Beresford, -who had recalled the brigade from Talavera, was -already in movement for the same place by the -royal causeway. This movement was to drive Latour -Maubourg over the Morena, and cut off general -Maransin. The latter general had been in pursuit -of Ballasteros ever since the retreat of Zayas, -and having defeated him at Fregenal on the 12th, -was following up his victory towards Salvatierra: -an alcalde, however, gave him notice of the allies -approach, and he retreated in safety. Meanwhile -two French regiments of cavalry, advancing from -Llerena to collect contributions, had reached<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_503"></a>[503]</span> -Usagre, where meeting with the British cavalry, -they were suddenly charged by the thirteenth dragoons, -and followed for six miles so vigorously -that three hundred were killed or taken, without -the loss of a man on the part of the pursuers.</p> - -<p>On the 16th general Cole arrived from Olivenza, -and the whole army being thus concentrated about -Zafra, Latour Maubourg retired on the 18th to Guadalcanal; -the Spanish cavalry then occupied Llerena, -and the resources of Estremadura were wholly -at the service of the allies. During these operations, -general Charles Alten, coming from Lisbon -with a brigade of German light infantry, reached -Olivenza, and lord Wellington also arrived at Elvas, -where Beresford, after drawing his infantry nearer to -Badajos, went to meet him. The presence of the -general-in-chief was very agreeable to the troops; -they had seen, with surprise, great masses put in motion -without any adequate results, and thought the -operations had been slow, without being prudent. -The whole army was over the Guadiana on the 7th, -and, including the Spaniards from Montijo, Beresford -commanded at least twenty-five thousand men, -whereas Latour Maubourg never had more than -ten thousand, many of whom were dispersed foraging, -far and wide: yet the French general had -maintained himself in Estremadura for ten days; -and during this time, no corps being employed to -constrain the garrison of Badajos, the governor continued -to bring in timber and other materials for -the defence, at his pleasure.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington arrived the 21st. The 22d, he -forded the Guadiana just below the mouth of the -Caya with Madden’s cavalry and Alten’s Germans,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_504"></a>[504]</span> -pushing close up to Badajos. A convoy, escorted by -some infantry and cavalry, was coming in from the -country, and an effort was made to cut it off; but -the governor sallied, the allies lost a hundred men, -and the convoy reached the town.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington, now considering that Soult -would certainly endeavour to disturb the siege with -a considerable force, demanded the assent of the -Spanish generals to the following plan of combined -operations, before he would commence the investment -of the place. 1º. That Blake, marching up -from Ayamonte, should take post at Xeres de los Cavalleros. -2º. That Ballasteros should occupy Burquillo -on his left. 3º. That the cavalry of the fifth -army, stationed at Llerena, should observe the road -of Guadalcanal, and communicate through Zafra, by -the right, with Ballasteros. These dispositions were -to watch the passes of the Morena. 4º. That Castaños -should furnish three battalions for the siege, -and keep the rest of his corps at Merida, to support -the Spanish cavalry. 5º. That the British army -should be in second line, and, in the event of a battle, -Albuera, centrically situated with respect to the roads -leading from Andalusia to Badajos, should be the -point of concentration for all the allied forces.</p> - -<p>In consequence of the neglect of the Portuguese -government, the whole of the battering-train and -stores for the siege were necessarily taken from the -ramparts and magazines of Elvas; the utmost prudence -was therefore required to secure the safety of -these guns, lest that fortress, half dismantled, should -be exposed to a siege. Hence, as the Guadiana, by -rising ten feet, had again carried away the bridge at -Jerumenha on the 24th, lord Wellington directed -the line of communication with Portugal to be re-established<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_505"></a>[505]</span> -by Merida, until settled weather would -admit of fresh arrangements.</p> - -<p>Howbeit, political difficulties intervening obliged -him to delay the siege. The troops under -Mendizabel had committed many excesses in Portugal; -the disputes between them and the inhabitants -were pushed so far, that the Spanish general pillaged -the town of Fernando; while the Portuguese -government, in reprisal, meant to seize Olivenza, -which had formerly belonged to them. The Spanish -Regency publicly disavowed Mendizabel’s conduct, -and Mr. Stuart’s strenuous representations deterred -the Portuguese from plunging the two countries -into a war; but this affair, joined to the natural -slowness and arrogance of the Spaniards, prevented -both Castaños and Blake from giving an immediate -assent to the English general’s plans: meanwhile, -intelligence reached the latter that Massena was -again in force on the Agueda; wherefore, reluctantly -directing Beresford to postpone the siege until the -Spanish generals should give in their assent, or -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_II">No. II.</a> -Section 10.</span>until the fall of Almeida should enable a British -reinforcement to arrive, he repaired with the utmost -speed to the Agueda.</p> - - -<h4>OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH.</h4> - -<p>During his absence, the blockade of Almeida -had been closely pressed, while the army was so -disposed as to cut off all communication. The -allied forces were, however, distressed for provisions, -and great part of their corn came from the -side of Ledesma; being smuggled by the peasants -through the French posts, and passed over the -Agueda by ropes, which were easily hidden amongst<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_506"></a>[506]</span> -the deep chasms of that river, near its confluence -with the Douro.</p> - -<p>Massena was, however, intent upon relieving the -place. His retreat upon Salamanca had been to -restore the organization and equipments of his army, -which he could not do at Ciudad Rodrigo, without -consuming the stores of that fortress. His cantonments -extended from San Felices by Ledesma to -Toro, his cavalry was in bad condition, his artillery -nearly unhorsed: but from Bessieres he expected, -with reason, aid, both of men and provisions, -and in that expectation was prepared to -renew the campaign immediately. Discord, that -bane of military operations, interfered. Bessieres -had neglected and continued to neglect the army -of Portugal; symptoms of hostilities with Russia -were so apparent, even at this period, that he -looked rather to that quarter than to what was -passing before him; his opinion that a war in the -north was inevitable was so openly expressed as to -reach the English army; and meanwhile, Massena -vainly demanded the aid, which was necessary to -save the only acquisition of his campaign.</p> - -<p>A convoy of provisions had entered Ciudad -Rodrigo on the 13th of April; on the 16th a reinforcement -and a second convoy also succeeded in -gaining that fortress, although general Spencer -crossed the Agueda, with eight thousand men, to -intercept them; a rear-guard of two hundred men -was indeed, overtaken; but, although surrounded -by the cavalry in an open plain, they made their -way into the place.</p> - -<p>Towards the end of the month, the new organization, -decreed by Napoleon, was put in execution. -Two divisions of the ninth corps joined Massena;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_507"></a>[507]</span> -and Drouet was preparing to march with the remaining -eleven thousand infantry and cavalry, to -reinforce and take the command of the fifth corps; -when Massena, having collected all his own detachments, -and received a promise of assistance from -Bessieres, prevailed upon him to defer his march -until an effort had been made to relieve Almeida. -With this view the French army was put in motion -towards the frontier of Portugal. The light division -immediately resumed its former positions, the left -at Gallegos and Marialva, the right at Espeja; -the cavalry were dispersed, partly towards the -sources of the Azava, and partly behind Gallegos, -and, while in this situation, colonel O’Meara and -eighty men of the Irish brigade were taken by -Julian Sanchez; the affair having been, it was said, -preconcerted, to enable the former to quit the French -service.</p> - -<p>On the 23d, two thousand French infantry and -a squadron of cavalry marching out of Ciudad -Rodrigo, made a sudden effort to seize the bridge -of Marialva; but the passage was bravely maintained -by captain Dobbs, with only a company of -the fifty-second and some riflemen.</p> - -<p>On the 25th, Massena reached Ciudad Rodrigo; -and the 27th, his advanced guards felt all the line of -the light division from Espeja to Marialva. Lord Wellington -arrived on the 28th, and immediately concentrated -the main body of the allies behind the Dos -Casas river. The Azava being swollen and difficult -to ford, the enemy continued to feel the line of the outposts; -but, on the 2d of May, the waters having subsided, -the whole French army was observed coming -out of Ciudad Rodrigo, wherefore, the light division, -after a slight skirmish of horse at Gallegos, commenced<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_508"></a>[508]</span> -a retrograde movement, from that place and -from Espeja, upon Fuentes Onoro. The country immediately -in rear of those villages was wooded as -far as the Dos Casas, but an open plain between -the two lines of march offered the enemy’s powerful -cavalry an opportunity of cutting off the retreat. -As the French appeared regardless of this advantage, -the division remained in the woods bordering -the right and left of the plain until the middle -of the night, when the march was renewed, and -the Dos Casas was crossed at Fuentes Onoro. This -beautiful village had escaped all injury during the -previous warfare, although occupied alternately, for -above a year, by both sides. Every family in it was -well known to the light division, it was therefore -a subject of deep regret to find that the preceding -troops had pillaged it, leaving only the shells of -houses where, three days before, a friendly population -had been living in comfort. This wanton act, -was so warmly felt by the whole army, that eight -thousand dollars were afterwards collected by general -subscription for the poor inhabitants; yet the -injury sunk deeper than the atonement.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington had determined not to risk -much to maintain his blockade, and he was well -aware that Massena, reinforced by the army of the -north and by the ninth corps, could bring down -superior numbers. Nevertheless, when the moment -arrived, trusting to the valour of his troops and -the ascendancy which they had acquired over the -enemy during the pursuit from Santarem, he resolved -to abide a battle; but not to seek one, -because his force, reduced to thirty-two thousand -infantry, twelve hundred cavalry in bad condition, -and forty-two guns, was unable, seeing the superiority<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_509"></a>[509]</span> -of the French horse, to oppose the enemy’s -march.</p> - -<p>The allies occupied a fine table-land, lying between -the Turones and the Dos Casas, the left at -Fort Conception; the centre opposite to the village -of Alameda; the right at Fuentes Onoro; the whole -distance being five miles. The Dos Casas, flowing -in a deep ravine, protected the front of this line, and -the French general could not, with any prudence, -venture to march, by his own right, against Almeida, -lest the allies, crossing the ravine at the -villages of Alameda and Fuentes Onoro, should -fall on his flank, and drive him into the Agueda. -Hence, to cover the blockade, which was maintained -by Pack’s brigade and an English regiment, it was -sufficient to leave the fifth division near Fort Conception, -and the sixth division opposite Alameda. -The first and third were then concentrated on a gentle -rise, about a cannon-shot behind Fuentes Onoro, -where the steppe of land which the army occupied -turned back, and ended on the Turones, becoming -rocky and difficult as it approached that river.</p> - - -<h4>FIRST COMBAT OF FUENTES ONORO.</h4> - -<p>The French came up in three columns abreast, the -cavalry, the sixth corps, and Drouet’s division against -Fuentes Onoro; but the eighth and second corps -against Alameda and Fort Conception, seeming -to menace the left of the position; wherefore, the -light division, after passing the Dos Casas, reinforced -the sixth division. General Loison however, without -waiting for Massena’s orders, fell upon Fuentes -Onoro, which was occupied by five battalions of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_510"></a>[510]</span> -chosen troops, detached from the first and third -divisions.</p> - -<p>Most of the houses of this village were quite -in the bottom of the ravine, but an old chapel -and some buildings on a craggy eminence, overhung -one end. The low parts were vigorously defended; -yet the violence of the attack was so great, -and the cannonade so heavy, that the British -abandoned the streets, and could scarcely maintain -the upper ground about the chapel. Colonel Williams, -the commanding officer, fell badly wounded, -and the fight was becoming very dangerous, when -the twenty-fourth, the seventy-first, and the seventy-ninth -regiments, coming down from the main position, -charged so roughly, that the French were -forced back, and, after a severe contest, finally -driven over the stream of the Dos Casas. During -the night the detachments were withdrawn; but -the twenty-fourth, the seventy-first, and seventy-ninth -regiments were left in the village, where two -hundred and sixty of the allies and somewhat more -of the French had fallen.</p> - -<p>On the 4th Massena arrived, and, being joined -by Bessieres with twelve hundred cavalry and a -battery of the imperial guard, examined all the -line, and made dispositions for the next day. His -design was to hold the left of the allies in check -with the second corps, but to turn the right with -the remainder of the army.</p> - -<p>Forty thousand infantry, and five thousand horse, -with thirty pieces of artillery, were under arms, -and they had shewn in the action of the 3d that -their courage was not abated; it was, therefore, a -very audacious resolution in the English general -to receive battle on such dangerous ground. His<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_511"></a>[511]</span> -position, as far as Fuentes Onoro, was indeed -strong and free for the use of all arms, and it -covered his communication by the bridge of Castello -Bom; but, on his right flank, the plain was -continued in a second steppe to Nava d’Aver, where -a considerable hill overlooking all the country, commanded -the roads leading to the bridges of Seceiras -and Sabugal. The enemy could, therefore, by a -direct march from Ciudad Rodrigo, place his army -at once in line of battle upon the right flank of the -allies, and attack them while entangled between -the Dos Casas, the Turones, the Coa, and the fortress -of Almeida; and the bridge of Castello Bom -only would have been open for retreat. To prevent -this stroke, and to cover his communications with -Sabugal and Seceiras, lord Wellington, yielding to -general Spencer’s earnest suggestions, stretched his -right wing out to Nava d’Aver, the hill of which he -caused Julian Sanchez to occupy, supporting him by -the seventh division, under general Houston. Thus -the line of battle was above seven miles in length, -besides the circuit of blockade. The Dos Casas, indeed, -still covered the front; but above Fuentes Onoro, -the ravine became gradually obliterated, resolving -itself into a swampy wood, which extended to -Poço Velho, a village half way between Fuentes and -Nava d’Aver. The left wing of the seventh division -occupied this wood and the village of Poço -Velho, but the right wing was refused.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF FUENTES ONORO.</h4> - -<p>It was Massena’s intention to have made his dispositions -in the night, in such a manner as to commence -the attack at day-break on the 5th; but a delay<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_512"></a>[512]</span> -of two hours occurring, the whole of his movements -were plainly descried. The <ins class="err" id="err-512" title="Erratum: was 'eight'"> -eighth</ins> corps withdrawn -from Alameda, and supported by all the French -cavalry, was seen marching above the village of -Poço Velho, and at the same time the sixth corps -and Drouet’s division took ground to their own -left, but still keeping a division in front of -Fuentes. At this sight the light division and the -English horse hastened to the support of general -Houston; while the first and third divisions made -a movement parallel to that of the sixth corps. -The latter, however, drove the left wing of the -seventh division, consisting of Portuguese and -British, from the village of Poço Velho with loss, -and was gaining ground in the wood also, when -the riflemen of the light division arriving at that -point, restored the fight. The French cavalry, then -passing Poço Velho, commenced forming in order -of battle on the plain, between the wood and the -hill of Nava d’Aver. Julian Sanchez immediately -retired across the Turones, partly in fear, but more -in anger, at the death of his lieutenant, who, having -foolishly ridden close up to the enemy, making -many violent gestures, was mistaken for a French -officer, and shot by a soldier of the guards, before -the action commenced.</p> - -<p>Montbrun occupied himself with this weak partida -for an hour; but when the Guerilla chief -had fallen back, the French general turned the -right of the seventh division, and charged the -British cavalry, which had moved up to its support. -The combat was unequal; for, by an abuse -too common, so many men had been drawn from -the ranks as orderlies to general officers, and -for other purposes, that not more than a thousand -troopers were in the field. After one shock,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_513"></a>[513]</span> -in which the enemy were partially checked and -the French colonel Lamotte taken fighting hand -to hand, by general Charles Stewart, the cavalry -withdrew behind the light division. Houston’s -people, being thus entirely exposed, were charged -strongly, and captain Ramsay’s horse-artillery was -cut off and surrounded. The light division instantly -threw itself into squares, but the main body -of the French horsemen were upon the seventh -division, ere a like formation could be effected: -nevertheless the troops stood firm, and, although -some were cut down, the chasseurs Brittaniques, -taking advantage of a loose wall, received the attack -with such a fire that the enemy recoiled. Immediately -after this, a great commotion was observed -amongst the French squadrons; men and officers -closed in confusion towards one point where a thick -dust was rising, and where loud cries and the sparkling -of blades and flashing of pistols, indicated some -extraordinary occurrence. Suddenly the multitude -was violently agitated, an English shout arose, the -mass was rent asunder, and Norman Ramsay burst -forth at the head of his battery, his horses breathing -fire and stretching like greyhounds along the plain, -his guns bounding like things of no weight, -and the mounted gunners in close and compact -order protecting the rear. But while this brilliant -action was passing in one part, the enemy were -making progress in the wood, and the English -divisions being separated and the right wing -turned, it was abundantly evident that the battle -would soon be lost, if the original position was -not immediately regained.</p> - -<p>In this posture of affairs lord Wellington directed -the seventh division to cross the Turones and move<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_514"></a>[514]</span> -down the left bank to Frenada, the light division -to retire over the plain, the cavalry to cover the -rear. He also withdrew the first and third divisions, -placing them and the Portuguese in line on -the steppe, before described as running perpendicular -to the ravine of Fuentes Onoro.</p> - -<p>General Crawfurd, who had resumed the command -of the light division, first covered the passage -of the <ins class="corr" id="tn-514" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'seventh divison'"> -seventh division</ins> over the Turones, and -then retired slowly over the plain in squares, having -the British cavalry principally on his right flank. -He was followed by the enemy’s horse, which continually -outflanked him, and near the wood surprised -and sabred an advanced post of the guards, -making colonel Hill and fourteen men prisoners, -but then continuing their charge against the -forty-second regiment, the French were repulsed. -Many times Montbrun made as if he would storm the -light division squares, but the latter were too formidable -to be meddled with; yet, in all this war, -there was not a more dangerous hour for England. -The whole of that vast plain as far as the Turones -was covered with a confused multitude, amidst -which the squares appeared but as specks, for -there was a great concourse, composed of commissariat -followers of the camp, servants, baggage, -led horses, and peasants attracted by curiosity, -and finally, the broken piquets and parties coming -out of the woods. The seventh division was -separated from the army by the Turones, five -thousand French cavalry, with fifteen pieces of -artillery, were close at hand impatient to charge; -the infantry of the eighth corps was in order of -battle behind the horsemen; the wood was filled -with the skirmishers of the sixth corps, and if the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_515"></a>[515]</span> -latter body, pivoting upon Fuentes, had issued forth, -while Drouet’s divisions fell on that village, while -the eighth corps attacked the light division, and -while the whole of the cavalry made a general -charge; the loose multitude encumbering the plain -would have been driven violently in upon the first -division, in such a manner as to have intercepted -the latter’s fire and broken their ranks.</p> - -<p>No such effort was made; Montbrun’s horsemen -merely hovered about Crawfurd’s squares, -the plain was soon cleared, the cavalry took post -behind the centre, and the light division formed a -reserve to the right of the first division, sending the -riflemen amongst the rocks to connect it with the -seventh division, which had arrived at Frenada -and was there joined by Julian Sanchez.</p> - -<p>At sight of this new front, so deeply lined with -troops, the French stopped short, and commenced -a heavy cannonade, which did great execution from -the closeness of the allied masses; but twelve -British guns replied with vigour and the violence of -the enemy’s fire abated; their cavalry then drew out -of range, and a body of French infantry attempting -to glide down the ravine of the Turones was repulsed -by the riflemen and the light companies -of the guards. But all this time a fierce battle was -going on at Fuentes Onoro. Massena had directed -Drouet to carry this village at the very moment -when Montbrun’s cavalry should turn the right -wing; it was, however, two hours later ere the -attack commenced. The three British regiments -made a desperate resistance, but overmatched in -number, and little accustomed to the desultory -fighting of light troops, they were pierced and -divided; two companies of the seventy-ninth were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_516"></a>[516]</span> -taken, colonel Cameron was mortally wounded, -and the lower part of the town was carried; the -upper part was, however, stiffly held, and the rolling -of the musketry was incessant.</p> - -<p>Had the attack been made earlier, and the whole -of Drouet’s division thrown frankly into the fight, -while the sixth corps moving through the wood -closely turned the village, the passage must have -been forced and the left of the new position outflanked; -but now lord Wellington having all his -reserves in hand, detached considerable masses to -the support of the regiments in Fuentes. The -French continued also to reinforce their troops -until the whole of the sixth corps and a part of -Drouet’s division were engaged, when several turns -of fortune occurred. At one time the fighting was -on the banks of the stream and amongst the lower -houses; at another upon the rugged heights and -round the chapel, and some of the enemy’s skirmishers -even penetrated completely through towards -the main position; but the village was never entirely -abandoned by the defenders, and, in a charge of the -seventy-first, seventy-ninth, and eighty-eighth regiments, -led by colonel M’Kinnon against a heavy -mass which had gained the chapel eminence, -a great number of the French fell. In this manner -the fight lasted until evening, when the lower part -of the town was abandoned by both parties, the -British maintaining the chapel and crags, and the -French retiring a cannon shot from the stream.</p> - -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_516fp" style="max-width: 35em;"> - <p class="right fs70"><em>Vol. 3. Plate 11.</em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_516fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_516fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - <div class="caption"> -Battle of FUENTES ONORO<br /> -<em>5<sup>TH</sup> MAY, 1811.</em><br /> - -<p><em>London Published by <span class="smcap">T. & W. Boone</span> Nov<sup>r</sup> 1830.</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>When the action ceased, a brigade of the light -division relieved the regiments in the village; and a -slight demonstration by the second corps near Fort -Conception, having been repulsed by a battalion of -the Lusitanian legion, both armies remained in observation.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_517"></a>[517]</span> -Fifteen hundred men and officers, of which -three hundred were prisoners, constituted the loss of -the allies; that of the enemy was estimated at the -time to be near five thousand, but this exaggerated -calculation was founded upon the erroneous supposition -that four hundred dead were lying about -Fuentes Onoro. All armies make rash estimates on -such occasions. Having had charge to bury the carcasses -at that point, I can affirm that, immediately -about the village, not more than one hundred and -thirty bodies were to be found, one-third of which -were British.</p> - -<p>During the battle, the French convoy for the -supply of Almeida, being held at Gallegos, in readiness -to move, lord Wellington sent Julian Sanchez -from Frenada, to menace it, and to disturb -the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. This -produced no effect, and a more decisive battle -being expected on the 6th, the light division -made breast-works amongst the crags of Fuentes -Onoro, while lord Wellington entrenched that -part of the position, which was immediately behind -this village, so that the carrying of it would -have scarcely benefitted the enemy. Fuentes Onoro, -strictly speaking, was not tenable; there was a -wooded tongue of land on the British right, that -overlooked, at half-cannon shot, all the upper as -well as the lower part of the village both in flank -and rear, yet was too distant from the position -to be occupied by the allies: had Ney been at the -head of the sixth corps, he would have quickly -crowned this ridge, and then Fuentes could only have -been maintained by submitting to a butchery.</p> - -<p>On the 6th the enemy sent his wounded to the rear, -making no demonstration of attack, and as the 7th<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_518"></a>[518]</span> -passed in a like inaction, the British entrenchments -were perfected. The 8th Massena withdrew his -main body to the woods leading upon Espeja and -Gallegos, but still maintained posts at Alameda and -Fuentes. On the 10th, without being in any manner -molested, he retired across the Agueda; the -sixth and eight corps, and the cavalry, at Ciudad -Rodrigo, the second corps by the bridge of Barba -del Puerco. Bessieres also carried off the imperial -guards, for Massena had been recalled to France, -and Marmont assumed the command of the army -of Portugal.</p> - -<p>Both sides claimed the victory; the French, -because they won the passage at Poço Velho, -cleared the wood, turned our right flank, obliged -the cavalry to retire, and forced lord Wellington -to relinquish three miles of ground, and to change -his front. The English, because the village of -Fuentes so often attacked, was successfully defended, -and because the principal object (the covering -the blockade of Almeida) was attained.</p> - -<p>Certain it is, that Massena at first gained great -advantages. Napoleon would have made them -fatal! but it is also certain that, with an overwhelming -cavalry, on ground particularly suitable -to that arm, the prince of Esling having, as it -were, indicated all the errors of the English -general’s position, stopped short at the very moment -when he should have sprung forward. By -some this has been attributed to negligence, by -others to disgust at being superseded by Marmont; -but the true reason seems to be, that discord in his -army had arisen to actual insubordination. The -imperial guards would not charge at his order; -Junot did not second him cordially; Loison neglected<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_519"></a>[519]</span> -his instructions; Drouet sought to spare -his own divisions in the fight; and Reynier remained -perfectly inactive. Thus the machinery of battle -being shaken, would not work.</p> - -<p>General Pelet censures lord Wellington for not -sending his cavalry against Reynier after the second -position was taken up; asserting that any danger, -on that side, would have forced the French to retreat; -but the criticism is unsustainable, being -based on the notion that the allies had fifty thousand -men in the field, whereas, including Sanchez’ -Partida, they had not thirty-five thousand. It may -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_I">No. I.</a> -Section 8.</span>be with more justice objected to Massena that he -did not launch some of his numerous horsemen, by -the bridge of Seceiras, or Sabugal, against Guarda -and Celerico, to destroy the magazines, cut the -communication, and capture the mules and other -means of transport belonging to the allied army. -The vice of the English general’s position would -then have been clearly exposed, for, although the -second regiment of German hussars was on the -march from Lisbon, it had not passed Coimbra at -this period, and could not have protected the depôts. -But it can never be too often repeated that war, however -adorned by splendid strokes of skill, is commonly -a series of errors and accidents. All the -operations, on both sides, for six weeks, furnished -illustration of this truth.</p> - -<p>Ney’s opposition had prevented Massena’s march -upon Coria, which would have secured Badajos and -Campo Mayor, and, probably, added Elvas to them. -Latour Maubourg’s tardiness had like to have cost -Mortier a rear guard and a battering-train. By -refusing the line of Merida, Beresford enabled the -French to secure Badajos. At Sabugal, the petulance<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_520"></a>[520]</span> -of a staff-officer marred an admirable combination, -and produced a dangerous combat. Drouet’s -negligence placed Almeida at the mercy of the -allies, and a mistaken notion of Massena’s sufferings -during the retreat, induced lord Wellington -to undertake two great operations at the same time, -which were above his strength. In the battle of -Fuentes Onoro, more errors than skill were observable -on both sides, and the train of accidents did -not stop there. The prize contended for presented -another example of the uncertainty of war.</p> - - -<h4>EVACUATION OF ALMEIDA.</h4> - -<p>General Brennier, a prisoner at Vimiero, and -afterwards exchanged, was governor of this fortress. -During the battle of Fuentes Onoro, his garrison, -consisting of fifteen hundred men, skirmished boldly -with the blockading force, and loud explosions, -supposed to be signals of communication with the -relieving army, were frequent in the place. When -all hopes of succour vanished, a soldier, named -Tillet, contrived, with extraordinary courage and -presence of mind, to penetrate, although in uniform, -through the posts of blockade, carrying Brennier -orders to evacuate the fortress. The French general -had, however, by crossing the Agueda, left Almeida -to its fate; the British general placed the light division -in its old position on the Azava with cavalry posts -on the Lower Agueda, and desired sir William -Erskine to send the fourth regiment to Barba -del Puerco, while general Alexander Campbell -continued the blockade with the sixth division and -with general Pack’s brigade.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_521"></a>[521]</span></p> - -<p>Campbell’s dispositions were either negligently -made, or negligently executed. Erskine never transmitted -the orders to the fourth regiment, and, in -the mean time, Brennier, undismayed by the retreat -of the French army, was preparing, like Julian -Estrada, at Hostalrich, to force his way through -the blockading troops. An open country and a double -line of posts greatly enhanced the difficulty, yet -Brennier was resolute not only to cut his own passage -but to render the fortress useless to the allies. To -effect this, he ruined all the principal bastions, and -kept up a constant fire of his artillery in a singular -manner, for always he fired several guns at one -moment with very heavy charges, placing one -across the muzzle of another, so that, while some -shots flew towards the besiegers and a loud explosion -was heard, others destroyed pieces without -attracting notice.</p> - -<p>At midnight of the 10th, all being ready, he -sprung his mines, sallied forth in a compact column, -broke through the piquets, and passed between -the quarters of the reserves, with a nicety -that proved at once his talent of observation and -his coolness. General Pack following, with a few -men collected on the instant, plied him with a -constant fire, yet nothing could shake or retard his -column, which in silence, and without returning -a shot, gained the rough country leading upon -Barba del Puerco. Here it halted for a moment, -just as daylight broke, and Pack, who was at hand, -hearing that some English dragoons were in a village, -a short distance to the right, sent an officer to bring -them out upon the French flank, thus occasioning -a slight skirmish and consequent delay. The troops -of blockade had paid little attention at first to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_522"></a>[522]</span> -explosion of the mines, thinking them a repetition -of Brennier’s previous practice; but Pack’s fire -having roused them, the thirty-sixth regiment was -close at hand, and the fourth, also, having heard the -firing at Valde Mula, was rapidly gaining the right -flank of the enemy. Brennier, having driven off -the cavalry, was again in march; yet the British -regiments, throwing off their knapsacks, followed -at such a pace, that they overtook the rear of his -column in the act of descending the deep chasm of -Barba del Puerco, killed and wounded many, captured -about three hundred, and even passed the -bridge in pursuit; there however the second corps, -which was in order of battle, awaiting Brennier’s approach, -repulsed them with a loss of thirty or forty -men. Had sir William Erskine given the fourth -regiment its orders, the French column would have -been lost.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington, stung by this event, and irritated -by several previous examples of undisciplined -valour, issued a remonstrance to the army. It was -justly strong, and the following remarks are as applicable -to some writers as to soldiers:—“<em>The officers -of the army may depend upon it that the enemy to -whom they are opposed is not less prudent than powerful. -Notwithstanding what has been printed in -gazettes and newspapers, we have never seen small -bodies, unsupported, successfully opposed to large; -nor has the experience of any officer realized the stories -which all have read of whole armies being driven by a -handful of light infantry and dragoons.</em>”</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_523"></a>[523]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXII_VI">CHAPTER VI.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>When Marmont had thus recovered the garrison -of Almeida, he withdrew the greatest part of his -army towards Salamanca. Lord Wellington then -leaving the first, fifth, sixth, and light divisions, -under general Spencer, on the Azava, directed the -third and seventh divisions and the second German -hussars upon Badajos: and on the 15th, hearing that -Soult, although hitherto reported, by Beresford, to -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_II">No. II.</a> -Section 11.</span>be entirely on the defensive, was actually marching -into Estremadura, he set out himself for that province; -but, ere he could arrive, a great and bloody battle -had terminated the operations.</p> - -<p>While awaiting the Spanish generals accession -to lord Wellington’s plan, Beresford fixed his -head-quarters at Almendralejos; but Latour Maubourg -remained at Guadalcanal, and his parties -were foraging the most fertile tracts between the -armies. Penne Villamur was, therefore, reinforced -with five squadrons; and colonel John Colborne -was detached with a brigade of the second division, -two Spanish guns, and two squadrons of cavalry, -to curb the French inroads, and to raise the confidence -of the people. Colborne, a man of singular -talent for war, by rapid marches and sudden -changes of direction, in concert with Villamur, -created great confusion amongst the enemy’s parties. -He intercepted several convoys, and obliged -the French troops to quit Fuente Ovejuna, La<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_524"></a>[524]</span> -Granja, Azuaga, and most of the other frontier -towns, and he imposed upon Latour Maubourg with -so much address, that the latter, imagining a great -force was at hand, abandoned Guadalcanal also and -fell back to Constantino.</p> - -<p>Having cleared the country on that side, Colborne -attempted to surprise the fortified post of Benelcazar, -and, by a hardy attempt, was like to -have carried it; for, riding on to the drawbridge -with a few officers in the grey of the morning, he -summoned the commandant to surrender, as the -only means of saving himself from the Spanish -army which was close at hand and would give -no quarter. The French officer, amazed at the -appearance of the party, was yet too resolute to -yield, and Colborne, quick to perceive the attempt -had failed, galloped off under a few straggling -shot. After this, taking to the mountains, he rejoined -the army without any loss.</p> - -<p>During his absence, the Spanish generals acceded -to lord Wellington’s proposition; Blake was in -march for Xeres Caballeros, and Ballasteros was -at Burgillos. The waters of the Guadiana had -also subsided, the bridge under Jerumenha was -restored, and the preparations completed for the</p> - - -<h4>FIRST ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.</h4> - -<p>The 5th of May, general William Stewart invested -this place, on the left bank of the Guadiana, -with two squadrons of horse, six field-pieces, and -three brigades of infantry, while the formation of -the depôt of the siege was commenced by the engineers -and artillery.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_525"></a>[525]</span></p> - -<p>On the 7th the remainder of the infantry, reinforced -by two thousand Spaniards under Carlos -d’España, encamped in the woods near the fortress; -but Madden’s Portuguese remained in observation -near Merida, and a troop of horse-artillery arriving -from Lisbon was attached to the English cavalry, -which was still near Los Santos and Zafra. The -flying bridge was at first brought up from Jerumenha, -and re-established near the mouth of the Caya; it -was however again drawn over, because the right -bank of the Guadiana being still open, some French -horse had come down the river.</p> - -<p>The 8th general Lumley invested Christoval on -the right bank, with a brigade of the fourth division, -four light Spanish guns, the seventeenth -Portuguese infantry, and two squadrons of horse -drafted from the garrison of Elvas; nevertheless -the troops did not arrive simultaneously, and sixty -French dragoons, moving under the fire of the place, -disputed the ground, and were only repulsed, after -a sharp skirmish, by the Portuguese infantry.</p> - -<p>Thus the first serious siege undertaken by the -British army in the Peninsula was commenced, -and, to the discredit of the English government, -no army was ever so ill provided with the means -of prosecuting such enterprises. The engineer -officers were exceedingly zealous, and, notwithstanding -some defects in the constitution and -customs of their corps tending rather to make -regimental than practical scientific officers, many -of them were very well versed in the theory of -their business. But the ablest trembled when reflecting -on their utter destitution of all that belonged -to real service. Without a corps of sappers -and miners, without a single private who knew how<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_526"></a>[526]</span> -to carry on an approach under fire, they were -compelled to attack fortresses defended by the -most warlike, practised, and scientific troops of -the age: the best officers and the finest soldiers -were obliged to sacrifice themselves in a lamentable -manner, to compensate for the negligence and incapacity -of a government, always ready to plunge -the nation into war, without the slightest care of -what was necessary to obtain success. The sieges -carried on by the British in Spain were a succession -of butcheries, because the commonest resources -of their art were denied to the engineers.</p> - -<p>Colonel Fletcher’s plan was to breach the castle -of Badajos, while batteries established on the right -bank of the Guadiana should take the defences in -reverse; false attacks against the Pardaleras and -Picurina were also to be commenced by re-opening -the French trenches; but it was necessary to reduce -the fort of Christoval ere the batteries for ruining -the defences of the castle could be erected.</p> - -<p>In double operations, whether of the field or of -siege, it is essential to move with an exact concert, -lest the enemy should crush each in detail, yet neither -in the investment nor in the attack was this maxim -regarded. Captain Squires, although ill provided -with tools, was directed to commence a battery -against Christoval on the night of the 8th, under -a bright moon, and at the distance of only four -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_X">No. X.</a> -Section 3.</span>hundred yards from the rampart. Exposed to a -destructive fire of musketry from the fort, and of -shot and shells from the town, he continued to -work, with great loss, until the 10th, when the -enemy, making a furious sally, carried his battery. -The French were, indeed, immediately driven back, -but the allies pursuing too hotly, were taken in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_527"></a>[527]</span> -front and flank with grape, and lost four hundred -men. Thus five engineer and seven hundred officers -and soldiers of the line were already on the long -and bloody list of victims offered to this Moloch; -and only one small battery against a small outwork -was completed! On the 11th it opened, but -before sunset the fire of the enemy had disabled -four of its five guns, and killed many more of the -besiegers; nor could any other result be expected, -seeing that this single work was exposed to the undivided -fire of the fortress, for the approaches against -the castle were not yet commenced, and two distant -batteries on the false attacks scarcely attracted the -notice of the enemy.</p> - -<p>To check future sallies, a second battery was -erected against the bridge-head, but this was also -overmatched, and meanwhile Beresford, having received -intelligence that the French army was again -in movement, arrested the progress of all the works. -On the 12th, believing this information premature, -he resumed the labour, directing the trenches to be -opened against the castle: the intelligence was, -however, true, and being confirmed at twelve o’clock -in the night, the working-parties were again drawn -off, and measures taken to raise the siege.</p> - - -<h4>SOULT’S SECOND EXPEDITION TO ESTREMADURA.</h4> - -<p>The duke of Dalmatia resolved to succour Badajos -the moment he heard of Beresford’s being in Estremadura; -the tardiness of the latter not only -gave the garrison time to organize a defence, but -permitted the French general to tranquillise his -province and arrange a system of resistance to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_528"></a>[528]</span> -allied army in the Isla. With that view, he commenced -additional fortifications at Seville, renewing -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, -<a href="#No_II">No. II.</a> -Section 11.</span>also the construction of those which had been -suspended in other places by the battle of Barosa, -and thus deceived Beresford, who believed that, -far from thinking to relieve Badajos, he was -trembling for his own province. Nothing could -be more fallacious. There were seventy thousand -fighting men in Andalusia, and Drouet, who had -quitted Massena immediately after the battle of -Fuentes Onoro, was likewise in march for that -province by the way of Avila and Toledo, bringing -with him eleven thousand men.</p> - -<p>All things being ready, Soult quitted Seville the -10th, with thirty guns, three thousand heavy dragoons, -and a division of infantry, reinforced by a battalion -of grenadiers belonging to the first corps, and by -two regiments of light cavalry belonging to the -fourth corps. The 11th he entered Olalla, where -general Marasin joined him, and at the same time -a brigade of Godinot’s division marched from Cordoba -upon Constantino, to reinforce the fifth corps, -which was falling back from Guadalcanal in consequence -of Colborne’s operations. The 13th a -junction was effected with Latour Maubourg, who -assumed the command of the heavy cavalry, while -Girard taking that of the fifth corps, advanced to -Los Santos. The 14th the French head-quarters -reached Villa Franca. Being then within thirty -miles of Badajos, Soult caused his heaviest guns -to fire salvos during the night, to give notice of -his approach to the garrison; but the expedient -failed of success, and the 15th, in the evening, -the army was concentrated at Santa Marta.</p> - -<p>Beresford, as I have before said, remained in a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_529"></a>[529]</span> -state of uncertainty until the night of the 12th, -when he commenced raising the siege, contrary to -the earnest representations of the engineers, who -promised to put him in possession of the place in -three days, if he would persevere. This promise -was ill-founded, and, if it had been otherwise, -Soult would have surprised him in the trenches: -his firmness, therefore, saved the army, and his -arrangements for carrying off the stores were admirably -executed. The artillery and the platforms -were removed in the night of the 13th, and, at -twelve o’clock, on the 15th, all the guns and stores on -the left bank, having been passed over the Guadiana, -the gabions and fascines were burnt, and the flying bridge -removed. These transactions were completely -masked by the fourth division, which, with -the Spaniards, continued to maintain the investment; -it was not until the rear guard was ready -to draw off, that the French, in a sally, after -severely handling the piquets of Harvey’s Portuguese -brigade, learned that the siege was raised. -But of the cause they were still ignorant.</p> - -<p>Beresford held a conference with the Spanish -generals at Valverde, on the 13th, when it was -agreed to receive battle at the village of Albuera. -Ballasteros’ and Blake’s corps having already formed -a junction at Baracotta, were then falling back -upon Almendral, and Blake engaged to bring them -into line at Albuera, before twelve o’clock, on the -15th. Meanwhile, as Badajos was the centre of an -arc, sweeping through Valverde, Albuera, and -Talavera Real, it was arranged that Blake’s army -should watch the roads on the right; the British -and the fifth Spanish army guard those leading -upon the centre; and that Madden’s Portuguese<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_530"></a>[530]</span> -cavalry should observe those on the left, conducting -through Talavera Real. The main body -of the British being in the woods near Valverde, -could reach Albuera by a half march, and no -part of the arc was more than four leagues from -Badajos; but the enemy being, on the 14th, at -Los Santos, was eight leagues distant from Albuera: -hence, Beresford, thinking that he could not be -forestalled on any point of importance to the -allies, continued to keep the fourth division round -the fortress. Colborne’s moveable column joined -the army on the 14th, Madden then retired to -Talavera Real, Blake’s army reached Almendral, -and the allied cavalry, under general Long, fell -back before the enemy from Zafra and Los Santos, -to Santa Marta, where it was joined by the -dragoons of the fourth army.</p> - -<p>In the morning of the 15th, the British occupied -the left of the position of Albuera, which was a -ridge about four miles long, having the Aroya Val -de Sevilla in rear and the Albuera river in front. -The right of the army was prolonged towards Almendral, -the left towards Badajos, and the ascent -from the river was easy, the ground being in all -parts practicable for cavalry and artillery. Somewhat -in advance of the centre were the bridge and -village of Albuera, the former commanded by a -battery, the latter occupied by Alten’s brigade. The -second division, under general William Stewart, was -drawn up in one line, the right on a commanding hill -over which the Valverde road passed; the left on the -road of Badajos, beyond which the order of battle -was continued in two lines, by the Portuguese -troops under general Hamilton and colonel Collins.</p> - -<p>The right of the position, which was stronger, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_531"></a>[531]</span> -higher, and broader than any other part, was left -open for Blake’s army, because Beresford, thinking -the hill on the Valverde road to be the key of the -position, as protecting his only line of retreat, was -desirous to secure it with the best troops. The -fourth division and the infantry of the fifth army -were still before Badajos, but general Cole had -orders to send the seventeenth Portuguese regiment -to Elvas; to throw a battalion of Spaniards into -Olivenza; to bring his second brigade, which -was before Christoval, over the Guadiana, by a ford -above Badajos, if practicable, and to be in readiness -to march at the first notice.</p> - -<p>In this posture of affairs, about three o’clock in -the evening of the 15th, while Beresford was at -some distance on the left, the whole mass of the -allied cavalry, closely followed by the French light -horsemen, came in from Santa Marta in a hurried -manner, and passing the Albuera abandoned all the -wooded heights in front to the enemy, whose dispositions -being thus effectually concealed at the distance -of cannon-shot, the strength of the position -was already sapped. Beresford immediately formed -a temporary right wing with the cavalry and artillery, -stretching his piquets along the road to -Almendral, and sending officers to hasten Blake’s -movements; but that general, who had only a few -miles of good road to march, and who had promised -to be in line at noon, did not reach the ground -before eleven at night; and his rear was not there -before three o’clock in the morning of the 16th; meanwhile, -as the enemy was evidently in force on the -Albuera road, Cole and Madden were ordered up. -The orders failed to reach the latter, but, at six -o’clock in the morning, the former reached the position<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_532"></a>[532]</span> -with the infantry of the fifth army, two -squadrons of Portuguese cavalry, and two brigades -of the fourth division; the third brigade, under -colonel Kemmis, being unable to cross the Guadiana, -above Badajos, was in march by Jerumenha. The -Spanish troops immediately joined Blake on the -right, and the two brigades of the fourth division, -were drawn up in columns behind the second division. -The Portuguese squadrons reinforced colonel -Otway, whose horsemen, of the same nation, were -pushed forward in front of the left wing; and, -as general Long seemed oppressed by the responsibility -of directing the troops of so many different -nations, general Lumley assumed the chief command -of the allied squadrons, which were concentrated -in rear of the centre.</p> - -<p>The position was now occupied by thirty thousand -infantry, above two thousand cavalry, and -thirty-eight pieces of artillery, of which eighteen -were nine-pounders; but, the brigade of the fourth -division being still absent, the British infantry, -the pith and strength of battle, did not amount to -seven thousand, and already Blake’s arrogance was -shaking Beresford’s authority. The French had fifty -guns, and above four thousand veteran cavalry, but -only nineteen thousand chosen infantry; yet being -of one nation, obedient to one discipline, and -animated by one spirit, their excellent composition -amply compensated for the inferiority of numbers, -and their general’s talent was immeasurably greater -than his adversary’s.</p> - -<p>Soult examined Beresford’s position, without -hindrance, on the evening of the 15th, and having -heard that the fourth division was left before -Badajos, and that Blake would not arrive before<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_533"></a>[533]</span> -the 17th, he resolved to attack the next morning, -for he had detected all the weakness of the English -general’s dispositions for battle.</p> - -<p>The hill in the centre, commanding the Valverde -road, was undoubtedly the key of the position -if an attack was made parallel to the front; but -the heights on the right presented a sort of table-land, -trending backwards towards the Valverde -road, and looking into the rear of the line of battle. -Hence it was evident that, if a mass of troops -could be placed there, they must be beaten, or the -right wing of the allied army would be rolled up -on the centre and pushed into the narrow ravine -of the Aroya: the Valverde road could then be -seized, the retreat cut, and the powerful cavalry -of the French would complete the victory. Now -the right of the allies and the left of the French -approximated to each other, being only divided by -a wooded hill, about cannon-shot distance from -either but separated from the allies by the Albuera, -and from the French by a rivulet called the Feria. -This height, neglected by Beresford, was ably -made use of by Soult. During the night he placed -behind it the artillery under general Ruty; the fifth -corps under Girard; and the heavy dragoons under -Latour Maubourg; thus concentrating fifteen thousand -men and forty guns within ten minutes’ march -of Beresford’s right wing, and yet that general could -neither see a man nor draw a sound conclusion as -to the real plan of attack.</p> - -<p>The light cavalry; the division of the first corps -under general Werlé; Godinot’s brigade, and -ten guns, still remained at the French marshal’s -disposal. These he formed in the woods, extending -along the banks of the Feria towards its confluence<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_534"></a>[534]</span> -with the Albuera, and Godinot was ordered to -attack the village and bridge, and to bear strongly -against the centre of the position, with a view to -attract Beresford’s attention, to separate his wings, -and to double up his right at the moment when -the principal attack should be developed.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF ALBUERA.</h4> - -<p>During the night, Blake and Cole, as we have -seen, arrived with above sixteen thousand men; but -so defective was the occupation of the ground, -that Soult had no change to make in his plans from -this circumstance, and, a little before nine o’clock -in the morning, Godinot’s division issued from the -woods in one heavy column of attack, preceded by -ten guns. He was flanked by the light cavalry, and -followed by Werlé’s division of reserve, and, making -straight towards the bridge, commenced a sharp cannonade, -attempting to force the passage; at the same -time Briché, with two regiments of hussars, drew further -down the river to observe colonel Otway’s horse.</p> - -<p>The allies’ guns on the rising ground above -the village answered the fire of the French, -and ploughed through their columns, which were -crowding without judgement towards the bridge, -although the stream was passable above and below. -But Beresford observing that Werlé’s division did -not follow closely, was soon convinced that the -principal effort would be on the right, and, therefore, -sent Blake orders to form a part of the first -and all the second line of the Spanish army, on -the broad part of the hills, at right angles to their -actual front. Then drawing the Portuguese infantry<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_535"></a>[535]</span> -of the left wing to the centre, he sent one -brigade down to support Alten, and directed -general Hamilton to hold the remainder in columns -of battalions, ready to move to any part of the -field. The thirteenth dragoons were posted near the -edge of the river, above the bridge, and, meanwhile, -the second division marched to support -Blake. The horse-artillery, the heavy dragoons, -and the fourth division also took ground to the -right, and were posted; the cavalry and guns on a -small plain behind the Aroya, and the fourth division -in an oblique line about half-musket shot behind -them. This done, Beresford galloped to Blake, for -that general had refused to change his front and, -with great heat, told colonel Hardinge, the bearer of -the order, that the real attack was at the village and -bridge. Beresford had sent again to entreat that he -would obey, but this message was as fruitless as -the former, and, when the marshal arrived, nothing -had been done. The enemy’s columns were, however, -now beginning to appear on the right, and -Blake, yielding to this evidence, proceeded to make -the evolution, yet with such pedantic slowness, that -Beresford, impatient of his folly, took the direction -in person.</p> - -<p>Great was the confusion and the delay thus occasioned, -and ere the troops could be put in -order the French were amongst them. For scarcely -had Godinot engaged Alten’s brigade, when Werlé, -leaving only a battalion of grenadiers and some -squadrons to watch the thirteenth dragoons and to -connect the attacks, countermarched with the remainder -of his division, and rapidly gained the -rear of the fifth corps as it was mounting the -hills on the right of the allies. At the same time<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_536"></a>[536]</span> -the mass of light cavalry suddenly quitted Godinot’s -column, and crossing the river Albuera above the -bridge, ascended the left bank at a gallop, and, sweeping -round the rear of the fifth corps, joined Latour -Maubourg, who was already in face of Lumley’s -squadrons. Thus half an hour had sufficed to render -Beresford’s position nearly desperate. Two-thirds of -the French were in a compact order of battle on a -line perpendicular to his right, and his army, disordered -and composed of different nations, was still in -the difficult act of changing its front. It was in -vain that he endeavoured to form the Spanish line -sufficiently in advance to give room for the second -division to support it; the French guns opened, -their infantry threw out a heavy musketry, and -their cavalry, outflanking the front and charging -here and there, put the Spaniards in disorder at all -points; in a short time the latter gave way, and -Soult, thinking the whole army was yielding, -pushed forward his columns, while his reserves also -mounted the hill, and general Ruty placed all the -batteries in position.</p> - -<p>At this critical moment general William Stewart -arrived at the foot of the height with colonel Colborne’s -brigade, which formed the head of the second -division. The colonel, seeing the confusion above, -desired to form in order of battle previous to -mounting the ascent, but Stewart, whose boiling -courage overlaid his judgement, led up without -any delay in column of companies, and attempted to -open out his line in succession as the battalions -arrived at the summit. Being under a destructive -fire the foremost charged to gain room, but -a heavy rain prevented any object from being -distinctly seen, and four regiments of hussars and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_537"></a>[537]</span> -lancers, which had passed the right flank in the obscurity, -came galloping in upon the rear of the line -at the instant of its developement, and slew or took -two-thirds of the brigade. One battalion only (the -thirty-first) being still in column, escaped the storm -and maintained its ground, while the French horsemen, -riding violently over every thing else, penetrated -to all parts. In the tumult, a lancer fell -upon Beresford, but the marshal, a man of great -strength, putting his spear aside cast him from his -saddle, and a shift of wind blowing aside the mist -and smoke, the mischief was perceived from the -plains by general Lumley, who sent four squadrons -out upon the lancers and cut many of them off.</p> - -<p>During this first unhappy effort of the second -division, so great was the confusion, that the -Spanish line continued to fire without cessation, -although the British were before them; whereupon -Beresford, finding his exhortations to advance fruitless, -seized an ensign and bore him and his colours, -by main force, to the front, yet the troops would -not follow, and the man went back again on being -released. In this crisis, the weather, which had -ruined Colborne’s brigade, also prevented Soult -from seeing the whole extent of the field of battle, -and he still kept his heavy columns together. His -cavalry, indeed, began to hem in that of the allies, -but the fire of the horse-artillery enabled Lumley, -covered as he was by the bed of the Aroya -and supported by the fourth division, to check -them on the plain, while Colborne still maintained -the heights with the thirty-first regiment; -the British artillery, under major Dickson, was -likewise coming fast into action, and William -Stewart, who had escaped the charge of the lancers,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_538"></a>[538]</span> -was again mounting the hill with general -Houghton’s brigade, which he brought on with the -same vehemence, but, instructed by his previous -misfortune, in a juster order of battle. The weather -now cleared, and a dreadful fire poured into the -thickest of the French columns convinced Soult -that the day was yet to be won.</p> - -<p>Houghton’s regiments soon got footing on the -summit, Dickson placed the artillery in line, the -remaining brigade of the second division came up -on the left, and two Spanish corps at last moved -forward. The enemy’s infantry then recoiled, yet -soon recovering, renewed the fight with greater -violence than before; the cannon on both sides -discharged showers of grape at half range, and the -peals of musketry were incessant and often within -pistol shot; but the close formation of the French -embarrassed their battle, and the British line would -not yield them one inch of ground nor a moment -of time to open their ranks. Their fighting was, -however, fierce and dangerous. Stewart was twice -hurt, colonel Duckworth, of the forty-eighth, was -slain, and the gallant Houghton, who had received -many wounds without shrinking, fell and -died in the act of cheering his men. Still the -struggle continued with unabated fury. Colonel -Inglis, twenty-two other officers, and more than four -hundred men out of five hundred and seventy -that had mounted the hill, fell in the fifty-seventh -alone, and the other regiments were scarcely better -off, not one-third were standing in any. Ammunition -failed, and, as the English fire slackened, -the enemy established a column in advance -upon the right flank; the play of Dickson’s -artillery checked them a moment, but again the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_539"></a>[539]</span> -Polish lancers charging, captured six guns. And -in this desperate crisis, Beresford, who had -already withdrawn the thirteenth dragoons from -the banks of the river and brought Hamilton’s -Portuguese into a situation to cover a retrograde -movement, wavered! destruction stared him in the -face, his personal resources were exhausted, and -the unhappy thought of a retreat rose in his agitated -mind. Yet no order to that effect was given, -and it was urged by some about him that the day -might still be redeemed with the fourth division. -While he hesitated, colonel Hardinge boldly ordered -general Cole to advance, and then riding to colonel -Abercrombie, who commanded the remaining -brigade of the second division, directed him also -to push forward into the fight. The die being thus -cast, Beresford acquiesced, and this terrible battle -was continued.</p> - -<p>The fourth division had only two brigades in -the field; the one Portuguese under general -Harvey, the other commanded by sir W. Myers -and composed of the seventh and twenty-third -British regiments, was called the fuzileer brigade. -General Cole directed the Portuguese to move -between Lumley’s dragoons and the hill, where -they were immediately charged by some of the -French horsemen, but beat them off with great -loss: meanwhile he led the fuzileers in person up -the height.</p> - -<p>At this time six guns were in the enemy’s possession, -the whole of Werlé’s reserves were coming -forward to reinforce the front column of the French, -and the remnant of Houghton’s brigade could no -longer maintain its ground; the field was heaped -with carcasses, the lancers were riding furiously<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_540"></a>[540]</span> -about the captured artillery on the upper part of -the hill, and on the lower slopes, a Spanish and an -English regiment in mutual error were exchanging -volleys: behind all, general Hamilton’s Portuguese, -in withdrawing from the heights above the bridge, -appeared to be in retreat. The conduct of a few -brave men soon changed this state of affairs. -Colonel Robert Arbuthnot, pushing between the -double fire of the mistaken troops, arrested that -mischief, while Cole, with the fuzileers, flanked by -a battalion of the Lusitanian legion under colonel -Hawkshawe, mounted the hill, dispersed the lancers, -recovered the captured guns, and appeared on the -right of Houghton’s brigade exactly as Abercrombie -passed it on the left.</p> - -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_540fp" style="max-width: 35em;"> - <p class="right fs70"><em>Vol. 3, Plate 12.</em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_540fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_540fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - <div class="caption"> -BATTLE of ALBUERA<br /> -<em>16<sup>TH</sup> MAY, 1811.</em><br /> - -<p><em>London Published by <span class="smcap">T. & W. Boone</span> Nov<sup>r</sup> 1830.</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>Such a gallant line, issuing from the midst of -the smoke and rapidly separating itself from the -confused and broken multitude, startled the enemy’s -heavy masses, which were increasing and pressing -onwards as to an assured victory: they wavered, -hesitated, and then vomiting forth a storm of fire, -hastily endeavoured to enlarge their front, while -a fearful discharge of grape from all their artillery -whistled through the British ranks. Myers was -killed; Cole and the three colonels, Ellis, Blakeney, -and Hawkshawe, fell wounded, and the fuzileer -battalions, struck by the iron tempest, reeled, -and staggered like sinking ships. Suddenly and -sternly recovering, they closed on their terrible -enemies, and then was seen with what a strength -and majesty the British soldier fights. In vain did -Soult, by voice and gesture, animate his Frenchmen; -in vain did the hardiest veterans, extricating -themselves from the crowded columns, sacrifice -their lives to gain time for the mass to open out -on such a fair field; in vain did the mass itself<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_541"></a>[541]</span> -bear up, and fiercely striving, fire indiscriminately -upon friends and foes, while the horsemen hovering -on the flank threatened to charge the advancing -line. Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. -No sudden burst of undisciplined valour, no nervous -enthusiasm, weakened the stability of their -order; their flashing eyes were bent on the dark -columns in their front; their measured tread shook -the ground; their dreadful volleys swept away the -head of every formation; their deafening shouts -overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from -all parts of the tumultuous crowd, as foot by foot -and with a horrid carnage it was driven by the -incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest edge -of the hill. In vain did the French reserves, joining -with the struggling multitude, endeavour to -sustain the fight; their efforts only increased the -irremediable confusion, and the mighty mass giving -way like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the -ascent. The rain flowed after in streams discoloured -with blood, and fifteen hundred unwounded men, -the remnant of six thousand unconquerable British -soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill!</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_542"></a>[542]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXII_VII">CHAPTER VII.</h3> -</div> - - -<p>While the fuzileers were thus striving on the -upper part of the hill, the cavalry and Harvey’s -brigade continually advanced, and Latour Maubourg’s -dragoons, battered by Lefebre’s guns, retired -before them, yet still threatening the British with -their right, and covering the flank of their own -infantry from a charge of Lumley’s horse. Beresford, -seeing that colonel Hardinge’s decision had -brought on the critical moment of the battle, then -endeavoured to secure a favourable result. Blake’s -first line had not been at all engaged, and were -ordered to move upon the village; Alten’s Germans -and Hamilton’s and Collins’s Portuguese were thus -rendered disposable, forming a mass of ten thousand -fresh men with which the English general followed -up the attack of the fuzileers and Abercrombie’s -brigade, and at the same time the Spanish divisions -of Zayas, Ballasteros, and España advanced. -Nevertheless, so rapid was the execution of the -fuzileers, that the enemy’s infantry were never attained -by these reserves, which yet suffered severely; -for general Ruty got the French guns altogether, -and worked them with prodigious activity, while -the fifth corps still made head, and, when the day was -irrevocably lost, he regained the other side of the -Albuera, and protected the passage of the broken -infantry.</p> - -<p>Beresford, being too hardly handled to pursue,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_543"></a>[543]</span> -formed a fresh line with his Portuguese, parallel -to the hill from whence Soult had advanced to the -attack in the morning, and where the French troops -were now rallying with their usual celerity. Meanwhile -the fight continued at the village, but Godinot’s -division and the connecting battalion of grenadiers -on that side were soon afterwards withdrawn, and -the action terminated before three o’clock.</p> - -<p>The serious fighting had endured only four hours, -and in that space of time, nearly seven thousand of -the allies and above eight thousand of their adversaries -were struck down. Three French generals -were wounded, two slain, and eight hundred -soldiers so badly hurt as to be left on the field. On -Beresford’s side only two thousand Spaniards, and -six hundred Germans and Portuguese, were killed -or wounded; hence it is plain with what a resolution -the pure British fought, for they had only fifteen -hundred men left standing out of six thousand! -The laurel is nobly won when the exhausted victor -reels as he places it on his bleeding front.</p> - -<p>The trophies of the French were five hundred -unwounded prisoners, a howitzer, and several -stand of colours; the British had nothing of that -kind to boast of; but the horrid piles of carcasses -within their lines told, with dreadful eloquence, -who were the conquerors, and all the night the -rain poured down, and the river and the hills and -the woods on each side, resounded with the dismal -clamour and groans of dying men. Beresford, -obliged to place his Portuguese in the front line, -was oppressed with the number of his wounded; -they far exceeded that of the sound amongst the -British soldiers, and when the latter’s piquets -were established, few men remained to help the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_544"></a>[544]</span> -sufferers. In this cruel situation he sent colonel -Hardinge to demand assistance from Blake; but -wrath and mortified pride were predominant in that -general’s breast, and he refused; saying it was -customary with allied armies for each to take care -of its own men.</p> - -<p>Morning came, and both sides remained in their -respective situations, the wounded still covering -the field of battle, the hostile lines still menacing -and dangerous. The greater multitude had fallen -on the French part, but the best soldiers on that -of the allies; and the dark masses of Soult’s -powerful cavalry and artillery, as they covered all -his front, seemed alone able to contend again for -the victory: the right of the French also appeared -to threaten the Badajos road, and Beresford, in -gloom and doubt, awaited another attack. On the -17th, however, the third brigade of the fourth -division came up by a forced march from Jerumenha, -and enabled the second division to retake -their former ground between the Valverde and the -Badajos roads. On the 18th, Soult retreated.</p> - -<p>He left to the generosity of the English general -several hundred men too deeply wounded to be removed; -but all that could travel he had, in the night -of the 17th, sent towards Seville, by the royal road, -through Santa Marta, Los Santos, and Monasterio: -then, protecting his movements with all his horsemen -and six battalions of infantry, he filed the -army, in the morning, to its right, and gained -the road of Solano. When this flank march was -completed, Latour Maubourg covered the rear with -the heavy dragoons, and Briché protected the -march of the wounded men by the royal road.</p> - -<p>The duke of Dalmatia remained the 19th at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_545"></a>[545]</span> -Solano. His intention was to hold a position in -Estremadura until he could receive reinforcements -from Andalusia; for he judged truly that, although -Beresford was in no condition to hurt Badajos, -lord Wellington would come down, and that fresh -combats would be required to save that fortress. -On the 14th he had commenced repairing the castle -of Villalba, a large structure between Almendralejos -and Santa Marta, and he now continued this -work; designing to form a head of cantonments, -that the allies would be unable to besiege before -the French army could be reinforced.</p> - -<p>When Beresford discovered the enemy’s retreat, -he despatched general Hamilton to make a show of -re-investing Badajos, which was effected at day-break -the 19th, but on the left bank only. Meanwhile -the allied cavalry, supported by Alten’s -Germans, followed the French line of retreat. -Soult then transferred his head-quarters to Fuente -del Maestre, and the Spanish cavalry cutting off -some of his men menaced Villalba. Lord Wellington -reached the field of battle the same day, and, after -examining the state of affairs, desired the marshal -to follow the enemy cautiously; then returning -to Elvas himself, he directed the third and seventh -divisions, which were already at Campo Mayor, -to complete the re-investment of Badajos on the -right bank.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Beresford, advanced by the Solano -road to Almendralejos, where he found some more -wounded men. His further progress was not opposed. -The number of officers who had fallen -in the French army, together with the privations -endured, had produced despondence and discontent; -the garrison at Villalba was not even disposed to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_546"></a>[546]</span> -maintain the castle, and under these circumstances, -the duke of Dalmatia evacuated it, and continued -his own retreat in the direction of Llerena, where -he assumed a position on the 23d, his cavalry being -near Usagre. This abandonment of the royal road -to Seville was a well-considered movement. The -country through which Soult passed being more -fruitful and open, he could draw greater advantage -from his superior cavalry; the mountains behind -him were so strong he had nothing to fear from an -attack; and by Belalcazar and Almaden, he could -maintain a communication with La Mancha, from -whence he expected Drouet’s division. The road of -Guadalcanal was in his rear, by which he could draw -reinforcements from Cordoba and from the fourth -corps, and meanwhile the allies durst not venture -to expose their left flank by marching on Monasterio.</p> - -<p>From Llerena, a detachment was sent to drive -away a Spanish Partizan corps which had cut his -communications with Guadalcanal, and at the same -time Latour Maubourg was directed to scour the -country beyond Usagre; this led to an action; for -that town, built upon a hill, and covered towards -Los Santos by a river with steep and rugged banks, -had only the one outlet by the bridge on that side, -and when Latour Maubourg approached, Lumley -retired across the river. The French light cavalry -then marched along the right bank, with the intention -of crossing lower down and thus covering the -passage of the heavy horsemen; but before they -could effect this object, general Bron rashly passed -the river with two regiments of dragoons, and -drew up in line just beyond the bridge. Lumley -was lying close behind a rising ground, and when -the French regiments had advanced a sufficient<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_547"></a>[547]</span> -distance, Lefebre’s guns opened on them, and the -third, and fourth dragoon guards, charged them -in front while Madden’s Portuguese fell on their -flank. They were overthrown at the first shock, -and fled towards the bridge, but that being choked -by the remainder of the cavalry advancing to their -support, the fugitives, turned to the right and left, -endeavouring to save themselves amongst some -gardens situated on the banks of the river; there -they were pursued and sabred until the French on -the opposite side, seeing their distress, opened a fire -of carbines and artillery that obliged the British to -discontinue the attack. Forty killed, above a hundred -wounded, and eighty prisoners were the fruits -of this brilliant action of general Lumley’s, which -terminated Beresford’s operations, for the miserable -state to which the Regency had reduced the Portuguese -army imperatively called for the marshal’s -presence. General Hill, who had returned to Portugal, -then re-assumed the command of the second -division, amidst the eager rejoicings of the troops, -and lord Wellington directed the renewed siege of -Badajos in person.</p> - - -<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4> - -<p>No general ever gained a great battle with so -little increase of military reputation as marshal -Beresford. His personal intrepidity and strength, -qualities so attractive for the multitude, were conspicuously -displayed, yet the breath of his own army -withered his laurels, and his triumph was disputed -by the very soldiers who followed his car. Their -censures have been reiterated, without change and -without abatement, even to this hour; and a close<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_548"></a>[548]</span> -examination of his operations, while it detects -many ill-founded objections, and others tainted -with malice, leaves little doubt that the general -feeling was right.</p> - -<p>When he had passed the Guadiana and driven -the fifth corps upon Guadalcanal, the delay that -intervened, before he invested Badajos, was unjustly -attributed to him: it was lord Wellington’s order, -resulting from the tardiness of the Spanish generals, -that paralyzed his operations. But when the time -for action arrived, the want of concert in the investment, -and the ill-matured attack on San Christoval -belonged to Beresford’s arrangements; and he is -especially responsible in reputation for the latter, -because captain Squires personally represented the -inevitable result, and his words were unheeded.</p> - -<p>During the progress of the siege, either the -want of correct intelligence, or a blunted judgement, -misled the marshal. It was remarked that, at all -times, he too readily believed the idle tales of -distress and difficulties in the French armies, with -which the spies generally, and the deserters always, -interlarded their information. Thus he was incredulous -of Soult’s enterprise, and that marshal was -actually over the Morena before the orders were -given for the commencing of the main attack of -the castle of Badajos. However, the firmness with -which Beresford resisted the importunities of the -engineers to continue the siege, and the quick and -orderly removal of the stores and battering-train, -were alike remarkable and praiseworthy. It would -have been happy if he had shewn as much magnanimity -in what followed.</p> - -<p>When he met Blake and Castaños at Valverde, -the alternative of fighting or retiring behind the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_549"></a>[549]</span> -Guadiana was the subject of consideration. The -Spanish generals were both in favour of giving -battle. Blake, who could not retire the way he -had arrived, without danger of having his march -intercepted, was particularly earnest to fight; -affirming that his troops, who were already in a -miserable state, would disperse entirely if they -were obliged to enter Portugal. Castaños was of -the same opinion. Beresford also argued that it -was unwise to relinquish the hope of taking Badajos, -and ungenerous to desert the people of Estremadura; -that a retreat would endanger Elvas, lay -open the Alemtejo, and encourage the enemy to -push his incursions further, which he could safely -do, having such a fortress as Badajos with its -bridge over the Guadiana, in his rear; a battle -must then be fought in the Alemtejo with fewer -troops and after a dispiriting retreat; there was -also a greater scarcity of food in the Portuguese -than in the Spanish province, and, finally, as -the weather was menacing, the Guadiana might -again rise before the stores were carried over, when -the latter must be abandoned, or the army endangered -to protect their passage.</p> - -<p>But these plausible reasons were but a mask; -the true cause why the English general adopted -Blake’s proposals was the impatient temper of the -British troops. None of them had been engaged -in the battles under lord Wellington. At Busaco -the regiments of the fourth division were idle -spectators on the left, as those of the second division -were on the right, while the action was in the -centre. During Massena’s retreat they had not -been employed under fire, and the combats of -Sabugal and Fuentes Onoro had been fought without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_550"></a>[550]</span> -them. Thus a burning thirst for battle was -general, and Beresford had not the art either of -conciliating or of exacting the confidence of his -troops. It is certain that if he had retreated, a -very violent and unjust clamour would have been -raised against him, and this was so strongly and -unceremoniously represented to him, by an officer -on his own staff, that he gave way. These are -what may be termed the moral obstacles of war. -Such men as lord Wellington or sir John Moore -can stride over them, but to second-rate minds they -are insuperable. Practice and study may make -a good general as far as the handling of troops -and the designing of a campaign, but that ascendancy -of spirit which leads the wise, and controls -the insolence of folly, is a rare gift of -nature.</p> - -<p>Beresford yielded with an unhappy flexibility -to the clamour of the army and the representations -of Blake, for it is unquestionable that the resolution -to fight was unwarrantable on any sound -military principle. We may pass over the argument -founded upon the taking of Badajos, because -neither the measures nor the means of the English -general promised the slightest chance of success; -the siege would have died away of itself in default of -resources to carry it on. The true question to consider -was, not whether Estremadura should be -deserted or Badajos abandoned, but whether lord -Wellington’s combinations and his great and well -considered design for the deliverance of the Peninsula, -should be ruined and defaced at a blow. To -say that the Alemtejo could not have been defended -until the commander-in-chief arrived from the -north with reinforcements was mere trifling. Soult,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_551"></a>[551]</span> -with twenty or even thirty thousand men, durst -not have attempted the siege of Elvas in the face -of twenty-four thousand men such as Beresford -commanded. The result of the battle of Fuentes -Onoro was known in the English and in the French -camps, before Beresford broke up from Badajos, -hence he was certain that additional troops would -soon be brought down to the Guadiana; indeed, the -third and seventh divisions were actually at Campo -Mayor the 23d of May. The danger to the Alemtejo -was, therefore, slight, and the necessity of a -battle being by no means apparent, it remains to -analyze the chances of success.</p> - -<p>Soult’s numbers were not accurately known, but -it was ascertained that he had not less than twenty -thousand veteran troops. He had also a great -superiority of cavalry and artillery, and the country -was peculiarly suitable for these arms; the martial -character of the man was also understood. -Now the allies could bring into the field more of -infantry by ten thousand than the French, but they -were of various tongues, and the Spanish part ill -armed, starving, and worn out with fatigue, had -been repeatedly and recently defeated by the very -troops they were going to engage. The French -were compact, swift of movement, inured to war, -used to act together, and under the command of -one able and experienced general. The allied -army was unwieldy, each nation mistrusting the -other, and the whole without unity of spirit, or of -discipline, or of command. On what, then, could -marshal Beresford found his hopes of success? -The British troops. The latter were therefore to -be freely used. But was it a time to risk the total -destruction of two superb divisions and to encounter<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_552"></a>[552]</span> -a certain and heavy loss of men, whose value he -knew so well when he calculated upon them alone -for victory in such circumstances?</p> - -<p>To resolve on battle was, however, easier than -to prepare for it with skill. Albuera, we have -seen, was the point of concentration. Colonel -Colborne’s brigade did not arrive until the 14th, -and these was no certainty that it could arrive -before the enemy did. Blake did not arrive until -three in the morning of the 16th. The fourth division -not until six o’clock. Kemmis with three fine -British regiments, and Maddens cavalry, did not -come at all. These facts prove that the whole plan -was faulty, it was mere accident that a sufficient -force to give battle was concentrated. Beresford -was too late, and the keeping up the investment -of Badajos, although laudable in one sense, was a -great error; it was only an accessary, and yet the -success of the principal object was made subservient -to it. If Soult, instead of passing by Villa -Franca, in his advance, had pushed straight on -from Los Santos to Albuera, he would have arrived -the 15th, when Beresford had not much more than -half his force in position; the point of concentration -would then have been lost, and the allies -scattered in all directions. If the French had even -continued their march by Solano instead of turning -upon Albuera, they must inevitably have communicated -with Badajos, unless Beresford had fought -without waiting for Blake, and without Kemmis’s -brigade. Why, then, did the French marshal turn -out of the way to seek a battle, in preference to -attaining his object without one? and why did he -neglect to operate by his right or left until the unwieldy -allied army should separate or get into confusion,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_553"></a>[553]</span> -as it inevitably would have done? Because the -English general’s dispositions were so faulty that -no worse error could well be expected from him, -and Soult had every reason to hope for a great and -decided victory; a victory which would have more -than counterbalanced Massena’s failure. He knew -that only one half of the allied force was at Albuera -on the 15th, and when he examined the ground, -every thing promised the most complete success.</p> - -<p>Marshal Beresford had fixed upon and studied his -own field of battle above a month before the action -took place, and yet occupied it in such a manner as -to render defeat almost certain; his infantry were -not held in hand, and his inferiority in guns and -cavalry was not compensated for by entrenchments. -But were any other proofs of error wanting, this -fact would suffice, he had a greater strength of infantry -on a field of battle scarcely four miles long, -and three times the day was lost and won, the -allies being always fewest in number at the decisive -point. It is true that Blake’s conduct was very -perplexing; it is true that general William Stewart’s -error cost one brigade, and thus annihilated -the command of colonel Colborne, a man -capable of turning the fate of a battle even with -fewer troops than those swept away from him by -the French cavalry: but the neglect of the hill -beyond the Albuera, fronting the right of the -position, was Beresford’s own error and a most -serious one; so also were the successive attacks of -the brigades, and the hesitation about the fourth -division. And where are we to look for that -promptness in critical moments which marks the -great commander? It was colonel Hardinge that -gave the fourth division and Abercrombie’s brigade -orders to advance, and it was their astounding<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_554"></a>[554]</span> -valour in attack, and the astonishing firmness of -Houghton’s brigade in defence that saved the day; -the person of the general-in-chief was indeed seen -every where, a gallant soldier! but the mind of the -great commander was seen no where.</p> - -<p>Beresford remained master of the field of battle, -but he could not take Badajos, that prize was the -result of many great efforts, and many deep combinations -by a far greater man: neither did he clear -Estremadura, for Soult maintained positions from -Llerena to Usagre. What then did he gain? The -power of simulating a renewal of the siege, and -holding his own cantonments on the left bank of -the Guadiana; I say simulating, for, if the third -and seventh divisions had not arrived from Beira, -even the investment could not have been completed. -These illusive advantages he purchased at the price -of seven thousand men. Now lord Wellington -fought two general and several minor actions, with -a smaller loss, and moreover turned Massena and -seventy thousand men out of Portugal!</p> - -<p>Such being the fruit of victory, what would have -been the result of defeat? There was no retreat, -save by the temporary bridge of Jerumenha, but, -had the hill on the right been carried in the battle, -the Valverde road would have been in Soult’s possession, -and the line of retreat cut; and, had it been -otherwise, Beresford, with four thousand victorious -French cavalry at his heels, could never have passed -the river. Back, then, must have come the army -from the north, the Lines of Lisbon would have been -once more occupied—a French force fixed on the -south of the Tagus—Spain ruined—Portugal laid -prostrate—England in dismay. Could even the -genius of lord Wellington have recovered such a -state of affairs? And yet, with these results,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_555"></a>[555]</span> -the terrible balance hung for two hours, and twice -trembling to the sinister side, only yielded at last to -the superlative vigour of the fuzileers. The battle -should never have been fought. The siege of Badajos -could not have been renewed without reinforcements, -and, with them, it could have been -renewed without an action, or at least without -risking an unequal one.</p> - -<p>But would even the bravery of British soldiers -have saved the day, at Albuera, if the French -general had not also committed great errors. His -plan of attack and his execution of it, up to the -moment when the Spanish line fell back in disorder, -cannot be too much admired; after that, the great -error of fighting in dense columns being persisted -in beyond reason, lost the fairest field ever offered -to the arms of France. Had the fifth corps opened -out while there was time to do so, that is, between -the falling back of the Spaniards and the advance -of Houghton’s brigade, what on earth could have -saved Beresford from a total defeat? The fire of -the enemy’s columns alone destroyed two-thirds of -his British troops; the fire of their lines would -have swept away all!</p> - -<p>It has been said that Latour Maubourg and Godinot -did not second Soult with sufficient vigour; -the latter certainly did not display any great energy, -but the village was maintained by Alten’s Germans, -who were good and hardy troops, and well backed -up by a great body of Portuguese. Latour Maubourg’s -movements seem to have been objected -to without reason. He took six guns, sabred many -Spaniards, and overthrew a whole brigade of the -British, without ceasing to keep in check their -cavalry. He was, undoubtedly, greatly superior in -numbers, but general Lumley handled the allied<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_556"></a>[556]</span> -squadrons with skill and courage, and drew all the -advantage possible from his situation, and, in the -choice of that situation, none can deny ability to -marshal Beresford. The rising ground behind the -horsemen, the bed of the Aroya in their front, the -aid of the horse-artillery, and the support of the -fourth division, were all circumstances of strength so -well combined that nothing could be better, and they -dictated Latour Maubourg’s proceedings, which -seem consonant to true principles. If he had -charged in mass, under the fire of Lefebre’s guns, -he must have been thrown into confusion in passing -the Aroya at the moment when the fourth division, -advancing along the slopes, would have opened a -musketry on his right flank; Lumley could then -have charged, or retired up the hill, according to -circumstances. In this case, great loss might have -been sustained, and nothing very decisive could -have accrued to the advantage of the French, -because no number of cavalry, if unsustained by -infantry and artillery, can make a serious impression -against the three arms united.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, a repulse might have been -fatal not only to himself but to the French infantry -on the hill, as their left would have been open to -the enterprises of the allied cavalry. If Latour -Maubourg had stretched away to his own left, -he would, in like manner, have exposed the flank -of Soult’s infantry, and his movements would -have been eccentric, and contrary to sound principles; -and, (in the event of a disaster to the -corps on the hill, as really happened,) destructive -to the safety of the retreating army. By keeping -in mass on the plain, and detaching squadrons -from time to time, as favourable opportunities -offered for partial charges, he gained, as we have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_557"></a>[557]</span> -seen, great advantages during the action, and kept -his troopers well in hand for the decisive moment; -finally, he covered the retreat of the beaten infantry. -Still it may be admitted that, with such -superior numbers, he might have more closely -pressed Lumley.</p> - -<p>When Soult had regained the hills at the other -side of the Albuera, the battle ceased, each side -being, as we have seen, so hardly handled that -neither offered to renew the fight. Here was the -greatest failure of the French commander; he had -lost eight thousand men, but he had still fifteen thousand -under arms, and his artillery and his cavalry -were comparatively untouched. On the side of the -allies, only fifteen hundred British infantry were -standing; the troops were suffering greatly from -famine; the Spaniards had been feeding on horseflesh, -and were so extenuated by continual fatigue -and misery, that, for several days previous to the -battle, they had gone over in considerable numbers -even to the French, hoping thus to get food: -these circumstances should be borne in mind, when -reflecting on their conduct in the battle; under -such a commander as Blake, and, while enduring -such heavy privations, it was a great effort of resolution, -and honourable to them that they fought at -all. Their resistance feeble, when compared to the -desperate valour of the British, was by no means -weak in itself or infirm; nor is it to be wondered -at that men so exhausted and so ill-managed should -have been deaf to the call of Beresford, a strange -general, whose exhortations they probably did not -understand. When the fortune of the day changed -they followed the fuzileers with alacrity, and at no -period did they give way with dishonour.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_558"></a>[558]</span></p> - -<p>Nevertheless, all circumstances considered, they -were not and could not be equal to a second -desperate struggle, a renewed attack on the 17th, -would have certainly ended in favour of the French; -and so conscious was Beresford of this, that, on the -evening of the 16th, he wrote to lord Wellington, -avowing that he anticipated a certain and ruinous -defeat the next day. The resolution with which -he maintained the position notwithstanding, was -the strongest indication of military talent he gave -during the whole of his operations; had Soult -only persisted in holding his position with equal -pertinacity, Beresford must have retired. It was a -great and decided mistake of the French marshal -not to have done so. There is nothing more essential -in war than a confident front; a general should -never acknowledge himself vanquished, for the front -line of an army always looks formidable, and the -adversary can seldom see the real state of what is -behind. The importance of this maxim is finely -indicated in Livy, where he relates that, after a -drawn battle, a god called out in the night, the -Etruscans had lost one man more than the Romans! -Hereupon the former retired, and the latter, remaining -on the field, gathered all the fruits of a -real victory.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_559"></a>[559]</span><br /></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="PAPERS_RELATING">PAPERS RELATING TO THE FORMER VOLUMES.</h2> -</div> - -<hr class="r10" /> - - <div class="fs80"> - -<p class="center"><em>Letter from major-general F. Ponsonby to colonel Napier.</em></p> - -<p>After the very handsome manner in which you have mentioned -my name, in your account of the battle of Talavera, it may -appear extraordinary that I should trouble you with this letter; -but my silence might be interpreted into the wish of taking praise -to myself which I do not deserve.</p> - -<p>The whole of your account of the charge made by general -Anson’s brigade is substantially correct; you have given the -reason for it, and the result; but there are two points, in the -detail, which are inaccurate. The first affecting the German -hussars; the other respecting myself.</p> - -<p>The Germans, on the left of the twenty-third, could not reach -the French columns, from the impracticability of the ravine -where they charged; this I ascertained, by personal observation, -the following day; the obstacle was much less serious where the -twenty-third attacked, headed by general Anson and colonel -Seymour. The mountain torrent, which gradually decreased as -it descended into the plain, was about thirty yards in front of the -enemy, and the twenty-third, though much broken in passing -this obstacle, charged up to the columns, and was repulsed, no -rally could be attempted; but the right squadron, under captain -Drake, having an easier passage of the ravine, and no French -column immediately in front, passed through the intervals, and -caused much confusion, which, together with the delay occasioned -by the charge, prevented the masses of infantry which were in -readiness on the French right flank, from joining in the general -attack on our line.</p> - -<p>You will perceive that this account, which I believe to be the -exact truth, does not, in the slightest degree, affect the accuracy -of your description of the movement; but, if I am correct, it proves -that the Germans were obliged to halt by an insuperable difficulty, -and that I had no particular merit in the execution of the charge -of the twenty-third.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr6">Believe me</span><br /> -<span class="padr2">Very sincerely yours,</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">F. Ponsonby</span>.</p> - -<p class="noindent"><em>Malta, Dec. 30, 1829.</em><br /></p> - </div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_560"></a>[560]</span></p> - - <div class="fs80" lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p2 center"><em>Note sur la Situation actuelle de l’Espagne.</em></p> - -<p class="right"><em>Rochefort, le Août, 1808.</em></p> - -<p>1º. Les événemens inattendus du général Dupont sont une -preuve de plus que le succès de la guerre dépend de la prudence, -de la bonne conduite, et de l’expérience du général.</p> - -<p>2º. A la seule lecture du rapport du colonel d’Affry, on avoit -diviné tous les événemens; après une perte aussi considérable, on -ne peut être surpris que le roi et les généraux jugent convenable -de concentrer l’armée et d’évacuer Madrid.</p> - -<p>En examinant avec attention, non les rapports mensongers des -individus qui parlent dans leur sens, mais les faits tels qu’ils se -sont passés, on est convaincu: premièrement, que le général Castaños -n’avoit pas plus de vingt-cinq mille hommes de troupe de -ligne et de quinze mille paysans; un jour on sera à même de -vérifier ce qui sera avancé ici. Secondement, que si le général -Dupont les eut attaqués ou se fût battû; avec tout son corps réuni, -il les eut complettement défaits.</p> - -<p>3º. On pense qu’on aura tout le tems d’évacuer les blessés de -Madrid qui arrivent à Aranda; il faudra occuper aussi longtems qu’il -sera possible les hauteurs de Buitrago, afin de donner le temps au -maréchal Bessières de revenir de son mouvement de Gallice; qu’il -faut réorganiser la province de Burgos, les trois Biscayes, et la -province de Navarre; elle comprendront facilement que, dans ce -moment plus que jamais, elles doivent rester fidèles et se bien -conduire sous peine d’être traitées avec toute la rigueur de la -guerre.</p> - -<p>4º. On pense que l’armée doit être divisée en trois corps, <em>le -corps principal</em>, ou de centre, où commande le roi, qu’on porteroit -à 30,000 hommes campé à Aranda; le corps de droite, du maréchal -Bessières d’environ 15 mille hommes faisant face à ce qui -pourroit arriver de Gallice ou d’Estramadura, occupant Valladolid -par une division, ayant une autre division intermédiaire avec le corps -du centre, et une troisième division de plus sur sa droite, selon -les circonstances; enfin le <em>corps de gauche</em>, ou d’Arragon destiné -à maintenir la Navarre et le pays environnant, occupant Logrono -et Tudela et liant sa droite au corps du centre, par une division -qui au besoin renforceroit ce corps et devra maintenir Soria par un -corps volant.</p> - -<p>Le corps du centre, et le corps de droite doivent s’appuyer sur -Burgos et le corps d’Arragon doit avoir son appui sur Pampelune.</p> - -<p>5º. Pour organiser le corps du centre dans ce bût, on croit<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_561"></a>[561]</span> -qu’on doit le renforcer de la brigade du 14<sup>me</sup> et 44<sup>me</sup> de ligne, 200 -chevaux et 8 pièces de canon, qu’on tireroit du corps devant -Saragosse; de la brigade du général Mouton composée du 4<sup>me</sup> -legère, 15<sup>me</sup> legère, du bataillon de Paris, et de huit pièces de -canon; de la brigade commandée par le maréchal Ney, et qui est -déjà à une marche en avant de Bayonne, composée du 43<sup>me</sup>, et du -51<sup>me</sup> de ligne, du 26<sup>me</sup> de chasseurs, et de 6 pièces de canon; enfin -de 4 escadrons de marche de dragons et d’une régiment Polonais -de la garde; on réuniroit le 3<sup>me</sup> bataillon aux deux premiers de -tous les régimens d’infanterie, et on méleroit les jeunes soldats -aux anciens.</p> - -<p>On évalue à environ dix mille hommes de renfort que -recevroit le corps du centre, qui seroit alors composé: savoir des</p> - -<table class="autotable"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">18,000 qui le forment à présent</td> -<td class="tdr pad6">18,000</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Du renfort évalué à</td> -<td class="tdr pad6">10,000</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p>Le détachement du depôt du 4<sup>me</sup> legère, 15<sup>me</sup> legère.</p> - -<p>14<sup>me</sup>, 44<sup>me</sup>, 43<sup>me</sup>, et 51<sup>me</sup> de ligne, le 2<sup>me</sup> et 12<sup>me</sup> legère rejoindront -insensiblement et porteront ce corps à 30,000 hommes.</p> - -<p>Ces trente mille hommes ne sauroient être en meilleure mains, -que sous les ordres du maréchal Ney, hormis une réserve de 4 à -5 mille hommes destinés à la garde du roi, et que le roi conserveroit -auprès de sa personne et feroit marcher avec le général -Saligny, ou avec le général Savary quand il le jugeroit nécessaire.</p> - -<p>Le corps du centre ce tiendrait à la hauteur d’Aranda, ses communications -bien assurées avec le maréchal Bessières à Valladolid, -des têtes de pont bien établies à Aranda et à Valladolid. Ce corps -se nourrira par Burgos et devra non seulement maintenir la tranquillité -dans cette province, mais encore assurer ses communications -avec le corps de Saragosse qui occupera Tudela et Logrono.</p> - -<p>Le corps du maréchal Bessières, fort de quinze mille hommes, -devra occuper Valladolid en faisant face à ce qui arrivera d’Estramadure -et de Castille, ayant ses trois divisions en échélons et se -nourrissant de la province de Valladolid, Placentia, et Leon.</p> - -<p>On enverra le maréchal Moncey pour commander le corps du -général Verdier, et on chargera le maréchal du commandement de -la Biscaye et de tous les derrières.</p> - -<p>On estime qu’on peut retirer du camp sous Saragosse le 14<sup>me</sup> et -44<sup>me</sup> de ligne, 200 chevaux, et 8 pièces de canon, le reste doit être -formé en trois divisions, et destiné, à maintenir la Navarre. La -position de Logrono est trop près, il faut occuper au moins jusqu’à -Tudela pour soumettre la Navarre, et tout ce qui bougeroit. Dans<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_562"></a>[562]</span> -l’ordre offensif, deux divisions peuvent se porter en marche forcée -sur l’armée.</p> - -<p>6º. Il ne faut point faire une guerre timide, ni souffrir aucun -rassemblement armé à deux marches d’aucun corps d’armée. Si -l’ennemi s’approche, il ne faut point se laisser décourager par ce -qui s’est passé, se confier dans sa supériorité, marcher à lui et le -battre. L’ennemi prendra lui même probablement une marche très -circonspecte: il y sera réduit du moment qu’il aura eu quelque -exemple.</p> - -<p>Dans cette situation de choses, toutes les fois qu’on seroit -sérieusement attaqué par l’ennemi, on pourra lui opposer le corps -du roi, qui doit toujours être ensemble, et les deux tiers du corps -du maréchal Bessières. Se maréchal doit toujours tenir un tiers -de son corps, à une demi journée, un tiers à une journée du -corps du centre, et un tiers sur la droite, suivant les circonstances, -également, un tiers du corps du général Verdier doit se tenir à la -gauche du roi, pour le joindre si cela étoit nécessaire, de sorte -que dans un jour le roi puisse réunir 40 mille hommes.</p> - -<p>7º. Il faut débuter par des coups d’éclât, qui rélévent le moral du -soldat et qui fassent comprendre à l’habitant qu’il doit rester tranquille, -un des premiers coups le plus important à porter, et qui seroit -utile pour réléver l’opinion et compenser l’évacuation de Madrid, -seroit que la brigade du 14<sup>me</sup> et 44<sup>me</sup> qu’on rappelle de Saragosse, -aidée d’une détachement du corps du centre, soumette Soria, le -désarme et le fasse rester tranquille. Attaquer et culbuter tout -ce qui se présentera doit être l’instruction générale, donnée au -maréchal Bessières, au maréchal Ney, et au général Verdier, de -sorte qu’à une marche, ou à une marche et demie du corps -François, il n’y ait aucun rassemblement d’insurgés; on est d’opinion -que si l’avant garde du général Castaños s’avance sur l’Aranda et -dépasse les montagnes de Buitrago il faut, avec tout ce qu’on -réunira dans un jour, marcher à lui sans lui donner le tems de s’y -établir sérieusement, le culbuter, le jetter au delà des montagnes, -et si l’affaire est décisive, se reporter sur Madrid. L’ennemi doit -essayer de déloger l’armée Françoise de cette position, par trois -points, par la Gallice et l’Estramadure, par la droite d’Aranda, et -enfin par les rassemblemens des provinces d’Arragon, de Valence -et autres de Castille. Toutes ces combinaisons sont difficiles à -l’ennemi, et si on dissipe ces rassemblemens à mesure qu’ils se -formeront sur tous les points et qu’on les tienne à distance d’une -ou deux marches du cantonnement François, si alternativement<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_563"></a>[563]</span> -les François prennent l’offensive, tantôt à leur droite, en renforçant -le maréchal Bessières, pendant que le centre se tiendra dans une -bonne position derrière la rivière, et à l’abri de toute attaque, -tantôt au centre avec le corps du roi, les deux tiers du corps -de droite, et un tiers du corps de gauche, l’ennemi sera bientôt -obligé à la plus grande circonspection.</p> - -<p>8º. On auroit pu aussi conserver Madrid en renforçant le -corps qui s’y trouve, du 14<sup>me</sup> et 44<sup>me</sup> de ligne, de la brigade du -général Mouton, de celle du général Le Fevbre, qui en dernier -lieu a été renvoyée au marshal Bessières, et enfin du renfort -qu’amène le maréchal Ney. On auroit ainsi renforcé le corps -de Madrid de plus de 14 mille hommes, et il est douteux que -l’ennemi eut voulu se mesurer avec des forces aussi considérables -et s’exposer à une perte certaine.</p> - -<p>9º. Si de fortes raisons obligoient d’évacuer Aranda, on perdroit -l’espoir de rétablir ses communications avec le Portugal. -Dans le cas où un évènement quelconque porteroit à évacuer le -Duero et à se concentrer sur Burgos pour se réunir là avec -le maréchal Bessières, le corps du général Verdier peut -communiquer par l’Ebre, et avoir toujours son mouvement -isolé pour maintenir la Navarre, contenir l’Arragon, tous les -rassemblemens de ce côté, et protéger la route principale.<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> Pendant -cet intervalle des renforts journaliers arriveront à l’armée, jusqu’à -ce qu’enfin les divisions de la grande armée qui sont en marche, -soient sur les Pyrénées.</p> - -<p>On a recommandé de tous tems le petit fort de Pancorvo. -Il est nécessaire de l’occuper, même quand on ne garderoit pas -la ligne de l’Ebre, c’est une vedette d’autant plus utile qu’elle -domine la plaine, et seroit un obstacle si jamais l’ennemi s’en -emparoit.<a id="FNanchor_9a" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> - -<p>10º. La troisième position qui se présente à l’armée, c’est la -gauche à Pampelune, et la droite sur Vittoria, maintenant ainsi -ses communications avec les places importantes de St. Sebastien -et de Pampelune. Au reste toutes ces notes peuvent difficilement -être de quelque utilité, les évènemens modifient nécessairement -les dispositions, tout dépend d’ailleurs de saisir un moment.</p> - -<p>11º. Résumé. Le premier but est de se maintenir à Madrid -si cela est possible.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_564"></a>[564]</span></p> - -<p>Le second, de maintenir ses communications avec le Portugal -en occupant la ligne du Duero.</p> - -<p>Le troisième, de conserver l’Ebre.</p> - -<p>Le quatrième de conserver ses communications avec Pampelune -et St. Sebastien afin que la grande armée arrivant, on puisse en -peu de tems culbuter et anéantir tous les révoltés.</p> - -<p class="right smcap">Lieut.-Gen. Bertrand.</p> - -<p><em>Rochefort, 6 Août, 1808.</em></p> - </div> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_565"></a>[565]</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="nobreak fs240 lsp2 p2b" id="APPENDIX">APPENDIX.</h2> -</div> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_566"></a>[566]</span><br /> - <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_567"></a>[567]</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p class="pfs150 lsp2">APPENDIX.</p> -</div> - -<hr class="r10" /> - - <div class="fs80"> - -<h3 id="No_I">No. I.</h3> - -<p class="p2 center lht2 lsp2">SECTION 1.—GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN -THE PENINSULA, EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL -MUSTER ROLLS.</p> - - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="9">King Joseph commanding, 1st Oct. 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Present under arms</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Absent.</td> -<td class="tdc">Effective.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdc">Hosp.</td> -<td class="tdc">Prison.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Cav.</td> -<td class="tdc">Draught.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">180,814</td> -<td class="tdr">28,091</td> -<td class="tdr">10,407</td> -<td class="tdr">3,165</td> -<td class="tdr">46,109</td> -<td class="tdr">4,124</td> -<td class="tdr">237,330</td> -<td class="tdr">23,196</td> -<td class="tdr">8,060</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">Deduct for the governments</td> -<td class="tdr">10,407</td> -<td class="tdrp" colspan="2">3,165</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdrp" colspan="2">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="4">Real total</td> -<td class="tdr">226,927</td> -<td class="tdrp" colspan="2">28,091</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdrp" colspan="2">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc tdpp" colspan="9">15th July, 1810.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">273,403</td> -<td class="tdr">52,336</td> -<td class="tdr">29,462</td> -<td class="tdr">7,846</td> -<td class="tdr">47,107</td> -<td class="tdr">4,915</td> -<td class="tdr">349,972</td> -<td class="tdr">41,848</td> -<td class="tdr">18,334</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="9">In march to join</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">6,121</td> -<td class="tdr">736</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdr">636</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdr">6,757</td> -<td class="tdrp" colspan="2">736</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdrp" colspan="2">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">279,524</td> -<td class="tdr">53,072</td> -<td class="tdr">29,462</td> -<td class="tdr">7,846</td> -<td class="tdr">47,743</td> -<td class="tdr">4,915</td> -<td class="tdr">356,729</td> -<td class="tdrp" colspan="2">60,918</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdrp" colspan="2">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc tdpp" colspan="9">15th August, 1810.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">279,639</td> -<td class="tdr">52,063</td> -<td class="tdr">25,340</td> -<td class="tdr">6,017</td> -<td class="tdr">46,982</td> -<td class="tdr">5,995</td> -<td class="tdr">351,961</td> -<td class="tdr">41,446</td> -<td class="tdr">16,634</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">In march to join</td> -<td class="tdr">1,957</td> -<td class="tdr">681</td> -<td class="tdr">511</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="4">Total effective in Spain</td> -<td class="tdr">353,918</td> -<td class="tdr">42,127</td> -<td class="tdr">17,145</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">Troops destined for Spain, quartered on the frontier</td> -<td class="tdr">16,006</td> -<td class="tdr">1,447</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="4">Grand total</td> -<td class="tdr">369,924</td> -<td class="tdr">43,574</td> -<td class="tdr">17,145</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p><em>Note.</em>—By this state it appears that allowance being made for casualties, -the reinforcements for Spain, in consequence of the peace with -Austria, were not less than one hundred and fifty thousand men.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdc tdpp" colspan="8">15th Jan. 1811.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Present under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdc">Absent.</td> -<td class="tdc">Effective.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdc">Hosp.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Cav.</td> -<td class="tdc">Draught.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">295,227</td> -<td class="tdr">52,462</td> -<td class="tdr">17,780</td> -<td class="tdr">4,714</td> -<td class="tdr">48,831</td> -<td class="tdr">361,838</td> -<td class="tdr">41,189</td> -<td class="tdr">15,987</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc tdpp" colspan="8">15th April, 1811.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">276,575</td> -<td class="tdr">46,990</td> -<td class="tdr">15,121</td> -<td class="tdr">2,166</td> -<td class="tdr">40,079</td> -<td class="tdr">331,776</td> -<td class="tdr">37,855</td> -<td class="tdr">11,301</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p>These states shew a decrease of nearly thirty thousand men in three -months. During this period the siege of Badajos, the retreat of Massena, -the battles of the Gebora, Barrosa, and Fuentes Onoro took place. -Hence, if the deaths in hospital be added to the losses sustained in those -operations we shall find that, at the period of its greatest activity, the -Guerilla system was more harassing than destructive to the French -army.</p> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_568"></a>[568]</span></p> - -<p class="p3 center lht2 lsp2">SECTION 2.—STATE OF THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL.</p> - -<p class="p2 center">April, 1810.—Head-quarter Caceres. Massena, Prince of Esling, commanding.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdc">Hosp.</td> -<td class="tdc">Pris-<br />oners.</td> -<td class="tdr">Effec-<br />tive. </td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Cav.</td> -<td class="tdr">Draught.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">2d corps d’armée</td> -<td class="tdr">18,372</td> -<td class="tdr">4,449</td> -<td class="tdr">1,119</td> -<td class="tdr">132</td> -<td class="tdr">1,628</td> -<td class="tdr">7</td> -<td class="tdr">21,126</td> -<td class="tdr">3,520</td> -<td class="tdr">1,061</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">6th Ditto</td> -<td class="tdr">33,759</td> -<td class="tdr">10,159</td> -<td class="tdr">496</td> -<td class="tdr">110</td> -<td class="tdr">5,086</td> -<td class="tdr">349</td> -<td class="tdr">39,690</td> -<td class="tdr">3,140</td> -<td class="tdr">3,129</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">8th Ditto</td> -<td class="tdr">28,045</td> -<td class="tdr">7,070</td> -<td class="tdr">25</td> -<td class="tdr">” </td> -<td class="tdr">5,976</td> -<td class="tdr">99</td> -<td class="tdr">34,145</td> -<td class="tdr">5,312</td> -<td class="tdr">1,758</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="9"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Total active army</td> -<td class="tdr">80,176</td> -<td class="tdr">21,678</td> -<td class="tdr">1,640</td> -<td class="tdr">242</td> -<td class="tdr">12,690</td> -<td class="tdr">455</td> -<td class="tdr">94,961</td> -<td class="tdr">15,972</td> -<td class="tdr">5,948</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Imperial guards</td> -<td class="tdr">17,380</td> -<td class="tdr">3,800</td> -<td class="tdr">174</td> -<td class="tdr">15</td> -<td class="tdr">733</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">18,287</td> -<td class="tdr">2,831</td> -<td class="tdr">954</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Province of St. Ander</td> -<td class="tdr">13,464</td> -<td class="tdr">752</td> -<td class="tdr">276</td> -<td class="tdr">” </td> -<td class="tdr">1,774</td> -<td class="tdr">377</td> -<td class="tdr">15,891</td> -<td class="tdr">15,752</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Province of Valladolid</td> -<td class="tdr">4,509</td> -<td class="tdr">124</td> -<td class="tdr">123</td> -<td class="tdr">” </td> -<td class="tdr">859</td> -<td class="tdr">145</td> -<td class="tdr">6,136</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">126</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="9"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Total under Massena’s command</td> -<td class="tdr">116,029</td> -<td class="tdr">26,254</td> -<td class="tdr">2,213</td> -<td class="tdr">257</td> -<td class="tdr">16,056</td> -<td class="tdr">977</td> -<td class="tdr">135,275</td> -<td class="tdr">19,555</td> -<td class="tdr">7,056</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="9"></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="tdc tdpp" colspan="10">15th May, 1810.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Etat major et gend’armes</td> -<td class="tdr">229</td> -<td class="tdr">241</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">” </td> -<td class="tdr">229</td> -<td class="tdr">241</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">2d corps Reynier</td> -<td class="tdr">16,903</td> -<td class="tdr">2,921</td> -<td class="tdr">992</td> -<td class="tdr">231</td> -<td class="tdr">1,337</td> -<td class="tdr">42</td> -<td class="tdr">19,232</td> -<td class="tdr">2,186</td> -<td class="tdr">966</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">6th do. Ney</td> -<td class="tdr">28,883</td> -<td class="tdr">5,421</td> -<td class="tdr">1,224</td> -<td class="tdr">964</td> -<td class="tdr">4,940</td> -<td class="tdr">357</td> -<td class="tdr">35,067</td> -<td class="tdr">2,152</td> -<td class="tdr">4,233</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">8th do. Junot</td> -<td class="tdr">30,782</td> -<td class="tdr">4,228</td> -<td class="tdr">7</td> -<td class="tdr">30</td> -<td class="tdr">5,642</td> -<td class="tdr">75</td> -<td class="tdr">2,643</td> -<td class="tdr">2,142</td> -<td class="tdr">2,116</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Reserve of cavalry. Montbrun</td> -<td class="tdr">4,776</td> -<td class="tdr">4,851</td> -<td class="tdr">246</td> -<td class="tdr">189</td> -<td class="tdr">95</td> -<td class="tdr">” </td> -<td class="tdr">5,117</td> -<td class="tdr">5,040</td> -<td class="tdr">11</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="9"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Total active army</td> -<td class="tdr">71,573</td> -<td class="tdr">17,662</td> -<td class="tdr">2,489</td> -<td class="tdr">1,414</td> -<td class="tdr">12,014</td> -<td class="tdr">474</td> -<td class="tdr">86,076</td> -<td class="tdr">11,761</td> -<td class="tdr">7,315</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="9"></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="tdc tdpp" colspan="10">15th August, 1810.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Etat major, &c</td> -<td class="tdr">199</td> -<td class="tdr">222</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">3</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">202</td> -<td class="tdr">222</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">2d corps</td> -<td class="tdr">16,418</td> -<td class="tdr">2,894</td> -<td class="tdr">2,494</td> -<td class="tdr">397</td> -<td class="tdr">3,006</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">21,913</td> -<td class="tdr">1,969</td> -<td class="tdr">1,304</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">6th corps</td> -<td class="tdr">23,456</td> -<td class="tdr">2,496</td> -<td class="tdr">1,865</td> -<td class="tdr">577</td> -<td class="tdr">5,541</td> -<td class="tdr">193</td> -<td class="tdr">30,862</td> -<td class="tdr">1,701</td> -<td class="tdr">1,372</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">8th corps</td> -<td class="tdr">18,803</td> -<td class="tdr">1,959</td> -<td class="tdr">436</td> -<td class="tdr">169</td> -<td class="tdr">4,996</td> -<td class="tdr">98</td> -<td class="tdr">24,235</td> -<td class="tdr">2,016</td> -<td class="tdr">1,112</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Reserve of cavalry</td> -<td class="tdr">4,146</td> -<td class="tdr">4,322</td> -<td class="tdr">1,138</td> -<td class="tdr">831</td> -<td class="tdr">157</td> -<td class="tdr">31</td> -<td class="tdr">5,441</td> -<td class="tdr">4,907</td> -<td class="tdr">246</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Artillerie et genie et du siege</td> -<td class="tdr">2,724</td> -<td class="tdr">2,969</td> -<td class="tdr">205</td> -<td class="tdr">159</td> -<td class="tdr">409</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">3,339</td> -<td class="tdr">108</td> -<td class="tdr">3,128</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="9"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Total active army</td> -<td class="tdr">65,746</td> -<td class="tdr">15,862</td> -<td class="tdr">6,139</td> -<td class="tdr">2,119</td> -<td class="tdr">14,112</td> -<td class="tdr">302</td> -<td class="tdr">85,997</td> -<td class="tdr">10,815</td> -<td class="tdr">7,162</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">6th Government Valladolid. Division Serras</td> -<td class="tdr">12,693</td> -<td class="tdr">3,045</td> -<td class="tdr">639</td> -<td class="tdr">20</td> -<td class="tdr">1,775</td> -<td class="tdr">641</td> -<td class="tdr">15,107</td> -<td class="tdr">2,931</td> -<td class="tdr">134</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Asturias et St. Ander. Bonet</td> -<td class="tdr">12,913</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">1,394</td> -<td class="tdr">15</td> -<td class="tdr">1,578</td> -<td class="tdr">107</td> -<td class="tdr">14,885</td> -<td class="tdr">434</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="9"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Total under Massena</td> -<td class="tdr">91,352</td> -<td class="tdr">18,907</td> -<td class="tdr">8,172</td> -<td class="tdr">2,154</td> -<td class="tdr">17,465</td> -<td class="tdr">1,050</td> -<td class="tdr">115,989</td> -<td class="tdr">13,746</td> -<td class="tdr">7,296</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">9th corps, Drouet Comte D’Erlon</td> -<td class="tdr">19,144</td> -<td class="tdr">2,436</td> -<td class="tdr">24</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">3,147</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">22,315</td> -<td class="tdr">2,436</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="9"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">General Total</td> -<td class="tdr">110,496</td> -<td class="tdr">21,343</td> -<td class="tdr">8,196</td> -<td class="tdr">2,154</td> -<td class="tdr">20,612</td> -<td class="tdr">1,050</td> -<td class="tdr">138,304</td> -<td class="tdr">16,616</td> -<td class="tdr">7,296</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="9"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p class="p2 center">Army of Portugal, 27th September, 1810. The 9th corps to the 15th -October.</p> - -<p class="p1 center">The reserve of cavalry, and the artillery of siege to the 1st September -only.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdc">Hosp.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3">Effective.       Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Cav.</td> -<td class="tdr">Draught.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Etat major</td> -<td class="tdr">192</td> -<td class="tdr">219</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">4</td> -<td class="tdr">196</td> -<td class="tdr">219</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">2d corps</td> -<td class="tdr">16,575</td> -<td class="tdr">2,921</td> -<td class="tdr">2,397</td> -<td class="tdr">287</td> -<td class="tdr">2,214</td> -<td class="tdr">21,186</td> -<td class="tdr">1,872</td> -<td class="tdr">1,336</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">6th do.</td> -<td class="tdr">23,224</td> -<td class="tdr">2,478</td> -<td class="tdr">1,708</td> -<td class="tdr">600</td> -<td class="tdr">5,418</td> -<td class="tdr">30,350</td> -<td class="tdr">1,730</td> -<td class="tdr">1,348</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">8th do.</td> -<td class="tdr">18,807</td> -<td class="tdr">2,958</td> -<td class="tdr">663</td> -<td class="tdr">140</td> -<td class="tdr">4,656</td> -<td class="tdr">24,126</td> -<td class="tdr">2,027</td> -<td class="tdr">1,071</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Reserve of cavalry</td> -<td class="tdr">4,146</td> -<td class="tdr">4,322</td> -<td class="tdr">1,138</td> -<td class="tdr">831</td> -<td class="tdr">157</td> -<td class="tdr">5,441</td> -<td class="tdr">4,907</td> -<td class="tdr">246</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Artilleries of siege</td> -<td class="tdr">3,022</td> -<td class="tdr">3,115</td> -<td class="tdr">206</td> -<td class="tdr">159</td> -<td class="tdr">409</td> -<td class="tdr">3,637</td> -<td class="tdr">146</td> -<td class="tdr">3,128</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Battalion of march which quitted Bayonne the 2d of October</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">474</td> -<td class="tdr">16</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">474</td> -<td class="tdr">16</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Total</td> -<td class="tdr">65,966</td> -<td class="tdr">16,013</td> -<td class="tdr">6,586</td> -<td class="tdr">2,033</td> -<td class="tdr">12,858</td> -<td class="tdr">85,410</td> -<td class="tdr">10,917</td> -<td class="tdr">7,129</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">9th corps</td> -<td class="tdr">19,062</td> -<td class="tdr">2,072</td> -<td class="tdr">413</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">3,516</td> -<td class="tdr">22,991</td> -<td class="tdr">1,755</td> -<td class="tdr">317</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Division Serras</td> -<td class="tdr">8,586</td> -<td class="tdr">1,015</td> -<td class="tdr">269</td> -<td class="tdr">35</td> -<td class="tdr">1,750</td> -<td class="tdr">10,605</td> -<td class="tdr">1,050</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Grand Total</td> -<td class="tdr">93,614</td> -<td class="tdr">19,100</td> -<td class="tdr">7,268</td> -<td class="tdr">2,068</td> -<td class="tdr">18,124</td> -<td class="tdr">119,006</td> -<td class="tdr">13,722</td> -<td class="tdr">7,446</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_569"></a>[569]</span></p> - -<p class="p2 center">Army of Portugal—1st January, 1811.</p> - -<p class="p1 center">Head-quarters, Torres Novas.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="9">2d Corps, Head-quarters Santarem.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"> </td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdc">Hosp.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3">Effective.     Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Cav. Draught.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Merle’s division, 9 battalions</td> -<td class="tdr">4,368</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">150</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">1,549</td> -<td class="tdr">6,067</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Heudelet’s do. 12 do.</td> -<td class="tdr">5,718</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">451</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">2,646</td> -<td class="tdr">8,815</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Lt. cavalry, Soult, 15 squadrons</td> -<td class="tdr">1,146</td> -<td class="tdr">993</td> -<td class="tdr">523</td> -<td class="tdr">537</td> -<td class="tdr">231</td> -<td class="tdr">1,900</td> -<td class="tdr">1,530</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Artillery and engineers</td> -<td class="tdr">1,284</td> -<td class="tdr">1,121</td> -<td class="tdr">52</td> -<td class="tdr">9</td> -<td class="tdr">189</td> -<td class="tdr">1,425</td> -<td class="tdr">112</td> -<td class="tdr">1,018</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">Total</td> -<td class="tdr">12,516</td> -<td class="tdr">2,114</td> -<td class="tdr">1,176</td> -<td class="tdr">546</td> -<td class="tdr">4,515</td> -<td class="tdr">18,207</td> -<td class="tdr">1,642</td> -<td class="tdr">1,018</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc tdpp" colspan="9">6th Corps, Thomar.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Marchand, 11 battalions</td> -<td class="tdr">4,987</td> -<td class="tdr">28</td> -<td class="tdr">529</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">1,121</td> -<td class="tdr">6,637</td> -<td class="tdr">28</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Mermet’s, 11 do.</td> -<td class="tdr">6,252</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">743</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">1,077</td> -<td class="tdr">8,104</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Loison, 12 do.</td> -<td class="tdr">4,589</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">1,037</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">3,291</td> -<td class="tdr">8,917</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Light cavalry, Lamotte, 7 squadrons</td> -<td class="tdr">652</td> -<td class="tdr">651</td> -<td class="tdr">663</td> -<td class="tdr">663</td> -<td class="tdr">117</td> -<td class="tdr">1,432</td> -<td class="tdr">1,314</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Artillery and engineers, 28 companies</td> -<td class="tdr">1,769</td> -<td class="tdr">1,372</td> -<td class="tdr">47</td> -<td class="tdr">78</td> -<td class="tdr">165</td> -<td class="tdr">1,981</td> -<td class="tdr">52</td> -<td class="tdr">1,398</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">Total</td> -<td class="tdr">18,272</td> -<td class="tdr">2,051</td> -<td class="tdr">3,019</td> -<td class="tdr">741</td> -<td class="tdr">5,771</td> -<td class="tdr">27,094</td> -<td class="tdr">1,394</td> -<td class="tdr">1,398</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc tdpp" colspan="9">8th Corps, Pernes.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Clausel, 11 battalions</td> -<td class="tdr">4,007</td> -<td class="tdr">18</td> -<td class="tdr">484</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">3,989</td> -<td class="tdr">8,627</td> -<td class="tdr">18</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Solignac, 14 do.</td> -<td class="tdr">4,997</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">1,953</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">3,337</td> -<td class="tdr">10,346</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">St. Croix’s dragoons, 12 squadrons</td> -<td class="tdr">981</td> -<td class="tdr">1,024</td> -<td class="tdr">698</td> -<td class="tdr">698</td> -<td class="tdr">238</td> -<td class="tdr">1,917</td> -<td class="tdr">1,722</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Artillery and engineers</td> -<td class="tdr">1,106</td> -<td class="tdr">859</td> -<td class="tdr">24</td> -<td class="tdr">4</td> -<td class="tdr">359</td> -<td class="tdr">1,522</td> -<td class="tdr">151</td> -<td class="tdr">712</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">On leave</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">206</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">Total</td> -<td class="tdr">11,108</td> -<td class="tdr">1,901</td> -<td class="tdr">3,159</td> -<td class="tdr">702</td> -<td class="tdr">7,956</td> -<td class="tdr">22,605</td> -<td class="tdr">1,191</td> -<td class="tdr">712</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc tdpp" colspan="9">Montbrun, Ourem.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Reserve of cavalry 24 squadrons with artillery</td> -<td class="tdr">2,729</td> -<td class="tdr">2,871</td> -<td class="tdr">1,486</td> -<td class="tdr">1,466</td> -<td class="tdr">178</td> -<td class="tdr">4,533</td> -<td class="tdr">4,337</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Artillery, engineers, and equipage of the army</td> -<td class="tdr">1,546</td> -<td class="tdr">614</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">283</td> -<td class="tdr">2,090</td> -<td class="tdr">614</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="9">9th Corps, Leiria.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Claparede,<br />15 battalions,<br />Almeida</td> -<td class="tdr">7,863</td> -<td class="tdr">11</td> -<td class="tdr">369</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">432</td> -<td class="tdr">8,714</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Couroux,<br />12 battalions,<br />Leiria</td> -<td class="tdr">7,592</td> -<td class="tdr">27</td> -<td class="tdr">447</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">1,299</td> -<td class="tdr">9,338</td> -<td class="tdr">27</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Fournier’s cavalry,<br />7 squadrons<br />at Toro</td> -<td class="tdr">1,698</td> -<td class="tdr">1,591</td> -<td class="tdr">60</td> -<td class="tdr">67</td> -<td class="tdr">114</td> -<td class="tdr">1,872</td> -<td class="tdr">1,658</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Artillery and engineers,<br />Ciudad Rodrigo</td> -<td class="tdr">670</td> -<td class="tdr">464</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">72</td> -<td class="tdr">742</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">464</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">Total</td> -<td class="tdr">17,823</td> -<td class="tdr">2,093</td> -<td class="tdr">876</td> -<td class="tdr">139</td> -<td class="tdr">2,637</td> -<td class="tdr">19,924</td> -<td class="tdr">2,149</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p><em>Note.</em>—Salamanca constituted a government containing the towns of -Alba de Tormes, Penaranda, and Salamanca, in which were deposited -the sick men, stragglers, equipages, and depôts, of the army of Portugal. -The total amounting to 2,354 men and 1,102 horses.</p> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_570"></a>[570]</span></p> - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr padr4" colspan="2">Present under arms.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">General Total of the army of Portugal in the<br />position of Santarem</td> -<td class="tdr">46,171</td> -<td class="tdr">9,551</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">9th Corps</td> -<td class="tdr">17,823</td> -<td class="tdr">2,093</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">63,994</td> -<td class="tdr">11,644</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Deduct troops of the 9th corps not in Portugal</td> -<td class="tdr">10,231</td> -<td class="tdr">2,066</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Real numbers under Massena</td> -<td class="tdr">53,763</td> -<td class="tdr">9,578</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p class="p2 center">Army of Portugal—1st April, 1811.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdr padr4" colspan="3">Under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdr">Hosp.</td> -<td class="tdr">Effective.</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">8th corps, Junot</td> -<td class="tdr">13,448</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">992</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">5,719</td> -<td class="tdr">20,159</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">6th do. Marmont</td> -<td class="tdr">13,984</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">1,374</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">1,576</td> -<td class="tdr">16,934</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">2d corps, Reynier</td> -<td class="tdr">10,837</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">1,350</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">4,318</td> -<td class="tdr">16,505</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Montbrun</td> -<td class="tdr" colspan="7"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">{ Dragoon, 23 squadrons</td> -<td class="tdr">4,173</td> -<td class="tdr">4,404</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">4,173</td> -<td class="tdr">4,404</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">{ Light cavalry, 14 squadrons</td> -<td class="tdr">3,636</td> -<td class="tdr">3,906</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">38</td> -<td class="tdr">3,636</td> -<td class="tdr">3,906</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">{ 1 squadron of gens-d’armes</td> -<td class="tdr">190</td> -<td class="tdr">72</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">5</td> -<td class="tdr">102</td> -<td class="tdr">72</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<table class="p2 autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdr padr4" colspan="3">Under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdr">Hosp.</td> -<td class="tdr">Effective.</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Artillery and Engineers</td> -<td class="tdr" colspan="6"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">{ Foot artillery.<br />Almeida and Rodrigo</td> -<td class="tdr">936</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">88</td> -<td class="tdr">1,055</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">{ Horse artillery</td> -<td class="tdr">410</td> -<td class="tdr">425</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">23</td> -<td class="tdr">453</td> -<td class="tdr">425</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">{ Artillery of the train</td> -<td class="tdr">2,181</td> -<td class="tdr">2,378</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">237</td> -<td class="tdr">2,448</td> -<td class="tdr">2,378</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">{ Workmen</td> -<td class="tdr">259</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">25</td> -<td class="tdr">295</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">{ Engineers</td> -<td class="tdr">1,448</td> -<td class="tdr">60</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">140</td> -<td class="tdr">1,623</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">{ Military equipage</td> -<td class="tdr">596</td> -<td class="tdr">897</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">60</td> -<td class="tdr">668</td> -<td class="tdr">897</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="7"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Total artilleries, engineers, &c.</td> -<td class="tdr">5,969</td> -<td class="tdr">3,335</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">573</td> -<td class="tdr">6,542</td> -<td class="tdr">2,760</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Total of infantry</td> -<td class="tdr">37,269</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">3,716</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">11,613</td> -<td class="tdr">53,598</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Total of cavalry</td> -<td class="tdr">7,999</td> -<td class="tdr">8,382</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">43</td> -<td class="tdr">7,911</td> -<td class="tdr">8,382</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="7"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">General Total</td> -<td class="tdr">51,237</td> -<td class="tdr">11,717</td> -<td class="tdr">3,716</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">12,229</td> -<td class="tdr">68,051</td> -<td class="tdr">11,142</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="7"></td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p><em>Note.</em>—In the imperial rolls there was no state of the army of Portugal -for May. Two divisions of the 9th corps, directed to be added to the -army of Portugal, are included in the state for April, and the prince of -Esling was empowered to distribute the cavalry as he pleased, provided -the brigade of general Fournier, from the 9th corps, was kept in the -reserve. The detached men were in the government of Salamanca. On -the 1st of June, however, the army of Portugal is returned as present -under arms 44,548 men, 7,253 horses, and 4,620 men detached. Hence, -I have estimated the number of fighting men and officers, including the -imperial guards, at Fuentes Onoro at 45,000, a number, perhaps, too -great, when the artificers, engineers, &c. are deducted.</p> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p class="p3 center lht2 lsp2">SECTION 3.—ARMY OF THE SOUTH, SOULT, DUKE OF DALMATIA, COMMANDING.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdr padr4" colspan="3">Under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdr">Hosp.</td> -<td class="tdr">Effective.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Cav.</td> -<td class="tdr">Draught.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">1st of January</td> -<td class="tdr">55,602</td> -<td class="tdr">12,092</td> -<td class="tdr">5,744</td> -<td class="tdr">1,999</td> -<td class="tdr">6,412</td> -<td class="tdr">67,758</td> -<td class="tdr">10,868</td> -<td class="tdr">3,223</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">15th May</td> -<td class="tdr">75,133</td> -<td class="tdr">13,124</td> -<td class="tdr">3,915</td> -<td class="tdr">1,336</td> -<td class="tdr">11,420</td> -<td class="tdr">90,468</td> -<td class="tdr">12,156</td> -<td class="tdr">2,304</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="8">Deduct the troops of the 9th corps in march from the north</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">11,917</td> -<td class="tdr">1,619</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">13,310</td> -<td class="tdr">1,220</td> -<td class="tdr">399</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="8">Real total of the army of the South</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">63,216</td> -<td class="tdr">11,505</td> -<td class="tdr">3,915</td> -<td class="tdr">1,336</td> -<td class="tdr">11,420</td> -<td class="tdr">77,158</td> -<td class="tdr">10,936</td> -<td class="tdr">1,905</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_571"></a>[571]</span></p> -<p class="p3 center">SECTION 4.</p> - -<p class="p2 center">5th Corps, 15th January.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80 tabw80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdr">Under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Detached.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">18,766</td> -<td class="tdr">6,158</td> -<td class="tdr">3,035</td> -<td class="tdr">640</td> -</tr> -</table> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p>16th December, 1810, le Duc de Dalmatie, va faire le siège de Badajos, -avec tout le 5<sup>em</sup> corps d’armée, 8 régimens de cavalerie formant 2,600 -chevaux pris dans les l<sup>ere</sup> et 5<sup>em</sup> corps d’armée sous les orders de general -Latour Maubourg, 900 hommes du 63<sup>em</sup> regiment de ligne, 2 compagnies -d’artillerie légère, 4 compagnies de sappeurs, 1 compagnie de -mineurs, et trois escadrons de cavalerie Espagnols.</p> - </div> - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p class="p3 center">SECTION 5.</p> - -<p class="p1 center">1st Corps before Cadiz.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdr padr4" colspan="3">Under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdr">Hosp.</td> -<td class="tdr">Effective.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Cav.</td> -<td class="tdr">Train.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">15th February, 1811</td> -<td class="tdr">20,572</td> -<td class="tdr">1,886</td> -<td class="tdr">1,331</td> -<td class="tdr">681</td> -<td class="tdr">1,254</td> -<td class="tdr">23,457</td> -<td class="tdr">1,495</td> -<td class="tdr">1,072</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="9">Reinforcement on the march from the Governments</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">5,209</td> -<td class="tdr">775</td> -<td class="tdr">”</td> -<td class="tdr">”</td> -<td class="tdr">743</td> -<td class="tdr">5,952</td> -<td class="tdr">712</td> -<td class="tdr">62</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">Total</td> -<td class="tdr">25,781</td> -<td class="tdr">2,661</td> -<td class="tdr">1,331</td> -<td class="tdr">681</td> -<td class="tdr">1,997</td> -<td class="tdr">29,409</td> -<td class="tdr">2,407</td> -<td class="tdr">1,035</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="9"> </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">4th corps, 15th Feb.</td> -<td class="tdr">16,706</td> -<td class="tdr">4,007</td> -<td class="tdr">741</td> -<td class="tdr">397</td> -<td class="tdr">1,699</td> -<td class="tdr">19,143</td> -<td class="tdr">3,618</td> -<td class="tdr">793</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="9">Reinforcement on the march from the Governments</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">6,620</td> -<td class="tdr">1,457</td> -<td class="tdr">”</td> -<td class="tdr">”</td> -<td class="tdr">878</td> -<td class="tdr">6,854</td> -<td class="tdr">1,451</td> -<td class="tdr">”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">Total</td> -<td class="tdr">22,726</td> -<td class="tdr">5,464</td> -<td class="tdr">741</td> -<td class="tdr">397</td> -<td class="tdr">2,577</td> -<td class="tdr">25,998</td> -<td class="tdr">5,069</td> -<td class="tdr">793</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p><em>Note.</em>—A reinforcement of more than one thousand men likewise -joined the 5th corps while in front of Badajos.</p> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p class="p3 center lht lsp2">SECTION 6.—ARMY OF THE NORTH—BESSIERES, DUKE OF ISTRIA, COMMANDING.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdr padr4" colspan="3">Under arms.</td> -<td class="tdr">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdr">Hosp.</td> -<td class="tdr">Effective.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Cav.</td> -<td class="tdr">Train.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">1st February, 1811</td> -<td class="tdr">58,515</td> -<td class="tdr">8,874</td> -<td class="tdr">1,992</td> -<td class="tdr">6,860</td> -<td class="tdr">67,767</td> -<td class="tdr">7,979</td> -<td class="tdr">1,079</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bt" colspan="7"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">15th April, 1811</td> -<td class="tdr">53,148</td> -<td class="tdr">6,930</td> -<td class="tdr">2,221</td> -<td class="tdr">5,350</td> -<td class="tdr">60,719</td> -<td class="tdr">6,065</td> -<td class="tdr">879</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_572"></a>[572]</span></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p3 center lht lsp2">SECTION 7.—ARMÉE IMPÉRIALE DU MIDI DE L’ESPAGNE 1<sup>me</sup> CORPS.</p> - -<p class="p1 center">Situation des présens sous les armes à l’époque du 22d Mars 1811.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr class="fs90"> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Etat des</td> -<td class="tdr">Dans les</td> -<td class="tdl"> Emplacement des Troupes</td> -<td class="tdl">Dispos-</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr class="fs90"> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">presens</td> -<td class="tdr">Forts et</td> -<td class="tdl pad3">dans les Forts et Redoutes.</td> -<td class="tdr">eables.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr class="fs90"> -<td class="tdl pad3">Designation des</td> -<td class="tdr">sous les</td> -<td class="tdr">  Redoutes.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr class="fs90"> -<td class="tdl">Division    Regimens        </td> -<td class="tdr">armes.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl tdpp">Division 1.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">9<sup>me</sup> Infantrie ligne</td> -<td class="tdr">1,000</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">1,000</td> -<td class="tdl">Sta Maria.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">24<sup>me</sup> do. do.</td> -<td class="tdr">800</td> -<td class="tdr">400</td> -<td class="tdl">Depuis et compris le Fort St. Catherine jusqu’au Rio St. Petro</td> -<td class="tdr">400</td> -<td class="tdl">Do.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">96<sup>me</sup> do. do.</td> -<td class="tdr">1,100</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">1,100</td> -<td class="tdl">Do. San Lucar, Esta, Chipiona, la Viala Atta.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl tdpp">Division 2.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">16<sup>me</sup> do. do.</td> -<td class="tdr">350</td> -<td class="tdr">350</td> -<td class="tdl">Xeres et la Cartuxa</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">8<sup>me</sup> do. do.</td> -<td class="tdr">713</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">713</td> -<td class="tdl">Port Reale au Trocadero.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">45<sup>me</sup> do. do.</td> -<td class="tdr">1,072</td> -<td class="tdr">744</td> -<td class="tdl">Depuis et compris le Fort Napoleon jusqu’à Chiese fe</td> -<td class="tdr">328</td> -<td class="tdl">Port Reale.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">54<sup>me</sup> do. do.</td> -<td class="tdr">820</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">820</td> -<td class="tdl">Chiclana.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">Bataillon d’Elite</td> -<td class="tdr">236</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">236</td> -<td class="tdl">Do.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl tdpp">Division 3.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">27<sup>me</sup> Infantrie ligne</td> -<td class="tdr">1,400</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">1,400</td> -<td class="tdl">Do.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">63<sup>me</sup> do. do.</td> -<td class="tdr">845</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">845</td> -<td class="tdl">Port Reale.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">94<sup>me</sup> do. do.</td> -<td class="tdr">1,500</td> -<td class="tdr">650</td> -<td class="tdl">Depuis et compris la Redoute jusqu’à cette de Vellati</td> -<td class="tdr">850</td> -<td class="tdl">Chiclana.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">95<sup>me</sup> do. do.</td> -<td class="tdr">1,414</td> -<td class="tdr">472</td> -<td class="tdl">Arcos, Medina, Vejer, et Conil</td> -<td class="tdr">942</td> -<td class="tdl">Do.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl tdpp">Régiment de Marine.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">43<sup>me</sup> Battalions de marine</td> -<td class="tdr">900</td> -<td class="tdr">900</td> -<td class="tdl">Au Trocadero</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">2<sup>e</sup> do. d’Ouvriers do.</td> -<td class="tdr">615</td> -<td class="tdr">615</td> -<td class="tdl">Do.</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">5<sup>e</sup> Chasseurs</td> -<td class="tdr">320</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">320</td> -<td class="tdl">Vejer et Conil.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl tdpp">Cavalrie.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">1<sup>e</sup> de Dragoons</td> -<td class="tdr">230</td> -<td class="tdr">50</td> -<td class="tdl">De Montesà, Alcazar de Xeres</td> -<td class="tdr">180</td> -<td class="tdl">Xeres.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">2<sup>e</sup> do. do.</td> -<td class="tdr">218</td> -<td class="tdr">72</td> -<td class="tdl">Do. et à la Cartuxa</td> -<td class="tdr">146</td> -<td class="tdl">Arcos.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl tdpp">Artillerie</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">à pied à Cheval</td> -<td class="tdr">678</td> -<td class="tdr">500</td> -<td class="tdl">Sur la ligne du Blocas</td> -<td class="tdr">178</td> -<td class="tdl">Santa Maria, Puerto Reale, et Chiclana.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">Sapeurs</td> -<td class="tdr">323</td> -<td class="tdr">323</td> -<td class="tdl">Au Trocadero</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">Mineurs</td> -<td class="tdr">77</td> -<td class="tdr">77</td> -<td class="tdl">Do.</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">14,611</td> -<td class="tdr">5,153</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">9,458</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -</table> - </div> - -<p>By this return, which is not extracted from the imperial rolls, but -was found amongst Colonel Lejeune’s intercepted papers, it appears -that Victor had above nine thousand disposable troops seventeen days -after the battle of Barosa. He must, therefore, have had about eleven -thousand disposable before that action, and Cassagne’s detachment -being deducted leaves about nine thousand for the battle of Barosa.</p> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_573"></a>[573]</span></p> - -<p class="p3 center lht lsp2">SECTION 8.—STATE OF THE BRITISH AND GERMAN TROOPS -ON THE COA, 25TH APRIL, 1811, EXTRACTED FROM -THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S RETURNS.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">Under arms.</td> -<td class="tdr">Sick.</td> -<td class="tdr">Detached.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Cavalry 4 regiments</td> -<td class="tdr">1,525</td> -<td class="tdr">274</td> -<td class="tdr">542</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Infantry 41 battalions</td> -<td class="tdr">20,700</td> -<td class="tdr">8,880</td> -<td class="tdr">3,214</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Artillery</td> -<td class="tdr">1,378</td> -<td class="tdr">144</td> -<td class="tdr">1,156</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">Total of all arms</td> -<td class="tdr">23,613</td> -<td class="tdr">9,298</td> -<td class="tdr">4,912</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Guns       24 British, 18 Portuguese     Total</td> -<td class="tdr">42</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p><em>Note.</em>—There are no separate returns of the army engaged in the -battle of Fuentes Onoro. Hence, the above is only an approximation to -the numbers of British and German troops; but if the Portuguese and -the Partida of Julian Sanchez be added, the whole number in line will -be about thirty-five thousand men of all arms.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="No_II">No. II.</h3> - -<p class="p2 lht lsp2 center">EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON -TO LORD LIVERPOOL.</p> - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 1.</p> - - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>November 30, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“I enclose copies and extracts of a correspondence which I -have had with Mr. Frere on the subject of the co-operation of the -British army with the corps of the duke of Albuquerque and the -duke Del Parque in this plan of diversion.</p> - -<p>“Adverting to the opinion which I have given to his majesty’s -ministers and the ambassador at Seville, it will not be supposed -that I could have encouraged the advance of general Areizaga, or -could have held out the prospect of any co-operation by the British -army.</p> - -<p>“The first official information which I had from the government -of the movement of general Areizaga was on the 18th, the -day before his defeat, and I gave the answer on the 19th regarding -the plan of which I now enclose a copy.</p> - -<p>“I was at Seville, however, when the general commenced his -march from the Sierra Morena, and in more than one conversation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_574"></a>[574]</span> -with the Spanish ministers and members of the Junta, I communicated -to them my conviction that general Areizaga would be -defeated. The expectation, however, of success from this large -army, stated to consist of fifty thousand men, was so general and -so sanguine that the possibility of disappointment was not even -contemplated, and, accordingly, your lordship will find that, on -the 10th only, the government began to think it necessary to -endeavour to make a diversion in favour of general Areizaga, and -it is probable that it was thought expedient to make this diversion -only in consequence of the fall of the general’s own hopes, after -his first trial with the enemy on the night of the 10th instant.”—“I -am anxious to cross the Tagus with the British army and to -station it on the frontiers of Old Castile, from thinking that the -point in which I can be of most use in preventing the enemy from -effecting any important object, and which best answers for my -future operations in the defence of Portugal. With this view, I -have requested Mr. Frere to urge the government to reinforce the -duke D’Albuquerque’s corps, in order to secure the passage of the -lower part of the Tagus. And, although the state of the season -would render it desirable that I should make the movement at an -early period, I do not propose to make it till I shall see most -clearly the consequences of that defeat, and some prospect that -the city of Seville will be secure after I shall move.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 2.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>December 7, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“——I had urged the Spanish government to augment the -army of the duke D’Albuquerque to twenty thousand men, in -order that it might occupy, in a sufficient manner, the passage of -the Tagus at Almaraz and the passes through the mountains leading -from Arzobispo to Truxillo, in which position they would have -covered effectually the province of Estremadura, during the winter -at least, and would have afforded time and leisure for preparations -for farther opposition to the enemy, and I delayed the movement, -which I have long been desirous of making, to the northward of -the Tagus, till the reinforcements could be sent to the duke -D’Albuquerque which I had lately recommended should be drawn -from the army of the duke Del Parque. During the discussions -upon the subject, the government have given orders to the duke -D’Albuquerque to retire with his corps behind the Guadiana, to a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_575"></a>[575]</span> -position which he cannot maintain, thus leaving open the road -into Estremadura, and incurring the risk of the loss of that province -whenever the enemy choose to take possession of it.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 3.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>January 31, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>“——There is no doubt that, if the enemy’s reinforcements -have not yet entered Spain, and are not considerably advanced -within the Spanish frontiers, the operation which they -have undertaken is one of some risk, and I have maturely considered -of the means of making a diversion in favour of the allies, -which might oblige the enemy to reduce his force in Andalusia, -and would expose him to risk and loss in this quarter. But the -circumstances, which are detailed in the enclosed copy of a letter -to M. Frere, have obliged me to refrain from attempting this -operation at present. I have not, however, given up all thoughts -of it, and I propose to carry it into execution hereafter, if circumstances -will permit.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 4.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>January 12, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>“My former despatch will have informed your lordship that I -was apprehensive that the Spanish troops in Estremadura would -not make any serious opposition to the progress which it was my -opinion the enemy would attempt to make in that province; but -as they had been directed to destroy the bridges on the Guadiana, -at Merida and Medellin, and preparations had been ordered for -that purpose, and to defend the passage of the Guadiana as long -as was practicable, I was in hopes that the enemy would have -been delayed at least for some days before he should be allowed to -pass that river. But I have been disappointed in that expectation, -and the town and bridge of Merida appear to have been given up -to an advanced guard of cavalry.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 5.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>January 19, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>“At the moment when the enemy entered Estremadura from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_576"></a>[576]</span> -Seville general Ballasteros received an order from the Regency, -dated the 21st December last, directing him to proceed with the -troops under his command into the Condada de Niebla. The -force in Estremadura was thus diminished by one-half, and the -remainder are considered insufficient to attempt the relief of the -troops in Olivenza.”</p> - -<p>“The circumstances which I have above related will show your -lordship that the military system of the Spanish nation is not -much improved, and that it is not very easy to combine or regulate -operations with corps so ill organised, in possession of so -little intelligence, and upon whose actions so little reliance can be -placed. It will scarcely be credited that the first intelligence -which general Mendizabel received of the assembly of the enemy’s -troops at Seville was from hence; and if any combination was -then made, either for retreat or defence, it was rendered useless, -or destroyed by the orders from the Regency, to detach general -Ballasteros into the Condado de Niebla, which were dated the 21st -of December, the very day on which Soult broke up from Cadiz, -with a detachment of infantry, and marched to Seville.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 6.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>February 2, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>“The various events of the war will have shown your lordship -that no calculation can be made on the result of any operation in -which the Spanish troops are engaged. But if the same number -of troops of any other nation (ten thousand) were to be employed -on this operation, (the opening the communication with Badajos,) -I should have no doubt of their success, or of their ability to -prevent the French from attacking Badajos with the forces which -they have now employed on this service.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 7.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>February 9, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>“General Mendizabel has not adhered to the plan which was -ordered by the late marquess De la Romana, which provided for -the security of the communication with Elvas before the troops -should be thrown to the left of the Guadiana. I don’t believe -that the strength of the enemy, on either side of the Guadiana,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_577"></a>[577]</span> -is accurately known, but if they should be in strength on the -right of that river, it is to be apprehended that the whole of the -troops will be shut up in Badajos, and I have reason to believe -that this place is entirely unprovided with provisions, notwithstanding -that the siege of it has been expected for the last year.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 8.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>February 23, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>“Although experience has taught me to place no reliance upon -the effect of the exertions of the Spanish troops, notwithstanding -the frequent instances of their bravery, I acknowledge that this -recent disaster has disappointed and grieved me much. The loss -of this army and its probable consequences, the fall of Badajos, -have materially altered the situation of the allies in this part of -the Peninsula, and it will not be an easy task to place them in -the situation in which they were, much less in that in which they -would have been, if that misfortune had not occurred. I am concerned -to add to this melancholy history, that the Portuguese -brigade of cavalry did not behave much better than the other -troops. Brigadier-general Madden did every thing in his power -to induce them to charge, but in vain.” “The operations of the -Guerillas continue throughout the interior; and I have proofs that -the political hostility of the people of Spain towards the enemy is -increasing rather than diminishing. But I have not yet heard of -any measure being adopted to supply the regular funds to pay and -support an army, or to raise one.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 9.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>March 21, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>“It (Campo Mayor) had been given over to the charge of the -marquis of Romana, at his request, last year. But, lately, the -Spanish garrison had been first weakened and then withdrawn, in -a manner not very satisfactory to me, nor consistent with the -honourable engagements to defend the place into which the marquis -entered when it was delivered over to his charge. I am -informed, however, that marshal Bessieres has collected at Zamora -about seven thousand men, composed principally of the imperial -guard, and of troops taken from all the garrisons in Castile. He<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_578"></a>[578]</span> -thus threatens an attack upon Gallicia, in which province there -are, I understand, sixteen thousand men under general Mahi; -but, from all I hear, I am apprehensive that that general will -make no defence, and that Gallicia will fall into the hands of the -enemy.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 10.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>May 7, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>“Your lordship will have observed, in my recent reports of -the state of the Portuguese force, that their numbers are much -reduced, and I don’t know what measure to recommend which -will have the effect of restoring them. All measures recommended -to the existing government in Portugal are either rejected, or are -neglected, or are so executed as to be of no use whatever; and -the countenance which the prince regent of Portugal has given to -the governors of the kingdom, who have uniformly manifested this -spirit of opposition to every thing proposed for the increase of the -resources of the government and the amelioration of their military -system, must tend to aggravate these evils. The radical defect, -both in Spain and Portugal, is want of money to carry on the -ordinary operations of the government, much more to defray the -expenses of such a war as that in which we are engaged.”</p> - -<p>“I have not received the consent of Castaños and Blake to -the plan of co-operation which I proposed for the siege of Badajos; -and I have been obliged to write to marshal Beresford to desire -him to delay the siege till they will positively promise to act as -therein specified, or till I can go to him with a reinforcement from -hence.”</p> - -<p>“Depend upon it that Portugal should be the foundation of all -your operations in the Peninsula, of whatever nature they may be, -upon which point I have never altered my opinion. If they are -to be offensive, and Spain is to be the theatre of them, your commander -must be in a situation to be entirely independent of all -Spanish authorities; by which means alone he will be enabled to -draw some resources from the country and some assistance from -the Spanish armies.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_579"></a>[579]</span></p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 11.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>May 22, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>“On the night of the 15th instant I received, from marshal -sir William Beresford, letters of the 12th and 13th instant, which -reported that marshal Soult had broken up from Seville about the -10th, and had advanced towards Estremadura, notwithstanding -the reports which had been previously received, that he was -busily occupied in strengthening Seville, and the approaches to -that city, by works, and that all his measures indicated an intention -to remain on the defensive in Andalusia.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 12.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Letter from sir J. Moore to major-general M’Kenzie, commanding -in Portugal.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 right"><em>Salamanca, 29th November, 1808.</em></p> - -<p class="allsmcap pad2 lsp">SIR,</p> - -<p>The armies of Spain, commanded by generals Castaños and -Blake, the one in Biscay and the other in Arragon, have been -beaten and dispersed. This renders my junction with sir David -Baird’s corps impracticable, but if it were, I cannot hope, with -the British alone, to withstand the formidable force which France -has brought against this country; and there is nothing else now -in Spain to make head against it.</p> - -<p>I have ordered sir David Baird to fall back on Coruña, re-embark, -and proceed to the Tagus; I myself, with the corps -which marched from Lisbon, mean to retire by Ciudad Rodrigo -or Almeida, and, by taking up such positions as offer, endeavour -to defend, for a time, the frontier of Portugal, and cover Lisbon. -But, looking forward that this cannot be done for any considerable -time against superior numbers, it becomes necessary for me to -give you this notice, that you may embark the stores of the army, -keeping on shore as little as possible that may impede a re-embarkation -of the whole army both now with you and that which -I am bringing.</p> - -<p>We shall have great difficulties on the frontier for subsistence; -colonel Murray wrote on this subject to colonel Donkin yesterday, -that supplies might be sent for us to Abrantes and Coimbra.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_580"></a>[580]</span> -Some are already at Oporto, and more may be sent. I have -desired sir D. Baird, if he has with him a victualler, of small -draft of water, to send her there. On the subject of provisions the -commissary-general will write more in detail, and I hope you will -use your influence with the government of Portugal to secure its -aid and assistance. It will be right to consider with the Portuguese -officers and engineers what points may be immediately strengthened -and are most defensible, and what use you can make of the -troops with you to support me in my defence of the frontiers, and -I shall be glad to hear from you upon this subject. I cannot yet -determine the line I shall take up, but generally it will be Almeida, -Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, Celerico, Viseu. The Portuguese, -on their own mountains, can be of much use, and I -should hope, at any rate, that they will defend the Tras os Montes. -Mr. Kennedy will probably write to Mr. Erskine, who now had -better remain at Lisbon; but, if he does not write to him, this, -together with colonel Murray’s letter to colonel Donkin, will be -sufficient for you and Mr. Erskine to take means for securing to -us not only a supply of biscuit and salt provisions, but the supplies -of the country for ourselves and horses, &c. In order to alarm -as little as possible, it may be said that more troops are expected -from England, to join us through Portugal: this will do at first, -but gradually the truth will, of course, be known. I am in great -want of money, and nothing else will secure the aid of the country.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr2">I have the honour to be, &c.</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">J. Moore</span>.<br /> -<span class="padr6">P.S. Elvas should be provisioned.</span></p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="No_III">No. III.</h3> - -<p class="p2 lht lsp2 center">EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF A -FIELD-OFFICER OF ENGINEERS, EMPLOYED AT CADIZ.</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 1.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>May 7, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>“We have at last broke ground for some works, but I am -almost at a loss to explain to you the cause of our delay. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_581"></a>[581]</span> -truth is, we left England so ill provided with tools and other requisites -for beginning works that till lately it has been positively -impossible to commence, even on a small scale, from our own -resources and number of men. These facts, with the backwardness -of the Spaniards to contribute either stores or workmen to the -general cause, has kept us so long inactive. We have now one -thousand three hundred men at work, and the Board of Ordnance -has supplied us with more tools.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 2.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>Isla, June 1, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>“We might defy the power of France to expel us by force -from hence if all were done that might be done, or even what is -projected, but we have only British troops at work on this important -position, and our numbers will not permit the progress -which the exigency of affairs requires.”—“We have in our -respected general (Graham) a confidence which is daily on the -increase. He has a mind and temper well adapted to encounter -difficulties which less favoured dispositions could not bear. We -may possibly maintain our ground. If we do, although our -success may have none of the brilliancy of victory, yet his merits, -who, by patience, prudence, and self-possession, shall have kept -all quiet within our lines, preserved tolerable harmony, and kept -an enterprizing enemy off with very inadequate means, should -be rewarded by his country’s good opinion, although none but -those who have witnessed can fully estimate the value of his -exertions. On the whole, our situation may be said to inspire -hope, though not security: to animate resistance, though not to -promise victory.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 3.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>June 29, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>“I have been attending a committee of Spanish engineers and -artillery officers, to settle some determinate plan for taking up the -ground near the town of La Isla; but they will enter into no -views which include the destruction of a house or garden. They -continue to propose nothing but advanced batteries upon the marsh -in front of the town, the evident object of which is to keep the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_582"></a>[582]</span> -shells of the enemy rather farther from the houses. At a general -attack, all this would be lost and carried, by small parties coming -in on the flanks and gorges. Instead of deepening the ditches -and constructing good redoubts at every seven hundred yards, this -is what they propose, although we offer to perform the labour for -them. On a barren spot they will agree to our working; but of -what service is one redoubt, if unsupported by a collateral defence, -and if a general system is not attended to. We have now been -here three months, and although they have been constantly urged -to construct something at that weak tongue of low land, St. -Petri, still nothing of importance is begun upon, nor do I imagine -they will agree to any work of strength at that point. I am -almost in despair of seeing this place strongly fortified, so as to -resist an army of from fifty to one hundred thousand men, which -I am convinced it is capable of.”—“We have now one thousand -three hundred labourers of the line and eighty carpenters, but, -for the latter, the timber we are supplied with from our ally, is -so bad that these artificers produce not more than one-fifth or one-sixth -what they would be capable of if the materials were good. -To judge from their conduct it is impossible to suppose them determined -to oppose a vigorous resistance even in La Isla, and I -have no idea of there ever being a siege of Cadiz itself.”—“Of -our seven subalterns of engineers two are generally ill; we are -obliged, therefore, to get assistance from the line. The consequence -is that the work is neither so well nor so speedily executed. -We ought to have many more (engineers). It is not economy in -the governments; and with Lord Wellington they have hardly any -with the army.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 lht lsp2 center">EXTRACTS FROM THE OFFICIAL ABSTRACT OF -MILITARY REPORTS FROM THE BRITISH COMMANDERS AT CADIZ.</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 4.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>General William Stewart, March 13, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>“The enemy’s force was supposed to be diminished, but no -advantage could be taken of it, on account of the inefficient state -of the Spanish troops.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_583"></a>[583]</span></p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>General Graham, March 26, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>“The isle of Leon required for its defence a larger force than -had been assigned. Its tenure was, in the then state of the -defences, very precarious.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>May, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>“General Blake, appointed to command the Spanish forces, -introduced some degree of activity and co-operation, in which the -Spaniards had been very deficient.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>October, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>“The progress made by the enemy at the Trocadero assumed -a very formidable character; while the Spaniards persisted in their -apathy, and neglected to fortify the most vulnerable points of -their line.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>General Graham to lord Liverpool, Cadiz, January 2, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>“——As far as the exertions of the British engineers and -soldiers under my command have been concerned, I have every -reason to be satisfied. I can by no means say the same of the -Spaniards, for, besides the reluctance with which some of the -most essential measures of the defence were agreed to, our people -were not permitted to carry into execution the plan for the intrenchment -of the left part of the Cortadura <ins class="corr" id="tn-583" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'de St. Fernado'"> -de St. Fernando</ins> until after much delay and very unpleasant contests.”</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="No_IV">No. IV.</h3> - -<p class="p2 lht lsp2 center">EXTRACTS FROM KING JOSEPH’S CORRESPONDENCE.</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 1.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>The duke of Santa Fé to the King, Paris, June 20, 1810.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 center">(Translation from the Spanish.)</p> - -<p>“Will your majesty believe that some politicians of Paris have -arrived at saying that in Spain there is preparing a new revolution, -very dangerous for the French; and they assert that the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_584"></a>[584]</span> -Spaniards attached to your majesty will rise against them. Let -your majesty consider if ever was heard a more absurd chimera, -and how prejudicial it might be to us if it succeeded in gaining -any credit. I hope that such an idea will not be believed by any -person of judgement, and that it will soon subside, being void of -probability.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 2.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Ministerial letter from the King to the marquis of Almenara.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 center">(Translation from the Spanish.)</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>September 21, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>“The impolitic violence of the military governors has attacked -not only men, and fields, and animals, but even the most sacred -things in the nation, as the memorials and the actions of families, -in whose preservation those only are interested to whom they -belong, and from which strangers cannot reap the least fruit. -In this class are the general archives of the kingdom, called the -archives of Simancas, which are found in the province of Valladolid, -the governor, Kellerman, has taken possession of them.” -“Those archives, from the time of their institution, for centuries -past, have contained the treaties of the kings since they -were known in Castile; also, ancient manuscripts of the kindred -of the princes, the descents and titles of families, pleadings in the -tribunals, decisions of the Cortes; in short, all that is publicly -interesting to the history of the nation, and privately to individuals.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 3.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>The Spanish secretary of state to the duke of Santa Fé.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>Madrid, September 12, 1812.</em></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p>“——Si l’Andalusie n’est pas entièrement pacifiée; si la -junte de Cadiz exista encore et si les Anglais y exercent leur -fatale influence, on doit l’attribuer en grande partie aux machinations, -et aux-trames ourdies par la junta et l’Angleterre au -moment où parvint à leur connaissance le décret du 8 Febrier, qui<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_585"></a>[585]</span> -établit des governmens militaire dans la Navarre, la Biscaye, -l’Arragon, et la Catalogne. Quelques governeur Françaises ayant -traité ces provinces comme si elles étaient absolument détachées de -la monarchie.”</p> - -<p>“——Mais combiens n’est il pas dementi par la conduite -de certains governeurs qui paraissent s’obstiner a prolonger l’insurrection -d’Espagne plutôt qu’a la soumettre! Car dans plusieurs -endroits on ne se contente pas d’exclure toute idée de l’autorité du -roi, en faisant administrer la justice au nom de l’empereur mais -ce qui est pire, on à exigé que les tribunaux civils de Valladolid -et de Palencia, pretassent serment de fidelité et d’obeisance à sa -majesté impériale comme si la nation Espagnole n’avoit pas de -roi.”</p> - </div> - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 4.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Memorial from the duke of Santa Fé and marquis of Almenara -to the prince of Wagram.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 center">(Translated from the Spanish.)</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>Paris, September 16, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>“——The decrees of his majesty the emperor are the same -for all the generals. The prince of Esling, who has traversed all -the provinces to the borders of Portugal, who appears to be -forming immense magazines, and has much greater necessities -than the governors of provinces, has applied to the Spanish prefects, -who have made the arrangements, and supplied him with -even more than he required; and this speaks in favour of the -Spanish people, for the prince of Esling receives the blessings of -the inhabitants of the provinces through which his troops pass. -Such is the effect of good order and humanity amongst a people -who know the rules of justice, and that war demands sacrifices, -but who will not suffer dilapidations and useless vexations.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_586"></a>[586]</span></p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 5.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Intercepted letter of comte de Casa Valencia, counsellor of -state, written to his wife, June 18, 1810.</em></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p>“Il y a six mois que l’on ne nous paie point, et nous perissons.</p> - -<p>“——Avant hier j’écrivis à Almenara lui peignant ma -situation et le pryant de m’accorder quelque argent pour vivre; -de me secourir, si non comme ministre, du moins comme ami. -Hier je restai trois heures dans son antichambre esperant un -reponse, je le vis enfin et elle fut qu’il n’avait rien.”</p> - -<p>“——Rien que la faim m’attend aujourd’hui.”</p> - </div> - -<hr class="tb" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="No_V">No. V.</h3> - -<p class="p2 lht lsp2 center">EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON.</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 1.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>Celerico, May 11, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>“——I observe that the minister Don Miguel Forjas considers -the inconvenience, on which I had the honour of addressing -you, as of ordinary occurrence, and he entertains no doubt that -inconveniences of this description will not induce me to desist from -making the movements which I might think the defence of the -country would require. It frequently happens that an army in -operation cannot procure the number of carriages which it requires, -either from the unwillingness of the inhabitants to supply -them, or from the deficiency of the number of carriages in the -country. But it has rarely happened that an army, thus unprovided -with carriages, has been obliged to carry on its operations -in a country in which there is literally no food, and in which, if -there was food, there is no money to purchase it; and, whenever -that has been the case, the army has been obliged to withdraw to -the magazines which the country had refused or been unable to -remove to the army. This is precisely the case of the allied -armies in this part of the country; and, however trifling the -difficulty may be deemed by the regency and the ministers, I consider<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_587"></a>[587]</span> -a starving army to be so useless in any situation, that I -shall certainly not pretend to hold a position or to make any -movement in which the food of the troops is not secured. I have -no doubt of the ability or of the willingness of the country to do -all that can be required of them, if the authority of the government -is properly exerted to force individuals to attend to their -public duties rather than to their private interests in this time of -trial. I have written this same sentiment to the government so -frequently, that they must be as tired of reading it as I am of -writing it. But if they expect that individuals of the lower -orders are to relinquish the pursuit of their private interests and -business to serve the public, and mean to punish them for any -omission in this important duty, they must begin with the higher -classes of society. These must be forced to perform their duty, -and no name, however illustrious, and no protection, however -powerful, should shield from punishment those who neglect the -performance of their duty to the public in these times. Unless -these measures are strictly and invariably followed, it is vain to -expect any serious or continued exertion in the country, and the -regency ought to be aware, from the sentiments of his majesty’s -government, which I have communicated to them that the continuance -of his majesty’s assistance depends not on the ability or -the inclination, but on the actual effectual exertions of the people -of Portugal in their own cause. I have thought it proper to -trouble you so much at length upon this subject, in consequence of -the light manner in which the difficulties which I had stated to -exist were noticed by Monsieur de Forjas. I have to mention, -however, that, since I wrote to you, although there exist several -causes of complaint of different kinds, and that some examples -must be made, we have received such assistance as has enabled -me to continue till this time in our positions, and I hope to be -able to continue as long as may be necessary. I concur entirely -in the measure of appointing a special commission to attend the -head quarters of the Portuguese army, and I hope that it will be -adopted without delay. I enclose a proclamation which I have -issued, which I hope will have some effect. It describes nearly -the crimes, or rather the omissions, of which the people may be -guilty in respect to the transport of the army; these may be as -follow:—1st, refusing to supply carts, boats, or beasts of burthen, -when required; 2dly, refusing to remove their articles or -animals out of the reach of the enemy; 3dly, disobedience of -the orders of the magistrates to proceed to and remain at any<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_588"></a>[588]</span> -station with carriages, boats, &c.; 4th, desertion from the service, -either with or without carriages, &c.; 5th, embezzlement of -provisions or stores which they may be employed to transport. -The crimes or omissions of the inferior magistrates may be classed -as follows:—1st, disobedience of the orders of their superiors; -2d, inactivity in the execution of them; 3d, receiving bribes, to -excuse certain persons from the execution of requisitions upon -them.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 2.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Lord Wellington to M. Forjas.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 right"><em>Gouvea, September 6, 1810.</em></p> - -<p class="allsmcap pad2 lsp">MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,</p> - -<p>I have received your letter of the 1st of this month, informing -me that you had placed before the government of this kingdom -my despatch of the 27th of August, announcing the melancholy -and unexpected news of the loss of Almeida, and that the government -had learned with sorrow that an accident unforeseen had -prevented my moving to succour the place, hoping, at the same -time, that the depression of the people, caused by such an event, -will soon vanish, by the quick and great successes which they -expect with certainty from the efforts of the army. I have already -made known to the government of the kingdom that the fall -of Almeida was unexpected by me, and that I deplored its loss -and that of my hopes, considering it likely to depress and afflict -the people of this kingdom. It was by no means my intention, -however, in that letter, to state whether it had or had not been -my intention to have succoured the place, and I now request -the permission of the government of the kingdom to say that, -much as I <ins class="corr" id="tn-588" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'wish to emove'"> -wish to remove</ins> the impression which this misfortune -has justly made on the public, I do not propose to alter the system -and plan of operations which have been determined, after the -most serious deliberation, as best adequate to further the general -cause of the allies, and, consequently, Portugal. I request the -government to believe that I am not insensible to the value of their -confidence as well as that of the public; as, also, that I am -highly interested in removing the anxiety of the public upon the -late misfortune; but I should forget my duty to my sovereign, to -the prince regent, and to the cause in general, if I should permit<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_589"></a>[589]</span> -public clamour or panic to induce me to change, in the smallest -degree, the system and plan of operations which I have adopted, -after mature consideration, and which daily experience shows to -be the only one likely to produce a good end.</p> - -<p class="right">(Signed) <span class="smcap pad3">Wellington</span>.</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 3.</p> - -<p class="p1 right"><em>Gouvea, September 7, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>——In order to put an end at once to these miserable -intrigues, I beg that you will inform the government that <em>I will -not stay</em> in the country, and that I will advise the king’s government -to withdraw the assistance which his majesty affords them, -if they interfere in any manner with the appointment of marshal -Beresford’s staff, for which he is responsible, or with the operations -of the army, or with any of the points which, with the -original arrangements with marshal Beresford, were referred exclusively -to his management. I propose, also, to report to his -majesty’s government, and refer to their consideration, what steps -ought to be taken, if the Portuguese government refuse or delay -to adopt the civil and political arrangements recommended by me, -and corresponding with the military operations which I am carrying -on. The preparatory measures for the destruction of, or -rather rendering useless the mills, were suggested by me long -ago, and marshal Beresford did not write to government upon -them till I had reminded him a second time of my wishes on the -subject. I now beg leave to recommend that these preparatory -measures may be adopted not only in the country between the -Tagus and the Mondego, laying north of Torres Vedras, as -originally proposed, but that they shall be forthwith adopted in all -parts of Portugal, and that the magistrates and others may be -directed to render useless the mills, upon receiving orders to do so -from the military officers. I have already adopted this measure -with success in this part of the country, and it must be adopted -in others in which it is probable that the enemy may endeavour to -penetrate; and it must be obvious to any person who will reflect -upon the subject, that it is only consistent with all the other -measures which, for the last twelve months, I have recommended -to government to impede and make difficult, and if possible prevent, -the advance and establishment of the enemy’s force in the -country. But it appears that the government have lately discovered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_590"></a>[590]</span> -that we are all wrong; they have become impatient for -the defeat of the enemy, and, in imitation of the Central Junta, -call out for a battle and early success. If I had had the power I -would have prevented the Spanish armies from attending to this -call; and if I had, the cause would now have been safe; and, -having the power now in my hands, I will not lose the only -chance which remains of saving the cause, by paying the smallest -attention to the senseless suggestions of the Portuguese government. -I acknowledge that I am much hurt at this change of -conduct in the government; and, as I must attribute it to the -persons recently introduced into the government, it affords additional -reason with me for disapproving of their nomination, and -I shall write upon the subject to the prince regent, if I should -hear any more of this conduct. I leave you to communicate the -whole or any part of this letter that you may think proper to the -regency.</p> - -<p class="right">(Signed) <span class="smcap pad3">Wellington.</span></p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 4.</p> - -<p class="p1 right"><em>Rio Mayor, October 6, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>——You will do me the favour to inform the regency, -and above all the principal Souza, that his majesty and the prince -regent having entrusted me with the command of their armies, and -likewise with the conduct of the military operations, I will not -suffer them, or any body else, to interfere with them. That I -know best where to station my troops, and where to make a stand -against the enemy, and I shall not alter a system formed upon -mature consideration, upon any suggestion of theirs. I am responsible -for what I do, and they are not; and I recommend to -them to look to the measures for which they are responsible, -which I long ago recommended to them, viz. to provide for the -tranquillity of Lisbon, and for the food of the army and of the -people, while the troops will be engaged with the enemy. As for -principal Souza, I beg you to tell him, from me, that I have had -no satisfaction in transacting the business of this country since -he has been a member of the government; that, being embarked -in a course of military operations, of which I hope to see the -successful termination, I shall continue to carry them on to the -end, but that no power on earth shall induce me to remain in the -Peninsula for one moment after I shall have obtained his majesty’s -leave to resign my charge, if principal Souza is to remain either<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_591"></a>[591]</span> -a member of the government or to continue at Lisbon. Either -he must quit the country or I will: and, if I should be obliged to -go, I shall take care that the world, or Portugal at least, and the -prince regent shall be made acquainted with my reasons. From -the letter of the 3d, which I have received from Monsieur Forjas, -I had hoped that the government was satisfied with what I had -done, and intended to do, and that, instead of endeavouring to -render all farther defence fruitless, by disturbing the minds of the -populace at Lisbon, they would have done their duty by adopting -measures to secure the tranquillity of the town; but I suppose -that, like other weak individuals, they add duplicity to their -weakness, and that their expressions of approbation, and even -gratitude, were intended to convey censure.</p> - -<p class="right smcap">Wellington.</p> - -<p>P.S.—All I ask from the Portuguese Regency is tranquillity in -the town of Lisbon, and provisions for their own troops while they -will be employed in this part of the country. I have but little -doubt of success; but, as I have fought a sufficient number of -battles to know that the result of any one is not certain, even -with the best arrangements, I am anxious that the government -should adopt preparatory arrangements, and take out of the -enemy’s way those persons and their families who would suffer if -they were to fall into their hands.</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 5.</p> - -<p class="p1 right"><em>Pero Negro, October 28, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>The cattle, and other articles of supply, which the government -have been informed have been removed from the island of -Lizirias, are still on the island, and most probably the secretary -of state, Don M. Forjas, who was at Alhandra yesterday, will -have seen them. I shall be glad to hear whether the government -propose to take any and what steps to punish the magistrates who -have disobeyed their orders and have deceived them by false reports. -The officers and soldiers of the militia, absent from their -corps, are liable to penalties and punishments, some of a civil, -others of a military nature: first, they are liable to a forfeiture of -all their personal property, upon information that they are absent -from their corps without leave; secondly, they are liable to be -transferred to serve as soldiers in the regiments of the line, upon<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_592"></a>[592]</span> -the same information; and, lastly, they are liable to the penalties -of desertion inflicted by the military tribunals. The two first are -penalties which depend upon the civil magistrate, and I should be -very glad to have heard of one instance in which the magistrates -of Lisbon, or in which the government had called upon the magistrates -at Lisbon to carry into execution the law in either of these -respects. I entreat them to call for the names of the officers and -soldiers absent without leave from any one of the Lisbon regiments -of militia, to disgrace any one or more of the principal officers, -in a public manner, for their shameful desertion of their posts in -the hour of danger, and to seize and dispose of the whole property -of the militia soldiers absent without leave, and to send -these men to serve with any of the regiments of the line. I -entreat them to adopt these measures without favour or distinction -of any individuals in respect to any one regiment, and to execute -the laws <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">bonâ fide</i> upon the subject; and I shall be satisfied of -their good intentions, and shall believe that they are sincerely -desirous of saving the country; but, if we are to go on as we -have hitherto, if Great Britain is to give large subsidies and to -expend large sums in support of a cause in which those most -interested sit by and take no part, and those at the head of the -government, with laws and powers to force the people to exertion -in the critical circumstances in which the country is placed, are -aware of the evil but neglect their duty and omit to put the laws -in execution, I must believe their professions to be false, that -they look to little dirty popularity instead of to save their country; -that they are unfaithful servants to their master, and persons in -whom his allies can place no confidence. In respect to the military -law, it may be depended upon that it will be carried into -execution, and that the day will yet come on which those military -persons who have deserted their duty in these critical times will -be punished as they deserve. The governors of the kingdom -forget the innumerable remonstrances which have been forwarded -to them on the defects in the proceedings of courts martial, which, -in times of active war, render them and their sentences entirely -nugatory. As an additional instance of these defects, I mention -that officers of the Olivera regiment of militia, who behaved ill in -the action with the enemy at Villa Nova de Fosboa, in the beginning -of August last, and a court martial was immediately -assembled for this trial, are still, in the end of October, under -trial, and the trial will, probably, not be concluded till Christmas. -In like manner, the military trial of those deserters of the militia,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_593"></a>[593]</span> -after assembling officers and soldiers at great inconvenience, for -the purpose cannot possibly be concluded till the period will have -gone by in which any benefit might be secured from the example -of the punishment of any one or number of them. The defect -in the administration of the military law has been repeatedly -pointed out to the government, and a remedy for the evil has been -proposed to them, and has been approved of by the Prince -Regent. But they will not adopt it; and it would be much better -if there was no law for the government of the army than that the -existing laws should continue without being executed.</p> - -<p class="smcap right">Wellington.</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 6.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>October 29, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>“——In answer to lord Wellesley’s queries respecting the -Portuguese Regency, my opinion is that the Regency ought to be -appointed by the Prince Regent, but during his pleasure; they -ought to have full power to act in every possible case, to make -appointments to offices, to dismiss from office, to make and alter -laws, in short, every power which the prince himself could -possess if he were on the spot. They ought to report, in detail, -their proceedings on every subject, and their reasons for the -adoption of every measure. The prince ought to decline to receive -any application from any of his officers or subjects in Portugal -not transmitted through the regular channels of the government -here, and ought to adopt no measure respecting Portugal -not recommended by the Regency. The smaller the number of -persons composing the Regency the better; but my opinion is -that it is not advisable to remove any of the persons now composing -it excepting principal Souza, with whom I neither can nor -will have any official intercourse. The patriarch is, in my -opinion, a necessary evil. He has acquired a kind of popularity -and confidence through the country which would increase if he -was removed from office, and he is the kind of man to do much -mischief if he was not employed. If we should succeed in removing -the principal (which <em>must</em> be done), I think the patriarch -will take warning, and will behave better in future. In respect to -military operations, there can be no interference on the part of -the Regency or any body else. If there is I can no longer be -responsible. If our own government choose to interfere themselves, -or that the Prince Recent should interfere, they have only<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_594"></a>[594]</span> -to give me their orders in detail, and I will carry them strictly -into execution, to the best of my abilities; and I will be responsible -for nothing but the execution; but, if I am to be responsible, -I must have full discretion and no interference on the part of the -Regency or any body else. I should like to see principal Souza’s -detailed instructions for his “<i lang="es" xml:lang="es">embuscados</i>” on the left bank of the -Tagus. If principal Souza does not go to England, or somewhere -out of Portugal, the country will be lost. The time we -lose in discussing matters which ought to be executed immediately, -and in the wrong direction given to the deliberations of the government, -is inconceivable. The gentlemen destined for the Alemtejo -ought to have been in the province on the evening of the 24th, -but, instead of that, three valuable days of fine weather will have -been lost because the government do not choose to take part in -our arrangements, which, however undeniably beneficial, will not -be much liked by those whom it will affect; although it is certain -that, sooner or later, these persons must and will be ruined, by leaving -behind them all their valuable property, and, as in the case of -this part of the country, every thing which can enable the enemy -to remain in the country. In answer to Mr. de Forjas’ note of -the 22d, enclosed in yours, (without date,) I have to say that I -know of no carriages employed by the British army excepting by -the commissary-general, and none are detained that I know of. -I wish that the Portuguese governors, or its officers, would state -the names of those who have detained carriages, contrary to my -repeated orders; or the regiment, or where they are stationed; -but this they will never do. All that we do with the carriages is -to send back sick in them, when there are any. It will not -answer to make an engagement that the wheel-carriages from -Lisbon shall not come farther than Bucellas, Montachique, &c. -many articles required by the army cannot be carried by mules, -and the carriages must come on with them here. In many cases -the Portuguese troops in particular are ill provided with mules, -therefore this must be left to the commissary-general of the -army, under a recommendation to him, if possible, not to send -the Lisbon wheel-carriages beyond the places above mentioned. I -wish, in every case, that a regulation made should be observed, -and the makers of regulations should take care always to frame -them as that they can be observed, which is the reason of my -entering so particularly into this point.”</p> - -<p class="smcap right">“Wellington.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_595"></a>[595]</span></p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 7.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>Pero Negro, October 31, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>“——I am glad that the gentlemen feel my letters, and I -hope that they will have the effect of inducing them to take some -decided steps as well regarding the provisions in the Alemtejo as -the desertion of the militia. The <em>ordenanza</em> artillery now begin -to desert from the works although they are fed by us with English -rations and taken care of in the same manner as our own troops. -Your note, No.—, of 29th, is strictly true in all its parts, the -French could not have staid here a week if all the provisions had -been removed, and the length of time they can now stay depends -upon the quantity remaining of what they have found in places -from which there existed means of removing every thing, if the -quantity had been ten times greater. They are stopped effectually; -in front all the roads are occupied, and they can get -nothing from their rear; but all the military arrangements which -have been made are useless if they can find subsistence on the -ground which they occupy. For what I know to the contrary, -they may be able to maintain their position till the whole French -army is brought to their assistance. It is heart-breaking to contemplate -the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly!”</p> - -<p class="smcap right">“Wellington.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 8.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>Pero Negro, November 1, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>“I have no doubt that the government can produce volumes of -papers to prove that they gave orders upon the several subjects to -which the enclosures relate, but it would be very desirable if they -would state whether any magistrate or other person has been -punished for not obeying those orders. The fact is that the -government, after the appointment of principal Souza to be a -member of the Regency, conceived that the war could be maintained -upon the frontier, contrary to the opinion of myself and of -every military officer in the country, and, instead of giving positive -orders preparatory to the event which was most likely to -occur, viz. that the allied army would retire, they spent much -valuable time in discussing, with me, the expediency of a measure -which was quite impracticable, and omitted to give the orders -which were necessary for the evacuation of the country between<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_596"></a>[596]</span> -the Tagus and the Mondego by the inhabitants. Then, when -convinced that the army would retire, they first imposed that -duty on me, although they must have known that I was ignorant -of the names, the nature of the offices, the places of abode of -the different magistrates who were to superintend the execution of -the measure, and, moreover, I have but one gentleman in my -family to give me any assistance in writing the Portuguese language, -and they afterwards issued the orders themselves, still -making them referable to me, without my knowledge or consent, -and still knowing that I had no means whatever of communicating -with the country, and they issued them at the very period when -the enemy was advancing from Almeida. If I had not been able -to stop the enemy at Busaco he must have been in his present -situation long before the order could have reached those to whom -it was addressed. All this conduct was to be attributed to the -same cause, a desire to avoid to adopt a measure which, however -beneficial to the real interests of the country, was likely to disturb -the habits of indolence and ease of the inhabitants, and to -throw the odium of the measure upon me and upon the British -government. I avowed, in my proclamation, that I was the -author of that measure, and the government might have sheltered -themselves under that authority, but the principle of the government -has lately been to seek for popularity, and they will not aid -in any measure, however beneficial to the real interests of the -country, which may be unpopular with the mob of Lisbon. I -cannot agree in the justice of the expression of the astonishment -by the secretary of state that the measure should have been executed -in this part of the country at all. The same measure was -carried into complete execution in Upper Beira, notwithstanding -that the army was in that province, and the means of transport -were required for its service, not a soul remained, and, excepting -at Coimbra, to which town my personal authority and influence -did not reach, not an article of any description was left behind; -and all the mills upon the Coa and Mondego, and their dependent -streams, were rendered useless. But there were no discussions -there upon the propriety of maintaining the war upon the frontier. -The orders were given, and they were obeyed in time, and the -enemy suffered accordingly. In this part of the country, notwithstanding -the advantage of having a place of security to retire -to, notwithstanding the advantage of water-carriage, notwithstanding -that the Tagus was fordable in many places at the period -when the inhabitants should have passed their property to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_597"></a>[597]</span> -left of the river, and fortunately filled at the moment the enemy -approached its banks; the inhabitants have fled from their habitations -as they would have done under any circumstances, without -waiting orders from me or from the government; but they -have left behind them every thing which could be useful to the -enemy, and could subsist their army, and all the mills untouched; -accordingly, the enemy still remain in our front, notwithstanding -that their communication is cut off with Spain and with every -other military body; and if the provisions which they have found -will last, of which I can have no knowledge, they may remain -till they will be joined by the whole French army in Spain. -I believe that in Santarem and Villa Franca alone, both towns -upon the Tagus, and both having the advantage of water-carriage, -the enemy found subsistence for their army for a considerable -length of time. Thus will appear the difference of a measure -adopted in time, and the delay of it till the last moment; and -I only wish that the country and the allies may not experience the -evil consequences of the ill-fated propensity of the existing Portuguese -Regency to seek popularity. In the same manner the -other measure since recommended, viz. the removal of the property -of the inhabitants of Alemtejo to places of security has been -delayed by every means in the power of the government, and -has been adopted at last against their inclination: as usual, they -commenced a discussion with me upon the expediency of preventing -the enemy from crossing the Tagus, they then sent their -civil officer to me to receive instructions, and afterwards they -conveyed to him an instruction of the ——, to which I propose -to draw the attention of his royal highness the Prince -Regent and of his majesty’s government. His royal highness -and his majesty’s government will then see in what manner the -existing Regency are disposed to co-operate with me. The additional -order of the 30th of October, marked 5 in the enclosures -from Mr. Forjas, shew the sense, which the Regency themselves -entertained of the insufficiency of their original instructions to -the Disembargador Jacinto Paes de Matos. I may have mistaken -the system of defence to be adopted for this country, and principal -Souza and other members of the Regency may be better -judges of the capacity of the troops and of the operations to be -carried on than I am. In this case they should desire his majesty -and the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of the -army. But they cannot doubt my zeal for the cause in which -we are engaged, and they know that not a moment of my time,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_598"></a>[598]</span> -nor a faculty of my mind, that is not devoted to promote it; and -the records of this government will shew what I have done for -them and their country. If, therefore, they do not manifest their -dissatisfaction and want of confidence in the measures which -I adopt by desiring that I should be removed, they are bound, -as honest men and faithful servants to their prince, to co-operate -with me by all means in their power, and thus should neither -thwart them by opposition, or render them nugatory by useless -delays and discussions. Till lately I have had the satisfaction of -receiving the support and co-operation of the government; and -I regret that, his royal highness the Prince Regent should have -been induced to make a change which has operated so materially -to the detriment of his people and of the allies. In respect to -the operations on the left of the Tagus, I was always of opinion -that the ordenança would be able to prevent the enemy from -sending over any of their plundering parties; and I was unwilling -to adopt any measure of greater solidity, from my knowledge, -that, as soon as circumstances should render it expedient, on any -account, to withdraw the troops, which I should have sent to the -left of the Tagus, the ordenança would disperse. The truth is, -that, notwithstanding the opinion of some of the government, -every Portuguese, into whose hands a firelock is placed, does not -become a soldier capable of meeting the enemy. Experience, -which the members of the government have not had, has taught -me this truth, and in what manner to make use of the different -description of troops in this country; and it would be very desirable, -if the government would leave, exclusively, to marshal -Beresford and me, the adoption of all military arrangements. -The conduct of the governor of Setuval is, undoubtedly, the -cause of the inconvenience now felt on the left of the Tagus. -He brought forward his garrison to the river against orders, and -did not reflect, and possibly was not aware as I am, that if they -had been attacked in that situation, as they probably would have -been, they would have dispersed; and thus Setuval, as well as -the regiment, which was to have been its garrison, would have -been lost. It was necessary, therefore, at all events, to prevent -that misfortune, and to order the troops to retire to Setuval, and -the ordenança as usual dispersed, and the government will lose -their five hundred stand of new arms, and, if the enemy can -cross the Tagus in time, their 3-pounders. These are the consequences -of persons interfering in military operations, who have -no knowledge of them, or of the nature of the troops which are<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_599"></a>[599]</span> -to carry them on. I am now under the necessity, much to the -inconvenience of the army, of sending a detachment to the left -of the Tagus.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 9.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>December 5, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>“All my proceedings have been founded on the following -principles: First, That, by my appointment of marshal-general -of the Portuguese army with the same powers as those vested in -the late duc de la Foéns, I hold the command of that army independent -of the local government of Portugal. Secondly, -That, by the arrangements made by the governors of the kingdom -with the king’s government, when sir William Beresford -was asked for by the former to command the Portuguese army, -it was settled that the commander-in-chief of the British army -should direct the general operations of the combined force. -Thirdly, That, supposing that my appointment of marshal-general -did not give me the independent control over the operations of -the Portuguese army, or that, as commander-in-chief of the -British army, I did not possess the power of directing the operation -of the whole under the arrangement above referred to; -it follows that either the operations of the two armies must have -been separated, or the Portuguese government must have had -the power of directing the operations of the British army. -Fourthly, It never was intended that both armies should be -exposed to the certain loss, which would have been the consequence -of a disjointed operation; and, undoubtedly, his majesty’s -government never intended to give over the British army to the -government of the kingdom, to make ducks and drakes of. -The government of the kingdom must, in their reply to my letter, -either deny the truth of these principles, or they must prove -that my charge against them is without foundation, and that they -did not delay and omit to adopt various measures, recommended -by me and marshal Beresford, calculated to assist and correspond -with the operations of the armies, upon the proposition and under -the influence of principal Souza, under the pretence of discussing -with me the propriety of my military arrangements.”</p> - -<p class="smcap right">“Wellington.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_600"></a>[600]</span></p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 10.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>Cartaxo, January 18, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>“It is necessary that I should draw your attention, and that of -the Portuguese government, upon the earliest occasion, to the -sentiments which have dropped from the Patriarch, in recent -discussions at the meeting of the Regency. It appears that his -eminence has expatiated on the inutility of laying fresh burthens -on the people, ‘which were evidently for no other purpose than -to nourish a war in the heart of the kingdom.’ It must be recollected -that these discussions are not those of a popular assembly, -they can scarcely be deemed those of a ministerial council, -but they are those of persons whom his royal highness the Prince -Regent has called to govern his kingdom in the existing crisis of -affairs. I have always been in the habit of considering his eminence -the Patriarch as one of those in Portugal who are of -opinion that all sacrifices are to be made, provided the kingdom -could preserve its independence; and, I think it most important -that the British government, and the government of the Prince -Regent, and the world, should be undeceived, if we have been -mistaken hitherto. His eminence objects to the adoption of -measures which have for their immediate object to procure funds -for the maintenance of his royal highness’s armies, because a war -may exist in the heart of the kingdom, but I am apprehensive -the Patriarch forgets the manner in which the common enemy -first entered this kingdom, in the year 1807, that in which they -were expelled from it, having had complete possession of it in -1808, and that they were again in possession of the city of -Oporto, and of the two most valuable provinces of the kingdom in -1809, and the mode in which they were expelled from those -provinces. He forgets that it was stated to him in the month of -February, 1810, in the presence of the Marquis of Olhao, of -Don M. Forjas, and of Don Joa Antonio Saltar de Mendoza, and -Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, that it was probable the enemy -would invade this kingdom with such an army as that it would -be necessary to concentrate all our forces to oppose him with any -chance of success, and that this concentration could be made with -safety in the neighbourhood of the capital only, and that the general -plan of the campaign was communicated to him which went to -bring the enemy into the heart of the kingdom; and that he expressed -before all these persons his high approbation of it. If he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_601"></a>[601]</span> -recollected these circumstances he would observe that nothing had -occurred in this campaign that had not been foreseen and provided -for by measures of which he had expressed his approbation, -of whose consequences he now disapproves. The Portuguese -nation are involved in a war not of aggression, or even defence on -their parts, not of alliance, not in consequence of their adherence -to any political system, for they abandoned all alliances and all -political systems in order to propitiate the enemy. The inhabitants -of Portugal made war purely and simply to get rid of the -yoke of the tyrant whose government was established in Portugal, -and to save their lives and properties; they chose this lot for -themselves, principally at the instigation of his eminence the -Patriarch, and they called upon his majesty, the ancient ally of -Portugal, whose alliance had been relinquished at the requisition -of the common enemy, to aid them in the glorious effort which -they wished to make, and to restore the independence of their -country, and to secure the lives and properties of its inhabitants. -I will not state the manner in which his majesty has answered -the call, or enumerate the services rendered to this nation by his -army; whatever may be the result of the contest, nothing can -make me believe that the Portuguese nation will ever forget -them; but when a nation has adopted the line of resistance to -the tyrant under the circumstances under which it was unanimously -adopted by the Portuguese nation in 1808, and has -been persevered in, it cannot be believed that they intended to -suffer none of the miseries of war, or that their government act -inconsistently with their sentiments when they expatiate on ‘the -inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, which were evidently -for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of -the kingdom.’ The patriarch in particular forgets his old principles, -his own actions which have principally involved his -country in the contest when he talks of discontinuing it, because, -it has again, for the third time, been brought into ‘the heart of -the kingdom.’ Although the Patriarch, particularly, and the -majority of the existing government approved of the plan which -I explained to them in February, 1810, according to which it was -probable that this kingdom would be made the seat of war which -has since occurred, I admit that his eminence, or any of those -members may fairly disapprove of the campaign and of the continuance -of the enemy in Portugal. I have pointed out to the -Portuguese government, in more than one despatch, the difficulties -and risks which attended any attack upon the enemy’s position -in this country, and the probable success not only to ourselves<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_602"></a>[602]</span> -but to our allies of our perseverance in the plan which I -had adopted, and had hitherto followed so far successfully, as that -the allies have literally sustained no loss of any description, and -this army is, at this moment, more complete than it was at the -opening of the campaign in April last. The inhabitants of one -part of the country alone have suffered and are continuing to -suffer. But without entering into discussions which I wish to -avoid on this occasion, I repeat, that if my counsels had been followed -these sufferings would at least have been alleviated, and I -observe that is the first time I have heard that the sufferings of a -part, and but a small part of any nation have been deemed a -reason for refusing to adopt a measure which had for its object -the deliverance of the whole. The Patriarch may, however, disapprove -of the system I have followed, and I conceive that he is -fully justified in desiring his majesty and the Prince Regent to -remove me from the command of these armies. This would be a -measure consistent with his former conduct in this contest, under -the circumstances of my having unfortunately fallen in his -opinion, but this measure is entirely distinct from the refusal to -concur in laying those burthens upon the people which are necessary -to carry on and to secure the object of the war. It must be -obvious to his eminence, and to every person acquainted with the -real situation of the affairs of Portugal, unless a great effort is -made to render the resources more adequate to the necessary expenditure -all plans and systems of operation will be alike, for the -Portuguese army will be able to carry on none. At this moment -although all the corps are concentrated in the neighbourhood of -their magazines, with means of transport, easy, by the Tagus, -the Portuguese troops are frequently in want of provisions because -there is no money to pay the expense of transport, and all -the departments of the Portuguese army, including the hospitals, -are equally destitute of funds to enable them to defray the necessary -expenditure, and to perform their duty. The deficiencies -and difficulties have existed ever since I have known the Portuguese -army, and it is well known that it must have been disbanded -more than once, if it had not been assisted by the provisions, -stores, and funds, of the British army. It may likewise occur to -his eminence that in proportion as the operations of the armies -would be more extended, the expense would increase, and the -necessity for providing adequate funds to support it would become -more urgent, unless, indeed, the course of their operations should -annihilate at one blow both army and expenditure. The objection -then to adopt measures to improve the resources of the government,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_603"></a>[603]</span> -go to decide the question whether the war should be carried -on or not in any manner. By desiring his majesty and the -Prince Regent to remove me from the command of their armies, -his eminence would endeavour to get rid of a person deemed incapable -or unwilling to fulfil the duties of his situation. By objecting -to improve the resources of the country he betrays an alteration -of opinion respecting the contest, and a desire to forfeit its advantages, -and to give up the independence of the country, and -the security of the lives and properties of the Portuguese nation. -In my opinion the Patriarch is in such a situation in this country -that he ought to be called upon, on the part of his majesty, to -state distinctly what he meant by refusing to concur in the -measures which were necessary to insure the funds, to enable this -country to carry on the war; at all events, I request that this -letter may be communicated to him in the Regency, and that a -copy of it may be forwarded to his royal highness the Prince -Regent, in order that his royal highness may see that I have -given his eminence an opportunity of explaining his motives -either by stating his personal objections to me, or the alteration -of his opinions, his sentiments, and his wishes, in respect to the -independence of his country.”</p> - -<p class="smcap right">“Wellington.”</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="No_VI">No. VI.</h3> - -<p class="p2 lht lsp2 center">EXTRACT FROM A REPORT MADE BY THE DUKE -OF DALMATIA TO THE PRINCE OF WAGRAM -AND OF NEUFCHATEL.</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 1.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>Seville, August 4th, 1810.</em></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p>“Par une décision de l’Empereur du mois de Fevrier dernier -S. M. détermine qu’à compter du 1<sup>er</sup> Janvier toutes les dépenses -d’administration générale du Genie et de l’artillerie seraient au -compte du gouvenement Espagnol; aussitôt que j’en fus instruit -je sollicitai S. M. C. d’assigner à cet effet une somme; mais je -ne pus obtenir que 2,000,000, de réaux (533,000 f.) et encore -le Roi entendait il que les payements ne remontassent qu’au mois<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_604"></a>[604]</span> -de Fevrier; cette somme était de beaucoup insuffisante. Je n’ai -cessé d’en faire la représentation, ainsi que Monsr. l’Intendant -Général; nos demandes n’ont pas été accueillies, et pour couvrir -autant que possible la différence j’ai du avoir recours aux -recettes extraordinaires faites sans la participation des ministres -Espagnols. J’espère que ce moyen réussira, déjà même il a -produit quelques sommes. L’état que je mets ci joint fait -connaître les recouvremens qui out été opérés sur les fonds de -533,000 f. du crédit mensuel à l’époque du 1<sup>er</sup> Août lesquels forment -la somme de 3,731,000 f. mais indépendamment il y a eu -des recettes extraordinaires pour au moins 500,000 f. qui ont -reçu la même destination (les dépenses d’administration générale) -antérieurement à cette époque. J’avais fait mettre à la disposition -de Monsr. l’Intendant Général des Valeurs pour plus d’un million -qui devait servir à payer une partie de l’armée. Mr. l’Intendant -Général justifie de l’emploi de toutes ces sommes dans ses -comptes généraux. Les ministres de S. M. C. n’admettent pas -les comptes que je présente; d’abord ils ne veulent pas allouer -la somme de 500,000 f. qui a été reportée a l’article des dépenses -d’administration générale, s’appuyant sur ce sujet sur la décision -du roi qui ne fait remonter ces dépenses que jusqu’au mois de -Fevrier, quoique l’empereur ait expressement entendu que le -mois de Janvier devait aussi y être compris, ils ne veulent pas non -plus reconnaître les recettes extraordinaires, où ils prétendent en -précompter le produit sur le crédit mensuel de 533,000 f. Il -n’est pas dans mon pouvoir d’admettre leurs motifs, la décision de -l’empereur est expresse et tant que je serai dans la situation -délicate où je me trouve, mon devoir m’obligera de pourvoir aux -besoins du service par tous les moyens praticables. Les recettes -qui ont eu lieu en Andalusie ont servi à toutes les dépenses de -l’artillerie, du genie, des état majors et de l’administration générale -qui sont vraiment immenses, et quoiqu’on ait absolument rien reçu -de France ni de Madrid, j’ai en même temps pu faire payer -trois mois de solde à l’armée, c’est sans doute bien peu quand il -est du 8 à 10 mois d’arrière à la troupe et que l’insuffisance des -moyens oblige à augmenter encore cet arrière, mais ne recevant -rien je crois qu’il m’était impossible de mieux faire. V. A. en sera -elle même convaincue si elle veut s’arrêter un moment sur l’apperçu -que je vais lui donner des charges que l’Andalusie supporte. On -consomme tous les jours près de 100,000 rations de vivres et -20,000 rations de fourrage; il y a 2000 malades aux hôpitaux. -La forteresse de Jaen, le fort de Malaga, l’Alhambra de Grenade,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_605"></a>[605]</span> -au dessus duquel on a construit un grand camp retranché; tous -les châteaux sur les bords de la mer depuis le cap de Gata jusqu’à -Fuengirola, le château d’Alcala la Réal, la place de Ronda, les -anciens châteaux d’Olbera et de Moron, le château de Belalcazar, -le château de Castillo de Los Guardias et plusieurs autres portes -sur les frontières de l’Estremadura qu’on a dû aussi occuper. -On a pourvu aux dépenses que les travaux devant Cadiz et la -construction d’une flottille occasionment. On a établi à Grenade -une poudrière et une fabrique d’armes, laquelle jusqu’à présent -a peu donné, mais qui par la suite sera très utile. On a rétabli -et mis dans une grande activité la fonderie et l’arsenal de Seville -où journellement 1500 ouvriers sont employés. Nous manquions -de poudre et de projectiles de feu et d’affûts. J’ai fait rétablir -deux moulins à poudre à Seville et fait exploiter toutes les -nitrières de l’Andalusie, à présent on compte aussi à Seville des -projectiles de tous les calibres, jusqu’aux bombes de 12 pouces, tout -le vieux fer a été ramassé, on a construit les affûts nécessaires pour -l’armement des batteries devant Cadiz. On a fait des réquisitions -en souliers et effets d’habillement dont la troupe a profité. -J’ai fait lever dans le pays 2000 mules qui out été données à -l’artillerie, aux équipages militaires et au Génie. J’ai fait construire -et organiser un équipage de 36 pièces de montagnes, dont -12 obusiers, de 12 qui sont portés à dos de mulets et vont être -repartis dans tous les corps d’armée. La totalité de ces dépenses -ainsi qu’une infinité d’autres dont je ne fais pas l’énumération -sont au compte du gouvernement Espagnol, et le pays les supporte -indépendamment du crédit mensuel de 533,000 f. et des -recettes extraordinaires que je fais opérer lorsqu’il y a possibilité -dont l’application a lieu en faveur de l’administration générale de -l’armée, du Genie, de l’artillerie, des états majors, des frais de -courses et des dépenses secrettes. Ces charges sont immenses et -jamais le pays n’aurait pu les supporter si nous n’étions parvenus -à mettre de l’ordre et la plus grande régularité dans les dépenses -et consommations; mais il serait difficile de les augmenter, peut-être -même y aurait il du danger de chercher à le faire; c’est au -point que malgré que nous soyons à la récolte il faut déjà penser -à faire venir du bled des autres provinces, le produit de l’Andalusie -étant insuffisant pour la consommation de ses habitans et -celle de l’armée. Cependant S.M.C. et ses ministres qui sont -parfaitement instruits de cette situation ont voulu attirer à Madrid -les revenues de l’Andalusie: je dis les revenues car leurs demandes -dépassaient les recettes; des ordres ont même été expédiés en<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_606"></a>[606]</span> -conséquence aux commissaires Royaux des Préfectures et je me -suis trouvé dans l’obligation de m’opposer ouvertement à l’effet -de cette mesure dont l’exécution eut non seulement compromis -tous les services de l’armée, mais occasionné peut être, des -mouvemens séditieux; d’ailleurs il y avait impossibilité de la -remplir, à ce sujet j’ai l’honneur de mettre sous les yeux de -V.A. extrait d’une lettre que j’eus l’honneur d’écrire au roi le -13 Juillet dernier et copie de celle que j’adressai à Monsieur le -marquis d’Almenara, ministre des finances, le 30 du même mois -pour répondre à une des siennes, où il me peignait l’état désespérant -des finances de S.M.C. Je supplie avec instance V.A. de -vouloir bien rendre compte du contenu de ces lettres et du présent -rapport à S.M. l’empereur.</p> - -<p>“J’aurai voulu pour que S.M. fut mieux instruite de tout ce -que s’est fait en Andalousie pouvoir entrer dans des détails plus -étendus; mais j’ai dû me borner à traiter des points principaux, -les détails se trouvent dans ma correspondance, et dans les rapports -de Monsieur l’intendant général sur l’administration. Cependant -d’après ce que j’ai dit S.M. aura une idée exacte des -opérations administratives et autres qui ont eu lieu, ainsi que de -l’état de ses troupes et des embarras de ma situation: elle est -telle aujourd’hui que je dois supplier avec la plus vive instance -S.M. au nom même de son service de daigner la prendre en considération: -j’ai des devoirs à remplir dont je sais toute l’étendue, -je m’y livre sans réserve mais la responsabilité est trop forte pour -que dans la position où je me trouve je puisse la soutenir; en -effet j’ai à combattre des prétentions et des intérêts qui sont -évidemment en opposition avec ceux de l’armée et par conséquent -avec ceux de l’empereur; je suis forcé par mes propres devoirs de -m’opposer à l’exécution des divers ordres que le roi donne et -faire souvent le contraire. J’ai aussi constamment à lutter contre -l’amour propre des chefs militaires, que souvent peuvent différer -d’opinion avec moi et naturellement prétendent faire prévaloir -leurs idées. Toutes ces considérations me font regarder la tâche -qui m’est imposée comme au dessus de mes forces et me portent -à désirer que S.M. l’empereur daigne me faire connaître ses -intentions ou pourvoir à mon remplacement et mettre à la tête -de son armée dans le midi de l’Espagne, un chef plus capable -que moi d’en diriger les opérations. Je me permettrai seulement -de faire observer à ce sujet que le bien du service de l’empereur -commande impérieusement que toutes les troupes qui sont dans -le midi de l’Espagne depuis le Tage jusqu’aux deux mers suivent<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_607"></a>[607]</span> -le même système d’opérations, et soyent par conséquent commandés -par un seul chef lequel doit être dans la pensée de -l’empereur, et avoir ses instructions afin que le cas se présentant -où il lui serait fait opposition d’une manière quelconque, il puisse -se conduire en conséquence et parvenir au but qui lui sera -indiqué; tout autre système retardera la marche des affaires et -occasionera inévitablement des désagréments qu’on peut autrement -éviter.”</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr6">“J’ai l’honneur, &c.</span><br /> -“(Signé) <span class="smcap pad3">Le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie</span>.”</p> - </div> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 2.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Intercepted Letter from marshal Mortier to the emperor, -13th July, 1810.</em></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 allsmcap pad2 lsp">SIRE,</p> - -<p>L’état de nullité où je suis depuis que Monsieur le duc de -Dalmatie, major général, a pris l’initiative de tous les movemens -même le plus minutieux de 5<sup>eme</sup> corps rend ici ma presence tout -à fait inutile, il ne me reste que le chagrin de voir d’excellentes -troupes animées du meilleur esprit, disseminées dans toute l’Andalusie -et perdant tous les jours de braves gens sans but ni résultat. -Dans cet état des choses je prie V.M. de vouloir bien me permettra -des me retirer à Burgos pour y attendre des ordres s’il ne -juge pas à propos de m’accorder un congé pour retourner en -France, congé que reclame ma santé à la suite d’une maladie -grave dont je suis à peine convalescent.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr40pc">J’ai l’honneur, &c. &c.</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">Le Mareschal Duc de Trévise</span>.</p> - </div> - -<hr class="tb" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="No_VII">No. VII.</h3> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 1.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from an intercepted despatch of Massena, dated -July 10, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>“Generals Romana and Carrera have gone to lord Wellington’s -head-quarters, but the latter has not abandoned his Lines.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_608"></a>[608]</span></p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>General P. Boyer to S. Swartz, July 8.</em></p> - -<p>“We are covering the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, a place strong -by its position and works, and which has been attacked with but -little method. The English army is opposite ours, but, for good -reasons, does not move: we compose the corps of observation; we -are on the look out for them.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center"><ins class="corr" id="tn-608" title="Transcriber’s Note—inserted missing heading 'SECTION 2.'"> -SECTION 2.</ins></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extrait du Journal du C. de B. Pelet, premier aide-de-camp du -maréchal prince d’Essling.</em></p> - -<p>“1810. 5 Août, à Ciudad Rodrigo.—Le capitaine du génie -Boucherat arrive du 2<sup>e</sup> corps; il a fait la campagne du Portugal, -1807. Beaucoup causé avec lui sur ce pays. Il a fait la route de -Lisbonne à Almeyda avec M. Mairet, et me remet un itinéraire -qu’il en a dressé. Il prétend ces routes très difficiles; les rivières -très encaissées, et inabordable sur les deux rives du Mondego. -Celui-ci a peu d’eau, doit être guéable presque partout; et une -partie de ses rives bien difficiles, et en certains endroits il n’y a pas -plus de 20 toises de largeur; un seul pont sans chemin (je crois à -Fornos;) mais la rivière n’est pas un obstacle aux communications -des deux rives. La route d’Idanha, Castelbranco, &c. mauvaise, -cependant non absolument impraticable à des pièces légères. -Tage, très escarpé, rocailleux, profond jusqu’à Abrantés * * * * -Au dessous de cette ville, ou plutôt au confluent du Zézère, le -pays devient plat; le lit du Tage s’élargit; il n’y a plus que des -collines même éloignées, et tout est très praticable. Les montagnes -de Santarem sont des collines peu élevées, praticables, -accessibles sur leur sommet, peu propres à être défendues ce qui -est commune jusqu’à la mer pour celles de Montachique, qui sont -des plateaux arrondis, accessibles à toute les armes; et on pourrait -marcher ou manœuvrer dans toutes les directions. J’ai fait copier -cet itinéraire.”</p> - -<p>“1810. 7 Octobre, à Leyria.—Causé avec le général Loison -des position de Montachique, ensuite avec le prince.”</p> - -<p>“1810. 9 Octobre, à Riomajor. On dit que l’ennemi se retranche -à Alhandra et Bucella. Les généraux Reynier et Foy ont -une carte de Riomajor à Lisbonne; espèce de croquis fait à la hâte, -d’après de bons matériaux, mais où la figure est très mauvaise. Je -le fais copier.”</p> - </div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_609"></a>[609]</span></p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 3.</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 center"><em>A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling. Sur la hauteur en -arrière de Moira, le 26 Septembre, 1810, à 10 heure ½.</em></p> - -<p>J’ai l’honneur de vous adresser une lettre que je viens de recevoir -du général Reynier et copie d’une réponse.</p> - -<p>Vous trouverez également ci-joint une lettre du général Reynier -adressée à votre excellence.</p> - -<p>Je vous renouvelle, prince, l’assurance de ma haute considération.</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signé) <span class="smcap pad3">Le Maréchal Duc D’elchingen</span>.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Elchingen. St. Antonio, le -26 Septembre, à 8 heure du matin.</em></p> - -<p>Depuis que le brouillard est dissipé, on apperçoit sur le Serra -au delà de St. Antonio, cinq bataillons Portugais qui étoient à -mi-côte et qui sont montés sur la crête à mesure que le brouillard -s’est éclairci. Il y a de plus au col où passe le chemin, 6 pièces -de canon et un détachement d’infantrie Anglaise, et à mi-côte une -ligne de tirailleurs partie Anglais qui s’étend depuis le chemin qui -monte du village de Carvailha à ma gauche, jusques vis-à-vis des -postes du 6<sup>e</sup> corps, on voit des troupes sur les sommités qui font -face au 6<sup>e</sup> corps; mais comme on ne les apperçoit que de revers, -ou ne peut juger de leur nombre.</p> - -<p>On ne peut deviner s’il y a des troupes en arrière, mais d’après -l’organisation de la montagne dont les crêtes, sont étroites, et -qui a des pentes rapides de chaque côte il ne doit pas avoir de terrain -pour y placer de fortes réserves et manœuvres. Cela me parait une -arrière garde mais la position est forte, et il faut faire des dispositions -pour l’attaquer avec succès. J’attends des nouvelles de -ce que l’ennemi fait devant vous pour faire aucun mouvement; -si vous jugez que c’est une arrière garde et que vous l’attaquiez, -j’attaquerai aussi. Si vous jugez convenable d’attendre les ordres -de Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, j’attendrai aussi, comme -je pense qu’il viendra vers votre corps, je vous prie de lui faire -parvenir le rapport ci-joint avec les vôtres.</p> - -<p>J’ai l’honneur de vous prier, Monsieur le maréchal, d’agréer -l’hommage de mon respect.</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signé) <span class="smcap pad3">Reynier</span>.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_610"></a>[610]</span></p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>A Monsieur le Général Reynier. Sur la hauteur en arrière -de Moira, le 26 Septembre 1810, à 10 heures ½ du matin.</em></p> - -<p>Je reçois à l’instant, mon cher général, votre lettre de ce jour. -Je pense qu’une grande partie de l’armée Anglo-Portugaise a -passé la nuit sur la crête des montagnes qui domine toute la -vallée de Moira. Un paysan dit qu’il existe de l’autre côté de ces -montagnes une plaine assez belle d’une demi-lieue d’étendue, et -très garnie d’Oliviers. Depuis ce matin, l’ennemi marche par -sa gauche, et semble diriger ses colonnes principales sur la route -d’Oporto; cependant il tient encore assez de monde à la droite du -parc qui couvre le couvent des minimes nommé Sako; et il montre -une 12<sup>ne</sup> de pièces d’artillerie. Le chemin de Coïmbre passe très -près de ce courent.</p> - -<p>J’ai envoyé ce matin un de mes aides-de-camp au prince d’Essling -pour lui dire que nous sommes en présence, et qu’il serait -nécessaire qu’il arrivât pour prendre un parti. Si j’avais le commandement, -j’attaquerais sans hésiter un seul instant; mais je -crois, mon cher général, que vous ne pouvez rien compromettre en -vous échelonnant sur la droite de l’ennemi; et en poussant ses -avant-postes, car c’est véritablement par ce point qu’il faudrait le -forcer à faire sa retraite.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr40pc">Je vous renouvelle, &c.</span><br /> -(Signé) <span class="smcap pad3">Le maréchal Duc d’Elchingen</span>.</p> - </div> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 4.</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 center"><em>A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, Commandant-en-chef, -l’armée de Portugal, Paris, le 4 Décembre, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>Monsieur le prince d’Essling, le général Foy que vous avez -expédié est arrivé à Paris le 22 Novembre; il a fait connaître à -sa majesté et dans le plus grand détail ce qui s’est passé et votre -situation.</p> - -<p>Dès le 4 Novembre le général Gardanne était en avant d’Almeida -avec un corps de 6,000 hommes. Le compte d’Erlon avec -les divisions Claparede, Conroux, et la division Fournier a dû se -trouver à Guarda vers le 20 Novembre.</p> - -<p>L’Empereur, prince, a vu par les journaux Anglais, que vous -aviez établi des ponts sur le Tage et que sous en avez un sur le -Zézère, défendu sur les deux rives pas de fortes têtes de pont.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_611"></a>[611]</span> -Sa majesté pense que vous devez vous retrancher dans la position, -que vous occupez devant l’ennemi; qu’Abrantés se trouvant à -800 toises du Tage, vous l’aurez isolé de son pont et bloqué pour -en faire le siège. L’Empereur vous recommande d’établir deux -ponts sur le Zézère, de défendre ces ponts par des ouvrages considérables, -comme ceux du Spitz devant Vienne. Votre ligne -d’opérations et de communications devant être établie par la route -de Garda, partant du Zézère, passant par Cardigos, suivant la -crête des montagnes par Campinha et Belmonte, vous aurez -toujours la route de Castelbranco et Salvatera pour faire des -vivres.</p> - -<p>Je viens de donner de nouveau l’ordre déjà réitéré plusieurs -fois au duc de Dalmatie, d’envoyer le 5<sup>me</sup> corps sur le Tage entre -Montalveo et Villaflor, pour faire sa jonction avec vous. L’Empereur -croit qu’il serait nécessaire de s’emparer d’Alcantara, de -fortifier et de consolider tous les ponts sur le Zézère et sur le -Tage, d’assurer toutes vos communications en saississant les -points favorables que peuvent offrir les localités pour fortifier de -petites positions; des châteaux ou maisons qui, occupées par peu -de troupes, soient à l’abri des incursions des milices.</p> - -<p>Vous sentirez, Monsieur le Prince d’Essling, l’avantage de -régulariser ainsi la guerre, ce qui vous mettra à même de -profiter de la réunion de tous les corps qui vont vous renforcer, -pour marcher sur lord Wellington et attaquer la gauche de sa -position, soit pour l’obliger à se rembarquer en marchant sur la -rive gauche du Tage, ou enfin, si tous ces moyens ne réussissaient -pas, vous serez en mesure de rester en position pendant les mois -de Décembre et de Janvier, en vous occupant d’organiser vos -vivres et de bien établir vos communications avec Madrid et -Almeyda.</p> - -<p>L’armée du centre qui est à Madrid, ayant des détachements -sur Placentia, vos communications avec cette capitale ne sont pas -difficiles.</p> - -<p>Deux millions 500 mille francs destinés à la solde de votre -armée sont déjà à Valladolid; deux autre millions partent en ce -moment de Bayonne. Ainsi votre armée sera dans une bonne -situation.</p> - -<p>Votre position deviendra très embarrassante pour les Anglais, -qui, indépendamment d’une consommation énorme d’hommes et -d’argent, se trouveront engagés dans une guerre de système, et -ayant toujours une immensité de bâtimens à la mer pour leur -rembarquement. Il faut donc, Prince, travailler sans cesse à<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_612"></a>[612]</span> -vous fortifier vis-à-vis de la position des ennemis, et pouvoir -garder la vôtre avec moins de monde; ce qui rendra une partie -de votre armée mobile et vous mettra à même de faire des incursions -dans le pays.</p> - -<p>Vous trouverez ci-joint des moniteurs qui donnent des nouvelles -de Portugal, parvenues par la voie de l’Angleterre, datées du -12 Novembre.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr2">Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,</span><br /> -<span class="padr6">Major-Général,</span><br /> -(Signé) <span class="smcap pad3">Alexandre</span>.</p> - </div> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 5.</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 center"><em>A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, Commandant-en-chef, -l’armée de Portugal, Paris, le 22 Décembre, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>Je vous expédie, Prince, le général Foy que l’Empereur a -nommé général de division; je vous envoie les moniteurs; vous -y verrez que nous apprenons par les nouvelles d’Angleterre qu’au -1 Décembre, vous vous fortifiez dans votre position de Santarem.</p> - -<p>L’Empereur met la plus grande importance à ce que vous -teniez constamment en échec les Anglais, à ce que vous ayez des -ponts sur le Zézère et sur le Tage; la saison va devenir bonne -pour les opérations militaires, et vous aurez le moyen de harceler -les Anglais et de leur faire éprouver journellement des pertes. -Par les nouvelles des journaux Anglais, il parait qu’il y a beaucoup -de malades dans leur armée, ils ne comptent que ———— -27 à 28 mille hommes sous les armes et un effectif de 31 milles, -y compris la cavalerie et l’artillerie. La situation de l’armée -Anglaise en Portugal tient Londres dans une angoise continuelle, -et l’Empereur regarde comme un grand avantage de tenir les -Anglais en échec, de les attirer et de leur faire perdre du monde -dans des affaires d’avant-gardes, jusqu’à ce que vous soyez à -même de les engager dans une affaire générale. Je réitère encore -au maréchal duc de Trévise l’ordre de marcher sur le Tage -avec le 5<sup>me</sup> corps.</p> - -<p>Le comte d’Erlon, qui réunit son corps à Ciudad-Rodrigo, -va profiter de ce moment où les pluies cessent pour reprendre -l’offensive et battre tous ces corps de mauvaises troupes que se -trouvent sur vos communications et sur vos flancs.</p> - -<p>Vos ponts étant bien assurés sur le Zézère, la ligne de vos<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_613"></a>[613]</span> -opérations la plus naturelle parait devoir être par la rive gauche de -cette rivière.</p> - -<p>Le général Foy, à qui l’Empereur a parlé longtems vous donnera -plus de détails.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr2">Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,</span><br /> -<span class="padr6">Major-Général,</span><br /> -(Signé) <span class="smcap pad3">Alexandre</span>.</p> - </div> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 6.</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 center"><em>A Monsieur le maréchal d’Essling, Commandant-en-chef, -l’armée de Portugal, Paris, le 16 Janvier, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>Je vous préviens, Prince, que par décret impérial, en date du -15 de ce mois, l’Empereur a formé une armée du Nord de -l’Espagne, dont le commandement est confié à Monsieur le -maréchal duc d’Istrie qui va établir son quartier général à Burgos.</p> - -<p>L’arrondissement de l’armée du Nord de l’Espagne est composé:—</p> - -<p>1º. De la Navarre formant le 3<sup>e</sup> governement de l’Espagne.</p> - -<p>2º. Des trois provinces de la Biscaye et de la province de Santander, -formant le 4<sup>e</sup> gouvernement.</p> - -<p>3º. De la province des Asturies.</p> - -<p>4º. Des provinces de Burgos, Aranda, et Soria, formant le -5<sup>e</sup> gouvernement.</p> - -<p>5º. Des provinces de Palencia, Valladolid, Leon, Benevente, -Toro, et Zamore, formant le 6<sup>e</sup> gouvernement.</p> - -<p>6º. De la province de Salamanque.</p> - -<p>Ainsi cet arrondissement comprend tout le pays occupé par -les troupes Françaises entre la mer, la France, le Portugal, et -les limites de l’arrondissement des armées du centre et de l’Arragon.</p> - -<p>Cette disposition en centralisant le pourvoir, va donner de -l’ensemble et une nouvelle impulsion d’activité aux opérations -dans toutes les provinces du Nord de l’Espagne; et Monsieur le -maréchal duc d’Istrie mettra un soin particulier à maintenir les -communications entre Valladolid, Salamanque, et Almeida.</p> - -<p>Je vous engage, Prince, à correspondre avec Monsieur le -maréchal duc d’Istrie toutes les fois que vous le jugerez utile -au service.</p> - -<p>D’après les ordres de l’Empereur je préviens Monsieur le duc<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_614"></a>[614]</span> -d’Istrie que dans des circonstances imprévues, il doit appuyer -l’armée de Portugal et lui porter du secours; je le préviens aussi -que le 9<sup>me</sup> corps d’armée serait sous ses ordres dans le cas où ce -corps rentrerait en Espagne.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr2">Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,</span><br /> -<span class="padr6">Major-Général,</span><br /> -(Signé) <span class="smcap pad3">Alexandre</span>.</p> - </div> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 7.</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 center"><em>A Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie, Paris, le 24 -Janvier, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>Vous verrez par le moniteur d’hier, Monsieur le duc de Dalmatie, -que les armées de Portugal étaient à la fin de l’année dernière -dans la même position. L’Empereur me charge de vous -renouveller l’ordre de vous porter au secours du prince d’Essling, -qui est toujours à Santarem; il a plusieurs ponts sur le Zézère, -et il attend que les eaux soient diminuées pour en jetter un sur le -Tage. Il parait certain que le 9<sup>me</sup> corps a opéré sa jonction avec -lui par le Nord, c’est-à-dire, par Almeyda.</p> - -<p>L’Empereur <em>espère que le prince d’Essling aura jetté un pont -sur le Tage</em>; ce que lui donnera des vivres.</p> - -<p>Les corps insurgés de Valence et de Murcie vont se trouver -occupé par le corps du général Suchet, aussitôt que Tarragone -sera tombé entre nos mains, comme l’a fait la place de Tortose; -alors Sa Majesté <em>pense que le</em> 5<sup>me</sup> corps et une partie <em>du</em> 4<sup>me</sup> -pourront-se porter au <em>secours</em> du prince d’Essling.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr4">Le Major-Général,</span><br /> -(Signé) <span class="smcap pad3">Alexandre</span>.</p> - </div> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 8.</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 center"><em>A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, Paris, le 25 Janvier, -1811.</em></p> - -<p>Je vous préviens, prince, que Monsieur le maréchal duc de -Dalmatie s’est mis en marche dans les premiers jours de Janvier -avec le 9<sup>me</sup> corps d’armée, un corps de cavalerie, et un équipage de -siège pour se porter sur Badajoz et faire le siège de cette place. -Ces troupes ont dû arriver le 10 de ce mois devant Badajoz; je -mande au duc de Dalmatie qu’après la prise de cette place il doit<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_615"></a>[615]</span> -se porter sans perdre de tems sur le Tage avec son équipage de -siège pour vous donner les moyens d’assiéger et de prendre -Abrantés.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr2">Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,</span><br /> -<span class="padr6">Major-Général,</span><br /> -(Signé) <span class="smcap pad3">Alexandre</span>.</p> - </div> - - -<p class="p2 center"><ins class="corr" id="tn-615" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'SECTION IX'"> -SECTION 9</ins>.</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 center"><em>Au Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, major-général, Paris, -le 6 Fevrier, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>Mon cousin, je pense que vous devez envoyer le moniteur -d’aujourd’hui au duc de Dalmatie, au duc de Trévise, au général -Belliard, au duc d’Istrie, aux commandans de Cuidad Rodrigo et -d’Almeida, aux général Thiébaut, et aux généraux Dorsenne, Cafarelli, -et Reille. Ecrivez au duc d’Istrie en lui envoyant le -moniteur, pour lui annoncer qu’il y trouvera les dernières nouvelles -du Portugal, qui paraissent être du 13; que tout parait prendre -une couleur avantageuse; que si Badajoz a été pris dans le courant -de Janvier, le duc de <em>Dalmatie a pû se porter sur le Tage, et -faciliter l’établissement du pont au prince d’Essling</em>; qu’il -devient donc très important de faire toutes les dispositions que j’ai -ordonnées afin que le général Drouet avec ses deux divisions puisse -être tout entier à la disposition du prince d’Essling. Ecrivez en -même tems au duc de Dalmatie pour lui faire connaître la situation -du duc d’Istrie, et lui réitérer l’ordre <em>de favoriser le prince -d’Essling</em> pour son possage du Tage; que j’espère que Badajoz -aura été prix dans le courant de Janvier; et que vers le 20 <em>Janvier -sa jonction aura eu lieu sur le Tage</em>, avec le prince d’Essling; -qu’il peut, si cela est nécessaire, retirer des troupes du 4<sup>me</sup> corps; -<em>qu’enfin tout est sur le Tage.</em> Sur ce je prie Dieu, mon cousin, -qu’il vous ait dans sa sainte et digne garde.</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signé) <span class="smcap pad3">Napoleon</span>.</p> - -<p>P.S. Je vous renvoie votre lettre au duc d’Istrie, faites le -partir.</p> - </div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_616"></a>[616]</span></p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 10.</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 center"><em>A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, commandant-en-chef -l’armée de Portugal, Paris, le 7 Février</em>, 1811.</p> - -<p>Je vous envoie, prince, le moniteur du 6, vous y trouverez les -dernières nouvelles que nous avons du Portugal; elles vont jusqu’au -13 Janvier, et annoncent <em>que tout prend une tournure avantageuse. -Si Badajoz a été pris dans le courant de Janvier, -comme cela est probable, le duc de Dalmatie aura pu faire -marcher des troupes sur le Tage, et vous faciliter l’établissement -d’un pont.</em> Je lui en ai donné et je lui en réitère l’ordre; l’Empereur -espère que la <em>jonction des troupes de ce maréchal a eu -lieu maintenant avec vous sur le Tage</em>.</p> - -<p>Les deux divisions d’infanterie du corps du général Drouet, -vout rester entièrement à votre disposition d’après les ordres que -je donne à Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, commandant en -chef l’armée du nord de l’Espagne; je lui mande de porter son -quartier général à Valladolid, d’établir des corps nombreux de -cavalerie dans la province de Salamanque afin d’assurer d’une -manière journalière sure et rapide la correspondance entre Almeyda, -Cuidad Rodrigo et Valladolid, et nous envoyer promptement toutes -les nouvelles qui pourront parvenir à l’armée de Portugal.</p> - -<p>Je lui prescris de tenir à Ciudad Rodrigo, un corps de 6,000 -hommes qui puisse éloigner toute espèce de troupe ennemie de -Ciudad Rodrigo et d’Almeida, faire même des incursions sur -Pinhel et Guarda, empêcher qu’il se forme aucun rassemblement -sur les derrières du 9<sup>me</sup> corps et présenter des dispositions offensives -sur cette frontière du Portugal.</p> - -<p>De réunir une forte brigade de la garde impériale vers Zamora -d’où elle sera à portée de soutenir le corps de Ciudad Rodrigo, et -où elle se trouvera d’ailleurs dans une position avancée pour agir -suivant les circonstances.</p> - -<p>De réunir une autre forte brigade de la garde à Valladolid où -elle sera en mesure d’appuyer la première et de réunir le reste -de la garde dans le gouvernement de Burgos.</p> - -<p>Par ces dispositions, prince, les deux divisions d’infanterie du -9<sup>me</sup> corps, seront entièrement à votre disposition et avec ce secours -vous serez en mesure de tenir longtems la position que vous occupez; -de vous porter sur la rive gauche du Tage; ou enfin d’agir -comme vous le jugerez convenable sans avoir aucune inquiétude -sur le nord de l’Espagne, puisque le duc d’Istrie sera à portée de<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_617"></a>[617]</span> -marcher sur Almeyda et Ciudad Rodrigo et même sur Madrid, si -des circonstances inattendues le rendaient nécessaire.</p> - -<p>Dès que le duc d’Istrie aura fait ses dispositions il enverra un -officier au général Drouet, pour l’en instruire et lui faire connoître -qu’il peut rester en entier pour vous renforcer.</p> - -<p>Le général Foy a dû partir vers le 29 Janvier de Ciudad Rodrigo, -avec 4 bataillons et 300 hommes de cavalerie pour vous -rejoindre.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr2">Le Prince de Wagram et d’Neuchâtel,</span><br /> -<span class="padr6">Major-Général,</span><br /> -(Signé) <span class="smcap pad3">Alexandre</span>.</p> - </div> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 11.</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 center"><em>A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Guarda, le 29 Mars, -1811.</em></p> - -<p>Mon cher Maréchal, vous aurez appris notre arrivée aux frontières -du Portugal, l’armée se trouve dans un pays absolument -ruiné; et avec toute ma volonté et la patience de l’armée, je -crains de n’y pouvoir tenir 8 jours, et je me verrai forcé de rentrer -en Espagne.</p> - -<p>J’écris à Mr. le Cte. d’Erlon pour qu’il fasse approvisionner -Almeyda et Rodrigo; ces deux places n’auraient jamais dû -cesser d’avoir pour 3 mois de vivres aux quels ou n’aurait pas dû -toucher sous aucun prétexte; et ma surprise est extrême d’apprendre -qu’il n’y a que pour 10 jours de vivres à Almeyda. Je lui -écris aussi de prendre une position entre Rodrigo et Almeyda, -avec ses deux divisions; vous sentez combien il est nécessaire, -qu’il se place à portée de marcher au secours d’Almeyda.</p> - -<p>Si je trouvais des vivres, je ne quitterais pas les frontières -d’Espagne et du Portugal, mais comme je vous l’ai dit, je ne vois -guère la possibilité d’y rester * * * *</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signé) <span class="smcap pad3">Le Prince d’Essling</span>.</p> - </div> - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 12.</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 center"><em>A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Alfayates, le 2 Avril, -1811.</em></p> - -<p>Mon cher Maréchal, le pays que l’armée occupe ne pouvant en<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_618"></a>[618]</span> -aucune manière le faire vivre, je me vois forcé de la faire rentrer -en Espagne. Voici les cantonnements que je lui ai assignés et -l’itinéraire de marche de chaque corps d’armée * * * *</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signé) <span class="smcap pad3">Le Prince d’Essling</span>.</p> - </div> - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 13.</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 center"><em>A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Rodrigo, le 5 Avril, -1811.</em></p> - -<p>Mon cher Maréchal, je suis arrivé avec toute l’armée sur -Ciudad Rodrigo, mes troupes depuis plusieurs jours sont sans -pain; et je suis obligé de faire prendre sur les approvisionnments -de Rodrigo 200 mille rations de biscuit, que je vous prie d’ordonner -de remplacer avec les ressources qui peuvent se trouver à -Salamanque et Valladolid. Nous partirons ensuite pour les cantonnements -que j’ai eu soin de vous faire connaître. J’espère que -vous aurez bien voulu faire donner des ordres aux intendans de -province, d’y faire préparer des vivres, seul moyen d’y faire -maintenir l’ordre.</p> - -<p>Je compte séjourner 3 à 4 jours ici pour voir si l’ennemi ne -s’approcherait pas des places.</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signé) <span class="smcap pad3">Le Prince d’Essling</span>.</p> - </div> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 14.</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 center"><em>A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 15 -Avril, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>Mon cher Maréchal, ma position devient toujours plus allarmante; -les places appellent des secours; je ne reçois pas de -réponses de vous à aucune de mes demandes; et si cet état de -chose se prolonge, je serai forcé de faire prendre à l’armée des -cantonnements où elle puisse vivre, et d’abandonner les places -que je ne suis pas chargé de défendre et encore bien moins d’approvisionner, -mes troupes manquant absolument de vivres.</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signé) <span class="smcap pad3">Le Prince d’Essling</span>.</p> - </div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_619"></a>[619]</span></p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 15.</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 center"><em>A Monsieur le maréchal due d’Istrie, Paris, le 3 Avril, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>Le general Foy est arrivé, Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, -ainsi que les deux aides-de-camp du maréchal prince d’Essling, -le capitaine Porcher, et le chef d’escadron Pelet. Il parait que le -prince d’Essling avec son corps d’armée prend position à Guarda, -Belmonte, et Alfuyates. Ainsi il protège Ciudad Rodrigo, -Almeyda, Madrid et l’Andalousie. Ses communications doivent -s’établir facilement avec l’armée du midi par Alcantara et Badajoz. -Si ce qu’on ne prévoit pas, le prince d’Essling étoit vivement -attaqué par l’armée Anglaise, l’empereur pense que <em>vous pourriez -le soutenir avec une 15ne. de milles hommes</em>. L’armée du -centre doit avoir poussé un corps sur Alcantara. L’armée du -midi sera renforcée par ce que vous aurez déjà fait partir, et -d’après le prince d’Essling, elle va se trouver assez forte pour ne -rien craindre de l’ennemi * * * *</p> - -<p class="center">(Le reste est sans intérêt.)</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr4">Le Major Général,</span><br /> -(Signé) <span class="smcap pad3">Alexandre</span>.</p> - </div> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 16.</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 center"><em>A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 17 Avril, -1811.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 allsmcap pad2 lsp">MON CHER MARECHAL,</p> - -<p>Le général Reynaud, commandant supérieur à Rodrigo, ainsi -que le général Marchand, qui est avec sa division autour de -cette place, me rendent compte que 2 divisions Portugaises -avec une division Anglaise ont pris position aux environs -d’Almeyda. Quoique cette place ait encore des vivres pour -une 20<sup>ne</sup> de jours, et que les Anglais et les Portugais meurent de -faim dans leurs positions, il faut faire des dispositions pour les -chasser au delà de la Coa, et pour ravitailler cette place. Je vous -propose en conséquence, mon cher maréchal, de mettre à ma disposition -12 à 1500 chevaux, ceux de l’armée de Portugal n’étant en -état de rendre aucun service; je vous demande de plus une division -d’infanterie pour placer en réserve. Vers le 24 ou le 29, ces -forces se joindront aux 6 divisions que je compte réunir de l’armée -de Portugal pour attaquer l’ennemi, s’il nous attend dans ses -positions et le chasser au delà de la Coa. Il est impossible de -faire faire le moindre mouvement à toutes ces troupes, du moins<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_620"></a>[620]</span> -à celles de l’armée de Portugal pour attaquer l’ennemi; si on ne -peut leur faire distribuer pour 10 jours de biscuit et avoir de l’eau -de vie à la suite de l’armée. Je vous demande encore 15 à 18 -pièces d’artillerie bien attelées, celles à mes ordres étant hors d’état -de marcher. Avec ces moyens, nul doute que l’ennemi ne soit -déposté et chassé hors des frontières de l’Espagne et au delà de la -Coa. Mon cher maréchal, je vis ici au jour le jour; je suis sans -le sol, vous pouvez tout; il faut donc nous envoyer du biscuit, de -l’eau de vie, du pain et de l’orge. Ce sera avec ces moyens que -nous pourrons manœuvrer. Il ne faut pas perdre un instant. Il -est très urgent de marcher au secours d’Almeyda. C’est à vous à -donner vos ordres; et vous me trouverez porté de la meilleure -volonté à faire tout ce qui sera convenable aux intérêts de S. M.</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signé) <span class="smcap pad3">Le Prince d’Essling</span>.</p> - </div> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 17.</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 center"><em>A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 22 -Avril, 1811.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 allsmcap pad2 lsp">MON CHER MARECHAL,</p> - -<p>J’ai reçu votre dépêche. Toutes vos promesses de vous -réunir à moi s’évanouissent donc dans le moment où j’en ai -besoin, ravitailler Almeida et Rodrigo est la 1<sup>re</sup> opération et -la seule qui peut nous donner la faculté de rendre l’armée de -Portugal disponible, lorsqu’on n’aura plus rien à craindre sur -le sort des places. En y jettant pour 3 à 4 mois de vivres, on -peut ensuite établir plusieurs colonnes mobiles; on peut envoyer -des troupes à Avila et Ségovie; on peut au besoin appuyer le -mouvement de l’armée d’Andalousie. Mais ne serait il pas honteux -de laisser rendre une place faute de vivres, en présence de -deux maréchaux de l’Empire? Je vous ai déjà prévenu de la -nullité de ma cavalerie, de l’impossibilité où se trouvent les chevaux -d’artillerie de rendre aucun service. Vous savez aussi que je dois -envoyer le 9<sup>me</sup> corps en Andalousie; je voulais aussi le faire concourir -avant son départ au ravitaillement des places. Pouvez -vous, mon cher maréchal, balancer un seul instant à m’envoyer -de la cavalerie et des attelages d’artillerie? Si vous voulez garder -votre matériel? Ne vous ai-je pas prévenu que je commencerais -mon mouvement le 26? et vous paraissez attendre le (22) une -seconde demande de ma part. Vous le savez aussi bien que moi, -perdre un ou deux jours à la guerre est beaucoup; et ce délai -peut avoir des suites fâcheuses qu’on ne répare plus.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_621"></a>[621]</span></p> - -<p>Quand je vous ai dit que je ne réunerais que 6 divisions; c’était -pour ne pas tout dégarnir des points importans occupés par les -corps d’armée; mais de la cavalerie et de l’artillerie sont un secours -dont je ne puis me passer. Je vous prie en conséquence, mon -cher maréchal, de me faire arriver de la cavalerie et des attelages -d’artillerie à marches forcées. Réflechissez qu’une fois les places -réapprovisionnées, je pourrai disposer des ⅔ de l’armée, et que -cette opération passe avant tout.</p> - -<p>En m’offrant de nous envoyer les attelages pour 16 pièces, vous -aurez bien entendu, sans doute, mon cher maréchal y comprendre -ceux nécessaires pour les caissons des pièces.</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signé.) <span class="smcap pad3">Le Prince d’Essling</span>.</p> - </div> - - -<p class="p2 center"><ins class="corr" id="tn-621" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'SECTION XVIII'"> -SECTION 18</ins>.</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 center"><em>A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 24 -Avril, 1811.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 allsmcap pad2 lsp">MON CHER MARECHAL,</p> - -<p>Je me rends demain à Ciudad Rodrigo, où toute l’armée -sera réunie le 26. Le ravitaillement de la place d’Almeida -est du plus haut intérêt pour les armes de S. M; et il eut -été bien à désirer que les secours que j’ai en l’honneur de -vous demander nous eussent été envoyés. L’ennemi parait avoir -de 20 à 29 mille hommes autour de cette place. Vous dire que je -n’aurai en cavalerie que 15 à 1800 hommes, et seulement 20 -pièces de canon pour toute l’armée, c’est vous faire sentir, mon -cher maréchal, combien votre secours m’eut été nécessaire au -moins sous deux rapports, pour votre armée même et pour la -tranquillité du nord de l’Espagne. Je n’ai pas ménagé mes instances -auprès de vous. Si mes efforts n’étaient pas heureux; -votre dévouement pour le service de l’Empereur, vous ferait certainement -regretter de ne pas les avoir secondés avec les moyens -que vous m’aviez fait espérer, avant que j’en eusse besoin.</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signé.) <span class="smcap pad3">Le Prince d’Essling</span>.</p> - </div> - - -<p class="p2 center"><ins class="corr" id="tn-621a" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'SECTION XIX'"> -SECTION 19</ins>.</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 center"><em>A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Rodrigo, le 29 Avril, 1811.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 allsmcap pad2 lsp">MON CHER MARECHAL,</p> - -<p>Vos lettres sont inconcevables. Dans celle du 20, vous me -dites que vous ne pouvez me donner aucun secours. Par celle<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_622"></a>[622]</span> -du 22, vous me dites que le 25 ou le 26 vous me joindrez -partout où je serai, et que la tête de votre colonne arrivera à Salamanque -le 26. Par celle que je reçois à l’instant, vous me dites, -que votre cavalerie et votre artillerie se trouvent encore le 27 à -une journée en arrière de Salamanque; et vous concluez que mon -mouvement doit être fini; et vous me témoignez vos regrèts de -n’avoir pû y coopérer. Convenez, mon cher maréchal, que si -l’armée de Portugal recevait un échec, vous auriez bien des reproches -à vous faire. Je vous ai demandé de l’artillerie et des -attelages et encore plus positivement de la cavalerie; vous avez -sous différens prétextes éludé ma demande. Toutes les troupes -qui sont en Espagne, sont de la même famille. Vous êtes, jusques -à ce qu’il y ait de nouveaux ordres, chargé de la défense et de -l’approvisionnement des places d’Almeida et de Rodrigo. Je -n’aurais pas mieux demandé que d’employer l’armée de Portugal -sous me ordres à défendre ces places, à marcher au secours de -l’armée du midi; mais comment puis-je le faire sans vivres?</p> - -<p>Je compte faire mon mouvement demain matin. J’ignore quelle -pourra être l’issue de ce mouvement; si ma lettre vous arrive dans -la journée de demain, votre cavalerie et votre artillerie pourraient -toujours se mettre en mouvement dans la nuit pour arriver après -demain 1er Mai à Cabrillas. Je vous prie de faire filer sans -s’arrêter le biscuit, la farine, le grain que vous n’aurez pas manqué -de réunir à la suite de vos troupes. Il est instant que ces ressources -comme beaucoup d’autres, arrivent à Rodrigo; cette place -n’aura pas pour 15 jours de vivres. A mon départ d’ici, il faudra -que des convois considerables y soient envoyés.</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signé) <span class="smcap pad3">Le Prince d’Essling</span>.</p> - </div> - - -<p class="p2 center"><ins class="corr" id="tn-622" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'SECTION XX'"> -SECTION 20</ins>.</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1 center"><em>A Monsieur le maréchal duc de Raguse, Paris, le 20 Avril, -1811.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 allsmcap pad2 lsp">MONSIEUR LE DUC DE RAGUSE,</p> - -<p>Vous trouverez ci-joint l’ordre de l’Empereur qui vous donne -le commandement de l’armée de Portugal. Je donne l’ordre -au maréchal prince d’Essling de vous remettre le commandement -de cette armée. Saisissez les rènes d’une main ferme; -faites dans l’armée les changemens qui deviendraient nécessaires. -L’intention de l’Empereur est que le duc d’Abrantes -et le général Reynier restent sous vos ordres. S. M.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_623"></a>[623]</span> -compte assez sur le dévouement que lui portent ses généraux, -pour être persuadé qu’ils vous seconderont de tous leurs moyens.</p> - -<p>L’Empereur ordonne, Monsieur le duc de Raguse, que le prince -d’Essling en quittant l’armée n’emmène avec lui que son fils et un -de ses aides-de-camp. Mais son chef d’état-major, le général -Fririon, le colonel Pelet, ses autre aides-de-camp, tous le officiers -de son état-major doivent rester avec vous.</p> - -<p>Toutefois, Monsieur le duc, je vous le répète S. M. met en vous -une confiance entière.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr4">Le Major Général, &c.</span><br /> -(Signé.) <span class="smcap pad3">Alexandre</span>.</p> - </div> - -<hr class="tb" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="No_VIII">No. VIII.</h3> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="center"><em>Les Officiers Français Prisonniers de Guerre, détenus à la -Maison, Rue S. Jean, à Monsieur le Général Trant, Gouverneur -de le Ville et Province d’Oporto.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 allsmcap pad2 lsp">MONSIEUR LE GENERAL,</p> - -<p>Chacun des officiers Français prisonniers de guerre, détenus -à la maison rue S. Jean, pénétré des obligations qu’il vous a -désirerait vous offrir individuellement l’expression de sa reconnoissance. -C’est nous que ces messieurs ont choisi pour être -auprès de vous leur organes et nous sommes d’autant plus flattés -de cette commission agréable qu’il n’y en a pas un parmi nous qui -dans son particulier n’ait reçu de vous des services importants. -Nous osons nous flatter que vous agréerez favorablement ce foible -témoignage de notre gratitude et les sincères remerciments que -nous venons vous présenter pour toutes les bontés que vous avez -eues pour nous. Ce n’est pas sans un vif regret que nous envisageons -le moment de votre départ, mais ce que déjà vous avez -fait pour nous, nous fait espérer que votre solicitude s’étendra au -delà de votre séjour et que pendant votre absence nous continuerons -à en éprouver les effets.</p> - -<p>Ce n’est pas, monsieur le général, d’après l’étendue de notre -lettre qu’il faudra mesurer celle de notre reconnoissance; nous -sommes mieux en état de sentir que d’éxprimer ce que nous vous<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_624"></a>[624]</span> -devons et lorsque des circonstances plus heureuses nous rameneront -vers notre patrie, nous nous ferons un devoir et une satisfaction -de faire connaître la manière dont nous avons été traités et -les peines que vous vous êtes donnés pour adoucir notre sort. -Nous nous recommandons à la continuation de votre bienveillance, -et nous vous prions d’agréer l’assurance de gratitude et de haute -considération avec lesquelles nous avons l’honneur d’être, monsieur -le général, vos très humbles et très obeissants serviteurs,</p> - -<p>Au nom des officiers Français, prisonniers de guerre.</p> - - -<p class="smcap pad60pc">Fallot,</p> -<p class="pad30pc negin1">Docteur médecin des armées Françaises attaché au -grand quartier général de l’armée de Portugal.</p> - -<p>Le colonel sous inspecteur au revues des troupes Françaises,</p> - -<p class="noindent"> -<span class="smcap pad60pc">Catelot</span>.<br /> -<span class="smcap pad60pc">H. Delahaye</span>,<br /> -<span class="pad60pc">  C<sup>om.</sup> de la marine.</span></p> - </div> - -<hr class="tb" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="No_IX">No. IX.</h3> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 1.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Letter from lieut.-general Graham to the right honourable -Henry Wellesley, Isla de Leon, 24th March, 1811.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 allsmcap pad2 lsp">SIR,</p> - -<p>You will do justice to my reluctance to enter into any controversy -for the purpose of counteracting the effects of that obloquy -which you yourself and many others assured me my conduct was -exposed to by the reports circulated, at Cadiz, relative to the -issue of the late expedition.</p> - -<p>But a copy of a printed statement of general La Peña having -been shewn to me, which, by implication at least, leaves the -blame of the failure of the most brilliant prospects on me, it -becomes indispensably necessary that I should take up my pen in -self-defence.</p> - -<p>Having already sent you a copy of my despatch to the earl of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_625"></a>[625]</span> -Liverpool, with a report of the action, I will not trouble you with -a detail of the first movements of the army, nor with any -other observation relative to them, than that the troops suffered -much unnecessary fatigue by marching in the night, and without -good guides.</p> - -<p>Considering the nature of the service we were engaged in, I -was most anxious that the army should not come into contest -with the enemy in an exhausted state, nor be exposed to the -attack of the enemy but when it was well collected; and, in consequence -of representations to this effect, I understood that the -march of the afternoon of the 4th was to be a short one, to -take up for the night a position near Conil; to prepare which, -staff-officers, of both nations, were sent forward with a proper -escort.</p> - -<p>The march was, nevertheless, continued through the night, -with those frequent and harassing halts which the necessity of -groping for the way occasioned.</p> - -<p>When the British division began its march from the position of -Barrosa to that of Bermeja, <em>I left the general on the Barrosa -height, nor did I know of his intentions of quitting it</em>; and, -when I ordered the division to countermarch in the wood, I did -so to support the troops left for its defence, and believing the -general to be there in person. In this belief I sent no report of -the attack, which was made so near the spot where the general -was supposed to be, and, though confident in the bravery of the -British troops, I was not less so in the support I should receive -from the Spanish army. The distance, however, to Bermeja is -trifling, and no orders were given from head-quarters for the -movement of any corps of the Spanish army to support the -British division, to prevent its defeat in this unequal contest, or -to profit of the success earned at so heavy expense. The voluntary -zeal of the two small battalions, (Walloon guards and Ciudad -Real,) which had been detached from my division, brought them -alone back from the wood; but, notwithstanding their utmost -efforts, they could only come at the close of the action.</p> - -<p>Had the whole body of the Spanish cavalry, with the horse-artillery, -been rapidly sent by the sea-beach to form in the plain, -and to envelop the enemy’s left; had the greatest part of the -infantry been marched through the pine-wood, in our rear, to -turn his right, what success might have been expected from such -decisive movements? The enemy must either have retired instantly,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_626"></a>[626]</span> -and without occasioning any serious loss to the British -division, or he would have exposed himself to absolute destruction, -his cavalry greatly outnumbered, his artillery lost, his columns -mixed and in confusion; a general dispersion would have been -the inevitable consequence of a close pursuit; our wearied men -would have found spirits to go on and would have done so trusting to -finding refreshments and repose at Chiclana. This moment was -lost. Within a quarter of an hour’s ride of the scene of action, -the general remained ignorant of what was passing, <em>and nothing -was done!</em> Let not, then, this action of Barrosa form any part -of the general result of the transactions of the day; it was an -accidental feature; it was the result of no combination, it was -equally unseen and unheeded by the Spanish staff; the British -division, left alone, suffered the loss of more than one-fourth of -its number, and became unfit for future exertion. Need I say -more to justify my determination of declining any further co-operation -in the field towards the prosecution of the object of the -expedition? I am, however, free to confess that, having thus -placed myself and the British division under the direction of the -Spanish commander-in-chief in the field, (contrary to my instructions,) -I should not have thought myself justified to my king and -country to risk the absolute destruction of this division in a second -trial. But I have right to claim credit for what would have been -my conduct from what it was; and I will ask if it can be -doubted, after my zealous co-operation throughout, and the ready -assistance afforded to the troops left on Barrosa height, that the -same anxiety for the success of the cause would not have secured -to the Spanish army the utmost efforts of the British division -during the whole of the enterprise, <em>had we been supported as -we had a right to expect</em>?</p> - -<p>There is not a man in the division who would not gladly have -relinquished his claim to glory, acquired by the action of Barrosa, -to have shared, with the Spaniards, the ultimate success that was -within our grasp as it were.</p> - -<p>The people of Spain, the brave and persevering people, are -universally esteemed, respected, and admired by all who value -liberty and independence; the hearts and hands of British soldiers -will ever be with them; the cause of Spain is felt by all to be a -common one.</p> - -<p>I conclude with mentioning that the only request expressed to -me, at head-quarters, on the morning of the 6th, on knowing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_627"></a>[627]</span> -of my intention to send the British troops across the river St. -Petri, was <em>that the opportunity of withdrawing the Spanish -troops, during the night, was lost</em>; and on my observing that, -after such a defeat, there was no risk of attack from an enemy, a -very contrary opinion was maintained.</p> - -<p>In point of fact, no enemy ever appeared during several days -employed in bringing off the wounded and burying the dead. It -may be proper to remark on the report published relative to the -enemy’s number at St. Petri, (4500 men of Villat’s division,) that, -by the concurrent testimony of all the French officers here, general -Villat’s division had charge of the whole line,—what, then, must -be the strength of that division to have afforded 4500 men to -St. Petri alone? In order to establish, by authentic documents, -facts which may have been disputed, and to elucidate others, I -enclose, by way of appendix, the reports of various officers of -this division.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr4">I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.</span><br /> -<span class="padr2">(Signed) <span class="smcap pad3">Tho<sup>s</sup>. Graham</span>,</span><br /> -Lt.-General.</p> - -<p>P.S. I must add this postscript distinctly to deny my having -spoken, at head-quarters, in the evening of the 5th, of sending -for more troops, or for provisions from the Isla. My visit was a -very short one, of mere ceremony. I may have asked if the -Spanish troops expected were arrived. This error must have -arisen from the difficulty of conversing in a foreign language.</p> - -<p>With this I send you a sketch of the ground, &c. of the -action of Barrosa; by which it will be seen how impossible, -according to my judgement, it would be for an enemy to expose -his left flank, by making a direct attack through the wood on the -Barmeja position, while that of Barrosa was occupied in force by -the allied army.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_628"></a>[628]</span></p> - - -<p class="p2 center"><ins class="corr" id="tn-628" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'SECTION II'"> -SECTION 2</ins>.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Adjutant-general’s state of the troops assembled at Tarifa, -under the command of the lieut.-general Graham, 25th Feb. 1810.</em></p> - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Designations.</td> -<td class="tdc pad1" colspan="2">Number of<br />bayonets.</td> -<td class="tdl pad3">Commanders.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Two squadrons of 2d German Hussars.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrp">”  </td> -<td class="tdl">Major Busche.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Detachment of artillery.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrp"></td> -<td class="tdl">Major Duncan. 10 guns      </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Detachment of engineers</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrp">47</td> -<td class="tdl">Captain Birch.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Brigade of guards, reinforced by a detachment of the 2d battalion 95th rifles</td> -<td class="tdl fs240">}</td> -<td class="tdrp">1221</td> -<td class="tdl"><ins class="corr" id="tn-628a" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Brigadier-gen. Dilkes'"> -Brigadier-gen. Dilke</ins>.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">1st battalion 28th foot; 2d battalion 67th; 2d battalion 87th; reinforced with 2 companies of the 20th Portuguese</td> -<td class="tdl fs240">}</td> -<td class="tdrp">1764</td> -<td class="tdl">Colonel Wheatley.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Flank battalion composed of detachments of the 3d battalion 95th rifles and two companies of the 47th foot</td> -<td class="tdl fs240">}</td> -<td class="tdrp">594</td> -<td class="tdl nowrap">Lt.-col. A. Barnard, 95th regt.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Two companies of 2d battalion 9th regt.; two companies of 1st battalion 28th regt.; two companies of 2d battalion 82 regt.</td> -<td class="tdl fs240">}</td> -<td class="tdrp">475</td> -<td class="tdl">Lt.-col. Brown, 28th regt.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">One Company of the royal staff corps</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrp">33</td> -<td class="tdl">Lieutenant Reid.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrp">——</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Total number of bayonets</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrp">4114</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">The hussars were about</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrp">180</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrp">——</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Total of sabres and bayonets</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrp">4294,</td> -<td class="tdl">with 10 guns.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrp">——</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_629"></a>[629]</span></p> - - -<p class="p2 center"><ins class="corr" id="tn-629" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'SECTION III'"> -SECTION 3</ins>.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from a letter of general Frederick Ponsonby.</em></p> - -<p>“I proceeded rapidly towards the entrance of the wood, found -the Germans, and conducted them along the right flank of our -little army. We came in contact with the French dragoons, -whom we found nearly abreast of our front line and about three -hundred yards apart from it on our right flank, our line had just -halted and the firing was gradually decreasing at the time we -charged. I do not imagine the French dragoons much exceeded -us in number, they behaved well, but if we had had half a dozen -stout squadrons the mass of beaten infantry would not have returned -to their camp.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_630"></a>[630]</span></p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 4.—STATE OF THE FIRST CORPS.</p> - -<p class="pad4"> -<br /> -[A] Genereaux de Brigade.<br /> -[B] Colonels.<br /> -[C] Chefs de Bt. ou Escadron.<br /> -[D] Capitaines.<br /> -[E] Lieutenants.<br /> -[F] Sous Lieutenants.<br /> -[G] Sous Officiers et Soldats.<br /> -[H] Total.<br /> -</p> - -<p class="p1 pad6"><span class="transnote">(Part 1 of 3)</span></p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl bt" colspan="3"> </td> -<td class="tdlbl bt brr" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3"></td> -<td class="tdcbl brr" colspan="8"><span class="fs120">Tués.</span></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3"> </td> -<td class="tdlbl bb brr" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [A]</td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [B]</td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [C]</td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [D]</td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [E]</td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [F]</td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [G]</td> -<td class="tdcbl brr"> [H]</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl bt" colspan="3"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt brr"></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="tdl" rowspan="2">St. Petri,</td> -<td class="tdl" rowspan="2">  4</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 95 de Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 3</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 3</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">{ Etat Major</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Etat Major</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 2</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 9 Infr. Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 14</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 15</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{     1</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 24 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 33</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 35</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 96 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 39</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 41</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{1 Br. Elite</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 2</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Etat Major</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{     2 </td> -<td class="tdl">{ 45 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 7</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 8</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">5  Mars</td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 8 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 2</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 3</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 2</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 3</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 63</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 74</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{ </td> -<td class="tdl">{ 54 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 2</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 26</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 29</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Etat Major</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{     3</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 27 Infr. Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 20</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 21</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 94 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 9</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 10</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 95 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 1 Regt.</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 2</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 2</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{  Dragoons</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 2 Regt.</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 3</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 3</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Artillerie</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 16</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 16</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" rowspan="2">Puerta</td> -<td class="tdl" rowspan="2">St. Maria</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 45 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 10</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 10</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">{ Artillerie</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Medina,</td> -<td class="tdl">9 Mars,</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 94</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 4</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 4</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">8 Dr.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{ 95</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 4</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 4</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 3</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 3</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 9</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 6</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 3</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 255</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 281</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb brr"></td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p class="p2 pad6"><span class="transnote">(Part 2 of 3)</span></p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl bt" colspan="3"> </td> -<td class="tdlbl bt brr" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3"></td> -<td class="tdcbl brr" colspan="8"><span class="fs120">Blessés.</span></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3"> </td> -<td class="tdlbl bb brr" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [A]</td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [B]</td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [C]</td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [D]</td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [E]</td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [F]</td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [G]</td> -<td class="tdcbl brr"> [H]</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl bt" colspan="3"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt brr"></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="tdl" rowspan="2">St. Petri,</td> -<td class="tdl" rowspan="2">  4</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 95 de Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 2</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 32</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 37</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">{ Etat Major</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 2</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 3</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Etat Major</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 9 Infr. Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 2</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 70</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 74</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{     1</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 24 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 4</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 2</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 214</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 221</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 96 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 3</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 2</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 109</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 205</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{1 Br. Elite</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 2</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 3</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 136</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 141</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Etat Major</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 2</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{     2 </td> -<td class="tdl">{ 45 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 44</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 44</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">5  Mars</td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 8 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 2</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 6</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 3</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 622</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 633</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{ </td> -<td class="tdl">{ 54 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 4</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 5</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 284</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 294</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Etat Major</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{     3</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 27 Infr. Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 2</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 3</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 150</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 157</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 94 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 49</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 52</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 95 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 32</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 32</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 1 Regt.</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 3</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 2</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 30</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 36</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{  Dragoons</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 2 Regt.</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 12</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 12</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Artillerie</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 3</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 31</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 34</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" rowspan="2">Puerta</td> -<td class="tdl" rowspan="2">St. Maria</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 45 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 43</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 43</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">{ Artillerie</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 2</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 2</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Medina,</td> -<td class="tdl">9 Mars,</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 94</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 29</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 29</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">8 Dr.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{ 95</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 18</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 19</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt brr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 3</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 5</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 23</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 27</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 12</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1997</td> -<td class="tdrbl brr"> 2068</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb brr"></td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p class="p2 pad6"><span class="transnote">(Part 3 of 3)</span></p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl bt" colspan="3"> </td> -<td class="tdlbl bt brr" colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdc bt bll"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3"></td> -<td class="tdcbl brr" colspan="6"><span class="fs120">Restes sus les Champ<br /> grièvement Blessés</span></td> -<td class="tdc bll"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3"> </td> -<td class="tdlbl bb brr" colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdc bb bll"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdc bll"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [A]</td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [B]</td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [D]</td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [F]</td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [G]</td> -<td class="tdcbl"> [H]</td> -<td class="tdc bll">Total<br />general.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdc bll"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl bt" colspan="3"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt bll"></td> -</tr> - -<tr> -<td class="tdl" rowspan="2">St. Petri,</td> -<td class="tdl" rowspan="2">  4</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 95 de Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 5</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 5</td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 42</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">{ Etat Major</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 3</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdc bll"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Etat Major</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 3</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 9 Infr. Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 18</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 19</td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 108</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{     1</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 24 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 2</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 21</td> -<td class="tdrbl">24</td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 280</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 96 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 3</td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 249</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{1 Br. Elite</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 59</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 60</td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 203</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdc bll"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Etat Major</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 2</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{     2 </td> -<td class="tdl">{ 45 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 3</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 3</td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 55</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">5  Mars</td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 8 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 19</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 19</td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 726</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{ </td> -<td class="tdl">{ 54 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 323</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdc bll"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Etat Major</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{     3</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 27 Infr. Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 2</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 21</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 23</td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 201</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 94 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 62</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 95 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 34</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdc bll"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 1 Regt.</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 3</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 4</td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 42</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{  Dragoons</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 2 Regt.</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 4</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 4</td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 19</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Artillerie</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 51</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdc bll"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" rowspan="2">Puerta</td> -<td class="tdl" rowspan="2">St. Maria</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 45 Ligne</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 27</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 28</td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 81</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">{ Artillerie</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 6</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 6</td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 9</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> </td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl"></td> -<td class="tdc bll"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Medina,</td> -<td class="tdl">9 Mars,</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 94</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 33</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">8 Dr.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{ 95</td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 24</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bt"></td> -<td class="tdc bll bt"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 1</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 5</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 6</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 180</td> -<td class="tdrbl"> 202</td> -<td class="tdrqq bll"> 2551</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdcbl bbb"></td> -<td class="tdc bll bbb"></td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p class="p1 right"> Certified copy by Count Gazan.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">Total</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">2551</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"><em>Note by the Editor.</em>—</td> -<td class="tdl">Deduct affair</td> -<td class="tdl">of the 4th about Santa Petri</td> -<td class="tdr">45</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">”     ”</td> -<td class="tdl">at Puerta Santa Maria.</td> -<td class="tdr">81</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">”     ”</td> -<td class="tdl">at Medina</td> -<td class="tdr">64</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">—–</td> -<td class="tdr">190</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">——</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">Remains loss at Barrosa</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">2361</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_631"></a>[631]</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 5.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Intercepted papers of colonel Lejeune.</em></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="smcap center">Ordre.</p> - -<p>Il est ordonné à Monsieur le colonel baron le Jeune, mon A. -D. C. de partir sur le champ en poste pour porter les ordres ci-joints -et parcourir l’Andalousie et l’Estramadure.</p> - -<p>Monsieur le colonel le Jeune se rendra d’abord à Grenade auprès -de Monsieur le général Sebastiani, commandant du 4<sup>me</sup> corps -d’armée, et il lui remettra les ordres qui le concernent.</p> - -<p>De Grenade, Monsieur le Jeune se rendra par Séville devant -Cadiz, et verra par lui-même la situation des choses, afin de pouvoir -à son retour en rendre un compte détaillé à l’Empereur. Monsieur -le Jeune remettra à Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie, les -dépêches qui lui sont destinées, soit à Séville, soit à Cadiz, soit partout -où il sera. Il se rendra ensuite au 5<sup>me</sup> corps d’armée commandé -par Monsieur le maréchal duc de Trévise en Estremadure: -le corps doit être à Badajos, ou même sur le Tage.</p> - -<p>Monsieur le Jeune prendra une connaissance exacte de sa position, -et de celle des troupes de l’armée du centre commandée par -le général —— qui sont réunies sur le Tage. Il verra si -ces corps sont en communication avec l’armée de Portugal, et -recueillera les nouvelles que l’on pourrait avoir de cette armée de -ce côté.</p> - -<p>Monsieur le Jeune prendra tous les renseignemens nécessaires -pour pouvoir réprondre à toutes les questions de l’Empereur, sur -la situation des choses en Andalousie, devant Cadiz, et en Estremadure, -d’où il viendra me rendre compte de sa mission.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="smcap lsp">Le prince de Wagram et de Neufchatel</span>,<br /> -<span class="padr4">Major-général.</span></p> - -<p><em>Paris, le 14 Février, 1811.</em></p> - </div> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 6.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extracts from Lejeune’s reports.</em></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="smcap center">Cadiz.</p> - -<p>“Montagnes de Ronda foyer d’insurrection entre le 4<sup>me</sup> corps -et le premier.”</p> - -<p>“Les obusiers à la villantrois portent à 2560 toises: l’obus doit -peser 75 livres, et contient 11 à 12 onces de poudre: on charge<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_632"></a>[632]</span> -l’obusier à poudre d’un ⅓ du poids de l’obus pour obtenir cette -distance. Il n’y en a que le 4 en batterie: à la redoute Napoleon -on en a 12 en fondus: mais il manque de projectilles et -de la poudre en suffisante quantité. Toutes les obus n’éclatent -pas en ville.”</p> - -<p>“Le pont de St. Pestri a été traversé le jour de l’affaire par -un sergent du 24<sup>me</sup> qui est revenu avec les Espagnols que l’on a -pris. Le moment eut été favorable pour s’emparer de l’Isle.”</p> - -<p>“Le duc de Bellune bien ennuyé, désire beaucoup retourner: -bon général mais voyant les choses trop en noir.”</p> - </div> - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 7.</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="right"><em>Puerto Real, 20 Mars, 1811.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 smcap pad2 lsp">Mon cher General,</p> - -<p>Enfin après 15 jours des plus cruelles souffrances je me trouve -en état de reprendre la plume et de continuer le réçit que j’ai eu -l’honneur de vous adresser dans ma lettre du 6 au 7 de ce mois.</p> - -<p>L’une des choses qui mérite d’abord de fixer votre attention, est -la composition de cette armée combinée dont nous avons été tout-à-coup -assaillis. J’ai déjà dit que le 26 Février une flotte de 180 -voiles était sortie de Cadiz portant 1500 hommes de débarquement, -et que de ce nombre étaient environ 4000 Anglais et 1000 Portugais. -Cette flotte se dirigea vers Tarifa où le débarquement se -fit le lendemain sans aucun accident. Il parait que les Anglais -en réunissant les garnisons d’Algéciras et de Gibraltar à quelques -restes de troupes venues récemment de Sicile, avaient déjà formé à -Tarifa un petit corps de 1000 Anglais et de 2000 Portugais commandé -par le général Stuart, et qui forma avec 2 ou 300 hommes -de cavalerie, l’avant garde de l’expédition dirigée contre nous. -Cette armée ainsi composée de 10 à 12,000 Espagnols bien ou -mal équipés, de 4 à 5000 Anglais et de 3000 Portugais se mit -enfin en campagne, et vint nous attaquer le 5. Il parait que -Monsieur le maréchal Victor ne fut instruit que tard de la vraie -direction prise par l’armée ennemie. Il arriva à Chiclana le 5 -entre 8 et 9 heures du matin, suivi des bataillons de la 1<sup>e</sup> et -2<sup>de</sup> division: le plan d’opérations auquel il s’arrêta fut d’envoyer -sur le champ la division Villate avec un régiment de cavalerie aux -lignes de St. Petri, avec ordre de laisser arriver l’ennemi, de lui -résister foiblement pour l’engager à suivre notre mouvement de -retraite et de l’attirer ainsi sous la position St. Anne, où il ne -pouvait manquer de se trouver dans une situation extrêmement<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_633"></a>[633]</span> -desavantageuse. Pendant cette manœuvre Monsieur le maréchal -Victor s’était lui-même porté avec la 1<sup>re</sup> et 2<sup>de</sup> division entre Conil -et St. Petri, à peu près à la hauteur de la Torre Barrosa avec -l’intention de couper à l’ennemi la retraite des montagnes. Là, -rencontrant la queue de l’armée, qui finissait de se filer, il la fit -attaquer vigoureusement, culbuta tout ce qui se rencontra devant -lui et accula les Espagnols à la mer, mais les Anglais que cette -manœuvre hardie mettaient entre deux feux, et dans l’impossibilité -de regagner Conil, revinrent sur leurs pas, et attaquant avec la -rage du désespoir, ils forcèrent à la retraite nos deux divisions, -qui ne formaient pas ensemble 5000 hommes.</p> - -<p>Cependant Monsieur le maréchal Victor se croyait si sur de la -victoire qu’avant d’attaquer il envoya ordre aux troupes qui étaient -à Médina, de se porter entre Veger et Conil, pour ramasser le -reste des trainards; les bagages, et les trains de munitions qu’ils -pouvaient rencontrer.</p> - -<p>Le projet d’attirer l’ennemi sur le feu de St. Anne n’avait pas -mieux réussi du côté de la division Villatte; car si cette division -fut d’abord assaillie par presque toute l’armée combinée, les généraux -Anglais et Espagnols, avertis de bonne heure que Monsieur -le maréchal les tournaient avec un corps de troupes, arrêterent -leurs colonnes sur la rive gauche du ruisseau qui touche au Moulin -d’Almanza, et là, naturellement retranchés derrière ce marais, ils -n’eurent à garder que le pont et le Moulin, les seuls endroits par -lesquels on pouvait les attaquer. Quelque chose de plus malheureux, -fut, que des le commencement de l’action, nos lignes de St. -Petri, n’étant pas défendues, il sortit par le pont de Radeaux 5000 -hommes de troupes fraiches de la Isla, lesquels se plaçant en -bataille devant la division Villatte, et couverts par le ruisseau du -Moulin d’Almanza laissèrent au reste de l’armée combinée la liberté -de se retourner tout entière contre l’attaque de Monsieur le maréchal -Victor. Ainsi se termina la battaille du 5, l’ennemi coucha -sur son champ de battaille, sans poursuivre les divisions Laval et -Rufin dans leur retraite. Je vous ai déjà fait part de notre perte. -Le général Rufin que nous croyons tué par une balle, qui lui a -traversé la tête, a été porté par les Anglais à la Isla, où après deux -jours de léthargie, il a donné signes de vie; on dit qu’il va mieux.</p> - -<p>La perte de l’ennemi a été à peu près de 3000 Anglais ou -Portugais, et de 5 à 600 Espagnols, tués ou blessés; les Anglais -ont eu beaucoup des officiers mis hors de combat, on croit les -généraux <em>Grâm</em> et Stuart ainsi que le général Peña blessés. -Le 6 à la pointe du jour nous nous attendions bien à une attaque<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_634"></a>[634]</span> -générale qui pouvait nous être très funeste; mais l’ennemi se -contenta d’occuper avec 2000 hommes, le fort de Médina, que -nous avions un peu imprudemment abandonnés; la flotille ennemie -fit aussi des démonstrations d’attaque sur le Trocadero, mais sans -effet. Elle débarqua 6 à 700 hommes entre le Port de St. Marie, -et le fort St. Cataline, qui fût sommé de se rendre; on répondit -à coups de canons. Un officier Anglais vint chez le gouverneur -de St. Marie le prévenir qu’il allait prendre possession de la ville, -mais il avait laissé ses troupes à la porte. Elles courent faire -une action d’éclat en brulant et réduisant la petite redoute St. -Antoine, qui n’était point gardée; enchantés de ce succès ils -se rembarquèrent. M. le maréchal s’attendait bien à être attaqués -le 6 à Chiclana, il avait donné des ordres en conséquence, ces -ordres furent mal interprétés, et on endommagea mal-à-propos -dans la nuit quelques uns de nos ouvrages, mais ils furent sur le -champ réparés. Lui-même était venu à Puerto Réal avec la -division Laval, et avait envoyé la 1<sup>re</sup> division à St. Marie pour -reprendre la ligne de Blocus comme avant la bataille du 5. Le -5<sup>me</sup> regiment de chasseurs fut envoyé entre Puerto Real et -Médina à la ferme de Guerra en reconnaissance; il y rencontra -une poste de cavalerie ennemie, et la tailla en pièces. Le 6 au -soir, on essaya de reprendre le fort de Médina, mais sans succès. -Le 7 il fallut y envoyer plus de monde, et les Espagnols l’évacuèrent -sans opposer de résistance.</p> - -<p>Dans la nuit du 5 les Espagnols avaient rasés nos lignes de -St. Petri, ils employèrent pendant plusieurs jours et plusieurs -nuits 6000 hommes, à transporter à la Isla, du bois, dont ils -manquaient, quelques jours après, nous avons fait cesser ces -approvisionnements, en reprenant la position de St. Petri, où on -ne trouva personne; les Espagnols craignant une répétition de -l’affaire du 2 Mars, ont détruits eux-même de fort bonne grace -leur tête de pont, et replié leur pont de Radeaux, des ce moment -chacun resta chez soi, comme avant les hostilités.</p> - - -<p class="p2 right"><em>Du 21 Mars, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>Il est surprenant que l’armée combinée ne nous ait pas poursuivis -le 5, bien plus surprenant encore qu’elle ne nous ait point -attaqués le 6 au matin; on en conçoit plusieurs raisons. On -conjecture d’abord que la principale perte de la bataille étant -tombée sur les Anglais, qui ont eu un grand nombre d’officiers et -même leurs généraux mis hors de combat, les Espagnols n’ont -pas osé venir seuls nous attaquer. Le général <em>Grâm</em> voulait<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_635"></a>[635]</span> -cependant les y contraindre le lendemain, mais sur leur refus -formel, il les a traité de lâches, de gens indignes d’être secourus. -Ils ont répondu qu’ils feraient une sortie de la Isla si l’on voulait -mettre le tiers d’Anglais ou Portugais avec les deux tiers d’Espagnols, -le général Anglais a répondu qu’il n’exposerait plus un -seul de ses soldats avec des troupes de cette espèce, et sur le -champ il a donné ordre aux Anglais et Portugais de se retirer.</p> - -<p>A Cadiz ou dans la ville de la Isla. Il parait même que le -lendemain les Anglais se sont embarqués pour se rendre à -Gibraltar ou peut-être à Lisbonne. Les gens du pays donnent -pour certain que le général <em>Grâm</em>, en envoyant ces jours derniers -à Londres trente-trois officiers des moins blessés, n’a pas dissimulé -qu’il les chargeaint d’exposer à son gouvernement quelle folie -il y avait de sacrifier de braves gens pour soutenir en Espagne -un parti sans moyens, sans bravoure et sans moralité. Si ce -qui précède n’est pas vrai, au moins sommes nous certains qu’une -grande mésintelligence règne entre les Espagnols et leurs alliés. -Le 20, les Espagnols ont encore essayé une sortie de la Carraca -mais sans succès; ils s’y prennent un peu tard. Nous sommes -à présent très à mesure pour les recevoir. Ils font semblant -d’embarquer continuellement des troupes qui n’agissent pas et qui -ne peuvent plus nous nuire. Il est arrivé à Médina quelques -bataillons du 4<sup>me</sup> corps, deux bataillons du soixante-trois sont -aussi venus de Séville. Nous apprenons avec la prise de Badajos, -que M. le maréchal Soult est à Séville. La blessure de M. le -commandant Bompar et les miennes vont un peu mieux.</p> - -<p class="smcap right">Legentil.</p> - -<p>Excusez les imperfections de cette longue lettre, j’écris de mon -lit, dans une posture gênante.</p> - -<p><em>Monsieur le général de division Lery, à Séville.</em></p> - </div> - -<p class="p2 center"><ins class="corr" id="tn-635" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'SECTION 7'"> -SECTION 8</ins>.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extracts from the intercepted report of general Garbé, commanding -the French engineers, at the Blockade of Cadiz.</em></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="right"><em>25 Mars, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>“On avait apperçu le 26 de Février au matin un grand convoi -partant de la baye de Cadiz, pour se diriger sur Tarifa. Ce convoi -portait à peu près 6 ou 7000 hommes des troupes de débarquement, -qui allait joindre celles qui étaient déjà réunies sur la<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_636"></a>[636]</span> -Barbate et dans les environs de l’Alcala de los Gazules. Le 2 -Mars à la pointe du jour, l’ennemi commença son opération sur -Caza Vieja, qui fut évacué, et en même temps, il effectua vers -l’embouchure de St. Petri, un passage pour faciliter l’établissement -d’un pont de radeaux et d’une tête de pont. Il fit aussi -débarquer des troupes dans l’Isletta del Coto, et s’occupa d’y -établir deux batteries. Le 3, on fit marcher la division du -général Rufin, qui prit position à moitié chemin de Puerto Real -à Médina Sidonia. Celle du général Laval, s’établit en avant de -Puerto Real, et le général Vilatte garda ses positions auprès de -Chiclana. Ce jour on n’apperçut aucun mouvement de l’ennemi. -Tous les ouvrages de la ligne étaient gardes par les garnisons -qu’on avait désignées auparavant. Santa Marie fut évacué et le -pont replié sur la rive gauche.</p> - -<p>“Puerto Real était défendu par une compagnie de sapeurs, -deux du 45<sup>me</sup> régiment, et par tous les réfugiés Français qu’on -avoit armés.</p> - -<p>“Le 4 Monsieur le maréchal fit attaquer à la pointe du jour -l’ennemi dans sa tête de pont de Santi Petri. Cette attaque se -fit par 4 compagnies du 95<sup>me</sup> régiment qui s’emparèrent de l’ouvrage, -firent prisonniers 500 hommes, et enlevèrent un drapeau. -Il est certain que si on eut employé dans cette opération 2 ou 3000 -hommes on enlevait le pont et l’Isle de Léon. L’ennemi fut si -disconcerté qu’il avait abandonné ses batteries et ses ouvrages -fermés. Un pareil résultat paraissait être d’un très bon augure -pour les grandes opérations. On fit partir le même jour de Médina -une reconnaissance sur Casa Vieja. On reçut avis dans la nuit que -cette reconnaissance n’avait rencontré personne, et que les colonnes -ennemies se dirigeant sur Conil, le mouvement ne pouvait avoir -pour but que d’opérer la jonction de ce corps d’armée, avec celui -qui était resté dans l’île. Le 5, avant le jour, on se mit en marche -de la position qu’on occupait à moitié chemin de Médina pour se -porter sur Chiclana. Arrivé dans cet endroit, Monsieur le maréchal -donna l’ordre au général Villatte de rassembler toute sa division -vers les flèches de St. Petri, pour y maintenir l’ennemi qui y -paraissait en force, pendant qu’il dirigeait sur la route de Conil, -les divisions de Laval et Rufin, et le peu de cavalerie qu’il avait -avec lui. Il se porta de ce côté, et ne tarda pas à rencontrer une -forte colonne, qui marchait le long de la mer entre St. Petri et -Conil, et se dirigeait sur le premier de ses endroits. Les troupes -arrivées à portée de canon se formèrent. Le général Rufin prit -la gauche pour aller occuper un mamelon où l’ennemi paraissait<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_637"></a>[637]</span> -s’établir. Quand les deux divisions furent formées, elle se trouvèrent -en présence d’une armée, beaucoup plus nombreuse qu’on ne -l’avait cru d’abord. L’artillerie n’était pas encore arrivée, et celle -de l’ennemi commençait à jour de toute parts. Le général Vilatte -n’avait pu garder les flèches de St. Petri, qui étaient au moment -d’être prises, n’étant alors défendues que par un seul bataillon du -27<sup>me</sup> d’infantrie légère.</p> - -<p>“Cette division fut obligée de se replier et de repasser le -ravin dans lequel roulent les eaux du Moulin d’Almanza. -Ce mouvement empêcha le général Vilatte de se réunir aux -deux autres divisions, qui n’ayant en tout que dix bataillons, -essuyaient un feu terrible de la part de l’ennemi. Nos pertes -devenaient d’autant plus sensible que le nombre des combattans -n’était que le tiers de celui de l’ennemi. Des corps entiers se -trouvaient accablés avant qu’on eut pu entamer la ligne des -Anglais. Il n’y avait point de réserve. Le deux mille hommes -de Médina Sidonia étaient en marche pour Conil. Il fallut -penser à la retraite qui se fit en bon ordre, jusque sur les hauteurs -en avant de Chiclana, où l’on fit camper une division pendant -la nuit. Les Anglais firent leur jonction avec les troupes de -l’île de Léon, et les Espagnols continuèrent d’occuper notre -position du Moulin d’Almanza et de St Petri. Si l’ennemi -voulant continuer ses opérations offensives dans la journée du 6, -se fut présenté de bonne heure, il est probable que dans la -situation où nous nous trouvions après la journée du 5 nous étions -obligés d’évacuer le terrain jusqu’à Puerto Réal, où on aurait -pris la position dont j’ai parlé plus haut, pour y livrer une seconde -bataille, mais les opérations ont manqué d’ensemble. Il s’est -contenté de rentrer dans l’île et pendant ce temps un très petit -corps de troupes Anglaises opéraient un débarquement entre -St. Marie, et la pointe de St. Catherine, qui n’eut d’autre résultat -que d’enlever une batterie défendue par quinze hommes et de -se promener une ou deux heures dans les rues de St. Marie. -Monsieur le maréchal ne voyait aucun mouvement offensif, -ordonna de rétablir les grandes communications par St. Marie, -chacun rentra dans ses portes et cette mesure produisit beaucoup -plus d’effet, sur l’armée et les habitans du Pays, que les dispositions -qu’on auraient pu prendre.”</p> - </div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_638"></a>[638]</span></p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="No_X">No. X.</h3> - -<p class="p3 pfs70 lht2 lsp2">EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF -CAPTAIN SQUIRES, OF THE ENGINEERS.</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 1.</p> - -<p class="p1 center">“<em>March 1, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>“I have been employed in constructing batteries, opposite the -mouth of the Zezere, for twenty-five guns! though we have only -one brigade of nine pounders to arm them.</p> - -<p>“Thank God, for my own credit, I protested against these -batteries from the first, in my reports which were sent to lord -Wellington, and now I verily believe the marshal himself is -ashamed of their construction. Punhete, you know, is situated -precisely at the confluence of the Zezere with the Tagus, the -enemy’s bridge is about half a mile from the mouth of the river, -and one mile, by measurement, from the nearest of our heights, -which we have crowned with an eight-gun battery.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 2.</p> - -<p>“I was truly sorry to hear that the Spaniards were so thoroughly -routed near Badajos, but Mendizabel was an idiot. On the 18th -February, the enemy threw a bridge over the Guadiana, above -Badajos. Don Carlos España, an active officer, whom I know -very well, reconnoitred the bridge, and made his report to Mendizabel, -who was playing at cards. Very well, said the chief, -we’ll go and look at it to-morrow! At day-break the Spanish -army was surprised.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center">SECTION 3.</p> - -<p>“May 17, 1811. I reconnoitred the ground in front of Cristoval, -and was pressed, by Colonel Fletcher, who was on the other -side of the Guadiana, to commence our operations that evening. -The soil was hard and rocky, and our tools infamous. I made,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_639"></a>[639]</span> -however, no difficulties, and we began our battery on the night of -the 8th, the moon being at the full: our work was barely four -hundred yards from Cristoval. In spite, however, of a most -destructive fire of musketry, and shot, and shells, from various -parts of the body of the place, we succeeded in completing our -battery on the night of the 10th; and, on the morning of the -11th, at four, a. m. its fire was opened. The enemy’s fire was, -however, very superior to our own; and, before sunset, the three -guns and one howitzer were disabled, for against our little attack -was the whole attention of the enemy directed. On the other -side of the river the intended attack had not yet been begun, -and we sustained the almost undivided fire of Badajos! I told -the marshal, when I saw him on the 11th, that to continue to -fight our battery was a positive sacrifice; he did not, however, -order us to desist until our guns were silenced. If doubt and indecision -had not governed all our operations, and had we begun -even on the night of the 9th, I am satisfied that our plan of -attack was excellent, and that we should have entered the place -on the 15th. It is true that two distant batteries were erected, on -the left bank of the river, against the place, but they scarcely -excited the enemy’s attention; our little corps bore the brunt of -the enemy’s exertions, which were great and spirited. Including -those who fell in the sortie, our loss has been from six to seven -hundred men. Both officers and men were exhausted, mind and -body; they felt and saw that they were absurdly sacrificed.”</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="No_XI">No. XI.</h3> - -<p class="p3 pfs70 lht lsp2">EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL CAMPBELL -TO LORD LIVERPOOL.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>Gibraltar, October 23, 1810.</em></p> - -<p>“The troops at Malaga, with the exception of three hundred -men, moved upon Fuengirola, of which lord Blayney was apprised; -but, in place of his lordship taking advantage of this -fortunate event, he wasted two days in a fruitless attack on the -fort of Fuengirola, cannonading it from twelve-pounders, although -he perceived that no impression had been made on it by the fire of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_640"></a>[640]</span> -the shipping and gun-boats, the artillery of which were double -the calibre. In this situation he was surprised by an inferior -force, and, whilst he was on board of a gun-boat, his guns taken -and the whole thrown into confusion; at this moment he was informed -of the disaster, and, so far to his credit, he retook his -guns, but, immediately after, conceiving a body of French cavalry -to be Spaniards, he ordered the firing to cease, when he was -surrounded and made prisoner; his men, losing confidence, gave -way, and, hurrying to the beach, relinquished their honour and -the field.”</p> - - </div> - - -<p class="p6 center">END OF VOL. III.</p> - - -<p class="p6 pfs80">LONDON:</p> - -<p class="pfs60 allsmcap">PRINTED BY W. MARCHANT, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET.</p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h2>FOOTNOTES:</h2> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">[1]</a> Lord Stuart de Rothesay.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="label">[2]</a> First aide-de-camp to marshal Massena.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="label">[3]</a> Admiral sir Edward Codrington.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="label">[4]</a> Lord Lynedoch.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="label">[5]</a> Lieut.-gov. of Gibraltar.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="label">[6]</a> Governor of Almeida.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="label">[7]</a> Dupont’s proceedings at Cordoba, as related in my first volume, have been -commented upon in a recent publication, entitled “<cite>Annals of the Peninsular -Campaigns</cite>.”</p> - -<p>Upon the authority of general Foy, the author asserts that Cordoba was sacked, -calls it “<em>a gratuitous atrocity</em>,” and “<em>an inhuman butchery</em>” and no doubt, -taking for fiction the stories of Agathocles, Marius, Sylla, and a thousand -others, gravely affirms, that, <em>capacity and cruelty are rarely united</em>; that <em>Dupont -was a fool</em>, and that <em>Napoleon did not poison him in a dungeon</em>, but that he must -have “<em>dragged on a miserable existence exposed to universal scorn and hatred</em>.”</p> - -<p>Unfortunately for the application of this nursery philosophy, Dupont, -although a bad officer, was a man of acknowledged talents, and became -minister of war at the restoration of the Bourbons, a period fixed by the author -of “<cite>the Annals</cite>,” <em>as the era of good government in France</em>. But I rejected -Foy’s authority, 1st, because his work, unfinished and posthumous, discovered -more of the orator than the impartial historian, and he was politically -opposed to Dupont. Secondly, because he was not an eye witness, and his -relation at variance with the “<cite>official journal of Dupont’s operations</cite>” was also -contradicted by the testimony of a <em>British general of known talents and accuracy, -who obtained his information on the spot a few months subsequent to the event</em>.</p> - -<p>“Some time after the victory, <em>order was restored, pillage was forbidden under -pain of death, and the chosen companies maintained the police</em>.”—Journal of -Operations.</p> - -<p><em>Cordoba was not pillaged</em>, being one of the few places where the <em>French were -well received</em>.—Letters from a British general to colonel Napier.</p> - -<p>On this point, therefore, I am clear; but the author of the “<cite>Annals</cite>,” after -contrasting my account with Foy’s, thus proceeds, “It is only necessary to add, -that the preceding statement is given by colonel Napier <em>without any quotation -of authority</em>.”</p> - -<p>A less concise writer might have thought it right to add that, <em>six months</em> previous -to the publication of the <cite>Annals</cite>, colonel Napier, hearing that some of his -statements appeared inconclusive to the author of that work, <em>because there was no -quotation of authority</em>, transmitted through a mutual friend, an assurance that he -had authority for every <em>statement</em>, and that he would willingly <em>furnish the author -with any or all of them</em>: no notice was taken of this offer!</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="label">[8]</a> An interesting account of this noble-minded woman, is to be found in a small -volume, entitled, “<cite>Sketches of a Soldier’s Life, in Ireland</cite>,” by the author of “<cite>The -Eventful Life of a Soldier</cite>.” This last work was erroneously designated, in my -first volume, as “<em>The Life of a Sergeant</em>.”</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="label">[9]</a> [Note in Napoleon’s own hand.] On ne doit pas oublier qu’en approchant -de France tout favourise la desertion.</p> - -</div> -</div> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<div class="transnote"> -<a id="TN"></a> -<p><strong>TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE</strong></p> - -<p><a href="#Footnote_9">Footnote [9]</a> is referenced twice from <a href="#Page_563">page 563</a>.</p> - -<p>Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been -corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within -the text and consultation of external sources.</p> - -<p>Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added, -when a predominant preference was found in the original book.</p> - -<p>To save space in the wide tables in <a href="#No_I">Note I</a> of the Appendix, the -headings ‘Hospital.’ and ‘Cavalry.’ have been abbreviated to -‘Hosp.’ and ‘Cav.’.</p> - -<p>The original table in <a href="#No_IX">Note IX</a>, section 4, was very wide and has -been split into three parts.</p> - -<p>In those sections of the Appendix that are French documents, some -corrections to accents have been made silently; primarily é for e, -and e for é. Incorrect grammar and spelling has been left unchanged.</p> - -<p>Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, -and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.</p> - -<p> -Table of Contents:<br /> -<a href="#tn-v">Pg v</a>: ‘Captain Hollowell’ replaced by ‘Captain Hallowell’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-x">Pg x</a>: ‘maratime operations’ replaced by ‘maritime operations’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-xii">Pg xii</a>: ‘retreats to Lerena’ replaced by ‘retreats to Llerena’.<br /> -<br /> -Main text:<br /> -<a href="#tn-3">Pg 3</a>: ‘Pyrennean vallies’ replaced by ‘Pyrennean valleys’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-3a">Pg 3</a>: ‘into the vallies’ replaced by ‘into the valleys’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-5">Pg 5</a>: ‘Nuesta Senora’ replaced by ‘Nuestra Senora’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-11">Pg 11</a>: ‘the commucations of’ replaced by ‘the communications of’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-13">Pg 13</a>: ‘being unqual to’ replaced by ‘being unequal to’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-14">Pg 14</a>: ‘very essense of’ replaced by ‘very essence of’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-18">Pg 18</a>: ‘on the ocsion’ replaced by ‘on the occasion’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-21">Pg 21</a>: ‘occupied by Coupigny’ replaced by ‘occupied by Conpigny’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-33">Pg 33</a>: ‘calamity befal’ replaced by ‘calamity befall’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-47">Pg 47</a>: ‘was betowed with’ replaced by ‘was bestowed with’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-54">Pg 54</a>: ‘and carelesssly’ replaced by ‘and carelessly’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-61">Pg 61 (Sidenote)</a>: ‘Wellesly’ replaced by ‘Wellesley’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-63">Pg 63</a>: ‘the Portugese’ replaced by ‘the Portuguese’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-64">Pg 64 (Sidenote)</a>: ‘Wellesly’ replaced by ‘Wellesley’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-73">Pg 73</a>: ‘subborn resistance’ replaced by ‘stubborn resistance’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-86">Pg 86</a>: ‘from Aranjues to’ replaced by ‘from Aranjuez to’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-92">Pg 92</a>: ‘whose procedings’ replaced by ‘whose proceedings’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-96">Pg 96</a>: ‘at Yevenes and’ replaced by ‘at Yebenes and’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-125">Pg 125</a>: ‘war of invavasion’ replaced by ‘war of invasion’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-138">Pg 138</a>: ‘evacuted the town’ replaced by ‘evacuated the town’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-139">Pg 139</a>: ‘to recal them’ replaced by ‘to recall them’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-143">Pg 143 (Sidenote)</a>: ‘des Française’ replaced by ‘des Français’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-174">Pg 174</a>: ‘Toccadero creek’ replaced by ‘Troccadero creek’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-179">Pg 179</a>: ‘soldiers, and and a’ replaced by ‘soldiers, and a’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-197">Pg 197</a>: ‘from about Lerena’ replaced by ‘from about Llerena’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-237">Pg 237</a>: ‘required extrordinary’ replaced by ‘required extraordinary’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-237a">Pg 237</a>: ‘merely a a conqueror’ replaced by ‘merely a conqueror’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-242">Pg 242</a>: ‘dictinct lines’ replaced by ‘distinct lines’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-243">Pg 243</a>: ‘Gallicia and Asturia’ replaced by ‘Gallicia and Asturias’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-247">Pg 247</a>: ‘in misrepresentions’ replaced by ‘in misrepresentations’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-261">Pg 261</a>: ‘having Silviera and’ replaced by ‘having Silveira and’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-280">Pg 280</a>: ‘secorrer esta plaza’ replaced by ‘socorrer esta plaza’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-304">Pg 304 (Sidenote)</a>: ‘Cox’s Narative’ replaced by ‘Cox’s Narrative’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-307">Pg 307</a>: ‘lost a quadron’ replaced by ‘lost a squadron’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-331">Pg 331</a>: ‘Portuguese caçadore’ replaced by ‘Portuguese caçadores’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-356">Pg 356</a>: ‘3º. From Bucellas’ replaced by ‘4º. From Bucellas’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-359">Pg 359</a>: ‘Massena, suprised’ replaced by ‘Massena, surprised’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-366">Pg 366</a>: ‘own governmennt’ replaced by ‘own government’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-380">Pg 380</a>: ‘Frenchmen run to’ replaced by ‘Frenchmen ran to’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-380a">Pg 380</a>: ‘with the assistace’ replaced by ‘with the assistance’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-396">Pg 396</a>: ‘when Bacellar brought’ replaced by ‘when Baccellar brought’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-414">Pg 414</a>: ‘Moguer and Heulva’ replaced by ‘Moguer and Huelva’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-454">Pg 454</a>: ‘the posisition of’ replaced by ‘the position of’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-464">Pg 464</a>: ‘the abler tactitian’ replaced by ‘the abler tactician’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-473">Pg 473</a>: ‘from distruction’ replaced by ‘from destruction’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-485">Pg 485</a>: ‘immediately run out’ replaced by ‘immediately ran out’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-514">Pg 514</a>: ‘seventh divison’ replaced by ‘seventh division’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-583">Pg 583</a>: ‘de St. Fernado’ replaced by ‘de St. Fernando’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-588">Pg 588</a>: ‘wish to emove’ replaced by ‘wish to remove’.<br /> -<br /> -Appendix:<br /> -<a href="#tn-608">Pg 608</a> Note VII: missing heading ‘SECTION 2.’ inserted before ‘Extrait du Journal du C. de B. Pelet’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-615">Pg 615</a> Note VII: ‘SECTION IX’ replaced by ‘SECTION 9’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-621">Pg 621</a> Note VII: ‘SECTION XVIII’ replaced by ‘SECTION 18’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-621a">Pg 621</a> Note VII: ‘SECTION XIX’ replaced by ‘SECTION 19’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-622">Pg 622</a> Note VII: ‘SECTION XX’ replaced by ‘SECTION 20’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-628">Pg 628</a> Note IX: ‘SECTION II’ replaced by ‘SECTION 2’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-628a">Pg 628</a> Note IX: ‘Brigadier-gen. Dilkes’ replaced by ‘Brigadier-gen. Dilke’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-629">Pg 629</a> Note IX: ‘SECTION III’ replaced by ‘SECTION 3’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-635">Pg 635</a> Note IX: ‘SECTION 7’ replaced by ‘SECTION 8’.<br /> -</p> -</div> - - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814, VOL. 3 OF 6 ***</div> -<div style='text-align:left'> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will -be renamed. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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