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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e6aa96a --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #61320 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/61320) diff --git a/old/61320-8.txt b/old/61320-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 394c813..0000000 --- a/old/61320-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6818 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Campaign of Marengo, by Herbert H. Sargent - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Campaign of Marengo - With Comments - -Author: Herbert H. Sargent - -Release Date: February 5, 2020 [EBook #61320] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Coe, Graeme Mackreth and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - - - - - - -THE CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO - - - - - THE - - CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO - - With Comments - - BY - - HERBERT H. SARGENT - - FIRST LIEUTENANT AND QUARTERMASTER, SECOND CAVALRY, UNITED - STATES ARMY; MEMBER OF THE MILITARY HISTORICAL - SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS; - AUTHOR OF "NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN" - - [Illustration] - - LONDON - KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRÜBNER, & CO. LTD - PATERNOSTER HOUSE, CHARING CROSS ROAD - - 1897 - - - Copyrighted in Great Britain. - - - University Press: - John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U.S.A. - - - - -DEDICATION - - _BY A SOLDIER - TO - THE SOLDIERS OF HIS COUNTRY_ - - -It is written in a certain book, with which most of us are familiar, -that a day will come when there shall be no more wars. But that time -is far distant. When the laws of human society change, wars may cease, -but not till then. All around us is strife; the weak are ever falling -before the strong. The grass takes its strength from the soil and -air, and each blade struggles for food and light with its neighbor. -The beast consumes the grass, and man destroys the beast. We struggle -on, contending with one another and with the world, and encountering -defeat and death when we meet a stronger power than ourselves. Such is -Nature's stern law. It regulates the life of the worm that crawls at -our feet, governs the actions of men, and determines the destinies of -peoples. The conclusion is therefore reached that until man can rise -above this law, the time will not come when there shall be no further -need of armies, and when war shall be no more. - -No country has ever become great without soldiers. They lay the -foundations of nations. In the history of every great people there is a -record of battles fought and battles won. At Lexington, at Bunker Hill, -at Gettysburg, men died that a nation might live. Is it any wonder -that we should be proud of our profession? "Whoever has a heart," says -Von der Goltz, "feels it beat higher and becomes enthusiastic for the -profession of the soldier." Napier says: "War is the condition of this -world. From man to the smallest insect, all are at strife; and the -glory of arms, which cannot be obtained without the exercise of honor, -fortitude, courage, obedience, modesty, and temperance, excites the -brave man's patriotism, and is a chastening corrective for the rich -man's pride." - -We cannot know whether we shall be called upon to fight for our -country; we may be called, or not; but we shall deserve no less the -gratitude of our countrymen, if we remain _always ready_. Wars have -been necessary in the past; they will be necessary in the future. - - "Man needs must fight - To make true peace his own; - He needs must combat might with might, - Or might would rule alone." - -"_The decisive events of the world take place in the intellect._ It is -the mission of books that they help one to remember it." - - - - -PREFACE - - -I have written this book for the civilian and the soldier. I cherish -the hope that it will be interesting to both. - - H.H.S. - - Fort Wingate, New Mexico, - December 7, 1896. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - CHAPTER I. Page - - Introduction 15 - Comments 30 - - - CHAPTER II. - - Genoa 54 - Comments 72 - - - CHAPTER III. - - Moreau in Germany 92 - Comments 109 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - Marengo 136 - Comments 173 - - - CHAPTER V. - - General Comments 216 - - - Index 233 - - - - -LIST OF MAPS - -AT END OF VOLUME. - - - Map 1 to illustrate Chapter I. - Map 2 to illustrate Chapters II. and IV. - Map 3 to illustrate Chapter III. - Map 4 to illustrate Battle of Marengo. - - - - -THE - -CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -INTRODUCTION.[1] - - After a war one ought not only to write the history of what has taken - place, but also the history of what was intended.--Von der Goltz. - -Upon Bonaparte's return from Egypt in October, 1799, he found England, -Austria, and the small states dependent upon them waging war against -France. The allies were united in an effort to crush the French -Republic. They were sanguine of success. Against this formidable -coalition France stood alone. - -Before Bonaparte's return, a Russian army, commanded by Suwaroff, had -also been fighting the French in Italy and Switzerland; but, having -been defeated by Masséna, Suwaroff had retreated with the remnants of -his army into the valley of the Danube, and thence had proceeded into -Russia. The defeat of Suwaroff had caused the Russian Emperor, Paul the -First, to believe that his army had not been properly supported by the -Austrian armies. He therefore felt angry and bitter towards Austria. -As soon as Bonaparte became aware of the state of the Emperor's mind he -collected the Russian prisoners then in France, gave them new uniforms -and new arms, and sent them back to their own country. These acts and -others of a conciliatory nature pleased and flattered the Emperor Paul, -and enabled Bonaparte, soon after his return, to detach Russia from the -alliance. - -Of the two great powers at war with France, England had been more -active and more successful upon the sea; Austria, upon the land. In the -battle of the Nile, Nelson had dealt the French navy a terrible blow, -from the effects of which it never recovered. England was now mistress -of the sea. Having her fleets in the Mediterranean and the Gulf of -Genoa, she was prepared to assist Austria in her efforts to overthrow -the French Republic. - -During Bonaparte's absence in Egypt, Austria, aided by Russia, had -pushed forward her armies to the boundaries of France. One large -Austrian army[2] in western Germany was watching the crossings of the -Rhine; another in northwestern Italy was fighting the French along -the Apennines and Maritime Alps. From the theatre of operations made -memorable by Bonaparte's victories in 1796-97, Austria had almost -driven the French eagles. Bonaparte's battles of Montenotte, Lodi, -Castiglione, Arcole, and Rivoli seemed to have been won in vain. -Austria had all but reconquered Italy. Except along the narrow seaboard -between the Apennines and the sea, no French soldiers were to be found -upon Italian soil. - -Such was the situation when, in November, 1799, Bonaparte became -First Consul of France. At this time his acts certainly indicated -a desire for peace. He wrote to the governments of England and -Austria, deploring the futility of a continuation of the conflict, -and suggesting that the war should cease. His overtures, however, -were coldly rejected. He was forced to fight. Against this powerful -coalition peace could be obtained only by victorious battle. - -Industriously Bonaparte prepared for war. France was in a deplorable -state. The treasury was empty; the soldiers were ill fed and ill clad; -recruits and supplies were obtained with difficulty; civil war existed -in certain parts of western France; and the armies of the Republic had -met with defeat again and again. Over the French people this condition -of affairs had cast a gloom which the magic of Bonaparte's name alone -could dispel. - -During the winter of 1799-1800 his energy and activity were apparent -everywhere. His proclamations aroused the spirit and patriotism of -the French people, and gave them confidence in their government, and -hope of success under his leadership. He placed the finances upon a -firm basis, crushed out the civil war, caused arms to be manufactured, -and supplies to be collected; and from the levies that he ordered -he organized sufficient forces to strengthen materially the French -military power. Of the two French armies in the field, he sent -re-enforcements to the Army of the Rhine, gave the command of it to -General Moreau, and ordered General Masséna to take command of the Army -of Italy, which, half-starved upon the rocks of Genoa, was struggling -heroically against overwhelming odds. At this time, too, he began to -collect, drill, and organize, in different parts of France, bodies of -men who were destined to unite near Lake Geneva, and together with -other troops in France already organized, were to form a third army, to -be known as the Army of Reserve. - -Before entering into the details of the campaign, it is necessary to -describe the topography of the theatre of operations, to point out the -situations of the opposing forces, and to explain the plans of the -contending powers. - -Bordering France on the east are Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. The -Alps, covering Switzerland like a huge network, give to this country -the appearance of an immense bastion, which, extending east, separates -Germany from Italy. From Switzerland these mountains extend through -and beyond the Tyrol. They separate the valley of the Danube from the -valley of the Po. In Switzerland they are known as the Swiss Alps; -in the Tyrol, as the Tyrolese Alps. On the north side of them are -the States of Swabia, Bavaria, and Upper Austria; on the south side, -Piedmont, Lombardy, and Venice. - -Extending south from western Switzerland to within about thirty miles -of the sea, the French Alps form part of the boundary line between -France and Italy; thence, turning east, they approach the Italian -shore, and are here known as the Maritime Alps; still farther east, -along the shores of the Gulf of Genoa, they are called the Apennines. - -With the exception of a few passes, this great mountain chain, almost -enclosing northern Italy, forms an insurmountable barrier to the -soldier. Even over the passes, especially across the higher ranges, -communication was, at the time of which we write, extremely dangerous. -The snow and ice, the glaciers, avalanches, frequent storms, and steep -declivities, made these mountain roads hazardous and difficult for the -passage of armies. The principal passes in the Swiss Alps are the St. -Gothard, the Simplon, and the Great St. Bernard; in the French Alps, -the Little St. Bernard, and the Mont Cenis; in the Maritime Alps, the -Col di Tenda and the Col di Ormea; and in the Apennines, the Col di -Cadibona and the Bochetta. - -Lying partly or entirely within this territory are three large rivers -and their tributaries. They have their sources in or near the great -chain of the Alps, and drain the tributary country. The Po rises in the -French Alps, and flows east through northern Italy. The Danube rises in -western Germany, and flows east through Bavaria and Austria. The Rhine -rises in Switzerland, flows north into Lake Constance, thence, forming -the outlet of the lake, flows west to Bâle, where it turns abruptly and -flows north for the rest of its course. - -Early in April, 1800, an Austrian army of one hundred and twenty -thousand soldiers, commanded by Marshal Kray, guarded the right bank of -the upper Rhine. The right wing extended beyond Strasburg; the left, -well up into the Alps east of Switzerland; and the centre, forming the -greater part of Kray's army, occupied the Black Forest in the angle -of the Rhine made by its change of direction at Bâle. Kray's line of -communication was along several roads down the Danube to the Austrian -capital. - -Facing the Austrian army, on the opposite side of the river, was the -Army of the Rhine, commanded by Moreau. Including the French forces in -Switzerland, it numbered one hundred and thirty thousand soldiers, and -extended from the St. Gothard on the right to Strasburg on the left. It -had for a base of operations the frontier fortresses of France, and -Switzerland, which was occupied by the French. - -The Austrian army in northwestern Italy consisted of one hundred and -twenty thousand soldiers, and was commanded by General Melas. The -greater part of it was in the vicinity of Genoa and along the Apennines -and Maritime Alps. The remainder, occupying the fortresses and guarding -the entrances to the passes of the Alps, was scattered throughout -northwestern Italy. This army had its base of operations on the Mincio; -and its line of communication was by several roads down the valley of -the Po to its base, thence by two roads: one north through the Tyrol -across the Brenner Pass into the valley of the Danube; the other -northeast through Friuli across the Pontebba Pass to Vienna. - -Opposed to the army of Melas was the Army of Italy. It consisted of -forty thousand soldiers, of whom thirty-six thousand, commanded by -Masséna, were holding the passes of the Apennines and Maritime Alps -from Genoa to the Col di Tenda. The remainder, four thousand strong, -commanded by General Thurreau, was guarding the Mont Cenis Pass in the -French Alps. The line of communication of the Army of Italy to its base -of operations on the Rhone was by the Genoa-Nice road. - -A British fleet, commanded by Admiral Keith was in the Gulf of Genoa; -and a British corps twelve thousand strong, commanded by General -Abercromby, was at Port Mahon in Minorca. - -Such were the main features of the theatre of operations, and such were -the positions and numbers of the opposing armies that were facing each -other in Germany, France, Switzerland, and Italy, at the beginning -of hostilities early in April, 1800. Against the Austrian armies, -supported by the British navy, and a British corps which might at any -time be thrown upon the coast of France, Bonaparte could not, with his -two armies, expect to make much headway. His chances of success were -small; the odds against him were too great. Unless he could increase -his own forces, a French victory was doubtful. Thus it was that early -in the winter he had seen the necessity of creating an army of reserve, -which could be sent to re-enforce Moreau in Germany or Masséna in -Italy as circumstances might require. But the Army of Reserve had not -yet been assembled. The divisions composing it were still scattered -throughout France. Their organization, however, was being rapidly -pushed forward, with the intention that early in May they should unite -near Lake Geneva and form an army of forty thousand soldiers. - -On the French side, Bonaparte, at the head of the French Republic, had -for the first time full control of all military operations. Hitherto, -great as had been his achievements in Italy and in Egypt, he had acted -as a subordinate, merely directing the operations of his own army; but -now his military genius was to have full play. - -On the Austrian side, the Aulic Council, consisting of twenty-one -members, directed all military operations. This council, which held -its sessions at Vienna, not only made the plans of campaign, but also -issued detailed orders to the Austrian commanders, and furnished them -information regarding Bonaparte's plans and manoeuvres. - -At this time the ablest soldier in Austria was the Archduke Charles. -Already he had greatly distinguished himself in several campaigns. He -reasoned that, inasmuch as Austria, England, and Russia had failed to -crush the French Republic in 1799, before Bonaparte's return to France, -the allies stood little hope of success after Russia had withdrawn -from one side, and Bonaparte had been added to the other. He therefore -advised his government to accept Bonaparte's offer of peace. To the -Aulic Council he also gave valuable advice upon the military situation. -But no attention was paid to his suggestions. In fact, before the -campaign opened, the Archduke was relieved of his command in the army, -and sent into Bohemia in a kind of honorable exile. - -The plan of campaign adopted by the allies was that the Austrian army -under Kray in Germany should remain on the defensive, holding Moreau -in check if possible, while the Austrian army under Melas in Italy -attacked the Army of Italy along the Apennines and Maritime Alps. By -this means, the allies expected that the Austrian forces in Italy, so -superior in numbers to the French, would be able with the help of the -British fleet to blockade Genoa, and to drive the Army of Italy across -the Var into southern France. This movement being accomplished, the -purpose was that Melas, supported by the British navy and Abercromby's -corps, should invade France, and attack and capture Toulon. -Furthermore, the allies hoped, by adopting this plan, to receive some -support from the Royalists in the south of France. If this operation -succeeded, it was expected that Moreau would detach a sufficient -force from the Army of the Rhine to march on Toulon for the purpose -of driving back the allies: whereupon Kray could attack the Army of -the Rhine, thus weakened, with much hope of success; that, in fact, he -could take the offensive, force the crossings of the Rhine, and invade -France. - -In this calculation no plans were made to attack the French forces in -the great stronghold of Switzerland. If, however, the allies succeeded -in their designs, Kray and Melas could unite their armies in France, -thus cut the communications of the French forces in Switzerland, and -smother them, as it were, between the two great Austrian armies. - -In view of the facts that the allies were flushed with their recent -victories, were superior to their adversary in numbers, and also held -the mastery of the sea, they expected great results in the coming -campaign. With so many advantages on their side, their plans seemed -both reasonable and accomplishable; but they reckoned without the -genius of Bonaparte. - -On the other side, Bonaparte had two plans, both of which it will be -well to examine, that the reader may grasp the breadth of Bonaparte's -intellect in originating strategic conceptions. Both plans were based -upon the fact that the great stronghold of Switzerland, extending like -a huge wedge between the Austrian army in Germany and that in Italy, -was occupied by the French. This natural fortress, almost impregnable, -could be used as a base of operations from which to attack either Kray -in Germany or Melas in Italy. - -The first plan conceived by Bonaparte was to leave Masséna in Italy on -the defensive to hold Melas in check, then to unite the Army of Reserve -with Moreau's army, cross the Rhine in force between Schaffhausen -and Lake Constance, and attack that part of Kray's army occupying -the Black Forest in the angle of the Rhine between Lake Constance -and Strasburg. By an attack in this direction, Bonaparte calculated -that he could defeat Kray, drive him north, sever his communications -with Vienna, and either destroy or capture his army. If successful in -this operation, he could descend the Danube and seize the Emperor's -capital; then by taking possession of the Tyrol and the Carnic Alps, -he could occupy the Brenner and Pontebba passes, which operation would -sever the communications of Melas in Italy and cut him off from Vienna. -With Kray's army captured or destroyed, with the French holding the -only passes by which the Austrians in Italy could retreat, and with -Bonaparte in possession of the Austrian capital, the campaign must -end; the Austrian Emperor would be compelled to make peace. This plan -had many advantages. It would, if successful, be far-reaching in -its results; it would not only destroy Kray, but would paralyze the -operations of Melas; it would, to use Bonaparte's expressive words, -"reconquer Italy at Vienna." - -Though this plan promised great results it was not carried out. A -rivalry between Moreau and Bonaparte was the principal cause. The -former, being jealous of the latter, refused to serve under him. Though -the First Consul had shown his confidence in Moreau, and, by appointing -him to command the Army of the Rhine, had recognized his great military -abilities, nevertheless Moreau objected to having Bonaparte direct the -operations of the combined armies in person. In fact, he stated that he -would send in his resignation if the First Consul took command of the -Army of the Rhine. At a later day this would undoubtedly have resulted -in Moreau's losing his command; but at this time Bonaparte was not in -a position to force a quarrel with him. He had need of Moreau's great -military talents. Furthermore, the commander of the Army of the Rhine -had the unbounded confidence of the soldiers under him, and was at that -time the only general in France, except Masséna and Bonaparte himself, -who was able to direct successfully the operations of a large army. -Victory was Bonaparte's object. To be victorious, it was necessary to -utilize the services of every great soldier of France. - -Doubtless, too, in adopting another plan, Bonaparte was influenced -somewhat by the hope of gaining a great victory with the army that -he himself had created. If he could cross the Alps with the Army of -Reserve and strike a blow which would decide the fate of Italy, he -alone would reap the glory. Moreover, by following in the footsteps of -Hannibal, he would be more likely to dazzle the French people, and to -fix deeply in their minds the splendor of his achievements. - -Bonaparte's second plan was that Moreau should cross the Rhine and -attack Kray in such a direction as to push him back from Lake Constance -towards the north; that he should then detach a corps of twenty or -twenty-five thousand soldiers from his army and send them across -Switzerland by the St. Gothard Pass into Italy, where they were to -unite with the Army of Reserve to be led by Bonaparte in person over -the Great St. Bernard Pass. With these forces Bonaparte purposed to -march south, cross the Po, seize the line of retreat of the Austrians, -and force them to fight a battle to recover their communications. - -Should he succeed in this manoeuvre, a single victorious battle would -decide the fate of the Austrians in Italy; for it would sever their -communications and cut them from their base of operations. To Melas, -therefore, a defeat would mean the ruin, capture, or annihilation of -his army; to Austria it would mean the loss of Italy. - -The success of this plan depended upon the skill with which Bonaparte -could deceive the Austrians in Italy as to his intentions; for should -they learn of the existence of the Army of Reserve, and of Bonaparte's -intention to cross the Great St. Bernard, they could concentrate near -the Italian entrance to the pass, and overwhelm the French divisions -in detail as they issued into Italy. It was necessary, therefore, that -the strength, destination, even the existence of the Army of Reserve, -should be kept as secret as possible. To accomplish this, Bonaparte -published in the newspapers, and announced in various ways, that the -Army of Reserve was assembling at Dijon in France, and that it would -soon be sent to re-enforce the Army of Italy. At the same time he took -care to collect there only a few thousand men, consisting mostly of -conscripts and old soldiers. - -The wide publicity given the matter caused the spies of England -and Austria to gather at Dijon, but finding there only unorganized -conscripts and veterans too old for active service, they sent word to -their governments that no such army existed. Consequently the Army of -Reserve was believed to be imaginary, and was ridiculed and caricatured -throughout Europe. - -Both Melas and Kray were completely deceived. Feeling certain that -there were but two French armies with which to contend, they had great -hope of success. Moreover, the information received from the Aulic -Council confirmed them in this opinion. Melas, in particular, regarded -the matter as a ruse of Bonaparte, intended to divert the Austrians in -Italy from invading France. He therefore felt secure in his positions, -and pushed forward his forces with renewed energy. Feeling certain that -he had fathomed Bonaparte's stratagem, he rested in a security which -doomed him to defeat. - -Meanwhile the divisions of the Army of Reserve were concentrating. They -were marching through France; and were rapidly assembling near Geneva, -from which place they were to be led across the Alps into Italy. This -army, so secretly organized, and so derided throughout Europe; this -army, whose very existence was doubted by the allies, was destined -to amaze the world by the brilliancy of its exploits. Bonaparte will -lead it over the Great St. Bernard Pass across the Alps, descend like -an avalanche into the valley of the Po, cut the communications of -the Austrians, and defeat them in the hard-fought battle of Marengo. -He will emulate the deeds of Hannibal. He will lead forty thousand -soldiers across the highest mountains of Europe, surmount every -obstacle in his pathway, overthrow every force sent to oppose his -progress, and by a single march and a single battle reconquer northern -Italy. - - -COMMENTS. - -In making war upon France the Austrian forces were obliged to advance -along both the Danube and the Po; for if they confined their operations -exclusively to the valley of the Danube, they must yield northern Italy -to the French; or if they restricted their operations wholly to the -valley of the Po, they must lose western Germany, and leave unguarded -the direct route between France and Austria. The Austrian forces -were, therefore, divided into two armies: one of which confined its -operations to the valley of the Danube; the other, to the valley of -the Po. In advancing towards France, these armies became farther and -farther separated from each other. Kray's army in western Germany and -the army of Melas in northwestern Italy were separated by Switzerland -and the great chain of the Alps. As Switzerland and the passes of -the Swiss Alps were held by the French, there could be no direct -communication between Kray and Melas. Though the great highway of the -Tyrol, which crossed the Alps over the Brenner Pass, was in possession -of the Austrians, it was so far in rear of the Austrian armies that -re-enforcements could not be sent over it from one army to the other -without making a march of several hundred miles. In fact, the nature of -the country was such that during active operations neither army could -expect to receive any support from the other. They were independent -armies of equal strength. Each had a separate commander, and each had -its own line of operations and its own line of retreat. - -On the other hand, the three French armies were so situated that they -could support one another. With Moreau's army on the Rhine, Masséna's -along the Apennines, and the Army of Reserve between them near Lake -Geneva, Bonaparte could move the last along the roads of eastern France -to re-enforce either of the others as circumstances might require. In -this way Bonaparte could re-enforce Masséna with the Army of Reserve, -which would increase the Army of Italy to eighty thousand combatants. -Or, should Masséna be driven back across the Var into France, Bonaparte -could leave Moreau on the defensive along the Rhine with a part of his -army, withdraw the remainder, unite it with the Army of Reserve, and -with these combined forces added to the remnants of Masséna's army, -destroy Melas in the south of France. - -Had the Austrian armies succeeded in invading France simultaneously, -Bonaparte would have detached a containing force[3] against one -army, and then have massed his remaining forces against the other. -By repeating this manoeuvre, first against one army and then against -the other, he would have attempted to defeat both. In this case, the -Austrian armies would enter France from different directions; one from -the east, the other from the southeast, separated by Switzerland and -the French Alps; and since the French armies, even while falling back, -would still be between the Austrian armies, Bonaparte would, from his -central position, have the advantage of interior lines, and could -rapidly combine his forces against his adversaries in succession. - -How well he would have succeeded in this manoeuvre can best be judged -by what he accomplished by similar manoeuvres. - -In the Italian campaign of 1796-97, when the Austrians advanced -against Bonaparte on both sides of Lake Garda, he united his forces -at the foot of the lake; and, by throwing a strong force against one -and then against the other of the advancing armies, defeated both in -succession before they could unite. In these manoeuvres, with a total -force of forty-five thousand soldiers, he defeated seventy-two thousand -Austrians. - -In the campaigns of Arcole and Rivoli, the Austrians likewise -advanced with divided forces. In the former, forty thousand Frenchmen -opposed seventy thousand Austrians; in the latter, forty-four -thousand Frenchmen opposed sixty-five thousand Austrians. By skilful -combinations, similar to those just described, Bonaparte defeated the -Austrian armies in both campaigns. - -In 1814, when the Prussians, under Blucher, and the Austrians, under -Schwarzenberg, were advancing from different points of the French -frontier upon Paris, the results obtained by Napoleon's leaving a -retarding force before one army, and by massing his remaining forces -against the other, were still more remarkable. With a force numerically -inferior to either army opposed to him, he succeeded in winning battle -after battle. Though in the campaign of 1814 we find strategical -problems with which we are not now concerned, yet Napoleon's victories -there in the face of such odds show what he might have accomplished had -Kray and Melas crossed the French frontiers and advanced on Paris. - -But the combination that offered Bonaparte the greatest chance -of success yet remains to be considered. Should Masséna be able -single-handed to hold in check the Austrians in Italy, Bonaparte could -unite the Army of Reserve, forty thousand strong, to Moreau's army of -one hundred and thirty thousand. This junction would give Bonaparte -one hundred and seventy thousand soldiers with whom to attack the -one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians under Kray. With such a -superiority in numbers, Bonaparte would probably have annihilated the -Austrian forces in the valley of the Danube. - -But the mere superiority in numbers, which, by this combination, -might have been obtained in Germany, is not the only advantage which -Bonaparte could have derived from the positions of the opposing armies. -In order to understand the subject better and see, perhaps, in a -measure, the whole strategical situation as it appeared to Bonaparte -himself, it will be necessary to examine somewhat carefully the -positions of the opposing forces, and point out the advantages which -the possession of Switzerland gave to the French. - -Since Moreau's army was in position in France along the west bank of -the Rhine from Strasburg to Bâle, and extended into Switzerland along -the south bank of the Rhine from Bâle to Lake Constance, Bonaparte -could use either France or Switzerland as a base of operations from -which to attack the Austrians in the Black Forest. This angular base -gave to Bonaparte a great advantage. His adversary could not know -on which side to expect him. By making demonstrations on one side, -Bonaparte might deceive Kray as to the real point of attack; then, by -massing his forces on the other, he might surprise and overwhelm him. -Moreover, by crossing the Rhine in force between Lake Constance and -Schaffhausen, he could strike the left flank of the Austrian divisions -in the Black Forest, and might be able to defeat them in detail -before they could unite. Even should Kray succeed in concentrating -his divisions, he would be compelled to face south in order to give -battle. In this position, his line of battle being parallel to his -line of retreat, he must, if defeated, lose his communications. In -this position, defeat meant ruin to his army; for with the loss of his -communications he could not escape capture or annihilation. - -On the other hand, Bonaparte's line of battle would face the north, -and be perpendicular to his line of retreat. If defeated, he could -fall back and cross the Rhine with little danger of losing his -communications. - -By uniting the Army of Reserve to Moreau's army, and by crossing the -Rhine in force near Schaffhausen, Bonaparte could not only greatly -outnumber Kray upon the battle-field, but could force him to fight in a -position where an Austrian defeat would be fatal to the Austrian cause. -By this manoeuvre Bonaparte would threaten the communications of the -enemy without exposing his own, and would, if victorious, decide in a -single battle the fate of the Austrians in the valley of the Danube. -He could then march rapidly upon the Austrian capital, and could seize -the Brenner and Pontebba passes, the possession of which would sever -the communications of the Austrians in the valley of the Po. Such a -manoeuvre would paralyze the operations of Melas in Italy, and compel -the Austrian Emperor to sue for peace. - -Though this plan offered Bonaparte great results, yet in several -respects it was somewhat difficult to execute. In order to gain a -favorable position for attacking Kray in the Black Forest, Bonaparte -would have to make a flank march from Bâle to Lake Constance; and -consequently would have to expose his own flank to the attacks of -the enemy. But in this case the French flank would be protected by -the Rhine; and as Bonaparte would march rapidly, he would in all -probability succeed in crossing the river in force near Lake Constance -before his adversary should discover his plan. Nevertheless, this flank -march would be attended with considerable danger. In fact, every flank -march in the vicinity of an active enemy is dangerous; for a commander -who gains a position on the enemy's flank must necessarily expose his -own flank to the attacks of the enemy. Even when his flank is protected -by a river, he cannot cross it without taking some risks. Had Kray's -army been assembled in force near Schaffhausen, where it could have -attacked the French divisions in detail as they crossed the Rhine, -Bonaparte would have had much difficulty in carrying out successfully -this plan of campaign. "Of all the operations of war," says Jomini, -"there is none more hazardous and difficult than the passage of a large -river in the presence of an enemy." - -Had Bonaparte adopted this plan, he would undoubtedly have attempted to -deceive Kray as to the real point of attack. If we form a judgment of -what he would have done by what he afterwards did in the Ulm campaign, -we can safely assume that he would have ordered at least one division -to cross the Rhine from France, and to advance directly eastward upon -Kray's army in the Black Forest. The march of this division would have -deceived Kray, and would probably have led him to expect the entire -French army from that direction. Bonaparte could then have made his -flank march in safety, and could have crossed the river with little -danger of having his divisions defeated in detail. - -As a matter of fact, however, Kray had his army so widely dispersed -that he could not in any case have concentrated a sufficient force in -time to oppose successfully the progress of Bonaparte. Even had he been -able to assemble his entire army near Schaffhausen, it is doubtful -whether, in the face of such odds, he could have prevented Bonaparte -from crossing the river. Perhaps it will be well to substantiate this -statement by an example. In the two passages of the Danube by Napoleon -at Lobau near Vienna in 1809, the difficulties were greater and the -odds less than in the hypothetical case now before us. Furthermore, in -these operations Napoleon was opposed by that illustrious soldier, the -Archduke Charles. Surely, these facts warrant the conclusion that an -army of one hundred and seventy thousand soldiers, led by the greatest -captain of modern times, could have successfully crossed the Rhine -in spite of one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians, commanded by -Marshal Kray. - -That Bonaparte could have executed this plan of campaign admits of -little doubt. We have already shown why the plan was not adopted. But -it is worthy of notice that afterwards, in the Ulm campaign, along -almost identical lines, he carried out this great strategic conception -with remarkable results. It is worthy of notice that, in 1805 at Ulm in -the valley of the Danube, he captured an Austrian army, under General -Mack, by manoeuvres similar to those by which in 1800 he purposed to -overwhelm Marshal Kray in the Black Forest. It is worthy of notice -that he then descended the Danube, and seized the Austrian capital, -and that this march paralyzed to a certain extent the operations of -the Archduke Charles in Italy. It is worthy of notice that this march -was the principal cause which led the Archduke Charles to retreat -before Masséna; and that the Archduke's army would have been captured -or destroyed, had not Napoleon been compelled to march north from -Vienna in order to meet the Austrian and Russian armies on the field of -Austerlitz. - -Consider now the situation in northwestern Italy. Since the French were -holding the Apennines and Maritime Alps on the south, the French Alps -on the west, and Switzerland on the north, they were in possession -of the three sides of a rectangle, which almost enclosed Melas in -Italy. Should Bonaparte decide to take the offensive there, he could -attack the Austrians from the south, from the west, or from the north. -This situation gave him several advantages; for Melas could not know -on which side to expect the French. Bonaparte might surprise his -adversary; he might deceive him as to the real point of attack, and -then mass his forces at some unexpected point where he would have the -advantage of position. - -On the other hand, Melas within the rectangle had the advantage -of interior lines. He could therefore, other things being equal, -concentrate his forces more quickly upon any side than could Bonaparte. -Should he learn in time where Bonaparte would enter Italy, he could -defeat the French divisions in detail as they issued from the passes of -the Alps. But in order to take advantage of his central position, he -must be accurately informed of Bonaparte's movements. He must fathom -his adversary's designs; otherwise the advantage of position could -avail him nothing. Thus it is seen how the element of surprise became -such an essential factor in these operations, and how important it was -that Bonaparte should deceive the Austrians as to his real intentions. -The success of the entire plan, the fate of Italy itself, hinged on -this fact. It was the first great step towards success; it was the -entering wedge to victory. Long before the campaign opened, Bonaparte -saw clearly this fact. In the midst of untiring activity at Paris, -while momentous questions were engaging his attention, he contrived the -stratagem that deceived his adversary, and worked out the details that -led ultimately to his triumph at Marengo. - -Already some of the advantages which the possession of Switzerland -gave to Bonaparte have been pointed out. It will now be noticed that -he could safely assemble a large force in this almost impregnable -stronghold, and could debouch therefrom upon the rear of the Austrians -in Italy. In this way he could descend upon the Austrian communications -with little danger of losing his own with Switzerland. Even should -the army of Italy be driven back to the line of the Var, as long as -the French held this river and the French Alps on one side of the -Austrians, and Switzerland on the other, Bonaparte had the advantage of -an angular base, from either side of which he could march to attack the -Austrians in Italy. In fact, the possession of Switzerland, extending -east from the French frontier, gave to Bonaparte the advantage of an -angular base in his operations against either Kray in Germany or Melas -in Italy. Moreover, Switzerland offered him a secure place where he -could assemble his forces and strike either Austrian army a vital blow. -Upon these facts was based not only the plan of campaign that decided -the fate of Italy, but that grander conception which offered still -greater results. - -As previously stated, the Austrian plan of campaign was that Kray -should remain on the defensive in Germany, while Melas took the -offensive in Italy. There were several reasons for adopting this plan. - -First: Austria had in the preceding year been remarkably successful in -northern Italy. Step by step she had driven the French from the Adige -to the Apennines. Being anxious to hold what she had conquered, and -hoping to continue her success in Italy, she gave Melas one hundred -and twenty thousand soldiers, and directed him to take the offensive -against Masséna. - -Second: By making her principal efforts there, she could receive the -support of the British fleet in the Gulf of Genoa, and possibly that of -the British corps in Minorca. - -Third: The English favored this plan; for they saw in it a chance -to gain possession of Toulon, which was a desirable acquisition on -account of the naval establishments there. - -Fourth: The Royalists of southeastern France were in sympathy with -England and Austria, and might possibly aid them at the first -opportunity. - -Fifth: Since Austria knew that Moreau's army was large, and that the -Army of Italy was small, she believed that, by taking the defensive in -Germany and the offensive in Italy, she could hold in check the larger -army, while she overwhelmed the smaller with greatly superior numbers. - -Consider for a moment the situation as it must have appeared at this -time to Austria. Not aware of the existence of the Army of Reserve, -she saw only Moreau's army along the Rhine, and Masséna's along the -Apennines. Was it not reasonable to suppose that the one hundred and -twenty thousand Austrians in Germany might hold in check Moreau's army -of one hundred and thirty thousand, while the one hundred and twenty -thousand Austrians in Italy destroyed the forty thousand French under -Masséna? - -On the other hand, there were several reasons why this plan should not -have been adopted by the Aulic Council. - -With the Army of Italy in possession of the Apennines and Maritime -Alps, flanked on the right by the fortified city of Genoa, Masséna -had the advantage of a strong defensive position. Without an enormous -superiority in numbers, it was a difficult matter for Melas to drive -back the French. And even should he succeed in this undertaking, there -still remained the line of the Var, a strongly fortified position, -flanked on the north by the Alps and on the south by the sea; a -position which could neither be turned nor be forced, except with -greatly superior numbers and desperate fighting. - -To succeed offensively in Italy, the Austrians had therefore to -outnumber greatly the French. The French superiority in position -counterbalanced the Austrian superiority in numbers. The Austrian plan -allowed Bonaparte with inferior forces to hold in check for a time a -large Austrian army in Italy, and left him free to direct his remaining -forces upon the important points of the theatre of operations. By -uniting the Army of Reserve with Moreau's army, he could outnumber his -adversary in Germany; or by uniting the Army of Reserve with a corps of -Moreau's army, he could descend upon the rear of Melas, and decide in a -single battle the fate of Italy. - -By remaining on the defensive in Germany, Kray gave Bonaparte the -opportunity of taking the offensive there. This allowed him to make -use of the angular base of operations formed by eastern France and -northern Switzerland. Bonaparte, however, could derive no advantage -from the angular base except by taking the offensive; for should he -simply defend the line of the Rhine, he would be obliged to occupy -both the Swiss and French sides of the river. In other words, he would -be obliged to divide his forces, to lengthen and weaken his line, thus -giving his adversary the opportunity either to defeat the French forces -in detail, or to force a passage across the river at some weak point. -Furthermore, it was important that Bonaparte should take the offensive -for other reasons than those already given; for should he once force -the position of the Rhine and Black Forest, he would find no other -great natural obstacles in his front as he descended the Danube towards -the Austrian capital. - -Because the strong position of the Rhine and Black Forest is a long -distance from Austria; because the more direct route between France and -Austria is through the valley of the Danube; because no great natural -obstacles, forming strong defensive positions, lie across this route -near the Austrian capital; and because a French victory in the valley -of the Danube would probably give the French commander an opportunity -to make such dispositions as should paralyze the operations of an -Austrian army in Italy,--it follows that the main effort for supremacy -between France and Austria should take place in the valley of the -Danube. There Austria should take the offensive; there she should show -her full strength; there she should make one mighty effort to decide -her own or her adversary's fate. "It is in the valley of the Danube," -says the Archduke Charles, "that the blows are to be struck which are -decisive of the fate of France or Austria." - -Austria did exactly the reverse of what she should have done. By taking -the offensive in Italy, and by remaining on the defensive in Germany, -she gave Bonaparte the opportunity to remain on the defensive in Italy -and to take the offensive in Germany. She gave him the opportunity to -carry out a plan of campaign which offered him the greatest results,--a -plan which was perhaps, on the whole, one of the grandest strategic -projects ever conceived by the mind of man. - -"To invade a country," says Napoleon, "upon a double line of operations -is a faulty combination." Though the Austrian plan was that Kray should -remain on the defensive in Germany, while Melas took the offensive in -Italy, yet both armies were, under certain circumstances, expected -to invade France. Separated as they were by impassable obstacles, -Bonaparte could leave a containing force to hold one in check, while -he massed overwhelming numbers to crush the other. Thus by adopting a -double line of operations, Austria gave Bonaparte the opportunity of -bringing superior numbers against either Austrian army. As the first -principle of war is to be stronger than the enemy at the vital point, -it is always of the greatest importance that no plan of campaign be -adopted which shall, at the very start, allow the enemy to bring -superior numbers upon the battle-field. For the battle-field _is_ the -vital point. - -The error of adopting a double line of operations might easily have -been avoided by Austria. Had she left fifty thousand soldiers in Italy -to hold Masséna in check, and concentrated one hundred and ninety -thousand in Germany to act on the offensive, she would have confined -her main efforts to the more important route between France and -Austria, and would have had greater chances of success. - -Had this plan been followed, Bonaparte could not, by any strategical -combination, have outnumbered the Austrians in Germany. Since it was -necessary that the Army of Italy should remain along the Apennines -and Maritime Alps to prevent the invasion of France on that side, the -maximum strength which Bonaparte could direct against the Austrians in -Germany was Moreau's army of one hundred and thirty thousand and the -Army of Reserve, forty thousand strong. In other words, Bonaparte could -bring only one hundred and seventy thousand Frenchmen to oppose one -hundred and ninety thousand Austrians. - -Furthermore, northern Italy offered Melas many advantages for a -defensive campaign. If hard pressed by Masséna, he could fall back to -the Mincio, a strong position, flanked on the right by Lake Garda and -on the left by the fortress of Mantua. If defeated in this position, -he could retire into the Tyrol, where he would directly cover his -communications with the valley of the Danube. In the mountains and -defiles of the Tyrol, he could, if hard pressed, fall back to another -strong position, fight again, and thus prolong the conflict. Moreover, -Masséna could not advance eastward through Friuli towards Austria so -long as fifty thousand Austrians remained in the Tyrol; for they could -then descend upon the flank and rear of the Army of Italy, and could -sever the French communications without exposing their own to Masséna's -attacks. Of still greater importance, however, is the fact that, had -Masséna driven Melas through the Tyrol, or across the Carnic Alps, -his success would have had little or no effect upon the operations of -the one hundred and ninety thousand Austrians in the valley of the -Danube. And why? Because the route between France and Austria through -northern Italy was longer than that through the valley of the Danube. -Because the mountains of Austria on the side towards Italy offered -strong defensive positions near the Austrian capital. Because the vital -point of the theatre of operations was in western Germany, and not in -northern Italy. - -The proof of this will be apparent when we examine the Italian campaign -of 1796-97. Though Bonaparte fought his way through northern Italy, -and crossed the Alps into Austria, this movement had scarcely any -effect upon the operations of the Austrian army that was facing the two -French armies, under Moreau and Hoche, on the Rhine in the vicinity of -the Black Forest. - -In this discussion it has been assumed, in order to point out some of -the advantages of a defensive campaign in northern Italy, that forty -thousand Frenchmen, commanded by Masséna, might have driven fifty -thousand Austrians, under Melas, from the Apennines to and even beyond -the Mincio. But this assumption is altogether improbable. Undoubtedly -Melas could have held in check the Army of Italy along the Apennines. -To prove this statement, consider for a moment what Bonaparte did -in the same theatre of operations in 1796. Though he defeated fifty -thousand allies with forty thousand Frenchmen, his success was due -in great measure to the faulty position of the allies. They were -greatly subdivided and separated. Their front was widely extended. At -Montenotte he broke through their long line, then defeated them in -detail at Millesimo, Dego, and Mondovi. Their faulty position was due -to the fact that the Sardinian army, based upon Turin, and the Austrian -army, based upon the Mincio, were attempting to cover their divergent -lines of communication back to their bases of operations. Moreover, as -they fell back along these divergent lines, they became farther and -farther separated from each other. The error of separating their armies -and of scattering their forces, caused by the attempt to cover directly -their communications, made it easier for Bonaparte to defeat them than -if they had been united into a single army, and had adopted a single -base of operations. For Masséna to defeat fifty thousand Austrians, -based upon the Mincio, would therefore be a more difficult undertaking -than was that of Bonaparte in 1796. But to do even what Bonaparte did -in the early days of the first Italian campaign required a greater -soldier than Masséna,--a Frederick himself might have failed. - -To the plan of campaign that we have suggested, there was one -objection: Marshal Kray did not have sufficient military ability to -handle an army of one hundred and ninety thousand soldiers. To direct -successfully the operations of so large an army is a great undertaking. -Even to command and care for a much smaller one is no small task. -Hundreds of matters must be carefully considered. Not only the -strategical and tactical manoeuvres by which the commander concentrates -his forces and wins his victories, but his communications, his means of -transportation, the supplies for his army, the equipment and discipline -of his troops, the abilities of his subordinate commanders, the -topography and resources of the country, give him the greatest anxiety. -He must give close attention to all these matters; for the neglect of -a single one may lead to disaster. He must be brave, clear-headed, -cool, cautious, and fearless; and be able to make a quick decision in -critical times. He must have an eye for facts. He must weigh correctly -all reports and rumors, and out of the doubtful information at hand -sift the true from the false. He must see everything that is going on -around him. His glance must penetrate the enemy's line, his vision -sweep the whole theatre of operations. - -As an army increases in size, so, likewise, the difficulties of -commanding it increase. To manoeuvre one hundred and ninety thousand -soldiers, so as to obtain from them a fighting power proportionate to -their numbers, requires the genius of a great captain. Neither Marshal -Kray nor General Melas was equal to the task. Though both were brave -soldiers, who had distinguished themselves in previous campaigns, -neither had great military ability. In fact, the Archduke Charles was -the only soldier in Austria capable of handling so large an army. He -had already shown himself to be a great general. His views upon war -were largely the outgrowth of his own successes. He was not wedded -to the past. He saw the errors in the system of war so persistently -advocated by the Aulic Council. He perceived the reasons for many of -Bonaparte's previous successes. He had fought Bonaparte in Italy; and -he comprehended, though somewhat dimly, Bonaparte's system of war. -Moreover, his views upon the military situation were sound. Though -he was far inferior to Bonaparte in military ability, yet, being the -ablest soldier of Austria, he should have been made commander in chief -of the Austrian armies, and should have been allowed to conduct the -campaign in his own way. Probably he would not have succeeded against -Bonaparte; and yet, who can say what the result would have been had he -commanded one hundred and ninety thousand soldiers in the valley of -the Danube? Austria was perishing for want of a leader, yet among her -distinguished sons she saw not her ablest soldier. - -Why was the Archduke Charles not made commander in chief? Why did -Austria deprive herself of his services at the beginning of a great -war? It was because the Aulic Council, which decided all military -questions and directed the operations of the Austrian armies, did not -approve of the Archduke's views upon the military situation. He had -advised Austria to accept Bonaparte's offer of peace, and had pointed -out that, in case of war, the principal effort against France should -be made in the valley of the Danube. But the members of the Aulic -Council knew little about military matters; they could see no merit -in these suggestions. With a narrowness which they had many times -exhibited before, they continued to blunder on, neither willing to -take the advice of their only great soldier, nor able to comprehend -the strategical combinations which their errors allowed Bonaparte to -make. They originated faulty plans, sent unreliable information to the -Austrian armies, and exercised over Melas and Kray a fatherly control -which hampered them throughout the campaign. In short, they failed -completely to appreciate the situation. "To the Aulic Council," said -Jomini in 1804, "Austria owes all her reverses since the time of Prince -Eugene of Savoy." - -That the Aulic Council should fail was inevitable. In war the opinion -of a trained soldier on military matters is worth more than that of -a congress of a hundred men. Whenever the members of a senate, a -council, or a congress, attempt to decide military questions, they are -sure to err; for, being absent from the theatre of operations, they -can neither see clearly the military situation, nor render decisions -with promptness in critical times. Besides, their decisions are often -halfway measures, neither one thing nor the other; like the laws passed -by a bicameral legislature, they are nearly all compromises. In war -there must be resolution, boldness, decision; to compromise is to court -defeat. - -In this chapter we have attempted to point out the strategical -situation as it appeared to Bonaparte at the beginning of the campaign. -In subsequent chapters we shall try to show how Bonaparte carried -out some of his strategical conceptions; and how the operations of -Masséna at Genoa, and of Moreau in the Black Forest, affected those of -Bonaparte in Italy. Before closing the discussion, it will be well to -remark that the most perfect strategy is of little value, unless it is -executed with energy and culminates in victory. The difficulty lies -not so much in the conception of great strategical projects, as in the -execution of them. Strategy is only a means to an end. It does not win -victories; but it clears the way for the winning of them, and adds to -their value. It aims to bring a stronger force upon the battle-field, -or to place an army in a position where victory will bring great -results. But the battle must decide the struggle. "Even the weakest -combatant does not lay down his arms to strategical manoeuvres." It is -victory upon the battle-field which settles the disputes of contending -powers. There, amidst the clash of arms and the roar of cannon, amidst -the shouts of triumph and the cries of despair, amidst the wounded, the -dying, and the dead, victory decides the fate of armies and of empires. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[Footnote 1: See Map 1.] - -[Footnote 2: Though troops from several of the small German States -dependent upon Austria formed a part of this army, it is referred to as -an "Austrian army," because the bulk of the troops composing it were -Austrians.] - -[Footnote 3: Containing force. A body of troops charged with the duty -of holding in check a body (generally numerically superior) of the -enemy, while the main efforts of the army are directed against another -portion of the hostile forces.--Wagner.] - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -GENOA.[4] - - -In the fertile valley of the Po, the Austrian army, commanded by Melas, -found supplies in abundance for both men and animals. The equipment, -discipline, and morale of the Austrians were good. The successes of the -preceding year had encouraged them. They had that confidence in their -commander so necessary to secure success. Filled with the enthusiasm of -victory and looking hopefully forward to new triumphs, they were ready -and anxious to be led against the French. - -On the other hand, the Army of Italy, extending along the Apennines -and Maritime Alps, found difficulty in obtaining supplies. Cut off -from the productive basin of the Po by the Austrians on the north, and -from the commerce of the sea by the British fleet on the south, this -army had to depend almost entirely upon such supplies as could be sent -from France over the Nice-Genoa road. The French soldiers were in a -deplorable condition. Neglected by the French government, they were -ragged, half-starved, discouraged. They had been defeated again and -again. They lacked the discipline and morale so essential to success. -A few soldiers had already deserted; many were so emaciated that they -could hardly bear arms, and a number were sick with fever. - -On assuming command of the Army of Italy, Masséna took steps to improve -the condition of his men. With money furnished by Bonaparte he supplied -his troops with wheat, and by his energetic measures soon brought -about better discipline. In Bonaparte's name, he published a spirited -proclamation, which did much to renew the courage of his soldiers and -to inspire in them the hope of victory. - -Notwithstanding the efforts of Masséna, his soldiers were in a -destitute condition. Only the bare necessaries of life were furnished -them. Ammunition alone was sent them in abundance. Though the Army of -Italy numbered but forty thousand men and was opposed to one hundred -and twenty thousand Austrians, Bonaparte would not re-enforce it by a -single soldier. In fact, all the men and _matériel_ collected in France -were used to strengthen Moreau's army and the Army of Reserve. The Army -of Italy was left to fight, as best it could, a force overwhelmingly -superior in numbers, _matériel_, and equipment. - -At the opening of the campaign, the condition of the Army of Italy was -such that but thirty-six thousand men were fit for active service. Of -this force, four thousand under Thurreau were in the Mont Cenis Pass, -so that there remained but thirty-two thousand with which to hold the -Apennines and Maritime Alps from Genoa to the Col di Tenda. Masséna's -right wing, numbering eight thousand under Miollis, held the fortified -city of Genoa, which, owing to the outlying works and natural obstacles -surrounding it, was an exceedingly strong place; his centre, twelve -thousand strong, commanded by Soult, defended the Bochetta Pass, which -opens upon Genoa, and the Cadibona Pass, which opens upon Savona; his -left, consisting of twelve thousand under Suchet, occupied the Col di -Tenda, Nice, and the line of the Var. - -Inasmuch as the active French army directly in front of Melas numbered -only thirty-two thousand soldiers, and was spread out from Genoa to -Nice, he calculated that by directing twenty-five thousand men upon -Genoa and a column of forty thousand upon the centre of the French -line, he could hold in check the French right, while he broke through -their centre and cut the Army of Italy in two. This feat accomplished, -he expected that his left wing of twenty-five thousand, with the aid -of the British fleet, would be able to enclose, blockade, and capture -Genoa, while his right wing of forty thousand was forcing the remainder -of the Army of Italy across the Var. - -On the French side, the plan of campaign that offered the best results -was one that Bonaparte himself had originated. He ordered Masséna -to leave only small detachments at the passes of Tenda, Ormea, and -Cadibona, and to concentrate twenty-five or thirty thousand men at -Genoa. In written instructions to Masséna, the First Consul set forth -his views as follows:-- - - "Take care," said he, "not to extend your line too widely. Put but - few men on the Alps, or in the defile of the Tenda, where the snow - will protect you. Leave some detachments around Nice and in the forts - in its vicinity; keep four fifths of your force in Genoa and its - neighborhood. The enemy will debouch upon your right in the direction - of Genoa, on your centre in the direction of Savona, and probably - on the two points at once. Refuse one of the two attacks, and throw - yourself with all your forces united upon one of the enemy's columns. - The nature of the ground will not allow him to avail himself of his - superiority in artillery and cavalry; he can only attack you with his - infantry, and yours is infinitely superior to his; and, favored by - the nature of the place, it may make up for the deficiency in number. - In that broken country, if you manoeuvre well, with 30,000 men you - may give battle to 60,000. In order to carry 60,000 light-armed - troops into Liguria, Melas must have 90,000, which supposes a total - army of 120,000 at least. Melas possesses neither your talents - nor activity; you have no reason to fear him. If he appear in the - direction of Nice, you being at Genoa, let him come on, stir not from - your position; he will not advance far if you remain in Liguria, - ready to throw yourself upon his rear, or upon the troops left in - Piedmont." - -Though this plan was excellent for holding in check the Austrians for a -time, unfortunately it was beyond the execution of Masséna. Provisions -were so scarce in Genoa that it would have been foolish to concentrate -nearly the whole of the Army of Italy there. To feed his army was the -difficulty that confronted Masséna. For this reason he scattered his -troops along the Apennines, and occupied the seaboard from Genoa to -Nice. In this position, his soldiers could seize the meagre supplies -that the barren country afforded, and could more easily obtain -provisions direct from France. Though it is doubtful whether Masséna -fully appreciated the advantages of Bonaparte's plan, nevertheless, -he would probably have carried it out, had he not been prevented from -doing so by a lack of provisions, and by the beginning of hostilities -much earlier than either he or Bonaparte expected. - -On the 5th of April, Melas, leaving thirty-five thousand Austrians -under General Kaim to occupy the fortresses of northwestern Italy and -to watch the passes of the Alps, advanced with sixty-five thousand[5] -to attack Masséna. His forces were divided into three columns: General -Ott with fifteen thousand men ascended the Trebbia and presented -himself before the defiles of the mountains which shoot off from the -main chain of the Apennines and extend along the east side of Genoa; -General Hohenzollern with ten thousand marched upon the Bochetta Pass -on the north side of the city; and Melas himself with forty thousand -ascended the Bormida, and attacked the forces of Soult and Suchet along -the Apennines and Maritime Alps. Confining his principal attack to the -centre of the French line, Melas succeeded, after hard fighting, in -forcing his way through the Cadibona Pass, which movement cut in two -the Army of Italy and separated Soult from Suchet. The former fell back -towards Genoa; the latter, towards Nice. In these engagements both -sides fought fiercely. Though the French had the advantage of position, -they were compelled to give way before the onslaughts of superior -numbers. - -At the Bochetta Pass, the attack made by General Hohenzollern was -repulsed; but on the east side of Genoa the French, numbering less than -four thousand, could not hold the defiles and crest of the Apennines -against General Ott's force of fifteen thousand. The Austrians drove -the French across the mountains, then surrounded and invested the -French forts that protected the city on that side. By this successful -attack, General Ott gained a foothold within cannon-shot of the walls -of Genoa. - -Thus far Melas had been successful. The first great step in his -undertaking had been accomplished. Now he could close in upon Masséna -with his left wing, force him back into Genoa, and hold him there as in -a vise; while with his right, strongly re-enforced, he could advance -against Suchet, perhaps crush him or drive him across the Var into -France. - -Meanwhile Masséna was in a precarious situation. His army was cut -in two; his communications with France were severed. In the face of -superior numbers, Suchet was being driven back towards Nice, and Soult -was withdrawing the shattered remains of his forces towards Genoa. In -front of the city and along the Italian shore, the British fleet was -actively supporting the operations of Melas. On the east side of the -city, the Austrians had gained the crests of the mountains; and at the -Bochetta Pass they were ready to make another attack, which would prove -successful. In fact, Masséna was surrounded. The allies were closing in -upon him. Already their guns could be heard at Genoa; soon they might -force him inside the walls of the city. - -But it was the want of provisions that gave Masséna the greatest -anxiety. Food was already scarce, and there was but little hope of -receiving any more. Though defeat and famine were staring him in the -face, yet he did not allow himself to be discouraged. He realized -that it was his duty to maintain a stubborn resistance, and to engage -actively as many of the Austrians as possible, in order that Bonaparte -could cross the Alps and strike the Austrian rear. By prolonging the -conflict he would gain time; and time was of the greatest importance to -the success of Bonaparte. - -In order to understand how Masséna attempted to carry out his purposes, -it is necessary to describe briefly the situation of Genoa and its -fortifications. The city lies at the foot of a spur of the Apennines, -on the shore of the gulf that bears its name. This spur, running -south from the main chain towards the sea, divides into two ridges -which extend to the water's edge, one along the east side, the other -along the west side of the city. Upon the crests of the ridges, which -form two sides of a triangle, having its base on the sea, a number of -forts had been constructed and were occupied by the French. Within the -triangle was the walled city of Genoa, containing about one hundred -thousand inhabitants. Thus the city had two lines of fortifications -surrounding it: one along the ridges and crests of the Apennines, the -other along the walls of the city. - -Masséna had but eighteen thousand soldiers to defend Genoa. But with -this force in so strongly fortified a place, he knew that he could hold -out as long as his provisions lasted. Perhaps, by vigorous fighting, he -might be able to unite with Suchet, and in this way re-establish his -communications with France. - -For the purpose of carrying out these views, Masséna resolved to -drive the Austrians from the crest of the Apennines on the east side -of the city; then, if possible, to effect a junction with Suchet by a -movement along the Genoa-Nice road. Accordingly, on the 7th of April, -at the head of a strong force, he issued from the city and vigorously -attacked General Ott. The French drove the Austrians from the crest of -the Apennines, and, after desperate fighting, seized and reoccupied the -Austrian positions. - -Having been successful in this attack, Masséna then made preparations -for a movement towards Nice. For this purpose, he divided his command -into two parts: he left Miollis with eight thousand men to defend -Genoa; and with the remaining ten thousand, divided into two columns, -one of which was commanded by Soult, the other by himself, he began -his westward march. At the same time, Suchet, who had been informed of -Masséna's plan, marched eastward from Nice to attack the Austrians from -that side. Both Masséna and Suchet met with fierce opposition. Neither -could make much headway against the overwhelming forces of Melas. For -several days the fighting was furious, desperate, and bloody. Though -Masséna captured several thousand Austrians, he was finally repulsed -and driven back. On the 18th of April he re-entered Genoa; and Suchet -again fell back towards the Var. - -Masséna was now enclosed in the city. From this time dates the -beginning of the siege of Genoa,--one of the most memorable and -stubbornly contested struggles mentioned in history. In this brief -account of these operations, we shall not attempt to describe the -sufferings of the French soldiers who fought and starved and died here; -nor to dwell upon the heroic deeds of their commander,--as stubborn a -soldier and fierce a fighter as ever trod a battle-field; but rather to -point out the important facts that had a bearing upon the operations of -Bonaparte, and to show why Masséna, in the midst of a starving army and -a starving city, still continued to fight on. - -The Army of Italy having been cut in two, Melas gave orders that -General Ott should take command of the thirty thousand Austrians then -surrounding Genoa, and, if possible, force Masséna to capitulate; -and that General Elsnitz, with twenty-five thousand, should proceed -vigorously against Suchet, whose active force at this time numbered -but ten thousand men. Masséna himself had but fifteen thousand; but -nevertheless he had resolved to hold out to the last extremity. He sent -an aid-de-camp to the First Consul to apprise him of the situation of -the Army of Italy, and to urge him to hasten the movement of the Army -of Reserve. Realizing that the scarcity of provisions would prevent -a long resistance, Masséna took possession of all the wheat he could -find in the city. Even the grain of inferior quality, such as rye and -oats, was seized and made into bread. Though the quantity of bread thus -obtained was small, and the quality poor, it sufficed to keep alive the -soldiers and the poor of Genoa during the first two weeks of the siege. -But ten days passed, and the supply of bread was almost exhausted. -Moreover, its bad quality was already causing sickness. A number of -soldiers were in the hospitals; and many were so weak and emaciated -that they could hardly bear the weight of their arms. - -Though the outlook was gloomy to Masséna's soldiers, some hope yet -remained in his rugged soul. Perhaps a storm or adverse winds might -drive the English fleet off the Italian shore, and thus allow the -French ships to bring in provisions; perhaps Bonaparte, now that he -understood the situation, would hurry across the Alps into Italy, and -strike a blow that would cause Melas to raise the siege of Genoa and -set free Masséna's perishing army. - -Masséna's force, exclusive of the sick, now numbered but twelve -thousand men; part of whom were occupying the outlying works, and the -remainder, within the city, were acting as a reserve. His purpose was -to attack the Austrians, whenever they advanced towards the city, and -to exhaust them as much as possible by partial engagements. By this -means he expected to prevent Melas from sending away a force, either to -aid the Austrians in front of Suchet, or to oppose the projected march -of Bonaparte across the Alps. - -On the 30th of April General Ott, supported by English gun-boats in -the Gulf of Genoa, made simultaneous attacks on the east, north, and -west sides of the city. In these attacks, he met with considerable -success. On all three sides the Austrian columns advanced and occupied -more favorable positions. In fact, they gained the crests of several -mountain ridges within cannon-shot of the city, and succeeded in -capturing several French forts. - -Masséna fought fiercely. Throwing his reserve first on one side of the -city and then on the other, in order to re-enforce his troops occupying -the outlying works, he finally forced back the Austrians from their -commanding positions and recovered the lost forts. The success of -Masséna at this time was discouraging to General Ott; for he knew that -he could not lay close siege to the place until his troops gained the -crests of the Apennines and invested, or captured, the outlying works. - -Meanwhile the twenty-five thousand Austrians under Elsnitz had, by -vigorous fighting, driven Suchet from position to position. They had -even forced him to abandon Nice, and to fall back on the Var. On -this river, which had been strongly fortified, Suchet rallied his -scattered forces. Having received from the departments of southern -France a considerable re-enforcement, which increased his total -strength to fourteen thousand men, he was able, in this position, to -make a successful stand, and to stop the onward rush of the victorious -Austrians. - -As soon as Bonaparte learned of the hopeless condition of affairs at -Genoa, he saw the necessity of hurrying across the Alps with the Army -of Reserve. But since the successful execution of his plan depended -upon his receiving a large re-enforcement from the Army of the Rhine, -and since Moreau could not safely detach this force till he had -defeated Kray and pushed him back from Lake Constance, Bonaparte was -compelled to delay his own movement. Moreau was slow to begin; and -his lingering inactivity gave Bonaparte intense anxiety, for it not -only paralyzed the operations of the Army of Reserve, but prolonged -the sufferings of the Army of Italy. Repeatedly Bonaparte urged Moreau -to cross the Rhine and attack Kray. "Hasten," said the First Consul, -"hasten by your success to accelerate the arrival of the moment at -which Masséna can be disengaged. That general wants provisions. For -fifteen days he has been enduring with his debilitated soldiers a -struggle of despair. Your patriotism is addressed, your self-interest; -for if Masséna shall be compelled to capitulate, it will be necessary -to take from you a part of your forces, for the purpose of hurrying -down the Rhone, in order to assist the departments of the south." - -Finally, on the 25th of April, Moreau began his advance against Kray. -It is not the intention at this time to describe in detail these -operations. At present it is sufficient to say that Moreau executed -vigorously his part in Bonaparte's great plan. Having defeated Kray -in two battles, he detached, on the 11th of May, a corps of fifteen -thousand men from his army, gave the command of it to General Moncey, -and ordered him to march by way of the St. Gothard into Italy. - -The time had come for Bonaparte to move forward the Army of Reserve. -Accordingly, on the 15th of May, he began his advance by way of the -Great St. Bernard into Italy. While this army of forty thousand and -this corps of fifteen thousand are marching hopefully forward across -the Alps, from France and Germany respectively, let us again turn our -attention to Masséna, who, amidst famine and death, is desperately -fighting on. - -On the 5th of May a small vessel, containing grain sufficient to last -the besieged garrison for five days, ran the blockade and entered -Genoa. Masséna felt encouraged, and shortly afterwards made a sortie -on the east side of the city. Though he drove the Austrians from their -positions, this assault was the last of his successes. On the 13th of -May he attempted another assault, but was badly defeated. Henceforth -his soldiers were so weak that they lacked the strength to undertake -any movement beyond the walls of Genoa. In fact, many, not being -able to bear the weight of their arms, were compelled to sit down -while doing guard duty. Consequently, Masséna was obliged to limit his -efforts to the defence of the city, and to the task of providing food -for his men. - -By the 20th of May the bread and meat were exhausted; even the horses -had all been consumed. All the linseed, starch, and cacao found in the -city were then collected and made into a kind of bread, which was all -but indigestible. This wretched and repulsive food, and a soup made of -herbs were all that remained to sustain life. Nevertheless, Masséna -would not capitulate. Stubborn and courageous to the last, he seemed -bent on defying even starvation and death. Possibly Bonaparte might yet -come; for word had been brought that he had crossed the Alps. It was -reported that, on the 20th of May, his army had been seen descending -the Great St. Bernard into Italy. If so, why did he not come? It was -now the 30th of May, and not another word had been heard of him. Could -he have met with defeat? Could he, whose movements were usually so -rapid, whose blows were so terrible and unexpected--could he have been -ten days in Italy, and not yet have struck the blow that was to shatter -the Austrian rear and bring relief to Masséna's perishing soldiers? - -With intense anxiety these despairing men looked for the coming of -Bonaparte. But he came not. Already discouraged, they now lost all -hope. A few went so far as to destroy their arms. Some plotted; others -talked wildly of the sufferings and horrors that they were called upon -to endure. All urged Masséna to surrender; but he would not yield. He -begged his soldiers to hold out a little longer. He told them that the -First Consul was advancing to their relief; that if they capitulated -now, they would lose the results of all their heroism, all their -sufferings. "Yet a few days," said he, "nay, a few hours, and you will -be delivered." - -Thus, for a brief time, Masséna succeeded in raising the hopes of his -soldiers. Again they looked expectantly towards the Apennines. Never -was anxiety more intense. In every sound, in every echo, in every flash -of light along the northern horizon, they thought that they saw signs -of the coming of Bonaparte. But they were mistaken. Despair seized -them; no hope remained. Even Masséna saw that the end had come; for -the last ounce of that wretched food composed of linseed, starch, and -cacao, had been consumed. It was now absolutely necessary to surrender. -Yet Masséna's inflexible nature would not wholly yield. He declared -that he would never capitulate, unless his soldiers should be allowed -to march out with the honors of war, and with the liberty to fight -again when beyond the enemy's line. And he kept his resolution. The -Austrians were compelled to accept these terms. - -That the reader may understand why General Ott did not continue the -struggle a few days longer, and thus force Masséna to surrender -unconditionally, let us consider for a moment the situation at this -time in the valley of the Po. - -On the 2d of June, two days before Masséna capitulated, Bonaparte -entered Milan, and there awaited Moncey's corps, which did not arrive -till the 6th of June. - -On the 29th of May Melas learned that Bonaparte was advancing on -Milan. On the 31st he learned that Moreau had defeated Kray, and that -Moncey's corps was marching by way of the St. Gothard into Italy. -At once he comprehended the vast plan of the First Consul. Melas -was in consternation; he had been surprised. To him the Army of -Reserve was no longer imaginary; it was a reality. Moreover, it was -rapidly approaching a favorable position from which it could strike -a formidable blow at the Austrian communications. Melas saw the -necessity of concentrating immediately his scattered forces. He must, -if possible, break through the French Army before it closed in upon -him. Accordingly, on the 31st of May, he sent orders to General Elsnitz -to quit the Var and march on Alessandria; and instructed General Ott to -raise the siege of Genoa and hasten north in order to defend the line -of the Po. - -General Ott received this order on the 2d of June, during the -negotiations for the capitulation of Genoa. He realized that he must -either raise at once the siege of the city or else accept Masséna's -terms. - -On the 4th of June Masséna surrendered. On the 5th his active force, -numbering eight thousand men, set out over the Genoa-Nice road to -join Suchet, who at this time was following closely upon the rear of -the Austrians in his front, as they withdrew towards Alessandria. In -addition to his active force, Masséna surrendered four thousand sick -soldiers at Genoa; but it was stipulated that they should be cared for, -and upon their recovery should be sent back to join the French army. -Having made these arrangements, Masséna himself proceeded by sea to -join Suchet. - -During these operations the English fleet in the Gulf of Genoa actively -supported the Austrians; but the English corps in Minorca remained -inactive. No effort was made to land it either at Genoa or at any other -point along the Italian or French coast. - -During these engagements the fighting on both sides was desperate, the -loss heavy. In prisoners, killed, and wounded, the Austrians lost about -twenty thousand; the French, about fourteen thousand. But the loss of -the latter was in reality much greater; for out of Masséna's active -force of eight thousand that had marched out of Genoa to join Suchet, -probably six thousand were unfit for arduous service. The total number, -therefore, on the French side put _hors de combat_, for the time -being, may be reckoned at about twenty thousand men. - -The active operations of the Army of Italy were ended. They had begun -on the 5th of April, and had terminated on the 4th of June. For two -months Masséna had shown himself firm as a rock,--had gloriously -performed his part in Bonaparte's great plan. - - -COMMENTS. - -At the outset the Austrian forces were greatly scattered. A few -thousand were in Tuscany and in the Papal States; an Austrian garrison -was occupying the fortress of Mantua, which is situated on the Mincio -about twenty miles south of Lake Garda; twenty-five thousand were -moving forward in two columns to attack Genoa; forty thousand were -being directed on the Apennines and Maritime Alps; and thirty-five -thousand were occupying the fortresses of northwestern Italy, and -guarding the Italian entrances to the passes of the Alps. - -The purpose of Melas was to push forward across the Apennines and -Maritime Alps, force the line of the Var, and invade France. How best -to accomplish this project was the problem before him. Having an army -of one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers and being opposed to but -forty thousand, he believed that his force was sufficiently large to -undertake the invasion of France. Since the French line directly in -his front extended along the mountains from Genoa to the Col di Tenda, -Melas could easily overwhelm the French centre and cut the Army of -Italy in two; then, by leaving a sufficient force to surround Genoa, he -could push forward vigorously to the Var with the bulk of his forces, -and perhaps carry the position there before the French had time to make -the necessary dispositions for defending it. Had he adopted this plan, -and made arrangements with Admiral Keith and General Abercromby to have -the English corps in Minorca landed at the same time on the coast of -Italy or France, he would doubtless have been successful. - -He was not successful because he did not thoroughly appreciate the -situation. He did not know how to handle his army. He scattered his -forces, and thus dissipated his strength. He spent too much energy at -Genoa, and not enough along the Var. His rear guard, which consisted of -the thirty-five thousand soldiers under General Kaim in Piedmont, and -of twenty thousand scattered throughout Italy, was unnecessarily large, -and yet was so divided, subdivided, and dispersed that it was weak at -all points. In short, Melas committed many errors. - -First: In advancing against Genoa with twenty-five thousand men, -divided into two columns, and against the centre of the French line -with a third column of forty thousand, Melas gave to Masséna the -opportunity of holding in check with small forces two of the columns, -while he concentrated his remaining forces against the third. In fact, -this was exactly what Masséna did. He left eight thousand soldiers in -and around Genoa to hold the place, then united the rest of his troops -near Savona to attack Melas. When it is remembered that these three -Austrian columns of attack were separated by impassable obstacles, and -could not support one another, the errors of Melas become apparent -to every soldier. That, in spite of such errors, he was successful -in cutting the Army of Italy in two and in gaining the crest of the -mountains on the east side of Genoa was due to his great superiority in -numbers. His attacking force numbered sixty-five thousand men, while -Masséna had but thirty-two thousand. - -In this connection it is worthy of notice that numbers alone can -neutralize and finally overcome any advantage of position or of -generalship. Thus mediocrity may triumph over genius. Even a Napoleon -cannot conquer in the face of odds sufficiently great. At Leipsic -one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers, commanded by him, were -defeated by two hundred and ninety thousand allies. In the Waterloo -campaign, which, from a strategical point of view, is a masterpiece in -generalship, his army of one hundred and twenty-five thousand men was -crushed and overwhelmed by the armies of England and Prussia, numbering -two hundred and eighteen thousand soldiers. Hence follows the first -principle of war: _Be as strong as possible at the vital point_. - -Second: A victory on the Var was of much greater importance to Melas -than was the capitulation of Genoa; for should this river be once -forced, there would be no further obstacle to the invasion of France; -and, besides, a successful attack on Suchet would hopelessly deprive -Masséna of all support, and would in time force him to surrender. -In truth, the great effort for success should have been made on the -Var. But Melas failed to appreciate this fact. After he had separated -Masséna from Suchet by forcing the centre of the French line, he -directed his greatest efforts to the capture of Genoa. For this purpose -the troops surrounding the place were increased to thirty thousand men, -and were kept at or about this strength till Masséna surrendered; while -on the Var the Austrian forces actively engaged during these operations -numbered but twenty-five thousand. Since, at the outset, Masséna had -only eighteen thousand combatants at Genoa, and since this number was -rapidly reduced from day to day by casualties and sickness, it is -evident that Melas could have surrounded the place and have maintained -the siege there with less than thirty thousand soldiers. The increase -of his troops beyond the number necessary to hold securely the place -was injudicious; for the surplus could have been used with greater -effect on the Var. Moreover, the surplus did not hasten the surrender -of Masséna; for he was able to hold out against thirty thousand till -his provisions were exhausted. Against ten thousand less he could -have held out no longer. Again and again Melas assaulted the works -surrounding the city, but his efforts were, to a great extent, a waste -of energy; for they resulted in a greater loss to the Austrians than to -the French, and had little or no effect in hastening the surrender of -Masséna. - -In the treatment of fortresses, it is worth while to compare the -methods of Bonaparte with those of Melas. In the Italian campaign of -1796-97, the strong fortresses which were held by the allies, and which -were on the direct line of Bonaparte's operations, did not stop his -progress for a moment. Though from a lack of siege artillery, he could -not completely invest them, he pushed forward past them to decide, if -possible, their fate upon the open battle-field. In that campaign he -invested the fortress of Mantua, containing twelve thousand combatants, -with ten thousand men; and though the besieged were finally increased -to twenty thousand soldiers, he continued with ten thousand or less -to hold them in check for seven months, while he won the battles of -Lonato, Castiglione, Roveredo, Bassano, San Georgio, Arcole, and -Rivoli. "It is upon the open field of battle," said Napoleon, "that the -fate of fortresses and empires is decided." - -Third: The Austrian rear guard was unnecessarily large. It consisted -of fifty-five thousand soldiers. At present it is not the purpose to -point out in detail the errors that Melas committed by leaving so large -a force inactive in Italy, but rather to show that this force was -larger than necessary, and that the surplus troops composing it could -have been used to much greater advantage along the Var. The necessity -for a strong rear guard in northwestern Italy becomes apparent when -it is remembered that Thurreau was occupying the Mont Cenis Pass with -four thousand men, and might at any time attempt to issue therefrom -upon the flank and rear of Melas as he advanced towards the Var. -Inasmuch as Thurreau's detachment occupied a favorable position from -which to attack the Austrians, it was necessary, perhaps, that Melas -should leave ten or twelve thousand men to hold this force in check. -There was, too, some likelihood that French troops might issue into -Italy from Switzerland by the St. Gothard Pass or the Simplon; a few -thousand troops were therefore needed in that vicinity to give warning -in case the French attempted to enter Italy from that direction. At -this time Melas doubted the existence of the Army of Reserve; but, had -he believed it to be a reality, doubtless he would not have expected -Bonaparte to cross the Great St. Bernard. And even had he expected -him from that direction, perhaps no better arrangement of his rear -guard could have been made than to leave five thousand men before the -St. Gothard, five thousand before the Great St. Bernard, and twenty -thousand near Turin with their left flank well extended towards the -Mont Cenis Pass. In this central position the rear guard could march -rapidly to attack the French, should they enter Italy by any one of -these passes, and could hold them in check till a larger Austrian force -could be concentrated. Had Melas known that Bonaparte expected to cross -the Alps with the Army of Reserve, no better method could have been -devised to prevent the projected march of Bonaparte than to force the -Var and invade France. This undertaking being accomplished, there would -be no further danger of Bonaparte's crossing the Alps; for he must then -fight on the west side of the mountains to save France from invasion. -The surest way to protect the Austrian rear was to force the Var. Every -spare man should have been directed there. Twenty thousand could have -held Genoa; thirty thousand would have sufficed for a rear guard; and -of the remaining seventy thousand, probably fifty or sixty thousand -could have united in an attack upon Suchet. - -Fourth: Had the English corps of twelve thousand men been thrown upon -the coast of France just in rear of Suchet, while sixty thousand -Austrians were attacking him in front, who can doubt what the result -would have been? Suchet had but fourteen thousand men; and against such -overwhelming odds he would have been compelled to yield. - -With a large and brave army, capable of doing great things, if it had -been properly led, Melas so scattered it and dissipated his strength -that he virtually accomplished nothing. Though he commanded one hundred -and twenty thousand men, he brought but twenty-five thousand upon the -vital point. In short, he committed blunder upon blunder, and finally -failed in his undertaking. - -The problem before Masséna was to hold in check the Austrians in Italy -until Bonaparte could perfect his arrangements, cross the Alps, and -strike the Austrian rear. Masséna could not expect to do more than -this; for he could not take the offensive single-handed against an -Austrian army three times the size of his own. Moreover, he was in -possession of the strong defensive positions of Genoa, of the Apennines -and Maritime Alps, and of the line of the Var, where inferior numbers -could make a vigorous resistance against greatly superior forces. -Masséna could not know how soon Bonaparte would cross the Alps. His -object, therefore, was so to arrange his troops as to enable them to -hold out as long as possible. - -At the outset of the campaign the Army of Italy was stationed as -follows: eight thousand were at Genoa; twelve thousand, in the vicinity -of Savona; twelve thousand, at the Tenda Pass, at Nice, and along -the Var; and four thousand, in the Mont Cenis Pass. By examining the -several positions on the map, it will be seen that the French forces -were greatly scattered. Thirty-two thousand, under the direct command -of Masséna, were defending the line of the Apennines and Maritime Alps -from Genoa to the Col di Tenda, a distance of about seventy-five miles; -and four thousand, under Thurreau, were holding the Mont Cenis Pass, -which lies in the French Alps about one hundred and twenty miles north -of Nice. - -Inasmuch as the direct road from Italy into France crossed the Alps -over this pass, it was necessary to leave Thurreau's detachment there. -Otherwise an Austrian corps of several thousand could have crossed the -Alps at this point, thence have marched south along the west side of -the mountains, and have attacked the French on the Var in rear, while -Melas with his main forces was advancing across the Apennines to attack -them in front. Moreover, in this favorable position, Thurreau, unless -strongly opposed, could descend the Alps and fall upon the flank and -rear of the Austrians as they advanced towards Nice. It was necessary, -therefore, for Melas to leave ten or twelve thousand soldiers of the -Austrian rear guard near the Italian entrance to the Mont Cenis Pass -in order to hold Thurreau in check. Thus, though this French detachment -could take no active part in the engagements along the Apennines and -Maritime Alps, its four thousand men did good service in the struggle -by rendering nugatory the fighting power of a much larger Austrian -force. - -Since the French along the Apennines and Maritime Alps occupied a front -of about seventy-five miles in extent, they could not concentrate -rapidly. Consequently, Melas could throw a strong force against some -point of their long line with great hope of success. In fact, by -attacking the centre of their line with superior numbers, he could cut -the Army of Italy in two. Having in this way separated Masséna from -Suchet, Melas could concentrate an overwhelming force against each in -succession, and thus defeat them separately. Moreover, this movement -would cut the communications of Masséna with France, and compel him to -seek safety in Genoa, where the opposition of superior numbers and the -scarcity of provisions must eventually force him to surrender. - -Strategically, therefore, the situation of the Army of Italy was -faulty; yet it must be remembered that the lack of provisions was the -principal cause that led Masséna to adopt this plan. In order better -to subsist his troops, he had scattered them. But was there no other -course that offered him greater advantages? A discussion of the subject -should throw light on this question. - -First: He might have left detachments to hold the Cadibona and Ormea -passes, and have concentrated the bulk of his army in rear of the Tenda -Pass in the vicinity of Nice. Had he adopted this course, his troops -would have been united, and could have drawn their provisions direct -from France. But no other advantages would have resulted. With the -French in this position, Melas could have attacked the passes of the -Apennines in force, and have gained possession of the Genoa-Nice road; -which operation would have compelled Masséna to fall back on the Var. -There he might have been able to make a successful stand for a time. -But should the Austrians once force this position, there would be no -further obstacle to the invasion of France. To adopt this plan would -undoubtedly have been a mistake; for it involved the abandonment of -Genoa, which was so strong, both naturally and artificially, that a -small force could hold it for a long time against superior numbers. -Moreover, in a defensive campaign, when the odds are greatly in favor -of the attacking army, and when the object is to gain time, advantage -should be taken of every strong position. - -Second: Masséna might have left small detachments to hold the passes -of the Apennines and Maritime Alps, and have concentrated the rest -of his army at Genoa. Indeed this was the plan that Bonaparte had -ordered Masséna to carry out; but it presented great difficulties. -Provisions were scarce at Genoa. Had Masséna increased his strength -there to thirty thousand soldiers, starvation and disease would sooner -have done their deadly work. Moreover, the greater fighting power thus -obtained would have availed him nothing; for with half the number he -in fact held the city till the food was exhausted. Had Masséna adopted -this course, undoubtedly he must have surrendered at least three weeks -earlier. In that case, the Austrians would have crossed the Var into -France, and Bonaparte would have abandoned his march into Italy. In -that case, the decisive struggle between Melas and Bonaparte would -doubtless have taken place in the valley of the Rhone instead of in -the valley of the Po. Indeed, it is not improbable to assume that, -had Masséna attempted to carry out either one of the plans mentioned, -Bonaparte would have been obliged to change the entire conduct of the -campaign. In war small matters often determine great events. - -Under the circumstances then existing, Masséna was justified in not -carrying out Bonaparte's instructions; nevertheless, had he fully -appreciated the advantages of the plan, he would undoubtedly have made -a greater effort to collect supplies at Genoa. Inasmuch as he took -command of the Army of Italy before the arrival of the British fleet -in the Gulf of Genoa, possibly he might have shipped sufficient grain -from Toulon to supply the Army of Italy during a siege of several -months. For the purpose of this discussion, let us assume that he had -done so; and that, in accordance with Bonaparte's orders, he had left a -few thousand men to hold the passes of the Apennines and Maritime Alps, -and had collected about thirty thousand at Genoa. What would have been -the result? What are the advantages of this situation? Surely, they are -many; for Bonaparte himself originated the plan. - -Since the mountains and outlying works surrounding Genoa made it a -veritable stronghold, Bonaparte calculated that the Army of Italy could -maintain itself there against greatly outnumbering forces; and that the -Austrians would hardly dare to force the Apennines and push forward in -order to invade France while thirty thousand men remained undefeated in -their rear. In this position, too, Masséna could, at any time, leave a -small force to hold Genoa, then march rapidly westward along the south -side of the Apennines, and arrive before any one of the threatened -passes with almost his entire army; or should the Austrians force -the Apennines and advance towards France, he could fall upon their -flank and rear, and perhaps sever their communications, while his own -communications with Genoa would be protected by the mountains on one -side and by the sea on the other. In fact, this position would enable -him to take advantage of the topography of the country to the fullest -extent. If he should make an attack in force upon the Austrians from -one of the passes in his possession, the mountains would protect him -during his concentration, and would give strength to his position after -his forces had united. If he should remain at Genoa, the fortifications -and natural obstacles there would increase enormously his fighting -power. It is evident, too, that he might march out of the city, force -his way through the Apennines, and cut the communications of the -Austrians in the valley of the Po. If, while holding the Apennines, he -should advance with his main army over the Genoa-Nice road to attack -the Austrians, he would be in a position where a victory would bring -him great results, and where a defeat would do him but little harm. -Should he be successful, he could sever the Austrian communications -and perhaps ruin their army; should he be repulsed, he could fall back -and seek safety in Genoa. "If," says Bonaparte in his instructions to -Masséna, "Melas appear in the direction of Nice, you being at Genoa, -let him come on, stir not from your position: he will not advance far -if you remain in Liguria, ready to throw yourself upon his rear, or -upon the troops left in Piedmont." - -In short, Bonaparte's design was so to make use of the works of nature -and of art as to prolong the conflict and increase the effectiveness -of Masséna's small army. Thus it was that Bonaparte expected thirty -thousand French to defeat sixty thousand Austrians. Thus it was that he -expected the Army of Italy to hold out against overwhelming odds till -he himself could strike the decisive blow. - -Though from a strategical point of view the plan set forth in -Bonaparte's instructions to Masséna possessed many advantages, yet -it had one great defect. With the main bulk of Masséna's forces -concentrated at Genoa, and with small detachments holding the line of -the Apennines and Maritime Alps, it is evident that Melas could force -his way across the mountains between Genoa and the Tenda Pass, and -thus cut the communications of Masséna and enclose him in Genoa. It is -evident, too, that Melas could surround Masséna and eventually force -him to capitulate. The French might fight desperately and hold out for -months; yet, in time, they would be compelled to yield. The histories -of wars and of sieges show that, when a commander allows himself to be -enclosed in a fortification, he is doomed to defeat in the end. "_Great -armies_," says Von der Goltz, "_which are shut up in a fortress after -lost battles, are, as the history of investments from Alesia down -to Metz proves, almost always lost_." Again he says: "Among all the -relations between fortress and field army, the latter must make it a -supreme rule _never to allow itself to be thrown into a fortress_. Even -to pass through it is dangerous, because the army may be kept prisoner -there against its will. _Fortresses protect the troops they contain, -but, at the same time, anchor them to the spot. An army can easily be -got behind fortifications, but only with difficulty back again into -the open field, unless it be that strong help from without lends it a -hand._" When the commander of an army is hard pressed, and there is -near at hand a strongly fortified place with outlying works of great -strength, and provisions and water within, the temptation is great to -seek security there. Second rate generals accept such opportunities, -but in doing so they make fatal mistakes. The great masters of the art -of war manoeuvre for position, and become themselves the besiegers, -or decide upon the open battle-field the fate of their fortresses and -their armies. - -During all Napoleon's military operations he never allowed himself to -be besieged in any place. How, then, are we to reconcile this fact with -the instructions that he sent to Masséna? Why should he order Masséna -to take up a position which would allow his army to be besieged, and -finally to be captured or destroyed? To answer satisfactorily these -questions, it is necessary to consider the operations of Masséna in -connection with the projected operations of Bonaparte. The Army of -Italy was essentially a containing force. Its duty was to hold Melas -in check for a time. How Masséna could best _prolong_ the conflict was -the problem that Bonaparte was solving. That the Army of Italy should -finally be defeated was of small consequence; that it should not be -defeated before Bonaparte had time to effect the destruction of Melas -was of great consequence. If it could hold out till then, the victory -of Bonaparte over Melas would render nugatory the triumph of Melas over -Masséna. If it could hold out till then, the success of Melas at Genoa -would avail him nothing; for it would be swallowed up by a greater -success, which was destined to produce far greater results. - -Bonaparte believed that Masséna was strong enough to hold Melas in -check; and since every spare man was needed to strengthen Moreau's army -and the Army of Reserve, he would not send any re-enforcements to the -Army of Italy. Doubtless an ordinary general would have marched the -entire Army of Reserve to the support of Masséna. What would have been -the result? With only eighty thousand Frenchmen to oppose one hundred -and twenty thousand Austrians, there would have been a long struggle in -Italy. Guided by the genius of Bonaparte the French might have repeated -the successes of 1796-97; but even had they done so, months of hard -fighting would have been necessary in order to drive the Austrians -out of northern Italy. In the Marengo campaign Bonaparte expected to -accomplish as great results in less time. The struggle for the mastery -was to take place, not along the Apennines, but in the valley of the -Po. Thus it was that no re-enforcements were sent to Masséna, and that -little or nothing was done to improve the condition of the Army of -Italy. "It must be admitted," says Thiers, "that the army of Liguria[6] -was treated a little as a sacrificed army. Not a man was sent to it. -Materials of war only were supplied to it; and even under that head -such only as were absolutely needful. It was in a different direction -that the great efforts of the government were exerted, because it was -in a different direction that the great blows were to be dealt. The -army of Liguria was exposed to destruction in order to gain the time -which should render the others victorious. Such is the hard necessity -of war, which passes over the heads of these to strike the heads of -those; obliging those to die that these may live and conquer." - -It seems hard that Masséna's soldiers should have starved and died, -and no help have been sent them. It seems hard that they should have -struggled on, performing heroic deeds, with little or no hope of -victory. But such is war; some must fail in order that others may -triumph. In beleaguered Genoa, at the bridge of Arcole, amid the snows -of Russia, men must die. But do they die in vain? Perhaps so: and yet, -who shall say? - -Victory was Bonaparte's object; and to obtain it, he would, if -necessary, sacrifice the Army of Italy. He had an eye for great -results. His glance penetrated the most complicated military problems. -It was his merit that he knew how, with the forces at hand, to do -great things. He did not fritter away his strength by sending useless -detachments here and there. The four thousand men under Thurreau were -a necessity in the Mont Cenis Pass; the Army of Italy, with Masséna at -its head, was large enough, but not too large, to do the work expected -of it; and the Army of Reserve, re-enforced by a corps of Moreau's -army, was of sufficient strength to produce the desired effect at the -vital point. Even Genoa, the Alps, and the Apennines were made to -serve Bonaparte. Nature was his re-enforcement. Like a mighty tide he -moved on, neither deterred by the sufferings of the Army of Italy, nor -stopped by the great chain of the Alps. - -He who would censure Bonaparte for not marching to the relief of -Masséna must remember that such a course would have prolonged the -struggle and ultimately would have led to a greater destruction -of life. Yet humane considerations probably did not influence his -decisions one iota. Let us not, then, attribute to him the virtues of -a Lincoln; but let us set forth with fairness what he did and why he -did it. We may not admire the man who can thus sacrifice an army to -attain his ends; but we must admire the soldier who penetrates the -future, who sees what to do and how to do it, who bends every energy to -the accomplishment of the task, and with relentless purpose, turning -neither to the right hand nor to the left, marches on to victory. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[Footnote 4: See Map 2.] - -[Footnote 5: In addition to the forces of Melas mentioned above, twenty -thousand Austrians were scattered throughout northern Italy, several -thousand of whom were in Tuscany, in the Papal States, and in the -fortress of Mantua.] - -[Footnote 6: In the "History of the Consulate and Empire" by Thiers, he -often refers to the Army of Italy as the "army of Liguria."] - - - - -CHAPTER III. - -MOREAU IN GERMANY.[7] - - -Lying in the angle of the Rhine between Lake Constance and Strasburg -is a mountainous region known as the Black Forest, which takes its -name from the dark foliage of its pine timber. The general shape of -the Black Forest is that of a triangle; its base resting on the Rhine -between Lake Constance and Bâle, and its apex pointing north. Its total -length is ninety-three miles; its breadth varies from forty-six to -thirteen miles, and its average elevation is about three thousand feet. -On the south and west sides the mountains are rugged and steep, but on -the east side they descend gradually to the lower level of the adjacent -country. - -Within its limits the Black Forest presents an almost impassable -barrier to an army attempting to enter Germany from France. A few roads -lead through it; but they lie in the fissures of the mountains, and are -therefore difficult for the passage of troops. Extending into the Black -Forest opposite Strasburg is the Kinzig Valley, and opposite Brisach -are the Höllenthal (valley of Hell) and the valley of Waldkirch. At -Bâle the valley of the Rhine is narrow, but at a short distance below -that point it begins to widen till it reaches a breadth of fifteen -miles. Good roads extend along the Rhine on both sides, and bridges -span the river at Bâle, Strasburg, and Mayence. - -The opposing armies were thus stationed: Moreau's right wing, -twenty-nine thousand strong, commanded by General Lecourbe, was in -Switzerland along the Rhine from Lauffenberg to Lake Constance. Next on -the left was the reserve of twenty-six thousand, commanded by Moreau -in person; it occupied the intrenched camp at Bâle and extended some -distance along the Rhine both above and below the city. The centre, -consisting of thirty thousand soldiers, under General St. Cyr, joined -the left of the reserve near Brisach, and stretched north almost to -Strasburg. The left wing, nineteen thousand strong, under General Ste. -Suzanne, occupied Strasburg and the bridge-head of Kehl on the opposite -shore. Besides these forces, about twenty-six thousand were occupying -Switzerland and the frontier fortresses of France along the Rhine as -far north as Mayence. - -On the Austrian side, sixteen thousand soldiers, under General Starray, -were posted from Mayence to Renchen; and fifteen thousand, under -General Kienmayer, were guarding the defiles of the Black Forest from -Renchen to the Höllenthal. These two corps constituted Kray's right -wing. The main body, forty thousand strong, commanded by Kray himself, -was at Villingen and Donaueschingen; and the reserve, numbering -nineteen thousand, was guarding the Austrian magazines at Stokach. -Cavalry detachments and outposts, to the number of about five thousand, -from these several corps, were observing the Rhine and the defiles -of the Black Forest; and an Austrian flotilla was on Lake Constance. -Beyond the lake was Kray's left wing, numbering about twenty-five -thousand men, of whom six or seven thousand were Tyrolese militia. This -wing was commanded by Prince de Reuss, and extended well up into the -mountains bordering eastern Switzerland, thence eastward into the Tyrol. - -The natural base of operations for Kray's army was the Bohemian -Mountains and the Enns River, which are about two hundred miles east -of the Black Forest. The Austrian lines of communication to this base -were over two roads: one by way of Stokach, Memmingen, and Munich; the -other along the Danube by way of Mosskirch, Ulm, and Ratisbon. The -temporary base of operations for the Austrians in the Black Forest was -Ulm. At this place, during the preceding year, the Archduke Charles had -constructed an immense intrenched camp. - -Knowing that it was necessary to gain a decisive victory over the -Austrians in the Black Forest before the Army of Reserve could begin -its operations in Italy, the First Consul submitted a plan of campaign -which he desired Moreau to carry out. Bonaparte proposed that Moreau -should concentrate his forces on the south side of the Rhine between -Schaffhausen and Lake Constance, cross the river in force, and attack -the flank and rear of the Austrians in the Black Forest. He calculated -that, by an attack in this direction, Moreau would be able to defeat -Kray, sever his communications, and either capture or destroy his army. - -To this plan Moreau objected. It seemed to him a difficult operation. -Cautious by nature, he looked upon the proposed manoeuvres of Bonaparte -as being too bold and hazardous. He argued that his left and centre -would have to make long flank marches in order to join his right; and -that while the movements were taking place Kray would be given the -opportunity of concentrating his forces near Schaffhausen, where he -could oppose the passage of the French corps, or crush them in detail -as they crossed the river. - -The First Consul replied that the Rhine afforded just the kind -of protection necessary to screen the French corps during their -concentration; and that these manoeuvres, if successfully executed, -would, in a short time, bring about great results. - -But Moreau, who appreciated the difficulties of forcing the passage -of a large river in the face of an active enemy, believed that the -risk was too great, and therefore refused to attempt the execution of -Bonaparte's plan. Instead, he proposed the following plan. His left, -under Ste. Suzanne, was to cross the Rhine at Kehl, and his centre, -under St. Cyr, at Brisach. Both corps were to push forward, attack -Kienmayer, and drive him into the defiles of the Black Forest. Moreau -calculated that these attacks would lead Kray to believe that the -French forces were massing in front of his right wing, and would cause -him to re-enforce Kienmayer. Having driven the Austrians back into -the Black Forest, and thus given the impression that the principal -attack of the French would be made from the direction of Strasburg, -Ste. Suzanne and St. Cyr were to withdraw suddenly. The former was to -recross the Rhine at Kehl, ascend the river, cross again to the German -side at Brisach, and take the position formerly occupied by St. Cyr; -the latter was to make a flank march over the spurs and hills towards -Schaffhausen by way of St. Blazien. Meanwhile Moreau with the reserve -was to cross the Rhine at Bâle and march towards Schaffhausen, where, -upon his arrival, his right, under Lecourbe, was to cross the river -and join him. As soon as these movements were completed, Ste. Suzanne -was to march towards Lake Constance by way of Friburg, Neustadt, and -Loffingen. By this series of complicated manoeuvres, Moreau expected to -unite the bulk of his forces in the vicinity of Schaffhausen, and to -march thence against the flank of Kray in the Black Forest. - -Though the First Consul was anxious to have his plan adopted; though he -had, in fact, already begun to collect boats in the Rhine preparatory -to crossing the river near Schaffhausen, yet Moreau persisted in his -own views. Nevertheless, Bonaparte hoped to convince him. With this -end in view, he explained the proposed manoeuvres and pointed out -their advantages to General Dessoles, Moreau's chief of staff. Through -this officer, who had an acute intellect and sound judgment, the First -Consul hoped to change the views of Moreau himself. Though General -Dessoles soon perceived that the plan of Bonaparte was superior to -that of Moreau, nevertheless he advised the First Consul to allow -Moreau to carry out his own ideas. "Your plan," said he to Bonaparte, -"is grander, more decisive, and probably even surer; but it is not -adapted to the genius of the man who is to execute it. You have a -method of making war which is superior to all others; Moreau has his -own,--inferior doubtless to yours, but still an excellent one. Leave -him to himself; he will act well, slowly perhaps, but surely; and he -will obtain as many results for you as are necessary for the success -of your general combinations. If, on the contrary, you impose your -ideas on him, you will disconcert him, you will wound his self-love, -and obtain nothing from him by seeking to obtain too much." The First -Consul appreciated the wisdom of these remarks, coming from such a man, -and yielded the point. "You are right," said he to General Dessoles. -"Moreau is not capable of grasping and executing the plan that I have -conceived. Let him follow his own course; only let him push back -Marshal Kray upon Ulm and Ratisbon, and afterwards move his right -wing in time upon Switzerland. The plan which he does not understand, -and dares not execute, I myself will carry out on another part of -the theatre of war. What he dares not attempt on the Rhine, I will -accomplish on the Alps." - -It being settled that Moreau should proceed against the Austrians in -his own way, Bonaparte now wished to come to an understanding with him -by which a corps of twenty or twenty-five thousand men should, at the -proper time, be detached from the Army of the Rhine, and be sent across -Switzerland to unite in Italy with the Army of Reserve. But Moreau did -not enter heartily into any of the plans proposed by the First Consul. -In fact, both he and Bonaparte seemed to distrust each other. Whether -from jealousy, or from honest convictions, Moreau opposed the plans -of Bonaparte. Moreover, he had declared that he would not serve under -the First Consul, should the latter unite the Army of Reserve with -the Army of the Rhine. Naturally this opposition created in the mind -of Bonaparte a doubt of Moreau's good faith. He feared that, at the -critical moment, the commander of the Army of the Rhine might fail to -send a corps into Italy. He was well aware that the commander of an -army is always reluctant to weaken his forces after operations have -begun; and he knew that circumstances might arise which would seem -to justify Moreau in refusing to obey the orders of his superior. He -therefore insisted that Moreau should sign a stipulation whereby he -promised that, after pushing Kray back from Lake Constance, he would -detach Lecourbe with twenty or twenty-five thousand men, and order him -into Italy. This agreement was signed at Bâle by Moreau and General -Berthier, the latter representing the First Consul. - -Nearly a month had passed since the arrangements between Bonaparte -and Moreau had been completed. It was now the latter part of April, -yet Moreau had made no movement to cross the Rhine and attack Kray. -Naturally cautious and slow, he had postponed his advance from day -to day, in order, if possible, to supply his army with everything -necessary to increase its fighting power. He was short of cavalry -and artillery horses, and had little or no camp equipage, and no -intrenching tools. But at this time it was impossible for him to obtain -everything he needed. Already Bonaparte had sent to the Army of the -Rhine all the spare material of war that he could collect in France. -Now he was anxious to have Moreau advance. Masséna was hard pressed at -Genoa, and Bonaparte desired to march into Italy in order to relieve -him. But to cross the Alps and throw himself upon the rear of Melas, -while Kray remained undefeated in the Black Forest, was too hazardous -an undertaking. Much therefore depended upon the early advance of -Moreau. Repeatedly Bonaparte urged him to press forward, and finally -sent him a positive order to cross the Rhine and attack Kray. - -On the 25th of April Moreau began his movement. Ste. Suzanne crossed -the Rhine at Kehl, ascended the Kinzig valley, and pushed Kienmayer's -outposts back into the Black Forest. At the same time St. Cyr crossed -at Brisach; one division of his corps then advanced towards the Kinzig -valley, while the other divisions forced back the Austrians at Friburg, -and occupied the entrance to the Höllenthal. - -On the next day Kray at Donaueschingen heard of these movements. -Having received word that a part of his right wing had been attacked -by forty thousand men, he was led to believe that Moreau intended to -force his way through the Black Forest by way of the Kinzig valley. He -therefore sent seven thousand Austrians from Villingen to re-enforce -Kienmayer, and to replace these troops withdrew seven thousand men from -his reserve at Stokach. At the same time he ordered his extreme right, -under Starray, to move towards the main army into the valley of the -Murg. - -On the 27th of April Ste. Suzanne withdrew his corps from its advanced -position preparatory to recrossing the Rhine at Kehl. St. Cyr, having -directed his artillery and trains to follow the river road on the right -bank towards Schaffhausen, led his infantry across the hills towards -St. Blazien. Moreau crossed the Rhine at Bâle with the reserve; one -of his divisions, commanded by General Richepanse, then ascended the -Weiss River, so as to join the right of St. Cyr's corps; the other -two, commanded by Moreau in person, marched up the Rhine towards -Schaffhausen. - -On the following day Ste. Suzanne recrossed at Kehl, and proceeded up -the left bank of the Rhine towards Brisach. St. Cyr, having united a -part of his forces with Richepanse's division, occupied St. Blazien. -Moreau himself forced a passage across the Alle River, and drove back -an Austrian brigade there, which retreated towards Bonndorf. - -On the 30th of April Ste. Suzanne, having arrived at Brisach, again -crossed the Rhine to the German side, and took up the position at -Friburg, at the entrance to the Höllenthal, recently occupied by St. -Cyr's troops. St. Cyr remained in the vicinity of St. Blazien. Moreau -advanced upon the Wutach River, and Lecourbe concentrated his corps on -the south bank of the Rhine near Schaffhausen, preparatory to crossing -the river at that point. - -Thus the French corps continued to push forward. On the 1st of May -Moreau reached Schaffhausen, where he was joined by Lecourbe's corps, -part of which crossed the river in boats, and the remainder over -a bridge temporarily constructed for the purpose. St. Cyr reached -Stuhlingen, and Ste. Suzanne, having driven back the Austrian brigade -occupying the Höllenthal, arrived at Neustadt. - -During these movements the Austrian outposts along the Rhine fell back -before Moreau to Stuhlingen, and, upon St. Cyr's arrival at that place, -retreated upon Zollhaus. Meanwhile Kray had directed part of his own -immediate command upon Loffingen and Zollhaus. Kienmayer, with the -greater part of his forces, still remained in the valley of the Kinzig, -and Starray in the valley of the Murg. - -Thus the first part of Moreau's plan was successfully executed. As -yet he had met with no reverse. His forces had driven before them the -Austrian outposts and advance brigades, till now three of his corps, -numbering eighty-five thousand men, were within supporting distance of -one another on the north side of the Rhine near Schaffhausen. From this -favorable position he could march at once against Kray in the Black -Forest, and outnumber him almost two to one; for Kray could not expect -immediate aid from his left wing, which was beyond Lake Constance on -the borders of eastern Switzerland and in the Tyrol, or from his right -wing, which was far away in the valleys of the Kinzig and the Murg. - -Kray now began to appreciate the insecurity of his position. He -perceived that his reserve and immense magazines at Stokach were in -danger. Should Moreau capture this place and push rapidly forward -towards Ulm, he would sever the Austrian communications, and thus place -Kray in a position where a defeat would ruin his army. In order to -prevent, if possible, such a result, Kray decided to unite his forces -at Stokach, and there give battle to Moreau. With this end in view, -Kray caused the following movements to be made. On the 2d of May the -Austrian brigade that had been driven from Neustadt by the advance of -Ste. Suzanne, moved to Bonndorf; the Austrians at Bonndorf marched to -Zollhaus; and those at Zollhaus, to Geisingen, where Kray had collected -the Austrian troops under his immediate command. On the 3d of May his -columns advanced towards Stokach over the Geisingen-Engen road. - -Meanwhile Moreau was not idle. On the 3d of May he moved on Engen with -the reserve; St. Cyr on Zollhaus; and Lecourbe, having directed two -brigades to ascend the Aach River, in order to connect with the right -of the reserve, marched on Stokach with about twenty thousand men, -attacked and defeated the twelve thousand Austrians there, captured the -immense magazines, and forced the Austrians back towards Ulm by way of -Mosskirch and by way of Memmingen. But after this victory Lecourbe, not -receiving any orders from Moreau to push forward and seize Mosskirch, -remained in the vicinity of Stokach, awaiting the result of the -operations of Moreau at Engen. - -Meanwhile Kray, on his way to Stokach, had reached Engen before the -arrival of Moreau. In this position his troops, numbering about -forty-five thousand men, faced south with their left at Engen and their -right extended towards Zollhaus. Moreau soon arrived with the reserve. -His forces, counting the two brigades on his right detached from -Lecourbe's corps, numbered about forty thousand men. At once Moreau -began the battle. Fiercely and desperately the French and Austrians -fought for several hours, but neither gained a decided advantage. -Finally, late in the day, St. Cyr, who had received orders from Moreau -to hurry forward from Zollhaus, arrived and began an attack upon the -right of the Austrians, which caused them to give way. But this attack -was made too late to produce any decisive result. The Austrians, -though forced at last to yield, were not crushed; in fact, Engen was -little more than a drawn battle. But, during the night, Kray, having -learned of the capture of Stokach, began to fear that Lecourbe would -push forward, seize Mosskirch, and sever his communications with Ulm. -He therefore decided to retreat. Leaving a rear guard to hold Moreau -in check, he directed his forces upon Tuttlingen, Liptengen, and -Mosskirch. At the battle of Engen each side lost in killed, wounded, -and captured, about seven thousand men. - -Kray now determined to unite as many of his troops as possible at -Mosskirch, and there to make a stand against the French, who were -pushing eagerly forward towards Ulm. Already he had sent word to -General Starray and General Kienmayer to descend the left bank of the -Danube, and join him at the earliest possible moment. - -On the 4th of May Moreau directed his own corps and that of Lecourbe on -Mosskirch; St. Cyr arrived at Geisingen; and Ste. Suzanne, who had been -forcing his way through the Black Forest, was at Donaueschingen. - -On the following day Kray, having been joined by the remnants of -his reserve, beaten at Stokach, took position at Mosskirch with -forty thousand men. His right was at Tuttlingen, about twelve miles -distant; but Kienmayer and Starray were beyond supporting distance on -the north side of the Danube. On this day Moreau attacked Kray with -fifty thousand men, and, after hard fighting, succeeded in forcing -the Austrians back towards Sigmaringen. But Kray did not retire far. -Being anxious for the safety of the Austrian troops at Tuttlingen, -he halted, formed line of battle, and with the right of his line -strongly re-enforced, attacked the French and drove them from the -Tuttlingen-Mosskirch road. This success opened his communications with -the Austrians at Tuttlingen, and enabled them to join him. Being thus -re-enforced, he again attacked the left flank of Moreau, and attempted -to seize the Stokach-Mosskirch road. But in his attempt to outflank the -French, he was in turn outflanked by them, and was again compelled to -retire. - -In the battle of Mosskirch the Austrians lost in killed, wounded, and -prisoners, about five thousand men; the French, about three thousand. -In this battle both sides fought fiercely, but neither gained a decided -success. Nevertheless, Kray saw the necessity of retreating; for St. -Cyr, who had taken no part in the battle, was now about to join Moreau; -and Ste. Suzanne was pushing rapidly forward towards Mosskirch by way -of Tuttlingen. In other words, Kray, with less than fifty thousand -men, could not expect to hold his own in a second battle at Mosskirch -against the united French corps. - -Kray crossed the Danube at Sigmaringen, and, being joined by the two -corps of his right wing, retired towards Ulm by way of Rietlingen -and Biberach. He was followed by Moreau. Lecourbe marched by way of -Memmingen, St. Cyr by way of Biberach, and Ste. Suzanne descended -the Danube towards Ulm. At Biberach Kray attempted to make a stand, -in order to save the Austrian magazines there, but was defeated -with considerable loss. Lecourbe also defeated an Austrian garrison -occupying Memmingen, and captured the place. - -On the 11th of May Kray continued his retreat on Ulm, which, through -the foresight of the Archduke Charles in the preceding year, had been -converted into a strongly intrenched camp. At Ulm Kray sought and found -safety for his army. Here he collected the shattered remains of his -defeated forces, and for several weeks made a successful stand against -Moreau. Here, eyeing each other with suspicion, these two armies -remained for a time, each ready to take advantage of any false movement -of the other, while more stirring operations and greater deeds were -happening in the valley of the Po. - -It is difficult to estimate accurately the losses sustained by the -contending armies in these operations. Probably the loss of the -Austrians was about twenty thousand men; that of the French, about -fifteen thousand. At the opening of hostilities, Kray's forces, not -counting the left wing under the Prince de Reuss, since it took no part -in the active operations, numbered ninety-five thousand men. At Ulm -Kray had seventy-five thousand. On the other hand, Moreau had crossed -the Rhine with one hundred and four thousand soldiers, and had reached -Ulm with nearly ninety thousand; but he was about to send fifteen -thousand men into Italy, which would leave the opposing armies about -equal in numbers. - -The time had arrived for the commander of the Army of the Rhine to -carry out the agreement entered into between himself and the First -Consul. In fact, since the battle of Engen, Bonaparte had awaited -anxiously for Moreau to start the promised re-enforcements towards -Italy. Fearing that Moreau might still delay in the matter, the First -Consul had sent Carnot, the French minister of war, to Moreau's -headquarters, in order to make the necessary arrangements, and to -insist that the troops should be detached and ordered forward at the -earliest possible moment. - -Moreau did not comply fully with the agreement entered into with the -First Consul, but on the 11th and 12th of May he selected fifteen -thousand men from the different French corps, united these troops into -a single corps and ordered it to proceed into Italy. - -Though Moreau had not succeeded in severing the communications of -Kray, and in capturing or destroying his army, he had been generally -successful in his manoeuvres; he had pushed the Austrians back from -Lake Constance, defeated them at Stokach and Engen, forced them to -retreat after the battle of Mosskirch, and compelled them to seek -security in the intrenched camp of Ulm. Though he had retained General -Lecourbe and his corps in the valley of the Danube, and had failed to -send into Italy the full number agreed upon in the stipulation with -the First Consul, nevertheless, he had weakened his army by fifteen -thousand men, and, by so doing, had given Bonaparte the opportunity of -bringing to a successful issue one of the most striking and dramatic -campaigns of his career. - - -COMMENTS. - -In order to understand clearly the strategical problems presented by -these operations, it is necessary to keep in mind the positions of the -French and Austrian forces, and the topography of the country in which -these manoeuvres and battles took place. - -Picture to yourself the French forces occupying Switzerland and France -on the left bank of the Rhine as far north as Strasburg; and on the -opposite side of the river, the long line of the Austrians, their left -on the borders of eastern Switzerland and in the Tyrol, their right -extending far to the north, even to Mayence, and their centre, forming -the main part of the Austrian army, occupying the Black Forest with -advanced brigades and outposts pushed forward almost to the banks of -the Rhine. Picture to yourself the triangular mountain system of the -Black Forest, lying in the angle of the Rhine between Lake Constance -and Strasburg, like a huge bastion, its south and west sides steep and -rugged, and its hills and mountains covered with a dark forest of pines -and firs. Picture to yourself the fifteen thousand Austrians, under -Kienmayer, along the rugged west face of this mountain group; the forty -thousand, under the immediate command of Marshal Kray, lying on the -eastern slope of this great barrier of mountains and hills; the reserve -of nineteen thousand at Stokach on the direct road between Schaffhausen -and Ulm, and but a day's march from the French in Switzerland; the -magazines at Stokach, Engen, Mosskirch, and Biberach, upon which Kray -depended for his supplies; and the immense intrenched camp at Ulm, -which, lying in his rear upon the Danube, was the temporary base of the -Austrians in the Black Forest. - -By occupying all the valleys, roads, and prominent points in the -theatre of operations, the Austrians expected to hold military -possession of the country. Their system of war was to form a chain of -posts--a cordon--along the line to be occupied; and by this means they -expected to prevent the advance of the enemy. Thus the Austrian army -was scattered over a great extent of country from the Tyrol to Lake -Constance, thence through the Black Forest to the Main River. Their -line was more than three hundred miles in extent. - -Kray had extended his right wing as far north as Mayence, in order -to protect the troops in the Black Forest from a French attack on -that side. Since Moreau held the line of the Rhine, possibly he -might attempt to cross at Mayence, thence, using the Main River to -screen his movements, might march to Wurtzburg, and from that point -march south on Ulm. By such a manoeuvre, he could sever Kray's -communications, take the Austrians in rear in the Black Forest, and -compel them to fight with their face towards Vienna, in order to -recover their communications. But, in order to protect himself on this -side, Kray had extended Starray's corps too far north; it consisted -of but sixteen thousand soldiers, and was so scattered from Mayence -to Renchen, a distance of one hundred miles, that it was weak at all -points. Moreover, it was so far distant from the main Austrian forces -in the Black Forest that it could neither readily aid them in case they -should be attacked in force, nor be readily aided by them should Moreau -attempt to make a flank movement against the Austrian right. - -But a greater fault in the situation of the Austrian army was due to -the fact that the Aulic Council had given orders that Kray's left -wing, under the Prince de Reuss, should remain on the borders of -eastern Switzerland and in the Tyrol. This wing could not, therefore, -re-enforce Kray in the Black Forest. With his left thus paralyzed by -the action of the Aulic Council, Kray found himself hampered throughout -the campaign. - -Kray committed another error in collecting immense magazines at -Stokach; for this place, being but a day's march from the French forces -in Switzerland, was not only the most vulnerable but also the most -important point occupied by the Austrians. Lying in a gap between Lake -Constance and the mountains of Switzerland on one side, and the Black -Forest on the other, and being on the direct road from Schaffhausen -to Ulm, it was, so to speak, the vital point of the long Austrian -line. Along this route the French would be most likely to advance -into Germany; for they could ascend the Rhine by the river roads, -thence proceed to Stokach, and thus avoid the great natural barrier -of the Black Forest. Moreover, by adopting this plan there were great -strategical advantages to be gained. - -First: Should the French capture Stokach, they would permanently -separate the Austrian left from the centre and right. Thus they would -divide the forces of the Austrians, and might thereafter be able to -defeat them in detail. - -Second: Should the French capture Stokach, they would be in a favorable -position to march north against the Austrians and sever their -communications with Ulm. In this position, the French, if defeated, -could fall back to Schaffhausen, and recross the river there with -little or no danger of losing their communications; but the Austrians, -being obliged to form their line of battle parallel, or nearly so, -to the roads leading to their base, would, if defeated, be thrown -back into the Black Forest, where doubtless they would be captured -or destroyed. In short, the success of the French at Stokach would -enable them to carry out two great principles of war: not only would -they divide the forces of their enemy, and thus eventually be able -to defeat them in detail; but they would gain a position where they -could threaten the communications of Kray in the Black Forest without -exposing their own to his attacks. - -In the angle of the Rhine between Lake Constance and Strasburg, Kray -had but eighty thousand soldiers. Upon this force he had to rely in -order to repel any attack which the French might make in the Black -Forest; for his extreme right, under Starray, and his left, under -Prince de Reuss, were too far away to support his centre before the -French could unite to attack it. Bearing in mind that the French -crossed the Rhine with one hundred and four thousand soldiers, we -perceive that the opportunity was offered Moreau of bringing superior -numbers against Kray. In other words, should both opposing commanders -succeed in uniting all their available forces upon a battle-field in -the Black Forest, Moreau would outnumber Kray in about the proportion -of four to three. As the first principle of war is to be stronger than -the enemy at the vital point, it is always of the greatest importance -that no plan of campaign be adopted, which shall, at the very start, -allow the enemy to bring superior numbers on the battle-field. - -In withdrawing seven thousand men from Stokach to replace the seven -thousand sent from Villingen to re-enforce Kienmayer, Kray committed -another error. In fact, at the outset of the campaign he weakened -the garrison of the most important point of the whole Austrian line, -by sending away more than one third of the troops there. Thus, -unconsciously, he played into the hands of his adversary; for at -the very time that these troops were leaving Stokach, Moreau was so -regulating his manoeuvres as to make in the near future his first great -effort against Kray at or near that place. - -Had the left wing of the Austrian army not been ordered to remain along -the eastern borders of Switzerland, it would seem that it might have -marched north along the east side of Lake Constance, and have struck -the flank and rear of the French as they proceeded from Stokach towards -Ulm. Doubtless such a manoeuvre would have produced great results; but -it must be remembered that the French, still in Switzerland, might then -have crossed the Rhine above Lake Constance, and have attacked the -flank and rear of the Austrian left wing. - -Says General Hamley:-- - - "In former years the base of the Republican armies operating in - Germany had been some part of the straight course of the Rhine, - from its corner at Bâle to Dusseldorf. Their eminent adversary, the - Archduke Charles, says that the strong line of the Rhine, and the - line of French fortresses behind it, can only be assailed by the - Austrians in circumstances unusually favorable. All that can be done - is to approach and choose a position where the plans of the enemy may - be defeated, his advance stopped, and the country behind covered. - - "The armies on the Rhine had hitherto been on parallel fronts; - the Austrians generally on the defensive, since the exceptionally - favorable circumstances which could alone enable them to assume the - offensive by passing the Rhine had not existed. The French, breaking - out at one or the other of the bridge-heads which they possessed on - the river, would try to press forward into Germany; the Austrians, - drawing together on the threatened points, would oppose them: and the - result was that, in 1800, the river still formed the frontier line - between them. - - "But in 1800 a new condition had entered into the problem of a - campaign on the Rhine. The French had occupied Switzerland, an act - which entailed military results such as few generals of that time - had the foresight to appreciate. One was to carry the French base - onward from Bâle, round the angle to Schaffhausen. Thus that base, - originally straight, was now rectangular, and enclosed within it a - part of the theatre of war." - -Herein is to be found in part the explanation of Kray's faulty -arrangement of his forces. Had Switzerland been neutral territory, his -reserve and magazines at Stokach would not have been within striking -distance of the French. Had Switzerland been neutral territory, the -French could not have made a flank movement against his forces in the -Black Forest, and thus have been given the opportunity of severing his -communications with Ulm. In fact, the possession of Switzerland gave -many advantages to Moreau, and enabled him to force the Austrians back -to Ulm, notwithstanding the fact that he committed many errors and -gained no great victory. - -It will now be apparent that Kray had taken up a position too far -to the front; and that, by so doing, he had allowed the French to -take advantage of the angular base of operations formed by northern -Switzerland and eastern France. "Although Kray showed himself -superior to Moreau," says Colonel Macdougall, "his faults were -serious. He disseminated his army along the line of the Rhine in too -forward a position, since his rear was exposed to attack by a French -force operating from Schaffhausen. He established his magazines at -Stokach, Engen, and Mosskirch, close to a part of the French base. If -Switzerland had been friendly or neutral, his magazines in those places -would have been well placed, since they would in that case have been -covered by the defiles of the Black Forest; as it was, they were quite -at the advanced posts." - -Moreau's plan of campaign did not differ greatly from that of -Bonaparte. In fact, both he and the First Consul aimed to concentrate -the French in force between Schaffhausen and Lake Constance. In order -to effect the concentration, however, Moreau purposed to cross the -Rhine at four points, then by a series of complicated manoeuvres to -unite the bulk of his forces in the vicinity of Schaffhausen. On the -other hand, Bonaparte's plan was to assemble the French corps on the -south side of the Rhine opposite Schaffhausen, to cross the river in -force near that place, and thence proceed against Kray. In an able and -interesting discussion of these two plans, General Hamley says:-- - - "The plans of campaign of Napoleon and of Moreau had this in - common, that both aimed at the communications of the Austrians by - an advance from the extreme point of the angular base; but in the - mode of effecting the common object they differed materially, and - the difference was the result of the individual characters of the - projectors. When Napoleon's glance was once fixed on the point where - decisive success lay, the obstacles in his way lost, in his mind, - much of their importance, and were viewed merely as difficult steps - to his object. Hence, though he neglected no provision nor precaution - which prudence and experience could suggest for overcoming them, yet - he never allowed them to assume an importance sufficient to deprive - his plan of campaign of its fullest significance. Disregarding, - therefore, the fact that he must throw his army entire at one point - across a great river which was observed by the enemy, he looked only - to the great results that must flow from the advance of that army, - concentrated, upon the vital point of an enemy whose forces would - still be in greater or less degree dispersed. - - "Moreau, cautious and forecasting by nature, saw in his mind's eye - the Austrian army assembled opposite Schaffhausen to oppose his - passage,--baffling the whole plan. All his precautions, therefore, - were framed to obviate the danger of crossing in the face of the - enemy. Only one corps was to cross at Schaffhausen,--another, the - reserve, was to cross at Bâle to cover the passage; this entailed the - movement of a third through the mountains to cover the long flank - march of the reserve along the river; and a fourth was to make a - false attack in order to detain the Austrian troops in the defiles as - long as possible, and prevent them from re-enforcing the left. - - "It is probable that Napoleon's plan would have miscarried in the - hands of Moreau; but looking at other achievements of Bonaparte,--his - descent on the Austrian rear in Italy a few weeks later,--his - decisive march to the Danube in 1805 on the other side of the present - theatre,--it is not to be denied that, executed by himself, the - design might have fulfilled all his expectations." - -It is certainly an interesting fact that, notwithstanding the -objections of Bonaparte to Moreau's plan, nevertheless the commander of -the Army of the Rhine succeeded in assembling the bulk of his forces in -the vicinity of Schaffhausen. In his own way he executed the manoeuvres -which, even to Bonaparte, seemed fraught with danger. As a matter of -fact, the assembling of the French corps in this position was the most -critical part of the whole campaign; and it mattered not whether the -concentration was made by marching on the German side of the Rhine, or -by marching on the Swiss side; in either case, skill and generalship -were required to carry out successfully these manoeuvres. It will now -be interesting to compare the plans of these two soldiers. - -The line of the Rhine divided the opposing armies. At the outset -the French corps crossed the river at Strasburg, Brisach, Bâle, and -Schaffhausen. Moreau then attempted to unite these corps before -proceeding to attack Kray in force. It is always a dangerous operation -to attempt a concentration upon some designated place within the -enemy's lines; for, as a rule, the enemy can mass his forces there -more rapidly than can the commander of an invading army. In fact, many -a campaign has failed because the commanding general has attempted to -unite his scattered forces at some point within the territory held by -the enemy. By so doing, he gives the enemy a chance to assemble his -forces between the separated columns of the attacking army, and to -bring superior numbers against each column in succession. Thus, when -Moreau crossed the Rhine at Strasburg, Brisach, Bâle, and Schaffhausen, -he gave Kray the opportunity of defeating in detail the several French -corps so widely separated from one another. Though the topography -of the country was such that it did not allow Kray to concentrate -his forces and throw them readily upon the separated French corps -in succession, yet, had he foreseen the design of his adversary, -undoubtedly he could have massed his forces between Schaffhausen and -Bâle, along the Wutach, and have thus intervened between Lecourbe's -corps and that of Moreau. By such a manoeuvre, he would have stood a -good chance of crushing both Moreau and St. Cyr, before they could have -been re-enforced by either Ste. Suzanne or Lecourbe. - -Again: Moreau's plan necessitated that his own corps and that of St. -Cyr should make long flank marches on the German side of the river. -In making these marches, the French corps necessarily exposed their -own flanks to the attacks of the enemy. In fact, Kray might have -issued in force from the Black Forest, and have attacked both Moreau -and St. Cyr with great chances of success. Had he done so, doubtless -these two French corps would have been destroyed; for they would have -found themselves enclosed between a victorious enemy on one side and -an impassable river on the other. Even when protected by a river, or -other great natural obstacle, a flank march, in the vicinity of an -active enemy, is often a difficult manoeuvre; but when undertaken in -an enemy's country, between an unfordable river on one side, and an -active enemy on the other, it then becomes an extremely delicate and -dangerous operation. - -It will also be noticed that though St. Cyr, in his march across -the hills and mountains from Friburg to St. Blazien, and thence to -Stuhlingen, flanked and protected the reserve in its march from Bâle -to Schaffhausen, yet he was obliged to send his artillery by the river -road. Had he, therefore, been attacked in force during this movement, -he would have been compelled to fight without his artillery. Thus the -fighting power of his corps would have been diminished; and his efforts -would have been directed towards the protection of his cannon, which, -under ordinary circumstances, should have strengthened, instead of -weakened, him. - -In commenting on these operations of Moreau, General Hamley says:-- - - "The false attacks of Ste. Suzanne and St. Cyr had the effect not - only of detaining Kienmayer's sixteen thousand men in the defiles, - but of causing Kray to move thither six or seven thousand additional - troops. But they had no influence in detaining Starray, who was - already so distant on the right that it would be impossible for him - in any case to join Kray in time for the first operations. We find, - then, that at first forty-nine thousand French were employed in - detaining less than half their number; and when St. Cyr had joined - the reserve, still Ste. Suzanne did not probably neutralise a greater - number of the enemy than his own corps. The detached operations of - Ste. Suzanne appear, therefore, dangerous and fruitless." - -Consider now the plan of Bonaparte. It is evident that the line of -the Rhine from Strasburg to Lake Constance would have screened the -French corps during their concentration. Since this unfordable river -and the bridges crossing it were in possession of the French, there -was little probability that the French corps would have been attacked -in flank during their march up the Rhine to Schaffhausen. In fact, the -Rhine and the mountains of the Black Forest, behind which the greater -part of the Austrians lay, would have formed such a complete screen to -the operations of Bonaparte that it is not improbable to suppose that -the proposed French concentration, preparatory to crossing the river, -might have been completed before Kray discovered what was in progress. -Moreover, since this plan involved no complicated manoeuvres, it could -have been carried out more quickly than the plan of Moreau. Thus time -would have been saved; and _time_ was then of the greatest importance -to Bonaparte, inasmuch as Masséna was in desperate straits at Genoa. - -The same reason makes it probable that the passage of the river -at Schaffhausen, the most difficult problem of Bonaparte's plan -of campaign, might have been accomplished before Kray learned the -designs of his adversary. Another fact confirms this view. It will be -remembered that, after Moreau crossed the Rhine with his four corps, -twenty-six thousand French soldiers still remained in Switzerland -and in the French fortresses along the Rhine. Inasmuch as a part of -this force was occupying Strasburg, it is quite probable that, had -Bonaparte's plan been adopted, a division of four or five thousand men -would have issued from the bridge-head opposite this place, and have -attacked the Austrians on the west side of the Black Forest. Such an -attack would probably have deceived Kray, and have left him in doubt -as to where the French intended to cross the river in force; it would -probably have caused him to leave Kienmayer's corps in its position, -and have prevented him from uniting a sufficient force in the vicinity -of Schaffhausen to oppose the passage of the French. - -It will be remembered that Bonaparte had already made some preparations -for crossing the Rhine near Schaffhausen; he had secretly collected a -number of boats on the river between Bâle and Lake Constance. These -boats were to be used for the crossing of the advance divisions. The -purpose also was to throw two or three bridges across the river; the -material for which could have been collected and prepared by Lecourbe's -corps while the remaining corps were ascending the Rhine. - -It will also be noticed that the point selected by Bonaparte for the -crossing was a favorable one. During the passage Lake Constance would -have protected the right flank of the French corps from an Austrian -attack, and would have continued to protect them as they marched -towards Stokach. - -Though the crossing of a large river in the face of an active enemy -is a difficult operation, yet it is generally successful, because -great pains is nearly always taken to deceive the enemy, and because -great preparations are nearly always made to insure the success of -the operation. "If," says Jomini, "we take into consideration the -great care and precautions that are requisite, the immense amount -of materials employed in such an operation, the concurrence of -circumstances necessary to secure success, and the difficulties which -may be occasioned by the slightest derangement on the part of the -enemy, it is really surprising that an operation of this kind ever -succeeds. Nevertheless, wonderful as it may seem, the most difficult -military enterprises are commonly the most successful, from the simple -fact that greater care and precautions are employed in their execution." - -From the foregoing it is apparent that the manoeuvres of Moreau were -not wisely planned. In appearance only they seemed to be less hazardous -than those of Bonaparte. After magnifying the difficulties of crossing -the Rhine with the four French corps at Schaffhausen, Moreau adopted a -course which was much more complicated, which required a longer time -to execute, which involved several strategical errors, and which, as -will be shown later, did not allow Moreau to take all the advantages -of the angular base of operations due to his possession of Switzerland. -Though these manoeuvres were successful, it is not because they were -wisely planned, but because there was little or no opposition to their -execution. They were successful because Kray, not appreciating the -situation, failed to profit by the mistakes of his adversary. - -It will now be of interest to examine into the operations of Moreau -after he had united the bulk of his forces in the vicinity of -Schaffhausen. - -On the 1st of May the four French corps were thus stationed: Moreau's -and Lecourbe's at Schaffhausen, St. Cyr's at Stuhlingen, and Ste. -Suzanne's at Neustadt. From these positions the French advanced to -attack Kray. Lecourbe with twenty thousand men marched on Stokach to -capture that place, and to drive back the Austrian reserve of twelve -thousand there; Moreau moved on Engen with forty thousand men and there -encountered Kray with forty-five thousand; St. Cyr directed his corps -on Zollhaus; and Ste. Suzanne remained in the vicinity of Neustadt. In -front of St. Cyr and Ste. Suzanne there were a few thousand Austrian -troops more or less scattered. Kienmayer's corps yet remained along the -western edge of the Black Forest, and Starray's corps was still farther -away toward the north. - -Though Moreau had assembled three of his corps, numbering eighty-five -thousand men, in such positions that they could easily have -concentrated upon a single battle-field, and have outnumbered Kray -almost two to one; yet, at the battle of Engen, he was outnumbered by -his adversary. St. Cyr's corps was so far away to the left that it -had scarcely any effect in deciding the battle. Evidently this corps -should have been so directed that it could have re-enforced the right -of Moreau or the left of Lecourbe. Had this been done, the battle of -Engen would have been a great victory. Then Moreau could have hurled -the Austrians back into the Black Forest, and have severed their -communications with Ulm. In short, Moreau should have advanced with his -right, instead of his left, strongly re-enforced. In order to reap the -full advantages of the flank position which he occupied, every effort -should have been made so to defeat the Austrians as to get possession -of their communications. Moreau failed to appreciate this fact. His -faulty movements enabled Kray, after the battle of Engen, to fall back -to Mosskirch; and, by so doing, to retain possession of the road to Ulm. - -It is evident, too, that Lecourbe's corps, after its victory at -Stokach, should have pushed forward and seized Mosskirch and the roads -leading to Ulm; but it failed to do so, because Moreau did not send -Lecourbe the necessary orders. After the capture of the most important -place occupied by the Austrians, this corps remained inactive for a -time, knowing not what to do or where to march. - -Why did Moreau fail to send the necessary orders to Lecourbe? Why -did he thus scatter his three corps? Why was St. Cyr directed upon -Zollhaus, instead of upon Engen or Stokach? These are interesting -questions, and their answers will perhaps enable us to form a correct -estimate of the military ability of Moreau. - -In retaining the direct command of a corps, Moreau committed a fault. -He should have appointed a corps commander of the reserve, and have -left himself free to give greater attention to the movements of his -entire army. As it was he was wrapped up in what his own corps was -doing. As long as the soldiers directly under him were victorious, he -seemed to be satisfied. Perhaps, from this cause, or from the fact that -he failed to appreciate the strategical situation, the significance and -importance of Lecourbe's victory at Stokach did not impress itself upon -him. Thus no orders were given for Lecourbe's corps to hasten forward -and seize Mosskirch. Moreau's military horizon was limited; his glance -failed to sweep the whole theatre of operations. - -That his corps were scattered was due in great measure to the plan of -campaign that he had adopted. In carrying out this plan, Ste. Suzanne -had marched through the Höllenthal, and was near Neustadt when the -French attacked the Austrians at Engen and Stokach. Moreau realized -that Stokach and Engen were the important points of the Austrian line; -yet, rather than leave Ste. Suzanne's corps isolated at Neustadt, where -possibly it might be crushed by overwhelming numbers, he directed St. -Cyr's corps on Zollhaus, so that it might, if necessary, re-enforce -Ste. Suzanne. Thus it was that his four corps were spread out from -Stokach to Neustadt; and that St. Cyr's corps was directed upon the -left instead of upon the right of Moreau. Thus it was that his plan -prevented him from taking full advantage of the angular base which the -possession of Switzerland gave to the French. - -But, notwithstanding the fact that Ste. Suzanne's corps was at -Neustadt, St. Cyr's corps should not have been directed upon Zollhaus. -Now, it might seem to us, as it undoubtedly seemed to Moreau, that, had -St. Cyr's corps marched directly to the support of the French at Engen -or Stokach, Ste. Suzanne's corps would have been left in an isolated -and dangerous position where it could have been captured or destroyed. -But such was not the case; indeed, there were several reasons why Kray -would not have attempted to concentrate against Ste. Suzanne. - -First: The movement of the French right on Stokach and Engen -threatened the communications of Kray, without in the least exposing -the communications of Moreau to an Austrian attack. In accordance -with a maxim of war, proved by experience, Kray would therefore have -abandoned any intended attack upon Ste. Suzanne, in order to fight -for the preservation of his own communications. "The commander," says -Hamley, "who finds himself on his enemy's rear, while his own is still -beyond the adversary's reach, may cast aside all anxiety for his own -communications, and call up every detachment to the decisive point, -certain that the enemy will abandon his own designs, in order, if -possible, to retrieve his position." Had Moreau appreciated this fact, -he could have safely united three of his corps near Stokach, and have -overwhelmed the Austrians with superior numbers. - -Second: Though Ste. Suzanne seemed to be in a dangerous position, -he was not so in reality. In fact, had Kray attacked Ste. Suzanne -in force near Neustadt, he would have given the French at Engen and -Stokach an immense advantage; for the farther he proceeded into the -Black Forest towards France, the more easily could the French sever his -communications and destroy or capture his army. - -Third: Instead, therefore, of Moreau's being fearful lest the Austrians -should concentrate against Ste. Suzanne, he should rather have hoped to -see them carry out this movement. But, in either case, he should have -strongly re-enforced his right by every means in his power. - -After the battle of Engen, Moreau continued to commit errors. At -Mosskirch he attacked the Austrians with but fifty thousand men. At the -beginning of the battle Kray had but forty thousand men, yet before it -ended he was strongly re-enforced. During the battle St. Cyr's corps -was near Geisingen and Ste. Suzanne's at Donaueschingen. Thus, for the -second time, Moreau fought the Austrians with two of his corps absent. -Moreover, they were far away on his left flank, when they should have -been near him, or on his right flank, where they would have been able -to overwhelm Kray, and sever his communications with Ulm. Had Moreau -re-enforced strongly his right, and attacked Kray at Mosskirch with his -four corps, or even with three of them, who can doubt what the result -would have been? Undoubtedly he would have destroyed the Austrians -between his army and the Danube, and could then have rapidly crossed -the river and have intercepted the corps of Kienmayer and Starray. In -truth, Moreau's faults allowed Kray to escape, when he should have been -destroyed. They allowed him to seek safety in Ulm, where for several -weeks he was able to make a successful stand. - -This part of Moreau's campaign, from the time he left Schaffhausen -till he arrived at Ulm, was a series of errors. Though in a measure -successful in his operations, he was outgeneralled by Kray. In this -campaign every opportunity was offered Moreau to win a great name, but -he did not possess the necessary military ability. He was in command -of the largest and best equipped army of France; instead of gaining -merely two or three indecisive victories and forcing Kray back to Ulm, -he should have united his forces, crushed his enemy, severed Kray's -communications, and captured his army; and then should have marched -on Vienna and compelled the Austrian Emperor to sue for peace. But -such fame was not for him. It was reserved for that greater genius, -who, beyond the Alps, on the plains of Italy, should, with inferior -forces, do greater deeds and accomplish far greater results. It was -reserved for him who, daring to follow in the footsteps of the great -Carthaginian, was destined to startle the world by the splendor of his -achievements. - - * * * * * - -If there was one distinguishing peculiarity in Napoleon's system of -war, it was that of so manoeuvring as to divide the forces of his enemy -and then to defeat them in detail. In the early part of his career -he was fortunate in being opposed to the Austrians, whose system of -scattering their troops enabled him to defeat separately the fragments -of their armies. He believed in concentrating his troops. He was, in -fact, the greatest exemplar of concentration that the world has ever -known. His plan was to mass his forces against some vital point of -the enemy, and to attack him on one line, and in such a direction -as to place him at a disadvantage. If the enemy's line was too much -extended, he struck at the centre and broke through it, then attacked -and defeated in detail the separated parts. If the enemy advanced to -attack with his army separated into parts by impassable obstacles, -Napoleon manoeuvred so as to crush in succession these isolated parts -before they could unite. In this way, by fighting a part of the enemy's -army at one time, he was nearly always stronger than the enemy on the -battle-field. With him this was the important point. His rapid marches, -his strategical manoeuvres, his combinations, had nearly always this -object in view. He believed that success in battle depended principally -on numbers. "God," said he, "is on the side of the heaviest battalions." - -But notwithstanding the fact that this was the distinguishing -peculiarity of Napoleon's system of war, yet he did not always follow -this system. Several times in his career he won a great victory by -making a flank movement against his enemy. Such a movement was made at -Marengo, at Ulm, and at Jena. - -Between these two methods of attack there is, as a rule, this -difference. By striking at the centre of the enemy's line, his army -can be separated into two parts, and then be defeated in detail. In -this case the aim is so to manoeuvre as to outnumber the enemy on -the battle-field. But by striking at the flank, the enemy is often -given the opportunity of concentrating his forces. Even if one flank -is defeated, it can fall back upon the other, and perhaps even then -make a successful stand against the attacking army. In this case -the advantages generally aimed at are to threaten or sever the -communications of the enemy, and to force him to fight a battle where a -defeat will ruin his army. From the foregoing, it is evident that these -two methods of attack have a tendency to produce opposite results. A -direct attack upon the enemy, if successful, breaks up and scatters -his forces. On the other hand, a flank attack gives him a chance to -concentrate, but at the same time places him in a position where a -defeat will ruin him. - -In making a choice between these two methods of attack, the able -general will be guided in great measure by the positions occupied by -the enemy's forces. But, as a rule, if he adopt one method, he must -abandon the advantages to be derived from the other. Thus, should he -decide to attack the centre of the enemy's line, he may reasonably -expect to divide the forces of the enemy, and afterwards to defeat -them in detail; but he cannot expect to threaten at the same time -their communications, and cut them from their base of operations. On -the other hand, if he make a flank attack, he may reasonably expect to -sever the communications of the enemy, and thus force him to fight a -battle under disadvantageous circumstances; but he cannot expect to -defeat in turn the several parts of the enemy's army. - -But in the campaign between Moreau and Kray, it is a remarkable fact -that the positions of the Austrian forces were such that the advantages -of both a front and flank attack could be obtained by the French. -By crossing the Rhine at Schaffhausen, and by attacking the flank -of Kray in the Black Forest, the French would not only separate the -Austrian left from the Austrian centre and right, but would threaten -the Austrian communications with Ulm. From the beginning Bonaparte saw -clearly this fact. His eye took in the entire situation. Thus it was -that he was anxious to have Moreau undertake this movement. Thus it was -that he himself had thought seriously at one time of uniting the Army -of Reserve with the Army of the Rhine, and of moving against the left -flank of Kray's forces in the Black Forest. - -From this discussion, it is evident that, had Moreau made no errors, -even after he assembled his three corps near Schaffhausen, he could -have brought superior numbers upon every battle-field in Germany, and -thus have won more decisive victories and have accomplished far greater -results. What, then, might not Bonaparte himself have accomplished -had he directed in person one hundred and seventy thousand soldiers -against the one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians in Germany? When -it is remembered that he never lost a battle in which he was superior -to his adversary in numbers, it cannot be doubted what the result would -have been. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[Footnote 7: See Map 3.] - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -MARENGO.[8] - - -Anxiously Bonaparte at Paris awaited the success of the Army of the -Rhine. Matters were urgent and time was precious, for Masséna could -hold out but a few days longer at Genoa. Until the French should be -victorious in Germany, the First Consul could not expect Moreau to send -a detachment across Switzerland into Italy. As soon as word should be -brought that this re-enforcement was on its way, Bonaparte purposed -to lead the Army of Reserve across the Alps against Melas, who was -fighting the French so vigorously at Genoa and along the Var. - -On the 6th of May Bonaparte left Paris to direct the operations of the -Army of Reserve. He had already assembled the several parts of that -army near Lake Geneva, and had collected vast supplies there, which -were to be used by the army in its march into Italy. On his arrival -at Dijon, he reviewed the few thousand conscripts and old soldiers -at that place. After this review, which was intended to confirm the -spies still further in their belief that the Army of Reserve was purely -imaginary, he proceeded to Geneva, and thence to Lausanne, at which -places the greater part of the army was assembled. On his arrival -there, Bonaparte began the final preparations for crossing the Alps. At -first, he thought of leading the Army of Reserve into Switzerland, in -order to unite it with Moncey's corps, which had been detached from the -Army of the Rhine, and thence march through the St. Gothard Pass into -Italy. He also considered the plan of marching into Switzerland, and -thence of descending into Italy by way of the Simplon Pass. But after -receiving the report of General Marescot, who had been sent to examine -the several passes of the Alps, he decided to conduct the greater part -of his forces over the Great St. Bernard Pass. By taking this route, -which was much the shortest, he could reach Milan earlier, and thus -gain the great advantage of time. - -The plan of Bonaparte was to conduct thirty-five thousand men of the -Army of Reserve over this pass into Italy, and to send the remaining -five thousand over the Little St. Bernard Pass, which lies in the -Alps but a few miles south of the Great St. Bernard. At the same time -a small detachment was to proceed from Switzerland into Italy by way -of the Simplon Pass; and Thurreau's division of four thousand, which -formed the left of the Army of Italy, was to descend from the Mont -Cenis Pass and attack the Austrians in the vicinity of Turin. These -movements having been accomplished, Bonaparte intended to direct the -greater part of the Army of Reserve on Milan, where it was to unite -with Moncey's corps, which was marching over the St. Gothard into -Italy. Should this part of the plan be successfully executed, Bonaparte -then purposed to march south with a strong force, cross the Po near -Placentia, and occupy the Stradella Pass. This pass, which is enclosed -on the north by the Po and on the south by the spurs that shoot -northward from the main chain of the Apennines, is a strong position on -the direct road between Alessandria and Mantua. While holding the pass, -Bonaparte expected to debouch westward therefrom against Melas, who, he -calculated, would advance eastward from Alessandria and meet him in the -plains of the Scrivia. - -It is clear, from the histories of this campaign, that the plan as here -set forth had not been determined on in all its details before the -movements began. In fact, until Bonaparte descended the eastern slope -of the Alps, he had not fully decided whether he would march directly -on Milan, or on Alessandria and the fortress of Tortona, in order thus -to bring relief more quickly to Masséna. Circumstances would then -determine the matter. But there is little doubt that before leaving -Paris he had mapped out in his own mind the essential features of the -plan as here set forth. Upon this point Bourrienne, in his "Memoirs of -Napoleon Bonaparte," writes as follows:-- - - "On the 17th of March, in a moment of gaiety and good humor, he - (Bonaparte) desired me to unroll Chauchard's great map of Italy. He - lay down upon it and desired me to do likewise. He then stuck into - it pins, the heads of which were tipped with wax, some red and some - black. I silently observed him, and awaited with no little curiosity - the result of this plan of campaign. When he had stationed the - enemy's corps, and drawn up the pins with the red heads on the points - where he hoped to bring his own troops, he said to me, 'Where do you - think I shall beat Melas?'--'How the devil should I know?'--'Why, - look here, you fool; Melas is at Alessandria with his headquarters. - There he will remain until Genoa surrenders. He has in Alessandria - his magazines, his hospitals, his artillery, and his reserves. - Crossing the Alps here' (pointing to the Great Mont St. Bernard) 'I - shall fall upon Melas, cut off his communications with Austria, and - meet him here in the plains of the Scrivia' (placing a red pin at San - Giuliano). Finding that I looked on this manoeuvre of pins as mere - pastime, he addressed to me some of his usual compliments, such as - fool, ninny, etc., and then proceeded to demonstrate his plans more - clearly on the map." - -The correspondence of Bonaparte at this time shows that he had a -full knowledge of the positions and condition of the Austrian forces -in Italy. From information sent him by Suchet, he learned that the -Austrian army was greatly scattered; that but a small portion of it was -occupying that part of northern Italy between the Po and Switzerland; -and that as yet General Melas did not believe in the existence of the -Army of Reserve. It was this knowledge which caused the First Consul -to believe that he could execute successfully this bold and hazardous -undertaking. - -From Villeneuve, at the east end of Lake Geneva, the road across the -Alps into Italy passes through the towns of Martigny and Saint Pierre, -thence over the Great St. Bernard, through the village of Saint Remy, -into the valley of the Aosta, and thence it continues along the Dora -Baltea River, through the towns of Aosta, Châtillon, Bard, and Ivrea, -into the plains of Piedmont. Not far south of the Great St. Bernard -lies the Little St. Bernard Pass, which opens also into the valley of -the Aosta. In 1800 these two roads were much more difficult of passage -than they are at the present time. When Bonaparte crossed the Alps, -the road from Saint Pierre to Saint Remy was simply a bridle path -over which no vehicle could pass. Even now it would be a hazardous -undertaking to conduct a large army into Italy over the Great St. -Bernard. Crossing the Alps at an elevation of more than eight thousand -feet, the pass lies in a region of perpetual snow and ice, where the -glaciers, the shock of avalanches, and the frequent and blinding storms -make the passage of troops difficult and dangerous. - -Having once reached the fertile valley of the Po, Bonaparte expected -to find food and forage there in abundance; but during the march from -Villeneuve to Ivrea it was necessary to provide supplies in advance -for the army. For this purpose he had collected them at Lake Geneva. -He now caused them to be distributed at different points along this -route. He also sent money to the monks in charge of the Great St. -Bernard Hospital, in order that they should purchase bread, cheese, -and wine for the soldiers. At Villeneuve, Martigny, Saint Pierre, and -Saint Remy, he established hospitals for the sick and injured. To -the foot of the defile at Saint Pierre he sent forward a company of -mechanics to dismount the guns and to divide the gun-carriages and -caissons into numbered parts for transportation on pack mules. The -ammunition too was carried in this way. But the cannon themselves could -not be thus transported. For this purpose sledges with rollers had -been made, but they were found to be of no use. Finally, the cannon -were enclosed within the trunks of trees hollowed out for the purpose. -Thus protected, they were dragged across the Alps by the soldiers -themselves. A second company of mechanics was ordered to march with the -first division and to establish itself at Saint Remy, in order to put -together the carriages and caissons, to remount the pieces, and to make -the necessary repairs. - -On the 14th of May Bonaparte was ready to begin the movement. The -Army of Reserve numbered forty thousand soldiers and forty cannon; -about four thousand were cavalry. Four corps of the army, numbering -thirty-five thousand men, commanded by Murat, Victor, Duhesme, and -Lannes, had taken position from Villeneuve to Saint Pierre. A fifth -corps, of five thousand men, commanded by Chabran, was in Savoy at the -foot of the Little St. Bernard Pass. Bonaparte himself was at Martigny, -at which place he issued the orders for the movement. He had sent -Berthier forward to receive the divisions on the Italian side of the -Alps. - -On the 15th of May the movement began. Lannes crossed first. He began -his march from Saint Pierre at two o'clock in the morning, in order to -avoid as much as possible the danger from the avalanches, which are -less frequent in the cool of the day. He reached the summit safely, and -his soldiers were pleasantly surprised to find there the bread, cheese, -and wine which Bonaparte had provided for them. Lannes halted but a -moment at the Great St. Bernard Hospital; he then began the descent -and arrived at Saint Remy on the same day. He was followed in turn by -the corps in his rear. At the same time Chabran crossed the Little St. -Bernard Pass, and Thurreau began to advance over the Mont Cenis Pass. -The entire Army of Reserve crossed between the 15th and 20th of May. -During this famous passage of the Alps the soldiers were filled with -energy and enthusiasm. Though heavily laden, they themselves, by sheer -strength, dragged their cannon over the rough and slippery paths. No -exertion seemed to tire them. As they pressed on, all were gay and -cheerful. As they climbed the mountain side, their spirits rose. With -shouts and cheers and songs, they made that Alpine region ring. In -that cold, clear air they felt their blood quicken. They felt, too, -the energy, the enthusiasm, the magnetism, of their commander. They -not only hoped for, but they expected victory. Were they not imitating -the daring deeds of the great Hannibal? Were they not about to enter -that Italy where their comrades had fought so gloriously before? Were -they not commanded by the "Little Corporal," their idol, whose deeds -of desperate daring at the bridges of Lodi and Arcole had won their -everlasting admiration? - -Thus the Army of Reserve crossed the Alps. By the 20th of May all -five corps had reached the valley of the Aosta. Owing to the careful -preparations made, there had been scarcely any accidents and no serious -delays during the passage. But the greatest difficulty was yet to be -met. Some distance down the valley of the Aosta, upon a perpendicular -rock commanding a narrow defile, Fort Bard had been constructed. Though -this fort was garrisoned by only two or three hundred Austrians, it -was impregnable and controlled the whole valley. After descending the -Great St. Bernard Pass, Lannes had pushed on down the valley, but was -stopped by the fire of the fort. At once he made an effort to capture -the place, but was repulsed. He soon saw that it could not be taken by -force. Though he gained the road that led past the fort, the deadly -fire of the Austrians prevented him from advancing. For a time it -seemed that this small but formidable fort would stop the progress of -the whole army. Lannes was greatly disturbed. He reported the matter -to Berthier, and Berthier sent at once a courier to inform Bonaparte -of the situation. The First Consul was still at Martigny, where he had -remained for the purpose of hastening forward all the artillery and -the rear divisions of the army. This news was a complete surprise to -Bonaparte. The effect which it produced upon him is thus described by -Thiers:-- - - "This announcement of an obstacle, considered insurmountable at - first, made a terrible impression on him; but he recovered quickly, - and refused positively to admit the possibility of a retreat. Nothing - in the world should reduce him to such an extremity. He thought that, - if one of the loftiest mountains of the globe had failed to arrest - his progress, a secondary rock could not be capable of vanquishing - his courage and his genius. The fort, said he to himself, might be - taken by bold courage; if it could not be taken, it still could be - turned. Besides, if the infantry and cavalry could pass it, with but - a few four-pounders, they could then proceed to Ivrea at the mouth of - the gorge, and wait until their heavy guns could follow them. And if - the heavy guns could not pass the obstacle which had arisen, and if, - in order to get any, those of the enemy had to be taken, the French - infantry were brave and numerous enough to assail the Austrians and - take their cannon. - - "Moreover, he studied his maps again and again, questioned a number - of Italian officers, and learning from them that many other roads led - from Aosta to the neighboring valleys, he wrote letter after letter - to Berthier, forbidding him to stop the progress of the army, and - pointing out to him with wonderful precision what reconnoissances - should be made around the fort of Bard." - -Having sent these instructions to Berthier and having seen the last -division well on its way, the First Consul hurried across the Alps -towards Fort Bard. Meanwhile a foot-path, leading along the mountain -side around the fort, was discovered by Lannes. By a few repairs the -path was soon rendered passable for the men and horses, but not for -the artillery. How to get the cannon past the fort was the question. -Finally, the following method was adopted. During a dark night the road -in front of the fort was strewn with manure and straw, and, to deaden -the sound of the artillery wheels, they were wrapped with tow and -straw; then the soldiers themselves quietly hauled the guns past the -fort. The stratagem succeeded; all the artillery was thus transported. -In this way the Army of Reserve surmounted this obstacle, which for a -time gave Bonaparte greater anxiety than the passage of the Great St. -Bernard itself. - -At this time the lower valley of the Aosta was guarded by three -thousand Austrians under General Haddick. On the 20th of May Lannes -arrived at Ivrea, which was occupied by the enemy. He attacked the -Austrian garrison there, defeated it, and captured the place. Thence, -continuing his march towards Chivasso, he again attacked the Austrians -on the Chiusella, defeated them, drove them from position to position, -and finally, having forced them back towards Turin, captured Chivasso. -Meanwhile Bonaparte, having left Chabran's corps to blockade Fort Bard, -followed Lannes with the remainder of the army. - -During these operations, General Thurreau descended the Mont Cenis -Pass and attacked General Kaim, who, with five thousand men, was at -Susa guarding the Mont Cenis route into Italy. Before the spirited -attacks of Thurreau, Kaim was obliged to abandon Susa and fall back to -Busseleno on the road to Turin. - -On the 27th of May Bonaparte with the greater part of the Army of -Reserve was near Chivasso, Thurreau was at Susa, a French detachment, -under Bethencourt, was descending the Simplon Pass, and Moncey's corps -was struggling heroically towards Milan over the St. Gothard. Thus far -the plans of the First Consul had been successful. He had crossed the -Alps, forced his way past Fort Bard, and driven the enemy out of the -valley of the Aosta. Now, the thunder of his cannon could be heard on -the plains of Piedmont. But what of the Austrians! Where were they? -Where was Melas? - -Still incredulous as to the existence of an army of reserve, Melas -was bending every energy to capture Genoa and to force the crossings -of the Var. In the engagements and battles with Masséna and Suchet, -the army of Melas, which originally numbered one hundred and twenty -thousand, had been reduced to one hundred thousand men. These troops -were greatly scattered. On the 13th of May they were thus stationed: -thirty thousand under General Ott were besieging Genoa; twenty-five -thousand under General Elsnitz were fighting Suchet along the Var; -ten thousand under General Vukassovich were watching the Italian -entrances of the St. Gothard and Simplon passes; three thousand, -commanded by General Haddick, were in the lower valley of the Aosta, -watching the St. Bernard passes; five thousand, commanded by General -Kaim, were occupying Susa at the foot of the Mont Cenis Pass; and two -thousand were scattered along the Maritime Alps near the Tenda Pass. -In addition, six thousand were on their way from Tuscany to re-enforce -Melas; three thousand remained in Tuscany, and sixteen thousand more -occupied Alessandria, the fortresses of Tortona and Mantua, and various -other garrisons of northern Italy. - -Such was the situation of the Austrians when, on the 21st of May, -Melas received information of the passage of French troops over the -Great St. Bernard. Immediately he collected ten thousand soldiers from -the Austrian forces in front of Suchet and in the vicinity of the Tenda -Pass, and marched on Turin. At first, he believed that the French -troops appearing in Italy were merely a detachment sent thither to -harass his rear; but at Coni, where he arrived on the 22d of May, he -learned to a certainty that Bonaparte himself was in Italy; that the -French soldiers were already issuing into the plains of Piedmont; and -that the First Consul had with him both cannon and cavalry. Melas was -surprised. He knew not what to do. Having been repeatedly informed by -his own spies, and even by the Aulic Council, that the Army of Reserve -was a mere fiction, he could now hardly bring himself to believe that -it was a reality. It might, after all, be but a large detachment; for -how could Bonaparte cross the Alps with an army? How could he pass Fort -Bard with cannon and cavalry? It must be remembered, too, that at this -time Melas had not learned that Moncey was marching on Milan. As yet, -therefore, he was not completely undeceived. He knew that a French -force was at the foot of the Mont Cenis Pass, and that French troops -were issuing from the valley of the Aosta into the plains of Piedmont; -but he did not know the number of the French forces nor did he know the -intentions of Bonaparte. Consequently he delayed issuing the orders -for the concentration of his scattered troops. - -Having reached Turin with ten thousand men, Melas was joined by General -Haddick's command, which had been driven from the valley of the Aosta -by Lannes, and by General Kaim's division, which had been driven -from Susa by Thurreau. But this junction gave Melas only sixteen or -seventeen thousand Austrians to oppose the thirty-five thousand French -near Chivasso under Bonaparte. - -At this time Melas expected the French to cross the Po and attack him -near Turin; but such was not the intention of Bonaparte. In order to -deceive Melas, the First Consul ordered Lannes to make preparations -as if the French intended to cross the Po at Chivasso, then to march -rapidly down the river, through Crescentino and Candia, on Pavia. At -the same time Bonaparte himself, with the corps of Victor, Duhesme, and -Murat, set out for Milan by way of Vercelli and Novara. On the 31st of -May Bonaparte arrived at the Ticino River. To oppose the passage of -the French, Vukassovich had collected a considerable force on the east -bank. Bonaparte crossed the river, attacked and defeated the Austrians, -thence, continuing his march eastward, entered Milan on the 2d of June. -Vukassovich, having left a garrison in the castle of Milan, fell back -behind the Adda. At Milan Bonaparte delayed several days to await -the arrival of Moncey's corps, the advance guard of which was just -beginning to appear in Italy. During the delay Bonaparte directed a -part of his forces on Brescia, Lodi, and Cremona. As a result of these -movements, Vukassovich retired behind the Mincio and sought safety -under the guns of Mantua. Bonaparte also directed Murat on Placentia in -order to seize the crossings of the Po there. - -Meanwhile the detachment under Bethencourt, marching by way of the -Simplon Pass, had reached Arona at the lower end of Lake Maggiore. -On the 1st of June Fort Bard surrendered to Chabran. Having left a -garrison in this place, and one also in Ivrea, he then took up a -position with the remainder of his corps along the Po from Chivasso to -the Sesia River. From the Sesia to Pavia the corps of Lannes occupied -the line of the Po. On the 1st of June Lannes had captured this place, -and had seized the large magazines there, which contained provisions, -several pieces of artillery, and a number of pontoon boats. - -Thus it will be seen that the French were in possession of the whole -of northern Italy lying between the Po and Switzerland. Looking south -from Milan, Bonaparte had in his front the line of the Po, which he -held from Chivasso to Cremona. Far away to his right was the Great St. -Bernard Pass, which he had just crossed, and which was now guarded by -the French garrisons of Fort Bard and Ivrea. To his left, at a distance -of eighty miles, was the Mincio, which formed on that side the dividing -line between the French and the Austrians; and in his rear were the -St. Gothard and Simplon passes, which offered him a safe retreat -into Switzerland in case he should meet with a reverse. Already, -within this territory, he had seized all the Austrian communications, -captured several Austrian garrisons, occupied several cities, and taken -possession of immense quantities of provisions and munitions of war. - -Thus situated, Bonaparte was almost ready to strike the blow that -should decide the fate of Italy. In a few days he would cross the Po, -march through the Stradella Pass, and encounter Melas on the bloody -field of Marengo. The delay at Milan was but the lull before the -storm. While Bonaparte remained there, completing his arrangements -and awaiting the arrival of Moncey, Melas was beginning to appreciate -the situation, and, though still somewhat confused and undecided, was -destined shortly to make an heroic effort to save his army. - -For several days after Melas reached Turin, he remained in doubt -as to the intentions of Bonaparte. In fact, he was deceived by the -preparations that Lannes had made to cross the Po at Chivasso. Again: -in descending the river towards Pavia, Lannes so masked the main part -of the Army of Reserve, that Melas did not immediately become aware of -the movement on Milan. But on the 29th of May he learned that Bonaparte -was marching on Milan; and, on the 31st, he learned that Moreau had -defeated Kray, and that Moncey's corps was marching by way of the St. -Gothard into Italy. At once he comprehended the vast plan of Bonaparte. -He saw that nothing could now prevent the Army of Reserve from uniting -with Moncey's corps; and that, with these combined forces, Bonaparte -would doubtless march south from Milan, cross the Po, and sever the -Austrian communications. Thus he saw himself being rapidly enclosed in -a net from which there would soon be little or no hope of escape. Being -now completely undeceived as to the intentions of Bonaparte, Melas had -no further cause for delay. He must concentrate his troops at once, in -order to break through the French forces rapidly closing in upon him. -He must, if possible, preserve his communications, and thus save his -army from capture or annihilation. - -Accordingly, he determined to concentrate at Placentia and the -Stradella Pass all the available Austrian troops that were fighting -the French near Genoa. By this means he hoped to seize and hold -the crossings of the Po from Pavia to Cremona, and thus to retain -possession of the great highway leading from Alessandria through the -Stradella Pass to Mantua. He also determined to unite at Alessandria -all the available Austrian troops in Piedmont and along the Var. By -this means he expected to assemble there an army of at least thirty -thousand men, and thence to proceed eastward through the Stradella -Pass to Mantua. By following this plan, he hoped to make his escape -with the greater part of his army. Having once reached the Mincio, he -could unite his forces with those of Vukassovich; and, perhaps, in this -strong position, flanked on one side by Lake Garda, and on the other -by the fortress of Mantua, he might be able to make a successful stand -against Bonaparte. - -In accordance with this plan, he sent imperative orders to General -Elsnitz to quit the Var and march on Alessandria, and to General Ott to -raise the siege of Genoa and hasten north in order to seize Placentia -and the crossings of the Po near that point. Meanwhile he himself, -having left a sufficient force to hold Thurreau in check, hastened with -the remainder of his army to march on Alessandria. - -Upon receiving the orders of Melas, General Elsnitz, whose command then -numbered but seventeen thousand, began to withdraw his forces from -the Var. He directed his columns towards the Tenda Pass, expecting to -cross the Apennines at that point, and thence to march on Alessandria -by way of Coni, Alba, and Asti. But Suchet, being well aware of the -desperate situation of Melas, was anticipating the recall of Elsnitz -and was prepared for it. Suchet's forces numbered fourteen thousand -men. By skilful manoeuvring and by a rapid march across the foothills -of the Apennines, he succeeded in reaching the Tenda Pass ahead of -his adversary. Having thus turned the flank of the Austrians, and -obtained possession of their line of retreat, he fell upon them, -defeated them, cut them in two, and killed, wounded, or captured more -than half of their army. As a result General Elsnitz was compelled to -retreat eastward and cross the Apennines over the Ormea Pass. With only -eight thousand men he arrived at Ceva on the 7th of June _en route_ to -Alessandria. Meanwhile Suchet, having proceeded eastward to Savona, -was joined by a part of Masséna's command, which had marched out of -Genoa on the 5th of June. With these combined forces, Suchet marched to -Acqui, and there, still acting under the orders of Masséna, awaited the -results of Bonaparte's operations. - -When, on the 2d of June, General Ott received the orders of Melas, the -negotiations for the capitulation of Genoa were pending. He delayed -until the 4th of June to receive the surrender of Masséna. On the -6th, having left a sufficient force to garrison the city, he sent a -brigade towards Placentia by way of Bobbio; and with the remainder of -his forces, numbering sixteen thousand soldiers, he himself marched -towards the same place by way of Novi, Tortona, and the Stradella Pass. - -During these operations, Bonaparte remained at Milan, perfecting his -arrangements and issuing the orders for the movements of his troops. He -had already sent forward Berthier to direct the operations along the -Po. On the 6th of June Moncey's corps arrived. This re-enforcement of -fifteen thousand men increased the effective forces under the immediate -command of Bonaparte to about sixty thousand. Immediately upon the -arrival of Moncey, thirty-two thousand soldiers under Lannes, Victor, -and Murat, began to cross the Po. The remainder of the army were thus -stationed: four thousand, under Thurreau, were at the foot of the -Mont Cenis Pass; two small detachments were occupying Fort Bard and -Ivrea; ten thousand were posted at Vercelli and along the Ticino from -the foot of Lake Maggiore to Pavia; three thousand were at Milan; and -ten thousand were along the Adda, and at Cremona and Placentia. All -these troops, except the division of Thurreau, which was isolated and -held in check by an Austrian force near Turin, were available for the -operations about Milan and along the Po. - -On the 6th of June Lannes and Victor crossed the Po near Belgiojoso, -a few miles below Pavia, and marched thence to the Stradella Pass. -On the following day Murat crossed at Placentia. In these passages -the French met with considerable opposition from small detachments of -cavalry and infantry that Melas had directed thither from Alessandria -and elsewhere to hold the crossings of the Po until General Ott should -arrive; but these detachments having been defeated and driven back, the -French occupied Placentia and the Stradella Pass. At the latter place -a fortified camp was constructed, and between Pavia and Placentia five -bridges were built for the use of the French in case they should be -forced to retreat. - -During these operations two Austrian couriers were captured. One was -carrying despatches from Melas to Vienna; the other, from the Aulic -Council to Melas. The despatches of the former told of the surrender -of Genoa, and of the plans and movements of Melas. Those of the latter -informed the Austrian commander that the Army of Reserve was a mere -myth, and that he should pay no attention to the rumors concerning it, -but should make every effort to capture Genoa and force the crossings -of the Var. - -The news that Genoa had surrendered was discouraging to Bonaparte, -for he at once appreciated the fact that he must now fight the forces -of General Ott in addition to those which Melas was assembling at -Alessandria. There was, however, a compensating advantage in knowing -the plans of his adversary, for, having learned that General Ott -was marching on Placentia, he at once saw that he might defeat this -corps, and perhaps destroy it, before it could reach Placentia or unite -with Melas. Accordingly, he sent to Berthier, Lannes, and Murat the -following instructions: "Concentrate yourselves at the Stradella. On -the 8th or 9th at the latest, you will have upon your hands fifteen or -eighteen thousand Austrians, coming from Genoa. Meet them and cut them -to pieces. It will be so many enemies less upon our hands on the day -of the decisive battle which we are to expect with the entire army of -Melas." - -In accordance with these instructions, Lannes and Victor faced -about their columns and proceeded westward towards Tortona. Lannes, -commanding the vanguard, preceded Victor by a distance of five miles. -The remainder of the French forces on the south bank of the Po marched -to the Stradella Pass. On the 9th of June Lannes with nine thousand men -encountered the sixteen thousand under Ott at Montebello. Immediately a -furious battle began. For several hours both sides fought desperately. -The Austrian superiority in numbers would have crushed an ordinary -soldier, but Lannes was of uncommon mould. Impetuous, stubborn, brave, -fierce, and terrible on the battle-field, he would not yield. In the -face of a deadly fire he encouraged his soldiers, and by his presence -and heroic action held them firm before the repeated onslaughts of the -Austrians. Nevertheless, he would eventually have been defeated had not -Victor arrived opportunely on the battle-field with six thousand men. -This re-enforcement turned the tide of battle in favor of the French. -The Austrians were defeated, cut to pieces, and compelled finally to -retreat. They lost in killed, wounded, and captured five thousand men; -the French, three thousand. With the remnants of his corps General Ott -fell back across the Scrivia, and thence proceeded to Alessandria. This -battle secured for Lannes the title of "Duke of Montebello." It covered -him with glory, and brought to his name an imperishable renown. - -The First Consul, who had left Milan on the morning of the 9th of -June, arrived at Montebello just at the termination of the battle. -Expecting that Melas would at once advance with all the troops that -he had collected at Alessandria, Bonaparte began on the 10th of June -to rearrange his troops, and to make preparations for battle. Being -deficient in both cavalry and artillery, while Melas was well supplied -with both, Bonaparte decided to fall back to a position near Casteggio, -in front of the Stradella Pass, where his flanks would be protected by -the Po on one side, and by the spurs of the Apennines on the other. -With the corps of Lannes and Victor he made a retrograde movement to -this point. Here he collected all his forces south of the Po, now -numbering twenty-nine thousand men. In this strong position he remained -for several days, expecting hourly that the Austrians would push -forward from Alessandria and attack him. But they failed to appear. - -On the 11th of June General Desaix, who had served under Bonaparte -in Egypt, arrived at the French headquarters. He was a distinguished -general, and a warm friend of the First Consul. At once Bonaparte gave -him the command of a corps, consisting of two divisions. - -On the following day Bonaparte, surprised at the non-appearance of the -Austrians, began to fear that they were trying to escape. He thought -that Melas might attempt to evade him, either by marching directly on -Genoa, or by crossing the Po at Valenza, and thence marching on Pavia -and Milan. Finally, he could bear the suspense no longer. He decided -to advance and seek Melas. Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 12th -of June, having left a force to occupy the intrenched camp at the -Stradella Pass, he advanced towards Alessandria. At Tortona he left -a force to blockade the fortress. On the 13th of June he crossed the -Scrivia and debouched into the plain of Marengo, which lies between -the Scrivia and Bormida rivers. Thus far he had met with no Austrians. -His anxiety increased. He had but few cavalry, and, consequently, was -unable to make a thorough reconnoissance of the surrounding country. -During the afternoon of that day, he directed Victor on Marengo. Here -the French found only a small detachment, which was quickly driven -across the Bormida. A party sent forward to reconnoitre the crossings -of the Bormida, reported that no Austrians were to be found there in -force. - -From all these indications, Bonaparte came to the conclusion that the -Austrians had left Alessandria. He reasoned that, if Melas intended -to attack the French and force his way through the Stradella Pass, he -would neither have given up the plain without a struggle, nor have -failed to occupy in force the village of Marengo. Moreover, he thought -that Melas would surely not neglect to hold the Bormida with a strong -force so long as he remained at Alessandria. But if he had gone, what -route had he taken? - -On that day Bonaparte received word that no Austrians had appeared at -Pavia or along the Ticino. It seemed probable, therefore, that Melas -might be marching on Genoa; and that he would attempt either to make -a stand there, where he could be supported by the British fleet, or -else to march thence through Bobbio, Placentia, and Cremona to Mantua. -With this thought in his mind, Bonaparte directed Desaix with one -division of his corps, numbering six thousand men, on Novi, in order to -intercept Melas, should he be attempting to escape by this route. - -Thus it happened that on the evening of the 13th of June Bonaparte was -unprepared for the battle of the next day. His forces were scattered. -Desaix was on his way to Novi; Victor was at Marengo; Lannes and Murat -were on the plain in rear of Victor; the Consular Guard, two regiments -of cavalry, and Monnier's division, which belonged to the corps of -Desaix, were along the Scrivia near Tortona. These forces numbered -twenty-eight thousand men, of whom three thousand and five hundred were -cavalry. Bonaparte had about forty cannon. That night he slept in a -small town about two miles east of San Giuliano. He expected to receive -on the next day some information that would enlighten him as to the -movements and intentions of Melas; but he had no thought of a battle on -the morrow. - -Meanwhile, at Alessandria there was much confusion. By the defeat of -General Ott at Montebello, Melas had lost possession of the direct -road from Alessandria through the Stradella Pass to Mantua. He could -not, therefore, make his escape by this route without first defeating -the French. He hardly knew what to do. Already his communications were -severed. Doubtless the French would soon advance towards Alessandria. -Perhaps, in a few days, they would force the crossings of the Bormida, -and attempt to shut him up within the city. In this uncertain State -of mind Melas called a council of war. To the officers composing the -council three plans suggested themselves. Should they cross the Po at -Valenza, march to Pavia, and attempt to make their escape by forcing -their way across the Ticino; or should they march to Genoa, and in that -place, supported by the British fleet, make preparations to stand a -siege; or, lastly, should they cross the Bormida, meet the French face -to face, and fight to recover their communications and save their army? - -The third plan was adopted. The Austrian officers reasoned that it was -doubtful whether either of the first two plans would succeed; that the -false position that they now occupied was due neither to Melas nor to -themselves, but to the Aulic Council, which had repeatedly misinformed -them as to the actual state of affairs; and that now the only honorable -course was to fight, and, if possible, cut their way through the French -forces. "If we succeed," said they, "victory will regain for us the -road to Placentia and Mantua; if not, we shall have done our duty, and -the responsibility of any disaster that may befall us will rest upon -other heads than ours." - -Melas concurred in the views of his officers. Though seventy years -old, age had not dimmed his courage. His army at Alessandria numbered -thirty-two thousand men, and contained two hundred pieces of artillery -and seven thousand cavalry. On the 13th of June he decided that on the -next day he would cross the Bormida and attack Bonaparte. - -The plain of Marengo lies between the Scrivia and Bormida rivers, which -rise in the Apennines and flow northward towards the Po. The town of -Marengo, from which this battle takes its name, is situated near the -east bank of the Bormida on the great highway leading from Alessandria -to Mantua. About two miles north of Marengo is the village of -Castel-ceriolo. On the main road, just east of Alessandria, two bridges -span the Bormida. They were held by the Austrians, and were defended -by a single bridge-head on the right bank. The surrounding country is -generally quite flat, but towards the village of San Giuliano, which -lies on the main road about three miles east of Marengo, several -hillocks thereabout render the ground uneven. - -At daybreak on the morning of the 14th of June, the Austrians began -to cross the Bormida and to issue from the bridge-head on the right -bank. Three thousand soldiers under General O'Reilly crossed first. -They drove back the French outposts and advanced towards Marengo. This -vanguard was followed by a division under Haddick, and that in turn by -another under Kaim. At eight o'clock these forces, having deployed, -began the battle. Being well supplied with cannon, they opened the -attack with a heavy artillery fire, then pressed forward towards -Marengo. - -Meanwhile, word was sent to Bonaparte that the whole Austrian army was -advancing. During the deployment of the Austrians, Victor at Marengo -had taken up a position in front of the village along the muddy stream -of Fontanone. Here he received the attacks of the Austrians, and -finally succeeded in driving them back. But the Austrian line was soon -strongly re-enforced. Melas directed two more divisions on Marengo, -and, having detached Ott's division, directed it on Castel-ceriolo, in -order to take the French in flank on that side. - -About ten o'clock Lannes brought his corps into line on the right -of Victor. He was supported by a cavalry brigade under Champeaux. -Kellerman's brigade of cavalry supported Victor. Meanwhile General -Ott, having arrived near Castel-ceriolo, began to threaten the French -right, which movement obliged Lannes to form front in that direction -with a part of his corps. The French line of battle, numbering about -fifteen thousand men, was about two miles long. It followed the -general direction of the Fontanone northward from Marengo towards -Castel-ceriolo, and westward from Marengo towards the Bormida. Facing -this line were the Austrian troops, numbering twenty-nine thousand -five hundred men. General Ott formed the left, and the reserve under -General Elsnitz was in the rear. Having been informed that Suchet had -reached Acqui, Melas had, during the morning, sent two thousand five -hundred of his reserve cavalry to reconnoitre in that direction. - -At ten o'clock Melas attacked with fury the whole French line. He made -a determined effort to drive back Victor's corps and to gain possession -of Marengo. Along the stream in front of the village the struggle was -fierce and bloody. Both sides fought desperately. Melas felt that he -_must_ conquer. Knowing that his situation was critical, and that -nothing short of victory could save his army, he fought with the -courage of despair. The French, too, fought like demons. Their victory -at Montebello had encouraged them; and now, having sought and found -their enemy, they expected to be again triumphant. With determination -they resisted the onsets of Melas. Before the furious attacks of -superior numbers, in the face of cannon, sabre, and steel, they stood -to their work like men. But all their efforts were unavailing. Against -so fierce an attack Victor could not long hold his position. He was -compelled to fall back to Marengo, where he again made a desperate -effort to stop the advance of the Austrians. For a time he held on to -the village, but was finally forced to give way. His corps was routed; -his soldiers became demoralized. In disorder they retired towards San -Giuliano, followed by the victorious Austrians. Meanwhile, Lannes had -held his position against the attacks of Melas in his front and of -Ott on his right. But when Victor gave way, Lannes found himself in a -desperate situation. This movement uncovered the left of his corps and -threatened it with destruction. Thus outflanked on both wings and hard -pressed in front, he saw defeat near at hand. In fact the Austrians -were on the point of sweeping everything before them. Though the French -were still fighting bravely, it was evident that they must soon fall -back into the plain, or else be routed and destroyed. - -Such was the situation at eleven o'clock when Bonaparte arrived. Having -received word early in the morning that the whole Austrian army was -advancing towards Marengo, he immediately sent Desaix orders to return, -then hurried to the front with all the troops that he could collect. -He brought with him the Consular Guard, Monnier's division, and two -regiments of cavalry,--in all about seven thousand men. A single glance -sufficed to show Bonaparte what should be done. He formed the Consular -Guard into squares to hold the Austrian cavalry in check, directed a -column on Castel-ceriolo, sent the greater part of Monnier's division -to re-enforce Lannes, and ordered Murat with the reserve cavalry to -protect as best he could the retreat of Victor's corps. Again the -struggle was renewed with increased fury; but all the efforts of -Bonaparte and of Lannes could not now turn the tide of battle in favor -of the French. With an almost resistless momentum, Melas pressed -forward. Seeing victory just within his grasp, he strained every nerve -to crush and annihilate his adversary. He ordered his reserves to the -front and threw them into the fight. Repeatedly his cavalry charged the -French, cut in on their flanks, and threatened them with destruction; -and, while the left of his line was resisting bravely the heroic -efforts of Lannes, he himself issued from Marengo with his victorious -troops, and directed them upon the flank of the French. - -It was no longer possible for Bonaparte to hold his ground. He ordered -a retreat. Again the heroism of Lannes displayed itself on that -sanguinary field. Fighting as he retired, he fell back slowly and in -admirable order. For more than two hours he prolonged the conflict, -while being forced back from position to position over a distance of -nearly two miles. But, finally, his indomitable spirit was compelled -to yield. His corps was driven from the field. At length, shattered, -crushed, almost demoralized, it retired behind the hillocks near San -Giuliano, where the remnants of Victor's corps had assembled. - -The Austrians had conquered. On the plain of Marengo Melas had defeated -Bonaparte. The victory seemed complete. There appeared to be no longer -any hope for Bonaparte. The French had been driven three miles beyond -Marengo. The greater part of their cavalry had been destroyed. More -than two thirds of their cannon had been captured. Fragments only -of their infantry organizations remained. On that bloody field six -thousand French soldiers had been killed, wounded, or captured. Such -was the result of the struggle at Marengo on the morning of the 14th -of June, 1800. Who would have thought that before the close of that -eventful day the vanquished would become the victors? - -Thus far Melas had exhibited great energy and courage; but when the -French had been driven from the field, and the excitement of the -conflict had ended, he felt deeply the effects of his exertion. The -weight of years, too, bore heavily upon him. Fully convinced that he -had gained a complete victory over Bonaparte, he left the command -of the army to his chief of staff, General Zach, and, having sent -despatches to his government announcing the result, returned to -Alessandria exhausted with fatigue. - -General Zach now rearranged his troops for the purpose of following the -French, whom he believed to be completely routed. But the Austrians -were not in a condition to pursue the enemy promptly and vigorously. -Their cavalry, in particular, had been roughly handled by Victor and -Lannes during the morning; and, moreover, it was much weakened by the -two thousand five hundred men that Melas had detached towards Acqui to -observe Suchet. Considerable time was therefore spent in perfecting the -arrangements of Zach. In fact, it was near four o'clock when he began -to advance. At the head of about five thousand Austrians he pushed -forward along the high-road leading from Marengo to San Giuliano. He -was followed at a distance of three quarters of a mile by the corps -of Kaim, and it in turn by the Hungarian infantry. At the same time -General Ott marched eastward from Castel-ceriolo towards Ghilina. The -Austrian troops were only partially deployed. Not expecting great -resistance, they were moving forward in marching order rather than in -order of battle. - -Meanwhile the French, not being vigorously pursued, had halted, and, -unperceived by the Austrians, had begun to rally behind the hillocks -near San Giuliano. At this time Bonaparte was awaiting anxiously the -arrival of Desaix. Early in the morning he had sent him an order to -return; but before it reached its destination Desaix, having heard the -sound of the first cannon-shot at Marengo, halted his division. Judging -from the thunder of the guns that a battle had begun between the French -and Austrians on the plain of Marengo, he hurriedly despatched several -cavalry troops to Novi, in order to assure himself that no Austrians -were in that vicinity, then faced about his troops and marched to the -sound of the cannon. Hour after hour he pushed eagerly forward. At -about four o'clock in the afternoon the head of his column appeared -near San Giuliano. - -Upon the arrival of Desaix Bonaparte's spirits rose. Though most of -the French officers favored a retreat, Bonaparte was opposed to this -course. Desaix, too, concurred in the views of the First Consul. In -fact, Desaix was anxious to renew the struggle. Though he saw that the -battle was lost, he did not despair of yet gaining another. - -Accordingly, Bonaparte at once formed Desaix's division, and the French -troops about San Giuliano, into line of battle. Desaix's division was -placed across the highway along which the Austrians were advancing. On -his right were Lannes, Monnier, and the Consular Guard; in his rear -was Victor. Kellerman's brigade of cavalry took a position to the left -and rear of Desaix, and Champeaux's brigade to the right and rear of -Lannes. Bonaparte had only twelve guns remaining. He placed them on the -right of Desaix towards the front of the battle-line. - -Such were the positions of the French, when suddenly there appeared -from behind the rising ground in their front the column of Zach. Though -this column was preceded by an advance guard with cavalry on each -flank, the greater part of the Austrian troops were marching somewhat -carelessly, and were surprised when they came thus unexpectedly upon -the whole French army in position for battle. Immediately, the French -guns opened upon Zach; at the same time Desaix made a furious assault -upon him. Kellerman, too, having been directed towards the right and -rear of Desaix's division during the early stages of the battle, then -moved forward past the right of Desaix and attacked vigorously the -Austrian cavalry. Having routed it, he wheeled his troopers to the left -and struck in flank the Austrian column, which was already much shaken -by the assault of Desaix. Everywhere the Austrians were overwhelmed; -two thousand were captured, among whom was General Zach himself. -Bonaparte now pushed eagerly forward with his entire force, and in turn -attacked and defeated the corps of Kaim and the Hungarian infantry. -Continuing to advance, he forced the Austrians back to Marengo. Here -they attempted to make a stand, but were again defeated and routed. In -disorder they retired towards Alessandria. - -Meanwhile General Ott, hearing the firing towards Marengo, marched in -that direction; but he only arrived in time to cover the retreat of -the main body across the Bormida. By ten o'clock that night all the -Austrian troops had recrossed the river. Thus Bonaparte won in the -afternoon the battle that he had lost in the morning. Thus a great -disaster was turned into a great victory. Once more the Austrians were -crushed; once more the French were triumphant. - -On the following morning, Bonaparte made preparations to assault the -bridge-head and to cross the Bormida, in order to attack the Austrians -in Alessandria. But in the meantime Melas sent an officer to the French -headquarters to propose terms of surrender. On the same day, the 15th -of June, the negotiations were completed, and an armistice between -Melas and Bonaparte was signed. By the terms of surrender Melas was -allowed to march out of Alessandria with the honors of war, and to -proceed thence to Mantua; in return, he was to evacuate the whole of -northern Italy as far as the Mincio, to surrender the fortresses of -Coni, Alessandria, Genoa, and Tortona, and the fortified cities of -Milan, Turin, Pizzighettone, Placentia, Ceva, Savona, and Arona. - -In proportion to the number of combatants at Marengo the losses on both -sides were large. Seven thousand Austrians were killed or wounded, and -three thousand were captured. The French loss in killed and wounded was -equal to that of the Austrians, but only one thousand were captured. -Among the first of the French soldiers killed in the battle of the -afternoon was Desaix. While gallantly leading his division against -the Austrians he was shot through the body and fell dead on the -battle-field. His loss was deeply felt by the First Consul and by the -French nation. - -On the 15th of May Bonaparte had begun the passage of the Great St. -Bernard with the Army of Reserve. On the 15th of June he received the -surrender of the Austrian army in Italy. In one month, he had crossed -the Alps, entered Milan, severed the Austrian communications, fought -and won a great battle, and, as a result, obtained possession of the -greater part of northern Italy. - -Thus ended the campaign of Marengo. It brought about a temporary peace -between France and Austria; it excited to a high pitch the military -spirit of the French people; and it fixed ultimately upon the head of -Bonaparte an emperor's crown. Upon the political history of Europe -it produced far-reaching results. It precipitated a contest between -England and France, between France and Europe, which, at irregular -intervals for fifteen years, was destined to continue, until, finally, -on the field of Waterloo, Napoleon's cannon were silenced forever. - - -COMMENTS. - -At the outset one hundred thousand Austrians were occupying northern -Italy. Fifty-five thousand were at Genoa and along the Var; two -thousand along the Maritime Alps; five thousand at the foot of the -Mont Cenis Pass; three thousand in the valley of the Aosta; and ten -thousand in the vicinity of Milan. The remaining twenty-five thousand -were scattered throughout northern Italy. They were engaged mostly -in garrisoning the fortresses and fortified cities, and in holding -possession of the country. - -It will be seen that Melas had so stationed his troops that he was -weak at all points. Except at Genoa and along the Var, the Austrian -army may be said to have been composed of a number of detachments -scattered throughout northern Italy. Melas seemed to think that he must -occupy every fortress, and guard every road and pass, in order to make -secure his position in Italy. Herein lay his great fault; for, his -forces being thus scattered, he could not unite them readily to oppose -Bonaparte. Though Melas learned of the march of the Army of Reserve on -Milan more than two weeks before the battle of Marengo, yet he was able -to assemble only thirty-two thousand men at Alessandria to oppose the -French. - -The main cause, however, of the defeat of Melas was the fact that he -was completely deceived as to the intentions of the First Consul. He -had no expectation that Bonaparte would cross the Alps; in fact, he did -not believe in the existence of an army of reserve. Having reached this -conclusion from the reports of his own spies, and from the instructions -sent him by the Aulic Council, he was utterly confounded when the -French descended into Italy from the Mont Cenis, the Great St. Bernard, -the Simplon, and St. Gothard passes. Not knowing by which route the -strongest column was entering Italy, he knew not where to strike. -Consequently, he hesitated and was lost. - -Had he fathomed the designs of his adversary in time, he might have -rapidly united his forces, and have defeated the several French columns -in succession before they could have united in Italy; for, inasmuch -as Bonaparte's object was to unite his columns within the Austrian -theatre of operations, Melas could concentrate there more quickly than -Bonaparte. - -On the 29th of May Melas learned of the march of the Army of Reserve on -Milan. He then had a splendid opportunity to strike Bonaparte a telling -blow. His command at Turin numbered sixteen or seventeen thousand -men. In his front at Chivasso and along the Po was Lannes with six or -seven thousand. On his left was Thurreau with four thousand. Had Melas -left four or five thousand men to hold Thurreau in check, and boldly -attacked Lannes with the remainder of his forces, he could easily have -defeated Lannes, and have immediately thereafter obtained possession -of Bonaparte's communications with France. Such a master stroke would -have greatly embarrassed Bonaparte; for he would then have been -obliged either to turn back and fight Melas, in order to recover his -communications with France, or to push on and fight Vukassovich, in -order to establish his communications with Switzerland. Had Bonaparte -adopted the former course, Vukassovich could have closed in on the -French rear and have thus aided Melas; had he adopted the latter -course, Melas could have aided Vukassovich. - -That Melas did not carry out this course was due to the fact that -no sooner had he learned of the destination of the Army of Reserve -than he began to tremble for the safety of his own army. He at once -perceived that it was the intention of Bonaparte to sever the Austrian -communications. He therefore abandoned any intention which he may have -had of attacking Lannes and of seizing the communications of Bonaparte, -in order to take the necessary measures for the preservation of his own -communications. - -Consider now the operations of Bonaparte; they are worthy of careful -study. No one who stops to consider the smallness of the means with -which he defeated the Austrians in this campaign can fail to appreciate -his genius. - -At the outset an Austrian army of one hundred thousand men, led -by a courageous commander, was in possession of northern Italy. -Everywhere Melas had defeated the French. Masséna at Genoa was about -to surrender; and Suchet along the Var was fighting desperately to -prevent the invasion of France. Melas, encouraged by these successes, -looked hopefully forward to new triumphs. Such was the situation when -Bonaparte entered Italy with his columns, numbering in all a little -less than sixty thousand men. With these forces he plunged into the -Austrian theatre of operations, and in a month ended the campaign. -He so manoeuvred that a victory of twenty-eight thousand Frenchmen -over twenty-nine thousand five hundred Austrians decided the fate of -one hundred thousand Austrians and gained for him the greater part of -northern Italy. - -How, in so short a time and with so few forces, did Bonaparte -accomplish such results? In these comments an attempt will be made to -answer this question. It is our purpose to analyze somewhat critically -the strategical manoeuvres of Bonaparte, to compare the things he did -with what he might have done, and to show why the whole of northern -Italy fell into his possession as a result of the victory at Marengo. -It is our purpose, also, to discuss the battle of Marengo from a -tactical point of view, and to set forth some of the reasons why the -battle, lost in the morning, was won in the afternoon. - -The portion of northern Italy then occupied by the Austrians is divided -by the Po and Apennines into three unequal parts, through all which -roads pass eastwardly from the French frontier to Mantua. Bonaparte, -having decided to lead the Army of Reserve into Italy, might have -adopted any one of three plans. He might have marched into the southern -part of the Austrian theatre of operations, lying between the Apennines -and the Gulf of Genoa; or into the middle part between the Apennines -and the Po; or into the northern part between the Po and Switzerland. -Let us examine each of these plans, in order to determine, if possible, -which would have procured him the greatest advantages. - -Inasmuch as the mountainous and narrow strip of country lying between -the Apennines and the sea was peculiarly fitted for the operations of -an inferior army, composed mostly of infantry, and inasmuch as the Army -of Reserve was deficient in both cavalry and artillery, it might seem -that Bonaparte should have united his army with Suchet's forces on the -Var for an attack against Melas. But other considerations deterred -Bonaparte from doing so. His objections to this course were that even -if he succeeded in forcing the crossings of the Var, the Austrians, -as they fell back from position to position, would be constantly -re-enforced, and could maintain the siege of Genoa. And again: if he -succeeded in driving them across the Apennines and in defeating them -at Genoa, they could still fall back along their communications to -their base of operations on the Mincio, where they would be protected -by Lake Garda on one side and by the fortress of Mantua on the other. -Even should the Army of Reserve and all the undefeated portions of -the Army of Italy be united into one army, Bonaparte's total strength -would not exceed seventy thousand men. With this force he could hardly -expect to defeat one hundred thousand Austrians flushed by their recent -successes. Furthermore, by adopting this plan, no opportunity would be -offered him of severing the Austrian communications. - -"An ordinary general," says Jomini, "alarmed by the victorious attitude -of the Austrians in Piedmont, would have gone in all haste by Dauphiné -toward Provence, and made the Alps the theatre of operations. But -Bonaparte appreciated too well the difficulties of a frontal attack. He -preferred to cross the mountains upon the rear of the imperial forces -and gain the Ticino unopposed, where his presence could not fail to -recall his adversaries, and compel them to accept battle with all the -chances of success against them." - -In order to accomplish this result, Bonaparte had purposely led Melas -to believe that the Army of Reserve was intended to re-enforce the -Army of Italy. Though Melas did not believe in the existence of an -army of reserve, he knew that an effort was being made to organize -troops in France, and he believed that they would eventually be sent -to join Suchet. But the First Consul had no intention of doing what -Melas expected him to do. It was necessary to the success of Bonaparte -that he should conceal as much as possible his own purposes, in order -to be able to surprise his adversary. In war it is always wise to -lead the enemy to believe that an attack will be made in a different -direction from that intended. "In whatever way strategy is employed," -says Colonel Maurice, "surprise and concealment are essential to -success. On this account it will continually happen, in selecting a -line of operations or a scheme of campaign, that the most important -point of all is to carry out just what an enemy does not expect. Very -often successful campaigns, the method of which has been subsequently -much criticised, have owed their success to the fact that, from a nice -calculation of time and distance, the successful general has seen that -he could carry through an operation dangerous in itself, but sure not -to be the one expected by his opponent. For the same reason, in all the -brilliant and successful efforts of strategic skill, steps have been -taken beforehand to carry out the preliminary movements of an army in -such a way as to leave an enemy up to the last moment uncertain in what -direction the blow would be struck." - -Had Bonaparte marched into the middle part of the Austrian theatre -of operations, it would have been necessary to cross the Alps over -the Mont Cenis Pass. The objections to this plan were that the -country lying between the Apennines and the Po contained the strong -fortifications of Turin, Coni, Alessandria, and Tortona, which would -enable the Austrians to hold Bonaparte in check long enough for Melas -to concentrate his scattered forces. Furthermore, by entering Italy -over this pass, Bonaparte would approach the centre of the Austrian -line, which would enable the Austrians to concentrate against him more -rapidly than if he moved against either flank of their position. Again: -since the Austrians held the passes of the Apennines, they could delay -the advance of the French on Genoa and continue the siege; or, if -defeated, could fall back along the great highway leading from Piedmont -through the Stradella Pass to Mantua. - -Though the great chain of the Alps seemed to present an almost -impassable barrier to an army attempting to enter the extreme northern -part of Italy from France or Switzerland, Bonaparte did not allow -this fact to deter him from his great undertaking. There were several -reasons why he adopted this plan. - -First: He knew that Melas was not expecting the French to enter this -part of Italy. - -Second: He knew that the country lying between the Po and Switzerland -contained but few fortifications, and was occupied by only a few -thousand Austrians. - -Third: Owing to the fact that he had deceived Melas as to the existence -and destination of the Army of Reserve, Bonaparte believed that he -could cross the Alps with this army, march to Milan, and there be -joined by Moncey's corps before Melas should discover his plan. - -Fourth: Inasmuch as all the roads leading from the French frontier -to the Austrian base of operations on the Mincio passed through -the country lying between Milan and Placentia, he hoped that, by -adopting this plan, he would be able to assemble his forces in this -space, seize the roads there, and thus completely sever the Austrian -communications and place Melas in a position where he must fight under -a great disadvantage. With the French in possession of these roads, -Melas would be compelled to concentrate and fight in order to recover -his communications and save his army. In doing so he would be forced -to raise the siege of Genoa and to abandon the attempted invasion of -France. - -Fifth: Should Bonaparte succeed in concentrating his forces as here set -forth, the advantages of his position would be immense. The St. Gothard -and Simplon routes in his rear would give him a safe retreat into the -great stronghold of Switzerland in case of defeat; the Ticino would -protect his right flank, the Adda his left; and the fertile plains of -the Po would furnish the necessary supplies for his men and animals, -while he was making ready to fight the Austrians or awaiting their -attack. - -Such are the principal reasons that decided Bonaparte to march the -Army of Reserve into that part of Italy lying between the Po and -Switzerland. But, having decided on this course, he had yet to -determine whether he would lead the Army of Reserve across the Great -St. Bernard, or march it into Switzerland and thence descend into Italy -by way of the St. Gothard or the Simplon. It will be remembered that -for a time he was undecided as to what course to take, and did not -fully make up his mind until some time after the Army of Reserve had -assembled at Lake Geneva. - -In several respects the safest course that Bonaparte could have taken -was to conduct his army into Switzerland, unite it with Moncey's corps, -and march on Milan by way of the St. Gothard Pass. Had he adopted this -course, he would have entered Italy with united forces along a single -line of operations, and would have avoided the dangerous flank march -from Ivrea to Milan within the enemy's territory. At this time his -objective was Milan. His purpose was to assemble his army and the corps -of Moncey in that vicinity. By crossing the Great St. Bernard with the -Army of Reserve, while Moncey marched by way of the St. Gothard Pass, -Bonaparte gave Melas the opportunity of concentrating the Austrian -forces between the Army of Reserve and Moncey's corps, and of crushing -each in turn with superior numbers. - -In the comments on Moreau's operations in Germany, it has already -been remarked that it is always a dangerous operation to attempt a -concentration upon some designated place within the enemy's lines, -for, as a rule, the enemy can mass his forces there more rapidly than -the commander of an invading army; that in fact many a campaign has -failed because the commanding general has attempted to concentrate -his scattered forces upon some point within the territory held by -the enemy. By so doing he gives the enemy a chance to assemble his -forces between the separated columns of the attacking army, and to -bring superior numbers against each column in succession. Yet in these -operations Bonaparte not only committed this error, not only did what -he had condemned Moreau for doing, but he also violated the principle -which he himself had so often set forth and had so often exemplified, -namely, _not to invade a country with a double line of operations_. - -Why then did Bonaparte take this course? To answer satisfactorily this -question it is necessary to bear in mind that, at this time, Suchet was -fighting greatly superior forces on the Var, and that Masséna was in -desperate straits at Genoa. The problem before Bonaparte was not merely -to assemble his forces in the vicinity of Milan, but so to assemble -them there as to stop the projected invasion of France and bring speedy -relief to Masséna. - -The most direct route from Lake Geneva to Milan is by way of the Great -St. Bernard Pass, and thence through northern Italy. Had, therefore, -Bonaparte taken the longer route through Switzerland by way of the -St. Gothard, the Austrians, in the meantime, could have forced the -crossings of the Var, and have compelled Masséna to surrender. Indeed, -these events were the more likely to happen, inasmuch as the Army of -Reserve, during its march through Switzerland, would not threaten in -the least the Austrian communications. - -The importance of crossing the Great St. Bernard with the Army of -Reserve is seen in the fact that no sooner had French troops appeared -in the valley of the Aosta than Melas at once withdrew ten thousand men -from Suchet's front and ordered them to march on Turin. Thus, by the -mere crossing of the Great St. Bernard with the Army of Reserve, the -projected invasion of France was brought to an end. It was inevitable -that such should be the case; for as soon as the French appeared in the -extreme northern part of Italy, their mere presence there threatened -the communications of the Austrians. It was therefore necessary that -Melas should abandon the invasion of France, in order to destroy, if -possible, the French troops that were threatening his rear. In war, it -will ever be thus. No commander can afford to take the risk of pushing -forward to new conquests so long as his communications are seriously -threatened by his enemy. - -Again: it will be remembered that no sooner had Melas learned that the -Army of Reserve was marching on Milan than he sent orders to General -Elsnitz to abandon the Var and to General Ott to raise the siege of -Genoa. Even the mere knowledge of Bonaparte's destination, before the -movement on Milan had actually been completed, was of itself sufficient -to cause Melas to change immediately his entire plan of campaign. Had -not Masséna, at the time, been just on the point of giving up Genoa, -General Ott would not have delayed there two or three days to await the -capitulation. In fact, had Masséna known of the exact state of affairs, -he doubtless would have held out a day or two longer, and saved -himself the humiliation of a surrender. Even without a battle, the -concentration of the French forces between Milan and Placentia would, -in a short time, have set free Masséna's soldiers; for Melas would then -have been obliged to concentrate and fight, in order to recover his -communications and connect with his base of supplies. Bonaparte saw -clearly this fact. Though he did not know how long Masséna could hold -out at Genoa, he realized that matters there were rapidly approaching -a crisis, and that it was of the utmost importance that the Army of -Reserve should reach Milan at the earliest possible moment. He realized -that upon the direction given his columns and upon the rapidity of -their movements depended the fate of Suchet on the Var and of Masséna -at Genoa. - -Other reasons, too, deterred Bonaparte from marching the Army of -Reserve through Switzerland. In this rough and mountainous country, -supplies could not be easily obtained. Especially was this true of the -St. Gothard route, which had been overrun by the French during the two -previous years. Besides, this route was reserved for Moncey's corps, -which, of itself, would tax to the utmost the resources of the country. -Moreover, this road, a mere bridle path in places, passes through -narrow defiles and across lofty and rugged mountains. Evidently a large -army issuing into Italy by this route would be so stretched out that -the advance divisions could be defeated before the rear divisions could -re-enforce them. - -The Simplon route was shorter than the St. Gothard route, but the -difficulties to be overcome on each were of the same character. -Inasmuch, however, as Lake Maggiore lies between these two routes, it -will be observed that, had Bonaparte advanced into Italy by way of the -Simplon, while Moncey marched by way of the St. Gothard, Melas might -have assembled a strong force at the foot of the lake, and, from his -central position, have thrown superior numbers against each French -column in succession. In this way he might have defeated both in detail -before they could have united at Milan. - -The principal reasons why Bonaparte chose the Great St. Bernard route -having been considered, it will now be of interest to point out the -several courses that he might have taken after having descended the -Alps into the lower valley of the Aosta. It will be remembered that -on the 27th of May Bonaparte was between Ivrea and Chivasso with -thirty-five thousand men, and that Melas was at Turin with sixteen or -seventeen thousand. At this time Bonaparte might have taken any one -of three courses. He might have advanced on Turin, driven back Melas, -united with Thurreau's division at Susa, and thus have secured his -communications with France by the Mont Cenis route; or he might have -crossed the Po at Chivasso, attacked and driven Melas from Turin, then -have marched on Genoa by way of Alessandria; or, lastly, he might -have marched on Milan, and there have united his army with Moncey's -corps. In his memoirs Napoleon himself has discussed the advantages and -disadvantages of these plans as follows:-- - - "Of these three courses, the first was contrary to the true - principles of war. Since Melas had considerable forces with him, the - French army, therefore, would run the risk of fighting without having - a certain retreat, Fort Bard not being then taken. Besides, if Melas - should abandon Turin and move on Alessandria, the campaign would be - a failure, and each army would find itself in its natural position: - the French army resting upon Mont Blanc and Dauphiné; and that of - Melas with its left at Genoa, and in its rear the fortified places of - Mantua, Placentia, and Milan. - - "The second course appeared impracticable: how hazardous would have - been the situation of the French between the Po and Genoa, in the - midst of an army so powerful as that of the Austrians, without any - line of operations[9] (communication), any assured retreat. - - "The third course, on the other hand, presented every advantage: - the French army, once in possession of Milan, would secure all the - magazines, depots, and hospitals, of the enemy's army; it would join - the left under General Moncey, and have a safe retreat by the Simplon - and St. Gothard. The Simplon led to the Valais and Sion, whither - all the magazines of provisions for the army had been sent. The St. - Gothard led into Switzerland, of which we had been in possession for - two years, and which was covered by the Army of the Rhine then on the - Iller. In this position the French general was at liberty to act as - he pleased; if Melas should march with his whole army from Turin upon - the Sesia and the Ticino, the French army could give him battle with - this incalculable advantage, that, if it should be victorious, Melas, - with his retreat cut off, would be pursued and driven into Savoy; and - if it should be defeated, it could retreat by the Simplon and the St. - Gothard. If Melas, as it was natural to suppose, should move towards - Alessandria in order to join the army coming from Genoa, it might be - hoped that, by advancing towards him and crossing the Po, he might - be met and be forced to fight before he could reach Alessandria. (In - other words, before the troops of Melas, and of General Ott, coming - from Genoa, could unite at Alessandria.) The French army having its - rear secured by the river, and by Milan, the Simplon, and the St. - Gothard; while the Austrian army, having its retreat cut off, and - having no communications with Mantua and Austria, would be liable - to be thrown upon the mountains of the western coast of Genoa, or - entirely destroyed, or taken at the foot of the Alps, at the Col - di Tenda and in the county of Nice. Lastly, by adopting the third - course, if it should suit the First Consul, when once master of - Milan, to suffer Melas to pass, and to remain between the Po, the - Adda, and the Ticino, he would thus, without a battle, reconquer - Lombardy, and Piedmont, the Maritime Alps, and the Genoese territory, - and raise the blockade of that city; these were flattering results to - anticipate." - -Bonaparte has been severely criticised for not taking the second -course, which he has so briefly discussed in his memoirs. It has -been represented that in marching on Milan, he sacrificed Masséna, -when he might have marched directly to the relief of Genoa by way of -Alessandria, and thus have saved his lieutenant the humiliation of a -surrender. But what are the facts? They are that Melas sent orders to -General Ott to raise the siege of Genoa before the Army of Reserve -had even reached Milan. Had, therefore, Bonaparte crossed the Po at -Chivasso, attacked and driven back Melas, and marched on Alessandria, -he could not have brought relief to Masséna any earlier. - -If Bonaparte had crossed the Po, he could undoubtedly have defeated -Melas and driven him back to Alessandria; but here the Austrian -commander, protected by the fortifications of the city, would doubtless -have made a stand, and would have collected a large force to oppose -Bonaparte. In this position, Melas would be joined by General Elsnitz, -already marching on Alessandria, and could receive re-enforcements -from General Ott and from General Vukassovich. Thus, in a short time, -he could outnumber Bonaparte's army. Moreover, at Alessandria he could -prevent the junction of Moncey's corps with the Army of Reserve, and -might possibly be able to defeat them in detail. - -In this position, Bonaparte, if defeated, would have no unobstructed -line of retreat, for Fort Bard was still held by the Austrians; -and, if victorious, he could do no more than force Melas back along -the great highway to Mantua. In fact, should Melas be defeated at -Alessandria, he could fall back to the fortress of Tortona or to the -Stradella Pass, and there occupy another strong position. Here, with -the re-enforcements that would doubtless join him from Genoa, from -Vukassovich's corps, and from the fortresses in his rear, he would -still have great chances of success. - -In short, it would have been the height of folly for Bonaparte, with -no secure line of retreat, to march into the centre of the Austrian -theatre of operations, and expect to conquer Italy with but thirty-five -thousand men. Even though it had been necessary to sacrifice Masséna, -Bonaparte would have been justified in marching on Milan; for, in no -other way could he be joined by Moncey's corps; in no other way could -he sever the Austrian communications, and in no other way could he hope -to defeat Melas and conquer Italy. Victory was his object. - -The most critical part of Bonaparte's operations was the flank march -from Ivrea to Milan; for at this time his only line of retreat was by -way of the Great St. Bernard; and even on this route the Austrians -still held Fort Bard. - -Under ordinary circumstances, a flank march is always more or less a -hazardous undertaking. When a commander makes this movement and is -attacked in route, he must form front to a flank,[10] and fight with -his battle-line parallel to his communications, while the enemy can -fight with his front perpendicular to his communications. In this -position the advantage of the enemy is enormous. If victorious, he -severs the communications of his adversary, and may then capture or -destroy his army; if defeated, he can retreat in safety along his -communications, or fall back to a new position, fight again, and -thus prolong the conflict. An army without communications is like a -rudderless ship adrift on the ocean. In order to fight, soldiers must -have food and ammunition. No greater calamity, short of defeat, can -befall a commander than to be cut from his base of operations and lose -his source of supply. - -Had, therefore, the Army of Reserve been defeated while marching from -Ivrea to Milan, it would have lost its line of communication by way -of the Great St. Bernard. In that case it would undoubtedly have been -captured or destroyed; for since the Italian entrances of the St. -Gothard and Simplon passes were then held by ten thousand Austrians -under Vukassovich, Bonaparte could not have retreated into Switzerland. - -That Bonaparte appreciated the critical features of the situation is -seen in the skill with which he planned and executed the march. By -ordering Lannes to make preparations to cross the Po at Chivasso, -Bonaparte gave Melas the impression that the French intended to cross -the Po and attack the Austrians near Turin. Thus Melas was deceived. -Meanwhile Bonaparte, with the greater part of the Army of Reserve, -marched rapidly on Milan. During the march Lannes descended the -Po towards Pavia, thus covering as with a screen the movements of -Bonaparte. So skilfully were these manoeuvres made that Melas did not -even attempt to cross the river, in fact, did not even learn of the -march of Bonaparte until the 29th of May, two days after the movement -had begun. On the 31st Bonaparte arrived on the Ticino; and on the 2d -of June, having driven back Vukassovich's corps, he entered Milan. Here -the critical part of his march ended, for he was then sure of being -joined by Moncey's corps, and had, in case of need, a safe line of -retreat into Switzerland by the St. Gothard and Simplon passes. - -Another circumstance that aided Bonaparte in this march was the -presence of Thurreau's division of four thousand men at Susa. Melas, -being ignorant of the strength of this division, hesitated to push -forward and attack Lannes, so long as these troops remained undefeated -on his flank and rear. On this point General Hamley makes the following -comments:-- - - "Thurreau's force, being entirely separated from the main army - throughout the operations, was useful only as leading the enemy to - a false conclusion. But its value in that respect was incalculable. - There were sufficient Austrian troops round Turin to check Thurreau - and crush Lannes, thus laying bare the rear of the French army. But - the road of the Mont Cenis was both more practicable and more direct - than that of the St. Bernard; moreover, Thurreau had artillery, - and Lannes, at first, had not, for his guns had been delayed by - the difficulties of passing the Austrian fort of Bard. It was but - a natural error, therefore, for Melas to believe that Thurreau was - backed by the whole French army." - -Upon his arrival at Milan a threefold problem confronted Bonaparte. -His object was to prevent the escape of the Austrians, to preserve his -communications with Switzerland, and, in case of an Austrian attack, -to make a quick concentration for battle. The skill with which he -solved this complex problem will become apparent, if we turn to the -map and study the positions of the French forces immediately after the -arrival of Moncey's corps. These forces numbered fifty-five thousand -men. Thirty-two thousand were stationed along the Po from Placentia -to the Stradella Pass on the great highway leading from Alessandria -to Mantua; ten thousand were stationed on the Ticino; ten thousand on -the Adda; and three thousand at Milan. Thus it will be seen that these -forces were occupying the sides of the triangular space enclosed by -the Ticino, the Po, and the Adda; and that they held possession of -all the roads leading from the Alps to the Austrian base of operations -on the Mincio. The ten thousand men on the Ticino not only protected -the Italian entrance to the St. Gothard on the west side, but they -were in a position to dispute the passage of the Ticino, should Melas -cross to the north side of the Po and attempt to reach Mantua by way -of Pavia and Milan. In the event that Melas should adopt this plan, -the resistance that these ten thousand men could offer him would give -Bonaparte time to unite all his forces for battle on the north side of -the Po. The thirty-two thousand men on the south side of the Po closed -with a barrier of steel the great highway leading from Alessandria to -Mantua. On this road they had fortified a camp at the Stradella; and -across the Po they had constructed five bridges, which would enable -Bonaparte, in an emergency, to recross the river rapidly with these -troops. The ten thousand men along the Adda not only covered the -Italian entrance to the St. Gothard on the east side, but they were -in a favorable position for holding in check Vukassovich's corps, -should it attempt to march westward to the relief of Melas. It will -be observed, too, that, should Melas attempt to escape by marching to -Genoa, and thence to Mantua by way of Bobbio and Placentia, the French -forces about Placentia and along the Adda could delay the progress of -the Austrians long enough for Bonaparte to concentrate all his forces -against them. - -Occupying a triangle in the heart of northern Italy, the French corps -and divisions supported one another. In a few hours Bonaparte could -concentrate nearly the whole of his army on the Po, on the Ticino, -or on the Adda. In this position he held complete possession of the -Austrian communications, and had his own with Switzerland strongly -guarded. In this position he could concentrate quickly, and fight with -nearly every advantage in his favor. - -"Napoleon has told us," says Colonel Hart, "that the whole art of -war--the secret of success--consists in being strongest at the decisive -point." Even when making a great flank or turning movement against -his enemy, Napoleon kept this principle constantly in view. Thus, -in these operations, though at the outset the several columns under -his immediate command, numbering nearly sixty thousand men, entered -Italy from different directions, separated by intervening obstacles -and great distances, yet, by deceiving his adversary and by skilful -manoeuvres, he succeeded in conducting fifty-five thousand men into -such positions that they could, in an emergency, support one another -on a single battle-field. His theory of war was concentration. His -constant endeavor was to outnumber the enemy in battle. In order to -accomplish this result, he nearly always made a great effort to -call in his detachments just previous to a general engagement. His -skill in strategy consisted in so directing his columns that when -needed they could be quickly assembled on the battle-field. His skill -in war consisted in the fact that he nearly always brought greater -numbers against his enemy on the day of battle, even when he was -outnumbered within the theatre of operations. On the battle-field, -too, when it was impossible to outnumber his adversary, his quick eye -discerned the vital point, the key of the position, so to speak; and -there, neglecting the less important points, he massed his troops and -overwhelmed his enemy. But in this campaign, strange to relate, after -the battle of Montebello, and prior to the battle of Marengo, he seemed -to neglect the principle of calling in his columns. When he assembled -his forces south of the Po in the Stradella Pass, he felt certain -that Melas would shortly advance eastward from Alessandria to attack -him; yet he issued no orders for his forces north of the Po to join -him. Again: at Marengo he was outnumbered, while ten thousand French -soldiers along the Ticino, but a short distance away, had not a single -Austrian in their front. - -Inasmuch as Bonaparte held the crossings of the Po between Pavia -and Cremona, he could easily have assembled the greater part of his -army on the south side of the Po, and have brought greatly superior -numbers against Melas. But Bonaparte feared that, if he adopted this -plan, Melas might cross the Po and make his escape by way of Pavia -and Milan. It will be remembered that, just prior to the battle of -Marengo, Bonaparte was completely in the dark as to the movements of -his adversary. He did not know but that the Austrian commander was -making preparations to escape. As a matter of fact Bonaparte had lost -touch of his enemy. He was in a state of confusion and uncertainty as -to the intentions of Melas. He could not understand why the Austrians -did not march eastward from Alessandria and attack the French, unless -it was because they were about to attempt their escape by way of Pavia -and Milan, or by way of Genoa. Had Bonaparte known the true state of -affairs; had he known that the Austrians would soon cross the Bormida -to attack the French, undoubtedly he would have assembled on the -battle-field the ten thousand men stationed along the Ticino. That -he did not do so was an error; perhaps, under the circumstances, an -unavoidable one, but nevertheless an error, for he was outnumbered at -Marengo when he might easily have outnumbered his adversary. In fact, -nearly all his operations after the battle of Montebello are open to -criticism. They are not up to the standard of the ordinary operations -of Napoleon. His forces were scattered when they might have been -united. He attempted too much. In order to win everything, he incurred -unnecessary hazard. In order to prevent the Austrians from escaping, he -took too great a risk on the battle-field. - -It will be borne in mind that it is easy for any one, having a fair -knowledge of the science of war, to point out, after the event, the -mistakes that were made. During active operations confusion and doubt -are constant factors that cannot be ignored by a commander. Neither -Bonaparte nor his officers knew, or could know, the facts as we know -them to-day. Thus the military student is able, after months of study, -to point out the errors made by a great master of war. He approaches -the subject from a different point of view from that of the commanding -general. He is cognizant of facts, many of which at the time were -unknown to the head of the army. He writes in the light; Napoleon -marched in the darkness. He has the details of the campaign at his -finger's end; Napoleon had to form his conclusions from the doubtful -information at hand. Thus it is that mediocrity can criticise what -genius alone can conceive and execute. - -Again: it must be remembered that the really great soldier is not he -who never makes a mistake, but he who in the aggregate makes the fewest -mistakes. In war the conditions are such that a commander cannot by -any possibility always know the truth. He must often decide momentous -questions on the spur of the moment, basing his decisions on unreliable -information obtained mostly from reports and rumors. "Speak to me of -a general who has made no mistakes in war," says Turenne, "and you -speak of one who has seldom made war." "In the profession of war," says -Napoleon, "the game is always to the one who makes the fewest mistakes." - -If Bonaparte had withdrawn all his forces to the south side of the Po, -Melas might have made his escape by way of Pavia and Milan, but even -then Bonaparte would have won northern Italy without a battle. Had -Melas taken this course, it is evident that he would have severed the -communications of Bonaparte with Switzerland. Though the loss of the -French communications would doubtless have inconvenienced Bonaparte, -it would not have put a stop to his active operations, nor have proved -fatal to his army; for he could then have united his forces with those -of Suchet, and have at once established another line of communication -with France by way of Nice. On this point General Hamley, one of the -greatest of military critics, comments as follows:-- - - "There was a special circumstance in this campaign which should have - induced Napoleon to bring his whole army to the south bank. For if - Melas moved through Milan he would leave the country south of the Po - clear for Napoleon to establish another and better communication - with France by the south of the Apennines, and, moreover, a junction - with Suchet would be effected, and the territory which was to be the - prize of the campaign would be lost to the Austrians. But Napoleon - could not be satisfied to let the enemy escape, even at such a - sacrifice of territory, and therefore it was that he left the Ticino - guarded." - -In studying these operations, one cannot but be struck by the fact -that Bonaparte seemed extremely anxious to retain his communications -with Switzerland. The arrangement of his forces was admirable for -this purpose. Even when he fought at Marengo, he had unobstructed -communication across the Po to Milan, and thence to the St. Gothard -Pass. Rather than weaken his communications by withdrawing his forces -from the Ticino, he seemed to prefer the hazard of battle with a -superior enemy. In a critical examination of these operations, it is -almost impossible not to come to the conclusion that Bonaparte had a -good reason for holding on to his communications with Switzerland. -Being at the head of the French government, he had control of the -armies of the Republic. He had crossed the Alps to conquer. Much -depended on his success, for his own destiny hung in the balance. -Undoubtedly he intended to return to France triumphant, whatever should -be the cost. He was bold enough to stake all on a single throw--to -hazard his own and his country's fate on a single battle. If he should -be defeated at Marengo and be driven out of the valley of the Po, might -he not retreat through Switzerland into Germany with the remnants of -his forces? Might he not unite them with Moreau's army, crush Kray in -the valley of the Danube, march on the Austrian capital, and "conquer -Italy at Vienna"? Is it not possible that this may have been the reason -why he held on so persistently to his communications with Switzerland? - -In this discussion it has just been assumed that Bonaparte might -have been driven out of the valley of the Po. But this assumption -is altogether improbable. Even if Bonaparte had been defeated at -Marengo, the chances of his success on another field in Italy would -still have been greatly in his favor. It needs but a glance at the -situation to substantiate this statement. It is evident that if Melas -had been victorious at Marengo, he would have attempted to open up -his communications with Mantua, by marching eastward from Alessandria -through the Stradella Pass. His victorious troops would have numbered -at the most but twenty-three thousand men. Doubtless Bonaparte, while -holding the Stradella Pass with the detachment already there, would -have fallen back across the Po with the remnants of his defeated -forces, numbering not less than eighteen thousand men; and would have -united them with his columns on the north side of the river. In this -way he could have collected in a short time on the north bank of the -Po an army of about forty thousand men to oppose the twenty-three -thousand under Melas. In this position the French communications would -have been in no danger; but the Austrians, in order to recover their -communications, would have been obliged to force the intrenched camp -of the Stradella; which operation would have given Bonaparte time to -cross the Po and attack the Austrians in flank. Having the advantage of -position and an overwhelming superiority in numbers, Bonaparte would -undoubtedly have crushed and destroyed the army of Melas. If this -statement seems too strong, reflect a moment, remember that during his -entire career Napoleon never lost a battle in which he outnumbered his -adversary. - -In the result of the victory at Marengo is seen the brilliancy of -Bonaparte's strategy. Having finally won the battle, northern Italy as -far as the Mincio at once fell into his hands. Notwithstanding the fact -that he failed to outnumber his enemy on the battle-field of Marengo, -his strategy was such that he could fight there with the assurance that -he would lose little if he were defeated, but would gain much if he -were victorious. - -On the other hand, Melas fought the battle, knowing that he must -conquer or lose all. Already his communications were in the hands of -Bonaparte. Nothing short of overwhelming victory could wrest them from -the French. Though Melas did not know the number of French troops in -his front, yet, having once decided upon the course to take, he made an -heroic effort to save his army. Courageously he faced the inevitable. -Brave man that he was, when the time came he fought as a soldier should -fight. - -After the battle of Montebello, Bonaparte united near the Stradella -Pass all his forces south of the Po. Here he collected twenty-nine -thousand men. Being deficient in cavalry and artillery, while Melas -was well supplied with both, Bonaparte decided to occupy this strong -position, where his flanks would be protected by the Po on one side -and by the spurs of the Apennines on the other. He had every reason -to believe that Melas would shortly advance from Alessandria, cross -the Scrivia, and attempt to cut his way through the French army. If, -therefore, Bonaparte should push westward from the Stradella, he must -expect to meet the Austrians in the plain lying between the Scrivia -and Bormida rivers. Here, however, the superiority of the Austrians -in cavalry and artillery would give them a great tactical advantage. -On the plain their artillery would have full sweep, and their cavalry -could manoeuvre with freedom against the flanks of the French. -Moreover, Bonaparte believed that the Austrian forces, under the -immediate command of Melas, outnumbered those of the French. - -It was, therefore, neither wise nor prudent for Bonaparte to leave this -strong position and march westward into the plain of Marengo. Other -reasons, however, caused him to take this course. - -First: He feared lest the Austrians should escape. While he remained in -this position, they might march on Genoa, or cross the Po at Valenza, -thence proceed to Pavia and force the crossings of the Ticino. - -Second: He wished to attack and defeat the Austrians under Melas before -they could be re-enforced by the numerous other Austrian detachments -scattered throughout Italy. Bonaparte had already delayed his movements -several days to await the arrival of Moncey's corps. During the delay -Masséna had surrendered. Now, Bonaparte was anxious to bring matters to -an issue before other advantages should accrue to the Austrians. - -Third: Though from a tactical point of view the chances of success in -the open country were unfavorable to Bonaparte, yet from a strategical -point of view they were greatly in his favor. He had severed the -Austrian communications by closing the great highway leading from -Alessandria to Mantua. Along the Ticino he had a strong force to -prevent Melas from escaping in that direction; in the Stradella Pass -he had established a fortified camp; and from Pavia to Cremona he held -the line of the Po, across which he had constructed five bridges that -could be used for a retreat in case he should be defeated. In the open -country, therefore, a defeat would, at the most, be but a temporary -check, for he could fall back, cross the Po, unite his defeated troops -with the French forces on the north side of the river, and be ready -in a short time to fight another battle. On the other hand, since the -communications of the Austrians were already in possession of the -French, the defeat of Melas must result in the capture or destruction -of his army, and in the loss of northern Italy. It follows, therefore, -that in the plain of Marengo Bonaparte could gain much more by a -victory than he could lose by a defeat. - -Fourth: He never was satisfied to take up a defensive position, and -there await an adversary. He seldom fought defensive battles. He -believed in the offensive. His method of making war was to march and to -fight. It was necessary to seek the enemy, to meet him face to face, to -crush him on the battle-field. - -At the battle of Marengo, Bonaparte was surprised. Having but a small -cavalry force under his immediate command, he held it in reserve in -rear of his infantry in order that it might, in case of battle, be -used against the Austrian cavalry, which greatly outnumbered his own. -Had he ordered it to the front to seek the Austrians and to screen the -movements of Victor and Lannes, doubtless he would not have remained -completely in the dark as to the position and intention of his enemy. -It has been said that "Cavalry are the eyes of an army." Certainly for -the want of it at Marengo, or for the failure to use what he had for -screening and reconnoitring purposes, Bonaparte lost touch of his enemy. - -Again: when he found that the village of Marengo was not occupied in -force by the Austrians, he was led to believe that Melas was trying to -escape. He was still further confirmed in this belief by the result -of the reconnoissance made on the 13th of June from Marengo towards -Alessandria. Though the Austrians were occupying the bridge-head on -the right bank of the Bormida and the two bridges in rear of it, the -French officer in command of the reconnoitring party failed to learn -this fact. Indeed, he reported that no Austrians were to be found in -force along the Bormida. Dumas tells us that "Bonaparte would not go -to bed until he made sure whether the Austrians had a bridge over the -Bormida. At one o'clock in the morning the officer in charge of this -mission returned and reported that it did not exist. This announcement -quieted the First Consul. He required a last account of the position -of his troops, and went to sleep not believing that there would be an -engagement the next day." This false information deceived Bonaparte. It -was, in fact, one of the causes that led to his defeat on the following -morning. - -If this reconnoitring party had done its duty, Bonaparte would -undoubtedly have been prepared for battle. In that case he would -have held on to Desaix, and would have concentrated his forces at -Marengo and along the Fontanone. Had he occupied this position with -twenty-eight thousand men, he might have defeated the Austrians in -detail as they crossed the Bormida. Even had Melas succeeded in -crossing the Bormida with his entire army, he would then have been -obliged to fight a great battle with an unfordable river directly in -his rear. Thus situated, the defeat of Melas must have resulted in the -capture or annihilation of his army. - -For several days Melas hesitated whether he should cross the Bormida -and attack the French. Owing, however, to the fact that he did not -decide until the 13th of June to attack Bonaparte, he neglected to -occupy Marengo. This neglect permitted Victor to occupy the village, -and aided him materially in resisting the attacks of the Austrians -on the next day. Yet, on the whole, this blunder of Melas proved to -be more advantageous to the Austrians than to the French; for it led -Bonaparte to believe that Melas had no intention of crossing the -Bormida and of attacking the French in the plain of Marengo. - -In sending two thousand five hundred cavalry to Acqui to watch Suchet, -Melas committed an error that probably lost him the battle. There was -little or no excuse for this error; for Suchet was so far away that -he could not possibly arrive at Marengo in time to take part in the -battle. Had Melas kept this cavalry force on the battle-field, and -thrown it vigorously against the French as they fell back towards San -Giuliano, he would undoubtedly have won the battle. It was the failure -of the Austrians to pursue the French promptly that enabled Bonaparte -to rally the scattered remnants of his defeated forces near San -Giuliano. Says Colonel Hart:-- - - "When a great battle is imminent, it is unwise for a commander to - detach any part of the force available, unless he is very confident - of victory. There are many examples in history of misfortune, or - misfortune narrowly escaped, in consequence of doing so. Melas would, - in all probability, have made perfectly certain of the victory at - Marengo, if he had not unnecessarily detached 2500 cavalry to arrest - the march of Suchet, who was at too great a distance to be taken - into consideration. Napoleon himself at Marengo, although ultimately - victorious, was as nearly as possible defeated because he detached - Desaix to reconnoitre towards Rivalta; indeed, he was at first - defeated, but the return of Desaix restored the battle." - -It is here worthy of notice that while Melas was sending away this -detachment of two thousand five hundred men, Bonaparte was making every -effort to hasten the return of the six thousand men under Desaix. - -At the sound of the first cannon-shot at Marengo, Desaix faced about -his command and hurried forward to aid Bonaparte. It was fortunate that -the First Consul had Desaix for a lieutenant at Marengo. Had Grouchy -marched to the sound of the cannon at Waterloo, and supported his chief -as loyally as did Desaix at Marengo, Napoleon might never have fallen. - -If Suchet, who was at Acqui with the remnants of the Army of Italy, -numbering about twenty thousand men, had pushed on vigorously towards -Marengo, and had arrived there on the morning of the 14th of June, the -battle would have been decided in favor of the French early in the day. -Such a movement would have given Bonaparte an overwhelming superiority -in numbers, and would probably have resulted in the destruction or -capture of the whole army of Melas. - -That Suchet did not take this course was due to several causes. The -soldiers of the Army of Italy had just finished a great fight. They -had already performed heroically their part in the great struggle. -Many of them, too, having starved and suffered at Genoa, had become so -emaciated that they could hardly bear the weight of their equipments. -Moreover, Suchet, who was still acting under the orders of Masséna, had -been cautioned not to peril his army by advancing too far. Inasmuch -as Bonaparte had been more than twenty days in Italy, and had not -yet destroyed Melas, Masséna was somewhat doubtful of the outcome. -Consequently he wished to hold the Army of Italy well in hand, so that, -in case Bonaparte should be defeated, it could fall back to the Var, -and, being there re-enforced from the departments of southern France, -make another effort to save France from invasion. - -On the morning of the 14th of June the forces of Melas concentrated at -Alessandria numbered thirty-two thousand men. He held the two bridges -spanning the Bormida, and the bridge-head on the right bank. On the -opposite side of the river the French forces available for battle -numbered twenty-two thousand men. In addition, Desaix's division, -if it could be recalled in time, would increase the French forces -to twenty-eight thousand. Early in the day Melas had despatched -two thousand five hundred men of his reserve cavalry on Acqui. It -will thus be seen that the opposing forces at Marengo were about -equal in strength: the Austrians numbered twenty-nine thousand five -hundred men; the French, twenty-eight thousand. But at the outset the -advantages were greatly in favor of Melas. He outnumbered Bonaparte in -both cavalry and artillery, and the plain of Marengo was especially -favorable to these arms. His forces were united; the French were -scattered. Desaix's division was marching on Novi; and the remainder of -Bonaparte's forces extended over a distance of ten miles from Marengo -to and even beyond the Scrivia. Moreover, Bonaparte was not expecting -a battle. Thus it happened that when the Austrians crossed the Bormida, -the French were surprised and outnumbered. At first Victor bore the -brunt of the fight; then he and Lannes were attacked by nearly the -whole Austrian army. By the time Bonaparte arrived on the field with -the Consular Guard, the reserve cavalry, and Monnier's division, Victor -was crushed and Lannes badly shattered. It was then too late for the -re-enforcement under Bonaparte to turn the tide of battle. That too was -soon overwhelmed. In short, Melas defeated the French forces in detail. -During that morning he was always stronger than his adversary at the -decisive points. - -In the afternoon all was changed. The Austrians were scattered; they -stretched from Marengo to San Giuliano. Moreover, they were marching -carelessly and had no expectation that Bonaparte would attack them. -Meanwhile, Desaix had returned, and Bonaparte's forces had rallied -behind the hillocks near San Giuliano. In a short time Bonaparte -overthrew the advance under Zach, then proceeding westward, gathering -momentum and strength as a result of his first success, he outnumbered -and crushed in succession the several Austrian organizations. Thus the -Austrians were defeated in detail in the afternoon as the French had -been defeated in the morning. Here again is seen the necessity of -outnumbering an enemy at the vital point of the battle-field. Courage -and heroism on the field of battle are of little avail, unless a -commander concentrates his forces and outnumbers his adversary at the -decisive point. The brain of the commanding general is the birthplace -of victory. - -In this battle the genius of Bonaparte is seen, not in the knowledge -he displayed of his adversary's doings, for Bonaparte was completely -surprised at Marengo; not in the arrangement of his forces, for that -could hardly have been worse; not in any deeds of surpassing courage, -for no one could excel the heroism of Lannes on that battle-field; but -in his complete mastery of the situation,--in the fact that, amidst -turmoil, ruin, and death, he saw just when and where and how the blow -should be struck to change disaster into victory. This was the merit of -Bonaparte at Marengo. On that field he was a great tactical captain. -While the storm of battle was at its height, and the dying and the -dead were around him, he was cool, clear-headed, and vigilant. While -disaster was staring him in the face, he saw the vulnerable spot in -the formation of his adversary's forces, and by massing troops there, -crushed and overwhelmed them. - -In this campaign Bonaparte was fortunate in having a Masséna at Genoa, -a Suchet on the Var, and a Lannes at Montebello and at Marengo. He was -fortunate, too, in having a Desaix near at hand, who dared march to -the sound of the cannon, and who counselled hope when he might have -counselled despair. - -Though these operations of Bonaparte were brilliant in strategic -manoeuvres and in far-reaching results, nevertheless they were faulty -in execution. Out of a total force of fifty-five thousand men, the -greater part of whom might have been present on the battle-field of -Marengo, only twenty-eight thousand fought there. Instead of calling -in his detachments before the engagement, and of outnumbering his -enemy on the battle-field, as had always been his plan heretofore, he -permitted himself to be outnumbered by Melas. Rather than let a single -Austrian escape, he took great chances on the battle-field. In short, -he attempted to grasp too much; and, by doing so, sacrificed a certain -amount of safety. Doubtless within his breast there was the feeling -that he would stake all and abide by the consequences. Reckless of the -sequel, he pressed on with the faith of a fatalist, little realizing -how much glory and how much gloom yet remained in store for him. It -would seem that his triumph was written in the stars; perhaps, too, his -fall was written there. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[Footnote 8: See Maps 2 and 4.] - -[Footnote 9: In his memoirs and in other places Napoleon often speaks -of "lines of operations," meaning "lines of communication." Every -advancing army must necessarily have a line of operations. If the roads -leading from an army to its base are held by the enemy, the army is -said to have lost its communications; in other words, to have lost -its line of communication with its base of operations. The point that -Napoleon intended to make in the discussion is this: Fort Bard being -at the time in possession of the Austrians, the French army had no -unobstructed line of communication back to its base of operations at -Lake Geneva; hence, if defeated, it would find great difficulty in -retreating by this route.] - -[Footnote 10: An army _forms front to a flank_ when it operates on a -front parallel to the line communicating with its base.] - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -GENERAL COMMENTS. - - -While the Army of Reserve was assembling near Lake Geneva, only a few -people at Paris knew that Bonaparte himself intended to take command of -it. In fact, a provision in the constitution of the Year VIII. did not -permit a consul to command an army in person. But, as Bonaparte himself -said, it did not prevent his being present with the army; moreover, -this constitutional provision was then regarded by the French people, -and even by the Senate and Tribunate of France, as having no binding -effect on Bonaparte. Nevertheless, the First Consul did not wish to -violate it openly, and, accordingly, adopted the subterfuge of making -General Berthier the nominal commander in chief, retaining in his own -hands the entire conduct of the campaign. To all intents and purposes, -therefore, Bonaparte was the real commander of the Army of Reserve. - -Having assembled the Army of Reserve at Lake Geneva, he was in a -position where, if the necessity should arise, he could march to the -assistance either of Moreau in Germany or of Suchet on the Var. Had -Melas succeeded in forcing the Var, Bonaparte would doubtless have -marched south along the west side of the French Alps in order to unite -the Army of Reserve with Suchet's forces for an attack against Melas. -The strategical skill of Bonaparte appears in this arrangement. Though -he expected to cross the Alps, yet up to the last moment his army was -so situated that he was prepared for any contingency that might arise. - -Though the campaign of Marengo, as planned and executed by him, was -a bold and hazardous undertaking, yet a careful analysis of the -operations shows that nearly all of them were marked by extreme -caution. It will be found, too, that his strategy was almost perfect -for accomplishing his ends. In fact one of the great merits of Napoleon -was that he knew how to produce a maximum effect with a minimum force. -The whole theatre of war was an open book to him. He saw just where -the battle should be fought in order to produce the greatest results. -Though the Austrians in this campaign numbered nearly a quarter-million -of men, and stretched from the Gulf of Genoa to the Main River, yet -Bonaparte was able, while still at Paris, to picture in his mind the -whole strategical situation, and to indicate Stokach in Germany and the -Stradella Pass in Italy, as being the two most important points within -this immense theatre of operations. These two places were the keys of -the territory occupied by the two Austrian armies. Here the greatest -results could be produced with the smallest efforts. Here, in each -case, a victory could be obtained with the least loss to the French. - -Bonaparte's caution is seen in the fact that he would not set out to -cross the Alps until Moncey's corps was well on its way towards Italy. -Before beginning the movement, he wished to be certain that he would -receive this re-enforcement, and to make sure of his communications -with Switzerland. He knew that he might be attacked in the plains of -Piedmont before he could reach Milan, and might lose his communications -by way of the Great St. Bernard Pass. If, however, Moncey succeeded in -reaching Italy, Bonaparte would then have uninterrupted communications -with the great stronghold of Switzerland. - -Again: his caution is seen in the fact that, after descending the Alps -with the Army of Reserve, he immediately took measures to concentrate -his forces, instead of crossing the Po at Chivasso and of marching -directly to the relief of Masséna. He knew that a great battle was -inevitable, yet safety was his first object. He wished to gain a -position where he could bring a strong force on to the battle-field, -and where, if defeated, he could retreat without losing his army. -In fact, throughout the campaign, he kept a watchful eye upon his -communications. It was his rear that gave him the greatest anxiety. -It is always so with the great masters of war. "While the distant -spectator," says Hamley, "imagines a general to be intent only on -striking or parrying a blow, he probably directs a hundred glances, a -hundred anxious thoughts, to the communications in his rear, for one -that he bestows on his adversary's front." Notwithstanding the fact -that Napoleon seemed always to take great chances in his military -career, and seemed often to stake everything on the fate of a single -battle, yet a careful analysis of his campaigns shows that no commander -has ever looked with more anxiety to his lines of retreat than did -this great master of war. At Austerlitz, where he allowed the enemy -to envelop his right and cut off his retreat on Vienna, and where he -was so certain of success that he issued a proclamation in advance -explaining the manoeuvre by which victory would be obtained, yet even -here he had provided for a retreat through Bohemia in case of defeat. - -This campaign was indeed a bold one; but it must be remembered that -the very boldness of Bonaparte was one of the principal causes of -his success. By descending the Alps into Italy upon the Austrian -rear, he surprised his adversary and caused him to tremble for his -communications. By this means he struck terror into the heart of Melas -even before a battle had been fought. No sooner had French troops -reached the valley of the Po than Melas was compelled to change -his whole plan of campaign. He had then to defend himself against -Bonaparte. He could no longer think of invading France. By this bold -movement Bonaparte snatched the initiative from his adversary and -compelled him to fight on the defensive. In war, the boldest course -is often the safest. "The greatest soldiers have always been the most -daring." - -From the discussion in the preceding chapter, it is evident that in -this campaign Bonaparte allowed his boldness to outrun his caution. -He attempted to grasp too much. This characteristic of Napoleon, here -exhibited for the first time in his military operations, was in after -years one of the principal causes of his fall. In his subsequent career -he fought Spain and Portugal on one side and nearly the whole of Europe -on the other. Though the greatest exemplar of concentration that the -world has ever known, yet at times he divided his forces when he should -have made peace on one side, and have concentrated on the other. In the -Russian campaign, too, he was overconfident. He was not satisfied with -ordinary victories or with ordinary results. His early successes were -so marvellous that he began to feel that he could conquer in the face -of all Europe, and in spite of the elements themselves. And yet this -very boldness, coupled with a caution that seldom failed him, was one -of the secrets of his numerous victories during so many years of war. - -The crossing of the Alps with the Army of Reserve was undoubtedly a -hazardous undertaking, yet it was so carefully planned in all its -details that it was completely successful. During the operations of -Masséna in Italy, and of Moreau in Germany, Bonaparte had displayed -marvellous energy in hastening the preparations for crossing the great -chain of the Alps. In this famous passage, nothing, however trivial, -that could contribute to the success of the operation was beneath the -attention of Bonaparte. Referring to the activity and care displayed by -the First Consul at this time, Thiers, in his "History of the Consulate -and Empire," writes as follows:-- - - "Himself toiling day and night, corresponding with Berthier, who - was organizing the divisions of infantry and cavalry; with Gassendi - and Marmont, who were organizing the artillery; with Marescot, who - was reconnoitring the whole line of the Alps; he urged every one - to exertion, with that headlong energy and ardour which sufficed - him to carry the French from the banks of the Po to the banks of - the Jordan, from the banks of the Jordan to those of the Danube - and Borysthenes. He would not leave Paris in person until the last - moment, not wishing to abandon the political government of France, - and leave the field clear to intriguers and conspirators for a longer - time than was absolutely necessary. Meanwhile, the divisions ordered - from La Vendée, from Brittany, from Paris, and from the banks of the - Rhone, traversed the widespread territory of the Republic, and the - heads of their columns were already appearing in Switzerland. The - depots of some corps were still at Dijon, besides some conscripts and - volunteers, sent thither to give credence in Europe to the opinion - that the army of Dijon was a pure fable, destined solely to alarm - Melas. Up to this moment everything had gone well; the illusion of - the Austrians was complete. The movement of the troops advancing - towards Switzerland was little noticed, because the corps were so - much dispersed, that they passed for re-enforcements sent to the - army in Germany.... To such a point had he carried his foresight - as to establish saddlers' workshops at the foot of the defile, for - the repair of the artillery harness. On this apparently trivial - matter he had already written several letters; and I mention this - circumstance for the instruction of those generals and governments - to whom the lives of men are intrusted, and who too often, through - indolence or vanity, neglect such particulars. Nothing, in fact, that - can contribute to the success of operations, or to the safety of - soldiers, is below the genius or rank of commanding officers." - -One of the secrets of Napoleon's success in war was the fact that he -bestowed great care on all military matters. Whether his operations -were simple or complex; whether his attention was called to the ration -of a single soldier, or to the subsistence of a hundred thousand men; -whether his mind was occupied with the trivial details of routine duty, -or was evolving the grandest strategic conceptions, he was the same -painstaking, orderly, careful man. "His plan," says Napier, referring -to Napoleon's projects in the war with Spain, "embraced every probable -chance of war, and even provided for the uncertain contingency of an -English army landing upon his flanks at either end of the Pyrenean -frontier. Neither his power nor his fortune nor the contempt he felt -for the military power of the Spaniards made him remiss. The conqueror -of Europe was as fearful of making false movements before an army of -peasants as if Frederick the Great had been in his front." - -In the campaign of Marengo Bonaparte displayed excellent judgment in -selecting his subordinates. However much he may have failed in this -respect in his subsequent career, certainly at this time his success -was due in great measure to the fact that he selected Masséna to -command the Army of Italy, and Moreau to command the Army of the Rhine. - -Masséna was peculiarly fitted both by birth and character to perform -the duty required of him. Born at Turbia near Nice, he was familiar -with every foot of country bordering on the Gulf of Genoa. Moreover, -he had fought in the same theatre of operations under Bonaparte in -1796-97. In action he was cool, clear-headed, obstinate, and brave. -When the battle was at its height, and the struggle fierce and -desperate, then his genius shone forth with great brilliancy. Probably -no other soldier of France could have made such an heroic struggle -at Genoa. Though he had some traits of character that stained his -reputation and dimmed his glory, he was nevertheless a great soldier, -perhaps the greatest of all those remarkable men who were afterwards -made marshals of France. His characteristics were thus set forth by -Napoleon at St. Helena:-- - - "Masséna was a man of superior talent. He generally, however, made - bad dispositions previous to a battle, and it was not until the dead - fell around him that he began to act with that judgment which he - ought to have displayed before. In the midst of the dying and the - dead, of balls sweeping away those who encircled him, then Masséna - was himself--gave his orders and made his dispositions with the - greatest _sang froid_ and judgment.... By a strange peculiarity of - temperament, he possessed the desired equilibrium only in the heat - of battle; it came to him in the midst of danger. The sound of the - guns cleared his ideas and gave him understanding, penetration, and - cheerfulness. He was endowed with extraordinary courage and firmness. - When defeated he was always ready to fight again as though he had - been the conqueror." - -Though Moreau failed to appreciate thoroughly the strategical situation -in Germany, nevertheless the First Consul showed wisdom in appointing -him to command the Army of the Rhine. Moreau was familiar with this -theatre of operations, and possessed the confidence of the soldiers -under him. Moreover, he was brave and cautious, and wonderfully cool -and collected on the battle-field. Though he failed to do all that he -might have done, yet he was generally successful, and, on the whole, -justified the confidence bestowed on him by the First Consul. - -In this connection it is worthy of remark that Desaix was ranked -by Napoleon as one of the greatest of his subordinates. Had he not -been killed at Marengo, he would undoubtedly have been made one of -Napoleon's marshals. At St. Helena Napoleon spoke of him as follows:-- - - "Of all the generals I ever had under me, Desaix and Kléber possessed - the greatest talents--especially Desaix; as Kléber only loved glory - inasmuch as it was the means of procuring him riches and pleasures, - whereas Desaix loved glory for itself, and despised everything else. - Desaix was wholly wrapped up in war and glory. To him riches and - pleasure were valueless, nor did he give them a moment's thought. He - was a little, black-looking man, about an inch shorter than I am, - always badly dressed, sometimes even ragged, and despising comfort - or convenience. When in Egypt, I made him a present of a complete - field-equipage several times, but he always lost it. Wrapt in a - cloak, Desaix threw himself under a gun, and slept as contentedly as - if he were in a palace. For him luxury had no charms. Upright and - honest in all his proceedings, he was called by the Arabs _the just - Sultan_. He was intended by nature for a great general. Kléber and - Desaix were a loss irreparable to France." - -It is worthy of remark that many of the generals that fought in the -French armies during these operations afterwards became marshals of -Napoleon. In the Army of Italy there were Masséna, Soult, and Suchet; -in the army of Reserve, Lannes, Victor, Murat, Berthier, Marmont, -and Davoust; and in the Army of the Rhine, St. Cyr, Moncey, and the -immortal Ney, "the bravest of the brave." - -The knowledge that Bonaparte displayed of his adversaries' doings in -this campaign is indeed wonderful. From reports sent him by Suchet, -Masséna, and Moreau, and from information obtained from spies, he had -not only a knowledge of the positions occupied by the Austrian armies, -but, in addition, was accurately informed as to their numbers and plans -of operations. A single example will suffice to illustrate the accuracy -of his information, and his remarkable intuition, before the beginning -of hostilities, as to the movements and plans of Melas. It will be -remembered that while still at Paris he wrote to Masséna as follows:-- - - "The enemy will debouch upon your right in the direction of Genoa, - on your centre in the direction of Savona, and probably on the two - points at once. Refuse one of the two attacks, and throw yourself - with all your forces united, upon one of the enemy's columns.... In - that broken country, if you manoeuvre well, with 30,000 men you may - give battle to 60,000; in order to carry 60,000 light-armed troops - into Liguria, Melas must have 90,000, which supposes a total army of - 120,000 men at least." - -Compare now the prediction of Bonaparte with what happened. Melas _had_ -one hundred and twenty thousand men. He advanced against Masséna in -two columns: one, numbering twenty-five thousand men, divided into two -parts, advanced on Genoa; the other, forty thousand strong, advanced on -Savona. The movements of Melas were carried out exactly as Bonaparte -had predicted. In the letter to Masséna, the Austrian plan, as well as -the numbers with which Melas was about to attack the Army of Italy, -were set forth with wonderful accuracy. When it is remembered that at -this time Bonaparte was at Paris, and that the great chain of the Alps -intervened between him and the Austrians in Italy, no one can fail to -be impressed by the foresight of Bonaparte and the accuracy of this -prediction made before the event. Wellington once said that he had been -trying all his life to find out what the other fellow was doing over -the hill. Bonaparte, at Paris, knew what Melas was doing over the hill. - -In the campaign of 1796-97 in Italy, Bonaparte had shown himself a -consummate master of tactics and of strategy. In the campaign of -Marengo he exhibited, in addition to these qualities, great organizing -power. When he returned from Egypt, civil war existed in certain -parts of France, the finances were in a deplorable state, and the -French armies had been everywhere defeated. In a few months, under -his leadership, all was changed. He crushed out the civil war, placed -the finances on a firm basis, sent re-enforcements to the Army of the -Rhine, and organized the Army of Reserve. Referring to this period, -Alison says:-- - - "The sudden resurrection of France, when Napoleon assumed the helm, - is one of the most extraordinary passages of European history.... - After the fall of the Committee of Public Safety, the triumph of - France centered in Napoleon alone; wherever he did not command - in person, the greatest reverses were experienced. In 1795 the - Republicans were defeated by Clairfait on the Rhine; in 1796 by the - Archduke Charles in Germany. In 1799 their reverses were unexampled - both in Italy and Germany; from the 9th Thermidor to the 18th - Brumaire, a period of about five years, the fortunes of the Republic - were singly sustained by the sword of Napoleon and the lustre of his - Italian campaigns. When he seized the helm in November, 1799, he - found the armies defeated and ruined; the frontier invaded both on - the sides of Italy and Germany; the arsenals empty; the soldiers in - despair, deserting their colours; the Royalists revolting against - their government; general anarchy in the interior; the treasury - empty; the energies of the Republic apparently exhausted. Instantly, - as if by enchantment, everything was changed; order reappeared out - of chaos, talent emerged from obscurity, vigour arose out of the - elements of weakness. The arsenals were filled, the veterans crowded - to their eagles, the conscripts joyfully repaired to the frontier, - La Vendée was pacified, the exchequer began to overflow. In little - more than six months after Napoleon's accession, the Austrians were - forced to seek refuge under the cannon of Ulm, Italy was regained, - unanimity and enthusiasm prevailed among the people, and the revived - energy of the nation was finally launched into a career of conquest." - -At the beginning of the campaign of Marengo, Kray's army, numbering one -hundred and twenty thousand men, occupied western Germany. The army of -Melas, one hundred and twenty thousand strong, occupied northwestern -Italy; a British corps of twelve thousand was in Minorca, and a British -fleet in the Gulf of Genoa. - -To oppose the forces of the allies, Bonaparte had three armies: the -Army of the Rhine, numbering one hundred and thirty thousand men, was -facing the Austrians in Germany; the Army of Italy, forty thousand -strong, was along the Apennines and Maritime Alps; and the Army of -Reserve, numbering forty thousand, was assembling near Lake Geneva. -It will thus be seen that the allies had two hundred and fifty-two -thousand men to oppose the two hundred and ten thousand under the First -Consul; and that they possessed the additional advantage of being -supreme on the sea. - -Such was the situation in the spring of 1800. On the 5th of April -Melas began active operations along the Apennines. On the 14th of -June the campaign ended at Marengo. In two months and ten days the -French, guided by the genius of Bonaparte, had compelled Kray to -seek safety in the fortified camp of Ulm, and had defeated Melas and -gained possession of northern Italy. These great results were due to -Bonaparte. It was he that crossed the Alps. In his brain was born the -strategy that led to victory. - -In this campaign Bonaparte calculated carefully every movement; he -left nothing to chance. Though fortune favored him in many ways, -nevertheless his success was due to his genius and to his mastery of -his profession. Strategically these operations were almost perfect, yet -they were faulty in execution. "The campaign of Marengo," says William -O'Connor Morris, "at least in design, was one of the most dazzling of -Napoleon's exploits in war. The plan of issuing from Switzerland by -a double movement in the rear of the enemy in Swabia and Italy was -perhaps equal to any formed by Hannibal; but the execution of it was -far from perfect. Moreau completely failed to cut off Kray. Napoleon -made a distinct mistake in marching into the plain of Marengo, and he -exhibited in this instance a fierce resolve to encounter his adversary -at any risk, which cost him dear on more than one occasion. The most -striking feature of this part of his career is the restoration of order -in France, her sudden and rapid rise out of misfortune, and the revival -of her military power; and though this was largely due to the energy -and resource of a great nation not often quelled by disaster, it -should perhaps be mainly ascribed to Napoleon's genius." At this time -Bonaparte was thirty years of age; he was vigorous in mind and body. -He was ambitious, and had a massive determination to succeed. He had a -will which no obstacle could daunt, a mind original, bold, profound, -quick, and penetrating. His eye pierced the depths and reached the -heights of things. With a marvellous intuition he was able at times to -foresee just what course his adversaries would take. So accurate was -his information, so profound his knowledge of military matters, that -he was often able to predict what, under certain conditions, would -happen. "He had," says Morris, "a faculty of organisation perhaps never -equalled, and a power of calculation, a force of insight and industry, -and a capacity of mastering details, which Nature has seldom bestowed -on man." Moreover, he had made a profound study of the campaigns of the -great commanders, and had read many books of history, the perusal of -which, says Lamartine, "changes theories into actions, and ideas into -men." In short, he was a consummate master of war. The fact that he -was a great organizer, a great tactician, and a great strategist, is -the real reason why he was so successful in war. Among all other great -soldiers of the world, it would be difficult to select a single one who -possessed in so marked a degree all these qualities. As an organizer, -he was not excelled by either Cæsar or Alexander; as a tactician he was -equal to Marlborough or Frederick; as a strategist, he surpassed every -soldier of ancient or of modern times. Take him all in all he was, -perhaps, the foremost soldier of the world. - - * * * * * - -Twenty-one years after this campaign, the Emperor Napoleon lay dying at -St. Helena. His thoughts were with his army. During a long delirium, -while a fierce storm was raging on the island, he was heard to say: -"mon fils ... l'armée ... Desaix." These were his last words. Perhaps, -amidst the shock of the billows and the battle-like roar of the storm, -the great captain believed himself once more with Desaix on the -tumultuous field of Marengo. - - - - -INDEX. - - - Abercromby, General, commands British corps in Minorca, 22. - - Alesia, battle of, 86. - - Alexander the Great, compared with Napoleon, 232. - - Alison, Archibald, sets forth Napoleon's organizing ability, 228, 229. - - Allies, plans of, seemed reasonable, 25; - advantages possessed by, 229. - - Alps, description of, 18; - Swiss, Tyrolese, French, and Maritime, 19; - passes of, 19. - - Apennines, description of, 19. - - Archduke Charles, ablest soldier in Austria, 23, 50; - relieved of command, 23; - opposes Napoleon in 1809, 38; - quotation from, 45; - his views sound, 50; - should have been allowed his way, 51; - had constructed an intrenched camp at Ulm, 94; - reference to, 107; - defeats the Republicans, 228. - - Arcole, battle of, 17, 76; - campaign of, 33. - - Army of Italy, struggles heroically, 18; - strength and position of, 21, 55, 79-80, 229; - line of communication of, 21; - necessity for its remaining along the Apennines, 46; - in a destitute condition, 55; - is cut in two, 63; - its active operations terminate, 72; - nothing done to improve condition of, 88; - sufferings of, 89. - - Army of Reserve, the third army, 18; - scattered throughout France, 22; - destination of, to be kept secret, 28; - caricatured 29; - concentrates, 29; - will cross the Alps, 29; - could re-enforce either Moreau or Masséna, 31, 216; - not imaginary, 74; - strong enough at vital point, 90; - crosses the Alps, 142; - passes Fort Bard, 145; - strength and position of, 229. - - Army of the Rhine, re-enforcement sent to, 18; - size of, and position of, 20, 229. - - Aulic Council, description of, 23; - reference to, 42; - errors of, 51; - ignorant of military matters, 51; - reasons for failure of, 52; - gives orders to Kray, 111; - informs Melas that Army of Reserve is a mere fiction, 148; - sends despatches to Melas, 156, 162. - - Austerlitz, battle of, 39. - - Austria, wages war against France, 15; - successful on the land, 16, 41; - assisted by England, 16; - aided by Russia, 16; - had almost reconquered Italy, 17; - spies of, gather at Dijon, 29; - directs Melas to take offensive, 41; - not aware of existence of Army of Reserve, 42; - should take the offensive in Germany, 45; - might have avoided error, 46. - - Austrians, must outnumber the French to succeed, 43; - discipline and morale of, 54. - - - Bard, fort of, 143; - is surrendered to the French, 150. - - Bassano, battle of, 76. - - Berthier, General, is sent forward, 142; - directs operations along the Po, 155; - made nominal commander in chief, 216; - became a marshal, 226. - - Bethencourt, descends the Simplon, 146; - arrives at Arona, 150. - - Black Forest, description of, 92; - mountain system of, 110. - - Blucher, opposes Napoleon in 1814, 33. - - Bochetta, pass of, 19. - - Bonaparte, First Consul, returns to France from Egypt, 15; - collects Russian prisoners, 16; - detaches Russia from alliance, 16; - his absence in Egypt, 16; - his victories in 1796-97, 17; - became First Consul, 17; - prepared for war, 17; - magic of his name, 17; - his energy, 17; - his chance of success small, 22; - had full control of military operations, 22; - his achievements in Italy and Egypt, 22; - his plans, 25; - first plan, 25; - rivalry between him and Moreau, 26; - Victory his object, 27; - wishes to dazzle the French people, 27; - second plan, 27; - will emulate Hannibal, 30; - could re-enforce Masséna or Moreau, 31; - would have had the advantage of interior lines, 32; - defeated the Austrians at Arcole and Rivoli, 33; - as the situation appeared to him, 34, 52; - could use either France or Switzerland as a base, 34; - could decide the fate of the Austrians in a single battle, 36; - could compel the Austrian Emperor to make peace, 36; - his plan difficult, 36; - his advantages in Italy, 39; - important for him to deceive Melas, 40; - could assemble his forces and decide the fate of Italy by a single - battle, 40; - important that he should take the offensive, 44; - writes to Masséna, 57, 85, 226; - must hurry across the Alps, 66; - sends Moreau instructions, 67; - advances, 67; - enters Milan, 70; - methods of, in the treatment of fortresses, 76; - might have been obliged to change his plan, 83; - his plan, 84-85; - the problem before him, 87-88; - if necessary, would sacrifice Masséna, 90; - nature was his re-enforcement, 90; - marches on to victory, 91; - submits a plan to Moreau, 95; - tried to convince Moreau, 97; - replies to General Dessoles, 97; - makes an agreement with Moreau, 98; - urges Moreau to hasten, 100; - his plan compared to that of Moreau, 117, 119, _et seq._; - makes preparations to cross Rhine, 123; - his chances of success in Germany, 134, 135; - anxiously awaits developments, 136; - leaves Paris, 136; - prepares to cross the Alps, 137; - his plan, 137, 138; - his knowledge of his adversaries' positions, 139; - is surprised, 144; - crosses the Alps, 145; - studies his maps, 145; - hurries to Fort Bard, 145; - marches on Milan, 149; - seizes crossings of the Po, 150; - delays at Milan, 150; - receives news of Masséna's surrender, 156; - arrives at Montebello and prepares for battle, 158; - advances towards Marengo, 159; - detaches Desaix, 160; - loses touch of his adversary, 161; - arrives on the battle-field of Marengo, 166; - retreats, 167; - is defeated, 167; - forms a new line of battle, 170; - forces the Austrians back to Marengo, 171; - receives surrender of Melas, 172; - his operations worthy of careful study, 176; - gained northern Italy, 177; - the plans which he might have adopted, 178; - deceived Melas, 179, 180; - is not deterred from his undertaking, 181; - his reasons for taking this course, 181, 182; - commits an error, 184, 199; - the problem before him, 184, 195; - his reasons for not marching through Switzerland, 187; - criticisms of, 190, 191; - his critical manoeuvre, 192-194; - his strong position, 195, 196, 197; - anxious for fear Melas might escape, 199; - in a state of doubt, 199; - risks too much, 200, 220; - courses that he might have taken, 201-203; - his chances of success on another field, 203; - his brilliant strategy, 204; - his reasons for advancing to Marengo, 206-208; - was surprised and deceived, 207-209, 213; - hastens the return of Desaix, 210; - defeated the Austrians in detail, 213; - his merit at Marengo, 214; - fortune favored him, 214, 215; - his operations faulty in execution, 215; - was the real commander of the Army of Reserve, 216; - was prepared for any contingency, 217; - his caution, 217-219; - his boldness, 219; - his activity and care, 221, 222; - his judgment in selecting his subordinates, 223; - his knowledge of his adversaries' doings, 226; - his brain the birthplace of victory, 230; - his success due to his genius, 230; - his characteristics, 230-232. - - Bourrienne, extract from his "Memoirs of Napoleon," 139. - - Brenner, pass of, 26. - - - Cæsar, compared with Napoleon, 232. - - Campaign of 1814, example from, 33. - - Campaign of 1796-97, example from, 33; - reference to, 47, 227. - - Carnot, minister of war, sent to Moreau's headquarters, 108. - - Castiglione, battle of, 17, 76. - - Chabran, General, commands a corps under Bonaparte, 142; - crosses the Alps, 142. - - Champeaux, General, commands cavalry brigade at Marengo, 164, 170. - - Clairfait, General, defeats the Republicans, 228. - - Col di Cadibona, pass of, 19. - - Col di Ormea, pass of, 19. - - Col di Tenda, pass of, 19. - - Comments, on the strategical situation, 30, _et seq._; - on the operations of Masséna and Melas, 72, _et seq._; - on Moreau's operations in Germany, 109, _et seq._; - on Bonaparte's operations in Italy, 173, _et seq._; - general, 216, _et seq._ - - - Danube, river, description of, 20. - - Davoust, became one of Napoleon's marshals, 226. - - Dego, battle of, 48. - - Desaix, General, arrives at the French headquarters, 159; - marches on Novi, 160; - returns and advises Bonaparte to fight, 170; - assaults Zach, 171; - is killed, 172; - marches to the sound of the cannon, 211, 214; - compared with Grouchy, 211; - how ranked by Napoleon, 225; - mentioned by Napoleon on his death-bed, 232. - - Dessoles, General, Moreau's chief of staff, 97; - gives advice to Bonaparte, 97. - - Duhesme, General, commands a corps under Bonaparte, 142; - marches on Milan, 149. - - Dumas, quotation from his life of Napoleon, 208. - - - Elsnitz, General, proceeds against Suchet, 63, 147; - drove Suchet back, 65; - is ordered to quit the Var, 70; - quits the Var, 153; - is defeated and retreats, 154; - commands reserve at Marengo, 164, 165. - - Engen, battle of, 104; - loss at, 105. - - England, wages war against France, 15; - is successful on the sea, 16; - spies of, gather at Dijon, 29; - army of, 75. - - - France, stands alone against coalition, 15; - in a deplorable state, 17; - civil war in, 17. - - Frederick the Great, might have failed, 49; - reference to, 223; - compared with Napoleon, 232. - - French, occupy a more favorable position, 43. - - Front to a flank, definition of, 193. - - - Genoa, a strongly fortified place, 56; - provisions scarce in, 58; - description of, and its fortifications, 61; - siege of, 63, _et seq._ - - Grouchy, Marshal, compared with Desaix, 211. - - - Haddick, General, occupies valley of Aosta, 146, 147; - attacks at Marengo, 163. - - Hamley, General, his remarks on the operations in Germany, 115, - 118, 121; - quotation from, 129, 195, 201, 219. - - Hannibal, Bonaparte follows in footsteps of, 27, 30, 131, 143. - - Hart, Colonel, quotation from, 197; - his remarks on the errors at Marengo, 210. - - Hohenzollern, General, advances on Bochetta Pass, 59; - is repulsed, 59. - - - Italy, might be reconquered at Vienna, 26. - - - Jomini, General, quotation from, 37, 52, 179; - his remarks on the passage of a river, 124. - - - Kaim, General, watches the passes of the Alps, 58; - holds Susa, 146, 147; - attacks at Marengo, 163; - follows General Zach, 169. - - Keith, Admiral, commands British fleet in Gulf of Genoa, 22. - - Kellerman, General, commands cavalry brigade at Marengo, 164, 170; - attacks Austrian cavalry, 171. - - Kienmayer, General, guards defiles of Black Forest, 93; - remains in Kinzig Valley, 102; - descends the Danube, 105. - - Kléber, General, how ranked by Napoleon, 225. - - Kray, Marshal, commanded Austrian army, 20; - was to remain on the defensive, 23; - was deceived, 29; - his army separated from that of Melas, 30; - must lose his communications if defeated, 35; - his army widely dispersed, 37; - gave Bonaparte an advantage, 43; - lacked military ability, 49; - commands main body in Germany, 94; - hears of Moreau's movements, 100; - re-enforces Kienmayer, 100; - moves on Loffingen and Zollhaus, 102; - appreciates his faulty position, 103; - attempts to unite his forces at Stokach, 103; - at Engen, 104; - unites his forces at Mosskirch, 105; - crosses the Danube, 106; - marches on Ulm, 107, 108; - his strength and losses, 107; - position of his troops, 110; - commits an error, 111, 112, 114; - faulty arrangement of his forces, 111-117; - outgenerals Moreau, 130; - position of his army, 229. - - - Lamartine, quotation from, 231. - - Lannes, General, commands a corps under Bonaparte, 142; - crosses the Alps, 142; - is checked at Fort Bard, 144; - passes the fort, 145; - defeats Haddick, 146; - captures Pavia, 150; - crosses the Po, 155; - fights battle of Montebello, 157; - secured the title of "Duke of Montebello," 158; - at Marengo, 164, _et seq._; - was badly shattered, 213; - became a marshal, 226. - - Lecourbe, General, commands Moreau's right wing, 93; - marches on Stokach, 103; - is victorious, 104; - delays there to await Moreau's operations, 104; - captures Memmingen, 107. - - Lincoln, Abraham, virtues of, 90. - - Lodi, battle of, 17. - - Lonato, battle of, 76. - - - Macdougall, Colonel, criticizes operations in Germany, 116. - - Mack, General, his army captured by Napoleon, 38. - - Mantua, fortress of, location of, 72. - - Marengo, campaign of, 88, 173; - plain of, 163; - battle of, 163, _et seq._; - opposing forces at, 212. - - Marescot, General, reports on the passes of the Alps, 137. - - Marlborough, Duke of, compared with Napoleon, 232. - - Marmont, General, became a marshal, 226. - - Masséna, General, takes command of Army of Italy, 18; - to remain on the defensive, 25; - had the advantage of a strong position, 42, 43; - could not have driven Melas through Italy, 48; - brings about better discipline, 55; - holds Genoa, 56; - his difficulties, 57-58; - failed to appreciate the advantages of Bonaparte's plan, 58; - in a precarious situation, 60; - was surrounded, 60; - not discouraged, 60; - his plan, 61, 64; - attacks General Ott, 62; - advances towards Nice, 62; - is again repulsed, 62; - heroic deeds of, 63; - resolves to hold Genoa at all hazards, 63; - urges the First Consul to hasten, 63; - has hope, 64; - strength of his forces, 64; - fought fiercely, 65; - is partially successful, 65; - fights on amidst famine and death, 67, 68; - would not surrender, 68, 69; - surrenders, 71, 176; - joins Suchet, 71; - firm as a rock, 72; - the problem before him, 79; - plans that he might have adopted, 82-86; - was justified in not carrying out Bonaparte's orders, 83; - received no re-enforcements, 89; - hard pressed at Genoa, 89, 184; - was doubtful of the outcome, 211; - his characteristics, 223, 224; - became a marshal, 226. - - Maurice, Colonel, his remarks on surprise and concealment, 180. - - Melas, General, commanded Austrian army in Italy, 21; - will attack the Army of Italy, 24; - deceived, 29; - was doomed to defeat, 29; - separated from Kray, 30; - could not know where to expect the French, 39; - difficult for him to drive back the French, 43; - many advantages offered him, 46; - could have held Masséna in check, 48; - lacked military ability, 50; - his plan, 56; - advances against Masséna, 58, 229; - cuts in two the Army of Italy, 59; - sends orders to Ott, 63; - hears of Bonaparte's movements, 70; - is in consternation, 70; - sends orders to Elsnitz and Ott, 70, 153, 186; - his purpose, 72; - his errors, 73-80; - assaulted again and again, 76; - his methods in treatment of fortresses, 76; - doubted existence of Army of Reserve, 77; - accomplished almost nothing, 79; - could force Masséna to capitulate, 86; - makes every effort to capture Genoa, 147; - receives notice of passage of Alps, 148; - marches on Turin, 148; - is surprised, 148; - forms a junction with Kaim's and Haddick's commands, 149; - is deceived, 151; - finally comprehends Bonaparte's plan, 152; - his plan, 152, 153; - marches on Alessandria, 153; - calls a council of war, 162; - begins battle of Marengo, 163, 164; - sends cavalry to Acqui, 165, 210, 212; - attacks French with fury, 165; - makes a great effort, 167; - defeats Bonaparte, 167; - returns to Alessandria, 168; - surrenders, 172; - was weak at all points, 174; - causes of his defeat, 174-177; - his success in Italy, 176; - had to abandon invasion of France, 185; - in doubt as to Thurreau's strength, 194; - knew he must conquer or lose all, 204, 205; - his situation unfavorable, 209; - failed to occupy Marengo, 209; - commits another error, 209; - number of his forces, 212; - outnumbered Bonaparte, 213; - defeated French in detail, 213; - position of his army, 229. - - Metz, battle of, 86. - - Millesimo, battle of, 48. - - Minorca, English corps in, 71. - - Miollis, General, defends Genoa, 62. - - Moncey, General, leads a corps into Italy, 67; - arrives at Milan, 70, 155; - became a marshal, 226. - - Mondovi, battle of, 48. - - Monnier, General, commands a division at Marengo, 166, 170. - - Mont Cenis, pass of, 19. - - Montenotte, battle of, 17, 48. - - Moreau, General, commands Army of Rhine, 18; - rivalry between Bonaparte and him, 26; - his talents, 27; - position of his army, 34; - his army strengthened, 55; - slow to begin, 66; - advances against Kray, 67; - executes vigorously his manoeuvres, 67; - defeats Kray and detaches a corps, 67; - commands reserve, 93; - objects to First Consul's plan, 95, 98; - proposes a plan of his own, 96, 97; - declares he will not serve under Bonaparte, 98; - is cautious and slow, 99; - begins his movement, 100; - crosses Rhine, 101; - is joined by Lecourbe, 102; - his plan successfully executed, 102; - at battle of Engen, 104; - marches on Mosskirch, 105; - at battle of Mosskirch, 105; - marches on Ulm, 106; - his strength and loss, 107; - orders 15,000 men into Italy, 108, 109; - was generally successful, 108; - commits errors, 117-121, 134; - his plan compared to that of Bonaparte, 122, 124, _et seq._; - his characteristics, 118, 224, 225; - discussion of his operations 125, _et seq._; - his faulty movements, 126-132; - outgeneralled by Kray, 130. - - Morris, William O'Connor, his remarks on Marengo, 230; - on Napoleon, 231. - - Mosskirch, battle of, 105, 106. - - Murat, General, commands a corps under Bonaparte, 142; - marches on Milan, 149; - crosses the Po, 156; - became a marshal, 226. - - - Napier, Colonel, remarks on Napoleon's projects, 222, 223. - - Napoleon I., his victories in 1814, 33; - his passages of the Danube, 38; - opposed to Archduke Charles, 38; - greatest captain of modern times, 38; - in the Ulm campaign, 38; - seized Austrian capital, 38; - meets Austrian and Russian armies at Austerlitz, 39; - quotation from regarding fortresses, 77; - never allowed himself to be besieged, 87; - peculiarity of his system of war, 131-135; - quotation from, 132, 201; - his remarks on the operations in Italy, 189, 190; - his wrong use of the expression, "lines of operations," 189; - on the art of war, 197; - his theory of war, 197; - his skill in strategy and war, 198; - is outnumbered at Marengo, 198; - might never have fallen, 211; - kept an eye on his communications, 218; - his boldness carried him too far, 220; - bestowed great care on military matters, 222; - his projects in Spain, 223; - his remarks on Masséna, 224; - same on Desaix and Kléber, 225; - fortunes of Republic sustained by his sword, 228; - was a great organizer, 231; - perhaps the foremost soldier of the world, 232; - the Emperor, his last words, 232. - - Nelson, Lord, dealt the French a terrible blow in the battle of the - Nile, 16. - - Ney, General, "the bravest of the brave," became a marshal, 226. - - Nile, battle of, 16. - - - Ott, General, advances on Genoa, 58; - is successful, 59; - takes command of Austrians at Genoa, 63; - attacked three sides of the city, 65; - failed to continue the struggle, 70; - is ordered to raise siege of Genoa, 70; - besieges Genoa, 147; - receives surrender of Masséna, 154, 186; - marches on Placentia, 154; - is defeated at Montebello, 158; - retreats on Alessandria, 158; - commands Austrian left at Marengo, 164; - marches on Ghilina, 169; - retreats, 171. - - O'Reilly, General, commands vanguard at Marengo, 163. - - - Paul I., Russian Emperor, felt bitter towards Austria, 15; - flattered by Bonaparte, 16. - - Po, river of, description of, 20. - - Pontebba, pass of, 26. - - Prince de Reuss, commands Kray's left wing, 94, 111. - - Prussia, army of, 75. - - - Rhine, river, description of, 20. - - Rivoli, battle of, 17, 77; - campaign of, 33. - - Roveredo, battle of, 76. - - Royalists, might support allies, 24; - sympathize with England and Austria, 42. - - - San Georgio, battle of, 60. - - Schwarzenberg, General, advances on Paris in 1814, 33. - - Simplon, pass of, 19. - - Soult, General, commands centre of Army of Italy, 56; - falls back to Genoa, 59; - commands one of Masséna's columns, 62; - became a marshal, 226. - - Starry, General, commands Kray's right, 93; - remains in valley of Murg, 102; - descends the Danube, 105. - - St. Bernard, Great, pass of, 19, 137; - Little, pass of, 19, 137. - - St. Cyr, General, commands Moreau's centre, 93; - crosses Rhine at Brisach, 100; - marches on St. Blazien, 101; - at Engen, 104; - marches on Ulm, 106; - his movement criticised, 120; - became a marshal, 226. - - Ste. Suzanne, General, commands Moreau's left wing, 93; - crosses the Rhine, 100, 101; - recrosses, 101; - marches on Ulm, 107. - - St. Gothard, pass of, 19. - - Stokach, battle of, 103, 104. - - Stradella, pass of, 138. - - Suchet, General, commands left of Army of Italy, 56; - falls back towards Nice, 59; - marches eastward from Nice, 62; - again falls back, 62; - rallies his troops, 65; - follows the Austrians, 71; - defeats Elsnitz and marches to Acqui, 153, 154; - fights along the Var, 176; - might have marched to Marengo, 211; - became a marshal, 226. - - Suwaroff, General, fights in Italy and Switzerland, 15; - retreats into valley of the Danube, 15. - - Switzerland, base of operations, 25; - separates two Austrian armies, 32; - possession of, advantageous to Bonaparte, 40. - - - Thiers, historian, quotation from, 89, 144, 145, 221. - - Thurreau, General, guards the Mont Cenis Pass, 55, 79, 80, 90; - could fall on the flank of the Austrians, 80; - crosses the Alps, 142; - attacks Kaim, 146; - is held in check, 155; - at Susa, 194, 195. - - Turenne, his remarks on mistakes in war, 201. - - Tyrol, highway of, in possession of the Austrians, 31. - - - Ulm, intrenched camp of, 94, 110. - - - Var, river of, effort for success should have been made on, 75. - - Victor, General, commands a corps under Bonaparte, 142; - marches on Milan, 149; - crosses the Po, 155; - re-enforces Lannes at Montebello, 158; - arrives at Marengo, 160; - at battle of Marengo, 164, _et seq._; - was crushed, 213; - became a marshal, 226. - - Von der Goltz, General, his remarks on writing history, 15; - his views regarding fortresses, 86-87. - - Vukassovich, General, watches the St. Gothard and Simplon passes, 147; - is defeated, and retreats to the Mincio, 150. - - - Wagner, Major, his definition of _containing force_, 32. - - Waterloo, battle of, reference to, 211. - - Wellington, Duke of, saying of, 227. - - - Zach, General, chief of staff, succeeds Melas in command at Marengo, 168; - advances against Bonaparte, 169, 171; - is taken prisoner, 171. - -[Illustration: - - Map 1. - - MAP - - TO ILLUSTRATE THE - - CAMPAIGN - OF - MARENGO] - -[Illustration: Map 2.] - -[Illustration: Map 3.] - -[Illustration: Map 4. - -BATTLE-FIELD - -OF - -MARENGO] - - -END - - - - -NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. - - -With Comments by Herbert H. Sargent, First Lieutenant Second Cavalry, -United States Army. Crown 8vo. 231 pages, with maps. $1.50. - - -Since its publication this work has received the enthusiastic praise of -Press and Public, and has taken an important, and in many respects a -unique, place in the ranks of Napoleonic contributions. - -The peculiar conciseness and lucidity of the style, and the -discriminating avoidance of technical and unessential details, have -invited the attention of a non-military public; while the preservation -of the strategic essence of the history has insured for the work a -permanent interest to the student of the art of war. The book has -been officially recognized by the United States Government,--the War -Department having purchased one hundred copies for distribution in the -service; and it has received the hearty commendation of the commander -in chief of the British army. - - -SOME COMMENTS FROM THE AMERICAN PRESS. - -_The Nation, New York._ - -The work is so clearly done, and the sketch maps so well illustrate the -successive stages of the campaign, that the general reader can follow -the story with satisfaction, and understand wherein Bonaparte was -really great. - -_The Outlook, New York._ - -So carefully and accurately written is this volume, that the _London -Times_ pays our compatriot the compliment of begging him to continue -his history through the other campaigns of Napoleon. - -_New York Herald._ - -Our author has been unusually successful in presenting his subject in -such a plain and easily comprehended fashion, that if we know nothing -about the strategy of the battle-field we follow him with increasing -curiosity and pleasure. - -_Chicago Evening Post._ - -The author's method of study is simple: to give a careful yet simple -description of a battle and then to comment upon it. Its non-technical -character and the fascination of its subject make it an acceptable -volume for popular reading. - - -SOME COMMENTS FROM THE BRITISH PRESS. - - -_The Times, London._ - -No one, whether he be civilian or soldier, can, after the perusal of -this small volume, fail to realize vividly the stupendous genius of -Napoleon Bonaparte as manifested even in the earliest years of his -service in the field.... Valuable as is this book as a treatise on -strategy, its worth in this respect is far surpassed by its value as a -life-like portrayal of Napoleon, not only the strategist and tactician, -but the general "heaven born." - - -_Army and Navy Gazette, London._ - -A volume that is well worthy to be ranked with Lord Wolseley's "Decline -and Fall of Napoleon" is "Napoleon Bonaparte's First Campaign." We -do not know where to find a firmer or better picture of the Italian -campaign than in Lieutenant Sargent's volume. - - -_Volunteer Service Gazette, London._ - -The captious critic might be disposed, on reading the titlepage, to -inveigh against a commentary on the greatest commander of modern -times by a cavalry subaltern; but the modest, unpretentious style and -thorough knowledge of the subject are more than sufficient to disarm -any such hostile reviewer. - - * * * * * - - -EXTRACTS FROM LETTERS RECEIVED BY THE AUTHOR. - - -_Lord Wolseley, Commander in Chief of British Army._ - -I have been reading Lieutenant Sargent's book on Napoleon's first -Italian campaign all the morning and was much interested. I hope it -may be studied closely by all our young officers, for it is easily -understood and tells its own story. - - -_William O'Connor Morris, author of "Napoleon: Warrior, Ruler."_ - -I hope you will let me express to you how much I admire your work on -the first campaign of Napoleon. I do not agree in all your views, but -the sketch is most able and interesting.... You beat us easily in -military history, possibly because you have lately had a great war,--at -least, within forty years. - - -_John C. Ropes, author of "The First Napoleon" and "Campaign of -Waterloo."_ - -I think your success in eliminating from your narrative all the -unimportant operations is extraordinary, and is only equalled by your -skill in showing how the various movements illustrate the principles -of strategy or their violation.... The comments, in fact, are most -instructive; and they are so carefully and clearly made that they are -easily comprehended. - - -_General Ruggles, Adjutant General, United Stales Army._ - -When I took it (the book) up to my house at night, I found it so well -written and so very interesting that I read into the small hours. - - * * * * * - - - _Sold by all booksellers, or mailed on receipt of price by_ - A.C. McCLURG & CO., Publishers, Chicago. - - - - -LAUREL-CROWNED LETTERS - - - Best Letters of Lord Chesterfield. With an Introduction by Edward - Gilpin Johnson. - - Best Letters of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu. With an Introduction by - Octave Thanet. - - Best Letters of Horace Walpole. With an Introduction by Anna B. - McMahan. - - Best Letters of Madame de Sévigné. With an Introduction by Edward - Playfair Anderson. - - Best Letters of Charles Lamb. With an Introduction by Edward Gilpin - Johnson. - - Best Letters of Percy Bysshe Shelley. With an Introduction by Shirley - C. 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Sargent - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Campaign of Marengo - With Comments - -Author: Herbert H. Sargent - -Release Date: February 5, 2020 [EBook #61320] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Coe, Graeme Mackreth and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - - -</pre> - - - - - - - - - -<p class="ph1">THE CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO</p> - -<div class="hidehand"> -<p class="center"> -<img src="images/cover.jpg" alt="cover" /> -</p></div> - - - -<p class="ph4">THE</p> - -<p class="ph2"><span class="smcap">Campaign of Marengo</span></p> - -<p class="ph3" style="margin-top: 5em;">With Comments</p> - -<p class="ph5">BY</p> - -<p class="ph3">HERBERT H. SARGENT</p> - -<p class="ph6">FIRST LIEUTENANT AND QUARTERMASTER, SECOND CAVALRY, UNITED -STATES ARMY;<br /> MEMBER OF THE MILITARY HISTORICAL -SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS;<br /> -AUTHOR OF "NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN"</p> - - - -<p class="ph5" style="margin-top: 10em;">LONDON</p> -<p class="ph4">KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRÜBNER, & CO. L<sup>TD</sup></p> -<p class="ph6">PATERNOSTER HOUSE, CHARING CROSS ROAD</p> -<p class="ph6">1897</p> - - - - -<p class="ph5" style="margin-top: 10em;"><span class="smcap">Copyrighted in Great Britain.</span></p> - - -<p class="ph5" style="margin-top: 10em;">University Press:</p> -<p class="ph6"><span class="smcap">John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U.S.A.</span></p> - - - - - -<p class="ph3" style="margin-top: 10em;">DEDICATION</p> - - -<p class="ph4"><i>BY A SOLDIER</i></p> -<p class="ph5"><i>TO</i></p> -<p class="ph4"><i>THE SOLDIERS OF HIS COUNTRY</i></p> - - - -<p class="drop">I<span class="uppercase">t</span> is written in a certain book, with which most of us are familiar, -that a day will come when there shall be no more wars. But that time -is far distant. When the laws of human society change, wars may cease, -but not till then. All around us is strife; the weak are ever falling -before the strong. The grass takes its strength from the soil and -air, and each blade struggles for food and light with its neighbor. -The beast consumes the grass, and man destroys the beast. We struggle -on, contending with one another and with the world, and encountering -defeat and death when we meet a stronger power than ourselves. Such is -Nature's stern law. It regulates the life of the worm that crawls at -our feet, governs the actions of men, and determines the destinies of -peoples. The conclusion is therefore reached that until man can rise -above this law, the time will not come when there shall be no further -need of armies, and when war shall be no more.</p> - -<p>No country has ever become great without soldiers. They lay the -foundations of nations. In the history of every great people there is a -record of battles fought and battles won. At Lexington, at Bunker Hill, -at Gettysburg, men died that a nation might live. Is it any wonder -that we should be proud of our profession? "Whoever has a heart," says -Von der Goltz, "feels it beat higher and becomes enthusiastic for the -profession of the soldier." Napier says: "War is the condition of this -world. From man to the smallest insect, all are at strife; and the -glory of arms, which cannot be obtained without the exercise of honor, -fortitude, courage, obedience, modesty, and temperance, excites the -brave man's patriotism, and is a chastening corrective for the rich -man's pride."</p> - -<p>We cannot know whether we shall be called upon to fight for our -country; we may be called, or not; but we shall deserve no less the -gratitude of our countrymen, if we remain <i>always ready</i>. Wars have -been necessary in the past; they will be necessary in the future.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 25%;"> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">"Man needs must fight</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">To make true peace his own;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">He needs must combat might with might,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Or might would rule alone."</span><br /> -</p> - -<p style="margin-TOP: 5em;">"<i>The decisive events of the world take place in the intellect.</i> It is -the mission of books that they help one to remember it."</p> - - - - -<p class="ph2">PREFACE</p> - - -<p>I have written this book for the civilian and the soldier. I cherish -the hope that it will be interesting to both.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 25%;"> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">H.H.S.</span></p> -<p> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;"><span class="smcap">Fort Wingate, New Mexico</span>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2.5em;">December 7, 1896.</span> -</p> - - - - -<p class="ph2" style="margin-top: 10em;">CONTENTS</p> - - -<table summary="toc" width="55%"> -<tr><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I.</a></td> </tr> -<tr><td colspan="2" align="right"><span class="smcap">Page</span></td></tr> -<tr><td><span class="smcap">Introduction</span></td> <td align="right"><a href="#Page_15">15</a></td></tr> -<tr><td><span class="smcap">Comments</span></td> <td align="right"><a href="#Page_30">30</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II.</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td><span class="smcap">Genoa</span></td> <td align="right"><a href="#Page_54">54</a></td></tr> -<tr><td><span class="smcap">Comments</span></td> <td align="right"><a href="#Page_72">72</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III.</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td><span class="smcap">Moreau in Germany</span></td> <td align="right"><a href="#Page_92">92</a></td></tr> -<tr><td><span class="smcap">Comments</span></td> <td align="right"><a href="#Page_109">109</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV.</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td><span class="smcap">Marengo</span></td> <td align="right"><a href="#Page_136">136</a></td></tr> -<tr><td><span class="smcap">Comments</span></td> <td align="right"><a href="#Page_173">173</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V.</a></td></tr> -<tr><td><span class="smcap">General Comments</span></td> <td align="right"><a href="#Page_216">216</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td><span class="smcap"><a href="#INDEX">Index</a></span></td> <td align="right"><a href="#Page_232">233</a></td></tr> -</table> - - - - -<p class="ph2">LIST OF MAPS</p> - -<p class="center">AT END OF VOLUME.</p> - - -<p style="margin-left: 35%;"> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;"><span class="smcap"><a href="#map1">Map 1 to illustrate Chapter I.</a></span></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;"><span class="smcap"><a href="#map2">Map 2 to illustrate Chapters II. and IV.</a></span></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;"><span class="smcap"><a href="#map3">Map 3 to illustrate Chapter III.</a></span></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;"><span class="smcap"><a href="#map4">Map 4 to illustrate Battle of Marengo.</a></span></span><br /> -</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph4">THE</p> - -<p class="ph3">CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO.</p> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I.</a></p> - - -<p class="center">INTRODUCTION.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p >After a war one ought not only to write the history of what has -taken place, but also the history of what was intended.—<span class="smcap">Von der -Goltz.</span></p></blockquote> - -<p class="drop">U<span class="uppercase">pon</span> Bonaparte's return from Egypt in October, 1799, he found England, -Austria, and the small states dependent upon them waging war against -France. The allies were united in an effort to crush the French -Republic. They were sanguine of success. Against this formidable -coalition France stood alone.</p> - -<p>Before Bonaparte's return, a Russian army, commanded by Suwaroff, had -also been fighting the French in Italy and Switzerland; but, having -been defeated by Masséna, Suwaroff had retreated with the remnants of -his army into the valley of the Danube, and thence had proceeded into -Russia. The defeat of Suwaroff had caused the Russian Emperor, Paul the -First, to believe that his army had not been properly supported by the -Austrian armies. He therefore felt angry and bitter<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> towards Austria. -As soon as Bonaparte became aware of the state of the Emperor's mind he -collected the Russian prisoners then in France, gave them new uniforms -and new arms, and sent them back to their own country. These acts and -others of a conciliatory nature pleased and flattered the Emperor Paul, -and enabled Bonaparte, soon after his return, to detach Russia from the -alliance.</p> - -<p>Of the two great powers at war with France, England had been more -active and more successful upon the sea; Austria, upon the land. In the -battle of the Nile, Nelson had dealt the French navy a terrible blow, -from the effects of which it never recovered. England was now mistress -of the sea. Having her fleets in the Mediterranean and the Gulf of -Genoa, she was prepared to assist Austria in her efforts to overthrow -the French Republic.</p> - -<p>During Bonaparte's absence in Egypt, Austria, aided by Russia, had -pushed forward her armies to the boundaries of France. One large -Austrian army<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> in western Germany was watching the crossings of the -Rhine; another in northwestern Italy was fighting the French along -the Apennines and Maritime Alps. From the theatre of operations made -memorable by Bonaparte's victories<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> in 1796-97, Austria had almost -driven the French eagles. Bonaparte's battles of Montenotte, Lodi, -Castiglione, Arcole, and Rivoli seemed to have been won in vain. -Austria had all but reconquered Italy. Except along the narrow seaboard -between the Apennines and the sea, no French soldiers were to be found -upon Italian soil.</p> - -<p>Such was the situation when, in November, 1799, Bonaparte became -First Consul of France. At this time his acts certainly indicated -a desire for peace. He wrote to the governments of England and -Austria, deploring the futility of a continuation of the conflict, -and suggesting that the war should cease. His overtures, however, -were coldly rejected. He was forced to fight. Against this powerful -coalition peace could be obtained only by victorious battle.</p> - -<p>Industriously Bonaparte prepared for war. France was in a deplorable -state. The treasury was empty; the soldiers were ill fed and ill clad; -recruits and supplies were obtained with difficulty; civil war existed -in certain parts of western France; and the armies of the Republic had -met with defeat again and again. Over the French people this condition -of affairs had cast a gloom which the magic of Bonaparte's name alone -could dispel.</p> - -<p>During the winter of 1799-1800 his energy and activity were apparent -everywhere. His proclamations aroused the spirit and patriotism of -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> French people, and gave them confidence in their government, and -hope of success under his leadership. He placed the finances upon a -firm basis, crushed out the civil war, caused arms to be manufactured, -and supplies to be collected; and from the levies that he ordered -he organized sufficient forces to strengthen materially the French -military power. Of the two French armies in the field, he sent -re-enforcements to the Army of the Rhine, gave the command of it to -General Moreau, and ordered General Masséna to take command of the Army -of Italy, which, half-starved upon the rocks of Genoa, was struggling -heroically against overwhelming odds. At this time, too, he began to -collect, drill, and organize, in different parts of France, bodies of -men who were destined to unite near Lake Geneva, and together with -other troops in France already organized, were to form a third army, to -be known as the Army of Reserve.</p> - -<p>Before entering into the details of the campaign, it is necessary to -describe the topography of the theatre of operations, to point out the -situations of the opposing forces, and to explain the plans of the -contending powers.</p> - -<p>Bordering France on the east are Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. The -Alps, covering Switzerland like a huge network, give to this country -the appearance of an immense bastion, which, extending east, separates -Germany from Italy. From Switzerland these mountains extend through<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> -and beyond the Tyrol. They separate the valley of the Danube from the -valley of the Po. In Switzerland they are known as the Swiss Alps; -in the Tyrol, as the Tyrolese Alps. On the north side of them are -the States of Swabia, Bavaria, and Upper Austria; on the south side, -Piedmont, Lombardy, and Venice.</p> - -<p>Extending south from western Switzerland to within about thirty miles -of the sea, the French Alps form part of the boundary line between -France and Italy; thence, turning east, they approach the Italian -shore, and are here known as the Maritime Alps; still farther east, -along the shores of the Gulf of Genoa, they are called the Apennines.</p> - -<p>With the exception of a few passes, this great mountain chain, almost -enclosing northern Italy, forms an insurmountable barrier to the -soldier. Even over the passes, especially across the higher ranges, -communication was, at the time of which we write, extremely dangerous. -The snow and ice, the glaciers, avalanches, frequent storms, and steep -declivities, made these mountain roads hazardous and difficult for the -passage of armies. The principal passes in the Swiss Alps are the St. -Gothard, the Simplon, and the Great St. Bernard; in the French Alps, -the Little St. Bernard, and the Mont Cenis; in the Maritime Alps, the -Col di Tenda and the Col di Ormea; and in the Apennines, the Col di -Cadibona and the Bochetta.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span></p> - -<p>Lying partly or entirely within this territory are three large rivers -and their tributaries. They have their sources in or near the great -chain of the Alps, and drain the tributary country. The Po rises in the -French Alps, and flows east through northern Italy. The Danube rises in -western Germany, and flows east through Bavaria and Austria. The Rhine -rises in Switzerland, flows north into Lake Constance, thence, forming -the outlet of the lake, flows west to Bâle, where it turns abruptly and -flows north for the rest of its course.</p> - -<p>Early in April, 1800, an Austrian army of one hundred and twenty -thousand soldiers, commanded by Marshal Kray, guarded the right bank of -the upper Rhine. The right wing extended beyond Strasburg; the left, -well up into the Alps east of Switzerland; and the centre, forming the -greater part of Kray's army, occupied the Black Forest in the angle -of the Rhine made by its change of direction at Bâle. Kray's line of -communication was along several roads down the Danube to the Austrian -capital.</p> - -<p>Facing the Austrian army, on the opposite side of the river, was the -Army of the Rhine, commanded by Moreau. Including the French forces in -Switzerland, it numbered one hundred and thirty thousand soldiers, and -extended from the St. Gothard on the right to Strasburg on the left. It -had for a base of operations the frontier for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span>tresses of France, and -Switzerland, which was occupied by the French.</p> - -<p>The Austrian army in northwestern Italy consisted of one hundred and -twenty thousand soldiers, and was commanded by General Melas. The -greater part of it was in the vicinity of Genoa and along the Apennines -and Maritime Alps. The remainder, occupying the fortresses and guarding -the entrances to the passes of the Alps, was scattered throughout -northwestern Italy. This army had its base of operations on the Mincio; -and its line of communication was by several roads down the valley of -the Po to its base, thence by two roads: one north through the Tyrol -across the Brenner Pass into the valley of the Danube; the other -northeast through Friuli across the Pontebba Pass to Vienna.</p> - -<p>Opposed to the army of Melas was the Army of Italy. It consisted of -forty thousand soldiers, of whom thirty-six thousand, commanded by -Masséna, were holding the passes of the Apennines and Maritime Alps -from Genoa to the Col di Tenda. The remainder, four thousand strong, -commanded by General Thurreau, was guarding the Mont Cenis Pass in the -French Alps. The line of communication of the Army of Italy to its base -of operations on the Rhone was by the Genoa-Nice road.</p> - -<p>A British fleet, commanded by Admiral Keith was in the Gulf of Genoa; -and a British corps<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> twelve thousand strong, commanded by General -Abercromby, was at Port Mahon in Minorca.</p> - -<p>Such were the main features of the theatre of operations, and such were -the positions and numbers of the opposing armies that were facing each -other in Germany, France, Switzerland, and Italy, at the beginning -of hostilities early in April, 1800. Against the Austrian armies, -supported by the British navy, and a British corps which might at any -time be thrown upon the coast of France, Bonaparte could not, with his -two armies, expect to make much headway. His chances of success were -small; the odds against him were too great. Unless he could increase -his own forces, a French victory was doubtful. Thus it was that early -in the winter he had seen the necessity of creating an army of reserve, -which could be sent to re-enforce Moreau in Germany or Masséna in -Italy as circumstances might require. But the Army of Reserve had not -yet been assembled. The divisions composing it were still scattered -throughout France. Their organization, however, was being rapidly -pushed forward, with the intention that early in May they should unite -near Lake Geneva and form an army of forty thousand soldiers.</p> - -<p>On the French side, Bonaparte, at the head of the French Republic, had -for the first time full control of all military operations. Hitherto, -great as had been his achievements in Italy and in Egypt, he had acted -as a subordinate,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> merely directing the operations of his own army; but -now his military genius was to have full play.</p> - -<p>On the Austrian side, the Aulic Council, consisting of twenty-one -members, directed all military operations. This council, which held -its sessions at Vienna, not only made the plans of campaign, but also -issued detailed orders to the Austrian commanders, and furnished them -information regarding Bonaparte's plans and manœuvres.</p> - -<p>At this time the ablest soldier in Austria was the Archduke Charles. -Already he had greatly distinguished himself in several campaigns. He -reasoned that, inasmuch as Austria, England, and Russia had failed to -crush the French Republic in 1799, before Bonaparte's return to France, -the allies stood little hope of success after Russia had withdrawn -from one side, and Bonaparte had been added to the other. He therefore -advised his government to accept Bonaparte's offer of peace. To the -Aulic Council he also gave valuable advice upon the military situation. -But no attention was paid to his suggestions. In fact, before the -campaign opened, the Archduke was relieved of his command in the army, -and sent into Bohemia in a kind of honorable exile.</p> - -<p>The plan of campaign adopted by the allies was that the Austrian army -under Kray in Germany should remain on the defensive, holding Moreau -in check if possible, while the Austrian army<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> under Melas in Italy -attacked the Army of Italy along the Apennines and Maritime Alps. By -this means, the allies expected that the Austrian forces in Italy, so -superior in numbers to the French, would be able with the help of the -British fleet to blockade Genoa, and to drive the Army of Italy across -the Var into southern France. This movement being accomplished, the -purpose was that Melas, supported by the British navy and Abercromby's -corps, should invade France, and attack and capture Toulon. -Furthermore, the allies hoped, by adopting this plan, to receive some -support from the Royalists in the south of France. If this operation -succeeded, it was expected that Moreau would detach a sufficient -force from the Army of the Rhine to march on Toulon for the purpose -of driving back the allies: whereupon Kray could attack the Army of -the Rhine, thus weakened, with much hope of success; that, in fact, he -could take the offensive, force the crossings of the Rhine, and invade -France.</p> - -<p>In this calculation no plans were made to attack the French forces in -the great stronghold of Switzerland. If, however, the allies succeeded -in their designs, Kray and Melas could unite their armies in France, -thus cut the communications of the French forces in Switzerland, and -smother them, as it were, between the two great Austrian armies.</p> - -<p>In view of the facts that the allies were flushed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> with their recent -victories, were superior to their adversary in numbers, and also held -the mastery of the sea, they expected great results in the coming -campaign. With so many advantages on their side, their plans seemed -both reasonable and accomplishable; but they reckoned without the -genius of Bonaparte.</p> - -<p>On the other side, Bonaparte had two plans, both of which it will be -well to examine, that the reader may grasp the breadth of Bonaparte's -intellect in originating strategic conceptions. Both plans were based -upon the fact that the great stronghold of Switzerland, extending like -a huge wedge between the Austrian army in Germany and that in Italy, -was occupied by the French. This natural fortress, almost impregnable, -could be used as a base of operations from which to attack either Kray -in Germany or Melas in Italy.</p> - -<p>The first plan conceived by Bonaparte was to leave Masséna in Italy on -the defensive to hold Melas in check, then to unite the Army of Reserve -with Moreau's army, cross the Rhine in force between Schaffhausen -and Lake Constance, and attack that part of Kray's army occupying -the Black Forest in the angle of the Rhine between Lake Constance -and Strasburg. By an attack in this direction, Bonaparte calculated -that he could defeat Kray, drive him north, sever his communications -with Vienna, and either destroy or capture his army. If successful in -this operation, he could<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> descend the Danube and seize the Emperor's -capital; then by taking possession of the Tyrol and the Carnic Alps, -he could occupy the Brenner and Pontebba passes, which operation would -sever the communications of Melas in Italy and cut him off from Vienna. -With Kray's army captured or destroyed, with the French holding the -only passes by which the Austrians in Italy could retreat, and with -Bonaparte in possession of the Austrian capital, the campaign must -end; the Austrian Emperor would be compelled to make peace. This plan -had many advantages. It would, if successful, be far-reaching in -its results; it would not only destroy Kray, but would paralyze the -operations of Melas; it would, to use Bonaparte's expressive words, -"reconquer Italy at Vienna."</p> - -<p>Though this plan promised great results it was not carried out. A -rivalry between Moreau and Bonaparte was the principal cause. The -former, being jealous of the latter, refused to serve under him. Though -the First Consul had shown his confidence in Moreau, and, by appointing -him to command the Army of the Rhine, had recognized his great military -abilities, nevertheless Moreau objected to having Bonaparte direct the -operations of the combined armies in person. In fact, he stated that he -would send in his resignation if the First Consul took command of the -Army of the Rhine. At a later day this would undoubtedly have resulted -in Moreau's losing his command;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> but at this time Bonaparte was not in -a position to force a quarrel with him. He had need of Moreau's great -military talents. Furthermore, the commander of the Army of the Rhine -had the unbounded confidence of the soldiers under him, and was at that -time the only general in France, except Masséna and Bonaparte himself, -who was able to direct successfully the operations of a large army. -Victory was Bonaparte's object. To be victorious, it was necessary to -utilize the services of every great soldier of France.</p> - -<p>Doubtless, too, in adopting another plan, Bonaparte was influenced -somewhat by the hope of gaining a great victory with the army that -he himself had created. If he could cross the Alps with the Army of -Reserve and strike a blow which would decide the fate of Italy, he -alone would reap the glory. Moreover, by following in the footsteps of -Hannibal, he would be more likely to dazzle the French people, and to -fix deeply in their minds the splendor of his achievements.</p> - -<p>Bonaparte's second plan was that Moreau should cross the Rhine and -attack Kray in such a direction as to push him back from Lake Constance -towards the north; that he should then detach a corps of twenty or -twenty-five thousand soldiers from his army and send them across -Switzerland by the St. Gothard Pass into Italy, where they were to -unite with the Army of Reserve to be led by Bonaparte in person over -the Great St. Ber<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span>nard Pass. With these forces Bonaparte purposed to -march south, cross the Po, seize the line of retreat of the Austrians, -and force them to fight a battle to recover their communications.</p> - -<p>Should he succeed in this manœuvre, a single victorious battle would -decide the fate of the Austrians in Italy; for it would sever their -communications and cut them from their base of operations. To Melas, -therefore, a defeat would mean the ruin, capture, or annihilation of -his army; to Austria it would mean the loss of Italy.</p> - -<p>The success of this plan depended upon the skill with which Bonaparte -could deceive the Austrians in Italy as to his intentions; for should -they learn of the existence of the Army of Reserve, and of Bonaparte's -intention to cross the Great St. Bernard, they could concentrate near -the Italian entrance to the pass, and overwhelm the French divisions -in detail as they issued into Italy. It was necessary, therefore, that -the strength, destination, even the existence of the Army of Reserve, -should be kept as secret as possible. To accomplish this, Bonaparte -published in the newspapers, and announced in various ways, that the -Army of Reserve was assembling at Dijon in France, and that it would -soon be sent to re-enforce the Army of Italy. At the same time he took -care to collect there only a few thousand men, consisting mostly of -conscripts and old soldiers.</p> - -<p>The wide publicity given the matter caused the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> spies of England -and Austria to gather at Dijon, but finding there only unorganized -conscripts and veterans too old for active service, they sent word to -their governments that no such army existed. Consequently the Army of -Reserve was believed to be imaginary, and was ridiculed and caricatured -throughout Europe.</p> - -<p>Both Melas and Kray were completely deceived. Feeling certain that -there were but two French armies with which to contend, they had great -hope of success. Moreover, the information received from the Aulic -Council confirmed them in this opinion. Melas, in particular, regarded -the matter as a ruse of Bonaparte, intended to divert the Austrians in -Italy from invading France. He therefore felt secure in his positions, -and pushed forward his forces with renewed energy. Feeling certain that -he had fathomed Bonaparte's stratagem, he rested in a security which -doomed him to defeat.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the divisions of the Army of Reserve were concentrating. They -were marching through France; and were rapidly assembling near Geneva, -from which place they were to be led across the Alps into Italy. This -army, so secretly organized, and so derided throughout Europe; this -army, whose very existence was doubted by the allies, was destined -to amaze the world by the brilliancy of its exploits. Bonaparte will -lead it over the Great St. Bernard Pass across the Alps, descend<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> like -an avalanche into the valley of the Po, cut the communications of -the Austrians, and defeat them in the hard-fought battle of Marengo. -He will emulate the deeds of Hannibal. He will lead forty thousand -soldiers across the highest mountains of Europe, surmount every -obstacle in his pathway, overthrow every force sent to oppose his -progress, and by a single march and a single battle reconquer northern -Italy.</p> - - -<p class="center">COMMENTS.</p> - -<p>In making war upon France the Austrian forces were obliged to advance -along both the Danube and the Po; for if they confined their operations -exclusively to the valley of the Danube, they must yield northern Italy -to the French; or if they restricted their operations wholly to the -valley of the Po, they must lose western Germany, and leave unguarded -the direct route between France and Austria. The Austrian forces -were, therefore, divided into two armies: one of which confined its -operations to the valley of the Danube; the other, to the valley of -the Po. In advancing towards France, these armies became farther and -farther separated from each other. Kray's army in western Germany and -the army of Melas in northwestern Italy were separated by Switzerland -and the great chain of the Alps. As Switzerland and the passes of -the Swiss Alps were held by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> French, there could be no direct -communication between Kray and Melas. Though the great highway of the -Tyrol, which crossed the Alps over the Brenner Pass, was in possession -of the Austrians, it was so far in rear of the Austrian armies that -re-enforcements could not be sent over it from one army to the other -without making a march of several hundred miles. In fact, the nature of -the country was such that during active operations neither army could -expect to receive any support from the other. They were independent -armies of equal strength. Each had a separate commander, and each had -its own line of operations and its own line of retreat.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the three French armies were so situated that they -could support one another. With Moreau's army on the Rhine, Masséna's -along the Apennines, and the Army of Reserve between them near Lake -Geneva, Bonaparte could move the last along the roads of eastern France -to re-enforce either of the others as circumstances might require. In -this way Bonaparte could re-enforce Masséna with the Army of Reserve, -which would increase the Army of Italy to eighty thousand combatants. -Or, should Masséna be driven back across the Var into France, Bonaparte -could leave Moreau on the defensive along the Rhine with a part of his -army, withdraw the remainder, unite it with the Army of Reserve, and -with these combined forces added to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> the remnants of Masséna's army, -destroy Melas in the south of France.</p> - -<p>Had the Austrian armies succeeded in invading France simultaneously, -Bonaparte would have detached a containing force<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> against one army, -and then have massed his remaining forces against the other. By -repeating this manœuvre, first against one army and then against -the other, he would have attempted to defeat both. In this case, the -Austrian armies would enter France from different directions; one from -the east, the other from the southeast, separated by Switzerland and -the French Alps; and since the French armies, even while falling back, -would still be between the Austrian armies, Bonaparte would, from his -central position, have the advantage of interior lines, and could -rapidly combine his forces against his adversaries in succession.</p> - -<p>How well he would have succeeded in this manœuvre can best be judged -by what he accomplished by similar manœuvres.</p> - -<p>In the Italian campaign of 1796-97, when the Austrians advanced against -Bonaparte on both sides of Lake Garda, he united his forces at the -foot of the lake; and, by throwing a strong force against one and then -against the other of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> advancing armies, defeated both in succession -before they could unite. In these manœuvres, with a total force -of forty-five thousand soldiers, he defeated seventy-two thousand -Austrians.</p> - -<p>In the campaigns of Arcole and Rivoli, the Austrians likewise -advanced with divided forces. In the former, forty thousand Frenchmen -opposed seventy thousand Austrians; in the latter, forty-four -thousand Frenchmen opposed sixty-five thousand Austrians. By skilful -combinations, similar to those just described, Bonaparte defeated the -Austrian armies in both campaigns.</p> - -<p>In 1814, when the Prussians, under Blucher, and the Austrians, under -Schwarzenberg, were advancing from different points of the French -frontier upon Paris, the results obtained by Napoleon's leaving a -retarding force before one army, and by massing his remaining forces -against the other, were still more remarkable. With a force numerically -inferior to either army opposed to him, he succeeded in winning battle -after battle. Though in the campaign of 1814 we find strategical -problems with which we are not now concerned, yet Napoleon's victories -there in the face of such odds show what he might have accomplished had -Kray and Melas crossed the French frontiers and advanced on Paris.</p> - -<p>But the combination that offered Bonaparte the greatest chance -of success yet remains to be considered. Should Masséna be able -single-handed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> to hold in check the Austrians in Italy, Bonaparte could -unite the Army of Reserve, forty thousand strong, to Moreau's army of -one hundred and thirty thousand. This junction would give Bonaparte -one hundred and seventy thousand soldiers with whom to attack the -one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians under Kray. With such a -superiority in numbers, Bonaparte would probably have annihilated the -Austrian forces in the valley of the Danube.</p> - -<p>But the mere superiority in numbers, which, by this combination, -might have been obtained in Germany, is not the only advantage which -Bonaparte could have derived from the positions of the opposing armies. -In order to understand the subject better and see, perhaps, in a -measure, the whole strategical situation as it appeared to Bonaparte -himself, it will be necessary to examine somewhat carefully the -positions of the opposing forces, and point out the advantages which -the possession of Switzerland gave to the French.</p> - -<p>Since Moreau's army was in position in France along the west bank of -the Rhine from Strasburg to Bâle, and extended into Switzerland along -the south bank of the Rhine from Bâle to Lake Constance, Bonaparte -could use either France or Switzerland as a base of operations from -which to attack the Austrians in the Black Forest. This angular base -gave to Bonaparte a great advantage. His adversary could not know -on which side to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> expect him. By making demonstrations on one side, -Bonaparte might deceive Kray as to the real point of attack; then, by -massing his forces on the other, he might surprise and overwhelm him. -Moreover, by crossing the Rhine in force between Lake Constance and -Schaffhausen, he could strike the left flank of the Austrian divisions -in the Black Forest, and might be able to defeat them in detail -before they could unite. Even should Kray succeed in concentrating -his divisions, he would be compelled to face south in order to give -battle. In this position, his line of battle being parallel to his -line of retreat, he must, if defeated, lose his communications. In -this position, defeat meant ruin to his army; for with the loss of his -communications he could not escape capture or annihilation.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, Bonaparte's line of battle would face the north, -and be perpendicular to his line of retreat. If defeated, he could -fall back and cross the Rhine with little danger of losing his -communications.</p> - -<p>By uniting the Army of Reserve to Moreau's army, and by crossing the -Rhine in force near Schaffhausen, Bonaparte could not only greatly -outnumber Kray upon the battle-field, but could force him to fight in a -position where an Austrian defeat would be fatal to the Austrian cause. -By this manœuvre Bonaparte would threaten the communications of the -enemy without exposing his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> own, and would, if victorious, decide in a -single battle the fate of the Austrians in the valley of the Danube. -He could then march rapidly upon the Austrian capital, and could seize -the Brenner and Pontebba passes, the possession of which would sever -the communications of the Austrians in the valley of the Po. Such a -manœuvre would paralyze the operations of Melas in Italy, and compel -the Austrian Emperor to sue for peace.</p> - -<p>Though this plan offered Bonaparte great results, yet in several -respects it was somewhat difficult to execute. In order to gain a -favorable position for attacking Kray in the Black Forest, Bonaparte -would have to make a flank march from Bâle to Lake Constance; and -consequently would have to expose his own flank to the attacks of -the enemy. But in this case the French flank would be protected by -the Rhine; and as Bonaparte would march rapidly, he would in all -probability succeed in crossing the river in force near Lake Constance -before his adversary should discover his plan. Nevertheless, this flank -march would be attended with considerable danger. In fact, every flank -march in the vicinity of an active enemy is dangerous; for a commander -who gains a position on the enemy's flank must necessarily expose his -own flank to the attacks of the enemy. Even when his flank is protected -by a river, he cannot cross it without taking some risks. Had Kray's -army been assembled in force near Schaffhausen,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> where it could have -attacked the French divisions in detail as they crossed the Rhine, -Bonaparte would have had much difficulty in carrying out successfully -this plan of campaign. "Of all the operations of war," says Jomini, -"there is none more hazardous and difficult than the passage of a large -river in the presence of an enemy."</p> - -<p>Had Bonaparte adopted this plan, he would undoubtedly have attempted to -deceive Kray as to the real point of attack. If we form a judgment of -what he would have done by what he afterwards did in the Ulm campaign, -we can safely assume that he would have ordered at least one division -to cross the Rhine from France, and to advance directly eastward upon -Kray's army in the Black Forest. The march of this division would have -deceived Kray, and would probably have led him to expect the entire -French army from that direction. Bonaparte could then have made his -flank march in safety, and could have crossed the river with little -danger of having his divisions defeated in detail.</p> - -<p>As a matter of fact, however, Kray had his army so widely dispersed -that he could not in any case have concentrated a sufficient force in -time to oppose successfully the progress of Bonaparte. Even had he been -able to assemble his entire army near Schaffhausen, it is doubtful -whether, in the face of such odds, he could have prevented Bonaparte -from crossing the river. Perhaps it will be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> well to substantiate this -statement by an example. In the two passages of the Danube by Napoleon -at Lobau near Vienna in 1809, the difficulties were greater and the -odds less than in the hypothetical case now before us. Furthermore, in -these operations Napoleon was opposed by that illustrious soldier, the -Archduke Charles. Surely, these facts warrant the conclusion that an -army of one hundred and seventy thousand soldiers, led by the greatest -captain of modern times, could have successfully crossed the Rhine -in spite of one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians, commanded by -Marshal Kray.</p> - -<p>That Bonaparte could have executed this plan of campaign admits of -little doubt. We have already shown why the plan was not adopted. But -it is worthy of notice that afterwards, in the Ulm campaign, along -almost identical lines, he carried out this great strategic conception -with remarkable results. It is worthy of notice that, in 1805 at Ulm in -the valley of the Danube, he captured an Austrian army, under General -Mack, by manœuvres similar to those by which in 1800 he purposed -to overwhelm Marshal Kray in the Black Forest. It is worthy of notice -that he then descended the Danube, and seized the Austrian capital, -and that this march paralyzed to a certain extent the operations of -the Archduke Charles in Italy. It is worthy of notice that this march -was the principal cause which led the Archduke Charles<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> to retreat -before Masséna; and that the Archduke's army would have been captured -or destroyed, had not Napoleon been compelled to march north from -Vienna in order to meet the Austrian and Russian armies on the field of -Austerlitz.</p> - -<p>Consider now the situation in northwestern Italy. Since the French were -holding the Apennines and Maritime Alps on the south, the French Alps -on the west, and Switzerland on the north, they were in possession -of the three sides of a rectangle, which almost enclosed Melas in -Italy. Should Bonaparte decide to take the offensive there, he could -attack the Austrians from the south, from the west, or from the north. -This situation gave him several advantages; for Melas could not know -on which side to expect the French. Bonaparte might surprise his -adversary; he might deceive him as to the real point of attack, and -then mass his forces at some unexpected point where he would have the -advantage of position.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, Melas within the rectangle had the advantage -of interior lines. He could therefore, other things being equal, -concentrate his forces more quickly upon any side than could Bonaparte. -Should he learn in time where Bonaparte would enter Italy, he could -defeat the French divisions in detail as they issued from the passes of -the Alps. But in order to take advantage of his central position, he -must be accurately informed of Bonaparte's movements. He must fathom -his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> adversary's designs; otherwise the advantage of position could -avail him nothing. Thus it is seen how the element of surprise became -such an essential factor in these operations, and how important it was -that Bonaparte should deceive the Austrians as to his real intentions. -The success of the entire plan, the fate of Italy itself, hinged on -this fact. It was the first great step towards success; it was the -entering wedge to victory. Long before the campaign opened, Bonaparte -saw clearly this fact. In the midst of untiring activity at Paris, -while momentous questions were engaging his attention, he contrived the -stratagem that deceived his adversary, and worked out the details that -led ultimately to his triumph at Marengo.</p> - -<p>Already some of the advantages which the possession of Switzerland -gave to Bonaparte have been pointed out. It will now be noticed that -he could safely assemble a large force in this almost impregnable -stronghold, and could debouch therefrom upon the rear of the Austrians -in Italy. In this way he could descend upon the Austrian communications -with little danger of losing his own with Switzerland. Even should -the army of Italy be driven back to the line of the Var, as long as -the French held this river and the French Alps on one side of the -Austrians, and Switzerland on the other, Bonaparte had the advantage of -an angular base, from either side of which he could march to attack the -Austrians in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> Italy. In fact, the possession of Switzerland, extending -east from the French frontier, gave to Bonaparte the advantage of an -angular base in his operations against either Kray in Germany or Melas -in Italy. Moreover, Switzerland offered him a secure place where he -could assemble his forces and strike either Austrian army a vital blow. -Upon these facts was based not only the plan of campaign that decided -the fate of Italy, but that grander conception which offered still -greater results.</p> - -<p>As previously stated, the Austrian plan of campaign was that Kray -should remain on the defensive in Germany, while Melas took the -offensive in Italy. There were several reasons for adopting this plan.</p> - -<p>First: Austria had in the preceding year been remarkably successful in -northern Italy. Step by step she had driven the French from the Adige -to the Apennines. Being anxious to hold what she had conquered, and -hoping to continue her success in Italy, she gave Melas one hundred -and twenty thousand soldiers, and directed him to take the offensive -against Masséna.</p> - -<p>Second: By making her principal efforts there, she could receive the -support of the British fleet in the Gulf of Genoa, and possibly that of -the British corps in Minorca.</p> - -<p>Third: The English favored this plan; for they saw in it a chance -to gain possession of Toulon,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> which was a desirable acquisition on -account of the naval establishments there.</p> - -<p>Fourth: The Royalists of southeastern France were in sympathy with -England and Austria, and might possibly aid them at the first -opportunity.</p> - -<p>Fifth: Since Austria knew that Moreau's army was large, and that the -Army of Italy was small, she believed that, by taking the defensive in -Germany and the offensive in Italy, she could hold in check the larger -army, while she overwhelmed the smaller with greatly superior numbers.</p> - -<p>Consider for a moment the situation as it must have appeared at this -time to Austria. Not aware of the existence of the Army of Reserve, -she saw only Moreau's army along the Rhine, and Masséna's along the -Apennines. Was it not reasonable to suppose that the one hundred and -twenty thousand Austrians in Germany might hold in check Moreau's army -of one hundred and thirty thousand, while the one hundred and twenty -thousand Austrians in Italy destroyed the forty thousand French under -Masséna?</p> - -<p>On the other hand, there were several reasons why this plan should not -have been adopted by the Aulic Council.</p> - -<p>With the Army of Italy in possession of the Apennines and Maritime -Alps, flanked on the right by the fortified city of Genoa, Masséna -had the advantage of a strong defensive position. Without an enormous -superiority in numbers, it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> was a difficult matter for Melas to drive -back the French. And even should he succeed in this undertaking, there -still remained the line of the Var, a strongly fortified position, -flanked on the north by the Alps and on the south by the sea; a -position which could neither be turned nor be forced, except with -greatly superior numbers and desperate fighting.</p> - -<p>To succeed offensively in Italy, the Austrians had therefore to -outnumber greatly the French. The French superiority in position -counterbalanced the Austrian superiority in numbers. The Austrian plan -allowed Bonaparte with inferior forces to hold in check for a time a -large Austrian army in Italy, and left him free to direct his remaining -forces upon the important points of the theatre of operations. By -uniting the Army of Reserve with Moreau's army, he could outnumber his -adversary in Germany; or by uniting the Army of Reserve with a corps of -Moreau's army, he could descend upon the rear of Melas, and decide in a -single battle the fate of Italy.</p> - -<p>By remaining on the defensive in Germany, Kray gave Bonaparte the -opportunity of taking the offensive there. This allowed him to make -use of the angular base of operations formed by eastern France and -northern Switzerland. Bonaparte, however, could derive no advantage -from the angular base except by taking the offensive; for should he -simply defend the line of the Rhine,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> he would be obliged to occupy -both the Swiss and French sides of the river. In other words, he would -be obliged to divide his forces, to lengthen and weaken his line, thus -giving his adversary the opportunity either to defeat the French forces -in detail, or to force a passage across the river at some weak point. -Furthermore, it was important that Bonaparte should take the offensive -for other reasons than those already given; for should he once force -the position of the Rhine and Black Forest, he would find no other -great natural obstacles in his front as he descended the Danube towards -the Austrian capital.</p> - -<p>Because the strong position of the Rhine and Black Forest is a long -distance from Austria; because the more direct route between France and -Austria is through the valley of the Danube; because no great natural -obstacles, forming strong defensive positions, lie across this route -near the Austrian capital; and because a French victory in the valley -of the Danube would probably give the French commander an opportunity -to make such dispositions as should paralyze the operations of an -Austrian army in Italy,—it follows that the main effort for supremacy -between France and Austria should take place in the valley of the -Danube. There Austria should take the offensive; there she should show -her full strength; there she should make one mighty effort to decide -her own or her adversary's fate. "It is in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> the valley of the Danube," -says the Archduke Charles, "that the blows are to be struck which are -decisive of the fate of France or Austria."</p> - -<p>Austria did exactly the reverse of what she should have done. By taking -the offensive in Italy, and by remaining on the defensive in Germany, -she gave Bonaparte the opportunity to remain on the defensive in Italy -and to take the offensive in Germany. She gave him the opportunity to -carry out a plan of campaign which offered him the greatest results,—a -plan which was perhaps, on the whole, one of the grandest strategic -projects ever conceived by the mind of man.</p> - -<p>"To invade a country," says Napoleon, "upon a double line of operations -is a faulty combination." Though the Austrian plan was that Kray should -remain on the defensive in Germany, while Melas took the offensive in -Italy, yet both armies were, under certain circumstances, expected -to invade France. Separated as they were by impassable obstacles, -Bonaparte could leave a containing force to hold one in check, while -he massed overwhelming numbers to crush the other. Thus by adopting a -double line of operations, Austria gave Bonaparte the opportunity of -bringing superior numbers against either Austrian army. As the first -principle of war is to be stronger than the enemy at the vital point, -it is always of the greatest importance that no plan of campaign be -adopted which shall, at the very start, allow the enemy to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> bring -superior numbers upon the battle-field. For the battle-field <i>is</i> the -vital point.</p> - -<p>The error of adopting a double line of operations might easily have -been avoided by Austria. Had she left fifty thousand soldiers in Italy -to hold Masséna in check, and concentrated one hundred and ninety -thousand in Germany to act on the offensive, she would have confined -her main efforts to the more important route between France and -Austria, and would have had greater chances of success.</p> - -<p>Had this plan been followed, Bonaparte could not, by any strategical -combination, have outnumbered the Austrians in Germany. Since it was -necessary that the Army of Italy should remain along the Apennines -and Maritime Alps to prevent the invasion of France on that side, the -maximum strength which Bonaparte could direct against the Austrians in -Germany was Moreau's army of one hundred and thirty thousand and the -Army of Reserve, forty thousand strong. In other words, Bonaparte could -bring only one hundred and seventy thousand Frenchmen to oppose one -hundred and ninety thousand Austrians.</p> - -<p>Furthermore, northern Italy offered Melas many advantages for a -defensive campaign. If hard pressed by Masséna, he could fall back to -the Mincio, a strong position, flanked on the right by Lake Garda and -on the left by the fortress of Mantua. If defeated in this position, -he could retire into the Tyrol, where he would directly cover<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> his -communications with the valley of the Danube. In the mountains and -defiles of the Tyrol, he could, if hard pressed, fall back to another -strong position, fight again, and thus prolong the conflict. Moreover, -Masséna could not advance eastward through Friuli towards Austria so -long as fifty thousand Austrians remained in the Tyrol; for they could -then descend upon the flank and rear of the Army of Italy, and could -sever the French communications without exposing their own to Masséna's -attacks. Of still greater importance, however, is the fact that, had -Masséna driven Melas through the Tyrol, or across the Carnic Alps, -his success would have had little or no effect upon the operations of -the one hundred and ninety thousand Austrians in the valley of the -Danube. And why? Because the route between France and Austria through -northern Italy was longer than that through the valley of the Danube. -Because the mountains of Austria on the side towards Italy offered -strong defensive positions near the Austrian capital. Because the vital -point of the theatre of operations was in western Germany, and not in -northern Italy.</p> - -<p>The proof of this will be apparent when we examine the Italian campaign -of 1796-97. Though Bonaparte fought his way through northern Italy, -and crossed the Alps into Austria, this movement had scarcely any -effect upon the operations of the Austrian army that was facing the two -French<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> armies, under Moreau and Hoche, on the Rhine in the vicinity of -the Black Forest.</p> - -<p>In this discussion it has been assumed, in order to point out some of -the advantages of a defensive campaign in northern Italy, that forty -thousand Frenchmen, commanded by Masséna, might have driven fifty -thousand Austrians, under Melas, from the Apennines to and even beyond -the Mincio. But this assumption is altogether improbable. Undoubtedly -Melas could have held in check the Army of Italy along the Apennines. -To prove this statement, consider for a moment what Bonaparte did -in the same theatre of operations in 1796. Though he defeated fifty -thousand allies with forty thousand Frenchmen, his success was due -in great measure to the faulty position of the allies. They were -greatly subdivided and separated. Their front was widely extended. At -Montenotte he broke through their long line, then defeated them in -detail at Millesimo, Dego, and Mondovi. Their faulty position was due -to the fact that the Sardinian army, based upon Turin, and the Austrian -army, based upon the Mincio, were attempting to cover their divergent -lines of communication back to their bases of operations. Moreover, as -they fell back along these divergent lines, they became farther and -farther separated from each other. The error of separating their armies -and of scattering their forces, caused by the attempt to cover directly -their communications, made it easier for Bonaparte<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> to defeat them than -if they had been united into a single army, and had adopted a single -base of operations. For Masséna to defeat fifty thousand Austrians, -based upon the Mincio, would therefore be a more difficult undertaking -than was that of Bonaparte in 1796. But to do even what Bonaparte did -in the early days of the first Italian campaign required a greater -soldier than Masséna,—a Frederick himself might have failed.</p> - -<p>To the plan of campaign that we have suggested, there was one -objection: Marshal Kray did not have sufficient military ability -to handle an army of one hundred and ninety thousand soldiers. To -direct successfully the operations of so large an army is a great -undertaking. Even to command and care for a much smaller one is no -small task. Hundreds of matters must be carefully considered. Not -only the strategical and tactical manœuvres by which the commander -concentrates his forces and wins his victories, but his communications, -his means of transportation, the supplies for his army, the equipment -and discipline of his troops, the abilities of his subordinate -commanders, the topography and resources of the country, give him the -greatest anxiety. He must give close attention to all these matters; -for the neglect of a single one may lead to disaster. He must be -brave, clear-headed, cool, cautious, and fearless; and be able to -make a quick decision in critical times. He must have an eye for -facts. He must weigh<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> correctly all reports and rumors, and out of the -doubtful information at hand sift the true from the false. He must see -everything that is going on around him. His glance must penetrate the -enemy's line, his vision sweep the whole theatre of operations.</p> - -<p>As an army increases in size, so, likewise, the difficulties of -commanding it increase. To manœuvre one hundred and ninety thousand -soldiers, so as to obtain from them a fighting power proportionate to -their numbers, requires the genius of a great captain. Neither Marshal -Kray nor General Melas was equal to the task. Though both were brave -soldiers, who had distinguished themselves in previous campaigns, -neither had great military ability. In fact, the Archduke Charles was -the only soldier in Austria capable of handling so large an army. He -had already shown himself to be a great general. His views upon war -were largely the outgrowth of his own successes. He was not wedded -to the past. He saw the errors in the system of war so persistently -advocated by the Aulic Council. He perceived the reasons for many of -Bonaparte's previous successes. He had fought Bonaparte in Italy; and -he comprehended, though somewhat dimly, Bonaparte's system of war. -Moreover, his views upon the military situation were sound. Though -he was far inferior to Bonaparte in military ability, yet, being the -ablest soldier of Austria, he should have been made com<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span>mander in chief -of the Austrian armies, and should have been allowed to conduct the -campaign in his own way. Probably he would not have succeeded against -Bonaparte; and yet, who can say what the result would have been had he -commanded one hundred and ninety thousand soldiers in the valley of -the Danube? Austria was perishing for want of a leader, yet among her -distinguished sons she saw not her ablest soldier.</p> - -<p>Why was the Archduke Charles not made commander in chief? Why did -Austria deprive herself of his services at the beginning of a great -war? It was because the Aulic Council, which decided all military -questions and directed the operations of the Austrian armies, did not -approve of the Archduke's views upon the military situation. He had -advised Austria to accept Bonaparte's offer of peace, and had pointed -out that, in case of war, the principal effort against France should -be made in the valley of the Danube. But the members of the Aulic -Council knew little about military matters; they could see no merit -in these suggestions. With a narrowness which they had many times -exhibited before, they continued to blunder on, neither willing to -take the advice of their only great soldier, nor able to comprehend -the strategical combinations which their errors allowed Bonaparte to -make. They originated faulty plans, sent unreliable information to the -Austrian armies, and exercised over Melas and Kray a fatherly control<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> -which hampered them throughout the campaign. In short, they failed -completely to appreciate the situation. "To the Aulic Council," said -Jomini in 1804, "Austria owes all her reverses since the time of Prince -Eugene of Savoy."</p> - -<p>That the Aulic Council should fail was inevitable. In war the opinion -of a trained soldier on military matters is worth more than that of -a congress of a hundred men. Whenever the members of a senate, a -council, or a congress, attempt to decide military questions, they are -sure to err; for, being absent from the theatre of operations, they -can neither see clearly the military situation, nor render decisions -with promptness in critical times. Besides, their decisions are often -halfway measures, neither one thing nor the other; like the laws passed -by a bicameral legislature, they are nearly all compromises. In war -there must be resolution, boldness, decision; to compromise is to court -defeat.</p> - -<p>In this chapter we have attempted to point out the strategical -situation as it appeared to Bonaparte at the beginning of the campaign. -In subsequent chapters we shall try to show how Bonaparte carried -out some of his strategical conceptions; and how the operations of -Masséna at Genoa, and of Moreau in the Black Forest, affected those of -Bonaparte in Italy. Before closing the discussion, it will be well to -remark that the most perfect strategy is of little value, unless it is -ex<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span>ecuted with energy and culminates in victory. The difficulty lies -not so much in the conception of great strategical projects, as in the -execution of them. Strategy is only a means to an end. It does not win -victories; but it clears the way for the winning of them, and adds to -their value. It aims to bring a stronger force upon the battle-field, -or to place an army in a position where victory will bring great -results. But the battle must decide the struggle. "Even the weakest -combatant does not lay down his arms to strategical manœuvres." -It is victory upon the battle-field which settles the disputes of -contending powers. There, amidst the clash of arms and the roar of -cannon, amidst the shouts of triumph and the cries of despair, amidst -the wounded, the dying, and the dead, victory decides the fate of -armies and of empires.</p> - - - -<div class="footnotes"><p class="ph3">FOOTNOTES:</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See <a href="#map1">Map 1.</a></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Though troops from several of the small German States -dependent upon Austria formed a part of this army, it is referred to as -an "Austrian army," because the bulk of the troops composing it were -Austrians.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Containing force. A body of troops charged with the duty -of holding in check a body (generally numerically superior) of the -enemy, while the main efforts of the army are directed against another -portion of the hostile forces.—<span class="smcap">Wagner.</span></p></div></div> - - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span></p> - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II.</a></p> - -<p class="center">GENOA.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> - - -<p class="drop">I<span class="uppercase">n</span> the fertile valley of the Po, the Austrian army, commanded by Melas, -found supplies in abundance for both men and animals. The equipment, -discipline, and morale of the Austrians were good. The successes of the -preceding year had encouraged them. They had that confidence in their -commander so necessary to secure success. Filled with the enthusiasm of -victory and looking hopefully forward to new triumphs, they were ready -and anxious to be led against the French.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the Army of Italy, extending along the Apennines -and Maritime Alps, found difficulty in obtaining supplies. Cut off -from the productive basin of the Po by the Austrians on the north, and -from the commerce of the sea by the British fleet on the south, this -army had to depend almost entirely upon such supplies as could be sent -from France over the Nice-Genoa road. The French soldiers were in a -deplorable condition. Neglected by the French government, they were -ragged, half-starved, discouraged. They had been defeated again and -again. They lacked<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> the discipline and morale so essential to success. -A few soldiers had already deserted; many were so emaciated that they -could hardly bear arms, and a number were sick with fever.</p> - -<p>On assuming command of the Army of Italy, Masséna took steps to improve -the condition of his men. With money furnished by Bonaparte he supplied -his troops with wheat, and by his energetic measures soon brought -about better discipline. In Bonaparte's name, he published a spirited -proclamation, which did much to renew the courage of his soldiers and -to inspire in them the hope of victory.</p> - -<p>Notwithstanding the efforts of Masséna, his soldiers were in a -destitute condition. Only the bare necessaries of life were furnished -them. Ammunition alone was sent them in abundance. Though the Army of -Italy numbered but forty thousand men and was opposed to one hundred -and twenty thousand Austrians, Bonaparte would not re-enforce it by a -single soldier. In fact, all the men and <i>matériel</i> collected in France -were used to strengthen Moreau's army and the Army of Reserve. The Army -of Italy was left to fight, as best it could, a force overwhelmingly -superior in numbers, <i>matériel</i>, and equipment.</p> - -<p>At the opening of the campaign, the condition of the Army of Italy was -such that but thirty-six thousand men were fit for active service. Of -this force, four thousand under Thurreau were in the Mont<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> Cenis Pass, -so that there remained but thirty-two thousand with which to hold the -Apennines and Maritime Alps from Genoa to the Col di Tenda. Masséna's -right wing, numbering eight thousand under Miollis, held the fortified -city of Genoa, which, owing to the outlying works and natural obstacles -surrounding it, was an exceedingly strong place; his centre, twelve -thousand strong, commanded by Soult, defended the Bochetta Pass, which -opens upon Genoa, and the Cadibona Pass, which opens upon Savona; his -left, consisting of twelve thousand under Suchet, occupied the Col di -Tenda, Nice, and the line of the Var.</p> - -<p>Inasmuch as the active French army directly in front of Melas numbered -only thirty-two thousand soldiers, and was spread out from Genoa to -Nice, he calculated that by directing twenty-five thousand men upon -Genoa and a column of forty thousand upon the centre of the French -line, he could hold in check the French right, while he broke through -their centre and cut the Army of Italy in two. This feat accomplished, -he expected that his left wing of twenty-five thousand, with the aid -of the British fleet, would be able to enclose, blockade, and capture -Genoa, while his right wing of forty thousand was forcing the remainder -of the Army of Italy across the Var.</p> - -<p>On the French side, the plan of campaign that offered the best results -was one that Bonaparte himself had originated. He ordered Masséna -to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> leave only small detachments at the passes of Tenda, Ormea, and -Cadibona, and to concentrate twenty-five or thirty thousand men at -Genoa. In written instructions to Masséna, the First Consul set forth -his views as follows:—</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"Take care," said he, "not to extend your line too widely. Put but -few men on the Alps, or in the defile of the Tenda, where the snow -will protect you. Leave some detachments around Nice and in the forts -in its vicinity; keep four fifths of your force in Genoa and its -neighborhood. The enemy will debouch upon your right in the direction -of Genoa, on your centre in the direction of Savona, and probably -on the two points at once. Refuse one of the two attacks, and throw -yourself with all your forces united upon one of the enemy's columns. -The nature of the ground will not allow him to avail himself of his -superiority in artillery and cavalry; he can only attack you with his -infantry, and yours is infinitely superior to his; and, favored by -the nature of the place, it may make up for the deficiency in number. -In that broken country, if you manœuvre well, with 30,000 men -you may give battle to 60,000. In order to carry 60,000 light-armed -troops into Liguria, Melas must have 90,000, which supposes a total -army of 120,000 at least. Melas possesses neither your talents -nor activity; you have no reason to fear him. If he appear in the -direction of Nice, you being at Genoa, let him come on, stir not from -your position; he will not advance far if you remain in Liguria, -ready to throw yourself upon his rear, or upon the troops left in -Piedmont."</p></blockquote> - -<p>Though this plan was excellent for holding in check the Austrians for a -time, unfortunately it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> was beyond the execution of Masséna. Provisions -were so scarce in Genoa that it would have been foolish to concentrate -nearly the whole of the Army of Italy there. To feed his army was the -difficulty that confronted Masséna. For this reason he scattered his -troops along the Apennines, and occupied the seaboard from Genoa to -Nice. In this position, his soldiers could seize the meagre supplies -that the barren country afforded, and could more easily obtain -provisions direct from France. Though it is doubtful whether Masséna -fully appreciated the advantages of Bonaparte's plan, nevertheless, -he would probably have carried it out, had he not been prevented from -doing so by a lack of provisions, and by the beginning of hostilities -much earlier than either he or Bonaparte expected.</p> - -<p>On the 5th of April, Melas, leaving thirty-five thousand Austrians -under General Kaim to occupy the fortresses of northwestern Italy and -to watch the passes of the Alps, advanced with sixty-five thousand<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> -to attack Masséna. His forces were divided into three columns: General -Ott with fifteen thousand men ascended the Trebbia and presented -himself before the defiles of the mountains which shoot off from the -main chain of the Apennines and extend along the east side of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> Genoa; -General Hohenzollern with ten thousand marched upon the Bochetta Pass -on the north side of the city; and Melas himself with forty thousand -ascended the Bormida, and attacked the forces of Soult and Suchet along -the Apennines and Maritime Alps. Confining his principal attack to the -centre of the French line, Melas succeeded, after hard fighting, in -forcing his way through the Cadibona Pass, which movement cut in two -the Army of Italy and separated Soult from Suchet. The former fell back -towards Genoa; the latter, towards Nice. In these engagements both -sides fought fiercely. Though the French had the advantage of position, -they were compelled to give way before the onslaughts of superior -numbers.</p> - -<p>At the Bochetta Pass, the attack made by General Hohenzollern was -repulsed; but on the east side of Genoa the French, numbering less than -four thousand, could not hold the defiles and crest of the Apennines -against General Ott's force of fifteen thousand. The Austrians drove -the French across the mountains, then surrounded and invested the -French forts that protected the city on that side. By this successful -attack, General Ott gained a foothold within cannon-shot of the walls -of Genoa.</p> - -<p>Thus far Melas had been successful. The first great step in his -undertaking had been accomplished. Now he could close in upon Masséna<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> -with his left wing, force him back into Genoa, and hold him there as in -a vise; while with his right, strongly re-enforced, he could advance -against Suchet, perhaps crush him or drive him across the Var into -France.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Masséna was in a precarious situation. His army was cut -in two; his communications with France were severed. In the face of -superior numbers, Suchet was being driven back towards Nice, and Soult -was withdrawing the shattered remains of his forces towards Genoa. In -front of the city and along the Italian shore, the British fleet was -actively supporting the operations of Melas. On the east side of the -city, the Austrians had gained the crests of the mountains; and at the -Bochetta Pass they were ready to make another attack, which would prove -successful. In fact, Masséna was surrounded. The allies were closing in -upon him. Already their guns could be heard at Genoa; soon they might -force him inside the walls of the city.</p> - -<p>But it was the want of provisions that gave Masséna the greatest -anxiety. Food was already scarce, and there was but little hope of -receiving any more. Though defeat and famine were staring him in the -face, yet he did not allow himself to be discouraged. He realized -that it was his duty to maintain a stubborn resistance, and to engage -actively as many of the Austrians as possible, in order that Bonaparte -could cross the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> Alps and strike the Austrian rear. By prolonging the -conflict he would gain time; and time was of the greatest importance to -the success of Bonaparte.</p> - -<p>In order to understand how Masséna attempted to carry out his purposes, -it is necessary to describe briefly the situation of Genoa and its -fortifications. The city lies at the foot of a spur of the Apennines, -on the shore of the gulf that bears its name. This spur, running -south from the main chain towards the sea, divides into two ridges -which extend to the water's edge, one along the east side, the other -along the west side of the city. Upon the crests of the ridges, which -form two sides of a triangle, having its base on the sea, a number of -forts had been constructed and were occupied by the French. Within the -triangle was the walled city of Genoa, containing about one hundred -thousand inhabitants. Thus the city had two lines of fortifications -surrounding it: one along the ridges and crests of the Apennines, the -other along the walls of the city.</p> - -<p>Masséna had but eighteen thousand soldiers to defend Genoa. But with -this force in so strongly fortified a place, he knew that he could hold -out as long as his provisions lasted. Perhaps, by vigorous fighting, he -might be able to unite with Suchet, and in this way re-establish his -communications with France.</p> - -<p>For the purpose of carrying out these views,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> Masséna resolved to -drive the Austrians from the crest of the Apennines on the east side -of the city; then, if possible, to effect a junction with Suchet by a -movement along the Genoa-Nice road. Accordingly, on the 7th of April, -at the head of a strong force, he issued from the city and vigorously -attacked General Ott. The French drove the Austrians from the crest of -the Apennines, and, after desperate fighting, seized and reoccupied the -Austrian positions.</p> - -<p>Having been successful in this attack, Masséna then made preparations -for a movement towards Nice. For this purpose, he divided his command -into two parts: he left Miollis with eight thousand men to defend -Genoa; and with the remaining ten thousand, divided into two columns, -one of which was commanded by Soult, the other by himself, he began -his westward march. At the same time, Suchet, who had been informed of -Masséna's plan, marched eastward from Nice to attack the Austrians from -that side. Both Masséna and Suchet met with fierce opposition. Neither -could make much headway against the overwhelming forces of Melas. For -several days the fighting was furious, desperate, and bloody. Though -Masséna captured several thousand Austrians, he was finally repulsed -and driven back. On the 18th of April he re-entered Genoa; and Suchet -again fell back towards the Var.</p> - -<p>Masséna was now enclosed in the city. From<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> this time dates the -beginning of the siege of Genoa,—one of the most memorable and -stubbornly contested struggles mentioned in history. In this brief -account of these operations, we shall not attempt to describe the -sufferings of the French soldiers who fought and starved and died here; -nor to dwell upon the heroic deeds of their commander,—as stubborn a -soldier and fierce a fighter as ever trod a battle-field; but rather to -point out the important facts that had a bearing upon the operations of -Bonaparte, and to show why Masséna, in the midst of a starving army and -a starving city, still continued to fight on.</p> - -<p>The Army of Italy having been cut in two, Melas gave orders that -General Ott should take command of the thirty thousand Austrians then -surrounding Genoa, and, if possible, force Masséna to capitulate; -and that General Elsnitz, with twenty-five thousand, should proceed -vigorously against Suchet, whose active force at this time numbered -but ten thousand men. Masséna himself had but fifteen thousand; but -nevertheless he had resolved to hold out to the last extremity. He sent -an aid-de-camp to the First Consul to apprise him of the situation of -the Army of Italy, and to urge him to hasten the movement of the Army -of Reserve. Realizing that the scarcity of provisions would prevent -a long resistance, Masséna took possession of all the wheat he could -find in the city. Even the grain of inferior quality,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> such as rye and -oats, was seized and made into bread. Though the quantity of bread thus -obtained was small, and the quality poor, it sufficed to keep alive the -soldiers and the poor of Genoa during the first two weeks of the siege. -But ten days passed, and the supply of bread was almost exhausted. -Moreover, its bad quality was already causing sickness. A number of -soldiers were in the hospitals; and many were so weak and emaciated -that they could hardly bear the weight of their arms.</p> - -<p>Though the outlook was gloomy to Masséna's soldiers, some hope yet -remained in his rugged soul. Perhaps a storm or adverse winds might -drive the English fleet off the Italian shore, and thus allow the -French ships to bring in provisions; perhaps Bonaparte, now that he -understood the situation, would hurry across the Alps into Italy, and -strike a blow that would cause Melas to raise the siege of Genoa and -set free Masséna's perishing army.</p> - -<p>Masséna's force, exclusive of the sick, now numbered but twelve -thousand men; part of whom were occupying the outlying works, and the -remainder, within the city, were acting as a reserve. His purpose was -to attack the Austrians, whenever they advanced towards the city, and -to exhaust them as much as possible by partial engagements. By this -means he expected to prevent Melas from sending away a force, either to -aid the Austrians<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> in front of Suchet, or to oppose the projected march -of Bonaparte across the Alps.</p> - -<p>On the 30th of April General Ott, supported by English gun-boats in -the Gulf of Genoa, made simultaneous attacks on the east, north, and -west sides of the city. In these attacks, he met with considerable -success. On all three sides the Austrian columns advanced and occupied -more favorable positions. In fact, they gained the crests of several -mountain ridges within cannon-shot of the city, and succeeded in -capturing several French forts.</p> - -<p>Masséna fought fiercely. Throwing his reserve first on one side of the -city and then on the other, in order to re-enforce his troops occupying -the outlying works, he finally forced back the Austrians from their -commanding positions and recovered the lost forts. The success of -Masséna at this time was discouraging to General Ott; for he knew that -he could not lay close siege to the place until his troops gained the -crests of the Apennines and invested, or captured, the outlying works.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the twenty-five thousand Austrians under Elsnitz had, by -vigorous fighting, driven Suchet from position to position. They had -even forced him to abandon Nice, and to fall back on the Var. On -this river, which had been strongly fortified, Suchet rallied his -scattered forces. Having received from the departments of southern -France a considerable re-enforcement, which in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span>creased his total -strength to fourteen thousand men, he was able, in this position, to -make a successful stand, and to stop the onward rush of the victorious -Austrians.</p> - -<p>As soon as Bonaparte learned of the hopeless condition of affairs at -Genoa, he saw the necessity of hurrying across the Alps with the Army -of Reserve. But since the successful execution of his plan depended -upon his receiving a large re-enforcement from the Army of the Rhine, -and since Moreau could not safely detach this force till he had -defeated Kray and pushed him back from Lake Constance, Bonaparte was -compelled to delay his own movement. Moreau was slow to begin; and -his lingering inactivity gave Bonaparte intense anxiety, for it not -only paralyzed the operations of the Army of Reserve, but prolonged -the sufferings of the Army of Italy. Repeatedly Bonaparte urged Moreau -to cross the Rhine and attack Kray. "Hasten," said the First Consul, -"hasten by your success to accelerate the arrival of the moment at -which Masséna can be disengaged. That general wants provisions. For -fifteen days he has been enduring with his debilitated soldiers a -struggle of despair. Your patriotism is addressed, your self-interest; -for if Masséna shall be compelled to capitulate, it will be necessary -to take from you a part of your forces, for the purpose of hurrying -down the Rhone, in order to assist the departments of the south."</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span></p> - -<p>Finally, on the 25th of April, Moreau began his advance against Kray. -It is not the intention at this time to describe in detail these -operations. At present it is sufficient to say that Moreau executed -vigorously his part in Bonaparte's great plan. Having defeated Kray -in two battles, he detached, on the 11th of May, a corps of fifteen -thousand men from his army, gave the command of it to General Moncey, -and ordered him to march by way of the St. Gothard into Italy.</p> - -<p>The time had come for Bonaparte to move forward the Army of Reserve. -Accordingly, on the 15th of May, he began his advance by way of the -Great St. Bernard into Italy. While this army of forty thousand and -this corps of fifteen thousand are marching hopefully forward across -the Alps, from France and Germany respectively, let us again turn our -attention to Masséna, who, amidst famine and death, is desperately -fighting on.</p> - -<p>On the 5th of May a small vessel, containing grain sufficient to last -the besieged garrison for five days, ran the blockade and entered -Genoa. Masséna felt encouraged, and shortly afterwards made a sortie -on the east side of the city. Though he drove the Austrians from their -positions, this assault was the last of his successes. On the 13th of -May he attempted another assault, but was badly defeated. Henceforth -his soldiers were so weak that they lacked the strength to undertake -any movement beyond the walls of Genoa. In fact,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> many, not being -able to bear the weight of their arms, were compelled to sit down -while doing guard duty. Consequently, Masséna was obliged to limit his -efforts to the defence of the city, and to the task of providing food -for his men.</p> - -<p>By the 20th of May the bread and meat were exhausted; even the horses -had all been consumed. All the linseed, starch, and cacao found in the -city were then collected and made into a kind of bread, which was all -but indigestible. This wretched and repulsive food, and a soup made of -herbs were all that remained to sustain life. Nevertheless, Masséna -would not capitulate. Stubborn and courageous to the last, he seemed -bent on defying even starvation and death. Possibly Bonaparte might yet -come; for word had been brought that he had crossed the Alps. It was -reported that, on the 20th of May, his army had been seen descending -the Great St. Bernard into Italy. If so, why did he not come? It was -now the 30th of May, and not another word had been heard of him. Could -he have met with defeat? Could he, whose movements were usually so -rapid, whose blows were so terrible and unexpected—could he have been -ten days in Italy, and not yet have struck the blow that was to shatter -the Austrian rear and bring relief to Masséna's perishing soldiers?</p> - -<p>With intense anxiety these despairing men looked for the coming of -Bonaparte. But he came<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> not. Already discouraged, they now lost all -hope. A few went so far as to destroy their arms. Some plotted; others -talked wildly of the sufferings and horrors that they were called upon -to endure. All urged Masséna to surrender; but he would not yield. He -begged his soldiers to hold out a little longer. He told them that the -First Consul was advancing to their relief; that if they capitulated -now, they would lose the results of all their heroism, all their -sufferings. "Yet a few days," said he, "nay, a few hours, and you will -be delivered."</p> - -<p>Thus, for a brief time, Masséna succeeded in raising the hopes of his -soldiers. Again they looked expectantly towards the Apennines. Never -was anxiety more intense. In every sound, in every echo, in every flash -of light along the northern horizon, they thought that they saw signs -of the coming of Bonaparte. But they were mistaken. Despair seized -them; no hope remained. Even Masséna saw that the end had come; for -the last ounce of that wretched food composed of linseed, starch, and -cacao, had been consumed. It was now absolutely necessary to surrender. -Yet Masséna's inflexible nature would not wholly yield. He declared -that he would never capitulate, unless his soldiers should be allowed -to march out with the honors of war, and with the liberty to fight -again when beyond the enemy's line. And he kept his resolution. The -Austrians were compelled to accept these terms.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span></p> - -<p>That the reader may understand why General Ott did not continue the -struggle a few days longer, and thus force Masséna to surrender -unconditionally, let us consider for a moment the situation at this -time in the valley of the Po.</p> - -<p>On the 2d of June, two days before Masséna capitulated, Bonaparte -entered Milan, and there awaited Moncey's corps, which did not arrive -till the 6th of June.</p> - -<p>On the 29th of May Melas learned that Bonaparte was advancing on -Milan. On the 31st he learned that Moreau had defeated Kray, and that -Moncey's corps was marching by way of the St. Gothard into Italy. -At once he comprehended the vast plan of the First Consul. Melas -was in consternation; he had been surprised. To him the Army of -Reserve was no longer imaginary; it was a reality. Moreover, it was -rapidly approaching a favorable position from which it could strike -a formidable blow at the Austrian communications. Melas saw the -necessity of concentrating immediately his scattered forces. He must, -if possible, break through the French Army before it closed in upon -him. Accordingly, on the 31st of May, he sent orders to General Elsnitz -to quit the Var and march on Alessandria; and instructed General Ott to -raise the siege of Genoa and hasten north in order to defend the line -of the Po.</p> - -<p>General Ott received this order on the 2d of June, during the -negotiations for the capitulation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> of Genoa. He realized that he must -either raise at once the siege of the city or else accept Masséna's -terms.</p> - -<p>On the 4th of June Masséna surrendered. On the 5th his active force, -numbering eight thousand men, set out over the Genoa-Nice road to -join Suchet, who at this time was following closely upon the rear of -the Austrians in his front, as they withdrew towards Alessandria. In -addition to his active force, Masséna surrendered four thousand sick -soldiers at Genoa; but it was stipulated that they should be cared for, -and upon their recovery should be sent back to join the French army. -Having made these arrangements, Masséna himself proceeded by sea to -join Suchet.</p> - -<p>During these operations the English fleet in the Gulf of Genoa actively -supported the Austrians; but the English corps in Minorca remained -inactive. No effort was made to land it either at Genoa or at any other -point along the Italian or French coast.</p> - -<p>During these engagements the fighting on both sides was desperate, the -loss heavy. In prisoners, killed, and wounded, the Austrians lost about -twenty thousand; the French, about fourteen thousand. But the loss of -the latter was in reality much greater; for out of Masséna's active -force of eight thousand that had marched out of Genoa to join Suchet, -probably six thousand were unfit for arduous service. The total number, -therefore,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> on the French side put <i>hors de combat</i>, for the time -being, may be reckoned at about twenty thousand men.</p> - -<p>The active operations of the Army of Italy were ended. They had begun -on the 5th of April, and had terminated on the 4th of June. For two -months Masséna had shown himself firm as a rock,—had gloriously -performed his part in Bonaparte's great plan.</p> - - -<p class="center">COMMENTS.</p> - -<p>At the outset the Austrian forces were greatly scattered. A few -thousand were in Tuscany and in the Papal States; an Austrian garrison -was occupying the fortress of Mantua, which is situated on the Mincio -about twenty miles south of Lake Garda; twenty-five thousand were -moving forward in two columns to attack Genoa; forty thousand were -being directed on the Apennines and Maritime Alps; and thirty-five -thousand were occupying the fortresses of northwestern Italy, and -guarding the Italian entrances to the passes of the Alps.</p> - -<p>The purpose of Melas was to push forward across the Apennines and -Maritime Alps, force the line of the Var, and invade France. How best -to accomplish this project was the problem before him. Having an army -of one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers and being opposed to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> but -forty thousand, he believed that his force was sufficiently large to -undertake the invasion of France. Since the French line directly in -his front extended along the mountains from Genoa to the Col di Tenda, -Melas could easily overwhelm the French centre and cut the Army of -Italy in two; then, by leaving a sufficient force to surround Genoa, he -could push forward vigorously to the Var with the bulk of his forces, -and perhaps carry the position there before the French had time to make -the necessary dispositions for defending it. Had he adopted this plan, -and made arrangements with Admiral Keith and General Abercromby to have -the English corps in Minorca landed at the same time on the coast of -Italy or France, he would doubtless have been successful.</p> - -<p>He was not successful because he did not thoroughly appreciate the -situation. He did not know how to handle his army. He scattered his -forces, and thus dissipated his strength. He spent too much energy at -Genoa, and not enough along the Var. His rear guard, which consisted of -the thirty-five thousand soldiers under General Kaim in Piedmont, and -of twenty thousand scattered throughout Italy, was unnecessarily large, -and yet was so divided, subdivided, and dispersed that it was weak at -all points. In short, Melas committed many errors.</p> - -<p>First: In advancing against Genoa with twenty-five thousand men, -divided into two columns, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> against the centre of the French line -with a third column of forty thousand, Melas gave to Masséna the -opportunity of holding in check with small forces two of the columns, -while he concentrated his remaining forces against the third. In fact, -this was exactly what Masséna did. He left eight thousand soldiers in -and around Genoa to hold the place, then united the rest of his troops -near Savona to attack Melas. When it is remembered that these three -Austrian columns of attack were separated by impassable obstacles, and -could not support one another, the errors of Melas become apparent -to every soldier. That, in spite of such errors, he was successful -in cutting the Army of Italy in two and in gaining the crest of the -mountains on the east side of Genoa was due to his great superiority in -numbers. His attacking force numbered sixty-five thousand men, while -Masséna had but thirty-two thousand.</p> - -<p>In this connection it is worthy of notice that numbers alone can -neutralize and finally overcome any advantage of position or of -generalship. Thus mediocrity may triumph over genius. Even a Napoleon -cannot conquer in the face of odds sufficiently great. At Leipsic -one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers, commanded by him, were -defeated by two hundred and ninety thousand allies. In the Waterloo -campaign, which, from a strategical point of view, is a masterpiece in -generalship, his army of one hundred and twenty-five<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> thousand men was -crushed and overwhelmed by the armies of England and Prussia, numbering -two hundred and eighteen thousand soldiers. Hence follows the first -principle of war: <i>Be as strong as possible at the vital point</i>.</p> - -<p>Second: A victory on the Var was of much greater importance to Melas -than was the capitulation of Genoa; for should this river be once -forced, there would be no further obstacle to the invasion of France; -and, besides, a successful attack on Suchet would hopelessly deprive -Masséna of all support, and would in time force him to surrender. -In truth, the great effort for success should have been made on the -Var. But Melas failed to appreciate this fact. After he had separated -Masséna from Suchet by forcing the centre of the French line, he -directed his greatest efforts to the capture of Genoa. For this purpose -the troops surrounding the place were increased to thirty thousand men, -and were kept at or about this strength till Masséna surrendered; while -on the Var the Austrian forces actively engaged during these operations -numbered but twenty-five thousand. Since, at the outset, Masséna had -only eighteen thousand combatants at Genoa, and since this number was -rapidly reduced from day to day by casualties and sickness, it is -evident that Melas could have surrounded the place and have maintained -the siege there with less than thirty thousand soldiers. The increase -of his troops beyond<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> the number necessary to hold securely the place -was injudicious; for the surplus could have been used with greater -effect on the Var. Moreover, the surplus did not hasten the surrender -of Masséna; for he was able to hold out against thirty thousand till -his provisions were exhausted. Against ten thousand less he could -have held out no longer. Again and again Melas assaulted the works -surrounding the city, but his efforts were, to a great extent, a waste -of energy; for they resulted in a greater loss to the Austrians than to -the French, and had little or no effect in hastening the surrender of -Masséna.</p> - -<p>In the treatment of fortresses, it is worth while to compare the -methods of Bonaparte with those of Melas. In the Italian campaign of -1796-97, the strong fortresses which were held by the allies, and which -were on the direct line of Bonaparte's operations, did not stop his -progress for a moment. Though from a lack of siege artillery, he could -not completely invest them, he pushed forward past them to decide, if -possible, their fate upon the open battle-field. In that campaign he -invested the fortress of Mantua, containing twelve thousand combatants, -with ten thousand men; and though the besieged were finally increased -to twenty thousand soldiers, he continued with ten thousand or less -to hold them in check for seven months, while he won the battles of -Lonato, Castiglione, Roveredo, Bassano, San Georgio, Arcole,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> and -Rivoli. "It is upon the open field of battle," said Napoleon, "that the -fate of fortresses and empires is decided."</p> - -<p>Third: The Austrian rear guard was unnecessarily large. It consisted -of fifty-five thousand soldiers. At present it is not the purpose to -point out in detail the errors that Melas committed by leaving so large -a force inactive in Italy, but rather to show that this force was -larger than necessary, and that the surplus troops composing it could -have been used to much greater advantage along the Var. The necessity -for a strong rear guard in northwestern Italy becomes apparent when -it is remembered that Thurreau was occupying the Mont Cenis Pass with -four thousand men, and might at any time attempt to issue therefrom -upon the flank and rear of Melas as he advanced towards the Var. -Inasmuch as Thurreau's detachment occupied a favorable position from -which to attack the Austrians, it was necessary, perhaps, that Melas -should leave ten or twelve thousand men to hold this force in check. -There was, too, some likelihood that French troops might issue into -Italy from Switzerland by the St. Gothard Pass or the Simplon; a few -thousand troops were therefore needed in that vicinity to give warning -in case the French attempted to enter Italy from that direction. At -this time Melas doubted the existence of the Army of Reserve; but, had -he believed it to be a reality, doubtless he would not have ex<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span>pected -Bonaparte to cross the Great St. Bernard. And even had he expected -him from that direction, perhaps no better arrangement of his rear -guard could have been made than to leave five thousand men before the -St. Gothard, five thousand before the Great St. Bernard, and twenty -thousand near Turin with their left flank well extended towards the -Mont Cenis Pass. In this central position the rear guard could march -rapidly to attack the French, should they enter Italy by any one of -these passes, and could hold them in check till a larger Austrian force -could be concentrated. Had Melas known that Bonaparte expected to cross -the Alps with the Army of Reserve, no better method could have been -devised to prevent the projected march of Bonaparte than to force the -Var and invade France. This undertaking being accomplished, there would -be no further danger of Bonaparte's crossing the Alps; for he must then -fight on the west side of the mountains to save France from invasion. -The surest way to protect the Austrian rear was to force the Var. Every -spare man should have been directed there. Twenty thousand could have -held Genoa; thirty thousand would have sufficed for a rear guard; and -of the remaining seventy thousand, probably fifty or sixty thousand -could have united in an attack upon Suchet.</p> - -<p>Fourth: Had the English corps of twelve thousand men been thrown upon -the coast of France<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> just in rear of Suchet, while sixty thousand -Austrians were attacking him in front, who can doubt what the result -would have been? Suchet had but fourteen thousand men; and against such -overwhelming odds he would have been compelled to yield.</p> - -<p>With a large and brave army, capable of doing great things, if it had -been properly led, Melas so scattered it and dissipated his strength -that he virtually accomplished nothing. Though he commanded one hundred -and twenty thousand men, he brought but twenty-five thousand upon the -vital point. In short, he committed blunder upon blunder, and finally -failed in his undertaking.</p> - -<p>The problem before Masséna was to hold in check the Austrians in Italy -until Bonaparte could perfect his arrangements, cross the Alps, and -strike the Austrian rear. Masséna could not expect to do more than -this; for he could not take the offensive single-handed against an -Austrian army three times the size of his own. Moreover, he was in -possession of the strong defensive positions of Genoa, of the Apennines -and Maritime Alps, and of the line of the Var, where inferior numbers -could make a vigorous resistance against greatly superior forces. -Masséna could not know how soon Bonaparte would cross the Alps. His -object, therefore, was so to arrange his troops as to enable them to -hold out as long as possible.</p> - -<p>At the outset of the campaign the Army of Italy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> was stationed as -follows: eight thousand were at Genoa; twelve thousand, in the vicinity -of Savona; twelve thousand, at the Tenda Pass, at Nice, and along -the Var; and four thousand, in the Mont Cenis Pass. By examining the -several positions on the map, it will be seen that the French forces -were greatly scattered. Thirty-two thousand, under the direct command -of Masséna, were defending the line of the Apennines and Maritime Alps -from Genoa to the Col di Tenda, a distance of about seventy-five miles; -and four thousand, under Thurreau, were holding the Mont Cenis Pass, -which lies in the French Alps about one hundred and twenty miles north -of Nice.</p> - -<p>Inasmuch as the direct road from Italy into France crossed the Alps -over this pass, it was necessary to leave Thurreau's detachment there. -Otherwise an Austrian corps of several thousand could have crossed the -Alps at this point, thence have marched south along the west side of -the mountains, and have attacked the French on the Var in rear, while -Melas with his main forces was advancing across the Apennines to attack -them in front. Moreover, in this favorable position, Thurreau, unless -strongly opposed, could descend the Alps and fall upon the flank and -rear of the Austrians as they advanced towards Nice. It was necessary, -therefore, for Melas to leave ten or twelve thousand soldiers of the -Austrian rear guard near the Italian entrance to the Mont Cenis Pass<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> -in order to hold Thurreau in check. Thus, though this French detachment -could take no active part in the engagements along the Apennines and -Maritime Alps, its four thousand men did good service in the struggle -by rendering nugatory the fighting power of a much larger Austrian -force.</p> - -<p>Since the French along the Apennines and Maritime Alps occupied a front -of about seventy-five miles in extent, they could not concentrate -rapidly. Consequently, Melas could throw a strong force against some -point of their long line with great hope of success. In fact, by -attacking the centre of their line with superior numbers, he could cut -the Army of Italy in two. Having in this way separated Masséna from -Suchet, Melas could concentrate an overwhelming force against each in -succession, and thus defeat them separately. Moreover, this movement -would cut the communications of Masséna with France, and compel him to -seek safety in Genoa, where the opposition of superior numbers and the -scarcity of provisions must eventually force him to surrender.</p> - -<p>Strategically, therefore, the situation of the Army of Italy was -faulty; yet it must be remembered that the lack of provisions was the -principal cause that led Masséna to adopt this plan. In order better -to subsist his troops, he had scattered them. But was there no other -course that offered him greater advantages? A discussion of the subject -should throw light on this question.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span></p> - -<p>First: He might have left detachments to hold the Cadibona and Ormea -passes, and have concentrated the bulk of his army in rear of the Tenda -Pass in the vicinity of Nice. Had he adopted this course, his troops -would have been united, and could have drawn their provisions direct -from France. But no other advantages would have resulted. With the -French in this position, Melas could have attacked the passes of the -Apennines in force, and have gained possession of the Genoa-Nice road; -which operation would have compelled Masséna to fall back on the Var. -There he might have been able to make a successful stand for a time. -But should the Austrians once force this position, there would be no -further obstacle to the invasion of France. To adopt this plan would -undoubtedly have been a mistake; for it involved the abandonment of -Genoa, which was so strong, both naturally and artificially, that a -small force could hold it for a long time against superior numbers. -Moreover, in a defensive campaign, when the odds are greatly in favor -of the attacking army, and when the object is to gain time, advantage -should be taken of every strong position.</p> - -<p>Second: Masséna might have left small detachments to hold the passes -of the Apennines and Maritime Alps, and have concentrated the rest -of his army at Genoa. Indeed this was the plan that Bonaparte had -ordered Masséna to carry out; but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> it presented great difficulties. -Provisions were scarce at Genoa. Had Masséna increased his strength -there to thirty thousand soldiers, starvation and disease would sooner -have done their deadly work. Moreover, the greater fighting power thus -obtained would have availed him nothing; for with half the number he -in fact held the city till the food was exhausted. Had Masséna adopted -this course, undoubtedly he must have surrendered at least three weeks -earlier. In that case, the Austrians would have crossed the Var into -France, and Bonaparte would have abandoned his march into Italy. In -that case, the decisive struggle between Melas and Bonaparte would -doubtless have taken place in the valley of the Rhone instead of in -the valley of the Po. Indeed, it is not improbable to assume that, -had Masséna attempted to carry out either one of the plans mentioned, -Bonaparte would have been obliged to change the entire conduct of the -campaign. In war small matters often determine great events.</p> - -<p>Under the circumstances then existing, Masséna was justified in not -carrying out Bonaparte's instructions; nevertheless, had he fully -appreciated the advantages of the plan, he would undoubtedly have made -a greater effort to collect supplies at Genoa. Inasmuch as he took -command of the Army of Italy before the arrival of the British fleet -in the Gulf of Genoa, possibly he might have shipped sufficient grain -from Toulon to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> supply the Army of Italy during a siege of several -months. For the purpose of this discussion, let us assume that he had -done so; and that, in accordance with Bonaparte's orders, he had left a -few thousand men to hold the passes of the Apennines and Maritime Alps, -and had collected about thirty thousand at Genoa. What would have been -the result? What are the advantages of this situation? Surely, they are -many; for Bonaparte himself originated the plan.</p> - -<p>Since the mountains and outlying works surrounding Genoa made it a -veritable stronghold, Bonaparte calculated that the Army of Italy could -maintain itself there against greatly outnumbering forces; and that the -Austrians would hardly dare to force the Apennines and push forward in -order to invade France while thirty thousand men remained undefeated in -their rear. In this position, too, Masséna could, at any time, leave a -small force to hold Genoa, then march rapidly westward along the south -side of the Apennines, and arrive before any one of the threatened -passes with almost his entire army; or should the Austrians force -the Apennines and advance towards France, he could fall upon their -flank and rear, and perhaps sever their communications, while his own -communications with Genoa would be protected by the mountains on one -side and by the sea on the other. In fact, this position would enable -him to take advantage of the topography<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> of the country to the fullest -extent. If he should make an attack in force upon the Austrians from -one of the passes in his possession, the mountains would protect him -during his concentration, and would give strength to his position after -his forces had united. If he should remain at Genoa, the fortifications -and natural obstacles there would increase enormously his fighting -power. It is evident, too, that he might march out of the city, force -his way through the Apennines, and cut the communications of the -Austrians in the valley of the Po. If, while holding the Apennines, he -should advance with his main army over the Genoa-Nice road to attack -the Austrians, he would be in a position where a victory would bring -him great results, and where a defeat would do him but little harm. -Should he be successful, he could sever the Austrian communications -and perhaps ruin their army; should he be repulsed, he could fall back -and seek safety in Genoa. "If," says Bonaparte in his instructions to -Masséna, "Melas appear in the direction of Nice, you being at Genoa, -let him come on, stir not from your position: he will not advance far -if you remain in Liguria, ready to throw yourself upon his rear, or -upon the troops left in Piedmont."</p> - -<p>In short, Bonaparte's design was so to make use of the works of nature -and of art as to prolong the conflict and increase the effectiveness -of Masséna's small army. Thus it was that Bonaparte<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> expected thirty -thousand French to defeat sixty thousand Austrians. Thus it was that he -expected the Army of Italy to hold out against overwhelming odds till -he himself could strike the decisive blow.</p> - -<p>Though from a strategical point of view the plan set forth in -Bonaparte's instructions to Masséna possessed many advantages, yet -it had one great defect. With the main bulk of Masséna's forces -concentrated at Genoa, and with small detachments holding the line of -the Apennines and Maritime Alps, it is evident that Melas could force -his way across the mountains between Genoa and the Tenda Pass, and -thus cut the communications of Masséna and enclose him in Genoa. It is -evident, too, that Melas could surround Masséna and eventually force -him to capitulate. The French might fight desperately and hold out for -months; yet, in time, they would be compelled to yield. The histories -of wars and of sieges show that, when a commander allows himself to be -enclosed in a fortification, he is doomed to defeat in the end. "<i>Great -armies</i>," says Von der Goltz, "<i>which are shut up in a fortress after -lost battles, are, as the history of investments from Alesia down -to Metz proves, almost always lost</i>." Again he says: "Among all the -relations between fortress and field army, the latter must make it a -supreme rule <i>never to allow itself to be thrown into a fortress</i>. Even -to pass through it is dangerous, be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span>cause the army may be kept prisoner -there against its will. <i>Fortresses protect the troops they contain, -but, at the same time, anchor them to the spot. An army can easily be -got behind fortifications, but only with difficulty back again into -the open field, unless it be that strong help from without lends it a -hand.</i>" When the commander of an army is hard pressed, and there is -near at hand a strongly fortified place with outlying works of great -strength, and provisions and water within, the temptation is great to -seek security there. Second rate generals accept such opportunities, -but in doing so they make fatal mistakes. The great masters of the art -of war manœuvre for position, and become themselves the besiegers, -or decide upon the open battle-field the fate of their fortresses and -their armies.</p> - -<p>During all Napoleon's military operations he never allowed himself to -be besieged in any place. How, then, are we to reconcile this fact with -the instructions that he sent to Masséna? Why should he order Masséna -to take up a position which would allow his army to be besieged, and -finally to be captured or destroyed? To answer satisfactorily these -questions, it is necessary to consider the operations of Masséna in -connection with the projected operations of Bonaparte. The Army of -Italy was essentially a containing force. Its duty was to hold Melas -in check for a time. How Masséna could best <i>prolong</i> the conflict was -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> problem that Bonaparte was solving. That the Army of Italy should -finally be defeated was of small consequence; that it should not be -defeated before Bonaparte had time to effect the destruction of Melas -was of great consequence. If it could hold out till then, the victory -of Bonaparte over Melas would render nugatory the triumph of Melas over -Masséna. If it could hold out till then, the success of Melas at Genoa -would avail him nothing; for it would be swallowed up by a greater -success, which was destined to produce far greater results.</p> - -<p>Bonaparte believed that Masséna was strong enough to hold Melas in -check; and since every spare man was needed to strengthen Moreau's army -and the Army of Reserve, he would not send any re-enforcements to the -Army of Italy. Doubtless an ordinary general would have marched the -entire Army of Reserve to the support of Masséna. What would have been -the result? With only eighty thousand Frenchmen to oppose one hundred -and twenty thousand Austrians, there would have been a long struggle in -Italy. Guided by the genius of Bonaparte the French might have repeated -the successes of 1796-97; but even had they done so, months of hard -fighting would have been necessary in order to drive the Austrians -out of northern Italy. In the Marengo campaign Bonaparte expected to -accomplish as great results in less time. The struggle for the mastery -was to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> take place, not along the Apennines, but in the valley of the -Po. Thus it was that no re-enforcements were sent to Masséna, and that -little or nothing was done to improve the condition of the Army of -Italy. "It must be admitted," says Thiers, "that the army of Liguria<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> -was treated a little as a sacrificed army. Not a man was sent to it. -Materials of war only were supplied to it; and even under that head -such only as were absolutely needful. It was in a different direction -that the great efforts of the government were exerted, because it was -in a different direction that the great blows were to be dealt. The -army of Liguria was exposed to destruction in order to gain the time -which should render the others victorious. Such is the hard necessity -of war, which passes over the heads of these to strike the heads of -those; obliging those to die that these may live and conquer."</p> - -<p>It seems hard that Masséna's soldiers should have starved and died, -and no help have been sent them. It seems hard that they should have -struggled on, performing heroic deeds, with little or no hope of -victory. But such is war; some must fail in order that others may -triumph. In beleaguered Genoa, at the bridge of Arcole, amid the snows -of Russia, men must die. But do they die in vain? Perhaps so: and yet, -who shall say?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span></p> - -<p>Victory was Bonaparte's object; and to obtain it, he would, if -necessary, sacrifice the Army of Italy. He had an eye for great -results. His glance penetrated the most complicated military problems. -It was his merit that he knew how, with the forces at hand, to do -great things. He did not fritter away his strength by sending useless -detachments here and there. The four thousand men under Thurreau were -a necessity in the Mont Cenis Pass; the Army of Italy, with Masséna at -its head, was large enough, but not too large, to do the work expected -of it; and the Army of Reserve, re-enforced by a corps of Moreau's -army, was of sufficient strength to produce the desired effect at the -vital point. Even Genoa, the Alps, and the Apennines were made to -serve Bonaparte. Nature was his re-enforcement. Like a mighty tide he -moved on, neither deterred by the sufferings of the Army of Italy, nor -stopped by the great chain of the Alps.</p> - -<p>He who would censure Bonaparte for not marching to the relief of -Masséna must remember that such a course would have prolonged the -struggle and ultimately would have led to a greater destruction -of life. Yet humane considerations probably did not influence his -decisions one iota. Let us not, then, attribute to him the virtues of -a Lincoln; but let us set forth with fairness what he did and why he -did it. We may not admire the man who can thus sacrifice an army to -attain his ends; but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> we must admire the soldier who penetrates the -future, who sees what to do and how to do it, who bends every energy to -the accomplishment of the task, and with relentless purpose, turning -neither to the right hand nor to the left, marches on to victory.</p> - - - -<div class="footnotes"><p class="ph3">FOOTNOTES:</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> See <a href="#map2">Map 2.</a></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> In addition to the forces of Melas mentioned above, twenty -thousand Austrians were scattered throughout northern Italy, several -thousand of whom were in Tuscany, in the Papal States, and in the -fortress of Mantua.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> In the "History of the Consulate and Empire" by Thiers, he -often refers to the Army of Italy as the "army of Liguria."</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III.</a></p> - -<p class="center">MOREAU IN GERMANY.<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> - - -<p class="drop">L<span class="uppercase">ying</span> in the angle of the Rhine between Lake Constance and Strasburg -is a mountainous region known as the Black Forest, which takes its -name from the dark foliage of its pine timber. The general shape of -the Black Forest is that of a triangle; its base resting on the Rhine -between Lake Constance and Bâle, and its apex pointing north. Its total -length is ninety-three miles; its breadth varies from forty-six to -thirteen miles, and its average elevation is about three thousand feet. -On the south and west sides the mountains are rugged and steep, but on -the east side they descend gradually to the lower level of the adjacent -country.</p> - -<p>Within its limits the Black Forest presents an almost impassable -barrier to an army attempting to enter Germany from France. A few roads -lead through it; but they lie in the fissures of the mountains, and are -therefore difficult for the passage of troops. Extending into the Black -Forest opposite Strasburg is the Kinzig Valley, and oppo<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span>site Brisach -are the Höllenthal (valley of Hell) and the valley of Waldkirch. At -Bâle the valley of the Rhine is narrow, but at a short distance below -that point it begins to widen till it reaches a breadth of fifteen -miles. Good roads extend along the Rhine on both sides, and bridges -span the river at Bâle, Strasburg, and Mayence.</p> - -<p>The opposing armies were thus stationed: Moreau's right wing, -twenty-nine thousand strong, commanded by General Lecourbe, was in -Switzerland along the Rhine from Lauffenberg to Lake Constance. Next on -the left was the reserve of twenty-six thousand, commanded by Moreau -in person; it occupied the intrenched camp at Bâle and extended some -distance along the Rhine both above and below the city. The centre, -consisting of thirty thousand soldiers, under General St. Cyr, joined -the left of the reserve near Brisach, and stretched north almost to -Strasburg. The left wing, nineteen thousand strong, under General Ste. -Suzanne, occupied Strasburg and the bridge-head of Kehl on the opposite -shore. Besides these forces, about twenty-six thousand were occupying -Switzerland and the frontier fortresses of France along the Rhine as -far north as Mayence.</p> - -<p>On the Austrian side, sixteen thousand soldiers, under General Starray, -were posted from Mayence to Renchen; and fifteen thousand, under -General Kienmayer, were guarding the defiles of the Black Forest from -Renchen to the Höllenthal. These<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> two corps constituted Kray's right -wing. The main body, forty thousand strong, commanded by Kray himself, -was at Villingen and Donaueschingen; and the reserve, numbering -nineteen thousand, was guarding the Austrian magazines at Stokach. -Cavalry detachments and outposts, to the number of about five thousand, -from these several corps, were observing the Rhine and the defiles -of the Black Forest; and an Austrian flotilla was on Lake Constance. -Beyond the lake was Kray's left wing, numbering about twenty-five -thousand men, of whom six or seven thousand were Tyrolese militia. This -wing was commanded by Prince de Reuss, and extended well up into the -mountains bordering eastern Switzerland, thence eastward into the Tyrol.</p> - -<p>The natural base of operations for Kray's army was the Bohemian -Mountains and the Enns River, which are about two hundred miles east -of the Black Forest. The Austrian lines of communication to this base -were over two roads: one by way of Stokach, Memmingen, and Munich; the -other along the Danube by way of Mosskirch, Ulm, and Ratisbon. The -temporary base of operations for the Austrians in the Black Forest was -Ulm. At this place, during the preceding year, the Archduke Charles had -constructed an immense intrenched camp.</p> - -<p>Knowing that it was necessary to gain a decisive victory over the -Austrians in the Black Forest be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span>fore the Army of Reserve could begin -its operations in Italy, the First Consul submitted a plan of campaign -which he desired Moreau to carry out. Bonaparte proposed that Moreau -should concentrate his forces on the south side of the Rhine between -Schaffhausen and Lake Constance, cross the river in force, and attack -the flank and rear of the Austrians in the Black Forest. He calculated -that, by an attack in this direction, Moreau would be able to defeat -Kray, sever his communications, and either capture or destroy his army.</p> - -<p>To this plan Moreau objected. It seemed to him a difficult operation. -Cautious by nature, he looked upon the proposed manœuvres of -Bonaparte as being too bold and hazardous. He argued that his left -and centre would have to make long flank marches in order to join his -right; and that while the movements were taking place Kray would be -given the opportunity of concentrating his forces near Schaffhausen, -where he could oppose the passage of the French corps, or crush them in -detail as they crossed the river.</p> - -<p>The First Consul replied that the Rhine afforded just the kind -of protection necessary to screen the French corps during their -concentration; and that these manœuvres, if successfully executed, -would, in a short time, bring about great results.</p> - -<p>But Moreau, who appreciated the difficulties of forcing the passage -of a large river in the face of an active enemy, believed that the -risk was too<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> great, and therefore refused to attempt the execution of -Bonaparte's plan. Instead, he proposed the following plan. His left, -under Ste. Suzanne, was to cross the Rhine at Kehl, and his centre, -under St. Cyr, at Brisach. Both corps were to push forward, attack -Kienmayer, and drive him into the defiles of the Black Forest. Moreau -calculated that these attacks would lead Kray to believe that the -French forces were massing in front of his right wing, and would cause -him to re-enforce Kienmayer. Having driven the Austrians back into -the Black Forest, and thus given the impression that the principal -attack of the French would be made from the direction of Strasburg, -Ste. Suzanne and St. Cyr were to withdraw suddenly. The former was to -recross the Rhine at Kehl, ascend the river, cross again to the German -side at Brisach, and take the position formerly occupied by St. Cyr; -the latter was to make a flank march over the spurs and hills towards -Schaffhausen by way of St. Blazien. Meanwhile Moreau with the reserve -was to cross the Rhine at Bâle and march towards Schaffhausen, where, -upon his arrival, his right, under Lecourbe, was to cross the river -and join him. As soon as these movements were completed, Ste. Suzanne -was to march towards Lake Constance by way of Friburg, Neustadt, and -Loffingen. By this series of complicated manœuvres, Moreau expected -to unite the bulk of his forces in the vicinity of Schaffhausen, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> -to march thence against the flank of Kray in the Black Forest.</p> - -<p>Though the First Consul was anxious to have his plan adopted; though he -had, in fact, already begun to collect boats in the Rhine preparatory -to crossing the river near Schaffhausen, yet Moreau persisted in his -own views. Nevertheless, Bonaparte hoped to convince him. With this -end in view, he explained the proposed manœuvres and pointed out -their advantages to General Dessoles, Moreau's chief of staff. Through -this officer, who had an acute intellect and sound judgment, the First -Consul hoped to change the views of Moreau himself. Though General -Dessoles soon perceived that the plan of Bonaparte was superior to -that of Moreau, nevertheless he advised the First Consul to allow -Moreau to carry out his own ideas. "Your plan," said he to Bonaparte, -"is grander, more decisive, and probably even surer; but it is not -adapted to the genius of the man who is to execute it. You have a -method of making war which is superior to all others; Moreau has his -own,—inferior doubtless to yours, but still an excellent one. Leave -him to himself; he will act well, slowly perhaps, but surely; and he -will obtain as many results for you as are necessary for the success -of your general combinations. If, on the contrary, you impose your -ideas on him, you will disconcert him, you will wound his self-love, -and obtain nothing from him by seeking to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> obtain too much." The First -Consul appreciated the wisdom of these remarks, coming from such a man, -and yielded the point. "You are right," said he to General Dessoles. -"Moreau is not capable of grasping and executing the plan that I have -conceived. Let him follow his own course; only let him push back -Marshal Kray upon Ulm and Ratisbon, and afterwards move his right -wing in time upon Switzerland. The plan which he does not understand, -and dares not execute, I myself will carry out on another part of -the theatre of war. What he dares not attempt on the Rhine, I will -accomplish on the Alps."</p> - -<p>It being settled that Moreau should proceed against the Austrians in -his own way, Bonaparte now wished to come to an understanding with him -by which a corps of twenty or twenty-five thousand men should, at the -proper time, be detached from the Army of the Rhine, and be sent across -Switzerland to unite in Italy with the Army of Reserve. But Moreau did -not enter heartily into any of the plans proposed by the First Consul. -In fact, both he and Bonaparte seemed to distrust each other. Whether -from jealousy, or from honest convictions, Moreau opposed the plans -of Bonaparte. Moreover, he had declared that he would not serve under -the First Consul, should the latter unite the Army of Reserve with -the Army of the Rhine. Naturally this opposition created in the mind -of Bonaparte a doubt of Moreau's good faith.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> He feared that, at the -critical moment, the commander of the Army of the Rhine might fail to -send a corps into Italy. He was well aware that the commander of an -army is always reluctant to weaken his forces after operations have -begun; and he knew that circumstances might arise which would seem -to justify Moreau in refusing to obey the orders of his superior. He -therefore insisted that Moreau should sign a stipulation whereby he -promised that, after pushing Kray back from Lake Constance, he would -detach Lecourbe with twenty or twenty-five thousand men, and order him -into Italy. This agreement was signed at Bâle by Moreau and General -Berthier, the latter representing the First Consul.</p> - -<p>Nearly a month had passed since the arrangements between Bonaparte -and Moreau had been completed. It was now the latter part of April, -yet Moreau had made no movement to cross the Rhine and attack Kray. -Naturally cautious and slow, he had postponed his advance from day -to day, in order, if possible, to supply his army with everything -necessary to increase its fighting power. He was short of cavalry -and artillery horses, and had little or no camp equipage, and no -intrenching tools. But at this time it was impossible for him to obtain -everything he needed. Already Bonaparte had sent to the Army of the -Rhine all the spare material of war that he could collect in France. -Now he was anxious to have Moreau<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> advance. Masséna was hard pressed at -Genoa, and Bonaparte desired to march into Italy in order to relieve -him. But to cross the Alps and throw himself upon the rear of Melas, -while Kray remained undefeated in the Black Forest, was too hazardous -an undertaking. Much therefore depended upon the early advance of -Moreau. Repeatedly Bonaparte urged him to press forward, and finally -sent him a positive order to cross the Rhine and attack Kray.</p> - -<p>On the 25th of April Moreau began his movement. Ste. Suzanne crossed -the Rhine at Kehl, ascended the Kinzig valley, and pushed Kienmayer's -outposts back into the Black Forest. At the same time St. Cyr crossed -at Brisach; one division of his corps then advanced towards the Kinzig -valley, while the other divisions forced back the Austrians at Friburg, -and occupied the entrance to the Höllenthal.</p> - -<p>On the next day Kray at Donaueschingen heard of these movements. -Having received word that a part of his right wing had been attacked -by forty thousand men, he was led to believe that Moreau intended to -force his way through the Black Forest by way of the Kinzig valley. He -therefore sent seven thousand Austrians from Villingen to re-enforce -Kienmayer, and to replace these troops withdrew seven thousand men from -his reserve at Stokach. At the same time he ordered his extreme right, -under Starray, to move<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> towards the main army into the valley of the -Murg.</p> - -<p>On the 27th of April Ste. Suzanne withdrew his corps from its advanced -position preparatory to recrossing the Rhine at Kehl. St. Cyr, having -directed his artillery and trains to follow the river road on the right -bank towards Schaffhausen, led his infantry across the hills towards -St. Blazien. Moreau crossed the Rhine at Bâle with the reserve; one -of his divisions, commanded by General Richepanse, then ascended the -Weiss River, so as to join the right of St. Cyr's corps; the other -two, commanded by Moreau in person, marched up the Rhine towards -Schaffhausen.</p> - -<p>On the following day Ste. Suzanne recrossed at Kehl, and proceeded up -the left bank of the Rhine towards Brisach. St. Cyr, having united a -part of his forces with Richepanse's division, occupied St. Blazien. -Moreau himself forced a passage across the Alle River, and drove back -an Austrian brigade there, which retreated towards Bonndorf.</p> - -<p>On the 30th of April Ste. Suzanne, having arrived at Brisach, again -crossed the Rhine to the German side, and took up the position at -Friburg, at the entrance to the Höllenthal, recently occupied by St. -Cyr's troops. St. Cyr remained in the vicinity of St. Blazien. Moreau -advanced upon the Wutach River, and Lecourbe concentrated his corps on -the south bank of the Rhine near Schaff<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span>hausen, preparatory to crossing -the river at that point.</p> - -<p>Thus the French corps continued to push forward. On the 1st of May -Moreau reached Schaffhausen, where he was joined by Lecourbe's corps, -part of which crossed the river in boats, and the remainder over -a bridge temporarily constructed for the purpose. St. Cyr reached -Stuhlingen, and Ste. Suzanne, having driven back the Austrian brigade -occupying the Höllenthal, arrived at Neustadt.</p> - -<p>During these movements the Austrian outposts along the Rhine fell back -before Moreau to Stuhlingen, and, upon St. Cyr's arrival at that place, -retreated upon Zollhaus. Meanwhile Kray had directed part of his own -immediate command upon Loffingen and Zollhaus. Kienmayer, with the -greater part of his forces, still remained in the valley of the Kinzig, -and Starray in the valley of the Murg.</p> - -<p>Thus the first part of Moreau's plan was successfully executed. As -yet he had met with no reverse. His forces had driven before them the -Austrian outposts and advance brigades, till now three of his corps, -numbering eighty-five thousand men, were within supporting distance of -one another on the north side of the Rhine near Schaffhausen. From this -favorable position he could march at once against Kray in the Black -Forest, and outnumber him almost two to one; for Kray<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> could not expect -immediate aid from his left wing, which was beyond Lake Constance on -the borders of eastern Switzerland and in the Tyrol, or from his right -wing, which was far away in the valleys of the Kinzig and the Murg.</p> - -<p>Kray now began to appreciate the insecurity of his position. He -perceived that his reserve and immense magazines at Stokach were in -danger. Should Moreau capture this place and push rapidly forward -towards Ulm, he would sever the Austrian communications, and thus place -Kray in a position where a defeat would ruin his army. In order to -prevent, if possible, such a result, Kray decided to unite his forces -at Stokach, and there give battle to Moreau. With this end in view, -Kray caused the following movements to be made. On the 2d of May the -Austrian brigade that had been driven from Neustadt by the advance of -Ste. Suzanne, moved to Bonndorf; the Austrians at Bonndorf marched to -Zollhaus; and those at Zollhaus, to Geisingen, where Kray had collected -the Austrian troops under his immediate command. On the 3d of May his -columns advanced towards Stokach over the Geisingen-Engen road.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Moreau was not idle. On the 3d of May he moved on Engen with -the reserve; St. Cyr on Zollhaus; and Lecourbe, having directed two -brigades to ascend the Aach River, in order to connect with the right -of the reserve, marched on Stokach with about twenty thousand<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> men, -attacked and defeated the twelve thousand Austrians there, captured the -immense magazines, and forced the Austrians back towards Ulm by way of -Mosskirch and by way of Memmingen. But after this victory Lecourbe, not -receiving any orders from Moreau to push forward and seize Mosskirch, -remained in the vicinity of Stokach, awaiting the result of the -operations of Moreau at Engen.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Kray, on his way to Stokach, had reached Engen before the -arrival of Moreau. In this position his troops, numbering about -forty-five thousand men, faced south with their left at Engen and their -right extended towards Zollhaus. Moreau soon arrived with the reserve. -His forces, counting the two brigades on his right detached from -Lecourbe's corps, numbered about forty thousand men. At once Moreau -began the battle. Fiercely and desperately the French and Austrians -fought for several hours, but neither gained a decided advantage. -Finally, late in the day, St. Cyr, who had received orders from Moreau -to hurry forward from Zollhaus, arrived and began an attack upon the -right of the Austrians, which caused them to give way. But this attack -was made too late to produce any decisive result. The Austrians, -though forced at last to yield, were not crushed; in fact, Engen was -little more than a drawn battle. But, during the night, Kray, having -learned of the capture of Stokach, began to fear<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> that Lecourbe would -push forward, seize Mosskirch, and sever his communications with Ulm. -He therefore decided to retreat. Leaving a rear guard to hold Moreau -in check, he directed his forces upon Tuttlingen, Liptengen, and -Mosskirch. At the battle of Engen each side lost in killed, wounded, -and captured, about seven thousand men.</p> - -<p>Kray now determined to unite as many of his troops as possible at -Mosskirch, and there to make a stand against the French, who were -pushing eagerly forward towards Ulm. Already he had sent word to -General Starray and General Kienmayer to descend the left bank of the -Danube, and join him at the earliest possible moment.</p> - -<p>On the 4th of May Moreau directed his own corps and that of Lecourbe on -Mosskirch; St. Cyr arrived at Geisingen; and Ste. Suzanne, who had been -forcing his way through the Black Forest, was at Donaueschingen.</p> - -<p>On the following day Kray, having been joined by the remnants of -his reserve, beaten at Stokach, took position at Mosskirch with -forty thousand men. His right was at Tuttlingen, about twelve miles -distant; but Kienmayer and Starray were beyond supporting distance on -the north side of the Danube. On this day Moreau attacked Kray with -fifty thousand men, and, after hard fighting, succeeded in forcing -the Austrians back towards Sigmaringen. But Kray did not retire far. -Being<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> anxious for the safety of the Austrian troops at Tuttlingen, -he halted, formed line of battle, and with the right of his line -strongly re-enforced, attacked the French and drove them from the -Tuttlingen-Mosskirch road. This success opened his communications with -the Austrians at Tuttlingen, and enabled them to join him. Being thus -re-enforced, he again attacked the left flank of Moreau, and attempted -to seize the Stokach-Mosskirch road. But in his attempt to outflank the -French, he was in turn outflanked by them, and was again compelled to -retire.</p> - -<p>In the battle of Mosskirch the Austrians lost in killed, wounded, and -prisoners, about five thousand men; the French, about three thousand. -In this battle both sides fought fiercely, but neither gained a decided -success. Nevertheless, Kray saw the necessity of retreating; for St. -Cyr, who had taken no part in the battle, was now about to join Moreau; -and Ste. Suzanne was pushing rapidly forward towards Mosskirch by way -of Tuttlingen. In other words, Kray, with less than fifty thousand -men, could not expect to hold his own in a second battle at Mosskirch -against the united French corps.</p> - -<p>Kray crossed the Danube at Sigmaringen, and, being joined by the two -corps of his right wing, retired towards Ulm by way of Rietlingen -and Biberach. He was followed by Moreau. Lecourbe marched by way of -Memmingen, St. Cyr by way of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> Biberach, and Ste. Suzanne descended -the Danube towards Ulm. At Biberach Kray attempted to make a stand, -in order to save the Austrian magazines there, but was defeated -with considerable loss. Lecourbe also defeated an Austrian garrison -occupying Memmingen, and captured the place.</p> - -<p>On the 11th of May Kray continued his retreat on Ulm, which, through -the foresight of the Archduke Charles in the preceding year, had been -converted into a strongly intrenched camp. At Ulm Kray sought and found -safety for his army. Here he collected the shattered remains of his -defeated forces, and for several weeks made a successful stand against -Moreau. Here, eyeing each other with suspicion, these two armies -remained for a time, each ready to take advantage of any false movement -of the other, while more stirring operations and greater deeds were -happening in the valley of the Po.</p> - -<p>It is difficult to estimate accurately the losses sustained by the -contending armies in these operations. Probably the loss of the -Austrians was about twenty thousand men; that of the French, about -fifteen thousand. At the opening of hostilities, Kray's forces, not -counting the left wing under the Prince de Reuss, since it took no part -in the active operations, numbered ninety-five thousand men. At Ulm -Kray had seventy-five thousand. On the other hand, Moreau had crossed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> -the Rhine with one hundred and four thousand soldiers, and had reached -Ulm with nearly ninety thousand; but he was about to send fifteen -thousand men into Italy, which would leave the opposing armies about -equal in numbers.</p> - -<p>The time had arrived for the commander of the Army of the Rhine to -carry out the agreement entered into between himself and the First -Consul. In fact, since the battle of Engen, Bonaparte had awaited -anxiously for Moreau to start the promised re-enforcements towards -Italy. Fearing that Moreau might still delay in the matter, the First -Consul had sent Carnot, the French minister of war, to Moreau's -headquarters, in order to make the necessary arrangements, and to -insist that the troops should be detached and ordered forward at the -earliest possible moment.</p> - -<p>Moreau did not comply fully with the agreement entered into with the -First Consul, but on the 11th and 12th of May he selected fifteen -thousand men from the different French corps, united these troops into -a single corps and ordered it to proceed into Italy.</p> - -<p>Though Moreau had not succeeded in severing the communications of -Kray, and in capturing or destroying his army, he had been generally -successful in his manœuvres; he had pushed the Austrians back from -Lake Constance, defeated them at Stokach and Engen, forced them to -retreat after the battle of Mosskirch, and compelled<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> them to seek -security in the intrenched camp of Ulm. Though he had retained General -Lecourbe and his corps in the valley of the Danube, and had failed to -send into Italy the full number agreed upon in the stipulation with -the First Consul, nevertheless, he had weakened his army by fifteen -thousand men, and, by so doing, had given Bonaparte the opportunity of -bringing to a successful issue one of the most striking and dramatic -campaigns of his career.</p> - - -<p class="center">COMMENTS.</p> - -<p>In order to understand clearly the strategical problems presented by -these operations, it is necessary to keep in mind the positions of the -French and Austrian forces, and the topography of the country in which -these manœuvres and battles took place.</p> - -<p>Picture to yourself the French forces occupying Switzerland and France -on the left bank of the Rhine as far north as Strasburg; and on the -opposite side of the river, the long line of the Austrians, their left -on the borders of eastern Switzerland and in the Tyrol, their right -extending far to the north, even to Mayence, and their centre, forming -the main part of the Austrian army, occupying the Black Forest with -advanced brigades and outposts pushed forward almost to the banks of -the Rhine. Picture to yourself the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> triangular mountain system of the -Black Forest, lying in the angle of the Rhine between Lake Constance -and Strasburg, like a huge bastion, its south and west sides steep and -rugged, and its hills and mountains covered with a dark forest of pines -and firs. Picture to yourself the fifteen thousand Austrians, under -Kienmayer, along the rugged west face of this mountain group; the forty -thousand, under the immediate command of Marshal Kray, lying on the -eastern slope of this great barrier of mountains and hills; the reserve -of nineteen thousand at Stokach on the direct road between Schaffhausen -and Ulm, and but a day's march from the French in Switzerland; the -magazines at Stokach, Engen, Mosskirch, and Biberach, upon which Kray -depended for his supplies; and the immense intrenched camp at Ulm, -which, lying in his rear upon the Danube, was the temporary base of the -Austrians in the Black Forest.</p> - -<p>By occupying all the valleys, roads, and prominent points in the -theatre of operations, the Austrians expected to hold military -possession of the country. Their system of war was to form a chain of -posts—a cordon—along the line to be occupied; and by this means they -expected to prevent the advance of the enemy. Thus the Austrian army -was scattered over a great extent of country from the Tyrol to Lake -Constance, thence through the Black Forest to the Main<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> River. Their -line was more than three hundred miles in extent.</p> - -<p>Kray had extended his right wing as far north as Mayence, in order -to protect the troops in the Black Forest from a French attack on -that side. Since Moreau held the line of the Rhine, possibly he -might attempt to cross at Mayence, thence, using the Main River to -screen his movements, might march to Wurtzburg, and from that point -march south on Ulm. By such a manœuvre, he could sever Kray's -communications, take the Austrians in rear in the Black Forest, and -compel them to fight with their face towards Vienna, in order to -recover their communications. But, in order to protect himself on this -side, Kray had extended Starray's corps too far north; it consisted -of but sixteen thousand soldiers, and was so scattered from Mayence -to Renchen, a distance of one hundred miles, that it was weak at all -points. Moreover, it was so far distant from the main Austrian forces -in the Black Forest that it could neither readily aid them in case they -should be attacked in force, nor be readily aided by them should Moreau -attempt to make a flank movement against the Austrian right.</p> - -<p>But a greater fault in the situation of the Austrian army was due to -the fact that the Aulic Council had given orders that Kray's left -wing, under the Prince de Reuss, should remain on the borders of -eastern Switzerland and in the Tyrol.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> This wing could not, therefore, -re-enforce Kray in the Black Forest. With his left thus paralyzed by -the action of the Aulic Council, Kray found himself hampered throughout -the campaign.</p> - -<p>Kray committed another error in collecting immense magazines at -Stokach; for this place, being but a day's march from the French forces -in Switzerland, was not only the most vulnerable but also the most -important point occupied by the Austrians. Lying in a gap between Lake -Constance and the mountains of Switzerland on one side, and the Black -Forest on the other, and being on the direct road from Schaffhausen -to Ulm, it was, so to speak, the vital point of the long Austrian -line. Along this route the French would be most likely to advance -into Germany; for they could ascend the Rhine by the river roads, -thence proceed to Stokach, and thus avoid the great natural barrier -of the Black Forest. Moreover, by adopting this plan there were great -strategical advantages to be gained.</p> - -<p>First: Should the French capture Stokach, they would permanently -separate the Austrian left from the centre and right. Thus they would -divide the forces of the Austrians, and might thereafter be able to -defeat them in detail.</p> - -<p>Second: Should the French capture Stokach, they would be in a favorable -position to march north against the Austrians and sever their -communications with Ulm. In this position, the French,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> if defeated, -could fall back to Schaffhausen, and recross the river there with -little or no danger of losing their communications; but the Austrians, -being obliged to form their line of battle parallel, or nearly so, -to the roads leading to their base, would, if defeated, be thrown -back into the Black Forest, where doubtless they would be captured -or destroyed. In short, the success of the French at Stokach would -enable them to carry out two great principles of war: not only would -they divide the forces of their enemy, and thus eventually be able -to defeat them in detail; but they would gain a position where they -could threaten the communications of Kray in the Black Forest without -exposing their own to his attacks.</p> - -<p>In the angle of the Rhine between Lake Constance and Strasburg, Kray -had but eighty thousand soldiers. Upon this force he had to rely in -order to repel any attack which the French might make in the Black -Forest; for his extreme right, under Starray, and his left, under -Prince de Reuss, were too far away to support his centre before the -French could unite to attack it. Bearing in mind that the French -crossed the Rhine with one hundred and four thousand soldiers, we -perceive that the opportunity was offered Moreau of bringing superior -numbers against Kray. In other words, should both opposing commanders -succeed in uniting all their available forces upon a battle-field in -the Black Forest, Moreau would outnumber<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> Kray in about the proportion -of four to three. As the first principle of war is to be stronger than -the enemy at the vital point, it is always of the greatest importance -that no plan of campaign be adopted, which shall, at the very start, -allow the enemy to bring superior numbers on the battle-field.</p> - -<p>In withdrawing seven thousand men from Stokach to replace the seven -thousand sent from Villingen to re-enforce Kienmayer, Kray committed -another error. In fact, at the outset of the campaign he weakened -the garrison of the most important point of the whole Austrian line, -by sending away more than one third of the troops there. Thus, -unconsciously, he played into the hands of his adversary; for at -the very time that these troops were leaving Stokach, Moreau was so -regulating his manœuvres as to make in the near future his first -great effort against Kray at or near that place.</p> - -<p>Had the left wing of the Austrian army not been ordered to remain along -the eastern borders of Switzerland, it would seem that it might have -marched north along the east side of Lake Constance, and have struck -the flank and rear of the French as they proceeded from Stokach towards -Ulm. Doubtless such a manœuvre would have produced great results; -but it must be remembered that the French, still in Switzerland, might -then have crossed the Rhine above Lake Constance, and have attacked the -flank and rear of the Austrian left wing.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span></p> - -<p>Says General Hamley:—</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"In former years the base of the Republican armies operating in -Germany had been some part of the straight course of the Rhine, -from its corner at Bâle to Dusseldorf. Their eminent adversary, the -Archduke Charles, says that the strong line of the Rhine, and the -line of French fortresses behind it, can only be assailed by the -Austrians in circumstances unusually favorable. All that can be done -is to approach and choose a position where the plans of the enemy may -be defeated, his advance stopped, and the country behind covered.</p> - -<p>"The armies on the Rhine had hitherto been on parallel fronts; -the Austrians generally on the defensive, since the exceptionally -favorable circumstances which could alone enable them to assume the -offensive by passing the Rhine had not existed. The French, breaking -out at one or the other of the bridge-heads which they possessed on -the river, would try to press forward into Germany; the Austrians, -drawing together on the threatened points, would oppose them: and the -result was that, in 1800, the river still formed the frontier line -between them.</p> - -<p>"But in 1800 a new condition had entered into the problem of a -campaign on the Rhine. The French had occupied Switzerland, an act -which entailed military results such as few generals of that time -had the foresight to appreciate. One was to carry the French base -onward from Bâle, round the angle to Schaffhausen. Thus that base, -originally straight, was now rectangular, and enclosed within it a -part of the theatre of war."</p></blockquote> - -<p>Herein is to be found in part the explanation of Kray's faulty -arrangement of his forces. Had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> Switzerland been neutral territory, his -reserve and magazines at Stokach would not have been within striking -distance of the French. Had Switzerland been neutral territory, the -French could not have made a flank movement against his forces in the -Black Forest, and thus have been given the opportunity of severing his -communications with Ulm. In fact, the possession of Switzerland gave -many advantages to Moreau, and enabled him to force the Austrians back -to Ulm, notwithstanding the fact that he committed many errors and -gained no great victory.</p> - -<p>It will now be apparent that Kray had taken up a position too far -to the front; and that, by so doing, he had allowed the French to -take advantage of the angular base of operations formed by northern -Switzerland and eastern France. "Although Kray showed himself -superior to Moreau," says Colonel Macdougall, "his faults were -serious. He disseminated his army along the line of the Rhine in too -forward a position, since his rear was exposed to attack by a French -force operating from Schaffhausen. He established his magazines at -Stokach, Engen, and Mosskirch, close to a part of the French base. If -Switzerland had been friendly or neutral, his magazines in those places -would have been well placed, since they would in that case have been -covered by the defiles of the Black Forest; as it was, they were quite -at the advanced posts."</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span></p> - -<p>Moreau's plan of campaign did not differ greatly from that of -Bonaparte. In fact, both he and the First Consul aimed to concentrate -the French in force between Schaffhausen and Lake Constance. In order -to effect the concentration, however, Moreau purposed to cross the -Rhine at four points, then by a series of complicated manœuvres to -unite the bulk of his forces in the vicinity of Schaffhausen. On the -other hand, Bonaparte's plan was to assemble the French corps on the -south side of the Rhine opposite Schaffhausen, to cross the river in -force near that place, and thence proceed against Kray. In an able and -interesting discussion of these two plans, General Hamley says:—</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"The plans of campaign of Napoleon and of Moreau had this in -common, that both aimed at the communications of the Austrians by -an advance from the extreme point of the angular base; but in the -mode of effecting the common object they differed materially, and -the difference was the result of the individual characters of the -projectors. When Napoleon's glance was once fixed on the point where -decisive success lay, the obstacles in his way lost, in his mind, -much of their importance, and were viewed merely as difficult steps -to his object. Hence, though he neglected no provision nor precaution -which prudence and experience could suggest for overcoming them, yet -he never allowed them to assume an importance sufficient to deprive -his plan of campaign of its fullest significance. Disregarding, -therefore, the fact that he must throw his army entire at one point<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> -across a great river which was observed by the enemy, he looked only -to the great results that must flow from the advance of that army, -concentrated, upon the vital point of an enemy whose forces would -still be in greater or less degree dispersed.</p> - -<p>"Moreau, cautious and forecasting by nature, saw in his mind's eye -the Austrian army assembled opposite Schaffhausen to oppose his -passage,—baffling the whole plan. All his precautions, therefore, -were framed to obviate the danger of crossing in the face of the -enemy. Only one corps was to cross at Schaffhausen,—another, the -reserve, was to cross at Bâle to cover the passage; this entailed the -movement of a third through the mountains to cover the long flank -march of the reserve along the river; and a fourth was to make a -false attack in order to detain the Austrian troops in the defiles as -long as possible, and prevent them from re-enforcing the left.</p> - -<p>"It is probable that Napoleon's plan would have miscarried in the -hands of Moreau; but looking at other achievements of Bonaparte,—his -descent on the Austrian rear in Italy a few weeks later,—his -decisive march to the Danube in 1805 on the other side of the present -theatre,—it is not to be denied that, executed by himself, the -design might have fulfilled all his expectations."</p></blockquote> - -<p>It is certainly an interesting fact that, notwithstanding the -objections of Bonaparte to Moreau's plan, nevertheless the commander -of the Army of the Rhine succeeded in assembling the bulk of his -forces in the vicinity of Schaffhausen. In his own way he executed the -manœuvres which, even to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> Bonaparte, seemed fraught with danger. As -a matter of fact, the assembling of the French corps in this position -was the most critical part of the whole campaign; and it mattered not -whether the concentration was made by marching on the German side of -the Rhine, or by marching on the Swiss side; in either case, skill and -generalship were required to carry out successfully these manœuvres. -It will now be interesting to compare the plans of these two soldiers.</p> - -<p>The line of the Rhine divided the opposing armies. At the outset -the French corps crossed the river at Strasburg, Brisach, Bâle, and -Schaffhausen. Moreau then attempted to unite these corps before -proceeding to attack Kray in force. It is always a dangerous operation -to attempt a concentration upon some designated place within the -enemy's lines; for, as a rule, the enemy can mass his forces there -more rapidly than can the commander of an invading army. In fact, many -a campaign has failed because the commanding general has attempted to -unite his scattered forces at some point within the territory held by -the enemy. By so doing, he gives the enemy a chance to assemble his -forces between the separated columns of the attacking army, and to -bring superior numbers against each column in succession. Thus, when -Moreau crossed the Rhine at Strasburg, Brisach, Bâle, and Schaffhausen, -he gave Kray the opportunity of defeating in detail the several<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> French -corps so widely separated from one another. Though the topography -of the country was such that it did not allow Kray to concentrate -his forces and throw them readily upon the separated French corps -in succession, yet, had he foreseen the design of his adversary, -undoubtedly he could have massed his forces between Schaffhausen and -Bâle, along the Wutach, and have thus intervened between Lecourbe's -corps and that of Moreau. By such a manœuvre, he would have stood a -good chance of crushing both Moreau and St. Cyr, before they could have -been re-enforced by either Ste. Suzanne or Lecourbe.</p> - -<p>Again: Moreau's plan necessitated that his own corps and that of St. -Cyr should make long flank marches on the German side of the river. -In making these marches, the French corps necessarily exposed their -own flanks to the attacks of the enemy. In fact, Kray might have -issued in force from the Black Forest, and have attacked both Moreau -and St. Cyr with great chances of success. Had he done so, doubtless -these two French corps would have been destroyed; for they would have -found themselves enclosed between a victorious enemy on one side and -an impassable river on the other. Even when protected by a river, or -other great natural obstacle, a flank march, in the vicinity of an -active enemy, is often a difficult manœuvre; but when undertaken in -an enemy's country, between an unfordable river on one side, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> an -active enemy on the other, it then becomes an extremely delicate and -dangerous operation.</p> - -<p>It will also be noticed that though St. Cyr, in his march across -the hills and mountains from Friburg to St. Blazien, and thence to -Stuhlingen, flanked and protected the reserve in its march from Bâle -to Schaffhausen, yet he was obliged to send his artillery by the river -road. Had he, therefore, been attacked in force during this movement, -he would have been compelled to fight without his artillery. Thus the -fighting power of his corps would have been diminished; and his efforts -would have been directed towards the protection of his cannon, which, -under ordinary circumstances, should have strengthened, instead of -weakened, him.</p> - -<p>In commenting on these operations of Moreau, General Hamley says:—</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"The false attacks of Ste. Suzanne and St. Cyr had the effect not -only of detaining Kienmayer's sixteen thousand men in the defiles, -but of causing Kray to move thither six or seven thousand additional -troops. But they had no influence in detaining Starray, who was -already so distant on the right that it would be impossible for him -in any case to join Kray in time for the first operations. We find, -then, that at first forty-nine thousand French were employed in -detaining less than half their number; and when St. Cyr had joined -the reserve, still Ste. Suzanne did not probably neutralise a greater -number of the enemy than his own corps. The detached operations of -Ste. Suzanne appear, therefore, dangerous and fruitless."</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span></p> - -<p>Consider now the plan of Bonaparte. It is evident that the line of -the Rhine from Strasburg to Lake Constance would have screened the -French corps during their concentration. Since this unfordable river -and the bridges crossing it were in possession of the French, there -was little probability that the French corps would have been attacked -in flank during their march up the Rhine to Schaffhausen. In fact, the -Rhine and the mountains of the Black Forest, behind which the greater -part of the Austrians lay, would have formed such a complete screen to -the operations of Bonaparte that it is not improbable to suppose that -the proposed French concentration, preparatory to crossing the river, -might have been completed before Kray discovered what was in progress. -Moreover, since this plan involved no complicated manœuvres, it -could have been carried out more quickly than the plan of Moreau. -Thus time would have been saved; and <i>time</i> was then of the greatest -importance to Bonaparte, inasmuch as Masséna was in desperate straits -at Genoa.</p> - -<p>The same reason makes it probable that the passage of the river -at Schaffhausen, the most difficult problem of Bonaparte's plan -of campaign, might have been accomplished before Kray learned the -designs of his adversary. Another fact confirms this view. It will be -remembered that, after Moreau crossed the Rhine with his four corps, -twenty-six thousand French soldiers still<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> remained in Switzerland -and in the French fortresses along the Rhine. Inasmuch as a part of -this force was occupying Strasburg, it is quite probable that, had -Bonaparte's plan been adopted, a division of four or five thousand men -would have issued from the bridge-head opposite this place, and have -attacked the Austrians on the west side of the Black Forest. Such an -attack would probably have deceived Kray, and have left him in doubt -as to where the French intended to cross the river in force; it would -probably have caused him to leave Kienmayer's corps in its position, -and have prevented him from uniting a sufficient force in the vicinity -of Schaffhausen to oppose the passage of the French.</p> - -<p>It will be remembered that Bonaparte had already made some preparations -for crossing the Rhine near Schaffhausen; he had secretly collected a -number of boats on the river between Bâle and Lake Constance. These -boats were to be used for the crossing of the advance divisions. The -purpose also was to throw two or three bridges across the river; the -material for which could have been collected and prepared by Lecourbe's -corps while the remaining corps were ascending the Rhine.</p> - -<p>It will also be noticed that the point selected by Bonaparte for the -crossing was a favorable one. During the passage Lake Constance would -have protected the right flank of the French corps from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> an Austrian -attack, and would have continued to protect them as they marched -towards Stokach.</p> - -<p>Though the crossing of a large river in the face of an active enemy -is a difficult operation, yet it is generally successful, because -great pains is nearly always taken to deceive the enemy, and because -great preparations are nearly always made to insure the success of -the operation. "If," says Jomini, "we take into consideration the -great care and precautions that are requisite, the immense amount -of materials employed in such an operation, the concurrence of -circumstances necessary to secure success, and the difficulties which -may be occasioned by the slightest derangement on the part of the -enemy, it is really surprising that an operation of this kind ever -succeeds. Nevertheless, wonderful as it may seem, the most difficult -military enterprises are commonly the most successful, from the simple -fact that greater care and precautions are employed in their execution."</p> - -<p>From the foregoing it is apparent that the manœuvres of Moreau were -not wisely planned. In appearance only they seemed to be less hazardous -than those of Bonaparte. After magnifying the difficulties of crossing -the Rhine with the four French corps at Schaffhausen, Moreau adopted a -course which was much more complicated, which required a longer time -to execute, which involved several strategical errors, and which, as -will be shown later, did not allow Moreau to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> take all the advantages -of the angular base of operations due to his possession of Switzerland. -Though these manœuvres were successful, it is not because they were -wisely planned, but because there was little or no opposition to their -execution. They were successful because Kray, not appreciating the -situation, failed to profit by the mistakes of his adversary.</p> - -<p>It will now be of interest to examine into the operations of Moreau -after he had united the bulk of his forces in the vicinity of -Schaffhausen.</p> - -<p>On the 1st of May the four French corps were thus stationed: Moreau's -and Lecourbe's at Schaffhausen, St. Cyr's at Stuhlingen, and Ste. -Suzanne's at Neustadt. From these positions the French advanced to -attack Kray. Lecourbe with twenty thousand men marched on Stokach to -capture that place, and to drive back the Austrian reserve of twelve -thousand there; Moreau moved on Engen with forty thousand men and there -encountered Kray with forty-five thousand; St. Cyr directed his corps -on Zollhaus; and Ste. Suzanne remained in the vicinity of Neustadt. In -front of St. Cyr and Ste. Suzanne there were a few thousand Austrian -troops more or less scattered. Kienmayer's corps yet remained along the -western edge of the Black Forest, and Starray's corps was still farther -away toward the north.</p> - -<p>Though Moreau had assembled three of his corps, numbering eighty-five -thousand men, in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> such positions that they could easily have -concentrated upon a single battle-field, and have outnumbered Kray -almost two to one; yet, at the battle of Engen, he was outnumbered by -his adversary. St. Cyr's corps was so far away to the left that it -had scarcely any effect in deciding the battle. Evidently this corps -should have been so directed that it could have re-enforced the right -of Moreau or the left of Lecourbe. Had this been done, the battle of -Engen would have been a great victory. Then Moreau could have hurled -the Austrians back into the Black Forest, and have severed their -communications with Ulm. In short, Moreau should have advanced with his -right, instead of his left, strongly re-enforced. In order to reap the -full advantages of the flank position which he occupied, every effort -should have been made so to defeat the Austrians as to get possession -of their communications. Moreau failed to appreciate this fact. His -faulty movements enabled Kray, after the battle of Engen, to fall back -to Mosskirch; and, by so doing, to retain possession of the road to Ulm.</p> - -<p>It is evident, too, that Lecourbe's corps, after its victory at -Stokach, should have pushed forward and seized Mosskirch and the roads -leading to Ulm; but it failed to do so, because Moreau did not send -Lecourbe the necessary orders. After the capture of the most important -place occupied by the Austrians, this corps remained inactive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> for a -time, knowing not what to do or where to march.</p> - -<p>Why did Moreau fail to send the necessary orders to Lecourbe? Why -did he thus scatter his three corps? Why was St. Cyr directed upon -Zollhaus, instead of upon Engen or Stokach? These are interesting -questions, and their answers will perhaps enable us to form a correct -estimate of the military ability of Moreau.</p> - -<p>In retaining the direct command of a corps, Moreau committed a fault. -He should have appointed a corps commander of the reserve, and have -left himself free to give greater attention to the movements of his -entire army. As it was he was wrapped up in what his own corps was -doing. As long as the soldiers directly under him were victorious, he -seemed to be satisfied. Perhaps, from this cause, or from the fact that -he failed to appreciate the strategical situation, the significance and -importance of Lecourbe's victory at Stokach did not impress itself upon -him. Thus no orders were given for Lecourbe's corps to hasten forward -and seize Mosskirch. Moreau's military horizon was limited; his glance -failed to sweep the whole theatre of operations.</p> - -<p>That his corps were scattered was due in great measure to the plan of -campaign that he had adopted. In carrying out this plan, Ste. Suzanne -had marched through the Höllenthal, and was near Neustadt when the -French attacked the Aus<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span>trians at Engen and Stokach. Moreau realized -that Stokach and Engen were the important points of the Austrian line; -yet, rather than leave Ste. Suzanne's corps isolated at Neustadt, where -possibly it might be crushed by overwhelming numbers, he directed St. -Cyr's corps on Zollhaus, so that it might, if necessary, re-enforce -Ste. Suzanne. Thus it was that his four corps were spread out from -Stokach to Neustadt; and that St. Cyr's corps was directed upon the -left instead of upon the right of Moreau. Thus it was that his plan -prevented him from taking full advantage of the angular base which the -possession of Switzerland gave to the French.</p> - -<p>But, notwithstanding the fact that Ste. Suzanne's corps was at -Neustadt, St. Cyr's corps should not have been directed upon Zollhaus. -Now, it might seem to us, as it undoubtedly seemed to Moreau, that, had -St. Cyr's corps marched directly to the support of the French at Engen -or Stokach, Ste. Suzanne's corps would have been left in an isolated -and dangerous position where it could have been captured or destroyed. -But such was not the case; indeed, there were several reasons why Kray -would not have attempted to concentrate against Ste. Suzanne.</p> - -<p>First: The movement of the French right on Stokach and Engen -threatened the communications of Kray, without in the least exposing -the communications of Moreau to an Austrian attack.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> In accordance -with a maxim of war, proved by experience, Kray would therefore have -abandoned any intended attack upon Ste. Suzanne, in order to fight -for the preservation of his own communications. "The commander," says -Hamley, "who finds himself on his enemy's rear, while his own is still -beyond the adversary's reach, may cast aside all anxiety for his own -communications, and call up every detachment to the decisive point, -certain that the enemy will abandon his own designs, in order, if -possible, to retrieve his position." Had Moreau appreciated this fact, -he could have safely united three of his corps near Stokach, and have -overwhelmed the Austrians with superior numbers.</p> - -<p>Second: Though Ste. Suzanne seemed to be in a dangerous position, -he was not so in reality. In fact, had Kray attacked Ste. Suzanne -in force near Neustadt, he would have given the French at Engen and -Stokach an immense advantage; for the farther he proceeded into the -Black Forest towards France, the more easily could the French sever his -communications and destroy or capture his army.</p> - -<p>Third: Instead, therefore, of Moreau's being fearful lest the Austrians -should concentrate against Ste. Suzanne, he should rather have hoped to -see them carry out this movement. But, in either case, he should have -strongly re-enforced his right by every means in his power.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span></p> - -<p>After the battle of Engen, Moreau continued to commit errors. At -Mosskirch he attacked the Austrians with but fifty thousand men. At the -beginning of the battle Kray had but forty thousand men, yet before it -ended he was strongly re-enforced. During the battle St. Cyr's corps -was near Geisingen and Ste. Suzanne's at Donaueschingen. Thus, for the -second time, Moreau fought the Austrians with two of his corps absent. -Moreover, they were far away on his left flank, when they should have -been near him, or on his right flank, where they would have been able -to overwhelm Kray, and sever his communications with Ulm. Had Moreau -re-enforced strongly his right, and attacked Kray at Mosskirch with his -four corps, or even with three of them, who can doubt what the result -would have been? Undoubtedly he would have destroyed the Austrians -between his army and the Danube, and could then have rapidly crossed -the river and have intercepted the corps of Kienmayer and Starray. In -truth, Moreau's faults allowed Kray to escape, when he should have been -destroyed. They allowed him to seek safety in Ulm, where for several -weeks he was able to make a successful stand.</p> - -<p>This part of Moreau's campaign, from the time he left Schaffhausen -till he arrived at Ulm, was a series of errors. Though in a measure -successful in his operations, he was outgeneralled by Kray.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> In this -campaign every opportunity was offered Moreau to win a great name, but -he did not possess the necessary military ability. He was in command -of the largest and best equipped army of France; instead of gaining -merely two or three indecisive victories and forcing Kray back to Ulm, -he should have united his forces, crushed his enemy, severed Kray's -communications, and captured his army; and then should have marched -on Vienna and compelled the Austrian Emperor to sue for peace. But -such fame was not for him. It was reserved for that greater genius, -who, beyond the Alps, on the plains of Italy, should, with inferior -forces, do greater deeds and accomplish far greater results. It was -reserved for him who, daring to follow in the footsteps of the great -Carthaginian, was destined to startle the world by the splendor of his -achievements.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>If there was one distinguishing peculiarity in Napoleon's system of -war, it was that of so manœuvring as to divide the forces of his -enemy and then to defeat them in detail. In the early part of his -career he was fortunate in being opposed to the Austrians, whose -system of scattering their troops enabled him to defeat separately the -fragments of their armies. He believed in concentrating his troops. He -was, in fact, the greatest exemplar of concentration that the world has -ever known. His plan was to mass his forces against<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> some vital point -of the enemy, and to attack him on one line, and in such a direction -as to place him at a disadvantage. If the enemy's line was too much -extended, he struck at the centre and broke through it, then attacked -and defeated in detail the separated parts. If the enemy advanced to -attack with his army separated into parts by impassable obstacles, -Napoleon manœuvred so as to crush in succession these isolated parts -before they could unite. In this way, by fighting a part of the enemy's -army at one time, he was nearly always stronger than the enemy on the -battle-field. With him this was the important point. His rapid marches, -his strategical manœuvres, his combinations, had nearly always this -object in view. He believed that success in battle depended principally -on numbers. "God," said he, "is on the side of the heaviest battalions."</p> - -<p>But notwithstanding the fact that this was the distinguishing -peculiarity of Napoleon's system of war, yet he did not always follow -this system. Several times in his career he won a great victory by -making a flank movement against his enemy. Such a movement was made at -Marengo, at Ulm, and at Jena.</p> - -<p>Between these two methods of attack there is, as a rule, this -difference. By striking at the centre of the enemy's line, his army -can be separated into two parts, and then be defeated in detail. In -this case the aim is so to manœuvre as to out<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span>number the enemy -on the battle-field. But by striking at the flank, the enemy is -often given the opportunity of concentrating his forces. Even if one -flank is defeated, it can fall back upon the other, and perhaps even -then make a successful stand against the attacking army. In this -case the advantages generally aimed at are to threaten or sever the -communications of the enemy, and to force him to fight a battle where a -defeat will ruin his army. From the foregoing, it is evident that these -two methods of attack have a tendency to produce opposite results. A -direct attack upon the enemy, if successful, breaks up and scatters -his forces. On the other hand, a flank attack gives him a chance to -concentrate, but at the same time places him in a position where a -defeat will ruin him.</p> - -<p>In making a choice between these two methods of attack, the able -general will be guided in great measure by the positions occupied by -the enemy's forces. But, as a rule, if he adopt one method, he must -abandon the advantages to be derived from the other. Thus, should he -decide to attack the centre of the enemy's line, he may reasonably -expect to divide the forces of the enemy, and afterwards to defeat -them in detail; but he cannot expect to threaten at the same time -their communications, and cut them from their base of operations. On -the other hand, if he make a flank attack, he may reasonably expect to -sever<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> the communications of the enemy, and thus force him to fight a -battle under disadvantageous circumstances; but he cannot expect to -defeat in turn the several parts of the enemy's army.</p> - -<p>But in the campaign between Moreau and Kray, it is a remarkable fact -that the positions of the Austrian forces were such that the advantages -of both a front and flank attack could be obtained by the French. -By crossing the Rhine at Schaffhausen, and by attacking the flank -of Kray in the Black Forest, the French would not only separate the -Austrian left from the Austrian centre and right, but would threaten -the Austrian communications with Ulm. From the beginning Bonaparte saw -clearly this fact. His eye took in the entire situation. Thus it was -that he was anxious to have Moreau undertake this movement. Thus it was -that he himself had thought seriously at one time of uniting the Army -of Reserve with the Army of the Rhine, and of moving against the left -flank of Kray's forces in the Black Forest.</p> - -<p>From this discussion, it is evident that, had Moreau made no errors, -even after he assembled his three corps near Schaffhausen, he could -have brought superior numbers upon every battle-field in Germany, and -thus have won more decisive victories and have accomplished far greater -results. What, then, might not Bonaparte himself have accomplished -had he directed in person one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> hundred and seventy thousand soldiers -against the one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians in Germany? When -it is remembered that he never lost a battle in which he was superior -to his adversary in numbers, it cannot be doubted what the result would -have been.</p> - - - -<div class="footnotes"><p class="ph3">FOOTNOTES:</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> See <a href="#map3">Map 3.</a></p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV.</a></p> - -<p class="center">MARENGO.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> - - -<p class="drop">A<span class="uppercase">nxiously</span> Bonaparte at Paris awaited the success of the Army of the -Rhine. Matters were urgent and time was precious, for Masséna could -hold out but a few days longer at Genoa. Until the French should be -victorious in Germany, the First Consul could not expect Moreau to send -a detachment across Switzerland into Italy. As soon as word should be -brought that this re-enforcement was on its way, Bonaparte purposed -to lead the Army of Reserve across the Alps against Melas, who was -fighting the French so vigorously at Genoa and along the Var.</p> - -<p>On the 6th of May Bonaparte left Paris to direct the operations of the -Army of Reserve. He had already assembled the several parts of that -army near Lake Geneva, and had collected vast supplies there, which -were to be used by the army in its march into Italy. On his arrival -at Dijon, he reviewed the few thousand conscripts and old soldiers -at that place. After this review,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> which was intended to confirm the -spies still further in their belief that the Army of Reserve was purely -imaginary, he proceeded to Geneva, and thence to Lausanne, at which -places the greater part of the army was assembled. On his arrival -there, Bonaparte began the final preparations for crossing the Alps. At -first, he thought of leading the Army of Reserve into Switzerland, in -order to unite it with Moncey's corps, which had been detached from the -Army of the Rhine, and thence march through the St. Gothard Pass into -Italy. He also considered the plan of marching into Switzerland, and -thence of descending into Italy by way of the Simplon Pass. But after -receiving the report of General Marescot, who had been sent to examine -the several passes of the Alps, he decided to conduct the greater part -of his forces over the Great St. Bernard Pass. By taking this route, -which was much the shortest, he could reach Milan earlier, and thus -gain the great advantage of time.</p> - -<p>The plan of Bonaparte was to conduct thirty-five thousand men of the -Army of Reserve over this pass into Italy, and to send the remaining -five thousand over the Little St. Bernard Pass, which lies in the -Alps but a few miles south of the Great St. Bernard. At the same time -a small detachment was to proceed from Switzerland into Italy by way -of the Simplon Pass; and Thurreau's division of four thousand, which -formed the left of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> Army of Italy, was to descend from the Mont -Cenis Pass and attack the Austrians in the vicinity of Turin. These -movements having been accomplished, Bonaparte intended to direct the -greater part of the Army of Reserve on Milan, where it was to unite -with Moncey's corps, which was marching over the St. Gothard into -Italy. Should this part of the plan be successfully executed, Bonaparte -then purposed to march south with a strong force, cross the Po near -Placentia, and occupy the Stradella Pass. This pass, which is enclosed -on the north by the Po and on the south by the spurs that shoot -northward from the main chain of the Apennines, is a strong position on -the direct road between Alessandria and Mantua. While holding the pass, -Bonaparte expected to debouch westward therefrom against Melas, who, he -calculated, would advance eastward from Alessandria and meet him in the -plains of the Scrivia.</p> - -<p>It is clear, from the histories of this campaign, that the plan as here -set forth had not been determined on in all its details before the -movements began. In fact, until Bonaparte descended the eastern slope -of the Alps, he had not fully decided whether he would march directly -on Milan, or on Alessandria and the fortress of Tortona, in order thus -to bring relief more quickly to Masséna. Circumstances would then -determine the matter. But there is little doubt that before leaving -Paris he had mapped out in his own mind the essential<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> features of the -plan as here set forth. Upon this point Bourrienne, in his "Memoirs of -Napoleon Bonaparte," writes as follows:—</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"On the 17th of March, in a moment of gaiety and good humor, he -(Bonaparte) desired me to unroll Chauchard's great map of Italy. He -lay down upon it and desired me to do likewise. He then stuck into -it pins, the heads of which were tipped with wax, some red and some -black. I silently observed him, and awaited with no little curiosity -the result of this plan of campaign. When he had stationed the -enemy's corps, and drawn up the pins with the red heads on the points -where he hoped to bring his own troops, he said to me, 'Where do you -think I shall beat Melas?'—'How the devil should I know?'—'Why, -look here, you fool; Melas is at Alessandria with his headquarters. -There he will remain until Genoa surrenders. He has in Alessandria -his magazines, his hospitals, his artillery, and his reserves. -Crossing the Alps here' (pointing to the Great Mont St. Bernard) 'I -shall fall upon Melas, cut off his communications with Austria, and -meet him here in the plains of the Scrivia' (placing a red pin at San -Giuliano). Finding that I looked on this manœuvre of pins as mere -pastime, he addressed to me some of his usual compliments, such as -fool, ninny, etc., and then proceeded to demonstrate his plans more -clearly on the map."</p></blockquote> - -<p>The correspondence of Bonaparte at this time shows that he had a -full knowledge of the positions and condition of the Austrian forces -in Italy. From information sent him by Suchet, he learned that the -Austrian army was greatly scattered; that but a small portion of it was -occupying that part<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> of northern Italy between the Po and Switzerland; -and that as yet General Melas did not believe in the existence of the -Army of Reserve. It was this knowledge which caused the First Consul -to believe that he could execute successfully this bold and hazardous -undertaking.</p> - -<p>From Villeneuve, at the east end of Lake Geneva, the road across the -Alps into Italy passes through the towns of Martigny and Saint Pierre, -thence over the Great St. Bernard, through the village of Saint Remy, -into the valley of the Aosta, and thence it continues along the Dora -Baltea River, through the towns of Aosta, Châtillon, Bard, and Ivrea, -into the plains of Piedmont. Not far south of the Great St. Bernard -lies the Little St. Bernard Pass, which opens also into the valley of -the Aosta. In 1800 these two roads were much more difficult of passage -than they are at the present time. When Bonaparte crossed the Alps, -the road from Saint Pierre to Saint Remy was simply a bridle path -over which no vehicle could pass. Even now it would be a hazardous -undertaking to conduct a large army into Italy over the Great St. -Bernard. Crossing the Alps at an elevation of more than eight thousand -feet, the pass lies in a region of perpetual snow and ice, where the -glaciers, the shock of avalanches, and the frequent and blinding storms -make the passage of troops difficult and dangerous.</p> - -<p>Having once reached the fertile valley of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> Po, Bonaparte expected -to find food and forage there in abundance; but during the march from -Villeneuve to Ivrea it was necessary to provide supplies in advance -for the army. For this purpose he had collected them at Lake Geneva. -He now caused them to be distributed at different points along this -route. He also sent money to the monks in charge of the Great St. -Bernard Hospital, in order that they should purchase bread, cheese, -and wine for the soldiers. At Villeneuve, Martigny, Saint Pierre, and -Saint Remy, he established hospitals for the sick and injured. To -the foot of the defile at Saint Pierre he sent forward a company of -mechanics to dismount the guns and to divide the gun-carriages and -caissons into numbered parts for transportation on pack mules. The -ammunition too was carried in this way. But the cannon themselves could -not be thus transported. For this purpose sledges with rollers had -been made, but they were found to be of no use. Finally, the cannon -were enclosed within the trunks of trees hollowed out for the purpose. -Thus protected, they were dragged across the Alps by the soldiers -themselves. A second company of mechanics was ordered to march with the -first division and to establish itself at Saint Remy, in order to put -together the carriages and caissons, to remount the pieces, and to make -the necessary repairs.</p> - -<p>On the 14th of May Bonaparte was ready to begin the movement. The -Army of Reserve<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> numbered forty thousand soldiers and forty cannon; -about four thousand were cavalry. Four corps of the army, numbering -thirty-five thousand men, commanded by Murat, Victor, Duhesme, and -Lannes, had taken position from Villeneuve to Saint Pierre. A fifth -corps, of five thousand men, commanded by Chabran, was in Savoy at the -foot of the Little St. Bernard Pass. Bonaparte himself was at Martigny, -at which place he issued the orders for the movement. He had sent -Berthier forward to receive the divisions on the Italian side of the -Alps.</p> - -<p>On the 15th of May the movement began. Lannes crossed first. He began -his march from Saint Pierre at two o'clock in the morning, in order to -avoid as much as possible the danger from the avalanches, which are -less frequent in the cool of the day. He reached the summit safely, and -his soldiers were pleasantly surprised to find there the bread, cheese, -and wine which Bonaparte had provided for them. Lannes halted but a -moment at the Great St. Bernard Hospital; he then began the descent -and arrived at Saint Remy on the same day. He was followed in turn by -the corps in his rear. At the same time Chabran crossed the Little St. -Bernard Pass, and Thurreau began to advance over the Mont Cenis Pass. -The entire Army of Reserve crossed between the 15th and 20th of May. -During this famous passage of the Alps the soldiers were filled with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> -energy and enthusiasm. Though heavily laden, they themselves, by sheer -strength, dragged their cannon over the rough and slippery paths. No -exertion seemed to tire them. As they pressed on, all were gay and -cheerful. As they climbed the mountain side, their spirits rose. With -shouts and cheers and songs, they made that Alpine region ring. In -that cold, clear air they felt their blood quicken. They felt, too, -the energy, the enthusiasm, the magnetism, of their commander. They -not only hoped for, but they expected victory. Were they not imitating -the daring deeds of the great Hannibal? Were they not about to enter -that Italy where their comrades had fought so gloriously before? Were -they not commanded by the "Little Corporal," their idol, whose deeds -of desperate daring at the bridges of Lodi and Arcole had won their -everlasting admiration?</p> - -<p>Thus the Army of Reserve crossed the Alps. By the 20th of May all -five corps had reached the valley of the Aosta. Owing to the careful -preparations made, there had been scarcely any accidents and no serious -delays during the passage. But the greatest difficulty was yet to be -met. Some distance down the valley of the Aosta, upon a perpendicular -rock commanding a narrow defile, Fort Bard had been constructed. Though -this fort was garrisoned by only two or three hundred Austrians, it -was impregnable and controlled the whole val<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span>ley. After descending the -Great St. Bernard Pass, Lannes had pushed on down the valley, but was -stopped by the fire of the fort. At once he made an effort to capture -the place, but was repulsed. He soon saw that it could not be taken by -force. Though he gained the road that led past the fort, the deadly -fire of the Austrians prevented him from advancing. For a time it -seemed that this small but formidable fort would stop the progress of -the whole army. Lannes was greatly disturbed. He reported the matter -to Berthier, and Berthier sent at once a courier to inform Bonaparte -of the situation. The First Consul was still at Martigny, where he had -remained for the purpose of hastening forward all the artillery and -the rear divisions of the army. This news was a complete surprise to -Bonaparte. The effect which it produced upon him is thus described by -Thiers:—</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"This announcement of an obstacle, considered insurmountable at -first, made a terrible impression on him; but he recovered quickly, -and refused positively to admit the possibility of a retreat. Nothing -in the world should reduce him to such an extremity. He thought that, -if one of the loftiest mountains of the globe had failed to arrest -his progress, a secondary rock could not be capable of vanquishing -his courage and his genius. The fort, said he to himself, might be -taken by bold courage; if it could not be taken, it still could be -turned. Besides, if the infantry and cavalry could pass it, with but -a few four-pounders, they could then proceed to Ivrea at the mouth of -the gorge, and wait until their heavy guns could<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> follow them. And if -the heavy guns could not pass the obstacle which had arisen, and if, -in order to get any, those of the enemy had to be taken, the French -infantry were brave and numerous enough to assail the Austrians and -take their cannon.</p> - -<p>"Moreover, he studied his maps again and again, questioned a number -of Italian officers, and learning from them that many other roads led -from Aosta to the neighboring valleys, he wrote letter after letter -to Berthier, forbidding him to stop the progress of the army, and -pointing out to him with wonderful precision what reconnoissances -should be made around the fort of Bard."</p></blockquote> - -<p>Having sent these instructions to Berthier and having seen the last -division well on its way, the First Consul hurried across the Alps -towards Fort Bard. Meanwhile a foot-path, leading along the mountain -side around the fort, was discovered by Lannes. By a few repairs the -path was soon rendered passable for the men and horses, but not for -the artillery. How to get the cannon past the fort was the question. -Finally, the following method was adopted. During a dark night the road -in front of the fort was strewn with manure and straw, and, to deaden -the sound of the artillery wheels, they were wrapped with tow and -straw; then the soldiers themselves quietly hauled the guns past the -fort. The stratagem succeeded; all the artillery was thus transported. -In this way the Army of Reserve surmounted this obstacle, which for a -time gave Bonaparte greater anxiety than the passage of the Great St. -Bernard itself.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span></p> - -<p>At this time the lower valley of the Aosta was guarded by three -thousand Austrians under General Haddick. On the 20th of May Lannes -arrived at Ivrea, which was occupied by the enemy. He attacked the -Austrian garrison there, defeated it, and captured the place. Thence, -continuing his march towards Chivasso, he again attacked the Austrians -on the Chiusella, defeated them, drove them from position to position, -and finally, having forced them back towards Turin, captured Chivasso. -Meanwhile Bonaparte, having left Chabran's corps to blockade Fort Bard, -followed Lannes with the remainder of the army.</p> - -<p>During these operations, General Thurreau descended the Mont Cenis -Pass and attacked General Kaim, who, with five thousand men, was at -Susa guarding the Mont Cenis route into Italy. Before the spirited -attacks of Thurreau, Kaim was obliged to abandon Susa and fall back to -Busseleno on the road to Turin.</p> - -<p>On the 27th of May Bonaparte with the greater part of the Army of -Reserve was near Chivasso, Thurreau was at Susa, a French detachment, -under Bethencourt, was descending the Simplon Pass, and Moncey's corps -was struggling heroically towards Milan over the St. Gothard. Thus far -the plans of the First Consul had been successful. He had crossed the -Alps, forced his way past Fort Bard, and driven the enemy out of the -valley of the Aosta. Now, the thunder of his cannon could<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> be heard on -the plains of Piedmont. But what of the Austrians! Where were they? -Where was Melas?</p> - -<p>Still incredulous as to the existence of an army of reserve, Melas -was bending every energy to capture Genoa and to force the crossings -of the Var. In the engagements and battles with Masséna and Suchet, -the army of Melas, which originally numbered one hundred and twenty -thousand, had been reduced to one hundred thousand men. These troops -were greatly scattered. On the 13th of May they were thus stationed: -thirty thousand under General Ott were besieging Genoa; twenty-five -thousand under General Elsnitz were fighting Suchet along the Var; -ten thousand under General Vukassovich were watching the Italian -entrances of the St. Gothard and Simplon passes; three thousand, -commanded by General Haddick, were in the lower valley of the Aosta, -watching the St. Bernard passes; five thousand, commanded by General -Kaim, were occupying Susa at the foot of the Mont Cenis Pass; and two -thousand were scattered along the Maritime Alps near the Tenda Pass. -In addition, six thousand were on their way from Tuscany to re-enforce -Melas; three thousand remained in Tuscany, and sixteen thousand more -occupied Alessandria, the fortresses of Tortona and Mantua, and various -other garrisons of northern Italy.</p> - -<p>Such was the situation of the Austrians when,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> on the 21st of May, -Melas received information of the passage of French troops over the -Great St. Bernard. Immediately he collected ten thousand soldiers from -the Austrian forces in front of Suchet and in the vicinity of the Tenda -Pass, and marched on Turin. At first, he believed that the French -troops appearing in Italy were merely a detachment sent thither to -harass his rear; but at Coni, where he arrived on the 22d of May, he -learned to a certainty that Bonaparte himself was in Italy; that the -French soldiers were already issuing into the plains of Piedmont; and -that the First Consul had with him both cannon and cavalry. Melas was -surprised. He knew not what to do. Having been repeatedly informed by -his own spies, and even by the Aulic Council, that the Army of Reserve -was a mere fiction, he could now hardly bring himself to believe that -it was a reality. It might, after all, be but a large detachment; for -how could Bonaparte cross the Alps with an army? How could he pass Fort -Bard with cannon and cavalry? It must be remembered, too, that at this -time Melas had not learned that Moncey was marching on Milan. As yet, -therefore, he was not completely undeceived. He knew that a French -force was at the foot of the Mont Cenis Pass, and that French troops -were issuing from the valley of the Aosta into the plains of Piedmont; -but he did not know the number of the French forces nor did he know the -intentions of Bonaparte. Consequently he de<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span>layed issuing the orders -for the concentration of his scattered troops.</p> - -<p>Having reached Turin with ten thousand men, Melas was joined by General -Haddick's command, which had been driven from the valley of the Aosta -by Lannes, and by General Kaim's division, which had been driven -from Susa by Thurreau. But this junction gave Melas only sixteen or -seventeen thousand Austrians to oppose the thirty-five thousand French -near Chivasso under Bonaparte.</p> - -<p>At this time Melas expected the French to cross the Po and attack him -near Turin; but such was not the intention of Bonaparte. In order to -deceive Melas, the First Consul ordered Lannes to make preparations -as if the French intended to cross the Po at Chivasso, then to march -rapidly down the river, through Crescentino and Candia, on Pavia. At -the same time Bonaparte himself, with the corps of Victor, Duhesme, and -Murat, set out for Milan by way of Vercelli and Novara. On the 31st of -May Bonaparte arrived at the Ticino River. To oppose the passage of -the French, Vukassovich had collected a considerable force on the east -bank. Bonaparte crossed the river, attacked and defeated the Austrians, -thence, continuing his march eastward, entered Milan on the 2d of June. -Vukassovich, having left a garrison in the castle of Milan, fell back -behind the Adda. At Milan Bonaparte<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> delayed several days to await -the arrival of Moncey's corps, the advance guard of which was just -beginning to appear in Italy. During the delay Bonaparte directed a -part of his forces on Brescia, Lodi, and Cremona. As a result of these -movements, Vukassovich retired behind the Mincio and sought safety -under the guns of Mantua. Bonaparte also directed Murat on Placentia in -order to seize the crossings of the Po there.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the detachment under Bethencourt, marching by way of the -Simplon Pass, had reached Arona at the lower end of Lake Maggiore. -On the 1st of June Fort Bard surrendered to Chabran. Having left a -garrison in this place, and one also in Ivrea, he then took up a -position with the remainder of his corps along the Po from Chivasso to -the Sesia River. From the Sesia to Pavia the corps of Lannes occupied -the line of the Po. On the 1st of June Lannes had captured this place, -and had seized the large magazines there, which contained provisions, -several pieces of artillery, and a number of pontoon boats.</p> - -<p>Thus it will be seen that the French were in possession of the whole -of northern Italy lying between the Po and Switzerland. Looking south -from Milan, Bonaparte had in his front the line of the Po, which he -held from Chivasso to Cremona. Far away to his right was the Great St. -Bernard Pass, which he had just crossed, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> which was now guarded by -the French garrisons of Fort Bard and Ivrea. To his left, at a distance -of eighty miles, was the Mincio, which formed on that side the dividing -line between the French and the Austrians; and in his rear were the -St. Gothard and Simplon passes, which offered him a safe retreat -into Switzerland in case he should meet with a reverse. Already, -within this territory, he had seized all the Austrian communications, -captured several Austrian garrisons, occupied several cities, and taken -possession of immense quantities of provisions and munitions of war.</p> - -<p>Thus situated, Bonaparte was almost ready to strike the blow that -should decide the fate of Italy. In a few days he would cross the Po, -march through the Stradella Pass, and encounter Melas on the bloody -field of Marengo. The delay at Milan was but the lull before the -storm. While Bonaparte remained there, completing his arrangements -and awaiting the arrival of Moncey, Melas was beginning to appreciate -the situation, and, though still somewhat confused and undecided, was -destined shortly to make an heroic effort to save his army.</p> - -<p>For several days after Melas reached Turin, he remained in doubt -as to the intentions of Bonaparte. In fact, he was deceived by the -preparations that Lannes had made to cross the Po at Chivasso. Again: -in descending the river<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> towards Pavia, Lannes so masked the main part -of the Army of Reserve, that Melas did not immediately become aware of -the movement on Milan. But on the 29th of May he learned that Bonaparte -was marching on Milan; and, on the 31st, he learned that Moreau had -defeated Kray, and that Moncey's corps was marching by way of the St. -Gothard into Italy. At once he comprehended the vast plan of Bonaparte. -He saw that nothing could now prevent the Army of Reserve from uniting -with Moncey's corps; and that, with these combined forces, Bonaparte -would doubtless march south from Milan, cross the Po, and sever the -Austrian communications. Thus he saw himself being rapidly enclosed in -a net from which there would soon be little or no hope of escape. Being -now completely undeceived as to the intentions of Bonaparte, Melas had -no further cause for delay. He must concentrate his troops at once, in -order to break through the French forces rapidly closing in upon him. -He must, if possible, preserve his communications, and thus save his -army from capture or annihilation.</p> - -<p>Accordingly, he determined to concentrate at Placentia and the -Stradella Pass all the available Austrian troops that were fighting -the French near Genoa. By this means he hoped to seize and hold -the crossings of the Po from Pavia to Cremona, and thus to retain -possession of the great highway leading from Alessandria through<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> the -Stradella Pass to Mantua. He also determined to unite at Alessandria -all the available Austrian troops in Piedmont and along the Var. By -this means he expected to assemble there an army of at least thirty -thousand men, and thence to proceed eastward through the Stradella -Pass to Mantua. By following this plan, he hoped to make his escape -with the greater part of his army. Having once reached the Mincio, he -could unite his forces with those of Vukassovich; and, perhaps, in this -strong position, flanked on one side by Lake Garda, and on the other -by the fortress of Mantua, he might be able to make a successful stand -against Bonaparte.</p> - -<p>In accordance with this plan, he sent imperative orders to General -Elsnitz to quit the Var and march on Alessandria, and to General Ott to -raise the siege of Genoa and hasten north in order to seize Placentia -and the crossings of the Po near that point. Meanwhile he himself, -having left a sufficient force to hold Thurreau in check, hastened with -the remainder of his army to march on Alessandria.</p> - -<p>Upon receiving the orders of Melas, General Elsnitz, whose command then -numbered but seventeen thousand, began to withdraw his forces from -the Var. He directed his columns towards the Tenda Pass, expecting to -cross the Apennines at that point, and thence to march on Alessandria -by way of Coni, Alba, and Asti. But Suchet,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> being well aware of the -desperate situation of Melas, was anticipating the recall of Elsnitz -and was prepared for it. Suchet's forces numbered fourteen thousand -men. By skilful manœuvring and by a rapid march across the foothills -of the Apennines, he succeeded in reaching the Tenda Pass ahead of -his adversary. Having thus turned the flank of the Austrians, and -obtained possession of their line of retreat, he fell upon them, -defeated them, cut them in two, and killed, wounded, or captured more -than half of their army. As a result General Elsnitz was compelled to -retreat eastward and cross the Apennines over the Ormea Pass. With only -eight thousand men he arrived at Ceva on the 7th of June <i>en route</i> to -Alessandria. Meanwhile Suchet, having proceeded eastward to Savona, -was joined by a part of Masséna's command, which had marched out of -Genoa on the 5th of June. With these combined forces, Suchet marched to -Acqui, and there, still acting under the orders of Masséna, awaited the -results of Bonaparte's operations.</p> - -<p>When, on the 2d of June, General Ott received the orders of Melas, the -negotiations for the capitulation of Genoa were pending. He delayed -until the 4th of June to receive the surrender of Masséna. On the -6th, having left a sufficient force to garrison the city, he sent a -brigade towards Placentia by way of Bobbio; and with the remainder of -his forces, numbering sixteen<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> thousand soldiers, he himself marched -towards the same place by way of Novi, Tortona, and the Stradella Pass.</p> - -<p>During these operations, Bonaparte remained at Milan, perfecting his -arrangements and issuing the orders for the movements of his troops. He -had already sent forward Berthier to direct the operations along the -Po. On the 6th of June Moncey's corps arrived. This re-enforcement of -fifteen thousand men increased the effective forces under the immediate -command of Bonaparte to about sixty thousand. Immediately upon the -arrival of Moncey, thirty-two thousand soldiers under Lannes, Victor, -and Murat, began to cross the Po. The remainder of the army were thus -stationed: four thousand, under Thurreau, were at the foot of the -Mont Cenis Pass; two small detachments were occupying Fort Bard and -Ivrea; ten thousand were posted at Vercelli and along the Ticino from -the foot of Lake Maggiore to Pavia; three thousand were at Milan; and -ten thousand were along the Adda, and at Cremona and Placentia. All -these troops, except the division of Thurreau, which was isolated and -held in check by an Austrian force near Turin, were available for the -operations about Milan and along the Po.</p> - -<p>On the 6th of June Lannes and Victor crossed the Po near Belgiojoso, -a few miles below Pavia, and marched thence to the Stradella Pass. -On<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> the following day Murat crossed at Placentia. In these passages -the French met with considerable opposition from small detachments of -cavalry and infantry that Melas had directed thither from Alessandria -and elsewhere to hold the crossings of the Po until General Ott should -arrive; but these detachments having been defeated and driven back, the -French occupied Placentia and the Stradella Pass. At the latter place -a fortified camp was constructed, and between Pavia and Placentia five -bridges were built for the use of the French in case they should be -forced to retreat.</p> - -<p>During these operations two Austrian couriers were captured. One was -carrying despatches from Melas to Vienna; the other, from the Aulic -Council to Melas. The despatches of the former told of the surrender -of Genoa, and of the plans and movements of Melas. Those of the latter -informed the Austrian commander that the Army of Reserve was a mere -myth, and that he should pay no attention to the rumors concerning it, -but should make every effort to capture Genoa and force the crossings -of the Var.</p> - -<p>The news that Genoa had surrendered was discouraging to Bonaparte, -for he at once appreciated the fact that he must now fight the forces -of General Ott in addition to those which Melas was assembling at -Alessandria. There was, however, a compensating advantage in knowing -the plans<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> of his adversary, for, having learned that General Ott -was marching on Placentia, he at once saw that he might defeat this -corps, and perhaps destroy it, before it could reach Placentia or unite -with Melas. Accordingly, he sent to Berthier, Lannes, and Murat the -following instructions: "Concentrate yourselves at the Stradella. On -the 8th or 9th at the latest, you will have upon your hands fifteen or -eighteen thousand Austrians, coming from Genoa. Meet them and cut them -to pieces. It will be so many enemies less upon our hands on the day -of the decisive battle which we are to expect with the entire army of -Melas."</p> - -<p>In accordance with these instructions, Lannes and Victor faced -about their columns and proceeded westward towards Tortona. Lannes, -commanding the vanguard, preceded Victor by a distance of five miles. -The remainder of the French forces on the south bank of the Po marched -to the Stradella Pass. On the 9th of June Lannes with nine thousand men -encountered the sixteen thousand under Ott at Montebello. Immediately a -furious battle began. For several hours both sides fought desperately. -The Austrian superiority in numbers would have crushed an ordinary -soldier, but Lannes was of uncommon mould. Impetuous, stubborn, brave, -fierce, and terrible on the battle-field, he would not yield. In the -face of a deadly fire he encouraged his soldiers, and by his presence -and heroic action held them<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> firm before the repeated onslaughts of the -Austrians. Nevertheless, he would eventually have been defeated had not -Victor arrived opportunely on the battle-field with six thousand men. -This re-enforcement turned the tide of battle in favor of the French. -The Austrians were defeated, cut to pieces, and compelled finally to -retreat. They lost in killed, wounded, and captured five thousand men; -the French, three thousand. With the remnants of his corps General Ott -fell back across the Scrivia, and thence proceeded to Alessandria. This -battle secured for Lannes the title of "Duke of Montebello." It covered -him with glory, and brought to his name an imperishable renown.</p> - -<p>The First Consul, who had left Milan on the morning of the 9th of -June, arrived at Montebello just at the termination of the battle. -Expecting that Melas would at once advance with all the troops that -he had collected at Alessandria, Bonaparte began on the 10th of June -to rearrange his troops, and to make preparations for battle. Being -deficient in both cavalry and artillery, while Melas was well supplied -with both, Bonaparte decided to fall back to a position near Casteggio, -in front of the Stradella Pass, where his flanks would be protected by -the Po on one side, and by the spurs of the Apennines on the other. -With the corps of Lannes and Victor he made a retrograde movement to -this point. Here he collected all his forces south of the Po, now<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> -numbering twenty-nine thousand men. In this strong position he remained -for several days, expecting hourly that the Austrians would push -forward from Alessandria and attack him. But they failed to appear.</p> - -<p>On the 11th of June General Desaix, who had served under Bonaparte -in Egypt, arrived at the French headquarters. He was a distinguished -general, and a warm friend of the First Consul. At once Bonaparte gave -him the command of a corps, consisting of two divisions.</p> - -<p>On the following day Bonaparte, surprised at the non-appearance of the -Austrians, began to fear that they were trying to escape. He thought -that Melas might attempt to evade him, either by marching directly on -Genoa, or by crossing the Po at Valenza, and thence marching on Pavia -and Milan. Finally, he could bear the suspense no longer. He decided -to advance and seek Melas. Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 12th -of June, having left a force to occupy the intrenched camp at the -Stradella Pass, he advanced towards Alessandria. At Tortona he left -a force to blockade the fortress. On the 13th of June he crossed the -Scrivia and debouched into the plain of Marengo, which lies between -the Scrivia and Bormida rivers. Thus far he had met with no Austrians. -His anxiety increased. He had but few cavalry, and, consequently, was -unable to make a thorough reconnoissance of the surround<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span>ing country. -During the afternoon of that day, he directed Victor on Marengo. Here -the French found only a small detachment, which was quickly driven -across the Bormida. A party sent forward to reconnoitre the crossings -of the Bormida, reported that no Austrians were to be found there in -force.</p> - -<p>From all these indications, Bonaparte came to the conclusion that the -Austrians had left Alessandria. He reasoned that, if Melas intended -to attack the French and force his way through the Stradella Pass, he -would neither have given up the plain without a struggle, nor have -failed to occupy in force the village of Marengo. Moreover, he thought -that Melas would surely not neglect to hold the Bormida with a strong -force so long as he remained at Alessandria. But if he had gone, what -route had he taken?</p> - -<p>On that day Bonaparte received word that no Austrians had appeared at -Pavia or along the Ticino. It seemed probable, therefore, that Melas -might be marching on Genoa; and that he would attempt either to make -a stand there, where he could be supported by the British fleet, or -else to march thence through Bobbio, Placentia, and Cremona to Mantua. -With this thought in his mind, Bonaparte directed Desaix with one -division of his corps, numbering six thousand men, on Novi, in order to -intercept Melas, should he be attempting to escape by this route.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span></p> - -<p>Thus it happened that on the evening of the 13th of June Bonaparte was -unprepared for the battle of the next day. His forces were scattered. -Desaix was on his way to Novi; Victor was at Marengo; Lannes and Murat -were on the plain in rear of Victor; the Consular Guard, two regiments -of cavalry, and Monnier's division, which belonged to the corps of -Desaix, were along the Scrivia near Tortona. These forces numbered -twenty-eight thousand men, of whom three thousand and five hundred were -cavalry. Bonaparte had about forty cannon. That night he slept in a -small town about two miles east of San Giuliano. He expected to receive -on the next day some information that would enlighten him as to the -movements and intentions of Melas; but he had no thought of a battle on -the morrow.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, at Alessandria there was much confusion. By the defeat of -General Ott at Montebello, Melas had lost possession of the direct -road from Alessandria through the Stradella Pass to Mantua. He could -not, therefore, make his escape by this route without first defeating -the French. He hardly knew what to do. Already his communications were -severed. Doubtless the French would soon advance towards Alessandria. -Perhaps, in a few days, they would force the crossings of the Bormida, -and attempt to shut him up within the city. In this uncertain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> State -of mind Melas called a council of war. To the officers composing the -council three plans suggested themselves. Should they cross the Po at -Valenza, march to Pavia, and attempt to make their escape by forcing -their way across the Ticino; or should they march to Genoa, and in that -place, supported by the British fleet, make preparations to stand a -siege; or, lastly, should they cross the Bormida, meet the French face -to face, and fight to recover their communications and save their army?</p> - -<p>The third plan was adopted. The Austrian officers reasoned that it was -doubtful whether either of the first two plans would succeed; that the -false position that they now occupied was due neither to Melas nor to -themselves, but to the Aulic Council, which had repeatedly misinformed -them as to the actual state of affairs; and that now the only honorable -course was to fight, and, if possible, cut their way through the French -forces. "If we succeed," said they, "victory will regain for us the -road to Placentia and Mantua; if not, we shall have done our duty, and -the responsibility of any disaster that may befall us will rest upon -other heads than ours."</p> - -<p>Melas concurred in the views of his officers. Though seventy years -old, age had not dimmed his courage. His army at Alessandria numbered -thirty-two thousand men, and contained two hundred pieces of artillery -and seven thousand cavalry.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> On the 13th of June he decided that on the -next day he would cross the Bormida and attack Bonaparte.</p> - -<p>The plain of Marengo lies between the Scrivia and Bormida rivers, which -rise in the Apennines and flow northward towards the Po. The town of -Marengo, from which this battle takes its name, is situated near the -east bank of the Bormida on the great highway leading from Alessandria -to Mantua. About two miles north of Marengo is the village of -Castel-ceriolo. On the main road, just east of Alessandria, two bridges -span the Bormida. They were held by the Austrians, and were defended -by a single bridge-head on the right bank. The surrounding country is -generally quite flat, but towards the village of San Giuliano, which -lies on the main road about three miles east of Marengo, several -hillocks thereabout render the ground uneven.</p> - -<p>At daybreak on the morning of the 14th of June, the Austrians began -to cross the Bormida and to issue from the bridge-head on the right -bank. Three thousand soldiers under General O'Reilly crossed first. -They drove back the French outposts and advanced towards Marengo. This -vanguard was followed by a division under Haddick, and that in turn by -another under Kaim. At eight o'clock these forces, having deployed, -began the battle. Being well supplied with cannon, they opened the -attack with a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> heavy artillery fire, then pressed forward towards -Marengo.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, word was sent to Bonaparte that the whole Austrian army was -advancing. During the deployment of the Austrians, Victor at Marengo -had taken up a position in front of the village along the muddy stream -of Fontanone. Here he received the attacks of the Austrians, and -finally succeeded in driving them back. But the Austrian line was soon -strongly re-enforced. Melas directed two more divisions on Marengo, -and, having detached Ott's division, directed it on Castel-ceriolo, in -order to take the French in flank on that side.</p> - -<p>About ten o'clock Lannes brought his corps into line on the right -of Victor. He was supported by a cavalry brigade under Champeaux. -Kellerman's brigade of cavalry supported Victor. Meanwhile General -Ott, having arrived near Castel-ceriolo, began to threaten the French -right, which movement obliged Lannes to form front in that direction -with a part of his corps. The French line of battle, numbering about -fifteen thousand men, was about two miles long. It followed the -general direction of the Fontanone northward from Marengo towards -Castel-ceriolo, and westward from Marengo towards the Bormida. Facing -this line were the Austrian troops, numbering twenty-nine thousand -five hundred men. General Ott formed the left, and the reserve<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> under -General Elsnitz was in the rear. Having been informed that Suchet had -reached Acqui, Melas had, during the morning, sent two thousand five -hundred of his reserve cavalry to reconnoitre in that direction.</p> - -<p>At ten o'clock Melas attacked with fury the whole French line. He made -a determined effort to drive back Victor's corps and to gain possession -of Marengo. Along the stream in front of the village the struggle was -fierce and bloody. Both sides fought desperately. Melas felt that he -<i>must</i> conquer. Knowing that his situation was critical, and that -nothing short of victory could save his army, he fought with the -courage of despair. The French, too, fought like demons. Their victory -at Montebello had encouraged them; and now, having sought and found -their enemy, they expected to be again triumphant. With determination -they resisted the onsets of Melas. Before the furious attacks of -superior numbers, in the face of cannon, sabre, and steel, they stood -to their work like men. But all their efforts were unavailing. Against -so fierce an attack Victor could not long hold his position. He was -compelled to fall back to Marengo, where he again made a desperate -effort to stop the advance of the Austrians. For a time he held on to -the village, but was finally forced to give way. His corps was routed; -his soldiers became demoralized. In disorder they retired towards San -Giuliano, followed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> by the victorious Austrians. Meanwhile, Lannes had -held his position against the attacks of Melas in his front and of -Ott on his right. But when Victor gave way, Lannes found himself in a -desperate situation. This movement uncovered the left of his corps and -threatened it with destruction. Thus outflanked on both wings and hard -pressed in front, he saw defeat near at hand. In fact the Austrians -were on the point of sweeping everything before them. Though the French -were still fighting bravely, it was evident that they must soon fall -back into the plain, or else be routed and destroyed.</p> - -<p>Such was the situation at eleven o'clock when Bonaparte arrived. Having -received word early in the morning that the whole Austrian army was -advancing towards Marengo, he immediately sent Desaix orders to return, -then hurried to the front with all the troops that he could collect. -He brought with him the Consular Guard, Monnier's division, and two -regiments of cavalry,—in all about seven thousand men. A single glance -sufficed to show Bonaparte what should be done. He formed the Consular -Guard into squares to hold the Austrian cavalry in check, directed a -column on Castel-ceriolo, sent the greater part of Monnier's division -to re-enforce Lannes, and ordered Murat with the reserve cavalry to -protect as best he could the retreat of Victor's corps. Again the -struggle was renewed with increased<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> fury; but all the efforts of -Bonaparte and of Lannes could not now turn the tide of battle in favor -of the French. With an almost resistless momentum, Melas pressed -forward. Seeing victory just within his grasp, he strained every nerve -to crush and annihilate his adversary. He ordered his reserves to the -front and threw them into the fight. Repeatedly his cavalry charged the -French, cut in on their flanks, and threatened them with destruction; -and, while the left of his line was resisting bravely the heroic -efforts of Lannes, he himself issued from Marengo with his victorious -troops, and directed them upon the flank of the French.</p> - -<p>It was no longer possible for Bonaparte to hold his ground. He ordered -a retreat. Again the heroism of Lannes displayed itself on that -sanguinary field. Fighting as he retired, he fell back slowly and in -admirable order. For more than two hours he prolonged the conflict, -while being forced back from position to position over a distance of -nearly two miles. But, finally, his indomitable spirit was compelled -to yield. His corps was driven from the field. At length, shattered, -crushed, almost demoralized, it retired behind the hillocks near San -Giuliano, where the remnants of Victor's corps had assembled.</p> - -<p>The Austrians had conquered. On the plain of Marengo Melas had defeated -Bonaparte. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> victory seemed complete. There appeared to be no longer -any hope for Bonaparte. The French had been driven three miles beyond -Marengo. The greater part of their cavalry had been destroyed. More -than two thirds of their cannon had been captured. Fragments only -of their infantry organizations remained. On that bloody field six -thousand French soldiers had been killed, wounded, or captured. Such -was the result of the struggle at Marengo on the morning of the 14th -of June, 1800. Who would have thought that before the close of that -eventful day the vanquished would become the victors?</p> - -<p>Thus far Melas had exhibited great energy and courage; but when the -French had been driven from the field, and the excitement of the -conflict had ended, he felt deeply the effects of his exertion. The -weight of years, too, bore heavily upon him. Fully convinced that he -had gained a complete victory over Bonaparte, he left the command -of the army to his chief of staff, General Zach, and, having sent -despatches to his government announcing the result, returned to -Alessandria exhausted with fatigue.</p> - -<p>General Zach now rearranged his troops for the purpose of following the -French, whom he believed to be completely routed. But the Austrians -were not in a condition to pursue the enemy promptly and vigorously. -Their cavalry, in particular, had been roughly handled by Victor<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> and -Lannes during the morning; and, moreover, it was much weakened by the -two thousand five hundred men that Melas had detached towards Acqui to -observe Suchet. Considerable time was therefore spent in perfecting the -arrangements of Zach. In fact, it was near four o'clock when he began -to advance. At the head of about five thousand Austrians he pushed -forward along the high-road leading from Marengo to San Giuliano. He -was followed at a distance of three quarters of a mile by the corps -of Kaim, and it in turn by the Hungarian infantry. At the same time -General Ott marched eastward from Castel-ceriolo towards Ghilina. The -Austrian troops were only partially deployed. Not expecting great -resistance, they were moving forward in marching order rather than in -order of battle.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the French, not being vigorously pursued, had halted, and, -unperceived by the Austrians, had begun to rally behind the hillocks -near San Giuliano. At this time Bonaparte was awaiting anxiously the -arrival of Desaix. Early in the morning he had sent him an order to -return; but before it reached its destination Desaix, having heard the -sound of the first cannon-shot at Marengo, halted his division. Judging -from the thunder of the guns that a battle had begun between the French -and Austrians on the plain of Marengo, he hurriedly despatched several -cavalry troops to Novi, in order to assure himself<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> that no Austrians -were in that vicinity, then faced about his troops and marched to the -sound of the cannon. Hour after hour he pushed eagerly forward. At -about four o'clock in the afternoon the head of his column appeared -near San Giuliano.</p> - -<p>Upon the arrival of Desaix Bonaparte's spirits rose. Though most of -the French officers favored a retreat, Bonaparte was opposed to this -course. Desaix, too, concurred in the views of the First Consul. In -fact, Desaix was anxious to renew the struggle. Though he saw that the -battle was lost, he did not despair of yet gaining another.</p> - -<p>Accordingly, Bonaparte at once formed Desaix's division, and the French -troops about San Giuliano, into line of battle. Desaix's division was -placed across the highway along which the Austrians were advancing. On -his right were Lannes, Monnier, and the Consular Guard; in his rear -was Victor. Kellerman's brigade of cavalry took a position to the left -and rear of Desaix, and Champeaux's brigade to the right and rear of -Lannes. Bonaparte had only twelve guns remaining. He placed them on the -right of Desaix towards the front of the battle-line.</p> - -<p>Such were the positions of the French, when suddenly there appeared -from behind the rising ground in their front the column of Zach. Though -this column was preceded by an advance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span> guard with cavalry on each -flank, the greater part of the Austrian troops were marching somewhat -carelessly, and were surprised when they came thus unexpectedly upon -the whole French army in position for battle. Immediately, the French -guns opened upon Zach; at the same time Desaix made a furious assault -upon him. Kellerman, too, having been directed towards the right and -rear of Desaix's division during the early stages of the battle, then -moved forward past the right of Desaix and attacked vigorously the -Austrian cavalry. Having routed it, he wheeled his troopers to the left -and struck in flank the Austrian column, which was already much shaken -by the assault of Desaix. Everywhere the Austrians were overwhelmed; -two thousand were captured, among whom was General Zach himself. -Bonaparte now pushed eagerly forward with his entire force, and in turn -attacked and defeated the corps of Kaim and the Hungarian infantry. -Continuing to advance, he forced the Austrians back to Marengo. Here -they attempted to make a stand, but were again defeated and routed. In -disorder they retired towards Alessandria.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile General Ott, hearing the firing towards Marengo, marched in -that direction; but he only arrived in time to cover the retreat of -the main body across the Bormida. By ten o'clock that night all the -Austrian troops had recrossed the river. Thus Bonaparte won in the -afternoon<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> the battle that he had lost in the morning. Thus a great -disaster was turned into a great victory. Once more the Austrians were -crushed; once more the French were triumphant.</p> - -<p>On the following morning, Bonaparte made preparations to assault the -bridge-head and to cross the Bormida, in order to attack the Austrians -in Alessandria. But in the meantime Melas sent an officer to the French -headquarters to propose terms of surrender. On the same day, the 15th -of June, the negotiations were completed, and an armistice between -Melas and Bonaparte was signed. By the terms of surrender Melas was -allowed to march out of Alessandria with the honors of war, and to -proceed thence to Mantua; in return, he was to evacuate the whole of -northern Italy as far as the Mincio, to surrender the fortresses of -Coni, Alessandria, Genoa, and Tortona, and the fortified cities of -Milan, Turin, Pizzighettone, Placentia, Ceva, Savona, and Arona.</p> - -<p>In proportion to the number of combatants at Marengo the losses on both -sides were large. Seven thousand Austrians were killed or wounded, and -three thousand were captured. The French loss in killed and wounded was -equal to that of the Austrians, but only one thousand were captured. -Among the first of the French soldiers killed in the battle of the -afternoon was Desaix. While gallantly leading his division against -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> Austrians he was shot through the body and fell dead on the -battle-field. His loss was deeply felt by the First Consul and by the -French nation.</p> - -<p>On the 15th of May Bonaparte had begun the passage of the Great St. -Bernard with the Army of Reserve. On the 15th of June he received the -surrender of the Austrian army in Italy. In one month, he had crossed -the Alps, entered Milan, severed the Austrian communications, fought -and won a great battle, and, as a result, obtained possession of the -greater part of northern Italy.</p> - -<p>Thus ended the campaign of Marengo. It brought about a temporary peace -between France and Austria; it excited to a high pitch the military -spirit of the French people; and it fixed ultimately upon the head of -Bonaparte an emperor's crown. Upon the political history of Europe -it produced far-reaching results. It precipitated a contest between -England and France, between France and Europe, which, at irregular -intervals for fifteen years, was destined to continue, until, finally, -on the field of Waterloo, Napoleon's cannon were silenced forever.</p> - - -<p class="center">COMMENTS.</p> - -<p>At the outset one hundred thousand Austrians were occupying northern -Italy. Fifty-five thousand were at Genoa and along the Var; two -thousand along the Maritime Alps; five thousand at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> the foot of the -Mont Cenis Pass; three thousand in the valley of the Aosta; and ten -thousand in the vicinity of Milan. The remaining twenty-five thousand -were scattered throughout northern Italy. They were engaged mostly -in garrisoning the fortresses and fortified cities, and in holding -possession of the country.</p> - -<p>It will be seen that Melas had so stationed his troops that he was -weak at all points. Except at Genoa and along the Var, the Austrian -army may be said to have been composed of a number of detachments -scattered throughout northern Italy. Melas seemed to think that he must -occupy every fortress, and guard every road and pass, in order to make -secure his position in Italy. Herein lay his great fault; for, his -forces being thus scattered, he could not unite them readily to oppose -Bonaparte. Though Melas learned of the march of the Army of Reserve on -Milan more than two weeks before the battle of Marengo, yet he was able -to assemble only thirty-two thousand men at Alessandria to oppose the -French.</p> - -<p>The main cause, however, of the defeat of Melas was the fact that he -was completely deceived as to the intentions of the First Consul. He -had no expectation that Bonaparte would cross the Alps; in fact, he did -not believe in the existence of an army of reserve. Having reached this -conclusion from the reports of his own spies, and from the instructions -sent him by the Aulic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> Council, he was utterly confounded when the -French descended into Italy from the Mont Cenis, the Great St. Bernard, -the Simplon, and St. Gothard passes. Not knowing by which route the -strongest column was entering Italy, he knew not where to strike. -Consequently, he hesitated and was lost.</p> - -<p>Had he fathomed the designs of his adversary in time, he might have -rapidly united his forces, and have defeated the several French columns -in succession before they could have united in Italy; for, inasmuch -as Bonaparte's object was to unite his columns within the Austrian -theatre of operations, Melas could concentrate there more quickly than -Bonaparte.</p> - -<p>On the 29th of May Melas learned of the march of the Army of Reserve on -Milan. He then had a splendid opportunity to strike Bonaparte a telling -blow. His command at Turin numbered sixteen or seventeen thousand -men. In his front at Chivasso and along the Po was Lannes with six or -seven thousand. On his left was Thurreau with four thousand. Had Melas -left four or five thousand men to hold Thurreau in check, and boldly -attacked Lannes with the remainder of his forces, he could easily have -defeated Lannes, and have immediately thereafter obtained possession -of Bonaparte's communications with France. Such a master stroke would -have greatly embarrassed Bonaparte; for he would then have been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> -obliged either to turn back and fight Melas, in order to recover his -communications with France, or to push on and fight Vukassovich, in -order to establish his communications with Switzerland. Had Bonaparte -adopted the former course, Vukassovich could have closed in on the -French rear and have thus aided Melas; had he adopted the latter -course, Melas could have aided Vukassovich.</p> - -<p>That Melas did not carry out this course was due to the fact that -no sooner had he learned of the destination of the Army of Reserve -than he began to tremble for the safety of his own army. He at once -perceived that it was the intention of Bonaparte to sever the Austrian -communications. He therefore abandoned any intention which he may have -had of attacking Lannes and of seizing the communications of Bonaparte, -in order to take the necessary measures for the preservation of his own -communications.</p> - -<p>Consider now the operations of Bonaparte; they are worthy of careful -study. No one who stops to consider the smallness of the means with -which he defeated the Austrians in this campaign can fail to appreciate -his genius.</p> - -<p>At the outset an Austrian army of one hundred thousand men, led -by a courageous commander, was in possession of northern Italy. -Everywhere Melas had defeated the French. Masséna at Genoa was about -to surrender; and Suchet along the Var was fighting desperately to -prevent the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> invasion of France. Melas, encouraged by these successes, -looked hopefully forward to new triumphs. Such was the situation when -Bonaparte entered Italy with his columns, numbering in all a little -less than sixty thousand men. With these forces he plunged into the -Austrian theatre of operations, and in a month ended the campaign. -He so manœuvred that a victory of twenty-eight thousand Frenchmen -over twenty-nine thousand five hundred Austrians decided the fate of -one hundred thousand Austrians and gained for him the greater part of -northern Italy.</p> - -<p>How, in so short a time and with so few forces, did Bonaparte -accomplish such results? In these comments an attempt will be made to -answer this question. It is our purpose to analyze somewhat critically -the strategical manœuvres of Bonaparte, to compare the things he did -with what he might have done, and to show why the whole of northern -Italy fell into his possession as a result of the victory at Marengo. -It is our purpose, also, to discuss the battle of Marengo from a -tactical point of view, and to set forth some of the reasons why the -battle, lost in the morning, was won in the afternoon.</p> - -<p>The portion of northern Italy then occupied by the Austrians is divided -by the Po and Apennines into three unequal parts, through all which -roads pass eastwardly from the French frontier to Mantua. Bonaparte, -having decided to lead the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> Army of Reserve into Italy, might have -adopted any one of three plans. He might have marched into the southern -part of the Austrian theatre of operations, lying between the Apennines -and the Gulf of Genoa; or into the middle part between the Apennines -and the Po; or into the northern part between the Po and Switzerland. -Let us examine each of these plans, in order to determine, if possible, -which would have procured him the greatest advantages.</p> - -<p>Inasmuch as the mountainous and narrow strip of country lying between -the Apennines and the sea was peculiarly fitted for the operations of -an inferior army, composed mostly of infantry, and inasmuch as the Army -of Reserve was deficient in both cavalry and artillery, it might seem -that Bonaparte should have united his army with Suchet's forces on the -Var for an attack against Melas. But other considerations deterred -Bonaparte from doing so. His objections to this course were that even -if he succeeded in forcing the crossings of the Var, the Austrians, -as they fell back from position to position, would be constantly -re-enforced, and could maintain the siege of Genoa. And again: if he -succeeded in driving them across the Apennines and in defeating them -at Genoa, they could still fall back along their communications to -their base of operations on the Mincio, where they would be protected -by Lake Garda on one side and by the fortress of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> Mantua on the other. -Even should the Army of Reserve and all the undefeated portions of -the Army of Italy be united into one army, Bonaparte's total strength -would not exceed seventy thousand men. With this force he could hardly -expect to defeat one hundred thousand Austrians flushed by their recent -successes. Furthermore, by adopting this plan, no opportunity would be -offered him of severing the Austrian communications.</p> - -<p>"An ordinary general," says Jomini, "alarmed by the victorious attitude -of the Austrians in Piedmont, would have gone in all haste by Dauphiné -toward Provence, and made the Alps the theatre of operations. But -Bonaparte appreciated too well the difficulties of a frontal attack. He -preferred to cross the mountains upon the rear of the imperial forces -and gain the Ticino unopposed, where his presence could not fail to -recall his adversaries, and compel them to accept battle with all the -chances of success against them."</p> - -<p>In order to accomplish this result, Bonaparte had purposely led Melas -to believe that the Army of Reserve was intended to re-enforce the -Army of Italy. Though Melas did not believe in the existence of an -army of reserve, he knew that an effort was being made to organize -troops in France, and he believed that they would eventually be sent -to join Suchet. But the First<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> Consul had no intention of doing what -Melas expected him to do. It was necessary to the success of Bonaparte -that he should conceal as much as possible his own purposes, in order -to be able to surprise his adversary. In war it is always wise to -lead the enemy to believe that an attack will be made in a different -direction from that intended. "In whatever way strategy is employed," -says Colonel Maurice, "surprise and concealment are essential to -success. On this account it will continually happen, in selecting a -line of operations or a scheme of campaign, that the most important -point of all is to carry out just what an enemy does not expect. Very -often successful campaigns, the method of which has been subsequently -much criticised, have owed their success to the fact that, from a nice -calculation of time and distance, the successful general has seen that -he could carry through an operation dangerous in itself, but sure not -to be the one expected by his opponent. For the same reason, in all the -brilliant and successful efforts of strategic skill, steps have been -taken beforehand to carry out the preliminary movements of an army in -such a way as to leave an enemy up to the last moment uncertain in what -direction the blow would be struck."</p> - -<p>Had Bonaparte marched into the middle part of the Austrian theatre -of operations, it would have been necessary to cross the Alps over -the Mont<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span> Cenis Pass. The objections to this plan were that the -country lying between the Apennines and the Po contained the strong -fortifications of Turin, Coni, Alessandria, and Tortona, which would -enable the Austrians to hold Bonaparte in check long enough for Melas -to concentrate his scattered forces. Furthermore, by entering Italy -over this pass, Bonaparte would approach the centre of the Austrian -line, which would enable the Austrians to concentrate against him more -rapidly than if he moved against either flank of their position. Again: -since the Austrians held the passes of the Apennines, they could delay -the advance of the French on Genoa and continue the siege; or, if -defeated, could fall back along the great highway leading from Piedmont -through the Stradella Pass to Mantua.</p> - -<p>Though the great chain of the Alps seemed to present an almost -impassable barrier to an army attempting to enter the extreme northern -part of Italy from France or Switzerland, Bonaparte did not allow -this fact to deter him from his great undertaking. There were several -reasons why he adopted this plan.</p> - -<p>First: He knew that Melas was not expecting the French to enter this -part of Italy.</p> - -<p>Second: He knew that the country lying between the Po and Switzerland -contained but few fortifications, and was occupied by only a few -thousand Austrians.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span></p> - -<p>Third: Owing to the fact that he had deceived Melas as to the existence -and destination of the Army of Reserve, Bonaparte believed that he -could cross the Alps with this army, march to Milan, and there be -joined by Moncey's corps before Melas should discover his plan.</p> - -<p>Fourth: Inasmuch as all the roads leading from the French frontier -to the Austrian base of operations on the Mincio passed through -the country lying between Milan and Placentia, he hoped that, by -adopting this plan, he would be able to assemble his forces in this -space, seize the roads there, and thus completely sever the Austrian -communications and place Melas in a position where he must fight under -a great disadvantage. With the French in possession of these roads, -Melas would be compelled to concentrate and fight in order to recover -his communications and save his army. In doing so he would be forced -to raise the siege of Genoa and to abandon the attempted invasion of -France.</p> - -<p>Fifth: Should Bonaparte succeed in concentrating his forces as here set -forth, the advantages of his position would be immense. The St. Gothard -and Simplon routes in his rear would give him a safe retreat into the -great stronghold of Switzerland in case of defeat; the Ticino would -protect his right flank, the Adda his left; and the fertile plains of -the Po would furnish the necessary supplies for his men and animals, -while he was mak<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span>ing ready to fight the Austrians or awaiting their -attack.</p> - -<p>Such are the principal reasons that decided Bonaparte to march the -Army of Reserve into that part of Italy lying between the Po and -Switzerland. But, having decided on this course, he had yet to -determine whether he would lead the Army of Reserve across the Great -St. Bernard, or march it into Switzerland and thence descend into Italy -by way of the St. Gothard or the Simplon. It will be remembered that -for a time he was undecided as to what course to take, and did not -fully make up his mind until some time after the Army of Reserve had -assembled at Lake Geneva.</p> - -<p>In several respects the safest course that Bonaparte could have taken -was to conduct his army into Switzerland, unite it with Moncey's corps, -and march on Milan by way of the St. Gothard Pass. Had he adopted this -course, he would have entered Italy with united forces along a single -line of operations, and would have avoided the dangerous flank march -from Ivrea to Milan within the enemy's territory. At this time his -objective was Milan. His purpose was to assemble his army and the corps -of Moncey in that vicinity. By crossing the Great St. Bernard with the -Army of Reserve, while Moncey marched by way of the St. Gothard Pass, -Bonaparte gave Melas the opportunity of concentrating the Austrian -forces<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> between the Army of Reserve and Moncey's corps, and of crushing -each in turn with superior numbers.</p> - -<p>In the comments on Moreau's operations in Germany, it has already -been remarked that it is always a dangerous operation to attempt a -concentration upon some designated place within the enemy's lines, -for, as a rule, the enemy can mass his forces there more rapidly than -the commander of an invading army; that in fact many a campaign has -failed because the commanding general has attempted to concentrate -his scattered forces upon some point within the territory held by -the enemy. By so doing he gives the enemy a chance to assemble his -forces between the separated columns of the attacking army, and to -bring superior numbers against each column in succession. Yet in these -operations Bonaparte not only committed this error, not only did what -he had condemned Moreau for doing, but he also violated the principle -which he himself had so often set forth and had so often exemplified, -namely, <i>not to invade a country with a double line of operations</i>.</p> - -<p>Why then did Bonaparte take this course? To answer satisfactorily this -question it is necessary to bear in mind that, at this time, Suchet was -fighting greatly superior forces on the Var, and that Masséna was in -desperate straits at Genoa. The problem before Bonaparte was not merely -to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> assemble his forces in the vicinity of Milan, but so to assemble -them there as to stop the projected invasion of France and bring speedy -relief to Masséna.</p> - -<p>The most direct route from Lake Geneva to Milan is by way of the Great -St. Bernard Pass, and thence through northern Italy. Had, therefore, -Bonaparte taken the longer route through Switzerland by way of the -St. Gothard, the Austrians, in the meantime, could have forced the -crossings of the Var, and have compelled Masséna to surrender. Indeed, -these events were the more likely to happen, inasmuch as the Army of -Reserve, during its march through Switzerland, would not threaten in -the least the Austrian communications.</p> - -<p>The importance of crossing the Great St. Bernard with the Army of -Reserve is seen in the fact that no sooner had French troops appeared -in the valley of the Aosta than Melas at once withdrew ten thousand men -from Suchet's front and ordered them to march on Turin. Thus, by the -mere crossing of the Great St. Bernard with the Army of Reserve, the -projected invasion of France was brought to an end. It was inevitable -that such should be the case; for as soon as the French appeared in the -extreme northern part of Italy, their mere presence there threatened -the communications of the Austrians. It was therefore necessary that -Melas should abandon the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> invasion of France, in order to destroy, if -possible, the French troops that were threatening his rear. In war, it -will ever be thus. No commander can afford to take the risk of pushing -forward to new conquests so long as his communications are seriously -threatened by his enemy.</p> - -<p>Again: it will be remembered that no sooner had Melas learned that the -Army of Reserve was marching on Milan than he sent orders to General -Elsnitz to abandon the Var and to General Ott to raise the siege of -Genoa. Even the mere knowledge of Bonaparte's destination, before the -movement on Milan had actually been completed, was of itself sufficient -to cause Melas to change immediately his entire plan of campaign. Had -not Masséna, at the time, been just on the point of giving up Genoa, -General Ott would not have delayed there two or three days to await the -capitulation. In fact, had Masséna known of the exact state of affairs, -he doubtless would have held out a day or two longer, and saved -himself the humiliation of a surrender. Even without a battle, the -concentration of the French forces between Milan and Placentia would, -in a short time, have set free Masséna's soldiers; for Melas would then -have been obliged to concentrate and fight, in order to recover his -communications and connect with his base of supplies. Bonaparte saw -clearly this fact. Though he did not know how<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> long Masséna could hold -out at Genoa, he realized that matters there were rapidly approaching -a crisis, and that it was of the utmost importance that the Army of -Reserve should reach Milan at the earliest possible moment. He realized -that upon the direction given his columns and upon the rapidity of -their movements depended the fate of Suchet on the Var and of Masséna -at Genoa.</p> - -<p>Other reasons, too, deterred Bonaparte from marching the Army of -Reserve through Switzerland. In this rough and mountainous country, -supplies could not be easily obtained. Especially was this true of the -St. Gothard route, which had been overrun by the French during the two -previous years. Besides, this route was reserved for Moncey's corps, -which, of itself, would tax to the utmost the resources of the country. -Moreover, this road, a mere bridle path in places, passes through -narrow defiles and across lofty and rugged mountains. Evidently a large -army issuing into Italy by this route would be so stretched out that -the advance divisions could be defeated before the rear divisions could -re-enforce them.</p> - -<p>The Simplon route was shorter than the St. Gothard route, but the -difficulties to be overcome on each were of the same character. -Inasmuch, however, as Lake Maggiore lies between these two routes, it -will be observed that, had Bona<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span>parte advanced into Italy by way of the -Simplon, while Moncey marched by way of the St. Gothard, Melas might -have assembled a strong force at the foot of the lake, and, from his -central position, have thrown superior numbers against each French -column in succession. In this way he might have defeated both in detail -before they could have united at Milan.</p> - -<p>The principal reasons why Bonaparte chose the Great St. Bernard route -having been considered, it will now be of interest to point out the -several courses that he might have taken after having descended the -Alps into the lower valley of the Aosta. It will be remembered that -on the 27th of May Bonaparte was between Ivrea and Chivasso with -thirty-five thousand men, and that Melas was at Turin with sixteen or -seventeen thousand. At this time Bonaparte might have taken any one -of three courses. He might have advanced on Turin, driven back Melas, -united with Thurreau's division at Susa, and thus have secured his -communications with France by the Mont Cenis route; or he might have -crossed the Po at Chivasso, attacked and driven Melas from Turin, then -have marched on Genoa by way of Alessandria; or, lastly, he might -have marched on Milan, and there have united his army with Moncey's -corps. In his memoirs Napoleon himself has discussed the advantages and -disadvantages of these plans as follows:—</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"Of these three courses, the first was contrary to the true -principles of war. Since Melas had considerable forces with him, the -French army, therefore, would run the risk of fighting without having -a certain retreat, Fort Bard not being then taken. Besides, if Melas -should abandon Turin and move on Alessandria, the campaign would be -a failure, and each army would find itself in its natural position: -the French army resting upon Mont Blanc and Dauphiné; and that of -Melas with its left at Genoa, and in its rear the fortified places of -Mantua, Placentia, and Milan.</p> - -<p>"The second course appeared impracticable: how hazardous would have -been the situation of the French between the Po and Genoa, in the -midst of an army so powerful as that of the Austrians, without any -line of operations<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> (communication), any assured retreat.</p> - -<p>"The third course, on the other hand, presented every advantage: -the French army, once in possession of Milan, would secure all the -magazines, depots, and hospitals, of the enemy's army; it would join -the left under General Moncey, and have a safe retreat by the Simplon -and St. Gothard. The Simplon led to the Valais and Sion, whither -all the magazines of provisions for the army had been sent. The St. -Gothard led into Switzerland, of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span>which we had been in possession for -two years, and which was covered by the Army of the Rhine then on the -Iller. In this position the French general was at liberty to act as -he pleased; if Melas should march with his whole army from Turin upon -the Sesia and the Ticino, the French army could give him battle with -this incalculable advantage, that, if it should be victorious, Melas, -with his retreat cut off, would be pursued and driven into Savoy; and -if it should be defeated, it could retreat by the Simplon and the St. -Gothard. If Melas, as it was natural to suppose, should move towards -Alessandria in order to join the army coming from Genoa, it might be -hoped that, by advancing towards him and crossing the Po, he might -be met and be forced to fight before he could reach Alessandria. (In -other words, before the troops of Melas, and of General Ott, coming -from Genoa, could unite at Alessandria.) The French army having its -rear secured by the river, and by Milan, the Simplon, and the St. -Gothard; while the Austrian army, having its retreat cut off, and -having no communications with Mantua and Austria, would be liable -to be thrown upon the mountains of the western coast of Genoa, or -entirely destroyed, or taken at the foot of the Alps, at the Col -di Tenda and in the county of Nice. Lastly, by adopting the third -course, if it should suit the First Consul, when once master of -Milan, to suffer Melas to pass, and to remain between the Po, the -Adda, and the Ticino, he would thus, without a battle, reconquer -Lombardy, and Piedmont, the Maritime Alps, and the Genoese territory, -and raise the blockade of that city; these were flattering results to -anticipate."</p></blockquote> - -<p>Bonaparte has been severely criticised for not taking the second -course, which he has so briefly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> discussed in his memoirs. It has -been represented that in marching on Milan, he sacrificed Masséna, -when he might have marched directly to the relief of Genoa by way of -Alessandria, and thus have saved his lieutenant the humiliation of a -surrender. But what are the facts? They are that Melas sent orders to -General Ott to raise the siege of Genoa before the Army of Reserve -had even reached Milan. Had, therefore, Bonaparte crossed the Po at -Chivasso, attacked and driven back Melas, and marched on Alessandria, -he could not have brought relief to Masséna any earlier.</p> - -<p>If Bonaparte had crossed the Po, he could undoubtedly have defeated -Melas and driven him back to Alessandria; but here the Austrian -commander, protected by the fortifications of the city, would doubtless -have made a stand, and would have collected a large force to oppose -Bonaparte. In this position, Melas would be joined by General Elsnitz, -already marching on Alessandria, and could receive re-enforcements -from General Ott and from General Vukassovich. Thus, in a short time, -he could outnumber Bonaparte's army. Moreover, at Alessandria he could -prevent the junction of Moncey's corps with the Army of Reserve, and -might possibly be able to defeat them in detail.</p> - -<p>In this position, Bonaparte, if defeated, would have no unobstructed -line of retreat, for Fort<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> Bard was still held by the Austrians; -and, if victorious, he could do no more than force Melas back along -the great highway to Mantua. In fact, should Melas be defeated at -Alessandria, he could fall back to the fortress of Tortona or to the -Stradella Pass, and there occupy another strong position. Here, with -the re-enforcements that would doubtless join him from Genoa, from -Vukassovich's corps, and from the fortresses in his rear, he would -still have great chances of success.</p> - -<p>In short, it would have been the height of folly for Bonaparte, with -no secure line of retreat, to march into the centre of the Austrian -theatre of operations, and expect to conquer Italy with but thirty-five -thousand men. Even though it had been necessary to sacrifice Masséna, -Bonaparte would have been justified in marching on Milan; for, in no -other way could he be joined by Moncey's corps; in no other way could -he sever the Austrian communications, and in no other way could he hope -to defeat Melas and conquer Italy. Victory was his object.</p> - -<p>The most critical part of Bonaparte's operations was the flank march -from Ivrea to Milan; for at this time his only line of retreat was by -way of the Great St. Bernard; and even on this route the Austrians -still held Fort Bard.</p> - -<p>Under ordinary circumstances, a flank march is always more or less a -hazardous undertaking.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span> When a commander makes this movement and is -attacked in route, he must form front to a flank,<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> and fight with -his battle-line parallel to his communications, while the enemy can -fight with his front perpendicular to his communications. In this -position the advantage of the enemy is enormous. If victorious, he -severs the communications of his adversary, and may then capture or -destroy his army; if defeated, he can retreat in safety along his -communications, or fall back to a new position, fight again, and -thus prolong the conflict. An army without communications is like a -rudderless ship adrift on the ocean. In order to fight, soldiers must -have food and ammunition. No greater calamity, short of defeat, can -befall a commander than to be cut from his base of operations and lose -his source of supply.</p> - -<p>Had, therefore, the Army of Reserve been defeated while marching from -Ivrea to Milan, it would have lost its line of communication by way -of the Great St. Bernard. In that case it would undoubtedly have been -captured or destroyed; for since the Italian entrances of the St. -Gothard and Simplon passes were then held by ten thousand Austrians -under Vukassovich, Bonaparte could not have retreated into Switzerland.</p> - -<p>That Bonaparte appreciated the critical features of the situation is -seen in the skill with which he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span> planned and executed the march. By -ordering Lannes to make preparations to cross the Po at Chivasso, -Bonaparte gave Melas the impression that the French intended to cross -the Po and attack the Austrians near Turin. Thus Melas was deceived. -Meanwhile Bonaparte, with the greater part of the Army of Reserve, -marched rapidly on Milan. During the march Lannes descended the -Po towards Pavia, thus covering as with a screen the movements of -Bonaparte. So skilfully were these manœuvres made that Melas did not -even attempt to cross the river, in fact, did not even learn of the -march of Bonaparte until the 29th of May, two days after the movement -had begun. On the 31st Bonaparte arrived on the Ticino; and on the 2d -of June, having driven back Vukassovich's corps, he entered Milan. Here -the critical part of his march ended, for he was then sure of being -joined by Moncey's corps, and had, in case of need, a safe line of -retreat into Switzerland by the St. Gothard and Simplon passes.</p> - -<p>Another circumstance that aided Bonaparte in this march was the -presence of Thurreau's division of four thousand men at Susa. Melas, -being ignorant of the strength of this division, hesitated to push -forward and attack Lannes, so long as these troops remained undefeated -on his flank and rear. On this point General Hamley makes the following -comments:—</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"Thurreau's force, being entirely separated from the main army -throughout the operations, was useful only as leading the enemy to -a false conclusion. But its value in that respect was incalculable. -There were sufficient Austrian troops round Turin to check Thurreau -and crush Lannes, thus laying bare the rear of the French army. But -the road of the Mont Cenis was both more practicable and more direct -than that of the St. Bernard; moreover, Thurreau had artillery, -and Lannes, at first, had not, for his guns had been delayed by -the difficulties of passing the Austrian fort of Bard. It was but -a natural error, therefore, for Melas to believe that Thurreau was -backed by the whole French army."</p></blockquote> - -<p>Upon his arrival at Milan a threefold problem confronted Bonaparte. -His object was to prevent the escape of the Austrians, to preserve his -communications with Switzerland, and, in case of an Austrian attack, -to make a quick concentration for battle. The skill with which he -solved this complex problem will become apparent, if we turn to the -map and study the positions of the French forces immediately after the -arrival of Moncey's corps. These forces numbered fifty-five thousand -men. Thirty-two thousand were stationed along the Po from Placentia -to the Stradella Pass on the great highway leading from Alessandria -to Mantua; ten thousand were stationed on the Ticino; ten thousand on -the Adda; and three thousand at Milan. Thus it will be seen that these -forces were occupying the sides of the triangular space enclosed by -the Ticino, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span> Po, and the Adda; and that they held possession of -all the roads leading from the Alps to the Austrian base of operations -on the Mincio. The ten thousand men on the Ticino not only protected -the Italian entrance to the St. Gothard on the west side, but they -were in a position to dispute the passage of the Ticino, should Melas -cross to the north side of the Po and attempt to reach Mantua by way -of Pavia and Milan. In the event that Melas should adopt this plan, -the resistance that these ten thousand men could offer him would give -Bonaparte time to unite all his forces for battle on the north side of -the Po. The thirty-two thousand men on the south side of the Po closed -with a barrier of steel the great highway leading from Alessandria to -Mantua. On this road they had fortified a camp at the Stradella; and -across the Po they had constructed five bridges, which would enable -Bonaparte, in an emergency, to recross the river rapidly with these -troops. The ten thousand men along the Adda not only covered the -Italian entrance to the St. Gothard on the east side, but they were -in a favorable position for holding in check Vukassovich's corps, -should it attempt to march westward to the relief of Melas. It will -be observed, too, that, should Melas attempt to escape by marching to -Genoa, and thence to Mantua by way of Bobbio and Placentia, the French -forces about Placentia and along the Adda could delay the progress of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span> -the Austrians long enough for Bonaparte to concentrate all his forces -against them.</p> - -<p>Occupying a triangle in the heart of northern Italy, the French corps -and divisions supported one another. In a few hours Bonaparte could -concentrate nearly the whole of his army on the Po, on the Ticino, -or on the Adda. In this position he held complete possession of the -Austrian communications, and had his own with Switzerland strongly -guarded. In this position he could concentrate quickly, and fight with -nearly every advantage in his favor.</p> - -<p>"Napoleon has told us," says Colonel Hart, "that the whole art of -war—the secret of success—consists in being strongest at the decisive -point." Even when making a great flank or turning movement against -his enemy, Napoleon kept this principle constantly in view. Thus, -in these operations, though at the outset the several columns under -his immediate command, numbering nearly sixty thousand men, entered -Italy from different directions, separated by intervening obstacles -and great distances, yet, by deceiving his adversary and by skilful -manœuvres, he succeeded in conducting fifty-five thousand men into -such positions that they could, in an emergency, support one another -on a single battle-field. His theory of war was concentration. His -constant endeavor was to outnumber the enemy in battle. In order to -accomplish this result, he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span> nearly always made a great effort to -call in his detachments just previous to a general engagement. His -skill in strategy consisted in so directing his columns that when -needed they could be quickly assembled on the battle-field. His skill -in war consisted in the fact that he nearly always brought greater -numbers against his enemy on the day of battle, even when he was -outnumbered within the theatre of operations. On the battle-field, -too, when it was impossible to outnumber his adversary, his quick eye -discerned the vital point, the key of the position, so to speak; and -there, neglecting the less important points, he massed his troops and -overwhelmed his enemy. But in this campaign, strange to relate, after -the battle of Montebello, and prior to the battle of Marengo, he seemed -to neglect the principle of calling in his columns. When he assembled -his forces south of the Po in the Stradella Pass, he felt certain -that Melas would shortly advance eastward from Alessandria to attack -him; yet he issued no orders for his forces north of the Po to join -him. Again: at Marengo he was outnumbered, while ten thousand French -soldiers along the Ticino, but a short distance away, had not a single -Austrian in their front.</p> - -<p>Inasmuch as Bonaparte held the crossings of the Po between Pavia -and Cremona, he could easily have assembled the greater part of his -army<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span> on the south side of the Po, and have brought greatly superior -numbers against Melas. But Bonaparte feared that, if he adopted this -plan, Melas might cross the Po and make his escape by way of Pavia -and Milan. It will be remembered that, just prior to the battle of -Marengo, Bonaparte was completely in the dark as to the movements of -his adversary. He did not know but that the Austrian commander was -making preparations to escape. As a matter of fact Bonaparte had lost -touch of his enemy. He was in a state of confusion and uncertainty as -to the intentions of Melas. He could not understand why the Austrians -did not march eastward from Alessandria and attack the French, unless -it was because they were about to attempt their escape by way of Pavia -and Milan, or by way of Genoa. Had Bonaparte known the true state of -affairs; had he known that the Austrians would soon cross the Bormida -to attack the French, undoubtedly he would have assembled on the -battle-field the ten thousand men stationed along the Ticino. That -he did not do so was an error; perhaps, under the circumstances, an -unavoidable one, but nevertheless an error, for he was outnumbered at -Marengo when he might easily have outnumbered his adversary. In fact, -nearly all his operations after the battle of Montebello are open to -criticism. They are not up to the standard of the ordinary operations -of Napoleon. His forces were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> scattered when they might have been -united. He attempted too much. In order to win everything, he incurred -unnecessary hazard. In order to prevent the Austrians from escaping, he -took too great a risk on the battle-field.</p> - -<p>It will be borne in mind that it is easy for any one, having a fair -knowledge of the science of war, to point out, after the event, the -mistakes that were made. During active operations confusion and doubt -are constant factors that cannot be ignored by a commander. Neither -Bonaparte nor his officers knew, or could know, the facts as we know -them to-day. Thus the military student is able, after months of study, -to point out the errors made by a great master of war. He approaches -the subject from a different point of view from that of the commanding -general. He is cognizant of facts, many of which at the time were -unknown to the head of the army. He writes in the light; Napoleon -marched in the darkness. He has the details of the campaign at his -finger's end; Napoleon had to form his conclusions from the doubtful -information at hand. Thus it is that mediocrity can criticise what -genius alone can conceive and execute.</p> - -<p>Again: it must be remembered that the really great soldier is not he -who never makes a mistake, but he who in the aggregate makes the fewest -mistakes. In war the conditions are such that a commander cannot by -any possibility<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span> always know the truth. He must often decide momentous -questions on the spur of the moment, basing his decisions on unreliable -information obtained mostly from reports and rumors. "Speak to me of -a general who has made no mistakes in war," says Turenne, "and you -speak of one who has seldom made war." "In the profession of war," says -Napoleon, "the game is always to the one who makes the fewest mistakes."</p> - -<p>If Bonaparte had withdrawn all his forces to the south side of the Po, -Melas might have made his escape by way of Pavia and Milan, but even -then Bonaparte would have won northern Italy without a battle. Had -Melas taken this course, it is evident that he would have severed the -communications of Bonaparte with Switzerland. Though the loss of the -French communications would doubtless have inconvenienced Bonaparte, -it would not have put a stop to his active operations, nor have proved -fatal to his army; for he could then have united his forces with those -of Suchet, and have at once established another line of communication -with France by way of Nice. On this point General Hamley, one of the -greatest of military critics, comments as follows:—</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"There was a special circumstance in this campaign which should have -induced Napoleon to bring his whole army to the south bank. For if -Melas moved through Milan he would leave the country south of the Po -clear for Napoleon to establish another and better communi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span>cation -with France by the south of the Apennines, and, moreover, a junction -with Suchet would be effected, and the territory which was to be the -prize of the campaign would be lost to the Austrians. But Napoleon -could not be satisfied to let the enemy escape, even at such a -sacrifice of territory, and therefore it was that he left the Ticino -guarded."</p></blockquote> - -<p>In studying these operations, one cannot but be struck by the fact -that Bonaparte seemed extremely anxious to retain his communications -with Switzerland. The arrangement of his forces was admirable for -this purpose. Even when he fought at Marengo, he had unobstructed -communication across the Po to Milan, and thence to the St. Gothard -Pass. Rather than weaken his communications by withdrawing his forces -from the Ticino, he seemed to prefer the hazard of battle with a -superior enemy. In a critical examination of these operations, it is -almost impossible not to come to the conclusion that Bonaparte had a -good reason for holding on to his communications with Switzerland. -Being at the head of the French government, he had control of the -armies of the Republic. He had crossed the Alps to conquer. Much -depended on his success, for his own destiny hung in the balance. -Undoubtedly he intended to return to France triumphant, whatever should -be the cost. He was bold enough to stake all on a single throw—to -hazard his own and his country's fate on a single battle.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> If he should -be defeated at Marengo and be driven out of the valley of the Po, might -he not retreat through Switzerland into Germany with the remnants of -his forces? Might he not unite them with Moreau's army, crush Kray in -the valley of the Danube, march on the Austrian capital, and "conquer -Italy at Vienna"? Is it not possible that this may have been the reason -why he held on so persistently to his communications with Switzerland?</p> - -<p>In this discussion it has just been assumed that Bonaparte might -have been driven out of the valley of the Po. But this assumption -is altogether improbable. Even if Bonaparte had been defeated at -Marengo, the chances of his success on another field in Italy would -still have been greatly in his favor. It needs but a glance at the -situation to substantiate this statement. It is evident that if Melas -had been victorious at Marengo, he would have attempted to open up -his communications with Mantua, by marching eastward from Alessandria -through the Stradella Pass. His victorious troops would have numbered -at the most but twenty-three thousand men. Doubtless Bonaparte, while -holding the Stradella Pass with the detachment already there, would -have fallen back across the Po with the remnants of his defeated -forces, numbering not less than eighteen thousand men; and would have -united them with his columns on the north side of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span> river. In this -way he could have collected in a short time on the north bank of the -Po an army of about forty thousand men to oppose the twenty-three -thousand under Melas. In this position the French communications would -have been in no danger; but the Austrians, in order to recover their -communications, would have been obliged to force the intrenched camp -of the Stradella; which operation would have given Bonaparte time to -cross the Po and attack the Austrians in flank. Having the advantage of -position and an overwhelming superiority in numbers, Bonaparte would -undoubtedly have crushed and destroyed the army of Melas. If this -statement seems too strong, reflect a moment, remember that during his -entire career Napoleon never lost a battle in which he outnumbered his -adversary.</p> - -<p>In the result of the victory at Marengo is seen the brilliancy of -Bonaparte's strategy. Having finally won the battle, northern Italy as -far as the Mincio at once fell into his hands. Notwithstanding the fact -that he failed to outnumber his enemy on the battle-field of Marengo, -his strategy was such that he could fight there with the assurance that -he would lose little if he were defeated, but would gain much if he -were victorious.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, Melas fought the battle, knowing that he must -conquer or lose all. Already his communications were in the hands of -Bonaparte. Nothing short of overwhelming<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span> victory could wrest them from -the French. Though Melas did not know the number of French troops in -his front, yet, having once decided upon the course to take, he made an -heroic effort to save his army. Courageously he faced the inevitable. -Brave man that he was, when the time came he fought as a soldier should -fight.</p> - -<p>After the battle of Montebello, Bonaparte united near the Stradella -Pass all his forces south of the Po. Here he collected twenty-nine -thousand men. Being deficient in cavalry and artillery, while Melas -was well supplied with both, Bonaparte decided to occupy this strong -position, where his flanks would be protected by the Po on one side -and by the spurs of the Apennines on the other. He had every reason -to believe that Melas would shortly advance from Alessandria, cross -the Scrivia, and attempt to cut his way through the French army. If, -therefore, Bonaparte should push westward from the Stradella, he must -expect to meet the Austrians in the plain lying between the Scrivia -and Bormida rivers. Here, however, the superiority of the Austrians -in cavalry and artillery would give them a great tactical advantage. -On the plain their artillery would have full sweep, and their cavalry -could manœuvre with freedom against the flanks of the French. -Moreover, Bonaparte believed that the Austrian forces, under the -immediate command of Melas, outnumbered those of the French.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span></p> - -<p>It was, therefore, neither wise nor prudent for Bonaparte to leave this -strong position and march westward into the plain of Marengo. Other -reasons, however, caused him to take this course.</p> - -<p>First: He feared lest the Austrians should escape. While he remained in -this position, they might march on Genoa, or cross the Po at Valenza, -thence proceed to Pavia and force the crossings of the Ticino.</p> - -<p>Second: He wished to attack and defeat the Austrians under Melas before -they could be re-enforced by the numerous other Austrian detachments -scattered throughout Italy. Bonaparte had already delayed his movements -several days to await the arrival of Moncey's corps. During the delay -Masséna had surrendered. Now, Bonaparte was anxious to bring matters to -an issue before other advantages should accrue to the Austrians.</p> - -<p>Third: Though from a tactical point of view the chances of success in -the open country were unfavorable to Bonaparte, yet from a strategical -point of view they were greatly in his favor. He had severed the -Austrian communications by closing the great highway leading from -Alessandria to Mantua. Along the Ticino he had a strong force to -prevent Melas from escaping in that direction; in the Stradella Pass -he had established a fortified camp; and from Pavia to Cremona he held -the line of the Po, across which he had constructed five bridges that -could be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span> used for a retreat in case he should be defeated. In the open -country, therefore, a defeat would, at the most, be but a temporary -check, for he could fall back, cross the Po, unite his defeated troops -with the French forces on the north side of the river, and be ready -in a short time to fight another battle. On the other hand, since the -communications of the Austrians were already in possession of the -French, the defeat of Melas must result in the capture or destruction -of his army, and in the loss of northern Italy. It follows, therefore, -that in the plain of Marengo Bonaparte could gain much more by a -victory than he could lose by a defeat.</p> - -<p>Fourth: He never was satisfied to take up a defensive position, and -there await an adversary. He seldom fought defensive battles. He -believed in the offensive. His method of making war was to march and to -fight. It was necessary to seek the enemy, to meet him face to face, to -crush him on the battle-field.</p> - -<p>At the battle of Marengo, Bonaparte was surprised. Having but a small -cavalry force under his immediate command, he held it in reserve in -rear of his infantry in order that it might, in case of battle, be -used against the Austrian cavalry, which greatly outnumbered his own. -Had he ordered it to the front to seek the Austrians and to screen the -movements of Victor and Lannes, doubtless he would not have remained -completely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span> in the dark as to the position and intention of his enemy. -It has been said that "Cavalry are the eyes of an army." Certainly for -the want of it at Marengo, or for the failure to use what he had for -screening and reconnoitring purposes, Bonaparte lost touch of his enemy.</p> - -<p>Again: when he found that the village of Marengo was not occupied in -force by the Austrians, he was led to believe that Melas was trying to -escape. He was still further confirmed in this belief by the result -of the reconnoissance made on the 13th of June from Marengo towards -Alessandria. Though the Austrians were occupying the bridge-head on -the right bank of the Bormida and the two bridges in rear of it, the -French officer in command of the reconnoitring party failed to learn -this fact. Indeed, he reported that no Austrians were to be found in -force along the Bormida. Dumas tells us that "Bonaparte would not go -to bed until he made sure whether the Austrians had a bridge over the -Bormida. At one o'clock in the morning the officer in charge of this -mission returned and reported that it did not exist. This announcement -quieted the First Consul. He required a last account of the position -of his troops, and went to sleep not believing that there would be an -engagement the next day." This false information deceived Bonaparte. It -was, in fact, one of the causes that led to his defeat on the following -morning.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span></p> - -<p>If this reconnoitring party had done its duty, Bonaparte would -undoubtedly have been prepared for battle. In that case he would -have held on to Desaix, and would have concentrated his forces at -Marengo and along the Fontanone. Had he occupied this position with -twenty-eight thousand men, he might have defeated the Austrians in -detail as they crossed the Bormida. Even had Melas succeeded in -crossing the Bormida with his entire army, he would then have been -obliged to fight a great battle with an unfordable river directly in -his rear. Thus situated, the defeat of Melas must have resulted in the -capture or annihilation of his army.</p> - -<p>For several days Melas hesitated whether he should cross the Bormida -and attack the French. Owing, however, to the fact that he did not -decide until the 13th of June to attack Bonaparte, he neglected to -occupy Marengo. This neglect permitted Victor to occupy the village, -and aided him materially in resisting the attacks of the Austrians -on the next day. Yet, on the whole, this blunder of Melas proved to -be more advantageous to the Austrians than to the French; for it led -Bonaparte to believe that Melas had no intention of crossing the -Bormida and of attacking the French in the plain of Marengo.</p> - -<p>In sending two thousand five hundred cavalry to Acqui to watch Suchet, -Melas committed an error that probably lost him the battle. There<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> was -little or no excuse for this error; for Suchet was so far away that -he could not possibly arrive at Marengo in time to take part in the -battle. Had Melas kept this cavalry force on the battle-field, and -thrown it vigorously against the French as they fell back towards San -Giuliano, he would undoubtedly have won the battle. It was the failure -of the Austrians to pursue the French promptly that enabled Bonaparte -to rally the scattered remnants of his defeated forces near San -Giuliano. Says Colonel Hart:—</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"When a great battle is imminent, it is unwise for a commander to -detach any part of the force available, unless he is very confident -of victory. There are many examples in history of misfortune, or -misfortune narrowly escaped, in consequence of doing so. Melas would, -in all probability, have made perfectly certain of the victory at -Marengo, if he had not unnecessarily detached 2500 cavalry to arrest -the march of Suchet, who was at too great a distance to be taken -into consideration. Napoleon himself at Marengo, although ultimately -victorious, was as nearly as possible defeated because he detached -Desaix to reconnoitre towards Rivalta; indeed, he was at first -defeated, but the return of Desaix restored the battle."</p></blockquote> - -<p>It is here worthy of notice that while Melas was sending away this -detachment of two thousand five hundred men, Bonaparte was making every -effort to hasten the return of the six thousand men under Desaix.</p> - -<p>At the sound of the first cannon-shot at Marengo,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span> Desaix faced about -his command and hurried forward to aid Bonaparte. It was fortunate that -the First Consul had Desaix for a lieutenant at Marengo. Had Grouchy -marched to the sound of the cannon at Waterloo, and supported his chief -as loyally as did Desaix at Marengo, Napoleon might never have fallen.</p> - -<p>If Suchet, who was at Acqui with the remnants of the Army of Italy, -numbering about twenty thousand men, had pushed on vigorously towards -Marengo, and had arrived there on the morning of the 14th of June, the -battle would have been decided in favor of the French early in the day. -Such a movement would have given Bonaparte an overwhelming superiority -in numbers, and would probably have resulted in the destruction or -capture of the whole army of Melas.</p> - -<p>That Suchet did not take this course was due to several causes. The -soldiers of the Army of Italy had just finished a great fight. They -had already performed heroically their part in the great struggle. -Many of them, too, having starved and suffered at Genoa, had become so -emaciated that they could hardly bear the weight of their equipments. -Moreover, Suchet, who was still acting under the orders of Masséna, had -been cautioned not to peril his army by advancing too far. Inasmuch -as Bonaparte had been more than twenty days in Italy, and had not -yet destroyed Melas, Masséna was somewhat doubtful of the outcome.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span> -Consequently he wished to hold the Army of Italy well in hand, so that, -in case Bonaparte should be defeated, it could fall back to the Var, -and, being there re-enforced from the departments of southern France, -make another effort to save France from invasion.</p> - -<p>On the morning of the 14th of June the forces of Melas concentrated at -Alessandria numbered thirty-two thousand men. He held the two bridges -spanning the Bormida, and the bridge-head on the right bank. On the -opposite side of the river the French forces available for battle -numbered twenty-two thousand men. In addition, Desaix's division, -if it could be recalled in time, would increase the French forces -to twenty-eight thousand. Early in the day Melas had despatched -two thousand five hundred men of his reserve cavalry on Acqui. It -will thus be seen that the opposing forces at Marengo were about -equal in strength: the Austrians numbered twenty-nine thousand five -hundred men; the French, twenty-eight thousand. But at the outset the -advantages were greatly in favor of Melas. He outnumbered Bonaparte in -both cavalry and artillery, and the plain of Marengo was especially -favorable to these arms. His forces were united; the French were -scattered. Desaix's division was marching on Novi; and the remainder of -Bonaparte's forces extended over a distance of ten miles from Marengo -to and even beyond the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> Scrivia. Moreover, Bonaparte was not expecting -a battle. Thus it happened that when the Austrians crossed the Bormida, -the French were surprised and outnumbered. At first Victor bore the -brunt of the fight; then he and Lannes were attacked by nearly the -whole Austrian army. By the time Bonaparte arrived on the field with -the Consular Guard, the reserve cavalry, and Monnier's division, Victor -was crushed and Lannes badly shattered. It was then too late for the -re-enforcement under Bonaparte to turn the tide of battle. That too was -soon overwhelmed. In short, Melas defeated the French forces in detail. -During that morning he was always stronger than his adversary at the -decisive points.</p> - -<p>In the afternoon all was changed. The Austrians were scattered; they -stretched from Marengo to San Giuliano. Moreover, they were marching -carelessly and had no expectation that Bonaparte would attack them. -Meanwhile, Desaix had returned, and Bonaparte's forces had rallied -behind the hillocks near San Giuliano. In a short time Bonaparte -overthrew the advance under Zach, then proceeding westward, gathering -momentum and strength as a result of his first success, he outnumbered -and crushed in succession the several Austrian organizations. Thus the -Austrians were defeated in detail in the afternoon as the French had -been defeated in the morning. Here again is seen the necessity of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span> -outnumbering an enemy at the vital point of the battle-field. Courage -and heroism on the field of battle are of little avail, unless a -commander concentrates his forces and outnumbers his adversary at the -decisive point. The brain of the commanding general is the birthplace -of victory.</p> - -<p>In this battle the genius of Bonaparte is seen, not in the knowledge -he displayed of his adversary's doings, for Bonaparte was completely -surprised at Marengo; not in the arrangement of his forces, for that -could hardly have been worse; not in any deeds of surpassing courage, -for no one could excel the heroism of Lannes on that battle-field; but -in his complete mastery of the situation,—in the fact that, amidst -turmoil, ruin, and death, he saw just when and where and how the blow -should be struck to change disaster into victory. This was the merit of -Bonaparte at Marengo. On that field he was a great tactical captain. -While the storm of battle was at its height, and the dying and the -dead were around him, he was cool, clear-headed, and vigilant. While -disaster was staring him in the face, he saw the vulnerable spot in -the formation of his adversary's forces, and by massing troops there, -crushed and overwhelmed them.</p> - -<p>In this campaign Bonaparte was fortunate in having a Masséna at Genoa, -a Suchet on the Var, and a Lannes at Montebello and at Marengo. He was -fortunate, too, in having a Desaix near<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span> at hand, who dared march to -the sound of the cannon, and who counselled hope when he might have -counselled despair.</p> - -<p>Though these operations of Bonaparte were brilliant in strategic -manœuvres and in far-reaching results, nevertheless they were faulty -in execution. Out of a total force of fifty-five thousand men, the -greater part of whom might have been present on the battle-field of -Marengo, only twenty-eight thousand fought there. Instead of calling -in his detachments before the engagement, and of outnumbering his -enemy on the battle-field, as had always been his plan heretofore, he -permitted himself to be outnumbered by Melas. Rather than let a single -Austrian escape, he took great chances on the battle-field. In short, -he attempted to grasp too much; and, by doing so, sacrificed a certain -amount of safety. Doubtless within his breast there was the feeling -that he would stake all and abide by the consequences. Reckless of the -sequel, he pressed on with the faith of a fatalist, little realizing -how much glory and how much gloom yet remained in store for him. It -would seem that his triumph was written in the stars; perhaps, too, his -fall was written there.</p> - - - -<div class="footnotes"><p class="ph3">FOOTNOTES:</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> See Maps 2 and 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> In his memoirs and in other places Napoleon often speaks -of "lines of operations," meaning "lines of communication." Every -advancing army must necessarily have a line of operations. If the roads -leading from an army to its base are held by the enemy, the army is -said to have lost its communications; in other words, to have lost -its line of communication with its base of operations. The point that -Napoleon intended to make in the discussion is this: Fort Bard being -at the time in possession of the Austrians, the French army had no -unobstructed line of communication back to its base of operations at -Lake Geneva; hence, if defeated, it would find great difficulty in -retreating by this route.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> An army <i>forms front to a flank</i> when it operates on a -front parallel to the line communicating with its base.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V.</a></p> - -<p class="center">GENERAL COMMENTS.</p> - - -<p class="drop">W<span class="uppercase">hile</span> the Army of Reserve was assembling near Lake Geneva, only a few -people at Paris knew that Bonaparte himself intended to take command of -it. In fact, a provision in the constitution of the Year VIII. did not -permit a consul to command an army in person. But, as Bonaparte himself -said, it did not prevent his being present with the army; moreover, -this constitutional provision was then regarded by the French people, -and even by the Senate and Tribunate of France, as having no binding -effect on Bonaparte. Nevertheless, the First Consul did not wish to -violate it openly, and, accordingly, adopted the subterfuge of making -General Berthier the nominal commander in chief, retaining in his own -hands the entire conduct of the campaign. To all intents and purposes, -therefore, Bonaparte was the real commander of the Army of Reserve.</p> - -<p>Having assembled the Army of Reserve at Lake Geneva, he was in a -position where, if the necessity should arise, he could march to the -assistance either of Moreau in Germany or of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span> Suchet on the Var. Had -Melas succeeded in forcing the Var, Bonaparte would doubtless have -marched south along the west side of the French Alps in order to unite -the Army of Reserve with Suchet's forces for an attack against Melas. -The strategical skill of Bonaparte appears in this arrangement. Though -he expected to cross the Alps, yet up to the last moment his army was -so situated that he was prepared for any contingency that might arise.</p> - -<p>Though the campaign of Marengo, as planned and executed by him, was -a bold and hazardous undertaking, yet a careful analysis of the -operations shows that nearly all of them were marked by extreme -caution. It will be found, too, that his strategy was almost perfect -for accomplishing his ends. In fact one of the great merits of Napoleon -was that he knew how to produce a maximum effect with a minimum force. -The whole theatre of war was an open book to him. He saw just where -the battle should be fought in order to produce the greatest results. -Though the Austrians in this campaign numbered nearly a quarter-million -of men, and stretched from the Gulf of Genoa to the Main River, yet -Bonaparte was able, while still at Paris, to picture in his mind the -whole strategical situation, and to indicate Stokach in Germany and the -Stradella Pass in Italy, as being the two most important points within -this immense theatre of operations. These<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span> two places were the keys of -the territory occupied by the two Austrian armies. Here the greatest -results could be produced with the smallest efforts. Here, in each -case, a victory could be obtained with the least loss to the French.</p> - -<p>Bonaparte's caution is seen in the fact that he would not set out to -cross the Alps until Moncey's corps was well on its way towards Italy. -Before beginning the movement, he wished to be certain that he would -receive this re-enforcement, and to make sure of his communications -with Switzerland. He knew that he might be attacked in the plains of -Piedmont before he could reach Milan, and might lose his communications -by way of the Great St. Bernard Pass. If, however, Moncey succeeded in -reaching Italy, Bonaparte would then have uninterrupted communications -with the great stronghold of Switzerland.</p> - -<p>Again: his caution is seen in the fact that, after descending the Alps -with the Army of Reserve, he immediately took measures to concentrate -his forces, instead of crossing the Po at Chivasso and of marching -directly to the relief of Masséna. He knew that a great battle was -inevitable, yet safety was his first object. He wished to gain a -position where he could bring a strong force on to the battle-field, -and where, if defeated, he could retreat without losing his army. -In fact, throughout the campaign, he kept a watchful eye upon his -communications. It was his rear<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> that gave him the greatest anxiety. -It is always so with the great masters of war. "While the distant -spectator," says Hamley, "imagines a general to be intent only on -striking or parrying a blow, he probably directs a hundred glances, a -hundred anxious thoughts, to the communications in his rear, for one -that he bestows on his adversary's front." Notwithstanding the fact -that Napoleon seemed always to take great chances in his military -career, and seemed often to stake everything on the fate of a single -battle, yet a careful analysis of his campaigns shows that no commander -has ever looked with more anxiety to his lines of retreat than did -this great master of war. At Austerlitz, where he allowed the enemy -to envelop his right and cut off his retreat on Vienna, and where he -was so certain of success that he issued a proclamation in advance -explaining the manœuvre by which victory would be obtained, yet even -here he had provided for a retreat through Bohemia in case of defeat.</p> - -<p>This campaign was indeed a bold one; but it must be remembered that -the very boldness of Bonaparte was one of the principal causes of -his success. By descending the Alps into Italy upon the Austrian -rear, he surprised his adversary and caused him to tremble for his -communications. By this means he struck terror into the heart of Melas -even before a battle had been fought. No sooner had French troops -reached the valley of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span> the Po than Melas was compelled to change -his whole plan of campaign. He had then to defend himself against -Bonaparte. He could no longer think of invading France. By this bold -movement Bonaparte snatched the initiative from his adversary and -compelled him to fight on the defensive. In war, the boldest course -is often the safest. "The greatest soldiers have always been the most -daring."</p> - -<p>From the discussion in the preceding chapter, it is evident that in -this campaign Bonaparte allowed his boldness to outrun his caution. -He attempted to grasp too much. This characteristic of Napoleon, here -exhibited for the first time in his military operations, was in after -years one of the principal causes of his fall. In his subsequent career -he fought Spain and Portugal on one side and nearly the whole of Europe -on the other. Though the greatest exemplar of concentration that the -world has ever known, yet at times he divided his forces when he should -have made peace on one side, and have concentrated on the other. In the -Russian campaign, too, he was overconfident. He was not satisfied with -ordinary victories or with ordinary results. His early successes were -so marvellous that he began to feel that he could conquer in the face -of all Europe, and in spite of the elements themselves. And yet this -very boldness, coupled with a caution that seldom failed him, was one -of the secrets<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span> of his numerous victories during so many years of war.</p> - -<p>The crossing of the Alps with the Army of Reserve was undoubtedly a -hazardous undertaking, yet it was so carefully planned in all its -details that it was completely successful. During the operations of -Masséna in Italy, and of Moreau in Germany, Bonaparte had displayed -marvellous energy in hastening the preparations for crossing the great -chain of the Alps. In this famous passage, nothing, however trivial, -that could contribute to the success of the operation was beneath the -attention of Bonaparte. Referring to the activity and care displayed by -the First Consul at this time, Thiers, in his "History of the Consulate -and Empire," writes as follows:—</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"Himself toiling day and night, corresponding with Berthier, who -was organizing the divisions of infantry and cavalry; with Gassendi -and Marmont, who were organizing the artillery; with Marescot, who -was reconnoitring the whole line of the Alps; he urged every one -to exertion, with that headlong energy and ardour which sufficed -him to carry the French from the banks of the Po to the banks of -the Jordan, from the banks of the Jordan to those of the Danube -and Borysthenes. He would not leave Paris in person until the last -moment, not wishing to abandon the political government of France, -and leave the field clear to intriguers and conspirators for a longer -time than was absolutely necessary. Meanwhile, the divisions ordered -from La Vendée, from Brittany, from Paris, and from the banks of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span> -Rhone, traversed the widespread territory of the Republic, and the -heads of their columns were already appearing in Switzerland. The -depots of some corps were still at Dijon, besides some conscripts and -volunteers, sent thither to give credence in Europe to the opinion -that the army of Dijon was a pure fable, destined solely to alarm -Melas. Up to this moment everything had gone well; the illusion of -the Austrians was complete. The movement of the troops advancing -towards Switzerland was little noticed, because the corps were so -much dispersed, that they passed for re-enforcements sent to the -army in Germany.... To such a point had he carried his foresight -as to establish saddlers' workshops at the foot of the defile, for -the repair of the artillery harness. On this apparently trivial -matter he had already written several letters; and I mention this -circumstance for the instruction of those generals and governments -to whom the lives of men are intrusted, and who too often, through -indolence or vanity, neglect such particulars. Nothing, in fact, that -can contribute to the success of operations, or to the safety of -soldiers, is below the genius or rank of commanding officers."</p></blockquote> - -<p>One of the secrets of Napoleon's success in war was the fact that he -bestowed great care on all military matters. Whether his operations -were simple or complex; whether his attention was called to the ration -of a single soldier, or to the subsistence of a hundred thousand men; -whether his mind was occupied with the trivial details of routine duty, -or was evolving the grandest strategic conceptions, he was the same -painstaking, orderly, careful man. "His plan," says Napier,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span> referring -to Napoleon's projects in the war with Spain, "embraced every probable -chance of war, and even provided for the uncertain contingency of an -English army landing upon his flanks at either end of the Pyrenean -frontier. Neither his power nor his fortune nor the contempt he felt -for the military power of the Spaniards made him remiss. The conqueror -of Europe was as fearful of making false movements before an army of -peasants as if Frederick the Great had been in his front."</p> - -<p>In the campaign of Marengo Bonaparte displayed excellent judgment in -selecting his subordinates. However much he may have failed in this -respect in his subsequent career, certainly at this time his success -was due in great measure to the fact that he selected Masséna to -command the Army of Italy, and Moreau to command the Army of the Rhine.</p> - -<p>Masséna was peculiarly fitted both by birth and character to perform -the duty required of him. Born at Turbia near Nice, he was familiar -with every foot of country bordering on the Gulf of Genoa. Moreover, -he had fought in the same theatre of operations under Bonaparte in -1796-97. In action he was cool, clear-headed, obstinate, and brave. -When the battle was at its height, and the struggle fierce and -desperate, then his genius shone forth with great brilliancy. Probably -no other soldier of France could have made such an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span> heroic struggle -at Genoa. Though he had some traits of character that stained his -reputation and dimmed his glory, he was nevertheless a great soldier, -perhaps the greatest of all those remarkable men who were afterwards -made marshals of France. His characteristics were thus set forth by -Napoleon at St. Helena:—</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"Masséna was a man of superior talent. He generally, however, made -bad dispositions previous to a battle, and it was not until the dead -fell around him that he began to act with that judgment which he -ought to have displayed before. In the midst of the dying and the -dead, of balls sweeping away those who encircled him, then Masséna -was himself—gave his orders and made his dispositions with the -greatest <i>sang froid</i> and judgment.... By a strange peculiarity of -temperament, he possessed the desired equilibrium only in the heat -of battle; it came to him in the midst of danger. The sound of the -guns cleared his ideas and gave him understanding, penetration, and -cheerfulness. He was endowed with extraordinary courage and firmness. -When defeated he was always ready to fight again as though he had -been the conqueror."</p></blockquote> - -<p>Though Moreau failed to appreciate thoroughly the strategical situation -in Germany, nevertheless the First Consul showed wisdom in appointing -him to command the Army of the Rhine. Moreau was familiar with this -theatre of operations, and possessed the confidence of the soldiers -under him. Moreover, he was brave and cautious,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span> and wonderfully cool -and collected on the battle-field. Though he failed to do all that he -might have done, yet he was generally successful, and, on the whole, -justified the confidence bestowed on him by the First Consul.</p> - -<p>In this connection it is worthy of remark that Desaix was ranked -by Napoleon as one of the greatest of his subordinates. Had he not -been killed at Marengo, he would undoubtedly have been made one of -Napoleon's marshals. At St. Helena Napoleon spoke of him as follows:—</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"Of all the generals I ever had under me, Desaix and Kléber possessed -the greatest talents—especially Desaix; as Kléber only loved glory -inasmuch as it was the means of procuring him riches and pleasures, -whereas Desaix loved glory for itself, and despised everything else. -Desaix was wholly wrapped up in war and glory. To him riches and -pleasure were valueless, nor did he give them a moment's thought. He -was a little, black-looking man, about an inch shorter than I am, -always badly dressed, sometimes even ragged, and despising comfort -or convenience. When in Egypt, I made him a present of a complete -field-equipage several times, but he always lost it. Wrapt in a -cloak, Desaix threw himself under a gun, and slept as contentedly as -if he were in a palace. For him luxury had no charms. Upright and -honest in all his proceedings, he was called by the Arabs <i>the just -Sultan</i>. He was intended by nature for a great general. Kléber and -Desaix were a loss irreparable to France."</p></blockquote> - -<p>It is worthy of remark that many of the generals that fought in the -French armies during these<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> operations afterwards became marshals of -Napoleon. In the Army of Italy there were Masséna, Soult, and Suchet; -in the army of Reserve, Lannes, Victor, Murat, Berthier, Marmont, -and Davoust; and in the Army of the Rhine, St. Cyr, Moncey, and the -immortal Ney, "the bravest of the brave."</p> - -<p>The knowledge that Bonaparte displayed of his adversaries' doings in -this campaign is indeed wonderful. From reports sent him by Suchet, -Masséna, and Moreau, and from information obtained from spies, he had -not only a knowledge of the positions occupied by the Austrian armies, -but, in addition, was accurately informed as to their numbers and plans -of operations. A single example will suffice to illustrate the accuracy -of his information, and his remarkable intuition, before the beginning -of hostilities, as to the movements and plans of Melas. It will be -remembered that while still at Paris he wrote to Masséna as follows:—</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"The enemy will debouch upon your right in the direction of Genoa, -on your centre in the direction of Savona, and probably on the two -points at once. Refuse one of the two attacks, and throw yourself -with all your forces united, upon one of the enemy's columns.... In -that broken country, if you manœuvre well, with 30,000 men you may -give battle to 60,000; in order to carry 60,000 light-armed troops -into Liguria, Melas must have 90,000, which supposes a total army of -120,000 men at least."</p></blockquote> - - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span></p> - -<p>Compare now the prediction of Bonaparte with what happened. Melas <i>had</i> -one hundred and twenty thousand men. He advanced against Masséna in -two columns: one, numbering twenty-five thousand men, divided into two -parts, advanced on Genoa; the other, forty thousand strong, advanced on -Savona. The movements of Melas were carried out exactly as Bonaparte -had predicted. In the letter to Masséna, the Austrian plan, as well as -the numbers with which Melas was about to attack the Army of Italy, -were set forth with wonderful accuracy. When it is remembered that at -this time Bonaparte was at Paris, and that the great chain of the Alps -intervened between him and the Austrians in Italy, no one can fail to -be impressed by the foresight of Bonaparte and the accuracy of this -prediction made before the event. Wellington once said that he had been -trying all his life to find out what the other fellow was doing over -the hill. Bonaparte, at Paris, knew what Melas was doing over the hill.</p> - -<p>In the campaign of 1796-97 in Italy, Bonaparte had shown himself a -consummate master of tactics and of strategy. In the campaign of -Marengo he exhibited, in addition to these qualities, great organizing -power. When he returned from Egypt, civil war existed in certain -parts of France, the finances were in a deplorable state, and the -French armies had been everywhere defeated.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> In a few months, under -his leadership, all was changed. He crushed out the civil war, placed -the finances on a firm basis, sent re-enforcements to the Army of the -Rhine, and organized the Army of Reserve. Referring to this period, -Alison says:—</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"The sudden resurrection of France, when Napoleon assumed the helm, -is one of the most extraordinary passages of European history.... -After the fall of the Committee of Public Safety, the triumph of -France centered in Napoleon alone; wherever he did not command -in person, the greatest reverses were experienced. In 1795 the -Republicans were defeated by Clairfait on the Rhine; in 1796 by the -Archduke Charles in Germany. In 1799 their reverses were unexampled -both in Italy and Germany; from the 9th Thermidor to the 18th -Brumaire, a period of about five years, the fortunes of the Republic -were singly sustained by the sword of Napoleon and the lustre of his -Italian campaigns. When he seized the helm in November, 1799, he -found the armies defeated and ruined; the frontier invaded both on -the sides of Italy and Germany; the arsenals empty; the soldiers in -despair, deserting their colours; the Royalists revolting against -their government; general anarchy in the interior; the treasury -empty; the energies of the Republic apparently exhausted. Instantly, -as if by enchantment, everything was changed; order reappeared out -of chaos, talent emerged from obscurity, vigour arose out of the -elements of weakness. The arsenals were filled, the veterans crowded -to their eagles, the conscripts joyfully repaired to the frontier, -La Vendée was pacified, the exchequer began to overflow. In little -more than six<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span> months after Napoleon's accession, the Austrians were -forced to seek refuge under the cannon of Ulm, Italy was regained, -unanimity and enthusiasm prevailed among the people, and the revived -energy of the nation was finally launched into a career of conquest."</p></blockquote> - -<p>At the beginning of the campaign of Marengo, Kray's army, numbering one -hundred and twenty thousand men, occupied western Germany. The army of -Melas, one hundred and twenty thousand strong, occupied northwestern -Italy; a British corps of twelve thousand was in Minorca, and a British -fleet in the Gulf of Genoa.</p> - -<p>To oppose the forces of the allies, Bonaparte had three armies: the -Army of the Rhine, numbering one hundred and thirty thousand men, was -facing the Austrians in Germany; the Army of Italy, forty thousand -strong, was along the Apennines and Maritime Alps; and the Army of -Reserve, numbering forty thousand, was assembling near Lake Geneva. -It will thus be seen that the allies had two hundred and fifty-two -thousand men to oppose the two hundred and ten thousand under the First -Consul; and that they possessed the additional advantage of being -supreme on the sea.</p> - -<p>Such was the situation in the spring of 1800. On the 5th of April -Melas began active operations along the Apennines. On the 14th of -June the campaign ended at Marengo. In two months and ten days the -French, guided by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span> genius of Bonaparte, had compelled Kray to -seek safety in the fortified camp of Ulm, and had defeated Melas and -gained possession of northern Italy. These great results were due to -Bonaparte. It was he that crossed the Alps. In his brain was born the -strategy that led to victory.</p> - -<p>In this campaign Bonaparte calculated carefully every movement; he -left nothing to chance. Though fortune favored him in many ways, -nevertheless his success was due to his genius and to his mastery of -his profession. Strategically these operations were almost perfect, yet -they were faulty in execution. "The campaign of Marengo," says William -O'Connor Morris, "at least in design, was one of the most dazzling of -Napoleon's exploits in war. The plan of issuing from Switzerland by -a double movement in the rear of the enemy in Swabia and Italy was -perhaps equal to any formed by Hannibal; but the execution of it was -far from perfect. Moreau completely failed to cut off Kray. Napoleon -made a distinct mistake in marching into the plain of Marengo, and he -exhibited in this instance a fierce resolve to encounter his adversary -at any risk, which cost him dear on more than one occasion. The most -striking feature of this part of his career is the restoration of order -in France, her sudden and rapid rise out of misfortune, and the revival -of her military power; and though this was largely due to the energy -and resource of a great nation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> not often quelled by disaster, it -should perhaps be mainly ascribed to Napoleon's genius." At this time -Bonaparte was thirty years of age; he was vigorous in mind and body. -He was ambitious, and had a massive determination to succeed. He had a -will which no obstacle could daunt, a mind original, bold, profound, -quick, and penetrating. His eye pierced the depths and reached the -heights of things. With a marvellous intuition he was able at times to -foresee just what course his adversaries would take. So accurate was -his information, so profound his knowledge of military matters, that -he was often able to predict what, under certain conditions, would -happen. "He had," says Morris, "a faculty of organisation perhaps never -equalled, and a power of calculation, a force of insight and industry, -and a capacity of mastering details, which Nature has seldom bestowed -on man." Moreover, he had made a profound study of the campaigns of the -great commanders, and had read many books of history, the perusal of -which, says Lamartine, "changes theories into actions, and ideas into -men." In short, he was a consummate master of war. The fact that he -was a great organizer, a great tactician, and a great strategist, is -the real reason why he was so successful in war. Among all other great -soldiers of the world, it would be difficult to select a single one who -possessed in so marked a degree all these qualities. As an or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span>ganizer, -he was not excelled by either Cæsar or Alexander; as a tactician he was -equal to Marlborough or Frederick; as a strategist, he surpassed every -soldier of ancient or of modern times. Take him all in all he was, -perhaps, the foremost soldier of the world.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>Twenty-one years after this campaign, the Emperor Napoleon lay dying at -St. Helena. His thoughts were with his army. During a long delirium, -while a fierce storm was raging on the island, he was heard to say: -"mon fils ... l'armée ... Desaix." These were his last words. Perhaps, -amidst the shock of the billows and the battle-like roar of the storm, -the great captain believed himself once more with Desaix on the -tumultuous field of Marengo.</p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="INDEX" id="INDEX">INDEX.</a></p> - - -<p> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Abercromby, General, commands British corps in Minorca, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Alesia, battle of, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Alexander the Great, compared with Napoleon, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Alison, Archibald, sets forth Napoleon's organizing ability, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Allies, plans of, seemed reasonable, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">advantages possessed by, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Alps, description of, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Swiss, Tyrolese, French, and Maritime, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">passes of, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Apennines, description of, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Archduke Charles, ablest soldier in Austria, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">relieved of command, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">opposes Napoleon in 1809, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">quotation from, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his views sound, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">should have been allowed his way, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">had constructed an intrenched camp at Ulm, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">reference to, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">defeats the Republicans, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Arcole, battle of, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">campaign of, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Army of Italy, struggles heroically, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">strength and position of, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>-80, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">line of communication of, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">necessity for its remaining along the Apennines, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">in a destitute condition, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is cut in two, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">its active operations terminate, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">nothing done to improve condition of, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">sufferings of, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Army of Reserve, the third army, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">scattered throughout France, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">destination of, to be kept secret, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">caricatured <a href="#Page_29">29</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">concentrates, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">will cross the Alps, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">could re-enforce either Moreau or Masséna, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">not imaginary, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">strong enough at vital point, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">crosses the Alps, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">passes Fort Bard, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">strength and position of, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Army of the Rhine, re-enforcement sent to, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">size of, and position of, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Aulic Council, description of, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">reference to, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">errors of, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">ignorant of military matters, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">reasons for failure of, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">gives orders to Kray, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">informs Melas that Army of Reserve is a mere fiction, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">sends despatches to Melas, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Austerlitz, battle of, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Austria, wages war against France, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">successful on the land, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">assisted by England, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">aided by Russia, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">had almost reconquered Italy, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">spies of, gather at Dijon, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">directs Melas to take offensive, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">not aware of existence of Army of Reserve, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">should take the offensive in Germany, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">might have avoided error, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Austrians, must outnumber the French to succeed, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">discipline and morale of, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Bard, fort of, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is surrendered to the French, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Bassano, battle of, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Berthier, General, is sent forward, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">directs operations along the Po, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">made nominal commander in chief, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">became a marshal, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Bethencourt, descends the Simplon, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">arrives at Arona, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Black Forest, description of, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">mountain system of, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Blucher, opposes Napoleon in 1814, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Bochetta, pass of, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Bonaparte, First Consul, returns to France from Egypt, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">collects Russian prisoners, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">detaches Russia from alliance, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his absence in Egypt, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his victories in 1796-97, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">became First Consul, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">prepared for war, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">magic of his name, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his energy, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his chance of success small, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">had full control of military operations, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his achievements in Italy and Egypt, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his plans, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">first plan, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">rivalry between him and Moreau, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Victory his object, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">wishes to dazzle the French people, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">second plan, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">will emulate Hannibal, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">could re-enforce Masséna or Moreau, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">would have had the advantage of interior lines, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">defeated the Austrians at Arcole and Rivoli, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">as the situation appeared to him, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">could use either France or Switzerland as a base, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">could decide the fate of the Austrians in a single battle, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">could compel the Austrian Emperor to make peace, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his plan difficult, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his advantages in Italy, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">important for him to deceive Melas, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">could assemble his forces and decide the fate of Italy by a single -battle, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">important that he should take the offensive, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">writes to Masséna, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">must hurry across the Alps, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">sends Moreau instructions, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">advances, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">enters Milan, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">methods of, in the treatment of fortresses, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">might have been obliged to change his plan, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his plan, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>-85;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">the problem before him, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>-88;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">if necessary, would sacrifice Masséna, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">nature was his re-enforcement, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">marches on to victory, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">submits a plan to Moreau, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">tried to convince Moreau, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">replies to General Dessoles, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">makes an agreement with Moreau, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">urges Moreau to hasten, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his plan compared to that of Moreau, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <i>et seq.</i>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">makes preparations to cross Rhine, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his chances of success in Germany, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">anxiously awaits developments, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">leaves Paris, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">prepares to cross the Alps, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his plan, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his knowledge of his adversaries' positions, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is surprised, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">crosses the Alps, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">studies his maps, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">hurries to Fort Bard, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">marches on Milan, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">seizes crossings of the Po, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">delays at Milan, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">receives news of Masséna's surrender, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">arrives at Montebello and prepares for battle, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">advances towards Marengo, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">detaches Desaix, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">loses touch of his adversary, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">arrives on the battle-field of Marengo, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">retreats, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is defeated, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">forms a new line of battle, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">forces the Austrians back to Marengo, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">receives surrender of Melas, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his operations worthy of careful study, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">gained northern Italy, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">the plans which he might have adopted, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">deceived Melas, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is not deterred from his undertaking, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his reasons for taking this course, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">commits an error, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">the problem before him, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his reasons for not marching through Switzerland, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">criticisms of, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his critical manœuvre, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>-194;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his strong position, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">anxious for fear Melas might escape, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">in a state of doubt, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">risks too much, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">courses that he might have taken, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>-203;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his chances of success on another field, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his brilliant strategy, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his reasons for advancing to Marengo, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>-208;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">was surprised and deceived, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>-209, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">hastens the return of Desaix, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">defeated the Austrians in detail, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his merit at Marengo, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">fortune favored him, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his operations faulty in execution, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">was the real commander of the Army of Reserve, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">was prepared for any contingency, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his caution, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>-219;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his boldness, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his activity and care, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his judgment in selecting his subordinates, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his knowledge of his adversaries' doings, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his brain the birthplace of victory, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his success due to his genius, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his characteristics, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>-232.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Bourrienne, extract from his "Memoirs of Napoleon," <a href="#Page_139">139</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Brenner, pass of, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Cæsar, compared with Napoleon, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Campaign of 1814, example from, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Campaign of 1796-97, example from, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">reference to, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Carnot, minister of war, sent to Moreau's headquarters, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Castiglione, battle of, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Chabran, General, commands a corps under Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">crosses the Alps, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Champeaux, General, commands cavalry brigade at Marengo, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Clairfait, General, defeats the Republicans, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Col di Cadibona, pass of, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Col di Ormea, pass of, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Col di Tenda, pass of, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Comments, on the strategical situation, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <i>et seq.</i>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">on the operations of Masséna and Melas, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <i>et seq.</i>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">on Moreau's operations in Germany, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <i>et seq.</i>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">on Bonaparte's operations in Italy, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <i>et seq.</i>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">general, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <i>et seq.</i></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Danube, river, description of, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Davoust, became one of Napoleon's marshals, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Dego, battle of, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Desaix, General, arrives at the French headquarters, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">marches on Novi, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">returns and advises Bonaparte to fight, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">assaults Zach, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is killed, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">marches to the sound of the cannon, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">compared with Grouchy, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">how ranked by Napoleon, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">mentioned by Napoleon on his death-bed, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Dessoles, General, Moreau's chief of staff, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">gives advice to Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Duhesme, General, commands a corps under Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">marches on Milan, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Dumas, quotation from his life of Napoleon, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Elsnitz, General, proceeds against Suchet, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">drove Suchet back, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is ordered to quit the Var, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">quits the Var, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is defeated and retreats, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">commands reserve at Marengo, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Engen, battle of, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">loss at, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">England, wages war against France, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is successful on the sea, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">spies of, gather at Dijon, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">army of, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">France, stands alone against coalition, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">in a deplorable state, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">civil war in, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Frederick the Great, might have failed, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">reference to, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">compared with Napoleon, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">French, occupy a more favorable position, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Front to a flank, definition of, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Genoa, a strongly fortified place, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">provisions scarce in, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">description of, and its fortifications, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">siege of, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <i>et seq.</i></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Grouchy, Marshal, compared with Desaix, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Haddick, General, occupies valley of Aosta, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">attacks at Marengo, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Hamley, General, his remarks on the operations in Germany, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, -<a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">quotation from, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Hannibal, Bonaparte follows in footsteps of, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Hart, Colonel, quotation from, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his remarks on the errors at Marengo, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Hohenzollern, General, advances on Bochetta Pass, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is repulsed, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Italy, might be reconquered at Vienna, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Jomini, General, quotation from, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his remarks on the passage of a river, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Kaim, General, watches the passes of the Alps, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">holds Susa, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">attacks at Marengo, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">follows General Zach, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Keith, Admiral, commands British fleet in Gulf of Genoa, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Kellerman, General, commands cavalry brigade at Marengo, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">attacks Austrian cavalry, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Kienmayer, General, guards defiles of Black Forest, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">remains in Kinzig Valley, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">descends the Danube, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Kléber, General, how ranked by Napoleon, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Kray, Marshal, commanded Austrian army, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">was to remain on the defensive, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">was deceived, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his army separated from that of Melas, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">must lose his communications if defeated, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his army widely dispersed, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">gave Bonaparte an advantage, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">lacked military ability, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">commands main body in Germany, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">hears of Moreau's movements, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">re-enforces Kienmayer, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">moves on Loffingen and Zollhaus, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">appreciates his faulty position, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">attempts to unite his forces at Stokach, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">at Engen, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">unites his forces at Mosskirch, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">crosses the Danube, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">marches on Ulm, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his strength and losses, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">position of his troops, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">commits an error, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">faulty arrangement of his forces, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>-117;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">outgenerals Moreau, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">position of his army, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Lamartine, quotation from, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Lannes, General, commands a corps under Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">crosses the Alps, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is checked at Fort Bard, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">passes the fort, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">defeats Haddick, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">captures Pavia, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">crosses the Po, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">fights battle of Montebello, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">secured the title of "Duke of Montebello," <a href="#Page_158">158</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">at Marengo, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <i>et seq.</i>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">was badly shattered, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">became a marshal, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Lecourbe, General, commands Moreau's right wing, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">marches on Stokach, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is victorious, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">delays there to await Moreau's operations, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">captures Memmingen, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Lincoln, Abraham, virtues of, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Lodi, battle of, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Lonato, battle of, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Macdougall, Colonel, criticizes operations in Germany, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Mack, General, his army captured by Napoleon, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Mantua, fortress of, location of, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Marengo, campaign of, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">plain of, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">battle of, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <i>et seq.</i>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">opposing forces at, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Marescot, General, reports on the passes of the Alps, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Marlborough, Duke of, compared with Napoleon, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Marmont, General, became a marshal, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Masséna, General, takes command of Army of Italy, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">to remain on the defensive, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">had the advantage of a strong position, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">could not have driven Melas through Italy, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">brings about better discipline, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">holds Genoa, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his difficulties, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>-58;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">failed to appreciate the advantages of Bonaparte's plan, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">in a precarious situation, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">was surrounded, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">not discouraged, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his plan, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">attacks General Ott, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">advances towards Nice, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is again repulsed, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">heroic deeds of, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">resolves to hold Genoa at all hazards, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">urges the First Consul to hasten, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">has hope, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">strength of his forces, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">fought fiercely, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is partially successful, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">fights on amidst famine and death, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">would not surrender, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">surrenders, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">joins Suchet, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">firm as a rock, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">the problem before him, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">plans that he might have adopted, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>-86;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">was justified in not carrying out Bonaparte's orders, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">received no re-enforcements, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">hard pressed at Genoa, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">was doubtful of the outcome, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his characteristics, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">became a marshal, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Maurice, Colonel, his remarks on surprise and concealment, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Melas, General, commanded Austrian army in Italy, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">will attack the Army of Italy, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">deceived, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">was doomed to defeat, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">separated from Kray, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">could not know where to expect the French, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">difficult for him to drive back the French, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">many advantages offered him, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">could have held Masséna in check, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">lacked military ability, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his plan, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">advances against Masséna, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">cuts in two the Army of Italy, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">sends orders to Ott, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">hears of Bonaparte's movements, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is in consternation, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">sends orders to Elsnitz and Ott, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his purpose, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his errors, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>-80;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">assaulted again and again, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his methods in treatment of fortresses, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">doubted existence of Army of Reserve, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">accomplished almost nothing, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">could force Masséna to capitulate, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">makes every effort to capture Genoa, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">receives notice of passage of Alps, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">marches on Turin, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is surprised, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">forms a junction with Kaim's and Haddick's commands, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is deceived, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">finally comprehends Bonaparte's plan, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his plan, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">marches on Alessandria, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">calls a council of war, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">begins battle of Marengo, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">sends cavalry to Acqui, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">attacks French with fury, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">makes a great effort, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">defeats Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">returns to Alessandria, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">surrenders, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">was weak at all points, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">causes of his defeat, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>-177;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his success in Italy, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">had to abandon invasion of France, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">in doubt as to Thurreau's strength, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">knew he must conquer or lose all, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his situation unfavorable, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">failed to occupy Marengo, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">commits another error, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">number of his forces, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">outnumbered Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">defeated French in detail, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">position of his army, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Metz, battle of, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Millesimo, battle of, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Minorca, English corps in, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Miollis, General, defends Genoa, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Moncey, General, leads a corps into Italy, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">arrives at Milan, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">became a marshal, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Mondovi, battle of, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Monnier, General, commands a division at Marengo, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Mont Cenis, pass of, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Montenotte, battle of, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Moreau, General, commands Army of Rhine, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">rivalry between Bonaparte and him, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his talents, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">position of his army, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his army strengthened, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">slow to begin, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">advances against Kray, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">executes vigorously his manœuvres, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">defeats Kray and detaches a corps, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">commands reserve, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">objects to First Consul's plan, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">proposes a plan of his own, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">declares he will not serve under Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is cautious and slow, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">begins his movement, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">crosses Rhine, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is joined by Lecourbe, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his plan successfully executed, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">at battle of Engen, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">marches on Mosskirch, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">at battle of Mosskirch, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">marches on Ulm, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his strength and loss, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">orders 15,000 men into Italy, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">was generally successful, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">commits errors, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>-121, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his plan compared to that of Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <i>et seq.</i>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his characteristics, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">discussion of his operations <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <i>et seq.</i>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his faulty movements, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>-132;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">outgeneralled by Kray, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Morris, William O'Connor, his remarks on Marengo, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">on Napoleon, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Mosskirch, battle of, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Murat, General, commands a corps under Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">marches on Milan, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">crosses the Po, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">became a marshal, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Napier, Colonel, remarks on Napoleon's projects, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Napoleon I., his victories in 1814, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his passages of the Danube, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">opposed to Archduke Charles, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">greatest captain of modern times, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">in the Ulm campaign, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">seized Austrian capital, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">meets Austrian and Russian armies at Austerlitz, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">quotation from regarding fortresses, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">never allowed himself to be besieged, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">peculiarity of his system of war, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>-135;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">quotation from, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his remarks on the operations in Italy, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his wrong use of the expression, "lines of operations," <a href="#Page_189">189</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">on the art of war, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his theory of war, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his skill in strategy and war, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is outnumbered at Marengo, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">might never have fallen, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">kept an eye on his communications, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his boldness carried him too far, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">bestowed great care on military matters, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his projects in Spain, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his remarks on Masséna, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">same on Desaix and Kléber, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">fortunes of Republic sustained by his sword, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">was a great organizer, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">perhaps the foremost soldier of the world, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">the Emperor, his last words, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Nelson, Lord, dealt the French a terrible blow in the battle of the -Nile, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Ney, General, "the bravest of the brave," became a marshal, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Nile, battle of, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Ott, General, advances on Genoa, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is successful, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">takes command of Austrians at Genoa, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">attacked three sides of the city, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">failed to continue the struggle, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is ordered to raise siege of Genoa, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">besieges Genoa, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">receives surrender of Masséna, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">marches on Placentia, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is defeated at Montebello, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">retreats on Alessandria, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">commands Austrian left at Marengo, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">marches on Ghilina, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">retreats, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">O'Reilly, General, commands vanguard at Marengo, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Paul I., Russian Emperor, felt bitter towards Austria, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">flattered by Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Po, river of, description of, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Pontebba, pass of, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Prince de Reuss, commands Kray's left wing, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Prussia, army of, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Rhine, river, description of, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Rivoli, battle of, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">campaign of, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Roveredo, battle of, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Royalists, might support allies, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">sympathize with England and Austria, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">San Georgio, battle of, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Schwarzenberg, General, advances on Paris in 1814, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Simplon, pass of, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Soult, General, commands centre of Army of Italy, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">falls back to Genoa, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">commands one of Masséna's columns, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">became a marshal, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Starry, General, commands Kray's right, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">remains in valley of Murg, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">descends the Danube, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">St. Bernard, Great, pass of, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Little, pass of, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">St. Cyr, General, commands Moreau's centre, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">crosses Rhine at Brisach, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">marches on St. Blazien, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">at Engen, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">marches on Ulm, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his movement criticised, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">became a marshal, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Ste. Suzanne, General, commands Moreau's left wing, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">crosses the Rhine, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">recrosses, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">marches on Ulm, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">St. Gothard, pass of, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Stokach, battle of, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Stradella, pass of, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Suchet, General, commands left of Army of Italy, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">falls back towards Nice, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">marches eastward from Nice, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">again falls back, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">rallies his troops, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">follows the Austrians, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">defeats Elsnitz and marches to Acqui, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">fights along the Var, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">might have marched to Marengo, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">became a marshal, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Suwaroff, General, fights in Italy and Switzerland, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">retreats into valley of the Danube, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Switzerland, base of operations, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">separates two Austrian armies, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">possession of, advantageous to Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Thiers, historian, quotation from, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Thurreau, General, guards the Mont Cenis Pass, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">could fall on the flank of the Austrians, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">crosses the Alps, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">attacks Kaim, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is held in check, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">at Susa, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Turenne, his remarks on mistakes in war, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Tyrol, highway of, in possession of the Austrians, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Ulm, intrenched camp of, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Var, river of, effort for success should have been made on, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Victor, General, commands a corps under Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">marches on Milan, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">crosses the Po, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">re-enforces Lannes at Montebello, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">arrives at Marengo, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">at battle of Marengo, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <i>et seq.</i>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">was crushed, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">became a marshal, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Von der Goltz, General, his remarks on writing history, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his views regarding fortresses, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>-87.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Vukassovich, General, watches the St. Gothard and Simplon passes, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is defeated, and retreats to the Mincio, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Wagner, Major, his definition of <i>containing force</i>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Waterloo, battle of, reference to, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Wellington, Duke of, saying of, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Zach, General, chief of staff, succeeds Melas in command at Marengo, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">advances against Bonaparte, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is taken prisoner, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>.</span><br /> -</p> - -<p class="center"> -<img src="images/map1.jpg" alt="map" /> -<a id="map1" name="map1"></a> -</p> - -<p class="caption"> -Map 1. -<br /> -MAP -<br /> -TO ILLUSTRATE THE CAMPAIGN<br /> -OF MARENGO -</p> - - -<p class="center"> -<img src="images/map2.jpg" alt="map" /> -<a id="map2" name="map2"></a> -</p> - -<p class="caption"> Map 2.</p> - -<p class="center"> -<img src="images/map3.jpg" alt="map" /> -<a id="map3" name="map3"></a> -</p> -<p class="caption"> Map 3.</p> - -<p class="center"> -<img src="images/map4.jpg" alt="map" /> -<a id="map4" name="map4"></a> -</p> - -<p class="caption"> Map 4.<br /> - -BATTLE-FIELD - -OF - -MARENGO</p> - - - - -<p class="ph4" style="margin-top: 10em;">NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN.</p> - - -<p>With Comments by <span class="smcap">Herbert H. Sargent</span>, First Lieutenant Second -Cavalry, United States Army. Crown 8vo. 231 pages, with maps. $1.50.</p> - - -<p>Since its publication this work has received the enthusiastic praise of -Press and Public, and has taken an important, and in many respects a -unique, place in the ranks of Napoleonic contributions.</p> - -<p>The peculiar conciseness and lucidity of the style, and the -discriminating avoidance of technical and unessential details, have -invited the attention of a non-military public; while the preservation -of the strategic essence of the history has insured for the work a -permanent interest to the student of the art of war. The book has -been officially recognized by the United States Government,—the War -Department having purchased one hundred copies for distribution in the -service; and it has received the hearty commendation of the commander -in chief of the British army.</p> - - -<p>SOME COMMENTS FROM THE AMERICAN PRESS.</p> - -<p><i>The Nation, New York.</i></p> - -<p>The work is so clearly done, and the sketch maps so well illustrate the -successive stages of the campaign, that the general reader can follow -the story with satisfaction, and understand wherein Bonaparte was -really great.</p> - -<p><i>The Outlook, New York.</i></p> - -<p>So carefully and accurately written is this volume, that the <i>London -Times</i> pays our compatriot the compliment of begging him to continue -his history through the other campaigns of Napoleon.</p> - -<p><i>New York Herald.</i></p> - -<p>Our author has been unusually successful in presenting his subject in -such a plain and easily comprehended fashion, that if we know nothing -about the strategy of the battle-field we follow him with increasing -curiosity and pleasure.</p> - -<p><i>Chicago Evening Post.</i></p> - -<p>The author's method of study is simple: to give a careful yet simple -description of a battle and then to comment upon it. Its non-technical -character and the fascination of its subject make it an acceptable -volume for popular reading.</p> - - -<p>SOME COMMENTS FROM THE BRITISH PRESS.</p> - - -<p><i>The Times, London.</i></p> - -<p>No one, whether he be civilian or soldier, can, after the perusal of -this small volume, fail to realize vividly the stupendous genius of -Napoleon Bonaparte as manifested even in the earliest years of his -service in the field.... Valuable as is this book as a treatise on -strategy, its worth in this respect is far surpassed by its value as a -life-like portrayal of Napoleon, not only the strategist and tactician, -but the general "heaven born."</p> - - -<p><i>Army and Navy Gazette, London.</i></p> - -<p>A volume that is well worthy to be ranked with Lord Wolseley's "Decline -and Fall of Napoleon" is "Napoleon Bonaparte's First Campaign." We -do not know where to find a firmer or better picture of the Italian -campaign than in Lieutenant Sargent's volume.</p> - - -<p><i>Volunteer Service Gazette, London.</i></p> - -<p>The captious critic might be disposed, on reading the titlepage, to -inveigh against a commentary on the greatest commander of modern -times by a cavalry subaltern; but the modest, unpretentious style and -thorough knowledge of the subject are more than sufficient to disarm -any such hostile reviewer.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - - -<p>EXTRACTS FROM LETTERS RECEIVED BY THE AUTHOR.</p> - - -<p><i>Lord Wolseley, Commander in Chief of British Army.</i></p> - -<p>I have been reading Lieutenant Sargent's book on Napoleon's first -Italian campaign all the morning and was much interested. I hope it -may be studied closely by all our young officers, for it is easily -understood and tells its own story.</p> - - -<p><i>William O'Connor Morris, author of "Napoleon: Warrior, Ruler."</i></p> - -<p>I hope you will let me express to you how much I admire your work on -the first campaign of Napoleon. I do not agree in all your views, but -the sketch is most able and interesting.... You beat us easily in -military history, possibly because you have lately had a great war,—at -least, within forty years.</p> - - -<p><i>John C. Ropes, author of "The First Napoleon" and "Campaign of -Waterloo."</i></p> - -<p>I think your success in eliminating from your narrative all the -unimportant operations is extraordinary, and is only equalled by your -skill in showing how the various movements illustrate the principles -of strategy or their violation.... 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